; (2) the extension of the New START Treaty in 2021 with no conditions attached and no attempts to resolve the numerous shortcomings of the original treaty harmed United States national security and emboldened America’s adversaries; (3) the Russian Federation is in material breach of its commitments under the New START Treaty, and Russia’s suspension of the treaty represents a de facto withdrawal from the treaty; (4) Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the New START Treaty removes the treaty’s value to the national security interest of the United States and its allies of limiting strategic nuclear weapons, as the United States is now unable to confirm Russia is adhering to the central limits of the treaty; (5) China’s nuclear buildup meets the Senate criterion of an expansion of the strategic arsenal of a country not party to the New START Treaty that jeopardizes the supreme interests of the United States; (6) Due to Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the New START Treaty and China’s nuclear expansion, the New START Treaty is no longer in the United States national interest and the United States should withdraw; (7) after the New START Treaty expires or becomes defunct, any new arms control agreement or treaty that sets numerical limits on nuclear arsenals should limit the Russian Federation’s nuclear arsenal—strategic and non-strategic—and should also restrict the nuclear arsenal of the People’s Republic of China without allowing China to increase its arsenal to reach treaty limits; (8) the United States should not divest itself of, or slow or halt the development or procurement of, any nuclear-capable strategic or non-strategic delivery systems unless a new nuclear arms control treaty is ratified that similarly constrains the nuclear arsenals of both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China