1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Stop China’s Heinous Exploitation and Malicious Espionage Against Congressional Access Act or the SCHEME Against Congressional Access Act . 2. Congressional employees with Chinese Communist Party connections and intent to engage in unlawful activities (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) The Chinese Communist Party has an explicit and subversive interest in gaining access to and influence over U.S. political activity. (2) In a July 2020 speech, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations Chris Wray said that Beijing is engaged in a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign with efforts that involve subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive attempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our country’s public discourse, and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values . (3) There have been several instances and investigations of Chinese operatives developing extensive ties and employment with U.S. elected officials, both senior and junior. (4) These same operatives, mostly Chinese nationals, have been deployed to infiltrate political operations by the main civilian spy agency of their home country as a means to gain influence over decision-makers and gain access to classified information. (5) These instances demonstrate a devoted strategy of China that takes years, or sometimes decades, to knowingly gain access, influence, or information. (6) To protect classified information and prevent seditious influence over elected officials, Congress must act to develop stronger oversight with respect to the foreign involvement of covered individuals. (b) Plan for background assessments Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives and the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate shall jointly— (1) consult with the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of State regarding potential unlawful activity