free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices - at least for a short period - is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. Because investments in telecommunications networks represent a legitimate form of competition on the merits, antitrust principles must be structured SO that they do not deter such procompetitive conduct. As the Court noted later in the opin- ion, expansions of Section 2 liability that penalize procompetitive conduct can be particularly harmful "because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect" (540 U.S. at 407-08, 414 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court's concern was that requiring a monopolist to share its bottleneck facility could impede dynamic efficiency. The Court noted, "Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage may lessen the incentive for the monop- olist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities." Later portions of the opinion emphasized "the uncertain virtue of forced sharing" and how mandating access under Section 2 "seem[ed] destined to distort investment." It is for this reason that "as a general matter, the Sherman Act 'does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal'" (540 U.S. at 407-08, 414, quoting Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307). At the same time, the Court recognized that "[t]he high value that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with other firms does not mean that the right is unqualified," although the Court "ha[s] been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions." The Court noted that the leading case supporting antitrust liability Networks in Telecommunications for a refusal to cooperate with a rival is the Aspen Skiing decision summarized above, which the Court described as "at or near the outer boundary of $ 2 liability." Accor