acy." (Louis K. Liggett Co. V. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) See also United States V. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that "the concentration of power leads predictably to socialism that is antagonistic to our system"). The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet break down the citizenry. As such, it does not seem well suited to industries such as broadband, in which large-scale, rapid, and often disruptive change is a prominent feature. Although some scholars have posited that network neutrality would yield important democratic benefits, they are usually articulated too generally and too incompletely to provide a basis for regulation (Yoo 2003c). C. Institutional Considerations Adoption of network diversity necessarily requires the incurrence of some degree of transaction costs. Some would be temporary, such as the costs incurred when network owners voluntarily retool their networks to accommodate different stan- dards. Other transaction costs would be more enduring. For example, if multiple standards were to exist, end users and providers of applications and content would have to expend significant resources to verify compatibility with respect to different networks. It is theoretically possible that the resulting friction might be SO severe that it more than offsets the benefits of shifting to another standard. When that is the case, society would be better off if network diversity were not permitted. At the same time, mandating network neutrality would involve transaction costs as well. As first discussed in Chapter 5 and developed further in Chapters 8 and 10, the costs of adopting, disseminating, maintaining, and updating a stan- dardized interface are considerable. Furthermore, imposing and updating any such interface gives rise to an inevitable regulatory delay that can be debilitating when the underlying technology is changing rapidly. Indeed, the FCC has recognized that network neutrality can actually harm consume