Question about ChaCha20's security I wonder the Stream Cipher ChaCha20 only changes 96 bits each block,
         why it can produce 512 bits keystream block, 
         I mean in the concept of  a random number generator,
         the entropy should be at least equal to the output.
         However,  change 96 bits to produce 512 bits keystream seems have some secure problem.
The fact that few bits change at the input of ChaCha's "core" function does not compromise the security of the ChaCha20 stream cipher.



The design principle of the stream ciphers Salsa and Chacha is to use a "core" function $C:\,\{0,1\}^{512}\to\{0,1\}^{512}$ over the set of 512-bit bitstring (equivalently the set fo 16 words each 32-bit). Among the 512 input bits, 128 are set to arbitrary public constant values $c$, turning the remaining into some function $C_c:\,\{0,1\}^{384}\to\{0,1\}^{512}$.

$C_c$ behaves essentially like a function chosen at random in the set of functions with such input and output domains. In particular, it is conjectured that not knowing $k$ of the 384 input bits chosen at random, the function $C_c$ can't be distinguished from a random function with works less than $2^k$ operations (each requiring a sizable number of CPU cycles), for $k$ up to some comfortable limit (like 160 to 256).

Of the 384 input bits of $C_c$, $k=$256 are for the key, 64 for the nonce/IV, 64 for the counter. The full 512-bit output forms the keystream. As long as the key is random and secret, and the combination of IV and counter value does not repeat, the above conjecture demonstrably implies security of the stream cipher in all common security models, including for related keys.

That's even though, for most blocks of a large keystream, the input of the core function differs by a single bit from the input for another block, and 256 bits (including all those that vary) at the input of the core function are public.



The supporting argument for the stated security conjecture is the design of the core function per $C(x)\gets G^r(x)\boxplus x$ where $G$ is a bijection iterated for $r$ rounds, and $\boxplus$ is a group operation on $\{0,1\}^{512}$. Bijection $G$ is optimized for fast diffusion when iterated.

Note: diffusion is the main area where ChaCha improves (slightly) on Salsa. Another it is that it removes a harmless class of collisions in $C$, see this.