; (2) confirms that the United States has not rejected any diplomatic offer to exhibit the SSC–8 missile system, negotiations on a verifiable mutual agreement prohibiting the placement of INF-range missiles on NATO territory or within range of a NATO Member State, or any other transparency measure which may successfully move Russia closer to returning to compliance with the Treaty or prevent a proliferation of INF-range systems on the continent; (3) assesses the implications, in terms of the military threat to the United States and its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, of a Russian Federation deployment of intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles without restriction; (4) identifies what types of technologies and programs the United States would need to pursue to offset the additional Russian capabilities, and at what cost; (5) identifies what mission requirements with respect to the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China will be met by INF-type systems; (6) identifies the degree to which INF-compliant capabilities, such as sea and air-launched cruise missiles, can meet those same mission requirements; and (7) identifies the ramifications of a collapse of the INF Treaty on the ability to generate consensus among States Parties to the NPT Treaty ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, and assesses the degree to which the Russian Federation will use the United States unilateral withdrawal to sow discord within the NATO alliance. (b) Form of report The report required under subsection (a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. (c) Appropriate committees of Congress defined In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.