under the sea, on land, and in space could obviate or reduce the requirement for penetrating strike platforms. (7) A re-evaluation of the most effective and efficient means for the joint force to perform the air superiority mission in both contested and uncontested environments, including the following: (A) An assessment of the ability to achieve air superiority from other domains, including with land-based systems, naval systems, undersea systems, space-based systems, electronic warfare systems, or cyber capabilities. (B) A validation of the envisioned operational and cost effectiveness of the Penetrating Counter-Air platform, and of the requirement for developing this system as part of the Air Force Next Generation Air Dominance program. (C) A detailed description of the optimal mix across the joint force of fourth-generation and fifth-generation fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, and Next Generation Air Dominance systems to fulfill operational demands for air superiority. (D) A detailed description of the manner in which the joint force will perform the mission of light aerial attack in uncontested environments to support counterterrorism and security force assistance missions, and the mission of countering violent extremism operations, at the lowest cost to the readiness of advanced, multirole combat aircraft. (E) A determination of what Armed Force, in addition to the Air Force, should have a role in the mission of light air attack in uncontested environments. (8) A reevaluation of the roles and missions of the joint special operations enterprise, including the following: (A) A detailed assessment whether the joint special operations enterprise is currently performing too many missions worldwide, and whether any such missions could be performed adequately and more economically by conventional units. (B) A detailed assessment whether the global allocation of special operations forces, and especially the most capable units, is aligned to the pacing threats and priority missions of the National Defense