CPA-secure of $\Pi$ implies CPA-security of $\Pi||\Pi||\ldots||\Pi$ Katz and Lindell book claim that from the theorem:


  
  Any private-key encryption scheme that is CPA-secure is also
  CPA-secure for multiple encryptions.
  


Follows the fact that:


  
  If $(Gen,Enc,Dec)$ is a fixed-length ($M_n = \{0,1\}^n$) CPA-secure ES
  then $(Gen,Enc',Dec')$ with $M_n' = (\{0,1\}^n)^{*}$ and
  $Enc_k'(m) = Enc_k(m^{(1)})||\ldots||Enc_k(m^{(s)})$ is also CPA-secure.
  


Why is it the case?

What strikes me more is that a similar theorem to 1. holds for CCA-security:


  
  Any private-key encryption scheme that is CCA-secure is also
  CCA-secure for multiple encryptions.
  


However, the construction does not hold (according to my slides) in the later case:


  
  Assuming $(Gen,Enc,Dec)$ is CCA-secure with $M_n = \{0,1\}^n$ then one
  can show that $(Gen,Enc',Dec')$ is not CCA-secure.
The proof of (1) is not given in the chapter on symmetric encryption since it requires knowing the hybrid proof technique that is taught in Chapter 7. However, the argument is proven in Chapter 11 for the asymmetric case (see Theorem 11.6 and the proof on page 383). Essentially the same proof holds for the symmetric case as well (except that instead of the reduction $\mathcal{A}'$ on page 385 computing the plaintexts itself for $j&lt;i$ and $j&gt;i$ in steps 2(a) and 2(c) respectively, it asks its encryption oracle to do it and uses the responses). 

Regarding CCA security, the proof of multiple encryptions indeed does go through as well. However, unlike CPA security, it does not imply that you can concatenate ciphertexts into one ciphertext. That is, you can encrypt multiple messages, but you cannot encrypt longer messages by concatenating. The reason is that if you encrypt a long message by concatenating ciphertexts (and you call this the new ciphertext) then the attacker can drop the last sub-ciphertext and ask for decryption (it is allowed to ask for decryption since this is not the same ciphertext received).