in the newly independent north africa of the second half of the twentieth century, amazigh  also known as berber  pursuits may not have sought political sovereignty. however, the alienation of amazigh culture, by subsuming it to a coalescing arab nationalism, mirrored the fate of its kurdish counterpart.  with the rise of kurdish and amazigh nationalisms, history today seems engaged in a course correction. with saddam husseins invasion of kuwait in 1990, the receding arab nationalism lost any remaining credibility as a political project. it is in the 1990s that the trajectories of these three nationalist expressions, arab, kurdish, and amazigh, intersect; the arab on the decline, while the kurdish and amazigh in ascent. arab-ness was assumed for any population living in an arab state and which is either arabic-speaking or muslim arabic-speaking coptic egyptians, as well as non-arabic speaking kurdish muslims, and even kurdish yazidis, re-conceived as umayyad muslims were covered by the arab identity umbrella. today, the distinct cultural and religious identity of yazidis is subsumed under the kurdish label, together with the shabak, zaza, and ahl-e haqq, irrespective of the individual or collective definitions within these communities. the amazigh quest for nationalism is not limited to the linguistic element. its reading of the cultural reality of the region posits three components: amazigh, arabized amazigh, and arabs. the second group, and consequently the amazigh as a collective, is assumed to be the majority. amazigh identity is thus presented as a question of essential being, as opposed to the arab overlay of having. the maghreb is accordingly amazigh   /policy-analysis/arabs-kurds-and-am azigh-quest-nationalist-fulfillment -old-and-new
Kekistani