Derandomized version of RSA-OAEP We know a standard way (cf. RFC 6979) to derandomize ECDSA signatures, i.e., to generate ECDSA signature without an external source of randomness. 

Is there any similar standard way, or academic-proof way, to derandomize RSA-OAEP encryption?
Derandomization for asymmetric encryption is a bad idea. Main reason for that is that if an asymmetric encryption mechanism is deterministic, then it allows a brute force attack on the plaintext: the attacker tries possible plaintext messages and encrypts them, and tries to see if it yields the same encrypted message as the one which was observed. Real-world plaintexts usually have much less entropy than cryptographic keys.

Some extra notes:


You could use asymmetric encryption only to convey a fully random symmetric key, in which case brute force on the key is not feasible. But then, this means that you have a random source at hand, so OAEP should not be an issue.
You could imagine a deterministic process that feeds on an extra secret value, thus not reproducible by attackers. But then, this would not really be "derandomization"; that process and the source secret value would better be described as a custom PRNG, i.e. you are just using normal RSA-OAEP.