ake space available to all manufacturers on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis would discourage entry by a second department store. Although entrants often 26 The FCC's experience with a broadcast regulation known as the financial interest and syndication rules ("finsyn") illustrates how imposing rate regulation discourages investment in alternative networks. Finsyn attempted to curb the dominant positions held by ABC, CBS, and NBC by limiting the extent to which networks could take ownership stakes in the programming that they televised. Reducing the profitability of networking had the inevitable consequence of deterring entry by new networks. This is confirmed by the fact that the Fox network was unable to enter successfully until it obtained a waiver from finsyn (FCC 1990; Chen 1996). The courts eventually struck down finsyn as arbitrary and capricious (Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. V. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992); Capital Cities/ABC V. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994)). The rules were eliminated shortly thereafter (FCC 1995d). 27 AT&T V. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428-29 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 28 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1002; AT&Tv Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388-89; U.S. Telecom Ass'n V. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008c, pp. 242-46). 29 Rogerson (2000a); Speta (2004). Networks in Telecommunications find it profitable to enter into competition with a monopolist earning monopoly rents, this incentive is reduced if rate regulation precludes any such rents from being earned. In addition, the frustrated manufacturers who would otherwise be eager to support construction of a second department store would also lose their enthusiasm for the project. Furthermore, compelling access to the department store shelves would also limit the ability of stores to control whether an appro- priate mix of goods was represented or to ensure that the goods satisfied certain quality standards. Preventing consolidation with manufacturers can preclud