operational nature and significant resource requirements of such mission. (C) An assessment whether a transition from large-deck amphibious ships to small aircraft carriers would result in a more lethal and survivable Marine Corps sea base that could accommodate larger numbers of more diverse strike aircraft. (D) An assessment of the manner in which an acceleration of development and fielding of longer-range, unmanned, carrier-suitable strike aircraft could better meet operational requirements and alter the requirement for shorter-range, manned tactical fighter aircraft. (E) An assessment of the manner in which the emerging technology to operate large numbers of low-cost, autonomous, attributable systems in the air, on and under the sea, on land, and in space could change the manner in which the joint force projects power globally. (6) An assessment, based on operational plans, of the ability of manned, stealthy, penetrating strike platforms to survive and perform effectively the highest priority operational missions described in the National Defense Strategy, including the following: (A) An assessment whether anticipated advances in stealth technology and the employment of such technology on existing or developmental systems, such as the F–35 and B–21 aircraft, can be expected to outpace and overmatch adversary capabilities to detect and target such systems. (B) An assessment of the ability of fourth generation aircraft with advanced sensors and weapons to perform certain missions equally or more effectively than the missions assigned to, or envisioned for, fifth-generation penetrating strike platforms. (C) An assessment of the manner in which the emerging technology to operate large numbers of low-cost, autonomous, attributable systems in the air, on and under the sea, on land, and in space could obviate or reduce the requirement for penetrating strike platforms. (7) A re-evaluation of the most effective and efficient means for the joint force to perform the air superiority mission in both contested and