RSA assumption and cryptography The RSA assumption states that it is hard to find $m$, given $c = m^e \bmod{n}$, $e$, and $n$ (for appropriate choice of $n,e$).

Suppose that there exists an algorithm, $D(c,e,n)$, that finds $m$ in 1% of cases.
What could be a pseudocode of an algorithm that can use $D(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$ and finds $m$ easily for any $c$?
Since it sounds a lot like homework, I will only give a hint, not the actual answer.


First, you don't want to mess with $e$, since you can not be sure that a different $e$ is actually a valid exponent ($e$ has to be coprime to $\phi(n)$, which contains at least $2$ as prime factor).
RSA is not IND-CCA. The same attack that works against IND-CCA also works against this.
This attack utilized the homomorphic property of RSA. If you decrypt $c=(ab)^e=a^eb^e$, you get back $m=ab$


edit: textbook-RSA is not IND-CPA either, but the according security game is trivial for the attacker, since the encryption is deterministic. That doesn't help in this case.