ctions. These arguments bear close scrutiny, since it is the persuasiveness 22 Network neutrality proponents also oppose access tiering because end users will not be able to determine whether problems with latency are the responsibility of the network owner or of the content and applications provider (Lessig 2002). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has upheld a district court decision condoning the bundling of complementary services (in this case installation and service of a cable television system) with a monopoly product (in this case cable television equipment) in part on the grounds that, should problems with the system develop, consumers would be unable to determine whether the problems resulted from the equipment or the manner in which the equipment had been installed and maintained. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable to allow the provider to bundle them together during the initial growth phase of its business. United States V. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557-58, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961). In the words of one industry consultant, ""If I have an expanding business or I create a [high- bandwidth] application, I'd gladly pay for better service" (CIO Magazine 2006). Networks in Telecommunications of these justifications for overriding the needs of network management that will determine the overall convincingness of network neutrality proposals. As first discussed in Chapter 11, relying on capacity expansion to solve the problems related to congestion implicitly presumes that capacity will grow faster than network demand. Over the longer term, there is no compelling reason to believe a priori that that will be the case, especially given the number of would-be providers of bandwidth-intensive applications that are waiting in the wings and in light of the fact that the number of potential connections increases quadrat- ically as the number of end users connected to the system increases. Indeed, many observers take for granted the existence of a cadre of would-be pro