ds policy compromises spectral efficiency. Caveat emptor may provide a measure of protection but an increase in litigation seems to be an inevitable outcome of the present policy approach. 15.24 Market Economics The problem here is that standards and regulatory policy has failed to adapt to the change in relative market importance between Asia and the rest of the world. If subscale markets, for example the US, continue to pursue a nationally specific standards and regulatory agenda Terrestrial Broadcast/Cellular Network Integration then it is understandable that Asian markets, particularly China, will want to do the same. The result will be an increase in litigation and more aggressive protectionist legislation. 15.25 Business Economics This is the problem of the 50 cent components compromising the $50 billion investment. The fact that most RF components don't scale has made it hard for the RF component industry to deliver products that can meet associated performance requirements. Newly dominant markets are understandably using their market leverage to extract significant performance promises from this underfunded and underresourced sector of the industry. The result will be an increase in Chapter 11 filing that will further inhibit RF innovation and investment. 15.26 Political Economics Back to where we started. Regulators will become increasingly exposed to litigation from entities who have bid for spectrum that is not fit for purpose or compromised either by poorly executed standards policy or, equally damaging, by the absence of a standards policy. The problem is compounded by regulatory policies that fail to take account of basic engineering reality and present RF component limitations and R and D constraints. 15.27 Remedies The standards process would benefit from being less focused on an assumed need for high peak data rates and more directly focused on delivery cost economics. Standards and spectral policy need to be more closely coupled and engineering cost needs to be directly factored into band alloca