; and (B) the consequent urgent need for new thinking and steady focus by the Department of Defense on ensuring the ability of the United States Armed Forces to prevent an adversary from using the fait accompli strategy to advance its interests at the expense of those of the United States. (9) Department of Defense strategic guidance and official statements underscore the essential role that denial operations will play in preventing a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, including— (A) the incorporation in the National Defense Strategy of the Global Operating Model that includes a blunt layer of combat-credible forward forces postured and employed to delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression ; (B) the conclusion by the National Defense Strategy Commission that the Department of Defense must position substantial capability forward in the form of the blunt layer included in the Global Operating Model to deter and prevent a fait accompli ; (C) the statement for the record by the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, in April 2018 in which he concludes, [d]ue to the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot rely solely on surge forces from the continental United States to deter Chinese aggression or prevent a fait accompli. PACOM must maintain a robust blunt layer that effectively deters Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific ; (D) the Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence Operations, which states that forward-deployed forces, such as those included in the blunt layer of the Global Operating Model and referenced by the National Defense Strategy Commission and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to denying benefits and thereby reduce the likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adversary decisionmakers from concluding they might achieve a military fait accompli that could be extremely costly for the [United States] to reverse by force