vestment in duplicative capital facilities. More- over, the 15 percent decline in price is entirely a transfer from the incum- bents to consumers. The CLEC competition in the larger business market is focused on spe- cial access services and various private line services, including high-speed lines. The incumbent Bell carriers reported $14.4 billion in special access revenues and $1.9 billion in private line revenues in 2003, but the special access revenues include DSL revenues. Assuming that the average DSL revenue was $480, the 6.5 million Bell DSL subscribers in mid-2003 gen- erated $3.1 billion in revenues, which must be deducted from the Bell com- panies' total of $16.3 billion in special access and private line revenues. This leaves $13.2 billion in revenues to be added to the $10.3 billion of larger- company CLEC revenues, or $23.5 billion. It has been estimated that Bell Local Competition under the 1996 Act company special access revenues per line fell by about 30 percent in con- stant dollars between 1996 and 2003. 70 Assuming, quite generously, that this entire decline is due to increased competition from CLECs and that the price elasticity of demand for special access and private lines is -0.5, the gain to business consumers is equal to $9.2 billion, but $8.4 billion of this gain is simply a transfer from the incumbents to business customers. 71 Thus the net welfare benefits in the business market are $0.8 billion. Since there are no net welfare benefits in the residential market, the total net welfare bene- fits from local competition may be estimated at $0.8 billion in 2003. The total consumer welfare gain is much larger, of course, totaling $10.5 billion, but $9.7 billion is simply a transfer from producers to consumers. If the CLECs served their business and residential customers at the same variable costs as the ILECs (surely an extremely generous assumption), the cost of conveying these benefits would only be the annual capital costs of the entrants. 72 Between 1996 and 2003, the publicly traded 