(11) The United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty will free the Russian Federation to expand deployment of the SSC–8 missile system in ways that threaten NATO and Indo-Pacific allies without bearing any international legal cost in doing so. (12) The Department of Defense has also not yet identified the full estimated research, development, testing, and evaluation, procurement, or personnel costs of producing, testing, and deploying a new short- or intermediate-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic missile currently prohibited by the INF Treaty. (13) No European or Asian ally has publicly declared its willingness or readiness to host a future United States short- or intermediate-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic missile currently prohibited by the INF Treaty should the United States seek to deploy that capability. (14) The Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, stated on October 24, 2018, that we don’t want a new Cold War, we don’t want a new arms race and therefore I don’t foresee that Allies will deploy more nuclear weapons in Europe as a response to the new Russian missile, which precedes United States National Security Advisor John Bolton’s statement of November 9, 2018, that there are no American plans to seek to deploy INF non-compliant missiles in Europe for the foreseeable future . (15) Any effort by the United States Government to proceed beyond research and development of an intermediate-range cruise or ballistic missile that is nuclear armed will be portrayed in as deeply inconsistent with the United States obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, July 1, 1968 (commonly known as the NPT ), to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . (16) Achieving the objective of expanding the INF Treaty’s membership to the People's Republic of China, which has deployed intermediate-range missile systems in great number, is greatly diminished if parties to the