g its cable modem customers from accessing streaming video, such problems would justify a targeted response limited to a particular application, as the FCC mandated in Madison River (FCC 2005b) and endorsed in Comcast (FCC 2008c). Under no circumstances would such concerns support the kind of blanket restrictions envisioned under the strongest versions of network neutrality. Regulation poses particularly grave risks in industries that are undergoing rapid technological change. When that is the case, even the most conscientious regulator will find it hard to keep up with the pace of change. Worse yet, whether imposed as an ex ante rule or as a presumption against discriminatory access with the specific The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet contours of the regulatory requirement developed ex post, network neutrality would have the effect of foreclosing practices that are ambiguous or about which there is too little information. This is why scholars from across the political spectrum have warned of the dangers of regulatory lag in industries that are technologically dynamic (see, e.g., Posner 1969; Kahn 1971; Panzar and Willig 1977; Breyer 1982). The task confronting policy makers is especially difficult because they would have to intervene at a fairly early stage in the technology's development to make any difference, because governmental intervention after the market has settled on the optimal technology would serve little purpose. Given the institutional considerations, how should the debate between network diversity and network neutrality be resolved? Lessig (2002, p. 47) suggests that although network management is a real problem, congestion problems can be solved by increasing bandwidth rather than by giving network owners more control over network flows. Although Lessig recognizes that this vision of a world with "infinite" bandwidth contradicts the basic economic notion that all commodities are inherently scarce, he nonetheless states, "I'm willing to believe in the potential of essentially i