Practicality of a certain hash function Consider the following hash function:
$$(V\cdot A + V\cdot B)^2 \bmod C$$
$A, B,$ and $C$ are large primes. $V$ is the value to be hashed and is guaranteed to contain at least as many bits as the largest prime.
Ostensibly, this should provide an excellent level of collision resistance.
Now assuming that the primes in question are large enough, computing the reverse should be unfeasible. Correct?
The obvious weakness when one sees a square is
$$(a)^{2} = (-a)^{2},$$ This is not a problem in the Rabin Cryptosystem since it requires an additional mechanism to resolve the message from possible 4 candidates. Here, however, this is can cause a direct collision.
Also, as noted by fgrieu, the calculation of the square root is not hard in the prime case by the Tonelli-Shanks. This algorithm work for prime $p$ and generalized for $p^k$, too.

Now assuming that the primes in question are large enough, computing the reverse should be unfeasible. Correct?

Take
$$h = (V\cdot A + V \cdot B)^2 = V^2(A+B)^2 \bmod C $$ So there is no reason for $A$ and $B$ to be a prime. Since it is not a keyed hash, we should know all values, like $A,B,C$ then
$$V^2 = \frac{h}{(A+B)^2} \bmod C$$ this has two solutions in the range $[0,C{-1}]$ and infinitely many solutions in the $\mathbf{Z}$. We can find these first two with the Tonelli-Shanks and the rest with modular arithmetic.
Therefore, one-can find pre-images, secondary pre-images, and collisions very easily. Remember in the pre-image attack we don't need to find the actual value $V$, and any value $V'$ that produces the given hash value $h$ will be enough for this attack to be successful.
Not even close to being a secure hash function at all.