Hash Function - Pre-image resistance and Strong collision Resistance Why does pre-image resistance not guarantee strong collision resistance?

Logically I can make sense of this, but I am wondering if there's any general theorem that proves this?
With the definitions that a function $F$ is


(strongly) collision-resistant when a [computationally bounded] adversary can't [with sizable odds] exhibit any $(a,b)$ with $a\ne b$ and $F(a)=F(b)$;
first-preimage-resistant when, given $f$ determined as $F(a)$ for an unknown random $a$, a [computationally bounded] adversary can't [with sizable odds] exhibit any $b$ with $F(b)=f$;
second-preimage-resistant when, given a random $a$, a [computationally bounded] adversary can't [with sizable odds] exhibit any $b$ with $a\ne b$ and $F(a)=F(b)$;


neither form of pre-image resistance guarantees (strong) collision resistance. As to why: there's no argument that such guarantee should hold; and we have counterexamples, both practical (e.g. MD5), and theoretical.

Consider an hypothetical random function $H$ from bitstrings to $k$-bit bitstrings; or a good practical cryptographic hash with $k$-bit output (assuming that exists). This $H$ has all three properties, for large enough $k$. Define another function $F$, as
$$F(x)=\begin{cases}H(\mathtt{“b”})&amp;\text{if }x\text{ is the string }\mathtt{“a”}\\H(x)&amp;\text{otherwise}\\\end{cases}$$
$F$ is not collision-resistant since the strings $\mathtt{“a”}$ and $\mathtt{“b”}$ collide; but is preimage-resistant (in both senses) for large enough $k$.

The above counterexample still works if we use quantitative definitions of the three properties, requiring effort $O(2^{k/2})$ to break collision-resistance, and effort $O(2^k)$ to break preimage-resistance.