a meaningful and credible alternative to achieve our economic and national security goals. (10) American workers and businesses also face competitive pressures as other countries in the region pursue regional rules and preferential trade agreements without the participation of the United States. There are now more than 200 preferential trade agreements in force with at least one party from the region and over 100 more are under negotiation or pending ratification. (11) Recognizing this void in American leadership, the Biden administration launched negotiations with Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (with Fiji joining shortly thereafter) on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022, with the aim of deepening trade ties, strengthening supply chain resiliency, accelerating the development of climate infrastructure, and countering corruption. (12) In November 2023, IPEF partners signed an agreement on supply chain resiliency and announced the substantial conclusion of negotiations on several additional agreements but have not finalized an agreement that includes commitments on trade. The Biden Administration has not sought to consult with Congress on the IPEF pillars. (13) To inform future policymaking, Congress should work with the administration in a bipartisan manner to examine current United States economic policy toward the Indo-Pacific, the impacts of regional trade agreements on American competitiveness, and policies to advance United States objectives in the region. (14) Through a more comprehensive trade and economic strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region, the United States could exert greater leverage to improve labor rights and help level the playing field for American workers, enhance environmental standards, counter non-market economies and authoritarianism, construct more resilient supply chains, better meet the needs of our allies and partners, and grow our economy by addressing barriers to