. For a discussion of other cases approving a manufacturers' shift to an exclusivity arrangement, see Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 454-55. 105 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 411 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 309-12; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 n. 26; Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 725; State Oil, 522 U.S. at 16. Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries reach other firms' customers may cause demand for network capacity to increase. On the other hand, the presence of other networks can place downward pressure on network demand, as customers substitute away and the other networks fulfill some of the functions previously provided by the primary network. In addition, unlike retail and wholesale access, under which service is provided at points at the edge of the network where service is already available, intercon- nection access requires network owners to permit interconnection at new points of entry in the middle of the network, although they are likely to be at major nodes. Not only does this require designing new interfaces to permit intercon- nection at locations other than customers' premises; it also alters the traffic on the network by introducing flows into the network at points where flows would otherwise not occur. The resulting diversion of traffic to other networks can dis- aggregate traffic to the point where it is no longer economical to take advantage of the scale economies provided by higher-volume networking technologies. The fact that traffic now originates and terminates outside of a single network also increases the cost of obtaining the information necessary for network planning and creates the possibility of strategic behavior to take advantage of the information asymmetries. The impact of interconnection access on total network demand is complicated by the presence of "network economic effects," which arise when the value of a network increases with the number of end users connected to it. The increase in value caused by providing customers with access to the customers of other netw