ress ▁of ▁disc rim ination . ▁ ▁Sub st ant ial ly , ▁the ▁human ▁dign ity ▁test ▁has ▁been ▁widely ▁critic ized ▁on ▁the ▁grounds ▁that ▁it ▁sets ▁a ▁dangerous ▁preced ent ▁for ▁section ▁ 1 5 ▁equality ▁claims ▁because ▁its ▁vague ▁nature ▁does ▁not ▁l end ▁itself ▁well ▁to ▁consistent ▁and ▁compreh ens ible ▁application ▁by ▁the ▁Court ▁in ▁the ▁future , ▁and ▁because ▁it ▁puts ▁forth ▁a ▁conception ▁of ▁equality ▁that ▁is ▁formal ▁rather ▁than ▁substant ive . ▁One ▁scholar ▁writes ▁that ▁"[ t ] he ▁Cour ts ' ▁mud d led ▁and ▁incons istent ▁application ▁of ▁human ▁dign ity ▁suggests ▁that ▁it ▁should ▁be ▁exc ised ▁from ▁Char ter ▁disc ourse ▁altogether ". ▁ ▁In ▁attempting ▁to ▁address ▁these ▁concerns ▁and ▁on ▁the ▁he els ▁of ▁the ▁controvers ial ▁Law ▁decision , ▁sch ol ars ▁proposed ▁various ▁alternatives ▁to ▁the ▁human ▁dign ity ▁test . ▁It ▁was ▁widely ▁accepted ▁that ▁the ▁section ▁ 1 5 ▁claims ▁were ▁in ade qu ately ▁addressed ▁using ▁the ▁previous ▁form ulations ▁following ▁Andrew s , ▁yet ▁the ▁Court ' s ▁decision ▁in ▁Law ▁was ▁seen ▁as ▁in ade qu ately ▁address ing ▁these ▁concerns . ▁One ▁writer ▁argued ▁the ▁Court ▁should ▁replace ▁the ▁human ▁dign ity ▁test ▁with ▁a ▁" re form ulated ▁grounds ▁approach ▁focused ▁on ▁human ▁vulner ability ▁and ▁concrete ▁human ▁interests " ▁that ▁would ▁be ▁focused ▁on ▁individual ▁and ▁group ▁vulner ability ▁and ▁which ▁would ▁take ▁into ▁account ▁of ▁a ▁variety ▁of ▁factors , ▁including ▁the ▁four ▁enumer ated ▁context