; (B) the deliberate catching of protected living marine resources; and (C) often entering the exclusive economic zones and marine protected areas of the region and suspected of fishing without authorization. (6) China’s distant water fleet facilitates its attempts to strengthen bilateral relationships, cultivate influence, and affect specific policy or diplomatic outcomes. (7) Chinese IUU fishing without authorization in other countries’ waters demonstrates China’s drive to capture the region’s resources and undermines countries’ sovereign rights. 3. Caribbean and Latin America Maritime Security Initiative (a) Program required The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies shall cooperate to carry out a program, to be known as the Caribbean and Latin America Maritime Security Initiative , in support of strengthening maritime security partnerships in the Caribbean and Latin America using assets of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as determined necessary. (b) Program goals The goals of the program required under subsection (a) shall be, to the extent practicable— (1) to enhance cooperation between personnel of the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, other relevant Federal departments and agencies, and, where appropriate, the maritime forces of countries that are allies and partners of the United States in the Caribbean and Latin America; (2) to strengthen the participation and coordination of the Coast Guard and, where appropriate, the Department of Defense and other relevant Federal departments and agencies, in regional organizations dedicated to coordination and cooperation in support of the fisheries policies that align with customary international law and United States standards, ocean conservation, maritime security, and related initiatives of the Caribbean and Latin America; (3) to enhance partner country— (A) maritime domain awareness