Why are there no OTP ciphers? We all know the OTP is unbreakable and we all love the OTP (judging by the amount of question on this site).

The strength of the OTP is not that it is unable to find a word without the key but you can find any word. Now obviously if we could create a cipher which output would be only letters and several keys would output several grammatically correct sentences (or what ever output you would expect to be a valid output). But is such a thing possible?

I find it odd the OTP is the only one with this characteristic. If we would take AES with a 128 bit key and encrypt hello world" with AES-CBC and key "Acknowledgement" (nvm the IV)

9e 6c d3 86 33 aa fa 09 59 b1 75 86 85 e1 5a ea


why wouldn't there be keys in the 128 bit space which could decrypt this to valid plain texts other than hello world.

With my above example if there are multiple valid decryptions for the given ciphertext then it won't be every single possibility which would make it weaker than the OTP since an attacker could sort the valid plain text on relevance. But when the valid plain texts are many (just not all possibilities) the chances of an attacker finding the right one are negligible.

lets disregard OTP for a second.

Is it possible to create a cipher with the following requirements:
For each N keys and X valid plaintexts there is a X/N chance of the decryption of the ciphertext resulting in a valid plaintext. Where 1 key can be used to encrypt multiple plaintexts where the key is smaller than the overall lenght of all plaintexts without posing a weakness. (similar to a block cipher) and X/N is sufficiently large for it to be impossible to determine what the correct plain text is.

Example:

Key K = "secret"
Plaintext p = "hello"
Plaintext p2 = "noway"
Ciphertext c = "aqfum"
RandomKey N = "wrong"

Encrypt(p, k) = c;
Decrypt(c, N) = "array"
Decrypt(c, N2) = "pozdi"
Decrypt(c, N3) = "bonus"

Encrypt(p2, k) = C2 = "almost"

Scheme(C2, C) != K


Has anything ever been tried or am I wrong in assuming that this is possible with reuse of the key?

NOTE
With cipher I mean an algorithm in the sense of something similar to a block cipher.
You need to understand that any variation on the OTP would ultimately be equivalent to the OTP security-wise, since it is unconditionally "secure" (the ciphertext leaks zero information about the plaintext or the key), and so you'd just making it harder to compute for now reason. So, sure, you can use the OTP, or some variant thereof, on 128-bit messages with a 128-bit key, but once you use up that key it's gone. With AES you can encrypt way more data with a single key.

So, looking at your question, you could, conceivably, design a cipher that takes in a 128-bit key and a 128-bit plaintext block, and encrypts it so that the 128-bit ciphertext provides exactly zero information on the plaintext or key (making it unconditionally "secure"). AES probably does not quite satisfy this condition, but the OTP does, and you can certainly design (redundant; see above) variants that could achieve the same thing. But the point is that you can only encrypt a single 128-bit block of plaintext with that 128-bit key. Encrypt any more than that, and the multiple ciphertext blocks must together leak sufficient information on the plaintexts for a (computationally unbounded) attacker to retrieve the corresponding key, no matter what cipher you use.

Basically, there is nothing to improve on; what you are asking for is impossible, and you cannot "work around" the OTP's key reuse problem by chopping the plaintext up into 128-bit (or any size) blocks.