sit (transmission), and electronic signaling were not deemed essential facil- ities and were therefore to be unbundled for only an "interim" period of five years. Local switching was not unbundled at all, even over the five-year transition period. Because local competition has been slow to develop in Canada, the CRTC was subsequently persuaded to extend the deadline for the "in- terim" requirement of local loop unbundling in urban areas. In addition, it recently reduced the markup on unbundled element costs from 25 percent to 15 percent, but it rejected a proposal by AT&T Canada to emulate the U.S. UNE-P requirement by forcing the incumbents to offer their entire service platform at a 70 percent discount from retail. Although the CRTC has not mandated line sharing, the incumbents, led by Bell Canada, now offer line sharing to digital subscriber line (DSL) entrants at rates of $5 a month per line and even less. By allowing integrated incumbent carriers to compete aggressively with the new entrants and by limiting the entrants' access to incumbent facili- ties at low, wholesale rates, the CRTC has been much less aggressive in promoting or even "subsidizing" entry than has its U.S. counterpart. This more conservative approach has allowed competition to develop at a more modest rate without creating the stock market frenzy that gripped the United States. The Results of Liberalization: Narrowband Competition in long-distance services increased rapidly after 1992. By 2002 the new entrants, principally Call-Net (Sprint) and Allstream (AT&T Canada), accounted for 30 percent of long-distance revenues (see Telecom Reform in Other Countries Table 9-1. Telecom Competition in Canada, Entrants' Share, 2003 Percent Category Business Residential Total Long-distance minutes Long-distance revenues Local lines Local revenues Internet access service revenues Source: Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, The Status of Competi- tion in Canadian Telecommunications Markets, Report to the Governor in Council (Novem