LUKS: decrypting with master-key rather than with passphrase It's my understanding that LUKS encrypts data by using a randomly-generated master-key, which is then itself stored encrypted by my passphrase. When I want to access the data, I use my passphrase to decrypt the master-key, which is then used to decrypt the data.

Question:
Is it possible to have LUKS just encrypt the data by using the randomly-generated master-key (can I specify the size?), but then instead of encrypting this with my passphrase and storing it, just tell me the master-key (which I will memorize or write on a piece of paper). When I'll want to access the data, I will use the masterkey to decrypt it.

As a side note, let me explain why I think that this would be more secure than the usual procedure: when cryptographically sanitizing a USB or non self-encrypting SSD drive (or changing the LUKS password), it's my understanding that the master-key encrypted by the old password will always be physically present on the drive, because digital sanitization is hard to achieve for USB and SSD. The randomly-generated master-key would then be recoverable by either guessing the old password, or by brute-forcing it.
Normally, you don't provide the master key directly. The master key is protected by a key encryption key. All storage encryption systems work this way.

There is no way to change the master key without re-encrypting all the data. Using a master key that's stored in a form wrapped by a key encryption key allows changing the key encryption key without re-encrypting the data. It also allows having multiple key encryption keys.

You propose not using a key encryption key and using the master key directly. This is always weaker than using a key encryption key, unless the mechanism for processing the key encryption is flawed. In your proposal, you propose to remember the master key (128 bits or more). If the master key is ever compromised, you've lost. Instead, suppose that you remember a passphrase with as much entropy as the master key (a random passphrase chosen in a space of 128 bits or more). Then you are protected against all the attacks that you would be protected against if you'd remembered the master key, and more.

The attack you're concerned about is someone finding a copy of the master key encrypted with an old, weak passphrase. If you want to protect against this attack, don't use a weak passphrase! If you only use a strong passphrase then there won't be anything lying around that was made by a weak passphrase. Storing the master key encrypted with a passphrase that's as strong as the master key itself is not a risk. The passphrase can even be weaker because it goes through a strengthening function (PBKDF2 or Argon2).