early compete with one another. The FCC specifically rejected the conclusion that last-mile broadband services constituted a natural monopoly in its 1999 report on broadband deployment, in which it found that "no competitor has a large embedded base of paying residential consumers" and "[t]he record does not indicate that the consumer market [for broadband services] is inherently a natural monopoly" (FCC 1999a, p. 2423). The D.C. Circuit emphasized the same point when invalidating the FCC's Line Sharing Order on the ground that fierce competition from cable modem service rendered the agency's conclusion that competitors would be impaired without access to the high-frequency portion of the loop unreasonable (U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 290 F.3d at 428-29). More recently, the FCC's Wireline Broadband Internet Access Services Ordera noted that "broadband Internet access services have never been restricted to a single network platform," which stood "in stark contrast to the information services market at the time the Computer Inquiry obligations were adopted, when only a single platform capable of delivering such services was contemplated and only a single facilities-based provider of that platform was available to deliver them to any particular end users." Any tendencies toward natural monopoly are further alleviated by the increase in demand created by innovative broadband service offerings. The presence of such intermodal competition, combined with the growth of demand, eliminated the need for the access requirements imposed by the Computer Inquiries (FCC 2005d). In short, the emergence of intermodal competition eviscerates claims that any particular last-mile broadband service is a natural monopoly. The natural monopoly to six over-the-air stations, which effectively limited rate deregulation to 30 percent of all cable subscribers (FCC 1991a). The Regulation of Last-Mile Broadband Networks justification would thus appear to have little purchase with respect to last-mile broadband services. Instead, the ultimate market st