5, 2010, within the context of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program and was tasked with negotiating an end to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s conflict with the Taliban in Afghanistan, with input from women and civil society representatives in the country. (6) As noted by the Commander of the United States Central Command, General Joseph Votel, in testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on March 9, 2017, corruption remains a significant challenge to the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces. (7) As stated in the report referred to in paragraph (3), the Afghan Ministry of Interior possesses the basic systems and organizations to investigate and adjudicate alleged corruption and human rights violations, but the political will to hold violators, especially senior officers, accountable remains fragile. . The report further notes that the Afghan Ministry of Interior lags behind the Afghan Ministry of Defense in its capacity to train personnel and units on rule of law and corruption issues. . (8) On June 30, 2016, the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan established the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) under the Attorney General’s Office to combat high-level corruption within the Government of Afghanistan. The ACJC has since prosecuted several major corruption cases. The Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee in Afghanistan noted, in its August 2017 quarterly report, that the ACJC has continued functioning as an effective judicial device to combat corruption in various government organizations. . (9) The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission was established on June 6, 2002, pursuant to the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, done in Bonn, Germany, December 5, 2001 (commonly known as the Bonn Agreement ), and functions as a national human rights institution working on the protection and promotion of human rights in