▁result ▁of ▁mechanism ▁design , ▁which ▁de als ▁with ▁conce iving ▁rules ▁to ▁make ▁collect ive ▁dec isions , ▁possibly ▁in ▁processes ▁that ▁involve ▁a ▁mon et ary ▁transfer . ▁No am ▁N isan ▁describes ▁this ▁relation : The ▁G S ▁theorem ▁seems ▁to ▁qu ash ▁any ▁hope ▁of ▁design ing ▁in cent ive - compatible ▁social - choice ▁functions . ▁The ▁whole ▁field ▁of ▁Mechan ism ▁Design ▁attempts ▁esc aping ▁from ▁this ▁impos s ibility ▁result ▁using ▁various ▁modifications ▁in ▁the ▁model . The ▁main ▁idea ▁of ▁these ▁" escape ▁routes " ▁is ▁that ▁they ▁deal ▁only ▁with ▁restricted ▁classes ▁of ▁prefer ences , ▁in ▁contrast ▁to ▁the ▁Gib b ard – S atter th wa ite ▁theorem , ▁which ▁de als ▁with ▁arbitrary ▁prefer ences . ▁For ▁example , ▁in ▁this ▁discipline , ▁it ▁is ▁frequently ▁assumed ▁that ▁agents ▁have ▁quasi - linear ▁prefer ences , ▁which ▁means ▁that ▁their ▁utility ▁function ▁depends ▁linear ly ▁on ▁money . ▁In ▁that ▁case , ▁mon et ary ▁trans fers ▁can ▁be ▁used ▁to ▁indu ce ▁them ▁to ▁act ▁truth fully . ▁This ▁is ▁the ▁idea ▁behind ▁the ▁successful ▁V ick rey – C lar ke – G ro ves ▁au ction . ▁ ▁See ▁also ▁ ▁Gib b ard ' s ▁theorem ▁ ▁Ar row ' s ▁impos s ibility ▁theorem ▁ ▁D ug gan – Sch wart z ▁theorem ▁ ▁References ▁ ▁Category : V oting ▁theory ▁Category : E conom ics ▁the or ems ▁Category : The or ems ▁in ▁discrete