.) ▁The ▁third ▁lieutenant ▁general ▁of ▁the ▁army , ▁D . H . ▁Hill , ▁was ▁not ▁informed ▁directly ▁by ▁B rag g ▁of ▁his ▁effective ▁dem otion ▁to ▁be ▁Pol k ' s ▁sub ordinate , ▁but ▁he ▁learned ▁his ▁status ▁from ▁a ▁staff ▁officer . ▁ ▁What ▁Hill ▁did ▁not ▁learn ▁was ▁his ▁role ▁in ▁the ▁up coming ▁battle . ▁The ▁cou rier ▁sent ▁with ▁written ▁orders ▁was ▁not ▁able ▁to ▁find ▁Hill ▁and ▁returned ▁to ▁his ▁unit ▁without ▁inform ing ▁anyone . ▁Maj . ▁Gen . ▁John ▁C . ▁Bre ck in ridge , ▁one ▁of ▁Hill ' s ▁division ▁command ers , ▁was ▁at ▁Pol k ' s ▁headquarters , ▁but ▁was ▁not ▁informed ▁that ▁his ▁division ▁was ▁to ▁initi ate ▁the ▁dawn ▁attack . ▁At ▁ 5 ▁a . m . ▁on ▁September ▁ 2 0 , ▁Pol k ▁was ▁aw ak ened ▁on ▁the ▁cold ▁and ▁fog gy ▁battle field ▁to ▁find ▁that ▁Hill ▁was ▁not ▁prepar ing ▁to ▁attack . ▁He ▁prepared ▁new ▁written ▁orders , ▁which ▁reached ▁Hill ▁about ▁ 6 ▁a . m . ▁Hill ▁respond ed ▁with ▁a ▁number ▁of ▁reasons ▁for ▁delay ing ▁the ▁attack , ▁including ▁read just ments ▁of ▁the ▁alignment ▁of ▁his ▁units , ▁reconna issance ▁of ▁the ▁enemy ▁line , ▁and ▁issu ing ▁breakfast ▁r ations ▁to ▁his ▁men . ▁Rel uct antly , ▁B rag g ▁agreed . ▁ ▁On ▁the ▁Union ▁side , ▁Rose cr ans ▁held ▁a ▁council ▁of ▁war ▁with ▁most ▁of ▁his ▁corps