es in which technological change is forcing the natural interfaces between firms to shift constantly. As discussed in Chapter 8, the FCC and the court overseeing the breakup of AT&T and the FCC had to create an elaborate set of rules forcing the local telephone companies to undertake certain modifications, limiting their ability to change their interfaces, and requiring them to provide advance notice of any changes that would be approved. The platform access mandated by the Computer Inquiries had a similar effect. Forcing such questions to be decided as a matter of regulation represented a significant hindrance in such a technologically dynamic industry. Furthermore, like any form of compelled access, platform access requires direct regulation of prices in order to be effective. As Trinko recognized, price regulation is not a task to which antitrust courts are particularly well suited. For example, as noted earlier, the Kingsbury Commitment required that AT&T make its long distance network available to independent local telephone companies. The problem was that the decree allowed AT&T to charge prices that were SO unattractive as to render this form of platform access useless (Mueller 1997). Most problematic is platform access's long-run impact on dynamic efficiency. As noted earlier, the primary policy goal should be to promote entry in those segments of the industry that are the least competitive. Only if competition in a particular segment proves unsustainable should policymakers pursue the second- best policy goal of promoting competition in complementary services. At the time of the consent decree settling the government's 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T, entry by competitive local telephone providers was thought to be Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries infeasible, making the promotion of competition in long distance and informa- tion services a legitimate policy goal. After competition between local telephone providers became feasible, platform access became counterproductive. Long dis- tance provi