evidence: However, Kinmen (金門) is an exception to this success story. Given its geography and economy, Kinmen is uniquely susceptible to PRC influence, and has been targeted through the weaponization of infrastructure and resource projects. Moreover, the CCP views political-economic integration between Kinmen and Fujian province as useful propaganda and as an experimental model for the integration of the rest of Taiwan. Many of the efforts that were temporarily put on hold due to the CCP’s challenges dealing with COVID are now being restarted. In the coming years, Taiwan should reassess both its defense policies and the economic development of Kinmen, to better address PRC cognitive warfare. [...] Kinmen’s prior history as part of the Republic of China’s Cold War-era fortress frontline against the PRC meant that Kinmen has had long-standing issues with economic self-sufficiency—particularly after the drawdown of the military garrison, which numbered over 100,000 at the height of the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. During a warmer period of Taiwan-PRC engagement, both sides sought to leverage Kinmen’s geographic proximity to the PRC through the "Three Mini Links" (小三通)—a program of limited postal, transportation, and trade links established in 2001. This, in turn, has resulted in a tourism industry largely catering to Chinese visitors.