he usual solution of burdening the legacy portion of the industry untenable. It is for these and other reasons that similar proposals for asymmetric regulation of other communications media have not been well received.³4 Such asymmetric regulation would also be inconsistent with regulatory prece- dent. The FCC has repeated emphasized the importance of maintaining technolog- ical neutrality and of regulating in a consistent manner across platforms (see, e.g., FCC 2002b, 2002c, 2005d). The FCC noted that it developed its previous asymmetric regulatory efforts, which distinguished between dominant and nondominant car- riers, at a time when the telecommunications industry was just beginning to evolve from one dominated by a monopoly provider into one in which a degree of compe- tition was possible for some communications services. The FCC further noted that "this market environment differs markedly from the dynamic and evolving broad- band Internet access marketplace before us today where the current market leaders, cable operators and wireline carriers, face competition not only from each other but also from other emerging broadband Internet access service providers. This rapidly changing market does not lend itself to conclusions about market dominance the commission typically makes to determine the degree of regulation to be applied to well-established, relatively stable telecommunications service markets. On the con- trary, any finding about dominance or non-dominance in this emerging broadband Internet access service market would be premature." Indeed, the FCC noted that even if it were to apply its traditional dominance/nondominance analysis to broad- band, the fact that cable modem systems had established the early lead dictated that would conclude that DSL was nondominant. Thus, if anything, the asymmetric reg- ulation would apply to the newly emerging technology and would exempt the more established technology, in direct opposition to the way that asymmetric regulation is usually applied (FCC 2005d, p. 14898