Lightning incentive for micro-cheating? New to Lightning, and I'm having a hard time understanding something about the incentive system.
So, if block sizes remain fixed, and transaction fees become prohibitively expensive one day, owing to future btc popularity, won’t there be an incentive to cheat in channels, knowing that the cost to settle on chain is prohibitive?

Who’s going to broadcast a refund transaction that costs (one day, e.g.) $100 in fees, just to claw back a few cents from an uncooperative channel node? Isn’t that an incentive for massive micro-cheating?

Sorry if i’m massively misunderstanding how this works. Is there a way to create a channel that guarantees any side can broadcast the refund without incurring extra costs?
When the total capacity of the channel is less than it costs to close the channel, neither party has an incentive to close the channel.

If broadcasting an outdated commitment transaction returns some funds to the cheating party, the cheated party can create a transaction to claim all funds from the cheater. In the worst case, the justice transaction can just burn all funds by sending them to fees. In no case would the cheating party be able to get any gain from broadcasting an outdated commitment transaction as long as the cheated party recognizes the attack.

Thus, the potential cheater is limited to choosing to hurt both parties. This seems strictly less beneficial than just keeping the channel open.

Especially, if you consider that other channel partners of the attacker would see the channel closure on-chain and may choose to ostracize the attacker.