 all the more attrac- tive the regulatory alternative of eliminating the problems of vertical exclusion by promoting facilities-based competition rather than by attempting to mandate structural separation and equal access. 4. Managed Competition The Bell System raised the classic argument that entry by the independents had caused the industry to engage in ruinous competition. For example, in several Annual Reports, AT&T President Frederick Fish repeatedly complained that compe- tition had driven rates too low to allow AT&T to recover its fixed costs (AT&T 1901, 1905, 1907). Theodore Vail picked up this refrain after he assumed the presidency of AT&T in 1907, complaining that "[d]uplication of plant is a waste to the investor" and that "[d]uplication of charges is a waste to the users." Competition simply forced "the public [to] pay double charges, on double capital, double operating expenses and double maintenance" (AT&T 1908, p. 18). Concerns about the costs to consumers from wasteful duplication also appeared in the report of the Study that laid the foundation for the Communications Act of 1934 (U.S. Senate 1934a). The avoidance of wasteful duplication was reflected in the fact that the order breaking up AT&T made no attempt to promote competition in local telephone service, 20 as well as the intention of UNE access requirements of the 1996 Act to permit competitors to share those portions of the network that remained a natural monopoly.21 As we noted in Chapter 4, ruinous competition has long been discredited as a justification for regulation. The duplication of costs about which Vail com- plained is an inevitable part of the market-based economy. As Richard Gabel (1969, p. 342) noted in his landmark study of the early telephone industry, "All competi- tion involves some redundancy of plant facilities and work effort. The question is whether the pressure of competing market forces produces a better or cheaper prod- uct than a single supply service." As the independent telephone industry pointed out at the time