han as a single earnings per share machine. It also represented a currency that the company could use in acquisitions: "Want to sell your cable company? Take part of our tracker in return." But in November and December 1998, as AT&T's stock price moved from the mid-$50s to the high $70s, it became clear that the market was already recognizing the company's segment values. And at those prices, AT&T itself became a currency that could be used in further acquisitions if cable partner- ships didn't materialize. Furthermore, everyone knew that tracking stocks added one more layer of complexity to managing a company. He had seen that firsthand at Hughes. So if we didn't need the cur- rency of a tracker and we didn't want the seams that come with it, why do it? We would cancel plans to create a tracking stock, reconsidering it when and if necessary. The people who had worked on the SEC filings for the tracker through the holidays could only take solace in the knowledge that there would be plenty of other filing to prepare. At the end of the week, AT&T scheduled an analyst meeting to announce the change in plans for a tracking stock and to begin putting flesh on the rough outlines of a "new" AT&T that was increasing cash flow from its traditional businesses at double-digit rates while reduc- ing its dependence on long-distance service by growing top-line reve- nue from its new lines of business, including wireless, cable, and outsourcing, by 20 to 25 percent annually. John Malone was there to endorse the company's plans, including the decision to defer the cre- ation of a tracking stock. Armstrong capped things by announcing a $4 billion stock repurchase and a three-for-two stock split, the first in thirty-five years. The stock soared by $2.81 a share, closing at an all- time high of $85.06. But the Los Angeles Times's Sallie Hoffmeister, who many of us Casting Is Everything 147 suspected had been the recipient of several Hindery leaks over the years, could find a dark cloud even in that cheery news. "Company sources," s