Title: The Marshall Plan Speech: Rhetoric and Diplomacy – America in Class – resources for history & literature teachers from the National Humanities Center
Headings: The Marshall Plan Speech: Rhetoric and Diplomacy
The Marshall Plan Speech: Rhetoric and Diplomacy
What rhetorical and diplomatic challenges did Secretary of State George Marshall face as he delivered his 1947 Marshall Plan speech?
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Content: Secretary of State George Marshall, who had been the Army Chief of Staff during the War, represented the United States. At the conference Marshall became convinced that the Soviets were not interested in solving economic problems but rather were prepared to wait for the war-weakened nations of Europe to collapse and fall under its domination. Shortly after his return to Washington, he delivered a national radio address describing the problems in Europe and calling for immediate action to remedy them. He ordered his policy advisors to develop a plan for such action, and they soon put together a set of recommendations, which became the basis of the Marshall Plan. Secretary Marshall and President Truman knew that it would not be easy to convince the American people and Congress to come to the aid of Europe, especially to help such a fierce former enemy as Germany. The United States had a long tradition of avoiding entangling relations with other countries. Even though World War II had, to say the least, deeply enmeshed the nation in foreign affairs in Europe and Asia and even though America emerged from the War as the only power capable of world leadership, many Americans still desired to avoid deep involvements abroad. And those Americans had strong allies in Congress, where Republicans held a majority. While the Republicans were split between isolationists and internationalists, even the latter were unlikely to support an aid program estimated to cost about $4 billion per year at a time when the entire federal budget was only $34.5 billion. The Truman administration embarked upon a massive publicity campaign to win both popular and Congressional support for American aid to Europe.