rovide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer."10 As was the case with interconnection access, the FCC implemented the unbundled access requirements of the 1996 Act through TELRIC. 11 B. Capacity and Configuration Effects of Access Regulation This section explores the consequences of the incremental demand associated with the various forms of access regulation. Mandated access may cause the total demand for capacity to rise or fall, depending on the regulated price of access and whether access involves some types of demand that were not present before. If man- dated access increases total demand for capacity, compelling access may necessitate changes in network capacity and configuration. If the network firm has sufficient excess capacity to meet any additional demands placed on the network, either across 9 As noted in Chapter 4, the emergence of intermodal competition from wireless has rendered this premise questionable. In addition to providing direct competition to wireline local loops, the fact that spectrum can be resold converts the upfront investments needed to establish network service from sunk costs into fixed costs, thereby arguably bringing local telephone service within the ambit of the theory of contestable markets. 47 U.S.C. § (3) & (d)(2)(A)-(B). 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a). Networks in Telecommunications the network or at specific locations on the network, then mandated access may not affect the capacity and configuration of the network. If SO, the effects of mandating access are restricted to the transaction costs of compliance and the opportunity costs of lost earnings from displaced demand. If the network firm lacks sufficient excess capacity to meet any increases in demand due to access, then the network firm must adjust its capacity accordingly. Adjusting network capacity to meet additional demand generally entails more than capacity expansion; it also requires reconfiguring the networ