 existing infrastructure, without having to fish the walls or get the landlord's permission. So the time to revenue was rather long, often close to a year. Thus the companies needed plenty of capital to continue expansion. Like other facilities-based providers, these wireless CAP/CLECs were able to raise plenty of capital during the early boom years. Some of this came in the form of vendor financing. Winstar was a major customer of Lucent Technolo- gies, which reportedly lent Winstar about $700 million between 1996 and 2000 [8]. Several billion more dollars came from other sources; however, it was largely lost in the company's 2001 bankruptcy filing. Winstar's business was acquired in late 2001 by IDT, a New Jersey-based telecom company that had managed its cash much better during the boom years. The price was only $42.5 million, in cash and stock. IDT Chairman Howard Jonas said at the time of the acquisi- tion, "This is an incredible deal. It might not top the Dutch settlers buying the Island of Manhattan for $24, but it comes pretty close. With almost $5 billion in assets and about $200 million in annual revenue, Winstar has great potential" [9]. But IDT Solutions, as the subsidiary was renamed in 2003, remained in the red into 2004, with no profit in sight. Teligent's original story featured its charismatic CEO, Alex Mandl, a former AT&T executive. It began with a trade of some valuable spectrum licenses that its founders had acquired earlier. But it also expanded too fast, run- ning out of cash in 2001. It filed for bankruptcy, emerging in 2002 under the ownership of its former creditors. Another CAP/CLEC, originally called Competitive Access Providers, the Costly Way to Local Competition Nextlink but later XO Communications, also built fixed wireless systems in most major markets. Its network was more diverse, featuring a mix of CAP fiber, a backbone network, a large ISP (formerly Concentric Networks), and a multi- product CLEC. But, as noted in Chapter 5, it too went through bankruptcy. A different approach