secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. . (5) Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, beginning with Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), have held that governmental entities are not responsible or liable for damages caused by their agents or employees who, in the course and scope of their employment, violate the constitutional rights of citizens and other persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. (6) Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, beginning with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), have established the doctrine of qualified immunity , absolving the individual wrongdoers themselves of liability for even the most egregious violations of the Constitution unless there exists a clearly established statutory or constitutional precedent of which all reasonable public officials would have known. (7) To be a clearly established precedent, there must be a prior case whose particularized facts clearly place the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate . White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551–52 (2017). (8) Qualified immunity was not known at common law and has had the effect of nullifying the right to seek redress for constitutional violations unless a virtually identical set of facts existed in a case previously decided that is so well-known and recognized that no reasonable public official would not have knowledge thereof. (9) The failure to hold governmental entities, responsible for the constitutional violations of