d for MediaOne, and SO far they had not expressed any concerns. Armstrong had discussed his thinking on MediaOne with individ- Tough Calls ual directors over the course of the last few weeks, but this was the first time they were hearing the full rationale. And management was still not prepared to discuss a specific bid. Comcast's all-stock offer had declined in value, as its stock had sunk about I3 percent following the announcement. But the AT&T board was under some time pres- sure. When MediaOne accepted Comcast's bid, it had cleverly given itself forty-five days to consider competing offers. That period would end on May 5, SO AT&T had to act by the end of the following week at the latest. Comcast could then make a new bid or walk away. Media- One could accept one of the bids or launch an auction. And, unlike Comcast's initial bid, this would all be done in public, with other players taking sides, possibly helping to finance Comcast's bid in exchange for a piece of the spoils. Microsoft, for example, had already invested $1 billion in Comcast and was sitting on $50 billion in cash. It might join the Comcast bid in order to gain favorable access to cable lines for its MSN service, which was in a pitched battle with AOL. Time Warner was obviously interested in the outcome of a bid- ding war for MediaOne, which owned a 25 percent interest in its own cable systems. It was even conceivable that Disney, Viacom, or one of the other large content producers might come to Comcast's aid in return for programming agreements. In fact, anyone who was inter- ested in MediaOne's wireless and non-U.S. cable assets might join in. Armstrong later enjoyed telling people that it was a scenario drawn straight from Barbarians at the Gate. The directors who had joined AT&T in quieter days could be forgiven for feeling that "AT&T has gone from Ma Bell to Pell Mell." The board reconvened by telephone on April 22, 1999. Armstrong and the other senior officers were gathered in one of the large confer- ence rooms at the law offices of Wac