evidence: Although rational calculations of power ought to dictate Russian aversion to expanding the war from a trajectory of losing to Ukraine to one of more rapidly and decisively losing should the United States become a direct combatant, the Biden team’s policy is predicated on concerns that uncontrollable escalation could result from U.S. assistance to Ukraine. To avoid an accidental war with Russia, the Biden administration has defended the international order by timidly progressing from declining before and in the early stages of the invasion to provide weapons to Ukraine because they would quickly end up in Russian hands if Russia won as expected, to refusing to provide "offensive weapons," to providing "offensive weapons" but not those that could reach Russian territory, to providing weapons that could reach Russian territory but making Ukraine promise not to use them at those ranges, to allowing Ukraine to target Russian forces in Crimea, to providing tanks and training in the United States.[4] Out of concern the United States could unavoidably be drawn into direct combat against Russia, the strongest power in the international order is conveying the limits of its interest to a violent transgressor losing a war against a lesser power.