nal 16.3% market share. But of these, only 16% (4.7 million lines) were resold and 23% (6.9 million) were on CLEC-owned facilities. Cable represented about 3 million lines-the number of lines other CLEC-owned transmission facilities had had barely grown in three years of tight capital. UNE loop had leveled off at about 4 million lines, but UNE Platform, with over 15 million lines, represented more than half of the CLEC line count. An ILEC-Friendly FCC Throws New Obstructions at Surviving CLECs But by late 2003, UNE Platform was a shaky foundation indeed to build a busi- ness on. The ILEC had made a full-court press against it, and its foundations were starting to crumble. ILECs had never really stopped litigating against UNEs. Although the Supreme Court's 1998 ruling in Iowa Utilities Board was a fairly ringing endorsement of the FCC's original position, the ILECs, through their trade organization, the United States Telecom Association (USTA), con- tinued to seek judicial support. In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis- trict of Columbia Circuit ruled, in USTA V. FCC ("USTA I"), [11] that the FCC had to re-examine its UNE policies giving more strict scrutiny to the "nec- essary and impair" test. In particular, the FCC needed to take into account the availability of alternative sources of supply other than the ILECs. This was consistent with FCC Chairman Michael Powell's own view of competition. An outspoken foe of UNEs in general, Powell preached the gospel of "intermodal competition." This meant that competition should be between the wireline provider, the cable provider, wireless providers, satellite providers, and, perhaps, power-line carriers. With multiple modes of access to the home, the consumer would have some degree of competition to protect against the most egregious abuses of monopoly. Powell's view had some support from manufacturers because UNEs were always existing facilities, used in lieu of new capital investment, whereas intermodal competition theoretically encouraged overbuilding, and th