 would require courts to evaluate whether the regulatory regime is "reasonably effective at addressing the relevant anticompetitive conduct" before yielding the field to an agency. Weiser's proposal is reminiscent of earlier proposals that would assess whether particular regulatory regimes furthered particular economic goals 94 or were the result of failures in the political process before conferring antitrust immunity. Even taken on their own terms, these proposals will require courts to determine whether a particular regulatory scheme is socially beneficial, an assess- ment that will vary depending on the assumptions employed. Even if measured in purely economic terms, determining the effectiveness of a regulatory program is likely to be extremely controversial, and courts are understandably chary of making antitrust liability turn on their assessment of another government entity's perfor- mance. Assessing the effectiveness of political process is further complicated by the lack of any consensus normative conception of a properly functioning regulatory system that can serve as a benchmark for evaluation, as well as the fact that regu- lation is often motivated by multiple concerns that are often openly redistributive and noneconomic in character (Hovenkamp 2005). A more modest version of this proposal can be constructed from language in the Supreme Court's opinion in FTC V. Ticor Title Insurance Co., which took the position that the active supervision requirement did not require courts "to determine whether the State has met some normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices." Instead, in determining whether an agency was actively supervising particular conduct, courts should simply ask whether the regulation in question represents the "independent judgment and control" of the state, and "not simply agreement among private parties." Framed in this manner, "[t]he question is not how well state regulation works but whether the anticompetitive scheme is the State's own" (504 U.S. at 634-35). 