▁European ▁and ▁Chinese ▁banks . ▁Second ary ▁san ctions : ▁Imp ose ▁san ctions ▁on ▁North ▁Korea ' s ▁partners , ▁" th us ▁present ing ▁them ▁with ▁a ▁strong ▁economic ▁dis in cent ive : ▁Either ▁continue ▁to ▁do ▁business ▁with ▁North ▁Korea ▁and ▁be ▁blocked ▁out ▁of ▁the ▁U . S . ▁financial ▁system ▁or ▁stop ▁all ▁business ▁with ▁North ▁Korea ▁and ▁continue ▁to ▁have ▁access ▁to ▁the ▁U . S . ▁financial ▁system ," ▁Public ly ▁identify ▁and ▁san ction ▁all ▁foreign ▁companies , ▁financial ▁institutions , ▁and ▁govern ments ▁assist ing ▁North ▁Korea ' s ▁nuclear ▁and ▁miss ile ▁programs . ▁This ▁cru cially ▁includes ▁" lev ying ▁he fty ▁fin es ▁on ▁the ▁Chinese ▁banks ▁that , ▁unw itting ly ▁or ▁otherwise , ▁la under ▁money ▁for ▁Py ong y ang ▁and ▁facil itate ▁doll ar ▁transactions ▁on ▁beh alf ▁of ▁North ▁Korean ▁entities ." ▁ ▁As ▁a ▁reference ▁point ▁on ▁strength ▁and ▁duration ▁of ▁san ctions , ▁Lee ▁remarks ▁that ▁it ▁took ▁several ▁years ▁for ▁a ▁combination ▁of ▁direct ▁and ▁secondary ▁san ctions ▁to ▁bring ▁Iran ▁back ▁to ▁the ▁b arg aining ▁table . ▁Moreover , ▁contrary ▁to ▁popular ▁belief , ▁san ctions ▁on ▁North ▁Korea ▁are ▁not ▁" max ed ▁out "; ▁rather , ▁until ▁the ▁san ctions ▁im posed ▁by ▁the ▁U . S . ▁in ▁ 2 0 1 6 , ▁American ▁san ctions ▁against ▁North ▁Korea ▁were ▁much ▁we aker ▁than ▁those ▁applied ▁to ▁Iran , ▁Sy ria , ▁or ▁Bur ma ,