▁self - det erm ination . ▁In ▁the ▁event ▁of ▁a ▁" Yes " ▁victory , ▁Par ize au ▁had ▁said ▁he ▁intended ▁to ▁return ▁to ▁the ▁National ▁Assembly ▁of ▁Quebec ▁within ▁two ▁days ▁of ▁the ▁result ▁and ▁seek ▁support ▁for ▁a ▁motion ▁recogn izing ▁the ▁result ▁of ▁the ▁refer endum . ▁In ▁a ▁speech ▁he ▁had ▁prepared ▁in ▁the ▁event ▁of ▁a ▁" Yes " ▁victory , ▁he ▁said ▁a ▁so ver eign ▁Quebec ' s ▁first ▁move ▁would ▁be ▁to ▁" extend ▁a ▁hand ▁to ▁its ▁Canadian ▁neighbour " ▁in ▁partners hip ▁purs u ant ▁to ▁the ▁word ing ▁of ▁the ▁refer endum . ▁ ▁Par ize au ' s ▁immediate ▁plans ▁after ▁the ▁refer endum ▁re lied ▁upon ▁what ▁he ▁felt ▁would ▁be ▁general ▁pressure ▁from ▁economic ▁mark ets ▁and ▁the ▁business ▁community ▁in ▁English ▁Canada ▁to ▁stabil ize ▁the ▁situation ▁as ▁quickly ▁as ▁possible , ▁which ▁he ▁believed ▁would ▁mit ig ate ▁any ▁cat ast roph ic ▁initial ▁events ▁( such ▁as ▁block ades ) ▁and ▁prepare ▁for ▁negoti ations . ▁ ▁Despite ▁the ▁prominent ▁pla cement ▁of ▁B ouch ard ▁in ▁the ▁refer endum ▁campaign , ▁Par ize au ▁planned ▁to ▁retain ▁all ▁authority ▁with ▁regard ▁to ▁negoti ations , ▁and ▁to ▁appoint ▁most ▁members ▁of ▁the ▁neg ot iation ▁team ▁if ▁they ▁were ▁to ▁occur . ▁Par ize au ▁also ▁believed ▁federal ist ▁Quebec ers ▁such ▁as ▁Chr ét ien ▁and ▁Char est ▁would ▁be ▁quickly ▁dis reg arded ▁and ▁replaced ▁at ▁negoti ations ▁by ▁represent atives