nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. (D) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons or provide transparency into its nuclear declaratory policy. (E) An agreement on a proactive United Nations Security Council resolution that expands access by the International Atomic Energy Agency to any country found by the Board of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant with its obligations under the NPT. (F) An agreement to refrain from configuring nuclear forces in a launch on warning or launch under warning nuclear posture, which may prompt a nuclear armed country to launch a ballistic missile attack in response to detection by an early-warning satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming ballistic missile. (G) An agreement not to target or interfere in the nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly referred to as NC3 ) infrastructure of another country through a kinetic attack or a cyberattack. (H) An agreement on transparency measures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are fired from sea-based, ground, and air platforms. (I) An agreement to provide a baseline and continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate number of active nuclear weapons and associated systems possessed by each country. (3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament toward the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to another international body or fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any country’s production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. (4) The United States should convene a series of head-of-state level summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the Nuclear Security Summits process, which saw the elimination of the equivalent of 3,000 nuclear weapons. (5) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of the CTBT and