▁monitor ▁and ▁manage ▁the ▁Phoenix ▁program ▁including , ▁according ▁to ▁Hel ms , ▁" a ▁seem ingly ▁ever - in cre asing ▁number ▁of ▁C IA ▁personnel ". ▁ ▁After ▁receiving ▁special ▁Phoenix ▁training , ▁Vietnam ese ▁forces ▁in ▁rural ▁areas ▁went ▁head ▁to ▁head ▁against ▁the ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁In frastr ucture , ▁e . g ., ▁they ▁sought ▁to ▁pen et rate ▁commun ist ▁organizations , ▁to ▁arrest ▁and ▁inter rog ate ▁or ▁sl ay ▁their ▁cad res . ▁The ▁Vietnam ▁War ▁res emble d ▁a ▁f ero cious ▁civil ▁war ; ▁the ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁had ▁already ▁assass in ated ▁thousands ▁of ▁Vietnam ese ▁village ▁leaders . ▁Unfortunately , ▁in ▁its ▁strategy ▁of ▁fighting ▁fire ▁with ▁fire , ▁forces ▁in ▁the ▁Phoenix ▁program ▁used ▁tort ure , ▁and ▁became ▁ent ang led ▁in ▁actions ▁involving ▁local ▁and ▁official ▁cor ruption , ▁resulting ▁in ▁many ▁question able ▁kill ings , ▁perhaps ▁thousands . ▁Despite ▁its ▁grave ▁fault s , ▁Col by ▁op ined ▁that ▁the ▁program ▁did ▁work ▁well ▁enough ▁to ▁stop ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁g ains . ▁Col by ▁favor ably ▁compared ▁Operation ▁Phoenix ▁with ▁the ▁C IA ' s ▁relative ▁success ▁in ▁its ▁" secret ▁war " ▁in ▁La os . ▁ ▁Hel ms ▁notes ▁that ▁the ▁early ▁efforts ▁of ▁Phoenix ▁" w ere ▁successful , ▁and ▁of ▁serious ▁concern ▁to ▁the ▁N V N ▁[ N orth ▁Vietnam ese ] ▁leadership ". ▁Hel ms ▁then ▁goes ▁on ▁to ▁rec ount ▁the ▁Phoenix ▁program ' s ▁progress ive ▁slide