▁The ▁prisoner ' s ▁reasoning , ▁which ▁gives ▁rise ▁to ▁the ▁par ado x , ▁is ▁able ▁to ▁get ▁off ▁the ▁ground ▁because ▁the ▁prisoner ▁t ac it ly ▁assumes ▁that ▁on ▁Monday ▁evening , ▁he ▁will ▁( if ▁he ▁is ▁still ▁alive ) ▁know ▁S 1 , ▁S 2 , ▁and ▁S 3 ▁to ▁be ▁true . ▁ ▁This ▁assumption ▁seems ▁unw arr anted ▁on ▁several ▁different ▁grounds . ▁ ▁It ▁may ▁be ▁argued ▁that ▁the ▁judge ' s ▁pron oun cement ▁that ▁something ▁is ▁true ▁can ▁never ▁be ▁sufficient ▁grounds ▁for ▁the ▁prisoner ▁knowing ▁that ▁it ▁is ▁true . ▁ ▁Further , ▁even ▁if ▁the ▁prisoner ▁knows ▁something ▁to ▁be ▁true ▁in ▁the ▁present ▁moment , ▁unknown ▁psych ological ▁factors ▁may ▁er ase ▁this ▁knowledge ▁in ▁the ▁future . ▁ ▁Finally , ▁Ch ow ▁suggests ▁that ▁because ▁the ▁statement ▁which ▁the ▁prisoner ▁is ▁supposed ▁to ▁" know " ▁to ▁be ▁true ▁is ▁a ▁statement ▁about ▁his ▁in ability ▁to ▁" know " ▁certain ▁things , ▁there ▁is ▁reason ▁to ▁believe ▁that ▁the ▁unexpected ▁h anging ▁par ado x ▁is ▁simply ▁a ▁more ▁intr icate ▁version ▁of ▁Moore ' s ▁par ado x . ▁ ▁A ▁suitable ▁anal ogy ▁can ▁be ▁reached ▁by ▁reducing ▁the ▁length ▁of ▁the ▁week ▁to ▁just ▁one ▁day . ▁Then ▁the ▁judge ' s ▁sentence ▁becomes : ▁You ▁will ▁be ▁h anged ▁tom orrow , ▁but ▁you ▁do ▁not ▁know ▁that . ▁ ▁It ▁has ▁been ▁suggested ▁that ▁the ▁prisoner ’ s ▁logical ▁elim ination ▁makes ▁any