aimed at coercion, espionage, or otherwise undermining a target. (E) Support of domestic or foreign proxy forces. (F) Coercive investment and bribery for political aims. (G) Industrial policy designed to monopolize a strategic industry or to destroy such an industry in other nations, especially when coordinated with other gray zone operations. (H) Military, paramilitary, or similar provocations and operations short of war. (I) Hostage diplomacy. (J) Gradual changes of internationally recognized borders. (K) Government financing or sponsorship of activities described in subparagraphs (A) through (J). (4) Various gray zone operations are frequently linked together into a coordinated campaign, that may also include tools of routine diplomacy, and that is designed to achieve a state’s political or military objective. (5) Gray zone campaigns are attractive to state actors for several reasons, including reduced costs compared to the deployment of conventional forces, thereby allowing states to pursue their objectives with limited resources. (6) The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other countries actively advance their own strategic objectives and challenge United States interests through the extensive use of gray zone operations. (7) Unwelcome escalation by adversarial powers—especially over the last decade—from routine statecraft into gray zone competition is a defining feature of the recent reemergence of great-power competition and requires an appropriate United States response. (8) The United States has not sufficiently deterred or responded to gray zone campaigns, thereby risking undermining United States national interests, diminishing United States influence and credibility, and encouraging rivals to further employ such tactics. (9) Successfully responding to adversary gray zone campaigns relies upon the full integration of instruments of national power across multiple domains and the ability to deploy such capacities in a coordinated, real-time campaign. 3.