evidence: In October 1950, Chinese troops under the name of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPV) crossed the Yalu River to assist North Korean armies, and engaged in the Korean War in an offensive manner after the U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel. One central question immediately arises with regard to the Chinese intervention: Why did the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) decide to send its troops to engage in a war which did not take place on its own territory? [...] As mentioned before, one constraint posed by U.S. military presence near the Yalu River is that it limited China’s ability to respond to domestic anti-Communist movements. Implicitly behind this campaign of countering anti-Communist elements was the CCP’s need to consolidate its regime which was established less than a year ago. More importantly, the CCP faced the difficult task of establishing its authority and credibility by creating extensive internal support from the population at large.20 Influenced by the traditional Chinese strategic culture of regarding crisis (weiji) as constituted by both danger (wei) and opportunity (ji), the outbreak of crisis in Korea was seen by the CCP as both a challenge and a rare opportunity for the CCP to achieve the above objectives.21 [...] Yao, X. Cong Yalujiang Dao Banmendian (From Yalu River to Panmunjom) (Beijing, People’s Press, 1985).