▁dign ity ▁of ▁all ▁persons ". ▁Human ▁dign ity ▁cannot ▁be ▁both ▁a ▁factor ▁in ▁and ▁a ▁definition ▁of ▁equality . ▁" D ign ity ▁requires ▁respect , ▁and ▁respect ▁is ▁acknowled gment ▁of ▁human ▁dign ity ." ▁Another ▁scholar ▁ident ifies ▁the ▁same ▁problem , ▁arg uing ▁that ▁harm ▁to ▁dign ity ▁is ▁itself ▁a ▁type ▁of ▁harm , ▁so ▁it ▁cannot ▁be ▁a ▁factor ▁in ▁determ ining ▁whether ▁there ▁has ▁indeed ▁been ▁harm . ▁ ▁Many ▁critic isms ▁level led ▁against ▁the ▁focus ▁on ▁human ▁dign ity ▁point ▁to ▁incons isten cies ▁in ▁the ▁Supreme ▁Court ' s ▁own ▁definition ▁of ▁the ▁term . ▁I ac ob ucci ▁J ▁has ▁various ly ▁character ized ▁the ▁term ▁as ▁referring ▁to ▁" person al ▁aut onomy ▁and ▁self - det erm ination ", ▁" phys ical ▁and ▁psych ological ▁integrity ▁and ▁emp ower ment ", ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁" self - res pect ▁and ▁self - worth ", ▁indicating ▁a ▁confl ation ▁of ▁different ▁understand ings ▁of ▁equality . ▁One ▁scholar ▁notes ▁that ▁this ▁confusion ▁"[ forms ] ▁a ▁ha ph az ard ▁am alg am ation ▁and ▁inter ming ling ▁of ▁dign ity ", ▁and ▁that ▁it ▁is ▁a ▁dis service ▁to ▁our ▁understanding ▁of ▁equality ▁by ▁failing ▁to ▁distinguish ▁between ▁human ▁dign ity ▁and ▁human ▁interest . ▁Similarly , ▁the ▁Court ▁has ▁at ▁times ▁linked ▁the ▁concept ▁of ▁dign ity ▁with ▁the ▁im position ▁of ▁dis adv antage ▁and ▁pre jud ice ▁while ▁at ▁other ▁times ▁linked ▁it ▁with ▁the ▁red