tablishing a standard is time-consuming and costly. In addition, as noted earlier, standards established through a centralized, institutionalized process run the risk of being subject to substantive biases. Furthermore, once the standards have been established, they must be disseminated. The need to provide advance notice of any changes that may affect the interface with providers of complementary services exacerbates the transaction costs still further. In addition, imposing standards on a network that has already been established can be quite costly. A classic example occurred during the breakup of AT&T, when the court ordered the BOCs to provide "equal access" to all long-distance providers. The problem was that the BOCs had not originally configured their switches to accommodate multiple long-distance providers and had instead employed interfaces Networks in Telecommunications that were tightly integrated and rich in information requirement and varied con- siderably from market to market. The process of reconfiguring and reprogramming the switches was protracted and expensive (Faulhaber 2003). Regulatory authorities that have imposed platform access have found that simple promulgation of the standards has not been enough. As the Supreme Court has recognized, if the interface is complex, an unwilling network owner will have a virtually unlimited number of means available to frustrate platform access in subtle and essentially undetectable ways (Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414). Platform access has historically required that regulators supervise almost every aspect of the business relationship between network owners and complementary service providers. The insertion of the regulators into what would otherwise be a private interaction represents another source of transaction costs. Nor do these transaction costs end once the standards have been deployed. In a world in which technology changes rapidly, standard setting is necessarily a dynamic process. Optimal interface design and location change over time. This requires 