▁intended ▁to ▁be ▁ready ▁for ▁a ▁German ▁off ensive ▁in ▁Lor raine ▁or ▁through ▁Belg ium . ▁It ▁was ▁anticip ated ▁that ▁the ▁Germ ans ▁would ▁use ▁reserve ▁troops ▁but ▁also ▁expected ▁that ▁a ▁large ▁German ▁army ▁would ▁be ▁mobil ised ▁on ▁the ▁border ▁with ▁Russia , ▁leaving ▁the ▁western ▁army ▁with ▁sufficient ▁troops ▁only ▁to ▁advance ▁through ▁Belg ium ▁south ▁of ▁the ▁Me use ▁and ▁the ▁Sam bre ▁rivers . ▁French ▁intelligence ▁had ▁obtained ▁a ▁map ▁exercise ▁of ▁the ▁German ▁general ▁staff ▁of ▁ 1 9 0 5 , ▁in ▁which ▁German ▁troops ▁had ▁gone ▁no ▁further ▁north ▁than ▁Nam ur ▁and ▁assumed ▁that ▁plans ▁to ▁bes ie ge ▁Belg ian ▁for ts ▁were ▁a ▁def ensive ▁measure ▁against ▁the ▁Belg ian ▁army . ▁ ▁A ▁German ▁attack ▁from ▁south - e astern ▁Belg ium ▁towards ▁Mé zi ères ▁and ▁a ▁possible ▁off ensive ▁from ▁Lor raine ▁towards ▁Verd un , ▁Nancy ▁and ▁St . ▁Di é ▁was ▁anticip ated ; ▁the ▁plan ▁was ▁an ▁evolution ▁from ▁Plan ▁XVI ▁and ▁made ▁more ▁provision ▁for ▁the ▁possibility ▁of ▁a ▁German ▁off ensive ▁through ▁Belg ium . ▁The ▁First , ▁Second ▁and ▁Third ▁arm ies ▁were ▁to ▁concent rate ▁between ▁É p inal ▁and ▁Verd un ▁opposite ▁Als ace ▁and ▁Lor raine , ▁the ▁Fif th ▁Army ▁was ▁to ▁assemble ▁from ▁Mont m éd y ▁to ▁Sed an ▁and ▁Mé zi ères ▁and ▁the ▁Four th ▁Army ▁was ▁to ▁be ▁held ▁back ▁west ▁of ▁Verd un , ▁ready ▁to ▁move ▁east ▁to ▁attack ▁the