y , ▁a ▁bill i ard ▁ball , ▁a ▁pu ppet , ▁or ▁a ▁robot , ▁then ▁people ▁must ▁not ▁have ▁free ▁will . ▁This ▁argument ▁has ▁been ▁rejected ▁by ▁compat ibil ists ▁such ▁as ▁Daniel ▁Den nett ▁on ▁the ▁grounds ▁that , ▁even ▁if ▁humans ▁have ▁something ▁in ▁common ▁with ▁these ▁things , ▁it ▁remains ▁possible ▁and ▁pla us ible ▁that ▁we ▁are ▁different ▁from ▁such ▁objects ▁in ▁important ▁ways . ▁ ▁Another ▁argument ▁for ▁in compat ibil ism ▁is ▁that ▁of ▁the ▁" ca us al ▁chain ". ▁In compat ibil ism ▁is ▁key ▁to ▁the ▁ideal ist ▁theory ▁of ▁free ▁will . ▁Most ▁in compat ibil ists ▁reject ▁the ▁idea ▁that ▁freedom ▁of ▁action ▁consists ▁simply ▁in ▁" vol unt ary " ▁behavior . ▁They ▁ins ist , ▁rather , ▁that ▁free ▁will ▁means ▁that ▁man ▁must ▁be ▁the ▁" ult imate " ▁or ▁" origin ating " ▁cause ▁of ▁his ▁actions . ▁He ▁must ▁be ▁causa ▁su i , ▁in ▁the ▁traditional ▁phrase . ▁Being ▁responsible ▁for ▁one ' s ▁choices ▁is ▁the ▁first ▁cause ▁of ▁those ▁choices , ▁where ▁first ▁cause ▁means ▁that ▁there ▁is ▁no ▁ante ced ent ▁cause ▁of ▁that ▁cause . ▁The ▁argument , ▁then , ▁is ▁that ▁if ▁man ▁has ▁free ▁will , ▁then ▁man ▁is ▁the ▁ult imate ▁cause ▁of ▁his ▁actions . ▁If ▁determin ism ▁is ▁true , ▁then ▁all ▁of ▁man ' s ▁choices ▁are ▁caused ▁by ▁events ▁and ▁facts ▁outside ▁his ▁control . ▁So , ▁if ▁everything ▁man ▁does ▁is