▁D iem ▁una ware ▁that ▁III ▁Corps ▁commander ▁T ô n ▁Th ấ t ▁ Đ ín h ▁was ▁with ▁the ▁reb els . ▁ Đ ín h ▁then ▁placed ▁a ▁re bel ▁sub ordinate ▁in ▁command ▁of ▁the ▁Se vent h ▁Division , ▁prevent ing ▁the ▁rest ▁of ▁C ao ' s ▁IV ▁Corps ▁from ▁saving ▁D iem . ▁ ▁By ▁the ▁end ▁of ▁ 1 9 6 5 ▁the ▁US ▁advis ers ▁to ▁the ▁Division ▁regarded ▁Division ▁commander ▁Col . ▁N gu y ễ n ▁Vi ế t ▁Th anh ▁as ▁an ▁ag gress ive ▁commander ▁who ▁demanded ▁" clear , ▁correct ▁and ▁fran k " ▁reports ▁from ▁his ▁sub ordinates ▁and ▁who ▁had ▁a ▁" sound ▁tact ical ▁sense ▁of ▁the ▁war ." ▁ ▁In ▁ 1 9 6 7 ▁Civil ▁Oper ations ▁and ▁Revolution ary ▁Development ▁Support ▁( C OR DS ) ▁advis ers ▁found ▁the ▁Division ' s ▁batt al ions ▁charged ▁with ▁area ▁security ▁miss ions ▁were ▁more ▁concerned ▁with ▁their ▁own ▁static ▁def enses ▁than ▁with ▁protect ing ▁nearby ▁villages ▁and ▁ham lets ▁or ▁with ▁ch asing ▁the ▁local ▁V C . ▁Ass ess ing ▁General ▁Th anh ▁they ▁found ▁that ▁" his ▁personal ▁c aut ious ness ▁and ▁rel uct ance ▁to ▁push ▁the ▁batt al ions ▁[ th ose ▁in ▁se cur ing ▁miss ions ] ▁into ▁more ▁off ensive ▁activities ... ▁difficult ▁to ▁understand ," ▁claim ing ▁that ▁he ▁disc ou rag ed ▁the ▁initi ative ▁and ▁ag gress iveness ▁of ▁his ▁sub