; ( Sir, let it be remembered that this power can only operate in a case of necessity, after the factious or listless disposition of a particular state has rendered an interference essential to the salvation of the general government. ). See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 12–13 (Nov. 2010). (5) John Jay made similar claims in New York. And, as constitutional scholar Robert Natelson notes in his invaluable article, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, Alexander Contee Hanson, a member of Congress whose pamphlet supporting the Constitution proved popular, stated flatly that Congress would exercise its times, places, and manner authority only in cases of invasion, legislative neglect or obstinate refusal to pass election laws [providing for the election of Members of Congress], or if a state crafted its election laws with a sinister purpose or to injure the general government. Cementing his point, Hanson goes further to decree, The exercise of this power must at all times be so very invidious, that congress will not venture upon it without some very cogent and substantial reason. . Alexander Contee Hanson (writing as Astrides), Remarks on the Proposed Plan: 31 January, reprinted in John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, and Richard Leffler (eds.), 3 Commentaries on the Constitution, public and private 18 December 1787 to 31 January 1788 522–26 (1984). (6) In fact, had the alternate view of the Elections Clause been accepted at the time of the Constitution’s drafting—that is, that it offers Congress unfettered power over Federal elections—it is likely that the Constitution would not have been ratified or that an amendment to this language would have been required. (7) Indeed, at least seven of the original 13 States—over half and enough to prevent the Constitution from being ratified—expressed specific concerns with the language of the Elections Clause. See 1 Annals of Cong. 799 (1789), Joseph Gales