▁the ▁law ▁of ▁neg lig ence ▁as ▁depending ▁on ▁principle ▁so ▁that , ▁when ▁a ▁new ▁point ▁emer ges , ▁one ▁should ▁ask ▁not ▁whether ▁it ▁is ▁covered ▁by ▁authority ▁but ▁whether ▁recogn ised ▁principles ▁[ from ▁Don og h ue ] ▁apply ▁to ▁it ". ▁Don og h ue , ▁he ▁argued , ▁should ▁therefore ▁be ▁applied ▁in ▁almost ▁all ▁circumstances . ▁ ▁"[ Don og h ue ] ▁may ▁be ▁regarded ▁as ▁a ▁mil estone , ▁and ▁the ▁well - known ▁passage ▁in ▁Lord ▁At kin ' s ▁speech ▁should ▁I ▁think ▁be ▁regarded ▁as ▁a ▁statement ▁of ▁principle . ▁It ▁is ▁not ▁to ▁be ▁treated ▁as ▁if ▁it ▁were ▁a ▁stat ut ory ▁definition . ▁It ▁will ▁require ▁qual ification ▁in ▁new ▁circumstances . ▁But ▁I ▁think ▁that ▁the ▁time ▁has ▁come ▁when ▁we ▁can ▁and ▁should ▁say ▁that ▁it ▁ought ▁to ▁apply ▁unless ▁there ▁is ▁some ▁just ification ▁or ▁valid ▁explanation ▁for ▁its ▁ex clusion ." ▁ ▁In ▁the ▁sole ▁diss ent ing ▁judgment , ▁Vis count ▁D il hor ne ▁held ▁that ▁the ▁neighbour ▁principle ▁could ▁not ▁have ▁been ▁intended ▁to ▁be ▁applied ▁in ▁all ▁circumstances ▁and ▁that ▁it ▁could ▁only ▁be ▁used ▁to ▁determine ▁to ▁whom ▁a ▁duty ▁of ▁care ▁is ▁ow ed ▁rather ▁than ▁if ▁one ▁exists . ▁Jud ges , ▁he ▁op ined , ▁" are ▁concerned ▁not ▁with ▁what ▁the ▁law ▁should ▁be ▁but ▁with ▁what ▁it ▁is . ▁The ▁absence ▁of ▁authority ▁shows ▁that ▁no ▁such ▁duty ▁[ to ▁Dor set ▁Y acht