▁physical ▁ind et erm in ism . ▁Non - ca us al ▁accounts ▁often ▁claim ▁that ▁each ▁intent ional ▁action ▁requires ▁a ▁choice ▁or ▁vol ition   – ▁a ▁willing , ▁trying , ▁or ▁endeav oring ▁on ▁beh alf ▁of ▁the ▁agent ▁( such ▁as ▁the ▁cogn itive ▁component ▁of ▁lif ting ▁one ' s ▁arm ). ▁Such ▁intent ional ▁actions ▁are ▁interpreted ▁as ▁free ▁actions . ▁It ▁has ▁been ▁suggested , ▁however , ▁that ▁such ▁acting ▁cannot ▁be ▁said ▁to ▁exercise ▁control ▁over ▁anything ▁in ▁particular . ▁According ▁to ▁non - ca us al ▁accounts , ▁the ▁caus ation ▁by ▁the ▁agent ▁cannot ▁be ▁anal ys ed ▁in ▁terms ▁of ▁caus ation ▁by ▁mental ▁states ▁or ▁events , ▁including ▁desire , ▁belief , ▁intention ▁of ▁something ▁in ▁particular , ▁but ▁rather ▁is ▁considered ▁a ▁matter ▁of ▁sp ont ane ity ▁and ▁cre ativity . ▁The ▁exercise ▁of ▁intent ▁in ▁such ▁intent ional ▁actions ▁is ▁not ▁that ▁which ▁determ ines ▁their ▁freedom   – ▁intent ional ▁actions ▁are ▁rather ▁self - gener ating . ▁The ▁" act ish ▁feel " ▁of ▁some ▁intent ional ▁actions ▁do ▁not ▁" const itute ▁that ▁event ' s ▁activ eness , ▁or ▁the ▁agent ' s ▁exercise ▁of ▁active ▁control ", ▁rather ▁they ▁" m ight ▁be ▁brought ▁about ▁by ▁direct ▁stim ulation ▁of ▁someone ' s ▁brain , ▁in ▁the ▁absence ▁of ▁any ▁relevant ▁desire ▁or ▁intention ▁on ▁the ▁part ▁of ▁that ▁person ". ▁Another ▁question ▁raised ▁by ▁such ▁non - ca us al ▁theory ,