Was Enigma really that hard to crack, given that you had access to hundreds of messages per network per day? Well, I guess that I have always been a little bit suspicious ... so to speak ... of the "official stories" about the difficulty of recovering Enigma message texts during WW2, because it seems to me that they're always focused on recovering "one message, in isolation."  Whereas, the actual situation faced by the intercept stations is that they were every day flooded with messages ... all of them encrypted using exactly the same (of course, unknown) network-key settings, differing only by their per-message keys.

So – my question is: "did all of that 'daily network-key mumbo-jumbo' actually matter," if you could be assured of a sufficient number of messages each day which ultimately differed from one another only by a three- or four-letter wheel setting?

I could go on at some length, but I think the question is clear:  could not cryptanalysts have exploited the process of statistically comparing the gathered messages against each other, treating most of the machine as simply "a pair-swapping transposition table that didn't change?"
Yes, it's just that the messages were often low value.

There was nothing like gps back then, you would not get a real time location of a submarine. At best you'd get a lat/long which is precise to several km and then spend hours trying to get a plane there.

You'd get vague obvious warnings like "Germans may be attacking this convoy"- and there was no central directions, it was up to the uboat commander to decide the details .

But that was important enough that the government gave them a few people to help them crack these messages.

So given such a small, resource poor team was allocated to the task it was a big accomplishment.