evidence: The 10th round of military commander-level talks held on Feb. 20 signaled a partial reduction of bilateral tensions. There remain several outstanding issues, including military withdrawal from the Depsang Plains and stalled disengagement from the Gogra and Hot Springs area in eastern Ladakh (which the 11th round of corps commander-level talks in April failed to resolve). But this did not stop nascent signs of reconciliation at the political level. These include the establishment of a hotline between both countries’ foreign ministers and reports that China has supported India’s candidacy to assume chairmanship of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Forum. [...] The Galwan Valley skirmishes were preceded by tensions in the Doklam plateau in 2017, the Chumar area in 2014, and the Depsang Plains in 2013. Each incident demonstrated China’s ability to apply pressure on the border and probe New Delhi’s resolve. The most recent border tensions (like the previous ones) also entailed both sides claiming victory (or at least refusing to acknowledge defeat). Nationalist rhetoric and an unwillingness to publicly examine the roots of the most recent crisis or to alter or reassess their territorial claims set the stage for renewed tensions in the future. This is particularly relevant for China, where there is limited space for independent and critical analysis of the country’s foreign policy. However, it also holds relevance for India, where there has been a longstanding tendency by the policymaking community to limit informed public debate on New Delhi’s China policy.