ad been open to all bidders (see Figure 6.1). But NextWave had another trick up its sleeve. The company was awarded the licenses after making only a down payment, about 10% of the total. (The FCC had allowed licenses to be paid off in installments, again a concession to Losing by Winning: Wireless License Auctions make it easier for smaller businesses to participate.) NextWave did not build anything, and it did not make any further payments. In 1998, it filed for bank- ruptcy, claiming the licenses as a bankruptcy asset. The FCC tried to cancel the licenses, for the simple reason that their terms (payment) had not been met. In early 2001, with boom prices still dominating the market, the FCC reauctioned the disputed licenses, raising $16 billion for them. But NextWave did not sur- render and continued a court battle to hold on to the licenses. A deal was struck in late 2001 in which Next Wave would get $6 billion out of these auction reve- nues, but Congress did not go along. In January 2003, the Supreme Court upheld NextWave's position that bankruptcy law trumped telecommunications law. But by then, the boom was over, and the market value of the licenses was going down. In 2004, NextWave and the FCC reached a settlement in which the company returned some of its licenses, kept others, and agreed to share with the government the profits of license sales or leases within a limited time. It then sold some of its licenses in a private auction that netted less than half of the voided 2001 auction's winning bids. But eight years had passed in which a major chunk of spectrum had lay fallow. "3G" Combined the Allure of Both Internet and Wireless With "Internet" on everyone's mind during the boom years and "dotcom" actu- ally being viewed positively by some marketeers, the digitization of wireless telephony via 2G technology was seen by some insiders and investors as quaint, voice-centric, and thus uninteresting. Customers seemed fairly happy, at least with voice service, but equipment providers were looking for the next 