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Content: This problem of collective action can
be divided into two general classes. First, individuals could fail to coordinate
when coordination is preferred to not coordinating (Taylor, 1976, 1987). Consider, for example, driving. Each individual prefers that everyone else
drive on the same side of the road (from the driver's perspective) as she
does. However, there are two possible ways to accomplish this. We can assume
that no one really cares which side is chosen as long as everyone chooses
the same side. In a world which has not yet solved this problem through
established rules, everyone is presented with quite a quandary. This class
of collective action problem, while one of the most common problems faced
by society, is only beginning to be thoroughly studied. Although not part
of my principal research, we will touch on the importance of coordination
problems later when dealing with larger games. The second class
of collective action problem involves a failure to achieve an outcome everyone
prefers over the outcome arrived at because each individual wanted to achieve
her most preferred outcome without, in essence, paying for it herself.