Arrow’s impossibility theorem and voting schemes
The answer is no in the following sense. 

Suppose there are $N = \{1,\dots,n\}$ individuals, and $M$ alternatives, where $|M|\geq 3$.

Let $\mathcal{P}$ be the space of strict preferences over $M$, each individual has preferences $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$, and let $P = \{P_1,\dots,P_n\}$ be the profile of preferences.

We look for a social choice function $f:\mathcal{P}^N \rightarrow M$.


$f$ satsifies Unanimity (Weak Pareto) if all individuals rank $a$ first, then $f(P) = a.$
$f$ is Strategy-Proof if it is a dominant strategy to tell the truth about your preference.
$f$ is Dictatorial if there exists an individual $i$ such that whenever $f(P) = a$, then $a$ is ranked first according to $i$.



  Theorem (Gibbard–Satterthwaite) A social choice function $f$ is Unanimous and Strategy-Proof if and only if it is Dictatorial.