evidence: This was despite some acts of commemoration for the war, and links between the 2022 democracy protests and the quest for justice for the war dead and disappeared. Thus when contemporary narratives of the Aragalaya/Porattam, to use the names for the movement in both Sinhala and Tamil, cast it primarily as an economic crisis they exhibit blatant short-termism and thus erase the violence of the civil war. [...] 2022, on the other hand, can be seen as beginning the end of Sinhala Buddhist extremism. First, throwing Rajapaksa supporters into the Beira Lake signified more than a violent act towards the political enemy. These Rajapaksa supporters represented the political ideology which was termed ‘Rajapaksawadaya’ (Rajapakshism) by historian Nirmal Dewasiri.42Rajapaksawadaya is a political ideology which managed to mobilize the Sinhala Buddhist constituency in the south between 2005 and 2015 to a greater extent than any other single political ideology had achieved. It was characterized by the combination of three elements: Sinhala Buddhist nationalism powered by the military victory against the LTTE; neoliberal economic commitments through mega development projects such as highways, a port and airport; and human rights violations through violent suppression of political protests and forced disappearances (and the murder) of political dissenters. The last was known as ‘white van culture’. Therefore, not only Rajapaksa supporters but also Rajapaksawadaya as an ideology went into the Beira Lake. Second, as I witnessed, it was ordinary people, regardless of ethnicity, class, caste, religion and language, who were acting together. There was an unspoken solidarity among us.