; (B) any potential public health security or national security risks associated with reliance on critical drugs and devices sourced or manufactured outside of the United States, which may include responses to previous or existing shortages or public health emergencies, such as infectious disease outbreaks, bioterror attacks, and other public health threats; (C) any existing supply chain information gaps, as applicable; and (D) potential economic impact of increased domestic manufacturing; and (2) provide recommendations, which may include a plan to improve the resiliency of the supply chain for critical drugs and devices as described in paragraph (1), and to address any supply vulnerabilities or potential disruptions of such products that would significantly affect or pose a threat to public health security or national security, as appropriate, which may include strategies to— (A) promote supply chain redundancy and contingency planning; (B) encourage domestic manufacturing, including consideration of economic impacts, if any; (C) improve supply chain information gaps; (D) improve planning considerations for medical product supply chain capacity during public health emergencies; and (E) promote the accessibility of such drugs and devices. (c) Input In conducting the study and developing the report under subsection (b), the National Academies shall— (1) consider input from the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Justice, and any other Federal agencies as appropriate