▁jud ges ▁require ▁only ▁the ▁facts ▁and ▁the ▁law , ▁all ▁norm ative ▁issues ▁such ▁as ▁mor ality ▁or ▁politics ▁being ▁irrelevant . ▁If ▁jud ges ▁are ▁seen ▁to ▁be ▁simply ▁applying ▁the ▁rules ▁in ▁a ▁mechanical ▁and ▁un cont ro vers ial ▁manner , ▁this ▁protect s ▁jud ges ▁from ▁criticism . ▁For ▁this ▁reason , ▁formal ism ▁has ▁been ▁called ▁' the ▁official ▁theory ▁of ▁jud ging '. ▁ ▁F ormal ists , ▁contrary ▁to ▁Real ists , ▁take ▁the ▁judge ▁at ▁face - value , ▁assuming ▁that ▁the ▁facts ▁and ▁principles ▁as ▁recorded ▁in ▁a ▁judge ' s ▁reasons ▁reflect ▁the ▁facts ▁that ▁the ▁judge ▁considered ▁to ▁be ▁relevant , ▁and ▁the ▁principles ▁that ▁the ▁judge ▁arrived ▁at ▁to ▁reach ▁the ▁jud g ement . ▁They ▁therefore ▁place ▁little ▁emphas is ▁on ▁the ▁means ▁by ▁which ▁a ▁judge ▁determ ines ▁the ▁facts . ▁ ▁As ▁a ▁norm ative ▁theory , ▁legal ▁formal ists ▁argue ▁that ▁jud ges ▁and ▁other ▁public ▁officials ▁should ▁be ▁const rained ▁in ▁their ▁interpretation ▁of ▁legal ▁texts , ▁suggesting ▁that ▁invest ing ▁the ▁jud ici ary ▁with ▁the ▁power ▁to ▁say ▁what ▁the ▁law ▁should ▁be , ▁rather ▁than ▁conf ining ▁them ▁to ▁expos iting ▁what ▁the ▁law ▁does ▁say , ▁viol ates ▁the ▁separation ▁of ▁powers . ▁This ▁argument ▁finds ▁its ▁most ▁el o quent ▁expression ▁in ▁the ▁Massachusetts ▁Constitution ▁of ▁ 1 7 8 0 , ▁which ▁provides ▁that ▁the ▁jud ici ary ▁" sh all ▁never ▁exercise ▁the ▁legisl ative ▁and ▁executive ▁powers