licensing boards. (8) Some States have responded to the decision in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners by establishing a layer of bureaucratic oversight that merely monitors board actions for consistency with State licensing laws. This response is a missed opportunity for reform, as it does not address the specific competition concern raised in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners or the underlying problems with over-reliance on occupational licensure as a regulatory approach and with overly broad enforcement of licensing laws as a means to regulate commercial activities outside an occupation’s scope of practice. (9) Legislation is necessary to clarify the requirements of active supervision, both to offer States a clear and certain mechanism to immunize their occupational boards and to make clear that mere bureaucratic oversight to ensure consistency with State licensing laws does not suffice to confer immunity. (10) This Act is intended to offer States a choice between two alternative routes to achieve immunity for their occupational licensing boards—either establishing a mechanism for meaningful active supervision of licensing boards by State officials or establishing a mechanism for meaningful judicial review of board actions in the State courts. 3. Definitions In this Act: (1) Certification The term certification means a voluntary program under which— (A) a private organization (in the case of private certification) or the government of a State (in the case of government certification) authorizes an individual who meets certain personal qualifications to use certified as a designated title with respect to the performance of a lawful occupation