▁caused ▁by ▁events ▁and ▁facts ▁outside ▁his ▁control , ▁then ▁he ▁cannot ▁be ▁the ▁ult imate ▁cause ▁of ▁his ▁actions . ▁Therefore , ▁he ▁cannot ▁have ▁free ▁will . ▁This ▁argument ▁has ▁also ▁been ▁challeng ed ▁by ▁various ▁compat ibil ist ▁philosoph ers . ▁ ▁A ▁third ▁argument ▁for ▁in compat ibil ism ▁was ▁form ulated ▁by ▁Carl ▁G inet ▁in ▁the ▁ 1 9 6 0 s ▁and ▁has ▁received ▁much ▁attention ▁in ▁the ▁modern ▁literature . ▁The ▁simplified ▁argument ▁runs ▁along ▁these ▁lines : ▁if ▁determin ism ▁is ▁true , ▁then ▁we ▁have ▁no ▁control ▁over ▁the ▁events ▁of ▁the ▁past ▁that ▁determined ▁our ▁present ▁state ▁and ▁no ▁control ▁over ▁the ▁laws ▁of ▁nature . ▁Since ▁we ▁can ▁have ▁no ▁control ▁over ▁these ▁matters , ▁we ▁also ▁can ▁have ▁no ▁control ▁over ▁the ▁consequences ▁of ▁them . ▁Since ▁our ▁present ▁choices ▁and ▁acts , ▁under ▁determin ism , ▁are ▁the ▁necessary ▁consequences ▁of ▁the ▁past ▁and ▁the ▁laws ▁of ▁nature , ▁then ▁we ▁have ▁no ▁control ▁over ▁them ▁and , ▁hence , ▁no ▁free ▁will . ▁This ▁is ▁called ▁the ▁consequence ▁argument . ▁Peter ▁van ▁In wagen ▁remarks ▁that ▁C . D . ▁Broad ▁had ▁a ▁version ▁of ▁the ▁consequence ▁argument ▁as ▁early ▁as ▁the ▁ 1 9 3 0 s . ▁ ▁The ▁difficulty ▁of ▁this ▁argument ▁for ▁some ▁compat ibil ists ▁lies ▁in ▁the ▁fact ▁that ▁it ▁ent ails ▁the ▁impos s ibility ▁that ▁one ▁could ▁have ▁chosen ▁other ▁than ▁one ▁has . ▁For ▁example , ▁if ▁Jane ▁is