▁will ▁with ▁the ▁ability ▁to ▁make ▁rational ▁dec isions . ▁ ▁A ▁different ▁approach ▁to ▁the ▁d ile m ma ▁is ▁that ▁of ▁in compat ibil ists , ▁namely , ▁that ▁if ▁the ▁world ▁is ▁determin istic , ▁then ▁our ▁feeling ▁that ▁we ▁are ▁free ▁to ▁choose ▁an ▁action ▁is ▁simply ▁an ▁ill usion . ▁Met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ism ▁is ▁the ▁form ▁of ▁in compat ibil ism ▁which ▁pos its ▁that ▁determin ism ▁is ▁false ▁and ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁possible ▁( at ▁least ▁some ▁people ▁have ▁free ▁will ). ▁This ▁view ▁is ▁associated ▁with ▁non - material ist ▁constru ctions , ▁including ▁both ▁traditional ▁dual ism , ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁models ▁supporting ▁more ▁minimal ▁criteria ; ▁such ▁as ▁the ▁ability ▁to ▁cons ci ously ▁v eto ▁an ▁action ▁or ▁compet ing ▁desire . ▁Yet ▁even ▁with ▁physical ▁ind et erm in ism , ▁arguments ▁have ▁been ▁made ▁against ▁libert arian ism ▁in ▁that ▁it ▁is ▁difficult ▁to ▁assign ▁Orig ination ▁( respons ibility ▁for ▁" free " ▁ind et erm in istic ▁choices ). ▁ ▁Free ▁will ▁here ▁is ▁pre domin antly ▁treated ▁with ▁respect ▁to ▁physical ▁determin ism ▁in ▁the ▁strict ▁sense ▁of ▁nom ological ▁determin ism , ▁although ▁other ▁forms ▁of ▁determin ism ▁are ▁also ▁relevant ▁to ▁free ▁will . ▁For ▁example , ▁logical ▁and ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁challenge ▁met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ism ▁with ▁ideas ▁of ▁dest iny ▁and ▁fate , ▁and ▁bi ological , ▁cultural ▁and ▁psych ological ▁determin ism ▁feed ▁the ▁development