ing rivals access to a bottleneck input, it gives the rival "more incentive to find an alternative supplier, which in turn gives alternate suppliers more reason to think that they can compete with the monopolist. Every act exploiting monopoly power to the disadvantage of the monopoly's customers hastens the monopoly's end by making the potential competition more attractive" (948 F.2d at 549). Thus, by the time the Supreme Court decided Trinko, the law had begun to reflect the theoretical critique of the essential facilities doctrine set forth in the scholarly literature. As we shall see, Trinko gave this critique an additional, albeit modest, endorsement. 49 Areeda and Hovenkamp (2008c, p. 266) show that essential facilities doctrine can be anticom- petitive when "the facility can be duplicated or some substitute developed, even in the relatively long run." Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries 2. The Allocation of Authority between Antitrust Courts and Regulatory Agencies Courts and commentators have also expressed concern about the proper division of responsibility between antitrust courts and regulatory agencies. Responding to these concerns, courts have developed a number of doctrines to prevent conflicts between antitrust law and regulatory regimes from arising. Two doctrines determine whether federal or state law provides outright immunity from antitrust scrutiny. Two additional doctrines address the timing of judicial consideration by postpon- ing it until after a state or federal regulatory agency has had a chance to consider the issues in the first instance. As a general matter, these doctrines have not been partic- ularly restrictive and have tended to give antitrust courts wide latitude to entertain antitrust claims requesting access to telecommunications networks. Scholarship on the essential facilities doctrine, however, has begun to question whether current law strikes the correct balance. a. Immunity from Antitrust Scrutiny Displacement of the Antitrust Laws by a Federal Regulatory Scheme. Cou