in the interim to AT&T's facilities" (MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-33, 1147, 1148). At first glance, this answer seems somewhat anomalous. AT&T was clearly a dominant firm and thus arguably posed a serious anticompetitive threat. The court's focus on the supply-side feasibility of constructing alternative network capacity ignored the demand-side scale economies associated with network eco- nomic effects. If refusing to allow MCI to interconnect with AT&T's long-distance network prevented MCI's customers from calling AT&T's customers, the demand- side scale economies would reinforce AT&T's market dominance regardless of the feasibility of constructing a second long-distance network. One possible solution to this puzzle lies in the fact that AT&T did not have complete control over long distance calls placed by its subscribers. Long-distance calls also require the services of local telephone companies. Those local telephone companies were required by a D.C. Circuit interpretation of the specialized common carrier tariff that AT&T filed with the FCC to terminate calls from MCI as well as AT&T,106 a conclusion that would later be reinforced by the "equal access" provisions of the decree ordering the breakup of AT&T.10 The fact that the local 106 MCI Telecomms. Corp. V. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1977); MCI Telecomms. Corp. V. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, 594-99 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 107 Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp. at 195-200. Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries telephone company, rather than AT&T, controlled access to the customer meant that AT&T could not prevent MCI's customers from calling AT&T's customers simply by refusing to allow MCI to interconnect with its long-distance network. The regulatory and antitrust obligations that prevented local telephone companies from discriminating against MCI made mandating interconnection access unnecessary. The closest analogue to interconnection access in Supreme Court precedent is Aspen Skiing. Recall that in Aspen Skiing, the owner of one ski area sought to co