sufficient capacity to support our combatant commanders and has developed significant carrier gaps in these critical areas. (8) Because of continuing use of a diminished aircraft carrier force structure, extensive maintenance availabilities result which typically exceed program costs and increase time in shipyards. These expansive maintenance availabilities exacerbate existing carrier gaps. (9) Because of maintenance overhaul extensions, the Navy is truncating basic aircraft carrier training to expedite the deployment of available aircraft carriers. Limiting aircraft carrier training decreases operational capabilities and increases sailor risk. (10) Despite the objections of the Navy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed the Navy on August 7, 2015, to perform shock trials on the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN–78). The Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy indicated that this action could delay the introduction of the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN–78) to the fleet by up to two years, exacerbating existing carrier gaps. (11) The Navy has adopted a two-phase acquisition strategy for the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy (CVN–79), an action that will delay the introduction of this aircraft carrier by up to two years, exacerbating existing carrier gaps. (12) Developing an alternative design to the Ford-class aircraft carrier is not cost beneficial. A smaller design is projected to incur significant design and engineering cost while significantly reducing magazine size, carrier air wing size, sortie rate, and on-station effectiveness among other vital factors when compared to the Ford-class. Furthermore, a new design will delay the introduction of future aircraft carriers, exacerbating existing carrier gaps and threatening the national security of the United States. (13) The 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment states A minimum of 12 aircraft carriers are required to meet the increased warfighting response requirements of the Defense Planning Guidance