▁any ▁chance ▁of ▁victory . ▁Third , ▁to ▁deliver ▁a ▁blow ▁to ▁America ' s ▁ability ▁to ▁mobil ize ▁its ▁forces ▁in ▁the ▁Pacific , ▁batt les hips ▁were ▁chosen ▁as ▁the ▁main ▁targets , ▁since ▁they ▁were ▁the ▁prest ige ▁ships ▁of ▁any ▁n avy ▁at ▁the ▁time . ▁Finally , ▁it ▁was ▁hoped ▁that ▁the ▁attack ▁would ▁und erm ine ▁American ▁mor ale ▁such ▁that ▁the ▁U . S . ▁government ▁would ▁drop ▁its ▁dem ands ▁contrary ▁to ▁Japanese ▁interests , ▁and ▁would ▁seek ▁a ▁comprom ise ▁peace ▁with ▁Japan . ▁ ▁St rik ing ▁the ▁Pacific ▁Fle et ▁at ▁anchor ▁in ▁Pear l ▁Har bor ▁carried ▁two ▁distinct ▁dis adv antages : ▁the ▁target ed ▁ships ▁would ▁be ▁in ▁very ▁shall ow ▁water , ▁so ▁it ▁would ▁be ▁relatively ▁easy ▁to ▁salv age ▁and ▁possibly ▁repair ▁them ; ▁and ▁most ▁of ▁the ▁cre ws ▁would ▁surv ive ▁the ▁attack , ▁since ▁many ▁would ▁be ▁on ▁shore ▁leave ▁or ▁would ▁be ▁res cu ed ▁from ▁the ▁har bor . ▁A ▁further ▁important ▁dis adv antage — this ▁of ▁timing , ▁and ▁known ▁to ▁the ▁Japanese — was ▁the ▁absence ▁from ▁Pear l ▁Har bor ▁of ▁all ▁three ▁of ▁the ▁U . S . ▁Pacific ▁Fle et ' s ▁aircraft ▁carri ers ▁( , ▁, ▁and ▁). ▁I J N ▁top ▁command ▁was ▁attached ▁to ▁Admir al ▁Mah an ' s ▁" de cis ive ▁battle " ▁doctrine , ▁especially ▁that ▁of ▁destroy ing ▁the ▁maximum ▁number ▁of ▁batt les hips .