▁b arg aining ▁problem ▁and ▁non co oper ative ▁games ▁can ▁generate ▁a ▁unique ▁equilibrium ▁solution . ▁Non co oper ative ▁game ▁theory ▁has ▁been ▁adopted ▁as ▁a ▁fundamental ▁aspect ▁of ▁ ▁experimental ▁econom ics , ▁behavior al ▁econom ics , ▁information ▁econom ics , ▁industrial ▁organization , ▁and ▁ ▁political ▁economy . ▁It ▁has ▁also ▁given ▁rise ▁to ▁the ▁subject ▁of ▁mechanism ▁design ▁( s ometimes ▁called ▁reverse ▁game ▁theory ), ▁which ▁has ▁private ▁and ▁public - policy ▁applications ▁as ▁to ▁ways ▁of ▁impro ving ▁economic ▁efficiency ▁through ▁in cent ives ▁for ▁information ▁sharing . ▁ ▁In ▁ 1 9 9 4 , ▁Nash , ▁John ▁H ars any i , ▁and ▁Rein hard ▁Sel ten ▁received ▁the ▁Nobel ▁Memorial ▁Prize ▁in ▁Econom ic ▁Sciences ▁their ▁work ▁on ▁non – co oper ative ▁games . ▁H ars any i ▁and ▁Sel ten ▁were ▁awarded ▁for ▁their ▁work ▁on ▁repeated ▁games . ▁Later ▁work ▁extended ▁their ▁results ▁to ▁computational ▁methods ▁of ▁model ing . ▁ ▁Agent - based ▁computational ▁econom ics ▁ ▁Agent - based ▁computational ▁econom ics ▁( ACE ) ▁as ▁a ▁named ▁field ▁is ▁relatively ▁recent , ▁d ating ▁from ▁about ▁the ▁ 1 9 9 0 s ▁as ▁to ▁published ▁work . ▁It ▁studies ▁economic ▁processes , ▁including ▁whole ▁econom ies , ▁as ▁dynamic ▁systems ▁of ▁interact ing ▁agents ▁over ▁time . ▁As ▁such , ▁it ▁falls ▁in ▁the ▁parad ig m ▁of ▁complex ▁adapt ive ▁systems . ▁In ▁corresponding ▁agent - based ▁models , ▁agents ▁are ▁not ▁real ▁people