Does bit commitment yield oblivious transfer in the information-theoretic security model?
No, commitment has strictly lower complexity than OT. I think an easy way to see this is the approach taken in Complexity of Multiparty Computation Problems: The Case of 2-Party Symmetric Secure Function Evaluation by Maji, Prabhakaran, Rosulek in TCC 2009 (disclaimer: self promotion!). In that paper we have a result characterizing what you can do given access to ideal commitment in the UC model with statistical security.

Suppose there were a statistically secure protocol (against malicious adversaries) $\pi$ for OT using access to ideal black-box bit commitment. Then $\pi$ must be secure against honest-but-curious adversaries as well (not as trivial as it probably sounds, but not very difficult to show either). But you could compose $\pi$ with the trivial honest-but-curious protocol for commitment, and have an honest-but-curious OT protocol that is statistically secure with no setups. But this is known to be impossible.

Another way to see it is through Impagliazzo-Rudich. If you have computationally unbounded parties and a random oracle, you can do commitment (since all you need are one-way functions) but you cannot do things like key agreement, and thus not OT.