Regarding the feasibility of MPC protocols I know that there is a general result stating that any function can be computed in an MPC protocol. In this question, I'm interested in understanding the practicality of MPC protocols.


Are any theoretical results regarding the feasibility of MPC protocols? To be more specific, are there any functions that are infeasible to compute in an MPC?
Even more specific, are there any 2-party computations that are impractical to run (assuming that both parties are honest), yet are practical to run by a single party that held both inputs?
Are any theoretical results regarding the feasibility of MPC protocols? To be more specific, are there any functions that are infeasible to compute in an MPC?
  


Yes, there are hundreds of paper on MPC feasibility. The answer always depends on the adversarial model. Here are a few of the more well-known/standard results:


$n$ parties can compute any function of their inputs, in the presence of a passive (semi-honest), computationally unbounded adversary that corrupts strictly less than $n/2$ parties.
There are functions that can't be computed in the presence of a passive adversary that corrupts $\lceil n/2 \rceil$ parties.
$n$ parties can compute any function of their inputs, in the presence of an active (malicious), computationally unbounded adversary that corrupts strictly less than $n/3$ parties.
There are functions that can't be computed in the presence of a malicious adversary that corrupts $\lceil n/3 \rceil$ parties.
$n$ parties can compute any function in the presence of a passive computationally-bounded adversary that corrupts any number of parties.
Most functions can't be computed against an active adversary in a way that provides universal composability, if there is no setup (like a common reference string).


I have taken all of these examples from a survey chapter that I co-wrote on the topic. You can find the original references there.


  
  Even more specific, are there any 2-party computations that are impractical to run (assuming that both parties are honest), yet are practical to run by a single party that held both inputs?
  


This is a harder question to answer because it is more about concrete efficiency than feasibility. There are theoretical results about how you can compute everything securely with "constant overhead" relative to the plaintext computation, but none of these results are what you would consider practical.

Using a more colloquial interpretation of what's "practical", pretty much everything falls into your category of "impractical" under secure computation. As @SEJPM points out in the other answer, unless you know that your problem has a lot of structure, the only known way to do 2-party secure computation would be to translate it to a boolean/arithmetic circuit and securely evaluate that circuit. This is many orders of magnitude slower than just computing something on raw data.

I know very few examples where the secure computation is reasonably close in efficiency to the plaintext computation. One such example is private set intersection, which is only ~ 6-8x slower than insecurely computing the intersection.