 from the access requirements imposed by the Computer Inquiries (FCC 2005d). The situation is quite different with respect to cable. As the FCC has noted, "cable operators have never been required to make Internet access transmission available to third parties on a wholesale basis" (FCC 2005d, p. 14887). As noted earlier, the FCC took somewhat inconsistent positions when facing calls for giv- ing unaffiliated ISPs wholesale access to cable modem systems when approving the AT&T-TCI, AT&T-MediaOne, America Online-Time Warner, and Comcast- AT&T mergers. The agency addressed the issue more definitively in its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, when it refused to mandate wholesale access to cable modem systems (FCC 2002c). The FCC's reluctance to mandate wholesale access to last-mile broadband sys- items is understandable. As discussed in Chapter 5, because total demand under wholesale access depends on two prices, its net impact on network demand is ambiguous and the accompanying increase or decrease in traffic can adversely affect network cost, capacity, and reliability. Forcing networks to externalize mar- keting, provisioning, and billing functions also forces networks to deviate from the transaction cost-minimizing institutional structure that represents the natural boundaries of the firm. Indeed, last-mile broadband providers already have strong incentives to provide wholesale access. As the FCC noted, the benefits of spreading fixed costs over a larger customer base already give network owners powerful incentives to maximize traffic on their networks and the competition to capture the available network demand represents a powerful inducement to offer wholesale access voluntarily. Indeed, all of the major wireline broadband providers negotiate private wholesale access contracts 35 FCC (1999d), pet. for review denied sub nom. Ass'n of Commc'ns Enters. V. FCC, 253 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2001). DSL services offered at retail stand in stark contrast to DSL services offered to ISPs, which the FCC ruled were not subject to t