 banned altogether and that every last-mile provider were forced to divest its ownership interests in any content or applications provider. Would doing SO reduce the market power of the last-mile providers? The answer is clearly "no." The market power exercised by DSL and cable modem providers exists 13 Indeed, if the market for rolling stock were also uncompetitive, double marginalization theory indicates that vertical integration could actually enhance welfare (Yoo 2002). The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet because of the limited number of options that end users have for obtaining last-mile services. The number of options will remain the same regardless of whether last- mile providers hold ownership stakes in content and application providers and of whether unaffiliated content and application providers are granted nondiscrimina- tory access. Vertical disintegration thus has no effect on last-mile providers' ability to extract supracompetitive returns. Consumers will receive benefits only if entry by alternative network capacity is promoted. This analysis emphasizes the extent to which network neutrality proponents are focusing on the wrong policy problem. By directing their efforts toward encouraging and preserving competition in the market for applications and content, they are concentrating on the segments of the industry that are already the most competitive and the most likely to remain that way. This is not to say that the previous regulations designed to foster competition in CPE, long distance, and enhanced services were misguided. Focusing on promoting competition in complementary services may make sense when entry by alternative network capacity is impossible, as was arguably the case when the FCC mandated access to network transmission in order to promote competition in CPE, long distance, and enhanced services. The FCC has recognized, however, that the increasing availability of last-mile alternatives has undercut the continued appropriateness of this approach. For exam- ple, the F