can impact the subscriber and/or the network. 3GPP UE security framework provides the following features for storage of UE credentials: integrity protection of the subscription credential(s); confidentiality protection of the 5G Network Architecture long-term key(s) of the subscription credential(s); and execution of the authentication algo- rithm(s) that make use of the subscription credentials. These features must be implemented in the UE, with using a tamper resistant secure hardware component. The subscriber identity module (SIM) functions for 5G are inherited from previous standards. Similar to LTE sys- items, the 5G USIM will be able to generate symmetric keys. It may also be able to generate new asymmetric key pairs and even new trusted public keys. Network slicing requires basic security from the UE side when accessing a slice; however, this is not trivial and there are new security challenges. The slice isolation must be ensured for network slices, without which attackers who access to one slice may attempt an attack to other slices. Proper isolation will enable integrity and confidentiality protection. Moreover, it should be ensured that resources of the network infrastructure or an NSI are not impacted from another slice instance, to minimize attacks and to provide availability. 5G UE can simultaneously access to different network slices for multiple services. Such access can be via various type of RANs including both 3GPP and non-3GPP access. When the network slice selection data is tampered, unauthorized UEs may use such information to establish connection with the network slice and consume network resources. On the other hand, the advantage of network slicing is that operators are able to provide customized security for each slice. Different access authentication and authorization can be provided within different network slice tenants that can be extended to host applications. In order to support network-controlled privacy of slice information for the slices that the UE can access, the UE must be ma