ct would put itself at a tremendous compet- itive disadvantage. In addition, commentators from a wide range of perspectives acknowledge that lock-in is less likely in markets undergoing rapid growth, in which new entrants will be able to compete for new users. Conversely, the formal models demonstrating how refusal to interconnect can harm competition have generally been based on duopoly and dominant-firm market structures. In the absence of such market concentration, a firm cannot plausibly use its interconnection poli- cies to harm competition. Even if risks of anticompetitive conduct exist, private ordering offers a variety of potential solutions aside from regulation. Furthermore, mandating access in an attempt to redress such anticompetitive problems risks delaying entry by additional providers and inducing the adoption of inefficient network technology. Thus, when markets are sufficiently competitive, imposing interconnection access is superfluous at best and may even be harmful. This conclusion is reflected in the FCC's current policy toward wireless-to- wireless interconnection, discussed in Chapter 8, in which the FCC has concluded that, in the absence of a dominant player, competition already provides wireless providers with sufficient incentives to interconnect. As discussed in Chapter 10, the FCC has taken a similar position with respect to backbone interconnection. The theoretical literature does identify one scenario in which participants in market without a dominant player may nonetheless refuse to interconnect. If the market consists of two players of equal size, they may reject compatibility and instead engage in a race for the market. Interestingly, though, this type of competition does not necessarily lead to the delays in technology adoption and supracompetitive returns that are associated with refusals to interconnect by dominant firms (Besen and Farrell 1994). It also has the virtue of promoting the rapid buildout of new network technologies. As discussed in Chapter 8, competition during the