metric regu- lation "may distort market shares, investment, and other decisions," "may increase incentives for lobbying and strategic behavior of various inefficient kinds," may reduce consumer welfare, and would place regulators in the position of picking technological winners and losers, but nonetheless argues for experimentation in different regulatory forms for its own sake until policymakers have a clearer picture of what works (Farrell 2006, pp. 207-09; see also Wilkie 2004). The Regulation of Last-Mile Broadband Networks Another former FCC Chief Economist, William Rogerson (2000b), offers a more conventional argument in favor of asymmetric regulation in which he pro- poses subjecting the legacy technology (DSL) to access regulation without imposing such regulation on the new technology (cable modem service). Rogerson argues that DSL can be deployed simply by adding additional equipment to the end of the loop without making substantial investments in the loops themselves. As a result, the adverse impact of DSL regulation on investment incentives would be minimal. The deployment of cable modem service, in contrast, requires huge investments and upgrades to physical plant. Mandating access to cable modem systems would thus cause unacceptable deterrence to investment. Asymmetric regulation has been heavily criticized by scholars favoring both regulatory and deregulatory approaches (Lemley and Lessig 2001; Crandall et al. 2002; Robinson 2002). The problem is that the deployment of DSL does require investment in the loop infrastructure. For example, lines must be conditioned to remove loading coils, bridge taps, and other attachments originally designed to optimize the circuit for voice, but which interfere with DSL service. Even more problematic is the fact that the natural resistance inherent in copper wire means that DSL service degrades in quality as the distance from the central office increases and becomes completely unusable once the distance exceeds roughly 12,000 feet (although technologies deployed lat