 brought its telephone operations to breakeven, while AT&T wasn't pre- dicting that for several quarters. In fact, he said, Comcast had im- proved the profit margins of systems it had previously acquired from AT&T by six percentage points in just six months. Comcast made its offer a referendum on AT&T's management of its cable systems. It also exploited another common suspicion when it hinted that "certain social issues" got in the way of the informal discussions Comcast had had with the company. In other words, Arm- strong wanted to run the merged companies, and Comcast couldn't agree to that. There was no truth to that insinuation, of course; the talks had never gone that far, breaking down at the first hint the AT&T board was uncomfortable ceding control of the merged company to the Roberts family. But most observers were quite willing to believe it. When Noski met with one of the largest institutional holders of AT&T stock, he was not surprised to find that it was quite willing to Credibility Breaks All Ties 231 take the money and run. While the board considered governance a big deal, it was of little concern to professional money managers; on the contrary, they considered it an excuse for management stonewalling. Among AT&T's directors, there were as many who thought that Comcast's offer was "stupid" as there were who felt that the company should take a closer look at it. AT&T's bankers, noting that Comcast's financial projections assumed that it would get only 50 percent of the synergies identified, believed that Comcast was poised to increase its offer. Meanwhile, both Robertses winged around the country with Steve Burke, calling on large institutions that owned AT&T shares to convince them to lobby management to accept the Comcast bid. Be- hind the scenes, the company's bankers and public relations firms planted stories about AT&T Broadband's ineptness. In a hostile takeover, the advantage goes to the raider, who controls the timing and the initial message. While the target is still getting organized, the