; and (B) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. (11) Whether an employer should be vicariously liable for harassment is a functional analysis that is based not on the title of the harasser or the employer’s job description for the harasser’s position but on the authority vested in that individual by the employer. (12) The Supreme Court holding in Vance limits the category of individuals who are considered supervisors and for which an employer may be held vicariously liable under Faragher and Ellerth to those individuals that have authority to take tangible employment actions. This holding ignores the reality that employees with the authority to control their subordinates’ daily work should be included in that category, for which an employer may be held vicariously liable, because such individuals are aided by that authority in perpetuating a discriminatory work environment. (13) Individuals who direct the daily work activities of employees but do not have the authority to take tangible employment actions against those employees are common in the workplace in the United States, particularly in industries that employ low-wage workers. Workers in industries including retail, restaurant, health care, housekeeping, and personal care, which may pay low wages and employ large numbers of female workers, are particularly vulnerable to harassment by individuals who have the power to direct day-to-day work activities but lack the power to take tangible employment actions. (b) Purpose The purpose of this Act is to clarify that an employer’s vicarious liability for harassment under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, section 1977 of the Revised Statutes, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, and title