ties, SO that the number of suppliers on each route could be determined. The TRO also gave the ILECs the vast majority of what they wanted with regard to FTTH. The ILECs' view was that such facilities should not be unbun- dled at all; they were, in effect, holding long-promised network upgrades hos- tage for a change in regulation. The FCC went along with that, citing the tortured logic that since the ILECs had to date only pulled a few thousand such lines nationwide, even fewer than had been pulled by CLECs, the CLECs' larger share of that miniscule market demonstrated that no impairment existed. The one concession to CLECs concerned FTTH overbuilds by the ILECs. The ILECs had to continue to make old copper available or provide CLECs with a single voice-grade narrowband path across their fiber. The TRO was a good deal for the ILECs, but they did not think it good enough. Both the CLECs and ILECs filed suit, in at least three appellate dis- tricts. The cases were consolidated at the D.C. Circuit. In March 2004, that court issued its USTA II ruling [12]. It vacated the TRO with a scathing rebuke of the FCC's delegation of its impairment findings to the states. It also expressed doubt that any UNE Platform was necessary, based on a frankly incomplete reading of the record [13]. And while it acknowledged on the one hand that the Supreme Court had upheld TELRIC rates as legal, it dismissed TELRIC pricing with the amazing tag line, "In competitive markets, an ILEC can't be used as a piñata." It then remanded and vacated the TRO, subject for a brief stay to allow CLECs' Winning Strategies Are Met by Rule Changes the FCC to promptly rewrite it. The Powell FCC did no such thing, of course; its record on remands was notoriously poor, and this was no exception. Instead, Powell called on CLECs and ILECs to engage in negotiation to create "commer- cial agreements" to replace UNEs. Of course that was farcical-the ILECs held all the cards, so, reportedly [14], they mostly offered only access tariff pricing for interoffice faci