▁eventually ▁revers ed ▁the ▁Japanese ▁advance . ▁While ▁six ▁of ▁the ▁eight ▁batt les hips ▁were ▁rep a ired ▁and ▁returned ▁to ▁service , ▁their ▁relatively ▁low ▁speed ▁and ▁high ▁fuel ▁consumption ▁limited ▁their ▁deployment , ▁and ▁they ▁served ▁mainly ▁in ▁shore ▁bomb ard ment ▁roles ▁( the ir ▁only ▁major ▁action ▁being ▁the ▁Battle ▁of ▁Sur iga o ▁Stra it ▁in ▁October ▁ 1 9 4 4 ). ▁A ▁major ▁f law ▁of ▁Japanese ▁strateg ic ▁thinking ▁was ▁a ▁belief ▁that ▁the ▁ult imate ▁Pacific ▁battle ▁would ▁be ▁fought ▁by ▁batt les hips , ▁in ▁keeping ▁with ▁the ▁doctrine ▁of ▁Captain ▁Alfred ▁Th ayer ▁Mah an . ▁As ▁a ▁result , ▁Yam am oto ▁( and ▁his ▁success ors ) ▁ho arded ▁batt les hips ▁for ▁a ▁" de cis ive ▁battle " ▁that ▁never ▁happened . ▁ ▁The ▁Japanese ▁confidence ▁in ▁their ▁ability ▁to ▁win ▁a ▁quick ▁victory ▁meant ▁that ▁they ▁neglect ed ▁Pear l ▁Har bor ' s ▁n avy ▁repair ▁yards , ▁oil ▁tank ▁far ms , ▁sub marine ▁base , ▁and ▁old ▁headquarters ▁building . ▁All ▁of ▁these ▁targets ▁were ▁omitted ▁from ▁G enda ' s ▁list , ▁yet ▁they ▁proved ▁more ▁important ▁than ▁any ▁batt les hip ▁to ▁the ▁American ▁war ▁effort ▁in ▁the ▁Pacific . ▁The ▁surv ival ▁of ▁the ▁repair ▁sh ops ▁and ▁fuel ▁dep ots ▁allowed ▁Pear l ▁Har bor ▁to ▁maintain ▁log ist ical ▁support ▁to ▁the ▁U . S . ▁Navy ' s ▁operations , ▁such ▁as ▁the ▁D ool ittle ▁Ra