▁lay man , ▁and ▁would ▁probably ▁do ▁so ▁in ▁practice . ▁The ▁fact ▁remained , ▁however , ▁that ▁there ▁was ▁no ▁express ▁oblig ation ▁on ▁the ▁magistr ate ▁to ▁do ▁so . ▁ ▁It ▁was ▁hardly ▁def ens ible ▁to ▁treat ▁a ▁civil - jud gment ▁deb tor ▁more ▁har sh ly ▁than ▁a ▁criminal . ▁The ▁latter ▁was ▁entitled ▁in ▁terms ▁of ▁section ▁ 2 5 ( 3 ) ▁of ▁the ▁Constitution ▁to ▁a ▁fair ▁trial ▁with ▁proced ural ▁saf egu ards , ▁including ▁the ▁right ▁to ▁legal ▁assistance ▁at ▁public ▁exp ense ▁if ▁justice ▁so ▁required . ▁The ▁deb t ors , ▁who ▁faced ▁months ▁of ▁imprison ment , ▁must ▁f end ▁for ▁themselves ▁as ▁best ▁they ▁could . ▁ ▁The ▁procedure ▁made ▁no ▁provision ▁for ▁rec ourse ▁by ▁the ▁deb tor ▁to ▁the ▁magistr ate ▁or ▁higher ▁authority ▁once ▁an ▁order ▁for ▁comm itt al ▁had ▁been ▁made . ▁Section ▁ 6 5 L , ▁which ▁de alt ▁with ▁the ▁release ▁of ▁a ▁deb tor ▁from ▁prison , ▁contained ▁no ▁mechanism ▁where by ▁a ▁deb tor , ▁even ▁one ▁against ▁whom ▁a ▁comm itt al ▁order ▁had ▁been ▁made ▁in ▁absent ia , ▁was ▁entitled ▁to ▁approach ▁a ▁court ▁for ▁relief . ▁As ▁a ▁result ▁of ▁these ▁defect s , ▁the ▁stat ute ▁swe pt ▁up ▁those ▁who ▁could ▁not ▁pay ▁with ▁those ▁who ▁could ▁but ▁simply ▁would ▁not . ▁For ▁this ▁reason , ▁the ▁limitation ▁could ▁not ▁be ▁just ified ▁as ▁reasonable , ▁as ▁required ▁by ▁section ▁ 3