; but, given the difficulties the national government had experienced with State cooperation (e.g., the failure of Rhode Island to send delegates to the Confederation Congress), the Federalists, including Alexander Hamilton, were concerned with the possibility that the States, in an effort to destroy the Federal Government, simply might not hold elections or that an emergency, such as an invasion or insurrection, might prevent the operation of a State’s government, leaving the Congress without Members and the Federal Government unable to respond. (3) Quite plainly, Alexander Hamilton, a leading Federalist and proponent of our Constitution, understood the Elections Clause as serving only as a sort of emergency fail-safe, not as a cudgel used to nationalize our elections process. Writing as Publius to the people of New York, Hamilton further expounds on the correct understanding of the Elections Clause: T[he] natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this place, that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election of its own members. . Alexander Hamilton (writing as Publius), Federalist no. 59, Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members, N.Y. PACKET (Fri., Feb. 22, 1788). (4) When questioned at the States’ constitutional ratifying conventions with respect to this provision, the Federalists confirmed this understanding of a constitutionally limited, secondary congressional power under article 1, section 4. ( [C]onvention delegate James McHenry added that the risk to the Federal Government [without a fail-safe provision] might not arise from state malice: An insurrection or rebellion might prevent a state legislature from administering an election. )