▁thick ▁scr ub ▁bush . ▁One ▁ran ▁north - n ortheast ▁and ▁marked ▁the ▁border ▁of ▁the ▁Orange ▁Free ▁State , ▁while ▁a ▁second ▁protected ▁the ▁tren ches ▁in ▁front ▁of ▁the ▁Bo er ▁position . ▁ ▁British ▁plan ▁ ▁M eth uen ▁believed ▁that ▁the ▁Bo ers ▁were ▁occup ying ▁the ▁cr ests ▁of ▁the ▁line ▁of ▁kop jes , ▁as ▁they ▁had ▁done ▁at ▁Bel mont , ▁but ▁he ▁was ▁unable ▁to ▁recon no it re ▁the ▁position ; ▁his ▁mounted ▁sc outs ▁could ▁not ▁ro am ▁the ▁coun tr ys ide ▁freely ▁on ▁account ▁of ▁wire ▁farm ▁f ences , ▁nor ▁could ▁they ▁approach ▁any ▁closer ▁than ▁ ▁to ▁the ▁Bo er ▁positions ▁without ▁being ▁driven ▁off ▁by ▁rif le ▁fire . ▁No ▁service able ▁maps ▁were ▁available ; ▁those ▁in ▁the ▁possession ▁of ▁the ▁British ▁officers ▁had ▁been ▁prepared ▁for ▁the ▁purposes ▁of ▁land ▁registration , ▁with ▁no ▁consideration ▁of ▁military ▁operations . ▁Offic ers ▁supp lement ed ▁these ▁maps ▁with ▁hast y ▁sketch es ▁based ▁on ▁limited ▁daily ▁reconna issance . ▁The ▁poor ▁maps ▁and ▁lack ▁of ▁reconna issance ▁would ▁prove ▁critical ▁to ▁the ▁outcome ▁of ▁the ▁battle . ▁ ▁Ever ▁since ▁the ▁victory ▁against ▁an ▁Egypt ian ▁army ▁at ▁the ▁Battle ▁of ▁Tel - el - K eb ir , ▁the ▁standard ▁British ▁t actic ▁against ▁an ▁ent rench ed ▁position ▁was ▁an ▁approach ▁march ▁at ▁night ▁in ▁close ▁order ▁to ▁maintain ▁coh es ion , ▁followed ▁by ▁deployment ▁into ▁open ▁order ▁within ▁a ▁few ▁hundred ▁yards