Is AES-CTR-NoPadding resistant to variable-length chosen-plaintext attack? Consider the following scenario: an adversary $A$ with access to an encryption oracle $\mathcal{O}$ is able to choose $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and pick $p_1,\dots,p_n$ such that $\forall i \in \{1,\dots,n\}:$ $A$ queries $\mathcal{O}$ with $p_i$ in order to obtain ciphertext $c_i := \texttt{AES_CTR_ENC}(p_i,k,IV)$ for some unkown key $k$ and initialization vector $IV$ (n padding scheme). Furthermore, assume that $|p_i| \neq |p_j|$ $\forall i\neq j $.

Is it possible that the abovementioned encryption scheme (AES-CTR without padding) is somehow resistant to this type of attack?
Your fundamental misunderstanding is that encryption does NOT provide security for plaintexts of different lengths. This is explicit in the definition, where indistinguishability only holds as long as the challenge plaintexts (of which one is encrypted) are of the same length.

In practice, in cases where length reveals information, one needs to pad.