; (2) United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty would free the Russian Federation to deploy greater quantities of the SSC–8 missile to the detriment of United States national security and that of our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific; (3) withdrawal from the INF Treaty will fail to limit or eliminate China’s shorter- and intermediate-range missiles; and (4) as opposed to formally notifying the Russian Federation of the intention of the United States to withdraw, the United States should seek one or more additional meetings of the Special Verification Commission (SVC), and other measures outlined in the Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy , to resolve the concerns related to the Russian Federation's violation of the Treaty and to reach agreement on measures to ensure the Treaty’s future viability. 4. Prohibition on use of funds for procurement or deployment of shorter- or intermediate-range ground launched ballistic or cruise missile system (a) In general No funds may be appropriated or otherwise made available for the procurement or deployment of a United States shorter- or intermediate-range ground launched ballistic or cruise missile system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, submits a report and offers a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that— (1) includes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from a NATO or Indo-Pacific ally committing it to host deployment of any such missile on its own territory; (2) confirms that the United States has initiated efforts through the Special Verification Commission (SVC) and/or other high-level bilateral forums since January 1, 2018, to resolve the Russian Federation's violation of the INF Treaty