Why are LMS and XMSS not candidates in the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process? Why are Leighton-Micali Signature Scheme (LMS) and eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) not candidates in the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process?
Both are mentioned in the final draft of Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes.
I was expecting that both algorithms are candidates in the standardization process as well, but it seems that they weren't even submitted. Can anyone explain why? If they are not considered as candidates for a new standard why does the Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes exist and mention exactly those two algorithms?
Is the recommendation just a temporary standard until the standardization process is finished?
Can anyone explain why?

That is because NIST specifically stated that stateful schemes were not allowed in the NIST postquantum competition, because they could not be implemented using the API that NIST has defined (which does not allow any state).
That would appear to be reasonable, as stateful hash based signature methods do need extra care to implement safely; NIST 800-208 outlines what NIST believes are reasonable precautions - those precautions are not needed for other algorithms, and hence NIST kept those separate.