evidence: The rationale behind Beijing’s landgrab is not entirely clear. Unlike Doklam, which is near India and where the PRC has also pressed ahead to alter the situation on the ground through construction of roads and bunkers, control over Beyul Khenpajong would have no strategic value in the event of an India-China war. Stobdan suggests that it "may be spiritually important for the Drukpas and Nyingmapas living on the Tibetan side," something which Beijing could be playing on to boost support. [12] Alternatively, Beijing may be tightening its grip over the Beyul to pressure Thimphu to accept the package proposal. Stobdan believes that Beijing’s infrastructure buildup and "nomadic Tibetan infiltration" has been successful in the past. He notes that in 2006, Bhutan excluded Kula Kangri (an Himalayan peak) from its national map, supposedly under duress from the PRC. [13] Given such precedents, Beijing has likely learned the lesson that such pressure can pay off. In this case, as a Bhutanese official warned, the recent structures "are not temporary structures aimed at just pressuring Bhutan but seem built for the long run." They added that this activity amounts to Chinese "occupation" of the Beyul. [14] This perception is not necessarily commonly held.