▁were ▁near ing ▁Beach ▁White ▁Two ▁where ▁a ▁company ▁of ▁L t . ▁Col . ▁Mer cer ▁M . ▁D oty ' s ▁ 3 / 6 0 th ▁Infantry , ▁was ▁to ▁land ▁when ▁the ▁fl ot illa ▁came ▁under ▁heavy ▁ro cket , ▁automatic , ▁and ▁small ▁arms ▁fire ▁from ▁both ▁sides ▁of ▁the ▁stream ▁( ). ▁Most ▁V C ▁fire ▁came ▁from ▁the ▁east , ▁and ▁the ▁organ ic ▁fire power ▁of ▁the ▁American ▁assault ▁craft ▁came ▁primarily ▁to ▁the ▁right ▁fl ank ▁of ▁the ▁force . ▁In ▁the ▁smoke ▁and ▁confusion ▁the ▁assault ▁craft ▁man eu ver ed ▁to ▁fire ▁weapons ▁or ▁to ▁avoid ▁other ▁American ▁craft ▁tempor arily ▁out ▁of ▁control . ▁One ▁A TC ▁proceeded ▁north ▁of ▁the ▁lead ▁mines we ep ers ▁and ▁land ed ▁on ▁Beach ▁White ▁Two ▁with ▁the ▁company ▁commander ▁and ▁one ▁pl ato on ▁of ▁Company ▁B , ▁ 3 / 6 0 th ▁Infantry . ▁ ▁During ▁the ▁ 1 5 – 2 0 ▁minutes ▁following ▁the ▁beginning ▁of ▁host ilities , ▁the ▁flow ▁of ▁information ▁through ▁the ▁American ▁command ▁and ▁control ▁communic ations ▁net ▁did ▁little ▁to ▁reflect ▁the ▁situation . ▁Col . ▁D oty , ▁flying ▁over ▁the ▁boats ▁and ▁obser ving ▁the ▁apparent ▁mob ility ▁of ▁all ▁assault ▁craft ▁and ▁the ▁success ▁of ▁one ▁A TC ▁in ▁arriv ing ▁at ▁Beach ▁White ▁Two , ▁was ▁convinced ▁that ▁his ▁unit ▁could ▁proceed ▁and ▁land ▁at ▁the ▁assigned ▁be aches . ▁Lieutenant ▁Commander ▁Francis ▁E . ▁Rh odes , ▁Jr