confusion about LUKS encryption from Can I clone a LUKS container?


  You can, but it breaks security, because the cloned container has the
  same header and hence the same master key.  You cannot change the
  master key on a LUKS container, even if you change the passphrase(s),
  the master key stays the same.  That means whoever has access to one
  of the clones can decrypt them all, completely bypassing the
  passphrases.


From What users should know about
Full Disk Encryption based on LUKS


  If  we  set  a  new  secret user key, the encrypted master key stored
  on disk changes but the master key does not. Hence, users can change
  password frequently without re-encrypting all the data.


My questions:


If we can have up to 8 slots for decryption does that mean we have 8
corresponding Master Keys split in anti-forensic stripes or is it
still ONE MK ? 
If it is ONE MK how the passphrase from slot 2 decrypt it when it is already encrypted with the passphrase from slot 1 (yes I know it
is not the passphrase itself, but I keep it like that for
simplicity). 
Regarding the second quotation. So per my understanding while changing the LUKS passphrase we first provide the current
passphrase, we then provide a new one and that changes the encrypted
representation of the MK but after decryption it is still the same
that was randomly generated during first initialization, correct? 
Then regarding the first quotation. I simply don't get it, at least notthe last sentence



  That means whoever has access to one of the clones can decrypt them
  all, completely bypassing the passphrases


Does that mean that if a have server A with LUKS encryption protected by a high-entrophy passphrase and clone that drive I would be able to decrypt that drive without even knowing or having to provide that passphrase ? If yes how would I do that ? Dump the MK from memory on server A, or how ?
Data is encrypted with Data Encryption Key. Each slot encrypts the DEK using a Key Encryption Key derived from a passphrase. Access to the DEK gets you the data. Access to any of the KEKs will give you access to the DEK. Clearing a passphrase slot, changing the passphrase, etc. does not change the DEK.

Whoever had access to the volume and a working passphrase could have extracted and saved the DEK, and that means they can use the DEK to decrypt the data in the future, when the slot with the passphrase they knew has been deleted. It also means they can decrypt any of the clones of the volume, even those for which the passphrase they knew was never valid.

If you really need to give different people access to a copy of the volume and be able to revoke access from other copies or from data added to the volume after their access was revoked, you have to change the DEK - reencrypt the volume or create a new encrypted volume (with possibly same passphrases protecting the new DEK) and copy all the data.

See https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/24024

See https://security.stackexchange.com/a/205190/70830