; (B) workers; (C) consumers; (D) customer choice; (E) sellers; (F) local, rural, or low-income communities; (G) privacy; (H) national security or public safety; (I) quality; (J) entrepreneurship; (K) innovation; (L) price; or (M) accessibility of goods or services. (2) Inherent harms In addition to other effects that may be assessed when evaluating an acquisition for which any party (or its ultimate parent entity) is the operator of a dominant platform, the acquisition would not serve the public interest if— (A) another party to the acquisition offers overlapping, competing, or functionally equivalent services or products; (B) another party to the acquisition is a critical trading partner in the supply chains or business ecosystems of the parties; or (C) the acquisition would create a platform conflict of interest. (3) Potential harms In addition to other effects that may be assessed when evaluating an acquisition for which any party (or its ultimate parent entity) is the operator of a dominant platform, it may be determined that the acquisition would not serve the public interest if— (A) the acquisition would result in a postacquisition market share of greater than 33 percent of any relevant market (including labor markets); (B) the acquisition would— (i) result in a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index greater than 1,800 in any relevant market; and (ii) increase the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by more than 100 in any relevant market; or (C) the acquisition would result in an aggregation of data or access to data in a matter that harms the competitive process or creates or helps maintain a monopoly, a monopsony, market power, or unfair methods of competition. (e) Nonreportable acquisitions Nothing in this section shall prevent the Commission from barring the consummation of— (1) any acquisition for which the operator of a dominant platform is not required to file a notification under section 7A of division A if the Commission determines that the acquisition would not serve the public interest