Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. By July 2003, only five states- Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming-had rates of $15 a month or more. See Billy Jack Gregg, "A Survey of Unbundled Network Element Prices in the United States" (National Regulatory Research Institute [NRRI]), periodic issues. 13. For a critique of this policy, see Jerry A. Hausman, "The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications Regulation," in Real Options: The New Investment Theory and Its Implications for Telecommunications Economics, edited by James Alleman and Eli Noam (Hingham, Mass.: Kluwer Academic, 1999); Robert W. Crandall and Jerry A. Hausman, "Competition in U.S. Telecommunications Services: Effects of the 1996 Legislation," in Deregulation of Network Industries: What's Next? edited by Sam Peltzman and Clifford Win- ston (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000). 14. The essential facilities argument derives from antitrust law. The landmark case is Terminal R.R. Association of St. Louis V. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924). But even under antitrust law, these essential facilities are never made available to rivals at cost-based regu- lated rates. In 2004 the Supreme Court closed the door on use of the Sherman Antitrust Act to seek treble damages from a failure to comply with the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Verizon Communications Inc. V. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.Ct. 872 (2004). 15. As of December 2003, 15.2 million incumbent loops were leased "with switching" (that is, as part of the UNE platform), whereas only 4.3 million loops were leased without Notes to Pages 36-39 switching. See FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 2003 (June 2004), table 4. This reliance on the UNE platform will now begin to dwindle rapidly after the U.S. Court of Appeals' remand of the FCC's 2003 rules and the commission's decision not to appeal this reversal to the Supreme Court. 16. The UNE-P began when the Bell companies were pressured into guaranteeing acce