haring (multiple PLMN identities). Generic protocol error handling. Support of self-configuration and self-optimization. Random access is specified entirely in the MAC, including initial transmission power estimation. The RRC connection establishment includes establishment of SRB1. The E-UTRAN completes RRC connection establishment prior to completing the establishment of the S1 connection, i.e., prior to receiving the UE context from the EPC. Therefore, the AS security is not activated during the initial phase of the RRC connection. During the initial phase of the RRC connection, the E-UTRAN may configure the UE to perform measurement reporting. However, the UE only accepts handover messages when security has been activated. On receiving the UE context from the EPC, E-UTRAN activates ciphering and integrity protection using the initial security activation procedure. The RRC messages to activate security are integrity-protected, while ciphering starts only after completion of the procedure. That is, the response to the message used to activate security is not ciphered, while the subsequent messages used to establish SRB2 and data RBs are both integrity- protected and ciphered. 6.13 3GPP LTE radio resource control functions Following activation of the initial security, the E-UTRAN establishes SRB2 and user data RBs, i.e., the E-UTRAN may perform this function prior to receiving the confirmation of the initial security activation from the UE. The E-UTRAN applies both ciphering and integrity protection for the RRC connection reconfiguration messages used to establish SRB2 and user data RBs. The E-UTRAN should release the RRC connection, if the initial security activation and/or the radio bearer establishment fails (i.e., security activation and user data RB establishment are triggered by a joint S1-procedure, which does not support partial success). For SRB2 and user data RBs, the security is always activated from the beginning, i.e., the E-UTRAN does not establish these bearers prior to activating security. The rel