; (B) the technical risks and estimated cost of accelerating the program to attempt to meet such deadline; (C) an assessment of threat systems that could not be detected or tracked persistently due to waiving such deadline; and (D) a plan, including a timeline, for beginning the required testing. . (f) Report on progress (1) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the progress of all efforts being made by the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air Force, and the Space Development Agency relating to space-based sensing and tracking capabilities for missile defense and how each of such organizations will work together to avoid duplication of efforts. (2) Form The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 4. Nonstandard acquisition processes of Missile Defense Agency (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) In 2002, four years prior to North Korea’s Taepodong-2 ICBM/SLV test in 2006, the Department of Defense directed the Missile Defense Agency to utilize flexible acquisition approaches to quickly develop missile defense capabilities, which led to the fielding of an initial operational homeland missile defense system by the fall of 2004. (2) The Department of Defense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy states that the Department of Defense must [d]eliver performance at the speed of relevance [and to] prioritize speed of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular upgrades. . (3) The Department of Defense’s 2019 Missile Defense Review states that— (A) the Department must adopt processes and cultures that enable the Missile Defense Agency and the military departments to deliver missile defense capabilities faster, learn from failure and rapidly adjust, and swiftly adapt systems once fielded