on may also affect the demand for network services. Mandatory wholesale and unbundled access will give competitors incentives to rely on other networks rather than expanding or establishing their own networks. Compulsory interconnection at any feasible point may lead competitors to seek inefficient interconnections and to use regulation of interconnection strategically against market rivals. Lowering the costs of inter- connection below market rates could provide some networks with an incentive to rely on interconnection when expansion of their own network through investment would be more efficient. Mandatory platform access potentially increases demand for services at inefficient interface points and will increase the costs of network own- ers who must design their networks to meet regulatory standards at those interface points. Markets rather than regulators should determine access to networks. Market pricing of access requires the avoidance of mandatory access regulations. Access prices should be determined by voluntary interaction among networks and between networks and their customers, suppliers, and partners. The Coasian analysis of networks shows how distortions in the market for access affect the boundaries and structure of networks. Pricing of Access to Networks The consensus economic position is that SO long as competition is sufficiently robust, market prices represent the best reflection of value. The market price is the outcome of the forces of supply and demand. The supply side of the market reflects the costs to sellers of providing a good; the demand side reflects the benefits to buyers from consuming the good. At market equilibrium, prices are thus determined by the marginal cost to sellers of providing a good and the marginal benefit to buyers of consuming it. Prices are adjusted through the process of exchange to balance supply and demand and to clear the market, SO that prices are further reflections of scarcity, the meeting of consumer wants, and supplier capacities. Because the services of a