ives created by the essential facilities doctrine will prevent competition from ever emerging. Of course, concerns about dampening incentives for investing in alternative sources of supply only make sense if competitive entry is feasible. If not, com- petition policy's traditional response is to abandon the first-order policy goal of using antitrust law to break up the input monopoly and instead subject the input monopoly to rate regulation and pursue the second-order policy goal of promot- ing competition in complementary markets through access requirements. This explains the rationale underlying the breakup of AT&T. The court's assumption that competition in local telephone service was not viable caused it to focus on pro- moting competition in complementary services, such as long distance, information services, and customer premises equipment (CPE). Once technological progress renders competition in the input market feasible, antitrust courts should abandon the second-order policy goal of promoting competition in complementary services and return to the first-order policy goal of promoting competition in the last mile. The problem is that mandating access will make it difficult for antitrust courts to determine when it is possible to do SO. In the worst case, the investment disincentives created by mandated access can cause it to be a source of, rather than the solution to, market failure by forestalling last-mile competition from emerging long after it has become viable. For this reason, commentators have consistently insisted that the allegedly essential facility not be duplicable or available from other sources (Areeda 1990). It is not sufficient that duplication of the facility might require significant capital investment and take a long time. 49 Simply put, late is better than never. Finally, courts have exhibited greater sensitivity to dynamic efficiency. In the words of the Ninth Circuit in Alaska Airlines, Inc. V. United Airlines, Inc., "[e]very time the monopolist asserts its market dominance" by deny