nd incomplete for "fail[ing] to recognize the dynamic nature of marketplace forces." Emerging markets such as broadband are "more appropriately analyzed in view of larger trends in the marketplace, rather than exclusively through the snapshot data that may quickly and predictably be rendered obsolete as this market continues to evolve." In particular, at the time of the order, broadband penetration rates had only reached 20%, whereas industry analysts fore- cast that penetration would eventually reach 90%. Thus, it mattered little that the cable modem industry had taken the early lead. DSL continued to emerge as an effective competitor. In addition, "emerging broadband platforms exert competi- tive pressure even though they currently have few subscribers compared with cable modem service and DSL-based Internet access service." Competition among cur- rent and emerging broadband platforms provided sufficient incentives to provide access in the absence of government intervention to justify deregulation of last-mile wireline broadband networks (FCC 2005d, pp. 14880-85, 14895). 3. Vertical Exclusion Calls for regulation of last-mile broadband networks often invoke the threat of ver- tical exclusion. Concern that local telephone companies would use their monopoly control over the local loop to discriminate against unaffiliated enhanced and infor- mation service providers represented the central concern underlying the Computer Inquiries as well as the initial application of the UNE access requirements of the 1996 Act to DSL. Vertical exclusion also represents the central justification for proposals for multiple ISP access to cable modem systems. It also undergirds the ongoing debate over "network neutrality" (discussed at greater length in Chapter 11 and 12), which would give content and application providers nondiscriminatory access to all last-mile broadband networks. As we discuss in Chapter 4, certain structural preconditions must be met in order to state a claim of vertical exclusion. Specifically, the primary and 