rks technological change. The differences in compensation regimes allow providers to engage in regulatory arbitrage by altering access rates simply by changing the way that service is characterized or by making relatively small technological changes. Consider, for example, the proper categorization of the first generation of Internet service providers, such as the original services offered by CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online, which established local offices housing modem banks through which consumers could connect to the Internet through their dial-up modems. It is possible to conceptualize the access provided to these companies in any one of four ways. First, these companies could be regarded simply as end users purchasing business lines from the local telephone company, in which case they would be provided service through retail access (FCC 1983c, 1997). Second, these companies could also be characterized as providing complementary services, in which case they would receive service via platform access. Third, these companies could declare themselves to be specialized local telephone companies serving a single customer and seek service through interconnection access. Fourth, these companies could use unbundled access to purchase all of the elements they needed to provide service to their end customers. These difficulties would be of little concern if a single, consistent pricing regime applied to all of these different types of access. Unfortunately, different types of access are governed by different ratemaking approaches and are often imposed by different regulatory entities. The result is that different methodologies apply to rates established for each different type of access. The inconsistency raises the possibility that firms will attempt to manipulate the categories of access in order to engage in regulatory arbitrage. The most prominent example of this is the controversy over UNE-P. During the early years following the enactment of the 1996 Act, a carrier that wished to compete without providing a