; (B) Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977); (C) Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); (D) Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976); and (E) Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977); (11) in defining the evidence required to prove a violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in the Meritor decision, the Supreme Court noted that harassment would be actionable when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)); (12) in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court clarified that harassment need not seriously affect an employee’s psychological well-being or lead the employee to suffer injury in order to be unlawful, but rather, need merely create a work environment that a reasonable person in the protected class would find hostile or abusive; (13) in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court held that whether a work environment is unlawfully hostile or abusive does not depend on any mathematically precise test, but rather, is to be determined by looking at all of the circumstances, with no single factor required; (14) in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Harris decision and further held that the hostility or abusiveness of each harassing act should be considered in the aggregate, not in isolation, regardless of whether such acts occur over days or even years; (15) notwithstanding the rulings of the Supreme Court specified in this subsection, some lower court decisions have treated harassing conduct’s severity or pervasiveness as the only 2 relevant factors in evaluating whether such conduct violates title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964