1. Short title This Act may be cited as the High-Speed Refund Act . 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) When presented to voters in 2008, California’s high-speed rail system was projected to cost $33.6 billion for a line from San Francisco to Anaheim, increasing $40 billion to add lines to Sacramento and San Diego. (2) The expanded project’s cost swelled to more than $100 billion, with the San Francisco to Anaheim line costing more than $77 billion, and now the State of California’s high-speed rail plan no longer includes any stops in Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Anaheim, or San Diego. (3) When presented to voters in 2008, California claimed the Federal Government would pay between a quarter and a third of the cost of the rail system. (4) The Federal Government had no such grant program at the time, and the $4 billion invested in the project represents less than 5 percent of the updated cost projections. (5) At the current level of project employment it would take nearly 400 years to accomplish the 1,000,000 job-years promised by the California High-Speed Rail Authority. (6) No significant private companies have invested in the California high-speed rail project. (7) The grant creation and award process for the California high-speed rail project did not incorporate the best practices of Government funding. (8) The grant agreement between the Federal Government and California did not require a feasible funding package to be prepared before awarding funds, which similar mass transit programs require. (9) The grant agreement between the Federal Government and California did not require a minimum operable segment before awarding funds, which similar mass transit programs require. (10) The grant agreement between the Federal Government and California did not require new high-speed trains to run on the new high-speed rail system. (11) The Department of Transportation inappropriately allowed the State of California to spend Federal money without a required State funding match. (12) The California