unbundling obligations we adopt will encourage the development of facilities-based competition by competitive LECs, and innovation and investment by both incumbent LECs and competitive LECs, especially for the provision of advanced services," (3) "reduced regulation the extent to which we can encourage investment and innovation by reducing regulatory obligations to provide access to network elements, as alternatives to the incumbent LECs' network elements become available in the future," (4) "certainty in the market how the unbundling obligations can provide the uniformity and predictability that new entrants and fledgling competitors need to develop national and regional business plans[, as well as] whether the rules provide financial markets with reasonable certainty SO that carriers can attract the capital they need to execute their business plans to serve the greatest number of consumers," and (5) "administrative practicality whether the unbundling obligations are administratively practical to apply" (FCC 2003e, pp. 16,999-17,000). The FCC identified a number of factors justifying its continued access regulation including alleged entry barriers, economies of scale, sunk costs, first-mover advan- tages, and absolute cost advantages. Network effects have sometimes been alleged to confer first-mover advantages C2003e). But even if the necessary empirical pre- conditions for network-induced market failure were present, regulatory interven- tion would not necessarily improve matters. As noted earlier, government-imposed solutions often fall short of efficient outcomes, even when they are implemented to correct a market failure. Not only can a regulatory access regime harm allocative efficiency if access prices are set at inefficient levels, but also regulation can harm dynamic efficiency by causing investment incentives to fall below efficient levels and by creating de facto entry barriers. 15 Thus, regulators confronting a market fail- ure must ask themselves the logically subsidiary question of whether governmen