 No. 3-83 Civ. 1228, 1998 WL 241122 (D. Minn. June 10, 1988); Central Telecomms., Inc. V. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891, 901 & n.33, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff' d, 800 F.2d 711, 713-18 (8th Cir. 1986). 32 Noam (1983); Shapiro et al. (1983). 33 The FCC initially ruled that cable operators face effective competition whenever they face competition from at least three over-the-air broadcast stations, which effectively eliminated rate regulation for 96.5 percent of all cable systems (FCC 1985b, aff'd sub nom. ACLU V. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). The FCC later raised the threshold of effective competition Networks in Telecommunications overruled the FCC with respect to whether broadcasting could serve as effective competition, but ratified the decision that cable operators might face competition from other multichannel video providers (while raising the threshold of homes actually served to 15%) (Statutes at Large 1992, p. 1470). The fact that DBS has now captured more than 30% of the market has led to widescale deregulation of cable rates. As of January 1, 2005, competition had already been sufficient to eliminate rate regulation in more than 1,000 cable communities (FCC 2006c). The insight that intermodal competition can eliminate natural monopoly has even stronger implications for broadband data networks. The shift to digital trans- mission has allowed networks that once were dedicated exclusively to voice or to video to compete with one another. Cable companies have begun to offer voice ser- vices and promote them aggressively. Telephone companies have begun to roll out fiber-based transmission networks, such as Verizon's FiOS service, and have begun to offer multichannel television. Most importantly for our purposes, digitization has allowed both telephone and cable companies to compete directly with respect to last-mile broadband services. Thus, regardless of whether cable or conventional telephone was once a natural monopoly with respect to the services they used to provide, they now cl