▁held ▁by ▁the ▁Supreme ▁Court ▁and ▁other ▁states ' ▁courts ▁to ▁support ▁the ▁doctrine ▁for ▁three ▁reasons . ▁First , ▁the ▁court ' s ▁own ▁prior ▁hold ings ▁recognized ▁Article ▁I , ▁Section ▁ 9 , ▁as ▁establish ing ▁a ▁broad ▁priv acy ▁interest ▁beyond ▁those ▁items ▁specified ▁in ▁it . ▁Second , ▁the ▁Supreme ▁Court ▁had ▁itself ▁admitted ▁in ▁K atz ▁that ▁in ▁extending ▁priv acy ▁protection ▁to ▁the ▁user ▁of ▁a ▁phone ▁bo oth ▁it ▁was ▁going ▁beyond ▁any ▁possible ▁meaning ▁of ▁" pers ons , ▁houses , ▁papers ▁and ▁effects ", ▁as ▁Justice ▁Th ur good ▁Marshall ▁had ▁noted ▁in ▁his ▁Oliver ▁diss ent . ▁Last ly , ▁G illet te ▁noted , ▁if ▁read ▁literally ▁the ▁Four th ▁Am end ment ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁Oregon ' s ▁constitution ▁would ▁have ▁only ▁protected ▁citizens ▁in ▁their ▁own ▁houses , ▁and ▁not ▁in ▁any ▁other ▁buildings . ▁" If ▁the ▁individual ▁has ▁a ▁priv acy ▁interest ▁in ▁land ▁outside ▁the ▁cur til age ▁of ▁his ▁dwell ing , ▁that ▁priv acy ▁interest ▁will ▁not ▁go ▁un protected ▁simply ▁because ▁of ▁its ▁location ." ▁ ▁Next , ▁G illet te ▁turned ▁to ▁the ▁claim ▁that ▁common ▁law ▁recognized ▁a ▁distinction ▁between ▁the ▁cur til age ▁of ▁a ▁house ▁and ▁the ▁property ▁as ▁a ▁whole . ▁In ▁H ester , ▁Justice ▁Oliver ▁Wend ell ▁Hol mes ▁had ▁c ited ▁William ▁Black stone ' s ▁Comment aries ▁on ▁the ▁La ws ▁of ▁England , ▁a ▁common ▁reference ▁for ▁English ▁common ▁law , ▁in ▁holding