ed to translate the transmitted web page content from the elaborate land-based Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to the lean world of wireless microbrowsers where small displays cannot be clogged with undesirable banner- like advertisements. However, the same gateway that enables the Internet browsing in the first place is also the Achilles heel of the solution in terms of security. Although the two links are secured using encryption, uplink WTLS-based traffic coming from the mobile device over the air interface to the gateway is decrypted at the gateway and reencrypted for the subsequent link to the server. The same thing happens in the opposite direction (downlink). The gateway is the only place where the sensi- tive traffic can be intercepted while it is temporarily in the clear. Similar issues (albeit not based on WAP) surround the Wi-Fi and WLAN arenas, where wirelss security has been one of the major problems. This fact is slowly pushing the industry toward adopting end-to-end solutions. Several efforts are currently under way. New algorithms and techniques have been steadily introduced such as Kasumi (an offspring of Mitsubishi's MISTY cipher) for third-generation European cellular handsets and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) for IEEE 802.11 networks. At the same time, some wireless equip- ment manufacturers use mainstream cryptography (such as Data Encryption Standard [DES] and Advanced Encryption Standard [AES]) to address some of the market's security concerns and a new sweeping standard IEEE 802. 11i is being prepared. Not many people are fully aware of the issues surrounding the act of securing wireless links in the cellular industry such as reliable hand-off from cell to cell. We will not expand on these issues here. Refer to the book Wireless Security: Threats, Models, and Solutions by Randall K. Nichols and Panos C. Lekkas (New York: McGraw-Hill, December 2001) for a more in-depth discussion of all these issues. Base stations must be able to sustain several encrypted sessions with a plethora of devic