e, fibre arrived in our street in 2009 as an upgrade to the existing cable network and we were duly leafleted with the offer of 50 Mbit broadband, all you can eat TV and telephone connectivity at £50 per month. Problematically for the fibre supplier, we have acceptable ADSL2 connectivity and minimal appetite for all you can eat TV already adequately supplied without a subscription fee via a £100 Freesat satellite receiver that we fully own and are still happy with two years later. This highlights that even in urban areas in developed economies (the UK can just about still claim to be a developed economy) the time taken to achieve a return on broadband connectivity investment may not be consistent with short- or long-term shareholder expectation. Local zoning restrictions preclude cellular as a broadband access option even if we needed it, which we don't. 12.7.7 Australia as an Example Simultaneously, the Australian government decided the Australian nation should have its own national broadband network delivering 100 Mbit fibre to 90% of the population over the next eight years. The cost is an estimated 43 billion dollars and is billed as Australia's largest ever infrastructure project The proposed funding is made up of an initial government investment of 4.7 billion dollars with the balance as a mix of 51% government bonds and 49% private funding. It is claimed that the scheme will create 37 000 jobs. The cost equated to a public funding investment per household of 1650 Euros. New Zealand has a similar programme that equates to 600 Euros per household. The equivalent UK national commitment is three Euros. Whether the Australian and New Zealand initiatives prove to be economically efficient or politically popular is always going to be dependent on how much of the promised funding materialised within the political election cycle, how well it is spent and the terms on which private sector funding is secured. The latter is the detail that has been problematic. As one example, in Brisbane a private sector group called