▁against ▁them , ▁reports ▁Stanley ▁K arn ow . ▁Thomas ▁R icks , ▁in ▁evalu ating ▁the ▁effect iveness ▁of ▁the ▁counter ins ur gency ▁tact ics ▁of ▁the ▁Marine ▁Corps ▁and ▁of ▁the ▁Phoenix ▁program , ▁confirmed ▁their ▁value ▁by ▁reference ▁to ▁" H ano i ' s ▁official ▁history ▁of ▁the ▁war ". ▁If ▁one ▁disc ount s ▁the ▁cor rupt ▁criminal ity ▁and ▁its ▁political ▁fall out , ▁the ▁Phoenix ▁part is ans ▁were ▁perhaps ▁better ▁able ▁tact ically ▁to ▁confront ▁the ▁el us ive ▁V iet ▁Cong ▁support ▁networks , ▁i . e ., ▁the ▁sea ▁in ▁which ▁the ▁fish ▁sw am , ▁than ▁the ▁regular ▁units ▁of ▁the ▁AR V N ▁and ▁the ▁U . ▁S . ▁Army . ▁Yet ▁the ▁military ▁less ons ▁of ▁the ▁war ▁in ▁full ▁complexity ▁were ▁being ▁understood ▁by ▁the ▁Army , ▁later ▁ins isted ▁Colonel ▁Sum mers . ▁ ▁Regarding ▁the ▁Phoenix ▁legacy , ▁a ▁sin ister ▁controvers y ▁ha un ts ▁it . ▁Dist ancing ▁himself , ▁Hel ms ▁summar ized : ▁" As ▁successful ▁a ▁program ▁as ▁P HO EN IX ▁was ▁when ▁gu ided ▁by ▁ener get ic ▁local ▁leaders ," ▁as ▁a ▁national ▁program ▁it ▁succ um bed ▁to ▁political ▁cor ruption ▁and ▁" failed ". ▁Col by ▁admitted ▁serious ▁fault s , ▁yet ▁in ▁conclusion ▁found ▁a ▁positive ▁pre ponder ance . ▁" It ▁was ▁not ▁the ▁C IA ," ▁writes ▁John ▁R anel agh , ▁" that ▁was ▁responsible ▁for ▁the ▁excess es ▁of ▁Phoenix ▁(