▁AR Bi H ) ▁and ▁the ▁Cro at ian ▁Def ence ▁Council ▁( H r vat sko ▁v ije će ▁ob rane ▁– ▁H VO ), ▁reporting ▁to ▁the ▁Bos nia k - domin ated ▁central ▁government ▁and ▁the ▁Bos n ian ▁Cro at ▁leadership ▁respectively , ▁as ▁well ▁as ▁the ▁H V , ▁which ▁occasionally ▁supported ▁H VO ▁operations . ▁In ▁late ▁April , ▁the ▁V RS ▁was ▁able ▁to ▁deploy ▁ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 ▁troops , ▁hundreds ▁of ▁t anks , ▁arm oured ▁personnel ▁carri ers ▁( AP C s ) ▁and ▁art illery ▁pieces . ▁The ▁H VO ▁and ▁the ▁Cro at ian ▁Def ence ▁Forces ▁( H rv ats ke ▁ob r amb ene ▁sn age ▁– ▁H OS ) ▁could ▁field ▁approximately ▁ 2 5 , 0 0 0 ▁soldiers ▁and ▁a ▁hand ful ▁of ▁heavy ▁weapons , ▁while ▁the ▁AR Bi H ▁was ▁largely ▁un prep ared ▁with ▁nearly ▁ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ▁troops , ▁small ▁arms ▁for ▁less ▁than ▁a ▁half ▁of ▁their ▁number ▁and ▁virt ually ▁no ▁heavy ▁weapons . ▁Ar ming ▁of ▁the ▁various ▁forces ▁was ▁ham per ed ▁by ▁a ▁United ▁Nations ▁( UN ) ▁arms ▁embargo ▁introduced ▁in ▁September ▁ 1 9 9 1 . ▁By ▁mid - May ▁ 1 9 9 2 , ▁when ▁those ▁J NA ▁units ▁which ▁had ▁not ▁been ▁transferred ▁to ▁the ▁V RS ▁with d rew ▁from ▁Bos nia ▁and ▁Herz egov ina ▁to ▁the ▁newly ▁declared ▁Federal