for it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. in spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. it might even be possible that what constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed thingsperhaps even in being essentially identical with them. perhaps! but who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous "perhapses"! for that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalentphilosophers of the dangerous "perhaps" in every sense of the term. and to speak in all seriousness, i see such new philosophers beginning to appear.
United Kingdom