nt. As a result, the court concluded that the claim based on the loops did not constitute a physical taking. The court once again emphasized that in holding that access to the loops did not constitute a physical taking did not negate its prior conclusion that "the implementation of mandatory access provisions requiring a telecommunications provider or utility to make space available on its premises for a competitor to affix its own equipment constitut[ed] a physical taking under Loretto" (48 Fed. Cl. 672, 689-90, 691, 693-94 (2001)). The FCC has attempted to avoid this conclusion by asserting that takings claims involving public utility property are governed by the more permissive principles embodied in the Supreme Court's confiscatory ratemaking and regulatory takings precedents (FCC 1992b, 1996c). The fundamental problem with this analysis is that ignores the distinction between physical and nonpossessory takings drawn by the Supreme Court in Loretto and Florida Power and reaffirmed in Tahoe-Sierra, detailed in Chapter 7. Because the 1996 Act's physical collocation mandate unambiguously requires incumbent LECs to permit competing carriers to place equipment on their property, it constitutes a classic physical taking under Loretto. Thus, in sharp contrast to what would be true under the Court's confiscatory ratemaking or regulatory takings jurisprudence, the magnitude of the regulation's economic impact and the public purposes served by the regulation are of no consequence. It thus follows that the owners of local telephone networks are entitled to just compensation for the physical invasion mandated by the 1996 Act. As discussed in Chapter 7, to the extent that external markets for a particular input exist, the prin- ciples of just compensation entitle the incumbent LECs to the market value of the inputs that are physically taken. Although the absence of direct competition in local telephony previously deprived regulators of any such market-based benchmarks, the emergence of cellular telephony and other forms o