; (3) set forth recommendations to ensure that by 2025 no pharmaceutical products purchased for beneficiaries of health care from the Department of Defense or any associated program are made in part or in whole in a covered country; (4) assess the resilience and capacity of the current supply chain and industrial base to support national defense if no pharmaceutical products purchased for beneficiaries of health care from the Department of Defense or any associated program are made in part or in whole in a covered country, including with respect to— (A) the manufacturing capacity of the United States; (B) gaps in domestic manufacturing capabilities, including non-existent, extinct, threatened, and single-point-of-failure capabilities; and (C) supply chains with single points of failure and limited resiliency; (5) set forth recommendations— (A) to diversify supply of pharmaceutical products away from complete dependency on sources of supply in countries that are competitors of the United States or politically unstable that may cut off supply in the United States; (B) to address critical bottlenecks in the supply of pharmaceutical products in the United States; and (C) to mitigate single points of failure and limited resilience of supply chains for pharmaceutical products in the United States