; and (B) the motivations of China for undertaking such obstruction or retaliation. (2) A description of activities undertaken by China, including with respect to cyber-theft, intended to licitly or illicitly acquire information and intellectual property in the possession of non-Chinese governments and businesses relating to COVID–19 testing, treatment, and vaccines. (3) An assessment of whether the activities described under paragraph (2) violate the commitment of China under the cybersecurity agreement entered into by China and the United States in 2015 to refrain from conducting or supporting cyber-enabled economic espionage. (4) An assessment of the manner by which China seeks to advance the foreign policy interests of China by providing economic aid or medical equipment to countries adversely affected by COVID–19 and a discussion of the degree to which such aid renders recipient countries more likely to adopt positions favorable to the interests of China or detrimental to the interests of the United States. (5) An assessment of— (A) the effects of the pledged economic support by China to international organizations, such as the World Health Organization; and (B) whether, and in what manner, China uses such support to induce such organizations to take actions favorable to the interests of China or detrimental to the interests of the United States. (6) An identification of the different ways in which China is using, or may be planning to use, the global disruption and distraction associated with the COVID–19 pandemic as an opportunity to more aggressively pursue longstanding domestic and foreign policy objectives, including the objectives of China with respect to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and territorial disputes. (7) An assessment of— (A) the means and methods by which China disseminates misinformation, whether overtly or covertly, about COVID–19, including on United States-based social media platforms or through other English language-based media