) ▁have ▁provided ▁empir ical ▁support ▁for ▁the ▁theory . ▁Several ▁further ▁models ▁have ▁been ▁developed ▁which ▁study ▁variants ▁of ▁this ▁setup . ▁For ▁instance , ▁when ▁the ▁agent ▁has ▁not ▁gathered ▁information ▁at ▁the ▁out set , ▁does ▁it ▁make ▁a ▁difference ▁whether ▁or ▁not ▁he ▁lear ns ▁the ▁information ▁later ▁on , ▁before ▁production ▁starts ? ▁What ▁happens ▁if ▁the ▁information ▁can ▁be ▁gathered ▁already ▁before ▁a ▁contract ▁is ▁offered ? ▁What ▁happens ▁if ▁the ▁principal ▁obser ves ▁the ▁agent ’ s ▁decision ▁to ▁ac quire ▁information ? ▁Finally , ▁the ▁theory ▁has ▁been ▁applied ▁in ▁several ▁context s ▁such ▁as ▁public - private ▁partners hips ▁and ▁vertical ▁integration . ▁ ▁S ources ▁of ▁information ▁asym met ry ▁Information ▁asym met ry ▁within ▁soci eties ▁can ▁be ▁created ▁and ▁maintained ▁in ▁several ▁ways . ▁First ly , ▁media ▁out lets , ▁due ▁to ▁their ▁ownership ▁structure ▁or ▁political ▁influ ences , ▁may ▁fail ▁to ▁dis sem inate ▁certain ▁view points ▁or ▁choose ▁to ▁eng age ▁in ▁propag anda ▁campaign s . ▁Furthermore , ▁an ▁educational ▁system ▁re lying ▁on ▁substantial ▁tu ition ▁fe es ▁can ▁generate ▁information ▁im bal ances ▁between ▁the ▁poor ▁and ▁the ▁aff lu ent . ▁Im bal ances ▁can ▁also ▁be ▁fort ified ▁by ▁certain ▁organiz ational ▁and ▁legal ▁measures , ▁such ▁as ▁document ▁classification ▁procedures ▁or ▁non - dis closure ▁cla uses . ▁Ex clus ive ▁information ▁networks ▁that ▁are ▁oper ational ▁around ▁the ▁world ▁further ▁contribute ▁to ▁the ▁asym met ry . ▁Last ly ,