▁mis app reh ension ▁that ▁no ▁exc use ▁for ▁his ▁failure ▁to ▁satisfy ▁the ▁judgment ▁would ▁be ▁acceptable , ▁that ▁his ▁imprison ment ▁was ▁an ▁in es cap able ▁consequence ▁of ▁the ▁default ▁to ▁which ▁he ▁had ▁to ▁res ign ▁himself , ▁and ▁that ▁his ▁attend ance ▁at ▁the ▁proceed ings ▁could ▁not ▁therefore ▁accomplish ▁anything , ▁for ▁the ▁notice ▁did ▁not ▁inform ▁him ▁of ▁any ▁such ▁exc use ; ▁nor ▁was ▁it ▁required ▁to ▁do ▁so . ▁ ▁A ▁fourth ▁dra con ian ▁feature ▁of ▁the ▁legisl ation , ▁described ▁by ▁Did c ott ▁J ▁as ▁" ug ly ," ▁would ▁confront ▁the ▁deb tor ▁if , ▁on ▁the ▁other ▁hand , ▁he ▁did ▁appear ▁before ▁the ▁magistr ate : ▁the ▁on us ▁then ▁rest ing ▁on ▁him ▁to ▁prove ▁that ▁he ▁could ▁not ▁pay ▁the ▁judgment ▁deb t ▁and ▁bore ▁no ▁bl ame ▁for ▁his ▁im pec un ios ity ▁on ▁various ▁grounds ▁listed ▁in ▁section ▁ 6 5 F ( 3 )( c ) ▁of ▁the ▁Act . ▁The ▁deb tor ▁might ▁not ▁manage ▁to ▁establish ▁those ▁facts , ▁although ▁they ▁were ▁the ▁truth , ▁especially ▁when ▁his ▁very ▁pover ty ▁had ▁prevent ed ▁him ▁from ▁h iring ▁a ▁lawyer ▁and ▁he ▁had ▁had ▁to ▁f end ▁for ▁himself ▁in ▁an ▁un famil iar ▁environment , ▁bew ilder ed ▁by ▁procedures ▁and ▁a ▁for ens ic ▁method ology ▁to ▁which ▁he ▁was ▁a ▁stranger . ▁The ▁result ▁might ▁well ▁be ▁( and ▁must ▁often ▁have ▁been ) ▁that ▁someone ▁who