; including Iran’s Central Bank, private Iranian banks, and branches, and subsidiaries of Iranian banks operating outside of Iran as posing illicit finance risks for the global financial system. . (5) Iran continues to be listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) among the Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories —countries which it perceived to be non-cooperative in the global fight against terror finance and money laundering. (6) Iran and North Korea are the only countries listed by the FATF as Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories against which FATF countries should take measures. (7) The Transparency International index of perceived public corruption ranks Iran 130th out of 168 countries surveyed. (8) The State Department identified Iran as a country/jurisdiction of primary concern for money laundering in its 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). (9) The State Department currently identifies Iran, along with Sudan and Syria, as a state sponsor of terrorism, having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism . (10) The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism , published last in June 2015 noted that Iran continued to sponsor terrorist groups around the world, principally through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC–QF). These groups included Lebanese Hizballah, several Iraqi Shia militant groups, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militia continued to provide support to the Asad regime, dramatically bolstering its capabilities, prolonging the civil war in Syria, and worsening the human rights and refugee crisis there. . (11) The Iranian Government’s tolerance of corruption and nepotism in business limits opportunities for foreign and domestic investment, particularly given the significant involvement of the IRGC in many sectors of Iran’s economy. (12) The IRGC and the leadership-controlled bonyads (foundations) control an estimated one-third of Iran’s total economy, including large portions of Iran’s