Title: 
Headings:  Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military
Russia’s
 
Reflexive
 
Control
 
Theory
 
and
 
the
 
Military
 

TIMOTHY
 
L.
 
THOMAS
 

INTRODUCTION
 

NATURE
 
OF
 
REFLEXIVE
 
CONTROL
 

THE
 
MILITARY
 
EXPERTS
 
SPEAK:
 
IONOV,
 
LEONENKO,
 
KOMOV,
 
CHAUSOV
 

US
 
INTERPRETATION
 
OF
 
RUSSIA’S
 
RC
 
THEORY
 

RECENT
 
EXAMPLES
 
OF
 
RC
 

FINAL
 
THOUGHTS
 
ON
 
RC
 

DISCLAIMER
 


Content: However,
 
the
 
Russians
 
employ
 
it
 
not
 
only
 
on
 
the
 
strategic
and
 
tactical
 
levels
 
in
 
war
 
but
 
also
 
on
 
the
 
strategic
 
level
 
in
 
association
with
 
internal
 
and
 
external
 
politics. Equally
 
significant,
 
the
 
concept
 
has
not
 
always
 
benefited
 
the
 
Soviet
 
Union
 
and
 
Russia. For
 
example,
 
some
Russians
 
consider
 
that
 
the
 
Strategic
 
Defense
 
Initiative
 
(SDI)
 
is
 
a
 
clas-
sic
 
example
 
of
 
US
 
use
 
of
 
reflexive
 
control. In
 
this
 
case,
 
the
 
US
 
“com-
pelled
 
the
 
enemy
 
to
 
act
 
according
 
to
 
a
 
plan
 
favorable
 
to
 
the
 
US.” By
doing
 
so,
 
it
 
forced
 
the
 
Soviet
 
Union
 
to
 
try
 
to
 
keep
 
pace
 
with
 
America’s
achievements
 
in
 
the
 
SDI
 
arena
 
(or
 
at
 
least
 
what
 
we
 
said
 
were
 
our
achievements)
 
and
 
ultimately
 
exhausted
 
the
 
Soviet
 
Union
 
economic-
ally
 
as
 
it
 
spent
 
money
 
to
 
develop
 
corresponding
 
equipment. As
 
a
result,
 
some
 
Russians
 
are
 
now
 
asking
 
themselves
 
whether
 
the
 
concept
of
 
information
 
warfare
 
is
 
yet
 
another
 
US
 
attempt
 
to
 
control
 
them
“reflexively”
 
and
 
to
 
force
 
them
 
to
 
invest
 
vast
 
sums
 
of
 
money
 
in
 
a
 
realm
that
 
is
 
simply
 
beyond
 
their
 
technological
 
reach
 
in
 
the
 
near
 
future. The
 
Soviet
 
and
 
Russian
 
Armed
 
Forces
 
have
 
long
 
studied
 
the
 
use
of
 
reflexive
 
control
 
theory,
 
particularly
 
at
 
the
 
tactical
 
and
 
opera-
tional
 
levels,
 
both
 
for
 
maskirovka
 
(deception)
 
and
 
disinformation
purposes
 
and,
 
potentially,
 
to
 
control
 
the
 
enemy’s
 
decision-making
processes.2
 
For
 
example,
 
the
 
Russian
 
Army
 
had
 
a
 
military
 
maskirovka
school
 
as
 
early
 
as
 
1904
 
that
 
was
 
later
 
disbanded
 
in
 
1929. This
school,
 
the
 
Higher
 
School
 
of
 
Maskirovka,
 
provided
 
the
 
bases
 
for
maskirovka
 
concepts
 
and
 
created
 
manuals
 
for
 
future
 
generations.3
Since
 
the
 
early
 
1960s,
 
there
 
have
 
been
 
many
 
Russian
 
intellectual
“giants”
 
who
 
have
 
emerged
 
in
 
the
 
field
 
of
 
reflexive
 
theory. In
 
the
civilian
 
sector,
 
these
 
include
 
G.
 
P.
 
Schedrovitsky,
 
V.
 
E.
 
Lepsky,
V.
 
A.
 
Lefebvre
 
(who
 
now
 
lives
 
in
 
the
 
West),
 
D.
 
A.
 
Pospelov,
V.
 
N.
 
Burkov,
 
and
 
many
 
others. The
 
foremost
 
theorists
 
in
 
the
 
mili-
tary
 
sector
 
include
 
V.
 
V.
 
Druzhinin,
 
M.
 
D.
 
Ionov,
 
D.
 
S.
 
Kontorov,
S.
 
Leonenko,
 
and
 
several
 
others.