2** -0.0026* -0.0077** (-3.20) (-1.85) (-2.95) With regulatory and Bell dummies -0.0058** -0.0027 -0.0085** (-3.12) (-1.63) (-2.83) (continued) UNE-P measure is used. The same is true for the rates published by Gregg in 2002. Gregg's data yield increasingly significant negative coefficients for the effect of UNE-P on 1996-2003 capital spending by the Bell companies as the date of the UNE-P price advances from 2001 to 2003. One can hardly interpret this result as showing that capital spending in 1996-99 was driven by UNE-P rates as states lowered them in 2002 and 2003. Moreover, the coefficients on Gregg's measures of the UNE-P rate are always greater in absolute value for 1996-99 than for 2000-03 capital spending. Why would 1996-99 capital spending be more sensitive than 2000-03 capital spending Estimates of Bell Company Cumulative Expenditures Table A-3. Coefficient Estimates from Capital Spending Regressions, 1996-2003 (Continued) Variable 1996-99 2000-03 1996-2003 UNE-P (Gregg, 2003 rates) No dummy variables -0.0090** -0.0059** -0.0149** (-4.93) (-4.07) (-5.72) With regulatory dummies -0.0091* -0.0069** -0.0161** (-4.95) (-4.69) (-6.16) With regulatory and Bell dummies -0.0096** -0.0069** -0.0166** (-4.92) (-4.32) (-6.01) UNE-P (Hassett and associates, AT&T) No dummy variables -0.0020 -0.0010 -0.0031 (-1.67) (-0.74) (-1.49) With regulatory dummies -0.0012 0.0006 -0.0021 (-1.16) (-0.45) (-1.09) With regulatory and Bell dummies -0.0009 -0.00004 -0.0012 (-0.70) (-0.02) (-0.50) CLEC share (FCC, 2002) No dummy variables 0.0013 0.0019 0.0006 (0.57) (1.07) (0.17) With regulatory dummies 0.0008 0.0022 0.0003 (0.59) (1.33) (0.10) With regulatory and Bell dummies 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0017 (0.22) (0.77) (-0.63) * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. a. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. to 2001-03 rates? Finally, the results using Hassett and associates' measure of the UNE-P rate show no statistically significant relationship between Bell compan