erefore encouraged incumbents to continue to invest in facilities that they could totally control. In one docket (FCC 02-33), the FCC suggested withdrawing common carrier obligations from ILECs when they pro- vided "broadband" service, such as DSL or T1 data lines. This would permit them to cut off access to all the independent ISPs that depended on ILEC DSL services. Combined with the failure of the DLECs, ISPs would be drowned, leaving ILEC- and cable-captive ISPs with a duopoly. Powell's view was at best only remotely tied to the obvious intent of the Telecom Act, but it had support from some quarters who blamed the meltdown on the Telecom Act and upon The Great Telecom Meltdown the competitors that it spawned. And it made him very popular among the ILECs, which of course also owned the largest wireless carriers. The Triennial Review Order Fiasco On February 20, 2003, the FCC announced that it had reached consensus on UNEs. This decision was known as the Triennial Review Order, as the FCC had said that it had planned to review its three-year-old UNE rules anyway. The actual text of the TRO did not come out until six months later! Clearly, the FCC had not reached agreement; the text, more than 500 pages long, was filled with personal jabs between the commissioners. The TRO was a complex mass of compromises. Its key feature was that in many key areas, it passed the issue of determining "impairment," a prerequisite to unbundling, to the states. The final determination on preserving UNE Platform was left to the states, which could make a finding of no impairment. The TRO also passed the key issue of dedi- cated interoffice transport to the states. It provided guidelines for determining when there was sufficient competition, on a route-by-route basis, to permit an ILEC to limit its availability at DS1 and DS3 rates. Similar tests were created for dark- fiber and high-capacity (DS1 and above) local loops. CLECs around the country were then asked to provide their state commissions with details of their network facili