line communications, which depend on having a physical connection to the network, regulations mandating access to wireless networks do not necessarily require the installation of third- party equipment on the network owner's property. For example, the D.C. Circuit recently rejected a takings challenge to an FCC order intended to ensure access to different forms of television service by, in essence, requiring property owners to allow residents to install antennas needed to receive DBS service, broadcast signals, and other forms of television programming. The court concluded that, because the regulation in question did not compel a physical invasion of property by a third party, it did not constitute a per se taking under Loretto and was properly analyzed as a regulatory taking (Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass'n Int'l V. FCC, 254 F.3d 89, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). It appears, then, that the constitutional arguments for basing access rates on market prices are weaker with respect to wireless networks than with respect to wireline networks. The economic arguments for basing access rates on market prices are the same in each case, as the harm effected by the third party's occupation of productive capacity is the same. As a result, we would still urge the FCC and state public utility commissions to base access rates on market prices as a matter of policy. Antitrust as Applied to Network Industries Antitrust courts have played a pivotal role in shaping the telecommunications industry, most significantly through the private antitrust suits brought against AT&T by MCI and the predecessor to Sprint in the 1970s and the case brought by the federal government against AT&T that culminated with the breakup of AT&T in 1984. All three of these cases relied upon the essential facilities doctrine, which requires owners of bottleneck elements unavailable elsewhere in the marketplace to make those elements available to competitors on reasonable terms. 1 The essential facilities doctrine has proven quite controversial, inspiring a welter of 