▁over ▁ 2 5 0 X ▁average ▁pay ▁before ▁the ▁ 2 0 0 7 ▁re cess ion ▁– ▁is ▁driven ▁by ▁an ▁increased ▁demand ▁for ▁scar ce ▁talent ▁and ▁set ▁according ▁to ▁performance , ▁K rug man ▁points ▁out ▁that ▁multiple ▁factors ▁outside ▁of ▁execut ives ' ▁control ▁govern ▁corpor ate ▁profit ability , ▁particularly ▁in ▁short ▁term ▁when ▁the ▁head ▁of ▁a ▁company ▁like ▁En ron ▁may ▁look ▁like ▁a ▁great ▁success . ▁Further , ▁corpor ate ▁bo ards ▁follow ▁other ▁companies ▁in ▁setting ▁pay ▁even ▁if ▁the ▁direct ors ▁themselves ▁disag ree ▁with ▁lav ish ▁pay ▁" part ly ▁to ▁attract ▁execut ives ▁whom ▁they ▁consider ▁ade qu ate , ▁partly ▁because ▁the ▁financial ▁market ▁will ▁be ▁susp icious ▁of ▁a ▁company ▁whose ▁CE O ▁isn ' t ▁lav ish ly ▁paid ." ▁Finally ▁" cor por ate ▁bo ards , ▁largely ▁selected ▁by ▁the ▁CE O , ▁h ire ▁compens ation ▁exper ts , ▁almost ▁always ▁chosen ▁by ▁the ▁CE O " ▁who ▁naturally ▁want ▁to ▁please ▁their ▁employ ers . ▁ ▁Luci an ▁A ry e ▁B eb ch uk , ▁J esse ▁M . ▁Fried , ▁the ▁authors ▁of ▁Pay ▁Without ▁Performance , ▁critique ▁of ▁executive ▁pay , ▁argue ▁that ▁executive ▁capture ▁of ▁corpor ate ▁govern ance ▁is ▁so ▁complete ▁that ▁only ▁public ▁relations , ▁i . e . ▁public ▁` out rage `, ▁const ra ins ▁their ▁pay . ▁This ▁in ▁turn ▁has ▁been ▁reduced ▁as ▁traditional ▁critics ▁of ▁excess ive ▁pay ▁– ▁such ▁as ▁polit