’ , ▁or ▁the ▁capacity ▁to ▁respond ▁to ▁imp ing ements ), ▁that ▁is , ▁as ▁a ▁dynamic ▁power . ▁ ▁Brown ' s ▁use ▁in ▁the ▁original ▁Latin ▁of ▁‘ inc it ability ’ ▁( r ather ▁than ▁the ▁more ▁restricted ▁term ▁used ▁in ▁the ▁English ▁– ▁‘ ex cit ability ) ▁contained ▁the ▁germ ▁of ▁a ▁distinction ▁between ▁the ▁sust ent ive ▁( L eb ensk raft ) ▁and ▁gener ative ▁( B ild ung str ieb ) ▁powers , ▁as ▁Col er idge ▁ast utely ▁noted : ▁“ B rown ▁has ▁not ▁proved ▁that ▁the ▁Inc it ability ▁itself ▁cannot ▁be ▁alter ed ▁– ▁not ▁merely ▁thro ’ ▁inc itement ▁– ▁but ▁un m ittle bar ▁[ un medi ated ] – ▁S ays ▁the ▁J ena ▁recens ent , ▁Feb . ▁ 1 7 9 9 , ▁No . ▁ 4 8 ▁( Not ebook s ▁ 1 : 3 8 ). ▁He ▁might ▁have ▁been ▁thinking ▁of ▁Brown ' s ▁discussion ▁of ▁cont ag ious ▁dise ases ▁where in ▁we ▁see ▁this ▁inter play ▁between ▁the ▁general ▁action ▁( ‘ aff ection ’ ) ▁of ▁the ▁sust ent ive ▁power ▁( ex cit ability / ex c itement ) ▁and ▁the ▁more ▁specific ▁and ▁different ▁action ▁of ▁‘ cont ag ions ’ ▁( e . g ., ▁L XX VI : ▁“ Cont ag ious ▁dise ases ▁are ] ▁not ▁an ▁exception ... because ... no ▁general ▁affection ▁follows ▁the ▁application ▁of ▁cont ag ion , ▁if ▁no