 al. 2001). Mark Lemley and Lawrence Lessig (2001) invoke similar concerns when they emphasize how much content and applications providers benefit from interoperable architectures that allow them to reach the widest customer base possible. The early lead established by cable modem providers can give them the power to harm competition. Specifically, the deployment of proprietary protocols can allow cable modem providers to act strategically to chill innovation in content and applications by reducing the number of end users who can be reached through a single network. In SO arguing, they emphasize the early lead taken by cable modem systems, as well as cable modem's advantages in delivering high-bandwidth applications such as video (see also Lessig 2002). As we noted in Chapter 4, concerns about existing market share are largely mis- placed in markets undergoing rapid growth. As the theoretical literature emphasizes, Networks in Telecommunications equilibria in markets subject to network economic effects depend not on current market shares, but rather on the market structure after the market has reached maturity. Put a different way, lock-in is unlikely to occur when competitors can compete for new customers. More fundamentally, the extensiveness of the literature analyzing how refusals to interconnect can harm competition often overshadows the fact that the primary impact of network economic effects is to provide powerful incentives for network owners to interconnect with one another. Furthermore, as we note in Chapter 4, the models in which network economic effects enable network owners to harm competition presume that the market is an oligopoly or dominated by a single firm. Competition among a sufficient number of equally sized players should be sufficient to eliminate any anticompetitive incentives to refuse to interconnect. Indeed, the FCC's Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Order took these considerations into account when it rejected arguments based on current market data as "limited and static" a