Is it a bad idea to make multiple SHA-* with the same header?
The standard assumption in cryptography is that the adversary knows


methods used
what's physically transmitted (here, I guess payload and the SHA-512 hash);
any data other than the key(s)


Here pincode is clearly a key, and the default assumption would be that unique ID is not. With this hypothesis, a single hash is enough to allow an adversary to find pincode by enumeration, then break the system. Thus multiple hashes are not worrying, but the basic principle is insecure.

Additionally, SHA-512 is vulnerable to a length-extension attack, and with a few hypothesis about what's admissible as payload, that might allow computing the hash for an extension of the payload, without knowledge of unique ID (or even the original payload; only its length is required).

If some other hypothesis applies, please edit the question.