ind et erm in istic ) ▁free ▁will ▁or ▁compat ibil istic ▁( det erm in istic ) ▁free ▁will . ▁Having ▁participants ▁read ▁articles ▁that ▁simply ▁" dis pro ve ▁free ▁will " ▁is ▁unlikely ▁to ▁increase ▁their ▁understanding ▁of ▁determin ism , ▁or ▁the ▁compat ibil istic ▁free ▁will ▁that ▁it ▁still ▁perm its . ▁In ▁other ▁words , ▁experimental ▁manip ulations ▁pur port ing ▁to ▁" pro voke ▁dis bel ief ▁in ▁free ▁will " ▁may ▁instead ▁cause ▁a ▁belief ▁in ▁fatal ism , ▁which ▁may ▁provide ▁an ▁alternative ▁explanation ▁for ▁previous ▁experimental ▁find ings . ▁To ▁test ▁the ▁effects ▁of ▁belief ▁in ▁determin ism , ▁it ▁has ▁been ▁argued ▁that ▁future ▁studies ▁would ▁need ▁to ▁provide ▁articles ▁that ▁do ▁not ▁simply ▁" att ack ▁free ▁will ", ▁but ▁instead ▁focus ▁on ▁explaining ▁determin ism ▁and ▁compat ibil ism . Some ▁studies ▁have ▁been ▁conducted ▁indicating ▁that ▁people ▁react ▁strongly ▁to ▁the ▁way ▁in ▁which ▁mental ▁determin ism ▁is ▁described , ▁when ▁recon cil ing ▁it ▁with ▁moral ▁responsibility . ▁Edd y ▁N ah mi as ▁has ▁noted ▁that ▁when ▁people ' s ▁actions ▁are ▁fr amed ▁with ▁respect ▁to ▁their ▁belief s ▁and ▁des ires ▁( r ather ▁than ▁their ▁ne uro log ical ▁under p inn ings ), ▁they ▁are ▁more ▁likely ▁to ▁dis soci ate ▁determin ism ▁from ▁moral ▁responsibility . ▁See ▁▁ ▁Ba ume ister ▁and ▁colle agues ▁also ▁note ▁that ▁volunte ers ▁dis bel ieving ▁in ▁free ▁will ▁are ▁less ▁capable ▁of ▁counter fact ual