; and (ii) the previous 5 years, with respect to each other study. (C) Contents Each study required under subparagraph (A) shall address the following issues: (i) The financial and other incentives and obligations of all groups involved in the proxy process. (ii) A consideration of whether financial and other incentives have created a process that no longer serves the economic interests of long-term retail investors. (iii) An analysis of whether regulations and financial incentives have created and protected the outsized influence of proxy advisors or a duopoly in proxy advice, and if so, what are the benefits and costs of that outsized influence or duopoly. (iv) The costs incurred by issuers in responding to politically-, environmentally-, or socially-motivated shareholder proposals. (v) An assessment, including a cost-benefit analysis, of the adequacy of the current submission thresholds in Rule 14a–8 (17 C.F.R. 240.14a–8) to ensure that shareholder proponents have demonstrated a meaningful economic stake in a company, which is appropriate to effectively serve markets and shareholders at large. (vi) An examination of the extent to which the politicization of the shareholder proposal process is increasing the operating costs of public companies. (vii) An analysis of the impact that shareholder proposals have on discouraging private companies from going public. (viii) An evaluation of the risk that shareholder proposals may contribute to the balkanization of the U.S. economy over time. (ix) A thorough assessment of the economic analysis, if any, conducted by proxy advisory firms and institutional shareholders when recommending or voting in favor of shareholder proposals. (x) A review of the extent to which institutional investors, who owe fiduciary duties, rely on proxy advisory firm recommendations. (xi) An assessment of whether, in light of their significant influence on corporate actions and vote outcomes, proxy advisors are subject to sufficient and effective regulation to ensure that their policies and