rs by forcing network owners either to delay deployment of new technologies while reengineering their networks to comply with interconnection and interoperability requirements or, in the event that they are able to do SO economically, by forcing them to forego deploying the full increase in capability made possible by a particular innovation (FCC 2005d). Resolution of the network neutrality debate thus depends on a complete analysis of the transaction costs on both sides of the equation. Entry by providers of differentiated networks will not be instantaneous. Thus, even if monopolistic competition is likely to yield dynamic efficiency benefits over the long run, the inevitable delays in entry may force the market to incur short-run static efficiency losses. As noted in Chapter 4, whether the dynamic efficiency gains will dominate the static efficiency losses depends on a myriad of factors, including the magnitude of the gains and losses, the speed of entry, and the appropriate discount rate. Determining the welfare implications of network diversity requires a multifaceted inquiry that is not susceptible to a simple policy inference. Regulation tends to take the form of ex ante rules, and such rules tend to be ill suited to factually nuanced determinations. Regulation is an inherently blunt instrument that acts in a categorical, non-fact-specific manner. It is less well suited Networks in Telecommunications to resolving issues that demand detailed inquiry into the circumstances of individual cases. Some commentators attempt to avoid the clumsiness of ex ante regulation by urging the adoption of a general regulatory standard of nondiscriminatory access that leaves the details of the regulatory regime to be developed after the fact through case-by-case adjudication on an ex post basis. Although better able than ex ante regulation to take into account the context-specific considerations described above, such an approach threatens to stifle network diversity nonetheless. Even proponents of network diversity concede th