o achieve the scale economy needed to develop products that can access all channels within the band. As a result, companies have paid for spectrum and built networks and then been frustrated by a lack of market competitive performance competitive user equipment. Some entities have not even got as far as building networks because no one can supply the filters needed to mitigate interference created by or suffered by spectrally adjacent user communities, in this example TV at the bottom of the band and public safety radio at the top of the band. In theory the regulatory process exists to anticipate and avoid this type pf problem but in practice a doctrine of caveat emptor has been applied. If entities are prepared to bid billions of dollars for unusable spectrum, SO be it. It is up to those entities to have performed sufficient technical due diligence to arrive at an informed view as to whether the spectrum being auctioned is an asset or a liability. However, a failure to bid and win spectrum typically results in a short term-hit on the share value of the bidding entity. Therefore, there is a perverse incentive to bid and win spectrum. In the US case the opportunity to return the US market to a duopoly was an associated incentive but resulted in an outcome directly contrary to US competition policy. 1.5 TV and Broadcasting and Mobile Broadband Regulation Regulatory objectives have changed over time. TV and broadcasting regulation may have its origins in spectral management but competition policy and the policing of content have become progressively more dominant. In telecommunications the original purpose of regulation was to act as a proxy for competition, protecting consumers from the potential use of market power by landline monopolies or later by their privatised equivalents. Cellular operators in the 1980s had to meet spectral mask requirements in terms of output power and occupied radio bandwidth, but were otherwise largely unregulated. The assumption was that market regulation would inhibit network investmen