 decision in 2004 that reversed the FCC's attempt to keep UNE-P alive, Covad's prospects do not look good. 44 The Broadband Revolution Figure 8-6. ILEC and Cable TV Companies' Capital Expenditures, 1996-2006 Billions of dollars ILECs estimates CableTV estimates Actual Estimate Source: CreditSuisse-First Boston (2002, 2003). There is no evidence that network sharing has increased competition in U.S. broadband markets. At the end of 2003, the FCC reported that only 1.7 percent of all broadband lines were DSL lines offered by nonincumbent telephone companies. Another 1.5 percent reflected nonincumbent tele- phone companies offering a wireline service other than ADSL or cable modem service. 45 Thus the share of broadband lines accounted for by entrants, in toto, was only 3 percent, and the share using the incumbent telephone companies' facilities remains mired in the range of 1 to 2 percent. In a recent analysis by Debra Aron and David Burnstein, facilities-based competition between cable modems and incumbent telephone companies' DSL services has a statistically significant positive effect on overall broad- band penetration in the United States, but the price of UNE loops has no statistically significant effect. 46 This is further evidence of the futility of regulatory policy focused on making incumbent telephone companies' facilities available to competitors rather than opening more lines to poten- tial final consumers. The Broadband Revolution Figure 8-7. Forecast of Addressable Broadband Locations, 2002 versus 2003 Millions Cable modem 2002 DSL 2003 DSL 2002 Source: Morgan Stanley (October 25, 2002, and April 6, 2003). As Michelle Kosmidis reports, unbundling has not worked any better in Europe. 47 Although the European Union has avoided the U.S. mistake of using unbundling to promote local entry into voice services, its more lim- ited local-loop unbundling policy to promote broadband appears to be failing. At the end of 2003, only 6 percent of all DSL lines in Europe were delivered by CLECs over unbundled or shar