, ▁command , ▁and ▁control ▁c land est ine ▁operations . ▁Cover t ▁action ▁and ▁esp ion age ▁could ▁be ▁tools ▁fitted ▁for ▁their ▁personal ▁use . ▁N ixon ▁used ▁them ▁to ▁build ▁a ▁political ▁for tr ess ▁at ▁the ▁White ▁House ." ▁ ▁In ▁his ▁mem oir s , ▁Hel ms ▁writes ▁of ▁his ▁early ▁meeting ▁with ▁K iss inger . ▁" Hen ry ▁spoke ▁first , ▁advis ing ▁me ▁of ▁N ixon ' s ▁ed ict ▁that ▁effective ▁immediately ▁all ▁intelligence ▁brief ings , ▁or al ▁or ▁otherwise , ▁were ▁to ▁come ▁through ▁K iss inger . ▁All ▁intelligence ▁reports ? ▁I ▁asked . ▁Yes ." ▁A ▁Senate ▁historian ▁of ▁the ▁C IA ▁obser ves ▁that ▁" it ▁was ▁K iss inger ▁rather ▁than ▁the ▁DC Is ▁who ▁served ▁as ▁N ixon ' s ▁senior ▁intelligence ▁ad visor . ▁Under ▁K iss inger ' s ▁direction ▁the ▁NS C ▁became ▁an ▁intelligence ▁and ▁policy ▁staff ." ▁Under ▁N ixon ' s ▁initial ▁plan , ▁Hel ms ▁was ▁to ▁be ▁ex cluded ▁even ▁from ▁the ▁policy ▁discuss ions ▁at ▁the ▁National ▁Security ▁Council ▁( NS C ) ▁meet ings . ▁ ▁Very ▁early ▁in ▁the ▁N ixon ▁administration ▁it ▁became ▁clear ▁that ▁the ▁President ▁wanted ▁Henry ▁K iss inger ▁to ▁run ▁intelligence ▁for ▁him ▁and ▁that ▁the ▁National ▁Security ▁Council ▁staff ▁in ▁the ▁White ▁House , ▁under ▁K iss inger , ▁would ▁control ▁the ▁intelligence ▁community . ▁This ▁was ▁the ▁beginning ▁of ▁a ▁shift ▁of ▁power ▁away ▁from ▁the ▁C IA ▁to