 physically collocate on their property. After reviewing the relevant takings analysis contained in Loretto, Florida Power, and Yee V. City of Escondido, the court concluded that the physical collocation requirement was properly char- acterized as the type of permanent physical invasion held to be a per se taking in Loretto. In SO holding, the court rejected the argument that the fact that the PUC had already placed restrictions on the telephone company's ability to use its property deprived it of any historically rooted expectation of compensation. As the court reasoned, "the facts that an industry is heavily regulated, and that a property owner acquired the property knowing that it is heavily regulated, do not diminish a physi- cal invasion to something less than a taking." The court also rejected the argument that physical collocation represented nothing more than a restriction on the use of the telephone company's property that was more properly analyzed as a regulatory Networks in Telecommunications taking. According to the court, the PUC lacked the statutory authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the PUC's collocation regulations as beyond the PUC's statutory authority.38 The analysis with respect to cable modem systems is slightly more ambiguous. Unless it mandates multiple ISP access as a general matter, the FCC need not address precisely how and where the interconnection needed for multiple ISP access should occur or how such access should be priced. None of the municipal ordinances requiring multiple ISP access set forth the parameters for interconnection or pricing guidelines; no consensus has emerged among industry participants as to where the interconnection needed for multiple ISP access should occur (Lathen 1999). If access is to provide anything more than the thin type of competition that results from resale of the same network capacity (such as occurred under the multiple ISP access mandate imposed during the AOL-Time Warner merger), a