; (3) to reject all statements, policies, or actions advocating for a military solution to the civil war in Yemen; and (4) to encourage long-standing United States security partners, including the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates, to take the lead in confidence-building measures that open space for political dialogue to end the war in Yemen and address the humanitarian crisis. 102. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) direct negotiations between the Government of Saudi Arabia and representatives of the Houthi movement (also known as Ansar Allah ) are required— (A) to reach a political solution; (B) to address the suffering of the Yemeni people; and (C) to counter efforts by Iran, al Qaeda, and ISIS to exploit instability for their own malign purposes; (2) the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates bear significant responsibility for the economic stabilization and eventual reconstruction of Yemen; and (3) the United States and the international community must continue to support the work of United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths to achieve a political solution to the civil war in Yemen. 103. United States strategy for ending the war in Yemen (a) Defined term In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate ; (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate ; (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives