▁determ ination ▁with ▁which ▁he ▁directly ▁mer ges . ▁Cons cious ▁life ▁activity ▁directly ▁distingu ishes ▁man ▁from ▁animal ▁life ▁activity . ▁Only ▁because ▁of ▁that ▁is ▁he ▁a ▁species - be ing . ▁Or , ▁rather , ▁he ▁is ▁a ▁conscious ▁being ▁– ▁i . e ., ▁his ▁own ▁life ▁is ▁an ▁object ▁for ▁him , ▁only ▁because ▁he ▁is ▁a ▁species - be ing . ▁Only ▁because ▁of ▁that ▁is ▁his ▁activity ▁free ▁activity . ▁E str anged ▁labour ▁revers es ▁the ▁relationship ▁so ▁that ▁man , ▁just ▁because ▁he ▁is ▁a ▁conscious ▁being , ▁makes ▁his ▁life ▁activity , ▁his ▁essential ▁being , ▁a ▁mere ▁means ▁for ▁his ▁existence . ▁ ▁Also ▁in ▁the ▁segment ▁on ▁E str anged ▁Labour : ▁ ▁Man ▁is ▁a ▁species - be ing , ▁not ▁only ▁because ▁he ▁pract ically ▁and ▁theoret ically ▁makes ▁the ▁species ▁– ▁both ▁his ▁own ▁and ▁those ▁of ▁other ▁things ▁– ▁his ▁object , ▁but ▁also ▁– ▁and ▁this ▁is ▁simply ▁another ▁way ▁of ▁saying ▁the ▁same ▁thing ▁– ▁because ▁he ▁looks ▁upon ▁himself ▁as ▁the ▁present , ▁living ▁species , ▁because ▁he ▁looks ▁upon ▁himself ▁as ▁a ▁universal ▁and ▁therefore ▁free ▁being . ▁ ▁More ▁than ▁twenty ▁years ▁later , ▁in ▁Capital , ▁he ▁came ▁to ▁muse ▁on ▁a ▁similar ▁subject : ▁ ▁A ▁sp ider ▁conduct s ▁operations ▁that ▁res emble ▁those ▁of ▁a ▁we aver , ▁and ▁a ▁be e ▁puts ▁to ▁shame ▁many ▁an ▁architect ▁in ▁the ▁construction ▁of ▁her ▁cells . ▁But ▁what ▁distingu