ts is to be mandated, economic analysis indicates that access rates should be based on market prices. Doing SO would promote alloca- tive efficiency by giving purchasers and providers alike the appropriate signals for calibrating consumption and production levels. In addition, basing access rates Networks in Telecommunications on market prices would enhance dynamic efficiency by providing the incentives need to attract the investments needed to finance the deployment of the various broadband technologies. As the FCC has repeatedly recognized, issues surrounding investment and innovation are of the utmost importance when the market involved is a nascent one (see, e.g., FCC 1999c, 2002c). Although market prices might previously have been difficult to determine, the emergence of new technologies capable of providing high-speed broadband services is making this task increasingly easy. As noted earlier, DSL and cable modem systems are currently competing vigorously for early dominance of the broadband industry. In addition, communications companies are preparing to provide broadband ser- vices through a wide variety of wireless technologies, including PCS, WiFi, WiMax, ancillary and supplemental service provided via digital television, and 3G mobile wireless devices. Although these services are still in their nascent stages, when fully operational they have the potential to provide a ready basis for determining the value of the transmission of services. Should these alternative technologies be insufficiently developed to allow direct determination of market prices, economic theory indicates that regulatory author- ities should base rates on ECPR, which sets rates as the sum of the forward-looking incremental cost and the opportunity cost associated with providing access. The opportunity cost of providing network access is determined by subtracting direct incremental costs from the retail price in the final goods market. The primary reason that the FCC has been reluctant to allow this issue in the context of DSL has be