t once again concluded that "[r]esort to per se rules is confined to restraints that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output." Thus, "[a]s a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason" (127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Conversely, the Court has been reluctant to apply a per se rule "where the economic impact of The Court of Appeals sustained the FCC's order in Time Warner Telecom, Inc. V. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007). The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet certain practices is not immediately obvious,"4 "4 when the courts lack experience with certain business relationships, 5 or when the effect of certain practices is not "so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality." In the absence of clear competitive harm, the standard response under competition policy is to forbear from categorically prohibiting the challenged practice and instead to evaluate its effect on a case-by-case basis.7 This approach allows policymakers to steer a middle course when facing uncer- tainty about the competitive impact of conflicting business models. Rather than presumptively favoring one particular architecture and placing the burden of proof on parties wishing to deviate from it, adopting a more restrained regulatory posture permits policymakers to avoid committing to either side of the debate and instead let both approaches go forward until the economic implications become clearer. It would have its biggest impact with respect to practices that could possibly promote or harm competition and in which it is difficult to anticipate which will be the case. Presumptions in favor of a particular architecture effectively foreclose the potential benefits of alternative appro