; and (2) a default by PDVSA on its loan from Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession of PDVSA’s United States CITGO assets, would warrant careful consideration by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. (c) Preventing Rosneft from controlling United States energy infrastructure The President shall take all necessary steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of critical United States energy infrastructure. (d) Security risk assessment (1) In general The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall conduct an assessment of the security risks posed by Russian control of CITGO’s United States energy infrastructure holdings. (2) Report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate , the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate , the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives , and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives that contains the results of the assessment conducted pursuant to paragraph (1). (e) Review of CITGO transactions If PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations, the Secretary of the Treasury should review CITGO’s transactions with United States persons to assess and ensure compliance with United States sanctions policies and regulations. 410. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and actors in Venezuela (a) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to Congress that describes— (1) the full extent of cooperation by the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Government of Cuba, and the Government of Iran with the Government of Venezuela and