motional issues through nonpersonal media. This was something that the com- pany's senior managers had to tackle personally. The only problem was that they felt just as deceived, particularly when word began spreading that, after the various units were spun off, Armstrong planned to go with the broadband company. So we scheduled a half-day mandatory seminar for all the senior officers in AT&T Classic, about IOO people. And every session started with a presentation by Chuck Noski on the company's debt position. For the first time since the restructuring announcement, and perhaps even for months before that, AT&T officers just one or two levels below those of us who reported to Armstrong understood the situation we faced. And 90 percent said that the seminar not only better equipped them to communicate with their own people, but also in- creased their personal confidence in the company's direction. If they had one complaint, it was that we had not given them the information sooner. Tough Calls Postscript A year and a half later, eight of AT&T's eleven largest competitors had filed for bankruptcy, Qwest's CEO had been replaced amid an SEC investigation, and the telecom industry was in a shambles. The dean of telecom analysts, Howard Anderson, wrote an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal entitled "The Last Telecom Standing." Without explic- itly recanting his view that AT&T's restructuring was "silly," Anderson said, "If there's a medal for seeing a train wreck coming and getting your shareowners safely out of harm's way, [Armstrong] ought to get one." Anderson pointed out that each of AT&T's businesses, including the long-distance business, was better positioned than any of its rivals. "During all the wheeling and dealing," Anderson wrote, "Mr. Arm- strong made a couple of side bets few people noticed: He invested $35 billion in local and global services for business. Today he has the fastest-growing local operation, the strongest managed-services busi- ness, a state-of-the-art data Internet network, and one of the be