e regulation advances. 10 Second, Loretto reasserted the sharp distinction between the Court's physical and regulatory takings jurisprudence. When a physical taking is involved, regulatory takings precedent does not apply. 3. Florida Power and the Distinction between Physical Takings and Confiscatory Ratemaking The Supreme Court advanced similar themes in FCC V. Florida Power Corp., the other leading case involving a takings challenge to regulation compelling access to a communications network. As noted in Loretto, the distribution of cable television depended on the operator's ability to establish a web of coaxial cables connecting individual households. Although in urban areas this could be accomplished by compelling building owners to allow cable operators to string cable across their properties, in suburban and rural areas, the network of utility poles owned by telephone and electric companies was the only feasible means of establishing the necessary infrastructure. Congress was concerned, however, that utility companies were exploiting their monopoly position by overcharging cable operators for the right to attach coaxial cables to existing utility poles. As a result, in 1978 Congress enacted the Pole Attachments Act authorizing the FCC to regulate the terms and conditions of pole attachment agreements in any state that did not already impose such regulation (Statutes at Large 1978, pp. 35-36 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224)). 10 It bears emphasizing that this argument is far narrower than the one advanced in Sidak and Spulber (1997a), which claimed that Loretto required compensation for any deviation from investment-backed expectations resulting from a change in regulatory systems and that a third party's introduction of a data stream constituted a physical occupation. Instead, we limit our- selves to what is indisputably Loretto's core holding that regulations authorizing the permanent placement of equipment on another person's property constitute a physical taking. Thus, even those who question th