 cellular provider contained a similar equal access requirement before the case was mooted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 111 To facilitate enforcement of equal access, the Modification of Final Judgment included line-of-business restrictions prohibiting the newly divested local telephone companies from offering long distance or information services or manufacturing CPE. To ensure that the local telephone companies did not evade rate regulation by entering into an unregulated complementary market, the Modification of Final Judgment included a catch-all line of business restriction prohibiting them from 108 MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-3; Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 195-97. 109 Kellogg et al. (1992). 110 United States V. GTE Corp., 603 F. Supp. 730, 743-44 (D.D.C. 1984). 111 Huber et al. (1999). Networks in Telecommunications "provid[ing] any other product or service, except [local telephone service], that is not a natural monopoly service actually regulated by tariff" (Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 228). There is considerable irony that platform access is where antitrust plaintiffs have fared the best. The economic logic suggests that the anticompetitive risks surrounding platform access are much lower than those of other forms of access and are in the process of being rendered nonexistent in the telecommunications in- dustry by the emergence of wireless and other alternatives to conventional local telephone service. As noted earlier, an exception exists when the underlying markets are subject to rate regulation. This exception, however, is largely inapposite in the telecommunications context, because many telecommunications markets, such as broadband and wireless, have never been subject to rate regulation, and the others have already been rate deregulated or are now on their way to becoming SO. Indeed, the extent to which the emergence of last-mile competition has under- cut the justification for imposing platform access is well illustrated by the D.C. Circuit's decision h