▁could ▁be ▁delivered . ▁Tokyo ▁transm itted ▁the ▁ 5 0 0 0 - word ▁notification ▁( comm only ▁called ▁the ▁" 1 4 - Part ▁Message ") ▁in ▁two ▁blocks ▁to ▁the ▁Japanese ▁Emb ass y ▁in ▁Washington . ▁Trans cri bing ▁the ▁message ▁took ▁too ▁long ▁for ▁the ▁Japanese ▁amb assador ▁to ▁deliver ▁it ▁on ▁schedule ; ▁in ▁the ▁event , ▁it ▁was ▁not ▁presented ▁until ▁more ▁than ▁an ▁hour ▁after ▁the ▁attack ▁began . ▁( In ▁fact , ▁U . S . ▁code ▁break ers ▁had ▁already ▁de ci pher ed ▁and ▁translated ▁most ▁of ▁the ▁message ▁hours ▁before ▁he ▁was ▁scheduled ▁to ▁deliver ▁it .) ▁The ▁final ▁part ▁is ▁sometimes ▁described ▁as ▁a ▁declaration ▁of ▁war . ▁While ▁it ▁was ▁viewed ▁by ▁a ▁number ▁of ▁senior ▁U . S ▁government ▁and ▁military ▁officials ▁as ▁a ▁very ▁strong ▁indicator ▁negoti ations ▁were ▁likely ▁to ▁be ▁terminated ▁and ▁that ▁war ▁might ▁break ▁out ▁at ▁any ▁moment , ▁it ▁neither ▁declared ▁war ▁nor ▁sever ed ▁diplom atic ▁relations . ▁A ▁declaration ▁of ▁war ▁was ▁printed ▁on ▁the ▁front ▁page ▁of ▁Japan ' s ▁newsp apers ▁in ▁the ▁evening ▁edition ▁of ▁December ▁ 8 ▁( late ▁December ▁ 7 ▁in ▁the ▁U . S .), ▁but ▁not ▁delivered ▁to ▁the ▁U . S . ▁government ▁until ▁the ▁day ▁after ▁the ▁attack . ▁ ▁For ▁dec ades , ▁conventional ▁wisdom ▁held ▁that ▁Japan ▁attacked ▁without ▁first ▁formally ▁breaking ▁diplom atic ▁relations ▁only ▁because ▁of ▁acc idents ▁and ▁b umb ling ▁that ▁delayed ▁the ▁delivery