; (2) United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty would free the Russian Federation to deploy greater quantities of the SSC–8 missile to the detriment of United States national security and that of our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific; (3) withdrawal from the INF Treaty will fail to limit or eliminate China’s shorter- and intermediate-range missiles; (4) the NATO alliance makes critical contributions to United States national security, and the failure to weigh the concerns of NATO allies risks weakening the joint resolve necessary to counter Russia’s aggressive behavior; and (5) as opposed to formally notifying the Russian Federation of the intention of the United States to withdraw, the United States should continue to advance other diplomatic, economic, and military measures outlined in the Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy , to resolve the concerns related to the Russian Federation's violation of the Treaty and to reach agreement on measures to ensure the Treaty’s future viability. 4. Prohibition on use of funds for procurement, flight testing, or deployment of shorter- or intermediate-range ground launched ballistic or cruise missile system (a) In general No funds may be appropriated or otherwise made available for the procurement, flight testing, or deployment of a United States shorter- or intermediate-range ground launched ballistic or cruise missile system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers until the Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, submits a report and offers a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that— (1) includes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from a NATO or Indo-Pacific ally that commits it to host deployment of any such missile on its own territory, and in the case of deployment on the European continent, has the concurrence of the North Atlantic Council