evidence: On June 8, a platoon-sized unit of Chinese border guards moved into territory claimed by both China and Bhutan, a client-state of India. They destroyed stone bunkers used sporadically by the Royal Bhutan Army, and shortly afterward a Chinese road construction crew arrived with excavators, bulldozers, and a larger military escort. On June 16, Indian troops arrived and blocked the road-building effort. The next two months saw periodic scuffles at Doklam, as well as a mass rock-fight (captured on video and posted to YouTube) by the disputed banks of the Pangong Lake 800 miles away. On August 28, both nations agreed to what India termed an "expeditious disengagement" of forces, and both declared this non-resolution a victory. [...] Moreover, a Chinese military presence at Doklam—particularly one with transportation infrastructure capable of supporting deeper incursions—would threaten a 17-mile-wide strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor linking seven Northeastern Indian states to the rest of the country. The corridor is often referred to as India’s "Chicken Neck"—and New Delhi had no intention of letting Beijing gain control of it. The 2007 treaty with Bhutan ominously notes that "neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other." Even if Bhutan were willing to let China take control of Doklam, India would likely have been unwilling (and, by treaty, unrequired) to stand aside.