be more consistent with network diversity than network neutrality. More recent scholarship on the anticommons has underscored the fact that property rights can be too small as well as too large (see, e.g., Heller 1998). The presence of innovation externalities more 45 This is a point that is more important to him than even the end-to-end argument. Indeed, Lessig acknowledges that even if discrimination were imposed by end users in a manner consistent with end-to-end, he would still be concerned (Lessig 2005). Networks in Telecommunications properly suggests the existence of an optimal size of a property right rather than blanket presumption in favor of an innovation commons. As such, little insight is gained by trying to elevate the preservation of the inno- vation commons into a rhetorical trump. The most plausible justification resembles a version of the "precautionary principle," which argues that certain harms are SO potentially catastrophic that regulators should guard against them even when it is uncertain whether they will ever come to fruition. Such an argument would claim that the potential harm to innovation associated with deviating from the transparency that now characterizes the Internet is SO great as to justify imposing network neutrality prophylactically. The problem with this argument is that the precautionary principle is incoherent as an a priori commitment. Because there are risks in adhering to as well as deviating from the status quo, taken to its logical conclusion, it forbids all courses of action, because regulation can impose costs and foreclose beneficial outcomes just as surely as nonregulation. As a result, theorists have attempted to render the precautionary principle coherent by limiting applica- tion to circumstances in which the adverse consequences are truly catastrophic and in which deviations from the status quo are irreversible (Sunstein 2005). Neither precondition would appear to be satisfied in the case of network neutrality. As the experience in reconfiguring local telephon