 by service line and calling plan, then he wanted to know reve- nue by customer segment and time of day, and SO forth. Small armies churned out the numbers in the bowels of the building, often over- night, and committed them to transparencies known as "viewgraphs" at AT&T. Managers at the level just below those of us in the room would work their way through the transparencies on an overhead pro- jector while being peppered with questions. Every presentation had the same conclusion-a "come-back" that required more "drilling down." In the process, we all developed a better understanding of our busi- ness and the threats it faced. First, most of the company's profits were Work Inside Out Toward Your Customers coming from the consumer long-distance business. The company had been steadily losing market share, but the same competition that had forced it to lower prices had stimulated demand, increasing total reve- nue. Since 1984, AT&T had been getting a smaller slice of a bigger pie. But now it seemed that prices had declined SO much that further reductions would stimulate no more demand. The most optimistic projections called for small declines in revenue on the order of I or 2 percent a year. And if the Bell operating companies were allowed to offer long-distance service, which we all believed was likely before the end of the decade, consumer long-distance revenue would decline even more. Second, to compete with the Bells, AT&T had to find a practical way to offer its own local service in addition to long-distance. String- ing wire from central offices to people's homes was hopelessly expen- sive and couldn't be justified by the revenue it could generate on phone calls. That's why AT&T had concentrated on re-selling the Bells' local service under the AT&T brand, as provided for in the Telecom Act. But the Bell's so-called wholesale rate was set SO high, AT&T lost at least $10 a month on every customer it signed. And the company's efforts to bring its own cables into office buildings, where the potential revenue coul