 called and suggested just that. The only person who stood to lose if a deal went through was John Walter. Now, unfortunately, Allen was caught in a two-way negotiation as he contended not only with SBC but with all the forces opposed to a merger. In addition, he couldn't argue in favor of a deal that he couldn't acknowledge. The only voices being heard were those of com- petitors, consumer advocates, and other pundits who opposed the deal on the principle that big is bad. Our policy of not commenting on such rumors was based on an SEC rule that would require us to comment whenever there was a substantial change in the situation we had commented on. So, for example, if we confirmed that we were talking to SBC, we would then have to announce it if we ended the talks. If they started again, we would have to announce that. And there was even a legal opinion that if we started talking to someone else about the same thing, we would have to announce that. And SO forth. Making all these announcements would box us in, SO it was easier and more prudent to avoid comment- ing as a matter of policy. Of course, once you have such a policy, you have to stick to it or reporters can start reading meaning into what you don't say as well as what you do say. Meanwhile, the company's critics used the merger rumors as proof that AT&T was never serious about competing with the local phone companies. It wanted to be one! Setting the Record Straight We decided to set the record straight. We chose as the venue a speech that Allen was scheduled to give to the CEO Club of Boston on June 9. The speech was designed to make three points: (I) We were com- mitted to offering local service and were prepared to go it alone, even though it had been slow going because of the Bell monopolies' foot- dragging, (2) no local Bell company should be allowed into long dis- tance until it opens its markets as required by the Telecom Act, and (3) mergers between long-distance companies and the Bell companies should not be unthinkable if they really lead to g