                             højesterets dom
                          afsagt mandag den 4. marts 2019
sag 137/2018
(2. afdeling)
anklagemyndigheden
mod
t
(advokat morten bjerregaard nielsen, beskikket)
i tidligere instanser er afsagt dom af retten på frederiksberg den 28. marts 2017 og af østre
landsrets 16. afdeling den 11. oktober 2017.
i pådømmelsen har deltaget fem dommere: lene pagter kristensen, vibeke rønne, kurt
rasmussen, jens kruse mikkelsen og anne louise bormann.
påstande
dommen er anket af t med påstand om frifindelse, subsidiært strafbortfald, mere subsidiært
formildelse.
anklagemyndigheden har påstået stadfæstelse.
anbringender
t har anført bl.a., at uanset at hans facebook-opslag var i strid med forbuddet mod at gengive
navnet på a, der var sigtet for drabsforsøg på b, vil det være i strid med den europæiske
menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 10, hvis han straffes herfor.
allerede i begyndelsen af 2016, da han offentliggjorde sine første facebook-opslag, var der
en stærk mistanke om, at a efter sin løsladelse i tyrkiet i 2014 var draget til syrien for at til-
slutte sig islamisk stat. denne mistanke blev yderligere underbygget i november 2016 ved det
                                               - 2 -
amerikanske udenrigsministeriums erklæring herom. når as formodede drabsforsøg ses i det-
te lys, er der tale om en meget alvorlig forbrydelse af særlig offentlig interesse. det kræver
derfor meget tungtvejende grunde at gøre indgreb i adgangen til at ytre sig herom, og sådanne
grunde foreligger ikke.
baggrunden for, at der overhovedet blev nedlagt navneforbud, var, at a blev vare-
tægtsfængslet in absentia, og dermed ikke havde haft lejlighed til at udtale sig i sagen. efter
as anholdelse – og senere løsladelse – i tyrkiet i 2014 havde han imidlertid mulighed for at
udtale sig i sagen, og den samfundsmæssige interesse i sagens oplysning oversteg i hvert fald
fra dette tidspunkt klart hensynet til a. det forhold, at retten fandt, at der var grundlag for
varetægtsfængsling in absentia, understøtter formodningen for as skyld, hvilket yderligere
taler for, at hensynet til ham må være begrænset.
da han offentliggjorde sine facebook-opslag var oplysningerne om, at a var mistænkt for
drabsforsøget på b, allerede offentlig kendt, bl.a. gennem bs bog ”[…]”, en række internet-
medier, samt artikler og anmeldelser i berlingske, jyllands-posten, lokalavisen frederiksberg
og the economist. det vil derfor være i strid med menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel
10, hvis han straffes for overtrædelse af navneforbuddet, da dette – i lyset af at navnet var
offentligt kendt – ikke var nødvendigt.
menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 10 giver i øvrigt en videre beskyttelse af mediers
ytringsfrihed. samfundsudviklingen har betydet, at mediernes rolle som ”public watchdog” i
dag ikke alene varetages af de traditionelle medier som radio, tv og aviser, men også af debat-
tører, der anvender digitale medier som f.eks. facebook. den særlige beskyttelse, der tilkom-
mer medier, må derfor også tilkomme sådanne debattører. det vil på den baggrund være
uproportionalt at straffe ham. det skal i den forbindelse tillægges betydning, at han alene har
offentliggjort as navn på facebook, og at opslagene – uanset at de har været offentligt til-
gængelige – reelt alene har haft en meget begrænset udbredelse og gennemslagskraft.
hvis højesteret mod forventning måtte finde, at der er grundlag for at straffe ham for over-
trædelse af navneforbuddet, skal straffen på grund af sagens særlige omstændigheder bortfal-
de, jf. straffelovens § 83.
                                                - 3 -
anklagemyndigheden har anført bl.a., at t har overtrådt retsplejelovens § 32 b, stk. 2, jf. § 31,
stk. 1, ved – i strid med et nedlagt navneforbud – på sin facebook-profil at have gengivet
navnet på a, der er sigtet for drabsforsøg på b.
idømmelse af straf for ts overtrædelse af navneforbuddet er ikke i strid med den europæiske
menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 10. navneforbuddet udgør en indskrænkning i yt-
ringsfriheden, men denne er nødvendig i et demokratisk samfund, jf. konventionens artikel
10, stk. 2. hensynet til ytringsfriheden må efter menneskerettighedsdomstolens praksis i en
sag som den foreliggende afvejes over for retten til privatliv i konventionens artikel 8, og
uskyldsformodningen i konventionens artikel 6. ved denne afvejning skal der bl.a. lægges
vægt på den sigtedes person, herunder om denne er offentlig kendt, straffesagens karakter,
samt om sagen vedrører et emne af offentlig interesse.
a var ikke en offentligt kendt person. drabsforsøget på b var nok et emne af offentlig interes-
se, men oplysningen om, hvem der var sigtet for drabsforsøget, var ikke af en sådan sam-
fundsmæssig relevans, at hensynet til ytringsfriheden vejede tungere end hensynet til den sig-
tede. den debat, som t søgte at rejse ved sine opslag på facebook, angik i øvrigt navnlig det
rimelige i, at der kunne nedlægges navneforbud i en sag af den pågældende karakter, og det
må antages, at en sådan debat kunne rejses, uden at det var nødvendigt at afsløre navnet på
den sigtede.
det forhold, at de amerikanske myndigheder er af den opfattelse, at a er eller har været til-
sluttet islamisk stat i syrien, jf. herved det amerikanske udenrigsministeriums erklæring af
22. november 2016, og at der muligvis også forud for denne erklæring verserede rygter om, at
a skulle have tilsluttet sig islamisk stat, er uden betydning for den proportionalitets- og nød-
vendighedsvurdering, der skal foretages efter konventionens artikel 10, idet a i sagen om
drabsforsøget på b ikke var – og fortsat ikke er – sigtet for terrorisme, men derimod alene for
drabsforsøg. ved proportionalitets- og nødvendighedsvurderingen må det derimod indgå, at
der er tale om en sag, hvor den sigtede endnu ikke har været afhørt af dansk politi, og hvor
der således ikke er taget stilling til, om der er grundlag for at rejse tiltale mod ham for drabs-
forsøg.
                                                - 4 -
det forhold, at as navn allerede var offentliggjort, da t overtrådte navneforbuddet, indebærer
ikke, at der foreligger sådanne informationsretlige hensyn, at straf for overtrædelse af navne-
forbuddet er i strid med menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 10. det skal i den forbin-
delse tillægges betydning, at der alene er tale om et meget begrænset indgreb i ytringsfrihe-
den, som ikke har medført hindringer i adgangen til at omtale sagen, og at myndighederne
effektivt har håndhævet det pågældende navneforbud i denne og andre sager.
det er korrekt, at medier efter menneskerettighedsdomstolens praksis nyder en særlig beskyt-
telse efter konventionens artikel 10, men t er ikke omfattet af denne særlige beskyttelse, da
han har overtrådt navneforbuddet som privatperson. selv hvis han var omfattet af den særlige
beskyttelse, der gælder for medier, ville dette ikke betyde, at hans overtrædelse af navnefor-
buddet var straffri.
landsrettens fastsættelse af straffen til en bøde på 25.000 kr. er proportional og i overens-
stemmelse med praksis.
retsgrundlag
den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol har i en række afgørelser taget stilling til, hvor-
dan retten til ytringsfrihed i menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 10 skal afvejes over for
retten til privatliv i artikel 8 og uskyldsformodningen i artikel 6 i sager om offentliggørelse af
identiteten på personer, som er mistænkt eller tiltalt for et strafbart forhold.
menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 11. januar 2000 i sagen news verlags mod østrig (nr.
31457/96) angik et nyhedsmagasin, der i en artikel om en række brevbomber, som var blevet
sendt til østrigske politikere og andre fremtrædende personer, havde omtalt og vist billeder af
en person, der var mistænkt for angrebene. de østrigske domstole pålagde nyhedsmagasinet at
betale godtgørelse til den mistænkte, idet offentliggørelsen var i strid med uskyldsformodnin-
gen. menneskerettighedsdomstolen fandt, at dette var i strid med menneskerettighedskonven-
tionens artikel 10. herom hedder det i dommen bl.a.:
       ”i. alleged violation of article 10 of the convention
       …
       d. whether the interference was ”necessary in a democratic society”
       …
                                          - 5 -
52. the court recalls its well-established case-law that the adjective ”necessary”, with-
in the meaning of article 10 § 2 implies the existence of a ”pressing social need”. the
contracting states have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a
need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a european supervision embracing both the
law and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. the court
is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ”restriction” is reconcilable
with freedom of expression as protected by article 10.
in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the court cannot confine itself to considering
the impugned court decisions in isolation; it must look at them in the light of the case as
a whole, including the articles held against the applicant company and the context in
which they were written. the court must determine whether the interference at issue
was ”proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued” and whether the reasons adduced by
the national courts to justify it are ”relevant and sufficient” (see for instance the sunday
times (no. 1) judgment cited above, p. 38, § 62; the observer and guardian v. the unit-
ed kingdom judgment of 26 november 1991, series a no. 216, pp. 29-30, § 59; and the
recapitulation in sürek v. turkey (no. 1), [gc], no. 26682/95, § 58, echr 1999-iv).
…
54. the articles which gave rise to the injunction proceedings were written against the
background of a spectacular series of letter bombs which had been sent to politicians
and other persons in the public eye in austria and had severely injured several victims.
the attacks, thus, were a news item of major public concern. the applicant company's
articles dealt with the activities of the extreme right and in particular with b., who had
been arrested as the main suspect. being a right-wing extremist, he had entered the pub-
lic scene well before the series of letter-bomb attacks. moreover, it has to be borne in
mind that the offences he was suspected of, namely offences under the prohibition act
and aiding and abetting assault through letter bombs, were offences with a political
background directed against the foundations of a democratic society. it may be added
that the photographs of b., with the possible exception of one wedding picture, did not
disclose any details of his private life. thus, the court cannot subscribe to the govern-
ment's argument that the publications at issue encroached upon b.'s right to respect for
his private life.
these circumstances have to be taken into account when assessing whether the reasons
adduced by the austrian courts for justifying the injunctions were ”relevant” and “suffi-
cient” and whether the injunctions were ”proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued”.
55. another factor of particular importance for the court's determination in the present
case is the essential function the press fulfils in a democratic society. although the press
must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of
others or of the proper administration of justice, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a
manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all
matters of public interest (see bladet tromsø and stensaas v. norway [gc], no.
21980/93, § 59, echr 1999-iii).
56. this duty extends to the reporting and commenting on court proceedings which,
provided that they do not overstep the bounds set out above, contribute to their publicity
and are thus perfectly consonant with the requirement under article 6 § 1 of the con-
vention that hearings be public. not only do the media have the task of imparting such
                                                - 6 -
      information and ideas: the public has a right to receive them (see the worm judgment
      cited above, pp. 1551-52, § 50). this is all the more so where, as in the present case, a
      person is involved who has laid himself open to public scrutiny by expressing extremist
      views (see, mutatis mutandis, the worm judgment, ibid.). however, the limits of per-
      missible comment on pending criminal proceedings may not extend to statements which
      are likely to prejudice, whether intentionally or not, the chances of a person receiving a
      fair trial or to undermine the confidence of the public in the role of the courts in the ad-
      ministration of justice (ibid.). thus, the fact that b. had a right under article 6 § 2 of the
      convention to be presumed innocent until proved guilty is also of relevance for the bal-
      ancing of competing interests which the court must carry out (see bladet tromsø and
      stensaas cited above, § 65).
      …
      58. the court acknowledges that there may be good reasons for prohibiting the publi-
      cation of a suspect's picture in itself, depending on the nature of the offence at issue and
      the particular circumstances of the case. a similar line of argument was followed by the
      supreme court, which stated that even the publication of a picture accompanied by a
      correct statement of fact could infringe the legitimate interests of the person concerned.
      however, no reasons to that effect were adduced by the vienna court of appeal. nor
      did it, contrary to the vienna commercial court, carry out a weighing of b.'s interest in
      the protection of his picture against the public interest in its publication which, as the
      government pointed out, is required under section 78 of the copyright act. this is all
      the more surprising as the publication of a suspect's picture is not generally prohibited
      under section 7a of the austrian media act unless the suspect is a juvenile or the of-
      fences are only of a minor nature, but depends precisely on a weighing of the respective
      interests. in sum the reasons adduced by the vienna court of appeal, though ”relevant”,
      are not ”sufficient”.
      59. it is true, as the government pointed out, that the injunctions did not in any way re-
      strict the applicant company's right to publish comments on the criminal proceedings
      against b. however, they restricted the applicant company's choice as to the presenta-
      tion of its reports, while it was undisputed that other media were free to continue to pub-
      lish b.'s picture throughout the criminal proceedings against him. having regard to
      these circumstances and to the domestic courts' finding that it was not the pictures used
      by the applicant company but only their combination with the text that interfered with
      b.'s rights, the court finds that the absolute prohibition on the publication of b.'s picture
      went further than was necessary to protect b. against defamation or against violation of
      the presumption of innocence. thus, there is no reasonable relationship of proportionali-
      ty between the injunctions as formulated by the vienna court of appeal and the le-
      gitimate aims pursued.
      60. it follows from these considerations that the interference with the applicant compa-
      ny's right to freedom of expression was not ”necessary in a democratic society”. ac-
      cordingly, there has been a violation of article 10 of the convention.”
menneskerettighedsdomstolen afviste ved afgørelse af 14. november 2002 i sagen
”wirtschafts-trend” zeitschriften-verlagsgesellschaft mod østrig (nr. 62746/00) at behandle
en sag, idet domstolen anså klagen for åbenbart grundløs. i den sag var et nyhedsmagasin ble-
                                                 - 7 -
vet pålagt at betale godtgørelse til en politibetjent, hvis navn var blevet nævnt i forbindelse
med magasinets omtale af en sag, hvor en asylansøger var død i politiets varetægt, og hvor
omstændighederne ved dødsfaldet var under efterforskning. i afgørelsen hedder det bl.a.:
       ”the court notes that the subject-matter of the present article was an issue of public
       concern and was part of a political debate on the lawfulness of deportation practices in
       austria. however, the report also contained information on criminal proceedings
       against the police officers, which were pending at an early stage. the court observes
       that the applicant company was not prevented from reporting about all details concern-
       ing the issue except for the full name of the police officer.
       as regards the reasons given by the regional court and the court of appeal, the court
       notes that they took into consideration the public interest in the disclosure of the inci-
       dent of the deceased deportee on his deportation flight and the alleged abusive exercise
       of authority of the accompanying officers. the domestic courts weighed these public in-
       terests against private interests of the aliens’ police officer concerned, against whom
       criminal investigation proceedings were pending at an early stage. both courts found
       that the disclosure of his identity had negatively affected his private and social life and
       had therefore infringed his legitimate interests. the court considers that the austrian
       courts gave relevant reasons, having regard to the early stage of the criminal proceed-
       ings against mr k. when particular care had to be taken to protect him against a ”trial by
       the media” and to give effect to the presumption of innocence under article 6 § 2 of the
       convention.
       the austrian courts concluded that mr k.’s legitimate private interests prevailed over
       the public interest in the disclosure of his identity. the court of appeal noted in its
       judgment of 26 april 2000 that reporting on the modalities of deportation practices and
       criticism thereon could be done without disclosing the identity of a concerned police of-
       ficer. the disclosure of his full name did not add anything of public interest to the in-
       formation already given in the article that could have outweighed the interests of the
       person concerned in non-disclosure of his identity. the court considers these reasons
       sufficient for the imposition of the relatively modest fine on the applicant company.
       therefore, it finds that the domestic courts did not overstep their margin of appreciation
       and that the interference cannot be regarded as disproportionate in the circumstances of
       the case.
       it follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accord-
       ance with article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the convention.”
menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 10. februar 2009 i sagen eerikäinen m.fl. mod finland
(nr. 3514/02) angik et magasin, der havde bragt en artikel om en kvinde, som var mistænkt for
bl.a. socialt bedrageri. kvindens navn var ikke nævnt i artiklen, men i artiklen var gengivet en
ældre, urelateret artikel, som indeholdt kvindens fulde navn og to billeder af hende. den fin-
ske højesteret fandt, at magasinet herved havde tilsidesat kvindens ret til privatliv. menneske-
                                                 - 8 -
rettighedsdomstolen fandt, at denne afgørelse var i strid med menneskerettighedskonventio-
nens artikel 10. i dommen hedder det bl.a.:
       ”i. alleged violation of article 10 of the convention
       …
       b. the court’s assessment
       …
       3. whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society
       …
       66. the court can accept that the purpose of the 1997 article was to contribute to a pub-
       lic discussion. the criminal case brought against x was selected as an example illus-
       trating the problems involved. while it is perfectly legitimate to use individual cases to
       highlight a more general problem, the question is whether the applicants went too far
       when they communicated x’s identity to the public. it is plain that x was not a public
       figure or a politician but an ordinary person who was the subject of criminal pro-
       ceedings (see schwabe v. austria, 28 august 1992, § 32, series a no. 242-b). the fact
       that she ran a relatively small cleaning firm and had given an interview eight years pre-
       viously to a magazine, which had come about in circumstances apparently not discussed
       during the domestic proceedings or at any length before the court, does not mean that
       she had knowingly entered the public arena (see, mutatis mutandis, fayed v. the united
       kingdom, 21 september 1994, § 75, series a no. 294-b). x’s status as an ordinary per-
       son enlarges the zone of interaction which may fall within the scope of private life. the
       fact that she was the subject of criminal proceedings cannot remove from her the protec-
       tion of article 8 (see sciacca v. italy, no. 50774/99, § 28-29, echr 2005-i).
       67. in order to assess whether the ”necessity” of the restriction of the exercise of the
       freedom of expression has been established convincingly, the court must examine the
       issue essentially from the standpoint of the relevancy and sufficiency of the reasons giv-
       en by the supreme court for requiring the applicants to pay compensation to x. the
       court must determine whether the applicants’ liability in damages struck a fair balance
       between the public interest involved and x’s interests and whether the standards applied
       were in conformity with the principles embodied in article 10 (see nikula v. finland,
       cited above, § 44).
       68. the court considers that the general subject matter which was at the heart of the ar-
       ticle concerned – namely, the abuse of public funds – was a matter of legitimate public
       interest, having regard in particular to the considerable scale of the abuse. from the
       point of view of the general public’s right to receive information about matters of public
       interest, and thus from the standpoint of the press, there were justified grounds support-
       ing the need to encourage public discussion of the matter in general.
       69. the court observes that it is not evident that the supreme court in its analysis as to
       whether the applicant’s privacy had been invaded attached any importance to the fact
       that the information given was based on a bill of indictment prepared by the public
       prosecutor and that the article clearly stated that the applicant had merely been charged.
       70. nor is it apparent what significance the supreme court attached to the publication
       of x’s photographs together with her name. the publication of a photograph must, in
                                                - 9 -
       the court’s view, in general be considered a more substantial interference with the right
       to respect for private life than the mere communication of the person’s name. as the
       court has held, although freedom of expression also extends to the publication of pho-
       tos, this is an area in which the protection of the rights and reputation of others takes on
       particular importance (see von hannover, no. 59320/00, §§ 50-53 and 59, echr
       2004-vi). nor did the supreme court analyse the significance of the fact that the pho-
       tographs had been taken with the applicant’s consent and with the intention of their be-
       ing published, albeit in connection with an earlier article and a different context.
       71. having regard to the foregoing the court concludes that the grounds relied on, alt-
       hough relevant, were not sufficient to justify the interference with the applicants’ right
       to freedom of expression, in terms of a ”pressing social need”.
       72. there has therefore been a violation of article 10 of the convention.”
menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 10. januar 2012 i sagen standard verlags mod østrig
(nr. 34702/07) angik en avis, der havde bragt en artikel om en igangværende efterforskning
vedrørende nogle store tab, som en bank havde lidt. en højtstående medarbejder i banken blev
i artiklen nævnt som havende forbindelse til de indtrådte tab. de østrigske domstole pålagde
avisen at betale godtgørelse til medarbejderen herfor. menneskerettighedsdomstolen fandt, at
denne afgørelse var i strid med konventionens artikel 10. i dommen hedder det bl.a.:
       ”i. alleged violation of article 10 of the convention
       …
       b. merits
       …
       2. the court’s assessment
       …
       (b) application of these principles to the present case
       …
       36. the court agrees with the domestic courts that the case concerned a balancing of
       the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression under article 10 against the
       claimant’s right to protection of his identity. in this connection the court reiterates that
       the concept of ”private life” protected by article 8 of the convention includes aspects
       relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name or picture (see von hannover v.
       germany, no. 59320/00, § 50, echr 2004-vi with further references).
       37. in cases in which the court has had to balance the protection of private life against
       freedom of expression, one factor it has taken into account is the position of the person
       concerned by the publication: whether or not he or she was a ”public figure” or had oth-
       erwise ”entered the public scene” (see, for instance, the following cases in the specific
       context of criminal proceedings: news verlags gmbh & co.kg v. austria,
       no. 31457/96, § 54, echr 2000-i, relating to the publication of pictures of the suspect
       of a high-profile crime; verlagsgruppe news gmbh v. austria (no. 2), no. 10520/02, §
                                         - 10 -
36, 14 december 2006, relating to the publication of a picture of a leading business man
in the context of proceedings against him for tax evasion; egeland and hanseid v. nor-
way, no. 34438/04, § 60, 16 april 2009, relating to the publication of pictures of a per-
son convicted of murder in a high-profile case; flinkkilä and others, cited above, § 83,
relating to the publication of the name and picture of the female friend of a senior public
figure, a married man, who had both been involved in a public disturbance which gave
rise to their conviction; and eerikäinen and others, cited above, § 66, concerning the
disclosure of the identity and pictures of the suspect of proceedings relating to social se-
curity fraud).
38. in the present case, both the vienna regional criminal court and the vienna court
of appeal found that the claimant, as a senior employee of the bank in issue, was not a
”public figure”, nor did the fact that his father had been a politician make him a public
figure. the court agrees with this assessment. it does not consider either that the claim-
ant can be considered to have entered the public scene. however, the court observes
that the question whether or not a person, whose interests have been violated by report-
ing in the media, is a public figure is only one element among others to be taken into
account (see the case of eerikäinen and others, cited above, §§ 66-72, in which the
publication concerned an ordinary individual but where the court nevertheless found
that the order to pay damages for publishing her name and picture in the context of a re-
port on an issue of general interest had not been ”necessary” within the meaning of ar-
ticle 10 § 2 of the convention).
39. another important factor which the court has frequently stressed when it comes to
weighing conflicting interests under article 10 on the one hand and article 8 on the
other hand, is the contribution made by articles or photos in the press to a debate of
general interest (see, in the context of criminal proceedings, news verlags gmbh &
co.kg, cited above, § 54; verlagsgruppe news gmbh (no. 2), cited above, § 37; flink-
kilä and others, cited above, § 76; and eerikäinen and others, cited above, § 66).
40. it is not in dispute in the present case that the article reported on an issue of public
interest. it concerned a banking scandal which led to enormous losses by a bank, 45% of
which was owned by the land of carinthia. against this background, the article dealt
with the fact that politics and banking were intertwined on the one hand and reported on
the opening of an investigation by the public prosecutor on the other hand. in this con-
nection the court reiterates that there is little scope under article 10 § 2 of the conven-
tion for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest (see
sürek v. turkey (no. 1) [gc], no. 26682/95, § 61, echr 1999-iv).
41. moreover, it is not in dispute that the facts reported in the article were correct. as
head of the bank’s treasury, the claimant held a position in the management of the bank
at the material time, in which he was responsible for authorising foreign currency trans-
actions and answerable only to the executive board. the fact that his father was a for-
mer member of the regional government was not in dispute either, nor the fact – not
mentioned in the article but established by the domestic courts in the course of the pro-
ceedings – that he had been a member of the bank’s supervisory board at the time when
the losses were incurred and the claimant was head of its treasury.
42. the vienna court of appeal relied heavily on the aspect that the article reported on
the opening of criminal proceedings and, by indicating the claimant’s name, presented
                                        - 11 -
him as a suspect in the embezzlement of a huge sum of money. the government, argu-
ing that the impugned judgment had served to protect the claimant’s right to be pre-
sumed innocent, appear to rely on a similar line of argument. the court refers to the
particular duties incumbent on the media in relation to providing information on crimi-
nal proceedings (see, in paragraph 19 above, the council of ministers recommendation
rec(2003)13). it accepts the vienna court of appeal’s finding that the disclosure of a
suspect’s identity may be particularly problematic at the early stage of criminal pro-
ceedings.
43. however, when assessing the necessity of an interference, the court must have re-
gard to the article as a whole. it observes that the article at issue is not a typical example
of court reporting but focuses mainly on the political dimension of the banking scandal
at hand. this is already made clear by its title ”haider’s hypo now also facing criminal
investigation”, which refers to mr haider, the then regional governor of carinthia, and
by the introductory text in which mr haider is said to have accused the authorities of
being ”overzealous and politically motivated”. apart from reporting the fact that the
public prosecutor had opened an investigation into the bank’s senior management on
suspicion of embezzlement, the article does not deal with the conduct or contents of the
investigation as such.
44. the article’s focus is instead on the extent to which politics and banking are inter-
twined and on the political and economic responsibility for the bank’s enormous losses.
it mentions that mr haider, who himself also represented the land as a shareholder and
performed a supervisory function at the bank, and mr kulterer from the bank’s execu-
tive board, were trying to put the blame on the claimant and in this context refers to his
father, member of the socialist party and former member of the regional government,
thus hinting at motives of party politics. names, persons and personal relationships are
clearly of considerable importance in this sphere. it is difficult to see how the applicant
company could have reported on these issues in a meaningful manner without mention-
ing the names of all those involved, including the claimant (see, mutatis mutandis,
flinkkilä and others, cited above, § 85, where the court also considered that the disclo-
sure of the identity of the person concerned had a direct bearing on matters of public in-
terest). that distinguishes the present case from a case in which the court declared in-
admissible the complaint by the publisher of an austrian news magazine, which had
been ordered to pay compensation for having disclosed the name of a police officer at
an early stage of criminal proceedings against him. the court found in that case that the
disclosure of the police officer’s name did not add anything to the information already
given in the article (wirtschafts-trend zeitschriften-verlagsgesellschaft mbh v. austria
(no. 2) (dec.), no. 62746/00, echr 2002-x).
45. furthermore, the court observes that the vienna court of appeal referred to the
regional court’s finding that the disclosure of mr rauscher’s identity had been detri-
mental to him, namely to his professional advancement. however, it did not counter the
regional court’s argument that his name and position at hypo alpe-adria must have
been well known in business circles before the publication of the article at issue.
46. in sum, the court finds that the reasons adduced by the vienna court of appeal,
though being ”relevant” were not ”sufficient”. the court therefore considers that the
domestic courts have overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them
with regard to restrictions on debates of public interest. it follows that the interference
                                              - 12 -
       with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression was not ”necessary in a
       democratic society”.
       47. consequently, there has been a violation of article 10 of the convention.”
menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 17. januar 2012 i sagen lahtonen mod finland (nr.
29576/09) angik en politibetjent, der var sigtet for bl.a. biltyveri. betjenten havde mod beta-
ling deltaget i et interview om sagen med en anden avis end den, sagen ved menneskeret-
tighedsdomstolen angik. hans navn fremgik ikke af interviewet, men det gjorde et profilbille-
de. det var endvidere oplyst, at han var i psykiatrisk behandling. betjenten havde ligeledes
forsøgt at sælge et interview til den avis, som sagen ved menneskerettighedsdomstolen ved-
rørte. denne avis bragte efterfølgende en artikel om betjenten. artiklen indeholdt bl.a. betjen-
tens navn, fødeår og baggrundsinformation om ham. herudover var det oplyst, at retten havde
bestemt, at der skulle foretages psykiatriske undersøgelser af ham. betjenten blev senere fun-
det skyldig i forbrydelserne, men straffen bortfaldt på grund af hans psykiske tilstand. betjen-
ten klagede efterfølgende over, at avisen havde bragt hans navn og oplysninger om, at han
skulle undergå psykiatriske undersøgelser. de finske domstole pålagde avisen at betale godt-
gørelse til betjenten. menneskerettighedsdomstolen fandt, at denne afgørelse var i strid med
konventionens artikel 10. i dommen hedder det bl.a.:
       ”i. alleged violation of article 10 of the convention
       …
       b. merits
       …
       2. the court’s assessment
       …
       3. whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society
       …
       72. the court observes at the outset that the impugned article described the details of
       the incident of 29 july 2003 and it included j.’s name, year of birth, some background
       information about him and his current place of work. the information in the article was
       based on the public court documents acquired by the applicant from the district court
       after the hearing on 3 february 2004. it also stated that j. had wished to undergo a psy-
       chiatric assessment before the court’s decision was made and that he had been ordered
       to do so by the court.
       73. the court notes that these facts were presented in an objective manner. there is no
       evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual misrepresentation or bad faith on the part
       of the applicant. nor is there any suggestion that details about j. were obtained by sub-
       terfuge or other illicit means (compare von hannover v. germany, cited above, § 68).
                                         - 13 -
the facts set out in the articles in issue were not in dispute even before the domestic
courts.
74. it is clear that j. was an experienced police officer whose duties involved the exer-
cise of public power. the offences were not committed in office but in j.’s free time.
however, he had used the authority of his public function to commit the offences. crim-
inal charges were preferred against him and he was later convicted as charged but the
sentence was waived due to his mental illness. the court notes that even though the of-
fences committed as such might appear ordinary, it was very rare for such offences to
be committed by a police officer.
75. the court further observes that the impugned article focused on explaining the
course of the events as they had been recounted by j. during the pre-trial investigation.
this information was public. no details of j.’s private life were mentioned, except his
name and the fact that he had wished to undergo a psychiatric assessment before the
court’s decision was made and that he had been ordered to do so by the court. practical-
ly the same information was given by j. in the course of an interview given to another
magazine.
76. moreover, it is to be noted that the disclosure of j.’s identity in the reporting had a
direct bearing on matters of public interest, namely his conduct and his ability to con-
tinue in his post as a police officer. as j. was a police officer, it is difficult to see how
his acts, even if committed during his free time, were not a matter of public interest.
therefore, the court considers that there was a continuing element of public interest in-
volved in the reporting.
77. the court further notes that the emphasis in the article in question was clearly on
j.’s account of the course of events. there was hardly any comment made by the appli-
cant in the article. even though the article was written and published before j.’s convic-
tion, the reporting and commenting on his court proceedings were objective and irre-
proachable from the point of view of article 6 § 2 of the convention.
78. finally, the court has taken into account the severity of the sanctions imposed on
the applicant, including the issue of civil liability which has meanwhile become final
(see paragraph 27 above). the applicant was convicted under criminal law and was or-
dered to pay thirty day-fines, amounting to eur 1,170. in addition, he was, together
with the publishing company, ordered to pay damages to j. in a total amount of eur
5,000 plus interest and his legal fees amounting to eur 2,140. moreover, the applicant
alone was ordered to pay j. costs and expenses in the amount of eur 4,000 and eur
4,200. the amounts of compensation must be regarded as substantial, given that the
maximum compensation afforded to victims of serious violence was approximately fim
100,000 (eur 17,000) at the time (see paragraph 40 above).
79. the court would observe in this connection that recourse to criminal sanctions in
order to punish media professionals who publish newspaper reports which are found to
invade an individual’s privacy is not, as such, incompatible with article 10 of the con-
vention. however, it is only in exceptional circumstances that such sanctions can be jus-
tified (see saaristo and others v. finland, no. 184/06, § 69, 12 october 2010; and
yleisradio oy and others v. finland (dec.), no. 30881/09, 8 february 2011; as regards
defamation and insult, see cumpǎnǎ and mazǎre v. romania [gc], no. 33348/96, §
                                               - 14 -
       115, echr 2004-xi; lindon, otchakovsky-laurens and july v. france [gc], nos.
       21279/02 and 36448/02, § 59, echr 2007-iv; and długołęcki v. poland, no. 23806/03,
       § 47, 24 february 2009). no such exceptional circumstances exist in the present case.
       80. the court considers that such severe consequences, viewed against the background
       of the circumstances resulting in the interference with j.’s right to respect for his private
       life, were disproportionate having regard to the competing interest of freedom of ex-
       pression.
       81. in conclusion, in the court’s opinion the reasons relied on by the domestic courts,
       although relevant, were not sufficient to show that the interference complained of was
       ”necessary in a democratic society”. moreover, the totality of the sanctions imposed
       was disproportionate. having regard to all the foregoing factors, and notwithstanding
       the margin of appreciation afforded to the state in this area, the court considers that the
       domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake.
       82. there has therefore been a violation of article 10 of the convention.”
også i andre sager for menneskerettighedsdomstolen er det indgået i vurderingen af, om en
restriktion af ytringsfriheden er i strid med artikel 10, om den information, hvis videregivelse
myndighederne vil forhindre, i forvejen er offentligt tilgængelig. det gælder f.eks. dom af 9.
februar 1995 i vereniging weekblad bluf! mod holland (nr. 16616/90), som angik de hol-
landske myndigheders fogedforbud mod og beslaglæggelse af en udgave af ugemagasinet
bluf!, der indeholdt en beskrivelse af den hollandske efterretningstjenestes aktiviteter. med-
arbejderne på ugemagasinet genoptrykte samme nat – uden myndighedernes viden – den på-
gældende udgave af ugemagasinet, og solgte dagen efter, der var national fridag, et større an-
tal eksemplarer i amsterdams gader. ugebladet anmodede efterfølgende om, at de beslaglagte
eksemplarer blev udleveret, hvilket blev afvist af de hollandske myndigheder. ca. et år senere
traf de hollandske domstole afgørelse om, at den pågældende udgave af ugemagasinet skulle
tilbagekaldes. menneskerettighedsdomstolen fandt, at denne afgørelse var i strid med konven-
tionens artikel 10. herom hedder det i dommen bl.a.:
       ”i. alleged violation of article 10 (art. 10) of the convention
       …
       b. justification for the interferences
       …
       3. ”necessary in a democratic society”
       …
       38. the government maintained that as the seizure complied with the requirements of
       article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), the same was true of its prolongation and of the sub-
       sequent withdrawal from circulation, since these were designed to prevent the report
                                        - 15 -
from falling into the hands of unauthorised persons. the information should have
remained confidential. it was for the state to decide whether it was necessary to impose
and preserve such confidentiality. the state was also in the best position to assess the
use that might be made of the information by subversive elements to the detriment of
national security. against that background, it should be allowed a wide margin of
appreciation.
the netherlands authorities had refrained from preventing distribution of the reprint
solely for fear of causing serious public disorder in view of the vast crowds on the
streets of amsterdam on 30 april 1987, the queen’s birthday. the withdrawal from
circulation remained in force after that date because the journal had been distributed
only locally and in limited quantities. the figure of 2,500 copies sold, advanced by the
applicant association, was exaggerated. moreover, to hold that the measures were no
longer effective following distribution of the periodical would be tantamount to
accepting that ”crime pays”.
lastly, the instant case differed from the cases of weber v. switzerland (judgment of 22
may 1990, series a no. 177, p. 23, para. 51), the sunday times v. the united kingdom
(no. 2) (judgment of 26 november 1991, series a no. 217, p. 30, para. 54) and open
door and dublin well woman v. ireland (judgment of 29 october 1992, series a no.
246-a, p. 31, para. 76). in this instance, unlike the situation in the first of those cases,
the netherlands authorities had brought proceedings to prevent publication; and, unlike
the situation in the other two cases, the information in the report could not be obtained
by other means.
…
43. the withdrawal from circulation, on the other hand, must be considered in the light
of the events as a whole. after the newspaper had been seized, the publishers reprinted a
large number of copies and sold them in the streets of amsterdam, which were very
crowded (see paragraphs 11 and 38 above).
consequently, the information in question had already been widely distributed when the
journal was withdrawn from circulation. admittedly, the figure of 2,500 copies ad-
vanced by the applicant association was disputed by the government. nevertheless, the
court sees no reason to doubt that, at all events, a large number were sold and that the
bvd’s report was made widely known.
44. in this latter connection, the court points out that it has already held that it was un-
necessary to prevent the disclosure of certain information seeing that it had already been
made public (see the weber judgment previously cited, pp. 22-23, para. 49) or had
ceased to be confidential (see the observer and guardian v. the united kingdom judg-
ment of 26 november 1991, series a no. 216, pp. 33-35, paras. 66-70, and the sunday
times (no. 2) judgment previously cited, pp. 30-31, paras. 52-56).
45. admittedly, in the instant case the extent of publicity was different. however, the
information in question was made accessible to a large number of people, who were
able in their turn to communicate it to others. furthermore, the events were commented
on by the media. that being so, the protection of the information as a state secret was
no longer justified and the withdrawal of issue no. 267 of bluf! no longer appeared nec-
                                               - 16 -
        essary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued. it would have been quite possible, howev-
        er, to prosecute the offenders.
        46. in short, as the measure was not necessary in a democratic society, there has been a
        breach of article 10 (art. 10).”
højesterets begrundelse og resultat
t er fundet skyldig i fra januar til maj 2016 i 10 opslag på facebook i strid med et navnefor-
bud at have gengivet navnet på en sigtet i en straffesag. navneforbuddet blev nedlagt i april
2014, idet byretten vurderede, at offentlig gengivelse af navn, stilling eller bopæl på sigtede,
som var varetægtsfængslet in absentia som sigtet for forsøg på manddrab, ville udsætte denne
for en unødvendig krænkelse, jf. retsplejelovens § 31, stk. 1, nr. 2. navneforbuddet blev op-
retholdt ved kendelser i oktober 2014 og januar 2016, som blev stadfæstet af landsretten.
navneforbuddet blev ophævet i november 2016, bl.a. fordi retten på dette tidspunkt vurdere-
de, at det beroede på sigtedes egne forhold, at han endnu ikke var afhørt af dansk politi, og at
betingelserne for navneforbud derfor ikke længere var opfyldt.
denne sag angår i første række, om håndhævelse af navneforbuddet er i strid med ts ret til
ytringsfrihed efter den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 10.
efter den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols praksis skal der ved afgørelsen af, om et
forbud mod at offentliggøre identiteten på en sigtet i en straffesag er foreneligt med artikel 10,
foretages en afvejning af hensynet til ytringsfriheden over for hensynet til den sigtedes privat-
liv, jf. artikel 8, og hensynet til uskyldsformodningen, jf. artikel 6.
i denne afvejning indgår bl.a. alvoren af den forbrydelse, som sigtelsen angår, om sagen angår
et spørgsmål af særlig offentlig interesse, og om sigtede i forvejen er offentlig kendt, jf. bl.a.
menneskerettighedsdomstolens dom af 11. januar 2000 i sagen news verlag mod østrig (nr.
31457/96), præmis 54 og 56, og dom af 10. februar 2009 i sagen eerikäinen m.fl. mod fin-
land (nr. 3514/02), præmis 66 og 68. hvis efterforskningen er på et tidligt stadium, følger det
af praksis, at der er en videre adgang til at forbyde offentliggørelse af sigtedes identitet, og det
indgår i vurderingen, om der kan redegøres for de spørgsmål af offentlig interesse, som sagen
rejser, på fyldestgørende vis uden at offentliggøre navnet på sigtede, jf. afgørelse af 14. no-
vember 2002 i sagen ”wirtschafts-trend” zeitschriften-verlagsgesellschaft mod østrig (nr.
62746/00) og dom af 10. januar 2012 i sagen standard verlags mod østrig (nr. 34702/07),
                                              - 17 -
præmis 44. endelig indgår det i vurderingen, hvilken sanktion der pålægges den, der har of-
fentliggjort oplysninger om sigtedes identitet, jf. dom af 17. januar 2012 i sagen lahtonen
mod finland (nr. 29576/09), præmis 78.
i sager om indgreb i ytringsfriheden lægger menneskerettighedsdomstolen generelt vægt på,
om de oplysninger, der videregives, i forvejen er offentligt tilgængelige, navnlig hvis dette
skyldes, at myndighederne har undladt at gribe ind over for en ulovlig videregivelse af fortro-
lige oplysninger, jf. dom af 9. februar 1995 i sagen vereniging weekblad bluf! mod holland
(nr. 16616/90), præmis 38 og 43, at oplysningerne stammer fra et offentligt retsmøde, eller at
den, oplysningerne angår, selv har udtalt sig til pressen, jf. dom af 17. januar 2012 i sagen
lahtonen mod finland (nr. 29576/09), præmis 75.
det navneforbud, som t har overtrådt, angår en person, som er sigtet for forsøg på manddrab
under omstændigheder, der gør, at sagen er af betydelig offentlig interesse, og højesteret fin-
der, at disse omstændigheder talte imod et navneforbud.
på den anden side finder højesteret, at hensynet til sigtede, som ikke i forvejen var kendt i
offentligheden, og som var varetægtsfængslet in absentia, idet han opholdt sig i udlandet og
endnu ikke var afhørt af dansk politi, på dette tidlige stadium af efterforskningen talte for et
navneforbud.
højesteret finder endvidere, at det ved afvejningen af hensynet til sigtede over for hensynet til
ytringsfriheden må tillægges betydelig vægt, at omtale af såvel sagen om drabsforsøg som den
debat om berettigelsen af navneforbuddet, som ts opslag på facebook var en del af, kunne
ske på fyldestgørende vis uden at nævne navnet på den sigtede.
byret og landsret har flere gange taget stilling til, om navneforbuddet skulle opretholdes, og i
november 2016 vurderede byretten, at hensynet til sigtede ikke længere kunne begrunde, at
forbuddet blev opretholdt.
højesteret finder på den anførte baggrund, at det indgreb, som navneforbuddet gjorde i ts
ytringsfrihed, var foreneligt med menneskerettighedskonventionens artikel 10.
                                                 - 18 -
det kan ikke føre til et andet resultat, at navnet på den sigtede, da t overtrådte navneforbud-
det, i et vist omfang var offentliggjort, herunder i en bog, i interviews med bogens forfatter og
efter det oplyste også i flere netmedier og udenlandske medier. højesteret har herved navnlig
lagt vægt på, at overtrædelser af navneforbuddet også er håndhævet over for andre end t, og
at den sigtede, som var omfattet af navneforbuddet, ikke selv har udtalt sig til medierne.
højesteret tiltræder på den anførte baggrund, at t er fundet skyldig i den rejste tiltale.
af de grunde, som landsretten har anført, tiltræder højesteret, at der ikke er grundlag for
strafbortfald, og at straffen er fastsat til en bøde på 25.000 kr., hvilket ikke kan anses for en
uproportional sanktion.
højesteret stadfæster herefter dommen.
                                       thi kendes for ret:
landsrettens dom stadfæstes.
t skal betale sagens omkostninger for højesteret.
