 price, regu- latory decrees require antitrust courts to allocate market share and restrict the lines of business that the entities subject to the decree may enter, actions that require an extraordinary level of intervention into the market and can limit competition. Most importantly, Posner questioned the expedience of creating ad hoc regula- tory regimes administered by scattered district courts. Indeed, he found that "the entry of such a decree is tantamount to a confession that the antitrust action has not succeeded in restoring competitive conditions." Posner later elaborated in the casebook he coauthored with Frank Easterbrook: There is a sense in which the entry of a regulatory decree signifies that the case should never have been brought. The decree is an acknowledgement that competition will not work in the particular circumstances of the case. question is thus posed whether antitrust enforcement, the cardinal purpose of which is to prevent and destroy monopolies, is also a suitable tool for domesticating those monopolies that are ineradicable at acceptable cost. (Posner and Easterbrook 1981, pp. 762-63) 81 Werden (1987); Hylton (1991). But see Ratner (1988), recognizing that antitrust courts are not well suited to regulate price, but arguing that intervention is the only meaningful remedy available to increase output toward competitive levels. 82 Compare O'Connor (1976), advocating structural over conduct remedies, with Crandall (2001), arguing that structural remedies provide insufficient benefit to consumers, and Piraino (2000), criticizing judicial use of structural remedies as failing to consider underlying market conditions and requiring expertise lacking in courts. This debate has gained new salience with the proposal of structural relief in the Microsoft case. Networks in Telecommunications The remedial difficulties associated with the essential facilities doctrine have led courts granting relief under the doctrine to be rather vague regarding the terms and conditions of access. 83 The degree of 