s0021000 - jf
                                    udskrift
                                         af
                     sø- & handelsrettens dombog
                                   ____________
den 10. juni 2005 blev i sagen s 21-01
                                         ft
                                (advokat per harder)
                                        mod
               shrewsbury underwriting capital limited
                         (advokat medea plesner petersen)
afsagt følgende
dom:
indledning
sagens spørgsmål er om det sagsøgte forsikringsselskab, shrewsbury
underwriting capital limited (shrewsbury), er berettiget til at afvise
forsikringsdækning for fts lystfartøj der brændte i ishøj havn den 19. september
2000. ft havde gennem sin forsikringsmægler, the miller kelsh insurance
brokers limited, tegnet forsikring for perioden 1. april 2000 til 1. april 2001.
forsikringen blev ved en misforståelse fra forsikringstagerens side bragt til ophør
pr. 7. august 2000, men blev den 23. august 2000 genetableret for perioden fra
den 7. august 2000 til 1. april 2001. spørgsmålet er herefter om
forsikringsgiveren i henhold til engelsk forsikringsret er berettiget til at nægte
udbetaling af forsikringssummen under henvisning til at forsikringstageren i
forbindelse med genetableringen af forsikringsforholdet undlod at give
oplysninger om at han var sigtet og varetægtsfængslet for skattesvig.
                                          - 2 -
sagen er anlagt ved fts værneting i henhold til ef- doms-konventionens artikel
8, stk. 1, nr. 2). forsikringspolicen indeholder en værnetingsklausul hvorefter
den er underlagt engelsk jurisdiktion. klausulen får efter ef-domskonventionens
artikel 12, jf. artikel 8, ikke betydning i sagen.
sagen skal efter bestemmelse i forsikringspolicen afgøres på grundlag af engelsk
ret, i det foreliggende tilfælde navnlig marine insurance act (mia), der har
følgende bestemmelser af mulig betydning for sagen:
section 17
a contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good
faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the
contract may be avoided by the other party.
section 18
(1) subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the
insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which
is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every
circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by
him. if the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the
contract.
(2) every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take
the risk.
(3) in the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be
disclosed, namely…
section 20
(1) every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the
insurer during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is
concluded, must be true. if it be untrue the insurer may avoid the contract.
(2) a representation is material which would influence the judgment of a
prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take
the risk.
(3) a representation may be either a representation as to a matter of fact or
as to a matter of expectation or belief.
(4) a representation as to matter of fact is true, if it be substantially
correct, that is to say, if the difference between what is represented and what
is actually correct would not be considered material by a prudent insurer.
(5) a representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is true
                                         - 3 -
if it be made in good faith.
(6) a representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract is
concluded.
(7) whether a particular representation be material or not is, in each case, a
question of fact.
parterne er enige om at der i sagen ikke er spørgsmål om afgivelse af urigtige
oplysninger (”misrepresentation”), men alene spørgsmål om ft har tilsidesat sin
pligt til at afgive oplysninger (”duty to disclose”) i forbindelse med
genetableringen af forsikringen i august 2000.
der er under sagens forløb og under indtryk af bl.a. erklæringen fra richard
youell, jf. nedenfor, opnået enighed om at tvisten alene vedrører
begivenhedsforløbet i august 2000, ikke gentegningen af forsikring pr. 1. april
2000.
påstande
ft har nedlagt påstand om at shrewsbury skal betale ham 150.000 gbp med
tillæg af rente, principalt beregnet som dansk procesrente fra sagens anlæg den
29. august 2001, subsidiært beregnet som den engelske ”base rate” med tillæg
af 2% fra den 24. oktober 2000.
shrewsbury har påstået frifindelse.
sagsfremstilling
ft der har været ejer af lystbåde siden 1975, anskaffede i begyndelsen af 1998
en båd for en købesum på ca. 150.000 gbp.
han søgte en kaskoforsikring for båden gennem et engelsk
forsikringsmæglerfirma, the miller kelsh insurance brokers limited, som han
tidligere havde benyttet, og anmodede om en forsikring på 150.000 gbp.
mægleren skaffede forsikringstilbud gennem firmaet tldallas (london) ltd. på
hvis foranledning ft den 13. marts 1998 udfyldte og underskrev en
forsikringsbegæring (proposal form). ud over at give forskellige konkrete
oplysninger om båden og dens benyttelse afgav ft oplysninger om sin fortid som
bådejer og eventuelle tidligere skader eller krav. han erklærede således at han
ikke havde haft skader på sine både, og at han altid havde tegnet forsikring på
normale vilkår. i skemaets punkt e – crewing/ location/usage punkt 5, blev
ft spurgt:
                                        - 4 -
”have you or any person you allow to use your vessel ever been charged with or
convicted for any offence involving dishonesty of any kind e.g. fraud, arson,
robbery, smuggling, theft or handling stolen goods?”
ft besvarede spørgsmålet med “never”. han oplyste videre at båden hørte til i
vedbæk havn, og at den skulle benyttes til sejlads i danske og svenske
farvande. i begæringen under important var anført:
”it is important to remember that failure to disclose all material facts (i.e. facts
which an insurer would regard as likely to influence his acceptance and
assessment of the proposal) may invalidate the insurance. if you are in any
doubt as to whether facts are material, you should disclose them. a specimen
copy of policy conditions is available on request.
in the event of an insurance being effected, it is important to consider the form
in conjunction with the policy condition because the latter may contain
exclusions which override anything stated on the proposal form.”
forsikring blev tegnet for et år fra den 1. april 1998. da forsikringen skulle
fornys i foråret 1999, ønskede ft at få dækning gennem lloyds, hvilket han
meddelte sin forsikringsmægler der den 5. marts 1999 rettede henvendelse til
firmaet yachtsure ltd. der tegner forsikringer på vegne underwriters tilknyttet
lloyds, herunder shrewsbury. forsikringsforholdet blev etableret som ønsket. ft
blev ikke afkrævet oplysninger i den forbindelse.
yachtsure udstedte "certificate of insurance" den 12. marts 1999 for perioden
1/4 1999 - 1/4 2000 med samme forsikringsdækning som hidtil for båden. det
fremgår af policen at forsikringen er omfattet af yachtsures almindelige vilkår. af
disse fremgår bl.a. under overskriften ”11 general conditions” i punkt 11.1 om
proposal form:
the proposal form which you have completed … forms the basis of the contract
between you and us. you guarantee the accuracy of the information in the
proposal form. if any of the information is materially untrue or if any material
information is omitted, we have the option to cancel this insurance form its
inception”
under pkt. 11.13 om cancellation and return of premium fremgår bl.a. at
opsigelse kan ske med 30 dages varsel.
                                        - 5 -
ved fax af 13. marts 2000 anmodede forsikringsmægleren om en fornyelse for
en 12-måneders periode. forud herfor havde yachtsure til forsikringstageren
sendt en renewal quotation af 17. februar 2000 hvori forsikringstageren
anmodes om at erklære at der ikke er nogen ændring i forsikringen. der
henvistes i den forbindelse til en passus på side 2 hvori det hedder:
n.b. any material alteration in the facts previously disclosed in connection with
this insurance which could affect the insurers decision on the terms and
conditions quoted must be notified to insurer’s or the insurance may be voided
by reason of non-disclosure. if there are any material changes of which the
insurer’s should be aware, please provide details below.”
der blev ikke afgivet supplerende oplysninger fra forsikringstagers side. the
miller kelsh insurance brokers ltd. udstedte på shrewsburys vegne den 13
marts 2000 en ny police for perioden 1. april 2000 til 1. april 2001 på uændrede
vilkår. præmien var 1.150 gbp med fradrag af 57,50 gbp (5%) i no claims
bonus.
den 22. maj 2000 blev ft anholdt og sigtet for groft skattesvig. han blev
varetægtsfængslet og sad i varetægt til den 18. september 2000. som led i
sagen blev den forsikrede båd beslaglagt til sikkerhed for det offentliges krav,
men efter at disse omkring midten af september var blevet opfyldt af ft, blev
beslaglæggelsen ophævet.
i mellemtiden havde ft fået båden overført fra vedbæk havn til ishøj havn og
givet den i kommission til en skibsmægler. fts hustru gik fejlagtigt ud fra at
båden var solgt og sendte den 7. august 2000 en fax til forsikringsmægleren
hvori hun på ægtefællens vegne anmodede om at få ophævet forsikringsaftalen
og refunderet præmie. faxen lyder således:
”…
please cancel the above insurance police no. … as i have sold the yacht, and
please send check to the above address.
…”
den 8. august 2000 meddelte mægleren yachtsure følgende:
”assured advised yesterday, this policy is to be cancelled with effect 7th august
2000 – he has sold the vessel.
…”
                                       - 6 -
der blev udstedt kreditnota for præmien for den resterende periode på 746,71
gbp med fradrag af mæglersalær på 149,34 gbp, dvs. netto 595,37 gbp.
endvidere udstedt yachtsure tillæg til policen, endorsement no a 1, med
angivelse af den nævnte ristorno. over opgørelsen af ristorno er anført:
”all other terms, clauses and conditions remain unaltered”
da misforståelsen blev opklaret, sendte fts ægtefælle den 16. august 2000 på
en fax til mægleren:
“…
dear sir, i cancelled the above by fax the 7th of aug 2000 – that is a mistake,
the boat is not sold, so please continue the assurance…”
mægleren gav denne besked videre til yachtsure med fax af 17. august 2000:
”…
thanks for the endorsement to cancel this policy.
however, i have now had a fax from the assured (attached) which states he
made a mistake – the boat is not sold so please continue cover.
strange!!!! but perhaps he has more than one boat.
anyway please reinstate cover with effect 7th august and confirm.
…”
modtageren hos yachtsure accepterede og anførte på faxen der blev returneret
til mægleren:
”agreed sub no known or reported losses at 17/8/00.
file already lapsed on system will take a day or so to sort out.”
i overensstemmelse hermed udstedtes endorsement no a 2 af 23. august 2000.
i en boks under angivelse af forsikringssum mv. er anført:
                                      - 7 -
”it is hereby understood and agreed that the cover herein is reinstated with
effect from 7th august 2000".
subject to no known or reported losses @ 17/08/2000
…"
under boksen er endvidere anført: "all other terms, clauses and conditions
remain unaltered"
præmien for den resterende periode blev angivet til 746,71 gbp brutto med
fradrag af 37,34 gbp (5%) no claims bonus.
mægleren sendte den 24. august 2000 følgende til ft:
”…
i confirm cover has been maintained on the vessel – warranted no known or
reported losses from the 7th august 2000 (the period during which you have
advised the boat sold).
…”
den 18. september 2000 blev ft af retten i lyngby idømt straf af fængsel i 1 år
6 måneder for overtrædelse af straffelovens § 289, 1. pkt., jf.
skattekontrollovens § 13, stk. 1, samt en tillægsbøde på 4,8 mio. kr. kort
forinden havde ft indgået forlig med skattevæsenet om efterbetaling af 4,8 mio.
kr. bødekravet og skattekravet blev opfyldt kort tid efter. ft blev løsladt efter
dommen.
den 19. september 2000 ca. kl. 03.00 opstod en større brand i ishøj havn,
hvorved 5-6 lystfartøjer, herunder fts båd, udbrændte. ft indgav anmeldelse til
forsikringsselskabet den 24. september 2000.
ekspertudtalelser
parterne har til dokumentation af engelsk ret indhentet en ”legal opinion” fra
advokat (barrister) michael crane, q.c., og to sagkyndige vurderinger fra
forsikringsekspert richard youell.
michael crane
af michael cranes erklæring fremgår bl.a.:
                                              - 8 -
“d1.1: please explain the duty of disclosure owed by an assured to an
       underwriter under ss.17, 18 and 20 of the marine insurance act 1906 and
       as a matter of general principle under the english law of insurance.
  c1: is determining whether, within the context of s.18(1) of the marine
       insurance act 1906, there has been a failure to disclose a material
       circumstance, in each case a question of fact? and, if so, is it one to be
       determined by the judge on the basis of the evidence presented by the
       parties?
the general framework
       6.       the assured party under a contract of insurance owes the same duties to
                his insurer under sections 17, 18 and 20 of the marine insurance act 1906
                (“mia”) as at common law,1 although the practical application of those
                duties may vary according to the type of insurance.2 it is well settled that
                the mia applies equally to non marine as well as to marine insurance and
                that it codified english common law at the date of its enactment. although i
                have described the scope of those duties below solely by reference to the
                act, my comments apply equally as a matter of general principle.
       7.      sections 17, 18 and 20 of mia provide as follows:
       …
       8.      section 17 in effect imposes on the parties a general duty to act in good
               faith in their dealings with one another, both before the contract is
               concluded and during its performance. the scope of the duty varies,
               however, according to the circumstances. the assured’s duties as to
               disclosure and representation are two specific aspects of the wider duty of
               good faith, and are set out in detail in sections 18 and 20.3 the duties
               imposed on the assured by sections 18 to 20 of the mia fall to be performed
               only “before the contract is concluded”. i consider below the implications of
               this in the context of renewals, variations and cancellations (followed by
               reinstatements) of insurance contracts.
the duty of disclosure
       9.       the assured owes a duty to disclose to the insurer all circumstances which
                would be considered material by a prudent insurer and which are known to
                the assured, subject to the exceptions set out in section 18(3) mia. where
                the assured is seeking to obtain insurance in the ordinary course of
                business, section 18(1) further provides that the duty of disclosure extends
                to material circumstances which he ought to know in that capacity; where
1
  see pan atlantic insurance co ltd v pine top insurance co ltd [1995] 1 ac 510 at 518, 541.
2
  macgillivray on insurance law, ed. n.legh-jones, 10th edn (sweet and maxwell, 2003) at 17-6.
3
  see macgillivray at 17-1 – 17-2.
                                               - 9 -
                  the assured is a consumer, however, the duty extends only to facts within
                  his actual knowledge, subject to the caveat that he may not deny
                  knowledge of facts to the evidence of which he deliberately shut his eyes.4
        10.       whether the assured failed to disclose a particular circumstance is a
                  question of fact. section 18(4) provides that whether a particular
                  undisclosed circumstance is material is also a question of fact. similarly,
                  whether a representation made before the conclusion of the contract is
                  material is also a question of fact (section 20 (7)). the sort of evidence
                  which an english court would typically receive in order to decide these
                  questions, is discussed below.
        11.      as set out in section 18(2) mia, the materiality of a particular fact or
                 circumstance is assessed objectively by reference to the opinion of the
                 hypothetical prudent insurer. the opinions of the assured5 or of the
                 particular insurer who actually underwrote the risk6 are irrelevant to this
                 question. a material circumstance is one which would have influenced the
                 judgment of a hypothetical prudent insurer in determining whether to take
                 the risk or on what terms to take the risk. if the circumstance in question is
                 shown to be one which would have “influenced” that decision making
                 process, it is not necessary to go further and show that it would have had a
                 decisive impact on the decision. this is settled by house of lords authority.7
                 the question of materiality is assessed at the date the contract was entered
                 into.8
        12.      entirely separate from the question whether a material fact or circumstance
                 was undisclosed, is the question whether that non disclosure induced the
                 insurer to underwrite the risk or to write it on the particular terms that, in
                 the event, were agreed. issues of “inducement” are directed to determining
                 whether the non disclosure was causative in a legal sense. in contrast to
                 questions of “materiality”, questions of inducement depend upon evidence
                 as to what the reaction of the insurer who actually wrote the risk would
                 have been had the circumstance in question been disclosed before the
                 contract was concluded. the question of inducement is referred to further
                 below.
misrepresentation
        …
4
  joel v law union and crown insurance co [1908] 2 kb 863 at 880, 884; economides v
commercial union assurance co [1998] qb 587 at 601-3, 607; see macgillivray at 17-15.
5
  see, for example, roselodge ltd v castle [1966] 2 lloyd’s rep 113 at 131.
6
  glasgow assurance corp v symondson (1911) 16 comcas 109 at 119.
7
  pan atlantic, supra at 516-518, 530-541, 550.
8
  re yager and guardian assurance co (1912) 108 lt 38; see also pan atlantic, supra at 531-2;
brotherton v aseguradora colseguros sa [2003] ewca civ 705, ca (22 may 2003), new law
online 203059701 at pages 6, 8.
                                                - 10 -
1.2. please explain how, if at all, the duty of disclosure identified in response to
       question 1.1 is varied by clauses 2.8 and 11.1 of the yachtsure policy
       conditions.
       …
       19.     the assured’s duties under sections 17, 18 and 20 mia are not, therefore,
               varied by clauses 2.8 and 11.1 of the conditions, although clause 11.1
               provides the insurer with an additional remedy for breach of warranty in
               circumstances where an answer in the proposal form is actually untrue.
d2. so far as you have not addressed the following matters in your answers to
      question 1, please identify:
2.1 when the assured owes an underwriter a duty of disclosure;
2.2 the rights of underwriters if an assured does fail to comply with his duty of
      disclosure;
2.3 what test or tests apply under english law in order to determine whether the
      assured has failed to comply with his duty of disclosure towards
      underwriters.
time at which the duties are owed
       20.     as stated above, the duty of utmost good faith imposed by section 17 mia
               governs both parties’ conduct throughout the negotiations for and
               performance of the contract, whereas the particular duties imposed by
               sections 18 and 20 apply only during pre-formation negotiations and then,
               only to the assured. the negotiation period continues up until the moment
               at which the contract is concluded, so that, for example, the assured is
               obliged to disclose any material circumstances which come to light after he
               has submitted the proposal form or to notify the insurer if any of the
               information he provided in the form subsequently becomes inaccurate.9
       21.     sections 18 and 20 also apply during negotiations to vary, extend10 or
               renew the contract, as the purpose of such negotiations is the creation of a
               new contract or the addition of fresh rights and obligations to an existing
               contract. in such cases, the assured must disclose both circumstances
               which arose during the expiring period of cover and also the fact, if it be the
               case, that he had consciously and deliberately omitted to disclose a
               circumstance which he knew to be material when presenting the risk
               originally.11 in cases of renewal or other changes which amount to the
               creation of a new contract, the duties apply in full as during negotiations for
9
  see macgillivray at 17-22.
10
   except where extension is a matter for the unilateral decision of the insured: macgillivray at 17-24.
11
   see macgillivray at 17-24.
                                               - 11 -
               the original contract. where all that is proposed is a variation of the
               subsisting contract, the duties are limited to facts material to the change in
               risk; the assured need not disclose matters relating to the original unaltered
               risk.12
remedies of the insurer for breach of duty by the assured
       22.     if the assured fails to comply with his duties under sections 18 and 20, the
               insurer is entitled to avoid the contract so long as he can prove that he was
               induced by the non-disclosure or representation to enter into the contract
               on the relevant terms. the remedy of avoidance was explained by lord
               mustill in pan atlantic insurance co ltd v pinetop insurance co ltd [1995] 1
               ac 501 in the following terms:
                    “(1) a circumstance may be material even though a full and
                    accurate disclosure of it would not in itself have had a decisive effect
                    on the prudent underwriter’s decision whether to accept the risk and
                    if so at what premium. but, (2) if the misrepresentation or non-
                    disclosure of a material fact did not in fact induce the making of the
                    contract (in the sense in which that expression is used in the
                    general law of misrepresentation) the underwriter is not entitled to
                    rely on it as a ground for avoiding the contract.”13
               i have already explained the requirements of establishing inducement as
               well as material non disclosure or misrepresentation. in english law
               avoidance is a draconian remedy; it involves the insurer rescinding the
               contract from the outset and repaying the premium. in contrast to some
               other legal systems, once there is a finding of material non disclosure/
               representation along with inducement, there is no discretion in english law
               to adjust the premium and direct that the insurance contract should
               continue. of course, an insurer may lose the right to avoid through
               subsequent affirmation of the contract with knowledge of the matters giving
               rise to a right to avoid, but that issue does not appear to arise in the
               present case. in principle, in cases of fraudulent or negligent
               misrepresentation, or even in cases of fraudulent non disclosure, the insurer
               may have a remedy in damages. but an insurer will almost inevitably opt to
               avoid the contract from the outset rather than claim as damages the
               financial loss which he has sustained through having been induced to enter
               into it. avoidance followed by repayment of claims and premium will cure
               any such loss.
12
   lishman v northern maritime (1875) lr 10 cp 179 at 181, 182; manifest shipping co ltd v uni-
polaris co ltd (the star sea) [1997] 1 lloyd’s rep 360 at 370. this case went on appeal to the
house of lords but these points in the decision of the court of appeal were not affected. see also
macgillivray at 17-24.
13
   at 550.
                                              - 12 -
       23.     it is no defence for the assured to claim that his failure to disclose was
               innocent, for “it is immaterial whether the omission to communicate a
               material fact arises from indifference or a mistake or from it not being
               present to the mind of the assured that the fact was one which it was
               material to make known.”14 the same principle applies to avoidance of the
               contract for misrepresentation.
       24.     where the assured is in breach of the limited duty of disclosure which is
               owed during negotiations to vary the contract of insurance, the insurer’s
               remedy is to avoid the agreement by which the contract was varied, not to
               avoid the entire contract ab initio.15
test for breach of duty by the assured
       25.     as explained above the test for determining whether the insured has
               complied with his duties of disclosure/ representation under sections 18 or
               20 mia is an objective one, namely, whether the relevant non-disclosure or
               misrepresentation would have influenced the hypothetical prudent
               underwriter in his judgment to take the risk on the relevant terms. the test
               to be applied to determine whether the insurer can exercise the remedy of
               avoidance is a subjective one, however, namely, whether the relevant non-
               disclosure or misrepresentation in fact induced him to take the risk on the
               relevant terms.
       …
inducement
       39.     finally, [shrewsbury] must also prove that the alleged non-disclosure(s)
               made by mr ft induced it to enter into the contract on the relevant terms.
               as set out above, it will not be entitled to a remedy for any non-disclosure
               without proof of this causative link between the non-disclosure and the
               making of the contract on the particular terms.
relevant evidence
       40.     the onus is on [shrewsbury] to prove that it is entitled to avoid the policy.
               the applicable standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. were this
               case to be tried in the english courts the relevant categories of evidence
               would be as follows:
               (a) evidence relevant for establishing whether mr ft was in breach of his
                     duty of disclosure, including the documentary evidence of the
14
   bates v hewitt (1867) lr 2 qb 595 at 607.
15
   k/s merc-scandia xxxxii v certain lloyd’s underwriters subscribing to lloyd’s policy no.25t
105487 and ocean marine insurance co ltd (the mercandian continent) [2001] 2 lloyd’s rep 563
at 571.
                                             - 13 -
                   negotiations for the contract, mr ft’s evidence as a witness, and the
                   evidence of any other witnesses of fact who can prove or disprove the
                   extent of his knowledge of circumstances (a) – (d). expert evidence is
                   irrelevant to this issue.
               (b) evidence to determine whether mr ft’s alleged non-disclosures were
                   material to the decision to take the risk is a question which, typically,
                   would be determined by independent expert evidence focusing on the
                   practice of the marine insurance market. although the materiality of a
                   particular fact may in some cases be so obvious that no such evidence
                   is required,16 in view of fisher j’s diffidence in gate v sun alliance
                   regarding the materiality of tax evasion as a matter of general principle,
                   this would probably not be such a case. both mr ft’s and
                   [shrewsbury]’s opinions are irrelevant to the question of materiality;
                   the court is concerned only to establish the opinion of the hypothetical
                   prudent underwriter.
               (c) to determine whether [shrewsbury] was in fact induced by the alleged
                   non-disclosures to enter into the contract on the relevant terms, the
                   court will look at the evidence of [shrewsbury]’s witnesses of fact and
                   any pertinent documentary or other factual evidence. expert evidence
                   is irrelevant to this issue.
d4. please identify:
4.1. the principles of english law and/ or any relevant contractual terms which
      you consider the court should apply; and
4.2. the evidence that you would consider (a) relevant and (b) irrelevant as a
      matter of english law;
when deciding whether the reinstatement of cover in august 2000 amounted to
(a) a new contract of insurance or (b) a renewal or sufficient modification of the
contract of insurance so as to impose on the assured a duty of disclosure in
relation to any material change of circumstance since march 2000.
c3. under english law, would the question whether reinstatement of insurance
      cover after some days’ break is equal to taking out a new insurance policy or
      not, be determined by the judge as a matter of fact?
c4. is the question under 3) to be decided according to ordinary contract rules,
      or do any special insurance rules apply (in addition or instead)?
       41.     there is one point which should be noted at the outset concerning
               cancellation of the policy before considering the principles to be applied in
               determining the legal consequences of the agreements to cancel and
               reinstate the insurance in august 2000.
16
   schoolman v hall [1951] 1 lloyd’s rep 139 at 144; glicksman v lancashire and general
insurance co ltd [1927] ac 139 at 143.
                                               - 14 -
cancellation of the policy
       42.       with regard to cancellation, the conditions provide as follows:
       …
       43.       where the terms of a contract expressly require that a party wishing to
                 terminate the contract give notice in a specified manner, those
                 requirements must usually be observed closely if the purported cancellation
                 is to be valid.17 in the present instance, the requirements of clause 11.13
                 were not complied with, as mrs ft did not give notice 30 days in advance of
                 the date on which she wished to cancel the contract, but sought to cancel it
                 with immediate effect.18 it follows that notice of termination of the contract
                 was not given according to its terms and conditions as required by clause
                 11.3 and it was, therefore open to the insurers to decline to accept
                 termination prior to the due date.
       44.       in accordance with general contractual principles, however, contractual
                 requirements as to notice may be waived expressly or by conduct; further,
                 a party who induces the other to forbear from enforcing the letter of the
                 agreement may not subsequently repudiate the waiver.19 in this case,
                 notwithstanding that mr. ft had not given due notice of cancellation,
                 [shrewsbury] agreed to terminate the policy from 7 august 2000 and to
                 return the pro rata value of the premium as soon as it received miller’s fax
                 on 8 august 2000. it is clear, therefore, that [shrewsbury] was content to
                 waive its entitlement to 30 days’ notice and acknowledge the contract as
                 terminated with immediate effect. in those circumstances, in my view mr
                 ft would be estopped from contending that his purported cancellation of the
                 contract was ineffective.
principles to be applied in determining the effect of [shrewsbury]’s decision to go back on
risk
       45.       the question whether particular changes to a given contract constitute a
                 renewal, extension or variation of that contract is answered by applying
                 basic principles of the english law of contract, including principles of
                 construction. 20 the object of rules of construction is to ascertain and give
                 effect to the intentions of the parties.21 but this reference to the intentions
                 of the parties is apt to confuse. by speaking of “the intentions of the
17
   see chitty on contracts, ed. h.g.beale, 28th edn (sweet and maxwell, 1999) at 23-049.
18
   documents 7, 8 and b.
19
   ogle v earl vane (1868) lr 3 qb 272 at 279; hickman v haynes (1875) lr 10 cp 598 at 607. see
chitty at 23-050, 23-042.
20
   kensington v inglis (1807) 8 east 273; royal exchange assurance co v hope [1928] 1 ch 179 at
191, 195; cornhill insurance co v assenheim (1937) 58 ll.l.rep 27 at 29. see also macgillivray at
17-25; the law of insurance contracts, m.a.clarke (llp, 2002) at 23-4d.
21
   chitty at 12-042.
                                                - 15 -
                 parties” the reference is    to the presumed intentions of the parties
                 collectively, to be established by objective inference, principally, from how
                 they expressed themselves in the contractual documents. although in
                 interpreting contracts due importance will be given to the circumstances in
                 which the transaction occurred and the relevant commercial background,
                 the court will not have regard to the parties’ subjective intentions or
                 negotiating aims. in the particular context of renewals, cancellations and
                 variations the approach taken by the courts suggests that the parties’
                 intention is usually evidenced by construction of the terms of the changes
                 agreed, seen in the context of their existing or previous contractual
                 relationship.22 this rule is probably a particular application in the insurance
                 context of the general contractual principle that the object of construing the
                 terms of an agreement is to ascertain objectively the presumed intention of
                 the parties.23
       46.       there is authority to suggest that where a policy has lapsed and is
                 subsequently revived, the revived policy is not a continuation of the old
                 contract but the creation of a new one.24 further, it has been suggested
                 that if an original insurance contract has run its course or has been
                 cancelled and offers no guidance as to what should follow, it is presumed
                 that the insurer can refuse further cover and that any further cover which is
                 agreed must, therefore, be a matter of renewal.25 i should say that, in my
                 view, the case relied upon in clarke to establish this proposition with regard
                 to cancellation of an original contract, pengelly v british empire assurance
                 co (1974) 38 dlr (3d) 624, does not in fact support such a presumption.
                 on the facts found by the judge, the case simply concerned a succession of
                 new motor insurance policies which were agreed by the parties when the old
                 contract expired; there was therefore no question of cancellation by either
                 party. nevertheless, the proposition appears sound with regard to policies
                 that have expired.
       47.       the case-law would seem to suggest that where changes are made to the
                 policy during its term and while the insurance is current, the principal factor
                 in determining the intention of the parties may well be the extent to which
                 those changes altered the nature of the risk. for example, where an
                 assured suspended cover for one vehicle of a particular make and then
                 completed a new application to substitute two vehicles of a different make
                 on the same policy, for which he paid a new premium, this amounted to
                 entering into a new contract.26 where, on the other hand, an assured
22
   this seems to be the approach taken in the cases cited in note 41 above; see macgillivray at 17-25.
23
   on the general contractual principle, see chitty at 12-042.
24
   doe d pitt v shewin (1811) 3 camp 134; handler v mutual reserve fund life association (1904)
90 lt 192. see general principles of insurance law, e.r.ivamy hardy, 6th edn (butterworths, 1993)
at 276.
25
   clarke at 23-4d.
26
   cornhill v assenheim, supra at 29.
                                             - 16 -
               obtained a short extension of the period of cover under a life assurance
               policy, it was held that the old contract had simply been continued and
               extended.27 in appropriate cases, the fact that the relevant changes are
               effected by means of an endorsement to the original policy seems to be a
               significant, but not necessarily decisive, factor.28
       48.     the approach taken where an original contract has lapsed places particular
               importance on the insurer’s right to consider any fresh substantial
               alterations in the risk for the future. in this context a key factor in indicating
               an intention to enter into a new contract for the future is the insurer’s right,
               following the lapse of the original policy, to refuse future cover altogether.
               in contrast, in cases where the insurer is already bound by particular
               obligations under the subsisting contract, there is no reason why the
               assured should owe the full duty of disclosure in respect of those obligations
               simply because he requests a minor variation; the insurer has already made
               his decision in respect of those matters and remains on risk in relation to
               them.      where the insurer is not so bound, however, he is in effect
               considering afresh whether or not to provide cover. in mr. ft’s case there
               was an agreement to cancel cover with effect from 7th august 2000 and to
               refund the premium for the unexpired term. a credit note was raised in
               favour of the insured’s brokers for that premium. according to the
               documents which i have seen, until insurers agreed to reinstate cover there
               was no insurance. insurers were not bound to reinstate cover; they were
               free to decline to do so or to do so only conditionally and subject to new
               conditions. just as in a renewal of an expiring policy, insurers had the
               choice whether or not to enter into a contract for the future.
       49.     depending upon whether the court decides this was a variation of an
               existing contract or an agreement for a fresh contract, so the insured’s
               duties of disclosure will vary in scope as i have described above. if this was
               a new contract the insured would have the full range of disclosure
               obligations set out in mia sections 18 and 20. if this was a variation to a
               subsisting contract then the only obligation would be to disclose matters
               material to new features of the varied risk.
relevant evidence
       50.     the intention of the parties during their negotiations in august 2000 is a
               matter to be inferred objectively from the evidence, including in particular
               those documents passing between the parties or their agents by which the
27
   royal exchange v hope, supra at 191, 195; see also tomlin j at first instance at 184. see also
kensington v inglis, supra.
28
   in royal exchange v hope, supra the court of appeal took into account the fact that the change
was effected by means of endorsement, whereas mackinnon j in cornhill v assenheim assumed that
an endorsement had been drawn up but did not consider that factor decisive.
                                           - 17 -
              cancellation and reinstatement were effected. as i have stated above, the
              parties’ intention would be ascertained by construing the terms of the
              changes agreed, in the context of the parties’ existing or previous
              contractual relationship. the relevant legal principles are those established
              by the common law for ascertaining contractual intention. expert evidence
              is irrelevant on this issue. in english law contractual construction is a
              matter of law, emphasising again the point that “intention” is a reference to
              presumed, rather than actual, intention the ascertaining of which involves a
              process of objective inference. particular regard would be had to any
              authorities decided in an insurance context which, by analogy, could be
              viewed as shedding light on the approach to be adopted on the particular
              facts of this case.
d5. please identify:
5.1. the principles of english law which you consider the court should take into
     account; and
5.2. the evidence that you would consider (a) relevant and (b) irrelevant as a
     matter of english law;
when deciding whether underwriters were entitled to avoid the contract of
insurance for the policy year 2000/2001 on the grounds that mr ft failed to
disclose to underwriters at the time of reinstating cover in august 2000 that:
(a) he had been charged under danish criminal law with gross tax fraud in
     relation to his failure to disclose to the danish tax authorities the existence
     of his overseas trust and his receipt of income from that trust;
(b) he had been in custody since 22 may 2000 in connection with the charges
     against him;
(c) the danish police had seized the insured vessel as security for the tax
     authorities’ claims against him;
(d) the tax authorities were looking to recover from mr ft additional taxes and
     fines.
       51.    there is no dispute that mr ft did not disclose the circumstances set out in
              paragraphs (a) – (d) of question d5 to [shrewsbury] at the time of
              reinstating cover in august 2000.        whether [shrewsbury] is entitled to
              avoid paying out on that ground will be determined by three factors:
              (a) what was the scope of the duties owed by mr ft during the negotiations
                   to reinstate the contractual relationship;
              (b) whether the non-disclosures were material to [shrewsbury]’s decision to
                   reinstate the contractual relationship on the relevant terms;
              (c) whether the non-disclosures in fact induced [shrewsbury] to reinstate
                   the contractual relationship on the relevant terms.
       52.    the scope of the duties owed by mr ft in august 2000 depends upon
              whether the reinstatement of cover constituted a new agreement or a
                                           - 18 -
              variation of the policy. the extent of the duties owed is a question of law to
              be determined on the principles which i have set out above.
       53.     i have previously described the approach to be taken in determining
              whether, as a matter of principle, the non-disclosures were material, and
              how, as a matter of principle, the scope of disclosure would vary depending
              on the court’s decision as to whether the agreement in august 2000 varied
              a subsisting contract or amounted to an agreement for a fresh contract for
              the unexpired term incepting on 7th august 2000.
       54.     whether the non-disclosures actually induced [shrewsbury] to reinstate
              cover on the relevant terms is a question of fact, to be decided on the basis
              of the evidence of the witnesses of fact and any pertinent documentation.”
richard youell
af richard youells erklæring af 30. juni 2004 fremgår bl.a.:
”7               marine hull and machinery underwriters constitute a separate and distinct
market, and the yacht market form an even more particular sector of that market. the
information that a prudent yacht underwriter requires, and by which his underwriting
judgement will be coloured, is of a particular type, and it is quite different to that which
an underwriter considering a directors & officers (d&o), a bankers blanket bond or an
errors and omissions propositions, as examples, would demand.
8                the yacht underwriter is concerned that his potential assured is a
competent and experienced yachtsman who has the means and the inclination to look
after his vessel, has proper respect for the perils of the seas and the welfare of other
vessels, and has demonstrated these virtues by having a beneficial loss record. his
business activities, and even his business ethics, are considered to be a matter quite
distinct from and irrelevant to his concern for the safety of his vessel.
…
14               b   would the judgement of a prudent underwriter in determining
whether to renew or reinstate cover for the claimant in august 2000 and if so on what
terms, have been influences by knowing one or more of the following facts:
i.               that by august 2000 the claimant had been charged under danish
criminal law with gross tax fraud in relation to his failure to disclose to the danish tax
authorities the existence of his overseas trust and his receipt of income from that trust;
ii.              that he had been in custody since 22nd may 2000 in connection with the
charges against him;
                                             - 19 -
iii.              that the tax authorities were looking to recover from the claimant
additional taxes and fines?
15                i understand that there remains a legal issue as to whether the
reinstatement of the cover in august 2000 constituted a new agreement or a variation of
the policy. if disclosure was in fact required at that time, the facts summarized in
paragraphs i., ii. and iii. above would, in my opinion, have exerted influence upon a
prudent underwriter in his assessment of the risk.
16                the reasons for this are several, but all reflect that a situation existed at
this point which a prudent underwriter would wish to consider. the fact that the assured
had been in custody and had been charged with gross tax fraud is a wholly different
proposition from the mere existence of a tax scheme of questionable legality or of initial
enquiry into it.
17                the assured’s ability to look after the vessel might now be in question,
and the possibility of the moral hazard and the temptations attaching to an unperforming
asset or one that is its owner might be unable to enjoy, as well as the assured’s ability to
fund potential fines, would all be issues for the underwriter to ponder.
18                some underwriters might be unwilling, as a matter of general policy, to
insure an owner who has been charged with an offence involving fraud, or might be
concerned that a man whom it was alleged had acted fraudulently in one sphere might be
inclined to be less honest in others. an assured who is in custody, or has been heavily
financially penalised, may not find it easy to pay the premium for the policy, or to meet
the inevitable expenses involved in the ownership and maintenance of the vessel.”
af richard youells tillægserklæring af 20. december 2004 fremgår bl.a.:
”4.               the hypothesis on which my opinions in paragraphs 15 to 18 of my first
report were made was that the claimant had already been charged with the criminal
offence of gross tax fraud and had been in custody for some considerable time. in
paragraph 1. (i) of the second questionnaire i am invited to accept that a prudent yacht
underwriter would or might have considered it material in april 2000 to know if an
assured was engaged in tax evasion that was a criminal offence which might lead to a
custodial sentence and/or a significant financial penalty. i am unable to accept such a
proposition.
5.                a yacht policy is a physical damage policy and its principle focus is always
on the property that it is designed to protect. the character or ethical standards of the
owner are of interest only to the extent that they directly affect the insured property or
the way in which it will be maintained and operated. they are subsidiary to the physical
characteristics of the insured property – its age, its condition, the quality of its build,
                                            - 20 -
where and how it will be employed. underwriters do not make random moral judgements
beyond the area of their particular business interest, as indicated in paragraph 17 of my
first report, and they have no right or ability so to do. they would however operate on the
assumption that a man is innocent until he is proved guilty, that is, until he is convicted of
an offence. after conviction, an underwriter should be able to consider whether the
offence committed has any bearing on the contract of insurance which he is considering,
and it is for this reason that actual convictions may be material information if they have a
demonstrable connection to the nature of the insurance in contemplation.
…
7.                the explanation of the prudent underwriter’s expectations, summarized
above,    indicates   the  distinction  between    the  situations postulated    in the   first
questionnaire, and answered in paragraphs 9-13 and 17-18 respectively, and approached
somewhat differently in paragraph 2. of the second questionnaire. the assumptions
offered in the second questionnaire produce a response more akin to the former (ie
paragraphs 9-13) than the latter (paragraphs 17-18).
8.                underwriters do not make moral judgement of their assureds and
although their experience in the world of both personal and commercial insurance will
almost certainly leave them with a low expectation of ethical standards, it is with the
quality and safety of the physical objects that they are insuring that they are concerned.
9.                 the nature of the information that is material will vary depending on the
type of insurance that is in contemplation. the opinions expressed in this report would not
stand if the insurance at issue was a fidelity or professional errors and omissions policy,
or other type of financial insurance. in the case of a yacht policy the underwriter is not
concerned with the possible moral turpitude of its owner, unless that has a direct
influence on the quality of the vessel and the care and competence with which it will be
operated.”
forklaringer
ft har forklaret at han efter anbefaling valgte en mægler tilsluttet lloyds. the
miller kelsh insurance brokers limited var derfor hans forbindelse med tldallas.
han udfyldte i forbindelse med tegningen af forsikringen en forsikringsbegæring
(proposal form). da forsikringen skulle fornys året efter, blev den flyttet til
yachtsure hvilket han erklærede sig indforstået med. han udfyldte ikke en ny
forsikringsbegæring og fandt ikke grund til at afgive yderligere oplysninger. han
modtog policen vedrørende perioden april 1999 – april 2000.
han anmodede om fornyelse af forsikringen i marts måned 2000, formentligt
efter at han havde modtaget en renewal quotation fra yachtsure. der var ikke
ændringer af betydning i forsikringsmæssig henseende. han havde intet
                                       - 21 -
kendskab til skattesagen ved fornyelsen af forsikringen. han blev først klar over
sigtelsen den 22. maj 2000 kl. 10.03 da han blev anholdt.
han var varetægtsfængslet indtil dommen den 18. september 2000. båden lå i
vedbæk havn, da han var varetægtsfængslet og lå der indtil den blev flyttet til
ishøj havn den 6. august med henblik på salg. båden var beslaglagt ligesom
hans faste ejendom. han satte båden til salg bl.a. på grund af udtalelser fra
politiets side om at tvangssalg måske kun ville indbringe 500.000 kr. hans
hustru troede at båden var solgt da den blev sejlet til ishøj havn med henblik på
salg, hvorfor hun opsagde forsikringen. opsigelsen skete uden forudgående
drøftelse med ham. hun nævnte opsigelsen af forsikringen for ham en uge
senere, og han bad hende snarest sørge for at få tilbagekaldt opsigelsen. der
kom ingen forespørgsler, hverken skriftlige eller mundtlige, i forbindelse med at
forsikringen blev sat i kraft på ny.
han modtog sin dom i retten i lyngby mandag den 18. september 2000 ca. kl.
14 og blev derefter løsladt. inden da havde han indgået aftale med
skattevæsenet om efterbetalingskrav m.v. forliget blev indgået den foregående
torsdag eller fredag. indtil da havde han ikke erklæret sig skyldig i sigtelserne.
han erkendte sig skyldig i retten i overensstemmelse med forliget og således
som det fremgår af dommen.
efter forliget som han opfyldte hurtigt, frafaldt politiet beslaglæggelsen.
han blev bekendt med branden tirsdag den 19. september 2000.
paul miller, underwriting risk services, london, har forklaret at han har været i
lloyds i 27 år. han har været underwriter siden 1985 og har for yachtsure, som
er et ”brandname”, og andre tegnet forsikringer af bl.a. lystbåde. de forsikrer
ca. 11.000 lystfartøjer over hele verden.
grunden til at forsikringsbegæringen indeholder spørgsmål om ”fraud” er at det
er forsikringsteknisk rimeligt at forholde sig til forsikringstagerens hæderlighed i
almindelighed, således at man kan vurdere de moralske risici ved forsikringen.
hvis der foreligger svigagtige forhold som nævnt, kan det endvidere betyde at
forsikringstageren kan komme i finansielle vanskeligheder mv.. det er derfor
rimeligt at forlange oplysninger i så henseende fra forsikringstageren eller den
der søger om en forsikring.
                                        - 22 -
fts opsigelse af forsikringen i august 2000 som følge af salg af båden fremtrådte
som en sædvanlig opsigelse. det er almindelig praksis at lade en forsikring
ophøre fra den dag meddelelsen om salget modtages. der var tale om en
sædvanlig ekspedition, der i almindelighed foregår meget hurtigt. forsikringen
var efter opsigelsen ophørt. i forbindelse med gentegning af den samme
forsikring som i det foreliggende tilfælde er det normalt at betinge dette af at der
ikke er indtrådt skader mv. i mellemperioden. det er sædvanlig praksis ikke at
sende en ny begæring (proposal form) til forsikringstageren i forbindelse med en
sådan fornyelse.
der er i hele forsikringsforholdet en stående pligt for forsikringstageren til at give
meddelelse om ændringer som kan få væsentlig betydning for forsikringen
(”materially may affect the insurance”).
yachtsure blev først bekendt med dommen vedrørende ft og den forudgående
varetægtsfængsling et par uger efter afsigelsen af dommen. oplysninger om
dommen, hvor ft blev dømt for skattesvig, og om varetægtsfængslingen i
anledning af sigtelse for skattesvig, ville ganske givet have betydning for
forsikringsforholdet. meddelelse om sigtelsen og fængslingen ville have medført
at forsikringen ikke var blevet sat i kraft på ny således som det skete ved
endorsement no 2 a. fængslingen betød bl.a. andet at båden var ude af
forsikringstagers kontrol, og at hans muligheder for at vedligeholde den var
væsentligt ændret. efter vidnets opfattelse er der ingen forsikringsgiver der ville
påtage sig risikoen i den situation som forelå for ft i august 2000. også det
forhold at båden var beslaglagt, ville have haft betydning. beslaglæggelse kan
føre til at værdien af det forsikrede formindskes fordi båden kommer ud af
forsikringstagers kontrol.
vidnet bekræftede at den oprindelige forsikringsbegæring (proposal form) er
grundlaget for forsikringen, og den er en standardformular. man accepterer
sædvanligvis en udfyldt proposal form som grundlag for en forsikring indtil den
er to eller tre år gammel. nogle mæglere anvender en renewal quotation form
som grundlag for en fornyelse, andre fornyer uden en sådan, men det ændrer
ikke på forsikringstagerens oplysningspligt
vidnet har været ude for at tegning af en forsikring blev afvist på grund af
oplysninger om bedrageri og smugleri, men han har ikke kendskab sager om
afvisning af forsikringsbegæringer på grund af skattesvig.
                                        - 23 -
det er væsentligt at vide om den forsikrede er dømt for strafbart forhold. vidnet
er hidtil gået ud fra at ft blev dømt fire måneder tidligere end det er oplyst i
dag. det gør naturligvis en forskel om forsikringstageren er dømt eller blot
sigtet. hvis han er sigtet, må han jo anses for ikke skyldig indtil andet viser sig
at være tilfældet.
procedure
fts advokat har gjort gældende at ft over for de sagsøgte forsikringsgivere skal
behandles som forbruger. han har ved den oprindelige forsikringstegning givet
fuldstændige og korrekte oplysninger om alle relevante forhold, såvel hvad
angår den forsikrede båd som sin egen person. han blev ved shrewsburys
overtagelse af forsikringen i 1999 hverken præsenteret for en ny
forsikringsbegæring eller andre spørgsmål fra de sagsøgtes side, og ved
fornyelsen af policen i 2000 krævede shrewsbury kun oplysninger om eventuelle
ændringer i forsikringen.
efter at have opsagt forsikringen den 7. august 2000 opnåede ft tilsagn fra
shrewsbury den 23. august 2000 om genoptagelse af forsikringsdækningen med
virkning fra den 7. samme måned. der blev i den forbindelse ikke blev afkrævet
ft nye erklæringer eller oplysninger. forsikringen blev således videreført i
uændret form. shrewsbury kunne muligvis have krævet at der blev indgået en
ny forsikringsaftale og i den forbindelse afkrævet ft oplysninger af betydning for
forsikringsforholdet, men det gjorde man ikke, og man markerede heller ikke at
tilsagnet om genoptagelse af dækning skulle betragtes som nytegning. af policen
der fortsatte med samme policenummer, fremgår at præmien var uændret, inkl.
rabatten for skadefrit forløb, men intet om at der var tale om en nytegning,
hvilke jo klart viser at der er tale om et vedvarende forhold der midlertidig var
blevet afbrudt. under disse omstændigheder havde ft ikke pligt til af egen drift
at fremkomme med yderligere oplysninger.
hvis det antages at genetableringen af forsikringen i august 2000 må sidestilles
med en nytegning, kan shrewsbury alene unddrage sig dækning hvis det må
antages
a.    at ft undlod at give oplysninger han havde pligt til at afgive,
b.    at disse oplysninger var af væsentlig betydning (”material”) for
      forsikringsgiver, og
c.    at undladelse af at give disse oplysninger var årsag til at shrewsbury
      tegnede en forsikring man ikke ville have tegnet hvis oplysningerne forelå
      (spørgsmålet om ”inducement” eller årsagsforbindelse).
                                         - 24 -
disse betingelser er ikke opfyldt.
fts personlige og skattemæssige forhold i august 2000 var uvæsentlige
(”immaterial”) for forsikringen og for forsikringsgiveren. hans forhold var ikke
ændrede i forhold til tegningen pr. 1. april 1999 og fornyelsen pr. 1. april 2000,
bortset fra at han nu var tiltalt for skattesvig og sad i varetægtsfængsel, men
shrewsburys risiko blev ikke påvirket af disse ændringer. der blev da heller ikke
afkrævet ft nogen som helst oplysninger i forbindelse med genetableringen,
herunder ikke om der var ændringer i forhold til perioden indtil opsigelsen,
bortset fra det selvfølgelige forbehold med hensyn til skade i perioden op til
genetableringen. genetableringen var en rutinesag for shrewsbury således som
det fremgår af de foretagne ekspeditioner. uagtet at den ekspederende fandt
fejltagelsen med bådsalget ”strange”, gjorde man intet for at skaffe nærmere
oplysninger.
det anerkendes at der er en videregående oplysningspligt efter engelsk
forsikringsret end efter dansk forsikringsret, men det er en betingelse for at
eventuelle undladelser kan påberåbes af forsikringsgiver, at de er væsentlige for
forsikringstegningen. shrewsbury har ikke sandsynliggjort at oplysningerne om
sigtelsen og varetægtsfængslingen ville have ført til at selskabet ikke havde
medvirket ved en gentegning. det er ikke forhold der ville få en forsigtig
forsikringsgiver til at undlade at tegne en forsikring af den omhandlede type. der
henvises i denne forbindelse til richard youells erklæring, pkt. 16-18.
hvis det antages at der var en pligt til at give oplysning om sigtelsen og
varetægtsfængslingen, gøres det gældende at meddelelse af disse oplysninger
ikke ville have fået en forsigtig forsikringsgiver til at undlade at tegne. risikoen
ved fartøjet var ikke forøget, ft var i stand til at betale præmie, og han var i
stand til at tage vare på båden. straffesagen bevirkede ikke at hans økonomiske
forhold ikke længere tillod ham at passe på båden. shrewsbury har således ikke
bevist at de manglende oplysninger ved genoptagelsen af forsikringen i august
2000 har formået dem til at tegne eller videreføre en forsikring de ellers ikke
ville have videreført.
over for paul millers forklaring må anføres at den ikke stemmer med youells
vurderinger, og den stemmer heller ikke med selskabets adfærd i forbindelse
med gentegningen. forsikringsgiver foretog sig intet i anledning af anmodningen
om genoptagelse ud over at gennemføre genoptagelsen med det nævnte og for
sagen betydningsløse forbehold. forsikringsgiver har da heller ikke kunnet
                                        - 25 -
angive tidligere tilfælde af skattesvig der har ført til nægtelse af tegning af
forsikring. paul millers forklaring var i øvrigt farvet af den fejlopfattelse som først
blev korrigeret under sidste del af hans forklaring, at ft var dømt på
gentegningstidspunktet. det var han ikke, og som forklaret af miller skulle ft
indtil domfældelse anses for ikke skyldig, også i forsikringsmæssig henseende.
til rentepåstanden bemærkes at den principale påstand er baseret på at
rentetabet er lidt i danmark og derfor bør følge sædvanlige danske regler. den
subsidiære rentepåstand er baseret på oplysninger om hvad der er normal
praksis i engelske retssager hvor udgangspunktet er den såkaldte ”base rate”,
hyppigt med tillæg af 1, 2, 3 eller 4 procent, afhængigt af parternes forhold. til
belysning af ”base rate” henvises til den fremlagte oversigt:
                 2000          13 jan             5,75
                               10 feb             6,00
                 2001            8 feb            5,75
                                 5 apr            5,50
                               10 may             5,25
                                 2 aug            5,00
                               18 sep             4,75
                                 4 oct            4,50
                                 8 nov            4,00
                 2003            6 feb            3,75
                 2003          10 jul              3,5
                                 6 nov            3,75
                 2004            5 feb               4
                                 6 may            4,25
                               10  jun             4,5
                                 5 aug            4,75
shrewsburys advokat har anført at ft opsagde forsikringen pr. 7. august 2000.
shrewsbury udstedte kreditnota som følge af opsigelsen. ft anmodede om
gentegning af forsikringen den 17. august 2000. fts forsikring var derfor opsagt
i perioden fra den 7. til den 17. august 2000, og det var en reel opsigelse. fts
anmodning om gentegning (genoptagelse) af forsikringen skal sidestilles med
tegning af en ny forsikring, idet shrewsbury frit kunne vælge om man ville
gentegne forsikringen og i givet fald på hvilke vilkår. det er uden betydning om
shrewsbury benyttede sig af sin ret til at afvise tegning af forsikringen eller
betingede forsikringstegning af ændrede forsikringsvilkår, ligesom det er uden
                                         - 26 -
betydning at forsikringen blev gentegnet med tilbagevirkende kraft til den 7.
august 2000.
ft var derfor forpligtet til på ny at give shrewsbury de oplysninger som han også
afgav i forbindelse med den oprindelige tegning af forsikringen, og oplyse om der
var ændringer heri i forhold til de tidligere afgivne oplysninger. han var
underlagt fuld oplysningspligt, herunder om oplysning om at han havde været
varetægtsfængslet og sigtet for groft skattesvig siden 22. maj 2000, og at
lystbåden var eller havde været beslaglagt af politiet.
fts forpligtelse til at afgive sådanne oplysninger bestod uafhængigt af om
shrewsbury anmodede om specifikke oplysninger. som forsikringstager har han
ansvaret for at shrewsbury modtog alle relevante oplysninger, og at disse
oplysninger var opdaterede.
hans undladelse af at opfylde sin oplysningspligt udgjorde ”non-disclosure” som
berettigede shrewsbury til at afvise forsikringsdækning.
såfremt det antages at anmodningen om gentegning (genoptagelse) af
forsikringen ikke skal sidestilles med tegning af en ny forsikring, men må anses
for en videreførelse af forsikringen, gøres det gældende at ft under alle
omstændigheder og uanset om der var tale om tegning af en ny forsikring,
gentegning eller fornyelse af en forsikring, var forpligtet til at oplyse om forhold
som i henhold til engelsk ret anses for ”material”, jf. michael cranes responsum
pkt. 49. undladelse af at afgive sådanne oplysninger udgjorde ”non-disclosure”,
og shrewsbury er derfor berettiget til at afvise forsikringsdækning.
om en undladt oplysning er væsentlig, afhænger af om en ”prudent underwriter”
ville have ladet sin vurdering af hvorvidt forsikring kunne antages og på hvilke
vilkår påvirke af oplysningerne. oplysningerne om at ft, da forsikringen blev
opsagt og anmodning om genoptagelse fremkom, havde været
varetægtsfængslet siden 22. maj 2000 og sigtet for groft skattesvig, samt at
lystbåden var eller havde været beslaglagt af politiet, var oplysninger som ville
have haft betydning for en ”prudent underwriters” vurdering af
forsikringsrisikoen og dermed af om forsikring kunne tegnes på ny. disse
oplysninger må således karakteriseres som ”material”, jf. richard youells første
erklæring pkt. 15–18. der henvises endvidere til votum afgivet af fisher j. i
sagen gates v. sun alliance insurance ltd [1995] lrlr 385, jf. pkt. 33 i michael
crane erklæring:
                                        - 27 -
”a prudent insurer would wish to know about anything which would increase the
risk associated with the proposed insurance contract. i accept that anything,
which increases the likelihood that a proposed insured will later make a
fraudulent claim on his or her policy is logically capable of being material for
present purposes. …. the most reliable guide to moral character is past conduct.
if the proposed insured has acted fraudulently in the past, this will be logically
relevant to the risk that he or she will do so again in the future. in principle,
therefore, i accept that incidents of prior dishonesty of the part of a proposed
insured are capable of being material for present purposes.”
det er uden betydning for sagen om ft er forbruger.
overfor fts rentepåstande gøres det gældende at rente først kan tillægges efter
udløbet af en vis periode hvori shrewsbury har haft lejlighed til at undersøge
kravet om forsikringsdækning. dette tidspunkt kan tidligst fastsættes til 3
måneder efter anmeldelsen af skaden, dvs. til den 24. december 2000. rente
ikke skal beregnes i henhold til den danske rentelov, men med ”base rate” plus
1% således som det i engelsk ret er sædvanligt for forsikringskrav. shrewsbury
henviser herved til følgende: “the commercial rate is commonly used in
commercial cases, including claims on bills of exchange. the practice of the
commercial court is to award interest at a base rate plus one per cent. …
shearson lehman hutton inc. v. maclaine watson & co. ltd (no.2) [1990] 3 all
e.r. 723”.
rettens afgørelse
det fremgår af michael cranes responsum at der ved sagens afgørelse som det
første skal tages stilling til om endorsement no a 2 indebar en udstedelse af en
ny police eller en fornyelse/ændring (”variation”) af en police. problemstillingen
er beskrevet således af michael crane:
“52. the scope of the duties owed by mr ft in august 2000 depends upon
whether the reinstatement of cover constituted a new agreement or a variation
of the policy. the extent of the duties owed is a question of law to be determined
on the principles which i have set out above.
53. i have previously described the approach to be taken in determining
whether, as a matter of principle, the non-disclosures were material, and how,
as a matter of principle, the scope of disclosure would vary depending on the
court’s decision as to whether the agreement in august 2000 varied a subsisting
                                         - 28 -
contract or amounted to an agreement for a fresh contract for the unexpired
term incepting on 7th august 2000.
54. whether the non-disclosures actually induced [shrewsbury] to reinstate
cover on the relevant terms is a question of fact, to be decided on the basis of
the evidence of the witnesses of fact and any pertinent documentation”.
forsikringen blev senest fornyet ved police dateret den 13. marts 2000 ved
police nr. m/00/03573. den årlige præmie var 1.150 gbp med fradrag af 5%
bonus for skadefrit forløb.
ved faxbrev af 7. august 2000 til sin forsikringsmægler anmodede
forsikringstager om at police nr. 03573 blev bragt til ophør på grund af salg af
den forsikrede genstand. forsikringsmægleren viderebragte anmodningen ved
faxbrev af 8. august 2000. anmodningen blev imødekommet uden undersøgelser
eller forespørgsler således som det fremgår af påtegningen på sidstnævnte brev
og af tillægget af 8. august 2000 til forsikringspolicen (endorsement no a 1).
der blev endvidere udstedt kreditnota for den resterende forsikringsperiode fra
den 7. august 2000 til den 1. april 2001. ristornoen udgjorde 746,71 gbp med
fradrag af mæglerhonorar på 149,34 gbp.
ved faxbrev af 16. august 2000 meddelte forsikringstager at ophævelsen
beroede på en fejl fra forsikringstagers side, og anmodede om at forsikringen
blev fortsat (”please continue the assurance”). denne anmodning blev straks
videregivet til forsikringsgiver der med det samme og tilsyneladende uden
nærmere overvejelser accepterede dette, således som det fremgår af
påtegningen af 17. august 2000 på telefaxen fra mægleren. fortsættelsen af
forsikringen der skete på samme policenummer, blev alene betinget af at der
ikke var kendte eller oplyste skader på båden i tiden indtil den 17. august 2000.
i overensstemmelse hermed blev udstedt et tillæg til policen (endorsement no a
2) i henhold til hvilket forsikringen blev sat i kraft igen (”reinstated”) med
virkning fra den 7. august 2000 med betingelse som anført (”subject to no
known or reported losses @ 17/08/2000”). præmien for perioden fra den 7.
august 2000 til den 1. april 2001 var i henhold til tillægget 746,71 gbp med
fradrag af bonus på 5% for skadefrit forløb. ligesom på tillæg nr. 1 var på dette
tillæg anført: ”all other terms, clauses and conditions remain unaltered”. der
blev ikke rettet forespørgsel til forsikringstageren i forbindelse med dette forløb.
det må på dette grundlag fastslås at det var parternes hensigt at
forsikringspolicen ved tillæg nr. 2 skulle sættes i kraft på ny. dette kan
                                        - 29 -
beskrives som en ”variation”, jf. afsnit 52 i michael cranes erklæring, men
må snarere, da forsikringen hvad angår den forsikrede genstand,
forsikringssummen, præmie eller andre forhold ikke undergik nogen
ændringer, betegnes som en ”reinstatement” eller en genetablering af det
afbrudte forsikringsforhold. der blev således ikke indgået en ny
forsikringsaftale. forsikringstageren havde derfor ikke pligt til at afgive
oplysninger til forsikringsgiver som nævnt i marine insurance act section 18,
og forsikringsgiver var derfor ikke berettiget til at nægte dækning efter
forsikringspolicen.
retten må herefter tage stilling til om ft har opfyldt pligten til højeste grad
af loyalitet (”the utmost good faith”) der følger af bestemmelsen i section 17.
i sommeren 2000 under fts varetægtsfængsling lå fartøjet i vedbæk havn i
nærheden af ejerens bopæl indtil det den 7. august 2000 hvor fartøjet i
forbindelse med salgsbestræbelser blev bragt til ishøj havn hvor det lå indtil det
blev ødelagt ved brand omkring kl. 3 den 19. september 2000. der foreligger
ikke oplysninger om omstændigheder der gør det antageligt at fartøjet i den
forbindelse var udsat for risikoforøgelse der kunne få betydning for
forsikringsforholdet. fartøjet der henlå ubenyttet i havnen, var fortsat under
opsyn, og forsikringstageren var fortsat i stand til at betale omkostninger i
forbindelse med fartøjet.
bestemmelsen i section 17 kan derfor heller ikke føre til at nægtelse af
dækning er berettiget, da der som anført i forbindelse med straffesagen og
bådens flytning ikke opstod nogen relevant fareforøgelse.
shrewsbury skal derfor betale ft 150.000 gbp.
da forsikringsforholdet er underlagt engelsk ret, kan der ikke tilkendes renter
efter den danske rentelov eller den danske forsikringsaftalelov. betaling i
forsikringsforhold er ikke omfattet af den almindelige engelske (britiske)
rentelov, late payment of commercial debts (interest) act 1998. ved
forsinket betaling af erstatning tillægges efter de foreliggende oplysninger i
sådanne tilfælde rente med en sats svarende til bank of englands base rate
med et tillæg på 1, 2 eller 3% afhængig af forholdene. retten finder efter de
tilvejebragte oplysninger om praksis at tillægget til base rate i fts tilfælde
passende kan sættes til 2%. der er mellem parterne enighed om at base
rate i denne sag skal være repo renten som fremgår af den tilvejebragte
                                       - 30 -
oversigt fra bank of englands ”changes in bank rate, minimum lending rate,
minimum band 1 dealing rate and repo rate”.
da de oplysninger der var nødvendige til at fastslå at betingelserne for
betaling af erstatning var opfyldt, har foreligget kort efter anmeldelsen, bør
der tillægges rente fra den 24. oktober 2000.
                              thi kendes for ret:
inden 14 dage efter denne dom skal shrewsbury underwriting capital limited
til ft betale 150.000 gbp med rente svarende til den engelske base rate med
et tillæg på 2% fra den 24. oktober 2000 samt 150.000 kr. i
sagsomkostninger.
    ejgil kromann                  jens feilberg                  helle lehmann
                                       (sign.)
                                    ___ ___ ___
                         udskriftens rigtighed bekræftes
                         p.j.v. sø- og handelsretten, den
