icy because it has much lower pen- etration (subscribers per capita) than many countries in Europe and Asia (see table 7-4). This low U.S. subscriber penetration is generally attributed to two factors: (1) the lack of the "calling party pays" regime employed in most of the world, through which the caller pays for the entire call; and (2) the failure to adopt a single technical standard. However, it is now evi- dent that the U.S. (and similar Canadian) policies in these areas are supe- rior to those of most other countries. First, by requiring both parties to share in the cost of a call, the U.S. sys- tem allows competition to drive the prices for both originating and termi- nating the calls on mobile handsets. In Europe, in particular, regulators have been struggling with the regulation of wireless termination charges that they claim are subject to "monopoly" power. This alleged power derives from the fact that subscribers have no incentive to discipline carriers who attempt to charge more than a competitive market rate for terminating the call because the subscribers do not pay for receiving calls. In the United States, a party generally pays the same amount for receiving and for originating calls. Com- petition keeps these rates low, as the last column in table 7-4 demonstrates. Second, "calling party pays" is not likely the most important explanation for greater mobile wireless telephone penetration in Europe or Asia. These countries typically have very high local calling rates on their traditional wireline telephone networks, particularly during peak hours. 45 By contrast, the United States and Canada have large, free local calling areas. As a result, the incentive to shift from the landline phone to a wireless phone is much weaker in these two countries. Third, the claim that a common standard across countries in Europe in- creases the attractiveness of wireless is surely overstated. While it is true that The Rapid Growth of Wireless Telecommunications Table 7-4. Mobile Wireless Performance Indicators, 2003 