                             højesterets dom
                          afsagt onsdag den 1. februar 2012
sag 94/2010
(2. afdeling)
a
(advokat poul bostrup, beskikket)
mod
skatteministeriet
(kammeradvokaten ved advokat steffen sværke)
i tidligere instanser er afsagt dom af retten i lyngby den 26. februar 2009 og af østre lands-
rets 11. afdeling den 14. december 2009.
i pådømmelsen har deltaget fem dommere: peter blok, lene pagter kristensen, marianne
højgaard pedersen, michael rekling og oliver talevski.
påstande
appellanten, a, har nedlagt påstand om, at hendes ansatte indkomst for 2003 yderligere ned-
sættes med 6 mio. kr., subsidiært et mindre beløb. mere subsidiært har hun nedlagt påstand
om, at sagen hjemvises til ligningsmyndighederne.
indstævnte, skatteministeriet, har påstået stadfæstelse.
supplerende sagsfremstilling
der er fremlagt korrespondance mellem a og b fra perioden efter den 22. april 2003, hvor
hun forlod deres fælles bolig sammen med børnene. i en udateret e-mail skrev a om baggrun-
den herfor, at hun ikke ”kunne fortsætte mit liv sammen med dig”. i en e-mail af 30. april
2003 skrev b, at ”jeg synes også at det nok er det bedste at du finder et eget sted at bo, så må
vi jo se tiden an derfra”. b nævnte muligheden for, at parterne atter flyttede sammen i en e-
                                               - 2 -
mail af 3. juni 2003 til a. i en e-mail af 17. oktober 2003 til a omtalte b sin nye kæreste
charlotte.
den 10. november 2003 underskrev a en købsaftale vedrørende en ejendom med overtagelse
den 1. januar 2004.
anbringender
a har yderligere anført, at beskatning ved ophør af et papirløst samlivsforhold er i strid med
den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 14, jf. artikel 8 og artikel 1 i tillægs-
protokol 1, idet der er tale om en urimelig forskelsbehandling i forhold til beskatning ved op-
hør af et ægteskab, hvor det økonomiske opgør er skattefrit. hun har navnlig henvist til den
europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols dom af 19. juli 2005 i sagen p.m. mod uk (sag nr.
6638/03).
skatteministeriet har heroverfor anført, at de påberåbte bestemmelser i den europæiske men-
neskerettighedskonvention m.v. ikke er til hinder for, at ugifte samlevende behandles anderle-
des ved samlivets ophør end ægtefæller, herunder skattemæssigt. ministeriet har navnlig hen-
vist til den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols dom af 27. april 2000 i sagen joanna
shackell mod uk (sag nr. 45851/99), dom af 29. april 2008 i sagen burden mod uk (sag nr.
13378/05) og dom af 2. november 2010 i sagen şerife yiğit mod tyrkiet (sag nr. 3976/05).
de påberåbte domme fra den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstol
domstolen anførte i sin dom af 27. april 2000 i sagen shackell (sag nr. 45851/99) mod uk
bl.a.:
       “however, the court recalls that article 14 of the convention safeguards individuals
       placed in similar positions from any discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and
       freedoms set out in the convention and protocols (see the marckx v belgium judgment
       of 13 june 1979, series a no. 31, p. 5). the applicant in the present case seeks to com-
       pare herself to a widow, in other words a woman whose husband, as opposed to partner,
       has died. the court recalls that the european commission of human rights held, in a
       case concerning unmarried cohabitees who sought to compare themselves with a mar-
       ried couple that
               “these are not analogous situations. though in some fields, the de facto relation-
               ship of cohabitees is now recognised, there still exist differences between mar-
               ried and unmarried couples, in particular, differences in legal status and legal ef-
                                               - 3 -
              fects. marriage continues to be characterised by a corpus of rights and obliga-
              tions which differentiate it markedly from the situation of a man and woman
              who cohabit” (lindsay v. the united kingdom, comm. dec. 1.11.86, d.r. 49, p.
              181).
     the court notes that that decision of the commission dates from 1986, that is, over
     14 years ago. the court accepts that there may well now be an increased social accep-
     tance of stable personal relationships outside the traditional notion of marriage. how-
     ever, marriage remains an institution which is widely accepted as conferring a particular
     status on those who enter it. the situation of the applicant is therefore not comparable to
     that of a widow.
     in any event, the court recalls that under its case-law, a difference in treatment is dis-
     criminatory for the purposes of article 14 if it “has no objective and reasonable justifi-
     cation”, that is if it does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable
     relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
     realised” (see, among other authorities, see the schmidt and dahlström v. sweden
     judgment of 6 february 1976, series a no. 21, pp. 32–33, § 24, and the van raalte v.
     the netherlands judgment of 21 february 1997, reports of judgments and decisions
     1997-i, p. 186, § 39).
     further, the court reiterates that “states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in as-
     sessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a
     different treatment in law. the scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according
     to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background…” (see the petrovic v aus-
     tria judgment of 27 march 1998, reports of judgments and decisions 1998-ii, p. 587, §
     38). the court again notes that marriage remains an institution that is widely accepted
     as conferring a particular status on those who enter it and, indeed, it is singled out for
     special treatment under article 12 of the convention. the court considers that the pro-
     motion of marriage, by way of limited benefits for surviving spouses, cannot be said to
     exceed the margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent government.”
i dom af 19. oktober 2005 i sagen p.m. mod uk (sag nr. 6638/03) hedder det bl.a.:
     ”27. the court notes the government’s arguments that this case is not about pater-
     nity/maternity but the married status of the parents. it is true that any person, not mar-
     ried to the mother of the child concerned, would not qualify for tax deductions for
     maintenance payments made. that said however, it is nonetheless the case that the ap-
     plicant may claim to be treated differently as an unmarried father than a married father,
     though both are parents of the child to be maintained and under obligations to pay
     maintenance. this is not a situation where the applicant seeks to compare himself to a
     couple living in a subsisting marriage (see, for example, lindsay v. the united kingdom,
     cited above, where married and unmarried couples, taxed differently, were not found in
     be in a comparable position), but one where the married father has separated or divorced
     and is also living apart from the child of the family. other persons, not parents, are not
     covered by the child support provisions and are generally in a different situation. this
     applicant differs from a married father only as regards the issue of marital status and
     may, for the purposes of this application, claim to be in an relevantly similar position.
                                                - 4 -
       28. the justification for the difference in treatment relied on by the government is the
       special regime of marriage which confers specific rights and obligations on those who
       choose to join it. the court recalls that it has in some cases found that differences in
       treatment on the basis of marital status has had objective and reasonable justification
       (see, for example, mcmichael v. the united kingdom, judgment of 24 february 1995,
       series a no. 307-b, § 98, concerning legislation which did not grant automatic parental
       responsibility to unmarried fathers who inevitably varied in their commitment and inter-
       est in, or even knowledge of, their children). it may be noted however that as a general
       rule unmarried fathers, who have established family life with their children, can claim
       equal rights of contact and custody with married fathers (see sahin v. germany [gc],
       no. 30943/96, § 94, echr 2003-viii). in the present case, the applicant has been ac-
       knowledged as the father and has acted in that role. given that he has financial obliga-
       tions towards his daughter, which he has duly fulfilled, the court perceives no reason
       for treating him differently from a married father, now divorced and separated from the
       mother, as regards the tax deductibility of those payments. the purpose of the tax de-
       ductions was purportedly to render it easier for married fathers to support a new family;
       it is not readily apparent why unmarried fathers, who undertook similar new relation-
       ships, would not have similar financial commitments equally requiring relief.
       29. the court concludes therefore that there has been a violation of article 14 of the
       convention in conjunction with article 1 of protocol no. 1 in this case.”
storkammeret udtalte i dom af 29. april 2008 i sagen burden mod uk (sag nr. 13378/05)
bl.a.:
       ”63. moreover, the grand chamber notes that it has already held that marriage confers
       a special status on those who enter into it. the exercise of the right to marry is protected
       by article 12 of the convention and gives rise to social, personal and legal conse-
       quences (b. and l. v. the united kingdom, cited above, § 34). in shackell (cited above),
       the court found that the situations of married and unmarried heterosexual cohabiting
       couples were not analogous for the purposes of survivors' benefits, since “marriage re-
       mains an institution which is widely accepted as conferring a particular status on those
       who enter it”. the grand chamber considers that this view still holds true.
       64. since the coming into force of the civil partnership act in the united kingdom, a
       homosexual couple now also has the choice to enter into a legal relationship designed
       by parliament to correspond as far as possible to marriage (see paragraphs 16-18
       above).
       65. as with marriage, the grand chamber considers that the legal consequences of civil
       partnership under the 2004 act, which couples expressly and deliberately decide to in-
       cur, set these types of relationship apart from other forms of co-habitation. rather than
       the length or the supportive nature of the relationship, what is determinative is the exis-
       tence of a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of rights and obligations of a con-
       tractual nature. just as there can be no analogy between married and civil partnership
       act couples, on one hand, and heterosexual or homosexual couples who choose to live
       together but not to become husband and wife or civil partners, on the other hand (see
       shackell, cited above), the absence of such a legally binding agreement between the ap-
       plicants renders their relationship of co-habitation, despite its long duration, fundamen-
                                                - 5 -
     tally different to that of a married or civil partnership couple. this view is unaffected by
     the fact that, as noted in paragraph 26 above, member states have adopted a variety of
     different rules of succession as between survivors of a marriage, civil partnership and
     those in a close family relationship and have similarly adopted different policies as re-
     gards the grant of inheritance tax exemptions to the various categories of survivor;
     states, in principle, remaining free to devise different rules in the field of taxation pol-
     icy.
     66. in conclusion, therefore, the grand chamber considers that the applicants, as co-
     habiting sisters, cannot be compared for the purposes of article 14 to a married or civil
     partnership act couple. it follows that there has been no discrimination and, therefore,
     no violation of article 14 taken in conjunction with article 1 of protocol no.1.”
storkammeret udtalte i dom af 2. november 2010 i sagen şerife yiğit mod tyrkiet (sag nr.
3976/05) bl.a.:
     ”67. according to the court's settled case-law, discrimination means treating diffe-
     rently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar
     situations (see d.h. and others v. the czech republic [gc], no. 57325/00, § 175,
     echr 2007-xii). a difference in treatment has no objective and reasonable justifica-
     tion if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of
     proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see
     larkos v. cyprus [gc], no. 29515/95, § 29, echr 1999-i). the provisions of the con-
     vention do not prevent, in principle, contracting states from introducing general policy
     schemes by way of legislative measures whereby a certain category or group of indi-
     viduals is treated differently from others, provided that the difference in treatment
     which results for the statutory category or group as a whole can be justified under the
     convention and its protocols (see, mutatis mutandis, ždanoka v. latvia [gc],
     no. 58278/00, § 112, echr 2006-iv).
     68. in other words, article 14 does not prohibit distinctions in treatment which are
     founded on an objective assessment of essentially different factual circumstances and
     which, being based on the public interest, strike a fair balance between the protection of
     the interests of the community and respect for the rights and freedoms safeguarded by
     the convention (see ünal tekeli v. turkey, no. 29865/96, § 51, echr 2004-x).
     69. the right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed
     under the convention is also violated when states without an objective and reasonable
     justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different
     (see thlimmenos, cited above, § 44).
     70. the contracting states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether
     and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treat-
     ment in law (see marckx v. belgium, 13 june 1979, § 33, series a no. 31; abdulaziz,
     cabales and balkandali v. the united kingdom, 28 may 1985, § 72, series a no. 94;
     and stubbings and others v. the united kingdom, 22 october 1996, § 72, reports 1996-
     iv). that margin is wider when it comes to the adoption by the state of general fiscal,
     economic or social measures, which are closely linked to the state's financial resources
     (see burden v. the united kingdom [gc], no. 13378/05, § 60, echr 2008-..., and pe-
     trov v. bulgaria, no. 15197/02, § 55, 22 may 2008). however, it is ultimately for the
     court to decide, in the light of the circumstances of the case in question, whether such
     measures are compatible with the state's obligations under the convention and its pro-
                                               - 6 -
      tocols (see james and others v. the united kingdom, 21 february 1986, § 46, series a
      no. 98, and national & provincial building society, leeds permanent building society
      and yorkshire building society v. the united kingdom, 23 october 1997, § 80, reports
      1997-vii).
      71. as to the burden of proof in this sphere, the court has established that once the ap-
      plicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the government to show that it was
      justified (see d.h. and others, cited above, § 177; timishev v. russia, nos. 55762/00
      and 55974/00, § 57, echr 2005-xii; and chassagnou and others v. france [gc],
      nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, §§ 91-92, echr 1999-iii).
      72. with regard to article 12 of the convention, the court has already ruled that mar-
      riage is widely accepted as conferring a particular status and particular rights on those
      who enter it (see burden, cited above, § 63, and shackell v. the united kingdom (dec.),
      no. 45851/99, 27 april 2000). the protection of marriage constitutes, in principle, an
      important and legitimate reason which may justify a difference in treatment between
      married and unmarried couples (see quintana zapata v. spain, commission decision of
      4 march 1998, decisions and reports (dr) 92, p. 139). marriage is characterised by a
      corpus of rights and obligations that differentiate it markedly from the situation of a
      man and woman who cohabit (see nylund v. finland (dec.), no. 27110/95, echr 1999-
      vi, and lindsay v. the united kingdom (dec.), no. 11089/84, 11 november 1986). thus,
      states have a certain margin of appreciation to treat differently married and unmarried
      couples, particularly in matters falling within the realm of social and fiscal policy such
      as taxation, pensions and social security (see, mutatis mutandis, burden, cited above, §
      65).
      …
      101. as to the applicant, she chose, together with her partner, to live in a religious mar-
      riage and found a family. she and ö.k. were able to live peacefully as a family, free
      from any interference with their family life by the domestic authorities. thus, the fact
      that they opted for the religious form of marriage and did not contract a civil marriage
      did not entail any penalties – either administrative or criminal – such as to prevent the
      applicant from leading an effective family life for the purposes of article 8. the court
      therefore finds no appearance of interference by the state with the applicant's family
      life.
      102. accordingly, the court is of the view that article 8 cannot be interpreted as im-
      posing an obligation on the state to recognise religious marriage. in that regard it is im-
      portant to point out, as the chamber did (see paragraph 29 of its judgment), that article
      8 does not require the state to establish a special regime for a particular category of
      unmarried couples (see johnston and others, cited above, § 68). for that reason the fact
      that the applicant does not have the status of heir, in accordance with the provisions of
      the civil code governing inheritance and with the domestic social security legislation,
      does not imply that there has been a breach of her rights under article 8.”
højesterets begrundelse og resultat
a og b havde boet sammen siden sommeren 1993 uden at have indgået ægteskab. i anledning
af parternes samlivsophævelse meddelte b ved e-mail af 27. oktober 2003 a, at han havde
bedt sin bank om at overføre 6 mio. kr. til hendes konto. sagens første spørgsmål er, om det
overførte beløb på 6 mio. kr. helt eller delvist skal anses for et skattefrit kompensationsbeløb.
                                                 - 7 -
det forhold, at a i forbindelse med modtagelsen af beløbet på 6 mio. kr. medunderskrev et
antedateret gavebrev og en gaveanmeldelse til skattemyndighederne, kan under de forelig-
gende omstændigheder ikke afskære hende fra at gøre gældende, at der rettelig i det hele eller
delvist var tale om et kompensationsbeløb, som hun modtog i forbindelse med samlivsophæ-
velsen, og som hun havde et retligt krav på.
det er i højesterets praksis fastslået, jf. bl.a. ufr 1985, side 607/2, at der ved ophør af et fler-
årigt, fast samlivsforhold kan tillægges en part, der gennem deltagelse i parternes fælles ud-
gifter – eller på anden måde – i væsentlig grad har bidraget til, at en anden part har kunnet
skabe eller bevare en ikke ubetydelig formue, et beløb, hvis størrelse fastsættes skønsmæssigt
under hensyntagen til bl.a. samlivets varighed og parternes økonomiske forhold ved dets op-
hør.
af de grunde, som byretten har anført, tiltræder højesteret ligesom landsretten, at det ikke er
godtgjort, at a havde et kompensationskrav mod b.
højesteret tiltræder derfor også, at det overførte beløb på 6 mio. kr. – i overensstemmelse med
den anmeldelse, som a og b indgav til skattemyndighederne – må anses for en gave.
spørgsmålet er herefter, om gaven falder ind under § 22, stk. 1, litra d, i lov om afgift af døds-
boer og gaver (boafgiftsloven) og dermed ikke skal henregnes til hendes skattepligtige ind-
komst, jf. statsskattelovens § 5, stk. 1, litra b.
af de grunde, som landsretten har anført, tiltræder højesteret, at a og b ikke havde fælles
bopæl efter den 22. april 2003. det tiltrædes endvidere, at det ikke er godtgjort, at b forud for
as fraflytning havde afgivet et gaveløfte til hende om betaling af 6 mio. kr., ligesom det til-
trædes, at et gaveløfte først blev afgivet i oktober 2003.
a modtog således ikke gaven på et tidspunkt, hvor hun og b havde fælles bopæl som krævet
efter boafgiftslovens § 22, stk. 1, litra d. gaven er dermed ikke omfattet af statsskattelovens §
5, stk. 1, litra b, men skal henregnes til as skattepligtige indkomst, jf. statsskattelovens § 4,
litra c.
                                               - 8 -
højesteret finder, at den europæiske menneskerettighedskonventions artikel 14 sammenholdt
med artikel 8 eller artikel 1 i tillægsprotokol 1 ikke er til hinder for, at ugifte samlevende i
økonomisk henseende behandles anderledes end ægtefæller ved samlivets ophør, herunder
skattemæssigt, jf. herved bl.a. den europæiske menneskerettighedsdomstols dom af 29. april
2008 i sagen burden mod uk og dom af 2. november 2010 i sagen şerife yiğit mod tyrkiet.
højesteret stadfæster herefter dommen.
                                       thi kendes for ret:
landsrettens dom stadfæstes.
i sagsomkostninger for højesteret skal statskassen betale 125.000 kr. til skatteministeriet.
de idømte sagsomkostningsbeløb skal betales inden 14 dage efter denne højesteretsdoms af-
sigelse og forrentes efter rentelovens § 8 a.
