; or substantial and specific dangers to public health or safety further the interests of good governance and provide a valuable service to the American public. (2) Despite efforts in recent years to protect whistleblowers—specifically, Presidential Policy Directive 19 and the codification of certain provisions of the Directive at section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004—retaliatory denial, suspension, or revocation of security clearance remains a very real threat for whistleblowers. Government officials can wield this threat with impunity due to the lack of defined penalties for misusing the security clearance system. (3) Because those found to have engaged in unlawful whistleblower reprisal are often senior agency officials, and because punishment for such misconduct is, under current law, both undefined and exclusively within the discretion of agency management officials, the retaliator often goes unpunished while the whistleblower is left to pick up the pieces of his or her career, livelihood, and reputation, often after months or years without a paycheck. (4) Defining penalties for unlawful whistleblower reprisal in the form of suspension, denial, or revocation of a security clearance, or the recommendation, threat, or furtherance of the same, places those contemplating misusing the security clearance system on notice that such behavior will not be tolerated, serves as a strong deterrent to unlawful retaliation, and ensures appropriate consequences are implemented when necessary. The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, which covers all reprisal except that pertaining to security clearances, has for many years done precisely that. The lack of penalty congruence between the Whistleblower Protection Act and section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, is inexplicable, unwarranted, and remedied by this Act. (5) This Act recognizes that the suspension, denial, or revocation of security clearance often has an even more insidious impact on