cy to a naked normative commitment (Blumenthal 2002). Like any baseline principle, it must be supported by substantial normative and empirical justification before being imposed as an absolute mandate. Until that occurs, the more technologically humble position would appear to be permitting network diversity through nonregulation, rather than mandating the use of any particular set of protocols. 19 Lessig's later work concedes that no network design is neutral and instead describes network neutrality as an attempt to eliminate certain kinds of discrimination (Lessig 2005). For the reasons stated above, reconstructing network neutrality in terms of discrimination and equality simply restates the underlying normative issues in different terms without resolving them. The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet Mandating interconnection, nondiscrimination, rate regulation, and standard- ization could reinforce the very sources of market failure that network neutrality is supposed to redress. The central concern of network neutrality is that DSL and cable modem providers are using their control over the last mile to restrict the ability of applications and content providers to reach end users. In this respect, it is motivated by the same policy concerns animating regulatory intervention into markets for CPE, long distance, and enhanced services. Two factors are typically cited as the reasons for the high degree of concentration in markets for last-mile services. The classic source of market concentration is the supply-side economies of scale that arise when entry requires significant up-front investments. More recently, attention has also focused on the demand-side economies of scale created by "net- work economic effects," which arise when the value of the network is largely determined by the number of people connected to it. Both forces tend to give the large players a decisive advantage. In the most extreme case, they create natural monopolies. Interestingly, mandating network neutrality can have the perv