; Whereas the A–10 is the least expensive combat plane in the United States arsenal to operate and buy; Whereas while the A–10 flew only 30 percent of the United States Air Force’s total sorties during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, these aircraft achieved more than half of the confirmed Iraqi equipment losses and fired 90 percent of the precision-guided Maverick missiles; Whereas during Operation Allied Force in 1999, A–10s destroyed more field-deployed Serbian weaponry than any other allied weapon system, and combat search and rescue support from the A–10 was 100 percent effective, successfully rescuing one F–117 pilot and one F–16CG pilot; Whereas during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, the A–10 flew 32 percent of the combat sorties in both theaters, and from 2006 to late 2013, flew 19 percent of close air operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; Whereas the A–10 is an effective close air support platform to counter violent extremist organizations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, having flown 11 percent of Air Force sorties against that organization; Whereas the demands for close air support in Iraq and Afghanistan keep the A–10 a relevant platform that requires upgrades; Whereas if the A–10 is removed from service, certain gaps in responsive close air support, forward air controller, air interdiction, strike control and reconnaissance, and combat search and rescue support could widen; Whereas the A–10 can be serviced and operated with high sortie rates from austere bases with limited facilities near battle areas, including unprepared dirt, grass, and narrow road runways, and from airfields that are too short or rough to handle fast jets; Whereas to continue providing unmatched airpower, gain and maintain air superiority, and extend global reach, global power is essential to preserving global security and stability; Whereas the A–10 program will support the Air Force, including the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve