▁national ▁security ▁ad visor , ▁asked ▁Hel ms ▁to ▁review ▁the ▁C IA ' s ▁finding , ▁yet ▁Hel ms ▁initially ▁stood ▁by ▁his ▁anal yst s ▁at ▁C IA . ▁Event ually , ▁however , ▁Hel ms ▁comprom ised . ▁ ▁Mel vin ▁La ird , ▁N ixon ' s ▁Secretary ▁of ▁Def ense , ▁had ▁told ▁Hel ms ▁that ▁the ▁C IA ▁was ▁intr ud ing ▁outside ▁its ▁area , ▁with ▁the ▁result ▁that ▁it ▁' sub vert ed ▁administration ▁policy '. ▁Hel ms , ▁in ▁part , ▁saw ▁this ▁M IR V ▁conflict ▁as ▁part ▁of ▁b ureau cr atic ▁man eu ver ing ▁over ▁extremely ▁difficult - to - det erm ine ▁issues , ▁in ▁which ▁the ▁C IA ▁had ▁to ▁find ▁its ▁strateg ic ▁location ▁within ▁the ▁new ▁N ixon ▁administration . ▁Hel ms ▁later ▁remembered : ▁ ▁I ▁realized ▁that ▁there ▁was ▁no ▁convin cing ▁evidence ▁in ▁the ▁Agency ▁or ▁at ▁the ▁Pent agon ▁which ▁would ▁prove ▁either ▁position . ▁Both ▁positions ▁were ▁estimates — spe cul ation — based ▁on ▁identical ▁fragments ▁of ▁data . ▁My ▁decision ▁to ▁remove ▁the ▁cont ested ▁paragraph ▁was ▁based ▁on ▁the ▁fact ▁that ▁the ▁Agency ' s ▁estimate — that ▁the ▁USS R ▁was ▁not ▁attempting ▁to ▁create ▁a ▁first - st rike ▁cap ability ▁– ▁as ▁originally ▁stated ▁in ▁the ▁earlier ▁detailed ▁National ▁Est imate ▁would ▁remain ▁the ▁Agency ▁position . ▁ ▁One ▁C IA ▁anal yst , ▁Abb ott ▁Smith , ▁viewed ▁this ▁f lip - f lop