Prove if it is a CCA secure Commitment Assume we have a IND-CCA-secure PKC (Public-Key-Cryption) and we construct a commitment-scheme(commit, reveal) with that IND-CCA-secure PKC (so that commitment should be IND-CCA-secure too). But how can I prove that? I am a beginner and have absolute zero idea how such a proof works.  
My idea: "the reveal-step" from commitment-scheme is uselss. so we can cut it? I heard something about reduction. But how does it work? Can anyone explain the reduction by using the example above step by step? Thank you!
The security property IND-CCA does not fit with commitment schemes. The IND-CCA game is specified in a certain way, and is usually used w.r.t. encryption schemes. However, a commitment scheme can be more general, because you don't need to be able to reverse the process like decryption.

A very simple model for a commitment scheme is that you have a one-way function with two inputs. One of them is the element you are commiting to, and the other is random. In the unveil phase you show them both, and it can be verified by applying the one-way function on those inputs. Those random coins are required for some security properties.

For the security properties of commitment schemes, there are two properties to look at: 


Hiding property: If it is computationally hiding, then it is a difficult problem to find a matching input. If it is unconditionally hiding, then there exists a way to unveil a commitment to every valid input. Basically this is similar to the principle of perfect secrecy.
Binding property: If it is computationally binding, then it is hard to unveil a commitment to any other element, which was not the original input. If it is perfectly binding, then it is not possible to unveil an element to anything else than the original input.


It is easy to see, that unconditionally hiding and perfectly binding are contradictions to each other, and in fact it is impossible to have them at the same time. But there are commitment schemes which are unconditionally hiding and computationally binding, and there are schemes which are computationally hiding and perfectly binding:


$G$ is a prime order group where the DLOG problem is hard, with generator $g$. Then commit to an integer $x$ (in matching bounds) as $Com(x) = g^x$. Unveil is just showing $x$. This is computationally hiding and unconditionally binding.
Pedersen commitment: $G$ again a prime order group where the dlog problem is hard with two generators $g,h$, commit to $x$ as $Com(x,r) = g^xh^r$ with a random integer $r$. In order to unveil, both $x$ and $r$ are shown. This scheme is unconditionally hiding, because if you knew $log_g(h)$, then it would be possible to unveil any value $x$ by calculating the matching value $r$. However, under the assumption that the commiter does not know that discrete logarithm, the scheme is computationally binding.


Besides that, it was one of the first results shown in the UC framework, that it is impossible to realize UC-secure commitments. But it was also shown, that the additional assumption of a common referecne string allows the construction of such a UC-secure commitment scheme.