Is it a cryptographic risk to share the same encrypted data over and over again? Regular scenario

Let's say I have secret files which I will encrypt. The resulting container will be shared and might be intercepted. Not good, but that's okay - that's why I encrypted the data in the first place.

Scenario in question

However, now, I'll encrypt and share the same data again. With the same passphrase. The container will be different (because the key changed) but the data inside it is identical. And the attacker knows this. Does this open the encryption to any vulnerabilities from a cryptographical standpoint?

Pardon my lack of technical terms. I guess this would be a ciphertext-only attack? But modified in a way that each plaintext (my data, my files) prior to encryption is the same?

(It's a general question, the encrypted container might be from dm-crypt/LUKS or VeraCrypt or even an encrypted ZIP archive. But I think all of them are using 256-bit AES.)
...but the data inside it is identical. And the attacker knows this. Does this open the encryption to any vulnerabilities from a cryptographical standpoint?


No. If it did, then encryption would not be very useful. 

In fact, modern encryption schemes are designed to be secure even if:


The adversary already knows the plaintext that the ciphertext represents (known plaintext attack - KPA)


Where "secure" means they cannot recover the key or learn any information from other ciphertexts

The adversary can choose plaintexts, submit them to be encrypted, and obtain the resultant ciphertexts (chosen plaintext attack - CPA)
The adversary can choose ciphertexts, submit them to be decrypted, and obtain the resultant plaintexts (chosen ciphertext attack - CCA)


Even in all of these scenarios, a modern cipher will remain secure. Not only will it protect the plaintext from discovery, no adversary will even be able to distinguish a ciphertext from a random stream of bits with a non-negligible probability.

As long as the encryption provider is:


using a competent algorithm (such as AES-256 mentioned in the question) 
in an appropriate mode of operation (e.g. an authenicated mode such as GCM)(edit: AEAD is apparently not relevant in this scenario)
and handles initialization vectors appropriately


then the messages will remain as secure as the passphrase that protects them. How secure the passphrase is will depend on how long/complex it is, combined with how the key is derived from it.