Securely "forwarding" a Large message in a hybrid encryption system without sending the actual message Alice has symmetrically encrypted the large (100Mb) MessageA with a random key K1, and then asymmetrically encrypted K1 with Bobs public key. She then stores the encrypted large message in a central and public repository and sends Bob's key to him.

Can Bob then decrypt the key K1 with his private key and then encrypt the key K1 again with Charles' public key, and send the resulting key to Charles - Giving Charles the ability to decrypt MessageA in the central repository?

I'm looking for a cryptographic approach to giving multiple users access to the same data without having to massage the actual data. (A gives to B, B gives to C and E, etc). Are there mechanisms for revocation?
One common way is securely sending the encryption key for each user with their public key and store the encrypted data on somewhere where each user can access. 

You can do this with RSA-KEM with using RSAES-OAEP padding and any Authenticated Encryption like AES-GCM;


The Distributer; 


First generate a random encrption key $k$ for AES-128,192,or 256 
Encrypt the message with AES-GCM genenerate an $IV$ and $$(IV,ciphertext,tag) = \operatorname{AES-GCM-Enc}(IV,message, k)$$
Upload $(IV,ciphertext,tag)$
For each user send a message with $\operatorname{RSAES-OAEP}(pk_{user},k)$ using their public key.

The receivers;


To get $k$, They are using their private key ,$$k = \operatorname{RSAES-OAEP}(priv_{user},k)$$ 
Decrypts the message with AES-GCM $$message = \operatorname{AES-GCM-Dec}(IV,ciphertext,tag, k)$$



This Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) together with Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM) provides the standard of IND-CCA2/NM-CCA2 — ciphertext indistinguishability and non-malleability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack.

Note 1: The above described modified the RSA-KEM since the original RSA-KEM for multiple users will fall into Håstad's broadcast attack. Instead, using RSAES-OAEP makes it safe for multiple recipients with the same $k$ encrypted for different recipients as PGP/GPG.