Key derivation for AES-Encryption key and HMAC
In both options, if the adversary has a way to check either AES key, then a brute password guessing attack can be attempted, and BCrypt is the main line of defense against that.

For constant effort, option 2 force to halve the cost parameter in BCrypt, and is thus twice more vulnerable to password guessing than option 1 is.

BCrypt's output is described as 31 byte, and likely has 192 bits of entropy excluding cost and salt. If so, this is more entropy than needed for security in the foreseeable future, and acceptable baring a diktat requirement that all keys have some larger size.

Thus option 1 is decidedly the best of the two; however a proper implementation of scrypt would be considerably safer, and as a bonus there is no need for something extra in order to generate the desired amount of key material.