. ▁Second arily , ▁met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ▁free ▁will ▁must ▁assert ▁influence ▁on ▁physical ▁reality , ▁and ▁where ▁mind ▁is ▁responsible ▁for ▁such ▁influence ▁( as ▁opposed ▁to ▁ordinary ▁system ▁random ness ), ▁it ▁must ▁be ▁distinct ▁from ▁body ▁to ▁accomplish ▁this . ▁Both ▁subst ance ▁and ▁property ▁dual ism ▁offer ▁such ▁a ▁distinction , ▁and ▁those ▁particular ▁models ▁there of ▁that ▁are ▁not ▁caus ally ▁in ert ▁with ▁respect ▁to ▁the ▁physical ▁world ▁provide ▁a ▁basis ▁for ▁illustr ating ▁in compat ibil ist ▁free ▁will ▁( i . e . ▁interaction al ist ▁dual ism ▁and ▁non - re duct ive ▁physical ism ). ▁ ▁It ▁has ▁been ▁noted ▁that ▁the ▁laws ▁of ▁physics ▁have ▁yet ▁to ▁resolve ▁the ▁hard ▁problem ▁of ▁conscious ness : ▁" Sol ving ▁the ▁hard ▁problem ▁of ▁conscious ness ▁involves ▁determ ining ▁how ▁phys i ological ▁processes ▁such ▁as ▁ ions ▁flow ing ▁across ▁the ▁n erve ▁memb rane ▁cause ▁us ▁to ▁have ▁experiences ." ▁According ▁to ▁some , ▁" In tr ic ately ▁related ▁to ▁the ▁hard ▁problem ▁of ▁conscious ness , ▁the ▁hard ▁problem ▁of ▁free ▁will ▁represents ▁the ▁core ▁problem ▁of ▁conscious ▁free ▁will : ▁Does ▁conscious ▁vol ition ▁impact ▁the ▁material ▁world ?" ▁O thers ▁however ▁argue ▁that ▁" cons cious ness ▁plays ▁a ▁far ▁smaller ▁role ▁in ▁human ▁life ▁than ▁Western ▁culture ▁has ▁t ended ▁to ▁believe ." ▁ ▁Comp at ibil ism ▁ ▁Comp at ibil ists ▁maintain ▁that ▁determin ism ▁is ▁compatible ▁with ▁free ▁will . ▁They