evidence: Washington was uncertain about how to follow up Seoul’s liberation but MacArthur was determined to march north to the Yalu River and the Chinese border. Mao, for his part, decided in early October to send his army south across the Yalu River and fight MacArthur’s forces. [...] MacArthur made one of his lightning quick trips to Korea from Tokyo on November 24, 1950, telling the U.S. ambassador in Seoul there were only 25,000 Chinese troops in Korea. Then he had his return flight to Tokyo fly along the Yalu River, making possible a personal reconnaissance intended to impress the media. His report to Washington dismissed the danger of Chinese intervention. Three days later Peng’s armies struck the American forces as they were driving to the Yalu River. [...] In September 1950 Panikkar’s military contacts in Beijing began to warn him that the PRC would not sit still and allow the UN forces including the Eighth Army to march to the Yalu. Chinese military officials told him that Mao was prepared to risk nuclear war to stop those forces from advancing. The Indian embassy in Beijing reported that trainloads of CCF troops were moving to the border region, and the Indian government passed these reports on to Washington and London.