ing statements include: Increasing penetration in BlackBerry Enterprise Service 10 (BES 10) with nearly 31% increase in servers installation from July 2013 Board continues to look at strategic alternative (Note: more on this later in this section) Although BlackBerry may still be able to make a turnaround and reinvent itself, the decline in the company's performance is very evident. Also, some additional information on where BlackBerry was a few years earlier (year 2011) may yield further pointers as to the direction the company's results have been leading it ness.time.com/2013/09/20/blackberry-to-layoff-4500-amid-massive-losses/) BlackBerry was employing 17,000 people around 2011 It was the proud owner of a 14% share in the U.S. smartphone market in 2011 Compare that to the following figures: BlackBerry had less than a 3% share of the smartphones in U.S. market in 2013 Its total employee strength in March 2013 was 12,700, which would undergo a reduction by nearly 35%, as mentioned above CHAPTER 5 NETWORK ROADMAP EVOLUTION As a result of the strategic alternatives assessment mentioned in their 2014 results, BlackBerry announced a LoI (Letter of Intent) with a consortium led by Fairfax to sell and transfer ownership (http://press.blackberry.com/ financial/2013/blackberry-enters-into-letter-of-intent-with-consortium-led-by-f.htm It is obvious to ask the question, Where did BlackBerry seemingly go wrong? It was very much a company in good health and named by Fortune magazine in 2009 to be the fastest growing company in the world, attested to by earnings growing by an astounding 84% per year (http://business. com/2013/09/24/the-fatal-mistake- that-doomed-blackberry/). Exploring its situation would seem to indicate some chief reasons for its demise. BlackBerry had ridden the wave, making phones that were tuned to serve business users with its own very unique features of push e-mail, which allowed users to receive their company e-mails automatically. Also, the usage of a qwerty keyboard enabled fully functional and eas