evidence: Until recently, counterterrorism experts discounted jihadists’ ability to expand into littoral West Africa because these states, unlike their Sahelian neighbors, were more politically stable and had greater control of their borders. According to this logic, the stronger security forces and governance structures in the littoral states made jihadism unwelcome. The complexity of the kidnapping and assassination operations indicated that the groups had a more permanent fixture in the WAP Complex and surrounding communities in Benin, Togo, and Burkina Faso than previously believed. In particular, the ungoverned, disputed territory around the town of Koalou, at the intersection of these three countries, has become a safe space for jihadist movement and a staging area inaccessible to security forces. [...] Lack of coherent and transparent military operations is another reason why jihadism has managed to proliferate and expand outside the Sahel and into the littorals. Numerous multilateral missions have often failed to agree upon and communicate a centralized objective, leading to incoherent operations. The joint Ivorian-Burkinabe Operation Comoé in the spring of 2020 is an example. Disconnected policies and poor coordination between the two militaries led to failed intelligence sharing, followed by racketeering in the border area between the two states. Since these borders are porous, jihadists fleeing kinetic operations crossed into Côte d’Ivoire, settled, and subsequently carried out an attack in Kafolo once the dust had settled. Poorly coordinated operations inadvertently fan jihadists out across the region rather than containing their areas of control.