Does sending the same message with 2 different keys in OTP leak information? Suppose a common message ($M$) is XOR'ed with two different keys $K_1,K_2$ producing two ciphertexts $C_1,C_2$. Thus,

$$M \oplus K_1 = C_1\\
M \oplus K_2 = C_2$$

On observing $C_1$ and $C_2$, an adversary can obtain the value of $C_1 \oplus C_2 = K_1 \oplus K_2$. Is this scheme semantically secure? Note that $|K_1|=|K_2|=|M|$ and the keys are randomly chosen from a uniformly distributed large key space ($\approx 2^{255}$).
As long as the keys $K_i$ are only used once, this is semantically secure.  To see it, observe that if $K_i$ is a uniformly random value in $\{0,1\}^{|M|}$ then so is $C_i = M \oplus K_i$.