▁compens ation . ▁In ▁these ▁cases , ▁the ▁transaction ▁costs ▁eat ▁away , ▁and ▁ultimately ▁eclipse , ▁the ▁price ▁signals ▁that ▁would ▁have ▁led ▁to ▁the ▁most ▁efficient ▁distribution ▁of ▁resources . ▁ ▁In ▁cases ▁like ▁these ▁with ▁potentially ▁high ▁transaction ▁costs , ▁the ▁law ▁ought ▁to ▁produce ▁an ▁outcome ▁similar ▁to ▁what ▁would ▁result ▁if ▁the ▁transaction ▁costs ▁were ▁elimin ated . ▁Hence ▁courts ▁should ▁be ▁gu ided ▁by ▁the ▁most ▁efficient ▁solution . ▁ ▁Additionally , ▁Co ase ▁highlight s ▁a ▁reci pro city ▁of ▁har ms ▁present ▁in ▁external ities ▁as ▁a ▁central ▁question ▁for ▁distrib uting ▁rights . ▁Dam age ▁is ▁shared ▁between ▁parties ▁in ▁a ▁dispute , ▁such ▁that ▁both ▁parties ▁consider ▁the ▁present ▁costs ▁in ▁their ▁optimization ▁question . ▁Co ase ▁uses ▁the ▁r uling ▁of ▁" B ry ant ▁v . ▁Le f ever " ▁to ▁explore ▁the ▁reci pro cal ▁nature ▁of ▁external ity . ▁Bry ant ▁v . ▁Le f ever ▁concerns ▁a ▁conflict ▁between ▁neighb ors , ▁in ▁which ▁one ▁neighbor ▁constructed ▁a ▁wall ▁such ▁that ▁the ▁other ▁neighbor ’ s ▁chim ney ▁would ▁smoke . ▁Origin ally , ▁the ▁court ▁determined ▁the ▁wall ▁was ▁the ▁cause ▁of ▁the ▁chim ne ys ▁sm oking ▁and ▁awarded ▁the ▁pla int iff ▁financial ▁compens ation . ▁However , ▁in ▁the ▁Court ▁of ▁App e als ▁this ▁judgment ▁was ▁revers ed . ▁Co ase ▁arg ues ▁that ▁this ▁jud g ement ▁provides ▁context ▁for ▁fr aming ▁bl ame . ▁According ▁to ▁Co ase , ▁“ The