ncluding Cellular South and US Cellular supported by Metro PCS and Cox Communications alleged that AT and T and Verizon Wireless misused their market dominance to prevent vendors from making user equipment and base Making Telecoms Work stations available capable of accessing the spectrum. The litigation and advocacy work was done through a 700 MHz Block A Good Faith Purchasers Alliance. Although Verizon had invested $2.57 billion in A block there were considerable performance costs implicit in adding the band to either Verizon or AT and T base station and user equipment. AT and T had no technical or commercial incentive to cover A Block and were more concerned as to how they repurposed and integrated the TDD bandwidth at channel 55 and 56 acquired from Qualcomm. For A block owners you could say this was either a case of caveat emptor or an example of the regulator bringing spectrum to market that was not fit for purpose. A regulatory environment that fails to take into account engineering reality inevitably results in the destruction of industry and end user value, trading short-term treasury gain against long-term loss to the national economy. In this case a $50 billion industry investment was compromised by the physical limitations of a few 50-cent components in the front end of a mobile broadband transceiver. 15.21.1 Other Prior and Present Examples One would have thought the FCC would have learnt from prior examples. In February 200219 a decision was taken to make bandwidth available between 3.1 and 10.6 GHz for ultrawideband technologies. The operational bandwidth was not acceptable in other countries. Other regula- tors responded with their own variations, thereby invalidating any potential business case for UWB. A decision to let the market decide on technology produced two competing standards that created additional market fragmentation. As suggested earlier, similar mistakes are being made on white-space legislation presently being introduced with minimal consideration for global spectral implications or