▁" effect s " ▁in ▁their ▁constitution s ▁had ▁held ▁it ▁applied ▁more ▁broad ly ▁than ▁Oliver ▁had ▁held . ▁ ▁" O ur ▁decision , ▁however , ▁need ▁not ▁rest ▁on ▁the ▁dra fter s ' ▁choice ▁of ▁one ▁word ▁over ▁another ", ▁Mor se ▁wrote . ▁" E ven ▁if ▁we ▁cannot ▁say ▁with ▁confidence ▁that ▁the ▁scope ▁of ▁the ▁term ▁' poss essions ' ▁mand ates ▁a ▁right ▁of ▁priv acy ▁in ▁real ▁estate , ▁it ▁certainly ▁does ▁not ▁rule ▁out ▁such ▁a ▁right ." ▁He ▁noted ▁that ▁this ▁interpretation ▁was ▁at ▁odd s ▁with ▁Oliver , ▁and ▁said ▁the ▁fault ▁lay ▁with ▁the ▁Oliver ▁Court , ▁which ▁had ▁" mis inter pre ted ▁its ▁own ▁Four th ▁Am end ment ▁preced ent ." ▁ ▁In ▁Oliver , ▁the ▁Supreme ▁Court ▁had ▁seemed ▁" to ▁equ ate ▁priv acy ▁with ▁crime ", ▁which ▁Mor se ▁considered ▁fla wed . ▁" If ▁one ▁assumes ▁at ▁the ▁out set ▁that ▁people ▁will ▁only ▁seek ▁priv acy ▁in ▁the ▁use ▁of ▁their ▁land ▁for ▁criminal ▁purposes ," ▁he ▁wrote , ▁" the ▁conclusion ▁that ▁society ▁will ▁not ▁recognize ▁a ▁claim ▁to ▁priv acy ▁in ▁the ▁land ▁readily ▁follows . ▁But ▁we ▁cannot ▁pres ume ▁how ▁an ▁individual ▁will ▁employ ▁private ▁lands — that ▁is ▁the ▁nature ▁of ▁priv acy ." ▁O li vers ▁association ▁of ▁priv acy ▁and ▁criminal ity , ▁according ▁to ▁Mor se , ▁was ▁an ▁ip se ▁dix it . ▁ ▁Mor se ▁accepted ▁the ▁Oregon ▁Supreme ▁Court ' s