Data switching on one time pad and Data leakage Assume all the values and operations defined over $\mathbb{F}_p$.
For the sake of simplicity assume all the values are non-zero. Let $(-r)$ denote additive inverse of value $r$.

We have one fixed value $a$. we compute $v_1=a+r_1$ and $v_2=(-r_1)+r_2$, where $r_i$ are picked uniformly at random from the field.

We give $v_1$ and $v_2$ to a semi-honest adversary and ask him to do: 

$v_1+v_2=a+r_2$



Question: Given $v_1$ and $v_2$ can the adversary learn anything about $a$ in above scenario (when it performs modular addition operation)?
This is just a blown up version of the OTP.

$v_1$ is basically just the normal OTP: To decrypt, it is enough to know $r_1$

And then you give the adversary just another random value: If $r_2$ is drawn uniformly and $r_1$ is fixed, $v_2$ has the very same distribution as $r_2$ itself. Essentially, you are using another OTP to encrypt the key of the first OTP (the minus sign does not change anything)

So in the end, if you transmit both $v_1$ and $v_2$, you just doubled the size of the message. And you have doubled the key size, and key management is the major drawback of OTP. Decryption is possible with knowledge of either $r_1$ (directly) or $r_2$ (indirectly, getting $r_1$ from $v_2$).

This construction can easily be turned into an attacker on OTP and vice versa, so the security is basically the same. But this is only true if you actually use OTP with true random keys. In a stream cipher construction (which people wrongfully call OTP sometimes), the situation might be entirely different, and from intuition I would say it would weaken the security.