; and (C) may consider, among other things, statistical evidence of the extent and durability of partisan bias, electoral responsiveness, and the ability of each party to translate votes into seat share. (c) Remedies In remedying a violation of subsection (a), a court shall apply the following: (1) If the court finds that the State has established a congressional districting plan with the purpose of unduly favoring or disfavoring a political party, the court shall appoint a special master or panel of special masters to propose a remedy to the court for the violation. (2) If the court finds that the State has established a congressional districting plan that will have the effect, but does not have the purpose, of unduly favoring or disfavoring a political party, the court may, in its discretion, appoint a special master or panel of special masters to propose a remedy to the court for the violation. (d) Legislative privilege No person, legislature, or State may claim legislative privilege under either State or Federal law in a civil action brought under this section or in any other legal challenge, under either State or Federal law, to a congressional districting plan. 5. Safe harbor With respect to any claim under section 4, a State’s enacted congressional districting plan shall have a rebuttable presumption of validity if that plan was created by a nonpartisan or bipartisan redistricting commission, where support from members of more than one political party and, if applicable, nonaffiliated members, is required to approve a congressional districting plan. 6. Other laws (a) No preemption Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt any cause of action under State law, or limit or abrogate any cause of action under Federal law. (b) Other districting criteria Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent a State from adopting congressional districting criteria or procedures that do not conflict with this Act and that serve to limit potential exposure to liability under section 4(a). (c) Voting Rights Act