rts have long recognized that the enactment of a federal regulatory scheme can immunize partic- ular conduct from antitrust scrutiny. In rare cases, a federal regulatory statute explic- itly repeals the antitrust laws with respect to certain conduct. For example, from 1921 until 1996, federal law gave the FCC the authority to exempt telephone com- pany mergers from antitrust scrutiny by the Justice Department and the FTC. 50 Such explicit repeals are relatively rare, though, and courts have construed them narrowly.51 In the absence of statutory language explicitly exempting conduct from the antitrust laws, defendants can still argue that the regulatory scheme is SO pervasive as to give rise to implied immunity from the antitrust laws. 52 The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that "[r]epeal of the antitrust laws by implication is not favored and not casually to be allowed." As a result, courts have generally insisted that there be "a plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provision" before holding conduct impliedly immune from the antitrust laws, and upheld implied immunity "even then only to the minimum extent necessary" to make the regulatory scheme work (Gordon V. N.Y. Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682, 683 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 53 50 This provision was originally enacted as part of the Willis-Graham Act (Statutes at Large 1921, pp. 27-28). It was subsequently incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934 (Statutes at Large 1934, p. 1080 (previously codified at 47 U.S.C. 221(a)). It was eventually repealed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Statutes at Large 1996, p. 143). See, e.g., Indus. Commc'ns Sys., Inc. V. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 152, 156 (9th Cir. 1974). 52 See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC V. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2392 (2007). 53 See also Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. V. Blue Cross of Kan. City, 452 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1981), calling these general principles "well established." Networks in Telecommunications Satisfying the "plain