▁the ▁other ▁European ▁powers . ▁ ▁Britain ▁was ▁labor ing ▁under ▁a ▁sense ▁of ▁loss ▁of ▁control , ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁loss ▁of ▁mark ets , ▁and ▁was ▁wor ried ▁by ▁Napoleon ' s ▁possible ▁threat ▁to ▁its ▁over se as ▁colon ies . ▁Mc L yn n ▁arg ues ▁that ▁Britain ▁went ▁to ▁war ▁in ▁ 1 8 0 3 ▁out ▁of ▁a ▁" mi xture ▁of ▁economic ▁mot ives ▁and ▁national ▁neu ros es ▁– ▁an ▁ir r ational ▁anx iety ▁about ▁Napoleon ' s ▁mot ives ▁and ▁intent ions ." ▁ ▁However , ▁it ▁proved ▁to ▁be ▁the ▁right ▁choice ▁for ▁Britain , ▁because ▁in ▁the ▁long ▁run ▁Napoleon ’ s ▁intent ions ▁were ▁host ile ▁to ▁British ▁national ▁interests . ▁ ▁Furthermore , ▁Napoleon ▁was ▁not ▁ready ▁for ▁war , ▁and ▁it ▁was ▁the ▁best ▁time ▁for ▁Britain ▁to ▁try ▁to ▁stop ▁him . ▁ ▁Britain ▁therefore ▁seized ▁upon ▁the ▁Mal ta ▁issue ▁by ▁ref using ▁to ▁follow ▁the ▁terms ▁of ▁the ▁Tre aty ▁of ▁Am iens ▁that ▁required ▁its ▁ev acu ation ▁of ▁the ▁island . ▁ ▁Sch ro eder ▁says ▁that ▁most ▁histor ians ▁agree ▁that ▁Napoleon ' s ▁" det erm ination ▁to ▁exclude ▁Britain ▁from ▁the ▁Cont inent ▁now , ▁and ▁bring ▁it ▁to ▁its ▁kne es ▁in ▁the ▁future , ▁made ▁war ... ine v itable ." ▁The ▁British ▁government ▁b alk ed ▁at ▁implementing ▁certain ▁terms ▁of ▁the ▁treat y , ▁such ▁as ▁ev acu ating ▁their ▁naval ▁presence ▁from ▁Mal ta .