ved Telephony Chapter 3 Figure 3-5 Carterphone device under any circumstances, but when he appealed to the FCC he was given permission, opening the customer-provided equipment (CPE) market for the first time. AT&T's concerns about possible damage to the network were well founded, but by the time AT&T U. Carter came to trial the device had been in use for several years and clearly hadn't done any damage whatsoever. In 1969, the very next year, the FCC gave MCI permission to offer pri- vate line services between St. Louis and Chicago over its privately owned microwave system. And in 1971 the court extended its 1956 Consent Decree mandate, ordering AT&T to allow non-Bell companies such as MCI, to connect directly to their network, ending AT&T's stranglehold on the private line market. The decision was based on a far-reaching FCC policy designed to create nationwide, full-blown competition in the pri- vate line marketplace. It didn't end there, however. In 1972 the FCC mandated that satellites could be used to transport voice and compete with AT&T, and that value- added carriers could resell AT&T services. In 1977, in the now famous Downloaded from Digital Engineering Library @ McGraw-Hill (www.digitalengineeringlibrary.com) Copyright © 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies. All rights reserved. Any use is subject to the Terms of Use as given at the website. Telephony Telephony Execunet decision, MCI won a legal battle that allowed them to compete directly with AT&T in the switched long-distance services market, AT&T's bastion of revenue. In 1974 they extended their attack, filing an antitrust suit against AT&T and charging them with unfairly restricting competition and dominating the marketplace. That same year, the Jus- tice Department filed an antitrust suit of their own, signaling the begin- ning of the end for the Bell System. In 1980, another crack appeared in AT&T's armor when the FCC con- sciously recognized the difference between basic and enhanced services. Computer Enquiry II stipulated that basic services would 