In EC with key chaining, is it possible to verify signature made by root private key using public key of derived keypair?
I think you're asking about what are called hierarchical signature schemes or blinded signature schemes.  There's a root private key $a$ and public key $A$, and for any tweak $t$, there is a derived private key $a_t = f(a, t)$, and a derived public key $A_t = F(A, t)$, such that signatures made with $a_t$ can be verified by $A_t$, but the set $\{A_t\}_t$ is supposed to be indistinguishable from $\{A'_t\}_t$ for any other $A'$ to anyone who doesn't know $A$.  See an earlier answer for some references.

I think you're further asking about whether there is an easy way to compute $A$ given $A_t$ and $t$, although you didn't mention $t$ so maybe there is only one possible derived key pair.  Whether you can do this depends on the specific signature scheme, so let's pick one for illustration:

Signatures.
$\newcommand{\Z}{\mathbb Z}\newcommand{\concat}{\mathop{\Vert}}$Let $k$ be the field $\Z/(2^{255} - 19)\Z$, and let $E/k$ be the twisted Edwards curve $$E/k\colon -x^2 + y^2 = 1 - (121665/121666) x^2 y^2,$$ whose group $E(k)$ of $k$-rational points has order $h\ell$ for large prime $\ell$ and cofactor $h = 8$.  A public key is a point $A \in E(k)$, and a signature on a message $m$ is an encoded pair $(R, s)$ of $R \in E(k)$ and a 253-bit integer $s$ satisfying the verification equation $$[h s] B = [h] R + [h H(R\concat A\concat m)]\,A,$$ where $B$ is the standard base point and $H$ is the standard hash function mapping long messages to 512-bit integers.

A signer chooses a secret 256-bit scalar $a$ (usually with $a \equiv 0 \pmod h$ and $2^{254} &lt; a &lt; 2^{255}$ so that it is compatible with X25519 secrets, but this is irrelevant to signature security) and a secret 256-bit string $\kappa$ as their private key, and publishes $A = [a]B$ as their public key.  To sign message $m$, they compute $r = H(\kappa\concat m)$, $R = [r]B$, and $$s \equiv r + H(R\concat A\concat m)\,a \pmod \ell.$$

Hierarchical signatures.
So far this is just standard Ed25519.  For a tweak $t$, we can let
\begin{align*}
  a_t &amp;\equiv a H(A\concat t) \pmod \ell, \\
  A_t &amp;= [H(A\concat t)] A.
\end{align*}
Note that $$A_t = [H(A\concat t)]([a]B) = [a H(A\concat t)]B = [a_t]B,$$ so that $A_t$ is the ordinary Ed25519 public key for the private key $a_t$.

Question.
In this hierarchical signature scheme, given $A_t$ and $t$ but not $A$, and given a signature $(R, s)$ on a message $m$ under key $A$, can we verify the signature?

Suppose $H(A\concat t)$ is coprime with $\ell$; then it has a multiplicative inverse, say $\xi$, modulo $\ell$, so that $$\xi H(A\concat t) \equiv 1 \pmod \ell.$$  If $A_t$ is a scalar multiple of the order-$\ell$ point $B$, then $$[\xi]A_t = [\xi]([H(A\concat t)]A) = [\xi H(A\concat t)]A = A.$$
Thus we can recover $A$ from $A_t$ and $t$, and use that to verify the signature $(R, s)$ on $m$.

Under uniform random choice of $H$, then probability that $\ell$ divides $H(A\concat t)$ is negligible; under the standard $H$ based on SHA-512, the overwhelming majority of outputs are not multiples of $\ell$.  If this bothers you on aesthetic grounds (the probability is so small it is inconsequential for security), you could use $H(A\concat t) \bmod 2^{252}$ instead of $H(A\concat t)$ in the above protocol.

Adapting this to other hierarchical signature schemes and other curves is left as an exercise for the reader.