to TikTok as just one of many areas of concern that combine to paint a concerning picture of the CCP’s capabilities and intent as an adversarial, malign competitor. (7) On November 30, 2023, John Garnaut of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) remarked that TikTok has sophisticated capabilities that create the risk that TikTok can clandestinely shape narratives and elevate favorable opinions while suppressing statements and news that the PRC deems negative. (8) On January 18, 2024, the Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representatives was briefed by a set of senior interagency officials to discuss these matters. (9) On March 22, 2023, elements of the intelligence community provided a classified briefing on the threat to members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and leadership for the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. (10) On April 26, 2023, the executive branch provided a classified briefing on the threat to members of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (11) On June 5, 2023, the executive branch provided a classified briefing on the threat to staff of the Committee on Banking of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. (12) In June 2023, at the request of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the intelligence community provided a classified threat briefing open to all Members of the House of Representatives. (13) On November 15, 2023, elements of the intelligence community provided a classified briefing to the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on, inter alia, the Peoples Republic of China’s conduct of global foreign malign influence operations, including through platforms such as TikTok. Whereas Congress and the