without a physical occupation. First, the Court acknowledged that a rate regulation may Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871); Transp. Co. V. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642-43 (1878); Meyer V. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82, 99 (1898). For reviews of early Takings Clause jurisprudence, see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. V. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325 n. 21 (2002); and Lucas V. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). Constitutional Limits on the Pricing of Access to Networks effect a taking if the rate is set SO low as to be confiscatory. Second, the Court recognized that the government may effect a taking without physical occupation or appropriation if it "goes too far" in limiting the owner's use of his or her property. a. Confiscatory Rate-Making Confiscatory rate-making doctrine is rooted in the notion that although regulators may limit the prices that certain industries charge for their services, "it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation." As a result, the Court acknowledged that the Constitution forbids rates that are set SO low as to be confiscatory. Although earlier Court opinions were unclear as to whether confiscatory rate-making doctrine was based on takings or due process principles, subsequent decisions clarified that the doctrine stems from the Takings Clause (Ely 1995). The methodology on which a particular rate is based does not determine whether it is confiscatory. Instead, determining whether a particular rate falls within the zone of reasonableness involves a "balancing of the investor and the consumer interests." Rates are constitutional SO long as they provide a return on equity that is sufficient to cover operating expenses, allow returns that are "commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks," and are "sufficient to assure confidence in the financial int