evidence: Malaysia can be accommodating, as it was with Indonesia when the two delimited their continental shelves in 1969 based on mutual understanding. Kuala Lumpur supported Jakarta’s quest for archipelagic status in exchange for a treaty that allowed Kuala Lumpur access through the Natunas. But Kuala Lumpur can also outsmart a bigger power, as when it went to court in the case of Sipadan and Ligitan in 2002 and won by the merit of having economic activities on the islands—which, for Jakarta, violated the prior understanding of restraint. Kuala Lumpur also legally challenged Indonesia’s interpretation that its EEZ and continental shelf in the north Natuna Sea are distinct (known as a dual boundary line) and engaged in an episodic confrontation with the Indonesian Navy around the oil-rich Ambalat block off the east coast of Borneo. [...] By postponing dispute resolution in the strait of Malacca (with Singapore and Indonesia) in exchange for joint patrol, Kuala Lumpur gained a better sense of security with which to manage a busy strait of global importance. Kuala Lumpur also shelves disputes in the South China Sea in favour of cooperation with Thailand and Vietnam. With Thailand, it has maintained the financially beneficial Joint Area for exploring and exploiting hydrocarbons in the two overlapping continental shelves since 1979.