e to generate interest. In hindsight, we should have leaked word of the calls that came in after Comcast's bid had first been announced. But our more fundamental mistake was not doing anything about the forces unleashed by our October 2000 restructuring. The restruc- turing put AT&T Broadband in play, but we didn't take that possibility seriously enough, even after Comcast's initial probes in January. Re- Tough Calls membering Comcast's deep resentment when AT&T swooped onto the scene and stole MediaOne from its grasp, many of us thought that the company might try to interfere with the spin-off of the Broadband unit. But we thought it would make its move toward the end of the year, when we launched the initial public offering for the AT&T Broad- band tracking stock. None of us realized that we would force the Robertses' hand when we scheduled the "beauty contest" for the tracking stock's underwrit- ers on July 9. Comcast's own investment banks, which had been in- vited to bid for the work, would have had to give AT&T their estimate of the broadband unit's value, seriously compromising Comcast's ne- gotiating position. In fact, after Comcast launched its unsolicited offer on July 8, the beauty contest went forward as scheduled, but none of Comcast's banks showed up. No one can anticipate every eventuality, but we should have shored up AT&T Broadband's story much earlier, including making an earlier change in management. The latter was not for lack of trying, however. After Hindery left at the end of 1999, Armstrong had interviewed and wooed practically everyone who was running a large U.S. cable sys- tem, including Steve Burke, but it was mid-October of 2001 before he landed a cable industry veteran. Bill Schleyer, who was a close associ- ate of Amos Hostetter's and had run Continental Cable for him, gave the business instant credibility within the industry and among the people who followed it. Instead, whether through arrogance or naiveté, we acted as if we were still in complete command of our destiny. Once Comc