; Whereas 22 NATO nations have increased their military spending since the Wales Declaration of 2014; Whereas, at the NATO Vilnius Summit in 2023, member countries affirmed their commitment to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense, and noted that in many cases, expenditure beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order ; Whereas 20 NATO members still fall short of meeting their 2 percent commitment; Whereas collective security demands real and sustained burden sharing; Whereas NATO members that do not meet their 2 percent goal have a responsibility to the other member states and should rapidly address their budget shortfalls and prioritize defense spending; Whereas NATO updated its Strategic Concept planning document in 2022 to recognize emerging threats to the alliance, including from the People's Republic of China, and begin the process of adapting our collective approach to face them in the coming generation; Whereas, at the NATO Vilnius Summit in 2023, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to its core values and take decisive action to defend them against threats across multiple domains; Whereas nations must put defense spending in their base budgets to provide long-term certainty to NATO planners and their partners; Whereas the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine marks the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II, representing a dramatic shift for European security and requiring NATO to change its policies to increase, modernize, and enhance its force posture and to create more strategic depth to adequately confront new challenges; Whereas, in adapting to growing aggression by the People’s Republic of China, NATO has deepened its partnerships with Indo-Pacific allies, including South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand