ani ▁Ash kal , ▁commander ▁of ▁loyal ist ▁forces ▁at ▁G add af i ' s ▁comp ound , ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁other ▁senior ▁military ▁officers , ▁at ▁least ▁ 7 2 , ▁who ▁were ▁secret ly ▁sympath etic ▁to ▁the ▁reb els , ▁but ▁had ▁been ▁asked ▁to ▁remain ▁under cover ▁by ▁the ▁N TC , ▁ordered ▁soldiers ▁under ▁their ▁command ▁to ▁dis per se , ▁abandoned ▁their ▁posts ▁and ▁allowed ▁the ▁reb els ▁to ▁enter ▁the ▁city ▁almost ▁entirely ▁uno pp osed , ▁in ▁line ▁with ▁agre ements ▁made ▁secret ly ▁between ▁them ▁and ▁the ▁N TC . ▁ ▁The ▁plan ▁was ▁discussed ▁between ▁the ▁N TC ▁and ▁the ▁French ▁government , ▁and ▁reb els ▁drew ▁up ▁a ▁list ▁of ▁over ▁ 1 2 0 ▁targets ▁for ▁NAT O ▁to ▁strike , ▁although ▁the ▁actual ▁number ▁of ▁targets ▁struck ▁was ▁much ▁lower . ▁Memory ▁cards ▁containing ▁information ▁on ▁loyal ist ▁command ▁and ▁control ▁cent res ▁and ▁other ▁regime ▁military ▁and ▁intelligence ▁facilities ▁were ▁supplied ▁to ▁NAT O ▁by ▁re bel ▁cells ▁in ▁Tri pol i . ▁The ▁N TC ▁assigned ▁ 2 , 0 0 0 ▁armed ▁men ▁to ▁go ▁into ▁Tri pol i ▁and ▁ 6 , 0 0 0 ▁un ar med ▁to ▁go ▁out ▁onto ▁the ▁streets ▁in ▁the ▁u pr ising ▁that ▁was ▁to ▁occur ▁the ▁day ▁before ▁the ▁assault ▁on ▁the ▁city ▁from ▁the ▁western ▁out sk ir ts . ▁Communic ations ▁equipment ▁was ▁supplied ▁to ▁re bel ▁cells ▁within ▁Tri pol i ▁by ▁British ▁and