rds may emerge despite the presence of network externalities if "consumers care more about product attributes than network size." Liebowitz and Margolis (2001, pp. 21-22) similarly note that the "greater the gap in performance between the two standards, the more likely that a move to the efficient standard will take place." Network Regulation Basics which will help minimize any slippage caused by the existence of the network externality. Furthermore, because large users are in a position to capture a dispro- portionate share of the benefit resulting from the adoption of a new technology, they have a significant incentive to make the investments needed to begin the shift toward the new technology (Katz and Shapiro 1986, 1994; Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). 25 Indeed, formal models of such market structures indicate that "the sponsor of a new technology earns greater profits than its entry contributes to social wel- fare. In other words, markets with network externalities in which new technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias towards new technologies" (Katz and Shapiro 1992, p. 73). 26 Far from being a bane, the existence of large players may be a blessing in disguise. In addition, significant growth in market size can render network externalities irrelevant. If an industry is undergoing explosive growth, market outcomes are determined by the adoption decisions of future users, and not the decisions of the users who have already committed to a particular network. In such cases, the fact that a particular network may currently dominate a market is of little consequence. People concerned about lock-in will focus on the network that will exist in the future, not the one that exists today. Determining the optimal number of networks and the optimal timing of tech- nological change requires a careful balance of the relevant costs and benefits. In striking this balance, policy makers should bear in mind that standardizing on a sin- gle network and slowing the pace with which one network is superseded by another can reduc