providers might possess a degree of local market power insufficient to justify prohibiting the bundling of CPE with wireless telephone service, because any one cellular provider represented a tiny fraction of the national equipment market. Any CPE manufacturer foreclosed from distributing its products in one geographic area remained free to sell its products in other areas. As the Federal Trade Commission's comments during this proceeding note, "If individual cellu- lar service companies do not possess market power in the sale of cellular service on a national level, it is unlikely that foreclosure of the CPE market can be suc- cessful." The FCC agreed, concluding that "it does not seem likely that individual cellular companies which operate in local markets possess market power that could impact the numerous CPE manufacturers operating on a national and international basis." The proper question is thus not the number of subscribers that a network controls in any one metropolitan area, but rather the network's market share in the national market. In short, it is national reach, not local reach, that matters. The FCC found that not only is bundling an efficient way to distribute CPE, but also "the high price of CPE represented the greatest barrier to inducing subscrip- tion to cellular service. Bundling wireless service with CPE allows wireless carriers to reduce the upfront cost of subscribing to cellular, which in turn will support greater competition and promote more efficient use of the spectrum" (FCC 1992a, pp. 4029-31). The FCC similarly concluded in 2001 that the growth in competition among local exchange carriers justified abolishing its prohibition of bundling CPE with wireline telecommunications services. Even though local exchange markets were not yet perfectly competitive, the FCC concluded that the growth of local competition and the consumer benefits of bundling, such as reduction of transaction costs and increase in innovation in services, sufficiently mitigated the risk of anticompetitive harm (FCC