Perfect Secrecy with 1 Time Complex Secret Cypher
Is it possible to achieve perfect secrecy, unbreakable, unguessable, uncrackable by using a totally secret cypher?

There are two different questions: Can you obtain perfect secrecy, and can you obtain an encryption algorithm that cannot be broken.

Perfect Secrecy

The One Time Pad is already a well known construction; Supposing that any construction that provides perfect secrecy is effectively equivalent to a One Time Pad, then using a secret cipher to obtain perfect secrecy will not be possible. 

Supposing you did develop some other algorithm that provided perfect secrecy, keeping the algorithm would not be necessary or improve anything: Proof of this can be demonstrated with the One Time Pad, in that it is information-theoretically secure, despite the adversary knowing that a OTP was used to encrypt the message.

Unbreakable, Unguessable, Uncrackable, etc

In theory, probably not. 

In practice, yes. However, once again, this is something that can/is achieved without resorting to keeping the algorithm secret; It is usually accomplished by creating designs that understand how an adversary will attack. 

Then some people might say that this would violate Kerckhoffs's principle, but I disagree.

This is the very definition of a violation of Kerckhoffs's principle: The cryptosystem should be secure even if the enemy knows everything about it except for the key. It appears that you are not disagreeing about whether or not this scheme violates the principle, but whether or not the principle is worth upholding.

The algorithm as a key

Keeping the algorithm secret means that the algorithm becomes the key material. We can (and do) quantify the size of keys in terms of bits; There is a minimum representation of your algorithm that requires a minimum number of bits to represent. 

The real problem with this is that symmetric keys should be shared between two parties; A secret algorithm is a symmetric key which must be shared between all parties. This dramatically increases the chances of exposure of the "key" the an adversary.

Because you have to execute it physically somewhere, somehow, you will have to ensure that copies of your program never end up on disk, never hang around in memory, that nobody ever sees the source code, and that nobody can watch what the CPU is doing. It is hard to make these guarantees even when many eyes are scrutinizing the source for mistakes.

Creating a cryptosystem on the assumption that an adversary does not know a single bit of plaintext implies that you only ever encrypt fully random blocks of data. If you are encrypting anything other then random data, this assumption will not be met and any further analysis is a waste.

Keeping the algorithm (and all plaintext messages) a secret in an attempt to thwart cryptanalysis is effectively equivalent to "hoping" that the adversary does not discover any flaws in the algorithm. "Hope" is not what cryptography provides; Cryptography provides certainty, preferably using as few assumptions against as strong of an adversary as possible. Instead of hoping, it is a proven superior practice to understand and design algorithms that can offer provable security.