such as the new local entrants (CLECs), are by and large resellers and arbi- trageurs that have a limited array of services and cannot develop innovative ones. Long-distance carriers or independent wireless companies may own their own transmission and switching facilities, but-other than Sprint- they cannot match the diverse service offerings of the Bell companies or the cable companies. Without this breadth, marketing costs are likely to be pro- hibitive. Whereas the Bell and cable companies can advertise and promote a large number of services simultaneously, less diverse carriers may pay just as much to promote a single service. Unless it is an innovative service not available from the Bell companies or the cable companies, the marketing cost per actual enrollee makes the service uneconomical. All in all, in the aftermath of the major shakeout of new local carriers and long-distance companies, the Bell companies are now in a position to offer residences and small businesses an array of communications services, other than video, that only Sprint can match. The Death of Distance and of the Long-Distance Carriers efore 1970 there were no separate, independent long-distance carriers in the United States. As in other countries, long-distance service was provided by integrated companies that offered local connections and long distance. AT&T, the leading carrier, provided access to more than 80 per- cent of local access lines and virtually all interstate long-distance service in the country. Entry in long-distance services first appeared in the 1970s, not necessarily because nonintegrated entry made economic sense but because state and federal regulators overpriced long-distance service. If entrants such as MCI or Sprint could gain access to AT&T's and other local com- panies' lines to originate and terminate calls, they could compete with AT&T in long distance because of these very high regulated rates. When AT&T tried to deny access to entrants, the antitrust authorities intervened and sued AT&T under the Sherman Ac