er have extended this distance). As a result, Rogerson (2000b) acknowledges that DSL providers will have to use a DLC archi- tecture for at least 56% of all their loops, with the number increasing if end users demand better performance. The net result is to make the investments needed to deploy DSL comparable to those for deploying cable modem service. The shift toward higher-bandwidth technologies like VDSL is likely to further increase the investments required to deploy DSL. Not only does this raise the capital investments needed to provide service. It also greatly complicates the regulatory problem by forcing the FCC to allocate the limited space in remote terminals and by creating incentives for incumbent local telephone companies to design their networks for strategic reasons rather than to promote economic efficiency. The alternative would be to require the incumbent to provide access to a "virtual loop." The problem is that compelling access to a virtual loop would mandate access to facilities that are not yet built and may require significant investment and innovation, in which case the deterrent impact on investment and innovation might justify relying on competition between DSL and cable modems instead of regulation. With respect to DLC loops, Rogerson thus concedes that he is simply raising important issues without drawing any firm conclusions. Implementing access regimes on even a portion of the industry would run afoul of the problems that have long confronted direct regulation of rates. Even worse, asymmetric regulation threatens to put the government in the position of favoring one transmission technology over the other. Lauding the benefits of one portion of the industry but not the other raises the question of which portion of the industry will be subject to regulation. As discussed above, the fact that cable modem service Networks in Telecommunications established the early lead and the significant capital investments needed to deploy last-mile broadband service through telephone lines renders t