 Q2 then for Q in (0, 1), fQ(Q) = Q and for Q in [1, 2], fQ(Q) = 2 - Q. So > K}=1 Pr{Q < K}= 1 - FQ(K) = 2 - 2K K2/2. 18 Thus, for 1 < K < 2, (1 - K2/4) > (2 2K+ K2/2). Networks in Telecommunications loss. On the supply side, the price of retail access will reflect the marginal cost of providing capacity. The interplay between the demand and supply of capacity has important impli- cations for access regulation. For a particular demand for capacity and supply of capacity, there is a corresponding pattern of information loss. The probability of information loss provides a measure of the quality of service. Increasing access to the network corresponds to increased demand for transmission capacity. Without any adjustments in the level of capacity, greater access results in a higher likelihood of information loss, all other things equal. Thus, increased access results in a dimin- ished quality of service. In compelling access to data networks, regulators need to take account of network congestion and its implications for information loss. Compelled access corresponds to congestion and reduced quality of service. If it is necessary to compel access, and regulators do not wish to cause reductions in the quality of service, access prices must increase to discourage capacity usage and to provide greater incentives for networks to provide more capacity. The possibility of information loss occurs at times of peak demand. Clearly, there may be excess capacity in the system in times of off-peak demand. It is particularly difficult to predict peak usage on data networks because transmissions may have so-called bursts of usage. Unlike electric power usage, which can depend on weather patterns or the time of day, data networks are subject to the effects of random transmission requirements. However, periods of excess capacity should not suggest to regulators that capacity is free just because it is not in use. The level of capacity is chosen to provide a particular quality of service. Thus, excess capacity in off-peak times is si