shabaab and aqap: recent attacks, such as the may 2023 assault on a ugandan base in buulo mareer that killed at least 50 soldiers from the uganda peoples defense forces, continue to amaze the international coalition, despite their strong fortifications, the strength of their military arsenal, and the availability of air cover. shabaab operates a specific kenyan wing, led by kenyan native ahmed iman ali, with its own military component, jaysh ayman. shabaab has active affiliates in tanzania, such as the ansar muslim youth centre and al-muhajiroun. elsewhere, shabaab has also recruited ethiopians, ugandans, rwandans, and burundians into its ranks to varying degrees.  coordinated by the islamic state in northern somalias puntland region, recruitment for other islamic state groups, such as its central africa province in congo and uganda and mozambique province, have undercut shabaabs market share. al-muhajir winds down his article by stating that the group prioritizes the protection of civilians and does not actively seek to target them, quoting jason warner and ellen chapins 2018 report on shabaabs as proof of careful, targeted practices. over the last year, aqap has lost two important leaders: former emir khalid batarfi and khaled mohammed salahaldin zidane, the son of sayf al-adl, who is thought to be al qaedas current overall emir. on the ground, aqap has also intensified its military operations against both uae-backed militias and hostile tribal forces in southern yemen. aqap maintains strong ties back to al qaedas central leadership and especially al-adl. however, after the death of zidane, this is more unclear. the un report also noted reported instances of the houthis training aqap in the use of drones and releasing aqap members they had previously arrested. aqap has not claimed any attacks on the houthis in several years. it notes the continued use of the port in shakra, abyan, for smuggling and transit with somalia.
Jihadi