Security of somewhat homomorphic encryption via LSB encoding? I'm reading this paper
https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/344.pdf

It says that 
"The secret-key encryption scheme whose security is based on the LWE assumption is rather straightforward.
To encrypt a bit, $m \in \{0, 1\}$ using secret key $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, we choose a random vector $\mathbf{a}\in \mathbb{Z}^n_q$ and a "noise" $e$ and output the ciphertext

$$
 c = (\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}\rangle + 2 e + m) \in \mathbb{Z}^n_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q
$$

The key observation in decryption is that the two “masks” – namely, the secret mask〈a,s〉and the “even mask” 2e– do not interfere with each other. (* Footnote)
"

The footnote says that
"We remark that using $2e$ instead of $e$ as in the original formulation of LWE does not adversely impact security,so long as $q$ is odd (since in that case 2 is a unit in $\mathbb{Z}_q$)"

Does this mean using even $q$ incurs vulnerability of the scheme?
If so, what is the intuition behind that?
As hinted by @kelalaka in the comments, note that $q$ is odd, and $\gcd(2,q)=1.$ 

Therefore within $Z_q$ we have that $2e\neq 0,$ if and only if $e \neq 0,$ so the noise is never masked.