 owner whole. Economic analysis indicates that the price charged by the building owner would be determined in part by the amount that other potential users of the same resources might be willing to 423 N.E.2d at 336 (Gabrielli, J., concurring). 21 311 F.3d 1357, 1367-71 (11th Cir. 2002). 22 See Sidak and Spulber (1997a) and Baumol and Sidak (2002). Pricing of Access to Networks pay. The price would also be determined by the value of that access to the person purchasing it. 23 In other words, the assumption that networks with excess capacity face zero opportunity costs ignores the fact that market value is determined in part by demand-side considerations that are independent of any supply-side, cost- oriented considerations. The mere fact that access to the facility has value to the party seeking access gives the facility's owner both the incentive and the ability to insist on receiving more than nominal compensation. The facts of Loretto provide an apt illustration of these basic concepts. The value of the right to attach a cable wire to an apartment building is not determined by the costs of constructing a half-inch strip across the roof and down the face of an apartment building, as a rate-making approach based on historical or replacement cost might suggest. In addition, the fact that attaching a cable television wire to a building does not consume the building does not mean that the right to attach has no real value absent proof that the building owner had some other use for the same space. Our analysis indicates instead that the value of the right to attach the cable wire to an apartment building is determined by the value of the services that are provided through those wires. Indeed, it is no surprise that the pricing arrangement negotiated among the parties before the state began regulating such access was based on a percentage of the value of the services provided by the cable company. To use a concrete example, the fact that a summer home may be unoccupied during the winter would arguably justify regardi