Encrypt twice with DES using same key ? $\operatorname{DES}(\operatorname{DES}(x,k), k)$ Does encrypting with $\operatorname{DES}$ in the following way $$\operatorname{DES}(\operatorname{DES}(x,k), k)$$ make $\operatorname{DES}$ as strong as $\operatorname{2DES}$ with 2 keys? 

Because we have to run $\operatorname{DES}$ twice now for each key in order to find it - first run $\operatorname{DES}(x,k)$ and the output is the input as text for the second round of encryption? So overall $2*2^{56} = 2^{57}$ just like meet in the middle complexity, right ?
Does encrypting with $\operatorname{DES}$ in the following way $\operatorname{DES}(\operatorname{DES}(x,k), k)$ make $\operatorname{DES}$ as strong as $\operatorname{2DES}$ with 2 keys? 


No.


  So overall $2*2^{56} = 2^{57}$ just like meet in the middle complexity, right ?


This time estimate ignores the memory requirement that the meet-in-the-middle attack on 2DES requires.

Memory is cheap, but it's not free.  The estimate of $2^{57}$ operations to break 2DES ignores the overhead of both the memory and the interprocessor communication (it's unlikely that a single processor will be able to perform $2^{57}$ DES operations in an acceptable period of time).  As these objections can be addressed, it's not a lie to ignore them, but they are nontrivial considerations.

In contrast, finding the key for $DES(DES(x,k), k)$ requires no memory, and can be trivially parallelized.