▁last ▁year ▁this ▁situation ▁was ▁being ▁review ed , ▁but ▁the ▁State ▁Department ▁seemed ▁compla cent ▁and ▁willing ▁to ▁rely ▁on ▁the ▁sh ah ' s ▁sol ilo qu ies ▁and ▁its ▁own ▁diplom atic ▁queries . Y et ▁" coded ▁confident ial ▁tele gram s " ▁between ▁the ▁sh ah ▁and ▁the ▁Iran ian ▁emb ass y ▁in ▁Washington ▁were ▁" regular ly ▁intercept ed " ▁and ▁read ▁by ▁the ▁US G . ▁Mil ani , ▁The ▁Shah ▁( Har vard ▁ 2 0 0 8 , ▁ 2 0 1 0 ) ▁p . ▁ 3 7 0 . ▁While ▁Hel ms ' ▁' not orious ' ▁connection ▁to ▁the ▁C IA ▁might ▁have ▁been ▁considered ▁an ▁asset ▁by ▁the ▁sh ah ▁and ▁his ▁circle , ▁many ▁Iran ians ▁viewed ▁the ▁American ▁emb ass y ▁and ▁its ▁sp y ▁Agency ▁as ▁dist ress ing ▁rem ind ers ▁of ▁active ▁foreign ▁med d ling ▁in ▁their ▁country ' s ▁affairs , ▁and ▁of ▁the ▁C IA ' s ▁ 1 9 5 3 ▁coup ▁against ▁the ▁civil ▁dem ocrat ▁Moh amm ad ▁M oss ade gh . We iner ▁( 2 0 0 7 ) ▁p . ▁ 3 6 8 . See ▁above ▁section ▁" I ran : ▁M oss ade gh " ▁for ▁the ▁coup ▁and ▁for ▁Hel ms ' ▁ref lections ▁on ▁the ▁C IA ▁and ▁the ▁subsequent ▁Islam ic ▁revolution ▁in ▁Iran . ▁"[ F ] ew ▁polit ically ▁mind ed ▁Iran ians ▁doubt ed ▁that ▁the ▁American