Attacking AES-128 with Grover's algorithm How many plain text / cipher text pairs are required by Grover's algorithm when it is used to try and discover a secret AES key?

I am trying to determine if having a device which limits the speed at which it produces cipher texts from plain texts will help protect against this attack.
Grover's algorithm is a brute-force quantum algorithm with complexity $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{N})$ with asymptotically optimal on unstructured data. There is also "Quantum Computing and Hidden Variables" in  $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt[3]{N})$ by Aaronson.

Ensuring uniqueness of the solution 

Requires ECB mode;

Let $n$ denotes the block size.

Let $r$ be the number of different plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

Let $r$ denotes the number of the simultaneous plaintext-ciphertext pairs  encrypted under two secret keys $k_1 \neq k_2$.

Then the expected result of having a different result if the $r$ plaintext are different;

$$ 1- \frac{1}{2^{rn}}$$

A good estimate on $r$ is given as;

$$r &gt; \lceil 2^k/n \rceil$$

For AES-128

$n=128, k=128 \Rightarrow r=3$

For AES-192

$n=128, k=192 \Rightarrow r=4$

For AES-256

$n=128, k=256 \Rightarrow r=5$

for more details, see "Applying Grover’s algorithm to AES:
quantum resource estimates"  at #3.1