he incumbent LEC's central office. The incumbent LEC brought a takings challenge arguing that the compensation that it received was constitutionally insufficient. The incumbent did circumscribe its argument in one, somewhat unusual way. It conceded that it was already receiving adequate compensation for the space occupied by the collocation cage. As a result, it restricted its takings claim to the loops leased by the new entrant. The court resolved the case by relying on the distinction between physi- cal and nonpossessory takings. In particular, the court accepted the notion that "government-mandated co-location of one party's equipment on another party's premises constitutes a physical taking of the occupied space." As a result, it acknowledged that requesting carrier's collocation cage "is analogous to the rooftop 36 For cases applying confiscatory ratemaking doctrine to such claims, see Verizon, 535 U.S. at 524; US West Communications, Inc. V. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1236 (D. Or. 1998); FCC (1996c). For cases applying regulatory takings doctrine to such cases, see Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel V. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 429 n. 59 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. V. FCC, 530 U.S. 1213, cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000); FCC (1992b). 37 Even scholars who are skeptical of broader readings of Loretto accept that regulations that require physical collocation effect per se takings (Baynes 1995; Chen 1999; Rose-Ackerman and Rossi 2000). The Regulation of Local Telephone Networks equipment in Loretto" and emphasized that it would have had little trouble holding that the restriction represented a per se taking had the incumbent LEC focused on the collocation cage itself. In contrast to the equipment contained in the colloca- tion cage, however, the leasing of loops by the new entrant by itself simply involved restrictions on the use of the incumbent LEC's property and did not require the incumbent LEC to submit to the permanent physical occupation of its property by any equipme