xpanded channel capacity. 30 In the case of broadband, policymakers are focused on developing infra- structure competition without any concern for creating the complemen- tary products required for this infrastructure to spread. Indeed, rather than encouraging the development of intellectual property through vertical inte- gration, they often attempt to impede vertical integration through open- access requirements, separate subsidiary mandates, and tough merger stan- dards. For instance, when AOL and Time Warner merged, the Federal Trade Commission required that the AOL-Time Warner cable systems pro- vide access to ISP competitors of AOL. 31 Subsequently, the FCC imposed a number of conditions before approving the AOL-Time Warner merger: First, we find that the proposed merger would give AOL-Time Warner the ability and incentive to harm consumers in the residential high-speed Internet access services market by blocking unaffiliated ISPs' access to Time Warner cable facilities and by otherwise discrim- inating against unaffiliated ISPs in the rates, terms, and conditions of access. To remedy this harm, this Order conditions approval of the merger on certain conditions relating to AOL Time Warner's con- tracts and negotiations with unaffiliated ISPs. Second, we find that the merger would make it more likely that AOL Time Warner would be able to solidify its dominance in the high-speed access market by obtaining preferential carriage rights for AOL on the facilities of other cable operators. We particularly find that the merger would harm the public interest by allowing for greater coordinated action between AOL Time Warner and AT&T in the provision of residential high-speed Internet access services. To remedy these harms, we impose a condi- tion forbidding the merged firm from entering into contracts with AT&T that would give AOL exclusive carriage or preferential terms, conditions and prices. Third, we find that the proposed merger would enable AOL Time Warner to dominate the next generation of The Broadband Revol