Lewis points out that this volume is a defense of the idea of an omnibenevolent God against the 'argument from the existence of pain' and is not conceived as a theodicy. That is, Lewis makes no attempt to separate God from the problem of pain, in fact, apart from certain classic theological ideas, the suffering of 'conscious' beings (humans) cannot be coherently understood as being a "problem" at all. In an atheistically meaningless universe, the concept of suffering is meaningless, thus the awareness of a pain "problem" can only be addressed theologically. Although he modestly suggests that others might offer better theological arguments, it seems that Lewis argues plausibly, rationally and soundly. The following sentences present, generally and briefly, one of Lewis' more famous arguments:
". . . anyone who has watched gluttons shoveling down the most exquisite foods as if they did not know what they were eating, will admit that we can ignore even pleasure. But pain insists on being attended to. God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pain: it is His megaphone to rouse a deaf world." (p 91) "While what we call 'our own life' remains agreeable we will not surrender it to him. What then can God do in our interests but to make 'our own life' less agreeable to us, and take away the plausible source of false happiness?" (p 94) "How can I say with sufficient tenderness what here needs to be said? It does not matter that I know I must become, in the eyes of every hostile reader, as it were, personally responsible for all the sufferings I try to explain . . . (p 95) " . . . [God] is not proud, He stoops to conquer, He will have us even though we have shown that we . . . come to Him because there is 'nothing better' now to be had." (p 96) "Those who would like the God of Scripture to be more purely ethical, do not know what they ask. If God were a Kantian, who would not have us till we came to him from the purest and best motives, who could be saved? And this illusion of self-sufficiency may be at its strongest in some very honest, kindly, and temperate people, and on such people, therefore, misfortune must fall." (p 96) " . . . but from our present point of view it ought to be clear that the real problem is not why some . . . people suffer, but why some do not. Our Lord Himself, it will be remembered, explained the salvation of those who are fortunate in this world only by referring to the unsearchable omnipotence of God." (p104)
Other problems and arguments are treated, but the approach is not exhaustive. Lewis doesn't intend it to be; he merely wants to address certain obvious questions (and he does this quite ably). As I read this I concurrently read J. C. Polkinghorne's "Quarks, Chaos & Christianity" which addresses the problem of pain as well as the problem of "natural evil" -- as each relate to the concept of freedom. Some say that Polkinghorne thinks as Lewis would have if he had been a quantum physicist; so if you find yourself agreeing with Lewis or at least intrigued by his arguments, I'll suggest you read Polkinghorne as well.
Lewis points out that this volume is a defense of the idea of an omnibenevolent God against the 'argument from the existence of pain' and is not conceived as a theodicy. That is, Lewis makes no attempt to separate God from the problem of pain, in fact, apart from certain classic theological ideas, the suffering of 'conscious' beings (humans) cannot be coherently understood as being a "problem" at all. In an atheistically meaningless universe, the concept of suffering is meaningless, thus the awareness of a pain "problem" can only be addressed theologically. Although he modestly suggests that others might offer better theological arguments, it seems that Lewis argues plausibly, rationally and soundly. The following sentences present, generally and briefly, one of Lewis' more famous arguments:
". . . anyone who has watched gluttons shoveling down the most exquisite foods as if they did not know what they were eating, will admit that we can ignore even pleasure. But pain insists on being attended to. God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pain: it is His megaphone to rouse a deaf world. " (p 91) "While what we call 'our own life' remains agreeable we will not surrender it to him. What then can God do in our interests but to make 'our own life' less agreeable to us, and take away the plausible source of false happiness? " (p 94) "How can I say with sufficient tenderness what here needs to be said? It does not matter that I know I must become, in the eyes of every hostile reader, as it were, personally responsible for all the sufferings I try to explain. . . (p 95) ". . . [God] is not proud, He stoops to conquer, He will have us even though we have shown that we. . . come to Him because there is 'nothing better' now to be had. " (p 96) "Those who would like the God of Scripture to be more purely ethical, do not know what they ask. If God were a Kantian, who would not have us till we came to him from the purest and best motives, who could be saved? And this illusion of self-sufficiency may be at its strongest in some very honest, kindly, and temperate people, and on such people, therefore, misfortune must fall. " (p 96) ". . . but from our present point of view it ought to be clear that the real problem is not why some. . . people suffer, but why some do not. Our Lord Himself, it will be remembered, explained the salvation of those who are fortunate in this world only by referring to the unsearchable omnipotence of God. " (p104)
Other problems and arguments are treated, but the approach is not exhaustive. Lewis doesn't intend it to be; he merely wants to address certain obvious questions (and he does this quite ably). As I read this I concurrently read J. C. Polkinghorne's "Quarks, Chaos & Christianity" which addresses the problem of pain as well as the problem of "natural evil" -- as each relate to the concept of freedom. Some say that Polkinghorne thinks as Lewis would have if he had been a quantum physicist; so if you find yourself agreeing with Lewis or at least intrigued by his arguments, I'll suggest you read Polkinghorne as well.