In 2020, SHA-1 practically broken in chosen-prefix collision (CP-collision). Can double SHA-1 hashing prevent CP-collision? In a recent study SHA-1 is a Shambles - First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin. 2020, they showed the first practical chosen-prefix collision attack that required two months of computations using 900 Nvidia GTX 1060 GPUs.

Chosen-prefix collision (CP- collision)1: two message prefixes $P$ and $P'$  are first given as challenge to the adversary, and his goal is to compute two messages $M$ and $M'$ such that $H(P \mathbin\| M) = H(P' \mathbin\| M')$ where $\mathbin\|$ denotes concatenation.

They worked for two kinds of attacks;

They reduced the use of neutral bits BCJ+05 and boomerangs JP07 from $2^{64.7}$ to $2^{61.2}$
Also, they improved graph-based technique (LP19) to compute CP-collision from $2^{67.1}$ to $2^{63.4}$.

Actually, the CP-collision attack enables attackers to create some meaningful messages; however, classical collisions are not.
To demonstrate the attack they achieved a PGP/GnuPG impersonation (CVE-2019-14855).
The list of attacks on SHA-1

2005, collision with complexity $2^{69}$, Finding collisions in the full SHA-1, Wang et. al.
2013, chosen-prefix collision with complexity $2^{77.1}$, New collision attacks on SHA-1 based on optimal joint local-collision analysis, Stevens et. al.
2013, collision with complexity $2^{64.7}$, from the previous article.
2016, free-start collision with complexity $2^{57.5}$, Freestart collision for full SHA-1. Stevens et. al.
2017, collision with complexity $2^{63.1}$, The first collision for full SHA-1., Steven et. al.
2019, chosen-prefix collision with $2^{67.1}$ complexity, From collisions to chosen-prefix collisions, Leurent et.al.
application to full SHA-1
2020, collision with $2^{61.2}$ complexity, SHA-1 is a Shambles - First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust, Leurent et. al. (The new article)
2020, chosen-prefix collision with  $2^{63.4}$ complexity, same paper above.

Questions:

Can a double hashing $h= \operatorname{SHA-1}(\operatorname{SHA-1}(m))$ mitigate the CP-collision?* It seems so, since the meaningful part will not exist for attackers as longs as they are not able to break double $\operatorname{SHA-1}$. This seems not feasible, yet.
An immediate follow-up question; if the answer is yes, should we design the new protocols based on double hashing?


*There can be many variants of double hashing.
a. No such double hashing doesn't do a bit of good. Anything which collides after a single hash will definetly collide after a double hash. It preserves all collisions and adds new ones.

We might consider other constructions which may provide some strength e.g $H(H(m) || m)$ however:

b. We have no need for any such double hashing of SHA1 as we have newer better hash functions. Most notably we have SHA3 which is by all accounts far from being broken