strate anticompetitive harm. In addition, the regulatory tools needed to implement the regime of inter- connection, standardization, rate regulation, and nondiscrimination implicit in network neutrality have long been criticized as difficult to implement and unlikely to be effective in industries such as broadband, where the services provided vary in quality and where technology is changing rapidly. Regulatory lag creates the danger that restrictions will persist long after the conditions that justified their imposition have dissipated. Even worse, by reducing investment incentives, network neutrality can itself become the means through which market concentration is cemented into Networks in Telecommunications place. Indeed, one of the principal drawbacks of regimes of mandatory interconnec- tion and interface standardization is that they implicitly presuppose that regulation will continue indefinitely. Network diversity, in contrast, is better at facilitating competitive entry. As such, it has the advantage of having embedded within it a built-in exit strategy. Even these arguments, although carrying considerable persuasive force, fall short of providing a definitive resolution of these issues, and the debate all too often risks collapsing into battles over ideology. Competition policy offers a potential solution by implicitly recognizing that the best response in the face of uncertainty is forbearance. Until it is clear whether adhering to or deviating from complete inter- operability would be the better course of action, competition policy would counsel in favor of permitting both architectures to go forward. Intervening by mandating network neutrality would have the inevitable effect of locking the existing interfaces into place and of foreclosing experimentation with new products and alternative organizational forms that transcend traditional firm boundaries. The decision to permit network diversity to emerge, then, does not necessarily depend on a conviction that it would yield a substantively better outcom