h the network change dis- closure process, the web positing requirements, and tariffing requirements" as well as the costs of determining the proper regulatory classification under the Computer Inquiry regimes as well as the steps needed to comply with those restrictions (FCC 2005d, pp. 14890-91). In addition, the FCC noted how platform access "deter[s] broadband infras- tructure investment by creating disincentives to the deployment of facilities capable of providing invocative broadband Internet access services." The FCC found "this negative impact on deployment and innovation particularly troubling in view of Congress' clear and express policy goal of ensuing broadband deployment, and its directive that we remove barriers to that deployment." Giving network owners greater flexibility in their dealings with providers of complementary services will allow them to "take more risks in investing in and deploying new technologies." In addition, the fact that network owners are already confronted with powerful incentives to make transmission capacity available to providers of complemen- tary services absent regulation cut against the need for imposing platform access. Indeed, such incentives are likely to become even stronger as content and applica- tions providers develop and deploy VoIP and other innovative broadband service offerings (FCC 2005d, pp. 14865, 14877-78, 14891). 5. Unbundled Access Unbundled access is a right to parts of the incumbent's network given to competi- tors. Cable modem systems have never been subject to unbundling. As we describe above, the FCC initially subjected DSL systems to limited unbundling requirements, but has repealed most of those requirements over time. As we discuss at some length in Chapter 5, unbundled access disrupts network management to a greater degree than any other form of access. Unbundled access simultaneously supports complementary services, which tend to increase network demand, while diverting some traffic outside of the network, which tends to decrease Networks in T