rmining what constitutes a reasonable price. 79 Commentators have invoked the difficulties that antitrust courts face in imple- menting access mandates when criticizing the essential facilities doctrine. As Philip Areeda notes in his now-classic critique of the essential facilities doctrine (1990, p. 853), "No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremediable by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency."80 Areeda elaborated on this critique in his treatise. As the current version (now coauthored with Herbert Hovenkamp) notes, if access is compelled without any restrictions being placed on the price charged, the essential facilities doctrine will provide no benefits to consumers through decreases in price and increases in output, as the monopolist will simply charge the full monopoly price. Antitrust courts will likely find, however, that their attempts at regulating prices are extremely difficult to administer. Because the monopolist has already evinced a lack of willingness to deal with its competitor, it is likely that disputes over the terms and conditions of the compelled access will surround the relationship: The plaintiff is likely to claim that the defendant's price for access to an essential facility is (1) SO high as to be the equivalent of a continued refusal to deal, or (2) is unreasonable, or (3) creates a "price squeeze" in that the defendant charges 79 Cline V. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 462-63 (1927); United States V. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-14 (1940); United States V. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1942); Catalano, Inc. V. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980); Town of Concord V. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990); Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship V. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996); cf. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. at 331-42 (pre-Trenton Potteries decision citing d