ordinates ." ▁C OR DS ▁chief ▁Robert ▁Kom er ▁agreed ▁and ▁in ▁ 1 9 6 8 ▁described ▁Th anh ▁as ▁un ag gress ive , ▁un im agin ative , ▁and ▁" r ather ▁a ▁x en oph obe ." ▁All ▁Kom er ' s ▁assist ants ▁noted ▁w ors ening ▁command ▁and ▁control ▁problems ▁at ▁the ▁lower ▁tact ical ▁levels ▁and ▁a ▁general ▁confusion ▁over ▁the ▁Division ' s ▁roles ▁and ▁miss ions . ▁T act ical ▁advis ers , ▁they ▁reported , ▁claimed ▁that ▁the ▁army ▁units ▁contributed ▁little ▁more ▁that ▁their ▁" pres ence " ▁to ▁local ▁security ; ▁were ▁idle ▁most ▁of ▁the ▁time ; ▁and , ▁when ▁ar oused , ▁were ▁content ▁with ▁" mer ely ▁ch asing ▁the ▁V C ▁and ▁showing ▁the ▁flag ." ▁Despite ▁all ▁the ▁revolution ary ▁development ▁training , ▁the ▁regular ▁troops ▁were ▁also ▁back ▁in ▁the ▁old ▁" ch icken - ste aling ▁business ," ▁for aging ▁for ▁food ▁and ▁living ▁off ▁the ▁local ▁pe asant ry ." ▁ ▁From ▁ 1 2 ▁September ▁to ▁ 7 ▁October ▁ 1 9 6 7 ▁the ▁Division ▁participated ▁in ▁Operation ▁Cor on ado ▁V ▁with ▁the ▁US ▁Mobile ▁River ine ▁Force ▁( MR F ) ▁against ▁the ▁V C ▁ 2 6 3 rd ▁Battalion ▁in ▁ Đ ị n h ▁T ư ờ ng ▁and ▁Ki ế n ▁H ò a ▁Provin ces . ▁The ▁ 7 th ▁Division ▁lost ▁ 6 ▁killed , ▁while ▁the ▁V C ▁lost ▁ 1 6