Removing a degree of freedom from relative utilitarianism
One of the major criticisms you hear about classical economic frameworks is that ordinal utility is the only valid form of utility, because cardinal utility is just putting arbitrary numbers onto people's preferences. The thing is, cardinal utility is really not as fraught as heterodox schools (or even Austrian economists) might expect. Cardinal utility is only an expression of preference up to positive affine transformations, so as long as a utility function maintains the order of all the preferences, the utility functions represent the same preferences; cardinal utility just allows for us to express convexity/concavity along with it.

So when I see a system of utility such as this, it just looks like a normal monotonic transformation into the range $[0,1]$. The only problem with it is that it will normalize all utility functions considered into that range, and you might lose some information about the strength of preferences relative to other agents to each other. I'm not exactly sure what it would be used for.