, ▁ST AR ▁voting ▁allows ▁vot ers ▁to ▁express ▁prefer ences ▁of ▁varying ▁strength s . ▁ ▁ST AR ▁voting ▁satisfies ▁the ▁monot onic ity ▁criter ion , ▁i . e . ▁raising ▁your ▁vote ' s ▁score ▁for ▁a ▁candidate ▁can ▁never ▁hurt ▁their ▁ch ances ▁of ▁winning , ▁and ▁lower ing ▁it ▁can ▁never ▁help ▁their ▁ch ances . ▁It ▁also ▁satisfies ▁the ▁resol v ability ▁criter ion ▁( in ▁both ▁T ide man ▁and ▁Wood all ' s ▁versions ). ▁ ▁It ▁does ▁not ▁satisfy ▁the ▁Cond or c et ▁criter ion ▁( i . e ., ▁is ▁not ▁a ▁Cond or c et ▁method ), ▁although ▁with ▁all - str ateg ic ▁vot ers ▁and ▁perfect ▁information , ▁the ▁Cond or c et ▁winner ▁is ▁a ▁strong ▁Nash ▁equilibrium . ▁It ▁does , ▁however , ▁satisfy ▁the ▁Cond or c et ▁los er ▁criter ion ▁and ▁the ▁majority ▁los er ▁criter ion . ▁ ▁There ▁are ▁a ▁number ▁of ▁other ▁voting ▁system ▁criteria ▁it ▁does ▁not ▁satisfy . ▁ ▁These ▁include ▁the ▁majority ▁criter ion , ▁since ▁the ▁highest - r ated ▁candidates ▁that ▁proceed ▁to ▁the ▁run off ▁may ▁not ▁be ▁the ▁first ▁preference ▁of ▁a ▁majority . ▁It ▁does ▁not ▁satisfy ▁the ▁mut ual ▁majority ▁criter ion , ▁although ▁the ▁more ▁candidates ▁there ▁are ▁in ▁the ▁mut ual ▁majority ▁set , ▁the ▁greater ▁the ▁ch ances ▁that ▁at ▁least ▁one ▁of ▁them ▁is ▁among ▁the ▁two ▁final ists ▁in ▁the ▁run off , ▁in ▁which ▁case ▁one