d be proportional to the degree of failure. However, one may note that compensation payment is an option, not a mandatory part of QoS agreements (e.g. it is typically not included in SLAs between telecom operators and end-users in developed telecom/ICT markets). When compensation is used as a measure for non-conformance with the SLA and its QoS agreement, one possible mechanism is compensation to be paid automatically without the requirement that the customer makes a claim. Also, it is possible to enforce penalty clauses for failing to meet QoS targets considering relevant national legislation. The main goal of financial penalties should be more toward encouragement for better QoS. But when QoS degradation persists, the penalties may be charged proportionally to the interruption period for one or more QoS parameters specified in the SLA. Another option (e.g. to avoid penalties) is to provide ease of switching service provider (i.e. tele- com operator), which means release from the SLA (with the previous provider) before its expiration. Overall, the SLA plays an important role in QoS regulation because it includes the main KPI targets between the service provider and the customer (i.e. end-user). Typ- ically, the NRA is the authority which monitors the format of the SLA between the telecom operators (as service providers) and end-users, and provides means for action in cases when the QoS level specified in the agreement is not provided. An NRA can impose certain requirements on selected KPIs such as bitrates, for example, as part of national broadband strategy. In that manner, by imposing require- ments to specify minimum bitrates (where it is technologically feasible, e.g. in fixed broadband networks), the NRA can ensure that all customers in a given country will receive a certain level of broadband and ultra-broadband access. The final packages offered to customers should be driven by the telecom/ICT market and its competition (in developed ICT/telecom markets), while the NRA may define the minimum bitrates that