ss story. The company's browser market share declined precipitously after Microsoft decided it wanted con- trol of the browser. The software giant, ironically enough, began by licensing Mosaic itself from Spyglass Inc., which held the licensing rights from the University of Illinois' National Center for Supercomputer Applications, where Andreesen had worked as a student. The first releases of Microsoft Internet Explorer were not terribly impressive, but the product rapidly became competi- tive. Microsoft Windows 95 did not originally include a browser, but by 1997, Internet Explorer was included with new copies, and Windows 98 was designed to tightly integrate it into many aspects of the system. With every new Windows system including a perfectly serviceable browser, most users saw no need to download Netscape Navigator, even though it was arguably superior and The Internet Boom and the Limits to Growth available for free. Finally, in late 1998, America Online acquired Netscape for $4.2 billion. This was well below its peak, but still inexplicable in terms of fundamentals. AOL did not even use Netscape's software for its own service, which at the time was growing rapidly. Netscape's main attraction may have been its home page: The browser, as installed, defaulted to Netscape's own home page, which carried advertising, and thus presented a modest revenue stream. The advertising model was the primary attraction behind another lead- ing Internet stock, Yahoo. Founded as an Internet search company, Yahoo developed a number of services behind its "portal," many carrying advertising, and some, such as an electronic commerce shopping cart service for small merchants, carrying real user fees. It actually made a profit. But its market cap during the bubble was ridiculous. Computerworld noted in 1999, "Santa Clara, Calif.-based Web portal Yahoo Inc., for example, is worth more on paper ($59.5 billion as of late November) than Detroit-based General Motors Corp. ($47.6 billion), even though GM has more than 100 times the net