; and (B) had a substantially similar motivation to coordinate their efforts to raise, lower, change, maintain, or manipulate pricing for the purchase or sale of reasonably interchangeable products or services. (2) A claimant asserting a claim of consciously parallel pricing coordination in violation of section 1 or 3(a) of the Sherman Act bears the burden of proving the prima facie case described in paragraph (1) by a preponderance of evidence, at which point the burden of production shifts to the defending party as set forth in subsection (d). (d) Burden of rebutting prima facie case The defending party bears the burden of rebutting a prima facie case of consciously parallel pricing coordination by producing evidence, sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact, that the defending party’s action described in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (c) was motivated by business judgment that is economically rational in the absence of any consciously parallel pricing coordination. Evidence of this nature may include, but is not limited to, evidence that the defending party acted rationally in response to or in anticipation of changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the products or services concerned. (e) Ultimate burden If the defending party rebuts the prima facie case, the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defending party entered a tacit agreement among two or more persons to raise, lower, change, maintain, or manipulate pricing for the purchase or sale of reasonably interchangeable products or services. The claimant may do so by means that include, but are not limited to, proving that— (1) the business judgment described in subsection (d) was not— (A) economically rational in the absence of consciously parallel pricing coordination; or (B) the predominant motivating factor for the defending party’s action described in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (c)