tration is underscored by comparing Lessig's concern, which is that portions of the network will be too eager to deviate from the established standard, with the concern asso- ciated more frequently with network economic effects, which is that users will be too reluctant to deviate from the established standard, thereby allowing an obsolete technology to become locked in (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1994). When the latter is the primary concern, the presence of large players is a potential boon, rather than a bane. Because larger players are able to internalize a greater share of the benefits created by their own technology choices, they are logical candi- dates to mitigate the lock-in effects caused by network externalities by becoming the sponsors of new technologies (Yoo 2002). In other words, to the extent that network economic effects create excess inertia rather than excess momentum, attempts to deviate from the existing standard should be embraced, rather than rebuffed. In the end, Lessig's primary concern is that network diversity would hurt the environment for innovation, which he believes stems from the existence of an "innovation commons" in which applications and content providers can have access to the entire universe of potential customers without having to obtain permission from any gatekeeper. Network owners, Lessig argues, are too eager to fracture the interoperability of the Internet because they fail to internalize the benefits from innovation associated with network neutrality (Lessig 2005). 45 As noted earlier, a close reading of the economic literature reveals that the impact of network economic effects on innovation is ambiguous and that such concerns appear to be misplaced in the context of a physical network that can be owned and in an industry undergoing exponential growth. Indeed, the use of the term "commons" creates some degree of irony, because the accepted solution to the tragedy of the commons is the creation of well-defined property rights (Hardin 1968), which would 