tion and auction policy. Some mechanism must also be devised to encourage more effective collaboration between different sectors of the industry, mobile broadband, public safety, broadcasting and the mobile satellite sector and closer economic integration of wireless, cable, copper and fibre delivery systems. Regulators are always under pressure to promote country-specific solutions to benefit their national stakeholders. The aim is laudable but history shows that this approach can be disastrous. In the early 1990s, Japan, at that time the world's second largest national econ- omy - went its own way with mobile cellular. As a result, Japanese manufacturers were left floundering, unable to service both a quirky domestic market and a brutally competitive global market. In the USA, Block A Purchasers rail against manufacturers who ignore their special needs. But manufacturers who wish to compete in the global market cannot afford to divert expensive engineering effort to rescue spectrum owners left stranded by poor regulation. In this context it is important to differentiate between constructive tension, the mechanism by which economic progress is achieved through efficiently ordered market competition and destructive tension, a general outcome of a poorly ordered market and misapplied regulatory intent. A similar differentiation can be made between constructive litigation, the valid arbitration of competing market interest and destructive litigation, the outcome of poorly implemented spectral and standards policy. Destructive litigation is unnecessary and wasteful but can be avoided provided potential causes are identified at an early stage - a challenge and opportunity for the regulatory community. Satellite Networks 16.1 Potential Convergence Getting coverage to deep rural areas or out at sea or on deserted mountain tops or in the middle of the desert where no one lives can be technically challenging and economically problematic. With the possible exception of coverage in the middle of the ocean, cellular network