tremely numerous, given the incessant, 91 Kauper (2005); Areeda and Hovenkamp (2006, g 652 pp. 286, 9773(g) p. 372). Goldwasser V. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir. 2000). Networks in Telecommunications complex, and constantly changing interaction of competitive and incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations." Policing this "death by a thousand cuts would surely be a daunting task for a generalist antitrust court." Also, "[j]udicial oversight under the Sherman Act would seem destined to distort investment and lead to a new layer of interminable litigation, atop the variety of litigation routes already available to and actively pursued by competitive LECs." Furthermore, "[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect" (540 U.S. at 408, 412-13, 414 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because "[e]ffective remediation of violations of regulatory sharing require- ments will ordinarily require continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree," supervising access requirements "may be beyond the practical ability of a judi- cial tribunal to control." Indeed, the Court cited with approval Areeda's conclusion (1990) that "[n]o court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or ade- quately and reasonably supervise" and that "[t]he problem should be deemed irre- media[ble] by antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency." In short, "[a]n antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer of these detailed sharing obligations" (540 U.S. at 414-15 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 3. Trinko's Implications Although Trinko did not explicitly repudiate the essential facilities doctrine, com- mentators generally acknowledge that its reasoning certainly cast serious doubts on doctrine's continuing vitality. 93 Trinko also substantially narrowed the potential for ant