How to factorize the group order in Pohlig-Hellman algorithm The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is for computing discrete logarithms in a group whose order is a smooth integer.
This algorithm requires the factorization of the group order. However we know that factorization of big number is a hard problem. So how could Pohlig-Hellman be an effective algorithm?
I will mostly talk about the Elliptic Curve since here the field size is around $2^{255}, 2^{448},2^{512}$ for secure curves. With Hasse's bound $$|N - (q+1)| \le 2 \sqrt{q}$$ the number of points is not too far away from the field size. With this, we can compare with the factoring records.
The current record achieved in 2020, CADO-NFS has factored an 828-bit $n$ with &quot;roughly 2700 core-years, using Intel Xeon Gold 6130 CPUs as a reference (2.1GHz)&quot;. For the history see this detailed answer
If you set up a curve that has no big prime order on the order of the safe curves, it is not hard to factor for a dedicated attacker then use the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm for the discrete logarithm. Don't set up such a curve.
Actually, the parameters are never meant to be hiding see in SafeCurves, no security by obscurity. This more about don't propose a curve that doesn't have a large factor.
Having one large and a few small is fine like Curve255 has 8 as cofactor. The cofactor ($h = \#E(k)/n$) of the curve Curve25519 is $h=8$ which means that there are small subgroups of Curve25519. The order of the subgroups is $2,4,8,n,2n,4n,8n$.
Small groups are also vulnerable to small-subgroup attacks ( Lim–Lee active small-subgroup attacks), so we don't want them for this reason, too. Curve255 has no problem with either the curve itself or its twist.

Multiplicative discrete logarithm, on the other hand, dead for characteristic 2 ($GF(2^m)$) and almost dead for characteristic 3, ($GF(3^m)$). To be secure you need to a big field that the Pohlig-Hellman is your least problem (see on the keylength.com). Anyway, there are not to be kept secret either.