fleeting advan- tage because of their established brand names, but simply attaching the resale of local service to their long-distance services, which are now experi- encing a staggering revenue decline, was not likely to save them (see chap- ter 6). They need new services-new ideas-but these are not likely to be developed on someone else's network. Welfare Gains from Local Competition Since 1996 entrants have expended enormous capital resources to wrest 18 percent of access lines from incumbents, with an uncertain effect on economic welfare. The rather limited evidence reviewed earlier in this chapter suggests little difference between entrants' services and those of the Local Competition under the 1996 Act incumbents or even in the prices charged to subscribers. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that subscribers would have shifted from incumbents to the entrants unless they were offered lower rates for the same service or higher service quality at the same rates. The data on local telephone rates reflect very little change since 1996 despite the advent of competition. The incumbents' local rates are still reg- ulated by the states and did not move perceptibly from 1996 to 2002. Between 1999 and 2002, the FCC raised the subscriber line charges at- tached to residential bills by approximately $2.00 a line in order to reduce access charges on interstate long-distance calls. 62 Net of increase, average urban rate for incumbents' local residential service in 2002 was $21.32. In 1995 the average rate was $20.01. 63 Regulated local residential rates did not decline in nominal terms over these six years; in fact, they increased by about 44 percent of the increase in the average consumer price index. 64 Similarly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics producer price index and con- sumer price index for local telephone service show little movement, even in constant dollars (see figure 4-7). This is not SO surprising given that en- trants had captured about 10 percent of residential and small business lines by 2002 and th