; or (2) any acquisition that would result in a dominant platform if the Commission determines that the acquisition would not serve the public interest. 2314. Retrospective reviews (a) In general The Commission may retrospectively review any acquisition— (1) consummated by the operator of a dominant platform; or (2) that resulted in a dominant platform. (b) Material harm to the public interest If, after the review under subsection (a), the Commission determines that the acquisition materially harmed the public interest, the Commission, as applicable, may order a remedy to improve the public interest, restore competition, or otherwise address the anticompetitive or harmful impacts of the acquisition, including— (1) unwinding the acquisition; or (2) requiring that the acquiring person make divestitures, which, to the extent practicable, shall be specified, standalone business units or lines. (c) Standards regarding material harm to the public interest For the purposes of this section, in addition to other effects on the public interest that may be assessed (including those described in section 313), an acquisition described in subsection (a) materially harms the public interest under subsection (b) if— (1) the operator of a dominant platform acquired a critical trading partner; (2) the acquisition resulted in a postacquisition market share of greater than 50 percent of any relevant market (including labor markets); or (3) the acquisition— (A) resulted in a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index greater than 2,500 in any relevant market