▁the ▁out comes ▁of ▁events . ▁ ▁In ▁the ▁definition ▁of ▁compat ibil ism ▁and ▁in compat ibil ism , ▁the ▁literature ▁often ▁fails ▁to ▁distinguish ▁between ▁physical ▁determin ism ▁and ▁higher ▁level ▁forms ▁of ▁determin ism ▁( pred et erm in ism , ▁the ological ▁determin ism , ▁etc .) ▁As ▁such , ▁hard ▁determin ism ▁with ▁respect ▁to ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁( or ▁" H ard ▁The ological ▁Det erm in ism " ▁above ) ▁might ▁be ▁class ified ▁as ▁hard ▁in compat ibil ism ▁with ▁respect ▁to ▁physical ▁determin ism ▁( if ▁no ▁claim ▁was ▁made ▁regarding ▁the ▁internal ▁caus ality ▁or ▁determin ism ▁of ▁the ▁universe ), ▁or ▁even ▁compat ibil ism ▁( if ▁freedom ▁from ▁the ▁constraint ▁of ▁determin ism ▁was ▁not ▁considered ▁necessary ▁for ▁free ▁will ), ▁if ▁not ▁hard ▁determin ism ▁itself . ▁By ▁the ▁same ▁principle , ▁met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ism ▁( a ▁form ▁of ▁in compat ibil ism ▁with ▁respect ▁to ▁physical ▁determin ism ) ▁might ▁be ▁class ified ▁as ▁compat ibil ism ▁with ▁respect ▁to ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁( if ▁it ▁was ▁assumed ▁such ▁free ▁will ▁events ▁were ▁pre - ord ained ▁and ▁therefore ▁were ▁dest ined ▁to ▁occur , ▁but ▁of ▁which ▁whose ▁out comes ▁were ▁not ▁" pred est ined " ▁or ▁determined ▁by ▁God ). ▁If ▁hard ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁accepted ▁( if ▁it ▁was ▁assumed ▁instead ▁that ▁such ▁out comes ▁were ▁pred est ined ▁by ▁God ), ▁then ▁met aph ys ical