andmark decision in Continental T.V., Inc. V. GTE Sylvania, in which it accepted the reduction of the transaction costs needed to guard against opportunism as a pro-competitive business justification sufficient to support holding exclusivity agreements. In the process, the Court rejected buyer and trader freedom as independent values that justify regulatory intervention even in the absence of any showing of harm to competition (433 U.S. at 53 n. 21, ,54-55) and implicitly reaffirmed the principle that the antitrust laws were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors." If competition is sufficiently robust, the reduction in freedom of some consumers or manufacturers does not rise to the level of antitrust concern, as any consumers who wish to avoid the strictures of the exclusivity arrangement can do SO simply by shifting their purchases to other providers. Sylvania marked a sea change in competition policy with respect to vertical integration. Following Sylvania, the debate shifted away from the impact on indi- vidual buyers and traders and focused on increasingly sophisticated analyses of whether or not particular exclusivity arrangements promote economic welfare. 29 Thereafter, antitrust law has become increasingly hospitable to vertical integration and vertical contractual restraints. 30 The image of end user and application/content provider freedom that lies at the center of network neutrality is quite reminiscent of the vision of an atomized market composed of small manufacturers that dominated pre-Sylvania antitrust law. Indeed, network neutrality proponents often wax rhapsodic about the early days of the Internet when small innovators were important sources of new Internet content and applications (see, e.g., U.S. Senate 2006a, p. 4). 27 Brown Shoe Co. V. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (offering the classic statement of this proposition). For more recent statements, see Brunswick Corp. V. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Cargill, Inc V. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 4