Agencies Trinko directed its strongest language toward the proper division of authority between antitrust courts and regulatory agencies. As an initial matter, the Court concluded that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not constitute an implied repeal of the antitrust laws. The Court noted that the extensive access requirements imposed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 were sufficiently detailed to be "a good candidate for implication of antitrust immunity, to avoid the real possibility of judgments conflicting with the agency's regulatory scheme that might be voiced by courts exercising jurisdiction under the antitrust laws" (540 U.S. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, any such conclusion was vitiated by the fact the Act contained an antitrust savings clause specifically providing that "nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws" (47 U.S.C. § 152 note). Although some lower courts had initially held that the 1996 Act represented more specific legislation that took precedence over the antitrust laws, 92 the Supreme Court held that the antitrust savings clause definitively foreclosed any suggestion that the 1996 Act could serve as the basis for implied antitrust immunity (540 U.S. at 406). The balance of the opinion, however, adopted a quite narrow view of antitrust courts' institutional competence. The Court noted, "Enforced sharing requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing - a role for which they are ill suited." Moreover, the existence of a regulatory framework capable of remedying the relevant harm dictated that subjecting the conduct in question to antitrust scrutiny would yield only slight benefits. In particular, disputes over access to telecommunications networks "are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are highly technical, but also because they are likely to be ex