ect the right CEO. My experience suggests that that's only half the job. The people who immediately surround the CEO will make or break the company. If they compensate for the CEO's weaknesses, they will help to ensure that the company is led by a complete execu- tive. If, in addition, they reinforce the CEO's strengths, they will greatly magnify his or her effectiveness. But if they suffer from the same weaknesses and mindlessly follow directions, they will put the CEO and the company on a path to disaster. In recent years, boards have reasserted that selecting a CEO's suc- cessor is their prerogative and theirs alone. To that end, most boards have devoted substantial time to reviewing the performance and capa- bilities of their company's most senior team. But much of their input comes from the sitting CEO, and when there's a problem, the board is unlikely to look for the cause in the dynamic between the CEO and his or her subordinates. Indeed, if the dynamic were too poisonous to ignore, it would almost certainly be the subordinate who would be let go. Having made the most significant decision of their tenure-the selection of a CEO-most boards suffer from cognitive dissonance if Complete the CEO subsequent events suggest that they were wrong, or even not as right as they might have been. When the AT&T board reviewed Mike Armstrong's performance for the year 2000 (the year in which the company revised its earnings guidance twice, saw its stock price tumble by I7 percent, flirted with a liquidity crisis, and ultimately announced a massive restructuring that would undo billions of dollars in acquisitions), it deliberated for more than two hours and then called him into the boardroom to give him a standing ovation. The board members were not applauding his mistakes, or even his performance. They were acknowledging his courage and the obstacles he had overcome. Not one of them would have wanted to be in his shoes. Of course, they cut his bonus. What they should have done was figure out what had gone wrong. Part of i