5 ▁September , ▁remembered ▁as ▁the ▁z en ith ▁of ▁the ▁battle , ▁the ▁guns ▁of ▁ 2 8 ▁AA ▁B de ▁were ▁in ▁prolong ed ▁combat , ▁eng aging ▁German ▁aircraft ▁over ▁Ch ath am ▁in ▁the ▁morning , ▁and ▁again ▁in ▁the ▁afternoon . ▁ ▁Over all , ▁British ▁anti - air craft ▁def ences ▁have ▁been ▁considered ▁to ▁have ▁performed ▁poor ly ▁during ▁the ▁Battle ▁of ▁Britain . ▁They ▁have ▁been ▁compared ▁unf av ou rab ly ▁with ▁similar ▁German ▁efforts ▁of ▁the ▁same ▁period . ▁General ▁Frederick ▁P ile , ▁General ▁Officer ▁Command ing ▁Anti - A ircraft ▁Command , ▁felt ▁that ▁his ▁most ▁effective ▁weapon ▁was ▁the ▁L AA ▁B of ors ▁gun , ▁which ▁was ▁in ▁short ▁supply ; ▁as ▁was ▁the ▁K err ison ▁Pred ict or , ▁the ▁only ▁fully ▁autom ated ▁anti - air craft ▁fire - control ▁system ▁available ▁for ▁low ▁and ▁intermediate ▁level ▁anti - air craft ▁fire . ▁For ▁H AA ▁guns , ▁gun ▁lay ing ▁rad ar ▁was ▁not ▁yet ▁oper ational . ▁The ▁larger ▁guns ▁also ▁suffered ▁from ▁a ▁lack ▁of ▁oper ational ▁mob ility , ▁being ▁mostly ▁s ited ▁in ▁fixed ▁concrete ▁emp lac ements . ▁ ▁The ▁Bl itz ▁ ▁After ▁ 1 5 ▁September ▁the ▁intensity ▁of ▁Luft wa ffe ▁day ▁ra ids ▁decl ined ▁rapidly , ▁and ▁it ▁began ▁a ▁prolong ed ▁night ▁bomb ing ▁campaign ▁over ▁London ▁and ▁industrial ▁towns ▁known ▁as ▁The ▁Bl itz . ▁This ▁meant ▁that ▁ 2 8 ▁B de