under the treaty. (15) The United States has not deployed a new nuclear-capable delivery system in over 30 years, while the Russian Federation has in that same time deployed over a dozen new nuclear-capable delivery systems. Russia also has active nuclear production facilities that enable it to produce large numbers of new warheads. (16) The United States nuclear modernization program of record does not expand the United States nuclear arsenal from current levels, while the People’s Republic of China is growing its nuclear arsenal as part of what former Commander of the United States Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, has labeled “breathtaking”. China’s deployed forces will achieve effective parity with the United States arsenal deployed under the New START Treaty by 2035, if not sooner. (17) In its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty in 2010, the Senate stated that if, during the time the New START Treaty remains in force, the President determines that there has been an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to the New START Treaty remains in the national interest of the United States . To date, the President has taken no action to consult with the Senate on this issue, even though China’s actions clearly meet this standard. (18) For deterrence to be effective, United States Strategic Command needs to be confident it can hold at risk what an adversary values most, including its nuclear forces. Therefore, the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China directly impact United States deterrence requirements. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) arms control is not an end in and of itself, and is only useful if it strengthens the security of the United States and its allies