on contains some tantalizing hints about certain considerations that may play a key role in the analysis. For example, the language in the opinion contrasting access provided to consumers with access provided to rivals suggests that the application of the antitrust law might depend on the nature of the party to whom access is granted. The opinion also drew a distinction between access to services that are already sold into the open market and access to network elements that are only available to the public because of regulation. In addition, Trinko indicated that unbundled access can only be provided "at considerable expense and effort," because network elements "exist only deep within the bowels of Verizon" and because "[n]ew systems must be designed and implemented" to make access to those network elements possible. Later in the opinion, the Court mentioned that unbundled access requirements "are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are highly technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the incessant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of competitive and incumbent LECs implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations" (540 U.S. at 414). This language suggests that the application of the antitrust laws may depend on certain key aspects of the type of access sought, such as whether access is to only a portion of the network or to its entirety and whether the network owner already offers the services sought to other customers. The problem is that the Trinko opinion did not analyze these considerations in a systematic manner. Equally importantly, it failed to take into account that networks are complex systems whose elements interact in ways that can be sharply discontinuous and hard to predict. The absence of an analytical framework that captures the interaction among network elements makes it impossible to assess how altering the costs of particular elements and introducing additional flows into a network can affect network design, cap