Text encrypted with key1, key1 encrypted with key2, meaningful? Simplified Question
Does it make sense from a security / cryptographic standpoint to encrypt a text in the following way:

create only one AES key K_Azure
create new random key K_Text1
encrypt Text1 with K_Text1
encrypt K_Text1 with K_Azure
store [ E(K_Text1), E(Text1) ] in the same storage
store K_Auzre somewhere else

Context
The DataProtection in asp.net core provides a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt some data.
The keys are stored in a key-value-pair format of (KeyId, XML), where XML provides some metadata and the actual encryption key itself.
The part of the XML where the key is stored can be encrypted using various providers, my question is about the ProtectKeysWithAzureKeyVault (link) implemented here.
Protecting the keys
With ProtectKeysWithAzureKeyVault a data encyption key (let's call it TEXT, because in our case this will be just a text) is encrypted using a random new generated key (let's call it K_Text). K_Text will be encrypted using a single key in the AzureKeyVault (let's call it K_Azure).
The encrypted TEXT and encrypted  K_Text are saved in the same store (in the same XML which is saved in in a SQL or file or we...).
To summarize
+------------------------------------ --------+          +---------+  
| Database                                    |          | Azure   |  
| ----------------------------------- --------|          | --------|  
| Id1, E(K_Azure, K_Text1), E(K_Text1, TEXT1) |          | K_Azure |  
| Id2, E(K_Azure, K_Text2), E(K_Text2, TEXT2) |          + --------+  
+ ------------------------------------ -------+


E (KEY, TEXT) = encript TEXT with KEY

My question
Is there any reason why it does not encrypt the TEXT directly with K_Auzre?
Notes

AES is used to encrypt everything as far as I know in this context

Update
I think Elias is right, K_Azure is kept in separate hardware and you can not get it.
Just two ideas:


If you have some kind of hardware security module (HSM) to protect your K_Azure you might want to avoid using that HSM to encrypt large volumes of data. But since you cannot get the K_Azure out you generate a new key and use that.
If you don't have other randomization in your AES mode you will leak equality information if you use the same key for the same data.