her railway networks to interconnect to its bridge and to require it to provide access to the bridge to all comers on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. Indeed, that is precisely the type of solution sanctioned by the Supreme Court (224 U.S. 383, 411-12 (1912)). Competition policy theorists have pointed out that this type of compulsory sharing of a monopoly facility represents something of a competition policy anomaly. When confronted with a concentrated market, the conventional response is to deconcentrate the problematic market, either by breaking up the existing monopoly or by facilitating entry by a competitor. The elimination of horizontal concentration allows private ordering to dissipate the supracompetitive prices and reductions in output associated with monopoly (see, e.g., Areeda and Hovenkamp 2008c). Compelling interconnection to the bottleneck resource deviates from the con- ventional approach by leaving the monopoly in place and simply requiring that it be shared. If shared at the monopoly price, it fails to reduce prices below or increase output above monopoly levels. If that is the case, forcing a bridge monopolist to provide nondiscriminatory access to its bridge provides no consumer benefits, because vertical disintegration does nothing to displace the bridge monopoly that is the real source of market failure. In essence, the Supreme Court focused on the wrong policy problem. It makes little sense to protect the market for rolling stock. That market was already quite competitive, and the barriers to entering that portion of the industry were quite low. Rather than attempting to foster competition among railways, it should have focused its efforts on increasing the competitiveness of the market for bridges. In other words, competition policy would be better promoted if attention were focused on the level of production that is the most concentrated and the most protected by entry barriers. The same economic reasoning holds true for broadband. Suppose that vertical integration in broadband were