 Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); U.S. Telecom Ass'n V. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428-9 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008c). See Bolter et al. (1984); Ordover and Baumol (1988). Network Regulation Basics number of institutional considerations militate in favor of the dynamic efficiency side of the balance. For example, calibrating the prices needed to implement rate regulation and access regulation will necessarily require the government to engage in an exquisite exercise in line drawing that requires a careful and fact-intensive balance of opposing considerations. This is made all the more complicated by the rapid pace with which the underlying technology and the demands that consumers are placing on the network are changing. The fact that regulatory processes invari- ably take several months to complete makes it inevitable that, even under the best of circumstances, rate and access regulation will be subject to a degree of regulatory lag. In the worst case, as many noted commentators have observed, it can cause regulation to endure long after technological change has eroded its justifications (Posner 1969; Kahn 1971; Breyer 1982). On the other hand, promoting dynamic efficiency allows regulatory authorities to focus on stimulating entry by new net- work platforms, which should represent a policy goal that is considerably easier to implement. Perhaps even more importantly, promoting entry has embedded within it a built-in exit strategy. Once a sufficient number of broadband network platforms exist, regulatory intervention will no longer be necessary. This stands in stark contrast to rate regulation and access-oriented solutions, which implicitly presume that regulation will continue indefinitely. The impact of this critique has been quite influential. The conventional wisdom has now largely abandoned its hostility toward vertical integration. 38 The manner in which technology is in the process of increasing the competitiveness of all segments of the telecommunications industry and the real effic