What languages have been successfully cryptographically trapdoored?
It is important to distinguish between trapdoor functions and public-key encryption. While trapdoor functions do yield public-key encryption schemes, some of the candidates you mentioned are only known to imply public-key encryption and do not necessarily give you trapdoor functions. In fact, Gertner, Malkin and Reingold show that there is no black-box construction of a trapdoor function from a "trapdoor predicate" (which can be thought of as a one-bit public-key encryption scheme). 

Classical examples of trapdoor functions are the RSA and Rabin functions. A classical example of a trapdoor predicate is deciding Quadratic Residuosity modulo a composite, due to Goldwasser and Micali. The discrete-log and lattice based constructions that you mention yield public-key encryption directly, without going through trapdoor functions. 

Below is a (non comprehensive) list of constructions of public-key encryption schemes, most of which are not known to go through trapdoor functions.


El Gamal public-key cryptosystem (including elliptic curve variants). Security is based on the Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption. Doesn't go throuhg trapdoor functions (but see the Peikert-Waters item below for a trapdoor function whose security is based on the semantic security of El Gamal). 

[Taher El Gamal: A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms. CRYPTO 1984: 10-18]
Ajtai-Dwork, Regev. Security is based on unique SVP in lattices. Not known to imply trapdoor functions. 

[Miklós Ajtai, Cynthia Dwork: A Public-Key Cryptosystem with Worst-Case/Average-Case Equivalence. STOC 1997: 284-293]

[Oded Regev: New lattice based cryptographic constructions. STOC 2003: 407-416]
Regev, Peikert. Security is based on hardness of learning with errors (this includes a reduction from SVP). Not known to imply trapdoor functions. 

[Oded Regev: On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. STOC 2005: 84-93]

[Chris Peikert: Public-key cryptosystems from the worst-case shortest vector problem: extended abstract. STOC 2009: 333-342]
Peikert, Waters. Security is based on decisional Diffie Hellman and on lattice problems. Known to imply trapdoor functions (through lossy trapdoor functions).

[Chris Peikert, Brent Waters: Lossy trapdoor functions and their applications. STOC 2008: 187-196]
Lyubashevsky, Palacio, Segev. Security is based on Subset-Sum. Not known to imply trapdoor functions.

[Vadim Lyubashevsky, Adriana Palacio, Gil Segev: Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum. TCC 2010: 382-400]
Stehlé, Steinfeld, Tanaka, Xagawa, and Lyubashevsky, Peikert, Regev. Security is based on hardness of ring LWE. The advantage of these over previous proposals is their smaller key size. Not known to imply trapdoor functions.

[Damien Stehlé, Ron Steinfeld, Keisuke Tanaka, Keita Xagawa: Efficient Public Key Encryption Based on Ideal Lattices. ASIACRYPT 2009: 617-635]

[Vadim Lyubashevsky, Chris Peikert, Oded Regev: On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors over Rings. EUROCRYPT 2010: 1-23]