▁figure , ▁top ▁left ). ▁ ▁We ak ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁either ▁compatible ▁or ▁in compatible ▁with ▁met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ▁free ▁will ▁depending ▁upon ▁one ' s ▁philosoph ical ▁interpretation ▁of ▁om nis cience   – ▁and ▁as ▁such ▁is ▁interpreted ▁as ▁either ▁a ▁form ▁of ▁hard ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁( known ▁as ▁the ological ▁fatal ism ), ▁or ▁as ▁soft ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁( termin ology ▁used ▁for ▁clar ity ▁only ). ▁So ft ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁claims ▁that ▁humans ▁have ▁free ▁will ▁to ▁choose ▁their ▁actions , ▁holding ▁that ▁God , ▁while ▁knowing ▁their ▁actions ▁before ▁they ▁happen , ▁does ▁not ▁affect ▁the ▁outcome . ▁God ' s ▁prov idence ▁is ▁" compatible " ▁with ▁volunt ary ▁choice . ▁So ft ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁known ▁as ▁the ological ▁compat ibil ism ▁( see ▁figure , ▁top ▁right ). ▁A ▁re jection ▁of ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁( or ▁divine ▁for ek now ledge ) ▁is ▁class ified ▁as ▁the ological ▁in compat ibil ism ▁also ▁( see ▁figure , ▁bottom ), ▁and ▁is ▁relevant ▁to ▁a ▁more ▁general ▁discussion ▁of ▁free ▁will . ▁ ▁The ▁basic ▁argument ▁for ▁the ological ▁fatal ism ▁in ▁the ▁case ▁of ▁weak ▁the ological ▁determin ism ▁is ▁as ▁follows : ▁ ▁Assume ▁divine ▁for ek now ledge ▁or ▁om nis cience ▁ ▁Inf al li ble ▁for ek now ledge ▁implies ▁dest iny ▁( it ▁is ▁known ▁for ▁certain ▁what ▁one ▁will ▁do ) ▁ ▁Dest