Risks of full length KCV (components and full keys)?
The usual (or at least traditional) blockcipher KCV is not a hash but rather the truncated encryption of zero; see How to obtain KCV from the key and KCV and compatibility with block cipher modes of operation 

If 3DES (TDEA) key components K1,K2,K3 (i.e. single-length) (or their shares) are checked separately, a full-length (64-bit) check value on a 56-bit key component is practical to bruteforce, with small chance of ambiguity. Similarly for AES-128 where block size equals key size, if 2^128 bruteforce were practical you would be unlikely to get more than a very few candidate keys, which in most situations is a break. For a double-length or triple-length 3DES key, the key is longer than a (full) data block, by 48 or 104 bits; the former is probably safe and the latter definitely so.