interfaces between companies are complex and constantly changing, and the avalanche of content available on the Internet has heightened end users' reliance on media filters exercising editorial discretion. Every deviation from network neutrality need not necessarily enhance eco- nomic welfare. It is sufficient if some deviations from network neutrality may plausibly be motivated by legitimate concerns and it is hard to distinguish The Regulation of Broadband Networks and the Internet procompetitive and anticompetitive uses of such restrictions, as network neutrality proponents have conceded is often the case. When it is possible that intervention may do more harm than good, and particularly when consumers do not face any immediate harm, the more prudent course would be to forego locking the network into any particular architecture. Because the threatened harms are neither catas- trophic nor irreversible, competition policy supports forbearing from forbidding particular practices until specific harm to competition can be demonstrated. Any competitive problems that do emerge can be addressed through the type of targeted intervention imposed by the FCC in Madison River, limited to prohibiting the broad- band provider from blocking access to those applications that compete directly with the broadband provider's core business (FCC 2005b). They would not justify the broad prohibition of end user restrictions envisioned under network neutrality. Indeed, if one adopts a broader notion of consumer welfare, such restrictions may well be a benefit to consumers by forcing heavy bandwidth users to bear the congestion costs they impose on other users and by effectively lowering the prices paid by light bandwidth users who previously were forced to cross-subsidize heavier users. It also engages the broader arguments about the economics of innovation and the dangers of imposing regulation in the face of prospective harms. A. Sources of Congestion on the Internet As is commonly known, the Internet is not a single network but rath