, the commissions regulating these industries were soon abolished, along with most rate regulation. Congress did not find it necessary or prudent to Introduction require carriers in these industries to sell their services or lease their facili- ties to rivals at regulated rates. By contrast, legislators viewed a large part of the distribution network in telecommunications, and later in electricity, as a natural monopoly. As a result, the 1996 act instructed regulators to deter- mine which incumbent-carrier facilities should be made available to entrants and to establish the cost basis for wholesale rates for such facilities, two issues that have tied up the regulators and the courts for most of the past nine years. The U.S. experiment in regulated competition has had a large impact because most other countries of the Organization for Economic Coopera- tion and Development (OECD) subsequently followed it.° The Euro- peans, in particular, have adopted a more modest version of mandated net- work sharing, as have the Japanese and the Canadians. Given its earlier successes in the deregulation of transportation, energy, and financial mar- kets, the United States now serves as an example to most of the world in the "deregulation" of important network industries. This deference to U.S. policy may change in view of the chaos resulting from U.S. telecom and electricity regulation.1 The Financial Market "Bubble" The first four years after the passage of the 1996 act were exhilarating for many participants in the telecommunications sector. Investment soared as stock market valuations rose at remarkable rates. U.S. long-distance com- panies, wireless companies, and the new local carriers ushered in by the act saw their stock prices rise by 500 percent or more in 1998-2000 as the Internet boom captured the imagination of investors. Capital spending rose to historic levels, fueled by expectations that the Internet would require enormous increases in telecom capacity. New local companies raced to take advantage of the stock mark