Do Curtmola et al.'s IND-CKA1/2 security definitions protect against search pattern leakage?
The condition $\tau(\mathbf{D}_{0}, w_{0,1},\ldots,w_{0,q})=\tau(\mathbf{D}_{1}, w_{1,1},\ldots,w_{1,q})$ rules out the possibility that $\mathcal{A}$ issues the keywords as I pointed in the question, since the output of $\tau$ includes the search pattern matrix defined in page 9. This has the effect of weakening the definition to allow search pattern leakage.

As a note, the stronger definition in Shen et al.'s 1 does not include a restriction of this type, and so it captures the search pattern protection property.

1 Shen, Emily, Elaine Shi, and Brent Waters. “Predicate Privacy in Encryption Systems.” In Theory of Cryptography, edited by Omer Reingold, 5444:457–73. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.