tion if another cable provider could provide service to 50% of the homes in any service area and actually provided service to 10% of those homes. 33 Congress 27 Hazlett (1986) concludes that cable television is probably not a natural monopoly and that even if it is, the benefits from temporary competition probably outweigh the costs of permitting entry. Lee (1983) notes the lack of empirical proof that cable television is a natural monopoly and warns of the dangers of improper market definition. Owen and Greenhalgh (1986) conclude that the scale economies in cable are not sufficiently substantial to preclude the possibility of competition. 28 Posner (1973) argues that periodic auctioning of cable franchises can replace rate regulation. Williamson (1976) identifies contracting problems with Posner's proposal and providing an empirical example in which franchise bidding was not superior to regulation. Zupan (1989) discusses possible solutions to contracting problems and provides more systematic empirical evidence supporting Posner's claim. Quincy Cable Television, Inc. V. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (questioning the natural monopoly rationale for regulating cable); Cmty. Commc'ns Co. V. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039-40 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 603 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (disagreeing that the evidence showed that cable television was a natural monopoly); Cmty. Commc'ns Co., 603 F.2d at 712 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (expressing his agreement with the district court's conclusion); see also Preferred Commc'ns, Inc. V. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) (accepting as true allegation that sufficient economic demand existed to support more than one cable operator), aff'd, 476 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1986) (same); Tele-Commo'ns of Key West, Inc. V. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same). Pac. W. Cable Co. V. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1328, 1339, 1349 (E.D. Cal. 1987). 31 Nor-W. Cable Commc'ns P'ship V. City of St. Paul,