evidence: MG: This is the thing that I'm doing a podcast on now — the parallel of this in fighting crime. It's what was wrong with stop-and-frisk in New York. It was a misunderstanding of the dynamics of criminality. It said you should stop any young Black male who looked a little bit suspicious and search them, and that was the best way to bring down crime. And the problem with that strategy is that they only found a gun in whatever it was, 1% of stop-and-frisks, and they did 4.5 million frisks in eight years, between 2004 and 2012. What we've understood after stop-and-frisk ends is that: no, no, no, the most effective way to fight crime is to be as precise as possible. It’s to figure out: oh, okay, if for every 100 people you frisk you only find guns once, then can you predict who that one person is? The answer is: yes, you sort of can. You can zero in much more precisely on the people who are actually at higher risk for committing an act, being victimized by an act, carrying a gun…and that's where the real opportunity lies in crime fighting.