▁leading ▁to ▁limited ▁success , ▁particularly ▁after ▁the ▁French ▁and ▁Rus si ans ▁modern ised ▁their ▁fort ifications ▁on ▁the ▁front iers ▁with ▁Germany . ▁Alfred ▁von ▁Sch lie ffen ▁Chief ▁of ▁the ▁Imperial ▁German ▁General ▁Staff ▁( , ▁ ▁O HL ) ▁from ▁ ▁de vised ▁a ▁plan ▁to ▁e va de ▁the ▁French ▁front ier ▁fort ifications ▁with ▁an ▁off ensive ▁on ▁the ▁northern ▁fl ank , ▁which ▁would ▁have ▁a ▁local ▁numerical ▁superior ity ▁and ▁obtain ▁rapidly ▁a ▁decis ive ▁victory . ▁By ▁ 1 8 9 8 – 1 8 9 9 , ▁such ▁a ▁man oe uv re ▁was ▁intended ▁to ▁rapidly ▁pass ▁through ▁Belg ium , ▁between ▁Ant werp ▁and ▁Nam ur ▁and ▁threaten ▁Paris ▁from ▁the ▁north . ▁ ▁Hel m uth ▁von ▁Mol t ke ▁the ▁Young er ▁succeeded ▁Sch lie ffen ▁in ▁ 1 9 0 6 ▁and ▁was ▁less ▁certain ▁that ▁the ▁French ▁would ▁conform ▁to ▁German ▁assumptions . ▁German ▁strategy ▁would ▁need ▁to ▁become ▁more ▁opportun istic , ▁and ▁Mol t ke ▁modified ▁German ▁plans , ▁to ▁make ▁them ▁less ▁rig id , ▁making ▁the ▁off ens ives ▁of ▁ 1 9 1 4 ▁the ▁opening ▁moves ▁of ▁what ▁was ▁expected ▁to ▁be ▁a ▁long ▁war ▁with ▁no ▁certain ty ▁of ▁victory . ▁Mol t ke ▁adapted ▁the ▁deployment ▁and ▁concentration ▁plan , ▁to ▁accommod ate ▁an ▁attack ▁in ▁the ▁centre ▁or ▁an ▁en velop ing ▁attack ▁from ▁both ▁fl anks , ▁by ▁adding ▁divisions ▁to ▁the ▁left ▁fl ank ▁opposite ▁the