How secure is Salsa20? I have been hearing about Salsa20 from quite some time. It is even the favorite cipher in the ransomware world. Some ransomware used this cipher, probably because of speed.

I want to know how secure  this cipher is when compared to AES. How much has it has been reviewed by cryptanalysts?
Pulling information from the wikipedia entry on Salsa20:

eSTREAM selection
Salsa20 has been selected as a Phase 3 design for Profile 1 (software) by the eSTREAM project, receiving the highest weighted voting score of any Profile 1 algorithm at the end of Phase 2.[6] Salsa20 had previously been selected as Phase 2 Focus design for Profile 1 (software) and as a Phase 2 design for Profile 2 (hardware) by the eSTREAM project,[7] but was not advanced to Phase 3 for Profile 2 because eSTREAM felt that it was probably not a good candidate for extremely resource constrained hardware environments.[8]
Cryptanalysis
As of 2015, there are no published attacks on Salsa20/12 or the full Salsa20/20; the best attack known[3] breaks 8 of the 12 or 20 rounds.
In 2005, Paul Crowley reported an attack on Salsa20/5 with an estimated time complexity of 2165, and won Bernstein's US$1000 prize for &quot;most interesting Salsa20 cryptanalysis&quot;.[9] This attack, and all subsequent attacks are based on truncated differential cryptanalysis. In 2006, Fischer, Meier, Berbain, Biasse, and Robshaw reported an attack on Salsa20/6 with estimated time complexity of 2177, and a related-key attack on Salsa20/7 with estimated time complexity of 2217.[10]
In 2007, Tsunoo et al. announced a cryptanalysis of Salsa20 which breaks 8 out of 20 rounds to recover the 256-bit secret key in 2255 operations, using 211.37 keystream pairs.[11] However, this attack does not seem to be comparative with the brute force attack.
In 2008, Aumasson, Fischer, Khazaei, Meier, and Rechberger reported a cryptanalytic attack against Salsa20/7 with a time complexity of 2153, and they reported the first attack against Salsa20/8 with an estimated time complexity of 2251. This attack makes use of the new concept of probabilistic neutral key bits for probabilistic detection of a truncated differential. The attack can be adapted to break Salsa20/7 with a 128-bit key.[3]
In 2012 the attack by Aumasson et al. was improved by Shi et al. aainst Salsa20/7 (128-bit key) to a time complexity of 2109 and Salsa20/8 (256-bit key) to 2250.[12]
In 2013, Mouha and Preneel published a proof[13] that 15 rounds of Salsa20 was 128-bit secure against differential cryptanalysis. (Specifically, it has no differential characteristic with higher probability than 2−130, so differential cryptanalysis would be more difficult than 128-bit key exhaustion.)

Salsa20 is about as secure and analyzed as one could reasonably ask for. It is one of the few alternatives to AES that a knowledgeable cryptographer could comfortably suggest for usage in the real world.