to vertical integration, which transformed antitrust doctrine from a vision of com- petition that favored the independence of purchasers and traders to buy and sell in an open market into one considerably more hospitable toward vertical integration. That the Court has since rejected this vision and has acknowledged that vertical integration and exclusivity arrangements can often promote competition is quite striking and suggests a dramatically different model of industrial organization. This history of vertical integration thus cautions against taking too narrow a vision of competition and taking too skeptical a position with respect to exclusivity. Network neutrality proponents do not simply justify their arguments by the need to preserve the autonomy of end users and providers of applications, content, and devices for its own sake. They also argue that network neutrality is essential to promoting and preserving innovation on the Internet. The concern is that without guaranteed access to markets, content and applications providers will be deterred from innovating and that network owners will make decisions that hurt the interests of the public as a whole. 31 Both the FCC and network neutrality proponents recognize that it is typically the best interests of network owners to maximize the value that end users derive their network connections. 32 Indeed, competition policy has long rejected the notion that the owners of bottleneck facilities have systematic incentives to expand into vertically related markets for the simple reason that there is only one monopoly rent generated by any vertical chain of production and a monopolist can extract the entirety of that rent without vertically integrating simply by charging the monopoly price for the bottleneck facility. Although later theorists identified limited circumstances under which the one-monopoly-rent theorem does not hold, those models explicitly or implicitly assume that the relevant markets are both concentrated and protected by barriers to entry. For reasons d