ll, took a much less friendly approach to competition. He seemed to view ILEC facilities as the ILEC's ordinary private property, to be used only as they wished, and he even proposed removing the most rudimentary common carriage obligations from their higher-speed serv- ices, including raw DSL (a telecom service sold to ISPs; ILEC-affiliated ISPs were, at least nominally, separate arms-length affiliates). The major area of contention for DLECs concerned shared loops. The Kennard FCC had authorized line sharing in 1998, opening up consumer ADSL to competition. In 2002, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated this [13], requiring the FCC to revise its rules or offer justification. The court said that the FCC "completely failed to consider the relevance of The Great Telecom Meltdown competition in broadband services coming from cable (and to a lesser extent sat- ellite)." This was a bizarre ruling, since cable does not offer an equivalent service (loops) to CLECs or even offer service to ISPs that buy competitive DSL; cable only competes with the ILECs' retail DSL subsidiaries for unregulated informa- tion service. One might conclude that the CLECs did not argue the case well; on the other hand, it was the FCC, not the CLECs, defending the rule that an ear- lier FCC had passed. The court's order was stayed until January 2003, at which point the FCC was due to issue its Triennial Review Order (TRO); its UNE rules were subject to periodic review anyway. The FCC could then either pro- vide clearer justification for the rule or remove it. When the TRO was adopted [14] in February 2003, line sharing was removed; in the final order, adopted six months later, existing shared lines were grandfathered, whereas new shared lines were to be available for only one more year, their price ratcheted upwards over a three-year period. Only one of the five commissioners, Kevin Martin, actually wanted line sharing removed; two oth- ers, Jonathan Adelstein and Michael Copps, stated that they were voting with Martin to remove 