ed by the IETF [37], as significant vulnerability was found that allowed traffic amplification for Denial-of-Service attacks. Due to deprecation and vulnerabilities, the Type 0 Routing Header feature is expected to be removed from IPv6 stacks and is also filtered away by some networks in order to stop possible attacks. MIPv6 uses another type of Routing Header, Type 2, which is used to contain the HoA of the destination MN. This routing header is used when a so-called Correspondent Node is sending packets directly to the MN. The packet sent by the Correspondent Node will have the MN's CoA as the destination address of the IPv6 header, and the HoA then inside the Type 2 Routing Header. We describe MIPv6 briefly in Section 3.7.2, but for readers deeply interested in MIPv6 details, we recommend studying RFC 6275 [35]. Fragment Header The Fragment header is used when the originating node is sending a packet larger than the MTU of the path towards the destination node. This header is always inserted by the originating node, as in IPv6 fragmentation does not occur on the path. For more details and usage see next Section 3.2.3. The Fragment header essentially contains identification of the packet it belongs to, the next header field informing what is the first header of the fragmented part, the offset indi- cating which part of the original packet a particular fragment contains, and the fragment data itself. No Next Header This header type indicates that there are no more headers in the IPv6 packet. Authentication and Encapsulating Security Payload Headers AH can be used to provide integrity protection and authenticity of origin of a transmitted IPv6 packet [38]. The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header can be used to provide confidentiality, authenticity of origin, integrity protection, and an anti-replay service [39]. In this book we will not address features of IPsec in any detail, as it is a wide subject, for which dedicated books are available. However, we will give an overview in Section 3.8. 3.2.3 MTU and 