nal-Constitution (2005); Broadcasting & Cable (2005); San Jose Mercury News (2005); Telephony (2005); Wall Street Journal (2005a). Networks in Telecommunications B. Noneconomic Justifications for Network Diversity In addition to the economic rationales discussed above, some commentators have invoked noneconomic rationales to justify network neutrality. Drawing inspira- tion from the Supreme Court's admonition that "it has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that the widest possible dissemination of infor- mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public," some of these scholars argue that the central rationale is to promote political discourse, even if it might be more economical to limit access. 33 Indeed, there is a long legacy of regulating network industries in order to protect access by small producers that dates back to the initial regulation of the railroads in the late nineteenth century.34 Following the landmark Supreme Court decision in Munn V. Illinois (94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876)), other scholars justify the imposition of inter- connection, standardization, nondiscrimination, and rate regulation requirements because telecommunications networks are "affected with a public interest" (Speta 2002, pp. 261 n. 185, 270-71; Nachbar 2008). There is nothing incoherent about imposing regulation to promote values other than economic welfare. The problems with this approach are more practical than conceptual. 35 Unless protecting the widest possible diversity of sources is a virtue in and of itself that trumps all other values, such a theory must provide a basis for quantifying the noneconomic benefits and for determining when those benefits justify the economic costs. Our nation's experience with antitrust law has revealed that telecommunications networks are often subject to economies of scale, which in turn implies that forcing communications enterprises to remain small can exact a price. At some point, the marginal benefit associated with protecting anot