Simplified Key Wrapping to Achieve Only Confidentiality? I'm looking for help in understanding why the algorithm described here would not deliver adequate protection of confidentiality.  We don't care about other criteria such as authenticity or integrity.  In other words, we only want to make sure our key material is secret.

Given a key $k$ that is $l$ bits long, a hashing algorithm $H$ that produces an $l$ bit digest, a password $p$ of at least $n$ bits (smaller than $l$), and a randomly generated $l$ bit salt $s$, we produce an $l$ bit wrapped key $W$ by:

$$\begin{align}
    W &amp;:= H(s||p) \oplus k &amp;\text{(Wrap)}
\\  k' &amp;:= H(s||p) \oplus W' &amp;\text{(Unwrap)}
\end{align}$$
where $W'=W,k'=k$ if the transmission has not been tampered with (nb: we do not care if it has).

We know that authenticated encryption would be better.  At this time hashing is our only tool.

Are we falling prey to a fearsome Birthday Attack?

It appears that a related question was asked before though they were more ambitious and the answer isn't clear.

Hash Based Encryption (fast &amp; simple), how well would this compare to AES?

Update (28 Apr): As my goal is to help eliminate some of the confusion, I'd like to amplify the answer.  I'm reading that malleability refers to the relatedness of ciphertexts, vis a vis Dolev, Dwork, Naor.  Specifically, we know that a certain number of bits in the ciphertext need to be inverted to recover the key.  We're also pretty certain that that all of the bits need to be inverted thereby reducing the search space.  The relationship between malleability and the chosen-ciphertext attacks is well known.

FWIW, if AES were available there would be no reason to consider anything other than one of the established key wrapping algorithms such as the NIST AES KeyWrap.

To summarize, the intention of using a hash function in the proposed construction is to build a reversible transformation from an inherently non-reversible function.  Because of the malleability introduced by the XOR there is no number of iterations of the hash to slow the pace of a brute-force search that would compensate for the fundamental weakness of the algorithm.

Many thanks.
Your proposal is malleable, so in particular, confidentiality does not hold against a chosen-W' attack, which is the key-wrap analogue of a chosen-ciphertext attack. $\:$ Also, the fact that your

proposal concatenates s with p suggests that H can probably be evaluated too quickly.

Although that may be typical, it shouldn't be, since the time needed to try passwords

in a known way scales linearly with the time needed to evaluate the password hash.

This answer gives some better password-based key derivation functions.

The "best reason that it is better for key wrapping" is that AES is hopefully non-malleable.

(Note that AES should replace xor, rather than replacing H.)