nts' premises at "just" and "reason- able" rates. Had this requirement not been included in the act, intercon- nection and unbundling might only have been interesting curiosa, because entrants would have had difficulty connecting to the incumbents' networks at various nodal points. Nevertheless, this provision created substantial opportunities for controversy and contentious negotiations because incum- bents had not designed their facilities to accept rivals' equipment. Access to Rights of Way Even before the 1996 act, regulated telecom carriers were required to allow their rivals access to conduits, poles, ducts, and rights of way on rea- sonable terms. This requirement is now incorporated into the general rules for interconnection under the 1996 act, the purpose being to ease entry and assist new entrants. Initially, the FCC interpreted the law's various requirements in a manner that would provide the greatest possible boost to entrants. 25 This experiment is now coming to a conclusion as entrants fail and regulators are forced to roll back many of the more ambitious attempts to promote entry (see chapter 4). Opening the Long-Distance Market It is often thought that although the 1996 act opened local telecommuni- cations to competition, no new legislation was required to create compet- itive long-distance markets because they were already highly competitive. The interstate long-distance market had indeed been open to entry since the FCC lost its battle in the federal courts in 1977 over its right to exclude competition. Moreover, the 1982 AT&T decree required the divested Bell companies to provide "equal access" to all long-distance competitors. Despite these pro-competitive policies, the long-distance market remained heavily concentrated through 1995, at which time the largest three long- distance carriers accounted for 75 percent of revenues. The Herfindahl- Hirschman index of concentration was in excess of 3,000, far above the Department of Justice's threshold of 1,800 that defines a "concentrated" Opening T