; (2) the involvement of Chinese government entities and state-owned enterprises in infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as— (A) the building, renovating, and operating of port facilities, including the Margarita Port of Panama, Posorja Deepwater Port in Ecuador, and the Port of Paranaguá in Brazil; (B) the building and maintenance of the region’s telecom infrastructure, including the bidding and construction of fiber optic submarine cables and the installation of 5G technologies, by Chinese companies, including Huawei, ZTE, and possibly others, and the likelihood that these companies will be the dominant providers of telecommunications infrastructure and associated products and services in the region, with great influence over Latin American government telecom entities; (C) the building of government facilities in the region; and (D) the building of Ecuador’s Coca Codo Sinclair Dam and other energy infrastructure projects in the region; (3) Chinese military activity in the region, including military education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such as the major satellite and space control station China recently constructed in Argentina; (4) Chinese security activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and monitoring technology to regional governments such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Ecuador, and the potential use of such technology as tools of Chinese intelligence; (5) Chinese intelligence engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the development of dual-use platforms; (6) the nature of the People’s Republic of China’s presence in the region, and whether it is competitive, threatening, or benign to the United States national interests