> "to discover this truth...it is necessary to make a distinction... we must distinguish between the perceiving of a perception, feeling of a sensation, thinking a thought from...later repetitions of the process in which recognition plays a part. in many cases this distinction is of fundamental importance." (p.93-94) weininger suggests that differentiating between initial experiences (perception, sensation, thought) and their later recognition is essential and often overlooked. > "every simple, clear...perception and every distinct idea...passes through a stage (which may indeed be very short) of indistinctness. so also in...association; for a longer or shorter time before the elements...have actually come together, there is a...generalised expectation or presentiment...leibnitz, in particular, has worked at kindred processes, and i believe them to underlie the attempts of herbart and horwicz." (p.94) weininger explains that all clear perceptions and ideas begin in a vague, indistinct phase. he ties this to leibnitz, herbart, and horwiczs earlier explorations of thought formation. > "the common acceptance of pleasure and pain as...fundamental sensations...makes the division of psychical phenomena into sensations and perceptions too narrow for due treatment of the vague...stages to which i have referred. i shall go...to the widest classification...that of avenarius into 'elements' and 'characters.' the word 'character' in this connection, of course, has nothing to do with...characterology." (p.94) criticizing the simplicity of pleasure-pain classifications, weininger turns to avenarius's broader framework of "elements" and "characters," which he finds better suited to describe the complex initial stages of perception.
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