sical layer, 379 ratemaking, 216-217, 219-220, 279 physical production facilities, investments in, 35-36 Loretto and physical vs. regulatory takings, 214-216, physical vs. nonpossessory takings, 210-220 219-220 confiscatory rate-making, regulatory takings, 212-214 emergence of nonpossessory takings doctrine, regulatory takings/confiscatory ratemaking 210-214 synthesis, 217-219 Florida Power and physical takings vs. confiscatory shift importance to access regulation, 219-220 ratemaking, 216-217, 219-220, 279 nonseparable cost function, 66 Loretto and physical vs. regulatory takings, 214-216, NSFNET, 384, 428 219-220 regulatory takings, 212-214 O'Connor, Kevin, 307n82 regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking O'Donoghue, Robert, 312n93 doctrine synthesis, 217-219 OEMs. See original equipment manufacturers shift importance to access regulation, 219-220 oligopoly market structure, 145-146 Piraino, Thomas A., 307n82 ONA. See open network architecture plain repugnancy standard, 299-300 once-for-all vs. regulatory decrees, 307 platform access, 7, 30, 34-35 one-monopoly-rent theorem, 144 under antitrust law, 327-331 one-way network, 21, 21f capacity and configuration effects, 169-171 open access, 344 complementary services and, 367 open network, 157 differentiation of products and, 328 Internet as, 34 economic effects of regulation of, 156-158 open network architecture (ONA), 134, 236 effect on dynamic efficiency, 270, 328-329, 366 Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), 379n12 effect on end user demand, 366-367 operations support systems (OSS), 55 effect on network architecture, 366 Index platform access (cont.) proprietary networks, 141n25 FCC on, 157-158,271-272,3 328 protocol nonstadardization, 387-388 last-mile providers and, 330, 362-367 proxy prices, 127, 156, 197, 205-206, 262n31 local telephone network, 268-272, 276 public goods, 86 regulation of, 30 free rider problem and, 86 standardization and, 327-328, 364 pure public goods, 412 technology change effect on, 364-366 public interest, 395-396 transactions cost