 convincing" evidence against government intervention to protect against vertical exclusion (LaFontaine and Slade 2008). The discussion up to this point has focused exclusively on courts' consideration of how best to allocate the network that exists today. These rationales overlook the impact that the essential facilities doctrine can have on incentives to invest in the network of tomorrow. In other words, the current policy debate has placed too much focus on static efficiency and given too little emphasis to the maximization of dynamic efficiency. When competitive entry is possible, the essential facilities doctrine can have a detrimental impact on incentives to invest in alternative network capacity. Exoge- nous factors - such as shifts in demand, cost-saving changes in technology, and the developments of new substitutes and complements - frequently cause markets to deviate from their long-run equilibrium. Antitrust law solves this problem through what one leading treatise calls "a uniquely American, market-affirming response to [market] power." It "assumes that strong incentives promote efficiency" and that in the absence of entry barriers, market power "will erode under the pressure of market developments." Tolerating a degree of short-run disequilibrium plays an essential role in this process of reequilibration. Indeed, "where supracompetitive pricing accompanies power, erosion of the power is thought to be more likely because high prices signal the need, and promise a reward, for entry" (Sullivan and Grimes 2006, pp. 84-85). This emphasis on allowing monopolists to charge supracompetitive prices in the short run is sometimes mistaken for the type of competition envisioned by Joseph Schumpeter (1942), in which the market is dominated by a succession of monopolists and firms compete by vying to discover the next breakthrough innovation that will give them a cost or quality advantage decisive enough to allow them to displace the current monopolist and dominate the market in its place. 45 This characterization