Why we can't implement AES 512 key size? Out of curiosity why we can't implement AES 512 key size?  

Please explain somehow i can understand! I'm not an expert.
We can't implement &quot;AES 512 key size&quot; because AES is defined for key sizes $k\in\{128,192,256\}$ bits only¹; much like, by definition, we can't make a bicycle with 3 wheels.
I see no reason why we would want to define an AES variant with 512-bit key size (since AES-128 is safe enough for anything foreseeable most current applications except those that require huge security margins, AES-192 is more than enough for the most demanding ones, and AES-256 more than overkill³). However we could define an AES variant with 512-bit key size. If we stick to the 128-bit block size, the two choices we have to make are:

How many rounds we should use; since the number of rounds in standard AES is $r=k/32+6$, anything even from $r=14$ (for performance and subkeys space comparable to AES-256, at the expense of resistance to related-key attacks much lower than AES-256) to $r=24$ (as a paranoia damper) seems justifiable.
How we would generate the $4(r+1)$ 32-bit words forming the $(r+1)$ 128-bit round subkeys out of the 512-bit key. By analogy with standard AES, the first 16 such words should be right from the key. I won't venture further.


The question seems to have been motivated by a &quot;paper&quot; titled AES Algorithm Using 512 Bit Key Implementation for Secure Communication (I'll charitably not mention the authors) which presents an AES variation with 512-bit key and block size, best summarized as: AES-128 with $8^2$ bytes wherever the original has $4^2$, an idea that at least could be made to work. However the &quot;paper&quot; has blatant issues:

The &quot;paper&quot; present as &quot;drawback&quot; of AES-256 (which uses 14 rounds) that a 9-round variant is vulnerable to a related-key attack with $2^{224}$ works; yet it introduces a 10-round AES variant without the slightest justification that it will resist similar attacks.
The aim is &quot;higher level of security throughput&quot;, without attempt of definition; and doing so &quot;without increasing overall design area as compared to the original 128 bit AES&quot;, while the state of the proposed algorithm (thus number of D latches in an hardware implementation) is 4 times that of AES-128, for both key and data.
The drawing of the byte substitution step clearly shows a 4x4 grid of bytes holding &quot;an array of 64 bytes&quot;.
There is the same issue in the &quot;shift row&quot; step (to be read as ShiftRows), and the drawing gets confusing, since the line with $s_3$ is shown right-rotated by 1 step, when the intend is that it is left-rotated by 3 steps.
Proof that the &quot;Mix Column&quot; step (to be read as MixColumns) is reversible, which is necessary for decryption to be possible, is alluded to only by dumping an alleged inverse of the polynomial used in MixColumns, without derivation.
On closer inspection, the matrix given for MixColumns does not correspond to the polynomial stated for MixColumns per the conventions used in the real AES; and the alleged inverse polynomial can not match either, according to any convention, for it contains too many terms with multiplication by $\{01\}$, so that decryption using it won't work. I conjecture that this would-be inverse polynomial simply has its four terms of even degree taken from the polynomial used for AES's InvMixColumns (within a reflexion); and other terms set to $\{01\}$, because there are a lot of these in the direct polynomial.
The number of rounds in the 512-bit AES variant is set to 10 with the sole justification that there are &quot;ten AES rounds&quot;, without reference to which of the three AES ciphers that applies to.
The round index is variably $I$ or $i$ including in the same equation.
The first round constant probably has a typo.
But there's no test vector to settle that.
Performance is compared against AES-128, stated as encrypting &quot;128 bytes&quot; in &quot;30-50 Seconds&quot; on an unspecified platform; which (if we ignore the spurious capital S) is about $2^{26}$ times slower than routinely achieved by a single core of a modern CPU with AES-NI.
The 512-bit AES variant is stated as encrypting the same &quot;128 bytes&quot; in &quot;20-40 Seconds&quot; yet has &quot;230%&quot; the throughput; this creatively redefines benchmarking.
It is stated that the &quot;Processor Required&quot; is &quot;Less&quot; than for regular AES, with no attempt to evaluate the number of operations or memory accesses per byte encrypted; indeed this is about the same as in AES-128 for all steps except MixColumns, where there is significantly more work per byte (twice as many columns, each requiring multiplication by a matrix with twice as many raws and twice as many columns, thus about 8 times more work for 4 times as many bytes, thus about twice more work per byte; admittedly, the proportion of entries in the matrix that hold a $\{01\}$ is higher, but this only partially lowers that increase in work).
Proceedings is spelled &quot;Pro-ceding's&quot;.
Several entries in the citations are to equally vacuous papers published in caricatures of scientific journals.
Two citations ([1] and [11]) are to other papers about AES-512, yet are not mentioned in the Existing Work section.
Citation [1] is a 2010 paper strikingly similar to the 2014 paper itself, including having nearly the same title (&quot;Implemented&quot; rather than &quot;Implementation&quot;), yet other authors (and even more mistakes and vacuity).
Citation [11] was published in the proceedings of an IAS 2011 conference with enough relation to the IEEE to be on their website and use their logo (notice that this IAS stands for Information Assurance and Security, not IEEE's Industry Applications Society). A look at this online version shows it is strikingly similar to the 2014 article (including same erroneous polynomials, typo in first round constant, and 230% improvement), with different authors. I vote this 2011 paper as poor (especially on justification of security and misleading benchmark), but the least objectionable of the three.
The numbers for references in the text are often from text cut and pasted from the 2010 paper, rather than related to the numbering of the references given in the end.
The paper is published in the &quot;Best Peer-Reviewed Journal&quot;, which also brags being an &quot;ISO 3297:2007 Certified Organization&quot; (when a cursory look at the summary of this standard shows that it is about numbering publications, not review of their content). That journal also boasts an impact factor of 7.488; this is telling of how reliable a measure of seriousness the impact factor is.


¹ Quoting FIPS 197:

This standard specifies the Rijndael² algorithm, a symmetric block cipher that can process data blocks of 128 bits, using cipher keys with lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.

² The Rijndael block cipher has the same 256-bit key limitation:

the block length and the key length can be independently specified to any multiple of 32 bits, with a minimum of 128 bits, and a maximum of 256 bits.

³ By most accounts, 256-bit key is safe including against hypothetical quantum computers usable for cryptanalysis. If we also want 256-bit blocks, Rijndael allows that.