Is it feasable to combine ECB and CTR block modes of operation?
Yet if you shuffle the blocks, the blocks that changed locations are completely broken.


This may be true, but you'd have to define what you have achieved if you do. What you are trying to do here is to change the error propagation of the mode of encryption. ECB however has very limited error propagation; it only extends to one block. If you change one bit then the whole output changes. But if your input may have a high amount of possible values, then the change won't be detected. Now you could introduce a crib, a known plaintext, but you'd still have to create yet another pass of e.g. a cryptographically secure hash to protect all the blocks using only one crib.

Error propagation was once an important topic for block ciphers. Nowadays however we tend to rely on CRC's or schemes like PAR2 to avoid damaged (cipher)text. And we tend to rely on message authentication codes (MAC's) to create cryptographically secure authentication tags. Finally we have schemes such as OCB and GCM that provide 1 to 1.5 pass authenticated encryption, making your scheme rather inefficient.


  Plus you can't just create an xor key using the same key/nonce, as the data is then still encrypted with a different key. This will also double the key size.


Encrypting twice often does not double the key size due to meet in the middle attacks. You'd have to prove that this is the case.

But given the inefficiency and only partial error propagation and ineffective authentication, I don't think you'd have to delve into that topic.