t number 3, controllers and applications lack the skill to put up trusted relationships. The main difference from the referred threat would lie in the way the certification is completed. The techniques used to confirm network devices are different from those used for applications. Possible Solutions Mechanisms intended for autonomic trust management could be used to security that the application is trusted during its life span. Threat Vector 6 Attacks on and vulnerabilities in administrative stations which, as it is also common in traditional networks, are used in SDNs to access the network controller. These machines are already an exploitable target in current networks, the difference being that the threat surface as seen from a single compromised machine increases dramatically in SDNs. It becomes easy to reprogram the network from a single location. Downloaded: 4/15/2022 9:44:49 AM Nova Southeastern University IP Address: 137.52.76.29 SDN Controller Possible Solutions The use of protocols requiring twice credential confirmation (e.g., requiring the qualifications of two different users to right of entry a control server). Also, the use of assured revival mechanisms to guarantee a reliable state after reboot. Threat Vector 7 Lack of trusted capital for forensics and remediation, which would permit to understand the cause of a detected problem and proceed to a fast and secure mode recovery. In order to investigate and set up facts about an occurrence, require reliable information from all components and domains of the network. Furthermore, this data will only be useful if its trustworthiness (integrity, authenticity, etc.) can be assured. Likewise, remediation requires safe and consistent system snapshots to assurance a quick plus right recovery of network basics to a familiar working state. Possible Solutions Logging and tracing are the normal mechanisms in use, and are needed both in the information and control planes. Though, in order to be efficient, they should be impossible to remove (a log that is guarante