o compete directly with the alleged bottleneck are the brightest. And even if a regulatory regime were defensible when imposed, it all too often endures long after technological change has eroded its justifications (Posner 1969; Kahn 1971; Breyer 1982). Finally, there is good reason to question the extent to which rate-making author- ities will make the pursuit of economic efficiency their primary goal. As demon- strated by the burgeoning literature on public choice, governmental institutions are subject to a wide variety of pressures that can cause them to redirect competition policy towards noneconomic ends. 5 The system of cross subsidies in telephone pric- ing aptly illustrates how governmentally established pricing can be directed toward political and social goals, and how such pricing is an imperfect guide to allocating goods and services or making investment decisions (Kaserman and Mayo 1994). A review of a previous attempt by the FCC to promote competition through access requirements provides little basis for optimism in this regard (Yoo 2005). The end result is similar to any system of rent controls, with demand for the service exceeding supply at the regulated price. Regulated prices do not fully serve their function of rationing user capacity and stimulating the provision of supplier capacity. In contrast, market prices send correct signals to companies that seek For an earlier discussion of the dynamic efficiency problems posed by access regulation, see Yoo (2002). See Posner (1969); Stigler (1971); Peltzman (1976); Baumol and Ordover (1985); McChesney (1995). Networks in Telecommunications access as well as to utilities that provide access. Competing companies will have incentives to make economically correct decisions about the amount of services to obtain from the network access supplier and the extent to which they should invest in their own network services. 2. The Difference between Market Prices and Unit Costs As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the market price of a good is the best indi