; (4) a full account of access restrictions imposed by the Assad regime and the overall impact on the ability of the United Nations to deliver international assistance to target beneficiaries in areas outside regime control; (5) a description of ways in which United Nations aid improperly benefits the Assad regime and its associates in defiance of basic humanitarian principles; (6) a description of the due diligence mechanisms and vetting procedures in place to ensure entities contracted by the United Nations to ensure goods, supplies, or services provided to Syria do not have links to the Assad regime, known human rights abusers, or persons designated for sanctions by United Nations donor countries; (7) an identification of entities affiliated with the Assad regime, including the Syria Trust for Development and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, foreign government ministries, and private corporations owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Assad regime, that have received United Nations funding, contracts, or grants or have otherwise entered into a formalized partnership with the United Nations; (8) an assessment of how the Assad regime sets arbitrary or punitive exchange rates to extract funding from the United Nations, as well as the total amount extracted by such means; (9) an assessment of the degree to which the various forms of manipulation described in this section has resulted in compromises of the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence of the United Nations; and (10) a strategy to reduce the ability of the Assad regime to manipulate or otherwise influence the United Nations and other aid operations in Syria and ensure United States and international aid is delivered in a neutral and impartial manner consistent with basic humanitarian principles.