▁movement ▁across ▁the ▁Confeder ate ▁front ▁and ▁B rag g ▁saw ▁another ▁off ensive ▁opportunity . ▁He ▁ordered ▁L t . ▁Gen . ▁Leon idas ▁Pol k ▁to ▁attack ▁C ritt enden ' s ▁lead ▁division , ▁under ▁Brig . ▁Gen . ▁Thomas ▁J . ▁Wood , ▁at ▁dawn ▁on ▁September ▁ 1 3 , ▁with ▁Pol k ' s ▁corps ▁and ▁Walker ' s ▁corps . ▁B rag g ▁rode ▁to ▁the ▁scene ▁after ▁hearing ▁no ▁sound ▁of ▁battle ▁and ▁found ▁that ▁there ▁were ▁no ▁prepar ations ▁being ▁made ▁to ▁attack . ▁Once ▁again , ▁B rag g ▁was ▁angry ▁that ▁one ▁of ▁his ▁sub ordinates ▁did ▁not ▁attack ▁as ▁ordered , ▁but ▁by ▁that ▁morning ▁it ▁was ▁too ▁late — all ▁of ▁C ritt enden ' s ▁corps ▁had ▁passed ▁by ▁and ▁concentr ated ▁at ▁Lee ▁and ▁Gordon ' s ▁Mill . ▁ ▁For ▁the ▁next ▁four ▁days , ▁both ▁arm ies ▁attempted ▁to ▁improve ▁their ▁dispos itions . ▁Rose cr ans ▁continued ▁to ▁concent rate ▁his ▁forces , ▁int ending ▁to ▁withdraw ▁as ▁a ▁single ▁body ▁to ▁Ch att ano oga . ▁B rag g , ▁learning ▁of ▁McC ook ' s ▁movement ▁at ▁Al pine , ▁fe ared ▁the ▁Feder als ▁might ▁be ▁planning ▁a ▁double ▁en velop ment . ▁At ▁a ▁council ▁of ▁war ▁on ▁September ▁ 1 5 , ▁B rag g ' s ▁corps ▁command ers ▁agreed ▁that ▁an ▁off ensive ▁in ▁the ▁direction ▁of ▁Ch att ano oga ▁offered ▁their ▁best ▁option . ▁ ▁By