f wireless communications as direct competitors to local telephone companies has now created an external basis for determining the value of the services provided by the local loop. Under such circumstances, basing access pricing on replacement cost contradicts the Court's established takings jurisprudence. Perhaps sensing the weakness of its position, the FCC offered the alternative argument that, assuming that a taking had occurred, fair market value would not properly include monopoly rents (FCC 1996c). The legal support for this claim, however, is suspect. 38 And even if the FCC's legal conclusion 38 The FCC cites but a single lower court decision as its authority for the proposition that just compensation does not permit recovery of monopoly rents (FCC 1996c). A perusal of that decision reveals that it does not in fact stand for the proposition for which the FCC cites it. In Networks in Telecommunications were somehow proven to be sound, there is also reason to doubt the factual premises underlying the argument. The emergence of direct facilities-based competition and the fact that retail prices for local telephone service are subject to rate regulation indicate that it is unlikely that there were any monopoly rents included in the prices set by the open market. 2. Virtual Collocation Although we find the conclusion that the physical collocation requirements of the 1996 Act effect a physical taking inescapable, we recognize that virtual collocation poses a much closer question. The Supreme Court specifically reserved this in Loretto, observing that regulations requiring property owners to install certain types of network-related equipment might present a different question. In such a case, the property owner would own the equipment, which would give it full authority over the placement, manner, use, and possibly disposition of the equipment outside of the mandate of the specific regulation in question. In addition, the property owner would have the latitude to decide how to comply with the applicable regulati