Under this standard, as developed by Herbert Hovenkamp, it is not necessary that the conduct in question "have been reviewed and approved by the agency"; it is sufficient if the conduct is "under 94 Cirace (1982); Spitzer (1988). 95 Wiley (1986a); Elhauge (1991); Inman and Rubinfeld (1997); Squire (2006). Networks in Telecommunications ongoing study" or if the agency has "manifested its ability and will to evaluate the conduct if asked" (Hovenkamp 2004, p. 352). Finally, although many observers have assumed that Trinko effectively elimi- nated Section 2 liability in regulated industries such as telecommunications," some lower courts have read Trinko narrowly, concluding that it barred essential facilities claims, but did not invalidate other types of monopolization claims. 97 Although these courts did not analyze the issue in these terms, a close examination of the regulatory regime erected by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 reveals the com- plexity of these issues. The Act envisions that interconnection will occur primarily through voluntary agreements negotiated by the parties. Only if those negotiations fail is the interconnection dispute submitted to binding arbitration before the state public utility commission (47 U.S.C. §S 252(a)(1), 252(b)(1)). The fact that the terms of interconnection are more a reflection of business judgment than of regu- latory coercion counsels against allowing immunizing this conduct from antitrust scrutiny. 4. The Impact of Trinko's Varying Interpretations Trinko's ultimate impact will be determined by how broadly later courts read the decision. The broadest reading of Trinko would hold that antitrust courts' institutional unsuitability to supervising access requirements would bar such claims. A narrower reading that makes judicial authority to entertain antitrust claims turn on the effectiveness of the agency's efforts to address the anticompetitive conduct would require courts to evaluate the success and failure of the regulatory efforts, finding it sufficient that an agency 