th distinct investment-backed expectations" as a factor in the regulatory takings analysis), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (noting that investors have "a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated"). Constitutional Limits on the Pricing of Access to Networks the rent control ordinance at issue "merely regulate[s] petitioners' use of their land by regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant." Indeed, the Court specifically equated rent ceilings imposed on landlords with other use restrictions and declared that both types of restrictions were properly analyzed under classic regulatory takings precedents such as Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central's progeny (503 U.S. 519, 522-23, 528, 529 (1992)). 16 The parallel between the two doctrines is further underscored by the Court's opinion in Lucas V. South Carolina Coastal Council, which described the strand of regulatory takings doctrine used to invalidate regulations prohibiting all economically beneficial land use as being directed against "confiscatory" regulations (Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029, 1032 n. 18). It is thus arguable that the Court's regulatory takings and confiscatory rate- making jurisprudence amount to slightly different aspects of a single doctrine. Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly addressed the relationship between these two lines of precedent, and scholarly analysis has shed little light on the issue.17 In addition, it would be anachronistic to suggest that the Court had a unified takings jurisprudence in mind from the outset. The Court's confiscatory takings jurispru- dence long antedates its recognition of regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal, let alone its announcement of ad hoc factors in Penn Central. In fact, because states primarily regulated rates and the Takings Clause was not applied to the states until Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. V. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897), 18 the earliest confiscatory rate-making cases arose under the Due Process Clause