additional losses of technological advantages of the Armed Forces and negate efforts to improve the capabilities of the Armed Forces to meet the National Defense Strategy. (18) Software, hardware, and services supply chains have proven to be major means through which adversaries seek to gain access to weapons systems and information and communications technology platforms and systems of the United States. (19) Vulnerabilities in these critical areas introduce unacceptable risks to human life and the ability of the Armed Forces to execute the missions the public of the United States expects of them. (20) The establishment of the Protecting Critical Technology Task Force of the Department of Defense and the Information and Communication Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force of the Department of Homeland Security is a welcome first step, but the United States Government requires a fundamental security culture change. (21) The innovative technologies that will help the Armed Forces, economy, and industry of the United States maintain competitive advantages over the competitors of the United States are developed in private industry and in academia. (22) Engagement to find solutions with industry stakeholders and allied countries to mitigate the clear, present, and rapidly evolving threats to the national security of the United States is necessary. (23) A national center to unify efforts across the whole of government to strategically warn of and support the mitigation of threats to supply chains and supply chain activities is vital to the cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and national security of the United States. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States Government should endeavor to deliver warfighting capabilities to operational forces without having critical information or technology wittingly or unwittingly lost, stolen, or modified