 the network owner's control. In addition, it forces network owners to develop systems for provisioning and monitoring network usage at points that would not otherwise be available to customers or other carriers. As Justice Breyer noted in criticizing the 1996 Act's UNE access requirements in Iowa Utilities Board: The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation to the firm's managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, the more likely these costs will become serious. And the more serious they become, the more likely they will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing requirement might otherwise provide. He further observed that unbundled access "can have significant administrative and social costs inconsistent with the Act's purposes." If taken to an extreme, "[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or element of a business would create, not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant terms." Most problematically, unbundled access delays the emergence of facilities-based competition by deterring investment in alternative last-mile facilities. Justice Breyer The Regulation of Local Telephone Networks described how unbundled access reduces incumbents' incentives to invest in their own networks when he pointed out that unbundled access may diminish the original owner's incentive to keep up or to improve the prop- erty by depriving the owner of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or labor. [One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake the investment necessary to produce complex technological innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from those innovations will be dissipated by the sharing requirement. (525 U.S. at 428-29) In Verizon V. FCC, Justice Breyer reiterated the negative impact of unbundled access on incumbents' incentive "either to innovate or to invest in a new "element." Unbundled access envisions "that the incumbent will share with competitors the c