; and (4) in subsection (f), as redesignated, by striking December 31, 2019 and inserting December 31, 2022 . (c) Sense of C ongress It is the sense of Congress that the President and Secretary of State should seek to encourage partner countries of the Organization of American States and the United Nations to impose sanctions with respect to Venezuelan individuals that are similar to sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to such Venezuelan individuals. 11. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in this section as PDVSA ), through a no-compete transaction, secured a loan from Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 percent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Petroleum Corporation, including its assets in the United States, as collateral. As a result of this transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collateral by PDVSA’s creditors. (2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in 19 States in the United States, including an extensive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refineries, with a combined oil refining capacity of 749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake Charles, Louisiana is the sixth largest refinery in the United States. (3) The Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Russian Government, and its Executive Chairman, Igor Sechin, following Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. (4) The Department of Homeland Security has designated the energy sector as critical to United States infrastructure. (5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela raises the probability that the Government of Venezuela and PDVSA will default on their international debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in which Rosneft could come into control of