▁of ▁Tennessee ▁camp ed ▁for ▁the ▁night , ▁una ware ▁that ▁the ▁Union ▁army ▁had ▁sli pped ▁from ▁their ▁grasp . ▁B rag g ▁was ▁not ▁able ▁to ▁mount ▁the ▁kind ▁of ▁purs uit ▁that ▁would ▁have ▁been ▁necessary ▁to ▁cause ▁Rose cr ans ▁significant ▁further ▁damage . ▁Many ▁of ▁his ▁troops ▁had ▁arrived ▁hurried ly ▁at ▁Ch ick am aug a ▁by ▁rail , ▁without ▁w ag ons ▁to ▁transport ▁them , ▁and ▁many ▁of ▁the ▁art illery ▁horses ▁had ▁been ▁injured ▁or ▁killed ▁during ▁the ▁battle . ▁The ▁Tennessee ▁River ▁was ▁now ▁an ▁obst acle ▁to ▁the ▁Confeder ates ▁and ▁B rag g ▁had ▁no ▁p onto on ▁brid ges ▁to ▁effect ▁a ▁crossing . ▁B rag g ' s ▁army ▁paused ▁at ▁Ch ick am aug a ▁to ▁re organ ize ▁and ▁gather ▁equipment ▁lost ▁by ▁the ▁Union ▁army . ▁Although ▁Rose cr ans ▁had ▁been ▁able ▁to ▁save ▁most ▁of ▁his ▁trains , ▁large ▁quantities ▁of ▁am mun ition ▁and ▁arms ▁had ▁been ▁left ▁behind . ▁Army ▁of ▁Tennessee ▁historian ▁Thomas ▁L . ▁Con nel ly ▁has ▁critic ized ▁B rag g ' s ▁performance , ▁claim ing ▁that ▁for ▁over ▁four ▁hours ▁on ▁the ▁afternoon ▁of ▁September ▁ 2 0 , ▁he ▁missed ▁several ▁good ▁opportun ities ▁to ▁prevent ▁the ▁Union ▁escape , ▁such ▁as ▁by ▁a ▁purs uit ▁up ▁the ▁D ry ▁Valley ▁Road ▁to ▁Mc F ar land ' s ▁G ap , ▁or ▁by ▁moving ▁a ▁division ▁( such ▁as ▁Che ath am ' s