How does CTR-ESSIV work?
For key $k_0$, nonce $n$ (‘initialization vector’), and message $m = m_0 \mathbin\| m_1 \mathbin\| \cdots \mathbin\| m_{\ell - 1}$, the AES-CTR ciphertext is $c = c_0 \mathbin\| c_1 \mathbin\| \cdots \mathbin\| c_{\ell - 1}$ where $$c_i = m_i \oplus \operatorname{AES}_{k_0}(n \mathbin\| i),$$ where $n \mathbin\| i$ is some unique encoding of $n$ and $i$ as a 128-bit block.  ESSIV means we derive $$n = H_{k_1}(\mathit{sector\ number})$$ to encrypt each disk sector.  We usually call $n$ a nonce instead of an IV because the only rule is that it must never be repeated with the same key; the consequences of nonce reuse are catastrophic.

This means that ‘CTR-ESSIV’ not terribly useful for disk encryption unless you never rewrite a disk sector: the standard threat model for disk encryption is disclosure of multiple versions of a disk, which would be the case if the border police confiscate your laptop whose SSD had queued up old versions of many disk sectors for deferred erasure.  In this threat model, CBC-ESSIV leaks only how long a prefix of each sector changed between the two versions; in contrast, CTR-ESSIV may allow arbitrary decryption of disk sectors depending on what the adversary knows about the different versions.