▁political ▁pressure ▁on ▁the ▁C IA ▁to ▁conform ▁to ▁the ▁military ' s ▁figures ▁of ▁enemy ▁cas ual ties ▁became ▁inten se . ▁Under ▁Hel ms ▁C IA ▁reports ▁on ▁the ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁order ▁of ▁battle ▁numbers ▁were ▁usually ▁moder ate ; ▁C IA ▁also ▁question ed ▁whether ▁the ▁strategy ▁employed ▁by ▁the ▁U . S . ▁Army ▁would ▁ever ▁comp el ▁H ano i ▁to ▁negoti ate . ▁Hel ms ▁himself ▁was ▁evidently ▁s cept ical , ▁yet ▁Johnson ▁never ▁asked ▁for ▁his ▁personal ▁opinion . ▁This ▁dispute ▁between ▁Army ▁and ▁C IA ▁over ▁the ▁number ▁of ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁combat ants ▁became ▁bitter , ▁and ▁eventually ▁common ▁knowledge ▁in ▁the ▁administration . ▁ ▁According ▁to ▁one ▁source , ▁C IA ▁Director ▁Richard ▁Hel ms ▁" used ▁his ▁influence ▁with ▁Ly nd on ▁Johnson ▁to ▁warn ▁about ▁the ▁growing ▁d angers ▁of ▁U . S . ▁invol vement ▁in ▁Vietnam ." ▁On ▁the ▁other ▁hand , ▁St ans field ▁Turner ▁( D CI ▁ 1 9 7 7 – 1 9 8 1 ) ▁describes ▁Hel ms ▁in ▁his ▁advis ory ▁relationship ▁to ▁Ly nd on ▁Johnson ▁as ▁being ▁over ly ▁loyal ▁to ▁the ▁office ▁of ▁president . ▁Hence , ▁the ▁C IA ▁staff ' s ▁fran k ▁opinions ▁on ▁Vietnam ▁were ▁sometimes ▁modified ▁before ▁reaching ▁President ▁Johnson . ▁At ▁one ▁point ▁the ▁C IA ▁anal yst s ▁estimated ▁enemy ▁strength ▁at ▁ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 , ▁while ▁the ▁military ▁ins isted ▁it ▁was ▁only ▁ 2