This Act targets scam PACs’ fraud and self-dealing. The Supreme Court has acknowledged it goes without saying that there is a substantial governmental interest[] in protecting the public from fraud. (Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2386 (2021)). In the context of elections, the State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process is undoubtedly important. . . . The State’s interest is particularly strong with respect to efforts to root out fraud, which not only may produce fraudulent outcomes, but has a systemic effect as well, (John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 197 (2010)). (5) The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld that giving and spending money in elections is protected speech. When scam PAC operators misuse donations, they are suppressing their donors’ speech. By making few to no political contributions with the dollars raised off false promises to further their donors’ political views, scam PACs are stealing money, and theft is not protected speech. (6) In the interest of safeguarding constitutionally protected speech, this Act does not prescribe sweeping regulations regarding how all political committees may spend money in elections. This Act’s prohibitions are narrowly tailored to only apply to a subset of nonconnected committees that do not have a majority of their disbursements spent on legitimate expenditures, sparing the vast majority of committees from being subjected to any additional requirements. For the committees that fail to have a majority of their disbursements spent on legitimate expenditures, their only penalty under this Act is being prevented from disbursing funds to any entity that has a financial interest or familial connection to the committees’ operators. This restriction is exceedingly reasonable and simple to comply with to promote the governmental interest of preventing self-dealing. (7) While current PAC reporting requirements provide the public with information that can be useful for identifying scam PACs, the mere public