ofitable business-long-distance voice-had always operated in a deflationary environment. But wire- less plans that treated long-distance calls as "just another minute". and even made them "free" in the evening and on weekends-were changing people's calling habits and exacerbating price competition among the long-distance carriers. But three years of budget cuts had weakened the consumer unit's vaunted "acquisition machine." Many of the customers lost to other long distance companies simply were not being replaced. Whereas at the end of 1999, the consumer long-distance unit had expected its revenue to decline by 3 to 5 percent in 2000, just five months later it forecast a revenue decline of 5 to 7 percent; in fact, it declined nearly IO percent. In 200I, consumer long-distance revenue was projected to decline "in the mid-teens." It actually declined 20 percent. Worse than the slope of the revenue decline was the total inability of anyone to predict it. The consumer long-distance business was SO large ($22 billion in revenue and nearly $9 billion in net income in 1999) that it cast a huge shadow over the company's other businesses, which were either far less profitable or losing money. Wireless reve- nue, for example, grew 44 percent in 1999, but wireless was still only about a third the size of consumer long distance and was as yet un- profitable. The stock market had figured out that in absolute dollars, AT&T's profitable businesses were declining faster than its growth businesses were growing. Further, it appeared that MCI WorldCom, even without a wireless subsidiary, had found the sweet spot in the business market-data. In hindsight, it is now clear that MCI WorldCom was not immune to the pressures buffeting AT&T; it used accounting gimmicks and outright fraud to insulate itself from them. This not only misled inves- tors who compared the two companies, it also created artificial price competition. If MCI WorldCom had priced its services at a level that matched the earnings it reported from 1999 to 2002, indust