code bandwidth results in an order of magnitude increase in per user bandwidth by the same amount over the same period of time is not valid or supported by observation. The present rate of increase for example is significantly higher with some operators reporting a fourfold increase annually and present forecasts are generally proving to be on the low side (as discussed in earlier chapters). However, if the opportunity cost of delivering this data in a fully loaded network exceeds the realisable value then it could be assumed that price increases will choke this growth in the future, unless value can be realised in some other way. A compromised or inconsistent user experience including a short duty cycle may similarly limit future growth rates. Also, the value may be realised by the content owners or, as stated above, the application vendors rather than the entities delivering or storing the content. Apple has managed this by establishing and then holding on to control of application added value. No other vendor has managed this including Nokia, who have made progress with their OVI application store though with a focus on developing market rather than developed market applications. The theory of course is that application value has a pull-through effect both on product sales and on monthly revenues and per subscriber margin. This may well be true but the counterbalance is that application value incurs application cost at least part of which shows up in product-return costs or product-support costs. The product-return costs as stated above will generally fall on the handset vendor. Product-support costs for example customer help lines, may well fall on the operator. Although deferred, these costs can be substantial. Present smart-phone sales practice has at least partially translated these costs into additional revenue. This has been achieved by implementing tariffs schemes that are SO impenetrably complicated that most of us end up paying more per month than we need to. Many of us also have smart phones that hav