Shamir's secret sharing scheme - type of channels For information theoretic security in Shamir's [m,m] secret sharing scheme, do i need both authentic and confidential channels?
Another related query is ;is it true that if the channels are only authentic; then the Shamir's [m,m] secret sharing scheme is only computationally secure?
If confidential channels are build on the basis of public key schemes; then doesn't that make the entire protocol computationally secure?
For information theoretic security in Shamir's [m,m] secret sharing scheme, do i need both authentic and confidential channels?


Regular shamir secret sharing provides no protection against modified shares. So we typically assume an honest dealer with authentic and confidential channels. That means the adversary cannot change the message in transit. If a party that receives a share is dishonest, however, they can change the share and go undetected.


  is it true that if the channels are only authentic; then the Shamir's [m,m] secret sharing scheme is only computationally secure?


updated this part of the answer
It appears that without some very non-standard assumptions, using only authentic channels completely breaks the security of the system. While all shares are needed to recover the secret, and one share is kept by each party (not transmitted directly), a function of that share is transmitted which would allow the adversary to recover that share and break privacy.


  If confidential channels are build on the basis of public key schemes; then doesn't that make the entire protocol computationally secure?


Assuming the adversary can see the cipertexts, then yes, using a public key scheme (or any computationally secure cipher) to protect confidentiality results in computational security since an adversary breaking the cipher would result in them finding all the shares, thus breaking the secret sharing.