▁into ▁cor ruption ▁and ▁counter product ive ▁violence , ▁which ▁came ▁to ▁null ify ▁its ▁early ▁success . ▁According ly , ▁by ▁the ▁time ▁it ▁was ▁dis cont in ued ▁Phoenix ▁had ▁become ▁useless ▁in ▁the ▁field ▁and ▁a ▁controvers ial ▁if ▁not ▁a ▁not orious ▁political ▁li ability . ▁Hel ms ▁in ▁his ▁mem oir s ▁presents ▁this ▁situation : ▁ ▁P HO EN IX ▁was ▁directed ▁and ▁staff ed ▁by ▁Vietnam ese ▁over ▁whom ▁the ▁American ▁advis ors ▁and ▁l ia ison ▁officers ▁did ▁not ▁have ▁command ▁or ▁direct ▁super vision . ▁The ▁American ▁staff ▁did ▁its ▁best ▁to ▁eliminate ▁the ▁ab use ▁of ▁authority — the ▁sett ling ▁of ▁personal ▁scores , ▁reward ing ▁of ▁friends , ▁summary ▁execution s , ▁prisoner ▁mist re at ment , ▁false ▁den unci ation , ▁illegal ▁property ▁se iz ure — that ▁became ▁the ▁by - products ▁of ▁the ▁P HO EN IX ▁counter ins ur gency ▁effort . ▁In ▁the ▁blood - so aked ▁atmosphere ▁created ▁by ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁terror ism , ▁the ▁notion ▁that ▁reg ulations ▁and ▁direct ives ▁im posed ▁by ▁foreign ▁l ia ison ▁officers ▁could ▁be ▁expected ▁to ▁cur b ▁reven ge ▁and ▁profit - making ▁was ▁un real istic . ▁ ▁After ▁the ▁war , ▁inter views ▁were ▁conducted ▁with ▁Vietnam ese ▁commun ist ▁leaders ▁and ▁military ▁command ers ▁familiar ▁with ▁the ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁organization , ▁its ▁war - making ▁capacity , ▁and ▁support ▁infrastr ucture . ▁They ▁said ▁the ▁Phoenix ▁operations ▁were ▁very ▁effective