munications and networking. The idea of using a markup language to encode web pages was truly brilliant. It would be unac- ceptable to eat up the available transmission bandwidth trying to transfer back and forth between com- puter systems large bit streams and bitmaps of graphics and pictures in order to create content made sense in the current multimedia world. It would make much more sense to encode the structure of web pages in a new language (HTML) and send the encoding instead to the client computer that asked for a specific web page. As a result, web page text could be combined with graphics, pictures, sound, and even video. The web page would reside on a server that is connected to the Internet. A name server would know its address and broadcast it to anyone interested in communicating with it. When a computer user accessed this web page, a whole set of actions would take place transparently to the user whereby the HTML text of the page and its constituent components would be downloaded to the requesting computer. A special piece of software called a browser, residing on the requesting computer, would then interpret the incoming data on-the-fly and compose the content of the web page locally on the user screen. This turned out to be the basic mechanism for network users for the gen- eration of an insatiable demand for more bandwidth. Routing was the third major factor of this tremendous explosion in operation efficiency. IBM had tried to contain this revolution by trying to squeeze SNA into every platform. This obviously had not worked at the departmental computing level (where IBM was not as powerful) as well as with mainframes and originally even the PC. IBM was forced to accept the presence of IP as the common interconnectivity thread. In fact, it was forced to embrace it with its own departmental platform based on AIX running on RS/6000 offerings. The outbreak of an IP culture effectively isolated SNA into the IBM legacy world. While IBM was in a new painful state of denial (shocked at its loss of con