vantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities." In addition, mandating unbundled access poses significant problems of admin- istrability. In the words of the Court, "[e]nforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing." Furthermore, because unbundled access affects network ele- ments "deep within the bowels" of a local telephone network, they can only be made available if "[n]ew systems [are] designed and implemented simply to make that access possible." Additionally, requests for unbundled access "are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are highly technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the incessant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of competitive and incumbent LECs implement- ing the sharing and interconnection obligations." The "uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm" made the Court loath to mandate unbundled access under the antitrust law (540 U.S. at 407-08, 410, 414). In sum, all five forms of access share a number of common characteristics. For example, access invariably has a dramatic impact on the cost, capacity, and reliability of the network. In addition, by requiring networks to externalize certain functions that would otherwise be internalized, access forces networks to diverge from the natural boundaries dictated by the Coasian theory of the firm. Every form of access also has the inevitable effect of reducing incentives for both incumbents and competitors to invest in alternative network capacity. Judicially imposed access also inevitably requires antitrust courts to undertake price-setting and output- allocation functions to which they are institutionally poorly suited. That said, these overarc