Are this recommendations from Colin Percival correct? In this article: http://www.bsdcan.org/2010/schedule/attachments/135_crypto1hr.pdf 

He has said:


AVOID: Poly1305. If your name is Daniel Bernstein, go ahead and use
this Otherwise, you’re never going to produce a secure and correct
implementation
DON’T: Use modes which provide both encryption and authentication
PROBABLY AVOID: Elliptic Curve signature schemes
First off, it sounds like you already have an opinion and should talk to Colin directly.

My take is, at least at the time, he was very much in favor of tried-and-true (and easy, relatively) encrypt-then-mac schemes.  Namely, he advocated CTR+HMAC.  This is easy and known to be secure.  You pay for it a little by deriving more key material than otherwise needed, by more expensive computations, and by more algorithms.  None of those things matter to most users in most settings.

In 2010 Poly1305, related AE schemes, and EdDSA were less well-known, less well standardized (which often serves as an implementation aid), and less widely implemented than good old AES-CTR and SHA2-256 (and RSA).  Again, these are me casting about to explain Colin P. when in fact you could just ask him if you so desire.