> as a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes... neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children... and although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right until the adoption of the nineteenth amendment half a century later... nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, in the political arena... > moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility..." weber v. aetna casualty surety co., 406 u.s. 164, 175 (1972). and what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society..." end of frontiero v. richardson, 411 u.s. 677, 685-87 (1973) (excerpt) *-*-*
United States