 of liberty and the classic vision of the proper relationship between the individual and the state (Yoo 2003c). It also allows decision making about technology adoption to be decentralized. Finally, it avoids the risks of locking the existing technological boundaries between firms into place in industries undergoing dynamic technological change. In the most extreme case, regulation can itself become the source of natural monopoly, in which case intervention would have the perverse effect of reinforcing the market failure that regulation was designed to redress. These intuitions are also informed by the practical problems associated with mandating interconnection, nondiscrimination, rate regulation, and standardiza- tion. Experience with cable leased access and UNE access has shown how difficult such regimes are to administer when interfaces are complex and the underlying technology is changing rapidly. Viewing the history of FCC regulation through the cautionary lens of public choice theory provides an additional reason to disfavor regulatory intervention. As noted earlier, it is quite possible that regulators will give preference to the concerns of static efficiency, which have a concrete impact in the here and now, over the concerns of dynamic efficiency, which involve contingent benefits to parties who often have yet to be identified. The FCC's history in this regard is not promising. Even James Landis, the leading proponent of expertise- driven public interest regulation and one of the key architects of the New Deal, acknowledged that the FCC has been a disaster (Landis 1960). This bias has unfortunate implications for the permanence of regulatory inter- vention. Compelling sharing of the existing network by mandating interconnection, nondiscrimination, rate regulation, and standardization implicitly presumes that regulatory supervision will continue indefinitely. In short, it represents a surren- der to monopoly that is only justifiable if entry by alternative network capacity is impossible. In contrast, sol