that the shift to access regulation represents a paradigm shift in the approach to regulating network industries (Kearney and Merrill 1998). As one commentator aptly acknowledges, we do indeed live in "the Age of Access" (Rifkin 2000). The shift to access regulation has changed the primary unit of regulatory analysis from the outputs of the entire network to the services provided by individual network elements. In SO doing, it has created the need for a more comprehensive understanding of how network components interact within the context of a complex system, as well as some basis for determining the impact of access regulation on optimal network design. Absent some greater insight into these considerations, regulatory authorities will be hard pressed to shape policy in ways that are both coherent and constructive. We demonstrate that the complexity of networks implies the need for addi- tional regulatory forbearance. The law of unintended consequences applies with a vengeance to network access regulation. Small regulatory changes that affect net- work utilization and interconnection can significantly affect network performance and capacity. This raises the bar for network access regulation in comparison with traditional utility regulation. Put differently, there must be a substantial market failure in telecommuni- cations to justify regulatory intervention through mandatory network access. In addition, regulators must show that their intervention will address the alleged mar- ket failure. To satisfy this test, regulators must identify the potential consequences of their intervention. This requires application of the theory of networks to understand the possible effects of access regulation. Networks in Telecommunications C. The Limits of Existing Scholarship Unfortunately, the existing economic and legal commentary on networks provides few insights into network architecture and design. The literature has been hampered by the absence of a terminology that identifies networks' essential components and captures the