197 two-way network, 21, 21f replacement cost, 197 subadditivity, 119-120. See also natural monopoly transactions costs, 197-198 subnetworks, 42 user costs of capital, 196 sunk costs, 136, 203-205, 376 Index supercompetitive pricing, by monopoly, 130, 136, transmission stage of, 167-168 145-146, 148-149 tree structure in, 25 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), unbundled network element, 29, 35, 199 vertical structure of, 167, 167f. See also Federal supply-chain managers, 17-18 Communications Commission; Telecommunications Act of 1996; telephone takings network confiscatory rate-making, Telecommunications Act of 1996, 3, 30-31 Florida Power and physical takings vs. confiscatory interconnection access, 260-262 ratemaking, 216-217, 219-220, 279 platform access, 268-269 Loretto and physical vs. regulatory takings, 214-216, RBOCs and, 132 219-220 resale of telecommunications, 155 nonpossessory takings doctrine emergence, resale provision, 155, 257 210-214 state action immunity, 301 nonpossessory vs. physical, 210-220, 278-279 on state PUCs and physical collocation, 372n38 regulatory takings, 212-214 takings, 278-279 regulatory takings-confiscatory rate-making unbundled network element, 159 synthesis, 217-219 unbundling requirements, 134-135, 182-183, 240, importance of, 219-220 . See also Takings Clause 254, 274, 276 Takings Clause, 8 use of individual components vs. services of determining market value under, 224-227 network itself, 198 comparable sales approach, 224, 226 vertical exclusion, 246-247 facilities-based network competition effect on, wholesale access, 259-260 Telecommunications Management Network (TMN), historical cost approach, 225-226 176, 176f, 177 income capitalization approach, 224-225 telephone companies opportunity cost approach, 224 cross subsidies in pricing, 193 replacement cost approach, 225 equal access provision and, 181-182 tariffing, 126-130, 255-256 growth rates, 246 capital-intensive ratemaking, 127-129 transaction costs of retail service provision, 173 cost-of-service appr