▁to ▁consult ▁effectively ▁with ▁and ▁instruct ▁her ▁att orney . ▁Since ▁it ▁is ▁not ▁known ▁exactly ▁what ▁trans p ired ▁at ▁the ▁hear ings , ▁it ▁is ▁difficult ▁to ▁comment ▁specifically ▁on ▁effects ▁this ▁had ▁on ▁her ▁trial , ▁but ▁it ▁does ▁not ▁seem ▁un reason able ▁to ▁argue ▁that ▁the ▁g ag ging ▁of ▁one ' s ▁att orney ▁concerning ▁certain ▁issues ▁of ▁fact ▁and ▁law ▁and ▁the ▁corresponding ▁destruction ▁of ▁an ▁optimal ▁( or ▁even ▁satisf actory ) ▁att orney - client ▁interaction ▁v iti ates ▁one ' s ▁right ▁to ▁a ▁fair ▁trial ▁and ▁dep riv es ▁one ▁of ▁liberty ▁without ▁due ▁process ▁of ▁law . ▁ ▁The ▁court ' s ▁failure ▁to ▁explain ▁officially ▁its ▁depart ▁from ▁preced ent ▁seems ▁ill - ad vised . ▁While ▁it ▁is ▁difficult ▁to ▁see ▁why ▁M s . ▁Gu ess ▁should ▁not ▁have ▁ ▁been ▁priv y ▁to ▁the ▁secret ▁hear ings ▁and ▁then ▁bound ▁by ▁court ▁order ▁to ▁disc lose ▁nothing , ▁that ▁is ▁not ▁to ▁say ▁definit ively ▁there ▁could ▁have ▁been ▁no ▁counter v ail ing ▁state ▁concern ▁of ▁sufficient ▁magnitude ▁to ▁overcome ▁M s . ▁Gu ess ' ▁interest ▁in ▁a ▁fair ▁trial . ▁ ▁Perhaps ▁there ▁is ▁some ▁concern ▁or ▁group ▁of ▁concerns ▁that ▁might ▁demand ▁secret ▁hear ings , ▁but ▁the ▁court ▁certainly ▁ow es ▁M s . ▁Gu ess , ▁the ▁public , ▁and ▁future ▁jur ists ▁an ▁explanation ▁as ▁to ▁what — in ▁concept ual ▁if ▁not ▁specific ▁terms — th ose ▁concerns ▁are