ne stroke, Allen would extricate himself from a computer com- pany acquisition that had never really worked out, free his manufac- turing division from the increasingly contentious conflict of trying to sell equipment to local phone companies that considered AT&T their biggest potential competitor, and position the largest part of the com- pany to focus on communication services. Resolving these last two issues had taken on greater urgency, as Congress seemed increasingly likely to pass a telecommunications reform bill. The news release announcing what would come to be known as "Trivestiture" was issued on the morning of September 20, 1995. Shortly after the news hit the wires, Miller briefed a small group of financial analysts in a conference room at AT&T's official headquar- ters at 32 Avenue of the Americas in downtown Manhattan. It was clear that they liked the plan. Whether because they coveted the invest- ment banking fees that would inevitably flow from the restructuring or because they honestly believed that it would unlock shareowner value, or both, they had difficulty containing their enthusiasm. The markets would confirm this, increasing AT&T's stock market value by $6 billion in two days. The analysts' questions quickly passed from "what" and "why" to "when." As agreed, Miller told them that we Understand the Power of Symbols anticipated making an initial public offering of shares in the equip- ment manufacturer "sometime in the first half of 1996." "Why SO long?" they asked. Separating the books of the three companies and giving each of them its own balance sheet was a monumental task. Together, the companies had revenue of $80 billion, debt of $20 billion, 300,000 employees, and facilities in all fifty states and around the world. They had contracts with each other, shared intercompany debt, and used each other's intellectual property. Miller, the proverbial "numbers man" who had made his reputation by helping Penn Central come out of bankruptcy and leading Wang Laboratories into it, did not nor- ma