Why are there no OTP ciphers?
You need to understand that any variation on the OTP would ultimately be equivalent to the OTP security-wise, since it is unconditionally "secure" (the ciphertext leaks zero information about the plaintext or the key), and so you'd just making it harder to compute for now reason. So, sure, you can use the OTP, or some variant thereof, on 128-bit messages with a 128-bit key, but once you use up that key it's gone. With AES you can encrypt way more data with a single key.

So, looking at your question, you could, conceivably, design a cipher that takes in a 128-bit key and a 128-bit plaintext block, and encrypts it so that the 128-bit ciphertext provides exactly zero information on the plaintext or key (making it unconditionally "secure"). AES probably does not quite satisfy this condition, but the OTP does, and you can certainly design (redundant; see above) variants that could achieve the same thing. But the point is that you can only encrypt a single 128-bit block of plaintext with that 128-bit key. Encrypt any more than that, and the multiple ciphertext blocks must together leak sufficient information on the plaintexts for a (computationally unbounded) attacker to retrieve the corresponding key, no matter what cipher you use.

Basically, there is nothing to improve on; what you are asking for is impossible, and you cannot "work around" the OTP's key reuse problem by chopping the plaintext up into 128-bit (or any size) blocks.