▁ability ▁to ▁release ▁the ▁tele gram ▁without ▁reve aling ▁the ▁extent ▁to ▁which ▁the ▁latest ▁German ▁codes ▁had ▁been ▁broken . ▁( At ▁worst , ▁the ▁Germ ans ▁might ▁have ▁realized ▁that ▁the ▁ 1 3 0 4 0 ▁code ▁had ▁been ▁comprom ised , ▁but ▁that ▁was ▁a ▁risk ▁worth ▁taking ▁against ▁the ▁possibility ▁of ▁United ▁States ▁entry ▁into ▁the ▁war .) ▁Finally , ▁since ▁copies ▁of ▁the ▁ 1 3 0 4 0 ▁cod et ext ▁would ▁also ▁have ▁been ▁depos ited ▁in ▁the ▁records ▁of ▁the ▁American ▁commercial ▁te legraph ▁company , ▁the ▁British ▁had ▁the ▁ability ▁to ▁prove ▁the ▁authentic ity ▁of ▁the ▁message ▁to ▁the ▁United ▁States ▁government . ▁ ▁As ▁a ▁cover ▁story , ▁the ▁British ▁could ▁public ly ▁claim ▁that ▁their ▁agents ▁had ▁st olen ▁the ▁tele gram ' s ▁dec oded ▁text ▁in ▁Mexico . ▁Priv ately , ▁the ▁British ▁needed ▁to ▁give ▁the ▁Americans ▁the ▁ 1 3 0 4 0 ▁code ▁so ▁that ▁the ▁United ▁States ▁government ▁could ▁verify ▁the ▁authentic ity ▁of ▁the ▁message ▁independently ▁with ▁their ▁own ▁commercial ▁te legraph ic ▁records , ▁but ▁the ▁Americans ▁agreed ▁to ▁back ▁the ▁official ▁cover ▁story . ▁The ▁German ▁Foreign ▁Office ▁refused ▁to ▁consider ▁a ▁possible ▁code ▁break ▁and ▁instead ▁sent ▁Amb assador ▁E ck ard t ▁on ▁a ▁w itch - h unt ▁for ▁a ▁tra itor ▁in ▁the ▁emb ass y ▁in ▁Mexico . ▁( E ck ard t ▁ind ign antly ▁rejected ▁the ▁accus ations , ▁and ▁the ▁Foreign ▁Office ▁eventually