at the incumbents did feel serious market heat, they had many resources at their disposal. Sometimes they were able to forestall losing sales to competitors by going straight to senior executive levels; a CEO is often more amenable to pressure from an incumbent vendor than an information technology manager or even a CIO. In some cases, especially sales to large busi- nesses, they often offered selective discounts. Perks like Super Bowl tickets to big customers did not hurt either. In some cases, especially the ILECs, they simply went to the courts or regulators to have the rules changed. Big, established com- panies are usually more able to do that than start-ups. They may have been dinosaurs, but the real dinosaurs must have had something going for them; they lasted for more than a hundred million years. The Next Big Thing Usually Is Not Technology investors are often hunting for the "next big thing." This occasion- ally results in a big payoff, especially for the investor who gets in early and gets out near the top. But of course it is hard to know when the market is topping off until it is too late. Lots of next big things turned out not to be. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was integrated voice-data PBXs. Then for a brief moment, it was supposed to be integrated voice-data workstations. Then in at least some parts of the world it was sure to be ISDN, then ATM. Then it was the Web, and any business beginning with the letter "e." And anything having to do with fiber optics. Venture capital is a high-stakes game. A venture firm succeeds if a small percentage of its investments pan out big; venture professionals are also experts at jumping off a moving train. Most small investors cannot do this. They become wedded to a stock, or they hang on too long, hoping its price will recover. Individual investors were some of the biggest victims of the meltdown. They often received false signals from the press, analysts, and even friends and fellow investors. Press reports do not always turn into profits. Reporters a