ons and therefore "could minimize, the physical, esthetic, and other effects of the installation" (458 U.S. 419, 440 n. 19 (1982)). The FCC followed this reasoning in its Expanded Interconnection proceeding. Without conceding that that mandatory physical collocation would constitute a per se taking, the FCC argued that offering the LECs virtual collocation as an option eliminated any remaining constitutional infirmities (FCC 1994). Unfortunately, the courts have never had the opportunity to address whether virtual collocation effects a physical taking, because before the courts could address that case, a manufacturer of patented rubber and metal mountings critical to allowing aircraft to fly in adverse weather conditions had developed a dominant market position that allowed it to earn profits ranging from fifty-nine to one hundred forty-seven percent. During World War II, the federal government ordered the manufacturer to sell its products to the government at prices determined by the government to be "fair and reasonable," which allowed the manufacturer a profit of only ten and one-half percent. The manufacturer challenged the action under the Takings Clause. The court conceded that "[i]f these were ordinary times," the manufacturer would have been allowed to earn supracompetitive profits. "[T]hese were not ordinary times," however, because the war had in effect caused the free and untrammeled market necessary for a fair market value determination to disappear (Lord Mfg. Co. V. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748, 751-55 (Ct. Cl. 1949)). The true holding of Lord Manufacturing is thus that circumstances may exist during which current market price is no longer a good indicator of fair market value, which is defined as the price to which a willing seller and a willing buyer would agree after ample time to find a purchaser (see also BFP V. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1994), discussing how transient exigencies can force prices below or above fair market value). Lord Manufacturing assuredly does not stand