Do all attacks against PKCS1 v1.5 encryption require an oracle As far as I know, all attacks against RSA PKCS1 v1.5 require an oracle; is that true? Or are there any other attacks against it which are able to break it without an oracle?

Background: I need to support PKCS1 v1.5 because most crypto-devices sadly don't support OAEP. However, the software is only used for manual file en-/decryption, so there is not an oracle available.
PKCS#1 padding succeeds in introducing enough entropy (slightly less than 64 bits at the very minimum) to make RSA encryption semantically secure. Furthermore, the number $m$ - the message used for modular exponentiation - it produces will be large enough to protect against attacks that rely on $m$ to be small. That means that the premisses for RSA modular exponentiation seem to be met.

It seems therefore unlikely that there are passive attacks on PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. Active attacks could succeed, as Bleichenbacher has shown. It may be that there are attacks on the random number generation as well, but that will require an attacker to have even higher privileges; the attacker must have access to the secure random number generator used. Usually those kind of attacks are considered attacks on the secure system creating the ciphertext itself instead of attacks on the algorithm itself.

Finally there are side channel attacks on modular exponentiation, but those are as much a problem for OAEP as for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. They also rely on the attacker gaining more knowledge from the system than should be allowed for a secure system to exist.