PostQuantum Lattice-based schemes and Nguyen-Regev like attacks As far as I know NTRUSign is considered to be a Post-Quantum scheme but it's vulnerable to the Nguyen-Regev attack that allow to recover private key when there is an access to signature oracle (as it stated in the original paper, 400 message-signature pairs are enough).

After that paper some improvements were proposed and cracked and now NTRUSign seems to be broken.

Do other lattice-based Post-Quantum schemes suffer from the attack by Nguyen-Regev or similar attacks? Signature and key agreement schemes should also be considered.
NTRUSign does not have a security reduction of the type "if one can break the scheme then one can find short vectors in some lattice."  There are several other lattice schemes that do have such a reduction, and are therefore unaffected (as far as we know) by the Nguyen-Regev attack.  If they were affected, then we would have a better algorithm fro finding short vectors in lattices.