s to insert authorized, but forged into the network. Possible Solutions The use of intrusion detection systems with hold up for rruntime root-cause investigation could assist recognize abnormal flows. This could be joined with mechanisms for dynamic manage of switch performance (e.g., rate bounds for control plane requests). Threat Vector 2 Attacks on vulnerabilities in switches, which can with no trouble wreak havoc with the system. One single switch could be used to go down or slow down packets in the system, replica or deviate network transfer (e.g., for data theft purposes), or even insert traffic or forged requests to overload the controller or adjacent switches. Downloaded 4/15/2022 9:44:49 AM Nova Southeastern University IP Address: 137.52.76.29 SDN Controller Possible Solutions The use of mechanisms of software evidence, such as autonomic trust management solutions for software mechanism, is a possible mitigating factor. Mechanisms to check and detect irregular behavior of network devices can also be useful to beat this kind of threats. Threat Vector 3 Attacks on control plane communications, which can be used to make DoS attacks or for data stealing. As is well-known in the safety community, using TLS/SSL does not per se assurance secure communication, and that compromises the controller device link. A variety of papers report the weaknesses of TLS/SSL communications and its main anchor of trust, the PKI infrastructure. The security of those communications is as strong as its weakest link, which could be a self-signed certificate, a compromised Certificate Authority, or vulnerable applications and libraries. For instance, there are many man-in-the-middle weak implementations of SSL being used in world-wide dangerous systems. Moreover, the TLS/SSL representation is not sufficient to set up and assure trust between controllers and switches. Once an attacker gains right of entry to the control plane, it may be capable of aggregating sufficient power force (in terms of the number of switches under its contro