▁task ▁force ' s ▁fuel ▁situation ▁did ▁not ▁permit ▁him ▁to ▁remain ▁in ▁waters ▁north ▁of ▁Pear l ▁Har bor ▁much ▁longer , ▁since ▁he ▁was ▁at ▁the ▁very ▁limit ▁of ▁log ist ical ▁support . ▁To ▁do ▁so ▁risk ed ▁running ▁un accept ably ▁low ▁on ▁fuel , ▁perhaps ▁even ▁having ▁to ▁abandon ▁destroy ers ▁en ▁route ▁home . ▁ ▁He ▁believed ▁the ▁second ▁strike ▁had ▁essentially ▁satisfied ▁the ▁main ▁objective ▁of ▁his ▁mission — the ▁neutral ization ▁of ▁the ▁Pacific ▁Fle et — and ▁did ▁not ▁wish ▁to ▁risk ▁further ▁losses . ▁Moreover , ▁it ▁was ▁Japanese ▁Navy ▁practice ▁to ▁prefer ▁the ▁conservation ▁of ▁strength ▁over ▁the ▁total ▁destruction ▁of ▁the ▁enemy . ▁ ▁At ▁a ▁conference ▁ab o ard ▁his ▁flags hip ▁the ▁following ▁morning , ▁Yam am oto ▁supported ▁Nag um o ' s ▁withdraw al ▁without ▁launch ing ▁a ▁third ▁wave . ▁In ▁ret ros pect , ▁sp aring ▁the ▁vital ▁dock y ards , ▁maintenance ▁sh ops , ▁and ▁the ▁oil ▁tank ▁farm ▁meant ▁the ▁U . S . ▁could ▁respond ▁relatively ▁quickly ▁to ▁Japanese ▁activities ▁in ▁the ▁Pacific . ▁Yam am oto ▁later ▁reg rett ed ▁Nag um o ' s ▁decision ▁to ▁withdraw ▁and ▁categor ically ▁stated ▁it ▁had ▁been ▁a ▁great ▁mistake ▁not ▁to ▁order ▁a ▁third ▁strike . ▁ ▁Sh ips ▁lost ▁or ▁dam aged ▁ ▁Tw enty - one ▁ships ▁were ▁dam aged ▁or ▁lost ▁in ▁the ▁attack , ▁of ▁which ▁all ▁but ▁three ▁were ▁rep a ired ▁and ▁returned ▁to ▁service