 and usage of keying material and parameters generated by EAP methods. Each protocol that uses EAP defines a method to encapsulate EAP messages within that protocol's messages. Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communications 841 by the respective SMF. Therefore, the access security is contained within that network slice and does not rely on the AMF, which may serve multiple slices that may have dif- ferent security requirements. Moreover, an attack mounted on one slice does not result in an increased risk for an attack on a different slice of the same network. In a nutshell, what 5G security is trying to achieve is increased user privacy, robustness to cyber-attacks on the network, and better device hardware security. These goals can be achieved with stronger authentication/authorization schemes between device and network, both radio access and core network functions, secure credential provisioning and storage on device, and new network functions that support device-to-network communications security. Cellular-based V2X systems treat latency as the most important performance metric because the level of protection decreases as the delay in receiving safety information increases. While the delay in non-mission-critical applications may be tolerated to some extent, delayed information in V2X communications could result in serious automobile accidents and injuries. The volume of traffic in V2X communication is much smaller than other appli- cations in cellular systems. Sensing information or safety notifications transmitted via a V2X link can be carried in small packets, thus high-speed data transmissions are less impor- tant in V2X systems. The device-to-core network (AMF) signaling is integrity- and confidentiality-protected. The device link to the radio access network is also protected for both signaling and data traffic. The V2X system can leverage the 5G system security for vehicle device authorization, authentication, and access to the network. 7.7 Implementation and Deployment Considerations The DSRC would require 