; (2) reviewed the supply chain risk from the presumptive awardee against available and relevant threat information provided by the FBI and other appropriate agencies; and (3) in consultation with the FBI or other appropriate Federal entity, conducted an assessment of any risk of cyber-espionage or sabotage associated with the acquisition of such system, including any risk associated with such system being produced, manufactured, or assembled by one or more entities identified by the United States Government as posing a cyber threat, including but not limited to, those that may be owned, directed, or subsidized by the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the Russian Federation. (b) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act may be used to acquire a high-impact or moderate-impact information system reviewed and assessed under subsection (a) unless the head of the assessing entity described in subsection (a) has— (1) developed, in consultation with NIST, the FBI, and supply chain risk management experts, a mitigation strategy for any identified risks; (2) determined, in consultation with NIST and the FBI, that the acquisition of such system is in the national interest of the United States; and (3) reported that determination to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate and the agency Inspector General. 515. None of the funds made available in this Act shall be used in any way whatsoever to support or justify the use of torture by any official or contract employee of the United States Government. 516. None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to include in any new bilateral or multilateral trade agreement the text of— (1) paragraph 2 of article 16.7 of the United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement; (2) paragraph 4 of article 17.9 of the United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement