o years between 2001 and 2002. 23. For a contrary view from a CLEC's perspective, see Z-Tel, "Does Unbundling Really Discourage Facilities-Based Entry? An Econometric Examination of the Unbundled Switch- ing Restriction" (February 2002). 24. James Zolnierek, James Eisner, and Ellen Burton, "An Empirical Examination of Entry Patterns in Local Telephone Markets, Journal of Regulatory Economics 19 (2001): 143-59; James Eisner and Dale E. Lehman, "Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry," paper presented at the 14th Annual Western Conference, Center for Research in Regulated Industries, San Diego, Calif., June 28, 2001; R. Dean Foreman, "For Whom the Bell Alter- natives Toll: Demographics of Residential Facilities-Based Telecommunications Competi- tion in the United States," Telecommunications Policy 26 (2002): 573-87. 25. Eisner and Lehman, "Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry"; Jaison R. Abel, "Entry into Regulated Monopoly Markets: The Development of a Competitive Fringe in the Local Telephone Industry," Journal of Law and Economics 45 (October 2002): 289-316. 26. Martin F. McDermott III, CLEC: An Insider's Look at the Rise and Fall of Local Exchange Competition (Rockport, Maine: Penobscot Press, 2002). Notes to Pages 39-44 27. Shane Greenstein and Michael Mazzeo analyze the effect of such strategies in "Dif- ferentiation Strategy and Market Deregulation: Local Telecommunication Entry in the Late 1990s," mimeo, April 2003. 28. Dale E. Lehman and Dennis Wiseman, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: The "Costs" of Managed Competition (Hingham, Mass.: Kluwer Academic, 2000). 29. Abel, "Entry into Regulated Monopoly Markets." See also Donald L. Alexander and Robert M. Feinberg, "Entry in Local Telecommunications Markets," Review of Indus- trial Organization, forthcoming. Alexander and Feinberg find that the form of state regula- tion has no significant effect. 30. Eisner and Lehman, "Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry." 31. Ibid. 32. The major competitive access providers (CAPs) are owned by larger carri