a new shorter- or intermediate-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic missile currently prohibited by the INF Treaty. (12) No European or Asian ally has publicly declared its willingness or readiness to host a future United States intermediate- or shorter-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic missile currently prohibited by the INF Treaty should the United States seek to deploy that capability. (13) The Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, stated on November 12, 2018, that NATO has no intention to deploy new nuclear missiles in Europe, which follows United States National Security Advisor John Bolton’s statement of November 9, 2018, that there are no American plans to seek to deploy INF non-compliant missiles in Europe for the foreseeable future . (14) Any effort by the United States Government to proceed beyond research and development of an intermediate-range cruise or ballistic missile that is nuclear armed will be portrayed in as deeply inconsistent with the United States obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington July 1, 1968 (commonly known as the NPT ), to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . (15) Achieving the objective of expanding the INF Treaty’s membership to the People's Republic of China, which has deployed intermediate-range missile systems in great number, is greatly diminished if parties to the existing Treaty cease implementation. (16) The Congressional Budget Office in October 2017 estimated that the costs of United States nuclear weapons spending over the next three decades will amount to $1,200,000,000,000, or $1,700,000,000,000 when adjusted for inflation, which does not include new systems proposed in the 2018 United States Nuclear Posture Review such as a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), and a ground launched cruise missile (GLCM). 3. Sense of the Senate It is the sense of the