ment ▁to ▁the ▁people ▁in ▁their ▁' pers ons , ▁houses , ▁papers , ▁and ▁effects ,' ▁is ▁not ▁extended ▁to ▁the ▁open ▁fields ." ▁This ▁opinion ▁appears ▁to ▁be ▁decided ▁on ▁the ▁basis ▁that ▁" open ▁fields ▁are ▁not ▁a ▁" const itution ally ▁protected ▁area " ▁because ▁they ▁cannot ▁be ▁constru ed ▁as ▁" pers ons , ▁houses , ▁papers , ▁[ or ] ▁effects ." ▁ ▁This ▁method ▁of ▁reasoning ▁gave ▁way ▁with ▁the ▁arrival ▁of ▁the ▁land mark ▁case ▁K atz ▁v . ▁United ▁States , ▁which ▁established ▁a ▁two - part ▁test ▁for ▁what ▁constit utes ▁a ▁search ▁within ▁the ▁meaning ▁of ▁the ▁Four th ▁Am end ment . ▁The ▁relevant ▁criteria ▁are ▁" first ▁that ▁a ▁person ▁have ▁exhib ited ▁an ▁actual ▁( subject ive ) ▁expectation ▁of ▁priv acy ▁and , ▁second , ▁that ▁the ▁expectation ▁be ▁one ▁that ▁society ▁is ▁prepared ▁to ▁recognize ▁as ▁reasonable ' ." ▁Under ▁this ▁new ▁analysis ▁of ▁the ▁Four th ▁Am end ment , ▁a ▁search ▁of ▁an ▁object ▁or ▁area ▁where ▁a ▁person ▁has ▁no ▁reasonable ▁expectation ▁of ▁priv acy ▁is , ▁in ▁a ▁legal ▁sense , ▁not ▁a ▁search ▁at ▁all . ▁That ▁search , ▁therefore , ▁does ▁not ▁trigger ▁the ▁prote ctions ▁of ▁the ▁Four th ▁Am end ment . ▁ ▁In ▁Oliver ▁v . ▁United ▁States , ▁the ▁Supreme ▁Court ▁held ▁that ▁a ▁priv acy ▁expectation ▁regarding ▁an ▁open ▁field ▁is ▁un reason able : ▁ ▁… ▁open ▁fields ▁do ▁not ▁provide ▁the ▁setting ▁for ▁those