If such access requirements are to be imposed, however, economic analysis indicates that rates for access should be based on market prices. Any attempt to base access prices solely on direct cost, as is currently done under TELRIC, fails to acknowledge that the market value of network access is determined by the value of the services sold through the network, not the cost of the network itself. Not only is this appropriate in light of the fact that networks are capital assets that are not consumables; it also reflects the demand-side considerations that underlie economic analysis. The presence of substitute facilities should permit market value to be determined through a comparison to actual market transactions or through the opportunity cost component mandated by ECPR. The presence of direct competition makes it unlikely that prices set in this manner will allow network owners to recover supracompetitive returns. The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence provides another reason for requir- ing that any access requirement imposed by the FCC be priced at market value. The issues are clearest with respect to DSL. Although the D.C. Circuit vacated the regulations providing that the high-frequency portion of the loop constituted a network element that was subject to unbundled access under the 1996 Act, it left intact the regulations giving requesting telecommunications carriers the right to physically collocate routing equipment on the incumbent LEC's property. As we discuss in Chapter 7, such a requirement constitutes the type of permanent physical occupation held to constitute a per se taking in Loretto. Lower court precedent supports this conclusion as well. A similar issue arose in GTE Northwest, Inc. V. Public Utility Commission. At issue in that case was the regu- latory provision enacted by the Oregon Public Utility Commission (PUC) similar to the ONA regime created by the FCC in Computer III. The key difference was that Oregon's regime required local telephone companies to permit enhanced service providers to