▁problem ▁of ▁orig ination ). ▁A ▁second ▁common ▁ob jection ▁to ▁these ▁models ▁is ▁that ▁it ▁is ▁question able ▁whether ▁such ▁ind et erm in ism ▁could ▁add ▁any ▁value ▁to ▁deliber ation ▁over ▁that ▁which ▁is ▁already ▁present ▁in ▁a ▁determin istic ▁world . ▁ ▁D eli ber ative ▁ind et erm in ism ▁as ser ts ▁that ▁the ▁ind et erm in ism ▁is ▁conf ined ▁to ▁an ▁earlier ▁stage ▁in ▁the ▁decision ▁process . ▁This ▁is ▁intended ▁to ▁provide ▁an ▁ind et erm inate ▁set ▁of ▁possibilities ▁to ▁choose ▁from , ▁while ▁not ▁risk ing ▁the ▁introduction ▁of ▁luck ▁( random ▁decision ▁making ). ▁The ▁selection ▁process ▁is ▁determin istic , ▁although ▁it ▁may ▁be ▁based ▁on ▁earlier ▁prefer ences ▁established ▁by ▁the ▁same ▁process . ▁D eli ber ative ▁ind et erm in ism ▁has ▁been ▁referenced ▁by ▁Daniel ▁Den nett ▁and ▁John ▁Martin ▁Fischer . ▁An ▁obvious ▁ob jection ▁to ▁such ▁a ▁view ▁is ▁that ▁an ▁agent ▁cannot ▁be ▁assigned ▁ownership ▁over ▁their ▁dec isions ▁( or ▁prefer ences ▁used ▁to ▁make ▁those ▁dec isions ) ▁to ▁any ▁greater ▁degree ▁than ▁that ▁of ▁a ▁compat ibil ist ▁model . ▁ ▁Cent red ▁accounts ▁propose ▁that ▁for ▁any ▁given ▁decision ▁between ▁two ▁possibilities , ▁the ▁strength ▁of ▁reason ▁will ▁be ▁considered ▁for ▁each ▁option , ▁yet ▁there ▁is ▁still ▁a ▁probability ▁the ▁we aker ▁candidate ▁will ▁be ▁chosen . ▁An ▁obvious ▁ob jection ▁to ▁such ▁a ▁view ▁is ▁that ▁dec isions ▁are ▁explicitly ▁left ▁up ▁to ▁chance , ▁and