n paying only local service rates for its open end lines, providing service only in low-cost areas such as major cities. This was derisively called "cream-skimming." The FCC then held negotiations among the key parties to come up with a new set of rules for competitive long distance providers [22]. As a result, long distance providers could no longer use local service, under state tariffs, to pro- vide the open ends of interstate switched long distance. Instead their connec- tions to local carriers would be tariffed federally, under a tariff called ENFIA (Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access). The ENFIA tariffs included both line-side connections to the local switches, as used by Execunet, and for the first time higher-quality trunk-side connections. These introduced the use of the 950 prefix for 7-digit uniform access to long distance carriers, versus dialing a separate local number in each city. And they introduced the concept of switched access charges for long distance carriers to use local networks. MCI's Growth Fueled by Antitrust Antitrust laws exist to protect competition, providing an avenue by which an aggrieved competitor can seek recourse from a monopolist that violates accepted standards of competition. MCI sued AT&T in 1974, claiming that its monop- oly on long distance service was a violation of antitrust law. A jury ruled in MCI's favor in 1980, awarding $600 million in actual damages, which were tri- pled under antitrust law. This was eventually reduced on appeal to $113 million [23], but it helped MCI's credibility and gave it crucial funding at a time when MCI's business had been consistently unprofitable. However, antitrust victories for competitive telecommunications provid- ers have not been consistent. To some extent, regulated companies have claimed some relief based on their monopolies' having been subject to regulatory scru- tiny. But the regulatory process itself is not an exemption from antitrust. And as we shall see, the biggest antitrust settlement of them all, the one t