▁of ▁dollars ▁to ▁opposition ▁groups , ▁e . g ., ▁political ▁parties , ▁the ▁media , ▁and ▁striking ▁tr uck ▁drivers , ▁in ▁a ▁continu ing , ▁long - term ▁effort ▁to ▁dest abil ize ▁Chile ' s ▁economy ▁and ▁so ▁sub vert ▁the ▁All ende ▁administration . ▁N ixon ' s ▁initial , ▁memor able ▁phrase ▁for ▁such ▁actions ▁had ▁been ▁" to ▁make ▁the ▁Chile an ▁economy ▁sc ream ". ▁Even ▁so , ▁according ▁to ▁D CI ▁Hel ms , ▁" In ▁my ▁remaining ▁months ▁in ▁office , ▁All ende ▁continued ▁his ▁determined ▁march ▁to ▁the ▁left , ▁but ▁there ▁was ▁no ▁further ▁effort ▁to ▁inst ig ate ▁a ▁coup ▁in ▁Chile ." ▁Hel ms ▁here ▁appears ▁to ▁parse ▁between ▁providing ▁funds ▁for ▁All ende ' s ▁political ▁opposition ▁(" track ▁I ") ▁versus ▁actually ▁supporting ▁a ▁military ▁over throw ▁(" track ▁II "). ▁Although ▁in ▁policy ▁disag re ement ▁with ▁N ixon , ▁Hel ms ▁assumed ▁the ▁role ▁of ▁the ▁" good ▁soldier " ▁in ▁following ▁his ▁president ial ▁instructions . ▁Hel ms ▁left ▁office ▁at ▁the ▁C IA ▁on ▁February ▁ 2 , ▁ 1 9 7 3 , ▁seven ▁months ▁before ▁the ▁coup ▁d ' et at ▁in ▁Chile . ▁ ▁Another ▁account ▁of ▁C IA ▁activity ▁in ▁Chile , ▁however , ▁states ▁that ▁during ▁this ▁period ▁ 1 9 7 0 – 1 9 7 3 ▁the ▁C IA ▁worked ▁dil ig ently ▁to ▁propag and ize ▁the ▁military ▁into ▁count en ancing ▁a ▁coup , ▁e