 for the proposition that monopoly profits are not properly considered part of fair market value. On the contrary, in the language quoted above, the Court of Claims explicitly recognized that the opposite was true (see also City of Tucson V. El Rio Water Co., 415 P.2d 872, 875 (Ariz. 1966), recognizing that monopoly profits are properly regarded as part of fair market value). The Regulation of Local Telephone Networks the issue, the virtual collocation provisions of the Expanded Interconnection pro- ceeding were rendered moot by the physical collocation provisions contained in the 1996 Act. On the one hand, the D.C. Circuit's opinion in GTE Service Corp. noted that "[v]irtual collocation minimizes the takings problem, because competitors do not have physical access to a LEC's property" (205 F.3d at 419). At the same time, language in the D.C. Circuit's Bell Atlantic opinion suggests that virtual colloca- tion may pose the same takings concerns as physical collocation. Both virtual and physical collocation allow CAPs to physically connect their networks to the LECs' networks. Requiring a physical interconnection is enough to constitute a physical taking, regardless of who owns the property on which the interconnection occurs (24 F.3d at 1446). Indeed, a subsequent court drew largely the same conclusion when it held that an administrative order requiring an incumbent LEC to reconfig- ure the wires it was using to provide telephone service to a multibuilding complex in order to accommodate an competitive service provider constituted a physical taking (GTE Sw. Inc. V. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 10 S.W.3d 7, 9, 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)). The fact that the reconfiguration occurred in an apartment complex rather than on land owned by the LEC played no role in the decision, which in turn suggests that virtual and physical collocation may be constitutionally indistinguishable. 3. Wireless Interconnection An even more difficult problem is posed when regulation compelling access to a wireless network is involved. In contrast to wire