▁of ▁little ▁use ▁or ▁value , ▁and ▁which ▁had ▁a ▁history ▁of ▁a iding ▁his ▁political ▁enemies , ▁according ▁to ▁N ixon . ▁Hel ms ▁found ▁it ▁difficult ▁to ▁establish ▁a ▁cord ial ▁working ▁relationship ▁to ▁the ▁new ▁President . ▁Ray ▁C line , ▁former ▁Deput y ▁Director ▁of ▁Int elligence ▁at ▁C IA , ▁wrote ▁how ▁he ▁saw ▁the ▁ag ency ▁under ▁Hel ms ▁during ▁the ▁N ixon ▁years : ▁ ▁N ixon ▁and ▁his ▁principal ▁assistant , ▁Dr . ▁K iss inger , ▁dis reg arded ▁analyt ical ▁intelligence ▁except ▁for ▁what ▁was ▁convenient ▁for ▁use ▁by ▁K iss inger ' s ▁own ▁small ▁personal ▁staff ▁in ▁support ▁of ▁N ixon - K iss inger ▁policies . ▁In coming ▁intelligence ▁was ▁closely ▁monitor ed ▁and ▁its ▁distribution ▁controlled ▁by ▁K iss inger ' s ▁staff ▁to ▁keep ▁it ▁from ▁embar rass ing ▁the ▁White ▁House ... ▁. ▁" ▁They ▁employed ▁" Hel ms ▁and ▁the ▁C IA ▁primarily ▁as ▁an ▁instrument ▁for ▁the ▁execution ▁of ▁White ▁House ▁wishes " ▁and ▁did ▁not ▁seem ▁" to ▁understand ▁or ▁care ▁about ▁the ▁carefully ▁struct ured ▁functions ▁of ▁central ▁intelligence ▁as ▁a ▁whole . ▁... ▁I ▁doubt ▁that ▁anyone ▁could ▁have ▁done ▁better ▁than ▁Hel ms ▁in ▁these ▁circumstances . ▁ ▁Under ▁the ▁changed ▁policies ▁of ▁the ▁N ixon ▁administration , ▁Henry ▁K iss inger ▁in ▁effect ▁disp la ced ▁the ▁D CI ▁and ▁became ▁" the ▁President ' s ▁chief ▁intelligence ▁officer ". ▁K iss inger ▁writes ▁that , ▁in ▁addition , ▁N