▁natural ▁law ▁ar ises ▁when ▁either ▁caus al ▁closure ▁or ▁physical ▁determin ism ▁( nom ological ▁determin ism ) ▁is ▁assert ed . ▁With ▁caus al ▁closure , ▁no ▁physical ▁event ▁has ▁a ▁cause ▁outside ▁the ▁physical ▁domain , ▁and ▁with ▁physical ▁determin ism , ▁the ▁future ▁is ▁determined ▁entirely ▁by ▁preceding ▁events ▁( c ause ▁and ▁effect ). ▁ ▁The ▁puzz le ▁of ▁recon cil ing ▁' free ▁will ' ▁with ▁a ▁determin istic ▁universe ▁is ▁known ▁as ▁the ▁problem ▁of ▁free ▁will ▁or ▁sometimes ▁referred ▁to ▁as ▁the ▁d ile m ma ▁of ▁determin ism . ▁This ▁d ile m ma ▁leads ▁to ▁a ▁moral ▁d ile m ma ▁as ▁well : ▁the ▁question ▁of ▁how ▁to ▁assign ▁responsibility ▁for ▁actions ▁if ▁they ▁are ▁caused ▁entirely ▁by ▁past ▁events . ▁ ▁Comp at ibil ists ▁maintain ▁that ▁mental ▁reality ▁is ▁not ▁of ▁itself ▁caus ally ▁effective . ▁Class ical ▁compat ibil ists ▁have ▁addressed ▁the ▁d ile m ma ▁of ▁free ▁will ▁by ▁arg uing ▁that ▁free ▁will ▁holds ▁as ▁long ▁as ▁we ▁are ▁not ▁extern ally ▁const rained ▁or ▁co er ced . ▁Modern ▁compat ibil ists ▁make ▁a ▁distinction ▁between ▁freedom ▁of ▁will ▁and ▁freedom ▁of ▁action , ▁that ▁is , ▁separ ating ▁freedom ▁of ▁choice ▁from ▁the ▁freedom ▁to ▁en act ▁it . ▁Given ▁that ▁humans ▁all ▁experience ▁a ▁sense ▁of ▁free ▁will , ▁some ▁modern ▁compat ibil ists ▁think ▁it ▁is ▁necessary ▁to ▁accommod ate ▁this ▁intu ition . ▁Comp at ibil ists ▁often ▁associate ▁freedom ▁of