▁institutions , ▁for ▁instance , ▁a ▁guarante es ▁for ▁goods . ▁By ▁providing ▁a ▁guarantee , ▁the ▁bu yer ▁in ▁the ▁transaction ▁can ▁use ▁extra ▁time ▁to ▁obtain ▁the ▁same ▁amount ▁of ▁information ▁about ▁the ▁good ▁as ▁the ▁s eller ▁before ▁the ▁bu yer ▁takes ▁on ▁the ▁complete ▁risk ▁of ▁the ▁good ▁being ▁a ▁" lem on ". ▁Other ▁market ▁mechan isms ▁that ▁help ▁reduce ▁the ▁im bal ance ▁in ▁information ▁include ▁brand - names , ▁ch ains ▁and ▁franch ising ▁that ▁guarantee ▁the ▁bu yer ▁a ▁threshold ▁quality ▁level . ▁These ▁mechan isms ▁also ▁let ▁own ers ▁of ▁high ▁quality ▁products ▁get ▁the ▁full ▁value ▁of ▁the ▁good . ▁These ▁counter act ing ▁institutions ▁then ▁keep ▁the ▁market ▁size ▁from ▁reducing ▁to ▁zero . ▁ ▁Information ▁gather ing ▁Most ▁models ▁in ▁traditional ▁contract ▁theory ▁assume ▁that ▁asym metric ▁information ▁is ▁ex ogen ously ▁given . ▁Yet , ▁some ▁authors ▁have ▁also ▁studied ▁contract - the or etic ▁models ▁in ▁which ▁asym metric ▁information ▁ar ises ▁end ogen ously , ▁because ▁agents ▁decide ▁whether ▁or ▁not ▁to ▁gather ▁information . ▁Specifically , ▁C ré mer ▁and ▁K hal il ▁( 1 9 9 2 ) ▁and ▁C ré mer , ▁K hal il , ▁and ▁Ro ch et ▁( 1 9 9 8 a ) ▁study ▁an ▁agent ’ s ▁in cent ives ▁to ▁ac quire ▁private ▁information ▁after ▁a ▁principal ▁has ▁offered ▁a ▁contract . ▁In ▁a ▁labor atory ▁experiment , ▁Ho ppe ▁and ▁Sch mit z ▁( 2 0 1 3