Title: The Logic of Collective Action - Wikipedia
Headings: The Logic of Collective Action
The Logic of Collective Action
Contents
Overview
Critique
Information asymmetry
Legitimacy
Critical Mass
See also
References

Content: The Logic of Collective Action - Wikipedia
The Logic of Collective Action
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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups is a book by Mancur Olson, Jr. published in 1965. It develops a theory of political science and economics of concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs. Its central argument is that concentrated minor interests will be overrepresented and diffuse majority interests trumped, due to a free-rider problem that is stronger when a group becomes larger. Contents
1 Overview
2 Critique
2.1 Information asymmetry
2.2 Legitimacy
2.3 Critical Mass
3 See also
4 References
Overview
The book challenged accepted wisdom in Olson’s day that: if everyone in a group (of any size) has interests in common, then they will act collectively to achieve them; and
in a democracy, the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannize and exploit the minority. The book argues instead that individuals in any group attempting collective action will have incentives to " free ride " on the efforts of others if the group is working to provide public goods. Individuals will not "free ride" in groups that provide benefits only to active participants. Pure public goods are goods that are non-excludable (i.e. one person cannot reasonably prevent another from consuming the good) and non-rivalrous (one person’s consumption of the good does not affect another’s, nor vice versa).