sity and by biasing the market against certain types of applications. It can have the perverse effect of reinforcing the sources of market failure used to justify regulatory intervention in the first place. It can further entrench monopoly power by dampening incentives to invest in alternative network neutrality. Instead, public policy might be better served if policymakers were to embrace network diversity. Doing SO would permit end users to enjoy the benefits of prod- uct variety. Network diversity also has the potential to mitigate the supply-side and demand-side scale economies that concentrate telecommunications markets and to make it easier for multiple networks to coexist. The more restrained approach inherent in network diversity is also more consistent with the current understand- ing of the institutional capabilities of courts and agencies. It also accommodates technological dynamism and humility by providing maximum room for experi- mentation and development. This is not to say that policy makers should reject network neutrality once and for all. What is called for is a sense of balance and optimality that can adjust with the circumstances. But in the face of technological uncertainty, the more appropriate and humble approach would appear to favor forbearance from mandating any particular architecture. The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet: Network Neutrality versus Network Capacity During the Internet's initial, narrowband phase of development, Internet service providers (ISPs) pursued a variety of architectural approaches. Some ISPs, such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online, initially adopted relatively restrictive policies, which only provided end users with access to proprietary applications and content and charged them for network usage on a per-minute basis. Others followed a more permissive approach, opening up their networks to all content and applica- tions providers on a nondiscriminatory basis and allowing end users to download any content, run any application, and att