▁ ▁In ▁August ▁ 1 9 6 4 , ▁alleg ations ▁arose ▁from ▁the ▁U . S . ▁military ▁that ▁two ▁U . S . ▁destroy ers ▁had ▁been ▁attacked ▁by ▁North ▁Vietnam ese ▁tor ped o ▁boats ▁in ▁international ▁waters ▁ ▁from ▁the ▁Vietnam ese ▁coast ▁in ▁the ▁G ulf ▁of ▁Ton kin ; ▁naval ▁communic ations ▁and ▁reports ▁of ▁the ▁attack ▁were ▁contradict ory . ▁Although ▁Johnson ▁very ▁much ▁wanted ▁to ▁keep ▁discuss ions ▁about ▁Vietnam ▁out ▁of ▁the ▁ 1 9 6 4 ▁election ▁campaign , ▁he ▁felt ▁forced ▁to ▁respond ▁to ▁the ▁supposed ▁ag gression ▁by ▁the ▁Vietnam ese , ▁so ▁he ▁sought ▁and ▁obtained ▁from ▁the ▁Congress ▁the ▁G ulf ▁of ▁Ton kin ▁Resol ution ▁on ▁August ▁ 7 . ▁The ▁resolution ▁gave ▁con gression al ▁appro val ▁for ▁use ▁of ▁military ▁force ▁by ▁the ▁commander - in - ch ief ▁to ▁rep el ▁future ▁attacks ▁and ▁also ▁to ▁assist ▁members ▁of ▁SE AT O ▁request ing ▁assistance . ▁Johnson ▁later ▁in ▁the ▁campaign ▁expressed ▁ass urance ▁that ▁the ▁primary ▁U . S . ▁goal ▁remained ▁the ▁pres ervation ▁of ▁South ▁Vietnam ese ▁independence ▁through ▁material ▁and ▁advice , ▁as ▁opposed ▁to ▁any ▁U . S . ▁off ensive ▁post ure . ▁▁ 1 9 6 5 – 1 9 6 6 ▁ ▁Re ject ing ▁the ▁advice ▁of ▁those ▁who ▁fav ored ▁an ▁immediate ▁and ▁dram atic ▁es cal ation ▁of ▁the ▁U . S . ▁role ▁in ▁Vietnam , ▁Johnson ▁waited ▁until ▁early ▁ 1 9