▁There ▁are ▁two ▁versions ▁of ▁this . ▁First , ▁when ▁there ▁are ▁sufficiently ▁great ▁advantages ▁for ▁striking ▁first , ▁then ▁neither ▁side ▁can ▁cred ibly ▁commit ▁to ▁any ▁distribution ▁of ▁the ▁st akes . ▁( The ▁cult ▁of ▁the ▁off ensive , ▁an ▁explanation ▁for ▁World ▁War ▁I , ▁roughly ▁makes ▁this ▁argument .) ▁Second , ▁if ▁one ▁side ▁is ▁slowly ▁getting ▁more ▁powerful ▁as ▁a ▁function ▁of ▁time , ▁then ▁the ▁decl ining ▁power ▁may ▁receive ▁a ▁better ▁distribution ▁of ▁the ▁st akes ▁by ▁fighting ▁a ▁prevent ive ▁war ▁now ▁rather ▁than ▁having ▁to ▁accept ▁a ▁peace ful ▁settlement ▁later . ▁( The ▁rising ▁power ▁still ▁has ▁in cent ive ▁to ▁negoti ate ▁when ▁it ▁reaches ▁its ▁peak ▁power ▁because ▁war ▁is ▁cost ly .) ▁ ▁Issue ▁ind iv is ibility ▁Finally , ▁each ▁may ▁gain ▁from ▁war ▁when ▁the ▁st akes ▁are ▁not ▁infinitely ▁divis ible . ▁( For ▁example , ▁control ▁over ▁a ▁holy ▁city .) ▁War ▁will ▁occur ▁when ▁both ▁states ' ▁expected ▁util ities ▁are ▁positive . ▁However , ▁F ear on ▁largely ▁dis cred its ▁issue ▁ind iv is ibility ▁as ▁a ▁rational ist ▁explanation ▁for ▁war , ▁claim ing ▁that ▁states ▁can ▁link ▁other ▁issues ▁or ▁make ▁side ▁pay ments ▁to ▁eliminate ▁the ▁in e ffic iency . ▁Additionally , ▁the ▁vast ▁majority ▁political ▁goods ▁( ter rit ory , ▁money , ▁control ▁of ▁a ▁government ) ▁are ▁divis ible ▁with ▁sufficient ▁cre ativity . ▁ ▁End ogen ous ▁Dest ruction ▁In ▁a ▁series ▁of ▁two