 user equipment RF development economics. 15.21.2 The Cost of Technology Neutrality If the US 700-MHz band was in some way unique in terms of regulatory approach then this would probably not matter that much. However, the disconnect between regulatory policy and physics is more generally pervasive. A doctrine of technology neutrality or at least an absence of technology direction compounds the problem and generally results in a loss of spectral efficiency. This in turn increases the risk of spectral litigation. Mixing CDMA, HSPA, WiMax and GSM in the 1900 or 850 bands is one example. One of the reasons we have regulators is to arbitrate between competing spectral property interests. This extends both to interindustry and intraindustry disputes. The amount of litigation could thus be viewed as a proxy measure of the individual and combined effectiveness of the regulatory process. In the US the 700 MHz spectral disputes are presently confined to interoperator disputes, but in years to come could easily involve the broadcast industry challenging interference from A block mobile broadband TX and public protection agencies challenging interference from Verizon upper block mobile TX. Both are the direct result of a poorly implemented band plan. Similar disputes are likely in L band and S band as mobile operators realise the potentially adverse fiscal and operational impact implicit in the present 18 http://ecfsdocs.fcc.gov/filings/2010/04/30/6015588771.html 19 http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/News_Releases/2002/nret0203.htm Terrestrial Broadcast/Cellular Network Integration repurposing of mobile satellite spectrum for terrestrial use. In Europe, similar disputes are simmering over the allocation and auction processes being proposed or implemented for the 2.6-GHz extension band linked directly or indirectly to 800-MHz deployments. Operators generally are concerned that their spectral holdings should be balanced across all available bands or rebalanced to address legacy allocations that in retrospect can