toward highly technical questions that would be of little interest (and incomprehensible) to the latter, the two briefings should have been announced simultaneously. Finally, the briefer should probably have been someone from oper- ations. While the AT&T Labs executives have great credibility with the media and analysts, they live in a nuanced world and seldom make flatly declarative statements. And like many engineers, if you ask them what time it is, they are programmed to tell you how to build a clock- or, in this case, a cable system. Luckily, we had also been pursuing a parallel strategy. Howard An- derson, founder of the most credible industry research firm, the Yan- kee Group, was an enthusiastic supporter of the TCI acquisition. The day of the merger announcement, he sent me an e-mail with "Fortune Favors the Bold" in the subject line. I told him that if the Yankee Group were to publish an analysis of the merged companies' pros- Tough Calls pects, including the likely cost of upgrades, we would pay for its distri- bution. The Yankee Group published its white paper on July I5. The title was "AT&T and TCI: Fortune Favors the Bold." While admitting that the deal was "not perfect," the report said that it was AT&T's "last best option" and moved the company's "grade for long-term strategy" from "a C to an A." It quoted the cost of upgrading the cable plant as "$1.8 billion" over three years. 9 On the very same day, the telephone and cable analysts at Morgan Stanley, which had not been involved in the merger discussions, issued a joint report strongly supporting the merger. Within days, analysts at other investment banks followed. Yet even when investors had perfect information, the company's stock price did not recover. It hovered around $57 or $58 a share through most of July, well below its peak of $65.38 on the day before the merger announcement. The Tracker John Malone, who would become AT&T's biggest individual share- holder when the merger closed, was unhappy about the stock slide, but he thought he knew