▁of ▁compat ibil ist ▁models . ▁Se par ate ▁classes ▁of ▁compat ibil ism ▁and ▁in compat ibil ism ▁may ▁even ▁be ▁formed ▁to ▁represent ▁these . ▁ ▁Below ▁are ▁the ▁classic ▁arguments ▁bearing ▁upon ▁the ▁d ile m ma ▁and ▁its ▁under p inn ings . ▁ ▁In compat ibil ism ▁ ▁In compat ibil ism ▁is ▁the ▁position ▁that ▁free ▁will ▁and ▁determin ism ▁are ▁log ically ▁in compatible , ▁and ▁that ▁the ▁major ▁question ▁regarding ▁whether ▁or ▁not ▁people ▁have ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁thus ▁whether ▁or ▁not ▁their ▁actions ▁are ▁determined . ▁" H ard ▁determin ists ", ▁such ▁as ▁d ' Hol bach , ▁are ▁those ▁in compat ibil ists ▁who ▁accept ▁determin ism ▁and ▁reject ▁free ▁will . ▁In ▁contrast , ▁" met aph ys ical ▁libert ari ans ", ▁such ▁as ▁Thomas ▁Re id , ▁Peter ▁van ▁In wagen , ▁and ▁Robert ▁K ane , ▁are ▁those ▁in compat ibil ists ▁who ▁accept ▁free ▁will ▁and ▁den y ▁determin ism , ▁holding ▁the ▁view ▁that ▁some ▁form ▁of ▁ind et erm in ism ▁is ▁true . ▁Another ▁view ▁is ▁that ▁of ▁hard ▁in compat ibil ists , ▁which ▁state ▁that ▁free ▁will ▁is ▁in compatible ▁with ▁both ▁determin ism ▁and ▁ind et erm in ism . ▁ ▁Trad itional ▁arguments ▁for ▁in compat ibil ism ▁are ▁based ▁on ▁an ▁" int u ition ▁p ump ": ▁if ▁a ▁person ▁is ▁like ▁other ▁mechanical ▁things ▁that ▁are ▁determined ▁in ▁their ▁behavior ▁such ▁as ▁a ▁wind - up ▁to