▁often ▁a ▁level ▁of ▁dist rust ▁between ▁F AR C ▁reb els ▁and ▁the ▁local ▁pe asant ▁communities , ▁which ▁lack ▁historical ▁t ies ▁to ▁the ▁group . ▁C iv ili ans ▁in ▁these ▁locations ▁also ▁t ended ▁to ▁get ▁caught ▁in ▁the ▁middle ▁of ▁the ▁conflict ▁between ▁F AR C ▁and ▁its ▁government ▁or ▁par amil it ary ▁oppon ents . ▁In ▁the ▁populated ▁urban ▁areas ▁where ▁the ▁Colomb ian ▁state ▁has ▁maintained ▁a ▁solid ▁historical ▁presence , ▁some ▁F AR C ▁sympath ies ▁may ▁have ▁existed ▁in ▁the ▁poor est ▁neighborhood s ▁and ▁among ▁certain ▁progress ive ▁se ctors ▁of ▁the ▁middle ▁class , ▁but ▁most ▁city ▁inhabitants ▁t ended ▁to ▁view ▁the ▁gu err illas ▁as ▁one ▁of ▁Colombia ' s ▁main ▁problems . ▁ ▁By ▁the ▁end ▁of ▁ 2 0 1 0 , ▁F AR C - EP ▁influence ▁was ▁significantly ▁reduced ▁in ▁the ▁regions ▁where ▁it ▁had ▁only ▁carried ▁out ▁a ▁recent ▁military - f oc used ▁expansion ▁during ▁the ▁ 1 9 8 0 s ▁and ▁ 1 9 9 0 s , ▁in ▁part ▁due ▁to ▁the ▁failure ▁to ▁establish ▁close ▁social ▁t ies ▁with ▁local ▁populations . ▁Government ▁off ens ives ▁er adic ated ▁much ▁of ▁the ▁visible ▁gu err illa ▁presence ▁in ▁northern ▁and ▁central ▁Colombia ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁in ▁Gu ain ía , ▁V au p és ▁and ▁Amazon as , ▁limit ing ▁F AR C ▁to ▁c land est ine ▁operations . ▁Similar ▁military ▁set back s ▁and ▁retre ats ▁occurred