Cryptanalysis of an certain algorithm Is an attacker of an cryptographic algorithm allowed to change order of sub-keys but not changing their number in attack? Would it be called an attack on broken algorithm of cipher?
The attack you describe (at least insofar as I understand it) is essentially a type of related key cryptanalysis, which is a valid but very strong attack model that is not always accepted by cryptographers as showing serious weaknesses in a cipher.  In terms of the plausibility of such an attack, the general idea is that if the expanded key (consisting of all the round keys) is stored or transmitted insecurely then it might be possible for an attacker to alter them in some particular way, even if she cannot simply read them directly.  The alterations to the rounds keys would induce the cipher to behave differently in a way that enables the attacker to deduce bits of the key.

This scenario might seem to stretch credulity a little too much, which is why not all cryptographers are concerned about related key attacks.  However, weaknesses in a cipher under related key attacks can often inspire breaks under the more conventional one-key model (e.g. Biham's 'key schedule' related-key cryptanalysis of LOKI inspired slide attacks, and differential related-key cryptanalysis techniques aided the development of biclique cryptanalysis).  We also may be interested in the strength of a cipher when it is being used as the core of a hash function, where the attacker can directly control the 'key' input.

You do have to be a little careful about with the type of "key alteration" you propose (i.e. transposition of round keys).  So long as the attacker is restricted to just transposing round keys that should be fine.  But if the attacker is given more fine-grained control, to the point where she can transpose individual bits of the round key, then that is much too strong of a capability to grant her, because not even an Ideal Cipher can resist an attacker with that ability.  Related key attacks are only really "interesting" (in the sense of revealing a structural weakness in a particular cipher) if an Ideal Cipher can in principle be secure against them.