, ▁but ▁he ▁bel ieves ▁subjects ▁still ▁have ▁a ▁" cons cious ▁v eto ", ▁since ▁the ▁read iness ▁potential ▁does ▁not ▁invari ably ▁lead ▁to ▁an ▁action . ▁In ▁Fre edom ▁E vol ves , ▁Daniel ▁Den nett ▁arg ues ▁that ▁a ▁no - free - will ▁conclusion ▁is ▁based ▁on ▁dub ious ▁assumptions ▁about ▁the ▁location ▁of ▁conscious ness , ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁question ing ▁the ▁accuracy ▁and ▁interpretation ▁of ▁Lib et ' s ▁results . ▁K orn h uber ▁and ▁De e cke ▁under lined ▁that ▁absence ▁of ▁conscious ▁will ▁during ▁the ▁early ▁Bere it schaft spot ential ▁( ter med ▁B P 1 ) ▁is ▁not ▁a ▁proof ▁of ▁the ▁non - ex istence ▁of ▁free ▁will , ▁as ▁also ▁un cons cious ▁ag end as ▁may ▁be ▁free ▁and ▁non - det erm in istic . ▁According ▁to ▁their ▁suggestion , ▁man ▁has ▁relative ▁freedom , ▁i . e . ▁freedom ▁in ▁degrees , ▁that ▁can ▁be ▁increased ▁or ▁decre ased ▁through ▁deliber ate ▁choices ▁that ▁involve ▁both ▁conscious ▁and ▁un cons cious ▁( pan ence phal ic ) ▁processes . ▁ ▁O thers ▁have ▁argued ▁that ▁data ▁such ▁as ▁the ▁Bere it schaft spot ential ▁und erm ine ▁e pi phen omen al ism ▁for ▁the ▁same ▁reason , ▁that ▁such ▁experiments ▁rely ▁on ▁a ▁subject ▁reporting ▁the ▁point ▁in ▁time ▁at ▁which ▁a ▁conscious ▁experience ▁occurs , ▁thus ▁re lying ▁on ▁the ▁subject ▁to ▁be ▁able ▁to ▁cons ci ously ▁perform ▁an ▁action . ▁That ▁ability