. g ., ▁the ▁C IA ▁supported ▁and ▁cultiv ated ▁right ists ▁in ▁the ▁formerly ▁" const itution ally ▁mind ed " ▁army ▁to ▁start ▁thinking ▁' out side ▁the ▁box ', ▁i . e ., ▁to ▁consider ▁a ▁coup ▁d ' et at . ▁Thus , ▁writes ▁author ▁Tim ▁We iner , ▁while ▁not ▁per ▁se ▁orch estr ating ▁the ▁ 1 9 7 3 ▁coup , ▁the ▁C IA ▁worked ▁for ▁years , ▁employ ing ▁economic ▁and ▁other ▁means , ▁to ▁s edu ce ▁the ▁army ▁into ▁doing ▁so . ▁All ende ' s ▁own ▁actions ▁may ▁have ▁caused ▁relations ▁with ▁his ▁army ▁to ▁become ▁une asy . ▁The ▁C IA ▁sow ed ▁" polit ical ▁and ▁economic ▁cha os ▁in ▁Chile " ▁which ▁set ▁the ▁stage ▁for ▁a ▁successful ▁coup , ▁We iner ▁con cludes . ▁Hence , ▁Hel ms ' s ▁careful ▁parsing ▁appears ▁off ▁the ▁mark . ▁Yet ▁views ▁and ▁opinions ▁differ , ▁e . g ., ▁K iss inger ▁cont ests , ▁what ▁William ▁Col by ▁in ▁part ▁acknowled ges . ▁ ▁After ▁Hel ms ' ▁departure ▁from ▁the ▁C IA ▁in ▁early ▁ 1 9 7 3 , ▁N ixon ▁continued ▁to ▁work ▁directly ▁against ▁the ▁All ende ▁regime . ▁Although ▁elected ▁with ▁ 3 6 . 3 % ▁of ▁the ▁vote ▁( to ▁ 3 4 . 9 % ▁for ▁runner - up ▁in ▁a ▁three - way ▁contest ), ▁All ende ▁as ▁President ▁reported ly ▁ignored ▁the ▁Const itu ción ▁de ▁ 1 9