gulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet it needs to survive. Granting access thus threatens to frustrate the appearance of alternative bridge capacity that remains the central goal of competition policy in this situation. In SO doing, it threatens to entrench the existing bridge monopolist in place. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Trinko: Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antirust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities. (540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004) At the same time, the obligation to share the benefits of any improvements also reduces the incumbents' incentives to undertake the investments needed to upgrade existing network technologies. 27 This dynamic is why courts and leading commen- tators have consistently condemned compelling access to communications networks whenever competition from alternative network platforms is feasible. 28 The need to stimulate reinvestment also undercuts asymmetric regulatory proposals that would impose interconnection mandates only on incumbents with market power. 29 Focus- ing on current market shares can be misleading in industries that are undergoing rapid growth, because it is future rather than current shares that are important. Even more importantly, imposing more stringent regulation on incumbents is also problematic in a world in which encouraging reinvestment in existing networks is as important as encouraging investment in new network technologies. The same dynamics can be illustrated by considering a hypothetical town in which there is a single department store. Much like a broadband network, a depart- ment store is simply a conduit for goods and services produced by others. Upon reflection, it becomes clear that imposing a rule requiring all department stores to m