mber! Interexchange carriers that used this were thus initially given discounts for "nonpremium" access. Feature Group B, created by the ENFIA agreement, was already, by 1984, becoming more com- mon. It was a trunk-side connection to the network accessed by dialing a uniform seven-digit access code beginning with 950. Sprint, for instance, had the nationwide Feature Group B code 950-0777. Feature Group referred to AT&T's specific predivestiture arrangements, remaining in place only until equal access could be instituted in a given central office. Feature Group D referred to equal access connection, which was phased in during the 1980s. Feature Group D had two novel features. One, presubscription, allowed each local subscriber to specify a carrier for "1+" long distance calls. (Before equal access, this was always AT&T, or the local exchange carrier itself for intra- LATA calls. IntraLATA presubscription did not occur until after the Telecom Act took effect.) The second was 10+ dialing to specify a carrier; for instance, Sprint's equal access code became 10777. (When 10xxx codes ran low in the 1990s, this format was changed to 101xxxx, and Sprint's code became 1010777.) Switched access rates were especially advantageous to the local telephone companies, including the newly created RBOCs. In 1984, the national average rate for switched access charges was 17.26 cents [16], more than half of the aver- age revenue per minute for international and interstate calls, which was 32 cents [17]. The RBOCs' own rates were, in general, somewhat lower, because the national average was dragged up by the high-cost independents, and the RBOCs initially had to pool their access revenues with the independents. It was clear, The Great Telecom Meltdown nonetheless, that the RBOCs were themselves the major beneficiaries of long distance revenues. Ordinary long distance rates thus did not fall immediately upon divesti- ture, even though competition was theoretically boosted. Indeed some rates, for short-haul and late-night calls, genera