IV's for different AES encryption modes I wanted to know if my understanding is correct!
I have been reading up on aes encryption and modes(specifically CTR and CBC) and it took me sometime to understand the concept of IV.
If the IV is generated randomly then: 

In CBC mode typically IV is prepended or appended after the encryption,So the first block of the cipher text is decrypted using this first block of data recieved which is the IV and from there on the previous cipher block is the IV for the next block.

I am not sure about the practice in CTR mode but there is a counter(or nonce) that increments the IV for each block for decryption adn encryption.

If the IV is generated value then well both parties need to agree on how it is generated.
And using a constant IV is not really recommended to use a fixed IV for any mode.

I also want to know, what other standard practices are in use to communicate the IV in between two parties in different AES modes?
For CBC mode, the IV can be generated in any manner where it would be unpredictable to an attacker from one message to the next. In practice that means a random number generator of some kind. Since the block size is 128-bits, the probability of IV repeat before the key expiration is negligible. The CBC IV is visible to an attacker viewing your ciphertext; as you said, it is attached some how.

There does not need to be any agreement on both ends as to the method of generating it. Most implementations I know of prefix the ciphertext with the IV.

For CTR mode it is a different story. The IV is the combination of Nonce and Counter. There needs to be strict agreement on both sides how they are combined and incremented, or the other party will not be able to decrypt. Additionally if the same key is used by both parties, they need to make sure there is no Nonce reuse between the 2. This can be achieved by forcing one party to always have a specific bit of the Nonce set to 0, and the other party set that bit to 1, such as the MSB. The better option is to have 2 different keys. Since CTR mode turns the block cipher into a stream cipher, IV reuse in CTR mode is catastrophic. There is no requirement that the Nonce be unpredictable, and can be a simple message counter.

The nonce is the only part of the CTR IV that is transmitted with the message, and once again it is visible to an attacker. Most implementations I know of prefix the ciphertext with the Nonce, and the block counter for the message starts at 0, except in the case of AES-GCM.