rket power enjoyed by early cellular telephone providers posed any threat to the cellular telephone equipment market, because any one cellular provider represented a tiny fraction of the national equipment market (FCC 1992a). The proper question is thus not whether the broadband transport provider wields market power vis-à-vis broadband users in any particular city, but rather whether that provider has market power in the national market for obtaining broadband content. In short, it is national reach, not local reach, that matters. 43 Lessig is candid about his bias against incumbent network owners: Dinosaurs should die And innovators should resist efforts by dinosaurs to keep control. Not because dinosaurs are evil; not because they can't change; but because the greatest innovation will come from those outside these old institutions. Whatever the scientists at Bell Labs understood, AT&T didn't get it. Some may offer a theory to explain why AT&T wouldn't get it. But this is a point most understand without needing to invoke a fancy theory. (Lessig 2002, p 176) 44 The following discussion is based on Yoo (2004a, 2004b). The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet When the relevant market is properly defined, it becomes clear that this market is too unconcentrated for vertical exclusion to pose a threat to competition. In the context of broadband, it amounts to the claim that a decision by the largest broadband provider to limit access to its network poses a real threat to competition in applications and content. Although such dangers might have been credible in the days in which AT&T dominated the last mile, they are considerably less compelling during an era in which the largest player controls only twenty-one percent of the national market (Yoo 2004b). Absent collusion with other providers, the intercon- nection decisions of even the largest player are not in a position to stifle the competi- tiveness of the applications and content layers. Indeed, the ambiguity inherent in the issues surrounding concen