, ▁meaning ▁that ▁coll ater al ▁was ▁being ▁re h yp othe c ated ▁ ▁several ▁times ▁over , ▁with ▁an ▁estimated ▁ch urn ▁factor ▁of ▁ 4 . ▁ ▁Following ▁the ▁Le h man ▁collapse , ▁large ▁h edge ▁funds ▁in ▁particular ▁became ▁more ▁w ary ▁of ▁allowing ▁their ▁coll ater al ▁to ▁be ▁re h yp othe c ated , ▁and ▁even ▁in ▁the ▁UK ▁they ▁would ▁ins ist ▁on ▁contract s ▁that ▁limit ▁the ▁amount ▁of ▁their ▁assets ▁that ▁can ▁be ▁rep ost ed , ▁or ▁even ▁prohib it ▁re h yp othe cation ▁completely . ▁ ▁In ▁ 2 0 0 9 ▁the ▁IM F ▁estimated ▁that ▁the ▁funds ▁available ▁to ▁US ▁banks ▁due ▁to ▁re h yp othe cation ▁had ▁decl ined ▁by ▁more ▁than ▁half ▁to ▁$ 2 . 1 ▁tr ill ion ▁due ▁to ▁both ▁less ▁original ▁coll ater al ▁being ▁available ▁for ▁re h yp othe cation ▁in ▁the ▁first ▁place ▁and ▁a ▁lower ▁ch urn ▁factor . ▁ ▁The ▁possible ▁role ▁of ▁re h yp othe cation ▁in ▁the ▁financial ▁crisis ▁of ▁ 2 0 0 7 – 2 0 0 8 ▁and ▁in ▁the ▁shadow ▁bank ing ▁system ▁was ▁largely ▁over look ed ▁by ▁the ▁main stream ▁financial ▁press , ▁until ▁Dr . ▁Gill ian ▁T ett ▁of ▁the ▁Fin an cial ▁Times ▁drew ▁attention ▁in ▁August ▁ 2 0 1 0 ▁to ▁a ▁paper ▁from ▁Man m oh an ▁Singh ▁and ▁James ▁A it ken ▁of ▁the ▁International ▁Mon et ary ▁Fund