ating ▁to ▁fundamental ▁rights . ▁The ▁section ▁is ▁to ▁be ▁understood , ▁he ▁held , ▁as ▁requiring ▁the ▁court ▁to ▁give ▁due ▁attention ▁to ▁such ▁experience , ▁with ▁a ▁view ▁to ▁finding ▁principles ▁rather ▁than ▁extract ing ▁rig id ▁formula e , ▁and ▁to ▁look ▁for ▁rational es ▁rather ▁than ▁for ▁rules . ▁With ▁reference ▁to ▁such ▁experience , ▁he ▁discussed ▁in ▁detail ▁the ▁meaning ▁of ▁the ▁word ▁" necess ary " ▁in ▁section ▁ 3 3 ( 1 ) ▁of ▁the ▁Constitution . ▁ ▁Reading ▁down ▁ ▁Section ▁ 2 3 2 ( 3 ) ▁of ▁the ▁Constitution , ▁Sach s ▁J ▁observed , ▁provided ▁that , ▁if ▁a ▁restricted ▁interpretation ▁of ▁the ▁law ▁concerned ▁was ▁possible , ▁saving ▁it ▁from ▁un const itution al ▁in ro ads ▁into ▁fundamental ▁rights , ▁then ▁that ▁interpretation ▁must ▁be ▁fav oured , ▁even ▁if ▁it ▁went ▁against ▁the ▁prima ▁fac ie ▁meaning ▁of ▁the ▁words ▁in ▁question . ▁This ▁section ▁gave ▁expression ▁to ▁the ▁principle ▁well ▁known ▁in ▁other ▁juris dict ions ▁as ▁" reading ▁down ." ▁The ▁section ▁would ▁permit ▁a ▁p ared - down ▁construction ▁of ▁legisl ation ▁so ▁as ▁to ▁rescue ▁it ▁from ▁being ▁declared ▁invalid , ▁but ▁it ▁would ▁not , ▁of ▁course , ▁require ▁a ▁restricted ▁interpretation ▁of ▁fundamental ▁rights ▁so ▁as ▁to ▁inter f ere ▁as ▁little ▁as ▁possible ▁with ▁pre - ex isting ▁law . ▁Furthermore , ▁it ▁would ▁not ▁be ▁the ▁function ▁of ▁the ▁court ▁to ▁fill ▁in ▁lac un ae ▁in ▁stat utes ▁that ▁might