Is AES-CTR or ChaCha20 vulnerable to a time-memory trade off? Is AES-CTR or ChaCha20 vulnerable to a time-memory trade-off attack?

According to this paper it seems to be, which would put AES-CTR at a clearly breakable $2^{64}$ security level (for AES-128-CTR).  Since AES-128-CTR is not considered breakable something is wrong with this statement and I would like to know what.
This is not a concern; the model of costs that the paper uses is unrealistic.  In the paper, they state:


  In other words, the attacker is given unlimited amount
  of time in preparation


(Section 2, second paragraph)

That is, they assume that the attacker can easily spend $O(2^{128})$ time (or more, if necessary) to generate a Hellman table (or Rainbow table) for AES-128.

Yes, once an attacker does that, he can attack AES-128 (at least, against the plaintext he used while building the rainbow table) faster than he would otherwise.

However, it is generally believed that $O(2^{128})$ effort is infeasible, even as a one-time effort.