▁environmental ▁protection . ▁▁ ▁Abs ence ▁of ▁an ▁underlying ▁theory ▁of ▁" good " ▁govern ance : ▁no ▁norm ative ▁concept ▁or ▁un ifying ▁single ▁theory ▁to ▁distinguish ▁between ▁good ▁or ▁bad ▁govern ance . ▁When ▁are ▁tax es , ▁labour ▁or ▁environmental ▁regul atory ▁protection ▁des irable ▁and ▁when ▁are ▁they ▁excess ive ? ▁▁ ▁H idden ▁bi ases : ▁Low ▁weight ▁given ▁to ▁household ▁surve ys ▁relative ▁to ▁the ▁weights ▁of ▁expert ▁assess ments ▁and ▁firm ▁surve ys . ▁For ▁example , ▁Gall up ’ s ▁World ▁Pol l ▁that ▁asks ▁citizens ▁about ▁their ▁expos ure ▁to ▁crime ▁gets ▁zero ▁weight ▁for ▁" Rule ▁of ▁Law ", ▁but ▁Global ▁Ins ight ▁Business ▁R isk ▁and ▁Cond itions , ▁a ▁U . S . ▁commercial ▁business ▁information ▁provider ▁that ▁measures ▁the ▁crime ▁risk ▁to ▁business es , ▁gets ▁the ▁third ▁highest ▁weight . ▁ ▁L ack ▁of ▁compar ability ▁over ▁time ▁and ▁space : ▁For ▁example , ▁the ▁W G I ▁“ Control ▁of ▁Cor ruption ” ▁for ▁Eastern ▁Europe ▁and ▁Central ▁Asia ▁has ▁ 2 3 ▁different ▁combinations ▁of ▁sources , ▁but ▁only ▁four ▁pair ▁of ▁countries ▁ratings ▁are ▁based ▁on ▁a ▁common ▁set ▁of ▁sources . ▁ ▁L ack ▁of ▁action ability : ▁W G I ▁offers ▁little ▁guidance ▁to ▁concrete ▁actions ▁to ▁improve ▁the ▁quality ▁of ▁govern ance . ▁For ▁example , ▁an ▁indicator ▁for ▁Rule ▁of ▁Law ▁" how ▁secure ▁business ▁people ▁feel ▁about ▁their ▁property " ▁not ▁why ▁they ▁feel ▁that ▁way . ▁▁ ▁Over - s