▁at ▁least ▁possible ) ▁and ▁hard ▁determin ism ▁( the ▁claim ▁that ▁determin ism ▁is ▁true ▁and ▁thus ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁not ▁possible ). ▁In compat ibil ism ▁also ▁en comp ass es ▁hard ▁in compat ibil ism , ▁which ▁holds ▁not ▁only ▁determin ism ▁but ▁also ▁its ▁neg ation ▁to ▁be ▁in compatible ▁with ▁free ▁will ▁and ▁thus ▁free ▁will ▁to ▁be ▁impossible ▁whatever ▁the ▁case ▁may ▁be ▁regarding ▁determin ism . ▁Since ▁free ▁will ▁implies ▁the ▁existence ▁of ▁alternative ▁out comes , ▁an ▁action ▁can ▁be ▁said ▁to ▁be ▁freely ▁w illed ▁if ▁and ▁only ▁if ▁the ▁agent ▁could ▁have ▁chosen ▁differently . ▁ ▁In ▁contrast , ▁compat ibil ists ▁hold ▁that ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁compatible ▁with ▁determin ism . ▁Some ▁compat ibil ists ▁even ▁hold ▁that ▁determin ism ▁is ▁necessary ▁for ▁free ▁will , ▁arg uing ▁that ▁choice ▁involves ▁preference ▁for ▁one ▁course ▁of ▁action ▁over ▁another , ▁requiring ▁a ▁sense ▁of ▁how ▁choices ▁will ▁turn ▁out . ▁Comp at ibil ists ▁thus ▁consider ▁the ▁debate ▁between ▁libert ari ans ▁and ▁hard ▁determin ists ▁over ▁free ▁will ▁vs ▁determin ism ▁a ▁false ▁d ile m ma . ▁D ifferent ▁compat ibil ists ▁offer ▁very ▁different ▁definitions ▁of ▁what ▁" free ▁will " ▁even ▁means ▁and ▁consequ ently ▁find ▁different ▁types ▁of ▁constraints ▁to ▁be ▁relevant ▁to ▁the ▁issue . ▁Class ical ▁compat ibil ists ▁considered ▁free ▁will ▁nothing ▁more ▁than ▁freedom ▁of ▁action , ▁considering ▁one ▁free ▁of ▁will ▁simply ▁if , ▁had ▁one ▁counter fact ually ▁wanted ▁to ▁do