en that the retail prices supposedly reflected monopoly returns. Although this position is at least arguable in the case of local telephony, it is unsupportable in the case of broadband. The FCC and the courts have recognized that vibrant competition exists, and the impending arrival of additional competitors should only cause it to intensify. Indeed, the presence of this competition raises serious questions whether com- pelling access to high-speed broadband facilities represents sensible economic pol- icy. Access requirements only make sense if there is a true bottleneck facility that in effect gives a company a natural monopoly. As noted above, when competition exists, compelling access at best accomplishes nothing, because parties who negoti- ate agreements on other terms will simply negotiate around access rates that are set too high. Access rates that are set too low, however, can harm allocative efficiency by creating the shortages and distortions inevitably associated with prices that are not calibrated to balance supply and demand. Even worse, compelling access can harm dynamic efficiency by eliminating the need for firms to invest in substitute facilities. By rescuing those who need alternative means of transmission from having to invest in alternative capacity, access require- ments can forestall the emergence of competition by depriving other facilities-based competitors of their natural strategic partners. Access requirements can thus have the perverse effect of cementing the existing technologies into place. Indeed, that is the clear import of the FCC's notice of proposed rulemaking underscoring the The Regulation of Last-Mile Broadband Networks importance of taking a more functional approach from the consumers' perspective and recognizing the emergence of multiple options in providing broadband service, including cable, telephony, wireless, and satellite. Indeed, it was the emergence of this competition that led the FCC to seek comment on whether access requirements should be foregone (FCC 2002b). 