; and (D) severe restrictions on the freedom of movement across the region. (6) (A) The August 2016 transfer of former Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to become the Xinjiang Party Secretary prompted an acceleration in the crackdown across the region. (B) Local officials in Xinjiang have used chilling political rhetoric to describe the purpose of government policy including eradicating tumors and spray[ing] chemicals on crops to kill the weeds . (C) Uyghurs are forced to celebrate Chinese cultural traditions, such as Chinese New Year, and unique Uyghur culture is facing eradication due to state control over Uyghur cultural heritage, such as muqam and meshrep, and due to elimination of the Uyghur language as a medium of instruction in Xinjiang schools and universities. (7) In 2017, credible reports found that family members of Uyghurs living outside of China had gone missing, that Chinese authorities were pressuring those outside the country to return, and that individuals were being arbitrarily detained in large numbers. (8) There is ample credible evidence provided by scholars, human rights organizations, journalists, and think tanks substantiating the establishment by Chinese authorities of political reeducation camps. (9) Chinese security forces have never been held accountable for credible reports of mass shootings in Alaqagha (2014), Hanerik (2013), and Siriqbuya (2013), as well as the extrajudicial killings of Abdulbasit Ablimit (2013) and Rozi Osman (2014). (10) Independent organizations conducted interviews, including testimonies from Kayrat Samarkan and Omir Bekali, along with others who had been detained in such facilities, who described forced political indoctrination, torture, uncertainty as to the length of detention, humiliation, and denial of religious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms, and confirmed that they were told by guards that the only way to secure release was to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty. Uyghurs Muhammed Salih Hajim (2018), Yaqupjan Naman (2018),