; and (bb) any gaps and challenges to address such differences. (III) Existing mechanisms through which information regarding threats of United States-based terrorism threats that are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, and United States-based terrorism threats that are not inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, is currently shared within and across the Federal Government with partners identified under clause (ii), including with respect to the following: (aa) Infrastructure, such as Guardian, eGuardian, and the National Crime Information Center. (bb) Task forces, such as joint terrorism task forces. (cc) Professional staff who perform information sharing as part as an official duty, such as liaison officers. (dd) Threat information sharing from Federal to State and local partners, from local partners to State and Federal partners, and information that is shared laterally between States and between Federal agencies. (ee) Threat information sharing across geographic and interagency lines, departments and agencies, and information systems. (IV) Effects of how sharing at different levels of classified information affects how threat information is shared with various partners. (v) Redundancies, gaps, and differences (I) Redundancies, gaps, and differences in information sharing regarding threats of United States-based terrorism threats that are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, and United States-based terrorism threats that are not inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof. (II) Causes of such redundancies, gaps, and differences described in subclause (I). (III) Challenges to improvement with respect to sharing described in subclause (I). (IV) How redundancies and gaps described in subclause (I) differ between United States-based terrorism threats that are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations, or the ideology thereof, and United States-based terrorism threats that are not inspired by