ISPs could obtain access to the BOCs' networks on an element-by-element basis, to a less granular approach in which unbundling was defined in terms of network services rather than facilities (FCC 1988). The Ninth Circuit again partially vacated the FCC's ONA regime on the grounds that the FCC had failed to explain its shift away from fundamental unbundling (California V. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 925-30 (9th Cir. 1994) ("California III")). Despite the court's invalidation of ONA, the FCC has continued to require the BOCs and GTE to comply with the ONA plans already filed with and approved by the FCC (FCC 1995a, 1995c). AT&T V. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388-92 (1999); U.S. Telecom Ass'n V. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 564-77 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States Telecom Ass'n V. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002); GTE Serv. Corp. V. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422-24, 425-26 (D.C. Cir. 2000); US West Commc'ns, Inc. V. FCC, No. 98-1410 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1999) (unpublished disposition available at 1999 WL 728555). Network Regulation Basics exempted most of the major elements needed to provide local telephone and DSL service from the UNE access requirements. 21 In the process, the FCC also resolved the issues that remained open following the Ninth Circuit's remand of the third Computer Inquiry by abolishing the CEI and ONA regimes (FCC 2005d). C. Analyzing the Rationales and Regulatory Instruments The foregoing review demonstrates the extent to which the rationales traditionally underlying the regulation of telecommunications, as well as the regulatory instru- ments traditionally used to implement them, are premised on the assumption that certain features render portions of the telecommunications network inherently uncompetitive. Over time, technological advances, changes in consumer demand, and the insights provided by breakthroughs in economic theory have largely under- mined these premises. The reduction in fixed costs and the emergence of new trans- mission and switching technologies have greatly increased the scope of the industry that i