es the network owner with two relatively unattractive possibilities. First, it can spend additional resources to determine in advance which geographies are likely to prove more successful. Even if it is success- ful in making this determination, unbundled access guarantees that any economic benefits it obtains from these investments will be quickly dissipated. Second, it can forego the investment altogether. Either decision will have an adverse impact on network investment. As we have discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, Justice Breyer invoked these consider- ations with respect to narrowband technologies in Iowa Utilities Board and Verizon Communications Inc. V. FCC and eventually saw them endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court in Trinko. The D.C. Circuit extended Justice Breyer's reason- ing to last-mile broadband networks when striking down the FCC's Line Sharing Order. The court noted that "mandatory unbundling comes at a cost, including disincentives to research and development by both ILECs and CLECs and the tan- gled management inherent in shared use of a common resource." In addition, the existence of intermodal competition from cable modem providers eliminated the need to impose unbundled access (U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 290 F.3d at 428-29, citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 416-17, 427-31). The FCC relied on many of these same insights in its Triennial Review Order, which eliminated UNE access to the high-frequency portion of the loop, fiber loops, and packet switching equipment. Extending unbundled access to last-mile broadband networks "would blunt the deployment of advanced telecommunica- tions infrastructure by incumbent LECs and the incentive for competitive LECs to invest in their own facilities." The FCC repeatedly acknowledged that the market for last-mile broadband services had grown increasingly competitive. Competition is better than unbundling because of the difficulties in allocating shared costs and resources (FCC 2003d). D. Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing If access to broadband inpu