Breaking Bitcoin Private Key Suppose my private key is properly generated. My public key is known to everybody.
I don't care about privacy.
How many times can I reuse my bitcoin address until someone has enough information from all my transaction data to break my private key?
Assume I operate as an eBay seller who sells USDT (zero loses purchases where anybody can resell later at the same price), where adversaries can freely transact with me to get the transaction data, signature etc.
What is the term for this case/matter? is it &quot;chosen cipher text attack&quot;, &quot;plain text attack&quot; etc.
How many times can I reuse my bitcoin address until someone has enough information from all my transaction data to break my private key?

An arbitrary number of times.
Assuming the discrete logarithm problem for secp256k1 is hard (the basic security assumption underlying Bitcoin's digital signatures), it does not matter at all how many signatures an attacker sees. He will not be able to find the private key, or be able to forge a signature.
There are two contexts in which the advice for not reusing keys appears:

Privacy. Reusing addresses increases the linkability of your transactions, which reduces your privacy as well as everyone else that you interact with through that address.
Post-quantum security. As soon as you've spent an output assigned to a given address once, its public key becomes public knowledge. Before that point, someone with a hypothetical machine that can compute private keys from public keys cannot even start their search. I personally think this is not a particularly strong reason not to reuse addresses though (the real reason not to is privacy); see What are the potential attacks against ECDSA that would be possible if we used raw public keys as addresses? for why.


What is the term for this case/matter? is it &quot;chosen cipher text attack&quot;, &quot;plain text attack&quot; etc.

This crypto SE answer is relevant: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/32715/72983
What you really want is protection against existential forgery (the ability for an attacker to sign a message he has never seen a signature for). That is a stronger notion of security than what you were talking about (as forgeries do not require the attacker to actually learn your private keys).