 of the household's local bill on a set of dummy variables for each calling feature- call waiting, voice messaging, number identification, call forwarding, and SO forth-and the number of lines. According to the results, the prices of new entrants' calling features were very similar to those offered by the incumbents. 44. A personal history of the CLECs, written by Martin F. McDermott III, a chief mar- keting officer for two CLECs, admits that the CLECs had little to offer customers other Notes to Pages 44-54 than 15 to 20 percent lower rates. See McDermott, CLEC: An Insider's Look, chaps. 11 and 13. 45. The TNS database, drawn from household bills across the country, identifies the household's local carrier and has local billing information for that carrier, but it does not provide the opportunity set of carriers facing any given household. 46. By December 2001, there was at least one CLEC in zip codes that contained 91.2 percent of the country's households and two or more CLECs in zip codes that con- tained 82.7 percent of the country's households. FCC, Local Telephone Competition, table 15. 47. Ibid., table 2. 48. Robert W. Crandall, "An Assessment of the Competitive Local Exchange Carriers Five Years after the Passage of the Telecommunications Act" (www.criterioneconomics. com/docs/Crandall%20CLEC.pd [accessed December 26, 2004]). 49. There were thirteen carriers in this group: Allegiance, US LEC, Covad, DSLNet, Elec Communications, Focal, ITC DeltaCom, Mpower, Network Access, North Pitts- burgh, PacWest, Primus, and Z-tel. I do not attempt to extend this calculation beyond 2001 revenues because of the widespread failures and the lack of data on switched access lines for the dwindling number of survivors. 50. These carriers were Adelphia Business Systems, CoreComm, CTC, CapRock, and McLeod. 51. These carriers were Allied Riser, Cogent, Cypress, Electric Lightwave, GCI, RCN, XO, Time Warner Telecom, USOL, and Winstar. 52. FCC, Local Telephone Competition, table 5. 53. Estimates based on various press releases a