▁cum ulative ▁US $ 2 2 ▁billion ▁in ▁def ic its ▁between ▁ 1 9 9 2 ▁and ▁ 1 9 9 9 . ▁Unable ▁to ▁de value , ▁Argentina ▁could ▁only ▁become ▁more ▁compet itive ▁if ▁prices ▁fell . ▁De fl ation ▁came ▁from ▁re cess ion , ▁falling ▁w ages ▁and ▁rising ▁un emp loyment . ▁Interest ▁rates ▁remained ▁high , ▁with ▁banks ▁l ending ▁dollars ▁at ▁ 2 5 %. ▁ ▁The ▁share ▁of ▁public ▁sp ending ▁in ▁G DP ▁increased ▁from ▁ 2 7 % ▁in ▁ 1 9 9 5 ▁to ▁ 3 0 % ▁in ▁ 2 0 0 0 . ▁Some ▁poor er ▁provinces ▁had ▁dep ended ▁on ▁state ▁enter pr ises ▁or ▁on ▁in efficient ▁indust ries , ▁such ▁as ▁sugar , ▁which ▁could ▁not ▁comp ete ▁when ▁trade ▁was ▁opened . ▁To ▁qu ell ▁social ▁un rest , ▁provincial ▁govern ors ▁p added ▁their ▁pay roll s . ▁The ▁government ▁had ▁emb ark ed ▁on ▁a ▁p ension ▁reform ▁with ▁costs ▁reaching ▁ 3 % ▁of ▁G DP ▁in ▁ 2 0 0 0 , ▁as ▁it ▁still ▁had ▁to ▁pay ▁p ension ers ▁but ▁no ▁longer ▁received ▁contributions . ▁ ▁Econom ic ▁crisis ▁( 1 9 9 8 ▁- ▁ 2 0 0 2 ) ▁ ▁Argentina ▁fell ▁into ▁a ▁deep ▁re cess ion ▁in ▁the ▁second ▁half ▁of ▁ 1 9 9 8 , ▁triggered ▁and ▁then ▁comp ounded ▁by ▁a ▁series ▁of ▁ad verse ▁external ▁shock s , ▁which ▁included ▁low