(C) The required number of operational Air Force squadrons, identified by function and the corresponding total end strength requirement once that number of squadrons is achieved. (D) The required total end strength and force structure by type for the Marine Corps. (E) The force sizing construct used to determine the end strength requirements covered by subparagraphs (A) through (D), the year-by-year plan for achieving such requirements, relevant force posture assumptions, and the associated military personnel costs of such plan. (3) A re-evaluation of the roles of the Armed Forces in performing low-intensity missions, such as counterterrorism and security force assistance, including the following: (A) An assessment whether the joint force would benefit from having one Armed Force dedicated primarily to low-intensity missions, thereby enabling the other Armed Forces to focus more exclusively on advanced peer competitors. (B) A detailed description of, and accompanying justification for, the total amount of forces required to perform the security force assistance mission and the planned geographic employment of such forces. (C) A revalidation of the Army plan to construct six Security Force Assistant Brigades, and an assessment of the impact, if any, of such plan on the capability of the Army to perform its primary roles under the National Defense Strategy. (D) An assessment whether the security force assistance mission would be better performed by the Marine Corps, and an assessment of the end strength and force composition changes, if any, required for the Marine Corps to assume such mission. (4) A reassessment of the roles and missions of the total ground forces, both Army and Marine Corps, to execute the National Defense Strategy, including the following: (A) A detailed description of the allocation of roles for the Army and Marine Corps in deterring and waging war against advanced peer competitors that can complement the activities and investments of each such Armed Force and optimize the capabilities of each