of future participation in violence, including violent extremism. (7) Since 2002, a body of research has emerged on failed or fragile states. The World Bank defines a fragile state as a low-income country characterized by weak state capacity, weak state legitimacy, or both, leaving citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks. (8) United States foreign policy and assistance efforts in highly violent and fragile states remain governed by an outdated patchwork of authorities that prioritize responding to immediate needs rather than solving the problems that cause them. United States Ambassadors, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Directors, and commanders of combatant commands do not have the policy framework or tools they need to align United States policy or assistance with an overarching, long-term strategy to reduce and prevent global fragility and violence. (9) Lessons learned over the past 20 years, documented by the 2013 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Lessons Learned Study and the 2016 Fragility Study Group report, show that effective, sustained United States efforts to reduce violence and stabilize fragile and violence-affected states require clearly defined goals and strategies, adequate long-term funding, rigorous and iterative conflict analysis, coordination across the United States Government, including strong civil-military coordination, and integration with national and sub-national partners, including local civil society organizations, local justice systems, and local governance structures. (10) United States National Security Strategies over the past 15 years have regularly affirmed that the United States has a national security interest in improving its capacity to prevent, manage, and mitigate violence and violent conflicts in order to mitigate the consequences of armed conflict, including humanitarian disasters, terrorism, organized crime, increased risk of mass atrocities, and reversed development. (11) According to the Small Arms Survey, the