 competitors, who are likely to be under no regulatory obligation to share that information and may have strategic incentives to withhold it. In addition, unbundled access forces network owners to develop new processes and equipment for provisioning and metering access at just about any points within the network, even if they have never provided service at those points in the past and have no plans to do SO in the future. Unbundled access can also have a devastating impact on incentives to invest in alternative network capacity. Giving competitors the right to access elements of the existing network at cost effectively destroys their incentive to invest in third- generation wireless networks and other broadband technologies, particularly if the network owner is not allowed to charge its actual cost and is instead required to charge the cost of a hypothetical network providing the same service using the most efficient technology currently available. Requiring that any successful improve- ments to the existing networks be shared also substantially dampens incumbents' incentives to invest in upgrading their own networks. This is particularly true when the success of various improvements is highly vari- able and hard to anticipate. Consider, for example, an incumbent that is considering The Regulation of Last-Mile Broadband Networks whether to upgrade its network in a way that is likely to be successful in some geo- graphic areas, but not in others, in ways that are unpredictable. Absent unbundled access, the network owner could forego determining in which geographies the inno- vation was likely to prove successful and instead focus on the average success rate across all geographies and undertake the investment as long as that average suc- cess rate exceeded its investment hurdle. The situation changes dramatically once unbundled access is imposed. Unbundled access gives competitors the opportunity to obtain access to only those geographies that prove economically successful and to ignore those that do not. This leav