ities had slightly outper- formed those relying on UNEs, but the difference was very small. Since reported capital expenditures presumably do not include start-up losses, all three groups of entrants obviously performed badly by this measure. Surprisingly, reliance on unbundled elements or resale does not gener- ate more revenues per dollar of capital investment than building one's own facilities. The carriers that survived into 2002 by relying heavily on UNEs generated $0.67 in 2001 revenues for each dollar of cumulative capital spending between 1996 and 2001. 49 Those relying on resale did somewhat worse, obtaining $0.47 in 2001 revenues per dollar of cumulative invest- ment. 50 But those investing in their own facilities generated $0.65 in 2001 revenues per dollar of cumulative investment, presumably because by hav- ing their own facilities they could generate more revenue per customer than resellers to offset their greater investment.51 By a second measure, the change in market capitalization, all CLECs have suffered. The facilities-based carriers' market values declined by more than 86 percent between December 31, 1999, and December 31, 2003. During this same period, resellers lost 95 percent of their market value, and UNE-based carriers lost 91 percent of theirs. The facilities-based carriers and the UNE-based carriers each had total market capitalization of $36 bil- Local Competition under the 1996 Act Figure 4-5. CLECs' Market Value, December 31, 2002, versus Cumulative Capital Expenditures, 1996-2002 Billions of dollars Cumulative capital expenditures Market value Resale On-net Source: Company reports; and www.quote.yahoo.com. a. The market values include the book value of debt. lion on December 31, 1999. By the end of 2003, these values had declined to just over $2 billion. Over the same period, the resellers' market cap fell from $20.3 billion to $0.4 billion. In short, there was very little equity left in the competitive local exchange sector by the end of 2003. A closer look at the individual entrant