; including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks, and branches, and subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran as posing illicit finance risks for the global financial system. . (5) Iran continues to be listed by the Financial Action Task Force (in this section referred to as FATF ) among the high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions , jurisdictions that FATF perceives to be non-cooperative in the global fight against terrorist finance and money laundering. (6) Iran and North Korea are the only countries listed by the FATF as high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions against which countries that are members of FATF should take measures. (7) The Transparency International index of perceived public corruption ranks Iran 131st out of 176 countries surveyed. (8) The Department of State identified Iran as a major money-laundering country in its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2016. (9) The Department of State currently identifies Iran, along with North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, as a state sponsor of terrorism, for having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism . (10) The Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2014, noted that Iran continued to sponsor terrorist groups around the world, principally through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC–QF). These groups included Lebanese Hizballah, several Iraqi Shia militant groups, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militia continued to provide support to the Asad regime, dramatically bolstering its capabilities, prolonging the civil war in Syria, and worsening the human rights and refugee crisis there. . (11) The Government of Iran’s tolerance of corruption and nepotism in business limits opportunities for foreign and domestic investment, particularly given the significant involvement of the IRGC in many sectors of Iran’s economy. (12) The IRGC and the leadership-controlled bonyads (foundations) control an estimated 1/3 of Iran’s total economy,