▁training ▁mode ▁for ▁months , ▁but ▁was ▁not ▁yet ▁oper ational . ▁The ▁operators , ▁Priv ates ▁George ▁Elli ot ▁Jr . ▁and ▁Joseph ▁Lock ard , ▁reported ▁a ▁target . ▁But ▁Lieutenant ▁K erm it ▁A . ▁Ty ler , ▁a ▁newly ▁assigned ▁officer ▁at ▁the ▁thin ly ▁man ned ▁Inter cept ▁Center , ▁pres umed ▁it ▁was ▁the ▁scheduled ▁arrival ▁of ▁six ▁B - 1 7 ▁bom bers ▁from ▁California . ▁The ▁Japanese ▁plan es ▁were ▁approaching ▁from ▁a ▁direction ▁very ▁close ▁( only ▁a ▁few ▁degrees ▁difference ) ▁to ▁the ▁bom bers , ▁and ▁while ▁the ▁operators ▁had ▁never ▁seen ▁a ▁formation ▁as ▁large ▁on ▁rad ar , ▁they ▁neglect ed ▁to ▁tell ▁Ty ler ▁of ▁its ▁size . ▁Ty ler , ▁for ▁security ▁reasons , ▁could ▁not ▁tell ▁the ▁operators ▁of ▁the ▁six ▁B - 1 7 s ▁that ▁were ▁due ▁( even ▁though ▁it ▁was ▁widely ▁known ). ▁ ▁As ▁the ▁first ▁wave ▁plan es ▁approached ▁O ahu , ▁they ▁encountered ▁and ▁shot ▁down ▁several ▁U . S . ▁aircraft . ▁At ▁least ▁one ▁of ▁these ▁radio ed ▁a ▁somewhat ▁in co her ent ▁warning . ▁Other ▁warnings ▁from ▁ships ▁off ▁the ▁har bor ▁entrance ▁were ▁still ▁being ▁processed ▁or ▁await ing ▁confirm ation ▁when ▁the ▁attack ing ▁plan es ▁began ▁bomb ing ▁and ▁st raf ing . ▁Nevertheless , ▁it ▁is ▁not ▁clear ▁any ▁warnings ▁would ▁have ▁had ▁much ▁effect ▁even ▁if ▁they ▁had ▁been ▁interpreted ▁correctly ▁and ▁much ▁more ▁prompt ly . ▁The ▁results ▁the ▁Japanese