The stable marriage algorithm with asymmetric arrays
Yes, the stable marriage problem still makes sense with unequal arrays. Permit me to use men and women as opposed to students and dorms. There are different stable matchings that you can ask for resulting in different cases. 


A specific stable matching is desired, either male optimal or female optimal solution
Any valid stable matching is desired
All the stable matchings are required


Let's consider the first case where we want a specific stable matching. Suppose there are $m$ men and $w$ women. Depending on which set is larger we modify the termination condition of the standard algorithm accordingly. Suppose without loss of generality we want the male optimal solution. If $m &lt; w$ we continue until $m$ women have been proposed to. If $m &gt; w$ then we continue until each man is either on the string of some women or has been rejected by all the women. 

It's easy to see how the above algorithm can be applied to the second case where any such stable matching is required. Just have the smaller set be the one that proposes. 

The third case depends on a theorem that states that if a person is unmarried in one stable matching then they are unmarried in every stable matching. The case then becomes identical to the case with equal sized sets. 

More detail on all three cases as well as pseudo-code for each algorithm can be found in McVitie and Wilson's paper titled "Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets".