Effective key length in DESX variant
The security of this variant is no better than regular DES. To see this, consider an attacker with access to $\text{ENC}(M) = \text{DES}_k(M \oplus k_1)$ and $\text{DEC}(C) = \text{DES}^{-1}_k(C) \oplus k_1$, its inverse:


Obtain one (or more) plaintext-ciphertext pair $M, C$;
Iterate through all $2^{56}$ DES keys;
For each candidate key $k$, obtain $k_1 = \text{DEC}(C) \oplus \text{DES}^{-1}_k(C) = M \oplus \text{DES}^{-1}_k(C)$;
For the correct key $k$, $k_1$ is also correct. This can be confirmed by checking against a few known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.


DESX avoids these trivial attacks by making it impossible to obtain $k_1$ without knowing $k_2$, or vice-versa. Hence DESX's security for $56+64+64$ bits of key being only $2^{56 + 64}$ instead of $2^{56 + 64 + 64}$. The paper by Kilian and Rogaway goes into detail on this, but the gist of it is: iterate through $k$ and $k_1$, and get $k_2$ for free, as above.