How can you limit excessive risk-taking at the institutional level? Some firms have a compensation structure that encourages risk-taking while insulating employees from the bad consequences of their decisions.  This creates the potential for moral hazard.

I started thinking about this because of what happened at AIG.  For those unfamiliar with the situation, a small division (AIG Financial Products) in a huge insurance company was able to bankrupt the entire company.  Incentives were very lop-sided for division management relative to the risks they were taking.  Even though management was making millions, they were taking risks an order of magnitude larger than that.  If they lost billions, they would only lose their future income (assuming they would be fired).

My question is, how do you align management/employee incentives at the institutional level in order to prevent this types of moral hazard?

Two things to note:


The situation at AIG is just an example.  I'm not asking for solutions specific
to AIG (e.g. limiting leverage) or financial firms in general.  Many firms
face this type of moral hazard with the CEO (i.e. a "golden parachute").
Aside from not being "at the institutional level", I doubt
regulation is the answer.  While there's a place for regulation,
regulators seem to &mdash; at least initially &mdash; react to crises instead of
prevent them (though there's no counter-factual for crises
regulators may have prevented).
Optimal contracting under moral hazard is an incredibly rich field. Any answer to your question would rely more on the assumptions being made about risk preferences, effort sets, etc. than any "universal solution" to moral hazard.

That being said, there are a couple of interesting pieces of the literature to note:


Optimal contracts often have a fixed component (the opposite of your "alignment" premise),  with the variable component offered only insofar as it is required to induce more effort from the agent.
Optimal contracts use any information relevant to determining the effort expended by the agent, not just the result.


So I would think an answer would be to reduce (not increase) the amount of compensation variable upon the result and to condition compensation relative to other benchmarks that would indicate whether someone is just benefiting from tailwind.