Is equal length of primes in Paillier cryptosystem is mandate for security reasons? In continuation to this question about length of primes , I am in doubt about the restriction on length of primes itself .

In Paillier  cryptosystem , equal length of primes are used .

My doubt is whether this restriction is to ensure the following condition only

$$\gcd(pq,(p-1)(q-1))=1$$

or , there are another security reasons that makes the equal length condition mandate .

I mean, in cryptosystems like RSA, approximately equal length primes are generally preferred for security reasons , If the length is more than specified value, then cryptosystem is not secure.

Is it the same case in paillier cryptosysyem too or not ?
No, exactly equal length of primes $p$ and $q$ is not mandatory for security (or proper functioning) in the Pailler cryptosystem. Sufficient requirements are that $p$ and $q$ are prime, $N=p q$ is hard to factor, and $\gcd(p q,(p-1)(q-1))=1$.

The requirement that $p$ and $q$ are of exactly equal size is usually made in the Pailler cryptosystem because this requirement


implies that $p&lt;2q&lt;4p$, which implies $\gcd(p q,(p-1)(q-1))=1$, which is a must for the Pailler cryptosystem to work;
is customary in RSA, and thus is an easily met condition, and unobjectionable from a security standpoint;
is a consequence of stronger conditions mandated by FIPS 186-4 and the earlier ANSI X9.31 RSA key generation standards, which both require $2^{k-1/2}&lt;p&lt;2^k$ and $2^{k-1/2}&lt;q&lt;2^k$ for integer $k$ at least 512 (and further constrained, including to be a multiple of 64), because it simplifies implementations of RSA, including using the CRT method; and similar implementation considerations apply to the Pailler cryptosystem. 


More precisely, on security:


even though imposing that $p$ and $q$ are of exactly equal size does reduce the choices for $N$, and thus helps at least some factorization algorithms (notably Fermat's and derivatives), it would be a surprise if such algorithms could be extended to factor with odds $\epsilon$ and expected cost lower than $\epsilon\min(p,q)^u$ operations, where $u\approx2/5$ in our wildest dreams, and even $u\approx1/2$ is hard to reach; thus such algorithms are not to fear in the first place, for they do not have odds worth consideration to factor products of two randomly-generated primes of approximately equal size if that size makes factorization by GNFS hard enough; says $N$ at least 768-bit (the current academic record), thus $\min(p,q)$ at least 350-bit, making $\min(p,q)^{2/5}$ at least 140-bit.
on the contrary, that $p$ and $q$ are of exactly equal size slightly increases the expected time to factor $N$ by the sub-exponential ECM for a given size of $N$, and does not lower the expected cost of any other sub-exponential algorithm that we know; thus can be regarded as more beneficial than not from a security standpoint.