evidence: Hanoi has made no bones about its sense of unease regarding Beijing’s growing material might and in parallel, its increasing assertiveness. This is evident with China’s continued militarization of its artificial islands in the South China Sea at the same time it is putting up "smile diplomacy" outreach to ASEAN and calling for cooperation, including an agreement to begin formal negotiations on the proposed Code of Conduct. Vietnam’s concerns about the future of the disputes were further heightened after the ruling Chinese Communist Party proposed sweeping reforms to the Chinese Constitution, including the removal of clauses mandating that the president would serve no more than two terms in office – thus creating the prospect of Xi Jinping holding onto power for perpetuity. [...] It is most likely that Vietnam would receive support from multiple major powers in times of a war with China over the South China Sea flashpoint, but not direct military intervention, especially if Beijing elects to keep the clashes localized and well contained to avoid provoking an overwhelming international response. As such, Hanoi could expect those friendly extraregional powers to cheer for it, or at best offer diplomatic condemnation against Beijing, and possibly some form of materiel and technical aid for its fighting efforts. But not more than that.