▁that ▁the ▁we aker ▁version ▁does ▁not ▁const itute ▁' the ological ▁determin ism ' ▁at ▁all . ▁The ological ▁determin ism ▁can ▁also ▁be ▁seen ▁as ▁a ▁form ▁of ▁caus al ▁determin ism , ▁in ▁which ▁the ▁ante ced ent ▁conditions ▁are ▁the ▁nature ▁and ▁will ▁of ▁God . ▁With ▁respect ▁to ▁free ▁will ▁and ▁the ▁classification ▁of ▁the ological ▁compat ibil ism / in compat ibil ism ▁below , ▁" the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁the ▁th esis ▁that ▁God ▁exists ▁and ▁has ▁inf al li ble ▁knowledge ▁of ▁all ▁true ▁propos itions ▁including ▁propos itions ▁about ▁our ▁future ▁actions ," ▁more ▁minimal ▁criteria ▁designed ▁to ▁enc aps ulate ▁all ▁forms ▁of ▁the ological ▁determin ism . ▁ ▁There ▁are ▁various ▁imp lications ▁for ▁met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ▁free ▁will ▁as ▁consequ ent ▁of ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁and ▁its ▁philosoph ical ▁interpretation . ▁ ▁Str ong ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁not ▁compatible ▁with ▁met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ▁free ▁will , ▁and ▁is ▁a ▁form ▁of ▁hard ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁( equ ivalent ▁to ▁the ological ▁fatal ism ▁below ). ▁It ▁claims ▁that ▁free ▁will ▁does ▁not ▁exist , ▁and ▁God ▁has ▁absolute ▁control ▁over ▁a ▁person ' s ▁actions . ▁Hard ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁similar ▁in ▁imp lication ▁to ▁hard ▁determin ism , ▁although ▁it ▁does ▁not ▁invalid ate ▁compat ibil ist ▁free ▁will . ▁Hard ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁a ▁form ▁of ▁the ological ▁in compat ibil ism ▁( see