escribed in Chapter 10, those structural preconditions are not satisfied in the context of broadband, which makes it far more likely that vertical integration is motivated by a desire to achieve efficiencies than it is by a desire to harm competition in the adjacent market. One would thus expect a network owner's natural instinct would be to open up its network to all content and applications providers, because doing SO would maximize the value of its network and thus maximize the amount that it could charge for network access. Because innovation in applications and content only serves to increase a network's value, network owners should have every incentive to encourage such innovation. To the extent that innovation is best promoted by an open architecture, network owners can generally be expected to embrace it 31 Lemley and Lessig (2001); Lessig (2002); Wu (2003). 32 FCC (2005a); Lessig (2002); Wu (2003); Wu and Lessig (2003). Networks in Telecommunications in the absence of some element that leads to market failure. 33 The failure of early proprietary services provided by America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy attests to the market's ability to discipline network owners who attempt to impose closed architectures on consumers who prefer open ones. This underscores the extent to which the interests of network owners on the one hand and the interests of content and application providers on the other hand are aligned. Indeed, this is the same conclusion that the FCC's Network Inquiry Special Staff drew more than twenty years ago with respect to the relationship between the broadcast television networks (the analog to modern applications and content providers) and their local affiliates (the analog modern last-mile providers). Sim- ply put, both players have a strong interest in maximizing joint profits. They will inevitably vie with one another over how those profits should be divided. Although the division of profits will be of intense interest to the parties, it raises few, if any, policy implications. From thi