ility ▁( th us ▁expos ing ▁them ▁to ▁pre - empt ive ▁NAT O ▁strik es ▁ahead ▁of ▁a ▁planned ▁attack ). ▁ ▁Where as ▁the ▁SS - 4 ▁and ▁SS - 5 ▁were ▁seen ▁as ▁def ensive ▁weapons , ▁the ▁SS - 2 0 ▁was ▁seen ▁as ▁a ▁potential ▁off ensive ▁system . ▁Washington ▁initially ▁considered ▁its ▁strateg ic ▁nuclear ▁weapons ▁and ▁nuclear - cap able ▁aircraft ▁to ▁be ▁ade qu ate ▁coun ters ▁to ▁the ▁SS - 2 0 ▁and ▁a ▁sufficient ▁d eter rent ▁against ▁Soviet ▁ag gression . ▁In ▁ 1 9 7 7 , ▁however , ▁Chan cell or ▁Hel mut ▁Schmidt ▁of ▁West ▁Germany ▁argued ▁in ▁a ▁speech ▁that ▁a ▁Western ▁response ▁to ▁the ▁SS - 2 0 ▁deployment ▁should ▁be ▁expl ored , ▁a ▁call ▁which ▁was ▁echo ed ▁by ▁NAT O , ▁given ▁a ▁perce ived ▁Western ▁dis adv antage ▁in ▁European ▁nuclear ▁forces . ▁ ▁On ▁ 1 2 ▁December ▁ 1 9 7 9 , ▁following ▁European ▁pressure ▁for ▁a ▁response ▁to ▁the ▁SS - 2 0 , ▁Western ▁foreign ▁and ▁defense ▁minister s ▁made ▁the ▁NAT O ▁Double - Track ▁Dec ision . ▁They ▁argued ▁that ▁the ▁Wars aw ▁P act ▁had ▁" develop ed ▁a ▁large ▁and ▁growing ▁cap ability ▁in ▁nuclear ▁systems ▁that ▁directly ▁threaten ▁Western ▁Europe ": ▁" the ater " ▁nuclear ▁systems ▁( i . e ., ▁tact ical ▁nuclear ▁weapons . ▁In ▁describing ▁this ▁" ag gra v ated " ▁situation , ▁the ▁minister s ▁made ▁direct