htell Lipton, where we had all been ensconced for the last week. Goldman Sachs ran through the strategic rationale for making a bid for MediaOne, estimated the value of its piece parts, and presented a range of bids in terms of market benchmarks and the likely impact on AT&T's financial profile. The lawyers ran through the details of the Comcast merger agreement with MediaOne, outlined the major elements of AT&T's bid letter, and described the various legal and regulatory risks. Then Somers delivered the punch line-management wanted au- thorization to offer $30.85 in cash and 0.95 of a share of AT&T stock Say Good-Bye to the Rah-Rah Brother- and Sisterhood for each share of MediaOne. At that day's closing price, AT&T's offer would be worth $83.375 per MediaOne share, a I7 percent premium over Comcast's offer and a 44 percent premium over MediaOne's price just prior to Comcast's original bid. The cash portion of the bid alone might have trumped Comcast's bid. After all, Comcast's share price had declined by $10 a share since it made its bid. But to sweeten AT&T's offer, Goldman Sachs recommended that the company agree to what is called a "collar," which would increase the cash portion of the company's offer to compensate for as much as a IO percent drop in its stock price. There were also other inducements. AT&T's shares had full voting rights, whereas Comcast's didn't; Amos Hostetter, one of MediaOne's largest shareowners, supported AT&T's bid and would join the com- pany's board after the merger; AT&T would also add one of Media- One's existing directors to its board; and AT&T had much of its financing in place (Chase Manhattan and Goldman Sachs had com- mitted to lend the company $10 billion and saw no problem raising more for the cash portion of the offer), SO the company could move quickly. Following the bankers' presentations, the directors approved management's proposal. Then we waited for the markets to close SO that a Goldman Sachs banker could compute the up-to-the-minute value of AT&T's offer. When we h