▁Although ▁compat ibil ism ▁is ▁generally ▁aligned ▁to ▁( or ▁is ▁at ▁least ▁compatible ▁with ) ▁physical ism , ▁some ▁compat ibil ist ▁models ▁describe ▁the ▁natural ▁occurr ences ▁of ▁determin istic ▁deliber ation ▁in ▁the ▁brain ▁in ▁terms ▁of ▁the ▁first ▁person ▁perspective ▁of ▁the ▁conscious ▁agent ▁performing ▁the ▁deliber ation . ▁Such ▁an ▁approach ▁has ▁been ▁considered ▁a ▁form ▁of ▁identity ▁dual ism . ▁A ▁description ▁of ▁" how ▁conscious ▁experience ▁might ▁affect ▁bra ins " ▁has ▁been ▁provided ▁in ▁which ▁" the ▁experience ▁of ▁conscious ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁the ▁first - person ▁perspective ▁of ▁the ▁neural ▁correl ates ▁of ▁choosing ." ▁ ▁Rec ently ▁Cla udio ▁Costa ▁developed ▁a ▁ne o compat ibil ist ▁theory ▁based ▁on ▁the ▁caus al ▁theory ▁of ▁action ▁that ▁is ▁complement ary ▁to ▁classical ▁compat ibil ism . ▁According ▁to ▁him , ▁physical , ▁psych ological ▁and ▁rational ▁restrictions ▁can ▁inter f ere ▁at ▁different ▁levels ▁of ▁the ▁caus al ▁chain ▁that ▁would ▁naturally ▁lead ▁to ▁action . ▁Cor respond ingly , ▁there ▁can ▁be ▁physical ▁restrictions ▁to ▁the ▁body , ▁psych ological ▁restrictions ▁to ▁the ▁decision , ▁and ▁rational ▁restrictions ▁to ▁the ▁formation ▁of ▁reasons ▁( des ires ▁plus ▁belief s ) ▁that ▁should ▁lead ▁to ▁what ▁we ▁would ▁call ▁a ▁reasonable ▁action . ▁The ▁last ▁two ▁are ▁usually ▁called ▁" rest rict ions ▁of ▁free ▁will ". ▁The ▁restriction ▁at ▁the ▁level ▁of ▁reasons ▁is ▁particularly ▁important ▁since ▁it ▁can ▁be ▁motiv ated ▁by ▁external ▁reasons ▁that ▁are ▁ins u fficient ly ▁conscious