; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). (5) Section 4 of this Act rejects the judicial decisions that have prevented meritorious price-fixing cases from advancing to trial and judgment. It does so by providing that, in civil actions, consciously parallel pricing coordination—as defined by this Act—is a contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce under sections 1 and 3(a) of the Sherman Act. (6) Section 4 of this Act does not supersede the law governing price fixing. It instead supplements and complements that law. It does not apply to criminal prosecutions. (b) Concerted action (1) The words contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in sections 1 and 3(a) of the Sherman Act require some form of agreement between two or more persons, but that agreement need not be expressly made. A tacit agreement also qualifies. Accordingly, the words contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy encompass both express and tacit agreements. (2) Although consciously parallel behavior alone does not constitute a contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy under sections 1 and 3(a) of the Sherman Act, consciously parallel behavior can be evidence of an agreement. And once the consciously parallel behavior crosses the line into consciously parallel coordination, the behavior qualifies as tacit agreement—that is, a contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy. (3) In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–49, 553–57, 564–70 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging that competitors engaged in parallel, anticompetitive conduct did not do enough to exclude the possibility that the competitors engaged in independent action and therefore failed to plausibly plead the existence of a conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In so holding, the Court understated the significance of consciously parallel behavior as