row- ing, but it had receded to just 23 percent by the end of 2003. The rest of the 30 million entrants' lines were leased or resold from the incumbents. Even more significant, reliance on the unbundled platform has been associated with a lack of growth in the new noncable entrants' use of their own lines. The slight increase in the net share of all entrants' own lines since June 30, 2000 (see figure 4-1), reflects the steady expansion of tele- phone subscribers to cable television systems, from 1.2 million in Decem- ber 2000 to 3.3 million in June 2004. By contrast, the facilities-based lines of noncable company entrants remained constant at about 4 million lines. 18 Thus it appears that noncable entrants stopped investing in their own facilities, perhaps because of the adverse outcomes for those who did SO before the 2000 collapse in CLEC stock values, but also because the environment created by regulators provided passive resellers of incumbent services more attractive returns than did investing in their own switches or even their own complete networks. The growth of entrants using their own switches and leasing incumbent loops has also slowed with the expansion of the resale of incumbents' ser- vices through the UNE-P. This trend would not likely have reversed itself under any conditions because there is no evidence that the entrants who use the entire UNE-P-such as MCI, AT&T, Talk America, or Z-Tel-were doing SO to obtain a "toehold" before launching facilities-based entry. Now that the Court of Appeals has virtually closed the door on the UNE-P, how- ever, these companies will be forced to invest in at least some of their own Local Competition under the 1996 Act facilities or slowly withdraw from offering local services. Most will choose the latter course. The Effect of UNE Rates on Entrants' Choice of Network Given the enormous variation in wholesale UNE rates across states, it is possible to test for the effect of these rates on the CLECs' choice of net- work strategy in the first five years of the new ac