are that the introduction into the network of the Ethernet at the core architectures now much in the press may not be as rapid as proponents had hoped. The incumbents may feel much more com- Next-Generation SONET and Optical Architectures fortable with next-generation SONET platforms since these behave, by and large, like traditional SONET systems. The new players who might have used the new technologies recently have had difficulties securing venture capitalist funding. Before proceeding with an assessment of next- generation SONET, we offer our rationalizations for the point just made; this point has major implications for technology developers. Why are new players who might have made use of the new technologies having difficul- ties securing venture capitalist funding? We believe this is because of the following reasons: The Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs), Digital Subscriber Line LECs (DLECs), and Building LECs (BLECs) were carbon copies of the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) in approach, architec- ture, and philosophy (being staffed by ex-ILEC employees and execu- tives), without much innovation. New players need to show that they are significantly different from these CLECs, DLECs, and BLECs and afford new thinking. The CLECs, DLECs, and BLECs misquoted the achievable financial results, promising 90 percent gross margins to investors (doing SO by inventing their own definition of gross margin). Realistically achievable metrics are 40 to 50 percent gross margins and 20 to 25 percent net returns. New players need to use the correct financial models and show that they are significantly more conservative than the CLECs, DLECs, and BLECs by underpromising and overdelivering. The CLECs, DLECs, and BLECs focused on narrowband services, where the chargeable fees are $20 to $50 per month per line, and were totally dependent on the ILECs for the underlying raw material, namely the copper loops, thereby greatly reducing margins and wealth- generation capabilities. To be a $600-million-a-year comp