journalist watchlists while also raiding satellite television stations in Baghdad. (5) The Commander of the Iranian Quds Force traveled to Iraq in October 2019 and met with militia leaders from the PMF. The PMF report to the Iraqi Prime Minister but many units maintain a command structure outside the formal military chain of command linked directly to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The PMF and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps established a joint operational cell in Baghdad on October 3, 2019, that may have directly contributed to the use of excessive force and snipers. (6) The 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of the Department of State found that civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over some elements of the security forces, particularly certain units of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that were aligned with Iran . (7) The Government of Iran continues to intervene and maintain influence with the militia leaders and Commanders of the PMF. This undermines the formal Iraqi chain of command and contributes to actions by the PMF that use repressive actions against Iraqi protestors to maintain Iranian proxy power. 3. Statement of policy It shall be the policy of the United States to— (1) support democracy and human rights in Iraq, including the robust exercise by Iraqis of the rights to free speech and assembly as guaranteed to them by the Iraqi constitution