; Whereas South Africa reneged on its initial call for the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its forces from Ukraine and has actively sought improved relations with Moscow in the last year; Whereas South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engage in consistent interparty cooperation in spite of South Africa’s Constitution being opposed to the CCP’s routine suppression of free expression and individual rights; Whereas the United Front work of the CCP has established at least 3 overseas police stations in South Africa, and these police stations, both in South Africa and in many other countries, are reportedly being used to track and harass PRC dissidents; Whereas South Africa hosts 6 Confucius Institutes, the most of any country in Africa, and cooperates with the PRC under the CCP’s Belt and Road Initiative; Whereas, in 2020, South Africa and the PRC established a joint bilateral Comprehensive Strategic Partnership , and maintain numerous prior and subsequent agreements, memorandums of understanding, and similar accords; Whereas South Africa is the PRC’s largest trading partner in Africa, with total trade valued at $54,000,000,000 in 2021, and has accepted $5,000,000,000 in PRC-provided power and transportation sector loans since 2015; Whereas South Africa is scheduled to hold the 15th leaders’ meeting of the informal Brazil, Russia, India, China grouping (BRICS) in August 2023; Whereas the increased Chinese presence in South Africa’s technology sector has raised concerns that the ANC may be trying to copy the PRC’s model of digitally aided authoritarian governance underpinned by cyber controls, social monitoring, and surveillance