's cars at wholesale and resell them at retail, when the manufacturer prefers to retail them directly." As a result, Areeda and Hovenkamp 13 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008c, pp. 234-36) similarly describe Terminal Railroad Court's empha- sis on combination of companies operating bridge and attempting to exclude rivals. Hovenkamp (2005, p. 309) points out that because Terminal Railroad "involve[ed] an agreement among multiple firms who controlled the facility," it "makes a poor ancestor for the essential facilities doctrine." Ratner (1988, pp. 336-37) argues that Terminal Railroad is more appropriately clas- sified as "a classic group boycott" or "horizontal agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Section 1." United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 61 Minn. 1971) (invoking the "bottleneck" theory), modified, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008c, p. 362) note that Otter Tail court did not "adequately elaborate[]" upon underlying grounds for decision. Kauper (2005, p. 1627) notes, "Virtually no discernible principle can be found in Otter Tail. Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries suggest that Otter Tail is best understood in light of its "peculiarities." The mandate to wheel power ought to be read in light of the historical common law duty to deal imposed on public utilities. The case is also "unique in its remedial aspects," in that the Federal Power Commission was available to oversee the terms and conditions of the interconnection mandate (see also Kauper 2005). The second decision, Aspen Skiing Co. V. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., arose from a dispute between operators of ski areas near Aspen, Colorado. Starting in 1962, the three independently owned ski facilities in the ea-Ajax Buttermilk, and Highlands - jointly offered a multiday, all-Aspen ticket that could be redeemed at any of the facilities. The owner of Ajax eventually acquired Buttermilk and opened a new ski area called Snowmass. The combined entity, now known as Ski Co., continued to cooperate with Highlands to o