rom delay can be a large multiple of forgone revenues. 37 When the price elasticity demand is high, consumers would be willing to pay little more than the current price for the service. As the demand for a service becomes less price elastic, however, the willingness to pay increases accordingly. Charles Jackson and I have estimated that the benefits of universal broadband service in the United States could be as high as $300 billion a year to consumers and producers. 38 If broadband rollout is delayed ulatory disincentives to invest, these gains-measured in terms of con- sumers' and producers' surplus-are likewise delayed. Even if the delay is just a few years, the present value of the losses to consumers and producers could be enormous, easily in the neighborhood of $500 billion.39 There is a growing perception that regulation has impeded the growth of the ILECs' DSL services. In 2001 one group of analysts downgraded its estimate of how fast ILECs would be able to roll out broadband services, explaining, While regulatory developments continue to favor cable [operators], the constraints on RBOCs [regional Bell operating companies] are increas- ing. Line sharing with other competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) has been required for the Bells, resulting in increased com- petition for the RBOCs. Moreover, the establishment of separate sub- sidiaries for DSL operations has been required. As a result, some Bells are holding back on their aggressive rollouts, such as SBC in Illinois. There is little empirical evidence to support or disprove this hypothesis. Because SO many other regulatory issues involving traditional voice services The Broadband Revolution have been interwoven with broadband regulation, it is difficult to provide an empirical test of the effect of the regulatory environment on ILEC investment. 41 In August 2003, when the FCC announced that it had decided to elim- inate line sharing, it also voted to remove the unbundling obligation for investment in next-generation, fiber-optic networks. 42 It a