ny consumer benefits, it necessarily requires subjecting the owner of the bottleneck facility to some form of price regulation. This reduction in price reduces the incentives for others to invest in the development of alternative sources of sup- ply of the input. Instead of entering under a price umbrella created by the input monopolist's efforts to maximize its own profits, any new entrant will confront a market with lower price-cost margins, which in turn makes sustainable entry even more difficult.47 As a result, compelled access can entrench the supposed bottle- neck facility by forestalling the emergence of the substitute sources of supply of the input, which in turn has the perverse effect of cementing the input owner's monopoly position into place. Compelled access also dampens the incentives of the essential facilities defen- dant to invest in improvements in its facilities, because price regulation will limit the returns it can earn on such investments and force it to share successful investments competitors. 48 Furthermore, because the monopoly is never displaced, the essential facilities doctrine implicitly presumes that supervision by antitrust courts will be indefinite. This is particularly problematic in technologically dynamic 46 Hylton (1991); Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008c). Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008c) argue that, in the absence of price regulation, compelled access does not preclude supracompetitive pricing. Ratner (1988) notes that monopoly pricing is a stimulus to develop independent capacity. Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008b) discuss the decrease in incentive to develop facilities arising from price regulation. Networks in Telecommunications industries. Even if the court strikes the proper balance at the time it renders its deci- sion, subsequent developments may alter the appropriate input price or may render competition in the input market possible. At best, economic welfare will suffer from some degree of delay, as the legal processes adjust to catch up with these changes. At worst, the disincent