▁consists ▁of ▁three ▁steps : ▁▁ ▁Step ▁ 1 : ▁The ▁DM ▁selects ▁a ▁decision ▁ ▁. ▁ ▁Step ▁ 2 : ▁In ▁response , ▁given ▁, ▁ ▁Nature ▁ ▁selects ▁a ▁state ▁. ▁ ▁Step ▁ 3 : ▁The ▁outcome ▁ ▁is ▁all otted ▁to ▁DM . ▁ ▁Note ▁that ▁in ▁contrast ▁to ▁games ▁considered ▁in ▁classical ▁game ▁theory , ▁here ▁the ▁first ▁player ▁( DM ) ▁moves ▁first ▁so ▁that ▁the ▁second ▁player ▁( N ature ) ▁knows ▁what ▁decision ▁was ▁selected ▁by ▁the ▁first ▁player ▁prior ▁to ▁selecting ▁her ▁decision . ▁Thus , ▁the ▁concept ual ▁and ▁technical ▁comp lications ▁regarding ▁the ▁existence ▁of ▁Nash ▁equilibrium ▁point ▁are ▁not ▁pert inent ▁here . ▁Nature ▁is ▁not ▁an ▁independent ▁player , ▁it ▁is ▁a ▁concept ual ▁device ▁describing ▁the ▁DM ' s ▁attitude ▁towards ▁uncertainty ▁and ▁risk . ▁ ▁At ▁first ▁sight , ▁the ▁simplicity ▁of ▁this ▁framework ▁may ▁strike ▁one ▁as ▁na ive . ▁ ▁Yet , ▁as ▁att ested ▁by ▁the ▁variety ▁of ▁specific ▁instances ▁that ▁it ▁en comp ass es ▁it ▁is ▁rich ▁in ▁possibilities , ▁flexible , ▁and ▁vers atile . ▁For ▁the ▁purposes ▁of ▁this ▁discussion ▁it ▁suff ices ▁to ▁consider ▁the ▁following ▁classical ▁generic ▁setup : ▁▁▁▁ ▁where ▁ ▁and ▁ ▁represent ▁the ▁DM ' s ▁and ▁Nature ' s ▁optim ality ▁criteria , ▁respectively , ▁that ▁is , ▁each ▁is ▁equal ▁to ▁either ▁▁ ▁or ▁. ▁ ▁If ▁ ▁then ▁the ▁game ▁is ▁co oper ative , ▁and ▁if ▁ ▁then ▁the ▁game ▁is