▁" con cludes ▁and ▁termin ates ▁coun sel . ▁Now ▁coun sel ▁is ▁terminated , ▁first , ▁by ▁the ▁judgment ▁of ▁reason ; ▁second ly , ▁by ▁the ▁accept ation ▁of ▁the ▁app et ite ▁[ that ▁is , ▁the ▁free - will ] ." ▁ ▁A ▁compat ibil ist ▁interpretation ▁of ▁Aqu inas ' s ▁view ▁is ▁def ended ▁thus : ▁" Free - will ▁is ▁the ▁cause ▁of ▁its ▁own ▁movement , ▁because ▁by ▁his ▁free - will ▁man ▁moves ▁himself ▁to ▁act . ▁But ▁it ▁does ▁not ▁of ▁necessity ▁belong ▁to ▁liberty ▁that ▁what ▁is ▁free ▁should ▁be ▁the ▁first ▁cause ▁of ▁itself , ▁as ▁neither ▁for ▁one ▁thing ▁to ▁be ▁cause ▁of ▁another ▁need ▁it ▁be ▁the ▁first ▁cause . ▁God , ▁therefore , ▁is ▁the ▁first ▁cause , ▁Who ▁moves ▁causes ▁both ▁natural ▁and ▁volunt ary . ▁And ▁just ▁as ▁by ▁moving ▁natural ▁causes ▁He ▁does ▁not ▁prevent ▁their ▁acts ▁being ▁natural , ▁so ▁by ▁moving ▁volunt ary ▁causes ▁He ▁does ▁not ▁dep rive ▁their ▁actions ▁of ▁being ▁volunt ary : ▁but ▁rather ▁is ▁He ▁the ▁cause ▁of ▁this ▁very ▁thing ▁in ▁them ; ▁for ▁He ▁oper ates ▁in ▁each ▁thing ▁according ▁to ▁its ▁own ▁nature ." F ur ther ▁discussion ▁of ▁this ▁compat ibil istic ▁theory ▁can ▁be ▁found ▁in ▁Thomas ' ▁Sum ma ▁contra ▁gent iles , ▁Book ▁III ▁about ▁Prov idence , ▁c . ▁ 8 8 – 9 1 ▁( 2 6 0 – 2 6 7 ), ▁where ▁it ▁is ▁post ulated ▁that