; (3) the United States should use the Bilateral Consultative Commission mechanism within the New START Treaty to address issues related to new Russian strategic nuclear weapons it believes may fall under New START treaty limits; (4) extending the New START Treaty would facilitate efforts by the United States to pursue additional arms control efforts with the Russian Federation, including efforts to address the Russian Federation’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons and emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons; (5) the United States should resume more regular talks on strategic stability with Russia, as well as additional bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts worldwide to address a changing global security environment; and (6) extending the New START Treaty would facilitate efforts by the United States to engage with the People’s Republic of China to reduce dangers associated with its nuclear arsenal, which is fundamentally different than the Russian Federation’s and requires a separate, focused arms control effort. 4. Certifications in event New START Treaty is not extended Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, if the parties to the New START Treaty have not completed the procedures outlined in the treaty and its related protocols and annexes to extend the treaty's effective date by up to five years beyond February 5, 2021— (1) the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State shall separately submit to the appropriate congressional committees a justification for why New START has not been extended and a certification that the absence of an extension of the treaty is in the national security interest of the United States; and (2) the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees— (A) an intelligence community-coordinated assessment of why the New START Treaty has not been extended