▁ Đ ồ ng ▁T â m ▁Base ▁Camp ▁and ▁elsewhere , ▁they ▁had ▁little ▁opportunity ▁to ▁familiar ize ▁themselves ▁with ▁the ▁local ▁enemy ▁and ▁terrain . ▁Because ▁of ▁del ays ▁in ▁the ▁formation ▁of ▁new ▁territorial ▁units , ▁the ▁Corps ' ▁commander ▁also ▁continued ▁to ▁hold ▁the ▁Division ▁responsible ▁for ▁its ▁existing ▁area ▁security ▁miss ions . ▁Thus , ▁despite ▁additional ▁av iation ▁support ▁and ▁the ▁rapid ▁activation ▁of ▁ 3 4 ▁new ▁R F ▁companies , ▁the ▁Division ▁was ▁spread ▁extremely ▁thin , ▁and ▁its ▁off ensive ▁cap ability ▁dropped ▁accordingly . ▁President ▁N gu y ễ n ▁V ă n ▁Th i ệ u ▁and ▁III ▁Corps ▁commander ▁General ▁Th anh , ▁tried ▁to ▁rect ify ▁the ▁situation ▁in ▁January ▁ 1 9 7 0 ▁by ▁sending ▁Col . ▁N gu y ễ n ▁K ho a ▁Nam , ▁an ▁Air bor ne ▁brig ade ▁commander , ▁to ▁head ▁the ▁Division . ▁Nam ▁had ▁earned ▁a ▁good ▁military ▁reputation ▁in ▁the ▁air bor ne ▁force ▁and ▁was ▁cred ited ▁with ▁making ▁remarkable ▁progress ▁with ▁the ▁Division . ▁Fort un ately ▁for ▁the ▁South ▁Vietnam ese , ▁P AV N / VC ▁activity ▁remained ▁low ▁in ▁the ▁D elta ▁during ▁late ▁ 1 9 6 9 ▁and ▁ 1 9 7 0 , ▁as ▁it ▁did ▁throughout ▁South ▁Vietnam , ▁and ▁the ▁in effect iveness ▁of ▁the ▁Division ▁had ▁no ▁immediate ▁re per cuss ions . ▁US ▁Corps - level ▁advis ers ▁believed ▁that ▁its ▁short com ings ▁could ▁be ▁easily