s-Graham Act, which immunized telephone mergers from antitrust scrutiny (Statutes at Large 1921, pp. 27-28). Instead, antitrust mergers would be reviewed by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which effectively became a rubber stamp that approved essentially all telecommunications mergers (ICC 1937). As we noted in Chapter 8, during this period, both the Bell System and the independents also endorsed rate regulation of local telephone services by state public utility commissions. This history underscores the extent to which refusal to interconnect need not be anticompetitive. It may also yield some insights into current broadband policy. It suggests that refusing to require interconnection could foster a race for the market between cable modem and DSL that could help meet the FCC's and state public utility commissions' statutory obligations to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans" U.S.C. 157 note). The primary worry is that the race logically ends with one of the two competitors emerging as the dominant player. An end result with a single dominant player, as noted earlier, no longer becomes a stable outcome if a third (and possibly a fourth) competitor emerges. According to Trinko, therefore, solutions that alter market structure to make them competitive are preferred to solutions like interconnection access, which require continuing price regulation (540 U.S. at 414-15). Furthermore, as the ongoing deployment of broadband fiber optic service demonstrates, the pace of technological change may dictate that the winner of an initial race may find its dominance destabilized by a new race to deploy a new technology. Skepticism about mandating interconnection access does not require embrac- ing this Schumpeterian vision of competition. As one of us has argued at length elsewhere, networks may deviate from perfect interoperability in order to distin- guish their service offerings from those of their competitors. Not only does this dif