of the Chinese diaspora. (5) The Chinese Government and Communist Party employs an array of government entities, friendship and exchange organizations, and government funded foundations, think-tanks, educational and other projects to carry out political influence operations, often called united front work . (6) The Chinese Government and Communist Party’s political influence operations aim is to secure the regime’s political stability domestically and spread globally its political and economic model as superior to those of Western democracies. (7) The Chinese Government and Communist Party’s political influence operations take advantage of the open and democratic nature of the United States, including constitutional protections for free speech and a free press, and the desire by some individuals or institutions to attract Chinese investment, gain access to Chinese markets, or attain greater global influence. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the Chinese Government and Communist Party’s political influence operations are not soft power intended to persuade, but sharp power intended to penetrate or corrupt democratic countries, foster attitudes and behavior favorable to the Chinese Government’s interest through disinformation, coercion, and other means, and to widen the scope of authoritarian influence globally. It is further the sense of Congress that Congress and the American public need reliable and current information to understand the malign goals of these political influence operations, identify the key institutions, individuals, entities, and ministries that carry out such operations, and distinguish them from the cultural, educational, and people-to-people exchanges which benefit both the United States and China. (c) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to— (1) clearly differentiate between the Chinese people and culture and the Chinese Government and Communist Party in official statements, media, and messaging, and to ensure that efforts to curtail Beijing’s