▁have ▁been ▁difficult ▁to ▁correct ▁if ▁the ▁attack ▁on ▁that ▁fl ank ▁had ▁been ▁vig or ously ▁carried ▁out . ▁They ▁had ▁also ▁left ▁Amsterdam ▁und ef ended ▁on ▁the ▁only ▁side ▁by ▁which ▁it ▁was ▁accessible . ▁ ▁The ▁plan ▁of ▁operations ▁was ▁as ▁follows : ▁The ▁left ▁column ▁was ▁to ▁turn ▁the ▁enemy ' s ▁right , ▁on ▁the ▁Zu ider ze e ; ▁the ▁right ▁was ▁to ▁drive ▁the ▁enemy ▁from ▁the ▁height s ▁of ▁Cam per du in , ▁and ▁to ▁se ize ▁Ber gen ; ▁the ▁right - cent re ▁had ▁to ▁force ▁the ▁position ▁at ▁War men hu izen ▁and ▁Sch o orld am , ▁and ▁to ▁co oper ate ▁with ▁the ▁right ▁column ; ▁while ▁the ▁left - cent re ▁had ▁to ▁obtain ▁possession ▁of ▁O ud kar sp el , ▁on ▁the ▁main ▁road ▁leading ▁to ▁Al k ma ar . ▁ ▁The ▁enemy ' s ▁left ▁was ▁advantage ously ▁posted ▁on ▁the ▁high ▁sand ▁hills ▁which ▁extend ▁from ▁the ▁sea , ▁in ▁front ▁of ▁Pet ten , ▁to ▁the ▁town ▁of ▁Ber gen . ▁The ▁ground ▁over ▁which ▁the ▁centre ▁columns ▁had ▁to ▁move ▁was ▁inter se cted ▁every ▁three ▁or ▁four ▁hundred ▁yards ▁by ▁broad , ▁deep , ▁wet ▁d itch es ▁and ▁can als . ▁The ▁brid ges ▁across ▁the ▁few ▁roads ▁leading ▁to ▁the ▁points ▁of ▁attack ▁were ▁destroyed , ▁and ▁obst acles ▁had ▁been ▁carefully ▁arranged . ▁ ▁Action ▁▁ ▁Con tr ary ▁to ▁all ▁reasonable ▁expect ations , ▁the