Areeda 1990, at 853) represents a rejection of courts' capacity to oversee access mandates. Indeed, Trinko's challenge to the courts' institutional competence goes 93 See, e.g., Bauer (2006, p. 1228) notes that Trinko called essential facilities doctrine "into serious question." Fox (2005, p. 154) claims that Trinko "nearly obliterated" essential facilities doctrine. Geradin and O'Donoghue (2005, p. 396 n. 104) argue that Trinko "cast[s] serious doubt on future reliance on the 'essential facilities' doctrine." Jacobs (2006, p. 1183) notes that Trinko "cast[s] very serious doubt on the vitality of [the essential facilities] doctrine." Keyte (2005, p. 44) notes that Trinko "clearly signaled that the demise of the essential facilities doctrine may be on the horizon." Noll (2005, p. 613 n. 47) notes that Trinko "all but abandoned the essential facilities doctrine." Shelanski (2007, p. 101) notes "the absence of a meaningful essential-facilities doctrine in U.S. antitrust law" after Trinko. Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries far beyond the critiques appearing in the earlier doctrines designed to allocate authority between courts and agencies. More than suggesting that courts should take advantage of agencies' superior expertise and factfinding capability by post- poning judicial consideration until after the agency had considered the matter, the language of the Trinko opinion, read for all it is worth, arguably takes mandating access to essential facilities outside the scope of Section 2 altogether (Hay 2005). Alternatively, other scholars have advanced narrower readings of Trinko. Build- ing on the requirement that state regulatory authorities must be actively supervising the conduct in question before courts will defer to their jurisdiction, these scholars suggest that determining the proper allocation of authority between antitrust courts and regulatory agencies requires a closer assessment of the details of the regulatory regime. The stronger form of this argument, advanced by Philip Weiser (2005, p. 562),