ll V. City of San Jose in terms of the Court's confiscatory rate-making precedent (485 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1988)). In contrast, the Court analyzed the rent control ordinance in Yee V. City of Escondido in terms of its regulatory takings jurisprudence, stating that Compare, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law"), with Fed. Power Comm'n V. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 591, 601 (1944) ("The fixing of prices may reduce the value of the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid"). 12 Compare Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (noting that, without some limit on the government's ability to restrict owners' use of their property, "the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears"), with R.R. Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) ("[I]t is not to be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation [of rates] is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation"). 13 Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (calling the regulatory takings standard an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]"), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602 (observing that determining whether a rate is confiscatory depends upon a series of fact-intensive inquiries focusing on the rate's net effect). Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" as a factor in the regulatory takings analysis), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (recognizing the importance of ensuring that the regulated entity receives "enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business"). 15 Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying "the extent to which the regulation has interfered wi