                              højesterets dom
                            afsagt fredag den 4. januar 2013
sag 100/2012
(1. afdeling)
statsadvokaten for københavn og bornholm (nu statsadvokaten i københavn) og
rigsadvokaten
(kammeradvokaten ved advokat henrik nedergaard thomsen for begge)
mod
a og
b
(advokat tyge trier for begge, beskikket)
i tidligere instans er afsagt dom af østre landsrets 6. afdeling den 9. marts 2012.
i pådømmelsen har deltaget syv dommere: lene pagter kristensen, poul søgaard, niels
grubbe, thomas rørdam, jon stokholm, michael rekling og jan schans christensen.
påstande
parterne har gentaget deres påstande.
retsgrundlag
menneskerettighedsdomstolen har i en række afgørelser taget stilling til, hvilken betydning
det har, at en offentlig ansat person, der berøver en anden livet, selv opfatter dette som beret-
tiget, jf. artikel 2 i den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention. i menneskerettigheds-
domstolens dom af 24. marts 2011 i sag nr. 23458/02, giuliani og gaggio mod italien, hedder
det således i præmis 178:
       “178. the use of force by agents of the state in pursuit of one of the aims delineated in
       paragraph 2 of article 2 of the convention may be justified under this provision where
       it is based on an honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the
                                                 - 2 -
      time but which subsequently turns out to be mistaken. to hold otherwise would be to
      impose an unrealistic burden on the state and its law-enforcement personnel in the
      execution of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others (see
      mccann and others, cited above, § 200, and andronicou and constantinou, cited
      above, § 192).”
menneskerettighedsdomstolen har endvidere ved en række domme fastlagt, hvilke krav der
skal stilles til en undersøgelse i forbindelse med dødsfald omfattet af artikel 2 i den europæi-
ske menneskerettighedskonvention, jf. f.eks. samme dom i præmis 298-306, hvor det hedder:
      ”298. having regard to their fundamental character, articles 2 and 3 of the convention
      contain a procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation into alleged
      breaches of the substantive limb of these provisions (see ergi v. turkey, 28 july 1998, §
      82, reports 1998-iv; assenov and others v. bulgaria, 28 october 1998, §§ 101-106,
      reports 1998-viii; and mastromatteo, cited above, § 89). a general legal prohibition of
      arbitrary killing by the agents of the state would be ineffective, in practice, if there ex-
      isted no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by state au-
      thorities. the obligation to protect the right to life under this provision, read in conjunc-
      tion with the state's general duty under article 1 of the convention to “secure to every-
      one within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] convention”, re-
      quires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation
      when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of
      the state (see mccann and others, cited above, § 161). the state must therefore ensure,
      by all means at its disposal, an adequate response – judicial or otherwise – so that the
      legislative and administrative framework set up to protect the right to life is properly
      implemented and any breaches of that right are repressed and punished (see zavoloka v.
      latvia, no. 58447/00, § 34, 7 july 2009).
      299. the state's obligation to carry out an effective investigation has in the court's
      case-law been considered as an obligation inherent in article 2, which requires, inter
      alia, that the right to life be “protected by law”. although the failure to comply with
      such an obligation may have consequences for the right protected under article 13, the
      procedural obligation of article 2 is seen as a distinct obligation (see i̇lhan v. turkey
      [gc], no. 22277/93, §§ 91-92, echr 2000-vii; öneryıldız v. turkey [gc], no.
      48939/99, § 148, echr 2004-xii; and šilih v. slovenia [gc], no. 71463/01, §§ 153-
      154, 9 april 2009). it can give rise to a finding of a separate and independent “interfe-
      rence”. this conclusion derives from the fact that the court has consistently examined
      the question of procedural obligations separately from the question of compliance with
      the substantive obligation (and, where appropriate, has found a separate violation of
      article 2 on that account) and the fact that on several occasions a breach of a procedural
      obligation under article 2 has been alleged in the absence of any complaint as to its
      substantive aspect (see šilih, cited above, §§ 158-159).
      300. for an investigation into alleged unlawful killing by state agents to be effective, it
      may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out
      the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events (see, for exam-
      ple, güleç, cited above, §§ 81-82, and oğur, cited above, §§ 91-92). this means not
                                         - 3 -
only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence.
what is at stake here is nothing less than public confidence in the state's monopoly on
the use of force (see hugh jordan, cited above, § 106; ramsahai and others [gc], cited
above, § 325; and kolevi v. bulgaria, no. 1108/02, § 193, 5 november 2009).
301. the investigation must also be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to
a determination of whether the force used was or was not justified in the circumstances
(see, for example, kaya v. turkey, 19 february 1998, § 87, reports 1998-i) and of
identifying and – if appropriate – punishing those responsible (see oğur, cited above, §
88). this is not an obligation of result, but of means. the authorities must take whatever
reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, in-
ter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy
which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the
clinical findings, including the cause of death (as regards autopsies, see, for example,
salman v. turkey [gc], no. 21986/93, § 106, echr 2000-vii; on the subject of wit-
nesses, see, for example, tanrıkulu v. turkey [gc], no. 23763/94, § 109,
echr 1999-iv; as regards forensic examinations, see, for example, gül v. turkey, no.
22676/93, § 89, 14 december 2000). any deficiency in the investigation which under-
mines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling
foul of this standard (see avşar, cited above, §§ 393-395).
302. in particular, the investigation's conclusions must be based on thorough, objective
and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. failing to follow an obvious line of in-
quiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation's ability to establish the cir-
cumstances of the case and the identity of those responsible (see kolevi, cited above, §
201). nevertheless, the nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfy the minimum thre-
shold of the investigation's effectiveness depend on the circumstances of the particular
case. they must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the
practical realities of investigation work (see velcea and mazăre v. romania, no.
64301/01, § 105, 1 december 2009).
303. in addition, the investigation must be accessible to the victim's family to the extent
necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests. there must also be a sufficient element
of public scrutiny of the investigation, the degree of which may vary from case to case
(see hugh jordan, cited above, § 109, and varnava and others v. turkey [gc], nos.
16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90
and 16073/90, § 191, echr 2009-...; see also güleç, cited above, § 82, where the vic-
tim's father was not informed of the decision not to prosecute, and oğur, cited above, §
92, where the family of the victim had no access to the investigation or the court docu-
ments).
304. however, disclosure or publication of police reports and investigative materials
may involve sensitive issues with possible prejudicial effects to private individuals or
other investigations and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an automatic requirement un-
der article 2. the requisite access of the public or the victim's relatives may therefore
be provided for in other stages of the procedure (see, among other authorities, mckerr
v. the united kingdom, no. 28883/95, § 129, echr 2001-iii). moreover, article 2 does
not impose a duty on the investigating authorities to satisfy every request for a particu-
lar investigative measure made by a relative in the course of the investigation (see ram-
sahai and others [gc], cited above, § 348, and velcea and mazăre, cited above, § 113).
                                               - 4 -
     305. a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context
     (see yaşa v. turkey, 2 september 1998, §§ 102-104, reports 1998-vi; tanrıkulu, cited
     above, § 109; and mahmut kaya v. turkey, no. 22535/93, §§ 106-107, echr 2000-
     iii). it must be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent
     progress in an investigation in a particular situation. however, a prompt response by the
     authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential
     in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing
     any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see mckerr, cited above,
     §§ 111 and 114, and opuz, cited above, § 150).
     306. however, it cannot be inferred from the foregoing that article 2 may entail the
     right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence (see šilih, cited
     above, § 194; see also, mutatis mutandis, perez v. france [gc], no. 47287/99, § 70,
     echr 2004-i) or an absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction, or
     indeed in a particular sentence (see zavoloka, cited above, § 34(c)).
     on the other hand, the national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared
     to allow life-endangering offences to go unpunished. the court's task therefore consists
     in reviewing whether and to what extent the courts, in reaching their conclusion, may be
     deemed to have submitted the case to the careful scrutiny required by article 2 of the
     convention, so that the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the signific-
     ance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to life are not
     undermined (see öneryıldız, cited above, § 96, and mojsiejew v. poland, no. 11818/02,
     § 53, 24 march 2009).”
menneskerettighedsdomstolen har endvidere i dom af 30. november 2004 i sag nr. 48939/99,
öneryildiz mod tyrkiet, i præmis 92-96 udtalt:
     “92. in this connection, the court has held that if the infringement of the right to life or
     to physical integrity is not caused intentionally, the positive obligation to set up an “ef-
     fective judicial system” does not necessarily require criminal proceedings to be brought
     in every case and may be satisfied if civil, administrative or even disciplinary remedies
     were available to the victims (see, for example, vo v. france [gc], no. 53924/00, § 90,
     echr 2004-vii; calvelli and ciglio, cited above, § 51; and mastromatteo, cited above,
     §§ 90, 94 and 95).
     93. however, in areas such as that in issue in the instant case, the applicable principles
     are rather to be found in those which the court has already had occasion to develop in
     relation notably to the use of lethal force, principles which lend themselves to applica-
     tion in other categories of cases.
     in this connection, it should be pointed out that in cases of homicide the interpretation
     of article 2 as entailing an obligation to conduct an official investigation is justified not
     only because any allegations of such an offence normally give rise to criminal liability
     (see caraher v. the united kingdom (dec.), no. 24520/94, echr 2000-i), but also be-
     cause often, in practice, the true circumstances of the death are, or may be, largely con-
                                          - 5 -
fined within the knowledge of state officials or authorities (see mccann and others v.
the united kingdom, judgment of 27 september 1995, series a no. 324, pp. 47-49, §§
157-164, and i̇lhan, cited above, § 91).
in the court’s view, such considerations are indisputably valid in the context of danger-
ous activities, when lives have been lost as a result of events occurring under the re-
sponsibility of the public authorities, which are often the only entities to have sufficient
relevant knowledge to identify and establish the complex phenomena that might have
caused such incidents.
where it is established that the negligence attributable to state officials or bodies on
that account goes beyond an error of judgment or carelessness, in that the authorities in
question, fully realising the likely consequences and disregarding the powers vested in
them, failed to take measures that were necessary and sufficient to avert the risks inhe-
rent in a dangerous activity (see, mutatis mutandis, osman, cited above, pp. 3159-60, §
116), the fact that those responsible for endangering life have not been charged with a
criminal offence or prosecuted may amount to a violation of article 2, irrespective of
any other types of remedy which individuals may exercise on their own initiative (see
paragraphs 48, 49 and 50 above); this is amply evidenced by developments in the rele-
vant european standards (see paragraph 61 above).
94. to sum up, the judicial system required by article 2 must make provision for an in-
dependent and impartial official investigation procedure that satisfies certain minimum
standards as to effectiveness and is capable of ensuring that criminal penalties are ap-
plied where lives are lost as a result of a dangerous activity if and to the extent that this
is justified by the findings of the investigation (see, mutatis mutandis, hugh jordan v.
the united kingdom, no. 24746/94, §§ 105-109, echr 2001-iii, and paul and audrey
edwards, cited above, §§ 69-73). in such cases, the competent authorities must act with
exemplary diligence and promptness and must of their own motion initiate investiga-
tions capable of, firstly, ascertaining the circumstances in which the incident took place
and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, secondly, identify-
ing the state officials or authorities involved in whatever capacity in the chain of events
in issue.
95. that said, the requirements of article 2 go beyond the stage of the official investi-
gation, where this has led to the institution of proceedings in the national courts; the
proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of the
positive obligation to protect lives through the law.
96. it should in no way be inferred from the foregoing that article 2 may entail the
right for an applicant to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal of-
fence (see, mutatis mutandis, perez v. france [gc], no. 47287/99, § 70, echr 2004-i)
or an absolute obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction, or indeed in a par-
ticular sentence (see, mutatis mutandis, tanlı v. turkey, no. 26129/95, § 111, echr
2001-iii).
on the other hand, the national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared
to allow life-endangering offences to go unpunished. this is essential for maintaining
public confidence and ensuring adherence to the rule of law and for preventing any ap-
pearance of tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts (see, mutatis mutandis, hugh jor-
                                                 - 6 -
       dan, cited above, §§ 108 and 136-140). the court’s task therefore consists in reviewing
       whether and to what extent the courts, in reaching their conclusion, may be deemed to
       have submitted the case to the careful scrutiny required by article 2 of the convention,
       so that the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the significance of the role
       it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to life are not undermined.”
højesterets begrundelse og resultat
forvoldelsen af cs død
den 1. april 2003 blev c skudt af en politibetjent med den følge, at han samme dag afgik ved
døden. ved højesterets dom af 5. maj 2011 (ufr 2011, s. 2208) blev det fastslået, at det krav
på godtgørelse, som a og b havde rejst mod københavns politi, var forældet. krav i
anledning af forvoldelsen af cs død indgår herefter ikke i den foreliggende sag.
statsadvokatens og rigsadvokatens efterforskning og sagsbehandling
det er fastslået ved højesterets dom af 5. maj 2011, at a og bs eventuelle krav mod
statsadvokaten for københavn og bornholm baseret på undersøgelsesforløbet ikke er
forældet, i det omfang kravet støttes på fejl begået af statsadvokaten inden for en 5-årig
forældelsesfrist, regnet fra sagens anlæg den 20. oktober 2008. det følger heraf, at deres krav
mod statsadvokaten kan gøres gældende for så vidt det støttes på dennes sagsbehandling efter
den 20. oktober 2003. deres krav mod rigsadvokaten støttes på rigsadvokatens
sagsbehandling efter indgivelsen af klagen den 21. oktober 2003 og er derfor ifølge dommen
ikke forældet. både statsadvokatens afsluttende udtalelse af 1. marts 2004 og rigsadvokatens
afgørelse inddrager statsadvokatens efterforskning, og der skal således ske en prøvelse af den
samlede efterforskning og sagsbehandling.
det er efter artikel 2 i den europæiske menneskerettighedskonvention et krav, at den under-
søgelse, der skal foretages, er uafhængig, upartisk og effektiv og har til formål at sikre, at de
regler, som beskytter individets ret til livet, håndhæves, og at et eventuelt ansvar for at have
forvoldt en andens død for personer, der handler på statens vegne, søges fastslået, jf. f.eks.
menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 24. marts 2011 i sagen giuliani og gaggio mod ita-
lien, præmis 298 og 300. ved stillingtagen til, om undersøgelsen opfylder de stillede krav, er
det afgørende, om konklusionen bygger på en grundig, objektiv og upartisk analyse af alle
relevante forhold, og om undersøgelsen er egnet til at fastslå, om den anvendte magtanven-
delse var berettiget, jf. dommens præmis 301 og 302. undersøgelsen skal fremmes med den
                                                - 7 -
fornødne hurtighed, og de efterladte skal involveres i processen i tilstrækkeligt omfang, lige-
som undersøgelsen for offentligheden skal fremstå som tillidsvækkende og være undergivet
en tilstrækkelig grad af offentlig kontrol, jf. præmis 303, 304 og 305.
højesteret tiltræder landsrettens bedømmelse af de påberåbte fejl ved statsadvokatens under-
søgelse for så vidt angår spørgsmålet om anklagemyndighedens opbygning og organisation,
politiets efterforskningsskridt, politibetjentenes mulighed for at samstemme forklaringer, re-
konstruktion, vægtning af vidneudsagn, genafhøring af vidner og aktindsigt. selv om statsad-
vokatens undersøgelse således på enkelte punkter giver anledning til kritik, finder højesteret,
at de kritiserede forhold ikke medfører, at undersøgelsen efter en samlet bedømmelse ikke
opfylder de krav, som menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 2 stiller.
højesteret finder på baggrund af det anførte, at statsadvokatens konklusion om at indstille
efterforskningen hviler på et grundlag og en analyse, der i overensstemmelse med artikel 2 i
menneskerettighedskonventionen har været egnet til at afdække spørgsmålet, om det var ab-
solut nødvendigt at skyde mod c, og om der var grundlag for at indlede strafferetlig
forfølgning mod den politibetjent, der skød mod ham.
statsadvokatens undersøgelse opfylder ikke kravet om, at undersøgelsen skal tilvejebringe det
fornødne grundlag for at vurdere, om man gennem ændrede procedurer eller regler mv. bedre
kan forebygge lignende hændelser, jf. forarbejderne til retsplejelovens § 1020 a, stk. 2 (fol-
ketingstidende 1994-95, tillæg a, side 3572), og menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 30.
november 2004 i sagen öneryildiz mod tyrkiet, præmis 96. rigsadvokaten har imidlertid i
sin supplerende redegørelse påtalt dette forhold, vurderet mulighederne for bedre forebyg-
gelse og foreslået konkrete initiativer. det nævnte krav må herefter anses for opfyldt.
efter retsplejelovens § 724, stk. 2, kan rigsadvokaten inden for en to måneders frist omgøre
statsadvokatens afgørelse om påtaleopgivelse. det er ubestridt en fejl, at statsadvokaten og
rigsadvokaten ikke var opmærksom på, at omgørelsesfristen fandt anvendelse, og at rigsad-
vokaten som følge heraf blev afskåret fra at tage stilling til tiltalespørgsmålet. spørgsmålet er,
om der herved er sket en krænkelse af artikel 2 i den europæiske menneskerettighedskon-
vention.
                                                - 8 -
den manglende iagttagelse af to måneders fristen i § 724, stk. 2, har ikke haft betydning for
rigsadvokatens mulighed for at behandle sagen i øvrigt, herunder forholde sig til statsadvo-
katens efterforskning, således som det også skete.
uanset at omgørelsesfristen var sprunget, forelå der endvidere en sådan sagsbehandling, at a
og b ved domstolene kunne få efterprøvet deres krav i anledning af forvoldelsen af cs død.
denne prøvelse blev afskåret alene som følge af, at der først blev anlagt sag efter
forældelsesfristens udløb.
statsadvokaten fandt, at den betjent, der skød c, var straffri som følge af nødværge efter
straffelovens § 13, stk. 1 og 2. umiddelbart før skudepisoden havde c ved sin hensynsløse
kørsel påført en fodgænger livsfarlige kvæstelser og bragt andres liv i fare, og det må under
disse omstændigheder og under hensyn til det, der er oplyst om den bil, han kørte i, for
betjenten have fremstået som en overhængende risiko, at c kunne og ville fortsætte sin kørsel
i det tæt trafikerede område og bringe yderligere menneskeliv i fare. på denne baggrund
finder højesteret det nærliggende, at rigsadvokaten om tiltalespørgsmålet ville være nået til
samme resultat som statsadvokaten, hvis han havde haft mulighed for at prøve det.
den manglende iagttagelse af omgørelsesfristen i retsplejelovens § 724, stk. 2, kan herefter
ikke antages at udgøre en krænkelse af artikel 2 i menneskerettighedskonventionen.
højesteret finder således, at der ikke ved statsadvokatens og rigsadvokatens efterforskning
og sagsbehandling er sket en krænkelse af menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 2.
sagsbehandlingstiden
højesteret finder, at den sagsbehandlingstid, som skal tages i betragtning ved bedømmelsen
af, om der foreligger en krænkelse af menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 6, tager sin
begyndelse ved indbringelse af sagen for domstolene. med denne bemærkning tiltræder høje-
steret, dels af de grunde, der er anført af landsretten, dels efter en samlet bedømmelse af for-
løbet af domstolenes sagsbehandling, at der ikke er grundlag for at fastslå, at behandlingen af
sagen indebærer en krænkelse af a og bs ret til rettergang inden for rimelig tid.
                                              - 9 -
samlet konklusion
højesteret frifinder herefter statsadvokaten for københavn og bornholm og rigsadvokaten.
højesteret finder, at der foreligger sådanne særlige grunde, at ingen af parterne skal betale
sagsomkostninger for landsret eller højesteret til nogen anden part.
                                      thi kendes for ret:
statsadvokaten for københavn og bornholm og rigsadvokaten frifindes.
ingen af parterne skal betale sagsomkostninger for landsret eller højesteret til nogen anden
part eller til statskassen.
