Can miners collude to bypass the penalty based revocation system of the lightning network? The core lightning security assumption relies on a punishment mechanism called “Justice Transaction”. However, how can you prevent a malicious user from colluding with a miner, and producing a block with old state transactions without the rest of the network (watchtowers/honest nodes) realising it pre-mining?
When a channel is closed unilaterally, it requires two transactions by the closing party to move funds from a channel back into unilateral control.
The closing party publishes their version of the commitment transaction to the network. The commitment transaction has a special condition for the closer's output.  After the commitment transaction is included in a block, the closing party's funds are locked for a period of time in which only the counterparty is able to issue their penalty transaction. The closing party can only spend their output after the lock expires. Since the two spending conditions are encoded in the output's locking script, the funds remain subject to potential penalty spending until the closing party moves the funds to a different output.
To prevent a penalty transaction from occurring during the wait period, the attacker would need to be able to censor the penalty transaction from being included in any block between the commitment transaction being confirmed and the lock expiring. Censorship of such level would require sufficient hashrate to reorganize any block that includes it.