▁traject ory ▁of ▁their ▁M aus er ▁rif les ▁to ▁greater ▁effect . ▁Since ▁the ▁tren ches ▁were ▁conce aled , ▁they ▁could ▁th wart ▁the ▁standard ▁British ▁t actic ▁of ▁adv ancing ▁to ▁within ▁close ▁range ▁under ▁cover ▁of ▁darkness ▁and ▁then ▁storm ing ▁the ▁Bo er ▁position ▁at ▁day break . ▁A ▁final ▁consequence ▁of ▁De ▁la ▁Rey ' s ▁def ensive ▁layout ▁was ▁that ▁the ▁troops ▁would ▁not ▁be ▁able ▁to ▁retre at , ▁as ▁Command ant ▁General ▁Mar th inus ▁Pr ins lo o ' s ▁forces ▁had ▁done ▁at ▁Mod der ▁River . ▁Before ▁leaving ▁the ▁front , ▁Ste yn ▁raised ▁the ▁mor ale ▁of ▁the ▁Free ▁State ▁burg h ers ▁by ▁dismiss ing ▁Pr ins lo o , ▁who ▁was ▁seen ▁as ▁the ▁chief ▁reason ▁for ▁the ▁defe ats ▁in ▁earlier ▁batt les . ▁ ▁The ▁new ▁def ensive ▁line ▁occupied ▁a ▁wide ▁cres cent - sh aped ▁front , ▁extending ▁for ▁ ▁and ▁str add ling ▁the ▁road ▁and ▁the ▁railway ▁line ▁that ▁M eth uen ' s ▁advance ▁dep ended ▁upon . ▁The ▁main ▁tren ch ▁directly ▁in ▁front ▁of ▁the ▁Mag ers f onte in ▁Hill ▁was ▁ ▁long , ▁and ▁protected ▁on ▁the ▁right ▁fl ank ▁by ▁a ▁single ▁tren ch . ▁ ▁The ▁tren ches ▁that ▁were ▁to ▁protect ▁the ▁left ▁fl ank ▁in ▁the ▁direction ▁of ▁the ▁river ▁were ▁not ▁completed ▁before ▁the ▁battle ▁comm enced . ▁Two ▁high ▁wire ▁f ences ▁complement ed ▁the ▁natural ▁obst acles ▁created ▁by ▁the