 use of structural separation and quarantine as regulatory tools by restricting AT&T to tariffed services and for- bidding them to participate in nontariffed markets (United States V. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. [CCH] g 68,246 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1956)). Similarly, the Computer Inquiries required that the largest telephone companies only offer enhanced service through separate subsidiaries (FCC 1971; 17 1980a18 The court in charge government's third antitrust suit against AT&T employed these same regulatory instruments when breaking up AT&T. Because long-distance services were now 17 The Court of Appeals upheld this order in relevant part on judicial review (GTE Serv. Corp. V. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1973)). The Court of Appeals upheld this order on judicial review (Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n V. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Networks in Telecommunications potentially competitive, the court structurally separated them from local telephone services, which remained a regulated monopoly. The court then restricted the local telephone companies' ability to participate in markets that were unregulated and/or potentially competitive, such as long distance, information services, and equipment manufacturing (Modification of Final Judgment, 552 F. Supp., at 189-90). The 1996 Act contained similar restrictions, prohibiting the RBOCs to sell in-region long distance and manufacturing CPE until the RBOCs satisfied a fourteen-point com- petitive checklist demonstrating that they were confronting effective competition. The statute also required RBOCs that wished to offer certain information ser- vices (specifically electronic publishing and alarm monitoring) to do SO through separate affiliate for a period of several years (47 U.S.C. §$ 271-275). The logic inherent in this approach suggests that regulation and the resulting quarantine should be limited to those services that are inherently noncompetitive. Doing SO would allow competition to determine outcomes to the greatest extent possible. This rationale thu