 to take off until after the Supreme Court's 1998 ruling in the AT&T V. Iowa Utilities Board case overturned the Eighth Circuit, affirming the viability of UNE-P as well as of the FCC's TELRIC price formula. It was a landmark vic- tory for CLECs. UNE Platform, with its wholesale price to the CLECs not coupled to ILEC retail tariffs, was cheaper than total service resale in urban areas, especially for business subscribers. It was usually even cheaper for residential service, at least once a few options were figured in. That was another difference between cost-based rates and resale; because features like call waiting and caller ID did not cost much to provision, they did not cost much as part of UNE switching. The ILECs' rate structure was thus in serious risk of being shattered. The ILECs did not embrace this excuse to migrate to a more cost-based rate structure them- selves; rather, they continued to apply political and legal pressure to shut down UNE-P. After receiving Section 271 authority to offer long distance, RBOCs took competition a bit more seriously, introducing more competitive bundles of local and long distance service. Of course it was the big long distance carriers, AT&T and MCI, that most strongly embraced UNE-P, largely because of one other detail that distinguished it from resale. Under UNE-P, the CLEC was the carrier of record, not the ILEC; the CLEC was merely outsourcing a number of tasks (well, an awful lot of them) to the ILEC. And thus the long distance carri- ers owed their switched access charges to the UNE-P CLEC, not the underlying ILEC. When the long distance carrier was the CLEC, it was thereby able to avoid a substantial part of its own expenses by paying them to itself. Some of the UNE-P CLECs were in the Centrex business, selling complex business telephone systems using ILEC switches. This was one of the first items to be challenged under the necessary and impair test. Centrex competed directly with PBX systems, which were widely available, SO it was evident that competi- tion for 