▁the ▁Battle ▁of ▁T ann enberg ▁between ▁ 2 6 ▁and ▁ 3 0 ▁August ▁ 1 9 1 4 . ▁ ▁As ▁the ▁battle ▁unfold ed ▁and ▁the ▁danger ▁to ▁the ▁Second ▁Army ▁became ▁clear , ▁the ▁First ▁Army ▁finally ▁respond ed ▁by ▁sending ▁units ▁to ▁help . ▁By ▁the ▁time ▁the ▁battle ▁proper ▁ended ▁on ▁ 3 0 ▁August ▁the ▁closest ▁of ▁R enn enk ampf ' s ▁units , ▁his ▁II ▁Corps , ▁was ▁still ▁over ▁ 4 5 ▁miles ▁( 7 0   km ) ▁from ▁the ▁pocket . ▁In ▁order ▁to ▁get ▁even ▁this ▁close , ▁his ▁units ▁had ▁to ▁r ush ▁south ward ▁and ▁were ▁now ▁spread ▁out ▁over ▁a ▁long ▁line ▁running ▁south ward ▁from ▁just ▁east ▁of ▁König s berg . ▁An ▁attack ▁by ▁the ▁German ▁E ighth ▁Army ▁from ▁the ▁west ▁would ▁fl ank ▁the ▁entire ▁army . ▁Of ▁course , ▁the ▁Germ ans ▁were ▁also ▁far ▁away , ▁but ▁unlike ▁the ▁Rus si ans , ▁the ▁Germ ans ▁could ▁easily ▁close ▁the ▁distance ▁using ▁their ▁rail ▁network ▁in ▁the ▁area . ▁ ▁On ▁ 3 1 ▁August , ▁with ▁T ann enberg ▁lost , ▁Zh il in sky ▁ordered ▁R enn enk ampf ▁to ▁stand ▁his ▁ground ▁in ▁the ▁event ▁of ▁a ▁German ▁attack . ▁Real izing ▁his ▁forces ▁were ▁too ▁spread ▁out ▁to ▁be ▁effective , ▁he ▁ordered ▁a ▁withdraw al ▁to ▁a ▁line ▁running ▁from ▁König s berg ' s ▁def ensive ▁works ▁in ▁the ▁north ▁to ▁the ▁Mas ur ian