55) The Supreme Court has reiterated these concerns in subsequent cases and has developed an elaborate jurisprudence to ensure that manufacturers remain free to enter into exclusivity agreements with some retailers and to refuse to deal with others. Given the amount of information that customers interested in purchasing telecommunications services need about service plans and necessary equipment, telecommunications markets would seem susceptible to this type of market failure. Conversely, limiting network owners' ability to shift to proprietary sales forces or exclusive retail outlets would serve only to give manufacturers the incentive to vertically integrate into retailing or to enter into exclusivity arrangements from the outset, an outcome that would have the perverse effect of harming retailers. 105 A wide range of justifications thus exist for providing wholesale access in a discriminatory manner and permitting producers to internalize or externalize marketing functions as they see fit. The compelling nature of these economic arguments and the weight of Supreme Court authority make the imposition of wholesale access by an antitrust court very unlikely. 3. Interconnection Access Interconnection access refers to reciprocal connections between networks that pro- vide similar services to similarly situated customers. One example would be requir- ing all wireless telephone networks operating in the same area to terminate calls orig- inating on other wireless telephone networks. Another example would be requiring top-level backbone providers to interconnect with all other top-level backbone providers. Interconnection access complicates network management to a much greater degree than retail and wholesale access. Increasing the number of users causes the number of possible connections to increase geometrically. The net effect on the demand on any particular firm's network is unclear, however. Making it possible to 104 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-3; Bus. Elecs. Corp. V. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-25 (1988)