Multiple iterations of AES for key derivation?
One of the advantages of schemes like scrypt and bcrypt is that they are designed to be "hard" to brute-force. That is, the actual guts of the algorithm are designed to continuously use something that is difficult for a specialized implementation to speed up. For example, scrypt is based on sequential memory-hard operations, which makes sequential memory access a bottleneck of the computation process (meaning that the CPU is idle waiting on memory for some of the time).

This scheme doesn't leverage such a problem, and I would further argue that it's choke-point is pragmatically easy to brute-force due to the prevalence of AES-NI. For an attacker with AES-NI, a scheme like this would possibly the easiest type of scheme to brute-force because the choke-point uses the fastest cryptographic algorithm the attacker has access to.