How does the security of Elliptic curve compare to normal discrete logarithm? Intro:
EC are often compared with RSA but how about a more safe version of the discrete logarithm?
All 3 can be reduced to the problem:
$$b = g^a \mod{P}$$
In RSA $P$ is a product of two primes. To solve the discrete logarithm 'just' a factorization of $P$ is required. Different to the two other cases $a,b$ is known and $g$ is searched.
But if $P$ is a prime the problem can get much harder. It depends at the factorization of $P-1$ because $P-1$ is also equal to the number of different elements.
As far as I know the best choice is a 'safe prime' with $P = 2 q +1$ with $q$ a prime as well.
This discrete logarithm can be solved in $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{q}) $ with $q$ the biggest prime factor (with Pollard's algorithm).
At EC $P$ is a prime as well but the number of elements can be different (but still $\approx P$). It can e.g. be determined with Schoof's algorithm.
A number of safe elliptic curves can be found at safecurves.cr.yp.to .
Tested safe curves had all $2^3 \cdot q$ elemnts (with $q$ a big prime). Afak solving those will also take $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{q}) $ time.

Question:
Given the discrete logarithm solving problem for normal numbers and elliptic curves (mod a prime $P_i, P_e$). Given a valid generator $g_i, g_e$ and a possible result $b_i, b_e$.
$$\text{normal: } b_i = g_i^{a_i} \mod P_i $$
$$\text{elliptic curve: } b_e = g_e^{a_e} \mod P_e $$
Let the elliptic curve have $N_e = 2^3 \cdot q$ different elements with $q$ a big prime (other variables chosen in that way).
Let $$P_i = 2 \cdot q +1$$
Do both problems have the same solving time of  $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{q}) $ ?
(we ignore the linear factor of computation time for each single step due to different multiplication time)

Bonus questions:
Which other factor have impact into the solving speed?
BQ1.) The number of elements of some curves from safecurves.cr.yp.to had also the property: $N_e -1 = 3 \cdot r$ with $r$ a big prime. Does this have any impact?
BQ2.) Has the factorization of $P_e -1$ any impact at the security?
BQ3.) Has the factorization of $q-1$ any impact at the security? (for normal and EC)

Edit: Update

It looks like 'number filed sieve' can do better than Pollard's algorithm ($\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{q}) $). To use it on EC the embedding need to be small -&gt; chose a big one
besides the safe prime property $P_i$ should als be not close to $p^n$ with $p$ a small prime like $2,3,..$

$\rightarrow$ assumption: so there is a difference?
As far as I know the best choice is a 'safe prime' with $P=2q+1$ with $q$ a prime as well.

This is the best choice for a given size of $P$, but not for a given size of $q$. See this.

This discrete logarithm can be solved in $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{q})$ with q the biggest prime factor (with Pollard's (Rho) algorithm).

Essentially yes (minor caveat: $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{q})$ is not effort, but the number of multiplications of integers of size $P$, with $P&gt;q$, hence the effort grows faster by a factor at least $\ln P\,\ln\ln P$). That the DLP can be solved with such method and effort does not imply that such method or effort is needed. And if $P$ is a safe prime, there are methods (including the Number Field Sieve) requiring less effort. Again, see this.

Do (DLP in a subgroup of an appropriate Elliptic Curve on one hand, of $\mathbb Z_P^*$ on the other hand) have the same solving time of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{q})$ (group operations, where prime $q$ is the order of the subgroup)?

Yes, when using Pollard's Rho algorithm. That algorithm is believed optimum in the Elliptic Curve case, and for $P$ large enough in the $\mathbb Z_P^*$ case.
No, when $P$ is a safe prime (and large enough to make the DLP non-trivial), and using the Number Field Sieve to tackle the DLP in the subgroup of $\mathbb Z_P^*$.

Note: I don't know that the Number Field Sieve can be used to solve the DLP in an appropriate Elliptic Curve (sub)group; and it would come as a huge surprise if it was more efficient than Pollard's Rho algorithm.