es of 100 Mbps and downlink of 720 Mbps. The plans of Globalstar and Iridium were more modest, calling for 48 and 66 satellites in their constellations, respec- tively, and providing transmission rates sufficient to support digital voice. While Teledesic demurred, Globalstar and Iridium started to build and launch a global mobile communications service based on the cost assumptions of the early 1990s. Satellite Communications By the mid-1990s, the second generation of mobile communications systems had been rolled out and were providing better coverage and higher transmission rates. The cost of devices and calling had also significantly fallen from the early days, and many opera- tors were fully subsidising the cost of a mo- bile. Regardless, both Iridium (picture [17])4 and Globalstar followed with their satellite constellation build up, apparently based on the earlier business assumptions. As the service launch neared, the target market had to shift from the general public to the businessman on holiday. Despite the shrinking market the system build up continued. By the time Iridium and Globalstar entered the market, the second generation of mobile phone systems had become very popular. Mobile phone sizes were reduced to smaller than 100 g and 100 cm³ and the costs of devices and calling rates were a fraction of those in the early 1990s. Both businesses failed to attract enough customers and had to file for bankruptcy protection. The main supporters of the companies, Qualcomm and Motorola, also suffered. Of these, Motorola faced other problems and ultimately had to sell its handset business to survive. Case Study Questions What were the initial motivations for LEO mobile satellite communications? How did the costs and revenue items compare at the start of these projects? What were the risks? What do you see as the extent of the target market at product launch? Is there a market for mobile satellite to make this a viable business? Business Ecosystems Broadband satellite systems create an infrastructure over which 