ned from at least three directions. First, the loss of end-user lines (subscribers) to the new CLECs, mostly in the form of leased wholesale lines or the entire UNE-P platform, has reduced the Bell companies' revenues by far more than their costs. The average regulated wholesale price of leasing the entire UNE platform declined steadily through 2003 owing to pressure on regulators to provide the entrants with greater potential operating margins. By November 2002, these UNE plat- form rates had fallen to about 40 percent of the incumbents' retail revenues per line (see table 4-1). 13 These low rates for essentially reselling the incum- bents' services over their entire platform had attracted entrants and con- tributed 8 percentage points of the incumbents' 16 percent loss of retail lines by the end of 2003 (see figure 4-1). The replacement of retail revenues with wholesale revenues, in turn, reduced Bell company revenues by about 5 percent. Since the Bell companies' avoided costs of customer service and marketing are only about 10 percent of their total costs, their cost savings from ceding the retailing function pale in comparison with their revenue losses from leasing the UNE platform, as shown in the last two columns of Effect of the 1996 Act on Incumbent Local Companies Table 5-5. Effects of CLEC Use of UNE Platform on the Bell Companies, Average Savings in wholesale Average Lines Revenue marketing UNE-P retail leased loss from and customer revenues/line UNE-P service (dollarsl (dollarsl UNE-P (millions of (millions of Company month) month) rates dollars/year) dollars/year) BellSouth 23.10 53.69 1,359,000 16.55 51.23 3,851,000 1,603 Verizon 19.40 42.49 2,574,000 Qwest 22.94 51.10 Source: Anna Maria Kovacs, Kristin Burns, and Gregory S. Vitale, The Status of 271 and UNE- Platform in the Regional Bells' Territories (Commerce Capital Markets, November 8, 2002). n.a. Not available. a. Figures in parentheses represent percent of total. table 5-5. These data show that the three largest Bell companies' losses from th