▁believe ▁freedom ▁can ▁be ▁present ▁or ▁absent ▁in ▁a ▁situation ▁for ▁reasons ▁that ▁have ▁nothing ▁to ▁do ▁with ▁met aph ys ics . ▁For ▁instance , ▁courts ▁of ▁law ▁make ▁jud g ments ▁about ▁whether ▁individuals ▁are ▁acting ▁under ▁their ▁own ▁free ▁will ▁under ▁certain ▁circumstances ▁without ▁bringing ▁in ▁met aph ys ics . ▁Similarly , ▁political ▁liberty ▁is ▁a ▁non - met aph ys ical ▁concept . ▁Like wise , ▁some ▁compat ibil ists ▁define ▁free ▁will ▁as ▁freedom ▁to ▁act ▁according ▁to ▁one ' s ▁determined ▁mot ives ▁without ▁h ind rance ▁from ▁other ▁individuals . ▁So ▁for ▁example ▁Arist ot le ▁in ▁his ▁Nic om ache an ▁Eth ics , ▁and ▁the ▁Sto ic ▁Ch ry si pp us . ▁In ▁contrast , ▁the ▁in compat ibil ist ▁positions ▁are ▁concerned ▁with ▁a ▁sort ▁of ▁" met aph ys ically ▁free ▁will ", ▁which ▁compat ibil ists ▁claim ▁has ▁never ▁been ▁coh er ently ▁defined . ▁Comp at ibil ists ▁argue ▁that ▁determin ism ▁does ▁not ▁matter ; ▁though ▁they ▁disag ree ▁among ▁themselves ▁about ▁what , ▁in ▁turn , ▁does ▁matter . ▁To ▁be ▁a ▁compat ibil ist , ▁one ▁need ▁not ▁end or se ▁any ▁particular ▁conception ▁of ▁free ▁will , ▁but ▁only ▁den y ▁that ▁determin ism ▁is ▁at ▁odd s ▁with ▁free ▁will . ▁ ▁Although ▁there ▁are ▁various ▁imped iments ▁to ▁exer cis ing ▁one ' s ▁choices , ▁free ▁will ▁does ▁not ▁imply ▁freedom ▁of ▁action . ▁Fre edom ▁of ▁choice ▁( fre edom