ugh this reasoning does not place network owners that are not currently offering wholesale access under any obligation to provide such access, Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries it can be read as requiring firms that already offer wholesale access to do SO on a nondiscriminatory basis (Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 536-39). That said, attempts to turn Otter Tail into a basis for imposing wholesale access must come to grips with the language in Trinko discussing Aspen Skiing. According to Trinko, the problem in Aspen Skiing was not that Ski Co. refused to sell lift tickets to Highlands at wholesale prices, a practice Ski Co. followed without drawing any criticism from the Trinko Court. Instead, the problem was that Ski Co. was unwilling to sell lift tickets to Highlands at the full retail price, which the Court believed "revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent" (540 U.S. at 409). This latter observation appears to be at least somewhat probative of anticompetitive behavior, since the literature on transfer pricing indicates that a firm that offers a product that is used both as a final good and as an input in making other goods maximizes both its profits and welfare when it charges a uniform price for the good (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). This language thus provides no support for a duty by monopolists to permit competitors to access their networks at wholesale prices. At most, this language suggests that monopolists may have some duty to serve those who are willing to pay the full retail price (MetroNet Servs., 383 F.3d at 1132-34). Moreover, to the extent that courts have been willing to mandate access at full retail prices, the duty has been limited to customers and has not been extended to competitors.102 Any arguments that firms providing wholesale access must do SO on a nondis- criminatory basis must address the long line of Supreme Court precedent rec- ognizing the benefit of allowing manufacturers to enter into exclusivity arrange- ments with certain retailers. Although the Supreme Cour