Do known-plaintext attacks exist for public key encryption? In asymmetric ciphers we publish the public key for anyone, which means an attacker can encrypt any message they want and compare the ciphertext and plaintext without communicating with the owner of the private key. So do known-plaintext attacks make sense for asymmetric ciphers, or are they only for symmetric ciphers?

Ps. What are all the attacks there exist for public key ciphers? (I know of chosen ciphertext and timing attacks.)
Known-plaintext attacks are key-recovery attacks. By design, an asymmetric cipher cannot be susceptible to known-plaintext attacks; it would be completely worthless.

The property you describe that asymmetric ciphers such as textbook RSA lack is called semantic security. Some considerations:


In practice, RSA might be used only to encrypt a randomly generated key for a symmetric encryption algorithm, since encrypting a large message would be very slow with RSA alone. If that key is long enough (e.g., 256 bits), it isn't feasible to launch an attack encrypting every possible plaintext; there are too many of them.
If RSA itself is used to encrypt the message, proper implementations apply some random padding to the message.
Symmetric ciphers do (should) not suffer from this, since you need the secret key to encrypt a message.


Last, it's not possible to enumerate all existing attacks on public-key cryptography. They're different for every cipher and even for different implementations of the same cipher (see blinding).