 top. Hindery did not have to write a memo about his political victory. But everyone at TCI soon knew that it would be business as usual following the merger. An employee broadcast the day after the merger announcement was the last time TCI employees saw Zeglis and Hindery together. The consumer long-distance business's only hope now was to con- vince regulators to let it lease parts of the Bell companies' networks at reasonable rates. To his credit, Armstrong threw himself into that bat- Tough Calls tle with all the urgency of a third-party candidate with unlimited pub- lic financing. For example, when it appeared that the Bells would win federal legislation freeing them from a requirement that they lease their networks to others, he met with fully half the members of the U.S. Senate in a single day. But it would be early 2002 before AT&T convinced the regulators in one large state (New York) to reduce the Bells' wholesale rates enough for it to make a small profit. Meanwhile, the consumer long- distance business slashed prices and tried packaging itself with every- thing from cable TV service to oil changes to slow down its erosion. However, the first cable TV discount package it offered was not in partnership with AT&T's own cable company, but with New York's Cablevision. Zeglis was right: An executive can meet goals only if he controls the necessary resources. Armstrong had made Zeglis respon- sible for something called "the consumer franchise" without really defining what that meant and had put one of its fastest-growing busi- nesses, cable, out of his reach. I suspected that Zeglis would leave the company in late 2000, when the balance of a retention grant that the board had given him- now worth about $1.5 million-would vest. Zeglis was becoming in- creasingly indiscreet in criticizing Armstrong in front of subordinates, but was all smiles when sitting at his side in meetings. My dilemma was what to do with him in the meantime. If I raised his profile, it would create a bigger hole when he left. If I lowere