rce Commission and Civil Aeronautics Board did for transportation companies in the twentieth century and as the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission is already doing for Canada's weak local telecom entrants. As the Bell companies increasingly market bundles of services, including local, long-distance, wireless, and DSL services, the faltering long-distance companies and CLECs will begin to argue that such competition is "predatory," or at least "unfair." When the cable companies offer similar packages of video, voice, and broadband ser- vices, pressure will build to regulate them too, to protect the few remaining struggling new local entrants and older long-distance companies. The United States has a long and undistinguished history of using pol- itics to protect industries confronted by new competition. Trade protection for textiles and steel are perhaps the best-known modern examples. As of October 2004, a large number of U.S. goods producers are lobbying to stop "jobs" from moving to China. In the 1930s, the Robinson-Patman Act was passed to protect small grocery stores from the more efficient chains that now provide the public with low-cost food distribution.' Tele- vision broadcasters successfully lobbied the FCC to prevent new, higher- frequency bands from being utilized to increase video competition and, subsequently, to protect them from cable television from 1972 through 1989 by limiting what cable systems could offer. 10 In each of these cases, protection occurred because politicians were forced to respond to public sympathy for the established companies and their employees. In the current U.S. telecom sector, the long-distance companies and new local entrants operate across the country and employ thousands of workers, many of whom sit at telemarketing terminals desperately trying to prevent the flight of customers to the integrated facilities-based carriers. Politicians may well respond to the plight of these entities and their employ- ees by asking regulators to protect them fro