7a), the Court's opinions in Loretto and Florida Power suggest that both lines of precedent may represent a single concept. It is easy to conceptualize a restriction on the amount that one can charge for access to a piece of property as either a restriction on the property's use or a "public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good" (Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). Moreover, similar concerns appear to animate both lines of precedent. Each recognizes that almost every government action necessarily affects the value of private property and that Networks in Telecommunications imposing too stringent a leash on regulatory action conflicts with the exigencies of modern governance. 11 At the same time, both recognize that excess power to regulate can constitute the power to destroy.12 In addition, both employ almost identical methodologies that emphasize the fact-specific nature of the claims and that focus primarily on the restriction's economic impact on the regulated entity14 and investor expectations.1 Finally, some case law suggests that these two approaches may be fungible. For example, in Florida Power the Court invoked its regulatory takings jurispru- dence when it suggested that unless a regulation required that utilities permit cable companies to occupy existing poles permanently, it would be "analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activ- ity." Immediately following that observation, however, the Court held that in the absence of such compulsion, the Pole Attachments Act was properly analyzed under the Court's confiscatory rate-making precedent. The juxtaposition of these two observations indicates that the Court may have viewed these two lines of prece- dent as simply variations on the same theme (Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 252-54, quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440). The Court's reasoning in rent control cases gives rise to a similar inference. For example, the Court analyzed the rent control ordinance at issue in Penne