▁Congress ’ ▁“ intent ▁to ▁pre clude ▁jud icial ▁imp lication ▁of ▁a ▁discovery ▁rule ” ▁was ▁clear . ▁ ▁C iting ▁an ▁earlier ▁case , ▁the ▁Court ▁held ▁that ▁“ [ w ] here ▁Congress ▁explicitly ▁enumer ates ▁certain ▁exceptions ▁to ▁a ▁general ▁prohib ition , ▁additional ▁exceptions ▁are ▁not ▁to ▁be ▁imp lied , ▁in ▁the ▁absence ▁of ▁evidence ▁of ▁a ▁contrary ▁legisl ative ▁intent .” ▁App lying ▁general ▁principles ▁of ▁stat ut ory ▁construction , ▁the ▁Court ▁reason ed ▁that ▁“ C ong ress ▁implicitly ▁ex cluded ▁a ▁general ▁discovery ▁rule ▁by ▁explicitly ▁including ▁a ▁more ▁limited ▁one .” ▁ ▁To ▁allow ▁the ▁incorpor ation ▁of ▁a ▁general ▁rule ▁in ▁light ▁of ▁this ▁fact , ▁would ▁have ▁the ▁practical ▁effect ▁of ▁rendering ▁the ▁stated ▁exception ▁to ▁the ▁general ▁rule ▁“ ent ire ly ▁super fl uous ▁in ▁all ▁but ▁the ▁most ▁unusual ▁circumstances ,” ▁thus ▁viol ating ▁a ▁“ card inal ▁principal ▁of ▁stat ut ory ▁construction ” ▁- ▁that ▁“ a ▁stat ute ▁ought , ▁upon ▁the ▁whole , ▁to ▁be ▁so ▁constru ed ▁that , ▁if ▁it ▁can ▁be ▁prevent ed , ▁no ▁clause , ▁sentence , ▁or ▁word ▁shall ▁be ▁super fl uous , ▁void ▁or ▁ins ign ific ant .” ▁ ▁As ▁if ▁anticip ating ▁the ▁Court ’ s ▁decision , ▁Andrew s ▁argued ▁that ▁if ▁the ▁stat ute ▁of ▁limitations ▁was ▁to ▁commence ▁on ▁the ▁date ▁on ▁which ▁li ability ▁ar ises , ▁the ▁date ▁should ▁be ▁the ▁date ▁on ▁which ▁the ▁in acc ura