aches even when there is no clear indication that per- mitting such a deviation would cause any demonstrable harm. A more restrained approach would give the benefit of the doubt to ambiguous cases and permit them to go forward unless and until there was a concrete showing of anticompetitive harm. Any other rule would short-circuit the process of experimentation with new products and alternate organizational forms that is essential to a properly function- ing market. Such tolerance is particularly appropriate in light of network neutrality proponents' acknowledgement that standardization can lead to market failure, that deviating from universal interoperability and interconnectivity can yield substan- tial benefits, and that determining whether a particular practice will help or harm competition is often difficult, if not impossible. 8 In addition, a less categorical more restrained approach is particularly appropriate when technological change is transforming the economic impact of various practices. A better understanding of the potential benefits of deviating from network neutrality is thus essential for any proper assessment of the relevant tradeoffs. Indeed, the FCC's 2008 Comcast order rejected broad, categorical, ex ante rules in favor of precisely the type of case-by-case, ex post analysis that we propose (FCC 2008c). 4 FTC V. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986). United States V. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); Broad. Music, Inc. V. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979); Arizona V. Maricopa County, 457 U.S. 332, 350 n. 19 (1982); State Oil Co. V. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs V. United States, 43 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). White Motor Co. V. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262-63 (1963); Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 724, 726; Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713. 8 Cooper (2000); Lemley and Lessig (2001); Lessig (2002); Wu (2003). 9 The existing critiques of network neutrality are important but do not attempt to offer any extended evaluation of the underly