 on the ground that it violated the Takings Clause. The New York Court of Appeals, consistent with the suggestion of the language in Penn Central and PruneYard quoted above, held that a government-authorized physical occupation is not necessarily a taking (423 N.E.2d at 330-32). The Supreme Court responded with a ringing reaffirmation of the distinction between physical and regulatory takings. In particular, the Court rejected the con- clusion that the takings determination should in all cases be governed by the ad hoc standards announced in Penn Central. Instead, the Court held that any regulation that authorizes a permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a per se taking. This proposition held regardless of whether the government itself occupied the property or simply empowered a third party to do SO (458 U.S. at 432 & n. 9). The Court based its decision on three considerations. First, the Court looked to precedent, finding that that "when the 'character of the governmental action' is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." Indeed, the Court indicated that it was the "historical" and "traditional" rule to treat a permanent physical occupation as a per se taking. In SO holding, the Constitutional Limits on the Pricing of Access to Networks Court explicitly limited or rejected language in Penn Central and PruneYard that suggested otherwise (458 U.S. at 427-35). Second, the Court drew support for its conclusion from the general policies underlying the existence of property rights. Permanent appropriation of property is "perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests." In SO reasoning, the Court invoked the familiar metaphor of property as a bundle of rights encompassing three separate strands: the rights to possess, use, and dis- pose of the property. Unlike regulatory taking