plans to provide to the SDF following a withdrawal of United States and coalition forces. (6) The likelihood that the Assad regime and its allies, including Hezbollah and Iranian forces, will retake areas where United States personnel and Syrian allies have operated or created demilitarized zones, and the actions the Administration plans to take to ensure the safety, and prevent the exodus, of civilians living in those areas. (7) The actions the Administration plans to take to ensure the safety of civilians living in refugee camps that may fall under the control of the Assad regime following withdrawal of United States forces, including Rubkan Camp, and to ensure access by humanitarian organizations to areas being vacated by United States forces and Syrian allies. (8) The expected windfall in oil revenue the Assad regime is likely to gain if the regime or its allies retake areas currently held by United States-allied groups. (9) The impact a withdrawal from Syria would have on Iranian power and influence in the Middle East, including an assessment of the current status of Iranian backed forces in Syria, whether withdrawal is likely to make easier Iranian advanced weapon transfers to Syria and Lebanon, the impact on the security of Israel, the prospect of large scale conflict between Israel and Iran in Syria and Lebanon, and a strategy to counter any such threats. (10) The impact any United States withdrawal from Syria would have on Russian power and influence in the Middle East. (11) The impact any United States withdrawal from Syria would have on diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian conflict, and on United States influence on those efforts, including a statement of the Administration’s current diplomatic objectives in that process. (12) The commitments, if any, Turkey has extended with respect to fighting ISIS and refraining from military action against the Kurds following a withdrawal of United States forces. (13) The commitments, if any, Saudi Arabia or any coalition partners have made to assist in Syria’s