Does godel's incompleteness theorem still hold if we have a TM that can do an infinity amount of computations?
There is some ambiguity in how to define these new machines, essentially based on the question whether we can nest the "bursts of doing infinitely many steps in some finite time" or not. In the weakest interpretation, we essentially just get an oracle Turing machine with access to the Halting problem. In the strongest, we get the Infinite Time Turing Machines (ITTM).

Both machines can easily decide the ordinary Halting problem. However, the proof of non-computability of the Halting problem uses very little prerequisites. In particular, it shows that none of our machines can solve their own Halting problems.

So while an ITTM can decide truth of all basic arithmetic formulas (by just searching through the natural numbers whenever required), they cannot decide all $\Sigma^1_2$-formulas. And to properly define and work with ITTMs, we need $\Sigma^1_2$-formulas. So we have just pushed undecidability further out, but we have not removed it.

A $\Sigma^1_2$-formula is one of the form
$$\exists A \subseteq \mathbb{N} \ \ \forall B \subseteq \mathbb{N} \ \ \phi(A,B)$$
where $\phi$ is a formula which contains only quantification over numbers, but not over sets of numbers.