telephone rather than from Internet services. As an example, in Figure 2.5 [17], the detailed analysis of the 2008 fixed-lines revenue stream of Telecom Italia is reported. From the figure, it is clear that as much as 43% of the global revenue in the retail market is due to telephone services. Revenue in the retail mar- ket from Internet services is almost as big as the revenue from business customers, and about half the revenue is due to wholesale. This clearly states that the old-style products (telephone and wholesale, that quite often is simply capacity leasing) produce by far the bigger revenue. Moreover, comparing fixed-line revenues with mobile ones (again considering the Telecom Italia case), the impact on the overall carrier revenue stream is 60% and 38%, respectively (with a 2% revenue from other sources) [17]. Since this situation is quite typical, an incumbent European carrier fights its main battle in the retail arena, the wholesale prices being mainly stated by the administrative authority. Unfortunately, the retail market is also the most difficult; the cost of different telephone services is steadily decreasing, striking carriers hard, and the trend does not seem to stop. The fast decrease of the cost of telephone services is largely due to the intense price competition that has emerged after the end of the bubble. However, the penetration of broadband lines has a role in this scenario, allowing broadband users to adopt alternative telephonic systems like IP-phone or Skype [18]. These services are free of charge or almost free of charge, and this cooperates to push down the cost of standard phone calls. However, it is clear that Internet revenues are far from compensating for the loss of telephone incomes. Thus, in this situation, the more the imbalance in the carrier service offering toward Internet, the more the revenue decrease. The situation is of course completely different for competitive carriers. In this case, the value proposition at the base of their proposal to leave the incumbent is ge