▁ruled ▁that ▁differential , ▁det r iment al ▁treatment ▁directly ▁affect ing ▁an ▁enumer ated ▁or ▁analog ous ▁ground ▁constit uted ▁a ▁viol ation ▁of ▁section ▁ 1 5 , ▁and ▁that ▁any ▁discussion ▁about ▁the ▁law ' s ▁purpose ▁or ▁reason ab len ess ▁should ▁then ▁take ▁place ▁in ▁the ▁section ▁ 1 ▁analysis . ▁As ▁constitution al ▁legal ▁scholar ▁Peter ▁Hog g ▁has ▁written , ▁by ▁exam ining ▁whether ▁the ▁challeng ed ▁law ▁und erm ines ▁dign ity ▁while ▁still ▁looking ▁at ▁section ▁ 1 5 , ▁and ▁not ▁yet ▁section ▁ 1 , ▁Law ▁moved ▁much ▁of ▁the ▁analysis ▁of ▁the ▁law ' s ▁purpose ▁and ▁reason ab len ess ▁from ▁the ▁traditional ▁section ▁ 1 ▁test , ▁and ▁into ▁section ▁ 1 5 . ▁This ▁means ▁that ▁a ▁person ▁who ▁claims ▁his ▁section ▁ 1 5 ▁rights ▁are ▁viol ated ▁must ▁himself ▁prove ▁his ▁dign ity ▁was ▁und erm ined . ▁ ▁Re actions ▁to ▁Law ▁have ▁been ▁varied , ▁but ▁responses ▁for ▁the ▁most ▁part ▁have ▁been ▁negative . ▁The ▁decision ▁prov oked ▁many ▁critic isms ▁by ▁legal ▁sch ol ars ▁centered ▁around ▁the ▁third ▁stage ▁of ▁the ▁section ▁ 1 5 ▁analysis : ▁the ▁el us ive ▁concept ▁of ▁human ▁dign ity . ▁In ▁an ▁attempt ▁to ▁move ▁towards ▁an ▁understanding ▁of ▁equality ▁as ▁substant ive ▁rather ▁than ▁formal , ▁the ▁Court ▁in ▁Law ▁replaced ▁its ▁earlier ▁focus ▁on ▁analog ous ▁grounds ▁in ▁Andrew s ▁with ▁one ▁focused ▁around ▁the ▁idea ▁of ▁human ▁dign ity . ▁This