nd orphans" issue. New players raised the risk-reward factor. And with the telecommunications industry in almost constant flux, investors would often have difficulties assessing both the risks and the potential rewards. Carterfone and MCI were early stages in a long process that eventually led to the telecom boom of the 1990s and the meltdown that followed. The process has proved extremely beneficial for users, but much more of a mixed bag for investors. Endnotes See, for instance, The Economist's definition in its "Economics A-Z" glossary at http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/. Alexander Graham Bell himself had little to do with the activities of the company that bore his name. For much of its early history, it was run by Theodore N. Vail, who, as much as anyone, was the visionary behind the Bell System. Theodore Vail's cousin, Alfred Vail, was himself a key player in the history of telecommunications; as assistant to Samual Morse, inventor of the telegraph, Vail was the actual inventor of the telegraph code that bore Morse's name. http://www.telephonecollectors.org/singwire/kellogg.htm Kingsbury-era interconnection with competitors was on a toll basis; Bell subscribers could only call other Bell subscribers at the local rate. This is the same concept sometimes expressed in the more recent aphorism called Metcal- fe's Law, which holds that "the usefulness, or utility, of a network equals the square of the number of users." The 1982 decision leading to the divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies was itself an extension of this case, hence the name "Modified Final Judgment." The Rebirth of Competition After the Hushaphone decision set a limit on monopoly power by its standard of private benefit without public harm, competition was no longer quite SO unthinkable. But the monopoly system was deeply entrenched. State regula- tors in particular had cozy relationships with both the Bell System and the inde- pendent telephone companies, which numbered about 6,000 in the 1960s. Breaking even a small part of 