evidence: Even if the theoretical case for the dilatory approach Kutuzov represented seemed persuasive, as the campaign went on it became more and more difficult to sustain. The French capture of Smolensk—the farthest into Russian territory an enemy army had reached in centuries—was a shock. An even more painful moment came with the Battle of Borodino outside of Moscow in September 1812, when 40,000 Russian casualties could not stop the French onslaught, despite inflicting comparable losses. The French then occupied the ancient capital unchallenged, provoking horror and indignation across the empire. Moscow’s governor, the arch-conservative aristocrat Fedor Rostopchin, had not known that Kutuzov planned to abandon the city. Furious as he was, Rostopchin suppressed his anger at Kutuzov and redirected it into a fiery propaganda campaign that successfully rallied nobles and commoners alike to seek patriotic vengeance against the godless French. It is also likely that he was the one who decided to start an enormous conflagration that devastated the city and made it impossible for the French to occupy it for long; had this not happened, Kutuzov’s talents might not have sufficed to save the empire.