Differences in willingness to correct errors made between human and computer interactions I have a design where I present participants with a series of decisions, and then ask them about some of these decisions later.  Similar work has found that even when the particular decision was made in error, and people 'should' realise this, participants carry on and attempt to justify the decisions anyway.  I presented similar decisions but with a computer program acting as 'the experimenter', providing text boxes for input.   Participants mentioned errors made in my study much more - they didn't carry on justifying an error.  

This was an unexpected result. I suspect some of this may be due to participants not wanting to admit to making an error when they feel more identifiable, but I don't know where to start in terms of literature on the topic!

So essentially - what are the differences in peoples willingness to admit and correct their own, or even others, errors, between social and computer interactions? and further, what causes these differences?
If I understand your question correctly, you have found that participants are more willing to admit to an error if they interact with a computer rather than a human being.

I would suggest reading up on related findings in the field of social desirability. Social desirability is the tendency of humans to think of themselves (self-deceptive enhancement) and try to present themselves towards others in a favorable way (impression management). There have been studies that suggest, that the effects of social desirability--or more precisely impression management--on reporting of sensitive or stigmatizing behavior are attenuated by interaction with computers rather than people (Turner et al., 1998; Joinson, 1999; King &amp; Miles, 1995; Davis, 1999; Reips, 2011). 

I suspect this effect is mostly a result of self-administration rather than being specific to computers, but may be a plausible explanation for your finding: Admitting mistakes is much more threatening to a person's self-worth than justifying a decision-- especially, when an experimenter is present.