ior, they are creating the cli- mate for stormy weather. Sometimes a major storm may begin by looking like a good sailor's breeze, but those who pay attention to the signs can usually get out of harm's way on time. The meltdown provides many fine examples of bad ways to use one's money. But the underlying truths are fairly simple. Technology, business, and regulation move, more or less, together. Technological progress usually leads. Regulators need to respond appropriately or risk having their regulatory schemes collapse under the weight of arbitrage or unforeseen competitive forces. The details of the economy change, but the underlying principles do not. There never is, and never will be, a real "new economy." And thus simple laws of busi- ness still apply: Companies need to eventually make a profit or they cannot con- tinue to operate. They must focus on the bottom line, not whatever convenient metric happens to make them look good. Engineers and scientists, but not accountants, are the ones who should be creative. The Great Telecom Meltdown Asset Valuation is Risky At the heart of the meltdown was the vast level of investment in telecommunica- tions facilities made during the 1990s. The decade began with a recession, with little new investment and little new motivation for investment in technology- based companies. The minicomputer industry had crashed just a few years ear- lier, and commoditization was driving down margins across the computer industry. Corporations were building private data networks, but most telecom- sector growth was fairly slow and steady, with mobile telephones just starting to penetrate the mass market. It was not until the Internet went public that the impetus existed for large-scale new expenditures in both telecommunications plants and in facilities to make use of it. A key problem with many of these investments was that the assets were simply not worth what they cost to build, in large part because a glut of construc- tion drove down prices and spread the business too thin. Of cour