evidence: Recent date from the IMF shows why this theory was persuasive. The IMF’s most recent "Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia," reports that Iran’s "Gross Official Reserves" fell from an average of $70 billion in 2000-2017, and $122.5 billion in 2018, to $12.4 billion in 2019 and an amazing $4 billion in 2020. At that level Iran was on a rough par with countries such as Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Armenia, and Georgia. By contrast, in 2020 Algeria had $46.7 billion in reserves, Iraq had $54.1 billion, Libya $51 billion--and Afghanistan $8.6 billion, twice as much as Iran. What explains the collapse in Iran’s reserves? The "maximum pressure" campaign. And the argument that 'faced with a continuation and even intensification of that campaign, Iran would have had to negotiate' seems entirely reasonable. [...] Whenever we hear that "the maximum pressure campaign failed," we ought to recall that IMF statistic: Iran’s reserves almost disappeared between 2018 and 2020. The Biden policy, which suggests that Iran will concede more while the pressure on it is reduced, is simply illogical. As the old saying goes, hope is not a strategy.