executing such options, and how the United States should incorporate and implement such options within the strategic approach described in subsection (a)(1). (4) To review and make determinations on the difficult choices present within such options, among them what norms-based regimes the United States should seek to establish to encourage the effective regulation of dangerous synthetic opioids. (5) To report on efforts by actors in the People’s Republic of China to subvert United States laws and to supply illicit synthetic opioids to persons in the United States, including up-to-date estimates of the scale of illicit synthetic opioids flows from the People’s Republic of China. (6) To report on the deficiencies in the regulation of pharmaceutical and chemical production of controlled substances and export controls with respect to such substances in the People’s Republic of China and other countries that allow opioid traffickers to subvert such regulations and controls to traffic illicit opioids into the United States. (7) To report on the scale of contaminated or counterfeit drugs originating from the People’s Republic of China and India. (8) To report on how the United States could work more effectively with provincial and local officials in the People’s Republic of China and other countries to combat the illicit production of synthetic opioids. (9) In weighing the options for defending the United States against the dangers of trafficking in synthetic opioids, to consider possible structures and authorities that need to be established, revised, or augmented within the Federal Government. (d) Functioning of Commission The provisions of subsections (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), and (m) of section 1652 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( Public Law 115–232 ) shall apply to the Commission to the same extent and in the same manner as such provisions apply to the commission established under that section, except that— (1) subsection (c)(1) of that section shall be applied