; and (iii) the likely reaction of such violent extremist organizations to the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces. (C) The strategic risks involved with countering such violent extremist organizations following a withdrawal of United States Armed Forces. (D) The operational risks involved with conducting United States led or enabled operations in Africa against such violent extremist organizations following a withdrawal of United States Armed Forces. (E) The military and political strategy of the covered official for meeting any threat from such violent extremist organizations. (F) The effect any United States withdrawal from Africa would have on Chinese power and influence in Africa. (G) The effect any United States withdrawal from Africa would have on Russian power and influence in Africa. (H) Any efforts the covered official plans to undertake to support legitimate, effective, and democratic local governance in Africa to diminish the intent, capability, and likelihood of return of such violent extremist organizations. (I) Any consultation or coordination with allies, partners, and associates of the United States concerning the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from the AFRICOM AOR. (J) An assessment of the likely response from the governments and military forces of France, the United Kingdom, and Canada to the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from the AFRICOM AOR. (2) Violent extremist organizations described The violent extremist organizations described in this paragraph are each of the following: (A) Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ( ISIS ). (B) Al Qaeda. (C) Ansaroul Islam. (D) Boko Haram. (E) Al-Shabaab. (F) Other adversarial groups and forces in the AFRICOM AOR, as determined by the covered official. (c) Waiver The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if, upon advice of the relevant military commanders, the Secretary determines that the waiver is necessary due to an imminent and extraordinary threat to members of the United States Armed Forces in the