her small voice will fall short of the marginal cost of preventing network firms from realizing the available economies of scale. The problem is that arguments in favor of protecting small customers and speakers have historically failed to reflect any sense of optimality and have instead regarded additional diversity as an absolute good. 36 But the presence of scale economies underscores the basic fact that promoting diversity exacts a cost that must be traded off against the benefits of additional producers. As the D.C. Circuit has noted in a related context, "Everything else being equal, each additional 'voice' may be said to enhance diversity. But at some point, surely, the marginal value of 31 See, e.g., Liebman (1997, p. 833): "Should the populist ancestry of the Sherman Act be revisited to contend with telecommunications giants?" Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. V. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. V. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997). 33 Benkler (2000); Cooper (2003); Turner II, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring). 34 Rabin (1986); Hovenkamp (1988). 35 For a more general critique of attempts to build theories of media regulation on democratic principles, see Yoo (2003c). FCC (1970a); Cooper (2003). The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet such an increment in 'diversity' would not qualify as an 'important' governmental interest. Is moving from 100 possible combinations to 101 'important'?" (Time Warner Entm't Co. V. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). More recent pronouncements have begun to acknowledge that not "each and every incremental increase in the number of outlet owners can be justified as necessary in the public interest" and that "there certainly are points of diminishing returns in incremental increases in diversity" (FCC 2003c, p. 13631). That said, the approach has remained decidedly ad hoc. As a result, those who take seriously the admonition that it takes a model to beat a model will be d