Static salt for PBKDF2, but unique salt for HKDF?
Yes, the salt in the HKDF can provide for key separation between the encrypt-then-mac applications. If that's needed depends on the system, maybe using an IV/nonce is enough, it depends on how many messages you want to encrypt and the used encryption and MAC scheme basically.
Some other remarks:

we derive keys - not passwords - for ciphers and MAC algorithms;
using an authenticated cipher such as GCM mode instead of encrypt-then-mac would be wise, in that case you only need to derive one key;
you'd use a static salt with PBKDF2 to derive the same master key, it's probably best to only use a static salt if you need to reuse the key (which of course assumes that you also use the same password);
you may want to additionally use a separate KDF invocation to derive a &quot;key check value&quot; stored with the ciphertext to check that you've derived the correct master key (instead of having to rely on authentication tag failures).