▁avoided ▁and , ▁in ▁the ▁cold ▁war ▁context , ▁the ▁ 1 9 5 9 ▁C IA ▁reports ▁evidently ▁saw ▁D iem ▁as ▁" the ▁best ▁ant ic ommun ist ▁bet " ▁if ▁he ▁under to ok ▁re forms , ▁but ▁reporting ▁also ▁that ▁D iem ▁consist ently ▁avoided ▁reform . ▁ ▁As ▁the ▁political ▁situation ▁progress ed ▁during ▁the ▁ 1 9 6 0 s ▁and ▁American ▁invol vement ▁grew , ▁subsequent ▁C IA ▁reports ▁craft ed ▁by ▁its ▁careful ▁anal yst s ▁continued ▁to ▁tr end ▁p ess im istic ▁regarding ▁the ▁prospect s ▁for ▁South ▁Vietnam . ▁" V ietnam ▁may ▁have ▁been ▁a ▁policy ▁failure . ▁It ▁was ▁not ▁an ▁intelligence ▁failure ." ▁Yet ▁the ▁Agency ▁itself ▁eventually ▁became ▁sharp ly ▁divided ▁over ▁the ▁issue . ▁Those ▁active ▁in ▁C IA ▁operations ▁in ▁Vietnam , ▁e . g ., ▁Luci en ▁C one in , ▁and ▁William ▁Col by , ▁naturally ▁adopted ▁a ▁robust ▁optim ism ▁regarding ▁the ▁outcome ▁of ▁their ▁content ious ▁projects . ▁Team work ▁in ▁dangerous ▁circumstances , ▁and ▁social ▁coh es ion ▁among ▁such ▁oper atives ▁in ▁the ▁field , ▁worked ▁to ▁rein force ▁and ▁intens ify ▁their ▁positive ▁views . ▁ ▁" At ▁no ▁time ▁was ▁the ▁institution al ▁dich ot omy ▁between ▁the ▁oper ational ▁and ▁analyt ic ▁components ▁more ▁stark ." ▁Hel ms ▁later ▁described ▁how ▁he ▁then ▁understood ▁his ▁pred ic ament ▁at ▁C IA . ▁ ▁From ▁the ▁out set , ▁the ▁intelligence ▁director ate ▁and ▁the ▁Office ▁of ▁National