▁that ▁r uling ▁was ▁subsequently ▁aff ir med ▁by ▁the ▁United ▁States ▁Supreme ▁Court ▁on ▁the ▁grounds ▁that : ▁ ▁The ▁trial ▁judge ' s ▁instruction ▁to ▁the ▁j ury ▁was ▁impro per , ▁as ▁it ▁emphas ized ▁a ▁pres umption ▁of ▁wrong ful ▁intent , ▁rather ▁than ▁concentr ating ▁on ▁ver ifying ▁the ▁def endant ' s ▁state ▁of ▁mind ▁through ▁evidence ▁and ▁infer ences ▁drawn ▁there from . ▁In ▁that ▁regard , ▁the ▁Sh erman ▁Act ▁does ▁not ▁create ▁a ▁regime ▁of ▁strict ▁li ability . ▁A ▁good ▁faith ▁belief , ▁rather ▁than ▁an ▁absolute ▁certain ty , ▁that ▁a ▁price ▁con cess ion ▁is ▁being ▁offered ▁to ▁meet ▁an ▁equally ▁low ▁price ▁offered ▁by ▁a ▁compet itor ▁suff ices ▁to ▁invoke ▁the ▁defense ▁available ▁under ▁§ ▁ 2 ( b ) ▁of ▁the ▁Clay ton ▁Act . ▁The ▁ex ▁parte ▁meeting ▁between ▁the ▁trial ▁judge ▁and ▁the ▁j ury ▁for eman ▁was ▁impro per , ▁and ▁the ▁Court ▁of ▁App e als ▁would ▁have ▁been ▁just ified ▁in ▁revers ing ▁the ▁conv ict ions ▁sole ly ▁because ▁of ▁the ▁risk ▁that ▁the ▁for eman ▁believed ▁the ▁judge ▁was ▁ins isting ▁on ▁a ▁dispos itive ▁ver dict . ▁The ▁trial ▁judge ' s ▁charge ▁concerning ▁participation ▁in ▁the ▁consp i racy , ▁although ▁perhaps ▁not ▁completely ▁clear , ▁was ▁sufficient , ▁but ▁his ▁charge ▁on ▁withdraw al ▁from ▁the ▁consp i racy ▁was ▁err one ous . ▁ ▁Civil ▁ ▁In ▁ 1 9 4 0 , ▁the ▁U . S