 to the FCC's apparent intent to deregulate broadband, Mark Lemley and Lawrence Lessig state: "We do not yet know enough about the relationship between these architectural principles and the innovation of the Internet. But we should know enough to be skeptical of changes in its design. The strong presumption should be in favor of preserving architectural features that have produced this extra- ordinary innovation."35 Rather than deregulating broadband and allowing network owners to develop their own architecture, some would extend regulation on a "lay- ered" basis, requiring the owners of the physical layer, that is, the network, to provide open access to all developers of applications and Internet service providers until there is demonstrated competition at the network level. ³6 In order to provide such nondiscriminatory access, network owners would be required to continue to develop "dumb" networks that are accessible through standard, nonproprietary protocols. This would prevent network operators from developing their own applications and content and denying access to competitive applications and content. In an earlier era, this would have been similar to requiring Henry Ford, who had more than 60 percent The Broadband Revolution of the U.S. automobile market in the early 1920s, from changing the design of his Ford platforms to adopt new technologies and deny his com- petitors the ability to install their components on his cars until GM and Chrysler became viable competitors. The Effects of Regulation Regulating a new service can generate large losses in economic welfare if such regulation increases the risk of investing in the facilities required to deliver the service. The consequent delay in the introduction of a new ser- vice or in the rate at which a new service is introduced denies consumers the opportunity to consume this service. In such cases, the economic costs to consumers can be quite high, particularly when the demand for these services is price inelastic. With inelastic demand, losses resulting f