; and (v) the electronic systems of Arizona, Illinois, and Florida, particularly voter database information. (B) Efforts by the Russian government, persons or entities associated with the Russian government, or persons or entities within Russia to put forward, disseminate, or promote false news about the campaigns for elections for public office held in the United States in 2016. (C) Efforts by the Russian government to work with other governments, entities, and individuals to carry out activities described in subparagraphs (A) and (B). (2) To investigate attempts or activities by governments other than the Russian government, persons or entities associated with governments other than the Russian government, and other entities and individuals to use electronic means to influence, interfere with, or sow distrust in elections for public office held in the United States in 2016, including activities similar to those described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1). (3) To identify, review, and evaluate the lessons learned from the attempts, activities, and efforts described in paragraphs (1) and (2) relative to detecting, preventing, protecting from, and responding to such attempts, activities, and efforts. (4) To make such recommendations as the Commission considers appropriate to ensure that foreign governments and persons associated with foreign governments never again use electronic means to influence, interfere with, or sow distrust in elections for public office held in the United States. (b) Reports to the President and Congress (1) Interim reports The Commission may submit to the President and Congress interim reports containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations as have been agreed to by a majority of Commission members. (2) Final report Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final report containing such findings, conclusions, and recommendations as have been agreed to by a majority of