iny ▁elimin ates ▁alternate ▁possibility ▁( one ▁cannot ▁do ▁otherwise ) ▁ ▁Assert ▁in compat ibility ▁with ▁met aph ys ical ▁libert arian ▁free ▁will ▁ ▁This ▁argument ▁is ▁very ▁often ▁accepted ▁as ▁a ▁basis ▁for ▁the ological ▁in compat ibil ism : ▁den ying ▁either ▁libert arian ▁free ▁will ▁or ▁divine ▁for ek now ledge ▁( om nis cience ) ▁and ▁therefore ▁the ological ▁determin ism . ▁On ▁the ▁other ▁hand , ▁the ological ▁compat ibil ism ▁must ▁attempt ▁to ▁find ▁problems ▁with ▁it . ▁The ▁formal ▁version ▁of ▁the ▁argument ▁rest s ▁on ▁a ▁number ▁of ▁prem ises , ▁many ▁of ▁which ▁have ▁received ▁some ▁degree ▁of ▁cont ention . ▁The ological ▁compat ibil ist ▁responses ▁have ▁included : ▁ ▁Den y ▁the ▁truth ▁value ▁of ▁future ▁cont ing ents , ▁although ▁this ▁den ies ▁for ek now ledge ▁and ▁therefore ▁the ological ▁determin ism . ▁ ▁Assert ▁differences ▁in ▁non - tem por al ▁knowledge ▁( space - time ▁independence ), ▁an ▁approach ▁taken ▁for ▁example ▁by ▁Bo eth ius , ▁Thomas ▁Aqu inas , ▁and ▁C . S . ▁Lewis . ▁ ▁Den y ▁the ▁Princi ple ▁of ▁Altern ate ▁Poss ib ilities : ▁" If ▁you ▁cannot ▁do ▁otherwise ▁when ▁you ▁do ▁an ▁act , ▁you ▁do ▁not ▁act ▁freely ." ▁For ▁example , ▁a ▁human ▁observer ▁could ▁in ▁principle ▁have ▁a ▁machine ▁that ▁could ▁detect ▁what ▁will ▁happen ▁in ▁the ▁future , ▁but ▁the ▁existence ▁of ▁this ▁machine ▁or ▁their ▁use ▁of ▁it ▁has ▁no ▁influence ▁on