; and (F) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan . (4) For decades and increasingly since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen as President of Taiwan in 2016, the Chinese Communist Party has employed a variety of coercive military and nonmilitary tactics short of armed conflict in its efforts to exert existential pressure on Taiwan, including through diplomatic isolation, restricting tourism, cyberattacks, spreading disinformation, and controlling the ability of Taiwan to purchase COVID–19 vaccines from other countries. (5) Since 2020, military incursions by the People's Republic of China into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone have been occurring at a rapidly increasing pace. In 2022, such incursions occurred 1,700 times, nearly double the total in 2021, which was itself almost triple the 2020 total. (6) Since 2021, there has been a notable increase in military provocations by the People’s Liberation Army against Taiwan, including incursions over the midline separating the People's Republic of China from Taiwan, holding military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan’s controlled waters, and performing live-fire exercises in the South China Sea. (7) In August 2022, the People's Republic of China held unprecedented live-fire military exercises and a simulated blockade involving hundreds of military aircraft, dozens of warships, and launches of short-range ballistic missiles over the territory of Taiwan. (8) The People’s Republic of China is attempting to erase the midline separating it from Taiwan, increasing the prospects for incidental contact between forces of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan as well as shorting reaction times related to provocations by the People's Republic of China. (9) On August 10, 2022, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China released a white paper entitled The Taiwan Question