500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty . (3) Potential consistency and compliance concerns regarding the INF Treaty noncompliant GLCM have existed since 2008, were not officially raised with the Russian Federation until 2013, and were not briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until January 2014. (4) The United States Government is aware of other consistency and compliance concerns regarding Russia actions vis-à-vis its INF Treaty obligations. (5) Since 2013, senior United States officials, including the President, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have raised Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty to their counterparts, but no progress has been made in bringing the Russian Federation back into compliance with the INF Treaty. (6) In April 2014, General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, correctly stated, A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European land mass, is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with … It can’t go unanswered. . (7) The Department of Defense in its September 2013 report, Report on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that it has multiple validated military requirement gaps due to the prohibitions imposed on the United States as a result of its compliance with the INF Treaty. (8) It is not in the national security interests of the United States to be legally prohibited from developing dual-capable ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, while Russia makes advances in developing and fielding this class of weapon systems. (9) A material breach of the INF Treaty by the Russian Federation affords the United States the right to