Work Department of the People’s Republic of China, or the successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. (2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China. (3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent. (4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese Student Scholar Associations. (5) A description of the evolution of the role of the United Front Work Department under the leadership of the President of China. (6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in the United States, with respect to issues of importance to the Chinese Communist Party. (7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with the United Front Work Department that are operating in the United States as of the date of the report. (8) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party. (c) Coordination In carrying out subsection (a), the Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of