evidence: - Gradual encirclement and establishment of effective control over disputed island territories (viz., Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Spratly Islands, Macclesfield Bank features) [...] While specific PRC gray zone activities vary in each case and over time in long-running campaigns (see, for example the patterns of Chinese law enforcement activity in the territorial seas and contiguous zones around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, or episodic enforcement of hydrocarbon rights in southern tier of SCS against Malaysia and Indonesia but not Brunei),5 there is an overall unity to the approach across the whole region. Generally, Chinese gray zone campaigns establish localized PRC advantages that can be sustained over time without precipitating acute crisis. When these actions target American allies, Beijing has also used its campaigns to degrade alliance cohesion. Finally, the intensity and efficacy of PRC gray zone activity has increased over the past decade. Access to well-positioned operating bases at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Subi Reef allows China to employ the superior mass of their constabulary and fishing fleets and remain permanently on station in remote waters. Meanwhile, modernization and expansion of China’s coast guard enables PRC law enforcement across the East Asian littoral, creating the permissive conditions for regularized PRC presence in the disputed territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands as well as the far reaches of the SCS.