Paillier cryptosystem, small integers and range of values
With version 1, you are essentially using an additively homomorphic substitution cipher. I understand that the database is quite large, but the number of different values small. This (typically) means that statistical analysis can be used to derive a lot of information, especially if the attacker has some auxiliary information which is often the case. This is a very bad idea.

Version 3 is like version 1, but it's a bit harder to do the statistics. The problem is that the database is so big, that this may also be easy. Of course, it's very hard for me to judge how easy it is to do statistics without knowing the application and without knowing what auxiliary information is available.

Having said the above, your actual question is whether it helps the attacker to actually decrypt (say, with no auxiliary information whatsoever). The answer is no. In order to see why this is the case, consider a game whereby the attacker either receives encryptions of 0 to 50, or 51 encryptions of 0. It is easy to see that the adversary can guess which is the case with probability only negligibly greater than 1/2 (e.g., this is the multiple encryption experiment). Now, an adversary in this game can emulate the database assuming it has encryptions of 0 to 50 and can see what the adversary for the database can learn. If it can learn something, then it must be that the encryption adversary received encryptions of 0 to 50 (since encryptions of zeroes only reveals nothing).

In any case, please do not interpret the above as "approval" for version 1. I think that it's a VERY BAD idea, and strongly advocate for version 2.