▁san ction ▁for ▁its ▁vi ability , ▁and ▁such ▁prov isions ▁were ▁clearly ▁incons istent ▁with ▁section ▁ 1 1 ( 1 ) ▁and ▁so ▁manifest ly ▁in def ens ible ▁under ▁section ▁ 3 3 ( 1 ) ▁that ▁there ▁was ▁no ▁war rant ▁for ▁their ▁ret ention , ▁even ▁tempor arily . ▁ ▁The ▁court ▁also ▁held ▁that , ▁in ▁declar ating ▁invalid ▁the ▁prov isions ▁of ▁a ▁stat ute ▁incons istent ▁with ▁the ▁fundamental ▁rights ▁in ▁chapter ▁ 3 ▁of ▁the ▁Constitution , ▁and ▁in ▁sever ing ▁the ▁invalid ▁prov isions ▁from ▁the ▁remainder ▁of ▁the ▁stat ute , ▁the ▁court ▁should ▁take ▁account ▁of ▁the ▁coming ▁into ▁force ▁of ▁the ▁new ▁Constitution ▁and ▁pay ▁due ▁regard ▁to ▁the ▁values ▁which ▁it ▁requires ▁the ▁court ▁to ▁promote . ▁The ▁court , ▁held ▁Sach s ▁J , ▁should ▁posit ▁a ▁not ional , ▁contemporary ▁Parliament ▁dealing ▁with ▁the ▁text ▁in ▁issue ▁when ▁the ▁choice ▁about ▁sever ance ▁falls ▁to ▁be ▁made . ▁ ▁The ▁case ▁is ▁often ▁c ited ▁now ▁for ▁its ▁provision ▁of ▁the ▁test ▁for ▁sever ability : ▁ ▁Although ▁sever ability ▁in ▁the ▁context ▁of ▁constitution al ▁law ▁may ▁often ▁require ▁special ▁treatment , ▁in ▁the ▁present ▁case ▁the ▁tr ite ▁test ▁can ▁properly ▁be ▁applied : ▁if ▁the ▁good ▁is ▁not ▁dependent ▁on ▁the ▁bad ▁and ▁can ▁be ▁separated ▁from ▁it , ▁one ▁gives ▁effect ▁to ▁the ▁good ▁that ▁remains ▁after ▁the ▁separation ▁if ▁it ▁still ▁gives ▁effect ▁to ▁the ▁main ▁objective ▁of ▁the ▁stat ute .