evidence: The agreement came almost one year after the government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa announced Sri Lanka’s imminent default on its sovereign debt, becoming the first Asia–Pacific country to do so in over two decades. This admission of inability to service external loans underlined the severity of Sri Lanka’s economic crisis that first broke in 2021 and sparked widespread and large-scale protests between March and July 2022. [...] The most obvious factor is that the country had nowhere left to turn. Sri Lanka had lost access to borrowing on the international financial market in 2021, an outcome of its sovereign credit rating being progressively downgraded from 2020 onwards, signalling international concern over likelihood of default on debt. Once a default occurs, all creditors (bilateral, multilateral, and private) freeze new lending. [...] Indeed, Sri Lanka has continued to service its multilateral debt post-default and not pressed for debt relief from those creditors, which places international financial institutions in a privileged position vis-à-vis bilateral and commercial creditors. However, China’s first claim ought to be scrutinized further, as there is domestic criticism of the return on investment of Chinese-funded projects, the "development" orientation of those projects (beyond large-scale infrastructure of limited value to the poor), and allegations of grand corruption attached to governing politicians and bureaucrats.