ay") to other services. The 1FR rate would thus be limited to the residual revenue requirement. This approach was not geared to produce economic efficiency nor did it later transition well into a competitive market. It did mean that many intrastate leased line rates, as well as long distance rates, produced rates of return that far exceeded the overall norm. The FCC Preferred a Market-Based Approach The FCC let high special access rates remain in place, presuming instead that competitive forces should be allowed to operate. The only problem was that there were not a lot of competitors out there. A few large corporations had built private microwave radio systems or fiber-optic networks. Westinghouse Corp., for instance, had built a large microwave network around the Pittsburgh area in the 1970s, and Digital Equipment Corp. built a few hundred miles of fiber- optic routes around Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the 1980s. These could interconnect directly with IXCs, bypassing the RBOCs. But almost every- one else had to pay full price. The newly minted RBOCs did not expect competition to become a serious problem. They preferred to risk losing a few customers around the edges versus having to lower prices in general. Thus a market opportunity was born. Because access services were under FCC, not state, jurisdiction and thus The Great Telecom Meltdown did not require state authorization, new local service competitors were dubbed CAPs. Satellite Bypass Did Not Quite Fly One other avenue of bypass had already been created. In the early 1970s, the FCC decided that domestic satellites should be competitive-the "Open Skies" policy-in contrast to the then-monopoly Bell System. Although early satellite systems required large Earth stations that were operated by common carriers, one company pioneered the very small aperture terminal (VSAT), a satellite Earth station that could be located at the end-user premise, bypassing the usual telephone company-provided last mile. Satellite Business Systems (SBS) was set up as a joint