es that would limit it to ordinary returns. In addition, the would-be builder would not find a group of content and applications providers clamoring for additional access, because mandating interconnection to the existing platform would rescue them from having to invest in alternative distribution arrangements. In the process, network neutrality risks reducing incentives to invest in new last-mile technologies to the extent that it cements the existing last-mile oligopoly in place. Although such a policy might be justifiable if entry by alternative network capacity were impossi- ble, it is indefensible when 3G, WiFi, powerline, and other technologies are actively searching for capital to support their deployment and when the state of the art in transmission is undergoing rapid technological change. At best, the inevitable lag in enacting new regulations will cause economic losses. At worst, by destroying incentives to build new technologies and to reinvest in existing technologies, reg- ulation might itself be the cause, rather than the consequence, of market failure. Under these circumstances, mandating network neutrality would appear to pose a serious threat to dynamic efficiency. It is for this reason that the FCC has repeatedly stated that its decisions with respect to broadband will be guided by the principle that "broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive market" (FCC 2002b, p. 3022; accord FCC 2002c). The manner in which lack of interconnection can stimulate investment in new networks is eloquently demonstrated by the fact that major complementary services and equipment providers, such as Google, EarthLink, IBM, Intel, and Disney, have each undertaken major investment in alternative broadband technologies in the wake of the Supreme Court's Brand X decision. 30 Embracing network diversity policy, in contrast, would thus appear to provide substantial incentives to support the build-out of new last-mile facilities. Atlanta Jour