; 125 Stat. 1643) determined that Russia would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout scenario under the New START Treaty, primarily because of the inherent survivability of the planned United States strategic force structure, particularly the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, a number of which are at sea at any given time . (9) For as long as it must exist, the United States nuclear arsenal must be maintained and modernized in a cost-effective manner to ensure it remains a safe, secure, and reliable effective nuclear force that can continue to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies, and so that the United States can continue to pursue further verifiable reduction in global nuclear stockpiles consistent with its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (10) The New START Treaty created a Bilateral Consultative Commission to resolve issues related to implementation of the New START Treaty, and Article II of the New START Treaty states, When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 3. Sense of the Senate It is the sense of the Senate that— (1) extending the New START Treaty by a period of five years is in the national security interest of the United States, so long as the Russian Federation continues to meet the central limits of the treaty; (2) the United States should immediately seek to begin discussions with the Russian Federation on agreeing to a 5-year extension of the New START Treaty; (3) the United States should use the Bilateral Consultative Commission mechanism within the New START Treaty to address issues related to new Russian strategic nuclear weapons it believes may fall under New START treaty limits