evidence: The PRC has always claimed Kinmen and other ROC islands as its own territory, so it does not need to formally declare annexation. It instead maintains some ambiguity about Kinmen’s change of status to avoid unwanted conflict escalation while it gradually solidifies its de facto control of the islands. The CCG continues to patrol Kinmen’s waters to control the ROC personnel, equipment, supplies, or services that are allowed to reach the islands. The ROC national government does not formally surrender its sovereignty over Kinmen, but Taipei nonetheless loses the ability to administer Kinmen County in practice. In the longer term, the PRC builds up Kinmen as an exemplar of the "One Country, Two Systems" scheme it wishes to impose on Taiwan. The PRC helps Kinmen build infrastructure and invests in Kinmen’s economy, delivering a substantial boon to the small island group’s economic prosperity. It takes over maritime law enforcement for Kinmen, even cracking down on illegal fishing by PRC nationals in the waters near Kinmen. On the other hand, it avoids overt meddling in Kinmen’s political system, aside from arresting the occasional "separatist." The CCP can afford to largely let Kinmen manage its own internal governance because Kinmen’s politics are already dominated by pan-Blue and relatively PRC-friendly politicians. The CCP will use its media and information warfare to promote narratives of Kinmen’s freedom and economic prosperity, thus increasing the appeal of such a model for Taiwan’s other outlying islands and eventually Taiwan itself.