1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Economic Espionage Prevention Act . 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) On March 14, 2024, the Department of State notified Congress of the following: (A) People’s Republic of China exports of semiconductors to Russia have increased substantially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (B) In the second half of 2023, China exported between $25,000,000 and $50,000,000 in additional semiconductors to Russia every month relative to pre-invasion levels. (C) During the same period, China also exported between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000 in additional exports to Russia every month to known transshipment hubs. (D) These exports include both Chinese and United States-branded semiconductors (integrated circuits), according to analysis of commercially available trade data by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, and are almost certainly supporting Russia’s military capabilities based on Ukrainian analysis of recovered Russian weapons. (E) Because of the prevalence of United States manufacturing equipment in global semiconductor supply chains, nearly all chips produced worldwide, including in the People’s Republic of China, are subject to United States export controls if destined for Russia or Belarus. (F) All advanced semiconductors described on the Commerce Control List have been subject to a license requirement if destined to an entity in Russia since its further invasion of Ukraine. (2) On April 3, 2024, Deputy Secretary of State, Kurt Campbell, said I think we have assessed, over the course of the last couple of months that Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily. And after the initial setbacks on the battlefield delivered to them by a brave and hearty group in Ukraine, with the support of China in particular, dual use capabilities and a variety of other efforts, industrial and commercial, Russia has retooled and now poses a threat to Ukraine. . .But not just to Ukraine, its new found capabilities pose a longer