 tions, there were SO many moving parts and open questions that no one had any illusion that a decision would be reached over the weekend. The board asked Armstrong to continue exploring strategic alterna- tives, but since the members had already talked themselves into some- how segregating the declining consumer long-distance business from the rest of AT&T, it was only a short step to breaking up the whole company. Tough Calls The company's deteriorating financial position left few practical al- ternatives. If AT&T spun off only its consumer long-distance business, its credit rating would drop because of all the cash flow it would lose. Similarly, AT&T's credit rating might suffer if it spun off AT&T Wire- less because it would lose the ability to raise cash by selling additional wireless tracking stock. There was no industrial logic to leaving busi- ness long distance and cable together, and, as a separate company, the cable unit could float its own initial public offering to raise capital. Any one of these moves without the others would endanger the company's credit rating just as it needed to refinance more than $30 billion worth of short-term debt. It was like being caught in a braided finger cuff-the harder you pull, the tighter it becomes. Armstrong knew that as these various scenarios began to jell, the company was approaching a disclosure cliff. Once again, he did not have the luxury of time, and making piecemeal announcements would simply extend the period of pain, SO he proposed bringing a full rec- ommendation to the board at its next regular meeting on Monday, October 23. As AT&T's board members left the conference center on Saturday to catch their limousines and jets, they had each crossed an invisible line. Imperceptibly, they had moved from discussing whether to throw in the towel and break up AT&T to discussing how. On Monday morning, Armstrong met with his senior team. Most of us had been at the board meeting, SO he didn't have to describe what had happened, but it was clear that in the single d