nd the trade press. See also New Paradigm Resources Group, Measuring the Economic Impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 54. This is not to say that such entry is impossible, but that the new CLECs have not discovered a successful entry strategy. However, the cable television companies and wireless (cellular) carriers remain important sources of competition. 55. Company financial reports and PACE, UNE-P Fact Report: January 2003 (www.Pacecoalition.org). 56. For details, see chapter 5 or the FCC's website, www.FCC.gov. 57. In August 2003, Sprint announced that it would also begin offering local service by relying on the UNE-P. 58. The FCC data reported by PACE show that 3.1 million of the 5.7 million UNE-Ps were leased in these two states. 59. Keith S. Brown and Paul R. Zimmerman, "The Effect of Section 271 on Compet- itive Entry into Local Telecommunications Markets: An Initial Evaluation," unpublished ms. (Washington, 2002). 60. See Nicholas Economides, Katja Seim, and V. Brian Viard, "Quantifying the Bene- fits of Entry into Local Phone Service," paper presented at a conference at the London Business School, May 2004. They estimate that New York subscribers switching from Ver- izon to AT&T or MCI saved 4.4 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively, in 1999-2003. 61. See Gregory L. Rosston and Bradley S. Wimmer, "Local Telephone Rate Structures: Before and after the Act," Stanford Institute for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 01-30 (August 2002). Rosston and Wimmer find that the 1996 act has not moved local rates closer to their relative costs, and that local urban rates in 2000 were not driven by the cost of service, but by the desire of regulators to use urban rates to defray the cost of rural service. Notes to Pages 54-56 62. This was part of the "CALLS" compromise that reduced interstate access charges to their current level of about 0.55 cents a minute for the larger ILECs. For a discussion of this plan, see James Eisner, Jim Lande, and Jim Zolnierek, CALLS Analysis (Federal Communi- cations Commissi