▁to ▁select ▁one ' s ▁will ) ▁is ▁log ically ▁separate ▁from ▁freedom ▁to ▁implement ▁that ▁choice ▁( fre edom ▁to ▁en act ▁one ' s ▁will ), ▁although ▁not ▁all ▁writers ▁observe ▁this ▁distinction . ▁Non eth eless , ▁some ▁philosoph ers ▁have ▁defined ▁free ▁will ▁as ▁the ▁absence ▁of ▁various ▁imped iments . ▁Some ▁" mod ern ▁compat ibil ists ", ▁such ▁as ▁Harry ▁Frankfurt ▁and ▁Daniel ▁Den nett , ▁argue ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁simply ▁freely ▁choosing ▁to ▁do ▁what ▁constraints ▁allow ▁one ▁to ▁do . ▁In ▁other ▁words , ▁a ▁co er ced ▁agent ' s ▁choices ▁can ▁still ▁be ▁free ▁if ▁such ▁co erc ion ▁coinc ides ▁with ▁the ▁agent ' s ▁personal ▁intent ions ▁and ▁des ires . ▁ ▁Free ▁will ▁as ▁lack ▁of ▁physical ▁rest raint ▁Most ▁" class ical ▁compat ibil ists ", ▁such ▁as ▁Thomas ▁Hob bes , ▁claim ▁that ▁a ▁person ▁is ▁acting ▁on ▁the ▁person ' s ▁own ▁will ▁only ▁when ▁it ▁is ▁the ▁desire ▁of ▁that ▁person ▁to ▁do ▁the ▁act , ▁and ▁also ▁possible ▁for ▁the ▁person ▁to ▁be ▁able ▁to ▁do ▁otherwise , ▁if ▁the ▁person ▁had ▁decided ▁to . ▁Hob bes ▁sometimes ▁attributes ▁such ▁compat ibil ist ▁freedom ▁to ▁each ▁individual ▁and ▁not ▁to ▁some ▁abstract ▁notion ▁of ▁will , ▁as ser ting , ▁for ▁example , ▁that ▁" no ▁liberty ▁can ▁be ▁infer red ▁to ▁the ▁will , ▁desire , ▁or ▁incl ination , ▁but ▁the ▁liberty ▁of ▁the ▁man ; ▁which ▁consist eth ▁in ▁this , ▁that