Can wiping a disk writing zeros on an encrypted device be a weak point? Can cryptsetup suggestion of wiping a disk before encryption with zeros written to an encryted device as described in question 2.19 as the recommended method on the CryptsetupFAQ (the part that starts with "For device set-up, do the following:" (which ends writing the encrypted random looking represantation of zeros) be a weak point as an attacker, knowing that the device is encrypted with LUKS, could suppose that the end of the disk is just zeros. With this information could he more easily find the key used on the initial wipping and, with this info, isolate the part of the disk that actually has relevant encrypted information?
The output of an encrypted stream of zeros is absolutely indistinguishable from random data.

What you do is not write zeros to the block device for the drive, but for the encrypted mapping. That is, instead of writing zeros to /dev/sdx, you write to /dev/mapper/sdx_crypt. This results in the contents on the actual drive being completely randomized. Even though an attacker may know that zeros were encrypted, they would be no closer to finding the key than before. If they were, it would mean the underlying cipher is vulnerable to a known plaintext attack, and none of the supported LUKS ciphers (AES, Twofish, Serpent, etc.) are. In fact, any symmetric cipher that was badly vulnerable to a known plaintext attack would be considered fatally broken, and would be either revised or discarded.

To prove a point, you can see that many high-quality cryptographic random number generators work by encrypting a counter with a block cipher. An attacker knows exactly what was encrypted by the block cipher. They know that the nth block of output is an encryption of integer n itself, yet it doesn't make it possible for them to predict any of the output or retrieve the key. Ciphers are stronger than you think.