, however, ignores the key role that short-run supracompetitive returns play in the horizontal competition within a market characterized by perfect competition in which multiple players offer substitute products to consumers and 45 For an example of commentary describing Trinko as Schumpeterian, see Weiser (2005). Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries in which any supracompetitive returns will prove transient and quickly dissipate (Yoo 2005). Thus, short-run supracompetitive returns not only allocate the scarce network resources, but also signal industry participants that the market is in short- run disequilibrium and provide incentives to invest in additional network capacity. The essential facilities doctrine threatens to derail this process of reequili- bration. Those forced to pay supracompetitive prices for a monopoly input or denied access to that input altogether have powerful incentives to invest in alter- native sources of supply. As a result, essential facilities plaintiffs are natural candi- dates either to develop independent capacity themselves or to enter into strategic partnerships with firms interested in becoming alternative suppliers of the input. Rather than simply requiring that the monopoly be shared, entry by independent providers of the input would break up the monopoly, which in turn would lead to long-run, sustainable consumer benefits without any continuing oversight by antitrust authorities. Conversely, anything that discourages investments in alterna- tive sources of supply threatens to impede rather than promote technological and economic development. The problem is that the essential facilities doctrine threatens to dampen invest- ment incentives in two ways. First, investing in alternative capacity is quite risky and can require substantial capital investment. Forcing the monopolist to share its input rescues other firms from having to undertake the risks associated with sup- plying the relevant input for themselves. 46 Second, if the essential facilities doctrine is to yield a