evidence: Though framed in terms hydropower production and flood control, water infrastructure in the Brahmaputra also serves as a form of territorial demarcation and control along a contested frontier. As one Indian official stated in 2016 with respect to one of China’s dams, "The strategic value of the Lalho project lies also in the fact that Shigatse is only a few hours driving distance from the junction of Bhutan and Sikkim, and the city from which the Chinese plan to extend their railroads to Nepal." The Great Bend Dam, if constructed, would for the first time move Chinese infrastructure off the Tibetan Plateau onto the southern slopes of the Himalaya toward the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, a region China calls "South Tibet." India, for its part, would place its mega-dam near its border with China, likewise signaling control of not only water but territory. The Indian megadam is also part of larger planning begun in the early 2000s for up to 150 dams within Arunachal Pradesh. [...] In the early 20th century, China and the United Kingdom placed stones to demarcate territorial ambitions in the Brahmaputra basin. In the early 21st century, China and India are using dams as the new boundary markers and water investments — or a lack thereof — as a way to build or assert regional power. Infrastructure may not drive water conflict in the Brahmaputra basin, but it plays a significant role in the contest for space and influence.