uded that Comcast was even more intransigent about keeping Internet service providers off its cables than AT&T was. And, while Microsoft had an II percent interest in Comcast, what it really wanted was a deal to get its software into as many set-top boxes as possible. By April 29, 1999, AT&T had secured a $30 billion loan commit- ment from eighteen banks to fund the cash component of its bid. On Saturday, May I, MediaOne notified Comcast that it had accepted AT&T's bid, giving Comcast five days to top it. With that, we all moved back into Wachtell Lipton. Armstrong and Hindery had been talking to Ralph and Brian Roberts by phone ever since AT&T had made its bid. Hindery had reasoned that Comcast would drop out of the bid- ding if it could save face by acquiring some of the MediaOne proper- ties. It would consider part of a loaf better than nothing-or than the whole loaf at a steeply increased price. He was right, and on the eve- ning of May 4, AT&T and Comcast reached an agreement to "swap cable systems." In reality, Comcast was buying systems with about two million subscribers for around $5.7 billion, $1.5 billion of which would ultimately come from AT&T in the form of the MediaOne/ Comcast breakup fee. It was all contingent on AT&T's completing the MediaOne purchase, and it included an agreement that Comcast would partner with AT&T in offering cable telephony if AT&T signed such a deal with two other nonaffiliated cable companies. Technically, Comcast could still tear up the cable swap deal and try to top AT&T's offer, but that was unlikely unless some white knight Say Good-Bye to the Rah-Rah Brother- and Sisterhood rode in with truckloads of cash. The most likely rescuer, Microsoft, was negotiating its own deal in an adjacent conference room. Hindery was SO eager to close that deal that the AT&T "minders" that Arm- strong had put around him spent as much time negotiating with him as with Microsoft. By the evening of May 5, the night before Comcast's deadline for topping AT&T's offer, Hindery and Somers were ab