; sense of Congress (a) Findings The Congress finds the following: (1) The United States could have, and should have, been significantly more prepared to combat the COVID–19 pandemic. (2) Examples of this are numerous but include the loss of stockpiled ventilators to breakage because the Federal Government let maintenance contracts lapse in 2018, the reuse of personal protective equipment that is only sanitary for single-patient use due to shortages, and the scarcity of available testing compared to other nations. (3) The loss of life and harm to the national economy is already staggering yet its extent will not be known for some time. (4) As in previous pandemics and other major health crises, confusion during the COVID–19 pandemic about which agency was in charge of what and who would coordinate the response of multiple agencies lead to calls for a czar to be named, as well as a task force to be created. (5) The Federal Government currently supports pandemic and biodefense preparedness and response in several ways through a myriad of agencies, each responsible for disparate programs and responsibilities related to pandemics, biological attacks, and other major health crises. (6) Following the attack on our homeland on September 11, 2001, the Director of National Intelligence position was created to ensure the cooperation of several agencies in the Intelligence Community through one Cabinet-level official coordinating between and among multiple Federal agencies charged with breaking down silos while keeping the Nation safe. (7) Preparing the United States for and responding to a future pandemic, biological attack, or other major health crisis should be a top priority across agencies of the Federal Government, yet the COVID–19 pandemic exposed the need for greater cohesion and speed in both preparedness and response. (8) Various Federal agencies report on recommendations for preparation and response to pandemics, biological attacks, and other major health crises, but no one Federal official can produce and speak