rnet lines has different characteristics from traffic on a dial-up service. While AtHome had only 5 percent as many users as AOL, it carried 35 percent as much traffic. As a result, the computers, called servers, on which the service ran typically oper- ated at 85 percent of their theoretical capacity, leaving little margin for error. AtHome's cable company board members, led by Ted Rogers, the Canadian media billionaire, were furious with the company's managers and insisted that they accept supervision from AT&T's tech- nical people. Within weeks, AT&T engineers had redesigned the net- work, developed a more realistic construction plan, and taught AtHome's engineers how to meet "telephone-quality" performance standards. In September, just weeks after AtHome's auditors expressed doubt that the company could continue as a going concern, AT&T offered to buy the network as part of a "prepackaged" bankruptcy filing that would have provided a more orderly transition for all the cable compa- nies' customers-allowing them to keep their e-mail addresses, for example. However, AT&T also hedged its bets, quietly building a net- work that could perform the same functions as the AtHome network and developing plans to move its customers to that network. A week before the judge was scheduled to render his decision, Tough Calls AT&T sent an e-mail to its AtHome customers warning them about the anticipated shutdown and advising them to check their e-mail every day SO that messages would be saved on their local computer. The e-mail also noted that AT&T was trying to buy the AtHome net- work, but warned, "If the proposal to purchase the [AtHome] network is not approved, your service may be temporarily interrupted and it will be necessary to move your service to a new AT&T network." The company also established a Web site where it promised to post infor- mation as the situation developed. AtHome Pulls the Plug When AtHome pulled the plug, Armstrong ordered the contingency plans put into action. The morning after the decision, every