oadband penetration is generally greater in countries with a well-developed, independent cable television sector. Those with the great- est broadband penetration, such as Belgium, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands, have a substantial number of cable modem connections (see figure 9-1). For this reason, the European Commission's policy has con- centrated on encouraging the separation of cable television ownership from the ownership of incumbent telephone companies and forcing local loop unbundling. Neither has been very successful. Germany's attempt to force Deutsche Telekom to divest itself of its extensive cable assets was slowed for a variety of reasons. And unbundling simply has not led to a vibrant, inde- pendent DSL sector, as figure 9-1 shows. Only Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands have any measurable unbundling or line sharing for indepen- dent DSL operators. For the entire European Union, these companies accounted for only 1.4 million lines out of a total of 22.5 million broad- band connections in December 2003. 21 Europe also allows entrants to resell the incumbents' DSL facilities through "bitstream access" to the incumbents' DSL services. This bitstream access and simple resale ac- counted for another 3.2 million lines. Thus, even by the most expansive definition of competition from nonincumbent providers of DSL, these new entrants accounted for just 4.6 million lines in December 2003, or slightly more than 20 percent of the total broadband market, with 70 per- cent of it through resale. The New Entrants As in the United States, the new entrants into the telecommunications sector in Europe are struggling. By 2001 entrants had obtained somewhat less than 20 percent of telecom revenues (table 9-2), but these entrants reached only a small share of their subscribers directly over their own facil- ities. Most of the entrants therefore offer calling services over the incum- bents' lines, exploiting arbitrage opportunities between regulated wholesale rates and retail rates. The EU entrants that have bu