▁Bureau ▁of ▁Int elligence ▁and ▁Research ▁at ▁the ▁United ▁States ▁State ▁Department . ▁While ▁the ▁C IA ▁might ▁agree ▁on ▁its ▁own ▁Est im ates , ▁other ▁department ▁reports ▁might ▁disag ree , ▁causing ▁difficulties , ▁and ▁making ▁inter - ag ency ▁conc ord ▁problem atic . ▁The ▁process ▁of ▁reaching ▁the ▁final ▁cons ensus ▁could ▁become ▁a ▁content ious ▁neg ot iation . ▁ ▁In ▁ 1 9 6 5 , ▁Johnson ▁had ▁substantial ly ▁es cal ated ▁the ▁war ; ▁he ▁sent ▁large ▁numbers ▁of ▁American ▁combat ▁troops ▁to ▁fight ▁in ▁South ▁Vietnam , ▁and ▁ordered ▁war plan es ▁to ▁bomb ▁the ▁North . ▁Non eth eless , ▁the ▁military ▁put ▁st iff ▁pressure ▁on ▁him ▁to ▁es cal ate ▁further . ▁In ▁the ▁" paper ▁wars " ▁that ▁followed , ▁Hel ms ▁at ▁C IA ▁was ▁regularly ▁asked ▁for ▁intelligence ▁reports ▁on ▁military ▁action , ▁e . g ., ▁the ▁political ▁effect iveness ▁of ▁bomb ing ▁H ano i . ▁The ▁military ▁res ented ▁such ▁review ▁of ▁its ▁conduct ▁of ▁the ▁war . ▁ ▁The ▁American ▁strategy ▁had ▁become ▁the ▁purs uit ▁of ▁a ▁war ▁of ▁attr ition . ▁The ▁objective ▁was ▁to ▁make ▁the ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁enemy ▁suffer ▁more ▁losses ▁than ▁it ▁could ▁tim ely ▁replace . ▁According ly , ▁the ▁number ▁of ▁combat ants ▁field ed ▁by ▁the ▁commun ist ▁ins ur gency ▁at ▁any ▁one ▁time ▁was ▁a ▁key ▁factor ▁in ▁determ ining ▁whether ▁the ▁course ▁of ▁the ▁war ▁was ▁favor able ▁or ▁not . ▁The