; (2) programming provided through the United Nations based on United States funding should be determined according to greatest need, not only greatest access; (3) United States assistance to Syria should not be manipulated for political or financial gain of any party to the conflict, especially those most responsible for compounding the suffering of Syrian civilians, including the Assad regime, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, any entities owned or controlled thereof, or non-state actors involved in international crimes and human rights abuses; (4) no United States assistance should be given directly or indirectly to the Assad regime in Syria, including through organs or subsidiaries of the United Nations; (5) the United States should support all efforts by the United Nations to establish an independent mechanism to vet procurement contracts in Syrian government-held areas, and such a mechanism must— (A) ensure no contracts are entered into with the Assad regime or its affiliates; (B) develop and implement enhanced human rights due diligence practices, including conducting quarterly human rights impact assessments that review how United Nations aid is disbursed and how such aid flows through its suppliers and local partners in Syria; and (C) make certain that the findings of the human rights impact assessments are integrated into all levels of United Nations operations, monitor the effectiveness of such assessments on such operations, and report how human rights impacts are being addressed and mitigated; (6) the United Nations procurement operations throughout Syria should abide by its own United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct, which states that suppliers to the United Nations must ensure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses