rks design and operation to assist NRAs. However, such an approach will be effective only with the approval of the tele- com operators; otherwise it may lead to confusion about responsibilities and duties between the NRA and operators. Requiring compensation to customers. This approach is not always possible (e.g. a missed voice call cannot be compensated It can be effective when customers can request compensation directly from operators without intervention by the NRA (or arbitrators). In that manner, compensation for QoS degradation is more likely to be paid for issues such as long service unavailability (e.g. due to longer repair times for the interruption) than in other cases of QoS degradation. Imposing fines. This approach is not always effective as it may seem because it can involve long legal processes (court processes), and is dependent upon the concrete legislation in the given country and the legal procedures for such cases. Also, fines may degrade the telecom operators' business (if they are too big) or have no effect at all (if they are too low). So, when fines are applied they should be proportional to the QoS degradations and should be beneficial to customers in obtaining better QoS. Price changing (such as the introduction of quality factors into price controls, with certain rewards for good QoS or penalties for bad QoS). Similar to imposing fines, this approach needs to be designed carefully to be helpful in improving QoS. This approach refers to the relation between QoS and pricing, which many times is not explicit or clear due to bundling of different services in the offers from telecom oper- ators to their customers (e.g. triple-play services based on bundling of voice, TV, and IAS). 9.9 Discussion Excluding access to licenses needed for telecom/ICT services. This is a drastic approach which is difficult to make it proportionate to QoS degradations by operators (because it intends to stop the given operators' operations). This measure can be effective when there is visible enough competition a