evidence: One oft-invoked example of unsustainable borrowing under the BRI is the case of Sri Lanka, and, in particular, the Hambantota port, which has failed to create projected revenues but instead incurred $300m in losses (Sum, 2019: 545). Yet project specifics are at times misrepresented in mainstream analyses (see Brautigam, 2020). Indeed, the Sri Lankan government has also extensively borrowed from non-Chinese sources, and officials have insisted that the government had signed the loan for the port without pressure from Beijing. As Jones and Hameiri point out, ‘China’s engagement was shaped by profit-seeking SOEs. Colombo’s application for Chinese funding was strongly encouraged by China Harbour Engineering Group (CHEG)’, which facilitated a $307 million commercial buyer’s credit from China Exim Bank for the first project phase (Jones and Hameiri, 2020: 14; see Brautigam, 2020). Importantly, the privatisation of Hambantota port was not the result of a debt-for-equity swap, as is often falsely reported. After a change in government, Sri Lanka rather leased the port for 99 years to China Merchants Port Holdings by means of a majority stake (70 per cent) in a joint venture with Sri Lanka’s port authority for an upfront payment of $1.12bn. [...] Ishak, N. (2022) Can Sri Lanka dig itself out of a $50 billion debt? A mountain of foreign debt has led the country to default on loans for the first time since its 1948 independence, Vox, www.vox.com/2022/4/30/23050242/sri-lanka-50-billion-debt-protests-loan-default-china-india-imf.