 into interLATA long-distance service in the state. However, the number of entrants using UNE loops is not a good indicator of the degree of sustain- able competition. Many of the public firms using UNE loops have failed or are failing, and the private companies are very small in general. These findings may reflect the fact that states ultimately use the appearance of competition, in the form of UNE-based entry, to justify Section 271 ap- proval, not that such approval creates sustainable entry. Indeed, as I have just shown, the number of lines accounted for by entrants generally rises following Bell company entry into long distance as MCI (WorldCom) and AT&T accelerate their use of the UNE platform to try to stave off Bell company competition for long-distance customers. One may quibble over whether entry by the long-distance carriers through the use of the ILEC platform is competition in any real sense. Recall that I was unable to find any effect of CLEC entry on local residen- tial rates through mid-2001. 60 The extent of this type of competition may be limited because the entrants have little new to offer through this exten- sion of resale. But even if the CLECs could continue to enroll customers through the use of the UNE platform, they would not likely prosper by Local Competition under the 1996 Act Figure 4-6. Effect of Bell Company entry on CLEC Competition, 1999-2003 CLEC share (percent) New York Massachusetts Texas United States 1999: 4 2000: 2000: 2001: 2001: 4 2002:2 2002: 2003: 2003: 4 Year and quarter Source: FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2003 (June 2004), Table 7. doing SO. Anyone can resell the incumbents' facilities in this way; indeed, arbitrageurs such as Birch, Z-Tel, Talk America, and IDT (through its Winstar division) were already doing SO before the Court of Appeals brought this policy to a virtual halt in 2004. Therefore margins would surely have been driven down to very low levels by entrants using the in- cumbents' platforms. AT&T and MCI may have enjoyed a 