Can Bitcoin scripting be used for double spending attacks?
What you're describing is a contradiction of terms. If a sum of money is deposited into an address, that means that only that address's private key can spend the money.

Maybe you could craft a non-standard transaction and tell people it's giving address B's owner permission to spend it, but if people look closely enough at the transaction, they'll be able to tell that it's really address C (and not B)'s owner that can spend it. There's no way around this: the transaction output is public, as is the implementation of how it works.

So if the question is: can you fool software X with a non-standard transaction? Perhaps, it would depend on finding a bug (or other less-than-ideal situation) in the software in question. (for example, if you craft a transaction that can be spent by address B or C, maybe the wallet owning B will say it has the balance, and if he doesn't transfer it again before you do, then you can "steal back" the money that way) However, I'd treat any non-standard transactions as highly suspect.