What is the most paranoid way to exchange messages? I'm looking for a way for Alice to send a message or a file to Bob in the most paranoid way possible (over the internet).

It can be asymmetric or symmetric. But According to some articles, AES 128bit, RSA, ECC are all broken or will be soon (with the new NSA Utah center).

I found PHPECC library on GitHub: https://github.com/mdanter/phpecc but I don't know how to generate private keys and change key length.

RSA is slow to get a decent security... AKA 2048-bit or more.

AES-256bit is fast and secure with a strong password... but I cannot figure how to communicate the password in the most paranoid way. (Again, please, not on a piece of paper :))

I've made a couple of schemas on a sheet, but I'm sure there's a better way than what I've imagine.

Any help or explanation, or good methods how to do that will be greatly appreciate.

EDIT:

OpenSSL Vulnerability: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/04/severe_openssl_vulnerability/

AES 128-bit: http://threatpost.ca/en_us/blogs/rsa-2010-experts-expect-several-ciphers-be-cracked-soon-030210

NSA is promoting ECC over RSA. And ECC 112-bit is broken:
http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography
RSA is slow to get a decent security... AKA 2048-bit or more.
  


Well, if you want to be ultra-paranoid, then you'll have to accept some trade-offs.  Suffice to say, a one-time 2048-bit RSA key-exchange shouldn't eat up too much processing time.

Using SSL is the most reliable way to exchange information securely; it not only takes care of the key-exchange and message encryption, but also message authentication (ie, man-in-the-middle attacks).

I don't think you should be concerned about AES being 'broken', but if you really want to be ultra-paranoid, you might take a look at using Serpent - it was the runner-up to Rijndael (AES) in the AES contest, with many people considering it more secure, but slower.


  "Serpent was widely viewed as taking a more conservative approach to security than the other AES finalists, opting for a larger security margin: the designers deemed 16 rounds to be sufficient against known types of attack, but specified 32 rounds as insurance against future discoveries in cryptanalysis."