e the achievement of real efficiencies by using tighter integration through inventory man- agement and electronic data interchange to reduce costs. Department stores often try to promote their popularity by entering into exclusivity arrangements with key manufacturers, sometimes even establishing boutiques in portions of their stores. Requiring department stores to provide nondiscriminatory access to all manufac- turers would thus prevent them from pursuing one of the best entry strategies available to new entrants. Indeed, this type of strategic partnership between man- ufacturers and retailers appears to have played a critical role in promoting the growth of the cable industry (Owen and Rosston 2006). This mechanism for pro- moting entry would be frustrated by regulations mandating open access to the retail platform. This underscores the extent to which mandating access to a bottleneck facility represents surrender to the monopoly. The normal response of competition policy when it encounters monopolies is to break them up or at least to prevent them from getting any worse. Mandating interconnection deviates from this tradition by addressing the symptoms of monopoly power without treating its causes. Instead of breaking up the monopoly, access leaves it in place and only requires that it be shared. Furthermore, approaches that break up monopolies necessarily have built-in exit strategies embedded within them. Mandated sharing of a bottleneck facility, in contrast, implicitly envisions that the monopoly, and thus the regime of regulatory oversight, will persist indefinitely. Such an approach might be appropriate if entry by a competitor to the bottle- neck were impossible, as was arguably the case when the FCC and the courts relied on interconnection and standardization to promote competition in CPE, long dis- tance, and enhanced services. In that event, any reduction of incentives to invest in alternative network capacity would be beside the point, because such entry would be impossible. The situation is quite d