▁volunt ary ▁action ▁and ▁orig ination . ▁Both ▁not ions ▁are ▁required ▁to ▁explain ▁freedom ▁of ▁will ▁and ▁responsibility . ▁Both ▁determin ism ▁and ▁ind et erm in ism ▁are ▁thre ats ▁to ▁such ▁freedom . ▁To ▁abandon ▁these ▁not ions ▁of ▁freedom ▁would ▁be ▁to ▁abandon ▁moral ▁responsibility . ▁On ▁the ▁one ▁side , ▁we ▁have ▁our ▁intu itions ; ▁on ▁the ▁other , ▁the ▁scientific ▁facts . ▁The ▁" new " ▁problem ▁is ▁how ▁to ▁resolve ▁this ▁conflict . ▁ ▁Free ▁will ▁as ▁an ▁ill usion ▁ ▁" Ex per ience ▁teach es ▁us ▁no ▁less ▁clearly ▁than ▁reason , ▁that ▁men ▁believe ▁themselves ▁free , ▁simply ▁because ▁they ▁are ▁conscious ▁of ▁their ▁actions , ▁and ▁un cons cious ▁of ▁the ▁causes ▁where by ▁those ▁actions ▁are ▁determined ." ▁Bar uch ▁Sp ino za , ▁Eth ics ▁David ▁H ume ▁discussed ▁the ▁possibility ▁that ▁the ▁entire ▁debate ▁about ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁nothing ▁more ▁than ▁a ▁merely ▁" ver bal " ▁issue . ▁He ▁suggested ▁that ▁it ▁might ▁be ▁account ed ▁for ▁by ▁" a ▁false ▁sens ation ▁or ▁seem ing ▁experience " ▁( a ▁v elle ity ), ▁which ▁is ▁associated ▁with ▁many ▁of ▁our ▁actions ▁when ▁we ▁perform ▁them . ▁On ▁reflection , ▁we ▁realize ▁that ▁they ▁were ▁necessary ▁and ▁determined ▁all ▁along . ▁ ▁Arthur ▁Sch open h auer ▁put ▁the ▁puzz le ▁of ▁free ▁will ▁and ▁moral ▁responsibility ▁in ▁these ▁terms : ▁Every one ▁bel ieves ▁himself , ▁a ▁pri ori , ▁perfectly ▁free   – ▁even ▁in