evidence: Since its establishment, Hezbollah has evolved from a non-state actor pursuing territorial liberation to more of a hybrid political entity intimately implicated in the day-to-day governance of Lebanon. Since 2008, it has partnered with successive governments. It has maintained a vast security apparatus encompassing, among other things, telecommunications, a standing militia and missile caches. Territorially, Hezbollah controls access to various parts of the republic, including the southern suburbs of Beirut and the governorates of Baalbek-Hermel, Nabatiyah and al-Janoub. This power is not unchallenged, however. Other collectives at the village and regional levels, alongside political parties, are engaged in arms stockpiling and basic training. [...] Conflict management in Lebanon is complicated. On the one hand, the longevity of the post-civil war political system, and its proponents’ success in stalling the reform agenda that ended the civil war (the Taif Accord), are evidence of a kind of cleavage management. On the other, the potential for small-scale disagreements or conflicts to escalate quickly out of control indicates political leaders’ consistent inability to resolve conflicts at the source. The political order can only exist because of long-running divisions in Lebanese society. The Tayyouneh clashes in 2021 are an example of both. Away from formal party politics, however, the Lebanese state has not demonstrated effective cleavage management. In 2020, for example, it took recourse to tribal customs to diffuse the skirmishes and tensions between the Jaafar and Jamal clans in Qasr.