; (3) section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 ( 22 U.S.C. 8924 ), as amended by section 226 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to Russian and other foreign financial institutions); (4) section 9 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 ( 22 U.S.C. 8908 ), as amended by section 227 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to significant corruption in the Russian Federation); (5) section 10 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 ( 22 U.S.C. 8909 ), as added by section 228 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to certain transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights abusers in the Russian Federation); (6) section 233 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( 22 U.S.C. 9527 ; relating to sanctions with respect to investment in or facilitation of privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian Federation); and (7) section 234 of that Act ( 22 U.S.C. 9528 ; relating to sanctions with respect to the transfer of arms and related materiel to Syria); Whereas in testimony on January 30, 2018, to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin said [i]n the near future, you will see additional sanctions based on the list of Russian oligarchs or senior political figures, presumably against those who had engaged in malign activities sanctionable under United States law