Recombination thresholds in degree reduction of multiplied Shamir shares Shamir's secret sharing can be considered multiplicatively homomorphic, if one is aware of the fact that multiplying two shares of a (n,t)-threshold shared secret yields a share of the same secret, but over a (n, 2t)-threshold sharing.

To overcome this, there is a secure degree reduction protocol, which is already explained in this question. My follow-up question tackles an unexplained point in that question's accepted answer:

The subsharings ($\sigma_3(x)$ to $\sigma_5(x)$ in the referenced answer) are polynomials of degree 1, i.e. 2 shares are needed for proper recombination.

However, trying this using two arbitrary shares for interpolation fails.
At the end of this question I paste a short Python script using VIFF that shows the misbehavior. When using a threshold of 2 (needing 3 shares) for 
recombining the subshares, then the final shares can be arbitrarily recombined using only two shares, as expected from the secure degree reduction protocol.

How comes that you need a larger number of subshares than the degree of the corresponding polynomials for proper recombination?

In the following the Python snippet (note that there is a 1/11 chance that the lower threshold accidentially works):

from viff import shamir
from viff.field import GF

# Zp(x) gives an object that corresponds to x mod 11 and allows for multiplication
# I.e., Zp(3) * Zp(5) == Zp(15) == Zp(4)
Zp = GF(11)

# Share 5 and 2 among 3 players with threshold 1 (&gt;= 2 shares needed)
t = 1
sh1 = (shamir.share(Zp(5), t, 3))
sh2 = (shamir.share(Zp(2), t, 3))

# Multiply shares, implies shares for 5*2 = 10, but threshold is 2
multiplied_shares = [ (Zp(i+1), sh1[i][1] * sh2[i][1]) for i in xrange(0, 3) ]
print('Recombination ' + ('works' if shamir.recombine(multiplied_shares[0:2*t+1]) == Zp(10) else 'does not work'))

# Create subshares of the multiplied shares, using threshold 1 (*)
sh3 = shamir.share(multiplied_shares[0][1], t, 3)
sh4 = shamir.share(multiplied_shares[1][1], t, 3)
sh5 = shamir.share(multiplied_shares[2][1], t, 3)

# Distribute the subshares
p1_shares = [ (Zp(1), sh3[0][1]), (Zp(2), sh4[0][1]), (Zp(3), sh5[0][1]) ]
p2_shares = [ (Zp(1), sh3[1][1]), (Zp(2), sh4[1][1]), (Zp(3), sh5[1][1]) ]
p3_shares = [ (Zp(1), sh3[2][1]), (Zp(2), sh4[2][1]), (Zp(3), sh5[2][1]) ]

# Try to recombine subshares using threshold 1 fails despite sharing (*) above
p1_final1 = shamir.recombine(p1_shares[0:t+1])
p2_final1 = shamir.recombine(p2_shares[0:t+1])
p3_final1 = shamir.recombine(p3_shares[0:t+1])
final_shares1 = [ (Zp(1), p1_final1), (Zp(2), p2_final1), (Zp(3), p3_final1) ]
final1 = shamir.recombine(final_shares1[0:t+1])
print(str(final1) + ' is ' + ('' if final1 == Zp(10) else 'NOT ') + 'correct')

# However, recombining subshares using threshold 2 works
p1_final2 = shamir.recombine(p1_shares[0:2*t+1])
p2_final2 = shamir.recombine(p2_shares[0:2*t+1])
p3_final2 = shamir.recombine(p3_shares[0:2*t+1])
final_shares2 = [ (Zp(1), p1_final2), (Zp(2), p2_final2), (Zp(3), p3_final2) ]
final2 = shamir.recombine(final_shares2[0:t+1])
print(str(final2) + ' is ' + ('' if final2 == Zp(10) else 'NOT ') + 'correct')
This is the correct behavior. Since the degree of the multiplication sharing is $2t$, it will take $2t+1$ shares of either it directly or the subshares. If done on the subshares, the resulting sharing is of degree $t$. 

Shamir secret sharing is commutative with respect to polynomial evaluation.

Let $\sigma_1^t$ be the polynomial for sharing $s$ with degree $t$. So, multiplying shares generated by $\sigma_1^t$ and $\sigma_2^t$ (which shares some $s'$), we get a share of $\sigma_3^{2t}$, which shares $ss'$. To reconstruct $ss'$ it would take $2t+1$ shares.

In the degree reduction step, we create subshares with a threshold of $t$, or $\sigma_4^{t}\circ\sigma_3^{2t}$, in other words, we have a degree $t$ sharing of a degree $2t$ share. Due to commutativity, we can rearrange things to get $\sigma_3^{2t}\circ\sigma_4^{t}$, then apply the inverse operation $(\sigma_3^{2t})^{-1}$, to get $(\sigma_3^{2t})^{-1}\circ\sigma_3^{2t}\circ\sigma_4^{t}$, which gives you $\sigma_4^{t}$.

So I have probably thoroughly abused notation, but hopefully that makes sense. You are doing the inverse operation on a $2t$ degree sharing in order to get back to the degree $t$ sharing.

Some consequences of this are 1) in MPC we assume that everyone will participate in the protocol. If one party refuses to participate, the degree reduction won't work. 2) This is used to establish the theoretic upper bound on information theoretic honest-but-curious MPC protocols.