ng the value of foregone alternatives, TELRIC in essence ignores the insights of neoclassical economics by basing value solely on cost without taking any demand-side effects into consideration. As such, TELRIC is fundamentally inconsistent with the analysis of markets that serves as the foundation for all modern economic theory. 32 Historically, such comparisons were complicated still further by the FCC's decision to award one of the two available first-generation cellular licenses to the incumbent LEC, which in turn produced reasons to question whether interconnection agreements between wireless carriers in fact represented arms-length transactions. The deployment of competitive wireless networks on national scale, the subsequent emergence of PCS, and the impending arrival of third-generation wireless devices should eliminate this problem in the near future, if they have not done SO already. One of us has elsewhere advanced the argument that, in addition to ECPR, the rates charged for access to unbundled network elements should also include a nonbypassable end-user charge to compensate incumbent LECs for costs stranded by deregulatory innovations that caused investment-backed expectations to fail (Sidak and Spulber 1997a). Extended discussion of these issues falls outside the scope of this book. For the time being, it suffices to point out that the argument advanced in this article, while consistent with the imposition of such user charges, does not require it. Networks in Telecommunications Although the FCC considered and rejected arguments that it should base access rates on ECPR, its reasons for doing SO do not withstand analysis. The first reason was that it believed that the statutory requirement that prices be based on "cost" precluded it from considering opportunity cost (FCC 1996c). The Verizon Court specifically rejected this reasoning when it found the term "cost" to be "too protean" to support any such plain language argument (535 U.S. at 500-01). If anything, the FCC's argument is directly undercut b