Title: Collective action problem | Britannica
Headings: Collective action problem
Collective action problem
The challenges of common goods
Game theory

Content: If taking part in a collective action is costly, then people would sooner not have to take part. If they believe that the collective act will occur without their individual contributions, then they may try to free ride. David Hume pointed out the problem in 1740, when he said in A Treatise of Human Nature that, although two neighbours may agree to drain a common meadow, to have a thousand neighbours agree on such a project becomes too complex a matter to execute. The challenges of common goods
The problems of collective action were popularized by the American political economist Mancur Olson, who wrote in 1965 that coercion or some other device must be present in order for a group of individuals to act in their common interest. Olson suggested that collective action problems were solved in large groups by the use of selective incentives. These selective incentives might be extra rewards contingent upon taking part in the action or penalties imposed on those who do not. However, in order for positive selective incentives to work, individuals who take part in collective action must be identified; and for negative selective incentives, those who do not take part must be identified. Either way, a good deal of organization is required. Game theory
One aspect of the collective action problem is that posed by collective or public goods.