; (5) the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report issued by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission concluded that, in the years between the passage of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act and the global financial crisis, regulation and supervision of traditional banking had been weakened significantly, allowing commercial banks and thrifts to operate with fewer constraints and to engage in a wider range of financial activities, including activities in the shadow banking system. The Commission also concluded that [t]his deregulation made the financial system especially vulnerable to the financial crisis and exacerbated its effects. ; (6) a report by the Financial Stability Oversight Council pursuant to section 123 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( 12 U.S.C. 5333 ) states that increased complexity and diversity of financial activities at financial institutions may shift institutions towards more risk-taking, increase the level of interconnectedness among financial firms, and therefore may increase systemic default risk. These potential costs may be exacerbated in cases where the market perceives diverse and complex financial institutions as ‘too big to fail,’ which may lead to excessive risk taking and concerns about moral hazard. ; (7) the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse , states that repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act made it more difficult for regulators to distinguish between activities intended to benefit customers versus the financial institution itself. The expanded set of financial services investment banks were allowed to offer also contributed to the multiple and significant conflicts of interest that arose between some investment banks and their clients during the financial crisis.