Networks in Telecommunications on a regular basis at reasonable prices and have indicated their intention to continue doing SO in the future. The development of VoIP and other new broadband service offerings will only cause the incentives to provide wholesale access voluntarily to become stronger. This current status of the broadband market thus alleviated any need for the FCC to compel wholesale access or to oversee the terms under which wholesale access occurs (FCC 2005d). In addition, wholesale access hurts dynamic efficiency by eliminating demand from complementary service providers who represent the natural strategic partners for those seeking to construct alternative network capacity. The FCC noted in its Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order, "Because our rules require a particular type of generalized wholesale offering, they may reduce incentives for ISPs to seek alternative arrangements from other broadband Internet access platform providers and for those other providers to offer such arrangements." The greater flexibility and reduction in risk stemming from eliminating wholesale access also increases incentives for existing players to invest in upgrading their networks (FCC 2005d, pp. 14886, 14891, 14905). Perhaps most problematic is the fact that the type of competition induced by wholesale access provides few consumer benefits. Under wholesale access, all of the competing ISPs employ the same equipment and thus provide the same speed, services, and access to content. Resellers thus cannot compete in terms of cost, network features, or quality of service impossible. Instead, the only way in which they can compete is through their willingness to accept thinner margins (Columbia Telecommunications Corporation 2001). The paucity of consumer benefits underscores the extent to which wholesale access represents something of a competition policy anomaly. When confronted with an excessively concentrated market, competition policy's traditional response is to deconcentrate the problematic market, ei