▁away ▁for ▁four ▁years ▁was ▁surprised ▁by ▁the ▁lack ▁of ▁engine ers ▁for ▁the ▁squad ron , ▁the ▁oper ational ▁tempo ▁( es pecially ▁given ▁the ▁age ▁of ▁the ▁aircraft ) ▁and ▁the ▁relative ▁in ex per ience ▁of ▁the ▁engine ers , ▁some ▁of ▁whom ▁were ▁on ▁their ▁first ▁tour . ▁There ▁had ▁also ▁been ▁pressure ▁on ▁the ▁pil ots ▁to ▁perform ▁at ▁a ▁greater ▁number ▁of ▁events . ▁For ▁the ▁ 2 0 1 2 ▁season , ▁the ▁number ▁of ▁hours ▁flow n ▁had ▁been ▁dropped ▁from ▁ 3 , 0 0 0 ▁to ▁ 2 , 5 0 0 . ▁ ▁The ▁coron er ▁described ▁the ▁seat ▁mechanism ▁as ▁being ▁" ent ire ly ▁useless ". ▁Seven ▁personnel ▁had ▁nin ete en ▁opportun ities ▁to ▁check ▁the ▁position ▁of ▁the ▁SF H ▁between ▁its ▁final ▁flight ▁on ▁ 4 ▁November ▁and ▁the ▁incident , ▁and ▁none ▁of ▁them , ▁including ▁C unning ham , ▁had ▁determined ▁the ▁SF H ▁to ▁be ▁mis pla ced . ▁One ▁senior ▁aircraft man ▁who ▁was ▁working ▁that ▁day ▁gave ▁evidence ▁at ▁the ▁in quest ▁about ▁how ▁he ▁had ▁not ▁seen ▁any ▁problems ▁with ▁the ▁e jection ▁seat ▁when ▁he ▁looked ▁at ▁it ▁and ▁that ▁if ▁the ▁seat ▁pin ▁was ▁in ▁the ▁seat , ▁then ▁it ▁was ▁de emed ▁safe . ▁He ▁said ▁" I ▁still ▁believe ▁it ' s ▁not ▁possible , ▁or ▁shouldn ' t ▁be ▁possible , ▁for ▁those ▁other ▁positions . ▁To ▁me , ▁an ▁e jection ▁seat ▁should ▁have ▁two