evidence: Indian figures admit that 'transgressions', or instances of Chinese patrols walking through Indian territory, have increased substantially in recent years, especially in Ladakh, or the western sector. In 2017, the year of the Doklam stand-off, these cases rose to 473 from 296 year-on-year. This year, they clocked 170 by April, in comparison with 663 in all of 2019. Ladakh accounted for 130 of these, up from 110 during the same period the previous year. That seems counter-intuitive. After all, the two sides dedicated two whole decades from 1993 onwards to devise a comprehensive regime of confidence building measures aimed at managing the border, formulating rules of engagement for the two militaries, and even setting up the Special Representatives framework to assist the process of finding political solutions to the historical issue. [...] In October, as the union territory of Ladakh was formally established, the Chinese foreign ministry again accused India of "challenging China's sovereign rights and interests," declaring that such a step would "neither change the fact that the relevant region is under China's actual control nor produce any effect." While none of this conclusively establishes that China’s behaviour at the LAC can be directly attributed to the decision on Article 370, it suggests that the move featured in China’s calculus.