▁political ▁cron ies ▁and ▁friends ▁like ▁C ao , ▁L ê ▁Qu ang ▁T ung ▁and ▁T ô n ▁Th ấ t ▁ Đ ín h , ▁who ▁had ▁little ▁military ▁ability , ▁but ▁were ▁very ▁likely ▁to ▁help ▁stop ▁a ▁coup ▁attempt . ▁After ▁a ▁sk irm ish ▁on ▁a ▁highway ▁that ▁resulted ▁in ▁a ▁small ▁number ▁of ▁South ▁Vietnam ese ▁cas ual ties ▁along ▁with ▁several ▁tr uck s ▁destroyed , ▁C ao ▁was ▁called ▁to ▁Sa ig on ▁and ▁repr im and ed ▁by ▁D iem . ▁Upon ▁his ▁return , ▁V ann ▁and ▁his ▁group ▁of ▁advis ers ▁were ▁forced ▁to ▁end ▁the ▁joint ▁planning ▁sessions ▁that ▁had ▁been ▁so ▁successful ▁earlier , ▁and ▁action ▁essentially ▁w ound ▁down ▁in ▁their ▁region . ▁C ao ▁used ▁the ▁excellent ▁military ▁intelligence ▁network ▁they ▁had ▁developed ▁to ▁find ▁areas ▁de void ▁of ▁V C , ▁and ▁planned ▁operations ▁only ▁in ▁those ▁areas . ▁In ▁many ▁other ▁cases , ▁operations ▁were ▁executed ▁on ▁paper ▁only , ▁in ▁order ▁to ▁report ▁an ▁increasing ▁tempo ▁of ▁operations ▁that ▁did ▁not ▁actually ▁exist . ▁ ▁On ▁ 2 ▁January ▁ 1 9 6 3 ▁the ▁Division ' s ▁ 1 1 th ▁Regiment ▁took ▁part ▁in ▁the ▁Battle ▁of ▁Ap ▁Bac , ▁a ▁dis astr ous ▁operation ▁to ▁trap ▁a ▁small ▁V C ▁force . ▁ ▁In ▁ ▁the ▁successful ▁coup ▁of ▁November ▁ 1 9 6 3 , ▁the ▁plot ters ▁managed ▁to ▁have ▁the ▁Division ▁transferred ▁tempor arily ▁to ▁III ▁Corps , ▁with