Update to "Cryptographic Right Answers" I'm a big fan of Colin Percival's "Cryptographic Right Answers" post.

This was written in 2009, which is a long time ago in Internet years.

Is the advice still valid or, if not, can someone point me to more up-to-date information?
For the clearly cryptographic recommendations:


AES CTR + MAC: still good advice, though AES-GCM is a good alternative. His recommendation of 256-bit keys clashes with Schneier's (also 2009) recommendation of 128-bit due to the weaker 256-bit key schedule. Neither choice is broken, however.
HMAC-SHA-256 as MAC: still good advice. While SHA-3 has been published, it has not yet seen as much use and SHA-2 remains unbroken.
256-bit random UIDs: 256-bits is not going to risk collisions, like ever.
PBKDF2 or scrypt: still fine. Although PHC chose Argon2 as a possible successor, it does not have much uptake yet.
RSAES-OAEP: I am torn here. It is a secure choice for public key encryption, but like he says it is easy to get wrong. A good elliptic curve would be as secure, faster, and ECC keys are much smaller. Not bad advice.
RSASSA-PSS: unlike the above, this is fairly simple. However, signature size is also large compared to ECC. Secure, but not always the Right Answer, as he says.
Diffie-Hellman on group #14. Still good advice.


So none of it is bad advice even after seven years.