; and (B) [i]n 2021, the [People's Liberation Army Rocket Force] launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training. This was more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in conflict zones. . (3) In 2019, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and their associated launchers, due to the Russian Federation’s continuing violation of the treaty. (4) The United States does not deploy or develop ground-based intermediate-range missiles. (5) In September 2021, the United States entered a security partnership with the United Kingdom and Australia (commonly known as AUKUS ). In April 2022, AUKUS leaders committed to commence new trilateral cooperation on hypersonic technologies, counter-hypersonic defense systems, and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as to deepen cooperation … on defense innovation. . (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) United States conventional ground-based theater-range missile systems in the Indo-Pacific region provide operational and strategy utility in— (A) availability of persistent, prompt, and survivable strike options; (B) deterrence of enemy attack or escalation; (C) imposition of operational costs on enemy forces; (D) responsive strikes against time-critical enemy targets; and (E) destruction of high-value targets to enable other joint forces; and (2) an Indo-Pacific Missile Strategy should— (A) provide coherent direction to concept and capability development, including procurement, deployment, and employment; (B) distribute integrated capabilities at operationally relevant ranges; (C) coordinate and differentiate strike missions among United States military services and its allies