[
 {
  "instruction":"For a number of years, United Leasing has been in charge of leasing the luxury skyboxes at City Sports Stadium, home of the local professional basketball team. During this time, it annually sent to chief executives of area businesses personalized \"invitations\" to lease skyboxes for the season. The invitations, which were always sent out several months before each season began, contained detailed price terms and language stating that the deadline for responding was 10 weeks before the start of the season and that all leases were subject to the approval of the management of United Leasing. Executives at Multimedia Marketing had always responded to their invitation immediately by registered mail because they found it very worthwhile to lease a skybox to entertain their clients. During the five years that they had responded affirmatively to the invitation, they never received any additional communications from United Leasing regarding approval, but the tickets and an invoice would arrive about a week before the season began. Several months before the current season, Multimedia received and immediately responded to its invitation. Two weeks before the season began, a stunning trade brought the league's most popular star to the City basketball team, prompting a dramatic increase in the demand for tickets. A few days later, Multimedia, which had already scheduled in a number of clients to attend games in its skybox, received a notice from United Leasing stating that management had not approved Multimedia's lease of the skybox for this season. In a separate announcement to all area businesses, United Leasing announced that all available skyboxes would be leased for three- or five-year terms, and that an auction of the leases would be conducted if the demand exceeded the supply. Multimedia decided that it was not financially feasible to commit itself to anything longer than a one-year lease. It sent a letter to United Leasing, stating that a contract was created between the parties and that United Leasing will be in breach if it does not perform. Is Multimedia correct in its assertions?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because United Leasing's failure to reject Multimedia's offer within a reasonable time constituted an acceptance under the circumstances.\nB. Yes, because United Leasing's \"invitation\" to Multimedia was an offer, which Multimedia accepted.\nC. No, because United Leasing was entitled to reject Multimedia's offer when it did.\nD. No, but Multimedia would be able to recover reliance damages from United Leasing under a quasi-contract theory. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Bulky was six foot four and weighed 280 pounds. One afternoon Bulky was wandering rather aimlessly and became lost in an unfamiliar part of the city. He reached into his pocket and discovered he only had 35 cents. He wanted to take a bus back to the city center, but bus fare was $ 1$ per ride. Bulky was rather scruffily dressed and he had not had a haircut in several months. He approached Juan, a slightly built man who was standing alone at the bus stop. In a gruff voice, Bulky asked Juan, \"Do you have any money?\" When Juan replied, \"Yes,\"'Bulky said, \"Give me five dollars!\" Juan reached into his pocket and handed Bulky a five-dollar bill. Juan walked away from the bus and flagged down a passing patrol car. Juan told the police, \"I've been robbed,\" and pointed out Bulky, who was still standing at the bus stop. Bulky was arrested and charged with robbery. At Bulky's trial, Bulky took the stand in his own defense. Bulky testified, \"I wasn't trying to rob anybody. I was just trying to beg some money to get myself back home.\" If the jury believes Bulky's testimony, Bulky should be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not guilty of robbery, because Bulky lacked the requisite criminal intent.\nB. Guilty of robbery, because Bulky took Juan's money after intimidating him, and the effect of Bulky's size on Juan, rather than Bulky's intent, is controlling.\nC. Not guilty of robbery, but guilty of assault, because Bulky placed Juan in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm.\nD. Guilty of both robbery and assault, because assault is not a lesser included offense of robbery.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Orville conveyed Redacre \"to my best friend, Nelson, and upon Nelson's death to my daughter, Dora.\" Nelson took up possession of Redacre and lived there for two years. He then conveyed \"my interest in Redacre\" to his longtime, and much younger, mistress, Magnolia. Although Dora was fond of her father's friend, Nelson, she could not abide Magnolia, and the thought of Magnolia taking over Redacre made Dora sick. Dora tried to get Magnolia to leave Redacre, but Magnolia told Dora, \"Redacre is mine until I die, and you'd better get used to that idea.\" Since Magnolia took up residence on Redacre, she has been sent two county property tax bills, which she has refused to pay. The county is now threatening to bring an action to force a judicial sale of Redacre to cover the tax deficiency. Dora files an appropriate suit asking the court to evict Magnolia from Redacre and to compel her to pay the taxes for her period of occupancy. The court will rule that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Magnolia has a life estate in Redacre for the period of her own life, and Magnolia must pay the taxes on the property.\nB. Magnolia has a life estate in Redacre for the period of Nelson's life, and Magnolia must pay the taxes on the property.\nC. Magnolia has a life estate in Redacre for the period of Nelson's life, but Magnolia does not have to pay the taxes on the property, because taxes are the responsibility of the remainder grantee.\nD. Dora owns Redacre, because Nelson could not convey his interest to Magnolia.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In 2000, Rogan Josh, then age 15, emigrated with his family from Dopyaza, an Asian country. Although Josh maintained Dopyazan citizenship, he held resident alien status and complied with all federal laws and regulations regarding maintenance of resident alien status. Upon arrival in the United States, Josh, his parents, and his siblings took up residence in the state of New Jingo. In 2003, Rogan Josh began'a course of studies in petroleum engineering at New Jingo University, a state institution. Because he was a resident of New Jingo, Josh qualified for the \"in-state\" tuition rate. The \"nonresident\" tuition rate was 10 times the in-state rate, and it would be impossible for Josh to attend New Jingo University if he were required to pay the nonresident tuition. In 2005, the legislature of New Jingo passed a statute denying in-state tuition rates at any statesupported college or university for any resident aliens who were citizens of \"any country which, during the previous five-year period, has held citizens of the United States as hostages.\" Due to an international dispute between the United States and the government of Dopyaza, the Dopyazan government had held six American citizens as hostages for a four-month period in 2002. The registrar of New Jingo University, where Josh has successfully completed two years of study, informed Josh that he would have to pay the nonresident tuition rate in order to begin his junior year. Josh cannot afford to pay the tuition. If Josh files an appropriate suit asking the federal courts to strike down the New Jingo statute, which of the following is his best argument? \n\nOptions:\nA. Because higher education is now so important for earning a livelihood, it has become a fundamental right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nB. Resident aliens cannot be blamed in retrospect for actions of their governments and, therefore, the New Jingo statute violates the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws.\nC. Alienage is a suspect category under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and New Jingo has not met the appropriate standard to burden Josh.\nD. Attending a state-supported university in a state where one is a legal resident is a property right that may not be taken away without due process of law. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Bernaise, the sole proprietor of Bernaise Distributors, a food service and food brokerage concern, entered into oral negotiations with Hollandaise, president and chief executive officer of Holsauce, a corporation that manufactured gourmet food products for restaurants and select retail outlets. Bernaise wished to secure an exclusive distributorship for Holsauce products in the six New England states. After some discussion, Bernaise and Hollandaise agreed on all salient points and shook hands on the deal. They agreed further that Hobson, Holsauce's general counsel, would reduce the agreement to writing and that the agreement would become effective after it was drawn up and initialed by Hobson and by Barker, Bernaise's counsel. Hobson duly committed the agreement to writing and sent the writing to Barker, but without initialing it first. Barker looked over the agreement, made no changes, initialed it, and mailed the agreement to Hobson on May 1. On May 2, Hollandaise decided that Bechamel would be a better distributor than Bernaise. Therefore, also on May 2, Hollandaise had Hobson telephone Barker, telling him, \"The deal's off.\" Barker responded, \"The heck it is. We have an enforceable contract.\" Hobson received the written agreement with Barker's initials on it on May 3. According to Hollandaise's instructions, Holsauce began to distribute its products in New England through Bechamel. If Bernaise files suit against Hollandaise and Holsauce for breach, he is likely to:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, because the mailing of the written agreement to Barker constituted an irrevocable offer.\nB. Prevail, because Bernaise and Hollandaise entered into a valid oral contract.\nC. Not prevail, because Hobson never initialed the written agreement and there was, therefore, failure of an express condition.\nD. Not prevail, because Hobson's phone call to Barker constituted a valid revocation before acceptance.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Babe was a professional baseball player who was known both for his prowess at the plate and his perceived \"heart of gold.\" One day, Babe was visiting a sick boy named Jimmy in the hospital. Babe was touched by Jimmy's will to live despite a very poor prognosis. In a moment of weakness, Babe told Jimmy that in consideration of Jimmy's courage, he would do anything that Jimmy asked. Jimmy's eyes momentarily gleamed as he asked Babe to \"hit a homer for me in your next game.\" Babe replied, \"Sure kid.\" As Babe was leaving Jimmy's hospital room, Jimmy's father, Joe, pulled Babe aside and told Babe, \"It would mean a lot to Jimmy if you would hit a home run for him in your next game. The medicinal value of raising Jimmy's spirits would be priceless.\" Babe replied, \"Hey man, we all have problems. I don't work for the Make a Wish Foundation.\" Undaunted, Joe repeated that it would really raise Jimmy's spirits if Babe would hit a homer, and as incentive, Joe told Babe that he would pay Babe $ 5,000$ if Babe did hit a home run in his next game. Babe replied, \"You've got a deal.\" To raise his chances of collecting the $ 5,000$ from Joe, Babe took extra batting practice before his next game, and the practice paid off because in his next game, Babe hit two home runs. During a post-game interview, Babe explained, \"I did it for little Jimmy, who is in the hospital.\" After showering, Babe went directly to Joe's house and asked Joe for $ 5,000$. Babe's contract with his ball club does not forbid him from accepting money from fans for good performance. If Joe refuses to pay and Babe brings an action against Joe for damages, which of the following is correct under the modern trend in contract law?\n\nOptions:\nA. Babe can recover the $ 5,000$ because the preexisting duty rule does not apply where the duty is owed to a third person.\nB. Babe can recover the $ 5,000$ if he can prove that the value of the home run to Jimmy is at least $ 5,000$. \nC. Babe cannot recover from Joe because Babe had a preexisting duty to use his best efforts to hit home runs.\nD. Babe cannot recover from Joe because, even under the modern trend, moral consideration is not valid.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dassent was on trial on a hit and run charge, whereby the prosecution asserts that, while driving his vehicle, Dassent struck and injured Proctor, an elderly pedestrian, and then sped away from the scene of the accident without stopping to assess Proctor's injuries or to render assistance. During the prosecution's presentation of its case, three eyewitnesses testified that the car that struck Proctor had the license plate number DASS 53. A witness from the State Department of Motor Vehicles produced records showing that a vehicle with license number DASS 53 was registered in Dassent's name and that Dassent claimed on his driver's license application that he was born in 1953. Dassent took the stand in his own defense. He admitted that a car meeting the description of the vehicle given by the eyewitnesses and bearing a license plate with the number DASS 53 belonged to him, but Dassent denied having driven the vehicle on the day that Proctor was injured. Without releasing Dassent as a witness, his lawyer called Father White, an Episcopal priest, to the stand. White is ready to testify that he has known Dassent for 12 years, that Dassent has performed many charitable acts, and that Dassent is a highly responsible person \"who would not run away from his obligations by leaving the scene of an accident.\" If the prosecution objects to White's proposed testimony, should the court bar White from testifying?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because the testimony shows that Dassent is a person of good character.\nB. No, because the testimony is habit evidence tending to show that it was unlikely that Dassent was the perpetrator.\nC. Yes, because one may not use character evidence to bolster one's own testimony.\nD. Yes, because the prosecution has not made an issue of Dassent's character.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In response to growing concern over public health issues, Congress passed legislation permitting states to completely ban the sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products. The legislation was subsequently upheld by the United States Supreme Court. The state of Jefferson, like most states, did not enact a complete ban on tobacco products. However, it passed a compromise measure that banned all ads for cigarettes and tobacco products by any print or broadcast media located in the state. A state tobacco distributor that wished to advertise in local newspapers brings an action in federal court to challenge the state statute. The court will probably find the statute:\n\nOptions:\nA. Unconstitutional, because by choosing not to exercise its right to impose a complete ban on the sale of tobacco products, the state can no longer claim that the regulation of advertising serves a substantial government interest.\nB. Unconstitutional, because the right to ban all truthful advertising for a product is not automatically justified by the right to ban the sale of a product entirely.\nC. Constitutional, because the state's power to ban advertising for a product is implicit in its power to ban the product altogether.\nD. Constitutional, because the ban on advertising constitutes a restriction on commercial speech that is rationally related to the legitimate state interest in reducing the use of tobacco products. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mommy's young son, Boy, accidentally swallowed a coin while playing. Boy had to be rushed to the hospital, and although Boy recovered, Mommy has suffered feelings of anxiety, worrying that her child might be injured again. Mommy's husband, Hal, talked Mommy into going to a movie to have a relaxing evening out. She agreed after her mother agreed to watch Boy for the evening. Mommy was enjoying the movie when Hal left his seat to get some popcorn from the concession stand. Hal ordered a large popcorn with extra butter. While handling change, Dizzie, the concession stand attendant, carelessly dropped a quarter into Hal's popcorn. After taking a couple of handfuls for himself, Hal returned to his seat and gave the popcorn box to Mommy. Mommy began to eat the popcorn. However, as she began to munch her third handful of popcorn, she bit the quarter that Dizzie had dropped into the box. Mommy did not swallow the quarter, nor did she bite on it hard enough to injure her teeth or gums, but the feel of the coin brought back all her anxieties about Boy's injury. That night Mommy could not sleep, and the few times that she did nod off for a second, a horrible nightmare recalling her son's injury because of the coin would occur. If Mommy sues the movie theater for her emotional distress, she will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Win, because Dizzie was negligent.\nB. Win, because Mommy suffered emotional distress.\nC. Lose, unless a reasonable person would have suffered similar distress after finding a coin in the popcorn and biting on it.\nD. Lose, because Mommy suffered no actionable harm. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Penquist was exiting from a parking garage owned and operated by the city of Durham when he discovered that the exit ramp was blocked by construction barricades and a pile of broken-up concrete. No workers or detour signs were around and Penquist was in a hurry, so he backed up and drove down an entrance ramp that was clearly marked as such. As he came around a corner, his car was broadsided by a pickup truck driven by Totten. Penquist was seriously injured in the collision. A statute in the jurisdiction requires drivers to obey all traffic directional markings in both public and private parking lots and garages. The jurisdiction retains traditional contributory negligence rules and retains governmental immunity for municipalities. If Penquist brings a lawsuit against the city to recover for his injuries, which of the following facts will be least helpful in the city's defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. Penquist was aware that another exit on the other side of the garage was open.\nB. The construction workers responsible for blocking off the exit ramp were employees of an independent contractor rather than the city.\nC. The city does not collect fees or make a profit in the operation of the garage.\nD. Totten could have avoided Penquist but recognized him as an old enemy and deliberately ran into him.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Patrice sued David on a breach of contract theory. Winston testified for Patrice. On crossexamination, which of the following questions is the trial judge most likely to rule improper?\n\nOptions:\nA. \"Weren't you convicted last year of forgery?\"\nB. \"Isn't it true that you and Patrice have been best friends for many years?\"\nC. \"Isn't it true that you are known in the community as an alcoholic?\"'\nD. \"Didn't you cheat your business partner out of a large amount of money last month?'",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Fred, a licensed real estate broker, and Tom, a homeowner, entered into a written listing agreement in which, among other things, Tom promised to pay Fred a commission of $6 \\%$ of the selling price of Tom's home if Fred obtained a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase it. Tom's home was listed in a service made available to real estate professionals, with an asking price of $ 80,000$. Murray, looking for a home to buy, went to Fred's real estate office and was shown Tom's home. He submitted a written offer to purchase the home for $ 80,000$, but Tom rejected this offer by, according to its terms, not accepting it within a stated period. Tom did not want to sell to Murray because, given the amount Murray had intended to borrow, Tom would have had to take back a second mortgage for a portion of his equity, and he did not consider Murray a good credit risk. Murray brings an action against Tom for specific performance, seeking to compel him to sell the home. What is the probable outcome of this litigation?\n\nOptions:\nA. Tom will win, because no writing or writings constitute a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.\nB. Tom will win, because Murray's remedy at law is adequate.\nC. Murray will win, because he is a thirdparty beneficiary of the agreement between Tom and Fred.\nD. Murray will win, because there is a memorandum that satisfies the Statute of Frauds.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Both Kenton and Evan owned their own homes on large tracts of land next to each other in the country. Evan, a physics teacher at the local college, was also a model rocket enthusiast. On many occasions he would launch one of his rockets from the back area of his property, and although none of Evan's rockets ever came near Kenton's property, Kenton was understandably upset. Kenton complained to Evan several times about his hobby and the fact that Evan stored flammable fuels in his house. Once, Kenton complained to the county sheriff, whereupon Evan was charged with violating a local ordinance that prohibits the improper storage of flammable liquids on residential property. He was given a warning and told that he must have proper storage permits and facilities if he intended to keep the fuels for his model rockets on his property. Although Evan obtained the proper permits to build underground storage tanks for his fuels, he continued to store them in 55gallon drums in a shed located on the edge of his property farthest away from Kenton. Eventually, Kenton brought a suit based on public nuisance against Evan. If Kenton is seeking an injunction against Evan to prevent his storing flammable liquids on his property and his launching model rockets, the defense by which Evan most likely would prevail is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. He obtained a permit from the city to build storage tanks for the fuels.\nB. There is no showing that Kenton suffered any special damage.\nC. This is not a residential neighborhood.\nD. There is no specific ordinance that prohibits Evan from launching model rockets on his own property.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The Federal Endangered Species Act imposes criminal penalties for killing certain specified animals that have been determined by Congress to be of importance to the tourism industry in the region in which the animal is located. Among the animals protected are the Puce Bandicoots of the Great Spotted Valley area of the state of Wilderness. The state of Wilderness classifies Puce Bandicoots as varmints that may be destroyed at will by anyone with a general hunting license. Rancher, who possesses a valid state of Wilderness general hunting license, regularly shoots and kills Puce Bandicoots that prey upon his artichoke plants. If Rancher is prosecuted under the federal statute, and challenges the constitutionality of the law, which of the following is the strongest constitutional argument in support of the federal statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. The commerce power.\nB. The Necessary and Proper Clause.\nC. The police power.\nD. The power to regulate federal lands.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Plumber, a plumbing contractor, sued Drain, a homeowner. Plumber alleged that Drain refused to pay for extensive pipe repairs performed on Drain's home by Wilson, an employee of Plumber. Plumber called Wilson to the stand as a witness. Wilson, under oath, testified that he did not perform any work at Drain's home. Wilson also denied writing a letter to Lorca telling Lorca that Wilson was going to do plumbing work on Drain's house. Without releasing Wilson as a witness, Plumber offers in evidence the letter written by Wilson to Lorca. Which of the following is not a proper basis for admitting Wilson's letter?\n\nOptions:\nA. Testimony by Wilson's wife that she recognizes Wilson's handwriting.\nB. Lorca's testimony that the statements in the letter are responsive to a prior letter from Lorca to Wilson.\nC. Comparison by the jury of the Wilson- Lorca letter with another letter that Wilson has admitted writing.\nD. In-court comparison by Lorca, a nonexpert, of the Wilson-Lorca letter with another letter that Wilson has admitted writing. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Julio, a vintner, ordered two large stainless steel tanks from Metalworks, Inc. for use in his wine making business. A month after they were installed, the building in which they were housed burned to the ground. Julio brought suit against Metalworks, Inc., alleging that overheating of the tanks caused the fire. Metalworks's defense is that the fire was caused by Julio's failure to install modern electrical wiring in the rather old building. At trial, Julio seeks to establish that the tanks overheated by testifying that, two weeks after the tanks were installed, a Metalworks, Inc. employee came to inspect the installation, and Julio said to him, \"You know, sometimes these tanks get awful hot.\" Should Julio be permitted to so testify?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, unless there has been no other evidence about overheating of the tanks presented by Julio.\nB. No, because Julio's testimony is inadmissible hearsay.\nC. Yes, because Julio's testimony is evidence of a fact in issue.\nD. Yes, because Julio's testimony is evidence of a verbal act. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"At a products liability trial, one of the most critical issues is whether the temperature was below freezing on January 16. Akiro does drafting work at an architectural and civil engineering firm, but Akiro is also an avid amateur meteorologist. The backyard of Akiro's home is rigged with many weather detection instruments that track wind, temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, and precipitation. One of Akiro's instruments records temperature by markings from a stylus on a round barograph. Akiro's record of the day in question indicates that it was unseasonably warm and that the temperature never fell lower than 48 degrees Fahrenheit, 16 degrees above the freezing mark. The plaintiff offers into evidence Akiro's barograph record of the temperature on January 16. The barograph record is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as past recollection recorded.\nB. Admissible, as a record of regularly con- ducted activity.\nC. Inadmissible, unless foundation testimony is given as to the accuracy and good working order of Akiro's instrument on the day in question.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Don's car struck Phaedra, a pedestrian, at a busy intersection. Bob was a bystander at the scene of the accident. As soon as Phaedra was hit Bob blurted out, \"My God, she was crossing on the green light!\" Wilma was standing next to Bob at the time. She did not see the accident because she was facing the other direction, but she clearly heard Bob's exclamation. That night Bob was talking to his friend Walter. He told Walter, \"You know that accident I saw this afternoon? The driver didn't run a red light. The light was yellow.\" Phaedra sued Don for her injuries. By the time the case came to trial, Bob had died of a heart attack. Phaedra called Wilma to the stand to testify as to Bob's statement that Phaedra was crossing on a green light. Although Don objected, Wilma's testimony was admitted as an excited utterance. Don now wishes to call Walter to the stand to testify as to Bob's statement that Don did not run a red light. Phaedra objects. Should Walter's testimony be admitted?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, but only to challenge the credibility of Bob's earlier inconsistent statement.\nB. Yes, both for impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence.\nC. No, because Bob is not available to explain or deny the statement.\nD. No, because it is hearsay, not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Prole was the chief operating officer of the Squidco Division of Octopus Corp., a privately held manufacturing and marketing firm. The Squidco plant was the major employer in Middletown, and Prole was a respected figure with a good reputation in the community. He served on the boards of several Middletown charities and was otherwise active in civic activities. Prole was suddenly fired by Dante, the executive vice president of Octopus Corp., prompting rumors about the financial health of Squidco. A reporter from the Middletown Herald interviewed Dante, and asked Dante why Prole had been dismissed. Dante said: \"Prole was fired because Prole was a bad manager and Squidco Division lost money because of Prole's stewardship.\" Dante's statement was printed in the Middletown Herald, and was picked up by business-oriented publications. If Prole sues the Middletown Herald for defamation, which of the following statements with regard to damages is correct?\n\nOptions:\nA. To prevail, Prole must plead and prove pecuniary damages, such as an inability to find a position with another company.\nB. To prevail, Prole must show evidence of actual injury, such as mental distress.\nC. Damages are presumed because the written repetition of a slander is characterized as libel.\nD. Damages are presumed if Prole is not deemed to be a public figure.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Daisy is on trial for fraud. One item of critical evidence in this trial is a check for $ 10,000$ that purportedly was signed by her. Daisy has denied that she signed the check in question. The prosecutor calls Julius, the landlord of the apartment building in which Daisy resided for three months before her arrest. Julius intends to testify that it is Daisy's signature on the check, and he bases his opinion of the authenticity of her signature on the ground that he saw her sign the lease to his apartment. The trial court should find this testimony:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because there was only a short period of time between when Julius saw her sign the lease and the time of trial.\nB. Admissible, because any lay person can testify to the authenticity of another's signature, if that witness has previously seen that person's signature.\nC. Inadmissible, because Julius has only seen the signature once and is not acting as a handwriting expert.\nD. Inadmissible, because the testimony is inherently unreliable.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Powell owned a parcel of land in the mountains near Redwoods National Forest that had been improved by the construction of a permanent campground, consisting of wooden floors and frames for tents, a wooden mess hall with kitchen, and wooden outhouses. Each year he allowed the Boy Scouts to use the parcel, Camp Whachacallit, for their annual summer camp. The rest of the year Powell and his family and friends used the parcel for camping and other recreation. Powell's will devised the parcel as follows: \"Camp Whachacallit to my nephew Ronald, his heirs and assigns, so long as it is used for camping and recreational purposes, otherwise to the National Council of the Boy Scouts of America.\" Powell died in 1996. The residuary clause of his will left all his property not devised in the remainder of the will to his daughter Erma, who was also his sole heir. Erma died intestate in 2002 , her only heir being her son Harold. The jurisdiction's decisional law follows the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, and a statute provides that future estates and interests are alienable, and may be devised or inherited, all in the same manner as possessory estates or interests. In 2003 , which of the following best describes the interests of Harold and the National Council of the Boy Scouts of America in Camp Whachacallit?\n\nOptions:\nA. Harold has a possibility of reverter and the Boy Scouts' Council has an executory interest.\nB. Harold has an executory interest and the Boy Scouts' Council has nothing.\nC. Harold has a possibility of reverter and the Boys Scouts' Council has a contingent remainder.\nD. Harold has a possibility of reverter and the Boy Scouts' Council has nothing.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"All the land and buildings comprising Miller's Mall, a small shopping center, were owned by Miller, who leased out various stores in the mall. Dwight obtained a two-year lease from Miller on one of the stores. Dwight then opened a gift and greeting card shop which he named \"Happy Times Cards and Gifts.\" Dwight's business was quite successful, and he was making good profits from the store's operation when he underwent a religious conversion and decided that the true meaning of life was not to be found in the quest for material success. Dwight spoke with his friend, Ariel, who was anxious to go into business for herself. Ariel wished to buy Dwight's business and inventory, and Dwight wished to assign his lease on the store in Miller's Mall to Ariel. The lease still had 14 months left to run. Dwight told Miller that he wanted to assign his lease to Ariel, who would run the same kind of business. Miller took out his copy of the lease and pointed out a clause requiring consent to any assignment and providing that any attempted assignment without consent is grounds for terminating the lease. Miller refused to consent to the assignment. Dwight assigned the lease to Ariel anyway; then he went off to meditate under the direction of a famed guru who operated an ashram high in the Himalayas. Ariel operated the card store in the same manner as Dwight, the only difference being a change of the store's name to \"Happier Days Cards and Gifts.\" Has Miller any recourse against Dwight or Ariel?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, he may evict Ariel and collect damages from Dwight because nonassignment clauses are valid and enforceable.\nB. No, the nonassignment clause is invalid in this case because Miller has a duty to mitigate damages.\nC. No, because Ariel is operating the same type of business as Dwight, and Miller has suffered no damages resulting from the assignment.\nD. No, because nonassignment clauses are invalid restraints upon alienation. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dietz had recently been released from a mental institution, and was living in a halfway house in Kirbyville. Dietz had a long history of mental illness and had been in and out of institutions since he was an adolescent. Although Dietz would improve for a while, he was subject to recurrent hallucinations and delusions involving a belief that people, animals, and alien beings from another planet were about to attack him. Pansy was peacefully walking along a quiet residential street in Kirbyville. It happened to be the same street as that along which Dietz was walking. Pansy noticed that a person was walking up the street on the sidewalk towards her, but she did not know Dietz. When Dietz saw Pansy approaching him, he pulled a softdrink bottle from his shopping bag and hurled it at Pansy, striking her in the head and causing her injury. Afterwards Pansy filed a civil battery action against Dietz. Which of the following, if true, provides the best defense for Dietz?\n\nOptions:\nA. Dietz had no desire to harm Pansy.\nB. Because of his mental illness, Dietz did not understand that his act was wrongful.\nC. Dietz did not know he was striking a person.\nD. Dietz thought Pansy was about to attack him.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ten years ago Gasmask Chemicals, a leading chemical manufacturer, decided that it needed a safe place to store byproduct waste from its manufacturing processes. Many of these byproducts were highly toxic; thus, Gasmask took great care in selecting a dump site. A highly reputable engineering company was hired and an exhaustive survey was performed. Finally the Temblor Canyon site was selected and the chemicals were stored there underground, using state-of-the-art techniques. Although the survey and attendant geological soundings were performed with consummate skill, the surveyors failed to discover a crack in the rock of the storage area that was too small for their instruments to detect. Over a period of years the chemicals began to seep through the crack and into the water table below the surface. Scientists in nearby Canyon City discovered that the city's water supply, all of which came from local wells that tapped into the water table, contained unacceptably high levels of chemical contaminants. Canyon City was required to spend $ 5$ million on a complex filtration system to remove the dangerous chemicals from its water. Canyon City brought an action against Gasmask to recover the cost of building the filtration system. At the end of plaintiff's case establishing the above facts, Gasmask moved for a directed verdict. Should the court grant Gasmask's motion?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Canyon City has not presented any evidence that Gasmask breached a duty owed to the city.\nB. Yes, if the evidence also established that Canyon City's water wells were drilled after Gasmask stored the chemicals.\nC. No, if the court determines as a matter of law that the chemicals could not be stored without risk of serious harm no matter how much care Gasmask took.\nD. No, because the trier of fact could determine that the chemicals could not be stored without risk of serious harm no matter how much care Gasmask took. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Popeye owned a large fleet of buses. He was fortunate enough to have won the contract to bus all the schoolchildren in a large midwestern city and most of its surrounding suburbs. He purchased a number of new vehicles to expand his fleet. Popeye had farmed out the maintenance of the buses to a number of different repair shops, but he now desired the consistent results obtainable from dealing with one repair and maintenance operation. He therefore contracted in writing with Bluto that all general maintenance and extraordinary repairs required for Popeye's buses would be performed by Bluto, who owned and operated \"Bluto's Bus and Truck Center.\" A schedule of fees for most standard repairs was included in the contract. It happened that Popeye's wife, Olive, owned and operated a small advertising agency. Popeye wanted Olive's business to succeed, and so he included a clause in his agreement with Bluto that Bluto would place all his ads for his repair shop through Olive's agency during the oneyear term of the agreement. Assume for purposes of this question only that Popeye dutifully sent all his buses to Bluto for repair and maintenance. However, six months into the agreement, Popeye divorced Olive. Although Bluto had been placing all his ads through Olive, Popeye told Bluto, \"You don't have to place ads with Olive anymore.\" Bluto promptly began placing ads through another agency. Olive then learned of the agreement between Popeye and Bluto. Popeye continued to send all his buses to Bluto. Can Olive enforce the agreement in her favor?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because she was an intended beneficiary of the agreement between Popeye and Bluto.\nB. Yes, because Olive had an enforceable contract with Bluto concerning the advertising.\nC. No, because Popeye and Bluto had a right to modify their agreement without Olive's permission.\nD. No, because Olive was a gratuitous beneficiary whose rights depended on her status as Popeye's wife.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When she died, Clara left a valid holographic will that contained the following provision: I want my only child, Truman, to have my house when I die and to live there as long as he wants. After that, I want it to go to my grandchildren. At the time of Clara's death, Truman was married to Dina, and they had a married son, Sam. Both Truman and Dina moved into the house, but about six months later, they separated and Dina moved out. The following year, Truman and Sam were involved in an airplane crash in which Truman was immediately killed. Several weeks later, Sam died, leaving his young widow, Tanya. Dina brings a suit against Tanya claiming an interest in the house as Truman's widow. There is no statute in this jurisdiction that governs the issue of the right of an estranged spouse to inherit property from a decedent spouse, but if Truman is found to own property at the time of his death, it is possible that Dina could inherit one-half as his surviving spouse. In this suit, Dina should most likely:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, because Clara's will gave Truman a fee simple interest in the property.\nB. Prevail, because the devise to Clara's grandchildren in her will is invalid as it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.\nC. Not prevail, because Sam had a vested remainder interest subject to open, which became indefeasibly vested. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Seth owned Slateacre, a rental property in Rock City that generated steady income. After Seth's second child was born, Seth properly executed a will containing the following disposition of Slateacre: \"To Truman in trust to pay the educational expenses of my children, but if any of them do not graduate from Rockville University by the age of 30 , then for the benefit of Rockville University's scholarship fund for residents of Rock City.\" When Seth died, he had three children, all preschoolers. The jurisdiction in which the parties and property are located retains the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Is the gift in trust to Rockville University valid?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the gift is a valid charitable trust.\nB. Yes, because the doctrine of cy pres is applicable.\nC. No, because the gift is not for a valid charitable purpose.\nD. No, because the gift violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A standard commercial unit for widgets is one gross, i.e., 144 widgets. Buyer ordered from Seller 50 gross of widgets at $ 100$ per gross, with the widgets to be delivered on or before October 3. On September 15, 50 boxes arrived from Seller. Each box was labeled, \"Widgetsone gross.\" On finding that one of the boxes contains 143 widgets, Buyer considered whether to: I. Seek cover. II. Immediately sue for breach. III. Reject the entire shipment of widgets. Which of the above can Buyer do?\n\nOptions:\nA. I. and III. only.\nB. I. and II. only.\nC. III. only.\nD. I., II., and III.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress enacted a statute, over the President's veto, that granted Congress the power to compel the President to remove United States troops from foreign territory when such troops have for 60 days been engaged in hostilities and there has been no formal declaration of war. The statute also provided that Congress may force the President to withdraw the troops before the 60 days have elapsed if Congress passes a joint resolution to that effect. Which of the following statements best describes the likely result of judicial review of the constitutional validity of this statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. The statute is a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the war power.\nB. The statute is constitutionally suspect as an infringement on the President's exclusive power, as commander in chief, over matters relating to war.\nC. The statute is a valid exercise of Congress's foreign relations powers.\nD. The statute is constitutionally suspect, because the joint resolution is not subject to a presidential veto.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Harry and Wilma were going through a divorce proceeding and were contesting the value of their house. Harry, a real estate agent familiar with property values in the area, had personally prepared an appraisal shortly before commencement of the divorce proceedings. The appraisal document stated that the house was worth $ 200,000$. Nora, a next-door neighbor of Harry and Wilma's, had seen this appraisal document. During settlement negotiations, Harry maintained that the house was worth $ 180,000$. When negotiations proved to be fruitless, the parties proceeded to trial. At trial, Wilma called Nora to testify as to the value placed on the house in the appraisal document. Nora's only knowledge as to the house's value comes from having read the document. Harry's attorney objects. May Nora testify as to the value stated in the appraisal document?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because she has personal knowledge of the contents of the document.\nB. Yes, if Harry has destroyed the document.\nC. No, because the appraisal document is the best, and thus the only admissible, evidence.\nD. No, because Nora's testimony would be inadmissible hearsay.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Denise, a 12-year-old girl, entered a grocery store. When she believed that no one was looking, she grabbed two packages of \"Blinkies,\" a popular confectionery item, and concealed them under her coat. As she attempted to leave the store, Gordon, a security guard employed by the store, grabbed Denise by the arm. He told her, \"You're too young to be a thief!\"' Denise began crying and blurted out, \"I lost my lunch money on the way to school and I was really hungry!\" If Denise is charged with shoplifting, what is the State's best argument that Denise's Miranda rights have not been violated by Gordon?\n\nOptions:\nA. Gordon's statement was not interrogatory.\nB. It is discretionary whether to give juveniles Miranda warnings.\nC. Denise has not yet been arrested and formally charged with any crime.\nD. Gordon was not a government agent.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Simpson and two others were indicted on felony charges for electronic theft of bank accounts. Simpson protested that he was innocent and wanted to prove it at trial, but agreed to discuss a plea bargain with the district attorney. The district attorney indicated that he would also charge Simpson with additional theft by computer offenses if Simpson insisted on going to trial, but that if he pleaded guilty to the one charge and agreed to testify against his codefendants at their trial, the prosecution would recommend probation only. Because of the risk of jail time if he was convicted of any of the additional offenses, Simpson agreed. When Simpson appeared in court, the judge informed him of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment, and that Simpson was waiving his right to trial by pleading guilty. She asked if his plea was voluntary and he replied that it was the best deal that he could get, but that he was really innocent of the crime charged. The judge nevertheless accepted the plea, reserving sentencing until Simpson testified against his co-defendants. Just before trial of Simpson's co-defendants, they pleaded guilty and provided additional information of Simpson's central role in the crime and in additional computer theft offenses. At Simpson's sentencing, the prosecution introduced the testimony of Simpson's codefendants and asked the judge to impose a jail term. The judge sentenced Simpson to five years in prison for the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Simpson appeals his sentence, raising the following arguments: I. The prosecution threatened to bring additional charges when Simpson indicated that he was going to exercise his right to go to trial. II. The judge accepted Simpson's guilty plea despite his claim of innocence. III. The prosecution did not adhere to the plea bargain after Simpson's co-defendants pleaded guilty. Which of the above arguments provide a valid basis for vacating Simpson's guilty plea and sentence?\n\nOptions:\nA. I. and III.\nB. I., II., and III.\nC. II. and III.\nD. III. only. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dunbad was on trial for the murder of his wife Victa. During the course of the trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence that, six months before Victa's death, Dunbad had purchased a large insurance policy on her life, and two weeks prior to her death he purchased two more large policies on Victa's life from separate insurance carriers. If the defense objects to admission of such evidence, the objection should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because such evidence would be more prejudicial than probative.\nB. Sustained, because evidence of insurance is inadmissible as a matter of public policy.\nC. Overruled, because the evidence tends to establish motive.\nD. Overruled, because the evidence tends to establish criminal propensity.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Hiram owned a residence on a large parcel of land that included a tennis court and a private golf course. He wanted to be sure that members of his family would continue to enjoy the recreational facilities and have a \"family home\" at which all the relatives could gather, so he provided in his will that the property would pass upon his death \"to Horace, my son, for life, then to my eldest grandchild living at Horace's death, for life, remainder to my great-grandchildren, share and share alike.\" When Hiram died, he was survived by his wife, his son Horace, Horace's children Candace and Suzanne, Hiram's daughter Elvira, and Elvira's children Leon and Emily. Candace was the eldest of the grandchildren, followed in age by Leon, Suzanne, and Emily. After Hiram's death, Horace had another child, Chester, and Elvira had two more children, John and Nancy, born in respective order. When Horace died many years later, Candace and Leon had predeceased him, and seven great-grandchildren (of Hiram) had been born. At Horace's death, in whom is title to the property vested?\n\nOptions:\nA. Hiram's heirs.\nB. Candace, Suzanne, Leon, and Emily.\nC. Suzanne for life, remainder to the great- grandchildren.\nD. Suzanne for life, remainder to Hiram's heirs. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Sandra had 30,000 miles on her car when she purchased four new \"Huggums\" tires from Mac's Tire and Muffler Shop. The \"Huggums\" tires were manufactured by Kimbo Tire and Rubber Company, a reputable tire manufacturer. It was widely known in the tire industry that purchasers of tires would, on occasion, exceed posted speed limits, and therefore tires were designed to perform at speeds higher than the maximum speed of 65 m.p.h. allowable in most states. Sandra was a safe and careful driver who never exceeded the speed limit. When Sandra's car had 32,000 miles on it, she sold the car to Pedro. Pedro immediately took the car on a 500-mile trip to visit his sister. During the course of the journey, Pedro often drove his car 10 m.p.h. over the posted limit of 65 m.p.h. As Pedro approached his destination, he was driving 73 m.p.h. on smooth pavement. Suddenly his left front tire blew out for no apparent reason. The car went out of control, crashed into another vehicle, and Pedro was severely injured. If Pedro sues Mac's for his injuries in a jurisdiction retaining traditional contributory negligence rules, Pedro should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because the tire blew out for no apparent reason.\nB. Recover, if the tire was defective when it left Kimbo's manufacturing plant.\nC. Not recover, if Mac's had no reason to know or anticipate that there would be any defects in \"Huggums\" tires.\nD. Not recover, because Pedro was contributorily negligent in exceeding the speed limit.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Kuegler, who had a long list of petty crimes to his credit, cased the Jaymart Department Store for a week. He noticed that a display case containing very expensive watches was near one of the store's exit doors. He planned to steal the watches by setting a diversionary fire in a trash basket, hoping that this would distract the store security personnel long enough for Kuegler to break the glass covering the watch case, grab the watches, and run out the nearby exit. Kuegler knew that the store had an automatic sprinkler system that would promptly douse the fire, but his purpose was merely to create a distraction rather than to cause any damage to the building. One afternoon at 2:30 p.m., Kuegler entered the Jaymart. He advanced to a trash barrel and poured some lighter fluid onto the trash. He threw the lighter fluid can into the barrel and tossed in a match after it. The lighter fluid immediately caused a long flame to rise. The flame quickly charred the wall next to the barrel and blistered the paint on the surrounding area. No serious damage was done to the structure, because the sprinklers operated as designed and quickly put out the fire before it could spread. Kuegler made a dash toward the case containing the watches, but just as he was breaking the glass case, one of the store's security guards apprehended Kuegler and called the police. Kuegler was read his Miranda rights and taken into police custody. A statute in the jurisdiction extends the crime of arson to buildings other than dwellings. Which of the following best describes the crimes, if any, of which Kuegler could be properly convicted?\n\nOptions:\nA. Larceny only.\nB. Larceny and attempted arson.\nC. Attempted larceny and arson.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"As Sandra, a newspaper reporter, was walking to her home, she saw undercover officer Cole chasing Tim. Cole yelled, \"Don't let him get away. I'm a police officer and he's just mugged a man!\" Sandra immediately put out her leg and tripped Tim. When Tim fell, he broke his glasses and badly gashed his cheek. If Sandra was sued by Tim for battery, she would have:\n\nOptions:\nA. No valid defense unless she had other reasons to believe Cole was a police officer besides his statement.\nB. A valid defense if Sandra believed that Cole had grounds to arrest Tim.\nC. A valid defense if she actually witnessed the crime.\nD. No valid defense if a felony had not in fact been committed.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a medical malpractice action, Dr. Zorba was called as an expert witness by the plaintiff and testified that the surgical procedure utilized by the defendant was so new and experimental as to constitute negligence under the accepted standard of practice in the relevant medical community. On cross-examination by defendant's counsel, the following occurred: Counsel: \"Dr. Zorba, is Modern Surgical Procedures by Weston a reliable authority in your area of specialty?\" Dr. Zorba: \"Yes.\" Counsel: \"Did you rely upon the treatise in reaching the conclusion that my client was negligent?\" Dr. Zorba: \"I did not.\" Defense counsel now proposes to read a passage from the treatise stating that the surgical procedure at issue is widely accepted by responsible medical practitioners. Plaintiff's counsel objects. How should the court rule?\n\nOptions:\nA. For defendant, but it should also caution the jury that the evidence may only be considered in impeachment of Dr. Zorba.\nB. For defendant.\nC. For plaintiff, because Dr. Zorba did not rely upon the treatise in forming his expert opinion.\nD. For plaintiff, because the passage from the treatise is inadmissible hearsay.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Marty was driving his auto on a public street of Duffyville on his way home from a party. His wife, Dolly, occupied the passenger seat. Two police officers, Dragby and Casey, noticed that Marty's car was weaving and generally being driven in an erratic manner. They pursued the vehicle and curbed it. When Marty emerged from the driver's seat, he was obviously inebriated, and the officers wrote out a drunk driving citation, and insisted that Marty accompany them to the station house. Marty accompanied Casey in the squad car, and Dragby drove Marty's car to the local precinct with Dolly in the passenger seat. Dolly walked into the station house with Marty. As Marty was being booked, Dragby took a standard police search form with him and began searching the car. Beneath the passenger seat he found Dolly's purse. He opened the purse and found a plastic zip-lock bag containing a small amount of marijuana. Dolly was charged with possession of drugs. At Dolly's trial, her attorney moved to suppress the admission of the marijuana seized from Dolly's purse into evidence. Should the court rule favorably on the motion?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because when conducting a search incident to an arrest the police may not open a closed container. \nB. Yes, because the police lacked probable cause to search Dolly's purse.\nC. No, because the search was incident to the lawful arrest of Marty.\nD. No, because the marijuana was discovered during the course of a valid inventory search.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Capitol City, West Carolina, has a city ordinance that prohibits the distribution of pamphlets \"on public sidewalks or other public areas when foot traffic is sufficiently heavy and the manner of distribution of the pamphlets causes obstruction of the foot traffic so as to result in spillover onto public streets where vehicular traffic creates a danger to human life.\"' The West Carolina state fair is held at fairgrounds whose entrances lie along a busy multilane street. Roger, who was distributing pamphlets advocating repeal of the federal milk price support program during Dairy Day at the state fair, attracted a crowd of about 10 farmers and children outside the fairgrounds entrance at which he stood, but most of the few fairgoers entering the fair at that late afternoon time simply ignored him. When one of the dairy farmers became irate and threatened to \"knock his block off,\" Roger was arrested by a fair security guard and subsequently prosecuted under the city ordinance. Which of the following statements is correct regarding the city ordinance and Roger's prosecution?\n\nOptions:\nA. The ordinance is void on its face and void as applied to Roger.\nB. The ordinance is valid on its face but void as applied to Roger.\nC. The ordinance is valid on its face and valid as applied to Roger. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Donald was convicted of burglary after a jury trial at which the prosecution established that Donald broke into Shelley's house at night by cutting open a window screen and climbing into a bedroom, then was frightened into leaping out the same window when Shelley, who was lying in bed in that same bedroom, produced a revolver from beneath her pillow. Donald testified in his own defense that he entered the house merely to use the telephone, and thus lacked the requisite intent for the entry to constitute burglary. The trial court, after instructing the jury on the elements of burglary, said, \"If you find that by a fair preponderance of the evidence Donald has shown that he intended to use the telephone when he entered Shelley's home, then you must find him not guilty.\" If Donald appeals his conviction, will he likely obtain a reversal?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to use the wrong standard of proof, in that they were told to find by a preponderance rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.\nB. Yes, because the trial court's instruction placed the burden of proof upon Donald.\nC. No, because any error in instructions was harmless, since it is more likely than not that the jury would have convicted him anyway.\nD. No, because the trial court is permitted to comment upon the evidence.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 2, 1993, Cheap lent Deadbeat $ 1,000$ and the parties agreed in writing that Deadbeat would repay Cheap on or before January 2, 1994. Deadbeat failed to repay Cheap, and on January 6,1999, Cheap phoned Deadbeat and told him, \"If you'll pay me $ 600$ now, I'll forget all about that unpaid $ 1,000$ debt.\" Deadbeat agreed orally and then sent Cheap a signed letter which stated, \"I, Deadbeat, agree to pay Cheap $ 600$.\" Deadbeat never paid Cheap the $ 600$ and Cheap sued Deadbeat. The statute of limitations on suits for debt in the jurisdiction is five years. Cheap is entitled to recover:\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 1,000$, because the agreement by Deadbeat to pay Cheap $ 600$ revived the original $ 1,000$ obligation.\nB. $ 600$, because Deadbeat's moral obligation to pay Cheap $ 1,000$ became the consideration for Deadbeat's agreement to pay Cheap $ 600$.\nC. Nothing, because the statute of limitations has run.\nD. Nothing, because no additional consideration was provided to support Deadbeat's agreement to pay Cheap $ 600$. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"With an election approaching, Congress passed a statute requiring that all full-time employees, including state and municipal employees, be paid overtime for any work over 40 hours per week, or be otherwise compensated through time off or vacation time. Patchquilt was a municipality located in a very warm climate. Many Patchquilt residents were on welfare, and the town contained no major industry or shopping district to bolster its tax base. Patchquilt employed only three refuse collectors and asserted reasonably that it could not afford to hire more. However, during the warmest times of the year, extra refuse collections were routine because of the city council's fear that rotting garbage in the hot climate could contribute to the spread of disease. During the hottest months, the three refuse collectors in Patchquilt regularly worked well beyond the 40 hours per week standard. Because of normal vacation time and the normally heavy garbage collection schedule, it would not be possible to give the refuse collectors additional time off during the cooler months, which were not always very cool, without hiring additional refuse collectors. Patchquilt brings an action in federal district court, asserting that the federal statute requiring overtime pay to municipal workers is unconstitutional. The court should hold the statute: \n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, as a reasonable application of the Necessary and Proper Clause.\nB. Constitutional, because regulation of state and local employees is within the ambit of federal power over interstate commerce.\nC. Unconstitutional, because regulation of state and local employees is an issue reserved to the states.\nD. Unconstitutional, because the state police power to promote health and safety precludes federal action in this case. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"State Green had a law on its statute books that made any teacher, guardian, therapist, school administrator, or any other person standing in loco parentis subject to the same rights and duties as actual parents. In effect this meant that persons standing in loco parentis could be charged with liability in cases where a parent would have been liable and granted immunity from liability where such would have been the case for a parent. Dr. Zarkov had a Ph.D. in child psychology and was the director of the Verdant Institute, a residential home for disturbed minors located in Verdant City, the largest city in State Green. The Verdant Institute had no fence surrounding its premises, but regular bedchecks were conducted each night to determine that all of the disturbed children were present. A bedcheck determined that Ming, a 12-year-old resident of the Institute, was absent. In fact, Ming had climbed out a window and run away about 15 minutes before the bedcheck. The security guard who conducted the bedcheck immediately reported to Zarkov that Ming was missing. Zarkov did not report Ming's absence to the police or any other authority. Thirty-six hours after Ming ran away from the Institute, Ming savagely beat and severely injured six-year-old Gordon, a child who lived a few blocks away from the Verdant Institute. Although Gordon recovered, physicians indicated that the beating might well cause Gordon to suffer permanent hearing and vision deficiencies. Gordon's parents filed suit against Zarkov on Gordon's behalf. Which party is likely to prevail in the lawsuit?\n\nOptions:\nA. Gordon, unless a 12-year-old would not be liable for administering the beating.\nB. Gordon, because Zarkov assumed the role of a parent and liability is, therefore, imposed under the in loco parentis statute.\nC. Zarkov, because he cannot be found vicariously liable for Ming's acts inasmuch as parents are not vicariously liable for the intentional torts of their children.\nD. Zarkov, unless Zarkov had reason to know that Ming had a propensity to commit violent acts. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jenny, a general contractor, advertised in a trade publication that she planned to bid on the construction of a new building to be located in the Civic Mall. The advertisement welcomed bids from subcontractors to perform various functions, such as plumbing, electrical work, and masonry. The lowest electrical bid was from Ohmco, who bid $ 20,000$. The lowest plumbing bid was from Plunger, who bid $ 10,000$. Jenny used Ohmco's and Plunger's bids in preparing her general bid. At 2 p.m., on June 22, Jenny submitted her general bid. At 3 p.m., Plunger called her and said, 'I'm sorry, Jenny, but I made a mistake on that bid I submitted to you; I can't possibly do that plumbing work for a dime less than $ 12,000$.\" Jenny told him, \"I can't do anything about that because I've already submitted my general bid.\" Jenny was awarded the contract. Assume for purposes of this question only that Jenny used Ohmco's $ 20,000$ electrical bid to prepare her general bid, but, after Jenny was awarded the contract, she decided to hire subcontractor Wattco to perform the electrical work. Wattco had bid $ 21,500$. Ohmco sues Jenny for damages. Will Ohmco prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because there was an implied acceptance that Jenny would use the lowest bid for electrical contracting.\nB. Yes, because Ohmco's bid was an offer for an option contract that was accepted upon acceptance of the general contract.\nC. No, because Jenny never communicated an acceptance of Ohmco's offer.\nD. No, because Jenny's advertisement for bids did not constitute an offer. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jeffries was the chief of security for The Watervliet, a large, exclusive apartment complex. Most of The Watervliet's residents were quite wealthy, and Jeffries resented the fact that he had many responsibilities and received what he considered to be a paltry salary. Therefore, Jeffries was receptive when Garth told him that he would pay Jeffries $ 250$ if Jeffries would obtain a key to the apartment of Mrs. Wealthy and give the key to Garth. Mrs. Wealthy was an affluent and socially prominent widow who resided in The Watervliet. The next day Jeffries obtained a key to Mrs. Wealthy's apartment and gave the key to Garth. Garth handed Jeffries the $ 250$ in cash. Jeffries believed that Garth planned to use the key to take valuables from Mrs. Wealthy's apartment. In fact, Garth planned to pretend that he was a \"Good Samaritan\" returning a \"lost key\" to Mrs. Wealthy that Garth had fortuitously found in The Watervliet lobby. Garth felt that this ploy would gain him access to Mrs. Wealthy's apartment, where he planned to sell her a \"real estate limited partnership share\" in nonexistent Florida property. Garth's plan worked up to a point. He brought the key to Mrs. Wealthy, who thanked him and invited him into her apartment for afternoon tea and watercress sandwiches. Garth attempted to sell the \"limited partnership share\" to Mrs. Wealthy, but she quickly surmised that the limited partnership was bogus and politely asked Garth to leave. Garth, a resourceful chap, did not want his $ 250$ investment in the key to be a total waste of money, so he surreptitiously removed a small but valuable art deco bronze statuette from Mrs. Wealthy's foyer and left the apartment with it. 9. If Jeffries is arrested and appropriately charged with theft of the key and conspiracy to commit theft of the key, of what additional crime or crimes, if any, could Jeffries be charged and convicted? (A) Attempted false pretenses. (B) Conspiracy to commit burglary. (C) Larceny, conspiracy to commit burglary, and conspiracy to commit false pretenses. (D) None of the above. At Nick's trial, the prosecution seeks to introduce the cocaine into evidence against Nick. Nick's attorney objects. The court should rule the cocaine:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because of the emergency conditions arising from the growing menace of drugs to the public.\nB. Admissible, because, in consenting to the search of his luggage, Nick impliedly consented to a body search.\nC. Inadmissible, because Sam had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to search Nick.\nD. Inadmissible, because Sam had no right to search the luggage.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paul was admitted to Doctors' Hospital to undergo $\\mathrm{x}$-rays and a series of other tests. During the course of the $\\mathrm{x}$-rays, Paul was strapped to an $\\mathrm{x}$-ray table manufactured by Hospital Suppliers. One feature of the table allowed the table to be tilted into an upright position, so that the patient could be $\\mathrm{x}$-rayed while in a vertical position. There was a footrest at the bottom of the table that helped support the patient when the table was in a vertical position. During the course of Paul's $x$-ray procedure, the table was tilted into an upright position. As the technician began to take x-rays of Paul, the footrest fell off the $\\mathrm{x}$-ray table. Had Paul been securely strapped in, he would have remained on the table. However, the loss of the footrest caused sufficient additional pressure on the straps that they loosened, and Paul fell from the table onto the floor. Paul's head struck the floor, and delicate brain surgery was required to save Paul's life. Although Paul recovered, he has suffered some permanent disabilities as a result of his fall. Assume for purposes of this question only that the laws of the jurisdiction provide for joint and several liability and that the common law rules regarding contribution have been abolished in favor of a system of contribution based on comparative fault. How much can Pluto collect from Donald?\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 70,000$, but Donald can compel Mickey to pay him $ 40,000$ as contribution.\nB. $ 40,000$, but Donald can compel Mickey to contribute $ 10,000$.\nC. $ 30,000$, because Donald was $30 \\%$ at fault.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Velma entered into an argument with her neighbor Diana over the height of the bushes on Velma's property. Diana claimed that the bushes were so high that when she attempted to pull out of her own driveway, she was unable to see if traffic was approaching from the south. Diana demanded that Velma cut the bushes down to half their present height. When Velma refused, Diana, in a fit of anger, slapped Velma. Velma reached into her purse, drew out a pistol, and fired a shot at Diana but missed. Just as Velma cocked the pistol to fire another shot, Diana grabbed a shovel and hit Velma over the head, killing her instantly. Diana was charged with the murder of Velma. At trial, Diana testified that she hit Velma because she believed that Velma would have shot and killed her if she did not. If the jury believes Diana, it should find her:\n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty of murder, because she did not retreat.\nB. Guilty of murder, because she was the original aggressor in the encounter and had not withdrawn.\nC. Not guilty of murder, because Velma was the first to resort to deadly force.\nD. Not guilty of murder, because she had no opportunity to premeditate.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Due to intense foreign competition in the domestic market and other adverse economic conditions, the domestic manufacturers of horse liniment formed a trade association, the American Horse Liniment Institute (\"AHLI\"), whose main purpose was to lobby Congress for tariff protection and for grants-in-aid to modernize their plants, which everyone agreed were less efficient than those of their Asian and European competitors. Congress passed legislation providing some degree of protection from foreign competition and appropriating 200 million dollars for grants-in-aid to domestic horse liniment manufacturers. However, because of concern about inefficiencies in the industry, the legislation was amended to allow the Secretary of Commerce to deny grants to horse liniment manufacturers who failed to meet certain \"management efficiency standards\" outlined in the legislation. Lum \\& Bagel Co., a liniment manufacturer and a member of AHLI, petitioned the Secretary of Commerce for a $15 million grant, the amount to which Lum \\& Bagel would be entitled under the legislation, based upon the number of its employees and plants and upon its average production of horse liniment over a 10-year period. The Secretary of Commerce refused to award funds to Lum \\& Bagel, because she determined that Lum \\& Bagel was making no attempt to improve its management efficiency. Lum \\& Bagel filed suit against the Secretary of Commerce, asserting that the power granted to the Secretary was unconstitutional. Is the legislation constitutional?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the Secretary of Commerce, as a representative of the executive branch, may be granted regulatory authority.\nB. Yes, because the executive branch, represented by the Secretary of Commerce, shares power with Congress in the field of foreign commerce.\nC. No, because there was an improper delegation of legislative power.\nD. No, because the executive branch may not impound funds appropriated by Congress. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"To help alleviate the burdens of poverty and perhaps to help cut the welfare rolls, the state legislature of Margate passed legislation establishing State Family Counseling Centers throughout the state. The legislature recognized that much of the \"welfare and poverty problem\" was centered on poor single-parent households headed by a woman. Therefore, it decreed in the legislation that all counseling would be free for single mothers with an income of less than $ 20,000$ per year. Others would have to pay fees for the counseling on a sliding scale depending upon income. The counseling services available at the State Family Counseling Centers included classes on parenting, anti-substance abuse programs, and financial counseling. The counseling centers were popular and other states considered copying the Margate model. Peter's wife had died recently of a drug overdose, and he was left to care for their two children (ages two and four) on an income of approximately $ 7,000$ per year. Peter had no idea how he could manage to care for the two children and himself on his small paychecks. He heard about the State Family Counseling Centers and went to the closest one for financial counseling. Peter was told that he would have to pay a $ 50$ fee for the counseling. Peter had $ 10$ in his pocket, which he needed for bus fare home and to feed his children until his check, due in five days, arrived. Peter became very angry when he learned that single mothers in his situation were entitled to free counseling while single fathers were not. A public-interest law firm agreed to take Peter's case and filed suit in federal court, asking that Peter be allowed to take advantage of the free counseling services because the law establishing them discriminated against males. To win the case:\n\nOptions:\nA. Peter must show that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest favoring mothers over fathers.\nB. Peter must show that the state has no compelling interest in favoring mothers over fathers.\nC. Margate must show that favoring mothers over fathers is substantially related to an important governmental interest.\nD. Margate must show that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest favoring mothers over fathers. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress passed a statute providing that if the President deployed more than 1,000 United States Armed Forces personnel in a foreign country where \"combat conditions\" existed, the President was required to return such Armed Forces to the United States within 60 days or formally seek a declaration of war from Congress. The statute further provided that, if Congress failed to declare war within 30 days of the President's request, the President was required to return the Armed Forces to the United States. After several tense incidents, the President ordered 10,000 troops from the Army and Marine Corps to land in Culebra, a Central American republic. The American forces had been fired on and had fired back, and they had continued to receive and inflict casualties. The 60-day period passed, but the President refused to go to Congress to seek a declaration of war, and in a televised address to the nation accused Congress of an unconstitutional attempt to usurp powers denied to it by the Constitution. What is Congress's best argument for the constitutionality of the statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. In making decisions concerning foreign affairs, the President must first obtain the advice and consent of the Senate.\nB. The statute does not limit the President's power to repel invasions.\nC. The President cannot institute military actions in foreign countries without a declaration of war, and only Congress has the right to declare war.\nD. The statute reflects the balance between the legislature and the executive branch in their shared control over the Armed Forces.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Plains was the headquarters of Bushel Basket Ministries, which had been characterized by the government as a \"religious cult.\" Seeking to broaden his influence, the leader of Bushel Basket, Reverend Bill E. Bob, decided that the state legislature would serve as an effective pulpit for his religious views by giving him a great deal of media exposure and direct mail resources. The state of Plains had no provision barring members of the clergy from serving as legislators. Bob entered a race that already had several other candidates and took advantage of the state's liberal voter registration laws by having many of his followers move into the district a month before the election. Bob's subsequent victory in the race shocked the political establishment and prompted a citizens' group to file a lawsuit in federal district court. The suit, invoking the Establishment Clause, sought to enjoin the state from seating Bob in the legislature or expending any state funds to provide him with legislative privileges. Bob moved to dismiss the lawsuit. Should the court grant Bob's motion?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the Eleventh Amendment bars this type of action against a state by its citizens.\nB. Yes, because a political question is involved.\nC. No, because citizens have standing to challenge government expenditures that may violate the Establishment Clause.\nD. No, because the lawsuit is not seeking damages from the state. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"St. Minny, a town with a population of 30,000 , was located on the west bank of a small river. Immediately across the river, on the east bank, was Paulopolis, a city of 60,000 . Over the years, many civic improvement groups urged that the two municipalities be merged into \"Minnypaulos,\" a single city of 90,000 souls. The arguments in favor of merger stressed savings to taxpayers accruing from the elimination of duplicate services. Proposals to merge the two places had appeared as referenda on the ballot on two separate occasions. Although the voters of Paulopolis approved each proposal by heavy margins, the voters of St. Minny, fearing that control of the government would be in the hands of more populous Paulopolis, rejected the referendum proposals by more than two to one. To avoid the failure of yet another such referendum, a new proposal was made for the governance of the proposed combined city. For a period of 20 years, beginning at the date of the merger, the city council of the merged city would consist of six persons. The former Paulopolis would be divided into three council districts, as would the former city of St. Minny. Thus, each St. Minny council representative would be elected from a district with a population of 10,000, while the Paulopolis districts would contain 20,000 persons each. A mayor would be elected at large. The proposal was placed on the ballot and was carried by large majorities in both St. Minny and Paulopolis. Representatives from Paulopolis and St. Minny carved each former city into three council electoral districts. Three Paulopolis taxpayers filed suit to enjoin the holding of an election with council districts of such disparate proportions. Which of the following represents the plaintiffs' best constitutional argument?\n\nOptions:\nA. The government of the merged cities is not a republican form of government.\nB. The plaintiffs and other Paulopolitans have been denied equal protection of the law.\nC. The plaintiffs and other Paulopolitans have been denied the privileges and immunities of citizenship as guaranteed by Article IV. of the federal Constitution.\nD. The plaintiffs and other Paulopolitans have been denied due process of law.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Perry sued Don for bodily injuries suffered by Perry as a result of a collision between the cars they were driving. The accident occurred on a rainy day, when Don's car skidded across the center line and struck Perry's car. A principal issue is whether Don was driving too fast for the wet conditions. At trial, Perry calls Wally to the stand. Wally is prepared to testify that he has lived next door to Don for 15 years, and that Don is notorious in the neighborhood for driving his car at excessive rates of speed. Don's attorney objects. May Wally's testimony be allowed?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Don's character as a careless driver is in issue.\nB. Yes, because character may be proven by reputation evidence.\nC. No, because the testimony is improper character evidence.\nD. No, because the testimony is hearsay, not within any exception. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The above chart indicates the configuration of three parcels of property located in State Blue, which has a 15-year prescription and adverse possession period. Seventeen years ago, Wallace purchased Woodlot, which is adjacent to Smoothacre and Roughacre. At the time Wallace purchased Woodlot, he asked Arnold, the owner of Smoothacre, if Arnold would grant Wallace an easement to use the paved way across Smoothacre to haul logs to the public road. Arnold was an affable person and he readily granted the easement to Wallace. Wallace paid nothing for the easement, and the deed granting the easement was properly recorded in the office of the county recorder of deeds. For six months Wallace hauled $\\operatorname{logs}$ across Smoothacre. However, Wallace decided it would be easier to haul the logs over Roughacre, because the distance to the public road was less using that route. Wallace negotiated with Brenda, the owner of Roughacre, and Brenda granted Wallace a license to haul logs on the gravel road across Roughacre to the public road. Wallace paid Brenda a modest annual fee for this privilege. In the intervening time period, Wallace never used the paved way across Smoothacre for any purpose. Six months ago, Arnold conveyed Smoothacre to Cyd, and two weeks ago, Cyd had a chain-link fence built around the perimeter of Smoothacre which, of course, blocked Wallace's access to the paved way crossing Smoothacre. One week ago, acting within her rights, Brenda revoked Wallace's license to use the gravel road crossing Roughacre. The next day, Wallace told Cyd, \"Open up that chainlink fence where Smoothacre abuts Woodlot, because I have an easement to haul my logs across your paved way.\" Cyd replied, \"Forget it, Buster. I never agreed to any easement, and I don't want you hauling logs across my property.\" Wallace seeks advice about his rights in the easement across Smoothacre. Which of the following best represents Wallace's rights under the circumstances?\n\nOptions:\nA. Wallace has no right to use the easement across Smoothacre, because Wallace abandoned the easement.\nB. Wallace may compel Cyd to allow him to use the easement, because nonuse of an easement does not constitute abandonment.\nC. Wallace may use the paved way across Smoothacre, because the revocation of his license to use the gravel road crossing Roughacre means that he has an easement by necessity to cross Smoothacre.\nD. Wallace has no right to use the easement across Smoothacre, because the easement reverted to the owners of Smoothacre by prescription. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Able purchased Blueacre from Oswald, he took out a $ 160,000$ mortgage on Blueacre. After being in possession of Blueacre for six months, Able concluded that his cash-flow situation would make it difficult for him to continue to make the high monthly mortgage payments. Therefore, he sold Blueacre to Brett. According to the terms of the agreement signed by the parties, Brett took Blueacre \"subject to the mortgage\" and agreed to \"assume payment of' the mortgage. A recession struck the area, and Brett soon found himself in financial difficulties. Brett sold Blueacre to Carly. Under the terms of the agreement signed by the parties, Carly agreed to take \"subject to the mortgage.\" All deeds and the mortgage were properly recorded. After two months on the land, Carly ceased making mortgage payments. Third National Bank (\"TNB\"), holder of the mortgage, unsuccessfully demanded payments from Carly, Brett, and Able. TNB properly instituted proceedings to foreclose, and Blueacre was put up for judicial sale. Because the recession had severely depressed property values, Blueacre sold for only $ 120,000$. After the $ 120,000$ was applied to the mortgage, $ 37,800$ was still owing on the principal amount. TNB now seeks judgment to cover the $ 37,800$ deficiency. Who can be required to pay the deficiency?\n\nOptions:\nA. Able only.\nB. Able and Brett.\nC. Brett and Carly.\nD. Able, Brett, and Carly. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"After several years in the planning, Jason was ready to begin building his dream house. To save money, he decided to act as the general contractor and hire all of the subcontractors himself. He hired separate contractors for the foundation, the frame, the electricity, the plumbing, and the masonry. After several months of work, the house was finally ready for occupancy. The first night that Jason stayed there, however, a fire swept through the house. Jason managed to escape with a broken ankle and some minor burns, but the house was a total loss. An investigation by the fire marshal established that the fire started from a short in some wiring behind a wall. A small section of wiring that ran to an outlet through a narrow gap between a furnace chimney and a hot water pipe had had part of its outer sheath cut off. Both the chimney and the pipe had been installed, and the walls put up, after the rough wiring had been completed. Jason filed suit against Shortstop Electrical Service, the contractor that did the rough wiring. The parties stipulated that Shortstop had installed the wiring in compliance with the detailed blueprints that Jason had drawn up, and that the wiring had been inspected and approved by the building inspector shortly after it had been installed. At trial, Jason introduced the report of the fire marshal establishing the above facts and evidence of his medical expenses and other damages. At the end of Jason's case, Shortstop's attorney rested her case and moved for a directed verdict. Jason's attorney also moved for a directed verdict. How should the court rule on the directed verdict motions?\n\nOptions:\nA. Deny both directed verdict motions, because Jason has presented enough evidence to submit the case to the jury.\nB. Deny Shortstop's motion and grant Jason's motion for a directed verdict, because Shortstop failed to rebut the presumption of negligence that Jason has established.\nC. Deny Jason's motion and grant Shortstop's motion for a directed verdict, because the wire could have been damaged by another contractor.\nD. Deny Shortstop's motion and grant Jason's motion for a directed verdict, because a short in the wiring caused Jason's injuries. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Arthur's hobby was restoring classic cars, and he frequently attended shows at which people with similar interests would gather to display their handiwork, compare techniques and information, and view products of manufacturers who catered to such hobbyists. At one such show, Arthur was examining a 1947 Pontiac \"Stretch\" Roadster when the owner, who was standing nearby, indicated that he was trying to sell the car. Bud, who stated that he had restored the Pontiac himself, told Arthur that (I) the car was restored using nothing but genuine Pontiac parts or parts that Bud had handmade himself. He said that (II) \"this is the finest restoration of a 1947 'Stretch' Roadster in the United States, and one of the two best in the world.\"' As they were discussing price, Bud pointed out that (III) \"this car has the original 'rearing horse' grille that was installed by the dealer on 1947 'Stretch' Roadsters.\" Arthur agreed to purchase the car for a considerable sum, and had it transported to his home. Later, he discovered that Bud had not been entirely truthful about the restoration. In his action for deceit, Arthur establishes that Bud knew, when he made statements I, II, and III, above, that each was false. Assuming that all the other elements of deceit are proven, which of the three statements will support Arthur's claims?\n\nOptions:\nA. I only.\nB. I and II.\nC. I and III.\nD. I, II, and III.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The citizenry of East Rabbit's Foot had experienced a tremendous increase in the incidence of begging in the downtown area. In response, the city council enacted an ordinance that required anyone soliciting for charitable contributions of any sort in any public place to wear an identity card issued by the local police department. Identity cards could be obtained by filling out an affidavit providing identification and address information about the applicant and further affirming that the applicant was not soliciting for personal use and belonged to a recognized charitable organization. George, a member of Airbreathers Against Tobacco (\"AAT\"), wishes to solicit contributions by similarly minded persons for use in his organization's campaign against public smoking. He does not want to comply with the identity card ordinance. He comes to you for legal advice and asks the advisability of challenging the ordinance in federal court. You should inform George that the ordinance is probably:\n\nOptions:\nA. Unconstitutional, because it violates the First Amendment's prohibition of government infringement of the right of free speech. \nB. Unconstitutional, because it prevents religious organizations from obtaining contributions from their members, and thus interferes with the free exercise of religion.\nC. Constitutional, because it represents a reasonable balancing of the state's police power interest in protecting its citizens from fraud and annoyance against the right of people to seek charitable contributions.\nD. Constitutional, because preventing fraud in the solicitation for charitable contributions is a compelling interest.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Woody is on trial for embezzlement. He does not take the stand. Which of Woody's previous convictions is most likely to be admitted into evidence against him?\n\nOptions:\nA. A 7-year-old conviction for arson, a felony.\nB. A 12-year-old conviction for embezzlement, a felony.\nC. A 6-month-old conviction for disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor.\nD. A 2-year-old conviction for felonious sexual assault.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Drew was tried for the July 21 murder of Victor. Drew called Warren to testify to an alibi. On cross-examination of Warren, the prosecutor asked, \"Weren't you on the jury that acquitted Drew of another criminal charge?\"' The best reason for sustaining an objection to this question is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The question goes beyond the scope of direct examination.\nB. The probative value of the answer would be substantially outweighed by its tendency to mislead.\nC. The question is a leading question.\nD. Prior jury service in a case involving a party renders the witness incompetent.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"During a gang shootout in City, Joe looked for Egbert among the combatants because he wanted to kill him. He spotted Ira, who resembled Egbert. Believing Ira to be Egbert, Joe shot at Ira and missed. The bullet passed through a window and killed Gladys, who was asleep on her sofa. Joe may properly be convicted of: I. Attempted murder of Egbert. II. Attempted murder of Ira. III. Murder of Gladys.\n\nOptions:\nA. I. and II. only.\nB. II. only.\nC. II. and III. only.\nD. None of the above. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Via a circular, WidgeCo, a manufacturer of widgets, sent an offer to Distrucorp, a major wholesaler. WidgeCo offered a standard lot (quantity well-known in the widget trade) of widgets for $ 8,000$. This was a good price, and the president of Distrucorp personally mailed back to WidgeCo Distrucorp's standard printed acceptance form. However, the president wrote \"in large letters in his own hand on the form, \"Our liability on this contract is limited to $ 200$.\" Two days later, the WidgeCo sales manager received the communication from Distrucorp. A week later, WidgeCo had sent no additional communication to Distrucorp. Assuming no additional facts, what is the relationship between the parties?\n\nOptions:\nA. There is no contract between WidgeCo and Distrucorp, because Distrucorp made a material alteration.\nB. There is a valid, enforceable contract between WidgeCo and Distrucorp, but it is limited to the terms of WidgeCo's offer.\nC. There is a valid, enforceable contract between WidgeCo and Distrucorp, and it contains the additional term because WidgeCo raised no objection.\nD. Distrucorp has sent a valid counteroffer to WidgeCo, which WidgeCo can accept or reject. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"State Green has a statute providing as follows: Any judgment properly filed shall, for 10 years from the date of filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered. Oscar conveyed Birchacre, located in State Green, to Allen, who had had a judgment lien recorded against him two years earlier in the county in which Birchacre was located. One year later, Allen conveyed the property to Brenda by general warranty deed. The deed did not mention the lien, but Brenda was aware of it. Two years later, Brenda conveyed Birchacre to Carla by special warranty deed. Carla was not aware of the lien and her deed also made no mention of it. One year after that transaction, Carla conveyed Birchacre to Dave by general warranty deed. Dave's deed did not mention the lien but Dave was aware of it. The next year, Dave entered into a contract to convey Birchacre to Edgar. Edgar's title search disclosed the judgment lien against Allen, and Edgar refused to proceed with the transaction because title was not marketable. Dave brought an action against Edgar for specific performance and was denied relief. He then brought an action against Allen, Brenda, and Carla for breach of warranty. Assume for purposes of this question that all transactions concerning Birchacre were promptly and properly recorded, and that the party holding the judgment lien has taken no action as of yet to enforce it. Which parties, if any, will be liable to Dave?\n\nOptions:\nA. No one, because Dave had actual knowledge of the lien when he purchased Birchacre.\nB. Carla only, because the party holding the judgment lien has taken no action as of yet to enforce it.\nC. Carla and Allen, because Brenda conveyed by special warranty deed.\nD. Brenda and Allen, because they were aware of the judgment lien but did not mention it in their deeds, but not Carla, because she was not aware of the lien. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Olivia and Scarlet were roommates who both attended a prestigious fashion design school. When Olivia had received her acceptance letter from the school, she splurged and purchased a new Scandervan 2001 sewing machine for $ 1,000$ so that she would be more than adequately equipped for her design assignments. One day when Olivia was at class, Scarlet loaned Olivia's sewing machine to Violet, whose own machine lacked the fancy options of the Scandervan 2001. Scarlet had loaned Olivia's Scandervan 2001 to other design students on several prior occasions. Unfortunately, Violet, who was not familiar with the delicate Scandervan 2001, caused extensive damage to the machine when she tried to create a cutting edge design by sewing silverware on a dress. It would cost $ 400$ to repair the sewing machine. If Olivia sues Scarlet for the damage Violet caused to the sewing machine, what will be the result?\n\nOptions:\nA. Olivia will recover $ 1,000$.\nB. Olivia will recover the fair market value of the sewing machine.\nC. Olivia will recover $ 400$.\nD. Olivia will recover nothing, because Scarlet did not damage the machine and Violet's conduct was not intentional. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Astro developed a new synthetic liquid that could safely double the output of electrical power plants. He built a manufacturing plant unlike any other in the world capable of producing this liquid. A byproduct of the production of the liquid was a hazardous chemical that was not biodegradable in the environment. Astro buried the waste chemical in a depression on his land. Before doing so, Astro secured expert opinion, based on soil analysis, that led him reasonably to believe that the earth beneath the disposal site was impermeable, and that there was no danger of contaminating the underground waters. The chemical, nonetheless, seeped through the underlying soil strata, and was carried by the flow of percolating water to a well used by Herder to water his sheep, which he raised on an adjacent property. The chemical rendered the water in the well unfit for consumption by sheep. If Herder's sheep were harmed by drinking from the contaminated well, and Herder asserts a claim against Astro for damages to the sheep, which of the following facts, if established, would best aid Astro's case? Assume that the jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules.\n\nOptions:\nA. Many companies converted their power plants so that they could utilize the synthetic liquid developed by Astro.\nB. Herder did not do what a reasonable person would have done to prevent harm to his sheep after he learned that the well was contaminated. \nC. If he had exercised ordinary care, Herder would have discovered the contamination before his sheep were harmed.\nD. Astro's plant was in place and in operation before Herder purchased his property.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A statute in the state of Lemon forbids employers from discriminating on the basis of religion; however, an exception provides that established religions that employ persons to engage in nonprofit activities may be exempted from this rule. A new religion sprang up called the Church of the Sunrise. It espoused a number of nontraditional views, among which was the belief that the sun is really a temple that is moved across the sky by a powerful race of aliens. When the Church gained enough members to open a meeting place, it advertised for clerical and maintenance workers. Patricia applied for a position and was told that she would be hired if she converted to the Church of the Sunrise religion. Patricia refused to do so and complained to the state of Lemon human relations board. After investigating, the board concluded that the Church was not an established religion and its beliefs were not plausible. It ruled that the religious exemption would not be applicable and ordered the Church to hire Patricia. Church officials filed an action in federal district court challenging the board's refusal to apply the exemption. How is the court likely to rule?\n\nOptions:\nA. The board may not refuse to apply the exemption unless it can prove scientifically that the Church's beliefs are false.\nB. The board may not refuse to apply the exemption because it does not have compelling grounds for favoring other religions over this one.\nC. The entire exemption scheme is unconstitutional because it does not have a secular purpose and has a primary effect of advancing religion.\nD. The board may refuse to apply the exemption because the state has the power to deny any religion the right to discriminate in its hiring. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Howard was supposed to be out of town on a three-day business trip. Because he completed his business more quickly than expected, he flew home on Wednesday night instead of Thursday afternoon. Howard arrived home and let himself into the house. He heard noises from the bedroom and, upon investigation, Howard was shocked to find his wife, Chastity, in bed with Nick, a good friend of Howard, who lived four blocks away. Nick dressed quickly and took off out the back door. Howard screamed a number of epithets at Chastity and then told her, \"Nick's going to pay for this! Get me a drink! It will give me the steadiness to do what I have to do to avenge my honor.\" A frightened Chastity brought Howard a bourbon and water. Howard drank it quickly and demanded yet another drink. After consuming several more drinks, Howard unlocked the closet, pulled out a rifle, and loaded it. He then set off for Nick's house. Howard arrived at Nick's about 10 minutes later. Nick had neglected to lock his front door, so Howard walked in. He found a trembling Nick in the living room, and Howard pointed the gun at him. Nick immediately began apologizing, blaming the affair on Chastity, and pleading for his life. Howard stood silently listening to Nick, but he kept the gun trained on his erstwhile friend. Suddenly, Nick pulled a switchblade knife from his pocket. As the metal flashed, Howard fired a single shot at Nick. The bullet struck him in the middle of the forehead and Nick died instantly. Howard set the gun down, fell to his knees, and began crying. A neighbor who heard the shot reported it to the police. They arrived a few minutes later and found a distraught Howard muttering about losing a friend and a marriage in one night. Howard can be convicted of:\n\nOptions:\nA. Murder.\nB. Manslaughter, because Howard was still distraught over finding Nick in bed with Chastity.\nC. Manslaughter, because his intoxication prevented Howard from having the requisite intent for murder.\nD. No homicide crime, because Nick was about to attack him with a knife. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Victor was desperately ill with a particularly virulent and painful form of cancer. He was permanently hospitalized and quite helpless as the killer disease tore at his vitals. Victor's daughter, Dana, was devoted to her dad. She visited him every evening in the hospital and spent many hours with him on the weekends. For over two months, Victor pleaded with Dana, \"Please kill me and put me out of my misery. I'm in such terrible pain. The pangs of Hell couldn't be any worse than this!\" Every day or evening that Dana visited, Victor would renew his plea to be killed. The staff doctors and nurses had often heard Victor's plaint. One Saturday afternoon, Dana paid her usual visit to Victor. His pleading was as heartrending as ever. With a tender expression on her face, Dana pulled a small revolver from her purse. She fired a shot at Victor, killing him instantly. Dana immediately broke into tears and repeatedly kissed the face of her dead father. Hospital authorities called the police, and Dana was charged with Victor's death. What is the most serious offense of which Dana can be convicted?\n\nOptions:\nA. First degree murder, defined by the jurisdiction as premeditated and deliberate killing of another human being.\nB. Second degree murder, defined as any murder not classified as first degree murder.\nC. Voluntary manslaughter.\nD. No crime. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alert police officers noticed that a late-model \"Belchfire 500\" automobile was being driven at an excessive rate of speed. The car, driven by Doofus, was pulled over to the curb. As Officer Smith issued a speeding citation to Doofus, her partner, Jones, fed the license plate numbers into the police computer. It turned out that the Belchfire had been very recently reported as stolen. Doofus was unable to produce satisfactory registration papers and was arrested for car theft. At the police station, Smith gave Doofus the standard Miranda warnings, and Doofus agreed to answer Smith's questions regarding a local \"chop-shop\" network, which arranged for the theft of expensive automobiles so that they could be cut up for parts. After a while, Jones suggested, \"Let's break for lunch.\" He and Smith escorted Doofus to a nearby cafeteria. During the course of their lunch, which lasted about an hour, Smith noticed that Doofus, who was otherwise rather shabbily dressed, was wearing an obviously expensive \"Xelor\" watch. Upon their return to the station, and without giving any new Miranda warnings, Smith resumed interrogation of Doofus. She asked Doofus about a recent home invasion in the swank \"Notting Hill\" neighborhood, where a quantity of valuable jewelry, including a \"Xelor\" watch, was taken. Doofus thereupon confessed to the home invasion, and was indicted on the home invasion charge, a felony under the jurisdiction's modern criminal code. If Doofus files an appropriate motion to prevent the confession from being admitted at his trial, Doofus will probably:\n\nOptions:\nA. Succeed, because the police did not repeat the Miranda warnings before questioning Doofus about another crime.\nB. Succeed, because the police acted in a custodial setting.\nC. Fail, because Doofus was not in custody on a home invasion charge.\nD. Fail, because the original Miranda warnings given Doofus were sufficient under the circumstances. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"With the busy summer beach season fast approaching, Trendee of Bayonne, a retail women's wear store, ordered 100 women's swimsuits at $ 10$ each, as advertised in the catalog of Stingray, a manufacturer of swimwear. Stingray shipped Trendee 40 swimsuits, along with a letter, stating in relevant part: \"We have shipped you 40 swimsuits at $ 10$ each as per your recent order. Please remit $ 400$ to Stingray. Be informed that we will be unable to ship the additional 60 suits you requested at this time or at any time during this year's beach season.\" Trendee took the 40 suits, put them on their salesracks, and began to sell them. Trendee immediately sought an alternate supplier of swimsuits. The best price it could obtain was $ 11$ per suit from Flying Fish Industries. Trendee ordered, received, accepted, and paid for 60 suits at $ 11$ each from Flying Fish. Trendee has refused to pay Stingray. If Stingray sues Trendee, Stingray is entitled to:\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 400$, the contract price for the 40 suits delivered by Stingray and accepted by Trendee.\nB. $340, the contract price for the 40 suits, less Trendee's cover damages.\nC. The fair market value of the 40 suits, less the $ 60$ cover damages.\nD. Nothing, because it failed to fully perform the contract.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Johnson, a small business owner, filed a treble damages civil antitrust suit against Greed Industries. While Greed's director of marketing, Mimms, was on the stand, Greed's attorney produced a \"synopsis of sales,\" a document generated by Greed's marketing division. Johnson's attorney objected that the record is hearsay. Greed's attorney responded, \"Your Honor, this is a business record and, as such, can be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.\" Johnson's attorney complained, \"Your Honor, this so-called 'synopsis of sales' is some selfserving writing concocted for this litigation. The hearsay exception requires that business records be made in the ordinary course of business. I demand a hearing to determine whether this qualifies as a business record.\" Which of the following is the most appropriate way for the issue to be decided?\n\nOptions:\nA. The issue should be decided by the judge after hearing evidence from Greed's attorney and Johnson's attorney outside the presence of the jury.\nB. The issue should be decided by the judge after hearing evidence from Greed's attorney and Johnson's attorney and may be conducted in the presence of the jury.\nC. The issue should be decided by the jury after hearing evidence from both sides.\nD. The issue should be decided by the judge after hearing evidence from both sides outside the presence of the jury, but if the document is admitted by the judge, Johnson may present evidence challenging that finding while presenting his case, and the ultimate decision rests with the jury. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Debra's car struck Peter, a pedestrian, and sped away from the scene of the accident. The car was linked to Debra, but she denies that she was driving the car when Peter was hit and injured. Peter sued Debra for his injuries. The only eyewitness, other than Peter, was Willie, a six-year-old child. During the trial, Peter put Willie on the stand, and Willie testified that he saw Debra driving the car that hit Peter. The defense elected not to cross-examine Willie. The plaintiff's next witness was Schrinkov, a child psychologist. Schrinkov, who had never met Willie before, was prepared to testify that, based on his observations of Willie on the witness stand, it was highly probable that Willie was telling the truth. Schrinkov was qualified as an expert witness with many years of experience dealing with children. However, the defense objected to any questions regarding the veracity of Willie. Should Schrinkov be allowed to testify about Willie?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because parties may put witnesses on the stand to reinforce or challenge the veracity of other witnesses.\nB. Yes, because an expert may be needed to explain how children testify in order to avoid confusing the jury.\nC. No, experts may not testify regarding veracity.\nD. No, because Willie's veracity has not yet been questioned.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"An act of Congress provides for the payment of Social Security benefits to the disabled children of deceased workers. A complex set of regulations carefully defines the meaning of the term \"disabled.\" The benefits are payable even after the child reaches his or her age of majority, but terminate automatically when the recipient marries, unless the recipient marries a person who is also disabled, in which case the Social Security payments continue. Dorit has been disabled since birth, and her father died in a coal mine cave-in when Dorit was 14 years of age. She has received Social Security benefits since her father's death. However, at age 25, Dorit married Jack, who is not disabled, and her Social Security benefits were summarily terminated. She files suit in federal district court, seeking to compel the government to restore her benefits. She asserts, among other things, that there is no logical reason why she should be deprived of benefits when unmarried disabled persons and disabled persons who marry other disabled persons continue to receive them. Which of the following provides the strongest constitutional basis for Dorit's suit?\n\nOptions:\nA. The privileges and immunities of national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\nB. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nC. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\nD. The prohibitions against bills of attainder.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Popeye owned a large fleet of buses. He was fortunate enough to have won the contract to bus all the schoolchildren in a large midwestern city and most of its surrounding suburbs. He purchased a number of new vehicles to expand his fleet. Popeye had farmed out the maintenance of the buses to a number of different repair shops, but he now desired the consistent results obtainable from dealing with one repair and maintenance operation. He therefore contracted in writing with Bluto that all general maintenance and extraordinary repairs required for Popeye's buses would be performed by Bluto, who owned and operated \"Bluto's Bus and Truck Center.\" A schedule of fees for most standard repairs was included in the contract. It happened that Popeye's wife, Olive, owned and operated a small advertising agency. Popeye wanted Olive's business to succeed, and so he included a clause in his agreement with Bluto that Bluto would place all his ads for his repair shop through Olive's agency during the oneyear term of the agreement. Assume for purposes of this question only that for six months Bluto dutifully placed all his ads through Olive's agency and informed her of his agreement with Popeye. During that time, Olive turned down work from two prospective clients because of the time that she would have to devote to designing and disseminating ads from Bluto. Bluto then discovered that Popeye was having some of his buses repaired and maintained by other shops. Bluto immediately ceased placing ads through Olive and employed another agency. Can Olive successfully bring suit against Bluto to enforce the agreement?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because she partially performed by placing ads for Bluto during the first six months of the agreement.\nB. Yes, because she detrimentally relied on Bluto's promise to place ads when she refused other clients.\nC. No, because Olive provided no consideration for the agreement between Popeye and Bluto.\nD. No, because Popeye's exclusive use of Bluto's repair shop was a condition for Bluto's duty to purchase ads through Olive, and Popeye's actions excused Bluto's duty to Olive.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"After a bomb explosion in an airport locker, Detective Jones received some information from Carlos, an informant who had given him reliable information several times in the past, that Karl was a member of a radical group that took credit for the bombing. Carlos told Jones that, three months before, he had been in Karl's apartment and on that occasion had seen what appeared to be some sticks of dynamite. Reasonably believing that Carlos's information established probable cause, Jones prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. After the warrant was issued, Jones and a group of police raided Karl's apartment. No evidence connecting Karl with the bombing was discovered, but in the search of his apartment the police discovered several grams of cocaine. At his trial for possession of narcotics, Karl's motion to suppress the evidence would probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Denied, because Carlos was a reliable informant and Jones reasonably believed that Carlos's information was accurate and that the warrant was properly issued.\nB. Granted, because in fact the police did not discover any evidence linking Karl to the bombings and, therefore, the seizure of the cocaine was fruit of the poisonous tree.\nC. Granted, if the court determines that the information supplied by Carlos to Jones concerned information too remote in time to justify a claim of probable cause at the time Jones requested the search warrant.\nD. Granted, because the search warrant was not issued for the purpose of searching Karl's apartment for illegal drugs.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Filmont designed and constructed a playground for children. Shortly thereafter, Filmont dedicated the property to the city of Oakville, to be used as a public park. Ken, a 10-year-old resident of Oakville, was playing at the park when he fell off the monkey bars, breaking his leg. On his behalf, Ken's parents filed suit against Filmont and Oakville, on the grounds of negligence in the design of the monkey bars. At the trial, Filmont was granted a directed verdict, because Oakville now owns the park. Ken's parents appealed the granting of the directed verdict as to Filmont. The appellate court will most likely hold that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The decision to grant the directed verdict should be upheld, because Filmont was relieved of liability when he dedicated the park to Oakville.\nB. The decision to grant the directed verdict should be upheld, because Filmont designed and constructed the park in the public interest.\nC. The decision to grant the directed verdict should be overturned if plaintiffs introduced evidence that Filmont dedicated the park to Oakville in an effort to avoid liability for the park's negligent design.\nD. The decision to grant the directed verdict should be overturned, because Filmont's liability for negligence was not affected by the dedication of the park to Oakville.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The city of West Rabbit's Foot, which lies astride a major interstate highway, recently passed a referendum declaring itself to be a \"nuclear free zone.\" The referendum included a provision making criminal any importation of specified nuclear materials into the city limits. The law was immediately challenged in federal court by an interstate trucking firm which regularly transported prohibited nuclear materials through West Rabbit's Foot on the highway. The case ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court, which held in a 5-4 decision that the challenged ordinance was constitutional because the city had a rational basis for concluding that the citizens of West Rabbit's Foot would be safer if the prohibited materials were kept outside of town, and because the ordinance did not unduly burden interstate commerce. Many other towns and cities throughout the nation considered similar enactments after the Supreme Court decision was announced. You are a lobbyist hired by the trucking industry to persuade Congress that a federal statute prohibiting the state regulation of interstate transportation of nuclear materials must immediately be enacted. Congress member Bluster has tentatively agreed to sponsor such legislation, but wants to know whether such a federal statute would pass constitutional muster. You should advise Bluster that the proposed statute would probably be held:\n\nOptions:\nA. Unconstitutional, since the Supreme Court has already ruled that local governments may prohibit specified nuclear materials from crossing their borders.\nB. Unconstitutional, because the disparate treatment of interstate versus intrastate carriers of nuclear materials would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nC. Constitutional, because Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.\nD. Constitutional, because the Supremacy Clause requires that state enactments bow to conflicting federal legislation.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Shelley lived in a house on a large corner lot. A few hundred feet down the street was a convenience store used by many people in the neighborhood, and everyone would take a short cut across Shelley's front yard rather than staying on the sidewalk that bordered her lawn. The heavy foot traffic was starting to wear a path through her lawn, and everyone left soft drink cans and candy wrappers strewn all over her front yard. Shelley therefore decided to build a fence around her front lawn, and hired Jack, a local contractor, to do the work. The next afternoon, Jack started the job by surveying the property and digging post holes. After he had completed that task, he left to do another small job in that area, leaving behind a wheelbarrow with a shovel leaning against it. When Shelley noticed that Jack had left the wheelbarrow and shovel in her front yard, she called his office and spoke to his wife. Jack's wife said that he was on another job in the area and must have intended to pick up the wheelbarrow and shovel on his way back. Shelley said that was fine, and left to go to her weekly bridge club meeting. Later that evening, Jack, who had finished the other job, returned to his office without stopping at Shelley's house. Eric, who owned a house down the street from Shelley, was walking to the convenience store to pick up a six-pack of beer. Because it was summer, it was still quite light, although it was 7 p.m. When he came to Shelley's house he took his usual short cut. A police car with siren wailing went by on the main street just as Eric was walking by the wheelbarrow, and as he followed the police car with his eyes, he tripped over the shovel leaning against the wheelbarrow and fell, breaking his arm. Is Shelley liable to Eric for his broken arm and related damages?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because she did not create the condition that harmed him.\nB. No, because the danger to which he was exposed was open and obvious.\nC. Yes, because she was aware of the condition that harmed him.\nD. Yes, because she knew that he frequently cut across her lawn on the way to the convenience store.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The citizens of Tidytown prided themselves on the neatness and beauty of the town of 30,000 people. This was reflected in the tough anti-litter ordinances that had been passed by the city council. Littering offenses carried fines of up to $ 500$ and were always very strictly enforced. Center Park was located near the downtown business area of Tidytown. Signs at each of the park entrances, and on the many trash barrels situated throughout the park, carried conspicuous warnings against littering. On October 15, a group of students from nearby colleges chose Center Park in Tidytown as the site for their demonstration against the proliferation of weapons in space. Approximately 125 students gathered in the park with placards and banners, and several speakers addressed the group. One of the speakers, Demagoga, during the course of her speech, walked to one of the trash barrels and dumped the contents out on the ground. As she did so, she told her listeners, \"This is what outer space is starting to look like, cluttered with the trash of nuclear weapons.\" The meeting broke up 15 minutes later. The students left the park peacefully, but no one bothered to pick up the trash or right the overturned barrel. Demagoga was arrested pursuant to the Tidytown littering ordinance. She was fined $ 500$ after her conviction. If Demagoga seeks to have her conviction set aside on constitutional grounds, she is likely to:\n\nOptions:\nA. Lose, because the anti-littering ordinance furthers an important governmental interest and is not aimed at communication.\nB. Lose, because Demagoga was convicted for her conduct rather than for what she said.\nC. Win, because Demagoga's conduct constituted symbolic speech.\nD. Win, unless the town can prove a compelling interest in its anti-litter laws.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ellen owns a high-style ladies' fashion store in Beverly Hills. Calvin is the designer and manufacturer of a world-famous line of original gowns. On April 1, Ellen and Calvin signed a written agreement wherein Ellen was appointed the \"sole and exclusive\" retail distributor for Calvin's clothes in Beverly Hills. The contract provided that Calvin was to have the absolute right to cease doing business with Ellen \"at any time and for any reasons Calvin chooses.\" On May 1, Ellen handed Calvin a written order for $ 50,000$ worth of his original gowns, to be delivered to Ellen on September 1. Calvin did not sign an acknowledgment of Ellen's order, but in her presence he set aside the originals designated in her order by putting her name on them. To publicize her new line of merchandise, Ellen conducted a large advertising campaign announcing to the Beverly Hills public that she would have a wide selection of Calvin's originals on display on September 1. She also made substantial improvements to the store to display these clothes in lush and expensive settings. On August 15 , Calvin wired Ellen, \"Sorry, darling, I have to invoke my right to terminate our arrangement. Your competitor in Beverly Hills, Shannon, has made an offer for the clothes you ordered that I simply couldn't pass up. I know you'll understand. Best wishes, Calvin.\" Upon receipt of the message, Ellen filed suit against Calvin. Calvin defends on the ground that his April 1 agreement with Ellen is unenforceable for lack of consideration because Ellen did not obligate herself under the contract in any way. How should the court rule on that issue?\n\nOptions:\nA. Any want of consideration at the formation stage was cured by Ellen's actual tender of a large order.\nB. The April agreement was, in effect, a \"firm offer\" between merchants and hence binding on both parties even though there was no consideration.\nC. There was sufficient consideration in Ellen's implied promise to exercise her best efforts to promote the sale of Calvin's gowns.\nD. Calvin set aside the gowns in Ellen's presence, and thereby apparently expressed his willingness to ship as per her order. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dorothy's very best friend was Melissa, and Dorothy shared all of her secrets with her. Dorothy and her husband, Hank, often brought Melissa, a divorcee, along on vacations and dining engagements. One day, however, after being tipped off by a mutual friend, Dorothy went through Hank's drawer and discovered steamy love letters to him from Melissa. The tone of the letters made it obvious that Hank and Melissa had been having an affair for at least three years. Dorothy became furious, but kept repeating to herself, \"Don't get mad, get even!\" She purchased a handgun and waited for the right moment to use it. The moment occurred at a large outdoor barbecue celebrating Melissa's birthday. At the barbecue, Dorothy gave the gun to Melissa's 10-year-old nephew, Sammy. She told Sammy, \"Why don't you go up and point this gun at your Auntie Melissa. When you pull the trigger a sign will come out saying, 'BANG! and Happy Birthday,' just like in the circus.\" Sammy took the gun, pointed it at Melissa, and pulled the trigger. However, Sammy's aim was faulty, and when the gun discharged the bullet struck Hank, killing him. The police quickly linked Dorothy to the crime. Which of the following best describes the crime or crimes of which Dorothy can be properly convicted?\n\nOptions:\nA. Murder of Hank and attempted murder of Melissa.\nB. Murder of Hank, but not attempted murder of Melissa.\nC. Attempted murder of Melissa, but not murder of Hank.\nD. Attempted murder of Melissa or murder of Hank, but not both.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Chaven was arrested in the city of Briggs, which is located in the state of Riverfront. He was charged with possession of illegal narcotics and placed on trial in the municipal court of Briggs. Chaven demanded a jury trial, which was duly granted. After the jury had been sworn, selected, and impaneled, Chaven's attorney, Fenway, filed a motion with the presiding judge praying for a dismissal based on a technical error in the bill of information drawn up by the city prosecutor. No witnesses had yet been sworn at the time Fenway filed the motion. The judge ordered an immediate recess while he considered the motion. Two days later he ruled in favor of defendant Chaven and dismissed the charges against him. A week later a state grand jury indicted Chaven for possession of illegal narcotics with intention to distribute same. The charges arose out of the same incident and arrest described above. Chaven was ordered to appear in the superior court of the state of Riverfront to answer the charges. Fenway immediately filed a motion on Chaven's behalf asserting that it would be unconstitutional to retry Chaven in the state court. The best argument against granting the motion is which of the following?\n\nOptions:\nA. The city of Briggs and the state of Riverfront are separate sovereigns.\nB. The state charge requires the proving of a fact not required by the municipal charge.\nC. Chaven's trial in municipal court had not yet reached the stage where jeopardy attaches.\nD. The dismissal of the case in municipal court was based on a technicality that did not go to the merits of the case.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Darryl is being sued under a federal statute that allows an action for damages by victims of domestic violence committed on military bases or other federal land. The lawsuit stems from the alleged longtime physical abuse of Violet, who is the eight-year-old daughter of Darryl's live-in girlfriend. At trial in federal court, the plaintiff, Violet's legal guardian, calls Phil to the stand. Phil is a physician who treated Violet for her injuries. The plaintiff seeks to have Phil testify that, during his treatment of Violet, he told her that in order to treat her injuries properly, he needed to know how she received her injuries and the length of time that her condition had existed. Phil will testify that Violet told him that Darryl had beaten her, and that the beatings had taken place fairly regularly for several months. The testimony of Phil is: \n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible only if Violet or her legal guardian has waived the physician-patient privilege.\nB. Admissible as a statement made to a doctor to treat a physical condition.\nC. Inadmissible, because the statement of Violet is not limited to a description of symptoms, but also includes a statement that Darryl caused her injuries.\nD. Inadmissible, unless Violet is too young to testify or is otherwise unavailable.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Oralee owned Blackacre for many years. After she reached retirement age, Oralee sold the property to Amber, who financed the purchase with a note secured by a 20 -year mortgage with Maritime Bank. Amber promptly recorded her deed, and for 20 years Amber promptly made every payment to the bank. During that period of time, Amber financed the purchase of three automobiles with loans from Maritime Bank, and her record of payment was exemplary. Five years after Amber had paid off the mortgage, she revisited the mortgage loan department of Maritime Bank. She told the loan officer that she wanted to borrow $ 30,000$ to help pay for the medical school education of a favorite niece, securing the loan with a mortgage on Blackacre. After confirming Amber's continuing employment status, the bank officer quickly approved the loan based upon Amber's excellent record with the bank. On June 3, Amber executed the note and the mortgage, and the bank gave Amber a certified check for $ 30,000$, which she immediately deposited in her account at National Bank. On June 4, Amber sold Blackacre to Brittany for $ 150,000$. Brittany, a wealthy actress and film director, paid Amber in cash. Brittany knew nothing about the mortgage. On June 5, Brittany recorded her deed to Blackacre. Two hours after Brittany recorded, Amber closed out her account at National Bank, which included the $ 30,000$ from the mortgage. Amber, an only child who had never married, had no \"favorite niece.\" By nightfall, Amber was on a flight to Tahiti with the proceeds of the aforementioned transactions, plus $ 2$ million that she had secretly embezzled from her employer. Brittany did have a favorite niece, an aspiring actress named Christie. On the evening of June 8 , which was a Saturday, Brittany presented Christie with a deed to Blackacre as a gift. At 10 a.m. on June 10, Maritime Bank recorded its mortgage. At 2 p.m. on June 10, Christie recorded her deed. After Amber missed her first mortgage payment on July 1, Maritime Bank employees were sent scurrying to the title office. They discovered the deeds to Brittany and Christie, and the facts surrounding Amber's hasty departure soon surfaced. Maritime Bank demanded that Christie satisfy the $ 30,000$ mortgage. Brittany provided Christie with an attorney, who filed an appropriate suit to determine the various interests in Blackacre. The recording statute in the jurisdiction reads, in relevant part: A conveyance of an estate in land shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without notice thereof, unless the conveyance is recorded. The court should rule that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Christie owns Blackacre subject to Maritime Bank's mortgage, because Christie is a donee.\nB. Christie owns Blackacre subject to Maritime Bank's mortgage, because Maritime Bank recorded before Christie.\nC. Christie owns Blackacre free of Maritime Bank's mortgage, because Brittany was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.\nD. Christie owns Blackacre free of Maritime Bank's mortgage, because the bank does not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Carol owed June $ 90,000$, which was due on January 1. On January 15, Carol offered to pay June $ 80,000$ if June would agree to accept the amount in full satisfaction of the $ 90,000$ debt. June agreed and Carol paid $ 80,000$ to June. If June then sues Carol for $ 10,000$, June will: \n\nOptions:\nA. Win, because Carol had an obligation to pay $ 90,000$ on January 1.\nB. Lose, because of June's agreement to accept $ 80,000$.\nC. Lose, because there was an accord and satisfaction.\nD. Lose, because June agreed to the $ 80,000$ after the January 1 due date.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"State Blue has a statute making it a crime to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated. State Blue has another statute providing that a blood alcohol level of 10 raises a presumption of intoxication. State Blue police spotted Billy Bob's pickup weaving from lane to lane on the highway and they stopped the truck. Billy Bob took a breathalyzer test that indicated a $.12$ blood alcohol level, and so Billy Bob was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. At trial, at the close of all the evidence, and over Billy Bob's objection, the judge instructed the jury: \"If you are convinced that, at the time Billy Bob was pulled over, his blood alcohol level was 10 or greater, you must presume that he was intoxicated.\" Billy Bob was convicted, and he is appealing on the ground that the judge's instruction was improper. The appellate court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Affirm, because the judge may instruct the jury on the law, and he merely cited the state statute. \nB. Reverse and remand, because the jury should have been left to draw its own conclusion without the judge's instruction.\nC. Reverse and remand, because the presumption might lead the jury to believe that the prosecution did not have to meet its burden of proving Billy Bob guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nD. Reverse and remand, because the instruction was substantially more prejudicial than probative.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is the named defendant most likely to suffer a criminal conviction that would be upheld on appeal?\n\nOptions:\nA. Byron, who admits to an undercover operative that he regularly snorted Jack Daniels whiskey until last Christmas, is prosecuted under a law effective January 1 of this year that makes it a felony for anyone to snort any alcoholic beverage.\nB. Chadwick, when asked by an off-duty police officer to sell two Super Bowl tickets for five times their face value, loudly proclaims, \"I couldn't do that, stranger, because scalping is a felony in this state!\" Chadwick, who is unaware that the buyer is a police officer, then whispers to the buyer, \"But if you make it six times face value, you've got a deal, buddy.\" Also unknown to Chadwick, effective the previous week, it is no longer a criminal offense in that state to scalp tickets to sports events. Chadwick is prosecuted for attempted scalping.\nC. State law makes it a misdemeanor to place water in a container that has held chlorine bleach. Duncan, whose car has overheated in the desert, walks several miles to a deserted gas station that has running water and fills an old chlorine bleach container with water to carry back to his car. On the way back, he is picked up by the highway patrol who notice the bleach container and ask what is inside. When Duncan answers, \"Water,\" he is arrested for violation of the misdemeanor statute.\nD. Ed, sitting at a bar whose bartender is an undercover police officer, says to the officer, \"God, I'd like to kill my wife. If there was any way I thought I could do it and not get caught, I'd blow her away in a second.\" Ed is prosecuted for violating a statute that proscribes intent to murder.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The Classical School is a private school located in the state of Romanova. Under an aidto-education statute passed by the state legislature a few years ago, The Classical School and certain other private schools receive state benefits. Among those received by The Classical School are: (i) free textbooks from the state, (ii) an exemption from state taxes, and (iii) $20 \\%$ of its operating budget in the form of state grants. The remaining $80 \\%$ of The Classical School's budget is covered by tuition fees and by donations from alumni and others. The Classical School is licensed by the state, but the state has no requirement for certification and licensure of teachers in private schools. Timon was hired to teach history at The Classical School and was given the standard three-year contract given to teachers in their first stint at the school. Timon, who had been a student activist in college, was annoyed every day when he faced classes wearing the uniform required by The Classical School. Timon kept his mouth shut until he was chosen, in the fall term of his second year, to give the monthly \"History Enrichment Lecture\" to the entire school. The topic of Timon's lecture was Europe between the two world wars. Timon's lecture was factual, balanced, and nonopinionated, until, at the end of his lecture, he told the assembled students, \"We've talked a lot this afternoon about the rise of fascism, but think about this: there is absolutely no qualitative difference between those uniforms you're wearing and those worn by the Hitler Youth. If you had any gumption you'd organize a protest against having to wear them.\" After the speech, Timon was called to the administrative office by the headmaster and fired on the spot, despite Timon's protests that he had almost two years left on his contract. Timon requested a hearing and was curtly told to leave the premises of the school immediately. Charging that his constitutional rights had been violated, Timon filed suit in federal district court. Timon will: \n\nOptions:\nA. Succeed, because the school's action violated Timon's freedom of speech rights.\nB. Succeed, because Timon has been denied due process of law.\nC. Fail, because Timon was not in his position long enough to acquire property rights in his job.\nD. Fail, because assistance and involvement by the state did not result in the private school's action being conduct by the state. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In the wake of revelations regarding safety hazards and toxic emissions from plants processing radioactive materials, a bill was introduced into the legislature of State Green barring the processing of plutonium, a radioactive artificial element, in State Green. After extensive public hearings it was clear that the bill had strong support in both houses of the state legislature and that, if called to a vote, the bill would pass easily. Governor Luddite had also made a major speech announcing that he would sign such a bill. However, a few members of the legislature raised questions as to the bill's constitutionality. The constitution of State Green provides that the state supreme court may hand down declaratory judgments, and the question of the bill's constitutionality was brought before the state supreme court. The court ruled that the bill, in the form it was introduced into the legislature, is constitutional. There is only one plutonium processing plant in State Green. It is owned and operated by Master Minerals Corporation. The plant operates under contract with the federal government and is highly profitable for Master Minerals. Master Minerals seeks to have the judgment of the state supreme court overturned, and its attorneys have filed appropriate papers to bring the case before the United States Supreme Court. The Court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not hear the matter, because no case or controversy exists.\nB. Review the state court's opinion and reverse it.\nC. Review the state court's opinion and affirm it.\nD. Not review the state court's opinion, because it is based on an independent state ground. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Doobad was on trial for armed robbery. The defense placed Doobad's friend Wendt on the stand as an alibi witness. Wendt testified that at the time of the armed robbery Doobad was engaged in other activities with Wendt. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Wendt, \"Isn't it true, Mr. Wendt, that the grand jury has indicted you for the same crime as Mr. Doobad?\" Doobad's lawyer knew that Wendt had been indicted for the armed robbery and was to be tried separately in two weeks, but she vigorously objected to the prosecutor's question. Her objection should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because Wendt has been indicted, but not convicted, of the armed robbery.\nB. Sustained, because prior bad acts may not be introduced to impeach a witness.\nC. Overruled, because Wendt's indictment tends to show his criminal propensities.\nD. Overruled, because Wendt's indictment tends to show bias on the part of the witness.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The President of the United States entered into a bilateral agreement with Nerddistan, a sovereign nation, regarding the probate of estates. One part of the agreement provided that, should a citizen of Nerddistan die owning property in the United States or its Commonwealths or Territories, the executor or administrator appointed in Nerddistan should have the power to deal with such property and a separate American administrator or executor need not be appointed. Reciprocal rights were extended to United States citizens who died owning property in Nerddistan. Tadzik, a citizen of Nerddistan, died owning property in the United States state of Gulfstream. Tadzik's will appointed Elwwan, a citizen of Nerddistan, as executor. A law in the state of Gulfstream requires that all property left by will within the state of Gulfstream be probated by an executor or administrator who is a resident of Gulfstream. If Elwwan desires to act as executor of the estate and properly distribute the Gulfstream property in accordance with Tadzik's will, should he be allowed to do so, notwithstanding the Gulfstream statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because the probate of real property within the state is within the exclusive purview of the state.\nB. No, because an executive agreement is not a treaty, and state law takes precedence over executive agreements.\nC. Yes, because executive agreements supersede state laws.\nD. Yes, because executive agreements are entitled to full faith and credit. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Rupert held a majority ownership interest in one of the three daily newspapers in City, as well as numerous other media outlets across the country. When a popular City radio station was put on the market, he entered into negotiations to purchase it. However, the Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\") blocked the sale on the basis of a regulation forbidding ownership of a radio or television station to any entity owning a daily newspaper in the same city. The next year, however, the FCC suspended enforcement of that regulation to permit the radio station to be sold to Sumner, the owner of another daily newspaper in City. Rupert filed an action in federal district court seeking to enjoin the sale. The court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Decide the case on the merits, because Rupert can claim that the FCC's unequal treatment of the two transactions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\nB. Decide the case on the merits, because Rupert can claim that the FCC's refusal to allow him to own the station violated his freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment.\nC. Dismiss the action, because Rupert cannot show that enjoining the transaction will eliminate any injury that he might have suffered.\nD. Dismiss the action, because the federal government has the power to regulate ownership of the broadcast media.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Petrolia derived most of its income from extractive industries, especially its extensive oil and natural gas fields. However, a worldwide drop in the price of petroleum was severe enough to cause a depression in Petrolia, and the state's unemployment rate soared. To counter the effect the depression was having on Petrolia's citizens, the state legislature passed a law requiring all employers operating in the state's oil and natural gas fields to give preference in hiring to residents of Petrolia. The bill banned the hiring of nonresidents unless no other qualified person could be found to fill an oilfield or natural gas field position. Under prevailing economic conditions, the statute was tantamount to a total ban on hiring of nonresidents because so many unemployed oil and gas workers had been created by the depression and little new exploration was taking place. \"Roughnecks,\" as oilfield workers call themselves, tend to be an itinerant lot, moving from place to place as new fields are brought into production. Driller was a 48-year-old roughneck whose permanent residence was in Louisiana. He had worked on offshore rigs in the Gulf waters off his home state, but Driller had also worked in Texas, Oklahoma, Alaska, Kuwait, Indonesia, and Venezuela. Upon hearing that one of the few independent companies actively exploring in Petrolia had struck a new field in that state, Driller drove to the field office of Ewing Exploration Company in Petrolia and applied for a job. Looking at Driller's extensive experience as described on Driller's resume, Ewing's personnel officer sadly shook his head. He indicated that Driller's qualifications were better than anyone's working in the field, but that he had more applications from experienced Petrolia residents than he had jobs to offer. The sole reason given for not hiring Driller was the preferential hiring statute favoring state residents. Driller filed suit in federal district court challenging the statute. The court should rule in favor of:\n\nOptions:\nA. Petrolia, because employment discrimination is only unconstitutional if it involves race, religion, alienage, or sex.\nB. Petrolia, because the state's interest in hiring local residents outweighs the interest of nonresidents.\nC. Driller, because the law denies him the privileges and immunities of state citizenship.\nD. Driller, because the preferential hiring law impairs Driller's rights under the Contract Clause of the federal Constitution.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Devlin is being tried for murder in the bludgeoning death of Vandross. Devlin denies any involvement in the crime. He calls Westin to the stand. Westin testifies that, in his opinion, Devlin is a nonviolent, peaceable man. Which of the following, if offered by the prosecution, would most likely be admissible?\n\nOptions:\nA. A neighbor's testimony that Westin has beaten his wife on several occasions.\nB. A police officer's testimony that Devlin has a general reputation in the community as a violent person.\nC. A neighbor's testimony that Devlin has a reputation for being untruthful.\nD. Evidence that Devlin has a conviction for aggravated battery.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Oiler, an investment banker in Big City, began having cash flow problems. Seeing no other way out, he decided to sell Cattlefork, a distant ranch that had been in his family for generations, to his childhood nemesis, Astro. Not wanting to lose control of the family property forever, Oiler inserted a provision in the deed to Astro binding \"Astro, his heirs, and assigns\" to offer \"Oiler, his heirs, and assigns\" the right of first refusal to purchase Cattlefork when it was offered for sale. Astro was not happy with the provision, but Oiler refused to sell the property without the covenant included. Astro reluctantly agreed. Cattlefork was conveyed to Astro, and the deed containing the right of first refusal was duly recorded. Astro lived on Cattlefork for 23 years. His dislike for Oiler was so great that he did not want Oiler to ever get the property back. Therefore, Astro devised a stratagem to get around the covenant. When informed that Cowboy was interested in buying the property, Astro decided to execute his plan. Astro's friend Ranger agreed to act as a \"straw man\" to avoid the consequences of the covenant. Astro deeded Cattlefork as a \"gift\" to Ranger. Ranger recorded the deed, which did not contain the right of first refusal covenant, and Ranger then sold the land to Cowboy for $ 200,000$, giving the proceeds of the sale to Astro. Cowboy knew nothing about the right of first refusal because he inspected only Ranger's deed from Astro. When Oiler learned of what had happened, he filed suit to compel conveyance of the land to him. To back up his words, Oiler produced a $ 200,000$ letter of credit. The jurisdiction in which the property is located has an unmodified common law Rule Against Perpetuities and the following recording statute: Any conveyance of an interest in land, other than a lease for less than one year, shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without notice, whose conveyance is first recorded. How will the court most likely rule in this case?\n\nOptions:\nA. Oiler will prevail, because a deed with the covenant granting the right of first refusal was in Cowboy's chain of title.\nB. Oiler will prevail, because Astro and Ranger acted in bad faith.\nC. Oiler will not prevail, because the covenant is void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.\nD. Oiler will not prevail, because the covenant, although enforceable against Astro personally, does not run with the land. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owen owned Copperacre, a large tract of mineral-rich land in a sparsely populated area. He entered into a lease with Yukon, a prospector who was interested in developing the land for mining. The term of the lease was two years and gave Yukon an option to buy the property at any time after the first year. Yukon did not record the lease. Six months later, Yukon left Copperacre for a period of time to prospect in Mexico, leaving no goods on the land that would identify him. Owen then conveyed Copperacre in fee simple to Darlene, who had inspected the property while Yukon was in Mexico and was unaware of the prior transaction. Darlene did not immediately record her deed. After three months in Mexico, Yukon returned to Copperacre and encountered Darlene. A statute in the jurisdiction provides, in part: No conveyance or mortgage of an interest in land, other than a lease for less than one year, is valid against any subsequent purchaser for value without notice thereof whose conveyance is first recorded. If Darlene brings an action to quiet title to Copperacre, how should the court rule?\n\nOptions:\nA. Darlene takes title subject to Yukon's leasehold interest and his option to purchase because Yukon acquired his interest first.\nB. Darlene takes title subject to Yukon's leasehold interest but not his option to purchase because he does not yet have the power to exercise the option. \nC. Darlene takes title subject to Yukon's leasehold interest and option to purchase regardless of whether she now records, because she will have had notice of Yukon's interest before recording.\nD. Darlene takes title free of Yukon's leasehold interest and option because Yukon failed to record before Darlene purchased the property without notice of his interest.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Soar Airlines Flight 226 was a flight from Miami to Washington, D.C., with an hour stopover in Orlando. At the Orlando Airport, Mike and Nick, holding tickets to Washington, D.C., disembarked from the plane. Each carried a rather large piece of carry-on baggage. Mike went into a telephone booth and placed a call, while Nick stood with his back to the booth, looking around in all available directions. Sam, an officer of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration assigned to watch for drug activities at the Orlando Airport, noticed Mike and Nick. As soon as Mike emerged from the phone booth, Sam approached the two men. Sam identified himself and asked Mike and Nick, \"Do you mind if I ask you a few questions?\" Both agreed. After asking about such matters as their destination, Sam asked, \"Do you mind if we go into my office and inspect what's in your hand baggage?\" Both Mike and Nick agreed. In the office, Sam searched both pieces of luggage and found nothing suspicious in either. He then proceeded to pat down Mike and Nick. He found nothing on Mike, but he felt a bulge around Nick's stomach. Further investigation revealed that Nick was wearing a pouch around his waist which proved to contain cocaine. Mike and Nick were charged with possession of cocaine. Assume for purposes of this question only that Nick pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine. At Mike's preliminary hearing it has been stipulated that Mike owns the cocaine, but Mike's attorney brings a motion at the hearing to suppress the introduction of the cocaine at trial. How should the court rule on the motion?\n\nOptions:\nA. In favor, because Mike was not in possession of the cocaine.\nB. In favor, because Mike and Nick had a reasonable expectation of privacy when Sam elected to search them.\nC. Against, because Mike has already stipulated that he owns the cocaine.\nD. Against, because the search of Nick did not violate Mike's reasonable expectation of privacy.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Tommy was in his third year of college, and Tommy's father, Dad, often sent Tommy money to help Tommy pay for books and for living expenses. During the last winter break, Tommy brought his girlfriend Gidget home to meet his family. Dad took an instant dislike to Gidget, and has continually lectured Tommy about her, insisting that Tommy could find someone \"more refined\" to date. In early March, Tommy telephoned Dad from College Village, where the university was located. Tommy asked Dad for $ 1,000$. Dad told Tommy, \"I'll send you the thousand bucks, but if you don't find a classier girlfriend than that Gidget person, this is the last subsidy you'll get from me, young man.\" Tommy thanked Dad, and promptly went to a jeweler with Gidget, where Tommy and Gidget selected an engagement ring priced at $ 5,000$. Tommy, who was 21 years of age, signed a contract to purchase the ring. The contract required Tommy to make a $1,000$ down payment and then to make a series of installment payments. Tommy planned to use the $ 1,000$ check he was expecting from Dad for the down payment. Tommy and Gidget both worked at part-time, minimum wage jobs while they attended school. Through a friend who lived in College Village, Dad discovered Tommy's plan to buy Gidget an expensive engagement ring. Dad refused to send Tommy the $ 1,000$ check. The jeweler is now demanding that Tommy make the $ 1,000$ down payment on the ring and pay the first installment as well. Can Tommy legally enforce Dad's promise to send Tommy $ 1,000$ ?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Tommy relied on Dad's promise and the doctrine of promissory estoppel applies.\nB. Yes, because Tommy was an intended beneficiary.\nC. No, because Dad's promise was a gift unsupported by consideration.\nD. No, because Dad did not promise to send the money with the expectation of inducing Tommy to buy an engagement ring for Gidget. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Tekmart, a leading computer supply retailer, contacted Megabyte, a manufacturer of blank diskettes, on October 25 to supplement the supply of diskettes at Tekmart's area stores. In response, Megabyte offered to supply 50 cartons of boxed diskettes at $ 200$ a carton, for a total price of $ 10,000$, delivery one week after acceptance, and sent a letter containing those contractual terms to Tekmart on October 26 . The president of Tekmart signed the letter on October 27 without making any changes to it and sent it back to Megabyte by first class mail. The next day, having not heard from Tekmart, Megabyte's sales manager contacted the president of Tekmart and informed him that, if Tekmart accepted by the end of the month, it would receive a $1 \\%$ discount in the total price. When Tekmart's president responded that he had already sent the acceptance, the sales manager assured him that the discount would still apply. On October 31, Tekmart received a circular from Dataco offering comparable diskettes for $5 \\%$ less than Megabyte's price. The president of Tekmart immediately faxed a rejection to Megabyte. Megabyte received the rejection immediately but took no action on it. The next day, November 1, Megabyte received the signed contract from Tekmart. What is the status of the agreement between the parties?\n\nOptions:\nA. An enforceable contract was formed for $ 9,900$ because Tekmart accepted before October 31 and needed no additional consideration for the oral modification.\nB. An enforceable contract was formed for $ 10,000$ because the parol evidence rule precludes Tekmart from offering evidence of the telephone conversation.\nC. An enforceable contract was formed for $ 10,000$ because, even though Tekmart accepted before October 31 , the Statute of Frauds makes the oral modification between the parties unenforceable.\nD. An enforceable contract was not formed between the parties because Tekmart's rejection was received before its acceptance. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Denton was on trial in a civil torts action. He was charged with driving his car negligently and, as a result of his negligence, injuring Potts. Denton's friend, Weiner, was sitting in the passenger seat of the car driven by Denton when the accident occurred. Denton put Weiner on the stand, and Weiner testified that Denton was driving safely and well below the posted 55 mile-per-hour speed limit. Shortly before the trial began, Weiner's secretary, Sarah, telephoned Potts and told him, \"You might be interested in knowing that Weiner has been understating his income to the government for years.\" The Internal Revenue Service has never charged Weiner with tax evasion, but Sarah's information was accurate. On cross-examination, Potts's attorney asked Weiner, \"Have you ever cheated on your tax returns?\" Denton's attorney objects. The objection should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because the question is not relevant to the facts of the case at bar.\nB. Sustained, because witnesses may not be impeached through the use of collateral material.\nC. Overruled, because Weiner's tax evasion shows a tendency to lie.\nD. Overruled, because Weiner's acts constitute a felony punishable by at least one year in prison. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Orbison owned Rockacre, but was badly in need of ready cash. He conveyed Rockacre to Presley, who put the deed in his guitar case and took off for a three-week tour of the Orient. Orbison knew that Presley had left town, and Orbison still found himself strapped for money. He offered to sell Rockacre to Madonna for $ 5,000$. Although Madonna had heard Presley say he had bought Rockacre, Madonna thought $ 5,000$ was a terrific price for the property. She paid Orbison $ 5,000$ and received a deed from him, which she promptly recorded. Madonna subsequently conveyed Rockacre to Fats for $ 15,000$. Fats knew nothing about Presley's deed and Fats promptly recorded the deed from Madonna. Two weeks later, upon his return from the Orient, Presley recorded his deed to Rockacre. A month after that, Fats conveyed Rockacre to Chubby for $ 17,000$. Chubby knew that Presley held a deed to Rockacre, but paid Fats $ 17,000$ anyway. Chubby immediately recorded and filed an appropriate action against Presley and against Fats to determine ownership of Rockacre. Assume that Rockacre is situated in a state with the following statute: No conveyance or mortgage of an interest in land is valid against any subsequent purchaser for value without notice thereof whose conveyance is first recorded. The court will most likely rule that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Presley has superior rights to both Fats and Chubby.\nB. Fats has superior rights to both Presley and Chubby.\nC. Chubby has superior rights to both Presley and Fats.\nD. Chubby has superior rights to Fats, but Presley has superior rights to Chubby.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Parafun, Inc. manufactured and sold parachutes for use by sport skydivers. The corporation's product development committee selected a design for a parachute submitted by Silk, one of Parafun's three professional designers. The chute was placed on the market, with the warning, \"This parachute should be discarded after 150 jumps.\" Parafun's market researchers had established that the usual practice among sport skydivers was to discard a parachute after 100 jumps. After the design had been approved and the product was successfully manufactured and marketed, Silk took several of the parachutes to an independent stress analysis laboratory. The scientists tested the chutes and concluded that there was a $1 \\%$ failure rate on the chutes for jumps 100 through 150 , because the center of the parachute might tend to collapse because of a design defect. Silk did not report this problem to his superiors at Parafun, because he feared he would be fired. Several months after Silk received the testing report, Airborne, a sport skydiver, used one of the chutes designed by Silk and manufactured and sold by Parafun. Airborne's use was the 115 th jump for the chute. When Airborne leaped from the airplane, the chute opened properly, but halfway down, the center of the chute collapsed inward. Airborne hurtled to the ground to his death. An investigation established that Silk knew of the design defect. If Parafun is charged with manslaughter in a common law jurisdiction, the verdict should be: \n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty, because Silk was Parafun's employee and he designed the instrumentality of death.\nB. Guilty, because Airborne died as a result of the failure of a product manufactured and sold by Parafun.\nC. Not guilty, because a corporation cannot be found guilty of manslaughter.\nD. Not guilty, because there was only a $1 \\%$ chance of parachute failure.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Deborah was at work when her husband called her and said, \"You lazy procrastinator, you were supposed to be working in the front yard this weekend while I did the backyard. Ned just tripped over those roots I told you to take out. He's really been badly hurt and I'll bet he sues us for all we're worth.\" Deborah then told her secretary, Walter, \"Ned just got hurt because I forgot to do my yard work.\" On returning home, however, Deborah discovered that Ned had tripped over roots from his own tree in his own yard. Ned disagreed and sued Deborah and her husband. At trial, Ned called Walter to testify as to Deborah's statement to him. Walter's testimony will be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Excluded, because Deborah had no firsthand information when she made her statement to Walter.\nB. Excluded, because it is inadmissible lay opinion.\nC. Admitted, because it is not hearsay.\nD. Admitted to impeach Deborah's expected testimony as to the result of her own investigation.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Harriet observed an automobile accident that took place across the street from her house. She noticed at the time that the green car, which was driven by Def, did not come to a complete stop at the stop sign and entered the intersection to strike the yellow car driven by Plee after Plee's car had already entered the intersection. Plee sued Def for damages and injuries, but the trial did not take place until almost three years after the accident. Plee wanted Harriet to testify on his behalf against Def, but Harriet's recollection of the accident was very fuzzy. The night before she was scheduled to testify, Harriet consulted her diary, in which Harriet had noted that Def's car ran the stop sign and entered the intersection after Plee's car was already in the intersection. Plee's attorney called Harriet to the stand, and she testified regarding Def's failure to observe the stop sign and Def's entrance into the intersection after Plee. On cross-examination, Def's attorney asked Harriet if she had consulted any materials to prepare for her testimony. Harriet admitted that her recollection of the accident had been fuzzy and that she had consulted her diary the night before her testimony. Def's attorney immediately moved that Harriet's testimony be stricken from the record. The court should rule that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Harriet's testimony is admissible if, after reviewing her notes, she had an independent recollection of the event.\nB. Harriet's testimony is admissible, because the contents of her diary are protected under the work product rule.\nC. Harriet's testimony should be stricken, because her diary was not made available to the opposing party prior to trial.\nD. Harriet's testimony should be stricken, because it is not the best evidence.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Moss, a state legislator, was the chairman of a committee that disbursed funds to schools in the state for various projects. A portion of the funds that were used were received from the federal government as part of a federal revenue sharing plan. Moss was charged with a violation of federal law when he and his committee made a $ 10,000$ grant for textbooks to a private school for whites only. Moss's defense is that his action as chairman of this committee was in the course of his legislative duties, and thus, immune from federal interference. The best argument that would support Moss's constitutional claim is:\n\nOptions:\nA. If the state law authorizes Moss's action, he cannot be prosecuted for violation of a federal law.\nB. The Tenth Amendment forbids the federal government from restricting the state's rights regarding the education of minor children within the state.\nC. The doctrine of federalism prevents the federal government from interfering with a member of the state's legislature in the performance of his legislative duties.\nD. As long as the private school is not a parochial school, federal law cannot limit a state's rights regarding the education of minor children within the state.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Alpine has a Fair Employment Act that provides a remedy for victims of employment discrimination. The Act requires complainants to bring charges before the Alpine Fair Employment Commission within 180 days of the occurrence of alleged unlawful employment practices. The Commission then has 120 days to convene a factfinding conference to obtain evidence, ascertain the parties' positions, and explore settlement possibilities. Larson was discharged from his job with Widget Corp. purportedly because of a physical handicap unrelated to his ability to perform his job. Larson filed a timely complaint, alleging unlawful termination of employment, as required by the statute. However, through inadvertence, the Commission scheduled the factfinding conference for a date five days after expiration of the 120 -day statutory period. At the conference, Widget moved that the charge be dismissed for lack of a timely conference. The Commission denied the motion. Widget petitioned the Alpine Supreme Court. The court held for Widget, stating that the failure to comply with the 120 day requirement deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to consider Larson's charge. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Larson argues that his right to due process will be violated if the Commission's error is allowed to extinguish his cause of action. Which of the following best describes the viability of Larson's due process claim?\n\nOptions:\nA. The claim fails, because Larson had no protected property interest in his job.\nB. The claim fails, because the Alpine legislature, having conferred on claimants a remedy for claims of unfair employment practices, has the prerogative to establish limiting procedures for such claims.\nC. The claim succeeds, because Larson had a protected property interest in the remedy.\nD. The claim succeeds, because of the fundamental unfairness of leaving Larson without a remedy.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Large semi-trailer trucks ordinarily used either \"Gripper\" tires or \"Grabber\" tires. There was some difference in the design of the tires, and a number of tire manufacturers made both types of tires, which were deemed to be equally safe by independent testing labs. Most state statutes and vehicle regulations allowed the use of both types of tires on state highways. However, State Plum and State Apricot had laws on their books permitting only Grippers and banning Grabbers. State Grapefruit, on the other hand, had a statute allowing the use of Grabbers, and banning Grippers, on its state highways. The National Trucking Board, a trade association of interstate trucking firms, brought suit to have the laws of State Plum and State Apricot declared unconstitutional. The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, which struck down the Apricot and Plum statutes as undue burdens on interstate commerce. The National Trucking Board then brought suit in federal court to have the State Grapefruit statute banning Grippers struck down. The Grapefruit attorney general argued that the Grapefruit statute did not burden interstate commerce because Grabbers were now legal in all 50 states. The case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court. How should the Court rule on the constitutionality of the statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because there is no difference in safety between Grippers and Grabbers.\nB. Constitutional, because the states have the power to regulate safety on their highways.\nC. Unconstitutional, because it is an undue burden on interstate commerce.\nD. Unconstitutional, because it violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Uncle Izzy died, his will left Blackacre, a piece of property located in State Black, to his favorite nephew, Seymour, a resident of State White. Seymour never bothered to visit the property. Meanwhile, back in State Black, Michael noticed that Blackacre was now unoccupied. Not one to miss an opportunity, Michael leased Blackacre to Theresa. The lease was in writing and Theresa agreed to pay Michael an annual rent, which she always did promptly. Theresa had been leasing Blackacre from Michael for 15 years, when Seymour took a trip to State Black and decided to take a look at Blackacre. Upon discovering Theresa's occupancy, Seymour filed suit to quiet title, joining Michael in the action. In State Black, the statute of limitations for bringing an ejectment action for trespass to real property is set at 10 years. Whom shall the court declare to be the owner of Blackacre?\n\nOptions:\nA. Seymour, because a lease to a third party does not constitute occupancy by Michael.\nB. Seymour, because he was unaware that another was occupying Blackacre.\nC. Michael, because Seymour abandoned Blackacre.\nD. Michael, because occupancy by a tenant is sufficient possession by Michael to invoke adverse possession.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Homer owned Springfield, a valuable piece of property located near the state university. Homer's son, Bart, was a student at the university, and Homer allowed Bart and Bart's classmate, Newt, to live in the large house on the property rent free, in part because he felt that the studious Newt would be a good influence on the partyloving Bart. On Bart's 20th birthday, Homer handed Bart an instrument of conveyance signed by Homer. The deed included the following language: \"I give Springfield to my dearly beloved son Bart on the condition precedent that he receive a college degree before he reaches the age of 30 , and if he does not receive the degree by his 30th birthday to my beloved daughter, Lisa.\" Bart promptly recorded the deed. Shortly thereafter, Bart asked Newt to start paying him rent. An argument evolved out of Bart's request and an angry Bart told Newt to get off his property. Newt refused to leave and Bart filed suit to evict Newt. How will the court rule?\n\nOptions:\nA. Bart wins, because he has a fee simple subject to divestment.\nB. Bart loses, because Newt is Homer's tenant and not Bart's.\nC. Newt wins, because Bart is attempting a retaliatory eviction.\nD. Newt loses, because Homer's conveyance cuts off Newt's tenancy. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Martha brought her nine-year-old son, Norton, along with her on a trip to the Modern Mall shopping center. Modern Mall was, as its name describes, a modern mall development containing many different stores. The mall was entirely enclosed to provide protection from the elements. Martha had spent about half an hour at the mall without purchasing anything. In fact, her main purpose for going to the mall was \"window shopping,\" a pastime that Martha found extremely enjoyable. At that time Norton told Martha that he needed to use the restroom and that he was going to the nearest men's room. Martha agreed to wait for him in front of Lacy's Lingerie Boutique. Norton entered the men's room. He was followed by Barry, a convicted child molester released on parole. Barry cornered Norton in the men's room and sexually molested him. Barry then quickly left the mall and has not yet been apprehended. Martha later filed suit against Modern Mall Management Associates (\"MMMA\"), the owner of the mall, on Norton's behalf for the injuries suffered by him. Is MMMA likely to be found liable to Norton?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because MMMA owes a strict duty to its customers.\nB. Yes, if MMMA had reason to know of the danger to Norton.\nC. No, because a criminal act is a superseding force.\nD. No, because Norton was not an invitee of MMMA. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Neither the legislature nor the courts of State Yellow have abolished the common law tort defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. However, the State Yellow legislature decided it was time to take steps against all forms of drug abuse and passed the Omnibus Anti-Drug Act (\"OADA\"). One of the OADA provisions forbade the selling of airplane glue to anyone under the age of 18 except in small quantities in prepackaged model kits. Violation of the statute was penalized by fines or, in cases of multiple violations, possible imprisonment. OADA also required that all elementary and secondary schools licensed by the state provide comprehensive drug education programs. Primrose was a 14-year-old resident of State Yellow. Primrose had experienced the drug education program in his school, as mandated by OADA. One of the units in the program covered the dangers of glue sniffing. Primrose understood the anti-drug instruction, but he enjoyed the \"high\" he got from sniffing glue when he constructed model airplanes, and he wanted to experience more of it. He went to Daffodil's Hobby \\& Craft Shop to purchase a large tube of airplane glue. Daffodil, sole proprietor of the hobby shop, sold the large tube of glue to Primrose. Primrose went home, hid in the garage, and sniffed the glue. His parents found Primrose in a coma on the garage floor. Although Primrose will survive, physicians have told his parents that he suffered permanent brain damage from sniffing the glue. On Primrose's behalf, the parents filed suit against Daffodil, which should result in a verdict: \n\nOptions:\nA. For Daffodil, because Primrose was aware of the danger when he sniffed the glue.\nB. For Daffodil, because Primrose is not a member of the class of persons meant to be protected by OADA.\nC. For Primrose, because Daffodil violated OADA when he sold the glue to Primrose.\nD. For Primrose, unless Primrose could reasonably have been mistaken for an 18 year-old by Daffodil.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Kuegler, who had a long list of petty crimes to his credit, cased the Jaymart Department Store for a week. He noticed that a display case containing very expensive watches was near one of the store's exit doors. He planned to steal the watches by setting a diversionary fire in a trash basket, hoping that this would distract the store security personnel long enough for Kuegler to break the glass covering the watch case, grab the watches, and run out the nearby exit. Kuegler knew that the store had an automatic sprinkler system that would promptly douse the fire, but his purpose was merely to create a distraction rather than to cause any damage to the building. One afternoon at 2:30 p.m., Kuegler entered the Jaymart. He advanced to a trash barrel and poured some lighter fluid onto the trash. He threw the lighter fluid can into the barrel and tossed in a match after it. The lighter fluid immediately caused a long flame to rise. The flame quickly charred the wall next to the barrel and blistered the paint on the surrounding area. No serious damage was done to the structure, because the sprinklers operated as designed and quickly put out the fire before it could spread. Kuegler made a dash toward the case containing the watches, but just as he was breaking the glass case, one of the store's security guards apprehended Kuegler and called the police. Kuegler was read his Miranda rights and taken into police custody. A statute in the jurisdiction extends the crime of arson to buildings other than dwellings. If Kuegler is tried for the crime of arson, the court should find him:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not guilty, because Kuegler did not intend to burn the building.\nB. Not guilty, because Kuegler's act was sufficient only for attempted arson.\nC. Guilty, because Kuegler's conduct demonstrated the requisite state of mind for the crime.\nD. Guilty, because Kuegler started the fire during the act of perpetrating another felony.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alpha gratuitously conveyed his interest in Greekacre to Beta by quitclaim deed. Beta promptly recorded. Six months later, Alpha conveyed his interest in Greekacre to Gamma for $ 50,000$. Alpha gave Gamma a warranty deed, which Gamma promptly recorded. As between Beta and Gamma, who has the superior right to title to Greekacre?\n\nOptions:\nA. Beta, regardless of the type of recording statute.\nB. Gamma, regardless of the type of recording statute.\nC. Beta, because she recorded prior to Gamma recording.\nD. Gamma, because he took by warranty deed rather than quitclaim deed.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The legislature of the state of Westcoast enacted a statute authorizing all state agencies having legal departments or employing lawyers to subscribe to a computerized legal research service provided by LawComp, Inc. A contract was duly entered into between the state and the corporation. Before LawComp could begin installation of the necessary equipment in state offices, it was revealed that Westcoast's state university system had exhausted its budgeted resources and would not be able to operate without additional money. The legislature then repealed the statute authorizing use of the computer legal service and allocated the funds thereby released to the university. LawComp brings an action against the state to enforce the contract. The trial court should rule that the statute repealing authorization for LawComp's services is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Invalid, because it violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.\nB. Valid, because the legislature has constitutional power to repeal its own enactments.\nC. Invalid, because the state is equitably estopped to renounce a valid bid it has accepted.\nD. Valid, because the sovereign may not constitutionally be sued without its own consent.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is the defendant most likely to be convicted of burglary?\n\nOptions:\nA. Unreasonably mistaking Walter's briefcase for his own, Defendant removes the briefcase from Walter's office and takes it home, placing it in his hall closet.\nB. Believing that it is not illegal to take a relative's property, Defendant enters his brother's home through an unlocked door while his brother is sleeping and takes his $ 2,000$ television set. Defendant later sells the set at a flea market. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Cyrus and Myrtle are adjoining landowners. On Myrtle's property there is a natural freshwater spring. Cyrus asked Myrtle if it would be possible to build an irrigation ditch from the spring to his property in order to provide water for his cattle. Since the spring supplied more than enough water to meet Myrtle's needs, she agreed, provided that Cyrus construct the ditch in such a manner that it would need the least maintenance possible, because Myrtle did not wish to be continually bothered by Cyrus's coming on her land. Cyrus constructed a concrete irrigation ditch from the spring to the land. The cost of construction of the ditch was $ 25,000$. The only maintenance required on the ditch was a semiannual cleaning. Three years later, Myrtle informed Cyrus that her water needs had increased and that she could no longer allow Cyrus to take water from the spring. In addition, Myrtle did not allow Cyrus on her land to do the semiannual cleaning, resulting in the blocking of the ditch. Cyrus wishes to keep water flowing through the irrigation ditch to his land. Which of the following would be his strongest argument? \n\nOptions:\nA. Cyrus owns a valid easement appurtenant to Myrtle's property.\nB. Because Myrtle has allowed Cyrus to construct the irrigation ditch, Myrtle would be estopped from preventing Cyrus from coming onto her land.\nC. Cyrus, although a licensee, has expended such a substantial sum of money in constructing the irrigation ditch that Myrtle may not terminate Cyrus's license now.\nD. Cyrus, although a licensee, may continue to enter Myrtle's property to clean and maintain the ditch until he is able to acquire another source of water.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Fat Goose Foods (\"FGF\") was a manufacturer of quality pates and terrines made from imported goose livers and truffles. In a written agreement between FGF and Gourmet Mart (\"GM\"), a retail seller of fine quality foods, FGF agreed to \"sell all output of Fat Goose Foods liver pate to Gourmet Mart,\" and GM agreed to \"sell Fat Goose Foods pates exclusively.\" The agreement went on to state that GM would pay $ 150$ for each 10 -loaf container of pates ordered from FGF. The agreement between GM and FGF also contained the statement, \"either party may cancel this contract after two months upon giving reasonable notice to the other party.\" Assume that, after FGF faithfully filled GM's orders for six months, FGF determined that it was becoming too costly to operate the special oven used to roast the pate loaves. The oven had been manufactured in Belgium in 1937, but the plant that manufactured the oven was destroyed by bombing during World War II, and no more of the ovens were produced after 1940 . It would be difficult and expensive to find a suitable substitute, and when the oven malfunctioned, replacement parts were extremely difficult to find and very costly as well. FGF, therefore, decided to get out of the pate business entirely and to use its supply of goose livers to make a German-style liver sausage. FGF notified GM of its decision and the reasons for it, and shortly thereafter stopped shipping pate to GM. GM sued FGF, demanding that FGF continue to ship pate to GM or pay monetary damages to GM. Will GM prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because it was not impossible for FGF to perform.\nB. Yes, because FGF assumed the risk that making pate would become expensive.\nC. No, because the expense of fixing the oven provides a good faith reason for stopping production.\nD. No, because the cancellation provision made the contract illusory. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Andt lent his swim fins to his friend Gracehoper. Gracehoper promised to return the fins in a week, but two months had passed and, despite many reminders, Gracehoper still failed to return the fins. Andt decided to go to Gracehoper's cabin to retrieve them. Andt went to the cabin and knocked on the door, hoping to find Gracehoper at home. After knocking several times with no response, Andt tried the door and found it to be unlocked. Andt decided to look for the swim fins in Gracehoper's cabin and to retrieve them. Andt opened the door and entered Gracehoper's cabin. He looked around the cabin for $20 \\mathrm{~min}$ utes, but he could not locate the swim fins. He concluded that Gracehoper was probably using them and left the cabin, taking nothing from it and closing the door behind him. If Andt is later charged and tried for burglary, Andt's best defense to the charge is which of the following?\n\nOptions:\nA. Andt left the cabin without doing anything.\nB. Andt took nothing from the cabin.\nC. The swim fins belonged to Andt.\nD. Gracehoper's door was unlocked.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On an icy day, a vehicle driven by Doug struck Peter's car in the rear, smashing a taillight and denting Peter's bumper. Before Peter could say anything, Doug rushed out of his car and told Peter, \"Look, if you'll take $ 500$ for the damage, I'm sure my insurance company will pay for it.\" Peter refused and sued Doug for damage to his car and minor personal injuries. Peter wishes to testify as to Doug's statement at the time of the accident. Doug objects. Should the court allow Doug's statement to be admitted?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because it is an admission of a party opponent.\nB. Yes, because it is hearsay within the statement against interest exception.\nC. No, because the statement took the form of a settlement negotiation.\nD. No, because the statement is hearsay, not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Augustus received an \"inside tip\" from his friend Drusus, a real estate developer. Acting on the tip, Augustus purchased several acres of scrub-covered land of little apparent value. Shortly thereafter, Whizny World, an international conglomerate, announced plans to develop a theme park to be called \"Romeland\" on a tract immediately adjacent to Augustus's scrubland. The Whizny World plan caused real estate values in the surrounding area to skyrocket. Augustus could have sold his land for a price many times greater than the purchase price, but Augustus decided that he would use the land to build a variety of tourist-oriented facilities. In order to finance his project, Augustus went to Brutus Bank (\"Brubank\") and took out a $ 20,000$ mortgage on his land. Brubank promptly recorded the mortgage. A few days later, Augustus went to Cassius Bank (\"Casbank\") and took out a $ 15,000$ mortgage on the land. Casbank had known of the Brubank mortgage, and Casbank promptly recorded its own mortgage. A few weeks after that, Augustus reviewed his plans and decided that he needed more money to make his proposed tourist facilities more \"upscale.\" Augustus went back to Brubank and, after full disclosure of the Casbank mortgage, asked the loan officer if he could receive another advance of $ 15,000$ from the original Brubank mortgage. The loan officer readily agreed, processed the loan, and increased the amount borrowed against the mortgage from $ 20,000$ to $ 35,000$. Brubank promptly recorded the change. Augustus quickly spent most of his available funds on retainers for architects, builders, and attorneys. He was shocked to read in the paper that the County Council summarily rejected the Whizny World proposal, acceding to the arguments of community activists and environmentalists that the economic benefits from the theme park would be outweighed by the deleterious effects on the natural beauty and tranquility of the area. Augustus made no more mortgage payments to Casbank, but continued to make payments to Brubank. The value of the land plummeted, and Casbank brought a foreclosure action against Augustus and included Brubank as a party. At the foreclosure sale, the proceeds were a mere $ 18,000$ after attorneys' fees and court costs. How should the proceeds be divided?\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 18,000$ to Brubank and nothing to Casbank.\nB. $ 9,000$ to Brubank and $ 9,000$ to Casbank.\nC. $ 3,000$ to Brubank and $ 15,000$ to Casbank.\nD. Nothing to Brubank, $ 15,000$ to Casbank, and $ 3,000$ to Augustus. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Soar Airlines Flight 226 was a flight from Miami to Washington, D.C., with an hour stopover in Orlando. At the Orlando Airport, Mike and Nick, holding tickets to Washington, D.C., disembarked from the plane. Each carried a rather large piece of carry-on baggage. Mike went into a telephone booth and placed a call, while Nick stood with his back to the booth, looking around in all available directions. Sam, an officer of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration assigned to watch for drug activities at the Orlando Airport, noticed Mike and Nick. As soon as Mike emerged from the phone booth, Sam approached the two men. Sam identified himself and asked Mike and Nick, \"Do you mind if I ask you a few questions?\" Both agreed. After asking about such matters as their destination, Sam asked, \"Do you mind if we go into my office and inspect what's in your hand baggage?\" Both Mike and Nick agreed. In the office, Sam searched both pieces of luggage and found nothing suspicious in either. He then proceeded to pat down Mike and Nick. He found nothing on Mike, but he felt a bulge around Nick's stomach. Further investigation revealed that Nick was wearing a pouch around his waist which proved to contain cocaine. Mike and Nick were charged with possession of cocaine. At Nick's trial, the prosecution seeks to introduce the cocaine into evidence against Nick. Nick's attorney objects. The court should rule the cocaine:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because of the emergency conditions arising from the growing menace of drugs to the public.\nB. Admissible, because, in consenting to the search of his luggage, Nick impliedly consented to a body search.\nC. Inadmissible, because Sam had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to search Nick.\nD. Inadmissible, because Sam had no right to search the luggage.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of West Dakota has the following statute: No conveyance or mortgage of an interest in land is valid against any subsequent purchaser for value without notice thereof whose conveyance is first recorded. Judy, a West Dakota resident, owned several parcels of land there, including Steppeacre. Judy conveyed Steppeacre to Keith. Keith placed the deed in a safe deposit box but did not record the instrument before departing on an extended visit to Adak, a chic resort island in the Aleutian chain. Six months after Keith departed, Judy conveyed Steppeacre to Clyde, who promptly recorded his deed. Clyde had heard from several sources that Judy had sold Steppeacre to Keith, but he was sure that Judy would not sell him property she had already sold to someone else. Six months after Clyde took possession of Steppeacre, Keith returned from Adak, tanned and rested. When he went to visit Steppeacre he found Clyde there. Keith now sues Clyde in ejectment. Who owns Steppeacre?\n\nOptions:\nA. Keith, because his deed from Judy came earlier than Clyde's.\nB. Clyde, because he recorded first.\nC. Keith, because Clyde is not protected by the recording act.\nD. Clyde, because his recording cured any possible defect of his knowing of the earlier sale.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On April 1, Stan, a law student, agreed to sell his prized possession - an antique dictionaryto Betsy for $ 1,500$, so that he could pay for his bar review course. Because Stan did not have to pay for his course until April 30, the written contract between Stan and Betsy provided that the dictionary would not be delivered to Betsy until April 20, thus giving Stan a last few extra days to peruse the dictionary's pages. Late on April 15, a terrible fire swept through Stan's apartment building and the dictionary was destroyed. Firefighters determined that the blaze started when Hugh, the tenant living below Stan, fell asleep while doing his taxes and dropped his cigarette onto his paperwork. Fortunately for Stan, he had insurance that covered all of his damages, including compensation for the destroyed dictionary. On April 20, Stan told Betsy of the fire, but still demanded payment, claiming that Betsy was the equitable owner of the dictionary when it was destroyed, and explaining that she could have obtained insurance on the dictionary had she wanted to, since she had an insurable interest in the dictionary as soon as the contract was made. Betsy refused to pay. Stan brings an action against Betsy for the $ 1,500$. Who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Betsy, because Stan was fully compensated for his dictionary and making Betsy pay would therefore result in unjust enrichment.\nB. Betsy, because destruction of the dictionary avoids the contract and discharges her duty to pay.\nC. Stan, because when he contracted with Betsy, the risk of loss passed to her.\nD. Stan, because of the doctrine of equitable conversion.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dogwood was put on trial for the robbery and aggravated battery of Birch. Despite having been seriously injured in the attack, Birch took the witness stand and identified Dogwood as his attacker. The first trial ended in a hung jury on both charges, and Birch died shortly thereafter from his injuries. The district attorney then charged Dogwood with felony murder. At the trial on that charge, the prosecution offers into evidence Birch's testimony at the first trial identifying Dogwood as his assailant. Dogwood's attorney immediately objects. The objection should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because Birch's testimony was from a prosecution for a different offense than the present trial.\nB. Sustained, because the use of the former testimony of someone who has died violates the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him in a criminal case. \nC. Overruled, because Birch's testimony is nonhearsay under the Federal Rules as a statement of prior identification.\nD. Overruled, because the requirements of the exception to the hearsay rule for former testimony have been satisfied.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"After a major merger and corporate reorganization, Gray, who had been an employee of Macho Corporation for 25 years and its public relations director for 10 years, was fired. The excuse given him was that the reorganization and merger required a trimming of personnel to make the corporation \"lean and mean.\" Shortly after Gray's dismissal, Frogman, a member of the board of directors of Macho, who had always liked Gray and admired his competent work, told Gray, \"I think what happened to you was rotten, and I want you to know I voted against it, but Cobb, as chairman of the board, took most of the directors with him when he made a point at the reorganization meeting to say, 'Now's our chance to get rid of old Gray, who just doesn't fit our corporate image of youthful vigor.\"' Gray, who was 60 years old, filed an age discrimination suit against Macho. It was typical practice that all directors' meetings be tape recorded, and that the corporate secretary use the tape recording to type up a formal transcript of the proceedings. The meeting at which Gray's dismissal was discussed was no exception. At the trial of Gray's case, Gray wishes to have Frogman testify as to Cobb's statement at the board meeting. If the defense objects, the court should rule that such testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because it is based on Frogman's firsthand knowledge.\nB. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.\nC. Inadmissible, because the audiotape of the directors' meeting is the best evidence.\nD. Inadmissible, because the corporate secretary's transcription of the directors' meeting is the best evidence.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Torrens owned Forestacre, a large tract of wooded land, in fee simple. He had always allowed hunters from the local hunting club to use his land during hunting seasons, and had often expressed the wish that they be permitted to continue to use it after he died. On his 75 th birthday, he conveyed Forestacre to his two nephews, Pelt and Dash, who were members of the local hunting club. The deed was a general warranty deed stating that the property was conveyed in fee simple absolute. A few days later, Dash had a serious dispute with Pelt and the other members of the hunting club, and he quit the club. Torrens then executed a written agreement with Pelt stating that the conveyance of Forestacre to Pelt and Dash was in trust for the benefit of the local hunting club for a period of ten years, with Pelt and Dash as trustees, and then to Pelt and Dash in fee simple. Several months later, Torrens died. When the next hunting season drew near, Pelt told Dash that members of the hunting club were once again planning to hunt on the property. Dash would not even consider it, and threatened to have anyone hunting on the property other than Pelt arrested for trespassing. Pelt did not wish to have any further confrontations with Dash, so he brought an action for appropriate legal or equitable relief to establish his rights and the rights of the hunting club. What, if any, relief should the court provide?\n\nOptions:\nA. Deny Pelt any relief, because Dash has done nothing that would constitute an ouster of Pelt.\nB. Partition Forestacre into two separate tracts so that Pelt may permit the hunting club to use his half of Forestacre.\nC. Order Dash to permit the hunting club to hunt on Forestacre, because Torrens created an inter vivos trust with the requisite formalities for the benefit of the hunting club.\nD. Order Dash to permit the hunting club to hunt on Forestacre, because Pelt is equally entitled to possession of all of it and can allow members of the hunting club to hunt on the property as his guests. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Burt purchased Sweetacre, he financed the purchase through a mortgage on the property held by First Bank. The mortgage contained a \"due-on-sale clause,\" requiring the mortgagor to pay off the mortgage at the time the property is sold. Burt made all of his mortgage payments in a timely manner. Five years after Burt purchased Sweetacre, he sold the property to Tully. Burt told Tully that there was a mortgage on the property but he did not mention the due-on-sale clause. Tully paid Burt the asking price for Sweetacre. Burt pocketed the proceeds without paying off the First Bank mortgage. Which of the following best states the effect of the due-on-sale clause on Tully's interest in Sweetacre?\n\nOptions:\nA. First Bank can foreclose on Sweetacre.\nB. Tully must agree to assume the First Bank Mortgage on Sweetacre.\nC. The only effect of the clause is that Tully is personally liable on the mortgage.\nD. The clause has no effect, because due-on- sale clauses are generally void as contrary to public policy. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Donnalou was the office cut-up and general practical jokester. She decided to pull a prank on Paul, a rather dour and staid co-worker. Knowing where Paul, a creature of habit, always kept his lunch box, she put a small quantity of mescaline, a synthetic hallucinogen, in Paul's thermos bottle of cranberry juice. She expected that strait-laced Paul would have a minor vision or two and act in a goofy and comical manner. However, when Paul drank his mescaline-laced juice at lunchtime he had a severe reaction to the mescaline and experienced wild hallucinations. Donnalou promptly drove Paul to the emergency room of nearby Hacksaw Hospital. Paul was put under observation for a couple of hours. The emergency room physician, Pillpush, was very busy and negligently released Paul prematurely. The next day, while driving, Paul had another powerful hallucination and drove his car into a bridge abutment. Paul suffered contusions, abrasions, a concussion, and several broken bones. After Paul recovered he sued Donnalou for his injuries. Who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Donnalou, because the auto accident would not have occurred but for the negligence of Dr. Pillpush.\nB. Donnalou, because Donnalou did not intend to harm Paul.\nC. Paul, unless the automobile accident could not have reasonably been foreseen.\nD. Paul, because Donnalou intended that Paul should ingest the mescaline. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jenny, a general contractor, advertised in a trade publication that she planned to bid on the construction of a new building to be located in the Civic Mall. The advertisement welcomed bids from subcontractors to perform various functions, such as plumbing, electrical work, and masonry. The lowest electrical bid was from Ohmco, who bid $ 20,000$. The lowest plumbing bid was from Plunger, who bid $ 10,000$. Jenny used Ohmco's and Plunger's bids in preparing her general bid. At 2 p.m., on June 22, Jenny submitted her general bid. At 3 p.m., Plunger called her and said, 'I'm sorry, Jenny, but I made a mistake on that bid I submitted to you; I can't possibly do that plumbing work for a dime less than $ 12,000$.\" Jenny told him, \"I can't do anything about that because I've already submitted my general bid.\" Jenny was awarded the contract. Assume for purposes of this question only that after receiving the contract, Jenny hired Flusher to do the plumbing work on the building at a cost of $ 12,000$. She now sues Plunger for damages. Jenny is entitled to recover:\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 10,000$.\nB. $ 2,000$, which represents the difference between Plunger's bid and the amount Jenny had to pay for plumbing work.\nC. Nothing, because $ 12,000$ was a reasonable amount to pay for the work performed.\nD. Nothing, because Jenny did not accept Plunger's bid before it was withdrawn.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alice entered into a written agreement with Moran, whereby Moran agreed to remodel the basement of Alice's home, and Alice agreed to pay Moran $ 8,000$ upon completion of the job. The agreement contained a list of specifications as to the types of materials to be used in the remodeling. Among these specifications was a provision that Moran was to use an imported Brazilian hardwood for the paneling. Moran began the job, and then assigned his right to payment under the agreement to Nicholls. When the job was a little more than half completed, Alice sold the house to Bill. In a document separate from the deed of conveyance, Alice assigned her right to Moran's labor and delegated her duty to pay under the contract to Bill. 11. Assume for purposes of this question only that Moran completed the job on time but used Wyoming knotty pine instead of Brazilian hardwood for the paneling. The knotty pine is considered to be inferior to the Brazilian hardwood and is much less expensive, and Bill was very displeased when he saw the result. Who can Bill sue for breach? (A) Alice only. (B) Moran only. (C) Moran and Nicholls. (D) Alice, Moran, and Nicholls. If Kuegler is tried for the crime of arson, the court should find him:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not guilty, because Kuegler did not intend to burn the building.\nB. Not guilty, because Kuegler's act was sufficient only for attempted arson.\nC. Guilty, because Kuegler's conduct demonstrated the requisite state of mind for the crime.\nD. Guilty, because Kuegler started the fire during the act of perpetrating another felony.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress enacted a law requiring all civil service employees to retire at age 75 , except when such employees are employed by the armed services. Civil service employees of the armed services are required to retire at age 65 . Portman is an employee of the Department of the Army; he is 65 years old. He files suit in the federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that would prevent the Army from requiring him to retire before age 75 . Portman's strongest argument in support of his contention that the statute's provisions regarding civil service employees of the armed services are invalid is that this provision:\n\nOptions:\nA. Denies him the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. \nB. Denies him a property right without just compensation.\nC. Is invidious discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the Fifth Amendment.\nD. Is not within the enumerated powers of Congress under Article I, Section 8.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Delbert had his laptop computer stolen from his office during a recent holiday weekend. He went to Alice's computer resale shop to find a replacement and saw what he mistakenly thought was his computer. He questioned Alice, who told him that someone had just sold her the computer a few days ago, but she refused to give him any information on the seller and would not let him inspect it more closely. That night, after the shop was closed, Delbert forced open the back door and took the computer. Alice's clerk, who lived in an apartment above the shop, heard someone breaking in and called the police. Delbert was apprehended a block away from the building. If Delbert is charged with burglary in a jurisdiction retaining the common law criminal offenses, which of the following facts will be most relevant in determining his guilt or innocence?\n\nOptions:\nA. His mistake as to the identity of the computer was not reasonable.\nB. He was unaware that there was an apartment above the shop and did not believe that anyone lived in the building.\nC. He realized that the computer was not his before he carried it out.\nD. None of the above facts are relevant. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Larry was passing by a house under construction when he noticed that the ladder being used by workers on the roof had copper braces supporting the rungs. After making sure that the workers on the roof could not see him, Larry used a pliers that he had in his pocket to remove all of the copper braces that he could reach from the ground. A short time later, Vernon climbed down the ladder and it collapsed. He fell to the ground and severely injured his back. Larry was apprehended a few hours later trying to sell the copper for scrap. A statute in the jurisdiction makes it a felony for \"maliciously causing serious physical injury to another.\" Larry was charged with malicious injury under the statute and was also charged with larceny. After a jury trial in which the above facts were presented, he was convicted of both charges. If Larry appeals the conviction for the malicious injury charge on grounds of insufficient evidence, how should the court rule?\n\nOptions:\nA. Affirm the conviction, because Larry was engaged in criminal conduct at the time of the act that resulted in the injury.\nB. Affirm the conviction, because the jury could have found that Larry acted with malice.\nC. Reverse the conviction, because there was no evidence that Larry intended to injure anyone.\nD. Reverse the conviction, because there was no evidence that Larry bore any malice towards Vernon or the other workers on the roof.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owl contracted in writing to sell Birdacre to Partridge and Wren, as joint tenants, for $ 60,000$. Partridge and Wren put up $ 6,000$ as earnest money. Before the closing date, Owl died. Shortly thereafter, and also before the closing date, a garage on Birdacre burned down. The garage had a fair market value of $ 6,500$ and was a complete loss. After the fire Partridge went to see Eagle, the executor of Owl's estate. Partridge demanded that Eagle return the $ 6,000$, because Partridge and Wren were no longer interested in Birdacre. Eagle refused and told Partridge that he expected Partridge and Wren to tender the $ 54,000$ due on the property when the closing date arrived. Partridge and Wren did not do so. Partridge filed suit demanding a refund of the $ 6,000$. Eagle countersued, demanding specific performance by Partridge and Wren or, in the alternative, monetary damages. How should the court rule?\n\nOptions:\nA. In favor of Eagle, by requiring specific performance of Partridge and Wren.\nB. In favor of Eagle, by assessing damages against Partridge and Wren.\nC. In favor of Partridge, by ordering Eagle to refund the earnest money.\nD. The court should rule that Eagle is not entitled to either damages or specific performance and that Partridge is not entitled to a refund of the earnest money.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Steve gave his brother-in-law, Randy, permission to use his boat for a few hours of fishing on the local lake. Randy took the boat out on the lake for a while and then decided to cruise through a system of inland waterways to a larger chain of lakes. The fishing was so good that Randy stayed overnight there and fished most of the next day. On his way back, the boat was struck and seriously damaged by a large tree that fell from the bank without warning. Randy managed to bring the boat back to his house. Just as he got in, Steve called, demanding to know why Randy had not brought it back when he was supposed to. Randy promised that he would bring it back as soon as he could, but Steve replied that he was coming over right now to pick it up. Randy did not want to be around when Steve saw the damage to the boat, so he went out to the store. It was dark when Steve arrived, and he accidently ran over a corner of Randy's garden when he backed his truck up to the boat trailer. When he saw the damage to the boat, however, he left it there and went home. Assuming that the boat was worth $ 18,000$ before it was damaged and sustained $ 9,000$ worth of damage, what is the most that Steve will be entitled to recover in an action against Randy?\n\nOptions:\nA. $9,000 and damages for loss of use.\nB. $ 9,000$ and damages for loss of use, offset by the damage to Randy's garden.\nC. $ 18,000$ plus interest.\nD. $ 18,000$ plus interest, offset by the damage to Randy's garden.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Just before going on an expedition to the Amazon, Farley gave his brother, Milton, a power of attorney to sell his house, which stated: My brother, Milton, is specifically empowered to sell and convey all, or any part, of the real property owned by me as of this date. Several weeks later, Milton sold Farley's house to Glenda and conveyed to her a customary deed containing covenants of title. A year later, when Farley returned from the expedition, he was served with a complaint by Glenda, who was suing him for breach of covenant because it turned out that Farley's former wife owns onehalf the house that Milton had sold on behalf of his brother. In this suit, Glenda should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, because Farley, through his attorney-in-fact, Milton, had covenanted with regard to the title of the property.\nB. Prevail, if in fact Farley's former wife has filed a claim against Glenda for her interest in the house.\nC. Not prevail, unless the power to \"sell and convey\" is construed to include the power to execute a usual form of deed used to convey real property. \nD. Not prevail, because Farley did not make any specific covenants with regard to the sale of this house.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Twin Falls has a city ordinance that makes it unlawful for any group of individuals or organizations in excess of 20 persons to demonstrate, march, or picket in the city's civic center without first posting a bond with the police department and receiving a permit. The permit procedure takes at least one working day, and a \"parade\" permit costs $ 10$. The requirement for a license is that each demonstration in excess of 20 persons have one parade marshal for each 20 persons who must be responsible for insuring that the demonstration remains on the city sidewalks, does not block traffic, and does not become noisy or unruly. The ordinance, in addition to making a violation a misdemeanor, authorizes the police department to terminate any demonstration if \"any person in the demonstration, without provocation, uses, in the presence of other persons not a party to the demonstration, annoying, disturbing, opprobrious words and abusive language in such a manner as tending to cause a breach of the peace.\" YAAF (the Young Americans Against Fascism) brings suit in the state court to enjoin the city from preventing their scheduled demonstration on Memorial Day without a permit, and to enjoin the city from using this ordinance to require them to have a permit. YAAF's strongest contention for finding the provisions of this statute unconstitutional is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The city's civic center is a place where demonstrations of this type normally occur, and the city cannot prevent citizens from demonstrating there.\nB. There is no showing by the city that YAAF's demonstrators are likely to become disruptive or unruly.\nC. The ordinance is overbroad and unduly vague.\nD. The First and Fourteenth Amendments ensure the right of association in public places without interference.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is the defendant least likely to be found guilty of an attempted crime?\n\nOptions:\nA. In order to track down \"fences\" and other distributors of stolen goods, police officers, with permission of the owners and insurers, forward stolen jewelry they have intercepted on the way to Don, a reputed fence. Don takes the jewelry, which he believes to be stolen. Don is arrested and charged with attempted receipt of stolen goods.\nB. Dewey, a 21-year-old male, believes the \"age of consent\" in the state to be 18 , and that sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 18 constitutes statutory rape. In fact, the statute applies only to females under the age of 16 . Dewey's girlfriend, Irma, is 17 years of age. With Irma's consent, Dewey engages in sexual intercourse with Irma. Later, Dewey brags in a bar, \"I just made it with some jailbait.\" Dewey is arrested and charged with attempted statutory rape.\nC. Doreen, a community activist, is outraged that a bill to place greater restrictions on picketing is being debated in the state legislature. Doreen asks her lawyer, Lax, if she can conduct a demonstration in the state capitol building, where the legislature sits. Lax assures her that the United States Supreme Court has recently upheld a very similar case and tells Doreen she should act freely \"because the First Amendment protects you.\" In fact, Lax did not read the case carefully. The Court allowed demonstrations on the capitol grounds, but not in the building itself. As Doreen carries her picket sign into the state capitol building, she is arrested by security guards and is charged by state police with attempting to conduct an illegal demonstration. \nD. Hartigan, a police officer, disguises himself as an elderly homeowner as part of a police \"sting\" operation aimed at unscrupulous home repair operations. Drew, president and sole proprietor of Drew's Home Repairs, inspects the home that he believes belongs to Hartigan. Drew believes Hartigan is the homeowner and a senior citizen with failing mental powers. Drew's inspection of the home reveals the only plumbing problem to be a 25 -cent washer that needs replacing. Drew tells Hartigan that the plumbing in the house is in terrible shape, and that city building inspectors are likely to condemn the home if plumbing repairs are not made immediately. Drew offers Hartigan a contract to perform all required plumbing repairs for $ 10,000$. Drew emphasizes that this is a \"rock bottom price with a $20 \\%$ senior citizen discount.\" Drew is arrested and charged with attempted theft by false pretenses. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Trent was on trial for the statutory rape of Vanessa. He denied that she was even in his company on the night of the alleged offense, when he was working as the night clerk at a convenience store. The prosecution offers to have Warren testify that, in a phone conversation on the evening in question, Vanessa said, \"I have to run; Trent wants me to stop by the store tonight while he's working.\" The defense objects to the proposed testimony. Should the court allow Warren's testimony?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, as a present sense impression of Vanessa's.\nB. Yes, as evidence that Vanessa was in Trent's company that night.\nC. No, unless Vanessa is unavailable as a witness.\nD. No, because Vanessa's state of mind is not in issue.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dan, an experienced trial lawyer, traveled from his hometown, Secondville, to Capitol City, where he was hired to complete a complex antitrust case that Dan estimated would take weeks, and possibly months, to complete. During his sojourn in Capitol City, which began on a Sunday, Dan stayed at the Capitol City Ryott Hotel. The normal room charges were $ 150$ per night. Dan made a deal with the hotel management to pay $ 700$ per week for his room for an indefinite period. Dan never told the hotel management exactly how long he planned to stay, but each Sunday he would present the cashier with a check for $ 700$, plus any additional taxes and room charges, to pay for the previous week's lodging. Dan was not asked to pay in this manner, but he did it as a matter of custom. Dan did this for four weeks, and then the opposing party suddenly made a generous settlement offer which Dan's client agreed to accept. On a Thursday morning, before checkout time for that day, Dan tendered the hotel cashier a check for $ 400$ plus additional charges incurred from Sunday through Wednesday nights. The cashier promptly took the check and then told Dan, \"You owe us $ 1,000$ plus taxes for 10 more days' lodging. We expect you to pay for the rest of this week as you customarily do, and then for an additional week because you didn't give us a week's notice that you planned to vacate.\" Dan refused to pay the additional charges. If the hotel sues Dan and the court determines that the parties created a tenancy, for how many additional days' lodging will he be required to pay?\n\nOptions:\nA. None, because a tenancy at will was created.\nB. Three days, because a periodic tenancy was created.\nC. Seven days, because a periodic tenancy was created.\nD. Ten days, because a periodic tenancy was created. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Publectric Company, a utility supplying gas and electricity to West Howard, was working on some of its underground lines. Access to the underground lines was through a utility hole, which Publectric had left uncovered. Publectric installed a modern guardrail around the hole to prevent members of the public from falling into the hole. Although the rail completely surrounded the utility hole, there was an opening in one part of the railing which made it easier to pass down tools to those working below. Hound, a dog fancier, lived in a single-family home across the street from where the Publectric utility hole was located. Hound owned \"Hobson's Hotspur of Trent,\"' a champion springer spaniel whom Hound exhibited at dog shows. The dog was also a family pet and was known affectionately to Hound's family as \"Hobby.\" Hound's home had a large front lawn where Hound often walked Hobby without first leashing him. One such afternoon, Hobby saw a squirrel and suddenly bolted away from Hound's lawn. Hobby dashed across the street, passed through the opening of the guardrail, and fell into the utility hole, suffering broken bones and internal injuries. Although expensive and lengthy care by veterinary specialists saved Hobby's life, the dog was no longer of \"show quality\" after the injuries. Assume that the jurisdiction in which West Howard is located still recognizes all the common law defenses to tort liability. Can Hound recover his economic losses resulting from the injuries to Hobby in a suit against Publectric?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, unless Publectric failed to exercise reasonable care in making the dangerous condition safe.\nB. No, if the guardrail used by Publectric meets typical industry standards.\nC. No, because the dog escaped from Hound's yard. \nD. No, unless a reasonably careful person would have been injured in the same manner.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"An act of Congress provides for the payment of Social Security benefits to the disabled children of deceased workers. A complex set of regulations carefully defines the meaning of the term \"disabled.\" The benefits are payable even after the child reaches his or her age of majority, but terminate automatically when the recipient marries, unless the recipient marries a person who is also disabled, in which case the Social Security payments continue. Dorit has been disabled since birth, and her father died in a coal mine cave-in when Dorit was 14 years of age. She has received Social Security benefits since her father's death. However, at age 25, Dorit married Jack, who is not disabled, and her Social Security benefits were summarily terminated. She files suit in federal district court, seeking to compel the government to restore her benefits. She asserts, among other things, that there is no logical reason why she should be deprived of benefits when unmarried disabled persons and disabled persons who marry other disabled persons continue to receive them. Which of the following is the strongest ground to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute in question?\n\nOptions:\nA. Congress's power over federal expenditures is plenary, and Congress has discretion to spend money from the Federal Treasury in whatever way it wishes.\nB. Because there is no constitutional entitlement to Social Security payments, Congress is free to condition them as it sees fit.\nC. The classification imposed by this statute is reasonable, inasmuch as it will save the national government a substantial amount of money.\nD. Congress could rationally conclude that a disabled child of a deceased worker who is unmarried or who marries another disabled person is more likely to be needy than a disabled person who is married to a person who is not disabled.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Oswald owned an old, unoccupied, and extremely run-down building in Hooverville. The walls were unstable and beginning to buckle. Oswald knew of the building's condition, but he did not want to spend the money needed to repair it and hoped that the Hooverville Redevelopment Commission would want his land to build a shopping mall. Timmy was a driver for U-Pump-It Tanker Lines, a concern that operated tanker trucks that delivered gasoline to filling stations. U-PumpIt's rules required drivers to park only in legally designated parking areas. After completing his deliveries for the day in Hooverville, Timmy stopped for a cup of coffee. He did not want to spend time trying to find a parking place on a side street, so he parked in front of Oswald's building, which was located on a through street. The area in front of Oswald's building was clearly marked, \"No Parking At Any Time.\" Timmy walked to the Emporium Restaurant, where he ordered coffee and the daily special. Hooverville was located in an area subject to minor earthquake activity. Just as Timmy began his lunch, a quake jolted Hooverville. The quake was not strong enough to cause damage to structurally sound buildings, but was sufficient to cause the walls of Oswald's building to collapse. The building fell on top of the U-Pump-It truck, causing the truck to roll over on its side. Gasoline leaked from the truck and began streaming down the street. Elvira, a pedestrian walking two blocks away, lit a cigarette and casually tossed a match in the street. The stream of gasoline had just reached that street and the match caused the gasoline to ignite. The flames spread to a nearby commercial building. An explosion occurred, causing many windows in a neighboring apartment building to be blown inward. Flying glass was propelled into Bonnie's apartment. Bonnie suffered multiple cuts and a serious eye injury from the flying glass. Bonnie brings a negligence action against UPump-It Tanker Lines. If the court finds in favor of U-Pump-It, it will be because: \n\nOptions:\nA. The court follows the Cardozo view regarding foreseeable plaintiffs.\nB. Timmy was acting outside the scope of his employment when Bonnie was injured.\nC. Oswald was the legal cause of Bonnie's injuries because his building was in an unreasonably dangerous condition.\nD. The company had a rule against illegal parking on streets.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is the offered evidence most likely to be admitted? \n\nOptions:\nA. In Paula's action against David for assault, David offers the testimony of Walter, a surprise witness who, it was just discovered, witnessed the altercation between Paula and David; when questioned by the judge, David's counsel agrees to permit a continuance following Walter's testimony so that Paula will have time to prepare for cross-examination of Walter.\nB. In Peter's negligence action against Dolores arising from an accident in which a 1994 Camaro struck Peter while he crossed Main Street at a crosswalk, Peter offers the testimony of Winchell, the owner of a garage, who will state that Dolores arranged to have the brakes of the subject 1994 Camaro relined and adjusted the day after the accident; Dolores stipulated in her responsive pleadings that she was the owner of the 1994 Camaro.\nC. In Patrick's action for personal injuries against Don arising from a collision between the two while both rode in a bicycle race, Patrick offers a videotape showing a surgeon resetting his broken leg, in which it was necessary to rebreak the leg while Patrick was anesthetized.\nD. In Penelope's defamation action against Delbert, Penelope offers the testimony of Wanda, who will state that when she heard Delbert describe Penelope as \"the biggest shyster in Middleville,\" she understood him to mean that Penelope was an incompetent lawyer; Wanda is the eleventh person Penelope has called to interpret the quoted statement.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The legislature of State Red recently enacted a statute that defined first degree murder as murder with premeditation and deliberation, or a homicide in the commission of arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping. The statute defined second degree murder as all other murder at common law. In which of the following situations is defendant most likely to be guilty of first degree murder?\n\nOptions:\nA. Believing that his neighbor, Paul, had stolen his lawn mower, defendant walked over to his neighbor's house and punched him in the nose, intending to injure him. As a result of the blow, Paul fell back, hit his head, and died.\nB. After leaving a bar in a highly intoxicated state, defendant attempted to drive home. While so doing, he struck Oscar, who was legally crossing the street in a marked crosswalk. Oscar died instantly.\nC. Infuriated over having caught Mary having an affair with defendant's husband, defendant bought a shotgun and shot and killed Mary as she was leaving her house on her way to work.\nD. Immediately after being punched by Betty, defendant in a rage took a knife and stabbed and killed Betty.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owens owned Goldacre in fee simple. In 1985, Owens executed a deed conveying Goldacre \"to Private School for the life of my wife Wilma, and then to my children, their heirs and assigns, in equal share, provided, however, that School shall use the premises for educational purposes only.\" School then erected a temporary building on Goldacre and conducted certain classes within the building. In 2000 , one of School's former students informed the principal of School that a geological survey of the area had indicated that there were valuable minerals beneath the surface of Goldacre. School, badly in need of money, granted to Mine Co. a right to remove the minerals from a one-acre portion of Goldacre upon the payment of a percentage of the value of the minerals removed. From 2000 to 2004, Mine Co. conducted mining operations on the one-acre portion of Goldacre. School had continued to conduct classes in the temporary building located on Goldacre. In 2004, while Owens and Wilma were still alive, both of Owens's children filed suit against School and Mine Co. seeking damages for the removal of minerals since 2000 , an injunction preventing further acts of removal, and all other appropriate remedies. Which of the following would be the most likely result?\n\nOptions:\nA. School and Mine Co. should be enjoined, and damages should be recovered, but impounded for future distribution.\nB. The children should succeed, because the interest of School terminated with the first removal of minerals from Goldacre. \nC. The injunction should be granted, but damages should be denied because Owens and Wilma are not parties to the action.\nD. Damages should be awarded, but the injunction should be denied.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Olman expected the value of property near Middletown to increase substantially. To buy a tract known as Blueacre, Olman secured a $ 10,000$ mortgage on Blueacre from Exbank. After completing the purchase, Olman wished to make certain improvements on Blueacre. To finance them, Olman took out a $ 2,000$ second mortgage on Blueacre from Wybank. Both mortgages were promptly and properly recorded. Before Olman made a payment on either mortgage, the federal government announced that it would begin storing nuclear waste products in the Middletown area. The value of property, including Blueacre, plummeted. Olman did not pay either Exbank or Wybank. Exbank brought a proper action to foreclose, notifying both Olman and Wybank. Purch bought Blueacre at the foreclosure sale for $ 6,000$, the property's fair market value. Assuming there are no special statutes in the jurisdiction regarding deficiency judgments, Olman owes:\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 5,000$ to Exbank and $ 1,000$ to Wybank.\nB. $ 4,000$ to Exbank and $ 2,000$ to Wybank.\nC. Nothing to Exbank and $ 2,000$ to Wybank.\nD. $4,000 to Exbank and nothing to Wybank. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On Halloween night, Darryl, who is 12 years old, dressed up as a bandit by wearing dark clothes and a pair of panty hose over his head and went trick or treating. Darryl carried a toy gun that looked like a real firearm. Darryl's method of operation was to go up to a house and ring the bell. When the person answered, he pointed his toy gun at the person's face and said, \"Your money or your life,\" and then shouted, \"Trick or treat!\" At the fifth house he went to, Darryl began his routine, but before he could say \"trick or treat,\" Patty, the elderly homeowner, screamed and slammed the door in Darryl's face. Still shaken by the experience, Patty suffered a heart attack five minutes later. Has Patty a cause of action against Darryl?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, for intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nB. Yes, for assault.\nC. No, because Darryl is only 12 years old.\nD. No, because Patty should have known that the gun was a toy since it was Halloween.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Manfred recently moved from an apartment to a house with a large yard. Fortunately, Manfred worked as a checkout clerk at Gardenshop, a nursery and garden supply concern, and was eligible for a discount on a lawn mower. Lately, he had been eyeing a fancy new model of power mower, but even with his discount, it was out of reach. When Manfred's neighbors began complaining about his yard, Manfred decided that he would simply take his dream mower. Gardenshop had so many, they would never miss it, he reasoned. The next day, he took a mower from the Garden Equipment Department and hid it behind some crates on the loading dock. He planned to take the mower home with him that night because he was scheduled to close the business for that day. At the end of the day, however, Manfred became afraid that he would be caught. He returned the mower to the Garden Equipment Department and went home as usual. Manfred has most likely committed:\n\nOptions:\nA. Larceny.\nB. Attempted larceny.\nC. Embezzlement.\nD. No crime.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Which of the following would the court be least likely to take judicial notice of?\n\nOptions:\nA. The birthdate of the plaintiff's son is June $14,1974$.\nB. The defendant has filed 25 frivolous lawsuits in the same court in which the case is being tried.\nC. It rained in the city in which the parties reside on March 28, 1987.\nD. Independence Day is July 4, and it is a state holiday.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paul sues Daniel for personal injuries that Paul suffered as a result of a battery committed on Paul by Daniel. Daniel's defense is that it is all a case of mistaken identity. Daniel admits that Paul was beaten up, but claims he had nothing to do with Paul's injuries. At trial, Daniel testified in his own behalf that on the date that Paul suffered his injuries, Daniel was on an extended vacation in England, 2,000 miles away from the place where the battery occurred. Paul's attorney did not cross-examine Daniel regarding that testimony. In rebuttal, Paul's attorney calls Walter, who is willing to testify that one week after Paul suffered his injuries, Daniel said to Walter, \"I haven't been out of the country in five years.\" Walter's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as a statement against interest by Daniel.\nB. Admissible as a prior inconsistent statement of Daniel.\nC. Admissible as an admission by Daniel.\nD. Inadmissible, because Daniel was not given an opportunity to comment on the statement prior to Walter's testimony.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Which of the following plaintiffs has\/have standing to sue in federal court? I. Jane Pease files suit on behalf of herself and taxpayers nationwide to challenge the federal government's spending so much money on military weaponry instead of using the funds for social programs. II. The \"Save Our Wildlife\" group files suit to block further oil drilling in the nation because such drilling is contrary to the public's interest in preserving wildlife. III. The \"End Nuclear Power Now Society\" files suit challenging a state law that requires disclosure of the Society's membership, alleging that the law infringes on its members' freedom of association. IV. Luigi Vercotti files suit to challenge exclusionary zoning practices by Carson City, alleging that the challenged zoning made it too expensive for him to buy a home in Carson City.\n\nOptions:\nA. I. only.\nB. II. and III. only.\nC. III. only.\nD. III. and IV. only.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Strobe, the owner of Goldacre, decided to sell her property and move to another state. She told her friends to \"spread the word\" that she wished to sell. After one week, Strobe received in the mail a written offer, signed by Briggs, to purchase Goldacre for $ 50,000$. The written offer was legally sufficient to form a written contract for the sale of Goldacre. Strobe called Briggs and said that the offer was acceptable, but that she did not want to sign it at that time because she wanted to \"make sure the paper was legal.\" The next day Strobe visited her attorney, gave him the written offer from Briggs, and asked him to prepare a formal contract for the sale of Goldacre on the same terms and conditions as those in the written offer. When the attorney had finished, Strobe signed the contract prepared by her attorney and mailed it to Briggs. Later that day, before Briggs had received the contract, Norris called Strobe and offered to buy Goldacre for $ 60,000$, which Strobe accepted immediately over the phone. Strobe called Briggs and told him that she had received a higher offer from Norris that she had accepted. Strobe then signed a written contract to sell Goldacre to Norris. When Norris received the contract he signed it and then promptly and properly recorded it, and sent Strobe the specified down payment. Briggs received the written contract from Strobe the next day. The recording statute in the jurisdiction provides: Any conveyance of an interest in land, other than a lease for less than one year, shall not be valid against a subsequent purchaser for value, without notice thereof, whose conveyance is first recorded. In an appropriate action brought by Briggs against Strobe and Norris for specific performance and to quiet title, Briggs will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Win, because the written offer satisfies the Statute of Frauds.\nB. Win, because the contract of sale satisfied the Statute of Frauds. \nC. Lose, because he never entered into a binding contract with Strobe.\nD. Lose, because the recording statute protects Norris.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of North Pacific contains major deposits of natural gas. In an effort to support this industry, and at the same time save its citizens substantial sums for the cost of heating their homes and businesses, the legislature enacted a substantial tax on out-of-state suppliers of natural gas. In addition, the state required state licensed public utilities to buy no less than $75 \\%$ of their natural gas needs from sources within the state as long as their needs could be met. Muni-Power, an out-of-state supplier, brought suit against North Pacific challenging this statute. The best constitutional argument Muni-Power could make is that the statute violates:\n\nOptions:\nA. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nB. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nC. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.\nD. The Commerce Clause.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In 1951, Owner conveyed Blackacre to Brian for \"so long as Blackacre is used solely for residential purposes. Should Brian ever use Blackacre for any other purpose, the interest in Blackacre shall revert to Owner and his heirs.\" Brian used Blackacre as his personal residence for 20 years, but in 1971, he began operating a bar on Blackacre. Owner knew that Brian was operating a bar on Blackacre, but he took no action. In 2000, the aged Brian decided to get out of the saloon business. Brian closed his business and once again began to use Blackacre solely as his personal residence. Also in 2000, Owner died, survived by his son and only heir, Stephen. In 2002, Stephen laid claim to Blackacre. The jurisdiction in which Blackacre is located has a seven-year adverse possession statute and another statute that bars enforcement of possibilities of reverter 55 years after their creation. May Stephen validly claim title to Blackacre?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because less than 55 years has elapsed since the creation of the possibility of reverter.\nB. Yes, because the adverse possession period began to run when Brian returned the property to residential status, and Brian has not held for the requisite seven years.\nC. No, because the adverse possession period began to run in 1971, and Brian has held the property for more than the requisite seven years.\nD. No, because Owner did not assert his possibility of reverter; thus, no cause of action arose in Owner or his heirs.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A federal statute provided for federal grants to cities that desired to reclaim and rebuild inner-city areas for multi-family residential housing. The city of Owenoak applied for funding to build housing and received a grant of $ 2.5$ million. After the area was prepared for construction, however, the city council decided it would greatly benefit the inner-city dwellers if, in addition to housing, commercial property was built. Thus, the Council decided to use $ 1.5$ million for housing and to \"borrow\" the remaining $ 1$ million from the housing fund to build a commercial mall. The city resolution provided that $30 \\%$ of the rental from the mall each year would go to a fund for maintenance of the housing and for funds to build additional housing. Construction had started on two high-rise residential buildings and the commercial mall when the federal court, at the request of the federal government, froze the construction accounts containing the proceeds from the grant. In a motion by the city to release the funds, the court would most likely:\n\nOptions:\nA. Grant the motion, because the city's plan for a fund to build more residential housing substantially complies with the terms of the grant.\nB. Grant the motion, because the doctrine of preservation of state sovereignty prevents the federal government from interfering with the state's discretion in this situation.\nC. Deny the motion, because the federal government can control the expenditure of the funds since it provided the funds.\nD. Deny the motion, since the doctrine of state sovereignty has no application in this situation since the action was by the city council and not the state legislature.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Opal owned a large tract of land in fee simple and subdivided 100 acres into 250 lots. She obtained all the necessary governmental approvals, and between 1991 and 2003 sold 175 of the lots. Preston, who purchased one of the lots to build a house, received a deed containing the following provision, which was in all the deeds to these 175 lots: It is agreed and covenanted by Opal that the property conveyed herein shall be used for a single-family dwelling only and that no structure, other than a single-family dwelling, shall be erected or maintained; further, that occupancy in any dwelling built on this property shall be by a single family for residential purposes only. This agreement is specifically made binding on the grantee and grantee's heirs, their assigns and successors. In 2004, Opal contracted with Fun Spa to sell an additional 100 acres that she owned contiguous to these lots. As part of this agreement, Opal conveyed to Fun Spa the 75 lots she had not previously sold. Nothing in the deeds for these 75 lots restricted their use to single-family residences, and in fact, Fun Spa was planning to use all the property purchased from Opal for a resort and for multi-family dwellings. If Preston brought suit against Opal to establish that all the original 250 lots, including the 75 she had agreed to sell to Fun Spa, had to be used only for single-family dwellings in a proper proceeding, what would be the most likely result?\n\nOptions:\nA. Opal will prevail, because the provision in the deed only binds the grantee.\nB. Opal will prevail, because the remaining 75 deeds did not contain this provision.\nC. Preston will prevail, if he can show that a common development scheme had been established for the entire subdivision.\nD. Preston will prevail, unless the evidence shows that Fun Spa was not aware of this provision at the time of its agreement with Opal.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Moms operated a corner drugstore. One afternoon she heard a screeching of brakes and Moms immediately rushed out of the store. She saw a car speeding off into the distance and found a badly injured Victor lying in the street. Victor gasped to Moms, \"I'm going to die. The car that hit me had license number DD666!\" Victor then lapsed into unconsciousness. Moms gave her information to the police, including a description of the car and Victor's comment on the license plate. Police traced the registration to Dick Devilish. Victor recovered from his injuries but now suffers permanent disabilities. Victor filed suit against Devilish for his injuries. At the trial, Victor wants to have Moms testify as to Victor's statement regarding Devilish's license number. The court should rule that such testimony by Moms is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible, because it is more prejudicial than probative.\nB. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. \nC. Admissible, as a declaration made in belief of impending death.\nD. Admissible, as an excited utterance.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Stone operated a newsstand on leased space in an office building. On March 15, Quinn purchased the office building and told Stone that he wanted to negotiate a new lease. During the negotiations, Stone and Quinn orally agreed that Stone would have the exclusive right to sell newspapers and magazines in the office building. Quinn prepared a written lease outlining the Stone-Quinn agreement, but forgot to include the agreement that Stone would have exclusive rights in the office building. Stone was given a copy of the lease to read, but Stone merely glanced over the lease because he assumed it reflected his agreement with Quinn. Stone then signed the lease, which included a merger and integration clause. On March 30, Quinn leased space to Jacobs for the establishment of a drug store to be run by Jacobs. The Quinn-Jacobs lease did not prevent Jacobs from selling newspapers or magazines. As a result of the competition, Stone lost substantial profits in his business. Stone brings suit to reform the contract to reflect his exclusive right to sell newspapers and magazines in the office building. The most likely result of this suit is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Stone will prevail.\nB. Stone will prevail only if he can prove a mutual mistake.\nC. Stone will not prevail because of the application of the parol evidence rule.\nD. Stone will not prevail because the mistake on his part was unilateral.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Walter purchased a new power boat with an inboard engine from City Marine. The boat was manufactured by Watersports, Inc. Later that summer, Walter was using his boat on the lake to tow some of his friends while they waterskied when he found himself near the end of the lake where the large dam that had formed the lake was located. Several hundred feet from the dam were large pylons bearing signs warning boaters to stay at least 50 yards away. Between the pylons and the dam, about 100 feet from the pylons, was a partially submerged chain link fence covering the underwater pipes that drew water to run the hydroelectric generating turbines. Walter decided to show off by weaving his boat in and out of the warning pylons. As he rounded the last of them, the steering mechanism of his boat jammed, and it and Walter were propelled into the chain link fence. Tom, who was skiing behind the boat, was pulled into one of the pylons. Both Walter and Tom were severely injured. The jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules. If Tom brings a negligence action against Watersports, Inc., and it is found that the steering failure resulted from a manufacturing defect in the boat, will he recover for his injuries?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because he did not purchase the boat.\nB. No, if Walter is found to have been negligent in weaving in and out of the pylons.\nC. Yes, if the defect in the steering mechanism could have been discovered by Watersports, Inc. in the exercise of reasonable care.\nD. Yes, unless the defect in the steering mechanism could have been discovered by City Marine in the exercise of reasonable care.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Cheryl is on trial for fraud, it having been alleged that she participated in an illegal scheme in which her victims were invited to become local distributors for a supposed cosmetics manufacturer. The victims were given bonus payments, after they had made a large initial \"investment,\" for additional distributors who they would bring to the manufacturer. Cheryl's defense is that she knew nothing of the scheme. She claims she was brought into the scheme by the purported head of the manufacturer's sales department and was just following instructions to bring additional distributors into the sales force. The prosecution intends to call Darryl, who will testify that Cheryl had talked him into making an investment in a similar scheme involving household products, rather than cosmetics, five years ago. Should the trial court admit this evidence over Cheryl's objection?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because evidence of other acts or wrongs is not admissible to prove character and action in conformity therewith.\nB. No, because it is irrelevant.\nC. Yes, because it is evidence of Cheryl's character for dishonesty.\nD. Yes, because it is evidence of Cheryl's state of mind.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Cheryl is on trial for fraud, it having been alleged that she participated in an illegal scheme in which her victims were invited to become local distributors for a supposed cosmetics manufacturer. The victims were given bonus payments, after they had made a large initial \"investment,\" for additional distributors who they would bring to the manufacturer. Cheryl's defense is that she knew nothing of the scheme. She claims she was brought into the scheme by the purported head of the manufacturer's sales department and was just following instructions to bring additional distributors into the sales force. The prosecution calls Zeke as a witness. Zeke is a former business associate of Cheryl's, and he testifies that her reputation in the community is for frequently participating in very questionable transactions, usually resulting in heavy losses for her investors. He testifies further that he thinks she is dishonest. Should the trial court admit this evidence over Cheryl's objection?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because the prosecution cannot initiate evidence of the accused's character.\nB. No, because use of Zeke's opinion is improper.\nC. Yes, because it is evidence of Cheryl's character for dishonesty.\nD. Yes, because it is evidence of habit. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alice owned Red Acre, a tract of land with a one-story house on it. Alice leased Red Acre to Betty for a term of three years. Betty and her teenage son, Norm, planned to live in the house for this period. Norm was a star baseball player for the local high school team. To provide Norm with an adequate place to practice, Betty installed a fully operational batting cage in the backyard located on Red Acre. In addition to the batting cage, Betty installed an automatic pitching machine and electric lights so that Norm could practice at night. Six months after Alice leased the premises to Betty, Alice mortgaged Red Acre to State Bank to secure a loan. Betty was not notified directly of the mortgage but the mortgage was recorded. Six months before the three-year term was to end, Alice defaulted on her mortgage payments, and State Bank began foreclosure proceedings, as it was entitled to do on the terms of the mortgage. Although unaware of the mortgage proceedings, Betty knew that her lease with Alice was about to end; she therefore began to remove all of the equipment she had installed in the backyard. State Bank brought an action to enjoin the removal of the equipment, naming both Betty and Alice as defendants in the suit. If the equipment concerned had been installed by Alice, but the facts were otherwise unchanged, the effect of the State Bank's prayer for an injunction would be that the:\n\nOptions:\nA. Likelihood of the State Bank's succeeding would be lessened.\nB. Likelihood of the State Bank's succeeding would be improved.\nC. Likelihood of the State Bank's succeeding would be unaffected.\nD. Outcome of the litigation would depend on whether the mortgage expressly mentioned personal property located on the premises.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Joey escaped from prison and stole a car. He picked up a young woman hitchhiker, Jenny, and told her what he had done. Jenny was emotionally disturbed and of borderline mental retardation, but understood that the police were after Joey, and because she hated the police, she told Joey she would do anything she could to help him. To avoid the police, they drove to the mountains with Jenny doing much of the driving. The following day, they were both very hungry. Toward evening, Joey saw Fisher camped by a stream nearby, and told Jenny, \"Go down there and steal some food from his ice chest; he'll never even see you, but if he does, hit him with something heavy.\" When she hesitated, Joey became angry and said, \"Go on, or I'll just leave you here to starve!\" Jenny went down to Fisher's campsite, and had just grabbed a sandwich out of his ice chest and taken a bite out of it, when Fisher, who was 6'6\" tall and weighed 250 pounds, ran back from the stream and grabbed her arm. Jenny was terrified and picked up a heavy frying pan and hit Fisher on the head; he slumped to the ground apparently dead. Joey then ran up and said, \"He's dead. We'd better put him in the stream so it will look like he drowned after slipping and falling.\" They thereupon put Fisher in the stream without attempting to determine if he was alive or dead. Later, a medical examination showed conclusively that the blow only knocked Fisher out; he died of suffocation due to water in the lungs. If Jenny is charged with petit theft of Fisher's food, a misdemeanor, the court should rule that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Jenny is not guilty because she was acting under the direction of Joey.\nB. Jenny is guilty because an otherwise criminal act cannot be justified by threats of starvation.\nC. Jenny is not guilty because there was no \"carrying away\" of Fisher's food, and hence no completed theft crime was committed.\nD. Jenny is not guilty if a reasonable person would have regarded the theft as essential to avoid starvation.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dirk broke into Vera's house one night. As he started to stuff silverware into a sack, he was surprised by Vera, who had arrived home earlier than usual. Dirk struck Vera on the head with a candlestick and tied her up. He finished filling his sack and left. The police discovered Vera several hours later and rushed her to the hospital. Dirk was apprehended by the police early the following morning with the loot still in his possession. He was taken to police headquarters, given Miranda warnings, and asked if he wished to make a statement about the prior evening's events. The police did not mention that Vera had been seriously injured and was in the hospital. Dirk said he understood his rights and was willing to talk. He then admitted that he committed the burglary of Vera's house. The following day, Vera died from injuries caused by the blow to her head. If, at Dirk's trial for murder, Dirk moves to prevent introduction of the confession into evidence, his motion should most probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Denied, because failure of the police to advise Dirk of Vera's condition was harmless error since felony murder does not require intent to kill or injure.\nB. Denied, because Dirk's waiver of his rights did not depend upon the nature of the charges that were later filed against him.\nC. Granted, because Dirk could not make a knowing and intelligent waiver unless he had information concerning Vera's condition.\nD. Granted, because the use of a confession to burglary in a prosecution for murder violates due process where the police withheld information about the potential seriousness of the offense.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Walter purchased a new power boat with an inboard engine from City Marine. The boat was manufactured by Watersports, Inc. Later that summer, Walter was using his boat on the lake to tow some of his friends while they waterskied when he found himself near the end of the lake where the large dam that had formed the lake was located. Several hundred feet from the dam were large pylons bearing signs warning boaters to stay at least 50 yards away. Between the pylons and the dam, about 100 feet from the pylons, was a partially submerged chain link fence covering the underwater pipes that drew water to run the hydroelectric generating turbines. Walter decided to show off by weaving his boat in and out of the warning pylons. As he rounded the last of them, the steering mechanism of his boat jammed, and it and Walter were propelled into the chain link fence. Tom, who was skiing behind the boat, was pulled into one of the pylons. Both Walter and Tom were severely injured. The jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules. Walter brings an action for damages against City Marine on a theory of strict liability in tort. Who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. City Marine, if it properly inspected the boat before selling it to Walter.\nB. City Marine, if Walter is found to have been negligent in weaving in and out of the pylons.\nC. Walter, if he can show that the steering failed due to a defect present when the boat left the manufacturer.\nD. Walter, because the steering mechanism failed while he was operating the boat.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"There is high and persistent unemployment in the industrialized state of Green. Its legislature therefore enacted a statute requiring every business with annual sales in Green of over $ 1$ million to purchase each year goods and\/or services in Green equal in value to at least half of its sales in Green. Which of the following parties most clearly has standing to contest the constitutionality of this statute of Green in federal court?\n\nOptions:\nA. A business in another state that supplies from that other state $95 \\%$ of the goods and services bought by a corporation that has annual sales in Green of $ 20$ million.\nB. A corporation selling $ 300,000$ worth of goods in Green but presently purchasing only $ 10,000$ in goods and services in Green. \nC. The governor of an adjacent state on behalf of the state and its residents.\nD. The owner of high-grade, secured bonds issued by a corporation with sales in Green of $ 10$ million that currently purchases only $ 1$ million in goods and services in Green.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Simmons and Boyd entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of Wideacre. The contract provided that \"Simmons agrees to convey a good and marketable title to Boyd 60 days from the date of this contract.\"' The purchase price was stated as $ 60,000$. At the time set for closing, Simmons tendered a deed in the form agreed to in the contract. Boyd's examination of the record prior to the date of closing had disclosed, however, that the owner of record was not Simmons, but Olson. Further investigation by Boyd revealed that, notwithstanding the state of the record, Simmons had been in what Boyd concedes is adverse possession for 15 years. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years. Boyd refuses to pay the purchase price or to take possession \"because of the inability of Simmons to transfer a marketable title.\" In an appropriate action by Simmons against Boyd for specific performance, Simmons will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, because he has obtained a \"good and marketable title\" by adverse possession.\nB. Prevail, because Simmons's action for specific performance is an action in rem even though Olson is not a party.\nC. Not prevail, because Boyd cannot be required to buy a lawsuit even if the probability is great that Boyd would prevail against Olson.\nD. Not prevail, because Simmons's failure to disclose his lack of record title constitutes fraud.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be not guilty of the charge made?\n\nOptions:\nA. Believing that state law made it a crime to purchase Valium without a prescription, Defendant purchased without a prescription a certain quantity of Valium. Unknown to Defendant, the state legislature had repealed the statute, and Valium could be legally purchased without a prescription. Defendant is charged with attempting to purchase Valium without a prescription.\nB. While in the course of a fight, Defendant, intending to kill Stan, ran up and stabbed Stan from behind. Unknown to Defendant, Stan had been stabbed through the chest only seconds before by another participant in the fight, killing him instantly. Defendant is charged with attempted murder.\nC. Defendant misrepresented his identity to a garage in order to take possession of an automobile that had been left with the garage for repairs earlier that week. The owner of the garage was not deceived and refused to turn over possession. Defendant is charged with attempting to obtain property by false pretenses.\nD. Police arrested Robber as he was leaving a house where he had stolen a good deal of property. As part of a plea-bargain arrangement, Robber took the property to Defendant and offered to sell it. Defendant, believing the property to be stolen, purchased it. Defendant is charged with attempting to receive stolen property. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jane, an architectural historian, bought a house in 1979 from William. She paid him $ 50,000$ in cash, and the balance of the $ 150,000$ sale price came from the proceeds of a mortgage she took out with State National Bank. The mortgage was recorded. In 1987, Jane borrowed $ 5,000$ from the Home Finance Company, using her house as security. Home Finance recorded its mortgage on the property. In 1996, Jane had an architect friend design an addition to her house. She borrowed $ 40,000$ from Property Equity Lenders, Inc. to pay for this construction. Property Equity did not record the mortgage Jane gave it to secure this debt. In 2003, Jane lost her job and was unable to make payments on some of her obligations. She made the payments on the State National mortgage, but was unable to make any payments on either the Home Finance or Property Equity Lenders mortgages. Home Finance filed foreclosure of its mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, Susan bought the property. After acquiring the property at the sale, what is Susan's obligation toward the holders of the other two mortgages, State National Bank and Property Equity Lenders, Inc.?\n\nOptions:\nA. She takes the property subject to both mortgages.\nB. She takes the property subject to neither mortgage.\nC. She takes the property subject to Property Equity Lenders's mortgage, but not subject to State National Bank's mortgage.\nD. She takes the property subject to State National Bank's mortgage, but not subject to Property Equity Lenders's mortgage. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paula's friend Roberto told her that she could use his lakeside cabin for the weekend. Roberto gave Paula instructions on how to find his cabin, but once Paula arrived at the lake, she found that all the cabins looked very similar. Paula rechecked Roberto's instructions and then entered the cabin that she thought belonged to Roberto. In fact, the cabin belonged to Otto. After Paula unpacked her luggage, she realized that the cabin was quite cold. Thus, she gathered some wood from the woodpile and started a fire in the fireplace. Unbeknownst to Paula, the fireplace flue was blocked and so an explosion ensued; Paula was injured by the explosion. Otto had known that the flue was blocked, but he had not gotten around to having the problem fixed. If Paula sues Otto for her injuries, who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Paula, because Otto knew that the flue was defective.\nB. Paula, because Otto had a duty to warn of the defect. \nC. Otto, but only if he had no reason to anticipate that anyone would be in the cabin.\nD. Otto, because he owed no duty to Paula.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be guilty of common law murder?\n\nOptions:\nA. As a joke, Defendant trips Tom as he walks by. As a result of the fall, Tom hits his head on the corner of a desk and dies immediately.\nB. During a heated argument, Ed punches Defendant in the stomach. Angered, Defendant responds by stabbing Ed with a knife and killing him instantly.\nC. While driving home from work late one night, Defendant falls asleep behind the wheel of his automobile. His car drifts across the middle of the road, strikes a car, and the other driver is killed instantly in the collision.\nD. Angered because his neighbor is playing his stereo at a very high volume, Defendant fires a gun into the neighbor's house. The bullet strikes and kills neighbor's wife.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Asa was an old man who had few friends and most of whose relatives had died. One day, while Asa was studying a chess problem at the senior citizens center, a young woman asked him if he would care to play a game. The woman had accompanied her grandmother to the center. Soon the woman, whose name was Stephanie, was visiting the center regularly to play chess with Asa. They became close friends and often visited each other's homes. Asa decided that he would like Stephanie to have his only real asset, Oldacre, the singlefamily residence in which he lived. He wrote a note to Stephanie dated December 25, 2003, stating, \"Because you have been such a good friend to a lonely old man, I want you to have this house and land.\"' He then went to Lawyer and had Lawyer draft a deed conveying Oldacre to Stephanie. Asa validly executed the deed and gave both the note and the executed deed to the director of the senior citizens center telling him to give them to Stephanie upon his death. Asa continued to live at Oldacre until his death in July of 2004. A will Asa had executed in 1987 was admitted to probate shortly thereafter; the will left all of Asa's property to a cousin in another state. When Stephanie received the note and deed from the lawyer prior to the probate of Asa's estate, she promptly recorded the deed, and after probate, she brought an appropriate action to quiet her title to the property conveyed by the deed. In that action, the court should find for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Stephanie, because the deed as delivered constituted a valid conveyance of Oldacre.\nB. Stephanie, because Asa's note to her constituted a valid conveyance of Oldacre.\nC. The cousin, because the deed conveying Oldacre to Stephanie was not recorded and thus was not effective until after Asa's death.\nD. The cousin, because the fact that Asa remained in possession of Oldacre rendered the conveyance in the deed to Stephanie ineffective.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations would Defendant's claim of intoxication most likely result in a finding of not guilty?\n\nOptions:\nA. Defendant is charged with battery after wounding Hal by shooting him. Defendant claims that he was too drunk to realize that anyone was in the house into which he shot.\nB. Defendant is charged with manslaughter when he hit and killed a child while riding his motorcycle. Defendant claims that he was so drunk he did not see the child in time to avoid hitting her.\nC. Defendant is charged with larceny. Defendant claims that when he took the car he was too drunk to realize that it was not his.\nD. Defendant is charged with involuntary manslaughter after her unsupervised fouryear-old child was killed in a fire at their home. Defendant claims that she was at the corner bar, drunk, when the fire occurred.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Parker was a guest at Hotel, located about 200 miles from his home. After Parker had spent two nights at Hotel, he received a call at 5 a.m. from his wife, who told him that their child had just been rushed to the hospital and was in critical condition. Parker decided to hurry home. He called the airport and reserved space on the next flight out, scheduled to leave at $6: 15$ a.m. Parker packed and rushed to the lobby. However, it happened that a number of guests were checking out early that morning, and thus there was a long line ahead of him and only one cashier on duty. Parker hoped that the line would move quickly, but when he heard the first guest in line arguing with Stockton, the desk clerk, over a $25 \/ otin$ telephone charge, he realized that he would never make it to the airport in time if he continued to wait in line. The hotel had no express check-out service available, so he left without paying his bill and flew home. As soon as Parker's child was out of danger, he wrote a letter to Hotel, apologizing for his swift departure and enclosing payment for two nights' lodging; he also added an extra $ 25$ \"to cover any inconvenience and billing expense\" he may have caused. Meanwhile, Stockton discovered that Parker had left without paying. On Hotel's behalf, Stockton signed a complaint with the state police, charging Parker with theft of services. The police went to the appropriate magistrate, and a warrant was sworn out for Parker's arrest. The day after Parker left Hotel, Hotel received Parker's letter and payment. However, no one notified the police that Parker had paid his bill. Three days after Parker left Hotel, the state police, armed with a warrant, came to Parker's office and arrested him. Despite Parker's objections, he was taken to jail. Although he repeatedly told the police that he had paid his bill and suggested that they call Hotel, they refused to do so. After holding Parker for 18 hours, the police called Hotel. The manager told the police, \"Yes, we got Parker's check two days ago, but we were too busy to call you.\" The police, with apologies, released Parker. Parker sued Hotel and the state police for false imprisonment. Will Parker prevail in his action against the police?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because of Parker's protestations of innocence.\nB. Yes, because Parker had not stolen services.\nC. No, because the police acted pursuant to a valid warrant.\nD. No, because Hotel had reasonable grounds for signing a complaint against Parker.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Civil service rules, which have been on the books in the city of Charlesville for many years, provide that any member of the police department must serve a one-year probationary period before he or she will be considered a permanent employee. In fact, this rule was enacted before Charlesville had a police academy, and now a prospective police officer spends six months in the academy before being hired by the city. Ruby, a graduate of the police academy, was with the city police department for eight months when she was terminated. There were no city ordinances or state laws that required that Ruby be given a reason for the termination or a hearing, and she was given neither. Which of the following facts, if shown, gives the city of Charlesville the strongest argument for refusing to give Ruby a statement of reasons why her employment was terminated and for denying her the opportunity to contest the termination? \n\nOptions:\nA. Ruby, as a female, did not perform as a police officer as well as her male counterparts.\nB. Ruby had failed to include in her application the fact that during college she was a member of a radical student organization.\nC. Ruby had not been granted permanent employment status.\nD. Ruby had graduated in last place in her class at the police academy.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"While it was parked on a side street, Driver's car was severely damaged by a hit-and-run accident. While the car was being repaired, Driver arranged to borrow a car from his friend, Lender, to drive until Driver's car was finished. Lender had an extra car that had not been driven for some time, which he gladly allowed Driver to use. However, when Driver picked up the car, Lender forgot to warn Driver that the brake fluid had a tendency to leak out of the brake system and needed to be replaced regularly. Lender telephoned Driver's wife, Rider, and warned her about the brake fluid problem. Rider, however, forgot to tell Driver. Shortly thereafter, Driver was driving Rider to work in the borrowed car. Driver was proceeding along at a reasonable rate of speed and within the posted speed limit. As he approached an intersection, another car, driven by Reckless, ran through the red light and into the intersection. Driver, upon seeing Reckless's car, stepped on the brakes, but the brakes failed and the two cars collided. If the proper amount of brake fluid had been in the brake system, Driver could have stopped in time to avoid the collision. Driver and Rider were injured. The jurisdiction has adopted \"pure\" comparative negligence. If Driver asserts a claim against Reckless, Driver will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover only a portion of his damages, because Rider was also at fault. \nB. Recover the full amount of his damages, because Driver himself was not at fault.\nC. Not recover, because Driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.\nD. Not recover, because Rider was negligent in not telling Driver about the defective brake condition, and Rider's negligence would be imputed to driver.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"While it was parked on a side street, Driver's car was severely damaged by a hit-and-run accident. While the car was being repaired, Driver arranged to borrow a car from his friend, Lender, to drive until Driver's car was finished. Lender had an extra car that had not been driven for some time, which he gladly allowed Driver to use. However, when Driver picked up the car, Lender forgot to warn Driver that the brake fluid had a tendency to leak out of the brake system and needed to be replaced regularly. Lender telephoned Driver's wife, Rider, and warned her about the brake fluid problem. Rider, however, forgot to tell Driver. Shortly thereafter, Driver was driving Rider to work in the borrowed car. Driver was proceeding along at a reasonable rate of speed and within the posted speed limit. As he approached an intersection, another car, driven by Reckless, ran through the red light and into the intersection. Driver, upon seeing Reckless's car, stepped on the brakes, but the brakes failed and the two cars collided. If the proper amount of brake fluid had been in the brake system, Driver could have stopped in time to avoid the collision. Driver and Rider were injured. The jurisdiction has adopted \"pure\" comparative negligence. If Rider asserts a claim against Reckless, Rider will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover in full for her injury, because Driver, who was driving the car in which she was riding, was not himself at fault.\nB. Recover a portion of her damages, based on the respective degrees of her negligence and that of Reckless.\nC. Not recover, because Driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.\nD. Not recover, because Rider was primarily at fault for the collision.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On a wholly random basis, a state agency has given a few probationary employees who were not rehired at the end of their probationary period a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a hearing; but the agency has very rarely done so. No statute or rule of the agency required such a statement of reasons or a hearing. The employment of Masters, a probationary employee, was terminated without a statement of reasons or an opportunity for a hearing. The agency did not even consider whether it should give him either. A suit by Masters requesting a statement of reasons and a hearing will probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Successful, on the grounds that failure to give Masters reasons and an opportunity for a hearing constituted a bill of attainder.\nB. Successful, on the grounds that an agency's inconsistent practices, even if unintentional, deny adversely affected persons the equal protection of the laws.\nC. Unsuccessful, because Masters does not have a right to be rehired that is protected by procedural due process.\nD. Unsuccessful, because the conditions of state employment are matters reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Constance owned Greenacre in fee simple. She executed two instruments in the proper form of deeds. The first instrument purported to convey an undivided one-half interest in Greenacre to Henry and his wife, Audrey, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The second instrument purported to convey an undivided one-half interest in Greenacre to Susan, the only child of Henry. Susan was 13 years old at the time. The common law joint tenancy is unmodified by statute. No actual consideration was paid for the deeds. Constance handed the two deeds to Henry. Henry promptly and properly recorded the deed to himself and Audrey and put the deed to his daughter, Susan, in a safe-deposit box without recording it. The same year, Henry, Audrey, and Susan were on a vacation when the plane in which they were flying went down, and all three were killed simultaneously. Henry, Audrey, and Susan died intestate. The applicable statute in the jurisdictions provides that \"when title to property on its devolution depends on priority of death and there is insufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived.\" An appropriate action was instituted by the heirs of Henry, Audrey, and Susan. Constance, who is not an heir of any of the deceased, was a party to the action. The court should determine that title to Greenacre is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Entirely in Constance.\nB. One-half in the heirs of Henry and one-half in the heirs of Audrey.\nC. One-half in Constance, one-quarter in the heirs of Henry, and one-quarter in the heirs of Audrey.\nD. One-half in the heirs of Susan, one-quarter in the heirs of Henry, and one-quarter in the heirs of Audrey. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dryden is tried on a charge of driving while intoxicated. When Dryden was booked at the police station, a videotape was made that showed him unsteady, abusive, and speaking in a slurred manner. If the prosecutor lays a foundation properly identifying the tape, should the court admit it in evidence and permit it to be shown to the jury?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because it is an admission.\nB. Yes, because its value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.\nC. No, because the privilege against selfincrimination is applicable.\nD. No, because specific instances of conduct cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Davis is arrested and tried for battery. At trial, the prosecution offers evidence that shows Davis punched Verne in the stomach. In which of the following situations is Davis most likely to be not guilty of battery?\n\nOptions:\nA. Davis was heavily intoxicated and was attempting to swat at a fly when he punched Verne.\nB. Davis, who had just awakened from a deep sleep, was not fully aware of what was happening and mistakenly thought Verne was attacking him.\nC. Davis was suffering from an epileptic seizure and had no control over his motions.\nD. Davis, angered by something Verne had said, punched him in retaliation.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state legislature of Nevada enacted legislation prohibiting the use of tractor-trailer rigs weighing more than 100,000 pounds gross, after lengthy hearings demonstrated to the legislators' satisfaction that superheavy trucks rapidly degrade the state's roadways and pose a greater safety danger than smaller trucks. Western States Freight, a trucking firm that frequently uses Nevada highways for trips between Colorado and California, has recently purchased several tractor-trailer rigs weighing over 100,000 pounds when loaded. Most of its equipment may still be legally used in Nevada, but the firm does not want to have to exclude the superheavies from the California runs and plans to gradually replace its older trucks with larger models. Western brings an action for declaratory relief in federal court in Colorado, seeking to have the Nevada legislation declared unconstitutional. The state of Nevada asserts that the legislation is justified as an exercise of the state's police power based upon safety considerations, and that the court may not second-guess the state legislators as to this subject. None of the evidence presented at the legislative hearings is produced in court. Western presents expert testimony that the heavier trucks are no less safe than smaller models. The trial court should rule:\n\nOptions:\nA. That the legislation is an unconstitutional violation of Western's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law.\nB. That the legislation is unconstitutional because it violates the Commerce Clause.\nC. That the legislation is a valid exercise of the state's police power to regulate highway safety.\nD. That the evidence of the damage done to the state's highways by the superheavy trucks is sufficient to uphold the legislation independently of the safety argument.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Howard and Wendy were engaged and looking for a lovely lot on which to build their dream house. They fell in love with Blueacre at first sight and purchased it, taking title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Before construction of the dream house could begin, Howard discovered that Wendy was having an affair with Claude, and the engagement was called off. Wanting to obtain the money to run off with Claude, Wendy wanted to sell Blueacre. Howard refused to sell. Wendy put Blueacre up for sale anyway, and when Tim agreed to purchase it, Wendy forged Howard's signature on the deed conveying Blueacre to Tim. Who owns Blueacre?\n\nOptions:\nA. Howard only.\nB. Tim only.\nC. Howard and Tim as tenants in common.\nD. Howard, Wendy, and Tim as tenants in common.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Penelope was injured when the car she was driving was struck by a truck owned by Deeco and driven by Deeco's employee, Albert. Albert was just finishing his deliveries for Deeco when the accident occurred. At the scene of the accident, Walter, a bystander, heard Albert say, \"I can't believe it ... I shouldn't have had all those beers.\" Penelope sued Deeco for her injuries and asked Walter to testify at trial as to Albert's statement. Walter's testimony should be ruled:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as a statement against interest.\nB. Admissible, as an admission of a partyopponent.\nC. Admissible, as an excited utterance.\nD. Inadmissible, as hearsay.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Lynn entered into an enforceable written agreement to sell her home to Werner for $ 150,000$. The agreement provided that escrow would close on March 31, and on that date Lynn would provide good and marketable title to the house, free and clear of all encumbrances. On March 10, Lynn was notified by her insurance company that she had to renew her insurance policy by March 15 . Lynn immediately notified the company that she did not want the insurance renewed at that time. Consequently, when the house was destroyed by fire on March 25, it was uninsured. On March 31, Werner refused to close and Lynn immediately brought an action against him for specific performance. In this jurisdiction, which has no applicable statute to govern this situation, the most probable result of this action would be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Werner prevails, because an implied term of all conveyances is that the property at the time of closing will be in substantially the same condition as it was at the time the contract was entered into.\nB. Werner prevails, because as the house was destroyed, Lynn would have nothing to \"sell\" and, therefore, could not convey marketable title.\nC. Lynn prevails, because under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the risk of loss was on Werner.\nD. Lynn prevails, but since the house was destroyed, she is only entitled to recover the fair market value of the land itself.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state police of New Lancashire wished to infiltrate the Aryan Consciousness Movement (\"ACM\"), a racist organization devoted to the goal of creating an \"All White America.\" The New Lancashire police decided to create a new undercover position for the person who would infiltrate the ACM. The pay was substantially better than the salary of ordinary officers. Dimer, the chief personnel officer of the New Lancashire State Police, put out a memo inviting all white New Lancashire police officers to apply for the undercover position. Pendergrass had been a New Lancashire State Police officer for eight years and had received many citations for efficiency, bravery, and public service. However, Pendergrass is black, and Dimer refused to even accept his application for the undercover position, even though Pendergrass told Dimer that he was very desirous of obtaining the position. If Pendergrass sues to require Dimer to give serious consideration to his application, should the court rule that Dimer has acted in a manner in accordance with the principles of the United States Constitution?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the state has a rational basis for using race as a qualification for the job.\nB. Yes, because the state has a compelling interest in infiltrating $\\mathrm{ACM}$, to promote the general welfare of its citizens.\nC. No, because Dimer's actions were discriminatory per se.\nD. No, if there is a chance that Pendergrass might be able to win the confidence of ACM leaders.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"While Doug was driving Olivia's car, he hit Peter in a pedestrian right-of-way. Peter sued both Doug and Olivia, alleging that Doug had negligently driven the car and that Olivia had negligently permitted an unfit driver to use her car. Assume for the purposes of this question only that the day after the preexisting structure is demolished and the rubble removed, a severe storm causes gigantic waves that erode the seashore so that Owner's lot is now under water. Must Builder still perform the contract?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, the contract is void because the subject of the contract was destroyed through no fault of the parties.\nB. No, Builder is discharged of his obligation because of impossibility of performance.\nC. Yes, if Owner obtains an alternative lot within a reasonable period of time.\nD. No, the contract is void because of mutual mistake.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 1, Fred executed and delivered a deed to his daughter, Diane, conveying his avocado ranch as follows: \"To Diane for life, but if Diane dies survived by her spouse and children, then to Diane's spouse for life, with the remainder in fee simple to Diane's children; but if Diane dies survived by her spouse and no children, then to my son Sam in fee simple.\" On June 15, Diane married George and as a wedding gift Fred quitclaimed his interest in the avocado ranch to George. Assume that the jurisdiction does not follow the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders. On December 1, Diane died without children and without a will. The applicable law of intestate succession provides that George is Diane's only heir. Sam claims that George has no interest in the land. Title to the avocado ranch is held by whom?\n\nOptions:\nA. George, because of the doctrine of merger.\nB. George, because Diane died intestate and her fee simple passed to him as her intestate heir.\nC. Sam, because the interest granted to Diane's spouse is void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.\nD. Sam, because Diane, although survived by her spouse, died without children.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dennis was charged with larceny. His principal defense was that he had no intent to permanently deprive the victim of her property. The judge instructed the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dennis was guilty of larceny and that the evidence tended to show that Dennis had taken some jewels belonging to the victim; but if they believed that Dennis had proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he did not intend to keep the jewels, but to return them, they should find him not guilty. Dennis was convicted of larceny. He appeals the conviction, contending that the judge erred in his instructions to the jury. Dennis's conviction will probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Affirmed, because the jury has the power to ignore Dennis's testimony if they do not believe him.\nB. Affirmed, because Dennis had failed to rebut the State's evidence tending to show that he intended to keep the jewels.\nC. Reversed, because the judge cannot comment at all on the evidence.\nD. Reversed, because the instructions put some of the burden of proof on Dennis.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Justin is being tried for the murder of Harvey, which occurred during the course of the robbery of Harvey's house. Justin took the stand in his own defense. His attorney asked him about the robbery and murder, and Justin denied committing the crimes. His attorney asked him what he said to the police when he was first arrested and he said, \"I told them I knew nothing of the crimes because I was in Seattle at the time.\" This answer should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Stricken, because it is self-serving.\nB. Stricken, because it is hearsay.\nC. Admissible, because Justin can competently testify to statements he made himself.\nD. Admissible, as a prior consistent statement.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In 1998, Jane sold Wes her resort hotel for $ 250,000$. Wes paid $ 100,000$ down and agreed to pay the balance in equal monthly installments over the next 15 years. Jane's eldest son, Luke, started law school in 1999 and, because Jane wanted to help him with his educational and living expenses, she sent a letter to Wes instructing him to send Luke $ 500$ a month from the money he owed to Jane until Jane instructed him otherwise. Wes was unable to raise the capital he needed to expand the hotel, and in 2000 he sold the resort to Funco in exchange for Funco's agreement to assume all his obligations and to provide him with a long-term contract to be the hotel's manager. Funco agreed with these terms and assumed the contract Wes had with Jane. In 2002, when Luke had completed law school, Jane's other son, Zack, was getting married. Jane knew Zack could not afford to buy a house so Jane told Zack that she would instruct Wes and Funco to send the full installments to Zack so he could buy a house if Zack agreed that Jane could have the funds back if she ever needed them. Zack agreed, and Jane wrote a letter to Wes informing him of this agreement and instructing him that the full payment should now go to Zack. Zack was given a copy of this letter. In 2003, Funco wanted to get out of the resort business, and it sold the hotel and all the obligations back to Wes. About this same time, Jane promised her sister's daughter, Susan, that if she wanted to go to Europe for several months to study art, Jane would pay her expenses. Susan agreed, and Jane sent another letter to Wes telling him to send the monthly installments to Susan until Jane told him otherwise. Wes did so. Several months later Jane died, leaving all her cash (and the balance due on the note from Wes) to Zack. If Zack were to sue Funco to recover the sums paid to Susan, how would a court hold?\n\nOptions:\nA. Judgment for Zack, because he was a creditor beneficiary, had notice, and had changed his position in reliance on the contract.\nB. Judgment for Zack, because he was a donee beneficiary and had assented to the agreement.\nC. Judgment for Funco, because Zack's rights had not vested before being extinguished by the subsequent assignment.\nD. Judgment for Funco, because Zack was only an incidental beneficiary of its agreement with Wes.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Leftacre and Rightacre are adjoining 50-acre parcels of land. For many years, Leftacre and Rightacre have been thriving dairy farms. In 1959, McWilliams, the owner of Rightacre, purchased Leftacre. She continued to operate both parcels as separate dairy farms. In 1979, McWilliams sold Rightacre to Stone, who promptly and properly recorded the deed. Since Rightacre had no direct access to a public road, McWilliams wrote into the deed, \"Stone, his heirs and assigns shall have the right to use the existing dirt path along the eastern border of Leftacre for ingress and egress to Rightacre.\" The dirt path, which connected with a public road on the northern boundary of Leftacre, was wide enough for motored vehicle traffic and had been graded for that purpose. In 1994, Sandberg purchased Leftacre from McWilliams. In 2002, Stone died, leaving a will that devised all his interest in Rightacre to O'Toole. For this question only, assume the following facts: In 2003, O'Toole decided to subdivide Rightacre into several lots for single-family residences. O' Toole notified Sandberg that he, O'Toole, will spend the money to improve the dirt path into a private driveway by paving it and doubling its width to 24 feet. He will also provide appropriate drainage for such an improved driveway by means of ditches on either side of the pavement. Sandberg had ceased using Leftacre as a dairy farm five years earlier, and it has been vacant ever since. Sandberg instituted an appropriate action for a declaratory judgment to establish that O'Toole cannot so improve the dirt path. If Sandberg prevails in such an action, it will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. The proposed improvement exceeds the scope of an easement by necessity.\nB. The proposed improvement constitutes a burden that exceeds the scope of an express easement.\nC. The servient owner has the obligation for maintenance of an easement for right-of-way, and hence can control the nature of its improvement.\nD. The proposed subdivision so changes the nature of the use of the dominant tenement that any easement has been abandoned.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pitts purchased a new Stratton Spitfire sportscar manufactured by the Stratton Corporation from a local dealership. While Pitts was driving home from the dealership, she stopped at a red light. She was struck from behind by a truck driven by Drago, who had negligently failed to stop. On impact, the door on the driver's side of the car flew open because of a defective latch. Pitts fell out the open door and was injured. Pitts fell even though she was wearing a seatbelt at the time of the impact because the seatbelt buckle was also defective and failed to hold Pitts. Assume that a local ordinance requires all automobiles to be equipped with door latches that will not open on impact, and that the jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules. If Pitts asserts a claim against Drago, Pitts will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, unless Stratton was negligent in the manufacture of the car that Pitts was driving.\nB. Prevail, because Drago's negligent driving was a cause in fact of the collision.\nC. Not prevail, because the door latch on Pitts's car violated a local ordinance.\nD. Not prevail if Pitts would not have been injured but for the failure of the seatbelt buckle.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pitts purchased a new Stratton Spitfire sportscar manufactured by the Stratton Corporation from a local dealership. While Pitts was driving home from the dealership, she stopped at a red light. She was struck from behind by a truck driven by Drago, who had negligently failed to stop. On impact, the door on the driver's side of the car flew open because of a defective latch. Pitts fell out the open door and was injured. Pitts fell even though she was wearing a seatbelt at the time of the impact because the seatbelt buckle was also defective and failed to hold Pitts. Assume that a local ordinance requires all automobiles to be equipped with door latches that will not open on impact, and that the jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules. If Pitts asserts a claim against Stratton, will Pitts prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, unless Pitts could have discovered either of the defects.\nB. Yes, because the car she was driving was dangerously defective.\nC. No, because Drago's negligent driving was the cause of Pitts's injuries.\nD. No, unless Stratton knew or had reason to know of either of the defects.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ben and Sandy, brother and sister, received a $ 50,000$ inheritance from their deceased father. By mutual agreement, they used the money to purchase a 10 -acre parcel of land. Ben and Sandy took title as joint tenants. Three years after the purchase, Ben suggested to Sandy that they build an apartment house on the property. Sandy rejected this idea. Ben then asked if he could build an apartment house on his half of the property; Sandy agreed. Ben then built an apartment house on the eastern five acres of the property. Six months later, Sandy gave permission to the Boy Scouts of America to use the western half of the property as a site for weekend camping trips. Two years later, Ben died, leaving his entire estate to his son, Steven. In an appropriate action to determine the respective interests of Sandy and Steven in the property, if Steven is judged to be the owner of the eastern five acres of the property, the most likely reason for the judgment will be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sandy's conduct during Ben's lifetime estopped her from asserting title to the eastern half of the property.\nB. The taking of title as joint tenants does not conclusively presume that the property is held as joint tenants.\nC. The joint tenancy was terminated by the oral agreement of Ben and Sandy at the time it was made. \nD. A joint tenant may will away his interest in property, provided it is passed on to a lineal descendant.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Allan invited all of his neighbors to a July 4 th party in his backyard. Practically the entire neighborhood showed up, except for Clem, who lived next door. Clem was an elderly man with a known heart condition who chose not to participate in neighborhood social functions. That evening, after a full day of festivities and much beer drinking, someone at the party suggested, \"We ought to set off some fireworks!\" Bob, another guest, thereupon produced a large skyrocket, which he lit. However, the skyrocket failed to climb properly and crashed into Clem's garage, starting a fire. Clem rushed out of his house and attempted to put out the flames, but he suffered a heart attack and was rendered unconscious. The garage burned to the ground before the fire department arrived. Fortunately, however, the firefighters were able to revive Clem, and he has since recovered from the heart attack. A local ordinance made it a misdemeanor to sell fireworks within the city limits. If Clem sues Allan for the damage to his garage, the theory on which he is most likely to prevail is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Allan failed to exercise due care to control the acts of his guests.\nB. Allan is strictly liable for harm resulting from ultrahazardous activities performed on his land.\nC. Clem had been invited to Allan's party; as an invitee, Allan owed him a duty to discover and guard against activities on his land involving an unreasonable risk of harm.\nD. Allan is liable on a negligence per se theory because of the local ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within the city.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In early January 2004 , representatives of MacDougall Corporation, makers of the famous \"MacDougall Dog\" hot dog and related convenience foods sold through thousands of owned and franchised \"MacDougall's\" restaurants, met with representatives of Time Management, Inc. (\"TM\"), a firm specializing in time-and-motion studies of labor intensive industries. After extensive negotiations, it was orally agreed that TM would redesign the food production area of MacDougall's restaurants, including modification of cooking equipment, if necessary, so that, using existing MacDougall's food products, savings in labor costs through reduction in restaurant cooking staffs would result. Lawyers for MacDougall's subsequently drafted a written agreement, sent it to TM, whose lawyers modified the draft, and returned the modified draft to MacDougall's. This modified writing, signed by both parties, stated in its entirety: Provided that at least 2,000 work-hours per restaurant are eliminated, MacDougall Corporation will pay to TM within 90 days of installation of new food production systems at MacDougall's restaurants in Richmond a first installment of $1$ million. Upon installation of new food processing systems nationwide, MacDougall Corporation will pay to TM a second and final installment of $ 1.5$ million. Nationwide installation must be completed by January 15,2005 . Any amendments to this agreement must be in writing signed by both parties. TM immediately began work on the restructuring of MacDougall's food processing methods. On September 5, 2004, a radical change in the layout of MacDougall's kitchen area and new personnel assignments had been designed, and TM demanded payment of the first installment payment of $ 1$ million. MacDougall Corporation refused, but negotiations conducted between the parties resulted in an oral agreement that MacDougall's would pay $ 750,000$ immediately and then the $ 1.5$ million second installment as originally agreed, after nationwide installation of the new system. The restructured food production system was installed and in operation in all Richmond MacDougall's restaurants on October 1, 2004. Subsequent audits revealed that the new system enabled MacDougall Corporation to eliminate 1,500 work-hours per restaurant, saving the corporation $ 90,000$ in labor costs for all Richmond restaurants. The new system required that MacDougall's increase the length of the famous \"MacDougall Dog\" by three centimeters and that the \"Mother MacDougall Hot Apple Fritters\" be made in a rectangular shape rather than the traditional round form. Nationwide installation of the new system in all MacDougall's restaurants was completed on January 30, 2005. The 1,500 work-hours per restaurant savings to MacDougall Corporation was projected at $ 1.8$ million per year. TM sent a certified letter to the chief executive officer of MacDougall Corporation requesting his certification that the new food production system was in place and operating as promised, and demanding the $ 1.5 \\mathrm{mil}$ lion second installment. The CEO refused to so certify and refused to make any payment, noting in his reply letter that the system had not been installed by January 15,2005 , and that it did not use existing MacDougall's food products, as promised by TM. Was TM entitled to payment of the first installment when it completed design work on the new system on September 5, 2004?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because substantial completion of installation of the system in Richmond restaurants would be a constructive condition precedent to MacDougall's duty to pay.\nB. No, because the phrase \"within 90 days of installation\" would be interpreted to mean within 90 days after installation.\nC. Yes, because September 5 was \"within 90 days of installation\" of the food processing system on October 1, 2004. \nD. Yes, because TM had completed work on designing the new system and could expect to install it within 90 days.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Baker had a contract with City to supply City with five computers a month for seven months. At the start of the fourth month, Baker realized that his supply of computers had dwindled to one. Baker called his normal supplier of computers but was informed that the supplier was out of computers. Baker immediately sent a fax to Stevens explaining the situation and asking for \"a price quote for 20 computers to be delivered before the first of next month.\" Stevens responded by fax: \"I can deliver 20 computers from my present stock at a cost of $ 2,000$ per computer.\" Baker responded the next day with a fax that stated: \"I will buy 20 computers at a cost of $ 2,000$ per computer.\" Assume for the purpose of this question only that a contract exists between the parties for the sale of the 20 computers. The payment provisions are $ 20,000$ upon acceptance of the contract, $ 10,000$ upon delivery of the computers, and $ 10,000$ when Baker receives his last payment from City. City defaults on its payments to Baker. Is Baker liable for the last payment of $ 10,000$ to Stevens?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the provisions only set a reasonable time for payment.\nB. Yes, because a buyer may not delegate the duty of payment.\nC. No, because an express condition for payment to Stevens has not occurred.\nD. No, because Baker has not received sufficient funds to make the payment to Stevens.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Abco developed a new drug, $\\mathrm{ZB}$, for treatment of Wegener's disease. Abco extensively tested $\\mathrm{ZB}$ for several years on animals and human volunteers and had observed no undesirable side effects. The Federal Drug Administration (\"FDA\") then approved ZB for sale as a prescription drug. Five other drug companies, each acting independently, developed drugs identical to $\\mathrm{ZB}$. Each of these drugs was also approved by the FDA for sale as a prescription drug. True Blue Drug, a wholesaler, bought identically shaped pills from all six of the manufacturers and sold the pills to drugstores as Wegener's $\\mathrm{X}$. This drug had a long-delayed side effect. Sons of male users of Wegener's $X$ are sterile. One such son, Crane, brought an action against Abco for his damages. Abco, through True Blue Drug, supplied about $10 \\%$ of the Wegener's X sold in the state where Crane lived. It is not possible to establish which of the five companies supplied the particular pills that Crane's father took. If Crane asserts a claim against Abco based on strict liability in tort, which of the following will be a decisive question in determining whether Crane will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Does the res ipsa loquitur doctrine apply?\nB. Can liability be imposed on Abco without proof that Abco knew that the drug had an undesirable side effect?\nC. Is Abco relieved of liability by the FDA approval of the drug?\nD. Can liability be imposed on Abco without showing that its pills were used by Crane's father?",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Lonny owned Gold Acre, a 40-acre tract of land improved with a one-story house. Lonny leased Gold Acre to Truman for a 15-year period. After five years had expired, the government condemned 15 acres of the property for road construction and allocated the compensation award to Lonny and Truman according to the respective interest so taken. It so happened, however, that Truman had used the 15 acres taken by the government to store vehicles necessary in Truman's work. Truman knew of no other place nearby where he could store the vehicles. There is no applicable statute in the jurisdiction where the property is located, nor any provision in the lease relating to the condemnation. Truman quit possession, claiming that he could no longer live in the premises if he could not park the vehicles needed in his work close to where he lived. Lonny brought suit against Truman to recover rent. The most likely result of this suit is that Lonny will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, because the relationship of landlord and tenant was unaffected by the condemnation, thus leaving Truman still obligated to pay rent.\nB. Prevail, because of the implied warranty on the part of the tenant to return the demised premises in the same condition at the end of the term as they were at the beginning.\nC. Not prevail, because there has been a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment by Lonny's inability to provide Truman with possession of the whole of the property for the entire term.\nD. Not prevail, because there has been a frustration of purpose that excuses Truman from further performance of his contract to pay rent.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On November 7, Margo agreed with Oscar to paint his house for $ 10,000$, payment to be made upon completion of the job. On November 14, while the job was still incomplete, Margo told her paint supplier, Percy, that if he would give her the paint she needed, she would have Oscar pay to him directly the $ 3,000$ for paint that she owed him. Percy agreed, and Margo sent Oscar a letter setting forth this agreement. On December 1, Margo had completed the job, but Oscar refused to pay Percy any money. In a suit by Percy against Oscar, what would be Oscar's best defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. Percy had already supplied the paint before the agreement, and therefore he had not relied on Oscar's promise.\nB. Percy was not an intended beneficiary of the agreement between Oscar and Margo. \nC. Margo had not painted the house in a proper, workmanlike manner.\nD. Margo attempted to assign her rights before completion and an assignment to receive money before personal services are performed is inoperable.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following circumstances would Defendant most likely be guilty of common law murder?\n\nOptions:\nA. Defendant and Nate are having an argument, and Nate punches Defendant. Mistakenly believing that Nate intends to stab him, Defendant shoots him.\nB. At a Fourth of July celebration, Defendant fires a pistol, and the ricocheting bullet hits and kills $\\mathrm{Al}$.\nC. While hunting, Defendant sees a movement. Although he cannot see what moved, he believes it to be a deer and fires into the bush. In fact, the movement was caused by George, and George is killed by the bullet fired by Defendant.\nD. During a robbery, Defendant accidentally drops a grenade. It goes off and a customer is killed. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alice owned Lot A, and Barry owned the adjacent Lot B. Both lots were located in State Red, which has a 20 -year adverse possession statute. In 1970, Alice married and left State Red to reside in State Blue. Alice did not return to view the property during her period of residence in State Blue. In 1971, Barry built a driveway on Lot B. The driveway extended three feet over onto Lot A. Barry mistakenly believed that this three-foot strip of land was his property. Barry regularly used the driveway and continued to use it when Alice, having been widowed, returned to State Red in 2002 . Alice discovered the encroachment upon her return. If Alice consults you as to her rights against Barry, how should you advise her?\n\nOptions:\nA. Alice has no action against Barry, because Barry's title to the three-foot strip has been established by adverse possession.\nB. Alice has no action against Barry, because her prolonged absence from State Red establishes a presumption of abandonment of her rights in the property.\nC. Alice has an action against Barry, because Alice had no knowledge of Barry's encroachment.\nD. Alice has an action against Barry, because Barry mistakenly thought the three-foot strip was his.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Under which of the following circumstances would the named defendant be least likely to be convicted of the charged offense?\n\nOptions:\nA. Walter, a chemical engineer, painstakingly constructs an explosive device from readily available materials and secretes it beneath the house where his ex-wife and her boyfriend are living. He waits until he is sure both have had time to get home from their jobs, and then detonates the device by remote control, totally demolishing the house. Unknown to Walter, his ex-wife and her boyfriend had impulsively decided to spend the evening at a motel downtown. Walter is charged with attempted murder.\nB. Yvette attempts to charge an expensive leather coat using a credit card that her boyfriend obtained when he stole a woman's purse. The store's electronic credit reporting system indicates the account is defunct, and the store clerk refuses to complete the transaction. Yvette is charged with attempting to obtain property by false pretenses.\nC. Hazel, seeing a well-heeled couple cross the park, decides to rob them and use the money for groceries. Hazel approaches the couple, pulls out a gun, and tells them to hand over all of their money and valuables. The couple was having an unusually bad day: they had just been mugged five minutes before and were on their way to notify the police when Hazel approached them. Consequently, they had no money or valuables. Hazel is charged with attempted robbery.\nD. Farley, a married man who believes adultery to be a felony, begins a torrid affair with Edna, his best friend's wife. Unknown to either of them, the jurisdiction they reside in has a statute that expressly makes noncriminal any sexual act between consenting adults in private. Farley is charged with attempted adultery.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Prentiss was a salesman and assistant manager of Pretty Petals, a retail florist. He was employed by Lilac, the owner of Pretty Petals. Lilac owned the land and building. A large wholesale nursery was located directly across the street from Pretty Petals. Although other effective fertilizers were available at comparable prices, Doreen, the owner of the nursery, liked to use \"Chemgrow,\" a brand-name artificial fertilizer, to nourish her young plants and trees. She stored a large quantity of Chemgrow granules in a mountainous heap on an empty lot adjacent to the nursery office. The Chemgrow gave off fumes that caused Prentiss to suffer eye, lung, and sinus irritation. Occasionally, Prentiss's irritations became so bad that he had to take off from work and seek medical attention. After losing a few hundred dollars in wages and amassing a few hundred dollars in medical expenses, Prentiss sued Doreen for damages. The court is likely to rule in favor of:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prentiss, because Doreen had equally effective fertilizers available at comparable prices to Chemgrow. \nB. Prentiss, because Doreen is strictly liable for injuries caused by emissions from her property.\nC. Doreen, if the selection of Chemgrow was reasonable and it was stored in a reasonable manner.\nD. Doreen, because Prentiss is merely an employee of Pretty Petals and does not own the property upon which the shop is located.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A construction crew for the Municipal Telephone Company was sent out to install new fiberoptic cables at a downtown intersection on a vacant lot where an old building that had been demolished had stood. The telephone workers had to dig out the old copper cables, install new sheathing, and then connect and insert the new cables. Because they ran into some portions of the old sidewalk that had been in front of the old building and that had been buried over the years, the excavating took much longer than planned, and by the end of the day they had just finished removing the old copper cables. The foreman of the crew put up a couple of wooden barriers around the trench, which was about 12 feet deep, 6 feet wide, and 30 feet long, and posted signs on each of the barriers reading, \"Open trench, do not approach.\" Marcus and a few friends had been playing basketball after they got out of their seventh grade classes and passed by the excavation on their way home. Marcus could not quite make out what the signs on the barriers said in the deepening dusk, so he walked over to the nearest one and read it. His friends, who had continued walking, called for him to hurry along, and as he ran toward where they had moved ahead on the street, the soft edge of the excavation gave way and Marcus fell into the trench, severely injuring himself. If Marcus's mother brings an action against the telephone company, what will be the probable outcome of her litigation? Assume that the jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence and assumption of risk rules.\n\nOptions:\nA. She will lose, because the construction foreman posted a warning notice that Marcus read and understood.\nB. She will lose, because Marcus assumed the risk of injury when, after reading the warning notice, he carelessly ran along the trench after his friends.\nC. She will win, if the trier of fact concludes that the construction crew was negligent in leaving the open trench without additional protection for passersby.\nD. She will win, because the telephone company is strictly liable for the injuries to Marcus.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mary's doctor informed her that she had a rare blood disease that was almost always fatal. He further informed her that there was no treatment known to medical science for this disease. Out of desperation, Mary consulted Quack, who claimed to have a cure for the blood disease. Mary entered into an agreement with Quack under which Quack promised to treat Mary for the blood disease. However, no price was given for the treatment. After two months of treatment, Mary did not appear to have improved at all. Mary's father, Stu, went to see Quack and told Quack that if Quack would cure Mary of the blood disease, Stu would pay Quack $ 25,000$. Four months later, after weekly sessions with Quack, Mary again went to see her doctor. This time her doctor told her that she appeared to have recovered completely from the blood disease, because all tests for the disease proved negative; and that, in his opinion, she was completely cured. Assume for the purposes of this question only that Stu refuses to pay Quack the $ 25,000$. Quack brings suit against Stu. Quack will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover nothing, because Stu's promise constituted no legal detriment to him.\nB. Recover nothing, because Quack had a preexisting duty to Mary under their prior agreement.\nC. Recover the reasonable value of his services, because they are less than $ 25,000$.\nD. Recover $ 25,000$, because Stu was bargaining for Mary's recovery.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In 1998, Jane sold Wes her resort hotel for $ 250,000$. Wes paid $ 100,000$ down and agreed to pay the balance in equal monthly installments over the next 15 years. Jane's eldest son, Luke, started law school in 1999 and, because Jane wanted to help him with his educational and living expenses, she sent a letter to Wes instructing him to send Luke $ 500$ a month from the money he owed to Jane until Jane instructed him otherwise. Wes was unable to raise the capital he needed to expand the hotel, and in 2000 he sold the resort to Funco in exchange for Funco's agreement to assume all his obligations and to provide him with a long-term contract to be the hotel's manager. Funco agreed with these terms and assumed the contract Wes had with Jane. In 2002, when Luke had completed law school, Jane's other son, Zack, was getting married. Jane knew Zack could not afford to buy a house so Jane told Zack that she would instruct Wes and Funco to send the full installments to Zack so he could buy a house if Zack agreed that Jane could have the funds back if she ever needed them. Zack agreed, and Jane wrote a letter to Wes informing him of this agreement and instructing him that the full payment should now go to Zack. Zack was given a copy of this letter. In 2003, Funco wanted to get out of the resort business, and it sold the hotel and all the obligations back to Wes. About this same time, Jane promised her sister's daughter, Susan, that if she wanted to go to Europe for several months to study art, Jane would pay her expenses. Susan agreed, and Jane sent another letter to Wes telling him to send the monthly installments to Susan until Jane told him otherwise. Wes did so. Several months later Jane died, leaving all her cash (and the balance due on the note from Wes) to Zack. Luke sued Wes, claiming he was entitled to receive $ 500$ per month from 2002 until all sums due to Jane had been paid. How would a court hold?\n\nOptions:\nA. Judgment for Wes, because Luke was only a gratuitous assignee and had no protected rights against Wes.\nB. Judgment for Luke, because he had changed his position in reliance upon Jane's agreement.\nC. Judgment for Wes, because Jane had the right to stop making payments to Luke at anytime.\nD. Judgment for Luke, because his rights were vested when Wes was instructed to make the payments to him.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owner and Builder executed a contract providing that Builder was to construct a residence on a specified location according to plans and specifications drawn up by Architect. The total contract price was $ 500,000$. The lot on which the residence was to be built was located on the seashore in Palm Beach, Florida and there was an existing woodframe structure that had to be demolished before the residence could be built. Owner contracted with Designer to furnish the interior of the residence after Builder completed construction, but no date was included in either contract for completion of the home. The contract between Owner and Builder stated that construction would begin within two weeks after the existing structure was demolished and the rubble removed from the lot. The contract between Owner and Builder was signed November 12, and the contract between Owner and Designer was signed November 11. Assume for the purposes of this question only that the day after the preexisting structure is demolished and the rubble removed, a severe storm causes gigantic waves that erode the seashore so that Owner's lot is now under water. Must Builder still perform the contract?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, the contract is void because the subject of the contract was destroyed through no fault of the parties.\nB. No, Builder is discharged of his obligation because of impossibility of performance.\nC. Yes, if Owner obtains an alternative lot within a reasonable period of time.\nD. No, the contract is void because of mutual mistake.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Civil service rules, which have been on the books in the city of Charlesville for many years, provide that any member of the police department must serve a one-year probationary period before he or she will be considered a permanent employee. In fact, this rule was enacted before Charlesville had a police academy, and now a prospective police officer spends six months in the academy before being hired by the city. Ruby, a graduate of the police academy, was with the city police department for eight months when she was terminated. There were no city ordinances or state laws that required that Ruby be given a reason for the termination or a hearing, and she was given neither. Ruby brought suit against the city in the state court because of the termination of her employment. Which of the following would most likely give Ruby a constitutional basis to force the city to give her a statement of reasons for the termination of her employment and an opportunity for a hearing?\n\nOptions:\nA. No police officer had ever been terminated during probation except where there was actual cause.\nB. The six months she spent in the academy must be considered as part of her probation period.\nC. The budget of the police department was recently increased to allow for the hiring of additional officers.\nD. She was the only female police officer on probation and the only officer not given permanent employment.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Telco, a local telephone company, negligently allowed one of its telephone poles, located between a street and a sidewalk, to become termite-ridden. Rhodes, who was intoxicated and driving at an excessive rate of speed, lost control of her car and hit the weakened telephone pole. One week later, the pole fell and struck Walker, a pedestrian who was walking on the sidewalk. The pole fell because of the combination of the force of the impact and the pole's termite-ridden condition. If Walker asserts a claim against Telco and Rhodes, will Walker prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, against Telco but not Rhodes.\nB. Yes, against Rhodes but not Telco.\nC. Yes, against Telco and Rhodes, each for one-half of his damages.\nD. Yes, against both Telco and Rhodes for the full amount of his damages.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Amp, an electrical contractor, sued Short, a homeowner. Amp alleged that Short refused to pay for extensive wiring repairs performed on Short's home by Wilson, an employee of Amp. Amp called Wilson to the stand as a witness. Wilson, under oath, testified that he did not perform any work at Short's home. Wilson also denied writing a letter to Lee telling Lee that Wilson was going to do electrical work on Short's house. Without releasing Wilson as a witness, Amp offers in evidence the letter written by Wilson to Lee. If Wilson's letter to Lee is properly authenticated, the trial court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admit the letter for impeachment purposes only.\nB. Admit the letter as both substantive and impeachment evidence.\nC. Exclude the letter because a party may not impeach his own witness.\nD. Exclude the letter because it is inadmissible hearsay.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In Peck's antitrust suit against manufacturers of insulation, Peck's interrogatories asked for information concerning total sales of insulation by each of the defendant manufacturers in a particular year. The defendants replied to the interrogatories by referring Peck to the Insulation Manufacturer's Annual Journal for the information. If, at trial, Peck offers the annual as evidence of the sales volume, this evidence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as an adoptive admission of the defendants.\nB. Admissible, as a business record.\nC. Inadmissible, as hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Inadmissible, as lacking sufficient authentication. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Farmer's Garden Foods (\"FGF\") was a manufacturer of quality red cheese made from imported yaks' milk. In a written agreement between FGF and Gourmet Mart (\"GM\"), a retail seller of fine quality foods, FGF agreed to \"sell all output of FGF red cheese to GM,\" and GM agreed to \"sell FGF red cheese exclusively.\" The agreement went on to state that GM would pay $ 150$ for each 10 -wheel container of red cheese ordered from FGF. Under the above facts, what are the relative obligations of the parties?\n\nOptions:\nA. FGF has to sell all of its output to GM; GM has to buy all of FGF's output.\nB. FGF has to sell all of its output to GM; GM has to sell exclusively FGF red cheese.\nC. FGF has to sell all of its output to GM; GM has to sell exclusively FGF red cheese but it does not have to buy any.\nD. FGF has to sell all of its output to GM; GM has to buy all of FGF's output and has to sell exclusively FGF red cheese.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dag lost about $ 500$ while playing poker with several persons at Vance's house. When Dag accused Vance of cheating, Vance asked him to leave. Dag became abusive and refused to leave, so Vance and a couple of other players forced him to go. Angry and determined to get back his money, Dag went to his home and got his gun. He put his pistol into his coat pocket and headed back to Vance's house intending to shoot Vance if he did not give back the $ 500$. But, because Vance knew that Dag had a reputation for being violent, after the altercation at the house Vance had called the police. Just as Dag was about to step onto Vance's property, the police pulled up and stopped him. They frisked him, and finding the pistol in his pocket, arrested him. A state statute prohibits entry onto the property of another with the intent to commit violence thereon. If charged with attempt under this statute, most likely Dag will be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not guilty, because this is an \"attempt\" statute, and there cannot be an attempt of an attempt.\nB. Not guilty, because it would be an attempt to convict a person for a guilty mind.\nC. Guilty, because Dag was trying to enter the property and he had the necessary state of mind.\nD. Guilty, because the statute was designed to protect the public from violence, and Dag is dangerous.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"During Dan's prosecution for burglary, the prosecution calls Teddy to the stand, and the following takes place: Prosecutor: \"After Dan left the room, what did Roger say to you, if anything?\" Previous evidence has established that Roger and Dan had agreed, prior to the time Dan left the room, to burglarize a jewelry store. Defense counsel: \"Objection!\" Court: \"Overruled.\"' Teddy then testifies about what Roger said. If defense counsel wishes to complain about the court's ruling in this matter on appeal, what more should she do before the trial concludes? \n\nOptions:\nA. Nothing.\nB. Ask the court for the reasons that the objection was overruled.\nC. Restate the objection for the record, stating the grounds therefor.\nD. Request the trial court to order the prosecution to make an offer of proof.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"State A, suffering from a severe loss of tax revenues due to an initiative that cut state sales taxes in half, enacted legislation that ended costof-living increases in all state employees' pensions. If a state organization of employees brought suit against the appropriate state official in the federal court to reinstate the increase, the most likely result will be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The employees' organization will prevail, because the statute violates the prohibition against the impairment of the obligations of contracts by a state.\nB. The employees' organization will prevail, if it can show that the statute violates the state's constitution. \nC. The employees' suit will be dismissed, because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a state's citizens from suing a state official for official acts in a federal court.\nD. The employees' organization will not prevail, because the state always has the power to amend its own legislation.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Concerned with the rising amount of organized crime activity in this country, Congress enacts the Stop Organized Crime Act (\"SOCA\"), which enumerates certain activities, and states that in addition to any crimes these activities currently constitute, they will henceforth constitute the criminal act of intentional furtherance of the goals of organized crime. Among the enumerated activities is the interstate distribution of cocaine. For purposes of this question, you are to assume that the Act is constitutional and otherwise valid in all respects. Dalton is arrested by federal agents after having driven a truck containing cocaine from Florida to Illinois, where he delivered his illicit cargo to Thomas. At trial, Dalton is convicted of interstate distribution of cocaine, as well as of a violation of SOCA. Dalton may be sentenced:\n\nOptions:\nA. Under either statute, but not both.\nB. Under both statutes.\nC. Only under the statute that carries a lesser maximum sentence.\nD. Only under the statute that carries a greater maximum sentence. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Sandra graduated from high school, her elderly Aunt Mildred asked her to come and live with her in the large, three-story brownstone owned by Mildred in Manhattan. Mildred had recently had hip replacement surgery and could no longer attend to even minor household activities, and needed assistance in caring for the several thousand orchids she cultivated in her rooftop greenhouse. Mildred said to Sandra, \"I probably have about five years left, so if you will live here and take care of me and my flowers for the rest of my life, this house and the flowers will be yours.\" Sandra agreed, and moved from her parents' home in Yonkers to the brownstone in Manhattan. Mildred lived for eight years after Sandra came to live with her. Sandra attended to Mildred's personal needs, an increasing necessity as Mildred grew more frail. Sandra also maintained the household, did the shopping, cooking, etc., and cared, with less and less assistance from Mildred, for the numerous orchids. Mildred's moderate income from her investments provided the money necessary to support the household. No further discussion was ever had between Mildred and Sandra regarding conveyance of the brownstone and its contents. Shortly after Mildred died, Sandra was contacted by a Mr. Cramer, who identified himself as Mildred's lawyer and stated that he was in possession of Mildred's last will and testament and would seek to have it admitted to probate. In the subsequent proceedings, it was revealed that Mildred had devised her orchids to a Nero Wolfe, also residing in Manhattan, and her investments, the house, and the remainder of her estate, to her daughter who lived in California and whom Mildred had not seen or heard from in over 15 years. When Sandra refused to vacate the brownstone or surrender the orchids, Cramer, now representing Mildred's daughter, brought action for possession of the house. If Sandra prevails in the action brought by Mildred's daughter, it will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. She can successfully assert the doctrine of \"unclean hands\" to prevent Mildred's daughter from pressing her claim under the will.\nB. The Statute of Frauds need not be satisfied as between family members.\nC. The Statute of Frauds will not bar enforcement of Mildred's promise because her promise induced Sandra to perform, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement. \nD. The Statute of Frauds will not be applied where there has been part performance and where that performance is such as can be explained by the existence of the asserted contract and in no other way.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Nimrod, who held a hunting license issued by the state of West, was hunting deer and elk in that state. After two days of fruitless hunting, Nimrod spied an elk. Nimrod was hunting on private land, but the elk was 200 yards away, inside a fence that surrounded a federal military base. Nimrod shot the elk from where he was standing, but entered the military base to retrieve the carcass. Nimrod took the carcass away and had it dressed and frozen for Nimrod's meals through the winter. A federal statute prohibits the removal of wild animals or the carcasses thereof from United States military bases. Nimrod is prosecuted under the statute. The best argument in favor of upholding the statute as constitutional would be based on:\n\nOptions:\nA. The Supremacy Clause.\nB. The Army and Navy Clause.\nC. The Commerce Clause.\nD. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Sam was a famous auto racer and builder of racing cars. He and Bob signed a contract for sale of one of Sam's hand-built race cars for $ 25,000$, the price to be paid and the car to be delivered one week later. The day after the contract was signed, Sam called Bob and told him that Sam's wife, Winnie, who had a half interest in the race car, would not go along with the sale at $ 25,000$. Winnie would agree to a sale for $ 40,000$. Assume for purposes of this question only that there was an enforceable contract between Sam and Bob. Bob fails to tender $ 25,000$ to Sam on the date set for delivery and Sam does not deliver the car. On these facts:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sam can recover from Bob for breach of contract.\nB. Bob can recover from Sam for breach of contract.\nC. Neither can recover until one of the parties tenders performance.\nD. The contract is terminated.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owner and Builder executed a contract providing that Builder was to construct a residence on a specified location according to plans and specifications drawn up by Architect. The total contract price was $ 500,000$. The lot on which the residence was to be built was located on the seashore in Palm Beach, Florida and there was an existing woodframe structure that had to be demolished before the residence could be built. Owner contracted with Designer to furnish the interior of the residence after Builder completed construction, but no date was included in either contract for completion of the home. The contract between Owner and Builder stated that construction would begin within two weeks after the existing structure was demolished and the rubble removed from the lot. The contract between Owner and Builder was signed November 12, and the contract between Owner and Designer was signed November 11. Assume for the purposes of this question only that after Builder has completed 5\\% of the residence, a severe storm causes gigantic waves that demolish the construction but leave the lot undamaged. Must Builder still perform the contract?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, the contract is void because the subject of the contract was destroyed through no fault of the parties.\nB. No, Builder is discharged of his obligation because of impossibility of performance.\nC. Yes, but he is entitled to a quantum meruit recovery for the work done prior to the destruction of the construction.\nD. Yes, Builder must perform the original contract without any compensation for the destruction of the construction.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Fred is arrested and charged with the burglary of Sam's warehouse. At trial, prosecution offers evidence that when Fred was arrested, shortly after the crime had been committed, he had a large amount of cocaine hidden in the trunk of his car. This evidence should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted to prove Fred's propensity to commit crimes.\nB. Admitted to prove Fred's general bad character.\nC. Excluded because such evidence may be offered only to rebut evidence of good character offered by the defendant.\nD. Excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Allan invited all of his neighbors to a July 4 th party in his backyard. Practically the entire neighborhood showed up, except for Clem, who lived next door. Clem was an elderly man with a known heart condition who chose not to participate in neighborhood social functions. That evening, after a full day of festivities and much beer drinking, someone at the party suggested, \"We ought to set off some fireworks!\" Bob, another guest, thereupon produced a large skyrocket, which he lit. However, the skyrocket failed to climb properly and crashed into Clem's garage, starting a fire. Clem rushed out of his house and attempted to put out the flames, but he suffered a heart attack and was rendered unconscious. The garage burned to the ground before the fire department arrived. Fortunately, however, the firefighters were able to revive Clem, and he has since recovered from the heart attack. A local ordinance made it a misdemeanor to sell fireworks within the city limits. If Clem sues Bob for the damage to his garage on a theory of negligence, which of the following arguments, if sustained by the facts, would be most helpful for Bob to avoid liability?\n\nOptions:\nA. The setting off of skyrockets on July 4 th is an accepted custom in the community.\nB. The skyrocket was aimed by Bob to avoid crashing into Clem's garage.\nC. The fire that started would have burned itself out but for the fact that Clem's garage was built out of substandard, highly flammable material.\nD. Bob was a guest on Allan's property and entitled to the same restricted scope of liability as Allan. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Driver knew that children frequently played in the street along Elm Street. As Driver was operating his vehicle along Elm Street, he saw a ball roll into the street. A few seconds later, Child darted out into the street after the ball. Pedestrian, a passerby, saw Driver's vehicle bearing down on Child. Concerned that Child would be hurt, Pedestrian rushed into the street to try to save Child. Just as Pedestrian reached Child, Pedestrian tripped and fell down in the street. Driver's car struck both Pedestrian and Child, and both were injured. The jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules. 143. Assuming that Child is four years old, will Child prevail in a personal injury suit against Driver? (A) Yes, because Driver knew that children played in Elm Street. (B) Yes, unless Driver was going no faster than the posted speed limit. (C) No, because Child negligently darted into the street. (D) No, because Child's parents were negligent in not properly supervising Child. On December 1, Diane died without children and without a will. The applicable law of intestate succession provides that George is Diane's only heir. Sam claims that George has no interest in the land. Title to the avocado ranch is held by whom?\n\nOptions:\nA. George, because of the doctrine of merger.\nB. George, because Diane died intestate and her fee simple passed to him as her intestate heir.\nC. Sam, because the interest granted to Diane's spouse is void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.\nD. Sam, because Diane, although survived by her spouse, died without children.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"West, a witness in a contract case, testified on direct examination that four people attended a meeting. When asked to identify them, she gave the names of three, but despite trying was unable to remember the name of the fourth person. The attorney who called her as a witness seeks to show her his handwritten notes of the part of his pretrial interview with her in which she provided all four names. The trial court is likely to consider the showing of the notes taken as:\n\nOptions:\nA. A proper attempt to introduce recorded recollection.\nB. A proper attempt to refresh West's recollection.\nC. An improper attempt to lead the witness.\nD. An improper attempt to support West's credibility. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Patricia sued Doris for injuries suffered when her car collided in an intersection with one driven by Doris. At trial, Patricia testified that she had had the right-of-way over Doris to enter the intersection. Doris did not cross-examine. Patricia then called Wendy to testify that, shortly after the collision, as she pulled Patricia from the car, Wendy heard Patricia say, \"I think I'm dying! Didn't the other driver see I had the right-of-way?\" Wendy's testimony was admitted over defense counsel's objections. On appeal from a verdict for Patricia, Doris challenges the admission of Wendy's testimony. Should the trial court's ruling be upheld?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Patricia's statement was made under belief of impending death.\nB. Yes, because Patricia's statement was an excited utterance.\nC. No, because Patricia's credibility had not been attacked.\nD. No, because Patricia's belief that she had the right-of-way had already been established without contradiction.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Seth was one of a group of persons who were engaged in a demonstration against the discriminatory practices of a private club. During the demonstration, Seth threw a bomb containing highly toxic gas through the window of the club. At the time he threw the bomb, he knew that the club's president, Larsen, was inside the building. Unknown to Seth, Carver, the club's treasurer, was also inside. Seth is charged with attempted murder of both Larsen and Carver. At trial, Seth testified that the reason he threw the bomb was that he wanted to make sure that nobody would be able to use the club, and that he did not intend to hurt anyone. Presuming that the jury believes Seth, he can be convicted of the attempted murder of:\n\nOptions:\nA. Larsen.\nB. Carver.\nC. Both Larsen and Carver.\nD. Neither Larsen nor Carver.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dr. Wally, a local physician who was prominent in the community and beloved by his patients, died suddenly of a heart attack. Wally was only 46 years old at the time of his death, and so the local newspaper, The Daily Bleat, had never prepared a \"pre-obituary,\" as it did for many prominent figures. Snoops, a reporter with The Daily Bleat, was assigned to write an obituary before the next day's edition went to press. Snoops talked briefly with Mary, Wally's widow, and then called State Medical School, from which Wally had always said he had graduated. As it was late in the afternoon, all the professors were out on the golf course; thus, Snoops spoke with Nina, a secretary in the office of the dean of the medical school. When asked about Wally, Nina replied, \"I don't think Wally ever graduated.\" In Snoops's obituary, which appeared in the next morning's Daily Bleat, Snoops had written that Wally had never actually received a medical degree from State Medical School. Upon reading the obituary, Mary broke into tears and then became very angry, for she had worked hard to help put Wally through State Medical School, from which Wally had, in fact, graduated with high honors. Wally's executor, Eddie, was equally incensed. Both Eddie and Mary called The Daily Bleat, demanding a retraction. The next day, on the front page, The Daily Bleat admitted its error and stated that Wally graduated with high honors from State Medical School. They also fired Snoops. Nonetheless, both Eddie and Mary sued The Daily Bleat for defamation. What is The Daily Bleat's best defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. There was no malice on the part of the defendant.\nB. The newspaper's retraction negated any harm.\nC. Snoops got his information from a secretary at the Medical School.\nD. Wally is dead.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Eastern Seaboard enacted a sales tax on specified items purchased within the state. The General Services Administration (\"GSA\") of the United States Government purchased from a dealer in Scrodtown, the largest city in Eastern Seaboard, 100 new automobiles for use by federal agencies operating within the state. Must GSA pay the sales tax applicable to the new auto purchase?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, unless Congress has consented to such a tax.\nB. No, because the tax unfairly discriminates against interstate commerce.\nC. Yes, because the tax is nondiscriminatory.\nD. Yes, because there is a rational basis for the tax and it does not appear to be a disguised penalty. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Egbert has died without having executed a will, and his rather substantial estate must be distributed by the probate court. The jurisdiction's applicable statute provides that where a decedent leaves neither issue nor spouse, nor parents, his estate goes to his brothers and sisters and their descendants. Egbert was never married, had no children, and both of his parents are dead. Tamara, whose birth certificate was destroyed by fire, seeks to establish that she is the daughter of Egbert's only sibling, Ethel, now also deceased. Tamara offers into evidence the statement in a trust instrument recorded pursuant to statute in the office of the county recorder (in which the original is kept). The instrument was executed by Egbert's father, Ethelbert, and recited that certain specified real property conveyed by Ethelbert into the trust should be held for the benefit of \"my devoted son Egbert and my beloved daughter Ethel and her loving daughter Tamara.\" The document actually offered is an enlarged print photocopy of microfilm records, authenticated by an employee of the county. The trial court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Exclude the evidence, because it is not the best evidence.\nB. Exclude the evidence, because it is inadmissible hearsay not within any recognized exception.\nC. Admit the evidence, because it is a record of a document affecting an interest in property.\nD. Admit the evidence, because it constitutes a past recollection recorded.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Oliver, who owned the Rocking O Ranch in fee simple, died and left the property to his daughter, \"Melinda, her heirs and assigns; but if my son, Oliver Jr., is living 25 years from the date of my death, then to Oliver Jr., his heirs and assigns.\" At the time of Oliver's death, Oliver Jr. was one year old. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified in the jurisdiction. The grant in the will to Oliver Jr. is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Valid, because the interest vests, if at all, within a life in being.\nB. Valid, because it grants Oliver Jr. a reversionary interest.\nC. Invalid, because the will grants Melinda the complete interest in the property, so there is nothing to be left to Oliver Jr.\nD. Invalid, if this jurisdiction does not recognize a testator's ability to convey a possibility of reverter by will.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"One night when Bob was very drunk, he took one of his rifles, loaded it, and fired a bullet through his front door. Unknown to him, at the time he fired the rifle, someone was driving by the house. The bullet went through the front door, through the window of the car, and killed the driver. Bob was convicted of murder and appeals. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of murder. The court of appeals should rule that the evidence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sufficient to prove that the killing was intentional.\nB. Sufficient to prove that the killing was done with malice aforethought.\nC. Insufficient, because Bob did not know that the driver was driving by his house and therefore he could not have acted intentionally.\nD. Insufficient, because at most Bob's conduct constituted gross negligence and involuntary manslaughter.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Hines and West had been dating for many years. They decided to live together and some day, should things work out, get married. Since each earned a sizable income, they decided to invest some of their money in real estate. They purchased Blackacre for $ 100,000$, each contributing half the purchase price from savings. They took title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Two years later, Hines and West were married. One year after that, the parties separated. Hines then quitclaimed all of his interest in Blackacre to his brother, Brown, who duly recorded the deed. The jurisdiction has no applicable statute. Blackacre is now held by:\n\nOptions:\nA. West and Brown, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.\nB. West and Brown, as tenants in common.\nC. Hines and West, as tenants by the entirety.\nD. Hines and West, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Bruno is on trial in federal court, charged with having sold cocaine to an undercover agent. Bruno calls Flossie to the stand, and Flossie testifies that she was with Bruno in another state on the date of the alleged drug sale. Following Flossie's testimony, the prosecution seeks to introduce the record of judgment of Flossie's seven-year-old embezzlement conviction. Bruno's attorney objects. The court should rule the record of judgment:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as going to Flossie's credibility.\nB. Admissible, provided no appeal is pending.\nC. Inadmissible, because the record is inadmissible hearsay.\nD. Inadmissible, because, for impeachment, a specific act of misconduct cannot be shown by extrinsic evidence.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The legislature of State Yellow passed a \"Fairness in Elections\" statute. A major provision of the statute stated that \"no newspaper in this state shall publish a political endorsement or an editorial favoring one political candidate or party over another on either the day of election or the day preceding the day of election.\" The stated purpose for the legislation was to prevent unfair attacks on candidates and to ensure that they would have time to respond to or rebut any published article prior to the election. The Yellow Press was the leading newspaper published in State Yellow. It had a high reputation regionally and was also distributed in states bordering on Yellow. The Yellow Press filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The newspaper's best argument for the invalidity of the statute is which of the following?\n\nOptions:\nA. The statute unduly burdens interstate commerce, because the Yellow Press is circulated in other states.\nB. The statute unduly interferes with the Yellow Press's property interest in distributing newspapers.\nC. The statute unduly restricts the Yellow Press's freedom of speech.\nD. The statute violates the Equal Protection Clause, because restrictions are imposed merely on the basis of the day the newspaper is printed, while the same material can be printed on other days.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 1, 2000, Red leased Whiteacre from Blue for a period of 10 years. On January 1,2005 , the state took title to Whiteacre under proper eminent domain proceedings. Which of the following statements are correct concerning the rights of Red? I. Red may continue to occupy Whiteacre, as eminent domain proceedings will not affect lessees. II. Red may not continue to occupy Whiteacre, is relieved from his obligation to pay rent to Blue, and will not share in the condemnation award. III. Red may not continue to occupy Whiteacre, and is entitled to share in the condemnation award based on the value of the remaining five years less rent that would have been paid during that period.\n\nOptions:\nA. Only I. is correct.\nB. Only II. is correct.\nC. Only III. is correct.\nD. None of the above are correct.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Maude's will left her farm in Rural County to her two grown children, Lisa and Louis. The will stated that the farm passed to the children \"jointly, as tenants in common.\" Lisa and Louis, having had no interest in farming, had long since moved to Paree, a large city located about 150 miles from the farm. However, after Maude's death, Louis had second thoughts about living on the farm. His children were becoming disciplinary problems in school, and remembering some of his strict but kindly teachers in the Rural County schools, he decided to move back to the farm. Thus, Louis and his family moved into Maude's home. Louis rented various parts of the land to sharecroppers. Louis regularly sent half of any profits from the farm to his sister. If Pitts asserts a claim against Drago, Pitts will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, unless Stratton was negligent in the manufacture of the car that Pitts was driving.\nB. Prevail, because Drago's negligent driving was a cause in fact of the collision.\nC. Not prevail, because the door latch on Pitts's car violated a local ordinance.\nD. Not prevail if Pitts would not have been injured but for the failure of the seatbelt buckle.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Christine and her friend Zelda were going away to college and had quite a few personal belongings to transport. Christine's father offered to drive them in his van, but when the van was loaded they discovered there was only room for two people, so Christine asked her boyfriend Harry to drive her in his car while Christine's father and Zelda rode in the van. About halfway to the college, while the van and Harry's car were driving down the freeway, the van in front, the van suddenly swerved out of control and ran off the highway, ending up on its side in the center divider. When Harry stopped his car and Christine ran to the van, she discovered to her horror that her father was dead. Zelda appeared to be injured, but not severely. Because her father previously had heart trouble, Christine assumed that he had had a heart attack while driving, although a later investigation would reveal that the accident was caused solely by a defect in the steering mechanism of the van. Filled with remorse, Christine told Zelda, \"I'm so sorry about this. I'll make good any losses you suffer because of this accident.\" Later, when Christine learned that Zelda was going to seek treatment from Dr. Winston, she wrote the doctor a letter stating that she would be responsible for all of Zelda's medical expenses; Dr. Winston received the letter the next day. Assume for purposes of this question only that, after treating Zelda for her injuries until she recovered, Dr. Winston sent Christine a bill for services rendered. When Christine refused to pay, Dr. Winston brought an action to recover the amount of her bill. Who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Dr. Winston, because she gave medical treatment to Zelda after receiving Christine's letter. \nB. Dr. Winston, because Christine's promise to pay Zelda's medical expenses was in writing.\nC. Christine, because there was no consideration for her promise to Dr. Winston.\nD. Christine, because she derived no benefit from the medical services rendered to Zelda.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 1, Fred executed and delivered a deed to his daughter, Diane, conveying his avocado ranch as follows: \"To Diane for life, but if Diane dies survived by her spouse and children, then to Diane's spouse for life, with the remainder in fee simple to Diane's children; but if Diane dies survived by her spouse and no children, then to my son Sam in fee simple.\" On June 15, Diane married George and as a wedding gift Fred quitclaimed his interest in the avocado ranch to George. Assume that the jurisdiction does not follow the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders. Assume for the purposes of this question only that Diane died survived by George and two children, Ann and Bradley. Bradley dies intestate two days after Diane, leaving one child, Curtis, as his only heir. What are the respective interests of George, Ann, and Curtis in the avocado ranch?\n\nOptions:\nA. George has a life estate, Ann has an absolutely vested remainder, and Curtis has nothing. \nB. George has fee simple ownership of the ranch, and Ann and Curtis have nothing.\nC. George has a life estate, and Ann and Curtis have absolutely vested remainders.\nD. George has a life estate, and Ann has a vested remainder subject to open.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alice owned Red Acre, a tract of land with a one-story house on it. Alice leased Red Acre to Betty for a term of three years. Betty and her teenage son, Norm, planned to live in the house for this period. Norm was a star baseball player for the local high school team. To provide Norm with an adequate place to practice, Betty installed a fully operational batting cage in the backyard located on Red Acre. In addition to the batting cage, Betty installed an automatic pitching machine and electric lights so that Norm could practice at night. Six months after Alice leased the premises to Betty, Alice mortgaged Red Acre to State Bank to secure a loan. Betty was not notified directly of the mortgage but the mortgage was recorded. Six months before the three-year term was to end, Alice defaulted on her mortgage payments, and State Bank began foreclosure proceedings, as it was entitled to do on the terms of the mortgage. Although unaware of the mortgage proceedings, Betty knew that her lease with Alice was about to end; she therefore began to remove all of the equipment she had installed in the backyard. State Bank brought an action to enjoin the removal of the equipment, naming both Betty and Alice as defendants in the suit. If the court refuses the injunction, it would be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. The circumstances reveal that the equipment was installed for Betty's (Norm's) exclusive benefit.\nB. The Statute of Frauds precludes the bank from claiming any interest in the equipment.\nC. Betty was never given direct notice of the mortgage.\nD. In the absence of a contrary agreement, a residential tenant is entitled to remove any personal property she voluntarily brings upon the premises.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The city of Newtown adopted an ordinance providing that street demonstrations involving more than 15 persons may not be held in commercial areas during \"rush\" hours. \"Exceptions\" may be made to the prohibition \"upon 24-hour advance application to and approval by the police department.\" The ordinance also imposes sanctions on any person \"who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence, opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace.\" No court has of yet interpreted the ordinance. Which of the following is the strongest argument for the unconstitutionality of both parts of the ordinance on their faces?\n\nOptions:\nA. No type of prior restraint may be imposed on speech in public places.\nB. Laws, regulating by their terms expressive conduct or speech, may not be overbroad or unduly vague.\nC. The determination as to whether public gatherings may be lawfully held cannot be vested in the police.\nD. The right of association in public places without interference is ensured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"While on a hiking trip during the late fall, Page arrived toward the end of the day at a clearing where several similar cabins were located, none of which was occupied. One of the cabins belonged to Levin, Page's friend, who had given Page permission to use it. Page entered one of the cabins, which she thought was Levin's, and prepared to spend the night. In fact the cabin was owned, not by Levin, but by Dwyer. When the night turned cold, Page started a fire in the stove. Unknown to Page, there was a defect in the stove that allowed carbon monoxide fumes to escape into the cabin. During the night the fumes caused serious injury to Page. If Page asserts a claim against Dwyer for her injury, will Page recover?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, if Dwyer knew that the stove was defective.\nB. Yes, if Dwyer could have discovered the defect in the stove by a reasonable inspection.\nC. No, because Dwyer had no reason to anticipate Page's presence in the cabin.\nD. No, unless Page needed to use the cabin for her own protection. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Developer owned a large tract of land that she had surveyed by a licensed surveyor and then subdivided into numerous lots. At the time of the survey, the surveyor drove wooden stakes into the ground to mark the boundaries. The surveyor then made a plat of the survey and recorded the plat in the County Recorder of Deeds Office. On June 1, Andrew purchased Lot 20 in the tract from Developer. Prior to purchase, Developer had shown Andrew the wooden stakes, and Andrew accepted such stakes as marking the boundaries of Lot 20 . After taking possession of Lot 20 , Andrew built a house thereon and enclosed it with a fence. On September 5, Bruce purchased Lot 21 from Developer. Lot 21 was adjacent to Lot 20. After taking possession of Lot 21, Bruce hired a licensed surveyor to survey Lot 21 . This surveyor discovered that, according to the recorded plat, Andrew's fence extended two feet onto Lot 21. Upon learning this, Bruce demanded that Andrew remove his fence. Andrew refused. If Bruce sues Andrew, who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Andrew, because he bought his lot first.\nB. Andrew, because the surveyor's stakes are controlling.\nC. Bruce, because the recorded plat controls.\nD. Bruce, because the adverse possession period has not run.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The jurisdiction in which Dawn lives follows the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. If Dawn conveys her property to \"Clara, her heirs and assigns, as long as the premises are used for noncommercial purposes, then to Grant, his heirs and assigns,\" Dawn's interest in the property, if any, is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Nothing.\nB. A reversion in fee simple absolute.\nC. A possibility of reverter.\nD. A right of entry based on a condition subsequent.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Thomas wanted to give his home to his brother, Ben. In 1995, Thomas executed a warranty deed conveying the home to Ben. Thomas then wrote a letter to Ben saying, \"Dear Ben, My home is now yours.\" He put the letter and deed in an envelope and wrote the following on the outside of the envelope: \"Kenneth, you are to give this deed to my brother, Ben, when I die. Until then, you should safeguard this envelope and the documents inside. Signed Thomas.\" Thomas delivered these items to his cousin Kenneth and continued to live in his home by himself. In 1997, Thomas executed a will leaving all of his property to his sister Sally. Thomas died in January 2004 . Shortly thereafter, Kenneth delivered the envelope containing the deed to Ben, who promptly recorded the deed. Thomas's will has been admitted to probate and Xavier is the executor. Xavier has brought an appropriate action against Ben to determine the title to Thomas's home. The court should rule:\n\nOptions:\nA. For Sally, because the deed was not effectively delivered before Thomas died.\nB. For Sally, because the deed was not recorded before the grantor died.\nC. For Ben, because the deed effectively conveyed title when it was executed.\nD. For Ben, because Thomas no longer owned his home when he died.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Shelley and Herman decided to get married. Both were in their final year of high school; Shelley was one month short of her 18th birthday, and Herman was 19 . They went to a local jeweler and looked at gold wedding bands, but saw nothing that appealed to them. When they discovered that the jeweler was himself a goldsmith and could make rings to order, they described what they were interested in and signed a purchase order for two rings; a woman's band for $ 500$ and a man's for $ 650$. Three weeks later, the jeweler called Shelley and informed her that the rings were ready. In the meantime, she and Herman had broken up and Herman had enlisted in the Marines and been sent to another state for training. The day after her 18th birthday, Shelley went to the jeweler and told him that they would not be needing the rings. When he protested that they were custom-made and would probably not sell to anyone else, Shelley said, \"All right, I've got $ 400$ in my savings account. I'll take my ring, but you'll have to find Herman about the other one.\" The jeweler had Shelley sign another purchase order for the woman's band at $ 400$, payment to be made by the end of the month. When the jeweler did not hear from Shelley after another month, he brought an action for breach of contract against her. Evidence produced at trial established that the market value of the rings was $ 500$ and $ 650$ for the woman's and man's, respectively, and that the age of majority in the jurisdiction was 18. Is the jeweler entitled to recover against Shelley?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, in the amount of $ 1,150$.\nB. Yes, in the amount of $ 500$.\nC. Yes, in the amount of $ 400$.\nD. No.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Zelda, a paving contractor with an excellent reputation in the community, entered into a written contract with Norman to pave the parking lot behind his new store. The contract contained no provision regarding assignment. A few days after they entered into the contract, Zelda realized that scheduling difficulties would make it impossible for her to complete the job in the time Norman needed to have the job done. Instead of running the risk of being in breach of contract, she assigned the job to one of her competitors, Kurt, whom she regarded as being almost as good as she, and who agreed to do the job for the contract price. With regard to this assignment by Zelda, which of the following statements is true?\n\nOptions:\nA. The assignment is valid only if Norman agrees to accept performance by Kurt.\nB. Zelda breached her contract with Norman by assigning it to Kurt without his prior consent.\nC. Norman must accept performance by Kurt.\nD. The assignment is valid, even if Norman objects, as long as Zelda supervises the performance of the contract by Kurt.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Parker was a guest at Hotel, located about 200 miles from his home. After Parker had spent two nights at Hotel, he received a call at 5 a.m. from his wife, who told him that their child had just been rushed to the hospital and was in critical condition. Parker decided to hurry home. He called the airport and reserved space on the next flight out, scheduled to leave at $6: 15$ a.m. Parker packed and rushed to the lobby. However, it happened that a number of guests were checking out early that morning, and thus there was a long line ahead of him and only one cashier on duty. Parker hoped that the line would move quickly, but when he heard the first guest in line arguing with Stockton, the desk clerk, over a $25 \/ otin$ telephone charge, he realized that he would never make it to the airport in time if he continued to wait in line. The hotel had no express check-out service available, so he left without paying his bill and flew home. As soon as Parker's child was out of danger, he wrote a letter to Hotel, apologizing for his swift departure and enclosing payment for two nights' lodging; he also added an extra $ 25$ \"to cover any inconvenience and billing expense\" he may have caused. Meanwhile, Stockton discovered that Parker had left without paying. On Hotel's behalf, Stockton signed a complaint with the state police, charging Parker with theft of services. The police went to the appropriate magistrate, and a warrant was sworn out for Parker's arrest. The day after Parker left Hotel, Hotel received Parker's letter and payment. However, no one notified the police that Parker had paid his bill. Three days after Parker left Hotel, the state police, armed with a warrant, came to Parker's office and arrested him. Despite Parker's objections, he was taken to jail. Although he repeatedly told the police that he had paid his bill and suggested that they call Hotel, they refused to do so. After holding Parker for 18 hours, the police called Hotel. The manager told the police, \"Yes, we got Parker's check two days ago, but we were too busy to call you.\" The police, with apologies, released Parker. Parker sued Hotel and the state police for false imprisonment. In Parker's action against Hotel, who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Hotel, because Hotel reasonably believed that Parker stole services. \nB. Hotel, because the police were not employees of Hotel.\nC. Parker, because Hotel failed to promptly notify the police that Hotel had received Parker's check.\nD. Parker, because Hotel failed to have an adequate number of cashiers on duty when Parker wanted to check out.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ben and Sandy, brother and sister, received a $ 50,000$ inheritance from their deceased father. By mutual agreement, they used the money to purchase a 10 -acre parcel of land. Ben and Sandy took title as joint tenants. Three years after the purchase, Ben suggested to Sandy that they build an apartment house on the property. Sandy rejected this idea. Ben then asked if he could build an apartment house on his half of the property; Sandy agreed. Ben then built an apartment house on the eastern five acres of the property. Six months later, Sandy gave permission to the Boy Scouts of America to use the western half of the property as a site for weekend camping trips. Two years later, Ben died, leaving his entire estate to his son, Steven. In an appropriate action to determine the respective interests of Sandy and Steven in the property, if Sandy is adjudged to be the owner of all of the property, the most likely reason for the judgment will be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The Statute of Frauds prevents the enforcement of Sandy's oral agreement.\nB. The record title of the property as joint tenancy can be changed only by a duly recorded instrument.\nC. Ben could not unilaterally sever the joint tenancy.\nD. Ben's expenditure of funds in building the apartment house in reliance on Sandy's oral promise estops her from denying the oral permission.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Baxter was heavily in debt and was concerned that his home was about to be repossessed. To try to generate money to satisfy his creditors, Baxter promised to pay his friend Dunn $ 100$ if Dunn would enter Baxter's house that evening and take his expensive color television and stereo. Baxter explained that he would then report the items as being stolen to the insurance company and collect a settlement from them. Baxter gave Dunn directions to his home, which was one of several tract houses in a fairly new development. Baxter told Dunn to arrive at approximately 9 p.m. and to enter through a window at the rear of the house that Baxter would leave ajar. Dunn knew that since Baxter lived alone, there was no possibility that he might find someone within the house when he arrived at the appointed time. Dunn arrived at the location at approximately 9 p.m., but due to the darkness of the evening and the fact that all of the homes in the development looked the same, he mistakenly entered the house belonging to Baxter's neighbor. He found a window ajar at the rear of the neighbor's home and pushed it open. He entered and took the neighbor's television set and stereo. When he returned to the bar where Baxter was waiting for him, both men were arrested by the police. If Dunn is charged with burglary, his best argument for acquittal would be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. He acted under a mistake of law.\nB. There was no breaking.\nC. There was no entry.\nD. He reasonably thought that he was in Baxter's home.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jesse was a member of an extreme right-wing, paramilitary organization. While out drinking with several fellow members one evening, Jesse got into an argument with a soldier from the nearby Army base and was bested in a brief exchange of punches. Feeling humiliated, he went to a different bar and drank a considerable amount of liquor. Vowing revenge on the soldier who had beaten him, Jesse and his friends drove out to the Army base. Using infiltration tactics practiced on weekends, they surreptitiously approached what they believed to be the barracks where the soldier slept. As Jesse was climbing through the window he had jimmied, a military police officer happened by and challenged him. In a tussle with the MP, Jessie struck the MP with his own baton, killing him. Still extremely intoxicated, Jesse abandoned the idea of finding and severely beating the soldier, and staggered to a nearby armored vehicle park. Since he was a heavy equipment operator, Jesse was familiar with the operation of such vehicles, and soon was driving an armored personnel carrier through the streets of the base and then out into the city. A curious police officer followed the armored vehicle for a few blocks, then pulled alongside in an attempt to determine whether it was on official Army business. At that moment, Jesse swerved the armored personnel carrier to the left, crushing the police car as it ground to a halt. The police officer inside was killed. The jurisdiction's statutes define murder as \"the premeditated and intentional killing of another or the killing of another in the commission of robbery, rape, burglary, or arson.\" Manslaughter is defined as \"the killing of a human being in a criminally reckless manner.\" Criminal recklessness is \"consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk resulting from the actor's conduct.\" The statutory definition of burglary is identical to the common law except that the prohibited conduct need not occur in the nighttime. The jurisdiction's statutes provide that intoxication is not a defense to a crime unless it negates an element of the offense. In a separate proceeding, Jesse is tried for manslaughter in connection with the death of the city police officer. The prosecution's best reply to Jesse's defense of intoxication in the charged manslaughter is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Whether Jesse was intoxicated is not the crucial issue; whether the manner in which he was operating the armored personnel carrier was criminally reckless is determinative.\nB. Conscious risk taking refers to Jesse's entire course of conduct, including drinking with the knowledge that he might become intoxicated and perform an act that might severely injure or kill someone.\nC. Intoxication is a defense to a crime only if the intoxication is involuntary.\nD. Intoxication is not a defense to the crime charged, because at common law manslaughter is a general intent crime.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Donald is being tried for the murder of Vincent, which occurred during the burglary of Vincent's house. In its case-in-chief, the prosecution seeks to offer evidence that Donald, who was arrested several days after the crime, had been caught with 50 grams of cocaine in his car. This evidence will most likely be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible, because Donald has not offered evidence of good character.\nB. Inadmissible, because it has limited probative value and is unduly prejudicial.\nC. Admissible, because it tends to show what Donald did with the money he stole.\nD. Admissible, because it tends to show that Donald is capable of committing serious crimes.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Baker had a contract with City to supply City with five computers a month for seven months. At the start of the fourth month, Baker realized that his supply of computers had dwindled to one. Baker called his normal supplier of computers but was informed that the supplier was out of computers. Baker immediately sent a fax to Stevens explaining the situation and asking for \"a price quote for 20 computers to be delivered before the first of next month.\" Stevens responded by fax: \"I can deliver 20 computers from my present stock at a cost of $ 2,000$ per computer.\" Baker responded the next day with a fax that stated: \"I will buy 20 computers at a cost of $ 2,000$ per computer.\" Assume no further communications between the parties. At this point has a contract been formed? \n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Baker's fax ordering the computers was an acceptance of Stevens's offer.\nB. Yes, because Stevens's fax was an acceptance of the offer in Baker's first fax.\nC. No, because the fax sent by Baker was an offer that was never accepted by Stevens.\nD. No, because none of the communications were worded in such a way as to be definite and certain enough to be offers.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dennis got into a fight with his former roommate Tom over some money that Dennis claimed Tom owed for some long distance telephone calls. When Tom refused to pay the money, Dennis took two tickets that Tom had purchased for the All Star game, intending to give them back to Tom the day after the game. Dennis is charged with larceny. Most likely Dennis will be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not guilty, because he intended to return the tickets to Tom.\nB. Not guilty, because he believed that Tom owed him money.\nC. Guilty, because he intended to deprive Tom of the value of the tickets.\nD. Guilty, because the intent to return is not a good defense.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"At the intersection of First and Main Streets, a large truck owned by Ace Meat Packing Co. collided with a car driven by Sam. At the time of the accident, Wilber, the driver of the truck, said to Sam, \"The accident was my fault; I wasn't paying any attention. Don't worry, my company will make it right.\"' The subsequent investigation of the accident by Ace revealed that Wilber had been drinking on the day of the accident. Wilber was fired. Sam brings an appropriate action against Ace for damages resulting from the accident. Wilber has disappeared. Sam seeks to testify as to what Wilber said at the time of the accident. The evidence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as an admission by an employee of the defendant.\nB. Admissible, as an excited utterance.\nC. Inadmissible, because Wilber is no longer employed by Ace.\nD. Inadmissible, unless Ace authorized Wilber to speak on its behalf.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The Social Security Act provided that surviving spouses and stepchildren would be denied benefits unless the decedent wage-earner spouse had been married at least nine months prior to death. Sal married her husband, who was in apparent good health, five months before his death. Sal was denied survivor benefits by the Social Security Administration. She now brings an action to compel the Social Security Administration to award her benefits. The decision of the court should be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sal should be awarded benefits, because the nine-month period is arbitrary, capricious, and without any rational justification.\nB. Sal should be awarded benefits, because the classification is an invidious scheme and violates her rights to equal protection.\nC. Sal should not be given benefits, because the nine-month period in question is reasonably calculated to achieve a permissible governmental end. \nD. Sal should not be awarded benefits, because it would be an undue burden on the public treasury to allow all wives survivor benefits.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jesse was a member of an extreme right-wing, paramilitary organization. While out drinking with several fellow members one evening, Jesse got into an argument with a soldier from the nearby Army base and was bested in a brief exchange of punches. Feeling humiliated, he went to a different bar and drank a considerable amount of liquor. Vowing revenge on the soldier who had beaten him, Jesse and his friends drove out to the Army base. Using infiltration tactics practiced on weekends, they surreptitiously approached what they believed to be the barracks where the soldier slept. As Jesse was climbing through the window he had jimmied, a military police officer happened by and challenged him. In a tussle with the MP, Jessie struck the MP with his own baton, killing him. Still extremely intoxicated, Jesse abandoned the idea of finding and severely beating the soldier, and staggered to a nearby armored vehicle park. Since he was a heavy equipment operator, Jesse was familiar with the operation of such vehicles, and soon was driving an armored personnel carrier through the streets of the base and then out into the city. A curious police officer followed the armored vehicle for a few blocks, then pulled alongside in an attempt to determine whether it was on official Army business. At that moment, Jesse swerved the armored personnel carrier to the left, crushing the police car as it ground to a halt. The police officer inside was killed. The jurisdiction's statutes define murder as \"the premeditated and intentional killing of another or the killing of another in the commission of robbery, rape, burglary, or arson.\" Manslaughter is defined as \"the killing of a human being in a criminally reckless manner.\" Criminal recklessness is \"consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk resulting from the actor's conduct.\" The statutory definition of burglary is identical to the common law except that the prohibited conduct need not occur in the nighttime. The jurisdiction's statutes provide that intoxication is not a defense to a crime unless it negates an element of the offense. Jesse is charged with the murder of the military police officer. At his trial on this charge, the court should instruct the jury on the issue of the defense of intoxication that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to the crime of murder if Jesse would not have killed the MP but for the intoxication.\nB. Jesse is guilty of murder despite his intoxication only if the prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that Jesse acted with premeditation and intentionally.\nC. Voluntary intoxication is no defense to the crime of murder.\nD. Intoxication is a defense to the crime of burglary if it prevented Jesse from forming the intent to commit a crime inside the barracks, in which case he could only be convicted of murder upon the requisite showing of intentional action and premeditation.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Donald is being tried for the murder of Vincent, which occurred during the burglary of Vincent's house. Wilson, who knew Donald, is called to testify that on the day after the robbery he saw Donald buying some groceries, and when Donald removed a large roll of money, Wilson had asked, \"You didn't steal that from someone, did you?\" Donald nodded. This evidence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as an excited utterance.\nB. Admissible, because it is not hearsay.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because Donald had no reason to respond to this statement.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Percy was shopping in ValuMart, a large department store. ValuMart was remodeling its menswear department and had hired Contractor to do the work. Cora, a carpenter employed by Contractor, was working on the ValuMart job. When Cora left ValuMart to take her lunch break, she left a carpenter's level projecting out into one of the aisles. Before Cora returned from lunch, Percy came down that aisle and tripped over the level. Percy fell and struck his head on the sharp corner of a display case. Percy required hospitalization and sued ValuMart for his injuries. Will Percy prevail in his suit against ValuMart?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Contractor's employee left the level in the aisle.\nB. Yes, if ValuMart's employees had a reasonable time to discover the level before Percy fell.\nC. No, because ValuMart's employees did not leave the level in the aisle.\nD. No, if ValuMart's employees were unaware that the level was in the aisle. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dennis robbed a bank and fled in a getaway car driven by an accomplice, not realizing that one of the bundles of money he took had the serial numbers recorded and had a tiny tracking device attached to the wrapper. The bank contacted its security consultant, who obtained portable tracking equipment and was able to trace the bundle of money to Dennis's house. The police were notified and they arrived at Dennis's house a few hours after the robbery. They knocked on the door and announced their presence, and saw someone matching the description of the robber in the hallway. They entered and arrested the suspect, Dennis, and then conducted a protective sweep of the house for the accomplice, who they believed had a gun. They did not find him, but while checking a closet they discovered several of the bundles of money from the bank and a gun Dennis had used in the robbery. The police also discovered two clear plastic bags of what appeared to be marijuana sitting on top of a dresser. They seized the money, the gun, and the two bags; later testing confirmed that the substance in the bags was marijuana. Dennis was charged with the bank robbery and with possession of the marijuana. At a preliminary hearing, he moves to suppress introduction of the money, gun, and marijuana. The court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Grant the motion as to the marijuana but not as to the money or the gun because the money and gun were found as a result of the protective sweep for Dennis's accomplice.\nB. Grant the motion as to the money and the gun but not as to the marijuana because the bags containing the marijuana were clearly visible on the dresser during the search.\nC. Grant the motion as to all of the evidence seized.\nD. Deny the motion as to all of the evidence seized. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Truffle agreed in writing to lease a restaurant site in a newly constructed mall from Lentil, the owner of the property. The term of the tenancy was two years, and rent was payable in monthly installments at the beginning of each month. At the end of the second year, there had been no discussions between Truffle and Lentil regarding renewal or termination. Truffle did not vacate the premises at the end of the term; instead, she sent a check for the next month's rent to Lentil. Lentil cashed the check after the term had expired but informed Truffle that his acceptance of the check did not mean that he was going to renew the lease or let Truffle stay. At the end of that month, Lentil seeks advice on whether he can evict Truffle. How should Lentil be advised to proceed?\n\nOptions:\nA. Lentil must give Truffle a full 30 days' notice before beginning eviction proceedings because a month-to-month periodic tenancy has been created.\nB. Lentil may begin eviction proceedings as soon as the additional month has expired.\nC. Lentil may not evict Truffle for 11 months and must give six months' notice before beginning eviction proceedings because a year-to-year periodic tenancy has been created.\nD. Lentil may not evict Truffle for 11 months but need not give any notice prior to eviction because a tenancy for years for a term of one year has been created. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"All of the deeds for the lots in the 5100 block of Elm Street contained a restrictive covenant requiring that all houses built on the lots be set back a minimum of 50 feet from the sidewalk. Local zoning regulations required that all homes in the area of the 5100 block of Elm Street be set back a minimum of 35 feet from the sidewalk. Dampier purchased a lot on the 5100 block of Elm Street on which it would be possible to build a home with a 50-foot setback. However, the lot was of an unusual shape, and Dampier applied to the city zoning commission asking for a variance allowing him to build a house set back 30 feet from the sidewalk. In his petition, Dampier cited the unusual shape of the lot and asserted that it would cause hardship for him to build in compliance with the 35-foot setback required by the zoning regulations. The zoning commission granted Dampier the variance. Nora, whose home was located at 5130 Elm Street, noticed surveyors putting up ropes 30 feet from the sidewalk on Dampier's lot, and she discovered that Dampier planned to build a home with only a 30 -foot setback. Nora seeks to enforce the restrictive covenant and brings suit to enjoin Dampier from building a residence with a setback of less than 50 feet. Who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Dampier, because zoning regulations take precedence over restrictive covenants as a matter of public policy.\nB. Dampier, because equity will not impose a hardship.\nC. Nora, because Dampier will be unjustly enriched if he is permitted to build a 30 foot setback.\nD. Nora, because a zoning variance does not affect the enforcement of a restrictive covenant.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Vincent, who operated a local neighborhood liquor store, was robbed by a man wielding an unusual knife with a pearl-studded handle. Davis was arrested and charged with armed robbery of Vincent. At trial the prosecution calls Wilma to testify that, three days after the robbery of Vincent, she was robbed by Davis with a knife that had a pearl-studded handle. The court will most likely hold that Wilma's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as showing habit.\nB. Admissible, as establishing an identifying circumstance.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence.\nD. Inadmissible, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A statute in State B stated that directors of orphanages, homes for the developmentally disabled, and similar institutions stand in loco parentis to the children under their charge. Dieter, a mentally disabled 11-year-old child, had been abandoned by his parents and lived in the Miserere Home, a State B residential facility for the developmentally disabled operated by the Sisters of Hope, a religious order. Sister Mary Smith was the director of the facility. The Miserere Home had no fence around it, because children who lived there were not considered to be dangerous. Dieter wandered away from the premises and was gone for 36 hours before he was found by the police and returned to Miserere. When Dieter was away from the facility, he beat up Paul, a five-year-old boy. Paul's parents filed suit against Sister Mary on Paul's behalf. Assuming that no other liability statute applies, who will prevail? \n\nOptions:\nA. Paul, because under the statute Sister Mary has the responsibilities and duties of a parent.\nB. Paul, because Sister Mary is strictly liable for Dieter's acts.\nC. Sister Mary, because parents are not vicariously liable for the intentional torts of their children.\nD. Sister Mary, unless she knew that Dieter had dangerous propensities.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mary boarded a city bus. The bus prominently displayed a sign stating \"No Smoking. Violators Will Be Prosecuted.\" Mary was tired after a long day at work, and deciding that she could not wait until she got home, she lit a cigarette. The bus driver shouted, \"Read the sign, lady; put that out or get off my bus!\" Mary told the bus driver, \"I've had a rough day; you can go to hell,\" and walked to the back of the bus and took a seat. The bus driver flagged down a passing police officer and told him that Mary was smoking on the bus (which was the misdemeanor of \"disorderly conduct\"). Mary, meanwhile, quickly extinguished the cigarette and put the butt in her purse so that by the time the police officer had boarded the bus, she was sitting there innocently chewing a breath mint. The officer told Mary that she was charged with disorderly conduct, and then he searched her purse and the coat that she was carrying. The officer found not only the recently extinguished cigarette butt, but also a marijuana cigarette in the coat pocket. Mary was then charged with possession of a controlled substance. At Mary's trial for possession, should the marijuana cigarette be admitted over Mary's objection?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because it was obtained in a search incident to a valid arrest.\nB. Yes, because the coat was within Mary's \"wingspan\" or reach.\nC. No, because the arrest was invalid.\nD. No, because the police officer did not give Mary Miranda warnings.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Leftacre and Rightacre are adjoining 50-acre parcels of land. For many years, Leftacre and Rightacre have been thriving dairy farms. In 1959, McWilliams, the owner of Rightacre, purchased Leftacre. She continued to operate both parcels as separate dairy farms. In 1979, McWilliams sold Rightacre to Stone, who promptly and properly recorded the deed. Since Rightacre had no direct access to a public road, McWilliams wrote into the deed, \"Stone, his heirs and assigns shall have the right to use the existing dirt path along the eastern border of Leftacre for ingress and egress to Rightacre.\" The dirt path, which connected with a public road on the northern boundary of Leftacre, was wide enough for motored vehicle traffic and had been graded for that purpose. In 1994, Sandberg purchased Leftacre from McWilliams. In 2002, Stone died, leaving a will that devised all his interest in Rightacre to O'Toole. For this question only, assume the following facts: In 2003, Sandberg decided to subdivide Leftacre into lots for singlefamily residences. Since no street in the proposed subdivision will align with the dirt path mentioned in the 1979 deed from McWilliams to Stone, O'Toole will be without ingress and\/or egress to Rightacre. $O$ 'Toole instituted an appropriate action to enjoin the blocking of the dirt path. The most likely result is that judgment will be for:\n\nOptions:\nA. O'Toole, because the owner of the servient tenement cannot obstruct an express easement.\nB. O'Toole, because O'Toole has a way by necessity.\nC. Sandberg, because there has been a significant change in conditions and circumstances.\nD. Sandberg, because the appropriate remedy for $\\mathrm{O}^{\\prime}$ Toole is damages, not injunction.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In an action by Patrick against David, one of the issues is whether David is a licensed psychotherapist. Normally, the names of all licensed psychotherapists are registered with the office of the State Department of Professional Registrations. Patrick wishes to introduce a certified document, signed by the chief registrar of the Department, stating that an examination of the Department's rolls does not disclose David's name. Should the document be admitted?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because a statement of absence from public record is admissible.\nB. Yes, but only if the chief registrar is unavailable.\nC. No, because the document is hearsay not within an exception.\nD. No, because the document is not selfauthenticating.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Benjamin, a foreign correspondent, wished to purchase Whiteacre. Smith, the owner of Whiteacre, was not yet sure he wished to sell the property. He was waiting to see if his bid on another parcel was going to be accepted. Before Smith could make up his mind, Benjamin was assigned to cover an ethnic conflict in eastern Europe that was escalating into a war. Prior to his departure, Benjamin gave his attorney, Lenora, $ 100,000$ and his power of attorney. He instructed Lenora that, should Whiteacre be put up for sale, she was authorized to: offer up to $ 100,000$ for it, enter into a binding contract to purchase it on Benjamin's behalf, and if he did not return in time, she was authorized to close on the property. In early January, Smith put Whiteacre on the market. Lenora offered $ 75,000$ for it, which Smith readily accepted. On January 15, Lenora, on Benjamin's behalf, entered into a written contract to purchase Whiteacre for $ 75,000$. Closing was set for February 15 . During this time, Lenora heard nothing from Benjamin. When he had not returned by the date of closing, Lenora attended the closing and tendered the $ 75,000$. Smith tendered a deed made out to Benjamin as the grantee. On February 20, news was received that Benjamin had been killed by a stray bullet on January 14. Benjamin's will left his entire estate to his niece, Nellie. In the meantime, Smith has had someone offer him $ 150,000$ for Whiteacre. Having heard of Benjamin's death, Smith believes the conveyance to Benjamin is invalid. Smith brings a suit to quiet title to Whiteacre. The court will most likely find that the owner of Whiteacre is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Nellie, because Lenora held the deed on constructive trust for Benjamin's estate.\nB. Nellie, because of the operation of the doctrine of equitable conversion.\nC. Smith, because a deed to a nonexistent person is void and conveys no title.\nD. Smith, because the risk of loss is on the buyer. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The High National Grasslands is owned by the United States and is located in the center of a large western state. Acting pursuant to a federal statute authorizing such action, the United States Bureau of Land Management leased the grazing rights in the High National Grasslands to ranchers located nearby. Grazingland Company owns a vast amount of rangeland adjacent to the High National Grasslands and leases its land for livestock grazing purposes to the same ranchers, but at prices higher than those charged by the Bureau. Grazingland Company sued the Bureau in an appropriate federal district court to restrain the Bureau from competing with that company by leasing the High National Grasslands. Which of the following constitutional provisions may most easily and directly be used to justify the federal statute authorizing this leasing program of the Bureau of Land Management?\n\nOptions:\nA. The General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8.\nB. The Federal Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3.\nC. The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8.\nD. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Rose was convicted in federal court of possession of one kilogram of heroin with intent to distribute. She was sentenced to a prison term. Subsequently, Rose was indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to distribute the same kilogram of heroin. She moved to dismiss the indictment. Her motion should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Denied, because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply when the second prosecution is for violation of a separate statute.\nB. Denied, because each prosecution requires proof of an element that the other does not.\nC. Granted, because the Double Jeopardy Clause protects her against a second prosecution for the same criminal conduct.\nD. Granted, because the Due Process Clause protects her against double punishment for the same criminal conduct.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pops, owner of a street corner candy store, heard several gunshots and rushed out in the street. He found Velma lying on the sidewalk, bleeding profusely. She gasped to Pops, \"I'm going to die. Danny Deft shot me.\" Velma lapsed into unconsciousness and died on the way to the hospital without uttering another word. Danny Deft was arrested and charged with the murder of Velma. At Deft's trial, the prosecution seeks to have Pops testify as to Velma's statement. Such testimony should be ruled:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible, because it is more prejudicial than probative.\nB. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.\nC. Admissible, as a declaration made in belief of impending death.\nD. Admissible, as an excited utterance.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Stone operated a newsstand on leased space in an office building. On March 15, Quinn purchased the office building and told Stone that he wanted to negotiate a new lease. During the negotiations, Stone and Quinn orally agreed that Stone would have the exclusive right to sell newspapers and magazines in the office building. Quinn prepared a written lease outlining the Stone-Quinn agreement, but forgot to include the agreement that Stone would have exclusive rights in the office building. Stone was given a copy of the lease to read, but Stone merely glanced over the lease because he assumed it reflected his agreement with Quinn. Stone then signed the lease, which included a merger and integration clause. On March 30, Quinn leased space to Jacobs for the establishment of a drug store to be run by Jacobs. The Quinn-Jacobs lease did not prevent Jacobs from selling newspapers or magazines. As a result of the competition, Stone lost substantial profits in his business. Assume for purposes of this question only that Stone's prior lease had given him the exclusive right to sell newspapers and magazines in the office building. Assume further that Stone told Quinn that he wanted the new lease to be the same as the old lease, and that Quinn had handed the new lease to Stone and represented it to be the same as the old lease, knowing that this was not true. Stone signed the lease without reading it because Quinn told him that there was no reason to read the new lease. If Stone sues Quinn, Stone could obtain:\n\nOptions:\nA. Rescission.\nB. Reformation. \nC. Novation.\nD. Repudiation.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Justin is being tried for the murder of Harvey, which occurred during the course of the robbery of Harvey's house. A witness to the robbery and murder had aided the police artist in making the composite picture by which Justin was identified. This witness disappeared before trial, and the prosecutor now wants to offer the sketch into evidence. The sketch is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible, under the best evidence rule.\nB. Inadmissible, as hearsay not within any exception.\nC. Admissible, as a record by a public employee.\nD. Admissible, as a prior identification.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mary's doctor informed her that she had a rare blood disease that was almost always fatal. He further informed her that there was no treatment known to medical science for this disease. Out of desperation, Mary consulted Quack, who claimed to have a cure for the blood disease. Mary entered into an agreement with Quack under which Quack promised to treat Mary for the blood disease. However, no price was given for the treatment. After two months of treatment, Mary did not appear to have improved at all. Mary's father, Stu, went to see Quack and told Quack that if Quack would cure Mary of the blood disease, Stu would pay Quack $ 25,000$. Four months later, after weekly sessions with Quack, Mary again went to see her doctor. This time her doctor told her that she appeared to have recovered completely from the blood disease, because all tests for the disease proved negative; and that, in his opinion, she was completely cured. Assume for the purposes of this question only that Mary refused to pay Quack anything. Quack brings suit against Mary for services rendered. Quack will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover whatever amount Quack shows is his normal fee for the treatment. \nB. Recover a reasonable price for his services.\nC. Not recover, because no price term was contained in the original contract.\nD. Not recover, because Quack cannot prove that he was the cause of Mary's recovery.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Zelda, a paving contractor with an excellent reputation in the community, entered into a written contract with Norman to pave the parking lot behind his new store. The contract contained no provision regarding assignment. A few days after they entered into the contract, Zelda realized that scheduling difficulties would make it impossible for her to complete the job in the time Norman needed to have the job done. Instead of running the risk of being in breach of contract, she assigned the job to one of her competitors, Kurt, whom she regarded as being almost as good as she, and who agreed to do the job for the contract price. Assume for the purposes of this question only that Kurt paved the parking lot under the contract, but Norman did not realize that Kurt was substituting for Zelda until the job was half complete. Upon learning that, Norman let Kurt complete the job. If Kurt fails to perform the job in accordance with the original terms of the agreement between Zelda and Norman, Norman:\n\nOptions:\nA. Has a cause of action only against Kurt for damages.\nB. Has a cause of action against Kurt and Zelda for damages.\nC. Has no cause of action against Kurt, because he and Kurt are not in privity of contract.\nD. Has no cause of action against Zelda, because he accepted performance from Kurt.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Edgar was employed as an electrician by Edgewater Electric Services. Edgewater had contracts with a number of large office and condominium buildings to provide emergency electrical services and repairs at any hour of the day or night. Edgewater also advertised in the telephone \"yellow pages\": \"If it's an electrical emergency, call Edgewater Electric Servicesnight or day.\"' Although Edgar usually worked from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. at Edgewater, the nature of Edgewater's emergency services required Edgar to be \"on call\" 24 hours a day. Therefore, Edgewater required Edgar to drive his company van to his home each night, so he would be in a position to speed off to an emergency with all of his tools and equipment at hand. One afternoon, Edgar left the Edgewater Electric offices at 4 p.m. as usual. However, when he left the main highway, he did not turn left toward his home but instead turned right toward the supermarket a few blocks away to pick up some items for dinner. While leaving the supermarket parking lot, Edgar drove negligently and struck Parka, a pedestrian. Parka suffered serious injuries and required several operations and a lengthy hospital stay. Parka filed suit against Edgewater for $ 100,000$. Is Parka likely to recover from Edgewater?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Edgar's trip to the market was only a slight deviation from the direct route to his home.\nB. Yes, but only if Edgewater knew that Edgar had proclivities to drive negligently.\nC. No, because turning in the opposite direction from his home constituted a \"frolic\" by Edgar.\nD. No, because an employer is not liable for the torts of an employee traveling to and from work.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Scholastica, the Academic Dean at Woodbine College, was well liked and considered a competent scholar and a fine teacher. However, six months after her appointment as Dean, Scholastica received a certified letter from Rector, the Provost of Woodbine College, summarily dismissing her. No reasons were given in the letter for Scholastica's dismissal. Scholastica had her lawyer, Loretta, contact Rector to discover the basis of her dismissal, if possible. Two days later, Loretta received a letter from Rector stating, in relevant part, \"Scholastica was dismissed from her employment at Woodbine College because I received an anonymous telephone call informing me that Scholastica was involved in selling drugs to students. One can't be too careful about these things in this day and age.\" Rector had, in fact, received such a phone call, but the basis of the statement was untrue, because Scholastica had never even used illegal drugs, much less sold them. If Scholastica files suit against Rector for libel:\n\nOptions:\nA. Scholastica will win, if Rector should have verified the anonymous statement before repeating it to Loretta.\nB. Scholastica will lose, because by having her attorney ask the reason for the dismissal, Scholastica impliedly consented to the statement in the letter.\nC. Rector will win, because Rector was merely repeating the defamatory communication of another.\nD. Rector will lose, because Scholastica was not dealing in drugs.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following cases would a leading question least likely be permitted over objection?\n\nOptions:\nA. When asked on direct examination of a disinterested witness.\nB. When asked on direct examination of a minor.\nC. When asked on cross-examination of an expert witness.\nD. When related to the name, address, or occupation of the witness.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In July of last summer George, a grape grower, contracted with Walter's Winery to deliver \" 500 tons of premium quality pinot chardonnay grapes grown on my ranch Grapeacre in Grape County.\" The price was to be $ 1,000$ per ton and delivery was to be on or before September 15. In August of the same year, George entered into an identical contract with Vinnie's Vintner Co. to sell 300 tons of premium quality pinot chardonnay grapes. George completed his harvest by September 10 and had 800 tons of premium quality grapes. On September 11, an unexpected rain ruined 400 tons, and George notified Walter and Vinnie on that day that he would only be able to deliver 250 tons to Walter and 150 tons to Vinnie. On September 14, Vinnie purchased an additional 150 tons of premium quality pinot chardonnay grapes from Godfrey, one of several other available sources for premium quality pinot chardonnay grapes. These grapes along with the 150 tons from George gave Vinnie the 300 tons he needed. On September 15, what is Walter's Winery's legal position with regard to George's failure to deliver the 500 tons of grapes required by his contract?\n\nOptions:\nA. If Walter has given George a written notice of termination, Walter will have the right to refuse to accept the 250 tons of grapes but will have no cause of action for damages against George.\nB. Even if Walter has given George a written notice of termination, Walter must accept the 250 tons of grapes and will have no cause of action for damages against George.\nC. Since Vinnie's purchase establishes that it is possible for George to perform by obtaining additional grapes from other available sources, Walter may accept the 250 tons from George and recover damages for George's failure to deliver the balance of the amount specified by the contract.\nD. Since George's contract with Walter was entered into before his contract with Vinnie, George is bound to deliver the entirety of his grape crop to Walter.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Doris was at a restaurant eating lunch when she looked up and saw another woman take Doris's coat off the coat rack and walk out the door with it. Doris quickly left and followed the woman. She saw the woman enter a house where she apparently lived. Later, when Doris knew that the woman was not at home, Doris opened a window in the woman's house, climbed in, and got her coat out of the front closet. When she put the coat on, however, she noticed for the first time that in fact it was not her coat. But, because it was so cold outside, Doris decided to wear this coat home and to return it the next day. The following day Doris changed her mind and decided to keep the coat. Doris is guilty of:\n\nOptions:\nA. Larceny.\nB. Burglary.\nC. Both larceny and burglary.\nD. Neither larceny nor burglary.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Carter, a nonunion carpenter, went to work on a construction project that was involved in a labor dispute. Every morning when he arrived at work, he would be accosted by the picketers who would try to persuade him not to continue to work. One morning while Carter was trying to get to work, one of the union workers, John, stopped Carter at the gate and told him that he shouldn't go to work. When Carter insisted that John get out of the way, John said, \"Try to make me, scab!\" Carter, intending to frighten John, swung his hammer at him. The head on the hammer, however, was defective and it flew off, hitting John in the face. John sues Carter for battery. Most likely he will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, because he was struck by the hammer head.\nB. Prevail, unless he intended to provoke Carter.\nC. Not prevail, because the negligence of the manufacturer of the hammer was the direct cause of the injury.\nD. Not prevail, if a reasonable person would have been angered by what John had said.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of North Freedonia has long had a reputation for growing the biggest and tastiest potatoes in the country. Growers of potatoes in North Freedonia recently began spraying Bugoff onto their crops to prevent the spread of the Potato Maggot, an insect that can destroy young potato plants. Bugoff is manufactured exclusively by Growit, Inc., at its plant in South Freedonia. When the plant is producing Bugoff it emits a fine, sticky, harmless mist as a byproduct. The mist drifts over Clampett's property which is adjacent to Growit's plant. Although Growit uses the best technology available, it is unable to prevent the release of the mist. Clampett brings suit against Growit on the theory of private nuisance to enjoin the production of Bugoff at the South Freedonia plant. Which of the following facts, if established, will be most helpful to Growit's defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. Growit commenced the manufacture of Bugoff at the South Freedonia plant three years before Clampett acquired the land adjacent to the plant.\nB. Federal, state, and local agencies approved the design of the plant and equipment used to produce Bugoff.\nC. The principal users of Bugoff are State and Federal Departments of Agriculture.\nD. Bugoff is the only pesticide that can safely and effectively kill the Potato Maggot, which, if not controlled, would destroy North Freedonia's potato crop, its principal product.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The United States General Accounting Office issued a call for competitive bids for a contract to supply the National Park Service with 3,000 four-wheel drive utility vehicles; the detailed specifications for the vehicles were included in the announcement. Auto Modifiers, Inc., of the state of Midwest won the contract as low bidder and began manufacture of the vehicles. Midwest statutes require that automobiles manufactured in that state be equipped with certain antipollution devices and have a maximum displacement of 2,500 cubic centimeters. The specifications of the federal contract require Auto Modifiers to manufacture the utility vehicles without the antipollution devices and with engines with a displacement of 4,000 cubic centimeters. When the president of Auto Modifiers learns that the Midwest Attorney General's office is investigating the manufacture of the government vehicles, he instructs his legal department to take affirmative action to protect the company. Auto Modifiers then files suit in state court for declaratory relief, seeking a judicial declaration that the state statute prescribing antipollution devices and engine size may not be enforced as to it. The court should rule:\n\nOptions:\nA. The statute may not constitutionally be applied to Auto Modifiers in this instance because to do so would violate the $\\mathrm{Su}-$ premacy Clause.\nB. The statute may not constitutionally be applied to Auto Modifiers because to do so would violate the Contracts Clause.\nC. The statute may not constitutionally be applied to Auto Modifiers because to do so would violate the Commerce Clause.\nD. All of the above.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The large metropolitan areas of East Rabbit's Foot and West Rabbit's Foot, Wyoming, lie adjacent to each other on the county line separating, respectively, Pecos and Tuscaloosa Counties, each city being entirely within its respective county. Wyoming state law grants each county great autonomy in setting the health standards governing the preparation, packaging, transportation, and sale of foodstuffs. The Pecos County council recently enacted an ordinance, valid under the constitution and statutes of Wyoming, prohibiting the packaging and sale of any food item in any nonbiodegradable material; the ordinance defines nonbiodegradable and specifically lists as prohibited all forms of plastics, cellophane, or similar materials. The ordinance specifically exempts from its terms sales of food to public institutions such as hospitals, jails, and schools. Snak-Mart, a retail food seller in East Rabbit's Foot, files an appropriate court action attacking the Pecos County ordinance on the grounds that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court should rule:\n\nOptions:\nA. For Snak-Mart, because the state's interests could be effectuated by alternative methods less intrusive upon Snak-Mart's constitutional rights.\nB. For Snak-Mart, because no compelling state interest is served by the challenged ordinance.\nC. For Pecos County, because the state may regulate in this area as Congress has not entered the field.\nD. For Pecos County, because the ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate state interest-the health and safety of its citizens. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The Bedford City Council enacted an ordinance regarding the right to parade in the streets of Bedford. The ordinance provided that city officials should automatically issue a parade permit to any group filing the proper papers with city authorities, except in situations where a prior group had already received permission to parade on the same street at the same time on the same day. Another city ordinance prescribed fines for persons conducting a parade in the city of Bedford without a permit. The Reverend Jim, leader of the Poor People's Association (\"PPA\"), filed appropriate papers with city officials to parade down Main Street in the city of Bedford at 1 p.m. on July 15 . City officials checked their records and noted that they had already issued a parade permit to the Little League Baseball Supporters to conduct a parade on Main Street at 1 p.m. on July 15 . The officials told Jim that he could not have a parade permit for the time and place requested and suggested that Jim select another day and\/or location. Jim refused and told the city officials, \"This is yet another insult to the poor from this administration. We poor people will march on Main Street any time we please, with or without your permits!\" On July 15 at 1 p.m. both Little League and PPA assembled on Main Street and began to parade. There was much confusion. City officials asked Jim and his followers to desist, but they refused. Jim and other PPA supporters were arrested, convicted, and fined under the city ordinance. If Jim and other convicted PPA members seek to have their convictions overturned by the federal courts, they will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Lose, because Jim should have gone to federal court to secure PPA's rights before violating the ordinance.\nB. Lose, because the Bedford ordinances are a reasonable restriction on time, place, and manner of speech and were not applied in a discriminatory manner.\nC. Lose, because the Bedford ordinances represented the will of the people as expressed through the city council. \nD. Win, because the Bedford ordinances, on their face, violate the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Photog, a freelance professional photographer, went to Department Store to purchase some film. As he was leaving the store, he noticed that Actress, a well-known Hollywood starlet, was browsing through the women's clothing department in Department Store. Photog took a picture of Actress in the clothing department without Actress's knowledge. Several days later, Photog took the photograph to the manager of Department Store and sold him the picture, explaining that Actress had agreed that Department Store could use the photograph in an advertising campaign. The manager enlarged the photograph and hung it above the main entrance to Department Store with a caption that read, \"The store where Actress shops.\" One month earlier, Actress had entered into a contract with Hardware Store, the terms of which provided that Hardware Store had the exclusive right to use Actress's name and likeness for advertising purposes. As a result of the photograph's appearing at Department Store, Hardware Store canceled its contract with Actress. If Actress asserts a claim based on invasion of privacy against Department Store, will Actress prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Department Store, without Actress's permission, used Actress's picture for profit.\nB. Yes, because Photog had no right to take Actress's picture.\nC. No, because Department Store believed it had permission to display Actress's picture.\nD. No, because Actress would clearly qualify as a public figure.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"To protect the minor children living in the area, the Rock Creek Town Council enacted an ordinance that prohibited advertisements that include \"a depiction of a nude person, whether male or female.\" Sylvester Screen owns and operates Rock Creek Video, a videotape rental shop. Screen often posts large posters to advertise movies he has available for rent. A substantial part of his business consists of the rental of \"X-rated\" movies. These adult tapes are kept in a separate part of the shop. In the adult tape room he hangs movie advertisements, many of them depicting nude or partially nude people. Screen does not allow minors to enter the adult tape room. If Screen challenges the ordinance, and assuming that he has standing to sue, how will the court most likely rule? \n\nOptions:\nA. For the town, because the ordinance is a valid exercise of the town's power to protect the morals of its minor citizens.\nB. For Screen, because prohibiting the posting of the movie advertisements violates his First Amendment rights.\nC. For the town, because the posters may appeal to a minor's prurient interest in sex.\nD. For Screen, because not all nudity is obscene.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Christine and her friend Zelda were going away to college and had quite a few personal belongings to transport. Christine's father offered to drive them in his van, but when the van was loaded they discovered there was only room for two people, so Christine asked her boyfriend Harry to drive her in his car while Christine's father and Zelda rode in the van. About halfway to the college, while the van and Harry's car were driving down the freeway, the van in front, the van suddenly swerved out of control and ran off the highway, ending up on its side in the center divider. When Harry stopped his car and Christine ran to the van, she discovered to her horror that her father was dead. Zelda appeared to be injured, but not severely. Because her father previously had heart trouble, Christine assumed that he had had a heart attack while driving, although a later investigation would reveal that the accident was caused solely by a defect in the steering mechanism of the van. Filled with remorse, Christine told Zelda, \"I'm so sorry about this. I'll make good any losses you suffer because of this accident.\" Later, when Christine learned that Zelda was going to seek treatment from Dr. Winston, she wrote the doctor a letter stating that she would be responsible for all of Zelda's medical expenses; Dr. Winston received the letter the next day. Assume for purposes of this question only that several months after the accident, but within the applicable statute of limitations, Zelda discovered that she had suffered an injury to her spinal column that would prevent her from ever playing basketball again. Zelda had been a scholarship athlete in basketball at the college and was considered to be a certain high draft selection for the newly formed women's professional basketball league when she graduated. She brought an action against Christine for several million dollars in damages. Which of the following is the best defense Christine could assert against Zelda's claim?\n\nOptions:\nA. There was no consideration supporting her promise to Zelda to make good any losses.\nB. She did not intend to offer to pay Zelda for the loss of her professional career when she said she would make good any losses.\nC. She was in error when she assumed that her father's heart attack was the cause of the accident.\nD. She did not know that Zelda would not be able to play basketball when she offered to make good any losses.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In early January 2004 , representatives of MacDougall Corporation, makers of the famous \"MacDougall Dog\" hot dog and related convenience foods sold through thousands of owned and franchised \"MacDougall's\" restaurants, met with representatives of Time Management, Inc. (\"TM\"), a firm specializing in time-and-motion studies of labor intensive industries. After extensive negotiations, it was orally agreed that TM would redesign the food production area of MacDougall's restaurants, including modification of cooking equipment, if necessary, so that, using existing MacDougall's food products, savings in labor costs through reduction in restaurant cooking staffs would result. Lawyers for MacDougall's subsequently drafted a written agreement, sent it to TM, whose lawyers modified the draft, and returned the modified draft to MacDougall's. This modified writing, signed by both parties, stated in its entirety: Provided that at least 2,000 work-hours per restaurant are eliminated, MacDougall Corporation will pay to TM within 90 days of installation of new food production systems at MacDougall's restaurants in Richmond a first installment of $1$ million. Upon installation of new food processing systems nationwide, MacDougall Corporation will pay to TM a second and final installment of $ 1.5$ million. Nationwide installation must be completed by January 15,2005 . Any amendments to this agreement must be in writing signed by both parties. TM immediately began work on the restructuring of MacDougall's food processing methods. On September 5, 2004, a radical change in the layout of MacDougall's kitchen area and new personnel assignments had been designed, and TM demanded payment of the first installment payment of $ 1$ million. MacDougall Corporation refused, but negotiations conducted between the parties resulted in an oral agreement that MacDougall's would pay $ 750,000$ immediately and then the $ 1.5$ million second installment as originally agreed, after nationwide installation of the new system. The restructured food production system was installed and in operation in all Richmond MacDougall's restaurants on October 1, 2004. Subsequent audits revealed that the new system enabled MacDougall Corporation to eliminate 1,500 work-hours per restaurant, saving the corporation $ 90,000$ in labor costs for all Richmond restaurants. The new system required that MacDougall's increase the length of the famous \"MacDougall Dog\" by three centimeters and that the \"Mother MacDougall Hot Apple Fritters\" be made in a rectangular shape rather than the traditional round form. Nationwide installation of the new system in all MacDougall's restaurants was completed on January 30, 2005. The 1,500 work-hours per restaurant savings to MacDougall Corporation was projected at $ 1.8$ million per year. TM sent a certified letter to the chief executive officer of MacDougall Corporation requesting his certification that the new food production system was in place and operating as promised, and demanding the $ 1.5 \\mathrm{mil}$ lion second installment. The CEO refused to so certify and refused to make any payment, noting in his reply letter that the system had not been installed by January 15,2005 , and that it did not use existing MacDougall's food products, as promised by TM. Assume for the purposes of this question only that TM brings an action for breach of contract against MacDougall Corporation seeking as damages $ 1.5$ million. MacDougall's attempts to introduce the testimony of its chief negotiator describing the oral agreement with TM representatives that the new food processing system would use existing MacDougall's food products. TM objects, arguing that the parol evidence rule bars admission of this testimony. Which of the following is the best argument supporting admission of the testimony?\n\nOptions:\nA. The memorandum signed by the parties was not a complete integration of their agreement.\nB. The parol evidence rule does not bar evidence interpreting a written agreement.\nC. MacDougall Corporation detrimentally relied on the oral agreement in signing the memorandum.\nD. The parol evidence rule does not exclude misrepresentations.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"State B's legislature passed a statute that required every used car sold in the state to be tested prior to sale to determine whether it was in compliance with a set of strict exhaust emission standards that were also included in the legislation. Used cars would have to be brought up to standard and pass the emissions test prior to sale. Certain persons in the state object to the legislation because one of its results will be to raise the average price of used cars in State B. Only cars to be sold for junk are exempt from the statute. Among the following, who would be most likely to have standing to raise a constitutional challenge to the legislation?\n\nOptions:\nA. A State B resident who was thinking about selling used cars in State B.\nB. A State B resident who was thinking about buying a used car in State B.\nC. An out-of-state dealer in used cars who had a contract to sell cars to a large dealer in State B.\nD. An out-of-state manufacturer who might be required to indemnify its dealers in State B for costs arising from the statute.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The United States entered into a treaty with Mexico whereby both countries agreed to ban hunting of the red tailed raccoon, a species of raccoon indigenous to both the United States and Mexico. The red tailed raccoon had been placed on the endangered species list of the International Wildlife Federation and other conservation groups. The raccoons tend to roam in small family groups in the semidesert lands of the western United States and northern Mexico. The raccoons freely crossed state lines and the international boundary. Laws in Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico permitted hunting of the red tailed raccoons. After the treaty was fully ratified by the United States and Mexico, a federal court would most likely hold that the state laws permitting hunting of the raccoons are:\n\nOptions:\nA. Unconstitutional, because a treaty is the supreme law of the land.\nB. Unconstitutional, because free roaming wildlife is federal property.\nC. Constitutional, because wild animals are natural inhabitants of the state, and the federal government may not take state property without consent of the state.\nD. Constitutional, under the rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Commercial fishing, primarily for salmon and tuna, in the waters of the Pacific Ocean along the state's western boundary, has long been one of Washington's major industries. To protect the fishing industry, which was being harmed by the too rapid depletion of the fish in the waters of the state's coast, and to promote the general welfare of the state's citizens, the state legislature enacted statutes for the first time requiring licenses for commercial fishing. To receive a license, the applicant must pay a $ 500$ fee and establish by acceptable evidence that he has been engaged in commercial fishing in the waters of the state of Washington (including ocean waters within three miles of its coastline) since January 1, 1995. A limited number of special licenses are available for those who do not meet the requirements of the regular licenses, and these special licenses are expressly reserved for citizens who have resided in Washington for at least three years prior to the date of the application. 116. $\\mathrm{Ng}$, a legally admitted alien who has been residing in the state of Washington for 10 years, brings suit in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the licensing statute as to himself and all other similarly situated noncitizen legal residents of the state of Washington. Which of the following doctrines will probably be determinative of his claims? (A) The powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. (B) The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (C) The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. (D) The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. At trial, prosecution offers evidence that when Fred was arrested, shortly after the crime had been committed, he had a large amount of cocaine hidden in the trunk of his car. This evidence should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted to prove Fred's propensity to commit crimes.\nB. Admitted to prove Fred's general bad character.\nC. Excluded because such evidence may be offered only to rebut evidence of good character offered by the defendant.\nD. Excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jack, a 17-year-old high school student living at home with his parents, decided one day to try the old practical joke he had seen so many times on television and in movies where a bucket of water is balanced on a partially open door so that the next person to enter the room through that door is drenched. Knowing that his parents were giving a dinner party that evening, Jack obtained a bucket from the tool shed, filled it with ice water, and balanced it on the partially open door of the guest bedroom, knowing that his father would take the guests' coats and wraps in there and toss them on the bed. Later that evening, Walt, an invited guest of Jack's parents, mistakenly wandered into the guest bedroom in search of the bathroom. Jack's father had decided to keep all the guests' coats in the hall closet, since there were only three couples coming to dinner. As Walt opened the door to the guest bedroom, the bucket of ice water plunged down upon him, opening a four-inch cut in his scalp. Walt was rushed to the hospital, where 12 stitches were required to close the head wound. In an action by Walt against Jack and his parents for personal injuries, the court should determine Jack's culpability according to:\n\nOptions:\nA. The presumption against negligence afforded to all minors.\nB. The age, experience, and intelligence of an ordinarily prudent minor in circumstances similar to Jack's.\nC. The standard applicable to adults, since Jack is nearly grown.\nD. Strict liability, since the practical joke turned out to be so dangerous.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Joey escaped from prison and stole a car. He picked up a young woman hitchhiker, Jenny, and told her what he had done. Jenny was emotionally disturbed and of borderline mental retardation, but understood that the police were after Joey, and because she hated the police, she told Joey she would do anything she could to help him. To avoid the police, they drove to the mountains with Jenny doing much of the driving. The following day, they were both very hungry. Toward evening, Joey saw Fisher camped by a stream nearby, and told Jenny, \"Go down there and steal some food from his ice chest; he'll never even see you, but if he does, hit him with something heavy.\" When she hesitated, Joey became angry and said, \"Go on, or I'll just leave you here to starve!\" Jenny went down to Fisher's campsite, and had just grabbed a sandwich out of his ice chest and taken a bite out of it, when Fisher, who was 6'6\" tall and weighed 250 pounds, ran back from the stream and grabbed her arm. Jenny was terrified and picked up a heavy frying pan and hit Fisher on the head; he slumped to the ground apparently dead. Joey then ran up and said, \"He's dead. We'd better put him in the stream so it will look like he drowned after slipping and falling.\" They thereupon put Fisher in the stream without attempting to determine if he was alive or dead. Later, a medical examination showed conclusively that the blow only knocked Fisher out; he died of suffocation due to water in the lungs. With respect to the stolen car, at common law, Jenny is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Liable as a co-conspirator to car theft.\nB. Liable as an accessory after the fact to car theft.\nC. Liable for compounding a felony.\nD. Not liable for any common law crime.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Buyer, a retail seller of lawn and garden equipment, entered into a written contract with Seller, a manufacturer of wheelbarrows. The terms of the contract call for Seller to deliver 100 fifteen-pound capacity, red wheelbarrows to Buyer by March 1. On February 28, Buyer received from Seller 90 fifteen-pound capacity, red wheelbarrows and 10 twenty-pound capacity, red wheelbarrows. A letter accompanying the shipment stated, \"We no longer make fifteen-pound capacity wheelbarrows. We are sending the last 90 we have in stock along with 10 twenty-pound capacity wheelbarrows. The twenty-pound capacity were sent as an accommodation to you.\" Which of the following correctly states the rights of Buyer? I. Buyer can reject the entire shipment. II. Buyer can accept the 90 conforming wheelbarrows, reject the 10 nonconforming wheelbarrows, and sue Seller for damages. III. Buyer can accept the entire shipment and sue Seller for damages.\n\nOptions:\nA. Only I. and II. are correct.\nB. Only I. is correct.\nC. I., II., and III. are correct.\nD. Only II. is correct.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The German-made Doppelpferd, featuring sleek styling and remarkable fuel efficiency, is the most popular automobile in the United States. Its United States sales are booming, and the average retail markup in such sales is $30 \\%$. Hardsell Motors, Inc., a franchised Doppelpferd dealer in the United States, contracted with Shift to sell him a new Doppelpferd for $ 9,000$ cash, the sale to be consummated after delivery to Hardsell of the car, which Hardsell ordered from the manufacturer specifically for Shift. The signed retail contractual document was a form drafted by Hardsell's lawyer, and Shift did not question or object to any of its terms, including the price inserted by Hardsell. When the car arrived from Germany, Shift repudiated the contract. Hardsell at once sold the car for $ 9,000$ cash to Karbuff, for whom Hardsell had also ordered from the manufacturer a Doppelpferd identical to Shift's. In an action against Shift for breach of contract, Hardsell will probably recover:\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 9,000$ minus what it cost Hardsell to purchase the car from the manufacturer.\nB. $ 9,000$ minus the wholesale price of an identical Doppelpferd in the local wholesale market among dealers.\nC. Nominal damages only because Hardsell resold the car to Karbuff without lowering the retail price.\nD. Nothing, because the parties' agreement was an adhesion contract and therefore unconscionable. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Marvin Manufacturing Company was in the business of making copper tubing. Golde Industries telephoned Marvin's sales department and placed an order for 10,000 linear feet of copper tubing at a sale price of $ 2$ per foot. The tubing was to be used in the production of a custom order for one of Golde's customers. Marvin installed special equipment for the manufacture of the tubing to Golde's specifications and had completed a portion of the order when Golde again telephoned the sales department. This time, however, Golde canceled its order, saying it no longer had need of the tubing because its customer had been declared bankrupt, and refused to pay for the order. If Marvin sues for breach, it will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Win, because the contract is fully enforceable.\nB. Win, because the contract is enforceable to the extent of the portion of the order completed.\nC. Lose, because a contract for the sale of goods over $ 500$ must be in writing.\nD. Lose, because the parol evidence rule would preclude testimony about the initial telephone call.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Able, an attorney, sued Clinton, a client, for his fee, based on an agreed hourly rate. Clinton subpoenaed the attorney's time records for the days on which he purported to have worked for Clinton to show that Able had billed an impossible number of hours to Clinton and others on those days. Clinton's subpoena provided that any information concerning the matters handled for other clients be deleted or masked. Able moved to quash the subpoena on the ground of attorney-client privilege. The subpoena should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Upheld, because the information about hours billed is not within the privilege.\nB. Upheld, because an attorney has no right to invoke his client's privilege without instructions from the client.\nC. Quashed, because an attorney is entitled to a right of privacy for the work product in his files.\nD. Quashed, because no permission was obtained from the other clients to divulge information from their files.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Tyrone challenged Dennison to an automobile race from Smalltown to Littleburg, a distance of 11 miles. The only road that ran between the two cities was Highway 17, a two-lane country road. At the 7-mile mark, Tyrone attempted to pass Dennison by pulling into the lane to the left of the center line. At that moment, Pryor's car came into view, heading directly at Tyrone's vehicle. Tyrone applied his brakes and attempted to pull back into the lane to the right of the center line. In so doing, Tyrone lost control of his vehicle and collided with Pryor's car. Dennison's car, having already passed Pryor's car, was not involved in the collision. Pryor brings suit against Dennison for damages suffered in the collision. Which of the following would be Dennison's best course of action?\n\nOptions:\nA. Seek dismissal of the claim, because Dennison did not cause Pryor's damage.\nB. Seek indemnity from Tyrone, if Pryor recovers a judgment against Dennison.\nC. Ask the court to limit his liability to onehalf of Pryor's damages.\nD. Seek contribution from Tyrone, if Pryor recovers a judgment against Dennison.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jeff lived in Arkanzona, a state where gambling was illegal. Nevertheless, Jeff gambled on a regular basis. Unfortunately, Jeff had a string of bad luck and needed a loan. Jeff asked his friend Steve to lend him $ 5,000$ to bet on a football game. Jeff claimed that the heavily favored Sabrebacks would lose the game because the game was fixed, and thus he could make a fortune by betting $ 5,000$ against them. Steve, not wanting to miss out on a good deal, agreed to lend Jeff $ 2,500$ if Jeff would bet the other $ 2,500$ for Steve. Jeff agreed, took Steve's $ 5,000$, and placed the bet. Jeff's tip paid off and Jeff won on 4-to-1 odds. He gave Steve his $ 5,000$ back but refused to tender any winnings. If Steve sues Jeff to recover the winnings due under the contract, who will prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Steve, because he fully performed his part of the bargain.\nB. Steve, because the court will not allow Jeff to unfairly profit from his illegal contract.\nC. Jeff, because the contract was illegal and the court will not enforce an illegal contract.\nD. Jeff, because the contract was illegal and the court will only act to put the parties in the status quo ante, and Steve already has his money back.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Sonny was arrested for shoplifting. As Sonny was being booked at the police station, Sonny's mother, Betty, arrived at the station. As she was talking with Sonny, Photog, a reporter for the Daily News, took Betty's picture. The photograph of Betty appeared on the front page of the next day's edition of the Daily News. The story of Sonny's arrest appeared just below it. A caption to the photograph identified Betty as Sonny's mother. Later that week, Betty lost her job as a result of the story in the Daily News. If Betty asserts a claim against the Daily News for invasion of privacy, Betty most likely will: \n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, if she was not involved in the events that led to Sonny's arrest.\nB. Recover, because the photograph and news story caused Betty to be discharged from her employment.\nC. Not recover, since Betty's photograph was taken in a public place.\nD. Not recover, because the caption was accurate.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mom, a wealthy woman, wished to buy her son, Sylvester, an expensive Rolls-Royce for a wedding present. She visited Dealership, a Rolls-Royce dealer, several times, looked at many cars, and discussed possible sales prices with Huck, a salesman. On May 15, after much discussion, Huck and Mom signed a writing that stated, \"If we can agree on price on or before June 1, Mom agrees to buy and Huck, for Dealership, agrees to sell one yellow Rolls-Royce Silver Streak, serial number XO857623.\" On May 20, Mom dispatched a letter to Huck stating, \"I will buy the Rolls-Royce for $ 150,000$.\" On the same day, Huck dispatched a letter to Mom, stating, \"I will sell the Rolls-Royce for $ 150,000$.\" Has a valid contract been formed between Dealership and Mom?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the May 15 writing constitutes a contract with a missing price term, and that term was filled by the crossing offers.\nB. Yes, because when two crossing offers are identical in import, one will be treated as an offer and the other as an acceptance.\nC. No, because there were two crossing offers and no acceptance; hence there was no mutual assent.\nD. No, but the result would be different if Mom were a merchant.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The Drug Control Act is a federal law that seeks to control those substances that are dangerous to the health of the population in general. The statute provides substantial penalties for violations of the Act. The Food and Drug Administration has conducted a substantial number of tests on a new drug called Gelutan. The results of the studies show that the drug might have dangerous side effects when taken regularly, and the Food and Drug Administration now seeks to prohibit its distribution under the Drug Control Act. Drugco, a major pharmaceutical company that desires to market Gelutan, sues to have the statute declared unconstitutional. The most likely result in this suit is that the statute will be declared to be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, as a proper exercise of the general welfare power.\nB. Constitutional, as a proper exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.\nC. Unconstitutional, because it interferes with the right of privacy of Gelutan users.\nD. Unconstitutional, because it deprives Drugco of property without just compensation.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Fred is arrested and charged with the burglary of Sam's warehouse. At the request of the police investigating the burglary, the night watchman at Sam's Warehouse who had seen the thief leaving the premises wrote out a description of a person who bore a strong likeness to Fred. However, the night watchman died of a heart attack before Fred was arrested and brought to trial. The prosecution attempts to offer the description written out by the night watchman into evidence. The description is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as a past recollection recorded.\nB. Admissible as an identification of a person the night watchman knew committed the crime in question.\nC. Inadmissible as hearsay not within an exception.\nD. Inadmissible as an opinion of a nonexpert.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Baxter was heavily in debt and was concerned that his home was about to be repossessed. To try to generate money to satisfy his creditors, Baxter promised to pay his friend Dunn $ 100$ if Dunn would enter Baxter's house that evening and take his expensive color television and stereo. Baxter explained that he would then report the items as being stolen to the insurance company and collect a settlement from them. Baxter gave Dunn directions to his home, which was one of several tract houses in a fairly new development. Baxter told Dunn to arrive at approximately 9 p.m. and to enter through a window at the rear of the house that Baxter would leave ajar. Dunn knew that since Baxter lived alone, there was no possibility that he might find someone within the house when he arrived at the appointed time. Dunn arrived at the location at approximately 9 p.m., but due to the darkness of the evening and the fact that all of the homes in the development looked the same, he mistakenly entered the house belonging to Baxter's neighbor. He found a window ajar at the rear of the neighbor's home and pushed it open. He entered and took the neighbor's television set and stereo. When he returned to the bar where Baxter was waiting for him, both men were arrested by the police. If Baxter and Dunn are tried for conspiracy, the court will most likely find them:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not guilty, because Dunn failed to take Baxter's property.\nB. Not guilty, because Dunn, being in the wrong house, could not take Baxter's property.\nC. Guilty, because they actually took the neighbor's property.\nD. Guilty, because they intentionally agreed to defraud the insurance company.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pike sued Digger, the contractor who constructed Pike's house, for breach of warranty of habitability. At trial, in cross-examination of Pike, Digger's attorney asked whether Pike had sued another contractor 30 years earlier, claiming similar defects in another house built for Pike. The question was not objected to and Pike answered that she had had some \"water problems\" with the first house she ever purchased, but no suit was filed. Digger then called Wirth, the contractor of 30 years earlier, to testify that Pike had brought suit against Wirth for defects in the earlier house, many of which were like those now claimed to be found in the home Digger built, but that the case was settled without trial. The trial court should rule Wirth's offered testimony:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as proper impeachment since Pike will have an opportunity to deny or explain Wirth's statement.\nB. Admissible, because Pike failed to object to Digger's questions on cross-examination relative to the prior suit.\nC. Inadmissible, because the best evidence of the former suit is the court record.\nD. Inadmissible, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will confuse the issues and waste time.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Argus Corporation is privately owned and incorporated in the state of Kiowa. It contracted with the United States to construct a dam across the Big Sandy River in the state of Arapahoe. The state of Arapahoe imposed a gross receipts tax on all business conducted within the state. Arapahoe sued Argus Corporation to collect that tax on the receipts Argus received under this federal contract. No federal statutes or administrative rules are applicable, and the contract between the United States and the Argus Corporation does not mention state taxation. The court should hold the state tax, as applied here, to be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because a state has exclusive jurisdiction over all commercial transactions executed wholly within its borders.\nB. Constitutional, because private contractors performing work under a federal contract are not immune in these circumstances from nondiscriminatory state taxation.\nC. Unconstitutional, because it violates the Supremacy Clause.\nD. Unconstitutional, because it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state penal statute makes it a misdemeanor to \"willfully shut off the gas, electricity, or any other form of power for cooking, heating, or illumination to an inhabited dwelling\" unless strictly outlined procedures for notice and hearing are met. Shelley owned several small, single-family residences in City, which she rented to various student groups and families. One such rental, a small, furnished two-bedroom house located in one of the poorer sections of City, had been rented to a young married couple for several months when Shelley failed to receive the monthly rent check. She drove by the house several times for two weeks and received no answer to her knocks. Neighbors told her that they had not seen the couple for at least three weeks. Finally, Shelley used her keys to enter the house. She discovered that the old set of dishware and utensils she had permitted the couple to use was still in the kitchen, but that there was no food in the house and all but a few old items of clothing had been removed from the closets. Concluding that the couple had abandoned the rental without paying the last month's rent, Shelley called the power company and had the electricity and gas shut off until she could find another tenant. A week later, the couple returned from an extended visit to the young wife's sick mother in Mexico. When they found that their power had been turned off, they reported this to the authorities and Shelley was prosecuted under the misdemeanor statute. At trial, it was established that the couple had inadvertently failed to place the proper postage on the rent check, which they had mailed from Mexico, and it had eventually been returned by Mexican postal authorities to the wife's mother's residence. Shelley will probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Convicted, because the charged crime is violation of a public safety statute, and she is strictly liable for her action in turning off the power.\nB. Convicted, because she did not undertake a more thorough inquiry or wait a more reasonable length of time before concluding that the house had been abandoned.\nC. Acquitted, if the trier of fact concludes that Shelley was reasonable in believing that the house had been abandoned.\nD. Acquitted, if the trier of fact concludes that the young couple was negligent in not placing proper postage on the rent check mailed from Mexico.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Sam was a famous auto racer and builder of racing cars. He and Bob signed a contract for sale of one of Sam's hand-built race cars for $ 25,000$, the price to be paid and the car to be delivered one week later. The day after the contract was signed, Sam called Bob and told him that Sam's wife, Winnie, who had a half interest in the race car, would not go along with the sale at $ 25,000$. Winnie would agree to a sale for $ 40,000$. If Winnie in fact has a half interest in the racing car:\n\nOptions:\nA. There is no enforceable contract because the car cannot be sold unless both owners convey title.\nB. There is an enforceable contract only if Bob was unaware of Winnie's interest when he signed with Sam.\nC. There is an enforceable contract regardless of whether Bob was aware of Winnie's interest at the time he signed.\nD. The contract is discharged by prospective inability of performance.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jack, a 17-year-old high school student living at home with his parents, decided one day to try the old practical joke he had seen so many times on television and in movies where a bucket of water is balanced on a partially open door so that the next person to enter the room through that door is drenched. Knowing that his parents were giving a dinner party that evening, Jack obtained a bucket from the tool shed, filled it with ice water, and balanced it on the partially open door of the guest bedroom, knowing that his father would take the guests' coats and wraps in there and toss them on the bed. Later that evening, Walt, an invited guest of Jack's parents, mistakenly wandered into the guest bedroom in search of the bathroom. Jack's father had decided to keep all the guests' coats in the hall closet, since there were only three couples coming to dinner. As Walt opened the door to the guest bedroom, the bucket of ice water plunged down upon him, opening a four-inch cut in his scalp. Walt was rushed to the hospital, where 12 stitches were required to close the head wound. Assume for the purposes of this question only that the jury believes Jack's testimony that he did not mean to hurt anyone, and did not expect anyone other than his father to enter the room where the bucket trap was set. Jack may be held liable for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Negligence only.\nB. Negligence and recklessness only.\nC. Negligence, recklessness, and battery.\nD. Battery only.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Police investigating a homicide had probable cause to believe that Drake had committed it. They then learned from a reliable informant that, a short while ago, Drake had gone to Trent's house to obtain a false driver's license from Trent, a convicted forger. Believing that Drake might still be there, the police, without obtaining a warrant, went to Trent's house. They entered the house and found Drake hiding in the basement. He was arrested and given his Miranda warnings. At the police station, he confessed to the homicide. At a preliminary hearing, Drake's attorney contends that the confession should be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds. Is the court likely to agree?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the police did not have a search warrant to enter Trent's house and there were no exigent circumstances.\nB. Yes, because the police did not have an arrest warrant for Drake and there were no exigent circumstances.\nC. No, because a reliable informant told police that Drake was in Trent's house.\nD. No, because the police had probable cause to arrest Drake. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Smythe was charged with the murder of his wife. In his defense, he testified that, at the time he killed her, he believed that his wife was planning to destroy the world by detonating a massive explosive device that she had developed and built in the basement of their home. He further testified that he had tried many times to dissuade his wife from her plan and had tried to destroy devices that she stored in the basement. She had, he testified, foiled his efforts by, on two occasions, signing papers for his hospitalization, which lasted for a brief period each time. He said that he had concluded that the only way to prevent her scheme was to kill her and that he had become so obsessed with the importance of doing so that he could think of nothing else. One day when he saw her open the door to the basement, he lunged at her and pushed her down the steps to her death. The best defense raised by Smythe's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Lack of the requisite mental element.\nB. Lack of the requisite act element.\nC. Insanity.\nD. Belief that the situation justified his actions. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pitt sued Dow for damages for injuries that Pitt incurred when a badly rotted limb fell from a curbside tree in front of Dow's home and hit Pitt. Dow claimed that the tree was on city property and thus was the responsibility of the city. At trial, Pitt offered testimony that, a week after the accident, Dow had cut the tree down with a chainsaw. The offered evidence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible, because there is a policy to encourage safety precautions.\nB. Inadmissible, because it is irrelevant to the condition of the tree at the time of the accident.\nC. Admissible to show the tree was on Dow's property.\nD. Admissible to show the tree was in a rotted condition. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A grand jury was investigating a bank robbery. The only information known to the prosecutor was a rumor that Taylor might have been involved. The grand jury subpoenaed Taylor. He refused to answer questions about the robbery and was granted use immunity. He then testified that he and Simmons had robbed the bank. The grand jury indicted both Taylor and Simmons for the bank robbery. The prosecutor permitted Simmons to enter a plea to a lesser offense in exchange for Simmons's agreement to testify against Taylor. The prosecutor had no evidence as to the identity of the robbers except the testimony of Simmons and Taylor. At Taylor's trial, his objection to Simmons's being permitted to testify should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because the prosecutor may not bargain away the rights of one co-defendant in a deal with another.\nB. Sustained, because Simmons's testimony was acquired as a result of Taylor's grand jury testimony.\nC. Overruled, because the police suspected Taylor even before he testified in the grand jury hearing.\nD. Overruled, because a witness cannot be precluded from testifying if his testimony is given voluntarily.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state statute provides that persons moving into a community to attend a college on a fulltime basis may not vote in any elections for local or state officials that are held in that community. Instead, the statute provides that for voting purposes all such persons shall retain their residence in the community from which they came. In that state the age of majority is 18 . Which of the following is the strongest argument to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of this state statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. A state does not have an interest that is sufficiently compelling to justify the exclusion from voting of an entire class of persons.\nB. There are less restrictive means by which the state could assure that only actual residents of a community vote in its elections.\nC. Most persons moving to a community to attend college full-time are likely to have attained the age of majority under the laws of this state.\nD. On its face this statute impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is Defendant least likely to be guilty of burglary in a jurisdiction that has extended burglary to buildings other than dwellings but otherwise retains the common law requirements?\n\nOptions:\nA. Defendant posed as a member of a cleaning crew so that a security guard would give him access to a department store after it was closed for the night, and then hid in a storage closet until the cleaning crew left. He then stole a quantity of jewelry from several jewelry cases, and forced open a loading dock door to escape from the building.\nB. Defendant, intending to steal money and valuables from a house he believed was unoccupied for the evening, pushed open a mail slot and reached his hand in to try to unlock the front door. The owners' dog bit Defendant's hand and he immediately pulled it out and fled.\nC. Defendant was owed $ 500$ by Victor, his bookie. While Victor was out of town one night, Defendant went to Victor's house to get his money, because he knew that Victor had $ 500$ in cash in a desk drawer and the debt was long overdue. Defendant opened an unlocked window and entered the house. He could not find the cash, so he decided to take a painting that he knew was worth substantially more than $ 500$. He later sold it for $ 1,000$ and kept the proceeds.\nD. Defendant, a security officer in a housing project, saw Von, who was wanted on a warrant for drug dealing, through a window of an apartment one evening. He fired his gun at Von from the sidewalk, intending to injure him, although Defendant knew that he was not legally authorized to use deadly force in that situation. The bullet went through the window and missed Von, lodging in a wall behind him.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Cars driven by Pugh and Davidson collided, and Davidson was charged with driving while intoxicated in connection with the accident. She pleaded guilty and was merely fined, although, under the statute, the court could have sentenced her to two years in prison. Thereafter, Pugh, alleging that Davidson's intoxication had caused the collision, sued Davidson for damages. At trial, Pugh offers the properly authenticated record of Davidson's conviction. The record should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted as proof of Davidson's character.\nB. Admitted as proof of Davidson's intoxication.\nC. Excluded, because the conviction was not the result of a trial.\nD. Excluded, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Cantebury Trails operated a fleet of touring buses. It owned its own garage for repairing and maintaining its fleet. Behind this garage was a large vacant lot in which Cantebury Trails stored old, discarded, and wrecked buses, which it salvaged for parts or sold for scrap. This area was fenced in by a five-foot high chain link fence, but Cantebury was aware that children from the neighborhood would climb the fence and play among the junked buses. Consequently, Cantebury Trails would have one of its employees walk through the storage area sometime during the day to chase away any children who may have scaled the fence. One Saturday afternoon, when Cantebury Trails' garage had closed for the weekend, a group of children climbed over the storage area's fence to play army among the junked buses. One of the children, Donny (who had been chased away from the lot before and who also had been warned by his parents not to play in these buses), was trying to climb on the roof of one of the old buses, when he slipped on the front bumper of the bus and his arm broke through the front windshield. As a result of this accident, Donny severed the tendon and nerves in his right arm, leaving it permanently disabled. Through an appropriate guardian, Donny brought suit against Cantebury Trails for his injury. Which of the following, if established, would most aid Donny in showing that Cantebury Trails breached a duty owing to him?\n\nOptions:\nA. It would have been economically feasible to remove the windows from all the abandoned buses. \nB. This area would be classified more as a residential neighborhood than an industrial area.\nC. Cantebury Trails could have eliminated the risk of injury without unduly interfering with its normal operations.\nD. Cantebury Trails improperly maintained the fence that surrounded the lot with the discarded and abandoned buses.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dillon held up a gasoline station. During the robbery he shot and killed a customer who attempted to apprehend him. Dillon was prosecuted for premeditated murder and convicted. Thereafter, he was indicted for armed robbery of the station. Before the trial, his attorney moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that further proceedings were unconstitutional because of Dillon's prior conviction. The motion to dismiss should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Granted, because once Dillon was convicted on any of the charges arising out of the robbery, the prosecution was constitutionally estopped from proceeding against Dillon on any charge stemming from the same transaction.\nB. Granted, because the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a subsequent trial on what is essentially a lesser included offense. \nC. Denied, because there is no constitutional requirement that all known charges against Dillon be brought in the same prosecution.\nD. Denied, because estoppel does not apply when the defendant is charged with violating two different statutes.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state statute provides that only citizens of the United States may be employed by that state. In an action brought in a federal court, a resident alien who was prevented from obtaining state employment as a garbage collector solely because of his alien status challenged the statute's constitutionality as applied to his circumstances. Which of the following statements concerning the burden of persuasion applicable to this suit is correct?\n\nOptions:\nA. The alien must demonstrate that there is no rational relationship between the citizenship requirement and any legitimate state interest.\nB. The alien must demonstrate that the citizenship requirement is not necessary to advance an important state interest.\nC. The state must demonstrate that there is a rational relationship between the citizenship requirement and a legitimate state interest.\nD. The state must demonstrate that the citizenship requirement is necessary to advance a compelling state interest.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dietz and Atkins worked together as pickpockets. Dietz approached Verner from the front to distract him, holding a small camera and asking him to take a picture, while Atkins came up from behind with a knife to slice open Verner's back pocket of his pants and remove his wallet. Verner was drunk and believed Dietz had a gun and was trying to rob him, but was unaware of Atkins behind him. Verner reached into his back pocket to hand over his wallet and was cut by Atkins's knife as it was slicing through his pocket. The wallet dropped to the ground as Verner clutched his hand. Atkins picked it up and Dietz and Atkins fled while Verner knelt on the ground in pain. Dietz was apprehended shortly thereafter and charged with robbery. Should Dietz be found guilty?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Atkins obtained the property by means of force.\nB. Yes, because Verner believed that Dietz would shoot him if he did not give up his wallet.\nC. No, because neither Dietz nor Atkins intended to use force against Verner to obtain the property.\nD. No, because Verner's belief that Dietz was robbing him was unreasonable. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Parmott sued Dexter in an automobile collision case. At trial, Parmott wishes to show by extrinsic evidence that Wade, Dexter's primary witness, is Dexter's partner in a gambling operation. This evidence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as evidence of Wade's character.\nB. Admissible as evidence of Wade's possible bias in favor of Dexter.\nC. Inadmissible, because criminal conduct can be shown only by admission or record of conviction.\nD. Inadmissible, because bias must be shown on cross-examination and not by extrinsic evidence.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Rogers gave Mitchell a power of attorney containing the following provision: My attorney, Mitchell, is specifically authorized to sell and convey any part or all of my real property. Mitchell conveyed part of Rogers's land to Stone by deed in the customary form containing covenants of title. Stone sues Rogers for breach of a covenant. The outcome of Stone's suit will be governed by whether:\n\nOptions:\nA. Deeds without covenants are effective to convey realty.\nB. The jurisdiction views the covenants as personal or running with the land.\nC. Stone is a bona fide purchaser.\nD. The power to \"sell and convey\" is construed to include the power to execute the usual form of deed used to convey realty. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Leonard was the high priest of a small cult of Satan worshippers living in New Arcadia. As a part of the practice of their religious beliefs, a cat was required to be sacrificed to the glory of Satan after a live dissection of the animal in which it endured frightful pain. In the course of such a religious sacrifice, Leonard was arrested on the complaint of the local Humane Society and charged under a statute punishing cruelty to animals. On appeal, a conviction of Leonard probably will be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, on the grounds that belief in or worship of Satan does not enjoy constitutional protection.\nB. Sustained, on the grounds that sincere religious belief is not an adequate defense on these facts.\nC. Overturned, on the grounds that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion and its expression was violated.\nD. Overturned, on the grounds that the beliefs of the cult members in the need for the sacrifice might be reasonable, and their act was religious. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Johnson and Tenniel owned Brownacre as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Johnson executed a mortgage on Brownacre to Lowden to secure a loan. Subsequently, but before the indebtedness was paid to Lowden, Johnson died intestate with Stokes as her only heir at law. The jurisdiction in which Brownacre is located recognizes the title theory of mortgages. In an appropriate action, the court should determine that title to Brownacre is vested:\n\nOptions:\nA. In Tenniel, with the entire interest subject to the mortgage.\nB. In Tenniel, free and clear of the mortgage.\nC. Half in Tenniel, free of the mortgage, and half in Stokes subject to the mortgage.\nD. Half in Tenniel and half in Stokes, with both subject to the mortgage. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Darren's car was stopped by Officer Jones for a minor traffic violation. The officer recognized Darren as a suspect in a multimillion-dollar bank fraud scheme that had just been discovered by the authorities. She placed Darren under arrest and gave him Miranda warnings. She then asked for permission to search the trunk of the car. Darren nodded and unlocked the trunk. Officer Jones searched the trunk and discovered a bag containing what appeared to be cocaine in a compartment in the trunk. When later tests determined that it was cocaine, the authorities added a charge of transporting illegal narcotics to Darren's indictment. At a preliminary hearing, Darren moved to have evidence of the cocaine excluded as the result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Should the court grant Darren's motion?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because one taken into custody cannot give valid consent to a search that would otherwise require a warrant.\nB. Yes, because the search exceeded the scope of a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest.\nC. No, if the court finds that Darren's consent was voluntary under the circumstances.\nD. No, because persons have a lesser expectation of privacy in their vehicles for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Barnes had been a beekeeper for many years, making a modest living selling honey in the area surrounding his farm. When he became aware of a sudden demand for beeswax for use in the manufacture of candles and certain types of exotic soaps sold in specialty shops, he built a plant to manufacture these items. The candle and soap business developed so rapidly that Barnes found it profitable to sell his bee farm to Stevens for $ 50,000$. The sale contract provided that \"Barnes reserves the right to purchase all of the beeswax produced by Stevens during the next five years at the current market price at time of delivery, delivery and payment to be made at weekly intervals, and Stevens agrees to supply in any event a minimum of 100 pounds of beeswax per month during that period.\"' When the sale was closed, Barnes's lawyer handed Stevens's lawyer a letter stating: \"This is to notify you that I will take all of your beeswax production until further notice.\"' For one year, Stevens delivered to Barnes and Barnes paid for all of the beeswax produced by Stevens. During that year, Stevens, who was an expert beekeeper, increased his beeswax production by $100 \\%$ by increasing the number and productivity of the bees. Stevens then proposed to Barnes that, since he had doubled production, it would only be fair that he supply Barnes with half of his new total, but in any event a minimum of 100 pounds per month, leaving Stevens free to sell the remainder of the wax at higher prices for new uses being made of beeswax. Barnes, in a signed writing, agreed to the proposal by Stevens for the remaining period of the original contract. During the following year, Stevens delivered to Barnes, and Barnes paid for, one-half of all of the beeswax produced by Stevens. As the first year of the new contract ended, Stevens was stung by a bee and, due to an allergy, became so seriously and permanently ill and impaired as to be unable to attend to the bees. From that time on he never made another delivery to Barnes. Jones offered to testify that he looked up Smith's telephone number in the directory, called that number, and that a voice answered, \"This is Smith speaking.\" At this, Jones asked, \"Was that your horse that tramped across my cornfield this afternoon?\" The voice replied, \"Yes.\" The judge should rule the testimony:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because the answering speaker's identification of himself, together with the usual accuracy of the telephone directory and transmission system, furnishes sufficient authentication.\nB. Admissible, because judicial notice may be taken of the accuracy of telephone directories.\nC. Inadmissible unless Jones can further testify that he was familiar with Smith's voice and that it was in fact Smith to whom he spoke.\nD. Inadmissible unless Smith has first been asked whether or not the conversation took place and has been given the opportunity to admit, deny, or explain.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress provides by statute that any state that fails to prohibit automobile speeds of over 55 miles per hour on highways within the state shall be denied federal highway construction funding. The state of Atlantic, one of the richest and most highway-oriented states in the country, refuses to enact such a statute. Which of the following potential plaintiffs is most likely to be able to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of this federal statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. A taxpayer of the United States and the state of Atlantic who wants his state to get its fair share of his tax monies for highways, and fears that, if it does not, his state taxes will be increased to pay for the highway construction in the state of Atlantic that federal funds would have financed.\nB. Contractors who have been awarded contracts by the state of Atlantic for specified highway construction projects, which contracts are contingent on payment to the state of the federal funds to which it would otherwise be entitled. \nC. An automobile owner who lives in the state of Atlantic and regularly uses its highway system.\nD. An organization dedicated to keeping the federal government within the powers granted it by the Constitution.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paul sued Dave for making a slanderous statement that greatly embarrassed Paul. Dave denied that he ever made such a statement. At trial, Paul called Willie to the stand, and Willie testified that he heard Dave make the statement on August 4. Dave discredited Willie, and Park offers evidence of Willie's good reputation for truthfulness. The rehabilitation is most likely to be permitted if the discrediting evidence by Dave was testimony that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Willie and Paul had known each other since childhood. \nB. Willie had been convicted of perjury in an unrelated case.\nC. Willie had attended a school for mentally retarded children.\nD. Willie disliked Dave.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"All lawyers practicing in the state of Erewhon must be members of the State Bar Association, by order of the state supreme court. Several state officials serve on the Bar Association's Board of Bar Governors. The Board of Bar Governors authorizes the payment of dues for two staff members to the Cosmopolitan Club, a private dining club licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. The Cosmopolitan Club is frequented by affluent businessmen and professionals and by legislators. It is generally known that the purpose of the membership of the Bar Association staff is to enable them to go where members of the \"elite\" meet and to lobby for legislation in which the Bar Association is interested. The State Association has numerous committees and subcommittees concerned with family law, real estate law, unauthorized practice, etc., and its recommendations often influence state policy. Some committee meetings are held at the Cosmopolitan Club. The club is known to have rules which restrict membership by race, religion, and sex. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, who are members of the Erewhon Bar Association, petition the Board of Bar Governors to adopt a resolution prohibiting the payment of club dues to and the holding of meetings of the Bar Association or its committees at places that discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or sex. After substantial public discussion, the Board of Bar Governors, by a close vote, fails to pass such a resolution. These events receive extensive coverage in the local newspapers. Plaintiffs bring an action in federal court seeking an injunction against such payments and the holding of meetings in such places as the Cosmopolitan Club. The strongest argument for Plaintiffs is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Private rights to discriminate and associate freely must defer to a public interest against discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sex.\nB. The failure of the State Bar Association to pass a resolution forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or sex constitutes a denial of equal protection.\nC. The State Bar Association is an agency of the state and its payment of dues to such private clubs promotes discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and sex.\nD. The State Bar Association's payment of dues to such private clubs promotes discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and sex.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ortega owned Blackacre in fee simple and by his will specifically devised Blackacre as follows: \"To my daughter, Eugenia, her heirs and assigns, but if Eugenia dies survived by a husband, a child or children, then to Eugenia's husband during his lifetime with remainder to Eugenia's children, their heirs and assigns. Specifically provided, however, that if Eugenia dies survived by a husband and no child, Blackacre is specifically devised to my nephew, Luis, his heirs and assigns.\" While Ortega's will was in probate, Luis quitclaimed all his interest in Blackacre to Eugenia's husband, Jose. Three years later Eugenia died, survived by Jose but no children. Eugenia left a will devising her interest in Blackacre to Jose. The only applicable statute provides that any interest in land is freely alienable. Luis instituted an appropriate action against Jose to establish title to Blackacre. Judgment should be for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Luis, because his quitclaim deed did not transfer his after-acquired title.\nB. Luis, because Jose took nothing under Ortega's will.\nC. Jose, because Luis had effectively conveyed his interest to Jose.\nD. Jose, because the doctrine of after-acquired title applies to a devise by will.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Defendant, a worker in a metal working shop, had long been teasing Vincent, a young colleague, by calling him insulting names and ridiculing him. One day Vincent responded to the teasing by picking up a metal bar and attacking Defendant. Defendant could have escaped from the shop. He parried the blow with his left arm, and with his right hand struck Vincent a blow on his jaw from which the young man died. What is the most serious offense of which Defendant could be properly convicted?\n\nOptions:\nA. Involuntary manslaughter.\nB. Voluntary manslaughter.\nC. Murder.\nD. None of the above.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Three states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids it in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides, \"Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it.\" Snipe traps cost about $ 15$ each. Prentis is a resident of West Hampton and an ardent snipe trapper. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new improved snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, Prentis stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after Prentis admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply. For this question only, assume that a valid federal administrative rule, adopted under a federal consumer product safety act, regulates the design of snipe traps. The rule was issued to prevent traps from causing injury to human beings, e.g., by pinching fingers while persons were setting the traps. No other federal law applies. Which of the following best states the effect of the federal rule on the Midland state statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule regulates the same subject mattersnipe traps.\nB. The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule does not contain affirmative authorization for continued state regulation.\nC. The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the Midland state statute regulates wild animals, a field of exclusive state power.\nD. The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the purposes of the federal rule and the Midland state statute are different.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Hammond decided to kill his wife by poisoning her. He asked his friend, Jordan, a pharmacist, to obtain some curare, a deadly poison, and to give it to him without recording the transaction. Because Jordan suspected Hammond's motive, she supplied Hammond with a small quantity of Marvane, an antibiotic, instead of curare. Marvane is harmless if administered in small quantities, except for the less than $1 \\%$ of the population who are allergic to the drug. Hammond injected his wife with the Marvane while she slept. She was allergic to the drug and died from the injection. Jordan was distraught and confessed the entire affair to the police, explaining that she had failed to report Hammond's conduct to the authorities because she feared that it would end their friendship if she did. In a common law jurisdiction, Hammond is guilty of:\n\nOptions:\nA. Murder only.\nB. Murder and conspiracy.\nC. Attempted murder only.\nD. Attempted murder and conspiracy. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"One night after work, Dunken stopped in at a bar next to his place of employment to have a few drinks before heading home. While there, he became intoxicated. Upon leaving the bar, Dunken decided that he would drive home rather than walk. Dunken went next door to a used car lot to take a car to drive home. However, Dunken discovered that there were no keys in any of the cars. He then broke into the main office of the used car lot where he surmised correctly that the keys would be kept. As he left the office with keys to one of the cars, Dunken saw a security guard coming toward him. Dunken pushed the guard to the side as he ran past. The guard fell back, hit his head on the pavement, and died. Dunken then climbed into the car and drove away. On his way home, he was so intoxicated that he missed his exit. Making an illegal u-turn to go back, he struck a car legally parked on the side of the road, killing its occupant. Relevant statutes extend burglary to include buildings not used as a dwelling. First degree murder is defined as \"the premeditated and intentional killing of another or a killing during commission of a rape, robbery, burglary, or arson.\" Second degree murder is defined as all murders that are not first degree murder. The Sisters of Charity's interest can best be described as:\n\nOptions:\nA. A contingent remainder.\nB. A vested remainder subject to total divestment.\nC. An executory interest.\nD. Nothing.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Floribama has recently had a problem with people dealing in, and with, its booming garment industry. The use of independent contractors by major garment makers, most of whom were headquartered out of state, had led to the hiring of illegal aliens to work under conditions reminiscent of 19 th century sweatshops. The legislature of Floribama enacted a statute to remedy the situation and to protect its citizens against the problems in the future. The statute provides: I. That all garment makers must be licensed by the state attorney general. II. That all subcontractors (defined separately in the statute) must be separately licensed by the attorney general and must have been a citizen of the United States for five years and a resident of Floribama for one year. For this question only, assume that Ohner and Byer were bound by a contract for the sale of lot 101 for $ 5,000$, that on May 3 Ohner telephoned Byer and stated that because he had just discovered that a shopping center was going to be erected adjacent to the Grove subdivision, he would \"need to have $ 6,000$ for each of the lots including lot $101, \"$ that Byer thereupon agreed to pay him $ 6,000$ for lot 101 , and that on May 6, Byer telegraphed, \"Accept your offer with respect to the rest of the lots.\" Assuming that two contracts were formed and that there is no controlling statute, Byer will most likely be required to pay:\n\nOptions:\nA. Only $ 5,000$ for each of the 50 lots.\nB. Only $ 5,000$ for lot 101 , but $ 6,000$ for the remaining 49 lots.\nC. $ 6,000$ for each of the 50 lots.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Farquart had made a legally binding promise to furnish his son Junior and Junior's fiancee a house on their wedding day, planned for June 10 of the following year. Pursuant to that promise, Farquart telephoned his old contractor-friend Sawtooth and made the following oral agreement-each making full and accurate written notes thereof: Sawtooth was to cut 30 trees into fireplace logs from a specified portion of a certain one-acre plot owned by Farquart, and Farquart was to pay therefor $ 20$ per tree. Sawtooth agreed further to build a house on the plot conforming to the specifications of Plan OP5 published by Builders, Inc. for a construction price of $ 18,000$. Farquart agreed to make payments of $ 2,000$ on the first of every month for nine months beginning August 1 upon monthly presentation of a certificate by Builders, Inc. that the specifications of Plan OP5 were being met. Sawtooth delivered the cut logs to Farquart in July, when he also began building the house. Farquart made three $ 2,000$ payments for the work done in July, August, and September, without requiring a certificate. Sawtooth worked through October, but no work was done from November 1 to the end of February because of bad weather; and Farquart made no payments during that period. Sawtooth did not object. On March 1, Sawtooth demanded payment of $ 2,000$; but Farquart refused on the grounds that no construction work had been done for four months and Builders had issued no certificate. Sawtooth thereupon abandoned work and repudiated the agreement. What was the probable legal effect of the following? I. Sawtooth's failure to object to Farquart's making no payments on November 1, December 1, January 1 , and February 1. II. Farquart's making payments in August through October without requiring a certificate from Builders.\n\nOptions:\nA. Estoppel-type waiver as to both I. and II.\nB. Waiver of delay in payment as to I. and revocable waiver as to II. \nC. Mutual rescission of the contract by I. combined with II.\nD. Discharge of Farquart's duty to make the four payments as to I. and estoppel-type waiver as to II.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A federal statute requires United States civil service employees to retire at age 75 . However, that statute also states that civil service employees of the armed forces must retire at age 65 . Prentis, a 65-year-old civil service employee of the Department of the Army, seeks a declaratory judgment that would forbid his mandatory retirement until age 75 . The strongest argument that Prentis can make to invalidate the requirement that he retire at age 65 is that the law: \n\nOptions:\nA. Denies him a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.\nB. Deprives him of a property right without just compensation.\nC. Is not within the scope of any of the enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, Section 8.\nD. Invidiously discriminates against him on the basis of age in violation of the Fifth Amendment.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The President of the United States recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government through the Secretary of State. Ruritania is governed by a repressive totalitarian government. In an appropriate federal court, Dunn brings a suit against the President and Secretary of State to set aside this action on the ground that it is inconsistent with the principles of our constitutional form of government. Dunn has a lucrative contract with the United States Department of Commerce to provide commercial information about Ruritania. The contract expressly terminates, however, \"when the President recognizes the country of Ruritania and undertakes diplomatic relations with its government.\" Which of the following is the most proper disposition of the Dunn suit by the federal court?\n\nOptions:\nA. Suit dismissed, because Dunn does not have standing to bring this action.\nB. Suit dismissed, because there is no adversity between Dunn and the defendants.\nC. Suit dismissed, because it presents a nonjusticiable political question.\nD. Suit decided on the merits.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress enacts a criminal statute prohibiting \"any person from interfering in any way with any right conferred on another person by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\" Application of this statute to Jones, a private citizen, would be most clearly constitutional if Jones, with threats of violence, coerces:\n\nOptions:\nA. A public school teacher to exclude black pupils from her class, solely because of their race.\nB. Black pupils, solely because of their race, to refrain from attending a privately owned and operated school licensed by the state.\nC. The bus driver operating a free school bus service under the sponsorship of a local church to refuse to allow black pupils on the bus, solely because of their race.\nD. The federal official in charge of distributing certain federal benefits directly to students from distributing them to black pupils, solely because of their race. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Technix, Inc. produces the most up-to-date, high-speed mainframe computers on the market, and Cruncher Corporation is on the cutting edge of data storage technology. Technix and Cruncher contracted to purchase\/sell a \"Yellow Giant\" computer. The written contract stated that Cruncher would purchase \"one Technix 'Yellow Giant' computer at a price of $ 175,000$.\" At the time, the going price for Yellow Giant computers was $ 150,000$. When Technix delivered a Yellow Giant on the specified date, Cruncher refused to accept delivery and refused to pay. Technix sued Cruncher for breach, claiming that its expensive computers were manufactured to order and so it was forced to dispose of the Yellow Giant at a price far below fair market value. In defending the suit, Cruncher's president wishes to testify that Cruncher rejected the Yellow Giant because both parties knew that Cruncher really wanted a \"Purple Giant,\" a machine much faster than the Yellow Giant, but which the parties agreed would be called in the contract a \"Yellow Giant\" to keep competitors in the dark as to Cruncher's new capabilities, and that the parties had executed contracts in the past that had specified a less powerful computer than the model that was actually delivered. Should the testimony of Cruncher's president be admitted?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Cruncher is entitled to reformation of the contract.\nB. Yes, because the president's testimony would explain the meaning of a disputed contract term.\nC. No, because the parol evidence rule applies and the president's testimony contradicts a term in the written contract.\nD. No, because the Statute of Frauds applies, since the contract is for a large amount of money.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Which of the following is least likely to be the underlying felony in a prosecution for felony murder?\n\nOptions:\nA. Arson.\nB. Manslaughter.\nC. Attempted rape.\nD. Burglary.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Potts, a building contractor, sued Dennis for failure to pay on a small cost-plus construction contract. At trial, Potts, who personally supervised all of the work, seeks to testify to what he remembers about the amount of pipe used, the number of workers used on the job, and the number of hours spent grading. Dennis objects on the ground that Potts had routinely recorded these facts in notebooks which are in Potts's possession. Potts's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as a report of regularly conducted business activity.\nB. Admissible as based on firsthand knowledge.\nC. Inadmissible, because it violates the best evidence rule.\nD. Inadmissible, because a summary of writings cannot be made unless the originals are available for examination.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Fernwood Realty Company developed a residential development, known as the Fernwood Development, which included single-family dwellings, town houses, and high-rise apartments for a total of 25,000 dwelling units. Included in the deed to each unit was a covenant under which the grantee and the grantee's \"heirs and assigns\" agreed to purchase electrical power only from a plant Fernwood promised to build and maintain within the development. Fernwood constructed the plant and the necessary power lines. The plant did not supply power outside the development. An appropriate and fair formula was used to determine price. After constructing and selling 12,500 of the units, Fernwood sold its interest in the development to Gaint Realty Investors. Gaint operated the power plant and constructed and sold the remaining 12,500 units. Each conveyance from Gaint contained the same covenant relating to electrical power that Fernwood had included in the 12,500 conveyances it had made. Page bought a dwelling unit from Olm, who had purchased it from Fernwood. Subsequently, Page, whose lot was along the boundary of the Fernwood development, ceased buying electrical power from Gaint and began purchasing power from General Power Company, which provided such service in the area surrounding the Fernwood development. Both General Power and Gaint have governmental authorization to provide electrical services to the area. Gaint instituted an appropriate action against Page to enjoin her from obtaining electrical power from General Power. If judgment is for Page, it most likely will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. The covenant does not touch and concern the land.\nB. The mixture of types of residential units is viewed as preventing one common development scheme.\nC. The covenant is a restraint on alienation.\nD. There is no privity of estate between Page and Gaint.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pullen used aluminum brackets in her business. On the telephone listed as hers in the telephone book, Pullen received a call in which the caller said, \"This is John Denison of Denison Hardware Company. We have a special on aluminum brackets this week at $30 \\%$ off.\" Pullen ordered brackets from the caller. When the brackets were never delivered, Pullen sued Denison for breach of contract. At trial, Denison, who denies having made the telephone call, objects to Pullen's testimony concerning it. When asked, Pullen testifies that, aside from the telephone call, she had never heard Denison speak until she met him in the judge's chambers before the trial and that, in her opinion, the voice on the telephone was Denison's. The strongest argument for admission of Pullen's testimony concerning the telephone call is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The call related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.\nB. The call was received at a number assigned to Pullen by the telephone company.\nC. After hearing Denison speak in chambers, Pullen recognized Denison's voice as that of the person on the telephone.\nD. Self-identification is sufficient authentication of a telephone call. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ben contracted to buy Woodacre, a parcel of land, from Owen, with deed to be delivered and money paid on August 1 . Ben planned to build a high-rise building on Woodacre. Ben had visually inspected the land, but did not take any special notice of the fact that a stream flowed up to the eastern property line of Woodacre and reappeared just beyond the western property line. In fact, there was a conduit under the surface of Woodacre through which the waters of the stream were diverted. On July 28 , one of Ben's friends mentioned the existence of the conduit to Ben. Ben was amazed, and when Owen tendered a deed to Woodacre on August 1, Ben refused to accept it, stating, \"I wouldn't have tried to buy Woodacre if I'd known about that conduit.\" Owen files suit, demanding performance by Ben or damages for breach. Who should prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Owen, because Ben had ample opportunity to discover the existence of the conduit before he agreed to buy Woodacre.\nB. Owen, because the purpose for which Ben intended to use Woodacre is irrelevant.\nC. Ben, because Owen had a duty to provide a marketable title.\nD. Ben, because of the doctrine of frustration of purpose.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"After being notified by Dr. Josephs that Nurse Norris's employment with his office was terminated, Norris applied for a position with Hospital. In her application, Norris listed her former employment with Josephs. Josephs, in response to a telephone inquiry from Hospital, stated that \"Norris lacked professional competence.\" Although Josephs believed that to be a fair assessment of Norris, his adverse rating was based on one episode of malpractice for which he blamed Norris but which in fact was chargeable to another doctor. Because of Josephs's adverse comment on her qualifications, Norris was not employed by Hospital. If Norris asserts a claim based on defamation against Josephs, will Norris prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Josephs was mistaken in the facts on which he based his opinion of Norris's competence.\nB. Yes, because Josephs's statement reflected adversely on Norris's professional competence.\nC. No, if Norris authorized Hospital to make inquiry of her former employer.\nD. No, if Josephs had reasonable grounds for his belief that Norris was not competent.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Allen and Barker are equal tenants in common of a strip of land 10 feet wide and 100 feet deep which lies between the lots on which their respective homes are situated. Both Allen and Barker need the use of the 10 -foot strip as a driveway; and each fears that a new neighbor might seek partition and leave him with an unusable five-foot strip. The best measure to solve their problem is:\n\nOptions:\nA. A covenant against partition.\nB. An indenture granting cross-easements in the undivided half interest of each.\nC. A partition into two separate five-foot-wide strips and an indenture granting crosseasements.\nD. A trust to hold the strip in perpetuity.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pursuant to a state statute, Clovis applied for tuition assistance to attend the Institute of Liberal Arts. He was qualified for such assistance in every way except that he was a resident alien who did not intend to become a United States citizen. The state's restriction of such grants to United States citizens or resident aliens seeking such citizenship is probably:\n\nOptions:\nA. Valid, because aliens are not per se \"a discrete and insular minority\" specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\nB. Valid, because the line drawn by the state for extending aid was reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.\nC. Invalid, because the justifications for this restriction are insufficient to overcome the burden imposed on a state when it uses such an alienage classification.\nD. Invalid, because the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV does not permit such an arbitrary classification. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Light Company is the sole distributor of electrical power in City. The company owns and maintains all of the electric poles and equipment in City. Light Company has complied with the National Electrical Safety Code, which establishes minimum requirements for the installation and maintenance of power poles. The Code has been approved by the federal and state governments. Light Company has had to replace insulators on its poles repeatedly because unknown persons repeatedly shoot at and destroy them. This causes the power lines to fall to the ground. On one of these occasions, Paul, Faber's five-yearold son, wandered out of Faber's yard, intentionally touched a downed wire, and was seriously burned. If a claim on Paul's behalf is asserted against Light Company, the probable result is that Paul will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover if Light Company could have taken reasonable steps to prevent the lines from falling when the insulators were destroyed.\nB. Recover, because a supplier of electricity is strictly liable in tort.\nC. Not recover unless Light Company failed to exercise reasonable care to stop the destruction of the insulators.\nD. Not recover, because the destruction of the insulators was intentional. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Vincent was engaged in a telephone conversation with Walter. At one point in the conversation, Vincent said to Walter, \"There's my doorbell. Hold the line a minute while I go see who it is.\" Two minutes later Vincent returned to the phone. He told Walter, \"Dornbach is here. I'll have to hang up. Talk to you later.\" The next morning, Vincent's housekeeper found him dead and obviously the victim of foul play. Dornbach was arrested and charged with Vincent's murder. The prosecution seeks to have Walter testify at Dornbach's trial as to Walter's telephone conversation with Vincent. The prosecution's attempt is met by an objection from the defense. How should the court rule on Walter's testimony?\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, as a present sense impression.\nB. Admissible, as evidence of the victim's state of mind.\nC. Admissible, as a prior identification.\nD. Inadmissible, as hearsay not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In the recently enacted Fair Opportunity Act, the United States Congress provided, among other things, that an employer whose products are in any way used by or sold to the federal government must meet certain very specific standards for integration of its workforce and affirmative action programs. Both civil and criminal penalties are established for violation of the Act, and it permits private civil suits for injunctive relief or for damages to enforce its provisions. The city of Davis, California also enacted a jobs opportunity ordinance effective the same year, requiring that any employer doing business with the city have a workforce consonant with the ethnic and gender composition of the population of the city. The local ordinance permits employers to apply for exemptions from its requirements if they can demonstrate that the pool of potential qualified employees has a different mix of ethnicity or gender than the general population. The population of Davis is approximately $55 \\%$ female and $45 \\%$ male, $75 \\%$ white, $10 \\%$ Asian, 7\\% black, 7\\% Hispanic, and $1 \\%$ other ethnic backgrounds. Watson Janitorial Service, a private employer located in the city of Davis, does contract cleaning and maintenance for both the local United States Department of Agriculture office and for the City Jail. Its workforce is $95 \\%$ male, $55 \\%$ black, $40 \\%$ Hispanic, and $5 \\%$ other ethnic backgrounds. The city of Davis notified the company that it would either have to bring its workforce into compliance with the local job opportunity ordinance or its contract with the City Jail would be terminated. The United States Department of Justice has notified Watson Janitorial that it meets the guidelines of the Fair Opportunity Act, and that the contract with the Department of Agriculture is not in jeopardy. 6. Watson Janitorial brings an action in state court to enjoin enforcement of the Davis ordinance. It argues that the local rule is invalid since it conflicts with the federal statute by creating more stringent standards. The trial court should rule: (A) There is no conflict, since Congress intended only that the Fair Opportunity Act apply to employers who dealt exclusively with the federal government. (B) There is no conflict, since Davis is permitted to impose more strict requirements to a local problem than those established by the federal government. (C) The federal act preempts the local ordinance and thus the latter cannot be enforced. (D) The federal act preempts the local ordinance only insofar as it attempts to regulate employers who do business with the federal government, so the ordinance may not be enforced only as to Watson Janitorial, but is otherwise valid. Jordan is an accomplice to:\n\nOptions:\nA. Murder.\nB. Manslaughter.\nC. Criminally negligent homicide.\nD. No degree of criminal homicide.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On May 1, Ohner telegraphed Byer, \"Will sell you any or all of the lots in Grove subdivision at $ 5,000$ each. Details follow in letter.\" The letter contained all the necessary details concerning terms of payment, insurance, mortgages, etc., and provided, \"This offer remains open until June 1.' On May 2, after he had received the telegram but before he had received the letter, Byer telegraphed Ohner, \"Accept your offer with respect to lot 101.\" Both parties knew that there were 50 lots in the Grove subdivision and that they were numbered 101 through 150 . For this question only, assume that on May 6, Byer telegraphed Ohner, \"Will take the rest of the lots,\" and that on May 8, Ohner discovered that he did not have good title to the remaining lots. Which of the following would provide the best legal support to Ohner's contention that he was not liable for breach of contract as to the remaining 49 lots?\n\nOptions:\nA. Impossibility of performance.\nB. Unilateral mistake as to basic assumption.\nC. Termination of the offer by Byer's having first contracted to buy lot 101 .\nD. Excuse by failure of an implied condition precedent.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state accredits both public and private schools, licenses their teachers, and supplies textbooks on secular subjects to all such schools. Country Schoolhouse, a private school that offers elementary and secondary education in the state, denies admission to all non-Caucasians. In a suit to enjoin as unconstitutional the continued racially exclusionary admissions policy of the Country Schoolhouse, which of the following is the strongest argument against the school?\n\nOptions:\nA. Because education is a public function, the Country Schoolhouse may not discriminate on racial grounds.\nB. The state is so involved in school regulation and support that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the school.\nC. The state is constitutionally obligated to eliminate segregation in all public and private educational institutions within the state.\nD. Any school with teachers who are licensed by the state is forbidden to discriminate on racial grounds.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress passes a law regulating the wholesale and retail prices of \"every purchase or sale of oil, natural gas, and electric power made in the United States.\" The strongest argument in support of the constitutionality of this statute is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The Constitution expressly empowers Congress to enact laws for \"the general welfare.\"\nB. Congress has the authority to regulate such products' interstate transportation and importation from abroad.\nC. Congress may regulate the prices of every purchase and sale of goods and services made in this country, because commerce includes buying and selling.\nD. In inseverable aggregates, the domestic purchases or sales of such products affect interstate or foreign commerce.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"While crossing Spruce Street, Pesko was hit by a car that she did not see. Pesko sued Dorry for her injuries. At trial, Pesko calls Williams, a police officer, to testify that, 10 minutes after the accident, a driver stopped him and said, \"Officer, a few minutes ago I saw a hit-and-run accident on Spruce Street involving a blue convertible, which I followed to the drive-in restaurant at Oak and Third,\" and that a few seconds later Williams saw Dorry sitting alone in a blue convertible in the drive-in restaurant's parking lot. Williams's testimony about the driver's statement should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted as a statement of recent perception.\nB. Admitted as a present sense impression.\nC. Excluded, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Excluded, because it is more prejudicial than probative.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Miller applied to the state liquor board for transfer of the license of Miller's Bar and Grill to a new site. The board held a hearing on the application. At that hearing, Hammond appeared without being subpoenaed and stated that Miller had underworld connections. Although Hammond did not know this information to be true, he had heard rumors about Miller's character and had noticed several underworld figures going in and out of Miller's Bar and Grill. In fact, Miller had no underworld connections. In a claim against Hammond based on defamation, Miller will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not recover if Hammond reasonably believed his statement to be true.\nB. Not recover if the board granted Miller's application.\nC. Recover, because Hammond's statement was false.\nD. Recover, because Hammond appeared before the board voluntarily.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In litigation over the estate of Baggs, who died intestate, Payton, who is 18 years old, claimed to be Baggs's niece and entitled, therefore, to a share of his large estate. In support of her claim, Payton offered in evidence a Bible, properly identified as having belonged to Baggs's family, in the front of which was a list of family births, marriages, and deaths. The list recorded Payton's birth to Baggs's oldest sister. To prove that Payton is Baggs's niece, the Bible listing is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as an ancient document.\nB. Admissible as a family record.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because there was no showing of firsthand knowledge by the one who wrote it.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Professor Peterson, an expert on American Colonial and Revolutionary History, conducted full-day tours through the historic sites of Philadelphia every Wednesday and Thursday through the summer months. Peterson's fee for his services was $ 105$, which did not include the entrance fees for several of the historical sites. Other persons and organizations conducted various American history tours through the city for somewhat less than Peterson, but Peterson's tour was generally rated the best by the leading tourist guidebooks because Peterson personally conducted the tours and shared his encyclopedic knowledge of American history and the city of Philadelphia. David had recently moved to Philadelphia, and all of his co-workers praised Professor Peterson's tour, but David was not inclined to pay $ 105$ for a tour of the historical sites of his new city. Therefore, David took a day off one Thursday and \"hung around\" the Liberty Bell monument, where Peterson's tour started. That day Peterson was conducting 27 persons on the tour. Most of the participants had paid in advance, but Peterson was holding up a sign with information about the tour and handing out brochures, one of which David took. Peterson accepted a few additional participants who signed up on the spot, but David was not among them. All day long, David hung around at the fringe of this group, paying the entrance fees separately but following the group through the different historical sites. However, he always positioned himself close enough to Peterson's group so that he could hear virtually every word of Peterson's lecture, although David did not ask Peterson any questions. David signed his name and address on the register at Independence Hall. Peterson noted this and took down the information. Two days after the tour concluded, David received a bill from Peterson in the amount of $ 105$. David will most likely be required to pay Peterson: \n\nOptions:\nA. $ 105$, because that is the contract price for the tour.\nB. $ 105$, because the amount of the contract was less than $ 500$, making the Statute of Frauds inapplicable.\nC. $ 105$, if that is a reasonable fee for the lectures based on Peterson's expertise.\nD. Nothing, because the historical sites were open to the public and David paid his own way.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"While on walking patrol in a commercial district in the early evening, Officer Murdoch noticed that a light was on in Walker's Machine Shop. Curious about what was going on inside, the officer tried to look through the window of the shop, but it had been painted on the inside so that only a strip about three inches at the top, eight feet above street level, was still transparent. Officer Murdoch quietly brought two trash cans from a neighboring business over to the window, stood on them and saw, through the strip of unpainted window, that the shop owner's son Tommy was inside with a friend, sucking white powder into his nose through a rolled up tube of paper from off a small mirror. Recognizing from his experience and training that Tommy was snorting cocaine, Officer Murdoch knocked at the front door to the shop, and Tommy let him in. Murdoch immediately arrested Tommy and his friend. In the back room of the shop through whose window he had peered, Murdoch found and seized several grams of cocaine, a razor blade, and a mirror. In Tommy's subsequent prosecution for possession of cocaine, Tommy seeks to bar introduction of the cocaine, mirror, and razor blade into evidence. His motion will probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Granted, because Officer Murdoch could not have known that Tommy was snorting cocaine absent a chemical test of the substance being snorted.\nB. Granted, because Officer Murdoch violated Tommy's reasonable expectation of privacy.\nC. Denied, because the search was incident to a valid arrest.\nD. Denied, because Tommy consented to Officer Murdoch's entry into the shop. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Downs was indicted in state court for bribing a public official. During the course of the investigation, police had demanded and received from Downs's bank the records of Downs's checking account for the preceding two years. The records contained incriminating evidence. On the basis of a claim of violation of his constitutional rights, Downs moves to prevent the introduction of the records in evidence. His motion should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Granted, because a search warrant should have been secured for seizure of the records.\nB. Granted, because the records covered such an extensive period of time that their seizure unreasonably invaded Downs's right of privacy.\nC. Denied, because the potential destructibility of the records, coupled with the public interest in proper enforcement of the criminal laws, created an exigent situation justifying the seizure.\nD. Denied, because the records were business records of the bank in which Downs had no legitimate expectation of privacy.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Nolan was negligently driving down the road, not paying attention to where he was going. Because of this, he hit and seriously injured Sue, who was lawfully crossing the street. The accident was witnessed by Martha, who suffered extreme emotional distress that physically affected her nervous system. Martha brings suit against Nolan for negligent infliction of emotional distress in a jurisdiction that has not adopted the \"foreseeability\" test for this tort. The most likely result of the suit will be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Martha will win, because she witnessed Sue being seriously injured by Nolan.\nB. Martha will win, because severe shock to the nervous system constitutes a physical injury.\nC. Martha will lose, unless she was crossing the street with Sue.\nD. Martha will lose, unless she was a close relative of Sue. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"At a time when Ogawa held Lot 1 in the Fairoaks subdivision in fee simple, Vine executed a warranty deed that recited that Vine conveyed Lot 1, Fairoaks, to Purvis. The deed was promptly and duly recorded. After the recording of the deed from Vine to Purvis, Ogawa conveyed Lot 1 to Vine by a warranty deed that was promptly and duly recorded. Later, Vine conveyed the property to Rand by warranty deed and the deed was promptly and duly recorded. Rand paid the fair market value of Lot 1 and had no knowledge of any claim of Purvis. In an appropriate action, Rand and Purvis contest title to Lot 1 . In this action, judgment should be for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Purvis, because Purvis's deed is senior to Rand's.\nB. Rand, because Rand paid value without notice of Purvis's claim.\nC. Purvis or Rand, depending on whether a subsequent grantee is bound, at common law, by the doctrine of estoppel by deed.\nD. Purvis or Rand, depending on whether Purvis's deed is deemed recorded in Rand's chain of title.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In 1980 Omar, the owner in fee simple absolute, conveyed Stoneacre, a five-acre tract of land. The relevant, operative words of the deed conveyed to \"Church [a duly organized religious body having power to hold property] for the life of my son, Carl, and from and after the death of my said son, Carl, to all of my grandchildren and their heirs and assigns in equal shares; provided that Church shall use the premises for church purposes only.\" In an existing building on Stoneacre, Church immediately began to conduct religious services and other activities normally associated with a church. In 1995, Church granted to Darin a right to remove sand and gravel from a one-half acre portion of Stoneacre upon the payment of royalty. Darin has regularly removed sand and gravel since 1995 and paid a royalty to Church. Church has continued to conduct religious services and other church activities on Stoneacre. All four of the living grandchildren of Omar, joined by a guardian ad litem to represent unborn grandchildren, instituted suit against Church and Darin seeking damages for the removal of sand and gravel and an injunction preventing further acts of removal. There is no applicable statute. Which of the following best describes the likely disposition of this lawsuit?\n\nOptions:\nA. The plaintiffs should succeed, because the interest of Church terminated with the first removal of sand and gravel.\nB. Church and Darin should be enjoined, and damages should be recovered but impounded for future distribution.\nC. The injunction should be granted, but damages should be denied, because Omar and Carl are not parties to the action.\nD. Damages should be awarded, but the injunction should be denied.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"According to a statute of the state of Kiowa, a candidate for state office may have his name placed on the official election ballot only if he files with the appropriate state official a petition containing a specified number of voter signatures. Roderick failed to get his name placed on the state ballot as an independent candidate for governor because he failed to file a petition with the number of voter signatures required by state statute. In a suit against the appropriate state officials in federal district court, Roderick sought an injunction against the petition signature requirement on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Which of the following, if established, constitutes the strongest argument for Roderick?\n\nOptions:\nA. Compliance with the petition signature requirement is burdensome.\nB. The objectives of the statute could be satisfactorily achieved by less burdensome means.\nC. Because of the petition signature requirement, very few independent candidates have ever succeeded in getting on the ballot.\nD. The motivation for the statute was a desire to keep candidates off the ballot if they did not have strong support among voters. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress passes an act requiring that all owners of bicycles in the United States register them with a federal bicycle registry. The purpose of the law is to provide reliable evidence of ownership to reduce bicycle theft. No fee is charged for the registration. Although most stolen bicycles are kept or resold by the thieves in the same cities in which the bicycles were stolen, an increasing number of bicycles are being taken to cities in other states for resale. Is this act of Congress constitutional?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Congress has the power to regulate property for the general welfare.\nB. Yes, because Congress could determine that, in inseverable aggregates, bicycle thefts affect interstate commerce.\nC. No, because most stolen bicycles remain within the state in which they were stolen.\nD. No, because the registration of vehicles is a matter reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Talbot and Rogers, as lessees, signed a valid lease for a house. Lane, the landlord, duly executed the lease and delivered possession of the premises to the lessees. During the term of the lease, Rogers verbally invited Andrews to share the house with the lessees. Andrews agreed to pay part of the rent to Lane, who did not object to this arrangement, despite a provision in the lease that provided that \"any assignment, subletting or transfer of any rights under this lease without the express written consent of the landlord is strictly prohibited, null and void.\" Talbot objected to Andrews's moving in, even if Andrews were to pay a part of the rent. When Andrews moved in, Talbot brought an appropriate action against Lane, Rogers, and Andrews for a declaratory judgment that Rogers had no right to assign. Rogers's defense was that he and Talbot were tenants in common of a term for years, and that he, Rogers, had a right to assign a fractional interest in his undivided onehalf interest. In this action, Talbot will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, because a co-tenant has no right to assign all or any part of a leasehold without the consent of all interested parties.\nB. Prevail, because the lease provision prohibits assignment.\nC. Not prevail, because he is not the beneficiary of the nonassignment provision in the lease.\nD. Not prevail, because his claim amounts to a void restraint on alienation.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"John Smith has denied his purported signature on a letter that has become critical in a breach of contract suit between Smith and Miller. At trial, Miller's counsel calls Alice, a teacher, who testifies that she taught John Smith mathematics in school 10 years earlier, knows his signature, and proposes to testify that the signature to the letter is that of John Smith. Smith's counsel objects. The trial judge should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustain the objection on the ground that identification of handwriting requires expert testimony and the teacher does not, per se, qualify as an expert.\nB. Sustain the objection on the ground that the best evidence of Smith's handwriting would be testimony by a person who had examined his writing more recently than 10 years ago.\nC. Overrule the objection on the ground that a schoolteacher qualifies as an expert witness for the purpose of identifying handwriting.\nD. Overrule the objection on the ground that a layman may identify handwriting if he has seen the person in question write, and has an opinion concerning the writing in question. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A statute in a jurisdiction makes it a crime to sell ammunition to a minor (defined as a person under the age of 18). The courts have interpreted this statute as creating a strict liability offense that does not require knowledge of the age of the purchaser and as creating vicarious liability. Duncan, who was 16 years old, but looked four or five years older, entered a store owned by Mathews and asked a clerk for a box of .22 caliber shells. Mathews had instructed her employees not to sell ammunition to minors. The clerk asked Duncan his age. Duncan said he was 20 . The clerk then placed a box of shells on the counter and asked, \"Anything else?\" Duncan said that was all he wanted but then discovered he did not have enough money to pay for the shells, so the clerk put the box back onto the shelf. If Mathews, the owner of the store, is charged with attempting to violate the statute, her best argument would be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. It was impossible for the sale to have occurred.\nB. She had strictly instructed her employees not to sell ammunition to minors.\nC. Duncan lied about his age.\nD. The clerk did not have the mental state needed for attempt. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In 1975, Hubert Green executed his will which in pertinent part provided, \"I hereby give, devise, and bequeath Greenvale to my surviving widow for life, remainder to such of my children as shall live to attain the age of 30 years, but if any child dies under the age of 30 years survived by a child or children, such child or children shall take and receive the share which his, her, or their parent would have received had such parent lived to attain the age of 30 years.\" At the date of writing his will, Green was married to Susan, and they had two children, Allan and Beth. Susan died in 1980 and Hubert married Waverly in 1982. At his death in 1990 , Green was survived by his wife, Waverly, and three children, Allan, Beth, and Carter. Carter, who was born in 1984, was his child by Waverly. In a jurisdiction that recognizes the common law Rule Against Perpetuities unmodified by statute, the result of the application of the Rule is that the:\n\nOptions:\nA. Remainder to the children and to the grandchildren is void because Green could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time Green executed his will.\nB. Remainder to the children is valid, but the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren is void because Green could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time Green executed his will.\nC. Gift in remainder to Allan and Beth or their children is valid, but the gift to Carter or his children is void.\nD. Remainder to the children and the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren are valid.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Defendant was charged with murder. His principal defense was that he had killed in hot blood and should be guilty only of manslaughter. The judge instructed the jury that the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing was presumed to be murder, and that the charge could be reduced to manslaughter, and Defendant accordingly found guilty of this lesser offense, if Defendant showed by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the killing was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Defendant was convicted of murder. On appeal, he seeks a new trial and claims error in the judge's instructions to the jury. Defendant's conviction will most probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Affirmed, because the judge carefully advised the jury of the state's obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nB. Affirmed, because Defendant's burden to show hot blood was not one of ultimate persuasion but only one of producing evidence to rebut a legitimate presumption.\nC. Reversed, because the instruction put a burden on Defendant that denied him due process of law.\nD. Reversed, because presumptions have a highly prejudicial effect and thus cannot be used on behalf of the state in a criminal case.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Brown contended that Green owed him $ 6,000$. Green denied that he owed Brown anything. Tired of the dispute, Green eventually signed a promissory note by which he promised to pay Brown $ 5,000$ in settlement of their dispute. In an action by Brown against Green on the promissory note, which of the following, if true, would afford Green the best defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. Although Brown honestly believed that $ 6,000$ was owed by Green, Green knew that it was not owed.\nB. Although Brown knew that the debt was not owed, Green honestly was in doubt whether it was owed.\nC. The original claim was based on an oral agreement, which the Statute of Frauds required to be in writing.\nD. The original claim was an action on a contract, which was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Rimm and Hill were fooling around with a pistol in Hill's den. Rimm aimed the pistol in Hill's direction and fired three shots slightly to Hill's right. One shot ricocheted off the wall and struck Hill in the back, killing him instantly. The most serious crime of which Rimm can be convicted is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Murder.\nB. Voluntary manslaughter.\nC. Involuntary manslaughter.\nD. Assault with a dangerous weapon.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alpha and Beta made a written contract pursuant to which Alpha promised to convey a specified apartment house to Beta in return for Beta's promise (1) to convey a 100 -acre farm to Alpha and (2) to pay Alpha $ 1,000$ in cash six months after the exchange of the apartment house and the farm. The contract contained the following provision: \"It is understood and agreed that Beta's obligation to pay the $ 1,000$ six months after the exchange of the apartment house and the farm shall be voided if Alpha has not, within three months after the aforesaid exchange, removed the existing shed in the parking area in the rear of the said apartment house.\" Federal taxpayer Allen challenges the provision that allows the distribution of free textbooks to students in a private school where religious instruction is included in the curriculum. On the question of the adequacy of Allen's standing to raise the constitutional question, the most likely result is that standing will be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because any congressional spending authorization can be challenged by any taxpayer.\nB. Sustained, because the challenge to the exercise of congressional spending power is based on a claimed violation of specific constitutional limitations on the exercise of such power.\nC. Denied, because there is insufficient nexus between the taxpayer and the challenged expenditures.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $ 1$ million in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label \"Premium Vintage-Bouquet.\" The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility. 81. If Vintage refuses to distribute the wine through Claret and Claret then sues Vintage for breach of contract, is it likely that Claret will prevail? (A) Yes, because Vintage's performance was to run to Claret rather than to Bouquet. (B) Yes, because Bouquet and Vintage could reasonably foresee that Claret would change his position in reliance on the contract. (C) No, because Bouquet and Vintage did not expressly agree that Claret would have enforceable rights under their contract. (D) No, because Bouquet and Vintage, having no apparent motive to benefit Claret, appeared in making the contract to have been protecting or serving only their own interests. For this question only, assume the following facts. Amicusbank lent Bouquet $ 200,000$ and Bouquet executed a written instrument providing that Amicusbank \"is entitled to collect the debt from my share of the profits, if any, under the Vintage-Bouquet contract.\" Amicusbank gave prompt notice of this transaction to Vintage. If Vintage thereafter refuses to account for any profits to Amicusbank and Amicusbank sues Vintage for Bouquet's share of profits then realized, Vintage's strongest argument in defense is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The Bouquet-Vintage contract did not expressly authorize an assignment of rights.\nB. Bouquet and Vintage are partners, not simply debtor and creditor.\nC. Amicusbank is not an assignee of Bouquet's rights under the BouquetVintage contract.\nD. Amicusbank is not an intended thirdparty beneficiary of the BouquetVintage contract.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dino purchased a new Belchfire automobile from Dealer. Within a few days of the purchase, Dino returned the car to Dealer for repairs. Dino complained, \"There's something wrong with the brakes. The car keeps pulling to the left whenever I apply them.\"' Dealer's mechanic readjusted the brakes but did not detect any other problem with the brake system. Dealer's mechanic told Dino, \"You shouldn't have any more problems with those brakes. However, if the same problem does occur, don't panic. The car may pull to the left, but the brakes will still work, allowing you to stop the car.\" Dino drove the car home. It worked fine for two days, but then the brakes started pulling to the left again. As Dino was driving the car back to Dealer's shop for further repair, he saw Pedestrian crossing the street. Dino pressed his foot down on the brake pedal, but the master cylinder failed, and the car would not stop. Dino's car struck Pedestrian, injuring him. 91. If Pedestrian sues Dino for his injuries: (A) Pedestrian will prevail, because Dino knew that there was a problem with his brakes. (B) Pedestrian will prevail, because drivers have a duty to maintain their vehicles in safe working order. (C) Dino will prevail, because he had no reason to know that his brakes would not stop the car. (D) Dino will prevail, because he diligently had his brakes repaired. For this question only, assume the following facts. Because she was overextended on other construction jobs, Structo did not complete the house until October 15. Homey returned on November 1 as planned and occupied the house. Ten days later, after making the $ 40,000$ final payment to Structo, Homey learned for the first time that the house had not been completed until October 15. If Homey sues Structo for breach of contract on account of the 15-day delay in completion, which of the following will the court probably decide?\n\nOptions:\nA. Homey will recover damages as specified in the contract, i.e., $ 500$ multiplied by 15 .\nB. Homey will recover his actual damages, if any, caused by the delay in completion.\nC. Having waived the delay by occupying the house and making the final payment, Homey will recover nothing. \nD. Homey will recover nothing because the contractual completion date was impliedly modified to November 1 when Homey on January 2 advised Structo about Homey's prospective trip and return date.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 1, Awl and Howser agreed in writing that Awl would build a house on Howser's lot according to Howser's plans and specifications for $ 60,000$, the work to commence on April 1. Howser agreed to make an initial payment of $ 10,000$ on April 1, and to pay the balance upon completion of the work. On February 1, Awl notified Howser that he (Awl) would lose money on the job at that price, and would not proceed with the work unless Howser would agree to increase the price to $ 90,000$. Howser thereupon, without notifying Awl, agreed in writing with Gutter for Gutter, commencing April 1, to build the house for $ 75,000$, which was the fair market cost of the work to be done. On April 1, both Awl and Gutter showed up at the building site to begin work, Awl telling Howser that he had decided to \"take the loss\" and would build the house for $ 60,000$ as originally agreed. Howser dismissed Awl and allowed Gutter to begin work on the house. Ruth also sues the officer, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Will she recover?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, unless the officer knew that Ruth and Bert were husband and wife.\nB. No, if the officer did not know that Ruth was watching from across the street.\nC. Yes, because the officer's conduct regarding Bert was extreme and outrageous.\nD. Yes, because the officer's conduct caused Ruth to be severely emotionally disturbed.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On June 1, Kravat, a manufacturer of men's neckties, received the following order from Clothier: \"Ship 500 two-inch ties, assorted stripes, your catalogue No. V34. Delivery by July $1 . \"$ On June 1, Kravat shipped 500 three-inch ties that arrived at Clothier's place of business on June 3. Clothier immediately telegraphed Kravat: \"Reject your shipment. Order was for two-inch ties.\" Clothier, however, did not ship the ties back to Kravat. Kravat replied by telegram: \"Will deliver proper ties before July 1.\" Clothier received this telegram on June 4, but did not reply to it. On June 30, Kravat tendered 500 two-inch ties in assorted stripes, designated in his catalogue as item No. V34; but Clothier refused to accept them. After Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to Brownacre was in:\n\nOptions:\nA. Hull.\nB. Orris.\nC. Burns.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congressional legislation regulating the conditions for marriages and divorces would be most likely upheld if it:\n\nOptions:\nA. Applied only to marriages and divorces by members of the armed services.\nB. Applied only to marriages performed by federal judges and to divorces granted by federal courts.\nC. Implemented an executive agreement seeking to define basic human rights.\nD. Applied only to marriages and divorces in the District of Columbia.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state statute requires that all buses which operate as common carriers on the highways of the state shall be equipped with seat belts for passengers. Transport Lines, an interstate carrier, challenges the validity of the statute and the right of the state to make the requirement. What is the best basis for a constitutional challenge by Transport Lines?\n\nOptions:\nA. Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \nB. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nC. Unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.\nD. Difficulty of enforcement.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Supermedia, a television station, was conducting a \"person on the street\" interview segment live for its evening \"magazine\" show and asking citizens of the community what they thought were the biggest problems facing the city. When the interviewer stopped Don and asked him the question, he replied, \"Corruption in city government, particularly the mayor.\" William, mayor of the city, has now brought an action for defamation against Don. At trial, William has produced testimony as to his honesty and good character. Which of the following evidence could Don properly adduce at trial as part of his defense? I. The fact that William was convicted two years ago of taking a bribe to award a city contract for solid waste disposal. II. The testimony of Harold, a local newspaper editor, that William is known throughout the state as a corrupt politician. III. The testimony of Allen, a former campaign manager of William's, that William was corrupt.\n\nOptions:\nA. I. only.\nB. I. and II. only.\nC. I. and III. only.\nD. I., II., and III. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Chemco designed and built a large tank on its premises for the purpose of storing highly toxic gas. The tank developed a sudden leak and escaping toxic gas drifted into the adjacent premises, where Nyman lived. Nyman inhaled the gas and died as a result. In a suit brought by Nyman's personal representative against Chemco, which of the following must be established if the claim is to prevail? I. The toxic gas that escaped from Chemco's premises was the cause of Nyman's death. II. The tank was built in a defective manner. III. Chemco was negligent in designing the tank.\n\nOptions:\nA. I. only.\nB. I. and II. only.\nC. I. and III. only.\nD. I., II., and III.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"An issue in Parker's action against Daves for causing Parker's back injury was whether Parker's condition had resulted principally from a similar occurrence five years before, with which Daves had no connection. Parker called Watts, his treating physician, who offered to testify that when she saw Parker after the latest occurrence, Parker told her that before the accident he had been working fulltime, without pain or limitation of motion, in a job that involved lifting heavy boxes. Watts's testimony should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted, because it is a statement of Parker's then-existing physical condition.\nB. Admitted, because it is a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.\nC. Excluded, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Excluded, because Parker is available as a witness.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Phyllis was crossing the street at a crosswalk, but did not look both ways. As she walked, Phyllis was hit by a car driven by Brett, and immediately afterwards, she was struck by a car driven by Andrew. As a result of these collisions with the cars, Phyllis suffered severe injuries. Although it was impossible to determine which portion of Phyllis's injuries was caused by Andrew and which by Brett, at the trial of Phyllis's suit, the jury determined that Andrew was $20 \\%$ negligent, that Brett was $40 \\%$ negligent, and that Phyllis was $40 \\%$ negligent. It was further determined that Phyllis had suffered $ 100,000$ in damages. Phyllis had already received $ 10,000$ from her group medical insurance plan. Andrew had a $ 500,000$ auto liability insurance policy, and Brett is now insolvent. In a pure comparative negligence jurisdiction, how much will Phyllis recover in damages from Andrew?\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 90,000$.\nB. $ 60,000$.\nC. $ 50,000$.\nD. $ 20,000$. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dent and Wren were playing golf. After they had completed nine holes, Dent left to make a telephone call. When he returned, he told Wren, \"My wife was just involved in an accident. She ran a red light and hit another car. I have to skip the back nine.\" After arriving at the scene of the accident, Dent, after talking with bystanders, determined that his wife had not driven through a red light. Notch, the driver of the other car, brought suit against Dent's wife for injuries suffered in the accident. To help establish liability, Notch seeks to have Wren testify as to Dent's statements on the golf course. Wren's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as an admission.\nB. Admissible as a statement against interest.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any recognized exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because it constitutes opinion.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Astin left her car at Garrison's Garage to have repair work done. After completing the repairs, Garrison took the car out for a test drive and was involved in an accident that caused damages to Placek. A statute imposes liability on the owner of an automobile for injuries to a third party that are caused by the negligence of any person driving the automobile with the owner's consent. The statute applies to situations of this kind, even if the owner did not specifically authorize the mechanic to test-drive the car. Placek sued Astin and Garrison jointly for damages arising from the accident. In that action, Astin cross-claims to recover from Garrison the amount of any payment Astin may be required to make to Placek. The trier of fact has determined that the accident was caused solely by negligent driving on Garrison's part, and that Placek's damages were $ 100,000$. In this action, the proper outcome will be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Placek should have judgment for $ 50,000$ each against Astin and Garrison; Astin should recover nothing from Garrison.\nB. Placek should have judgment for $ 100,000$ against Garrison only.\nC. Placek should have judgment for $ 100,000$ against Astin and Garrison jointly, and Astin should have judgment against Garrison for $50 \\%$ of any amount collected from Astin by Placek.\nD. Placek should have judgment for $ 100,000$ against Astin and Garrison jointly, and Astin should have judgment against Garrison for any amount collected from Astin by Placek. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A 10-lot subdivision was approved by the proper governmental authority. The authority's action was pursuant to a map filed by Diaz, which included an undesignated parcel in addition to the 10 numbered lots. The shape of the undesignated parcel is different and somewhat larger than any one of the numbered lots. Subdivision building restrictions were imposed on \"all the lots shown on said map.\" Diaz contracts to sell the unnumbered lot, described by metes and bounds, to Butts. Is title to the parcel marketable?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the undesignated parcel is not a lot to which the subdivision building restrictions apply. \nB. Yes, because the undesignated parcel is not part of the subdivision.\nC. No, because the undesignated parcel has never been approved by the proper governmental authority.\nD. No, because the map leaves it uncertain whether the unnumbered lot is subject to the building restrictions.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 2, Hugh Homey and Sue Structo entered into a written contract in which Structo agreed to build on Homey's lot a new house for Homey, according to plans and specifications furnished by Homey's architect, Barbara Bilevel, at a contract price of $ 200,000$. The contract provided for specified progress payments and a final payment of $ 40,000$ upon Homey's acceptance of the house and issuance of a certificate of final approval by the architect. Further, under a \"liquidated damages\" clause in the agreement, Structo promised to pay Homey $ 500$ for each day's delay in completing the house after the following October l. Homey, however, told Structo on January 2 , before the contract was signed, that he would be on an around-the-world vacation trip most of the summer and fall and would not return to occupy the house until November 1. For this question only, assume the following facts. Because she was overextended on other construction jobs, Structo did not complete the house until October 15. Homey returned on November 1 as planned and occupied the house. Ten days later, after making the $ 40,000$ final payment to Structo, Homey learned for the first time that the house had not been completed until October 15. If Homey sues Structo for breach of contract on account of the 15-day delay in completion, which of the following will the court probably decide?\n\nOptions:\nA. Homey will recover damages as specified in the contract, i.e., $ 500$ multiplied by 15 .\nB. Homey will recover his actual damages, if any, caused by the delay in completion.\nC. Having waived the delay by occupying the house and making the final payment, Homey will recover nothing. \nD. Homey will recover nothing because the contractual completion date was impliedly modified to November 1 when Homey on January 2 advised Structo about Homey's prospective trip and return date.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state statute requires the permanent removal from parental custody of any child who has suffered \"child abuse.\" That term is defined to include \"corporal punishment of any sort.\" Zeller very gently spanks his six-year-old son on the buttocks whenever he believes that spanking is necessary to enforce discipline on him. Such a spanking occurs no more than once a month and has never physically harmed the child. The state files suit under the statute to terminate Zeller's parental rights solely because of these spankings. Zeller defends only on the ground that the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied to his admitted conduct. In light of the nature of the rights involved, which of the following is the most probable burden of persuasion on this constitutional issue? \n\nOptions:\nA. The state has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to Zeller is necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest.\nB. The state has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to Zeller is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.\nC. Zeller has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to him is not necessary to vindicate an important state interest.\nD. Zeller has the burden of persuading the court that the application of this statute to him is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Until 1954, the state of New Atlantic required segregation in all public and private schools, but all public schools are now desegregated. Other state laws, enacted before 1954 and continuing to the present, provide for free distribution of the same textbooks on secular subjects to students in all public and private schools. In addition, the state accredits schools and certifies teachers. Little White School House, a private school that offers elementary and secondary education in the state, denies admission to all non-Caucasians. Stone School is a private school that offers religious instruction. 46. Which of the following is the strongest argument against the constitutionality of free distribution of textbooks to the students at the Little White School House? (A) No legitimate educational function is served by the free distribution of textbooks. (B) The state may not in any way aid private schools. (C) The Constitution forbids private bias of any kind. (D) Segregation is furthered by the distribution of textbooks to these students. For this question only, assume that Prentis demonstrates that common carriers are permitted to transport snipe traps as cargo across Midland for delivery to another state and that, in practice, the Midland statute is enforced only against private individuals transporting those traps in private vehicles. If Prentis challenges the application of the Midland statute to her on the basis only of a denial of equal protection, this application of the statute will probably be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because the traps constitute contraband in which Prentis could have no protected property interest.\nB. Constitutional, because there is a rational basis for differentiating between the possession of snipe traps as interstate cargo by common carriers and the possession of snipe traps by private individuals.\nC. Unconstitutional, because the state cannot demonstrate a compelling public purpose for making this differentiation between common carriers and such private individuals.\nD. Unconstitutional, because interstate travel is a fundamental right that may not be burdened by state law.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a trial between Jones and Smith, an issue arose about Smith's ownership of a horse, which had caused damage to Jones's crops. Jones offered to testify that he looked up Smith's telephone number in the directory, called that number, and that a voice answered, \"This is Smith speaking.\" At this, Jones asked, \"Was that your horse that tramped across my cornfield this afternoon?\" The voice replied, \"Yes.\" The judge should rule the testimony:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because the answering speaker's identification of himself, together with the usual accuracy of the telephone directory and transmission system, furnishes sufficient authentication.\nB. Admissible, because judicial notice may be taken of the accuracy of telephone directories.\nC. Inadmissible unless Jones can further testify that he was familiar with Smith's voice and that it was in fact Smith to whom he spoke.\nD. Inadmissible unless Smith has first been asked whether or not the conversation took place and has been given the opportunity to admit, deny, or explain.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Don Dent was on trial for the murder of Michael Richards. At the trial, Dent put forth the defense of self-defense, claiming that Michael was about to kill him when he shot Michael. To help establish that he was in fear of Michael, Dent called Walter to testify. Walter will testify that he heard Sam Smith say to Dent, \"Michael Richards is a mean, vicious killer; he has murdered three people in the past year.\" Walter's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.\nB. Admissible nonhearsay.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not covered by an exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because it does not help establish that Dent acted in self-defense. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The federal government has complete jurisdiction over certain park land located within the state of Plains. To conserve the wildlife that inhabits that land, the federal government enacts a statute forbidding all hunting of animals in the federal park. That statute also forbids the hunting of animals that have left the federal park and have entered the state of Plains. Hanson has a hunting license from the state of Plains authorizing him to hunt deer anywhere in the state. On land within the state of Plains located adjacent to the federal park, Hanson shoots a deer he knows has recently left the federal land. Hanson is prosecuted for violating the federal hunting law. The strongest ground supporting the constitutionality of the federal law forbidding the hunting of wild animals that wander off federal property is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. This law is a necessary and proper means of protecting United States property.\nB. The animals are moving in the stream of interstate commerce.\nC. The police powers of the federal government encompass protection of wild animals.\nD. Shooting wild animals is a privilege, not a right.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Acorp and Beeco are companies that each manufacture pesticide $\\mathrm{X}$. Their plants are located along the same river. During a specific $24-$ hour period, each plant discharged pesticide into the river. Both plants were operated negligently and such negligence caused the discharge of the pesticide into the river. Landesmann operated a cattle ranch downstream from the plants of Acorp and Beeco. Landesmann's cattle drank from the river and were poisoned by the pesticide. The amount of the discharge from either plant alone would not have been sufficient to cause any harm to Landesmann's cattle. If Landesmann asserts a claim against Acorp and Beeco, what, if anything, will Landesmann recover?\n\nOptions:\nA. Nothing, because neither company discharged enough pesticide to cause harm to Landesmann's cattle.\nB. Nothing, unless Landesmann can establish how much pesticide each plant discharged.\nC. One-half of Landesmann's damages from each company.\nD. The entire amount of Landesmann's damages, jointly and severally, from the two companies. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 2, Hugh Homey and Sue Structo entered into a written contract in which Structo agreed to build on Homey's lot a new house for Homey, according to plans and specifications furnished by Homey's architect, Barbara Bilevel, at a contract price of $ 200,000$. The contract provided for specified progress payments and a final payment of $ 40,000$ upon Homey's acceptance of the house and issuance of a certificate of final approval by the architect. Further, under a \"liquidated damages\" clause in the agreement, Structo promised to pay Homey $ 500$ for each day's delay in completing the house after the following October l. Homey, however, told Structo on January 2 , before the contract was signed, that he would be on an around-the-world vacation trip most of the summer and fall and would not return to occupy the house until November 1. For this question only, assume the following facts: Structo completed the house on October 14 and, when Homey returned on November 1 , requested the final payment of $ 40,000$ and issuance of a certificate of final approval by the architect, Bilevel. Homey, however, refused to pay any part of the final installment after Bilevel told him, \"Structo did a great job and I find no defects worth mentioning, but Structo's contract price was at least $ 40,000$ too high, especially in view of the big drop in housing values within the past 10 months. I will withhold the final certificate, and you just hold on to your money.\" If Structo sues Homey for the $ 40,000$ final payment after Bilevel's refusal to issue a final certificate, which of the following will the court probably decide?\n\nOptions:\nA. Structo wins, because nonoccurrence of the condition requiring Bilevel's certificate of final approval was excused by Bilevel's bad-faith refusal to issue the certificate.\nB. Structo wins, but, because all contractual conditions have not occurred, her recovery is limited to restitution of the benefit conferred on Homey, minus progress payments already received.\nC. Homey wins, provided he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the fair-market value of the completed house is $ 160,000$ or less.\nD. Homey wins, provided he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that total payments to Structo of $ 160,000$ will yield a fair net profit. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 15, Carpenter agreed to repair Householder's house according to certain specifications and to have the work completed by April 1. On March 1, Householder's property was inundated by flood waters which did not abate until March 15. Householder could not get the house in a condition which would permit Carpenter to begin the repairs until March 31 . On that date Carpenter notified Householder that he would not repair the house. Which one of the following facts, if it was the only one true and known to both parties on January 15, would best serve Carpenter as the basis for a defense in an action brought against him by Householder for breach of contract?\n\nOptions:\nA. Carpenter's busy schedule permitted him to work on Householder's house only during the month of March.\nB. Any delay in making the repairs would not seriously affect Householder's use of the property.\nC. The cost of making repairs was increasing at the rate of $3 \\%$ a month.\nD. The area around Householder's property was frequently flooded during the month of March.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress enacted a statute providing that persons may challenge a state energy law on the ground that it is in conflict with the federal Constitution in either federal or state court. According to this federal statute, any decision by a lower state court upholding a state energy law against a challenge based on the federal Constitution may be appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. The provisions of this statute that authorize direct United States Supreme Court review of specified decisions rendered by lower state courts are:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because congressional control over questions of energy use is plenary.\nB. Constitutional, because Congress may establish the manner by which the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is exercised.\nC. Unconstitutional, because they infringe the sovereign right of states to have their supreme courts review decisions of their lower state courts.\nD. Unconstitutional, because under Article III of the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court does not have authority to review directly decisions of lower state courts.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In March, when Ohm was 17, Stereo delivered to $\\mathrm{Ohm}$ a television set. At that time Ohm agreed in writing to pay $ 400$ for the set on July 1 , when he would reach his 18 th birthday. Eighteen is the applicable statutory age of majority, and on that date $\\mathrm{Ohm}$ was to receive the proceeds of a trust. On July 1, when the reasonable value of the television set was $ 250$, Ohm sent Stereo a signed letter stating, \"I'll only pay you $ 300$. That is all the set is worth.\" In an action against $\\mathrm{Ohm}$ for money damages on July 2 , what is the maximum amount that Stereo will be entitled to recover?\n\nOptions:\nA. Nothing.\nB. $ 250$, the reasonable value of the set.\nC. $ 300$, the amount $\\mathrm{Ohm}$ promised to pay in his letter of July 1.\nD. $ 400$, the original sale price.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Zall, a resident of the state of Paxico, brought suit in federal district court against Motors, Inc., a Paxico corporation. Zall seeks recovery of $ 12,000$ actual and $ 12,000$ punitive damages arising from Motors's sale to him of a defective automobile. Zall's suit is based only on a common law contract theory. From a constitutional standpoint, should the federal district court hear this suit on its merits?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Article III vests federal courts with jurisdiction over cases involving the obligation of contracts.\nB. Yes, because it is an action affecting interstate commerce.\nC. No, because this suit is not within the jurisdiction of an Article III court.\nD. No, because there is no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A statute of the state of Lanape flatly bans the sale or distribution of contraceptive devices to minors. Drugs, Inc., a national retailer of drugs and related items, is charged with violating the Lanape statute. Which of the following is the strongest constitutional argument Drugs, Inc., could make in defending itself against prosecution for violation of this statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. The statute constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce. \nB. The statute denies minors one of their fundamental rights without due process.\nC. The statute denies Drugs, Inc., a privilege or immunity of state citizenship.\nD. The statute violates the First Amendment right to freedom of religion because it regulates morals.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A written contract was entered into between Bouquet, a financier-investor, and Vintage Corporation, a winery and grape-grower. The contract provided that Bouquet would invest $ 1$ million in Vintage for its capital expansion and, in return, that Vintage, from grapes grown in its famous vineyards, would produce and market at least 500,000 bottles of wine each year for five years under the label \"Premium Vintage-Bouquet.\" The contract included provisions that the parties would share equally the profits and losses from the venture and that, if feasible, the wine would be distributed by Vintage only through Claret, a wholesale distributor of fine wines. Neither Bouquet nor Vintage had previously dealt with Claret. Claret learned of the contract two days later from reading a trade newspaper. In reliance thereon, he immediately hired an additional sales executive and contracted for enlargement of his wine storage and display facility. 81. If Vintage refuses to distribute the wine through Claret and Claret then sues Vintage for breach of contract, is it likely that Claret will prevail? (A) Yes, because Vintage's performance was to run to Claret rather than to Bouquet. (B) Yes, because Bouquet and Vintage could reasonably foresee that Claret would change his position in reliance on the contract. (C) No, because Bouquet and Vintage did not expressly agree that Claret would have enforceable rights under their contract. (D) No, because Bouquet and Vintage, having no apparent motive to benefit Claret, appeared in making the contract to have been protecting or serving only their own interests. For this question only, assume the following facts. Soon after making its contract with Bouquet, Vintage, without Bouquet's knowledge or assent, sold its vineyards but not its winery to Agribiz, a large agricultural corporation. Under the terms of this sale, Agribiz agreed to sell to Vintage all grapes grown on the land for five years. Agribiz's employees have no experience in wine-grape production, and Agribiz has no reputation in the wine industry as a grape producer or otherwise. The BouquetVintage contract was silent on the matter of Vintage's selling any or all of its business assets. If Bouquet seeks an appropriate judicial remedy against Vintage for entering into the Vintage-Agribiz transaction, is Bouquet likely to prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the Vintage-Agribiz transaction created a significant risk of diminishing the profits in which Bouquet would share under his contract with Vintage.\nB. Yes, because the Bouquet-Vintage contract did not contain a provision authorizing a delegation of Vintage's duties.\nC. No, because Vintage remains in a position to perform under the Bouquet-Vintage contract.\nD. No, because Vintage, as a corporation, must necessarily perform its contracts by delegating duties to individuals. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"All lawyers practicing in the state of Erewhon must be members of the State Bar Association, by order of the state supreme court. Several state officials serve on the Bar Association's Board of Bar Governors. The Board of Bar Governors authorizes the payment of dues for two staff members to the Cosmopolitan Club, a private dining club licensed to sell alcoholic beverages. The Cosmopolitan Club is frequented by affluent businessmen and professionals and by legislators. It is generally known that the purpose of the membership of the Bar Association staff is to enable them to go where members of the \"elite\" meet and to lobby for legislation in which the Bar Association is interested. The State Association has numerous committees and subcommittees concerned with family law, real estate law, unauthorized practice, etc., and its recommendations often influence state policy. Some committee meetings are held at the Cosmopolitan Club. The club is known to have rules which restrict membership by race, religion, and sex. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, who are members of the Erewhon Bar Association, petition the Board of Bar Governors to adopt a resolution prohibiting the payment of club dues to and the holding of meetings of the Bar Association or its committees at places that discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or sex. After substantial public discussion, the Board of Bar Governors, by a close vote, fails to pass such a resolution. These events receive extensive coverage in the local newspapers. Plaintiffs bring an action in federal court seeking an injunction against such payments and the holding of meetings in such places as the Cosmopolitan Club. Which of the following actions should a federal district court take with respect to jurisdiction?\n\nOptions:\nA. Hear the case on the merits, because a federal claim is presented.\nB. Hear the case on the merits, because the expenditure of state funds in support of segregation is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.\nC. Abstain from jurisdiction, because the constitutional issue should be litigated first in a state court.\nD. Dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, because the issue of Bar Association activities is solely within the domain of state law.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Although by all appearances Herb and Edna, an elderly couple, were destitute, they had, in fact, substantial cash in the bank. Their new neighbors, the Smiths, feeling sorry for them on Thanksgiving, bought a month's supply of food and gave it to Herb and Edna. Later, Edna confided in the Smiths that she and Herb had money and told them that, because they had been so kind, she was leaving them money in her will. All of Herb's and Edna's bank accounts were held in joint tenancy. When Edna died, at the Smiths' request Herb gave the Smiths the following signed instrument: \"In consideration of my wife's promise to the Smiths, and their agreement not to sue her estate, I agree to pay them the sum of $ 5,000$.\" When Herb died of a heart attack several days later, the Smiths asked the administrator of his estate to pay them the $ 5,000$. The administrator refused on the ground that there was no consideration for the agreement. On which of the following theories would it be most likely that the Smiths would recover?\n\nOptions:\nA. Herb's written instrument was a binding unilateral contract.\nB. Herb's acceptance of the food was fraudulent.\nC. Herb is bound by promissory estoppel.\nD. Herb and the Smiths entered into a valid compromise.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Johnston purchased 100 bolts of standard blue wool, No. 1 quality, from McHugh. The sales contract provided that Johnston would make payment prior to inspection. The 100 bolts were shipped and Johnston paid McHugh. Upon inspection, however, Johnston discovered that the wool was No. 2 quality. Johnston thereupon tendered back the wool to McHugh and demanded return of his payment. McHugh refused on the ground that there is no difference between No. 1 quality wool and No. 2 quality wool. What is Johnston's remedy because the wool was nonconforming?\n\nOptions:\nA. Specific performance.\nB. Damages measured by the difference between the value of the goods delivered and the value of conforming goods.\nC. Damages measured by the price paid plus the difference between the contract price and the cost of buying substitute goods.\nD. None, since he waived his remedies by agreeing to pay before inspection.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Assume for the purposes of this question that you are counsel to the state legislative committee that is responsible for real estate laws in your state. The committee wants you to $\\mathrm{draft}$ legislation to make all restrictions on land use, imposed by deeds (now or hereafter recorded), unenforceable in the future so that public landuse planning through zoning will have exclusive control in matters of land use. Which of the following is least likely to be a consideration in the drafting of such legislation?\n\nOptions:\nA. Compensation for property rights taken by public authority.\nB. Impairment of contract.\nC. Sovereign immunity.\nD. Police power.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Missoula has enacted a new election code designed to increase voter responsibility in the exercise of the franchise and to enlarge citizen participation in the electoral process. None of its provisions conflict with federal statutes. The Missoula election code provides that in a special-purpose election for directors of a state watershed improvement district, the franchise is limited to landowners within the district, because they are the only ones directly affected by the outcome. Each vote is weighted according to the proportion of the holding of that individual in relation to the total affected property. The best argument in support of the statute and against the application of the \"one person, one vote\" principle in this situation is that the principle:\n\nOptions:\nA. Applies only to election of individuals to statewide public office.\nB. Does not apply where property rights are involved.\nC. Does not apply because the actions of such a district principally affect landowners.\nD. Does not apply because of rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Osif owned Broadacres in fee simple. For a consideration of $ 5,000$, Osif gave Bard a written option to purchase Broadacres for $ 300,000$. The option was assignable. For a consideration of $ 10,000$, Bard subsequently gave an option to Cutter to purchase Broadacres for $ 325,000$. Cutter exercised his option. Bard thereupon exercised his option. Bard paid the agreed price of $ 300,000$, and took title to Broadacres by deed from Osif. Thereafter, Cutter refused to consummate his purchase. Bard brought an appropriate action against Cutter for specific performance, or, if that should be denied, then for damages. Cutter counterclaimed for return of the $ 10,000$. In this action, the court will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Grant money damages only to Bard.\nB. Grant specific performance to Bard.\nC. Grant Bard only the right to retain the $ 10,000$.\nD. Require Bard to refund the $ 10,000$ to Cutter.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Drake owned a small warehouse that he leased to Teague, who used it as a storage and distribution center for fresh cut flowers being shipped to area florists. Drake wanted to put Teague out of business so that he could lease the warehouse to someone else at a higher rent. $\\mathrm{He}$ entered the warehouse one night using a master key, and turned off the cooling system to destroy the flowers. To ensure that all of Teague's inventory would be destroyed, he also deployed several kerosene space heaters. While he was filling one, a small amount of kerosene spilled and was ignited by an ash from his cigarette. Although the fire that started was small at first, Drake panicked when he saw the flames and ran out of the building. The fire eventually spread to the walls of the building and heavily damaged it before being extinguished by firefighters. If Drake is charged with arson, can he be found guilty?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Drake caused the fire during the commission of a malicious felony.\nB. Yes, because Drake did nothing when the kerosene caught on fire.\nC. No, because Drake did not intend to set the building on fire.\nD. No, because Drake cannot be liable for arson of a building that he owned.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Harold and Wanda, once married to each other, had gone through a bitter divorce. The divorce decree awarded custody of the couple's four-year-old son Jake to Wanda, with Harold receiving visitation rights. On the first opportunity that Harold had to take Jake for the weekend, Harold disappeared with Jake. Wanda was greatly distressed and called Harold's parents, Grandmaw and Grandpaw, on a weekly basis, always asking if they knew anything about the whereabouts of Harold and Jake. Grandmaw and Grandpaw knew quite well where Harold and Jake were, and they often sent money to help support Harold while he was on the run. However, they always insisted that they knew nothing about the child. Four years after Jake was abducted, the police arrested Harold and returned Jake to his mother. Wanda files an action against Grandmaw and Grandpaw alleging infliction of emotional distress. Will Wanda prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Grandmaw and Grandpaw acted in deliberate disregard of a high probability that their actions would cause Wanda to suffer emotional distress.\nB. Yes, but only if Grandmaw and Grandpaw actually knew that their actions would cause Wanda to suffer emotional distress.\nC. No, unless Wanda can prove that she suffered physical harm.\nD. No, because Wanda never was in a zone of danger.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Four years ago, Owen held Blackacre, a tract of land, in fee simple absolute. In that year he executed and delivered to Price a quitclaim deed which purported to release and quitclaim to Price all of the right, title, and interest of Owen in Blackacre. Price accepted the quitclaim and placed the deed in his safe deposit box. Owen was indebted to Crider in the amount of $ 35,000$. In September of the current year, Owen executed and delivered to Crider a warranty deed, purporting to convey the fee simple to Blackacre, in exchange for a full release of the debt he owed to Crider. Crider immediately recorded his deed. In December, Price caused his quitclaim deed to Blackacre to be recorded and notified Crider that he (Price) claimed title. Assume that there is no evidence of occupancy of Blackacre and assume, further, that the jurisdiction where Blackacre is situated has a recording statute which required good faith and value as elements of the junior claimant's priority. Which of the following is the best comment concerning the conflicting claims of Price and Crider?\n\nOptions:\nA. Price cannot succeed, because the quitclaim deed through which he claims prevents him from being bona fide (in good faith).\nB. The outcome will turn on the view taken as to whether Crider paid value within the meaning of the statute requiring this element.\nC. The outcome will turn on whether Price paid value (a fact not given in the statement).\nD. Price's failure to record until December of the current year estops him from asserting title against Crider.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Otto conveyed Goldacre to \"Andy, his heirs and assigns, but if Andy dies and is not survived by children by his present wife, Jane, then to Bob and his heirs and assigns.\" Shortly after taking possession, Andy discovered rich metal deposits on the land, opened a mining operation, and removed and sold a considerable quantity of valuable ore without giving Bob any notice of his action. Andy has no children. Andy, Jane, and Bob are all still living. Bob brought an action in equity for an accounting of the value of the ore removed and for an injunction against further removal. If the decision is for Andy, it will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. Bob has no interest in Goldacre.\nB. The right to take minerals is an incident of a defeasible fee simple.\nC. The right to take minerals is an incident of the right to possession.\nD. There was no showing that Andy acted in bad faith. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Duncan was charged with aggravated assault. At trial Duncan did not testify; however, he sought to offer opinion evidence of his good character for truth and veracity. This testimony should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted, because a criminal defendant is entitled to offer evidence of his good character.\nB. Admitted, because a party's credibility is necessarily in issue.\nC. Excluded, because evidence of character is not admissible to prove conduct in conformity therewith.\nD. Excluded, because it is evidence of a trait not pertinent to the case.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dray was prosecuted for bank robbery. At trial, the bank teller, Wall, was unable to identify Dray, now bearded, as the bank robber. The prosecutor then showed Wall a group of photographs, and Wall testified that she had previously told the prosecutor that the middle picture (concededly a picture of Dray before he grew a beard) was a picture of the bank robber. Wall's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\nB. Inadmissible, because it is a violation of Dray's right of confrontation.\nC. Admissible as prior identification by the witness.\nD. Admissible as past recollection recorded.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a contract suit by Perez against Drake, each of the following is an accepted method of authenticating Drake's signature on a document offered by Perez except:\n\nOptions:\nA. A nonexpert who, in preparation for trial, has familiarized himself with Drake's usual signature testifies that, in his opinion, the questioned signature is genuine.\nB. The jury, without the assistance of an expert, compares the questioned signature with an admittedly authentic sample of Drake's handwriting.\nC. A witness offers proof that the signature is on a document that has been in existence for at least 20 years, that was in a place where it would likely be if it was authentic, and that has no suspicious circumstances surrounding it.\nD. A witness testifies that Drake admitted that the signature was his. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jaywalking (crossing a street outside of a crosswalk or not at an intersection) is punishable by a fine in Metropolis. Bert, who had lived in Metropolis all of his 67 years, was out windowshopping with his wife, Ruth, also 67 , when he saw a friend across the street at a diner they both frequented. Telling Ruth that he would be right back, he saw that there were no cars nearby and so strode briskly across the street in the middle of the block. As he reached the other sidewalk, a police officer who had been checking parked cars for parking violations stepped up to Bert and said, \"Hold it buddy, let's see your driver's license,\" and then reached for her citation book. Bert, a city dweller from birth, had always walked or used public transportation, had never learned to drive, and did not have a driver's license. When he told the officer that he did not have a driver's license, she said, \"All right, I'm taking you in,\" and seized his wrist, twisting it up and behind him in a personnel control lock. A black belt in judo, Bert easily slipped the officer's grasp. \"You asked for it,\" she then growled, and pulled her baton from her belt. When she attempted to strike Bert, he moved swiftly to the side, chopped at her arm, and caused the baton to fall from her grasp to the pavement. At that point two other officers arrived on the scene and arrested Bert. Ruth watched the entire episode from across the street and became greatly distressed. 34. Bert brings an action against the first officer for battery. What will be the probable outcome of this litigation? (A) He will lose, because he struck the officer. (B) He will lose, because the offense was committed in the officer's presence. (C) He will win, unless he is found guilty of jaywalking. (D) He will win, because the officer was not privileged to arrest him. If Dunken is charged with first degree murder for the death of the security guard, the court should charge the jury on the issue of the defense of intoxication that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Voluntary intoxication is no defense to the crime of first degree murder as defined by the statute.\nB. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to the crime of first degree murder if Dunken would not have killed the security guard but for the intoxication.\nC. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to the crime of first degree murder if it prevented Dunken from forming the intent to commit a burglary.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"As part of a comprehensive federal aid-toeducation program, Congress included the following provisions as conditions for state receipt of federal funds: (1) Whenever textbooks are provided to students without charge, they must include no religious instruction and must be made available on the same terms to students in all public and private schools accredited by the state educational authority. (2) Salary supplements can be paid to teachers in public and private schools, up to $10 \\%$ of existing salary schedules, where present compensation is less than the average salary for persons of comparable training and experience, provided that no such supplement is paid to any teacher who instructs in religious subjects. (3) Construction grants can be made toward the cost of physical plants at private colleges and universities, provided that no part of the grant is used for buildings in which instruction in religious subject matters is offered. Federal taxpayer Bates also challenges the construction grants to church-operated private colleges and universities. The most likely result is that the construction grants will be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because aid to one aspect of an institution of higher education not shown to be pervasively sectarian does not necessarily free it to spend its other resources for religious purposes.\nB. Sustained, because bricks and mortar do not aid religion in a way forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.\nC. Held unconstitutional, because any financial aid to a church-operated school strengthens the religious purposes of the institution.\nD. Held unconstitutional, because the grants involve or cause an excessive entanglement with religion. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Seller and Buyer executed an agreement for the sale of real property. Assume for this question only that Seller dies before closing and his will leaves his personal property to Perry and his real property to Rose. There being no breach of the agreement by either party, which of the following is correct?\n\nOptions:\nA. Death, an eventuality for which the parties could have provided, terminates the agreement if they did not so provide. \nB. Rose is entitled to the proceeds of the sale when it closes, because the doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply to these circumstances.\nC. Perry is entitled to the proceeds of the sale when it closes.\nD. Title was rendered unmarketable by Seller's death.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dunbar and Balcom went into a drugstore, where Dunbar reached into the cash register and took out $ 200$. Stone, the owner of the store, came out of a back room, saw what had happened, and told Dunbar to put the money back. Balcom then took a revolver from under his coat and shot and killed Stone. Dunbar claims that Stone owed her $ 200$ and that she went to the drugstore to try to collect the debt. She said that she asked Balcom to come along just in case Stone made trouble but that she did not plan on using any force and did not know that Balcom was armed. 145. If Dunbar is prosecuted for murder on the basis of felony murder and the jury believes her claim, she should be found: (A) Guilty, because her companion, Balcom, committed a homicide in the course of a felony. (B) Guilty, because her taking Balcom with her to the store created the risk of death that occurred during the commission of a felony. (C) Not guilty, because she did not know that Balcom was armed and thus did not have the required mental state for felony murder. (D) Not guilty, because she believed she was entitled to the money and thus did not intend to steal. The modification between Barnes and Stevens reducing the contractual amounts by $50 \\%$ was:\n\nOptions:\nA. Enforceable in all respects.\nB. Enforceable only to the extent of beeswax tendered by Stevens.\nC. Unenforceable, because there was no consideration for Barnes's promise to take only one-half of the production.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A statute of the state of Tuscarora made it a misdemeanor to construct any building of more than five stories without an automatic fire sprinkler system. A local construction company built, in Tuscarora, a 10-story federal office building. It constructed the building according to the precise specifications of a federal contract authorized by federal statutes. Because the building was built without the automatic fire sprinkler system required by state law, Tuscarora prosecutes the private contractor. Which of the following is the company's strongest defense to that prosecution?\n\nOptions:\nA. The state sprinkler requirement denies the company property or liberty without due process.\nB. The state sprinkler requirement denies the company equal protection of the laws.\nC. As applied, the state sprinkler requirement violates the Supremacy Clause.\nD. As applied, the state sprinkler requirement violates the Obligation of Contracts Clause.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"David is being tried in federal court for criminal conspiracy with John to violate federal narcotics law. At trial, the prosecutor calls David's new wife, Wanda, and asks her to testify about a meeting between David and John that she observed before she married David. Which of the following is the most accurate statement of the applicable rule concerning whether Wanda may testify?\n\nOptions:\nA. The choice is Wanda's.\nB. The choice is David's.\nC. Wanda is permitted to testify only if both Wanda and David agree.\nD. Wanda is compelled to testify even if both Wanda and David object.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"For a valuable consideration, Amato, the owner of Riveracre, signed and gave to Barton a duly executed instrument that provided as follows: \"The grantor may or may not sell Riveracre during her lifetime, but at her death, or if she earlier decides to sell, the property will be offered to Barton at $ 500$ per acre. Barton shall exercise this right, if at all, within 60 days of receipt of said offer to sell.\" Barton recorded the instrument. The instrument was not valid as a will. Is Barton's right under the instrument valid?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the instrument is recorded.\nB. Yes, because Barton's right to purchase will vest or fail within the period prescribed by the Rule Against Perpetuities.\nC. No, because Barton's right to purchase is a restraint on the owner's power to make a testamentary disposition.\nD. No, because Barton's right to purchase is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Husband and Wife were going through a nasty divorce. Wife hired Patrick, a retired detective, to spy on Husband. Patrick followed Husband to Hotel, where he saw Husband meet a woman and go into her hotel room. Patrick checked into the adjoining room, placed an electronic listening device on the wall, and listened to the activities of Husband and the woman in the next room. While Patrick was listening, a burglar broke into Patrick's room and hit Patrick over the head with a blackjack. As a result, Patrick was hospitalized. A state statute makes adultery a crime. 121. If Patrick sues Hotel for his injuries: (A) Patrick will prevail if Hotel's management had reason to believe the hotel room locks were inadequate. (B) Patrick will prevail, because innkeepers owe their guests a very high degree of care. (C) Hotel will prevail, because the burglar was a superseding intervening cause. (D) Hotel will prevail if it was in compliance with a state statute setting minimum standards for hotel room locks. Assuming that Sawtooth committed a total breach on March 1, what would be the probable measure of Farquart's damages in an action against Sawtooth for breach of contract?\n\nOptions:\nA. Restitution of the three monthly installments paid in August, September, and October.\nB. What it would cost to get the house completed by another contractor, minus installments not yet paid to Sawtooth.\nC. The difference between the market value of the partly built house, as of the time of Sawtooth's breach, and the market value of the house if completed according to specifications.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress passes an Energy Conservation Act. The Act requires all users of energy in this country to reduce their consumption by a specified percentage, to be set by a presidential executive order. The Act sets forth specific standards the President must use in setting the percentage and detailed procedures to be followed. The provision that allows the President to set the exact percentage is probably:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because it creates a limited administrative power to implement the statute.\nB. Constitutional, because inherent executive powers permit such action even without statutory authorization.\nC. Unconstitutional as an undue delegation of legislative power to the executive.\nD. Unconstitutional, because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A recently enacted state law forbids nonresident aliens from owning more than 100 acres of land within the state and directs the state attorney general to bring an action of ejectment whenever a nonresident alien owns such land. Zane, a nonresident alien, has obtained title to 200 acres of land in the state, and he brings an action in federal court to enjoin the state attorney general from enforcing the statute. The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint. The federal court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Dismiss the action, because under the Constitution, nonresident aliens may not sue in federal court.\nB. Dismiss the action, because a state has plenary power to determine the qualifications for landholding within its boundaries.\nC. Hear the action, because the United Nations Charter forbids such discrimination.\nD. Hear the action, because a federal question is presented. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Champlain enacts the Young Adult Marriage Counseling Act, which provides that, before any persons less than 30 years of age may be issued a marriage license, they must receive at least five hours of marriage counseling from a state-licensed social worker. This counseling is designed to ensure that applicants for marriage licenses know their legal rights and duties in relation to marriage and parenthood, understand the \"true nature\" of the marriage relationship, and understand the procedures for obtaining divorces. In a case in which the constitutionality of the Young Adult Marriage Counseling Act is in issue, the burden of persuasion will probably be on the: \n\nOptions:\nA. Person challenging the law, because there is a strong presumption that elected state legislators acted properly.\nB. Person challenging the law, because the Tenth Amendment authorizes states to determine the conditions on which they issue marriage licenses.\nC. State, because there is a substantial impact on the right to marry, and that right is fundamental.\nD. State, because there is a substantial impact on the discrete and insular class of young adults.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Amy Docent, a state college instructor, was discharged because of her refusal to comply with a state statute requiring public employees to swear or affirm that they will (1) \"uphold and defend\" the state and federal constitutions, and (2) \"oppose the overthrow\" of the state or federal governments \"by force, violence, or by any improper method.\" The statute had previously been held constitutional by the state supreme court. Docent filed a complaint in federal district court alleging the unconstitutionality of the statute and seeking an injunction and damages. Which of the following is the state's strongest argument for sustaining the validity of the statute?\n\nOptions:\nA. Government employment is a privilege, not a right.\nB. The oath as a whole is only a commitment to abide by constitutional processes.\nC. The First and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to fix the conditions of state employment.\nD. The state has a compelling need to keep disloyal persons out of governmental positions of trust. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Hunko, a popular professional wrestler, entered into a written agency contract with Adman, who agreed to try to get Hunko's picture on a variety of food products. Hunko promised that Adman would have the exclusive right to promote Hunko on food product lines. They agreed that Hunko would receive $70 \\%$ of the proceeds and Adman would receive $30 \\%$. Adman was able to persuade the makers of \"Chocolate Charms\" breakfast cereal to put Hunko's picture on the cereal boxes. Shortly after Adman confirmed the Chocolate Charms deal with the cereal manufacturer, Hunko and Adman agreed orally that henceforth Hunko would receive $50 \\%$ of the proceeds, including proceeds from the Chocolate Charms deal, and Adman would receive the other $50 \\%$. Hunko received a $ 10,000$ check from Chocolate Charms, and he promptly sent Adman a check for $ 3,000$. Adman demanded an additional $ 2,000$, but Hunko refused to pay. If Adman sues Hunko for the $ 2,000$, the party likely to prevail is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Hunko, because of the parol evidence rule.\nB. Adman, because consideration is not required for a modification.\nC. Hunko, because Adman had a preexisting legal duty to secure food product promotions for Hunko.\nD. Hunko, because an exclusive contract requires that the party given the privileges of exclusivity use his best efforts. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Cycle Company manufactured a bicycle that it sold to Bike Shop, a retail bicycle dealer, which in turn sold it to Roth. Shortly thereafter, while Roth was riding the bicycle along a city street, he saw a traffic light facing him turn from green to amber. He sped up, hoping to cross the intersection before the light turned red. However, Roth quickly realized that he could not do so and applied the brake, which failed. To avoid the traffic that was then crossing in front of him, Roth turned sharply to his right and onto the sidewalk, where he struck Perez, a pedestrian. Both Perez and Roth sustained injuries. Assume that the jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules. For this question only, assume the following facts. Amicusbank lent Bouquet $ 200,000$ and Bouquet executed a written instrument providing that Amicusbank \"is entitled to collect the debt from my share of the profits, if any, under the Vintage-Bouquet contract.\" Amicusbank gave prompt notice of this transaction to Vintage. If Vintage thereafter refuses to account for any profits to Amicusbank and Amicusbank sues Vintage for Bouquet's share of profits then realized, Vintage's strongest argument in defense is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The Bouquet-Vintage contract did not expressly authorize an assignment of rights.\nB. Bouquet and Vintage are partners, not simply debtor and creditor.\nC. Amicusbank is not an assignee of Bouquet's rights under the BouquetVintage contract.\nD. Amicusbank is not an intended thirdparty beneficiary of the BouquetVintage contract.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Three states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids it in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides, \"Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it.\" Snipe traps cost about $ 15$ each. Prentis is a resident of West Hampton and an ardent snipe trapper. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new improved snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, Prentis stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after Prentis admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply. For this question only, assume that Prentis demonstrates that common carriers are permitted to transport snipe traps as cargo across Midland for delivery to another state and that, in practice, the Midland statute is enforced only against private individuals transporting those traps in private vehicles. If Prentis challenges the application of the Midland statute to her on the basis only of a denial of equal protection, this application of the statute will probably be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because the traps constitute contraband in which Prentis could have no protected property interest.\nB. Constitutional, because there is a rational basis for differentiating between the possession of snipe traps as interstate cargo by common carriers and the possession of snipe traps by private individuals.\nC. Unconstitutional, because the state cannot demonstrate a compelling public purpose for making this differentiation between common carriers and such private individuals.\nD. Unconstitutional, because interstate travel is a fundamental right that may not be burdened by state law.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress enacted a law prohibiting the killing, capture, or removal of any form of wildlife upon or from any federally owned land. Which of the following is the most easily justifiable source of national authority for this federal law?\n\nOptions:\nA. The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8.\nB. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.\nC. The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nD. The Property Clause of Article IV, Section 3.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Missoula has enacted a new election code designed to increase voter responsibility in the exercise of the franchise and to enlarge citizen participation in the electoral process. None of its provisions conflict with federal statutes. Which of the following is the strongest reason for finding unconstitutional a requirement in the Missoula election code that each voter must be literate in English?\n\nOptions:\nA. The requirement violates Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that representatives to Congress be chosen \"by the people of the several States.\"\nB. The requirement violates Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to \"make or alter\" state regulations providing for the \"times\" and \"manner\" of holding elections for senators and representatives.\nC. The requirement violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nD. The requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Champlain enacts the Young Adult Marriage Counseling Act, which provides that, before any persons less than 30 years of age may be issued a marriage license, they must receive at least five hours of marriage counseling from a state-licensed social worker. This counseling is designed to ensure that applicants for marriage licenses know their legal rights and duties in relation to marriage and parenthood, understand the \"true nature\" of the marriage relationship, and understand the procedures for obtaining divorces. Pine, aged 25 , contemplates marrying Ross, aged 25. Both are residents of the state of Champlain. Pine has not yet proposed to Ross because he is offended by the counseling requirement. Pine sues in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Young Adult Marriage Counseling Act is unconstitutional. Which of the following is the clearest ground for dismissal of this action by the court?\n\nOptions:\nA. Pine and Ross are residents of the same state.\nB. No substantial federal question is presented.\nC. The suit presents a nonjusticiable political question.\nD. The suit is unripe.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a telephone call on March 1, Adams, an unemployed, retired person, said to Dawes, \"I will sell my automobile for $ 3,000$ cash. I will hold this offer open through March 14.\" On March 12, Adams called Dawes and told her that he had sold the automobile to Clark. Adams in fact had not sold the automobile to anyone. On March 14, Dawes learned that Adams still owned the automobile, and on that date called Adams and said, \"I' $\\mathrm{m}$ coming over to your place with $ 3,000$.\" Adams replied, \"Don't bother. I won' $t$ deliver the automobile to you under any circumstances.\" Dawes protested, but made no further attempt to pay for or take delivery of the automobile. In an action by Dawes against Adams for breach of contract, Dawes probably will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Succeed, because Adams had assured her that the offer would remain open through March 14.\nB. Succeed, because Adams had not in fact sold the automobile to Clark.\nC. Not succeed, because Dawes had not tendered the $ 3,000$ to Adams on or before March 14.\nD. Not succeed, because on March 12, Adams had told Dawes that he had sold the automobile to Clark.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Zeller contracted in writing to deliver to Baker 100 bushels of wheat on August 1 at $ 3.50$ per bushel. Because his suppliers had not delivered enough wheat to him by that time, Zeller on August 1 had only 95 bushels of wheat with which to fulfill his contract with Baker. If Zeller tenders 95 bushels of wheat to Baker on August 1, and Baker refuses to accept or pay for any of the wheat, which of the following best states the legal relationship between Zeller and Baker?\n\nOptions:\nA. Zeller has a cause of action against Baker, because Zeller has substantially performed his contract.\nB. Zeller is excused from performing his contract because of impossibility of performance.\nC. Baker has a cause of action against Zeller for Zeller's failure to deliver 100 bushels of wheat.\nD. Baker is obligated to give Zeller a reasonable time to attempt to obtain the other five bushels of wheat.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Which of the following is most likely to be found to be a strict liability offense?\n\nOptions:\nA. A city ordinance providing for a fine of not more than $ 200$ for shoplifting.\nB. A federal statute making it a felony to possess heroin.\nC. A state statute making it a felony to fail to register a firearm.\nD. A state statute making the sale of adulterated milk a misdemeanor.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A group of children, ranging in age from 8 to 15 , regularly played football on the common area of an apartment complex owned by O'Neill. Most of the children lived in the apartment complex, but some lived elsewhere. O'Neill knew that the children played on the common area and had not objected. Peter, a 13-year-old who did not live in the apartment complex, fell over a sprinkler head while running for a pass and broke his leg. Although Peter had played football on the common area before, he had never noticed the sprinkler heads, which protruded one inch above the ground and were part of a permanently installed underground sprinkler system. If a claim is asserted on Peter's behalf, Peter will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Prevail, if the sprinkler head was a hazard that Peter probably would not discover.\nB. Prevail, because O'Neill had not objected to children playing on the common area.\nC. Not prevail, because Peter did not live in the apartment complex.\nD. Not prevail, unless the sprinkler heads were abnormally dangerous to users of the common area. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"An appropriations act passed by Congress over the President's veto directs that $ 1$ billion \"shall be spent\" by the federal government for the development of a new military weapons system, which is available only from the Arms Corporation. On the order of the President, the Secretary of Defense refuses to authorize a contract for purchase of the weapons system. The Arms Corporation sues the Secretary of Defense, alleging an unlawful withholding of these federal funds. The strongest constitutional argument for the Arms Corporation is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Passage of an appropriation over a veto makes the spending mandatory.\nB. Congress's power to appropriate funds includes the power to require that the funds will be spent as directed.\nC. The President's independent constitutional powers do not specifically refer to spending.\nD. The President's power to withhold such funds is limited to cases where foreign affairs are directly involved. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paulsen sued Daly for nonpayment of a personal loan to Daly, as evidenced by Daly's promissory note to Paulsen. Paulsen called Walters to testify that he knows Daly's handwriting and that the signature on the note is Daly's. On direct examination, to identify himself, Walters gave his name and address and testified that he had been employed by a roofing company for seven years. During presentation of Daly's case, Daly called Wilson to testify that she is the roofing company's personnel manager and that she had determined, by examining the company's employment records, that Walters had worked there only three years. The trial judge should rule that Wilson's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible, because it is not the best evidence.\nB. Inadmissible, because it is impeachment on a collateral question.\nC. Admissible as evidence of a regularly conducted activity.\nD. Admissible as tending to impeach Walters's credibility.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Acting on an anonymous telephone call, police went to Desmond's apartment, knocked on the door, and demanded to search it for narcotics. When Desmond refused, the police forced the door open and placed him under arrest. As they were removing him from the apartment, Desmond offered to give the officers \"valuable information\" in exchange for his release. Before he could say anything else, Desmond was given Miranda warnings by the police. Thereafter, he told the police that he had stored some heroin in his friend's apartment and that he and his friend had been going to sell it. The heroin was recovered, and Desmond was prosecuted for conspiracy to sell narcotics and for possession of narcotics. At his trial, Desmond moved to suppress his statements. Which of the following is Desmond's best argument in support of the motion to suppress?\n\nOptions:\nA. Desmond is entitled to know the identity of his accuser, and the state cannot supply this information.\nB. The police should have given Desmond Miranda warnings prior to entry into the apartment, and the warnings were ineffectual once Desmond offered to give the police information.\nC. Desmond was intimidated by the forced entry into the apartment, and since the statements were involuntary and coerced, their use against him would violate due process of law.\nD. The statements were fruits of an unlawful arrest, and though the Miranda warnings may have been sufficient to protect his right against self-incrimination, they were not sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Arthur and Celia, brother and sister, both of legal age, inherited Goodacre, their childhood home, from their father. They thereby became tenants in common. Goodacre had never been used as anything except a residence. Arthur had been residing on Goodacre with his father at the time his father died. Celia had been residing in a distant city. After their father's funeral, Arthur continued to live on Goodacre, but Celia returned to her own residence. There was no discussion between Arthur and Celia concerning their common ownership, nor had there ever been any administration of their father's estate. Arthur paid all taxes, insurance, and other carrying charges on Goodacre. He paid no rent or other compensation to Celia, nor did Celia request any such payment. Thirty years later, a series of disputes arose between Arthur and Celia for the first time concerning their respective rights to Goodacre. The jurisdiction where the land is located recognizes the usual common law types of cotenancies, and there is no applicable legislation on the subject. If Arthur claims the entire title to Goodacre in fee simple and brings an action against Celia to quiet title in himself, and if the state where the land is located has an ordinary 20 -year adverse possession statute, the decision should be for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Arthur, because during the past 30 years Arthur has exercised the type of occupancy ordinarily considered sufficient to satisfy the adverse possession requirements.\nB. Arthur, because the acts of the parties indicate Celia's intention to renounce her right to inheritance.\nC. Celia, because there is no evidence that Arthur has performed sufficient acts to constitute her ouster.\nD. Celia, because one co-tenant cannot acquire title by adverse possession against another. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In compliance with a federal statute requiring buildings to be made accessible to persons with disabilities, Walter installed wheelchair ramps at both entrances to his office building located on Blackacre, which he had owned for many years. One year later, Walter entered into a contract with Barbara to sell Blackacre, including the office building. After having the property surveyed, Barbara notified Walter that she was not going to complete the sale because the wheelchair ramp on the south side of the building extended over the property line and into the adjoining parcel of Whiteacre, making the title unmarketable. Walter insisted that Barbara proceed with the sale, and brought an action to compel her performance. If the court were to find that title is marketable, it will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. The wheelchair ramp is required by federal law.\nB. Walter currently owns Whiteacre and acquired Whiteacre and Blackacre as part of a larger parcel.\nC. The wheelchair ramp extends only 10 inches over the property line.\nD. The contract between Walter and Barbara requires Walter to convey only a quitclaim deed. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Peters sued Dietrich, claiming that they had entered into an oral agreement whereby Dietrich agreed to hire Peters as Chief Engineer of Dietrich Products and Peters agreed to take the job at a specified salary, and that Dietrich had subsequently breached their employment contract by refusing to hire Peters. At the trial of Peters's suit, Dietrich took the stand and denied having any contract with Peters for employment or otherwise. In response, Peters offers into evidence a properly authenticated phone message to Dietrich's wife, Wanda, that Dietrich had left with the switchboard operator at her office. The message stated, \"I know you won't be happy, but I've offered Peters the Chief Engineer position and he's accepted.\" Dietrich's attorney objects. The phone message should be ruled:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because it is the statement of a party-opponent.\nB. Admissible, if it is a recent perception.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is a privileged communication between husband and wife.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Plummer, a well-known politician, was scheduled to address a large crowd at a political dinner. Just as Plummer was about to sit down at the head table, Devon pushed Plummer's chair to one side. As a result, Plummer fell to the floor. Plummer was embarrassed at being made to look foolish before a large audience but suffered no physical harm. If Plummer asserts a claim against Devon for damages because of his embarrassment, will Plummer prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, if Devon knew that Plummer was about to sit on the chair.\nB. Yes, if Devon negligently failed to notice that Plummer was about to sit on the chair.\nC. No, because Plummer suffered no physical harm along with his embarrassment.\nD. No, if in moving the chair Devon intended only a good-natured practical joke on Plummer. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a civil suit by Pine against Decker, Decker called Wall, a chemist, as an expert witness and asked him a number of questions about his education and experience in chemistry. Over Pine's objection that Wall was not shown to be qualified in chemistry, the trial court permitted Wall to testify as to his opinion in response to a hypothetical question. On cross-examination, Pine asked Wall if he had failed two chemistry courses while doing his graduate work. The answer should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted, because it is relevant to the weight to be given Wall's testimony.\nB. Admitted, because specific acts bearing on truthfulness may be inquired about on cross-examination.\nC. Excluded, because the court has determined that Wall is qualified to testify as an expert.\nD. Excluded, because Wall's character has not been put in issue.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a writing signed by both parties, Paul Plannah, a renowned architect, agreed for a fee of $ 25,000$ to design and supervise construction of a new house for Phoebe Threedee, a famous sculptor, the fee to be paid upon completion of the house. Plannah and Threedee got along poorly and, when the design plans were about two-thirds complete, they had a heated argument over the proper location of a marble staircase. Hoping to avoid such encounters, Plannah, without Threedee's knowledge, assigned to Donna Drafty, a newly licensed architect practicing solo, \"all of my rights and duties under my design and construction-supervision contract with Threedee.\" Drafty expressly promised Plannah to carry out the work to the best of Drafty's ability. For this question only, assume that Threedee, on learning of the assignment, refused to allow Drafty to proceed as architect and brought an action against Plannah to compel him to resume and complete performance of the contract. Is Threedee entitled to such relief?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Plannah's services under the contract are unique.\nB. Yes, because Plannah has personally completed two-thirds of the design work.\nC. No, because the Plannah-Threedee contract is one for personal services by Plannah.\nD. No, because Plannah effectively delegated his remaining duties under the Plannah-Threedee contract to Drafty.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a writing signed by both parties, Paul Plannah, a renowned architect, agreed for a fee of $ 25,000$ to design and supervise construction of a new house for Phoebe Threedee, a famous sculptor, the fee to be paid upon completion of the house. Plannah and Threedee got along poorly and, when the design plans were about two-thirds complete, they had a heated argument over the proper location of a marble staircase. Hoping to avoid such encounters, Plannah, without Threedee's knowledge, assigned to Donna Drafty, a newly licensed architect practicing solo, \"all of my rights and duties under my design and construction-supervision contract with Threedee.\" Drafty expressly promised Plannah to carry out the work to the best of Drafty's ability. For this question only, assume that Threedee allowed Drafty to proceed with the design work, but that Drafty, without legal excuse, abandoned the project shortly after construction began. Which of the following legal conclusions are correct? I. Plannah is liable to Threedee for legal damages, if any, caused by Drafty's default. II. Drafty is liable to Threedee for legal damages, if any, caused by Drafty's default. III. Threedee is indebted to Drafty, on a divisible contract theory, for a prorated portion of the agreed $ 25,000$ architect's fee promised to Plannah.\n\nOptions:\nA. I. and II. only.\nB. I. and III. only.\nC. II. and III. only.\nD. I., II., and III.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Hammond decided to kill his wife by poisoning her. He asked his friend, Jordan, a pharmacist, to obtain some curare, a deadly poison, and to give it to him without recording the transaction. Because Jordan suspected Hammond's motive, she supplied Hammond with a small quantity of Marvane, an antibiotic, instead of curare. Marvane is harmless if administered in small quantities, except for the less than $1 \\%$ of the population who are allergic to the drug. Hammond injected his wife with the Marvane while she slept. She was allergic to the drug and died from the injection. Jordan was distraught and confessed the entire affair to the police, explaining that she had failed to report Hammond's conduct to the authorities because she feared that it would end their friendship if she did. Jordan is an accomplice to:\n\nOptions:\nA. Murder.\nB. Manslaughter.\nC. Criminally negligent homicide.\nD. No degree of criminal homicide.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A newly enacted criminal statute provides, in its entirety, \"No person shall utter to another person in a public place any annoying, disturbing or unwelcome language.\" Smith followed an elderly woman for three blocks down a public street, yelling in her ear offensive four-letter words. The woman repeatedly asked Smith to leave her alone, but he refused. In the subsequent prosecution of Smith, the first under this statute, Smith will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not prevail.\nB. Prevail, because speech of the sort described here may not be punished by the state because of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\nC. Prevail, because though his speech may be punished by the state, the state may not do so under this statute.\nD. Prevail, because the average user of a public street would think his speech\/action here was amusing and ridiculous rather than \"annoying,\" etc.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A federal criminal law makes it a crime for any citizen of the United States not specifically authorized by the President to negotiate with a foreign government for the purpose of influencing the foreign government in relation to a dispute with the United States. The strongest constitutional ground for the validity of this law is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Under several of its enumerated powers, Congress may legislate to preserve the monopoly of the national government over the conduct of United States foreign affairs.\nB. The President's inherent power to negotiate for the United States with foreign countries authorizes the President, even in the absence of statutory authorization, to punish citizens who engage in such negotiations without permission.\nC. The law deals with foreign relations and therefore is not governed by the First Amendment.\nD. Federal criminal laws dealing with international affairs need not be as specific as those dealing with domestic affairs.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"At trial of Pendergast's battery action against Dellacourt, arising from an incident in which Dellacourt allegedly bit off Pendergast's ear, Winchester testified that he was taking a shortcut through an urban alley one morning and heard someone cry \"Help!\" Rushing around the corner of a building, Winchester saw Pendergast lying on the sidewalk in a pool of blood, with his left ear missing. Dellacourt, who was standing nearby, turned quickly and made a move as if to approach Winchester, and so Winchester ran down the sidewalk away from Dellacourt to summon the police. The following exchange then occurred during cross-examination of Winchester by Dellacourt's counsel. D: \"You didn't actually see my client bite off the plaintiff's ear, did you, Mr. Winchester?\" W: \"No.\" D: \"For all you know, my client could have been an innocent bystander like yourself, but one who didn't run away but stayed to offer assistance.\" W: \"I ran away because I was afraid of the defendant and because I wanted to call the police.\" D: \"For all we know you might have been running out of that alley because you had just committed a crime yourself, Mr. Winchester.\" W: \"Look, Dellacourt is the one who bit off the ear, not me!\" D: \"If you arrived on the scene after the alleged ear biting, how can you possibly know my client is the one who bit off the plaintiff's ear?\"' W: \"Because I read in the newspaper the next day that an eyewitness to the entire event told police that he saw Dellacourt spit the ear out after I left.\" Dellacourt then moved to have Winchester's last remark stricken from the record. If the trial court denies Dellacourt's motion, that ruling is most strongly supported by which of the following?\n\nOptions:\nA. The report of the eyewitness was an excited utterance.\nB. The report of the eyewitness was a statement of recent perception.\nC. The error in admitting the statement could not be cured by an appropriate jury instruction.\nD. The remark was invited by the crossexaminer's questions.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Egbert, who was sent to prison for nine years for car theft, vowed to get even with Charles, the prosecutor at his trial. While in prison, Egbert was told by another prisoner, Duane, that when Charles was in private practice as a criminal defense attorney, he had represented Duane in a drug charge. Duane claimed that because he did not have the cash to pay Charles his fees, he offered to pay his fees with five ounces of cocaine, and Charles accepted. Although Egbert had no independent reason to believe that what Duane said was true, when he got out of prison he learned that Charles was running for District Attorney. Egbert went to one of the local papers and sold them the story for $ 1,000$. In the article that resulted, Egbert was quoted as saying \"I only hope that Charles suffers like I had to suffer for the last nine years.\" Although the allegation was false, Charles withdrew from the race as a result of the article. In a suit by Charles against Egbert for defamation, the probable result would be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Charles prevails because Egbert acted with deliberate malice towards Charles.\nB. Charles prevails if Egbert should have known that the story was false.\nC. Egbert prevails because the story was a matter of public concern.\nD. Egbert prevails if he honestly believed the truth of the assertion made by Duane.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Donaldson broke into Professor Ruiz's office to look at examination questions. The questions were locked in a drawer, and Donaldson could not find them. Donaldson believed that looking at examination questions was a crime, but in this belief he was mistaken. Charged with burglary, Donaldson should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Acquitted, because he did not complete the crime and he has not been charged with attempt.\nB. Acquitted, because what he intended to do when he broke in was not a crime.\nC. Convicted, because he had the necessary mental state and committed the act of breaking and entering.\nD. Convicted, because factual impossibility is not a defense.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Lordsville was a small, agricultural village with a population of 400 . It was a quiet, conservative town, and $90 \\%$ of the inhabitants belonged to the Lordsville Church of Jesus, a whitewashed frame building located on Lordsville's main street. The Lordsville Village Council consisted of five members, all of whom were members of the Lordsville Church of Jesus. The Council unanimously appropriated $ 350$ to pay Mower to mow the lawn of the Lordsville Church of Jesus for a year. Mower was a 15-year-old resident of Lordsville and a member of the Lordsville Church of Jesus whose father had been killed the previous year when he was struck by lightning. Curmudgeon, a Lordsville resident, lived in a tiny house and paid only $200 per year in village and county property taxes, but he was incensed that any of it should go to support what he called \"a bunch of holier-thanthou, superstitious, holy-rollers.\" Curmudgeon filed suit in federal district court to strike down the Council's appropriation to mow the church lawn. Should the court entertain Curmudgeon's suit?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because Curmudgeon paid so little in taxes that his interest in the matter, if any, is too minimal.\nB. No, because taxpayers lack standing to sue over appropriations by duly constituted legislative bodies.\nC. Yes, because a taxpayer may sue under the authority of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause if a fund into which he has paid is being used for religious purposes.\nD. Yes, because taxpayers have standing to sue when questions involving constitutional rights are at issue.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Torgeson, a prosperous widower, owned Fruitacre, a large tract of land located near Sunbelt City. Fruitacre was primarily used for extensive citrus orchards, but Torgeson was sure that rapidly growing Sunbelt City would expand toward Fruitacre, and that Fruitacre would be a prime tract for a residential subdivision within 20 years. Torgeson wanted to see his three grandchildren, Hubert (age 22), Dubert (age 17), and Luberta (age 15), benefit from the large price that he was sure Fruitacre would bring, but he was also concerned that the grandchildren be of sufficient maturity. Torgeson suggested to his only child, Diana, that he give her a life interest in Fruitacre, and that Diana's children take Fruitacre upon her death. Diana told Torgeson that she did not need the income from Fruitacre and would prefer that Torgeson give the land directly to Hubert, Dubert, and Luberta. Torgeson arrived at what he felt was a reasonable compromise, using his good friend, Fran (age 55), as the person to whom he conveyed the land. Torgeson's conveyance read, in pertinent part, as follows: \"I convey Fruitacre to Fran for life, remainder to all of my grandchildren who ever attain the age of 25 , and if none of them attains such age, to the Sisters of Charity.\" 44. The grandchildren's interest can best be described as: (A) A contingent remainder. (B) A vested remainder. (C) An executory interest. (D) Nothing. Which of the following is the strongest argument in favor of the constitutionality of free distribution of textbooks to the students at Stone School?\n\nOptions:\nA. Private religious schools, like public nonsectarian schools, fulfill an important educational function.\nB. Religious instruction in private schools is not constitutionally objectionable.\nC. The purpose and effect of the free distribution of these textbooks is secular and does not entangle church and state.\nD. The Free Exercise Clause requires identical treatment by the state of students in public and private schools. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jaywalking (crossing a street outside of a crosswalk or not at an intersection) is punishable by a fine in Metropolis. Bert, who had lived in Metropolis all of his 67 years, was out windowshopping with his wife, Ruth, also 67 , when he saw a friend across the street at a diner they both frequented. Telling Ruth that he would be right back, he saw that there were no cars nearby and so strode briskly across the street in the middle of the block. As he reached the other sidewalk, a police officer who had been checking parked cars for parking violations stepped up to Bert and said, \"Hold it buddy, let's see your driver's license,\" and then reached for her citation book. Bert, a city dweller from birth, had always walked or used public transportation, had never learned to drive, and did not have a driver's license. When he told the officer that he did not have a driver's license, she said, \"All right, I'm taking you in,\" and seized his wrist, twisting it up and behind him in a personnel control lock. A black belt in judo, Bert easily slipped the officer's grasp. \"You asked for it,\" she then growled, and pulled her baton from her belt. When she attempted to strike Bert, he moved swiftly to the side, chopped at her arm, and caused the baton to fall from her grasp to the pavement. At that point two other officers arrived on the scene and arrested Bert. Ruth watched the entire episode from across the street and became greatly distressed. 34. Bert brings an action against the first officer for battery. What will be the probable outcome of this litigation? (A) He will lose, because he struck the officer. (B) He will lose, because the offense was committed in the officer's presence. (C) He will win, unless he is found guilty of jaywalking. (D) He will win, because the officer was not privileged to arrest him. Ruth also sues the officer, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Will she recover?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, unless the officer knew that Ruth and Bert were husband and wife.\nB. No, if the officer did not know that Ruth was watching from across the street.\nC. Yes, because the officer's conduct regarding Bert was extreme and outrageous.\nD. Yes, because the officer's conduct caused Ruth to be severely emotionally disturbed.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Seller and Buyer executed an agreement for the sale of real property. Assume for this question only that Buyer dies before closing, there being no breach of the agreement by either party. Which of the following is appropriate in most jurisdictions?\n\nOptions:\nA. Buyer's heir may specifically enforce the agreement.\nB. Seller has the right to return the down payment and cancel the contract.\nC. Death terminates the agreement.\nD. Any title acquired would be unmarketable by reason of Buyer's death. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Although by all appearances Herb and Edna, an elderly couple, were destitute, they had, in fact, substantial cash in the bank. Their new neighbors, the Smiths, feeling sorry for them on Thanksgiving, bought a month's supply of food and gave it to Herb and Edna. Later, Edna confided in the Smiths that she and Herb had money and told them that, because they had been so kind, she was leaving them money in her will. All of Herb's and Edna's bank accounts were held in joint tenancy. When Edna died, at the Smiths' request Herb gave the Smiths the following signed instrument: \"In consideration of my wife's promise to the Smiths, and their agreement not to sue her estate, I agree to pay them the sum of $ 5,000$.\" When Herb died of a heart attack several days later, the Smiths asked the administrator of his estate to pay them the $ 5,000$. The administrator refused on the ground that there was no consideration for the agreement. Besides the consideration stated in Herb's written instrument, what other fact would strengthen the Smiths' claim?\n\nOptions:\nA. They would have never given the food if they had known Herb and Edna had money.\nB. They believed they could sue Edna's estate.\nC. The majority of the funds in the bank were left to Edna by her parents.\nD. Edna's promise to them was in writing.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress provides by statute that any state that fails to prohibit automobile speeds of over 55 miles per hour on highways within the state shall be denied federal highway construction funding. The state of Atlantic, one of the richest and most highway-oriented states in the country, refuses to enact such a statute. The best argument that can be made in support of the constitutionality of this federal statute is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The states conceded their authority over highways to the national government when the states accepted federal grants to help finance the highways.\nB. The federal government can regulate the use of state highways without limitation because the federal government paid for most of their construction costs.\nC. Reasonable legislators could believe that the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit will ensure that the federal money spent on highways results in greater benefit than harm to the public.\nD. A recent public opinion survey demonstrates that $90 \\%$ of the people in this country support a 55 mile-perhour speed limit.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Yuma provides by statute, \"No person may be awarded any state construction contract without agreeing to employ only citizens of the state and of the United States in performance of the contract.\" If the Yuma statute is attacked as violating the Commerce Clause, which of the following defenses is the weakest?\n\nOptions:\nA. The statute will help protect the workers of the state of Yuma from competition by foreign workers.\nB. The statute will help ensure that workers with jobs directly affecting the performance of public contracts are dedicated to their jobs.\nC. The statute will help ensure a continuously available and stable work force for the execution of public contracts.\nD. The statute will help ensure that only the most qualified individuals work on public contracts.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"After several days of negotiations, Ohner wrote to Plummer: \"Will pay you $ 3,000$ if you will install new plumbing in my office building according to the specifications I have sent you. I must have your reply by March 30 .\" Plummer replied by a letter that Ohner received on March 15: \"Will not do it for less than $ 3,500$.\" On March 20, Plummer wrote to Ohner: \"Have changed my mind. I will do the work for $ 3,000$. Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I will begin work on April 5.\" Ohner received this letter on March 22 but did not reply to it. Plummer, without Ohner's knowledge, began the work on April 5. Which of the following best characterizes the legal relationship between Ohner and Plummer as of April 5?\n\nOptions:\nA. A contract was formed on March 20 when Plummer posted his letter.\nB. A contract was formed on March 22 when Ohner received Plummer's letter.\nC. A contract was formed on April 5 when Plummer began work.\nD. There was no contract between the parties as of April 5.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"An ordinance of City makes it unlawful to park a motor vehicle on a City street within 10 feet of a fire hydrant. At 1:55 p.m., Parker, realizing he must be in Bank before it closed at 2 p.m. and finding no other space available, parked his automobile in front of a fire hydrant on a City street. Parker then hurried into the bank, leaving his aged neighbor, Ned, as a passenger in the rear seat of the car. About five minutes later, and while Parker was still in Bank, Driver was driving down the street. Driver swerved to avoid what he mistakenly thought was a hole in the street and sideswiped Parker's car. Parker's car was turned over on top of the hydrant, breaking the hydrant and causing a small flood of water. Parker's car was severely damaged and Ned was badly injured. There is no applicable guest statute and the jurisdiction follows traditional contributory negligence rules. If Ned asserts a claim against Parker, the most likely result is that Ned will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because Parker's action was negligence per se.\nB. Recover, because Parker's action was a continuing wrong that contributed to Ned's injuries.\nC. Not recover, because a reasonably prudent person could not foresee injury to Ned as a result of Parker's action.\nD. Not recover, because a violation of a city ordinance does not give rise to a civil cause of action.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A federal statute set up a program of dental education. The statute provided that the Secretary of Health and Human Services \"shall, on a current basis, spend all of the money appropriated for this purpose\" and \"shall distribute the appropriated funds\" by a specified formula to state health departments that agree to participate in the program. In the current year Congress appropriated $100$ million for expenditure on this program. To ensure a budget surplus in the current fiscal year, the President issued an executive order directing the various Cabinet Secretaries to cut expenditures in this year by $10 \\%$ in all categories. He also ordered certain programs to be cut more drastically because he believed that \"they are not as important to the general welfare as other programs.\" The President identified the dental education program as such a program and ordered it to be cut by $50 \\%$. Assume that no other federal statutes are relevant. To satisfy constitutional requirements, how much money must the Secretary of Health and Human Services distribute for the dental education program this year?\n\nOptions:\nA. $50 million, because the President could reasonably determine that this program is not as important to the general welfare as other programs.\nB. $50 million, because as chief executive the President has the constitutional authority to control the actions of all of his subordinates by executive order.\nC. $ 90$ million, because any more drastic cut for the program would be a denial of equal protection to beneficiaries of this program as compared to beneficiaries of other programs.\nD. $100 million, because the President may not unilaterally suspend the effect of a valid federal statute imposing a duty to spend appropriated monies. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be guilty of the crime charged?\n\nOptions:\nA. Without the permission of Owner, Defendant takes Owner's car with the intention of driving it three miles to a grocery store and back. Defendant is charged with larceny.\nB. Defendant gets permission to borrow Owner's car for the evening by falsely promising to return it, although he does not intend to do so. Two days later, he changes his mind and returns the car. Defendant is charged with larceny by trick.\nC. Defendant gets permission to borrow Owner's car for the evening by misrepresenting his identity and falsely claiming he has a valid driver's license. He returns the car the next day. Defendant is charged with obtaining property by false pretenses.\nD. With permission, Defendant, promising to return it by 9 p.m., borrows Owner's car. Later in the evening, Defendant decides to keep the car until the next morning and does so. Defendant is charged with embezzlement. ",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The industrial city of Tunbridge suffered from battles over gang turf and a rash of drive-by shootings. Most street gangs were affiliated with one of the two loose gang confederations that fought for dominance, the Assassins and the Ghouls. To \"issue a warning\" to the Ghouls, a carload of Assassins, armed with Uzi submachine guns, sped into the Ghouls' neighborhood. It was late at night when the car passed a corner store, around which the Ghouls were known to congregate during daylight hours. The Assassins knew that the store closed at 6 p.m. and that the Ghouls went elsewhere after nightfall. As the Assassins drove by, they sprayed the store with submachine gunfire, smashing the windows and pocking the brick exteriors. One of the bullets struck and killed Jamie, a six-yearold girl who was asleep in an apartment located on the second floor, above the corner store. A few days later, the police arrested Dennison, who admitted to being a member of the Assassins and to having been in the car when the Assassins shot up the store. Dennison was placed on trial for the murder of Jamie. If Dennison takes the stand in his own defense, and the jury believes Dennison's testimony, which of the following assertions by Dennison would be his best defense to the murder charge?\n\nOptions:\nA. \"I was the driver of the car and did not actually shoot into the building.\"\nB. \"I took a lot of drugs that night, and I was so high that I don't even remember the incident; I was certainly in no condition to form an intent to kill somebody.\"\nC. \"Another member of my gang pointed a gun at me. I was really scared that if I didn't shoot into the building I would be seriously injured or killed myself.\"\nD. \"I believed that the building was abandoned and had no idea that there would be people inside it.\"",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A statute authorizes a specified federal administrative agency to issue rules governing the distribution of federal grant funds for scientific research. The statute provides that, in issuing those rules, the agency must follow procedures and substantive standards contained in the statute. In a severable provision, the statute also provides that otherwise valid rules issued by the agency under authority delegated to it by this statute may be set aside by a majority vote of a designated standing joint committee of Congress. The provision of this statute relating to the power of the designated standing joint committee of Congress is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because it is a necessary and proper means of ensuring that the rules issued by this agency are actually consistent with the will of Congress.\nB. Constitutional, because discretionary money grants authorized by statute are privileges, not rights, and, therefore, Congress has greater freedom to intervene in their administration than it has to intervene in the administration of regulatory laws. \nC. Unconstitutional, because it denies equal protection of the laws to members of Congress who are not appointed to the joint legislative committee authorized to set aside rules of this agency.\nD. Unconstitutional, because it authorizes a congressional change of legal rights and obligations by means other than those specified in the Constitution for the enactment of laws.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The town of Hometown had a municipal auditorium that all groups were permitted to use. Lately, Bhagwan Bigbucks has begun to hold recruiting seminars for his religious cult at the auditorium. Sensing the displeasure of the voting public and fearing that the auditorium would become a mecca of fringe religious groups, the Hometown Town Council adopted the following ordinance: \"Effective immediately, no religious groups will be permitted to use the Municipal Auditorium for meetings, speeches, or other public gatherings.\" Bigbucks, who was having great success recruiting followers in Hometown, challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance in federal court. His suit should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Fail, because the ordinance treats all religions equally.\nB. Fail, because continuing to allow religious groups to use the auditorium would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.\nC. Succeed, because \"religious groups\" is an unconstitutionally vague term.\nD. Succeed, unless Hometown can show that the ordinance serves a compelling government interest.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Eureka, Inc., inventor of the LBVC, a laserbeam vegetable chopper, ran a television ad that described the chopper and said, \"The LBVC is yours for only $ 49.99$ if you send your check or money order to Box 007, Greenville. Not available in stores.\" Gourmet, who owned a retail specialty shop, wrote Eureka, \"What's your best, firm price for two dozen LBVCs?\" Eureka sent a written reply that said in its entirety, \"We quote you for prompt acceptance $ 39.99$ per unit for 24 LBVCs.\" Gourmet subsequently mailed a check to Eureka in the appropriate amount, with a memo enclosed saying, \"I accept your offer for 24 LBVCs.\" Assume for this question only that Seller dies before closing and his will leaves his personal property to Perry and his real property to Rose. There being no breach of the agreement by either party, which of the following is correct?\n\nOptions:\nA. Death, an eventuality for which the parties could have provided, terminates the agreement if they did not so provide. \nB. Rose is entitled to the proceeds of the sale when it closes, because the doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply to these circumstances.\nC. Perry is entitled to the proceeds of the sale when it closes.\nD. Title was rendered unmarketable by Seller's death.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Orris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris's knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned. After 12 years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Burns by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Burns remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 years. Besides the consideration stated in Herb's written instrument, what other fact would strengthen the Smiths' claim?\n\nOptions:\nA. They would have never given the food if they had known Herb and Edna had money.\nB. They believed they could sue Edna's estate.\nC. The majority of the funds in the bank were left to Edna by her parents.\nD. Edna's promise to them was in writing.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress enacts a statute punishing \"each and every conspiracy entered into by any two or more persons for the purpose of denying black persons housing, employment, or education, solely because of their race.\" Under which of the following constitutional provisions is the authority of Congress to pass such a statute most clearly and easily justifiable?\n\nOptions:\nA. The Obligation of Contracts Clause.\nB. The General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state statute makes fraud for personal financial gain a crime. Jones was convicted of violating this statute on three separate occasions. Following his most recent conviction, he professed to have undergone a religious conversion and proclaimed himself to be the divine minister of \"St. Rockport,\" an alleged messiah who would shortly be making his appearance on earth. Jones solicited cash donations from the public to support his efforts to spread the word of St. Rockport and his coming appearance on earth. Following complaints by several contributors who claimed he defrauded them, Jones was again charged with fraud under this state statute. The charge was that Jones \"should have known that his representations about St. Rockport were false and, therefore, that he made them solely to collect cash donations for his personal gain.\" A witness for the prosecution in Jones's trial stated that Jones had admitted that, at times, he had doubts about the existence of St. Rockport. Jones was the only religious minister prosecuted for fraud under this state statute. The strongest constitutional defense that Jones could assert would be that this prosecution:\n\nOptions:\nA. Deprived him of the equal protection of the laws because other religious ministers have not been charged under this statute.\nB. Denied him procedural due process because it placed upon Jones the burden of rebutting evidence, submitted by the state, of his bad faith in raising this money.\nC. Denied him rights conferred by the Obligation of Contracts Clause by preventing him from taking money from persons who wished to contract with him to spread the word of St. Rockport.\nD. Denied him the free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it required the state to determine the truth or falsity of the content of his religious beliefs. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ann leased commercial property to Brenda for a period of 10 years. The lease contained the following provision: \"No subleasing or assignment will be permitted unless with the written consent of the lessor.\" One year later, Brenda assigned all interest in the lease to Carolyn, who assumed and agreed to perform the lessee's obligations under the terms of the lease. Ann learned of the assignment and wrote to Brenda that she had no objection to the assignment to Carolyn and agreed to accept rent from Carolyn instead of Brenda. Thereafter, Carolyn paid rent to Ann for a period of five years. Carolyn then defaulted and went into bankruptcy. In an appropriate action, Ann sued Brenda for rent due. If Ann loses, it will be because there was:\n\nOptions:\nA. Laches.\nB. An accord and satisfaction.\nC. A novation.\nD. An attornment.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ellis, an electrical engineer, designed an electronic game known as Zappo. Ellis entered into a licensing agreement with Toyco under which Toyco agreed to manufacture Zappo according to Ellis's specifications and to market it and pay a royalty to Ellis. Carla, whose parents had purchased a Zappo game for her, was injured while playing with the game. Carla recovered a judgment against Toyco on the basis of a finding that the Zappo game was defective because of Ellis's improper design. In a claim for indemnity against Ellis, will Toyco prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because as between Ellis and Toyco, Ellis was responsible for the design of Zappo.\nB. Yes, because Toyco and Ellis were joint tortfeasors.\nC. No, because Toyco, as the manufacturer, was strictly liable to Carla.\nD. No, if Toyco, by a reasonable inspection, could have discovered the defect in the design of Zappo. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Responding to an open bid solicitation from the procurement office of the Defense Department, Midwest Technologies submitted a bid for the development of a new flame-resistant fabric. Upon review of the bids, Midwest was notified that it was the low bidder; however, its bid for the contract was denied because of its failure to meet guidelines on minority representation that the procurement office imposed on firms contracting with the Defense Department. Several months later, the project was rebid. Although Midwest did not participate, company officials later learned that the contract had been awarded to another regional company, Great Plains Technologies, after the procurement office waived its minority representation guidelines for that project. Midwest filed an action in federal district court seeking only to enjoin performance of the contract. The court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Dismiss the action, because Midwest cannot show a relationship between the procurement office's award of the contract and any injury that it may be claiming.\nB. Dismiss the action, because the federal government may enter into contracts under whatever conditions it chooses.\nC. Decide the case on the merits, because the procurement office must show that its waiver of the minority representation guidelines was necessary to further a compelling government interest.\nD. Decide the case on the merits, because Midwest can claim that the unequal treatment of the two bidders violated its rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On March 15, Venus Viniferous entered into a written agreement with Tipple Winery that provided that Venus would sell 1,600 tons of tokay grapes to Tipple for $ 750$ per ton, delivery to be no later than November 1 of the same year. By November 1, Venus had delivered only 700 tons of grapes, and had informed Tipple by telegram that she had used the remainder of her crop in the production of her own boutique winery's latest release, Tokay With Me wine cooler. Tipple purchased an additional 900 tons of tokay grapes from other growers at the thenprevailing market price of $ 800$ per ton. Venus has submitted an invoice to the marketing department of Tipple for $ 525,000$. The head of marketing has come to you, Tipple's legal officer, for advice on how to respond to this billing. Ignoring incidental costs of cover, you should advise her to:\n\nOptions:\nA. Pay the $ 525,000$, since by accepting delivery of the 700 tons of grapes Tipple waived an objection to Venus's breach.\nB. Pay Venus the market value of her 700 tons of grapes as of November 1, less the cost of cover for the remaining 900 tons.\nC. Pay Venus $ 480,000$, representing the contract price for the grapes she delivered less the cost of cover for the remaining 900 tons.\nD. Pay Venus nothing, since she will be unable to enforce any claim for payment in court. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When the latest generation of interactive video games reached the video arcades in State Russet, community groups and civic leaders were alarmed to discover that the most popular games among young teenagers had graphic displays of violence and sexual themes. The state legislature quickly responded to the public outcry. With the stated aim of protecting minors from the perceived evils of offensive but not necessarily obscene materials, the legislature enacted a statute banning the commercial licensing of video arcade games with a specifically defined degree of graphic violent or sexual content. Delmar, the owner of a chain of video arcades in State Russet shopping malls, was denied licenses for a number of video games that he wanted to install at his arcades. He challenges the state's action in federal district court. The court will probably find the State Russet statute:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because for materials accessible to minors, the state may adopt a different standard for determining whether the material is offensive or obscene than the standard it applies for adults.\nB. Constitutional, because the statute precisely defines the type of content that is prohibited in the video games.\nC. Unconstitutional, because narrower means are available to deny minors access to the objectionable material without affecting rights of adults.\nD. Unconstitutional, because some of the banned video games may have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, as determined by contemporary community standards, and thus do not fall within the definition of obscenity. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Davison was driving through an apartment building area plagued with an unusually high incidence of burglaries and assaults. Acting pursuant to a police department plan to combat crime by the random stopping of automobiles in the area between midnight and 6 a.m., a police officer stopped Davison and asked him for identification. As Davison handed the officer his license, the officer directed a flashlight into the automobile and saw what appeared to be the barrel of a shotgun protruding from under the front seat on the passenger side of the car. The officer ordered Davison from the car, searched him, and discovered marijuana cigarettes and a shotgun. At Davison's trial for unlawful possession of narcotics, his motion to suppress the use of the marijuana as evidence should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustained, because the marijuana was discovered as a result of the unlawful stopping of Davison's automobile. \nB. Sustained, because the use of the flashlight constituted a search of the interior of Davison's automobile without probable cause.\nC. Denied, because the officer's conduct was consistent with the established police plan.\nD. Denied, because the discovery of the gun in plain view created the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the arrest and search of Davison.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dean, charged with murder, was present with her attorney at a preliminary examination when White, who was the defendant in a separate prosecution for concealing the body of the murder victim, testified for the prosecution against Dean. When called to testify at Dean's trial, White refused to testify, although ordered to do so. The prosecution offers evidence of White's testimony at the preliminary examination. The evidence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as former testimony.\nB. Admissible as past recollection recorded.\nC. Inadmissible, because it would violate White's privilege against self-incrimination.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Santos agreed to sell and Perrine agreed to buy a described lot on which a single-family residence had been built. Under the contract, Santos agreed to convey marketable title subject only to conditions, covenants, and restrictions of record and all applicable zoning laws and ordinances. The lot was subject to a 10 -foot side line setback originally set forth in the developer's duly recorded subdivision plot. The applicable zoning ordinance zones the property for single-family units and requires an 8.5-foot side line setback. Prior to closing, a survey of the property was made. It revealed that a portion of Santos's house was $8.4$ feet from the side line. Perrine refused to consummate the transaction on the ground that Santos's title is not marketable. In an appropriate action, Santos seeks specific performance. Who will prevail in such an action?\n\nOptions:\nA. Santos, because any suit against Perrine concerning the setback would be frivolous.\nB. Santos, because the setback violation falls within the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex.\nC. Perrine, because any variation, however small, amounts to a breach of contract.\nD. Perrine, because the fact that Perrine may be exposed to litigation is sufficient to make the title unmarketable.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alford was a suspect in a homicide committed during a robbery of a liquor store. Barber was a friend of Alford. Police telephoned Barber and asked if he would help locate Alford. Barber agreed and met the police officers at headquarters later that night. After a discussion during which police asked questions about Alford and the homicide, Barber said that he wanted to get something \"off his chest\" and advised the officers that he was in on the robbery but that Alford had shot the owner of the store without his permission or prior knowledge. The officers then for the first time gave Barber his Miranda warnings. Barber was indicted for felony murder. He moved to prevent the introduction of his statement into evidence. His motion should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Granted, because Barber was effectively in custody and entitled to receive Miranda warnings at the beginning of the discussion.\nB. Granted, because Barber's right to counsel and due process were violated by the interrogation at police headquarters.\nC. Denied, because his statement was freely and voluntarily given and he was not entitled to Miranda warnings.\nD. Denied, because by visiting headquarters voluntarily, Barber waived his right to have Miranda warnings at the beginning of the discussion.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a trial between Jones and Smith, an issue arose about Smith's ownership of a horse, which had caused damage to Jones's crops. Jones seeks to introduce in evidence a photograph of his cornfield to depict the nature and extent of the damage done. The judge should rule the photograph:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible if Jones testifies that it fairly and accurately portrays the condition of the cornfield after the damage was done.\nB. Admissible if Jones testifies that the photograph was taken within a week after the alleged occurrence. \nC. Inadmissible if Jones fails to call the photographer to testify concerning the circumstances under which the photograph was taken.\nD. Inadmissible if it is possible to describe the damage to the cornfield through direct oral testimony.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The state of Yuma provides by statute, \"No person may be awarded any state construction contract without agreeing to employ only citizens of the state and of the United States in performance of the contract.\" In evaluating the constitutionality of this state statute under the Supremacy Clause, which of the following would be most directly relevant?\n\nOptions:\nA. The general unemployment rate in the nation.\nB. The treaties and immigration laws of the United States.\nC. The need of the state for this particular statute.\nD. The number of aliens currently residing in Yuma.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Duffer and Slicker, who lived in different suburbs 20 miles apart, were golfing acquaintances at the Interurban Country Club. Both were traveling salesmen-Duffer for a pharmaceutical house and Slicker for a widget manufacturer. Duffer wrote Slicker by United States mail on Friday, October 8: I need a motorcycle for transportation to the country club, and will buy your Sujocki for $ 1,200$ upon your bringing it to my home address above [stated in the letterhead] on or before noon, November 12 next. This offer is not subject to countermand. Sincerely, [signed] Duffer Slicker replied by mail the following day: I accept your offer and promise to deliver the bike as you specified. Sincerely, [signed] Slicker This letter, although properly addressed, was misdirected by the postal service and not received by Duffer until November 10 . Duffer had bought another Sujocki bike from Koolcat for $ 1,050$ a few hours before. Koolcat saw Slicker at the Interurban Country Club on November 11 and said: \"I sold my Sujocki to Duffer yesterday for $ 1,050$. Would you consider selling me yours for $ 950$ ?\" Slicker replied, \"I'll let you know in a few days.\" On November 12, Slicker took his Sujocki to Duffer's residence; he arrived at 11:55 a.m. Duffer was asleep and did not answer Slicker's doorbell rings until $12: 15 \\mathrm{p}$.m. Duffer then rejected Slicker's bike on the ground that he had already bought Koolcat's. In a lawsuit by Slicker against Duffer for breach of contract, what would the court probably decide regarding Slicker's letter of October 9?\n\nOptions:\nA. The letter bound both parties to a unilateral contract as soon as Slicker mailed it.\nB. Mailing of the letter by Slicker did not, of itself, prevent a subsequent effective revocation by Duffer of his offer.\nC. The letter bound both parties to a bilateral contract, but only when received by Duffer on November 10.\nD. Regardless of whether Duffer's offer had proposed a unilateral or a bilateral contract, the letter was an effective acceptance upon receipt, if not upon dispatch.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Taylor and Scott, an unmarried couple, purchased a condominium as tenants in common and lived in the condominium for three years. Subsequently, they made an oral agreement that, on the death of either of them, the survivor would own the entire condominium, and, as a result, they decided they did not need wills. Two years later, Taylor and Scott were involved in the same automobile accident. Taylor was killed immediately. Scott died one week later. Both died intestate. Taylor's sole heir is his brother, Mark. Scott's sole heir is her mother, Martha. Mark claimed one-half of the condominium, and Martha claimed all of it. The jurisdiction has no applicable statute except for the Statute of Frauds; nor does it recognize common law marriages. In an appropriate action by Martha claiming the entire ownership of the condominium, the court will find that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Martha owns the entire interest because Taylor and Scott did not make wills in reliance upon their oral agreement.\nB. Martha owns the entire interest because she is entitled to reformation of the deed to reflect the oral agreement.\nC. Mark and Martha each own an undivided one-half interest because Taylor and Scott each died as the result of the same accident.\nD. Mark and Martha each own an undivided one-half interest because the Statute of Frauds applies. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A statute in the state of Peridot permits the state to seize and dispose of real property that was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony drug offense. After Keith's arrest for selling cocaine out of his home, a felony, the state instituted an action of forfeiture against Keith's house and property. After notice to Keith and a hearing, a judge granted the order and the state seized the property. Six months later, after the time for any appeals had expired, the property was sold at a public auction to a third party. It was only when the third party brought an action to quiet title that Northwest Bank, the holder of a properly recorded mortgage on Keith's property, learned of the forfeiture. Because the bank's mortgage payments were automatically deducted from an account Keith had under a different name, no one at the bank was aware that the property had been seized. The only notice provided to parties other than Keith was a public notice published for three weeks in a general circulation newspaper. The bank defends the quiet title action on the ground that it did not receive the notice required under the United States Constitution to protect its interest in the property. If the court rules that Northwest Bank's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the state's seizure of the property, it will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. In any judicial proceeding affecting rights to real property, a claimant is required to provide notice and an evidentiary hearing to all parties with a legal interest in the property before taking actions affecting their rights.\nB. The government itself was the party that seized the property, rather than a private party using governmental processes.\nC. The notice was not adequate under the circumstances to apprise a party with a properly recorded legal interest in the property.\nD. The jurisdiction treats the mortgagee as having title to the property rather than merely a lien. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In 1956, Silo Cement Company constructed a plant for manufacturing ready-mix concrete in Lakeville. At that time Silo was using bagged cement, which caused little or no dust. In 1970, Petrone bought a home approximately 1,800 feet from the Silo plant. One year ago, Silo stopped using bagged cement and began to receive cement in bulk shipments. Since then at least five truckloads of cement have passed Petrone's house daily. Cement blows off the trucks and into Petrone's house. When the cement arrives at the Silo plant, it is blown by forced air from the trucks into the storage bin. As a consequence, cement dust fills the air surrounding the plant to a distance of 2,000 feet. Petrone's house is the only residence within 2,000 feet of the plant. If Petrone asserts a claim against Silo based on nuisance, will Petrone prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, unless using bagged cement would substantially increase Silo's costs.\nB. Yes, if the cement dust interfered unreasonably with the use and enjoyment of Petrone's property.\nC. No, because Silo is not required to change its industrial methods to accommodate the needs of one individual.\nD. No, if Silo's methods are in conformity with those in general use in the industry.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Deanna was moving to Russia to work in a foreign policy institute, and was in the process of moving out of the apartment that she had shared with Vanessa, who was not in at the time. Just before leaving, Deanna collected numerous items of hers from Vanessa's room that Vanessa had borrowed, usually without permission. As she was leaving the apartment, she grabbed what she believed to be her laptop computer, which Vanessa had often borrowed to do reports for work. Because it was an older, slower machine, she planned to trade it in for a different model at a computer resale store during a stopover in London. When she arrived at the computer store she discovered that she had taken a brand new, state-of-the-art laptop that Vanessa had apparently just purchased. Is Deanna guilty of larceny of the computer?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, because she mistakenly believed that the computer she had picked up was hers.\nB. No, if her mistake as to whose computer she had picked up was reasonable.\nC. Yes, because she intended to permanently deprive Vanessa of the computer when she took it.\nD. Yes, if she decides to keep the computer or trade it in for a different one.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Congress enacts a law providing that all disagreements between the United States and a state over federal grant-in-aid funds shall be settled by the filing of suit in the federal district court in the affected state. \"The judgment of that federal court shall be transmitted to the head of the federal agency dispensing such funds, who, if satisfied that the judgment is fair and lawful, shall execute the judgment according to its terms.\" This law is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Constitutional, because disagreements over federal grant-in-aid funds necessarily involve federal questions within the judicial power of the United States.\nB. Constitutional, because the spending of federal monies necessarily includes the authority to provide for the effective settlement of disputes involving them.\nC. Unconstitutional, because it vests authority in the federal court to determine a matter prohibited to it by the Eleventh Amendment.\nD. Unconstitutional, because it vests authority in a federal court to render an advisory opinion. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Torgeson, a prosperous widower, owned Fruitacre, a large tract of land located near Sunbelt City. Fruitacre was primarily used for extensive citrus orchards, but Torgeson was sure that rapidly growing Sunbelt City would expand toward Fruitacre, and that Fruitacre would be a prime tract for a residential subdivision within 20 years. Torgeson wanted to see his three grandchildren, Hubert (age 22), Dubert (age 17), and Luberta (age 15), benefit from the large price that he was sure Fruitacre would bring, but he was also concerned that the grandchildren be of sufficient maturity. Torgeson suggested to his only child, Diana, that he give her a life interest in Fruitacre, and that Diana's children take Fruitacre upon her death. Diana told Torgeson that she did not need the income from Fruitacre and would prefer that Torgeson give the land directly to Hubert, Dubert, and Luberta. Torgeson arrived at what he felt was a reasonable compromise, using his good friend, Fran (age 55), as the person to whom he conveyed the land. Torgeson's conveyance read, in pertinent part, as follows: \"I convey Fruitacre to Fran for life, remainder to all of my grandchildren who ever attain the age of 25 , and if none of them attains such age, to the Sisters of Charity.\" 44. The grandchildren's interest can best be described as: (A) A contingent remainder. (B) A vested remainder. (C) An executory interest. (D) Nothing. The Sisters of Charity's interest can best be described as:\n\nOptions:\nA. A contingent remainder.\nB. A vested remainder subject to total divestment.\nC. An executory interest.\nD. Nothing.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Poe ordered some merchandise from Store. When the merchandise was delivered, Poe decided that it was not what he had ordered, and he returned it for credit. Store refused to credit Poe's account, continued to bill him, and, after 90 days, turned the account over to Kane, a bill collector, for collection. Kane called at Poe's house at 7 p.m. on a summer evening while many of Poe's neighbors were seated on their porches. When Poe opened the door, Kane, who was standing just outside the door, raised an electrically amplified bullhorn to his mouth. In a voice that could be heard a block away, Kane called Poe a \"deadbeat\" and asked him when he intended to pay his bill to Store. Poe, greatly angered, slammed the door shut. The door struck the bullhorn and jammed it forcibly against Kane's face. As a consequence, Kane lost some of his front teeth. If Kane asserts a claim based on battery against Poe, will Kane prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Poe had not first asked Kane to leave the property.\nB. Yes, if Poe knew that the door was substantially certain to strike the bullhorn.\nC. No, if Kane's conduct triggered Poe's response.\nD. No, because Kane was an intruder on Poe's property.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A recently enacted state law forbids nonresident aliens from owning more than 100 acres of land within the state and directs the state attorney general to bring an action of ejectment whenever a nonresident alien owns such land. Zane, a nonresident alien, has obtained title to 200 acres of land in the state, and he brings an action in federal court to enjoin the state attorney general from enforcing the statute. The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint. The best argument for Zane is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. States are forbidden by the Commerce Clause from interfering with the rights of nonresidents to own land.\nB. The state's power to restrict alien rights is limited by the federal power to control foreign relations.\nC. The state statute adversely affects Zane's right to travel.\nD. The 100-acre restriction means that aliens cannot engage in farming operations requiring larger amounts of land.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Carver is a chemical engineer. She has no interest in or connection with Chemco. Carver noticed that Chemco's most recent publicly issued financial statement listed, as part of Chemco's assets, a large inventory of a certain special chemical compound. This asset was listed at a cost of $ 100,000$, but Carver knew that the ingredients of the compound were in short supply and that the current market value of the inventory was in excess of $ 1$ million. There was no current public quotation of the price of Chemco stock. The book value of Chemco stock, according to the statement, was $ 5$ per share; its actual value was $ 30$ per share. Knowing these facts, Carver offered to purchase from Page at $ 6$ per share the 1,000 shares of Chemco stock owned by Page. Page and Carver had not previously met. Page sold the stock to Carver for $ 6$ per share. If Page asserts a claim based on misrepresentation against Carver, will Page prevail? \n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Carver knew that the value of the stock was greater than the price she offered.\nB. Yes, if Carver did not inform Page of the true value of the inventory.\nC. No, unless Carver told Page that the stock was not worth more than $ 6$ per share.\nD. No, if Chemco's financial statement was available to Page.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Duffer and Slicker, who lived in different suburbs 20 miles apart, were golfing acquaintances at the Interurban Country Club. Both were traveling salesmen-Duffer for a pharmaceutical house and Slicker for a widget manufacturer. Duffer wrote Slicker by United States mail on Friday, October 8: I need a motorcycle for transportation to the country club, and will buy your Sujocki for $ 1,200$ upon your bringing it to my home address above [stated in the letterhead] on or before noon, November 12 next. This offer is not subject to countermand. Sincerely, [signed] Duffer Slicker replied by mail the following day: I accept your offer and promise to deliver the bike as you specified. Sincerely, [signed] Slicker This letter, although properly addressed, was misdirected by the postal service and not received by Duffer until November 10 . Duffer had bought another Sujocki bike from Koolcat for $ 1,050$ a few hours before. Koolcat saw Slicker at the Interurban Country Club on November 11 and said: \"I sold my Sujocki to Duffer yesterday for $ 1,050$. Would you consider selling me yours for $ 950$ ?\" Slicker replied, \"I'll let you know in a few days.\" On November 12, Slicker took his Sujocki to Duffer's residence; he arrived at 11:55 a.m. Duffer was asleep and did not answer Slicker's doorbell rings until $12: 15 \\mathrm{p}$.m. Duffer then rejected Slicker's bike on the ground that he had already bought Koolcat's. In Duffer's letter of October 8, what was the legal effect of the language: \"This offer is not subject to countermand\"?\n\nOptions:\nA. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the offer was irrevocable until noon, November 12.\nB. Such language prevented an effective acceptance by Slicker prior to noon, November 12.\nC. At common law, such language created a binding option in Slicker's favor.\nD. Such language did not affect the offeror's power of revocation of the offer.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mater, a wealthy widow, wishing to make a substantial and potentially enduring gift to her beloved adult stepson, Prodigal, established with the Vault Savings and Loan Association a passbook savings account by an initial deposit of $ 10,000$. For this question only, assume the following facts. The passbook was issued by Vault to Mater solely in her own name. That same day, disinterested witnesses being present, she handed the passbook to Prodigal and said, \"As a token of my love and affection for you, I give you this $ 10,000$ savings account.\" Shortly thereafter, she changed her mind and wrote Prodigal, \"I hereby revoke my gift to you of the $ 10,000$ savings account with Vault Savings and Loan Association. Please return my passbook immediately. Signed: Mater.\" Prodigal received this letter but ignored it, and Mater died unexpectedly a few days later. In litigation between Prodigal and Mater's estate, which of the following is a correct statement of the parties' rights with respect to the money on deposit with Vault? \n\nOptions:\nA. The estate prevails, because Mater's gift to Prodigal was revocable and was terminated by her death.\nB. The estate prevails, because Mater's gift to Prodigal was revocable and was terminated by her express revocation.\nC. Prodigal prevails, because he took Mater's claim to the savings account by a gratuitous but effective and irrevocable assignment from Mater.\nD. Prodigal prevails, because his failure to reject the gift, even if the assignment was revocable, created an estoppel against Mater and her estate.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Tortfeasor tortiously injured Victim in an auto accident. While Victim was recovering in Hospital, Tortfeasor's liability insurer, Insurer, settled with Victim for $ 5,000$. Victim gave Insurer a signed release and received a signed memorandum wherein Insurer promised to pay Victim $ 5,000$ by check within 30 days. When Victim left Hospital two days later, Hospital demanded payment of its $ 4,000$ stated bill. Victim thereupon gave Hospital his own negotiable promissory note for $ 4,000$, payable to Hospital's order in 30 days, and also, as security, assigned to Hospital the Insurer settlement memorandum. Hospital promptly assigned for value the settlement memorandum and negotiated the note to Holder, who took the note as a holder in due course. Subsequently, Victim misrepresented to Insurer that he had lost the settlement memorandum and needed another. Insurer issued another memorandum identical to the first, and Victim assigned it to $\\mathrm{ABC}$ Furniture to secure a $ 5,000$ credit sale contract. $\\mathrm{ABC}$ immediately notified Insurer of this assignment. Later it was discovered that Hospital had mistakenly overbilled Victim by the amount of $ 1,000$ and that Tortfeasor was an irresponsible minor. If Victim starts an action against Insurer 40 days after the insurance settlement agreement, can Victim recover?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because his attempted assignments of his claim against Insurer were ineffective, inasmuch as Insurer's promise to pay \"by check\" created a right in Victim that was too personal to assign.\nB. No, because he no longer has possession of Insurer's written memorandum.\nC. No, because Tortfeasor's minority and irresponsibility vitiated the settlement agreement between Victim and Insurer.\nD. No, because he has made at least one effective assignment of his claim against Insurer, and Insurer has notice thereof.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Esther, Gray's 21-year-old daughter, finished college, Gray handed her a signed memorandum stating that if she would go to law school for three academic years, he would pay her tuition, room, and board, and would \"give her a $ 1,000$ bonus\" for each \"A\" she got in law school. Esther's uncle, Miller, who was present on this occasion, read the memorandum and thereupon said to Esther, \"and if he doesn't pay your expenses, I will.\" Gray paid her tuition, room, and board for her first year but died just before the end of that year. Subsequently, Esther learned that she had received two \"As\" in the second semester. The executor of Gray's estate has refused to pay her anything for the two \"As\" and has told her that the estate will no longer pay her tuition, room, and board in law school. In an action against Gray's estate for $ 2,000$ on account of the two \"As,\" if the only defense raised is lack of consideration, Esther probably will: \n\nOptions:\nA. Succeed under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.\nB. Succeed on a theory of bargained-for exchange for her father's promise.\nC. Not succeed, because the $ 1,000$ for each \"A\" was promised only as a bonus.\nD. Not succeed, because Esther was already legally obligated to use her best efforts in law school.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jack and Paul planned to hold up a bank. They drove to the bank in Jack's car. Jack entered while Paul remained as lookout in the car. After a few moments, Paul panicked and drove off. Jack looked over the various tellers, approached one and whispered nervously, \"Just hand over the cash. Don't look around, don't make a false move-or it's your life.\" The teller looked at the fidgeting Jack, laughed, flipped him a dollar bill, and said, \"Go on, beat it.\" Flustered, Jack grabbed the dollar and left. Paul's best defense to a charge of robbery would be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Jack alone entered the bank.\nB. Paul withdrew, before commission of the crime, when he fled the scene.\nC. Paul had no knowledge of what Jack whispered to the teller.\nD. The teller was not placed in fear by Jack. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Adams, Bennett, and Curtis are charged in a common law jurisdiction with conspiracy to commit larceny. The state introduced evidence that they agreed to go to Nelson's house to take stock certificates from a safe in Nelson's bedroom, that they went to the house, and that they were arrested as they entered Nelson's bedroom. Adams testified that he thought the stock certificates belonged to Curtis, that Nelson was improperly keeping them from Curtis, and that he went along to aid in retrieving Curtis's property. Bennett testified that he suspected Adams and Curtis of being thieves and joined up with them in order to catch them. He also testified that he made an anonymous telephone call to the police alerting them to the crime and that the call caused the police to be waiting for them when they walked into Nelson's bedroom. Curtis did not testify. If the jury believes Bennett, it should find him:\n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty, because there was an agreement and the entry into the bedroom is sufficient for the overt act.\nB. Guilty, because he is not a police officer and thus cannot claim any privilege of apprehending criminals.\nC. Not guilty, because he did not intend to steal.\nD. Not guilty, because he prevented the theft from occurring.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paula sued for injuries she sustained in a fall in a hotel hallway connecting the lobby of the hotel with a restaurant located in the hotel building. The hallway floor was covered with vinyl tile. The defendants were Horne, owner of the hotel building, and Lee, lessee of the restaurant. The evidence was that the hallway floor had been waxed approximately an hour before Paula slipped on it, and although the wax had dried, there appeared to be excessive dried wax caked on several of the tiles. Horne's defense was that the hallway was a part of the premises leased to Lee over which he retained no control, and Lee denied negligence and alleged contributory negligence. Lee offered to prove by Marks, the restaurant manager, that in the week immediately preceding Paula's fall at least 1,000 people had used the hallway in going to and from the restaurant, and Marks had neither seen anyone fall nor received reports that anyone had fallen. The trial judge should rule this evidence:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because it tends to prove that Paula did not use the care exercised by reasonably prudent people.\nB. Admissible, because it tends to prove that Lee was generally careful in maintaining the floor.\nC. Inadmissible, because Marks's testimony is self-serving.\nD. Inadmissible, because it does not bear on the issue of Lee's exercise of due care on this specific occasion.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pemberton and three passengers, Able, Baker, and Charley, were injured when their car was struck by a truck owned by Mammoth Corporation and driven by Edwards. Helper, also a Mammoth employee, was riding in the truck. The issues in Pemberton $v$. Mammoth include the negligence of Edwards in driving too fast and in failing to wear glasses, and of Pemberton in failing to yield the right of way. Pemberton's counsel proffers evidence showing that shortly after the accident, Mammoth put a speed governor on the truck involved in the accident. The judge should rule the proffered evidence:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as an admission of a party.\nB. Admissible as res gestae.\nC. Inadmissible for public policy reasons.\nD. Inadmissible, because it would lead to the drawing of an inference on an inference.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The following facts concern a tract of land in a state which follows general law. Each instrument is in proper form, recorded, marital property rights were waived when necessary, and each person named was adult and competent at the time of the named transaction. In 1940, Oleg, the owner, conveyed his interest in fee simple \"to my brothers Bob and Bill, their heirs and assigns as joint tenants with right of survivorship.\" In 1950 Bob died, devising his interest to his only child, \"Charles, for life, and then to Charles's son, Sam, for life, and then to Sam's children, their heirs and assigns.\"In 1970 Bill died, devising his interest \"to my friend, Frank, his heirs and assigns.\" In 1972 Frank conveyed by quitclaim deed \"to Paul, his heirs and assigns, whatever right, title, and interest I own.\" Paul has never married. Paul has contracted to convey marketable record title in the land to Patrick. Can Paul do so?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, without joinder of any other person in the conveyance.\nB. Yes, if Charles, Sam, and Sam's only child (Gene, aged 25) will join in the conveyance. \nC. No, regardless of who joins in the conveyance, because Sam may have additional children whose interests cannot be defeated.\nD. No, regardless of who joins in the conveyance, because a title acquired by quitclaim deed is impliedly unmarketable.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Diner, a drive-in hamburger and ice cream stand, recently opened for business in the suburban town of Little City. Diner's business hours are from 9 a.m. to midnight. It is in an area that for 15 years has been zoned for small retail businesses, apartment buildings, and one- and two-family residences. The zoning code specifies that \"small retail businesses\" include \"businesses where food and drink are dispensed for consumption on the premises.\" Diner was the first drive-in in Little City. For seven years Mr. and Mrs. Householder have owned and lived in their single-family residence, which is across the street from Diner. On opening day a brass band played in the parking lot of Diner until midnight, and the noise of cars and the usual activity as a result of the new business prevented the Householders from getting to sleep until well after midnight, long after their usual time. Diner is heavily patronized during the day and night by high school students. The noise of cars, the lights of the cars, the lights illuminating the parking lot at Diner, and the noise from the loudspeaker of the ordering system prevented the Householders from sleeping before midnight. Paper cups, napkins, and other items from the drive-in are regularly blown into the Householders's front yard by the prevailing wind. The traffic to and from Diner is so heavy on the street in front of their house that the Householders are afraid to allow their small children to play in the front yard. The Householders have asserted a claim against Diner based on private nuisance. The most likely effect of the fact that the Householders were in the area before Diner is that it:\n\nOptions:\nA. Requires that the Householders' interest be given priority.\nB. Is irrelevant because of the zoning ordinance.\nC. Is irrelevant because conforming economic uses are given priority.\nD. Is some, but not controlling, evidence.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Gasco owns a storage facility where flammable gases are stored in liquefied form under high pressure in large spherical tanks. The facility was constructed for Gasco by Acme Company, a firm that specializes in the construction of such facilities. After the facility had been in use for five years, an explosion in the facility started a large fire that blanketed the surrounding countryside with a high concentration of oily smoke and soot. Farber owns a large truck farm near the facility. His entire lettuce crop was destroyed by oily deposits left by the smoke. If Farber asserts a claim against Gasco for the loss of his lettuce crop and is unable to show any negligence on the part of Gasco, will Farber prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the operation of the storage facility was an abnormally dangerous activity.\nB. Yes, because the intrusion of the smoke onto Farber's farm amounted to a trespass.\nC. No, if the explosion was caused by internal corrosion that reasonable inspection procedures would not have disclosed.\nD. No, if the explosion was caused by negligent construction on Acme's part.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Johnston purchased 100 bolts of standard blue wool, No. 1 quality, from McHugh. The sales contract provided that Johnston would make payment prior to inspection. The 100 bolts were shipped and Johnston paid McHugh. Upon inspection, however, Johnston discovered that the wool was No. 2 quality. Johnston thereupon tendered back the wool to McHugh and demanded return of his payment. McHugh refused on the ground that there is no difference between No. 1 quality wool and No. 2 quality wool. Which of the following statements regarding the contract provision for preinspection payment is correct?\n\nOptions:\nA. It constitutes an acceptance of the goods.\nB. It constitutes a waiver of the buyer's remedy of private sale in the case of nonconforming goods.\nC. It does not impair a buyer's right of inspection or his remedies.\nD. It is invalid.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Furrow leased in writing a 100 -acre farm from Quark for five years at $ 2,000$ per year, with an option to purchase \"five acres of the land for $ 10,000$ cash\" at the end of the lease term. Before the lease was executed, Quark orally promised to have a five-acre parcel surveyed before the end of the lease term. Furrow took possession of the farm and paid the rent for five years. During the fifth year, having decided that he would exercise the purchase option, Furrow planted several fruit trees and built a large grain silo on the property. At the end of the term, Furrow tendered Quark $ 10,000$ and demanded a conveyance, but Quark repudiated the option agreement and retook possession of the farm. He had never had the five-acre parcel surveyed. Assume for this question only that Quark is not liable to Furrow for breach of a landsale contract. In an action by Furrow against Quark for the reasonable value of the improvements that Furrow added to the farm, which of the following theories would best support Furrow's claim?\n\nOptions:\nA. Quasi-contract, for benefits unofficiously and non-gratuitously conferred upon Quark by Furrow. \nB. Tort, for conversion by Quark in retaking possession of the improvements.\nC. Breach of trust by Quark as trustee of a resulting trust of the improvements.\nD. Breach by Quark of an implied-in-fact promise (manifested by his retaking possession of the farm and improvements) to compensate Furrow for the improvements. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The Kernel Corporation, through its president, Demeter Gritz, requested from Vault Finance, Inc., a short-term loan of $ 100,000$. On April 1, Gritz and Vault's loan officer agreed orally that Vault would make the loan on the following terms: (1) the loan would be repaid in full on or before the following July 1 and would carry interest at an annual rate of 15\\% (a lawful rate under the applicable usury law); and (2) Gritz would personally guarantee repayment. The loan was approved and made on April 5. The only document evidencing the loan was a memorandum, written and supplied by Vault and signed by Gritz for Kernel, that read in its entirety: In consideration of a loan advanced on this date, Kernel Corporation hereby promises to pay Vault Finance, Inc., $ 100,000$ on September 1. Kernel Corporation by \/s\/ Demeter Gritz Demeter Gritz, President Kernel Corporation did not repay the loan on or before July 1, although it had sufficient funds to do so. On July 10, Vault sued Kernel as principal debtor and Gritz individually as guarantor for $ 100,000$, plus $15 \\%$ interest from April 5. At the trial, can Vault prove Kernel's oral commitment to repay the loan on or before July 1 ?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because the oral agreement was supported by an independent consideration.\nB. Yes, because evidence of the parties' negotiations is relevant to their contractual intent concerning maturity of the debt.\nC. No, because such evidence is barred by the preexisting duty rule.\nD. No, because such evidence contradicts the writing and is barred by the parol evidence rule.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On October 1, Toy Store, Inc., entered into a written contract with Fido Factory, Inc., for the purchase at $ 20$ per unit of 1,000 mechanical dogs, to be specially manufactured by Fido according to Toy Store's specifications. Fido promised to deliver all of the dogs \"not later than November 15, for the Yule shopping season,\"' and Toy Store promised to pay the full $ 20,000$ price upon delivery. In order to obtain operating funds, Fido as borrower entered into a written loan agreement on October 5 with the High Finance Company. In relevant part, this agreement recited, \"Fido Factory hereby transfers and assigns to High Finance its (Fido Factory's) October 1 mechanical dog contract with Toy Store, as security for a 50 -day loan of $ 15,000$, the advance and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged by Fido Factory. ...\" No copy of this agreement, or statement relating to it, was filed in an office of public record. On October 15, Fido notified Toy Store, \"We regret to advise that our master shaft burned out last night because our night supervisor let the lubricant level get too low. We have just fired the supervisor, but the shaft cannot be repaired or replaced until about January 1. We can guarantee delivery of your order, however, not later than January 20.\" Toy Store rejected this proposal as unacceptable and immediately contracted with the only other available manufacturer to obtain the 1,000 dogs at $ 30$ per unit by November 15 . For this question only, assume that on November 1, Toy Store sues Fido for damages and alleges the above facts, except those relating to the Fido-High Finance loan agreement. Upon Fido's motion to dismiss the complaint, the court should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Sustain the motion, because Fido on October 15 stated its willingness, and gave assurance of its ability, to perform the contract in January.\nB. Sustain the motion, because Toy Store's lawsuit is premature in any case until after November 15.\nC. Deny the motion, because Toy Store's complaint alleges an actionable tort by Fido.\nD. Deny the motion, because Toy Store's complaint alleges an actionable breach of contract by Fido.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a written contract Singer agreed to deliver to Byer 500 described chairs at $ 20$ each F.O.B. Singer's place of business. The contract provided that \"neither party will assign this contract without the written consent of the other.\" Singer placed the chairs on board a carrier on January 30. On February 1, Singer said in a signed writing, \"I hereby assign to Wheeler all my rights under the Singer-Byer contract.\" Singer did not request and did not get Byer's consent to this transaction. On February 2, the chairs, while in transit, were destroyed in a derailment of the carrier's railroad car. In an action by Byer against Singer for breach of contract, Byer probably will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Succeed, because the carrier will be deemed to be Singer's agent. \nB. Succeed, because the risk of loss was on Singer.\nC. Not succeed, because of impossibility of performance.\nD. Not succeed, because the risk of loss was on Byer.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Drew is charged with the murder of Pitt. The prosecutor introduced testimony of a police officer that Pitt told a priest administering the last rites, \"I was stabbed by Drew. Since I am dying, tell him I forgive him.\" Thereafter, Drew's attorney offers the testimony of Wall that the day before, when Pitt believed he would live, he stated that he had been stabbed by Jack, an old enemy. The testimony of Wall is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.\nB. Admissible to impeach the dead declarant.\nC. Inadmissible, because it goes to the ultimate issue in the case.\nD. Inadmissible, because irrelevant to any substantive issue in the case.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owner and his employee, Driver, consult Attorney about a motor vehicle collision resulting in a suit by Litigant against Owner and Driver as joint defendants. Attorney calls Irving, his investigator, into the conference to make notes of what is said, and those present discuss the facts of the collision and Owner's insurance. Owner thereafter files a cross-claim against Driver for indemnity for any damages obtained by Litigant. Driver calls Irving in his defense against the cross-claim. He seeks to have Irving testify to admissions made by Owner in the conference. On objection by Owner, the court should rule Irving's testimony:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because the attorney-client privilege does not apply, in suits between those conferring with him, to joint consultations with an attorney.\nB. Admissible, because the attorney-client privilege does not apply to testimony by one who does not stand in a confidential relationship with the person against whom the evidence is offered. \nC. Admissible, because the conference was not intended to be confidential, since it concerned anticipated testimony in open court.\nD. Inadmissible, because Owner has not waived the attorney-client privilege.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Rider, a bus passenger, sued Transit Company for injuries to his back from an accident caused by Transit's negligence. Transit denies that Rider received any injury in the accident. Transit Company calls Observer to testify that right after the accident, Rider told him that he had recently suffered a recurrence of an old back injury. The judge should rule Observer's testimony:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as an admission of a partyopponent.\nB. Admissible as a spontaneous declaration.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is irrelevant.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owens contracted to sell a tract of land, Overlea, to Painter by general warranty deed. However, at the closing Painter did not carefully examine the deed and accepted a quitclaim deed without covenants of title. Painter later attempted to sell Overlea to Thompson, who refused to perform because Owens had conveyed an easement for a highway across Overlea before Painter bought the property. Painter sued Owens for damages. Which of the following arguments will most likely succeed in Owens's defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. The existence of the easement does not violate the contract.\nB. The mere existence of an easement that is not being used does not give rise to a cause of action.\nC. Painter's cause of action must be based on the deed and not on the contract.\nD. The proper remedy is rescission of the deed.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"While hospitalized, Marsh requested her attorney to draw a deed conveying her home to her son, Simon. While Marsh remained in the hospital, the deed was drawn, properly executed, and promptly and properly recorded. On being informed of the existence of the deed, Simon told his mother, \"I want no part of the property; take the deed right back.\" Marsh recovered and left the hospital, but shortly thereafter, before any other relevant event, Simon died intestate. Marsh brought an appropriate action against Simon's heirs to determine title. If Marsh wins, it will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. The court will impose a constructive trust to carry out the intent of the deceased son.\nB. The presumption of delivery arising from the recording is not valid unless the grantee has knowledge at the time of the recording.\nC. Simon's declaration was a constructive reconveyance of the land.\nD. There was no effective acceptance of delivery of the deed. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Martinez, a widower, owns in fee simple a ranch, Ranchacre. Martinez has one child, Enrique, who is married. Enrique has one child, Ana Maria, who is also married but has no children. In an effort to dispose of Ranchacre to his descendants and to honor a request by Ana Maria that she be skipped in any such disposition, Martinez conveys Ranchacre to his son, Enrique, for life with the remainder to Ana Maria's children in fee simple. What interest, if any, is created in favor of Ana Maria's unborn children at the time of the conveyance?\n\nOptions:\nA. A contingent remainder.\nB. A vested remainder subject to divestment.\nC. A springing use.\nD. None.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Oaks, the owner of Blackacre, conveyed a right-of-way to United Utility \"for the underground transportation of gas by pipeline, the location of right-of-way to be mutually agreed upon by Oaks and United Utility.\" United Utility then installed a six-inch pipeline at a location selected by it and not objected to by Oaks. Two years later, United Utility advised Oaks of its intention to install an additional six-inch pipeline parallel to and three feet laterally from the original pipeline. In an appropriate action, Oaks sought a declaration that United Utility has no right to install the second pipeline. If Oaks prevails, it will be because:\n\nOptions:\nA. Any right implied to expand the original use of the right-of-way creates an interest that violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.\nB. The original installation by United Utility defined the scope of the easement.\nC. Oaks did not expressly agree to the location of the right-of-way.\nD. The assertion of the right to install an additional pipeline constitutes inverse condemnation.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Trease owned Hilltop in fee simple. By his will, he devised as follows: \"Hilltop to such of my grandchildren who shall reach the age of 21 ; and by this provision I intend to include all grandchildren whenever born.\" At the time of his death, Trease had three children and two grandchildren. Courts hold such a devise valid under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. What is the best explanation of that determination?\n\nOptions:\nA. All of Trease's children would be measuring lives.\nB. The rule of convenience closes the class of beneficiaries when any grandchild reaches the age of 21 . \nC. There is a presumption that Trease intended to include only those grandchildren born prior to his death.\nD. There is a subsidiary rule of construction that dispositive instruments are to be interpreted so as to uphold interests rather than to invalidate them under the Rule Against Perpetuities.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ohner holds title in fee simple to a tract of 1,500 acres. He desires to develop the entire tract as a golf course, country club, and residential subdivision. He contemplates forming a corporation to own and to operate the golf course and country club; the stock in the corporation will be distributed to the owners of lots in the residential portions of the subdivision, but no obligation to issue the stock is to ripen until all the residential lots are sold. The price of the lots is intended to return enough money to compensate Ohner for the raw land, development costs (including the building of the golf course and the country club facilities), and developer's profit, if all of the lots are sold. Ohner's market analyses indicate that he must create a scheme of development that will offer prospective purchasers (and their lawyers) a very high order of assurance that several aspects will be clearly established: Of the following, the greatest difficulty that will be encountered in establishing the scheme is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Any judicial recognition will be construed as state action which, under current doctrines, raises a substantial question whether such action would be in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.\nB. The scheme, if effective, renders title unmarketable. \nC. One or more of the essential aspects outlined by Ohner will result in a restraint on alienation.\nD. There is a judicial reluctance to recognize an affirmative burden to pay money in installments and over an indefinite period as a burden that can be affixed to bind future owners of land.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mrs. Ritter, a widow, recently purchased a new uncrated electric range for her kitchen from Local Retailer. The range has a wide oven with a large oven door. The crate in which Stove Company, the manufacturer, shipped the range carried a warning label that the stove would tip over with a weight of 25 pounds or more on the oven door. Mrs. Ritter has one child-Brenda, age three. Recently, at about 5:30 p.m., Brenda was playing on the floor of the kitchen while Mrs. Ritter was heating water in a pan on the stove. The telephone rang and Mrs. Ritter went into the living room to answer it. While she was gone Brenda decided to find out what was cooking. She opened the oven door and climbed on it to see what was in the pan. Brenda's weight ( 25 pounds) on the door caused the stove to tip over forward. Brenda fell to the floor and the hot water spilled over her, burning her severely. Brenda screamed. Mrs. Ritter ran to the kitchen and immediately gave her first aid treatment for burns. Brenda thereafter received medical treatment. Brenda's burns were painful. They have now healed and do not bother her, but she has ugly scars on her legs and back. Brenda's claim is asserted on her behalf by the proper party. If Brenda asserts a claim based on strict liability against Stove Company, she must establish that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The defendant negligently designed the stove.\nB. Stoves made by other manufacturers do not turn over with a 25-pound weight on the oven door.\nC. The defendant failed to warn the Ritters that the stove would turn over easily.\nD. The stove was defective and unreasonably dangerous to her. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Donna was arrested and taken to police headquarters, where she was given her Miranda warnings. Donna indicated that she wished to telephone her lawyer and was told that she could do so after her fingerprints had been taken. While being fingerprinted, however, Donna blurted out, \"Paying a lawyer is a waste of money because I know you have me.\" At trial, Donna's motion to prevent the introduction of the statement she made while being fingerprinted will most probably be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Granted, because Donna's request to contact her attorney by telephone was reasonable and should have been granted immediately.\nB. Granted, because of the \"fruit of the poisonous tree\" doctrine.\nC. Denied, because the statements were volunteered and not the result of interrogation.\nD. Denied, because fingerprinting is not a critical stage of the proceeding requiring the assistance of counsel.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Park sued Dent for breach of an oral contract which Dent denied making. Weston testified that he heard Dent make the contract on July 7. Dent discredited Weston, and Park offers evidence of Weston's good reputation for truthfulness. The rehabilitation is most likely to be permitted if the discrediting evidence by Dent was testimony that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Weston had been promoting highly speculative stocks.\nB. Weston had been Park's college roommate.\nC. Weston had attended a school for mentally retarded children.\nD. Weston had been out of town the whole week of July 4-10.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Darden was prosecuted for armed robbery. At trial, Darden testified in his own behalf, denying that he had committed the robbery. On crossexamination, the prosecutor intends to ask Darden whether he had been convicted of burglary six years earlier. The question concerning the burglary conviction is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Proper if the court finds that the probative value for impeachment outweighs the prejudice to Darden.\nB. Proper, because the prosecutor is entitled to make this inquiry as a matter of right.\nC. Improper, because burglary does not involve dishonesty or false statement.\nD. Improper, because the conviction must be proved by court record, not by question on cross-examination. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Lester, the owner in fee simple of a small farm consisting of 30 acres of land improved with a house and several outbuildings, leased the same to Tanner for a 10 -year period. After two years had expired, the government condemned 20 acres of the property and allocated the compensation award to Lester and Tanner according to their respective interest so taken. It so happened, however, that the 20 acres taken embraced all of the farm's tillable land, leaving only the house, outbuildings, and a small woodlot. There is no applicable statute in the jurisdiction where the property is located nor any provision in the lease relating to condemnation. Tanner quit possession and Lester brought suit against him to recover rent. Lester will: \n\nOptions:\nA. Lose, because there has been a frustration of purpose which excuses Tanner from further performance of his contract to pay rent.\nB. Lose, because there has been a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment by Lester's inability to provide Tanner with possession of the whole of the property for the entire term.\nC. Win, because of the implied warranty on the part of the tenant to return the demised premises in the same condition at the end of the term as they were at the beginning.\nD. Win, because the relationship of landlord and tenant was unaffected by the condemnation, thus leaving Tanner still obligated to pay rent. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Innes worked as a secretary in an office in a building occupied partly by her employer and partly by Glass, a retail store. The two areas were separated by walls and were in no way connected, except that the air conditioning unit served both areas and there was a common return-air duct. Glass began remodeling, and its employees did the work, which included affixing a plastic surfacing material to counters. To fasten the plastic to the counters, the employees purchased glue, with the brand name Stick, that was manufactured by Steel, packaged in a sealed container by Steel, and retailed by Paint Company. In the course of the remodeling job, one of Glass's employees turned on the air conditioning and caused fumes from the glue to travel from Glass through the air conditioning unit and into Innes's office. The employees did not know that there was common ductwork for the air conditioners. Innes was permanently blinded by the fumes from the glue. The label on the container of glue read, \"DANGER. Do not smoke near this product. Extremely flammable. Contains Butanone, Toluol, and Hexane. Use with adequate ventilation. Keep out of the reach of children.\" The three chemicals listed on the label are very toxic and harmful to human eyes. Steel had received no reports of eye injuries during the 10 years that the product had been manufactured and sold. If Innes asserts a claim against Paint Company, the most likely result is that she will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover if she can recover against Steel.\nB. Recover, because Innes was an invitee of a tenant in the building. \nC. Not recover, unless Paint Company was negligent.\nD. Not recover, because the glue came in a sealed package.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Furrow leased in writing a 100 -acre farm from Quark for five years at $ 2,000$ per year, with an option to purchase \"five acres of the land for $ 10,000$ cash\" at the end of the lease term. Before the lease was executed, Quark orally promised to have a five-acre parcel surveyed before the end of the lease term. Furrow took possession of the farm and paid the rent for five years. During the fifth year, having decided that he would exercise the purchase option, Furrow planted several fruit trees and built a large grain silo on the property. At the end of the term, Furrow tendered Quark $ 10,000$ and demanded a conveyance, but Quark repudiated the option agreement and retook possession of the farm. He had never had the five-acre parcel surveyed. In an action by Furrow against Quark for specific performance of the option agreement, which of the following is Quark's best defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. The option part of the agreement is unenforceable because it lacked a separate consideration.\nB. The description of the property to be sold in the parties' written agreement is too indefinite to permit the remedy sought.\nC. Quark's failure to have the five-acre parcel surveyed was failure of a condition precedent to his own duty of performance. \nD. The option part of the agreement is unenforceable under the parol evidence rule.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Adam and Bailey, brothers, operated an illicit still. They customarily sold to anyone unless they suspected the person of being a revenue agent or an informant. One day when Adam was at the still alone, he was approached by Mitchell, who asked to buy a gallon of liquor. Mitchell was in fact a revenue officer. After Adam had sold him the liquor, Mitchell revealed his identity. Adam grabbed one of the rifles that the brothers kept handy in case of trouble with the law, and shot and wounded Mitchell. Other officers, hiding nearby, overpowered and arrested Adam. Shortly thereafter, Bailey came on the scene. The officers in hiding had been waiting for him. One of them approached him and asked to buy liquor. Bailey was suspicious and refused to sell. The officers nevertheless arrested him. Adam and Bailey were charged with conspiracy to violate revenue laws, illegal selling of liquor, and battery of the officer. On the charge of battery, which statement concerning Adam and Bailey is true?\n\nOptions:\nA. Neither is guilty.\nB. Both are guilty.\nC. Adam is guilty but Bailey is not, because the conspiracy had terminated with the arrest of Adam.\nD. Adam is guilty but Bailey is not, because Adam's act was outside the scope of the conspiracy.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Powers sued Debbs for battery. At trial, Powers's witness, Wilson, testified that Debbs had made an unprovoked attack on Powers. On cross-examination, Debbs asks Wilson about a false claim that Wilson had once filed on an insurance policy. The question is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Proper, because the conduct involved untruthfulness.\nB. Proper, provided that the conduct resulted in conviction of Wilson.\nC. Improper, because the impeachment involved a specific instance of misconduct.\nD. Improper, because the claim form would be the best evidence.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Statutes in the jurisdiction define criminal assault as \"an attempt to commit a criminal battery\" and criminal battery as \"causing an offensive touching.\" As Edward was walking down the street, a gust of wind blew his hat off. Edward reached out, trying to grab his hat, and narrowly missed striking Margaret in the face with his hand. Margaret, fearful of being struck by Edward, pushed Edward away. If charged with criminal battery, Margaret should be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty, because she intentionally pushed Edward.\nB. Guilty, because she caused the touching of Edward whether she meant to do so or not.\nC. Not guilty, because a push is not an offensive touching.\nD. Not guilty, because she was justified in pushing Edward.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In Polk's negligence action against Dell arising out of a multiple-car collision, Witt testified for Polk that Dell went through a red light. On crossexamination, Dell seeks to question Witt about her statement that the light was yellow, made in a deposition that Witt gave in a separate action between Adams and Baker. The transcript of the deposition is self-authenticating. On proper objection, the court should rule the inquiry:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible for impeachment only.\nB. Admissible as substantive evidence only.\nC. Admissible for impeachment and as substantive evidence.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Meadowview is a large tract of undeveloped land. Black, the owner of Meadowview, prepared a development plan creating 200 house lots in Meadowview with the necessary streets and public areas. The plan was fully approved by all necessary governmental agencies and duly recorded. However, construction of the streets, utilities, and other aspects of the development of Meadowview has not yet begun, and none of the streets can be opened as public ways until they are completed in accordance with the applicable ordinances of the municipality in which Meadowview is located. College Avenue, one of the streets laid out as part of the Meadowview development, abuts Whiteacre, an adjacent one-acre parcel owned by White. Whiteacre has no access to any public way except an old, poorly developed road which is inconvenient and cannot be used without great expense. White sold Whiteacre to Breyer. The description used in the deed from White to Breyer was the same as that used in prior deeds except that the portion of the description which formerly said, \"thence by land of Black, northeasterly a distance of 200 feet, more or less,\" was changed to \"thence by College Avenue as laid out on the Plan of Meadowview North $16^{\\circ}$ East $201.6$ feet,\" with full reference to the plan and as recording data. Breyer now seeks a building permit which will show that Breyer intends to use College Avenue for access to Whiteacre. Black objects to the granting of a building permit on the grounds that he has never granted any rights to White or Breyer to use College Avenue. There are no governing statutes or ordinances relating to the problem. Black brings an appropriate action in which the right of Breyer to use College Avenue without an express grant from Black is at issue. The best argument for Black in this action is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Breyer's right must await the action of appropriate public authorities to open College Avenue as a public street, since no private easements arose by implication.\nB. The Statute of Frauds prevents the introduction of evidence which might prove the necessity for Breyer to use College Avenue.\nC. Breyer's right to use College Avenue is restricted to the assertion of a way by necessity and the facts preclude the success of such a claim.\nD. Breyer would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to use College Avenue.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Defendant is charged with assault and battery. The state's evidence shows that Victim was struck in the face by Defendant's fist. In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be not guilty of assault and battery?\n\nOptions:\nA. Defendant had been hypnotized at a party and ordered by the hypnotist to strike the person he disliked the most. \nB. Defendant was suffering from an epileptic seizure and had no control over his motions.\nC. Defendant was heavily intoxicated and was shadow boxing without realizing that Victim was near him.\nD. Defendant, who had just awakened from a deep sleep, was not fully aware of what was happening and mistakenly thought Victim was attacking him.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"A state statute makes it a felony for any teacher at a state institution of higher education to accept anything of value from a student at the same institution. Monroe, a student at the state university, offered Professor Smith, his English teacher, $ 50$ in exchange for a good grade in his English course. Smith agreed and took the money. Professor Smith and Monroe are tried jointly for violation of the state statute. Professor Smith is charged with violating the statute and Monroe with aiding and abetting him. Monroe's best argument for a dismissal of the charge against him is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. A principal and an accessory cannot be tried together, since the principal must be convicted first.\nB. He cannot be an accessory, since he is the victim of the crime.\nC. The legislature did not intend to punish the person giving the thing of value.\nD. He did not assist Professor Smith in violating the statute.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a will case, Paula seeks to prove her relationship to the testator Terrence by a statement in a deed of a gift from Terrence, \"I transfer to my niece Paula ...\" The deed was recorded pursuant to statute in the office of the county recorder and is kept there. Paula calls Recorder, who authenticates an enlarged print photocopy of the deed. The photocopy was made from the microfilm records kept in Recorder's office pursuant to statute. The photocopy is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as a record of a document affecting an interest in property.\nB. Admissible as recorded recollection.\nC. Inadmissible as hearsay not within any recognized exception.\nD. Inadmissible as not the best evidence.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Price sued Derrick for injuries Price received in an automobile accident. Price claimed Derrick was negligent in (a) exceeding the posted speed limit of 35 m.p.h., (b) failing to keep a lookout, and (c) crossing the center line. Bystander, Price's eyewitness, testified on cross-examination that Derrick was wearing a green sweater at the time of the accident. Derrick's counsel calls Wilson to testify that Derrick's sweater was blue. Wilson's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as substantive evidence of a material fact.\nB. Admissible as bearing on Bystander's truthfulness and veracity.\nC. Inadmissible, because it has no bearing on the capacity of Bystander to observe.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Sue owned a five-acre tract of land, one acre of which had previously been owned by Opal, but to which Sue had acquired title by adverse possession. Sue contracted to convey the full five-acre tract to Peg, but the contract did not specify the quality of title Sue would convey. Suppose Sue's contract had called for the conveyance of \"a good and marketable title.\" Pursuant to that contract, Peg paid the purchase price and accepted a deed from Sue containing no covenants of title. Sue's title to the one acre subsequently proved defective and Peg was ejected by Opal. Peg sued Sue. Which of the following results is most likely?\n\nOptions:\nA. Peg will win, because Sue's deed was fraudulent.\nB. Peg will win, because the terms of the deed control Sue's liability.\nC. Sue will win, because the terms of the deed control her liability.\nD. Sue will win, because the deed incorporates the terms of the contract.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Henry hated Wanda, his former wife, for divorcing him and marrying John a short time thereafter. About a month after Wanda married John, Henry secretly entered Wanda and John's rented apartment during their absence by using a master key. Henry placed a microphone behind the bookstand in the bedroom of the apartment and drilled a hole in the nearby wall, with the result that the microphone appeared to be connected with wires going into the adjoining apartment. Actually, the microphone was not connected to anything. Henry anticipated that Wanda would discover the microphone in a few days and would be upset by the thought that someone had been listening to her conversations with John in their bedroom. Shortly thereafter, as he was putting a book on the stand, John noticed the wires behind the bookstand and discovered the hidden microphone. He then called Wanda and showed her the microphone and wires. Wanda fainted and, in falling, struck her head on the bookstand and suffered a mild concussion. The next day John telephoned Henry and accused him of planting the microphone. Henry laughingly admitted it. Because of his concern about Wanda and his anger at Henry, John is emotionally upset and unable to go to work. If Wanda asserts a claim against Henry based on infliction of mental distress, the fact that John was the person who showed her the microphone will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Relieve Henry of liability, because John was careless in so doing.\nB. Relieve Henry of liability, because John's conduct was the immediate cause of Wanda's harm.\nC. Not relieve Henry of liability, because Henry's goal was achieved.\nD. Not relieve Henry of liability, because the conduct of a third person is irrelevant in emotional distress cases.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Hank owned a secondhand goods store. He often placed merchandise on the sidewalk, sometimes for short intervals, sometimes from 7 a.m. until 6 p.m. Pedestrians from time to time stopped and gathered to look at the merchandise. Fred had moved into an apartment that was situated immediately above Hank's store; a street-level stairway entrance was located about 20 feet to the east. On several occasions, Fred had complained to Hank about the situation because not only were his view and peace of mind affected, but also his travel on the sidewalk was made more difficult. Fred owned and managed a restaurant two blocks to the west of his apartment and made frequent trips back and forth. There was a back entrance to his apartment through a parking lot; this entrance was about 200 feet farther in walking distance from his restaurant. Once Fred complained to the police, whereupon Hank was arrested under a local ordinance which prohibited the placing of goods or merchandise on public sidewalks and imposed, as its sole sanction, a fine for its violation. One day, the sidewalk in front of Hank's store was unusually cluttered because he was cleaning and mopping the floor of his shop. Fred and his 15-year-old son, Steve, saw a bus they wished to take, and they raced down the stairs and onto the cluttered sidewalk in front of Hank's store, Fred in the lead. While dodging merchandise and people, Fred fell. Steve tripped over him and suffered a broken arm. Fred also suffered broken bones and was unable to attend to his duties for six weeks. If, prior to the day of his personal injuries, Fred had asserted a claim based on public nuisance for injunctive relief against Hank for his obstruction of the sidewalk in violation of the ordinance, the defense on which Hank would have most likely prevailed is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Fred consented to the obstruction by continuing to rent his apartment.\nB. The violation of the ordinance was not unreasonable. \nC. Remedy of abatement by self-help was adequate.\nD. There was no claim for special damage.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Mary Weld visited Dugan's Alleys to participate in the weekly bowling league competition held there she brought her two-year-old son, Bobby, along and left him in a nursery provided by Dugan for the convenience of his customers. The children in the nursery were normally supervised by three attendants, but at this particular time, as Mary Weld knew, there was only one attendant present to care for about 20 children of assorted ages. About 30 minutes later, while the attendant was looking the other way, Bobby suddenly started to cry. The attendant found him lying on his back, picked him up, and called his mother. It was later discovered that Bobby had suffered a skull fracture. If a claim is asserted against Dugan on Bobby's behalf, will Bobby prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Dugan owed the child the highest degree of care.\nB. Yes, because a two-year-old is incapable of contributory negligence.\nC. No, unless Dugan or his employees failed to exercise reasonable care to assure Bobby's safety.\nD. No, if Mary Weld assumed the risk by leaving Bobby in the nursery.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dent, while eating in a restaurant, noticed that a departing customer at the next table had left a five-dollar bill as a tip for the waitress. Dent reached over, picked up the five-dollar bill, and put it in his pocket. As he stood up to leave, another customer who had seen him take the money ran over to him and hit him in the face with her umbrella. Enraged, Dent choked the customer to death. Dent is charged with murder. He requests the court to charge the jury that they can find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. Dent's request should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Granted, because the jury could find that Dent acted recklessly and not with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.\nB. Granted, because the jury could find that being hit in the face with an umbrella constitutes adequate provocation.\nC. Denied, because the evidence shows that Dent intended to kill or to cause serious bodily harm.\nD. Denied, because the evidence shows that Dent provoked the assault on himself by his criminal misconduct.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Linda was 15 years old, but she appeared and acted older. When asked, she always said she was 22 , and she carried false identification saying she was that old. She frequented taverns and drank heavily. One evening in a bar she became acquainted with Duke. He believed her when she told him her claimed age. They had several drinks and became inebriated. Later, they drove in Duke's car to a secluded spot. After they had necked for a while, Duke propositioned Linda and she consented. Before Duke achieved penetration, Linda changed her mind, saying, \"Stop! Don't touch me! I don't want to do it.\" When Duke did not desist, Linda started to cry and said, \"I am only 15.\" Duke immediately jumped from the car and ran away. Duke was indicted for attempted rape, assault with intent to rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and attempted statutory rape. The age of consent in the jurisdiction is 16 . With respect to the contributing charge under the statute set out in the question above, proof by Duke that he was so inebriated that he could not have formed a criminal intent would be a:\n\nOptions:\nA. Good defense, because the charge requires a specific intent.\nB. Good defense, because at least a general criminal intent is required for every offense.\nC. Poor defense, because contributing to the delinquency of a minor is an offense against a child.\nD. Poor defense, because the state of mind of the defendant is irrelevant to this offense, so long as he was legally sane.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Statutes in the jurisdiction define criminal assault as \"an attempt to commit a criminal battery\" and criminal battery as \"causing an offensive touching.\" As Edward was walking down the street, a gust of wind blew his hat off. Edward reached out, trying to grab his hat, and narrowly missed striking Margaret in the face with his hand. Margaret, fearful of being struck by Edward, pushed Edward away. If charged with criminal assault, Edward should be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty, because he caused Margaret to be in apprehension of an offensive touching.\nB. Guilty, because he should have realized he might strike someone by reaching out.\nC. Not guilty, because he did not intend to hit Margaret.\nD. Not guilty, because he did not hit Margaret.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Polk sued DeVore on a written contract. In her case-in-chief, DeVore testified that she withdrew from the contractual arrangement, as the contract permitted, by notifying Polk by means of a letter. She testified that she put the letter in an envelope, with proper postage, addressed to Polk at his place of business, and that she placed it in a United States Post Office mailbox. In rebuttal, Polk testified that he got his mail each day from a locked post office box and that he had never received any such letter. There was no other evidence relating to receipt of the notice letter. When the case is ready to go to the jury, the trial judge should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Withdraw from the jury's consideration the issue of whether Polk received the notice.\nB. Instruct the jury that it may presume that Polk received the notice.\nC. Instruct the jury that it should find that Polk received the notice.\nD. Submit the case to the jury without instruction concerning a presumption of receipt.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a written contract Singer agreed to deliver to Byer 500 described chairs at $ 20$ each F.O.B. Singer's place of business. The contract provided that \"neither party will assign this contract without the written consent of the other.\" Singer placed the chairs on board a carrier on January 30. On February 1, Singer said in a signed writing, \"I hereby assign to Wheeler all my rights under the Singer-Byer contract.\" Singer did not request and did not get Byer's consent to this transaction. On February 2, the chairs, while in transit, were destroyed in a derailment of the carrier's railroad car. In an action by Wheeler against Byer, Wheeler probably will recover:\n\nOptions:\nA. $ 10,000$, the contract price.\nB. The difference between the contract price and the market value of the chairs.\nC. Nothing, because the chairs had not been delivered.\nD. Nothing, because the Singer-Byer contract forbade an assignment.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Driving down a dark road, Defendant accidentally ran over a man. Defendant stopped and found that the victim was dead. Defendant, fearing that he might be held responsible, took the victim's wallet, which contained a substantial amount of money. He removed the identification papers and put the wallet and money back into the victim's pocket. Defendant is not guilty of:\n\nOptions:\nA. Larceny, because he took the papers only to prevent identification and not for his own use.\nB. Larceny, because he did not take anything from a living victim.\nC. Robbery, because he did not take the papers by means of force or putting in fear.\nD. Robbery, because he did not take anything of monetary value.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be guilty of larceny?\n\nOptions:\nA. Defendant took Sue's television set, with the intention of returning it the next day. However, he dropped it and damaged it beyond repair.\nB. Defendant went into Tom's house and took $ 100$ in the belief that Tom had damaged Defendant's car to that amount.\nC. Mistakenly believing that larceny does not include the taking of a dog, Defendant took his neighbor's dog and sold it.\nD. Unreasonably mistaking George's car for his own, Defendant got into George's car in a parking lot and drove it home. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pack sued Donlon for slander, alleging that Donlon had publicly accused Pack of being a thief. In his answer, Donlon admitted making the accusation, but alleged that it was a true statement. At trial, Donlon offers evidence that Pack stole a ring worth $ 10,000$ from a jewelry store. Evidence concerning this theft should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admitted, because specific instances of conduct may be proved when character is directly in issue.\nB. Admitted, because Pack's actions constituted a felony.\nC. Excluded, because character must be shown by reputation or opinion.\nD. Excluded, because its relevance is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Morgan conveyed Greenacre, her one-family residence, to \"Perez for life, remainder to Rowan, her heirs and assigns, subject, however, to First Bank's mortgage thereon.\" There was an unpaid balance on the mortgage of $ 10,000$, which is payable in $ 1,000$ annual installments plus interest at $6 \\%$ on the unpaid balance, with the next payment due on July 1 . Perez is now occupying Greenacre. The reasonable rental value of the property exceeds the sum necessary to meet all current charges. There is no applicable statute. Under the rules governing contributions between life tenants and remaindermen, how should the burden for payment be allocated? \n\nOptions:\nA. Rowan must pay the principal payment, but Perez must pay the interest to First Bank.\nB. Rowan must pay both the principal and interest payments to First Bank.\nC. Perez must pay both the principal and interest payments to First Bank.\nD. Perez must pay the principal payment, but Rowan must pay the interest to First Bank.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Anders conveyed her only parcel of land to Burton by a duly executed and delivered warranty deed, which provided: To have and to hold the described tract of land in fee simple, subject to the understanding that within one year from the date of the instrument said grantee shall construct and thereafter maintain and operate on said premises a public health center. The grantee, Burton, constructed a public health center on the tract within the time specified and operated it for five years. At the end of this period, Burton converted the structure into a senior citizens' recreational facility. It is considered by all parties in interest that a senior citizens' recreational facility is not a public health center. In an appropriate action, Anders seeks a declaration that the change in the use of the facility has caused the land and structure to revert to her. In this action, Anders should:\n\nOptions:\nA. Win, because the language of the deed created a determinable fee, which leaves a possibility of reverter in the grantor.\nB. Win, because the language of the deed created a fee subject to condition subsequent, which leaves a right of entry or power of termination in the grantor. \nC. Lose, because the language of the deed created only a contractual obligation and did not provide for retention of property interest by the grantor.\nD. Lose, because an equitable charge is enforceable only in equity.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Doctor, a licensed physician, resided in her own home. The street in front of the home had a gradual slope. Doctor's garage was on the street level, with a driveway entrance from the street. At two in the morning, Doctor received an emergency call. She dressed and went to the garage to get her car and found a car parked in front of her driveway. That car was occupied by Parker, who, while intoxicated, had driven to that place and now was in a drunken stupor in the front seat. Unable to rouse Parker, Doctor pushed him into the passenger's side of the front seat and got in on the driver's side. Doctor released the brake and coasted the car down the street, planning to pull into a parking space that was open. When Doctor attempted to stop the car, the brakes failed to work, and the car crashed into the wall of Owner's home, damaging Owner's home and Parker's car and injuring Doctor and Parker. Subsequent examination of the car disclosed that the brake linings were badly worn. A state statute prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle unless the brakes are capable of stopping the vehicle within specified distances at specified speeds. The brakes on Parker's car were incapable of stopping the vehicle within the limits required by the statute. Another state statute makes it a criminal offense to be intoxicated while driving a motor vehicle. The state follows traditional contributory negligence rules. If Parker asserts a claim against Doctor for his injuries, Parker will probably:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because Doctor was negligent as a matter of law.\nB. Recover, because Doctor had no right to move the car.\nC. Not recover, because his brakes were defective.\nD. Not recover, because he was in a drunken stupor when injured.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Denton heard that his neighbor, Prout, intended to sell his home to a minority purchaser, Denton told Prout that Prout and his wife and children would meet with \"accidents\" if he did so. Prout then called the prospective purchaser and told him that he was taking the house off the market. If Prout asserts a claim against Denton for assault, Prout will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover if Denton intended to place Prout in fear of physical harm.\nB. Recover, because Denton's conduct was extreme and outrageous.\nC. Not recover if Denton took no action that threatened immediate physical harm to Prout.\nD. Not recover, because Prout's action removed any threat of harmful force. ",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Linda was 15 years old, but she appeared and acted older. When asked, she always said she was 22 , and she carried false identification saying she was that old. She frequented taverns and drank heavily. One evening in a bar she became acquainted with Duke. He believed her when she told him her claimed age. They had several drinks and became inebriated. Later, they drove in Duke's car to a secluded spot. After they had necked for a while, Duke propositioned Linda and she consented. Before Duke achieved penetration, Linda changed her mind, saying, \"Stop! Don't touch me! I don't want to do it.\" When Duke did not desist, Linda started to cry and said, \"I am only 15.\" Duke immediately jumped from the car and ran away. Duke was indicted for attempted rape, assault with intent to rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and attempted statutory rape. The age of consent in the jurisdiction is 16 . If the contributing charge were based on a statute reading, \"Whoever shall commit an act affecting the morals of a minor under 16 years of age shall be deemed guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period not to exceed 5 years,\" Duke's best legal defense would be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The statute is unconstitutionally vague.\nB. Linda consented to his actions.\nC. He was entrapped by Linda's appearance.\nD. He did not intend to contribute to her delinquency.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alex and Sam were arrested for holding up a gas station. They were taken to police headquarters and placed in a room for interrogation. As a police officer addressing both started to give them Miranda warnings prior to the questioning, Alex said, \"Look, Sam planned the damned thing and I was dumb enough to go along with it. We robbed the place-what else is there to say?\" Sam said nothing. Sam was escorted into another room and a full written confession was then obtained from Alex. If Sam is brought to trial on an indictment charging him with robbery, the fact that Sam failed to object to Alex's statement and remained silent after Alex had implicated him in the crime should be ruled:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because his silence was an implied admission by Sam that he had participated in the crime.\nB. Admissible, because a statement of a participant in a crime is admissible against another participant.\nC. Inadmissible, because under the circumstances there was no duty or responsibility on Sam's part to respond.\nD. Inadmissible, because whatever Alex may have said has no probative value in a trial against Sam.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Post sued Dean for personal injury alleged to have been caused by Dean's negligence. A major issue at trial was whether Post's disability was caused solely by trauma or by a preexisting condition of osteoarthritis. Post called Dr. Cox, who testified that the disability was caused by trauma. On crossexamination, Dr. Cox testified that a medical textbook entitled Diseases of the Joints was authoritative and that she agreed with the substance of passages from the textbook that she was directed to look at, but that the passages were inapplicable to Post's condition because they dealt with rheumatoid arthritis rather than with the osteoarthritis that Post was alleged to have. Dean then called his expert, Dr. Freed, who testified that, with reference to the issue being litigated, there is no difference between the two kinds of arthritis. Dean's counsel then asks permission to read to the jury the textbook passages earlier shown to Dr. Cox. The judge should rule the textbook passages:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible only for the purpose of impeaching Cox. \nB. Admissible as substantive evidence if the judge determines that the passages are relevant.\nC. Inadmissible, because they are hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because Cox contended that they are not relevant to Post's condition.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Alice was held up at the point of a gun, an unusual revolver with a red-painted barrel, while she was clerking in a neighborhood grocery store. Dennis is charged with armed robbery of Alice. The prosecutor calls Winthrop to testify that, a week after the robbery of Alice, he was robbed by Dennis with a pistol that had red paint on the barrel. Winthrop's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as establishing an identifying circumstance.\nB. Admissible as showing that Dennis was willing to commit robbery.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence.\nD. Inadmissible, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Rider, a bus passenger, sued Transit Company for injuries to his back from an accident caused by Transit's negligence. Transit denies that Rider received any injury in the accident. Rider's counsel seeks to introduce an affidavit he obtained in preparation for trial from Dr. Bond, who has since died. The affidavit avers that Dr. Bond examined Rider two days after the Transit Company accident and found him suffering from a recently incurred back injury. The judge should rule the affidavit:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as a statement of present bodily condition made to a physician. \nB. Admissible as prior recorded testimony.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is irrelevant.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Andres conveyed Applewood Farm \"to Bogatz, her heirs and assigns, so long as the premises are used for residential and farm purposes, then to Cohen and his heirs.\"' The common law Rule Against Perpetuities, unmodified by statute, is part of the law of the jurisdiction in which Applewood Farm is located. As a consequence of the conveyance, Cohen's interest in Applewood Farm is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Nothing.\nB. A valid executory interest.\nC. A possibility of reverter.\nD. A right of entry for condition broken.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ogden was the fee simple owner of three adjoining vacant lots fronting on a common street in a primarily residential section of a city which had no zoning laws. The lots were identified as Lots 1, 2, and 3. Ogden conveyed Lot 1 to Akers and Lot 2 to Bell. Ogden retained Lot 3, which consisted of three acres of woodland. Bell, whose lot was between the other two, built a house on his lot. Bell's house included a large window on the side facing Lot 3 . The window provided a beautiful view from Bell's living room, thereby adding value to Bell's house. Akers erected a house on his lot. Ogden made no complaint to either Akers or Bell concerning the houses they built. After both Akers and Bell had completed their houses, the two of them agreed to and did build a common driveway running from the street to the rear of their respective lots. The driveway was built on the line between the two houses so that one-half of the way was located on each lot. Akers and Bell exchanged right-of-way deeds by which each of them conveyed to the other, his heirs and assigns, an easement to continue the right of way. Both deeds were properly recorded. After Akers and Bell had lived in their respective houses for 30 years, a new public street was built bordering on the rear of Lots 1, 2, and 3 . Akers informed Bell that, since the new street removed the need for their common driveway, he considered the right-of-way terminated; therefore, he intended to discontinue its use and expected Bell to do the same. At about the same time, Ogden began the erection of a six-story apartment house on Lot 3 . If the apartment house is completed, it will block the view from Bell's window and will substantially reduce the value of Bell's lot. In an action brought by Bell to enjoin Ogden from erecting the apartment building in such a way as to obstruct the view from Bell's living room window, the decision should be for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Bell, because Ogden's proposed building would be an obstruction of Bell's natural right to an easement for light and air.\nB. Bell, because Bell was misled by Ogden's failure to complain when Bell was building his house.\nC. Ogden if, but only if, it can be shown that Ogden's intention to erect such a building was made known to Bell at or prior to the time of Ogden's conveyance to Bell.\nD. Ogden, because Bell has no easement for light, air, or view.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Construction Company contracted to build a laundry for Wash Company on the latter's vacant lot in a residential area. As a part of its work, Construction Company dug a trench from the partially completed laundry to the edge of a public sidewalk; waterlines were to be installed in the trench. Because of the contour of the land, the trench was dug to a depth ranging from seven to nine feet. Construction Company did not place any barriers around the trench and permitted it to lie open for almost a week while waiting for the delivery of water pipes. This was known to Wash Company, but it raised no objection. During the time the trench was open, a series of heavy rains fell, causing five feet of surface water to gather in the bottom of the trench. While this condition existed, five-year-old Tommy, who was playing on the vacant lot with friends, stumbled and fell into the trench. Robert, an adult passerby, saw this and immediately lowered himself into the trench to rescue Tommy. However, his doing so caused the rain-soaked walls of the trench to collapse, killing both him and Tommy. In a claim for wrongful death by Tommy's administrator against Construction Company, the most likely result is that plaintiff will: \n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because the defendant left the open trench unprotected.\nB. Recover, because construction companies are strictly liable for inherently dangerous conditions.\nC. Not recover, because Tommy was a trespasser.\nD. Not recover, because Tommy's death was a result of the collapse of the trench, an independent intervening cause.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 15 , in a signed writing, Artisan agreed to remodel Ohner's building according to certain specifications, Ohner to pay the agreed price of $ 5,000$ to Artisan's niece, Roberta Neese, as a birthday present. Neese did not learn of the agreement until her birthday on May 5. Before they signed the writing, Artisan and Ohner had orally agreed that their \"written agreement will be null and void unless Ohner is able to obtain a $ 5,000$ loan from the First National Bank before January 31.\" For this question only, assume that Ohner obtained the loan, that Artisan completed the remodeling on May 1, and that on May 3 , at Artisan's request, Ohner paid the $ 5,000$ to Artisan. If Neese learns of Ohner's payment to Artisan on May 5, at the same time she learns of the written Artisan-Ohner contract, will she succeed in an action against Ohner for $ 5,000$ ?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because she is an intended beneficiary of the written Artisan-Ohner contract.\nB. Yes, because the written Artisan-Ohner contract operated as an assignment to Neese, and Artisan thereby lost whatever rights he may have had to the $ 5,000$. \nC. No, because Neese had not furnished any consideration to support Ohner's promise to pay $ 5,000$ to her.\nD. No, because on May 3, Artisan and Ohner effectively modified their written contract, thereby depriving Neese of whatever rights she may have had under that contract.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On January 15 , in a signed writing, Artisan agreed to remodel Ohner's building according to certain specifications, Ohner to pay the agreed price of $ 5,000$ to Artisan's niece, Roberta Neese, as a birthday present. Neese did not learn of the agreement until her birthday on May 5. Before they signed the writing, Artisan and Ohner had orally agreed that their \"written agreement will be null and void unless Ohner is able to obtain a $ 5,000$ loan from the First National Bank before January 31.\" For this question only, assume that Ohner was unable to obtain the loan and, on January 31, phoned Artisan and told him, \"Don't begin the work. The deal is off.\" In an action for breach of contract brought against Ohner by the proper party, will Ohner be successful in asserting as a defense his inability to obtain a loan?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because obtaining a loan was a condition precedent to the existence of an enforceable contract.\nB. Yes, because the agreement about obtaining a loan is a modification of a construction contract and is not required to be in writing.\nC. No, because the agreement about obtaining a loan contradicts the express and implied terms of the writing.\nD. No, because Ohner is estopped to deny the validity of the written agreement.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The Kernel Corporation, through its president, Demeter Gritz, requested from Vault Finance, Inc., a short-term loan of $ 100,000$. On April 1, Gritz and Vault's loan officer agreed orally that Vault would make the loan on the following terms: (1) the loan would be repaid in full on or before the following July 1 and would carry interest at an annual rate of 15\\% (a lawful rate under the applicable usury law); and (2) Gritz would personally guarantee repayment. The loan was approved and made on April 5. The only document evidencing the loan was a memorandum, written and supplied by Vault and signed by Gritz for Kernel, that read in its entirety: In consideration of a loan advanced on this date, Kernel Corporation hereby promises to pay Vault Finance, Inc., $ 100,000$ on September 1. Kernel Corporation by \/s\/ Demeter Gritz Demeter Gritz, President Kernel Corporation did not repay the loan on or before July 1, although it had sufficient funds to do so. On July 10, Vault sued Kernel as principal debtor and Gritz individually as guarantor for $ 100,000$, plus $15 \\%$ interest from April 5. At the trial, can Vault prove Gritz's oral promise to guarantee the loan?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Gritz signed the memorandum.\nB. Yes, because, as president of the debtor-company, Gritz is a third-party beneficiary of the loan.\nC. No, because there was no separate consideration for Gritz's promise.\nD. No, because such proof is barred by the Statute of Frauds. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Tortfeasor tortiously injured Victim in an auto accident. While Victim was recovering in Hospital, Tortfeasor's liability insurer, Insurer, settled with Victim for $ 5,000$. Victim gave Insurer a signed release and received a signed memorandum wherein Insurer promised to pay Victim $ 5,000$ by check within 30 days. When Victim left Hospital two days later, Hospital demanded payment of its $ 4,000$ stated bill. Victim thereupon gave Hospital his own negotiable promissory note for $ 4,000$, payable to Hospital's order in 30 days, and also, as security, assigned to Hospital the Insurer settlement memorandum. Hospital promptly assigned for value the settlement memorandum and negotiated the note to Holder, who took the note as a holder in due course. Subsequently, Victim misrepresented to Insurer that he had lost the settlement memorandum and needed another. Insurer issued another memorandum identical to the first, and Victim assigned it to $\\mathrm{ABC}$ Furniture to secure a $ 5,000$ credit sale contract. $\\mathrm{ABC}$ immediately notified Insurer of this assignment. Later it was discovered that Hospital had mistakenly overbilled Victim by the amount of $ 1,000$ and that Tortfeasor was an irresponsible minor. In view of Tortfeasor's age and irresponsibility when Insurer issued his liability policy, can Holder and $\\mathrm{ABC}$ Furniture recover on their assignments?\n\nOptions:\nA. Neither can recover because Victim, the assignor, is a third-party beneficiary of the liability policy, whose rights thereon can be no better than Tortfeasor's.\nB. Neither can recover unless Insurer knowingly waived the defense of Tortfeasor's minority and irresponsibility.\nC. Neither can recover because the liability policy, and settlement thereunder, are unenforceable because of Tortfeasor's minority.\nD. Either Holder or ABC Furniture, depending on priority, can recover as ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On May 1, Selco and Byco entered into a written agreement in which Selco agreed to fabricate and sell to Byco 10,000 specially designed brake linings for a new type of power brake manufactured by Byco. The contract provided that Byco would pay half of the purchase price on May 15 in order to give Selco funds to \"tool up\" for the work; that Selco would deliver 5,000 brake linings on May 31; that Byco would pay the balance of the purchase price on June 5; and that Selco would deliver the balance of the brake linings on June 30 . On May 10, Selco notified Byco that it was doubtful whether Selco could perform because of problems encountered in modifying its production machines to produce the brake linings. On May 15, however, Selco assured Byco that the production difficulties had been overcome, and Byco paid Selco the first $50 \\%$ installment of the purchase price. Selco did not deliver the first 5,000 brake linings on May 31 , or at any time thereafter; and on June 10, Selco notified Byco that it would not perform the contract. Which of the following correctly states Byco's rights and obligations immediately after receipt of Selco's notice on May 10?\n\nOptions:\nA. Byco can treat the notice as an anticipatory repudiation, and has a cause of action on May 10 for breach of the entire contract.\nB. Byco can treat the notice as an anticipatory repudiation, and can sue at once to enjoin an actual breach by Selco on May 31.\nC. Byco has no cause of action for breach of contract, but can suspend its performance and demand assurances that Selco will perform.\nD. Byco has no cause of action for breach of contract, and must pay the installment of the purchase price due on May 15 to preserve its rights under the contract.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Patty sues Mart Department Store for personal injuries, alleging that while shopping she was knocked to the floor by a merchandise cart being pushed by Handy, a stock clerk, and that as a consequence her back was injured. Handy testified that Patty fell near the cart but was not struck by it. Thirty minutes after Patty's fall, Handy, in accordance with regular practice at Mart, had filled out a printed form, \"Employee's Report of Accident-Mart Department Store,\" in which he stated that Patty had been leaning over to spank her young child and in so doing had fallen near his cart. Counsel for Mart offers in evidence the report, which had been given him by Handy's supervisor. The judge should rule the report offered by Mart:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as res gestae.\nB. Admissible as a business record. \nC. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because Handy is available as a witness.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In Peel's personal injury action, Wilson, a physician who had no previous knowledge of the matter, sat in court and heard all of the evidence about Peel's symptoms and conditions. Wilson is called to give her opinion whether Peel's injuries are permanent. May Wilson so testify?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, provided she first identifies the data on which her opinion is based.\nB. Yes, because an expert may base her opinion on facts made known to her at the trial.\nC. No, because she has no personal knowledge of Peel's condition.\nD. No, because permanence of injury is an issue to be decided by the jury.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Peters sued Davis for $ 100,000$ for injuries received in a traffic accident. Davis charges Peters with contributory negligence and alleges that Peters failed to have his lights on at a time when it was dark enough to require them. Davis calls Bystander to testify that Passenger, who was riding in Peters's automobile and who was injured, confided to him at the scene of the accident that \"we should have had our lights on.\" Bystander's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as an admission of a party opponent.\nB. Admissible as a statement against interest.\nC. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is opinion.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"By her validly executed will, Sallie devised a certain tract of land to her son, Ben, for his life with remainder to such of Ben's children as should be living at his death, \"Provided, however, that no such child of Ben shall mortgage or sell, or attempt to mortgage or sell, his or her interest in the property prior to attaining 25 years of age; and, if any such child of Ben shall violate this provision, then upon such violation his or her interest shall pass to and become the property of the remaining children of Ben then living, share and share alike.\" Sallie's will included an identical provision for each of her four other children concerning four other tracts of land. The residuary clause of the will gave the residuary estate to Sallie's five children equally. Sallie died and was survived by the five children named in her will and by 11 grandchildren. Several additional grandchildren have since been born. In an action for a declaration of rights, it was claimed that the attempted gifts to Sallie's grandchildren were entirely void and that the interests following the life estates to Sallie's children passed to the children absolutely by the residuary clause. Assuming that the action was properly brought with all necessary parties and with a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the interests of unborn and infant grandchildren, the decision should be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. The attempted gifts to grandchildren are void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.\nB. The attempted gifts to grandchildren are void as unlawful restraints on alienation. \nC. The provisions concerning grandchildren are valid and will be upheld according to their terms.\nD. Even if the provisions against sale or mortgage by the grandchildren are void, the remainders to grandchildren are otherwise valid and will be given effect.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Householder hired Contractor to remodel Householder's kitchen. She had learned of him through a classified advertisement he placed in the local newspaper. During the telephone conversation in which she hired him, he stated he was experienced and qualified to do all necessary work. Because of his low charge for his work, they agreed in writing that on acceptance of his job by Householder, he would have no further liability to her or to anyone else for any defects in materials or workmanship, and that she would bear all such costs. Householder purchased a dishwasher manufactured by Elex Company from Dealer, who was in the retail electrical appliance business. The washer was sold by Dealer with only the manufacturer's warranty and with no warranty by Dealer; Elex Company restricted its warranty to 90 days on parts and labor. Contractor installed the dishwasher. Two months after Householder accepted the entire job, she was conversing in her home with Accountant, an acquaintance who had agreed to prepare her income tax return gratuitously. As they talked, they noticed that the dishwasher was operating strangely, repeatedly stopping and starting. At Householder's request, Accountant gave it a cursory examination and, while inspecting it, received a violent electrical shock which did him extensive harm. The dishwasher had an internal wiring defect that allowed electrical current to be carried into the framework and caused the machine to malfunction. The machine had not been adequately grounded by Contractor during installation; if it had been, the current would have been led harmlessly away. The machine carried instructions for correct grounding, which Contractor had not followed. If Accountant asserts a claim based on strict liability against Elex Company for damages, the probable result is that Accountant will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because the dishwasher was defectively made.\nB. Recover, because Elex Company is vicariously liable for the improper installation.\nC. Not recover, because he assumed the risk by inspecting the machine.\nD. Not recover, because he was not the purchaser.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In City of State Y, Maple Street is a local public thoroughfare, designated as a one-way street for northbound traffic. Pine Street is a public thoroughfare, designated as a one-way street for eastbound traffic. Maple and Pine Streets intersect at right angles. The intersection is controlled by traffic lights. There are two sets of lights, one at the northeast corner and one at the northwest corner, for traffic on Maple Street. There are two sets of lights, one at the northeast corner and one at the southeast corner, for traffic on Pine Street. Trucker was making a delivery to a market on the east side of Maple Street, just north of its intersection with Pine Street. There being insufficient space for his truck and enclosed trailer, he parked it with the rear of the trailer extending entirely across the crosswalk on the north side of the intersection. The height of the trailer was such that it entirely obscured the traffic light on the northeast corner from the view of traffic moving east on Pine Street. Unknown to Trucker, the traffic light at the southeast corner was not functioning, because a collision 72 hours earlier had knocked down the pole from which the light was suspended. Visitor, on his first trip to City, was driving east on Pine Street. Not seeing any traffic light or pole, he entered the intersection at a time when the light was red for eastbound traffic and green for northbound traffic. Driver, proceeding north on Maple Street and seeing the green light, entered the intersection without looking for any cross traffic and struck Visitor's car. Driver received personal injuries, and Visitor's car was damaged severely as a result of the impact. Statutes of State Y make it a misdemeanor (1) to park a motor vehicle so that any part projects into a crosswalk and (2) to enter an intersection contrary to a traffic signal. If Driver asserts a claim against City, the theory on which he has the best chance of prevailing is that City:\n\nOptions:\nA. Is strictly liable for harm caused by a defective traffic signal.\nB. Was negligent in not replacing the broken pole within 72 hours.\nC. Had an absolute duty to maintain installed signals in good operating order.\nD. Created a dangerous trap by not promptly replacing the broken pole.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Gasco owns a storage facility where flammable gases are stored in liquefied form under high pressure in large spherical tanks. The facility was constructed for Gasco by Acme Company, a firm that specializes in the construction of such facilities. After the facility had been in use for five years, an explosion in the facility started a large fire that blanketed the surrounding countryside with a high concentration of oily smoke and soot. Farber owns a large truck farm near the facility. His entire lettuce crop was destroyed by oily deposits left by the smoke. If Farber asserts a claim against Acme Company for the loss of his lettuce crop, will Farber prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. No, if Acme did not design the storage facility. \nB. No, because Acme was an independent contractor.\nC. Yes, because the operation of the storage facility was an abnormally dangerous activity.\nD. Yes, if the explosion resulted from a defect of which Acme was aware.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mater, a wealthy widow, wishing to make a substantial and potentially enduring gift to her beloved adult stepson, Prodigal, established with the Vault Savings and Loan Association a passbook savings account by an initial deposit of $ 10,000$. For this question only, assume the following facts. The passbook was issued solely in Prodigal's name; but Mater retained possession of it, and Prodigal was not then informed of the savings account. Subsequently, Mater became disgusted with Prodigal's behavior and decided to give the same savings account solely to her beloved adult daughter Distaff. As permitted by the rules of Vault Savings and Loan, Mater effected this change by agreement with Vault. This time she left possession of the passbook with Vault. Shortly thereafter, Prodigal learned of the original savings account in his name and the subsequent switch to Distaff's name. If Prodigal now sues Vault Savings and Loan for $ 10,000$ plus accrued interest, will the action succeed?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because Prodigal was a thirdparty intended beneficiary of the original Mater-Vault deposit agreement.\nB. Yes, because Prodigal was a constructive assignee of Mater's claim, as depositor, to the savings account.\nC. No, because Prodigal never obtained possession of the passbook.\nD. No, because Prodigal's right, if any, to the funds on deposit was effectively abrogated by the second Mater-Vault deposit agreement.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On May 1, Selco and Byco entered into a written agreement in which Selco agreed to fabricate and sell to Byco 10,000 specially designed brake linings for a new type of power brake manufactured by Byco. The contract provided that Byco would pay half of the purchase price on May 15 in order to give Selco funds to \"tool up\" for the work; that Selco would deliver 5,000 brake linings on May 31; that Byco would pay the balance of the purchase price on June 5; and that Selco would deliver the balance of the brake linings on June 30 . On May 10, Selco notified Byco that it was doubtful whether Selco could perform because of problems encountered in modifying its production machines to produce the brake linings. On May 15, however, Selco assured Byco that the production difficulties had been overcome, and Byco paid Selco the first $50 \\%$ installment of the purchase price. Selco did not deliver the first 5,000 brake linings on May 31 , or at any time thereafter; and on June 10, Selco notified Byco that it would not perform the contract. Which of the following is not a correct statement of the parties' legal status immediately after Selco's notice on June 10 ?\n\nOptions:\nA. Byco has a cause of action for total breach of contract because of Selco's repudiation, but that cause of action will be lost if Selco retracts its repudiation before Byco changes its position or manifests to Selco that Byco considers the repudiation final.\nB. Byco can bring suit to rescind the contract even if it elects to await Selco's performance for a commercially reasonable time.\nC. Byco can await performance by Selco for a commercially reasonable time, but if Byco awaits performance beyond that period, it cannot recover any resulting damages that it reasonably could have avoided.\nD. Byco has a cause of action for breach of contract that it can successfully assert only after it has given Selco a commercially reasonable time to perform.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is Defendant most likely to be guilty of common law murder?\n\nOptions:\nA. During an argument in a bar, Norris punches Defendant. Defendant, mistakenly believing that Norris is about to stab him, shoots and kills Norris.\nB. While committing a robbery of a liquor store, Defendant accidentally drops his revolver, which goes off. The bullet strikes and kills Johnson, a customer in the store.\nC. While hunting deer, Defendant notices something moving in the bushes. Believing it to be a deer, Defendant fires into the bushes. The bullet strikes and kills Griggs, another hunter.\nD. In celebration of the Fourth of July, Defendant discharges a pistol within the city limits in violation of a city ordinance. The bullet ricochets off the street and strikes and kills Abbott.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pratt sued Danvers for injuries suffered by Pratt when their automobiles collided. At trial, Pratt offers into evidence a properly authenticated letter from Danvers that says, \"Your claim seems too high, but, because I might have been a little negligent, I'm prepared to offer you half of what you ask.\" The letter is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as an admission by a partyopponent.\nB. Admissible as a statement against pecuniary interest.\nC. Inadmissible, because Danvers's statement is lay opinion on a legal issue.\nD. Inadmissible, because Danvers's statement was made in an effort to settle the claim.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"At the trial of Davis for a murder that occurred in Newtown, the prosecution called Waite, who testified that she saw Davis kill the victim. Davis believed that Waite was 600 miles away in Old Town, engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics, on the day in question. On crossexamination by Davis, Waite was asked whether she had in fact sold narcotics in Old Town on that date. Waite refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination. The judge, over the prosecutor's objection, ordered that if Waite did not testify, her direct testimony should be stricken. The order to testify or have the testimony stricken can best be supported on the basis that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Waite had not been charged with any crime and, thus, could claim no privilege against self-incrimination. \nB. Waite's proper invocation of the privilege prevented adequate cross-examination.\nC. The public interest in allowing an accused to defend himself or herself outweighs the interest of a nonparty witness in the privilege.\nD. The trial record, independent of testimony, does not establish that Waite's answer could incriminate her.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Sue owned a five-acre tract of land, one acre of which had previously been owned by Opal, but to which Sue had acquired title by adverse possession. Sue contracted to convey the full five-acre tract to Peg, but the contract did not specify the quality of title Sue would convey. Suppose Peg pays the purchase price and accepts a deed. Subsequently, Sue's title to the one acre proves inadequate and Opal ejects Peg from that acre. Peg sues Sue for damages. Which of the following statements applies most accurately to the determination of Peg's rights?\n\nOptions:\nA. Sue's deed was fraudulent.\nB. The terms of the deed control Sue's liability.\nC. The only remedy available for breach of warranty of title is rescission.\nD. Peg's rights are based on the implied covenants that the title conveyed shall be marketable.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Oscar, the owner in fee simple, laid out a subdivision of 325 lots on 150 acres of land. He obtained governmental approval (as required by applicable ordinances) and, between 1968 and 1970 , he sold 140 of the lots, inserting in each of the 140 deeds the following provision: The Grantee, for himself and his heirs, assigns and successors, covenants and agrees that the premises conveyed herein shall have erected thereon one singlefamily dwelling and that no other structure (other than a detached garage, normally incident to a single-family dwelling) shall be erected or maintained; and, further, that no use shall ever be made or permitted to be made other than occupancy by a single family for residential purposes only. Because of difficulty encountered in selling the remaining lots for single-family use, in January 1971, Oscar advertised the remaining lots with prominent emphasis: \"These lots are not subject to any restrictions and purchasers will find them adaptable to a wide range of uses.\" Payne had purchased one of the 140 lots and brought suit against Oscar to establish that the remaining 185 lots, as well as the 140 sold previously, can be used only for residential purposes by single families. Assuming that procedural requirements have been met, to permit adjudication of the issue Payne has tendered, which of the following is the most appropriate comment? \n\nOptions:\nA. Oscar should win because the provision binds only the grantee.\nB. The outcome turns on whether a common development scheme had been established for the entire subdivision.\nC. The outcome turns on whether there are sufficient land areas devoted to multiple family uses within the municipality to afford reasonable opportunity for all economic classes to move into the area so as to satisfy the standards of equal protection of the law.\nD. Payne should win under an application of the doctrine, which requires construction of deeds, to resolve any doubt against the grantor.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The owner of Newacre executed and delivered to a power company a right-of-way deed for the building and maintenance of an overhead power line across Newacre. The deed was properly recorded. Newacre then passed through several intermediate conveyances until it was conveyed to Sloan about 10 years after the date of the right-of-way deed. All the intermediate deeds were properly recorded, but none of them mentioned the right-of-way. Sloan entered into a written contract to sell Newacre to Jones. By the terms of the contract, Sloan promised to furnish an abstract of title to Jones. Sloan contracted directly with Abstract Company to prepare and deliver an abstract to Jones, and Abstract Company did so. The abstract omitted the right-of-way deed. Jones delivered the abstract to his attorney and asked the attorney for an opinion as to title. The attorney signed and delivered to Jones a letter stating that, from the attorney's examination of the abstract, it was his \"opinion that Sloan had a free and unencumbered marketable title to Newacre.\" Sloan conveyed Newacre to Jones by a deed which included covenants of general warranty and against encumbrances. Jones paid the full purchase price. After Jones had been in possession of Newacre for more than a year, he learned about the right-of-way deed. Sloan, Jones, Abstract Company, and Jones's attorney were all without actual knowledge of the existence of the right-of-way prior to the conveyance from Sloan to Jones. If Jones sues Sloan because of the presence of the right-of-way, the most likely result will be a decision for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Jones, because Sloan is liable for his negligent misrepresentation.\nB. Jones, because the covenants in Sloan's deed to Jones have been breached. \nC. Sloan, because Jones relied upon Abstract Company, not Sloan, for information concerning title.\nD. Sloan, because Sloan was without knowledge of any defects in the title to Newacre.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"The owner of Newacre executed and delivered to a power company a right-of-way deed for the building and maintenance of an overhead power line across Newacre. The deed was properly recorded. Newacre then passed through several intermediate conveyances until it was conveyed to Sloan about 10 years after the date of the right-of-way deed. All the intermediate deeds were properly recorded, but none of them mentioned the right-of-way. Sloan entered into a written contract to sell Newacre to Jones. By the terms of the contract, Sloan promised to furnish an abstract of title to Jones. Sloan contracted directly with Abstract Company to prepare and deliver an abstract to Jones, and Abstract Company did so. The abstract omitted the right-of-way deed. Jones delivered the abstract to his attorney and asked the attorney for an opinion as to title. The attorney signed and delivered to Jones a letter stating that, from the attorney's examination of the abstract, it was his \"opinion that Sloan had a free and unencumbered marketable title to Newacre.\" Sloan conveyed Newacre to Jones by a deed which included covenants of general warranty and against encumbrances. Jones paid the full purchase price. After Jones had been in possession of Newacre for more than a year, he learned about the right-of-way deed. Sloan, Jones, Abstract Company, and Jones's attorney were all without actual knowledge of the existence of the right-of-way prior to the conveyance from Sloan to Jones. If Jones sues Abstract Company for damages caused to Jones by the presence of the right-of-way, the most likely result will be a decision for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Jones, because Jones was a thirdparty creditor beneficiary of the contract between Sloan and Abstract Company.\nB. Jones, because the abstract prepared by Abstract Company constitutes a guarantee of Jones's title to Newacre.\nC. Abstract Company, because Abstract Company had no knowledge of the existence of the right-of-way.\nD. Abstract Company, because there was no showing that any fraud was practiced upon Jones.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Siddon worked as a private duty nurse and on occasion worked in Doctors' Hospital. The hospital called Registry, the private duty referral agency through which Siddon usually obtained employment, and asked that in the future she not be assigned to patients in Doctors' Hospital. Registry asked the hospital why it had made the request. Doctors' Hospital sent a letter to Registry giving as the reason for its request that significant amounts of narcotics had disappeared during Siddon's shifts from the nursing stations at which she had worked. If Siddon asserts a claim based on defamation against Doctors' Hospital, Siddon will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because the hospital accused Siddon of improper professional conduct.\nB. Recover if Siddon did not take the narcotics.\nC. Not recover if narcotics disappeared during Siddon's shifts.\nD. Not recover if the hospital reasonably believed that Siddon took the narcotics.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dock had been the unsuccessful suitor of Mary, who had recently announced her engagement to Paul. Angered by her engagement, Dock sent Mary the following letter: \"I hope you know what you are doing. The man you think you love wears women's clothes when at home. A Friend.\" The receipt of this letter caused Mary great emotional distress. She hysterically telephoned Paul, read him the letter, and told him that she was breaking their engagement. The contents of the letter were not revealed to others. Paul, who was a young attorney in the state attorney's office, suffered serious humiliation and emotional distress as a result of the broken engagement. If Paul asserts a claim against Dock based on defamation and it is proved that Dock's statement was true, such proof will be:\n\nOptions:\nA. A defense by itself.\nB. A defense only if Dock was not actuated by malice.\nC. A defense only if Dock reasonably believed it to be true.\nD. No defense by itself.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Customer, age 20 , went into Store at approximately 6:45 p.m. to look at some suits that were on sale. The clerks were busy, and one of them told him that he should wait on himself. Customer selected three suits from a rack and went into the dressing room to try them on. Signs posted on the walls of the Store state that closing time is 9 p.m.; however, because of a special awards banquet for employees, Store was closed at 7 p.m. on this day. The employees, in a hurry to get to the banquet, did not check the dressing rooms or turn off the lights before leaving. When Customer emerged from the dressing room a few minutes after 7 p.m., he was alone and locked in. Customer tried the front door but it was secured on the outside by a bar and padlock, so he went to the rear door. Customer grabbed the doorknob and vigorously shook the door. It did not open, but the activity set off a mechanism that had been installed because of several recent thefts committed by persons who had hidden in the store until after closing time. The mechanism sprayed a chemical mist in Customer's face, causing him to become temporarily blind. The mechanism also activated an alarm carried by Store's employee, Watchman, who was just coming to work. Watchman unlocked the front door, ran into the store, and grabbed Customer. Customer, who was still unable to see, struck out at this person and hit a metal rack, injuring his hand. Watchman then identified himself, and Customer did the same. After assuring himself that Customer was telling the truth, Watchman allowed him to leave. If Customer is to prevail on a claim against Store based on battery from the use of the chemical spray, Customer must establish that:\n\nOptions:\nA. He suffered severe bodily harm.\nB. The spray mist was an offensive or harmful contact.\nC. He suffered severe emotional distress.\nD. His conduct was not a factual cause of the chemical's spraying him.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Peter was rowing a boat on a mountain lake when a storm suddenly arose. Fearful that the boat might sink, Peter rowed to a boat dock on shore and tied the boat to the dock. The shore property and dock were the private property of Owner. While the boat was tied at the dock, Owner came down and ordered Peter to remove the boat because the action of the waves was causing the boat to rub against a bumper on the dock. When Peter refused, Owner untied the boat and cast it adrift. The boat sank. Peter was wearing a pair of swimming trunks and nothing else. He had a pair of shoes and a parka in the boat, but they were lost when Owner set it adrift. Peter was staying at a cabin one mile from Owner's property. The only land routes back were a short rocky trail that was dangerous during the storm, and a 15-mile road around the lake. The storm continued with heavy rain and hail, and Peter, having informed Owner of the location of his cabin, asked Owner to take him back there in Owner's car. Owner said, \"You got here by yourself and you'll have to get back home yourself.\" After one hour the storm stopped, and Peter walked home over the trail. 13. A necessary element in determining if Peter is liable for a trespass is whether: (A) Owner had clearly posted his property with a sign indicating that it was private property. (B) Peter knew that the property belonged to a private person. (C) Peter had reasonable grounds to believe the property belonged to a private person. (D) Peter had reasonable grounds to believe his boat might be swamped and might sink. If the claim is asserted against Dave's parents, the most likely result is they will be: \n\nOptions:\nA. Liable, because parents are strictly liable for the torts of their children.\nB. Liable, because Dave's parents encouraged him to be aggressive and tough.\nC. Not liable, because a child under seven is not liable in tort.\nD. Not liable, because parents cannot be held liable for the tort of a child.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Parents purchased a new mobile home from Seller. The mobile home was manufactured by Mobilco and had a ventilating system designed by Mobilco with both a heating unit and an air conditioner. Mobilco installed a furnace manufactured by Heatco and an air conditioning unit manufactured by Coolco. Each was controlled by an independent thermostat installed by Mobilco. Because of the manner in which Mobilco designed the ventilating system, the first time the ventilating system was operated by Parents, cold air was vented into Parents' bedroom to keep the temperature at $68^{\\circ}$ $\\mathrm{F}\\left(20^{\\circ} \\mathrm{C}\\right)$. The cold air then activated the heater thermostat, and hot air was pumped into the bedroom of Child, the six-month-old child of Parents. The temperature in Child's room reached more than $170^{\\circ} \\mathrm{F}\\left(77^{\\circ} \\mathrm{C}\\right)$ before Child's mother became aware of the condition and shut the system off manually. As a result, Child suffered permanent physical injury. Claims have been asserted by Child, through a duly appointed guardian, against Mobilco, Seller, Heatco, and Coolco. If Child's claim against Seller is based on negligence, the minimum proof necessary to establish Seller's liability is that the ventilating system:\n\nOptions:\nA. Was defective.\nB. Was defective and had not been inspected by Seller.\nC. Was defective and had been inspected by Seller, and the defect was not discovered.\nD. Was defective, and the defect would have been discovered if Seller had exercised reasonable care in inspecting the system.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pace sues Def Company for injuries suffered when Pace's car collided with Def Company's truck. Def's general manager prepared a report of the accident at the request of the company's attorney, in preparation for the trial, and delivered the report to the attorney. Pace demands that the report be produced. Will production of the report be required?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because business reports are not generally privileged.\nB. No, because it is a privileged communication from client to the attorney.\nC. No, because such reports contain hearsay.\nD. No, because such reports are self-serving.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Homer conveyed his home to his wife Wanda, for life, remainder to his daughter, Dixie. There was a $ 20,000$ mortgage on the home, requiring monthly payment covering interest to date plus a portion of the principal. Which of the following statements about the monthly payment is correct?\n\nOptions:\nA. Wanda must pay the full monthly payment.\nB. Wanda must pay a portion of the monthly payment based on an apportionment of the value between Wanda's life estate and Dixie's remainder.\nC. Wanda must pay the portion of the monthly payment that represents interest.\nD. Dixie must pay the full monthly payment.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Metterly, the owner in fee simple of Brownacre, by quitclaim deed conveyed Brownacre to her daughter, Doris, who paid no consideration for the conveyance. The deed was never recorded. About a year after the delivery of the deed, Metterly decided that this gift had been ill-advised. She requested that Doris destroy the deed, which Doris dutifully and voluntarily did. Within the month following the destruction of the deed, Metterly and Doris were killed in a common disaster. Each of the successors in interest claimed title to Brownacre. In an appropriate action to determine the title to Brownacre, the probable outcome will be that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Metterly was the owner of Brownacre, because Doris was a donee and therefore could not acquire title by quitclaim deed.\nB. Metterly was the owner of Brownacre, because title to Brownacre reverted to her upon the voluntary destruction of the deed by Doris. \nC. Doris was the owner of Brownacre, because her destruction of the deed to Brownacre was under the undue influence of Metterly.\nD. Doris was the owner of Brownacre, because the deed was merely evidence of her title, and its destruction was insufficient to cause title to pass back to Metterly.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owen held in fee simple Farmdale, a large tract of vacant land. The state wherein Farmdale is situated has a statute which provides, in substance, that unless the conveyance is recorded, every deed or other conveyance of an interest in land is void as to a subsequent purchaser who pays value without notice of such conveyance. The following transactions occurred in the order given. First: Owen conveyed Farmdale, for a fair price, to Allred by general warranty deed. Allred did not immediately record. Second: Owen executed a mortgage to secure repayment of a loan concurrently made to Owen by Leon. Leon had no notice of the prior conveyance to Allred and promptly recorded the mortgage. Third: Owen, by general warranty deed, gratuitously conveyed to Niece, who promptly recorded the deed. Fourth: Allred recorded his deed from Owen. Fifth: $\\quad$ Niece, by general warranty deed, conveyed Farmdale to Barrett. Barrett had no actual notice of any of the prior transactions, paid full value, and promptly recorded the deed. Assume for this question only that Niece had not conveyed to Barrett. After Allred recorded his deed from Owen, Allred, asserting that Allred's title was held free of any claim by Niece, instituted suit against Niece to recover title to Farmdale. Judgment should be for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Niece, because she had no notice of Allred's rights when she accepted the deed from Owen.\nB. Niece, because she recorded her deed before Allred recorded his.\nC. Allred, because Niece was not a bona fide purchaser who paid value.\nD. Allred, because he had paid value for Farmdale and had no actual or constructive notice of the deed to Niece.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Trease owned Hilltop in fee simple. By his will, he devised as follows: \"Hilltop to such of my grandchildren who shall reach the age of 21 ; and by this provision I intend to include all grandchildren whenever born.\" At the time of his death, Trease had three children and two grandchildren. Which of the following additions to or changes in the facts of the preceding question would produce a violation of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities?\n\nOptions:\nA. A posthumous child was born to Trease.\nB. Trease's will expressed the intention to include all afterborn grandchildren in the gift.\nC. The instrument was an inter vivos conveyance rather than a will.\nD. Trease had no grandchildren living at the time of his death.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Auto Company, a corporation, was a small dealer in big new cars and operated a service department. Peter wanted to ask Mike, the service manager, whether Auto Company would check the muffler on his small foreign car. Peter parked on the street near the service department with the intention of entering that part of the building by walking through one of the three large entrances designed for use by automobiles. There was no street entrance to the service department for individuals, and customers as well as company employees often used one of the automobile entrances. As Peter reached the building, he glanced behind him to be sure no vehicle was approaching that entrance. Seeing none, he walked through the entrance, but immediately he was struck on the back of the head and neck by the large overhead door which was descending. The blow knocked Peter unconscious and caused permanent damage. Peter did not know how the door was raised and lowered; however, the overhead door was operated by the use of either of two switches in the building. One switch was located in the office of the service manager and the other was located near the door in the service work area for the convenience of the mechanics. On this occasion, no one was in the service work area except three Auto Company mechanics. Mike, who had been in his office, and the three mechanics denied having touched a switch that would have lowered the door. Subsequent investigation showed, however, that the switches were working properly and that all of the mechanisms for moving the door were in good working order. If Peter asserts a claim based on negligence against Auto Company, Peter probably will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because Auto Company is strictly liable under the circumstances.\nB. Recover, because an employee of Auto Company was negligent.\nC. Not recover, because Peter was a licensee.\nD. Not recover, because Peter assumed the risk.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dever drove his car into an intersection and collided with a fire engine that had entered the intersection from Dever's right. The accident was caused by negligence on Dever's part. As a result of the accident, the fire engine was delayed in reaching Peters's house, which was entirely consumed by fire. Peters's house was located about 10 blocks from the scene of the accident. If Peters asserts a claim against Dever, Peters will recover:\n\nOptions:\nA. That part of his loss that would have been prevented if the collision had not occurred.\nB. The value of his house before the fire.\nC. Nothing if Dever had nothing to do with causing the fire.\nD. Nothing, because Dever's conduct did not create an apparent danger to Peters.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ted frequently visited Janet, his next-door neighbor. Janet was separated from her husband, Howard. Howard resided with his mother but jointly owned the house in which Janet resided. Late one night, Ted and Janet were sitting on the bed in Janet's bedroom drinking when Howard burst through the door and told Ted, \"Get out!\" When Ted refused, Howard challenged him to go outside and \"fight it out.\" Ted again refused. Howard then pulled a knife from his pocket and lunged at Ted. Ted grabbed a lamp, struck Howard on the head, and killed him. Ted is charged with murder. On a charge of murder, Ted should be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Not guilty, because Ted had as much right as Howard to be in the house.\nB. Not guilty, because Howard attacked Ted with a deadly weapon.\nC. Guilty, because Ted's presence in Janet's bedroom prompted Howard's attack.\nD. Guilty, because Ted's failure to obey Howard's order to leave the house made him a trespasser.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Adams, Bennett, and Curtis are charged in a common law jurisdiction with conspiracy to commit larceny. The state introduced evidence that they agreed to go to Nelson's house to take stock certificates from a safe in Nelson's bedroom, that they went to the house, and that they were arrested as they entered Nelson's bedroom. Adams testified that he thought the stock certificates belonged to Curtis, that Nelson was improperly keeping them from Curtis, and that he went along to aid in retrieving Curtis's property. Bennett testified that he suspected Adams and Curtis of being thieves and joined up with them in order to catch them. He also testified that he made an anonymous telephone call to the police alerting them to the crime and that the call caused the police to be waiting for them when they walked into Nelson's bedroom. Curtis did not testify. If the jury believes Adams, it should find him:\n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty, because there was an agreement and the entry into the bedroom is sufficient for the overt act.\nB. Guilty, because good motives are not a defense to criminal liability.\nC. Not guilty, because he did not have a corrupt motive.\nD. Not guilty, because he did not intend to steal.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Price sued Derrick for injuries Price received in an automobile accident. Price claimed Derrick was negligent in (a) exceeding the posted speed limit of 35 m.p.h., (b) failing to keep a lookout, and (c) crossing the center line. Derrick testified in his own behalf that he was going 30 m.p.h. On cross-examination, Price's counsel did not question Derrick with regard to his speed. Subsequently, Price's counsel calls Officer to testify that, in his investigation following the accident, Derrick told him he was driving 40 m.p.h. Officer's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.\nB. Admissible as an admission.\nC. Inadmissible, because it lacks a foundation.\nD. Inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In City of State Y, Maple Street is a local public thoroughfare, designated as a one-way street for northbound traffic. Pine Street is a public thoroughfare, designated as a one-way street for eastbound traffic. Maple and Pine Streets intersect at right angles. The intersection is controlled by traffic lights. There are two sets of lights, one at the northeast corner and one at the northwest corner, for traffic on Maple Street. There are two sets of lights, one at the northeast corner and one at the southeast corner, for traffic on Pine Street. Trucker was making a delivery to a market on the east side of Maple Street, just north of its intersection with Pine Street. There being insufficient space for his truck and enclosed trailer, he parked it with the rear of the trailer extending entirely across the crosswalk on the north side of the intersection. The height of the trailer was such that it entirely obscured the traffic light on the northeast corner from the view of traffic moving east on Pine Street. Unknown to Trucker, the traffic light at the southeast corner was not functioning, because a collision 72 hours earlier had knocked down the pole from which the light was suspended. Visitor, on his first trip to City, was driving east on Pine Street. Not seeing any traffic light or pole, he entered the intersection at a time when the light was red for eastbound traffic and green for northbound traffic. Driver, proceeding north on Maple Street and seeing the green light, entered the intersection without looking for any cross traffic and struck Visitor's car. Driver received personal injuries, and Visitor's car was damaged severely as a result of the impact. Statutes of State Y make it a misdemeanor (1) to park a motor vehicle so that any part projects into a crosswalk and (2) to enter an intersection contrary to a traffic signal. If Driver asserts a claim against Trucker and establishes that Trucker was negligent, the likely result is that Trucker's negligence is:\n\nOptions:\nA. A legal but not an actual cause of Driver's injuries.\nB. An actual but not a legal cause of Driver's injuries.\nC. Both an actual and a legal cause of Driver's injuries.\nD. Neither an actual nor a legal cause of Driver's injuries.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"On October 1, Toy Store, Inc., entered into a written contract with Fido Factory, Inc., for the purchase at $ 20$ per unit of 1,000 mechanical dogs, to be specially manufactured by Fido according to Toy Store's specifications. Fido promised to deliver all of the dogs \"not later than November 15, for the Yule shopping season,\"' and Toy Store promised to pay the full $ 20,000$ price upon delivery. In order to obtain operating funds, Fido as borrower entered into a written loan agreement on October 5 with the High Finance Company. In relevant part, this agreement recited, \"Fido Factory hereby transfers and assigns to High Finance its (Fido Factory's) October 1 mechanical dog contract with Toy Store, as security for a 50 -day loan of $ 15,000$, the advance and receipt of which are hereby acknowledged by Fido Factory. ...\" No copy of this agreement, or statement relating to it, was filed in an office of public record. On October 15, Fido notified Toy Store, \"We regret to advise that our master shaft burned out last night because our night supervisor let the lubricant level get too low. We have just fired the supervisor, but the shaft cannot be repaired or replaced until about January 1. We can guarantee delivery of your order, however, not later than January 20.\" Toy Store rejected this proposal as unacceptable and immediately contracted with the only other available manufacturer to obtain the 1,000 dogs at $ 30$ per unit by November 15 . For this question only, assume that by November 16, Fido, without legal excuse, has delivered no dogs, and that Toy Store has brought no action against Fido. In an action brought on November 16 by Toy Store against High Finance Company because of Fido's default, Toy Store can recover:\n\nOptions:\nA. Nothing, because the October 5 assignment by Fido to High Finance of Fido's contract with Toy Store was only an assignment for security.\nB. Nothing, because no record of the October 5 transaction between Fido and High Finance was publicly filed.\nC. $ 10,000$ in damages, because Toy Store was a third-party intended beneficiary of the October 5 transaction between Fido and High Finance. \nD. $ 10,000$ in damages, because the October 5 transaction between Fido and High Finance effected, with respect to Toy Store as creditor, a novation of debtors.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In which of the following situations is Defendant's claim of intoxication most likely to result in his being found not guilty?\n\nOptions:\nA. Defendant is charged with manslaughter for a death resulting from an automobile accident. Defendant, the driver, claims he was so drunk he was unable to see the other car involved in the accident.\nB. Defendant is charged with assault with intent to kill Watts, as a result of his wounding Watts by shooting him. Defendant claims he was so drunk he did not realize anyone else was around when he fired the gun.\nC. Defendant is charged with armed robbery. He claims he was so drunk he did not know whether the gun was loaded.\nD. Defendant is charged with statutory rape, after he had sexual intercourse with a girl aged 15 , in a jurisdiction where the age of consent is 16 . Defendant claims he was so drunk he did not realize the girl was a minor.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Owner and his employee, Driver, consult Attorney about a motor vehicle collision resulting in a suit by Litigant against Owner and Driver as joint defendants. Attorney calls Irving, his investigator, into the conference to make notes of what is said, and those present discuss the facts of the collision and Owner's insurance. Owner thereafter files a cross-claim against Driver for indemnity for any damages obtained by Litigant. Litigant calls Driver to testify in Litigant's case-in-chief to admissions made by Owner in the conference. On objection by Owner, the court should rule that Driver's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because of the presence of persons in the conference other than Attorney and Owner.\nB. Admissible, because Driver is an adverse party in the lawsuit.\nC. Inadmissible, because of the attorney-client privilege.\nD. Inadmissible, because the best evi- dence is Irving's notes of the conference.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Odum owned Brightacre (a tract of land) in fee simple. He conveyed it \"to Pike, his heirs and assigns; but if Farley shall be living 30 years from the date of this deed, then to Farley, his heirs and assigns.\" The limitation \"to Farley, his heirs and assigns\" is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Valid, because Farley's interest is a reversion.\nB. Valid, because the interest will vest, if at all, within a life in being.\nC. Valid, because Farley's interest is vested subject to divestment.\nD. Invalid.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Meadowview is a large tract of undeveloped land. Black, the owner of Meadowview, prepared a development plan creating 200 house lots in Meadowview with the necessary streets and public areas. The plan was fully approved by all necessary governmental agencies and duly recorded. However, construction of the streets, utilities, and other aspects of the development of Meadowview has not yet begun, and none of the streets can be opened as public ways until they are completed in accordance with the applicable ordinances of the municipality in which Meadowview is located. College Avenue, one of the streets laid out as part of the Meadowview development, abuts Whiteacre, an adjacent one-acre parcel owned by White. Whiteacre has no access to any public way except an old, poorly developed road which is inconvenient and cannot be used without great expense. White sold Whiteacre to Breyer. The description used in the deed from White to Breyer was the same as that used in prior deeds except that the portion of the description which formerly said, \"thence by land of Black, northeasterly a distance of 200 feet, more or less,\" was changed to \"thence by College Avenue as laid out on the Plan of Meadowview North $16^{\\circ}$ East $201.6$ feet,\" with full reference to the plan and as recording data. Breyer now seeks a building permit which will show that Breyer intends to use College Avenue for access to Whiteacre. Black objects to the granting of a building permit on the grounds that he has never granted any rights to White or Breyer to use College Avenue. There are no governing statutes or ordinances relating to the problem. Black brings an appropriate action in which the right of Breyer to use College Avenue without an express grant from Black is at issue. The best argument for Breyer in this action is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. There is a way by necessity over Meadowview's lands to gain access to a public road.\nB. The deed from White to Breyer referred to the recorded plan and therefore created rights to use the streets delineated on the plan.\nC. Sale of lots in Meadowview by reference to its plan creates private easements in the streets shown on the plan.\nD. The recording of the plan is a dedication of the streets shown on the plan to public use. ",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Purvis purchased a used car from Daley, a used-car dealer. Knowing them to be false, Daley made the following statements to Purvis prior to the sale: Statement 1. This car has never been involved in an accident. Statement 2. This car gets 25 miles to the gallon on the open highway. Statement 3. This is as smooth-riding a car as you can get. If Purvis asserts a claim against Daley based on deceit, which of the false statements made by Daley would support Purvis's claim?\n\nOptions:\nA. Statement 1. only.\nB. Statement 2. only.\nC. Statements 1. and 2. only.\nD. Statements 2. and 3. only.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Mrs. Ritter, a widow, recently purchased a new uncrated electric range for her kitchen from Local Retailer. The range has a wide oven with a large oven door. The crate in which Stove Company, the manufacturer, shipped the range carried a warning label that the stove would tip over with a weight of 25 pounds or more on the oven door. Mrs. Ritter has one child-Brenda, age three. Recently, at about 5:30 p.m., Brenda was playing on the floor of the kitchen while Mrs. Ritter was heating water in a pan on the stove. The telephone rang and Mrs. Ritter went into the living room to answer it. While she was gone Brenda decided to find out what was cooking. She opened the oven door and climbed on it to see what was in the pan. Brenda's weight ( 25 pounds) on the door caused the stove to tip over forward. Brenda fell to the floor and the hot water spilled over her, burning her severely. Brenda screamed. Mrs. Ritter ran to the kitchen and immediately gave her first aid treatment for burns. Brenda thereafter received medical treatment. Brenda's burns were painful. They have now healed and do not bother her, but she has ugly scars on her legs and back. Brenda's claim is asserted on her behalf by the proper party. If Brenda asserts a claim based on strict liability against Local Retailer, she must establish that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Local Retailer did not inform Mrs. Ritter of the warning on the crate.\nB. The stove was substantially in the same condition at the time it tipped over as when it was purchased from Local Retailer.\nC. Local Retailer made some change in the stove design or had improperly assembled it so that it tipped over more easily.\nD. Local Retailer knew or should have known that the stove was dangerous because of the ease with which it tipped over.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Parents purchased a new mobile home from Seller. The mobile home was manufactured by Mobilco and had a ventilating system designed by Mobilco with both a heating unit and an air conditioner. Mobilco installed a furnace manufactured by Heatco and an air conditioning unit manufactured by Coolco. Each was controlled by an independent thermostat installed by Mobilco. Because of the manner in which Mobilco designed the ventilating system, the first time the ventilating system was operated by Parents, cold air was vented into Parents' bedroom to keep the temperature at $68^{\\circ}$ $\\mathrm{F}\\left(20^{\\circ} \\mathrm{C}\\right)$. The cold air then activated the heater thermostat, and hot air was pumped into the bedroom of Child, the six-month-old child of Parents. The temperature in Child's room reached more than $170^{\\circ} \\mathrm{F}\\left(77^{\\circ} \\mathrm{C}\\right)$ before Child's mother became aware of the condition and shut the system off manually. As a result, Child suffered permanent physical injury. Claims have been asserted by Child, through a duly appointed guardian, against Mobilco, Seller, Heatco, and Coolco. If Child's claims against Mobilco, Heatco, and Coolco are based on strict liability in tort, Child will probably recover against:\n\nOptions:\nA. Mobilco only, because the ventilating system was defectively designed by Mobilco.\nB. Heatco only, because it was the excessive heat from the furnace that caused Child's injuries.\nC. Mobilco and Heatco only, because the combination of Mobilco's design and Heatco's furnace caused Child's injuries.\nD. Mobilco, Heatco, and Coolco, because the combination of Mobilco's design, Heatco's furnace, and Coolco's air conditioning unit caused Child's injuries. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Esther, Gray's 21-year-old daughter, finished college, Gray handed her a signed memorandum stating that if she would go to law school for three academic years, he would pay her tuition, room, and board, and would \"give her a $ 1,000$ bonus\" for each \"A\" she got in law school. Esther's uncle, Miller, who was present on this occasion, read the memorandum and thereupon said to Esther, \"and if he doesn't pay your expenses, I will.\" Gray paid her tuition, room, and board for her first year but died just before the end of that year. Subsequently, Esther learned that she had received two \"As\" in the second semester. The executor of Gray's estate has refused to pay her anything for the two \"As\" and has told her that the estate will no longer pay her tuition, room, and board in law school. In an action by Esther against Miller on account of the executor's repudiation of Gray's promise to pay future tuition, room, and board, which of the following would be Miller's strongest defense?\n\nOptions:\nA. The parties did not manifestly intend a contract.\nB. Gray's death terminated the agreement.\nC. The agreement was oral.\nD. The agreement was divisible.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Jackson and Brannick planned to break into a federal government office to steal food stamps. Jackson telephoned Crowley one night and asked whether Crowley wanted to buy some \"hot\" food stamps. Crowley, who understood that \"hot\" meant stolen, said, \"Sure, bring them right over.\" Jackson and Brannick then successfully executed their scheme. That same night they delivered the food stamps to Crowley, who bought them for $ 500$. Crowley did not ask when or by whom the stamps were stolen. All three were arrested. Jackson and Brannick entered guilty pleas in federal court to a charge of larceny in connection with the theft. Crowley was brought to trial in the state court on a charge of conspiracy to steal food stamps. On the evidence stated, Crowley should be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty, because, when a new confederate enters a conspiracy already in progress, he becomes a party to it.\nB. Guilty, because he knowingly and willingly aided and abetted the conspiracy and is chargeable as a principal.\nC. Not guilty, because, although Crowley knew the stamps were stolen, he neither helped to plan nor participated or assisted in the theft.\nD. Not guilty, because Jackson and Brannick had not been convicted of or charged with conspiracy, and Crowley cannot be guilty of conspiracy by himself.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Park brought an action against Dan for injuries received in an automobile accident, alleging negligence in that Dan was speeding and inattentive. Park calls White to testify that Dan had a reputation in the community of being a reckless driver and was known as \"Daredevil Dan.\" White's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as habit evidence.\nB. Admissible, because it tends to prove that Dan was negligent at the time of this collision.\nC. Inadmissible, because Dan has not offered testimony of his own good character.\nD. Inadmissible to show negligence.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Pemberton and three passengers, Able, Baker, and Charley, were injured when their car was struck by a truck owned by Mammoth Corporation and driven by Edwards. Helper, also a Mammoth employee, was riding in the truck. The issues in Pemberton $v$. Mammoth include the negligence of Edwards in driving too fast and in failing to wear glasses, and of Pemberton in failing to yield the right of way. Pemberton's counsel seeks to introduce Helper's written statement that Edwards, Mammoth's driver, had left his glasses (required by his operator's license) at the truck stop which they had left five minutes before the accident. The judge should rule the statement admissible only if:\n\nOptions:\nA. Pemberton first proves that Helper is an agent of Mammoth and that the statement concerned a matter within the scope of his agency. \nB. Pemberton produces independent evidence that Edwards was not wearing corrective lenses at the time of the accident.\nC. Helper is shown to be beyond the process of the court and unavailable to testify.\nD. The statement was under oath in affidavit form.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Lord leased a warehouse building and the lot on which it stood to Taylor for a term of 10 years. The lease contained a clause prohibiting Taylor from subletting his interest. Can Taylor assign his interest under the lease? \n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, because restraints on alienation of land are strictly construed.\nB. Yes, because disabling restraints on alienation are invalid.\nC. No, because the term \"subletting\" includes \"assignment\" when the term is employed in a lease.\nD. No, because even in the absence of an express prohibition on assignment, a tenant may not assign without the landlord's permission.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Testator devised his farm \"to my son, Selden, for life, then to Selden's children and their heirs and assigns.\" Selden, a widower, had two unmarried adult children. In an appropriate action to construe the will, the court will determine that the remainder to the children is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Indefeasibly vested.\nB. Contingent.\nC. Vested subject to partial defeasance.\nD. Vested subject to complete defeasance.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ohner holds title in fee simple to a tract of 1,500 acres. He desires to develop the entire tract as a golf course, country club, and residential subdivision. He contemplates forming a corporation to own and to operate the golf course and country club; the stock in the corporation will be distributed to the owners of lots in the residential portions of the subdivision, but no obligation to issue the stock is to ripen until all the residential lots are sold. The price of the lots is intended to return enough money to compensate Ohner for the raw land, development costs (including the building of the golf course and the country club facilities), and developer's profit, if all of the lots are sold. Ohner's market analyses indicate that he must create a scheme of development that will offer prospective purchasers (and their lawyers) a very high order of assurance that several aspects will be clearly established: Aside from the country club and golf course, there will be no land use other than for residential use and occupancy in the 1,500 acres. The residents of the subdivision will have unambiguous right of access to the club and golf course facilities. Each lot owner must have an unambiguous right to transfer his lot to a purchaser with all original benefits. Each lot owner must be obligated to pay annual dues to a pro rata share (based on the number of lots) of the club's annual operating deficit (whether or not such owner desires to make use of club and course facilities). In the context of all aspects of the scheme, which of the following will offer the best chance of implementing the requirement that each lot owner pay annual dues to support the club and golf course?\n\nOptions:\nA. Covenant.\nB. Easement.\nC. Mortgage.\nD. Personal contractual obligation by each purchaser.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paulsen was eating in a restaurant when he began to choke on a piece of food that had lodged in his throat. Dow, a physician who was sitting at a nearby table, did not wish to become involved and did not render any assistance, although prompt medical attention would have been effective in removing the obstruction from Paulsen's throat. Because of the failure to obtain prompt medical attention, Paulsen suffered severe brain injury from lack of oxygen. If Paulsen asserts a claim against Dow for his injuries, will Paulsen prevail?\n\nOptions:\nA. Yes, if the jurisdiction relieves physicians of malpractice liability for emergency first aid.\nB. Yes, if a reasonably prudent person with Dow's experience, training, and knowledge would have assisted Paulsen.\nC. No, because Dow was not responsible for Paulsen's condition.\nD. No, unless Dow knew that Paulsen was substantially certain to sustain serious injury.",
  "response":"C"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Innes worked as a secretary in an office in a building occupied partly by her employer and partly by Glass, a retail store. The two areas were separated by walls and were in no way connected, except that the air conditioning unit served both areas and there was a common return-air duct. Glass began remodeling, and its employees did the work, which included affixing a plastic surfacing material to counters. To fasten the plastic to the counters, the employees purchased glue, with the brand name Stick, that was manufactured by Steel, packaged in a sealed container by Steel, and retailed by Paint Company. In the course of the remodeling job, one of Glass's employees turned on the air conditioning and caused fumes from the glue to travel from Glass through the air conditioning unit and into Innes's office. The employees did not know that there was common ductwork for the air conditioners. Innes was permanently blinded by the fumes from the glue. The label on the container of glue read, \"DANGER. Do not smoke near this product. Extremely flammable. Contains Butanone, Toluol, and Hexane. Use with adequate ventilation. Keep out of the reach of children.\" The three chemicals listed on the label are very toxic and harmful to human eyes. Steel had received no reports of eye injuries during the 10 years that the product had been manufactured and sold. If Innes asserts a claim against Glass, the most likely result is that she will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover, because a user of a product is held to the same standard as the manufacturer.\nB. Recover, because the employees of Glass caused the fumes to enter her area of the building.\nC. Not recover, because Glass used the glue for its intended purpose.\nD. Not recover, because the employees of Glass had no reason to know that the fumes could injure Innes.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"When Denton heard that his neighbor, Prout, intended to sell his home to a minority purchaser, Denton told Prout that Prout and his wife and children would meet with \"accidents\" if he did so. Prout then called the prospective purchaser and told him that he was taking the house off the market. If Prout asserts a claim against Denton for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Prout will:\n\nOptions:\nA. Recover if Prout suffered severe emotional distress as a consequence of Denton's conduct.\nB. Recover, because Denton intended to frighten Prout.\nC. Not recover, because Denton made no threat of immediate physical harm to Prout or his family.\nD. Not recover if Prout suffered no physical harm as a consequence of Denton's conduct.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dave is a six-year-old boy who has a welldeserved reputation for bullying younger and smaller children. His parents have encouraged him to be aggressive and tough. Dave, for no reason, knocked down, kicked, and severely injured Pete, a four-year-old. A claim has been asserted by Pete's parents for their medical and hospital costs and for Pete's injuries. If the claim is asserted against Dave's parents, the most likely result is they will be: \n\nOptions:\nA. Liable, because parents are strictly liable for the torts of their children.\nB. Liable, because Dave's parents encouraged him to be aggressive and tough.\nC. Not liable, because a child under seven is not liable in tort.\nD. Not liable, because parents cannot be held liable for the tort of a child.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"In a suit attacking the validity of a deed executed 15 years ago, Plaintiff alleges mental incompetency of Joe, the grantor, and offers in evidence a properly authenticated affidavit of Harry, Joe's brother. The affidavit, which was executed shortly after the deed, stated that Harry had observed Joe closely over a period of weeks, that Joe had engaged in instances of unusual behavior (which were described), and that Joe's appearance had changed from one of neatness and alertness to one of disorder and absentmindedness. The judge should rule Harry's affidavit:\n\nOptions:\nA. Inadmissible as opinion.\nB. Inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception.\nC. Admissible as an official document.\nD. Admissible as an ancient document.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Oscar, the owner in fee simple, laid out a subdivision of 325 lots on 150 acres of land. He obtained governmental approval (as required by applicable ordinances) and, between 1968 and 1970 , he sold 140 of the lots, inserting in each of the 140 deeds the following provision: The Grantee, for himself and his heirs, assigns and successors, covenants and agrees that the premises conveyed herein shall have erected thereon one singlefamily dwelling and that no other structure (other than a detached garage, normally incident to a single-family dwelling) shall be erected or maintained; and, further, that no use shall ever be made or permitted to be made other than occupancy by a single family for residential purposes only. Because of difficulty encountered in selling the remaining lots for single-family use, in January 1971, Oscar advertised the remaining lots with prominent emphasis: \"These lots are not subject to any restrictions and purchasers will find them adaptable to a wide range of uses.\" Suppose that Oscar sold 50 lots during 1971 without inserting in the deeds any provisions relating to structures or uses. Doyle purchased one of the 50 lots and proposes to erect a service station and to conduct a retail business for the sale of gasoline, etc. Pringle purchased a lot from Boyer. Boyer had purchased from Oscar in 1968 and the deed had the provision that is quoted in the fact situation. Pringle brings suit to prevent Doyle from erecting the service station and from conducting a retail business. In the litigation between Pringle and Doyle, which of the following constitutes the best defense for Doyle?\n\nOptions:\nA. Oscar's difficulty in selling with provisions relating to use establishes a change in circumstances which renders any restrictions which may once have existed unenforceable.\nB. Enforcement of the restriction, in view of the change of circumstances, would be an unreasonable restraint on alienation. \nC. Since the proof (as stated) does not establish a danger of monetary loss to Pringle, Pringle has failed to establish one of the necessary elements in a cause of action to prevent Doyle from using his lot for business purposes.\nD. The facts do not establish a common building or development scheme for the entire subdivision.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dave is a six-year-old boy who has a welldeserved reputation for bullying younger and smaller children. His parents have encouraged him to be aggressive and tough. Dave, for no reason, knocked down, kicked, and severely injured Pete, a four-year-old. A claim has been asserted by Pete's parents for their medical and hospital costs and for Pete's injuries. If the claim is asserted against Dave, the most likely result is Dave will be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Liable, because he intentionally harmed Pete.\nB. Liable, because, as a six-year-old, he should have known his conduct was wrongful.\nC. Not liable, because a child under seven is not liable in tort.\nD. Not liable, because he is presumed to be under his parents' control and they have the sole responsibility.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Brown suffered from the delusion that he was a special agent of God. He frequently experienced hallucinations in the form of hearing divine commands. Brown believed God told him several times that the local Roman Catholic bishop was corrupting the diocese into heresy, and that the bishop should be \"done away with.\" Brown, a devout Catholic, conceived of himself as a religious martyr. He knew that shooting bishops for heresy is against the criminal law. $\\mathrm{He}$ nevertheless carefully planned how he might kill the bishop. One evening Brown shot the bishop, who was taken to the hospital, where he died two weeks later. Brown told the police he assumed the institutions of society would support the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and he expected to be persecuted for his God-inspired actions. Psychiatrist Stevens examined Brown and found that Brown suffered from schizophrenic psychosis, that in the absence of this psychosis he would not have shot the bishop, and that because of the psychosis Brown found it extremely difficult to determine whether he should obey the specific command that he do away with the bishop or the general commandment \"Thou shalt not kill\"; Brown was charged with murder. If Brown interposes an insanity defense and the jurisdiction in which he is tried has adopted only the M'Naghten test of insanity, then the strongest argument for the defense under that test is that:\n\nOptions:\nA. Brown did not know the nature of the act he was performing.\nB. Brown did not know that his act was morally wrong.\nC. Brown did not know the quality of the act he was performing.\nD. Brown's acts were the product of a mental disease.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Dutton, disappointed by his eight-year-old son's failure to do well in school, began systematically depriving the child of food during summer vacation. Although his son became seriously ill from malnutrition, Dutton failed to call a doctor. He believed that as a parent he had the sole right to determine whether the child was fed or received medical treatment. Eventually, the child died. An autopsy disclosed that the child had suffered agonizingly as a result of the starvation, that a physician's aid would have alleviated the suffering, and that although the child would have died in a few months from malnutrition, the actual cause of death was an untreatable form of cancer. The father was prosecuted for murder, defined in the jurisdiction as \"unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.\" 'The father should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Acquitted, because of the defendant's good faith belief concerning parental rights in supervising children.\nB. Acquitted, because summoning the physician or feeding the child would not have prevented the child's death from cancer.\nC. Convicted, because the father's treatment of his son showed a reckless indifference to the value of life.\nD. Convicted, because the child would have died from malnutrition had he not been afflicted with cancer.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Tom had a heart ailment so serious that his doctors had concluded that only a heart transplant could save his life. They therefore arranged to have him flown to Big City to have the operation performed. Dan, Tom's nephew, who stood to inherit from him, poisoned him. The poison produced a reaction which required postponing the journey. The plane on which Tom was to have flown crashed, and all aboard were killed. By the following day, Tom's heart was so weakened by the effects of the poison that he suffered a heart attack and died. If charged with criminal homicide, Dan should be found:\n\nOptions:\nA. Guilty.\nB. Not guilty, because his act did not hasten the deceased's death, but instead prolonged his life by one day.\nC. Not guilty, because the deceased was already suffering from a fatal illness.\nD. Not guilty, because the poison was not the sole cause of death. ",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Parker sued Dodd over title to an island in a river. Daily variations in the water level were important. For many years Wells, a commercial fisherman, kept a daily log of the water level at his dock opposite the island in order to forecast fishing conditions. Parker employed Zee, an engineer, to prepare graphs from Wells's log. Wells was called to testify to the manner in which he kept the log, which had been available for inspection. His testimony should be:\n\nOptions:\nA. Excluded on a general objection because not admissible for any purpose. \nB. Excluded on a specific objection that it calls for hearsay.\nC. Admitted to support the credibility of Wells and Zee as witnesses.\nD. Admitted as part of the foundation for admission of Zee's graphs.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Paula sued for injuries she sustained in a fall in a hotel hallway connecting the lobby of the hotel with a restaurant located in the hotel building. The hallway floor was covered with vinyl tile. The defendants were Horne, owner of the hotel building, and Lee, lessee of the restaurant. The evidence was that the hallway floor had been waxed approximately an hour before Paula slipped on it, and although the wax had dried, there appeared to be excessive dried wax caked on several of the tiles. Horne's defense was that the hallway was a part of the premises leased to Lee over which he retained no control, and Lee denied negligence and alleged contributory negligence. If Paula offered to prove that the day after she fell, Horne had the vinyl tile taken up and replaced with a new floor covering, the trial judge should rule the evidence:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible, because it is relevant to the issue of whether Horne retained control of the hallway. \nB. Admissible, because it is relevant in the issue of awareness of the unsafe condition of the hallway at the time of Paula's fall.\nC. Inadmissible, because there was no showing that the new floor covering would be any safer than the old.\nD. Inadmissible, because to admit such would discourage a policy of making repairs to prevent further injury, regardless of fault.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Peters sued Davis for $ 100,000$ for injuries received in a traffic accident. Davis charges Peters with contributory negligence and alleges that Peters failed to have his lights on at a time when it was dark enough to require them. Davis offers to have Bystander testify that he was talking to Witness when he heard the crash and heard Witness, now deceased, exclaim, \"That car doesn't have any lights on.\" Bystander's testimony is:\n\nOptions:\nA. Admissible as a statement of present sense impression.\nB. Admissible, because Witness is not available to testify.\nC. Inadmissible as hearsay not within any exception.\nD. Inadmissible, because of the Dead Man's Statute.",
  "response":"A"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Assume for the purposes of this question that you are counsel to the state legislative committee that is responsible for real estate laws in your state. The committee wants you to draft a statute, governing the recording of deeds, that fixes priorities of title, as reflected on the public record, as definitely as possible. Which of the following, divorced from other policy considerations, would best accomplish this particular result?\n\nOptions:\nA. Eliminate the requirement of witnesses to deeds.\nB. Make time of recording the controlling factor.\nC. Make irrebuttable the declarations in the deeds that valuable consideration was paid.\nD. Make the protection of bona fide purchasers the controlling factor.",
  "response":"B"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Ogden was the fee simple owner of three adjoining vacant lots fronting on a common street in a primarily residential section of a city which had no zoning laws. The lots were identified as Lots 1, 2, and 3. Ogden conveyed Lot 1 to Akers and Lot 2 to Bell. Ogden retained Lot 3, which consisted of three acres of woodland. Bell, whose lot was between the other two, built a house on his lot. Bell's house included a large window on the side facing Lot 3 . The window provided a beautiful view from Bell's living room, thereby adding value to Bell's house. Akers erected a house on his lot. Ogden made no complaint to either Akers or Bell concerning the houses they built. After both Akers and Bell had completed their houses, the two of them agreed to and did build a common driveway running from the street to the rear of their respective lots. The driveway was built on the line between the two houses so that one-half of the way was located on each lot. Akers and Bell exchanged right-of-way deeds by which each of them conveyed to the other, his heirs and assigns, an easement to continue the right of way. Both deeds were properly recorded. After Akers and Bell had lived in their respective houses for 30 years, a new public street was built bordering on the rear of Lots 1, 2, and 3 . Akers informed Bell that, since the new street removed the need for their common driveway, he considered the right-of-way terminated; therefore, he intended to discontinue its use and expected Bell to do the same. At about the same time, Ogden began the erection of a six-story apartment house on Lot 3 . If the apartment house is completed, it will block the view from Bell's window and will substantially reduce the value of Bell's lot. In an action brought by Bell to enjoin Akers from interfering with Bell's continued use of the common driveway between the two lots, the decision should be for:\n\nOptions:\nA. Akers, because the termination of the necessity for the easement terminated the easement.\nB. Akers, because the continuation of the easement after the change of circumstances would adversely affect the marketability of both lots without adding any commensurate value to either. \nC. Bell, because an incorporeal hereditament lies in grant and cannot be terminated without a writing.\nD. Bell, because the removal of the need for the easement created by express grant does not affect the right to the easement.",
  "response":"D"
 },
 {
  "instruction":"Philip was a 10-year-old boy. Macco was a company that sold new and used machinery. Macco stored discarded machinery, pending sale for scrap, on a large vacant area it owned. This area was unfenced and was one-quarter mile from the housing development where Philip lived. Macco knew that children frequently played in this area and on the machinery. Philip's parents had directed him not to play on the machinery because it was dangerous. One day Philip was playing on a press in Macco's storage area. The press had several wheels, each geared to the other. Philip climbed on the largest wheel, which was about five feet in diameter. Philip's weight caused the wheel to rotate, his foot was caught between two wheels that were set into motion, and he was severely injured. A claim for relief was asserted by Philip through a duly appointed guardian. Macco denied liability and pleaded Philip's contributory fault as a defense. In determining whether Macco breached a duty to Philip, which of the following is the most significant?\n\nOptions:\nA. Whether the press on which Philip was injured was visible from a public way.\nB. Whether the maintenance of the area for the storage of discarded machinery was a private nuisance. \nC. Whether the maintenance of the area of the storage of discarded machinery was a public nuisance.\nD. Whether Macco could have eliminated the risk of harm without unduly interfering with Macco's normal operations.",
  "response":"D"
 }
]