hese strict controls, although even when the Securities and Exchange Commission tightened rules on financial disclosure in 2000, it wasn't at all clear that they applied to journalists. The real reason for the controls, of course, was that in fast-moving industries, information is power. Releasing information at the wrong time or in the wrong way can put the company at a Tough Calls distinct competitive or regulatory disadvantage. For example, in 1996, when word of a new wireless service leaked the day before AT&T's scheduled announcement, several competitors were able to throw water on it before it even happened. Leaks fall into two categories: the malicious and the careless. Delib- erate leaks increase in inverse proportion to company loyalty, SO any company that is experiencing high stress is vulnerable, and as in one's personal life, even positive change is stressful. Outsiders, of course, are never confused about where their loyalty belongs-they will trade on a company's private information whenever it benefits them. AT&T was essentially a case history of seemingly malicious leaks. At one point, I had my staff review every major AT&T announcement between 1995 and 1997. The biggest ones-Trivestiture, John Walter's hiring and resignation, changes in our earnings outlook-never leaked. Almost all the stories that did leak involved people who were new to the company or weren't getting along with the "headquarters" types. For example, every major announcement involving AT&T Wire- less leaked prematurely. And the Internet talent hired to goose the company's nascent efforts in that area played their Rolodexes as hard as their PCs. Many leaks are simply rumors with a press pass. When employees know that something is going on, but can't get anyone to tell them what it is, they fill in the blanks for themselves. Since they are on the inside and understand the company at least as well as their bosses do, their educated guesses are often correct. When rumors fly freely, one of those rumors is bound to land on a reporter'