; and (B) calls upon member states to take the necessary measures to prevent, except as decided otherwise by the UN Security Council in advance on a case-by-case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iran . (2) The United States maintains bilateral sanctions against Iran for its efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch technology, and its acquisition of destabilizing types and amounts of conventional weapons. (3) According to the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the United States intelligence community judges that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them. Iran’s ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering [weapons of mass destruction], and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran’s progress on space launch vehicles—along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies—provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including ICBMs. . (4) Since the passage of United Nations Security Council 2231, Iran has conducted numerous tests of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and has acquired destabilizing types of conventional weapons. (5) Iran has pursued the ability to indigenously produce ballistic missile and cruise missile goods, services, and technologies. (b) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. (c) Report on supply chain of Iran’s ballistic missile program (1) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the following: (A) An analysis of the foreign and