; and (D) provides adequate monitoring and compliance of agreements to mitigate such risks. (4) Whether other agencies of the United States Government, including the Department of the Interior, are aware of the counterintelligence risks posed to facilities of the Department by purchases or leases of nearby Federal land and are cooperative in providing information to permit a proper assessment of those risks. (5) Whether and to what extent industrial espionage is occurring against private United States companies to obtain commercial secrets related to critical or foundational technologies. (6) Whether and to what extent future foreign investments have the potential for any of the following: (A) To increase the cost to the Department of acquiring or maintaining necessary defense-related equipment and systems. (B) To reduce the United States technological and industrial advantage relative to any country of special concern. (C) To give any country of special concern a heightened ability to conduct information warfare against the United States, including through the spread false or misleading information to the American public and the manipulation of American public opinion on critical public policy issues. (7) Whether currently mandated annual reports to Congress on the interagency vetting of foreign investments provide valuable information. (d) Elements The elements of the assessment, plan, and recommendations required by subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) A list of countries of special concern for investments that could potentially impair the ability of the Department to defend the nation. (2) A description of recent trends in foreign investment transactions by countries of special concern, including joint ventures, the sale of assets pursuant to bankruptcy, and the purchase or lease of real estate in proximity to military installations. (3) A description of any strategies used by countries of special concern to exploit vulnerabilities in existing foreign investment vetting processes and regulations.