ms of managing a network in an environment characterized by rapid changes in technology and consumer demand. Given that the costs of discrimination and capacity expansion are likely to vary from case to case, and amidst the uncertainty that the cost of adding capacity will decline faster than demand for network capac- ity will grow, it would seem imprudent to precommit to one solution over the other. The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet Other commentators urge network owners to solve congestion problems through metered pricing. 24 Although metered pricing would solve some of the problems associated with congestion costs, it would also require the establishment of mechanisms for monitoring bandwidth usage and for bringing enforcement actions against those who exceed the bandwidth limits. As a result, it would require the incurring of transaction costs quite similar to those required to implement a regime of usage-sensitive pricing. To the extent that the transactions costs are likely to render usage-sensitive pricing uneconomical, they will probably also preclude the use of tiered pricing as a solution. D. A Broader Perspective on Consumer Welfare The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, contrary to the suggestions of network neutrality proponents, allowing some end user restrictions may in fact be welfare- enhancing. In SO doing, it underscores the often-overlooked downside to the image of competition advanced by network neutrality proponents, in which end users and providers of content and applications are able to contract with each other freely in a constantly shifting spot market. Use of the alternative institutional forms can in fact benefit consumers by effectively lowering the prices paid by low-volume end users. In addition, increasing the economic efficiency of the overall pricing system should lower the price of basic access, which in turn should increase the number of people able to benefit from the network's services. In this sense, the debate over network neutrality bears a number of