e switches for independent long distance providers demonstrates, allowing networks to become noninteroperable is unlikely to prove irreversible. Furthermore, as important as innovation on the Internet is, reduced innovation does not constitute the type of catastrophic harm that would justify regulatory intervention in the absence of a concrete showing of competitive harm. Ultimately, Lessig fails to provide a determinative resolution to the question. Likewise, in the absence of a clearer picture of the contextual details, the resolu- tion proposed here is necessarily no more definitive. Short of swapping ipse dixit claims about better policy, how should decision makers resolve disputes in the face of uncertainty? Fortunately, competition policy offers a potential way out of this analytical limbo. It suggests that when policy makers cannot determine whether a new institutional form would help or hinder competition, the proper response is nonregulation until a practice is shown to effect a concrete harm to competition. Forbearance from either forbidding or mandating any particular solution leaves room for the experimentation upon which markets depend. Nonintervention is particularly appropriate where, as here, regulators will struggle to distinguish anti- competitive from procompetitive behavior. As noted earlier, network neutrality advocates candidly acknowledge that deviations from network neutrality are often the result of benign attempts to meet the increasingly varied demands that end users are placing on the network. Permitting deviations from network neutrality in the absence of concrete demonstrations of competitive harm draws further support from the growing empirical literature on vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints, as The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet demonstrated by the recent surveys described in Chapter 9. Placing the burden of proof on those who would regulate represents the proper way for regulators to show technological humility and accords with our notions